University of Southern California Dissertations and Theses

Constraining stories: four narratives that limit options for U.S.-Cuba relations

(USC Thesis Other)

Constraining stories: four narratives that limit options for U.S.-Cuba relations

PDF

Download a page range

Download transcript

Copy asset link

Request this asset

Transcript (if available)

Content CONSTRAINING STORIES:
FOUR NARRATIVES THAT LIMIT OPTIONS FOR U.S.-CUBA RELATIONS

by

Melissa Rae Franke

A Dissertation Presented to the
FACULTY OF THE USC GRADUATE SCHOOL
UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA
In Partial Fulfillment of the
Requirements for the Degree
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
(COMMUNICATION)

December 2011

Copyright 2011 Melissa Rae Franke
ii

DEDICATION

To my parents, Ron and Jan Franke. Thank you for believing.

iii

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
Completion of this dissertation would not have been possible without the help,
support, encouragement, and pushing from many people. Your patience and belief that I
would finish have been a source of strength. Thank you to everyone who listened to me talk
about Cuba and everyone who provided helpful advice.
To my wonderful friends who went through the process and gave me invaluable
advice, you‘re fantastic and I can‘t thank you enough for bringing me back to reality. John
Kephart, Craig Hayden, Cyndy Willis-Chun, Carrie Anne Platt, you are all amazing people to
go through graduate school with. Thanks as well to the friends who were there for study
breaks, study sessions, encouraging chats, and celebration, especially Tania Lotia, Patrick
Linford, Brittany Henderson, Rob Layne, Glenn Prince, Jerae Bjelland. Kelly Ryan deserves
extra thanks for helping keep me on task when we had work days, for reading countless
footnotes, and for the sugar. I look forward to our great research plans!
Several Pacific Lutheran University students provided helpful feedback, assistance,
and sometimes distraction. Thanks to Teal Flannigan, Amanda Wilkins, Nicolette Paso, and
especially Justin Kjolseth. Thank you to my colleagues at Pacific Lutheran University for
your encouragement, gentle inquiries, and support. Thanks to Amanda Feller for the not as
gentle inquiries. Thanks to Ed Inch for believing as a foregone conclusion that I would
finish. Thanks especially to Michael Bartanen who spent time reading chapters and making
suggestions, helping me clarify my thinking.
My professors and advisors at University of Southern California have been incredible.
Thanks to Anne Marie Campian for your cheerful assistance, patient clarifications, and
iv

incredible effort in getting me done. Abe Lowenthal gave me a fantastic opportunity to delve
into policy issues about Cuba. Thanks for your feedback and a great class. Thanks to Steven
Lamy for your feedback on the dissertation and spending the time to serve on my committee.
I truly enjoyed talking with you and value the advice and suggestions. It has been an
absolute treat to get to work with Tom Goodnight over the last several years. Goodnight‘s
insights into argument and theory have been instrumental in shaping how I approach theory.
Thanks for the heart-warming kindness, the brilliant feedback, and your valuable time.
Tom Hollihan, my advisor and committee chair, has probably qualified for sainthood
by now for having the enormous amount of patience and understanding I needed in this
process. Classes with Tom illuminated ways of reading rhetoric in energizing ways. I
learned a lot about the process of rhetorical criticism, writing, and politics. Thank you so
much for your incredible and immediate feedback, for sticking with me during the writing
process, and for the fact that I always felt better about the world after going to talk to you. I
appreciate everything you put into this and I am grateful for the influence and impact you
have had on me.
Thank you to Robert Trapp and Judy Bowker for literally forcing me to finish writing
the dissertation. Your generosity is unbelievable. I appreciate your support and very
practical help and advice. Thanks for the time spent reading chapters, offering wonderful
feedback, and just helping me talk things out. Thank you making me see that it was possible
to finish.
v

Finally, Mom, Dad, and Chel. Thanks for giving me every kind of support
imaginable. Thanks for teaching me to look at the world more closely and for valuing
education so highly. Words cannot express how blessed and lucky I feel. Thank you.

vi

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Dedication ................................................................................................................................. ii

Acknowledgments.................................................................................................................... iii

Abstract .................................................................................................................................. viii

Chapter One: Introduction ........................................................................................................ 1
Reasons to Study the Rhetoric about Cuba ................................................................... 3
Studying Cuba Narratives ............................................................................................. 5
Theory/Critical Method .............................................................................................. 11
Elements of the Narrative about Cuba ........................................................................ 25
Review of U.S-Cuba Relations ................................................................................... 29

Chapter Two: Cuba as Posession of the United States ........................................................... 36
Cuba as a Potential State ............................................................................................. 36
Cuba as a Playground for Wealthy Americans ........................................................... 43
Cuba as an Unstable Government in Need of Assistance ........................................... 47

Chapter Three: Cuba as a Cold War Adversary ...................................................................... 73
Cuba as Lost ................................................................................................................ 73
Cuba as a Dangerous Communist Satellite 90 Miles Away ....................................... 81
Cuba as Engaging in Cold War Aggression ............................................................... 93

Chapter Four: Cuba as a Place from which to Escape ............................................................ 95
Confirming the Cold War story: First and Second Wave Migration .......................... 95
Confirming and Challenging the Cold War story:
The Mariel Boatlift and Scarface .............................................................................. 110
The Immigration Challenge: Balseros and the Need for the Cold War .................... 123
Elián Gonzalez and the Limits of the Cold War Frame ............................................ 135

vii

Chapter Five: Cuba as Ruled by an Anachronistic Tyrant ................................................... 140
The End of the Cold War and the Inevitability of Democracy ................................. 141
Cuba as an International Outlaw ............................................................................... 152
Cuba as Backward and Repressive ........................................................................... 157

Chapter Six: Conclusion ....................................................................................................... 185
Narratives of Cuba and Narrative Implications ........................................................ 186
Narrative Theory ....................................................................................................... 198
Narrative Suggestions ............................................................................................... 209
Current Openings ...................................................................................................... 214
Final Conclusions and Lessons ................................................................................. 220

Bibliography ......................................................................................................................... 225

viii

ABSTRACT
This dissertation examines the relationship between the United States and Cuba from the
perspective of political and cultural narratives about Cuba existing in the United States from
1823-2010. These narratives serve to explain and justify U.S. policy toward Cuba. Four
dominant narratives have been identified: Cuba as possession of the United States, Cuba as a
Cold War adversary, Cuba as a place from which to escape, and Cuba as led by an
anachronistic tyrant resisting the tide of democracy. These narratives have some overlaps
and some contradictions, but all have strong ties to the narrative in the United States about
the Cold War. Even though the Cold War is over, the explanatory power of the Cold War
narrative continues to exercise authority in U.S.-Cuba relations. In addition to explaining
U.S.-Cuba relations, narratives tied to the Cold War limit options for policy change. This
dissertation analyzes political and popular discourse to uncover the sources of these
narratives and how they remain so prominent in the United States. Understanding how these
narratives develop, function, and survive provides insight into how leaders might create
narratives that are more reflective of current political reality between the United States and
Cuba.
1

CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION
Over the past fifty years, the United States has maintained a hostile policy toward
Cuba, a small island nation state 90 miles southeast of Florida. The goal has been to weaken
or topple the regime dominated by Fidel Castro and later his brother Raul by crippling its
economy through trade restrictions and even an embargo. Embedded in the rhetoric used to
explain and justify these policies are long-standing and often-told narratives that have
characterized Cuba and its political leadership. These narratives are firmly fixed and feature
the language of the Cold War, even though the Cold War has been over for more than twenty
years. U.S. policy toward Cuba continues to be informed and limited by profoundly outdated
presumptions. These Cold War narratives have also constrained the possibilities for political
change.
The U.S. policies toward Cuba are thus firmly locked in the grip of the past, and U.S.
policy makers have come rely on discourse about Cuba that was generated decades ago.
Within this discourse, the powerful narratives have gained strength by virtue of the
momentous events from which they grew and also from their uninterrupted longevity. A new
narrative that can better explain U.S.-Cuba circumstances in the twenty-first century needs to
replace the old stories that otherwise will continue to drive U.S. policy.
Early signs from the Obama administration, including statements from President
Barack Obama himself and from Secretary of State Hilary Clinton, have hinted at a
willingness to change U.S. foreign policies toward Cuba. In an abrupt departure from the
direction taken by the U.S. for the last fifty years and, in particular, the direction taken by
2

George W. Bush in the last administration, Obama suggests he seeks not only conversation
with Cuba, but perhaps new ground rules for the relationship between the two nation states.
Successfully setting those new ground rules requires a thorough understanding of the
nature and function of the powerful stories that have, in the past, generated the context from
which previous policy decisions have been made. Insight into these old stories will provide
reasons and means for changing outdated and maladapted narratives into a new narrative
capable of fostering change. This historical moment of change following Barack Obama into
the presidency of the United States presents possibilities for creating that new narrative.
Toward that end, this dissertation investigates past narratives created in the United
States regarding Cuba, narratives that have driven government policy for decades. A review
of both political and popular discourse in the United States revealed that four different
narratives have developed to discuss Cuba. A narrative might replace a previous narrative or
overlap with one another without completely eclipsing a previous narrative. The first
narrative operated from 1823 until 1960 when it was replaced with a new narrative that
operated between 1960 and 1962. The third narrative emerged from and overlapped with the
second narrative. This third narrative dominated the discourse about Cuba between 1960 and
2000. The fourth narrative began in 1991 and continues through today. This dissertation
will explicate each of the four narratives to draw conclusions in the final chapter about the
influence of these narratives on policy and the possibilities for creating a new narrative. All
four narratives hover around issues and images of the Cold War, the imposing and
threatening story that has survived decades of recall and revision. The dissertation ends with
3

an analysis of why the Cold War story remains so influential twenty years after the end of the
Cold War and what this means for creating a new narrative.
Examining the origin, development, content, and inevitable expiration of these
narratives reveals their restrictive natures. Analysis of these narratives helps explain how the
U.S. government locks itself into particular policy choices, choices limited to the narrow
field of explanatory resources allowed in the narratives. The analysis also reveals the
exigence into which the Obama administration might design a new narrative to facilitate a
change in policy.
The first section of this chapter provides the grounds for an examination of the
rhetoric of U.S.-Cuba relations and justifies and explains the utility of a narrative approach to
this topic. The second discusses theories of how narratives function and clarifies the critical
method used to explicate the four major narratives within the U.S. discourse about Cuba.
The third provides the themes of the four major narratives detailed in the chapters to follow.
Finally, the fourth section discusses the history of the relations between the two states and
provides a context for the study.
Reasons to Study the Rhetoric about Cuba
For years after the end of the Cold War, the United States continued to maintain a
trade and travel embargo against Cuba. While the politics of the state of Florida may suffice
to explain the reluctance of presidential candidates to support a softer line toward Fidel
Castro or the nation of Cuba, there are several reasons to delve deeper into the strange case of
this maintenance of Cold War policies toward Cuba. Even if presidential candidates appear
to pander to the Cuban-American community in election years, such as when Clinton
4

supported the Cuban Democracy act in 1992, or when Obama changed his stance on the
Embargo between 2004 and 2007, the anti-Castro Cuban Americans in south Florida did not
have as much influence as these campaign tactics made it seem. For example, Wayne Smith
argued that the influence of the anti-Castro faction of the Cuban-American community on the
1992 election was overestimated, even by political leaders.
1
In 1996, President Clinton won
Florida‘s electoral votes despite Dole winning a majority of the Cuban-American vote.
2
Ann
Louise Bardach argues that in 2000, not recounting all counties of Florida cost Gore the
election, not the Cuban-American vote.
3
Additionally, Opensecrets.org, an organization that
tracks campaign contributions explains while influential, the Cuban-American lobby‘s
limited financial power met competition from agricultural business wanting to trade with
Cuba.
4
In 2008, President Obama won in the state of Florida even though he was calling for
change in Cuba policy. Explaining Cuba policy in terms of Florida only also ignores the
historical, cultural, and rhetorical forces that made the policy appear consistent with
American foreign policy goals.
The second reason to look deeper into U.S.-Cuba relations is that 2009 represents a
particularly critical juncture in U.S.-Cuba relations. People all around the world are looking
to President Obama to change Cuba policy. Regardless of which direction policy takes, Fidel
Castro is no longer in power and a Democrat won Florida while calling for change in Cuba
policy. Studying how Cuba policy has evolved and the ways in which rhetoric about Cuba

1
Smith, ―Our Cuba Diplomacy: A Critical Reexamination.‖
2
Dario Moreno, ―Exile Political Power,‖ 5.
3
Bardach, Cuba Confidential, 314.
4
Open Secrets, ―The Cuban Connection: Cuban American Money in U.S. Elections 1979-2000.‖
5

creates and reinforces the conditions for maintaining these policies will help us understand
what comes next in U.S.-Cuba relations.
Finally, the issue of U.S. policy toward Cuba merits attention and study because it
represents a flawed policy supported by an outdated narrative that once resonated with the
American public. Despite this residual resonance, the current policy is not supported by the
majority of the U.S. public, it is denounced by almost every country in the world, and it
seems to cater only to a small portion of the U.S. electorate in Florida. The policy has failed
to achieve the ouster of Castro and it has impoverished and alienated the Cuban people.
Some provisions of the policy, such as title III of the Helms-Burton Act, are so objectionable
they have never been implemented. Others, such as reducing family travel angered members
of the very community the policy was meant to appease.
5
The material consequence of the
narrative, the policy, reveals the disconnect between narrative and reality. Uncovering the
rhetorical and narrative resources keeping the policy in place provides a better explanation of
policy and the role of narratives in political discourse.
Studying Cuba Narratives
U.S. policy toward Cuba is a foreign policy, but it also serves a domestic function in
sending a message to the Cuban-American community about their role in U.S. political
culture. As such, to get a more complete picture of U.S.-Cuba relations, one must look into
the discourse about Cuba within the United States. Just as important as what policy makers
and analysts say about Cuba is the way that this discourse is fashioned by news reports and

5
President Obama reversed the policy limiting the number of times Cuban Americans can visit relatives in
Cuba in April 2009.
6

representations within popular culture. All of the official statements, news stories, images in
film and popular music play a part in how the public understands U.S. relations with Cuba.
These statements, stories, and representations portray characters, plot lines, settings, and
themes and create for the public narratives about U.S.-Cuba relations. This dissertation
examines these various texts of communication to identify elements the Cuban story. In that
it takes a narrative approach to the study of the discourse about Cuba, this study will offer
insights into several aspects of U.S.-Cuba relations that might not be apparent if the study
were focused only on official rhetoric or public policy discourse.
One of the biggest reasons to study narratives is because such analysis explains policy
and relations with Cuba in ways that a ―rational world‖ perspective cannot.
6
Narrative
analysis accounts for the seeming contradictions, problems, and incongruities in policy.
Looking at policy from this perspective explains the values, attitudes, hopes, and fears of the
public and how narratives sustain the conditions for current U.S. relations with Cuba.
Specifically the history of Cuba represented as a gambling playground makes the Cold War
with Cuba much more important. It helps us understand the different rhetorical choices made
by U.S. leaders during the Elián Gonzalez event.
7
Perhaps most importantly, a narrative

6
Walter Fisher‘s on the narrative paradigm contrasts the rational world paradigm with the narrative paradigm.
This distinction looks at the rational world, where the paradigmatic form of communication is argument
compared to the narrative paradigm, where the paradigmatic form of communication is storytelling. Fisher
argues that people make everyday decisions based on ―good reasons‖ found in stories, rather than proceeding
along the lines of formal argumentation. Fisher, Human Communication as Narration.
7
In November 1999, some fishers off the coast of Florida found a 5 year-old Cuban boy floating on an inner
tube. Elian Gonzalez‘s mother and most of their fellow travelers had perished on the journey from Cuba. The
subsequent controversy over Elián‘s fate turned into a media spectacle until he was returned to live with his
father in Cuba in April 2000.
7

analysis may help answer the question, ―why does the United States still have an embargo on
Cuba?‖
Second, explanations about foreign policy are limited by what the public has come to
accept. The logic of the narrative is what provides the boundaries for this acceptance. By
examining the sources and background of the narratives about Cuba that are accepted by the
public, we can better understand the explanations leaders offer for policies toward Cuba.
This also helps us understand what is not being said.
Third, nostalgia permeates discourse about Cuba. This nostalgia saturates narratives
and gives a clearer picture of the role that the past plays in current discourse and policies.
Looking at the narratives of Cuba, specifically, the narrative of Cuba as U.S. possession
helps us to understand the reasons for public nostalgia in storytelling about Cuba.
Fourth, since few Americans have had the experience of visiting Cuba, it is a nation
state that is known only through stories. There has not been a steady stream of recent events
to report. Even during a particular event, the specific details recede and the narrative theme
is what remains with the public. In the case of the specifics of the different periods and
events of immigration, the American public retains that the U.S. welcomes people who are
not free in their own homeland. The specific details of demographics, causes, and effects of
each migration eventually fade in public memory. Not only do the explanations of policy
take on a narrative character, but policies themselves contain narratives and follow the logic
of the accepted narrative of the time. The Helms-Burton act has characters written into it and
references to past events. Both Fidel and Raul Castro are characterized as unacceptable
8

leaders of a Cuba that the United States could normalize relations with in the text of the
Helms-Burton Act.
Finally, studying discourses surrounding U.S. policy toward Cuba will also lend
insight into larger issues, such as pervasive problems with U.S. foreign policy rhetoric
including the trend toward demonization and personalization in foreign policy discourse as
well as the rhetorical inability to end failed policy. From focusing on Saddam Hussein to the
exclusion of security and exit strategies in Iraq to refusing to end an inactive stance on
genocides in Africa, many of the problems with U.S. foreign policy are born in the gap
between wise and practical policy and the explanations used to persuade the public. Cuba
represents a long-standing, yet current example of some of the most dangerous shortcomings
in U.S. foreign policy rhetoric. Studying Cuba may contribute to a clearer understanding the
relationships among narratives, argument, and policy. Learning to become better storytellers
and advocates can help bridge the gap between complex policy and public discourse about it,
leading to more robust public debate and better policymaking.
Castro‘s age has prompted much writing about what will happen when he departs the
scene. American Enterprise Institute scholar Mark Falcoff explores the post-Castro
possibilities in his 2003 Cuba the Morning After: Confronting Castro’s Legacy.
8
Brian
Latell brings the lower-profile Raul Castro, Fidel‘s brother, into the spotlight in After Fidel:
The Inside Story of Castro’s Regime and Cuba’s Next Leader.
9
The Rand Institute‘s 2004
Study Cuba after Castro: Legacies, Challenges, and Impediments by Edward Gonzalez and

8
Falcoff, Cuba the Morning After.
9
Latell, After Fidel.
9

Kevin F. McCarthy examines the demographics, economics, and politics to determine what
Castro‘s long-term impact will be and the paths available to Cuba once he is gone. In
addition to works tackling the question of ―where will Cuba go after Castro?‖ work has also
begun on the concern for national reconciliation. A report by the Task Force on Memory,
Truth, and Justice was published in 2003.
10
In the policy realm, the Bush administration‘s
Commission for Assistance to a Free Cuba has taken the anticipated end of Castro‘s rule as
the impetus for a myriad of new policy suggestions and a renewed push in the fight against
Castro. Even as Fidel Castro has stepped down from power, his behind the scenes influence
still prompts speculation among journalists.
11

Several authors have taken on the subject of discourse about Cuba in the United
States, but have focused on a particular time period or have only studied press coverage of
Cuba. Richard E. Welch, Jr. takes one of the more comprehensive looks at the various sites
of discourse about Cuba in the form of responses to the revolution. In his 1985 book
Response to Revolution, he examines the reactions of the political right, the left, the ―campus
and coffeehouse,‖ and the press from 1959 to 1961.
12

Welch‘s work looks at press coverage and other responses to the Cuban revolution in
the first years of the revolution. In The Selling of Fidel Castro: The Media and the Cuban

10
Gonzalez and McCarthy, Cuba After Castro.
11
In April 2009, Raul Castro offered to engage in talks with the United States while a few days later, Fidel
wrote an article in the Cuban national paper insisting that his brother had been misunderstood. The Salt Lake
Tribune noted, ―Fidel Castro‘s latest comments about last weekend‘s 34-country Summit of the Americas seem
to support a growing theory among U.S. and Latin American leaders – that there is a split between Cuban leader
Raul Castro and his nominally retired brother Fidel.‖ Salt Lake Tribune, ―Cuban Power Struggle May Doom
Obama‘s Overtures.‖
12
Welch, Response to Revolution.
10

Revolution, Ratliff‘s edited volume presents essays about the early New York Times coverage
of the Cuban revolution, the press in Cuba, and the European press coverage of Cuba. Most
relevant to this study are ―The New York Times and the Cuban Revolution‖ and ―Fidel Castro
and the U.S. press.‖ These essays, coming from a 1984 conference on the press and the
Cuban revolution sponsored by the Cuban American National Foundation explain that the
U.S. press, especially the New York Times was instrumental in the success of the Cuban
revolution.
13
Thomas Patterson‘s Contesting Castro shares this perspective arguing that the
New York Times articles by Herbert Matthews provided publicity about the survival of
Castro‘s revolutionary movement when Cuban media were reporting that the rebellion had
been all but crushed. Patterson also argues that Matthews‘s articles portrayed Castro as a
folk hero for a noble cause. ―No doubt Matthews‘s work shaped anti-Batista opinion in the
United States and thus satisfied Castro‘s aim of rolling back U.S. support for the regime.‖
14

On the other hand, Welch argues that the ―initial lack of apprehension‖ about radicalization
of the revolution and favorable impression of the revolutionaries was not just because of the
Matthews‘s articles, but was instead a reflection of ―the unspoken assumption that Cuba was
irrevocably a part of the geographic sphere of influence of the United States,‖ and was
dependent upon the U.S. for security and economic strength.
15
This dissertation argues that
the dominant narratives of the relationship between Cuba and the United States constrain the
options for policy, this stage wherein presumptions about the evil of communism and the

13
Ratliff, The Selling of Fidel Castro.
14
Patterson, Contesting Castro, 79
15
Welch, Response to Revolution, 161-62.
11

assumption that Cuba couldn‘t possibly go against the United States is a pivotal turning point
in the story about Cuba.
Soderlund, Wagenberg, and Surlin compare news coverage of Cuba in the United
States and Canada between the years 1988 and 1992, at the end of the Cold War. They
conclude that the end of the Cold War had little impact on the way that Cuba was portrayed
in the news media in either country.
16
As the framework for the relationship between the
U.S. and its communist adversaries disappeared, the media continued to use the Cold War
framework for depicting the relationship between the U.S. and Cuba. In Soderlund‘s 2003
study of the coverage of President Carter‘s 2002 visit to Cuba, he notes that coverage of
events since 1992 have also depicted Cuba, and specifically Castro in a negative light (85%
of stories were negative in 1994 and 1996).
17

Theory/Critical Method
Foreign policy discourse
One of the keys to understanding how narratives about Cuba function in the United
States is an awareness of how American politicians, policy makers, and public discuss
foreign policy. Studies of foreign policy rhetoric have shown multiple ways in which this
discourse works in the U.S.
18
Thomas Hollihan, in his study of the debates over the Panama

16
Soderlund, Wagenberg, and Surlin, ―The Impact of the End of the Cold War.‖
17
Soderlund, ―U.S. Television Network News Coverage,‖ 5.
18
In addition to rhetorical studies, the field of International Relations also examines the role of culture in
foreign policy discourse and decision making. In Valerie Hudson‘s Culture and Foreign Policy, she proposes a
research agenda for International Relations and Foreign Policy Analysis that considers culture as a factor in
foreign policy decision making. Hudson‘s volume includes essays by Hellmut Lotz, which claims that Al Gore
recast NAFTA as an extension of the American dream, influencing public opinion on the trade agreement.
(Hudson, Culture and Foreign Policy.)
12

Canal treaties in 1977, argued that foreign policy rhetoric is best conceived as a drama.
Hollihan identified three different dramas, or stories, that dominated the debates over the
Panama Canal treaties. Advocates explained their positions in the context of the Cold War
drama, the New World Order drama, or the Power Politics drama. While the world has
changed a great deal since the Panama Canal treaties were ratified; the U.S. relationship with
Cuba remains largely unchanged, and thus looking at Cold War foreign policy dramas retains
particular relevance. In examining the stories about Cuba in the United States, Hollihan‘s
explanation of foreign policy discourse as drama provides important insights.
Foreign policy dramas situate events by providing credible historical accounts and
visions of the future. The dramatic form must account for the behaviors of the actors,
and their motives must flow from their dramatic roles…To win and sustain support,
rhetorical dramas must be consistent and must corroborate people‘s beliefs and
expectations regarding the fulfillment of dramatic form. If a particular drama does
not have the capacity (perhaps the better term is elasticity) to explain events
consistently and to correspond to people‘s understanding of those events, it is
unlikely that it will maintain support.
19

Hollihan concludes that the power politics drama became the most persuasive explanation of
the situation with Panama. Despite Hollihan‘s argument that the Cold War drama failed to
persuade the majority of the public because of the dangerous implications of Cold War
rhetoric (such as nuclear conflict), I argue that in the case of Cuba, a Cold War explanation
remains the dominant story about Cuba. The Cuban Missile Crisis transformed Cuba into a
dangerously prominent setting for Cold War drama, creating long-lasting associations of
Cuba and the Cold War. The Cold War drama also remains the most compelling and

19
Hollihan, ―The Public Controversy over the Panama Canal Treaties,‖ 379.
13

relevant explanation because Kennedy realized the risks of the Cold War and adopted a less
rigid brand of Cold War Rhetoric.
20

Philip Wander details two types of discourse found in the foreign policy rhetoric of
the Cold War. The first type of discourse, which he discovers in the rhetoric of President
Dwight Eisenhower and Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, he calls ―prophetic dualism.‖
He defines prophetic dualism as a rhetorical form that characterizes the U.S. as morally and
spiritually superior, and those against the U.S. as evil.
In its perfected form prophetic dualism divides the world into two camps. Between
them there is conflict. One side acts in accord with all that is good, decent, and at one
with God‘s will. The other acts in direct opposition. Conflict between them is
resolved only through the total victory of one side over the other. Since no guarantee
exists that goodwill triumphs, there is no middle ground.
21

Drawing upon the religious tone set during the First and Second World Wars, the
Republican Party cultivated a style of patriotic, moral, religious discourse, especially in the
anti-communism movement headed by McCarthy.
22
Eisenhower and Dulles used this
discourse to generate support for the foreign policy decisions they announced by garnering
absolute support for the United States. Speaking before the American Bar Association in
1955, Eisenhower highlighted the United States as the good in the fight between good and
evil.
On the one side, our Nation is ranged with those who seek attainment of human goals
through a government of laws administered by men. Those laws are rooted in moral

20
Wander, ―American Foreign Policy Rhetoric,‖ 164-6.
21
Ibid., 157.
22
Ibid., 158.
14

law reflecting a religious faith that man is created in the image of God and that the
energy of the free individual is the most dynamic force in human affairs.
23

Dulles claimed, ―The reality of the matter is that the United States, by every standard
of measurement, is the world‘s greatest power not only materially but spiritually.‖
24
This
rhetoric, along with the characterization of the enemy as the Communist menace, evil, and
godless, calls for ―overwhelming support – a response appropriate to the world‘s greatest
spiritual power.‖
25

In contrast to prophetic dualism, Wander described the second form of discourse in
American foreign policy rhetoric as ―technocratic realism.‖ Wander argued that technocratic
realism, which was heavily used by President John F. Kennedy, was characterized by the
possibility of negotiation, vigorous competition, and reliance on the expert or technocrat.
26

Growing out of the progressive movement, reliance on expertise formed the basis of
technocratic realism and was a response to the religious, dualistic, Holy War discourse of the
Republicans. Instead of discussing the world as two morally opposed camps, technocratic
realism recognizes that similarities and common interests can make compromise possible.
As John F. Kennedy stated on June 10, 1963 in a speech at American University, ―our most
basic common link is that all inhabit this planet. We all breathe the same air. We all cherish
our children‘s future. And we are all mortal.‖
27
Kennedy‘s movement way from the

23
Quoted in Wander, ―American Foreign Policy Rhetoric,‖ 159.
24
Quoted in Wander, ―American Foreign Policy Rhetoric,‖ 160.
25
Wander, ―American Foreign Policy Rhetoric,‖ 160.
26
Ibid., 165.
27
Quoted in Wander, ―American Foreign Policy Rhetoric,‖ 165.
15

dualities within the discourse of the previous administration required some assurance that
American interests would continue to be protected in international relations. The experts
make foreign policy decisions based on carefully considered cost benefit analysis and
looking toward American interests, rather than on principle or morality.
28
Technocratic
realism moves away from religion and morality, as it argues that the problems in this world
are too complex for religion and casting the world as simply good versus evil.
29
This
complexity also leads to the view that ordinary people will not understand the technical
issues and data needed to make foreign policy decisions, and thus, has the same advantage of
the discourse of prophetic dualism, in that it limits public debate.
30

Because the post-Cold War relationship with Cuba, although explained by a Cold
War narrative and locked largely in Cold War-era policies, occurs in a post-Cold War world,
looking at how foreign policy rhetoric has evolved since the collapse of the Soviet Union
becomes important to understanding the surrounding rhetorical context as well as discursive
possibilities. Kathryn Olson‘s study of Clinton‘s democracy enlargement rhetoric provides a
post-Cold War rhetorical form worth examining, as democracy enlargement serves as a way
to update the language of a remaining Cold War relationship with Cuba while retaining the
narrative.
31
Robert Ivie‘s discussion of the theory of democratic peace (Ivie claims that
democracies do not go to war with one another) illustrates another way that Clinton‘s rhetoric

28
Wander, ―American Foreign Policy Rhetoric,‖ 165-66.
29
Ibid.
30
Ibid., 167-8.
31
Olson, ―Democratic Enlargement‘s Value Hierarchy.‖
16

of democracy resurrects the narrative of the Cold War.
32
Unfortunately, for political reasons,
Clinton did not extend this rhetoric to Cuba. Chapter five will explore the reasons that
Clinton did not seize the opportunity for rhetorical reconstruction of the world and the
opportunity to recast the place of Cuba within that world.
Narrative
Rhetorical theories of narrative and argumentation contribute to the theoretical
perspective of this dissertation. The critical methodology employed to examine Cuba
discourse and policy comes from narrative rhetorical criticism
Because of the nature of foreign policy discourse, the ways people understand and
contextualize information, and the form of news reporting that dominates political coverage,
it is important to look to theories of narrative within rhetoric and politics to understand
rhetoric about Cuba. In analyzing the narratives in public discourse, Walter Fisher suggests
that critics look to narrative rationality, which is made up of the narrative probability and the
narrative fidelity of a story. Narrative probability has to do with the form of the story and its
internal coherence. Does the narrative display the typical qualities of a story? Does it have a
beginning, middle, and an end? Do heroes behave like heroes and villains like villains? Is
the story internally coherent? Do characters behave consistently throughout the story?
Narrative fidelity has to do with the content of the story with respect to the content of other
stories and information the audience has. Does this story line up with evidence the audience
has access to or with other stories they have heard? Are the details consistent with details of
other stories? Fisher says that audiences accept information using narrative rationality and

32
Ivie, ―A New Democratic World Order,‖ 252.
17

these are the criteria they implicitly employ when evaluating narratives. We can better
understand why Bush‘s narrative continues to hold such wide acceptance by looking to its
narrative probability and narrative fidelity.
In addition to the criteria employed in narrative rationality, W. Lance Bennett and
Murray Edelman offer explanations about political narratives that can help us better
understand the success of Bush‘s narrative. In their 1985 article ―Toward a New Political
Narrative,‖ Bennett and Edelman explain how recurring news stories serve to disguise
ideologies as social truth.
33
Their article is full of insights about narratives in political news,
but I will focus on just a few. First, Bennett and Edelman explain that political narratives
rely upon the same standard plots to explain the world. These plots highlight the struggle of
defending the good life against foes such as the deceitful communists, the lazy poor, or the
immoral criminals.
34
While the narratives never get us any closer to solving the problems of
the narrative, they seem to portray constant change, and therefore, constant hope.
35
A story
can do this through presenting victories in individual episodes of struggle that ultimately do
not measurably change the world.
Second, Bennett and Edelman note that
contested issues in politics are quickly simplified and cast in mutually exclusive
ideological terms. People become so accustomed to ideological formulations
disguised and embedded in standard narratives that the ‗either-or‘ poles of political
debate seem natural and adequate characterizations of reality.
36

33
Bennett and Edelman, ―Toward a New Political Narrative,‖ 156.
34
Ibid., 156.
35
Ibid., 161.
36
Ibid., 158-9.
18

Casting narratives in such a way removes the complexity from political issues. Narratives
are set up to force people to choose one side or the other.
Finally, Bennett and Edelman offer some characteristic of narrative credibility and
explain that frequently storytellers will provide selective documentation and fragmentary plot
outlines and let the audience fill in the blanks from what they already know.
37
This process
illustrates how a storyteller makes use of Fisher‘s narrative rationality. Counting on an
audience‘s sense of narrative probability and narrative fidelity relies upon, as Bennett and
Edelman put it, ―the impression that ‗the same old story‘ is, despite its repetitive nature, the
most adequate account of the situation.‖
38
New details give life to the stock narrative,
reinforcing its explanatory power, while capturing the new facts of the story in a well-known
coherence. When the narrator presents only those facts that support the story, of course the
explanation has fidelity with the documentary evidence. Further, the narrative itself,
especially because the audience supplies it in full, serves to limit the facts to which the
audience pays attention.
Michael Schudson, in his chapter ―The Politics of Narrative Form,‖ explains that
news stories give readers instructions on what content to attend to, but also how to attend to
it. The nature of narrative in news is that it contextualizes the event within American
political life.
39
Schudson suggests that
the power of the media lies not only (and not even primarily) in its power to declare
things as true, but in its power to provide the forms in which the declarations appear.

37
Ibid., 162-3.
38
Ibid., 163.
39
Schudson, The Power of News, 70.
19

News in a newspaper or on television has a relationship to the ―real world,‖ not only
in content but in form; that is, in the way the world is incorporated into unquestioned
and unnoticed conventions of narration, and then transfigured, no longer a subject for
discussion but a premise of any conversation at all.
40

Not only, then, do news stories rely on stock narratives, but the very fact of being a story
means that audiences attend to the events in ways already contextualized within other stories.
This contextualization seems natural, and, as this dissertation argues later, hegemonic,
crowding out other possible contextualizations.
This study will examine narratives in the context of public policy justifications.
Theories concerning presumption and burden of proof from the field of argumentation assist
in framing disagreements within policy discussions as positions competing for adherence.
This competition involves a perspective that has presumption with an audience, and one that
must uphold a burden of proof if it is to succeed. I first look to the way that these notions are
most commonly employed – in a courtroom or debate context, and to Richard Whately‘s
explanation of presumption and burden of proof in his work Elements of Rhetoric.
The common understanding of presumption and burden of proof can be best
summarized in the line ―innocent until proven guilty.‖ This phrase boils down the
convention of placing the burden of proof on the prosecution in a criminal trial. This means
that until the prosecution has presented a case that overcomes the reasonable doubt of those
making the decision (the jury, in most cases), the accused is presumed innocent. Once the
prosecution has presented a case that overcomes reasonable doubt, they have fulfilled their
burden of proof and the defense no longer has presumption, but the burden of rejoinder. In

40
Ibid., 54.
20

academic debate, the convention is similar. Thomas Hollihan and Kevin Baaske discuss the
narrative demands of courtroom argument in their book Arguments and Arguing. They argue
that because a human, non-expert jury makes decisions about competing arguments in the
courtroom, and because human decision makers rely upon stories to do this, arguments in the
courtroom take the form of narratives.
41
They further note that prosecutors and plaintiffs
have the burden of proof, and as such, must present a compelling story to the jury. It is best
for the defense if they also present a unified story to compel the jury.
42
According to
Hollihan and Baaske, then, part of the burden of proof in the courtroom is a complete story
that accounts for the facts of the case. Similarly, narratives about foreign policy must
account for the facts of the situation. Once a public has a story that adequately explains a
situation, they are reluctant to abandon this story unless they have a story that more
completely accounts for the facts of that situation. Hollihan and Baaske explain that jurors
seek a rival story from the defense. A defense attorney who depends on pointing out
weaknesses in the opponent‘s case rather than presenting a story of his or her case risks
jurors finding for the plaintiff or prosecution because they cannot identify such a story.
43
A
defense can more successfully uphold their burden of rejoinder by presenting a complete
counter narrative.
In the courtroom, those on the side of the defense have presumption. The structure of
the legal system apportions presumption and burden of proof based on rules. In academic

41
Hollihan and Baaske, Arguments and Arguing, 198.
42
Ibid., 199.
43
Ibid., 199.
21

debate, the proposition divides ground and assigns presumption to those defending the status
quo. In both cases, presumption is enjoyed artificially. Richard Whately‘s writings on
presumption and burden of proof indicate that presumption occurs more naturally based on
strength, possession, and logic.
44
Whately lays out the definition stating,
a presumption in favor of any supposition, means, not (as has been sometimes
erroneously imagined) a preponderance of probability in its favor, but, such a
preoccupation of the ground, as implies that it must stand good till some sufficient
reason is adduced against it.
45

Therefore, while presumption and burden of proof do function in some contexts as a result of
assignment by conventions or rules and in other situations by the nature of the debate or
controversy, in many situations, members of the audience will perceive with whom
presumptions lies based upon their own knowledge, beliefs, information, and allegiances.
Similarly, G. Thomas Goodnight outlines a theory of political presumption in his
essay ―The Liberal and the Conservative Presumptions,‖ grounding presumption in
individual and community assessment of the risk involved in deciding a course of action in
public deliberation. Presumption, rather than assigned by institutions, residing with the
status quo, or situated in the values and beliefs of ―the audience,‖ comes from the way
individuals assess the risk of remaining stagnant (the liberal presumption) or of making
unnecessary or harmful change (the conservative presumption).
46
For Goodnight,
determining where presumption lies is the beginning and the end of public argument.
47

44
Whately, ―Excerpts from Elements of Rhetoric,‖ 847-8.
45
Ibid., 846-7.
46
Goodnight, ―The Liberal and the Conservative Presumptions,‖ 311-314, 316, 319-325.
47
Ibid., 316.
22

Presumption in deliberations about Cuba policy could lie with either those who argue the
U.S. should maintain a policy of isolation, or with those who argue that the time has come to
change policy, depending on how the argument proceeds and how the individuals in the
debate construct and evaluate risk.
This dissertation argues that narratives can enjoy a ―preoccupation of the ground‖ and
require another coherent seemingly true narrative to displace these presumptive narratives.
Because the rivalry of discourses about Cuba occurs in a narrative form, I will look to the
ways in which presumption and burden of proof function differently in these public policy
discussions and how attention must be paid to the narrative burden of proof that must be
overcome by those attempting to challenge it.
Another aspect of narrative discourse is hegemony. Narratives are an inherently
hegemonic form of discourse. In their work Hegemony and Socialist Strategy, Laclau and
Mouffe define hegemony as a type of political relation emerging through the process of
articulation in a field of antagonisms.
48
They explain articulation as ―a practice establishing
a relation among elements such that their identity is modified as a result of the articulatory
practice.‖
49
Articulation is a discursive practice whereby a relationship is constructed among
elements through linking them together. This linking of elements (people, countries,
institutions, and concepts) changes the way that all elements in the relationship are seen.
They are talked about differently after they are articulated to one another, as they are
discussed in terms of their relationship, as opposed to the identity held outside of this

48
Laclau and Mouffe, Hegemony and Socialist Strategy, 134, 139.
49
Ibid., 105.
23

relationship. For example, the articulation of Castro as the tyrannical dictator of Cuba links
the man Fidel Castro to the notions of tyranny and dictator, which are linked to Cuba. The
identities of all of these elements are constructed through their relationship to one another.
In order for articulations to be hegemonic, they must occur in a field of antagonisms.
Antagonisms, for Laclau and Mouffe are limits to the closure and objectivity of the
articulation. This means that the linkages of elements are not necessary linkages. The cases
in which the articulation does not hold true constitute antagonisms. If it is possible for the
elements to have been understood in a different way or linked in different or contrary ways,
the articulation is in a field of antagonisms and therefore, meets Laclau and Mouffe‘s
definition of the hegemonic. Castro, for example, could be considered a benevolent leader
by those who benefit from the education and literacy programs in Cuba. This is a case in
which the articulation does not apply, and so is a limit to the articulation. It shows that the
relationships among Cuba, Castro, and tyrant are not necessary relationships and are
constructed discursively. Thus, the articulation is operating in a terrain of antagonisms and is
hegemonic.
Hegemony does not operate in a dominating, forceful way, obliging people to accept
a certain view of the world. Hegemony works by representing an ongoing situation as if
there isn‘t another way to look at the world. Only hearing one side of the story, or hearing
another side of the story presented ridiculously helps entrench a particular view of the world
as necessary, if not desirable. One of the ways hegemonic narratives are both entrenched and
revealed is through popular culture. Portrayals of Cuba in fiction, films, and television
illustrate how creators of entertainment envision public understanding of Cuba. In fact, one
24

of the ways that hegemonic narratives make their way to the non-foreign policy public is
through representations in popular culture.
Critical Method
This dissertation employs a critical method of narrative analysis. Examining
speeches, news reports, and popular film, television, and travel magazines, I identify the
dominant narrative themes articulated throughout political and popular culture. Dominant
themes emerge from repetition, key phrases that resonate with the public, and the cumulative
effect of a combination of discourses circulating about an issue. These themes become
clearer in looking at the portrayal of events and the representation of characters within the
stories about those events. Within each dominant narrative, component elements appear.
Each component situates the narrative about Cuba in a specific context. I examine these
components by looking at key moments in the history of U.S.-Cuba relations. A series of
snapshots captures the significant occasions for the creation and solidification of the
narratives about Cuba.
Just as important as the narratives and elements of the narrative are the sources of the
stories. The narrative about Cuba naturally belonging to the United States appears in letters
and diary entries of early leaders of the United States. These sources provide a glimpse into
the thinking of U.S. government officials at the time. Speeches by U.S. presidents and
officials of the government articulate a picture of what the U.S. government wants the public
to take away from a particular situation. The sources for explaining how the public viewed
the United States‘ relationship with Cuba before the revolution include travel magazines
encouraging U.S. citizens to explore the historical sites of significance to the U.S., informing
25

readers where to find the hottest dance shows, and explaining how to get to Cuba by car.
Popular news coverage of a variety of events, including fighting during the Cuban revolution,
waves of immigration from Cuba, and the shooting down of the Brothers to the Rescue plane
in 1996 shows us what the U.S. public learned at the time of the events. Feature films such
as Scarface, Havana, The Perez Family, and The Godfather Part II illustrate the dramatic
nature of the moments in U.S.-Cuba relations and what publics learn long after an event is
over. A combination of many different types of sources builds the narratives about Cuba.
Finally, I inquire as to how the narratives influenced policy. In some cases, the
narratives affect the policy directly and appear in the policies themselves, such as with the
Platt Amendment and the Helms-Burton Act. In other cases, the narrative has a dominant
effect on the public‘s attitude about Cuba, directing policy choices for decades, as in the case
of the story about the Cuban Missile Crisis. Examining how the narratives influence policy
illustrates the significance of these narratives and the potential need for change in
characterizations of Cuba.
Elements of the Narrative about Cuba
Based on examination of the discourse about Cuba, four dominant narratives stand
out. All four of these narratives relate to the Cold War relationship between the U.S. and
Cuba. The four stories overlap, mutually reinforce one another, and at times, appear
contradictory. The chapters of this dissertation will examine each dominant narrative in turn.
The first narrative is the story of Cuba belonging to the United States, as a child or
little sibling. This narrative runs from the mid-1800s through 1960 and determines the
reaction of the U.S. to the radicalization of the Cuban revolution and the establishment of a
26

relationship between Cuba and the Soviet Union. When this radicalization occurs, the
second narrative, the story of Cuba becoming a Cold War adversary of the United States
eclipses the previous notion that the U.S. possessed Cuba. Understanding the first theme is
critical to understanding how the second theme had such visceral power within the United
States. The Cold War narrative about Cuba begins in 1960 and hasn‘t really ended. The
third narrative functions as a result of the Cold War narrative, that of Cuba as a place from
which to escape. With hundreds of thousands of people leaving Cuba for the United States,
the narrative about Cuban migration draws upon and reinforces the Cold War narrative. The
narrative of Cuba as a place from which to escape begins with the Cuban revolution in 1959
and runs until the Elián Gonzalez saga in 2000. The fourth narrative about Cuba carries the
Cold War story into the post-Cold War years, that of Cuba and Castro as anachronistic
demons of the Post-Cold War world. This story begins in 1991 with the collapse of the
Soviet Union and runs through the end of the George W. Bush administration in 2008.
Chapter 2 explores the Cuba as U.S. possession narrative. This narrative includes
the element of aiming to include Cuba as a state in the United States. The sources of this
narrative include letters and diary entries of leaders in the mid-1800s. The story of wanting
to include Cuba as part of the United States prompted U.S. leaders to enter the Spanish-
American War and draft the Platt Amendment. The second element of the Cuba as
possession narrative is Cuba as playground to wealthy U.S. citizens. Popular travel
magazines constitute the primary source of this narrative element. The Cuba as playground
notion led to U.S. support for corrupt leaders and significant American business investment.
Havana as a city of sin is the third element of the story and comes from popular travel
27

magazines and news accounts of activities in Havana. The films The Godfather Part II and
Havana contribute to the picture of Havana‘s vices. Similar to Cuba as a travel destination,
the story of Havana as a city of sin caused tacit support of corruption and American
investment in mafia-run casinos. The final element of Cuba as possession is that Cuba is
unable to rule itself. This story comes from the variety of news reports about violence,
rebellions, and corruption as well as depictions of this instability in films like Cuba and
Havana. Cuba as unable to rule itself functions as a reason that Cuba belongs to the U.S. and
prompts policies such as the Platt Amendment and actions such as waiting around for Fidel
Castro to fall out of power.
Chapter 3 explicates the narrative of Cuba as Cold War adversary of the United
States. The first element of this narrative is the ―loss‖ of Cuba to the Communists. This
story comes primarily from John F. Kennedy‘s 1960 presidential campaign rhetoric and the
discourse surrounding the Bay of Pigs Invasion. This narrative affected policy in that
Kennedy gave the green light to the Bay of Pigs Invasion. The second narrative element is
that Cuba was a dangerous Communist satellite 90 miles from the U.S. This narrative
element grows from the Cuban Missile Crisis, the story after the Crisis that remained with the
U.S. public, and Cuba‘s military ventures in Latin America and Africa. Increasing
restrictions of the embargo and all future Cold War policies resulted from this narrative.
Chapter 4 details the narrative of Cuba as a place from which to escape. The first
element of the story is that the first and second waves of migration establish a Cold War
frame for understanding Cuban migration. The sources for this element include speeches and
press conferences by Presidents Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson, news coverage of
28

Cuban exiles and migration, and memoirs of arriving in the U.S. The first and second wave
of migration had profound effects on policies, including a 1965 immigration bill and the
1966 Cuban Adjustment Act. The second element of the Cuba as a place from which to
escape narrative is that the third wave of migration of 1980 challenged the Cold War
explanation with the Scarface narrative. Ultimately, the Scarface narrative failed to displace
the Cold War frame for understanding migration. The sources for this story include speeches
by President Carter, the films Scarface and The Perez Family, and news coverage of the
Mariel Boatlift. The effect of the Mariel crisis on policy included an agreement with Cuba to
end the crisis and heavy criticism of President Carter. The third element of this narrative is
that the fourth wave of migration, the balseros crisis challenged the Cold War narrative with
the boat people/immigration narrative, but that eventually political needs had the Cold War
frame win out. The sources for this story include speeches by President Clinton and news
coverage of the balseros crisis. The effect on policy was the reversal of the longstanding
Cuban Adjustment Act and the institution of the Wet Foot/Dry Foot policy. The fourth
element of the narrative is that the Elián Gonzalez case strained the Cold War narrative to the
breaking point. The story about Elián Gonzalez and the new frame of family drama comes
from news coverage of the story and rhetoric by the Clinton administration. The result of the
story was sending Elián back to Cuba rather than allowing him to stay in the United States.
Chapter 5 looks at the narrative of Cuba as led by an anachronistic tyrant resisting the
tide of democracy. This narrative is a modification of the telling of the Cold War narrative
and makes use of the structures of the Cold War narrative. The first element of this story is
the inevitability of democracy in Cuba at the end of the Cold War. This narrative comes
29

from the speeches of President H.W. Bush and the news coverage of the end of the Cold War
and the passage of the Cuban Democracy Act. The effect this had on policy was the passage
of the Cuban Democracy Act. The second element of this story is Cuba as an international
outlaw. Speeches by President Clinton, news coverage of Cuba shooting down the Brothers
to the Rescue plane, and news coverage of the passage of the Helms-Burton Act form the
basis of this narrative. Passage of the Helms-Burton Act was the direct consequence of this
part of the story. The third element of this narrative is that Cuba is backward and repressive
and that the U.S. government and the Cuban people should look forward to a free Cuba of the
future. This story appears in speeches by President George W. Bush, statements by his
administration, and speeches by Senator John Kerry in the 2004 election, and news coverage
of Cuba. This story led to the development of the Commission for Assistance to a Free Cuba
in 2004 and 2006.
Review of U.S-Cuba Relations
In order to understand the story in the United States about Cuba, one must understand
the history of relations between Cuba and the United States. Louis A. Perez‘s book Cuba
and the United States: Ties of Singular Intimacy addresses the long-standing relationship that
the United States has had with Cuba. Long before Castro‘s revolution made Cuba the nearest
Cold War adversary, Cuba and the United States had a history marked by hegemony,
antagonism, and dependence. Colonial history, geography, and economics made relations
seem ―destined from the beginning to be close and complicated.‖
50
Richard Gott‘s Cuba: A
New History explains the process of colonization in Cuba. A Spanish colony from 1511

50
Perez, Cuba and the United States, xv.
30

when Diego de Velásquez sailed to Cuba from the island of Hispaniola with 300 men,
51
Cuba
experienced the worst of colonial brutality. The indigenous peoples who survived initial
encounters with the Spaniards were forced to work in the encomienda system. After the
Indian population dwindled to numbers insufficient to work the land, many settlers left Cuba
as well. Spain ordered that slaves from Africa be taken to Cuba beginning in 1527.
52

