University of Southern California Dissertations and Theses

Defending Rawls's Law of Peoples against cosmopolitan critiques

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Defending Rawls's Law of Peoples against cosmopolitan critiques

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Content Defending Rawls's Law of Peoples against Cosmopolitan Critiques
A Diss erta tion Presented to the
FACULTY OF THE USC GRADUA TE SCHOOL
UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA
In Partial Fulf illment of the
Requirements for the Degree
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
(PHILOSOPHY)
By
Xiao Wei
December, 20 12
Dedication
For my parents and my husband
11
Acknowledgments
I want to thank my wonder fu l committee, Sharon Lloyd, Gary Watson and Alison
Renteln, for their guida nce, help and support in the process of writing this dissertation. I am
extremely grateful to Sharon Lloyd, my advisor and Committee Chair, for her patience and
continuous help throughout the proj ect. Her seminar on Rawls's theory of justice inspired
the inception of this proj ect, and she was invo lved with it ever since. It was through many
discussions with her that I gradually developed a clear picture of this pro ject. Thanks are
also due to Gary Watson who spent so much time reading every one of several drafts and
meeting with me. His commen tary gave me invaluab le perspective on my own work and
challenged me to carefully examine my arguments for particular problems. I also thank
Alison Renteln for leading me to insi ghtfu l sources on human righ ts. My writing benefited
fr om her kind encouragement and her comments.
The kind help fr om other prof essors also contributed to my diss erta tion. I am
indebted to John Dreher, Mark Schroeder and Kenneth Easwaran. John Dreher read the
first draft and provided very helpf ul comments for improvement. Mark Schroeder and
Kenneth Easwaran's detai led comments on the second chapter helped greatly for more
clea rly laying out the arg uments. I also appreciate Mark Schroeder's superb work as
Advisor of Job Placement. He helped me every step in this process.
Lastly, I want to thank my parents and my husband, without whose support and
understanding the completion of this dissertation would be impossible.
ill
Abstract
After the World War II, we have witne ssed the increase in interna tional coop eration
in almost all aspects of human life . Various global organizati ons are established for this
pur pose, for example, the United Nati ons, European and World Trade Organiza tion.
There was a prevalent optimism that, the interna tional coop era tion in all these
international organiza tions will rec onstruct everyo ne's iden tity and each will eventually
see herself as the citizen of the world first and fo remost.
Such a change is espec ially welcomed by cosmopolitan theorists, who hold that
individuals and their int erests should be the ultimate concern for any theory of justice.
They consider this ongoing phenomenon to empirically support their conviction that
global justice should be justice among individuals rather than justice among states as
traditionally conceived. Some cosmopoli tans apply the leading liberal philosopher John
Rawls's domestic theory of justice to analyze global issues. They conclude that Rawls
would agree that global instituti ons should be reform ed fo llowing a global diff erence
principle so that the vast inequali ties in income and wealth can be reduced. To them,
global justice should be justice without borders and the sovereign sta tes should have no
moral value in their consi derati ons.
However, Rawls's publication of his own theory of international justice surprisingly
disappoints these cosmopolitans . In these cosmopolita ns' eyes, Rawls betrays his own
liberal concerns for individuals and he becomes a defender of the traditi onal view of
global justice of na tions.
Now the question is whether Rawls becomes more conser vative in his interna tional
theory and keeps distance fr om his liberal stance in his domestic theory. I believe the
!V
answer is no. So the puzzles I try to solve in my diss erta tion include how a liberal should
conceive the most fu ndamental interests of individuals and what the reasonable global
intuitions are required to best protect these in terests.
I argue that a liberal should consider self-re spect or the sense of worth to be the
most fu ndamental interest of individuals, and their sense of worth partly comes fr om
collectively develop their society provided that the socie ty is well-o rdere d. We ll-ordered
societies includes liberal and decent ones, both of which provide necessa ry social
conditions for individuals to develop and sustain their sense of worth. The sense of worth
is the precondition for any agent to be able to take her life to be valuable. Without this
sense of worth, she would consider her life to be dull and miserable. Lib erals, who
cherish the equal value and autonomy of human beings, should agree that the sense of the
worth is the core of the dignity of human beings. This sense of worth is supported at least
partly by respect shown by the society and others to the individual in the choices she
make s. One of the choices an individual member of a well-ordered society makes is to
participate in the collective decision- making for developing the society, fr om which
process she has a sense of pride and honor. Because this sense of pride and honor partly
consti tute the sense of worth of a member of a well-o rdered society, the global society
should respect the integrity, autonomy and independence of a socie ty that provides
necessa ry social conditions for its members to develop a sense of worth, so that
individual members may preserve their self- respect in maintaining and developing their
shared society. Thus, Rawls's international theory of justice protects his liberal values.
One may ask since liberals are concerned with the equal worth of human beings,
don't cosmopolitans more closely adhere to liberal values in envisioning that liberal
v
political liberties should be uni versalized and included in basic human righ ts? My answer
is no. If a nonliberal soci ety is decent, it equips itself with all necessa ry social conditions
to support the development of self- respect as that of capaciti es to make reasonable
decisions. Thus, fr om a liberal point of view of respecting individuals, members of a
decent society should be allowed to remain in their society and develop their society
according to the plan they make collectively , and this decision should be respected. Any
reform in the global institu tions that involves fo rcing upon these individuals immediate
change for liberal values violates liberal values themselves.
Lastly, how should a liberal deal with the inequali ties in wealth and income in the
world? Are cosmopolitans right in insisting that there should be certain transnational
institutions to reduce the gap among societies even if all of them are well-o rdered? The
answer is still no. With the fu ndamental idea that the international original position should
consist of represen tatives of societies esta blished, we need to examine what would
naturally fo llow fr om it. Represen tatives will choose to help burdened societies to acquire
well-orderedness beca use this helps realize democratic peace, which is more likely to
occur among well-ordered societies. The repre sen ta tives will also choose not to continue
redistributing wealth because doing so does not contribute to the social conditions for
se lf-re spect but rather violates the collective autonomy of members of well-o rdered
societies by imposing a goal of development on them.
Vl
Table of Contents
Dedica tion
!!
Acknowledgments 111
Abstract 1v
Chapter 1 Introduction
l
Chapter 2 The Sense of Worth and the International Original Position 28
Chapter 3 Human Rights and Toleration 52
Chapter 4 Global Distributive Justice and Global institu tions 89
Chapter 5 On the Duty of Assistance 119
Bibliography 151
Vll
Chapter 1 Introduction
Chapter 1 Introduction
The Cosmopolitan Challenge
In The Law of Peoples, Rawls advocates what is on the fa ce of it a very different
conception of interna tional justice than his conception of domestic justice as described in
A Theory of Justice. A numb er of Cosmopoli tans find in his interna tional theory errors
in reasoning and object that he misapplies his theory to the global arena. They arg ue,
instead, that consistency requires Rawls to accept the same princ iples for interna tional
justice as for domestic justice, and argue for this approach. In this diss ertati on, I defend
Rawls fr om these cosmop olitan crit ics.
Cosmopo litanism
1
, as Garrett Wallace Brown and David Held charac terize it,
"maintains that there are moral obli gations owed to all human beings based solely on our
humanity alone, without ref erence to race, gender, nationality, ethnicity, culture, religion,
political affi liation, state citizenship, or other communal particula riti es" (Brown and Held,
2010, p. 1 ). Based on their ultimate concern of individuals, cosmopoli tans rej ect the idea
that sovereign states or societies are the primary concern for a theory of interna tional
justice. As Charles Beitz write s, "If one takes the morality of states to posit that state
boundaries are limits to the scope of justifica tion, then cosmopolitani sm is plainly
incompatible with it" (Beitz, 2005, p. 17).
1 There are different classifications of different types of cosmopolitanism, which are not the main concern
for the purpose of this dissertation. I use cosmopo litanism in the general sense to refer to the moral doctrine
with its implication in global political and economic insti tuti ons. To learn more about these classifications,
please see Brown and Held, 2010.
Page 1 of 159
Chapter 1 Introduction
Rawlsian cosmopolitans, who highly value Rawls's domestic theory of justice and
directly apply Rawl s's contractarian framework to the global arena, argue that Rawls has
proposed a different theory of justice in his global theory than his domestic theory of
justice. Instead of taking the individuals and their interests as the primary concern in his
international theory, as he does in his domestic theory, Rawls seems to fo cus more on
societies and their interests of the societies. This shift in the primary concern can be seen
in his design of the international original position, in which parties represent peoples
instead of individu als. Rawls fu rther holds in his interna tional theory that liberal soci eties
and non-liberal decent soci eties should both be represented in the interna tional original
position and deliber ate on the princ iples regulating international relati ons. That is, in his
international theory, he does not only extend toleration to decent societies, he also holds
that they should be treated as equal members .
However, this seems to contradict Rawls's domestic theory since he sacrif ices the
interests of individuals in decent societies by extending equal membership to these
societies rega rdless of the fact that individual members do not en joy as extensive liberties
and rights as citizens of liberal societies do. Part of the reason why Rawls thinks that
decent societies should be tolerated and respected by liberal soci eties is that decent
societies honor human righ ts. However, cosmopolitans cri ticize Rawls for being circular
since his list of human rights seems to in tentionally leave out some liberal rights that are
generally considered to be human rights, such as the right of equal political participation
and the fu ll right of fr ee expression, simply for the purp ose of accommoda ting decent
societies. Rawls's neglect of individual interests can also be shown in his fai lure to
include a principle of economic justice in interna tional theory-instead of applying his
Page 2 of15 9
Chapter 1 Introduction
diff erence principle to the global socie ty to maximize the life expectations of the globally
worst off individual s, Rawls rej ects such a principle of distributive justice but rather
holds that well-ordered societies only have a duty of assistance to those soci eties in
economically unfa vorable conditions .
While attacking Rawls's own interna tional theory, these cosmopolitans apply
Rawl s's method of deriving principles of justice in his domestic theory and develop a set
of principles regulating international relati ons. Their interna tional principles, however,
are different fr om Raw ls's due to the fact that they take individuals and their interests to
be the primary concern just as Rawls does in his domestic theory. The diff erences
between the se Rawlsian cosmopolitan international principles and Rawls own
international theory should be examined, because it is important to show that Rawls is
able to answer these Rawlsian cosmop olitan challenge s. This is impo rtant because Rawls
need to show that he is consis tent with his two theories and that he does not change his
position when he moves to the international theory. More importantly, the Ra wlsian
cosmopo litan challenges should be answered because their theories regarding
international justice do seem to be more inherent to Rawls's domestic theory than his
international theory, and Rawls's Law of Peoples may be simply wrong if he cannot
succes sf ully address these problems.
The Law of Peoples as the guidelines of foreign policies of a Liberal Society
Before I assess cosmopoli tan critiques and lay out my own arguments in detail, it
would be worthwhile to review Rawls's Law of Peoples. By showing which
consid erati ons lead him to his writing this international theory of justice and by sketching
Page 3 of15 9
Chapter 1 Introduction
out how it is connected to the domestic theor y, we can better understand Rawl s's goal in
his international theor y. We can fu rther see why it has the prima fa cie plausibili ty to start
with peoples instead of persons.
According to Rawls, "[ A]n ideal conception of a Law of Peoples for the Society of
well-ordered Peoples, that is, liberal and decent peoples .. .is to guide these well-ordered
peoples in their conduct toward one another and in their designing common institu tions
for their mutual benefit ... [and] to guide them in how to deal with non-well-ordered
peoples" (Rawls, 1999b, p. 89). Rawls claims that The Law of Peoples "is developed
within political liberalism and is an extension of a liberal conception of justice for a
domestic regime to a Socie ty of Peoples" (Rawls's 1999b, p. 9). What does he mean by
saying that his international theory is an extension of his domestic theory? From a
metho dology perspective, it obviously means that Rawls ap plies his contractarian device,
the original position, which he uses to derive the princip les of justice for a domestic liberal
socie ty, to the global socie ty. The question, however, is whether the second application of
the device should be designed in exactly the same way and whether, fr om the perspective
ofthe content, principles of a just global socie ty should be the same as those regulating a
liberal domestic society.
Rawls does not seem to consider it to be fit to use the domestic original position in the
global arena. At several places in The Law of Peoples, he indicates that his international
theory of justice intends to provide a reasonable theory of fo reign policy for liberal
societies. For example, Rawls explicitly says that the Law of Peoples "concerns what the
fo reign policy of a reasonably just liberal people should be .... [and] it allows us to examine
in a reasonably realistic way what should be the aim of the fo reign policy of a liberal
Page 4 of15 9
Chapter 1 Introduction
democratic people ." (Rawls, 1999b, p. 83) Rawls also emphasizes that,
[I]n developing the Law of Peoples within a liberal conception of justice,
we work out the ideals and princ iples of the fo reign policy of a reasonably
just liberal people .... The reason we go on to consider the point of view of
decent peoples is not to prescribe principles of justice for them, but to assure
ourselves that the ideals and principles of the fo reign policy of a liberal
people are also reasonable fr om a decent nonliberal point of view. (Rawls,
1999b, p. 10, original emphasis)
Thomas Nagel makes the correct obser vation of the nature of Rawls's Law of
Peoples: "it is an elaboration of his accou nt of a just socie ty, rather than an independent
accou nt of a just world" (Nagel, 2005, p. 134). That is, Rawls does not intend his
international theory to guide the setup of global political institu tions, nor does he intend
to apply it to regulate inte ractions between individ uals. Rather, his interna tional theory is
the final part of the jigsaw puzzle of a just liberal society. If a socie ty truly value justice,
it would not have the incentive to take advantage of other societies or mistreat them with
disrespect. A just society should not only fo llow the princ iples of justice domestically but
also treat other societies with a sense of justice. It is in this sense that he claims his Law
of Peoples to be an extension of his political liberalism.
It should be very clear now that Rawls's Law of people is for a different purp ose
than a cosmopoli tan global theory of justice. Different fr om cosmopoli tans, whose
proj ect largely fo cuses on how the world order should be, Rawls's proj ect is a more
humble one. Instead of trying to find the universally true or good way of organizing
human associa tions, he is more concerned with the question how the current societies, as
they are now, assuming that they are capable of proposing and fo llowing reasonable
principles and are willing to do so, may be able to coexist pea cefully with each other
under some principles that they can reasonably agree on. He does not intend to provide
Page 5 of15 9
Chapter 1 Introduction
any map for the fu ture development of the international socie ty. Nonet heless, this does
not mean that Rawls would not welcome or would even oppose any change . His proj ect is
open to all sorts of changes that the interna tional socie ty may undergo, simply due to the
fact that he refrains fr om providing any directions.
Self -respect and the Consistency of Rawls's Two Theories
The most fu ndamental error that cosmop olitans attribute to Rawls's two theories is
that he shifts his ultimate concern fr om an "individual ism" in his domestic theory to a
communitaria nism in his interna tional theory. Cosmopo litans claim that Rawls considers
the int erests of individuals to be less crucial than the in terests of sovereign societies in his
international theory. I call this the "inconsistency problem".
Defenders of Ra wls, such as Samuel Freeman, solve the seeming inconsistency
problem by insisting that the Law of Peoples is intended to be a theory of how to
maintain a peacef ul global environment so that a just and democratic society can be
preserved as a system of coop eration among the citizens for genera tions. I agree with him
on this point. However, his defense fa ils to answer cosmopolita ns' challenge of the
inconsistency problem. Their worry is that Rawls seems to be willing to sacrifice the
interests of individuals who belong to those in Rawls's terms "decent but nonliberal
societies" in order to protect the inte rests of conationals of a liberal and just socie ty, and
this stra tegy does not seem to be just. To answer this challenge, it is not suff icient to
merely show that Rawls's Law of Peoples aims at protecting interests of some individuals
just because of their nati onality. We must show that certain fun damental interests of all
individuals qua human beings are respected and protected.
Page 6 of15 9
Chapter 1 Introduction
I propose that there is one fun damental interest of individuals that can be considered
universal to any form of good human life, and this fun damental interest is the ultimate
concern in both Rawl s's theories of justice. This interest is self- respect or what Rawls
calls "sense of worth" of individual s.
This interest, as defined inA Theor y of Justice, is closely related to one's ability to
fo rm, revise and pursue one's lif e plan in a liberal society. To be more speci fic, one's
confidence in his ability to form, revise and pursue her conception of the good is the
source of her sense of worth.
In order to protect this fu ndamental interest in a liberal and democratic socie ty,
Rawls, in his domestic theory of justice for a liberal socie ty, is concerned with how to
secure the equal moral status of every citizen so that a liberal society is a fair system of
coop eration among them. For this pur pose, Rawls's principles of justice intend to
guarantee not only the equal share of liberal rights but also the fa ir opportunities for all.
To fa cili tate these pur poses, the society should also fo llow a distributive principle that
provides "all-pur pose means" for citizens to take advantage of their equal rights and
liberties and their fa ir opportuni ties. All these institu tions ensure that every citizen enjoys
the same set of "social bases of self -re spect" and has the capacity to have a sense of
worth. To be more specific, this is the sense of the worth of fr ee and equal persons
2
The reason that the sense of worth of a citizen in liberal society requires liberal
institutions is that liberal ideals are part of the political culture as an achievement that
citizens of current and previous generations accomplish collec tively. Continuous eff orts
2 Rawls explains "free and equal persons" in the following way: "The basic idea is that in virtue of their
two moral powers (a capacity for a sense of justice and for a conception of the good) and the powers of
reason (of judgment, thought, and inference connected with these powers), persons are free. Their having
these powers to the requisite minimum degree to be fully cooper ating members of society makes persons
equal. (Rawls, 1993, p. 19)
Page 7 of15 9
Chapter 1 Introduction
in collectively maintaining such a political culture form the continuum of a collec tive
activity that members of the society choose collec tively, contribute to and fe el proud of.
At the same time, their capacity to choose collectively a path of development is supported
by the social bases of se lf-re spect that a liberal society off ers. Thus, the consi derations
that members of a liberal society have the capacity to choose and pursue collectively their
way of organizing the socie ty and that the society provides social conditions to support
the development of the capacity thereof are what explain why democratic instituti ons are
necessa ry for the sense of worth of democratic citize ns.
The legitimacy of a liberal socie ty therefore is partly based on the fact that citizens
willingly support it
3
However, this does not mean that liberal institu tions are universally
required or presupp osed to protect one's sense of worth, although Rawls believes that a
liberal socie ty can best protect one 's self-respect by securing everyone 's equal status.
Following the same line of reasoning, it is plausible to hold that there could be a form of
nonliberal socie ty that supports the sense of worth, as long as (1) it provides social
conditions that support the development of its members' capacity to individually or
collectively fo rm, revise and pursue life plans, and (2) one of these goals in life is to
collectively maintain and develop the society in their own way.
3 Eric Cavallero argue s that Rawls actually offers a "popular soverei gnty" argument for the legi timacy of
well-ordered societies (See Cavallero 2003). According to this argum ent a well-ordered society is
legitimate because it receives "majority loyalty". Cavallero argues that Rawls should not simply assume
that well-ordered societies, both liberal and decent receive "majority loyalty" automatically. Instead, Rawls
should analyze what conditions will give rise to it and whether all well-ordered societies contain these
condition s. He further argue that it is unlikely for a decent society to gain majority loyalty due to its lack of
these social conditions. Wh ile I disagree that Cavallero's popular sovereignty argument is what Rawls
intends to offer because I do not agree that popular support alone suff ices legitimacy, I agree with him on
the point that popular support does play a role in the legi timacy of a society. I will also put aside his
discussion on the conditions necessary for majority loyalty for the reason that in Rawls's ideal theory,
which is the major focus of this dissertation, well-ordered societies by definition are those whose members
are and will be loyal to the society and they take pride in being members provided that the political
institutions and political culture of the society will be sustaine d.
Page 8 of15 9
Chapter 1 Introduction
This is what I consider to be Rawls 's theory of legitimac y based on sense of worth
or se lf- respect of individu als. This theory also shows that Rawls is concerned with
securing the fun damental interest of individuals in their sense of worth in his
international theory. It is a misunderstanding that Rawls considers the interests of a
socie ty or a community to have higher priority. Members of a legitimate society like you
and I, here and now, would consider it a fu ndamental interest to secure their colle ctive
activity of maintaining their society and con tinuing their own way of developing it, if
they entered the global original position. For this reason they would want the
representa tives in this original position represent societies. In contrast, whenever they put
themselves in the global original position, they would not agree that their interests are
thoroughly or best represented if the parties do not take into consi dera tion their interest in
preserving the autonomy and independence of their socie ty.
Proper Patriotism of a Liberal Society
So far I have shown that my interpretation of Ra wl's Law of Peoples based on the
fu ndamental interest of individuals in their self-respect has the advantage of showing that
Rawl s's two theories consis tently fo cus on protecting this interest. It also has the
advantage of explaining how maintaining the se lf-determina tion of a well-ordered socie ty
is a fu ndamental interest of its members. That is, my interpreta tion explains why
maintaining the borders of different societies as they are is an interest of individuals
beca use one's sense of worth partly comes fr om one's ability to fo rm, revise and pursue
together with her compatriots the plan of developing the society they all belong to. One's
sense of pride of her ability and activiti es thereof is the source of what Rawls calls
Page 9 of15 9
Chapter 1 Introduction
"proper patri otism," which in turn explains why individual members of a well-ordered
socie ty are loyal to and willing to remain in the society.
As Kok-Chor Tan observes, instead of being et hnically homogeneous, Rawls
considers the fact that individual members participate in common public institu tions,
share a language and a sense of common belonging and dest iny, and a sense of a shared
history or collec tive memory to be more responsible for generating a national cultural
character (See Tan, 2006, p. 78). Rawls claims that it is part of the nature of peoples to
have a proper pride and sense of honor in their history and achievements, as a proper
patriotism allows (See Rawls, 1999b, p. 44 & p. 62). That is, members of a liberal society
share what Mill called "common sympathies," or rather a sense of na tional ity (See Rawls,
1999b, p. 23, n. 17). These common sympathies, whatever the source, are something that
is shared among citizens in the society but not between them and others. It makes citizens
in a socie ty "cooperate with each other more willingly than with other people, desire to
be under the same government, and desire that it should be government by themselves, or
a portion of themselves, exclusively" (Rawls, 1999b, p. 23, n. 17).
This could answer the questi on: what is the diff erence between a people and
collective individ uals. Sometimes, persons may not share a sense of belonging to the
same destiny, and they may not be able to form a sense of nationality even if they are
geographically close. As Philip Pettit says, "The natural persons who happen to have the
same height or to live at the same latitude on earth cons titute collections but amount to
nothing of social significance" (Pe ttit, 2006, p. 44). We may say that it is the political
culture that ultimately unites citizens of a liberal socie ty and distinguishes a liberal
people fr om merely collec tive persons. When the political culture of a society is
Page 10 of159
Chapter 1 Introduction
appropriate, individual citizens will form a sense of attachment to their socie ty as well as
one's fe llow citizens, not merely because the socie ty provides a fr am ework for her to live
her lif e. Rather, such a sense would be formed in an informa tive and reflective way-one
is not only attached to her socie ty, she also sees that she is justified to fe el this way.
The ma jor right reason can be seen in how a liberal society protects the in terests of
individuals and ensures that the society is a cooper ative system advant ageous to all. A
liberal democratic socie ty, according to Rawls, guarantees each member of the society
equal liberties and rights and ensures fa ir op portu nities to every one. Such a society also
ensures that each citizen has the all-pur pose means to take inte lligent and eff ective
advantage of their liberties and rights to pursue their life plans (Ra wls, 1999b, p. 14, p.
49). These societies maintain fo rmal constitutional regimes that include: (1) a certain fair
equality of oppo rtunity, especia lly in education and traini ng; (2) a decent distribution of
income and wealth; (3) measures to ensure a sense of long-term security and the
oppo rtunity for me aningful work and occupation; ( 4) a health care system that ensures
basic health care for all citizens; (5) public financing of elections and ways of assuring
the availability of public informati on on matters of policy. These institu tions together
prevent exces sive social and economic inequali ties (Rawls, 1999b, pp. 50-51) . The pu blic
recognition and sincere acceptance of princ iples of justice contributes greatly to every
member' sense of belo nging to the society as well as her compatriotic ties with other
members.
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Chapter 1 Introduction
A Liberal Society's Interest in Peace by Satisfaction
Given that a liberal society's se lf -determination is the fu ndamental interest that its
individual members are willing to def end, the principles of in ternational relations should
maintain stable peace among those pea cef ul soci eties which are willing to cooperate
fo llowing principles that they mutu ally agree on. In order to sketch out these princ iples,
the first step then is to iden tif y which societies are more likely to coop erate with others
and abide by the principles provided others do the same thing. Any society that exhibits
high likeliness of doing so should be included in the global scheme of coop eration and be
considered to be an equal member of the global society. It would be unre asonable and
irrational for liberal soci eties to deny a society which has these characteristics equal
membership in the society of peoples, for doing so shows disrespect and desta bilizes the
global peace because it crea te s resen tment and hatred in the society that is mistrea ted.
Liberal Societies
Liberal societies, according to Rawls, generally fo llow the principle of reciproc ity,
name ly, they are willing to coop erate according to fa ir terms if others would do so. They
have this fe ature because individual members are satisfied. In the last section, it has been
shown that members of a liberal socie ty have a sense of na tionality partly due to the
political institu tions of the soci ety. When every member's fr eedom and integrity is greatly
protected, everyo ne's basic need for se curity and respect is satisf ied. For this reason,
these individuals are more willing to stay in the socie ty. That is, the political institu tions
strengthen the shared sense of belonging of individual members partly because these
members are satisf ied. Since the individual members of a liberal socie ty are satisfied with
Page 12 of 159
Chapter 1 Introduction
their collective achievements in their society's political culture of the society to which
they belong, they are not collec tively motiva ted by "gl ory, the exci tement of conquest
and the pleasure of exercising power over others ."(Rawls, 1999b, p. 47) In contrast, they
recognize that maintaining peacef ully cooper ative relations with other societies is in their
best interest. In this sense, a liberal society is "satisf ied with the status quo" and "their
fu ndamental interests [are] fu lly compatible with those of other democratic peoples."
(Rawls, 1999b, p. 47) All liberal societies are satisfied peoples for this reason, and it is
highly unlikely that they will go to war with each other simply because wars endanger the
socie ty as a whole and viola te the interest of individuals in se curity and respect . This is
what Rawls calls demo cratic peace or peace by satisfa ction.
Rawls holds that when all peoples become well-o rdered, the society of peoples will
achieve the status of "peace by satisf acti on," under which condition all the liberal
societies will be sati sf ied for the right reason and true peace will reign. A liberal people is
satisfi ed because it is regulated by the principles of justice and because it gains its
se lf-re spect in its members ' collec tive achievement in just institu tions and its political
culture. These princ iples "speci fy basic rights, liberties, and opportuni ties, and assign to
these fr eedoms a priority", and they also aim at preventing excess ive "social and
economic inequali ties." (Rawls, 1999b, p. 49) Under these principles, all the incentives
(such as striving for more territory, power, glory or for the religious conversion of other
societies) which have historically motiva ted nation-states to go to war, would be removed,
and the well-ordered soci eties would not fight against each other unless for the purp ose of
se lf -defense or for the protection of basic human rights .
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It is for this reason that a liberal socie ty has a moral character which makes it
different fr om a state in a traditional sense. To say a liberal society has a moral character
is to say that a people will offer fair terms of coop eration to other peoples, and will honor
these terms given that other peoples do so as well (Rawls, 1999b, p. 25). This is why
Rawls insists that just peoples are not moved solely by their prudent or ra tional inte rests,
but behave according to the reasonable pri nciples of the Law of Peoples. In the case
where a liberal society may promote its own ra tional interests by taking advantage of
other societies, it would not choose to do it. Rawls disting uishes peoples fr om states in
the passage below,
What disting uishes peoples from states-and this is crucial-is that just
peoples are fu lly prepared to grant the very same proper respect and
recognition to other peoples as equals ... .It is, theref ore, part of a people's
being reasonable and rational that they are ready to offer to other peoples
fa ir terms of political and social cooperation. These fair terms are those
that a people sincerely believes other equal peoples might accept also; and
should they do so, a people will honor the terms it has proposed even in
those cases where reciprocity applies to the Law of Peoples in the same
way it does to the principles of justice for a constituti onal regime. (Rawls,
1999b, p. 35)
For this moral sense of justice, liberal societies are not likely to be willing to go to
war with each other or with other societies unless it is either for the pur pose of
se lf -defense or for that of def ending human righ ts. This is not merely an assumption of
what a liberal and democratic society should be like. This is also a description of how
such a socie ty is disposed to behave after genera tions of moral education. In A Theor y of
Justice, Rawls describes a process of moral education through which citizens of a liberal
socie ty may develop a stable sense of justice- they are willing to abide by the principles
of justice out of sinc erity because they recognize the fact that these princip les are
mutually advant ageous (Rawls, 1971 & 1999a, Chpater VIII). The society consisting of
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Chapter 1 Introduction
these individual members does not have a sep arate volition or agenda except to
appropriate ly maintain the just political and social institu tions in line with the princip les
of justice, and this goal should be the primary concern of the society's fo reign policies.
