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Content AGREEM ENT, DISAGREEM ENT AND RHETORICAL INVENTION
by
Yameng Liu
A Dissertation Presented to the
FACULTY OF THE GRADUATE SCHOOL
UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA
In Partial Fulfillment of the
Requirements for the Degree
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
(English)
December 1992
Copyright 1992 Yameng Liu
UMI Num ber: D P23172
All rights reserved
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a note will indicate th e deletion.
Dissertation Publishing
UMI D P23172
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789 E ast Eisenhow er Parkway
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Ann Arbor, Ml 4 8 1 0 6 -1 3 4 6
UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA
THE GRADUATE SCHOOL
UNIVERSITY PARK
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E
•sa
L 7 § 3
3 1 U E
This dissertation, w ritten by
Y M M O , LIU..............
under the direction of h.t&........ Dissertation
Committee, and approved b y all its members,
has been presented to and accepted b y The
Graduate School, in partial fulfillm ent of re
quirem ents for the degree of
D O C TO R OF PH ILO SOPH Y
Dean of G raduate Studies
November 30, 1992
DISSERTATION COMMITTEE
C hairperson
ii
CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION Inventio as a Point of View 1
CHAPTER I Invention, Discovery and Creation 21
CHAPTER II From Informal Logic to the Principle
of Consubstantiality 79
CHAPTER III Nonloci, Differentiae and
Deconstructive Invention 118
EPILOGUE Toward a New Copia of Words and
Ideas 183
NOTES 222
W O RK S CITED 226
I n t r o d u c t i o n : I n v e n tio as a P o in t of View
1
When R ichard McKeon c a l l e d in the e a r l y 1970s for
r e s u r r e c t i n g r h e t o r i c a s an " a r c h i t e c t o n i c p r o d u c tiv e a r t , "
what he had in mind was th e "breakdown of i n t e r p e r s o n a l ,
i n te r g r o u p , and i n t e r c u l t u r a l communication" in our
" te c h n o lo g ic a l a g e ” (11). The r e v o l u t i o n of th e a r t s and
s c ie n c e s in our tim e, he o b s e rv e s , has p la c e d a r e l e n t l e s s
demand on th e s o c i e t y f o r evei—deepening s p e c i a l i z a t i o n , so
much so t h a t as the p r e s e n t c e n tu ry e n t e r s i t s l a s t
d ecades, we f in d o u r s e lv e s t h r e a te n e d w ith not only a
d iv o r c e of knowing and doing, but a ls o a " fra g m e n ta tio n " of
knowledge i t s e l f . What we u r g e n t l y need is t h e r e f o r e "an
a r t of s t r u c t u r i n g a l l p r i n c i p l e s and p ro d u c ts of knowing,
doing, and making," th e a r t which "should f u n c tio n
p r o d u c t i v e l y in th e r e s o l u t i o n of new problems and
a r c h i t e c t o n i c a l l y in th e fo rm a tio n of new i n c l u s i v e
communities" (2 ).
Ten y e a r s l a t e r , T erry E agleton made a s i m i l a r p le a
f o r r e v i v i n g what he term s "th e r e c e iv e d form of c r i t i c a l
a n a l y s i s a l l the way from a n c i e n t s o c i e t y to th e e i g h t e e n t h
c en tu ry " (2 05 ), but he d id so fo r q u i t e a d i f f e r e n t rea so n .
D ism issing as an " i l l u s i o n " th e commonsensical view t h a t
l i t e r a r y s t u d i e s e x i s t a s a d i s t i n c t , u n i f i e d , c l e a r l y
d e li m it e d body of knowledge, E ag leto n c o u n te r s w ith h i s
b e l i e f t h a t we need to r e - e s t a b l i s h r h e t o r i c as a
2
" d is c o u rs e theory" whose horizon " is n o th in g le s s th an "the
f i e l d of d i s c u r s i v e p r a c t i c e s in s o c i e t y as a whole" and
whose s p e c ia l " i n t e r e s t " l i e s in " g rasp in g such p r a c t i c e s
as forms of power and perform ance" (205). The reb o rn
r h e t o r i c , in o th e r words, should cover bo th th e p r a c t i c e
and th e a r t of e f f e c t i v e d i s c o u r s e , and should d evote
i t s e l f to examining "th e way d i s c o u r s e s a re c o n s t r u c t e d in
o rd e r to a c h ie v e c e r t a i n e f f e c t s " (205-206).
For a l l t h e i r obvious p o l i t i c a l d i f f e r e n c e s , bo th
McKeon and E ag leto n f i n d i t d e s i r a b l e to have a new,
o v e ra r c h in g d i s c i p l i n e t h a t would e i t h e r " s t r u c t u r e " the
e n t i r e sp here of doing and knowing or have as i t s o b j e c t of
stud y th e t o t a l i t y of d i s c u r s i v e p r a c t i c e s . And j u s t as
McKeon em phasizes th e "p ro d u c tiv e " n a tu r e of r h e t o r i c , so
E ag leto n p r i v i l e g e s words such as " e f f e c t " or "performance"
in h i s r e - d e f i n i t i o n of th e old d i s c i p l i n e . The s i m i l a r i t y
in t h e i r c o n c e p tio n s fo r a r e c o n s t i t u t e d r h e t o r i c , however,
sto p s h e re . For w hile McKeon i s concerned w ith c u rb in g
the c e n t r i f u g a l f o r c e s , w ith b r i d g in g the gaps developed
among s o c i a l , i n t e l l e c t u a l and c u l t u r a l groups, w ith , in
s h o r t , r e - c o n s t i t u t i n g th e " i n c l u s i v e com m unities,"
E a g le to n seems more i n t e r e s t e d in r a l l y i n g every d e v ic e of
" c r i t i c a l a n a l y s i s " under th e banner of " r h e t o r i c " in
o rd e r to launch a g e n eral o f f e n s i v e a g a i n s t an e n tre n c h e d ,
t o t a l i z i n g " p o w e r-sy ste m ." For McKeon, " r h e t o r i c "
3
s i g n i f i e s e f f o r t s to overcome th e rampant " s e p a r a t i s t "
te n d e n c ie s and to fo rg e a sense of i d e n t i t y th ro u g h the
f o r m u la tio n of a new s e t of "commonplaces" as th e core of
a new u n i t y . For E ag leto n , th e re a so n why " r h e t o r i c "
should be g ra n te d a s p e c ia l s t a t u s l i e s p r e c i s e l y in i t s
l e g i t i m a t i o n and encouragement of c r i t i c a l d i f f e r e n c e s a t
the expense of a l l a tte m p ts to s e t up " i n c l u s i v e
comm unities": a r a d i c a l e x t e r i o r i t y i s c l e a r l y im plied when
t h i s new form of stu d y is p i t t e d a g a i n s t , r a t h e r than
g lu in g t o g e t h e r , "the whole f i e l d " of d i s c u r s i v e p r a c t i c e s .
That the term " r h e t o r i c ” should have been used to
d e s i g n a t e programs p o le s a p a r t i d e o l o g i c a l l y must have
been a p u z z le or an embarrassment to many who tak e an
i n t e r e s t in th e a n c i e n t a r t . In c h a r a c t e r i z i n g h i s study
of l i t e r a r y i n t e r p r e t a t i o n as " r h e t o r i c a l r a t h e r than
a n a l y t i c a l , t o p i c a l r a t h e r th an com prehensive, s p e c u l a t i v e
r a t h e r th an d e s c r i p t i v e , " f o r i n s t a n c e , G erald Bruns
h a s te n s to g iv e h i s own brand of r h e t o r i c an unassuming
label f r e e from ponderous s e r i o u s n e s s or high-minded
p u rp o siv e n e ss ( x i i i ) . "We may d e f i n e in v e n tio n in a
r h e t o r i c a l r a t h e r th an Romantic way," he d e c l a r e s , "by
saying t h a t i t is sim ply th e a r t of f i n d in g t h in g s to say,
and saying them, f o r whatever purpose" ( 1 ) . Whereas fo r
McKeon r h e t o r i c i s " p ro d u ctiv e" p r i m a r i l y in th e sense t h a t
i t is cap a b le of s o lv in g th e "new problems" of our
4
te c h n o lo g i c a l age, Bruns sc o rn s the u b i q u it o u s p re s e n c e of
th e " p r o b le m a tic a l" in l i t e r a r y stu d y , s e e in g "problem" as
no more th a n a "manner of sp e a k in g ," one on which "we have
come to r e l y w ith more h a b i t th a n p assio n" (2 ). And w hile
E agleto n* s c h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n of r h e t o r i c as a "theo ry" and
a "sc ie n c e " im p lies i t s prom otion to a p h i lo s o p h ic a l
s t a t u s , Bruns r e v iv e s th e o ld r h e t o r i c / p h i l o s o p h y dichotomy
y e t g iv e s i t an a n t i - P l a t o n i c t w i s t when he compares the
q u i x o t i c " p h ilo s o p h ic a l d e s i r e " to "reduce th in g s to t h e i r
n a t u r e s , or to remove t h e i r c o n tin g e n c ie s and local
i d e n t i t i e s , " w ith th e way of "the r h e t o r i c i a n " who "w ill
always tra n s fo rm n a tu r e s in to t o p i c s and problem s in to
meanings" (2 ).
I t is an odd " r h e t o r i c i a n " fo r whom th e "meanings"
should ta k e the preceden ce over th e i s s u e s or "problems"
in vo lv ed in a r h e t o r i c a l o c c a sio n . And i t is e q u a l l y odd
t h a t in what p u r p o r ts to be a r h e t o r i c a l th e o r y or model ,
th e concept of au d ie n ce has not been ta k e n in to
c o n s i d e r a t i o n . N e ith e r Bruns nor E ag leto n nor, f o r t h a t
m a t t e r , McKeon, can be seen as a l a t t e r - d a y r h e t o r i c i a n in
th e t r a d i t i o n a l sense of th e t i t l e , and t h e i r shared
e n thu siasm fo r a r e n a i s s a n c e of t h i s a n c i e n t a r t p ro b ab ly
as much d e m o n s tra te s th e h i s t o r i c a l r e s i l i e n c e and the
modern r e le v a n c e of r h e t o r i c as i t r e v e a l s a tt e m p ts to
a p p r o p r i a t e i t "fo r whatever p u rp o se ," or to reduce i t to
5
a r o o t l e s s s i g n i f i e r , d i s s o c i a t e d from i t s c l a s s i c a l
s i g n i f i e d , hence cap ab le of b e in g used to tra n s fo rm any
"problem" i n to "m eaning .” The " r h e t o r i c " they champion has
been t r a n s p l a n t e d , fo r b e t t e r or fo r worse, i n to a
s t r u c t u r e of assu m p tio n s, i n t e r e s t s , and d e s i r e s t h a t
belong d e c id e d ly to our tim e. As Ralph Cohen p o i n t s o u t,
" [ i f ] we c o n s id e r what th e term ' r h e t o r i c ' has come to mean
f o r us, we can see t h a t i t has become unhinged from th e
c l a s s i c a l concept of an independent d i s c i p l i n e of sp eakin g
and a rg u in g and has become an embracing term d e s c r i b i n g th e
v a r io u s s t r a t e g i e s peo ple employ in communicating w ith
o t h e r s " (84).
Or maybe i t has been made to "embrace" more th an j u s t
th e s t r a t e g i e s of i n t e r p e r s o n a l communication and maybe i t
has not become c o m p lete ly "unhinged" from i t s c l a s s i c a l
c o n c e p tio n . In McKeon’s c a l l fo r an " a r c h i t e c t o n i c
p r o d u c tiv e a r t , " or in E a g l e t o n ’s more e x p l i c i t assignm ent
to r h e t o r i c of the ta s k to examine how d i s c o u r s e s g e t
" c o n s t r u c t e d ," t h e r e l i e s an u n m is ta k a b le concern w ith th e
p r o d u c tio n of human d i s c o u r s e as a whole. Even B r u n s ’s
low-key d e f i n i t i o n of " in v e n tio n " as th e a r t of " f in d in g
t h in g s to s a y ," i t seems, b e l i e s a s e r i o u s concern w ith how
" th e c o n v e r s a t io n t h a t we are " (Gadamer) g e ts p e r p e t u a t e d .
In t h e i r p re o c c u p a tio n w ith the g e n e r a t i o n of d i s c o u r s e , we
f i n d an obvious p a r a l l e l w ith c l a s s i c a l r h e t o r i c , where
6
i n v e n tio has been g r a n te d such a c e n t r a l r o l e t h a t fo r
A r i s t o t l e a t l e a s t , i t is th e a r t . A r i s t o t l e ’s d e f i n i t i o n
of r h e t o r i c as "the f a c u l t y of d is c o v e r i n g the p o s s i b l e
means of p e r s u a s io n in r e f e r e n c e to any s u b j e c t whatever"
( R h e to ric I . I I . 1 1355b), however, p re su p p o se s an o r d in a r y
r h e t o r i c a l s i t u a t i o n t h a t in v o lv e s , in th e s im p le s t term s,
a speaker and an a u d ie n c e , whereas in contemporary
r e c o n s t r u c t i o n s of t h i s " f a c u l t y , " a c o n te x tu a l expansion
has tran sfo rm e d th e t r a d i t i o n a l concept of i n v e n ti o from a
m i c r o - r h e t o r i c a l in to a m a c r o - r h e t o r i c a l in q u ir y , or from
an i n v e s t i g a t i o n of how speeches a r e composed or how
p e r s u a s io n i s e f f e c t e d , to an i n v e s t i g a t i o n of how
d i s c o u r s e is produced.*
O pinions vary as to what is im plied by r h e t o r i c ’s
ascendancy to the new m e t a - d i s c u r s i v e s t a t u s . An
i n f l u e n t i a l view is found in E rn e st G r a s s i ’ s s u g g e s t i v e l y
t i t l e d R h e to r ic as P h ilo s o p h y , where he d e c l a r e s t h a t the
term " r h e t o r i c " has assumed "a fu n d a m e n ta lly new
s i g n i f i c a n c e ; [ i t ] i s n o t, nor can i t be th e a r t , the
te c h n iq u e of an e x t e r i o r p e rs u a s io n ; i t is r a t h e r t h a t
speech which i s the b a s i s of th e r a t i o n a l thought" (20).
This is tantam ount to sa y in g t h a t in o rd e r to succeed
p h ilo so p h y to the th ro n e of th e t h e o r e t i c a l mode of thought
and speech, r h e t o r i c would have to have a c le a n break w ith
i t s humble p a s t as " th e a r t , th e te c h n iq u e of an e x t e r i o r
7
p e r s u a s i o n . " There can be no doubt t h a t to c o n s t i t u t e
r h e t o r i c as th e new f o u n d a tio n a l mode of th o ug ht and speech
would b r in g about changes in th e way human d i s c o u r s e s ,
in c lu d in g r h e t o r i c i t s e l f , a re c o n c e p tu a liz e d . Yet i f i t
has to be p u r i f i e d of i t s o r i g i n a l or t r a d i t i o n a l "base"
elem ents in th e f i r s t p la c e , or to be " p h ilo s o p h iz e d ," what
r e s u l t s i s more l i k e l y to be a d y n a s t ic s u c c e s s io n th a n a
genuine d i s c u r s i v e r e v o l u t i o n . G ra ssi h i m s e l f , fo r
in s t a n c e , c a l l s a t t e n t i o n to the p a ra d o x ic a l f a c t t h a t the
u l t i m a t e p r i n c i p l e s , or archai , of any p roo f and of
knowledge cannot be proved th em se lv e s. And because of th e
" n o n - d e r iv a b le , prim ary c h a r a c t e r " of th e s e in d is p e n s a b l e
archai (w ith o u t which "we n e i t h e r can speak nor comport
o u r s e l v e s " ) , he goes on to p o in t o u t, "the r a t i o n a l p ro c e s s
and c o n se q u e n tly r a t i o n a l speech" must n e c e s s a r i l y "move
from th e f o r m u la tio n of prim ary a s s e r t i o n s " (1 8 -1 9 ).
E p i s t e m o l o g i c a l l y , t h e r e seems indeed a quantum leap
i f we g iv e up our h u b r i s t i c b e l i e f in th e e t e r n a l ,
unchanging p r i n c i p l e s as th e o r i g i n a t i v e core of and f i n a l
j u s t i f i c a t i o n fo r th e " r a t i o n a l ” d i s c o u r s e , and w ith due
h u m il i ty a c c e p t i n s t e a d th e a s s e r t i v e and t h e r e f o r e
n o n - j u s t i f i a b l e n a tu r e of the a rc h a i. So long as the
" r a t i o n a l " p ro c e s s and " r a t i o n a l " speech c o n tin u e to
proceed u n d is tu r b e d in t h e i r old o r b i t s , however, what
happens would be l i t t l e more th a n g r a n t i n g l e g i t i m a t i o n to
8
an u s u rp e r ("p rim ary a s s e r t i o n s " ) , w ith the u n d e rs ta n d in g
t h a t a f f a i r s would be conducted in v e ry much th e same way.
In s u g g e s tin g t h a t "th e f o r m u la tio n of a s s e r t i o n s is th e
prime mover of p r o c e s s and speech, G ra ss i i s c la im in g f o r
in v e n ti o by f a r th e most p r i v i l e g e d p o s i t i o n in h i s
c o nceptual model. Yet th ro ug ho ut h i s t r e a t i s e , one looks
in v a in f o r even a c lu e as to how th e a s s e r t i o n s them selves
g e t "fo rm u la te d " or in v e n te d , and more im p o r ta n tly , how
t h e s e p a r t i c u l a r " a s s e r t i o n s , " r a t h e r th an o t h e r s , become
a c c e p te d as th e f o u n d a tio n a l a r c h a i, i f they a r e e q u a l ly
u n j u s t i f i a b l e . All we a r e t o l d i s t h a t ingenium, "the
f a c u l t y to u n i t e what i s d i s p e r s e d and d i v e r s e , " r a t h e r
th a n r a t i o , i s th e "source of th e c r e a t i v e a c t i v i t y of
t o p i c s , ” hence th e source of t o p i c a l i n v e n tio n (45).^ I f
G r a s s i ’s employment of a v i r t u a l e q u iv a le n t f o r th e
ro m antic concept of " i m a g i n a t io n ” a s h i s " u ltim a te "
e x p l a n a t i o n f o r i n v e n tio t e l l s us a n y th in g , i t is the
d i f f i c u l t y of th e " p h ilo s o p h iz e d " r h e t o r i c to g iv e an
ad eq u a te account f o r i t s c e n t r a l component, t h a t i s , th e
i n v e n tio n of d i s c o u r s e . Such a d i f f i c u l t y f o r c e s i t s
exponents e i t h e r to ta k e r e f u s e in the e s s e n t i a l
a s s e r t i v e n e s s or n o n -e x p 1a i n a b i 1i t y of th e a r c h a i , or to
have r e c o u r s e to e x i s t i n g models of th e o r i g i n a t i n g of
d i s c o u r s e , when th ey do a tte m p t to t h e o r i z e on in v e n tio n .
9
An i n t e r e s t i n g i l l u s t r a t i o n f o r th e general
t h e o r e t i c a l awkwardness on t h i s s u b j e c t i s f u r n i s h e d by
Michel F o u c a u lt. His c e l e b r a t e d e ssa y "What Is An Author?"
i s so p reo c cu p ie d w ith what we can say about th e t o p i c in
q u e s t io n , r a t h e r th an what c o n s t i t u t e s th e " c o r r e c t
answer to th e c o n t r o v e r s i a l q u e s t io n , t h a t i t can well be
seen as an exemplar f o r d i s c u r s i v e i n v e n t i o n in the
post-m odern a g e . B a s i c a l l y , F o u c a u lt o f f e r s a long l i s t of
q u e s t io n s t h a t may be asked about th e concept of "an
a u t h o r , " w ith o u t h im s e lf b o t h e r i n g to answer most of them.
In th e s o c i o h i s t o r i c a l c o n te x t a lo n e he s u g g e s ts as many as
f i v e t o p ic s of s p e c i a l i n t e r e s t :
how th e a u th o r was i n d i v i d u a l i z e d in a c u l t u r e
such as o u rs ; the s t a t u s we have g iv en the
a u th o r , f o r i n s t a n c e ; when we began our r e s e a r c h
in to a u t h e n t i c i t y and a t t r i b u t i o n ; th e system s
of v a l o r i z a t i o n in which he was in c lu d e d , or th e
moment when th e s t o r i e s of h e ro e s gave way to an
a u t h o r ’s b i o g r a p h y ; th e c o n d it i o n s t h a t f o s t e r e d
th e f o r m u la tio n of th e fundamental c r i t i c a l
c a te g o r y of "th e man and h i s work." (115)
As he se es i t , t h e r e a r e sim ply too many such " c o n t e x t s ”
from which to g e n e r a t e m eaningful q u e s t i o n s : th e g e n eral
f u n c t i o n of the "auth or" w i t h in d i s c o u r s e ; th e r e l a t i o n s h i p
between an "au tho r" w i t h in d i s c o u r s e ; th e r e l a t i o n s h i p
between an "autho r" and a t e x t ; th e k in s h i p between w r i t i n g
and d e a th . . . . Even the absence of th e "au th or" i s fo r
F o u c a u lt an o c c a s io n f o r copious in v e n tio n :
10
I t i s o b v io u sly i n s u f f i c i e n t to r e p e a t empty
s lo g a n s : th e a u th o r has d is a p p e a re d .
R a th e r, we should re-exam ine th e empty space
l e f t by th e a u t h o r ’s d is a p p e a r a n c e ; we should
a t t e n t i v e l y o b se rv e , along i t s gaps and f a u l t
l i n e s , i t s new d e m a rc a tio n s, and th e
re a p p o rtio n m e n t of t h i s v o id ; we should aw ait
th e f l u i d f u n c t i o n s r e l e a s e d by t h i s
d i s a p p e a r a n c e . (121)
R ather th an h o ld in g to th e n a iv e , outworn concept of the
"auth or" as th e in d iv id u a l c r e d i t e d w ith th e w r i t i n g of a
book, F o u c a u lt s u g g e s ts t h a t we see i t as a " f u n c t i o n of
d i s c o u r s e " c h a r a c t e r i z e d by i t s r e l a t i o n to th e " le g a l and
i n s t i t u t i o n a l system s t h a t c ir c u m s c r ib e , d e te rm in e , and
a r t i c u l a t e th e realm of d i s c o u r s e s , " i t s v a r i a t i o n under
d i f f e r e n t d i s c u r s i v e , temporal and c u l t u r a l c irc u m s ta n c e s ,
e t c . (130). With t h i s r a d i c a l t r a n s p o s i t i o n of the
" auth or" to an e n t i r e l y d i f f e r e n t p r o b le m a tic , t h e r e w ill
no longer be "th e tire so m e r e p e t i t i o n s " of q u e s t i o n s about
r e a l a u t h o r s h i p , a u t h e n t i c i t y , o r i g i n a l i t y , r e v e l a t i o n of
s e l f th ro u g h s t y l e ; in t h e i r s t e a d , we w ill hear such new
q u e s t io n s as "What a r e th e modes of e x i s t e n c e of t h i s
d i s c o u r s e ? " "Where does i t come from; how i s i t
c i r c u l a t e d ; who c o n t r o l s i t ? " "what p lacem en ts a r e
d eterm in ed f o r p o s s i b l e s u b j e c t s ? " (138)
The new in v e n tiv e p o s s i b i l i t i e s r e v e a le d by F o u c a u l t ’s
p ro b in g q u e s t io n s a r e indeed s tu n n in g . Yet one might s t i l l
wonder how F o u c a u lt came to "in v en t" t h i s r e v o l u t i o n a r y new
q u e s t i o n n a i r e in th e f i r s t p l a c e , i f th e " le g a l and
— _ X1
i n s t i t u t i o n a l system s" rem ain b a s i c a l l y th e same which
" c ir c u m s c r ib e , d e te rm in e , and a r t i c u l a t e the realm of
d i s c o u r s e s . ” In th e e ssa y , F o u c a u lt does not become
s e l f - r e f l e c t i v e enough to c o n fr o n t t h i s th orn y problem
d i r e c t l y , y e t he a p p e a rs not i n s e n s i t i v e to th e unasked
q u e s t i o n when, im m ediately a f t e r summarizing th e
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of th e " au th o r f u n c t i o n , " and a s i f in a
s u p e r f lu o u s a f t e r th o u g h t, he b e g in s to t a l k about what he
c a l l s " i n i t i a t o r s of d i s c u r s i v e p r a c t i c e s . ” U nlike a u th o r s
u s u a l l y deemed " g re a t" or " i n f l u e n t i a l , " and d i f f e r e n t even
from th o se re c o g n iz e d a s fo u n d ers of "new s c i e n c e ,"
F o u c a u l t ’s " d is c o u r s e i n i t i a t o r s " r e f e r to a " s i n g u l a r
t y p e ” of i n d i v i d u a l s produced in th e 19th c e n tu r y Europe,
such as Marx and Freud, whose " d i s t i n c t i v e c o n t r i b u t i o n is
t h a t th ey produced not o n ly t h e i r own work, but the
p o s s i b i l i t y and th e r u l e s of f o rm a tio n of o th e r t e x t s , "
thu s e s t a b l i s h i n g "the e n d le s s p o s s i b i l i t y of d is c o u r s e "
(131). In a d d i t i o n to making p o s s i b l e "a c e r t a i n number of
a n a l o g ie s t h a t co uld be adopted by f u t u r e t e x t s , " th e s e
v e ry s p e c i a l a u th o r s a l s o "made p o s s i b l e a c e r t a i n number
of d i f f e r e n c e s " (132). They c l e a r e d a space fo r th e
i n t r o d u c t i o n of elem ents o t h e r th a n t h e i r own, which,
n e v e r t h e l e s s , rem ain w i t h in th e f i e l d of d i s c o u r s e they
i n i t i a t e d " (132). There a r e , moreover, no " f a l s e ”
s t a te m e n ts in th e work of th e s e i n i t i a t o r s , and the
12
' i n i t i a t i o n of a d i s c u r s i v e p r a c t i c e " i s n e c e s s a r i l y j
d e ta c h e d from i t s l a t e r development and t r a n s f o r m a t i o n s , so
t h a t "we d e f i n e th e t h e o r e t i c a l v a l i d i t y of a s ta te m e n t
w ith r e s p e c t to th e work of th e i n i t i a t o r " (133).
We have th u s G r a s s i ’s ingenium in a n o th e r
te r m in o l o g i c a l d i s g u i s e . F o u c a u l t ’s " i n i t i a t o r s , " to o ,
were in p o s s e s s i o n of "a f a c u l t y to u n i t e what i s d i s p e r s e d
and d i v e r s e " ( th e y make p o s s i b l e "a c e r t a i n number of
a n a l o g ie s . . . [and] d i f f e r e n c e s " ) . They a l s o fo rm u la te d a
s e t of a s s e r t i o n s ( " [ t h e r e could be] no f a l s e s t a t e m e n t s ” ).
And th e s e i n a u g u r a ti v e a s s e r t i o n s f u n c t i o n a g a in a s th e
prime mover of and th e u l t i m a t e j u s t i f i c a t i o n fo r
d i s c u r s i v e p r a c t i c e s ( " [ t h e y produce] th e p o s s i b i l i t y and
th e r u l e s of fo rm a tio n of o th e r t e x t s ; . . . [and they
d e f i n e ] th e t h e o r e t i c a l v a l i d i t y " ) . For b o th G ra ss i and
F o u c a u lt, i t t a k e s c r e a t i v e g e n iu s e s , th o s e who somehow
manage to f r e e them selv es from th e g r a v i t y f i e l d of the
dominant " i n s t i t u t i o n a l sy s te m s," f o r us to g e t r i d of th e
tire so m e r e p e t i t i o n s " of th e same o ld q u e s t i o n s .
F o u c a u l t ’ s view on i n v e n t i o , of c o u rs e , does no t co rre sp o n d
e x a c t l y to t h a t of G r a s s i. While G r a s s i ’s program a p p e a rs
to aim a t l i t t l e more th an s t a g in g an e p is te m o l o g i c a l coup
d ’e t a t by r e p l a c i n g " t r u t h s " w ith " a s s e r t i o n s " as th e core
i
of a " r a t i o n a l p ro c e ss " t h a t is allow ed to c o n tin u e to s ta y !
in v e ry much th e same c o u rs e , F o u c a u lt v a l o r i z e s a complete
13
r e n o v a t io n of the d i s c o u r s e when he d i s t i n g u i s h e s between
th e " i n i t i a t o r s of d i s c u r s i v e p r a c t i c e s " on th e one hand,
and "fou nd ers" of no rm ativ e l i t e r a r y t r a d i t i o n s , s c i e n c e s
and r e l i g i o n s on th e o t h e r . Yet c o n s t r a i n e d by a
p h i l o s o p h i c a l - l i t e r a r y framework, even so in n o v a tiv e a
t h e o r i s t of d i s c o u r s e as F o u c a u lt could not a vo id f a l l i n g
back on th e rom antic concept of c r e a t i o n in h i s
c o n c e p t u a l i z a t i o n of the o r i g i n a t i v e a c t of in v e n tio n .
The p e r s i s t e n c e of t h i s framework has p re v e n te d an
a u t h e n t i c r e v i v a l of th e a r t of p e r s u a s io n from ta k in g
p la c e and has b lin d e d many t h e o r i s t s to th e h e rm e n e u tic a l
and p r o d u c tiv e p o t e n t i a l s a r h e t o r i c r e i n s t a t e d as a
co n ce p tu a l paradigm could prom ise. Thus McKeon a p p a r e n t l y
f o r g o t about th e e n t i r e is s u e of in v e n tio n when he c a l l e d
f o r th e c o m p ila tio n of a d i c t i o n a r y of fundamental term s of
p h i l o s o p h i c a l and p o l i t i c a l th o u g h t, b e l i e v i n g t h a t such a
d i c t i o n a r y would c l a r i f y th e meanings of th e s e o f t e n
ambiguous and " m i s i n t e r p r e t e d " term s and would th us
e l i m i n a t e or a t l e a s t red uce th e danger of i n t e r n a t i o n a l
c o n f l i c t s (Conley, 288). And E a g le to n , having d is m is s e d
a l l o t h e r t h e o r e t i c a l p o s i t i o n s as "academic m y t h t s ] ,"
pro ce ed s to p r e s e n t th e view t h a t l i t e r a r y th e o ry is always
a l r e a d y p o l i t i c a l and i d e o l o g i c a l as i f i t were a
d e f i n i t i v e t r u t h , th us g r a n t i n g h i s own d i s c o u r s e an
immunity from th e kind of r h e t o r i c a l d i s s e c t i o n to which he
14
says a l l d i s c u r s i v e p r a c t i c e s would be s u b j e c t e d (195).
Even Bruns, whose d e f i n i t i o n of i n v e n t i o n as "the a r t of
f i n d i n g th in g s to say" seems th e c l o s e s t in s p i r i t to a
r h e t o r i c a l mode of th o u g h t, i s so s in g le -m in d e d in h i s
e f f o r t s to reduce "problems" to "meanings" t h a t h i s
In v e n tio n con clu des w ith th e sober r e c o g n i t i o n t h a t
"knowledge of a c e r t a i n kind r e q u i r e s t h a t we overcome the
c o n ti n g e n c i e s of every h i s t o r i c a l s i t u a t i o n , but .
p r e c i s e l y t h i s achievem ent would remove us from the
p o s s i b i l i t y of u n d e rs ta n d in g a n y th in g " (181).
For Bruns, th e f i n a l "meaning" is t h a t " t h a t which we
would know would always be som ething o t h e r th an th e r e a l i t y
of i t . . . some K antian or lo g ic a l s p e c t e r ” which we have
no a l t e r n a t i v e but to t r y to a c c e p t a s p a r t of our l i f e
(181). A r h e t o r i c i a n would r e f u s e to l e t t h i s p e r c e p t i o n
congeal i n to a d e f i n i t i v e "meaning," nor would she b e li e v e
t h a t a p h i lo s o p h ic a l r e s i g n a t i o n to th e p re s e n c e of t h i s
" l o g i c a l s p e c t e r " is th e o n ly way we can deal w ith i t .
R a th e r, she would tend to see th e tum bling of the
com placent old b e l i e f in th e p o s s i b i l i t y of genuine
"knowledge" or a c c u r a t e " r e p r e s e n t a t i o n " a s r e s u l t i n g from
th e r e l e n t l e s s need or p r e s s u r e f o r d i s c o u r s e to renew
i t s e l f , and to see th e a c c e p ta n c e of B r u n s ’s p a ra d o x ic a l
new i n s i g h t i n to th e " n atu re " of knowledge as s i g n i f y i n g
n o th in g more th a n a tem porary new b a la n c e of d i s c u r s i v e
15
f o r c e s , to be broken as soon as enough f r e s h i n v e n tiv e
energy is b u i l t up. S i m i l a r l y , from th e p o i n t of view of
r h e t o r i c a l in v e n tio n , E a g le to n would do b e t t e r to a n a ly z e
th e c o n d i t i o n s which a llo w words l i k e " p o l i t i c s , "
" id e o lo g y ," "power" or even " r h e t o r i c ” to come to th e f o r e
in l i t e r a r y s t u d i e s , and to see t h a t the f u n c t i o n of th e s e
new l e x i c a l s t a r s is n ot j u s t to u p s ta g e th e old
e s t a b l i s h e d c r i t i c a l language which has s ta y e d in the
l i m e l i g h t f o r too long, but more im p o r ta n tly , to i n v i t e new
s t a s i a s t i c c h a l l e n g e r s in t u r n t o come forw ard and to make
them o b s o l e te in an ever r e v o l v i n g d ra m a tic m erry -g o -ro u n d .
And in McKeon*s p ro p o sa l f o r th e "fundam ental term s" of
p h i l o s o p h i c a l and p o l i t i c a l tho u g h t to be s e m a n t i c a l l y
f i x e d in an i n t e r n a t i o n a l l y e n d o rsed , " o f f i c i a l "
d i c t i o n a r y , a r h e t o r i c i a n would u nd o u b ted ly d e t e c t a v i s i o n
f o r a logos which i s , as Michel Meyer p u ts i t , " c lo s e d upon
i t s e l f , " and in which " d i s c u s s i o n o n ly e x i s t s in th e form
of a v e h i c l e f o r p r e - c o n s t i t u t e d t r u t h s , " and "no r e a l
problem may any longer a r i s e " ( 2 ) .
To c on ceive of d i s c o u r s e in th e m a c r o - r h e t o r i c a l terms
of i t s need to renew i t s e l f , to grow, and to expand is to
b r in g about a major change in our p e r c e p t i o n of and
a p pro ach to d i s c u r s i v e p r a c t i c e s , and to e s t a b l i s h what
H e rb e rt ¥. Simons c a l l s an "em ancipatory" r h e t o r i c "worthy
of a c e n t r a l p la c e in th e academy" (2 1 ). Such a
16
p e r s p e c t i v e w i l l h e lp to f o s t e r in us an i r o n i c a l
s e l f - a w a r e n e s s of what might be c a l l e d " i n v e n t i o n a 1
c o n ti n g e n c i e s " of th e p o s i t i o n s we a r e t a k i n g , a d v o c a tin g
or d e fe n d in g . I t w i l l p re v e n t new t h e o r i e s , in c lu d in g a l l
t h e o r i e s on r h e t o r i c a l in v e n t i o n , from h a rd e n in g in to
dogmas. And i t w i l l a l s o c a l l i n to q u e s t io n many alarm s
and a n x i e t i e s about a d i s a b l i n g f r a g m e n ta tio n or a
s u f f o c a t i n g t o t a l i z a t i o n a t th e m e t a d i s c u r s i v e l e v e l , even
though th e sounding of t h e s e alarm s and th e e x p r e s s io n of
t h e s e a n x i e t i e s make im p o rtan t c o n t r i b u t i o n s to th e c o p ia
of speech and thou gh t a t th e d i s c u r s i v e level , and a re
t h e r e f o r e an i n t e g r a l p a r t of th e p ro c e s s we c a l l
r h e t o r i c a l in v e n tio n . F a i l u r e to c o n s id e r th e p o s s i b i l i t y
of u sin g in v e n t i o as a c o n ce p tu a l model fo r stu d y in g
d i s c o u r s e or to d i s t i n g u i s h between in v e n ti o as a p o i n t of
view and i n v e n t i o as the c e n t r a l p a r t of r h e t o r i c a l p r a x i s
o f t e n makes i t v e ry d i f f i c u l t , i f not a l t o g e t h e r
i m p o s s ib le , f o r champions of r h e t o r i c to sound p e r s u a s i v e .
Simons concedes, in h i s o f t e n p e r c e p t i v e comments on
what he a c c la im s as th e " r h e t o r i c a l tu rn " in modern
i n t e l l e c t u a l h i s t o r y , t h a t t h e r e i s a " g r e a t iron y of th e
r h e t o r i c of i n q u ir y movement" in t h a t th e "more t r e n c h a n t
and f a r r e a c h in g i t s c r i t i q u e of o b j e c t i v i s m , th e more is
th e claim of i t s r e c o n s t r u c t i v e p o t e n t i a l re n d e re d
s u s p e c t , " f o r "once you co n ce iv e of r e a l i t y a s r h e t o r i c a l l y
17
c o n s t i t u t e d , and of re a s o n as r h e t o r i c a l l y j u s t i f i e d , you
a r e l e f t v u l n e r a b l e to th e charge of b e in g u n a b le to
v o u ch safe your own c la im s , i n c lu d in g c la im s about the
p o s s i b i l i t i e s f o r a r e c o n s t r u c t i v e r h e t o r i c of in q u iry "
(2 0 ). To t h i s l in e of argument he a d m its t h a t he could
o f f e r no "pat a n s w e r s ” e x ce p t to i n s i s t , a s an a r t i c l e of
f a i t h , t h a t th e g e n e ra l prem ise of th e r h e t o r i c i a n "must
be" t h a t "even i f re a so n i s r h e t o r i c a l , some re a so n s a re
s u r e l y s u p e r i o r to o t h e r s ” (2 2). For a " r h e t o r i c of
in q u ir y " a s Simons and o t h e r s have c o n c e iv e d , i t is indeed
a t h e o r e t i c a l impasse to make commitment to an
a n t i - o b j e c t i v i s t s ta n c e on the one hand, and on th e o t h e r
to b e l i e v e in th e p o s s i b i l i t y fo r " d i s c o v e r i n g , as [Wayne]
Booth p u ts i t , th o se 'good r e a s o n s ' t h a t r e a l l y w a rran t
a s s e n t " ( 6 ) . From th e p e r s p e c t i v e of a " r h e t o r i c of
in v e n tio n " concerned w ith th e problem of enrichm ent and
p r o d u c t i v e n e s s r a t h e r th a n t h a t of a d j u d i c a t i o n , however,
th e "boomeranging" of r h e t o r i c ’s c r i t i q u e of o b j e c ti v i s m is
a n o n - i s s u e . For one t h i n g , t h i s seeming
s e l f - i n c r i m i n a t i o n can well be seen as th e in v e n tio n a l
mechanism t h a t e n s u re s th e c o n s t a n t s e l f - r e n e w a l of the
d i s c o u r s e on r h e t o r i c in an e n d le s s s e r i e s of s t a s e s . A
d i s c o u r s e w ith o u t a b u i l t - i n s e l f - c o n t r a d i c t i o n a t i t s core
i s a c lo s e d , s t e r i l e , dead d i s c o u r s e in c a p a b le of f u r t h e r
grow th. And i f a d i s t i n c t i o n is made between r h e t o r i c as
18
a d i s c o u r s e and r h e t o r i c as a m e ta d is c o u r s e , or between a
r h e t o r i c t h a t i s g r a p p l i n g w ith " o b je c tiv is m " on th e same
d i s c u r s i v e t e r r a i n , and a r h e t o r i c t h a t s e r v e s a s a
p e r s p e c t i v e on " o b je c tiv is m " and i s t h e r e f o r e above what is
a p p l i c a b l e to th e l a t t e r , t h e r e is no need w hatsoev er fo r
r h e t o r i c to be a p o l o g e t i c o r d e f e n s i v e f o r th e
s e l f - c o n t r a d i c t i o n im plied in i t s claim t h a t r e a l i t y is
r h e t o r i c a l l y c o n s t i t u t e d or t h a t p r o b a b i l i t y i s th e s o l i d
f o u n d a tio n of in q u ir y .
