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University of Southern California Dissertations and Theses
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The role of the DPRK's Propaganda Office in the Korean War (1946-1953)
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The role of the DPRK's Propaganda Office in the Korean War (1946-1953)
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Content
THE ROLE OF THE DPRK’S PROPAGANDA OFFICE IN THE
KOREAN WAR (1946-1953)
by
Sang Bum Kim
A Thesis Presented to the
FACULTY OF THE USC GRADUA TE SCHOOL
UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA
In Partial Fulfillment of the
Requirements for the Degree
MASTER OF ARTS
(EAST ASIAN AREA STUDIES)
August 2012
Copyright 2012 Sang Bum Kim
ii
Table of Contents
List of Tables iii
List of Figures iv
Abstract v
Chapter One: Introduction 1
Chapter Two: Institutional and Historical Background 6
1) The Activities and Goals of Propaganda and Agitation in Socialism
2) Previous Research
3) The Origins and Implementation of a Propaganda Office during the
Pre-Korean War (1945 – 1950)
Chapter Three: The Operating Structure and System of a Propaganda Office
during the Korean War 17
1) The Composition and Management of the Propaganda Office
2) The Selection and Education of the Director and the Propagandists
Chapter Four: The War Effort through Education and Mobilization 27
1) Education
a. NKWP and DPRK’s Broad Policies for the General Public
b. Patriotism and the Soviet Culture
c. Advanced Agricultural Skills
d. Cultural Enlightenment and Entertainment
2) Mobilization
a. Production of War Provisions
b. Army Assistance
Conclusion: The Pursuit of Regime Legitimacy in the Rural Areas 48
Bibliography 51
iii
List of Tables
Table 1: The Operation Structure and System of the Propaganda Office 26
Table 2: The Amount of Harvesting 36
iv
List of Figures
Figures 1: The Exterior of a Propaganda Office 21
Figures 2: Farmers in a Propaganda Office 43
v
Abstract
This research investigates how propaganda was used to prevent the government of
the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (North Korea) from collapsing during the
Korean War. In particular, we will focus on the propaganda office as the functional unit of
organization for the war effort. This office was central the government’s efforts to recover
and reestablish political and economic strength, especially in rural regions. To solidify its
political and agricultural authority, the regime relied on political-ideological public
education and the mobilization of war resources. This study will examine the propaganda
office’s key role in establishing and maintaining the regime’s legitimacy throughout the
Korean War. This study focuses on North Korea’s propaganda office because it was
central to the regime’s answer to these challenges. The major and primary resource of my
research comes from a daily periodical of the North Korean Workers’ Party. Because
North Korea continuously fabricated, controlled, and developed ideology for its regime
through its own interpretation of his history, the language in its current books and
journals has been moditified to reflect a fabricated history. However, the daily Rodong
Sinmun has not been tampered with. This provides a unique opportunity to uncover what
actually occurred inside the regime during the Korean War. In addition, the daily is the
only publication that presents extensive information that can be inferred about the
propaganda office because the daily was one of the primary propaganda tools used during
the Korean War.
1
Chapter One: Introduction
In the DPRK (Democratic People’s Republic of Korea), the party is the state: the
party is the highest level of organization. It is vital to the state’s operation and runs North
Korea through political control. The party is better known as the North Korean Workers’
Party (NKWP). The NKWP manages the regime through political control and the basic
unit of governance is organization. Even the smallest unit of organization’s activity is
based on propaganda and agitation. The NKWP’s organization and propaganda and
agitation both operate through ideology and tactics, which creates a flexible structure that
achieves the regime’s goals.
Most North Korean experts in South Korea support the view that North Korea
established a socialist system after the anti-Japanese guerrilla conflict in Manchuria in the
1930’s. However, I believe that the Korean War from 1950 to 1953 primarily formed
North Korea’s current socialist system, only after which North Korea had its own nation
with which to experiment with structure and ideology. I believe that North Korean
conducted the war through its highly detailed organization and propaganda and agitation
form these experiences, established its political power and authority.
In the middle of the Korean War, North Korea faced its most serious national
crisis. General MacArthur’s landing operation at Incheon in September 1950 forced
North Korean forces to retreat to the border between China and North Korea, leaving
most of North Korea occupied by U.S. and South Korean forces. The U.S. and South
Korea had destroyed the North’s industrial bases, causing massive loss of life and
2
property in rural areas with the goal of crippling agriculture, North Korea’s economic
backbone. When North Korea retreated, the party organization crumbled and anarchy was
widespread because the political leadership was not organized enough to control the
general public in a way that implemented the party’s goals and duties.
For instance, in Yeon-chon County in Kang-Won Province, the North Korean
workforce decreased by 40% in the period September 1950 to February 1951.
1
The
majority of the workforce in the rural areas at that time consisted of elderly and women,
because young people were sent to the battlefield. Many farmers and local citizens in
Ham-Ju and Jung-Pyung County, in Ham-Nam Province, neglected their farming, sold
agriculture produce and tools at a low price, and ran away in order to survive.
2
In addition, many North Korean citizens who were anti-socialist and did not
support the regime used this opportunity to flee to South Korea. Because these targeted
farmers comprised nearly 80 percent of the North Korean workforce,
3
the political-
economic foundations of the North Korean regime began to crack. After North Korea
recovered its occupied lands with the aid of the Chinese Army, the vital question
remained: how would the regime restore its agricultural production system and re-exert
political control?
This research investigates how propaganda was used to prevent the government of
the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (North Korea) from collapsing during the
Korean War. In particular, we will focus on the propaganda office as the functional unit of
1
Labors, 1951. 2, pp. 107-108.
2
Collections of Decisions of the NKWP Central Committee in 1953 (Pyongyang: the NKWP Central Committee, 1953), p. 66.
3
Kim Il Sung, “On Improving the Work of the Party Organization,” Kim Il Sung W orks V ol. 6 (Pyongyang: The Worker’s Party of
Korea Publishing House, 1980), p. 499.
3
organization for the war effort. This office was central in the government’s efforts to
recover and reestablish political and economic strength, especially in rural regions.
To solidify its political and agricultural authority, the regime relied on political-
ideological public education and the mobilization of war resources. This study will
examine the propaganda office’s key role in establishing and maintaining the regime’s
legitimacy throughout the Korean War. This study focuses on North Korea’s propaganda
office because it was central to the regime’s answer to this challenge.
This research is valuable for a number of reasons. First, the propaganda office
system is not currently in use in North Korea, so few outside scholars are aware of its
existence. Many North Korean experts have underestimated its role and duties, but
Hwang Jang-yup, former president of Kim Il Sung University and former secretary of the
North Korean Workers’ Party (NWKP), had a different view that the propaganda office
played an important role in cultivating a strong sense of national identity and helping the
general public prove their political loyalty as North Korean citizens. This paper explores
their questions and the adequacy of their claims.
Second, research on North Korea during the Cold War especially the Korean War
is difficult due to the lack of primary documents. The Korean War in school achievement
has been studied extensively during the past five decades for political reasons. North
Korea’s society and culture at that time has received relatively little attention from
Korean scholarship in general and the Korean War has been much neglected branch of
North Korean studies in South Korea and the US. In recent years, many scholars have
collected research materials from China and Russia and constructed a database of them
4
such as the daily of the NWKP, the Rodong Sinmun, Kim Il-Sung and Kim Jong-Il works
and collections, Collections of decisions of the NKWP, and various North Korean
academic journals supported by the Ministry of Education in South Korea since 2003.
This study with these invaluable documents will provide scholars with a new area to
research especially during the Korean War. There have been several accounts that point to
the dynamics of North Korean’s everyday life and society at this time.
Lastly, it is imperative that scholars view the Korean War through the lens of
cause-and-effect policy-making processes rather than simply battle-outcome reports.
However, within the vast territory of studies on the Korean War there remains a large
piece of uncharted terrain about North Korea’s propaganda and agitation. To date, there
has been minimal research regarding North Korea’s propaganda and agitation because
previous research on North Korea focuses on its political system and leadership for
political reasons. Therefore, rather than focusing on one specific role of the propaganda
office in rural areas, I will broadly describe its origin, growth, and role before and during
the Korean War, the period from 1946 through 1953. Even though it is a brief 7-year
period, this study spans a large amount of researches of the policies and processes that
formed North Korea, an area which has not been researched rigorously.
The major and primary resource of my research comes from a daily periodical of
the North Korean Workers’ Party called Rodong Sinmun. Because North Korea
continuously fabricated, controlled, and developed ideology for its regime through its
own interpretation of its history, the language in its current books and journals has been
modified to reflect a fabricated history. However, the daily Rodong Sinmun has not been
5
tampered with. This provides a unique opportunity to uncover what actually occurred
inside the regime during the Korean War. In addition, the daily is the only publication that
presents extensive information that can be inferred about the propaganda office because
the daily was one of the primary propaganda tools used during the Korean War. My
research method is primarily based upon a historical approach.