According to Gott, it was when the British invaded Cuba in 1762 that Cuba became a player
in regional trade. Prior to the British occupation of Havana, Spain tightly controlled Cuba‘s
trade. While the restrictions imposed by Spain and Spain‘s inability to support the growth of
production in Cuba led to illicit trading with the North American colonies,
53
it was England
opening up Cuba to trade with the British colonies that got the ball rolling between Cuba and
North America. With the 1763 Treaty of Paris, Cuba reverted to Spain‘s control, but with
more relaxed trade restrictions.
54
While commerce was not as free between North America
and Cuba as during British occupation, a little over a decade later saw the American
revolution open new opportunities between Cuba and North America – the rebelling colonies
needed markets and imports previously supplied by the British Caribbean colonies, and
Spain‘s willingness to trade with the American states was a way of slighting the British.
55

While Spain kept re-imposing and relaxing trade restrictions between Cuba and North
America, a lot of U.S. trade began between Saint-Domingue (now Haiti). The slave rebellion

51
Gott, Cuba: A New History, 13-14.
52
Ibid., Chapter 1.
53
Perez, Cuba and the United States, 1-2
54
Perez, Cuba and the United States, 4-5; Gott, Cuba: A New History, 42-3.
55
Perez, Cuba and the United States, 5.
31

in Saint-Domingue in 1791 cemented the trade relationship between Cuba and the United
States.
According to Jerry Sierra, it was after the British occupation when Spain regained
control of Cuba that Cubans began to dream of independence.
56
While some within Cuba
saw annexation by the United States as the best path to preventing a slave rebellion like that
in Saint-Domingue,
57
in the United States, annexation was seen as an almost foregone
conclusion. Writing to President Monroe in 1823, Thomas Jefferson articulated Cuba‘s value
to the United States,
I candidly confess, that I have ever looked on Cuba as the most interesting addition
which could ever be made to our system of States. The control which, with Florida
Point, this island would give us over the Gulf of Mexico, and the countries and
isthmus bordering on it, as well as all those whose waters flow into it, would fill up
the measure of our political well-being.
58

The Monroe Doctrine helped ensure that Cuba would not fall to any other European power as
the U.S. specified a ―no transfer‖ policy and declared the Americas as the sphere of influence
of the United States.
In addition to the perception that Cuba naturally belonged to the United States, an
economic relationship had grown between the two nation states as a result of sugar

56
Sierra, History of Cuba, http://www.historyofcuba.com/history/scaw/scaw1.htm
57
Gott, Cuba: A New History, 55, 57. The Cuban journalist Jose Antonio Saco wrote about annexation by the
United States, where slavery was still legal, as a possible solution to what he saw as a potential race problem in
Cuba.
58
Jefferson, ―Thomas Jefferson on the Monroe Doctrine‖ Jefferson does go on to say that he is mindful of the
fact that Cuba could not be obtained but by war, which would not be desirable. A few months earlier, as
President Monroe‘s Secretary of State, John Quincy Adams wrote of Cuba and Puerto Rico, ―These
islands…are natural appendages of the North American continent, and one of them, Cuba, almost in sight of our
shores, from a multitude of considerations has become an object of transcendent importance to the commercial
and political interests of our Union.‖ He goes on to say that, ―it is scarcely possible to resist the conviction that
the annexation of Cuba to our Federal Republic will be indispensable to the continuance and integrity of the
Union itself.‖ (Adams to Hugh Nelson, the American minister in Madrid, 27-28).
32

commerce. Growing trade in the 19
th
century prompted Cuba to focus on growing sugar and
importing most food for consumption. By the end of the 19
th
century, the United States was
the principle importer of Cuban sugar.
59
The rise of Cuban nationalism in the late 19
th

century upset the perception that Cuba would fall naturally into the hands of the United
States. Increased trade had developed into increased direct investment in Cuba.
60
With more
U.S. ownership of the means of production in Cuba, greater interest in defending property
complicated Washington‘s response when Spain‘s grip on the island started to falter. When
rebellion broke out in 1895 and was quickly more widespread than Spain had faced in the
past, the U.S. attempted to broker an agreement between Cuba and Spain to stop the
violence, and more importantly, to stop the tide toward an independent Cuba. The United
States pushed for Spain to retain sovereignty but to grant autonomy to Cuba in hopes of
pacifying Cuban rebels and preserving the perceived order of succession of colonial control
over Cuba. Spain decided to crush the uprising and rejected the U.S. supported plan.
61

When Spain finally had no choice but to adopt these reforms, neither the Spanish loyalists in
Cuba nor the rebels were pleased. Spanish loyalists felt abandoned and called for U.S.
intervention and annexation. The Cuban rebels continued to fight for independence,
convinced that Spain‘s compromise was due to Spain‘s inevitable defeat.
62

With the realization that Spain had lost hold of Cuba, ―Washington confronted in
Cuba the anathema of all U.S. policy makers since Jefferson—the specter of Cuban

59
Perez-Stable, The Cuban Revolution, 15.
60
Benjamin, The United States and the Origins of the Cuban Revolution, 33.
61
Perez, Cuba and the United States, 86.
62
Ibid., 87-9.
33

independence.‖
63
At this point, the McKinley administration asked Congress for the
authority to enter the conflict. What became known as the Spanish American War was,
according to Perez, really the response to Spain‘s inability to retain sovereignty in Cuba and
the United States‘ attempt to prevent an independent Cuba.
64
Benjamin argues that the
debate over war and annexation within the United States occurred at a time when
philosophies of American expansionism were shifting from the old justifications of Manifest
Destiny to one of influence and control through commerce and diplomacy.
65
But the rhetoric
of these debates tells another story. Republican Senator Albert J. Beveridge of Indiana called
for the ―march of the flag‖ to continue as it had during the expansions of Jefferson, Monroe,
and Jackson. Arguing that the consent of the governed is not needed if they cannot govern
themselves, Beveridge argued for the necessity of statehood for Cuba, Puerto Rico, and the
Philippines.
66

Although the majority of Cubans supported independence, the elites and former
Spanish loyalists preferred U.S. control to Cuban sovereignty. ―North Americans searched
for a substitute for independence, local elites sought a substitute for Colonialism‖
67

Attempting to engineer landowning elites into power in the 1900 elections within Cuba, the
United States failed to set up the ―stable government‖ it required for withdrawal from

63
Ibid., 90-1.
64
Ibid., 94-7.
65
Benjamin, The United States and the Origins of the Cuban Revolution, 19, 28-30.
66
Albert J. Beveridge, ―The March of the Flag.‖
67
Pérez, Cuba and the United States, 102.
34

Cuba.
68
Not wanting to remain as an occupier in Cuba, especially as it became clear that
promoting conservative elites in elections was not going to work, the U.S. made Cuba‘s
adoption of the Platt amendment a condition for U.S. withdrawal from Cuba.
69
The Platt
Amendment specified that the United States has the right to intervene in Cuba when U.S.
interests demanded and placed restrictions on Cuba‘s ability to forge ties with other
countries. After the Cubans adopted the constitution with the Platt Amendment in June 1901,
the U.S. military ended its occupation on May 20, 1902.
The war destroyed most of the sugar industry, which was revived with U.S.
assistance. The United States increasingly had a role in Cuban affairs until the 1920s when a
new entrepreneurial bourgeoisie within Cuba decided they wanted more of a role in political
decisions to defend local economic interests.
70
U.S. presence was most noteable in the sugar
industry. ―By 1925, U.S. capital totaled $750 million, owned 41 percent of all mills, and
controlled 60 percent of the harvest.‖
71
The great depression hit the sugar industry hard after
Cuban output had already been exceeding demand, pushing prices down. Popular discontent
prompted by economic deterioration and a series of repressive leaders led to a short-lived
revolution in 1933. The revolutionary regime of Ramón Grau San Martín made a lot of
immediate changes but failed to gain the support or recognition of the United States. ―In
January 1934, Batista informed Grau that the army was not longer able to support him.‖ A
strike on January 17 led to Grau‘s overthrow by Batista, whose government the United States

68
Ibid., 102-4.
69
Ibid., 107-11.
70
Ibid., 170-172.
71
Perez-Stable, The Cuban Revolution, 15.
35

recognized within a week.
72
Batista headed the Cuban government in official and unofficial
capacities until revolutionary tensions within Cuba created a chaotic situation. The United
States
withdrew its support of the Batista regime by instituting an arms embargo in 1958. In
January of 1959, the revolution led by Fidel Castro brought the Batista rule to an end. As
chapter two will argue, this long history between the United States and Cuba directly
influenced the story about Cuba that gained prominence with the American public and
continues to influence the narrative of today.
After this brief glimpse of the history of U.S.-Cuba relations, the explanation of the
critical method and theoretical approach to the stories about Cuba, and justification for
studying Cuba from the perspective of narrative, Chapter two takes as its starting point the
year the Monroe Doctrine was announced, and details the sources, development, and themes
of the narrative of Cuba belonging to the United States.

72
Staten, 62.
36

CHAPTER TWO: CUBA AS POSESSION OF THE UNITED STATES
Cuba‘s close proximity and strategic location as a gateway to the Caribbean Sea have
long offered compelling reasons for the United States to assert its interests in this island
nation. Early in the history of the United States, American leaders speculated about how to
bring Cuba more securely into the sphere of influence of the United States. Their shared
history contributes significantly to how the American public reacted to the revolution and
how Cuba is viewed today. The first dominant narrative that shapes the U.S. public‘s
understanding of Cuba: Cuba as a natural possession of the United States. This dominant
narrative operated in the United States before the radicalization of the Cuban Revolution and
prior to the widespread worry of communism in the Western Hemisphere. The primary
elements of this story include 1) attempts to include Cuba in the United States of America, 2)
the notion of Cuba as a travel destination and Havana as a city of sin 3) the conviction that
the U.S. need to assist in governing because Cuba was unable to rule itself.
Cuba as a Potential State
The first element in the narrative about subsuming Cuba as a U.S. possession is the
application of the Monroe doctrine which aimed to include Cuba as a state in the United
States. In an entry in the Diary of Charles Jared Ingersoll
73
before the December 1823
announcement of the Monroe Doctrine, Ingersoll states that he talked to a Foreign Service
officer in Cuba who indicated that Cuba was ―ripe for union with the U.S. whenever Spain is

73
Charles Jared Ingersoll was a U.S. District Attorney for Pennsylvania and Democratic member of the House
of Representatives from Pennsylvania.
37

forced to change her constitution.‖
74
Later in 1823, then Secretary of State John Quincy
Adams writes,
these islands, from their local position are natural appendages to the North American
continent; and one of them, Cuba, almost in sight of our shores, from a multitude of
considerations has become an object of transcendent importance to the political and
commercial interests of our Union.
75

Adams goes on to say
…it is scarcely possible to resist the conviction that the annexation of Cuba to our
federal republic will be indispensable to the continuance and integrity of the Union
itself...there are laws of political as well as of physical gravitation; and if an apple
severed by the tempest from its native tree cannot choose but fall to the ground, Cuba,
forcibly disjoined from its own unnatural connection with Spain, and incapable of
self-support, can gravitate only towards the North American Union, which by the
same law of nature cannot cast her off from its bosom.
76

Thomas Jefferson shared the opinion. ―I candidly confess, that I have ever looked on
Cuba as the most interesting addition which could ever be made to our system of States,‖
77

he writes. However, Jefferson was even more concerned about Great Britain acquiring Cuba.
He would settle for Cuba‘s independence if it meant maintaining a relationship with Great
Britain and keeping powers other than Spain from interfering in the hemisphere. The
prevailing attitude was that Cubans would choose annexation when the time came. The
framing narrative for understanding Cuba was that if the decision were made by Cuba or the
by United States, Cuba would become a state because of the natural union they shared.

74
Ingersoll, ―Entry of February 7, 1823,‖ 26.
75
Adams to Hugh Nelson, 27.
76
Ibid.
77
Jefferson to Monroe, 30.
38

Cuba was not the only concern of American leaders in 1823. They also worried about
European influence in the rest of Latin America and wanted to prevent new colonization in
the Western hemisphere. In December 1823 President Monroe announced the foreign policy
of his administration would object to transfer of Western hemisphere countries to other
European powers. This stance indicated the importance Latin America had for the United
States and guided policy for the foreseeable future. Implicit in the doctrine is the idea that
belonging politically with the North American continent rather than the European continent
was more natural for all American colonies and that Cuba would eventually belong to the
United States, once Spain‘s grip weakened.
Between 1823 and the Spanish-American War in 1898, the United States continued to
covet Cuba; then in the 1840s the U.S. began looking to expand by annexing territory in the
West and in the Caribbean,
78
consistent with manifest destiny and the annexation of all of
Oregon Country and the Mexican-American War. In 1848, President James K. Polk wrote in
his diary, ―I am decidedly in favor of purchasing Cuba and making it one of the States of the
Union.‖
79
Spain rejected Polk‘s offer of one hundred million dollars and the next
administration explained that they had no intention of renewing this offer until a time when
Spain was willing to part with the island. Again, the idea that Cuba would naturally join the
United States when the time was right reassured those who still wished for annexation.
President James Buchanan also attempted to purchase Cuba between 1857 and 1860 but was

78
Smith, What Happened in Cuba? 37.
79
Polk, ―Diary of James K. Polk,‖ 38.
39

unable to convince Congress to appropriate the funds.
80
The 1860 Democratic Party platform
stated ―that the Democratic Party are [sic?] in favor of the acquisition of the Island of Cuba,
on such terms as shall be honorable to ourselves and just to Spain, at the earliest practicable
moment.‖
81
While the United States was consumed by the Civil war in the coming years,
acquisition of Cuba remained a topic of discussion among leaders.
In 1895, war broke out between Spain and Cuba. Disagreement remains about the
reasons for the U.S. entry into that war. Some argue that the war was caused by the
February 1898 sinking of the U.S.S. Maine, others that it was motivated by the desire to free
Cuba from Spain and still others that it was intended to achieve Cuba‘s annexation to the
United States. Regardless of the reason, the U.S. declared war against Spain in April of
1898. The war ended later that year when Spain and the United States signed the Treaty of
Paris without involving Cuba. According to Clifford L. Staten, ―Cuban officials were not
asked to participate. The exclusion of Cubans from the decision-making process at the end
of the war foreshadowed future Cuban relations with the United States.‖
82
When the war
ended the United States established a military government in Cuba. According to Perez, the
United States was confident that when it came time to elect Cuban leaders, annexationists
would win. When Cubans kept voting for leaders who favored independence, the United
States took another approach to ensure future ties between Cuba and the United States.
83

80
Smith, What Happened in Cuba? 76.
81
―Democratic National Platform, 1860,‖ 79.
82
Staten, The History of Cuba, 39.
83
Pérez, Cuba Between Empires, 350-352.
40

The United States encouraged Cuba to adopt the Platt amendment as part of the
Cuban constitution under the threat of maintaining the military occupying government. The
Platt amendment defined the future relations between the United States and Cuba. The
amendment regulated Cuba‘s treaties, debt, and commerce, and granted the United States use
of Guantanamo Bay. Essentially giving the United States veto power over significant Cuban
policies, the amendment stated ―[t]hat the government of Cuba consents that the United
States may exercise the right to intervene for the preservation of Cuban independence, the
maintenance of a government adequate for the protection of life, property, and individual
liberty….‖
84

James Bradley explains another reason for the creation of the Platt Amendment, that
of racism.
85
After Teddy Roosevelt‘s ―Rough Riders‖ landed in Cuba, Roosevelt expressed
disdain for the Cuban fighters, noting that they were ―almost all blacks and mulattoes‖ and
―unable to make a serious fight.‖
86
Bradley details Roosevelt‘s documented racism and notes
that when the surrender was negotiated with Spain, that no Cubans were allowed to sign it.
87

This racism prevails through much of the possession narrative, whereby Cubans are deemed
too volatile and ―hot-headed‖ to govern themselves.
Like other policies toward Cuba that the United States instituted later, the Platt
amendment stands as an example of where the story about Cuba appears in the actual policy.
The narrative that guided U.S. actions toward Cuba was that their land belonged to the

84
de la Torriente, ―The Platt Amendment,‖ 367-368.
85
Bradley, The Imperial Cruise, 61-93
86
Ibid.
87
Ibid.
41

United States. When that presumption failed to materialize at the end of the war, the United
States encouraged the adoption of a policy whereby Cuba agreed to be subject to the United
States in matters of foreign policy. For years to come, the Platt amendment guided the
relationship between Cuba and the U.S. Even if Cuba would not formally become part of the
United States, significant business investments by American companies could knit the island
nation closer to the shores of the United States. By the 1950s, the U.S. took in almost 70
percent of Cuba‘s sugar exports, provided Cuba with 75 percent of its imports, and had
nearly a billion dollars invested in the Cuban economy.
88
Big companies such as Exxon,
Texaco, and ITT invested substantially.
The narrative of Cuba as U.S. possession drove political, military, and trade decisions
following the Spanish-American War and formed the basis for how Americans
comprehended the complicated relationship with their neighbor. One of the lasting
implications of this story is that the U.S. never relates to Cuba as another nation state or an
equal, but as a little sibling or a colony. This attitude runs through the rest of the elements of
the narrative of Cuba as a U.S. possession.
Based on the official discourse, news coverage, accounts of travel, and popular
images (such as those in films) the narrative of Cuba in the 1950s includes the following
elements: Cuba as a vacation spot and Havana as a city of sin, Cuban business and
government as an unstable and corrupt network in league with the mafia. These elements
painted a picture of a Cuba that had a powerful place in the American imagination. It was a
place where the government, the economy, and politics were almost amusingly broken.

88
Gonzalez, Partners in Deadlock, 5-6.
42

Nothing in Cuba worked along the same rules as in the United States, and for Americans, the
different set of rules included morals. It was not just that ―what happens in Cuba stays in
Cuba,‖ but that one stepped into another world when one got off the ferry or plane in Cuba.
A place where the mob ran casinos, where revolution was constantly brewing, and where
Americans could abandon the everyday rules served as a fanciful escape from the
responsibilities of modern democracy. Visitors did not have to account for the political and
economic outcomes of their tourism or indulgence. And since the Cuban people did not
seem to be in control of their own democracy, why should the U.S. people worry about what
tourism fostered in Cuba?
As a result, the start of the Castro revolution seemed like other revolutions and
rebellions until the Castro government started closing casinos, executing members of the
previous corrupt government, appropriating land, and cozying up to the Soviets. During
1959 and 1960, the Cuba of the American imagination was supplanted by the Cuba of the
Cold War. The memory of the tropical playground plays an important role in how the United
States public understood, emotionally, the ―loss‖ of Cuba to the communists. Because Cuba
always existed slightly outside the modern democratic world, its loss removed it completely
from the modern world of foreign policy making. Cuba existed in the collective imagination
as it was before Castro and the American public looked forward to what it would be once
Castro was gone, but in the mean time, it was essentially part of the Soviet Union: cold,
dangerous, evil, and, as chapter four discusses, a place to escape from rather than to. Prior to
this shift, however, Cuba belonged to the U.S. as an exotic getaway.

43

Cuba as a Playground for Wealthy Americans
The popular magazines Holiday and Travel featured articles about traveling in Cuba
or Havana nearly every year in the 1950s. These magazines contribute to a story that Cuba
existed to entertain American tourists, that Cuba was the backyard playground set apart from
the seriousness of life in the United States. The recurring feature ―Thrift Tour‖ in Holiday
turned its attention to Havana, detailing in 1951 how to have a ―gala time‖ in the ―Paris of
America.‖
89
The article described Havana as ―the most exciting city between Miami and
Rio.‖
90
The 1956 Travel article ―Around Cuba: By Car,‖ describes architecture, beaches,
plantations and mountains along Cuba‘s central highway and some out-of-the-way back
roads ―yet untouched by tourist throngs.‖
91

Travel assures readers that ―American foods are found almost everywhere‖ and that
travelers will find familiar brands of gasoline at only slightly higher prices than in the U.S.
92

Also highlighting the historical value of traveling in Cuba the article contextualizes the
background of the Oriente province, ―once in this province you will recall your school
history of the Spanish American War,‖ noting that Oriente was the stronghold of the
opposition to Spanish rule.
93
―Thrift Tour‖ explains that a Havana city tour will show the

89
Holiday, Thrift Tour, 14.
90
Ibid., 16.
91
Slight, ―Around Cuba,‖ 18.
92
Ibid., 21.
93
Ibid., 22.
44

traveler where the Maine was sunk, ―plunging the U.S. into war with Spain,‖
94
and where
Hemingway wrote A Farewell to Arms.
95

The 1956 issue of Travel also included information about how to get to Cuba and the
logistics of taking one‘s car from the U.S. into Cuba, giving prices for specific ferries and
overnight sailing from Miami. Author and illustrator Ludwig Bemelmans
96
warns against
taking one‘s car to Cuba in his 1957 ―The Best Way to See Cuba‖ in Holiday, ―I never
expected to find a place where driving is worse than it is in France, but I did. It is here.‖
97

Bemelmans notes the frequent comparison of Havana to Paris ―You are reminded of it now
and then – the driving is as awful, the natives are as much in love with it, and the mass of the
people are as bourgeois as are the Parisians.‖
98

Accounts of traveling in Cuba note how friendly the people are in Havana, ―Not only
do the cuffs of trousers wear out here, but also the shoulder padding of suits, for there is
constant patting on the back.‖
99
Author Hamilton Basso was ―struck by the tolerance with
which Americans are regarded.‖
100
According to Basso, the honored place of the U.S. in the
imagination of Cubans is due in part to the long friendly relations between the two countries,
the genuine liking for North Americans, and American businesses serving as ambassadors of

94
Holiday, Thrift Tour, 17.
95
Ibid., 19.
96
Ludwig Bemelmans is most famous for the series of children‘s books about Madeline.
97
Bemelmans, ―The Best Way to See Cuba,‖ 218.
98
Ibid., 73.
99
Ibid.
100
Basso, ―Havana,‖ 141.
45

goodwill, but has more to do with the U.S.‘s being ―the land of the double play and the home
of the triple steal.‖
101
The dominant theme in these stories then was that North Americans
were well-received and well-treated when they visited Cuba. Furthermore, not only were
Cubans hospitable and friendly, there was even evidence to suggest that the Cubans were
indeed just like Americans -- they even played and appreciated that most American of
summer pastimes, baseball. Because of the ease of travel, American brands, and the location
of significant U.S. historical events, Cuba served Americans as more than an exciting
getaway, it was America‘s backyard. The Cubans wanted Americans in Cuba and Americans
believed the shared history entitled Americans to their playground.
Havana: City of Sin
The backyard playground included the exotic location of Havana. Inescapable in the
stories about Havana before the revolution are references to the hot nightlife, including
gambling, dancers, and prostitution. These accounts build a narrative that Havana is the
place where Americans go to enjoy their vices away from the scrutiny and responsibility of
their everyday lives at home.
The highlight of the evening is the visit to Sans Souci, an open-air place of
Technicolor lushness, dominated by towering royal palms. A full scale girlie show of
the same caliber you‘d see at Miami‘s Copa frames the two-hour entertainment. And
if you‘re in a gambling mood the adjoining casino will give you a fine whirl for your
money at roulette, craps, chemin de fer, or baccarat.
102

Bemelmans shared his impression that, ―Cubans will bet on anything.‖ At a lavish party
attended by President Batista one partygoer asked the author if he wanted to bet on ―whether

101
Ibid.
102
Holiday, Thrift Tour, 20.
46

we have a quiet dinner or a bombing.‖
103
Such a question characterized the odd juxtaposition
of parties and gambling amidst the political violence.
Basso notes Havana‘s reputation as ―one of the last unabashedly sinful cities of the
world.‖
104
A 1951 Time article explains that prostitution is not confined to one area of the
city as it is in other Latin American cities, and that attempts to ―clean up‖ parts of the city
simply moves those prostitutes into another part of the city.
105
Shortly after Batista‘s 1952
coup, Time reported, ―The prize Batista recaptured is a lush green tropical treasure island….
Its exuberant Havana is one of the world‘s fabled fleshpots. The whole world dances to its
sexy rumbas and mambos.‖
106
Time also referred in 1958 to ―the fleshpot city of Havana,
where gambling has always been one of the more reputable vices…‖
107
For those wanting to
take a taste of Havana home with them, Holiday specifies that one can take ―100 fine Havana
cigars and a gallon of Cuban Rum‖ back to the U.S.
108

Cuba was also described as a politically volatile island where the citizens are quickly
caught up in the emotional politics of revolution, but where even these moments do not
diminish the social scene. For example, visiting right after Batista‘s 1952 coup, Basso notes,
―even its revolutions are part of the pattern; even in the midst of its domestic upheavals,

103
Bemelmans, ―The Best Way to See Cuba,‖ 216.
104
Basso, ―Havana,‖ 68.
105
―Qualified Cleanup,‖ 34.
106
―Dictator with the People,‖ 38.
107
―A Game of Casino,‖ 32.
108
Holiday, Thrift Tour, 180.
47

Havana manages to remain itself.‖
109
Robert Redford‘s voice over in the opening scene of
the 1990 film Havana explains what it was like to visit Cuba in December 1958,
General Batista‘s been running the country for almost thirty years. This was 1958.
We weren‘t paying attention to the rebels in the hills. All we knew about Havana was
that the lights on the Prado never went out. And you had a damn good chance of
having the time of your life.
110

Boarding a ferry to cross to Havana in 1957, Bemelmans‘ car and luggage was searched
carefully by inspectors because of the fighting for the revolution. When asked why there is a
revolution in Cuba, the inspector replied, ―Oh, Cuba is a rich country and the others want to
get some money, too.‖ To the question, ―Which others,‖ the inspector replied,
Those who are not in the government at the moment. The outs—you know what I
mean—same as in America. Republicans, Democrats, Socialists—but we only have
two parties, ins and outs. The president of the outs always sit in Miami and he
wait[s]—until he is in again.
111

During Bemelmans‘ visit he observed, ―The bombings and bomb scares were part of the
most casual revolution I ever saw…Most of my Cuban friends assured me that quite probably
it would be over before my story appeared.‖
112

Cuba as an Unstable Government in Need of Assistance
The matter-of-factness of the revolutions, the coup attempts, and the violence
reflected in Time and in the travel magazines reveals a large part of the story about Cuba
prior to the revolution. The sentiment that Cubans were not capable of ruling themselves, a

109
Basso, ―Havana,‖ 66.
110
Havana, DVD.
111
Bemelmans, ―The Best Way to See Cuba,‖ 68.
112
Ibid., 216.
48

sentiment expressed during the Spanish American War, evolved into a sentiment that Cubans
could not stably govern themselves. Popular images of Cuba made since the revolution
confirm the view of the Cuban people as politically unsophisticated and unstable. A hotel
operator explaining the effect of the 1958 fighting on gambling in Cuba in the film Havana
tells Robert Redford‘s character that Castro is talking about change, ―Change what? They
don‘t know what the hell they want, these people.‖
113
There is an almost patronizing attitude
in describing the violence and the revolutions. After Batista‘s ―victory‖ in the November
1954 elections, Time reported it as a tarnished badge of electoral legitimacy, but better than
none.
114
Reporting on his inauguration speech about peace and love in early 1955, Time
mused, ―Despite the talk of peace and love, bullets flew in Havana only six hours before the
inauguration as a raiding party of cops shot it out with a longtime enemy of Batista‘s.‖ The
police uncovered a weapons cache at his hideout, ―a sizable arsenal for a man to have lying
around the house, even in Cuba.‖
115

Even routine political events were viewed with an amused condescension by Time. In
a story about the Havana mayoral elections in 1950, Time explained that the winner ran on a
campaign of reminding everyone that he‘d filled the bathtubs of Havana after building up the
water reservoirs. Time also noted that he put together ―one of the strangest political alliances
in the republic‘s history. Behind him were right-wing republicans, former Dictator Fulgencio
Batista, ex-president Grau San Martín (who is Batista‘s pet hate) and Cuba‘s small (140,000

113
Havana, DVD.
114
―Tarnished Triumph,‖ 46.
115
―Love and Bullets,‖ 44.
49

members) Communist Party (Popular Socialist Party).‖
116
Corruption was a foregone
conclusion in Time reports about Cuban politics, highlighting the ―uncommon ministerial
honesty‖ in the work of Cuba‘s finance minister of 1951,
117
and Carlos Hevia being that
―almost unique Cuban man of affairs – a man of such universally acknowledged character as
to be virtually above personal attack.‖
118

The connection between the casinos and organized crime in the United States was
evident long before The Godfather: Part II portrayed its own version of the real-life 1946
Havana Conference.
119
Pérez explains that the influx of crime syndicates from the United
States began during Prohibition and that after Prohibition, interests shifted from alcohol to
gambling.
120
Reporting on Batista‘s chosen technical advisor on gaming, Meyer Lansky‘s,
Time refers to him as ―one of the six top U.S. hoodlums,‖ and explains that several casinos in
Havana were run by Lansky.
121
The 1990 film, Havana, makes a reference to Lansky when a
hotel boss tells Redford‘s character, ―Meyer still runs this town.‖
122
This corruption
confirms the story that Cuba‘s government lacks legitimacy on its own.

116
―The Bathtub Election,‖ 38.
117
―An Honest Man,‖ 44.
118
―Next President?‖ 40. Carlos Hevia was the Auténtico Party‘s candidate for President in 1952.
119
The Havana conference was a meeting of organized crime leaders who met in Havana, partly to discuss
Bugsy Siegel and problems with his Las Vegas casino project.
120
Pérez, Cuba and the United States, 223.
121
―A Game of Casino,‖ 32.
122
Havana, DVD
50

July 26 Movement
The possibility of legitimacy was undermined by revolutions and violence, which had
long been typical of the narrative about Cuba‘s unstable government. Not surprisingly then,
when Fidel Castro led a failed attack on the army barracks at Moncada on July 26, 1953, the
American press gave it the same passing attention it gave to other revolts and rebellions. The
July 26 uprising did not make a big splash in the United States although it made the front
page of the New York Times on July 27, 1953.
123
Most Americans probably do not realize
that Cuba celebrates the anniversary of the revolution on July 26. The revolt was put down
quickly but it was characterized as the ―bloodiest revolt since last year's uprising in
Bolivia.‖
124
In that revolt, 165 rebels attacked the military post at Moncada and at Bayamo in
an attempt to capture the garrisons to arm a full-scale revolution against Batista. Given
Cuba‘s political history, the July 26
th
movement was just another rebellion against a Cuban
dictator. According to the New York Times, President Batista denounced the rebels as
―Mercenaries in the service of those who became rich during the regime of Prio [former
President Carlos Prio Socarras], in conjunction with Communist elements.‖
125
Prio denied
any connection to the rebellion.
126
Fidel Castro, however, led that rebellion was sentenced to
fifteen years in prison but was released less than two years later and granted amnesty along
with about one hundred other political prisoners.
127

123
Phillips, ―55 Reported Killed,‖ 1.
124
―Strongman's Headache,‖ 35.
125
Phillips, ―55 Reported Killed,‖ 1.
126
―Opposition Warned in Cuba,‖ 13; ―Prio Denies Responsibility,‖ 11.
127
―Cuba Freeing Prisoners,‖ 26.
51

In December 1956, Americans were again reminded of the volatile nature of Cuban
politics as Castro returned from exile in Mexico with a ―rag tag‖ force called the July 26
Movement.
128
Staging ―lightning attacks on police stations and rural guard posts,‖ in towns
throughout the Oriente province, rebels set fire to gas stations and police stations and seized
arms supplies from munitions headquarters.
129
The Cuban government cracked down on the
insurgency. Claiming to have ―wiped out‖ the exiled revolutionaries, the Cuban government
announced two days later that leader Fidel Castro and his brother Raul were among those
killed by planes and ground troops putting down the rebellion.
130
Castro‘s fate remained,
―unclarified‖ throughout the rest of the month with reports of him hiding in the Sierra
Maestra conflicting with official government reports that he had been killed.
131
Fighting
continued despite the rebels having been ―wiped out‖ by the government.
The clarification of Castro‘s fate and an arguable shot in the arm for the rebellion
came in late February 1957 with a series of articles in the New York Times. Reporter Herbert
L. Matthews painted a picture of the rebellion in Cuba as exciting, admirable, and potentially
successful. These articles functioned as significant cultural influences in the United States
because they appeared in one of the country‘s leading newspapers, they provided detailed,
entertaining, and fully engaging glimpses into Cuban life, saturating readers with vignettes

128
―Hit-Run Revolt,‖ 42.
129
Phillips, ―Cuba Quells Revolt,‖ 1.
130
―Cuba Wipes Out Invaders,‖ 1, 20.
131
Phillips, ―Cuban Terrorism More Intense,‖ 3.
52

and insights. Later, at least two books would be written about Matthews‘ experiences in
Cuba.
132

More important to this narrative analysis, however, some observers assert that
Matthews‘ stories played a significant role in altering key propaganda claims by the Cuban
government and perhaps even tipped the scales of the rebellion. That a newspaper reporter
could singlehandedly manifest such a change contributed to the ongoing narrative of Cuba as
a nation of weak or volatile governance. The American story about Cuba continued to
characterize the Cuban government as unstable and even somewhat comical, but the stories
about this rebellion piqued the imagination of American readers with an insider‘s intimate
experiences with the emerging and dynamic leader, Fidel Castro.
Traveling to Cuba, with his wife, Nancie, Matthews posed first as a tourist, then as an
American on a fishing trip, and later as a sugar planter. Taking advantage of a network of
personal contacts to find Castro and avoid roadblocks and government military patrols,
Matthews traveled by foot by night through the rain and mud of the Sierra Maestras to
interview Castro. Matthews was the first journalist to have contact with the revolutionary
leader since Castro‘s arrival in Cuba. Castro gave Matthews the impression of being
invincible when he described how the original eighty two men who landed with Castro
fought off the Cuban military while they recruited new troops from the Oriente province.
―Perhaps he isn‘t,‖ writes Matthews, ―but that is the faith he inspires in his followers.‖
133

132
DePalma, The Man Who Invented Fidel: Castro, Cuba and Herbert L. Matthews of the New York Times, and
Ratliff, The Selling of Fidel Castro: The Media and the Cuban Revolution.
133
Matthews, ―Cuban Rebel is Visited,‖ 34.
53

Castro told Matthews that rebels were stronger than ever after seventy nine days of fighting
and that the morale of the Cuban military was low.
While Matthews‘ accounts of his interviews with Castro provided American readers
with vivid details for the narrative about the broken political system in Cuba, they also
provided a closer look at the persona of Fidel Castro. Writing about the revolutionary
program of the rebels, Matthews describes Castro‘s political mind. ―[Castro] has strong ideas
of liberty, democracy, social justice, the need to restore the Constitution, to hold elections,‖
Matthews wrote.
134
Matthews went on to report that Castro explained ―we are fighting for a
democratic Cuba and an end to the dictatorship.‖
135
In his third article of the series,
Matthews described the movement, claiming that ―as a whole, their traditions are anti-
Communist and democratic.‖
136
Matthews‘ survey of the situation in Cuba concluded that
the future looked bleak for the Cuban government. ―From the looks of things, General
Batista cannot possibly hope to suppress the Castro revolt.‖
137

When the story, complete with a photo and signature of Fidel Castro appeared on the
front page of the New York Times of February 24, 1957, the government of Cuba quickly
debunked it, continuing to claim that Castro had been killed. Cuba‘s Minister of National
Defense issued a statement condemning the Matthews articles,
Before anything else, let me assure you that the opinion of the Government and, I am
sure, of the Cuban public also, is that the interview and the adventures described by
Correspondent Matthews can be considered as a chapter in a fantastic novel. Mr.

134
Ibid.
135
Ibid.
136
Matthews, ―Old Order in Cuba is Threatened,‖ 13.
137
Matthews, ―Cuban Rebel is Visited,‖ 34.
54

Matthews has not interviewed the pro-Communist insurgent Fidel Castro, and the
information obtained came from certain opposition sources.
138

The minister‘s statement chided Matthews for producing what he claimed was a picture of
Castro; the minister questioned why Matthews had not taken a picture of himself with the
rebel leader.
That Matthews‘ articles had drawn such a significant response from the Cuban
Government marked Matthews‘ work as an important source of cultural narrative. The New
York Times recognized the power of the ongoing interchange between its reporter and the
Cuban government. In its next edition—February 28, 1957—The New York Times published
not only the minister‘s searing denials but also Matthews‘ responses to the minister
accompanied by a photograph of the reporter with Fidel Castro. By March 2, more stories
emerged about fighting in Cuba; these stories referred to statements made by members of the
Cuban army about the rebel forces led by Fidel Castro.
139
These statements indicated that the
Cuban government had accepted that Castro was alive or that the government had not
succeeded in convincing the Cuban public that Castro (or more importantly, his revolution)
was dead.
Debates within Cuba about the truth of the Matthews‘ interviews were not the only
controversies engendered by the Matthews articles. Some analysts argued that Matthews was
responsible for Castro‘s victory in the Cuban revolution. In 1959, the National Review ran a
cover with a cartoon of Fidel Castro with the New York Times Classified slogan ―I got my job
through the New York Times‖ as the caption. William E. Ratliff argued that the influence of

138
―Stories on Rebel Fiction,‖ 13.
139
Phillips, ―Cuba says Rebels Number only 50,‖ 14.
55

the New York Times combined with the inappropriate bias of Matthews toward Castro
resulted in the success of the revolution. ―Seldom has a single writer so influentially set the
tone—at least as perceived by a broad cross-section of its interested readership—toward a
person, movement, or historical phenomenon.‖
140
Historian Richard E. Welch, Jr., argued
that the influence of the article has been overestimated, even by Matthews and Castro,
141
and
that the favorable attitude toward Castro‘s rebellion was due largely to the ―unspoken
assumption that Cuba was irrevocably part of the geographic sphere of influence of the
United States.‖
142
Welch‘s argument echoed the dominant narrative of Cuba as a natural
possession of the United States.
In any case, Matthews‘ articles did not change the story in the United States about
Cuba, but only lent a spotlight to a typical chapter not only about political unrest and
violence in Cuba but also about the nearly whimsical interpretations of that unrest. The
previous December, when Castro and his 81 rebels landed in Cuba to begin the revolution, an
article titled, ―The Violent Cubans‖ appeared in the New York Times musing,
There is something special, if not unique, about the sporadic revolutionary violence
that shakes Cuba. It does not make sense to outsiders, but it must do so to Cubans
for, after all, Cubans risk and lose their lives in these adventures.
143

The observation that the violence ―does not make sense to outsiders‖ but ―must‖ to Cubans
who sacrifice their lives for ―these adventures‖ sets a dismissive, patronizing tone that drives

140
Ratliff, ―The New York Times and the Cuban Revolution,‖ 3-4. Geraldine Lievesley argues that the level of
analysis in texts such as Ratliff‘s is ―unsophisticated and vitriolic, but worries that the sentiments of researchers
who demonize Castro have a large influence on U.S. Policymakers. (Lievesley, The Cuban Revolution, 3).
141
Richard Welch, Response to Revolution, 142.
142
Welch, Response to Revolution, 162.
143
―The Violent Cubans,‖ 38.
56

this dominant narrative that Cuba is a natural possession of the U.S. in part because Cubans
cannot govern themselves.
If not quite understandable to the rest of the world, the revolutionary fighting did
have a quaint, almost cute, quality in some American coverage. Time told American readers,
―Swashbuckling young lawyer Fidel Castro set off the violence when he trained a group of
irregulars in Mexico and landed with 81 of them, seasick but nervy, in Cuba‘s southern
Oriente province.‖
144
The use of terms like ―swashbuckling‖ and ―seasick but nervy‖ lends a
tone of fictional fantasy to Castro‘s campaign. These approaches to reporting may have
stemmed from reasons other than entertainment. C. Wright Mills, for example, proposes in
his book Listen, Yankee that American reporters have very little experience writing about
revolution because ―[c]ommunism‖ prevents journalists from knowing or making use of
leftist theory.
145
In any case, the coverage of the initial stages of the revolution revealed the
patronizing amusement with which the U.S. viewed Cuban politics.
This third element, that Cuba needs assistance because Cubans cannot govern
themselves emerges in numerous ways over the next two years of 1957 and 1958. For
example, amidst the violence and rebellion, as with the coup in 1952, Havana life seemed to
go on as usual. In March 1957, rebels took over a radio station in Havana to announce that
Batista was dead at the very time a group attacked the presidential palace to kill him. Time
magazine reported,
When the attack was over, it was the attackers who were dead; Fulgencio Batista, 56,
was alive, elated and still president. Normality came back fast. In jammed planes,

144
―Running-sore Revolt,‖ 43.
145
Mills, Listen, Yankee, 10.
57

U.S. tourists, held out of Cuba for a few hours when the airport was closed, flooded
in; roulette wheels spun in the casinos, saucy chippies flirted in the nightspots.
146

The almost flippant attitude toward the juxtaposition of rebel violence to Cuban nightlife
entertainment indicated that U.S. tourists charted their own behaviors in concert with this
dominant narrative and dismissed the incongruities as inconveniences to be expected from a
nation unable to govern itself.
The constant threat of government collapse and violent counter attacks by
government forces also contributed to this narrative about instability. Routine attacks
undermined Batista‘s regime. In June 1957 Batista‘s ―staying power‖ was questioned and his
regime declared ―in danger‖ by Time, which also noted that Batista‘s orders to wipe out
Castro‘s rebels would likely be unsuccessful because of the revolt‘s support among the
people in the Oriente province.
147
Toward the end of 1957, the town of Cienfuegos and the
naval station fell to rebel forces and men from Batista‘s navy defected to the rebellion to
assist.
Using American-supplied B-26 and F-47 bombers and tanks, Batista responded with
an overwhelmingly violent crackdown in violation of hemispheric defense agreements which
prohibited their use in maintaining internal order.
148
Wayne Smith notes that this action by
Batista ultimately led to the U.S. arms embargo announced in March 1958.
149
Smith, in
Cuba with the Foreign Service at the time, explained that the arms embargo was irritating to

146
―Not Afraid to Die,‖ 36.
147
―Revolutionary Upsurge,‖ 42; ―Ready for War,‖ 34; ―Province in Revolt,‖ 40.
148
Smith, The Closest of Enemies, 16; ―Revolution Spreads,‖ 47.
149
Smith, The Closest of Enemies, 17.
58

the Batista regime, but had little impact on how the people in Cuba viewed the U.S. and its
role in Cuba. The U.S. military training mission remained in Havana to train Cuban
troops.
150

Most of 1958 saw Batista struggle with trying to hold on to power while at the same
time promising to hold elections. The suspension of constitutional guarantees was one of the
sticking points in this struggle. The United States pressured Batista to hold free elections,
and to guarantee the civil liberties of Cuban citizens. In February, constitutional guarantees
of civil liberties were back, but only until mid-March, when Batista suspended them again.
Elections were supposed to be held in June, but Batista delayed them until November, when
his candidate easily won in the ―mock election.‖
151
These see-saw actions confirmed U.S.-
held attitudes about instability of Cuban government. In April, Castro attempted to start a
―total war,‖ including a general strike and armed attacks,
152
but the strike floundered and
Batista was quoted as saying, ―We‘ll soon see how hard it is to make this dictator fall,‖ and
he violently suppressed the strike.
153
Castro‘s total war failed, but the rebels fought on,
showing ―plenty of bombast.‖
154

To this point that narrative about instable governance featured a president whose
decisions seemed to see-saw and a rebel leader who sporadically and dramatically generated

150
Ibid.
151
Sierra, History of Cuba, http://www.historyofcuba.com/history/time/timetbl3b.htm#che; Cuba, the 1979 film
starring Sean Connery set during the revolution includes a scene in which government officials oversee the
filling out of stacks of ballots for Agüero prior to the election. (Cuba, DVD.)
152
―Week of Waiting,‖ 32.
153
―Strongman‘s Round,‖ 27.
154
―Agonizing Reappraisal,‖ 37.
59

violence. In July of 1958, a new character in this narrative contributed to the story. Raul
Castro, Fidel‘s brother, who was commanding the rebel forces in the Eastern hills of Cuba,
decided to send the United States a message by kidnapping fifty U.S. and Canadian citizens
from the nickel mines and Guantanamo. Raul Castro treated the hostages well and elicited
responses from them such as ―a swell guy, that Raul Castro.‖ Captives interviewed by a
Time correspondent while they were still being held discussed what otherwise might have
been interpreted as a grave situation saying, ―Hell, a few days won‘t hurt us,‖ and ―We are all
rebel sympathizers anyway.‖ Raul was under the mistaken impression that the U.S. was still
arming Batista; even when he was informed that this was not the case, Raul wanted to force
the U.S. to publicly promise not to arm Batista in the future. But the U.S. State Department
responded saying ―conciliatory moves by the U.S. are not likely. The State Department is
confident that the rebels will return the men unharmed, lest the propaganda move backfire
into a wave of anger in the U.S.‖
155
Even if the face of imminent threat, the narrative stayed
in place, dismissing Cuban governance as instable and at some level patronizingly amusing.
As the summer went on, the rebel forces gained strength, making a ―comeback‖ after
the failure of the ―total war.‖
156
Around the time of the November elections, ―Castro‘s brass
knuckles took over,‖ and the rebels hijacked an airliner, killing 17 people upon the crash
landing and laid ambushes in the roads so people could not get to the polling places.
157
The
hijacking was the third in a series and helped cut off the government from Santiago by taking

155
―Caught in a war,‖ 29. In February, 1959, four of the kidnapped technicians from the U.S. attended the
wedding of Raul Castro, giving him a silver ice-bucket and a good luck card. (―The Hemisphere: Society
Wedding,‖ 27.)
156
―Comeback,‖ 28.
157
―Trappings of an Election,‖ 45.
60

over the airlines‘ planes.
158
By December 1958, Castro‘s rebels dominated a third of Cuba
and was getting ―ardent backing from students, professional classes who chafe at the
indignities and corruption of the dictatorship, and the political left,‖ while Batista had almost
no support, according to Time magazine.
159
The rebellion had crippled business in rebel
occupied areas, drastically decreased tourism throughout the island, and shortened the train
runs. Increasingly, Batista could not keep order.
160

The violence went on for over two years, exhausting many within Cuba. In February
1958, Time explained that ―while most Cubans opposed Batista, many of them were also
tiring of Castro‘s…unremitting violence.‖
161
As had been the case during other times of
violence, even at the end of 1958, the fun in Havana continued. The 2004 film Dirty
Dancing: Havana Nights emphasizes the sizzling dance scene in Havana. Patrick Swayze‘s
character appears as a dance instructor for Americans in late 1958 and encourages American
teen, Katey, to enter a dance contest. All of this frivolity occurs amidst the violence and
impending success of the revolution.
162
By the end of 1958, governments in the region
started holding secret talks to discuss how they might help end the bloodshed that had
continued for over two years. No country chose to interfere in Cuba‘s internal affairs, so no
solution was found.
163
In the last couple of days of 1958, Castro declared the rebellion close

158
―Flight 482 Is Missing,‖ 32.
159
―Into the Third Year,‖ 32.
160
Ibid.
161
―Peace & War,‖ 38.
162
Dirty Dancing: Havana Nights, DVD.
163
Associated Press, ―American Nations Confer in Secret for Peace in Cuba,‖ 1.
61

to victory. Batista‘s sons flew to the U.S., allegedly for New Year‘s celebrations, but many
speculated that it signaled Batista‘s impending resignation.
Success of the Revolution
Although a change in regime loomed imminent, no competing narrative arose in the
United States; events in Cuba continued to fit into a presumption that Cuba lacked stable
governance. On January 1, 1959, shortly before dawn, Batista and his family and several
members of his government fled the island of Cuba for the Dominican Republic. Fidel
Castro declared the revolution victorious. The people of Cuba and, to some extent, the U.S.
press celebrated Fidel Castro as a hero, a liberator, and a romantic figure. Life described
Castro‘s entrance into Havana: ―He came not as a dutifully honored conqueror but as a man
ecstatically acclaimed by the people he had liberated.‖
164
The Life article emphasized that
Castro sought no official post in the new government, asking for no ―spoils for his own
sacrificial struggle.‖
165
Newsweek described Castro as an ―athletic and yet mystic figure‖ and
―a living legend.‖
166
Although these depictions reinforced the caricature of the nature of the
new leader of Cuba, they did not install a new narrative regarding the volatility of Cuban
government.
The United States recognized the revolutionary government of Fidel Castro on
January 7, but took a cautious wait-and-see approach to the youthful and relatively
inexperienced leaders. Newsweek took a similarly cautious stance, noting that ―nothing in all

164
―Liberator‘s Triumphal March,‖ 28.
165
Ibid., 29.
166
―What Next for Cuba and its Hero,‖ 42.
62

his life has prepared him to rule his country.‖
167
Although Castro‘s words about fighting for
democracy and for an end to the dictatorship were brave, Washington was apprehensive
about what it saw. Eisenhower‘s first public statement about the revolution was at a January
28 news conference where he was asked to give his impressions of Castro and his feelings
about recent events in Cuba. ―No, I don‘t want to go into that kind of a thing,‖ said President
Eisenhower,
But I will tell you what I will do, I‘ll just say this: I am certain this government and
all the American people hope that his Government will be truly representative of the
Cuban people, and that his Government will achieve the ability to reflect their views,
their aspirations, and to encourage and help their progress.
168

But other than answering reporters‘ questions during news conferences, Eisenhower had very
little to say about Cuba publicly. Richard Gott points out that Eisenhower, ―with his
memories of the invasion of Europe and relationships with Churchill and Stalin, could not
have been expected to take an interest in a Caribbean revolutionary, let alone to look on him
with favour.‖
169
Gott‘s implications reinforced the narrative of Cuba as lesser important,
even dependant state.
Nearly imperceptible signs of the upcoming change of narrative appeared because of
U.S. investment in Cuba. Newsweek writes that ―the political complexion of this movement
is of the first importance.‖
170
Che Guevara‘s and Raul Castro‘s ties to Communist

167
―Cuba Under Castro,‖ 42.
168
―Transcript of President Eisenhower‘s News Conference Comments,‖ 10.
169
Gott, Cuba: A New History, 178.
170
―Cuba Under Castro,‖ 42.
63

movements had Washington worried.
171
Nonetheless, the U.S. public was somewhat taken
with the underdog revolutionary turned hero who defeated a brutal dictator and vowed ―from
now on, the people are entirely free.‖
172
The dominant narrative that Cuba belonged in some
way to the United States was supported by this new leader‘s broad rhetoric. Americans
traveled to Havana and counted on the Cuban government to maintain the playground they
had come to love.
Before long, however, the romance began to wear away and the standard stories about
violence and political instability in Cuba returned, eclipsing the stories about the triumphant,
young revolutionaries. Castro‘s new government worried people in the United States when
stories appeared about Castro‘s practices of rapidly trying and executing hundreds of
members of the Batista regime. Time likened the executions to earlier episodes in Cuban
history pointing out that two Cuban leaders have had the nicknames ―the butcher,‖ and that
while capable of a warm generosity, ―Cubans are also endowed to the full with the Latin
capacity for brooding revenge and blood purges.‖
173
In a letter to the editor in mid-January,
John Billi of Brooklyn admitted that it gave him ―an uneasy feeling reading in the
newspapers that the victorious rebels are placing hundreds of persons—men and women—
before firing squads after drumhead trials lasting a few minutes.‖
174
Typical of the moment
was the comment by Senator Wayne Morse of Oregon, who denounced the trials and

171
Ibid.
172
―End of a War,‖ 33.
173
―The Vengeful Visionary,‖ 41.
174
Billi, ―Executions in Cuba Protested,‖ 46.
64

executions as a ―bloodbath,‖ asking the Cuban government to wait to conduct the trials until
―emotions cool.‖
175
Morse refused an invitation from Castro to observe the trials in Cuba.
176

Objections to Castro‘s actions grew. Newsweek noted the objections to the numbers
of people executed in show trials, but highlighted that the trials helped prevent mob violence
and that they might have been overemphasized in U.S. news coverage.
177
As criticism from
the United States continued, Castro declared that he would not base his decisions on U.S.
objections: ―If the Americans don‘t like what is happening in Cuba they can land the marines
and then there will be 200,000 gringos dead.‖
178

The Cuban public initially appeared to have approved of the executions, but grew
alarmed when an increasing number of crimes, including the undefined crime of
collaborating with the Batista regime, became punishable by death by firing squad.
179
In
March, the Cuban public had more reason for concern when Castro ignored the principle of
double jeopardy and ordered the reversal of a not-guilty verdict of some Cuban airmen on
trial for war crimes. The verdict reversal raised protests from several Cuban bar associations
and caused one defense attorney to warn that Castro may be stamped as a ―Napoleon in the
Caribbean.‖
180
Tensions increased and confirmed the familiar narrative of Cuba‘s instability
and appetite for violence.