For this reason, there is no reason for the individual members or the government of the
soci ety, which serves as the agent of interests of individual s, to be violent externally
unless this primary concern is in danger.
Nonliberal Societies
However, to maintain democratic peace, a liberal socie ty should also carefully
consider what appropria te attitu des it should take towards nonliberal societies. Since a
peac eful global environment is crucial for a liberal socie ty, does this means that a liberal
socie ty should indiscriminately tolerate nonliberal societies simply to avoid any
possibili ty of war or other types of conflict? Or, to the con trary, since Rawls shows that
liberal societies, due to their liberal political institu tions and political culture, have the
innate desire to maintain peacef ul relationships with one another, does it mean that liberal
societies, while maintaining peace with one another, should commit themselves to
changing nonliberal soci eties and making them become liberal using all neces sary means
before considering treating them as equals? To Rawls, neither of these two proposals is
appropria te.
While democratic peace is a fun damental concern for a liberal and just society in its
relations with other societies, it does not mean that Rawls considers it to be permissible
or required to indiscriminately toler ate practi ces of other societies just for the sake of
stabil ity. Nor does Rawls deem it obviously just to disregard the right of
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Chapter 1 Introduction
se lf -determination of all non-liberal societies and fo rce them to reform so that a more
stable global soci ety could be maintai ned.
Rather, Rawls caref ully distinguishes between fo ur typ es of societies: decent
societies, outlaw societies, burd ened societies and societies that are benevolent
absolutisms. He argues that among all nonliberal societies only decent peoples can be
included as equal members in the global soci ety. Ifthere are nonliberal soci eties that are
satisfied fo r the right reason, they may tend to be as peacef ul as liberal societies. These
societies should be respected as equal players as liberal societies and they should be
allowed to contribute to a stable democratic peace or peace by satisfaction in the global
soci ety.
Decent Societies
Decent soci eties are not aggre ssive and do not engage in war except for the pur pose
of self-def ense. A decent society respects basic human rights and ensures that every
member of the soci ety has a substantial role in political decision making that affe cts
everyone through such institu tions as the consultation hierarchy to. A Consultati on
hierarchy guarantees each member substantial political participation because it ensures
that every member of the soci ety participates in at least one association or group and
every associa tion or group is represented by a repres entative body whose opinions are
carefully considered. Even the opinions of dissen ters are openly presented. Not only are
opinions of different groups represented, when some suggestions are re jec ted, officials
and judges offer sincere and conscientious expla nations and fu rther reasonable appeals
are allowed. A decent society allows everyone substantial, though not equal political
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Chapter 1 Introduction
participation because it views individuals as agents who are able to recognize and act
upon duties. It also has the sufficient material means to ensure that every member of the
socie ty has the all-pur pose means to take advantage of her civic rights and liberties.
These all-pur pose means include the possibi lity of changing the society through the
collective efforts of people. In the history of a decent socie ty, reforms in various aspects
of social and political life have been made in the past, and it is possible that fu rther
reforms may be made when members consider it to be necessa ry and they collec tively
push the society to develop in the corresponding directi on. Due to all these fe ature s,
Rawls considers decent soci eties to be satisfied for the right reason and hence an equal
"h
4
party to coope rate w1t .
The Exclusion of other Nonli beral Societies fr om the Society of Peoples
It should be clea r by now why Rawls is willing to grand equal status to all
well-ordered societies, including liberal and decent peoples. Due to their inner
well-orderedness and satisf action, liberal and decent peoples tend to be stably
non-aggressive and willing to coop erate based on mutually agreeable rules when others
are willing to do the same. Thus, liberal and decent societies are more likely to contribute
to the prolonged and stable peace of the global socie ty and maintain peace for the right
reason. Unless they become aggressive, at which point, they are merely outlaw societies,
they should treat each other as equals.
Although decent peoples are eligible for equal membership in the Society of
Peoples, other typ es of nonliberal societies are not gran ted this status. In this section, I
will analyze the fe atures of different typ es of societies, and explain what contributes to
4 Walter Riker has a very detailed explanation why a decent society is satisfied. See Riker, 2009.
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Chapter 1 Introduction
Rawls's insistence that only liberal and decent soci eties are "f ull members in good
standing of the society of well-o rdered peoples" (Rawls, 1999b, p. 93).
Outlaw Societies
The second form of nonliberal society that Rawls consideres is the outlaw societies.
Outlaw societies are willing to go to war with any society as long as doing so will
advance their ra tional in terests . The aggre ssive and violent nature of the se soci eties may
be the consequence of a lack of well-ordered political and social institu tions, a lack of
sufficient ma terial means to support these institu tions or the combination of these and
other insuff iciencies. Correspondi ngly, these soci eties often times fa il to recognize their
members as moral agents, neglect or viola te human rights, or fa il to provide individuals
with sufficient means to take advantage of liberties and rights (if these societies allow
any). In societies like the se, the will of the socie ty is in the hands of aristocrats or
whoever has the absolute power over others, and these individuals in charge, who are
willing to rule by pure coercion, are often times motiva ted only by their own rational
in terests. The society's powerless majority, on the other hand, is denied a meaningf ul role
in political decision making either due to the lack of constitutional guarantee or due to the
lack of material means. Such soci eties are unstable both domestically and interna tionally
since neither the soci eties nor their members are satisfied .
Burdened Societies
Burdened societies are not aggre ssive or warlike. However, they "lack the political
and cultural tradi tions, the human capital and know-how, and, often, the material and
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Chapter 1 Introduction
technological resources needed to be well-ordered" (Rawls, 1999b, p. 106). Due to the
fact that the society is in economica lly unfavora ble conditions, neither the society nor its
members are likely to be sati sfied. Without the appropriate political culture which
cultivates members ofthe society to value fair terms of coop era tion for their own sake,
burdened socie ties can easily become aggre ssive and outlaw when its economic strength
is strengt hened.
Benevolent Absolutist Societies
Lastly, societies that are benevolent absolutisms are societies that honor most
human rights . However, these soci eties are not well-o rdered and thus do not en joy the
equal membership because they deny their members a meaningf ul role in making
political decisions. These soci eties are also non-aggressive and non-expansionist. These
societies are self -sustainab le at least ma terially spea king. They arrange their political
institutions in such a way that they respect some basic human rights but deny members an
active role in political aff airs, probably beca use the ruling class or the elites of the socie ty
have the idea that the maj ority of the members in the society are not capable of fu lf illing
moral du ties and hence are not moral agents . It is also possible that these societies are
reluctant to allow members to participate in political aff airs substantially because both the
rulers and other socie ty members are unfam iliar with the idea of moral equality of all
individ uals. Whatever the reason is, due to the benevolence of the rulers, the members of
the society remain loyal to the society and do not aspire to change the society in any
particular direction. Due to the fact that a benevolent absolutism "is nonaggre ssive" and
that it "honors human rights" (Rawls, 1999b, p. 92).
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Chapter 1 Introduction
However, this does not mean that this internal harmony and peace is stable. On the
con trary, given that the na tions in the world nowadays are highly interactive, it is
plausible to assume that, through all the cultural, commercial and political in teractions
and exchange of informati on between individuals as well as between nati ons, members of
these benevolent absolutism society would be unlikely to remain ignorant of these more
developed ideas. At one point, members may be satisfied due to the benevolence of the
government or the ruler. However, in the long run, they are likely to become more and
more unsatisfied and demand changes in their socia l and political institu tions, once they
see that the well-ordered fo rms of a political socie ty are adopted by more and more
societies. When these people decide to change and become more decent or liberal, they
may find that they lack the necessa ry means to reform the soci ety. If the rulers determine
to maintain the existing way of ruling the socie ty and ref use any changes, they have to
rule by pure coercion in order to suppress members' demands and opinions. In cases like
this, societies that are benevolent absolutisms fa ll all into the category of outlaw societies.
For these reasons, a socie ty that is benevolent absolutism cannot be a stably peac eful
socie ty given that individual members are either completely unsatisfied or are satisfied
for the wrong reason (which makes it only fr agile but not robust satisfac tion).
Methodology and Principles
We ll-ordered liberal and decent societies so characteriz ed are willing to propose and
fo llow fair terms of cooper ation that can be agreed on by each other as fr ee and equal
societies and to stabilize the global society as a fa ir system of coop era tion among them
over time from one generation to the next. Here Rawls uses his contractarian method,
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Chapter 1 Introduction
''the original posi tion", again to ensure that each liberal society's fr ee and equal's status
in seeking to making a con tract with one another.
In Rawls's domestic theory of justice, his aims to answer the question: what are the
fa ir terms of coop eration among members of a society so that this society is a fa ir system
of coop eration between the se members over time fr om one generation to the next? He
continues the liberal and democratic social con tract tradi tions of Locke, Rousseau and
Kant and uses a contractarian fr amework- the original posi tion-to conclude that a just
socie ty should fo llow his two princ iples of justice. To extend the model of the original
position to cover the global society and interna tional rela tions, Rawls ap plies it twice on
the global level. First the original position is applied for liberal societies. Only after its
first application on the global level, during which stage the principles of Law of Peoples
are sele cted, is it app lied to decent peoples. The purp ose of this second application on the
global level is to show that decent peoples will agree on the principles selected by liberal
peoples.
This two-stage application of original position on the Law of Peoples level is often
neglected by almost all philosophers who write on Rawl s's international theory, both
opponents and proponen ts. It has been overl ooked that the original position is used twice
on the international level with different repre sen tatives and that parties representing
liberal peoples have different responsibilities than parties representing decent peoples.
The first application of interna tional original position is for represen tatives of liberal
societies only. It was in this app lication that the terms ofthe Law of Peoples are
determin ed. Represen tatives of decent peoples, however, only appear in the second
application of the international original position and their task is to determine that they
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Chapter 1 Introduction
accept and confirm "the same Law of Peoples that the parties representing liberal
societies adopt" (Rawls, 1999b, p. 64). Part of the reason that decent societies are trea ted
as equals is that they honor the same set of principles regarding interna tional relations as
liberal societies do. The neglect of this two-stage application of the original position may
be the reason why many cosmopolitans have the wrong impre ssion that the principles of
the Law of Peoples are selected with the intention to accommo date decent peoples.
Rawls lets parties in the first interna tional original position represent liberal peoples.
Similar to the parties in the domestic original position, the parti es in the international
original position reason fr om behind a veil of ignora nce, which deprives parti es particular
inf ormation about the societies they represen t-"they do not know the extent of their
natural resourc es, or the level of their economic development, or other such inform ation"
(Rawls, 1999b, p. 33). From such a device, Rawls says that liberal societies will agree on
a set of principles regulating their mutual relations "took fr om the history and usages of
international law and practi ce" (Rawls, 1999b, p. 57) so that they can enjoy the fair
system of coop eration with each other.
After showing that liberal soci eties will achieve mutual agreement on the fa ir
principles of international rela tions, Rawls applies the device of original position at the
global level a second time. This time the original position is composed of parti es
representing decent societies, and it shows that decent societies will also accept these
principles to protect their ra tional in terests.
For the pur pose of clarificati on, I will list these princ iples below:
1. Peoples are fr ee and independent, and their fr eedom and independence are to be
respected by other peoples.
2. Peoples are to observe trea ties and underta kings .
3. Peoples are equal and are parties to the agreements that bind them.
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Chapter 1 Introduction
4. Peoples are to observe a duty of non-in terventi on.
5. Peoples have the right of self -def ense but no right to instigate war for reasons
other than self-def ense.
6. Peoples are to honor human righ ts.
7. Peoples are to observe certain specified restrictions in conducting war.
8. Peoples have a duty to assist other peoples living under unfavorable conditions
that prevent their having a just or decent political and social regime. (Rawls,
1999b, p. 37)
Division of Chapters
To reply to the cosmopolitan objections mentioned at the beginning of this chapter,
I will first defend Ra wls's design of international original position and explain why
preserving the independence and autonomy of a well-ordered socie ty is consi stent with
protecting the interests of all individual s. I argue that both of Rawls's theories aim at
protecting one fu ndamental interest of individuals-one 's sense of worth or self -respect.
One's sense of worth or se lf-re spect, according to Rawls, includes one's capacity to
conceive her conception of the good or a meaningf ul life plan and her capacity to pursue
it. In other words, this sense of worth comes fr om one's capacity and ability to exercise
her moral agency and autonomy. This is of fu ndamental in terest because without it
individuals may easily find their lives to be meaningl ess or dull to live. I will show that
both well-ordered liberal and decent societies provide social bases of se lf-re spect and
support individual s' autonomy, although to different degrees. When an individual
member of a soci ety has minimal autonomy, others should not deny their ability to make
ra tional choices for themselves both individually and colle ctively. Individua ls' collec tive
achievements in a society (including its political institu tions) based on their colle ctive
choices is partly fr om which one's sense of worth comes-one's pride and honor over
these achievements or what in Rawls terms a proper patriotism constitutes one's sense of
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Chapter 1 Introduction
worth. These collective achievements are , in this sense, valuab le in themselves. Thus, in a
global socie ty, the right to independence and autonomy of a well-o rdered socie ty is the
most fu ndamental interest of an individual, for the violation of this right is the viola tion
of the fun damental interest of an individual member in her sense of worth. This is the
main argument in Chapter 2.
However, this explains only partly why Rawls considers a decent but nonliberal
socie ty to be worth tolerating, according to cosmopolitans, since Rawls justifies the
toleration based on a decent society's respect of Rawls's narrow list of human rights
5
In Chapter 3, I argue that this is a misunderstanding of Rawls theory of human righ ts.
Instead of being a justification for the legitimacy of decent societies, Rawls's list of
human rights is the overlapping consensus of all well-ordered societies, both liberal and
decent, on the basic interests necessa ry for all kinds of good human lif e. For Rawls, the
most fu ndamental interest that needs to be guaranteed for any form of good human life is
a minimal degree of autonomy-the absence of unmediated political coercion. Without
this minimal degree of autonomy, it is highly unlikely that individuals can develop the
capacity to conceive a conception of the good and the ability to pursue it. Any condition
that would constrain political power and political coercion should be considered an
interest universal to any form of good human life . If it is agreed that basic human rights
are a distinctive set of rights and what disting uishes them fr om other rights is that they
are particularly used to limit the internal legitimacy of a regime and constrain a society's
political power, the rights that would only guarantee a particular kind of good human
life-the life as a citizen of a liberal and democratic socie ty-should not be included.
5 Rawls's list of human rights include the right to basic subsistence and security, freedom from slavery and
serfdom and sufficient liberty of conscience (Rawls, 1999b, p. 65, 79).
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Chapter 1 Introduction
By showing that the independence and autonomy of well-o rdered soci eties should
be preserved and respected for protecting the fun damental interest of individuals in their
sense of worth and moral agency , it is obvious that the basic structure of the global
socie ty would not and should not resemble that of a domestic soci ety-that is, there
would not and should not be a unified central political authority which would ensure the
implemen tation of Rawls's domestic princ iples of justice by coercive powers. In Chapter
4, I examine some arguments on that the basic structure of the global socie ty should
resemble that of a domestic well-o rdered socie ty and that the sovereign soci eties are not
worth preserving. According to Rawlsian cosmopolita ns, a principle of global distributive
justice (and global economic institu tions) would naturally fo llow had Rawls aba ndoned
his view that it is soci eties that primarily matter in the global society. In addition, they
argue that a world government would not be required to implement this principle. To
reply, I point out that Rawlsian cosmopoli tans should recognize that constructing
principles of global justice by strictly fo llowing Rawls's domestic model has some
implications for global institu tions. That is, global institu tions of distributive justice
presuppose the existence of such political global institu tions that grant equal liberties and
rights and fair opportuni ties to every individual in the world. In other words, a unified
global authority and a world government is presup posed. However, cosmopolitans could
rescue their position by accepting the world government view. I fu rther argue that this
view is implausible. This completes my defense of Rawls's view that the basic structure
of the society of peoples is different fr om a domestic socie ty and therefore we cannot
simply extend his domestic principles to the global socie ty.
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Chapter 1 Introduction
Showing that the basic structure of the society of peoples is different fr om that of a
domestic soci ety, however, does not automa tically show that Rawls's duty of assistance is
more plausible than a global distributive principle. Nor does it explain why the
fu ndamental interest of individuals in their sense of worth and moral agency naturally
lead to a duty of assistanc e, instead of a global distributive principle, as a principle of
interna tional rela tions. In Chapter 5, I will show why a duty of assistance is preferable to
a cosmopolitan global distributive princ iple. As has been argued, the fun damental interest
of individuals cannot be protected unless a society is able to maintain its well-ordered
liberal or decent political cultu re. A global diff erence principle would fo cus mainly on
continuously transferring wealth fr om better-off societies to worse-off ones. Such a
system of continuous wealth transfer has two limitat ions. On the one hand, it would
viola te the independence and autonomy of individual well-ordered societies. This is a
problem since we have shown that the right of independence and autonomy of
well-ordered societies should be supported for the sake of protection of their individual
members. On the other hand, even if we assume that one's socio-e conomic status in a
socie ty at least partly reflects her personal achievements, which is a source of one's sense
of worth, what ena bles one to make such achievements in the first place are her
opportunities to exercise her moral agency in conceiving a conception of the good and
pursuing it. In a well-ordered socie ty These opportunities are guaranteed by civic liberties
and righ ts. In this sense, the basic structure that ensures these civic liberties and rights is
more crucial to one's sense of worth than the accumulation of wealth. In contrast to a
principle of global distribu tion, the goal of which is to continuously transfer wealth, the
duty of assista nce, similar to the duty of just savings of a domestic socie ty, is me ant to
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Chapter 1 Introduction
help the burdened societies lay the material as well as cultural fo undation
6
for a just or a
decent basic structure of soci ety, so that the well-orderedness can be preserved over time.
Once the society is self -sustainable in maintaining its economic well-being and
preserving its well-o rdered political culture, this duty may cease to apply. Thus, a duty of
assistance is more consis tent with supporting the fun damental interest of individ uals.
6 Forms of assistance include the accumulation of"real capital" in all forms, ranging from monetary
wealth, net inv estment in machinery and other means of production to investment in learning and
education.
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Chapter 2 The Sense of Worth and the International Original Position
Olapter 2 The Sense of Worth and the International Original Position
Cosmopo litans like Thomas Pogge and Allen Buchanan have cri ticized Rawls's
Law of Peoples by claiming that by characterizing the parties as peoples rather than
individuals, Rawls fails to take the interests of individuals seriously, and he is therefore
inconsis tent with his domestic application of Justice as Fairne ss.
1
In this chapter, I argue
that this cri ticism is misplaced because what unifies the two applications is Rawls's
concern to support the conditions for the individual 's development of a sense of
se lf -worth. In the interna tional case, this sense is supported by others ' respect for their
proper patriot ism of peoples and their citiz ens. This proper patriotism is a sense of
attachment to their particular culture and society based on their pride in the achievements
members of the society have made collec tively. However, proper patriotism alone cannot
explain why individuals take self -determination to be their most fu ndamental interest in a
global society. A more important reason is that certain fo rms of political societies, i.e.,
well-ordered liberal and decent societies, respect individuals as moral agents and hence
can better support their sense of worth. This shows that Rawls 's design ofhis
interna tional original position is consi stent with his domestic theory of justice.
1 It should be notic ed that there can be two sorts of criticism on Rawls's theories for being inconsistent in
two different directions. One group of critics say that Rawls's international theory should look more like his
domestic theory and take individual interests to be primary. The other could argue that his domestic theory
should resemble his international theory more and attend more to the interests of associations. The so-ca lled
cosmopoli tans take the first path and their arguments are the focus of this chapter.
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Chapter 2 The Sense of Worth and the International Original Position
The Cosmopolitan Objection
Rawls takes The Law of Peoples as an extension of A Theor y of Justice, both of
which are based on the thought experiment of the original position, which is a
delib erative forum for rational deliberators--parties. In Rawls's domestic theory, the
interests of individual human beings are the only ones that count. In his international
theory, however, the interests of peoples, rather than the inte rests of individuals, are the
primary concern. Cosmopo lita ns, such as Pogge, ob ject that while the int erests of
individual human beings are the only ones that count in Rawls 's domestic theory, the
interests of individuals have been deprived of that priority within his interna tional theory.
In contrast, while in the domestic theory the interests of associa tions are only considered
as instrumentally valuab le, they seem to become the ultimate concern in his interna tional
theory. Pogge write s:
[I]n Rawls's domestic theory, the interests of collectives (associa tions) are
given no independent wei ght -- are considered only insof ar as persons
choose and iden tif y with them. In his interna tional theory, by contrast,
peoples are recognized as ultimate units of moral concern and .. .individuals
are not so recognized. In selec ting and justifying particular rules governing
state conduct, Rawls disregards the interests of persons by fo cusing
exclusively on the interest, attribu ted to each well- ordered people, "to
preserve [its] equality and independence" ... as a stable liberal or decent
socie ty. (Pogge, 2006, p. 211)
He argues that Rawls's design ofthe interna tional original position has undermined
the importance of the basic needs and interests of individu als. According to Pogge, Rawls,
in this international original position, takes well-o rdered peoples' in terests, such as
maintaining mutual equality and independence and keeping the society of peoples stable,
as more fu ndamental than other interests of individuals that are not shared collectively.
These collec tive interests are more fu ndamental in the sense that non-collec tive interests
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Chapter 2 The Sense of Worth and the International Original Position
of individuals are only valuab le once those interests of peoples such as stability equality
and independence are satisfi ed. However, Pogge arg ues, Rawls has overlooked the fa ct
that in terests of individuals include both collective ones and personal ones, and it is not
clear why only collec tive interests are taken into consi deration when we delib erate on the
principles regulating international relati ons. Thus, it is inappropriate for Rawls to neglect
those interests of individuals qua individuals, such as to avoid severe poverty and to
reduce the gap between the wealth held by poor and affluent societies. (Pogge, 2004, p.
1752)
Allen Buchanan has a similar ob jection to Rawls's international theory. He argues
that in terests of a people may not be able to reflect those of individual s. He worri es that,
in the same vein as Pogge, having parti es in the original position represent peoples
instead of persons will overlook and actually threaten the interests of individuals who
have been marg inaliz ed in the socie ty for their conception of good. As Buchanan write s,
To say that the parties represent peoples is, in eff ect, to ensure that
the fu ndamental princ iples of international law that will be chosen
reflect the interest ofthose who support the dominant or offi cial
conception of the good or of justice in the socie ty, and this may mean
that the inte rests of dissident individuals or minorit ies are utterly
disregarded. (Buchanan, 2000, p. 698)
Following Rawls, I will call this the cosmopoli tan obje ction. 2 Cosmopo litans,
theref ore, generally advocate taking into consideration all interests of individuals,
especia lly economic ones, and constructing a liberal Law of Peoples through an original
position that situates symmetri cally represen tatives of persons rather than repre sen ta tives
of peoples.
2 For further cosmopolitan critics ofRawls, see Ackerman 1994, Barry 1998, Beitz, 1994, 1999, 2000,
Buchanan 2000, Kuper 2000, Tan 1998, Tes6n 1995.
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However, this stra tegy is explicitly re je cted by Rawls. He argues that such an
approach would be intole rant of other types of poli tical cultures and conceptions of the
good, since it will af firm only a liberal democratic soci ety and its values, such as the
fr eedom and equality of individ uals. Rawls arg ues,
[The cosmop olitan approach] amounts to saying that all persons are to
have the equal liberal rights of citizens in a constituti onal democracy. On
this account, the fo reign polic y of a liberal people-which it is our
concern to elab orate -will be to act gradually to shape all not yet liberal
soci eties in a liberal direction, until eventually (in the ideal case) all
soci eties are liberal . But this fo reign policy simply assumes that only a
liberal democratic socie ty can be accepta ble. Without trying to work out a
reasonable liberal Law of Peoples, we cannot know that nonliberal
soci eties cannot be accepta ble. The possi bility of a global original position
does not show that, and we can't merely assume it. (Rawls, 1999b, pp.
82-83)
Beitz (2000) objects that such an argument simply avoids the question by changing
the topic. The question about the basis for choosing principles of interna tional conduct is
different fr om the question about toleration of nonliberal decent societies. The principle
of toler ation, which deter mines whether or to what extent nonliberal societies should be
toler ated by liberal ones, should be derived fr om a principle of international justice ra ther
than a prerequisite for it. That is, the theory of international justice should not presu ppose
that all forms of societies should be tolerated and respected. In this sense, the above
argument off ered by Rawls has inverted the relationship between these two the ories. His
idea that at least some fo rms of nonliberal societies should be tolerated is derived fr om
his international original position, where parties represent peoples not persons.
Nonethe less, this design of the international original position makes parties insensible to
some individua ls' int erests and presupposes the fr ee and equal status of peoples. In this
sense, this argument of Rawls's is circular.
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I shall arg ue, however, that the cosmopoli tan objec tion neglects the fa ct that Rawls
is concerned with a fu ndamental individual interest in both of his theor ies, and this
concern makes the two theories consis tent. This fun damental individual in terest is what
Rawls calls the "sense of worth" or the "se lf-re spect" of individu als.
My Strategy
In The Law of Peoples, Rawls does not provide a clear expla nation for why he
designs the interna tional original position in such a way that parti es in it represent
peoples rather than individual s. However, in the fa ce of cosmopolitan ob jec tions, such a
design stands in need of fu rther elaboration. In what fo llows, I will attempt to provide
such an ela boration and find a fu ndamental interest of individuals that unifies the
domestic and international original positions. One candidate is the sense of worth of
individ uals. In A Theor y of Justice, Rawls's has an explicit discussion of self-re spec
e
. A
discussion on se lf-re spect as such seems to be absent in The Law of Peo ples. However,
Rawls includes the citizens' collec tive self -respect as a people among the fu ndamental
interests of peoples. He also argues that "a certain proper pride and sense of honor",
which he calls a pro per patrioti sm, should be allowed and respected. These seem to
consti tute his reason for the design of the interna tional original position. My pur pose here
is to examine Rawls's account of self- respect and examine how it can be connected to a
pro per patriotism. This connection is the key to solve the problem of inconsistency in the
primary concern in Rawl s's domestic and interna tional theories.
3 For Rawls's discussion of self-respect, see A Theory of Justice, § 67 "Self -Respect, Excellences, and
Shame." Some philosophers argue that Rawls has used the wrong term because he actually means
self-esteem in his discussions of self-respect. I use "self-respect" and "self-esteem", following Rawls,
interchangeably, unle ss otherwise noted.
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What is the Sense of Worth
Before we see how this sense of self- respect unifies his two theorie s, we need to
review Rawls's account of se lf-r espect. One may ask why he takes the sense of worth to
be a fu ndamental interest of individual s. According to Rawls, self-respect is essential to
one's well-being. He writes that:
When we fe el that our plans are of little value, we cannot pursue them
with pleasure or take delig ht in their exec uti on. Nor plagued by fa ilure and
se lf -doubt can we continue in our endeavors .... Without [self-respect]
nothing may seem worth doing, or if some things have value for us, we
lack the will to strive for them. All desire and activity becomes empty and
vain, and we sink into apathy and cynicism. Theref ore the patiies in the
original position would wish to avoid at almost any cost the social
conditions that undermine self -respect. (Rawls, 1971, p.440; 1999a, p.
386)
What is self- respect? In A Theor y of Justice, Rawls defines self -re spect as including
(1) a person's sense of his own value, his secure conviction that his conception ofthe
good, his plan of life, is worth carrying out, and (2) a confidence in his ability, so far as it
is within his own power, to fu lfill his conception of the good. (Rawls, 1971, p.440; 1999a,
p. 386) According to Rawls, the content of one's conception ofthe good or life plan,
satisfi es the Aristotelian principle that "other things equal, human beings en joy the
exercise of their realized capacit ies, and this enj oyment increases the more the capacity is
realized, or the greater its complexit y." (Rawls, 1971, p.426; 1999a, p. 374) Based on
our past success at learning things and experiencing the enj oyments of current activiti es,
we expect greater sati sf acti on by learning and exercising more capaciti es, espec ially
those more complex ones. Nonet heless, this does not mean that the complexity is to be
understood in an absolute sense because, as Rawls points out, what is complex for one
person may not be for another (Rawls, 1971, pp.441 -442; 1999a, pp. 387-388). Nor
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should or will complexity be the same for everyone, since different people have diff erent
conceptions of the good, and even when they hold the same one, they are different in
their talents and their skill sets.