That t h e s e l i n e s of c o u n te r-a rg u m e n t a g a i n s t c r i t i c s
of r h e t o r i c should f a i l to su g g e st th e m se lv e s, and the
ten den cy toward a "phi 1o s o p h i z a t i o n ” of r h e t o r i c should
have escaped the a t t e n t i o n even of contem porary
r h e t o r i c i a n s , ^ d ra m a tiz e s th e need to a d d re s s or r e - a d d r e s s
a number of t h e o r e t i c a l i s s u e s b e fo r e we can b r i n g a b ou t a
gen uine r e n a i s s a n c e of r h e t o r i c in our tim e. How a r e we,
f o r i n s t a n c e , to c o n c e p t u a l i z e th o s e " a rc h a ic " a s s e r t i o n s
t h a t "move" and inform our d i s c o u r s e ? I f th e y a r e not
e t e r n a l " p r i n c i p l e s , " how a r e we to acco un t f o r t h e i r
fo rm a tio n , i n t e r a c t i o n , e v o l u t i o n or m u ta tio n ? I f t h i s is
indeed th e d e s i r a b l e r o l e i t has to p la y , what kind of
"communities" would i t b r in g i n to being" Do th e
"communities" in t u r n " c ir c u m s c r ib e , d e te rm in e and
a r t i c u l a t e th e realm of d i s c o u r s e " ? And most i m p o r ta n tly ,
i f th e w i 11 - t o - t r u t h i s no longer ta k e n fo r g r a n te d a s th e
19
t e l o s f o r a l l d i s c u r s i v e p r a c t i c e s , and th e N ie tz sc h e a n or
F o u c a u lt i a n w i 11-to -p o w e r is u n l i k e l y to win a consensus
from th e e n t i r e i n t e l l e c t u a l community, can the
wi 11- t o - i n v e n t , to borrow a term used in E ric C h arles
W h ite ’ s stu d y of l i t e r a r y c r e a t i o n , 4 be a v a l i d a l t e r n a t i v e
to g iv e us a sense of p urpose? I f i t can, what would be
th e i m p l i c a t i o n s of i t s a c c e p ta n c e as an u l t i m a t e end?
These a r e not e n t i r e l y new q u e s t i o n s , and many answers
a r e a l r e a d y a v a i l a b l e from, f o r example, t h e o r i s t s and
c r i t i c s of p h i l o s o p h i c a l or l i t e r a r y d i s c o u r s e s . Few
s y s te m a t i c a t t e m p t s , however, have been made to a d d re s s
th e s e is s u e s d i r e c t l y from a r h e t o r i c a l p e r s p e c t i v e , even
though in th e works of g r e a t r h e t o r i c a l t h e o r i s t s of our
tim e, such as Kenneth Burke and Chaim Perelm an, we do f in d
i n s p i r i n g d i r e c t i o n s f o r t a c k l i n g t h e s e seem ingly
i n t r a c t a b l e problem s. The p r e s e n t stu d y w i l l , t h e r e f o r e ,
a d d re s s i t s e l f to major t h e o r e t i c a l i s s u e s r e l a t e d to th e
problem of i n v e n t i o in our post-m odern age. By a n a ly z in g
what i n f l u e n t i a l t h e o r i e s of th e " p h ilo s o p h iz e d " r h e t o r i c
have to say about i n v e n t i o n , and by comparing th e s e w ith an
" i n v e n t i o n a l " r h e t o r i c r e c o n s t r u c t e d on th e b a s i s of
i n s i g h t s from c l a s s i c a l r h e t o r i c s and t h e i r modern
r e i n c a r n a t i o n s , I w i l l a tte m p t to d e f i n e an a l t e r n a t i v e
m a c r o - r h e t o r i c a l model f o r c o n c e p t u a l i z i n g the p r o d u c tiv e
mode of our d i s c o u r s e , and to see what f r e s h answers I can
p r o v id e fo r many of the
d i s c u s s i o n . None of t h e s e
sense t h a t th ey re v e a l th e
d i s c o u r s e .
p ro v id e new ways of
s u g g e s t, as R ichard
s to p doing th o se
They a r e "good"
or i e n t a t ion
d i v e r s i
d i s c o u r s e in g e n e ra l and on
20
in t h i s
in the
human
is to
and to
"we m ight want to
(9) .
if th e new c o n ceptu al
i b u te s to the v a r i e t y ,
p r e s e n t d i s c u s s i o n on
i n v e n ti o in p a r t i c u l a r .
q u e s t i o n s r a i s e d
answers a r e " c o r r e c t "
u l t i m a t e “t r u t h ” about
R a th e r, what th ey can do, a t b e s t ,
loo kin g a t some o ld i s s u e s ,
R orty t e l l s u s, t h a t
to ld ] t h i n g s and do som ething e l s e
answ ers, however,
they p o i n t to c o n tr
t y , and enrichm ent of
21
C hapter I: I n v e n tio n , D isco v ery and C r e a tio n
Ever s i n c e th e age of c l a s s i c a l r h e t o r i c , a t t e m p t s to
d e f i n e in v e n ti o seem to have led above a l l e l s e to a
f r u s t r a t i n g r e a l i z a t i o n of th e d i f f i c u l t y of th e p r o j e c t .
Thus e x ce p t f o r Ad Herennium . where i n v e n t i o n i s e x p l i c i t l y
d e fin e d as "the d e v i s i n g of m a t t e r , t r u e or p l a u s i b l e ,
t h a t would make th e c ase co n v in c in g " ( I . I I . 3 ) , c l a s s i c a l
r h e t o r i c i a n s g e n e r a l l y p r e f e r to l e t th e meaning of t h i s
c r u c i a l concept rem ain u n d e rs to o d , and a m b ig u ity o f t e n
a r i s e s when th e y do r e f e r to i t d i r e c t l y . A r i s t o t l e , f o r
example, a p p e a rs t o c o n t r a d i c t h i s im plied e q u a tio n of
i n v e n t i o n w ith r h e t o r i c as a power to " d isc o v e r" th e
p o s s i b l e means of p e r s u a s io n when he h o ld s , having
d i s t i n g u i s h e d between " i n a r t i f i c i a l " and " a r t i f i c i a l "
p r o o f s , t h a t "we have only to make use of th e fo rm er,
whereas we must in v e n t th e l a t t e r " (R h e t o r i c . I. I I . 2.
1355b, emphasis a d d ed). And a lth o u g h Ad Herennium makes i t
amply c l e a r t h a t b o th " tr u e " and " p l a u s i b l e " m a tte r f a l l
w i t h i n th e scope of i n v e n t i o n , th e c l a r i t y i s a c h ie v e d a t
th e expense of s t r e t c h i n g th e meaning of th e v e rb "to
d e v is e " to such an e x t e n t t h a t i t co v ers v i r t u a l l y
e v e r y t h in g from "to make use of" to "to f a b r i c a t e , " th u s
le a v in g th e r e a d e r w ith a n o t i o n of i n v e n t i o n as fuzzy as
22
e v e r. T his d i f f i c u l t y w ith th e d e f i n i t i o n of i n v e n tio
p e r s i s t s , and p e rh a p s th e most t y p i c a l modern e x p r e s s io n i t
has found i s in th e lack of d i s c r i m i n a t i o n , even in
t e c h n i c a l c o n t e x t s , among th e words " i n v e n t i o n ,"
" d isc o v e ry " and " c r e a t i o n . " In contem porary s c h o l a r l y
works on c l a s s i c a l r h e t o r i c , i t i s n o t uncommon f o r
i n v e n tio to be d e f i n e d as " [ t h a t ] p a r t of r h e t o r i c
concerned w ith th e d is c o v e r y of argum ents" (Conley 317,
emphasis added) or as " [ t h e ] g e n e r a t i o n , or c r e a t i o n . of
id e a s f o r a g iv e n d i s c o u r s e " (Welch 169). And i t h a rd ly
s t r i k e s us a s in any way unusual to f i n d in The N ature of
C r e a t i v i t y . a c o l l e c t i o n of contem porary p s y c h o lo g ic a l and
p h i l o s o p h i c a l p e r s p e c t i v e s on th e s u b j e c t , an e ssa y t i t l e d
"The P o s s i b i l i t i e s of I n v e n t i o n ," which f r e q u e n t l y u se s
"d isc o v ery " as a v a r i a t i o n f o r e i t h e r " in v e n tio n " or
" c r e a t i o n " (3 6 2 -3 8 5 ).
The v i r t u a l syn on ym ization of th e t h r e e words might be
e x p la in e d d i f f e r e n t l y . B e sid es p o i n t i n g to th e same old
am b ig u ity t h a t has c o n s i s t e n t l y c h a r a c t e r i z e d our
u n d e rs ta n d in g of r h e t o r i c a l in v e n t i o n , i t co u ld c o n c e iv a b ly
have r e s u l t e d , f o r i n s t a n c e , from th e more mundane need to
a v o id t e d i o u s r e p e t i t i o n . Yet i f th e a s s o c i a t i o n of th e s e
words i n to an alm ost in te r c h a n g e a b l e t r i o i s viewed from a
h i s t o r i c a l p e r s p e c t i v e , or i s p la c e d a g a i n s t th e background
of th e long p r o c e s s of human i n q u ir y i n to th e g e n e s i s of
23
d i s c o u r s e , t h i s seem ingly u n p ro b le m a tic l e x i c a l c l u s t e r
becomes so p re g n a n t w ith i n v e n t i v e p o s s i b i l i t i e s t h a t we
can h a r d l y a f f o r d to d is m is s i t c a s u a l l y as stemming from
a mere q u e s t f o r e le g a n t v a r i a t i o n . I f , t h a t i s , i n s t e a d
of c o n ti n u i n g to ta k e th e i n t e r c h a n g e a b i l i t y of th e t h r e e
c o n c e p ts f o r g r a n t e d , we b r i n g them in to p la y w ith each
o t h e r by s i t u a t i n g " in v e n tio n " somewhere between
" d isc o v e ry " on th e one s i d e and " c r e a t i o n ” on th e o t h e r ,
th e t r i o w i l l n ot only e p ito m iz e , d i a c h r o n i c a i l y , the
e v o l u t i o n and development of th e co ncep t of i n v e n t i o in the
p a s t two m i l l e n n i a , b ut a l s o b rin g in to focus
s y n c h r o n i c a l l y a p a i r of o pp osin g co n ce p tu a l o r i e n t a t i o n s
t h a t c o n s t i t u t e a " f o r c e f i e l d " w i t h in which much of
contem porary t h e o r i z i n g on i n v e n t i o n , i t seems, has taken
pi a c e .
S e m a n tic a lly sp e a k in g , to "d isc o v e r" i s to make
v i s i b l e or known som ething t h a t , though h id d en and unknown
p r e v i o u s l y , has alw ays been "out t h e r e , " som ething whose
e x i s t e n c e p r i o r to i t s " d isc o v e ry " i s im m ediately
re c o g n iz e d b ecau se of i t s fundam ental sameness w ith t h i s
or o t h e r o b j e c t a l r e a d y f a m i l i a r to u s, or becau se of i t s
b a s i c c o m p a t i b i l i t y w ith th e view s, a ssu m p tio n s , r u l e s we
c u s t o m a r il y h o ld . To " c r e a t e , " on th e o t h e r hand,
s u g g e s ts b r i n g i n g in to b e in g som ething t h a t has never
b e f o r e e x i s t e d , some s t r a n g e e n t i t y sn a tc h e d ex n i h i l o
24
which i s , presum ably, c o m p le te ly d i f f e r e n t from w hatever
has been a c c e p te d as p a r t of th e " r e a l i t y , " and which
t h e r e f o r e r e f u s e s to f i t in w ith our h a b i t u a l scheme of
c o n c e iv in g th e w orld. In making a " d i s c o v e r y ," we i d e n t i f y
th e unknown w ith th e known. In making a " c r e a t i o n , " we
d i f f e r r a d i c a l l y from th e known. I f we t r a n s l a t e a l l t h e s e
se m an tic d i s t i n c t i o n s i n to r h e t o r i c a l te rm s, t h a t i s , i f we
see b o th " d isc o v e ry " and " c r e a t i o n " in term s of a speech
a c t in v o lv in g an a d d r e s s e r ( t h e " d i s c o v e r e r " or th e
" c r e a t o r " ) and an a d d r e s s e e ( th e "world" or th e P erelm an ian
" u n iv e r s a l a u d ie n ce " p r i o r to th e a c t of "d isc o v ery " or
" c r e a t i o n " ) , th e in v e n tio n -c u m - d is c o v e r y would th en
p resu p p o se a mode of d i s c u r s i v e p r o d u c t i o n t h a t i s
d e c i d e d l y o r i e n t e d toward f i n d i n g new ways f o r r e a f f i r m i n g
a fundam ental sam eness, tow ard, t h a t i s , renewing an
agreem ent w ith what th e "world" or what b o th th e sp eak er
and th e a u d ie n c e h o ld , c o n s c i o u s ly or u n c o n s c io u s ly , as
" tr u e " or " v a l i d ; " and th e i n v e n t i o n - c u m - c r e a t i o n , on th e
o t h e r hand, would imply an o r i e n t a t i o n in j u s t th e o p p o s i t e
d i r e c t i o n : to in v e n t in t h i s sen se i s to s e a r c h f o r ways to
d e f i n e a fundam ental d i f f e r e n c e from, or to a r t i c u l a t e a
gen uine d isa g re e m e n t w ith , w hatever i s b e in g a d d re s s e d .
Thus d e s p i t e a l l th e i n t e r e s t in A r i s t o t l e ’s
d iv e r g e n c e from P l a t o ’s s u p e r n a t u r a l i s m on th e is s u e of
p o e t i c p r o d u c t i o n , what seems more s i g n i f i c a n t in
25
c o m p arativ e s t u d i e s of th e two a s sem inal t h e o r i s t s of
l i t e r a r y d i s c o u r s e i s t h e i r s u b s c r i p t i o n to th e same
m im etic model of i n v e n t i o . Whether th e t e l o s of th e
d i s c o u r s e i s a s e t of t r a n s c e n d e n t a l " id e a s" or of "forms"
immanent in " n a t u r e , " or w hether i t s achievem ent i s th ro u g h
a d i v i n e i n s p i r a t i o n or th ro u g h r a t i o n a l work, th e dynamics
of i n v e n t i o n f o r b o th P l a t o and A r i s t o t l e Cas th e a u th o r of
th e P o e t i c s ) i s j u s t th e same s t r i v i n g to d i s c o v e r a h idden
" u l t i m a t e r e a l i t y . " Perelm an s u g g e s ts t h a t from a
r h e t o r i c a l p o i n t of view, what we deem the " r e a l " sh ou ld be
u n d e rs to o d as a c la im to " u n c o n t r o v e r te d , u n i v e r s a l
agreem ent" or to " v a l i d i t y " v i s - a - v i s th e s o - c a l l e d
" u n i v e r s a l a u d i e n c e , ” or t h a t i t can well be se en a s a
" c o n s t r u c t i o n " t h a t p r o v id e s a " c r i t e r i o n , " a "norm” or a
" r u l e ” f o r o r d e r i n g th e o f t e n in c o m p a tib le " m u lt i p le
a s p e c t s " of th e phenomenal "appearance" i n to a c o h e re n t
" h ie r a r c h y " a c c e p t a b l e to a l l (New R h e to r ic 66-67,
4 1 6 -4 1 7 ). Seen from t h i s p e r s p e c t i v e , th e p r i n c i p l e of
mimesis in th e t h e o r i e s of th e two Greek t h i n k e r s would
a p p ea r to s i g n i f y a q u e s t , th ro u g h th e a c t of w r i t i n g or
sp e a k in g , f o r a " u n i v e r s a l ” agreem ent or f o r a d e f i n i t i o n
of th e s e t of c r i t e r i a , t a c i t l y a g re ed upon by a l l , which
presum ably makes i t p o s s i b l e fo r us to o r g a n i z e the
c h a o t i c , c o n f 1i c t i n g phenomena 1 d a ta in to an o rd e re d " te x t"
we c a l l th e "world" or " r e a l i t y . " T h is i s a s tr o n g v e r s i o n
26
of in v e n t i o n - c u m - d is c o v e r y , and p ro b a b ly by d i n t of th e
j o i n t a u t h o r i t i e s of P l a t o and A r i s t o t l e , i t had in time
become so w id e ly a c c e p te d a s th e model f o r c o n c e p t u a l i z i n g
d i s c o u r s e t h a t in h i s c e l e b r a t e d apology f o r p o e t r y , S i r
P h i l i p Sidney should o b se rv e t h a t " [ t h e r e ] i s no a r t
d e l i v e r e d to mankind t h a t h a th n o t th e works of n a t u r e f o r
h i s p r i n c i p a l o b j e c t , w ith o u t which th ey co u ld not c o n s i s t ,
and on which they so depend, a s th ey become a c t o r s and
p l a y e r s , a s i t were, of what n a t u r e w ill have s e t f o r t h "
(Adams 157).
S idney, however, c a l l s i n to q u e s t i o n t h i s
s in g le -m in d e d o r i e n t a t i o n toward " n a t u r e ” and hence
c h a l le n g e s th e v a l i d i t y of th e o ld m im etic model. For him,
th e id e a l "maker" of d i s c o u r s e i s " th e p o et [w ho],
d i s d a i n i n g to be t i e d to any such s u b j e c t i o n , l i f t e d up
w ith th e v ig o r of h i s own i n v e n t i o n , d o th grow in e f f e c t
a n o th e r n a t u r e , in making t h i n g s e i t h e r b e t t e r th a n n a t u r e
b r i n g e t h f o r t h , or q u i t e anew, forms such a s n ever were in
n a t u r e . . . . " (Adams 157). The "n a tu re " r e f e r r e d to h e r e ,
j u s t l i k e o t h e r magic words such a s " t r u t h " or " r e a l i t y , "
i s one of th o s e p r i v i l e g e d c o n s t r u c t s t h a t p resu p p o se an
" u n c o n t r o v e r t e d ” agreem ent and a r e in f a c t d e r i v a t i v e of
th e co n cep t of th e " u n i v e r s a l a u d ie n c e ." By s u g g e s t i n g
t h a t th e "v ig o r" of " in v e n tio n " sh o u ld lead to th e "making"
of " t h in g s . . . q u i t e anew," Sidney a tt e m p ts to b r i n g
27
about a r a d i c a l s h i f t in th e o r i e n t a t i o n of d i s c u r s i v e
p ro d u c tio n . While h i s advocacy of a s e a r c h f o r fundam ental
d isa g re e m e n t as th e prime mover o f d i s c o u r s e marks an
im p o r ta n t s t e p in t h e a s c e n s i o n of t h e
i n v e n t i o n - c u m - c r e a t i o n model, th e f u l l i m p l i c a t i o n of h i s
i n s i s t e n c e on v a l o r i z i n g th e "making" of "forms such as
never were in n a tu r e " was n ot t h e o r i z e d u n t i l Kant
fo rm u la te d h i s d e f i n i t i o n of "genius" in The C r i t i q u e of
Judgm ent:
We th u s see (1) t h a t g e n iu s i s a t a l e n t f o r
p ro d u c in g t h a t f o r which no d e f i n i t e r u l e can be
g iv e n ; i t i s not a mere a p t i t u d e f o r what can be
l e a r n t by a r u l e . Hence o r i g i n a l i t y must be i t s
f i r s t p r o p e r t y . (2) But s i n c e i t a l s o can
produce o r i g i n a l n on sense, i t s p r o d u c ts must be
m odels, i . e . exem plary; and th e y c o n s e q u e n tly
ought not to s p r i n g from i m i t a t i o n , but must
s e r v e as a s t a n d a r d or r u l e of judgment f o r
o t h e r s . (3) I t can no t d e s c r i b e or i n d i c a t e
s c i e n t i f i c a l l y how i t b r i n g s a bo ut i t s p r o d u c t s ,
b ut i t g iv e s th e r u l e j u s t as n a t u r e does.
(R othenberg e t a l . 38)
For Kant, th e p r i v i l e g e d form of " p ro d u c tio n " should
be th e one t h a t c r e a t e s new r u l e s by and f o r i t s e l f , the
one which b r i n g s f o r t h o r i g i n a t i v e models f o r i m i t a t i o n
r a t h e r th a n " s p r in g in g " from i m i t a t i o n . A lthough Kant
s u g g e s ts t h a t g e n iu s a s " th e in n a te p r o d u c t i v e f a c u l t y of
th e a r t i s t " sh ou ld be u n d e rs to o d w i t h i n th e framework of
" N a tu re ," or t h a t i t i s in f a c t th e "medium" by which
N ature "p r e s c r i b e t s ]" r u l e s (R othenberg e t a l . 3 9), the
"Nature" he i s t a l k i n g about i s q u i t e d i f f e r e n t from th e
28
" n a tu r e " in S id n e y ’s t r e a t i s e . In r h e t o r i c a l term s, Sidney
means by " n a tu re " a g e n e r a l agreem ent on th e way t h in g s
a r e , w hereas the K a n tia n co n cep t of "Nature" seems more a
p r o c e s s th a n a s t a t e , w ith g e n iu s as i t s mechanism f o r
c o n s t a n t change or ren ew al. In d e f i n i n g i n v e n t i o n a s th e
"making" of t h in g s b e t t e r th a n what n a t u r e b r i n g s f o r t h or
t h i n g s t h a t were never in n a t u r e , Sidney s t i l l c l i n g s to
" n a tu re " a s a c e n t r a l con cept and what he s u g g e s t s i s in
f a c t t h a t to in v e n t i s to improve on and to expand th e
" u n i v e r s a l " lo g o s. Kant, on th e o t h e r hand, lay s emphasis
on an e th o s - c e n t e r e d model of i n v e n t i o n , w ith th e s p e a k e r
t r y i n g to a d d re s s her a u d ie n c e in h e r own " o r i g i n a l ” term s
and to c r e a t e an a l t e r n a t i v e lo go s a c c o rd in g to h e r own
" r u l e s ."
Kant d id n o t , of c o u r s e , see h i s model of d i s c u r s i v e
p r o d u c t i o n in th e c o n te x t of a r h e t o r i c a l th e o r y . He
d i s m is s e s th e e n t i r e co n cep t of p e r s u a s i o n when he o b s e r v e s
in th e same e ssa y t h a t " [ r h e t o r i c ] , so f a r a s t h i s i s ta k e n
to mean th e a r t of p e r s u a s i o n , i. e . , th e a r t of d e lu d in g
by means of a f a i r sem blance, . . . m e r i t s no r e s p e c t
w hatever" (G ra s s i 19). Yet th e c a r e f u l q u a l i f i c a t i o n he
g i v e s to th e " r h e t o r i c " as th e o b j e c t of h i s a t t a c k
s u g g e s t s t h a t he was not unaware of th e p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t
h i s th e o r y could be r h e t o r i c a l l y i n t e r p r e t e d i f " r h e t o r i c "
were d e f i n e d in a l e s s r e s t r i c t e d way, or t h a t i t c ou ld be
29
ta k e n f o r a model of i n v e n t i o — even though he d id not
r e a l i z e what impact i t would s t i l l be e x e r t i n g on th e l a t e
t w e n t i e t h - c e n t u r y s t u d i e s of d i s c o u r s e . His "genius" has
a p p a r e n t l y been renamed in G r a s s i ’s th e o ry a s th e
" f o r m u la to r s " of " a r c h a i c a s s e r t i o n s . " F o u c a u l t ’s
" o r i g i n a t o r s of d i s c o u r s e s " a r e p r e c i s e l y th o se whose
d i s c u r s i v e "p ro d u c ts" must s e r v e a s "models" or as
" s ta n d a r d or r u l e of judgment" f o r o t h e r s . And in R ichard
R o r t y ’ s v i s i o n of how d i s c o u r s e e v o lv e s , we have an even
more m i l i t a n t contem porary a tte m p t to e n th ro n e a
r a d i c a l i z e d K a n tia n model of in v e n tio n .
In h i s C on tin g ency . Iro n v and S o l i d a r i t y . R orty f a u l t s
what he term s th e " c a n o n ic a l P la to - K a n t sequence" of
p h ilo s o p h y f o r i t s b e l i e f in an " i n t r i n s i c n a tu r e " of
t h i n g s . Concepts such as " r e a l i t y , " " t r u t h ” or "essen ce"
a r e , he t e l l s u s , a "leg acy " of an age in which th e w orld
was seen a s h avin g been c r e a t e d once and f o r a l l by a
d i v i n e b e in g , and s u b s c r i p t i o n to t h e s e c o n c e p ts i n e v i t a b l y
commits one to a view of human d i s c o u r s e a s p r o g r e s s i n g
toward th e u l t i m a t e r e v e l a t i o n or d i s c o v e r y of an o r d e r
beyond tim e and change, whether we c a l l t h i s o rd e r th e
P l a t o n i c Id ea or th e H e g e lia n S p i r i t . R orty i s , of c o u rs e ,
f u l l y aware of th e sh a rp d i f f e r e n c e betw een P l a t o and Kant
in th e d i s c o v e r y / c r e a t i o n c o n tr o v e r s y . He f i n d s German
i d e a lis m " u n s a t i s f a c t o r y " no t because f o r th e f i r s t tim e in
30
th e i n t e l l e c t u a l h i s t o r y i t gave "a c l e a r se n se to th e
vague id e a t h a t human b e in g s make t r u t h r a t h e r th a n f in d
i t , " b u t, on th e c o n t r a r y , b ecau se Kant and Hegel went only
"halfway" in t h e i r " r e p u d i a ti o n " of th e id ea t h a t t r u t h i s
"out t h e r e , " because f o r them, "only h a l f of t r u t h — th e
bottom , s c i e n t i f i c h a l f — was made," w h ile th e " [ h ig h e r ]
t r u t h , th e t r u t h a b ou t mind . . . was s t i l l a m a t t e r of
d is c o v e r y r a t h e r th an c r e a t i o n " (4, em phasis added).
Seeking to tr a n s fo r m K a n t’s th e o r y in to a c o n s i s t e n t l y and
th o ro u g h ly c r e a t i o n - o r i e n t e d m o d el, R orty drops th e K an tian
n o t i o n of "g enius" a s th e " i n t r i n s i c " g e n e r a t i v e agency or
a s "th e i n n a t e p r o d u c t i v e f a c u l t y of th e a r t i s t " f o r the
sim p le re a s o n t h a t i t p o i n t s to som ething u n i v e r s a l ,
t i m e l e s s and "given" r a t h e r th a n c o n ti n g e n t and " c r e a t e d . "
In i t s s t e a d , he borrows from H arold Bloom th e co n cep t of
a " s tr o n g p o e t , " and p ro c e e d s to r e d e f i n e i n v e n t i o n in
term s of a c u l t u r a l l y s p e c i f i c s t r i v i n g to break out of the
"sp h ere of i n f lu e n c e " of th e e x i s t i n g " r u l e s . " Such a
" p o e t ” i s c h a r a c t e r i z e d n o t by a "stro n g " i n t r i n s i c f a c u l t y
of im a g in a tio n c a p a b le of u n i t i n g th e d i v e r s e and the
d i f f e r e n t , nor by a pen chan t to " r a t i o n a l i z e " or to
" s c i e n t i z e , " but by a r e s t l e s s u rg e to " p o e t i c i z e , " to
"slou gh o f f " o ld idiom s, to o f f e r an e n t i r e l y new
" r e d e s c r i p t i o n , " and to come up w ith " l i n g u i s t i c
in n o v a tio n s " d e p a r t i n g r a d i c a l l y from c u r r e n t ways of
31
t a l k i n g about t h i n g s (5 3 ). She i s , in o t h e r words,
d e f i n a b l e only by an " a n x i e ty of sam en ess," and what she
s t a n d s f o r i s th e tendency to d i f f e r or to d i s a g r e e . By
r e f r a i n i n g from going any f u r t h e r th a n th e h i s t o r i c i z e d
f i g u r e of a " s tr o n g p o e t ” in l o c a t i n g th e c r e a t i v e agency,
R orty su c ce ed s in doing two t h i n g s a t th e same tim e. He
no t o n ly e l i m i n a t e s what a p p e a rs to him to be a
" f o u n d a t i o n a l " v e s t i g e of K a n t’s model of i n v e n t i o n , but
a l s o r e a s s e r t s v i r t u a l l y a l l o t h e r major assu m p tio n s in th e
same model. His i n s i s t e n c e on th e v a l i d i t y of th e s e
a ssu m p tio n s i s such t h a t much of h i s own th e o ry on
d i s c u r s i v e p r o d u c t i o n t u r n s out to be an e l a b o r a t i o n on,
and a r a d i c a l i z a t i o n o f , two key K a n tia n p r i n c i p l e s : t h a t
none of th e e x i s t i n g " r u l e s ” or " c r i t e r i a ” a r e a p p l i c a b l e
to a g e n u in e ly "new" d i s c o u r s e , and t h a t th e emergence of
"new" d i s c o u r s e s i s in c a p a b le of b e in g d e s c r i b e d
" s c i e n t i f i c a l l y " or b ein g c o n c e p t u a l i z e d " r a t i o n a l l y . "
R orty se e s th e d i s c u r s i v e developm ent of human s o c i e t y
in term s of chan ging "language games" or s h i f t i n g
" v o c a b u l a r i e s . " He h o ld s t h a t c o n t r a r y to th e n a iv e b e l i e f
in a " f i n a l " language as an " o b j e c t i v e " e x i s t e n c e in which
th e u l t i m a t e t r u t h i s e x p re s s e d and from which o b j e c t i v e
v a l i d i t y i s d e r i v a b l e , a l l we have a r e d i f f e r e n t
" v o c a b u l a r i e s " w ith which we make d i f f e r e n t t h e s e
" v o c a b u l a r i e s " and " f in d a m etav o c ab u la ry which somehow
32
t a k e s a cc o u n t of a l l d o s s i b l e v o c a b u l a r i e s , a l l p o s s i b l e
ways of ju d g in g and f e e l i n g " ( x v i ) . S t a r t i n g from t h i s
a n t i - f o u n d a t i o n a l p re m ise , Rorty c o n c e iv e s of human
d i s c o u r s e s y n c h r o n i c a l l y a s th e c o e x i s t e n c e of a number of
in d e p e n d e n t, u n r e l a t e d and " e q u a l ” d i s c o u r s e s , which he
compares to many s e t s of t o o l s , each d e s ig n e d f o r a s p e c i a l
t a s k y e t a l l e q u a l l y i n d i s p e n s a b l e . D i a c h r o n i c a l l y , he
se e s th e e v o l u t i o n of d i s c o u r s e as a p r o c e s s of c o n s t a n t l y
r e i n v e n t i n g new t o o l s o r c o n s t a n t l y " r e d e s c r i b i n g " the
w orld. "On t h i s v iew ," he m a i n t a i n s , " g r e a t s c i e n t i s t s
in v e n t d e s c r i p t i o n s of th e w orld which a r e u s e f u l fo r
p u rp o se s of p r e d i c t i n g and c o n t r o l l i n g what happens, j u s t
as p o e ts and p o l i t i c a l t h i n k e r s inv ent o t h e r d e s c r i p t i o n s
of i t f o r o t h e r p u rp o se s" ( 4 ) , and i n t e l l e c t u a l and
c u l t u r a l h i s t o r y i s f o r him a m a tte r of "o ld m etaphors
c o n s t a n t l y dying o f f i n t o l i t e r a l n e s s , and then
s e r v i n g a s a p la t f o r m and f o i l f o r new m e ta p h o r s ” (1 6 ).
The com parison of th e d i v e r s e " d e s c r i p t i o n s " of the
w orld to d i f f e r e n t s e t s of t o o l s might h e lp to e r a d i c a t e
th e d e e p - s e a t e d p resu m p tio n about an u l t i m a t e
" d e s c r i p t i o n , " or to d r i v e home th e p o i n t t h a t " t h e r e i s no
sense in which any of t h e s e d e s c r i p t i o n s i s an a c c u r a t e
r e p r e s e n t a t i o n of th e way th e w orld is in i t s e l f " ( 4 ) . Yet
i t is obvious t h a t th e same metaphor may p o i n t to th e
o p p o s i t e i n t e r p r e t i v e d i r e c t i o n when th e c o o r d i n a t i v e s id e
33
of u s in g t h e s e t o o l s is em phasized or when they a r e se en as
b e in g d e s ig n e d f o r , and employed in , th e same p r o j e c t .
What a p p e a rs to be s e p a r a t e " d e s c r i p t i o n s " of th e w orld or
d i s t i n c t , u n r e l a t e d " v o c a b u l a r i e s , " in o t h e r words, might
be so i n t e r r e l a t e d w ith each o t h e r ( e . g . , by th e same
"gram m atical r u l e s " ) t h a t t o g e t h e r , th ey produce a u n i f i e d
p a t t e r n , even i f o n ly in th e form of a d i s c u r s i v e "m osaic."
R orty i s not i n s e n s i t i v e to t h i s do u b led -ed g ed
h e rm e n e u tic a l p o s s i b i l i t y of th e metaphor he u s e s .
Throughout h i s d i s c u s s i o n , he makes f r e q u e n t a t t e m p t s to
d is c o u r a g e t h in k i n g a lo n g th e c o o r d i n a t i v e l i n e by
employing s t i l l more m etaphors to s t r e s s th e fundam ental
d i s s i m i l a r i t y , in u t i l i t y and f u n c t i o n , of t h e s e " t o o ls "
and " d e s c r i p t i o n s . " I t i s b o th " u n d e s i r a b l e " and " f u t i l e , "
he i n s i s t s , to t r y to b r in g t o g e t h e r th e d i v e r s e
d i s c o u r s e s , f o r t h e s e a r e "as l i t t l e in need of s y n t h e s i s
as a r e p a i n t b r u s h e s and crow bars" ( x i v ) . O ther th a n t h i s
h i g h l y f i g u r a t i v e way of p l e a d in g h i s c a s e , however, R orty
o f f e r s few c o m p e llin g " rea so n s" f o r th e d e fe n s e o f h i s
c o n t r o v e r s i a l c la im . I f such a s t r a t e g y a p p e a rs more l i k e
an u n w a rran ted a s s e r t i o n th a n a well re a s o n e d , cogent
argum ent, R orty j u s t i f i e s i t by making y e t a n o th e r
a s s e r t i o n about d i s c u r s i v e p r a c t i c e s in g e n e r a l : s in c e
t h e r e i s no such th in g as a "m etavocabulary" t h a t can se rv e
as th e f i n a l a r b i t r a t o r when two d i s c o u r s e s a r e in c o n f l i c t
34
w ith each o t h e r , th e co ncep t of u n i v e r s a l l y b in d in g
c r i t e r i a i s a myth and a rg u m e n ta tio n in g e n e r a l has n o th in g
to do w ith th e outcome of what in f a c t i s a r u l e - f r e e
c o m p e titio n between u n r e l a t e d and incom p arable "m etaphors. "
A h i s t o r i c a l p e r s p e c t i v e on th e r i s e and f a l l of
" a l t e r n a t i v e language games," such as " a n c ie n t A then ian
p o l i t i c s v e r s u s J e f f e r s o n ’s" or th e "moral v o c a b u la r y of
S a in t Paul v e r s u s F r e u d ’s , " le a d s R o rty to th e c o n c lu s io n
t h a t " i t i s d i f f i c u l t to th in k of th e w orld as making one
of t h e s e b e t t e r th an a n o t h e r , of th e world a s d e c i d in g
between them" or t h a t "th e id ea t h a t th e world d e c id e s
which d e s c r i p t i o n s a r e t r u e can no lo n g er be g iv e n a c l e a r
s e n s e ” : th e f a c t t h a t Newton’s v o c a b u la ry l e t s us p r e d i c t
th e w orld more e a s i l y th a n A r i s t o t l e ’s "does not mean t h a t
th e w orld speaks Newtonian" ( 5 - 6 ) . The moral to be drawn
from t h i s new r e v e l a t i o n i s t h a t
the n o t io n s of c r i t e r i a and c h o ic e ( i n c l u d i n g
t h a t of " a r b i t r a r y " c h o ic e ) a r e no longer in
p o i n t when i t comes to changes from one language
game to a n o th e r . Europe d id n o t d e c id e to a c c e p t
th e idiom of Romantic p o e t r y , or of s o c i a l i s t
p o l i t i c s , or of G a l i l e a n m echanics. That s o r t of
s h i f t was no more an a c t of w i l l th a n i t was a
r e s u l t of argum ent. R a th e r, Europe g r a d u a l l y
l o s t th e h a b i t of u s in g c e r t a i n words and
g r a d u a l l y a c q u ir e d th e h a b i t of u s in g o t h e r s .
. . . C u l tu r a l change of t h i s m agnitude does not
r e s u l t from a p p ly in g c r i t e r i a (or from
" a r b i t r a r y d e c i s i o n " ) any more than i n d i v i d u a l s
become t h e i s t s or a t h e i s t s , or s h i f t from one
spouse or c i r c l e of f r i e n d s to a n o t h e r , as a
r e s u l t e i t h e r of a p p ly in g c r i t e r i a or of a c t e s
g r a t u i t s .( 6 )
35
T h is i s , o b v io u s ly , a r e a f f i r m a t i o n of th e K antian
p r i n c i p l e of " i n e x p l i c a b i l i t y " in a m a c r o - r h e t o r i c a l
c o n t e x t . J u s t as Kant i n s i s t s t h a t i n d i v i d u a l a c t of
c r e a t i o n i s in c a p a b le of b e in g e x p la in e d " s c i e n t i f i c a l l y "
or " r a t i o n a l l y , " so R orty s u g g e s ts t h a t th e change from one
language game to a n o th e r or th e emergence of new
" v o c a b u la r ie s " in th e broad h i s t o r i c a l scen e of d i s c u r s i v e
i n t e r a c t i o n s i s n o t the r e s u l t of a p p ly in g c r i t e r i a or
making a c h o ic e , hence is an a c t j u s t as random, haphazard
and i n e x p l i c a b l e . To su g g e st o t h e r w i s e , he m a i n t a i n s , is
to succumb to "th e more g e n e r a l t e m p t a t io n to t h in k of th e
w orld, or th e human s e l f , a s p o s s e s s i n g an i n t r i n s i c
n a tu r e " (6 ).