6
Chapter Two: Institutional and Historical Background
1. The Activities and Goals of Propaganda and Agitation in Socialism
Propaganda and agitation are general forms of communication between a
Communist party and its general public, performed as education. Propaganda combines
new social and cultural concepts with traditional ones. Agitation combines new social and
cultural concepts with human activities
4
. Propaganda emphasizes theory; agitation
emphasizes action. Agitation is a particular kind of political activity, “which through the
propagation of certain ideas and slogans should influence the consciousness and the
mood of the broad masses”.
5
They have two kinds of meaning: announcement and advertisement.
Announcements inform people of important information and knowledge that they must
know as forms of compulsion.
6
Advertisement is to inform people of simple information
that people may need to know as forms of self-activity.
7
Propaganda and agitation must
be combined to attempt to improve political consciousness and raise cultural levels of the
popular masses.
Kim Il Sung, former president of North Korea, explains that the purpose of
propaganda is to educate party members about Marxism-Leninism so that they can
understand the political line and policy of the party. Agitation is to encourage the general
4
Edited by the Editorial Department, The Theory of Propaganda and Agitation (Seoul: Jiyangsa, 1989), p. 20.The original version of
this book is Russian but it was translated into Korean.
5
C. D Kernig ed, “Agitation”, W estern Society and Marxism Communism, Vol. 1, (New York: Herder and Herder, 1972), p. 51.
6
Edited by the Editorial Department, The Theory of Propaganda and Agitation, pp. 22-24
7
Edited by the Editorial Department, The Theory of Propaganda and Agitation, pp. 22-24.
7
public to join and perform revolutionary tasks of the party and government by arousing
their enthusiasm.
8
According to a political dictionary for the general public, propaganda
is to explain and educate the public about certain ideology, theory, knowledge, and
political views through radio, publications, or conversations.
9
Agitation is to concentrate
all the party’s energy into the public in order to build up a close relationship with the
public.
10
In addition, agitation plays a key role in explaining the policy of the party and
government and helping people perform and successfully complete assigned missions.
The difference between propaganda and agitation is that propaganda helps ordinary
people see a problem and plan a solution by understanding the nature of certain issues.
11
Therefore, propaganda is more logical and methodical than agitation in terms of theory.
These forms are fused in socialist nations into the compound word “agitprop.” This word
denotes agitation and propaganda that are carried out through the medium of the arts and
largely dispense with technical aids such as the press, the visual arts and especially the
spoken word.
12
The goal of both is to educate and mobilize the popular masses to perform civic
duties by improving political consciousness, national identity, and socio-cultural
awareness by improving a relationship with the general public. Education and
8
Selection of Kim Il Sung’s W ork V ol. 3(Pyongyang: The Worker’s Party of Korea Publishing House, 1953), pp. 304-305.
9
Political Dictionary for the General Public (Pyongyang: The Worker’s Party of Korea Publishing House, 1964), p. 251.
10
Ibid., p. 250.
11
Ibid., p. 251.
12
C. D Kernig ed, “Agitation”, W estern Society and Marxism Communism, Vol. 1, p. 51.
8
mobilization through the propaganda and agitation allow the popular masses to know
how to interact and achieve the contemporary regime goal and what to do for the goal.
Propaganda is an effective means to understand little-known North Korean society
and a dynamic dialogic process between the party and government and the general
public.
13
North Korean propaganda reflects the state’s wishful desire to cultivate its ideal
self-portrait and a transparent showcase of the regime’s intentions.
14
Therefore,
propaganda enables the popular masses to know how to achieve the regime’s
contemporary goal and what to do for it. People’s improved consciousness and raised
cultural level through education played a key role in cultivating the regime legitimacy
and national identity. Given the fact that North Korea was a young country liberated from
Japan, its history was short and the politico-ideology level of the party members and
popular masses were low respectively. More seriously, North Korean people were
confused about their identity. Therefore, propaganda was to cultivate and strengthen a
strong sense of belonging and legitimacy and national identity as a North Korean.
Legitimacy is the popular acceptance of a governing law or regime as an authority.
Political legitimacy is a basic condition for governing, without which a government will
suffer deadlock and collapse.
15
In political systems where this is not the case, unpopular
regimes survive because they are considered legitimate by a small, influential elite.
16
13
Suk Young Kim, Illusive Utopia-theater, film, and everyday performance in North Korea (Ann Arbor: the University of Michigan,
2010), p.12.
14
Ibid., pp. 11-12.
15
Dahl, Robert A. Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1971), pp. 124-150.
16
Ibid., pp. 124-170.
9
National identity is a person’s sense of belonging to one state or nation, a feeling
one shares with a group of people, regardless of one’s citizenship status.
17
National
identity is not an inborn trait, but rather a direct result of the presence of “common
points” in people’s daily lives. The national identity of most citizens of the one state or
nation tends to strengthen when the country or the nation is threatened militarily. As an
external threat becomes clearer, the sense of belonging to the nation rises, as individuals
seek to unite with fellow countrymen to protect themselves and fight against the common
threat.
18
In North Korea, the increase in political consciousness, national identity and a
raised cultural level of the popular masses was spurred by propaganda and agitation. This
increased common consciousness enabled the country to recover and reestablish a unified,
ordered political system and identity, and played a key role in creating North Korea’s
regime legitimacy.
Lenin pointed out that the operating structure and system of propaganda and
agitation should be dualistic and different than the existing political organizations.
19
This
shows the functional and organizational importance of propaganda and agitation activities
on a daily basis
20
and explains why North Korea established a propaganda office, even
though there were similar political organizations for propaganda and agitation in the
political party and government. North Korea’s propaganda and agitation activities
followed the principle of the USSR’s propaganda and agitation.
17
Anthony D. Smith, National Identity (Reno: University of Nevada Press, 1993), pp. 13-50.
18
Ibid., pp. 13-50.
19
Edited by the Editorial Department, The Theory of Propaganda and Agitation (Seoul: Saemulgyul, 1989), p. 150.
20
Ibid., pp. 137-138.
10
2. Previous Research
There is no comprehensive monograph in any language and little is known of the
original copy of the propaganda office. The propaganda office played an important role in
recovering and reestablishing political and economic strength, especially in rural regions
through education and mobilization during the Korean War. This is because the Rodong
Sinmun is a unique primary source and many parts of this paper during the Korean War
era were overlooked. In addition, North Korea’s neighboring countries, namely China
and the USSR (Russia), also the US, hold copies of the newspaper that neither Koreas
possess.
North Korean experts in Dongguk University in South Korea performed an
academic project called “The change of North Korean society from 1945 to 2003 through
the Rodong Sinmum” sponsored by the Ministry of Education of the South Korean
government from 2002 to 2005. Through this research, North Korean academy in South
Korea was able to get the full index of the Rodong Sinmun by gathering the paper from
China, Russia, and the US. However, because of the multiple research and publications of
the North Korea’s politics and economic, the research on the propaganda office even
propaganda was a work not much studied until Professor Armstrong at Columbia
University published his book, the North Korean Revolution 1945-1950 (2003).
This book makes the biggest and most important contribution to our new
understanding of the North Korean regime formation from 1945 to 1950 by focusing on
political, cultural, economic, and social change with unnoticed North Korean resources
11
stored at the US National Archives. The author explains how the North Korean system
actually works and they established national legitimacy and identity. In this book, he
argued that culture, propaganda, and education have tended to be blurred in revolutionary
Marxist-Leninist states and North Korea is no exception, and indeed the emphasis on
ideology and propaganda is even more striking in the formative years of the DPRK than
in many other socialist regimes.
21
In addition, his book brings us closer to understanding
the role and value of the propaganda, and offers a discerning analysis of the deep
connections and affinities, by stating that culture, ideology, propaganda, and education
were drawn together in order to create a technically competent workforce for national
reconstruction and to instill revolutionary consciousness among the masses.
22
The book does not mention the propaganda office that played a central role in
propaganda. It may be that North Korea tried to strengthen its work during the Korean
War and most of the resources were issued in that period, even though it was established
in 1946. This book plays a key role in focusing our attention toward North Korea’s own
elements rather than the Soviet direction in terms of the propaganda.
Armstrong’s book is an invaluable work of propaganda studies on North Korea in
South Korea. In particular, the book introduced North Korean documents in Inje County
in Kangwon Province during the Korean War stored the National Archive and provided
Korean history scholars the chance to research on North Korea’s political ruling system.
The northern part of Inje County belonged to North Korea and the southern part of Inje
21
Charles K. Armstrong, The North Korean Revolution 1945-1950 (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2003), p. 166.
22
Ibid., pp. 174-177.
12
County belonged to South Korea before the Korean War and it was included in South
Korea after the Korean War. Based on these resources, there are a few articles on North
Korea’s propaganda and agitation from 1946 to 1949.