175
Phillips, ―Military Court in Cuba,‖ 1.
176
Phillips, ―Military Court in Cuba,‖ 1.
177
―Semper Fidel,‖ 52-53.
178
Phillips, ―Castro says Cuba Wants Good Ties,‖ 1.
179
Phillips, ―Reds‘ Alleged Role,‖ 1, 4.
180
―One-Man Court,‖ 40.
65

For the first few months of 1959, letters of support for the revolution published in the
New York Times indicated that public reaction to the executions was mixed in the United
States. Newsweek continued to point out Castro‘s lack of experience, stating,
Imagine what it would be like trying to run a company like General Electric or U.S.
Steel if all the officials, down to shop foremen, had disappeared overnight. That‘s the
job Fidel Castro and his largely amateur government faced last week as they tried to
bring order out of revolutionary chaos in Cuba.
181

Newsweek admitted that the Castro regime was doing pretty well given the circumstances.
Castro was not seen as the perfect leader for Cuba and was unacceptable according to
others,
182
but the story about Cuba continued. It was easy enough for the American public to
accept that the Cubans were used to the violence of the executions and would carry them out
themselves if the government did not dispense the justice. Americans could also readily
believe that the political instability that might result from the revolutionaries‘ lack of
experience was nothing new. The two factors that threatened to change the story about Cuba
for the American people were the fate of U.S. interests (including gambling) and the
increasing reports that Castro might be a Communist.
The picture of Havana as playground for the wealthy began to fade on January 4,
1959. The New York Times article, ―Gamblers in Cuba Face Dim Future,‖ told of the
victorious rebels smashing slot machines and gaming tables with sledgehammers.
183
This
scene was portrayed in the film Havana, with rebels smashing slot machines in the streets

181
―Budgets and Bullets,‖ 46-7.
182
Former Ambassador to Cuba Earle E. T. Smith, for one, thought that there were signs from the beginning
that Castro was a communist and pushed for the State Department to do what it could to install a moderate
leader before Castro‘s revolution triumphed.
183
―Gamblers in Cuba Face Dim Future,‖ 6.
66

and storming casinos to overturn tables and break slot machines.
184
A week later, tourism
and gambling remained ―one of the greatest question marks in the Cuban picture,‖
185
until
Castro announced that the luxury hotels with casinos could continue to operate with heavy
restrictions, including high taxes and the provision that they would operate only for
tourists.
186
The 2004 film, Dirty Dancing: Havana Nights, portrays the American Miller
family as leaving shortly after the success of Castro‘s revolution.
187
On February 16, Fidel
Castro was named Prime Minister of Cuba, replacing Jose Miro Cardona after a disagreement
over reopening the casinos. Gambling was the issue most prominently covered in the U.S.
press when Castro became Prime Minister, relieving many who had investments in hotels and
casinos in Cuba. While Castro agreed with Miro Cardona in principle, opening the casinos
was an economic decision to alleviate the decrease in tourism and increase in unemployment
that resulted when the casinos were closed. In February, sixteen casinos reopened, while 27
closed for good.
188

If Castro‘s decision to maintain many of the U.S. owned gambling establishments
was welcome news in the United States, his land reform program met with a decidedly
negative response. The narrative of Cuba as possession of the United States played out after
the Spanish-American War with millions in American business investments. After the
success of the revolution, the first two concerns of American business were the sugar harvest

184
Havana, DVD
185
Phillips, ―Cuba may have a Tourist Season,‖ X23.
186
―Castro Gives Gambling Go-Ahead on Tight Reign,‖ 4.
187
Dirty Dancing: Havana Nights, DVD.
188
―Cuba to Restore Gambling Friday,‖ 11.
67

and utility companies operating in Cuba. On January 19, 1959, the New York Times
explained that utility companies, such as the American and Foreign Power Company and the
International Telephone and Telegraph Corporation waited anxiously to see what the Castro
government would do regarding American owned utilities. Early March saw the Cuban
government confiscating properties from former Batista officials, reducing rents 30 to 50
percent and nationalizing the U.S.-owned phone company.
In May, the Cuban government approved a land reform law that limited land
ownership to one thousand acres, prohibited companies from running both a sugar plantation
and a sugar mill, giving landless families sixty-six acres, and compensating for expropriated
land through twenty-year government bonds. U.S. companies owned 36 sugar mills and
produced roughly 40 percent of the sugar output
189
at the time and were greatly affected,
having to give up sugar for compensation at tax assessed values (traditionally undervalued to
keep taxes low and attract foreign investment). Time described Cuba‘s land reform law as
―Latin America‘s rudest slap at capital since Mexico expropriated the oil industry in
1938.‖
190
Referring to ―the long, sad history‖ of ―land reform,‖ Time said the law ―plunged
Cuba down a land-reform road where many Latin American hopes have been dashed.‖
191

Time pointed out that the law would hurt both the American companies involved in the sugar
industry as well as the Cuban economy. Reports of Castro‘s actions had begun to create
kernels of a new narrative.

189
―U.S. Sugar Mill Men to Protest to Cuba,‖ 8.
190
―Confiscation!‖ 37.
191
Ibid., 36.
68

The land reform law caused a huge uproar in Cuba and in the United States. In June,
when five Cuban cabinet ministers objected to the law, ―Castro‘s answer was to fire them all
and replace them with more fervent yes-men.‖
192
Americans losing land as a result of the
law protested, as did Cuban sugar mill owners, but ―Castro fought for his law with threats,
cajolery, and left-wing bombast.‖
193
Some of the public in the United States supported
Cuba‘s right to promulgate land reform, but questioned the method of compensation and the
effect the law would have on the economy. A May 20, 1959 editorial in the New York Times
stated
[t]hat an agrarian reform was overdue in Cuba [and] would be generally
acknowledged…. The one justifiable demand is for ‗adequate, just and prompt
compensation.‘ This will be the real test of the Cuban reform, and all one can say
today is that there are doubts that the new law fulfills this requirement.
194

Land reform was the beginning of the end of American glorification of Fidel Castro
and the beginning of a larger, longer-lasting story about Castro the Communist. Finding a
Communist in power in Cuba was alarming to the American public precisely because of the
long-held story about Cuba as belonging to the United States. This alarm led to the
development of a story about Cuba having ―gone Communist,‖ which quickly began to
replace the previous story. The transition from the dominant narrative in the U.S. of Cuba as
possession to the narrative of Cuba as Cold War adversary occurred over the two year period
of 1959 to 1961.

192
―Cabinet Split,‖ 30.
193
―Cabinet Split,‖ 30.
194
―Cuba‘s Agrarian Reform,‖ 34.
69

The narrative about communism was bolstered by a series of resignations within the
Cuban government. Citing the increasing radicalization of the revolution, and the ―rising
influence of communism,‖ military commander Huber Matos resigned from his position in
October 1959 and was subsequently charged with treason and sentenced to 20 years in
prison. Matos‘ actions came after President Urrutia resigned in July and after Jose Miro
Cardona‘s resignation in February. By the end of 1959, twelve of the twenty-one ministers
appointed by Castro had either resigned or been fired. Four more left during 1960.
195

Increased criticism from the United States, first about the executions and then about
the land reform laws, led to more vitriolic anti-Americanism in Castro‘s speeches and
policies. In early 1960, Deputy Prime Minister Mikoyan from the Soviet Union visited a
Cuban trade fair and initiated an agreement to buy Cuban sugar in exchange for oil, wheat,
iron, and other goods. Mikoyan offered Castro a credit with which Cuba could purchase
additional commodities.
When the crude oil purchased by Cuba arrived in April, the oil refineries owned by
U.S. and British companies refused to process it. Castro announced that if the refineries did
not change their stance, consequences such as seizure or confiscation would result.
196
A few
days later, the Texaco oil refinery quietly prepared for the plant to be seized.
197
On June 29
and July 1, Cuba nationalized the oil refineries of Esso, Texaco, and Shell. On July 3, the
United States passed legislation to authorize the President to use U.S. national interests as a

195
Sierra, ―The War for Cuban Independence.‖ http://historyofcuba.com.
196
Phillips, ―2 Luxury Hotels Seized in Havana,‖ 41.
197
―Refinery Expects Seizure,‖ 6.
70

measure for determining the sugar quota. In response, Cuba then nationalized all business
and property owned by U.S. firms. The United States retaliated by cutting the remaining
sugar quota for 1960. The Soviet Union stepped in on July 8 and offered to purchase what
the U.S. abandoned. In September, Cuba nationalized U.S. banks and when the U.S.
imposed an economic embargo on Cuba on October 19, 1960, Cuba nationalized all
remaining property owned by U.S. interests.
By the time most of the seizures and expropriations occurred, nearly everyone in the
United States was comfortable calling Castro a communist, but this condition had not always
been the case. Even a year earlier in May 1959, when Castro fought hard for the land reform
program, many cited his action as a much needed anti-communist policy.
198
Castro had been
labeled a Communist by Batista from the beginning stages of the revolution, but little
evidence had been seen to confirm this charge. Matthews had explicitly stated that the July
26 Movement was anti-Communist in 1957,
199
and Castro issued several statements
denouncing Communism,
200
but the fears still lingered. ―Will Cuba Go Communist?‖ was
increasingly the question in the minds of the American public at that time, and the question
was one posed by U.S. news coverage. ―Just three and a half months after Fidel Castro and
his bearded rebels swept out of the hills and threw out Fulgencio Batista, this chill question is
disturbing observers here and in the Caribbean.‖
201

198
Drimmer, ―Cuba‘s Land Plan Upheld,‖ 24.
199
Matthews, ―Cuban Rebel is Visited.‖
200
During Castro‘s visit to the U.S. in April 1959, he stated that his revolution was against ―all kinds of
dictators…That is why we are against communism.‖ (Dana Schmidt, ―Castro Stresses Land Reform Aim,‖ 1.)
201
―Another Guatemala?‖ 65.
71

In March 1959, when he was called upon by former Costa Rican President José
Figueres to side with the United States in the Cold War, Castro declared Cuba neutral.
―[Castro] voiced his opposition to the idea expressed by Colonel Figueres and, by
implication, attacked the United States.‖
202
Time called Castro‘s neutrality stance ―a
forthright rebuff to the U.S.‖
203
During a Cold War filled with fears of the ideological spread
of Communism, non-alignment was not an option.
In April 1959, the New York Times explained that in Havana, ―a growing number of
persons here see a Communist pattern in the development of the revolutionary program under
Premier Fidel Castro and fear that communist influence is rising throughout the island.‖
204
It
was not until April 19, 1961 (two days after the landing at the Bay of Pigs) that Castro
declared the revolution to be socialist and not until December 2, 1961 that Castro called
himself a Marxist-Leninist; however, Cuba‘s association with the Soviet Union, and the
resonance of voices charging Castro with communism had already alarmed the U.S. and
made Castro the chief bad guy in a standard Cold War story.
As Castro rebelled against the idea that Cuba belonged to the United States, he took
steps that ushered in a new narrative about Cuba: Cuba as an adversary to the United States
in the Cold War. Cuba went from a vacation spot with hot nightlife and mildly amusing and
volatile governance to a forbidding Communist outpost unavailable to U.S. citizens. After
spending over a century believing that Cuba was a natural possession of the U.S., the

202
Phillips, ―Castro Bars Pledge to Join U.S. in War,‖ 4.
203
―All Wet,‖ 34.
204
Phillips, ―Reds‘ Alleged Role,‖ 1.
72

American public acutely felt the ―loss‖ of Cuba to Communism. Perhaps because of the
island‘s proximity or maybe because of a long shared history, Cuba‘s adoption of
Communism was more ominous than were similar actions of other countries around the
world. Two events between 1961 and 1962, the Bay of Pigs Invasion and the Cuban Missile
Crisis, characterized the bold escalation of Cuba‘s new adversarial relationship with the
United States and affirmed a new dominant narrative.

73

CHAPTER THREE: CUBA AS A COLD WAR ADVERSARY
From two powerful and politically charged events—the Bay of Pigs and the Cuban
Missile Crisis—emerged the second dominant narrative about Cuba disseminated in the
United States. Occurring in 1961 and 1962, these two international confrontations generated
dramatic and explosive news reports, popular images, and political discourse. Attention to
these events fashioned public memory about Cuba, memory that would prove to be long
lasting, and created a new narrative: Cuba as Cold War adversary. This new narrative
usurped the old narrative of Cuba as possession because of the force of the visceral terror of
the threat of nuclear war with an enemy whose outpost lay 90 miles from a U.S. coast.
Terror about survival suffocated the cavalier story of Cuba as playground and brings gravity
to the narrative of Cuba as unstable and mildly amusing volatile nation state.
The new Cuba as Cold War adversary narrative was comprised of two main elements:
the ―loss‖ of Cuba as reflected in the Bay of Pigs and the advent of Cuba as a dangerous
Communist satellite 90 miles away as reflected in the Cuban Missile Crisis. Although other
events and reports have contributed to this new narrative, these two events dominate the
narrative structure.
Cuba as Lost
The first element of the Cold War story about Cuba is the loss of Cuba to
Communism. After a longstanding expectation that one day the U.S. might buy, annex, or
act as protectorate to Cuba, it follows that the Cuba as a U.S. possession narrative concludes
with ―losing‖ Cuba. The theme of losing Cuba also emerges explicitly from the rhetoric of
John F. Kennedy during the 1960 presidential campaign. Just as Nixon charged the Truman
74

administration with the loss of China in previous campaigns,
205
Kennedy charged the
Eisenhower administration with the loss of Cuba. Kennedy eventually acts on this loss by
launching the Bay of Pigs Invasion in 1961. As a theme, losing Cuba runs implicitly through
State Department discourse about Cuba prior to the Bay of Pigs Invasion and through
President Kennedy‘s speech following the invasion.
Kennedy and the 1960 Campaign
Kennedy made the story about losing Cuba a key campaign issue in 1960. Kennedy
claimed during a debate with Vice President Nixon that the United States had never been on
the side of freedom in Cuba, and that even though two Republican ambassadors informed the
U.S. government that Fidel Castro was a Marxist and that Raul Castro was a Communist, aid
to Batista continued and, ―Today Cuba is lost to freedom.‖
206
In an October 6, 1960 speech,
Kennedy referred to the ―Communist menace that has been permitted to arise under our very
noses, only 90 miles from our shores.‖
207
He went on to state that Castro ―betrayed the ideals
of the Cuban revolution,‖
208
and that the United States ―can hardly close its eyes to a
potential enemy missile or submarine base only 90 miles from our shores.‖
209
The rest of the

205
In the October 7, 1960 Presidential Debate between Senator Kennedy and Vice President Nixon, the first
question of the debate draws this parallel for the candidates and for the public. Reporter Paul Niven of CBS
posed the following question to Vice President Nixon, ―Mr. Vice President, Senator Kennedy said last night that
the Administration must take responsibility for the loss of Cuba. Would you compare the validity of that
statement with the validity of your own statements in previous campaigns that the Truman Administration was
responsible for the loss of China to the Communists?‖ (―Senator John F. Kennedy and Vice President Richard
M. Nixon Second Joint Radio-Television Broadcast,‖ http://www.jfklibrary.org/NR/exeres/99355CAC-E029-
42A7-B400-71D04E12F957.htm.)
206
Ibid.
207
Kennedy, ―Speech of Senator John F. Kennedy, Cincinati, Ohio, Democratic Dinner‖ par. 1.
208
Ibid.
209
Ibid.
75

speech lays the blame for the situation at the feet of the Eisenhower administration and calls
for friendship for the Cuban people and actions to prevent other Latin American countries
from slipping behind the Iron Curtain. Stock Cold War metaphors such as the Iron Curtain
help transform the notion of Cuba from a tropical paradise to a cold and unfriendly place.
Kennedy‘s positions on Cuba, that Castro betrayed the ideals of the revolution, the
U.S must express friendship for the Cuban people, and the Cuban people once again will be
free, served as the bases for U.S. official rhetoric on Cuba during the first few years of the
revolution. This rhetoric contributed to a story of Cuba as lost, but retrievably lost. The U.S.
could take actions to prevent other countries from falling to Communism and could face the
loss of Cuba with a determination to see freedom restored to Cuba.
One of the most significant documents announcing the U.S. position on Cuba was
released by the State Department on April 3, 1961. Known as the White Paper on Cuba, the
36-page pamphlet explained that Castro had betrayed the ideals of the revolution, had
welcomed Communism into the hemisphere, and that his government represented an attack
on the inter-American system. The State Department constituted the U.S. government‘s
attempt to explain the rhetorical situation of the Cuban Revolution. Its paper proclaimed,
―Never in history has any revolution so rapidly devoured its children.‖
210
This story spoke to
the American public and policy makers. In acknowledging the positive changes made at the
beginning of the revolution, the White Paper explained the cautious support for the
revolution that many felt during 1959 as consistent with the anti-Castro stance of 1961 by
framing the situation as one of betrayal.

210
U.S. Department of State ―Cuba,‖14.
76

The context of the rhetorical situation, the Cold War, committed the United States to
action. Unfortunately, the action that had already been planned and that Kennedy inherited
from Eisenhower was the Bay of Pigs invasion.
Bay of Pigs Invasion
If the story about Cuba was one of loss, the logical response would be to attempt to
take back Cuba. Rather than launch a U.S. military invasion of the island, President
Eisenhower approved plans for a covert action by exiles to overthrow Castro. The idea was
that once Cuban exiles had begun the fight, the rest of the Cuban people would join forces
against Castro. On April 17, 1961, 1500 CIA-trained Cuban exiles landed at the Bay of Pigs
on the southwest coast of Cuba. CIA Director of Plans Richard Bissell
211
estimated to Robert
Kennedy that the odds the rest of the Cuban people rising up to overthrow Castro as a result
of the invasion were two out of three.
212
Bissell predicted that the exiles could take to the
jungles and become guerilla fighters if they did not succeed.
213
By April 18, it became clear
to the White House that things were not going well. Cuban planes took out the munitions
ship and Cuban tanks practically met the exiles at the shore. The Kennedy administration
decided to provide air cover for the brigade, but various problems plagued this plan and the
air support never materialized. The exiles were left stranded without support and the Cuban
government tried and jailed nearly 1,200 of the exile invaders. The operation was seen as a
win for Castro and a devastating loss for the Kennedy Administration.

211
Director of Plans was the title for the director of covert operations in the CIA.
212
Thomas, Cuba or The Pursuit of Freedom, 120.
213
Ibid.
77

News reports of the invasion clarified the position of the Kennedy administration on
the attack and on Cuba. During the invasion, Cuba and the Soviet Union accused the United
States government of launching the invasion. The United States denied U.S. military
involvement and explained that the issue was between Castro and the Cuban people.
Secretary of State Dean Rusk explained in a press conference that ―the administration was
‗not indifferent‘ to the intrusion of the ‗communist conspiracy‘ into this hemisphere.‖
214
In
responding to Soviet offers of help to Cuba, President Kennedy warned the USSR not to get
involved. His statement characterized the Cuban government as ―an alien dominated
regime.‖
215

Both the attempt and failure of the invasion had far-reaching consequences. While
the United States saw Castro‘s rule as a loss for the United States, not everyone shared this
narrative frame and many in the world community opposed the actions taken by the U.S.
President Kennedy spoke at the American Association of Newspaper Editors a few days later
on April 20 about ―that unhappy island.‖
216
Kennedy‘s task was complicated. He spoke to
many audiences who were expecting different things from him, including the Cuban
American community who felt betrayed by the lack of air cover, the American people who
needed to be reassured that their country did not just lose in a conflict, the international
community who possibly perceived the U.S. as having invaded Cuba unprovoked, the Soviet

214
―Rusk Declares Sympathy of Nation for Castro Foes,‖ 1.
215
―President is Firm,‖ 1.
216
Kennedy, ―Address before the American Society of Newspaper Editors.‖
78

Union who had denounced the invasion, and the Cuban people and government who had just
survived a limited attack on their government.
Kennedy chose primarily to address the American people and the international
community by emphasizing that the invasion was not an intervention by the U.S. but an
action by Cuban Patriots, although he admitted, ―we could not be expected to hide our
sympathies.‖
217
Rather than explaining that the CIA and his own administration had
underestimated the ability of Castro, Kennedy claimed that the brigade knew what it was
getting into, saying that if the U.S were to invade we would not ―expect or accept the same
outcome which this small band of gallant Cuban refugees must have known that they were
chancing, determined as they were against heavy odds to pursue their courageous attempts to
regain their Island‘s freedom.‖
218
He reassured the international community that the U.S. had
not violated any of its agreements or traditions and reassured the American people that it was
not the U.S. military that had lost to the Cubans. Kennedy also encouraged the American
people to take seriously the threat of communism in the hemisphere and to not ―fail to see the
insidious nature of this new and deeper struggle.‖
219
Kennedy‘s plea followed the rhetoric of
the familiar Cold War narrative.
In addition to speaking to the international community about the obligations of the
U.S. and the need for vigilance about communism, Kennedy had an answer for the Soviet
Union, stating that if the U.S. needed to intervene in Cuba, ―we do not intend to be lectured

217
Ibid.
218
Ibid.
219
Ibid.
79

on ‗intervention‘ by those whose character was stamped for all time on the bloody streets of
Budapest!‖
220
Any need for the Cuban government to be reassured that the U.S. would not
invade with its own forces was left unmet. In fact, President Kennedy carefully reserved the
right to intervene in Cuba, ―But let the record show that our restraint is not inexhaustible.‖
221

JFK went on to say that if the traditions of non-interference became an excuse not to act
against ―outside Communist penetration,‖ then the U.S. would not hesitate to meet the
obligations of national security.
222
These statements, as well as the Cold War warnings
against the spread of Communism undoubtedly worried the Castro government. According
to Richard Gott, this fear drove Castro to request a security agreement from the Soviets, who
instead of publicly promising a security guarantee, decided to put missiles on Cuba.
223

Similar to the White Paper released before the Bay of Pigs invasion, Kennedy‘s
speech continued the story that the revolution had been betrayed, reiterating the point that
Castro‘s betrayal of the revolution created opportunities for Communist encroachment. ―But
once in power, all talk of discontent is repressed; all self-determination disappears, and the
promise of a resolution of hope is betrayed, as in Cuba, into a reign of terror.‖
224

The President also broke with traditional Cold War rhetoric to make a distinction
between nation states and people within these states. This move, similar to others in
Kennedy‘s campaign rhetoric and in the white paper, stepped away from talking about nation

220
Ibid.
221
Ibid.
222
Ibid.
223
Gott, Cuba: A New History, p. 198-201
224
Kennedy, ―Address before the American Society of Newspaper Editors.‖
80

states as irreducible units in foreign policy discourse. In discussing Cold War rhetoric,
Wander explains that government officials talk about states as opposed to people to avoid
getting ―bogged down in moral concerns.‖
225
The irreducible unit of nation state in this
discourse allows policymakers to consider costs and benefits to international relations, rather
than the consequences to the people living there. Because Americans were subjected to this
move all the time in the post-Cold War rhetoric of democratic enlargement, it may not
immediately strike one as remarkable; but, during the Cold War, the rhetorical separation
was so out of the ordinary that the foreign policy discourse itself signaled to the American
public an actual split between the Cuban government and the Cuban people that had not
existed previously.
In the case of Cuba, the betrayal of the original ideals that drove this popular
revolution, created a distinction between the government, i.e. the new ruling revolutionaries,
and the people, i.e. the farmers and fieldworkers who made up Cuban society. Kennedy‘s
distinction between the government and the people was a strategic maneuver to justify the
consequences of the invasion as consequences the people of the country would willingly
accept to rid themselves of this government that is now rhetorically distinct from them.
Unfortunately, the assumptions of this distinction in Cuba resulted in grossly underestimating
or deliberately ignoring the popular support for the Castro government by the Bay of Pigs
planners. During the Bay of Pigs, this error proved disastrous. However, later rhetoric about
Cuba, specifically rhetoric about Cuban migration makes extensive use of this distinction.

225
Wander, ―The Rhetoric of American Foreign Policy,‖ 171.
81

Cuba as a Dangerous Communist Satellite 90 Miles Away
The story of losing Cuba was just the beginning. The alliance Cuba forged with the
Soviet Union did not raise too many red flags until more dangerous existing Cold War fears
underscored the gravity of this narrative. Missiles sat 90 miles away on the island of Cuba,
possibly aimed at the U.S. mainland. The threat of these missiles emphasized the proximity
of Cuba to the United States and constituted the second element of the Cold War story. This
element of the story became viscerally real during the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962. Already
frightening by itself, the arms race between the United States and the Soviet Union became a
nightmare when the USSR installed missiles in Cuba. The perception of Cuba in the United
States became indelibly altered by the crisis and the feelings engendered by the situation that
brought the world closer to nuclear war than any other time in history.
The narrative element of Cuba becoming a dangerous communist satellite 90 miles
away arises from the description of the Cuban Missile Crisis found in Robert Kennedy‘s
memoir, Thirteen Days, and historical accounts of the crisis, in speeches given by President
Kennedy and in statements by other U.S. leaders throughout the crisis, in news reports about
the situation, and in popular films depicting the Cuban Missile Crisis. From this discourse,
the public in the U.S. learned of the seriousness of the situation and lastingly associated Cuba
with grave global conflict. To illustrate this association, this section details the story of the
Cuban Missile Crisis, the aftermath frequently left out of the narrative, Cuba‘s titular role in
the crisis, and finally how the narrative affected the U.S. public in the long term.

82

The Crisis
The Cuban Missile Crisis began on October 16, 1962 when the Kennedy
administration was surprised by aerial photos taken from spy planes that indicated the Soviet
Union had installed offensive nuclear weapons in Cuba. For weeks prior to October 16,
ships arriving in Cuba from Russia alarmed observers in the United States who suspected the
ships carried offensive weapons. President Kennedy, however, was unprepared for the
revelation of Soviet duplicity because various Soviet ambassadors and ministers had assured
him the military assistance to Cuba was defensive in nature. As a result, this deception
shocked U.S. government officials who were taken unaware. Recalling this revelation,
Senator Robert F. Kennedy wrote, ―The dominant feeling…was stunned surprise.‖
226

The crisis compelled several members of the administration to strategize an
immediate response by the United States. Air strikes, a full invasion, or a naval blockade
emerged from their heated debate as the most forceful alternatives. President Kennedy
elected the naval quarantine as the best military response. On the evening of October 22,
1962, Kennedy announced to the American public the presence of Soviet offensive missile
sites on Cuba and his decision to impose a naval quarantine.
This Government, as promised, has maintained the closest surveillance of the Soviet
Military buildup on the island of Cuba. Within the past week, unmistakable evidence
has established the fact that a series of offensive missile sites is now in preparation on
that imprisoned island.
227

Like Kennedy, the American public reacted with shock, surprise, and fear.

226
Kennedy, Thirteen Days, 2.
227
Kennedy, "Radio and Television Report to the American People on the Soviet Arms Buildup in Cuba."
83

Over the course of the next several days, the U.S. imposed a naval blockade to
prevent any Russian ships from reaching Cuba with more weapons. Kennedy and
Khrushchev exchanged letters and blame for the crisis, with the U.S. demanding nothing
short of the removal of offensive missiles from Cuba. Adlai Stevenson presented
photographic evidence at the United Nations, garnering world support for the position of the
U.S. On October 26, Kennedy received a letter from Khrushchev stating that the Soviets
would remove the missiles if the U.S. made a pledge not to invade Cuba in the future. A
second letter from Khrushchev arrived the next morning demanding that the U.S. remove
missiles from Turkey in exchange for the removal of the missiles from Cuba.
Confounded by the contradictory nature of these two messages, Kennedy calculated
his tactical options. Deciding how to respond to the Soviet Union represented the most grave
moment of the crisis. Ultimately, Kennedy responded to the first letter but strategically acted
as though he did not receive the second one. To Kennedy‘s great relief, Khrushchev
responded by accepting the proposal to remove the missiles in exchange for the U.S.‘s
promise not to invade Cuba. Attorney General Robert Kennedy held a secret meeting with
Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin; Kennedy promised that if the actions of the government were
not publicized, the U.S. would remove missiles from Turkey.
228
On October 28, 1962,
Khrushchev announced on Radio Moscow that he would withdraw the missiles from Cuba,
thus signaling the end of the crisis.

228
President Kennedy had indicated that he wanted the missiles removed from Turkey six months prior to the
Cuban missile crisis, but no one completed the task. The missiles themselves were outdated and not needed in
Turkey. (Kennedy, Thirteen Days, 72-3).
84

Attempting Resolution in a Cold War Environment
For the American public, the actions of these two leaders ended the immediate
conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union; however, the story of the Missile
Crisis extended far past October 28, 1962. The story of October 29 and beyond is not a part
of the narrative about Cuba familiar in the United States. For example, dramatic portrayals
of the Cuban missile crisis, such as the 1976 film, The Missiles of October, and the 2000
film, Thirteen Days, focus on the decision-making process and the intensity of the danger.
These presentations of the crisis celebrate the resolution to the conflict as a U.S. response to
Khrushchev in a way that allowed both countries to avoid war and save face. What these
films do not portray is that after the immediate crisis had passed, agreements between the
United States and the Soviet Union took weeks to reach, and even when agreements were
reached, their terms remained unfulfilled.
Nevertheless, these popular films recount narratives familiar to the U.S. public,
narratives that contextualize Cuba‘s place within the larger story of the Cold War. In this
particular case, the new story associated Cuba with fears generated by the dangers of the
Cold War dreaded by the U.S. public. In addition, the story oversimplifies the actual process
of enacting U.S. policy, leaving out critical details about subsequent actions by Khrushchev,
Kennedy, and even Castro. In these popular images, the narrative of Cuba as Cold War
adversary receives greatest dramatic play and attention. Events not captured in these images
contain less drama and point to less strident differentiations between the factions.
In the events not captured by the popular narrative of the Cuban Missile Crisis,
President Kennedy and Premier Khrushchev exchanged letters and U.N. Ambassador
85

Stevenson met with Soviet officials to negotiate which weapons had to be removed and the
conditions of the non-invasion pledge. Kennedy announced in a November 20, 1962 press
conference that he had been ―informed by Chairman Khrushchev that all of the IL-28
bombers now in Cuba will be withdrawn in 30 days,‖ that Khrushchev ―agreed to remove
from Cuba all weapons systems capable of offensive use,‖ and that the U.S. ―agreed that
once these adequate arrangements for verification had been established, we would remove
our naval quarantine and give assurances against invasion of Cuba.‖
229

However, in concert with the narrative of Cuba as adversary, Castro refused to allow
UN inspectors into Cuba to verify the removal of missiles. President Kennedy declared that
―important parts of the understanding of October 27
th
and 28
th
remain to be carried out. The
Cuban Government has not yet permitted the United Nations to verify whether all offensive
weapons have been removed…‖
230
According to some, this meant that the missile crisis
never was resolved, and that the United States did not make a pledge not to invade Cuba.
231

At the end of 1962, Newsweek columnist Raymond Moley charged that in giving the U.N. the
responsibility for on-site inspections, the U.S. lost its demand for on-site inspections, as the
U.N. did not have the power to insist upon them.
232
In January, President Kennedy was
questioned about new military buildup by the U.S.S.R. in Cuba and answered that the U.S.
had been ―conducting continued surveillance‖ showing that the personnel connected with the
offensive weapons had left Cuba and that 16,000 to 17,000 Russians remained in Cuba to

229
Kennedy, ―News Conference 45.‖ This was President Kennedy‘s first news conference after the crisis.
230
Ibid.
231
Waldron and Hartmann, Ultimate Sacrifice, 21.
232
Moley, ―Expendable Missiles,‖ 68.
86

operate technical equipment.
233
Kennedy‘s tone beginning with the November 20 press
conference was that the danger involving Soviet weapons had passed.
While the crisis between the U.S. and the Soviet Union was resolved, the ―Cuban‖
part of the Cuban missile crisis was still a problem. Cuba was still ninety miles away,
communist, and uncooperative. Castro was still in power and feeling the need to assert
authority that was seemingly lost when he was bypassed during the crisis. In discussing
Castro‘s unwillingness to cooperate on inspections and removal of the IL-28 bombers,
Newsweek stated on November 26, ―Castro‘s refractory behavior emphasized a significant
fact – the Cuban crisis was shifting from U.S.-versus-U.S.S.R. to U.S.-versus-Castro.‖
234

Increasingly, the danger seemed to come from the bearded revolutionaries in the Caribbean
rather than from the Soviet Union. On December 21, Time printed quotations from Ernesto
―Che‖ Guevara that Cuba planned to continue revolutionary activities throughout Latin
America and that
―if the rockets had remained, we would have used them all and directed them against
the very heart of the U.S., including New York, in our defense against aggression.
But we haven‘t got them, so we shall fight with what we‘ve got.‖
235

Cuba‘s continued assertion of power and authority made them an unpredictable threat. Many
Americans supported increased economic sanctions or an invasion to get rid of Castro.

233
Kennedy, ―News Conference 47.‖
234
―If Castro Falls,‖ 17.
235
―Castro‘s Warhawk,‖ 24.
87

The “Cuban” Missile Crisis
Although the event was called the Cuban missile crisis, the crisis itself erupted
between the United States and the Soviet Union. The ―Cuban‖ part refers only to the
geographic location of the missiles. All of the negotiations took place between the U.S. and
Russia. Cuba merely supplied the land upon which the missiles were installed and also
created the political alliance that allowed Soviet missiles into the country. Cuba had already
been troublesome because of the nationalization of U.S.-owned property and the failed Bay
of Pigs Invasion. Not surprisingly, the people in the U.S. expected the worst from Cuba until
the facts became known when the situation erupted into a full-blown crisis.
Naming the event the ―Cuban Missile Crisis‖ cements the already shifting
connotations the public had in the United States about the word, ―Cuba.‖ The fact of the
event contributes less to the narrative about Cuba than the fact that it is referred to as the
Cuban missile crisis. The phrase does not accurately name the situation that occurred in
October 1962. The situation could have been called the Soviet Missile Crisis, or the Russian
Missile Crisis, or the Communist Missile Crisis. The missiles were not Cuban. The crisis
was not Cuban. The connotations that grew out of the name of this event include a crisis-
prone relationship, danger, and national security threats. The naming of the event
emphasized the reality of ―90 miles away.‖
After the end of the crisis, the name and the imminence of the danger the U.S. faced
in October of 1962 remain associated. Because the solution to the crisis came from
diplomatic communication between the Soviet Union and Russia, Cuba does not play a part
in the resolution of the danger, only in the crisis itself. Because of the events, Cuba and the
88

U.S.S.R. became more closely associated than before, and probably more closely associated
than the independent Castro would have liked.
Castro‘s obstinacy over the issue of inspectors represents his response to the rapid
shift in his role in the drama. After the Bay of Pigs Invasion, Castro‘s strength and support
became clearer to U.S. policymakers. More of a threat than previously thought, Castro
represented a serious problem for the United States. While Castro worried about another
invasion, the U.S. worried about a popular communist dictator in Cuba. When Khrushchev
bypassed Castro in negotiating with Kennedy, Castro was understandably upset. He had
suddenly become a ―Soviet stooge,‖
236
―merely an aggressive puppet of communist Russia,
and an expendable puppet at that.‖
237
Newsweek asks, ―Where does the great power play
between Kennedy and Khrushchev leave Fidel Castro? The answer is—in the American
vernacular—out in left field.‖
238
Castro had quickly lost credibility in the eyes of the U.S.
and Latin America. ―But after Khrushchev dealt directly with Kennedy on the Cuban
missiles, bypassing Castro as an unimportant puppet, the Cuban dictator lost even those
supporters, Latin American leftists have been bitterly disowning both Castro and
Communism ever since.‖
239
To reassert his power and relevance in the situation, Castro
played the only card he held: Cuban sovereignty. He was facing his own crisis of authority
and responded in the least effective way for regaining credibility. Without that credibility, he
remains the Soviet satellite, a key pawn of the Cold War narrative.

236
―If Castro Falls,‖ 17.
237
―The Lessons Learned,‖ 23.
238
Ibid.
239
―Castro‘s Warhawk,‖ 25.
89

In the crisis, the remarkable differences between Khrushchev and Castro served to
highlight who would employ diplomacy in dealing with the United States and who would
not. Castro came out of the crisis as the sticking point, the agent who held up the resolution,
the ―Cuban‖ in ―Cuban missile crisis.‖ Castro confirmed his part in the story about Cuba.
Castro came across as emotional, as reports from his meetings with U.N. Secretary General
U Thant showed. ―At one point the emotional Cuban ranted for two hours against the U.S.
while the courteous, soft-spoken Asian was not able to get in a single word,‖ the report says,
while on the second day, ―By all accounts, Castro launched into a tirade accusing
Khrushchev of selling him down the river.‖
240
In addition, Castro did not fit the image of a
statesman or a diplomat in his ubiquitous fatigues and hat. Castro ended up looking more
ridiculous, but more dangerous and more stable as a result of his association with the Soviet
Union. His willingness to play host to Soviet nuclear missiles and his unpredictability made
him, more than ever, a dangerous adversary to President Kennedy and his brother.
Lasting Narrative
Other than the Cuban revolution, the story about the Cuban Missile Crisis became for
the U.S. public the most significant chapter defining the relationship between the United
States and Cuba. The story achieved this high level of importance through the unified view
of the crisis espoused by and encouraged by U.S. leaders. The narrative also has had
remarkable longevity in explaining Cuba because of Cuba‘s subtle appearance in the story
rather than from an explicit detailing of the role Cuba played.

240
―The Lessons Learned,‖ 22.
90

As has been the case with other national security crises, many leaders sounded the
call for unity and support for the president during the Cuban missile crisis. President
Eisenhower, in fundraising speech in Pennsylvania, called for support for President Kennedy:
―As in all international crises, America, as a unit, must follow her constitutional leader.‖
Eisenhower also denounced partisan political disagreement: ―So far as Cuba and Soviet
Russia are concerned, in the weeks ahead we cannot be partisan.‖
241
Time reported
Republican Senator Kenneth Keating (NY) as saying ―Americans will support the President
on the decision or decisions he makes for the security of our country,‖ and former president
Hoover declared, ―There is only one course for the American people in this crisis of
Communist aggression—to stand by the president.‖
242
Time also indicated that the U.S. had
strong international support in the decision to act, including NATO and OAS support. The
New York Times featured several articles each day about different countries expressing
support for the United States during the crisis.
243
Demonstrating the unity of opinion and
support for the president shows that it is the popular and right thing to do, encouraging
readers within the United States to follow suit. Willingness to abandon partisanship signals
the dualistic nature of the conflict of the Cold War.
There is room for some disagreement in unity, as acknowledged by President
Eisenhower, ―a united America need not and should not degenerate into a conformist, a

241
Eisenhower, ―Republican County Dinner.‖
242
―The Backdown,‖ 16.
243
Headlines included ―U.S. Thinks Latins Sanction Force‖, ―Action on Cuba Spurs Hemisphere to Unity‖, and
―Cuba Crisis Shows our Friends Will Support Strong Stand‖.
91

silenced America.‖
244
But at the same time, the primary effect of this unity is a singularity of
experience and a narrowing of the narratives available to explain events. A lack of public
outcry, international disagreement, or contention within Congress meant only one official
story was to exist. The bases for any alternative narratives are more obscure and are less
likely to produce stories readily accepted by the public. In the case of a crisis, the emotional
intensity and level of danger are the most prominent part of public memory about an event.
The details of personal experience become eclipsed and the official version of the story is the
only thing that remains. Films like The Missiles of October and Thirteen Days may prompt
recall of the details, but again, these stories are based on official versions of the narrative of
the missile crisis, possibly reframing remembered experiences within that official narrative,
even if they had not been lived that way the first time. This reframing results in a single
story from which to draw in explaining current relations, experiences, and actions.
The single story that emerges from this crisis appears to be circumscribed in the
"thirteen days" of the tense event and largely revolves around decision making and the
seriousness of the Cold War. The 2000 film Thirteen Days portrays the Kennedy brothers as
engaging in careful negotiation, discussion, and debate to avoid responding violently to the
crisis. The story of the Cuban Missile Crisis teaches lessons about group communication,
decision making, and diplomacy. These lessons see the story repeated in many contexts,
usually emphasizing the familiar aspect of tense decision making.
The story about Cuba that comes out of the crisis does so subtly. Both because of the
name of the crisis and because Castro‘s role in the thirteen days is implicit, Cuba retains its

244
Eisenhower, ―Republican County Dinner.‖
92

central role in the story. The crisis seems resolved at the end of the thirteen days without the
appearance of Cuba in that resolution. Cuba is only part of the problem, not part of the
solution. Because of the lack of explicit detail about Cuba‘s role, revision of the impressions
made during the crisis may prove difficult to implement. Cuba represented a danger to the
United States by its instability, its leader‘s unpredictability, and its ties to the Soviet Union.
The previous amusing instability of politics in Cuba had been replaced with a Soviet-
supported dictator who held onto power but could be used as a puppet by Communist leaders.
That same dictator harbored a desire for power that brought the U.S. to the brink of nuclear
war with the Soviet Union. Castro‘s obstinacy in refusing UN inspectors and his tirade at the
UN had deleterious effects on his power after the Cuban Missile Crisis, but these details and
the erosions do not appear in the popular narrative of the crisis.
If the narrative of the Cuban Missile Crisis were complete, it would also include
images of Castro as a ridiculous buffoon, losing stature on an international stage. Castro
would also be depicted as ineffectual and unimportant as a result of the Soviet Union
bypassing him in building the missile sites and in resolving the conflict. Instead, the public is
left with the incomplete and somewhat inaccurate impression that Castro loomed even more
dangerous and powerful at the end of the crisis.
The impression about Cuba resulting from this story guided immediate policy
decisions, such as Kennedy adding further trade and travel restrictions to the embargo in
1963 as well as additional restrictions imposed thirty years later. The fear of Cuba that
resulted from the story generated out of this event has lasted for generations, prompting
many to argue that the U.S. can never trust Cuba. In Chapter Six, I will explore how the
93

Cuban Missile Crisis story and the Cold War narrative have locked the United States into an
unproductive and adversarial relationship with Cuba. I will also make suggestions for how
the U.S. might take advantage of new openings and lay these narratives to rest.
Cuba as Engaging in Cold War Aggression
The Cuban Missile Crisis cemented Cuba‘s place in the narrative of the Cold War.
Their alliance with the Soviet Union proved to be dangerous and their leader unpredictable.
Throughout the rest of the Cold War, events continued to confirm Cuba‘s place in the Cold
War story. Cuba began sending troops to conflicts in countries such as Ghana, Guinea-
Bissau, Angola, Ethiopia, Granada, and Nicaragua.
245
These interventions garnered
condemnation from the United States. President Nixon proclaimed in 1969 that ―[t]he
‗export‘ of revolution is an intervention which our system cannot condone, and a nation like
Cuba which seeks to practice it can hardly expect to share in the benefits of this
community.‖
246
Referring to Cuba‘s involvement in Angola, President Gerald Ford stated in
1976, ―The U.S. cannot accept as a principle of international conduct that Cuban troops and
Soviet arms can be used for a blatant intervention in local conflicts in areas thousands of
miles from Cuba and the Soviet Union, and where neither can claim an historic national
interest.‖
247
He encouraged a stand against Soviet and Cuban intervention in Angola, stating
that if the U.S. did not act, ―[i]t would make Cuba the mercenaries of upheavals

245
Williams, ―Cuba: Havana‘s Military Machine.‖
246
Nixon, ―Remarks at the Annual Meeting.‖
247
Ford, ―Letter to the Speaker of the House.‖
94

everywhere.‖
248
President Ford characterized the Cuban intervention as the ―Soviet Union
[operating] with impunity many thousands of miles away with Cuban troops and massive
amounts of military equipment.‖
249
In this way, Cuba continued to be seen as a puppet of the
Soviet Union. Within the story of the Cold War, the United States wished to prevent other
nation states from falling to Communism. Cuba‘s help with revolutions thousands of miles
away, as well as with those in the Western Hemisphere confirmed Cuba as a dangerous agent
of the Soviet agenda.
This chapter has explored the development of the Cold War narrative about Cuba.
Cuba‘s new relationship with the Soviet Union thrust Cuba into the existing Cold War
drama. Following the loss of Cuba and its disappearance behind the Iron Curtain, the United
States was faced with the danger of Cuba‘s relationship with the Soviet Union in the form of
nuclear weapons 90 miles off the shores of the U.S. Cuba‘s entrance into the Cold War
drama presented a colorful villain in the form of Fidel Castro and a new distinction between
the people and the government of Cuba. For the rest of the Cold War, the United States
emphasized this distinction, both to encourage Cubans to rise up against Castro and to
welcome the Cuban people dissatisfied with the Castro regime. Chapter Four examines the
migration of Cuban people to the United States and how the story about Cuban migration
emphasized the Cold War position of Cuba in the world.

248
Ibid.
249
Ford, ―Remarks on Senate Action.‖
95

CHAPTER FOUR: CUBA AS A PLACE FROM WHICH TO ESCAPE
In the standard narrative about the Cold War, life under Communism meant a lack of
freedom, assault on families, and loss of property. Cuba slipping behind the Iron Curtain
transformed it into such a place and created the third narrative explaining Cuba: Cuba as a
place from which to escape. Hundreds of thousands of people left Cuba for a better life
elsewhere, and most of them ended up in the United States. The narrative of Cuba as a place
people left relies upon the Cold War story to explain Cuban migration. Cuba used to belong
to the U.S. as a possession, and then Cuba became a Cold War adversary. Now, instead of
possessing Cuba, the United States welcomed the Cuban people to their natural destiny as
part of the U.S. This story includes four elements. The first speaks to how the first and
second waves of immigration confirmed major details of the Cold War narrative and
established a Cold War frame for understanding Cuban migration. The second element is
that the third wave of immigration in 1980 challenged the Cold War story with the Scarface
narrative, but that this challenge ultimately failed to displace the Cold War narrative. The
third element of the story is that the fourth wave of migration in 1994 challenged the Cold
War story with the ―boat people‖ or immigration narrative but political needs kept the Cold
War frame in place. The fourth element is that in 2000, the story of a six-year-old boy from
Cuba stretched the Cold War narrative to its breaking point.
Confirming the Cold War story: First and Second Wave Migration
Certainly people had migrated to the United States from Cuba long before the Cuban
revolution; my use of the term ―first wave‖ immigration, however, refers to the large number
of people who fled Cuba in the immediate aftermath of the revolution, between 1959-1962.
96

The second wave of immigration occurred from 1965-1973. These first two waves of
migration established the Cold War migration story with respect to Cuba and helped explain
Cuban migration to the American public.
Official political rhetoric in the U.S. about Cuban exiles served to cement the
connection between the exiles and the position of the United States in the Cold War. In his
1961 State of the Union Address, President Eisenhower likened Cuban exiles to those fleeing
Hungary a few years earlier, ―Over 32,000 victims of Communist tyranny in Hungary were
brought to our shores, and at this time our country is working to assist refugees from tyranny
in Cuba.‖
250
Eisenhower went on to specifically link immigration policy to the Cold War.
The Administration also has made legislative recommendations to liberalize existing
restrictions upon immigration while still safeguarding the national interest. It is
imperative that our immigration policy be in the finest American tradition of
providing a haven for oppressed peoples and fully in accord with our obligation as a
leader of the free world.
251

A week later, Eisenhower used the same rhetoric he had used when he encouraged the
American public to welcome Hungarian refugees with open homes and hearts.
This latest exodus of persons fleeing from Communist oppression is the first time in
many years in which our nation has become the country of first asylum for any such
number of refugees. To grant such asylum is in accordance with the long standing
traditions of the United States. Our people opened their homes and hearts to the
Hungarian refugees four years ago. I am sure we will do no less for these distressed
Cubans.
252

250
Eisenhower. ―Annual Message to the Congress on the State of the Union,‖ sec.11.
251
Ibid.
252
Eisenhower. ―Statement by the President on Releasing a Report on Cuban Refugee Problems,‖ par. 3.
97

President Kennedy continued this rhetoric, referring to the United States as a humanitarian
sanctuary
253
and characterizing the exiles as having been ―forced from their homes.‖
254

Consistent with later news stories about the economic and political success of Cuban exiles,
Kennedy said, ―Secretary Ribicoff paid tribute to the refugees as a proud and resourceful
people, whose courage and fortitude in the face of tragic disruption of their lives is
magnificent.‖
255

Kennedy also makes explicit the distinction between the Cuban government and the
Cuban people, ―our differences of opinion on matters affecting Cuba are not with the Cuban
people. Rather, we desire the closest, and harmonious and friendly, and most sympathetic ties
with them.‖
256
Additionally, President Kennedy‘s rhetoric following the Bay of Pigs
invasion refers to the Cuban people and makes specific reference to the Cubans living in the
United States.
257
This change in Cold War rhetoric allows for the Cuban people to feel
welcome in the United States, especially as fleeing Cubans are some of the best evidence that
Communism is a terrible system. As Cold War rhetoric, discussions about Cuba could
operate on two levels, the level of national government and the level of the people.
Migration of ―the people‖ to the U.S. allowed their individual stories to become part of the
resources available to the overall Cold War story. This made the story stronger, as people in

253
Kennedy. ―Letter to Secretary Ribicoff,‖ par. 3.
254
Ibid., par. 2.
255
Kennedy. ―Statement by the President Following a Conference With Secretary Ribicoff,‖ par. 2.
256
Kennedy. ―The President's News Conference, March 8, 1961,‖ sec. 8.
257
John F. Kennedy. ―The President‘s News Conference, May 5, 1961,‖ sec. 9.
98

the American public could identify with people who came to the U.S. to try out the American
dream and escape Communism.
The story about the Cuban exiles gave the public in the U.S. details about both Cuba
and the United States in the context of the Cold War. Reading in the news about the hordes
of Cubans who were eager to flee Cuba for the United States confirmed the perspective that
communist Cuba under Fidel Castro was not a place anyone would want to live. In addition
to the increasingly alarming reports reaching the U.S. through traditional news channels
about executions and suspension of legal rights, the people fleeing Cuba brought their own
reports of repression and tyranny. News reports about refugees helped spread these stories to
the American public. One such story was that of Miguel Angel Quevedo, who began
publishing Bohemia Libre, the exile version of the Cuban Bohemia, in Miami after fleeing
Cuba in July 1960. Quevedo published Bohemia in Cuba, but left when his initial support for
the revolution was replaced with criticism of Communist infiltration and when the linotype
operators refused to set a particularly critical article.
258
Miami Herald journalist James
Buchanan was jailed in Cuba awaiting trial for concealing information about an interview.
After spending twelve days in a secret police jail, Buchanan explained, ―Cuba isn‘t yet a
police state, but the network of spies and jails is being organized in a pattern that threatens to
smash the hopes and prayers of thousands of Cubans.‖
259
Jorge Zayas, a former supporter of
the July 26
th
Movement fled the U. S. fearing arrest after taking an anti-Castro stand in his
newspaper Avance. Two days after he left, his paper was seized by the Cuban government.