U n d e rly in g h i s sweeping d i s m is s a l of c r i t e r i o n ,
argument and c h o ic e a r e , in f a c t , not j u s t a c a t e g o r i c a l
d e n ia l of th e e x i s t e n c e of any " o b j e c t i v e , " " u n i v e r s a l " or
" t r a n s c e n d e n t a l " c r i t e r i a a p p l i c a b l e to a l l " v o c a b u la r ie s "
a l l th e tim e , but an im p lied d e n i a 1 of th e p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t
two i n t e r a c t i n g " v o c a b u la r ie s " a t a p a r t i c u l a r
s p a t io te m p o r a l p o i n t could have some c r i t e r i a in common
w ith each o t h e r . For R o rty , a "v ocab ulary " is i d e n t i f i a b l e
only by a s e t of c r i t e r i a s p e c i a l to i t s e l f , and a new
v o c a b u la r y , in so f a r as i t is "new," can n ev er be
u n d e rs to o d or judged by a p p ly in g th e c r i t e r i a of an "old"
v o c a b u la r y . "The t r o u b l e w ith argum ents a g a i n s t th e u se of
36
a f a m i l i a r and tim e -h o n o re d v o c a b u la ry i s , ” R orty o b s e r v e s ,
" t h a t th e y a r e e x p e c te d to be p h rased in t h a t v e ry
v o c a b u la ry " or a r e e x p e c te d to show t h a t " c e n t r a l e le m e n ts"
in t h a t v o c a b u la ry a r e " i n c o n s i s t e n t in t h e i r own term s" or
t h a t th e y " d e c o n s t r u c t th em se lv e s" (8 ), S ince th e two
c o n f l i c t i n g " v o c a b u l a r i e s " sh a re no common g r o u n d , in o t h e r
words, and s in c e none of th e "weapons" of th e new
"v o ca b u lary " have any e f f e c t in d e a l i n g w ith i t s opponent,
in o r d e r to a t t a c k th e old " v o c a b u la r y ," one has to b u i ld
a b a se i n s i d e i t s t e r r i t o r y , to g e t equipped w ith i t s own
"weapons," and in th e p r o c e s s to become i d e n t i f i e d w ith the
t a r g e t " v o c a b u la ry ." " I n t e r e s t i n g p h ilo so p h y " f o r R orty is
t h e r e f o r e " r a r e l y an e x a m in a tio n of th e p ro s and cons of a
t h e s i s "; r a t h e r , i t is u s u a l l y a " c o n te s t" betw een "an
e n tre n c h e d v o c a b u la ry which has become a n u is a n c e and a
h a lf - f o r m e d new v o c a b u la r y which v a g u ely p ro m ises g r e a t
t h i n g s " ( 9 ) .
The a c t u a l "method" f o r b r i n g i n g about d i s c u r s i v e
changes i s , R o rty t e l l s u s , "to r e d e s c r i b e l o t s and l o t s of
t h i n g s in new ways, u n t i l you have c r e a t e d a p a t t e r n of
l i n g u i s t i c b e h a v io r which w i l l tempt th e r i s i n g g e n e r a t i o n
to adopt i t " ( 9 ) . I t does not work " p ie c e by p i e c e ,
a n a l y z i n g concept a f t e r c o n c e p t, or t e s t i n g t h e s i s a f t e r
t h e s i s , " r a t h e r , i t works " h o i i s t i c a l l y " and
" p r a g m a t i c a l l y ” :
37
I t say s t h i n g s l ik e " t r y t h i n k i n g of i t t h i s
way” — or more s p e c i f i c a l l y , " t r y to ig n o re th e
a p p a r e n t l y f u t i l e t r a d i t i o n a l q u e s t i o n s by
s u b s t i t u t i n g th e f o llo w in g new and p o s s i b l y
i n t e r e s t i n g q u e s t i o n s . " I t does no t p r e t e n d to
have a b e t t e r c a n d i d a t e f o r d o in g th e same o ld
t h i n g s which we d id when we spoke in th e old
way. R a th e r , i t s u g g e s ts t h a t we m ight want to
s to p doing t h o s e t h i n g s and do som ething e l s e .
But i t does n o t arg u e f o r t h i s s u g g e s t i o n on th e
b a s i s of a n te c e d e n t c r i t e r i a common to th e old
and th e new language games. For j u s t i n s o f a r as
the new language r e a l l y i s new, t h e r e w i l l be no
such c r i t e r i a . (9)
What te n d s to sound l i k e " c r i t e r i a ” and "argum ents" a r e in
f a c t p s e u d o - c r i t e r i a and p se u d o -a rg u m e n ts, th o se which
p e o p le employ to g iv e t h e i r u n j u s t i f i a b l e a s s e r t i o n s or
i n e x p l i c a b l e p r e f e r e n c e s a fa c ad e of l o g i c a l c o n v i c t i o n .
I f a t tim e s p e o p le ap p ea r to be d e fe n d in g t h e i r p o s i t i o n s
by fo llo w in g a rg u m e n ta tiv e c o n v e n tio n s or re a s o n in g
p r o c e d u r e s , th e y a r e o n ly p r e t e n d i n g to a rg u e f o r som ething
t h a t i s by " n a tu re " in a r g u a b le . "To say t h a t F r e u d ’s
v o c a b u la r y g e t s a t th e t r u t h about human n a t u r e , or
Newton’s a t th e t r u t h about th e h e a v e n s ," R orty h o l d s , " i s
n ot an e x p l a n a t i o n of a n y t h i n g ; " r a t h e r , " i t i s j u s t an
empty compliment" t r a d i t i o n a l l y p a id t o w r i t e r s whose
"novel jarg o n " we have found more " u s e f u l" or more
" p r o f i t a b l e " th a n th e o ld one. Once we see th ro u g h th e
" t r u e n a tu r e " of a r g u m e n ta tio n , R orty goes on to s u g g e s t,
d i s c o u r s e r s sho uld f e e l under no o b l i g a t i o n to o f f e r
argum ents f o r what th ey a d v o c a te . They "sho uld no t be
38
ask ed f o r argum ents a g a i n s t [ f o r exam ple,] . . . th e
c o rre sp o n d e n c e th e o r y of t r u t h or th e id ea of the
' i n t r i n s i c n a t u r e of r e a l i t y ' " ( 8 ) . I n s t e a d , a l l th e y a r e
e x p e c te d to do i s to endeavor to make th e v o c a b u la r y th ey
f a v o r "look a t t r a c t i v e " by showing "how i t may be used to
d e s c r i b e a v a r i e t y of t o p i c s " ( 9 ).
R orty is f u l l y co nvinced t h a t " a n y th in g can be made to
look good or bad, im p o rta n t or u n im p o r ta n t, u s e f u l or
u s e l e s s , by b e in g r e d e s c r i b e d " (7 ). T h is c o n v i c t i o n has an
u n m is ta k a b le f l a v o r of what George A. Kennedy d e s c r i b e s a s
th e s o p h i s t i c a l " i n t o x i c a t i o n w ith th e u n l i m i t e d power of
th e word" (Kennedy 2 6 ), and indeed in h i s d i s m is s a l of an
" i n t r i n s i c n a tu r e " or of a " tr u e " r e a l i t y b eh in d a
d e c e p t i v e a p p e a ra n c e , R orty has ev ery re a s o n to esp ou se th e
b a s i c p r i n c i p l e s of a r h e t o r i c which has been condemned by
a t r u t h - b e l i e v i n g Kant as " th e a r t of d e lu d in g by means of
< ■
a f a i r sem blan ce." R o r t y ’s r e f u s a l to meet h i s o b j e c t o r s
in d i r e c t t h e o r e t i c a l e n c o u n te r s and e s p e c i a l l y h i s
d ow nright r e j e c t i o n of " c r i t e r i a " and "argum ents" as
r e l e v a n t c o n c e p ts , however, d e m o n s tra te t h a t he i s a t odds
w ith some of th e fundam ental a ssu m p tio n s of r h e t o r i c . For
one t h i n g , R orty shows a com plete d i s r e g a r d f o r th e
p r i n c i p l e of c o n t e x t , f o r what Kenneth Burke c a l l s th e
" s c e n e - a c t and s c e n e - a g e n t r a t i o s whereby th e q u a l i t y of
th e c o n te x t in which a s u b j e c t i s p la c e d w i l l a f f e c t th e
39
q u a l i t y of th e s u b j e c t p la c e d in t h a t c o n t e x t ” (A Grammar
of M otives 7 7 -7 8 ). He draws h i s c o n c l u s i o n a b o u t the
" i r r e l e v a n c e " of c o n c e p ts such as " c r i t e r i o n " or "argument"
from h i s e x a m in a tio n of th e h i s t o r i c a l developm ent of
d i s c o u r s e , which he s u g g e s ts to have shown t h a t " c u l t u r a l
change of [a g r e a t ] m agnitude does n ot r e s u l t from a p p ly in g
c r i t e r i a , ” o r t h a t E u ro p e ’s a c c e p ta n c e of " th e idiom of
Romantic p o e tr y " was by no means a " d e c is io n " re a c h e d on
th e b a s i s of arg um en ts. "The n o t i o n s of c r i t e r i a and
c h o ic e . . . a r e no longer in p o i n t , " he c o n te n d s, "when i t
comes to changes from one language game to a n o th e r " in th e
broad h i s t o r i c a l se n se . Yet he goes on to a p p ly what is
su p p o sed ly t r u e of a macro- r h e t o r ic a l s i t u a t i o n to a
m ic ro - r h e t o r i c a l one when he i n s i s t s t h a t a s p e c i f i c
d i s c o u r s e r a t a s p e c i f i c h i s t o r i c a l moment l i k e h im s e lf has
no o b l i g a t i o n to a rg u e f o r h i s own th e o r y , a s i f c o n te x t
were not a f a c t o r to be ta k e n i n t o s e r i o u s a cc o u n t and the
same id e a would alw ays ho ld t r u e however i t were
c o n t e x t u a l i z e d .
For a n o t h e r , a u d ie n c e seems n e v er a c o n s i d e r a t i o n when
R o rty u n d e rt a k e s to c o n s t r u c t h i s new d i s c u r s i v e o r d e r . I f
we, a s he has s u g g e s te d , have no way "to s t e p o u t s i d e th e
v a r i o u s v o c a b u l a r i e s we have em ployed," and i f a new and an i
o ld v o c a b u la r y s h a r e no " a n te c e d e n t c r i t e r i a " or no common
ground w h a tso e v e r, t h e r e sh o u ld be th e obvio us problem of
40
how u s e r s of th e o ld v o c a b u la r y g e t to u n d e r s ta n d th e new
idiom i f a l l t h a t i s a v a i l a b l e to them a r e t h e i r old
" l e x i c a l " c a t e g o r i e s , n o t to m ention how, by a p p ly in g th e
o l d , f a m i l i a r s t a n d a r d s or c r i t e r i a , u s e r s of th e o ld
v o c a b u la r y come to f i n d a t o t a l l y s t r a n g e v o c a b u la ry
" a t t r a c t i v e . " From a r h e t o r i c a l p o i n t of view, the
i n v e n t o r s or s p e a k e r s of th e new v o c a b u la r y , o r what R orty
c a l l s th e " s tr o n g p o e ts " of th e c u l t u r e , would have to be
a b l e to communicate w ith u s e r s of th e o l d , "en tre n ch e d "
ja r g o n , and to co nv in ce them t h a t th e new l e x ic o n i s indeed
th e more a t t r a c t i v e of th e two, b e f o r e t h e r e i s any hope to
" lu r e " th e a u d ie n c e i n to a c c e p t i n g th e new " r e d e s c r i p t i o n s "
and th u s to d i s p l a c e th e o ld p a r a d ig m a tic way of t a l k i n g
about t h i n g s e v e n t u a l l y . R o rty i s c o r r e c t in p o i n t i n g out
t h a t argum ents a g a i n s t th e use of "a f a m i l i a r and
tim e -h o n o re d v o c a b u la ry " a r e "ex p e c te d to be p h ra s e d in
t h a t v e ry v o c a b u l a r y ," which i s a n o th e r way of say in g t h a t
th ey sho uld be p h ra s e d in term s u n d e r s t a n d a b le to the
a u d ie n c e . He is wrong, however, in b e l i e v i n g t h a t i t is
p o s s i b l e to c ircum vent th e im p e ra tiv e of communication by
sim p ly p l a y i n g a l e x i c a l s l e i g h t of hand, t h a t i s , by
sim ply r e p l a c i n g " a rg u m e n ta tio n " w ith a " r e d e s c r i p t i o n "
made su p p o sed ly in a fu n d a m e n ta lly d i f f e r e n t language.
A ccording to h i s th e o r y , t h e r e i s c l e a r l y no such th in g as
a " n e u t r a l , " " o b j e c t i v e " or "u nbiased" group of v ie w e rs , so
41
t h a t i f a n y th in g can be made to look "good or bad,
im p o rta n t or u n im p o rta n t" by b e in g " r e d e s c r i b e d , " as he
s u g g e s t s , i t must n e c e s s a r i l y a p p ea r so to v ie w e rs w ith a
c e r t a i n e s t a b l i s h e d “t a s t e " or a s e t of e s t a b l i s h e d r u l e s
f o r making judgm ents, which is n e c e s s a r i l y a c o n s t i t u e n t
p a r t of t h e i r o ld " v o c a b u la r y ." E q u ally p r o b l e m a t i c i s h i s
c o n t e n t i o n t h a t by p r e t e n d i n g to a rg u e , a l i n g u i s t i c
in n o v a to r w ill be a b l e to win a c c e p ta n c e f o r h e r new
v o c a b u la r y . The q u e s t i o n h e re i s a g a i n from which
p e r s p e c t i v e th e s o - c a l l e d p se u d o -arg u m en ts a r e indeed
" f a l s e " or "sham." For j u s t b ecau se R orty d e c l a r e s t h a t
th e argum ents a r e in f a c t "empty co m p lim en ts," or j u s t
b e ca u se R o rty* s new v o c a b u la r y d e c i d e s t h a t th e y a r e bogus
r e a s o n s , does not g u a r a n t e e t h a t th e y would be p e r c e i v e d in
th e same way by an a u d ie n c e c o n v e r s a n t in , or i n c l i n e d to
making judgments a c c o rd in g to th e c o n v e n tio n s o f , th e o ld
v o c a b u la r y . R orty might assume t h a t th e a u d ie n c e a r e so
c r e d u lo u s as to be e a s i l y ta k e n in by some c o sm etic
c o u n t e r f e i t s , y e t from th e p o i n t of view of th o s e who a r e
won over by th e s e "arg u m e n ts," i t could be R o rty who is
s i n g l e - h a n d e d l y t r y i n g to w i l l in to "sham" argum ents th o se
good re a s o n s d i s c o u r s e r s have been com pelled to o f f e r by a
d i s c u r s i v e n e c e s s i t y .
R o r t y ’s d i s m is s a l o f c o n te x tu a l c o n s t r a i n t and
d i s r e g a r d f o r p a th o s p r e p a r e th e way f o r h i s i n s i s t e n c e ,
42
when i t comes to th e c e n t r a l problem of i n v e n t i o , on th e
paradigm of c r e a t i o n . By s i t u a t i n g i n v e n t o r s of d i s c o u r s e
am biguously betw een a m a c r o - r h e t o r i c a l and a
m i c r o - r h e t o r i c a l c o n t e x t , he dodges a d i r e c t answer to th e
c r u c i a l q u e s t i o n of how h i s new " v o c a b u l a r i e s " a re
o r i g i n a t e d . Yet h i s r e j e c t i o n of c r i t e r i a and
a rg u m e n ta tio n makes i t c l e a r t h a t d i s c u r s i v e in v e n t i o n is
f o r him n e i t h e r t r a n s a c t i o n a l nor i n t e r a c t i o n a l , or we may
say t h a t from R o r t y 's p o i n t of view, a new d i s c o u r s e or
" v o ca b u lary " r e s u l t s n e i t h e r from an i n t e r a c t i o n among
e x i s t i n g d i s c o u r s e s nor from a t r a n s a c t i o n between i t s
o r i g i n a t o r and an a u d ie n c e whose a d h e re n c e to her novel way
of d e s c r i b i n g t h i n g s she i s t r y i n g to win. I f we ta k e
s e r i o u s l y R o r t y ’s a r t i c l e of f a i t h — t h a t t h e r e i s no such
t h i n g as an " i n t r i n s i c " c r e a t i v e f a c u l t y , n o t even in th e
"mind" of th e " s t r o n g p o e t , " th e n in th e absen ce of a
s h a re d s e t of a s s u m p tio n s , r u l e s o r c r i t e r i a which a lo n e
e n a b le two d i s c o u r s e s to engage each o t h e r , new
v o c a b u l a r i e s must n e c e s s a r i l y come i n to b e in g by
th e m s e lv e s , in a m y s t e r i o u s l y sp o n ta n eo u s way. R orty
h im s e lf n e v er s p e l l s out t h i s l o g i c a l i n f e r e n c e from h i s
own p r e m is e s , and h i s r e t i c e n c e i n d i c a t e s t h a t he c o n s i d e r s
th e g e n e s i s of d i s c u r s i v e p r o d u c t i o n e i t h e r as som ething
u t t e r l y i n e x p l i c a b l e or a s an outw orn, " u n p r o f i t a b l e "
s u b j e c t , below th e a t t e n t i o n of th e new R ortyan d i s c o u r s e .
43
Yet th e c o n sp ic u o u s s i l e n c e R orty m a i n t a i n s on th e t o p i c i s
u n j u s t i f i a b l e even in h i s own term s. The p r o p e r t h i n g to
do f o r a r i s i n g new " v o c a b u la r y ," a c c o r d in g to R o rty , i s to
" r e d e s c r i b e " l o t s of [presum ably "o ld "! " th in g s " in ways
t h a t a p p e a r more i n t e r e s t i n g " or " u s e f u l" th a n th e ways of
th e o ld " e n tre n c h e d " j a r g o n s , w ith a view to e v e n t u a l l y
" l u r i n g " s p e a k e r s of th e o ld j a r g o n s i n t o a d o p ti n g th e new
le x ic o n . I t would be s e l f - d e f e a t i n g , t h e r e f o r e , f o r th e
new v o c a b u la r y e i t h e r to r e j e c t d i s d a i n f u l l y t o p i c s of
i n t e r e s t to th e a u d ie n c e i t i s t r y i n g to win o v e r, or to
e x clu d e from i t s " r e d e s c r i b i n g " program t h i n g s a l r e a d y with>>
n o rm ativ e or a c c e p te d " d e s c r i p t i o n s ” in t h e o ld ja r g o n s ,
f o r t o do so i s to make a v i r t u a l c o n f e s s i o n t h a t t h e r e a r e
t h i n g s which th e new v o c a b u la ry i s in c a p a b le of
" r e d e s c r i b i n g . " ><-'
S ince a m ajor p a r t of R o r t y ’s th e o r y c o n s i s t s in an
a tte m p t to c o n s t r u c t what in f a c t i s a model o f i n v e n t i o n ,
i t i s v e ry d i f f i c u l t f o r him to rem ain c o n s i s t e n t l y e v a s iv e
or non-co m m ittal c o n c e rn in g th e way d i s c o u r s e s g e t
produced. In h i s e a g e r n e s s to r e j e c t th e t r a n s a c t i o n a l
m o d e l, he c o u ld no t b u t invoke th e c o n ce p t of an i n t r i n s i c
" t a l e n t " when he d e c l a r e s a t one p l a c e t h a t he is
" sy m p a th e tic " to th e s u g g e s t i o n , su p p o se d ly made by the
l
"R om antics," t h a t "a t a l e n t f o r sp e a k in g d i f f e r e n t l y ,
r a t h e r th a n f o r a rg u i n g w e ll, is th e c h i e f in s tr u m e n t of
44
c u l t u r a l change" ( 7 ) . As c u l t u r a l change f o r him t a k e s the
form of v o c a b u la r y s h i f t s , to speak " d i f f e r e n t l y " could
o n ly mean to in v e n t a v o c a b u la r y so d r a s t i c a l l y d i f f e r e n t
from a l l e x i s t i n g v o c a b u l a r i e s a s to s h a re no common ground
w ith them, or we m ight say t h a t f o r R o rty , to in v e n t i s to
d i f f e r , and to d i f f e r r a d i c a l l y . I t is not c l e a r , however,
how one v o c a b u la r y can " d i f f e r " from o t h e r v o c a b u l a r i e s to
which i t i s u n r e l a t e d and w ith which i t i s incomparabl e .
On t h i s p i v o t a l p o i n t R o rty , a g a i n , never b o t h e r s to
e x p l a i n , p r o b a b ly becau se t h a t would v i o l a t e h i s p o l i c y of
no a r g u m e n ta tio n and would g r a n t t h e o b j e c t o r " h is c h o ic e
of weapons and t e r r a i n " ( 4 4 ) . Yet i t i s e q u a l l y p o s s i b l e
t h a t he would have g r e a t d i f f i c u l t y in e x p l a i n i n g even i f
he wanted t o . For in h i s su b se q u e n t d i s c u s s i o n on r e l a t e d
s u b j e c t s , h i s comments by i m p l i c a t i o n have so p r o b le m a tiz e d
h i s own model of i n v e n t i o n t h a t he h im s e lf becomes one of
i t s most i n v i d i o u s " o b j e c t o r s . "
He i s in fa v o r of an " i r o n i c a l " s ta n c e of f a c i n g up to
th e c o n t i n g e n c i e s of o n e ’ s " f i n a l v o c a b u la ry " or o n e ’s
"most c e n t r a l b e l i e f s and d e s i r e s , " f o r i n s t a n c e , and
a c c o rd in g to h i s own d e f i n i t i o n , "an i r o n i s t can no t g e t
a lo n g w ith o u t th e c o n t r a s t betw een th e f i n a l v o c a b u la r y she
i n h e r i t e d and th e one she i s t r y i n g to c r e a t e f o r h e r s e l f .
. . . I r o n i s t s have to have som ething to have d o u b ts a b o u t,
som ething from which to be a l i e n a t e d " (8 7 ). I n s t e a d of
45
sim ply c o n ju r i n g up an i r o n i s t d i s c o u r s e from an
i n t e l l e c t u a l v o id , t h a t i s , th e i r o n i s t can b r i n g i n to
b e in g th e new " f i n a l v o c a b u la ry " she i s t r y i n g to " c r e a t e "
f o r h e r s e l f o n ly th ro u g h " th e c o n t r a s t " w ith th e
" i n h e r i t e d , " o ld f i n a l v o c a b u la ry , w ith o u t which t h e r e
would be n o th in g to "have d o u b ts about" hence no c r e a t i o n
of a "new" v o c a b u la r y . T h is view c o n firm s h i s e a r l i e r
o b s e r v a t i o n t h a t th e " t r o u b le " w ith argu m en ts a g a i n s t th e
use of a f a m i l i a r v o c a b u la r y is t h a t th e y would have to be
"p hrased" in t h a t v e ry v o c a b u la r y in o r d e r to show t h a t
c e n t r a l e le m e n ts in t h a t v o c a b u la r y a r e " i n c o n s i s t e n t in
t h e i r own te r m s ," and i t r e b u t s a t th e same tim e h i s claim
t h a t i t i s p o s s i b l e to by pass th e need to "argue" w ith or
t o o t h e r w is e r e l a t e to th e o ld " v o c a b u l a r i e s " in th e
i n v e n t i o n of a new one. For th e v e ry a tt e m p t to get
" a l i e n a t e d " from t h e f a m i l i a r v o c a b u la ry would i n e v i t a b l y
lead to " [ t h e r e a f f i r m a t i o n o f] t h e same p r i n c i p l e of
c o n s i s t e n c y in i t s v e ry v i o l a t i o n " (Burke, A Grammar of
Mot iv es 3).
And when R o rty looks more c l o s e l y i n t o th e p r o c e s s or
mode of v o c a b u la ry s h i f t s , h i s [ r e l d e s c r i p t i o n of how
l e x i c a l g e s t a l t - w i t c h e s a r e b ro u g h t a b o u t a l s o te n d s to
c h a l le n g e th e v a l i d i t y of th e c la im s he has made about
i n v e n t i o n . The i r o n i s t , R o rty t e l l s us in one p l a c e , views
th e "sequence" of p h i l o s o p h i c a l t h e o r i e s n o t a s co n v erg in g
46
toward th e d i s c o v e r y of f i n a l t r u t h s , but as "g ra d u a l .
t a c i t s u b s t i t u t i o n s of a new v o c a b u la r y f o r an o ld one"
(77, em phasis ad d ed ). In a n o th e r p l a c e , R orty
c h a r a c t e r i z e s " i r o n i s t s " a s th o s e who " s p e c i a l i z e in
r e d e s c r i b i n g ra n g e s of o b j e c t s or e v e n ts in p a r t i a l l y
n e o l o g i s t i c j a r g o n , in th e hope of i n c i t i n g p e o p le to a d o p t
and e x te n d t h a t ja rg o n " (78, em phasis a d d e d ). From h i s
p e r s p e c t i v e , th e most s i g n i f i c a n t s i g n of th e i n t e l l e c t u a l
p r o g r e s s s i n c e th e 18th c e n t u r y is th e " r i s e " to
" p re e m in e n c e ," w i t h i n th e h ig h c u l t u r e of th e d e m o c ra c ie s,
of " l i t e r a r y c r i t i c i s m " which he r e d e f i n e s a s th e
" d i a l e c t i c " mode of c r i t i c i s m t h a t " c o n s t a n t l y changed th e
v o c a b u la r y in which th e o ld p l a t i t u d e s had been s t a t e d ,
i n s t e a d of c o n s t r u c t i n g p h i l o s o p h i c a l t h e o r i e s and a rg u i n g
f o r them ," and th e form such a " r i s e " t a k e s i s , a g a i n , a
"g ra d u a l and o n ly se m ic o n sc io u s a ssu m p tio n of th e c u l t u r a l
r o l e " (7 7 -7 8 , em phasis a d d e d ). To say t h a t th e new
v o c a b u la r y in th e p r o c e s s of i t s developm ent i s a
" p a r t i a l l y n e o l o g i s t i c ja rg o n " i s to say t h a t in e v ery
s t a g e of i t s f o r m a tio n , t h i s "new" v o c a b u la r y i s a m ix tu r e
of o ld and new le x ic o n s or is o n ly " p a r t i a l l y ” new. And to
d e s c r i b e th e t r a n s i t i o n from th e o ld t o th e new v o c a b u la r y
as a " g r a d u a l , " " t a c i t " o r " se m ic o n sc io u s" p r o c e s s i s to
adm it t h a t a t e v ery p a r t i c u l a r moment of i t s h i s t o r y , th e
47
new v o c a b u la r y in f a c t c o n t a i n s so l i t t l e t h a t i s r e a l l y
"new" t h a t i t s "newness" rem ains l a r g e l y s u b l i m i n a l .
There a r e good r e a s o n s why t h i s t a c i t , u n o b t r u s i v e
p r o c e s s sh o u ld c h a r a c t e r i z e th e way d i s c o u r s e s e v o lv e i f we
ta k e th e c o n c e p ts of a u d ie n c e and r h e t o r i c a l e f f i c i e n c y
i n t o c o n s i d e r a t i o n . S t u d i e s in modern i n f o r m a ti o n th e o r y
and r e a d in g p sy c h o lo g y , f o r i n s t a n c e , have long r e v e a l e d
th e p a r a d o x i c a l f a c t t h a t to f a c i l i t a t e th e p r o c e s s i n g of
in f o r m a ti o n a s som ething p r e v i o u s l y unknown to th e r e a d e r ,
i t i s n e c e s s a r y f o r a t e x t to be "re d u n d a n t" o r to c o n t a i n
a h ig h p e rc e n t a g e of p r e d i c t a b l e o ld in f o r m a ti o n ; t h a t
" r e a d e r s o f t e n l e a r n most from a t e x t which g i v e s them the
l e a s t 'i n f o r m a t i o n ' in t h e t e c h n i c a l s e n se of th e word;"
and t h a t "th e u l t i m a t e l y i n f o r m a tiv e t e x t , " or th e t e x t
t h a t "speaks" o n ly " d i f f e r e n t l y " and t h e r e f o r e s t r i k e s th e
r e a d e r s a s t o t a l l y "new" or " u n p r e d i c t a b l e , " would in f a c t
be "nonsense" b e ca u se o f i t s u t t e r i n c o m p r e h e n s i b i l i t y
(H irs c h 9 4 -9 6 ). T his p a r a d o x ic a l s i t u a t i o n is t r u e no t
o n ly of th e t e x t - r e a d e r r e l a t i o n s h i p in a m i c r o - r h e t o r i c a l
s e n s e , i t is o b v io u s ly a l s o t r u e of th e d i s c o u r s e - a u d i e n c e
r e l a t i o n s h i p in a m a c r o - r h e t o r i c a l s e n s e , f o r how o th e r w is e
can we e x p l a i n th e need to d i l u t e o ld " v o ca b u lary " w ith new
words in th e kin d of g r a d u a l , p a r t i a l l y " n e o l o g i s t i c , "
" se m ic o n sc io u s" e v o l u t i o n of v o c a b u l a r i e s R orty has
d e s c r i b e d f o r us? The "newness" in th e "new" v o c a b u la ry ,
48
from th e p o i n t of view of th e a u d ie n c e , can b e t t e r be
u n d e rs to o d a s a s t a t e of becoming c o n s c i o u s ly aware o f a
d i f f e r e n c e or a d is a g r e e m e n t betw een what th e y h o ld to be
th e c a se and what th e sp e a k e r p r e s e n t s to them as th e c a se .
I t i s , in o t h e r words, th e c u m u la tiv e e f f e c t of a
d i f f e r e n t i a l p r o c e s s t h a t goes on f o r e v e r w i t h i n th e
i n t e r a c t i n g "old" v o c a b u l a r i e s , r a t h e r th a n a p r e - d e f i n e d
t e l o s or e n d - p r o d u c t . c o n c e iv e d in a m y s te r io u s or
" i n e x p l i c a b l e " way by some e q u a l l y m y s te r io u s c r e a t i v e
g e n i u s , to be r e a l i z e d th ro u g h sh rew d ly and d e l i b e r a t i v e l y
employing p s e u d o - a r g u m e n ta tiv e d e co y s. And to c r e a t e such
an e f f e c t , i t r e q u i r e s a s i m u lta n e o u s r e a f f i r m a t i o n of what
i s "old" or " f a m i l i a r " to t h e a u d ie n c e .
Even th e "Romantics" who, a c c o r d in g to R o rty , r e a l i z e d
t h a t a " t a l e n t f o r sp e a k in g d i f f e r e n t l y , r a t h e r th a n f o r
a rg u i n g w e ll" i s th e a g e n t of c u l t u r a l change, were not
b l in d e d to t h i s ambiguous dual t h r u s t in th e c r e a t i o n of
new d i s c o u r s e s . Wordsworth might seem to be c o n firm in g
R o r t y 5s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n when he i n s i s t s t h a t "ev ery A u th or,
as f a r a s he i s g r e a t and a t th e same tim e o r i g i n a l , has
had th e t a s k of c r e a t i n g th e t a s t e by which he i s to be
en joyed" (6 5 7 ). Yet th e a u th o r of L y r i c a 1 Ba11 ads h a s t e n s
to add t h a t " [ t h e ] p r e d e c e s s o r s of an o r i g i n a l Genius of a
h ig h o r d e r w i l l have smoothed th e way fo r a l l t h a t he has
in common w ith them ;— and much he w ill have in common"
49
(6 5 8 ). . As i t t u r n s o u t, what Wordsworth means when he
s u g g e s t s t h a t th e " o r i g i n a l po et" sh o u ld " c r e a t e th e t a s t e ”
by which she i s to be " e n jo y e d ” i s p o l e s a p a r t from
R o r t y ’s program to speak " d i f f e r e n t l y " :
And where l i e s th e r e a l d i f f i c u l t y of c r e a t i n g
t h a t t a s t e by which a t r u l y o r i g i n a l Poet i s to
be r e l i s h e d ? I s i t in b r e a k in g th e bonds of
custom, in overcom ing th e p r e j u d i c e s of f a l s e
r e f i n e m e n t , and d i s p l a c i n g th e a v e r s i o n s of
in e x p e r ie n c e ? Or, i f he lab o u r f o r an o b j e c t
which h e r e and e lse w h e re I have pro p o sed to
m y se lf, does i t c o n s i s t in d i v e s t i n g t h e Reader
of th e p r i d e t h a t induces him to dwell upon
th o se p o i n t s w h e rein Men d i f f e r from each o t h e r ,
to t h e e x c l u s i o n of th o se in which a l l Men a r e
a l i k e , or th e sam e: and in making him ashamed of
th e v a n i t y t h a t r e n d e r s him i n s e n s i b l e of th e
a p p r o p r i a t e e x c e l l e n c e which c i v i l a rra n g e m e n ts ,
l e s s u n j u s t th a n might a p p e a r, and N atu re
i l l i m i t a b l e in h e r b ounty, have c o n f e r r e d on Men
who s ta n d below him in th e s c a l e of s o c i e t y ?
(658, em phasis added)
The " p r i n c i p a l o b j e c t " which Wordsworth s e t f o r h im s e lf is
a c c o r d i n g l y to "chuse i n c i d e n t s and s i t u a t i o n s from common
l i f e , and to r e l a t e or d e s c r i b e them, t h r o u g h o u t, a s f a r as
was p o s s i b l e , in a s e l e c t i o n of language r e a l l y used by
men" (5 9 6 -5 9 7 ). I t i s c l e a r t h a t from W ordsw orth’s p o in t
of view, what R orty has a d v o c a te d would have s e rv e d as one
more exem plar of th e " r e a l d i f f i c u l t y " of c r e a t i n g a new
t a s t e , f o r what seems to him th e most c r u c i a l in the
g e n e r a t i n g of a new d i s c o u r s e i s by no means to fo r m u la te
a s e t of c r i t e r i a or r u l e s h i t h e r t o unknown or
n o n - e x i s t e n t , or t o "dwell upon th o s e p o i n t s w h e rein Men
50
d i f f e r from each o t h e r , " to u se W ordsw orth’s own words.
R a th e r , i t i s to seek o ut th o s e p o i n t s in which " a l l Men
a r e a l i k e , or th e same," or to d i s c o v e r th e g r e a t e s t
"commonness" or agreem ent.
The em phasis Wordsworth la y s on th e d i s c o v e r y of th e
"common" o r even th e "same" a s th e s i n g l e most c r i t i c a l
a s p e c t in th e c r e a t i o n of a new p o e t i c language throws
l i g h t on th e ambiguous and complex n a t u r e of i n v e n t i o n , and
i t d e m o n s tr a te s by c o n t r a s t th e r a t h e r extrem e p o s i t i o n
R o rty has embraced in h i s a tt e m p t to c o n s t r u c t a
r a d i c a l i z e d model of i n v e n t i o n - c u m - c r e a t i o n . To c o n s t r u c t
such a model, R orty has a p p a r e n t l y tu r n e d h i s a t t e n t i o n to
o n ly one s i d e of what th e Rom antics h e ld to th e n e g l e c t of
th e o t h e r . A lthough t h i s i s h a r d l y j u s t i f i a b l e in i t s e l f ,
i t i s n e v e r t h e l e s s u n d e r s t a n d a b l e when we p l a c e i t in a
l a r g e r t h e o r e t i c a l c o n te x t and c o n s i d e r i t in c o n j u n c t i o n
w ith an e q u a l l y p o l a r i z e d , y e t d i a m e t r i c a l l y opposed
t h e o r e t i c a l o r i e n t a t i o n tow ard in v e n tio n - c u m - d is c o v e r y in
con tem po rary d i s c u r s i v e sc en e . I f even in th e heyday of
th e Romantic n o t io n of c r e a t i v e g e n iu s , th e model of
d i s c o v e r y rem ained a pow erful and i n f l u e n t i a l c o n c e p tu a l
in s tru m e n t when i t comes to th e q u e s t i o n of i n v e n t i o n , i t
i s h a r d l y s u r p r i s i n g t h a t th e q u e s t f o r a fundam ental
agreem ent between th e d i s c o u r s e r and her a u d ie n c e o r among
a l l members of th e same r h e t o r i c a l community sho uld
51
c o n tin u e to be viewed by many in our days a s th e t e l o s ,
m o t i v a t i o n and mode of i n v e n t i o . From McKeon’s c a l l f o r
th e f o r m u la ti o n of a s e t of new "commonplaces," to Wayne
B o o th ’s advocacy of a "community of a s s e n t , " th e ten den cy
tow ard an a g r e e m e n t - o r i e n t e d model of i n v e n t i o n keeps
a s s e r t i n g i t s e l f , and nowhere a r e i t s s t r e n g t h and
i n f l u e n c e more c o n v in c in g ly d e m o n s tra te d th a n in th e f a c t
t h a t a s ta u n c h champion f o r t h i s p o s i t i o n sh ou ld be found
in no l e s s a t h i n k e r th a n Jtirgen Habermas, who in h i s
th e o r y of "com m unicative a c t i o n ” c a l l s vehem ently f o r
se e k in g out and r e a f f i r m i n g a u n i v e r s a l c o re of
" r a t i o n a l i t y ” a s th e u l t i m a t e o r i e n t a t i o n in "sym bolic
f o r m a t i o n s ," th u s o f f e r i n g a model of i n v e n t i o n t h a t i s in
alm o st e v ery com parable a s p e c t a n t i p o d a l to t h a t proposed
by R orty .