Self -respect and Social Unions
One's self- respect defined as such can only be achieved within associa tions or what
Rawls calls "social unions. '4 Social unions are fo rmed by a group of people who pursue
the same conception of the good or who share other common ends in their lives.
Examp les of social unions include the family, the school, the neighborhood, and the
nation as a whole.
A social union has several characteristic features. First, members of a social union
share certain aff ection ties. That is, a mere union of individuals is not a social union
unless it "f used with elements of aff ection and fr iendship" (Rawls, 1971, p. 525; 1999a, p.
460). Second, this tie exists because members share a final end with each other and
pursue it through "accepted ways of ad van ding it which allow for the public reconition of
the attainments of every one" (Rawls, 1971, p. 526; 1999a, p. 46 1).
Rawls claims that social unions are neces sary for one to develop a sense of worth.
This is so for three reasons.
First, one's pursuit of her conception ofthe good is supported by social unions
beca use she can improve her ability by learning fr om othe rs. There are various ways of
life and conceptions ofthe good, such as fa mily , fr iendship, science, art, "religion and
culture of all kinds" (Rawls, 1971, p. 526; 1999 a, p. 461), which we value and are willing
4 To illustrate the nature of unions, Rawls cites an example of orchestra, in which "persons need one
another since it is only in acti ve cooperation with others that one's powers reach fr uition. Only in a social
union is the individual complete ." (Rawls, 1971, pp.524-5; 1999a, p. 460, n.4).
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to engage in for their own sake . In the course of pursuing them, we develop and elici t the
required capacit ies. Correspondi ngly, there are vari ous kinds of social unions. People
who hold and want to pursue the same conception of the good share a common end of
maintaining the corresponding social union and making "the excellences and enj oyments
of each complementary to the good of all" through "an agreed scheme of conduct"
(Rawls, 1971, p. 526; 1999 a, p. 46 1). By way of an agreed or established scheme of
conduct, whatever it is, persons are able to learn from one another's efforts and en joy
their con tributi ons to the way of life they engage in together.
Second, one can develop her confidence and strenghthen it when her associa tes
show her respect. Through the process of learning fr om each other, one's abilities are
developed and one's confidence is strengt hened. Respect shown by others influ ences
one's se lf-re spect in at least two ways: One maintains the conviction that her endeavors
are worthwh ile only when they are appreciated by her associa tes, and she fe els that her
ends are worth advanc ing only when they are confirmed and respected by others in the
community. In this sense, a necessa ry condition for having self-re spect is to make
avai lable for each person at least one community or associa tion of shared interests with
others to which she belongs and where she finds her endeavors confirmed by her
associates.
Third, some skills or talents of individuals (such as playing in an orchestra, or a
team sport) can only be exercised colle ctively , and the social union is ess ential
to this aspect of an individ ual's se lf -worth. This can be seen in what Rawls calls ''the
character of sociability". Human beings tend to associa te with others not merely because
various associa tions are instrumentally valuable as suggested above . Rather, human
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beings have a social nature in the sense that "human beings have in fact shared final ends
and they value their common institu tions and activiti es as good in themselves." (Rawls,
1971, p.522; 1999a, p. 458) This is especially true for those social unions that require
coop eration between members. To use Rawls's own examples again, an orchestra and a
game are both desirable in themselves for the individuals who participate in them. To join
these common activities and make participation in them good experiences is a final
common end that unites the individuals together. Through the common activi ties with one
another, participants collec tively develop the terms of coope ration so that they are
en joyable to all. These terms of cooper ation themselves are deemed as achievements in
participa nts' capacity for coop erating with others in an en joyable and succes sful play of
an orchestral piece or a game.
Political Society as a Social Union
From the discussion above on the last aspect of the necessi ty of social unions for
one's self -re spect, we can see that collec tive achievements, espec ially those in the
development of coop erative systems with one another, which individuals belonging to the
same group accomplish together, at least partly contribute to one's sense of worth. This
partly explains the sense of na tionality and patriotic sentiment that members of a society
usually share . That is, the cultural, economic and political achievements of a society are
all considered by its members to be something that they can properly take pride and
honor in, given that these achievements are something that they collec tively inherit fr om
their common ancestors and develop to a higher level in their own hands. These
collective achievements give rise to what John Stuart Mill calls "common sympathies
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which stem fr om language as well as the senses of belonging and destiny shared by all
members" (Rawls, 1999b, p. 23, n. 17). These common sympath ies make citizens in a
socie ty "cooperate with each other more willingly than with other people, desire to be
under the same government, and desire that it should be governed by themselves, or a
portion ofthemselves, exclusively." (Rawls, 1999b, p. 23, n. 17) Though there could be
various sources ofthese "common sympathies", Mill arg ues, and Rawls agrees, the most
signi ficant ones include "[an] identity of political anteced ents ; the possession of national
histo ry, and conse quent community of recollec tions; collective pride and humiliation,
pleasure and regret, connected with the same incidents in the past." (Rawls, 1999b, p. 23,
n. 17) That is, it is natural for peoples to have a "proper pride and sense of honor in their
history and achievements" (Rawls, 1999b, p. 44, p. 62), on which one's sense of worth is
partly fo unded.
Because of their political achievements, certain political societies may be called
social unions. A political society that is not regulated by pure coercion but is built as
certain kind of coop erative system is a common activity that all members play a role in.
A society ruled by pure coercion does not allow its members to play any active role in
political par ticipation. Rather, they are merely expected and permitted passively to obey
orders.
In contrast, in a political socie ty, individual members share a sense of nationality
not merely beca use they are born into the society by accident. Nor is the shared language,
history, culture and tradi tions the most fu ndamental reason that they want to stick
together and remain in a unified soci ety. A socie ty cannot be stably unifi ed if a large
population of it remains unsati sfied because their legitimate requests and interests are
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ignored or violently suppre ssed. In serious cases of oppression like this, demands for
changes will build up and will eventually break out, normally in violent fo rms. In such
cases, pride and honor in the cultural (and maybe economic) achievements alone would
not be able to retain members' loyalty and attachment to the society.
In this sense, what most eff ectively strengthens the sense of na tionality among
citizens of any socie ty is its political culture and improvements in its way of organizing
the society. If members see the society as being able to sati sf y their legitimate demands
or they view society as being capable of changes in this direction, it is usually the case
that citizens are more reluctant to appeal to violent fo rms of disobedience as compared
with the case where they see no such hope.
The members of the socie ty have the fe eling that achievements in the political
culture and institu tions of their political society belongs exclusively to them as a
collective beca use it is a result of their trials collectively carri ed out fr om their ancestors
to themselves. In this sense, a socie ty may be considered as a social union itself. These
collective achievements give rise to what partly constitutes one's sense of worth-the
pride and honor for the soci ety that one is affi liated with.
Proper Patriotism
Although Rawls never makes the connection explici tly, this pride and honor in
collective soci al achievements is what Rawls calls in his The Law of Peoples "proper
patrioti sm." Proper patrioti sm, in Rawls's characterizati on, "is an attachment to one's
people and country, and a willingness to defend its legitimate claims while fu lly
respecting the legitimate claims of other peoples." (Rawls, 1999b, p. 111) This sense of
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proper patri otism, including the pride and honor for their collective achievements,
presumably would be hurt if the autonomy and independence of the society were not
respected by others . For this reason, in their negotiation with others concerning
international relations among societies, members consider the independence and
autonomy of their soci eties to be a fu ndamental interest that needs to be secured in order
to secure other fu ndamental interests.
Others ' respect of a society is also important because it is, in most cases, crucial for
a stable domestic order, which is necessa ry for the existence and flourishing of various
social unions, within which individuals develop their sense of worth. Thus, the
development of one's sense of worth requires others ' respect and recognition in the
global society. Without others' respect and recognition, the very existence of the socie ty
may be constantly threatened, and this threat would hinder all sorts of valuable human
activi ties. When the independence and autonomy of the society is endangered, its laws
may not be eff ective in regulating the society beca use the enf orcement of these laws
could be interru pted, challenged or nullif ied. It is in this sense that preserving the moral
status of peoples is consistent with protecting fun damental individual s' interests such as
their sense of worth.
One may ob ject that a sense of worth is quite different fr om a proper pat riotism,
given that the latter is mainly a sense of lo yalty. Since Rawls himself defines proper
patriotism mainly as a sense of "attachment," it is not clear how this sense of loyalty and
"attachment" would be related to one's sense of worth.
This objection is plausible only under the assumption that proper pat riotic
sentiments include nothing but a sense of loyalty. However, our analysis above of proper
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patriotism should be sufficient to show that it is not merely a sense of lo yalty, if it
includes loyalty at all. Mostly , it is the sense of pride and honor over the achievements of
a society, due to which citizens fe el "attached" and are loyal to the political socie ty they
share. Pride and honor regarding their collec tive achievements should not be taken as
irrelevant to members' sense of worth. For example, when a soccer team wins a game,
individual players do fe el proud about the success of the whole team, because they are all
part of the team and they have all contributed to its success. Even though this is a
collective pride and honor for their collec tive success, each player does recognize this
pride and honor as part of her sense of worth in virtue of the capability to coope rate and
contribute, without which group success is impossible.
Cosmopo litans may claim, however, this is disanalagous to political society in the
sense that the political culture of a well-ordered liberal socie ty is largely inherited fr om
the previous generations rather than achieved by its contemporary citizens. Thus, for
contemporary citizens, the content of their proper patriot ism is more of the sense of
loyalty to this political society and its political tradition than the sense of pride and honor.
The reason is simple: it is not their efforts that lead to this political tradit ion and therefore
there is nothing to fe el proud and honored about.
This objection assumes that the role contemporary citizens play in a political
socie ty is entire ly passive. The grounds fo r this passiveness are that, more or less,
political tradition was not "created" in their own hands but by their ancestors. However, it
is hard to draw a line at which point the process of "creati on" ends. The continuous
existence of a political tradition relies on the continuous practi ces of citizens. Not only do
such practic es continue the political tradition, they also contribute to its development.
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Whenever contemporary citizens make the effort to maintain their political culture and
rej ect any alteration that may cause its decline, they have accomplished more than simply
passively inheriting the tradition. For example, it is not difficult to predict how citizens of
a well-o rdered liberal society would respond to someone 's attempts to change the
constitution and laws in order to recognize the superior status of a particular group or a
particular class. Such attempts would be considered by the majority of citizens to be a
huge lapse and a betrayal, and they are fierc ely ob jected to on this ground. Contemporary
citizens, on the other hand, also make contribu tions to the political culture in the form of
their daily political activiti es. All deliber ations and public conversations on public issues
and policy-making on a daily basis are forms of experiments and trials to improve a
socie ty so that citizens can lead a dignified and flourishing life. Even a citizen's daily life
cooper ating with others by obeying laws of this well-ordered socie ty, sitting on Juries,
paying taxes, and voting should be considered as an effort to maintain the political
tradition. All these fo rms of political participation are part of maintaining and developing
the political culture and political tradit ion. These active continuous efforts are worthy
of pride and honor simply for the reason that they are all part ofthe "creating" of the
political tradi tion.
Proper Patriotism and Self-determination
Proper patriotism does partly cons titute one's sense of worth. This is so beca use, as
I have arg ued, members in a socie ty take an active role in contributing to their collec tive
achievements. For this reason they rightly fe el proud and honored in achieving them. It is
this active participation and individual s' role of political and moral agency that gives
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them good reason for grounding their self-respect on the se collec tive achievements .
However, ifthe value of proper patri otism lies in the active role that individual members
play in common activiti es or public aff airs, a proper patri otism, as part of the sense of
worth of an individual member, may justify self- determina tion of the society only to the
extent that this society allows individual members' active roles in public aff airs,
especia lly in its political institu tions. That is, if Rawls considers an individual 's sense of
worth to be a fu ndamental individual in terest that should be protected in both domestic
and interna tional societies, this concern for self- respect of individuals does not
necessa rily imply that the society has a right to self -determination unless it is a
coop erative system that every member acti vely participates in.
Since a proper pat riotism of a people does not automa tically grant this people an
equal membership in the global society, nor does it automatically immunize it from all
sorts of interna tional interventi ons, Rawls needs to spec ify why, among the five types of
societies
5
in Rawls categoriza tion, only liberal and decent peoples are equal members in
the society of peoples. It is not obviously plausible for Rawls to hold that only
well-ordered liberal and decent societies but not the other typ es of societies have the right
to independence and autonomy. Unf ortunately, this selec tive membership is not
elaborated in sufficient detail to make it clear why only liberal and decent societies but
not the other fo rms of non-liberal societies are admitted to the society of peoples. This
position appears particularly inconsis tent with what Rawls delivered in his domestic
theory of justice since he seems to overlook the interests of members in decent socie ties,
5 (1) reasonable liberal peoples; (2) decent hierarchical peoples; (3) outlaw state s; ( 4) societies burdened by
unfavorable conditions; and (5) benevolent absolutisms (Rawls, 1999b, p. 4, 63, 92).
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given that these societies do not guarantee all liberal rights that members in liberal
societies en joy.
I will explain in the fo llowing sections that well-ordered liberal and decent societies
have a justifiable claim to independence and autonomy beca use these societies provide
proper conditions for an individual to develop her sense of worth. I will argue that only
liberal and decent soci eties are considered to be equal members because only they have
the political institutions that both only recognize and protect each member as a moral
agent. Such political institu tions are consistent with sustaining a sense of worth. This is
also the reason why members of these societies justifiably hold that the independence and
autonomy of their soci eties is the most fu ndamental interest they have in a global society
consisting of dif fe rent societies.
The Case ofWell-ordered Liberal Societies
In this section, I will first explain how a well-ordered liberal socie ty provides
proper conditions for moral agency and sense of worth of individu als. A liberal society
protects the sense of worth of members by its recognition that each individual is equal
beca use each is a moral agent who is capable of making her own reasonable and rational
decisions. Based on such a recognition, the political institu tions of a liberal society are
designed in such a way that these institu tions provide the social bases of one's
se lf-re spect in such a way that each individual 's equal status is guaranteed. These
political institutional constraints, in Rawls's terms, are "the social bases of self-respect",
which "are those aspects of basic institutions that are normally es sential if citizens are to
have a lively sense of their own worth as moral persons. " (Rawls, 1993, p. 309; 1999c, p.
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Chapter 2 The Sense of Worth and the International Original Position
31 4, p. 31 6; emphasis added) InA Theory of Justice, Rawls argues that the institutional
fact that citizens have equal basic liberties, the public recognition ofthis fa ct, and its
lexical priority over principles regarding distribution of income and wealth are among the
social basis of self -re spect.
In what sense do these conditions support one's sense of worth? One way to
understand it is that these conditions by themselves guarantee that each citizen actually
possesses the sense of worth. This, however, does not sound plausible, since it is not
plausible to argue that it is guaranteed that a mental state must exist given certain
conditions, nor should it be. According to an alternative interpreta tion, the role of the
social bases of self -re spect is not to guarantee the actual existence of a citizen's sense of
wmih; rather, the se social bases are conditions necessa ry for a warranted sense of worth
to exist. That is, social bases lay out the necessar y conditions and provide robust equal
opportunities for everyone to achieve a sense of worth, if they are reasonable and rational
and care to form it. Thus, the fun ction of the social bases of self-respect is to guarantee a
sense of equal worth qua citizens in the socie ty so that individuals could build upon it
other senses of worth by pursuing their goals. These social bases of self-re spect ensure a
healthy comparison between individuals-even if one is inferior to others in terms of her
achievements, she would not fe el that her equal status is undermined, so long there is
recognition of her equal share of basic rights and liberties by law and by other citizens.
Raised in such a well-o rdered liberal society, citizens must value these political
institutions if they truly cherish their sense of worth. I am not trying to argue that
individuals cannot develop a sense of self-worth without the protection of such liberal
political institu tions. It is conceivable that even individuals who belong to a lower class
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in a hierarchical socie ty, or even slaves or serfs, have a strong sense of worth. It is
implausible to argue that these individuals cannot possess any sense of worth whatsoever.
However, it is reasonable to assume that, in a well-ordered liberal socie ty, individuals
must have a more secure sense of worth, given their understanding that their equal status
with others may never be taken as trivial regar dless of their imperf ections in their
particular life pursuits . Without such profound institutional measures and the political
culture, which recognizes moral equal ity, one's confidence in her equal value as a human
being would be much easier to shatter, and her challenge against social in justice may be
silenced by her self -doubt before it is even fu lly fleshed out.
Citizens value the political institu tions of a well-ordered liberal socie ty for another
reason. Such a society affirms the equal status of every citizen by means of its
constitution and legislation. It also provides a political culture which educates citizens,
thereby equipping them with two highest order moral powers (a capacity to understand,
to apply and to act fr om the public conception of justice, and a capacity to form, to revise,
and ra tionally to pursue a conception of the good). That is, the political culture of a
well-ordered liberal society gives rise to a distinct kind of self- res pect as citiz ens. This
se lf-re spect as a citizens has two elements: ''the first element is our self-confidence as a
fu lly cooper ating member of society rooted in the development and exercise of the two
moral powers (and so as possessing an effe ctive sense of justice); the second element is
our secure sense of our own value rooted in the conviction that we can carry out a
worthwhi le plan of life" (Rawls, 1993, p. 31 9). That is, the self-respect of a citizen in a
well-ordered liberal society consists not only ofthe worth of one's conception ofthe
good and one's capacity to put it into pract ice, but also of one's capacity for being a fu lly
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cooper ating citizen. To use Michael Blake's words, the political institutions of a socie ty,
though coercive in nature, are necessa ry for one's autonomy:
Without some sort of state coercion, the very ability to autonomously
pursue our proj ects and plans seems impossible; settled rules of coercive
adjudication seem necessa ry for the settled expec ta tions without which
autonomy is denied. (Blake, 200 1, p. 25)
In other words, the political institu tions and constitutional regimes, on the one hand,
guarantee that everyone has the equal basic rights and equal liberties, and on the other
hand, secures certain necessa ry conditions for citizens to develop their capacities in
understanding and exercising these entitlements over their whole lif e as they so decide. It
is through this process of moral education that citizens become fu lly cooper ating
members of society. It is also through institu tions securing the equal basic rights, liberties
and fair opportuniti es that the exercises of doing justice to each other is ensured. In other
words, the existence of a liberal political society cultiva tes the idea that everyone has an
equal moral status, and it secures this idea with institu tional enf orcement mechani sms.
This idea is firmly grounded beca use in such a socie ty, members uphold the same
common end ofp olitical justice, that is, "the end of supportin gjust institu tions and giving
one another justice accordingly. " (Rawls, 200 1, p. 199) Not only do they share this
common end, they give highest priority to it rather than to their comprehensive doctri nes.
In this way, this shared final end fo rms part of citizens' iden tity (See Rawls, 2001, p. 199,
p. 200) and it is in this sense that it is ess ential to them.
Thus, taking citizens of well-ordered liberal societies as they are, we must admit
that one indispensible part of one's self- respect is related to being a citizen in those
political societies. Individual members value the political society and iden tify themselves
with it both because they were raised in such a political culture and, more importantly,
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beca use it is through the political society that they recognize themselves as cooper ating
members who are capable of choosing a valuable life and carrying it out, and they are
confident about it. In this sense, belonging to a the well-ordered liberal political society
stably maintains necessa ry social conditions for a citizen to develop a confident sense of
se lf -worth. It is implausible to insist that without the support of liberal political
institu tions, one cannot develop se lf-re spect and lead a lif e that she considers to be
meaningf ul and worthwh ile. Yet liberal political institu tions consis tently provide social
conditions that support the development of a sense of worth and reduce the chance that
one's self -re spect is easily shattered. It is on the basis of one's confidence in making
reasonable and worthwhile choices of lif e plans and conceptions of the good, which will
fu rther exercise her talents and capaciti es, that she is able to pursue her conceptions of the
good with no serious doubt. Without this confidence, one may be tra pped in a vicious
circle of constantly verif yi ng the value of her lif e.
The Case ofWell-ordered Decent Societies
In this section, I will explain how a decent society supports its members' sense of
worth and moral agency. Before we explain it, we need to know what a decent society is
6
.
A decent socie ty is defined as fo llows by Rawls:
[A] decent people must honor the laws of peace; its system of law must be
such as to respect human rights and to impose duti es and obligations on all
persons in its territory. Its system of law must fo llow a common good idea
of justice that takes into account what it sees as the fun damental interests
of everyone in society. And finally, there must be a sincere and not
unreasonable belief on the part of judges and other officials that the law is
indeed guided by a common good idea of justice. (Rawls, 1999b, p. 67)
6 Amore detailed analysis of decent societies will be provided in Chapter 3.
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In addition, all the members of the society, including religious and other minorities
have a sense of attachment to the society and they support the government. They have
such a sense because the basic structure of the socie ty treats everyone fa irly even though
they are not gran ted equal civic rights . The religious and other minorities are not
arbitrari ly discriminated against in the sense that they "are encouraged to have a
flourishing cultural life oftheir own and to take part in the civic culture ofthe wider
socie ty" (Rawls, 1999b, p. 76). A decent socie ty so characterized is not merely a system
of domination or fo rce. Rather, it is a system of coop erati on. It is in this sense that such a
polity is morally significant. One importa nt reason that such a society is a cooper ative
system is that the relationship between the ruler and the ruled is reciprocal although they
are not necessa rily recognized as equals. The national pursuits of the society are not
defined by the ruler's will. It is rather constrained by "a common good idea of justice"
and a decent consultation hierarchy. The common good idea of justice is defined as the
maximization of the pursuit of a common aim in a way that is consis tent with the
restrictions specified by the consultation hierarchy. A decent consultation hierarchy
guarantees that each member of the people belongs to a group and all groups are
consulted in making any political decisions. Participating in this way, individuals have a
meaningf ul role in political decision making, although not all of them participate directly.
This active and meaningful role is recognized and guaranteed by the legal system of
a decent society. The legal system is settled in such a way that basic human rights are
ensured and respected
7
. These basic human rights include:
the right to lif e (to the means of subsistence and security); to liberty (to
fr eedom fr om slavery, serfdom, and fo rced occupa tion, and to a suffi cient
7 Chapter 3 will be devoted to answering the question why Rawls's list of hum an rights is proper even
though it does not include some rights that are norm ally recognized as human rights.
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measure of liberty of conscience to ensure fr eedom of religion and
thought); to property (personal property); and to fo rmal equality as
expressed by the rules of natural justice (that is, that similar cases be
treated similarly). (Rawls, 1999b, p. 63)
These rights guarantee that each member of the society has physical integrity and
se curity when she engages in political activiti es. They also ensure that every member
en joys fo rmal equality and is not subject to arbitrary discrimination. For example, the se
rights ensure that political dissent can be fr eely expressed in what Rawls calls ''the
procedure of consultation," and peacef ul conversations between the officials and the
dissidents will be conducted if necessa ry. Individuals en joy rights as well as fu lfill
obligations defin ed by laws because they are deemed as being capable of moral learning
and having the capacity to recognize, understand, and act according to a common good
idea of justice, which aims at the good of all members. Members with such moral
capacities do not merely fo llow the rules and laws by fo rce. Rather, they are willing to
obey them because it is acceptable and mutually agreeable to all.
Thus, in a decent society, such a political culture that contains the recognition of
each individual as capable of developing their moral capacities may also serve as a basis
to support a sense of equality as human beings. Educated by such a political culture,
individuals recognize each other as equals beca use they possess similar potential moral
capaci ties. Instead of being led blindly by propaganda, members of a decent society have
the capacity to evaluate their society. Since every individual member has a chance to
exercise their moral capaciti es and plays a role in political life, each individual should be
deemed as also possessing the capacity to form together with others a path of
developmen t-through public deliberation-that is most suitab le to the society.
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Due to the capacity to make both personal choices and collec tive ones, members of
a decent society would be able to collec tively change political institu tions in such a way
that they are "more sensitive to the needs of the society's people and the many different
groups represented by legal bodies in the consultation hierarchy" (Rawls, 1999b, p. 76),
although at least some of these members only participate indirectly in the
decisio n-making process of consultation hierarchy. An individual 's role is more
prominently shown in the right to be a dissident. Although Rawls does not make it
explicit, such a consultation hierarchy presumably would allow a group of liberal
dissenters. When dissent of this kind is raised, a well-reasoned public conversation would
fo llow, which could possibly lead to a fu ndamental change in the basic structure of the
socie ty, moving it towards becoming liberal and democratic.
These characteristi cs of a decent society show that such a society is consistent with
respecting the moral and political agency of individu als. Such individuals are willing to
collectively form their own path of development. They also have the capaciti es to do so.
Only when they are allowed to remain in their own society can they exercise these
capaci ties. Given that members of the se soci eties are more fam iliar with their own
problems and interests than any outsider is, others should respect their collec tive choice
of staying in their own socie ty and improving it in their own way.
One thing that needs to be pointed out is that to grant a decent society equal
membership in the socie ty of peoples does not entail that it is internally just. Nor does it
entail that a decent society is morally justified in largely denying members the equality in
their rights and liberties. All it says is that individual members in a decent soci ety should
be allowed the oppo rtunity to exercise their autonomy collec tively in determining their
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shared fat e, provided that they are willing to remain in the society and they have the
corresponding moral capacities to make responsible decisions for themselves.
Conclusion
In this chapter, I explain why Rawls consider the independence and autonomy of
the society as the most fun damental interest of individuals in the global society. I argue
that given the proper patriotism members of a socie ty share, a society has a prima fac ie
right to self-determination and this right is in the best interest of members for the
protection oftheir sense of worth. This prima fa cie right to se lf- determination is not
warranted, however, if the soci ety does not allow a signific ant and active role of members
in the society. Since well-ordered soci eties have esta blished political institu tions that
support every member's active participation, though not to the same degree, proper
patriotism in these two societies should be allowed in order to protect the sense of worth
of individual members. Thus, the right to self- determina tion of well-ordered societies
should be protected and this is ultimately for the interests of individual s.
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Chapter 3 Human Rights and Toleration
Rawls's list of basic human rights is fo und by many to be unconventional and too
narrow. According to Rawls, human rights only include those "urgent rights"-the right
to life (to the means of subsistence and secu rity), the right to fr eedom fr om slavery,
ser fdom and forc ed occupation, the right to some degree of liberty of conscience, the
right to personal prope rty, and the right to fo rmal equality (See Rawls, 1999b, p. 65).
Rawls claims that the support of human rights should be a fixed concern of the fo reign
policies of liberal and decent societies, and these human rights play important roles in the
Law of Peoples. Among these roles, Rawls seems to suggest that respect for basic human
rights defines the minimal standard ofleg itimacy and the limits of toleration, and the
violation of them justifies international interventi on. Many cosmopolitan critics (e.g.,
Beitz 2000, Buchanan 2006, Cavallero 2003, Caney 2002, Tan 1998, 2006) argue that
Rawls needs to provide an explanation of why he excludes fr om his list some liberal
rights which are included in the conventional list of human righ ts. For example, Rawls's
list lacks some crucial items fr om the 1948 Universal Decla ration of Human Rights
(UDHR)
1
These omitted rights include the rights to fr eedom of expression and
associa tion (UDHR, arts. 19 and 20) and the right of democr atic political participation
(UDHR, art. 21 ).
These cosmopol itan criti cs are especia lly dissatisfied because they argue that Rawls
uses his list of basic human rights to justify the equal status of decent but nonliberal
1 For further inf ormation on the Univ ersal Declaration of Human Rights, please read Hunt 2007, Lauren
2011, Morsink 1999 and Moyn 2010. My thanks to Alison Renteln for bringing these sources to my
attention.
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societies in the society of peoples, and due to this equal membership, liberal societies
should toler ate and respect the independence and autonomy of decent societies even
though these decent societies do not respect all the liberal rights of individuals
domestically. As Beitz challenges, "[ a]t issue is whether, and if so why, decent but not
just societies should be regarded as legitima te and, theref ore, and qualifi ed for treatment
as 'members in good standing' ofthe international order" (Beitz, 2001, p. 275). What
makes Rawls's theory of human rights less plausible is that the list is narrowed down
merely to maintain the international order, beca use the more societies may accept it the
more stable this order is.
In this chapter, I will reco nstruct Rawls's argument for his list of basic human rights .
I will argue that this list is grounded on the liberal societies' toleration of and respect for
decent societies. I will show that a decent socie ty as Rawls defines it deserves equal
membership in the society of peoples due to its recognition and respect for the values of
individuals and its readine ss to change its way of organizing itself in order to better
reflect this recognition and respect. Another reason that a decent society deserves respect
is that liberal societies and their members should respect members of a decent society's
collective decisions to remain in their own society and to determine their own way of
development. Because decent soci eties are legitima te and equal members ofthe global
soci ety, the list of human rights should be construed based on the overlapping consensus
of all well-ordered societies including both liberal and decent societies. Thus, some
liberal rights that cannot be accepted by decent societies should not be included because
they could not be the object of an overlapping consensus of the society of peoples.
