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The Hawai'i State Teachers’ Association and Race to the Top: HSTA’S role in the RTTT grant

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The Hawai'i State Teachers’ Association and Race to the Top: HSTA’S role in the RTTT grant

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Content Running head: HSTA’S ROLE IN THE RACE TO THE TOP GRANT

1

THE HAWAI’I STATE TEACHERS’ ASSOCIATION AND RACE TO THE TOP:
HSTA’S ROLE IN THE RTTT GRANT

by

Linnea Sherrard-Libed

______________________________________________________________________

A Dissertation Presented to the
FACULTY OF THE USC ROSSIER SCHOOL OF EDUCATION
UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA
In Partial Fulfillment of the
Requirements for the Degree
DOCTOR OF EDUCATION

August 2017

Copyright 2017 Linnea Sherrard-Libed

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DEDICATION
This dissertation is dedicated to my parents, Jean and Alyce Sherrard. Thank you to my
husband, Clifford Rofoli Libed, my sister, Beth Hill, and to my brother and sister-in-law,
Andrew and Michele Sherrard, for supporting me during this process. I could not have done it
without you.

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
I would like to thank my advisor and committee chair, Dr. Lawrence Picus, for all of his
knowledge and support during the dissertation process. This would not have been possible
without his expertise, guidance, and insight. Additionally, I would like to thank my committee
members, Dr. Monique Datta, and Dr. Alan Green. Thank you for all of your feedback, ideas,
and analysis during the dissertation process.
I would also like to thank my USC professors for their knowledge and guidance
throughout the program. Lastly, I would like to thank my family, friends, and husband, for their
support, encouragement, and understanding.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS
Dedication 2
Acknowledgements 3
List of Tables 6
Abstract 7
Chapter 1: Overview of the Study 8
Introduction 8
Background of the Problem 15
Statement of the Problem 17
Purpose of the Study 17
Research Questions 18
Importance of the Study 18
Limitations, Delimitations, and Assumptions 19
Definitions 20
Chapter 2: Literature Review 25
Introduction 25
Federal Educational Reform Efforts 26
Teacher Effectiveness 36
Impact of Student Characteristics on Performance 40
Class Size 41
School Governance 41
Conceptual Framework 42
Figure 1. Proximity to educational policy decision making in Hawaii 44
Teacher Unions 50
School Reform in Hawaii 62
Summary 78
Chapter 3: Methodology 80
Introduction 80
Methodology 81
Research Questions 82
Purposeful Sample and Population 82
Interview Respondents 89
Identifying Schools and Complex Areas 90
Summary 90
Chapter 4: Results 92
Introduction 92
Case Study Schools 93
Findings for Research Question 1 97
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Findings for Research Question 2 108
Findings for Research Question 3 117
Summary 124
Chapter 5: Discussion 126
Introduction 126
Discussion of Findings 127
Limitations 140
Recommendations 141
Conclusion 144
References 146
Appendices 172
Appendix A: Case Study Schools 172
Appendix B: List of Documents Gathered from the Hawaii DOE and Case 183
Study Schools
Appendix C: Role Group Position During RttT Years and Impact on Reliability 184
Appendix D: Teacher Interview Data Collection Protocol 185
Appendix E: Policy Maker Interview Data Collection Protocol 187
Appendix F: Policy Implementer Interview Data Collection Protocol 190
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LIST OF TABLES
Table 1. Demographic School Data from Case Study Schools 95
Table 2. Total Responses to Themes in Research Question 1 108
Table 3. Total Responses to Themes in Research Question 2 117
Table 4. Total Responses to Themes in Research Question 3 124
Table 5. Makai School: Teacher Data during RttT 174
Table 6. Makai School: Student Data during RttT Year Four 175
Table 7. Moana School: Teacher Data during RttT 176
Table 8. Moana School: Student Data during RttT Year Four 177
Table 9. Akau School: Teacher Data during RttT 179
Table 10. Akau School: Student Data during RttT Year Four 180
Table 11. Hema School: Teacher Data during RttT 181
Table 12. Hema School: Student Data during RttT Year Four 182

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ABSTRACT
This study applies a conceptual framework which examines the proximity that individuals and
groups have to education policy making, as well as stakeholders’ historical access to educational
decision-making in Hawaii. The purpose of this study is to understand the role of the Hawaii
State Teacher’s Association (HSTA) and the contracts the union had with the State of Hawaii
during Race to the Top. The study sought to examine HSTA’s role in developing, writing, and
implementing the Race to the Top application, plans and programs in Hawaii as well as the
differential treatment of Zone of School Innovation teachers and non-zone teachers. The study is
a qualitative comparative case study between two schools in the Zone of School Innovation (ZSI)
and two schools out of the zone. Additional interviews were conducted with key stakeholders
and document collection was used to help support study findings. Data collection and analysis
utilized open coding to selective coding methods that generated reflexive themes. Findings from
this study indicate that HSTA was initially acting as a reformed union prior to grant
implementation. After Hawaii’s Race to the Top grant was placed on high risk status, the union
shifted to functioning as a traditional union for the remainder of the grant. Recommendations for
future research include conducting an analysis of educational policy decisions in Hawaii in the
last twenty years to determine if stakeholder groups have shifted position in regards to access to
educational decision-making in Hawaii.

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CHAPTER 1
OVERVIEW OF THE STUDY
Introduction
Hawaii has the only statewide teachers’ union in the nation. In 1970, the State of Hawaii
approved Act 171 to allow collective bargaining for state and county workers (Puette, 2008).
Educators were divided into three categories to bargain for wages and working conditions: public
school teachers, public school administrators, and faculty at the University of Hawaii (Fox &
Buchanan, 2004; Hirata & Oyama, 2010; Puette, 2008). The Hawaii State Teachers’ Association
(HSTA) was founded a year later in 1971 and served teachers in the state’s single, statewide
public school system. Only one year after its foundation, HSTA members voted to hold a strike
because they did not have a signed collective bargaining agreement. Hours before the strike a
resolution was reached between the HSTA leadership and then Governor Burns, and teachers
went to work as scheduled (Hawaii State Teachers Association [HSTA], 2012). But in 1973,
HSTA and the employer were again in a conflict. The Hawaii State Teachers’ Association called
for a strike vote, which passed, and teachers were on the picket line striking for better working
conditions and higher pay. It was HSTA’s first strike and the first statewide teacher strike in the
nation (Puette, 2008). Two years after the strike, in 1975, the Hawaii State Legislature voted to
eliminate all salary increases for teachers (HSTA, 2012). The relationship between the teachers’
union and the state was off to a turbulent start.
Over the next forty years, the HSTA called for walkouts four times and held two strikes.
Hawaii teachers operated without a contract from 2001 to 2003 during which time the HSTA
appealed to the Hawaii Labor Relations Board (HLRB) for implementation and execution of the
2001 collective bargaining agreement (HSTA v. Cayetano & Board of Education, State of
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Hawaii, 2002). The ruling was favorable for teachers as it determined the state was at fault for
failing to agree to a 3% differential in pay for teachers with higher degrees as stated in the
contract, a stipulation upon which teachers had agreed to end their strike (HSTA v. Cayetano &
Board of Education, State of Hawaii, 2002). Although the Hawaii Labor Relations Board ruled
in favor of the HSTA, the legislature funded advanced degrees for only one year. The next
contract, which was the 2005 Agreement Between the HSTA and the State of Hawaii Board of
Education, July 1, 2005 – June 30, 2007, mitigated some salary losses from the 2003
underfunded contract conflict (Graphic Communications International Union, 2005). However,
by 2009 the State and HSTA were again in a funding disagreement.
Faced with substantial revenue losses due to the economic recession, in 2009 the Hawaii
Department of Education, the Hawaii State Teachers’ Association, then Governor Lingle, and the
Board of Education approved cost-cutting measures in the form of the “Furlough Friday” four-
day work week, which was a plan to reduce teacher salaries over a two year period (Okabe,
2009; Pilkington, 2009). Furloughs required that schools close on designated days and teachers
take an 8% cut in pay but retain professional development days and holidays as scheduled
(Okabe, 2009; Roig, 2009; Wilson, 2009). The furloughs, scheduled at 17 per year, were the
most in the nation and one of the most drastic cost saving and pay cut methods nationwide (Oliff
& Johnson, 2010; Pilkington, 2009; Roig, 2009).
While the teachers settled for unpaid leave, the State of Hawaii saved an estimated $117
million (Napier, 2012; Wilson, 2009). In protest of the furloughs, which gave Hawaii the
shortest school year in America at 163 days per year, parents formed a group called Save Our
Schools and held weekly sit-ins at then Governor Lingle’s office (Juscen, 2010; Pilkington,
2009; Roig, 2009). Although 34 furlough days were initially scheduled, an agreement was
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reached in 2010 which ended teacher furloughs one year earlier than planned and cut the total
number of slated furloughs in half (Moreno, 2010b; Napier, 2012). Parents stated they were
relieved the furloughs had ended sooner than expected (Moreno, 2010b).
The union maintained the contentious furlough Fridays had saved the state money but
protected teacher planning days (Okabe, 2009). Parents and the public asserted that students
with categorical funding had gone without services and educators’ emphasized students had lost
momentum (Moreno, 2010b; Roig, 2009). The furlough issue was on the front page of the news
at regular intervals, which may have placed more attention on education in Hawaii both locally
and nationally as a result. The Hawaii Department of Education (HIDOE) has historically been
compliant with Federal requests, and shortening the school year was atypical for the state. Major
news reports highlighted the shortened school year in the wake of poor test results (Letman,
2009; Pilkington, 2009; Roig, 2009). For instance, Hawaii scored third from last in nationwide
grade 8 reading and math assessments in 2007, forty-sixth in grade 8 NAEP math scores in 2005,
and fiftieth in national grade 8 NAEP reading scores in 2005 (National Center for Education
Statistics [NCES], n.d.; Pilkington, 2009). As part of Hawaii’s on-going effort towards
education reform, and in the same calendar year as furlough Fridays, the State of Hawaii
submitted an application for President Obama’s Race to the Top grant (Hawaii State Board of
Education, 2010; Okabe, 2009; Weiss, 2014).
In 2009 the Hawaii Department of Education applied for but was unsuccessful in
obtaining a Race to the Top grant. In 2011, in the second phase of grants, Hawaii received a
Race to the Top (RttT) award. The federal RttT grant had two eligibility requirements. The first
requirement was that each State’s application for funding be approved before the State could
receive grant funds, and the second requirement was that the State could not have any barriers to
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using student data to evaluate educators (U.S. Department of Education [USDOE], 2009, 2015b).
Up to 45 out of a possible 125 points could be awarded in the state success category for
leadership support signatures, which could include a signature from a union leader, all of which
Hawaii procured (Lingle, 2010; USDOE, 2009).
Hawaii’s RttT grant focused on four key areas: raising student achievement, increasing
the college-going rate, closing achievement gaps, and emphasizing Science, Technology,
Engineering, and Technology (Lingle, 2010). The State worked to implement the four areas with
a five-point action plan which included adoption of Common Core Standards and assessments, a
data system overhaul, rewarding effective teachers and leaders, implementing tri-level reform
with Local Education Agencies (LEAs) and State Education Agencies (SEAs), and improving
struggling schools in Zones of School Innovation (USDOE, 2013; Lingle, 2010; McNeil, 2013).
The Zones of School Innovation (ZSI) were selected by following the RttT guidelines
and targeting the lowest-performing schools in the state, along with additional component
schools in the same complex area (Hawaii State Department of Education [HIDOE], n.d.-a). The
result included thirteen Title I schools in rural, hard to staff locations on the Oahu’s leeward
coast and on Hawaii Island’s south coast and the western region (Essovan, 2010; HIDOE, n.d.-a;
Moreno, 2010a). The fourteenth lowest performing school, the Hawaii School for the Deaf and
Blind, housed in urban Honolulu, was not included in the ZSI (Essovan, 2010; Moreno, 2010a).
The two Zones of School Innovation also had the largest numbers of Native Hawaiian students in
the state, high numbers of students living in poverty, and ZSI students were overrepresented in
special education programs when compared with state-wide averages (HIDOE, n.d.-a). Twenty-
five percent of Hawaii’s total RttT award was allocated to the two Zones of School Innovation
(Essovan, 2010).
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The ZSI section of the RttT grant outlined seven reforms for the ZSI schools. The ZSI
reforms included: early child education for preschool students in the zone, financial retention and
pay for performance in hard to fill areas and hard to fill subjects, extended learning time,
incentives for highly effective teachers, expansion of the Hawaii DOE video conferencing for
remote areas, establishment of two High Tech High Schools, and a commitment to turn around
low-achieving schools (Essovan, 2010; Lingle, 2010). The ZSI schools also received support
from early learning centers and health care programs (HIDOE, n.d.-a).
As part of the $75 million dollar RttT application, a pay for performance program was
included in both ZSI and non ZSI schools. Hawaii’s pay for performance section of the grant
was often at the center of a nearly two-year disagreement between HSTA and the HIDOE
(McNeil, 2013; Poythress, 2011). The pay for performance program used the same criteria for
all public schools in the state and was described in detail in the Educator Effectiveness System
(EES) section of the grant. Wil Okabe, HSTA president for the duration of the RttT grant from
2009 – 2015, gave the green light for the Educator Effectiveness System in the Zones of School
Innovation (HIDOE, n.d.-a; Moreno, 2010a). Okabe also requested additional professional
training for struggling teachers and was open to exploring innovative solutions required to
achieve EES goals in the zone schools (Moreno, 2010a). One Race to the Top EES solution, for
example, was to pay highly qualified ZSI teachers a $3,000 bonus in 2010 (Essovan, 2010).
Additionally, the HIDOE planned to offer all highly qualified ZSI teachers a 20% increase for
the 2011-2012 school year (Essovan, 2010).
The HIDOE piloted a scaled down version of the Educator Effectiveness System in the
Zones of School Innovation in 2011 and expanded the EES pilot to include 81 schools in 2012
(USDOE, 2013). Although the State was able to move forward with the Educator Effectiveness
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System pilot, it was unable to secure a collective bargaining agreement with HSTA to mandate
the implementation of EES requirements statewide. In an effort to save the RttT grant, Governor
Abercrombie enforced what came to be known as the “Last, Best, and Final Offer” two-year
imposed union contract from July 1, 2011, to July 1, 2013 (Kim, 2011; Poythress, 2012). The
2011-2013 Last, Best, and Final Offer contract was the only contract imposed on any union in
the State of Hawaii (Butrymowicz, 2013; Kim, 2011; Maynard, 2012; Strauss, 2012). The
imposed contract included a 1.5% pay cut, a 50/50 split of medical contributions, and “Directed
Leave Without Pay” days (Butrymowicz, 2013; Kim, 2011; Poythress, 2012). “Directed Leave
Without Pay” (DLWOP) days were unpaid, non-instructional days when teachers were directed
to stay home. “Directed Leave Without Pay” days were scattered throughout the school year
during the imposed contract. Although unpaid, many teachers reported to work anyway in order
to organize their classrooms, for example, before students’ first day of school or to prepare for
class after winter break. For instance, the first two DLWOP dates occurred on the third and
fourth day of the 2011 school year, prior to the first day of student instruction. Ten-month
teachers had fourteen DLWOP in the imposed two-year contract and twelve-month teachers had
sixteen DLWOP days in the imposed contract (Lucas-Zenk, 2012; Vorsino, 2011; HIDOE,
2012). The HSTA maintained the DLWOP days were furloughs and the State maintained that it
had the right to impose a contract due to a breach in bargaining with no loss in student
instructional time (Kim, 2011; Maynard, 2012; Vorsino, 2011). Possibly as a result of the
continual friction between the HSTA and the HIDOE, public school teachers launched a work-
to-rule movement that went statewide – without official HSTA support (Butrymowicz, 2013;
Strauss, 2012). While teachers continued to work under the imposed contract, HSTA filed a
complaint with the Hawaii Labor Relations Board (HLRB) but HLRB did not make a ruling, and
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subsequently HSTA filed with the Hawaii Supreme Court to force HLRB to rule on the imposed
contract (Kim, 2011; Strauss, 2012).
Due to delays in RttT implementation, on December 21, 2011, the United States
Department of Education sent a letter to Governor Abercrombie placing Hawaii on high-risk
status (Whalen, 2011). The letter cited the lack of a signed union contract between the State of
Hawaii and HSTA without which the HIDOE could not implement Hawaii’s RttT requirements
including teacher pay for performance, teacher evaluations, and the EES pilot programs via the
ZSI initiatives (McNeil, 2012; Whalen, 2011; Strauss, 2012). One month later, on January 19,
2012, the HSTA leadership unanimously supported a six-year contract that fulfilled many RttT
requirements and presented it for approval to HSTA members (Poythress, 2012). However, for
the first time in HSTA history, 67% of the HSTA rank and file members rejected the six-year
contract proposal (Poythress, 2012; Strauss, 2012). Teachers cited continued pay cuts and they
also expressed frustration that they had not received enough information on the proposed teacher
pay for performance Educator Effectiveness System (Eagle, 2012; Poythress, 2012). In response
to the rejected contract, the union conducted a round of statewide talks and against then
Governor Abercrombie’s objections, put the rejected contract up for re-vote and the rejected
contract passed (Eagle, 2012). HSTA stated the re-vote was their attempt to help Hawaii save
the RttT grant (Eagle, 2012; Strauss, 2012). By mid-2012 HSTA and the employer had ratified a
four-year contract which covered July 1, 2013 – June 30, 2017 (Butrymowicz, 2013). In 2015,
HSTA successfully re-opened the 2013-2017 contract in order to improve teacher salary and
compensation for the remaining two years of the contract (HSTA, 2015; Kalani, 2015b). The
conflict between the Hawaii DOE and the teachers’ union regarding the RttT grant had become a
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conflict within the union itself (Butrymowicz, 2013; USDOE, 2013; McNeil, 2011, 2013;
Poythress, 2012).
Despite the two-year dispute, Hawaii teachers as represented by HSTA were key
stakeholders in the implementation of the RttT grant. The HSTA used member surveys, press
releases, and newsletters to communicate with membership about RttT reforms (HSTA, 2014).
HSTA also participated in a Joint Committee with the HIDOE and negotiated that HSTA
members be part of the HIDOE pilot and implementation phases of the pay for performance
section of RttT grant (HIDOE, 2013). Although all public school teachers in Hawaii were
covered by the same collective bargaining agreement, during the Hawaii RttT grant, the teachers
in the Zones of School Innovation (ZSI) were treated differently under a supplemental
bargaining agreement.
Background of the Problem
In 1965 the Elementary and Secondary Education (ESEA) act was passed in an effort to
improve student achievement. The ESEA attempted to level the playing field by supporting
specific sub groups of students, such as students living in poverty (Title I) or English language
learners (Title III). Hess and Finn (2007) report the ESEA was a method for the Federal
Government to send money to states for specific groups of students, but assert ESEA never
functioned as an accountability tool.
The No Child Left Behind Act was a reauthorization of ESEA, passed by Congress in
2001 and enacted into law in 2002 (No Child Left Behind [NCLB], 2002). The No Child Left
Behind Act mandated that educators close achievement gaps between all subgroups of students,
such as black and white students, or English Language Learner students and native speakers of
English (Gamoron & Long, 2006; Manna & Ryan, 2011; Schwartz, 2009). The No Child Left
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Behind Act attempted to address the Elementary and Secondary Education Act’s lack of
accountability with a series of measures, often involving sanctions (Birman, 2013; Hess & Finn,
2007). Under NCLB, like ESEA, Title 1 funds continued to go to schools as long as they met No
Child Left Behind mandates (Hess & Finn, 2007). Schools could be labeled as failing under
NCLB if test score targets were not met. Many saw NCLB as a superficial education reform
initiative because the money always arrived regardless of the educational outcomes (Hess &
Finn, 2007; McGuinn, 2012b; Moffitt, 2016).
Perhaps in an effort to move away from the Elementary and Secondary Education Act
and NCLB’s use of categorical grants, the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009
offered both School Improvement Grants (SIG) and Race to the Top grants based on total points
earned instead of categories. The School Improvement Grants focused on specific schools and
local education agencies. Race to the Top grants, on the other hand, focused on education
reform at the state level.
Race to the Top was the largest Federal competitive education reform grant program to
date and required states to implement several statewide education reform initiatives to qualify for
funding (Nicholson-Crotty & Staley, 2012). The Race to the Top grant applications could
receive up to 25% of the total evaluation points possible if they passed laws or proposed to
eliminate seniority-based compensation tenure and RttT guidelines gave states some flexibility
from traditional union policies (Nicholson-Crotty & Staley, 2012; Strunk & Grissom, 2010).
Hawaii’s Race to the Top grant included a teacher pay for performance proposal that included
the possibility of dismissal if a teacher received multiple unsatisfactory ratings.
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Statement of the Problem
Hawaii’s $75 million RttT grant required a number of assurances by the State of Hawaii
in order to fulfill the RttT grant from 2010 – 2014. Included in the assurances were the adoption
of the Common Core, improved data systems, alignment of the educational system and
monitoring the system for improvement, Zones of School Innovation, and teacher pay for
performance. In the Zones of School Innovation (ZSI) schools, additional resources were
allocated which included funds to pay teachers for extending the school day in the ZSI schools.
While RttT had many assurances, teacher pay for performance created disputes between
the HIDOE and the HSTA (McNeil, 2013). The HSTA Collective Bargaining Agreement
included the Educator Effectiveness System (EES) that outlined multiple categories and weights.
Student achievement scores, for example, were measured by a value-added growth model on
standardized tests and were a significant portion of a teacher’s effectiveness rating. The weights
to determine how much student scores would count for each teacher depended on the role of the
teacher. Teacher roles were categorized as: classroom teachers in tested grades/subjects,
classroom teachers in non-tested grades/subjects, non-classroom teachers at the school level, and
non-classroom teachers not at the school level. Additional categories in the Educator
Effectiveness System contained: evaluations of teachers by their students via the Tripod Student
Survey, teacher identified goals as outlined in the Student Learning Objectives stipulation, and
which included observations of classroom teachers by administrators, as well as professional
development for all teachers to increase student achievement.
Purpose of the Study
The purpose of this study was to understand the role of the HSTA and the contract the
union had with the State of Hawaii during the four years of Hawaii’s RttT grant. The study
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compared two Zone of Innovation schools and two non-Zone of Innovation schools with similar
demographics. Specifically, the four schools in the study are rural elementary schools that serve
large numbers of Native Hawaiian students. Stakeholder interviews to explore teacher pay for
performance also included state lawmakers, union officials, and district liaisons. This study
attempted to examine how HSTA’s role impacted the RttT grant.
Research Questions
1. What was HSTA’s role in developing and writing the RttT application to the Federal
Government?
2. What role did HSTA play in the implementation of RttT plans and programs
throughout the life of RttT in Hawaii?
3. What was the impact of differential treatment of Zone of School Innovation schools
in the teacher contract on HSTA, union relationships with the DOE, and on the
implementation of RttT reforms across the zone and non-zone schools?
Importance of the Study
The study examined HSTA’s role in Hawaii’s RttT grant. Researchers assert unions and
collective bargaining agreements pose significant barriers to education reform (Chubb & Moe,
1990; Moe, 2011; Snell & Furtick, 2013). The study lent insight into how the HSTA and the
Hawaii DOE were able to come to an agreement and overcome significant challenges to
implement statewide education reform in Hawaii during the RttT grant. The study may be useful
to practitioners who wish to examine how the union and the Hawaii DOE worked with teachers
to implement teacher pay for performance in both the ZSI and non-ZSI schools (Hanushek,
2011; Vachon & Ma, 2015). The study may also be useful to policy makers who wish to
understand HSTA’s collective bargaining agreement and the teacher pay for performance
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stipulation (McNeil, 2013; Winkler, Scull, & Zeehandelaar, 2012). The study provided data
regarding teacher and stakeholder views of teacher pay for performance regarding Hawaii’s
Educator Effectiveness System (Alvarez & Anderson-Ketchmark, 2011; Kuhfeld, 2015). The
importance of the completed study is a contribution to the literature on the HSTA, the HIDOE
RttT grant, and the joint agreement between the HSTA and the HIDOE (Weiss, 2014).
Limitations, Delimitations, and Assumptions
Limitations of the study beyond the control of the researcher included some scenarios in
which stakeholders such as teachers, lawmakers, and newer union members had difficulty
remembering details about RttT. Some current school officials had reduced roles during the
implementation of RTTT. Researcher limitations, to a small degree, were a lack of access to
teachers and lawmakers who worked directly with RttT during 2010 to 2014. Reduced access
did not impact the validity of the data gathered.
Delimitations which the researcher chose to allow were using O’ahu Zones of School
Innovation for the study and not to include the Hawaii Island Zone of Innovation schools due to
time, money, and travel costs. A second delimitation to the study was that the schools in the
study and the stakeholders interviewed were purposefully selected. A third delimitation was that
Hawaii is geographically isolated and is the nation’s only statewide school district, which means
the findings may not be generalizable to other states.
Assumptions made by the researcher were that all stakeholders would answer honestly
and to the best of their ability. Additional assumptions included that access to off-site
stakeholders would be granted in order to supplement data gathered in the ZSI and non-ZSI
school sites. It was also assumed that the study would contain valid data. Lastly, the study was
designed with a reliable methodology.
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Definitions
Agency Free Provisions: Provisions that compel state employees in a union shop who
wish to remain non-union employees to pay a fee to the union for which they receive the union
newsletter and the benefit of the college bargaining agreements but do not vote in union elections
or on contract issues (Hartney & Flavin, 2011).
Alternate Pay Schedules: Teacher salaries that include compensation for greater levels of
leadership and responsibility (Loeb, Miller, & Strunk, 2009).
Blocking: A tactic unions use to stop the policies and bills the NEA and AFT do not want
(Moe, 2011).
Categorical Grants: Allocating money to districts based on need driven formulas in
which districts automatically receive the money regardless of performance such as Title 1 dollars
for low SES students (USDOE, 2015b).
Classroom Climate: Positive teacher-student relationships in which teachers trust
students, are respectful to students, and care about students, especially in the areas of social-
emotional, intellectual relationships, as well as persistence, and self- efficacy (Winheller, Hattie,
& Brown, 2013).
Collective Bargaining Agreements (CBAs): One of the most important sets of regulations
that control school district policy; the rules that determine teacher compensation, hiring, transfer,
grievance, and evaluation procedures (Chubb & Moe, 1990).
Combat Pay: Rewarding teachers with additional compensation when they teach in tough
conditions (Farkas, Johnson, & Duffett, 2003).
General Equilibrium: the situation across an entire economy such as a school district;
which affects supply, demand, and prices; for example teachers transfer between schools and
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may cost specific schools more (or less) which may readjust the balance of teacher resources
across the entire district (Woessmann, 2011).
Highly Qualified: NCLB required that all teachers be highly qualified and receive “high
quality professional development” (NCLB, Section 1119). Requirements to be highly qualified
were as follows: Full state certification OR pass a state license exam (Cochran-Smith, 2002;
Heck, 2007).
High Quality Professional Development: To be considered high quality professional
development, the training must improve teachers’ knowledge of subject matter, align with state
standards, and improve teachers’ understanding of (scientifically based) instructional strategies
(Cochran-Smith, 2002).
High Risk Status: A condition in which the Federal government limited access to a State’s
remaining RttT money, rejected requests for changes to the State’s plan, an extensive on-site
review of the State by RttT Federal oversight, and the USDOE released a statement that the
Secretary of Education was concerned the State could not fulfill its commitment to the grant
(McNeil, 2013).
Input Based Incentives: A salary compensation which often rewards teachers with the
same degree at identical levels; for example two teachers with a Ph.D. receive exactly the same
pay increase (Loeb et al., 2009; West & Mykerezi, 2011).
Merit Pay A compensation system that explicitly rewards teachers for better performance
(Dee & Keys, 2004). This can also be pay that encompasses instances in which teachers receive
temporary or permanent increases for being more effective in the classroom; merit pay should
not include hard to staff areas, hard to staff subjects, or payment for additional credentials
(Leigh, 2013).
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Migration: teachers leaving one school to transfer to another school (Guarino,
Santibanez, & Daley, 2006).
No Child Left Behind (NCLB): A set of cumbersome mandates; a civil rights manifesto
acting as an educational accountability system; an accountability “X-Ray” of transparency in
reporting school and student scores; an accountability “No chance” model of school behavior
modifications to set goals, assess effectiveness and improve schools; an accountability “Bully
Pulpit” model which publically shames educators to try to meet unreachable targets (Hess &
Finn, 2007; McGuinn, 2012b).
Opportunity Cost: A benefit that must be given up to get something else; smaller class
size, for example, comes at a high opportunity cost and increases the total number of teachers,
and may create easier working conditions; teacher behavior in providing the objectives for a
specific task (Moe, 2007).
Output Based Salaries: Linking pay to performance (Loeb et al., 2009).
Output Based Incentives: Rewarding teachers differently based on different levels of
performance, such as rewarding individual teachers for improved test scores. (West & Mykerezi,
2011).
Reform Unionism: Changing unions from fighting for benefits and rules and enforcing
collective bargaining agreements to a union that make decisions regarding school governance
and student learning (Donaldson, Mayer, Cobb, LeChausseur, & Welton, 2013; Moe, 2007).
Race to the Top (RttT): a vehicle to provide political cover for education reform and a
way to help states handle innovation (McGuinn, 2012b).
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Rural Communities: Communities that are defined based on: their proximity to urban
areas, the level of amenities that are attractive to outsiders (tourists), industrial composition, and
in-migration of foreign born Hispanics (Gagnon & Mattingly, 2015).
Salary Schedule and Structure: The education level and years of experience of an
individual (Loeb et al., 2009).
School Community Based Management (SCBM): A democratic system that enables key
stakeholders (principal, teachers, faculty, parents, students, and community members) to actively
shape the direction of education at a school (Ganopole, 1993).
Teacher Certification: A teacher that has been in a state-approved teacher education
program and has completed a major or minor, education courses, student teaching, and earned
passing scores on their entrance exams (Darling-Hammond, 2000).
Teacher Inputs: years of experience and educational preparation (Buddin & Zamarro,
2009).
Teacher Unions: An organization that has the same function as parents and voters and
who want to improve school quality; a labor group promoting the self-interest of teachers to the
detriment of the students such as raising salaries increases class size and teachers have less time
for individual students which increases drop-out rates; rent-seekers that want to gain influence by
increasing teacher salaries and controlling working conditions through collective bargaining
agreements; a labor group that achieve increases (rents) but have no immediate gain on student
achievement; organized interest groups who try to influence policy (Brunner & Squires, 2013).
Traditional Tenure: Basing pay on seniority (Cowen & Strunk, 2015).
Typical Salary Schedule: Rewarding teachers at the same rate based on years of
experience and levels of professional development when applicable (West & Mykerezi, 2011).
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Value Added Model: The learning the student brings to the classroom is incorporated in
the form of his / her achievement in the relevant subject in the previous year (Clotfelter, Ladd, &
Vigdor, 2007).