H aberm as’s th e o r y of com m unicative a c t i o n has been
d e v elo p ed out of h i s d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n w ith th e model of "a
lo n e ly s u b j e c t c o n f r o n te d w ith a t o t a l i t y of e x i s t i n g
s t a t e s of a f f a i r s , " w ith t r a d i t i o n a l t o p i c s such as
i n t e n t i o n a l i t y , th e r e l a t i o n s h i p betw een mind and body,
f r e e w ill and c a u s a l i t y , which have gone to th e making of
what he c a l l s " th e p h ilo s o p h y of c o n s c io u s n e s s " ("Remarks"
151-152). In a d e te rm in e d e f f o r t to "undo” W estern
p h i l o s o p h y ’s " f i x a t i o n s " w ith th e problem of b e i n g . which
he se e s as l e a d in g o n ly t o an " o n t o l o g i c a l and
52
c o g n i t i v i s t i c o n e - s i d e d n e s s " ("Remarks" 177), he t u r n s h i s
a t t e n t i o n to th e th e m a t i c s of d o i n g . t a k i n g up th e to p o i of
s o c i a l a c t i o n and s o c i a l r e p r o d u c t i o n i n s t e a d . S ince a
s o c i a l a c t i o n p r e s u p p o s e s th e c o o r d i n a t i o n of s o c i a l
members, and th e c o o r d i n a t i o n n e c e s s a r i l y e n t a i l s
com m unication th ro u g h language or o t h e r sym b olic means, a l l
s o c i a l a c t s f o r Habermas a r e , a s S te v en Seidman p o i n t s o u t,
to such an e x t e n t " l i n g u i s t i c a l l y m ediated" t h a t language
"embeds us in an i n t e r p e r s o n a l com m unicative c o n te x t" (1 7).
Whenever we make an u t t e r a n c e , we a r e in f a c t t a k i n g up
r e l a t i o n s to t h i s o v e r a r c h i n g com m unicative c o n t e x t , which
may be s p e c i f i c a l l y r e c o n s t r u c t e d in term s of t h r e e
"w orld s": t h e o b j e c t i v e world or th e t o t a l i t y of th e s t a t e s
of a f f a i r s , th e s o c i a l w orld or th e t o t a l i t y of a l l
l e g i t i m a t e l y r e g u l a t e d i n t e r p e r s o n a l r e l a t i o n s , and th e
s u b j e c t i v e w orld or th e t o t a l i t y of th e in n e r e x p e r ie n c e s
of th e sp e a k in g s u b j e c t to which he h im s e lf has p r i v i l e g e d
a c c e s s .
These "w orlds" a r e a n a l y t i c a l a s p e c t s of a c o n te x tu a l
t o t a l i t y r a t h e r th a n s e p a r a b l e e n t i t i e s , and any a d e q u a te
t h e o r y of a c t i o n would t h e r e f o r e have to r e f e r to them a l l
a t th e same tim e. Yet as Habermas se e s i t , none of the
e x i s t i n g t h e o r e t i c a l models of a c t i o n q u i t e m easure up to
t h i s b a s i c r e q u ir e m e n t. The model of t e l e o l o g i c a l a c t i o n ,
f o r example, i s co n cern ed w ith b r i n g i n g a b o u t a d e s i r e d
53
s t a t e or a t t a i n i n g an end th ro u g h making a d e c i s i o n among
a l t e r n a t i v e c o u rs e s of a c t i o n . I t th u s p r e s u p p o s e s
r e l a t i o n s betw een an a c t o r and a w orld of e x i s t i n g s t a t e s
of a f f a i r s o n ly . The model of n o r m a tiv e ly r e g u l a t e d a c t i o n
s e e s a c t o r s m erely as members of a s o c i a l group who o r i e n t
t h e i r a c t i o n to common v a l u e s . I t hence r e f e r s m ain ly to
th e " s o c i a l w o r ld ," and i t n e g l e c t s th e " s u b j e c t i v e world"
a l t o g e t h e r . S i m i l a r l y , t h e d r a m a tu r g i c a l model is so
p re o c c u p ie d w ith " s e l f p r e s e n t a t i o n " a s i t s c e n t r a l co n cep t
t h a t i t le a v e s ou t t h e " s o c i a l w orld" from th e ran g e of i t s
c o n s i d e r a t i o n s . As a r e s u l t of th e r e s t r i c t e d c o n te x tu a l
p r e s u p p o s i t i o n of t h e s e m odels, in each c a s e , " o n ly one
f u n c t i o n of language i s th e m a tiz e d : th e r e l e a s e of
p e r l o c u t i o n a r y e f f e c t s , th e e s t a b l i s h m e n t of i n t e r p e r s o n a l
r e l a t i o n s , and th e e x p r e s s i o n o f s u b j e c t i v e e x p e r ie n c e s "
( Theory 1 :9 5 ) , whereas what happens in a c t u a l sp e ec h a c t s
i s t h a t th e a c t o r s , in o r d e r to n e g o t i a t e "common
d e f i n i t i o n s of th e s i t u a t i o n , " employ language "as a medium
of u n c u r t a i l e d comm unication" ( Theory 1:95) and
s i m u lt a n e o u s ly e x p re s s a p r o p o s i t i o n a l c o n t e n t , e s t a b l i s h
an i n t e r p e r s o n a l r e l a t i o n s h i p and i n d i c a t e th e i n t e n t i o n of
th e s p e a k e r .
H aberm as’s own a c t i o n - t h e o r e t i c a l model s e e k s to
c o r r e c t t h i s p e r v a s i v e " o n e - s id e d n e s s " th ro u g h i t s em phasis
on th e co m p reh ensive, " u n c u r t a i l e d " n a t u r e of no t j u s t th e
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c o n te x tu a l c o n d i t i o n , but a l l o t h e r f a c t o r s in v o lv e d in th e
c o n c e p t u a l i z a t i o n of s o c i a l a c t i o n . As an i n t e g r a t e d
p h i l o s o p h i c a l and s o c i o l o g i c a l i n v e s t i g a t i o n , i t c r i t i c a l l y
s y n t h e s i z e s i n s i g h t s from an im p r e s s iv e a r r a y of major
t h i n k e r s of our tim e . And s t a r t i n g from j u s t a few key
a s s u m p tio n s , i t has managed to d e v elo p i n to a powerful
i n t e r p r e t i v e paradigm a d d r e s s i n g i t s e l f to v i r t u a l l y a l l
problem s c o n c e rn in g s o c i o c u l t u r a l s t r u c t u r e , i n t e r a c t i o n
and developm ent. Among th e b a s i c t h e o r e t i c a l p o s i t i o n s
Habermas has ta k e n th e fo llo w in g ones a r e of s p e c i a l
r e l e v a n c y to th e p r e s e n t d i s c u s s i o n :
1. A s o c i a l a c t i o n can be d e f i n e d a s th e
r e a l i z a t i o n of an a c t i o n p l a n based on an
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of th e s i t u a t i o n . I t is made up
o f , in o t h e r words, th e t e l e o l o g i c a l a s p e c t of
c a r r y i n g o u t an a c t i o n p la n and th e
comm unicative a s p e c t of i n t e r p r e t i n g th e
s i t u a t i o n and r e a c h i n g a c o n se n t a b o u t i t . Of
th e s e two th e com m unicative a s p e c t of r e a c h in g
an agreem ent a bo ut th e s i t u a t i o n i s th e p rim a ry
one, s i n c e w ith o u t a co n sen su al agreem ent on the
s i t u a t i o n and on each o t h e r ’s a c t i o n p l a n , i t i s
im p o s s ib le f o r th e sp e a k in g o r a c t i n g s u b j e c t s
to c o o r d i n a t e w ith each o t h e r and th u s to
r e a l i z e t h e i r r e s p e c t i v e a c t i o n p l a n s .
2. The " c o r r e c t " u n d e r s ta n d in g or i n t e r p r e t a t i o n
of th e a c t i o n s i t u a t i o n means an
i n t e r s u b i e c t i v e l y v a l i d a p p r a i s a l or d e f i n i t i o n
of th e s i t u a t i o n . In sym bolic i n t e r a c t i o n , th e
p a r t i c i p a n t s r a i s e a t l e a s t t h r e e " v a l i d i t y
c l a i m s ” v i s - a - v i s th e o b j e c t i v e , th e s o c i a l and
th e s u b j e c t i v e w orld w ith e v e ry u t t e r a n c e th ey
make: t h a t th e s t a te m e n t made i s t r u e ; t h a t th e
sp eech a c t i s r i g h t w ith r e s p e c t to t h e e x i s t i n g
n o rm a tiv e c o n t e x t ; and t h a t th e m a n i f e s t
i n t e n t i o n of th e sp e a k e r is meant a s i t is
e x p re s s e d . The c la im s made by one p a r t i c i p a n t to
t r u t h , r i g h t n e s s and s i n c e r i t y may or may n o t be
a c c e p te d by o t h e r p a r t i c i p a n t s as v a l i d , or in
Haberm as’s own te rm s, th ey a r e " c r i t i c i z a b l e . “
For th e p a r t i e s in v o lv e d , t h e r e f o r e , th e
i n t e r p r e t i v e t a s k c o n s i s t s in i n c o r p o r a t i n g th e
o t h e r ’s u n d e r s t a n d i n g of th e s i t u a t i o n i n to
o n e ’s own in such a way t h a t in th e r e v i s e d
v e r s i o n , " h is " e x t e r n a l w orld and "my" e x t e r n a l
world can be r e l a t i v i z e d in r e l a t i o n to "the"
w o rld , and th e d i v e r g e n t s i t u a t i o n d e f i n i t i o n s
can be b ro u g h t to c o i n c i d e s u f f i c i e n t l y . The
p r o c e s s of t r y i n g to n e g o t i a t e a c o n sen su al
u n d e r s t a n d i n g of th e s i t u a t i o n i s in t h i s se n se
th e p r o c e s s to "com m un icativ ely redeem" th e
v a l i d i t y c la im s b e in g r a i s e d .
3. Every p r o c e s s of r e a c h i n g u n d e r s ta n d in g t a k e s
p l a c e a g a i n s t a background of a c u l t u r a l l y
i n g r a i n e d p r e - u n d e r s t a n d i n g or of th e
" l i f e w o r l d , " which rem ain s u n p r o b le m a tic a s a
whole in th e com m unicative p r o c e s s . The
l i f e w o r l d s e r v e s two c r u c i a l f u n c t i o n s : i t is
th e " h o r iz o n - f o r m in g c o n te x t of communication"
t h a t l i m i t s th e scope o f th e r e f e r e n c e s th e
p a r t i c i p a n t s c o u ld p o s s i b l y make in c o o r d i n a t i n g
t h e i r speech a c t s , and i t p r o v id e s "a r e s e r v o i r
of i n t u i t i v e l y c e r t a i n i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s " or of
" c u l t u r a l l y t r a n s m i t t e d and l i n g u i s t i c a l l y
o r g a n iz e d s t o c k of i n t e r p r e t i v e p a t t e r n s " on
which th e p a r t i c i p a n t s can draw in o r d e r to
r e a c h c o n sen su s r e g a r d i n g th e d e f i n i t i o n of th e
s i t u a t i o n . The l i f e w o r l d ’s p a r a d o x i c a l r o l e as
b o th th e u l t i m a t e c o n s t r a i n t t o , and th e
u l t i m a t e r e s o u r c e f o r , com m unicative a c t i o n
d e c i d e s t h a t i t i s c o n s t i t u t i v e of
com m unication, y e t t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p betw een th e
two i s p a r a d o x i c a l in a n o th e r s e n s e . The
e x i s t e n c e of th e l i f e w o r l d , on th e one hand,
e n s u r e s t h a t whenever a v a l i d i t y claim r a i s e d by
one p a r t i c i p a n t i s c h a l le n g e d or " c r i t i c i z e d , "
e i t h e r she or h e r c r i t i c s would alw ays be a b l e ,
in th e end, to "ground" th e d e fe n s e or c r i t i c i s m
by a d du cing "good r e a s o n s " a c c e p t a b l e to b o th
s i d e s , so t h a t a co n sen su s i s e v e n t u a l l y
a s s u r e d . On th e o t h e r hand, th e com m unicative
a c t i o n has as i t s t e l o s and dynamics th e
s e a r c h i n g o u t, s u s t a i n i n g and renew ing of t h i s
u n d e r l y i n g com m onality, so t h a t in th e p r o c e s s
of c o o r d i n a t i n g t h e i r i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s of th e
56
s i t u a t i o n , th e p a r t i c i p a n t s of th e comm unicative
a c t i o n a r e in f a c t engaged in th e sym bolic
r e p r o d u c t i o n of th e l i f e w o r l d .
S t a r t i n g from t h e s e a s s u m p tio n s , Habermas p ro c e e d s to o f f e r
a sweeping r e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of th e t r a n s i t i o n from th e
" r e l i g i o u s - m e t a p h y s i c a l w orldview s" to th e "modern
s t r u c t u r e s of c o n s c io u s n e s s " a s a r e s u l t of th e " p a s s t i n g l
over" to com m unicative a c t i o n of " th e s o c i a l l y i n t e g r a t i v e
and e x p r e s s i v e f u n c t i o n s " f u l f i l l e d a t f i r s t by " r i t u a l
p r a c t i c e , " o r of " th e a u t h o r i t y of th e h o ly" g r a d u a l l y
r e p l a c e d by " th e a u t h o r i t y of an a c h ie v e d consensus"
(Theory 2 : 7 7 ) . Yet even from t h i s s k e tc h y , p a r t i a l summary
of h i s m ajor p o s t u l a t e s , i t i s a l r e a d y c l e a r t h a t w hatever
e l s e Habermas has done, he has o f f e r e d a f u l l y - d e v e l o p e d
model f o r c o n c e p t u a l i z i n g d i s c u r s i v e p r o d u c t i o n , o r has
made a t h e o r e t i c a l s t a te m e n t on r h e t o r i c a l in v e n t i o n
s t r i k i n g f o r i t s m i l i t a n t i n s i s t e n c e on th e c e n t r a l i t y of
"co nsensus" in sym bolic f o r m a t io n s . Habermas, l i k e Kant,
would abhor b e in g c a l l e d a " r h e t o r i c i a n . " In h i s c r i t i q u e
of th e s o - c a l l e d "t e l e o l o g i c a l model of a c t i o n , ” he has
r e j e c t e d th e c o n s t i t u t i v e r h e t o r i c a l t e n e t t h a t th e
achiev em en t of an end th ro u g h making a c h o ic e among
a l t e r n a t i v e c o u r s e s of a c t i o n i s th e c e n t r a l c o n c e rn of
com m unication. One of th e c o r n e r s t o n e s of h i s th e o r y i s in
f a c t a s h a rp d i s t i n c t i o n betw een " s u c c e s s - o r i e n t e d " and
" c o n s e n t - o r i e n t e d " a c t i o n s a s based on "two m u tu a lly
57
e x c l u s i v e mechanisms" f o r c o o r d i n a t i o n ("Remarks" 153).
And many of h i s argum ents a g a i n s t th e c o n s e q u e n c e - o r i e n t e d
c o n c e p ti o n of a c t i o n t u r n ou t to be r e p h r a s e d old
a c c u s a t i o n s a g a i n s t th e a r t of e lo q u e n c e . He s u g g e s t s , fo r
example, t h a t in c o n t r a s t to th e " c o n s e n t - c o o r d i n a te d "
a c t i o n s , where "mutual o b l i g a t i o n s d e v e lo p from
i n t e r s u b j e c t i v e l y sh a re d c o n v i c t i o n s , " e x t e r n a l i n f l u e n c e
on th e o p i n io n s and a t t i t u d e s of o t h e r p a r t i c i p a n t s
"rem ains o n e -s id e d " and can n ev er have a " m u tu a lly b in d in g
e f f e c t " ("Remarks" 153). And he c la im s t h a t in the
s u c c e s s - o r i e n t e d a c t i o n s , "good re a s o n s " have no
" p r i v i l e g e d p o s i t i o n , " th e n a t u r e of means n e v e r c o u n ts ,
and what i s deemed im p o rta n t i s alw ays th e " s u c c e s s o f th e
i n f l u e n c e on th e d e c i s i o n of th e o t h e r p e rs o n , w h eth er t h i s
s u c c e s s i s a c h ie v e d th ro u g h money and power or th ro u g h
words" ("Remarks" 153). I f a t tim es he sounds a s i f he
would have a l l p e r s u a s i o n s — which a r e n e c e s s a r i l y
" s u c c e s s - o r i e n t e d " — b a n is h e d from th e sp h e re of
"com m unication," however, he does no t c o n s i s t e n t l y m a in ta in
t h i s e x c l u s i v i s t i c s t a n c e in r e g a r d to r h e t o r i c . R a th e r ,
he a p p e a rs to f i n d i t d e s i r a b l e to a p p r o p r i a t e r h e t o r i c ,
d e c e n t e r i t and t r a n s f o r m i t i n t o a key component p a r t of
h i s a l l - i n c l u s i v e co n cep t of a c t i o n .
H aberm as’s a tte m p t to a p p r o p r i a t e th e o ld a r t of
p e r s u a s i o n s t a r t s w ith a d i s t i n c t i o n among r h e t o r i c ,
58
d i a l e c t i c and l o g ic a s th e t h r e e " a n a l y t i c a l a s p e c t s " of
" th e f a m i l i a r d i s c i p l i n e s of th e A r i s t o t e l i a n c an on ," th e
a s p e c t s which he c la im s to be c o n ce rn e d r e s p e c t i v e l y w ith
th e " p r o c e s s ," "p rag m a tic p ro c e d u re s " and " p ro d u c ts" of
a r g u m e n ta tio n , hence d e f i c i e n t f o r t h e i r " o n e - s id e d n e s s "
( Theory 1 :2 6 ) , as is th e c a se w ith th e t h r e e models of
a c t i o n he c a l l s i n t o q u e s t i o n in th e name of a
com prehensive "com m unicative a c t i o n . " I f t h i s d i s t i n c t i o n
e n a b le s him to r e l e g a t e r h e t o r i c , s a i d to be co ncern ed only
w ith th e " p ro c e ss " of a rg u m e n ta t io n , to a lo c a l or
s u b o r d i n a t e s t a t u s , and a t th e same tim e to f u r t h e r e l e v a t e
h i s own a c t i o n - t h e o r e t i c a l model t o th e p o s i t i o n of a
dom inant, t o t a l i z i n g c o n c e p tu a l p aradigm , he goes on
n e v e r t h e l e s s to p o i n t o ut t h a t " th e s e p a r a t i o n of th e t h r e e
a n a l y t i c a l l e v e l s cann ot be m a in ta in e d " in t h e " a tte m p t to
a n a ly z e th e c o rr e s p o n d in g b a s i c c o n c e p ts " c o n s t i t u t i v e of
h i s th e o r y of a r g u m e n ta tio n , such a s " th e u n i v e r s a l
a u d ie n c e ," " th e a t t a i n m e n t of a r a t i o n a l l y m o tiv a te d
agreem ent" or th e " d i s c u r s i v e re d e m p tio n of a v a l i d i t y
claim " ( Theory 1 :2 6 ) . In o t h e r words, he s e t s up a
d i s t i n c t i o n , l a r g e l y of h i s own, j u s t f o r h im s e lf to
c h a l l e n g e i t s v a l i d i t y . For him, th e t r i p a r t i t e d i v i s i o n
of a rg u m e n ta tio n i n t o r h e t o r i c , d i a l e c t i c and lo g ic is
u n t e n a b le n o t b e ca u se i t i s a r b i t r a r y in th e f i r s t p l a c e to
a s s i g n a h i g h l y r e s t r i c t e d lo c a l co n ce rn to r h e t o r i c , but
59
b ecau se th e developm ent of h i s th e o r y of a c t i o n had f i n a l l y
r e n d e r e d such a d i v i s i o n s u p e r f l u o u s or i r r e l e v a n t : the
f o r m u l a t i o n of h i s th e o r y has made a v a i l a b l e a c o m p l e t e >
view of com m unication, and has th u s red u c ed th e t h r e e
d i s c i p l i n e s in q u e s t i o n to no more th an t h r e e p a r t i a l or
in co m p lete v i s i o n s of what i s th e case w ith com m unication.
To come to g n ip s w ith t h e e s s e n t i a l c h a r a c t e r of
a r g u m e n ta tio n , we now need to have t h e s e outmoded schemes
fu se d and con verg ed i n t o th e q u e s t fo r "agreem ent":
[ th e ] fundam ental i n t u i t i o n c o n n ec te d w ith
a rg u m e n ta tio n can b e s t be c h a r a c t e r i z e d from th e
p r o c e s s p e r s p e c t i v e by th e i n t e n t i o n of
c o n v in c in g a u n i v e r s a l a u d ie n c e and g a in i n g
g e n e r a l a s s e n t f o r an u t t e r a n c e ; from th e
p r o c e d u r a l p e r s p e c t i v e , by th e i n t e n t i o n of
ending a d i s p u t e a b o u t h y p o t h e t i c a l v a l i d i t y
c la im s w ith a r a t i o n a l l y m o tiv a te d a g r e e m e n t :
and from th e p r o d u c t p e r s p e c t i v e by th e
i n t e n t i o n of g ro u n d in g or redeem ing a v a l i d i t y
c la im w ith a rg u m e n ts. ( Theory 1:26)
The r e p e a t e d r e f e r e n c e to " i n t e n t i o n " and to
" u n i v e r s a l a u d ie n c e " in H aberm as’s "fundam ental i n t u i t i o n "
a b ou t a r g u m e n ta tio n u n d e r s c o r e s a dual em phasis on e th o s
and p a th o s a s two p i v o t a l s t r u c t u r i n g c o n c e p ts of th e
th e o r y of com m unicative a c t i o n . And c l e a r l y im p lied in key
c o n c e p ts such as "a u n i v e r s a l a u d ie n c e ," " g e n e ra l a s s e n t "
and " r a t i o n a l l y m o tiv a te d ag reem ent" i s a b e l i e f in the
e x i s t e n c e of a body of lo cu s communis, which a lo n e makes a
" u n i v e r s a l " or " g e n e r a l" ag reem ent p o s s i b l e or m e a n in g fu l.
As he p o i n t s out e ls e w h e re , to v a l o r i z e th e sp e ec h a c t s
60
o r i e n t e d toward a " r a t i o n a l l y m o tiv a te d agreem ent" i s in
e f f e c t to make a " d e c i s i o n in f a v o r of a b ro a d e r c o n ce p t of
r a t i o n a l i t y which d e r i v e s from o l d e r id e a s of logos"
("Remarks" 176). By v i r t u e of i t s f i x e d "gaze" on modes of
c o o r d i n a t i o n between p a r t i c i p a n t s in comm unicative a c t s as
well as of i t s commitment to th e i n t e r s u b j e c t i v e q u e s t fo r
a g e n e r a l lo g o s, H aberm as’s t h e o r y s h a r e s w ith th e
t r a d i t i o n a l c o n ce p t of i n v e n t i o e x a c t l y th e same t h r e e
e s s e n t i a l c o n s t i t u e n t s . R a th e r th a n b e in g a p p r o p r i a t e d and
made a mere component p a r t of a new th e o r y of d i s c o u r s e ,
t h e r e f o r e , r h e t o r i c a c t u a l l y comes to p o s s e s s th e
H aberm asian m o d e l. The moment Habermas t r i e s to c la im f o r
h i s t h e o r y th e k in d of c o n c e p tu a l co m p reh en siv en ess
t r a d i t i o n a l l y en jo y ed by r h e t o r i c o n l y , he could n o t but
f a l l back on th e " o ld e r id e a s" ab ou t d i s c o u r s e , o f t e n
w ith o u t h i s own aw areness of i t . When he s u g g e s t s t h a t an
a p p r o p r i a t e th e o r y of com m unicative a c t i o n sh ou ld a t once
r e f e r to th e o b j e c t i v e , th e s o c i a l and th e s u b j e c t i v e
" w o rld s ," in f a c t , he has a l r e a d y q u i e t l y a c c e p te d th e
fundam ental schema of r h e t o r i c a s h i s own framework. For
what he d e f i n e s a s th e t h r e e c o n c e rn s r e l a t e d to th e t h r e e
" w o rld s ," t h a t i s , th e e x p r e s s i o n of p r o p o s i t i o n a l c o n t e n t ,
th e e s t a b l i s h m e n t of i n t e r p e r s o n a l r e l a t i o n s , and th e
p r e s e n t a t i o n of s e l f , p a r a l l e l t r a d i t i o n a l c o n c e rn s under
th e r u b r i c s of l o g o s , p a th o s and e th o s .
61
W ithin t h i s tim e -h o n o re d s t r u c t u r i n g framework,
however, Habermas o f f e r s a un iq u e "r e d e s c r i p t i o n " on th e
mode of sy m bo lic p r o d u c t i o n . S ince language embeds us a l l
in an " i n t e r p e r s o n a l com m unicative c o n t e x t , " sym bolic
p r o d u c t i o n i s f o r him alw ays s o c i a l by n a t u r e , t h a t i s , i t
i s alw ays an a c t of " c o o r d i n a ti o n " i n v o lv i n g more th a n one
p a r t i c i p a n t . Even th e t a s k of a seem ing ly s o l i t a r y r e a d e r
t r y i n g to make "meaning" out of a t e x t , f o r example, is
n e v e r " c a r r i e d ou t in a s o l i p s i s t i c manner" ( Theory 1 :1 1 2 ).
R a th e r , i t r e q u i r e s t h a t th e r e a d e r ta k e up "an
i n t e r s u b j e c t i v e r e l a t i o n w ith th e s u b j e c t who b ro u g h t f o r t h
th e e x p r e s s io n " ( Theory 1 :1 1 1 ). As a s o c i a l a c t , sym bolic
p r o d u c t i o n can w ell be se e n as th e p r o c e s s in which th e
p a r t i c i p a n t s r a i s e and c r i t i c i z e each o t h e r ’s " v a l i d i t y
c la im s" in t h e i r c o o r d i n a te d q u e s t f o r agreem ent and
c o n se n s u s. In phenom enological term s, such a p r o c e s s might
well t u r n ou t to be a "a d i f f u s e , f r a g i l e , c o n ti n u o u s l y
r e v i s e d and o n ly m o m e n tarily s u c c e s s f u l com m unication in
which p a r t i c i p a n t s r e l y on p r o b l e m a t i c and u n c l a r i f i e d
p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s and f e e l t h e i r way from one o c c a s io n a l
commonality to th e n e x t" ( Theory 1 :1 0 0 -1 0 1 ). That is to
say, in making an u t t e r a n c e , th e "cla im s" we a r e r a i s i n g
i m p l i c i t l y a b o u t th e t r u t h of our s t a t e m e n t , th e r i g h t n e s s
f o r us to make such a s t a te m e n t and our s i n c e r i t y in making
th e s t a te m e n t a r e more o f t e n th a n no t " p r o b l e m a t i c and
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u n c l a r i f i e d p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s , " which o t h e r p a r t i c i p a n t s in
th e same com m unicative a c t may or may not f i n d a c c e p t a b l e .
While a "yes" r e s p o n s e from th e h e a r e r l s ] has th e e f f e c t of
h e lp i n g to " c l a r i f y " or a f f i r m th e v a l i d i t y of th e c la im s ,
a "no" re s p o n s e would make i t n e c e s s a r y f o r b o th s i d e s to
adduce "good re a s o n s " f o r e i t h e r th e c r i t i c i s m o r th e
d e f e n s e of th e h y p o t h e t i c a l l y r a i s e d v a l i d i t y c l a i m s , u n t i l
t h e s e c la im s a r e "redeem ed," th e p a r t i c i p a n t s f i n a l l y
overcome t h e i r m erely s u b j e c t i v e v iew s, and a " m u tu a lity "
in th e d e f i n i t i o n of th e s i t u a t i o n is re a c h e d .
H aberm as’s p r i v i l e g e d use of words such as
" a rg u m e n ta tio n " and " c r i t i c i s m " and e s p e c i a l l y th e s c e n a r i o
i t c r e a t e s of i n t e r l o c u t o r s engaged in " c r i t i c i z i n g " each
o t h e r ’ s " p ro b le m a tic " p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s in th e p r o c e s s of
sym bolic p r o d u c t i o n have led many t h e o r i s t s of
com m unication to b e l i e v e t h a t th e " c r i t e r i a and o p e r a t i o n a l
s h a p e ” of t h e Haberm asian "com m unicative r a t i o n a l i t y " b e ar
"a c l o s e resem b lan c e to th e c l a s s i c id ea of c o n tr o v e r s ia "
(Conley 3 0 2 ). H aberm as’s t h e o r y , a s has been p o i n t e d o u t,
does i n h e r i t from c l a s s i c a l r h e t o r i c a b a s i c c o n c e p tu a l
framework, and s t r i k i n g s i m i l a r i t i e s can indeed be found
betw een h i s ap p ro a ch and t h o s e of c l a s s i c a l r h e t o r i c i a n s .
C ic e r o , f o r i n s t a n c e , h e l p s to e s t a b l i s h th e prim acy of
e lo q u e n ce by s k e t c h i n g in h i s De o r a t o r e . a s Henato B a r i l l i
o b s e r v e s , "a view of th e w o rld , a g lo b a l c o n c e p tio n of
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c u l t u r e , w i t h i n which r h e t o r i c f i n d s a c e n t r a l i z i n g and
u n i f y i n g r o l e " (2 6 ) . T h is i s e x a c t l y th e s t r a t e g y Habermas
a d o p ts when he u n d e r t a k e s to c la im a " c e n t r a l i z i n g and
u n i f y i n g r o l e " to h i s n o t i o n of com m unicative a c t i o n
th ro u g h a "com prehensive" c o n c e p tio n of th e " w o rld ." The
same c an n o t be s a i d , however, of th e id e a of c o n t r o v e r s i a .
Developed on th e b a s i s of th e " s t a s i s " t h e o r y of i n v e n t i o
in c l a s s i c a l r h e t o r i c , which c o n c e iv e s of i n v e n t i o n in
term s of a d e b a te betw een a d v e r s a r i e s around th e fo u r
c a r d i n a l g e n e r a t i v e q u e s t i o n s CStases') of f a c t , d e f i n i t i o n ,
q u a l i t y and j u r i s d i c t i o n , th e co n cep t of c o n t r o v e r s i a p i t s
d i f f e r e n t p e r s p e c t i v e s on th e i s s u e c o n ce rn e d a g a i n s t each
o t h e r in a t e s t of t h e i r r e s p e c t i v e c la im s o f p r o b a b i l i t y ,
w ith th e a ssu m p tio n t h a t one of t h e s e d i f f e r i n g p o s i t i o n s
would e v e n t u a l l y p r e v a i l . Although i t a l s o se es i n v e n t i o
in c o l l a b o r a t i v e te rm s , th e c o n t r o v e r s i a model h as r e b u t t a l
a s i t s modus operandi and i t is d e c i d e d l y o r i e n t e d toward
c o n f l i c t , r a t h e r th a n toward agreem ent and c o n s e n s u s . as i s
th e c a se w ith H aberm as’ s paradigm . The r e l a t i o n s h i p
betw een Haberm as’ s "com m unicative a c t o r s ” i s , a s a m a t t e r
of f a c t , a n y th in g b ut c o n t e n t i o u s and a d v e r s a r i a l . I f in
h i s model i t i s n e c e s s a r y f o r th e a c t o r s in v o lv e d to
" c r i t i c i z e ” each o t h e r ’s v a l i d i t y c la im s , th e word
" c r i t i c i s m " has been endowed w ith t h e s p e c i a l meaning in
th e Haberm asian "v o ca b u lary " of a f f i r m i n g th e
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i n t e r s u b j e c t i v i t y of th e " c o r r e c t " c la im s , im proving on or
redeem ing a ssu m p tio n s which a r e m erely " s u b j e c t i v e , " and
s t r i v i n g f o r th e " r e c o g n i t i o n of v a l i d i t y c la im s " th ro u g h
c o n c e r t e d e f f o r t s .
E q u a lly m is le a d in g i s h i s u se of th e term
" i n t e r s u b j e c t i v i t y , " which i s u s u a l l y ta k e n to imply a
d e n i a l of an o b j e c t i v e s t a t u s to th e " v a l i d i t y c l a i m s , " or
an a c c e p ta n c e of th e s p a t i o t e m p o r a l l y s p e c i f i c agreem ent by
th e p a r t i c i p a t i n g s u b j e c t s as b o th th e n e c e s s a r y and th e
s u f f i c i e n t c o n d i t i o n s f o r d e te r m in in g " v a l i d i t y . " The
im p re s s io n th u s c r e a t e d has even prompted R o rty , f o r one,
t o se e H aberm as’s " s u b s t i t u t i o n " of "com m unicative re a so n "
t o " s u b j e c t - c e n t e r e d re a so n " as j u s t a " m is le a d in g way” of
making th e same p o i n t he sa y s he h im s e lf has been u r g i n g ,
t h a t i s , we sh ou ld " c a l l ' t r u e ' (o r ' r i g h t ' or ’ j u s t ' )
w h atever th e outcome of u n d i s t o r t e d com m unication happens
t o be, w hatever view wins in a f r e e and open e n c o u n te r"
( R o rty , 6 7 ). T h is i s , ho w e v er, a g r o s s m is u n d e r s ta n d in g of
th e p o s i t i o n Habermas h o ld s c o n c e rn in g " v a l i d i t y c l a i m s . "
From H aberm as’s p o i n t of view, under no c i r c u m s ta n c e s does
" v a l i d i t y " r e s i d e in "w hatever view" happens to win in
com m unicative e n c o u n te r , even i f such an e n c o u n te r is
indeed " f r e e and o p e n ," u n r e s t r i c t e d and " u n c u r t a i l e d . "
For to b e l i e v e so would be tan tam o un t to b e l i e v i n g t h a t
v a l i d i t y i s an ongoing b a la n c e of r h e t o r i c a l f o r c e s , a
65
r e l u c t a n t compromise among th e com m unicating s u b j e c t s , or
w h atev er u n d e r l i e s th e c la im s of t h e s t r o n g e r hence th e
p r e v a i l i n g " v o ca b u lary " in a d i s c u r s i v e power s t r u g g l e .
Such a b e l i e f i s u t t e r l y i n c o m p a tib le w ith H aberm as’s
o v e r r i d i n g em phasis on c o o r d i n a t i o n and c o n se n su s, and on
th e freedom from even th e s u b t l e s t form of i n f l u e n c e and
c o e r c i o n . For him, " [ n ] e g o t i a t i n g compromises does n o t a t
a l l s e r v e to redeem v a l i d i t y c la im s in a s t r i c t l y
d i s c u r s i v e m anner," r a t h e r , i t m ere ly s e r v e s "to harm onize
n o n g e n e r a l i z a b l e i n t e r e s t s on t h e b a s i s of b a la n c e d
p o s i t i o n s o f power" ( Theory 1 :3 5 ) . And in h i s c r i t i q u e of
th e c o n ce p t " c o l l e c t i v e l y v a l i d , ” h i s commitment to a
f o u n d a t i o n a l p o s i t i o n i s r e n d e r e d s t i l l c l e a r e r . He f i n d s
th e co n cep t u n a c c e p t a b l e b e ca u se i t r e f e r s to " th o s e views
t h a t a r e a c t u a l l y sh a re d by s p e c i f i c g ro u p s a t s p e c i f i c
tim es" o n ly — view s which s c r e e n ou t " a l l i n t e r n a l r e l a t i o n s
betw een what i s de f a c t o a c c e p te d as v a l i d " and "what
sho uld have v a l i d i t y . . . in th e s e n s e of a claim
t r a n s c e n d i n g l o c a l , te m p o ra l, and s o c i a l l i m i t a t i o n s "
(Theory 1 :2 8 ). His d e f i n i t i o n o f "com m unicative
r a t i o n a l i t y " i s , in f a c t , "an u n c l a r i f i e d s y s t e m a t i c
i n t e r c o n n e c t i o n of u n i v e r s a l v a l i d i t y c laim s" ( Theory
1 :1 8 ) , which c l e a r l y p o i n t s to a b e l i e f in th e p r i o r
e x i s t e n c e of a body of g e n u in e ly " v a l i d " c r i t e r i a , or of
"good r e a s o n s " c a p a b le of commanding t h e c o n v i c t i o n of
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e v e ry r a t i o n a l b e in g . A ccording to t h i s view , any g e n u in e
" v a l i d i t y claim " sh o u ld be a g re e d upon by a l l p a r t i c i p a n t s
in th e com m unicative a c t i o n , y e t what has been a g re e d upon
"by s p e c i f i c g ro up s a t s p e c i f i c tim e s" does n o t n e c e s s a r i l y
count a s " r i g h t " o r " j u s t ” or " v a l i d . ”
I f th e e x i s t e n c e of a t r a n s c e n d e n t a l s e t of
c r i t e r i a of v a l i d i t y makes i t p o s s i b l e to have a "grounded"
c o n s e n s u s , i t i s th e " l i f e w o r l d , " a n o th e r key term in
H aberm as’s v o c a b u la r y , which r e n d e r s i n e v i t a b l e th e
o r i e n t a t i o n toward a g re em e n t. The H aberm asian c o n ce p t of
" l i f e w o r l d " r e f e r s to "a c u l t u r a l l y t r a n s m i t t e d and
l i n g u i s t i c a l l y o r g a n iz e d s t o c k of i n t e r p r e t i v e p a t t e r n s , "
a " r e s e r v o i r , " so to sp e ak , of " t a k e n - f o r - g r a n t e d s " or
"unshaken c o n v i c t i o n " ( Theory 2 :1 2 4 ) . J u s t a s language and
c u l t u r e , i t s two c o n s t i t u t i v e e le m e n ts , alw ays rem ain in
th e background of a com m unicative a c t i o n , so t h e l i f e w o r l d
t a k e s on a " t r a n s c e n d e n t a l s t a t u s " v i s - a - v i s comm unication
and s e r v e s th u s a s an i m p l i c i t y e t h o l i s t i c a l l y s t r u c t u r e d
and u n i v e r s a l l y s h a re d knowledge f o r every on e t a k i n g p a r t
in an a c t of com m unication. S ince in th e p r o c e s s of
r a i s i n g and c r i t i c i z i n g v a l i d i t y c la im s , t h e p a r t i c i p a n t s
a l l draw from t h i s " s to c k of knowledge" which " s u p p l i e s
[them] w i t h u n p r o b le m a tic , common, background c o n v i c t i o n s
t h a t a r e assumed to be g u a ra n te e d " ( Theory 2 :1 2 5 ) , i t is
o n ly too n a t u r a l t h a t th e y sh o u ld te n d to c o n c u r, in th e
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end, in t h e i r i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of e i t h e r th e a c t i o n s i t u a t i o n
or t h e i r r e l a t i o n s to th e " t h r e e w o rld s " :
When th e y go beyond th e h o r i z o n of a g iv e n
s i t u a t i o n , th e y cannot s t e p i n t o a v o id ; th e y
f i n d th e m se lv e s r i g h t away in a n o t h e r , now
a c t u a l i z e d , y e t p r e i n t e r p r e t e d domain of what i s
c u l t u r a l l y ta k e n f o r g r a n t e d . In ev eryd ay
com m unicative p r a c t i c e t h e r e a r e no c o m p le te ly
u n f a m i l i a r s i t u a t i o n s . Every new s i t u a t i o n
a p p e a rs in a l i f e w o r l d composed of a c u l t u r a l
s to c k of knowledge t h a t is "always a lr e a d y "
fami 1i a r . . . The s t r u c t u r e s of th e l i f e w o r l d lay
down th e forms of th e i n t e r s u b j e c t i v i t y of
p o s s i b l e u n d e r s t a n d i n g . . . The l i f e w o r l d i s ,
so to sp eak , th e t r a n s c e n d e n t a l s i t e where
sp e a k e r and h e a r e r m e e t , where th e y can
r e c i p r o c a l l y r a i s e c la im s t h a t t h e i r u t t e r a n c e s
f i t w ith th e w orld ( o b j e c t i v e , s o c i a l , or
s u b j e c t i v e ) , and where th e y can c r i t i c i z e and
c o n firm th o s e v a l i d i t y c la im s , s e t t l e t h e i r
d i s a g r e e m e n ts , and a r r i v e a t a g re e m e n ts . ( Theory
2 :1 2 5 -2 6 )
I t f o llo w s from H aberm as’s d e s c r i p t i o n of th e
l i f e w o r l d t h a t com m unicative a c t o r s a r e alw ays moving
w i t h i n t h i s o v e r a r c h i n g h o r i z o n of p r e - i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , t h a t
i t i s im p o s s ib le to have th e kin d of r a d i c a l d i f f e r e n c e
a d v o c a te d by R o rty , and t h a t a co nv ergen ce toward agreem ent
i s to such an e x t e n t p r e - o r d a i n e d t h a t from t h i s
o r i e n t a t i o n t h e r e co u ld be no e sc a p e . The " a c t o r s , "
however, a r e in a d i a l e c t i c a l r e l a t i o n s h i p w ith th e
l i f e w o r l d . While th e l i f e w o r l d p r o v i d e s t h e i r a c t i o n w ith
a l l th e u l t i m a t e e n a b l in g c o n d i t i o n s , i t i s t h e i r
com m unicative a c t i o n t h a t s e r v e s t o " a c t u a l i z e , " to
s u s t a i n , and to re p ro d u c e th e l i f e w o r l d . The " l i f e " of th e
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l i f e w o r l d , in o t h e r words, i s c o n t i n g e n t on th e c o n tin u e d
p e rfo rm an c e of th e com m unicative a c t i o n , whose p a r t i c i p a n t s
a r e in f a c t assum ing a dual i d e n t i t y a s b o th th e " p ro d u c ts"
and th e " r e p r o d u c e rs " of t h e l i f e w o r l d in th e p r o c e s s of
com m unicating w ith each o t h e r . They s i m u l t a n e o u s l y draw
from and a c t u a l i z e or renew th e c u l t u r a l t r a d i t i o n and
i n t e r p r e t i v e p a t t e r n s c o n s t i t u t i v e of t h e i r l i f e w o r l d .