258
Grutzner. ―Magazine in Exile Opposing Castro.‖ 38.
259
Buchanan. ―Writer Says Fires of Hate, Distrust Building up a Police State in Cuba,‖ 6A.
99

―As an editor I cannot conceive of true democracy without freedom of the press.‖
260
Some
fishermen fleeing Cuba arrived in Miami in January 1961 saying that they were being
watched by police because of some critical comments they made. They were worried for
their families and asked that their details not be published in the news article.
261
Overall, the
first and second wave of immigration helped paint a picture of what life was like under
Castro.
First and second wave exiles also helped prove that the American way works. In the
first place, Cubans were fleeing from an economic system the United States had deemed evil.
In 1961, when Cubans were arriving at the rate of 100 per day, the Voorhees report to
Eisenhower about Cuban immigration stressed, ―the high caliber of the Cuban refugees…‖
according to the New York Times,
262
which also noted that those fleeing Cuba are doctors,
engineers, and lawyers: the very people the Cuban government needs to stay in Cuba. The
Wall Street Journal explained in November 1961 that the American Council for Émigrés in
the Professions, Inc. was providing assistance to Cubans who fled their home and their
profession. Scientists were being trained as teachers and lawyers in American library
science.
263

Second, once Cuban exiles were settled in Miami, their economic success showed
that capitalism brings out industriousness and innovation in people, while communism
suppresses it. It took a while for this success to manifest itself and for the stories to spread to

260
Zayas. ―‗I Erred in Backing Castro,‘ says Editor,‖ 1A.
261
Brewer, ―Job Program Gains,‖ 10.
262
Ibid.
263
Collings, ―Agency Assists Cuban Exiles in Professions to find jobs in U.S,‖ 1.
100

the American public, but once they did, the economic success became part of the story of the
Cuban exile. A 1968 article about Cuban exile political participation begins by describing
―the prosperous and growing Cuban exile community in Miami…‖
264
A year later, the Wall
Street Journal declared ―Cubans Thrive in Miami Area, And So Does the City,‖ in which
individual success stories are celebrated and the Cubans are noted as particularly industrious.
―The enterprise of the Cubans is impressive. One study shows that Cuban exiles and other
Latins living here have started or now control nearly a third of the city‘s businesses.‖
265
In
1971, a New York Times Sunday Magazine article detailing the employment challenges
facing members of minority groups in the United States, the second paragraph notes that the
Cuban community stands as the ―outstanding exception‖ to generalizations about these
challenges. ―In the last eight years, according to some estimates, Cubans have opened about
6,000 businesses ranging from small coffee shops to a shoe factory employing 1,500 persons,
mostly fellow Cuban exiles.‖
266
During events with increased media coverage of the Cuban
American community, the public is reminded of the economic success of Cuban exiles. After
the Mariel crisis, the 1960 refugees were referred to as ―economic bulwarks‖ of the
communities in which they settled.
267

In addition to economic success, the Cuban American community jumped into the
political process in the U.S. The 1966 Cuban Adjustment Act allowed Cubans the status of
resident alien, making them eligible for citizenship. The 1968 presidential election was one

264
―Cuban Exiles in Miami Take Part in U.S. Politics for First Time,‖ 114.
265
Thayer, ―Havana, Fla.: Cubans Thrive in Miami Area, And So Does the City,‖ 1.
266
―The ‗Other‘ Americans,‖ NER27.
267
Narvaez, ―A Cuban Odyssey: How a Family Was Reunited,‖ NJ4.
101

of the first major elections in which many Cubans were eligible to vote, and they ―actively
participat[ed] for the first time in the American electoral process.‖
268
The political success of
the Cuban people demonstrated that those who left Cuba (and most likely opposed Castro)
were the most politically savvy and responsible. Carrying out their civic duties at home was
only thwarted by the latest revolution. This political success was further evidence of the evil
of communism, as it seemed to be suppressing more than economic freedom in Cuba. This
served to illustrate that democratic institutions only flourish under a free market system. The
media noted this parallel by stating, ―As the exiles‘ prosperity increases, so does their
participation in local political life.‖
269

This kind of orderly political participation starkly contrasts with initial Cuban
American participation in various organizations dedicated to overthrowing Castro. In 1960,
the New York Times Sunday Magazine reported that ―between 500 and 600 Cubans spend all
or part of their days intriguing to overthrow Premier Fidel Castro.‖
270
The article goes on to
say that the tactics vary depending on which society the group comes from. ―Former Batista
partisans, for example, do not mix with those who once were friendly to Castro but have
broken with him. To date, the factions have not tried to form a popular front.‖
271
A year
later, the Bay of Pigs invasion helped highlight the various factions and disagreements
among exile groups. Headlines such as, ―Rivalries Beset Top Cuban Exiles,‖ ―Cuban Exile
Leaders Wrangle Over Failure of Invasion Plan,‖ and ―Disunity Hampers Cuban Exile Units‖

268
―Cuban Exiles in Miami Take Part in U.S. Politics for First Time,‖114.
269
Ibid.
270
Baggs, ―The Other Miami – City of Intrigue,‖ SM25.
271
Ibid.
102

ran throughout 1961.
272
This assortment of organizations, plans, and oppositions comes from
an older story about Cuban politics. As discussed in chapter 2, the pre-Castro story about
Cuba included accounts of frequent revolutions, elections that may or may not have been
legitimate, corruption, and violent demonstrations. The initial story seemed to be that the
Cubans brought this chaotic Latin politics with them to Florida when they fled. However,
after the overthrow of Castro seemed less and less likely and Cubans settled into political life
in the U.S., the needs of the Cold War story helped emphasize their economic and political
successes in the U.S. The story shifted to emphasize that the factions, oppositions,
revolutions, and violence were left behind in Castro‘s Cuba, and how repressive Castro had
to be to maintain power in that climate. The narrative about Cuban American political
participation in the context of the Cold War necessarily contrasted the working democracy in
the U.S. with the problems in Cuba.
273

Also contributing to the impression that Castro‘s Cuba was politically broken was the
emigration of former members of Castro‘s government. When people who used to be a part
of his revolution came to the U.S. with stories of increasing radicalization and tyranny, the
picture of the Cuban government as an evil threat was solidified for the American people.
Both former Prime Minister Jose Miro Cardona and Major Raul Chibas fled Cuba for the
United States after the revolution started to radicalize. In July 1960, Miro Cardona walked

272
Szulc, ―Rivalries Beset Top Cuban Exiles,‖ Brewer, ―Cuban Exile Leaders Wrangle Over Failure of Invasion
Plan,‖ Brewer, ―Disunity Hampers Cuban Exile Units.‖
273
While intrigue, disunity, and terrorism continued through the 70s, 80s, and 90s, the emphasis on lobbying
and voting made the chaos exceptional stories rather than the norm they once were.
103

into Argentina‘s embassy in Cuba and asked for asylum.
274
He claimed to have been
betrayed by the shift to communism in Cuba.
275
Subsequently arriving in the U.S. in October
1960, he was elected to be the president of the Revolutionary Council, planning a provisional
government for installing when they took back control of Cuba.
276
Another Cuban leader,
Major Chibas, referred to by a New York Times editorial as ―one of Fidel Castro‘s most loyal
supporters,‖
277
defected in August of 1960. The front page of the August 4, 1960 New York
Times ran ―Close Castro Aide Flees to Florida,‖ but without comment from Raul Chibas.
The next day, the New York Times ran a UPI story quoting Chibas as explaining that his
defection ―was the only way I could make it known to the Cuban people that I did not like
what their government was doing.‖
278
Chibas noted that Castro‘s popularity was on the
decline and that ―red indoctrination‖ was everywhere. He accused Castro of having betrayed
the ideals of the Cuban revolution.
279

Many of these former Castro associates formed or joined organizations dedicated to
overthrowing Castro or planning the government after Castro. Jose Mira Cardona became
the head of the Cuban Revolutionary Council, a group of Cuban leaders dedicated to
realizing the goals of the revolution they believed Castro hijacked and distorted. Cardona

274
Szulc, ―Ex-Cuban Premier Quits Regime and Asks Asylum,‖ 1,4.
275
Szulc, ―Miro Accuses Cuba of Betrayal on Reds,‖ 1.
276
Kihss, ―Cuban Exiles Pick Provisional Chief,‖ 1.
277
―The Cuban Defectors,‖ 22.
278
―Castro Aide Says He Defected to Show Opposition To Regime,‖ 3.
279
Ibid.
104

appeared on the cover of Time in April 1961 after the Bay of Pigs invasion.
280
Inside, an
article detailed the disaster of the Bay of Pigs invasion, during which UN Ambassador Adlai
Stevenson spoke before the United Nations responding to charges by Cuba‘s UN ambassador
Raul Roa that the invasion was done by hired mercenaries.
―Many of them are Dr. Roa's friends and associates of long standing,‖ said Stevenson.
―They make a rather impressive list: the first Provisional President of the
Revolutionary Government, Dr. Manuel Urrutia; the first Prime Minister, Dr. José
Miró Cardona; the first President of the Supreme Court, Dr. Emilio Menéndez.‖
Stevenson read the full roll call: ―Nearly two-thirds of Castro's first Cabinet, rebel
leaders, labor leaders, editors and commentators, and even such confidants as Juan
Orta, the head of the Prime Minister's own office.‖
281

If Castro‘s own collaborators and loyal supporters could not remain in the country,
were imprisoned, or dedicated themselves to opposing Castro, then clearly, he was a very bad
leader and possibly a very bad person. Cementing this evaluation was the fact that members
of Castro‘s family moved to Miami and became prominent members of the Cuban American
community and active in exile politics. As detailed by Ann Louise Bardach in Cuba
Confidential, Fidel‘s bitter custody battle with his first wife, Mirta Diaz-Balart over their son
Fidelity resulted in additional tensions between Fidel and her family. She and most of her
family moved to Miami.
282
Later, her nephews Lincoln and Mario Diaz-Balart were both
elected to Congress in Florida. Fidel‘s sister, Juanita Castro publicly broke with her brother
in 1964 and left Cuba for Mexico, eventually moving to Miami. In an October 13, 1964 New
York Times article she compared Castro to Nero and said that the time was ripe for his

280
Time Magazine, April, 28, 1961, Cover.
281
―The Massacre,‖ 17.
282
Bardach, Cuba Confidential: Love and Vengeance in Miami and Havana, 45-50.
105

overthrow.
283
A month later, she blamed her brother for Kennedy‘s death.
284
If his own
sister reported that the revolution was doing bad things
285
and that it lacked support in
Cuba,
286
then the U.S. was right to do what was necessary to bring a better situation to the
Cuban people. The story about the Cuban government was largely already a story about one
man, the details about Castro‘s personal life (made available only through their immigration)
emphasized that the Cuban drama and the rhetoric about Cuba was about one character, Fidel
Castro. This also emphasized that under Castro, family was not important.
Thousands of people in Cuba couldn‘t leave right away when they wanted to, but
feared for their children, becoming alarmed at rumors that the communists planned to ship all
children off for education and brainwashing in Russia.
287
The fears experienced by Cuban
parents represented the worst of the red scare. Describing a typical situation of the police
finding a homeless Cuban refugee child on the street in 1960 the AP explained, ―His story
was invariably the same. To keep him out of political trouble or to escape Communist
teachings in Cuba, the child‘s parents had pinned a visitor‘s visa to his shirt and sent him to
relatives here.‖ Many children were shuffled from home to home until they ended up on the
street.
288
Román de la Campa was one of the 14,000 children relocated to and within the

283
―Sister Says Castro Might Ruin Cuba,‖ 15.
284
Long, ―Sister of Castro Assails him Here,‖ 11.
285
Ibid.
286
‖Sister Says Castro Might Ruin Cuba,‖ 15.
287
de la Campa, Cuba on My Mind, 37.
288
―Cuban Children Helped in Florida‖ 41.
106

United States
289
as a part of the Pedro Pan program begun by the Catholic Charities of South
Florida in 1961.
290
After almost a year, de la Campa‘s parents joined him and his sisters in
Florida. Joan Gross, involved as a social worker in the program noted that teenagers
frequently had the hardest time with homesickness because ―they are old enough to realize
that a reunion with their parents is not guaranteed.‖
291
Yvonne Conde‘s study of Pedro Pan
children notes that 85% of them think their parents did the right thing in rescuing them from
Communism.
292
De la Campa notes the irony, however, of parents‘ fears of losing parental
rights prompting them to send their children away to be relocated around the United States
without their knowledge or consent.
293
It seems as if the rhetoric and fears about what
Communism does to families led to the fracturing and heartache that people feared the most.
While these events led to the creation of the story about the Cuban exile, the story is
bolstered by and contributes to particular forms of rhetoric and policies in the United States.
Contributing to the sense of Cuban exceptionalism is the labeling of Cuban Americas as
exiles rather than as immigrants. ―Exile‖ implies that an individual has temporarily relocated
to the U.S. for political reasons. As pointed out by Lisandro Perez, founder of the Cuban
Research Institute at Florida International University, in a Frontline interview about the
Cuban American community during the Elián affair, ―It's very important to the image of
Cuban-Americans to see themselves and for others to see them as exiles, not as immigrants.

289
de la Campa, Cuba on my Mind, 37.
290
―Cuban children Helped in Florida,‖ 41.
291
Ibid.
292
Conde, Operation Pedro Pan: The Untold Exodus of 14,000 Cuban Children, 225.
293
de la Campa, pg 41.
107

The term ‗immigrant‘ to them denotes the notion of people who come in search of economic
opportunities.‖
294
He goes on to say,
Cubans, despite what may be the reality, do have this ideology that they came here
because they were in a sense driven out, impelled to leave by a government and by a
political system. Therefore they view themselves as exiles.
295

In the same set of Frontline interviews, Max Castro, a senior research fellow at the Dante
Fascell North South Center at the University of Miami says, ―People defined themselves as
exiles, that is, they felt that they would go back to Cuba.‖
296
Victor Curry, a Baptist Bishop
and head of the Miami-Dade NAACP stated that, ―‗Exile‘ means that they're not going to
assimilate—that one day they're going to go back to Cuba.‖
297
―Exile‖ also means that
Cubans remain largely outside of the debates about immigration. Emphasizing the role that
the Cold War plays in their own migration story helps keep discourse about their place in the
U.S. grounded in discussions about refugees and exiles, rather than immigrants.
While Cuban Americans see themselves as exiles residing in the United States
temporarily as a result of political circumstances in Cuba, the longer that Castro remained in
power, the less likely it seemed that they would ever be returning home. Cuban exiles began
working within the U.S. political system both for change in Cuba, as well as securing lives
for themselves in the United States.
298

294
Perez, ―Cuban Americans: Exiles, Not Immigrants,‖ sec. 1.
295
Ibid.
296
Castro, ―Cuban Americans: Exiles, Not Immigrants,‖ sec. 2.
297
Curry, ―Cuban Americans: Exiles, Not Immigrants,‖ sec. 3.

298
García, Havana USA: Cuban Exiles and Cuban Americans in South Florida, 1959-1994, 121
108

The view that the Cuban exiles were different from the other people who came to the
United States also played out in policy. Remarkable because of its uniqueness, the special
treatment of the Cuban immigrants evolved gradually. In the two years following the
triumph of the revolution, around 100,000 people arrived in the United States from Cuba.
299

U.S. immigration policy made it easy for Cubans to move to the United States. John Scanlan
and Gilburt Loescher explain that the U.S. adopted a ―passive admissions policy‖ where the
consular office issued expedited visas, the Coast Guard chose not to turn away Cuban
immigrants arriving in boats, and the INS did not deport anyone arriving illegally from Cuba
or those who had expired visas.
300
Contributing to the creation of these lenient immigration
policies was the ―special perception‖ of the Eisenhower and Kennedy administrations that the
waves of people coming from Cuba were temporary immigrants who would someday be able
to return home and reclaim their island nation. These views were ―embodied in the frequent
use of the word ‗exile‘ to describe those fleeing from Castro‘s Cuba…‖
301
In addition to the
―passive policies‖ that made it easier for Cubans to find refuge from Castro‘s changes, the
Eisenhower administration undertook active efforts to train a group of Cubans to overthrow
Castro. By the autumn of 1959, the CIA was ―not only in contact with the exile community
but [was helping] ferry Cubans from Cuba to Florida.‖
302

299
Scanlan & Loescher, “U.S. Foreign Policy, 1959-80: Impact on Refugee Flow from
Cuba,” 118.
300
Scanlan & Loescher, 118-119.
301
Scanlan & Loescher, 120.
302
Scanlan & Loescher, 120.
109

President Johnson makes the warrant that migration proves that Communism is a
terrible system explicit in 1965, ―it stamps the mark of failure on a regime when many of its
citizens voluntarily choose to leave the land of their birth for a more hopeful home in
America.‖
303
In this statement, during the signing of a 1965 immigration bill, Johnson also
said, ―we Americans will welcome these Cuban people. For the tides of history run strong,
and in another day they can return to their homeland to find it cleansed of terror and free
from fear.‖ Silvia Pedraza names this speech as the precipitating factor for the second wave
of migration. Specifically, the statement, ―So it is in that spirit that I declare this afternoon
to the people of Cuba that those who seek refuge here in America will find it,‖
304
and the
organization of ―freedom flights‖ from Cuba ferried around 260,000 Cubans to the United
States.
305

In 1966, the Johnson administration recognized that the Cuban émigrés would not
likely be returning home anytime soon, and agreed to formalize the immigration policy that
allowed for Cubans to become legal permanent residents of the U.S. if they were admissible
to the U.S. (i.e., they didn‘t face criminal charges at home) and if they had been in the U.S.
for at least two years. Known as the Cuban Adjustment Act, the law applied to all Cubans
arriving in the United States since 1959. This legislation made possible most of the second
wave of immigration between 1965 and 1973, as well as the Mariel boatlift of 1980.

303
Johnson, ―Remarks at the signing of the Immigration Bill, Liberty Island, New York,‖ par. 36.
304
Ibid., par. 31.
305
Pedraza, Political Disaffection in Cuba's Revolution and Exodus, 120-121.
110

Confirming and Challenging the Cold War story: The Mariel Boatlift and Scarface
The next major event contributing to the story of Cuban migration was the 1980
Mariel Boatlift. Details from the Mariel boatlift challenged the Cold War narrative with the
Scarface narrative, but ultimately failed to displace the Cold War frame.
The 1980 Mariel Boatlift began with a general thawing of relations between the
United States and Cuba in the mid-1970s. The OAS voted to end its embargo on Cuba,
306

Cuba and the United States opened ―interest sections‖ in the Swiss embassies in each others‘
countries, travel resumed between Cuba and the U.S., and Kissinger began secret talks with
the Cuban government.
307
In March 1977, President Carter lifted the ban on travel to Cuba.
At the start of 1979, Cuba allowed exiles into Cuba to visit their families. Both the talks and
the visits to Cuba produced widespread unintended consequences.
As a result of these talks, the Cuban government agreed to release several thousand
political prisoners. When the talks over Cuba‘s military involvement in North Africa broke
down, Castro‘s government decided to use the release of political prisoners in an attempt to
curry favor with the exile community in the United States. He especially hoped to use these
exiles to help shape the U.S.-Cuba foreign relations.
308
Although normally vehemently
contemptuous of the émigré population, Castro publicly announced that he intended to hold a
dialogue with Cubans living outside Cuba.
309
Known as the diálogo, the talks between the
Cuban government and the exile community began in November 1978 and involved many

306
Lowenfield, " ... 'Sauce for the Gander': The Arab Boycott and United States Political Trade Controls," 32.
307
de los Angeles Torres, In the Land of Mirrors: Cuban Exile Politics in the United States, 91.
308
Garcia, Havana USA, 47-48.
309
Ibid., 47.
111

people in the exile community, including 140 who traveled to Cuba in December 1978 to
sign the prisoner release and family reunification program.
310
Controversial within Cuba,
within the exile community, and among political prisoners in Cuba,
311
the diálogo divided
the émigré community in Miami and prompted terrorist actions against members of the
community who participated in the dialogue.
312
―Some of those who have participated in the
dialogue with Cuba since it began several months ago report death threats and business
boycotts. The exile media in Miami, they say, has largely refused to cover their
activities.‖
313
Despite the disagreements surrounding the dialogo, Cuba announced the
release of 3,000 political prisoners following the first dialogue. As Garcia points out, ―more
political prisoners were released in one year than in the previous twenty,‖
314
and by July
1980, the Cuban government had released over 4000 political prisoners, which was more
than their initial promise.
315

Another unintended consequence came from exiles who returned home to visit family
members. When émigrés were finally free to visit their relatives, they brought with them
gifts, stories, and evidence of success from their new lives in the United States. While their
visits helped the economy of Cuba, their prosperity in the U.S. contributed to jealousy,
resentment, and a growing discontent on the island. Frustrated with behaving like good

310
DeYoung, ―Exiles‘ visit is political, public relations coup for Castro,‖ A25.
311
138 political prisoners in Cuba signed a petition rejecting the diálogo and encouraging the exile community
to boycott it. Garcia, Havana USA, 50.
312
Garcia, Havana USA, 49.
313
DeYoung, ―Exiles‘ visit is political, public relations coup for Castro,‖ A25.
314
Garcia, Havana USA, 51.
315
Ibid., 51.
112

revolutionaries, many Cubans lost faith in the Revolution and wished to emigrate to the U.S.
Jokingly referred to as the ―blue-jean revolution,‖ popular opposition to the Cuban
government and the revolution grew and dissent threatened the stability of the regime.
316

In March of 1980, a crisis broke out when a group of six Cubans stole a bus and
crashed it through the gates of the Peruvian embassy. The guards stationed at the gates shot
at the bus and accidentally killed one of the other guards. Castro pulled the guards from the
embassy gates and thousands of people fled to the embassy to seek asylum. Within forty-
eight hours, 10,800 people had entered the embassy.
317
Peru was not able to accept all
10,800 refugees. Eventually a number of different countries agreed to accept 7000
immigrants. Costa Rica agreed to accept the remainder, but only on a temporary basis. The
airlifts to Costa Rica began on April 16 and ended two days later when Castro decided the
publicity was too negative.
318
After the flights ended, Castro decided that he would open the
port at Mariel and let anyone who wanted to leave Cuba leave any way that they could, and
encouraged them to call their relatives in Miami to pick them up.
319
By June 1, 1980, over
90,000 Cubans had migrated to Florida.
320
Between April 20, 1980 and September 1980,
125,000 people made it to the U.S. from Cuba.
321

316
Ibid., 54.
317
Ibid., 55.
318
Ibid., 58.
319
Ibid., 60.
320
Burt, ―C.I.A. Gave Early Warning of Exodus From Cuba,‖ A9.
321
Card, ―The Impact of the Mariel Boatlift on the Miami Labor Market,‖ 2.
113

In many ways the Mariel boatlift both confirmed and supplemented the Cold War
story. Castro‘s Cuba was still a place you would not want to live. The most obvious
confirmation of this long-held belief was the image of 125,000 people crowding on to
sometimes rickety boats and headed toward the United States. Many news articles and
broadcasts emphasized how those fleeing Cuba hoped to find a better life for themselves and
their families. On May 20, 1980, the New York Times ran ―The Long Journey of Hope from
Mariel to Key West,‖ and The Washington Post ran ―The Perilous Journey; Cubans Sail With
Hope, Return with Empty Arms…‖ on May 22, 1980.
322
The desperation of people seeking
to leave their homeland showed how bad things were in Cuba. Right after Castro announced
that people could leave the telephone office in Mariel was packed with people calling their
relatives in the United States to get them to bring boats to Mariel to pick them up.
323
And
even though the weather was bad and getting worse, hundreds of boats took to the water to
pick up relatives from Cuba.
324
Through the boatlift, the American public came to
understand that the refugees were forbidden to leave, but many had wanted to do so for years.
―During most of the 21 years that Fidel Castro has been in power in Cuba, the Cuban
government has been highly restrictive in allowing people to leave the country.‖
325
Once
people got to the U.S., they experienced some of the freedom they had sought.

322
Schumacher, ―The Long Journey of Hope From Mariel to Key West,‖ A1., Bruske, ―The Perilous Journey;
Cubans Sail with Hope, Return With Empty Arms; Cuban Refugees Meet Chaos, heartbreak in Attempts to
Bring Back Relatives,‖ Md. 1
323
Thomas, ―Cubans Phoning Kin in U.S. to get them,‖ A17
324
Crewdson, ―High Seas and Stiff Winds Threaten Flotilla Off Cuba,‖3.
325
Schumacher, ―Cuban Reunion in Newark Brings a Joyous Beginning,‖1, 27.
114

For at least an hour the uncertainties of the future were set aside, as several hundred
refugees celebrated mass. It was the first time in years that many had been allowed to
openly practice religion…It was in a spirit of hope that the service ended.
326

The Mariel event confirmed the details of political repression and economic failure in
Cuba, as the immigrants told their stories when they arrived in the U.S. Even before the
incident at the Peruvian embassy, a group of 67 people hijacked a boat in a Cuban port to sail
for Miami. When questioned, one explained, ―Havana, Cuba, plenty hungry, plenty
repression, too much communist, no good.‖
327
As the boatlift started, Rolando de la Arena
explained that he was leaving because he was laid off his job as a taxi driver and offered a
new job to either be a garbage man or a cemetery worker. He wanted to go to Florida to
work. When asked if the Cuban revolution accomplished anything positive, ―‗Health and
education,‘ he answered. ‗Nothing else.‘‖
328
―I am going to liberty,‖ the New York Times
quoted refugee Gaspar Fernandez who spent his journey across the Florida Straits seasick.
329

He went on to say, ―I am going to a great country where they give opportunity to all
immigrants to find work, to make a living and to walk the road they want.‖
330
The paper
explained that for these people ―the crossing is both an end and a beginning: an end to a long
arduous odyssey to escape one government‘s system and a beginning of a new life in

326
World News Tonight Sunday.
327
World News Tonight.
328
Thomas, ―Harbor in Cuba a Floating City,‖ 1
329
Schumacher, ―The Long Journey of Hope From Mariel to Key West,‖ A1.
330
Ibid.
115

another.‖
331
Experiences of those who went to pick up relatives at Mariel gave additional
evidence of how repressive Cuba had become.
Yesterday the Cuban Government started giving boat crews visas to come ashore and
stay at hotels in Mariel and nearby Havana. Although they initially were allowed to
leave their hotels, they are now being asked to stay inside and not wander around.
332

In addition to the news stories of the time, the narrative about Cuban migration
played upon and subtly reinforced the stories found in the popular culture. Two characters
from the 1995 film The Perez Family contributed to the understanding of the economic and
political repression in Cuba. Because the film appeared 15 years after the boatlift, and
because the boatlift was used as the backdrop for the story about the characters, the details
provided about life in Cuba were those that audience members more or less already accepted
as true. In the film, Marisa Tomei plays Dorita, a Cuban worker who decides to go to
America on one of the boats from Mariel. She dreams of meeting John Wayne and of
owning a small gold compact with shells on it. She is seen cutting sugar cane and imagining
the kind life she will enjoy in the United States. She joins crowds of other Cubans
attempting to leave for the U.S. and once there, stays in the Orange Bowl with thousands of
other Cuban refugees. Alfred Molina plays Juan Perez who is grabbed by guards in a Cuban
prison and kicked before being marched out by gunpoint to a square. A large painting of Che
Guevara hangs in the background. As the prisoner is put on his knees he declares ―Fire you
son of a bitch.‖ The guards do not fire and Juan Perez becomes one of the prisoners sent
away during the Mariel boatlift. In Florida, an immigration official asks Juan what crimes he

331
Ibid.
332
Thomas, ―Harbor in Cuba a Floating City,‖ 1.
116

committed in Cuba. He answers that he burned his sugar cane fields rather than give them to
―him….Fidel.‖
333

Even though the boatlift seemed to be a win for Castro, the event ultimately
confirmed the earlier detail that the American way works and that the U.S. would welcome
refugees from the Cold War with somewhat open arms. After two weeks of the boatlift,
President Carter answered questions about it saying, ―We, as a nation, have always had our
arms open to receiving refugees in accordance with American law. We now have more than
800,000 Cuban refugees in our country, who are making outstanding new American citizens,
as you know.‖
334
He acknowledged the problems that were arising as a result of the massive
influx, including the need to go to Congress to ask for money to cope with the wave of
people. ―But we'll continue to provide an open heart and open arms to refugees seeking
freedom from Communist domination and from economic deprivation, brought about
primarily by Fidel Castro and his government.‖
335
Carter was apologetic about the
consequences of open arms, but maintained the rhetoric of the exiles as refugees of the Cold
War.
Similar to the story told by the Pedro Pan project, the event of Mariel emphasized that
Communism destroys families. So many people were taking boats to Cuba to rescue family
members. Exiles were buying boats at the harbor in Key West or chartering boats for tens of
thousands of dollars. ―A young man with a 50-foot cruiser pocketed $23,000 in cash

333
The Perez Family, DVD.
334
Carter. ―League of Women Voters Remarks and a Question-and-Answer Session at the League's Biennial
National Convention,‖ sec. 9.
335
Ibid.
117

yesterday from a group of families who hired him to bring back their relatives, and the owner
of a large charter fishing boat took in $75,000.‖
336
Even facing fines of up to $1,000 per
Cuban brought back on a boat deterred few people from seeking to bring family back from
Cuba.
337
They had ―come [to Key West] with their savings in their pockets and a single
dream: to see again the mothers, fathers, brothers and sisters they had left behind in Cuba.‖
338

The papers were full of stories of families who were reunited for the first time in years. In
one of a series of articles in the New York Times about refugee families the paper noted that
the refugees were ―seeking not only to achieve personal liberty, but also to reunite their
families.‖
339
Family is also one of the main themes of the film The Perez Family. Dorita has
no family and attempts to build one from other refugees that she meets in order to secure
faster placement outside of the camp at the Orange Bowl and Juan seeks to be reunited with
his wife and daughter who left Cuba twenty years earlier. Nothing in the film turns out as
planned, but the premise of families torn apart by Cuba‘s Communism remains a strong
theme in the story.
340

Mariel also added details to the story about Castro. The boatlift provided details of a
story that Castro was still an evil leader who emptied his jails and unleashed his ―unwanted
elements‖ on the United States. Further, the reports also highlight that Castro got a political
win from allowing those who disagreed with him to leave the country. Most articles

336
Crewdson, ―High Seas and Stiff Winds Threaten Flotilla Off Cuba,‖ 3.
337
Ibid.
338
Crewdson, ―For Six Cuban Emigres, Voyage Ends in Despair,.‖ A14.
339
Schumacher, ―Cuban Reunion in Newark Brings a Joyous Beginning,‖ 1.
340
The Perez Family, DVD.
118

detailing the refugee influx noted that many of the seats on the boats were filled with those
who had crowded the Peruvian embassy and people from Castro‘s jails. The front page of
the New York Times proclaimed, ―Retarded People and Criminals Are Included in Cuban
Exodus.‖
341
The jump head read ―The Cubans Include Unwanted Elements.‖
342
The article
notes that Cuban soldiers in Mariel were filling two boats with refugees and that these two
boats ―are being used in a major effort, discussed openly by Cuban officials, to rid the
country of criminals, mentally retarded people, delinquents, and others the Government calls
‗scum‘ by sending them to the United States.‖
343

While all of these details helped confirm or enriched the stories that situated the
Cuban migration in the Cold War narrative, other details threatened to undermine this
narrative. In order to remain consistent with previous explanations, some effort was made to
explain these details in terms of the Cold War story. Criminals among the refugees offered
explanations and mitigating circumstances.
When the boatlift began from Mariel, Cuba on April 21, the Cuban authorities
announced that they were sending the United States ‗escoria‘ – ‗scum.‘ An easy way
to get a safe-conduct to the boats at Mariel was to show evidence of a jail term for
criminal or anti-government behavior.
344

Some even borrowed criminal records of friends to get out of the country easier, but some
were incarcerated as a result of misunderstanding and bad luck. Immigration officials noted

341
Schumacher, ―Retarded People and Criminals Are Included in Cuban Exodus,‖ 1.
342
Ibid., 17.
343
Ibid., 1.
344
Montgomery, ―1,774 People Without a Country: Cuban Refugees Sit in U.S. Jails,‖ 1.
119

that 24,000 of the Mariel refugees admitted to criminal records.
345
Additionally, these
reports also emphasized that some of these crimes were political in nature, such as attempting
to leave Cuba illegally.
While the news reports made it clear that some of the people that Cuban Americans
had to bring back on their boats with them were prisoners and criminals, nothing emphasized
this as much as the 1983 film Scarface. This Brian De Palma film starring Al Pacino follows
the story of Tony Montana, a Marielito who works his way up through organized crime in
Miami and begins a cocaine empire in the United States. The audience first meets Tony in an
INS office being questioned about his criminal past based on the idea that many of the
immigrants of Mariel were criminals. Tony‘s prison tattoo also indicates that he has some
criminal history, possibly as an assassin.
The context of the historical event is established through the use of narrative prologue
that reads,
In May 1980, Fidel Castro opened the harbor at Mariel, Cuba, with the apparent
intention of letting some of his people join their relatives in the United States. Within
seventy-two hours, 3,000 U.S. boats were headed for Cuba. It soon became evident
that Castro was forcing the boat owners to carry back with them not only their
relatives, but the dregs of his jails. Of the 125,000 refugees that landed in Florida, an
estimated 25,000 had criminal records.
346

This historical context is further established through the use of archive footage of boats
arriving in Florida, and footage of Castro‘s fiery speech in which he shouts, ―They are
unwilling to adapt to the spirit of our revolution. We don‘t want them! We don‘t need

345
Ibid.
346
Scarface, DVD.
120

them!‖
347
Other than that, the film makes limited explicit references to Cuba and Tony
Montana‘s connection to Cuba because it is not at all necessary to the story. In fact the film
is a remake of the 1932 film Scarface set in Chicago and based loosely on the life of Al
Capone. There are a few other references to Cuba and Cuban Americans: the scene in the
INS office also makes reference to Castro, Castro‘s prisons and to Carter‘s human rights
policies. In a scene mid-way through the film Tony goes to visit his mother and sister and
attempts to give his mother some money. His mother throws it back at him and angrily yells,
―You know, all we read about in the papers today are animals like you and the killings. It's
Cubans like you who are giving a bad name to our people. People who come here to work
hard and make an honest living for themselves.‖
348

At the end of the credits to the film, a disclaimer reads,
Scarface is a fictional account of the activities of a small group of ruthless criminals.
The characters do not represent the Cuban/American community and it would be
erroneous and unfair to suggest that they do. The vast majority of Cuban/Americans
have demonstrated a dedication, vitality and enterprise that has enriched the
American scene.
349

Despite this disclaimer and the relative unimportance of the historical context to the plot of
the film, for some, it is the most significant portrayal of Cuban American immigration and
perhaps the only representation of the Mariel immigrants they have seen. Before Scarface
started filming, Miami City Commissioner Demetrio Perez Jr. thought the movie would be
better if Al Pacino‘s character was someone working for Castro‘s government. He was

347
Ibid.
348
Ibid.
349
Ibid.
121

worried that the film would discredit the hardworking Cuban-American people. Perez write
a letter to the producer suggesting that the film not portray the Cuban Government in a
favorable light and asking that 20 percent of the film be devoted to showing anti-Castro
activities of those in the Cuban-American community.
350
Eventually, the producers decided
to film Scarface outside of Los Angeles.
The Scarface narrative was popular, largely due to its sensationalism, and its
persistence in the public imagination did sully the reputation of the exile community in
Florida. Most significantly, those who arrived during the Mariel crisis suffered a persistent
stigma among exiles that arrived earlier.
In the end, the Cold War story continued to explain Cuban migration most coherently,
including the 125,000 people who came during the Mariel boatlift. In the first place, the
difference between first and second wave migration and the people who arrived during
Mariel was felt most strongly within the Cuban American community and was not as starkly
presented to the rest of the American public, except maybe in Scarface. While the film and
story of Scarface was a more sensational portrayal of Cuban migration, the Cold War story
remained more coherent. The sensational and extraordinarily violent nature of the film
created a sense that it was not the kind of story the audience could believe happened all the
time in Miami. The suspension of disbelief required for enjoying the film meant that it did
not serve as a coherent narrative for understanding Cuban migration. Further, the papers
frequently ran stories of Mariel migrants looking for a better life and eager to reunite with
their families. The papers also reminded readers of the prosperity of the first and second

350
Jaynes, ―Miami Official Objects to Cuban Refugee Film,‖ A12.
122

wave exiles, making the Scarface narrative a story with poor narrative fidelity with the other
stories the American public knew to be true about Cuban migration.
The Cold War story, that people were fleeing an evil government and evil system and
that the United States ought to continue to welcome them with open arms continued to have
the most coherence for understanding the place of Cuban exiles in American society. It made
the most sense that if people were fleeing from Castro‘s Cuba, they were on the side of the
United States. It also made the most sense that if they had criminal backgrounds it was
because the system they fled forced them to resort to criminal activity. That Cuba lacked a
proper rule of law was consistent with the impressions of the politically broken island.
Further, if there were dangerous criminals coming to the U.S. from Cuba, officials in the U.S.
had most likely taken care of them through the detention centers other measures in place,
351

especially because the United States would be better equipped to deal with criminals than
would a place like Cuba.
Additionally, the Cold War story continued to have the most fidelity for the American
people, as it rang true with all of the other stories about Cuban migration the public had heard
during the previous twenty years. Further, the Cold War story accounted for more details of
Cuban migration than the Scarface narrative did. The economic and political success of
Cuban Americans points to the fact that they were good people who although oppressed in
their own country were able to achieve success in a democratic free market system. When
Ronald Reagan assumed the presidency in 1981, the Cold War narratives were further

351
A screening process as refugees arrived in the U.S. determined if exiles needed to be detained upon their
entry. Many of the Mariel exiles stayed in centers like the Orange Bowl in Miami and Fort Chafee in Arkansas
because they did not have family to stay with.
123

reinforced. With an articulate spokesperson such as Reagan, the importance of these Cold
War stories as an explanatory lens through which the world‘s political tensions could be
understood was enhanced. As a result, the American public seemed to have little difficulty
stretching the Cold War narrative to explain the new details of the 3
rd
wave of migration from
Cuba.
The Immigration Challenge: Balseros and the Need for the Cold War
In the wake of the Mariel boatlift, the Cold War remained the best explanatory story
for relations between the U.S. and Cuba and for Cuban migration. At the same time the Cold
War was drawing to an end as many communist countries around the world collapsed or
transitioned to free market economies. The ostensible source of the Cold War narrative
disappeared and the United States appeared to have won that conflict. It seemed to be only a
matter of time before Cuba followed suit and collapsed under the pressure of losing the six
billion dollars a year that the USSR supplied in trade subsidies. The United States attempted
to hasten the collapse through measures such as the 1992 Torricelli Bill.
352
Cuba continued
to struggle with their economic crisis and instituted the ―Special Period in Time of Peace,‖
which enforced rations and programs to radically reduce energy use. These programs led to
increasing calls for change within Cuba. As before, major discontent prompted an attempted
exodus, and again, Castro‘s government found that by permitting emigration it could
externalize dissent. In August 1994, Castro announced that if the United States did not stop
encouraging illegal migration from Cuba, the Cuban government would no longer enforce

352
Also known as the Cuban Democracy Act, the Torricelli Act strengthened the embargo by barring ships from
the U.S. if they have docked in Cuba in the last six months and restricting food sales to Cuba. U.S. Department
of State, Title XVII—Cuban Democracy Act of 1992.
124

laws keeping people from leaving. The mass desire to exit Cuba became known as the
balseros crisis. Ultimately, almost 30,000 people fled Cuba in rafts, hijacked boats, and
whatever other objects they could get to float toward the shores of Florida. In the United
States, details from the balseros crisis challenged the Cold War narrative with the ―boat
people‖ or immigration narrative, but ultimately failed to displace Cold War rhetoric with
respect to Cuban migration.
Again many of the details that became known during the balseros crisis confirmed
the Cold War narrative. In the first place, the crisis showed that Cuba was still a place you
would not want to live. In July 1994, over 30 people died when their hijacked tugboat
headed for Florida was rammed by a Cuban government boat.
353
In August, riots broke out
in Havana after three passenger ferries were hijacked by Cubans ―desperate to leave their
country.‖
354
Between 10,000 and 30,000 Cubans gathered on the Havana waterfront on
August 5, 1994 at the rumor of another hijacking
355
and to shout ―Down with Fidel.‖
356

Protests and hijackings illustrated that the power wielded by Fidel was starting to decrease
and that the rest of the world was hearing the true voice of the Cuban people. A Washington
Times editorial noted,
On Friday, Havana saw its first real manifestation of civil disobedience in years,
when a crowd of hundreds rioted in the streets. A rumor that boats were available at
the docks to carry people to the United States attracted the many to the harbor, and a

353
Kerry, ―Castro Threatens to Flood U.S. With Refugees,‖ A3.
354
Booth, ―U.S. Warns Cuba over refugees; Castro threatens repeat of chaotic 1980 Mariel Boatlift,‖ A1.
355
Gordon ―Castro‘s threat to Unleash Refugees Brings a Warning by U.S.‖ 17; Rohter, ―Flight From Cuba:
The Policy; Castro's Refugee Weapon Has Been Wielded Before,‖ 11.
356
Booth, ―U.S. Warns Cuba over Refugees…‖A1; ―Castro threatens flood,‖ 1A.
125

fight broke out when the police showed up. In a country as tightly controlled as
Cuba, such an outbreak is almost unthinkable.
357

People left the country on rafts cobbled together out of cars, oil drums and old boats.
Press reports told accounts of how people drowned in the Florida Straits, willing to risk their
lives to leave Cuba.
358
These accounts illustrated how desperate Cubans were to forsake
their homeland; many even preferred death to life in Castro‘s Cuba. At the detention center
at Guantanamo Bay, one Cuban declared, ―We throw ourselves at sharks before we go back
to Cuba.‖
359

Once again, the reasons people gave for braving the straits during the balseros crisis
showed that Cuba was politically broken. Jesus Iglesia told reporters after arriving at a
shelter in Miami that ―There are no rights. You can‘t speak.‖
360
A Cuban still in Cuba
explained that ―the reason there is not more protest against Mr. Castro is that people are
afraid to speak up. ‗Remember that Mr. Castro is an intelligent man,‘ he said. ‗He has
created the most perfect system of repression in the world.‖
361
In the Cold War story about
Cuba, that made perfect sense: Castro, a communist tyrant, repressed political opposition. In
the midst of the crisis, Representative Lincoln Diaz-Balart wrote for the USA Today that
The Soviet Union may have collapsed, but Stalinism survives in Cuba. As my friend
Tom Lantos, a congressman from California who is a renowned expert on Communist
dictatorships, told the House Foreign Affairs Committee upon returning from Cuba

357
―Is Cuba Next?‖ A18.
358
Navarros, ―Straits of Florida Hide the Unknown Toll of a Rush to Freedom,‖ A1, A15.
359
Komarow, ―Cubans back where they began / 'Tidal wave of people' seen at sea,‖ 1A.
360
Fiagome, ―Florida Sets out Welcome Mat for Exodus of Cubans on Rafts,‖ 4.
361
Newman, ―Cuba Patrolling Beaches to Keep Children Off Unseaworthy Rafts ,‖A1.
126

recently, not even in the worst days of dictator Nicolae Ceausescu's Romania was
oppression as severe as in today's Cuba.
362

In 1994, more than ever before, it was also clear that Cuba was economically broken.
The stories the boat people brought about the Cuba they were escaping told of shortages,
lines, hunger, and desperation. Jesus Iglesia, added to his criticism of the political situation
in Cuba by describing that work was hard to find and that the government deducted so much
from his paycheck that he did not have much left to live on.
363
Juan Rene Rodriguez Perez,
diverted to Guantanamo Bay explained that he loved Cuba but had to leave for economic
reasons, ―There‘s no future. We must leave.‖
364
In Cuba, a Cuban worker told the New York
Times, ―Cuba is hungry…There is no food here. We don't have enough shoes or clothing for
the young people.‖
365
These details confirmed what the public already held to be true, that
Cuba‘s system did not allow for people to prosper. At that time, the Cold War narrative
portrayed countries that adopted communism as countries doomed to eventual failure. The
American public learned more about the economic and political problems during the 1994
crisis, which only validated that impression.
While many of the details confirmed the Cold War story, the balseros crisis also
illustrated that Cuba was mired in the past. In the first place, the Cold War was essentially
over. If the U.S. still needed to oppose Cuba as a Cold War adversary, it must be because
Cuba was still futilely fighting the ideological battle of the Cold War. Cuba seemed to be

362
Diaz-Balart, ―Impose Naval Blockade,‖ 10A.
363
Fiagome, ―Florida Sets Out Welcome Mat for Exodus of Cubans on Rafts,‖ 4.
364
Komarow, ―Cubans back where they began,‖ 1A.
365
Newman, ―Cuba Patrolling Beaches to Keep Children off Unseaworthy Rafts,‖ A1.
127

occupying a position in the world that no longer existed. Castro‘s long-winded speeches
blaming Cuba‘s problems on the U.S. were more absurd than ever without the muscle of the
Soviet Union flexing in the background. Cuba had become largely irrelevant from a national
security standpoint, but you wouldn‘t know it to listen to Castro. The Washington Post
explained,
During a long, mostly calm speech in front of a handful of journalists in Havana,
Castro also attacked the long-running U.S. economic blockade against Cuba, which
Castro said was the cause of his island's troubles and behind the current wave of
illegal immigration.
366

As the crisis began, Castro blamed the U.S. for encouraging illegal migration with its
immigration policy.
In addition to Cuba being mired in the past, U.S. policy suddenly seemed outdated
and disproportionate to the situation. A New York Times editorial pointed out the
contradictions in the situation,
But with the end of the cold war, Mr. Castro ceased to be a threat to U.S. security.
The Soviet collapse exposed the folly of Cuba's lopsided dependence on sweetheart
barter deals with the Communist bloc. Cuba's economy has crumbled. Yet the U.S.
response to these new circumstances was the enactment in 1992, with candidate Bill
Clinton's blessing, of stiffer trade sanctions, which even ban trade with Cuba by
foreign subsidiaries of U.S. companies.
367

The Cold War story did not lose truth because of this, but it seemed insufficient to continue
to explain U.S. policy toward Cuba.
Events of the balseros crisis reminded the United States public of Mariel and the
reasons people always had for leaving Cuba. As such, the public recalled the Cold War

366
Devroy and Williams, ―Coast Guard to Stop Vessels Bound for Cuba,‖ A34.
367
―Cubans, and Cuba Policy, Lost at Sea,‖ A22.
128

reasons they had always welcomed Cuban exiles into the United States. At the same time,
however, other experiences in the U.S. and fears of another Mariel called to mind an
alternative narrative frame for understanding this latest wave of Cuban migrants. The
immigration narrative challenged the prevalence of the Cold War frame. All over the United
States, immigration was a hot political issue. People in the U.S. feared that ―illegal aliens‖
were taking jobs and services in their communities. California passed proposition 187 in
1994 that required people to prove they had a legal right to be in the country before receiving
services. The story about immigration in the United States portrayed the U.S. as a desirable
land of opportunity that attracts unsuccessful people from other countries who want to live
out the American Dream and find a better life. The story included a strong current of fear of
the destruction of the American way of life by the many people (and many different people)
moving here. In this story, the immigrant was often cast as a villain who took things – jobs,
hospital beds, school desks, etc. – that rightfully belonged to American citizens.
In this climate, after the 1980 Mariel Boatlift, and in the midst of a Haitian refugee
crisis, the American public was concerned that their ―open arms‖ stance with respect to Cuba
had been a mistake. One letter to the editor writer argued as follows: ―In a purely rational
world, we would end the refugee imbroglio by taking the necessary legislative steps to
terminate the incongruous policy of granting residence status to almost any undocumented
Cuban who arrives illegally.‖
368

In 1994, it seemed that the balseros crisis might be more consistent with the
immigration narrative than previous waves of migration were. The vivid images of cobbled-