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CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW
Introduction
The Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA) of 1965 sought to improve
education nationwide. President Clinton reauthorized ESEA with the Improving America’s
Schools Act (IASA) in 1994. The Improving America’s Schools Act required schools to submit
school improvement plans as a condition of receiving Title I funds. President Clinton’s Goals
2000 plan, President Bush’s America 2000 reform, and ISIA all attempted to bring
accountability and excellence to education. The No Child Left Behind (NCLB) Act of 2002,
another reauthorization of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act, focused education
reform by setting clear test score Annual Yearly Progress (AYP) goals, publishing the results,
and sanctioning schools that did not meet Annual Yearly Progress (Birman, 2013). The NCLB
reforms mandated that every child attain full proficiency in math and reading by 2014.
However, many reported the Annual Yearly Progress targets were often unreachable (Hess &
Finn, 2007; Michelman, 2012). Additionally, during the NCLB era, the American Recovery and
Reinvestment Act of (ARRA) of 2009 allowed states to compete for Race to the Top Grants and
School Improvement Grants (Kolbe & Rice, 2012; Manna & Ryan, 2011).
The RttT funds accounted for less than 1% of total educational federal funding but
provided some of the most dramatic education reforms in the last decade (USDOE, 2015a).
Many of the RttT grant application reforms required both state legislation approval and national
union approval from the National Education Association and the American Federation of
Teachers (Kober & Rentner, 2011). Education has historically been a state right with little
interference from the federal government but Race to the Top attempted to shift this balance of
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power (Birman, 2013; Hess & Finn, 2007; Moffitt, 2016; Tirozzi & Uro, 1997). Often linking
teacher pay to performance via student test scores, the specific details of each RttT application
was left up to each State (Levine & Levine, 2012). Furthermore, the language of the teacher
union collective bargaining agreements was determined by each state or each school district as
needed. The State of Hawaii and the Hawaii Department of Education, for example, were quick
to promise teacher pay for performance based on student test scores with a value-added growth
model, but the Hawaii State Teacher’s Union was reluctant to make the same commitment after
HSTA rank and file members rejected a contract that would have ensured a pay for performance
stipulation (Butrymowicz, 2013; McNeil, 2011). The lack of a signed contract delayed Hawaii’s
RttT grant implementation for nearly two years and almost risked the loss of the entire grant
(Eagle, 2012; McNeil, 2011; Poythress, 2012).
Chapter 2 provides a review of the literature surrounding education reform, divided into
six sections. Section one examines the literature on Federal education reform efforts. Section
two overviews the literature on teacher effectiveness. Section three investigates the impact of
student characteristics on performance. Section four details the literature on school governance.
Section five appraises teacher unions, including the Hawaii State Teachers’ Association. Section
six reviews school reform in the State of Hawaii including the Educator Effectiveness System
(EES) policy area, specifically focusing on the pay for performance section of Hawaii’s RttT
application.
Federal Educational Reform Efforts
This section uses the lens of Federal efforts to address education reform. Education
reform in the U.S. has emphasized efforts that address all students, including students
traditionally covered by categorical grants and those students not traditionally included in
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specific, targeted groups. Race to the Top drove Federal education reform by competition, rather
than requesting states comply, even in states that were not RttT award recipients (Birman, 2013;
Kolbe & Rice, 2012; Nicholson-Crotty & Staley, 2012; Kober & Rentner, 2011). Weiss (2014)
asserts RttT failed to meet its goals primarily due to delays in teacher evaluation systems
nationwide.
Elementary and Secondary Education Act
In the 1960s, the Coleman Report, Equality of Educational Opportunity, examined
segregation, the black-white achievement gap, school variation, and the impact of a student’s
socio-economic status on achievement (Coleman, 1968; Gamoron & Long, 2006). Coleman
(1968) asserted that due to factors outside of the family’s control, it was up to the school to foster
educational achievement that would, in turn, improve equality for students. The Coleman Report
argued equality in education is a myth. Another finding in the Coleman Report was that a
student’s socioeconomic status (SES) had a greater bearing on educational achievement, more
than any other factor (Gamoron & Long, 2006; Hochschild & Scovronick, 2003). Nash (2004)
emphasizes that American educators strive to provide educational equity to students.
In an attempt to mitigate the impact of students living in poverty, President Lyndon
Johnson signed the Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA) into law in 1965 (Benham
& Heck, 1994; Hanushek & Lindseth, 2009; Hochschild & Scovronick, 2003). Categorical
funding was sent to schools in an attempt to address these factors. Federal Title I funding, for
instance, was allocated to schools to reduce the impact of poverty on school children. At that
time, nearly 100% of all school funding was provided by states and local school districts
(Michelman, 2012). Education was primarily the concern of each state, and with ESEA, the
federal government supplemented up to 10% of state education budgets with categorical funds to
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help students with issues such as limited English, poverty, and disabilities (Moffitt, 2016). Some
researchers assert ESEA did not improve achievement for disadvantaged students nor did it
fundamentally change education, although it did increase federal funding (Hanushek & Lindseth,
2009; Moffitt, 2016). However, other researchers have found that gains made by Hispanic and
black students on the National Assessment of Educational Progress (NAEP) scores between 1970
and 1990 were most likely due to large increases in public policy such as ESEA (Grissmer,
Kirby, Berends, & Williamson, 1994). Evaluations of Federal Title I programs show funding
positively impacted student achievement (Tirozzi & Uro, 1997). Researchers submit that
successful educational policies help to improve student achievement and in turn sustain our
democratic society (Tirozzi & Uro, 1997). Yet poverty reduces students’ educational
achievement (Coley & Baker, 2013; Weiss, 2014). Additionally, research demonstrates that low
test scores negatively impact the nation’s economy (Carnoy & Rothstein, 2015). Becker, as
reported by Teixeira (2014), asserted that educational achievement led individuals to better-
paying jobs and had a positive impact on our economy.
Human Capital Theory
Human capital theory examines the impact of education on society (Lauder, 2015; Levin,
1989; Psacharopoulos, 2006). Human capital theory asserts the more education a person
receives, and the better quality that education is, the more money the individual can potentially
earn (Hanushek & Luque, 2003; Lauder, 2015). The quality of education has been found to
impact individual earnings over time, and the higher the quality of education, as measured by test
scores, the higher an individual’s earnings may be (Hanushek & Lindseth, 2009; Hanushek &
Luque, 2003; Murnane, Willett, Duhaldeborde, & Tyler, 2000). Researchers also note that
individuals with only a high school degree were more likely to be unemployed more often and to
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have lower earnings over the course of their life (Daly & Bengali, 2014; Psacharopoulos, 2006).
Researchers maintain that college graduates continue to benefit from increased earnings as a net
gain over the course of their life (Daly & Bengali, 2014; Orfield, 2014). Human capital theory
contends society can invest in human resources such as education and health, and these
investments will lead to a stronger economy (Lauder, 2015; Levin, 1989). Specifically, the
instruction a student receives has an impact on his or her learning, and that learning has a value
to society. Examining schooling as an economic model, the skills and knowledge children learn
would be considered human capital. If children learn more skills they may be more productive,
if they have improved knowledge they may earn higher wages and contribute more to the
economy (Psacharopoulos, 2006). Human capital has a long return on the initial investment
because current resources are invested for future rewards (Levin, 1989; Psacharopoulos, 2006).
Consequently, a child entering preschool at age five might graduate from college by age twenty-
two. Better quality education improves earnings and economic gains (Hanushek & Lindseth,
2009).
Hanushek (2011) asserts “A teacher one standard deviation above the mean effectiveness
annually generates marginal gains of over $400,000 in present value of student future earnings”
(p. 466). Additionally, countries with higher scores on math and science PISA exams or higher
scores on The International Science and Science Study (TIMSS) tests also have stronger
economic growth (Hanushek, 2011). Carnoy and Rothstein (2015) caution against using a single
test such as the PISA to measure economic growth, because test scores may be related to how
well a curriculum is aligned to the test or impacted by socioeconomic status. Human capital
theory also suggests education may improve the equity of an individual by raising income level,
increasing life expectancy, and by decreasing the impact of poverty (Psacharopoulos, 2006).
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Supporting and funding higher quality education may increase an individual’s skills and in turn
support a stronger, more competitive national economy (Hanushek & Luque, 2003; Murnane et
al., 2000; Teixeira, 2014).
A Nation at Risk
In 1983, A Nation at Risk asserted that the failure of America’s schools to deliver high-
quality education was a contributing cause for the nation’s economic troubles (Good, 2010; Hall,
2003; Murnane et al., 2000). A Nation at Risk outlined failing schools, test scores and standards,
and drew the public’s attention to national educational reform (Birman, 2013; Good, 2010; Hall,
2003). According to a review of survey data collected by the Roper Center’s Public Opinion
Location Library, confidence in public schools declined during the eighties and nineties
(Hochschild & Scott, 1998). Public opinion was also divided on educational issues. The
American public, for instance, supported the idea of desegregation but did not support integrated
bussing practices to alleviate school segregation (Hochschild & Scott, 1998; Weinstein, 2016).
After bussing ended per court orders, racial segregation in schools increased to original levels or
higher (Levine & Levine, 2012; Reardon, Grewal, Kalogrides, & Greenberg, 2012; Weinstein,
2016). The public had favorable reactions to supporting increased federal funding for schools,
especially when linked to smaller class size, but school vouchers and a longer school year had
mixed public support (Hochschild & Scott, 1998; Hochschild & Scovronick, 2003). Public
opinion of American schools was at an all-time low between 1978 and 1998 (Hochschild &
Scott, 1998). In response, the United States governors’ published Action in the States, a report
detailing improvements and increased expectations in a majority of the States (Schwartz &
Robinson, 2000). As a result of the intense focus A Nation at Risk generated, educational reform
moved to the forefront of many political campaigns.
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No Child Left Behind
In 1994 the Elementary and Secondary Education Act was reauthorized as the Improving
American Schools Act and Goals 2000. Tied with Title I funding, the Improving American
Schools Act and Goals 2000 were embraced by both President Clinton and President Bush
(Birman, 2013). Raising expectations and providing common targets for teachers and students,
Goals 2000 had bipartisan support, included the standards movement as part of its education
reform platform, and also paved the way for the No Child Left Behind Act (McShane, 2014;
Schwartz & Robinson, 2000).
A decade after A Nation at Risk was published, President Bush reauthorized the
Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA) of 1965 as the No Child Left Behind (NCLB)
Act in 2001. Under NCLB, states had until 2014 to meet performance targets in which all
students would reach full proficiency in reading and math, as measured by Annual Yearly
Progress on state tests (Birman, 2013; Michelman, 2012). The No Child Left Behind Act set
closing the achievement gap between subgroups of students as a key target, but white students
consistently outperformed other groups (Levine & Levine, 2012; Manna & Ryan, 2011; Tirozzi
& Uro, 1997). The NCLB act was successful in that it implemented transparency in reporting
school and student scores and created urgency about school reform (Birman, 2013; Gamoron &
Long, 2006; Hess & Finn, 2007). Like Goals 2000, NCLB included multiple targets to improve
education. Teacher qualifications were a key component of NCLB reforms (Boyd, Goldhaber,
Lankford, & Wyckoff, 2007). The No Child Left Behind Act defined highly qualified teachers
(HQT) as having successfully earned both a certified state degree and earning passing scores on
all required state licensure tests (Buddin & Zamarro, 2009; Cochran-Smith, 2002; Gagnon &
Mattingly, 2015; Strain, 2007). The No Child Left Behind Act did allow some relief from highly
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qualified teacher requirements for experienced teachers’ in rural and hard to fill schools, for
science teachers, for and teachers who taught multiple subjects (Gagnon & Mattingly, 2015;
Strain, 2007).
The No Child Left Behind Act also required teachers be provided high-quality
professional development. Professional development under NCLB entailed aligning the training
with state standards, refining teachers’ knowledge of content, and improving teachers’
understanding of scientifically based instructional strategies (Paik et al., 2011; Strain, 2007).
Professional development is best when aligned with practice, embedded in school-wide goals,
and based on research (Cochran-Smith, 2002; Darling-Hammond, Wei, Andree, Richardson, &
Orphanos, 2009). Cochran-Smith (2002) argues that the NCLB Section 1119 definition of
professional development was at times ineffective as it favored random experiments and not
empirical studies.
The No Child Left Behind Act was problematic in part because its accountability model
had superficial goals, unreachable targets, used a generic approach for all schools, and had too
many compliance loopholes (Hess & Finn, 2007; Moffitt, 2016). The Elementary and Secondary
Education Act was not successful as the vehicle for NCLB education reforms as it was never
designed to carry the accountability the No Child Left Behind Act required (Hess & Finn, 2007;
McGuinn, 2012b; Michelman, 2012). Although accountability under NCLB was inconsistent,
Title I money continued to flow to schools as long as schools met compliance timelines,
requirements, collected records of financial spending, published school test results and filed
required reports (Hess & Finn, 2007). Another issue with the No Child Left Behind Act was that
American education had historically been a state right but NCLB implemented education
mandates from the Federal level (Birman, 2013; Hess & Finn, 2007; Moffitt, 2016; Tirozzi &
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Uro, 1997). In keeping with this, States continued to push for their own education reform
agendas as they had always done.
Common Core State Standards
Many states drafted their own standards in an effort to create clear, rigorous curriculum
requirements, and to drive education reform from the state level. Standards identified what
knowledge students would gain during a specific course, as well as what students would be able
to do as a result of finishing a course (Haag & Megowan, 2015; Vogler & Virtue, 2007;
Williams, 2012). In the next decade many states, including Hawaii, drafted educational
standards, adopted different definitions of proficiency and revised state standards and
assessments (Haag & Megowan, 2015; McShane, 2014; Moffitt, 2016; Odden & Picus, 2014).
In 1991 the Hawaii Legislature created a commission on state education standards and in 1994
Hawaii was the first state to receive money from President Clinton’s Goals 2000 to refine state
standards (Brown, 2009). Working with the Mid-Continent Research for Education and
Learning (McREL) group, Hawaii’s first draft of the Hawaii Content and Performance Standards
(HCPS I) had over 1,500 standards which was subsequently pared down to 139 standards and
published as Hawaii Content and Performance Standards III (HIDOE, 2005). In 2009, in an
effort to bring both rigor and a single definition of assessment proficiency to the standards
movement, the National Governors Association in association with the American Federation of
Teachers, the National Education Association, the National Council for Teachers of
Mathematics, and the National Council on Teachers of English, drafted and published national
standards in English and math (Common Core State Standards Initiative, 2017). The
implementation of the Common Core State Standards had begun. Federal education reform,
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including Race to the Top, would include the Common Core State Standards and related
assessments.
Race to the Top
By 2012 President Obama, with the support of then U.S. Secretary of Education Arne
Duncan, gave ten NCLB waivers to states awarded RttT grants (Hu, 2012; McGuinn, 2014).
Although the Elementary and Secondary Education Act was scheduled for reauthorization during
this time, Congress continued to draft revisions and did not pass an updated version of NCLB
until the 2015 Every Student Succeeds Act (ESSA) (Michelman, 2012; Peterson, 2016; ESSA,
2015). While educators waited for a revision of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act,
which might have created changes to the No Child Left Behind Act, the NCLB mandate that all
students reach proficiency in English and math remained in effect (Moffitt, 2016).
Historically, federal funds were allocated through categorical grants that were given to
states based on how many total students in a school fit a specific category (McGuinn, 2012b).
The largest federal categorical grant program, Title I, was designed to help mitigate the effects of
student poverty and accounts for up to 5% of a school’s budget (Matsudaira, Hosek, & Walsh,
2012; Weinstein, Stiefel, Schwartz, & Chalico, 2009; van der Klaauw, 2008). One issue with
Title I categorical funding is that some researchers question if the additional funds improved
student achievement (Hanushek & Lindseth, 2009; Matsudaira et al., 2012; Weinstein et al.,
2009; van der Klaauw, 2008). Another issue with categorical funding was that funding has
historically been based on inputs, such as equitable resources for Title III, English language
learners, rather than on student outputs, such as student achievement (Adams, 2010; Gamoron &
Long, 2006; Moffitt, 2016). Categorical funding was automatic regardless of school
improvement (Hess & Finn, 2007). The RttT funds, however, were housed under the American
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Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 and structured as a competitive grant process that
allowed states to compete for awards based on results and not on a census based categorical grant
(Kober & Rentner, 2011; USDOE, 2015b). The RttT funds were awarded to states per a 500
point grant application (Manna & Ryan, 2011; McGuinn, 2012b; Weiss, 2014). Unlike
categorical funds, the bulk of the RttT grant was typically released incrementally — after
successful achievement of identified targets (Manna & Ryan, 2011; McGuinn, 2012b; Weiss,
2014). Race to the Top sought to shift education reform from compliance to innovation and to
improve the capacity and resources of State Education Agencies (SEAs) (McNeil, 2011;
McGuinn, 2012b; Weiss, 2014). Additional RttT goals included modernizing the technology
with which data was collected and increasing state-level legislative reform (Kolbe & Rice, 2012;
Weiss, 2014).
Race to the Top had four overarching components of reform (Weiss, 2014; USDOE,
2015b). The first reform goal was to better prepare students to succeed in college and careers.
The second reform goal was to build data systems to inform and enhance instruction. The third
reform goal was to recruit, reward, and retain effective teachers and leaders. The fourth reform
goal was to turn around low achieving schools (Howell, 2015; USDOE, 2015b; Weiss, 2014).
All but Alaska, North Dakota, Texas, and Vermont, competed for RttT grants (Howell, 2015;
McGuinn, 2012b). The RttT grant applications occurred in two phases, and although 46 states
competed for the grants, only 11 States and the District of Columbia received awards. Hawaii
competed in both rounds and was awarded a grant in the second phase of funding. Hawaii’s
grant ended in September of 2014 and all other grants ended by the summer of 2015 (USDOE,
2015b).
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Driving change in America’s large, decentralized school system was a difficult task.
Although many states had education goals, they also often had weak accountability and
administration (Kolbe & Rice, 2012; McGovern, 2011; McGuinn, 2012b). The RttT applications
required states address each of the four overarching goals whether or not they had aligned their
statewide education systems to their statewide goals. While all of the RttT application goals
were important, RttT’s stated top priority for LEAs, SEAs and states, was to have a
“comprehensive approach to education reform” (USDOE, 2009, p. 3). A key focus of the grant
imbedded in each RttT goal was improving student achievement. Research shows that more than
any other factor, student achievement is impacted by teacher effectiveness and high-quality
teaching (Darling-Hammond, 2000; Hanushek, 2007; Moe, 2011).
Teacher Effectiveness
High quality, effective teachers have characteristics that directly impact student
achievement (Darling-Hammond, 2000; Gagnon & Mattingly, 2015; Heck, 2007; Strain, 2007).
Multiple studies find high-quality teaching matters and is especially important for struggling
students (Darling-Hammond, 2000; Gagnon & Mattingly, 2015; Heck, 2007). Research has
shown that struggling students can make educational gains if given extended learning time
(Odden & Archibald, 2009). Furthermore, interventions, such as tutoring, are best delivered by
highly qualified teachers (Cohen, 2003; Odden & Picus, 2014). Results to measure those gains
were evaluated by improvements in student learning, test scores, and formative assessments
(Odden & Archibald, 2009; Odden & Picus, 2014). Teacher quality is positively related to
student achievement and states with the highest gains in reading and math scores have the
highest qualified teachers in the nation (Darling-Hammond, 2000; Heck, 2007). Yet teacher
quality is complicated. Clear characteristics of effective teachers are hard to define and there is
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little agreement on how to measure teacher quality (Boyd et al., 2007; Guarino et al., 2006;
Heck, 2007; Hanushek, 2011; Lankford, Loeb, & Wyckoff, 2002). Separating teacher quality
from school quality, and separating student quality from teacher quality is also difficult. The
knowledge and skills a student brings into the classroom are part of student quality. While
overall teacher quality has a large effect on student learning, specific teacher characteristics have
small effects on student achievement (Buddin & Zamarro, 2009; Darling-Hammond, 2000;
Hanushek, 2011; Heck, 2007).
While teacher quality is the most important factor in student achievement, specific
characteristics of teacher quality are difficult to identify (Buddin & Zamarro, 2009; Hanushek,
2011; Heck, 2007). Teacher quality may be delineated into implicit factors such as individual
teacher performance and explicit factors such as licensure test scores, years of teaching,
professional development, and advanced degrees (Buddin & Zamarro, 2009). Multiple factors
impact student achievement and while it is difficult to separate which sole, specific factor has the
most impact, it is possible to identify factors that have a positive effect. For instance, classroom
climate, school climate, and the quality of the student-teacher relationship are keys to effective
teaching (Winheller et al., 2013). High scores on state licensure exams and pedagogical skills,
for example, also often resulted in more effective teaching (Boyd et al., 2007; Darling-
Hammond, 2000; Lankford et al., 2002). Teacher quality often delineates educational
achievement, qualifications, and credentials but this category could be expanded to include
graduation rates, classroom management, engagement, attitudes, and the learning environment
(Goe, Bell, & Little, 2008; Winheller et al., 2013). Another area contributing to teacher
effectiveness is dynamic teaching.
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Dynamic teaching models have a large effect size on student learning outcomes
(Kyriakides, Christoforou, & Charalambous, 2013). When examining implicit teacher quality,
the average performance results of individual teachers varies widely (Buddin & Zamarro, 2009).
Not surprisingly, teachers with better credentials are often matched to better students who have
higher achievement scores (Boyd et al., 2007; Clotfelter et al., 2007; Krieg, 2006; Lankford et
al., 2002). Union hiring and transfer rules may allow for better teachers to self-sort into better
schools which may make it difficult for administrators to select the best teachers for their
students (Moe, 2001, 2007; Strunk & Grissom, 2010). In addition, due to union seniority and
tenure rules teachers may be transferred or may be sorted into different schools, which is an issue
as low SES students tend to have weaker test scores (Buddin & Zamarro, 2009; Chubb & Moe,
1990; Lankford et al., 2002; Woessmann, 2011). In other words, some teachers may opt to
transfer to specific schools, in order to work with higher achieving students. Researchers assert
that by focusing only on student achievement as measured by test scores, teacher effectiveness is
defined by what is valued (Goe et al., 2008). Possibly due to NCLB and highly qualified teacher
requirements, society has placed a greater value on high test scores and various methods of
achieving improved results.
Teacher Academic Talent and Experience
Teacher Academic talent has been shown to increase a teacher’s ability to positively
impact student achievement (Boyd et al., 2007; Steele, Murnane, & Willett, 2010). One method
of improving teachers’ academic talent is through professional development. The 2012 Program
for International Student Assessment (PISA) report noted countries that required teachers to
continue their education were 48% more likely to have completed professional development
(Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development [OECD], 2013). Odden and
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Archibald (2009) specify professional development needs to be targeted at improving instruction
in the core subjects such as English, math, history, and science.
Another factor researchers have examined in relationship to high-quality instruction and
student achievement is years of teaching. In the first 1–3 years, for instance, most teachers are
weak but improve their practice over time (Buddin & Zamarro, 2009; Darling-Hammond, 2000).
After five years of experience, additional years of teaching has a small impact on teacher quality
as long as the teacher has collegial support at school (Buddin & Zamarro, 2009; Darling-
Hammond, 2000; Dee & Keys, 2004; Goldhaber & Player, 2005; Hanushek, 2011). Researchers
suggest monetary incentives may be one method of attracting academically talented teachers to
work in low-performing, high needs schools (Steele et al., 2010). In addition to teacher
academic talent and experience, teacher credentials have been shown to increase student
achievement (Darling-Hammond, 2000).
Teacher Credentials and Certification
Teacher credentials, certification, and licensure have a small but positive impact on
student learning (Buddin & Zamarro, 2009; Clotfelter et al., 2007; Darling-Hammond, 2000;
Hanushek, 2011). One issue with measuring teacher licensure is that studies show teacher
licensure and enforcement of licensing standards varies widely from state to state (Boyd et al.,
2007; McGuinn, 2012a). Darling-Hammond (2000) argues full licensure has a stronger impact
on teacher effectiveness than a master’s degree. Hanushek (2011) however, reports that both
Teach For America candidates, who typify non-traditional routes into the education profession,
and teachers who are traditionally licensed state teachers, show almost no difference in teacher
effectiveness. Well qualified teachers are defined as having passed all required education
coursework and certification and having a strong disciplinary knowledge, such as holding a
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degree in his or her content area, and strong educational knowledge. Poor and minority students
are more likely to have less qualified teachers (Darling-Hammond, 2000). African-American
students have double the chance of receiving an ineffective teacher and ineffective teachers are
likely to be both less credentialed and lack either credentials or certification, while a high-quality
teacher could improve student learning (Darling-Hammond, 2000; Rivkin, Hanushek, & Kain,
2005).
Impact of Student Characteristics on Performance
Student characteristics of poverty, such as students with low socioeconomic status.
English Language Learners, and minorities, are negatively correlated with student outcomes
(Darling-Hammond, 2000; Hochschild & Scott, 1998; Lankford et al., 2002; Lin, 2010). Studies
show socioeconomic status is a strong predictor of student success and students in low-income
schools make fewer educational gains than their peers (Buddin & Zamarro, 2009; Gamoron &
Long, 2006; Rueda, 2011). The Coleman Report identified family background as an important
indicator of student achievement in school (Gamoron & Long, 2006; Hochschild & Scott, 1998).
Notably, schools with less parent support and needier students may increase rules and restraints
regarding personnel and expand union influence (Chubb & Moe, 1990; Farkas et al., 2003; Rose
& Sonstelie, 2010). Compounding the problem for students attending low socioeconomic status
urban schools is that students in these schools may have new, inexperienced teachers for multiple
years in a row (Chambers, Levin, & Shambaugh, 2010; Rivkin et al., 2005). A revolving door of
teachers is problematic because more experienced teachers tend to have a larger, positive effect
on student attendance (Gershenson, 2016; Gottfried, 2009). Increased years of schooling is
crucial to student achievement as the learning a student brings to the classroom is built upon
learning from the previous year (Clotfelter et al., 2007; Rivkin et al., 2005).
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Class Size
Teachers, the public, and teachers unions, often request fewer students per teacher, but
fewer students in a classroom may not automatically improve teacher quality (Cowen & Strunk,
2015; Moe, 2001; Farkas et al., 2003; Odden & Picus, 2014). Fewer pupils per teacher increases
the total number of teachers in a school and class size has long been a bargaining point of unions
(Cowen & Strunk, 2015; Hochschild & Scott, 1998; Lott & Kenny, 2013; Moe, 2007, 2011).
One standard deviation in teacher quality may be equivalent to 10 fewer students in class
(Rivken et al., 2005). While class size studies show positive results for grades K-3, at other
grade levels relative to the effect of student to teacher ratios, studies found teacher talent,
credentials, and teacher quality are larger (Clotfelter et al., 2007; Heck, 2007; Krueger &
Whitmore, 2001; Moe, 2007; Odden & Picus, 2014). Small classes cost more and the results
regarding the effectiveness of small classes are mixed (Brunner & Squires, 2013; Krueger &
Whitmore, 2001; Moe, 2007; Odden & Picus, 2014). Research confirms teacher salaries take the
largest share of a school’s budget and account for the largest expenditure in a school system
(Akiba, Chiu, Shimizu, & Liang, 2012). Class size directly impacts how many teachers a school
hires, and how a school handles expenditures and resource allocation has a great deal to do with
school governance.
School Governance
Public schools typically have a hierarchical governing structure that includes federal
funding, federal accountability, categorical grants, and compliance reports. Federal funding
increases the degree to which schools have multiple layers of bureaucracy and complexity within
their organizational structures (Chubb & Moe, 1990; Meyer, Scott, & Strang, 1987). Formal
organizations are often impacted by the number of federal level organizations associated with
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their environments (Meyer et al., 1987). Higher levels of centralization at the national level may
increase the complexity of the organization at the local level, which may be especially true for
education (Meyer et al., 1987). Additionally, large organizations often have significant levels of
bureaucracy (Bolman & Deal, 2003). Schools are organizations that function under
bureaucratization and Federal oversight (Chubb & Moe, 1990).
The Hawaii Department of Education is a large, formal organization and one of the most
centralized school districts in the nation, which adds to the complexity of the Hawaii Department
of Education, dilutes transparency, and may distance stakeholders (Benham & Heck, 1994;
Chambers et al., 2010; Kwak & Mak, 2011). Possibly as a result of Hawaii’s plantation history,
Hawaii has low levels of citizen and stakeholder participation which effectively increases
external control (Benham & Heck, 1994; Meller, 1992).
Conceptual Framework
The following review of political culture and context serve as the conceptual framework
for the research questions in this study. The literature shows that considering the political culture
and context of stakeholders is key when examining those stakeholders access to education policy
making (Chubb & Moe, 1990; Marshall, Mitchell, & Wirt, 1986). Benham and Heck (1994), as
well as Marshall et al. (1986) apply these ideas to Hawaii’s unique political and cultural context.
Education is influenced by policies, and those policies are a result of the political culture
and context of the participants (Chubb & Moe, 1990; Marshall et al., 1986). Researchers submit
that state-level education decision-making is more likely to be controlled by those individuals
who are the most influential in a centralized state, such as Hawaii (Benham & Heck, 1994;
Marshall et al., 1986). The most influential decision-makers are referred to as “insiders”
(Benham & Heck, 1994; Marshall et al., 1986). Researchers also note that near circle actors,
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defined as professional educators, are involved in creating and controlling a state’s educational
policies (Benham & Heck, 1994; Marshall et al., 1986). Far circle members, who are defined as
individuals representing organizational authority, such as complex area superintendents, or
teacher unions, are on the third tier of influence in educational policy creation (Benham & Heck,
1994; Marshall et al., 1986). Sometime players, such as teachers or parent groups, help drive
values in policymaking and are on the fourth tier in educational decision making (Benham &
Heck, 1994; Marshall et al., 1986). Forgotten stakeholders represent the fifth and last tier of
influence, and have the least influence on educational policies (Marshall et al., 1986). Minorities
are one example of forgotten stakeholders (Benham & Heck, 1994; Marshall et al., 1986).
Benham and Heck (1994) report that insiders in Hawaii who shaped Hawaii’s educational system
and policies were initially the ruling monarch of Hawaii, then the territorial governor, and post-
statehood, the governor. Advisors, lawmakers, and more recently, finance officers, were
additional inside members, whereas the elected board of education and the superintendent of
education in Hawaii were near circle actors on the second tier of influence and had intermittent
yet frequent contact with the inside power players (Benham & Heck, 1994).
The HSTA, the HIDOE, and complex area superintendents were reported as far circle
members, influencing education in a formal role but with little influence (Benham & Heck,
1994). Higher levels of concentrated power and centralization allowed Hawaii’s insiders to
consolidate power, and a lack of citizen involvement made it easier to implement selected
policies. One group that moved from the status of forgotten stakeholder on the fifth and
outermost tier to the second tier of near circle members next to insiders were the Native
Hawaiians, via the passage of laws and policies to promote and protect the Hawaiian language
(Benham & Heck, 1994). Similar to other government agencies in Hawaii, the Hawaii
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Department of Education is highly centralized, bureaucratic, and compliant with educational
mandates and policies (Benham & Heck, 1994). For example, Hawaii implemented the
Common Core State Standards and routinely met participation requirements on annual Smarter
Balanced Assessment (SBA) tests. Hawaii’s Department of Education initially prevented parents
from opting out of Smarter Balanced Assessment tests by proposing that enrollment in a public
school is equivalent to an agreement with school goals such as mandatory participation in
assessments (Kalani, 2015a). Hawaii’s appointed school board endorsed the Smarter Balanced
Assessments in order to prepare for Race to the Top and did not comment on the Hawaii DOE’s
lack of a Smarter Balanced Assessment opt-out option. The research presented by Benham &
Heck (1994) pertains to an elected school board. Currently, the Board of Education in Hawaii is
appointed by the governor.