Tae Woo Kim’s article
23
makes a considerable effort to provide scholars with a
detailed analysis of how the North Korean party and government tried to change people’s
political consciousness by focusing on propaganda and agitation in Inje County from
1948 to 1949. He assumes that propaganda by the North Korean government played a
key role in the formation of national ideology and the main context of the propaganda
was education on patriotism and Soviet’s advanced politics and culture. Moreover, he
reveals that North Korea’s propaganda work was very well organized and even people in
village that was the smallest administrative unit were educated. Through his research, I
am able to know not only how the ruling system in local areas was established but also
how the policy of the party and government was implemented. Unfortunately, his article
leaves unanswered many questions about the effect and result of the propaganda, local
citizens’ acceptance and their attitude, and the analysis of main agents of the propaganda
work in the party and government.
Young Hee Kim’s article
24
shows how North Korea controlled the occupied areas of
South Korea through propaganda and agitation works during the Korean War. Her
articles allows me to see the propaganda and agitation policy and its major projected
conducted by North Korea toward the South Korean people in the occupied area during
23
Tae Woo Kim, “The Propaganda and Agitation of North Korea from 1948 to 1949 in Inje county”, History and Reality vol. 60
(Seoul: Korean History Research Institute, 2006), pp. 97-139.
24
Young Hee Kim, “North Korea’s Propaganda and Agitation Projects in the occupied areas of South Korea during the Korean War”,
Korean Journal of Journalism and Communication Studies vol. 54, No. 6 (Seoul: The Korean Society for Journalism and
Communication Studies, 2010), pp. 150-172.
13
the Korean War and to evaluate its outcome and limits. This article pulls together a great
deal of useful information about the propaganda and agitation projects that was one of the
important elements to execute all the policies by North Korea in South Korea.
However, despite the similarity of the propaganda and agitation projects led by
North Korea in South Korea, heavy emphasis of this article is given to the occupied areas
of South Korea. The goal and role of the propaganda and agitation was different between
South Korean people and North Korean ones. This means that the propaganda and
agitation projects in South Korea were to control South Korea effectively, but in North
Korea was to recover and reestablish political and economic strength and authority. What
is more, her article does not show me how to interact the projects with South Korean
people and focuses much attention on the negative outcomes of the projects due to the
South residents’ rejection and opposition against the policy of the North Korean party and
government.
Suk Young Kim’s book
25
addresses this question and concludes that propaganda is
North Korea’s most efficient governing strategy and plays a crucial role in organizing and
regulating North Korean society by forcing people to participate in state ritual and
requiring constant institutional surveillance. Her book offers an indispensible key to
understanding the value and role of propaganda in North Korea. Also, this book offers a
sophisticated examination of the aesthetic, political and philosophical significance of
propaganda in North Korea. However, too little attention is paid to North Korea’s
propaganda in the 1950’s. However, in general, her views put forward in this book can be
25
Suk Young Kim, Illusive Utopia-theater, film, and everyday performance in North Korea (Ann Arbor: the University of Michigan,
2010)
14
seen as remarkably compatible with the propaganda work of North Korea in the 1950’s,
complementary rather than in conflict.
3. The Origins and Implementation of a Propaganda Office during the Pre-
Korean War (1945-1950)
North Korea’s independent history was short and the problem to purge vestiges of
Japanese imperialism was serious. The politico-ideological and socio-cultural level of the
political party, government officials, and the public especially in the countryside were all
low. These units therefore did not know how to communicate with each other to
coordinate responsibilities in the service of the regime. North Korea thus needed to
construct a sense of independence, patriotism, and collectivism.
In order to solve these problems, Kim Il Sung, ex-president of North Korea, created
the propaganda offices by changing the election propaganda offices, which played
significant roles in the first democratic election, into the propaganda office for public
education on November 3, 1946.
26
According to his order, the North Korean Provisional
People's Committee (NKPPC) adopted a resolution for specific policies to change the
election offices to the propaganda offices through decision 107.
27
The tall and large
buildings that were formerly landlords’ houses and the election propaganda offices, as
well as newly constructed facilities made by the public in the rural areas, all gradually
26
Chang Myung Choi, “The Enlightenment Work of The Propaganda Office for Farming Populations under Kim Il Sung’s Great
Instruction before the Korean War,” History Science, No. 2 (1990), p. 6.
27
Ibid., p. 6.
15
transformed into propaganda offices. The propaganda office was established to enlighten
the rural populations, to improve economic conditions, and to mobilize efficiently.
Because of these efforts, 4,546 new propaganda offices were built up on a national scale
in 1947 and the number increased to 16,662 by the end of 1948.
28
From normal villages
to secluded ones in the mountains, propaganda offices were established across North
Korea. This means that North Korea placed an emphasis on ideology and propaganda that
was even more striking in its formative years than in many other socialist regimes.
29
During the Pre-Korean War, according to the guidebook for the management of the
propaganda office, each office was to consist of three to nine active farmers including the
director, the directors of propaganda, placards, and arts, and some staff members.
30
Fewer
staff members were involved in the offices than during the Korean War. The directors
were not paid, and were typically appointed from among active farmers. Party
memberships were not required to become directors or staff members. This is because the
director was an honorary position in the village among active farmers given free land
from North Korea.
The propaganda office at that time focused mainly on purging the vestiges of Japanese
imperialism and raising a politico-cultural level of the popular masses through education
about anti-Americanism, patriotism, and socialism. However, because of the lack of
competent directors and understanding of the role of the propaganda offices within the
regime, the propaganda offices only succeeded in superficially penetrating the basic
28
Ibid., p. 7.
29
Charles K. Armstrong, The North Korean Revolution, 1945-1950 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2003), p. 166.
30
Chang Myung Choi, p. 7.
16
socialist thought and the party’s political line to the public. Therefore, the propaganda
office rarely played a role in forming political identity and consciousness to perform the
duties raised by North Korea in order to maintain the regime and its goals. The offices
focused mainly on educational functions for cultural enlightenment.
After recovering the occupied areas of North Korea in January 1951, Kim Il Sung
suggested the political slogan “Let’s send the active party members to the rural areas,”
and rebuilt and remodeled the destroyed propaganda office. These centers convinced
citizens to worship the leader (synonymously the NKWP), to join the army, to maximize
agriculture for the war effort, and to revolve their lives around absolute belief in victory.
17
Chapter Three: The Operating Structure and System of a Propaganda Office
during the Korean War
North Korean documents rarely mention the operating structure or system of the
propaganda office during the Pre-Korean War. I think that the operating structure and
system changed significantly due to the Korean War. I will therefore focus on the
structure and system during the War.
1. The Composition and Management of the Propaganda Office
Large differences may be noted in the composition of the propaganda office
between the pre-War and War periods. During the war, the office expanded to three vice-
chairmen and more propagandists on staff, and all participants were required to be party
members.
31
These differences helped the North Korean leadership not only to better
understand the people’s situation and sentiments during the war, but also to meet the
demands of the popular masses.
Each propaganda office in the village consisted of one director, three vice-chairmen
and 30 propagandists during the Korean War.
32
The propaganda office was run by a
steering committee, including the director, the director of propaganda, the director of
placards, the director of arts, and staff members.
33
Active propagandists in each village
31
Jinkye Kim, My homeland, (Seoul: Hyunjang munhaksa, 1990), p. 201.
32
Rodong Sinmun, 31 December 1951, p. 3.
33
Rodong Sinmun, 27 November 1952, pp. 2-3.
18
were appointed as either the vice-director of the propaganda office or editor-in-chief of
the local newspaper. The propagandists were between 19 and 35 years old and their
education level was low.
34
Most members in propaganda office were the bereaved
families of revolutionary martyrs and victims of the Korean War. As relatives of those
who were killed by the US, South Korea, and the Korean People’s Army (KPA), these
workers had a strong sense of patriotism, anti-Americanism, and loyalty to Kim Il Sung.
At the 74
th
session of the political committee of the central committee of the NKWP
on Jan 21, 1951, North Korea instituted countermeasures to take care of the rural areas
and reinforce the politico-ideology education and mobilization of party organizations at
rural levels.
35
Considering the war situation, the committee assumed that sweeping
changes in both politico-ideology system and agricultural production would be
implemented and the role of the NKWP would be reinforced.
By this decision, North Korea announced the system of paid-directors of the
propaganda office. The unpaid director was changed to the paid director and 5,000 new
paid directors
36
were sent to rural areas.
37
Importantly, according to this new system, a
party membership became a prerequisite for becoming a director.
38
The committee
wanted to rebuild or remodel the propaganda offices throughout the country, so the
34
Rodong Sinmun, 17 November 1952, p. 2.
35
Changok Park, “The Strengthening of Politico-Ideology Education and Mobilization”, Labors, 1951.2, p. 102.
36
North Korean spies to South Korea were included, because they had a strong sense of loyalty for Kim Il Sung and their regime.