368
Taylor, ―Playing into Castro‘s Hands,‖ A19.
129

together rafts highlighted the role that economic desperation had played in creating this
crisis. While the severity of the economic problems in Cuba were consistent with the Cold
War narrative, the emphasis on migrating for economic reasons has been one of the key
distinctions between immigrants and exiles (who migrate for political reasons). These details
rang true with what the American public knew to be true about other immigrants and were
also consistent with the immigration story already told regarding immigrants coming from
other countries. Mirroring common concerns about immigration throughout the country,
Americans, especially those in Florida, were worried about where to get the resources to cope
with a new influx of Cuban exiles. Although Americans worried about how to deal with the
Mariel boatlift,
369
in 1994, these concerns seemed much more in line with the type of worries
circulating about immigrants. Political exiles do not typically raise these kinds of concerns.
Throughout the crisis, Clinton repeated that Americans did not want ―another Mariel.‖
370

The details of the story of the balseros crisis helped offer an alternative explanation
for Cuban migration to the United States and the discourse about the balseros also knit the
crisis to the immigration narrative. Some of the hallmarks of Cold War rhetoric shifted
drastically during the balseros crisis. Welcoming Cubans ―with open arms‖ or having a
―welcome mat‖ for Cubans were ubiquitous phrases in rhetoric about Cuban migration
throughout the different waves of immigration.
371
During the balseros crisis, news coverage

369
Florida even sued the USFG to cover the 125,000 people that overwhelmed services in Florida.
370
Clinton, ―Cuban Refugees,‖ question 10.
371
Presidents Eisenhower, Johnson, and Carter all mentioned open homes, open hearts, open arms, or open
doors as well as the word welcome.
130

began by explaining, ―Florida Sets out Welcome Mat for Exodus of Cubans on Rafts.‖
372
As
the crisis wore on, discussions began about the need to change the immigration policy as it
pertained to Cubans. The news media began to pay attention to this issue. For example, the
Washington Post ran a front page article with a headline that declared, ―Suddenly the
Welcome Mat says, ‗You‘re illegal.‘‖ Succinctly summarizing the rhetorical and political
background of the situation, the article explained,
For 30 years, it has been unthinkable to refuse asylum to refugees from Cuba who
crossed the liquid Berlin Wall that is the Florida Straits. But guaranteed asylum for
Cubans has been swept away by an array of factors that have drowned out Cold War
concerns: fear in the Clinton administration of a politically disastrous exodus into
Florida; a political need to treat Cubans the same as Haitians also fleeing a
dictatorship; and the intensification of negative attitudes nationally about
immigration. Yesterday, President Clinton announced his decision in jarring
language: he labeled the flight of refugees from Cuba ‗illegal,‘ a word no one would
have used in the past to describe those fleeing hard-line countries like Cuba that were
part of the Soviet bloc.
373

The day before, in an attempt to discourage Cubans from taking to rafts, Clinton declared in a
press conference, ―Today, I have ordered that illegal refugees from Cuba will not be allowed
to enter the United States.‖ Additionally, Clinton stated, ―I have directed the Coast Guard to
continue its expanded effort to stop any boat illegally attempting to bring Cubans to the
United States.‖
374
He explained that those picked up at sea would be taken to Guantanamo
Bay. Using the word ―illegal‖ twice in a short statement sent a stronger message to Cubans
than any President Carter tried to send in 1980 to stop the Mariel boatlift. At the same time,

372
Fiagome, ―Florida Sets Out Welcome Mat for Exodus of Cubans on Rafts,‖ 4.
373
Williams, ―Suddenly, the Welcome Mat Says 'You're Illegal',‖ A1.
374
Clinton, ―Cuban Refugees,‖ par. 4.
131

he was reassuring the American public that he was taking steps to deal with the problem of
illegal immigration and to prevent another Mariel.
Policy changes enacted by the Clinton administration during the balseros crisis
marked a change in U.S. policy on Cuban migration. Now the Cubans would be treated
much like anyone else arriving in the United States. When the Clinton administration
reversed the long-standing immigration policy that had afforded special treatment to Cubans
many argued that removing this welcome mat signaled the end of the Cold War stance
toward Cuban exiles.
375
In the United States, exceptional immigration policy had been so
important to the exile community that even considering a change in that policy had entailed
significant political risk. Indeed, hearing the President of the United States utter such public
statements had profound implications for how the relationship between the U.S. and Cuban
was described rhetorically. Immigration was a key factor in making the Cold War story
about Cuba vivid and tangible to the American people. Similarly, immigration policy was
vital to the place that Cuban exiles had in the U.S. imagination. This was especially true in
1994, when the difference between exiles from Cuba and immigrants from everywhere else
had so far kept Cubans out of the controversy over immigration. Changing the policy that
codified this difference also changed the rhetoric about the Cuban exile and prompted fears
that they might not hold the same privileged place that they had previously held.
In 1994, the Cold War had not been over long enough to have yet passed into
memory, but the debates about immigration, because they had occurred more recently,

375
McIntyre and Wienand, ―Washington‘s Shift on Immigration Abandons Cold War Relic.‖; Williams,
―Suddenly the Welcome Mat Says ‗You‘re Illegal.‘‖; Hoagland, ―Clinton‘s Cuba Miscue.‖
132

seemed to be more salient in describing the current conditions. While Cuba appeared to be a
hold-out in the Cold War, its importance in international relations had sufficiently receded
that in 1994, domestic concerns had overridden fears of western hemisphere dominoes
falling. Immigration was a looming domestic problem and reading the balseros crisis
through the lens of these worries cast a very different light on the exile community.
At the same time that the story about the Cuban exiles appeared to be changing from
a Cold War story to an immigration story, there were several aspects of the crisis and the
rhetoric that sought to explain the crisis that also served to help sustain the now damaged
Cold War narrative. In the first place, the policy change discouraged people from leaving
Cuba. Fewer people arriving in the United States meant that it was less likely that Cuban
exiles would be seen as significantly contributing to the nation‘s current immigration
problem. By taking steps to stop the balseros crisis from turning into another Mariel, Clinton
ensured that the immigration narrative would only be one explanation for what was
happening in 1994. It is easier to welcome with open arms 30,000 people than it is to
welcome 125,000 people.
Additionally, even though Clinton started using the word illegal, he still referred to
Cubans as refugees. He did not shift the language completely to fit the immigration
narrative. Further, Clinton blamed Castro for the fact that the people went to sea.
In recent weeks the Castro regime has encouraged Cubans to take to the sea in unsafe
vessels to escape their nation's internal problems. In so doing, it has risked the lives of
thousands of Cubans, and several have already died in their efforts to leave.
376

376
Clinton, ―Cuban Refugees,‖ par. 1.
133

He went on to refer to Castro as ―cold-blooded‖ and charged him with attempting to dictate
immigration policy.
377
The immigration narrative failed to account for Castro‘s willingness
to let untold numbers of Cubans die in the Florida Straits as they attempted the dangerous
crossing to the U.S. This detail of the story showed that Castro was willing to use his people
as pawns in the fight against the U.S., which is only something an evil communist tyrant
would do. By minimizing the impact of the migration crisis and naming Castro as the villain
of the story, there was enough room for the Cold War narrative to continue to coherently and
comprehensively explain the balseros crisis.
The policy change itself also left room for exceptional treatment of Cuban refugees.
Whereas before, the Cuban Adjustment Act granted asylum to Cubans who made it to the
United States, the new policy meant that if Cubans were found at sea, they would be returned
to Cuba and encouraged to migrate to the U.S. through legal channels. However, if a Cuban
made it to the United States without being picked up at sea he or she was eligible for the
same treatment under the Cuban Adjustment Act. (This became known as the wet foot/dry
foot policy.) Immigrants from places other than Cuba would probably be deported, but the
Cold War story and the influence of the Cuban American community saw that the new
immigration policy would still privilege Cuban exiles.
In the Cold War story, the United States was depicted as a beneficent hero welcoming
people in chains from all around the world. The immigration story focused on the scene of
the United States as a land of opportunity that should not be open to just anyone. The new
immigration narrative thus had a villain, but no hero. This new narrative did not help the

377
Ibid, par. 2.
134

American people discover what was best about themselves. The Cold War narrative was
comfortable, familiar, and cast the people of the United States and their government in a
more favorable light. This was a significant factor in encouraging most of the American
people to want to maintain an overarching narrative explanation for U.S. actions that
otherwise seemed badly outdated. The Clinton administration also benefited from acting to
curb migration from Cuba while also continuing to refer to Cuban exiles as refugees who
were fleeing from tyranny and communism. This allowed Clinton to maintain a relationship
with the exile community (who wanted to prevent another Mariel, too
378
) and also to respond
to the very vocal concerns of many other Americans who were deeply anxious about the
increased number of illegal immigrants in their midst. Clinton thus continued to use Cold
War rhetoric to refer to Cuba, Castro, and the Cuban exiles.
Beyond serving Clinton‘s political needs, Cuba was left hanging on by a thread as it
was believed that it might follow the path of the Soviet Union and soon implode. In fact, it
the United Stated continued to adhere to its Cold War restrictions on trade and travel to
Cuba, perhaps it could expedite the collapse of Castro‘s government. There would then be
an opportunity to forge a new relationship with a free and democratic Cuba. Using the
familiar rhetoric of the Cold War allowed the Clinton administration to persist in its
justification of the embargo. Although the Cold War might be behinds us, there were still
outmoded throwback regimes clinging to power such as the one in Cuba. Thus, it was
appropriate to use the methods of the Cold War to deal with a despotic leader such as Castro
who treated his citizens as expendable pawns.

378
Fiagome, ―Cuban Americans Reject another Castro-Backed Refugee Exodus,‖ 7.
135

Elián Gonzalez and the Limits of the Cold War Frame
After the changes in immigration law the massive exodus of Cubans leaving their
homes for the U.S. ended. Cubans still had a chance of settling in the U.S., however, if they
could make in all the way to the American soil. Many continued to risk the dangerous
journey. Some were caught and sent back to Cuba, some landed on the Florida beaches, and
others drowned in the dangerous waters. In 1999 on Thanksgiving morning one remarkable
little immigrant, a six year-old boy named Elián Gonzales made it all the way to Florida. His
mother and others on the journey with him perished. His story, and the political controversy
over whether or not it was more morally conscionable to send him home to his loving father
in tyrannical Cuba or place him with distant relatives whom he had never met before in free
Florida, would forever change U.S.-Cuban immigration policy.
The story of Elián Gonzalez garnered a lot of media attention. His unlikely survival,
his winning smile, and the controversy he ignited made for sensational news stories. As
such, the case, the spectacle, the media coverage, and the images have become the subject of
study in several disciplines. Sarah Banet Weiser examines the media framing of the Elián
Gonzalez spectacle, including the childhood innocence of Elián, the role of the family, and
Elián‘s potential as a citizen within the exile community and the United States.
379

Elián quickly became a symbol who was used to serve the interests of both the Cuban
American community and the Cuban government. The Cuban American community made
use of decades of Cold War logic to explain why Elián should stay in the United States.
Those who argued that Elián should go back to Cuba to live with his father played upon the

379
Banet-Weiser, ―Elián Gonzalez and ‗The Purpose of America,‘‖ 149-178.
136

very current ―family values‖ rhetoric. Both the Cold War narrative and the family values
narrative have strong adherents among conservative Americans. In this case, however, these
narratives directly compete with one another. One narrative ends with Elián staying with
relatives (and freedom) in Miami, while the other has him return to Cuba (and Communism)
with his father. The Cold War narrative looks at the larger ideological battle between the
exile community and the Cuban government, whereas the family drama narrative looked at
the situation as an individual case about a 6-year-old boy being taken from his father.
The details from the Elián Gonzalez case challenged the Cold War narrative with the
story of a now damaged family. In the process it successfully displaced the Cold War story
as the frame for explaining Cuban migration. Some of the circumstances of the Elián case
remained consistent with the Cold War. Fidel was still an evil tyrant who presided over a
place that people still risked their lives to leave. The United States was still preferable to
economically and politically broken Cuba. Further, Fidel Castro happily used the 6-year-old
Elián as a pawn in his fight with the United States. The activism of the Cuban American
community during the Elián controversy reminded the American public of the political and
economic success Cuban exiles have had in the U.S., again distinguishing them from
immigrants and emphasizing that Cubans just need a place that is free and Cuba is not it.
On the other hand, it was also this activism that seemed to wake the American public
up to the fact that the Cold War was over and that Cuba policy looked as if it was in the
hands of unreasonable radical zealots. The protests over a 6-year-old being reunited with his
father combined with the fact that Castro was not the boogeyman he once was made people
question why the United States still isolated Cuba. The immediate post-Cold War tactics
137

were ineffective in ousting Castro and there did not seem to be any other reason to continue
the Cold War policies other than to appease the anti-Castro Cuban American community.
Additionally, the Cuban American community was typically supported by the right
wing of the Republican Party, the same group of politicians who championed the family
values rhetoric in the early 1990s. The incompatibility of the Elián Gonzalez Cold War
narrative and the family values stance of those who wanted to see Elián returned to his father
damaged the credibility of the Cold War stance. Looking back over the decades of the Cold
War story about Cuba tells us that preserving family is a strong feature of the story. In the
story about Elián framed by the Cold War, demonizing Castro took priority over the need to
protect the integrity of his family. This exposed the story as thin, outdated, and self-serving
to the Cuban American community. It did not function as a coherent explanation of the
whole case. When the Cuban American community attempted to stretch the Cold War
narrative to fit the Elián case, it did not stretch that far. It broke.
The Elián Gonzalez case was not as much about immigration as it was about a
custody battle. Because of this, many Americans could relate to the family drama inherent in
Elián‘s case more than the political issues at stake. It was easier to understand what should
be done in a case where a boy has lost his mother but still has a loving father and a home
than it was to figure out how Fidel Castro fits into these kinds of decisions. Rather than
viewing it as a symbol for how the United States should approach immigration and Cuba,
most of the public viewed the case as one little boy whose mother died and whose father
happened to live in Cuba. As a result, over 50% of Americans polled said that Elián should
138

be returned to his father in Cuba.
380
The immediacy and salience of the family drama
narrative made more sense to the American public nearly a decade after the end of the Cold
War and certainly made more sense in deciding what to do in this particular situation. The
Elián case had stronger analogies to personal experiences of divorce and custody battles than
it did to the images of 1950s Russia and China.
Immigration from Cuba played a key role in solidifying the Cold War narrative about
Cuba. This story helped determine how the U.S. would treat exiles from Cuba and how the
U.S. public would understand major events in the history of migration from Cuba. The first
two waves of migration established the Cold War story. The third wave in 1980 confirmed
most of the details and helped explain others within the coherent story of the Cold War. The
balseros Crisis in 1994 significantly challenged the primacy of the Cold War narrative with a
story about immigration but ultimately the public continued to understand Cuban migration
and Cuba through the lens of the Cold War. In 1999-2000 Elián Gonzalez brought Cuban
migration to that attention of the American public again. The individual nature of the Elián
Gonzalez case and the fact that it held more in common with custody battles and family
drama than Cold War worries contributed to the Cold War narrative‘s inability to explain
everything related to Cuba.
While the Cold War frame was rejected in favor of a story that made more sense and
was a bit more timely, this family drama narrative really only explained Elián Gonzalez
better. As we‘ll see in chapter five, the American public did not have a more coherent story

380
Blumner, ―Courts Must Respect Kid‘s Parental Ties,‖ 1D. Newport, ―Americans Continue to Favor the
Return of Elián Gonzalez to Cuba.‖
139

to explain Castro, Communism, trade, and lingering memories of the Cuban Missile Crisis.
The people of the United States were stuck with Cold War rhetoric and justifications for the
rest of U.S-Cuba relations. The experiences with the Elián Gonzalez affair made these
explanations hollow, disingenuous, and insufficient. Without an alternative narrative, people
were stuck with empty Cold War rhetoric to continue to explain Cuba to the American
public.

140

CHAPTER FIVE: CUBA AS RULED BY AN ANACHRONISTIC TYRANT
At the end of the Cold War, Cuba was on the brink of economic collapse. U.S. policy
attempted to push Cuba over that threshold by putting additional pressure on the economy
through increasing restrictions on trade with Cuba.
381
Even though the Cold War with the
Soviet Union was over, the Cold War narrative remained the most familiar and accessible
narrative for explaining Cuba. Presidents Bush and Clinton took the lead in modifying Cold
War rhetoric for the post-Cold War era into the fourth dominant narrative: Cuba as led by an
anachronistic tyrant resisting the tide of Democracy. There were two primary elements to
this story. First, that Cuba too would eventually be swept up in the tide of democracy that
characterized the end of the Cold War. Second, that what was preventing Cuba from joining
the community of democratic nations was the outlaw nature of the Cuban regime. The
outlaw nature of the regime was evidenced when Castro‘s henchmen shot down a plane that
was attempting to fly exiles out of the country as well as by the backwardness and lack of
political freedom in the Cuba. In this story, the inevitability of democracy, was being
tragically postponed only by the anachronistic outlaw in charge of Cuba. This chapter argues
that this overarching narrative functioned hegemonically to limit alternative explanations
about Cuba, and therefore, alternative policies toward Cuba. Adding to the complicated
relationship between the hegemonic narrative and policy options is the fact the most
significant moments in U.S.-Cuba relations occurred in 1992, 1996, 2000, and 2004. In some

381
When the Soviet Union collapsed, Cuba lost billions of dollars in trade subsidies and the Cuban economy
suffered. The 1992 Cuban Democracy Act attempted to hasten the end of the Castro government by restricting
access to funds. ―News Conference Announcing the Introduction of the Cuba Democracy Act of 1992.‖
141

cases these incidents coincidentally occurred during an election year,
382
and in other cases
purposefully engineered to push Cuba policy into the spotlight during a presidential
campaign. That rhetorical situations about Cuba were created or emerged in election years
further constrained the available rhetorical responses. This chapter begins by looking at the
rhetoric of George H. W. Bush as the Cold War was ending and the discourse in 1992 from
both Bush and Clinton about the Cuban Democracy Act. It next delves into the 1996 shoot
down of the Brothers to the Rescue plane and the subsequent Helms Burton legislation.
Finally, this chapter examines the rhetoric during the George W. Bush administration and
how the Commission for Assistance to a Free Cuba increased restrictions on trade and travel
despite the fact that restrictions had not previously brought about the desired effect in Cuba.
The End of the Cold War and the Inevitability of Democracy
At the end of the Cold War, President George H. W. Bush saw Castro‘s fall and a
transition to democracy in Cuba as inevitable. This position followed from the belief that
Cuba under Castro was a puppet of the Soviet Union that Cuba would crumble shortly after
the USSR. If the government of Cuba were to collapse, it made sense according to the older
narrative of Cuba as possession of the United States, that Cuba would at least adopt the
United States‘ way of life. When the tide of Democracy failed to sweep Castro and Cuban
Communism away, the United States increased pressure on Cuba, in the form of the Cuban
Democracy Act, to hasten the end of the Castro regime. President Bush‘s speeches about the
tide of democracy and the Cuban Democracy Act itself laid the groundwork for the

382
The events of the Cuban Government shooting down a civilian plane flown by a U.S.-based exile group in
1996 and of finding Elián Gonzalez in the Florida Straits in 1999 happened to occur before presidential
elections. The ensuing controversies that turned these events into debates about Cuba policy may have been
purposely inflated for the election context.
142

development of the newer narrative about Cuba, signaling the shift from Cuba as Communist
satellite to Cuba as ruled by an anachronistic tyrant. The first element of the narrative, the
inevitability of democracy in Cuba, grew from the initial response to the end of the Cold War
and what that meant for U.S. relations with Cuba.
As the Cold War ended with coup attempts and finally a collapse of government in
the Soviet Union, many wondered
383
if this would signal a change in U.S. policy toward
Cuba. On September 30, 1991, President George H. W. Bush emphatically declared the
continuation of the Cold War policy toward Cuba.
Let me tell you something, I'm not going to change it one single bit. The Cuban
people are entitled to have this wave of democracy fulfill their dreams. And we want
to be a part of that answer, a part of that new democracy in which many people in this
room can have such an active role as we try to bring commerce and prosperity to
people that have been deprived too long because they've been the victim of
totalitarianism.
384

Specifically, Bush exhorted Castro to make democratic changes,
freedom and democracy, Mr. Castro, not sometime, not someday, but now. If Cuba
holds fully free and fair elections under international supervision, respects human
rights, and stops subverting its neighbors, we can expect relations between our two
countries to improve significantly.
385

383
For example, at President Bush‘s December 19, 1991 press conference, a reporter asked, ―The Russian
empire is collapsing, we don‘t know what will come out of it. Fidel Castro has lost his patrons definitely. He
has no petroleum. They are importing bicycles – difficult. Doesn‘t this present the United States, as it does for
Cuba, an opening for a new dialog or new relations or new solutions, whatever?‖ (Bush, ――The President's
News Conference With Foreign Correspondents.‖)
384
Bush, ―Remarks at the Beacon Council Annual Meeting in Miami, Florida.‖
385
Bush, ―Message on Cuban Independence Day.‖ After the Brothers to the Rescue plane was shot down,
however, the U.S. added the requirement that Castro and his brother have nothing to do with Cuban
government.
143

President Bush was enjoying the his Gulf War popularity spike,
386
much of which was due to
the rhetoric about the freedom and democracy the United States was spreading throughout
the world. Speeches about Cuba are full of the same kind of foreign policy discourse that
characterized the rhetoric about Kuwait and Iraq.
387

In addition to calling for Castro to make democratic changes in Cuba, President Bush
described Cuba as an anachronism that would inevitably follow the tide of history. In June
of 1991, Bush referred to Cuba as a ―holdout‖ in the democratization that had occurred all
over the hemisphere.
388
After a trip to Moscow later that summer, Bush explained that Cuba
was a ―sore thumb that is being financed by the Soviet Union.‖
389
At the end of August
1991, Bush discussed the unavoidable transition that would come to Cuba,
Yes, it clearly is the death knell for the Communist movement around the world.
There's [sic] only a handful of people that stick out like a sore thumb. I think of one
down there in Cuba right now that must be sweating, because you can't stop, as I said
earlier on, right here, this quest for freedom.
390

In light of this inevitability, the best action was to stay the course, ―So I'm not saying
it's easy, but I just think the tide is so inexorable that he won't be around.‖
391
Bush continued

386
George H. W. Bush‘s highest popularity rating was 89% during the end of February and beginning of March
1991. ―Presidential Approval Ratings -- Gallup Historical Statistics and Trends.‖
387
―Recently Greece also cooperated with the United States and other nations in the historic coalition effort to
uphold the rule of law and to liberate Kuwait from ruthless aggression.‖ Bush, ―Proclamation 6264 - Greek
Independence Day: A National Day of Celebration of Greek and American Democracy, 1991.‖
388
Bush, ―Remarks Commemorating the First Anniversary of the Enterprise for the Americas Initiative and an
Exchange With Reporters.‖
389
Bush, ―The President's News Conference, August 2, 1991.‖
390
Bush, ―The President's News Conference With Prime Minister Mulroney of Canada in Kennebunkport,
Maine.‖
391
Ibid.
144

to use the metaphor of democracy as a tide, saying in December that ―Fidel Castro is
swimming against the tide.‖
392
Democracy as a tide was a common metaphor, especially at
the end of the Cold War. The metaphor portrays democracy as something that unavoidably
happens to a country or people, rather than as something that takes hard work and significant
intention. A belief in this metaphor could explain why the United States would take the
approach of waiting for democratic change to happen in Cuba, rather than providing
resources and assistance for a shift to democracy.
In addition to describing the belief that Cuba would have to succumb to the pressure
of tidal democracy, President Bush expressed quite a bit of certainty about what would
happen in Cuba at the end of the Cold War that is humorous in hindsight. Responding to
reporters in December 1991, he said,
You say you don't know what will come out of it? At the risk of sounding pretentious,
I think I do know what will come out of it. What will come out of it is democracy and
freedom for the people of Cuba.
393

Even though a month earlier Bush explained that no one knew when this would happen, ―I
can't give you a time frame on that,‖
394
he was hopeful that his presidency would see
democratization take place, ―It could be the success story of the nineties, if Castro would
permit the freedom and democracy that the people want.‖
395
In March he expressed this hope
more explicitly, ―I'm looking forward to being the first President of the United States to set

392
Bush, ―The President's News Conference With Foreign Correspondents.‖
393
Ibid.
394
Bush, ―Interviews With NBC Owned and Operated Television Stations.‖
395
Bush, ―News Conference With Foreign Correspondents.‖
145

foot on the free soil of post-Castro Cuba.‖
396
After the successful invasion of Panama, the
success of the Gulf War, and the collapse of the Soviet Union, President Bush was swimming
in foreign policy success. His confidence in the fall of Castro was understandable, if
mistaken.
As President Bush stated that he wanted to be the first president to set foot in a free
Cuba, he emphasized that there would not be a normalization of relations with Cuba for as
long as the ―dictatorship‖ was in power. He also explained that he was going to keep ―heavy
pressure on the outlaw regime.‖
397
This was a shift from the requirement that Castro should
hold free elections, respect human rights and stop subverting Cuba‘s neighbors.
Conditioning improved relations on the exit of the dictatorship was where the older Cold War
rhetoric met the newer anti-Castro rhetoric appeasing the Cuban-American lobby. This was
also an attempt to link Cold War rhetoric to the new rhetoric naming rogue states and outlaw
states that the Pentagon began using to justify continued military spending after the collapse
of the Soviet Union.
398
Since Jimmy Carter had left office, there had been little question as
to the White House‘s position on Castro. The end of the Cold War called the necessity of
that position into question. More than at any time in the previous twelve years, President
Bush had to explicitly articulate the Cold War story to anti-Castro rhetoric. However, this
anti-Castro rhetoric was not enough for the Cuban American National Foundation in 1992.

396
Bush, ―Remarks at the Bush-Quayle South Florida Rally in Hialeah, Florida.‖
397
Ibid.
398
Klare, Rogue States and Nuclear Outlaws, Chapter 1.
146

In February 1992, Representative Robert Torricelli (R-NJ) introduced new Cuba
legislation on the floor of the House of Representatives. The Cuban Democracy Act also
known as the Torricelli Act tightened the embargo by adding food and medicine to the list of
goods prohibited in trade with Cuba. While humanitarian aid was still allowed, no U.S.
company or foreign subsidiary of U.S. companies could trade with Cuba at all. Additionally,
the Cuban Democracy Act stipulated that any ship visiting Cuba must wait six months before
docking in a U.S. port. According to Torricelli, the Act was intended to paralyze the Cuban
economy driving them to collapse in a matter of weeks.
399

In a biography of the CANF leader Jorge Mas, Gaeton Fonzi explains that the logic of
increasing sanctions on Cuba at the end of the Cold War did not make much sense and that
the Cuban Democracy Act had ―little chance‖ of receiving backing from the Bush
Administration.
400
The State Department opposed the bill on the grounds that the provisions
that applied to foreign subsidiaries of U.S. companies were bad foreign policy. Fonzi argues
that Mas decided to increase his odds of getting the bill passed by the Bush administration by
playing the 1992 presidential candidates against one another. Clinton announced his support
for the previously disliked bill in April, 1992. This caused the Bush administration to change
its tune and pass an executive order resembling the bill and announce his support for the
Torricelli Bill. Fonzi explains that the State Department kept quiet on the issue of the bill,
even though off the record they were opposed to the legislation.
401

399
Smith, ―Cuba‘s Long Reform.‖
400
Fonzi, ―Jorge Who?‖
401
Ibid.
147

Clinton‘s sudden support for the Cuban Democracy Act gained the Clinton campaign
nearly $400,000 in campaign donations and support from members of the Cuban American
community. While Bush carried Florida in 1992, Clinton won the election and forged such
an alliance with the Cuban American community that he decided not to change policy during
the next four years. ―Clinton's politically expedient alliance with Cuban-American anti-
Castro forces appears to be a major factor in his decision not to change the anti-Castro
policy.‖
402
The 1992 campaign is a prime example of how election year rhetoric shapes and
constrains the available discourse about Cuba as well as the possible policy options for
presidents and presidential candidates. To gain the support of Cuban American donors,
activists, and voters, Clinton reversed his position on Cuba policy and supported tougher
sanctions on Cuba for the next eight years.
After Bush began supporting the Torricelli legislation, he referred to it as a step in
working toward democracy in Cuba. ―The ‗Cuban Democracy Act of 1992‘ seeks to build
on the strong prodemocracy [sic] policy of my administration. I applaud such efforts and
endorse the objectives of this legislation to isolate Cuba until democratic change comes to
that embattled island.‖ However, Bush made it clear that he wasn‘t satisfied with the
Torricelli bill as passed.
I believe in and I am committed to work with the Congress this session to pass a
stronger, more effective ‗Cuban Democracy Act,‘ which tightens the embargo and
closes any unintentional loopholes that could benefit the Castro regime…However, as
currently written, the ‗Cuban Democracy Act‘ could, without intending to do so,
weaken the embargo.…
403

402
Wall, ―US Cuba Policy is Obsolete-Come in From the Cold War.‖
403
Bush, ―Statement on Actions to Support Democracy in Cuba.‖
148

Bush‘s rhetoric sought to make his dissatisfaction with the bill apparent but probably not in
the ways that he actually objected to the bill. He had to increase his anti-Castro stance in
response to Clinton‘s position on the Cuban Democracy Act. Bush desperately needed the
Florida electoral votes and would lose little by talking about the harder line approach he
would like to take. Specifically, Bush expressed concern about loopholes effectively
allowing the sale of food and medicine to the Castro regime. ―To do so, as the bill proposes,
could directly aid the security forces of the Castro dictatorship and could contribute to the
building of a biotechnology industry.‖
404
Robert Torricelli lauded the bill as a measure that
would shorten the suffering of the Cuban people.
405
But Bush stated, ―My administration
will continue to press governments around the world on the need to isolate economically the
Castro regime. Together we will bring to Cuba a new era of freedom and democracy.‖
406

George H. W. Bush‘s stance on Cuba at the end of 1991 was important in
establishing that policy toward Cuba would not change as major world circumstances
changed. It was also important in spelling out that a change in policy would only happen
with Castro leaving office and not with the decline of the world power the U.S. had been
most worried about spreading its ideology.
As President Clinton took office, many people, including Castro thought this would
be an opportunity for improving relations between Cuba and the United States. At a
February 1993 press briefing by press secretary George Stephanopoloulos, a reporter asked,

404
Ibid.
405
―News Conference Announcing the Introduction of the Cuba Democracy Act of 1992.‖
406
Bush, ―Statement on Actions to Support Democracy in Cuba.‖
149

George, Castro yesterday praised President Clinton for the first time, calling he is
[sic] a man of peace and guided by ethics. Does the President think that this marks the
beginning of a new kind of a relationship between Cuba and the U.S., or what's his
opinion?
407

A month later, the President was presented with this question again,
Among the people you have charmed, it seems you have charmed President Fidel
Castro because— [laughter] —in a recent interview with a TV network, he wanted to
meet with you. Would you be willing to meet with him? And a Democratic
administration might change the approach towards Cuba, versus a Republican?
408

The perception that Clinton might be open to changing policy and talking with Castro was
not out of the realm of possibility, in light of the recent end of the Cold War and the change
in political ideology in the White House. Clinton, however, answered that ―I have no change
in Cuba policy except to say that I supported the Cuban Democracy Act, and I hope someday
that we'll all be able to travel to a democratic Cuba.‖
409
When asked after a meeting with
Caribbean leaders if there was a possibility of ending the embargo, Clinton responded,
I support the Torricelli bill, as you know. I did when it was passed, and I still do. But
I said before, I could just reiterate what I said again: We all hope that there will come
a time when democracy and an open economy will come to Cuba. And it will be a
cause of enormous celebration in this country when it happens.
410

Clinton‘s lukewarm, if repetitive, support of the Cuban Democracy did not exactly
advance the Cold War agenda, but it kept it alive during a pivotal opportunity for change.
Rather than constructing a new story about U.S. relations with Cuba, he maintained (albeit to
a far lesser degree) the Bush administration rhetoric about the anachronistic tyrant swimming

407
Stephanopolous, ―Press Briefing by George Stephanopoulos, February 25, 1993.‖
408
Clinton, ―The President's News Conference, March 23, 1993.‖
409
Ibid.
410
Clinton, ―Exchange With Reporters on Cuba.‖
150

against the tide of democratization in the hemisphere. Although Castro indicated that he
would be willing to talk to Clinton about improving relations, Clinton rejected this in favor of
developing a relationship with the Cuban American voters in South Florida. Maintaining a
Cold War status quo was essentially how Clinton kept the Cuban American community
appeased while preventing harder line approaches to Cuba from being taken too seriously in
policy discussions about Cuba.
When Senator Jesse Helms (R-NC) introduced new Cuba legislation at the beginning
of 1995, the White House press secretary Mike McCurry responded to reporters that the
president knew about the legislation but, ―We remain fully supportive of the Cuban
Democracy Act and the elements of the Cuban Democracy Act that currently guide
administration policy towards Cuba.
411
On March 7, 1995, the Washington Post ran an
article claiming that senior administration officials had been pushing for an easing of
sanctions on Cuba.
412
When reporters asked McCurry about Representative Gingrich‘s
comment that the administration should be tightening the screws on the Castro regime,
McCurry responded, ―Well, that's exactly what the United States does with bipartisan support
of the Congress and the President by pursuing the economic embargo of Cuba, which is the
centerpiece of our strategy for bringing pressure on the Castro regime to change its ways, to
get on the right side of history, and to allow its citizens the benefits of market democracy and
market economics that we believe they are entitled to enjoy.‖
413

411
McCurry, ―Press Briefing with Mike McCurry, February 10, 1995.‖
412
Devroy and Williams, ―Clinton May Ease Sanctions on Cuba,‖ A01.
413
McCurry, ―Press Briefing by Mike McCurry. March 7, 1995.‖
151

In a CNN interview with Judy Woodruf and Wolf Blitzer, Clinton was asked about
his position on the legislation proposed by Senator Helms. Clinton responded,
I support the Cuban Democracy Act, which was passed in 1992 and which we have
implemented faithfully. The Cuban Democracy Act gives us the leeway to turn up
both the heat on the Cuban Government and to make certain changes in policy in
return for changes that they make. It is a carefully calibrated, disciplined, progressive
approach. I believe it will work. I do not—I don't know why we need any more legal
authority than we already have.
414

Clinton went on to say,
But we have been very firm. Our administration's position has been much tougher
than the previous administrations, but we've also operated under the Cuban
Democracy Act to restore, for example, direct telephone communications, which has
been a good thing for the Cubans and a good thing for the United States.
415

Clinton strategically supported the 1992 legislation as the perfect policy to deal with Cuba
(rather than proposed stronger policies). At the same time that he made claims about being
harsher on Cuba than the administration that signed the legislation he talked about how his
own administration instituted some increased contact between the U.S. and Cuba. This
increased contact was a step toward engagement with Cuba, but also allowed Cuban
Americans to talk to family members in Cuba. For this reason, Clinton‘s position both
appeased the anti-Castro Cuban American community and allowed for progressive
movement on interaction with Cubans on the island. This allowed the Clinton administration
to maintain the status quo policy toward Cuba.
Shortly after the CNN interview, Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs Peter
Tarnoff explained the Clinton Administration‘s position on the Helms legislation,

414
Clinton, ―Interview With Wolf Blitzer and Judy Woodruff on CNN.‖
415
Ibid.
152

while we supported many of the objectives of the Helms-Burton draft legislation as
we see it, namely the promotion of an acceleration of democracy in Cuba, the
endorsement of the continued vigilance and reinforcement of the embargo, the other
provisions of the Cuban Democracy Act, and also features of that bill that allow the
United States to begin assistance to a transition government in Cuba, all of those we
regard as quite positive. There are, nonetheless, certain other aspects of the bill, the
extraterritoriality of it and other things which do causes [sic] problems, but we are
available to have discussions with sponsors of the bill on the legislation.
416

In the middle of 1995 there was little reason to consider making the embargo stronger by
adding provisions that allowed Cuban American citizens to sue foreign entities that benefited
from confiscated properties in Cuba. Clinton‘s rhetoric on Cuba continued to push the
maintenance of the Cuban Democracy Act. Senator Helms put Clinton in a tough position by
outflanking him on the right on Cuba policy. The administration responded by pointing out
that certain aspects of Helms‘ legislation caused foreign policy problems with allies and
could not be adopted.
Largely coming from a desire to maintain the status quo until conditions improved in
Cuba, the Clinton administration rhetoric focused on the progress that had been made under
the Cuban Democracy Act and attempted to deflect the arguments in favor of the Helms
Burton legislation.
Cuba as an International Outlaw
On February 24, 1996, the Cuban government shot down two planes flown by
Cuban exile group Brothers to the Rescue, killing four people. So began the plot of Cuba as
an international outlaw. Primarily found in the speeches of Clinton and statements by

416
―Press Briefing by Attorney General Janet Reno.‖
153

Clinton administration officials, this element of the narrative characterizes Castro as a
criminal under international law and supports the toughest sanctions on Cuba as a result.
Brothers to the Rescue typically flew between the United States and Cuba looking for
rafters that needed to be rescued. The group has also flown planes over Cuba to drop
leaflets. The Cuban government had warned the group that if they flew over Cuba again,
they would be shot down. On February 24, the group flew three planes from Florida toward
Cuba searching for rafters. The Cuban Air Force shot down two of the planes. Cuba and the
U.S. disagree over whether the planes entered Cuban airspace on this mission. The
immediate response from the Clinton administration was to ―condemn this action in the
strongest possible terms.‖
417
Two days after the incident, Clinton stated that ―further
evidence that Havana has become more desperate in its efforts to deny freedom to the people
of Cuba.‖ Clinton also noted that it served as ―an appalling reminder of the nature of the
Cuban regime: repressive, violent, scornful of international law.‖
418
In addition to calling for
Congress to pass legislation compensating the families of those who were killed from frozen
Cuban assets, Clinton also promised to ―move promptly to reach agreement with the
Congress on the pending Helms-Burton Cuba legislation so that it will enhance the
effectiveness of the embargo in a way that advances the cause of democracy in Cuba.‖
419

417
Clinton, ―Remarks on the Downing of American Civilian Aircraft by Cuba and an Exchange With Reporters
in Shoreline, Washington.‖
418
Clinton, ―Remarks Announcing Sanctions Against Cuba Following the Downing of American Civilian
Aircraft.‖
419
Ibid.
154

Clinton picked up the rhetoric about democracy as a tide and said that he would ―do
everything in [his] power to see that this historic tide reaches the shores of Cuba.‖
420

Press Secretary Mike McCurry explained the actions the Clinton administration was
taking after the planes were shot down, ―more importantly, we've taken direct action against
Fidel Castro. That's the purpose of the Helms-Burton legislation that was referenced earlier,
and that is very strong and swift response to this brutal act.‖
421
Although the Clinton
administration opposed the Helms-Burton legislation, the rhetorical situation of the planes
being shot down required some kind of response. The legislation was a readily available
response that would appease much of the audience who needed a response – the Cuban
American community. Further, because the Helms-Burton legislation was already part of the
conversation about Cuba – at least among the foreign policy public, devising another
response would have required significant justification when there was already one available.
Clinton‘s position on the Helms-Burton Act the months prior to the Brothers to the Rescue
incident was that the legislation was unnecessary in light of the sufficient Cuban Democracy
Act. Because Clinton had not criticized the Act as problematic or flawed, there did not seem
to be any reason he should not sign it when the incident illustrated that the Cuban Democracy
Act was not working.
On March 12, 1996, President Clinton signed the Cuban Liberty and Democratic
Solidarity Act of 1996. This legislation, more commonly known as the Helms-Burton Act,
specifically condemned the shooting down of the Brothers to the Rescue planes, detailed the

420
Ibid.
421
McCurry, ―Press Briefing by Mike McCurry, March 7, 1996.‖
155

conditions a new government in Cuba must meet for lifting the embargo, and allowed U.S.
citizens who lost property during the revolution to sue foreign nationals in U.S. courts. Upon
signing the bill, Clinton remarked, ―Today I sign it with a certainty that it will send a
powerful, unified message from the United States to Havana, that the yearning of the Cuban
people for freedom must not be denied.‖
422
Clinton explained that he had representatives
from his administration work with Congress to improve the bill and has signed a ―bipartisan
effort to pursue an activist Cuba policy, an effort that began some 4 years ago with the Cuban
Democracy Act.‖
423
Clinton was backed into a political corner and had to sign the Helms-
Burton Act. This response to the Brothers to the Rescue incident was the political and
rhetorical response available to Clinton. If he had decided not to sign the Helms Burton Act,
the administration would have had to explain why the Cuban Democracy Act was still the
effective and sufficient solution they had argued it was.
During the rest of 1996, President Clinton emphasized the necessity of stricter
sanctions on Cuba explaining that Cuba was ―the only nondemocratic country left in our
hemisphere,‖ and that they had shot down two civilian planes, violating international law.
424

Attempting to push the conversation further, presidential candidate Senator Bob Dole said
that Clinton had ―squandered‖ the hard line policies put in place during the Reagan and Bush
administrations and that if he were elected he would bring down Castro and ―his house of

422
Clinton, ―Remarks on Signing the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act of 1996.‖
423
Ibid.
424
Clinton, ―The President's News Conference With President Scalfaro.‖
156

cards.‖
425
In the summer of 1996, Clinton continued explaining his support of the Helms-
Burton legislation, saying that Cuba had engaged in a ―flagrant shooting-down of two
airplanes, American airplanes, in international airspace and killing innocent civilians, most of
whom were American citizens.‖ Clinton also characterized the situation in Cuba as Cuba
refusing to move toward democracy.
426
Undersecretary of State for political affairs, Peter
Tarnoff faced very difficult questions about U.S. policy toward Cuba. Reporters asked
Tarnoff if other countries were still opposed to the extraterritoriality of the Helms-Burton
legislation, pressing,
Mr. Tarnoff, can you give us an example of what you've just said -- one other foreign
government, other than Israel or Uzbekistan that supported a resolution before the
U.N. that in any way supports your efforts on Helms-Burton? Can you give us some
example of cooperation from some other foreign government?
427

Tarnoff stated that countries, in private talks realize that there is a problem with Cuba, but he
never answered the question of an example of another country that supported the legislation.
Reporters asked about the anticipated outcome of stronger embargo legislation asking if the
United States should just start trading and see what happens. Tarnoff answered that that
wouldn‘t work. Reporters continued to press on the purpose of U.S. policy: ―I'm just trying
to understand what U.S. policy is then. If you're saying that the carrot won't work and the
stick hasn't worked, what do you figure will? Or do you simply assume that nothing will
work?‖
428
Questions about how the law would accomplish foreign policy goals with Cuba

425
Harden, ―Dole Promises to ‗Bring Fidel Castro Down,‘‖ A04.
426
Clinton, ―The President's News Conference With European Union Leaders.‖ June 12, 1996.
427
Tarnoff, ―Press Briefing by Peter Tarnoff, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, June 20, 1996.‖
428
Ibid.
157

(or other countries) presented difficulties for the Clinton administration. For the most part,
the administration focused on the punishment aspect of the law. Later in 1996, President
Clinton referred to the Brothers to the Rescue incident saying that ―Fidel Castro had
Americans murdered illegally,‖ and that he is proud to have a blockade on Cuba.
429

When asked if Clinton‘s change in position on the Helms-Burton legislation was a
part of his election-year positioning, Clinton answered,
On the Helms-Burton bill, I would remind you that the defense of freedom in Cuba is
not a Republican issue. I came out for the Cuba Democracy Act before President
Bush did in 1992. And I made it clear that we had some concerns about Helms-
Burton, many of which were answered in the legislation, which gave me some
flexibility there. And there was a big intervening event which gave us a clear signal
about whether things had changed in Cuba or not. Two planes with American citizens
on it [sic] were shot out of the sky in international waters. That didn't have anything
to do with the election.
430

Reporters seemed to be able to ask the right questions, but would not necessarily push the
issue. Clinton and his administration officials were able to continue to explain Clinton‘s
position on the Helms-Burton legislation in terms of the Brothers to the Rescue incident and
freedom and democracy. The charges that Castro had violated international standards of
conduct would play well with the Cuban-American community who were largely pushing for
tougher restrictions.
Cuba as Backward and Repressive
Although his campaign rhetoric about Cuba had a decidedly Cold War tone, some
wondered if President George W. Bush might not emulate the foreign policy strategy that

429
Clinton, ―Remarks at a Brunch for Representative Robert Torricelli in Teaneck, New Jersey.‖
430
Clinton, ―The President's News Conference With Chancellor Helmut Kohl of Germany in Milwaukee,
Wisconsin.‖
158

former President Nixon had pursued with China. In essence, they speculated that Bush might
push for an alternative route to democratization in Cuba. On May 18, 2001, Bush delivered a
speech at the White House to honor Cuban Independence Day. In that speech, he stated, ―my
administration will oppose any attempt to weaken sanctions against Cuba‘s government until
the regime – and I will fight such attempts – until this regime frees its political prisoners,
holds democratic, free elections, and allows for free speech.‖
431
President George W. Bush
and his administration made heavy use of Cold War rhetorical forms by making statements
that Cuba was backward and repressive and that the United States and the Cuban people look
forward to the Cuba of the future, a Cuba that would be free.
References to the importance of democracy and free markets form the heart of the
rhetoric justifying the blockade. The appeals to democracy usually appear in the form of an
explanation that Cuba is not a democracy and therefore, is not included in trade talks and
international summits. Bush emphasized a number of times that Cuba would not be joining
the Summit of the Americas to negotiate the Free Trade Area of the Americas in Quebec City
because Cuba is not a democracy. On April 2, 2001, Bush said,
Cuba is the only country in the hemisphere that will be missing from the Quebec
Summit. It is my sincere hope that our neighbor will soon rejoin the fraternity of
democracies and that the Cuban people will again know freedom.
432

Condoleezza Rice confirmed these sentiments on January 9, 2004 in a press briefing where
she stated,

431
Bush, ―Remarks on the Observance of Cuban Independence Day.‖
432
Bush, ―Pan American Day‖ 4. On April 21, 2001, in a radio address to the nation from Canada, he stated,
―Only one country in the western hemisphere is not represented because that country, Cuba, is the only one that
is not yet a democracy.‖ (Bush, ―The President‘s Radio Address.‖)
159

The President, meeting in a hemisphere where only one country – Cuba—remains
uncommitted to the principles of democracy, will be able to remind his fellow leaders
of the benefit of free and open markets, open societies, and the importance of
transparent elections.
433

That democracy is good and even necessary is a given in American public discourse.
Appeals to democracy function hegemonically, articulating an agreement with ―democracy,‖
(whatever that may mean to you) to a support for sanctions on Cuba. I argue that the defense
of the sanctions against Cuba represents a discourse operating out of a Cold War mentality.
For this reason, I look to Philip Wander‘s reading of Cold War rhetoric as a basis for
identifying Cold War rhetorical forms in the current discourse
434
. I first examine the
discourse supporting the embargo for evidence of prophetic dualism and technocratic
realism, then turn to the narratives found within the official discourse and analyze them with
respect to Bennett and Edelman‘s discussion of political narratives.
435

As mentioned in Chapter One, the rhetorical form of prophetic dualism divides the
world into two camps and characterizes one as good and one as evil. In the case of Cuba,
Bush and his administration very explicitly divide the world into two camps. As Bush stated
in his speech recognizing Cuban Independence Day, in one camp, the United States stands as
―the world‘s leader in support of human rights‖
436
along with the other nations in support of
freedom: ―thirty-four democratic nations committed ourselves to building a hemisphere of

433
Rice, ―Dr. Rice Previews President‘s Trip to Mexico.‖
434
Wander, ―American Foreign Policy Rhetoric.‖
435
Bennett and Edelman, ―Toward a New Political Narrative.‖
436
Bush, ―Remarks on the Observance of Cuban Independence Day.‖
160

freedom.‖
437
In the other camp is Cuba. ―But one nation was not there, because that nation
has a leader who has no place at the democratic table.‖
438

Many of the conditions that keep Cuba in its camp (human rights violations and a
lack of democracy) also apply to other countries with which the United States does trade.
Because of this, the Bush administration made the lines of this dualism clearer. Powell drew
distinctions between past enemies and Cuba.
[W]e are able to respond in other parts of the world with other nations that had
despotic leaders, but at least started to sense that change was upon them and gave us
something to work with. I don‘t think Mr. Castro has ever really given us anything to
work with.
439

National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice echoed this sentiment when she stated,
There are societies that are open enough and in transition enough that trade and
involvement and engagement can actually make a difference, and then there are those
that are so closed that any effort to engage actually ends up simply reinforcing the
regime; and the administration believes that Cuba is in that second category.
440

Claiming that attempts to engage have gone badly really means that the embargo is about
Castro, not democracy, and that there is nothing he could do to invite a change in policy.
The need for the policy has been attached to Castro the person, rather than any interest that
could be weighed through a cost-benefit analysis. The fact that Castro is still in power makes
it easy to believe that change is nearly impossible in Cuba, which keeps the dualism in place
until Castro is gone.