Figure 1. Proximity to educational policy decision making in Hawaii (Modified from Benham
and Heck (1994), and Marshall et al. (1986))

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School boards set district policy, meet with community members, negotiate with unions,
and hire a superintendent of education who oversees the state department of education (Hess,
2010; Johnson, 2012; Moe, 2001). The task of selecting and hiring the school superintendent
may be the most important job a school board undertakes (Hess, 2002). In a survey of over
2,000 school boards by the National School Board Association, school boards reported their
most critical issues were student safety, the relationship the board maintained with the
superintendent, and district-wide employee morale (Hess, 2002). Chubb and Moe (1990) assert
local school boards have the most validity regarding district policy and are often viewed by the
public as having authority over school governance decisions.
Schools are organized in a variety of ways, but all are beholden to governing authorities.
Public schools are created and funded by the government and controlled by elected officials
(Chubb & Moe, 1990; Moe, 2001, 2007). According to open systems theory, schools are
influenced by their environment and their survival depends on their relationship to that
environment (Bastedo, 2006). Economic, political, and social factors influence schools.
Cultural norms and societal values are embedded in a school’s environment, and a school must
function based on its resources (Bastedo, 2006). Additionally, schools have a set structure and as
an organization must accomplish multiple tasks while abiding by their mandate to educate
children. School boards are part of that educational structure. In the 1990s through the present
day, school boards have increasingly focused on improving student achievement (Hess, 2002;
Johnson, 2012). The majority of school boards have little knowledge of schools which makes
efficiency difficult as effective school boards monitor progress toward district education goals
and are tasked to take action when goals are not met (Hess, 2002; Johnson, 2012). According to
the National School Board Association survey, the majority of school board members requested
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training in student achievement, systemic improvement, and increased school board performance
(Hess, 2002).
Chubb and Moe (1990) found school board impact on school governance issues was
higher for ineffectively organized schools. Specifically, personnel issues and curriculum were
more strongly influenced by school boards, particularly in larger schools, where parental
influence was absent (Chubb & Moe, 1990). Chubb and Moe (1990) emphasize the organization
of a school is directly related to how a school is controlled. An increase in bureaucratic
oversight and governance by external authority will result in poorly organized schools (Chubb &
Moe, 1990).
Union influence is stronger in weakly organized schools and stronger unions are more
successful in collective bargaining, which also increases school bureaucracy (Chubb & Moe,
1990; Strunk & Grissom, 2010). Increased union influence makes it more difficult for a
principal to have autonomy in decision-making. Teacher transfers, vacancies, class size, and
working conditions are more heavily restricted in districts with stronger unions (Strunk &
Grissom, 2010).
Researchers assert that the area of personnel is where schools would benefit the most
from decreased bureaucracy (Chubb & Moe, 1990). Union mandated staffing policies
undermine administrators’ ability to allocate personnel to best serve their school (Moe, 2001;
Strunk & Grissom, 2010). Hiring, firing, and retaining effective teachers is key for schools to fill
needed positions and increase student achievement. Paying teachers at a higher rate may
improve student learning and school quality (Grissom & Strunk, 2012; Lavy, 2009).
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Teacher Recruitment and Retention
To ensure high-quality teaching, schools must attract high-quality teachers, and some
teachers are more effective than others. High-quality teaching is maintained over the duration of
the teacher’s career (Hanushek, 2011). Highly effective teachers can make a 1.5 gain in years of
schooling each year, while other less effective teachers only make a 0.5 gain in years of
schooling each year (Hanushek, 2011). Researchers report that linking pay to performance is a
logical strategy to recruit, reward, and retain effective teachers (Akiba et al., 2012; Dee & Keys,
2004; Hanushek & Woessmann, 2011; Loeb et al., 2009).
New teacher attrition impacts teacher retention rates. Defined as teachers who have
taught from one to five years and who leave the profession during that time, new teacher attrition
is a problem in many countries and occurs at a rate of between 40% and 50% (Gallant & Riley,
2014). One reason given for the high rate of attrition in America is weak teacher preparation
programs (Gallant & Riley, 2014). High quality, female teachers tend to stay in the profession,
but teacher quality does not seem to impact whether male teachers stay or go (Kreig, 2006).
Incentives to decrease teacher attrition may need to be addressed with gender in mind and may
help to improve school culture (Gallant & Riley, 2014; Kreig, 2006).
Another important factor impacting student achievement is teacher migration. Teacher
migration is defined as teachers moving from one school to another. Over half of all teacher
attrition from a school site is due to migration (Guarino et al., 2006). Teacher migration may
also be due to teacher transfers as teachers with more seniority are able to transfer out of hard to
staff, low-performing schools (Moe, 2011). New teachers, who typically have weak results in
the classroom, often end up teaching in low socioeconomic status schools (Chambers et al.,
2010). After teachers accrue years in a district, and when they become eligible, they may
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transfer out of low performing schools (Guarino et al., 2006; Woessmann, 2011). Senior
teachers may prefer a short commute, or they may prefer working in high achieving schools.
Steele et al. (2010) found that a payment of $1,800 reduced teacher turnover by 17%.
Additionally, teacher leaders often take on additional roles and may leave the teaching
ranks to become schools administrators. Research findings indicate that teachers who do better
at improving student achievement often move into administrative roles, possibly because
principals are paid more than teachers (Hanushek & Woessmann, 2011). While teacher leaders
may make strong administrators, they may also be hard to replace at the classroom level.
Paying teachers more money may attract better teachers to the profession and increase
teacher retention, but the solution is expensive (Chubb & Moe, 1990). Research does not
indicate that the increased cost is acceptable unless the additional funding goes directly to pay
for effective teachers (Chubb & Moe, 1990; Hanushek, 2011). The majority of teachers are paid
via traditional salary schedules (Loeb et al., 2009; Moe, 2001; West & Mykerezi, 2011).
However, traditional salary schedules do not reward effective teachers who do better than their
peers (Hanushek & Woessmann, 2011; Moe, 2011).
Salary schedules.
Traditional salary schedules reward teachers based on years of service at the same pay
rate (Moe, 2011; West & Mykerezi, 2011). Collective bargaining agreements have typically
included a traditional salary schedule, which rewards time spent on the job and consequently,
veteran teachers earn more money (Dee & Wyckoff, 2015; Hanushek, 2011; Loeb et al., 2009;
Sawchuk, 2009). Teacher experience is a characteristic closely linked to student gains, and those
gains are noticeable by year four or five (Darling-Hammond, 2000; Grissom & Strunk, 2012).
Yet over 92% of school districts pay teachers based on years of experience and education
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(Grissom & Strunk, 2012). The prevalence of pay based on years of service is likely due to
union-negotiated collective bargaining agreements that contain traditional salary schedules (Moe,
2011).
If schools want to attract high-quality teachers, and private jobs require the same resume
and pay more, top candidates will not become teachers (Goldhaber & Player, 2005; Steele et al.,
2010; Vachon & Ma, 2015). Frontloading pay raises may be a method of retaining high-quality
teachers. Frontloading pay could increase economic attraction to the profession, increase the
number of people applying to teach, improve the selection pool, and reduce new teacher attrition
(Grissom & Strunk, 2012; Sawchuk, 2009). Frontloading pay requires more money be paid
earlier in a teacher’s career, and smaller raises paid later on.
Input based incentives, or merit pay, compensates teachers at the same rate for the same
achievement, such as a standard pay increase for earning additional degrees (Loeb et al., 2009;
West & Mykerezi, 2011). Output based incentives could reward teachers differently dependent
upon performance (Dee & Keys, 2004; Leigh, 2013; West & Mykerezi, 2011). The difficulty
with increasing teacher pay is that unless teacher pay is directly linked to recruiting and retaining
higher quality teachers, besides increasing the education budget, little will have changed
(Hanushek, 2011). Increasing teacher salaries through pay for performance is one strategy to
attract and recruit better candidates. Allowing the private sector to set the base for teacher pay
would accomplish this, but it would need to be determined which private sector jobs were
comparable to teaching (Hanushek, 2011). Some districts have relied on Teacher Incentive
Funds and private funding to provide more pay to teachers who are found to be higher
performing or who teach in a hard to fill school (Miles, Pennington, & Bloom, 2015).
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Pay for performance.
Pay for performance and merit pay incentives deviate from traditional salary schedules.
Teachers who select merit pay often opt for better schools (Dee & Keys, 2004). Restructuring
teacher pay to improve recruitment and retention has become a reality, especially for Race to the
Top award recipients. In a study of 500 school districts in Pennsylvania, over a three year time
period, increased teacher salaries were shown to attract higher qualified teachers, improve
classroom instruction, and increase student achievement (Lin, 2010). Hanushek (2011) asserts
that replacing the lowest 8% of teachers with average teachers in science and math could benefit
America’s economy and would have a 2011 economic value of $100 trillion.
To attract high-quality teachers, schools may need to offer them more money, and
districts losing students may lay off teachers (Arsen & Ni, 2012; Woessmann, 2011). Due to
collective bargaining, staff reductions and layoffs are carried out based on years of service and
are not based on teacher effectiveness (Moe, 2011). As most teachers are unionized, teachers
with the least seniority and lowest salaries will be laid off first, raising average teacher pay
(Arsen & Ni, 2012). Some collective bargaining agreements have stipulations for merit pay,
combat pay for teaching in hard to fill schools, and teacher pay for performance incentives. The
American Federation of Teachers (AFT) is not completely opposed to pay for performance
initiatives. According to statements made by the American Federation of Teachers current
president, Randi Weingarten, the American Federation of Teachers is willing to examine pay for
performance as an educational reform.
Teacher Unions
America’s teachers’ unions rose to power in the 1960s after laws changed allowing for
collective bargaining. Wisconsin was at the forefront of national union building and passed the
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first collective bargaining laws in 1959. The American Federation of Teachers (AFT) was the
first education union, created in 1916 in Chicago. The American Federation of Teachers was
formed as several Chicago teachers’ unions came together, renamed themselves as the American
Federation of Teachers, and then officially brought into the national American Federation of
Labor (American Federation of Teachers, n.d.).
The National Education Association (NEA), then called the National Teachers
Association, was founded in 1857. The National Education Association was progressive for the
time, charging dues, publishing its history, and conducting a membership drive (Holcomb, n.d.).
The National Education Association was primarily a professional organization run mostly by
administrators (Moe, 2001). By 1957 the NEA had over 7,000 members and had partnered with
the American Teachers Association to promote school desegregation, teacher pay, and teachers’
rights (Holcomb, n.d.). Both the American Federation of Teachers and the National Education
Association worked to increase their numbers.
In 1961, the American Federation of Teachers won the right to represent New York City
teachers (Moe, 2001). The landmark event created a competition between the American
Federation of Teachers and the National Education Association. The American Federation of
Teachers promoted teacher tenure, academic freedom, and defended members from accusations
of communism. Led by Al Shanker in the 1970s, the American Federation of Teachers paved the
way in negotiating collective bargaining agreements and promoted teacher professionalism
(American Federation of Teachers, n.d.). Al Shanker was president of the American Federation
of Teachers from 1974 to 1986. Shanker was a dynamic leader of the American Federation of
Teachers who opposed school choice but supported testing teachers for competency (Donaldson
et al., 2013; Jacoby & Nitta, 2012; Moe, 2011). The American Federation of Teachers
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membership is based in large cities, due in part to the Shanker’s union leadership in New York
City.
Shanker began his union career as the secretary of the New York City’s United
Federation of Teachers (UFT). He quickly rose to the position of the United Federation of
Teachers president and during New York City’s school decentralization, he helped push
collective bargaining rights forward (Berger, 1997). In 1968, Shanker led the United Federation
of Teachers during a city-wide public school strike in which 900 schools were closed for 55 days
(Berger, 1997). The result was a decentralization law that had strong protections for teachers.
The United Federation of Teachers became the most powerful local union in the nation under
Shanker’s leadership. Shanker held the United Federation of Teachers presidency from 1964 to
1986 and he also held the American Federation of Teachers presidency from 1974 to his death in
1997 (American Federation of Teachers, n.d.). During his tenure as the leader of the American
Federation of Teachers, Shanker worked to lead the nation in removing bad teachers, rewarding
effective teachers, and protecting teacher rights (Jacoby & Nitta, 2012). Shanker’s report
“Making Standards Matter” was published in 1995, and influenced the nationwide standards
movement (Brown, 2009).
Throughout the 1960s and 1970s, the American Federation of Teachers and the National
Education Association waged a membership war to see who would emerge as the nation’s largest
union. The National Education Association-American Federation of Teachers competition
increased teacher union membership nationwide, with the American Federation of Teachers
retaining control in many cities, and the National Education Association gaining control in many
states, except for the South. Southern states were rarely unionized (Moe, 2001). The National
Education Association emerged as the winner with more members, and in 2001 had
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approximately 2.5 million members, of which 2 million were teachers (Moe, 2001). The
National Education Association is a nationwide organization with chapters in every state and is
the biggest union in America (Moe, 2011). Although the American Federation of Teachers is a
smaller union with about 1.6 million members — half of whom are teachers — the American
Federation of Teachers may have more power due to the fact that it retains the same president for
life (Moe, 2011). While the National Education Association is reported to be America’s most
powerful union, the American Federation of Teachers president may have more power because
like Shanker, the American Federation of Teachers current president, Randi Weingarten will
remain American Federation of Teachers president until she decides to retire (Moe, 2011).
Weingarten was previously employed as general counsel to the United Federal Teachers (UFT)
and was familiar with both the union’s history and its doctrine (Toch, 2011). Weingarten’s on
the job experience and learning curve was dramatically enhanced by her relationship with
Shanker. The National Education Association, on the other hand, elects a president every six
years and has to constantly deal with an internal regime change (Moe, 2001). Moe (2001)
contends that compared to different labor organizations, teacher unions are the most powerful
unions in the country.
Teacher Unions and Political Power
Workers in large organizations may form labor unions as a way to establish equal power
with management, and teachers are no exception (Bolman & Deal, 2003). Researchers report
educational policy is dominated by teacher unions who wield more political power than any
other organization (Cowen & Strunk, 2015; Hartney & Flavin, 2011; Moe, 2011). National
legislators ranked teacher unions as the most active and effective group to lobby for educational
issues (Hartney & Flavin, 2011). Teacher unions also lobby for collective bargaining, policies
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that promote union agendas, school structure, and school autonomy (Casey, 2012; Chubb &
Moe, 1990; Cowen & Strunk; 2015). Additionally, teacher unions work to attract members,
secure benefits, increase teacher pay, reduce competition, and maintain political power (Chubb
& Moe, 1990; Cowen & Strunk, 2015; Moe, 2001).
Teacher unions are wealthy. The National Education Association and the American
Federation of Teachers combined has over 4.5 million members who each pay an average of
$600 per year in dues, or over $2.7 billion in annual income (Moe, 2011). Teacher unions are
able to maintain power through large union membership and the dues from union members.
At the local level, low election turnout works in favor of union-backed candidates.
Union-backed school board candidates won 76% of the time, whereas non-union backed
candidates won 31% of the time (Hartney & Flavin, 2011). Unions often ask their members to
vote in local, state, and national elections, which can significantly impact the results in elections
with low voter turnout (Cowen & Strunk, 2015; Moe, 2011; Strunk & Grissom, 2010). School
board elections, for instance, typically have less than 16% voter turnout (Hartney & Flavin,
2011). Voter turnout is even lower for school board elections held during non-election years.
Educational issues are often obscure to the general public as voters have little knowledge
about school board agendas or politics and union membership typically outnumbers parent and
business groups (Chubb & Moe, 1990; Hartney & Flavin, 2011). Teacher unions far outweigh
parents, students, and business organizations as special interest groups focused on increasing
their political power to influence educational policy and practice (Chubb & Moe, 1990; Hartney
& Flavin, 2011; Moe, 2001). Chubb and Moe (1990) state teacher unions represent teachers
during collective bargaining as well as “in the broader political struggle to control public
authority” (p. 49). Hartney and Flavin (2011) make an important distinction between union
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influence on educational policy and union-negotiated collective bargaining agreements. Hartney
and Flavin (2011) contend that union political power and collective bargaining are different.
From this standpoint, political power is an external influence and collective bargaining is an
internal influence, therefore Hartney and Flavin include both collective bargaining agreement
data and campaign contribution data when measuring union power (Hartney & Flavin, 2011).
Teacher Unions and Political Contributions
At the state level, teacher unions maintain a strong influence on policy making,
contribute heavily to political candidates, and offer organizational support and manpower to state
candidates from the union rank and file. At the federal level, teacher unions contributed more
money between 1989 and 2009 to federal elections than any other group or individual (Lott &
Kenny, 2013). Examining data from state elections during election years when state candidates
faced re-election, data show that from 1998 to 2006, Hawaii was 24th in campaign spending
contributions (Hartney & Flavin, 2011). For example, Hawaii’s HSTA gave 1.03% in campaign
contribution to candidates for U.S. State Offices. HSTA, for instance, contributed $1,615,571
between 1996 and 2016 to political candidates, lobbyists, and ballot measures (National Institute
on Money in State Politics, 2017). Oregon, the top contributor, had a 3.69% contribution, and
Vermont, the lowest contributor, gave 0.5% to U.S. State Offices by their respective teacher
unions (Hartney & Flavin, 2011).
Union-backed candidates may be more open to union ideals and work with the union to
promote legislation the union wants. Pro-union candidates may block legislation unfavorable to
teachers. Teacher unions traditionally support increased teacher pay and benefits, smaller class
size, and protections for all teachers (Cowen & Strunk, 2015; Hochschild & Scott, 1998; Lott &
Kenny, 2013; Moe, 2007, 2011). In the 2008 elections, for instance, the NEA/AFT gave $5.4
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million to national campaigns and 61.8 million to state campaigns (Moe, 2011). Blocking is one
method that teachers’ unions use to stop policies or bills they do not want while promoting
agenda items they favor (Moe, 2001). Teachers’ unions often block legislation that promotes
school vouchers, merit pay and linking teacher pay to student performance. Moe (2007) purports
teacher unions represent the best interest of teachers and not necessarily the best interests of
students.
Teacher Unions and Collective Bargaining Agreements
Many superintendents do not believe they can negotiate contracts that emphasize
improved student achievement. A 2010 report by the American Institutes for Research noted,
“Only 67 out of 157 superintendents agreed they could negotiate union contracts that place a
priority on improved student achievement” (Williams, Kirst, & Haertel, 2010, p. 7). It is often a
union’s collective bargaining practices that are responsible for the abundance of restrictive rules
(Moe, 2011). Due to all of these restrictions and a lack of transparency, funding is often
disconnected from student achievement (Adams, 2010). Conversely, teachers’ unions allow
teachers to have a say in professional development, help with the selection of teaching materials,
and have input and some degree of autonomy about classroom instruction, all of which have a
positive impact on student achievement (Vachon & Ma, 2015). Overall, Vachon and Ma (2015)
found unionism had a positive effect on student achievement. Moe (2011) on the other hand,
cautions drawing a causal relationship between teacher unions and their impact at the school
level. Moe (2011) purports the research on union influence and school and student achievement
is limited, and results are mixed. Research shows unions have been found to have both positive
and negative influence on schools and student achievement. On one hand, Moe (2011) asserts
that unions represent teachers and increase the cost of education by as much as 15%. On the
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other hand, Lott and Kenny (2013) share student test scores were lower in states with stronger
teacher unions as measured by union dues, expenditures, influence on legislation and decreased
parental support.
Over 75% of teachers are satisfied with union representation (Casey, 2012). Veteran
teachers felt supported by unions whereas newer teachers tended to express more dissatisfaction
and were not as favorable in their views (Farkas et al., 2003; Moe, 2011). Teachers with less
than five years of experience were more open to removing ineffective teachers (Moe, 2011).
Moe (2007) found that teachers 35 and younger agreed with their older peers on union policy,
which was different from the results found in a 2012 Education Sector Survey. The Education
Sector Survey reported newer teachers with up to five years of experience had only a 22%
favorable opinion of their union, but veteran teachers were satisfied with union representation
(Butrymowicz, 2013).
Teacher Unions in Hawaii
Like other labor groups, teachers in Hawaii had to fight for their right to organize. A
Constitutional Convention held in 1968 made constitutionally mandated collective bargaining
possible for the public sector in the State of Hawaii (Fox & Buchanan, 2004; HSTA, 2012).
Prior to collective bargaining, the Hawaii Education Association (HEA), which was a
professional association, represented public school educators, administrators, and UH faculty
(Hirata & Oyama, 2010). After collective bargaining passed the legislature, the Hawaii
Education Association restructured to create the Hawaii State Teachers’ Association. The
Hawaii State Teachers’ Association was designed to provide professional support for Hawaii’s
public school teachers (HSTA, 2012). A second association, the Hawaii Federation of Teachers
(HFT), an American Federation of Teachers affiliate, also represented Hawaii public school
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teachers. The Hawaii Federation of Teachers focused on traditional union issues such as salaries,
working conditions, and benefits (HSTA, 2012). The Hawaii State Teachers’ Association had
previously focused primarily on professional development whereas Hawaii Federation of
Teachers focused on worker’s rights. In 1970, neither the Hawaii Federation of Teachers nor the
Hawaii State Teachers’ Association had the exclusive right to represent all of Hawaii’s teachers
in collective bargaining (Hirata & Oyama, 2010). Both organizations lobbied members and
stakeholders to represent Hawaii educators and the Hawaii State Teachers’ Association emerged
the winner.
The Hawaii State Teachers’ Association
In 2014, the Hawaii State Teachers’ Association was comprised of over 13,000 public
school teachers in 255 public schools, 33 charter schools, in a school district with 185,000
students (HSTA, 2014). The Hawaii State Teachers’ Association represents teachers in
collective bargaining, legislation, and professional development (HSTA, 2014).
The Hawaii State Teachers’ Association won the right to exclusively represent Hawaii’s
teachers in 1971. Like many teacher unions nationwide, the Hawaii State Teachers’ Association
fought for better pay, improved working conditions and teacher input about school reform. A
report by the Thomas B. Fordham Institute ranked the Hawaii State Teachers’ Association as the
strongest teacher union in the nation (Butrymowicz, 2013). Although at over 13,000 members
the Hawaii State Teachers’ Association is not a large union. For example, United Teachers Los
Angeles represents 31,000 teachers and New York’s United Federation of Teachers represents
140,000 union members. The Thomas B. Fordham Institute used five criteria in their ranking,
which included resources and membership, involvement in politics, the scope of bargaining, state
policies, and perceived influence (Winkler et al., 2012). The Hawaii State Teachers’ Association
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ranked first overall in criteria two, involvement in politics, and third overall in criteria one,
resources and membership (Winkler et al., 2012). The Hawaii State Teachers’ Association was
ranked as the strongest teacher union in the nation (Winkler et al., 2012). Based on Hawaii’s
historically hard-won workers’ rights and plantation labor past, it is not surprising that Hawaii’s
citizens value unionism.
Historically, the HSTA leadership has been involved in politics. The Hawaii State
Teachers’ Association’s first president, Odetta Fujimori, was politically active. Fujimori, prior
to involvement with The Hawaii State Teachers’ Association, volunteered for the Democratic
Party in Hawaii. Fujimori also attended the National Democratic Party Convention three times
as a delegate or alternate. Next, Fujimori began working with the Hawaii Educator Association
(HEA), which was affiliated with the O’ahu Educator Association, and a precursor to the Hawaii
State Teachers’ Association (Hirata & Oyama, 2010). In 1971, Fujimori was elected as the
Hawaii State Teachers’ Association president and “waged a vigorous campaign to educate her
fellow teachers on the collective bargaining process” (Hirata & Oyama, 2010, p. 3). In 1973
Fujimori was elected to the National Education Association’s Board of Directors and would
continue working with the NEA’s executive committee until 1991 (Gonsor, 2006; Hirata &
Oyama, 2010). The relationship between Fujimori and the National Education Association may
have contributed to a stronger tie between the Hawaii State Teachers’ Association and the
national NEA organization.
During the eighties, the Hawaii State Teachers’ Association maintained support for fair
working conditions and supported School Community Based Management practices (SCBM).
Ganopole (1993) defines School Community Based Management as a school based decision
making and management system that involves key stakeholders in a school. School Community
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Based Management was a dramatic reform intended to increase local control and decentralize
school decisions by placing them at the school level (Benham & Heck, 1994; Chubb & Moe,
1990). Other key players in the drive to reform education were represented by the Hawaii
Business Roundtable, a group of businessmen with members from the Big Five, and insiders in
Hawaii’s educational policy decisions (Benham & Heck, 1994). Adoption of School Community
Based Management was voluntary and stakeholders including administrators, teachers, school
staff, parents, students and community members had to achieve a consensus in order to
implement school level decisions (Ganopole, 1993; O’hora-Weir & Yanagida, 2000). Only
Hawaii adopted SCBM statewide although other districts in Chicago, Miami, and New York also
implemented the reform (Chubb & Moe, 1990). In another effort to improve schools, in the
nineties the Hawaii State Teachers’ Association developed the Hawaii Teacher Standards Board
(HTSB) to improve teacher qualifications and focus on student centered schools.
Brunner and Squires (2013) assert that unionization increased teacher pay nationwide
between 4% and 5%. Following the national trend, the Hawaii State Teachers’ Association
consistently negotiated for increased teacher salaries and merit pay. Historically, State and
county workers had been among the lowest paid in the State of Hawaii, prior to collective
bargaining (Puette, 2008). In Hawaii, teacher pay has often been an issue in the contract
negotiations (Butrymowicz, 2013). The McIver Institute’s National Center for Policy Analysis
found pay in Honolulu was last in their study, when adjusted for cost of living (Villarreal,
Novak, & D’Andrea, 2014).
In 2001, the Hawaii State Teachers’ Association held a 21 day strike in which 99% of
HSTA members participated. During the twenty day the Hawaii State Teachers’ Association
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strike the University of Hawaii’s Professional Assembly also went on strike for thirteen days,
effectively suspending kindergarten through university classes (Puette, 2008).
Despite years of contentious negotiations during which time the Hawaii State Teachers’
Association often fell short of their objectives, an evaluation of union strength by rank, tier,
bargaining status, and agency fees scored the Hawaii State Teachers’ Association as a tier one
teachers’ union (Winkler et al., 2012). In states where unions are regarded as necessary, it is
more probable that collective bargaining, agency fees, high membership rates, and unionism will
be supported and valued (Winkler et al., 2012).
Hawaii matches the tier one profile as a liberal, Democratic state in which unions are
perceived as highly influential (Winkler et al., 2012). In 2013, Hawaii was third in the nation for
union membership, behind New York and Alaska, and by 2015 Hawaii had the second largest
percent of union membership in the nation at 20.4% (Butrymowicz, 2013; U.S. Bureau of Labor
Statistics, 2016). The Hawaii State Teachers’ Association also has demonstrated strong
membership support and the majority of Hawaii public school teachers are active members of
HSTA. For instance, over 9,000 of the total 13,000 teachers voted on the proposed Last, Best,
and Final Offer contract Governor Abercrombie proposed (Eagle, 2012). While the contract did
not pass, participation numbers in voting for or against the collective bargaining agreement were
high.
Hawaii has all four of the indicators of strong unionism, which include a blend of
mandatory bargaining, increased resources, a wide scope of influence, and education policies
that are favorable to unions (Winkler et al., 2012). Hawaii and the Hawaii State Teachers’
Association have a pro-union climate when compared with other states (Winkler et al., 2012).
Political support during the 2001 strike was evident when the Hawaii State Teachers’
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Association members walked the picket line with U.S. Senator Patsy Mink, Representative
Maize Hirono, and Honolulu Mayor Jeremy Harris (National Education Association, 2001).
Unions who do not feel pressured to contribute all of their funds to politics may, in fact, be