Jinkye Kim, My homeland, (Seoul: Hyunjang munhaksa, 1990). Interestingly, the author was a North Korean spy to South Korea and
he was a director of the propaganda office in rural areas during the Korean War.
37
The History of North Korea (Pyongyang: The Social Science Book Publishing House, 1979), p. 275.
38
Ibid., p. 275.
19
number of offices was from 3,794 in 1950 to 12,833 in 1951.
39
This meant that the
NKWP started being actively engaged in the propaganda office’s work. This was the
most decisive step taken to reorganize the rural areas. People who graduated high school
or the school of party politics were appointed as directors and were treated as equally as a
principal of high school.
40
In 1952, North Korea reorganized its administrative districts for war efficiency and
exerting control down to the local level. The change was from the administrative system
of Province-City-County-Township-Village to Province-City-County-Village-Dong.
Elimination of the township gave the People’s Committee at the county level control of
the village. When Macarthur pushed past the 38
th
parallel, he isolated those North Korean
villages in the occupied areas from the NKWP. In addition to this problem, it took a lot of
time to receive and implement orders from the central party and government because of
bureaucracy. And vice versa, reports from the local agricultural villages could not be
delivered quickly to the central government.
Cut off from the source, the People’s Committee of each village began to plan for
the war effort independently. As a result of this fragmentation, local committees
developed roles as enforcers of the NKWP, to maintain the regime at the lowest level of
organization. As these committees gained experience by necessity, this flexible small-
scale management system turned out to be efficient for war mobilization for organizing
people, and for gathering material resources. This administrative system change meant
39
The History of Chosun V ol 26, (Pyongyang: The Social Science Book Publishing House, 1980), p. 290.
40
Rodong Sinmun, 30 August 1951, p. 2.
20
that the NWKP now could manage not only resources for the war effort efficiently, but
also the command structure down to the village level.
Based on this administrative system, branches of the propaganda office in the village
were set up in each Dong, the smallest administrative unit. North Korea ordered each
director to oversee two propaganda offices at the same time.
41
A vice-director of the
propaganda office and a branch director of the propaganda office in each dong were not
paid unlike a director of the propaganda office.
The director held another position as vice-chairman of the party in each village due
to the NKWP reorganized administrative system in 1952, the director’s political and
social position had changed. He had two positions: the director of the propaganda office
and a local NKWP officer. Some directors tended to be absorbed in work for the party
instead of work for the propaganda office and some directors preferred to be called vice-
chairman of the party in the village instead of the director, and if someone called him the
director, he hardly answered because the vice-chairman was politically in a more
powerful position than the director and the director became focused on their personal
gain.
42
41
Rodong Sinmun, 10 November 1952, p. 1.
42
Rodong Sinmun, 9 April 1953, p. 2.
21
Figures 1: The Exterior of a Propaganda Office
43
The propaganda office was placed in the center of each village at a site which
functioned best a bomb shelter in the face of U.S. bombardment. Undestroyed churches
were also used as propaganda offices.
44
In order to educate local citizens, each
propaganda office needed to contain useful and attractive facilities including radios,
Korean board games, guitars, and especially libraries to teach the Korean alphabet,
politics, culture, and “common sense” about the North Korean regime. Its interior and
exterior design was adorned with patriotic decorations. Pictures of Stalin, Mao, and Kim
Il Sung, as well as national flags of the USSR, China, and the DPRK were hung on walls
inside the propaganda offices. Pictures, posters, production graphs, and model farmers
and the medals they received from NKWP or DPRK were mandated as well.
45
Up-to-date news on the war from the supreme command of the KPA was crucial
because at least one member of each family in the village was on the battlefield.
46
The
43
Rodong Sinmum, 8 Febuary 2000, p. 3
44
Jinkye Kim, My homeland, p. 221.
45
Rodong Sinmun, 12 August 1952, p. 3.
46
Rodong Sinmun, 15 June 1953, p. 2.
22
director not only created lists of new books, newspapers, and scraps to encourage farmers
to read, but also provided a variety of books on agriculture, politics, and the history of
communism. In addition, in order to fulfill their roles as educational offices, each office
contained several rooms to separate citizens by educational level, class level, and age, in
order to educate citizens about the North Korean regime’s superior legitimacy relative to
the South Korean government.
47
The local citizens thus came to accept the governing
regime as an authority.
2. The Selection and Education of the Director and the Propagandists
The Division of Agitation in the central committee of the NKWP and the
Department of Cultural Propaganda of the DPRK instructed the propaganda office.
48
The
party committee in each province was involved in the selection of the director, his
appointment, and management. Selecting capable officials as directors was the most
important task to strengthen the propaganda offices. In order to instruct the work of the
propaganda office, the NKWP ordered to install the instruction bureau of the propaganda
office in the division of agitation of the provincial party committee of the NKWP and one
section chief and two guidance counselors were appointed as its members in the division
47
Rodong Sinmun, 16 January 1952, p. 2.
48
Kim Il Sung, “On Strengthening the Work of Political and Cultural Enlightenment in the Countryside”, Kim Il Sung W orks V ol.7
(Pyongyang: The Worker's Party of Korea Publishing House, 1980), p. 303.
23
of agitation of the provincial party committee of the NKWP.
49
Moreover, a guidance
counselor in county was arranged in each county.
People with good reputations, a strong sense of loyalty to Kim Il Sung, strong
education backgrounds in the theory of communism, and talent or experience in mass
work units were appointed as village office directors by the director of the party
committee in each province.
50
The propaganda office faced a shortage of competent directors. Except for the few
who graduated from the NKWP’s political or military schools, the majority of the
directors had weak educational background and low level political thought since the
majority of the skillful party members were sent to battlefield. These directors often did
not have interest in the propaganda office’s goals and used the office as their private
house or a storage facility for the village.
51
Moreover, directors from the city were not
effective because they had no background related to rural villages or farming culture, so
they did not know how important the rural areas were. Without an understanding of the
countryside, the directors viewed rural areas as dirty and the farmers as lazy. Mistakes
were sometimes made, including instances when the deceased or otherwise occupied
were selected as directors.
Through the party’s orders, the people’s committee was in charge of the
administrative order and supervision of the director at each administrative level. Through
the reorganized administrative districts, the chairman of the party in each village and the
49
Collections of Decisions of the NKWP Central Committee from 1949 to 1951 (Pyongyang: the NKWP Central Committee, 1953), p.
329.
50
Rodong Simun, 27 March 1951, p. 3.
51
Rodong Sinmun, 13 December 1952, p. 2.
24
director of the propaganda office enabled the NKWP to exert political power to the
smallest administrative units. The director was a member of both the local party and the
people’s committee. The director’s salary was 12 Won, higher than the salary of the
chairman of the county party and other party officials at local levels.
52
Directors were educated to improve their qualifications and abilities for better
performance. The Department of Cultural Propaganda in each province sponsored by the
party committee performed workshops three times per year. Through the workshops, the
directors were able to learn not only about laws, decisions, and instructions from NKWP
and DPRK, but also Marxism, Kim Il Sung’s greatness, and Soviet theory and culture.
The workshops also functioned to raise the directors’ low standards, appoint new
directors, and to censor activities at each office.
53
They trained over 400 directors for 240
hours over a month period. All of this served to make the directors realize why their work
was so important in maintaining the North Korean regime. In particular, meeting to
exchange ideas among party officials was the part that most intrigued the attending
directors.
54
In order to bolster the role of the propaganda office, the efforts to enhance the
performance of the vice-directors and propagandists were also significant. The director
would hold regular seminars or workshops on the policies of NKWP and DPRK, Kim Il
Sung’s public addresses, and the USSR’s war experiences. These sessions also educated
active participants on domestic and international circumstances, battlefield news, and
52
Jinkye Kim, p. 203.
32
Rodong Sinmun, 27 November 1952, pp. 2-3.
33
Rodong Sinmun, 28 October 1952, p. 3.
25
their duties imposed and ordered by NKWP.
55
The active propagandists then helped
neighborhood units to solve public problems by applying lessons learned from workshops
and seminars given by the director. They also worked with social institution agitators to
address the problem of the lack of workers.
The propagandists tried to make the public not only be interested in the work of the
office and realize why the propaganda office was so important, but also feel a sense of
belonging for the regime and feel like the party deeply took care of them. It kept people
from leaving their hometown and caused the public to try to do more for North Korea
during the Korean War. Through the party’s political instructions and guidance, the
propaganda office held an informal council meeting for party members and the members
of social institutions in each village to talk about the work of the propaganda office.
56
55
Rodong Sinmun, 12 August 1952, p. 2.
56
Always with Kim Il Sung-the Nation’s Liberation War (Pyongyang: Work Groups Publishing House, 1977), pp. 51-52.