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I will then move to consider some cosmopolitan ob jec tions. The first one suggests
that Rawls's account of human rights and his toleration of decent soci eties seem to be
inter- dependent and hence circula r. The second one fo cuses on the meth odology of
deriving the list, and it suggests that Rawls is wrong in modeling interna tional
overlapping consensus after the liberal one since a decent society's re jec tion of liberal
rights cannot be "not unre asonable" due to its nonliberal nature. The third refers to the
consequence of the toleration that this list would bring about, name ly, the danger of
perpetuating in justice in those nonliberal societies. I will show that none of these
objections is plausible.
Human Rights in the UDHR and Human Rights Proper
Before I recons truct Rawls's argument for his list of human rights, I should first
clarity what human rights are . Human rights are the rights that all individuals have qua
human beings. The modern human rights doctrine and its contemporary pract ices can find
its origin in the_Universal Decla ration of Human Rights (UDHR) adopted by UN in 1948.
Although the doctrine is derived fr om the natural rights doctrine (Hart 1955), more and
more philosophers and human rights theorists argue that it should not be political and
institutional (Beitz 2001 & 2003, Cohen 2004, Nickel 2007, Pogge 2000, Scanlon 1979).
The doctrine of human rights is political in the sense that it should not be based on a
particular theory of human nature or that of the common humanity. It should rather have
an independent justifica ti on that can be accepted and supported by equally reasonable but
diverging theories. The doctrine should be institutional in the sense that it is not meant to
regulate interp ersonal relationships but to evaluate the political institu tions of a society in
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terms of their relationships with members of that society. The doctrine of human rights is
the set of standards that all states are expected to meet. These human rights are used for
different pur poses, including for determining the eligibility for development assistance
programs, for evaluating the fo reign policy of a society (such as the U.S. government),
and more importantly for justifying international political, economic or even military
sanctions of a society when neces sary (Be itz 2001). The quantifier of the last fu nction,
"when necessa ry," remains vague at this point and I will pick it up later.
As can be seen in the intention of drafting UDHR, the purp ose of the doctrine is not
to describe the ideal of political institutions but their "minimum standards" (Nickel 2007,
Scanlon 1979, Rawls 1999b). This minimalism is preferable particularly due to the last
fu nction of human rights mentioned above-to justif y interf ering with a society's internal
aff airs on the part of another society or some interna tional institu tions-since it shows
disrespect to independence and autonomy of a sovereign society and this requires strong
justificati on.
This fu nction of human rights is Rawls's main concern in his Law of Peoples. This
can be seen in Rawls's description about the fu nction of human rights-to "restrict the
justif ying reasons for war and its conduct" and to "spec ify limits to a regime's internal
autonomy" (Rawls, 1999b, p. 79). However, Rawls suggests that the UNHR is not
suitab le for this purp ose because it contains many social and political rights that would
preclude many societies, which may deserve the equal status fr om being equal members .
Instead, he claims that human rights are "a proper subset of the rights possessed by
citizens in a liberal constituti onal democratic regime, or of the rights of the members of a
decent hierarc hical socie ty" (Rawls, 199b, p. 81). That is, Rawl s's worry here is that
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many rights included in UNHR may not be "minimal standards" but rather "ideals" and
that it is not a justifiab le reason to deny certain soci eties respect just because they have
not met the ideal standards of a good and just socie ty. Rawls particularly emphasizes that
at least some types of nonliberal societies, i.e., decent societies, deserves respect and
equal membership, which would be denied if evaluated by UNHR. A minimalist account
of human rights, in contrast, would show the legitimacy of a decent society. Rawls claims
that such a minimalist account includes the fo llowing items:
Among human rights are the right to life (to means of subsistence and
secu rity); to liberty (to fr eedom fr om slavery, serfdom, and fo rced
occupation and to a suff icient measure of liberty of conscience to ensure
fr eedom of religion and thought); to property (personal property); and to
fo rmal equality as expressed by the rules of natural justice (that is, that
similar cases be trea ted similarly). (Rawls, 1999b, p. 65)
Many cosmopolitans claim that Rawls reluctance to accept all the rights in UDHR
(e.g., his exclusion of equal right to political parti cipation and equal liberty of conscience
fr om his list of human rights) and his willingness to include decent peoples in the Society
of Peoples shows that his argument is circular because it presupposes something that it is
supposed to determi ne. That is, Rawls's definition of human rights presupposes the
legitimacy of decent societies, but whether they are legitimate or not should be measured
by the standards of human rights.
This charge of circula rity can be easily answered if it can be shown that the
justifica tory fo rce of human rights for evaluating the internal legitimacy of a political
socie ty comes fr om an independent principle, such as what I call "a principle of the
minimal standard ofleg itimacy. " With such a principle, a decent society's equal
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membership
2
is determined before the content of human rights is worked out between all
the member soci eties, because the doctrine of human rights is part of the princ iples
regulating the interna tional relations between soci eties agreed upon by these members of
the society of peoples.
How should we determine the minimal standard of legitimacy of a political society?
It is obvious that if a sovereign political society rules solely by terror or military might, if
it enacts genocide policy towards a particular religious, ethnic or racial group, if it ref uses
to provide basic subsistence to the people, or if it enslaves the people and denies them
any form of decent human life, it cannot be legitimate . The intuitive idea behind it is that
a society that does not allow any form of decent or good human life cannot be legitimate .
A decent or good human life is important beca use our sense of worth relies on it.
The concept of the sense of worth has been discussed in Chapter 2, and it should not be
considered to be a value only for liberals or westerners. It is rather a fa ct of human
psychology that one would not deem her life to be me aningful unless she has a good in
her life that she considers to be worth pursuing and he is confident that she can pursue it.
A political society that lacks any social basis for a member to have this sense of worth
therefore undermines and violates a fu ndamental interest shared by all human beings.
So far we have argued that to protect the sense of worth of individuals, a society
must ensure some social basis so that any member is allowed to have a sense of worth,
due to which she considers her life to be me aningful and valua ble. If a socie ty allows its
members to pursue any conception of the good, it must offer some fre edoms,
opportunities and resources. In contrast, a socie ty run by pure coercion and unmediated
2 A society's equal membership in the global society entails that its right to self-determination and
autonomy should be respected unless it violates basic human rights or it is aggressive and threatens other
peacef ul societies.
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power denies the minimal standard of fr eedoms, opportuni ties or resources required for
any form of decent or good human lif e. The minimal thre shold of the se conditions need
to be met for individuals to have a sense of worth because, to use David Miller's words,
human beings "must have fr eedom to think and act, the opp ortunity to learn and to work,
the resources to fe ed and clothe themselves" (David Miller, 2004, p. 123).
This idea of minimal conditions for a meaningful human life may be cri ticized by
cultural relativists and cultural pluralists fo r its conscious or unconscious intention of
instilling western ideals, i.e., individuals as choosing agents, to those societies that lack
this idea. They may ask these quest ions: What if they do not value liberties and rights as
western liberals do? What if they prioritize the in terests of their societies over their
personal interests and willingly subj ect their judgments to the ruler or the government
about what to do in their public lives or even in their private lives? Can we legitimately
claim that these individuals do not have a sense of worth or that it is impossible for them
to have it? It is possible that, they may want to argue, the ability to choose for oneself and
the achievements one accomplishes as a result of these choices may not be the only
source of self -respect.
However, we do not have to agree on the picture of individuals as choosing agents
to agree that we cannot have a sense of pride of what we do if we are fo rced to do it
against our will. Even for those people who willingly stay in a tyra nnical regime, the
reason that they have a sense of worth, if they have it at all, is not that the source of this
sense of worth is different fr om that of most individuals in well-ordered societies. Rather,
they believe that they have a sense of worth beca use they consider remaining in such a
socie ty to be their volu ntary choice. Without such a perception of their voluntar iness and
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willingness, they must perceive their status quo as being fo rced, beca use either of these
two opposites must be true. When they are fo rced to do something that they are not
willing to, they cannot consider the life that they are living to be desirable, let alone
valuable. If an individual resents her lif e and remains in it only beca use of external
coercion, she would have the perception that her happi ness and inte rests are tri vializ ed by
others. If she is not respected by others in the socie ty and she lacks the internal power to
prove to herself that her life is valuab le, it is highly unlikely that she would perceive her
life in a posi tive way. On the con trary, a sense of worth and an understanding of one's life
as something meaningf ul are possible only ifthere is an interpretation avai lable to this
person which can provide a sense of willingness and voluntar iness. For example, a
woman in a Muslim socie ty that deprives women all the rights and liberti es may support
the regime if she believes that this is required by the Quran and this is how she as a
sincere Muslim should serve Allah. It is inconceivable, however, that she would
wholeheartedly support the regime even though all her liberties and rights are
undermined if she has the contrary belief system which does not give her a sense of
willingness or voluntari ness. It is in this sense that some degree of autonomy and the
ability to choose is essential to one's sense of worth and to any form of decent or good
human life
3
One may worry that the example above is an overstatement, and the argument
would legitimize societies run by pure coercion. However, all I have argued is that a
necessa ry condition for one to have a sense of life about her life is that she views her life
to be the result of her own choice, and this sense of control is crucial regardless of the
3 By "some degree of auto nomy and the ability to choose" I simply mean the absence of pure coercion and
the negation of absolutely no autonomy and the ability to choose.
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form of society that one lives in. I do not intend to argue that so long as it is possible for
one to have a sense of control of her life and develop a sense of worth, this possibili ty
automa tically justif y the form of society one lives in. An indecent and nonliberal society
by nature does not systematically provide social conditions for individuals to form and
develop their sense of worth. One's sense of worth is highly contingent upon whether the
conception of the good that an individual deems to be worth pursuing is the same one that
the political authority fo rced upon all members. Even for these individuals who willingly
choose to pursue a conception of the good that converges with the publicly enf orced one,
her sense of worth may easily be undermined once she has doubts about her conception
of the good and desires to revise it.
Now we may conclude that the minimal standard of a legitimate political society is
that it should not be ruled by pure coercion and unmediated power but rather allows its
members some degree of autonomy so that they can have the capacity to choose. With
this being said, we can move to investigate how Rawls uses this minimal standard of
legitimacy to determine that decent soci eties deserve equal membership in the society of
peoples and fu rther to construct a doctrine of human righ ts.
Rawls's Argument for Human Rights Proper
In this section, I will recons truct Rawls's argument for his unconventionally limited
list of human rights. I will argue that his list is derived fr om a political conception that is
the ob ject of an overlapping consensus of both liberal and decent nonliberal societies.
Such an overlapping consensus seems to unjustifiably assume that decent nonliberal
societies should be tolerated and admitt ed by liberal soci eties as equal members of
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socie ty of peoples. However, I will argue that liberal societies tolerate decent societies
beca use of their fe atures. It is due to those fea tures that decent but nonliberal societies
deserve respect fr om liberal societies and equal membership in the global society.
Rawls :S account of decency
Before we examine why decent societies deserve respect and equal membership, we
need to review Rawls's account of decency and understand what decent societies are.
According to Rawls, a decent society must satisf y these conditi ons:
(1) It does not pose dangers to other societies since it is not aggressive and it seeks to
obtain its legitimate interests through peac eful means.
(2) The society is regulated by a "common good idea" of justice which takes into
accou nt every member's fu ndamental intere sts.
(3) The society treats its members as having the capacity to participa te in social life
and to make responsible decisions. Due to this view of its members, the socie ty
has a system of law that not only secures civic rights, of which the list of basic
human rights is a subset, but also attributes moral duti es and obli ga tions to
members.
( 4) The dominant religious or philosophical comprehensive doctrine of the socie ty
"must admit a sufficient measure of liberty or conscience and fr eedom of religion
and thought" (Rawls, 1999b, p. 74)
(5) Judges and other off icials must have "a sincere and not unreasonable belief ...
that the law is indeed guided by a common good idea of justice" (Rawls, 1999b, p.
66).
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(6) The basic structure of the society must include a decent consultation hiera rchy,
which includes repres entative bodies representing groups in the society. Since
each member of the society must belong to a group, this decent consul tation
hierarchy allows everyone to participate in political life and hence gives "a
substantial political role to its members in making political decisions" (Rawls,
1999b, p. 64).
(7) Another fu nction of the decent consultation hierarchy is to provide a fo rum for
objections and dissent to political decisions. Dissent can be expr essed without fe ar
or loss of civic rights, and the government has the duty to explain how the policies
are made according to the common good conception of justice. With such
conversations between the government and the dissenters being conducted, the
society would reform in its basic structure. In this sense, the political culture of
the society is constantly developing and government policy-ma king procedure is
more sensitive to the interests of indivi duals. (See Rawls, 1999b, p. 72, p. 78)
(8) All the members of the socie ty, including religious and other minorities have a
sense of attachment to the socie ty, and for this reason they support the
government. They have such a sense because the basic structure of the socie ty
ensures every member substantial rights and liberties even though they are not
granted equal civic righ ts. For example, the religious and other minorities are not
arbitrari ly discriminated against in the sense that they "are encouraged to have a
flourishing cultural life of their own and to take part in the civic culture of the
wider socie ty" (Rawls, 1999b, p. 76).
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The last fe ature cau be seen fr om Ra wls's imagined example of a decent nonliberal
soci ety, Kazanistan. Some cosmopolitans object that this example has portrayed a very
benevolent and open-minded nonliberal socie ty, which does not seem to exhaust the
possible fo rms of soci eties that satisf y Rawl s's accou nt of decency. That is, these critics
argue, Ra wls's account of decency is compatible with those less internally tolerant and
more disc riminatory nonliberal regimes, which intu itively do not deserve respect and
equal status. However, if Rawls considers those more disc riminatory regimes to be
compatible with his account of decen cy, he should have considered these example as
decent societies, since examples like these are more common in our world than
Kazanistan. Thus, it is plausible to argue that Rawls does not intend to include those less
tolerant and more dis criminatory regimes in his category of decent peoples. In this sense,
his example of Kazanistan is a paradigm case of a decent society and a sup plemental
account of decency ra ther than merely an insta nce. With this supplemental account
clarified, it should be clear that Rawls's account of decent societies is a narrow account
that will include only those nonliberal societies that are highly tolerant and have obtained
public support by their toleranc e.
The moral grounds fo r tolerating decent societies
The last fe ature of a decent socie ty characteriz ed above shows that individual
members of a decent society must take remaining in their own socie ty and collectively
making decisions regarding how it should develop as a fu ndamental inte rest. In Chapter 2,
I argued that such a sense of attachment aud belonging to the decent socie ty that they live
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in is based on some moral grounds, which are implied by other feature s of decen t
societies.
On the one hand, a decent society so characte rized recognizes and sincerely respects
the worth of all human beings based on their ability to develop moral capacities through
moral educati on. This respect is not incompatible with regarding all members as equals.
By securing civic rights and imposing moral du ties and responsibilities, a decent society
ensures that it treats its members with the respect that is owed to a human being capable
of moral learning and of making ra tional decisions. A society with such a political culture
recognizes and values the worth of all human beings rega rdless of their religious belie fs,
gender, ethnic ity, and other morally arbitrary fa ctors. Not only does the government of
the society sincerely cherish the worth of all members, its political culture also cultivates
members in such a way that they recognize each other as equals in terms of possessing
similar potential moral capacit ies.
On the other hand, the political institut ions of decent societies are devised in such a
way that every individual member has a chance to exercise their moral capacities and to
play a role in political lif e. A decent society is not managed by pure coercion. When a
socie ty is regulated by pure coercion, its individual members would not play any role in
the political decisio n-making, and individuals would not have suff icient amount of rights
and liberties to pursue the conception of the good that they deem to be valua ble. the
coercive measures are mainly reserved for the enf orcement of the ruler's wills. There is
no way for the members' legitimate desires to be reflected in political decisions. Thus, the
pres ervation of the society is not achieved by collec tive eff orts of individuals, but by
absolute obedience on the members' part. For this reason, the pres ervation of the society
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is not a collec tive achievement that all members can reasonably take pride in. A society
ruled by politically unmediated pure coercion lacks grounds for its members to have a
sense of attachment. It also denies individua ls' autonomy since the political participation
is a crucial part in exercising one's autonomy. In contrast to such a soci ety ruled by
unmedia ted pure coercion, members of a decent socie ty en joy substantial liberties and
righ ts. They also have a substantial role in political decisio n-making through a
consultati on hierarchy of repres entative bodies of every group and association in the
soci ety. Their opinions and interests would then be expressed by the repres entative bodies
in the consultation system and would be seriously considered by the government.
Although it is true that an individual in a decent socie ty may not have as much impact on
the government that a member of a liberal society would have on the liberal government,
individual members can have a substantial role in political par ticipa tions. A decent
socie ty would allow a peac eful conversation between dissen ters and the government, and
it also would allow any possible changes and reforms in the policies and political
institutions as a result of this conversation, as long as the changes and reforms could
reasonably better serve the common good conception of justice. Thus, the autonomy and
the sense of worth of individuals are supported by political institu tions of a decent
soci ety.
Since a decent society would recognize the worth of its members as moral agents
and would allow them to exercise their capacit ies, individual members of such a society
taken together can be recognized as being able to make their own decisions and their
decisions should be respected. One decision individual members of a decent society have
collectively made is to find their own path of development (due to the last fe ature of a
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decent society). In order to respect the autonomy of individual members of a decent
socie ty, liberal societies should respect the collective choice made by these individuals to
stay in their own society and improve it in their own way. Thus, decent soci eties should
be tolerated and respected by liberal societies, even though they are neither liberal nor
fu lly just.
So far we have shown that a decent society deserves toleration and equal
membership in the society of peoples. What this equal membership implies is that the
socie ty of peoples should recognize the legitimacy of decent societies as well as their
right to independence and self -determinatio n. Thus, other societies should not interfere
with the internal aff airs of these decent soci eties without strong justificati on.
A political conception of human rights
Since the decent societies are legitimate and equal members in the society of
peoples, the list of human rights, which provides justifications for imposing sanctions on
or fo rcibly intervening in the affairs of an independent socie ty, must be acceptable to
these decent societies as well. Thus, the list of human rights should be part of the
overlapping consensus of all well-ordered societies, both liberal and decent.
According to Rawls, the fu nction of human rights is to iden tify "necessa ry
conditions of any system of social cooperation," and the regular violation of these human
rights often leads to "command by forc e, a slave system, and no coop eration of any kind"
(Rawls, 1999b, p. 68). Social cooperation, compared to fo rced group activity or other
types of "socially coordinated activity", as Freeman points out, has three features. First,
the nature of soci al coop erati on must be vol untary. Second, each person engages in social
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coop eration because doing so fac ilitates her pursuit of her conception of the good. Lastly,
social cooper ation must fo llow fair terms and the principle of reciproci ty. 4
Being constructed in this manner, Rawls's list of human rights is actually grounded
on some basic human int erests, i.e., those conditions that are neces sary for a minimal
degree of individual autonomy and a sense of worth, since both liberal and decent
societies recognize and respect these basic human int erests.
This shows the impla usibili ty of some cosmopo litan obje ctions, such as Buchanan 's,
that Rawls wrongly avoids grounding his list of human rights on any human inte rests in
order to avoid being paro chial. Buchanan argues that there are ideologica lly neutral
human int erests we would like to secure for a good human life, such as "the interest in
avoiding torture, in phys ical secu rity, and in not being enslaved" (Buchanan, 2006, p.
15 8). However, beca use there are such ideologically neutral human inte rests, Buchanan
argue s, "there is nothing parochial about grounding human rights in basic human
in terests" (Buchanan, 2006, p. 15 9, original emphasis). Buchanan fu rther explains his
point by writi ng:
To say that a theory of human rights is parochial is to say that it is based
on a partial, or narrow, or unduly circumscrib ed perspective- that it leaves
out something of relevance. A theory of human rights based on interests
that are common to all human beings is not based on a parochial
conception of human good, if this means a conception of human good that
is appropriate only for human beings in this or that particular societies ....
So such a conception of human rights is not paro chial; nor, conse quently,
is it into le rant by virtue of being parochial.
The compl aint then boils down to the claim that Rawls fa ils to recognize the
existence of universal human interests that could be the grounds for human righ ts.
However, fr om what we have shown above, Buchanan simply misunderstands Rawls's
4 See Freeman 2006, p. 36.
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argument for the list of human rights by criticizing that Rawls does not recognize any
universal basic human inte rest. For Rawls, the most fun damental interest that needs to be
guaranteed for any form of good human life is the minimal degree of autonomy that
makes a sense of worth possible, i.e., the absence of pure political coercion by political
institutions of the socie ty, which, as explained earlier, do not allow individuals any role
in political decisi on-making but instead require their absolute obedience. Without this
minimal degree of autonomy, it is impossible for individuals to have the ability to pursue
a conception of the good. Any condition that would put constraints on the political power
and political coercion and would allow some degree of coop eration in the political arena
is considered an interest universal to any form of good human lif e. In this sense, a set of
human rights that would only include those rights that would only guarantee a particular
kind of good human life, i.e., the life as a citizen of a liberal and democratic socie ty, is
too narrow because it fa ils to take other possible fo rms of good human life seriously.
Failing to do so and discrediting or even condemning the pursuits of other possible fo rms
of good human life, unf ortunately, disrespects the autonomous choices some individuals
make .
Now we need to say more about which rights should be included in the list of basic
human rights . We have argued earlier in this section that the doctrine of human rights
should be consis tent with respect to individua ls' autonomy and their sense of worth. The
sense of worth of individuals, as I argued in Chapter 2, is a fu ndamental interest of
individuals that Rawls's Law of Peoples is inte nded to protect and support. We have
shown that this sense of worth has two sources. One source is the fact that one has
capacities to pursue her conception of the good, and the other is one's sense of
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achievement in her pursuits. In other words, one's sense of worth comes fr om one's
ability to make autonomous choices and decisions. Thus, the account of human righ ts, the
goal of which is to protect this sense of worth, must be suffi cient to perform its role in an
international theory of justice, and the violation of any right in the list makes individuals
incapable of developing and exercising the most fu ndamental moral capacities and hence
incapable of making ra tional and reasonable decisions on their own.
Although Rawls does not argue explici tly in this way, this seems to be why Rawls
claims that the minimal requirement of the content of basic human rights is that the basic
needs of individual members in liberal and decent societies should be met, where the
basic needs include not only basic subsistence but also "economic means as well as
institutional rights and fre edoms", which ensures that all individuals are able to "take
advantage of the rights, liberties, and opportuniti es of their socie ty" (Rawls, 1999b, p. 38,
n. 47). We may call this the Basic Need Requirement of human rights .
Thus, the fun ction of human rights in the society of peoples should be to ensure the
minimal conditions fo r the capacity fo r autonomy, and these minimal conditions define
the minimal standard of legitimacy. A socie ty that fa lls below this standard may be
subj ect to international in terventions which intend to enable it to fo ster development and
exercise of individual autonomy instead of hinder it.
Why should the minimal conditions for the capacity for autonomy be so defi ned?
Any society that fai ls to provide basic subsistence as Rawls describes it would not be able
to guarantee a safe environment against pure political coercion. A society ruled by pure
coercion would not consider its people as being capable of developing their moral
capaci ties, and due to the fa ct that this society has such a view of its members, it fa ils to
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take seriously the moral value of individ uals. An accou nt of human rights should provide
grounds for criticizing societies like this and fu rther for showing that societies like this
are illeg itima te. In contrast, a society that is not ruled by unmediated coercion and is a
system of social coop eration to some degree should be considered to be legitima te.
This being said, this constraint on the content of human rights does not imply that
all political rights should neces sarily be among human rights, but rather only those rights
urgent in the sense that they mark the distinction between coop era tion and unmediated
coercion. Although it is true that socie ty of peoples could better ensure the protection of
sense of worth and autonomy of individuals by expanding the list of human rights to
include all liberal rights, such an expansion is undesirable because it would not be
acceptable by decent societies.
Since the civic rights of decent societies satisf y the minimal requirement for human
righ ts, and these rights are also guaranteed in liberal socie ty, they cons titute the
overlapping consensus of liberal and decent soci eties and should be recognized as the
basic human rights. The lack of these rights in a society means the depriva tion of human
dignity of those individuals who are in an inf erior position in that soci ety. Often times,
when a socie ty cannot even protect these rights of individuals, it upholds slavery,
ser fdom or tyranny, where people are ruled by pure fo rce. In such societies, there will be
no grounds for a sense of worth for the majority of the population.
The list of human rights is not a political compromise
Such a way of constructing the content of human rights can easily be misunderstood
as a modus vivendi between liberal and decent societies, and liberal societies are willing
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to compromise their liberal political values only to accommoda te decent societies. For
example, Pogge argues that Rawls's accou nt of human rights is me ant to tolerate
nonliberal ways of organizing a society only for the purp ose of achieving an agreement
between liberal and decent societies on the terms regulating their mutual relations (See
Thomas Pogge, 1994).
Samuel Freeman has a response to this objec tion. He suggests that liberal peoples
agree that human rights should not include all the liberal political rights not just to
achieve a modus vivendi but because some liberal political rights are not necessa ry for
coop eration among peoples (See Freeman 2006; 2007a, pp. 263-273; 2007b ). Freeman
argues that social coop eration in a domestic society is different fr om the coop eration
among peoples, each of which has its own political system. Such a diff erence is due to
the different basic structure between a domestic society and the socie ty of peoples. To be
more speci fic, Freeman makes the fo llowing distinc tion:
The Society of Peoples is not a political society, and thus has no original
political jurisdiction or eff ective basic political power .... The eff ective
political power and jurisdiction that global institutions exercise are
possessed by these institu tions only to the degree that they have been
granted such power and jurisdiction by independent peoples. (Freeman,
2006, pp. 39-40, original emphasis)
Because global coop era tion between peoples is different fr om social coop era tion in
a domestic socie ty, fair terms regulating these different types of coop eration may differ. It
can be easily agreed that Rawls's basic human rights are prerequisite for any kind of
cooperation. In contrast, other liberal rights such as political parti cipa tion, liberal fr eedom
of associa tion and fr eedom of speech do not seem to be required by all kinds of social
coop eration and therefore should not be considered as basic and as urgent as basic human
righ ts. Thus, although the liberal rights menti oned above are en joyed by individuals in
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liberal societies and are considered valua ble, they should not be applied to the global
socie ty of peoples due to the nature of global coop eration among peoples.
Freeman seems to suggest here the form of coop eration in the society of peoples
should not and cannot be modeled after a liberal domestic society simply beca use there is
no unif ied political authority and political institu tions enforcing it in the soci ety of
peoples. Instead of envisioning the form of coop erati on in the society of peoples as
highly systemati cally orga nized and enf orced, such coop eration should rather be more out
of individual societies' voluntariness and willingness to coop erate with each other. Such a
sense of volunta riness and willingness, however, would require a domestic cooper ative
system in each socie ty. When a society is not a coop erative system of any kind
domestical ly, it is not capable of cooperating with other peoples in the global socie ty.
Although Freeman does not make this explicit, he would agree that the reason for such a
socie ty' lack of capacity to coop erate is that it fa ils to recognize and respect individuals as
moral agents at any level, yet moral agency is presupposed by any kind of coop erati on.
When a society ref uses its members any moral agency and respect, such a political
culture would not treat other peoples and their members with respect. Due to this lack of
recognition and respect of the values of individu als, it would be impossible for such a
socie ty to honor and fo llow the terms of coop eration for the right reason. It may only be
able to fo llow the terms as a result of a power str uggle. Thus, honoring these basic human
rights is a precondition for a society to have the capacity to coop erate with other societies.
In contrast, this is not true for liberal rights that are included in conventional concept of
human rights (such as the UDHR), and those rights are not required for stable and
prolonged peace in the socie ty of peoples.
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Such an understanding of Rawls suggests that on the international level a liberal
socie ty is purely concerned with how to coop erate with others so that a peacef ul and
stable order could reign among well-ordered societies and allow the society to exist and
flouri sh.
However, it seems that this interpretati on has to sacrifice the concern for individuals
and their interests (Wenar 2006, p. 104), and all a liberal society could say for tolerating
and respecting a decent society is that it is a necessa ry means of maintaining peace,
which will benefit liberal societies themselve s. This interpretation of Rawls's reasoning
for not including some liberal rights that appear on the conventional list of human rights
may strike one as overlooking some important in terests of individuals (such as the equal
right to political participation, and the fu ll right of fr ee expression and associa tion) fo r the
sake of securing others (such as the interest in the autonomy and independence of their
societies). It requires stronger justification to sacrifice some individual interests for their
pursuits of collec tive in terests . Other wise, such a view would suggest that the most
impo rtant interests are those communal in terests, and individual interests should not be
taken as equally important.