stronger unions who require less effort to achieve their goals (Winkler et al., 2012).
The Hawaii State Teachers’ Association self-reports it is a proactive union that works to
find innovative solutions for education (HSTA, 2012). Researchers submit that reform unionism
can be defined as shifting unions from focusing on collective bargaining agreements to inviting
unions to help make decisions regarding student learning (Donaldson et al., 2013; Moe, 2007).
While the Hawaii State Teachers’ Association has been involved in many progressive reforms
such as School Community Based Management, standards, and Race to the Top, Hawaii also has
some of the most pro-union policies and collective bargaining agreements in the nation (Winkler
et al., 2012). Collective bargaining rights in Hawaii are set in the State’s constitution and any
changes would require an amendment via a constitutional convention (Maynard, 2012). The
Hawaii State Teachers’ Association union officials supported Race to the Top reforms and they
publically stated on the record that they felt the changes would improve education in the State of
Hawaii (Yuen, 2013).
School Reform in Hawaii
The Hawaii Department of Education is the sole statewide education system in the
country. As a school district, Hawaii is ranked in the top ten of districts nationally (Benham &
Heck, 1994). The public school system in Hawaii is state legislated and state funded (Kwak &
Mak, 2011). Understanding the public educational system in Hawaii requires background
knowledge of Hawaii’s public school system.
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Hawaii Public School System
In Hawaii, public schools served plantation workers and working class Native Hawaiians
and set out to Americanize the students (Benham & Heck, 1994). The statewide school system
in Hawaii was inherited from the Kingdom of Hawaii, which had a statewide public school
system. Lahainaluna High School, for instance, was founded in 1831 and would become the first
public high school west of the Rockies. The Kingdom of Hawaii began a public education
system in 1840, run by the Minister of Public Education and replaced by a Board of Education in
1855 (Hawaii State Archives, 2003). Board members were appointed by King Kamehameha III
(Hawaii State Archives, 2003). By the 1850s, the Hawaiian monarchy had surrounded itself with
white advisors, some of whom later overthrew the monarchy in 1898 (Cooper & Daws, 1985).
After the overthrow and prior to the rise of the Democratic Party in Hawaii, educational policy in
Hawaii was controlled by the ruling oligarchy (Benham & Heck, 1994). Meller (1992) submits
the current Hawaii DOE is highly centralized in nature and this centralization is attributable to
the school system of the Hawaii monarchy. After successfully establishing an oligarchy, the new
white ruling class needed labor to work on their sugar plantations. They opted for cheap
immigrant labor (Hughes, 1993; Puette, 2008).
Immigrant labor in Hawaii began with an influx of Chinese in early 1880, the Japanese in
1890, Puerto Ricans and Koreans in 1910, and Filipinos in 1920 (Perlman, 1952; Puette, 2008).
In a few generations, their descendants began attending Hawaii’s public schools. The
immigrants, along with Native Hawaiians, would become a culturally, racially diverse population
in the State of Hawaii.
Each racial group had separate plantation camp housing and each camp had their own
hierarchy (Perlman, 1952; Puette, 2008). The Japanese, for example, divided themselves into
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organized subgroups based on geographic areas in Japan. Fifty percent of the Japanese in
Hawaii were from the area of Honshu in southern Japan, 25% were from Kyushu, and 14% were
from Okinawa (Perlman, 1952). Each subgroup maintained their own religious and cultural
practices. Like camp housing, unions were organized by race. Although there were seventeen
different unions in Hawaii before 1904, they were often organized by race, such as the Japanese
Federation of Labor and the Filipino Federation of Labor (Perlman, 1952). The different unions
were often unwilling to integrate into larger, mixed race groups (Perlman, 1952). Hawaii’s
unions were ineffective until they organized by trade groups, instead of by racial groups. An
American Federation of Labor union in Hilo, Hawaii, for example, existed just to keep Asians
out of work. Perlman (1952) states Hawaii’s unionization was a cultural issue because
immigrant labor in Hawaii had to first adapt to the American culture before it could fight for
unionization.
By 1900 the Kingdom of Hawaii was a United States Territory, controlled by white
republicans, who would remain in power until after WWII (Cooper & Daws, 1985). After
Hawaii became a Territory of the United States, Republican businessmen controlled the
legislature, big business, and the government, as a small, ruling elite who were not interested in
forming a Democratic society (Cooper & Daws, 1985). Initially, plantation workers subsidized
foreign language schools so that their children could learn their native language. The plantation
owners, as represented by the Hawaii Sugar Planters Association (HSPA), supported the
language schools because it kept the camps separated by both language barriers and cultural
differences, making it more difficult for them to unionize. The planters eventually turned against
the foreign language schools after a U.S. Federal Government report cited the schools as
fostering anti-American values (Asato, 2003). After the report was published the Hawaii Sugar
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Planters Association was in favor of strict regulations for foreign language schools, often leading
to their closure (Asato, 2003; Fuchs, 1961).
Traditionally, missionary children, Hawaiian royalty, and members of the oligarchy did
not attend public school (Fuchs, 1961; Hormann & Kasdon, 1959; Pickens, 1991). Hawaiian
royalty had their own private tutors and their own set of royal schools (Pickens, 1991). Elite
students from the ruling class attended private schools, sometimes based on religious affiliation
such as Punahou School and St. Louis School (Pickens, 1991). Hormann and Kasdon (1959)
state “In order to keep their children close by and avoid ‘contamination’ with the Hawaiian
language, they welcomed the establishment of a local boarding school, Punahou, in 1841”
(p. 406). Since the ruling elite did not attend public schools, they often avoided involvement in
issues with the department of education although the missionaries and churches were very
involved in the day to day operations at Hawaii’s public schools (Fuchs, 1961; Pickens, 1991).
While the missionary descendants may not have attended public school, they did support public
education and integrating the races (Fuchs, 1961).
Between 1900 and 1930, the Department of Education continued to restructure the
education system and consolidated 24 sub-districts to 8, added supervising principals, and hired a
superintendent of education based in Honolulu (Hawaii State Archives, 2003; Fuchs, 1961;
Pickens, 1991). By 1925, middle-class whites from the mainland, and often the South, arrived in
Hawaii to provide skilled labor, but they refused to send their children to Hawaii’s racially
diverse public schools (Fuchs, 1961; Pickens, 1991; Puette, 2008). Public school teachers in
Hawaii continued to emphasize democratic ideals, civic participation, and racial integration
(Fuchs, 1961; Pickens, 1991). Working class whites did not support racial integration in public
schools. In response, the Hawaii DOE created the English Standard Schools in the 1920s and
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1930s. Entry into English Standard Schools was dependent upon students passing oral tests of
specific words and phrases spoken in standardized English.
English Standard Schools.
In 1924, Lincoln Elementary opened, followed in 1928 by Thomas Jefferson Junior High
School and Robert Louis Stevenson Junior High Schools, and in 1930 President Theodore
Roosevelt High School became the first English Standard high school. Additional English
Standard Schools were opened on neighbor islands. To put the ethnic make-up of the school
system in perspective, in 1920 there were 1,222 white children in Hawaii’s public schools and
there were 41,350 non-white students in public school (Fuchs, 1961). For instance, in 1930, less
than 10% of the Roosevelt High School students were Asian, and by 1941 less than 20% of all
English Standard School students on all islands were Asian (Fuchs, 1961). While all public
schools had an open admission policy for all children in the state, in order to attend English
Standard Schools, students had to pass a rigorous test based completely on spoken, standard,
American English (Hughes, 1993). Although public school teachers and some missionary
descendants supported liberal ideals, the oligarchy did not. The climate among the elite ruling
class towards Hawaii’s public education system was racist and classist. Hormann and Kasdon
(1959) asserted
Because of this polyglot population, the public schools in Hawaii have in former years
assumed two tasks: First, transforming a stone-age folk people into a literate people…
and second, assimilating to our urban American industrial way of life the children of …
Asian and European immigrants of peasant background and foreign culture. (p. 403)
Possibly due to these attitudes, Territorial public school teacher pay was very low and schools
were underfunded (Fuchs, 1961). Public school teachers, however, still emphasized the
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democratic ideals of John Dewey (Cooper & Daws, 1985; Fuchs, 1961). On the other hand,
Territorial Governor Wallace Rider Farrington, 1921–1929, believed non-whites should supply
manual labor (Fuchs, 1961). The sugar and pineapple planters did not want additional schools
built for fear education would place Hawaii’s agriculture in jeopardy (Fuchs, 1961). New rural
public schools built in the 1930s did not follow Dewey’s democratic idealism, but instead were
agricultural vocational schools built to supply labor for plantation owners.
Philosophical conflicts between Hawaii’s working class and the ruling elite occurred in
public education, the political arena, and in the Hawaii labor movement. Hawaii is not a right to
work state. Historically, Hawaii has had labor disputes since the era of sugar plantations circa
1850 (Perlman, 1952; Puette, 2008). After the Hawaiian monarchy was overthrown, Hawaii was
ruled by missionaries, some of whose descendants became sugar barons. The sugar plantation
owners were represented by the Hawaiian Sugar Planters Association (Perlman, 1952). By 1911,
the Hawaiian Sugar Planters Association (HSPA) diversified into five large companies known as
the “Big Five” in addition to many of the original sugar plantations. The Big Five, consisting of
C. Brewer, Castle & Cooke, Alexander and Baldwin, Theo Davies, and American Factors, held
the majority of power in the state alongside Hawaii’s sugar planters (Puette, 2008). From 1911
to 1935, labor movements in Hawaii were suppressed and rejected by both the Hawaiian Sugar
Planters Association and the Big Five. While labor movements were starting to make gains
around 1935, six years later following the attack on Pearl Harbor, Hawaii was placed under
martial law from 1941 until 1945 (Fuchs, 1961). In 1946, after martial law ended, between
twenty-one and twenty-six thousand sugar plantation workers who were organized by the
International Longshoreman and Warehouseman’s Union (ILWU) went on strike against the
Hawaiian Sugar Planters Association for 79 days (Fuchs, 1961; Perlman, 1952; Puette, 2008).
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The International Longshoreman and Warehouseman’s Union, the sugar workers, and their
families encompassed 76,000 people (Perlman, 1952). The strike ended with the Hawaiian
Sugar Planters Association granting better housing, medical care, and recreation for workers
(Perlman, 1952; Puette, 2008). The striking workers were supported by their children, who had
attended public school and had learned about American civil liberties and voting. The unions
began urging members and families to vote in elections. By the mid-1950s, the Democratic
Party was in power (Cooper & Daws, 1985). The Democratic Party supported public education
and began heavily funding public K–12 schools while subsidizing the University of Hawaii
system to keep tuition low and increase access to higher education (Cooper & Daws, 1985). The
concentration of wealth and power, however, was still held by the ruling elite Republican
businessmen and Republican control in Hawaii lasted until Statehood in 1959.
The Hawaii Sugar Planters Association, the American Federation of Labor and the
Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO), and the International Longshoreman and
Warehouseman’s Union were strong participants in the fight for and against organized labor in
Hawaii. Hormann and Kasdon (1959) assert integrated public education in Hawaii helped to
strengthen racial integration in politics and in the community. By the early 1960s, the plantation
workers’ children were United States citizens, and they were able to practice the Democratic
ideals they had learned about from their public school teachers. They began by voting in
elections and helped to elect Democratic politicians from the 1960s to present day.
In keeping with the hard-won political reforms of Hawaii’s labor movement, educators in
Hawaii continually worked to improve student achievement. In 2009, Hawaii educators
continued to support education reform by applying for and obtaining an RttT grant. Part of the
RttT grant included paying higher quality teachers for effective performance. Teacher pay for
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performance was a component of national and state-level education reform. Prior to applying for
the RttT grant, states could not have “any legal, statutory, or regulatory barriers at the State level
linking data on student achievement …or student growth… to teacher and principal evaluation”
(USDOE, 2009, p. 4). States with such restrictions had to change their laws, statutes, or
regulations. Hawaii had no such legal, statutory, regulatory, or explicit restrictions regarding a
pay for performance stipulation. The Hawaii Department of Education submitted its RttT grant
application under the implicit assumption the teacher’s union would be in full support of teacher
evaluations. The Hawaii State Teachers’ Association, however, was not ready to support teacher
pay for performance statewide.
Hawaii’s Educator Effectiveness System
Hawaii was the only RttT state to receive a notice of unsatisfactory progress as a result of
failure to negotiate a collective bargaining agreement to secure teacher evaluations (Klein, 2012;
McNeil, 2011). Without a contract, Federal Government officials did not believe Hawaii could
implement needed initiatives (McNeil, 2011; Weiss, 2014). McNeil (2011) reports that “the
federal letter said . . . the state doesn’t have the ‘proper authority’ either in law, regulation or
contract – to even carry out its plan” (p. 4). Teacher unions have traditionally opposed pay
linked to student performance and stronger teacher unions typically bargain for more restrictive
collective bargaining agreements (Chubb & Moe, 1990; Lott & Kenny, 2013; Moe, 2001).
The Hawaii State Teachers’ Association governing board unanimously supported the
contract sent to HSTA members for ratification that included components of teacher pay for
performance (Poythress, 2012). By November of 2012, teachers had worked without a contract
for sixteen months during which time a federal mediator crisis consultant could not resolve the
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conflict (Butrymowicz, 2013). While the governor stated rank and file teachers were in support
of pay for performance proposals, teachers disagreed with his statements (Kalani, 2013).
On January 6, 2012, the Hawaii State Teachers’ Association asked teachers to ratify the
next contract that included RttT stipulations and pay for performance agreements (Poythress,
2012). Teachers did not agree. Over 72% of union members voted to reject the proposed
contract (Kalani, 2013). In Hawaii, the proposed agreement was the first contract in 44 years
that the board supported and the rank and file rejected (Poythress, 2012). At issue were the 5%
pay cuts over two years, increased health care costs and teacher evaluations. After the contract
was rejected, the Hawaii State Teachers’ Association offered a counter-proposal in which the
union agreed to allow for the use of student test scores in teacher evaluations but stated the test
scores could not count for more than 10% of a teacher’s overall rating (Butrymowicz, 2013).
The Hawaii State Teachers’ Association also negotiated to eliminate student surveys
(Butrymowicz, 2013). The state rejected the counter-proposal. Either the rejected teacher
contract, or the union’s counter-proposal, would have secured Race to the Top teacher
evaluations and additional RttT agreements.
In April of 2013, the union, the employer, and HSTA rank and file came to a consensus
and approved a four-year contractual agreement that included RttT provisions and teacher pay
for performance. Although many states were behind on RttT agreements, Hawaii had the most
tenuous position prior to the signed collective bargaining agreement (McNeil, 2011; Weiss,
2014). As a result of the difficult contract negations, Hawaii’s RttT grant became a high-risk
guarantee in which remaining RttT funds were only released as reimbursements, and the State
had to file monthly RttT progress reports (McNeil, 2011). Race to the Top officials visited
Hawaii in March of 2012 to review RttT progress and allowed Hawaii to continue, officials also
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asked for frequent updates and new deadlines (Klein, 2012). In Hawaii, the teacher pay for
performance system, known as the Educator Effectiveness System in Hawaii, went into effect
two years late. Weiss (2014) asserts every state that received the RttT grant had to delay teacher
evaluations. States focused on using test scores to inform teacher evaluations but did not link the
evaluations to improving classroom instruction (Weiss, 2014). A key component of the RttT pay
for performance was to reward high-quality teachers and streamline dismissal of weak,
unsuitable teachers (Weiss, 2014). Hawaii’s Educator Effectiveness System (EES) was a first
step towards speeding up the dismissal process. As a part of the Educator Effectiveness System
agreement, teachers were evaluated based on student test scores and Hawaii used a value added
model for the test score component. While value-added scores focus on growth gained by
individual students instead of preset subgroup targets, the value-added model may measure only
a small portion of teaching and may not be very reliable (Darling-Hammond, Amrein-Beardsley,
Haertel, & Rothstein, 2012; Dee & Wyckoff, 2015; Gamoron & Long, 2006; Hanushek &
Rivkin, 2010; Weiss, 2014).
Hawaii’s Educator Effectiveness System included five areas that were tracked and
managed via a digital database. The database was named the Professional Development
Experiences that Educate and Empower, or PDE3 (HIDOE, 2013). The Hawaii DOE worked to
implement the evaluation systems in a four-year timeline, and to slowly scale up the number of
teachers impacted. By School Year 2014 – 2015, the State planned to be at full implementation
on all components. In 2013, the Hawaii DOE revised and simplified the Educator Effectiveness
System based on feedback from teachers and administrators to streamline the system and
improve efficiency (HIDOE, 2014b). A key revision was that the frequency of evaluations was
to be based on teachers’ past performance level (HIDOE, 2014b). In other words, teachers who
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had scored at a rating of highly effective would not be required to participate in some Educator
Effectiveness System areas for SY 2014 – 2015. All five areas were weighted, based on the role,
grade level and subject of the teacher. The 2013 – 2014 Educator Effectiveness Memorandum
defined four groups of teachers (Matayoshi, 2013). The first group was classroom teachers of
tested grade levels and or subjects. The second group was classroom teachers of non-tested
grade levels. The third group was non-classroom teachers at the school level. The fourth and
last group was non-classroom teachers at the non-school-level. The four groups had specific
weights in each of the five Educator Effectiveness System components. A teacher’s overall
effectiveness rating was measured based on a rubric which rated student growth, student
learning, and teacher practice.
The Educator Effectiveness System component of core professionalism applied to all
teachers in the Hawaii DOE who were required to document professional activities as outlined in
the Danielson Framework and submit evidence in a PDE3 electronic portfolio. Danielson (2007)
maintains the Tripod Student Survey was based on her work as a developer of the Praxis III
Classroom Performance Assessments and designed to promote a shared understanding of
effective teaching. Alvarez and Anderson-Ketchmark (2011) report renewed interest in the
Danielson’s framework as a result of Race to the Top grant requirements. Alvarez and
Anderson-Ketchmark (2011) also state Delaware included the Danielson framework in its
application and was one of the first states to be awarded an RttT grant. In 2013, the Hawaii
Department of Education revised the requirements for core professionalism to increase its overall
weight by 5%, or from 15% to 20% for classroom teachers, and an increase to 30% for non-
classroom teachers (NCTs) (HIDOE, 2014a). Additionally, non-classroom teachers could
substitute an observation in lieu of a core professionalism portfolio.
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Classroom observations were the second component of the Educator Effectiveness
System and applied to teachers with students. Non-classroom teachers (NCTs) were exempt.
Observations were initially scheduled at a frequency of two observations per year, one in the fall
and one in the spring (HIDOE, 2013). Classroom observations were to be conducted with a
teacher and administrative pre-conference, next the observation was to be conducted by a trained
administrator and followed up with a teacher and administrator post-conference. Weiss (2014)
contends districts and schools lacked the capacity to implement teacher evaluation systems, and
principals and administrators lacked the time to conduct classroom observations. The 2013
revision for individual teacher’s requirement for classroom observations was dependent upon
past performance. Teachers rated highly effective the year prior would not be observed, those
rated effective would have one observation, new teachers and teachers rated marginal or
unsatisfactory would have two observations per year starting in SY 2014 – 2015 (HIDOE,
2014a).
Tripod Student Surveys were the third component of the Educator Effectiveness System
and initially scheduled at a frequency of two per year (HIDOE, 2013). The Tripod Student
Surveys were designed to be administered using a set protocol, proctor instructions, and a script.
However, decisions as to whether teachers should administer their own Tripod Survey to their
own students, versus moving to a different classroom and administering surveys to students they
did not teach, were inconsistently determined — dependent upon each school site. All teachers
received their own electronic copy of survey results, although they were not required to view the
results, and administrators received a copy of the same report (HIDOE, 2013). The email link
containing survey results expired within a few months of receipt. Schoolwide trends were
available for faculty viewing, and results were compiled and anonymous. Students in grades K –
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12 received the same survey questions, and students below grade 3 often had trouble
comprehending the questions. Kuhfeld (2015) outlined that the Tripod Student Survey was
designed to measure seven areas of teaching and is becoming widely used in teacher evaluations.
The Tripod Student Survey gathered data from students specifically asking questions regarding
student perceptions of how they perceived their teacher in the categories of caring, control,
clarity, challenge, conferring, captivating, and consolidating (HIDOE, 2013). Kuhfeld (2015)
declared the available evidence does not support using the Tripod Student Survey as a valid
measurement in teacher evaluations systems. Kuhfeld (2015) sampled 1000 middle school
classrooms in five U.S. school districts. Multiple revisions were made to Hawaii’s Educator
Effectiveness System component of the Tripod Student Surveys in 2013. For instance, only
students in grades 3 – 12 were surveyed, demographic questions were eliminated, the survey
frequency was reduced to once a year, and all survey evaluation weight was removed from the
Educator Effectiveness System (HIDOE, 2014a).
The fourth component of the Educator Effectiveness System student test scores, was
referred to as the Hawaii Growth Model and based on a value-added model. Weiss (2014)
submits that value-added bonuses may create friction among teachers who work in a
collaborative culture. Few studies have examined how teachers feel about value added growth
models (Corcoran & Goldhaber, 2013). The Hawaii Student Growth Percentile (SGP) measured
tested grades in English and Math, initially on the Hawaii State Assessment (HSA) and then on
the Smarter Balanced Assessment. Student test scores applied to all teachers for English test
scores results only, but the most weight was allocated to classroom teachers of tested grades.
Classroom teachers in tested grades and subjects had a weight of 25% for the Hawaii Growth
Model in both English and math at the elementary level, and in the subject they taught at the
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secondary level. For SY 2014 – 2015, the weight remained static for classroom teachers in
tested grades and subjects. Classroom teachers of non-tested grades and subjects, as well as
school level non-classroom teachers, had a weight of 5% of the English test score results, which
remained static for 2013 – 2015. A revision for all teachers was cut scores were revised to be
anchored in criterion, rather than as a base in percentile ranking of teachers. A factor in margin
of error classification was also included (HIDOE, 2014a).
The last component of the Educator Effectiveness System was the teacher selected
Student Learning Objective (SLOs). Student Learning Objectives were initially scheduled at a
frequency of two per year with one to count towards teacher evaluation (HIDOE, 2013). Student
Learning Objectives were defined by the Hawaii DOE as an academic goal set by the teacher for
their specific students, aligned to the common core or national standards, and the goal was
required to be specific and measurable. Student Learning Objectives were scored based on a
common rubric which was available to the teacher and reviewed and rated by an administrator
(HIDOE, 2013). The pre and post conference also required written feedback from the
administrator, whereas a mid-term conference with the administrator was optional (HIDOE,
2013). Non-classroom teachers could either implement a Student Learning Objective provided
they had access to classroom students or non-classroom teachers could access faculty members
as students. Non-classroom teachers could also opt to use a School or System Improvement
Objective (SSIO). Weights for Student Learning Objectives remained static during 2013 to 2015
dependent on teacher role group. Specifically, classroom teachers in tested grades and subjects
had a weight of 25%, classroom teachers in non-tested grades and subjects had a weight of 45%,
non-classroom teachers at the school level had a weight of 45%, and non-classroom teachers not
at the school level had a weight of 50% (HIDOE, 2014a). The 2013 revisions included a
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streamlined Student Learning Objectives template. Additional revisions in 2013 included a
reduction in frequency to one time per year and an addition that new teachers must incorporate
all professional development as a Student Learning Objective.
Hawaii’s Educator Effectiveness System implementation timeline was not evaluative in
its initial years and primarily focused on Student Learning Objectives. The initial year included
a pilot with 18 schools, during SY 2011 – 2012 (HIDOE, 2013). The second year, SY 2012-
2013, an additional 63 schools were added and the 81 total schools continued to work with the
EES components. The third year, SY 2013 – 2014, the design was launched statewide and the
Hawaii Growth Model was measured but did not impact teacher pay. In SY 2014 – 2015, the
final design went statewide for all five components at full implementation.
The Hawaii DOE revised and simplified the Educator Effectiveness System based on
feedback from teachers and administrators in order to streamline the system and improve
efficiency (HIDOE, 2014b). For example, 1,800 classroom and non-classroom teachers rated
highly effective were exempt from all Educator Effectiveness System components in SY 2014 –
2015 (HIDOE, 2014b).
The Hawaii Department of Education created multiple groups of stakeholders to generate
feedback on the Educator Effectiveness System. The Teacher Leader Work Group met between
2010 and 2013 and included over 100 educators from all fifteen statewide complex areas. The
Hawaii DOE Policy Group consisted of the superintendent, deputy and assistant superintendents,
and directors, who reviewed the Technical Advisory Group recommendations. The Technical
Advisory Group was comprised of national, regional and local experts for the purpose of
advising the Joint Committee. The Joint Committee consisted of four HSTA representatives and
four Hawaii Department of Education representatives.
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The Hawaii State Teachers’ Association, the Hawaii Board of Education and the Hawaii
Department of Education created a Joint Committee to review the Educator Effectiveness
System. The Joint Committee contracted Ward Research to conduct a Joint Committee Survey
to gather teacher feedback about teachers understanding of the Educator Effectiveness System.
A total of 4,280 online surveys were completed by teachers, which accounted for 30% of the
HSTA membership (HSTA, 2014). Kalani (2014) reports one out of six survey respondents
knew how their EES rating was calculated, and fewer than 20% of respondents understood the
Educator Effectiveness System. Survey respondents’ top request was to have more time to pilot
EES components (Kalani, 2014). Kubota (2014) asserted that teachers neither understand the
Educator Effectiveness System nor how it would impact their salaries yet the Educator
Effectiveness System was scheduled to determine teacher’s raises in SY 2014 – 2015. Ward
Research Inc. (2014) reported respondents had the highest level of understanding regarding
classroom observations.
The survey findings also reported that 43% of survey respondents believed administrator
bias would impact classroom observation ratings and 64% disagreed that their students put their
best effort into the Tripod Survey (Ward Research, 2014). Yuen (2013) emphasizes teachers had
to earn a satisfactory or higher rating in the Educator Effectiveness System in order to receive
step movements and across the board pay increases. Under the Educator Effectiveness System
guidelines, only the state superintendent could fire a teacher if they were rated unsatisfactory
(Yuen, 2013). According to news reports, The Hawaii State Teachers’ Association stated the
contract was fair and felt the Educator Effectiveness System would help transform education in
Hawaii (Yuen, 2013). The union did note it wanted the DOE to improve communication
regarding the Educator Effectiveness System (Yuen, 2013). Pay for performance was one of the
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methods used in Hawaii towards education reform efforts. Weiss (2014) contends pay for
performance rewards effective teachers but does not coach the middle-level teachers, who are
more likely to stay in the profession.
Summary
The literature review focused on the research surrounding pay for performance, which
includes defining high quality, effective teaching, based on measurable results. The literature
review explored education reform on both a national and state level, it also examined
measurements of teacher effectiveness, the impact of student characteristics on performance,
school governance, school reform, and the role of unions and collective bargaining agreements in
education. Additionally, a review of the existing literature on the Hawaii State Teachers’
Association was included to better understand pay for performance in the State of Hawaii. In
order to establish the context in which HSTA exists, a historical review of labor and public
education in Hawaii was conducted while examining human capital theory and open systems
theory. The review concluded with a detailed examination of Hawaii’s Educator Effectiveness
System.
The purpose of this study was to examine the role of HSTA during the Race to the Top
Grant. Specifically, the study sought to understand the union’s role in drafting the application
for Hawaii’s Race to the Top grant, the implementation of the grant, and the differential
treatment of zone and non-zone teachers. Of particular interest was the teacher pay for
performance extended day extended pay stipulation in the Zones of School Innovation. The
study was designed as a comparative case study to establish HSTA’s role in both the Zones of
Innovation Schools and HSTA’s role in non-zone areas. The findings helped to document and
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understand HSTA’s involvement throughout the life of the RttT grant. The methodology for the
study is presented in the following chapter.