26
Table 1: the Operating Structure and System of the Propaganda Office
The Central Committee of NKWP
조선로동당중앙위원회
The Division of Agitation of NKWP
조선로동당 선전선동부
The Department of Cultural Propaganda
of DPRK 공화국 문화선전성
The Division of Agitation of the
Provincial Party Committee of NKWP
도당위원회선전선동부
The Division of Agitation of the
City and County Party Committee of
NKWP 시군당위원회선전선동부
The Division of Agitation of the Myoun
Party Committee of NKWP
면당위원회선전선동부
The Division of Agitation of the Village
Party Committee of NKWP
리당위원회선전선동부
The Director of the Village
Propaganda Office
리민주선전실장
The Department of Cultural Propaganda
of the Provincial People’s Committee of
DPRK 도인민위원회문화선전과
The Department of Cultural Propaganda
of the City and County People’s
Committee of DPRK 군인민위원회문화선전과
The Department of Cultural Propaganda
of the Myoun People’s Committee of
DPRK 면인민위원회문화선전과
The Department of Cultural Propaganda
of the Village People’s Committee of
DPRK 리인민위원회문화선전과
The Vice Director of the
Village Propaganda Office
민주선전실부실장
The Head Director of the Village
Propaganda Office at each
Branch 민주선전실분실장
The Propagandists of
Neighboring Units
인민반선동원
The Propagandists of the
Propaganda Office
민주선전실선동원
The Propagandists of
Social Institutions
사회단체선동원
Political Order and Guidance
Direct Instructions and Supervision
Work
Work
27
Chapter Four: The War Effort through Education and Mobilization
North Korea unified organizations for the war effort in order to concentrate
political power and increase education and mobilization efficiency. The Supreme Military
Committee was established on June 26, 1950 with Kim Il Sung nominated as its leader.
The committee, the supreme organization, rolled all other organizations into subsidiaries
and legalized the use of all organizations toward the Korean War. On June 30, 1950, the
US announced that it will enter the Korean War to assist democratic South Korea
militarily and financially. In North Korea, the NKWP ordered conscription of the entire
society for the education and war mobilization duties.
In order to perform efficiently in the war, Kim Il Sung was inaugurated supreme
commander of North Korea on July 4
th
, which granted him full control of the country’s
armed forces.
57
This meant that he assumed power of not just the military, but the
complete synthesis of human and material resources. In order to conduct the war
efficiently, he installed “military mobilization committees” into the center of government
in every province, county, and urban and rural city. He also established military
headquarter and military collective headquarter which could command military authority
as a permanent organization.
58
It implemented the supreme commander’s orders to each
armed unit, disseminated the party’s political ideology and the justice of the war through
education and mobilization, and disciplined the army through training-it even managed
57
Rodong Sinmun, 4 July 1950, p. 1.
58
Kim Il Sung, Dear Kim Il Sung’s Immoral Revolutionary Achievement-the Great Victory of the National Liberation W ar V ol. 4
(Pyongyang: NKWP Press), pp. 89.
28
education and mobilization all the way North to the rear of the war front, the farthest
point from the 38
th
parallel.
What I would like to point out is that North Korea set up military courts on August
22, 1950.
59
At first glance, it seemed like a court to preside over matters of criminal
behavior in the military. However, the court actually ruled on laws that included murder,
robbery, infringements, and social disorders on nation’s sovereignty. Therefore, the court
supplemented the party’s objectives and strict social rules: again, every system was
applied toward the war effort. The propaganda office played a dominant role in educating
and mobilizing people for the war effort through these laws and social norms. The
propaganda office’s key duty was to educate and mobilize the public to work for the
NKWP with faithfulness in order to make the public realize that we are on and that
performing the war is our holy work. The propaganda office organized North Korean
society to be one in mind and one in action.
1. Education
a) NKWP and DPRK’s Broad Policies for the General Public
The purpose of education was both to create a technically competent workforce for
national reconstruction and to instill political consciousness among the masses.
60
The
59
Rodong Sinmun, 22 August 1950, p. 1.
36
Charles K. Armstrong, p. 178.
29
biggest difference in education between this period and the Japanese colonial rule was
that people now had a stronger willingness to join the education for North Korea.
Through various seminars, the director of the propaganda office taught and explained the
policies, decisions, and instructions of the party and government in order to take care of
the general public in the rural areas.
61
In addition, the director also used propaganda
documents and flyers to teach warfront news and current internal and external political
issues related to the war.
In order to educate people, North Korea distributed various types of cultural
resources to the countryside for people in rural areas and propagandists such as the daily
paper issued by the NKWP, the Minju Chosun issued by the DPRK, propagandist diaries,
and pop culture and literature books produced by the North. Furthermore, the office sent
diverse visual aids such as political posters and pictures,
62
which played a great role in
the propaganda office.
Considering the educational level of the rural citizens, the content of the wall posters
was supposed to be easy to view and comprehend. The important fact was that the wall
posters played a key role in political exposure, which meant that people could get up-to-
date information about the war. The wall posters also emphasized diligence in working
and played a key role in people monitoring each other’s efficiency. Even the news on
who got a new calf was included on these wall posters. This is, of course, if the office had
social and agricultural information about each town.
61
Rodong Sinmun, 27 November 1952, pp. 2-3.
62
Ibid, pp. 2-3.
30
In order to improve the efficiency and credibility of the director, the director
continuously tried to strengthen his political and ethical authority. He had to be a social
role model in North Korea. This enabled the general public to understand the meanings
and benefits of the policies of party and government, and helped create a sense of
belonging and pride as a North Korean.
For example, Saun Kim, the director of the propaganda office, visited the farmers
who had received benefits from the policies of NKWP and DPRK, encouraging them to
explain their experiences to those who had not received benefits because they did not
know about the policy.
63
The director checked families that had not benefited from the
policies because they did not know about them and brought them to the village committee
to get benefits. Furthermore, the director brought a doctor to the family who suffered
from illness or looked for medicines for the family. When the village flooded, the director
helped the people escape from the flood, to move out to a safe place, and to minimize the
flood damage, even if the disaster occurred at night.
64
These actions and gestures allowed people change their political consciousness and
think about what they should do for the nation. People who received help became active
propagandists, and this became an important way of communicating with people and the
nation. More importantly, the propaganda office brought in people who had half-willingly
and half-unwillingly helped the US and South Korean army in order to get benefits
63
Rodong Sinmun, 20 April 1953, p. 2.
64
Rodong Sinmum, 27 September 1952, p. 3.
31
instead from the North Korean government. They would ask the people’s forgiveness and
then tried to work harder than others.
65
No research exists when it comes to violation of these kinds of rules and norms in
North Korea. The methods and locations of punishments and executions that befell
violators were unknown because no substantial accounts of court decisions can be found.
Therefore, we have to consider some examples of the violators from the USSR because
much of the USSR’s system was transplanted to North Korea before and during the
Korean War. Under Soviet laws, the violators underwent “comrade judgment,” and
evaluation by their peers in the local labor union. The decision made by the local labor
union was accepted as final by the USSR’s communist party. Those who violated these
rules multiple times were considered lazy and disloyal; thus, repeat offenders either went
sent to work at factories with harsher working conditions or were sent to the People’s
Court to receive a condemnation from the general public that would.
66
In those cases the
people should have worked at a local coal mine, if he did not change his attitude and
work hard again, they were sent to the battlefield compulsory with very intensive law
adaption.
67
This rule during the Korean War maintained social order and obedience. The
party provided goals and the people performed unconditionally. These activities of the
propaganda office played a key role in propagandizing the value of the regime and
national ideology and cultivating political identity as a North Korean.
65
Rodong Sinmun, 19 November 1951, p. 2.
66
NKWP Propaganda Bureau, USSR Bolshevik Party during the War (Pyongyang: NKWP Press, 1950), pp. 129-130.
67
Ibid., pp. 208-229.
32
b) Patriotism and the Soviet Culture
Patriotism was the key concept before and during the Korean War to establish and
reestablish the regime. The major goal of the education was to cultivate patriotism. North
Korean people learned about a sense of belonging, external hostilities, and the
justification for the war. Because the farms faced dangerous bombing conditions, the
NKWP staffed the farms with the most faithful of its citizens: families of soldiers
especially war heroes, families of disabled veterans, and families who participated in the
anti-Japanese guerilla activities. Because these families were tied to the war effort, it was
easier for the NKWP to enforce production goals and prevent the local citizens from
escaping the farms. The propaganda office used them to show how caring North Korea to
its most citizens and how the best workers maintain this nation with a strong sense of
loyalty. This patriotism was growing more important to defeat the US and South Korea
because a loss in the war meant that the people would have to be under US imperialism,
as they were under Japanese colonial rule with no sense of freedom or justice. It was the
propaganda office that communicated these messages to the general public in the rural
areas.
The propaganda office was given various types of cultural resources to educate the
public about Kim Il Sung’s greatness, including the leader’s orders and instructions
which were regularly printed on the NKWP’s daily paper, the Minju Chosun,
propagandist diaries, pop culture, and literature. The propaganda office was also given
33
diverse visual aids such as political posters and pictures.