437
Ibid.
438
Ibid.
439
House Appropriations Committee, Commerce, Justice, State and Judiciary Subcommittee, Hearing of the
Commerce, Justice, State, and Judiciary Subcommittee of the House Appropriations Committee on Fiscal Year
2002 State Department Appropriations.
440
Rice, ―Condoleeza Rice Holds Briefing.‖
161

As well as dividing the world into two camps, the ―not-U.S.‖ camp within prophetic
dualism is characterized as evil and everything one would want to reject as a thinking, moral
being. In Bush administration rhetoric, Castro plays the part of the evil tyrant with whom
there can be no compromise. At an April 23, 2004 campaign stop, Bush stated, ―We will
keep the pressure on the tyrant. We want the people of Cuba to hear this message loud and
clear: We will make no concessions to tyranny.‖
441
Bush refers to Castro‘s tyranny,
442
and
the ways to force change in ―repressive regimes‖ and ―oppressive governments.‖
443
In a
press release on January 17, 2002, on the occasion of Bush‘s second suspension of Title III of
the Helms-Burton Act, the administration again pointed out the pernicious nature of Castro as
a leader. ―The Cuban regime is a repressive, totalitarian anachronism in a region where
democracy and open markets prevail.‖
444
In one statement, then Assistant Secretary of State
for Western Hemisphere Affairs Otto Reich warned that the United States should not throw
―a lifeline to a failed, corrupt, dictatorial, murderous regime.‖
445
His charge of Castro‘s
regime as murderous and a refusal to support the regime by trading with Cuba illustrates both
the portrayal of Castro as evil and unwillingness to compromise.
A prominent rhetorical form during the 1950s when the political climate was more
explicitly religious, the prophetic dualism of today relies on more implicit religious
references. While Colin Powell makes no explicit references to religious faith or God, he has

441
Bush, ―Remarks at a Victory 2004 Reception in Coral Gables, Florida.‖
442
Bush, ―Recognition of Cuban Independence Day.‖
443
Ibid.
444
Office of the Press Secretary, ―Title III of the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act Fact Sheet.‖
445
Carter, ―U.S. Official Sees tougher Policy, Not Softer One.‖
162

referred to Castro as ―totally unrepentant.‖
446
This recalls Christian practices of penitence
and characterizes Castro as a sinner who is not sorry. Bush calls the embargo a ―moral
statement,‖
447
and has remarked that it is ―wrong‖ to support a regime like Castro‘s.
448
Bush
refers to God in a 2004 campaign speech, ―We will insist upon their human rights, their God-
given rights. We stand strongly with the freedom fighters and the island of Cuba.‖
449
Bush
also describes the tyranny that rules Cuba as an insult to the sacrifices of leaders such as Jose
Marti,
450
putting ―sacrifice‖ on the side of freedom and a pre-Castro Cuba. Wander states
that one of the advantages of using prophetic dualism for those who do not want their
policies and rhetoric scrutinized, is that ―God dampens public debate.‖
451
While the climate
that allowed for such powerful religious language in the 1950s has changed, appeals to
human rights, freedom, and fighting against tyranny serve the same purpose as appealing to
God‘s will. They are taken as obvious, absolute principles that need no debating in
American public discourse. The prophetic dualism of today relies on the dualisms of
yesterday. That is, a lack of democracy is godlessness and tyranny is evil. Freedom and
supporting human rights is good and morally right.
452

446
House Committee of Appropriations, Departments Appropriations for 2002.
447
Bush, ―Remarks on the Observance of Cuban Independence Day.‖
448
Bush, ―Statement: Toward a Democratic Cuba.‖
449
Bush, ―Remarks at a Victory 2004 Reception.‖
450
Bush, ―Remarks on the Observance of Cuban Independence Day.‖
451
Wander, ―The Rhetoric of American Foreign Policy,‖ 160.
452
The word ―communist‖ is rarely used in the Bush rhetoric. Its more recent instantiation ―not democracy‖
functions in the same way ―communist‖ did in early Cold War rhetoric.
163

Most recently, in the post-September 11
th
war against terrorism, ―terrorist‖ and
―terrorism‖ have entered this dualism opposite freedom. The Bush administration has not let
this pass by in its discourse about Cuba. Mentioned in the same breath as Sudan, Iraq, Iran
and the ―axis of evil‖ countries, and condemned for ―its egregious rejection of the global
coalition‘s efforts against terrorism,‖
453
Cuba has made it into the terrorism discourse on the
side of the evil camp as well. In his message to Congress about extending the national
emergency in February 2004, Bush stated,
I have exercised my authority to expand the scope of the national emergency as, over
the last year, the Cuban government, which is a designated state-sponsor of terrorism,
has taken a series of steps to destabilize relations with the United States, including
threatening to abrogate the Migration Accords with the United States and to close the
U.S. Interests Section.
454

In a move that the rest of the State Department quietly distanced themselves from,
Undersecretary for Arms Control John R. Bolton claimed in a 2002 speech titled ―Beyond
the Axis of Evil‖ that three additional rogue states are intent on getting weapons of mass
destruction. ―The United States believes that Cuba has at least a limited offensive biological
warfare research and development effort. Cuba has provided dual-use biotechnology to other
rogue states.‖
455
Bolton reiterated these concerns in March 2004.
456
Because fighting
terrorism has become such a prominent part of today‘s political discourse, it is developing

453
Office of Management and Budget, ―Statement of Administration Policy: S. 1731 - Agriculture,
Conservation, and Rural Enhancement Act of 2001.‖
454
Bush, ―Message to the Congress on Continuation and Expansion of the National Emergency With Respect to
Cuba.‖
455
Ibid.
456
House Committee on International Relations, ―Panel I of a Hearing of the House Committee on International
Relations.‖
164

into part of the common sense of the people of the United States. The move to articulate
anti-terrorism to isolating Cuba is not surprising, given it is consistent with a prophetic
dualism making use of common sense to maintain hegemony.
The Bush administration gained many rhetorical advantages by framing the world in
terms of prophetic dualism. While debate over the merits of the embargo has certainly not
been dampened, the possibilities for real rhetorical challenges have been limited. While not
explicitly appealing to religion and God, the Bush administration appealed to what Richard
Weaver referred to as ―God terms.‖ These terms, such as ―progress,‖ ―democracy,‖
―freedom,‖ and ―justice‖ embrace universal values and have the capacity to demand
sacrifice.
457
By appealing to common sense of a God-like status (democracy, freedom, and
most recently fighting terrorism), the Bush administration was able to retain most of the
rhetorical ground in the situation. Bush made opposing the policy effectively the same thing
as advocating tyranny. No one in the United States wants to argue that freedom is bad and
that tyranny and human rights violations are good. But accepting the world given by the
Bush administration gives opponents only that rhetorical ground. Casting the world in these
terms is one of the ways hegemony is maintained.
Looking at discourse in terms of technocratic realism helps us to see which interests
guide policy, which issues are too complex for a dualistic characterization, and what
compromises have to be made to serve competing interests. While much of U. S. policy
toward Cuba has been described in dualistic terms and characterized by the Bush
administration‘s refusal to compromise on the embargo, elements of technocratic realism

457
(Golden 302-3; Foss, Foss, and Trapp, 73).
165

emerge in the rhetoric about Cuba as well. Taking that hard-headed look at U. S. interests
reveals that the blockade may not be based on such interests. Even though the business and
agriculture communities make arguments about lifting the embargo for U. S. economic gain,
these arguments have made little progress in loosening trade restrictions. The embargo shuts
the United States out of the Cuban market. Further, the embargo has received condemnation
at the United Nations every year for the past ten years. Cuba provides an excellent example
of where foreign policy makes no little sense without considering the role of domestic
politics.
The U.S. normalized relations with Vietnam and trades with China. Cuba, although
geographically close and a desired market of many industries in the United States, remains
subject to trade blockade. Powell addresses the apparent inconsistency of not trading with
Cuba by citing other countries that have ―gotten burned‖ by doing so.
458
Mentioning the
existence of examples furnishes the public with evidence that a cost-benefit analysis of
trading with Cuba has already been done by experts with more information who have decided
that the costs outweigh the benefits. State Department spokesperson Richard Boucher made
similar claims in responding to a question in February 2002 about a possible reconciliation
between Cuba and the United States. He directly refers to the wisdom of experts (or
technocrats) to make decisions about policy regardless of what the media and public might
claim.
I think it‘s important to make clear that the administration, Bush administration, the
political appointees, such as the secretary and Assistant Secretary Reich, have full

458
Senate Budget Committee, ―Hearing of the Senate Budget Committee.‖
166

confidence in the professionalism of career diplomats who are carrying out U.S.
policy towards Cuba.
459

Another significant appeal to expert decision making instead of relying upon a strict dualism
to explain the issue or expecting the public to determine the best course of action is in the
case of the travel restrictions. Until recently, the U.S. government allowed travel to Cuba on
a limited basis as licensed by the Treasury Department. Travelers who did not meet the
conditions of the general license or who were not granted a specific license to travel were in
violation of the embargo. The support for limited travel is based on the notion that
―engagement between people, outreach by everyday Americans to everyday Cubans‖ can
assist in a rapid transition to democracy in Cuba.
460
The experts who ostensibly have more
information and knowledge about Cuba and the best way to transition to democracy were
entrusted to decide whose trips to the Island might best accomplish this goal. As James
Carragher, the State Department Coordinator for Cuban Affairs, stated in a Senate
Appropriations hearing on February 11, 2001,
However, travel outside the authority of the Cuban assets control regulations does not
contribute to outreach or to our policy goal in Cuba. Instead, it can help to prop up a
regime which continues to harass and imprison its people who dare to criticize their
government.
461

Since May 2004, the guidelines for who can travel became even stricter. Bush‘s
Commission for Assistance to a Free Cuba recommended limiting travel by Cuban
Americans to visit family to one trip every three years (they used to be able to travel to Cuba

459
Boucher, ―Richard Boucher Holds State Department Briefing.‖
460
Senate Committee of Appropriations, ―Restrictions on Travel to Cuba.‖
461
Ibid.
167

once a year). Educational programs have been limited to semester-long study programs
(which essentially eliminates educational programs in Cuba). And more resources have been
devoted to enforcing the travel restrictions. These changes have been billed as the result of
an extensive study, the report of which is available, but is 500 pages long (deterring even the
most curious or interested members of the public).
In the February 11, 2002 hearing of the Senate Appropriations Committee in which James
Carragher, the Cuban Affairs Coordinator for the State Department testified, Senator Byron
Dorgan (D-ND) questions Carragher about the distinction. ―If travel introduces the best of
the United States to the Cuban people, it seems to me it just does, no matter the
circumstances of the travel.‖
462
Carragher again appeals to the wisdom of the law explaining
that the reason that the government supports licensed travel to Cuba as assisting in a
transition is because those are the people who are permitted by law to travel to Cuba.
463
This
lack of explanation about a complicated law tries to rest on the rationalization that the policy
is in place for a reason, which is why the government supports it. Technocratic realism relies
on these experts presumably because there is too much information requiring too much
specialized knowledge to burden the public with figuring it all out. Wander explains,
Ordinary people, it is assumed, are not equipped to grasp the demands made on
American foreign policy, to deliberate issues about which most of the information, for
reasons of national security, cannot be made available, or to understand the technical
instruments used to select, process, and interpret the data relevant in the formation of
government policy.
464

462
Ibid.
463
Ibid.
464
Wander, ―The Rhetoric of American Foreign Policy,‖ 167.
168

Often, this rhetorical form is covering up for a process with little rational justification within
a supposed democratic setting.
Unlike prophetic dualism, which casts the world in two camps so a middle ground is
not visibly available, technocratic realism admits of the necessity to compromise on certain
issues to best protect American interests. While Bush refuses to consider lifting the
economic blockade to trade with Castro, he talks about dealing directly with the people of
Cuba. ―In addition, I will expand support for human rights activists, and the democratic
opposition; and, we will provide additional funding for non-governmental organizations to
work on pro-democracy programs in Cuba.‖
465
In discussing the report of the CAFC, Bush
stated,
This strategy is a strategy that encourages the spending of money to help
organizations to protect dissidents and to promote human rights. It is a strategy that
encourages a clear voice of the truth being spoken to the Cuban people through radio
and TV Marti.
466

This compromise furthers U.S. interests in working with people within Cuba to bring
Castro‘s regime to an end. It also furthers the interests of the administration to maintain
good relations with those pro-democracy groups who have significant ties to the Cuban-
American community in Florida. Additionally, it allows Bush to avoid charges that the
sanctions hurt the people of Cuba, because he has pledged support for the people within
Cuba.
Another compromise the Bush administration was willing to make was the
suspension of Title III of the Helms-Burton Act. Enacting this measure allowing U.S.

465
Bush, ―Toward a Democratic Cuba.‖
466
Bush, ―Remarks Following a Meeting With the Commission for Assistance to a Free Cuba.‖
169

citizens to sue foreign corporations would endanger United States trading relations and
promote very little gain for the U.S. or for the Bush administration (other than support of the
Cuban-American Community). A provision in the Helms-Burton Act allows the president to
suspend Title III for 6 months at a time. Bush has suspended Title III of Helms-Burton every
six months, determining that it is in the best interest of the United States and the promotion
of democracy in Cuba at the time. ―I hereby determine and report to the Congress that
suspension for 6 months beginning August 1, 2004, of the right to bring an action under title
III of the Act is necessary to the national interests of the United States and will expedite a
transition to democracy in Cuba.‖
467

Technocratic realism argues that the affluence of free market economies should be
evidence enough of the superiority of capitalism, making armed conflict unnecessary.
468
The
embargo arguably keeps Cuba from realizing that affluence currently. This also achieves
U.S. interest of promoting free market capitalism, because the U.S. can use the embargo to
keep Cuba poor and then point to its socialist system and Castro as the reasons for the
poverty. Secretary Powell, responding to Florida Senator Bill Nelson, stated that once Castro
is gone, ―there will be quite a flow of friendship and funds from your great state that will be
evidence to the people of Cuba what they have been missing for all these years.‖
469
The
embargo attempts to use economic competition (of a sort) rather than military conflict to

467
Bush, ―Letter to Congressional Leaders on Review of Title III of the Cuban Liberty and Democratic
Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act of 1996.‖
468
Wander, ―The Rhetoric of American Foreign Policy,‖ 166.
469
―U.S. Senator Pete Domenici (R-Nm) Holds Hearing.‖
170

drive Castro out of power. Technocratic realism recognizes the destructive effects of military
conflict and instead promotes a foreign policy based on competition.
One break that recent discourse about Cuba makes from Cold War rhetoric concerns
the portrayal of Cuba as a nation state. In most foreign policy rhetoric during the Cold War,
nation states were discussed as irreducible units,
470
rather than a collection of people whom
the policies affected. Bush rarely spoke of Cuba as a nation, except when referring to a post-
or pre-Castro period. With respect to U.S. foreign policy, the Bush administration discussed
Castro and the people of Cuba who are opposed to Castro. This break from nationalism and
from prophetic dualism served U.S. interests by blaming the tyrant for the oppression,
poverty, and human rights violations, as well as recognizing a people who deserve support
and assistance to overthrow the tyrant. In this way, official rhetoric did not need to
acknowledge that the embargo was against the whole nation, hurting all the people, including
those who support Castro and those who oppose him. According to the discourse of the Bush
administration, the embargo is against Castro‘s regime. The goal is for freedom in Cuba,
471

and to stand with Cubans working for freedom.
472
This compromise of working with the
Cuban people reflected a common interest in the defeat of Castro. Those Cubans who may
support Castro were either ignored by this discourse or included in the ―Castro regime.‖ By
ignoring them, the Bush administration said that these people either did not exist (and
therefore, cannot be hurt by the policy) or were on the side of tyranny and evil.

470
Wander, ―The Rhetoric of American Foreign Policy,‖ 170.
471
Bush, ―Recognition of Cuban Independence Day.‖
472
Ibid.
171

Technocratic realism helps maintain hegemony in a number of ways. First, it allows
a standard appeal to expert knowledge as the rationale for a policy, not requiring further
explanation beyond the determination of experts that a particular policy or approach is a good
idea. This means that those making, enforcing, and supporting particular laws do not have to
explain their workings to the public. Technocratic realism also maintains hegemony by
making a distinction between those elements of a situation which can be compromised and
those which cannot. The appeal to competition and the superiority of capitalism entrenches
the view of the world that capitalism is the only system that works. It does this by
constructing a world which uses capitalist criteria to define success and then proclaiming
that capitalism wins because it is the only system that meets the criteria. However, the
success criteria are built upon common sense ideas of democracy and freedom that have been
articulated, through diligent rhetorical work by the right, to notions of neo-liberal capitalism.
This articulation obscures the viability of other economic systems in promoting freedom and
democracy as well. Understanding this could help those struggling for a more pluralistic and
radical democracy to uncover antagonisms where possibilities for new articulations may lie.
However dualistic the rhetoric may sound, calculation of U.S. interests, rather than
the actual configuration of the dualism (i.e. whether or not the policy really does avoid
supporting tyranny and therefore, is in the camp of good), determines which issues are
available for compromise. Recognizing this helps rhetorical critics understand how prophetic
dualism and technocratic realism work together. This also helps determine which interests
could be highlighted as more important for the purposes of forcing compromise on other
issues in the situation. (Even if these issues were previously ones not available for
172

compromise.) For example, if an opposition could make it more politically expensive for
Bush to continue the ban on travel, it could become an issue on which it is easier for him to
compromise.
The Cold War was also built around metaphors such as the domino theory and the
policy of containment. Preventing the spread of communism and Soviet influence by
confining it to the states where it already existed drove much of the rhetoric and policy of the
Cold War. While today‘s rhetoric about Cuba no longer relies on the fear of state after state
falling to communism, Cuba‘s position in the Western Hemisphere certainly did alarm policy
makers during the Cold War. The Cuban Missile Crisis stands out as a discrete event during
the Cold War, but throughout the 70s and 80s, worries about Cuba‘s support for leftist
governments and movements in Latin America brought the domino theory closer to home.
Statements condemning any expansion of Cuban-style communism characterized the rhetoric
about Cuba in the 70s and 80s. Although the same rhetoric about the Soviet Union has
understandably disappeared, and other Cold War issues have been resolved through
recognizing the benefits of trade (as in the case of China) or through normalization of
diplomatic relations (as in the case of Vietnam) perhaps because Castro remains in power, we
still see vestiges of Cold War containment policy in today‘s rhetoric about Cuba.
473

Often, these Cold War worldviews manifest themselves in the narratives embedded in
political discourse. While the master narrative explaining the place of the United States in
the world broke at the end of the Cold War, the fragments of that narrative remained part of

473
Cuba‘s relations with countries such as Venezuela and Venezuela‘s President Hugo Chavez‘s leftist policies
prompt a return to containment thinking. In 2002, an unsuccessful coup attempt in Venezuela raised questions
about what the United States was willing to do to keep Venezuela safe for trade.
173

the common sense of the American public. Of course the United States stands for democracy
and freedom, while Cuba represents a threat to security and free markets. Experts carefully
weigh policy options when the stakes are high and the interests of the U.S. are best served
through compromise and agreements. The pieces of the Cold War narrative, made up of both
dualism and realism can serve as starting points for new stories or the justifications of old
stories. That the current rhetoric on Cuba contains both elements of prophetic dualism and
technocratic realism is due to at least two factors. One, both rhetorical forms are available as
floating elements at the end of the cold war. They themselves are narrative fragments that
can be articulated in a newer context. Two, both prophetic dualism and technocratic realism
appear in the form of a story which can account for both rhetorical forms in the way the plot
unfolds and the characters are described. I now turn to W. Lance Bennett and Murray
Edelman‘s work on political narratives to discuss the ways in which the Cold War view of
the world remains entrenched in the stories we tell about the world and the way it works.
474

The first question raised by taking a narrative approach to rhetoric about Cuba, and
the most basic one we can begin to answer, is what standard narratives do Bush and his
administration officials use in discussing Cuba? The stories told in the Bush administration
rhetoric include that Castro tyrannizes his people and denies them any freedom. The United
States takes a moral stand against human rights abusers by refusing to support such a
repressive regime through trade. The United States also does what it can to engage and
support the people of Cuba who want freedom. To understand how these narratives work
rhetorically, we have to ask how standard narratives establish their credibility.

474
Bennett and Edelman, ―Toward a New Political Narrative,‖
174

First, Bennett and Edelman explain that standard narratives make use of selective
documentation that supports a particular plot while encouraging the rejection of other
possible plots.
475
Among the selective documentation offered by Bush is the reference to the
UN Human Rights Commission statement calling for Cuba to respect the human rights of its
people.
476
This helps support the plot that Castro is a tyrant with the world standing against
him. Bush fails to mention that the United Nations also condemned the embargo as a
violation of international law. This allows the public to reject the story that the U.S.
maintains a policy that is an anachronism caught in a time warp. The American public can
also reject that the U.S. might not have the support from the world, and so may not be on the
side of all that is democratic, free, just and good. In a response to Representative Serrano‘s
question about why the United States trades with China and Vietnam and not Cuba, Powell
states that in these other countries, the leaders understand that the world is changing, but that
Castro is in a time warp.
477
This helps support the plot line that Castro is outdated and
cannot engage in the world democratic scene. Powell ignores the suggestion by Serrano that
Florida electoral politics play a part in the policy. Powell also fails to offer any evidence for
the understanding that leaders of China, Vietnam, and Korea have shown that Castro does not
display. This allows the audience to ignore the story of a self-interested president who won
the election through the loyalty of the Cuban-American block in Florida. It also allows the

475
Bennett and Edelman, ―Toward a New Political Narrative,‖163.
476
Bush, ―Recognition of Cuban Independence Day.‖
477
Committee of Appropriations, Departments Appropriations for 2002.
175

public to ignore inconsistencies revealing interest, as opposed to principle, as guiding U.S.
policy.
The second feature of narrative credibility is that audiences are given fragmentary
plot lines that they can put together to complete the story.
478
When audiences know the rest
of the story, they gain satisfaction from supplying the rest of the details from their
experience, knowledge, and beliefs. I would argue that many fragmentary and contradictory
plot lines appear in the rhetoric of George W. Bush and Colin Powell. The plot line that tells
the story of the embargo against Cuba appears in pieces. One piece is that the embargo is
against Castro‘s regime. This piece of the plot fails to tell how the embargo works or exactly
how it is aimed at Castro‘s regime. But it is a fragment that allows audience members to feel
comfortable with the policy. The audience can supply the rest of the narrative without
having to confront arguments against the merits of the policy. Another plot fragment is that
the embargo is working, or at least that lifting it would enhance Castro‘s power. This
fragment doesn‘t explain the workings of the blockade or what would happen if lifting it did
enhance Castro‘s power. This fragment helps quiet the calls for trading with Cuba to further
U.S. economic interest.
Another fragment that helps quiet calls to end the embargo is that other countries‘
attempts at engagement have gone bad. The only information that Powell gives about this
example is that it is a Canadian company that got burned.
479
He gave no explanation of
which company it is, of how they got burned, or how Castro used the investment to

478
Bennett and Edelman, ―Toward a New Political Rhetoric,‖ 163.
479
Committee of Appropriations, Departments Appropriations for 2002.
176

strengthen his own power. Another plot line suggests that the people of Cuba are all poor, all
anti-Castro, and all want to leave for the United States. Bush uses the story of HUD
Secretary Mel Martinez to enhance this plot line, even accidentally getting details of the story
wrong in telling it to the public.
I‘m very proud to be traveling with one of my Cabinet Secretaries, a man who is
doing a fabulous job at HUD. His name is Mel Martinez. When he was a young boy,
his mother and daddy put him on a boat – I guess it was an airplane – to come to
America from Cuba. They weren‘t ever sure whether they would see him again.
They were sure, however, they were sending him to a place that loved freedom, a
place where you can be anything you want to be in America.
480

On another occasion, Bush refers to Martinez being put on a boat to come to the land of
freedom.
481
This narrative allows the United States to take a paternalistic role in Cuba, rather
than admitting that the arguments for the self-determination of the Cuban people might have
some merit.
The third feature of standard narratives with credibility is that audience members may
draw familiar beliefs and morals from the unfolding story.
482
The stories in the rhetoric
about Cuba allow people to continue to believe that communism is evil; that the United
States takes stands to promote human rights, and that the main goal of United States policy is
to overthrow a tyrannical dictator. Not only does this narrative draw upon familiar beliefs, it
draws upon the familiar meanings that people have already associated with certain words and
concepts from many years of repeating the narrative. The association of Castro with tyranny,

480
Bush, ―Remarks at the University of Toledo in Toledo.‖
481
In an August 8, 2001 speech in Texas, Bush states, ―. . .as a young boy, his parents put him on a boat from
Cuba, hoping that he could find freedom. . .‖ Bush, ―Remarks to Participants in Habitat for Humanity‘s ―World
Leaders Build‖ in Waco.‖
482
Bennett and Edelman , ―Toward a New Political Rhetoric,‖ 163.
177

human rights abuses, and repression forms the basis for the narrative and has been repeated
so many times that the public doesn‘t require further explanation of details to confirm the
narrative‘s seeming correspondence with the world.
Examining what makes these narratives credible to an audience helps us to
understand how the narratives work with beliefs to reinforce old understandings of the world.
One problem with these narratives is that, in their reliance on incomplete information and
previously held beliefs, real problems with human rights and economic conditions are
ignored. Without the information and new narratives to accommodate this information, the
American public remains comfortable with outdated and ineffective policies. While the
policies and narratives regarding Cuba represent a particularly blatant example of outdated
Cold War discourse, the last few years have seen a resurgence of the use of dualistic rhetoric
generally. Bush‘s war on terrorism rhetoric closely follows the discourse of the Cold War,
not only in his use of good and evil dualisms,
483
but in the ways that seemingly unrelated
conflicts (Iraq) have been billed as a part of winning the war on terrorism. The USA Patriot
Act authorizes abridgment of civil liberties, which reminds many of the McCarthyism of the
1950s.
This unfolding narrative describing the role of the United States in the world and how
foreign policy should be conducted makes it more difficult to oppose U.S. policy toward
Cuba. In gaining more insight into the workings of narratives, we may be able to draw upon

483
Bush‘s ―axis of evil‖ and ―You‘re either with us or against us‖ are only two of the most famous lines
creating this dualism.
178

these beliefs and excluded information to create counter-narratives that let new solutions into
the realm of possibility.
In the summer of 2003, a group of Republican state representatives in Florida sent a
letter to George W. Bush pushing for a stronger Cuba policy. The letter and subsequent
statements by the legislators signing the letter indicated that support for George W. Bush in
the 2004 election might waver if he did not deliver on a set of stricter regulations. The letter
specifically called for an end to the ―wet foot/dry foot‖ policy, which sends Cuban
immigrants back to Cuba if they are intercepted in the water, while those who make it to dry
land are usually allowed to stay in the United States. They also demanded that Castro be
tried as a terrorist for the downing of the Brothers to the Rescue planes in 1996.
On October 10, 2003, George W. Bush established the Commission for Assistance to
a Free Cuba, a group headed by Secretary of State Colin L. Powell to study and develop a
plan for a democratic transition in Cuba.
484
Bush asked the Commission to give its report by
May 2004. The Commission studied five specific areas, including bringing about an end to
the Castro dictatorship, creating democratic institutions, establishing a free market economy,
modernizing infrastructure, and meeting the basic needs of the Cuban people.
485
On May 6,
2004, the Commission for Assistance to a Free Cuba published its 500-page findings and
recommendations. In the forward to the report by the Secretary of State, Powell stated, ―Our
goal is a true democratic transition. We want to help the Cuban people put Castro and

484
U.S. Department of State, ―Mission and Members.‖
485
Ibid.
179

Castroism behind them forever.‖
486
The executive summary of the report (a more concise
ten-page document released by the White House press secretary) clarified what this
democratic transition entails,
the United States rejects the continuation of a communist dictatorship in Cuba, and
this Commission recommends measures to focus pressure and attention on the ruling
elite so that succession by this elite or any one of its individuals is seen as what it
would be: an impediment to a democratic and free Cuba.
487

Overall, the Commission‘s recommendations include extreme tightening of
restrictions on travel, trade, and educational programs. Moreover, the report recommends
providing an additional $29 million to U.S. government agencies for increased assistance to
dissidents and providing materials (such as computers) to NGOs who work in Cuban civil
society and an additional $5 million to public diplomacy efforts such as broadcasting radio
programs from airplanes. They recommend restricting or eliminating almost all current
provisions for travel, trade, and person-to-person contacts.
488

The new regulations met with some opposition in the Cuban American community.
Those who still have family in Cuba might like to see their family more than once every
three years. According to the Boston Globe on June 1, 2004,
Some Cuban-Americans support the tougher regulations against Castro and see their
implementation as a positive step to bringing democratic change to the country.
Others say the clampdown on travel and aid may mean more hardship for their
families, not for Castro. ‗It can be very devastating to the work we are doing,‘ said
Oswald Mondejar, a Boston resident who visits his homeland once a year to deliver
medicine and Braille books to Cubans with disabilities.
489

486
Powell, ―Foreword,‖ 1.
487
Office of the Press Secretary, ―Executive Summary,‖ xvi.
488
Office of the Press Secretary, ―Executive Summary,‖ xvi-xix.
489
Diaz, ―Travel Restrictions Confound Boston-Area Cubans,‖ B1.
180

The Globe goes on to note that the new restrictions prompted some protests in Miami.
490

Cubans who arrived in the 1960s are less likely to have family on the island than those who
came to the U.S. during Mariel or later. Of course, for many, the restrictions signaled Bush‘s
continued commitment to an anti-Castro stance and the continued support of the Miami anti-
Castro voters.
The timing of the Commission for Assistance to a Free Cuba was lost on few. Kerry
‗s spokesperson Phil Singer pointed out, ―For three and a half years [Bush] did nothing on
Cuba, waiting until an election year to enact policy that will do nothing to bring down the
Castro regime but will hurt the Cuban people.‖
491
Kerry cautioned on June 5
th
, ―President
Bush‘s recent election-year move to significantly restrict cash remittances to Cuban families
and virtually eliminate family travel must be seen for what it is – a cynical and misguided
ploy for a few Florida votes.‖
492
However, Kerry himself advanced a few different positions
on Cuba policy before settling on his June 5, 2004 ―Statement of Principles on U.S. Cuba
Policy.‖ In March, Kerry said that he voted for the Helms-Burton legislation in 1996, when
in fact, he voted against it. His explanation was similar to his defense of claiming to vote for
additional funding for operations in Iraq, that he disagreed with the final version while
approving of the conference version of the bill. In April, responding to questions about
statements he made in 2000 calling the embargo ―frozen, stalemated counterproductive
policy,‖ Kerry tried to come across as tough on Castro. He stated, ―I have never suggested

490
Ibid.
491
Reynolds, ―Bush Visits Miami to Shore Up Cuban American Backing,‖ A18.
492
Kerry, ―Statement of Principles on U.S. Cuba Policy.‖
181

lifting the embargo‖ (cite). No one could understand how he was going to outflank Bush on
the right, especially when there wasn‘t any room there. Bush was already to the right of the
right-wing CANF. Someone in the Kerry campaign must have realized the problem and
presented an alternative.
In a June 5, 2004 press release, Kerry explained, ―I am committed to seeing the end
of to the Castro regime, which I have long condemned for its flagrant human rights abuse and
political oppression.‖
493
He goes on to say that he will support peaceful and effective
strategies to bring an end to the Castro government.
494
Among these strategies, he stated his
plan for ―encouraging principled travel.‖
495
Although supporting some travel, Kerry did not
want anyone to think he meant to lift the embargo. ―Let me be clear – I do not support lifting
the embargo or recognizing Castro‘s dictatorial regime.‖
496
He supported enabling ―the
Cuban people to take their rightful place in the democratic community of the Americas.‖
497

Other than saying Cuban American families are a positive force for change, Kerry gave no
indication what he meant by principled travel. As a part of supporting selective engagement,
Kerry also supported the sale of food and medicine, as well as lifting the cap on remittances
for Americans to send gifts and money to households and humanitarian institutions in
Cuba.
498
While this took the ground of supporting families that Bush gave up with

493
Ibid.
494
Ibid.
495
Ibid.
496
Ibid.
497
Ibid.
498
Ibid.
182

regulations that reduce the frequency of visits home to family and tried to gain the support of
younger Cuban Americans, it did not change the policy significantly from what had been in
place during most of the Bush presidency, and most of the Cold War.
The difference between Kerry‘s position and the Bush administration‘s position
before the CAFC report came out was very small. Even the Kerry campaign officials noted
that Bush and Kerry‘s position on Helms-Burton is ―in effect, the same.‖
499
Unlike Gore,
Kerry did not have to distance himself from Clinton‘s actions in the Elián Gonzalez case, and
has was trying to display stronger leadership on fundamentally altering U.S.-Cuba relations
than had George W. Bush. Yet, Kerry‘s rhetoric looked too much like Bush‘s rhetoric to
constitute a coherent counter-narrative. While not characterizing Castro as evil, Kerry did
mention that remittances will help Cubans ―not just to survive, but also to start small
businesses and thereby gain a measure of autonomy from the crushing repression of the
Cuban state.‖
500
He used the same narrative pieces that Bush used, but tried not to take the
story in the same direction. He called for selective engagement, rather than further
isolation
501
to communicate American ideals.
502
Kerry thus chose not to seize the
opportunity to make bold statements about Cuba that might signal a new direction in U.S.-
Cuban foreign policy. While he stated that he had consistently voted to lift the ban on travel,
he could have emphasized this and argued that lifting the travel ban is only the first step
toward making better policy.

499
Reynolds, ―Bush Visits Miami to Shore Up Cuban American Backing,‖ A18.
500
Kerry, ―Statement of Principles on U.S. Cuba Policy.‖
501
Ibid.
502
Ibid.
183

The narrative that explained Castro‘s position in the world and the alleged benefits he
would realize from expanded U.S. trade remained in place, and this limited the options
available to Kerry. But this story did not enjoy the status of absolute truth. Hegemony, as
Williams reminds us, is never total or complete, but must be defended in the face of
opposition to it.
503
Opposing stories about Cuba existed, but did not amount to a significant
challenge to the hegemony of the story Bush told about Castro. Kerry was in a position to
challenge that story, but did not create any new rhetorical space because he did not create or
use a different story about what trade does and who Castro is as a political figure. Further,
Kerry could not advance a position that included trading with Cuba. Either not able, not
willing, not confident enough, or not concerned enough to build a new story to challenge the
dominant narrative, Kerry missed opportunities for exposing antagonisms by remaining a
part of the rhetoric about Cuba.
As I‘ve argued throughout this chapter, the narrative about Cuba both justifies and
constrains policy options. At the same time, this narrative presents the ingredients for its
own opposition. Articulated as a part of a wider story explaining U.S. foreign policy that
includes supporting democracy, fighting terrorism and rogue states, and increasing free trade,
the Cuba narrative rests on new elements as well as the old Cold War fragments. Chapter six
will discuss how to make use of new narrative elements so as to discard the Cold War
fragments that continue to anchor the Cold War frame in place.

503
Williams, Marxism and Literature, 112-14.
184

The outcome of the 2004 election ensured the embargo‘s place in U.S. policy for at
least the next four years. Without changing the stories told about the Castros, it will be in
place for as long as they are there. Because ―common sense‖ dictates that one should support
policies that punish human rights abusers, a tough policy toward Castro-style government
will remain. Much of the rhetoric about Cuba panders to an older, more affluent electorate in
Florida who fled Cuba in the 1960s. As this group of people pass from the scene and become
increasingly marginalized by younger generations and younger and more recent immigrants
from Cuba, the policy emphasis may change. But, as Kerry himself shows us, simply
focusing on a younger group of Cuban Americans without changing the narrative only
resulted in advocating ―principled travel.‖
Even among lawmakers and candidates who would like to change policy toward Cuba
to increase agricultural markets and bring trade policy out of the Cold War, the narrative
resources available do not allow this to happen. As we‘ll see in Chapter 6, Hillary Clinton
and Barak Obama would only advocate changing travel and trade regulations back to the
regulations in place before the CAFC. Neither candidate came out in favor of overturning
Helms-Burton. Chapter six looks at the most recent rhetoric on Cuba in the wake of Fidel
Castro stepping down and looks at how to develop narrative resources for telling a more
coherent story with more narrative fidelity.

185

CHAPTER SIX: CONCLUSION
Now that the Cold War is long over, the Soviet threat disappeared, and Fidel Castro
no longer in power, many people wonder why the U.S. still has an embargo on Cuba and
continues to demonize Fidel Castro and his brother and successor Raul Castro. The
explanation advanced in this dissertation is that the U.S. Cold War narrative of Cuba has
been so compelling and so often told over the past six decades that the U.S. has been unable
to construct an alternative narrative that would enable it to take advantage of the changed
global conditions and to redefine the relationship between these nation states. Even if U.S.
officials and members of the public would like to start a new relationship with Cuba, the
language to explain and justify this new relationship is absent from the dominant narrative
that serves to justify and clarify U.S. relations with Cuba for the past half century, and thus
absent from general political discourse in the U.S.
Typically, Cold War stories have ended with a big momentous event, such as the
tearing down of a wall, the collapse of a country, or an invasion. For more than 50 years, the
United States has anticipated a big moment to end the story about Cuba and the United
States. This big moment should mark the victory of the United States and bring the U.S. and
Cuba into a new harmonious (or at least tolerant) relationship. Ideally, the story anticipates
that the Cuban people will rise up and overthrow Castro. Barring this, Castro‘s death would
mark a momentous shift in the story. In any case, this moment has yet to occur. The
circumstances in Cuba continue to change gradually and the existing story has less and less
resemblance to reality. If the big moment marking the end to the U.S.-Cuba Cold War never
occurs, rhetoricians and politicians must make use of alternative rhetorical strategies to
186

change the way the U.S. public understands U.S.-Cuba relations. The Obama administration
has already started to make use of some of these strategies, but the Cold War story still has
traction and explanatory power for the American public and Cold War rhetoric still
permeates President Obama‘s discussions of Cuba. In order to abandon the cold war
narrative, The U.S. needs a new story in place to explain U.S.-Cuba relations. This narrative
should explain U.S.-Cuba relations in a way that is more coherent and has greater fidelity
than the Cold War story. Absent a convincing breakthrough, the public will be reluctant to
accept changes that contradict the story that has, for so long, enjoyed presumption. Given
that the Cold War story about Cuba should have ended years ago and that some, such as
those in the Obama administration have attempted small moves away from it, this chapter
recaps the Cold War narratives about Cuba, including the implications of those stories and
what keeps them in place. The chapter then looks at narrative theory for instructions for
moving away from these narratives and for conclusions about narrative theory. Using these
instructions, I then make suggestions about ways to move past the Cold War narratives and
move to examine the current rhetorical openings in discourse about Cuba and draw some
final conclusions. The Cold War account of Cuba in the U.S. comes from a variety of
different events, responses, speeches, characterizations, and contexts. Through awareness of
the conditions that established the dominant story the U.S. may be able to create the
resources for a new narrative about Cuba.
Narratives of Cuba and Narrative Implications
The set of stories that the United States has about Cuba spans over a century. From
possessing Cuba to opposing Cuba as a Cold War enemy to taking the Cuban people
187

escaping from Cuba to demonizing Castro after the Cold War, the U.S. story has had many
consequences for U.S. policy toward Cuba and the interaction between the two nation states.
The narratives also contain factors that perpetuate and reinforce its explanatory power in the
United States, even as the narratives bear less and less resemblance to reality.
The first narrative, that of Cuba naturally belonging to the United States discussed in
Chapter 2, begins with the element of a series of early U.S. leaders indicating interest in
adding Cuba to the United States of America, some even going so far as to attempt to
purchase Cuba from Spain. Upon failing to annex Cuba, the U.S. entered the Spanish
American War in a failed attempt to win Cuba‘s desire for annexation. The U.S. military
occupation of Cuba continued until writers of the new Cuban constitution agreed to include
the Platt amendment, essentially giving the United States veto power over Cuba‘s policies.
This element of the story about Cuba resulted in the United States interacting with Cuba not
as another nation state or an equal, but as an inferior sibling or child.
From the end of the military occupation in 1902 until the revolution in 1959, the U.S.
remained involved in Cuban affairs through business investment, aid, and travel. The U.S.
continued to possess Cuba, but in more subtle ways. The United States viewed Cuba as its
backyard playground, vice-filled and exciting. These elements of the story, Cuba as
playground for the wealthy and Havana as a city of sin contributed to the U.S. decisions to
support Batista, who kept American businesses and the casinos in Cuba.
The narrative that Cuba belonged to the U.S. included the element that Cuba could
not stably govern itself. Usually patronizingly amused by the instability and ―Latin hot-
headedness,‖ of Cuban politics, the fighting in 1957 and 1958 seemed to be another episode
188

in the mercurial and violent politics of Cuba. Eyeing Castro‘s revolution warily but
hopefully, the United States had grown used to leaders friendly to the economic interests of
U.S. business and trade. The U.S. public had also come to find Cuban politics entertaining
and Castro, with his inexperience and his beard and fatigues captured the imagination of the
public. Nothing in the history of Cuban politics or in Castro‘s background pointed toward
him lasting very long as a leader of Cuba. During the Cold War, the U.S. attributed Castro‘s
strength to Soviet Backing. When the Cold War ended, the U.S. assumed that he would
collapse in the absence of that support.
The narrative about Cuba belonging to the United States only receded into the
background with the rise of the Cold War narrative, but it still operated as a part of the
American social knowledge. The United States continues to relate to what it sees as a
politically broken Cuba while longing for the Cuba of the past: that exciting playground of a
place with amusing political antics. The narrative of possession prevents the U.S. from
making progress in U.S.-Cuba relations because of the subtle operation of the narrative that
keeps the U.S. from relating to Cuba as another nation state.
The second narrative, found in Chapter 3, emphasized that Cuba was a Cold War
adversary. This narrative grew out of the new Cuban government nationalizing U.S.
properties, declaring the revolution socialist, and seeking help from the Soviet Union. The
cautious optimism felt in the U.S. gave way to characterizations of the revolution as having
―betrayed,‖
504
and then ―devoured its children.‖
505
Kennedy emphasized that the U.S. ―lost‖

504
Kennedy, ―Address before the American Society of Newspaper Editors.‖
505
U.S. Department of State ―Cuba,‖14.
189

Cuba, much as the U.S. had lost China. Relying upon the previous narrative, that Cuba
belonged to the United States, the element of the story that the U.S. had lost Cuba implies
that the U.S. should attempt to retrieve it.
The Bay of Pigs invasion represented the attempt to retrieve Cuba from the clutches
of a dictator that sold out the promising revolution to the Soviets. The invasion also allowed
the U.S. to add to the story that Cuban refugees were determined to ―regain their island‘s
freedom.‖
506
The U.S. stood back and played host to people who had fled their country and
offered support for their endeavor to fight for their freedom. President Kennedy used the
Bay of Pigs invasion to underscore the seriousness of the threat of communism and put Cuba
into the Cold War battlefield. This told the U.S. public that it would take a lot more to
remove Castro from power.
After the Bay of Pigs, Cuba was the scene for one of the most serious events of the
Cold War. The second element of the developing Cold War narrative was that of Cuba
becoming a dangerous Communist satellite 90 miles away. The U.S.S.R. installed missiles
on Cuba and touched off the Cuban Missile Crisis. A conflict between the U.S. and the
U.S.S.R., the ―Cuban‖ part of the missile crisis remained after the situation was resolved.
The visceral fears from the biggest scare of the Cold War were forever tied to the word
―Cuban.‖ In this story about Cuba, Castro becomes an unpredictable Soviet puppet,
increasing the danger he poses for the U.S., even as the crisis with the Soviets was resolved.
The story did not capture the picture of the obstinate Castro, frustrated over his lost power
when he was bypassed in the resolution of the Crisis. The story of the Cuban Missile Crisis

506
Kennedy, ―Address before the American Society of Newspaper Editors.‖
190

portrayed diplomacy as possible with the Soviet Union, but not with Cuba. Cuba remained a
dangerously close enemy in the ideological battle. Cuba‘s actions to support revolution in
other nation states added details to the Cold War narrative, emphasizing the loss of Cuba
throughout the rest of the Cold War.
The emotional memory tied to the Cuban missile crisis continues to underscore the
adversarial relationship between the U.S. and Cuba. These emotions remain reasons that
Cuba might be dangerous today and therefore remain reasons to continue to see Cuba in Cold
War terms. The Cold War terms of the relationship with Cuba dictate isolation rather than
engagement. Despite the fact that Cuba‘s relationship with the Soviet Union ended when the
Soviet Union collapsed and that Cuba poses no security threat to the United States, the Cuba
as Cold War adversary narrative lives on in rhetoric and policy today.
As chapter 4 explains, the mid-1960s had the United States focusing on making a
place in the U.S. for the Cubans who cared to flee Cuba. The third narrative reinforced the
Cold War story about Cuba with a new narrative of Cuba as a place from which to escape.
Worried Cuban parents put thousands of children on planes to the U.S. The United States
began to celebrate the success of Cuban immigrants who had escaped Communism and who
built lives of freedom in Florida and elsewhere in the U.S. Making use of the Cold War
narrative, Cubans arriving in the United States defined themselves as exiles or refugees,
rather than as immigrants. Exiles have a privileged place in society and in policy vs.
immigrants. Thus, Cuban exiles have an interest in maintaining the Cold War narrative to
describe their situation.
191

Throughout the rest of the Cold War, migration became an important part of the story
about Cuba and spoke volumes to the U.S. public about what life in Cuba must be like.
When they had the chance in 1980, 125,000 people boarded boats at Mariel to get away from
the hell that those in the U.S. imagined Cuba to be. While the story of Mariel itself featured
criminal exiles, the primary contribution Mariel made to the narrative about Cuba is that
people were desperate to leave Cuba and that Fidel Castro was an evil dictator that uses
migration as a weapon against the U.S.
In 1994, the balseros crisis saw people fleeing Cuba again, but the United States was
ready to prevent a repeat of the Mariel boatlift. Castro once again threatened to use his
people as a weapon against U.S. policy. People took to the Florida Straits in anything that
would float (and some things that did not). The U.S. public saw people who risked their lives
to leave Cuba for the United States. In the Cold War story, people (understandably) fled
Communism. While most of the people who fled in 1994 did so for economic reasons, the
story that they fled Cuba for freedom reinforced the Cold War story three years after the end
of the Cold War. Those who did not leave Cuba must have stayed because they were part of
the Communist enemy or could not get away.
The final element of the story about Cuba as a place from which to escape exposed
the thinness of the Cold War narrative in explaining Cuban migration 10 years after the end
of the Cold War. The Elián Gonzalez saga pitted two narratives against one another: the
narrative of the Cold War and the narrative of family values. The Cuban exile community
fought hard for the application of the Cold War narrative to Elián‘s situation in order to keep
him in the U.S. to enjoy freedom. In the end, the narrative of family values triumphed
192

among most of the American public, who found that they could relate better to a narrative
closer to home and more current in their lives. While this event started to reveal cracks in the
frame of the Cold War narrative, the narrative remained to explain the rest of U.S. policy
toward Cuba because of the lack of a better and more current story.
Rather than ending the Cold War story about Cuba when the Cold War ended, George
H. W. Bush made the choice to increase the isolation of Cuba to try to force its collapse or to
prompt the Cuban people to rise up and overthrow Castro. The fourth narrative about Cuba,
discussed in chapter 5, is Cuba as led by an anachronistic tyrant resisting the tide of
Democracy. To justify tightening the embargo, both Governor Clinton and President Bush
had to use modified Cold War rhetoric about Cuba. The first element of the story focused on
the inevitability of democratic change. The U.S. just had to wait for the last outpost to
capitulate and admit the defeat that other Communist nation states experienced. When
waiting for this inevitability did not satisfy hard-line members of the Cuban exile
community, the Bush administration signed the Cuban Democracy Act in the election year of
1992. Adapting Cold War rhetoric to account for this major change in world relations
ensured that the Cold War narrative could continue to explain relations with Cuba for as long
as Castro was in power. The collapse of the Soviet Union represented an opportunity to shift
away from the use of the Cold War narrative to explain Cuba. President George H.W. Bush
did not take advantage of this opportunity. (And neither did his son when the next
opportunity presented in 2006.)
President Clinton rejected Fidel Castro‘s offers for talks when he entered office. The
Clinton administration supported the Cuban Democracy Act until 1996, when the Brothers to
193

the Rescue incident prompted Clinton to sign the Helms-Burton Act. The second element of
the post-Cold War story about Cuba was one that emphasized that Castro was an
international outlaw. This rhetoric emphasized the brutality of Fidel Castro and the goals of
the U.S. to punish and isolate his regime. This story still operates in discussions about
political prisoners, freedom of speech, and elections in Cuba. The events of 1996 have faded
into the background, but the emotional power of the Cold War narrative supports continued
isolation of Cuba. The 1996 Helms-Burton Act stands directly in the way of changing
relations with Cuba, as it forbids normalizing relations while Fidel or Raul have a part in
governing Cuba.
The third element of the narrative of Cuba as led by an anachronistic tyrant is that
Cuba today is depicted as backward and repressive. This narrative further suggests that the
U.S. and the Cuban people should look to a Cuba of the future that is prosperous and free.
This story permeates the rhetoric of the second President Bush. Focusing on freeing Cuba in
the future and the repressive measures of the Castro government preventing the U.S. from
changing trade policy, Bush mainly appeals to the Cuban Americans in vote-rich Florida. By
this point, even when members of the public had ceased caring about the communist leanings
of an aging dictator, they explained the incongruities of Cuba policy by assigning it to the
domain of the Cuban American community. This dismisses the salience of Cuba policy for
everyone except Cuban Americans, essentially taking non-Cuban U.S. citizens out of the
conversation about policy and about creating a new story. The Cold War story has become a
story of ―wait and see.‖ Wait and see what will happen when Castro is gone. Wait and see
194

what will happen when Obama is in office. The element of waiting, such a prevalent feature
of life in Cuba, is ironic in a democracy that has set itself apart from Cuba for so many years.
In all of these narratives about Cuba, the story of Cuba did not contain much of the
actual experiences of the Cuban people in Cuba. Other than talking about freedom for
Cubans on the island, the narrative in the United States substituted the stories of Cuban exiles
for those who continued to live in Cuba. This, combined with the narrative about looking
forward to a free Cuba, results in U.S. policy focusing on people who used to live in Cuba
and people who may live in Cuba in the future, but U.S. policies rarely address the people
who live there now and experience the consequences of the policies. A lack of interaction
between Cubans on the island and U.S. citizens, policy makers, and the foreign policy public
means that the story necessarily excludes their side of this story and anything they might
contribute to an understanding of the effects of U.S. rhetoric and policy. The U.S. story
about Cuba also excludes dialogue between U.S. leaders and Cuban leaders on anything
other than terms dictated by the U.S. Even if these are happening at a secret level (like they
were during the Carter administration) or among lower-level officials they do not make it
into the story.
After 2004, two events occurred that tested the viability of the Cold War narrative
frame: Fidel Castro temporarily handed power over to his brother in August 2006 and
stepped down from power permanently in February 2008. In August 2006, Fidel Castro had
to undergo gastrointestinal surgery and temporarily handed power over to his brother Raul.
The Bush White House followed the rhetorical work of the Helms-Burton legislation that
stated ―a transition government in Cuba is a government that…does not include Fidel Castro
195

or Raul Castro.‖
507
White House spokesperson Tony Snow cautioned that the U.S. public
should not expect major change from Cuba or from the approach of the United States
government. ―There are no plans to reach out,‖ he said. ―The fact that you have an autocrat
handing over power to his brother does not indicate an end to autocracy.‖
508
The White
House issued a press release urging ―the Cuban people to work for democratic change on the
island.‖
509
The press release goes on to say, ―we will take note of those, in the current Cuban
regime who obstruct your desire for a free Cuba.‖
510
Even as journalists, opinion writers, and
community leaders in Miami lauded the beginning of a transition,
511
official political rhetoric
in the U.S. carefully steered away from any anticipation of change. Secretary of State
Condoleeza Rice stated in an appearance on Hardball that ―it‘s extremely important that no
one think that it is acceptable when there is a change in Cuba that the Cuban people have to
go from one dictator to another.‖
512

Without knowing how much power Fidel still had (or if he was even alive), direct
U.S. assistance to a democratic transition was unthinkable. Barring a full democratic
transition, the U.S. was unprepared to repair relations with Cuba. The idea that the U.S.
might engage in diplomatic relations when Castro could return to power or be running the

507
The Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (Libertad) Act of 1996, Section 208. The restrictions
implemented with the Helms-Burton Act remain in effect until the transition government is in place.
508
Nichols, ―Americans Await Word on Castro,‖ 1A.
509
Bush, ―Statement on Cuba.‖
510
Ibid.
511
Bachelet, ―Sen. Martinez Says Moment of Transition Could Be Near.‖; Nichols, ―Americans Await Word on
Castro, 1A; Beam, ―¿Cuba Libre?‖
512
Rice, ―Interview with David Gregory.‖
196

show from behind the scenes had U.S. leaders holding out for a definitive sign that
democratic changes were taking place. In Raul Castro‘s first public comments after Fidel‘s
surgery he indicated that Cuba was ready for an invasion from the United States, ―‗We could
not rule out the risk of somebody going crazy, or even crazier, within the U.S. government,‘‖
he told the Cuban newspaper, The Granma.
513
Raul went on to note that the people are
behind the Cuban government. Reports such as these, as well as headlines proclaiming,
―Few Expect Change Under Raul Castro; Fidel's Brother Will Maintain Course Some
Analysts Say,‖
514
and, ―Democracy in Cuba unlikely as Raul rules,‖
515
emphasized that Raul
was ―Fidel light,‖ as State Department spokesperson Tom Casey noted.
516
On the other
hand, the desire for change and the opportunity represented by this temporary shift in power
can be seen in headlines such as, ―As Castro Era Fades, U.S. Sticks to Failed Policy,‖
517

―Hope for Raul,‖
518
and, ―Change may be on the Horizon.‖
519
The U.S. had not seen an
opening in the story about Cuba since the collapse of the Soviet Union. Fidel Castro handing
over power was potentially a huge shift in the narrative. The Bush administration was
unprepared to make changes in policy with the Fidel‘s health and Raul‘s leadership up in the
air. The groundwork had already been laid to avoid major changes in the story in the event

513
Quoted in Lacy, ―Saturday Cuba Mobilized for a U.S. Attack,‖ 4.
514
Lakshmanan, ―Few Expect Change Under Raul Castro.‖
515
Scarborough, ―Democracy in Cuba Unlikely,‖ A01.
516
Casey, ―State Department Regular Briefing.‖; Quoted in Soltis, ―Hope For Raul as Friendlier Red-Fellow,‖
4.
517
―As Castro Era Fades,‖ 8A.
518
Soltis, ―Hope For Raul as Friendlier Red-Fellow,‖ 4.
519
Williams, ―Change May Be On the Horizon,‖ A10.
197

that Raul would take over. In 2006, the Bush administration made no changes to the rhetoric
about Cuba and the policies remained the same. The administration had successfully adapted
the Cold War story about Fidel apply to Raul as well.
Questions about whether or not Fidel would return to power led to uncertainty about
the leadership in Cuba and uncertainty about the United States‘ next move. Fidel answered
those questions in February 2008 when he announced that he would not be seeking
reelection. The response of the Bush administration was to continue the same policies and
rhetoric as before. At this point, eighteen months of very little change in Cuba sealed the fate
of U.S. relations with Raul under President Bush. The old nemesis was gone from the scene
but his brother, ―Fidel light,‖ was in officially in charge of Cuba. In a response to an ―Ask
the White House‖ question about possibilities for change now that Raul was president,
Secretary of Commerce Carlos Gutierrez replied,
Cuba‘s decision to confirm Fidel Castro‘s brother, Raul Castro, as his handpicked
successor for president of Cuba slams the door to real political change for the Cuban
people. It ensures that a key agent of Castro‘s legacy of hate, violence, repression,
and countless human rights violations will continue in power.
520

On the occasion of International Women‘s Day in 2008, President and Mrs. Bush celebrated
courageous women from around the world. President Bush noted the efforts of Marta Beatr z
Roque Cabello in fighting for freedom in Cuba. ―This courageous woman knows that
freedom is not going to come to Cuba by trading one oppressive Castro regime for
another.‖
521
Bush expanded on this a few days earlier in a speech in the White House.