One way to justify the priority of defending the collec tive interest of individuals in
the autonomy and independence of the society is to argue that, to the individuals in
decent societies, their continuous pursuit of their interest in living in their own society
and their interest in collec tively choosing their own path of development will, in the long
run, better serve their in terest in gaining liberal political righ ts. As Bernard Williams
arg ues, there are nonliberal soci eties which differ fr om "the paradigm of un just coercion"
due to their beli efs about how the society should be regulated are adapting. Although
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these bel iefs are unjust and unsound, this society cannot change independently fr om
reforming them, because these beli efs are deeply embedded in the lives of the members.
Williams arg ues:
In that case, although we shall have various things to say against this state
of aff airs, and although we may see the decline of these bel iefs as
representing a form of liberation, we may be less eager to insist that its
way of life constitutes a violation of human rights . (Williams, 2005, p. 71)
What Williams suggests here is that to change a socie ty must start with changing
its political culture, and this is especia lly true for those socie ties with long histori es and
rich traditi ons. Rawls could not agree more on this point with Williams. It seems that they
agree that for these societies to change and sustain liberal political rights, a system of
rights is not the most crucial part. Rather, a political culture accompanied by evolved
institutions is more important. That is, a more plausible way of developing such a society
into a liberal and democratic status fr om its current nonliberal but decent status is not to
break its ties with its history and tradi tions. Rather, they would prefer an evolution fr om
within its traditions and culture. Although a decent society does not have a culture that
would sustain or even recognize all the liberal rights in the conventional conception of
human rights for the moment, this does not entail that a decent society would not be able
to recognize and sustain all the liberal rights in the long run. Rather, this means that a
decent society lacks a context against which the vocabulary of liberal rights could make
sense. Decent societies, with their achievements in recognizing and respecting the values
of individuals and in orga nizing the political institut ions in ways that are more sensitive
to these values, should have the capacity to accept liberal values on their own without
external pressure. Such a development path is not only a learning process but also
integrating liberal values as their own values and part of their own history and traditions.
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The system of rights and liberal political institu tions estab lished this way must be more
stable than those fo rmed by external pressure.
Such a development path, however, entails that it is crucial to secure what a decent
socie ty has achieved thus far and not to impose liberal values on it. Thus, liberal societies
should realize that insisting on the conventional list of human rights violates the interest
of individuals in collec tively deciding the fu ture path of their socie ty. Another problem of
doing so is that it acts against securing their liberal rights in decent societies in the long
run.
The cosmopolitan objections to Rawls's list of human rights
With Rawls's argument for his list of human rights recons tructed, we now move to
consider some cosmopoli tan ob jec tions. The first one suggests that Rawls's account of
human rights and his toleration of decent societies seem to be in ter-depen dent and hence
circular. The second one fo cuses on the methodology of deriving the content of human
rights and it suggests that Rawls is wrong in modeling the overlapping consensus in the
socie ty of peoples after that in a liberal democratic society. The last one worri es about the
consequence this toleration would bring about, namely, the danger of perpetuating
in justice in those nonliberal societies.
The argument fro m circularity
One specific objection to Rawl s's toleration of decent societies is that Rawls's
argument is circular: he seems to presuppose that certain forms of socie ty, i.e., decent
nonliberal peoples, are legitimate and should be accepted by liberal soci eties as equal
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members of global society; but such a legitimate status is what the account of human
rights is supposed to be applied to determine (Beitz, 2000, p. 687).
This objection fr om circu larity should have been adequate ly answered by the
recon struction of Rawls's argument earlier in this chapter. Liberal societies' toleration of
and respect for decent societies is not deter mined or measured by the list of human righ ts.
It is rather grounded on some fe atures of decent societies, viz. their recognition and
respect of the value of individuals and their readiness to change their way of organizing
the society in order to better reflect this recognition and respect. Due to these features,
members of decent societies have a sense of attachment to the society and they take it to
be their fu ndamental interest to remain in their own societies and determine their own
path of development. Such a sense of attachment should be deemed justifiable even fr om
a liberal point of view, beca use these individuals should be respected for their capacity to
make their own decisions individually and collectively, and ref using to respect their
decisions constitutes a significant gesture of disrespect. In this sense, Rawls's argument is
not circular since he has more solid moral ground for toler ating and respecting the decent
societies, and the content of human rights is an overlapping consensus between all
well-ordered societies, both liberal and decent.
The argument against the overla pping consensus in the global society
Some cosmopolitans suggest that Rawls lacks suff icient grounds to appeal to
political conceptions in the global society for human rights. Rawls seems to inten tionally
model the overlapping consensus of the socie ty of peoples after that of liberal societ ies:
Just as a citizen in a liberal socie ty must respect other persons'
comprehensive religious, philosophical, and moral doctrines provided they
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are pursued in accordance with a reasonable political conception of justice,
so a liberal society must respect other societies organized by
comprehensive doctri nes, provided their political and social institu tions
meet certain conditions that lead the society to adhere to a reasonable law
of peoples. (Rawls, 1999b, p. 43)
Cosmopo litans argue that such a construction of the overlapping consensus between
liberal and decent soci eties does not seem to be a proper extension of the domestic model.
In a liberal society, a political conception is proper beca use of "the fact of reasonable
pluralism." The reason that different comprehensive doctrines in a liberal socie ty are
considered reasonable is that they all support the liberal ways of orga nizing the socie ty.
Due to the "reasonableness" of these comprehensive doctri nes, a political conception of
justice regulating the society should be one that cannot be "not unreasonably" rej ected by
these comprehensive doctrine s. In contrast, a global society does not have such a
reasonable pluralism, since nonliberal societies for various reasons and to different
degrees diverge fr om a liberal democratic socie ty. 5 These cosmop olitans fu rther argue
that since a decent nonliberal socie ty would allow a society that systematically and
institu tionally discriminates against part of its popula tion, it would rej ect the conventional
list of human rights (espec ially on the equal status of all) on the basis of some
"conception of morality [that] is seriously distorted by indef ensible beliefs" (Buchanan,
2006, p. 156). Thus, nonliberal society's rej ection of adopting liberal rights in the
conventional human rights cannot be "not unreasona ble."
This objection seems to fo cus on the nonliberal nature of decent soci eties and
argues that Rawls wrongly applies his model for the overlapping consensus in the
domestic case to the global society-since decent societies are nonliberal, well-ordered
liberal societies should not seek the overlapping consensus with decent societies in the
5 For this line of criticism, see Buchanan 2006 and Tan 1998.
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first place, because such au attempt violates the liberal principles of justice. However, as
my reconstruction of Rawls's argument shows, a decent soci ety deserves respect and
equal membership because it has developed a social form that distingui shes itself fr om
other fo rms of nonliberal societies in that it allows and respects the agency and autonomy
of every individual . For liberal societies, to admit a socie ty like this as an equal
participant in the society of peoples does have moral grounds. That is, this decision is
consis tent with the ultimate concern of liberal princ iples of justice- the most
fu ndamental interest of individual sense of worth and autonomy. In contrast, it is a
violation of this fu ndamental interest of individuals in decent soci eties to ref use to grant
decent societies equal status, given that these individuals have the capacity to make
reasonable choices on their own.
We are generally less concerned when a liberal society violates liberal rights such as
the right to fr ee expression than when a nonliberal society does so. For example, we can
imagine a liberal society fo rbids the small group of Muslim women to wear veils in
public on the ground that these veils are sy mbols of religious oppression, although these
women voluntarily chose to wear them without any pressure fr om their religious
community. Such a policy seems to disrespect individua ls' right to practi ce their religions
fr eely. However, a common intuitive reaction to a case like this is to deem it as less
urgent for international sanctions or even to be reluc taut to give this liberal socie ty any
sanctions just to fo rce it to change this policy. The reason for this reluctance is not
beca use this policy is justifiable based on liberal princ iples. Rather, the reason is that a
liberal socie ty is capable of redressing in justice through the collective efforts of members,
and it is inconsistent with the respect for individual members' capacities for autonomy to
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fo rce the society to change .
If this is the reason why liberal soci eties are willing to tolerate each other, however,
it seems that liberal societies should extend their toleration and respect to decent societies
given that members of decent societies also have the capacity to some extent to change
the status quo.
The argument fro m perpetuating in justice
Cosmopo litans generally are dissa tisf ied by the fact that Rawls's list of human
rights fa ils to include many liberal rights that are widely accepted as human rights . The
neglect of such rights is particularly problematic fr om their point of view since it would
tolerate nonliberal societies that unjustly discr iminate against some of their population,
while privileging others. 6 For example, Caney argues that without including many liberal
political rights, it seems that Rawls's decent societies would allow some intolerable
pract ices such as
racial discr imina tion, the political exclusion of ethnic minori ties, the
fo rcible removal of members of some ethnic communities (that is, ethnic
cleansing), the reduction of some to just above subsistence whilst other
members of that society luxuriate in opulent splendor, and the perpetuati on
of grossly unequal opportuni ties and political power. (Caney , 2002, p. 1 02)
A worry related to such unjust practi ces is that Rawls's list of human rights will
perpetua te the in justice in those nonliberal societies. Buchanan, for example, argues that,
since Rawls's list of human rights does not include some importa nt liberal rights, it will
help maintain the status quo in those nonliberal societies. This would be unjust because,
Buchanan arg ues, a nonliberal hierarchical society tends to dis advantage its underclass by
putting them in an inf erior economic and political position, due to which they may lack
6 Similar objections can be found in Teson 1995, Franck 1995, Caney 2002 and Buchanan 2006.
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the basis needed to surviv e, lack access to education and health care services, or not be
able to take advantage of using laws to protect their own inte rests
7
(See Buchanan, 2006,
p. 151 ). Eric Cavallero provides more concrete illustra tions of how a decent society may
perpetua te in justice without viola ting Rawls's list of human righ ts:
[T]he regime may legitimately prohibit assembly for the pur pose of
political discussion or pe aceful protest; ban the possession or
diss emination of litera ture that is deemed subversive ; control access to the
mass media or employ them directly as organs of state propaganda;
mandate the political indoctrination of children; direct the internal
reloca tion of individuals or of whole populati ons; and restrict the
educational and prof essional opportuni ties of citizens who occupy a
legally subordinate stati on. It may jail those who resist these methods as
long as it lends a sincere ear, at some point, to their grieva nces.
In addition to these more or less overt means of social control, there is also
a range of covert means that, on Rawls's account, the state may
legitima tely use. These include intr usive surve illance; the use of informant
networks or neighborhood cells to create a chilling eff ect on political
discussion; the infiltra tion of dissident groups to fo ment disunity and
suspicion; and the use of agents provoca teurs to discredit peacef ul reform
effor ts. A regime that manages to maintain popular acquiescence by covert
means like these can eviden tly, by Rawls's lights, count as decent.
(Cavollero, 2003, pp.191-19 2)
From the individualist view of cosmopoli tans, this is problem atic both because some
members are put in an inf erior position and beca use such a socie ty does not seem to allow
any improvement fr om within. In particular, Rawls's Law of Peoples fa ils to provide
substantial support for those in Tan 's terms "dissenting individual members in these
nonliberal socie ties" (Tan, 2006, p. 85) in their efforts "against suppressive group
traditi ons" (Tan, 1998, p. 294).
Such a supportive stance toward dis advan taged individuals in decent societies,
however, shows some misunderstandings of Rawls's idea of decent peoples as well as of
his concept of human righ ts. The right to life must ensure that individuals have "general
7 A similar view is expressed in Eric Cavallero 2003.
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all-pur pose economic means" to ra tionally exercise their liberties and inte lligently use
their properties (Rawls, 1999b, p. 65, n. 1 ). It has been said earlier that the list of basic
human rights is a subset of the political rights ensured in a decent society. Thus, a
characteristic fe ature of a decent socie ty is that it ensures its members "general
all-pur pose economic means" not only to survive but also to take in tellig ent advantage of
the liberties and rights . A decent society has this fe ature because the socie ty is a system of
political and social coop eration which ensures that every individual has the oppo rtunity to
play a substantial role. Due to this fe ature of a decent socie ty, its political institutions
must provide neces sary means for members to survive, guarantee their access to adequate
health care services, enf orce adequate education that is sufficient for individuals to
understand and exercise their rights and liberties, to make public fo rum and media
avai lable to diff erent groups so that they can express their opinions, to permit public
fu nding or public fu ndraising to support the proper fu nctioning of the repr esen ta tive
bodies of various groups so that all of them can eff ectively express their views on behalf
of group members.
A decent socie ty does not only ensure material means for its members to take
advantage of liberties and rights, it also provides legal and political means for this
purpose. Its consultation hierarchy and system of laws provide members the oppo rtunity
to play a substantial role in public and political life . By the protection of sufficient
measure of liberty of conscience and fr eedom of religion and thought, every individual
can fr eely choose the group that she wants to be a member of, and she can practice her
religion or other comprehensive doctrines without fe ar even if the doctrine is not the
dominant one in the society. The same liberty and fr eedom fu rther protects the individual
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when she expresses dissen ting opinions. If the government of a decent society considers a
practice of a group or an individual to be punisha ble, off icials and judges must use the
court as a forum to show that their judgments are not arbitrary and the practi ce in
question violates the common good conception of justice. It would be against the nature
of such a socie ty to exercise thought control or "covert means of social control" in
Cavollero 's terms.
Rawls's commen tators like Buchanan and Cavollero, who hold the view that
without a much expanded list of human rights (such as UDHR) members of a decent
socie ty would be powerless to resist the unj ust coercion by their government, should
rather give some credit these individual s' ability to change their own society. These
commen tators should also attend to the se members' desire to change their own society in
their own way as they so choose. The motive to expand the list of human rights to
include all the political rights ensured by liberal societies may be that a liberal soci ety is
the best form of organi zing socie ty as far as human beings have developed, and it is in
every individual 's best interest to have all the liberal political and social rights guaranteed
around the world. This view, in fa ct, is compatible with that of Rawls and Rawls agrees
with it. What he disagrees with is that, without having an overlapping consensus among
the liberal and decent societies that all should endorse liberal political institu tions, liberal
societies should fo rce those decent ones to include this agenda into their development
plan. Coercion should not be used even when it is used for the best in terest of others if
these people are deemed as capable of reasonably making their own decisions.
This is not difficult to see in the case involving individ uals. For example, in many
cases of arranged marriage, the parents make the decision not to advance their own
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interests but to protect their children, by, to name a few, securing their economic
well-being or the social status of them. What has been left out, however, is the chance for
the two individuals who end up in the marriage to make their own choices and decisions,
and this chance is generally considered crucial and valuab le. Such marriage s, thus, cannot
be crit icized for parents ' inten tions at the moment of making the decision, nor their
motive in doing so. Nor can they be crit icized due to the quality of the marriage, since
voluntary love marriages could also evolve many problems and the two individuals do
not necessa rily end up in happiness. Rather arranged marriages are morally unapp ealing
on the ground that the individuals who are directly related to the marriage are fo rced into
a life path that they did not choose and were never given a chance to do so.
When discussing the problem of global justice, however, cosmopoli tan liberals
seem to suggest that it is not only permissible but also necessa ry to direct these decent
societies to develop in a way that liberals, especia lly those who reside in liberal
democratic societies, would deem to be right and best.
It could be argued that fo rcing all nonliberal soci eties to become liberal is not
analogous to an arra nged marriage in the sense that the fo rmer could better protect the
interests of individuals and prevent individuals fr om being unfairly treate d, which
eventually benefits all individual s. However, if what I argued earlier in this chapter is
right, that changing the political culture of a socie ty fr om within eventually provides a
more stable and inherent recognition ofthe values of these liberal rights, then it is more
plausible to assume that allowing the development fr om within should provide better
protection of individuals and their interests in the long run. For the present generation of
individuals, non-members of the society and other societies should simply respect their
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autonomous collec tive choice to change the socie ty on their own. If the concern is how to
better protect the fu ndamental interests of individuals, it is implausible to deny certain
individuals respect when these individuals do not only have the capacity to choose for
themselves but also are actually able to do so.
This analogy between individual autonomy and that of a society may fa ll apart for
a different reason: a society is different fr om an individual beca use the fo rmer is made up
of individuals, and it is hard to imagine that these individuals will all converge on one
path of development.
To reply to this argument that members of a decent society may never converge on a
development path, cosmop olitans should be reminded that one crucial element of a
decent society is that its members have a reasonable attachment to their socie ty. They
iden tif y with their society and will continue to remain loyal to it not because of fe ar or
coercion, but because of their sense of pride in and honor of their society based on its
achievements. Thus, even if it is true that members of decent societies may never agree
on a path of development, it does not justif y interf erence fr om the outs ide. On the other
hand, it is implausible to conclude that there will not be a decision that is acceptable to all
just because there are disagreements . Disagreements could be shared, discussed,
evalua ted in the public fo rum, and this is normally how any unf orced agreement is
achieved. Because decent societies allow such public discussion, there is no reason to
doubt their ability to make one collec tive decision on the direction of social development.
A fu rther worry on cosmopoli tans' part could be that members of a decent socie ty
may not have the internal power to strive for a better soci ety given that they have been
long embedded in a society that fa ils to recognize the equal status of all individuals and
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fa ils to give equal rights to every one. For example, Buchanan argues that it is possible
that individuals in a decent society may have a "systematically distorted belief system"
(Buchanan, 2006, p. 156) and they may not have the internal power to realize that the
political institu tions need to be changed and their political culture needs to be impro ved.
However, it should be recalled that a decent society has a non-aggressive nature and
it is willing to participate in cooper ation with other societies fo llowing some fair ter ms.
That is, a decent society allows and actively engages in interna tional cultural exchanges,
economic interacti ons, political negotiations, and some interna tionally collaborative
efforts such as those in disease prevention. With fr equent exchanges of inf ormation in
almost all aspects of members' daily life, it is more reasonable to assume that individuals
have access to the inf ormation regarding liberal ideals and regarding what political
institutions liberal soci eties have than to assume the opposite. They have the access to
these ideas, and their civic rights and the hierarchical consultation system in a decent
socie ty would allow these ideas be presented and discussed. A decent socie ty is a
nonliberal socie ty that has made changes in its political institu tions to rec tify the in justice
it has done to a particular group as a result of the past public discussions between
dissen ting individuals and officials. This shows that a decent society has the inner power
to improve itself and this power is inherent in its political institu tions. There is no reason
to beli eve that this decent society would suddenly lose this inner power. Thus, with the
access to informa tion and with the means of using the inf ormation to improve the society,
even though the nonliberal or even religious beliefs are dominant in the socie ty, the
socie ty should be allowed to continue to change itself with the help of its own inner
power for innova tion.
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It should also be remembered that all the liberal societies were once nonliberal and
that their nonliberal past did not prevent them fr om evolving into a better fo rm. Surely
there were difficulties and struggles. Yet it is proved that a society can develop its elf and
undergo changes in its fun damental values and beliefs. Thus, it is implausible to insist
that members of decent soci eties permanently lose their capacity to imagine and strive for
a better society.
Cosmopo litans may fu rther argue that if Rawls is right on insisting that members of
decent nonliberal societies would probably choose the pattern of a liberal society after
they have observed the advant ages of a liberal socie ty, then it should not make much
diff erence for liberal societies to use some measures to stimulate change .
However, it should be noticed that the measures that cosmopoli tans are willing to
take in order to "stimulate change" are sanctions and intervent ions that do not only show
disrespect to the independence and autonomy of a society that fa lls below the liberal
ideals as described by UDHR. More impo rtantly, these measures, whether they are in a
coercive form or not, have the intention of instilling immedia te and drastic social and
political changes in a socie ty, and these measures express cosmopoli tans' willingne ss to
punish a decent society for its noncomplia nce. In many cases, such mandatory sanctions
seem to lead to consequences that contradict the original motive of protecting individuals
and their in terests . One prominent example is the humanitarian crisis in Iraq in the
1990s. For these reasons, it is difficult to distinguish such measures that cosmopoli tans
allow for the pur pose of stimulating changes fr om mere coercions or threats to fo rce a
decent society to change . However, such a distinction needs to be made so that it can be
shown that the changes undergone in decent soci eties are not fo rced upon them but rather
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out of members' voluntary choices. Rawls is optimistic that members of decent societies
are very likely to collec tively choose to change their society toward a liberal one
gradually. Nonethe less, he does not agree to put too much pressure on the society and its
members. Instead, all liberal societies need to do is to well conduct their domestic aff airs
well in order to serve as examples to decent societies. That way members of decent
societies will be able to observe the advan tages of a liberal society and be naturally
willing to make the choice to change .
Conclusion
One of the reasons that many liberals, espe cially cosmopolitans, in democratic
societies desire to extend all the liberties and rights they en joy to all the individuals
worldwide is a sense of guilt and a sense of compassion. The question they ask is : if we
have extensive liberties and rights, how can we live with the fact that there are
individuals who do not have them? However, this good intention does not automatically
justif y all the means to achieve the end. This is obvious especially in the case where these
"others" share a society and they are willing to stay in it provided that it is decent as
Rawls describes it. Thus, in trying to improve these individua ls' lives, another important
question that should be asked is: even if they do desire the extensive liberties and rights
that citizens of liberal societies enj oy, on whose terms should their socie ty be
change d-should they be allowed to change in their own way based on their own
collective decisions, or should they subj ect their judgments to liberal societies and merely
fo llow their instr uctions? I have been trying to show that the fo rmer is more plausible in
this chapter. It is more plausible because the right to choose should be left in the hands of
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its members once a socie ty satisfi es the minimal requirement ofle gitimacy. To enf orce
judgments on members in such a society fa ils to respect their autonomy. In this sense,
given the role of human rights used in the society of peoples, human rights should only
be used to indicate the minimal standard of legitim acy, beca use without a minimal degree
of legitimacy individua ls' ability to choose is threa tened or even undermined.
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Chapter 4 Global Distributive Justice and Global Institutions
In Chapter 2, I explained why Rawls's fundamental concern of his international
theory is the same as that of his domestic theory-Ra wls's thoughts are consistently
about how to protect the most fu ndamental interest of individuals, i.e., their sense of
worth. In Chapter 3, I argued that Rawls 's minimalist content of human rights is derived
fr om the equal membership that decent societies deserve in the society of peoples. Due to
this equal membership the content of human rights, which provide grounds for
interf erence of another sovereign society's internal aff airs, should be considered
reasonable fr om a decent society's perspe ctive-t heir comprehensive doctrine should
support this theory of human rights fr om within. Now I move to consider cosmopolita ns'
compla int that Rawls fa ils to attend to economic justice in the global society in his
international theory.
In this chapter I will examine the relationship between a global distributive
principle cosmopolitans argue for and global institu tions. Rawlsian cosmop olitans insist
that their proposed moral pri nciples do not require a change in global basic structure-its
fu lfillment does not require the establishment of a world government. Theref ore, they
argue, a global distributive principle does not viola te individua ls' particular attachments
(e.g., one 's identity as the member of a society) and hence cannot be rej ected on this
ground. I will argue that since the fu lfillment of the global distributive principle that
cosmopolitans advocate for entai ls a world government as the ultimate political authority,
such a principle undermines individua ls' capacity and willingness to exercise their
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powers to develop their societies in their own way. For this reason, this principle fa ils to
respect and protect the most fu ndamental interest of individuals, namely their sense of
worth.
I will show that these cosmopoli tans cannot adopt a global distributive principle
without being committed to a world government-to accept the cosmopoli tan princi ples
means not that patriotism should be constrained but that pat riotism is not allowed. This is
so because cosmopolitans derive the principle fr om a global original position in which
parti es represent individuals rather than diff erent peoples. Such a global prin ciple is a
direct application of Rawls's domestic original position. The domestic original position,
however, presupposes that individuals share common political institu tions and are united
under a political authority which makes decisions about how to sustain and develop the
socie ty based on collec tive choices made by individual members together. Thus, this
original position is not limited to determining principles regulating economic exchanges
in the society. It is first and fo remost used to determine the more fun damental
constitutional essentials and economic principles are attended to only when those more
fu ndamental aspects are settled. A direct ap plica tion of the domestic original position in
the global arena must lead to the same set of principles which regulate a society with one
ultimate political authority beca use parties in the original position reason in the same way
as parti es in the domestic one. This causes a problem because a globally unif ied society
with one political authority is presupposed if the domestic original posi tion can be
applied directly to the global society.
This leads us to consider the plausibili ty of a unif ied global state with a global
government. My ob jec tions to this world government argument are twof old. First, it is
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unlikely for citizens to develop a sense of identity without an existing and fun ctioning
sta te, not to mention this identity being stable. Second, a world government is
incompatible with preserving a well-ordered society as a social union, which is crucial for
one's sense of worth.
The Cosmopolitan Proposal of a Global Distributive Principle
As shown in Chapter 1, cosmopolitans generally hold that citizenship is morally
arbitrary, and principles of global justice should not be constrained by the borders of
different societies. Some cosmopoli tans who agree with Rawls's domestic theory of
justice correspondingly argue that Rawls should simply extend the application of his
domestic principles of justice to the global arena. These cosmopoli tans rej ect the idea that
the sense of citizenship should play a role in determining global justice, which "at the
fu ndamental level [determi nes] the legitimate claims and entitlements of individuals"
(Tan, 2004, p. 190), beca use justice requires impartiality rega rdless of one's citizenship .
To support this argument, these cosmopolitans fu rther argue that the basic structure of the
global society does not differ fr om that of a domestic socie ty, since a global system of
coop eration resembles the domestic one. If the basic structure of the global society is the
same as that of a domestic society, the argument contin ues, there is nothing to prevent
Rawls fr om applying his domestic princi ples of justice to global coop era tion.
To apply Rawls's domestic principles of justice to the global arena, however, does
not imply that the sense of na tionality that individuals have should altogether be
dissolved. Rather, these cosmopoli tans claim that impartial justice on the global level "is
not to eliminate all fo rms of national and other associative concerns, inte rests, and
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pursuits, but to determine the global context and rules within which such concerns and
interests may be legitimately pursued" (Tan, 2005, p. 184). In particular, according to
such a view, even if we take the current bounda ries of soci eties to be justified, "they
should not have the institu tional significance they currently have." (Pogge, 1994, p. 198)
For example, Beitz argue s:
[I]f evidence of global economic and political interd ependence shows the
existence of a global scheme of social cooperation, we should not view
national boundaries as having fu ndamental moral significa nce. Since
boundaries are not coextensive with the scope of social coop era tion, they
do not mark the limits of social obligation. (Beitz, 1999, p. 151 )
Although these cosmopoli tans sometimes ob ject to Rawls's toleration of decent
societies, they do not explicitly argue for a democratic world government, which
presumably would guarantee every human being an equal moral sta tus. The fo cus of the
application of Rawls's principles of justice, however, is large ly on the diff erence
principle, and the concern is how to optimize the expectations of the globally worst- off.
Since the main in justice exists in the economic order of the current global socie ty, this
view says, Rawls should have a principle of justice regulating legitimate material
entitlements (Pogge 1989, part III; 1994; Tan, 2004). Nonet heless, such a concern does
not commit Rawlsian cosmopoli tans to the idea of a world sta te, either. On the con trary,
they disagree with the view that a world government is the only option avai lable (Beitz,
1999; Tan, 2004; Pogge, 1988, 1992, 1994). Rather, they try to argue for some global
arrangements that will achieve global economic justice in their terms which can at the
same time accommoda te the existence of diff erent independent political societies. For
example, Tan argues:
[The claim] that either we estab lish a world state or we rej ect
cosmopo litan distributive principles, presents a fa lse dilemma. Various
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plausible institu tional means of regulating global distribu tion have been
proposed that do not invoke the idea of a world government. (Tan, 2004, p.
80)
Internal Inconsistency of the Rawlsian Cosmopolitan View
In this section, I want to examine what the Ra wlsian cosmop olitan argument
implies regarding institu tional arrangements. The result of their deliber ation, I argue, will
inevitably involve the loss of political autonomy of the society to some degree. For
example, although Tan argues that a world government is not necessa ry fr om his
cosmopo litan view, he does make it clear that, as Pogge suggests, a global distributive
system is require d. That is, a society is not automa tically entitl ed to all the wealth it
makes in its own and its economic autonomy should be partially submitted to certain
global associa tions so that all the societies in the world can have a share of the wealth all
societies make .