68
The propaganda office issued
its own newspaper in order to inspire people to become social role models.
69
The
interesting thing was that the members of the NKWP needed to set a good example for
the public, and the heroes in the newspaper were almost always party members. It helped
the public to realize that their party and government have continuously taken care of them.
War heroes played a key role in cultivating patriotism and providing role models to
the citizens in rural areas. People came to believe that, in order to win this war, they
should become heroes for their regime and its leader. Given the fact that most of the KPA
soldiers were from the rural areas, people in the countryside wanted to become heroes
like their sons. This cultivation of a strong sense of patriotism and self-esteem was
precisely what North Korea wanted. Model soldiers were presented as model citizens
whose example people should follow. They encouraged locals to realize their nationality
and what the North Korean society wanted from them as citizens. War heroes thus
provided justification for the mobilization organized by the regime.
The propaganda office would display posters to inform people about how the heroes
came from even rural villages to help with the war. Most of these war heroes would have
low social status such as poor farmers, tenant farmers, slash-and-burn farmers, and of
course slaves. The heroes were used as propaganda tools to maintain and enhance the
regime during the Korean War. They admired Kim Il Sung’s legitimacy as a leader and
68
Rodong Sinmun, 27 November 1952, pp. 2-3.
69
Ibid., pp.2-3
34
political supporter. New heroes who joined the NKWP served as role models who would
educate non-party member soldiers on political ideology and the greatness of Kim Il Sung.
As a soldier membership in North Korea expanded, joining became more difficult,
and the application process became a strenuous competition used to cement the NKWP’s
support. Soldiers who were accepted into the NKWP were branded war heroes, Kim Il
Sung’s warriors. The NKWP became a foundation of society again, whose citizens
trusted the party. North Korea solidified his political power by establishing political
foundation in both the army and society. Kim Il Sung ordered each village to erect a
statue of a hero or heroine of the war. The local citizens decided to chip in, and the
director and propagandists conducted a fund-raising campaign to set up the statue.
70
Coming from a low status, having an enthusiasm for education, having experienced
Japanese colonialism, being willing to die for their country, looking up to Kim Il Sung’s
heroic activities, and desiring to become a party member were important elements of the
chosen heroes. The relationship between Kim Il Sung and the North Korean people
morphed into the concept of Dear Leader and his warriors, which solidified Kim Il
Sung’s legitimacy.
The political theory and advanced culture of the USSR were also important parts of
cultivating political identity. The USSR was the most important model and inspiration for
education in North Korea because of its war experience and ideology.
71
The main channel
for cultural exchange between the USSR and North Korea was the Korean-Soviet
70
Rodong Sinmun, 31 December 1952, p. 2.
71
Charles K. Armstrong, p. 179.
35
Cultural Society (Cho-Sso munhwa hyophoe), established in North Korea in November
1945.
72
This organization played a key role in cultural exchange and learning the USSR’s
advanced socialist system and its greatness. The flow of USSR materials were censored,
manipulated, controlled, and dramatized in order to maximize their effect on a North
Korean public.
The major subject was about Russia's victory in its great patriotic war. The lowest
educational unit was the Korean-Soviet unit (Cho-Sso ban), and one was established in
each village. The director of the propaganda office was also the director of the Korean-
Soviet Cultural Society in each village.
73
A place for this education was set up in each
propaganda office.
74
By educating people on Soviet culture and socialism, they felt that
they we part of a larger, great socialist movement.
The Korean-Soviet unit held regular seminars on the USSR’s prosperity. People
watched Soviet-produced films about the USSR’s political and economic activities. The
propaganda office had lots of books about the USSR and the director had to schedule for
the education on the USSR’s culture and socialism.
75
The propaganda office intensively
introduced the war experience of the USSR, including the heroic struggle of the USSR
people, the role of farmers in the collective farms, and how the Soviet people overcome
their problems in order to win the war. These experiences enabled people to cultivate a
strong sense of self-respect for production activities and mobilization. By viewing these
72
Ibid., p. 172.
73
Jinkye Kim, p. 204.
74
Rodong Sinmun, 16 January 1952, p. 2.
75
Rodong Sinmun, 20 October 1951, p. 3.
36
examples, North Koreans were encouraged to support the role of the USSR and to
cultivate a strong sense of pride as a member of socialism and North Korea. They
provided rural people with an ideology to believe that they would eventually win this war.
In addition, this education helped the people become socialists and come to know about
socialism and its justification.
c) Advanced Agricultural Skills
Improving agricultural production through advanced agricultural skills was critical
to perform and win the war because many industrial facilities were destroyed. The
propaganda office educated people on the important of relations between agricultural
production and regime safety. The most important measure for the advanced agricultural
technique was to establish and run an independent room for agricultural techniques in the
propaganda office.
76
Table 2: The Amount of Harvesting
(Unit: ton)
1946 1949 1953
Grain 1898 2654 2327
Rice 1052 1158 1229
Corn 156 375 224
Row Cotton 15 78 18
Hemp 3 4 1
Tobacco 2 10 2
Vegetables 623 797 466
Feed Grains - 7 17
77
76
Rodong Sinmun, 28 March 1952, p. 3.
77
Statistics for Economic Development of North Korea (Pyongyang: National Publishing House, 1961), p. 85.
37
The advanced agricultural technique was divided into two topics: improving rice
farming methods and improving the quality of seeds. In regard to rice farming, the
propaganda office educated the public about efficient ways to transplant rice seedlings by
taking advantage of dense planting with fewer seedlings. In terms of the quality of the
seeds, the propaganda office educated them about how the summer and winter seasons
required the soaking of rice seeds.
78
The propaganda office organized increased production groups among the farmers
who had increased agricultural production, and encouraged them to teach their way of
cultivating the crops.
79
The propaganda office initiated a campaign for advanced
agricultural skills and agricultural production was increased drastically. 1.2 million
farmers attended workshops and short classes to learn advanced agricultural production in
1952.
80
Given that North Korea was an agricultural nation in the middle of a major war,
this advanced agricultural technique played a key role in strengthening national identity
and making the people more enthusiastic to protect the country. Increased agricultural
production was the only means of bolstering the internal economic situation for survival
and thus dealing with the external threat. Additionally, it provided local citizens in the
countryside with the rationality to believe in and follow the regime. In other words, the
increased agricultural production provided the belief that the people will not be colonized
again by foreign powers and that they would defeat the enemy eventually. The orders
78
History Research Institute, The Revolutionary Spirit of The General Public in the rural area during the Fatherland Liberation W ar
(Pyongyang: The Social Science Book Publishing House), p. 72.
79
Rodong Sinmum, 8 March 1953, p. 2.
80
History Research Institute, p. 73.
38
from NWKP and DPRK thus became laws that the people must follow for the good of the
nation.
d) Cultural Enlightenment and Entertainment
Because the young were sent to the battlefield, most people were older, women, and
children. Many houses and agricultural facilities were destroyed by the US bombardment.
North Korea thus had many problems with its workforce in order to provide a stable life
and sufficient war provisions. In this situation, women were very important to produce
the increased agricultural products essential for the war.
Although many directors were male, the majority of staff members were women
whose political activities focused on creation of better working conditions. North Korea
needed to change the role of women by eliminating the old-fashioned idea of
Confucianism which the elderly embraced. North Korea targeted women as party and
government officials in the rural areas to solve these problems. The state’s true
motivation in encouraging women to join the collective labor forces was to fill the empty
places that men had left when they joined the army.
81
The representative example was that a woman director was appointed as a director
of the propaganda office and many propagandists were women.
82
In addition, by teaching
the farmers scientific knowledge, the propaganda office tried to undo traditional customs
81
Suk Young Kim, Illusive Utopia-theater, film, and everyday performance in North Korea, p. 209.
82
History Research Institute., p. 65.
39
in order to improve the farming population’s health and standard of living. This enabled
many North Korean women to exert their potential as a major part of the workforce,
especially in agriculture, and to overcome the social bias and obstacles such as the idea of
predominance of men over women.
The cultural enlightenment work also allowed North Korean people to bolster their
political courage and moral responsibility. The propaganda office was more interested in
helping the vagrants and idlers by visiting their homes, trying to find their problems, and
persuading them to do better. The director and propagandists gave them a letter from Kim
II Sung and their sons at the battlefield.
83
If they were illiterate, the director helped them
to read and educated them of the meaning of the letter. It made them feel obligated to do
something helpful for their country. They tried to share some of their story and the
propaganda office’s help and encouragement. This was often enough to persuade local
citizens.
84
The locals who received benefits from the regime became active propagandists.
In other words, the party tried to encourage high moral responsibility and a more cogently
controlled national identity.