They r e l y on t h e i r s o c i a l group membership in o r d e r to
c o o r d i n a t e t h e i r a c t i o n p la n s and a t t h e same tim e
r e i n f o r c e th e i n t e g r a t i o n of t h e s e g ro u p s. And th ro u g h
i n t e r a c t i o n w ith o t h e r s in com m unicative a c t i o n , th e
i n d i v i d u a l a c t o r s come to i n t e r n a l i z e th e v a lu e
o r i e n t a t i o n s of t h e i r s o c i a l group and th u s a c q u i r e th e
g e n e r a l i z e d com petence f o r a c t i n g . What r e s u l t s from th e
com m unicative a c t i o n i s th u s a t h r e e - f o l d "sym bolic
r e p r o d u c t io n " of th e l i f e w o r l d : th e t r a n s m i s s i o n and
renewal of c u l t u r a l knowledge under th e a s p e c t o f " r e a c h in g
c o n s e n t ," th e s o c i a l i n t e g r a t i o n under th e a s p e c t of
" c o o r d i n a t i n g a c t i o n , " and th e i d e n t i t y fo rm at ion under the
a s p e c t of s o c i a l i z a t i o n . For Habermas, t h e r e f o r e , an
o r i e n t a t i o n toward ag reem ent and c o n sen su s in comm unication
i s n e v er a m a t t e r of p r e f e r e n c e , i t i s a d i s c u r s i v e ,
c u l t u r a l and s o c i a l n e c e s s i t y .
Such a p o s i t i o n s e t s Habermas and R o rty in a head-o n
c o 11i s i o n c o u r s e . R o rty d e n i e s th e e x i s t e n c e of a n te c e d e n t
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c r i t e r i a common to d i f f e r e n t "lan g u ag e games” and, on th e
b a s i s of t h i s d e n i a l , d i s m i s s e s a r g u m e n ta tio n a s a t o t a l l y
i r r e l e v a n t c o n c e p t; Habermas, on th e o t h e r hand, f i r m l y
b e l i e v e s in n ot o n ly " i n t e r n a l r e l a t i o n s " between d i v e r s e
s e t s of s t a n d a r d s ( Theory 1 :3 0 ) , b u t a l s o in u n i v e r s a l l y
v a l i d "good r e a s o n s " i n h e r e n t in a l l a c t s of com m unication,
and he h o ld s a c c o r d i n g l y t h a t " [ t h e ] r a t i o n a l i t y p ro p e r to
th e com m unicative p r a c t i c e of ev ery d ay l i f e p o i n t s to th e
p r a c t i c e o f a rg u m e n ta tio n as a c o u r t of a p p e a l" (Theory
1 :1 7 ) . R o rty i s s i n g l e - m i n d e d l y com m itted to i n v e n t i n g an
" a l t e r n a t i v e v o c a b u la ry " o r to sp e a k in g " d i f f e r e n t l y , " and
th e "method" he p r e s c r i b e s f o r d i s c u r s i v e p r o d u c t i o n in
g e n e ra l is to " r e d e s c r i b e " l o t s of t h i n g s in "new" ways
u n t i l an e n t i r e l y d i f f e r e n t l i n g u i s t i c " p a t t e r n " is
c r e a t e d . Habermas shows no i n t e r e s t in t h i s paradigm of
d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n , assum ing i n s t e a d t h a t " th e human s p e c i e s
m a i n t a i n s i t s e l f th ro u g h th e s o c i a l l y c o o r d i n a t e d
a c t i v i t i e s of i t s members," which a r e " e s t a b l i s h e d th ro u g h
co m m unication"— in p a r t i c u l a r com m unication "aimed a t
r e a c h i n g agreem en t" ( Theory 1:397) or o r i e n t e d to
a c h i e v i n g , s u s t a i n i n g , and renew ing a " c o n s e n s u s ” r e s t i n g
on " th e i n t e r s u b j e c t i v e r e c o g n i t i o n of c r i t i c i z a b l e
v a l i d i t y c la im s" (Theory 1 :1 7 ) . Such a c o n s e n s u s - o r i e n t e d
com m unicative a c t i o n n e c e s s a r i l y e n t a i l s th e p r i v i l e g i n g of
a l l " sp e a k in g or a c t i n g s u b j e c t s " a s e q u a l l y im p o rta n t
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" p a r t i c i p a n t s " in th e speech a c t to th e e x t e n t t h a t th e
e t h o s / p a t h o s dichotom y i s b l u r r e d , y e t in R o r t y ’s model,
a l l we have i s th e dom inant f i g u r e of a " s t r o n g p o e t" or
" o r i g i n a t o r of d i s c o u r s e " who, h a v in g m y s t e r i o u s l y bypassed
th e im p e r a tiv e to communicate, i s b u s i l y engaged in w i l l f u l
" s e l f - c r e a t i o n " or in l u r i n g , w ith p se u d o -arg u m en ts or non
s e q u i t u r s , a p a s s i v e , c r e d u lo u s a u d ie n c e i n t o a c c e p t i n g her
new fangled language game which i s by R o r t y ’s own d e f i n i t i o n
h a r d l y c o m p re h e n s ib le to s p e a k e r s of t h e o l d " j a r g o n ."
U n d e rly in g t h e s e d i f f e r e n c e s i s th e c l a s h between two
r a t h e r extrem e p o s i t i o n s on th e problem of in v en t i o . When
R orty i n s i s t s on th e a b sen c e of any c o n n e c tio n or
comm onality betw een d i f f e r e n t " v o c a b u l a r i e s , " he i s in f a c t
making th e a s s e r t i o n t h a t i n v e n t i o n sh o u ld be se e n in term s
of s t r i v i n g toward a com plete b re a k w ith e x i s t i n g
d i s c o u r s e s th ro u g h th e r e j e c t i o n of a l l o ld a ssu m p tio n s and
c a t e g o r i e s and th e c r e a t i o n , ex n i h i l o , o f a s e t of new
c r i t e r i a , r u l e s , t a s t e s . The dynamic of i n v e n t i o n ,
a c c o r d in g to t h i s view , i s th e c r e a t i v e f a c u l t y of
im a g in a tio n , p e r s o n i f i e d v a r i o u s l y a s t h e F o u c a u l t i a n
" o r i g i n a t o r of d i s c o u r s e " o r th e B1oom ian-Rortyan " s tr o n g
p o e t . " And th e mode of d i s c u r s i v e p r o d u c t i o n i s th e s e a r c h
f o r new m etaph ors o r th e c r e a t i n g of " r e d e s c r i p t i o n " of
t h i n g s in t o t a l l y u n f a m i l i a r ways. Habermas, on th e o t h e r
hand, s i t u a t e s h im s e l f a t th e o p p o s i t e end of th e same
71
c o n c e p tu a l spectrum by s t r e s s i n g a fundam ental
i d e n t i f i c a t i o n of a l l "com m unicative a c t o r s " and, f o r t h a t
m a t t e r , a l l d i s c o u r s e s in th e name of a s h a re d l i f e w o r l d ,
which McKeon would p r e f e r to c a l l an " a l l - i n c l u s i v e
community." Such an i d e n t i f i c a t i o n i s se e n a s p r o v i d in g
b o th th e n e c e s s a r y and th e s u f f i c i e n t c o n d i t i o n s f o r what
Habermas term s "sym bolic f o r m a t i o n s , " a s i t s e r v e s b o th as
th e means th ro u g h which d i f f e r e n t p e o p le can communicate
w ith each o t h e r , and a s th e end a t which a l l com m unicative
a c t i o n s a r e aim ing in t h e i r e f f o r t s to s u s t a i n and renew
th e l i f e w o r l d . The dynamic of i n v e n t i o n from t h i s
p e r s p e c t i v e i s th e magnetism of a "core of r a t i o n a l i t y "
i n h e r e n t in a l l com m unicative p r a c t i c e s , and to c r i t i c i z e
each o t h e r ’ s h y p o t h e t i c a l l y r a i s e d v a l i d i t y c la im s in o r d e r
to " c l a r i f y , " " re c o g n iz e " or d i s c o v e r th e " u n c l a r i f i e d "
u n i v e r s a l v a l i d i t y i s th e o n ly c o r r e c t mode of sym bolic
p r o d u c t i o n . In R o rty , what we have i s an unabashed
commitment to a v o id in g what F o u c a u lt term s " th e t e d i o u s
r e p e t i t i o n s " produced when one maneuvers w i t h i n th e o ld
" v o c a b u la r y ," a w h o l e - h e a r t e d s u b s c r i p t i o n to th e view of
i n v e n t i o n a s c r e a t i o n ; in Habermas, th e commitment to
e l i m i n a t i n g t h e d i f f e r e n c e s d e t r i m e n t a l to th e w e l l - b e i n g
of th e l i f e w o r l d and an e q u a l l y u n r e s e r v e d s u b s c r i p t i o n of
th e view of i n v e n t i o n as d i s c o v e r y .
72
N e i th e r th e R o rty an nor th e H aberm asian m o d el,
however, seems to be a p ro d u c t of e i t h e r a com plete b reak
w ith th e p a s t o r a mere i d e n t i f i c a t i o n w ith t r a d i t i o n a l
c o n c e p ts of i n v e n t i o n . R o r t y ’s cla im t h a t in d i s c u r s i v e
p r o d u c t i o n , i t i s p o s s i b l e o r even i m p e r a t i v e to f o r m u la te
a new " v o c a b u la ry " based e x c l u s i v e l y on unknown c r i t e r i a is
c l e a r l y t r a c e a b l e , th ro u g h Kant and S id n ey , a l l th e way to
p e rh a p s th e c r e a t i o n m ythology. And Habermas a p p a r e n t l y
f i n d s i n s p i r a t i o n from th e Greek t r a d i t i o n t h a t se e s
i n v e n t i o n a s l e a d in g toward an ev er g r e a t e r r e v e l a t i o n of
an u l t i m a t e " t r u t h " or " r e a l i t y ” or tow ard a g ra d u a l
d i s c o v e r y of som ething h id d e n y e t alw ays a l r e a d y a v a i l a b l e .
At th e same tim e , however, th e y do g iv e th e two t r a d i t i o n s
a u n iq u e co ntem porary " r e d e s c r i p t i o n " when in t h e i r
r e f l e c t i o n s on th e o ld problem o f how d i s c o u r s e g e t s
pro d u ce d , th e y ask q u e s t i o n s such a s " i s a rg u m e n ta tio n
s t i l l r e l e v a n t ? ” or "how i s th e i n v e n t i n g s u b j e c t g oin g to
do w ith th e e x i s t i n g lo g o s a s a s e t of u n d e r l y i n g c r i t e r i a
or v a l i d i t y c la im s ? " , r a t h e r th a n th e more t r a d i t i o n a l
q u e s t i o n of "how sh o u ld a r g u m e n ta tio n be co nd ucted?" or
"how to make use of lo g o s a s an a v a i l a b l e means of
p e r s u a s i o n ? " . T h e ir c e n t r a l c o n c e rn i s w hether to d i f f e r
or to a g r e e : d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n / i d e n t i f i c a t i o n or
d i s a g r e e m e n t / a g r e e m e n t , r a t h e r t h a n t h e more f a m i l i a r
schem ata such as " th e p r i v a t e v s . th e p u b l ic " or "th e
73
i n d i v i d u a l v s. th e s o c i a l , " has become t h e i r i m p l i c i t
s t r u c t u r i n g dichotom y.
The fo cu s of a t t e n t i o n , however, i s n o t th e o n ly p la c e
where th e R o rty a n /H a b e rm a sia n o p p o s i t i o n d i f f e r e n t i a t e s
i t s e l f from o t h e r b i n a r y i n t e r p r e t i v e frameworks in
d i s c o u r s e s t u d i e s ( e . g . , t h e o p p o s i t i o n betw een " i n d i v i d u a l
c r e a t i o n " and " s o c i a l c o n s t r u c t i o n , " or t h a t betw een "th e
c e n t r i f u g a l f o r c e s " and " th e c e n t r i p e t a l f o r c e s " which M.
M. B a k h tin e s t a b l i s h e s in h i s stu d y of n o v e l i s t i c
d i s c o u r s e ) . The a n ta g o n ism betw een R o r t y ’s and H aberm as’s
t h e o r e t i c a l p o s i t i o n d i s p l a y s a s t a s i a s t i c vehemence r a r e l y
se en in o t h e r c o n c e p tu a l m odels. B a k h tin m ight have an
u n m is ta k a b le a f f i n i t y w ith R orty in h i s em phatic
v a l o r i z a t i o n of th e " c e n t r i f u g a l f o r c e s ” over th e
" c e n t r i p e t a l f o r c e s " in what he c a l l s th e
"v erb a 1 - ideo 1 o g ic a 1" l i f e or w orld . For him, th e
*
c e n t r i p e t a l f o r c e s m a n i f e s te d in t h e te n d e n c y toward
u n i f i c a t i o n and c e n t r a l i z a t i o n i s alw ays o p e r a t i n g " in th e
m id st of h e t e r o g 1o s s i a ," th e embodiment of th e f o r c e s of
s t r a t i f i c a t i o n and d i v e r s i f i c a t i o n which c o n s t i t u t e s the
" a u t h e n t i c environm ent" f o r a l l sy m bolic e x p r e s s i o n s
(B a k h tin 2 7 1 -7 2 ). Yet u n l i k e R o rty , who s e e s " th e t a l e n t
to speak d i f f e r e n t l y " a s by f a r th e most im p o rta n t
" in s tr u m e n t of c u l t u r a l change" and d i s m i s s e s o f fh a n d the
p o s s i b i l i t y and r e l e v a n c e of a " m etav o c ab u la ry " b a sed on a
74
s h a re d s e t of c r i t e r i a , B a k h tin o f f e r s a somewhat b a la n c e d
v i s i o n of how t h e i n t e r a c t i o n of th e two c o n f l i c t i n g
t e n d e n c i e s i n s u r e s th e dynamics of " l i n g u i s t i c l i f e . "
D e s p ite t h e f a c t t h a t th e " u n i t a r y language" a s th e
e x p r e s s i o n of th e c e n t r i p e t a l f o r c e s in B a k h t i n 's
v e r b a l - i d e o 1o g i c a 1 w orld i s " p o s i t e d " or a r t i f i c i a l a s
opposed to th e " r e a l i t i e s of h e t e r o g l o s s i a ," i t r e p r e s e n t s
n e v e r t h e l e s s f o r c e s t h a t " s t r u g g l e to overcome th e
h e t e r o g l o s s i a of la n g u a g e ," t h e r e f o r e p l a y s an e q u a l l y
im p o rta n t r o l e in th e "c r e a t i n g of a l i f e f o r language"
(2 7 0 ).
S i m i l a r l y , th e em phasis th e s o - c a l l e d s o c i a l
c o n s t r u c t i o n i s t s in c o m p o s itio n th e o r y lay on th e s o c i a l
a s p e c t of i n v e n t i o n does not lea d them to ig n o r e , a s
Habermas has a p p a r e n t l y done, th e f u n c t i o n of th e
i n d i v i d u a l . When Habermas r e j e c t s th e c o n c e p ti o n of
c o n se n s u s a s th e b a la n c e of " n o n g e n e r a l i z a b l e i n t e r e s t s ” on
th e b a s i s t h a t " n e g o t i a t i n g compromises does n o t a t a l l
s e r v e to redeem v a l i d i t y c l a i m s , " he i s in f a c t r u l i n g out
th e p o s s i b i l i t y of th e i n d i v i d u a l p e r s p e c t i v e s p l a y i n g a
v i t a l c o n s t i t u t i v e r o l e in d i s c u r s i v e i n v e n t i o n , or th e
p o s s i b i l i t y of a " c o l l e c t i v e c r e a t i o n " of th e sym bolic
o r d e r . For him, t h e r e a r e o n ly " p a r t i c i p a n t s " c o o r d i n a t i n g
w i t h each o t h e r f o r th e d i s c o v e r y of a t r a n s c e n d e n t a l s e t
of v a l i d i t y c la im s and t h e renew al of an e x tra m u n d a n e ,
75
o v e r a r c h i n g " l i f e w o r l d " t h a t i s i n a c c e s s i b l e to them. In
c o n t r a s t , a s o c i a l c o n s t r u c t i o n i s t , such as Karen Burke
LeFevre in h e r I n v e n t i o n a s a S o c ia l A c t , would t y p i c a l l y
s u g g e s t t h a t "we sh o u ld be acknow ledging th e i n d i v i d u a l ’s
i n v e n t i v e e f f o r t s " (L eFevre 139) even in a model t h a t le a n s
h e a v i l y to th e s o c i a l a s p e c t of i n v e n t i o n . LeFevre and
lik e -m in d e d t h e o r i s t s s t a r t from th e p re m ise t h a t th e
" i n v e n t i n g s e l f i s s o c i a l l y c o n s t i t u t e d " or t h a t i t is
"perm eated" w ith s o c i a l v a l u e s in th e f i r s t p l a c e , so t h a t
i t i s n o t c l e a r how in th e f i n a l a n a l y s i s , th e i n d iv i d u a l
can have "a p a r t i c u l a r way of i n t e r a c t i n g w ith what she
i n h e r i t s s o c i a l l y and c u l t u r a l l y " or how she sh o u ld be
" c a p a b le of o f f e r i n g som ething u n iq u e in t h a t r e g a r d ," as
th e y have c la im e d (LeFevre 139). Yet th e y a t l e a s t f e e l
th e need to acknowledge th e c o n t r i b u t i n g r o l e of th e
"unique" i n d i v i d u a l p e r s p e c t i v e in i n v e n t i o n , which i s in
e f f e c t an acknowledgment of th e p o s s i b i l i t y of a genuine
d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n . Such an acknowledgment s e t s o f f by
c o n t r a s t th e extrem e p o s i t i o n Habermas has ta k e n in
s u g g e s t i n g t h a t e v e r y t h i n g i s " p r e - i n t e r p r e t e d " or t h a t
n o t h in g i s c o m p le te ly " u n f a m i l i a r " in th e p ro c e s s of
com m unicative a c t i o n . By v i r t u e of t h e i r t h e o r e t i c a l
i n t r a n s i g e n c e , R o rty and Habermas have s i t u a t e d th em se lv e s
r e s p e c t i v e l y a t two o p p o sin g " p o le s " of th e sp ace of
con tem p orary d i s c o u r s e on i n v e n t i o n . Between t h e s e two
76
p o l e s a l l o t h e r m odels, w i t h t h e i r v a r i o u s ways of
h i e r a r c h i z i n g c r e a t i o n and d i s c o v e r y , f i n d t h e i r p l a c e s .
The equal but o p p o s i t e " p o l a r i t i e s " we f i n d in R orty
and Habermas d e c id e t h a t f o r a l l t h e i r avowed b re a k w ith a
p h i l o s o p h i c a l t r a d i t i o n of b e in g , th e y a c t u a l l y make up
s e v e r a l what Perelm an l i s t s a s th e "uncompromising and
i r r e d u c i b l e p h i l o s o p h i c a l o p p o s i t i o n s " which a m odernized
r h e t o r i c commits i t s e l f to " c o m b a tt i n g ] ," such a s th e
"d ualism of re a s o n and im a g i n a t io n , . . . of a u n i v e r s a l l y
a c c e p te d o b j e c t i v i t y and an incommunicable s u b j e c t i v i t y , of
a r e a l i t y b in d in g on everybody and v a lu e s t h a t a r e p u r e l y
i n d i v i d u a l " ( New R h e to r i c 510). A lthough th e y seem
d i a m e t r i c a l l y opposed to each o t h e r when R o rty r e j e c t s th e
n o t i o n o f a rg u m e n ta tio n as u t t e r l y " i r r e l e v a n t " w h ile
Habermas i n s i s t s t h a t a r g u m e n ta tio n should be e n s h r i n e d as
th e " c o u r t of a p p e a l ," th e y b o th deny th e " e x i s t e n c e of an
a r g u m e n ta tio n t h a t i s n e i t h e r c o m p e llin g nor a r b i t r a r y , " or
th e e x i s t e n c e of a " s t a t e in which a r e a s o n a b l e c h o ic e can
be e x e r c i s e d " ( New R h e to r i c 514). For R o rty , even i f
a r g u m e n ta tio n betw een d i f f e r e n t " v o c a b u l a r i e s " was
p o s s i b l e , i t would alw ays be to o a r b i t r a r y to have any r e a l
b e a r i n g on d i s c u r s i v e p r o d u c t i o n or on th e r i s e and f a l l of
s p e c i f i c " v o c a b u l a r i e s , ” a s each " v o ca b u lary " by h i s
d e f i n i t i o n i s a s e l f - d e f i n e d and s e l f - c o n t a i n e d
com m unicative system . And as Habermas s e e s i t ,
77
a r g u m e n ta t io n is p o s s i b l e o n ly b e c a u se i t i s alw ays
p ro c e e d in g w i t h i n th e c o n f i n e s of a " h o r i z o n - f o r m in g ,"
a l l - i n c l u s i v e , u n i t a r y ” 1 i f e w o r l d . " They b o th assume t h a t
th e d i s c u r s i v e e co lo g y ( t h e " v o c a b u la ry " or th e
"1 i f e w o r l d " ) i s homogeneous and m o n o l i t h i c . And th e y b o th
p ro p o se a lo g o s t h a t " p r e - i n t e r p r e t s " e v e r y t h i n g and i s
t h e r e f o r e , t o q u o te Michel Meyer a g a i n , " c lo s e d upon
i t s e l f , " f o r w i t h i n such a lo g o s d i s c u s s i o n co u ld s e r v e
o n ly as "a v e h i c l e f o r p r e - c o n s t i t u t e d t r u t h s . " S in c e w ith
th e e x c e p t i o n of o n ly a few " s t r o n g p o e t s , " we can no t s t e p
o u t s i d e e i t h e r our "v o ca b u lary " or th e " l i f e w o r l d , " i t is
im p o s s ib le f o r us to f o r m u la te a r e a l problem or t o a sk any
q u e s t i o n w ith o u t t h e r e h a v in g a l r e a d y been an answer f o r
i t . I f by " i n v e n t i o n " we mean more th a n th e r e s h u f f l i n g ,
r e p e t i t i o n and p e r p e t u a t i o n of o ld p l a t i t u d e s , th e n u n l e s s
we b e l i e v e t h a t some new d i s c u r s i v e e n t i t i e s would
m y s t e r i o u s l y come ou t of an i n t e l l e c t u a l v o i d , or t h a t some
n o n - d i s c u r s i v e deus ex m&china (su c h as th e i n t e r v e n t i o n
from a c h an g in g "economic b a s e ” ) c o u ld be c o n v e n i e n t l y
summoned to f u r n i s h an e x p l a n a t i o n f o r th e emergence of any
novel e le m e n ts , t h e r e would n o t be any r e a l i n v e n t i o n
a c c o r d in g to th e two m odels. In th e R orty an and th e
Haberm asian th e o r y on d i s c o u r s e , we have th u s two more
exam ples of th e d i f f i c u l t y on th e p a r t of contem p orary
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" p h ilo s o p h iz e d " r h e t o r i c to o f f e r an a d e q u a te and
c o n v in c in g " r e d e s c r i p t i o n " of th e o ld c o n c e p t of in v en t i o .
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C h apter I I : From In fo rm a l Logic to th e P r i n c i p l e of
C o n s u b s t a n t i a l i t y
When Chaim Perelm an embarked on th e p r o j e c t of
co m p ilin g a "new" r h e t o r i c f o r our tim e in th e 1950s, he
was m o tiv a te d , as i s th e c a se w ith R o rty and Habermas
d e c a d e s l a t e r , by a d i s i l l u s i o n m e n t w ith t h e dom inant
p h i l o s o p h i c a l model in th e s tu d y of d i s c o u r s e . And l ik e
R o rty and Habermas, he found in a r g u m e n ta tio n a t o p i c of
s p e c i a l i n t e r e s t and was c o n ce rn e d in p a r t i c u l a r w i t h th e
problem of " c r i t e r i a " or " v a l i d i t y c l a i m s , " which he
d i s c u s s e s under th e r u b r i c of " l o g i c . " While t h e t h r e e
th u s s h a r e a common p r o b l e m a t i c s , P e r e lm a n ’s l i n e of
i n q u i r y i s so d i f f e r e n t from t h a t a d o p te d by e i t h e r R orty
o r Habermas t h a t h i s p o i n t of d e p a r t u r e t u r n s ou t to be a
c r i t i q u e of b o th . What i s wrong w ith th e W estern
p h ilo s o p h y s i n c e D e s c a r t e s , he p o i n t s o u t in th e
" I n t r o d u c t i o n " to The New R h e t o r i c , i s i t s s in g le - m in d e d
q u e s t f o r th e id e a l of c e r t i t u d e b ased on n e c e s s i t y and
s e l f - e v i d e n c e , to th e com plete n e g l e c t of th e ambiguous,
th e p r o b a b le or th e p l a u s i b l e . .This t h e o r e t i c a l
o n e - s i d e d n e s s le a d s to a sy n o n y m iza tio n of " l o g ic " w ith
"formal l o g i c , ” a p r e o c c u p a t i o n w ith e l a b o r a t i n g a system
of " n e c e s s a r y p r o p o s i t i o n s " t h a t would "impose i t s e l f on
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e v e ry r a t i o n a l b e in g , c o n c e rn in g which agreem ent i s
i n e v i t a b l e , " and th e e x c l u s i o n from i t s domain of s tu d y a l l
th e methods of p ro o f and p e r s u a s i o n employed in e v eryd ay
com m unication ( New R h e to r i c 2 ) . What we have i s th u s a
c o n c e p tu a l system c l o s i n g in on i t s e l f : a system which
c o n s i d e r s a s " r a t i o n a l " o n ly th o s e d e m o n s tr a ti o n s t h a t
e x te n d s th e " s e l f - e v i d e n c e " of e i t h e r m ental or s e n s i b l e
i n t u i t i o n s from "axioms" or " f a c t s " to th e d e r i v e d
c o n c l u s i o n s , r e l e g a t i n g e v e r y t h i n g la c k in g in th e
" c e r t a i n t y of c a l c u l a t i o n s " to th e limbo of th e i r r a t i o n a l
or th e i l l o g i c a l . A f a l s e dichotom y i s e s t a b l i s h e d under
t h i s system whereby we a r e r e q u i r e d to make a c h o ic e
betw een a n a rro w ly c o n c e iv e d r a t i o n a l i t y o r an a r t i f i c i a l l y
s t i p u l a t e d l o g i c a l i t y on th e one hand, and th e s o - c a l l e d
i r r a t i o n a l or i l l o g i c a l , t h a t i s , th e n a t u r a l , on th e
o t h e r ; b e t w e e n w h a t i s " c o m p e l l i n g " o r
agreem ent-com m anding, and what is " a r b i t r a r y " or
d i s a g r e e m e n t - i n d u c i n g ; betw een, ro u g h ly , th e H aberm asian
a l t e r n a t i v e which s e e s e v ery d is a g r e e m e n t a s "a s i g n of
e r r o r " and r e f u s e s to be " c o n te n t w ith more or l e s s
p r o b a b le o p in io n s " (New R h e to r i c 2 ) , and th e R o rty an
a l t e r n a t i v e t h a t d i s m i s s e s th e p o s s i b i l i t y of even h aving
a common ground betw een two d i f f e r e n t " v o c a b u l a r i e s " and
r e j e c t s th e c o n c e p ts of c r i t e r i a and a rg u m e n ta tio n as
t o t a l l y i r r e l e v a n t in th e e v o l u t i o n of d i s c o u r s e . T h e ir
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seem in gly r a d i c a l d i f f e r e n c e s n o t w i t h s t a n d i n g , Habermas and
R o rty a r e a c t u a l l y u n i t e d in t h e i r l o y a l t y to t h i s
dichotom y: f o r them, a rg u m e n ta tio n i s e i t h e r th e r i t u a l
th ro u g h which a p r e - o r d a i n e d c o n se n su s can be r e a f f i r m e d or
i t i s th e f u t i l e a tt e m p t to g iv e a r a t i o n a l fa c a d e to what
in f a c t a r e e r r a t i c and a r b i t r a r y d i s c u r s i v e e v e n t s ,
whereas f o r Perelm an, a rg u m e n ta tio n i s of u tm o st im portance
to us p r e c i s e l y b e c a u se i t e n a b le s us to make a r e a s o n a b 1 a
c h o ic e among p o s s i b l e t h e s e s th u s to s t e e r away from th e
b i n a r y o p p o s i t i o n betw een th e a b s o l u t e l y n e c e s s a r y and th e
a b s o l u t e l y c o n t i n g e n t .
In The New R h e t o r i c . Perelm an f a u l t s t h i s
p h i l o s o p h i c a l t r a d i t i o n m ain ly on th e c o g n i t i v e ground,
which means t h a t h i s argu m ents a g a i n s t t h a t " f a m i l i a r and
tim e -h o n o re d v o c a b u l a r y ” a r e to a c o n s i d e r a b l e e x t e n t s t i l l
" p h r a s e d ," to borrow from R o rty , in " t h a t v e r y v o c a b u l a r y ."
In a posthu m ou sly p u b l i s h e d l e c t u r e by Perelm an t i t l e d
"Formal Logic and Info rm al L o g ic ," how ever, we w i t n e s s a
s u b t l e s h i f t in h i s l i n e of a t t a c k when he blames th e
formal system , e r e c t e d on th e f o u n d a t i o n of a formal l o g i c ,
c h i e f l y f o r i t s te n d e n c y to s t i f l e what in e f f e c t a r e
i n v e n t i v e p o s s i b i l i t i e s . Perelm an s e e s form al l o g ic as
c o n s i s t i n g in t h r e e m e th o d o lo g ic a l p r i n c i p l e s : th e use of
an a r t i f i c i a l lan g u ag e, fo rm alism , and o b j e c t i v i s m . While
th e u n i v o c i t y of s i g n s in an a r t i f i c i a l language makes i t
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p o s s i b l e to e l i m i n a t e m is u n d e r s ta n d in g s , a m b i g u i t i e s and
c o n t r o v e r s i e s u n a v o id a b le in n a t u r a l la n g u a g e , t h i s
c e r t a i n t y and c l a r i t y have been a c h ie v e d a t th e
u n a c c e p t a b l e expense of l i m i t i n g "th e p o s s i b i l i t i e s of
e x p r e s s i o n and d e m o n s tr a ti o n in such a manner t h a t , g iv e n
an a r t i f i c i a l lan g u a g e, i t does n o t p e rm it e v e r y t h i n g to be
s a i d ; g iv e n a s e t of axioms and r u l e s of d e d u c t i o n , one
must a llo w . . . th e e x i s t e n c e of i r r e s o l v a b l e
p r o p o s i t i o n s " (" In fo rm a l L ogic" 9 ) . In c o n t r a s t , a n a t u r a l
language i s " c a p a b le of com m unicating [ i . e . , i n v e n t i n g ] any
id ea w h a ts o e v e r ," a s w i t h i n i t s c o n t e x t , th e c o n s i d e r a t i o n s
f o r "a s e n s i b l e com m u nication ," or f o r t h e c r e a t i o n of
m eanings, " ta k e th e p re c e d e n c e over a l l o t h e r
c o n s i d e r a t i o n s " (" I n f o r m a l Logic" 10). Thus a s s p e a k e r s of
th e n a t u r a l lang uag e, we t a c i t l y presume t h a t "what we a r e
t o l d i s n o t in c o h e r e n t and i s n o t w ith o u t i n t e r e s t , " and
our r e s p o n s e t o , f o r exam ple, th e famous H e r a c l i t e a n
frag m en t "We e n t e r and we do n o t e n t e r th e same r i v e r
tw ice " i s to " s t r i v e . . . t o i n t e r p r e t what he t e l l s us so
a s to a s c r i b e an a c c e p t a b l e meaning to i t " ( " I n f o rm a l
L ogic" 10), i n s t e a d of d i s m i s s i n g i t c a s u a l l y f o r i t s
"obvious" in c o h e r e n c e , i 1 l o g i c a l i t y or s e l f - c o n t r a d i c t i o n .
Only in th e u se of n a t u r a l lan gu age, in f a c t , i s i t
p o s s i b l e to lend " s e v e r a l , sometimes e n t i r e l y novel
m eanings to a s i n g l e e x p r e s s io n " and to a p p ea l t o
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"m etaphors and c o n t r o v e r s i a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s " (" In fo rm a l
Logic" 10), w hereas a form al system i s so comm itted to th e
" c o r r e c t n e s s " of e x p r e s s i o n or th e p r e c i s i o n of meaning a s
to v i r t u a l l y e l i m i n a t e th e p o s s i b i l i t y of c o p io u s
in v e n t i o n .
Whenever "fu zz y n o t io n s " c h a r a c t e r i z i n g th e n a t u r a l
language g i v e r i s e to "numerous i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s " or " v a r i e d
d e f i n i t i o n s , " Perelm an f u r t h e r p o i n t s o u t , we a r e com pelled
t o make c h o ic e s and d e c i s i o n s , and a r e "v ery o f t e n o b l ig e d
to j u s t i f y t h e s e c h o ic e s and to p r o v id e m o tiv e s f o r t h e s e
d e c i s i o n s " (" I n f o r m a l Logic" 11). In such c a s e s , we can
o n ly a p p ea l to what he term s "in fo rm a l l o g i c , " t h a t i s , th e
" l o g i c of a r g u m e n ta tio n " which " j u s t i f i e s a c t i o n ,
a llo w s a c o n t r o v e r s y to be s e t t l e d and a r e a s o n a b l e
d e c i s i o n to be made" (" In fo rm a l Logic" 11). U nlike formal
l o g i c , which r e q u i r e s t h a t a d i s c o u r s e s t a r t from
u n c o n t r o v e r t e d "axioms" and th e n p ro c e e d to d e m o n s tra te
t h a t an o b j e c t i v e q u a l i t y ( e . g . , t r u t h , s e l f - e v i d e n c e )
moves from th e p r e m is e s to th e c o n c l u s i o n s , a r g u m e n ta tio n
governed by th e r u l e s of info rm al l o g i c s t a r t s from
"commonplaces," and i t aims o n ly a t a " t r a n s f e r of
a d h e sio n " or a s u c c e s s f u l p e r s u a s i o n of th e a u d ie n c e to
a c c e p t th e r e a s o n a b l e c h a r a c t e r of a d e c i s i o n or of a
c h o ic e . A lthough t h e r e i s a g e n e r a l c o n sen su s a bo ut th e
commonplaces, th e y a c t u a l l y " c o n c e rn vague, sc ram b led ,
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c o n t r o v e r s i a l n o t i o n s from which one cann ot draw
c o n seq u e n ce s w ith o u t s e e k in g to c l a r i f y them" (" In fo rm a l
L o g ic ” 12). They may, m oreover, g i v e r i s e to
i n c o m p a t i b i l i t i e s in th e p r o c e s s of t h e i r c l a r i f i c a t i o n so
t h a t i t becomes n e c e s s a r y t o g iv e a cu sto m ary n o t i o n a new
meaning which i s more a d a p te d to th e s i t u a t i o n . T h is
change of meaning r e q u i r e s j u s t i f i c a t i o n , and " th e burden
of p ro o f b e f a l l s th e opponent to th e c u sto m ary m ean in g”
( " I n f o r m a l Logic" 12). The c o n s e r v a t i v e p r e s u m p tio n f a v o r s
t h e s t a t u s quo, f o r exam ple, so t h a t o n ly change r e q u i r e s
a j u s t i f i c a t i o n , y e t f o r a s o c i a l i s t , " E q u a l i t y need s no
r e a s o n s , o n ly i n e q u a l i t y does" (" In fo rm a l Logic" 13).