520
Gutierrez, ―Ask the Whitehouse.‖
521
Bush, ―Remarks at a Celebration of Women‘s History Month.‖
198

So far, all Cuba has done is replace one dictator with another. And its former ruler is
still influencing events from behind the scenes. This is the same system, the same
faces, and the same policies that led Cuba to its miseries in the first place.
522

Because of the efforts to explicitly include Raul in the story about Cuban evils, maintaining
the longstanding policy made sense. President Bush explained that,
life will not improve for the Cuban people until their system of government changes.
It will not improve by exchanging one dictator for another. It will not improve if we
prop up the same tyranny for the false promise of so-called stability.
523

The Bush administration explained the transfer of power as more of the same, making any
change in the policy seem absurd.
Narrative Theory
The case of Cuba illustrates the power of narratives to explain events, justify
decisions, and drive policy. The narratives about Cuba also allow us to draw three
conclusions about narrative theory. The first is that in addition to narrative fidelity and
narrative coherence,
524
audiences also make use of notions of presumption and burden of
proof. Second, stacked, convergent narratives are an inherently hegemonic form of
discourse. The third conclusion is that narratives disseminated through popular culture have
a longer shelf-life.
In addition to Fisher‘s narrative rationality, audiences employ other criteria to test
stories. The long-standing Cold War narrative provides an example of a story past its
expiration date. Applying Fisher‘s criteria of narrative fidelity and narrative coherence, the

522
Bush, ‖Remarks on the Situation in Cuba.‖
523
Ibid.
524
Fisher, Human Communication as Narration.
199

Cold War narrative now fails the test of narrative fidelity. Other stories the audience knows
to be true include the end of the Cold War. However, the Cold War narrative continues to
explain U.S. policy toward Cuba.
A story that lacks narrative probability and narrative fidelity survives because no
story exists to take its place. Looking at narrative in terms of presumption and burden of
proof is instructive here. If a narrative has been accepted by audiences as explanatory of a
situation, it then is part of the status quo and enjoys presumption with that audience. The
Cold War narrative fails the test of narrative fidelity. According to the narrative paradigm,
audiences should reject the story as not being a story with good reasons. However, looking
at the story in terms of presumption and burden of proof tells us that dispensing with the
Cold War narrative requires more than just pointing out it is broken. One must present a
narrative with more fidelity and more coherence to replace the story. This new story must
meet a narrative burden of proof to win the acceptance of audiences. Poking holes in the old
story proves unsatisfying to audiences, who need some story to explain the events.
The first narrative explaining U.S. relations with Cuba, the narrative of Cuba as
belonging to the United States stopped representing Cuba for the American pubic when a
new story, Cuba as Cold War adversary, took its place. Similarly, in the Elián Gonzalez
affair, the public in the United States abandoned the Cold War story for this one case because
the family drama narrative had more fidelity and more coherence to those members of the
public. The story also had more immediate salience in their lives. The adoption of a new
story meant that the public agreed with the decision to send Elián home to Cuba. The Cold
War narrative continued to explain the rest of U.S. policy toward Cuba, however, because the
200

family drama narrative could not account for all of the details of the U.S.-Cuba relationship.
As such, the public defaulted to the story that enjoyed presumption for so long.
To create a new relationship with Cuba, the U.S. must develop a new story that can
account for the details of present-day Cuba and present-day United States. The story should
hang together as a story and confirm other stories the public knows to be true. The U.S. has a
remarkable opportunity to end the Cold War-influenced narrative and create a story that
explains the relationship between the two nation states in a more productive light.
Continuing to use the pieces of the Cold War narrative in the form of the Cuba as
ruled by an anachronistic tyrant narrative is problematic because the U.S. does not know how
to end this story. As mentioned, other Cold War stories have ended with a big moment. The
United States has been, for so long, anticipating the overthrow or death of Castro as the big
moment to end this story. Fidel Castro leaving power voluntarily did not end the story. Now
out of power, Fidel Castro cannot be overthrown. His death will also not change the
immediate governance of Cuba. The anticipated end to the story will likely never occur. The
other possible coherent endings to the anachronism narrative would include a successful Bay
of Pigs type invasion, Raul Castro spontaneously removing himself from power and
announcing free elections to be overseen by the UN, or a democratic coup led by U.S.-
backed dissidents. None of these scenarios seems particularly likely, even if Raul Castro has
approached the United States in an attempt at improving relations. The lack of ending for
this story means that it continues to explain relations with Cuba. Members of the American
public either reject new events that might change the story or reinterpret them in the context
of the current narrative, destroying their power to move the story toward an ending.
201

Stacked and convergent narratives arealso an inherently hegemonic. Narratives
structure individual elements of a discourse into a coherent whole, uniting them within a
linear plot and building relationships between and among characters. These characters take
on the qualities determined by their place within the narrative as necessary attributes and
relate to the other characters in the story in a way dictated by the structure of the story.
Stories assign motives and explanations to events in a way that makes their place in the story
coherent and logical. For example, the Cold War-framed story attributes migration to the
desire to escape repressive communism and seek a better life in the United States. Details
that have trouble fitting into the coherence of the story are discarded or changed to fit the
story. This means that individual events that challenge the validity of the narrative have little
chance of destabilizing its explanatory power.
Because the details fit together into a coherent whole of the story, hearing some of the
details calls to mind the rest of the details related by the structure of the narrative. In this
way, news stories, television plots, and scenes in films can provide pieces of the story,
relying enthymematically on the audience to supply the rest of the story. With respect to
Cuba, members of the U.S. public do not have a story to explain Castro and Cuba outside of
the Cold War frame. This means that American audiences can only supply Cold War details
and relationships to the story. Not only does the narrative serve to explain U.S.-Cuba
relations, then, but for many Americans, it defines Castro, Cuba, and the Cuban people. The
Cold War and anachronism narratives define Castro‘s relationship to the Cuban people as
one of repression and brutality. Images of Castro as benevolent, wise, or moral make little
sense to people who know the story and make no sense to people who only know the story.
202

In addition to narratives structuring separate elements into a coherent whole, the
accessibility of narratives in popular culture helps naturalize them for the pubic and keep the
narratives around longer. Narratives that grow from a presidential speech or a series of
articles in the New York Times last as long as people talk about the stories or for as long as
they are relevant in current context. Images in popular culture return to publics over and
over. Films made long after an event, such as Thirteen Days, give audiences a story about
the Cuban Missile Crisis event nearly 40 years later. Members of the public who were not
around to sit front of the television waiting to hear what would happen next or scour the
paper every morning can get a sense of the enormity of the danger and the associations the
public had at the time. Members of the public who did experience the crisis the first time can
relive that memory, but frequently constrained by the representation in the film.
Popular images in film and television also appear in reruns, late night movies, and
video rentals, giving narratives a longer shelf-life than stories based on more ephemeral
sources. Godfather Part II immortalizes the role of the mafia in Cuba prior to the revolution.
Audiences readily recall that the mob was in Cuba sixty-five years after the actual event
depicted. Catching The Perez Family on cable one afternoon might introduce audiences to
the way that Castro‘s Cuba tore apart families. These popular images also make the stories
more vivid than a 30 second spot on the news, a 15 minute speech by a president or a story in
a newspaper.
Subtle references in popular media also call to mind, confirm, and therefore entrench
narratives existing in Culture. In a scene in 1990‘s The Hunt for Red October, Jeffery Jones‘
character Skip says to another character, ―When I was twelve, I helped my daddy build a
203

bomb shelter in our basement because some fool parked a dozen warheads 90 miles off the
coast of Florida.‖
525
This reference calls to mind the Cuban Missile Crisis for a moment,
confirming the original story about it and then leaving it without further discussion.
Humorous depictions of Cuba work even more subtly to entrench narratives.
In the episode of The Simpsons titled ―Trouble with Trillions,‖ Homer flees the U.S.
with Mr. Burns and Smithers and Mr. Burns‘ trillion dollar bill.
526
They are flying in a
private plane above a group of islands looking for a country to buy. Mr. Burns says,
―There‘s a big one, and it has freedom written all over it!‖ Smithers replies, ―Sir, that‘s
Cuba.‖ Meanwhile in Cuba, Castro is talking to his aids and laments, ―Comrades, our nation
is completely bankrupt! We have no choice but to abandon communism!‖ He responds to
the sighs of the aids, ―I know, I know, I know…but we all knew from day one that this
mumbo jumbo wouldn‘t fly. I‘ll call Washington and tell them that they won.‖ When Burns,
Smithers, and Homer meet with Castro and find they cannot buy Cuba, Burns says, ―will you
at least permit us to live in your socialist paradise?‖ Castro replies, ―You talking about
Cuba?‖ When Burns displays the trillion dollar bill as a reason to receive preferential
treatment in Cuba, Castro asks to see it. Mr. Burns replies, ―Ho ho ho, see with your eyes,
not with your hands!‖ Homer says, ―Mr. Burns…I think we can trust the president of
Cuba…‖ Mr. Burns lets Castro hold the trillion dollar bill and when he asks for it back,

525
The Hunt for Red October, DVD.
526
The Simpsons, ―The Trouble with Trillions‖
204

Castro responds, ―Have what back?‖ So Burns, Smithers, and Homer leave Cuba having lost
the trillion dollar bill to Castro.
527

Fans and Message board critics have panned the writing of the episode as being out of
touch with the characters in the show, as well as out of touch with the ideological perspective
the show usually displays.
528
As such, the humor of Homer‘s trust and the portrayal of
Castro as deceitful and somewhat ridiculous struck more liberal and politically savvy viewers
as atypical of the show‘s usually critical stance on mainstream American political culture.
Regardless, the majority of the audience still supplies the necessary information and attitudes
to enjoy the humor, frequently readily and uncritically.
The (at times offensive) stop motion animated television program Robot Chicken,
which airs on the Cartoon Network‘s late night Adult Swim lineup, has featured Castro as a
character in a couple of sketches. In a February 2005 episode, Walt Disney has left orders to
be reanimated as a robot after his death. The catch is that robot Walt Disney feeds on Cuban
children. Building Walt Disney World in Orlando satisfies this problem with a tunnel to
Cuba until news reports of the Elián Gonzalez case cause robot Walt Disney to seek out Elián
in Cuba. After the robot attacks Cuba, Elián offers to sacrifice himself to stop the
devastation on Cuba. Fidel Castro, dressed in his fatigues and hat and smoking a cigar,
walks up and shoots the Walt Disney robot in the head. Elián says, ―We must always
remember the sacrifices made today by the brave Cuban soldiers whose deaths will not be

527
Ibid.; ―The Trouble with Trillions,‖ The Simpsons Archive.
528
―The Trouble with Trillions,‖ The Simpsons Archive. In this episode, Lisa, who usually dreams of going to
Vassar, says, ―Who needs college‖ upon learning that the Simpsons might be rich following Homer‘s fleeing
the country.
205

known outside Cuba thanks to the American embargo.‖ Fidel then shoots Elián in the head
and says, ―I love doing that.‖
529
Complete absurd silliness aside, the representation of Castro
as someone who loves shooting people in the head calls upon the worst idea of who Castro is.
Elián is wearing a t-shirt that says, ―I ♥ Cuba,‖ and talks in Cuban propaganda catch phrases.
This emphasizes the idea that Fidel used Elián as a propaganda tool for years after he
returned to Cuba. Castro is seen in his iconic fatigues and hat and smoking a cigar, even
though he quit smoking completely in 1985 to encourage Cubans to stop smoking.
530
The
standard story about Castro in Cuba allows audience members to supply the missing
information about why a bearded, cigar smoking man would come up and shoot Elián
Gonzalez for fun. While viewers would recognize the exaggerated absurdity of the situation,
they supply the information about the dictator to make the joke work.
An April 2006 episode of Robot Chicken again made use of the narrative about Cuba.
This episode features a sketch wherein the video game ―Dance Dance Revolution‖ has
gained huge popularity in Cuba. Inside Pedro‘s Funzone Arcade, guarded by Cuban soldiers
with guns, a Cuban youth begins playing ―Dance Dance Revolución.‖ Cut to Fidel at his
desk with his feet up, smoking a cigar. His office is decorated with the Cuban flag and
pictures of what looks to be Subcommandante Marcos of the Zapatistas in Mexico. An aid
runs in and yells, ―El presidente, tenemos una situation muy serioso. Un hombre is scoring
very high in el Dance Dance Revolución.‖ Castro replies, ―Dios Mio.‖ Next, Castro
appears in the arcade shouting, ―Silencio. I challenge your revolution con una Dance Dance

529
Robot Chicken, ―Nutcracker Sweet: Disney Attacks.‖
530
Castro, interview by Marvin R. Shanken, ―A Conversation with Fidel.‖
206

Counter-Revolution.‖ Another dance dance revolution game machine is uncovered when a
soldier pulls a sheet off of it. Fidel and the boy dance. Partway through, Fidel stops to
relight his cigar. Fidel wins. ―Yo soy the best dancer dancer en el mundo.‖ Fidel walks over
to the boy, ―I have quelled your revolution. But I must say that your bravery is inspiring. I
honor and respect your courage and conviction.‖ And then he shoots him in the head and
exclaims, ―I love doing that!‖
531

Obviously, the joke is about the name of the video game and the idea that Castro
cares about—of all things—his DDR score. Viewers again see him smoking cigars and
shooting Cuban youth. Aimed at an audience that is not examining the terminology of
revolution very closely, Robot Chicken mixes up how Cubans and Castro would refer to
revolution vs. counter-revolution. (In Cuba, Castro‘s triumph is referred to as the revolution
and anti-Castro movements are frequently referred to as counterrevolutionary.) Again,
audience members supply the necessary details about Cuba, Castro, and his brutality to
understand and make the joke work.
In a season four episode of South Park, the boys get tickets to a concert, but Kyle‘s
parents will not let him go. He argues and begs and asks if they‘ll let him go if he does
chores around the house. Kyle‘s mom says that he can go to the concert if he cleans out the
garage, shovels the driveway, and brings democracy to Cuba. Kyle asks, ―What‘s Cuba?‖
His dad answers, ―A communist country run by a dictator named Fidel Castro.‖ Kyle then
asks if he‘s to shovel the whole driveway or just the side with the car.
532

531
Robot Chicken, ―Celebrity Rocket: Dance Dance Counter-Revolution.‖
532
South Park, ―The Wacky Molestation Adventure.‖
207

Kyle‘s response is to write a letter to Fidel Castro about his one wish for Cuba to
change because the Cuban people are in pain. A montage of Kyle writing and drawing and
Fidel Castro reading the letter shows tears falling from Kyle‘s eyes as a Kyle voice over
sings, ―all the joy in the world, from sea to shining sea doesn‘t mean a thing if Cubans aren‘t
free.‖ In all of the drawings Kyle includes in the letter, the people have tears on their faces.
By the time he reaches the end of the letter, ―Oh won‘t you search your soul and find a way
to change your mind,‖ Castro has tears welling in his eyes. He runs out of his building
shouting, ―¡¡Llamen a todos junto!!‖
533

The next day, Kyle‘s family is in the living room watching the news. We hear a
reporter say, ―Once again, this marks the end of communism in Cuba.‖ The news report gives
Kyle credit and says that Cuba is open to tourism, ―Plans can finally resume for Knott‘s
Berry Farm Cuba.‖
534
Kyle is ecstatic because this means he should get to go to the concert.
His dad replies, ―We gave you a chore that we thought was impossible. You weren‘t
supposed to actually do it.‖
535

In this case, Castro is portrayed more benevolently. He isn‘t smoking a cigar and he
actually feels bad when he receives Kyle‘s letter full of drawings of crying, sad people.
However, the benevolent portrayal of Castro, like most aspects of South Park, is ironic. The
fact that it is funny that he cries at Kyle‘s letter is indicative of perceptions that Castro would
do exactly the opposite. The assumption by Kyle‘s parents that bringing democracy to Cuba

533
―Call everyone together!‖ South Park, ―The Wacky Molestation Adventure.‖
534
South Park, ―The Wacky Molestation Adventure.‖
535
South Park, ―The Wacky Molestation Adventure.‖
208

is an impossible task underlines the idea that problems in Cuba are not something that
anyone can solve with policy changes, but that everyone needs to wait for Castro to die
before anyone can work toward freedom in Cuba.
Subtle repetition throughout culture means that these images remain part of the
public‘s unquestioned understanding of Cuba. New policy proposals and explicit discussions
about how Americans view Cuba might challenge this narrative, but cartoon scenes with
Castro jealously guarding his score on a video game and shooting Cuban youth reinforce the
characterization of him as a Cold War foe. Viewers don‘t even have to think about these
images. They‘re ridiculous, of course, but rather than point out, ―Castro has not smoked
cigars since 1985,‖ or ―that scene is funny because of the ironic depiction of Castro,‖
audience members just laugh and reach for another handful of Fritos. Just as these images
play upon Cold War premises, they entrench them by making use of the premises without
calling them into question, or they rely on the truth of those premises for humor. In order to
enjoy the program, viewers have to accept the premise as true. Otherwise, the humor won‘t
be funny. Subtly requiring audiences to accept ideological conclusions as premises to humor
reproduces the ideological conclusions as natural truth. The lack of critical questioning of
the assumptions that audiences have to accept in order to enjoy humorous programming
further entrenches their power to explain the political situations mocked in the programs. In
the case of Cuba, the Cold War story bypasses criticism and holistically explains U.S.
relations with Cuba.
209

Knowing that narratives have longer shelf-lives when represented in popular culture
can assist critics in finding places where narrative stubbornly remains active in a culture and
where that narrative might garner undeserved coherence.
Narrative Suggestions
Having examined the consequences of the long-standing narratives explaining U.S.-
Cuba relations, some of the reasons that the Cold War narrative frame continues to explain
Cuba, and how even outdated narratives gain power to explain situations, I will now suggest
some steps toward a new narrative to explain U.S.-Cuba relations. Whatever policy changes
members of the U.S. government decide to adopt, developing a story to describe a new
relationship between Cuba and the United States will be essential in explaining this
relationship to the American public. Because the old narratives have constrained policy
options by restricting the available resources for justifying and explaining the policy, a new
way forward should take care to avoid the same language, metaphors, stories, and elements
found in the patronizing and adversarial rhetoric of the previous century.
The narrative of Cuba as natural possession of the United States operated as an
undercurrent of the Cold War narrative. This narrative keeps the United States from
interacting with Cuba as another nation state. Explicitly indicating the intention to take steps
away from thinking of Cuba as a politically broken child would clear the way for a new type
of interaction with Cuba, an interaction with a sovereign nation with some good policies and
bad policies.
The element of aiming to include Cuba as a state fell by the wayside a century ago,
but is still a part of U.S. history with Cuba. Recognizing that the desire to have Cuba as a
210

state drove policy in the 19
th
and first part of the 20
th
century helps make sense of that policy
and the subtle attitudes about Cuba that operated under the Cold War narrative.
Seeing Cuba as a playground or Havana as a city of sin disregards the culture of the
Cuban people and views the country patronizingly. Alive in Dirty Dancing: Havana Nights,
Guys and Dolls, Godfather Part II, and many other images, the narrative element of Cuba as
the backyard of the United States also puts Cuba in a subservient role to U.S. caprice. If the
United States lifted the travel ban, a potential danger exists that the U.S. public could
reanimate this narrative. A new narrative should explicitly describe Cuba as an equal nation
state with a rich cultural heritage worthy of respect.
The element that looks at Cuba as unable to govern itself has a significant role in
current policy. This becomes apparent when looking at the Helms-Burton Act, which creates
conditions for the government with which the U.S. will have diplomatic relations.
Acknowledging the influence of this element would go a long way in helping the U.S. have a
new relationship with Cuba.
In addition to explicitly abandoning the narrative of possession, the United States
should discard the Cold War frame to describe relations with Cuba. Viewing Cuba as a Cold
War adversary is outdated and harmful. Cuba no longer has ties with the Cold War enemy of
the United States, because that enemy does not exist. Cuba poses no national security risk to
the United States. The United States has diplomatic and trade relations with other countries
it fought during the Cold War.
The first element of establishing Cuba as a Cold War adversary was that of losing
Cuba. Implicitly relying on the narrative of possession, the notion of losing Cuba places
211

Cuba in the inferior position and implies that they must come to their senses and come home.
The policies of the United States keep Cuba lost to the U.S. Because of the travel ban, the
United States forgoes opportunities to influence Cuba through person to person contacts. It
might be easier to ―find‖ Cuba through engagement than through continued isolation.
The second element establishing the Cold War narrative was that of Cuba as a
dangerous Communist satellite ninety miles away from U.S. shores. The Cuban Missile
Crisis launched this narrative element. The enormous impact that this event had on the
perception of Cuba for the American people still influences opinion about Cuba. However,
Cuba has no Soviet missiles pointed at the U.S., Cuba‘s military is a fraction of the size it
was during the 1960s,
536
and the Soviet Union has disappeared. Less obviously, the story
about the Cuban Missile Crisis does not tell the whole story about Cuba. Cuba was the
geographical location for the Crisis, not the instigator of it, and Fidel Castro actually lost
power among his people and the people of Latin America. This narrative continues to retain
power because of films like Thirteen Days, but these films do not include the Cuban
perspective or the aftermath. To help move past this narrative, an acknowledgement of the
actual role played by Cuba may help the people of the U.S. deal with the Cold War fears
associated with Cuba. Perhaps a blockbuster film about the days before and after those
thirteen would add details and a new component to the narrative.
The narrative of Cuba as a place from which to escape played upon and reinforced the
Cold War narrative. The first three elements of this narrative ultimately confirm the Cold
War explanation of Cuban migration. The 1994 balseros crisis becomes most instructive in

536
World Security Institute, ―Increases in Cuban Military Spending Reflect Economic Recovery.‖
212

how the U.S. might move forward in developing a new story. In 1994, the people fleeing
Cuba left primarily because of economic reasons. Cuba had lost its primary trading partner
in 1991 and the United States had increased restrictions on trade in 1992. Rather than
acknowledge the role the embargo played in devastating the Cuban economy and thus the
financial well-being of the Cuban people, the U.S. claimed it showed that Communism
cannot care for a population and that Castro is an evil dictator. The longstanding embargo
has had an effect on the Cuban people. A new story could acknowledge the role of the
economic devastation caused by the embargo in the migration of the Cuban people.
The story of Elián Gonzalez was the final element in the Cuba as a place from which
to escape narrative. While the Cuban exile community attempted to make the case of Elián
Gonzalez ideological in nature, the U.S. public viewed it as an individual case of a family
torn apart. This story recognized that there were more important factors for peoples‘ lives
than winning every battle against Castro. If the United States public and the U.S.
government could apply this same way of thinking to the rest of policy toward Cuba, the
United States could move forward to a new relationship with Cuba.
The fourth narrative, of Cuba as led by an anachronistic tyrant resisting the tide of
democracy, brought the Cold War story into the post-Cold War world. The first element of
this narrative characterizes democracy as inevitable in Cuba. This element sees democracy
too simplistically and the transition to democracy as magical and instant. Recent experience
of U.S. foreign policy illustrates that democracy is far from inevitable and the transition from
an authoritarian state to a democratic one is anything but instant. Russia continues to
struggle with post-Cold War governance and the fledgling democracy in Iraq has met with
213

multiple obstacles in establishing elected leadership. Histories of corruption, division, and
centralized control make it difficult for a nation to develop the structures necessary for
effective democracy. Describing democracy as a tide makes it seem as if democracy can just
sweep into a country and take hold. Cuba does not have the civil infrastructure for instant
democracy. Democracy takes hard work, practice, and commitment. Rather than waiting for
the tide to sweep Castro and his brother out of Cuba, the United States could engage Cuba in
ways that make that tide more likely to reach Cuba and make the people more likely to pay
attention to it, such as student exchanges, an extension of the Fulbright program in Cuba, or
debate education programs.
The second element of the story, Castro as international outlaw, grew out of an event
that was brutal and criminal. This part of the story might help the U.S. move forward from
the Cold War narrative. As Fidel Castro reaches the end of his rule, and the end of his life,
the U.S. can tell a story about how that tyranny is part of the past. That Castro has stepped
down from power gives the United States an opportunity explicitly tie this part of the
narrative to Fidel, allowing a new story to view Raul as different.
Finally, the narrative element of painting Cuba as backward and repressive and
prompting the U.S. to call for looking to the future when Cuba is free ignores the Cuba of the
present. U.S. policy ought to consider the experiences of people currently in Cuba.
Therefore, the new narrative about Cuba should strive to include the story of Cuban people,
respecting the self-determination of the people of Cuba.
With these steps and cautions in mind, a new narrative must account for the details of
the relationship between the U.S. and Cuba and do so coherently and in a way that rings true
214

with other stories the U.S. public knows to be true. New narrative possibilities may lie in a
trade relationship with Cuba. Not only did this work in establishing relations with Vietnam
and China, but widespread support exists in the U.S. for loosening trade restrictions.
537
Other
post-Cold War rhetoric articulated trade liberalization with the spread of democracy.
538

Trading with Cuba and traveling to Cuba allows for the kind of interaction which may give
Cuba real support for developing democratic infrastructure.
In any case, Castro stepped down from power. The work to articulate the Cold War
animosity to his brother serves only to entrench elements of the outdated Cold War narrative.
Reaching out to find out the ways that Raul is different from Fidel and taking the opportunity
afforded by the perception of new leadership would be no less counterproductive than Cold
War isolation has been. It would be a step toward developing a new narrative that could
guide a new relationship with Cuba.
Current Openings
In 2009, with a new president who won the electoral votes in Florida without winning
the Cuban American vote, many in the U.S. hoped for change in policy toward Cuba.
539
To

537
In April 2009, an CBC/New York Times Poll found that 67% of Americans favored establishing diplomatic
and trade relations with Cuba. At the same time, an ABC/Washington Post Poll found that 57% of Americans
favored ending the trade embargo. (collected at pollingreport.com ―Cuba,‖ pollingreport.com)
538
President George H. W. Bush frequently mentioned democracy and free markets in the same breath, as he
did three times in a toast at a State Dinner in Moscow beginning with, ―We will spend much of our two days
together discussing the issues that will shape our future: democracy, free markets, prosperity, and peace.‖
(Bush, ―Toast and the State Dinner in Moscow.‖) President Clinton repeatedly referred to ―market democracy‖
in statements and speeches. ―We will support the consolidation of market democracy where it is taking new
root, as in the states of the former Soviet Union and all over Latin America.‖ (Clinton, ―Remarks to the 48
th

Session of the United Nations General Assembly.‖)
539
For example, Thomas Omestad writes in the December 5, 2008 U.S. News and World Report, ―Still, change
is in the air on the Cold War relic known as U.S. Cuba policy. The views of Cuban-Americans—long the
dominant political factor in America for holding onto current policy are changing. Polls suggest support for the
embargo is dropping as younger Cuban-Americans come on the scene. A majority of that group voted for
215

understand how much of an opening President Obama represents in rhetoric about Cuba, we
must look at his campaign rhetoric when running for the Senate in 2004, his rhetoric during
the 2008 presidential campaign, and his rhetoric in April 2009 when faced with the
possibility of dialogue with Cuba.
In January 2004, when running for Senate in Illinois, Obama stated, ―I think it's time
for us to end the embargo with Cuba.‖ He went on to say,
The Cuban embargo has failed to provide the sorts of rising standards of living and
has squeezed the innocents in Cuba, and utterly failed in the effort to overthrow
Castro...so it's time for us to acknowledge that that particular policy has failed.
540

Obama‘s comments were appropriate to his Southern Illinois University audience while he
was running for Senate, but also indicate some desire to change U.S. policy toward Cuba.
In 2007, in Florida, Obama said, ―As president, I'll maintain the embargo - it's an
important inducement for change because we know that Castro's death will not guarantee
freedom.‖
541
This contradiction was not lost on the news media. Cuba made the list of
Obama‘s top flip flops in the Washington Post.
542
In the 2007 speech, he even attempted to
describe a world wherein the embargo continues past Fidel‘s death. In 2008, distinguishing
himself from Hillary Clinton in a debate, Obama said that he would sit down with Raul

Obama. A shift from full-on pressure to diplomacy—to some degree—looks likely in the future Obama
administration.‖ (Omestad, ―Obama Will Change Policy – But How?‖)
540
Obama, ―Remarks At Southern Illinois University,‖ quoted in ―RNC - Obama: Weak on Cuba.‖
541
Beth Reinhard of the Miami Herald shared Obama‘s prepared remarks on Cuba from his speech at the
Miami-Dade County Auditorium on August 25, 2007 in the Miami Herald blog Naked Politics. (Reinhard, ―It‘s
got a good beat and you can dance to it.‖)
542
―Top Obama Flip Flops,‖ A04.
216

Castro without preconditions.
543
Given these statements, their contradictory nature, and the
fact that Obama won the electoral votes of Florida without winning the Cuban American
votes, it wasn‘t clear what (if any) changes would happen in 2009 when Obama took office.
On April 13, 2009, the White House announced that they were easing restrictions on
travel and remittances to Cuba.
The promotion of democracy and human rights in Cuba is in the national interest of
the United States and is a key component of this Nation's foreign policy in the
Americas. Measures that decrease dependency of the Cuban people on the Castro
regime and that promote contacts between Cuban-Americans and their relatives in
Cuba are means to encourage positive change in Cuba.
544

The change in policy allows Cuban Americans to visit family members in Cuba at any time
and allows unlimited remittances. In 2004, family travel was limited to once every three
years and remittances were limited. Some point out that the timing of this policy change was
designed to give Obama credibility in the hemisphere right before his trip to Trinidad and
Tobago for the Summit of the Americas on April 17.
545
Within the United States, even the
Obama administration had to frame changes in policy in terms of separating the people from
the Castro ―regime,‖ a word with fairly negative connotations that typically implies a desired
change and is reserved for governments of a dictatorial nature.
On April 16, 2009, Cuban President Raul Castro announced while in a conference in
Venezuela, ―We have sent word to the U.S. government in private and in public that we are
willing to discuss everything — human rights, freedom of the press, political prisoners,

543
Clinton and Obama, ―Democratic Presidential Candidates Debate at the University of Texas in Austin.‖
544
Obama, ―Memorandum on Promoting Democracy and Human Rights in Cuba.‖
545
Ibbitson, ―U.S. Eases Restrictions on Cuba,‖ A1.
217

everything.‖
546
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton responded in a press conference on April
17,
[E]arlier this week President Obama announced the most significant policy changes
toward Cuba by the United States Government in decades. And we are continuing to
look for productive ways forward because we view the present policy as having
failed. You are all familiar with the Administration‘s general view that engagement
is a useful tool to advance our national interests and our goals of promoting human
rights, democracy, peace, prosperity, and progress. So we have seen Raul Castro‘s
comments. We welcome this overture. We are taking a very serious look, and we will
consider how we intend to respond.
547

Many news articles characterized the comments of the two leaders as a ―warm exchange,‖ or
a ―thaw.‖
548
This language subtly invokes the metaphor of the Cold War and implies that it
might be drawing to a close. This set of statements created the expectation that movement on
Cuba policy would continue at the Summit of the Americas later that day.
Clinton stated that the administration viewed the ―present policy as having failed.‖
While Obama used phrasing the next day to indicate that the failure is in the policy that
restricts visits and remittances, Clinton‘s remarks implied that the entire policy toward Cuba
has failed. Even acknowledging the failure of some aspect of the approach toward Cuba is a
big difference from administrations past.

546
Feller, ―US, Cuban Presidents Open Door.‖
547
Clinton, Hillary Rodham, ―Remarks With Dominican Republic President Leonel Fernandez.‖
548
The Washington Times noted ―[t]he relatively warm exchange with Cuba started Monday with Mr. Obama‘s
move to lift the strictest parts of the U.S. travel and trade embargo, and it continued through Mr. Castro‘s olive-
branch remarks Thursday and the Obama administration‘s various replies Friday.‖ (Dinan, ―U.S.-Cuba
Relations Continuing to Thaw,‖ A01.) The headline refers to a ―thaw‖ in relations, along with many other
headlines proclaiming a warming and thawing of relations.
218

At the Summit of the Americas, the meeting of the heads of state of the Western
hemisphere, Obama had to respond publicly to the speculation about the response of the
United States.
There's [sic] been several remarks directed at the issue of the relationship between the
United States and Cuba, so let me address this. The United States seeks a new
beginning with Cuba. I know that there is a longer -- (applause) -- I know there's a
longer journey that must be traveled to overcome decades of mistrust, but there are
critical steps we can take toward a new day. I've already changed a Cuba policy that I
believe has failed to advance liberty or opportunity for the Cuban people.
549

Obama‘s acknowledgement of both the fact that the policy has failed in advancing liberty and
of the mistrust that exists between the U.S. and Cuba generated even more hopes for actual
change in U.S.-Cuba relations. Obama made reference to the way that outdated conflicts
have continued to guide policies for countries around the hemisphere.
To move forward, we cannot let ourselves be prisoners of past disagreements…Too
often, an opportunity to build a fresh partnership of the Americas has been
undermined by stale debates. And we've heard all these arguments before, these
debates that would have us make a false choice between rigid, state-run economies or
unbridled and unregulated capitalism; between blame for right-wing paramilitaries or
left-wing insurgents; between sticking to inflexible policies with regard to Cuba or
denying the full human rights that are owed to the Cuban people.
550

Explicitly calling attention to the fact that the debate over Cuba policy has become stale and
is one of the ways that the U.S. may have been a prisoner of a past disagreement primes the
audience for a new debate about Cuba.
Over the past two years, I've indicated, and I repeat today, that I'm prepared to have
my administration engage with the Cuban government on a wide range of issues --
from drugs, migration, and economic issues, to human rights, free speech, and
democratic reform. Now, let me be clear, I'm not interested in talking just for the

549
Obama, ―Remarks to the Summit of the Americas.‖
550
Ibid.
219

sake of talking. But I do believe that we can move U.S.-Cuban relations in a new
direction.
551

Obama did not mention his 2007 intention to retain the embargo as an ―inducement‖
for change. Obama indicated that he would be willing to talk to the Cuban government for
the sake of action and change. This, as well as Hillary Clinton‘s remarks from the day
before, implied that the U.S. would be willing to discuss all aspects of its Cuba policy.
Obama emphasized putting the role of history in the right place, ―I believe, as some of our
previous speakers have stated, that we must learn from history, but we can't be trapped by
it.‖
552

The changes in Obama‘s approach to foreign policy and his stated opposition to the
embargo in 2004 makes his current support of the embargo an issue for discussion. Why does
the president support a policy that he opposed as having failed in 2004? When reporters
asked him this on April 19 about his support for the embargo in light of his 2004 comments
Obama answered, ―Well, 2004, that seems just eons ago. What was I doing in 2004?‖
553

When reminded that he was running for the Senate in 2004, he responded,
Is it while -- I was running for Senate. There you go. Look, what I said and what I
think my entire administration has acknowledged is, is that the policy that we've had
in place for 50 years hasn‘t worked the way we want it to. The Cuban people are not
free. And that's our lodestone, our North Star, when it comes to our policy in Cuba. It
is my belief that we're not going to change that policy overnight, and the steps that we
took I think were constructive in sending a signal that we'd like to see a
transformation. But I am persuaded that it is important to send a signal that issues of

551
Ibid.
552
Ibid.
553
Obama, ―The President‘s News Conference in Port of Spain.‖ Enough news articles had been written in
2007, 2008, and that week that Obama should have no trouble recalling his remarks at SIU in January 2004.
Further, circumstances in Cuba had changed since the time he voiced opposition to the policy. The leadership
in Cuba changed, and Raul released some political prisoners.
220

political prisoners, freedom of speech, freedom of religion, democracy -- that those
continue to be important, that they're not simply something to be brushed aside.
554

Even in light of Raul Castro‘s offer of a discussion about issues that have always
been off limits, Obama said that he needs to see actions from the Cuban government, letting
the audience supply the premise that the U.S. does not completely trust the Cuban
government. If the U.S. operated with a new story, maybe one of engagement, trade, and
repairing relations, the public would not need to supply this premise. Dario Moreno, a
Florida International University political scientist and Cuba specialist hopefully explained,
Still, Raoul's [sic] surprise offer could be the most important break in U.S.-Cuba
relations since the Castro revolution 50 years ago…What makes this different is that
Fidel is really in the last stages of his life and the changing leadership in Cuba might
be more willing to move forward.
555

Whether the Obama administration turns these rhetorical openings into political openings or
not depends on many outside factors such as issue agendas and political capital. Recognizing
the role that the narratives play in keeping policy and attitudes in the United States ―prisoner
of past disagreements‖ can help leaders in the United States move toward the new day
President Obama referred to in April 2009.

Final Conclusions and Lessons
This dissertation examined the discourse about Cuba and identified four major
narratives operating within the United States that describe the relationship the United States
has with Cuba. The U.S. public understood Cuba as a possession of the United States for
more than a century prior to the Cuban revolution. When Fidel Castro rejected this

554
Ibid.
555
March, ―Obama Makes Mark on Florida.‖
221

explanatory narrative and joined forces with the Soviet Union, the narrative about possession
gave way to a narrative about Cuba as a Cold War adversary. The U.S. was still reeling from
―losing‖ China. This loss of Cuba, so long thought to be a part of the United States, hit
especially hard. Prior to the revolution, Cuba existed as a place of escape for wealthy
Americans. The third narrative, an extension of the Cold War narrative, recast Cuba as a
place from which to escape, which hundreds of thousands of Cubans did. Finally, after the
fall of the Soviet Union, the Cold War narrative morphed into the anachronism narrative,
portraying Cuba as a relic stuck in a bygone era, ruled by an outlaw tyrant. These narratives
illustrate how and why Cuba remains stuck in an adversarial, Cold War relationship with the
United States.
Despite public opinion and stated (though contradicted) opinions of President Obama,
the stories enjoy presumption with the American public. The anachronism narrative keeps
Cuba and Cuba policy largely irrelevant to the American public. This irrelevance and lack of
a pressing reason to change U.S. policy means that little effort goes into transforming these
narratives. The community for which policy has held the most relevance, the Cuban-
American community, pushed for a strict anti-Castro policy. With little strong opposition,
the Cuban-American community contributed significantly to the stories about Cuba and
enjoyed great success in lobbying for the policies isolating Cuba. A change in U.S. policy
toward Cuba will need to be accompanied by a narrative that can account for a new
relationship between the two nation states. These four narratives also suggest steps on a path
toward developing a new story and a new relationship with Cuba.
222

In addition to identifying the dominant narratives about Cuba within the United
States, I drew three conclusions about narrative theory. First, based on the stories that retain
adherence from audiences and the circumstances that cause them to lose adherence, I
concluded that audiences have a sense of a narrative burden of proof in addition to testing
narrative fidelity and narrative probability. Second, the structure of narrative discourse
serves to articulate elements into a coherent whole. This whole, the narrative, is naturally
hegemonic, especially when narratives converge and mutually reinforce one another.
Finally, I concluded that narratives disseminated through popular culture have longer shelf
lives because of the subtle ways the story becomes entrenched and because of the lasting
media that carry these stories. These conclusions can assist rhetors in developing and
distributing new stories about Cuba.
Several additional situations of international relations would benefit from heeding the
lessons learned by examining the narratives about Cuba in the United States. Cuba provides
a clear example of how holding onto elements of the Cold War narrative, or characterizing
another nation state as subservient or inferior produces detrimental results. While narratives
about Cuba change so slowly, we can apply the lessons to situations that are more dynamic
and changing. Specifically, U.S. relations with Venezuela and relations with China might
have more productive and democratic potential if we understand the dangers of Cold War
narrative forms and stories that cast another nation state as broken.
The U.S. risks developing a long-standing adversarial relationship with Venezuela
very similar to the relationship it has with Cuba. Whereas the personalization of foreign
policy to just one figure, that of Fidel Castro, might now provide an opening for a new
223

narrative about Cuba relatively soon, this same personalization of relations to Hugo Chavez
could have the U.S. waiting for decades for a renewed relationship with a country long-
alienated and with crumbling democratic infrastructures. For so long, the United States was
locked into isolating Cuba because Castro was still in power, even though circumstances had
changed radically. The connection that Hugo Chavez has to Fidel Castro paints him as the
same kind of tyrannical dictator, out of touch with the problems of his country. The political
situation in Venezuela is more complex, and a narrative that simplifies and demonizes locks
the U.S. into fewer options for policy and an adversarial relationship.
Paying attention to the dangers of good and evil dualisms that characterize Cold War
narratives will also help the United States avoid dangerous relations with China. While
narratives about trade and economic competition compete with old Cold War stories, China
is often cast as a threat in its economic ascendency. This threat looms larger in discussions
about sea lanes and U.S. debt. Leaders in the U.S. will do well to continue to keep the
narratives of economic cooperation and economic competition at the center of political
discourse so that those stories continue to have narrative fidelity and narrative probability,
competing with the story that China and the United States are natural adversaries. Trade and
competition allow policy makers to focus on weighing out the costs and the benefits of
policies, rather than basing decisions on a dualism of good vs. evil that is emphasized in Cold
War rhetorical forms. Maintaining exchange programs, travel, and increased understanding
between the two countries will decrease the threat that each experience, keeping options for
relations open and productive.
224

U.S. policy toward Cuba illustrates the complex rhetorical, political, and historical
factors that go into foreign policy. Exploring the narratives about Cuba uncovers what has
helped keep a largely unchanged policy in place for nearly fifty years. Understanding how
these stories work reveals how leaders might develop new directions in policy and new
narratives.

225

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Adams, John Quincy. John Quincy Adams to Hugh Nelson, the American minister in
Madrid, 28 April 1823, in What Happened in Cuba? A Documentary History, by
Robert F. Smith, 27-29. New York: Twayne Publishers, 1963.

―Agonizing Reappraisal.‖ Time. 28 April 1958, 37.

―All Wet.‖ Time. 6 April 1959, 34.

American Immigration Law Foundation. ―Cuban Migration: Averting a Crisis.‖ June 2003.

―As Castro Era Fades, U.S. Sticks to Failed Policy.‖ USA Today. 3 August 2006, 8A.

Associated Press. ―American Nations Confer in Secret for Peace in Cuba,‖ New York Times,
December 27, 1958, 1.

Babineck, Mark. ―Group Wants to End Cuban Embargo,‖ Associated Press, 20 April, 2001.
http://www.cubanet.org/CNews/y01/apr01/20e6.htm (Accessed 15 May, 2010).

Bachelet, Pablo. ―Sen. Martinez Says Moment of Transition Could Be Near, Cautions against
migration.‖ The Miami Herald. 1 August 2006.

―The Backdown,‖ Time, 02 November, 1962, 16

Baggs, William C. ―The Other Miami – City of Intrigue,‖ New York Times. 13 Mar, 1960,
SM25.

Banet-Weiser, Sarah. ―Elián Gonzalez and "The Purpose of America": Nation, Family, and
the Child-Citizen.‖ American Quarterly. Vol. 55, No. 2 (June 2003): 149-178.

Bardach, Ann Louise. Cuba Confidential: Love and Vengeance in Miami and Havana. New
York: Random House, 2002.

Basso, Hamilton. ―Havana.‖ Holiday, 12 December 1952, 64-70+.

―The Bathtub Election,‖ Time, 12 June, 1950, 38.

Beam, Christopher. ―¿Cuba Libre?‖ Slate Magazine 1 August 2006.

Bemelmans, Ludwig. ―The Best Way to See Cuba.‖ Holiday. December 1957.

226

Benjamin, Jules R. The United States and the Origins of the Cuban Revolution: An Empire of
Liberty in an Age of National Liberation. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press,
1990.

Bennett, Lance and Edelman, Murray. ―Towards a New Political Rhetoric,‖ Journal of
Communication, Vol. 35, No. 4 (1985): 156 – 171.

Beveridge, Alfred J. ―The March of the Flag,‖ 16 September 1898. In History Tools.org:
Resources for the Study of American History, ed. David J. Volker,
http://www.historytools.org/sources/beveridge.html, 2005.

Billi, John. ―Executions in Cuba Protested.‖ New York Times. 13 January 1959, 46.

Blumner, Robyn. ―Courts Must Respect Kid‘s Parental Ties.‖ St. Petersburg Times. 16 April
2000, 1D.

Booth, William. ―U.S. Warns Cuba over refugees; Castro threatens repeat of chaotic 1980
Mariel Boatlift,‖ Washington Post, 7 August, 1994; A1, 1A.

Boucher, Richard. ―Richard Boucher Holds State Department Briefing.‖ FDCH Political
Transcripts. 25 February 2002. http://www.lexisnexis.com/.

Bradley, James. The Imperial Cruise: A Secret History of Empire and War. New York: Little,
Brown, and Company, 2009.

Brewer, Sam Pope. ―Cuban Exile Leaders Wrangle Over Failure of Invasion Plan,‖ New
York Times, 14 May, 1961, 22.

---. ―Disunity Hampers Cuban Exile Units,‖ New York Times, 12 Jan, 1961, 9.

---. ―Job Program Gains,‖ New York Times, 19 January, 1961, 10.

Bruske, Ed. ―The Perilous Journey; Cubans Sail with Hope, Return With Empty Arms;
Cuban Refugees Meet Chaos, heartbreak in Attempts to Bring Back Relatives,‖
Washington Post, 22 May, 1980, Md. 1.

Buchanan, James. ―Writer Says Fires of Hate, Distrust Building up a Police State in Cuba.‖
Hartford Courant, 27 December, 1959, 6A.

―Budgets and Bullets.‖ Newsweek. 9 February 1959, 46-47.

Burt, Richard, ―C.I.A. Gave Early Warning of Exodus From Cuba,‖ New York Times, June 2,
1980, A9.

227

Bush, George H.W. ―Interviews With NBC Owned and Operated Television Stations,‖
November 20, 1991. In The American Presidency Project [online], edited by John T.
Woolley and Gerhard Peters. http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=20249.

---. ―Message on Cuban Independence Day,‖ May 20, 1991. In The American Presidency
Project [online], edited by John T. Woolley and Gerhard Peters.
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=19598.

---. ―Proclamation 6264 - Greek Independence Day: A National Day of Celebration of Greek
and American Democracy, 1991,‖ March 25, 1991. In The American Presidency
Project [online], edited by John T. Woolley and Gerhard Peters.
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=47278.

---. ―Remarks at the Beacon Council Annual Meeting in Miami, Florida,‖ September 30,
1991. In The American Presidency Project [online], edited by John T. Woolley and
Gerhard Peters. http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=20042.

---. ―Remarks at the Bush-Quayle South Florida Rally in Hialeah, Florida,‖ March 4, 1992.
In The American Presidency Project [online], edited by John T. Woolley and Gerhard
Peters. http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=20684.

---. ―Remarks Commemorating the First Anniversary of the Enterprise for the Americas
Initiative and an Exchange With Reporters,‖ June 27, 1991. In The American
Presidency Project [online], edited by John T. Woolley and Gerhard Peters.
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=19738.