Rawlsian cosmopoli tans are heavily infl uenced by Rawls's way of determining the
justifiable form of coercive political power, and some directly ap ply Rawls's domestic
original position, in which parties represent individuals rather than societies, to the global
arena to determine the principles regulating the global society. 1 Rawls's domestic
original position, however, has assumed the existence of a state with a government. In
particular, this methodology, as Michael Blake argue s, is intended to apply only to "a set
of individuals who share coercive political institu tions, since those institu tions stand in
need of justification through the use of public reason." (Blake, 200 1, p. 287) Such a
coercive global political authority, however, does not seem to be the goal Rawlsian
cosmopolitans have in mind, since they insist that their theory does not require a world
1 See Beitz 1999a [1979] and Pogge 1989. Tan also explicitly says tliat lie "[adopts] tlie Raw !sian model as
[liis] cosmopolitan conceptions of justice" (Tan, 2004, p. 60).
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government and only some interna tional associa tions are necessa ry to guarantee the
application of an international diff erence principle, which will benefit the worst-off
individuals in the world most. The example of these "plausible institutional means"
include various global tax systems that would implement and regulate global distribu tion.
While it is questionable whether a global diff erence principle is justifiab le, which I
will discuss in Chapter 5, it seems that this principle is implausible due the global
institutional arra ngements its applica tion require s. If they take the idea of original
position represen ting individuals and that of applying the diff erence princip le to all the
individuals across soci eties seriously, they should recognize that there must be some
global institu tional arrangements not only to implement the economic principle but also
to ensure the equal political status and fa ir equality of opportunity of every individual.
There are two implications of this attempted proj ect. First, since the application of the
diff erence principle in Rawls's domestic theory is lexically posterior to the
implemen tation of the principle of equal liberties and that of fair opportuniti es, a global
diff erence principle and its institu tions presu ppose the execution of the other two
principles in a lexical order. In other words, the extension of Rawls's principle of
economic justice fr om the domestic arena to the global one must honor its constrain ts. It
would not make much sense, fr om Raw ls's point of view, to emphasize economic justice
too much without addressing political justice first and fo remost. Second, the
implemen tations of the se princ iples would require political coercions in the form of laws
and legal punishments . In order to ensure the eff ective and fe asible execution of these
principles, the direct coercive power the global institutions is needed.
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However, if the global institutional coercions are not limited to the distribution of
wealth and income, but also apply to the enf orcement of equal liberties and rights, it is
difficult to see what options are avai lable to these Rawlsian cosmopoli tans other than a
democratic world government.
The Implementation ofthe Principle of Equal Liberties at the Global Level
This can be obviously shown in the application of Rawls's princip le of equal rights
and liberti es. In order to enforce the equal rights and liberties of every individual in the
world, there must be some measures to deter violations by sovereign societies and to set
things right when it actually occurs. In order to achieve this, systems of legal punishment
and enforcement should be esta blished. That is, there should be interna tional police
fo rces, interna tional court and places for internationally sancti oned confinement or
imprisonment. These may all sound fam iliar, since they can be justifiably applied in the
case of human-rights violations . However, it needs to be noticed that a globally applied
principle of equal rights and liberties would take many more social and political rights
that are not urgent into consider ation, and presumably the violation of any these social
and political rights would justif y global interven tion. For example, suppose the
international law prescribes that each individual has a right to a minimal level of hourly
wage of $8. Under such an interna tional law, a lower hourly wage will expose the
enter prise to interna tional trials and punishments instead of the domestic ones. In this
sense, the global institu tions should fu nction in the same way as domestic ones do in
exe cuting political coercions. Nonet heless, this means nothing but that the global
application of the principle of equal rights and liberties would require an eff ective global
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government and this would unf ortunately make the domestic governments of each society
unnecessa ry.
One may argue that these global enf orcement systems are not neces sary. A
plausible alternative is to preserve the global institu tions as a fo rce to ensure that every
domestic socie ty abide by the international laws and legisla te its domestic laws and
punishments accordingly. This way the global institu tions would not interfere with the
domestic aff airs of individual societies. However, it must be recognized that interna tional
laws would merely remain as moral prescriptions without coercive fo rce to ensure their
applications. It should also be agreed that if the global political institu tions do not have
the political authority over domestic governments or even refrain fr om interf ering with
them, the se global political institutions lack political authority and coercive fo rce. What
is more, a just global order, as Rawls ian cosmopolitans propose, should have a process to
determine which measures should be taken, and this process, which is a decision
mechanism that presumably settles all the dispute s, should be justifiable to all. It, on the
other hand, must involve an auth ority who can apply coercive powers. Thus, plausible as
this alternative may sound, it fa ils to address how the international institu tions could
coercively enf orce Rawls's principle of equal liberties and rights without a world
government as the final authority.
The Implementation of the Principle of Fair Opportunities on the Global Level
The implementation of the principle of fair opportunities across the boundaries of
societies may appear more problematic since it must require some universal standards of
fa ir opportuni ties. However, what fa irness means in some particular insta nces may be
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debata ble. For example, in a socie ty with a history of enslaving and exploiting some of its
people, the genuinely fair opportunity cannot be achieved without some policies
addressing the historical depriva tions, because these individuals or their ancestors
suff ered fr om them and they largely contribute to the dis advantaged status of these
individ uals. Issues like this will be more eff ectively resolved by hold ing public forum and
discussions within the socie ty, since the members of this society rather than
non-members would be ones who are directly aff ected by the policy. Since nonmembers
and outsiders are not aff ected in any way, it does not seem to be necessa ry to include
them in the conversation and let them play a part in determining what the most
reasonable standard of fa irness for this society is.
In contrast, including them seems to be not only unneces sary but also
unreasona ble. This is so because laws and policies that ensure fa irness among individuals
have a tremendous impact on individua ls' lives and hence these individuals should solely
determine them. We should also recognize the fact that non-members and outsiders are
not experts on the particularity of the society, and what this means is nothing but that
non-members and outsiders do not hold better judgments on the issues that the society
needs to attend to. In fa ct, even if these non-members and outsiders display better
judgments, which is highly unlikely, such a global conversation, with an intention to
enf orce whatever decisions this conversation leads to, still would not be desirable, simply
beca use members of each of these societies should have the right to find the solution that
best suits them, as long as they are willing to remain in the society and coopera te with
each other in finding the solution. Determining at the global level what should be
determined domestically fa ils to sincerely respect the autonomy of the individual
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members of the socie ty, and doing so also undermines the autonomy and sovereign of the
socie ty that these individuals willingly remain in.
However, cosmopolitans may argue that, to ensure that every society fo llows the
principle of fa irness, it is not required that the global society should have a universal
standard for fairn ess, nor is it required that there should be some global institu tions that
do not have the authority to legislate but also to enf orce these laws in domestic societies.
Rather, these global institu tions, such as the United Nations, World Trade Organizati on,
Interna tional Criminal Court or other various transnational organiza tions, may examine
different societies case by case and determine, based on Rawls 's principle of fai rness,
whether a domestic socie ty has ensured that every individual en joys fair opportunit ies
and no one is priv ileged just because of some morally arbitrary fa ctors such as gender,
ethnicity, natural endowments and the socio-e conomic status that one is born into . Thus,
a network of such coop erative global institu tions is obviously an alternative to a world
state. For example, Pogge suggests:
Once we dispense with the traditional concept of sovereignty and leave
behind all-or-nothing debates about world government, there emerges a
clea r pref erence for an intermediate solution that provides for some central
organs of world government without, however, investing them with
"ultimate sovereign power and authority". Of course, such an intermediate
solution is what we have now, in the form of some interna tional law with
some mechanisms of adjudication and enf orcement (the International
Court of Jus tice and the U.N. Secu rity Council). (Pogge, 1988, p. 285)
This def ense, however, overlooks the very nature of the se global coop erative
institu tions. Although they are global in scope, they rely heavily on the voluntary
coo peration of sovereign soci eties for eff ective actions, whereas these sovereign societies
have the authority and the coercive power to exe cute thereof. Since a global society as
Rawlsian cosmopoli tans propose is a coop erative system based on volu ntary par ticipation,
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a sovereign society may choose not to coop erate with others on these domestic aff airs . If
a sovereign society decides to retreat fr om participating in worldwide activit ies led by
these global institu tions, they may be cri ticized for being irre sponsible and inconsidera te.
Nonethe less, this action does not necessa rily lead to substantial punishments, such as
political or economic sanctions or military interven tions, unless this action involves
severe violations of some fu ndamental moral princip les and hence is intolera ble.
However, without eff ective punishments, there is no way for global institu tions to ensure
that fai rness reigns in every domestic society. Thus, we conclude, the eff ective
implemen tations of global institutions require legisla tions and law enf orcements
comparable to those in a sovereign sta te, which presuppose an authority as the final
appeal.
Pogge's Vertical Dispersion model
Pogge, however, argue that, this reasoning is "the dogma of absolute
sovereignty"-"the belief that a juridical state (as distinct fr om a lawless state of nature)
presupposes an authority of last resor t"-and it should be rej ected in the fa ce of "the
historical fa cts of the last two hundred years" that "law -governed societies are possible
without a supreme authority or court of last appeal" (Pogge, 1988, p. 284). 2 Instead of
having a world state, he proposes that, in the opposite direction, the sovereign ty power
can be and should be dispersed vertically. He suggests that, since the fun damental
concerns of a cosmopo litan morality are the basic needs and interests of individual
2 Chia-ming Chen offered several objections to Pog ge's model of vertically-dispersed political authority in
his dissertation. He argues that Pogge seems to overlook the fact that a democratic society is different from
Hobbes's state sovereign and Rousseau's popular sovereign, because a democratic society is merely "a
notional bearer of a sovereignty [which] can allow the delegated political authorities to check against one
another. (Chen, 2007, p. 92)
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human beings, a goal of mitigating the sovereign power vertically must be included, so
that "persons [are] citizens of, and govern themselves through, a number of political units
of various sizes, [which can include neighborhood, town, county, provinc e, state, region,
and world at large,] without any one political unit being dominant and thus occupying the
traditional role of state" (Pogge, 1992, p. 58). According to this view, peace, democracy,
prosp erity, and the environment would be better served by a system in which the political
allegiance and loyalties of persons are widely dispersed. When this goal is achieved, it is
conceivable that the ob ject of one's patriotic allegiance will not solely be the political
socie ty one belongs to but also include these political units of various sizes. This
proposed scheme is superior to a world government because, Pogge arg ues, it
could be gradually reached fr om where we are now (through ...
second-order decen tralization [away from the now dominant level of the
state]), while a world sta te-involving, as it does, the annihilation of
existing sta tes-would seem reachable only through revolution or in the
wake of some global catast rophe. (Pogge, 1992, p. 63)
It seems that to avoid a result of a world government, Pogge 's vertically dispersed
view is Rawlsian cosmopoli tans' best, if not only, option. As Pogge himself suggests, in
contrast to a world government, which is impractical and too demanding, his own
proposed scheme is more preferable because it is more "reacha ble" due to its
compatibility with the preser vation of existing sta tes. There are two ways to understand
why Pogge thinks that his approach is more "reacha ble".
The first understanding is that Pogge 's scheme is more capable of being attained
beca use it does not propose to fu ndamentally change the basic structure of the society.
Rather, it starts with what we have in our lives and calls only for gradual change s. For
this reason, Pogge may argue, his approach would involve only nonviolent measures and
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it would not give rise to any violence since it would not arouse resistance or resen tment.
Because his approach would neither endanger peace nor lead to drastic changes that
individuals are not willing to commit to, citizens in different sovereign states will
gradually and collectively make the transition.
It is not clear, however, why Pogge 's proposal is less drastic a change and hence
less likely to arouse any hatred and res entment, compared to the proposal for a world
state. Actually the two views are different fo rms of reco nstruction of the world order in
great depth, although in different directions . Pogge 's scheme requires changes in the
social structure and institu tions in such a way that either there is no final resting po int for
sovereignty and the court of final appeal or there could be political authorities at diff erent
levels. Pogge would probably choose the fo rmer instead of the latte r. This pref erence can
be obviously seen beca use he rej ect what he calls "the dogma of absolute sovereignty."
This pref erence would also save him troubles explaining how political authority at
different levels which equally lack the status as the final appeal may fu nction seamlessly.
His in tended result of such a change in basic structures of domestic societies as well as
the global socie ty is that the social and institu tional changes would lead to changes in
individua ls' mental state s, which redirect their object of patriotic sentiments.
However, given the drastic changes Pogge 's scheme suggests, it may require
perhaps generations of pract ices and cooperation. Patriotic sentiments do not ari se fr om
abstract moral pri nciples, but rather fr om one's life within some political institu tions. For
citizens in a well-ordered socie ty, since they share common sympathies with each other
and they take pride in their collec tive achievements in mainta ining and improving the
socie ty, due to which they do not only iden tif y themselves with the current way of
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organizing their society but also are content with it, they have no reason to fa vor a change,
be it towards a vertically dispersed sovereign or a world government. Given this situa tion,
it is quite doubtful that they will choose to vertically disperse political authority and to
equip the mselves with multi-layered political allegianc es comparable to patriotic
sentimen ts.
On the other hand, if the argument is that, through certain caref ully-designed
education program, these individuals would switch their pref erence fr om staying in the
current society to adding more political units on the paral lel level of sovere ignty, it is
unfair to overlook the possi bility of an equally eff ective education program for a world
government. Thus, in terms of the likelihood to be accomplished, Pogge 's vertically
dispersed view does not seem to be superior to a world government view.
The second understanding of why preserving the sta tes makes Pogge 's view more
plausible is that, since the main concern of a cosmopoli tan morality is the individuals and
their in terests, his scheme helps preserve what individuals value deep ly-the local
attachments, i.e., their political allegiance to one's political socie ty. However, it is not
clear that this belief can be sustained as long as individuals do not voluntarily and
collectively make the choice of reform ing the political institu tions in this way. It should
be noticed that Pogge 's proposal invo lves denying a society the sense of inclusiveness of
members of a socie ty for them to collectively decide how to improve their socie ty, and
due to this incompatibility such a proposal does not seem to preserve and protect the
same kind of "local attachment" as "proper patrioti sm." To truly embrace the proper
patriotism it is crucial not to prescribe how individuals should organize their society and
organize their relationships with other societies institu tionally. Rather, to protect this
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"local attachment" requires respecting the collective choices that individual members
make provided that they have the capacity to do so. In this sense, the problem with
Pogge 's image of world order is that it fa ils to take into consid eration the source of
proper patrio tism. We may say that this image is incompatible with the proper pat riotism
that individuals currently in two sense s: (1) it fails to show due respect to the collec tive
choice that capable individual makes regarding their own societies, and (2) it would
eventually diminish this local attachment were it put into prac tice, because proper
patriotism requires an independent socie ty with its autonomous government as the
political authority and the exe cutive of their collec tive decisions and Pogge 's world order
simply does not allow an ultimate political authority at any level.
Theref ore, given the unsucces sful attempt that Pogge make s, Rawlsian
cosmopolitans inevitably have to commit to a world government view, which they
themselves regard as undesira ble. This being said, however, it is not the case that
Rawlsian cosmopolitans' view is necessa rily implausible simply beca use they have to
commit to a world government. The fact that they are reluc tant to choose it alone does
not make the idea of a world government less appealing. In contrast, if a world state is the
only or the most promising solution to human problems and conflicts, this cosmopolitan
position may still be defendab le. However, I will argue in the last section of this chapter
that the arguments for a world government are not succe ssf ul.
Before I spec ify why a world government is impla usible, I want to consider whether
Pogge 's model is more desirable than Rawls 's. Pogge suggests that his "verti cal division
of sovereignty" approach is more desirable beca use it is more likely to reduce eff ectively
the competition, rivalries and wars in the global society. This is so because his model can
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more stably reduce the unfri endly circumstance for self-interested states by implanting
multi-layered individual membership identity and allegiance (See Pogge 1992, p. 70).
While Pogge may be right about this advantage of his model, he fa ils to
acknowledge that Rawls's Law of Peoples can have the similar impact in the long run. He
needs to be reminded that Rawls's theory is ideal and it does not claim that any existing
liberal socie ty has met the standards of being a liberal society in Rawls's terms or that
any existing nonliberal society is truly "decent". However, current existing societies in
the world, through some improvements, may gradually reach the ideal standard.
When all the liberal societies exhibit the ideal moral and cultural characters, they
must have esta blished a political culture which educates citizens and trains them to
become reasonable and ra tional individuals, who, while having their own plans of life to
pursue, are able and ready to propose and accept reasonable princ iples based on
reciprocity, and who will not pursue their own good by violating these principles.
Ultimately, it is not the political institutions that ensure the liberal political culture. The
stability of such a political culture ra ther relies on individuals, who are embedded in and,
at the same time, who contribute to this cultu re. Through generations of education, the
values of equality, fa irness and mutual respect in both domestic and international
societies natural ly become the presupposition "operating in the background" (Rawls,
1999b, p. 102).
The same progress in political culture must also take place in nonliberal societies
when they become decent. Basic human rights, mutual respect and recognition of each
other's capacity as moral agent are all part of continuous public discussion and education
required by anyone who takes part in political lif e.
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Through this process of moral education in a well-ordered socie ty, it is highly
unlikely that individual members of such a society would tolerate or obey a highly unjust
regime which takes advantage of the uneven level of development among dif fe rent
societies, pursues national int erests at the price of other's loss, or undermines human
rights and wages unjust wars. When these sorts of unjust national conducts occur, these
individuals are likely to fe el a sense of shame, because this conduct betrays the
fu ndamental values they treasure . Instead, these individuals find their sense of pride and
honor concerning their socie ty when the socie ty fo llows the just principles of
international relati ons. This would constrain the interna tional conduct of a society and
ensure that it is not lead astray by its se lf-intere st.
While Pogge has some difficulty to show that his approach is superior to Rawls's, it
does seem that his approach needs more justification than Rawls 's approach does. Pogge
does not only advocate some fun damental changes in social structure and how individuals
may conceive their identiti es, he also indicates the right orientation for these cha nges.
Instead of letting individuals collectively find their own path of development, Pogge, as
well as his peer cosmopoli tans, narrows down the plausible possibil iti es to only one. This
is what autonomous individuals may find resen tf ul.
The World Government Argument
The world government argument and Pogge 's vertical dispersion model share the
intention of making world peace more fea sible. According to both views, competition
between interstate rivalries is the main cause of instability and wars in the existing global
order. Due to this obser vation, they agree that the current world order consisting of
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"hegemonic nati on-sta tes" should be replaced by a new one. However, the world
government argument distingui shes itself fr om vertically dispersed political model by
giving a different answer to the question who has "the right to the legitimate means of
violence" (Nielsen, 1988, p. 265) to enforce political decisions. Pogge 's answer is that
such a right should be vertically dispersed. 3 In contrast, a world government argument
suggests that there should be a "single final authority, a court of last appeal" (Nielsen,
1988, p. 264). I will fo cus on Kai Nielsen's arguments for a world government since they
represent the paradigm case.
In "World Government, Security, and Global Justi ce", Nielsen explicitly supplies an
argument for a world government. He claims that a world government is desira ble if we
desire "a world with more justice and more humanity in it" (Nielsen, 1988, p. 269). This
world government, according to Nielsen, is "the loose fe deralism of a cantonal system"
that secures the equality of "socially necessa ry rights of security and subsiste nce."
4
Such
a government is the ultimate sovereign power and authority that has a court of last app eal
and military might. It has the universalistic commitments to the basic human rights that
protect the moral equality of all human beings. Nielsen suggests that national sovereig nty
of existing independent soci eties can be traded off for this pur pose, if a world
government is a more efficient way to guarantee this moral equality:
National sovereignty should not be seen as our most important entitlement,
such that without this sovereignty, we lose our centers of gravity or what
makes us a people. We do not need such national sovere ignty to be a
3 Pogge argues that all governmental functions are divisible. He writes, "Eminent domain, economic
policy, foreign policy, judicial review; the control of natural resources, security forces, education, health
care, and income support; the regulation and taxation of resource extraction and pollution, of work and
consumption, can all be handled at various levels and indeed are so handled in existing federal regimes and
confederations" (Pogge, 2008, p. 186).
4 According Nielson, these rights include "right not to be subject to killing, torture, assault, and the like,"
and "rights to healthy air, water, adequate food, clothing, and shelter where these can be had" (Nielson,
1988, p. 275)
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people, and we should see ourselves to put the matter moralistically, as
members of the human community first and as Italians, Americans, Greeks,
Germans, or Canadians second. We should come to recognize that the
soci ally necessa ry rights of security and subsistence, rights that no one can
do without if he or she is even to approximate living a tolerable life, are
universal. Moreover, because no one can do without these rights, they
should be accorded to all people and should not be subverted by
nati onalist considera tions. This moral stance fo llows fr om a respect for
persons. (Nielsen, 1988, p. 268)
However, this does not mean that a world government must be authoritarian or
totalitarian. Nielsen only tries to argue that national sovereignty is not crucial to
preserving national identity. This is especially true for contemporary societies since they
are not self -enclosed beca use of their cooperation in many aspects. He acknowledges the
value of instinctive ways of life and individua ls' local attachments and he claims that a
fe deral world government helps preserve these values. According to him, since the world
government that he advocates is a "loose fe deralism of a cantonal system," different
regions preserve their "considerable autonomy." Nielsen gives an example that different
regions may continue their distinct socioeconomic orders with a world government. He
argues that such a global state therefore is compatible with preser ving "the distinctive
ways of life of different cultures" (Nielsen, 1988, p. 266).
Nielsen holds that this fu rther helps preserve individual s' "local identiti es and
attachments". Instead of dissol ving the identi ties and attachments that individuals already
possess, a world government adds a dif fe rent layer to them. That is, "We can see
ourselves as members of particular nati ons and also as citizens of a common world"
(Nielsen, 1988, p. 267). This new layer of identity greatly benefit individuals because
they do not see each other as members of rivalry societies but rather members of a unifi ed
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community, and this sense of unity reduces the possi bilities of war while enha nces
possi bilities of coop era tion.
It needs to be made clear how Rawls's own view of the basic structure of global
socie ty is different fr om a world government view. It is important to address this
distinction espec ially because Rawls in his international theory suggests that the socie ty
of peoples is "Confedera tion of Peoples," which may give the impr ession that Rawls's
international theory is compatible with a world government. However, in Rawls's
confederation model, each socie ty maintains its own political autonomy and
independence, and the political authority of such a confederation system is derived fr om
the agreement made by the political auth ority of each political society. That is, the global
coop erative organizations do not have the right to legitimate means of violence without
consents and mutual agreements among members. These organizations do not possess
independent means of coercive enforcements but requires contribution and participation
of members. In contrast, according to a world government view, the world government
has its independent political authority and source of coercive means to enf orce its
political decisions. While the regions or soci eties in this world state have autonomy to a
certain degree (e.g., they can make their own economic policies), they rely on the fe deral
world government for the final decision on the disputes on all the other matt ers.
With this distinction clarif ied, I will now explain why this world government view
is not a preferable alternative to Rawls 's society of independent and autonomous
societies.
The first problem with a world government argument is that a democr atic fe deralist
world state presupposes a sense of national iden tity of all its citizens, but this national
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iden tity is unlikely to be developed without an existing and fun ctioning world state.
Nielsen's ideal world state is democratic and fe deralist. For such a citizen democracy to
be sustaina ble, it relies heavily on, according to Charles Taylor, "the spontaneous support
of their members", and "the strong sense of allegiance" (Taylor, 1996, p. 11 9). This is so
beca use, given the liberal nature of a citizen democracy, its continuous fu nctioning
requires that all citizens not only iden tif y themselves with it but also take it to be a crucial
good in their lives. However, it is not clear how this sense of allegiance can exist in the
first place. It seems reasonable to predict that citizens of well- ordered societies, given
their attachments to their current societies, will continue to uphold their political society
and, for the same reason, they will be unwilling to give up their own political society for
a global one. Attachments to a society and the patri otic sentiments can only be cultivated
and developed within an existing political institutional syst em. One can hardly have the
patriotic sentiments toward an imagined world state before it actually exists.
We may say that the European Union (EU) is more or less an experiment of a
regional or even a global government. Many studies show that after many years of being
integrated into a unified Europe, national identiti es individuals have for their own
societies does not seem to diminish but rather thri ve. These researches at the same time
show that "a European sense of iden tity" is either unlikely to emerge or unab le to
compete with the national iden tity despite the intense coop eration among member
societies (Carey, 2002, Cinpoes, 2008, Menendez-Alarcon 2000, Petithomme 2008).
National identity of member societies is the main obstacle for fu rther integration of
European Union. These empirical data show that even with the presence of a common
political and economic community, a sense of belonging and "common sympathy" can
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hardly be fo stered without a strong background of shared history and cultu re. Thus, it is
even more hopeless to expect that an identity with a global regime can emerge without
any global institu tions.
On the other hand, even if individuals in the fut ure develop this sense of allegiance,
it is unlikely to be stable. Given that the world state has huge territory, conceivably there
will be minoriti es who fe el that they and their particular needs are ignored and because of
this they are dis advant aged and treated unf airly by the political institu tions. Just like
situa tions like this in a sovereign society triggers nati onalist and seces sionist movements,
so will it happen in a global society, and these movements will contribute to the
instability of the society or eventually lead to its collapse. Thus, even if a global
government is fe asible, it is highly vulnerable
5
It requires more substantial empirical evidence to determine whether the above two
worries about the idea of a world state are too pessimistic. However, we do not need to
rely on this empirical indeterminacy to show that a world state and a world government
are undesira ble. Instead, we have suffi cient theoretical reasons to show that a world state
is unappealing.
The more serious problem with this world government is that it is not compatible
with any form of proper pat riotism. Nielsen's world government has the same problem as
Pogge 's verti cally-dispersed global institu tions. Both schemes, were they in prac tice,
would not retain suff icient independence and autonomy for a domestic society such that
the society can remain sovereign political socie ty whose members can exclusively and
collectively determine the development plan for it. For this reason, neither of the schemes
5 An in-depth analysis of dissatisfaction of membership in EU of Spaniards due to Spain's disadvantaged
position in economic and political cooperation with more affluent European societies can be found in
Menendez-Alarcon 2000.
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is compatible with protecting proper patriotism that constitu tes individ uals' sense of
worth.
We have argued that a well-ordered society could be considered as a socia l union, in
which persons learn and exercise their excellences fr om associates. Some values cannot
be realized without the joi nt activiti es and coop eration of a collec tive of individ uals. To
illu strate this idea, Rawls uses the example of the orchestra. According to Rawls, the
orchestra is the result of group eff orts, in which "persons need one another since it is only
in active coop eration with others that one's powers reach fru ition" (Rawls, 1971, p. 525,
n. 4; 1999a, p. 460, n.4). No matter how talented and skil lful each individual player is,
she cannot compose an orchestra all by herself. An orchestra is impossible without "a
coordination of activiti es among peers" (Rawls, 1993, p. 321) , because no one player can
"be suffi ciently skilled on many instruments, must less play them all at once". A case of
succes sful coor dina tion among individuals like the orchestra, then, should be considered
valuab le in its elf because it is an achievement that can only be possible through certain
well-coor dinated collec tive activiti es. It is the shared end of socia l union to coordinate the
collective activiti es of individuals in such a way that "the excellences and enj oyments of
each are complem entary to the good of all." (Rawls, 1971, p. 526)
Well-o rdered political socie ties, both liberal and decen t, are themselves social unions
in the sense that, as I have argued in Chapters 2 and 3, they are the common activity or
the "game" that all individual members desire to be a part of, for the pur pose of which
they are willing to esta blish some agreed scheme of conduct. Persons' pride and honor of
their collective achievements in their way of organi zing and improving the society is the
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source oftheir loyalty to the society. It also constitutes one's sense of worth. As Rawls
says:
That there should be such a political and social good is no more
mysterious than that members of an orchestra, or pla yers on a team, or
even both teams in a game, should take pleasure and a certain (proper)
pride in a good per fo rma nce, or in a good play of the game, one that they
will want to remember. (Rawls, 1993, p. 204)
The problem of a world state, therefore, is that it fa ils to take seriously the
confidence individuals take in collec tively determining their own aff airs. Since the
individuals have developed proper patri otism, this will be the main reason that they resist
the expansion of a world government.
Thomas Baldwin, however, argues that it is not clear why a political society
regulated by the princ iples of justice is itself a "preeminent form of human flourishing"
given that it is coercive in nature. This argument of Rawls's fa ils mainly because,
according to Baldwin, Rawls wrongly extends the "social union model" to include a
political society. The succes sful fun ction of a social union relies on its members'
"complem entary activiti es" (Baldwin, 2008, p. 265). Every member, that is to say, must
actively and voluntarily engage in the activity and make her own part of con tributi on.