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CHAPTER 3
METHODOLOGY
Introduction
Chapter 3 includes research questions, sampling instruments, data collection, and the
planned analysis of the data. Additionally, this chapter outlines the selection of schools and
categories of respondents used in the study, as well as credibility, researcher bias, and ethical
considerations. This study examined HSTA’s role in the implementation of Hawaii’s Race to the
Top grant.
Hawaii’s RttT grant attempted to address teacher quality by linking pay to performance.
Teacher pay for performance was a reported source of contention for many in the union rank and
file yet the union was key in the implementation of the grant. The union’s role and the
agreements outlined in the supplemental contract entitled The Extended Learning Time and
Additional Professional Development / Collaboration Time for Teachers in the Zones of School
Innovation and Hawaii School for the Deaf and Blind SY 2012- 2013 was compared to the
union’s role and the agreements outlined in the contract between HSTA and the State of Hawaii
Board of Education covering July 1, 2009 – June 30, 2011, and the final contract between HSTA
and the Hawaii BOE covering July 1, 2013 – June 30, 2017. Teacher unions are involved in
every level of school governance and are the most powerful unions in the nation (Moe, 2011).
Including the role of the union in the RttT grant was important in order to have a complete
picture of the RttT grant implementation in Hawaii.
The study also investigated the Educator Effectiveness System teacher evaluation
stipulation in the RttT grant. Teacher evaluation systems encompass all aspects of RttT goals,
including improved assessments and schools, comprehensive data systems, high-quality teachers,
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and increased student achievement (Weiss, 2014). The literature on student achievement and
high-quality teaching is abundant, however, literature definitively linking specific teacher
characteristics to student achievement is inconclusive. The literature on teacher evaluations and
pay for performance in the public school system is moderate but practical applications of pay for
performance are somewhat limited. Currently, there was little information about how EES
impacted Hawaii’s Zone of Innovation Schools and the study provided additional local data and
historical context.
Methodology
This study was designed as a qualitative comparative case study between two Zone of
Innovation Schools and two non-Zone of Innovation Schools. The qualitative study included site
visits, interviews, and document collection. Interviews to examine stakeholder perceptions
regarding the union’s role in RttT implementation included ZSI and non-ZSI teachers, DOE
administrators, union members, labor specialists, and state legislators. Interviews also examined
ZSI and non-ZSI stakeholder views on what happened to RttT reforms after the grant ended.
The union is positioned at a key juncture between the Hawaii Department of Education,
the Board of Education, the legislature, and public school teachers. All groups are responsible
for improving student achievement. Including interviews with additional stakeholders such as
union leaders and legislators helped to give the researcher new information about the role of
HSTA in Hawaii’s RttT grant. Data was gathered from documents and interviews. Dominant
themes, ideas, and the beliefs of respondents were analyzed. Interviewing teachers in and out of
the Zones of School Innovation, as well as other stakeholders, helped inform the study as to how
the RttT’s Educator Effectiveness System and teacher pay for performance impacted student
success.
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Research Questions
The following research questions were used in this study.
1. What was HSTA’s role in developing and writing the RttT application to the Federal
Government?
2. What role did HSTA play in the implementation of RttT plans and programs
throughout the life of RttT?
3. What was the impact of differential treatment of Zone of School Innovation schools
in the teacher contract on HSTA, union relationships with the DOE and on the
implementation of RttT reforms across the zone and non-zone schools?
Purposeful Sample and Population
The study used a nonrandom, bounded, purposeful sample of four public elementary
schools. The case study was particularistic as it focused specifically on the union’s role in the
implementation of RttT. Merriam (2009) maintains that particularistic, qualitative case studies
focus on a specific situation or event. This study met such criteria. Two of the schools in the
study were in the Zone of School Innovation (ZSI) and two of the schools were out of the Zone
of School Innovation. Two complex areas were included in the study.
All four schools were served by the same union, the Hawaii State Teachers’ Association.
All four schools functioned under the same collective bargaining contractual agreement but ZSI
schools functioned under an additional collective bargaining supplemental agreement, and the
teachers in the ZSI schools received additional RttT funds. The additional collective bargaining
agreement was commonly referred to as the “Supplemental Contract.” A portion of the ZSI RttT
funds were allocated for ZSI teachers who worked an extended day for extended pay. Two of
the ZSI elementary schools in the case study received additional RttT funds and teachers in those
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schools were treated differently during the RttT grant (HIDOE & HSTA, 2012). The other two
elementary schools, which were out of the ZSI, did not receive additional extended day RttT
funds.
The four elementary case study schools were selected based on similar criteria. The
criteria included demographic data such as school enrollment, geographic location, Title I
students and Native Hawaiian students. When data was available, Title III students were also
considered. All four selected schools served heterogeneous student populations and held classes
for grades K-6 students. All four schools were public schools with high student attendance rates
and a traditional leadership structure. The data for school selection was gathered from publicly
accessible documents published by the Hawaii State Department of Education. This study was
done as part of a thematic dissertation process at the University of Southern California. Five
researchers participated in on-line and face-to-face work sessions to define individual research
questions and conceptual frameworks. Each researcher investigated a different aspect of
Hawaii’s Race to the Top grant. The thematic group collaborated to identify and gain access to
school sites. The group requested access to documents to help the researchers better understand
RttT at the school sites. School interviews, both one-on-one, and in small groups were requested
by the researchers and the feasibility was determined by each school principal.
Interviews and Document Collection
Interviews and document collection were used to gather data in this qualitative case
study. Qualitative research was appropriate for this study as one of the goals of the study was to
understand the context in which the unions and the employer implemented RttT initiatives.
Qualitative research provides insight regarding the perceptions and meaning people have created
to make sense of an experience (Merriam, 2009). Information gathered from documents helped
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to triangulate data sets and reduce potential researcher bias as the documents were created
without any interaction from the researcher (Bodgen & Biklen, 2007). Using an inductive
approach, information from interviews and documents helped identify emerging concepts and
themes.
Merriam (2009) expresses that interviews are mandatory when investigating how people
feel and perceive an event. Interviews help to supply holistic impressions and provide a window
into how respondents react to and interpret a past event. Interviews can also guide the researcher
to develop new information and gain new insights to guide the research. As Hawaii’s RttT grant
application was awarded in 2009 and implemented from 2010 to 2014, interviews and document
collection were appropriate data collection methods to help understand past events.
The research questions helped to determine the structure of the interview questions. Two
of the three research questions in this study were unstructured and a third research question could
be considered as both highly structured as well as unstructured and holistic. Based on the
structure of the research questions, a semi-structured interview format was used. The semi-
structured design gave the researcher a format to follow while allowing for discovery and
innovation.
The interview protocol started by establishing rapport. At the beginning of the interview,
it was critical to instill rapport, which was often done with small talk (Bogden & Biklen, 2007).
A script was referred to at the beginning of the interview to help explain the study, establish
informed consent, and answer any questions the participant may have had. Bogden and Biklen
(2007) recommend that the researcher create a relationship, identify the purpose of the interview,
and establish respondent confidentiality. The script also clearly explained confidentiality and
anonymity. When the subject granted permission, the interview was recorded and the recordings
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were transcribed by a transcription service or by hand, dependent upon the subject’s preference.
If the subject did not wish to be recorded, the researcher recorded notes by hand. The questions
were printed out with space for notes, and the researcher recorded body language, non-verbal
expressions, interruptions, inflections, and insights, during the interview. The interview
questions began with uncomplicated questions and gradually moved towards more challenging
inquiry.
During the interview, to help maintain rapport, the researcher practiced active listening.
The researcher focused on keeping the interview on topic, used attentive, non-verbal body
language, and encouraging phrases and probes. Both general and specific questions were asked.
Specific questions helped respondents share information from multiple perspectives whereas
unstructured questions were used to help establish rapport. Maxwell (2013) suggests that
specific questions help to establish information about events that took place in the past and are
unobservable. To that end, semi-structured interview questions were used. Semi-structured
interviews were a mix of highly structured questions and a free flowing conversation. As the
RttT grant was implemented in the past, between the years of 2010 to 2014, specific questions
were asked about the RttT grant and the union’s role in the implementation of the Educator
Effectiveness System. During the interview, the researcher focused on keeping the interview
questions relevant, worked with the respondent, and respected the respondent’s integrity.
Throughout the interview, open-ended questions, probes, and transitions were also used.
At the end of the interview, additional open-ended questions were added as necessary.
The interview wrapped up with references to a pre-written script. In closing, the researcher
requested access for follow up questions if needed, provided contact information, and thanked
the respondent for their time. Post interview, the researcher made written comments and
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annotations on the interview notes. The date and time were jotted down on the interview notes.
Each respondent was given a small token of appreciation at the end of the interview.
Document collection was also used in this study. Requests were made for access to
internal documents such as memos, agendas, and meeting minutes (Bogden & Biklen, 2007).
Additional requests for any RttT documents and external communication documents from 2010
to 2014 were made if items were not easily accessible. Examples of external communication
included press releases, financial and budgetary information, contractual information and
historical timelines. School documents helped to establish the social context of the school sites
during RttT (Bogden & Biklen, 2007). Union contracts, school data, and school site documents
were collected and analyzed to establish the context of the RttT grant and the Zones of School
Innovation. House and Senate Bills from the Hawaii State Legislature were collected and
analyzed to establish the timeline and involvement of the legislature prior to and during the life
of the RttT grant. During site visits, the researcher was a non-participant observer as the
researcher’s activities were known to the school site but the research was more important to the
researcher than their group role. The researcher had no contact with any of the four schools in
the study, therefore the researcher was able to maintain the role of a non-participant observer.
Whenever possible, the researcher jotted down notes, impressions, and ideas, to help collect rich,
descriptive, field work data and to help establish the context of the site.
Bogden and Biklen (2007) recommend the researcher continually reflect and clarify
statements that help to explain the purpose of the project. Some initial coding occurred during or
just after interviews and field site visits. Researchers suggest writing memos initially as a way of
recording thoughts and ideas to help identify emerging patterns and themes (Miles, Huberman, &
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Saldaña, 2014). Memos were also written after the completion of interviews to help the
researcher clarify new ideas and information (Harding, 2013).
Data Analysis
Interview and document collection data were analyzed using the open coding method.
Coding was utilized to process data to make sense out of the data and to support data analysis
(Corbin & Strauss, 2008). Specifically, raw data was transcribed and coded into clean data. The
initial coding was done directly on the transcribed interviews in hard copy form. Clean data was
color coded and marked for keywords. Data was collected and coded on a continuous cycle. All
interview data was organized in a code book using open coding methods. After numerous open
codes emerged, interview data was grouped by each open code in an EXCEL spreadsheet and
was supported with words, phrases, and sentences from respondents. Each open code was
organized by respondent group and tagged by a pseudonym. After applying open coding, the
codes were grouped by theme as the second step of the constant comparative method of axial
coding (Lichtman, 2014; Merriam, 2009). As additional codes emerged, both the hard copy of
the transcribed interviews and the EXCEL database were updated. Selective coding, the third
step of axial coding, was applied to the data. The researcher looked for patterns in the key ideas.
Corbin and Strauss (2008) assert that “…interpretation is not an exact science. It never can be,
nor should it be” (p. 49). Repetitive key ideas were analyzed to gain understanding and insight
in addressing the research questions.
Open codes were cross-referenced for reliability in a three column matrix created in MS
Word with in which each research question and corresponding interview questions were listed
and analyzed. The open codes were then grouped by into seven dominant themes in a chart to
analyze the frequency of responses along with a three column matrix. The matrix was created to
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support codebook analysis. The matrix was organized with corresponding evidence listed under
each interview question. For example, column A of the matrix included an identified open code,
column B included keywords and properties from supporting evidence, and column C included
verbatim, tagged evidence from respondents. A culminating two column chart listed all of the
relevant open codes and themes with each corresponding research question. With the open codes
in the right-hand column, axial codes were generated in the left-hand column. Axial codes were
then analyzed to determine selective codes. Finally, overarching reflective codes were reviewed
for consistency with their corresponding research question. Data from the overarching reflective
codes was included in the summary of each finding.
Creditability and Researcher Bias
Triangulation helped to establish creditability and trustworthiness (Bogden & Biklen,
2007; Merriam, 2009). Interviews and documents were used to support data collection.
Maxwell (2013) contends two threats to credibility and validity are researcher bias and reactivity.
Researchers must be aware of how their bias influences their findings as researcher bias is not
likely to be eliminated (Maxwell, 2013). The researcher taught public school at the secondary
level in the Hawaii DOE for seventeen years and is a dues-paying member of HSTA. As
reactivity cannot be eliminated, it was important for the researcher to avoid leading questions
during interviews. Additionally, the researcher practiced empathetic neutrality and avoided
jargon so that the respondent felt comfortable and secure in the interview session.
Ethics
All Institutional Review Board (IRB) protocols were followed at all times, as well as
additional Hawaii DOE research stipulations. No real names were used and the respondent’s
gender may have been changed as gender is not relevant to this study. Any identifiable
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information obtained in connection with this study remained confidential and was only used to
set up the interviews and was not linked to an individual’s responses. No participants were
placed at risk at any time and all participants could stop at any point. Research participants have
the right to confidentiality and anonymity (Glesne, 1999). Role groups were relevant to the
study but all non-relevant characteristics were changed to protect participant identity.
Participants had information about the study in order to make informed decisions and
they were allowed to stop at any time. An informed consent document was provided by the
researcher and read by the participant, and was shared prior to any data collection. When the
respondent agreed, interviews were recorded and the data was transcribed. Raw audio data was
destroyed after transcription. Transcribed data was kept in a secure location until USC cleared
the researcher after the study was completed and the data was then destroyed. When the results
of the research were published no identifiable information was used.
Interview Respondents
There were fourteen respondents in this case study. For the purposes of data coding and
analysis, respondents were categorized into three groups: policy makers, policy implementers,
and teachers. Policy makers were defined as those individuals involved in creating, shaping,
drafting, or funding Hawaii’s RttT grant application to the Federal Government. Policy maker
respondents were coded as Policy Maker 1 or PM1. Policy makers were interviewed
individually. Policy implementers were those individuals who were tasked with grant
deliverables, grant monitoring, or ensuring the implementation of grant plans and programs at
the school level. Policy implementers were interviewed with other case study researchers or they
were interviewed individually by the principal investigator. Respondents in this category were
coded as Policy Implementer 1 or PI 1. Teachers were defined as those individuals who were
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HSTA members and who were at a school site during some or all of the RttT years, specifically
between 2010 and 2014. Teachers were interviewed individually. Teachers were coded as
Teacher 1 or T1. Each group of respondents was asked similar questions. Policy makers were
asked a specific set of interview questions, policy implementers were asked a specific set of
interview questions, and teachers were asked a specific set of interview questions. Interviews
were conducted in person and via telephone. When needed, a second interview was conducted to
further clarify key ideas. The identity of all respondents was protected at all times.
Identifying Schools and Complex Areas
Hawaii had two Zones of School Innovation on two different islands that received
additional RttT funds. Due to geographic considerations, the Zone of School Innovation on
Hawaii Island was not included in this study. Initially, three schools in the Zone of Innovation
from O’ahu ZSI schools in the same complex were identified based on similar characteristics,
and two schools were selected due to accessibility. After the two Zone of Innovation schools
were selected, two non-Zone of Innovation schools with similar characteristics in a different
complex were identified. Schools were selected based on student demographic information and
geographic data. This study focused on the union’s role throughout the duration of the Hawaii’s
Race to the Top grant in both the Zone and the non-Zone schools.
Summary
Chapter 3 focused on the methodology used in this study. The study employed a
qualitative comparative case study to answer three research questions. The literature review
provided in Chapter 2 guided the research questions which in turn guided the structure of the
data collection and analysis. This chapter also identified the population and sample, interview
and document collection methods, ethics, research bias, and the selection of schools and
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complexes. Chapter 4 examines the site visits and interview findings, and explores how those
findings connect to the research questions.

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CHAPTER 4
RESULTS
Introduction
This qualitative case study sought to examine HSTA’s role in Hawaii’s RttT grant. Three
research questions were analyzed using data gathered from interviews and document collection.
Interviews were conducted with individuals from HSTA, the Hawaii DOE, the Hawaii State
Legislature, teachers, and key participants from each school site. Documents were collected
from publically accessible databases, legislative archives, and from case study school sites.
Four case study schools in two different complexes were analyzed. Additional details
regarding the case study schools are located in Appendix A. Three research questions provided
the framework for this study. The three research questions were as follows:
1. What was the HSTA’s role in developing and writing the RttT application to the
Federal Government?
2. What role did HSTA play in the implementation of RttT plans and Programs
throughout the life of RttT in Hawaii?
3. What was the impact of differential treatment of Zone of School Innovation schools
in the teacher contract on HSTA, union relationships with the DOE, and on
implementation of RttT reforms across the zone and non-zone schools?
Findings for the first research question demonstrate that HSTA was a participant in
providing input and shaping the direction of the RttT application to the Federal Government.
Findings for the second research question regarding the role HSTA played in implementing the
RttT grant show that HSTA functioned as a traditional union working to enforce the collective
bargaining agreement, to mitigate grievances, and to support union members. Findings for the
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third research question indicate that the impact of the differential treatment of Zones of School
Innovation (ZSI) schools via the supplemental contract was inconclusive. Data gathered from
both ZSI and non-ZSI stakeholders indicated that some teachers lost faith in the union. Some
teachers were neutral regarding the union and the grant deliverables, whereas other teachers
gained faith in HSTA and in the opportunities that RttT brought to the educational system in
Hawaii. Stakeholder groups were compliant with Federal grant mandates and contract
requirements, once the supplemental contract was in place and until the grant ended. To help
understand the findings presented in this chapter, an overview of the case study schools and a
basic structure of the Hawaii DOE and the HSTA was provided. To ensure anonymity and to
protect the identity of all participants, pseudonyms were used for all interview participants, for
all four case study schools, and for the two complex areas. Data used to select the case study
schools was accessed from documents published by the Hawaii DOE.
Case Study Schools
Selection criteria required that the four case study schools have closely matched
demographics and similar school structures. All four schools included kindergarten through
grade 6 students, Title 1 students, and had a significant number of Native Hawaiian students
enrolled. Geographic location was also considered when selecting case study schools. In order
to draw comparisons between schools in the Zones of School Innovation and non-zone schools,
two of the schools were selected from within the same ZSI complex and two of the case study
schools were selected from the same non-ZSI complex. Specifically, Makai School and Moana
School were part of the same Zones of School Innovation within Plumeria Complex. The other
two case study schools, Akau School and Hema School, were both located in the non-zone
Hibiscus Complex.
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Case study school selection criteria required that the selected schools have a high
percentage of Title I students. The four selected case study schools served at least 76% or more
Title I students. For example, Akau School had 86% Title I students and Makai School
contained 85% Title I students. Selection criteria did not include Title III data but the zone
schools in Plumeria Complex did contain 5% or more Title III students. The non-zone schools in
Hibiscus Complex did not report data on Title III students. Selection criteria required that the
case study schools have a similar number of special education and Native Hawaiian students.
All of the schools in the study were rural schools, and each school had 8% or more Special
Education students and 59% or more Native Hawaiian students. Although daily attendance rates
were not part of the selection criteria, the case study schools did have high daily attendance rates.
Total enrollment numbers were part of the selection criteria and efforts were made to choose
schools of similar size. Makai School in the Plumeria Complex contained 582 students for total
enrollment which was similar to the student enrollment level of Hema School in Hibiscus
Complex which had just 536 students. Moana School in Plumeria Complex had the highest
student population with over 900 students and Akau School in Hibiscus Complex had the lowest
student population containing 235 students. Although Moana School and Akau School did not
have similar total enrollment counts, due to their geographic location in their respective complex
area and zone designation, as well as permission from the Hawaii DOE to gain access to these
particular schools, the two schools were included in the case study. Additional selection criteria
for Akau School and Moana School were closely matched. All four case study schools met a
majority of the required selection criteria.

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Table 1
Demographic School Data from Case Study Schools
School
Zone
Designation
District
Area Enrollment
% Native
Hawaiian
% Free
Reduced
Lunch
% Special
Education
%
ELL
Daily
Attendance
Rate
Makai ZSI Plumeria
Complex
582 60% 85% 12% 5% 90%
Moana ZSI Plumeria
Complex
906 59% 74% 8% 8% 99%
Akau non-ZSI Hibiscus
Complex
235 84% 86% 12% No
data
92%
Hema non-ZSI Hibiscus
Complex
536 61% 84% 13% No
data
93%
Source: HIDOE (n.d.-b)

Organizational Structure of the Hawaii DOE and HSTA
All four case study schools had a traditional, hierarchical structure in which teachers
reported to a principal and a principal reported to a complex area superintendent. In the Hawaii
DOE, a complex area consists of a high school and its component, or feeder, schools. A
Complex Area Superintendent, or CAS, oversees two to four high school complexes in a sub-
district. Each complex has a presiding Complex Area Superintendent who answers to a Deputy
Superintendent (HIDOE, n.d.-b). The Deputy Superintendent answers to the Hawaii DOE
Superintendent of Schools, who is the chief operating officer of the Hawaii DOE, appointed by
the Hawaii Board of Education. There are fifteen sub-districts within the Hawaii DOE.
The teachers’ union is represented in all Hawaii public schools by a teacher who
functions as the lead school site HSTA representative. The teacher acts as the school’s union
teacher representative and attends monthly union chapter meetings. Smaller elementary schools
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typically have one HSTA faculty representative while larger high schools may have a lead
faculty representative and two assistant representatives. HSTA also appoints a teacher to act as a
grievance representative (HSTA, 2012). A school site Association Policy Committee (APC) is
maintained or formed as needed by each school. Association Policy Committees work with
school level teachers and school level administration to ensure the collective bargaining
agreement is correctly applied and followed (HSTA, 2012). During Race to the Top, HSTA had
additional teacher roles in ZSI schools. For example, HSTA created Teacher Leader Work
Groups in zone schools to help shape RttT policy and to provide teacher input in the Zones of
School Innovation.
At the school level, teachers serve as voluntary faculty union representatives and are
supported by a Uni-Serv Director who is employed by HSTA. The Hawaii State Teachers’
Union Uni-Serv Directors work in twelve geographic areas which HSTA designates as chapters.
Statewide, the twelve HSTA chapters are serviced by a total of sixteen Uni-Serv Directors and
staff. Distribution of Uni-Serv Directors, secretaries, a deputy executive director and staff, and a
field operations manager and staff, are allocated based on school and student density in each a
sub-district. For instance, Honolulu District contained sixty public schools and in SY 2013 –
2014 served over 30,000 students (HIDOE, n.d.-b). The Hawaii State Teachers’ Association
allocated three full-time positions to Honolulu District. Two HSTA Uni-Serv Directors worked
exclusively within the Honolulu District and one additional full-time position was divided
between two Uni-Serv staff members (HSTA, 2012). Windward District, for example, included
seventeen public schools, 14,600 students, and had two full-time HSTA Uni-Serve positions
which were divided among three directors (HSTA, 2012). Although the islands of Kauai and
Ni’ihau contained one more school than Windward District, at eighteen schools, Kauai and
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Ni’ihau served 5,000 fewer students. The Hawaii State Teachers’ Association assigned one
dedicated Uni-Serv Director to Kauai and Ni’ihau (HSTA, 2012; HIDOE, n.d.-b). Therefore, the
union allocated Uni-Serv positions based on student enrollment counts and school site density.
All HSTA Uni-Serv Directors report to HSTA officers and to the HSTA board. The number of
directors who may sit on the HSTA board was also determined by the number of teachers in each
of the twelve chapters (HSTA, 2012).
Findings for Research Question 1
This section addresses the first research question regarding the role HSTA played in
developing and writing the RttT application to the Federal Government. Findings reveal that
HSTA was invited to join the Hawaii DOE as it prepared for RttT by providing input, sharing
ideas, and collaborating on Hawaii’s RttT application to the Federal Government. HSTA was
also a key member of the team that created a conceptual agreement relating to education reform
in Hawaii prior to the RttT application.
System Leaders During RttT
Reviews of the Phase I application demonstrate that as a one statewide system, it was of
crucial importance for state education leaders to sign off on the RttT grant application precisely
because Hawaii did not have local education agencies, thereby placing all of the decision making
power with the top leaders in the state (USDOE, 2010a). Data gathered from interviews and
document collection demonstrate that HSTA was an integral part of the leadership that guided
the RttT grant application.
Interview and document collection data show that HSTA was initially hopeful about
Hawaii’s RttT grant. The union represented this as a chance to include teachers’ perspective and
to join with other stakeholders in reforming Hawaii’s public education system. Invited to have a
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seat at the table, HSTA believed the Hawaii DOE presented a genuine offer to work together as
equals to improve student learning, to increase higher level thinking, to ensure that support for
teachers was part of the blueprint of Hawaii’s RttT plan, and to strengthen the teaching
profession. Specifically, the union was involved early on as the state mapped out its conceptual
agreement which shaped the big ideas in the grant (USDOE, 2010b). The union negotiated key
pieces in Hawaii’s Phase II Race to the Top grant application as an equal participant during the
collaboration phase prior to the grant application submittal. In the application point distribution,
up to 25% of RttT points were awarded to states if they could pass laws to implement pay for
performance or show that they had collective bargaining agreements in place that linked teacher
pay to student test scores (Nicholson-Crotty & Staley, 2012). Researchers contend that enacting
education reform by altering the pay scale would not be possible without union endorsement
(Colvin, 2012; Hartney & Flavin, 2011; Moe, 2011).
Notably, salary schedule reforms are unpopular with teachers (West & Mykerezi, 2011).
Despite how potentially unpopular pay for performance might have been with rank and file, the
Hawaii State Teachers’ Association was in support of Hawaii’s RttT application. The Hawaii
State Teachers’ Association was also a member of the application team. For example, HSTA
attended planning meetings, provided input to the conceptual agreement, and traveled to
Washington D.C. with other application team members in order to pitch Hawaii’s proposal to the
federal RttT grant review board. In the question and answer phase of the RttT grant application
in Washington D.C., the union was able to clearly articulate that they were excited about the
potential increase in professional development opportunities for teachers (USDOE, 2010b). The
Hawaii State Teachers’ Association shared that they were focused on ensuring that the Hawaii
DOE would clearly define Common Core State Standard exit targets, goals and that the Hawaii
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DOE would support teachers as the state transitioned to a Common Core curriculum (USDOE,
2010b). In the application question and answer section, the union appeared to have more clarity
on Hawaii’s RttT grant and the Zones of School Innovation than other team members.
During the application phase, HSTA practiced reform unionism and viewed the grant as
an opportunity to rejuvenate education in Hawaii’s public schools. Researchers purport that in a
reform unionism model, unions are equals in educational decision making and are partners in
improving both schools and student learning (Donaldson et al., 2013; Jacoby & Nitta, 2012). As
a member of the application team, HSTA was an equal participant in decision making,
functioned as a reformed union, and if only for a brief time, gained greater access to the inner
circle of state level educational policy making. This theme of access to decision making was
dominant for HSTA stakeholders, but less so for other role groups.
A Seat at the Table
Only one teacher respondent mentioned the theme of access to educational decision
making at the state level when reflecting on RttT. In fact, only five of the fifteen total
respondents interviewed noted HSTA gained a “seat at the table” to participate as equals in state-
level educational policy decision making, which could be due to the perspective of each group.
It seems unlikely that the majority of teachers would have considered insider access in regards to
educational policy making. Only Teacher 4 (T4) expressed the union had helped others
understand that increased access to decision-making and a seat at the influential table were
important aspects of the union’s involvement in the RttT application.
Two of the four policy maker respondents affirmed that access to guide and shape
educational policies via the RttT grant, to have a seat at the table, and to participate in decision
making was key for HSTA. Policy Maker 1 (PM 1) and Policy Maker 2 (PM 2) noted HSTA’s
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participation in the RttT grant application meant that HSTA had an equal position with other
influential policy makers. Respondents PM 1 and PM 2 reported that the union represented
teachers which included their expertise, such as knowledge of educational pedagogy and teacher
training. Jacoby and Nitta (2012) purport that unions play a critical role in sharing professional
knowledge from the teacher to the employer. Policy maker respondents stated many of the
federal and state level grant writers seemed to have limited educational experience. Teachers
brought the perspective of classroom experience to educational discussions and the union
believed it was crucial that the collective teacher voice was heard. Research indicates that
unions have a positive influence on student achievement precisely because they advocate that
teachers be allowed to have input in educational decision making (Vachon & Ma, 2015).
Conversely, other researchers note that unions raise the cost of education and that research is not
conclusive regarding union influence and student achievement (Lott & Kenny, 2013; Moe,
2011).
The majority of policy implementers did not identify that via Hawaii’s Race to the Top
grant, HSTA had gained a seat at the table and closer proximity to the insiders who make
educational policy decisions in Hawaii. Only Policy Implementer 1 (PI 1) observed that HSTA
needed to be present during the collaboration phase, prior to drafting the RttT application, in
order to be a voice for teachers specifically to push for an incentive-based plan. A majority of
policy implementers affirmed that HSTA was involved in the application and traveled to
Washington D.C. as a member of the grant proposal team. Policy implementers did not,
however, link that information directly to HSTA as an equal participant in state-level educational
decision making.
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While the idea of HSTA as a needed member in state level educational policy decision
making was declared by only one-third of the total respondents, this lack of recognition could be
a reflection of Hawaii’s unique political and cultural context. In a centralized state with low
citizen participation, such as Hawaii, political culture and context must be considered (Benham
& Heck, 1994; Marshall et al., 1986). Moreover, low citizen participation and a concentration of
power by insiders may have helped to create a political climate in Hawaii in which policy
discussions occurred among insiders and near circle actors, but such policy discussions may not
have moved beyond the initial circles of influence (Chubb & Moe, 1990; Marshall et al., 1986).
After coding interview data, one explanation as to why RttT appealed to the union could be that
as a direct result of HSTA’s participation in the grant application process the union gained access
to higher levels of educational policy making and a closer proximity to insiders. Historically,
HSTA has not had insider access to educational policy decisions.
Researchers report that Hawaii’s teacher union sits on the third tier of influence in state
level educational policy decision making from HSTA’s inception in 1971 to present (Benham &
Heck, 1994). From 1820 to 1994, Hawaii insiders, which included the ruling monarch or the
prevailing governor and their finance officers, had the most influence on state-level educational
policy decisions, while the business elite had the second greatest level of influence on
educational policy in Hawaii (Benham & Heck, 1994).
A complicating issue regarding the research on Hawaii’s insiders and the tiers of
influence is that the research is over two decades old. It is possible that in the ensuing twenty
years the role groups associated with different tiers of influence may have shifted. For instance,
based on interview data some stakeholders implied the business elite gained increasing access to
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the inside circle and may currently be on the “insiders” first tier, although when pressed,
interviewees retracted statements or asked to go off the record.
Likewise, data collection analysis of HSTA and Hawaii DOE contracts may indicate that
due to years of lackluster collective bargaining agreements and an imposed contract, the
teachers’ union may have slipped from the third tier to the fourth tier of influence and
educational policy making. For example, from 1986 to present, Hawaii’s business elite
leveraged the Hawaii Business Roundtable to formally promote education and economics in the
State of Hawaii. Notably, the Hawaii Business Roundtable Agenda 2013, listed supporting
Hawaii’s RttT education reform plan as one of its top priorities (Hawaii Business Roundtable,
2012). Interview data revealed some speculation on the part of policy makers as to the degree of
influence that the Hawaii Business Roundtable had in promoting Hawaii’s RttT grant
applications.
Document collection analysis shows that in both Phase I and Phase II of Hawaii’s RttT
applications, the Hawaii Business Roundtable and the Hawaii Chamber of Commerce were in
full support of the RttT applications (USDOE, 2010a, 2010b; Lingle, 2010). Of particular note is
a partnership between the Hawaii DOE, the University of Hawaii, the Hawaii Business
Roundtable, and the American Diploma Project to increase assessment and align high school
requirements with expectations held by businessmen (Lingle, 2010). Additional document
collection from the 2012 Hawaii Business Roundtable Action Agenda 2012 lists supporting the
Hawaii Department of Education’s RttT education reform plan as the third priority action out of
a total of eighteen education action agenda items (Hawaii Business Roundtable, 2012).
During RttT, the Hawaii Board of Education became an appointed board, as compared to
previous years in which Hawaii’s Board of Education was elected. Between 2011 and 2015, the
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Hawaii Board of Education was dominated by business roundtable members. For instance, only
one educator, a professor at the University of Hawaii at Manoa, was appointed to the 2011
Hawaii BOE. Additionally, the Hawaii BOE leadership was often selected from the business
community. For example, during RttT, then-Governor Neil Abercrombie appointed the CEO of
First Hawaiian Bank, Don Horner, to serve as chairman of the Hawaii BOE from 2011 to 2015.
After stepping down as chairman, Horner served on the board under Governor Ige for an
additional two years, resigning from the BOE in 2017. The Hawaii Business Roundtable (HBR)
had key members on the Hawaii BOE, and the Hawaii Business Roundtable gave input for the
Hawaii DOE’s strategic plan and RttT. Teacher tenure and teacher evaluation policies were also
listed by the business leaders as a critical piece of RttT reform (Hawaii Business Roundtable,
2012).
Pay for performance was a key reform included in RttT. Researchers note that Hawaii
teacher salaries were among the lowest in the nation when adjusted for cost of living (Villarreal
et al., 2014). Suppressed teacher salary schedules and imposed teacher contracts may indicate
HSTA’s lack of access to state-level educational policy making. The Hawaii State Teachers’
Association expressed publicly that being invited to attend in RttT planning placed them in a
stronger negotiating position. Interview and document collection data clearly show the union
stated their support of Hawaii’s RttT application was to improve Hawaii’s education system.
RttT as Rejuvenation for Education in Hawaii
Improving the system of education in Hawaii was a dominant theme among respondents.
Twelve out of fifteen interview respondents noted RttT had the potential to change the structure
of education in the Hawaii DOE for the better. For example, nationwide, RttT grant recipient
states received a waiver from NCLB and a clear message to enact a multi-level education
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structure overhaul. Improving how state and local education agencies interfaced were part of
RttT requirements (Weiss, 2014). Since Hawaii was already a one state system, all local
education agencies were automatically signed on to state level reform. In the Hawaii DOE, the
fifteen district complexes functioned in part as local education agencies. As Hawaii did not have
multiple local education agencies representing different districts governed by their own Board of
Education, nor did Hawaii have several unions, Hawaii was in a unique position as compared to
other recipient states. Structurally, Hawaii was a step ahead of other states regarding education
reform. A majority of interview respondents commented on education reform and RttT.
Half of the teacher respondents expressed that RttT was a vehicle through which the
Hawaii DOE could rejuvenate education in Hawaii. Responses differed dependent upon ZSI or
non-ZSI status. Non-ZSI teacher respondents shared no data on this theme of rejuvenation while
teachers in the ZSI asserted that RttT was intended to empower teachers and to help move
education forward. The difference in responses between zone and non-zone teachers may have
been influenced by the frequency of communication with teachers regarding RttT goals. For
example, ZSI teacher respondents observed that the union and the Hawaii DOE visited zone
schools, monitored zone schools, and communicated frequently with zone teachers to increase
teacher understanding of RttT goals and requirements. Non-zone teacher respondents did not
share any information about additional site visits by union officers or DOE officials to increase
understanding of RttT goals and objectives.
Policy maker respondents recognized that RttT had the potential to enact real, systemic
change in the Hawaii DOE. All policy makers shared that RttT gave teachers an opportunity to
change how they approached education. Respondent PM3 contended that RttT was intended to
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be a blueprint for educational change. Respondent PM4 disclosed that RttT reforms could have
created structural changes designed to last beyond RttT.
The entirety of policy implementers, both in the zone and out of the zone, stated RttT
represented a shift in education reform for Hawaii. Four out of seven policy implementers
believed RttT could bring a cohesive focus to education reform in Hawaii. Three more policy
implementers thought RttT reforms could be implemented statewide. Zone status did not seem
to impact how RttT policy implementers viewed RttT reform. Some zone policy implementers
welcomed the shift RttT brought to Hawaii while other zone policy implementers expressed
frustration and dissatisfaction with specific aspects of RttT. Zone policy implementers expressed
frustration regarding extended learning time, while non-zone policy implementers conveyed
discontent with the common core curriculum and teacher evaluations. Conversely, a few non-
zone policy implementers endorsed RttT overall, while other non-zone policy implementers were
relieved RttT was over. Only PI3 noted Hawaii’s application was a lengthy read cover to cover,
although PI1 seemed thoroughly versed on Hawaii’s RttT application as well.
When discussing RttT as a method of improving education in Hawaii public schools,
many of the respondents in all role groups included common themes of communication and
understanding. While coding interview data, communication and an understanding of RttT goals
were documented in two distinct areas. First, the majority of interview respondents thought
communication to stakeholders regarding RttT goals, expectations, and deliverables needed
improvement. Second, all but two respondents felt that stakeholders needed more clarification in
order to understand the bigger picture of RttT.
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Communication and Understanding of RttT Goals
All teacher respondents disclosed the union continually communicated with them via
surveys, questionnaires, open conversations, and requests for frequent meetings. All teacher
respondents expressed the Hawaii DOE held numerous training sessions on RttT. The ZSI
teacher respondents, T2 and T4, indicated the union worked hard to communicate with teachers,
that the ZSI schools had positive relationships with the union, and that some teacher leader work
groups held meetings during the school day at non-instructional times to better understand RttT
goals. Specifically, teacher respondents T2 and T4 noticed a marked increase in union site visits,
union communication via meetings, questionnaires, and surveys during RttT years. Non-zone
teacher respondents both mentioned the union encouraged teachers to reach out to HSTA if
contractual issues arose, particularly around the Educator Effectiveness System ratings, but could
not remember any union officials visiting their non-zone school sites during RttT years. Teacher
respondent T4 had a clear understanding of RttT goals, expectations, and deliverables as well as
the bigger picture of RttT. Teacher respondents T1 and T3 had a strong working knowledge of
what they experienced as teachers during RttT, and T3 had clarity regarding the union’s position
before, during, and after RttT. Respondent T3 declared HSTA was initially pro RttT.
Respondent T3 noted the union then backed off RttT endorsement and worked to enforce the
contract for the remainder of the grant. Data analysis of interviews indicates that while union
officials worked to communicate and help teachers understand the goals, expectations,
deliverables, and the bigger picture of RttT, union officials appear to have spent more time,
energy, and made more site visits in the Zones of School Innovation. All teacher respondents
believed RttT communication and understanding could have been improved.
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Policy makers also described communication and understanding of RttT goals as
dominant themes. Two of the four policy makers divulged that helping people understand RttT
was a huge issue for them and could have been handled better by RttT leaders. While respondent
PM 2 reflected that while the people at the top had a clear picture and understanding of RttT, the
bigger picture had not filtered down to stakeholders at district and school sites. The majority of
policy maker respondents noted clarity was lacking at all levels. Policy maker respondents also
reported clarity among stakeholders regarding RttT goals, objectives, and deliverables was weak
and needed to be addressed.
Additionally, policy implementers commented on the themes of communication and
understanding. All seven policy implementers pointed out that RttT would have been more
successful if the Hawaii DOE had communicated RttT goals to participants. Policy
implementers noted that if stakeholders had understood the different aspects of RttT and how
those parts worked together, stakeholders might have been able to see the bigger picture of RttT
reform. The majority of policy implementers discerned RttT would have been better if there was
less overall confusion regarding RttT. For example, nearly every non-ZSI policy implementer
respondent remained convinced that zone schools received large amounts of unrestricted funds.
However, the zone schools unilaterally stated they received zero dollars in unrestricted RttT
funds. After interviews concluded, and again when coding interview data, it became apparent
that the majority of policy implementers had little knowledge of what was happening one level
above them. Policy implementers at the school level, for instance, were unaware of decisions
and RttT resource allocation at the district level. Policy implementers at the district level had
some awareness of state level RttT resource allocation when it applied directly to their complex,
but expressed conflicting reports regarding RttT resource allocation statewide.
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During interviews policy implementers often expressed frustration that when they asked
for clarification regarding exactly how a specific item needed to handled, the answer changed
dependent upon whom they asked. For example, respondent PI3 shared, “You can ask three
different people at the state level and get three different answers.” Respondent PI1, for instance,
noted “We had a lot of training on specific pieces but not a comprehensive training bringing all
the pieces together to make sense.” Seven out of seven policy implementer respondents believed
RttT communication and understanding needed improvement.