O s t e n s i b l y , what Perelm an i s t a l k i n g a b o u t h e r e is
l i t t l e more th a n th e modus operandi of " in fo rm a l l o g i c , "
y e t i t i s a lm o st j u s t a s o b v io u s t h a t h i s d e s c r i p t i o n is
r e a l l y a b o u t t h e mode of r h e t o r i c a l i n v e n t i o n . A ccording
to h i s m o d e l, th e prim e mover of d i s c u r s i v e p r o d u c t i o n i s
n e i t h e r t h e R o rty an c e n t r i f u g a l w i 11- t o - d i f f e r nor th e
c e n t r i p e t a l magnetism of a H aberm asian c o re of " u n i v e r s a l
v a l i d i t y c l a i m s , " b u t th e b u i l t - i n f u z z i n e s s of th e n a t u r a l
lan g u ag e. Such i n h e r e n t v a g u en e ss c r e a t e s what can w ell be
seen a s a r h e t o r i c a l s i t u a t i o n when i t g i v e s r i s e t o th e
need to d e c id e on or t o choose from t h e numerous
p o s s i b i l i t i e s of m eaning-m aking, hence th e need to
" j u s t i f y " th e d e c i s i o n o r th e c h o ic e . An i n v e n t i v e a c t
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i n v a r i a b l y s t a r t s from g e n e r a l a g re em e n ts among th o s e
in v o lv e d , o r th e "commonplaces," i t i s th u s im p o s s ib le to
have th e k in d of s i t u a t i o n in which two i n t e r a c t i n g
v o c a b u l a r i e s s h a r e n o th in g a t a l l . The r e a s o n why "begging
t h e q u e s t io n " i s an e r r o r in a r g u m e n ta t io n i s p r e c i s e l y
t h a t i t t r i e s to s t a r t from what in f a c t i s a c o n t e s t e d
t h e s i s or a d is a g r e e m e n t. Yet t h e s e "commonplaces" a r e so
s t r u c t u r e d t h a t th e y c o n t a i n th e se ed s f o r
i n c o m p a t i b i l i t i e s , c o n t r o v e r s i e s and d i f f e r e n c e s , so t h a t
th e y a r e , p a r a d o x i c a l l y , b e t t e r d e f i n e d a s "agreem ents f o r
d i s a g r e e m e n t s ” : t h e moment we t r y to c l a r i f y them and to
a d a p t them t o s p e c i f i c r h e t o r i c a l s i t u a t i o n s , th ey b e g in to
e x h i b i t t h e i r in n e r a m b ig u ity and to g e n e r a t e
c o n t r o v e r s i e s . An u n p r o b le m a tic a g re em e n t, or what i s
g e n e r a l l y g r a n t e d a s th e custo m ary m eaning, does n o t need
any j u s t i f i c a t i o n , and t h e r e f o r e does n o t in i t s e l f lea d to
i n v e n t i o n . That i s why " i f P, t h e n P" might be an
im p o rta n t law in form al l o g i c , b ut i t i s m e a n in g le ss
a c c o r d i n g t o th e lo g ic of a r g u m e n ta tio n or i n v e n t i o n , f o r
to move from "P" to th e same "P" s i g n i f i e s o n ly a movement
from an agreem ent to e x a c t l y th e same agreem en t.
S i m i l a r l y , i f e v e r y t h i n g i s " p r e - i n t e r p r e t e d " w i t h i n th e
h o r i z o n - f o r m in g " l i f e w o r l d , ” a s Habermas s u g g e s ts in h i s
t h e o r y of com m unicative a c t i o n , and a l l we a r e e x p e c te d to
do i s to c o o r d i n a t e w ith each o t h e r f o r th e achievem ent of
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th e o n ly p o s s i b l e outcom e, o r to a d h e re to a p r e v i o u s l y
g iv e n " n a t u r a l " o r d e r in a c o n s e n s u s - o r i e n t e d sym bolic
exchange, t h e r e would h a r d l y be any i n v e n t i o n in v o lv e d
s i n c e what th e p a r t i c i p a n t s do i s n o t make a c h o ic e or a
change, b ut perform a r i t u a l . A ccording to P e r e lm a n ’s
model, t h e r e f o r e , to p e rfo rm an i n v e n t i v e a c t t a k e s a t
l e a s t a g e n e r a t i v e a m b ig u ity , a f o u n d a t i o n a l a g re e m e n t, and
a p r o d u c t i v e d i s a g r e e m e n t, t h a t i s , a d e v i a t i o n from
commonly h e ld p r e s u m p tio n s t h a t c a l l s f o r j u s t i f i c a t i o n .
A com parison betw een Perelm an on th e one s i d e and
R o rty and Habermas on th e o t h e r b r i n g s i n t o s h a r p e r fo cu s
n o t o n ly th e " s p i r i t . . . f o r e i g n to th e r h e t o r i c a l p o i n t
of view" (New R h e to r i c 5 0 9 ), in which th e l a t t e r conduct
t h e i r s t u d i e s of d i s c o u r s e , bu t a l s o t h e f o r m e r ’s c l o s e
g e n e a l o g i c a l t i e s w ith th e a n c i e n t a r t of p e r s u a s i o n .
Perelm an makes c l e a r t h a t h i s i n q u i r y i s r e l a t e d to "th e
c o n c e rn s of th e R e n a is s a n c e and, beyond t h a t , to th o s e of
c e r t a i n Greek and L a t i n a u t h o r s , " in p a r t i c u l a r to
A r i s t o t l e a s a r h e t o r i c i a n . The b a s i c framework of h i s new
r h e t o r i c i s to such an e x t e n t A r i s t o t e l i a n t h a t h i s
a n a l y s i s c e n t e r s on " th e p r o o f s which A r i s t o t l e term ed
' d i a l e c t i c a l ' ” and e x p lo r e d in b o th th e T o n ic s and th e
R h e t o r i c as "th e a r t of r e a s o n i n g from g e n e r a l l y a c c e p te d
o p in io n s " ( New R h e t o r i c 5) and many of h i s a s s u m p tio n s
a b o u t i n v e n t i o n a r e e a s i l y t r a c e a b l e to A r i s t o t l e ’s t h e o r y .
87
In th e T o p i c s . f o r exam ple, A r i s t o t l e d i s t i n g u i s h e s betw een
two k in d s of a rg um en ts: d e m o n s tr a ti o n s and d i a l e c t i c a l
d e d u c t i o n s . A d e m o n s tr a ti o n s t a r t s from p re m ise s which a r e
" t r u e and p r i m i t i v e " or a r e " c o n v in c in g on th e s t r e n g t h n o t
of a n y th i n g e l s e , but of th e m se lv e s" (1 00 a20 ). A
d i a l e c t i c a l d e d u c t io n , on th e o t h e r hand, " r e a s o n s from
r e p u t a b l e o p in io n s " or from o p i n i o n s t h a t a r e " a c c e p te d by
e v eryo ne or by th e m a j o r i t y o r by th e w is e — i . e . by a l l , o r
by th e m a j o r i t y , or by th e most n o t a b l e and r e p u t a b l e o f
them" ( 1 0 0 a 3 0 -l0 0 b 2 5 ). T h is d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n betw een
" d e m o n s tra tio n " and " d i a l e c t i c a l d e d u c tio n " rem inds us o f
P e r e lm a n ’s d i s t i n c t i o n betw een form al and in form al l o g i c ,
bu t t h e p a r a l l e l does n ot s t o p h e r e . A r i s t o t l e s e e s a l l
a rg um en ts a s c o n s i s t i n g of two b a s i c s t r u c t u r a l components:
th e y " s t a r t w ith p r o p o s i t i o n s , w h ile th e s u b j e c t s on which
d e d u c t i o n s ta k e p l a c e a r e p r o b le m s " (1 0 1 b l5 , em phasis
a d d e d ) . These two components a r e equal in number: "out of
e v e ry p r o p o s i t i o n , " we a r e t o l d , "you w i l l make a problem"
by sim p ly chan ging th e " t u r n of p h r a s e , " f o r th e d i f f e r e n c e
betw een a problem and a p r o p o s i t i o n i s n o th in g b u t "a
d i f f e r e n c e in th e t u r n of th e p h ra s e " (10 1 b 2 5 -3 5 ). T h is ,
however, by no means s u g g e s t s t h a t a p r o p o s i t i o n and a
problem a r e d i f f e r e n t from each o t h e r o n ly in name. For
A r i s t o t l e makes i t v e ry c l e a r t h a t in c o n s t r u c t i n g
d i a l e c t i c a l a rg u m e n ts, "no one in h i s s e n s e s would make a
88
p r o p o s i t i o n of what no one h o l d s , n or y e t make a problem of
what i s obvio us to everybody: f o r t h e l a t t e r a d m its of no
d o u b t, w h ile to th e form er no one would a s s e n t " (1 0 4 a 5 -1 0 ).
An " a s s e n t" and a " d o u b t," t h e r e f o r e , d e f i n e a p r o p o s i t i o n
and a problem r e s p e c t i v e l y , and in t h i s p a i r of term s we
r e c o g n i z e , a g a i n , th e f a m i l i a r a g r e e m e n t/d is a g r e e m e n t
d ic h o to m y .
What A r i s t o t l e la y s down h e r e a r e some of th e
p r i n c i p l e s of h i s th e o r y of r h e t o r i c a l i n v e n t i o n whose
im po rtance has y e t to be f u l l y a p p r e c i a t e d . A ccording to
A r i s t o t l e , th e p o i n t from which i n v e n t i o n s t a r t s i s a
p r o p o s i t i o n o r t h a t upon which t h o s e in v o lv e d in th e
com m unicative a c t a g r e e . The s u b j e c t which keeps an
i n v e n t i v e a c t g o in g i s a "problem" or som ething which
a d m its of " d o u b t," t h a t i s , of a d i f f e r e n c e or a
d is a g r e e m e n t among th e p a r t i c i p a n t s . I t i s th e "doubt" or
a gap betw een d i f f e r i n g d i s c u r s i v e p o s i t i o n s t h a t c r e a t e s
th e space n e c e s s a r y f o r i n v e n t i o n t o ta k e p l a c e . In t h i s
s e n s e , to in v e n t i s to "probl emat i z e , " to d i f f e r , or to
d i s a g r e e . Yet s i n c e th e p r o b 1e m a t i z a t i o n can p ro c e e d o n ly
from th e r e l a t i v e l y s o l i d ground of a " p r o p o s i t i o n " or a
co n sen su s of o p i n i o n s , th e i n v e n t i v e p r o c e s s i s one of
c o n s t a n t l y s e e k in g to " p r o p o s e ," to i d e n t i f y , to a g re e
a l s o . I f A r i s t o t l e th u s makes a v a i l a b l e a t h e o r e t i c a l
p r o t o t y p e t h a t s e e s i n v e n t i o n a s a d i a l e c t i c a l i n t e r p l a y
89
betw een, o r a s im u lta n e o u s s e e k in g f o r , agreem ent and
d i s a g r e e m e n t, h i s g e n iu s l i e s l e s s in h i s i d e n t i f i c a t i o n of
" p r o p o s i t i o n " and "problem" as th e two s t r u c t u r a l
components of i n v e n t i o th a n in h i s i n s i g h t t h a t each of
t h e s e two p a r t s can s w itc h or t r a n s l a t e i n t o t h e o t h e r ’s
i d e n t i t y th ro u g h a mere change in th e " t u r n of p h r a s e ."
A r i s t o t l e i n s i s t s r e p e a t e d l y t h a t t h e d i f f e r e n c e
betw een a problem and a p r o p o s i t i o n i s a d i f f e r e n c e i n "th e
t u r n of th e p h r a s e , " b u t he s t o p s s h o r t of e l a b o r a t i n g on
t h i s c r u c i a l p o i n t . The o n ly t h i n g he o f f e r s by way of an
i l l u s t r a t i o n i s a com parison betw een two ways of a sk in g
e s s e n t i a l l y ' th e same q u e s t i o n : "For i f i t be pu t in t h i s
way, ' I s tw o - f o o te d t e r r e s t r i a l animal th e d e f i n i t i o n of
man?' or ' I s anim al th e genus of man?' th e r e s u l t i s a
p r o p o s i t i o n ; but i f t h u s , ' I s tw o -f o o te d t e r r e s t r i a l animal
t h e d e f i n i t i o n of man or n o t ? ' and ' I s anim al th e genus of
man or n o t ? ' th e r e s u l t i s a problem . S i m i l a r l y to o in
o t h e r c a s e s ” (101b30). In th e a b sen c e of f u r t h e r
c l a r i f i c a t i o n from A r i s t o t l e , th e d i f f e r e n c e betw een th e
two ways of p o s in g what looks l i k e th e same q u e s t i o n could
w ell lend i t s e l f to m u l t i p l e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s . One
p l a u s i b l e e x p l a n a t i o n , f o r i n s t a n c e , i s t h a t t h e sim p le
y e s / n o q u e s t i o n i m p lie s an u rg e f o r th e q u e s t i o n e e to
c o n firm , th ro u g h a p o s i t i v e answ er, what b o th th e
q u e s t i o n e r and th e q u e s t i o n e e have a l r e a d y t a c i t l y a g re e d
90
upon; w hereas th e q u e s t i o n w ith an "or n o t" t a g s u g g e s t s a
la c k of c e r t i t u d e or a "doubt" c o n c e rn in g t h e s u b j e c t in
q u e s t i o n , on th e p a r t of e i t h e r th e q u e s t i o n e r or th e
q u e s t i o n e e or b o th . In t h e f i r s t c a s e , a sim p le answ er i s
s u f f i c i e n t a s what i s needed i s n o th in g but a r i t u a l i s t i c
a c t of c o n f i r m a t i o n . In th e second c a s e , a s u s t a i n e d
e x p l a n a t i o n or d i s c u s s i o n i s r e q u i r e d so a s to do j u s t i c e
to th e " d o u b t." Yet Occam’s r a z o r compels a more l i t e r a l
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n . By s u g g e s t i n g t h a t th e d i f f e r e n c e betw een
a " p r o p o s i t i o n " and a "problem" i s t e r m i n i s t i c in n a t u r e or
t h a t t h e i r d e f i n i t i o n depends on a " t u r n of p h r a s e , "
A r i s t o t l e m ight well mean t h a t a change in th e way a
s t a te m e n t i s p h ra s e d would c o n s t i t u t e an i n v i t a t i o n to
assume a d i f f e r e n t p e r s p e c t i v e , t h a t language can be made
to d i v i d e or to u n i t e , to b r i n g about agreem ent or
d is a g r e e m e n t, and t h a t in th e f i n a l a n a l y s i s , r h e t o r i c a l
i n v e n t i o n i s j u s t a m a t t e r of s k i l l f u l l y m a n i p u l a t in g
" p h r a s e s " or p l a y i n g language games.
T h is i s tan tam o u n t to s a y in g t h a t th e ag reem ent and
th e d is a g r e e m e n t betw een th e sp e a k e r and t h e a u d ie n c e a r e
n ot n e c e s s a r i l y or a l t o g e t h e r a p r i o r s t a t e of a f f a i r s .
R a th e r , th e y can well be an e f f e c t b ro u g h t ab ou t by t h e way
language is employed. In a d i s c u s s i o n on how p r o p o s i t i o n s
a r e " s e l e c t e d , " A r i s t o t l e i s even more e x p l i c i t in h i s
91
em phasis on th e need to c o n s t r u c t , r a t h e r th a n to f i n d , th e
two components of a r g u m e n ta tio n :
P r o p o s i t i o n s sh o u ld be s e l e c t e d in a s many ways
a s we drew d i s t i n c t i o n s in r e g a r d to th e
p r o p o s i t i o n : th u s one may choose th e o p in io n s
h e ld by a l l o r by most men or by th e w ise , i . e . ,
by a l l , or m ost, or th e most n o t a b l e of them— i f
th e y a r e n o t c o n t r a r y to t h o s e t h a t seem to be
g e n e r a l l y h e l d , as was l a i d down b e f o r e . I t i s
u s e f u l a l s o to make them by s e l e c t i n g n o t o n ly
t h o s e o p i n io n s t h a t a c t u a l l y a r e r e p u t a b l e , but
a l s o th o s e t h a t a r e l i k e t h e s e
( 10 5a3 5-1 05 b5 , em phasis added)
The p e r c e p t i o n t h a t " p r o p o s i t i o n " and "p ro b lem ” a r e
l i n g u i s t i c a l l y m a n ip u la b le and m u tu a lly t r a n s f o r m i n g , and
t h a t t h e r e is a " c r e a t i o n ” s i d e a s w ell a s a " d is c o v e ry "
s i d e to th e p r o d u c t i o n of o p i n io n s " r e p u t a b l e " to th e
a u d ie n c e , i s so r a d i c a l l y r h e t o r i c a l t h a t in com parison
even Perelm an seems c o n s e r v a t i v e . A lthough Perelm an sounds
as i f he were u p h o ld in g A r i s t o t l e ’s p o s i t i o n when he
s u g g e s t s in th e New R h e to r i c t h a t a u d ie n c e i s a
" c o n s t r u c t i o n of th e s p e a k e r , " he p i t s t h i s c o n ce p t a g a i n s t
an im p lie d c o n ce p t of th e " r e a l - l i f e a u d i e n c e . " As he s e e s
i t , th e s u c c e s s or f a i l u r e of p e r s u a s i o n depends e n t i r e l y
on w hether or n o t th e s p e a k e r ’s " c o n s t r u c t i o n " of th e
a u d ie n c e i s " a d e q u a te to th e o c c a s io n " or i s in c o n fo rm ity
to th e a u d ie n c e in " r e a l l i f e " (New R h e t o r i c 1 9 -2 0). While
t h e r e i s n o t h in g wrong w ith h i s i n s i s t e n c e t h a t th e sp e a k e r
sh o u ld s t r i v e t o f i n d o u t t h e o p i n io n s of th e a u d ie n c e and
to a d a p t h e r s e l f to them, Perelm an f a i l s to n o t i c e t h a t h i s
92
a c c e p ta n c e of " th e r e a l - l i f e a u d ie n c e " a s an u n p ro b le m a tic
co n ce p t and h i s c l e a r - c u t d i v i s i o n of a u d ie n c e i n t o one
t h a t i s e n t i r e l y g iv e n and a n o th e r t h a t i s e n t i r e l y
c o n s t r u c t e d do n o t s q u a r e w ith h i s own o p p o s i t i o n to a
n a iv e o b j e c t i v i s m and a f a l s e dichotom y (b etw een the
"co m p ellin g " and th e " a r b i t r a r y " ) c h a r a c t e r i z i n g th e
p h i l o s o p h i c a l a p p ro a c h to th e s tu d y of d i s c o u r s e . From a
r h e t o r i c a l p o i n t of view , th e s o - c a l l e d " r e a l - l i f e
a u d ie n c e " i s n ev er so m ething e n t i r e l y f i x e d , " o b j e c t i v e , ”
g iv e n . R a th e r , th e " r e a l - l i f e a u d i e n c e , ” a s opposed to th e
" a u d ie n c e c o n s t r u c t e d by th e s p e a k e r ," i s i t s e l f a
c o n s t r u c t i o n of th e a d d r e s s e e in th e p r o c e s s of b eing
a d d r e s s e d . and i s in t h i s s e n s e c o - c o n s t r u c t e d by b o th th e
a d d r e s s e e and th e a d d r e s s e r th ro u g h sym bolic exchanges or
com m unicative a c t s . T h is has to be th e c a s e f o r th e same
r e a s o n t h a t s i n c e t h e sp e a k e r would have t o s t r i v e to " f i n d
o u t" th e p o s s i b l e o p i n io n s of th e a u d ie n c e in th e p r o c e s s
of c o n s t r u c t i n g th e l a t t e r , or s i n c e h e r f o r m u l a t i o n of a
v a l i d i t y cla im c o n c e rn in g h e r a u d ie n c e i s s u b j e c t to th e
a p p ro v a l of th e l a t t e r , th e a u d ie n c e as "a c o n s t r u c t i o n of
th e sp e a k e r" i s n e v e r e n t i r e l y a c r e a t i o n on th e p a r t of
th e s p e a k e r . The two c o n c e p ts of a u d ie n c e a r e in t h i s
s e n s e j o i n t c r e a t i o n s of b o th t h e sp e a k e r and th e a u d ie n c e
th ro u g h th e u se of lan g u ag e, or we may say t h a t th e y a r e
b o th c o n s t r u c t i o n s of th e r h e t o r i c a l p r o c e s s .
93
A fundam ental d i f f e r e n c e between th e r h e t o r i c a l and
th e p h i l o s o p h i c a l a p p ro a c h to th e stu d y of d i s c o u r s e , as
Perelm an c o r r e c t l y p o i n t s o u t , i s t h a t th e form er b e l i e v e s
in t h e g e n u in e p o s s i b i l i t y of c h o ic e and in th e power of
language to sway th e outcome of any sym bolic i n t e r a c t i o n ,
w hereas th e l a t t e r s u b s c r i b e s , in one way or a n o t h e r , to
th e c o n c e p t o f n e c e s s i t y or i t s o p p o s i t e , th e c o n c e p t of
co m p lete c o n tin g e n c y . In l i n e w ith t h i s b a s i c r h e t o r i c a l
b e l i e f , t h e s o - c a l l e d " r e a l - l i f e a u d ie n c e " can well be seen
a s a c o l l e c t i o n of " a u d ie n c e r o l e s " or a sp ectru m of
" a u d ie n c e f u n c t i o n s " t h a t can be s e l e c t i v e l y a c t u a l i z e d by
th e language used in a d d r e s s i n g i t , n o t w i t h s t a n d i n g th e
f a c t t h a t th e s i z e of such a c o l l e c t i o n or th e ra n g e of
such a sp e ctru m s e t s a l i m i t on th e p o s s i b i l i t y of th e
s e l e c t i o n . One can, f o r exam ple, a ro u s e a d m i r a t i o n or
d i s l i k e f o r a p e rs o n on t h e p a r t of th e a u d ie n c e , hence
change i t s o p i n io n s or a t t i t u d e s c o n c e rn in g t h i s p a r t i c u l a r
i n d i v i d u a l , by p r e s e n t i n g th e same p e rs o n a s " c a u t io u s " or
" c o ld and d e s i g n i n g , " " fra n k " o r " q u a r r e ls o m e ," " d i g n i f i e d "
or " a r r o g a n t , " "co urag eou s" or " f o o l h a r d y , " as Kenneth
Burke o b s e r v e s in A R h e t o r i c of M otives ( 5 5 ) . S in c e i t is
much l e s s l i k e l y t h a t th e r h e t o r i c i a n can sway th e
a u d i e n c e ’ s o p i n io n c o n c e rn in g th e same p e rs o n from
" a r r o g a n t " to "humble" or from "co urageo us" to " c o w a rd ly ,"
and s i n c e th e " a r o u s a l " can be a c c o m p lish e d o n ly th ro u g h
94
sym bo lic means, and o n ly in th e p r o c e s s of com m unicative
e x ch a n g es, i t would seem r e a s o n a b l e to say t h a t w hatever
th e "aro used" o p i n io n s o r a t t i t u d e s may be, th e y a r e
a c t u a l l y p a r t of th e a u d i e n c e ’s p r e - c o n c e i v e d o p in io n s or
a t t i t u d e s , o r , so to speak , p a r t of th e " r e a l - l i f e
a u d i e n c e ." I t i s im p o s s ib le to draw a c l e a r d e m a rc a tio n
l i n e betw een th e " r e a l - l i f e a u d ie n c e " and th e " c o n s t r u c t e d
a u d i e n c e . " They a r e b o th l i n g u i s t i c c o n s t r u c t s , and t h e i r
d i f f e r e n c e i s m ere ly "a t u r n of th e p h r a s e , " a s A r i s t o t l e
s a y s of th e d i f f e r e n c e betw een " p r o p o s i t i o n " and "problem ."
Of th e c o n tem po rary r h e t o r i c i a n s who seek to r e s t o r e
th e a n c i e n t a r t of p e r s u a s i o n to i t s form er g l o r y , Kenneth
Burke seems th e one who does th e most in e x p l o r i n g the
i m p l i c a t i o n s of many of A r i s t o t l e ’s l a c o n i c or even D elph ic
pronouncem ents on r h e t o r i c a l i n v e n t i o n , e s p e c i a l l y the
i m p l i c a t i o n s of h i s s u g g e s t i o n t h a t a " t u r n of p h r a s e ” is
what d i s t i n g u i s h e s a " p r o p o s i t i o n " from a "p ro b lem ." Burke
e m phasizes th e c o n s t i t u t i v e , as opposed to th e " e x p r e s s iv e "
or t h e " r e p r e s e n t a t i v e , " f u n c t i o n of lan g u a g e. For him,
human b e in g s a r e by d e f i n i t i o n "symbol-making and
sy m b o l-u sin g a n i m a l s ," and what we b e l i e v e to be th e
" r e a l i t y " i s l i t t l e more th a n a " c l u t t e r of symbols about
t h e p a s t combined w ith w h atever t h i n g s we know m ainly
th ro u g h maps, m ag azin es, new spapers, and th e 1 ike a b o u t th e
p r e s e n t " ( Language a s Symbolic A c tio n 5 ). A part from a
95
" t i n y s l i v e r of r e a l i t y " we have e x p e r ie n c e d " f i r s t - h a n d , "
th e o v e r a l l " p i c t u r e " o f th e " r e a l l i f e " i s "bu t a
c o n s t r u c t of our symbol system s" ( Language a s Symbolic
Act ion 5 ). So much so t h a t , p a r a d o x i c a l l y , we te n d to
c l i n g to a kind of " n a iv e v e r b a l r e a l i s m , " r e f u s i n g to
r e a l i z e " th e f u l l e x t e n t of th e r o l e p la y e d by symbol i c i t y "
in our n o t i o n s of r e a l i t y , b e c a u se to " m e d ita te on t h i s
f a c t u n t i l one s e e s i t s f u l l i m p l i c a t i o n s i s much l i k e
p e e r i n g ov er th e edge of t h i n g s i n t o an u l t i m a t e a b yss"
( Language a s Symbolic A c tio n 5 ) . One such m in d -b o g g iin g
i m p l i c a t i o n i s t h a t th e sym bolic sy s te m s, or what Burke
p r e f e r s to c a l l " t e r m i n i s t i c s c r e e n s , " a r e a t once
c o n n e c tin g us to and s e p a r a t i n g us from th e n o n v e rb a l
w o rld . B u rk e ’s d i s c u s s i o n on t h i s d u a l i t y of language
s t a r t s w i t h th e more o b v io u s phenomenon t h a t "any
n o m e n c la tu re n e c e s s a r i l y d i r e c t s th e a t t e n t i o n i n t o some
c h a n n e ls r a t h e r t h a n o t h e r s " ( Language as Symbolic A c tio n
4 5 ), in th e se n se t h a t th e term s of p h y s i c s would t u r n our
a t t e n t i o n in a d i r e c t i o n q u i t e d i f f e r e n t from t h o s e of
p sy c h o lo g y . Less o b v io u s , he p o i n t s o u t, i s th e f a c t t h a t
d i f f e r e n t t e r m i n o l o g i e s would a f f e c t th e n a t u r e of our
o b s e r v a t i o n s in th e same way t h a t th e u se of d i f f e r e n t
c o l o r f i l t e r s in p h o to g ra p h y would y i e l d d i f f e r e n t p i c t u r e s
of th e same o b j e c t s , or th e a d o p ti o n of d i f f e r e n t t h e o r i e s
of p s y c h o a n a l y s i s would prod uce d i f f e r e n t i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s
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of th e same dream. And i f we move f a r enough a lo n g t h i s
l i n e , we soon come to r e c o g n i z e t h a t most of what we
c o n s i d e r our ’o b s e r v a t i o n s " a r e a c t u a l l y
" i m p l i c a t i o n s of th e p a r t i c u l a r te r m in o lo g y in term s of
which th e o b s e r v a t i o n s a r e made," o r t h a t much of what we
ta k e as " o b s e r v a t i o n s " a b o u t " r e a l i t y " a r e in f a c t "th e
s p in n in g o ut of p o s s i b i l i t i e s i m p l i c i t in our p a r t i c u l a r
c h o ic e of term s" ( Language a s Symbolic A c tio n 4 6 ). The
words we a r e u s i n g no t o n ly a f f e c t our p e r c e p t i o n of th e
" r e a l i t y " ; t h a t i s , th e y c r e a t e t h a t p e r c e p t i o n .
I t i s o b v io u s t h a t B u r k e ’s " t e r m i n i s t i c s c r e e n s " is
v i r t u a l l y synonymous w ith R o r t y Ss " v o c a b u l a r i e s . " Both
term s imply t h a t language i s c o n s t i t u t i v e of r e a l i t y and
t h a t d i f f e r e n t s e t s of words would b r i n g a b ou t d i f f e r e n t
" d e s c r i p t i o n s ” or " o b s e r v a t i o n s " of th e same o b j e c t . Yet
t h i s i s a b o u t a s f a r a s th e two t h e o r i s t s would concur in
t h e i r o p i n io n s on d i s c o u r s e . While R o rty , s t a r t i n g from
h i s d e n ia l of t h e e x i s t e n c e of a " m e ta - v o c a b u la r y ,"
c o n c e iv e s of t h e s e " v o c a b u l a r i e s " a s i s o l a t e d , m u tu a lly
u n r e l a t e d e n t i t i e s d e f i n a b l e o n ly by t o t a l l y d i f f e r e n t s e t s
of " c r i t e r i a , " Burke does n ot see h i s " t e r m i n i s t i c s c r e e n s "
in th e same l i g h t . Burke i s f u l l y aware of th e problem
c o n f r o n t i n g a l l who have f r e e d th e m s e lv e s from th e "n a iv e
v e r b a l r e a l is m " and have come to a c c e p t th e p l u r a l i s t i c and
c o n s t i t u t i v e n a t u r e of d i s c o u r s e . As soon a s he r e v e a l s
97
f o r us " th e f u l l e x t e n t of th e r o l e p la y e d by symbo1i c i t y , "
he f o r c e s us to f a c e up to th e c o m p le x ity of th e new
p r o b l e m a t i c s th u s c r e a t e d by a s k in g b l u n t l y th e c r u c i a l
q u e s t i o n "And now where a r e we? Must we m erely r e s i g n
o u r s e l v e s to an e n d l e s s c a t a l o g u e of t e r m i n i s t i c s c r e e n s ,
each of which can be v a lu e d f o r th e l i g h t i t throw s upon
th e human a n im a l, y e t none of which can be c o n s id e r e d
c e n t r a l ? ” ( Language a s Symbolic A c tio n 52) The p o s s i b l e
c o u rs e of a c t i o n he m en tio ns in t h e q u e s t i o n is e x a c t l y
t h a t which R o rty t a k e s w ith o u t any h e s i t a t i o n . Yet f o r
Burke, th e answer i s f a r from t h a t sim p le and c l e a r - c u t .
In "one s e n s e , " Burke t e l l s u s , our r e s p o n s e to th e
q u e s t i o n sh o u ld be a " y e s ," a s " s t r i c t l y s p e a k in g , t h e r e
w i l l be a s many d i f f e r e n t w orld view s in human h i s t o r y as
t h e r e a r e p e o p l e , " and in " th e u n w r i t t e n cosmic
c o n s t i t u t i o n . . . i t i s d e c re e d by th e n a t u r e of t h i n g s
t h a t each man i s ' n e c e s s a r i l y free* to be h i s own t y r a n t ,
i n e x o r a b ly im posing upon h im s e lf th e p e c u l i a r c o m b in atio n
of i n s i g h t s a s s o c i a t e d w ith h i s p e c u l i a r c o m b in a tio n of
e x p e r i e n c e s " ( Language a s Symbolic A c tio n 5 2 ). T his
" p o s i t i v e " answer is p r o b le m a tiz e d n o t o n ly th ro u g h th e
c a r e f u l q u a l i f i c a t i o n and th e m il d l y s a r c a s t i c to n e w ith
which Burke o f f e r s h i s r e a s o n s , but i t i s a l s o shown to be
s e 1f - d e c o n s t r u c t i v e in th e se n se t h a t t h e v e ry a tte m p t to
s t r e s s th e v a l i d i t y of t h i s answer a c t u a l l y p o i n t s to th e
98
i m p o s s i b 1e co n seq u en ces i t would 1o g i c a 11y have b ro u g h t
a b o u t. I f we r e a l l y " r e s i g n o u r s e l v e s to an e n d l e s s
c a t a l o g u e of t e r m i n i s t i c s c r e e n s , " none of which e n jo y s a
p r i v i l e g e d s t a t u s , or i f we, l i k e R o rty , e n c o u ra g e or
v a l o r i z e o n ly th e te n d e n c y "to d i f f e r , " th e r e s u l t would
c e r t a i n l y be an a t o m i z a t i o n of th e sym bolic o r d e r whereby
every on e would become a d i s c u r s i v e " i s l a n d , " t h e r e would be
no sym bolic i n t e r a c t i o n , and i t would h a r d l y be p o s s i b l e to
have any r h e t o r i c a l i n v e n t i o n . To i n v e n t , Wordsworth
rem inds u s , i s l e s s to "dwell upon th o s e p o i n t s w h e re in Men
d i f f e r from each o t h e r " th a n to pay a t t e n t i o n to t h o s e in
which " a l l Men a r e a l i k e , o r th e sam e." Even i f we have to
adm it t h a t e v ery i n d i v i d u a l i s , in a s t r i c t s e n s e , a
s p e c i a l t e r m i n i s t i c u n i t or a u n iq u e c o m b in a tio n of
i n s i g h t s d e r i v e d from some u n iq u e e x p e r i e n c e s , s t i l l we
must no t lo s e our s i g h t of what Burke term s th e " f a t a l
f a c t " t h a t "however th e s i t u a t i o n came to be, a l l members
of our s p e c i e s c o n c e iv e of r e a l i t y somewhat ro u n d a b o u t,
th r o u g h v a r i o u s media of symbolism" ( Language a s Symbolic
Act ion 5 2 ). Whether we look upon such "p ro n e n e ss to
sym bo lic a c t i v i t y " a s "a p r i v i l e g e or a c a l a m i t y , " Burke
f u r t h e r p o i n t s o u t, we have to acknowledge t h a t t h i s
sy m b o l-u sin g te n d e n c y i s a " d i s t i n g u i s h i n g c h a r a c t e r i s t i c
of th e human animal in g e n e r a l , " and can " p r o p e r l y s e r v e as
t h e b a s i s of a g e n e r a l , or p h i l o s o p h i c d e f i n i t i o n of t h i s
99
a n im al" ( Language as Symbolic A c tio n 5 2 ). O th e rw ise p u t ,
th e t h e o r y of " t e r m i n i s t i c s c r e e n s " g i v e s r i s e n o t o n ly to
th e R o rty a n v i s i o n of a g r e a t d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n , b u t , by a
mere A r i s t o t e l i a n " t u r n of p h r a s e , ” to t h e v e ry o p p o s i t e of
such a v i s i o n a l s o , t h a t i s , to th e p e r c e p t i o n t h a t f o r a l l
t h e i r d i f f e r e n c e s , t h e s e t e r m i n i s t i c u n i t s s h a r e a t l e a s t
t h e same " p ro n e n e ss to sym bolic a c t i v i t y " o r have t h e same
r o o t in s y m b o l i c i t y . On t h e b a s i s o f t h i s g r e a t
com m onality so many o b s e r v a t i o n s w i l l " n e c e s s a r i l y " fo llo w
t h a t a whole new " t e r m i n i s t i c s c r e e n " can be b u i l t .
I s t h i s j u s t one more s c r e e n ? Or must we c la im f o r i t
a s p e c i a l s t a t u s ? For Burke, th e answ er i s s e l f - e v i d e n t .
T h is i s a " s c re e n " b u i l t on t h e b a s i s of th e n o t i o n of
s y m b o l i c i t y a s a d i s t i n g u i s h i n g p r o p e r t y of a l l human
b e in g s . I t c o n s i s t s of n o t h in g b u t t h o s e i m p l i c a t i o n s
d e r i v a b l e from t h i s o r i g i n a t i v e n o t i o n . I t i s grounded in
a k in d of " c o l l e c t i v e r e v e l a t i o n , " or in what i s r e v e a l e d
in a l l a c t i v i t i e s of symbol u s in g or symbol making,
i n c l u d i n g th e a c t i v i t i e s of f o r m u l a t i n g t h e o r i e s t h a t would
deny a p r i v i l e g e d s t a t u s t o t h i s e x t r a o r d i n a r y " s c r e e n ."
I t h a s , t h e r e f o r e , e v ery r e a s o n to c la im s p e c i a l f a v o r s
from u s. Such a c o n v i c t i o n n o t w i t h s t a n d i n g , Burke, l i k e
a l l good r h e t o r i c i a n s , a d o p ts an " i r o n i s t " p o s t u r e when he
p r e s e n t s h i s c o n s t r u c t i o n of t h i s " m e ta - s c r e e n " n o t a s an
i n c o n t r o v e r t i b l e t r u t h , b ut m ere ly as a " p r o p o s i t i o n " f o r
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our " c o n s i d e r a t i o n . " He s t a r t s w ith th e "p rag m a tic
r e c o g n i t i o n " t h a t t h e r e is a fundam ental d i f f e r e n c e between
" p erso n s" and " t h in g s " and betw een " a c t i o n s " and s h e e r
" m o tio n s " — "p rag m a tic " in t h e se n se t h a t t h i s " r e c o g n i t i o n "
m ight well be j u s t a n o th e r i l l u s i v e i n t u i t i o n , y e t
" i l l u s i o n or n o t , t h e human r a c e c an n o t p o s s i b l y g e t a lo ng
w ith i t s e l f on th e b a s i s of any o t h e r i n t u i t i o n " ( Language
a s Symbolic A c tio n 5 3 ). The d i s t i n c t i o n e n a b l e s him to
make two c r u c i a l a s s u m p tio n s a s c o n c e p tu a l u n d e rp in n in g s
f o r th e s p e c i a l " te rm in o lo g y " : t h a t th e "human animal
. . . emerges i n t o p e r s o n a l i t y by f i r s t m a s te r in g w hatever
t r i b a l sp e ec h happens to be i t s p a r t i c u l a r sym bolic
e n v ir o n m e n t," and t h a t "lan g u ag e and th o u g h t" a r e
" b a s i c a l l y modes of a c t i o n , " r a t h e r th a n "means of
co nveying i n f o r m a tio n " ( Language a s Symbolic A c tio n 54).
S in c e i t t a k e s a s t r u c t u r i n g m etaphor or what Burke term s
a " r e p r e s e n t a t i v e a n e c d o te " to c o n s t r u c t a " te r m in o lo g y ,"
and drama i s th e " c u l m i n a t iv e form of a c t i o n , " Burke names
t h i s s p e c i a l " v o c a b u la ry " th e " D r a m a t i s t i c s c r e e n , " whose
c o n s t r u c t i o n is a c c o m p lish e d th ro u g h "a m eth o d ic t r a c k i n g
down of th e i m p l i c a t i o n s in th e id ea of sym bolic a c t i o n ,
and of man as th e kind of b e in g t h a t i s p a r t i c u l a r l y
d i s t i n g u i s h e d by an a p t i t u d e f o r such a c t i o n " ( Language as
Symbolic A c tio n 54).