The propaganda office provided the local citizens with a place to talk and learn in a
friendly environment. Art performances and clubs played crucial roles in removing the
fear and mental fatigue from the war. The clubs consisted of propagandists in social
organizations. They regularly performed festivals of song and dance, some of which Kim
Il Sung personally attended.
85
Members of the Communist Youth helped to organize and
83
Rodong Sinmun, 20 April 1953, p. 2.
84
Ibid., p. 2.
85
History Research Institute, p. 160.
40
run the entertainment clubs. This enabled people to come together and escape, at least
momentarily, from the horrors of war.
86
The rural citizens sometimes prepared the
effective visual aids themselves. People who had great artistic talent prepared dances and
songs, while others told old stories to crowds of onlookers.
87
The director prepared other programs for people at the propaganda office, including
a music class for the youth as well as Korean chess matches. In the middle of these
activities, the director tried to learn what kinds of problems the people had and discussed
with them about agricultural production. This helped people come together to work and
enjoy their life during the war.
The propaganda office also played an important role in public health and disease
surveillance. When the US waged biological warfare during the Korean War
88
, the
propaganda office informed people of this by seminars and set up policies to prevent the
contagious disease for public health. The propaganda office vaccinated every citizen and
helped clean up their villages six times per month, fumigating the village three times per
month.
89
The director appointed a head of the inspection and ordered him to protect the
well of the village.
90
86
Rodong Sinmun, 12 September 1951, p. 2.
87
Ibid., p. 2.
88
Stephen Endicott and Edward Hagerman, The United States and Biological W arfare (Bloomington: Indiana University
Press, 1998)
89
Rodong Sinmun, 27 March 1952, p. 2.
90
Ibid., p. 2.
41
2. Mobilization
a) Production of War Provisions
After recovering the North Korean area from the US and South Korea with the
support of the Chinese Army, the most urgent issue was to re-establish the political
control system and to establish a system of implementation for agricultural production.
There was an acute shortage of manpower, livestock, and farming tools. Kim Il Sung
ordered the DPRK cabinet to organize the rural society for increased production. The
efficiency of the advanced agricultural techniques and organized working units played a
decisive role in legitimizing the regime.
Through instruction No. 638, the DPRK cabinet organized a system of joint effort to
sow rice seeds in spring.
91
In the process, Kim Il Sung instructed the propaganda office to
play the main role by organizing a unit of exchange of labor (Pum as si ban) and a joint
work unit for plowing by cow (So gyu ri ban).
92
The propaganda office organized party
officials and active farmers who had a strong sense of loyalty for Kim Il Sung and
NKWP. Both units were a traditional Korean joint work system, temporary seasonal
organizations in spring and fall. However, both became steady work units.
93
These units were intended not only to produce more agricultural production. They
also encouraged cooperation among neighbors and interaction with DPRK and NKWP. In
91
Rodong Sinmun, 20 February 1951, p. 2.
92
History Research Institute, p. 90.
93
Rodong Sinmum, 4 August 1952, p. 2.
42
fact, there was no difference between Pum as si ban and So gyu ri ban in agricultural
production during the war. By these units, farmers shared farming tools and rice seeds
and they made new tools if there were not enough at hand. The propaganda office played
an important role in facilitating the interaction between the people and NKWP and DPRK.
26,151 So gyu ri ban were organized in Pyung-Nam Province in 1952.
94
This is an
indication that labor had started to be more centrally organized by North Korea.
Because most men went to the battlefield, the efficient labor of women was
important in the rural areas. Traditionally, men plowed the field with a cow because it
was very hard for women and demanded skilled techniques. However, women started
plowing the field with a cow called Nyu seong bo jab i un dong. This was a
representative campaign for women during the Korean War.
Rak Hee, a member of democratic youth league at Gae Cheon County in Pyung-
Nam Province, set a good example supported by the propaganda office and the youth
league. She educated 46 women on the necessary techniques, and together they plowed
80 percent of the field in their village.
95
She went on to educate 260 women on how to
plow the fields in the county. North Korean men took to guns, and women plowed the
fields to provide food. We need to remember that most of the North Korean farmlands
were plowed by women during the War. Additionally, the propaganda office helped
people sow rice seeds in the evening or at night, and set up farmland shelters in order to
avoid the US bombardment.
94
History Research Institute, p. 94.
95
The Y outh of North Korea 2 (Pyongyang: Youth League Publishing House, 1961), pp. 292-293.
43
Figures 2: Farmers in a Propaganda Office
96
The propaganda office made various competition graphs of each neighboring unit
for agricultural production and displayed them to arouse people’s competitive spirits. The
propaganda office introduced good models of increased agricultural production, showed
struggles, and pointed out how some people were not diligent and overwhelmed by a
sense of defeat. In other words, the level of good models was rising and people needed to
improve the intensity of their labor and increase their already long working hours. To
accomplish these goals, the office believed that higher levels of loyalty for Kim Il Sung
and North Korea were needed.
However, directors from a big city could not institute changes because they had no
background related to the countryside and farming culture. Spring and fall were the
business time of the year, but the directors tried to mobilize people instead for
96
www.minjok21.com
44
propaganda. This caused farmers to complain about performance by pointing out the
directors’ faults and trying to correct their mistakes. Directors would often accept the
advice and actively shared ideas on how to run the propaganda office more effectively,
resulting in a functional comradeship. When the directors did not change their
performance, the local citizens would send a letter to high ranking party or government
officials to inform about these problems and to request a replacement of the director.
97
Increased political consciousness and identity played a key role in interacting with each
other and in connecting the DPRK with their public.
b) Army Assistance
North Korea started a national donation campaign for army assistance and to send
rice to the battlefield. Both campaigns were popular patriotic movements to send
weapons and tools, including tanks and airplanes. People in the rural area struggled to
increase agricultural production and collected waste articles, steel, and idle materials
under the instruction of the propaganda office.
98
In addition, they carried out the cotton
work on the sideline and picked up the ears of rice in the field. Furthermore, they gave
their valuables such as wedding rings, Korean traditional ornamental hairpins made by
gold or silver, and sewing machines without hesitation. Thus, women in Kangsu County
in Pyung-Nam Province made 2,000 dollars and used these proceeds to donate two
97
Rodong Sinmun, 17 April 1952, p. 2.
98
Rodong Sinmun, 19 October 1952, p. 2.
45
airplanes. Women in Bukchyung, Sinheong and Hyesan counties in Ham-Nam Province
donated 2,292 valuables, $2,306 in American one-dollar bills, and 23 sewing machines.
99
Local citizens tried to send additional food to soldiers by saving food at home.
Farmers at the propaganda office in Namu village in Hwang-Hae Province held a rally
and decided to donate more food by eliminating empty formalities and vanity in four
ceremonial occasions of coming of age, wedding, funeral, and ancestral rites. Food
rationing and a thrifty habit of purging the vestiges of food practiced during the feudal
age and Japanese colonial rules were also major plans to save energy and resources.
100
The director also focused his attention on the poor farmers and their living conditions. He
made them realize that the rear of the war was similar to the front. In addition, they were
made to believe that their small effort would have effects that they couldn’t even imagine.
The benefits ignited the people’s spontaneous participation in the campaign for the
increase in production and performance. For example, farmers in Changpyung village at
Buryung County in Ham-Buk Province donated rice that was supposed to be used for a
baby’s first birthday to the military camp where the baby’s father was.
101
The propaganda office tried to discourage idle lifestyles by prohibiting gambling
and drinking too much. Moreover, the director recommended people to perform regular
social ceremonies in the propaganda office in order to provide further education on the
99
Rodong Sinmun, 23 November 1952, p. 2.
1 0 0
Rodong Sinmun, 3 May 1952, p. 3.
101
Rodong Sinmun. 30 January 1952, p. 3
46
policies of the NKWP and DPRK.
102
Farmers in North Korea at that time donated 2.2
hundred thousand tons of rice.
103
Another important role of the propaganda office was to support soldiers passing
through their town and to assist the army at the front of the war. Given the fact that the
majority of staff members were women, they provided North Korean army and Chinese
Reds with food and transportation.
104
Furthermore, to make the people as one, he ordered
the local party and government to perform art performances to encourage the soldiers.
105
When the soldiers passed through their town, the propaganda office provided them with
food or shelter and put on art performances to entertain them. The propaganda office also
treated injured soldiers and farmers donated their blood to treat them.
Before the War, Kim Il Sung organized a support association for national security
called Joguk bowihuwonheoi. The organization issued lottery tickets and people
purchased the tickets half-willingly and half-unwillingly. The propaganda office sold the
tickets during the Korean War
106
, and a winner donated the money to NKWP and he or
she became a national hero or heroine. The local citizens’ activities for the war effort
played an important role in creating political alliance. North Korea tried to protect North
Korean people and fight against the common threat. Through these activities, North
102
Rodong Sinmun, 17 February 1952, p. 2.
103
History research Institute, p. 134.