Table 2
Total Responses to Themes in Research Question 1
Research Question 1: Supporting Properties from Respondents
Number of Respondents
Mentioning Item (N=15)
HSTA as RttT participants with “a seat at the table” 5
RttT as rejuvenation for education in Hawaii 14
Communication and understanding of RttT goals 13

Findings for Research Question 2
This section addresses the second research question, HSTA’s role in the implementation
of plans and programs throughout the life of the RttT grant. Findings for the second research
question indicate that HSTA made a dramatic shift in its approach to RttT shortly after Hawaii
was awarded the RttT grant. This shift may be due to two reasons. Firstly, interview data show
respondents asserted that the Hawaii DOE could not deliver on RttT reforms. Secondly,
respondents contend there was a lack of support for teachers and administrators during RttT.
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Due to these factors, HSTA may have moved away from functioning under a reform union
model to that of a traditional union.
RTTT Teacher Pay for Performance
Interview data reflects that following Hawaii’s successful grant application, HSTA
became disillusioned and felt the Hawaii DOE did not have the capacity to enact the grant.
HSTA also maintained the Hawaii DOE lacked a system of support for teachers and
administrators. This about-face placed HSTA in a difficult position as they had fully participated
in shaping and signing the RttT grant application. For instance, HSTA pitched the grant to the
feds in 2010 but fought hard during the ZSI “extended pay, extended day” supplemental contract
negotiations in 2011. Research shows that teachers highly value collective bargaining
agreements (Moe, 2011). Post receipt of the grant and prior to implementation, HSTA and the
Hawaii DOE held a series of meeting during which time the two parties were able to forge a ZSI
supplemental contract. For the remainder of the RttT grant, HSTA functioned as a traditional
union representing teachers and ensuring that all parties were compliant with the collective
bargaining agreement and fulfilled their part of the ZSI supplemental contract.
HSTA Conducted Union Tasks
All fifteen respondents identified that HSTA behaved as a traditional labor union during
the implementation years of RttT, specifically 2011 through 2014. During this time, contractual
issues were monitored by the union. A primary function of teacher unions is to enforce
collective bargaining agreements (Brunner & Squires, 2013; Casey, 2012; Moe, 2011; Strunk &
Grissom, 2010). Interview data show that in response the employer consulted attorneys and
continually worked to abide by the collective bargaining agreements. For the duration of RttT
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implementation, the union represented the rank and file to mitigate grievance issues,
communicate with members, and enforce the contract with the employer.
All teacher respondents reported the union acted as a traditional labor union during RttT
implementation. HSTA, for example, was a constant presence during RttT implementation. The
union held monthly meetings with teacher representatives and encouraged faculty representatives
to stay in communication with the union. Respondent T3 thought the union was especially
concerned about negative evaluations teachers may have received due to the Educator
Effectiveness System. Respondents T2, T3, and T4 stated the union was a continual, positive
presence on campus, especially when teachers needed support. Respondent T1, on the other
hand, relayed that the teachers at their site were very familiar with their collective bargaining
agreement, the teachers knew the contract, and they would call HSTA whenever it was
warranted. Respondent T1 divulged that HSTA was not a dominant presence at their school site.
Policy makers indicated the union was constantly working to represent educator
perspectives during the Educator Effectiveness System negotiations, to support teachers during
implementation, and to enforce the contract once the Educator Effectiveness System went
statewide. Interview data from respondents PM1 and PM2 show HSTA brought alternate
viewpoints and experts into state-level discussions on education reform. Respondent PM1 noted
that many of the DOE RttT representatives, both locally and at the federal level, appeared to
have limited educational experience. For instance, when negotiating the Educator Effectiveness
System component of teacher evaluations, the Hawaii DOE contracted Charlotte Danielson and
exclusively used Danielson’s Framework for Teaching with which to develop the Educator
Effectiveness System. The union, however, brought Linda Darling-Hammond to join state level
Hawaii DOE officials in discussions about alternatives to the Danielson Framework. Although
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the Hawaii DOE had exclusively signed with The Danielson Group to build the Educator
Effectiveness System teacher evaluations, the union was able to represent an alternate viewpoint
and share teacher concerns. The Hawaii State Teachers’ Association contends that the Danielson
Framework was lacking in areas such as differentiation, personalization, and relationship
building with students. Respondents PM3 and PM4 observed there were many contract issues
with RttT but did not elaborate on this point.
All policy implementer respondents commented that during implementation HSTA’s role
was as a traditional union enforcing contractual issues. While all ZSI respondents critiqued the
design of the ZSI reforms or a section of the ZSI contract, three out of seven policy implementer
respondents recognized HSTA had spent time negotiating and crafting the supplemental contract.
Two out of the three non-ZSI policy implementer respondents observed that the union held the
employer to the contract by requiring that the Hawaii DOE train teachers repeatedly during the
Educator Effectiveness System roll-out and implementation. The same non-ZSI policy
implementer respondents also noticed that the union had the most contractual concerns with the
Educator Effectiveness System. The remaining non-ZSI policy implementer respondent did not
feel the union did anything more or less than what the union typically did, even when asked for
specific information and even when the Educator Effectiveness System was included in the
inquiry. During the interviews and again when coding data, it appeared that many of the policy
implementer respondents seemed to be reflecting on a micro level and referencing their personal
experiences with the Educator Effectiveness System, or reflecting on teachers’ reactions to the
Educator Effectiveness System, rather than on a macro level regarding the union’s position
towards the Educator Effectiveness System and Hawaii’s RttT grant.
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Stakeholders Complied with RttT
Compliance was a dominant theme for the majority of respondents. Many respondents
blended RttT compliance and contractual compliance. Compliance in regards to meeting goals
set out by Hawaii’s RttT grant plans and programs was coded as RttT compliance. Compliance
in regards to the union contract was also a dominant theme for all respondents and was coded as
contractual compliance. Contractual compliance was included in the findings above on labor
union issues. The linking of RttT compliance and contractual compliance may have been due to
HSTA’s involvement in Hawaii’s RttT grant applications, both the unsuccessful Phase I grant
and the successful Phase II grant.
In 2010, prior to Hawaii’s second RttT grant application, the ZSI was already piloting
RttT plans and programs in preparation for Phase I of Hawaii’s RttT grant application. The
Hawaii DOE and HSTA signed a Memorandum of Understanding which allowed the zone
schools to move forward with the ZSI plan which included a pilot of the Educator Effectiveness
System (USDOE, 2010a). At that point, and continuing until the successful Phase II application
and its initial implementation, the union and the Hawaii DOE were collaborating on a regular
basis. However, a few months after the state was awarded the RttT grant, the union shifted its
role to one of contract enforcement. For respondents, the theme of RttT compliance seemed to
be yoked to the Educator Effectiveness System. Findings from respondents regarding
compliance with RttT plans and programs indicate that once Hawaii was placed on high-risk
status, all stakeholders worked to produce deliverables and to meet deadlines.
All teacher respondents asserted teachers were compliant during RttT implementation.
Respondent T3 stated “We were dutiful, subservient teachers and we just did whatever we were
told.” All four teacher respondents noted there was little room for input and that the Hawaii
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DOE had the right to implement what they wanted. There was also a sense of resignation from
the teachers, and teacher respondents expressed they were told what to do rather than asked. All
teacher respondents both in and out of the ZSI were able to cite training sessions and monitoring
as part of RttT at their school sites. While T3 was able to list additional items such as Common
Core State Standards, Danielson, data teams, Student Learning Objectives, teacher observations,
and the twenty-one hours of additional administrative directed meeting time, other teachers were
only able to recall two or three items. There did not appear to be much difference between ZSI
teacher responses and non-ZSI teacher responses. All respondents commented that they were
compliant with RttT plans and programs. All but one respondent listed data teams and the
Educator Effectiveness System as components of teacher involvement. Teacher respondents
observed a large level of required Hawaii DOE monitoring at the school level as a direct result of
the Educator Effectiveness System.
All policy makers pointed out that compliance was part of RttT. Policy implementer
respondents PI1 and PI3 observed that the Hawaii DOE was compliance driven and that once
Hawaii received the RttT federal grant funds, RttT became dominated by compliance to the
strings that were now attached. Respondent PM4 stated “There were strings attached to the
funds.” Respondent PI2 communicated that DOE administrators were often focused on
mandates and compliance issues. Two of the four policy makers who were in greater contact
with RttT on a daily basis were able to quickly list a majority of the RttT component parts such
as Danielson, the Educator Effectiveness System, Extended Learning Time, the ZSI, and the
twenty-one hours of additional administrative directed meeting time. The remaining two policy
makers were not involved with RttT on a daily basis and did not have a strong working
knowledge of the different components of RttT. This may have limited their ability to reflect on
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the day to day workings of RttT and the Educator Effectiveness System, as well as any
subsequent compliance issues at the school or district level.
All policy implementers reported compliance was a critical part of RttT. All policy
implementer respondents were able to identify over half of the plans and programs of RttT. For
example, policy implementers recalled: Academic Review Teams, Common Core State
Standards, Comprehensive Student Support Systems, Danielson, Extended Learning Time, the
Educator Effectiveness System, Formative Instruction and Data Teams, Induction and
Mentoring, meetings, monitoring, professional development, SGP, Student Learning Objectives,
Teacher Leader Work Groups, training, Tripod Student Surveys, and the ZSI. There did not
appear to be a marked difference in the responses of ZSI policy implementers and non-ZSI
policy implementers. Policy implementer responses regarding compliance ranged from extreme
to more moderate statements. Policy implementer respondent PI2 announced “This is what we
had to do, but it killed us…we were dictated to do this.” Respondent PI2 observed “RttT was
compliance driven.” Policy implementer PI6 asserted “RttT did not look two to three changes
away.” Whether policy implementers were reactive, neutral, or reflective, all policy implementer
respondents concurred that compliance, monitoring, and meeting deadlines were a significant
aspect of RttT implementation.
RttT Lacked a System of Support
Providing a system of support was a foundational piece of the RttT grant. In the
application phase, HSTA publicly announced their motivation for signing on to the RttT grant
was to support teachers (USDOE, 2010b). Multiple Hawaii DOE application team members
discussed providing support for teachers as part of RttT implementation and teacher support was
mentioned numerous times in Hawaii’s RttT application (Hawaii State Board of Education,
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2010). However, during the interviews, thirteen respondents commented that Hawaii’s RttT
grant lacked a system of support.
Teacher respondents felt the Hawaii DOE lacked a system of support for Hawaii’s RttT
grant. Three out of four teacher respondents discerned that the Hawaii DOE had failed to
provide RttT support for teachers. The remaining respondent did not report any data on this
theme. Respondent T3, for instance, noted helping teachers improve, particularly when it came
to teachers who had scored below satisfactory on their Educator Effectiveness System rating,
was a critical piece for RttT. Respondent T3 emphasized “That important piece, it just never
happened… it never ever materialized.” Respondent T2 contended that the high turnover rate of
new teachers was exacerbated by the lack of support during RttT. The majority of teacher
respondents held that the Hawaii DOE had been unable to make lasting, systemic changes via
RttT, possibly due to a lack of support for teachers.
Policy makers believed there was a lack of support for RttT on the part of the Hawaii
DOE. Policy makers asserted that within the first three months of implementation it became
clear the Hawaii DOE could not provide needed supports for teachers. When reflecting on RttT,
PM3 declared “The leadership for RttT was not implemented. Let’s put it that way.” Respondent
PM2 questioned whether or not the Hawaii DOE had RttT leadership in place at the school level,
the district level, and at the state level. Policy maker respondents expressed disappointment at
the lack of support for teachers from the Hawaii DOE. Some policy maker respondents noted
that when it became clear to the union that the Hawaii DOE was unable to honor the RttT
agreements as stated in the conceptual agreement and application, the union shifted its position
from collaboration and endorsement to negotiation and contract enforcement.
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Policy implementers also commented on a lack of support from the Hawaii DOE for RttT
implementation. All policy implementer respondents agreed that the Hawaii DOE did not
provide an adequate system of support for RttT. Both ZSI and non-ZSI policy implementers
proclaimed that support was either non-existent or top down. All policy implementer
respondents thought the Hawaii DOE rushed implementation, that little planning time was
provided for teachers and administrators, and that Hawaii’s RttT plans and programs could have
been more successful if supports had been provided. Policy implementer respondents cited
support for teachers should have included: additional training for teachers, common planning
time for teachers and administrators, clear directives and guidance from state officials, funding at
the school level, additional personnel at the school level, and models of successful systems of
support from other states.
Policy implementer respondents noted that in order to meet deadlines, school level
administrators had to complete multiple steps to fulfill Educator Effectiveness System
requirements. For example, respondents shared that the administrators conducting classroom
teacher observations were overwhelmed because administrators had to do two observations per
teacher per year. Respondent PI4 declared these were “Outrageous expectations, two
observations, every teacher, it just consumed us.” Policy implementers were clear in their
agreement that the Hawaii DOE was unable to deliver needed RttT supports.
All teacher respondents, policy maker respondents, and policy implementer respondents
reported that once Hawaii received the RttT funds, the Hawaii DOE needed to enact the grant but
that it lacked the carrying capacity for full implementation. Interview data reflected that prior to
high-risk status, the Hawaii DOE had seven employees handling RttT deliverables. Post high-
risk status, and in response to the Federal Government’s oversight visit, the Hawaii DOE
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increased the number of personnel assigned to manage RttT deliverables, the Hawaii DOE hired
consultants and companies, utilized assistance from educational experts, and began expending
grant funds.

Table 3
Total Responses to Themes in Research Question 2
Research Question 2: Supporting Properties from Respondents
Number of Respondents
Mentioning Item (N=15)
HSTA conducted union tasks 15
Stakeholders complied with RttT 14
RttT lacked a system of support 13

Findings for Research Question 3
This section addresses the third research question, the impact of differential treatment of
Zone of Innovation schools in the teacher contract on HSTA, union relationships with the DOE,
and the implementation of RttT reforms across the zone and non-zone schools. As part of the
grant application, the Hawaii DOE addressed turning around failing schools with two targeted
geographic areas, labeled the Zones of School Innovation. The Zones of School Innovation were
utilized as test sites for RttT reforms. For instance, the zone schools piloted the Educator
Effectiveness System prior to statewide implementation. Once Hawaii received the RttT grant,
the zone schools were mandated per grant requirements to implement Extended Learning Time.
In order to implement Extended Learning Time, working conditions and additional pay for ZSI
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teachers were negotiated by HSTA and the employer and delineated in the one year ZSI
Extended Learning Time supplemental contract.
RttT Reform Strategies
Complicating the ZSI supplemental contract negotiations was the absence of an agreed
upon, over-arching collective bargaining agreement. Teachers were without a contract and RttT
was in play. Upon expiration of the previous so-called “Furlough Friday” contract under
Governor Lingle, in place between July 1, 2009, and June 30, 2011, union members rejected the
next proposed contract. As the rejected contract had been blessed by the union and approved by
the Hawaii DOE, pressure was on Hawaii’s RttT leaders to procure a signed contract and remove
Hawaii’s RttT grant from high-risk status. Facing the potential loss of RttT funds, the state and
the union still had to determine exactly what zone and non-zone teachers would be expected to
do under RttT mandates. Shortly after the rank and file rejected the proposed contract, Governor
Abercrombie enforced a “Last, Best, Final Offer” imposed contract which was in place from
2011 to 2013. While the imposed contract appeared to solve the RttT compliance issue for the
governor, the imposed contract did not delineate RttT ZSI extended learning time teacher pay or
working conditions. After many meetings, both publically and behind the scenes, the employer
and the union were able to negotiate the supplemental bargaining agreement relating only to the
ZSI. The ZSI supplemental contract was in place from March 1, 2012, to June 30, 2013, and was
in addition to Governor Abercrombie’s imposed contract (HSTA, 2012).
Collective bargaining agreements address all aspects of teachers working conditions and
pay (Moe, 2011; Strunk & Grissom, 2010). Collective bargaining agreements typically cover all
rank and file under the same contract, but with the addition of the ZSI supplemental agreement,
HSTA had two agreements running simultaneously. From 2012 to 2013, all HSTA members
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were functioning under one contract while a second, much smaller group of zone teachers were
covered by a different, additional, ZSI Extended Learning Time contract for one year.
Differential Treatment
Teacher respondent interview data had varied results regarding the differential treatment
and multiple contracts covering teachers in the ZSI. Teacher respondent interview data revealed
a significant difference between union activity inside and outside of the zone schools, possibly
due to the presence of an additional contractual agreement inside of the zone. ZSI teacher
respondents remarked that union leadership and officials visited the ZSI, zone administrators
made time for HSTA directed teacher advisory boards to meet during the school day, feedback
was a continual two-way stream between members and the union, and the Hawaii DOE
monitored the ZSI pilot schools more frequently. Out of the zone, non-zone teacher respondents
mentioned that HSTA Uni-Serv directors requested information from schools but school level
representatives did not always send it. Non-zone teachers also shared that the union worked to
address the Educator Effectiveness System teacher evaluation issues. Zone teachers did not
comment on differential treatment but did identify Extended Learning Time as part of Hawaii’s
RttT. Non-zone teachers did not comment on differential treatment by HSTA.
Half of the policy maker respondents emphasized that initially the union and the
employer were collaborating and coordinating their efforts for RttT. Policy maker respondents
noted many vertical and horizontal discussions occurred during the supplemental contract
negotiations. Zone of School Innovation teachers were paid as twelve-month employees under
the supplemental contract. Interestingly, during the negotiations a review of salary charts took
place. Upon review of the twelve-month employee pay scales, the union discovered twelve-
month workers had not been paid properly since the inception of the position. Subsequently, the
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pay scale for all twelve-month employees was revised and corrected. Policy maker respondents
reported that once the supplemental contract was in place, the union primarily focused on
contract grievance issues. While policy maker respondents were able to clearly articulate the
specifics of the supplemental contract, they did not discuss differential treatment of zone teachers
per say.
Only one policy implementer respondent commented directly on the differential
treatment of zone and non-zone teachers. Policy implementer PI6 stated “The ZSI had to do one
hundred percent of the Educator Effectiveness System pilot.” The majority of policy
implementers focused primarily on the way in which ZSI schools were selected, possibly
because they believed that ZSI schools received additional funds. Policy implementer
respondents PI1 and PI7 reported that ZSI administrators were required to attend weekly
meetings. Policy implementer PI1 noted that a significant amount of time was spent on
meetings. The remaining policy implementer respondents did speculate about how teachers felt
about all of the changes RttT brought to education in Hawaii.
Teacher Feelings
To some extent, all teacher respondents addressed the theme of how teachers felt about
RttT. Many teacher respondents blended feelings about HSTA with feelings about RttT
mandates. For instance, all teacher respondents asserted that teachers were cooperative towards
RttT mandates and requirements. Some teacher respondents shared a range of feelings and were
happy to moderately supportive of the union. For example, teacher respondents pointed out that
the union backed them up on RttT grievance issues. The other half of the teacher respondents
divulged that the union was not welcome at their school site but did not attribute this position as
being related to RttT. Respondent T3 stated teachers were neutral in their feelings regarding the
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union and that teachers had been dutiful in their response to RttT requirements. Respondent T4
expressed that teachers were “Scared to death” and that RttT was “a nightmare” for many
classroom teachers. Respondents T1, T2, and T3 did not divulge that teachers feared RttT. Most
of the teacher respondents either believed that union relationships with the DOE had been calmer
since RttT ended, or did not address this theme.
Policy makers did not report any data on how teachers felt about RttT. Policy maker
respondents did not describe any data on teacher relationships with the Hawaii DOE and RttT.
Half of policy maker respondents observed teachers had to carry the burden of RttT reforms and
that teachers were not happy with RttT, although policy makers did not give specific examples or
attribute this unhappiness to either the union or the Hawaii DOE. Policy maker respondents did
not address how teachers felt about the union. When asked directly, policy maker respondents
stated they could not address such questions.
All policy implementers perceived that RttT was unfair to teachers and that schools and
teachers were continually monitored under RttT. ZSI policy implementer respondents pointed
out that they had to implement whatever the Educator Effectiveness System required. Policy
implementer respondent PI7 proclaimed ZSI educators had to “Get and Do, Get and Do” in
regards to RttT requirements. Policy implementer respondents reported that professional
development for the Common Core State Standards was time-consuming. While they agreed
training was required they also noticed it took time away from school. Two policy implementers
expressed that teachers were afraid of the Educator Effectiveness System and that the Hawaii
DOE was very unclear about expectations regarding teacher evaluations. Linking teacher pay to
student test scores was one of the many RttT requirements that appeared to lack sustainability.
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Sustainability of RttT Reforms
Building the capacity to sustain RttT reforms beyond the $75 million grant funds was of
critical importance for Hawaii. Federal reviewers cited Hawaii’s Phase I application for lacking
a clear pathway to post-RttT sustainability (USDOE, 2010a). While interview respondents were
able to discuss what happened when the money ran out in regards to the Common Core State
Standards textbooks, other reforms such as school monitoring and alternate teacher certification
routes were far more abstract for respondents.
The RttT grant required states to define how they would improve student achievement
and address five assurance areas. The federal RttT assurance areas included: standards and
assessments, a continually monitored system, a state-wide data system, recruiting and retaining
teachers and leaders, and improving the lowest performing schools. Hawaii’s RttT grant
responded to the federal assurances by selecting a Common Core State Standards and assessment
curriculum, monitoring and assessing K – 12 schools with rubrics and goals as evaluated by
Complex Area Support Teams, building a Longitudinal Data System, revising teacher
recruitment, starting a teacher leader academy, creating an alternate certification route for
principals, and by improving low-achieving schools with two Zones of School Innovation
(USDOE, 2013; Lingle, 2010; McNeil, 2013).
Teacher respondents reported different degrees of sustainability for RttT reforms. In the
ZSI, teacher respondents maintained that professional development was not sustained post-RttT.
Zone respondent T4 noted that there was a large increase in administrative personnel and that
this was the only reform that has remained to date. Zone respondent T2 stated the schools
seemed calmer with less intrusion from district staff and the site had less professional
development but did not elaborate further. Non-zone teacher respondents mentioned Student
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Learner Objectives were still required. Non-zone respondent T3 stated many components of
RttT were still in play but to a lesser degree. For example, T3 shared they felt the teacher
evaluations and curriculum for Common Core State Standards were still used. Half of teacher
respondents communicated that educators were waiting to see how ESSA would impact RttT
reforms.
Only one policy maker respondent directly addressed the theme of sustainability for RttT
reforms. Respondent PM4 disclosed that many of the structural changes implemented via RttT
reforms were designed to last beyond RttT. Respondents PM 2 and PM3 did not address RttT
sustainability, although PM3 noted that in the State of Hawaii, support for education is
unilaterally endorsed but that support rarely moves beyond a campaign flyer. Respondent PM1
disclosed that the Hawaii DOE could not support teachers or administrators, and lacked the
capacity to implement the grant. Respondent PM1 implied that if the state could neither support
nor implement RttT, it was likely very little in the Hawaii DOE would change.
Four out of seven policy implementer respondents felt that RttT reforms either went away
or were maintained at the school level using a different funding source post-RttT. Alternate
funding sources were cited as Title I and Title II funds. Policy implementer respondents also
mentioned grants and weighted student formula monies were noted as options for post-RttT
funding sources. One policy maker expressed that the state was working to maintain RttT
reforms but to a lesser degree due to a lack of funds. When pressed as to how the state or district
complex maintained the reform, the policy maker said “Well, creatively.” Respondent PI4
observed that some of the reforms were not cost driven and that maintaining data teams, for
instance, simply required a reshuffling of personnel resources. For example, at one case study
school site, teachers in non-teaching lines were asked to cover other teacher’s classes so the
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classroom teachers could attend data team meetings. The remaining case study school level
policy implementers did not share the strategy of shuffling personnel to maintain non-cost RttT
reforms. Respondent PI6 emphasized that Hawaii’s RttT reforms failed to think beyond
immediate implementation towards sustainability. Respondent PI3 commented “I think that was
the problem with RttT. When the funding source went away, a lot of positions left with it, a lot
of supports in the school left with it. Now the school is back to square one and struggling.”
Interview data from all respondent groups regarding the sustainability of RttT reforms was
inconclusive. Interview data from the zone and non-zone respondents regarding the
sustainability of RttT reforms was also inconclusive.