While it may be true that every member of a political socie ty is in terested in and active ly
participate in the political life, it seems that ''the public realization of justice" and the
continuously eff ective existence of such institu tions, which according to Rawls are the
shared ends of a liberal political society, is more of coercive measures by public
authorities than a collec tive activity by individual citiz ens. Thus, sustaining just
institutions cannot be the shared end understood in the same manner as a shared end of a
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social union, since the realization of the fo rmer does not involve the public participation
but mostly, if not solely, compliance.
It seems that the main reason Baldwin disting uishes a political society fr om a social
union is that the fo rmer is coercive and hence cannot be voluntary while the latter is
voluntary in nature. Such a view undermines the active role that individuals play in
political life of a well-ordered society. Just beca use the political institu tions are coercive
in nature, it does not necessa rily mean that it is impossible for members of a society to
voluntarily engage in the public life and socia l coop era tion with others. Because the
well-ordered societies provide the socia l conditions that support the development of their
sense of worth, the political institu tions will not become the object of dissa tisfaction and
res entment if they continue to serve as the social bases of self-respect. I argued in
Chapter 2 that, for the reason that the political institu tions of a well-ordered socie ty
protect and support members' sense of worth, these individuals identify themselves with
their socie ty, and they are willing to not only remain loyal to it but also to coop erate with
others in collec tively maintaining and developing it. To con tribute to their collec tive
efforts in improving their society, they are willing to coop erate with others by obeying
laws of the socie ty, sitting on Ju ries, paying taxes and voting should be considered as an
effort to maintain the political tradi tion. It is true that these are insta nces of compliance.
However, these are at the same time evidence of their voluntary engagement in the public
aff airs and political life of the society. Thus, the mere fa ct that political institutions are
coercive does not necessa rily show that individual members of a political society remain
in the political socie ty only beca use they are fo rced to do so or they do not have other
options.
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It should also be noti ced that one ma jor motiva tion for members of well-ordered
societies to voluntarily engage in political and public aff airs is that they understand that
everyone has an active role in modif ying the "r ules of the game" so that political
institutions are arranged in such a way that better suits "the common good conception of
justice." Although it may take some efforts and people need endure social in justices for
certain amount of time, sometimes very long, it is the nature of a well-o rdered society
that it is open to changes and it does not dismiss compl aints and suggestions without
justification acceptable to all using the public reason. As long as different opinions and
disagreements are not oppressed and public discussions are allowed to continue, the
socie ty should be able to progre ss. After all, this is how liberal societies break away from
its illiberal past. Those currently decent but nonliberal soci eties should be able to
progress in the same way. Thus, to reply to Baldwin's objection, Rawls should be able to
say: Yes, a well-o rdered society is coercive in nature; however, it is only coercive in
exe cuting the collec tive decisions individual members collectively and voluntarily make .
For this reason, how a well- ordered society should be organized is a decision that is
voluntary in nature, and it is absurd to insist that members of a well-ordered society are
merely compelled to obey passively.
On the other hand, in a loose sense all social unions are coercive to certain degree,
and it is not obvious that this should be the charact eristic that marks the diff erence
between a political society and a social union. To illustrate this point, we can refer to
Rawl s's analysis of the example of a game:
Here we can easily distinguish four sorts of ends: the aim of the game as
defined by its rules, say to score the most runs; the various motives of the
players in playing the game, the excitement they get fr om it, the desire for
exercise, and so on, which may be different for each person; the socia l
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pur poses served by the game which may be unin tended and unknown to
the players, or even to anyone in the society, these being matters for the
reflective observer to ascertain; and then finally, the shared end, the
common desire of all the players that there should be a good play of the
game. This shared end can be realized only if the game is played fa irly
according to the rules, if the sides are more or less evenly matc hed, and if
the players all sense that they are playing well. But when this aim is
attai ned, everyone takes pleasure and satisfaction in the very same thing.
A good play of the game is, so to speak, a collective achievement
requiring the cooper ation of all. (Rawls, 1971, pp. 525-526)
Without taking interest in and valuing the common activity and the process of
coop eration itself, there can hardly be a common ground on which everyone may take
some pleasure in participating. Thus, the charact eristic of all social unions, given that
remaining in them is a member's voluntary decision, is the desire or expectation of"a
good play of the ga me", although some may also have the shared end in some
comprehensive goals. In the case of a game, it is not implausible to say that all the
players are "coerced" in some sense. A common activity is deemed as this game rather
than any other game, only when all the players fo llow the rules that characterize this
game. Without fo llowing these rules, players are not playing this game but something
else. In order to ensure that the players are playing this game, some coercive measures
may be applied. For example, if one player or a few of them do not fo llow the rules, they
will be warned, punished or even excluded fr om playing it. The rules of this game and the
enf orcement of them are necessa ry because, if most or all of the players fa il to fo llow the
rules, they simply cease to play this game. Nonet heless, this does not keep the whole
game fr om being an en joyable common activity to all parties when some constraints
apply. The constraints include that the rules of this game, which is coercive in nature,
must be fa ir to all the part ies. Thus, each individual player must obey the rules that are
mutually agreed by all, and her behavior is constrained by these rules as long as she still
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desires to stay in the ga me. When the game is fa ir and the rules are fo llowed, even though
all the players are "coerced" in the sense that they have no other option than to comply,
this does not undermine the fact that the game is still a process of coop era tion and it is
en joyable to all. It is reasonable to argue that, moreover, the success fu l practi ce and
existence of any form of human associa tion should involve some rules and members, in
order to en joying the association, must comply with them. In like fa shion, the mere fact
that the eff ective operation of a society involves coercion does not neces sarily show that
the society cannot be a good in itself.
Now we should be able to conclude that well-orderedne ss of certain societies are
collective achievements of their individual members, and for this reason these soci eties
are valuable in themselves. Because a world state is incompatible with this value, such a
globally unified fe deral state is not desirable.
One More Obser vation
The core of the disagreement between Rawls and his cosmopo litan critics in terms
of justice of interna tional relations seems to lie in the overarching agenda that guides the
design of such a theory. What Rawls aims to provide is a theory that can conduct
appropriate international interacti ons between peoples, and this theory should be
reasonably acceptable to them. Any agenda on hugely improving human race by
reorganizing the world they live in is not rel evant to this pur pose.
This being said, it is a misunderstanding of Rawls that he intends his principles
regarding international relations as fixed and universally app lied in terms of both space
and time. Such an intention will not allow any space to accommodate the possi bility that
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Chapter 4 Global Distributive Justice and Global Institutions
human beings, at some po int of the development of the whole species, may change the
way of perceiving the world and how they should organize their life fu ndamental ly. A
theory for such an inten tion, as cosmopoli tan criti cs suggests, does not allow any
possibili ty of change but rather tries to retain the status quo. However, this is not the
intention of Rawls's project. He has a more humble pro ject than suggested above. Instead
of trying to find the universally true or good way of organizing human beings, he is more
concerned with the question how the current societies, as they are now, assuming that
they are capable of proposing and fo llowing reasonable princip les and are willing to do
so, may be able to coexist peacefully with each other under some reasonable princ iples
that they can agree on. He does not intend to provide any map for the fu ture development
of the interna tional socie ty. Nonet heless, this does not mean Rawls would not welcome
or would even oppose any change . His proj ect is open to all sorts of changes that the
international society may undergo, simply due to the fact that he ref rains fr om providing
any directions . If individuals all over the world or the majority of them in the fu ture
collectively choose to fo llow, for example, Pogge 's verti cally dispersed model, Rawls
would say, we should simply revise our starting point and ask the question what should
societies nowadays, as what they are now, coexist peacefully under some overlapping
principles, which are not merely modus vivendi but make the peace stable and reliable.
Af ter all, human beings are always constrained by the time and place they live in, and
what they deem to be the best choice may turn out to be less per fe ct as time goes by. In
this sense, it seems to be better to choose a theory of just international relations that
makes the current world better and let it develop in whatever way it may do.
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Conclusion
In this chapter, I argued that the cosmop olitan proposal for a global distributive
principle is implausible due to its implications on the global institu tions. Since the
principle of global distributive justice is derived fr om a cosmopoli tan interna tional
original position, in which parties represent individuals rather than societies, the
reasoning should strictly fo llow that of Ra wls's domestic original position. This means
that there must be a global prin ciple of equal liberties and that of fair opportuniti es, and
these two principles should be the two more fu ndamental principles than the distributive
principle. This poses a question about how the global instituti ons should be arra nged.
Two possible implemen tations can be fo und in Pogge 's and Nielson's works respectively.
Both of the two schemes, however, fail to take seriously the interest of individuals in
collectively determining the domestic aff airs and the pride and honor they take in
corresponding achievements .
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Chapter 5 On the Duty of Assistance
In Chapter 4, I argued that Rawlsian cosmopolitans, who adopt Rawls's
methodol ogy, cannot consis tently hold that there should be a global economic order with
a set of global economic institu tions without first insisting on a world state government.
The problem with such a world state government, however, is that it cannot accommoda te
the proper patr iotism which these Rawlsian cosmopolitans claim to be compatible with
their view. It is on this ground that the cosmopoli tan global order is re je cted. However,
even if Rawlsian cosmopolitanism is compatible with proper pat riotism, I shall argue that
a global diff erence principle is not a more plausible choice than Rawls's duty of
assista nce.
Cosmopo litans object Rawls's duty of assistance because it does not go far enough
in supporting individuals and in protecting the fu ndamental interests of individu als. There
are generally two reasons for this objec tion. One ofthese arguments fo cuses on Rawls's
international original position. Cosmopo litans argue that the reason that a duty of
assista nce, rather than a global distributive principle, fo llows fr om the international
original position is that parti es in it are designed to represent societies instead of
individual s. Had Rawls directly app lied his domestic original posi tion to the global arena,
the argument contin ues, Rawls would have to admit that parties representing individuals
would agree on a global distributive principle. This argument has been responded to in
previous chapters (Chapters 2 and 4). A second argu ment that cosmopoli tans give to show
why Rawls's duty of assistance is not sufficient for interna tional justice fo cuses on the
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globally worst-off individual s. The worry is that since in Ra wls's international theory
there is no principle that can protect the most dis advantaged individuals in the world,
which fu nction a global diff erence principle would fu lf ill, the se individuals are actually
neglected. Since the interests of the globally worse-o ff individuals are neglected by
Rawls's international theor y, it cannot be suff icient for the interna tional justice.
In this chapter I will show that Rawls's interna tional theory of justice only requires
a duty of assistance and that this duty is sufficient for in ternational justice. I will begin by
reco nstructing Ra wls's argument for the duty of assis tance. Since I have shown that
Rawls's design of interna tional original position is justified as it is, such a reconstruction
consists of two steps. I will first show why a duty of assistance will be chosen fr om this
international original position. After this, I will show why a duty of assistance must cease
to apply once a socie ty is well-ordered and is able to develop on its own. After the
recon struction of this argument, I will consider the three main cosmopolitan arguments
against Rawls's duty of assistance and for the global distributive justice principle -what I
call the individualistic argument, the circumstantial fa ctor argument and the historical
debt argument-and I will show that none of these arguments succeed.
What is A Duty of Assistance
According to Rawls, burdened soci eties are not well-o rdered due to their
unfa vorable conditions, and the se soci eties can barely be self -sustainab le. Most
commonly they lack the cultural and political resources to be well-o rdere d. In order to
help such societies to become well-ordered, liberal and decent peoples have a duty to
assist them. The long-term goal of a duty of assistance is "to bring burdened
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societies ... into the Society of well-o rdered Peoples" (Rawls, 1999b, p. 106). In order to
achieve this goal, the duty of assistance is me ant to lay the fo unda tion for a just basic
structure of socie ty, at which point it may cease.
This fu nction is similar to that of the principle of just savings in Rawls's domestic
theor y. The aim of both duti es is not to increase the average level of wealth but to realize
and preserve just or decent institu tions. According to Rawls, the pur pose of the principle
of just savings is "to make possible the conditions needed to estab lish and to preserve a
just basic structure over time ." (Rawl s, 2001, p. 15 9) Each gene rati on should do this by
putting aside a suita ble amount of real capital, which does not have to be in a monetary
fo rm. Forms of savings, besides money , range fr om net investment in machinery and
other means of production to investment in learning and education. In particular, Rawls
points out that capital should also include ''the knowledge and culture, as well as the
techniques and skills, that make possible just institu tions and the fair value of liberty"
(Rawls, 1999a, p. 256). A just saving principle assigns an appropriate rate of
accumulation, which changes depending on the state of socie ty. For example,
When people are poor and saving is difficult, a lower rate of saving should
be required; whereas in a wealthier socie ty greater savings may reasonably
be expected since the real burden is less. (Rawls, 1999a, p. 256)
The duty of just saving should end when the just institu tions are firmly esta blished,
and at this point it should be replaced by the duty of maintaining just institu tions and
preserving their material base. This arrangement is justifiable mainly because what is
valuab le to men "is me aningful work in fr ee associa tion with others, the se associa tions
regulating their relations to one another within a framework of just basic institu tions"
(Rawls, 1971, p. 290; 1999a, p. 258). Excessive wealth would distract men fr om what is
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truly me aningful to them.
Similar to the principle of just savings, the duty of assistance requires various
methods not limited to the accumulation of monetary wealth, and, most of the time,
material wealth is not the most impo rtant aspect that needs to be attended to. Different
well-ordered societies may have uneven con tribu tions to those burdened societies,
depending on their own economic situati ons. For example, a more affluent socie ty,
compared to a less affluent one, may have a greater responsibili ty to help a burdened
socie ty than do the less affluent ones. Once the assisted society has the basic structure
and the political culture for a well-ordered socie ty and is able to carry on its own path of
development by itself, the duty of assistance by other well-ordered societies is replaced
by the duty of maintaining just or decent institu tions and preserving their material base.
At this point, the latter duty should be carried out by the society itse lf, unless it fa lls
below the standard of being well- ordered again.
What Rawls fa ils to explain clearly is why cosmopolitans are wrong in asserting
that a duty of assistance does not go far enough for international justice. My goal in the
rest of this section is to show that Rawls's interna tional theory of justice only requires a
duty of assistance and that this duty is suff icient. In order to do this, an explicit argument
for a duty of assistance is required, and such an argument should include three ste ps : ( 1)
to justif y the global original position, (2) to explain why a duty of assistance will be
chosen in this global original position and (3) to explain why a duty of assistance needs
an ending point. (3) is important because a duty without an ending point presumably is a
form of duty of global distributive justic e-the wealth and resources will be continuo usly
redistributed and transf erred between societies. The first step has been accomplished in
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Chapter 2. I shall fo cus on the next two steps in the fo llowing discussions.
Why a duty of assistance is chosen in the global original position
I have argued that Rawls's main concern in both his domestic and interna tional
theories is how to protect the fun damental interest of individuals in their sense of worth.
The social conditions for this sense of worth to be developed are provided by
well-ordered societies, both liberal and decent. In these societies, social conditions allow
individuals to develop their autonomy and exercise their capacities to accomplish
achievemen ts. One of the achievements that members value is to collec tively determine
the path of development for their own socie ty, and their pride and honor in these
achievements partly constitute their self-r espect. For these reasons, it is a fu ndamental
value to individuals in well-ordered societies to maintain the independence and autonomy
of these societies.
For this reason, one of the fun damental interests that well-ordered peoples have in
the global socie ty is to maintain democratic peace in the global society. For a stably
peac eful environment is considered by well-ordered societies to be indispensable for their
se lf -preser vation and development. Only when the global socie ty is peac eful for the right
reason, i.e., peoples obey the international laws for their own sake rather than merely as a
result of the balance of powers, can the society continuously maintain its independence
and fo cus on its own development. Since this ability to stably maintain self-determination
is crucial for the sense of worth of individual members of a well-ordered socie ty, striving
for democr atic peace should be the main goal of interna tional relations of a well-o rdered
soci ety.
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Now the question is how to achieve democratic peace. I have explained in Chapter
1 that the nature of democratic peace is peace by satisfacti on. I esta blished there the
correlation between satisfaction of individuals and the well-ordered ness ofthe
soci ety -only when it is reasonable to expect that individual members in the society are
generally satisfi ed with what the society secures them can they be satisf ied and be willing
to coopera te with other societies on fa ir terms. The individuals as well as the government
representing them value democratic peace not only because it is in everyone 's best
interest, but also because they have a moral character that make them more likely to value
fa irness and justice for its own sake. In con trast to a well-o rdered society, although
burdened socie ties may appear to be pea ceful, they do not have the innate power to
constrain them selves and to refrain fr om becoming expansionist and aggre ssive when
they have the oppo rtunity. Since only well-ordered liberal and decent societies can be
reasonably expected to be satisfied peoples, it is in a well-o rdered society's interest to
maintain a global environment of democr atic peace in which all the other types of
societies can become well-o rdered. Thus, parties in the international original position
representing well-o rdered soci eties will agree that they should provide aids in all
necessa ry fo rms to the burd ened societies in order to fo ster the appropriate political
culture to enable the individual members to be satisfied for the right reason.
For this pur pose, the parti es in the international original position are willing to
choose a principle that can help construct well-o rdered political culture for the societies
who lack it. A principle that can achieve this goal would ensure that every society has the
capacity to make their own goals of development, and this goal cannot be achieved
simply by distributing resourc es.
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One may ask, fr om the same line of reasoning, why wouldn't parties in the original
position extend the duty of assistance to those nonliberal societies that are benevolent
absolutisms? Since such societies are not stably peac ef ul, it seems to be plausible to argue
that it is in a well-ordered society's interest to urge these nonliberal soci eties to become
well-ordered. However, unlike the burdened societies, socie ties that are benevolent
absolutisms are better off both economically and politica lly, since they are
self-sustainable and they honor basic human righ ts. In this sense, it is more urgent to help
the burdened societies than to help societies that are benevolent absolutisms. On the other
hand, although both types of societies lack the proper political tradi tions and culture, the
members of benevolent absolutist societies do not have a desire to change the socie ty,
partly due to the fact that the society is economically self-sustainable and politically more
advanc ed. This means that such a society potentially is able to improve on its own,
although it does not possess the inner power yet. If a well-o rdered socie ty truly values the
autonomy and self -re spect of individuals, it should not simply assume that individual
members of a benevolent absolutist society do not have the capacity to recognize the
political achievements of well- ordered soci eties and make the decision to change .
Why a duty of assistance must have an ending point
Now we have shown why parti es in the original position would choose a duty of
assistance to help the burdened soci eties construct well-o rdered political culture and
political tradi tions. We can explain now why a duty of assistance is in the best interest of
individual members of economically worse-o ff societies, even though, unlike a global
distributive principle, it does not particularly aim to maximize the life expectations of the
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worst-off individuals in the world.
One advantage of the duty of assistance compared to the global distributive justice
is that it does not merely fo cus on the economic well-being of the burdened societies and
individuals in them. In The Law of Peoples, Rawls rej ects the cosmopol itan view that
there should be a principle of global distributive justice. He argues that the goal of such a
principle is to bring more wealth into poor societies to compensa te for the economic
inequalities in the world. In contrast, a duty of assistance rather emphasizes that
excessive accumulation of wealth in these societies does not contribute to the protection
of the more fu ndamental inte rests of individ uals.
It is true that the political culture of a burdened society cannot be improved without
its economic well-being being improved-when this society cannot sustain its elf nor
ensure its members basic subsistence, it cannot be well-o rdered. In order to be
well-ordered, a society should first and fo remost provide suff icient basic subsistence to
not only enable its members and their dependents to continue their lives but also to
provide its members all-purpose means to take inte lligent advantage of rights and
liberties. Nonet heless, the well-being of a socie ty is not ultimate ly determined by its
material wealth, since the transfer of wealth alone is not suff icient to rectif y the basic
political and social in justices in those burdened societies. What is crucial in terms of
justice is the political culture of a socie ty, name ly, its members' political and civic virt ues.
Although Rawls does not make the connection expli citly, a liberal or decent
political culture is crucial in the sense that, as has been shown in Chapters 2 and 3, only a
liberal or decent political culture is consistent with and can better protect the individ uals'
interest in a sense of worth. When the suff icient level of basic subsistence is met, which
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Chapter 5 On the duty of Assistance
ensures that the society can maintain its well-orderedness, excessi ve wealth does not
contribute much, if anything, to social bases of self-r espect
1
and hence accumula ti on of
wealth beyond certain point does not contribute to the satisfaction of individua ls. Thus,
continuously transf erring wealth fr om wealthy societies to the economically worse-off
ones 1s unnecessa ry.
On the other hand, a scheme of continuous transfer of wealth is also undesirable
due to fo re seeable problems it will create in app lication. Suppose members of a
well-ordered socie ty A collec tively decide that the socie ty should provide more leisure
time even if this is in conflict with continuously increase GDP, when its economic
conditions are suff icient for maintaining its ability to fu nction normally and for providing
material bases for individuals to take advantage of the social conditions to develop and
exercise their autonomy. In the case where this collec tive decision decreases the
economic growth and the society's level of wealth accumulation fal ls behind other
societies, a global scheme of continuous wealth transfer requires that other societies
compensa te for the seeming loss of society of A, even though the loss is the result of a
well-considered voluntary collec tive choice. This will inevitably create tensions between
socie ty A and other societies and it does not seem to be a fa ir system of cooperation.
In order to maintain stable and peacef ul relations of coope ration with other member
societies, it seems that society A is compelled by the global scheme of continuous wealth
transfer to maintain its economic growth at a reasonably expected speed, and this requires
efforts and emphasis on developing the society in its economic aspect. This consequence,
however, suggests that such a global scheme disrespect the autonomy and capacity of
1 In liberal societies, social bases of self-respect include equal liberties and rights, fair opportunities and
their priority over distributive justic e. In a decent society, social bases of self-respect include civic rights
and duties and consultation hierarchy which ensure substantial political participation of indiv iduals.
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making decisions collec tively. It should be clear now that individual members of a
well-ordered socie ty are able to conceiving and pursuing reasonable plans. They also
have the capacity to collec tively determine the development path for their society. Thus,
their collective decision should be allowed and respected by the global socie ty. However,
a global scheme of unconditionally and continuously transferring wealth means nothing
but setting a goal of development for every member society. This goal is that every
socie ty should fo cus on improving the economic well-being and welf are of the socie ty.
That is, the global soci eties requires that economic growth be a fixed plan for any
member soci ety, no matter what individual members actually agree on. However, to set
such a goal fa ils to respect the autonomy of individual members of the socie ty, beca use it
does not allow these individual members to exercise their capacity of concei ving and
pursuing reasonable plans collectively for their soci ety. Thus, to truly respect the
collective decisions individuals make regarding their soci ety, no such goals should be
imposed on a well-ordered socie ty, and a global scheme of continuous wealth transfer is
undesired.
Wealth is Not the Social Basis of Self res pect
In order to show that excessive transfer of wealth does not contribute to peace by
satisfa ction, however, more should be said on why excessive wealth does not contribute
to the sense of worth of indivi duals. In a well-o rdered society, wealth is not as esse ntial as
one's rights and liberties.
As can be seen fr om previous chapters, in a liberal society, self-re spect is secured
by "the public aff irmation of the status of equal citizenship for all" (Rawls, 2001, p. 545)
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and "the fu ll and diverse internal life of the many fr ee communities of inte rests that equal
liberty allows ." (Rawls, 2001, p. 544) Both the status of equal citizenship and the fr ee
social unions depend upon the equal basic liberti es. Based on the equal distribution of
fu ndamental liberties and rights, "everyone has a similar and secure status when they
meet to conduct the common aff airs of the wider society. " (Rawls, 200 1, p. 544) The
equality in terms of basic rights and liberties is so fu ndamental that parti es in the original
position will not compromise them for anyth ing:
[I]f persons in the original position assume that their basic liberties can be
eff ectively exercised, they will not exchange a lesser liberty for an
improvement in their economic well-bei ng, at least not once a certain
level of wealth has been attai ned. (Rawls, 200 1, p. 542)
This is so beca use compromising one's equal liberties will "have the effect of
publicly establishing their inf eriority as defined by the basic structure of soci ety.
This subordinate ranking in public lif e would indeed be humi liating and
destructive of self-est eem". (Rawls, 1971, pp. 544-545; 1999a, p. 477, emphasis
added i
Moreover, the emphasis on material means such as income and wealth will
be "a great misf ortune ". To illus trate this point, Rawls says,
Suppose ... that how one is valued by others depends upon one's relative
place in the distribution of income and wealth. In this case having a
higher status implies having more material means than a larger fr action of
socie ty. Thus not everyone can have the highest status, and to improve
one person's position is to lower that of someone else. Soc ial coop erati on
to increase the conditions of self-respect is impossible. The means of
status, so to speak, are fixed, and each man's gain is anothe r's
loss .... Persons are set at odds with one another in the pursuit of their
self -esteem. (Rawls, 1971, p. 545; 1999a, p. 478)
2 In the original edition, Rawls has a slight different expression from the emphasized part: "This
subordinate ranking in the public forum experienced in the attempt to take part in political and economic
life, and felt in dealing with those who have a greater liberty, would indeed be hu miliating and destructive
of self -esteem."
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The case of a decent society is more complica ted since although such a socie ty
secures basic human rights for every member, it does not ensure every citizen an equal
right to political participation and a fu ll right of fr ee expression. Such a society may even
be compatible with the case where certain positions in the government are reserved for
certain privileged individuals or groups. 3 This shows that a decent society is not fu lly
just. However, as we have shown in Chapter 2, this does not necessa rily mean that a
decent society cannot provide its members social bases of self-respect. The political
institutions of a decent society ensure its members fr eedom fr om slavery, ser fdom and
fo rced occupation but also guarantee that everyone has a substantial role in political
participati on. Members are also ensured to have a substantial degree of fr eedom of
thought and religion. By taking advantage of these rights, individua ls' opinions can be
expr essed in the process of political participation and will be received by officials and
judges with sinceri ty. Also, all comprehensive views are not only allowed to exist but also
"are encouraged to have a flourishing cultural life of their own and to take part in the
civic culture of the wider socie ty" (Rawls, 1999b, p. 76). All these liberties and rights
ensure that all the individual members of the society may develop their moral powers for
the pursuit of any life plan they deem to be valuab le and a sense of confidence in
exercising these powers. Because of the liberties and rights such a decent society
guarantees its members, it affirms a sense of equality based on its respect for and
confidence in every one's capacity in developing and exercising moral agency and
autonomy. On the other hand, due to the decency of the political institu tions and moral
powers of individuals, individuals can fe el a sense of confidence in improving the socie ty
3 This can be seen in Rawls's own example of a decent soci ety-Kanzanistan (Rawls, 1999b, p. 76).
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on their own. For these reasons, individual members of a decent society would not want
to trade the decency of the society for more material gai ns.
Although the person who fa lls in the most disadvan taged group in a well ordered
liberal or decent socie ty may experience more obstacles to achieve her aims due to their
inf eriority in power and wealth, her sense of equali ty, which is the ma jor source of one's
confidence and sense of worth, is still defined and secured by political institu tions.
One thing to be clear about here is that the role of liberties and rights are not to
guarantee that one's self- respect is fo rmed, beca use there is no guarantee that the two
moral powers are developed. Rather, the pur pose of maintaining the equal status of
everyone is simply to guarantee a necessa ry condition for se lf-re spect, without which it
cannot be securely formed.
Since wealth is not fun damentally valuab le to an individual, and the duty of
assistance is not only consistent with what is truly me aningful to men and women but
also ensures a stable democratic peace among all the peoples, which entails that all
individuals are "assured that all-pur pose means necessa ry for them to take in telligent and
eff ective advantage of their basic fr eedoms", the duty of assista nce, rather than a
principle of global distributive justice, is to be preferre d.
The Advantage of the Duty of Assistance
So far we have shown that compared to the principle of global distributive justice,
the duty of assistance is pref erable for two reasons. First, the duty of assistance
emphasizes the importance of the political culture and political tradi tions in protecting
every individual member's interest in self -respect. Only when the well- ordered political
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institutions are esta blished can the society provide social bases of self - respect. In contrast,
the accumulation of wealth is neces sary for the well-orderedne ss only to the extent that it
is suff icient to maintain the well-orderedness of the socie ty and to enable individuals to
take advantage of the rights and liberties
The duty of assistance has another advantage compared to the principle of global
distributive justice. The goal of this duty is consistent with the respect for the political
autonomy of a people as well as the autonomy of its individual members, since this duty
allows these individual members to collec tively design their own plan of development.
The ability to develop on their own is a crucial part of exercising the moral powers of
making reasonable decisions and carrying them out. In contrast, to continue transferring
wealth, as the global distributive principle requires, would threaten the political
autonomy of both the assisted and assisting peoples by interf ering with how its wealth is
spent and distribute d. This economic autonomy is a crucial part of a society's ability of
se lf -determination, because the realization of the latter depends upon the former in many
aspects. A well-ordered society should be respe ctf ully allowed by others to make its own
decisions regarding its domestic aff airs as long as it does justice to other societies and it
assures its members basic human righ ts. It should also be given the oppo rtunity to bear
the consequences of its decisions. Only by being recognized and respected for its capacity
to make decisions and bear the consequences thereof can we say that a society's
autonomy and equality are well recognized and respected.