104
Kim Il Sung, “The Current Situation and Our tasks”, Kim Il Sung W orks V ol.6 (Pyongyang: The Worker's Party of Korea Publishing
House, 1980), p. 205.
105
Ibid., p. 229.
106
Kim Il Sung, “Our Justice War Will Victory,” Kim Il Sung W orks V ol.7 (Pyongyang: The Worker's Party of Korea Publishing House,
1980), p. 368.
47
Koreans set up a strong sense of self-conscious as North Koreans because they also had a
key part in conducting war-related activities and maintaining the regime.
In addition, the propaganda office played a dominant role in encouraging the local
citizens to save the money through frugality and a side job at the local banks.
107
The
director educated the farmers the importance of saving money for the war effort and
victory. The directors in some areas that the farmers had high profits and incomes
struggled to bring them into competition with other people in different villages by setting
up a high goal of the saving in order to save more money for the war effort. This was
very important in terms of monitoring political dissidents in the local areas. This is
because those who were against land reform carried out in 1946 were sent to the
mountain areas and they lived in remote mountain villages. Most of them were vicious
landlords, pro-Japanese collaborators during the Japanese colonial period, or followers of
Christianity. They insisted that we will manage our own land given by North Korea and
refused collective agricultural activities such as So gyu ri ban.
108
By encouraging the
local citizens to save the money, North Korea was able to not only save money for the
war effort but also monitor and control the political dissidents’ economic activities.
107
Rodong Sinmun, 10 April 1952, p. 1.
108
Rodong Sinmun. 28 March 1952, p. 2.
48
Conclusion: Political and Social meaning-analysis of the Propaganda Office during
the Korean War: The Pursuit of Regime Legitimacy in the Rural Areas
This essay’s examination of the propaganda office during the Korean War
demonstrates that improved political consciousness, national identity, and a raised
cultural level of the popular masses thanks to propaganda and agitation enabled North
Korea to recover and reestablish unified political and economic system. These activities
played a pivotal role in creating North Korea’s regime legitimacy in the rural areas during
the Korean War.
First, the propaganda office enabled laborers, farmers, and soldiers to realize that
they were part of one common effort. Further, the propaganda office reinforced the
people’s political alliances and consciousness. They shared a strong class consciousness
with each other. They did not want the regime to be a colony of the US imperialism and
to experience the tragedy of colonialism again. Soldiers donated their salaries to make the
rear secure and improve the standard of living for the masses in the countryside. Labors
and farmers provided the soldiers and their family members with food and healthcare,
encouraging the soldiers to fight with bravery in the battlefield. These mutual
relationships strengthened a sense of collectivism. This played a crucial role in
cultivating a sense of national identity in the rural areas during the Korean War.
Second, the propaganda office helped North Korea to recover and reestablish
political and economic strength through politico-ideological education and mobilization
in the rural areas. In order to improve the efficiency of the propaganda office during the
49
Korean War, North Korea sent to the rural areas paid propaganda directors with a strong
sense of loyalty and patriotism, not to mention party membership. The local citizens thus
learned what they should do for the regime and why during the Korean War. The regime
pushed on its demands to the end and the propaganda office became the spearhead to
maintain the regime. Directors had to set a good example to justify the North Korean
regime and its leader Kim Il Sung. In addition, due to the directors’ high performance,
they became social role models to the masses in the countryside. This model encouraged
local citizens to get closer to the regime emotionally and to learn the justifications of the
regime.
It is important to note that unlike the Japanese colonial rule, the local citizens
actively participated in the propaganda office’s activity because most of the local citizens
were given free lands through land reform in 1946 and they experienced democratic
elections by voting. These reforms enabled them to have a strong sense of self-
consciousness as North Korean. Additionally, most of the soldiers came from the
countryside.
Third and most crucially, improved political consciousness through education and
mobilization enabled the public in the countryside to interact with the directors, party,
and government officials. Through these educational, social, economic, and political
programs, the propaganda office raised the citizenry’s political thoughts higher and
higher. The local citizens traded ideas by giving healthy advice and criticism to the
regime. Some of the NKWP and government officials in the local areas who gave the
word of commend with swear words to the local citizens were reported their behaviors to
50
high-ranking officials by the local citizens and they were asked to change their high
attitude.
The local citizens prompted the office’s director, the NWKP officers and
government officers to correct any corrupt work. They complained about unreasonable
policies and asked the director of the propaganda office to change them, going up the
ladder to party or government officials by letter or in person when necessary. The
NKWP’s role in supervising the local party and government were performed by local
villagers with high-level political belief. The director and officials accepted their opinions
and tried to share fruitful ideas with them to run the propaganda office more effectively.
This helped to establish a comradeship between the local citizens and party or
government officials. Corruption, bureaucracy, and ineptitude were easily avoided by the
propaganda office during the Korean War. When a director of the propaganda office
withheld commodities from the government and overcharged various taxes such as
agricultural taxes to the public in the rural areas, they brought out their problems and
asked for a replacement of the director through NKWP or DPRK. Although North Korea
currently has a strong dictatorship, governance during North Korea during the Korean
War was dynamic enough to allow citizens to express their thoughts and interact with
officials and the regime. During the Korean War, the propaganda office made North
Korea’s regime flexible and dynamic in terms of the relationships between the general
public and the NKWP and government.
51
Bibliography
Always with Kim Il Sung-the Nation’s Liberation War (Pyongyang: Work Groups
Publishing House, 1977)
Armstrong Charles K., The North Korean Revolution, 1945-1950 (Ithaca: Cornell
University Press, 2003)
Choi Chang Myung, “The Enlightenment Work of The Propaganda Office for Farming
Populations under
Kim Il Sung’s Great Instruction before the Korean War,” History Science, No. 2 (1990)
Dahl, Robert A. Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition (New Haven and London: Yale
University Press, 1971)
Edited by the Editorial Department, The Theory of Propaganda and Agitation (Seoul:
Jiyangsa, 1989)
Edited by the Editorial Department, The Theory of Propaganda and Agitation (Seoul:
Saemulgyul, 1989)
Endicott Stephen and Hagerman Edward, The United States and Biological Warfare
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1998)
History of North Korea (Pyongyang: The Social Science Book Publishing House, 1979)
History research Institute, The Revolutionary Spirit of The General Public in the rural
area during the Fatherland Liberation War (Pyongyang: The Social Science Book
Publishing House, 1976)
Kim Il Sung, “On Improving the Work of the Party Organization,” Kim Il Sung Works V ol.
6 (Pyongyang: The Worker’s Party of Korea Publishing House, 1980)
52
Kim Il Sung, “The Current Situation and Our tasks”, Kim Il Sung Works V ol.6
(Pyongyang: The Worker's Party of Korea Publishing House, 1980)
Kim Il Sung, “On Strengthening the Work of Political and Cultural Enlightenment in the
Countryside”, Kim Il Sung Works V ol.7 (Pyongyang: the Worker's Party of Korea
Publishing House, 1980)
Kim Il Sung, “Our Justice War Will Victory,” Kim Il Sung Works V ol.7 (Pyongyang: The
Worker's Party of Korea Publishing House, 1980)
Kim Jinkye, My homeland, (Seoul: Hyunjang munhaksa, 1990)
Kernig C. D ed, “Agitation”, Western Society and Marxism Communism, Vol. 1 (New
York: Herder and Herder, 1972)
Park Changok, “The Strengthening of Politico-Ideology Education and Mobilization”,
Labors, 1951.2
The Daily of North Korean Workers’ Party called Rodong sinmun (1951 ~ 1953)
Smith Anthony D., National Identity (Reno: University of Nevada Press, 1993)
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Abstract (if available)
Abstract
This research investigates how propaganda was used to prevent the government of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (North Korea) from collapsing during the Korean War. In particular, we will focus on the propaganda office as the functional unit of organization for the war effort. This office was central the government’s efforts to recover and reestablish political and economic strength, especially in rural regions. To solidify its political and agricultural authority, the regime relied on political-ideological public education and the mobilization of war resources. This study will examine the propaganda office’s key role in establishing and maintaining the regime’s legitimacy throughout the Korean War. This study focuses on North Korea’s propaganda office because it was central to the regime’s answer to these challenges. The major and primary resource of my research comes from a daily periodical of the North Korean Workers’ Party. Because North Korea continuously fabricated, controlled, and developed ideology for its regime through its own interpretation of his history, the language in its current books and journals has been moditified to reflect a fabricated history. However, the daily Rodong Sinmun has not been tampered with. This provides a unique opportunity to uncover what actually occurred inside the regime during the Korean War. In addition, the daily is the only publication that presents extensive information that can be inferred about the propaganda office because the daily was one of the primary propaganda tools used during the Korean War.
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Kim, Sang Bum
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Core Title
The role of the DPRK's Propaganda Office in the Korean War (1946-1953)
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College of Letters, Arts and Sciences
Degree
Master of Arts
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East Asian Area Studies
Publication Date
05/29/2012
Defense Date
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