101
Burke d e s c r i b e s t h i s " D r a m a t i s t i c s c re e n " v a r i o u s l y as
th e " g ro u n d in g ," " r e s o u r c e s " o r "a common ground or
s u b s ta n c e " f o r a l l o t h e r ''s c r e e n s . 1 ,1 I f t h i s d e s c r i p t i o n
rem inds us of H aberm as’s " l i f e w o r l d , " th e two c o n c e p ts
a c t u a l l y s i g n i f y q u i t e d i f f e r e n t t h i n g s . The H aberm asian
l i f e w o r l d i s made up of a l l " l i n g u i s t i c a l l y o r g a n i z e d s to c k
of background a ssu m p tio n s " or of th e " s to c k of c u l t u r a l
knowledge ta k e n f o r g r a n t e d , " i n c l u d i n g , f o r exam ple, " th e
i n t u i t i v e knowledge" of "how to cope w ith a s i t u a t i o n " or
"whom one can r e l y on in a s i t u a t i o n " (Habermas, "Remarks"
16 6 -6 7 ). The D r a m a t i s t i c s c r e e n , in c o n t r a s t , c o m p rise s
m ere ly a s k e l e t a l s e t of " g e n e r a t i n g p r i n c i p l e s " in
a d d i t i o n to th e o r i g i n a t i v e a s s u m p tio n which we have j u s t
d i s c u s s e d . The l i f e w o r l d "assumes to a c e r t a i n e x t e n t a
t r a n s c e n d e n t a l p o s i t i o n v i s - a - v i s th e com m unicative
u t t e r a n c e s f o r which i t p r o v i d e s e n a b lin g c o n d i t i o n s " or
s e r v e s a s a fram in g c o n t e x t , and i t i s t h e r e f o r e i n c a p a b l e
of b e in g d i s c u r s i v e l y a c c e s s e d or " th e m a tiz e d " ("Remarks"
166). The D r a m a t i s t i c s c r e e n i s immanent and c a p a b le of
b e in g t h e m a tiz e d , c o n s t r u c t e d o r embodied, f o r i t c o n s i s t s
of n o t h in g b ut " th e b a s i c forms" o f sym bolic a c t i o n which
a r e " e x e m p lif ie d in th e a t t r i b u t i n g of m o tiv e s" and
" e q u a l ly p r e s e n t " in e v e r y t h i n g from " s y s t e m a t i c a l l y
e l a b o r a t e d m e ta p h y s ic a l s t r u c t u r e s " to " b i t s of g o s s i p
o f f e r e d a t random" (Grammar of M otives x v ) . The l i f e w o r l d
102
i s a d j u d i c a t i v e and c e n t r i p e t a l : i t is th e lo cus of
" u n i v e r s a l v a l i d i t y cla im s" and "good r e a s o n s " by which th e
v a l i d i t y of e v e ry i n d i v i d u a l l y r a i s e d c la im sh o u ld be
judged or e v a l u a t e d ; i t i s th e u l t i m a t e " r e s o u r c e f o r
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n " t h a t p r e - d e t e r m i n e s th e meaning of e v ery
s i t u a t i o n ; and i t c o n s t i t u t e s th e sy m b olic c e n t e r of
g r a v i t y to which a l l com m unicative a c t s a r e n e c e s s a r i l y
o r i e n t e d or c o n v e rg in g . The D r a m a t i s t i c s c r e e n i s , on th e
o t h e r hand, i n v e n t i v e and c e n t r i f u g a l : i t s o n ly r a i s o n
d ’e t r e i s t h a t i t makes p o s s i b l e th e c o n s t a n t g e n e r a t i n g of
new " s c r e e n s " or " v o c a b u l a r i e s , " and i t r a d i a t e s o ut o n to ,
i n s t e a d of demanding a co n v erg en ce to i t s e l f from, ev ery
sym bolic a c t i o n , f o r u n l i k e H aberm as’s l i f e w o r l d , i t is
form al r a t h e r th a n s u b s t a n t i a l , i t "h au n ts" e v ery sym bolic
a c t i v i t y , and i t does n ot r e q u i r e th e k in d of h e l i o t r o p i s m
tow ard "co n sen su s" o r "agreem ent" o f H aberm as’s scheme f o r
i t s " r e p r o d u c t i o n . "
Burke s t r e s s e s r e p e a t e d l y " i d e n t i f i c a t i o n " or
agreem ent a s one of th e b a s i c d i s c u r s i v e p r i n c i p l e s in A
R h e to r i c of M o t i v e s , to be s u r e , y e t he does so f o r q u i t e
d i f f e r e n t r e a s o n s . Any sym b olic exchange, or more
s p e c i f i c a l l y , any p e r s u a s i v e a c t w hether perform ed
c o n s c i o u s l y or u n c o n s c i o u s ly i s f o r him alw ays a p r o c e s s of
" g iv e and t a k e , " or a t r a n s a c t i o n , and s u c c e s s in
p e r s u a s i o n depends i n v a r i a b l y on a p r i o r or c o n c o m ita n t
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s u c c e s s in a c h i e v i n g an agreem ent or c o n se n su s among th o se
in v o lv e d . "You p e rs u a d e a man," he o b s e r v e s p o i n t e d l y ,
" o n ly i n s o f a r a s you can t a l k h i s language by sp e ec h ,
g e s t u r e , t o n a l i t y , o r d e r , image, a t t i t u d e , id e a ,
i d e n t i f y i n g your ways w ith h i s ” : some of h i s o p i n io n s a r e
needed to s u p p o r t " th e fulcrum " by which you would move
o t h e r o p i n io n s ( R h e to r i c of M otives 5 5 -5 6 ). The im p e r a tiv e
to i d e n t i f y must n o t , however, be u n d e rs to o d s h e e r l y in th e
t e c h n i c a l s e n se or o n ly w i t h i n th e s p e c i f i c c o n t e x t of
p e rfo rm in g a p e r s u a s i v e a c t . As Burke f u r t h e r p o i n t s o u t,
i d e n t i f i c a t i o n i s " a f f i r m e d w ith e a r n e s t n e s s p r e c i s e l y
b e ca u se t h e r e i s d i v i s i o n , " and th e c o n f r o n t a t i o n between
i d e n t i f i c a t i o n and i t s " i r o n i c c o u n t e r p a r t , " t h a t i s ,
d i v i s i o n , i s a t th e v e ry r o o t of r h e t o r i c a l in v e n t i o n :
In p u re i d e n t i f i c a t i o n t h e r e would be no s t r i f e .
L ik e w ise , t h e r e would be no s t r i f e in a b s o l u t e
s e p a r a t e n e s s , s i n c e op p o n en ts can j o i n b a t t l e
o n ly th ro u g h a m e d ia to r y ground t h a t makes t h e i r
com m unication p o s s i b l e , th u s p r o v i d i n g th e f i r s t
c o n d i t i o n n e c e s s a r y f o r t h e i r i n t e r c h a n g e of
blows. But p u t i d e n t i f i c a t i o n and d i v i s i o n
am biguously t o g e t h e r , so t h a t you c a n n o t know
f o r c e r t a i n j u s t where one ends and th e o t h e r
b e g i n s , and you have th e c h a r a c t e r i s t i c
i n v i t a t i o n to r h e t o r i c . ( R h e to r i c of M otives 25)
From t h i s p o i n t of view, s t r i v i n g f o r a "pure
i d e n t i f i c a t i o n " (a s a d v o c a te d by Habermas) or an " a b s o l u te
s e p a r a t e n e s s " (a s p re a c h e d by R o rty ) would s i m i l a r l y lead
to a breakdown in com m unication or a s u s p e n s io n of a l l
d i s c u r s i v e e x ch an g es. For i t i s o n ly th ro u g h th e
104
c o - p r e s e n c e and a c t i v e engagement of i d e n t i f i c a t i o n and
d i v i s i o n t h a t " r h e t o r i c " or d i s c o u r s e becomes p o s s i b l e .
T h is e n a b l in g a m b ig u ity Burke has term ed th e p r i n c i p l e of
c o n s u b s t a n t i a 1i t y , which he s e e s as a n e c e s s a r y c o n d i t i o n
n o t o n ly f o r sym bolic i n t e r c h a n g e s , bu t f o r "any way of
l i f e " ( R h e to r i c of M otives 2 7 ).
The em phasis Burke la y s on t h e " c o n s u b s t a n t i a l i t y " of
i d e n t i f i c a t i o n and d i v i s i o n as a g e n e r a t i v e c o n d i t i o n i s ,
of c o u r s e , A r i s t o t e l i a n in i t s o r i g i n . The
i d e n t i f i c a t i o n / d i v i s i o n dichotom y i s c l e a r l y a
r e - a f f i r m a t i o n of th e p r o p o s i t i o n / p r o b l e m o p p o s i t i o n , and
in th e p r o d u c t i v e a m b ig u ity of a "c o n s u b s t a n t i a l " s i t u a t i o n
we have an i l l u m i n a t i n g r e d e s c r i p t i o n of what A r i s t o t l e
o n ly h i n t s a t in th e T o p ics when he s u g g e s t s t h a t th e
d i f f e r e n c e betw een a p r o p o s i t i o n and a problem c o u ld be
m ere ly a " t u r n of p h r a s e . " Yet n o t o n ly does B u r k e ’s
d i s c u s s i o n throw much new l i g h t on a dim ly l i t o ld problem
by r e i n t e r p r e t i n g i t in th e f a r more c o n c r e t e term s o f an
a g re e m e n t/d is a g r e e m e n t antin om y betw een t h e a d d r e s s e r and
th e a d d r e s s e e , b u t , a s th e c o n n o t a t i o n s of th e term
" c o n s u b s t a n t i a l i t y " i n d i c a t e , i t a l s o d i s p l a y s a h i g h ly
p o s i t i v e a t t i t u d e tow ard a m b ig u ity r a r e l y seen e ls e w h e r e .
Perelm an has tou ched on th e same problem , f o r i n s t a n c e , y e t
he seems to look upon in d e te r m in a c y a s an u n d e s i r a b l e g iv e n
to be p ut up and d e a l t w ith . I t i s p r e c i s e l y on th e ground
105
t h a t r h e t o r i c i s good a t d e a l i n g w ith such a scram bled
s i t u a t i o n , or t h a t i t a lo n e a llo w s us to make a r a t i o n a l
c h o ic e among a c o n f u s i n g p l u r a l i t y of p o s s i b l e m eanings,
t h a t he i n s i s t s on th e s u p e r i o r i t y of r h e t o r i c over o t h e r
models of d i s c o u r s e . Burke s h a r e s w ith Perelm an and many
o t h e r t h e o r i s t s th e view t h a t " i n s o f a r a s men cannot
th e m se lv e s c r e a t e t h e u n i v e r s e , t h e r e must rem ain som ething
e s s e n t i a l l y e n ig m a tic . . . and t h a t t h i s u n d e r l y i n g enigma
w i l l m a n i f e s t i t s e l f in i n e v i t a b l e a m b i g u i t i e s and
i n c o n s i s t e n c i e s " (Grammar of M otives x v i i i ) . He d i s a g r e e s
w ith them, however, in t h a t r a t h e r th a n f i n d i n g in
a m b ig u ity a t h o r n y problem to be s o lv e d , he s e e s in i t th e
so u rc e of i n v e n t i v e en erg y to be drawn from. "What h a n d ie r
l i n g u i s t i c r e s o u r c e co u ld a r h e t o r i c i a n want th a n an
a m b ig u ity whereby he can say 'The s t a t e of a f f a i r s i s
s u b s t a n t i a l l y s u c h - a n d - s u c h , '" Burke m a rv e ls (th o u g h not
w ith o u t h i s c h a r a c t e r i s t i c to u c h of iro n y ) in h i s
d i s c u s s i o n of th e c o n ce p t of s u b s t a n c e , " i n s t e a d of h av in g
to say 'The s t a t e of a f f a i r s i s a n d /o r i s not
s u c h - a n d - s u c h '? " ( Grammar of M otives 52) I t i s a m b ig u ity ,
or p r o b a b i l i t y , t h a t e n a b le s us to a v o id s w itc h in g
t e d i o u s l y to and f r o betw een th e o n ly two p o s i t i o n s
a v a i l a b l e in a y e s /n o b i n a r y o p p o s i t i o n o r f a l l i n g s i l e n t ,
and to a v a i l o u r s e l v e s of th e e n d l e s s p o s s i b i l i t i e s of
alw ays f i n d i n g so m ething to say a b o u t so m ething e l s e . Such
106
an im p o r ta n t f u n c t i o n h as a m b ig u ity p erfo rm ed in B u r k e ’s
model of i n v e n t i o n t h a t he compares i t to th e " g r e a t
c e n t r a l m o lte n n e ss " of t h e e a r t h , from which th e la v a is
throw n to t h e s u r f a c e and c o n g e a ls i n t o " d i s t i n c t i o n s , " and
to which th e c r u s t e d d i s t i n c t i o n s may r e t u r n , become m o lten
l i q u i d a g a i n , e n t e r i n t o new c o m b in a tio n s and be thrown
f o r t h as new " d i s t i n c t i o n s . " And he c o n s i d e r s i t h i s ta s k
in A Grammar of M otives " to stu d y and c l a r i f y th e r e s o u r c e s
of a m b ig u ity " r a t h e r th a n " to 'd i s p o s e o f ' any a m b ig u ity by
m ere ly d i s c l o s i n g th e f a c t t h a t i t i s an a m b ig u ity "
(Grammar of M otives x i x ) .
Nowhere i s B u r k e ’s commitment to t h i s t a s k more
c l e a r l y d e m o n s tra te d th a n in th e way he d e f i n e s th e f i v e
b a s i c t e r m s , i . e . , A ct, Scene, Agent, Agency, P u rp o s e , which
make up h i s D r a m a t i s t i c s c r e e n . These key term s q u a l i f y a s
th e " g e n e r a t i n g p r i n c i p l e s ” of d i s c o u r s e n o t b e ca u se
t o g e t h e r th e y make f o r a r o c k - r i b b e d " f o u n d a tio n " by v i r t u e
of th e seeming u n d i s p u t a b l e u n i v o c i t y of t h e i r m eanings,
b u t , on th e c o n t r a r y , b e ca u se th e y a r e th e most t y p i c a l
c a s e s of a c o n s u b s t a n t i a 1i t y of sameness and d i f f e r e n c e ,
f a m i l i a r i t y and s t r a n g e n e s s , c o n s ta n c y and c h a n g e a b i l i t y .
A lthough th e y seem " u n d e r s ta n d a b le a lm o st a t a g l a n c e , " a s
soon a s we look a t them " q u i z z i c a l l y , " th e y become " s t r a n g e
and d i f f i c u l t " ( Grammar of M otives x v - x v i ) . What can be
s im p le r and l e s s p r o b l e m a t i c , f o r exam ple, t h a n th e
107
d e f i n i t i o n of th e term "Agent" as " th e p e rs o n who pe rfo rm s
an a c t " ? Yet an a g e n t "might have h i s a c t m o d ifie d . . . by
f r i e n d s ( c o - a g e n t s ) or enemies ( c o u n t e r - a g e n t s ) , " and under
t h e h e ad in g of "Agent" we c o u ld " p la c e any p e rs o n a l
p r o p e r t i e s t h a t a r e a s s i g n e d a m o t i v a t i o n a l v a l u e , such as
' i d e a s , ' ' t h e w i l l , ' ' f e a r , ' ' m a l i c e , ' ' i n t u i t i o n , ' ' t h e
c r e a t i v e i m a g i n a t i o n '" (Grammar of M otives x i x - x x ) . And
n o t o n ly a r e t h e s e b a s i c p r i n c i p l e s " e q u a l l y p r e s e n t " in
e v e r y t h i n g from " s y s t e m a t i c a l l y e l a b o r a t e d m e ta p h y s ic a l
s t r u c t u r e s " to " b i t s of g o s s i p o f f e r e d a t random," they
te n d even t o "haunt" or t o c l u s t e r in th e same i n d i v i d u a l
c o n c e p ts . The word "w ar," f o r i n s t a n c e , may be t r e a t e d as
a c o l l e c t i v e A ct, a s an Agency when se en as a means f o r
some p o l i t i c a l end, as a s i t u a t i o n or a Scene f o r t h o s e who
p a r t i c i p a t e in i t , a s a Purpose " i n schemes p r o c l a im i n g a
c u l t of w a r," and even as an Agent in th e f i g u r e of a war
g o d .
T h e ir c o l l e c t i v e p a r t i c i p a t i o n in "a common g ro u n d ,"
Burke f u r t h e r p o i n t s o u t, "makes f o r t r a n s f o r m a b i 1i t y ":
At e v e ry p o i n t where th e f i e l d co v ered by any
one of t h e s e term s o v e r l a p s upon th e f i e l d
c o v e re d by any o t h e r , t h e r e i s an alc h em ic
o p p o r t u n i t y , whereby we can p u t one p h ilo s o p h y
or d o c t r i n e of m o t i v a t i o n i n t o t h e a le m b ic , make
th e a p p r o p r i a t e p a s s e s , and ta k e o u t a n o t h e r .
From th e c e n t r a l m o lte n n e s s , where a l l th e
e le m e n ts a r e fu se d i n t o one t o g e t h e r n e s s , t h e r e
a r e thrown f o r t h , in s e p a r a t e c r u s t s , such
d i s t i n c t i o n s a s t h o s e betw een freedom and
n e c e s s i t y , a c t i v i t y and p a s s i v e n e s s , c o o p e r a t i o n
108
and c o m p e t i t i o n , cau se and e f f e c t , mechanism and
t e l e o l o g y . (Grammar of M otives x i x ) .
Here we have B u r k e ’ s two b a s i c t e n e t s of i n v e n t i o \ t h a t the
d i s t i n g u i s h i n g p r o p e r t y of a g e n e r a t i n g p r i n c i p l e i s i t s
p r o t e a n " t r a n s f o r m a b i 1i t y ," and t h a t th e c r e a t i v e " c e n t r a l
m o lte n n e ss " i s n o t h in g b ut th e sp ace where th e " t u r f s " of
t h e s e key term s o v e r l a p . With th e f i r s t t e n e t Burke
e s t a b l i s h e s a s t a t e of a m b ig u ity as th e u l t i m a t e so u rc e of
sym bolic p r o d u c t i o n , e q u a t in g i n v e n t i o n w i t h an e n d le s s
p r o c e s s of t r a n s f o r m a t i o n th ro u g h s k i l l f u l s h i f t i n g among
or r e a lig n m e n t of t h e f i v e key te rm s. What he o f f e r s in A
Gr a mma r of M o tiv e s i s t h e r e f o r e a
g e n e r a t i v e - t r a n s f o r m a t i o n a 1 " g r a m m a r , " o r a
g e n e r a t i v e - t r a n s f o r m a t i o n a l model of r h e t o r i c a l i n v e n t i o n ,
w ith o u t th e p r o s c r i p t i o n of a s e t of h a rd and f a s t
"gram m atical" r u l e s to be obeyed by a l l u s e r s of the
" la n g u a g e ." With th e second t e n e t , he d i s p e l s th e
e n ig m a tic h a lo s u r r o u n d in g th e c o n ce p t of a " c r e a t i v e
i m a g i n a t i o n , " o f f e r i n g in i t s s t e a d a r a t i o n a l , and
q u i n t e s s e n t i a l l y r h e t o r i c a l , e x p l a n a t i o n o f how new
" v o c a b u l a r i e s " g e t i n v e n te d .
Burke h o ld s t h a t th e i n t e r c o n n e c t e d n e s s of th e
p e n t a d i c term s in th e D r a m a t i s t i c s c r e e n a llo w s f o r th e
f o r m a tio n of t e n t e r m i n i s t i c r e l a t i o n s , such a s t h a t
betw een sc en e and a c t , a c t and a g e n t , or a g e n t and agency.
109
These r e l a t i o n s , or " r a t i o s , " a r e " p r i n c i p l e s of
d e t e r m i n a t i o n ” (Grammar of M otives 15) in t h e s e n s e t h a t
th e y u n d e r l i e th e c o n s t r u c t i o n of e v ery c o n c e p tu a l model,
and a r e t h e r e f o r e what u l t i m a t e l y "d e te rm in e " our
p e r c e p t i o n of t h i n g s . The s c e n e - a g e n t r a t i o i s c l e a r l y
d e t e c t a b l e , f o r example, in t h e o r e t i c a l c o n s t r u c t s r a n g in g
from l i t e r a r y d e te rm in is m , D a rw in ’s th e o r y of e v o l u t i o n ,
M a rx is t econom ics, to th e h i s t o r i c i s m which t r e a t s
h i s t o r i c a l s c e n e s a s th e background o r m otive of i n d i v i d u a l
d e v e lo p m e n ts. The a g e n t - s c e n e r a t i o , on th e o t h e r hand,
inform s i n t e r p r e t i v e s t r a t e g i e s as d i v e r s e a s th e c r e a t i o n
myth, 1i t e r a r y ro m a n tic ism , th e H e g e lia n id e a li s m t h a t se e s
"Reason" a s th e background or m otive of h i s t o r i c a l seq uen ce
in g e n e r a l . To make a v a i l a b l e th e fundam ental b i n a r y
schem ata so t h a t our c o n s c i o u s n e s s can be s t r u c t u r e d or
"d ete rm in e d " i s , however, by no means th e whole s t o r y of
t h e s e r a t i o s . For a s Burke s e e s i t , th e r a t i o s a r e
c o n s t i t u t e d as much by th e p o s s i b i l i t i e s of e s t a b l i s h i n g a
c le a i—c u t d i v i s i v e n e s s in each p a i r of term s a s by th e
p o s s i b i l i t i e s of h a v in g t h i s t e r m i n i s t i c o p p o s i t i o n
c o l l a p s e i n t o a p r o d u c t i v e a m b ig u ity a t some " s t r a t e g i c " or
"alch em ic" moments, "w h erein momentous m i r a c l e s of
t r a n s f o r m a t i o n can ta k e p l a c e " ( Grammar of M otives 24).
These r a t i o s a r e , in o t h e r words, f i r s t o f a l l
p r i n c i p l e s of t r a n s f o r m a t i o n by v i r t u e of t h e i r
no
s u s c e p t i b i l i t y to c o n s u b s t a n t i a l i t y . A t y p i c a l example of
t h i s t r a n s f o r m a t i o n a l a m b ig u ity is found in th e c o n ce p t of
" s u b s t a n c e . " In o r d i n a r y u sa g e , t h i s i s an " a g e n t ” term
d e s i g n a t i n g " e s s e n t i a l n a t u r e , " " e sse n c e " o r " i n t r i n s i c
b ein g" of some t h i n g or some p e rs o n . E t y m o l o g i c a l l y ,
however, i t i s c l e a r l y a " sc e n ic " term a s i t means "to
s ta n d u n d e r ," or r e f e r s to a s t a n d , b a s e , bottom , p ro p,
s u p p o r t . What a c l o s e e x a m in a tio n of th e word r e v e a l s is
t h e r e f o r e n ot o n ly an i m p l i c i t a g e n t - s c e n e r a t i o , bu t th e
c o l l a p s i n g of t h i s r a t i o i n t o t h a t t e r m i n i s t i c "m olten ness"
of a c o n c e p t which d e s i g n a t e s so m eth ing w i t h i n or
i n t r i n s i c . p a r a d o x i c a l l y , by r e f e r r i n g to what is w ith o u t
or e x t r i n s i c to t h a t t h i n g , or to what th e t h i n g i s n o t .
In c a l l i n g our a t t e n t i o n to t h i s "paradox of s u b s t a n c e ,"
Burke p e rfo rm s a b r i l l i a n t s t r o k e of d e c o n s t r u c t i o n t h a t
fo reshadow s th e c o l l a p s i n g , d ecad es l a t e r , of b i n a r y
o p p o s i t i o n s s u c h a s p r e s e n c e / a b s e n c e o r
i n t e r i o r i t y / e x t e r i o r i t y . Yet u n l i k e many of th e l a t t e r - d a y
d e c o n s t r u c t i o n i s t s whose e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l c o n c e rn has led
them to a p r e o c c u p a t i o n w ith th e p o s s i b i l i t y o r c o n d i t i o n
of m e a n in g . Burke f i n d s in such "alchem ic" c a s e s b o th th e
c o n d i t i o n f o r i n v e n t i n g new " v o c a b u l a r i e s " and th e key to
a r a t i o n a l c o n c e p t u a l i z a t i o n of th e i n v e n t i o n a l p r o c e s s .
The b l u r r i n g of th e d i s t i n c t i o n betw een a g e n t and scene or
betw een " i n t r i n s i c n a tu r e " and " c o n te x t" in th e c o n ce p t of
I l l
" s u b s ta n c e " makes i t p o s s i b l e to d e f l e c t a t t e n t i o n from th e
o n t o l o g i c a l c o n c e rn w ith b e in g th ro u g h d e r i v i n g an a c t from
t h e n a t u r e of s i t u a t i o n r a t h e r th a n from th e t r a i t s o f th e
a g e n t . What r e s u l t s i s a g ra d u a l t r a n s i t i o n from an
A g e n t - c e n t e r e d d i s c o u r s e , such a s humanism, t o a
S c e n e - c e n t e r e d one such as n a t u r a l i s m .
The a c t u a l t r a n s f o r m a t i o n of one dom inant s c r e e n in to
a n o th e r i s , of c o u r s e , much more complex. The s h i f t from
t e l e o l o g i c a l to m e c h a n i s t i c p h ilo s o p h y , f o r i n s t a n c e , is
b r o u g h t a b o u t by a s e r i e s of t e r m i n i s t i c m a n e u v e rin g s— from
a g e n t to a c t , from a c t to sc e n e , and f i n a l l y from sc en e a s
c o n te x t to scen e a s a g e n t . O th e rw ise p u t , th e s h i f t i s th e
r e s u l t of a s e r i e s of d r a m a t i s t i c le a p s from God a s the
c r e a t o r to n a t u r e a s h i s c r e a t i o n , to n a t u r e as the
" e f f i c i e n t cause" a s opposed to th e " f i n a l c a u s e , " u n t i l
f i n a l l y we a r r i v e a t th e synonym izing e q u a t io n in S p i n o z a ’s
"God or N a t u r e ," where N a tu re i s so u n p r o b l e m a t i c a l ly
e q u a te d w i t h God t h a t i t i s j u s t a m a t t e r of tim e f o r i t to
r e p l a c e God as th e new " g o d -te rm ." What makes t h e s e
" le a p s " p o s s i b l e , Burke f u r t h e r p o i n t s o u t , i s the
f o r m u l a t i o n of t e r m i n i s t i c e q u a t i o n s :
Such i m p l i c i t or e x p l i c i t e q u a t io n s in which
d i s t i n c t i o n s a r e merged s e r v e h i s t o r i c a l l y as
b r i d g e s from one te r m in o lo g y to a n o t h e r ,
p r e c i s e l y by re a s o n of th e Occamite p r i n c i p l e .
For i f th e two te rm s, o r th e two a s p e c t s of th e
one term , a r e ta k e n a s synonymous, th e n one s i d e
of th e e q u a t io n can be dropped a s " u n n e c e s s a r y ."
112
I f you say t h a t th e laws of e l e c t r o - c h e m i c a l
t r a n s f o r m a t i o n a r e e x a c t l y a s God would have
them, th e n i t f o llo w s t h a t t h e i r s t r u c t u r e
r e p r e s e n t s th e w ill of God. . . . Thereupon,
a lm o st i m p e r c e p t i b l y , th e t e r m i n i s t i c lo g ic has
ta k e n you from s u p e r n a t u r a l i s m to "chemism."
(Grammar of M otives 81-82)
Once th e new g o d -te rm becomes well e s t a b l i s h e d , however, we
have what Burke term s " th e iro n y of h i s t o r i c a l d e v e lo p m e n t”
whereby " th e v e ry s t r e n g t h in th e a f f i r m i n g of a g iv e n term
may th e b e t t e r e n a b le men to make a w orld t h a t d e p a r t s from
i t " (Grammar of M otives 5 4 ). T h is p a r a d o x i c a l s i t u a t i o n
comes t o p a s s b ecause th e supposed om n ip resence and
om nipotence of t h e g o d -term e n a b le p e o p le to go f a r a f i e l d
w ith o u t b e in g aware of a l o s s of o r i e n t a t i o n , and by th e
tim e t h e i r d e p a r t u r e from th e " c e n t e r " becomes o b v io u s, th e
new d i s c u r s i v e o r d e r e s t a b l i s h e d in th e name of th e o ld
o r d e r i s a l r e a d y so e n tr e n c h e d t h a t i t is b o th d e s i r a b l e
and even n e c e s s a r y to abandon t h e o ld g o d -term and a d op t a
new o n e .
In th e m id dle of t h i s amorphous t r a n s f o r m a t i o n a l
f l u i d i t y , where t e r m i n i s t i c e q u a t i o n s a r e c o n s t a n t l y formed
and c o n s t a n t l y b ro k e n , Burke i d e n t i f i e s two oppo sing
t h r u s t s t h a t i n t e r a c t w ith each o t h e r a l l th e tim e in a
n e v e r - e n d i n g movement toward new " s t r a t e g i c s p o ts " or
f r e s h "alch em ic moments," t h a t i s , tow ard what we c o n s i d e r
" b re a k th r o u g h s " in th e c h ang ing c o n f i g u r a t i o n of our
113
d i s c o u r s e . He names t h e s e two t e n d e n c i e s "sy n o n y m izatio n "
and "d e s y n o n y m iz a t i o n ," h o l d in g t h a t
I th e ] g r e a t d e p a r t u r e s in human th o u g h t can be
e v e n t u a l l y red u ced to a moment where th e t h i n k e r
t r e a t s a s o p p o s i t e , key term s f o r m e r ly
c o n s i d e r e d a p p o s i t e , or v . v . So we a r e
admonished to be on th e lo o k - o u t f o r t h o s e
moments when s t r a t e g i c synonym izings or
d esy no ny m izin gs o c c u r . And, in a c c o rd a n c e w ith
th e lo g ic of our r a t i o s , when th e y do o c c u r , we
a r e f u r t h e r adm onished to be on th e lo o k - o u t f o r
a s h i f t in th e so u rc e of d e r i v a t i o n , a s term s
f o r m a l ly d e r i v e d from d i f f e r e n t s o u r c e s a r e now
d e r i v e d from a common s o u r c e , or v . v . ( Grammar
of M otives 192)
From t h i s p o i n t of view, f o r example, what i s so
s i g n i f i c a n t about S p in oza i s t h a t f o r th e f i r s t tim e in
i n t e l l e c t u a l h i s t o r y , he made an e x p l i c i t synonym izing of
God w ith N a tu re , th u s p a v in g th e way f o r N a t u r e ’s
s u c c e s s i o n to God a s th e m a s te r m etaphor. And C o l e r i d g e ’s
B io g r a p h ia L i t e r a r i a can w ell be seen as b e in g
c o n ce rn e d c h i e f l y w ith desynonym izing two words p r e v i o u s l y
c o n s i d e r e d synonymous, t h a t i s , im a g in a tio n and fa n c y .
S i m i l a r l y , Freud d i f f e r e n t i a t e s in h i s t h e o r y of
p s y c h o a n a l y s i s th e "u n co n scio u s" from what u sed to be tak e n
f o r a u n i t a r y m ental f a c u l t y , t h a t i s , th e " c o n s c i o u s n e s s , "
and in D e r r i d a ’s p r o j e c t of d e c o n s t r u c t i o n , " p r e s e n c e " and
"ab sen ce" a r e v i r t u a l l y synonymized.
B u r k e ’ s i d e n t i f i c a t i o n of
s y n o n y m iz a tio n /d e s y n o n y m iz a tio n a s th e two modes of
i n v e n t i o n a l t r a n s f o r m a t i o n le a d s us i n e v i t a b l y to
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A r i s t o t l e ’s d i s t i n c t i o n between " p r o p o s i t i o n ” and "problem"
and h i s c h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n of t h e i r d i f f e r e n c e a s a mere
" t u r n of p h r a s e , ” In synonym izing two term s n o t u s u a l l y
c o n s i d e r e d a s hav ing th e same or n e a r l y same m eanings, we
b r i n g a b o u t an a g re em e n t; in desynonym izing two term s
c u s t o m a r i l y ta k e n as s i g n i f y i n g th e same or s i m i l a r
meaning, on th e o t h e r hand, a d i f f e r e n c e or a d is a g re e m e n t
i s c r e a t e d . And h i s p u rp o se f o r " r e d e s c r i b i n g " th e
A r i s t o t e l i a n o p p o s i t i o n of p r o p o s i t i o n / p r o b l e m a s the
a g re e m e n t/d is a g r e e m e n t betw een term s r a t h e r t h a n betw een
p e rs o n s i s to s t r e s s t h e a c u t e l y t e r m i n i s t i c n a t u r e of th e
a g re e m e n t/d is a g r e e m e n t betw een com m unicative a c t o r s , r a t h e r
th a n to d i m i n i s h th e r e l e v a n c e of th e c o n ce p t of a u d ie n c e
in r h e t o r i c a l i n v e n t i o n . T his i s c l e a r l y shown in h i s
o b s e r v a t i o n e ls e w h e re t h a t " t h e r e a r e two k in d s of term s:
term s t h a t p ut t h i n g s t o g e t h e r , and term s t h a t ta k e t h i n g s
a p a r t , " or term s t h a t make A f e e l i d e n t i f i e d w ith B, and
term s t h a t make th e same A t h i n k of h e r s e l f as
d i s a s s o c i a t e d from B (Language as Symbolic A c tio n 4 9 ), The
same c o n c e rn w ith p a th o s o r w ith th e u n i t y of lo g o s and
p a th o s in i n v e n t i o a g a in d e m o n s tr a te s i t s e l f when Burke
c h a r a c t e r i z e s t h e t e n r a t i o s of h i s D r a m a t i s t i c s c r e e n as
" p r i n c i p l e s of s e l e c t i v i t y " a l s o . As he se e s i t , in any
g iv e n h i s t o r i c a l moment, t h e r e a r e alw ays p e rs o n s of many
s o r t s w ith a v a r i e t y in th e k in d s of a c t s th e y would
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t y p i c a l l y make. A g iv e n p o l i t i c a l s i t u a t i o n may t h e r e f o r e
be se en a s "not to change p e o p le in t h e i r e s s e n t i a l
c h a r a c t e r , b u t r a t h e r to f a v o r , or b r i n g to t h e f o r e . .
c e r t a i n k in d s of a g e n t s (w ith t h e i r a p p r o p r i a t e a c t i o n s )
r a t h e r th a n o t h e r s , " and one s e t of " s c e n i c c o n d i t i o n s , "
f o r i n s t a n c e , w i l l "implement" or "am p lify " g iv e n ways and
tem peram ents which, in o t h e r s i t u a t i o n s , would rem ain mere
p o t e n t i a l i t i e s (Grammar of M otives 1 8 -1 9).
T h is em phasis on t h e p o s s i b i l i t y of l i n g u i s t i c
m a n i p u l a t i o n in c o n s t i t u t i n g " a g e n ts" o r in c r e a t i n g
ag reem ent and d is a g r e e m e n t b r i n g s to f o r e B u r k e ’s c l o s e
a s s o c i a t i o n w ith A r i s t o t l e and Perelm an. A lthough i t
a l i g n s Burke w ith A r i s t o t l e ’s p o s i t i o n t h a t th e p r o d u c t i o n
of " r e p u t a b l e " o p i n io n s has b o th a " c r e a t i o n " and a
" d is c o v e r y " s i d e , w h ile i t d i s t a n c e s him from P e r e lm a n ’s
commitment to th e c o n c e p t of a " r e a l - l i f e a u d ie n c e "
im p erv io u s to th e c o n s t i t u t i v e power of lan g u a g e, a l l t h r e e
s h a r e a commitment to a r h e t o r i c a l ap p ro a ch to th e problem
of sym bolic p r o d u c t i o n and to b a s i c a l l y th e same model of
i n v e n t i o n . I f in A r i s t o t l e what we have i s l i t t l e more
th a n a t h e o r e t i c a l " p r o to ty p e " based on th e g e n e r a t i v e
c o n c e p ti o n of in v e n t io a s a s i m u l t a n e o u s l y
p r o p o s i t io n - m a k i n g and p r o b l e m - c r e a t i n g p r o c e s s , and o f th e
d i f f e r e n c e betw een th e two key modi o p e ra n d i as a mere
" t u r n of p h r a s e , " in P e r e lm a n ’s t h e o r y of " in fo rm a l l o g i c , "
116
and e s p e c i a l l y in B u rk e ’ s p r i n c i p l e of c o n s u b s t a n t i a 1i t y
and in h i s g e n e r a t i v e - t r a n s f o r m a t i o n a l [ t h a t i s ,
i n v e n t i o n a l j "grammar," we have a v a i l a b l e a f a i r l y well
d e v elo p ed r h e t o r i c a l th e o r y of d i s c u r s i v e p r o d u c t i o n whose
e x i s t e n c e or im portance have y e t to be f u l l y re c o g n iz e d .
Such a th e o r y h o ld s t h a t an e s s e n t i a l f u z z i n e s s or
" m o lte n n e s s ," or an ambiguous "c o n s u b s t a n t i a 1i t y " of
d i f f e r i n g p o s i t i o n s , t e n d e n c i e s and t h r u s t s , p r o v i d e s th e
dynamic f o r , and i s t h e r e f o r e th e n e c e s s a r y c o n d i t i o n o f ,
th e i n v e n t i o n of any s i g n i f i c a n t d i s c o u r s e . I t s e e s th e
i n v e n t i o n a l p r o c e s s in i n t e r a c t i o n a l , t r a n s a c t i o n a l and
t r a n s f o r m a t i o n a l te rm s, a s i n v o lv i n g i n t e n s e and c l o s e
engagement among th e s p e a k e r , t h e a u d ie n c e , and th e
d i f f e r e n t t e r m i n i s t i c s c r e e n s th e y have employed. I t
m a i n t a i n s t h a t th e t r a n s f o r m a t i o n a l f l u i d i t y
n o t w i t h s t a n d i n g , t h e r e i s n o th in g e s s e n t i a l l y m y s te r io u s
about th e i n v e n t i v e a c t . What a " s t r a t e g i c " or "alchem ic"
moment in sy m b olic p r o d u c t i o n s i g n i f i e s i s l i t t l e more th a n
th e t a k i n g of a d e c i s i v e s t e p , a s th e c u lm i n a t in g a c t of a
s e r i e s of t e r m i n i s t i c m a n e u v e r in g s , toward a sy n o n y m iza tio n
o r d e sy n o n y m iz a tio n of key term s in o ld " v o c a b u l a r i e s . ”
T h is has to be th e c a se sim p ly b e ca u se th e a c t of i n v e n t i o n
i s s t r u c t u r e d by two b a s i c t e n d e n c i e s toward i d e n t i f i c a t i o n
and d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n , c o m p o s itio n and d i v i s i o n , agreem ent
and d is a g r e e m e n t, which, u n l i k e th e b i n a r y o p p o s i t i o n s
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s t r u c t u r i n g th e D e r r id e a n " m e ta p h y s ic s ," a r e com plem entary
i n s t e a d of a n t a g o n i s t i c tow ard each o t h e r , i n t e r d e p e n d e n t
r a t h e r th a n m u tu a lly e x c l u s i v e , e q u a l l y v a lu e d r a t h e r th a n
h i e r a r c h i z e d . In t r e a t i n g b o th th e t h r u s t to
" p r o b le m a tiz e " and th e t h r u s t to " p r o p o s e ” a s e q u a l l y
d e s i r a b l e , e q u a l l y im p o r ta n t and e q u a l l y i n d i s p e n s a b l e
a s p e c t s of th e i n v e n t i o n a l a c t , Burke makes i t a b u n d a n tly
c l e a r t h a t what he i s i n t e r e s t e d in i s th e f r u i t f u l
p r o d u c t i o n of d i s c o u r s e , r a t h e r th a n th e judgem ent of
c o r r e c t n e s s or e r r o n e o u s n e s s of t h i s or t h a t t e r m i n i s t i c
s c r e e n . Such a w h o le - h e a r t e d d e v o ti o n to th e id e a l of
c o p ia i s p r e c i s e l y what inform s th e Burkean model of
in v e n t io and d i s t i n g u i s h e s i t a s by f a r th e most
s a t i s f a c t o r y answer to th e fram ing q u e s t i o n we have r a i s e d
in th e " I n t r o d u c t i o n , " t h a t i s , "how d i s c o u r s e g e t s
i n v e n t e d ."