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Cosmopolitan C1itiques
In this section, I will assess some cosmopolitan objections to Rawls's duty of
assista nce. Cosmopoli tans charge that Rawls's duty of assistance is not enough in terms
of global justice, if Rawls consis tently holds that the interests of individuals should be the
primary concern. Cosmopoli tan theorists often argue that their view is more consistent
with this primary concern beca use it "aims to iden tify principles that are acceptable when
each person's prospects, ra ther than the pr ospects of each society or people, are taken
fa irly into account." (Beitz, 1999, p. 51 9) In general, they have three arguments against
Rawls's refuta tion of a global distributive principle. I will explain and evaluate these
three arguments in the fo llowing.
The individualistic argument
This argument can be fo und in Pogge, Tan, and Beitz 's writings (Beitz, 2000; Pogge,
2006; Tan, 2004). Pogge argues that individuals in poorer societies should not
indistinguishably be held responsible for poverty given that not all of them had the
control over the decisio n-making process. In some cases, the bearers of the consequences
of crucial decisions made for a society had no role in this decision, e.g., children or later
generations in the society; while in others, "the consequences of crucial decisions made
for a society are heavily influenced by luck or other unf oreseeable interve ning caus es."
(Pogge, 2006, p. 215 )
Tan shares Pogge 's worry that Rawls may have overlooked the fact that individuals
in unfavorable situa tions may suffer consequences that they should not be responsible fo r.
He argues that Rawls's argument presupposes implicitly the distinction between
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inequality as a result of choice and inequality due to circumstance. Since a society's
status quo and the economic inequality among peoples are solely a result of its own
previous choices and decisions, the unfa vorable situa tions should not be compensa ted by
a justice principle. This is so because the compensation would involve transferring wealth
fr om the better-off soci eties to the worse-off ones, and this transfer will amount to a
punishment of the well- ordered societies for "their good governa nce". In this sense,
Rawls seems to suggest, "a global distributive principle would be insensitive to the
choice/c ircumstance distincti on; it would treat citizens of well-managed economies
un f ai rly by transferring their gains to citizens of poorly managed economies continuously
as long as global ineq uality remains." (Tan, 2004, p. 70) However, Tan argue s, the
choice/c ircumstance distinction can only apply to individuals but not societies. This is so
beca use a society is composed of individual members, and when we say that a socie ty
should be responsible for some unsound domestic policies or decisions, it is equivalent to
having every individual member responsible for them, However, in many cases, it seems
unfair to hold every individual in a socie ty to be responsible for these social policies
beca use "a major ity of them had no part in the making of these policies." (Tan, 2004, p.
73) Tan argues that being born into an unfavorable circumsta nce, such as a society with
poor population control and bad economic policies, is an accident and no one should be
held as deser ving it. And since no one deserves such bad luck, individuals in socie ties as
described above should not be made suffer the bad consequences, and hence Rawl s's
theory is unwarranted.
Beitz offers a similar argument on this point. He argues that one of Ra wls's
arguments against a global distributive justice prin ciple is that "a cosmopoli tan
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distributive principle would unfairly burden societies which have been responsible in the
conduct of their economic aff airs and benefit those which have not." (Beitz, 2000, p. 691)
This could be shown by Rawls's thought experiment about two hypothetical societies in
The Law of Peo ples. (See Rawls, 1999b, pp. 11 7- 11 8) In this thought experimen t, Rawls
imagines two liberal or decent societies starting at the same level of wealth and the same
size of population but choosing different paths of development. One of them chooses to
industrialize and increase its rate of savings, while the other decides to keep things as
they are . The result of their diff erent choices is that the fo rmer is much wealthier than the
latter after some time. Rawls argues that in cases like this, it would seem unfair to tax the
fo rmer for their choosing a better way of development and getting wealthy and to transfer
part of their wealth to help the latter society as cosmopolitan global distributive justice
require s. The success of this thought experiment, according to Beitz, depends on an
analogy with the individual case-" that socie ty has no obligation to hold people harmless
fr om the adverse consequences of their own inf ormed, uncoerced choic es." (Beitz, 2000,
p. 691) However, he continue s, this analogy does not hold given that the bearers of the
adverse consequences of previous choices are different in two cases. In the individual
case, the bearer is the choice maker. In contrast, in the case of a socie ty, most of the time
the bearers are not the same persons as decision mak ers; rather, they are victims of
unfortunate choices made either by previous generations or elites in the society (Beitz,
2000, p. 527, n. 27). In such cases, it is not reasonable to hold these individuals
responsible for their misfortu ne.
In summary, the common theme of these arguments is that individuals, at least in
some cases, should not be held as responsible for the unfortunate situation that they are in,
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and, therefore, justice requires a principle that would alleviate this situa tion. This
argument has a claim about what individuals deserve-since individuals are not
responsible for the na tional decisions that lead to poverty, they do not deserve the poverty.
This argument has assumed that one does not deserve anything that results fr om
something that she has no control of. The problem with this argument is that fr om the fact
that some persons are not responsible for the consequences, it cannot be concluded that a
burden-sharing princ iple is needed, because a burden-sharing principle will involve what
other persons should be responsible for. If some persons are not responsible for the
consequences and should not suffer them, neither should other persons (who have no
control over the issue whatsoever), and hence there should be no ground for a
burden-sharing princ iple.
On the other hand, if the goal is to benefit the worst-off individuals in the world, it
is arbitrary to transfer wealth fr om the richer soci eties to the poorer ones. There are very
rich persons in the poor countri es and there are very poor persons in those rich countries.
So why simply transfer wealth to the poorer countri es to benef it worst-off persons there
solel y, while leaving the most-dis advan taged persons in the rich countri es behind? Given
that worst-off persons scatter around the world rather than reside aggregate ly in some
poor countri es, it seems that a global distributive princ iple, which aims at transferring
wealth fr om the rich societies to the poor societies, will not achieve its goal.
The cosmopolitan theorists may point out that they are more worried about the
extreme cases of poverty. Due to extreme pove rty, the worst-off individuals in the society
lack the necessa ry means to take eff ective advantage of their basic rights and liberties. In
worse cases, their basic needs for life cannot be sustai ned. In this sense, the worst-off
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individuals in the burdened soci eties must suffer a worse economic situation since,
according to Rawl s's standard ofwell-ordered socie ty, worst-off individuals in a
well-ordered socie ty must be guaranteed the "means necessa ry for them to take inte lligent
and eff ective advantage of their basic fr eedoms." (Rawls, 1999b, p. 50)
To reply to this cosmopolitan challenge, it needs to be pointed out that one of the
pur poses of establishing the just or decent political institu tions, as the parti es deliber ate in
the domestic original position, is to protect and support the development of individua ls'
se lf-re spect so that they can lead a meaningful life as they desire. The priority of liberties
and fr eedoms over wealth and income is for the purp ose of guaranteeing that each has
equal liberties and rights, and the fa ir opportunities to pursue her life plan that may or
may not be driven by the economic concerns. The material resources are only neces sary
but not sufficient for a meaningf ul and desirable life plan and one's se lf-re spect. lf one
chooses to improve their material well-being and earn a greater share of social output, she
should have the opportunity and access to this life plan. Nevert heless, citiz ens' pursuits of
their conceptions of the good should not be impounded by this material goal, nor should
they be fo rced to engage in careers that are highly productive materially speaking. In
order to do this, the basic structure of the society should be regulated in order
to secure citizens' fr eedom and independence, and continually to moder ate
tendencies that lead, over time, to greater inequali ties in social status and
wealth, and in the ability to exert political inf luence and to take advantage
of avai lable opportuni ties. (Rawls, 2001, p. 159)
Given that the primary fu nction of the basic structure of the society is to ensure
individuals the opportuni ties for the pursuits of different conceptions of the good, it is not
among the crucial objects of a socie ty to improve the material life of every citizen or to
raise their expectations over their material gains over time, as long as each has sufficient
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material resources "to take advantage of avai lable opportuniti es". Although the diff erence
principle aims at ensuring that all citizens possess the material means that are neces sary
for their exercises of basic rights and liberties and their eff ective political parti cipation, it
does not require "continual economic growth over generations to maximize upward
indefinite ly the expectations of the least advan taged measured in terms of income and
wealth." (Rawls, 200 1, p. 159)
In this sense, even if it is true that the worst-off individuals in the burdened
societies need more urgent attention to their economic well-being than those in
well-ordered societies for reasons described above, it does not necessa rily imply that a
global distributive principle is required or desirable. A global distributive principle is
solely attentive to the economic aspect of human life, which is importa nt and valuab le to
the extent that one's possession of material resources enable one to engage in me aningful
and desirable life plans, but fa ils to appropria tely address other more crucial aspects. This
principle seems to aim at the continual increase in material gains in those economically
unfa vorable peoples. However, such an increase is both unnecessa ry and distracting for a
meaningf ul lif e. If such an increase is not the goal of the principle of global distributive
justice, then, it must be admitted, it is pointl ess to have this principle or to favor this
principle over the duty of assistanc e. The duty of assista nce, in contrast, has the
advantage that it does not solely fo cus on the economic problems but also attends to other
more important aspects, such as the just basic structure and the supporting political
culture. These are critical for a citizen's self- respect, as has been said in the last section
and in Chapter 2, because they provide robust social bases for one's sense of worth as an
equal member in the community of human beings, without which one's sense of worth
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can be easily threa tened. Therefore, the more appropria te solution for the problem of
world pove rty, even the cases of extreme pove rty, fr om the point of view of justice,
should be the duty of assistance if the individual s' interests are at stake .
The circumstantial fa ctor ar gument
Cosmopo litans, such as Thomas Pogge, Brian Barry and Kok-Chor Tan, point out
that many burd ened societies end up where they are beca use the interna tional economic
order is so structured that they are not able to improve . Since it is imper missible by
global justice to make peoples bear the consequences of decisions that are out of their
control, cosmopoli tans argue, it is impermissible by global justice to leave weaker or
poor societies in the status quo without setting up a burden sharing scheme to improve
their situa tion.
All these arguments assume that Rawls's Law of Peoples fa ils to provide a just
global order without proposing a global economic princ iple. For example, according to
Tan, Rawls's duty of assistance has assumed the justice of the global order rather than
using principles to regulate it in a just way. He argue s,
If we accept that rich countri es have onl y a duty of humanity to poorer
countri es, we are also accepting that the existing baseline resource and
wealth distribution is a just one, and that the global basic institutions
orga nized around and legitimizing the prevailing allocation of wealth
and resources are accepta ble." (Tan, 2004, p. 66, original emphasis)
In this sense a duty of global distributive justice will be more appropriate, since it tries to
structure just global circumsta nces for societies in the first place, that is, to determine the
criteria of rightful ownership . As Tan puts it, "while [duties of assistance] aim to
redistribute wealth, du ties of justice aim to iden tif y what counts as a just distribution in
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the first place." (Tan, 2004, p. 67)
According to Pogge, the reason Rawls rej ects principles of global distributive
justice is that he assumes that "the causes of severe poverty and of other human
deprivation are domestic to the soci eties in which they occur." (Rawl s, 1999b, p. 217)
Based on this assumption, Pogge arg ues, Rawls conceives the duty of affluent soci eti es
towards poor soci eties as one of how to "assist" them. However, Pogge argues, Rawls
fa ils to see that the global economic order fo rces the poor societies into their current
situa tion. That is, instead of attributing the sole responsibi lity to domestic fa ctors for the
economic fa ilure of a socie ty, it should be noticed that the international order will
co-de termine the consequences of national decisions. Thus, to hold a society fu lly
responsible for their status quo presu pposes the justice of global economic order. A fair
global economic order, in contrast to fr ee bargaining, should "make it easier for poorer
than for richer soci eties to achieve high rates of economic growt h". (Rawls, 1999b, p. 215 )
For example, the global economic order could be devised in such a way that it can be
adjusted to minimize poverty or economic hardship in a society. Such a global economic
order should require some burden sharing principle.
Brian Barry seems to agree on the point that a global economic order will
co-de termine domestic economic situa tions (Barry, 1998). According to Barry, the total
amount of world wealth should not be deemed indefinite ly expanda ble. lfwe drop this
assumption, we will realize that "the poor are poor because the rich are rich." (Barry,
1998, p. 151) This fu rther implies that the poor countries can improve economically only
when the rich countries step back and take less advantage of the existing world economic
order. As he write s:
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Let us suppose that we are at the sustaina ble maximum, and that it would
be possible to stay at this maximum while shifting income fr om rich to
poor. Then it does become true that an yone with a large slice of the cake is
directly res ponsible fo r somebod y else having a small one. Interna tionally
it means that poor countri es can expand production (within the limits of
global sustainability) only if the rich countries cut back to make room.
(Barry, 1998, pp. 151-15 2, emphasis added)
Because of the current economic situation-that we are at the sustainab le maximum
amount of world wealth-in the world, Barry argue s, a system is needed so that resources
could be transf erred fr om the wealthier societies to the poorer ones, with the ultimate
goal that the resourc es are benefitting poor individual persons. Theref ore, rich countries
have the oblig ation to transfer resources to poor countries. This obligation, Barry fu rther
argue s, should not be conditional on the in ternal distribution situati on in those poor sta tes.
That is, this responsibility should hold even if the poorer societies are domestically unjust
in terms of economic distribu tion, such as a distributive system that would systematically
fa vor the rich, including the extreme cases in which the society is capable of meeting
every one's needs but ref uses to do so. Conditions like these do not nullif y the obligation
on the wealthier societies' part to transfer wealth and resources to poorer ones becau se:
If some people are not doing their bit, does that mean that others do not
have to step in? If they do not, the vital needs of the poor in poor countries
will continue to go unmet. If they act, vital needs will be met and the cost
will be spread over hund reds of millions of people. It seems an
inescapable conclusion that justice will be adva nced by making the
transfer. (Barry, 1998, p. 160)
It seems that these cosmopolitan philosophers take the global economic order
without a global distributive principle to be unjust because the better-off societies will
take advantage of such a system and infini tely promote their own material well-b eing,
even at the price of the well-being of those poor societies, given that they have a stronger
bargaining power. However, these arguments neglect the fact that well-o rdered soci eties,
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as Rawls define them, would not take advantage of the burde ned societies. Rather, it is
among the fu ndamental interests of the fo rmer to help the latter become self-sustainable
and well-ordered, and one necessa ry condition for a well-o rdered socie ty is that "all
citizens must be assured the all-pur pose means neces sary for them to take inte lligent and
eff ective advantage of their basic fre edoms." (Rawls, 1999b, p. 50) It is also among the
fu ndamental interests of well-ordered societies to maintain fa ir terms of coop eration with
each other regardless of their actual bargaining powers. The well-ordered societies have
these two fun damental inte rests because they are necessa ry for the prolonging and stable
democratic peace in the global socie ty, without which the independent and autonomous
developing path will be interrupt ed or threa tened.
Of course, these prudent concerns are not the only reason that well-ordered people
are ready to propose and fo llow the fa ir terms of coop eration to each other and to help
burdened socie ties so that the se soci eties could be included into this circle of coopera tion.
It should be remembered that for the citizens in the well-o rdered societies, to live in the
liberal or decent institu tions and to fo llow constituti ons and laws are a processes of moral
education. Through this process, the recognition and respect for the equal moral worth of
each other and fo llowing fa ir or decent coop erative terms are deeply embedded into every
citizen's identity. That is, being a citizen in a just liberal soci ety, one is most likely to
have the tendency to respect each other and coop erate with each other on fair terms. It is
in this sense that Rawls distingui shes "a people" from "a state" based on the moral
character of the fo rmer, which regulates a people's behavior in such a way that a people
will not only recognize other peoples as equals but also will offer and honor fair terms of
coop eration to them given that other peoples do so as well. We ll-ordered peoples, due to
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this moral character, are not moved solely by their prudent or rational interests such as to
protect their territor y, but will limit their basic interests as required by the reasona ble.
Thus, they will not take advantage of their bargaining power so that their interests can be
unlimitedly preserved and maximized. The duty of assis tance, among all the other
principles that Rawls proposes to guarantee a fair global coop erative system, aim not at
redistribute the wealth in the world. Rather, it aims at maintaining a fair background
fr am ework, so that a fr ee competiti ve-ma rket trading scheme to everyone 's mutual
advantage could exist. As has been argued above, well-ordered peoples have the moral
character and they "will not attempt to monopolize the market, or to conspire to form a
cartel, or to act as an oligopoly." (Rawls, 1999b, p. 43) In addition, the existing unjust
distributive methods used by the global cooper ative organizati ons must be "corrected,
and taken into accou nt by the duty of assi stance." (Rawls, 1999b, p. 43)
Given that the global institu tional order for well-o rdered soci eties is proposed
within the constraints of the moral character of well- ordered peoples, it will not
perpetua te some societies in inf erior and poor situa tions. A global economic order that
will constantly dis advantage the economically worse-off societies is unacceptable to
well-ordered societies because it is against their own fu ndamental interests as well. Thus,
Rawls's Law of People will not lead to a global institutional order that simply reflects the
bargaining power of different soci eties and fa vor the rich societies. The duty of assistance,
based on what I have argued, is not merely a duty of humanitarian aid. Rather, it is one of
the fun damental principles that help maintain the background justice needed for fa ir trade
and it regulate the economic order of the global society in this sense.
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It may be argued that even if Ra wls's duty of assistance can regulate the economic
order of the socie ty, it still may not be the best choice, because it has no means of
preventing the (vast) inequali ties among socie ties, which should not be allowed by a just
global order. In other words, if a global order has the potential or has no measure to
prevent the possi bility of the increasing gap, then this global order must be unjust. It
seems that, the cosmopoli tans may argue, if Rawls's Law of peoples with its duty of
assistance is not able to eff ectively narrow down or eventually eliminate the gap, it
should be replaced by a global principle of distributive justice that will have such an
eff ect.
The assumption of this cosmopol itan ob jec tion, it should be noticed, is that
inequality is equivalent to in justice. However, Rawls has emphasized many times that
inequality is not equivalent to in justice, and the gap between the rich and poor is not
necessa rily unjust. In a well- ordered liberal soci ety, Rawls argues, reasonable inequalities
among different individuals are a ma jor incentive for them to strive for their goals and
contribute to the socie ty. As he puts it, "any modern soci ety, even a well-ordered one,
must rely on some inequaliti es to be well designed and eff ectively organiz ed." (Rawls,
200 1, p. 55) This inequality is allowed in a well-o rdered society only when it is the result
of a proced ure that honors both the equal basic liberty princ iple and the fair equality of
oppo rtunity principle. That is, the inequality must not violate the equal and fr ee
citizenship that every individual owns in a well-ordered liberal society; and it must not
undermine the fair chance and equal prospects held by all who are similarly endowed and
motivate d, regard less of the continge ncies such as their social class of origin and their
good or bad luck. As long as these two principles are satisfied bef ore the social wealth
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and positions are distribu ted, a reasonable and ra tional citizen must recognize that her
expectation of life could be as high as, or even higher than, that of any other citizen,
rega rdless of the current socio-e conomic status that she occupies, provided she has the
motivation to fu lly train her natural gifts into various required capacities to carry out her
life plan. That is, one's position in the society should play a very small role, or even no
role at all, in fo rming the content of one's final ends and purposes. She should be
motivated and confident to pursue her reasonable life plan solely based on the means and
opportunities that are avai lable to her. This implies that, whatever the distributive pattern
allowed by the diff erence principle is, every citizen should be provided with substantial
support and means to train their natural endowments.
The social and economic inequalities should not be allowed if "the least advan taged
[do not] have sufficient all-pur pose means to make inte lli gent and eff ective use of their
fr eedoms and to lead reasonable and worthwhile liv es." (Rawls, 1999b, p. 14 4) What
truly matters, in this sense, is not the current possession of a certain socio-e conomic
status, but rather the prospects of fu ture achievements. As long as one's prospects of her
life plans are not constra ined by her socio-eco nomic status, the soci al distribution of
wealth and positions should not be deemed to be unfair. Similar to the domestic case, in
the society of peoples, what matte rs is that every people has the equal prospect of their
path of development and fut ure achievements . The duty of assista nce, when it is fu lf illed,
should suffice a fair opportunity to every society, regardless of its possession of wealth
and resourc es. Based on this equal share of opportuni ties, any people should be able to
pursue the goal that members collec tively take to be worthwhile and peoples should share
this prospect equally.
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Cosmopo litans, however, may have the worry that, without a distributive principle
regulating the long-term coop eration between peoples, the global fr ee market system
must lead to excessive concen tra tions of property and wealth in the better-off societies
and fu rther their political domination over the worse-off societies, even though individual
transactions between societies are fair. It seems that this challenge takes the economic
inequalities between peoples to be evil because it leads to uneven political powers and
dominative role of rich soci eties over poor societies. After all, this seems to be Rawls's
worry in his theory of the domestic justice and it is the reason why a diff erence principle
regulating social distribu tion is necessa ry:
Even though the initial state may have been just, and subsequent social
conditions may also have been just for some time, the accumulated results
of many sepa rate and seemingly fair agreements entered into by
individuals and associa tions are likely over an extended period to
undermine the background conditions required for fr ee and fair
agreements . Very considerable wealth and property may accumulate in a
few hands, and these concen trations are likely to undermine fair equality
of oppo rtunity, the fair value of the political liberties, and so on. (Rawls,
200 1, p. 53)
The worry of the cosmopolitans, when it comes to global issues, is that the
inequality in the share of wealth will lead to unequal standings of different peoples
eventually , which will encroach the independence and the autonomy of those
economically worse-off ones.
It must be acknow ledged that, however, such an unfortunate consequence
presupposes that, without the regulation of a we alth-transferring principle between the
rich and the poor societies, the rich socie ty will inevitably takes advantage of the poorer
ones. However, as have been argued above, on the one hand, one of the fu ndamental
interests of well-ordered peoples is the well-orderedness of all the other societies in the
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global socie ty, because this is the only way to ensure the democratic peace; on the other
hand, it is the moral nature of a well-o rdered socie ty to offer and obey fair terms of
coop eration to other societies. It is not the case that all societies will behave purely
altruistically. Surely they are motiva ted by their own in terests . However, this pursuit of
se lf -interests is constrained by other interests such as the fu ndamental interest in the
democratic peace.
The historical debt argument
One specific type of the circu mstantial fa ctors argument is the historical debt
argum ent. For example, Pogge, in certain wri tings, seems to suggest that Rawls's Law of
Peoples, due to its fe ature of being an ideal theor y, fa ils to address the real problems in
the world. One example of such fa ilure is that Rawls neglects the fact that the uneven
economic achievements in different soci eties are largely due to the long-term exploi tation
of the poor societies carried out by the wealthy societies in the history, which directly
leads to the current economic difficulti es in the poor societies. Pogge may try to argue
that in an ideal world where well-ordered soci eties do not owe any debts to each other or
to burdened state s, it could be expected that repres enta tives in the interna tional original
position would mention nothing about historical events that may have become a barrier
for some sta tes to become members of well-o rdered societies. However, our world is not
the ideal world, and in a large part the world is what it is now beca use of what ha ppened
historically. For example, Pogge points out, "the social starting positions of the worse-off
and the better- offhave emerged fr om a single historical process that was pervaded by
massive grievous wrongs." (Pogge, 2002, p. 203) To be more specific,
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Most of the existing international inequality in standards of living was
built up in the colonial period when today's affluent countries ruled
today's poor regions of the world: trading their people like cattle,
destroying their political institu tions and cultu res, and taking their natural
resourc es. Around 1960, when the colonizers finally left, taking what they
could and destroying much else, the inequality in per capita income
between Europe and Af rica had grown to 30:1, and vast inequalities
existed also in education, healt h-care, infr astructure, and legal and
political organiza tion. These inequalities greatly dis advan taged Af ricans in
their dealings with governments and corporations of the affluent countries.
(Pogge, 2005, p. 97)
That is, Rawls's theory should consider a case like this: Initially the two societies
are of the same level of wealth and have the same size population, and neither country is
well-ordered. The first decides to industri alize and to increase its rate of (real) saving,
while the second does not. Being not satisfied with the wealth accumulation and saving
rate and fe eling a need for more natural resourc es, the first one tried all the means to grab
wealth and resources fr om the second. The second state simply does not have the power
to stop the exploitati on. Decades (or even hundreds of years) later, the first has
accumulated enough savings and in this process it gradually beca me a liberal or decent
soci ety, and it admitted that it is immoral to grab wealth and resources fr om the seco nd
and prevented it fr om developing. The second, however, due to all these historical
reasons, has lost the chance to become industri alized, and was fo rced to keep the old way
of life and remains economically unsustainab le. In this sense, the inferior situation of the
second society is not the result of its own choices. Rather, in the historical context, it has
been left few, if any, choices. In a case like this, it seems that the duty to avert the harms
caused by one's previous conducts would require a wealth-transferring system.
Rawls may argue that he only considers ideal the ories in ideal cases where such
historical debts do not exist. Nonethe less, since he believes that his theory is realistically
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Chapter 5 On the duty of Assistance
utopian, it should help to add more complications, if it is necessa ry to address the doubts
on the extent to which the theory can be realistic. This being said, however, even if we
take possible historical debts into consid erati on, it does not fo llow that a
wealth-transferring system is needed. What a now well-ordered society owes a burdened
one, assuming the former has a history of exploiting the latter in the past, is a fair starting
point and the opportunity to become well-ordered if it chooses to do so. This fair starting
point and the opportunity can be provided by the duty of assistance by paying back the
wealth and natural resources taken away before and using them in helping establish legal
and political institu tions and fo ster political cultures. When the assisted socie ty has
acquired all the capacities to sustainably manage its own aff airs and to aid its own
members in basic needs, education, health-care and other necessa ry means to pursue a
meaningf ul life, they should be able to take advantage of the fair terms of cooper ation
and make its own path of development. When the assisted socie ty becomes an equal
member of the soci ety of peoples, it is not clear how the historical debt needs to be
fu rther compensated.
On the other hand, it has been argued by some, such as Mathias Risse's essa y, that
colonialism may have a more complicated impact on the now burdened societies than
simply causing harm s. In this ess ay, Risse points out that cosmopolitans like Pogge
always comes to the conclusion that "developing countries would be better off had they
been left alone" by comparing the economic well-being of indust rialized soci eties with
that of the developing countri es and observing that the development path of the former
was never interf ered with (Risse, 2005, p. 13). This argument, however, is not obviously
true, given that the influence and effect of colonial prac tices is more complicated than
Page 149 of 159
Chapter 5 On the duty of Assistance
simply being harmful to the developing countries. For example, it should not be denied
that colonial rule, while being harmful to the invaded societies and their members during
its existence, also encourages "Technological advanc es in infrastruct ure, medicine, and
other areas that it brought" (Raisse, 2005, p. 14). This should not be taken as an excuse
defending colonialism. All this shows is that an argument based counterfactual
hypothe ses, such as Pogge 's, does not provide any definite answer in understanding the
world and people in reali ty. The methodology of using counterfactuals as the only
varia bles becomes more implausible in reaching the accurate conclusion, if we recognize
that a lot of historical events happen due to some accidents, and maybe no fa ctor can be
held as constant.
Conclusion
In this Chapter, I reconstructed Rawls's argument for a duty of assistance. I
explained why parti es in the international original position representing societies would
choose a duty of assista nce. They choose it because it is necessa ry for maintaining
democratic peace by bringing more societies to become well-o rdered, and democratic
peace in turn is necessa ry to secure the fun damental interest of individuals in their
self -respect. I fu rther examined why a duty of assistance is preferred to a duty of global
distributive justice. I argued that once a society is well-o rdered, contin uously transf erring
wealth to it, as required by a duty of global distributive justice is both unnecess ary and
undesired. Lastly, I showed that the three ma jor fo rms of objections cosmopolitans hold
against a duty of assistance fa il to establish that global justice requires a global
distributive principle.
Page 150 of 159
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Creator Wei, Xiao (author)

Core Title Defending Rawls's Law of Peoples against cosmopolitan critiques

School College of Letters, Arts and Sciences

Degree Doctor of Philosophy

Degree Program Philosophy

Publication Date 11/21/2012

Defense Date 08/15/2012

Publisher University of Southern California (original), University of Southern California. Libraries (digital)

Tag cosmopolitanism,decent societies,global distributive justice,liberal societies,OAI-PMH Harvest,sense of worth,The Law of Peoples

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Advisor Lloyd, Sharon (committee chair), Renteln, Alison Dundes (committee member), Watson, Gary L. (committee member)

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