Table 4
Total Responses to Themes in Research Question 3
Research Question 3: Supporting Properties from Respondents
Number of Respondents
Mentioning Item (N=15)
Differential treatment 6
Teacher Feelings 11
Sustainability of RttT Reforms 10

Summary
This chapter focused on interview data and document collection findings, and how those
findings connected to the three research questions in the study. This chapter also provided
information on the case study school sites and an overview of HSTA’s structure. Chapter 4
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provided detailed insight into how teacher respondents, policy maker respondents, and policy
implementer respondents perceived specific aspects of Hawaii’s RttT.
Data for research question one, regarding HSTA’s role in the RttT application, illustrate
that HSTA believed they could participate as equals to rejuvenate education in Hawaii. HSTA
was hopeful RttT could reform education in Hawaii. However, shortly before implementation,
HSTA realized the DOE was not able to provide the needed support to enact or sustain RttT
reforms.
Data for research question two, in regards to the role HSTA played in the implementation
of RttT in Hawaii, show that HSTA negotiated the ZSI supplemental agreement to comply with
grant requirements while protecting contractual rights. HSTA worked to mitigate contract
violations and communicate with members. HSTA communicated frequently with union
members but more frequently with ZSI teachers.
Data for research question three, in regards to the impact of differential treatment of zone
and non-zone teachers, union relationships with the DOE, and on the implementation of RttT
reforms in and out of the zone, show that different stakeholder groups had different insights.
Some HSTA members were fearful of the Educator Effectiveness System pay for performance
mandates. Some HSTA members had a neutral to a positive impression of HSTA, possibly due
to the union’s assistance with unfavorable teacher ratings determined via the Educator
Effectiveness System. Other respondents had negative feelings toward the union, although those
could have been present prior to RttT. While for a short time equality increased among
educational decision makers in the State of Hawaii, few stakeholders believed RttT reforms were
sustainable post-RttT funding. Chapter 5 provides conclusions, limitations, and
recommendations for future research.
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CHAPTER 5
DISCUSSION
Introduction
Teacher unions access power at the local, state, and national level (Hartney & Flavin,
2011; Moe, 2001, 2011; West & Mykerezi, 2011). While teacher unions typically exercise more
power than other unions and educational organizations, educational decision-making in Hawaii
has historically relegated the Hawaii State Teachers’ Union to one of outsider status (Benham &
Heck, 1994; Marshall et al., 1986; Moe, 2011). Race to the Top, however, required union
support, thereby giving HSTA insider status if only for a brief time.
This study explored HSTA’s involvement in applying for and implementing the RttT
grant in Hawaii. A significant component of Hawaii’s RttT grant was the Educator Effectiveness
System which addressed teacher pay for performance. The study also looked at the impact of the
differential treatment placed upon educators within the Zones of School Innovation as compared
to educators outside of the ZSI. The purpose of this study was to examine the role of HSTA
prior to and during Hawaii’s Race to the Top grant. This qualitative case study examined three
research questions.
1. What was HSTA’s role in developing and writing the RttT application to the Federal
Government?
2. What role did HSTA play in the implementation of RttT plans and programs
throughout the life of RttT in Hawaii?
3. What was the impact of differential treatment of Zone of School Innovation schools
in the teacher contract on HSTA, union relationships with the DOE, and on the
implementation of RttT reforms across zone and non-zone schools?
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To address these questions, data was gathered from documents and interviews.
Documents were collected from case study schools, publicly accessible databases, and legislative
archives. Interviews were conducted with fifteen diverse participants. Interview respondents
contained key stakeholders from the Hawaii Department of Education including educators from
schools, district, and state offices, as well as individuals from case study schools. Additional
interviews were held with union members, union employees, and legislators. Interview
respondents were grouped into three categories which were as follows: Teachers, policy makers,
and policy implementers. Pseudonyms were used for all case study schools, sub-districts, and
participating individuals. All interview data was transcribed and analyzed in a code book. Raw
data was organized using an open code system. Documents were analyzed to reinforce specific
axial codes. Once axial codes were established, raw data was coded a second time to establish
the frequency and depth of support for specific themes. A checklist of which respondents
commented on each theme was also created to analyze patterns of response. Reflective codes
supplied further analysis of the data to support the conceptual framework. This chapter provides
the conclusions, limitations, and recommendations for future research.
Discussion of Findings
The study was designed to investigate the involvement of the Hawaii State Teachers’
Union Race to the Top. Specifically, this study sought to understand the Hawaii State Teachers’
Association role in Hawaii’s Race to the Top grant application and the subsequent
implementation of Race to the Top, as well as the differential treatment of zone and non-zone
teachers during the Race to the Top grant. Each of the three research questions and its
corresponding reflexive code were discussed in a sequential order in the following section.
Limitations and implications for future research are provided at the end of this chapter.
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System Leaders During RttT
Findings for research question one demonstrate that HSTA played a key role in
developing and writing Hawaii’s RttT grant application. Hawaii is a small, centralized state with
limited access to education decision making (Benham & Heck, 1994). In a state such as Hawaii,
it was unusual for HSTA to be included in educational policy making. However, HSTA
participated as an educational system leader during Hawaii’s RttT application and initial grant
implementation. For example, HSTA was involved in shaping the big ideas in the grant and was
part of Hawaii’s RttT application team that traveled to Washington DC to bid for Phase 2 of RttT
grant funding.
When investigating the first research question regarding HSTA’s role in the RttT grant,
three dominant themes emerged from the interviews and document collection data. Firstly, as
RttT guidelines required that the union would be included, HSTA was invited to be part of Race
to the Top. Additional top tier educational policy and decision makers, such as the Hawaii
Business Round Table and the Workforce Development Council, also provided support for the
RttT grant applications. Secondly, the union viewed RttT as a chance rejuvenate education in
Hawaii. Thirdly, interview respondents noted understanding of RttT components was weak
among all stakeholders and communication of Hawaii’s RttT goals and objectives needed
considerable improvement.
Insider status.
One-third of respondents described a “seat at the insiders table” as a critical part of
HSTA’s involvement in RttT. While only five out of fifteen respondents mentioned access to
educational decision making as key for HSTA, the fact that so few of the interviewees identified
access to policy making as a theme was notable. The small number of responses could be
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evidence of limited citizen participation and restricted access to power in Hawaii. Historically,
Hawaii was run by a monarchy, followed by an oligarchy, and the vestiges of both groups still
have a strong influence on policy making in Hawaii (Benham & Heck, 1994; Cooper & Daws,
1985; Puette, 2008). For instance, members of the Hawaii Business Roundtable serve on and
chair the Hawaii Board of Education. Key business leaders have more access to educational
policy making than either the teachers union or educators in Hawaii (Benham & Heck, 1994;
Marshall et al., 1986). Added to Hawaii’s centralization of power, citizen participation in
Hawaii has been quite low for decades (Benham & Heck, 1994; Meller, 1992). Due to these
factors, HSTA did not traditionally have insider access to educational policy or decision making.
Invited to participate in shaping the RttT grant, for a short time HSTA gained access to
educational decision making in Hawaii.
Education reform.
Interview data from nearly all of the respondents provided clear evidence that RttT was
viewed as a vehicle to reform education in the Hawaii DOE. Fourteen out of fifteen respondents
cited RttT was a chance to rejuvenate education in Hawaii’s public schools. Data gathered for
this study indicated that the union believed Hawaii’s RttT application was an opportunity to
overhaul education in Hawaii. Teachers, policy makers, and policy implementers all concurred
that Hawaii’s RttT application was an ambitious plan to reform public education in Hawaii.
Hawaii has a single, statewide, public education system, one board of education, and one
teachers’ union. Due to the State of Hawaii’s educational composition as compared to those of
other grant applicant states, structural reform in Hawaii should have been easier to get off the
ground.
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Lack of communication and understanding.
Despite this structural advantage, thirteen out of fifteen respondents noted there was an
overall lack of communication and poor understanding of RttT goals among educators at all
levels. Respondents expressed that the Hawaii DOE did not provide a clear picture of how RttT
components interfaced. Respondents also divulged that they felt the Hawaii DOE did not help
educators to understand Hawaii’s RttT master plan. The union disclosed the Hawaii DOE had a
myopic approach to teacher evaluations. For example, the union reported the Hawaii DOE used
only Charlotte Danielson’s Framework for Teaching with which to build the Educator
Effectiveness System and was not interested in alternate research provided via live meetings with
Linda Darling-Hammond. The Hawaii DOE respondents observed that only seven individuals
were assigned to RttT deliverables, and the grant was essentially short staffed until Hawaii was
placed on high-risk status. At that point, the Hawaii DOE hired additional personnel and
contracted mainland companies to expedite grant requirements.
In summary, findings for the first research question reflect that the union was initially an
active, willing participant in Hawaii’s RttT grant. Although the union and the employer did not
have a signed contract during the grant application, the union did present a proposed six-year
contract to HSTA rank and file members. The proposed contract included pay for performance
agreements as outlined in the Educator Effectiveness System. The proposed six-year contract
was intended to secure union endorsement of Hawaii’s RttT grant. During the RttT grant
application and initial implementation, HSTA acted as a reformed union.
Teachers’ Pay for Performance
Findings for research question two show that in the beginning of Hawaii’s RttT grant
implementation, HSTA initially functioned under reform unionism and worked closely with the
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Hawaii DOE to ensure a smooth launch of Hawaii’s RttT grant. Respondents noted HSTA was
particularly interested in professional development for teachers and wished to ensure that the
Hawaii DOE provided the promised support for teachers and administrators during the life of the
RttT grant. As a reformed union, HSTA signed off on Hawaii’s RttT grant, which included the
Educator Effectiveness System. The Educator Effectiveness System was a method of paying
teachers based on an overall performance score, which included criteria to base teacher pay on
students’ standardized test scores and administrator evaluations. For the first time in HSTA
history, teachers rejected the union endorsed Hawaii BOE approved contract (Eagle, 2012;
Poythress, 2012; Strauss, 2012). The rejected contract meant that Hawaii’s RttT did not have a
signed contract which would have delineated specific teacher pay for performance mandates. As
a result of the rejected contract and minimal grant fund expenditures by the Hawaii DOE, the
Federal Government placed Hawaii on high-risk status.
After grant implementation, the union backed away from full support of RttT.
Respondents cited mitigating factors such as limited professional development plans and a
perception that the Hawaii DOE could not handle implementation. Whether the Hawaii DOE’s
offer to HSTA to participate in RttT education reform was genuine or merely compliance driven,
a few months after implementation, HSTA and the Hawaii DOE were engaged in ZSI
supplemental contract negotiations. HSTA had shifted away from acting under reform unionism
and working with the employer to that of a traditional union.
HSTA conducted union tasks.
Unions work to ensure the employer abides by the contract, as specified in the joint
collective bargaining agreement (Brunner & Squires, 2013; Casey, 2012; Moe, 2011; Strunk &
Grissom, 2010). Interview data demonstrated that after HSTA felt that the Hawaii DOE could
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not deliver grant reforms as pledged, HSTA operated as a traditional union until the end of
Hawaii’s RttT grant in 2014. Interview data further revealed that 100% of interview respondents
cited examples of HSTA conducting union tasks during RttT implementation. For example,
HSTA communicated with rank and file members, enforced the collective bargaining agreement,
and supported teachers who received poor Educator Effectiveness Ratings. The Educator
Effectiveness System was presented by the Hawaii DOE as a method through which teachers
with a top rating could earn a higher salary. Hawaii teacher salaries are low when cost of living
is included in wage calculations (Villarreal et al., 2014). However, at the time RttT was
implemented, the union and the employer did not have a contract. Exacerbating the wage issue
while alleviating the high-risk status problems, then Governor Abercrombie imposed a contract
on Hawaii educators which further reduced teacher salaries.
Even though then-Governor Abercrombie’s imposed contract may have protected
Hawaii’s RttT grant after it was placed on high-risk status, the imposed contract did not outline
how extended pay in the ZSI would work. Complicating the matter, the statewide Educator
Effectiveness System, under which exceptional teachers could potentially earn more money, was
extremely difficult to understand. Yet in order to meet grant mandates, the Hawaii DOE and
HSTA had to reach an agreement regarding teacher pay in the Zones of School Improvement and
had to abide by the Educator Effectiveness System. The ZSI Supplemental Contract negotiations
enabled the union to leverage its bargaining position, buy time, and function as a traditional
union. In response, the Hawaii DOE consulted attorneys and held numerous negotiation
sessions. Known as the “Extended Pay for Extended Day” ZSI Supplemental Contract, the
agreement covered a one-year time period from 2012 to 2013 and applied only to HSTA rank
and file members working in the Zones of School Innovation. Zone teachers were required to
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teach students for one additional hour during extended learning time and were paid by the
employer as twelve-month employees under the ZSI contract. The Educator Effectiveness
System, on the other hand, applied to all HSTA members, both in and out of the zone. The
Educator Effectiveness System included educators that had direct contact with students as well
as those that did not work directly with pupils. Interview data show that administrators had a
difficult time managing the Educator Effectiveness System (EES) and a joint HSTA and Hawaii
DOE survey revealed that teachers were confused by EES (HSTA, 2014; Kalani, 2014; Ward
Research, 2014). Document analysis revealed that the Hawaii DOE revised EES multiple times
during the RttT years. While ambitious, interview data established that respondents noted EES
was cumbersome to implement and research revealed the majority of teachers received
satisfactory ratings (Kalani, 2015c). Throughout the RttT grant, interview data reflected the
union worked to support teachers, enforce the collective bargaining agreement, and ensure
teachers were protected yet compliant with RttT plans and programs.
Stakeholders complied with RttT.
Fourteen of the interview respondents stated educators from all areas complied with RttT
mandates. The Hawaii DOE complied with HSTA requests to train teachers multiple times to
help ensure that teachers understood what was expected of them. Interview data revealed that
HSTA continually communicated with rank and file members regarding teachers’ understanding
of the rating system embedded in the Educator Effectiveness System, possibly to enable teacher
compliance with EES. Interview respondents also shared that once Hawaii was placed on high-
risk status, all stakeholders at all levels worked to meet grant deliverables. After negotiating the
ZSI Supplemental Contract, HSTA officials and Hawaii DOE officers visited the Zones of
School Improvement more frequently than other areas, likely to ensure compliance with RttT
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mandates in zone schools. Zone interview data signaled that zone administrators were in
constant communication with the Hawaii DOE state level RttT personnel to monitor
implementation compliance issues.
Although extended learning time (ELT) was a challenging component of RttT per ZSI
interviews, ZSI educators held extended learning time from 2012 to 2013. Interview data
revealed the Hawaii DOE seemed rushed to implement (ELT) and zone high schools had a
particularly difficult time with ELT. For instance, the first phase of ELT did not include any
planning time for teachers yet after repeated requests by the union and the school administrators,
the Hawaii DOE added ELT planning time. However, zone high schools that had selected credit
recovery as part of ELT were unable to decrease ELT time in order to access planning time. In
other words, the Hawaii DOE failed to initially include teacher planning time when designing
ZSI ELT for zone students in grades 9-12. Interview data reflect that some zone schools worked
to maintain extended learning time from 2013 to 2014, but were less successful without
additional teacher pay or required student attendance. Also challenging, zone and non-zone
administrators worked to abide by the frequency of teacher observations as part of the Educator
Effectiveness System but reported it was difficult. Interview data indicated that the details of
RttT component implementation appeared to be outside the scope of the Hawaii DOE.
RttT lacked a system of support.
Notably, many respondents concurred that the Hawaii DOE lacked the ability to
successfully implement its RttT plan. Additionally, prior to high-risk status, interview
respondents disclosed that the Hawaii DOE had allocated only seven positions to handle grant
deliverables. Document collection analysis revealed that simultaneously the imposed contract
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reduced benefits and pay for rank and file members. Chronologically, the imposed contract
followed years of furloughs and canceled professional development for public school educators.
At a time when teachers, administrators, and the union, were ready for education reform,
the Hawaii DOE was able to successfully secure grant funding in Phase 2 of RttT. Nonetheless,
interview data show thirteen out of fifteen respondents believed Hawaii’s RttT grant lacked a
comprehensive system of support. HSTA stated they had signed on to the RttT grant specifically
to support teachers (USDOE, 2010b). Document analysis revealed that the Hawaii Business
Round Table and the Hawaii Legislature were in full support of the Hawaii’s RttT grant. Despite
these positive factors, interview respondents expressed that the Hawaii DOE was unable to meet
grant deliverables and failed to jumpstart education reform in Hawaii via RttT plans and
programs.
In summary, findings for the second research question reflect that during implementation
the union was compliance driven and worked to mitigate unpopular educational policies such as
the Educator Effectiveness System. The union used contract negotiations, the existing collective
bargaining agreement, the legal system through the Hawaii Labor Relations Board, and frequent
communication with teachers to assert its position as a traditional union working for rank and file
members. The RttT grant implementation brought about a radical shift for HSTA away from
reform unionism to traditional unionism. The Hawaii DOE struggled to remove itself from high-
risk status and continually revised unwieldy RttT mandates in part by reducing the overall
number of required administrator conducted teacher observations and by eliminating the Tripod
Survey from the Educator Effectiveness System altogether. Findings for research question three
were less conclusive.
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RttT Reform Strategies
Findings for research question three show that the impact of differential treatment of ZSI
schools in the teacher contract, union relationships with the DOE, and the implementation of
RttT reforms statewide, both in and out of the zone, were mixed. Simply put, interview data
gathered for research question three varied widely. While document collection provided some
clarity, stakeholder perspectives of events, timelines, and resources were disparate.
Hawaii’s RttT application outlined that Hawaii would use two Zones of School
Innovation in order to address RttT grant requirements that states turn around the lowest schools.
The zones were to be placed in the poorest, worst performing schools in the same geographic
areas. Hawaii’s ZSI schools were designated to pilot all of Hawaii’s RttT grant mandates prior
to a second, broader wave of implementation, followed by full adoption of RttT reforms
statewide. In order to have a full agreement between the union and the employer concerning the
RttT reforms, zone educators were covered by a supplemental contract. Research question three
addressed the differential treatment of zone and non-zone educators and the impact that had on
the contract, the union, and RttT reforms. While findings were inconclusive, communication
was a constant challenge throughout RttT. A lack of clear communication regarding RttT plans
and programs was a dominant theme in each interview and may have contributed to the divergent
responses to research question three.
Differential treatment.
Only six out of fifteen respondents commented on the differential treatment of educators
during Hawaii’s RttT. Surprisingly, teacher respondents either in or out of the zone did not
comment on differential treatment as a theme. Zone teachers did talk about extended learning
time (ELT) but did not reflect on the fact that non-zone teachers were not mandated or paid to
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implement ELT. All of the non-zone policy implementers erroneously believed zone schools
received additional, non-discretionary, RttT funds and conveyed frustration regarding this issue.
Some of the policy maker respondents and most of the policy implementers commented on
issues related to differential treatment, such as resources and funding, but just over one-third
directly addressed the topic of differential treatment. A few respondents felt zone schools
carried the brunt of the reforms while other respondents believed it was helpful to have extra
time as a pilot school. ZSI responses for ELT were split and seemed dependent upon the
structure of the school. While additional pay for zone educators was covered by the ZSI
Supplemental Contract, the ZSI contract was only in place from 2012 to 2013. During this time,
all educators were covered under the same collective bargaining agreement while ZSI educators
also had an additional contract.
Document analysis revealed that the union negotiated the ZSI Supplemental Contract
prior to negotiating the statewide collective bargaining agreement, which was in place from July
1, 2013, to June 30, 2017. The supplemental contract may have been negotiated first due to the
stalled Hawaii Labor Relations Board (HLRB) ruling on the imposed contract. While both of the
contracts and the HLRB issue were continually in the news, only a few of the interview
respondents referred to contract issues. The majority of respondents discussed the impact of the
Educator Effectiveness System, which was a state-wide reform. By the end of Hawaii’s RttT,
public school educators in and out of the Zones of School Innovation had undergone years of pay
scale adjustments and education reforms.
Teacher feelings.
Eleven out of fifteen interview respondents commented on teacher feelings regarding
Hawaii’s RttT. Some respondents believed teachers felt attacked, others noted teachers were
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fearful, while others believed teachers welcomed RttT reforms and the opportunity to excel.
Administrators seemed to feel that excellent teachers were invigorated by the EES system which
included observations of teachers by administrators, collecting data to meet student learning
objective targets, and documentation of teacher reflections in an electronic database. Other
stakeholders focused on how teachers rated “unsatisfactory” or “marginal” felt, and some
respondents observed that those teachers needed to feel supported as they worked to improve
their rating.
Teacher respondents often combined their feelings about RttT with opinions about the
union. Some policy implementers commented about how they perceived teachers felt regarding
the union. Policy maker respondents did not comment on teacher feelings even when asked. All
respondents reported that educators from every level were cooperative and compliant with RttT
plans and programs. Many respondents were critical of the sustainability of the grant post-RttT
funding.
Sustainability of RttT reforms.
Ten out of fifteen interview respondents commented on the lack of sustainability of RttT
reforms. The Federal RttT grant required applicant states to address how they would maintain
grant reforms post-RttT. Hawaii was unsuccessful in its first attempt to secure RttT funding in
Phase 1 Applications, partly due to the State’s failure to clearly articulate post-grant
sustainability plans (USDOE, 2010a).
Interview respondents shared the system of support for teachers and administrators was
weak before and during Hawaii’s RttT, and support continued to be lacking post RttT funding.
Specifically, respondents disclosed there appeared to be no pathway with which to maintain RttT
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plans and programs statewide post RttT. Following is a brief synopsis of post grant
sustainability in regards to the five assurances per interview and document collection data.
Interview and document collection data show that Hawaii continued to use the Common
Core State Standards curriculum materials during SY 2015-2016 and SY 2016-2017 as
purchased during RttT years. Interview data demonstrated that during SY 2016-2017 and SY
2017-2018, schools could apply for a waiver if they wished to deviate from the first assurance of
a standards-based curriculum. Each waiver needed to outline how the replacement curriculum
would address similar, standard based targets and approval or denial of the waiver was to be
decided by each Complex Area Superintendent. In regard to standardized testing, as of SY 2015
– 2016, Hawaii continued to use the Smarter Balanced Assessment (SBA) and published SBA
state results from implementation in SY 2014 through SY 2016, with additional grade level
results added for SY 2015-2016.
The second assurance, monitoring the educational system, also continued but to what
degree was inconclusive. Interview data revealed that post-RttT Hawaii continued to use internal
rubrics to monitor its educational system. Per interview respondents, rubric data was used
internally both during and after RttT.
The third assurance required States to use data system wide. In response to the RttT
mandate that states create a statewide electronic data collection system, the Hawaii DOE created
the Longitudinal Data System. The Hawaii DOE continued to use the Longitudinal Data System
post-RttT. Parts of the data system remain available to the public, dependent upon compliance
with the Family Educational and Privacy Act stipulations.
The fourth assurance dealt with educator retention issues and asked recipient states to
increase teacher and administrator retention. Interview respondents reported some district
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complexes continued to specifically focus on recruiting and retaining teachers and leaders post-
RttT, but that statewide the teacher leader academy launched late and ended with RttT. During
the question and answer segment for Hawaii’s Phase 2 application, federal RttT panel members
expressed concerns regarding Hawaii’s plans for alternate certification. Likewise, interview data
revealed respondents were confused about many of the alternate certification programs. Some
respondents thought the alternate certification had ended after the first year while others had no
knowledge of the program.
Lastly, the fifth assurance to turn around the lowest-performing schools, which Hawaii
addressed with the Zones for School Innovation, officially ended with Hawaii’s RttT grant,
although a few ZSI school websites cited RttT as part of their history and appeared to have
maintained a few RttT reforms, such as standards-based curriculum.
In summary, findings for the third research question indicated that different stakeholders
had divergent perspectives and responses. Results were so varied as to be inconclusive. Fewer
than half of interview respondents commented on differential treatment as a theme. Just over
two-thirds of interview respondents addressed teacher feelings regarding RttT, but responses
ranged from positive, to neutral, to negative. Document collection clearly demonstrated that
some RttT reforms remained post-RttT funding yet interview respondents had a difficult time
citing specific instances of RttT sustainability. While responses for research questions one and
two were somewhat homogenous, responses for research question three were strikingly
disparate. Following are the limitations of the study and recommendations for future research.
Limitations
A potentially significant limitation to the study was that the researcher was a member of
HSTA and stakeholders may not have felt comfortable talking about RttT with a rank and file
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141
HSTA member. This may have created a situation in which some stakeholders were unwilling to
be interviewed. While the requested target stakeholder would have been the best match based on
their role and position during RttT years, many teachers and some lawmakers either did not
respond to interview requests or initially agreed to do interviews but later were uncommunicative
when it was time to schedule the interview. Therefore, after repeated attempts were made to
reach an interviewee, different respondents were contacted to replace the initial target
stakeholders. While the replacement stakeholders were a good match, some were slightly
removed from the ideal position, location, or time frame.
Another limitation regarding a few of the stakeholders was in regards to those who
currently hold positions of authority may not have held those positions during the RttT grant.
Interviewing those few stakeholders who had changed role groups was difficult as they
responded to questions based on their previous, more limited roles during RttT. Both of these
limitations may have contributed to inconclusive data for research question three but did not
significantly impact data reliability (see Appendix C). Following are the recommendations for
future research.
Recommendations
There are three areas for future research as a result of this study. The first area for future
study is based on the limitations of the study and the role of the researcher. The second area for
future research is related to the conceptual framework, precisely relating to the existing research
on educational decision makers and access to power in the State of Hawaii. Finally, it may be
helpful to expand the existing study to include quantitative research methods in order to measure
the sustainability of specific RttT reforms.
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Firstly, it would be helpful to have a non-HSTA member conduct research on the
teachers’ union in order to address some of the limitations of the study. Despite assurances by
the researcher, respondents may have felt conflicted about granting interview requests about the
union to a union member. Assurances provided by the researcher for all stakeholders included a
certified information sheet, anonymity, and interview request protocols. It may be that teachers
in a closed shop state such as Hawaii did not feel comfortable answering questions about the
union they belong to when the questions were posed by a fellow union member. It may also be
possible that individual stakeholders had strong feelings about the union and did not want to
discuss HSTA and RttT issues. This could be addressed if a non-union member conducted
research on the union.
The other stakeholder group that proved difficult to interview was legislators. Similar to
teachers, legislators may have had strong feelings about the union and RttT, and did not wish to
be interviewed on these topics. Existing literature establishes that lawmakers often receive
campaign contributions, manpower, and endorsements from teachers’ unions nationally, as well
as in the State of Hawaii (Hartney & Flavin, 2011; Lott & Kenny, 2013; Moe, 2011). Due to
these factors, lawmakers may have been unwilling to take part in research about the teachers’
union. The limitation of an active HSTA member conducting research on the union’s role in
Hawaii’s RttT could be eliminated if a non-union member were to conduct future research.
Another recommendation for future research addressed the second limitation. A
limitation of the study was that some of the interview respondents held different positions during
RttT. For the most part, this only became an issue when the respondent had held a decreased
position of authority during RttT years. This typically meant that during RttT years they had
moved up their career ladder to a higher position of authority. This became an issue when the
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examples and rationale they shared matched those of a less informed or less positioned role
group. Respondents had a tendency to initially answer interview questions based on what they
experienced and then to apply that experience from RttT to their position at the time of the
interview. Interviewees who held the same position before, during, and after RttT had a higher
degree of congruous responses. As only two of the fifteen respondents had reduced roles during
RttT this limitation was not seen as significantly impacting the validity of the data. See
Appendix C for more information on interview respondents’ roles during RttT. A
recommendation for future research would be to include only those respondents who held the
same position during RttT years.
The second recommendation for future research is related to the conceptual framework.
The conceptual framework for the study is based on Hawaii’s unique political context and
culture and the impact that has on educational decision making. Research conducted by Benham
and Heck (1994) and Marshall et al. (1986) regarding key role groups and their historical
proximity to educational policy decision making in Hawaii informed this study. Notably, the
groups with insider status traditionally had the most access to power regarding educational
decisions in Hawaii. The Race to the Top grant included a stipulation that the union would be
included as a decision maker in Hawaii’s RttT grant application and implementation. Due to the
age of the research, a recommendation would be to conduct additional inquiries to update the
research regarding the tiers of insider status.
The third and final limitation is in regard to the inconclusive results for research question
three. Research question three explored the impact of differential treatment of ZSI schools on
the teacher contract, union relationships, and the implementation of RttT reforms across the zone
and non-zone schools. One difficulty was interview respondents struggled to identify specific
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examples of differential treatment possibly because nearly all of the RttT reforms implemented
in the ZSI as a pilot were later implemented statewide. While extended learning time (ELT) was
one of the RttT reforms that applied only to ZSI schools, interview respondents did not mention
ELT as a specific example of differential treatment. However, nearly every policy implementer
and teacher erroneously believed that the Zones of School Innovation had received large
amounts of discretionary funds at the school level. Additionally, aside from some policy makers
and a few policy implementers, it was difficult for interview respondents to identify any RttT
reforms that were sustainable post-RttT funding. Conversely, document collection established
that a significant number of statewide RttT reforms have continued post-RttT funding. As a
result of these divergent findings, a recommendation for future research would be to expand the
existing study to include quantitative research methods in order to better measure the
sustainability of specific RttT reforms.
Conclusion
There are a limited number of reports that detail RttT on a local level (Weiss, 2014). The
research provided in this study contributed to data gathered on a local level. This study sought to
examine Hawaii’s RttT grant in both Zones for School Innovation and non-zone schools. This
study also looked at how HSTA and the Hawaii DOE were able to work together to apply for and
implement Hawaii’s RttT plan. The findings of this study explored Hawaii’s pay for
performance via the Educator Effectiveness System and examined how teachers, policy makers,
and policy implementers perceived those events (Alvarez & Anderson-Ketchmark, 2011;
Kuhfeld, 2015; McNeil, 2013; Winkler et al., 2012). Additionally, this study attempted to clarify
multiple legal and contractual events and how those events impacted HSTA and the Hawaii
DOE.
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Recommendations for future research include updating research surrounding educational
policy decision making in Hawaii and addressing the inconclusive findings for the third research
question. It would be interesting to find out where different groups are positioned on the tiers of
influence and how much access to power those groups can leverage. In a small, centralized state
with limited citizen involvement, insiders may disclose more information if interacting with
quantitative research methods. In conclusion, it is possible that a quantitative research study
could reveal data that would otherwise remain unreported.