---. ―Statement on Actions to Support Democracy in Cuba,‖ April 18, 1992. In The American
Presidency Project [online], edited by John T. Woolley and Gerhard Peters.
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=20855.

---. ―The President's News Conference, August 2, 1991,‖ August 2, 1991. In The American
Presidency Project [online], edited by John T. Woolley and Gerhard Peters.
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=19873.

---. ―The President's News Conference With Foreign Correspondents,‖ December 19, 1991.
In The American Presidency Project [online], edited by John T. Woolley and Gerhard
Peters. http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/ ?pid=20376.

---. ―The President's News Conference With Prime Minister Mulroney of Canada in
Kennebunkport, Maine,‖ August 26, 1991. In The American Presidency Project
[online], edited by John T. Woolley and Gerhard Peters.
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=19928.

228

---. ―Toast at the State Dinner in Moscow.‖ July 30, 1991. In The American Presidency
Project [online], edited by John T. Woolley and Gerhard Peters.
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=19850.

Bush, George W. ―Message to the Congress on Continuation and Expansion of the National
Emergency With Respect to Cuba.‖ February 26, 2004. In The American Presidency
Project [online], edited by John T. Woolley and Gerhard Peters.
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=72559.

---. ―Remarks at a Victory 2004 Reception in Coral Gables, Florida,‖ April 23, 2004. In The
American Presidency Project [online], edited by John T. Woolley and Gerhard Peters.
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=63698.

---. ―Remarks at the University of Toledo in Toledo,‖ September 6, 2001. In The American
Presidency Project [online], edited by John T. Woolley and Gerhard Peters.
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=64618.

---. Remarks Following a Meeting With the Commission for Assistance to a Free Cuba,‖
May 6, 2004. In The American Presidency Project [online], edited by John T.
Woolley and Gerhard Peters. http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=64664.

---. ―Remarks on the Observance of Cuban Independence Day,‖ May 18, 2001. In The
American Presidency Project [online], edited by John T. Woolley and Gerhard Peters.
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=45622.

---. ―Statement: Toward a Democratic Cuba,‖ July 13, 2001. In The American Presidency
Project [online], edited by John T. Woolley and Gerhard Peters.
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=63565.

---. ―The President‘s Radio Address,‖ April 21, 2001. In The American Presidency Project
[online], edited by John T. Woolley and Gerhard Peters.
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=45634.

Bush, George W. ―Letter to Congressional Leaders on Review of Title III of the Cuban
Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act of 1996.‖ July 16, 2004. In The
American Presidency Project [online], edited by John T. Woolley and Gerhard Peters.
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=72693.

Bush, George W. ―Remarks to Participants in Habitat for Humanity‘s ‗World Leaders Build‘
in Waco.‖ August 8, 2001. In The American Presidency Project [online], edited by
John T. Woolley and Gerhard Peters.
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=73381.

229

Bush, George W. ―Statement on Cuba.‖ August 3, 2006. In The American Presidency Project
[online], edited by John T. Woolley and Gerhard Peters.
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=522.

Bush, George W. ―Remarks at a Celebration of Women‘s History Month and International
Women‘s Day.‖ March 10, 2008. In The American Presidency Project [online],
edited by John T. Woolley and Gerhard Peters.
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=76835.

Bush, George W. ‖Remarks on the Situation in Cuba.‖ March 7, 2008. In The American
Presidency Project [online], edited by John T. Woolley and Gerhard Peters.
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=76580.

―Cabinet Split,‖ Time, 22 June, 1959, 30.

Card, David. ―The Impact of the Mariel Boatlift on the Miami Labor Market.‖ NEBR
Working Paper Series. No. 3069 (August 1989).

Carter, Jimmy. ―League of Women Voters Remarks and a Question-and-Answer Session at
the League's Biennial National Convention.‖ May 5, 1980. In The American
Presidency Project [online], edited by John T. Woolley and Gerhard Peters.
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=33365.

Carter, Tom. ―U.S. Official Sees tougher Policy, Not Softer One,‖ Washington Times, 13
March, 2002, A11.

Castro, Fidel. ―A Conversation with Fidel.‖ By Marvin R. Shanken. Cigar Aficionado. 01
June 1994: http://www.cigaraficionado.com/.

Castro, Max. ―Cuban Americans: Exiles, Not Immigrants.‖ Frontline.
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/elian/views/exilesnotimmigrants.htm
l (Accessed 25 March, 2010).

―Castro Aide Says He Defected to Show Opposition To Regime,‖ New York Times, 5
August, 1960, 3.

―Castro Gives Gambling Go-Ahead on Tight Reign,‖ New York Times, 14 January, 1959, 4.

―Castro‘s Warhawk,‖ Time, 21 December, 1962, 24-25.

―Caught in a War,‖ Time, 14 June, 1958, 29.

Clinton, Hillary Rodham, ―Remarks With Dominican Republic President Leonel Fernandez.‖
April 17, 2009. http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2009a/04/121847.htm.
230

Clinton, Hillary, and Barak Obama. ―Democratic Presidential Candidates Debate at the
University of Texas in Austin.‖ February 21, 2008. In The American Presidency
Project [online], edited by John T. Woolley and Gerhard Peters.
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=76563.

Clinton, William. ―Cuban Refugees,‖ August 19, 1994. In The American Presidency Project
[online], edited by John T. Woolley and Gerhard Peters.
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=48994.

---. ―Exchange With Reporters on Cuba,‖ August 30, 1993. In The American Presidency
Project [online], edited by John T. Woolley and Gerhard Peters.
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=47011.

---. ―Interview With Wolf Blitzer and Judy Woodruff on CNN,‖ April 13, 1995. In The
American Presidency Project [online], edited by John T. Woolley and Gerhard Peters.
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=51225.

---. ―Remarks Announcing Sanctions Against Cuba Following the Downing of American
Civilian Aircraft,‖ February 26, 1996. In The American Presidency Project [online],
edited by John T. Woolley and Gerhard Peters.
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=52460.

---. ―Remarks at a Brunch for Representative Robert Torricelli in Teaneck, New Jersey,‖
October 20, 1996. In The American Presidency Project [online], edited by John T.
Woolley and Gerhard Peters. http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=52136.

---. ―Remarks on Signing the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act of
1996.‖ March 12, 1996. In The American Presidency Project [online], edited by John
T. Woolley and Gerhard Peters. http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=52531.

---. ―Remarks on the Downing of American Civilian Aircraft by Cuba and an Exchange With
Reporters in Shoreline, Washington,‖ February 24, 1996. In The American
Presidency Project [online], edited by John T. Woolley and Gerhard Peters.
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=52453.

---. ―The President's News Conference, March 23, 1993,‖ March 23, 1993. In The American
Presidency Project [online], edited by John T. Woolley and Gerhard Peters.
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=46363.

---. ―The President's News Conference With Chancellor Helmut Kohl of Germany in
Milwaukee, Wisconsin,‖ May 23, 1996. In The American Presidency Project
[online], edited by John T. Woolley and Gerhard Peters.
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ ws/?pid=52895.

231

---. ―The President's News Conference With European Union Leaders,‖ June 12, 1996. In
The American Presidency Project [online], edited by John T. Woolley and Gerhard
Peters. http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=52935.

---. ―The President's News Conference With President Scalfaro,‖ April 2, 1996. In The
American Presidency Project [online], edited by John T. Woolley and Gerhard Peters.
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=52617.

Clinton, William J. ―Remarks to the 48
th
Session of the United Nations General Assembly in
New York City.‖ September 27, 1993. In The American Presidency Project [online],
edited by John T. Woolley and Gerhard Peters.
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=47119.

Collings, Anthony C. ―Agency Assists Cuban Exiles in Professions to find jobs in U.S.‖ Wall
Street Journal, November 16, 1961, 1.

―Comeback,‖ Time, 25 August, 1958, 28.

Committee of Appropriations, United States House. Departments of Commerce, Justice,
State, The Judiciary and Related Agencies Appropriations for 2002. April 26, 2001.
http://frwebgate3.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/
TEXTgate.cgi?WAISdocID=8603169537+1+1+0&WAISaction=retrieve (Accessed
15 May, 2010).

Committee of Appropriations, United States Senate. Restrictions on Travel to Cuba.
February 11, 2002. http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/
getdoc.cgi?dbname=107_senate_hearings&docid=f:78446.wais.pdf (Accessed 15
May, 2010).

Conde, Yvonne. Operation Pedro Pan: The Untold Exodus of 14,000 Cuban Children. New
York: Routledge, 1999.

―Confiscation!‖ Time, 1 June, 1959, 36-37.

Crewdson, John M. ―For Six Cuban Emigres, Voyage Ends in Despair,‖ New York Times, 28
April, 1980, A14.

---. ―High Seas and Stiff Winds Threaten Flotilla Off Cuba,‖ New York Times, 27 April,
1980, 3.

Cuba. Directed by Richard Lester. 122 minutes. Los Angeles, CA: MGM, 1979. DVD.

―Cuba Freeing Prisoners,‖ New York Times, 15 May 1955, 26.

232

―Cuba to Restore Gambling Friday,‖ New York Times, 17 February, 1959, 11.

―Cuba Under Castro.‖ Newsweek. 12 January 1959, 42-44.

―Cuba Wipes Out Invaders,‖ New York Times, 3 December, 1956; 1, 20.

―Cuba's Agrarian Reform,‖ New York Times, 20 May, 1959, 34.

―Cuban Children Helped in Florida,‖ New York Times, 27 May, 1967, 41.

―The Cuban Defectors,‖ New York Times, 5 August, 1960, 22.

―Cuban Exiles in Miami Take Part in U.S. Politics for First Time,‖ New York Times, 15
September, 1968, 114.

The Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (Libertad) Act of 1996, Public Law 104-114,
22 U.S.C. § 6021-6091.

―Cuban Power Struggle May Doom Obama‘s Overtures.‖ Salt Lake Tribune, April 24, 2009.

―Cubans, and Cuba Policy, Lost at Sea‖, New York Times, 11 August, 1994, A22.

Curry, Victor. ―cuban americans: exiles, not immigrants.‖ Frontline.
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/elian/views/exilesnotimmigrants.htm
l (Accessed 25 March, 2010).

De la Campa, Ramon. Cuba On My Mind. New York: Verso, 2000.

De la Torriente, Cosmo. ―The Platt Amendment.‖ Foreign Affairs. Vol. 8, No. 3 (April
1930): 364-378.

De los Angeles Torres, María. In the Land of Mirrors: Cuban Exile Politics in the United
States. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2002.

―Democratic National Platform, 1860; Compromise Platform Reported by the Majority.‖ In
What Happened In Cuba? A Documentary History, by Robert F. Smith, 79. New
York: Twayne Publishers, 1963.

DePalma, Anthony. The Man Who Invented Fidel: Castro, Cuba, and Herbert L. Matthews
of the New York Times. New York: Public Affairs, 2006.

Devroy, Ann and Williams, Daniel. ―Clinton May Ease Sanctions on Cuba,‖ The Washington
Post, 7

March, 1995. http://www.lexis-nexis.com.

233

---. ―Coast Guard to Stop Vessels Bound for Cuba; Reno Issues Warning to Head Off Exodus
After Refugee Boat Is Reported in Florida Straits,‖ Washington Post, 12 August,
1994, A34.

DeYoung, Karen. ―Exiles‘ visit is political, public relations coup for Castro,‖ Washington
Post, 15 December, 1978, A25.

Diaz, Johnny. ―Travel Restrictions Confound Boston-Area Cubans,‖ The Boston Globe, June
1, 2004, B1.

Diaz-Balart, Lincoln. ―Impose Naval Blockade,‖ USA Today, 22 August, 1994, 10A.

―Dictator With the People,‖ Time, 21 April, 1952, 38.

Dinan, Stephan. ―U.S.-Cuba Relations Continuing to Thaw; Topic Distracts from Obama‘s
Cooperation Agenda.‖ Washington Times. 18 April 2009, A01, http://lexisnexis.com/.

Dirty Dancing: Havana Nights. Directed by Guy Ferland. 86 minutes. Lions Gate Films,
2004. DVD.

Drimmer, Melvin. ―Cuba‘s Land Plan Upheld.‖ New York Times. 22 June 1959, 24.

Eisenhower, Dwight D. ―Annual Message to the Congress on the State of the Union.‖
January 12, 1961. In The American Presidency Project [online], edited by John T.
Woolley and Gerhard Peters. http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=12074

---. ―Republican County Dinner.‖ 23 October 1962.
http://www.eisenhowermemorial.org/speeches/19621023%20Republican%20County
%20Dinner%20Gettysburg%20Pennsylvania.htm (Accessed 9 March 2010).

---. ―Statement by the President on Releasing a Report on Cuban Refugee Problems.‖
January 18, 1961. In The American Presidency Project [online], edited by John T.
Woolley and Gerhard Peters. http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=12097.

―End of a War.‖ Time. 12 January 1959, 33.

European Union. ―EU Presidency Statement-Explanation of Vote: Embargo against Cuba.‖
European Union at United Nations. 8 November 2005. http://europa-eu-
un.org/articles/en/article_5273_en.htm.

Falcoff, Mark. Cuba the Morning After: Confronting Castro’s Legacy. Washington, DC:
American Enterprise Institute for Policy Research, 2003.

234

Feller, Ben. ―US, Cuban Presidents Open Door for New Relations.‖ Associated Press. 16
April 2009, http://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory?id=7355892.

Fiagome, Clemence. ―Cuban Americans Reject another Castro-Backed Refugee Exodus.‖
Christian Science Monitor. 15 August 1994, 7.

---. ―Florida Sets out Welcome Mat for Exodus of Cubans on Rafts,‖ Christian Science
Monitor, 13 July, 1994, 4.

Fisher, Walter R. Human Communication as Narration: Toward a Philosophy of Reason,
Value, and Action. Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1987.

―Flight 482 Is Missing,‖ Time, 17 November, 1958, 32.

Fonzi, Gaeton. ―Jorge Who?‖ Cuban Information Archives, 1993. http://cuban-
exile.com/doc_051-075/doc0063.html (Accessed 15 May, 2010).

Ford, Gerald R. ―Letter to the Speaker of the House of Representatives on the Situation in
Angola.‖ January 27, 1976. In The American Presidency Project [online], edited by
John T. Woolley and Gerhard Peters. http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=5833.

---. ―Remarks on Senate Action to Prohibit United States Assistance to Angola.‖ December
19, 1975. In The American Presidency Project [online], edited by John T. Woolley
and Gerhard Peters. http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=5447.

Foss, Sonja K., Karen A. Foss, and Robert Trapp. Contemporary Perspectives on Rhetoric.
2nd Ed. Prospect Heights, IL: Waveland Press, 1991.

―A Game of Casino,‖ Time, 20 January, 1958, 32.

―Gamblers in Cuba Face Dim Future,‖ New York Times, 4 January 1959, 6.

García, María. Havana USA: Cuban Exiles and Cuban Americans in South Florida, 1959-
1994. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1996.

Gibbs, Stephen. ―Castro Mocks Parkinson‘s Report.‖ BBC News: International Version. 18
November 2005. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/4448048.stm.

Golden, James L., Goodwin F. Berquist, and William E. Coleman. The Rhetoric of Western
Thought. 4
th
Ed. Dubuque, IA: Kendall Hunt Publishing Co., 1989.

235

Goodnight, G. Thomas. ―The Liberal and the Conservative Presumptions: On Political
Philosophy and the Foundation of Public Argument.‖ In Proceedings of the [First]
Summer Conference on Argumentation, edited by Jack Rhodes and Sara Newell, 304-
337. Annandale, VA: Speech Communication Association, 1980.

Gonzalez, Edward. Partners In Deadlock: The United States and Castro 1959-1972,
Southern California Arms Control and Foreign Policy Seminar, Working Group-U.S.
Relations with Leftist Regimes, 1972.

Gonzalez, Edward, and Kevin F. McCarthy. Cuba after Castro: Legacies, Challenges, and
Impediments. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2004.

Gordon, Michael R. ―Castro‘s threat to Unleash Refugees Brings a Warning by U.S.‖ New
York Times, 7 August, 1994, 17.

Gott, Richard. Cuba: A New History. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2004.

Grutzner, Charles. ―Magazine in Exile Opposing Castro.‖ New York Times, 4 November,
1960, 38.

Gugliotta, Guy. ―The Castro Bill: No Cigar,‖ The Washington Post, March 29, 1992.
http://www.lexis-nexis.com.

Gutierrez, Carlos. ―Ask the Whitehouse.‖ The White House. 13 May 2008.
http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/ask/20080313.html.

Harden, Blaine. ―Dole Promises to ‗Bring Fidel Castro Down‘; GOP Leader‘s Words Are
His Strongest Yet,‖ The Washington Post, 20 May, 1996, A04.

Havana. Produced and Directed by Sydney Pollack. 144 minutes. Universal City, CA:
Universal Studios, 1998. DVD.

―The Hemisphere: Society Wedding,‖ Time, 9 February, 1959, 27.

―Hit-Run Revolt,‖ Time, 10 December, 1956, 42.

Hoagland, Jim. ―Clinton‘s Cuba Miscue.‖ Washington Post. 25 August 1994, A19.

Holiday. Thrift Tour. December 1951, 14+.

Hollihan, Thomas A. ―The Public Controversy over the Panama Canal Treaties: An Analysis
of American Foreign Policy Rhetoric.‖ Western Journal of Communication 50, no. 4
(Autumn 1986): 368-387.

236

Hollihan, Thomas A. and Kevin T. Baaske. Arguments and Arguing: The Products and
Process of Human Decision Making. New York: St. Martin‘s Press, 1994.

―An Honest Man,‖ Time, 19 March, 1951, 44.

House Appropriations Committee, Commerce, Justice, State and Judiciary Subcommittee,
Hearing of the Commerce, Justice, State, and Judiciary Subcommittee of the House
Appropriations Committee on Fiscal Year 2002 State Department Appropriations.
April 26, 2001.

House Committee on International Relations, ―Panel I of a Hearing of the House Committee
on International Relations on the Bush Administration and Nonproliferation: A New
Strategy Emerges.‖ March 30, 2004, http://www.lexisnexis.com/.

Hudson, Valerie M. Culture and Foreign Policy. Boulder, CO: Lynne Reiner, 1997.

The Hunt for Red October. Directed by John McTiernan. 134 minutes. Paramount Pictures,
1990. DVD.

Ibbitson, John. ―U.S. Eases Restrictions on Cuba as Attitudes Toward Castros Shifts. Globe
and Mail. 14 April 2009, A1. http://www.lexisnexis.com

―If Castro Falls Few Will Care [Including Russia].‖ Newsweek. 26 November 1962, 17-28.

Ingersoll, Charles Jared. ―Entry of February 7, 1823, Diary of Charles Jared Ingersoll.‖ In
What Happened In Cuba? A Documentary History, by Robert F. Smith, 26-27. New
York: Twayne Publishers, 1963.

Institute of International Education. ―U.S. Study Abroad Increases by 9.6%, Continues
Record Growth.‖ Opening Minds to the World. 14 November 2005.
http://www.iie.org/Content/NavigationMenu/Pressroom/PressReleases/U_S_STUDY
_ABROAD_INCREASES_BY_9_6_CONTINUES_RECORD_GROWTH.htm.

Institute for Public Opinion Research. ―2004 FIU/Cuba Poll.‖ Florida International
University. http://www.fiu.edu/orgs/ipor/cubapoll/index.html

Institute for Public Opinion Research. ―2007 FIU Cuba Poll: Tabulation of Questions.‖
Florida International University. http://www.fiu.edu/~ipor/cuba8/pollresults.html

―Into the Third Year,‖ Time, 1 December, 1958, 32.

―Is Cuba Next?‖ Washington Times, 9 August, 1994, A18.

237

Ivie, Robert L. ―A New Democratic World Order?‖ In Critical Reflections on the Cold War:
Linking Rhetoric and History, edited by Martin J. Medhurst and H. W. Brand, 247-
265. College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2000.

Jaynes, Gregory. ―Miami Official Objects to Cuban Refugee Film,‖ New York Times, 24
August, 1982, A12.

Jefferson, Thomas. ―Thomas Jefferson on the Monroe Doctrine.‖ 24 October, 1823.
www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/thomas.htm. (Accessed 7 March, 2006).

Jefferson, Thomas. Thomas Jefferson to James Monroe, June 11, 1823. In What Happened In
Cuba? A Documentary History, by Robert F. Smith, 29-30. New York: Twayne
Publishers, 1963.

Johnson, Lyndon B. ―Remarks at the signing of the Immigration Bill, Liberty Island, New
York.‖ October 3, 1965. In The American Presidency Project [online], edited by
John T. Woolley and Gerhard Peters. http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/
ws/?pid=27292.

Kennedy, John F. ―Address before the American Society of Newspaper Editors.‖ 20 April,
1961. http://www.jfklibrary.org/Historical+Resources/Archives/Reference+Desk/
Speeches/JFK/003POF03NewspaperEditors04201961.htm. (Accessed 9 March,
2010).

---. ―Letter to Secretary Ribicoff Requesting Him To Undertake Direction of Cuban
Refugee Activities.‖ 27 January, 1961. In The American Presidency Project [online],
edited by John T. Woolley and Gerhard Peters.
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=8544.

---. ―News Conference 45.‖ 20 November, 1962. http://www.jfklibrary.org/
Historical+Resources/Archives/Reference+Desk/Press+Conferences/003POF05Press
conference45_11201962.htm (Accessed 9 March 2010).

---. ―News Conference 47.‖ 20 November, 1962. http://www.jfklibrary.org/
Historical+Resources/Archives/Reference+Desk/Press+Conferences/003POF05Press
conference47_01241963.htm (Accessed 9 March 2010).

---. ―Radio and Television Report to the American People on the Soviet Arms Buildup in
Cuba.‖ 22 October, 1962. http://www.jfklibrary.org/jfkl/cmc/j102262.htm (Accessed
9 March, 2010).

---. ―Speech of Senator John F. Kennedy, Cincinnati, Ohio, Democratic Dinner.‖ 6 October,
1960. In The American Presidency Project [online], edited by John T. Woolley and
Gerhard Peters. http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/ index.php?pid=25660.
238

---. ―Statement by the President Following a Conference With Secretary Ribicoff on Cuban
Refugee Problems.‖ 3 February, 1961. In The American Presidency Project [online],
edited by John T. Woolley and Gerhard Peters.
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=8133.

---. ―The President's News Conference, March 8 1961.‖ 8 March, 1961. In The American
Presidency Project [online], edited by John T. Woolley and Gerhard Peters.
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=8524.

---. ―The President‘s News Conference, May 5, 1961,‖ 5 May, 1961. In The American
Presidency Project [online], edited by John T. Woolley and Gerhard Peters.
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=8113.

Kennedy, Robert. Thirteen Days. New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1969.

Kerry, John. ―Statement of Principles on U.S. Cuba Policy.‖ John Kerry For President, 5
June, 2004. http://www.nowaroncuba.org/Documentation/Kerry/pr_2004_0605a.html
(Accessed 15 May, 2010).

Kerry, Frances. ―Castro Threatens to Flood U.S. With Refugees,‖ Philadelphia Inquirer, 7
August, 1994, A3.

Kihss, Peter. ―Cuban Exiles Pick Provisional Chief,‖ New York Times, 22 Mar, 1961, 1.

Klare, Michael. Rogue States and Nuclear Outlaws: America’s Search for a New Foreign
Policy. New York: Hill and Wang, 1995.

Komarow, Steve. ――Cubans back where they began / 'Tidal wave of people' seen at sea,‖ USA
Today, 23 August, 1994, 1A.

Laclau, Ernesto and Chantal Mouffe. Hegemony and Socialist Strategy. London: Verso,
1985.

Lacy, Marc. ―Saturday Cuba Mobilized for a U.S. Attack This Month, Raul Castro Says.‖
New York Times. 19 August 2006, 4.

Lakshmanan, Indira A. R. ―Few Expect Change Under Raul Castro; Fidel's Brother Will
Maintain Course Some Analysts Say.‖ Boston Globe. 2 August 2006.

Latell, Brian. After Fidel: The Inside Story of Castro’s Regime and Cuba’s Next Leader. New
York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005.

―The Lessons Learned [Cuban Crisis].‖ Newsweek. 12 November 1962, 21-24.

239

―Liberator‘s Triumphal March,‖ Life, January 19, 1959; 28-32.

Lievesley, Geraldine. The Cuban Revolution: Past, Present and Future Perspectives. New
York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004.

Long, Tania. ―Sister of Castro Assails him Here,‖ New York Times, 21 November, 1964, 11.

―Love and Bullets,‖ Time, 7 March, 1955, 44.

Lowenfeld, Andreas F. " ... 'Sauce for the Gander': The Arab Boycott and United States
Political Trade Controls." Texas International Law Journal. Vol. 12, No. 1 (Winter
1977): 25-39.

Luxner, Larry. ―Controversial Cuba Position Introduced at State Department.‖ The
Washington Diplomat. January 2006.
http://www.washingtondiplomat.com/January%202006/a6_01_06.html

Management Office of Management and Budget. ―Statement of Administration Policy: S.
1731 - Agriculture, Conservation, and Rural Enhancement Act of 2001.‖ December 5,
2001. In The American Presidency Project [online], edited by John T. Woolley and
Gerhard Peters. http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=25632

March, William. ―Obama Makes Mark on Florida in First 100 Days.‖ Tampa Bay Online. 24
April 2009, http://www2.tbo.com/content/2009/apr/24/obama-makes-mark-florida-
first-100-days/.

―The Massacre,‖ Time, 28 April, 1961, 15-24.

Matthews, Herbert L. ―Cuban Rebel is Visited.‖ New York Times. 24 February 1957, 34.

---. ―Old Order in Cuba is Threatened.‖ New York Times. 26 February 1957, 13.

McCurry, Mike. ―Press Briefing with Mike McCurry, February 10, 1995,‖ February 10,
1995. In The American Presidency Project [online], edited by John T. Woolley and
Gerhard Peters. http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=59486.

---. ―Press Briefing with Mike McCurry, March 7, 1995,‖ March 7, 1995. In The American
Presidency Project [online], edited by John T. Woolley and Gerhard Peters.
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=59539.

---. ―Press Briefing by Mike McCurry. March 7, 1996,‖ March 7, 1996. In The American
Presidency Project [online], edited by John T. Woolley and Gerhard Peters.
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ ws/?pid=48755.

240

McIntyre, Dave and Anke Wienand. ―Washington‘s Shift on Immigration Abandons Cold
War Relic.‖ Deutsche Presse-Agentur. 19 August 1994.

Mills, C. Wright. Listen, Yankee: The Revolution in Cuba. New York: Ballantine Books,
January 1961.

Moley, Raymond. ―Expendable Missiles.‖ Newsweek. 24 December 1962, 68.

Montgomery, Paul L. ―1,774 People Without a Country: Cuban Refugees Sit in U.S. Jails,‖
New York Times, 7 December, 1980, 1.

Munoz-Wides, Laura. ―Cuban-Americans May Hold GOP Accountable.‖ 11 Janurary 2006.
(finish citation)

Moreno, Dario. ―Exile Political Power: Cubans in the United States Political System.‖
Metropolitan Center, Florida International University.
http://metropolitan.fiu.edu/downloads/exile%20political%20power.doc.

Nair, Mira. The Perez Family, DVD, (1995; Los Angeles, CA; Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer,
2003).

Narvaez, Alfonso A. ―A Cuban Odyssey: How a Family Was Reunited,‖ New York Times, 7
December, 1980, NJ4.

Navarros, Mireya. ―Straits of Florida Hide the Unknown Toll of a Rush to Freedom,‖ New
York Times, 24 August, 1994; A1, A15.

Newman, Maria. ―Cuba Patrolling Beaches to Keep children off Unseaworthy Rafts,‖ New
York Times, 29 August, 1994, A1.

Newport, Frank. ―Americans Continue to Favor the Return of Elián Gonzalez to Cuba,‖
Gallup News Service, 4 April, 2000. http://www.gallup.com/poll/3034/ Americans-
Continue-Favor-Return-Elian-Gonzalez-Cuba.aspx (Accessed 14 April, 2010).

―News Conference Announcing the Introduction of the Cuba Democracy Act of 1992.‖
Federal News Service. 5 February 1992, http://www.lexisnexis.com/.

―Next President?‖ Time, 25 February, 1952, 40.

Nichols, Bill. ―Americans Await Word on Castro; Some Speculate Wildly; Others Plan For
Transition.‖ USA Today. 2 August 2006, 1A.

241

Nixon, Richard. ―Remarks at the Annual Meeting of the Chamber of Commerce of the
United States.‖ April 29, 1969. In The American Presidency Project [online], edited
by John T. Woolley and Gerhard Peters.
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=2024.

―Not Afraid to Die,‖ Time, 25 March, 1957, 36.

Obama, Barack. ―Memorandum on Promoting Democracy and Human Rights in Cuba.‖
April 13, 2009. In The American Presidency Project [online], edited by John T.
Woolley and Gerhard Peters. http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=85998.

---. ―The President‘s News Conference in Port of Spain, Trinidad and Tobago.‖ April 19,
2009. In The American Presidency Project [online], edited by John T. Woolley and
Gerhard Peters. http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=86033.

---. ―Remarks to the Summit of the Americas in Port of Spain, Trinidad and Tobago.‖ April
17, 2009. In The American Presidency Project [online], edited by John T. Woolley
and Gerhard Peters. http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=86017.

---. ―Senator Barack Obama, Remarks at Southern Illinois University, Carbondale, IL,
1/20/04.‖ quoted in ―RNC – Obama: Weak on Cuba.‖ Reuters. 20 May 2008.
http://www.reuters.com/article/pressRelease/idUS127480+20-May-
2008+PRN20080520.

Office of Management and Budget, ―Statement of Administration Policy: S. 1731 -
Agriculture, Conservation, and Rural Enhancement Act of 2001,‖ December 5, 2001.
In The American Presidency Project [online], edited by John T. Woolley and Gerhard
Peters. http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=25632.

Office of the Press Secretary, ―Executive Summary― Title III of the Cuban Liberty and
Democratic Solidarity Act Fact Sheet,‖ January 17, 2002. In The American
Presidency Project [online], edited by John T. Woolley and Gerhard Peters.
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=79361.

Olson, Kathryn M. ―Democratic Enlargement‘s Value Hierarchy and Rhetorical Forms: An
Analysis of Clinton‘s Use of a Post-Cold War Symbolic Frame to Justify Military
Interventions.‖ Presidential Studies Quarterly 34 (2004): 307-340.

Omestad, Thomas. ―Obama Will Change Cuba Policy – But How?‖ U.S. News and World
Report. 5 December 2008, http://politics.usnews.com/.

―One-man Court,‖ Time, 16 March, 1959, 40.

242

Open Secrets. ―The Cuban Connection: Cuban American Money in U.S. Elections 1979-
2000.‖ Opensecrets.org. http://www.opensecrets.org/pubs/cubareport/summary.asp

―Opposition Warned in Cuba,‖ New York Times, 27, July 1953, 13.

―The ‗Other‘ Americans,‖ New York Times, 10 January, 1971, NER27.

Paterson, Thomas G. Contesting Castro: The United States and the Triumph of the Cuban
Revolution. New York: Oxford University Press, 1995.

―Peace & War,‖ Time, 17 February, 1958, 38.

Pedraza, Silvia. Political Disaffection in Cuba's Revolution and Exodus. New York:
Cambridge University Press, 2007.

The Perez Family. Directed by Mira Nair. 113 minutes. Los Angeles, CA: MGM, 1995.
DVD.

Perez, Lisandro. ―cuban americans: exiles, not immigrants.‖ Frontline.
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/elian/views/exilesnotimmigrants.htm
l (Accessed 25 March, 2010).

Pérez, Louis. Cuba Between Empires, 1878-1902, Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburg Press,
1983.

---. Cuba and the United States: Ties of Singular Intimacy, Athens: University of Georgia
Press, 2003.

Perez-Stable, Marifeli. The Cuban Revolution: Origins, Course, and Legacy. New York:
Oxford University Press, 1999.

Phillips, Ruby Hart. ―2 Luxury Hotels Seized in Havana,‖ New York Times, 12 June, 1960; 1,
41.

---. ―55 Reported Killed,‖ New York Times, 27 July, 1953, 1.

---. ―Castro Bars Pledge to Join U.S. in War,‖ New York Times, 23 March, 1959; 1, 4.

---. ―Castro says Cuba Wants Good Ties,‖ New York Times, 16 January, 1959, 1.

---. ―Cuba Quells Revolt,‖ New York Times, 1 December, 1956; 1, 12.

---. ―Cuba may have a Tourist Season,‖ New York Times, 11 January, 1959, X23.

243

---. ―Cuban Terrorism More Intense,‖ New York Times, 29 December, 1956, 3.

---. ―Cuba says Rebels Number only 50,‖ New York Times, 2 March, 1957, 14.

---. ―Military Court in Cuba,‖ New York Times, 13 January, 1959, 1.

---. ―Reds‘ Alleged Role,‖ New York Times, 24 April, 1959; 1, 4.

Polk, James K. ―Diary of James K. Polk – Entries of May 10, May 30, and June 17, 1848.‖ In
What Happened In Cuba? A Documentary History, by Robert F. Smith, 38-39. New
York: Twayne Publishers, 1963.

Pollack, Sydney. Havana, DVD, (1990; Universal City, CA; Universal Studios, 1998).

Polling Report. ―Cuba.‖ Pollingreport.com. 2010, http://www.pollingreport.com/cuba.

Powell, Colin. ―Foreword,‖ in Commission on Assistance to a Free Cuba: Report to the
President, 1-2. http://www.cafc.gov/documents/organization/67963.pdf (Accessed 15
May, 2010).

―Press Briefing by Attorney General Janet Reno, General John Sheehan, Commander In
Chief of the U.S. Atlantic Command, and Under Secretary of State for Political
Affairs Peter Tarnoff.‖ May 2, 1995. In The American Presidency Project [online],
edited by John T. Woolley and Gerhard Peters.
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=59683.

―President is Firm,‖ New York Times, 19 April, 1961; 1, 12.

―Presidential Approval Ratings -- Gallup Historical Statistics and Trends,‖ Gallup, Inc.
http://www.gallup.com/poll/116677/Presidential-Approval-Ratings-Gallup-
Historical-Statistics-Trends.aspx (Accessed 15 May, 2010).

―Prio Denies Responsibility,‖ New York Times, 27, July 1953, 11.

―Province in Revolt,‖ Time, 24 June, 1957 40.

―Qualified Cleanup,‖ Time, 22 January, 1951, 34.

Ratliff, William E. The Selling of Fidel Castro: The Media and the Cuban Revolution. New
Brunswick, NJ: Transaction, Inc., 1987.

―Ready for War,‖ Time, 17 June, 1957, 34

―Refinery Expects Seizure,‖ New York Times, 18 June, 1960, 6.
244

Reinhard, Beth. ―It‘s Got a Good Beat and You Can Dance To It.‖ Naked Politics. 25 August
2007, http://miamiherald.typepad.com/nakedpolitics/2007/08/page/6/.

―Revolution Spreads,‖ Time, 16 September, 1957, 47.

―Revolutionary Upsurge,‖ Time, 10 June, 1957, 32

Reynolds, Maura. ―Bush Visits Miami to Shore Up Cuban American Backing,‖ Los Angeles
Times, 28 August, 2004, A18.

Rice, Condoleezza. ―Dr. Rice Previews President‘s Trip to Mexico,‖ January 9, 2004. In The
American Presidency Project [online], edited by John T. Woolley and Gerhard Peters.
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=81532.

---. ―Meeting of the Commission for Assistance to a Free Cuba.‖ 19, December 2005.
http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2005/58283.htm

Rice, Condoleezza. ―Condoleezza Rice Holds Briefing Regarding the Upcoming Summit of
the Americas.‖ FDCH Political Transcripts. 19 April 2001. http://lexisnexis.com/.

Rice, Condoleezza. ―Interview with David Gregory.‖ MSNBC. 4 August 2006.

―RNC – Obama: Weak on Cuba.‖ Reuters. 20 May 2008.
http://www.reuters.com/article/pressRelease/idUS127480+20-May-
2008+PRN20080520.

Robot Chicken. ―Celebrity Rocket: Dance Dance Counter-Revolution.‖ Episode number 24,
first broadcast April 23, 2006 by Cartoon Network. Directed by Tom Root and
written by Douglas Goldstein and Tom Root.

Robot Chicken. ―Nutcracker Sweet: Disney Attacks.‖ Episode number 2, first broadcast
February 27, 2005 by Cartoon Network. Directed by Douglas Goldstein and written
by Douglas Goldstein and Tom Root.

Rohter, Larry. ―Flight From Cuba: The Policy; Castro's Refugee Weapon Has Been Wielded
Before,‖ The New York Times, 20 August, 1994, 11.

―Running-sore Revolt,‖ Time, 25 February, 1957, 43.

―Rusk Declares Sympathy of Nation for Castro Foes‖, New York Times, 18 April, 1961, 1.

Sanchez, Isabel. ―Cuban Regime and Dissidents Agree in Rejecting New US Official.‖ 31,
July 2005. http://www.lexis-nexis.com/.
245

Scanlan, John and Loescher, Gilburt. ―U.S. Foreign Policy, 1959-80: Impact on Refugee
Flow from Cuba.‖ The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social
Science. Vol. 467, No. 1. (May 1983): 116-137.

Scarborough, Rowan. ―Democracy In Cuba Unlikely as Raul Rules.‖ Washington Times. 28
August 2006, A01.

Scarface. Directed by Brian DePalma. 170 minutes. Universal City, CA: Universal Studios,
1983. DVD.

Schudson, Michael. The Power of News. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1982.

Schumacher, Edward. ―Cuban Reunion in Newark Brings a Joyous Beginning,‖ New York
Times, 24 May, 1980; 1, 27.

---. ―Retarded People and Criminals Are Included in Cuban Exodus,‖ New York Times, 11
May, 1980; 1, 17.

---. ―The Long Journey of Hope From Mariel to Key West,‖ New York Times, 20 May, 1980,
A1.

Schmidt, Dana. ―Castro Stresses Land Reform Aim,‖ New York Times, 21 April, 1959, 1.

―Semper Fidel,‖ Newsweek, 2 February, 1959, 52-53.

Senate Budget Committee. ―Hearing of a Senate Budget Committee On The Fiscal Year
2002 International Affairs Budget Proposal.‖ March 14, 2001,
http://www.lexisnexis.com/.

―Senator John F. Kennedy and Vice President Richard M. Nixon Second Joint Radio-
Television Broadcast.‖ John F. Kennedy Presidential Library & Museum.
http://www.jfklibrary.org/NR/exeres/99355CAC-E029-42A7-B400-
71D04E12F957.htm.

Sierra, Jerry A. ―The War for Cuban Independence.‖ Historyofcuba.com.
http://www.historyofcuba.com/history/scaw/scaw1.htm.

---. ―Time Table History of Cuba: Before the Revolution.‖ Historyofcuba.com.
http://www.historyofcuba.com/history/time/timetbl3b.htm#che

The Simpsons. ―The Trouble with Trillions.‖ Episode number 198, first broadcast April 15,
1998 by Fox Broadcasting Company. Directed by Swinton Scott and written by Ian
Maxtone-Graham.

246

―Sister Says Castro Might Ruin Cuba,‖ New York Times, 13 October, 1964, 15.

Sleight, E. F. ―Around Cuba.‖ Travel. December 1956, 18-22.

Smith, Wayne. ―American Nations Confer.‖ 1. (what is this?)

Smith, Wayne. Closest of Enemies: A Personal and Diplomatic History of the Castro Years.
New York: WW Norton and Co., February 1988.

---. ―Cuba‘s Long Reform.‖ Foreign Affairs. Vol. 75, No. 2 (March/April 1996): 99-112.

---. ―Our Cuba Diplomacy: A Critical Reexamination.‖ Center for International Policy.
1994. http://www.ciponline.org/diplomcy.htm.

Smith, Robert F. What Happened in Cuba?: A Documentary History. New York : Twayne
Publishers, 1963.

Soderlund, Walter C. ―U.S. Television Network News Coverage of the Carter Visit to Cuba,
May 2002.‖ Paper prepared for presentation at the annual meeting of the Canadian
Political Science Association, Halifax, Nova Scotia, May 30-June 1, 2003,
http://www.cpsa-acsp.ca/paper-2003/soderlund.pdf.

Soderlund, Walter C., Ronald H. Wagen, and Stuart H. Surlin. ―The Impact of the End of the
Cold War on Canadian and American TV News Coverage: Image Consistency or
Image Change?‖ Canadian Journal of Communication 23, no. 2 (1998),
http://www.cjc-online.ca/index.php/journal/article/view/1033.

Soltis, Andy. ―Hope For Raul as a Friendlier Red-Fellow.‖ New York Post. 20 February
2008, 4.

South Park. ―The Wacky Molestation Adventure.‖ Episode number 64, first broadcast
December 13, 2000 by Comedy Central. Directed and written by Trey Parker.

Staten, Clifford L. The History of Cuba. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005.

Stephanopolous, George. ―Press Briefing by George Stephanopoulos, February 25, 1993.‖
February 25, 1993. In The American Presidency Project [online], edited by John T.
Woolley and Gerhard Peters. http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=60057.

―Stories on Rebel Fiction,‖ New York Times, 28, February 1957, 13.

―Strongman's Headache," Time, 10 August, 1953, 35.

―Strongman‘s Round,‖ Time, 21 April, 1958, 27.
247

Szulc, Tad. ―Ex-Cuban Premier Quits Regime and Asks Asylum,‖ New York Times, 6 July,
1960; 1,4.

---. ―Miro Accuses Cuba of Betrayal on Reds,‖ New York Times, 9 July, 1960, 1.

---. ―Rivalries Beset Top Cuban Exiles,‖ New York Times, 9 April, 1961, 1-2.

―Tarnished Triumph,‖ Time, 15 November, 1954, 46.

Tarnoff, Peter. ―Press Briefing by Peter Tarnoff, Under Secretary of State for Political
Affairs, June 20, 1996,‖ June 20, 1996. In The American Presidency Project [online],
edited by John T. Woolley and Gerhard Peters.
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=48880. (Accessed 15 May, 2010).

Taylor, Jay. ―Playing into Castro‘s Hands,‖ Washington Post, 9 August, 1994, A19.

Thayer, Yvonne. ―Havana, Fla.: Cubans Thrive in Miami Area, And So Does the City,‖ Wall
Street Journal, 11 December, 1969, 1.

Thomas, Hugh. Cuba or The Pursuit of Freedom. New York: Da Capo, 1998.

Thomas, Jo. ―Cubans Phoning Kin in U.S. to get them,‖ New York Times, 24 April, 1980,
A17.

---. ―Harbor in Cuba a floating City of 1,300 Boats,‖ New York Times, 27 April, 1980, 1.

Time Magazine, April, 28, 1961, Cover.

―Top Obama Flip Flops.‖ Washington Post. 25 February 2008, A04,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2008/02/24/AR2008022402094.html.

―Transcript of President Eisenhower‘s News Conference Comments,‖ New York Times, 29
January, 1959, 10.

―Trappings of an Election‖ Time, 10 November, 1958, 45.

―The Trouble with Trillions.‖ The Simpsons Archive. http://www.snpp.com/episodes/5F14.
2001

U.S. Congress. Senate. ―U.S. Senator Charles Grassley (R-IA) Holds Hearing on U.S.-Cuba
Economic Relations.‖

248

U.S. Congress. Senate. Subcommittee of the Appropriations Committee. 20 April 2004.
(make alphabetical when title present)

U.S. Congress. House. Subcommittees of the House Financial Services Committee. 30
September 2004. (alphabetize with title)

U.S. Department of State. Cuba. Washington D.C.: U.S. Department of State, April, 1961

---. Mission and Members. http://2005-2009.cafc.gov/mission/index.htm (Accessed 15 May,
2010).

---. Title XVII—Cuban Democracy Act of 1992.
http://www.state.gov/www/regions/wha/cuba/democ_act_1992.html (Accessed 7
April, 2010).

―U.S. Senator Pete Domenici (R-Nm) Holds Hearing On The Fiscal Year 2002 State
Department Budget Proposal.‖ FDCH Political Transcripts. 14 March 2001,
http://www.lexisnexis.com/.

―U.S. Sugar Mill Men to Protest to Cuba,‖ New York Times, 21 May, 1959, 8.

USCSCA US-Cuba Sister Cities Association. ―About USCSCA.‖ US-Cuba Sister Cities
Association. http://www.uscsca.org/about.html

VandeHei, Jim. ―In Hindsight, Kerry Says He‘d Still Vote For War,‖ The Washington Post,
10 August, 2004, A01.

―The Vengeful Visionary,‖ Time, 26 January, 1959, 41.

―The Violent Cubans‖ New York Times. 4, December 1956. 38.

Waldron, Lamar and Thom Hartmann. Ultimate Sacrifice: John and Robert Kennedy, the
Plan for a Coup in Cuba, and the Murder of JFK. Berkeley: Publishers Group West,
2005.

Wall, James M. ―US Cuba Policy is Obsolete-Come in From the Cold War,‖ Christian
Century, 7 September, 1994. http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m1058/
is_n25_v111/ai_16269646/ (Accessed 15 May, 2010).

Wander, Philip. ―The Rhetoric of American Foreign Policy.‖ In Cold War Rhetoric: Strategy,
Metaphor and Ideology, Ed. M. Medhurst, R. Ivie, P. Wander, R. Scott. p. 153-184.

―Week of Waiting‖ Time, 7 April, 1958, 32.

249

Welch, Richard E., Jr. Response to Revolution: The United States and the Cuban Revolution
1959-1961. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1985.

―What Next for Cuba and its Hero?‖ Newsweek. 19 January 1959, 42-44.

Whately, Richard. ―Excerpts from Elements of Rhetoric.‖ In The Rhetorical Tradition:
Readings from Classical Times to the Present, edited by Patricia Bizzell and Bruce
Herzberg, 831-858. Boston: Bedford Books of St. Martin‘s Press, 1990.

Williams, Carol J. ―Change may be on the horizon for Cuba; Analysts see signs of modest
political and economic reform since Castro temporarily stepped down.‖ Los Angeles
Times. 20 January 2008, A10.

Williams, Daniel. ―Suddenly, the Welcome Mat Says 'You're Illegal',‖ Washington Post, 20
August, 1994, A1.

Williams, John Hoyt. ―Cuba: Havana‘s Military Machine,‖ The Atlantic, August 1988.

Williams, Raymond. Marxism and Literature. New York: Oxford University Press, 1977.

World News Tonight Sunday. ABC. May 4, 1980. ABC News Transcripts,
http://lexisnexis.com/.

World News Tonight. ABC. February 1, 1980. ABC News Transcripts, http://lexisnexis.com/.

World Security Institute. ―Increases in Cuban Military Spending Reflect Economic
Recovery.‖ U.S.-Cuba Cooperative Security Project. 7 March 2008,
http://www.wsicubaproject.org/militaryspending08.cfm.

Zayas, Jorge. ―‗I Erred in Backing Castro,‘ says Editor.‖ Hartford Courant, 24 January,
1960, 1A.

Abstract (if available)

Linked assets

University of Southern California Dissertations and Theses

Conceptually similar

PDF

George H. W. Bush and the new world order: on stasis, the just war & rhetorical legacy—“a world in disarray”?

PDF

The Vulcan rhetoric of crisis: presidential advisors and the War in Iraq

PDF

Adversaries and statecraft: explaining U.S. foreign policy toward rogue states

PDF

Miracles of birth and action: natality and the rhetoric of birth advocacy

PDF

Nosopolitics of postwar trauma: a study in rhetorical networks (1967–2015)

PDF

Competing logics and organizational failure: the structuring of California prison health care

PDF

The impact of state-society relations on the design and implementation of digital-communication networks: a Franco-American comparative perspective

PDF

Gagged: the politics of reproduction and U.S. foreign aid, 1961-2009

PDF

Case study on Chinese heavy industry companies' community relations in U.S.: a comparison between corporate effort and media representation

PDF

Reproducing fear amid fears of reproduction: the Black maternal body in U.S. law, media, and policy

PDF

International politics and domestic institutional change: the rise of executive war-making autonomy in the United States

PDF

Organizational structuring for homeland security: a U.S. state-by-state comparative analysis

PDF

A comparison of corporate PR practices in U.S. and China: a case study approach

PDF

Falun Gong’s evolving definitions through stages and disputes

PDF

Religion of a different color: Vietnamese Catholic and Caodai U.S.-Cambodia ties in comparative perspective

PDF

Narratives in the autism paradigm: rhetoric, (re)presentation, and (inter)action

PDF

Measuring for what: networked citizen science movements after the Fukushima nuclear accident

PDF

The 2010 Haiti network relief movement: rhetoric in natural disaster, institutional intervention, and biosecurity

PDF

An anthropocene rhetoric of ecological networking: the biomic politics of nonhuman nature, culture and politics at the European Green Belt

PDF

New theoretical and research directions for foresight scenario work: narratives, sensemaking, and networks

Asset Metadata

Creator Franke, Melissa Rae (author)

Core Title Constraining stories: four narratives that limit options for U.S.-Cuba relations

School Annenberg School for Communication

Degree Doctor of Philosophy

Degree Program Communication

Publication Date 11/30/2011

Defense Date 01/25/2011

Publisher University of Southern California (original), University of Southern California. Libraries (digital)

Tag communication,Cuba,international relations,narrative,OAI-PMH Harvest,rhetoric,U.S. foreign policy,U.S.-Cuba relations

Language English

Contributor Electronically uploaded by the author (provenance)

Advisor Hollihan, Thomas (committee chair), Goodnight, Gerald Thomas (committee member), Lamy, Steven (committee member)

Creator Email mfranke.plu@gmail.com,mfranke@plu.edu

Permanent Link (DOI) https://doi.org/10.25549/usctheses-c3-214473

Unique identifier UC11290469

Identifier usctheses-c3-214473 (legacy record id)

Legacy Identifier etd-FrankeMeli-444-0.pdf

Dmrecord 214473

Document Type Dissertation

Rights Franke, Melissa Rae

Type texts

Source University of Southern California (contributing entity), University of Southern California Dissertations and Theses (collection)

Access Conditions The author retains rights to his/her dissertation, thesis or other graduate work according to U.S. copyright law. Electronic access is being provided by the USC Libraries in agreement with the a...

Repository Name University of Southern California Digital Library

Repository Location USC Digital Library, University of Southern California, University Park Campus MC 2810, 3434 South Grand Avenue, 2nd Floor, Los Angeles, California 90089-2810, USA