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APPENDIX A
CASE STUDY SCHOOLS
Makai School
Makai School, located in the Plumeria Complex, is a rural, elementary school that served
students in kindergarten through grade six. Plumeria Complex was designated as a Zone of
School Innovation during RttT. Makai School was a Title I school with 85% of students
qualified for free and reduced-priced lunch. Makai School, situated in Plumeria Complex,
contained a significant number of homeless families.
According to the City and County of Honolulu Point-In-Time Count 2015, sheltered
families for Plumeria Complex was documented at 44%, which was the highest out of the seven
regions listed in the report (City & County of Honolulu, 2015). Hawaii had the highest homeless
population of any state as of 2015 (Terrell, 2015). Despite the number of displaced families,
Makai School maintained a high rate of continuously enrolled students for the entire school year.
For example, during the last year of RttT, Makai School reported that 89% of students were
continuously enrolled for SY 2013 - 2014.
Not unexpectedly, education levels were lower than state averages in the Makai
community. For example, 13% of the community had not earned a high school diploma. The
state average for non-graduates was 10%. Only 45% of Makai School community members
earned a high school diploma. Twenty-nine percent of Makai community members spent some
time in college, and 12% had earned a college degree. Statewide, 29% of Hawaii’s population
completed a college degree. In other words, Makai School was part of a community with a
higher amount of non-graduates and fewer college degrees than state averages. Income levels
were also lower for Makai School residents than more affluent areas. In 2014, the median
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household income in the Makai School community was $55,000 per year, which was ten
thousand dollars below the state average.
Possibly due to the geographic location of the Plumeria Complex and the housing issues
among the student population, Makai School faced teacher retention issues. Teacher retention
was a persistent issue facing the Hawaii DOE (Wong, 2013). For example, 46.5% of Makai
teachers had five or more years of teaching experience from 2011 through 2014. In the last year
of RttT, 44% of Makai School educators had five or more years of experience, which was a
slight decrease from prior years. During the fourth year of RttT, Makai educators had an average
of 7.5 years of teaching experience, which was also a slight decline from previous years. From
2011 to 2014, more than half of Makai educators were in their initial years of teaching and
teacher turnover was steady.
According to School Quality Survey results, 61% of Makai teachers were satisfied with
the overall quality of Makai School during the final year of RttT. One hundred percent of Makai
School teachers completed the School Quality Survey. In 2013 – 2014, Makai School educators
had a 72% positive response rate on SQS items. In the same time period, over 97% of the
teachers at Makai School were fully licensed and two percent were emergency hires.
Additionally, 29% of Makai School educators held advanced degrees.

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Table 5
Makai School: Teacher Data during RttT
School
5+ Years of
Experience
Teachers
Holding
Advanced
Degrees
Teacher
Satisfaction
with Makai
School
Fully
Licensed
Teachers
Emergency
Hire
Teachers
Average
Teacher
Years of
Experience
Makai 44% 29% 61% 97.9% 2.1% 7.5 years
Source: HIDOE (n.d.-b)

As part of Hawaii’s RttT requirements, the Hawaii DOE transitioned from the Hawaii
State Assessment (HSA) to the Common Core Smarter Balanced Assessment. Smarter Balanced
Assessments were not at full implementation by the final year of Hawaii’s RttT. Due to this
situation, in RttT year four, SY 2013 – 2014, the Hawaii DOE used a Hawaii State Assessment
Bridge Test that included standard based questions (HIDOE, n.d.-b). The Hawaii State
Assessment Bridge Test results for Makai School show that Makai Elementary students in grade
five scored at a 47% proficiency rate for math and at a 54% proficiency rate for reading. Makai
School met the 95% target for participation with 100% of students taking the standards-based
test.
In terms of overall student behavior throughout the school year, Makai School data
reflect an average suspension rate of 1% during the four years of RttT. According to SQS
results, over 87% of students reported they enjoyed attending school. In 2013 – 2014, Makai
School students had an 84% positive response rate on SQS items. No students were retained at
Makai School during RttT years.

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Table 6
Makai School: Student Data during RttT Year Four
School
Title
I
Continuous
Student
Enrollment
Grade 5 Math
Proficiency
Grade 5
Reading
Proficiency
Suspension
Rate
Retention
Rate
Makai 85% 89% 47% 54% 1% 0%
Source: HIDOE (n.d.-b)

Moana School
The second case study school, Moana School, was also located in Plumeria Complex.
Like Makai School, Moana School was in a Zone of School Innovation and is a rural,
kindergarten through grade six school. The student population at Moana School was almost 30%
larger than Makai School. Almost three-quarters of Moana students were eligible for Title I
services. As a school in Plumeria Complex, Moana School also serviced a significant number of
sheltered homeless families. Despite this challenge, published data indicate that during RttT
years, Moana School had between a 92% to a 95% rate of continuous student enrollment for each
school year.
Moana School community education levels were not on par with state averages. Thirteen
percent of the community did not graduate from high school, which was 3% higher than the rest
of the state. Forty-five percent of community members earned a high school diploma. Twenty-
nine percent of Moana residents spent some time in college, which was 2% below the state
average. Twelve percent of Moana School community members had a college degree, which
was 17% below the state average. Median household income for Moana School community
members was $55,000 in 2014, which was ten thousand dollars less than the state average.
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Although Moana School was in a hard to staff area, conceivably due to its rural location
and the high number of homeless families, Moana School had a better teacher retention rate than
Makai School. For instance, in the fourth year of RttT, Moana School educators had 10 average
years of experience, which was 25% higher than Makai School. Likewise, in the last year of
RttT, 57% of Moana School educators had over five years of teaching experience as compared to
44% at Makai School. However, merely 20% of Moana School educators held advanced degrees
which was 9% fewer than Makai School educators.
Remarkably, Student Quality Survey (SQS) results show that 95% of teachers at Moana
School reported they were satisfied with teaching at Moana School. In 2013 – 2014, Moana
School educators had a 95% positive response rate on SQS items. The SQS teacher surveys at
Moana School had a 100% return rate. Moreover, 93% of teachers at Moana School were fully
licensed and 7% of teachers were emergency hires in the final year of RttT.

Table 7
Moana School: Teacher Data during RttT
School
5+ Years of
Experience
Teachers
Holding
Advanced
Degrees
Teacher
Satisfaction
with Moana
School
Fully
Licensed
Teachers
Emergency
Hire
Teachers
Average
Teacher
Years of
Experience
Moana 57% 20% 95% 93% 7% 10 years
Source: HIDOE (n.d.-b)

The Hawaii State Assessment Bridge Test results reflect that during the final year of
RttT, Moana Elementary grade five students scored at a 50% proficiency rating for math and at a
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56% proficiency rating for reading. Moana School met the HSA Bridge participation rate of
95%, with 100% of Moana students taking the test.
Student behavior at Moana School was reported at a 1% average suspension rate during
the four years of RttT. Per the School Quality Survey administered in SY 13 - 14, 88% of
students at Moana School reported they enjoyed attending school. In 2013 – 2014, Moana
School students had an 84% positive response rate on SQS items. No students were retained at
Moana School during RttT years.

Table 8
Moana School: Student Data during RttT Year Four
School Title I
Continuous
Student
Enrollment
Grade 5 Math
Proficiency
Grade 5
Reading
Proficiency
Suspension
Rate
Retention
Rate
Moana 74% 95% 50% 56% 1% 0%
Source: HIDOE (n.d.-b)

Akau School
The third case study school, Akau School, is a rural school that contained kindergarten
through grade six. The school’s student population was the smallest of the case study schools.
Akau School reported a student population of 235 students in the final year of RttT. Akau
School was located in the Hibiscus Complex, which was a non-zone area. Akau School qualified
as a Title I school because 86% of students were eligible for free and reduced-priced lunch
services. During RttT years, Akau School data indicate the school maintained yearly continuous
student enrollment at a rate fluctuating between 89% and 95%.
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Akau School community education levels fluctuated above and below the state averages.
Twenty-eight percent of Akau residents spent some time in college, which was 3% below the
state average. Thirty-five percent of Akau School community members had a college degree,
which was 6% above the state average. Only 7% of the community did not graduate from high
school, which was 3% better than the state average. Statewide, 10% of Hawaii residents were
non-high school graduates. Thirty percent of community members earned a high school
diploma. In 2014, the Akau School community had a median household income of $92,000,
which was twenty-six thousand dollars above the state average.
Akau School did not have high teacher turnover. The average years of experience for
teachers at Akau School was 14 years. Seventy-one percent of Akau School educators had over
five years of teaching experience and 29% held advanced degrees.
School Quality Survey (SQS) data demonstrate that 90% of Akau School educators felt
satisfied with teaching at Akau School. In 2013 – 2014, Akau School educators had an 86%
positive response rate on SQS items. The SQS teacher surveys at Akau School had a 93% return
rate. Additionally, 100% of teachers at Akau School were fully licensed and no teachers were in
the emergency hire category in the last year of RttT.

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Table 9
Akau School: Teacher Data during RttT
School
5+ Years of
Experience
Teachers
Holding
Advanced
Degrees
Teacher
Satisfaction
with Akau
School
Fully
Licensed
Teachers
Emergency
Hire
Teachers
Average
Teacher
Years of
Experience
Akau 71% 29% 90% 100% 0% 14 years
Source: HIDOE (n.d.-b)

Akau School data reported TerraNova Assessment scores for SY 2010 – 2011. Akau
School grade five students scored at a rate of 83% proficiency in math and 76% proficiency in
reading in TerraNova. Akau School did not report TerraNova Assessment scores after 2011.
The HSA Bridge Test results from the last year of RttT reflect that Akau Elementary students
scored at a 53% proficiency rate for math and at a 39% proficiency rate for reading for fifth
grade. Akau School met the HSA Bridge participation rate of 95%. In fact, 100% of Akau
students participated in the standards-based test in SY 2013 – 2014.
Student behavior at Akau School was relatively uneventful for the first three years of
RttT. For instance, in the first two years of RttT, Akau School suspension rates were 2% per
year. In SY 2012 – 2013, the suspension rate for Akau School dropped to 1% for the year.
However, in year four of RttT, the suspension rate was reported at 6% for SY 2013 – 2014. Per
the SQS, 81% of students at Akau School reported they enjoyed attending school. In 2013 –
2014, Akau School students had an 84% positive response rate on SQS items. Akau School had
a 1% retention rate for two RttT years and a 0% retention rate for the opposite RttT years.

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Table 10
Akau School: Student Data during RttT Year Four
School Title I
Continuous
Student
Enrollment
Grade 5 Math
Proficiency
Grade 5
Reading
Proficiency
Suspension
Rate
Retention
Rate
Akau 86% 94% 53% 39% 6% 1%
Source: HIDOE (n.d.-b)

Hema School
The fourth case study school, Hema School, is also a rural Title I school that included
students in kindergarten through sixth grade. In the final year of RttT, Hema School reported a
student population of 536 students with 86% of students eligible for Title I services. Located in
the non-zone Hibiscus Complex, Hema School had a yearly continuous student enrollment rate
between 91% and 93% during RttT years.
Like Akau School, Hema School community education levels were above and below
state averages. Seven percent of the community did not graduate from high school, which was
3% better than the state average. Thirty percent of community members earned a high school
diploma. Twenty-eight percent spent some time in college, which was 3% below the state
average. Thirty-five percent of Hema School community members had a college degree, which
was 6% above the state average. The Hema School community had a median household income
of $92,000 in 2014, which was twenty-six thousand dollars above the state average.
Identical to Akau School, the average years of experience for teachers at Hema School
was 14 years. Sixty-one percent of Hema School educators had over five years of teaching
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experience. This was 10% lower than Akau School. Twenty-eight percent of teachers at Hema
School held advanced degrees.
In 2013 – 2014, Hema School teachers had an 87% positive response rate on SQS items.
School Quality Survey (SQS) data indicate that 93% of Hema School educators felt satisfied
with teaching at Hema School. The SQS teacher surveys at Hema School had a 100% return
rate. Additionally, 100% of teachers at Hema School were fully licensed and no teachers were in
the emergency hired category in the last year of RttT.

Table 11
Hema School: Teacher Data during RttT
School
5+ Years of
Experience
Teachers
Holding
Advanced
Degrees
Teacher
Satisfaction
with Hema
School
Fully
Licensed
Teachers
Emergency
Hire
Teachers
Average
Teacher
Years of
Experience
Hema 61% 28% 93% 100% 0% 14 years
Source: HIDOE (n.d.-b)

Hema School data reported TerraNova Assessment scores for SY 2010 – 2011. Hema
School grade five students scored at a rate of 95% proficiency in math and 82% proficiency in
reading for TerraNova. Hema School did not report TerraNova Assessment scores after 2011.
The HSA Bridge Test results demonstrate that during the last year of RttT, Hema Elementary
School grade five students scored at a 36% proficiency rate for math and at a 41% proficiency
rate for reading. Hema School met the HSA Bridge participation rate of 95%, with 100% of
Hema students taking the test.
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Student behavior data at Hema School show a six percent suspension rate in the final year
of RttT. Per the SQS, 88% of students at Hema School reported they enjoyed attending school.
In 2013 – 2014, Hema School students had a 78% positive response rate on SQS items. Hema
School reflected a 1% retention rate for the first two years of RttT and a 0% retention rate for the
last two years of RttT.

Table 12
Hema School: Student Data during RttT Year Four
School Title I
Continuous
Student
Enrollment
Grade 5 Math
Proficiency
Grade 5
Reading
Proficiency
Suspension
Rate
Retention
Rate
Hema 84% 91% 36% 41% 6% 0%
Source: HIDOE (n.d.-b)

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APPENDIX B
LIST OF DOCUMENTS GATHERED FROM THE HAWAII DOE AND CASE STUDY
SCHOOLS
1. Academic and Financial Plan
2. School Calendar
3. SSIR (School Status and Improvement Report)
4. SQS (School Quality Survey Report)
5. Trend Report: Educational and Fiscal Accountability School Report
6. ZSI RTTT Proposal: Plumeria Complex

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APPENDIX C
ROLE GROUP POSITION DURING RTTT YEARS AND IMPACT ON RELIABILITY

Role Group Static during RttT? Description of Change Impact on Reliability
Policy Maker 1 Yes
Policy Maker 2 Yes
Policy Maker 3 Yes
Policy Maker 4 Yes
Policy Implementer 1 Yes
Policy Implementer 2 No Increase None
Policy Implementer 3 No Lateral None
Policy Implementer 4 Yes
Policy Implementer 5 No Decrease Possible
Policy Implementer 6 No Increase None
Policy Implementer 7 No Decrease Possible
Teacher 1 Yes
Teacher 2 Yes
Teacher 3 Yes
Teacher 4 Yes
Source: Interview Data

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APPENDIX D
TEACHER INTERVIEW DATA COLLECTION PROTOCOL
Introduction
Thank you for agreeing to participate in my study. I appreciate the time that you have set
aside to answer my questions. Before we get started, I want to provide you with an overview of
my study and answer any questions you might have about participating. I am currently enrolled
in the University of Southern California (USC) and I am working on my dissertation. The
primary purpose of this study is to understand the role of HSTA and the contract the union had
with the State of Hawaii during Hawaii’s RttT grant. This study will attempt to examine how
HSTA’s role impacted the RttT grant. This study could benefit education reform by lending
insight into how the HSTA and the Hawaii DOE worked together to implement the RttT grant. I
am interviewing multiple educators, teachers, principals, union officials and lawmakers to learn
more about this.
I want to assure you that I am strictly wearing the hat of researcher today. What this
means is that the nature of my questions are not evaluative. I will not be making any judgments
on how you are performing as an educator. All data collection will be anonymous and I will use
pseudonyms in my report so that no schools or sites are identifiable.
I would like to go over the informed consent document at this time. I will be recording
our conversation on a phone app recorder if you agree. I will only be using the recording to
make sure I capture your words and not my interpretation of your words. If don’t feel
comfortable with recording the interview I will take notes by hand. Do I have your permission to
audio record the interview? I would also like to have the recording transcribed by a professional
transcription service. If you don’t feel comfortable with a professional service I will transcribe
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the interview by hand. All audio recordings will be destroyed once transcribed. Do I have your
permission to use a professional transcription service? I would like to have your permission to
begin the interview.
Interview Questions
1. How were you involved in RttT?
2. What was implemented at your school as a result of RttT?
3. What role did teachers play in implementing these programs?
4. What was HSTA’s position regarding RttT at the beginning of Race (2009)?
5. How did HSTA interact with the school during implementation of RttT?
6. Were there any activities that HSTA enacted at the school level during RttT?
7. What was HSTA’s position regarding RttT in the middle of Race (2010-2014)?
8. How was the contract used?
9. In the ZSI, what happened to RttT reforms when Race funding ended?
10. (Non-ZSI) how did you implement Race reforms without the RttT ZSI funds?
11. What was HSTA’s position about RttT when it Race ended (2015)?
Closing
Thank you so much for you sharing your thoughts with me today! I really appreciate
your time and willingness to share. Everything that you have shared is very helpful for this
study. If I find myself with a follow-up question, may I contact you, and if so, if email is ok?
Again, thank you for participating in this study.

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187
APPENDIX E
POLICY MAKER INTERVIEW DATA COLLECTION PROTOCOL
Introduction
Thank you for agreeing to participate in my study. I appreciate the time that you have set
aside to answer my questions. Before we get started, I want to provide you with an overview of
my study and answer any questions you might have about participating. I am currently enrolled
in the University of Southern California (USC) and I am working on my dissertation. The
primary purpose of this study is to understand the role of HSTA and the contract the union had
with the State of Hawaii during Hawaii’s RttT grant. This study will attempt to examine how
HSTA’s role impacted the RttT grant. This study could benefit education reform by lending
insight into how the HSTA and the Hawaii DOE worked together to implement the RttT grant. I
am interviewing multiple educators, teachers, principals, union officials and lawmakers to learn
more about this.
I want to assure you that I am strictly wearing the hat of researcher today. What this
means is that the nature of my questions are not evaluative. I will not be making any judgments
on how you are performing in your role group. All data collection will be anonymous and I will
use pseudonyms in my report so that no schools or sites are identifiable.
I would like to go over the informed consent document at this time. I will be recording
our conversation on a phone app recorder if you agree. I will only be using the recording to
make sure I capture your words and not my interpretation of your words. If don’t feel
comfortable with recording the interview I will take notes by hand. Do I have your permission to
audio record the interview? I would also like to have the recording transcribed by a professional
transcription service. If you don’t feel comfortable with a professional service I will transcribe
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188
the interview by hand. All audio recordings will be destroyed once transcribed. Do I have your
permission to use a professional transcription service? I would like to have your permission to
begin the interview.
Interview Questions
1. Could you tell me about your position in 2009?
2. Could you tell me what you know about the RttT grant application process?
3. Could you tell me your role (how were you involved) in RttT?
4. Do you know if there were any areas of the grant that were easy to complete?
5. There were many news reports of difficulty with the application, what was your view
of the conflict?
6. What do you feel caused this?
7. Have you ever been involved in resolving a conflict between the union and the
employer?
8. To the best of your knowledge, how were the union and the employer able to reach an
agreement?
9. What advice would you give if another application for an incentive grant is proposed?
10. How did HSTA interact with the school during implementation of RttT (2010-2014)?
11. How did HSTA interact with your organization during the implementation of RttT?
12. What role did teachers play in implanting the RttT grant?
13. What role did your stakeholder group play implementing the RttT grant?
14. Could you tell me about how the ZSI impacted union relationships with the DOE?
15. During implementation of RttT, how was the HSTA / DOE contract used?
16. How do you think HSTA viewed RttT before, during, and after the grant (2009)?
HSTA’S ROLE IN THE RACE TO THE TOP GRANT

189
17. How do you think HSTA viewed RttT during the grant (2010-2014)?
18. How do you think HSTA viewed RttT after the grant (2015 to present)?
19. During implementation of RttT, how was the HSTA/DOE contract used?
20. Is there anything else you would like to share?
Closing
Thank you so much for you sharing your thoughts with me today! I really appreciate
your time and willingness to share. Everything that you have shared is very helpful for this
study. If I find myself with a follow-up question, may I contact you, and if so, if email is ok?
Again, thank you for participating in this study.

HSTA’S ROLE IN THE RACE TO THE TOP GRANT

190
APPENDIX F
POLICY IMPLEMENTER INTERVIEW DATA COLLECTION PROTOCOL
Introduction
Thank you for agreeing to participate in my study. I appreciate the time that you have set
aside to answer my questions. Before we get started, I want to provide you with an overview of
my study and answer any questions you might have about participating. I am currently enrolled
in the University of Southern California (USC) and I am working on my dissertation. The
primary purpose of this study is to understand the role of HSTA and the contract the union had
with the State of Hawaii during Hawaii’s RttT grant. This study will attempt to examine how
HSTA’s role impacted the RttT grant. This study could benefit education reform by lending
insight into how the HSTA and the Hawaii DOE worked together to implement the RttT grant. I
am interviewing multiple educators, teachers, principals, union officials and lawmakers to learn
more about this.
I want to assure you that I am strictly wearing the hat of researcher today. What this
means is that the nature of my questions are not evaluative. I will not be making any judgments
on how you are performing in your role group. All data collection will be anonymous and I will
use pseudonyms in my report so that no schools or sites are identifiable.
I would like to go over the informed consent document at this time. I will be recording
our conversation on a phone app recorder if you agree. I will only be using the recording to
make sure I capture your words and not my interpretation of your words. If don’t feel
comfortable with recording the interview I will take notes by hand. Do I have your permission to
audio record the interview? I would also like to have the recording transcribed by a professional
transcription service. If you don’t feel comfortable with a professional service I will transcribe
HSTA’S ROLE IN THE RACE TO THE TOP GRANT

191
the interview by hand. All audio recordings will be destroyed once transcribed. Do I have your
permission to use a professional transcription service? I would like to have your permission to
begin the interview.
Interview Questions
1. Could you describe your role in [and during] RttT?
2. What was implemented in the school as a result of RttT?
3. What role did the teachers play in implementing these programs?
4. How did HSTA interact with the school during implementation of RttT?
5. Were there any activities that HSTA implemented at the school level during RttT?
6. During implementation of RttT, how was the HSTA/DOE contract used?
7. How did the ZSI affect union relationships with the DOE?
8. What happened to the RttT reform when the RttT funding ended?
9. [Non-ZSI Schools:] How did non-ZSI schools implement reforms without RttT ZSI
funds?
10. What advice would you give if another application for an incentive grant is proposed?
Closing
Thank you so much for you sharing your thoughts with me today! I really appreciate
your time and willingness to share. Everything that you have shared is very helpful for this
study. If I find myself with a follow-up question, may I contact you, and if so, if email is ok?
Again, thank you for participating in this study.

Abstract (if available)

Abstract This study applies a conceptual framework which examines the proximity that individuals and groups have to education policy making, as well as stakeholders’ historical access to educational decision-making in Hawaii. The purpose of this study was to understand the role of the Hawaii State Teacher’s Association (HSTA) and the contracts the union had with the State of Hawaii during Race to the Top. The study sought to examine HSTA’s role in developing, writing, and implementing the Race to the Top application, plans and programs in Hawaii as well as the differential treatment of Zone of School Innovation teachers and non-zone teachers. The study is a qualitative comparative case study between two schools in the Zone of School Innovation (ZSI) and two schools out of the zone. Additional interviews were conducted with key stakeholders and document collection was used to help support study findings. Data collection and analysis utilized open coding to selective coding methods that generated reflexive themes. Findings from this study indicate that HSTA was initially acting as a reformed union prior to grant implementation. After Hawaii’s Race to the Top grant was placed on high risk status, the union shifted to functioning as a traditional union for the remainder of the grant. Recommendations for future research include conducting an analysis of educational policy decisions in Hawaii in the last twenty years to determine if stakeholder groups have shifted position in regards to access to educational decision-making in Hawaii.

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Asset Metadata

Creator Sherrard-Libed, Linnea (author)

Core Title The Hawai'i State Teachers’ Association and Race to the Top: HSTA’S role in the RTTT grant

School Rossier School of Education

Degree Doctor of Education

Degree Program Education (Leadership)

Publication Date 06/01/2017

Defense Date 05/30/2017

Publisher University of Southern California (original), University of Southern California. Libraries (digital)

Tag education reform,Hawaii,OAI-PMH Harvest,pay for performance,policy,Race to the Top,teacher unions

Language English

Contributor Electronically uploaded by the author (provenance)

Advisor Picus, Lawrence (committee chair), Datta, Monique (committee member), Green, Alan (committee member)

Creator Email linneasherrard@aol.com,linneasherrard@gmail.com

Permanent Link (DOI) https://doi.org/10.25549/usctheses-c40-374572

Unique identifier UC11258328

Identifier etd-SherrardLi-5343.pdf (filename),usctheses-c40-374572 (legacy record id)

Legacy Identifier etd-SherrardLi-5343.pdf

Dmrecord 374572

Document Type Dissertation

Rights Sherrard-Libed, Linnea

Type texts

Source University of Southern California (contributing entity), University of Southern California Dissertations and Theses (collection)

Access Conditions The author retains rights to his/her dissertation, thesis or other graduate work according to U.S. copyright law. Electronic access is being provided by the USC Libraries in agreement with the a...

Repository Name University of Southern California Digital Library

Repository Location USC Digital Library, University of Southern California, University Park Campus MC 2810, 3434 South Grand Avenue, 2nd Floor, Los Angeles, California 90089-2810, USA