118
C h a p te r I I I : Nonloci , D i f f e r e n t i a e and
D e c o n s t r u c t i v e I n v e n t i o n
What th e A r i s t o t e 1ia n -B u rk e a n model makes c l e a r i s
t h a t a r h e t o r i c a l t h e o r y of d i s c o u r s e i s c o n ce rn e d l e s s
w ith a r i g o r o u s d e f i n i t i o n of what i s , or sh o u ld be, th e
c o r r e c t mode of i n v e n t i o n th a n w ith a f l e x i b l e
c o n c e p t u a l i z a t i o n of th e c o n d i t i o n s under which maximum
t e x t u a l p r o d u c t i v i t y can be a c h i e v e d , or we may say t h a t i t
i s c o n ce rn e d l e s s w ith th e e t h i c s th a n w ith th e econom ics
of i n v e n t i o n . R h e to r i c assum es t h a t any com m unicative
exchange i s an a c t of p e r s u a s i o n ; t h a t an a c t of p e r s u a s i o n
a t once i m p lie s an e n a b l in g d i f f e r e n c e and depends on a
f o u n d a t i o n a l agreem ent f o r i t s s u c c e s s ; and t h a t in
i n v e n t i n g , a r h e t o r sh o u ld f e e l f r e e to f i n d argu m en ts in
a s many p l a c e s or lo c i a s p o s s i b l e . S t a r t i n g from t h i s
o r i g i n a t i v e a s s u m p tio n , a g e n u in e ly r h e t o r i c a l model of
i n v e n t i o n would f i n d i t b o th n e c e s s a r y and d e s i r a b l e to do
two t h i n g s in i t s own c o n s t r u c t i o n and o p e r a t i o n : (1)
s i m u l t a n e o u s l y to engage a s many " p l a y e r s ” in th e
i n v e n t i o n a l game a s p o s s i b l e , or to o f f e r a " c a l c u l u s "
c a p a b le of f i n d i n g many s o l u t i o n s , so to sp e ak , f o r a
h ig h - d e g r e e e q u a t io n in v o lv in g m u l t i p l e v a r i a b l e s ; and (2)
to m a i n t a i n a dynamic b a la n c e betw een agreem ent and
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d i s a g r e e m e n t, i d e n t i f i c a t i o n and d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n ,
p r o b l e m - s o l v in g and p r o b l e m - c r e a t i n g . A p r e o c c u p a t i o n w ith
" c o r r e c t n e s s " or "co herence" in th e c o n c e p t u a l i z a t i o n of
d i s c o u r s e , in c o n t r a s t , would m a n i f e s t i t s e l f in a ten den cy
tow ard e i t h e r a t o t a l agreem ent or a co m p lete d is a g r e e m e n t
as i t s b a s i c o r i e n t a t i o n , a s is th e c a se w ith Habermas and
R o rty , o r in p r i v i l e g i n g some p l a y e r s a t th e expense of
o t h e r s , which c o u ld n ot but r e s u l t in a s t r i v i n g f o r
u n i v o c i t y or f o r a r e s t r i c t i v e sy m bolic o r d e r r a t h e r th a n
an unimpeded r h e t o r i c a l e n v iro n m en t.
A r h e t o r i c a l model would see i n v e n t i o n a s a
m u l t i - d i m e n s i o n a l , h e t e r o g l o t i n t e r p l a y of e th o s , p a th o s ,
lo g o s and t o p o i. Even though i t r e c o g n i z e s th e need f o r
t e r m i n i s t i c " p l a y e r s ” to ta k e t u r n s in p l a y i n g th e
d i s c u r s i v e game, to o u tla w or to ban some "teams"
a l t o g e t h e r i s , a c c o r d i n g to th e Burkean d r a m a t i s t i c l o g ic ,
to d i m i n i s h th e o v e r a l l i n t e r e s t , i n t e n s i t y and fun. From
a r h e t o r i c a l p e r s p e c t i v e , in f a c t , i t i s i n c o n c e i v a b l e t h a t
any of th e d r a m a t i s t i c or a x i a l term s co u ld be ex clu d ed or
s u p p r e s s e d c o m p le te ly , a s among them no h a r d - a n d - f a s t
d i s t i n c t i o n s e x i s t , and i t i s p r e c i s e l y t h e i r ambiguous
o v e r l a p p in g and mutual t r a n s 1a t a b i 1i t y t h a t e n a b le any
s i g n i f i c a n t i n v e n t i o n to ta k e p l a c e . The s e a r c h f o r th e
t h e o r e t i c a l l y c o r r e c t , on th e o t h e r hand, would i n e v i t a b l y
lea d to th e s u p p r e s s i o n or e x c l u s i o n o f w h atev er is
120
d e c l a r e d "wrong" or " u n tru e " or " m is le a d i n g ." To a v o id the
k in d of " c o n fu s io n " cau sed by what H orty c a l l s
" s e l f - r e f e r e n t i a l i n c o n s i s t e n c y , "* u n r u l y term s need s must
be e x p e l l e d from th e " v o c a b u l a r y ." To s t r i v e f o r com plete
" c e r t a i n t y , " " c l a r i t y " and " c o h e r e n c e ," a s Perelm an p o i n t s
o u t , we would have to l i m i t th e " p o s s i b i l i t i e s of
e x p r e s s i o n and d e m o n s tr a tio n " to such an e x t e n t t h a t th e
d i s c o u r s e "does n o t p e rm it e v e r y t h i n g to be s a i d . "
There i s no lack of e x h i b i t i o n s in co ntem po rary
d i s c u r s i v e p r a c t i c e s of th e te n d e n c y to model a f t e r th e
s c i e n t i f i c method and to red u c e to " c o n s t a n t s " a l l b u t one
c o n c e p tu a l " v a r i a b l e , " be i t th e t e x t , th e lan g u a g e, th e
r e a d e r , th e a u th o r or th e c o n t e x t , or a t l e a s t to
d i s q u a l i f y some p l a y e r s t h e o r e t i c a l l y or e t h i c a l l y , so t h a t
th e y a r e d e n ie d t h e r i g h t to p a r t i c i p a t e a c t i v e l y in th e
c o n c e p t u a l i z a t i o n of d i s c o u r s e . In d e n ou ncin g th e
s o - c a l l e d " i n t e n t i o n a l f a l l a c y " and " a f f e c t i v e f a l l a c y " in
th e name of a " t r u e and o b j e c t i v e way of c r i t i c i s m , "
Wimsatt and B e a rd s le y t r y to keep two key c o n c e p ts from
0
e n t e r i n g th e h e rm e n e u tic a l a r e n a . In s u g g e s t i n g t h a t "th e
b i r t h of t h e r e a d e r [as th e new b a s i s f o r t e x t u a l u n i t y ]
must be a t th e c o s t of th e d e a t h of th e A u th o r ," and t h a t
th e r e a d e r so e n th ro n e d "can n o t any lo n g er be p e r s o n a l , "
Roland B a r th e s a t t e m p t s , v i a an e n t i r e l y d i f f e r e n t r o u t e ,
to e x c lu d e b a s i c a l l y th e same c o n c e p ts from th e sc en e of
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0
sym bo lic p r o d u c t i o n . And when S t a n le y F i s h makes a moral
c la im f o r h i s t r a n s f o r m a t i o n from a " c l o s e t f o r m a l i s t " to
a reader—r e s p o n s e c r i t i c and beyond, on th e ground t h a t th e
p o s i t i o n he h e ld p r e v i o u s l y i s a l e s s "h o n est" one, he,
to o , c a l l s in e f f e c t f o r a ban on th e u se of th e key term s
a s s o c i a t e d w ith th o s e "bad" models.* When " t e x t " i s found
to be n o t h in g but a c o l l e c t i o n of marks, d e v o id of any
"immanent" meaning or " i n h e r e n t " p r o p e r t i e s , i t i s of
c o u rs e m is le a d i n g to c o n ti n u e to use th e term a s i f i t were
a u n i f i e d , s e 1f - s u s t a i n e d c o n c e p t. And when th e
t e x t - r e a d e r or th e o b j e c t - s u b j e c t o p p o s i t i o n f i n a l l y
c o l l a p s e s a f t e r i t i s found to be " i l l u s o r y , " even th e
i n v o c a t i o n of th e " r e a d e r , " w ith i t s c o n n o t a t i o n of
i d i o s y n c r a s y , s u b j e c t i v i t y and d i v e r s i t y , becomes
t h e o r e t i c a l l y u n a c c e p t a b l e .
The e t h i c a l a s s u m p tio n u n d e r l y i n g t h i s te n d e n c y to
s u p p r e s s and e x c lu d e i s in c o m p a tib le w i t h th e
A r i s t o t e 1ian -B u rk e a n c o n c e p ti o n of d i s c o u r s e . From a
r h e t o r i c a l p o i n t of view, i t i s th e i m p e r a tiv e to i n v e n t ,
r a t h e r th a n a moral or an i n t e l l e c t u a l c o n s i d e r a t i o n , t h a t
e x p l a i n s and j u s t i f i e s , f o r i n s t a n c e , th e d i s m i s s a l of th e
f o r m a l i s t t e n e t t h a t th e t e x t or i t s l i n g u i s t i c s t r u c t u r e
is th e lo cu s of meaning. In i t s e l f , th e t e n e t i s n e i t h e r
m o r a lly wrong nor i n t e l l e c t u a l l y i n d e f e n s i b l e . I t has been
championed by c r i t i c s of r a d i c a l l y d i f f e r e n t i d e o l o g i c a l
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s t a n c e s . And t h e r e i s no fundam ental d i f f e r e n c e betw een
a s c r i b i n g to th e t e x t some " i n h e r e n t " p r o p e r t i e s and
m eanings and a s c r i b i n g to p h y s i c a l o b j e c t s (such a s a
s t o n e ) some o t h e r " i n h e r e n t ” p r o p e r t i e s : b o th i n v o lv e s , in
th e f i n a l a n a l y s i s , th e p r o j e c t i o n of human e x p e r i e n c e and
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o n to m a t e r i a l o b j e c t s . Yet d u r in g th e
heyday of th e New C r i t i c i s m , th e a c c e p t a n c e of h i s t e n e t by
l i t e r a r y s c h o l a r s was so com plete and u n r e s e r v e d t h a t th e
i n t e r p r e t i v e model d e v elo p ed on i t s b a s i s began, as
A r i s t o t l e sa y s in th e T o p i c s . to "adm it of no doubt" or to
le a v e l i t t l e space f o r " p r o b l e m a t i z a t i o n ," and hence to
lo s e i t s a b i l i t y f o r any e x c i t i n g new i n v e n t i o n .
S i m i l a r l y , th e d e c i s i o n t o r e p l a c e th e " t e x t " w ith th e
" r e a d e r " as t h e fo c u s of c r i t i c a l a t t e n t i o n has h a r d l y
a n y th in g to do w ith " h o n e s ty ." R a th e r , a s Ja n e P. Tompkins
p o i n t s ou t in h e r c r i t i c a l su rv e y o f th e r e a d e r - r e s p o n s e
c r i t i c i s m , th e r e a l r e a s o n f o r t h i s r e - f o c u s i n g i s t h a t
"once th e id e a of th e r e a d e r has come i n t o view i t p r o v id e s
th e c r i t i c w ith th e o p p o r t u n i t y to in v e n t a new s e t of
C
a n a l y t i c a l t o o l s . " The i n t r o d u c t i o n of th e c o n ce p t of th e
r e a d e r to l i t e r a r y s t u d i e s has g iv e n r i s e to n o t io n s
r a n g in g from Walker G i b s o n ’s "mock r e a d e r " and G e rald
P r i n c e ’ s " n a r r a t e e " in th e e a r l y s t a g e of i t s developm ent,
th ro u g h Michael R i f f a t e r r e ’s " s u p e r r e a d e r " or Wolfgang
I s e r ’s " g a p - f i l l i n g r e a d e r , " to F i s h ’s " i n t e r p r e t i v e
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community” more r e c e n t l y . And t h e s e c o n c e p ts have f u r t h e r
spawned s e c o n d a r y n o t i o n s su c h as
" p r e d i c t a b i l i t y / u n p r e d i c t a b i l i t y , " " f r u s t r a t i o n o f
e x p e c t a t i o n , " " a n t i c i p a t i o n / r e t r o s p e c t i o n " o r " i n t e r p r e t i v e
s t r a t e g i e s . " The a v a i l a b i l i t y o f so many new id e a s ,
c o n c e p ts and p e r s p e c t i v e s h a s g r e a t l y added to our
t e r m i n i s t i c r e s o u r c e s , and has th u s opened up new sp a ce f o r
s i g n i f i c a n t and v ig o r o u s i n v e n t i o n and re n e w a l.
The opening of new d i s c u r s i v e space can w ell be seen
a s th e r e s u l t of t e r m i n i s t i c t r a n s f o r m a t i o n , or of th e
a x i a l term s g e t t i n g " t r a n s l a t e d " i n t o each o t h e r th r o u g h a
sy n o n y m izin g /d esy n o n y m izin g p r o c e s s . As Thom pkins’s
d e t a i l e d a c c o u n t of t h e r i s e of th e r e a d e r - r e s p o n s e th e o r y
has d e m o n s tr a te d , th e developm ent of t h i s new c r i t i c a l
v o c a b u la r y can well be se en as a s h i f t i n g of th e
t e r m i n i s t i c c e n t e r from th e Agency ( t h e t e x t / l a n g u a g e )
th ro u g h th e Agent ( t h e r e a d e r ) , to th e Scene ( th e
co m m u nity/1i f e w o r 1 d / h i s t o r y ) a n d /o r th e Pu rpo se ( t h e
p o l i t i c s / p o w e r ) . When th e " r e a d e r " was f i r s t
d i f f e r e n t i a t e d from th e t e x t , i t was looked upon m ere ly a s
a s p e c i a l f u n c t i o n of th e l a t t e r . T h is desynonym izing
p r o c e s s g r a d u a l l y led to th e r e a d e r ’s a s s u m p tio n of an
in d ep e n d en t s t a t u s as an equal p a r t n e r of th e t e x t in th e
c r e a t i o n of meaning. From t h i s apex of d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n a
r e v e r s e d synonym izing p r o c e s s s t a r t e d which g r a d u a l l y
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subsumed th e t e x t to th e r e a d e r u n t i l f i n a l l y th e t e x t came
to be se e n a s n o th in g but th e f u n c t i o n or t h e p r o d u c t of
th e r e a d e r ’ s c r i t i c a l a p p a r a t u s . Meanwhile, a n o th e r
d esy n o n y m iz in g /sy n o n y m izin g p r o c e s s s e t in whereby a
d i s t i n c t i o n was made betw een th e a c t u a l , i n d i v i d u a l r e a d e r
and th e " s u p e r r e a d e r " or id e a l r e a d e r , and th e id e a l r e a d e r
was viewed a s th e r e p r e s e n t a t i v e of a community of r e a d e r s .
As t h i s p a r t i c u l a r c o n c e p tio n of th e r e a d e r th u s became
v i r t u a l l y i n d i s t i n g u i s h a b l e from th e community, i t was
c o m p le te ly d i s p l a c e d by th e l a t t e r a s th e fo c u s of c r i t i c a l
a t t e n t i o n .
The r e c o g n i t i o n t h a t we need to keep s h i f t i n g from one
"god term" (m a s te r m etap ho r, c o n c e p tu a l p aradigm , e t c . ) to
a n o th e r in o r d e r to keep t h e i n v e n t i v e p r o c e s s g o ing r a i s e s
a t h e o r e t i c a l l y i n t e r e s t i n g q u e s t i o n : I s g e n u in e i n v e n t i o n
s t i l l p o s s i b l e w i t h i n an e s t a b l i s h e d model, or when a
d i s c o u r s e is made w ith o u t t r a n s g r e s s i n g th e l i m i t s of
c o n v e n tio n s or th e b o u n d a rie s of a dom inant t h e o r e t i c a l
framework? T h is q u e s t i o n i s of i n t e r e s t to t h e o r e t i c a l
s t u d i e s of d i s c o u r s e f o r a number of r e a s o n s : (1) th e
c u r r e n t p en ch an t f o r "paradigm s h i f t " has a c c e l e r a t e d th e
r a t e of o b s o le s c e n c e of t h e o r e t i c a l models to such an
e x t e n t t h a t many seemed to have been abandoned long
b e f o r e t h e i r i n v e n t i v e p o t e n t i a l s were f u l l y ta p p e d , which
r e s u l t s in a w aste of sy m b olic r e s o u r c e s ; (2) such a
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q u e s t i o n would te n d to g e n e r a t e a c u t e l y or even
d i a m e t r i c a l l y d i f f e r e n t r e s p o n s e s , and i s t h e r e f o r e a v e ry
p r o l i f i c q u e s t i o n w i t h i n th e postm odern p r o b l e m a t i c s ; and
(3) i t i s one of t h o s e q u e s t i o n s to which a r e c o n s t r u c t e d
r h e t o r i c i s in a p o s i t i o n to p r o v id e a u n iq u e answer. That
t h i s i s a h i g h l y c o n t r o v e r s i a l q u e s t i o n t h e r e can be l i t t l e
d o u b t. H aberm as’s answer to th e q u e s t i o n would be an
u n e q u iv o c a l " y e s ," a s f o r him, a l l com m unicative a c t i o n s
a r e in f a c t o r i e n t e d toward th e p e r p e t u a t i o n of th e f o r e v e r
p r e s e n t y e t f o r e v e r i n a c c e s s i b l e 1i few o rId or the
c o n f i r m a t i o n of th e u n d e r l y i n g r a t i o n a l i t y . th e tw in god
term s in h i s d i s c o u r s e th e o r y . Because of h i s c o n c e p tio n
of th e " v e r b a l - i d e o l o g i c a l " en v iro n m en t a s a f i e l d
c o n s t i t u t e d of two i n t e r a c t i n g f o r c e s , B a k h tin would
l ik e w i s e have g iv e n i t a p o s i t i v e answer a s f o r him, th e
c e n t r i p e t a l ten d e n cy i s a s much a v i t a l f o r c e to and an
i n t e g r a l p a r t of d i s c o u r s e a s i t s c e n t r i f u g a l c o u n t e r p a r t .
Many o t h e r p ostm odern t h e o r i s t s , however, e n t e r t a i n a deep
s u s p i c i o n of such a p o s s i b i l i t y , and a n a g g in g m is g iv in g
a b o u t th e e t h i c a l i t y of m aneuvering w i t h i n any e s t a b l i s h e d
c o n c e p tu a l model. I t i s u n l i k e l y , f o r i n s t a n c e , t h a t
F o u c a u lt would have been a y e a - s a y e r on t h i s i s s u e , s i n c e
f o r him, " th e problem [ i n c o n c e p t u a l i z i n g d i s c u r s i v e
p r a c t i c e s ] i s no lo n g er one of t r a d i t i o n , " of "how a s i n g l e
p a t t e r n i s formed and p r e s e r v e d , " b u t "one of
126
g
t r a n s f o r m a t i o n s t h a t s e r v e as new f o u n d a t i o n s . " And
Edward S a id , b e l i e v i n g t h a t c r i t i c a l d i s c o u r s e is
" c o n s t i t u t i v e l y opposed to e v e ry form of t y r a n n y ,
d o m in a tio n and a b u s e ," s e e s " c r i t i c i s m m o d ifie d in advance
by l a b e l s l i k e 'M arxism' o r ' l i b e r a l i s m ’ " a s "an oxymoron,"
b e ca u se " s o l i d a r i t y b e f o r e c r i t i c i s m " means " th e end of
7
c r i t i c i s m .
By e s t a b l i s h i n g an i m p l i c i t lin k a g e betw een any
e s t a b l i s h e d t h e o r e t i c a l p o s i t i o n and a system of " ty r a n n y
and d o m i n a t i o n , "and by e q u a t i n g r a l l y i n g under one c r i t i c a l
b an n er w ith " th e end of c r i t i c i s m , ” S aid v i r t u a l l y r u l e s
o u t b o th th e p o s s i b i l i t y and th e d e s i r a b i l i t y of i n v e n t i n g
i n s i d e any known c r i t i c a l framework, w h atev er i t s p o l i t i c a l
a f f i l i a t i o n . There is n o t h in g r h e t o r i c a l l y wrong, of
c o u r s e , i f what S aid means i s sim p ly t h a t any new
c o n t r i b u t i o n to th e c r i t i c a l d i s c o u r s e sh o u ld in some way
d i f f e r from th e e x i s t i n g " v o c a b u l a r i e s " or from th e view s
c u r r e n t l y h e ld by th e d i s c u r s i v e p r a c t i t i o n e r s , f o r w ith o u t
such a d i f f e r e n c e t h e r e would be no r e a s o n a t a l l f o r th e
c r i t i c - c u m - r h e t o r i c i a n to say a n y th i n g . Yet h i s p o s i t i o n
i s f a r more r a d i c a l th a n t h a t , and when we c o n s i d e r th e
f a c t t h a t n o t a l l p o l i t i c a l e n t i t i e s a r e t y r a n n i c a l or in
any e v e n t a r e e q u a l l y o p p r e s s i v e , th e way he draws th e
p o l i t i c a l a n a lo g y betw een a t h e o r e t i c a l framework and a
t o t a l i t a r i a n regim e b e g in s to look s i m p l i s t i c and
127
m is le a d i n g . I t i s h a r d l y p e r s u a s i v e , in f a c t , f o r him to
make th e p a r a d o x i c a l c la im t h a t in o r d e r to p a r t i c i p a t e in
th e c o n v e r s a t i o n t h a t is c r i t i c i s m , a c r i t i c sh o u ld alw ays
s i t u a t e h e r s e l f in o p p o s i t i o n t o , and hence in e x t e r i o r i t y
o f , a l l e x i s t i n g t h e o r i e s . For su ch a c la im is c l e a r l y
b ased on t h e p r e s u p p o s i t i o n t h a t i t i s p o s s i b l e to f i n d a
n e u t r a l o r t r a n s c e n d e n t a l ground from which to f i r e a few
c r i t i c a l s a l v o s a t th e t a r g e t e d m ethodology, or t h a t i t i s
p o s s i b l e to engage an a u d ie n c e w ith o u t f i r s t i d e n t i f y i n g
w ith i t . D i s c o u r s e , as Ja c q u e s D e r r id a t e l l s us in Margins
of P h i l o s o p h y , has "th e s t r a n g e and u n iq u e p r o p e r t y " t h a t
" o r g a n i z e s th e economy of i t s r e p r e s e n t a t i o n , th e law of
i t s p r o p e r weave, such t h a t i t s o u t s i d e i s n ever i t s
o u t s i d e , n e v e r s u r p r i s e s i t " (M argins of P h ilo s o p h y x v i ) .
And i t f o llo w s t h a t th e moment S a i d ’s c r i t i c t r i e s to
engage th e o b j e c t of h er o p p o s i t i o n a l c r i t i c i s m , she f i n d s
h e r s e l f w i t h i n what D e r r id a term s " th e v a u l t of i t s
a u t i sm."
D e r r id a s h a r e s w ith S aid a d e s i r e to " f i n d a n o n - s i t e ,
o r a n o n -p h i 1o s o p h ic a l s i t e , from which to q u e s t i o n
p h ilo s o p h y " ( " D e c o n s t r u c t i o n and th e O ther" 108). Yet he
r e a l i z e s a t th e same tim e t h a t i t i s " n a i v e ” and w is h fu l to
b e l i e v e in t h e p o s s i b i l i t y of g e t t i n g " o u t s i d e of
m e ta p h y s ic s" ( " D e c o n s t r u c t i o n and t h e O ther" 111). As a
p h i l o s o p h e r - c r i t i c , he i s th u s t o r n betw een two c o n f l i c t i n g
128
th o u g h ts . On th e one hand, he b e l i e v e s t h a t " r a d i c a l
tr e m b li n g can o n ly come from th e out s i d e " (M argins of
Phi 1osophv 134), and t h a t i t i s n e c e s s a r y t h e r e f o r e "to
change [ d i s c u r s i v e ] t e r r a i n , in a d i s c o n t i n u o u s and
i r r u p t i v e f a s h i o n , by b r u t a l l y p l a c i n g o n e s e l f o u t s i d e , and
by a f f i r m i n g an a b s o l u t e b re a k and d i f f e r e n c e " ( M argins of
Phi 1osophy 135). On th e o t h e r hand, he i s f u l l y aware t h a t
even " th e sim ple p r a c t i c e o f language" would " c e a s e l e s s l y
[ r e i n s t a t e ] th e new t e r r a i n on th e o l d e s t g r o u n d ," as
a t t e m p t s f o r "an e x i t and a d e c o n s t r u c t i o n " would end up
" r e p e a t i n g what i s i m p l i c i t in th e fo un ding c o n c e p ts and
t h e o r i g i n a l p r o b l e m a t i c , by u s i n g a g a i n s t th e e d i f i c e th e
i n s t r u m e n t s or s t o n e s a v a i l a b l e in th e h o u s e ," o r would put
one a t th e r i s k of " c e a s e l e s s l y c o n f ir m in g , c o n s o l i d a t i n g ,
r e 1i f t i n g . . . t h a t which one a l l e g e d l y d e c o n s t r u c t s "
(M argins of P h ilo so p h y 13 5.) What u n d e r l i e s t h i s
p r e d ic a m e n t a p p e a rs to be th e a ssu m p tio n t h a t to e f f e c t any
r e a l change means to s t a r t a l l over a g a i n , t h a t a
d i s c u r s i v e c o n s t r u c t can be c o n s i d e r e d "new" o n ly in th e
s e n se t h a t i t d i f f e r s from a l l e x i s t i n g " e d i f i c e s " in term s
even of th e most b a s i c b u i l d i n g m a t e r i a l s , and t h a t the
sym bolic system in which we f i n d o u r s e l v e s i s a m o n o l i t h i c ,
r i g o r o u s l y s t r u c t u r e d and p e rm a n e n tly s o l i d i f i e d
p r i s o n - h o u s e w i t h i n which i n v e n t i o n a l freedom i s p o s s i b l e ,
y e t from which t h e r e can be no e s c a p e . In him, i t seems,
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t h e r e i s an odd c o e x i s t e n c e of b o th th e R o rty an a ssu m p tio n
t h a t a new v o c a b u l a r y , so f a r as i t i s " n e w ,” s h a r e s no
c r i t e r i o n a t a l l w ith a l l e x i s t i n g o ld v o c a b u l a r i e s , and
th e H aberm asian b e l i e f t h a t t h e r e can be no c o m p le te ly
u n f a m i l i a r s i t u a t i o n s in sym bolic p r o d u c t i o n , as one can
n ev er hope t o go beyond th e h o r i z o n o f "a l i f e w o r l d
composed of a c u l t u r a l s t o c k of knowledge t h a t i s 'a lw a y s
a l r e a d y ' f a m i l i a r . "
To se e D e r r i d a ’s p o s i t i o n in term s of an uneasy
m ix tu re o f , o r t e n s i o n betw een, b o th R o rty and Habermas,
however, co u ld be e n t i r e l y m is le a d i n g . From th e D e r r id e a n
p o i n t of view , i t i s n a iv e to b e l i e v e w ith R o rty t h a t a
brand new v o c a b u la r y co u ld be c r e a t e d a t w i l l , out of
n o t h i n g , w ith o u t any d i f f i c u l t y . "The s t e p 'o u t s i d e
p h i l o s o p h y * , ” D e r r id a p o i n t s o u t, " i s much more d i f f i c u l t
to c o n c e iv e th a n is g e n e r a l l y im agined by t h o s e who th in k
th e y made i t long ago w ith c a v a l i e r e a s e , and who in
g e n e r a l a r e swallowed up in m e ta p h y s ic s by th e e n t i r e body
of d i s c o u r s e which th e y c la im to have d is e n g a g e d from i t "
(W ritin g and D i f f e r e n c e 28 4). And even though he a g r e e s
w ith Habermas t h a t t h e r e does e x i s t a "h o riz o n " from which
we have l i t t l e hope of making an e x i t , o r t h a t we a re
n e c e s s a r i l y w r i t i n g or d i s c o u r s i n g w i t h i n a c o n c e p tu a l
framework t h a t is "always a lr e a d y " t h e r e , he r e j e c t s th e
n o t i o n t h a t a l l d i s c u r s i v e p r a c t i c e s sh o u ld be and a r e
130
n e c e s s a r i l y o r i e n t e d tow ard p e r p e t u a t i n g , r e a f f i r m i n g and
" r e l i f t i n g " th e same r a t i o n a l c o re of th e l i f e w o r l d . In
i t s s t e a d , he s t r e s s e s th e p r i n c i p l e of " u n d e c i d a b i 1i t y ,"
p u t s fo rw a rd th e n o t i o n of a "play" w i t h i n a " d e c e n te r e d "
s t r u c t u r e , and works out a d e c o n s t r u c t i v e s t r a t e g y which
r e n d e r s i t p o s s i b l e , in a s e n s e , to b r i n g a b o u t a g e n u in e
i n v e n t i o n or a r a d i c a l r e c o n f i g u r a t i o n of th e dom inant s e t
of c r i t e r i a from w i t h i n th e same " t e r r a i n , " w ith o u t h a v in g
to " b r u t a l l y [ p l a c e ] o n e s e l f o u t s i d e " in th e f i r s t p l a c e .
Any s t r u c t u r e , he s u g g e s t s in " S t r u c t u r e , Sig n and
P la y in th e D is c o u rs e of th e Human s c i e n c e s , " must needs
have a c e n t e r which f u n c t i o n s to " o r i e n t , b a l a n c e , and
o r g a n i z e th e s t r u c t u r e , " and th u s to " [ p e r m i t] th e p la y of
i t s e le m e n ts i n s i d e th e t o t a l f o r m . ” And y e t such a
" c e n t e r " a l s o te n d s to " [ c l o s e ] o f f th e p l a y which i t opens
up and makes p o s s i b l e " ( W r i t in g and D i f f e r e n c e 2 79). T his
i s b e ca u se th e c e n t e r i s "th e p o i n t a t which th e
s u b s t i t u t i o n of c o n t e n t s , e le m e n ts , or term s i s no lo n g er
p o s s i b l e , " th e p o i n t where " th e p e r m u t a t i o n or th e
t r a n s f o r m a t i o n of e le m e n ts . . . i s f o r b i d d e n . " I t i s , in
t h i s s e n s e , t h a t un iq ue s t r u c t u r a l elem ent which g o v ern s
t h e s t r u c t u r e y e t e s c a p e s s t r u c t u r a l i t y , or we may say t h a t
i t i s a t once i n s i d e and o u t s i d e th e s t r u c t u r e . W ith in th e
s t r u c t u r e , th e c e n t e r i s se en a s p r o v i d in g th e b a s i s of a
"fundam ental im m o b ility and a r e a s s u r i n g c e r t i t u d e . " I t i s
131
th u s c o n c e iv e d of a s a f o u n d a t i o n a l p r e s e n c e i t s e l f beyond
th e r e a c h of p l a y , and " th e e n t i r e h i s t o r y of th e c o n ce p t
of s t r u c t u r e [or of m e ta p h y s ic s , f o r t h a t m a t t e r ] .
must be th o u g h t of a s a s e r i e s of s u b s t i t u t i o n s of c e n t e r
f o r c e n t e r , a s a lin k e d c h a i n of d e t e r m i n a t i o n s of th e
c e n t e r " ( W ritin g and D i f f e r e n c e 2 79 ). The h i s t o r y of th e
c e n t e r , in o t h e r words, i s f o r D e r r id a a h i s t o r y of
t e r m i n i s t i c t r a n s f o r m a t i o n w i t h i n th e same s t r u c t u r e
whereby t h e c e n t r a l p o s i t i o n is o c c u p ie d in t u r n by
d i f f e r e n t names, such a s e s s e n c e , e x i s t e n c e , s u b s ta n c e ,
s u b j e c t , t r a n s c e n d e n t a 1i t y , c o n s c i o u s n e s s , God, man, which
have alw ays d e s i g n a t e d an i n v a r i a b l e p r e s e n c e .
Side by s i d e w ith such a p r o c e s s of s u b s t i t u t i o n s and
d i s p l a c e m e n t s f o r c o n s t a n t l y r e a f f i r m i n g t h e c e n t e r a s a
" p r e s e n t - b e i n g " i s , however, th e d e c e n t e r i n g p r o c e s s t h a t
works in th e o p p o s i t e d i r e c t i o n . A lth o u g h t h i s l a t t e r
p r o c e s s "has alw ays a l r e a d y begun to p r o c la im i t s e l f and
begun to w o r k , " we a r e n ot aware of i t u n t i l we b e g in to
t h i n k th e "s t r u c t u r a 1 i t y ” of th e c e n t e r o r u n t i l we come to
th e r e a l i z a t i o n t h a t th e s u b s t i t u t e "does not s u b s t i t u t e
i t s e l f f o r a n y th in g which has somehow e x i s t e d b e f o r e i t , "
t h a t " t h e r e was no c e n t e r , " t h a t " th e c e n t e r has no n a t u r a l
s i t e , " and t h a t th e c e n t e r "was n o t a f i x e d lo cu s b ut a
f u n c t i o n , a s o r t of n o n lo c u s in which an i n f i n i t e number of
s i g n s u b s t i t u t i o n s came i n t o p la y " ( W ritin g and D i f f e r e n c e
132
28 0). The a b sen c e of a f u l l y p r e s e n t c e n t e r or of a
t r a n s c e n d e n t a l s i g n i f i e d n o t o n ly e x te n d s th e domain and
th e p l a y of s i g n i f i c a t i o n i n f i n i t e l y , i t s u g g e s t s a l s o
e f f e c t i v e " s t r a t e g i e s ' ' f o r p l a y i n g such a game. With the
new a w are n ess t h a t what has been w o rshipp ed a s an
o r d e r - g i v i n g d i v i n e p r e s e n c e i s in r e a l i t y n e i t h e r d i v i n e
no r f u l l y p r e s e n t , we may c h oo se, a c c o r d i n g to D e r r i d a , to
" q u e s t i o n s y s t e m a t i c a l l y and r i g o r o u s l y " th e h i s t o r y of the
c o n ce p t of a c e n t r a l s i g n i f i e d or a god term , a s t e p which
would q u i t e c o n c e iv a b ly a c c e l e r a t e th e d e c e n t e r i n g p r o c e s s
and i s t h e r e f o r e a lm o st as good as u s h e r i n g in th e
" b e g in n in g s of a s t e p o u t s i d e " th e s t r u c t u r e or framework.
More p r o f i t a b l y and p r o d u c t i v e l y , however, i s t h e s t r a t e g y
whereby we " [ c o n s e r v e ] a l l t h e s e o ld c o n c e p ts w i t h i n th e
domain of e m p i r ic a l d i s c o v e r y w h ile h e r e and t h e r e
denouncing t h e i r l i m i t s , t r e a t i n g them a s t o o l s which can
s t i l l be used" (W ritin g and D i f f e r e n c e 28 4). T h is s t r a t e g y
of p u t t i n g c e n t r a l term s "under e r a s u r e " or of u s i n g them
as t o o l s y e t d e n y in g them t h e i r t r u t h v a lu e would,
a c c o rd in g to D e r r i d a , e n a b le us to e x p l o i t th e " r e l a t i v e
e f f i c a c y " of t h e s e key term s and to e x p l o i t i t f o r th e
p u rp o se of c r i t i q u i n g th e e x i s t i n g s t r u c t u r e c o n s t i t u t e d by
t h e s e v e ry term s.
The D e r r id e a n c o n c e p ts of d e c o n s t r u c t i o n and
d if f F r a n c e have long become commonplaces in p h i l o s o p h i c a l
133
and 1i t e r a r y d i s c o u r s e s , y e t t h e i r r h e t o r i c a l i m p l i c a t i o n s ,
e s p e c i a l l y t h e i r i m p l i c a t i o n s f o r u n d e r s t a n d i n g
c o n te m p o ra ry e f f o r t s to r e c o n c e p t u a 1iz e i n v e n t i o , seem to
0
rem ain r e l a t i v e l y u n d e r - e x p l o r e d . What has been or
p ro m is e s to be r e v e a l e d from th e c u r s o r y look we have j u s t
t a k e n a t D e r r id a s u g g e s t s th e need to r e - r e a d th e m a s te r
d e c o n s t r u c t i o n i s t as a m ajor r h e t o r i c a l t h e o r i s t of our
tim e , and to r e c o n s i d e r some of h i s best-k no w n id e a s w i t h i n
t h e p r o b l e m a t i c s of th e p r e s e n t i n q u i r y . T here i s an
u n m is ta k a b le p a r a l l e l betw een h i s p r i v i l e g i n g of
" u n d e c i d a b i l i t y " and A r i s t o t l e ’s em phasis on "doubt" or
B u r k e ’ s v a l o r i z i n g of a m b ig u ity a s an e n a b l in g c o n d i t i o n
f o r r h e t o r i c a l i n v e n t i o n . The n o t i o n of p u t t i n g th e " f i n a l
v o c a b u la ry " or th e s e t of th e c u r r e n t f o u n d a t i o n a l c o n c e p ts
"under e r a s u r e " s u g g e s t s th e p o s s i b i l i t y of t u r n i n g th e
u l t i m a t e b a s i s f o r ag reem ent i n to an o c c a s i o n f o r u l t i m a t e
d i s a g r e e m e n t, and th e s p e a k e r - a u d i e n c e r e l a t i o n s h i p im p lie d
in th e n o t i o n c l e a r l y embodies a c o n s u b s t a n t i a 1i t y of u n i t y
and d i v i s i o n , i d e n t i f i c a t i o n and d i f f e r e n c e , a g reem ent and
d is a g r e e m e n t. The same p r e o c c u p a t io n w ith i n v e n t i o
m a n i f e s t s i t s e l f when he d i s c u s s e s th e c e n t r a l s i g n i f i e d in
term s of a " s i t e , " a " lo c u s " or a "n on locu s" where an
i n f i n i t e number of s i g n s p l a y a g a i n s t each o t h e r . His use
of t h e s e term s co u ld n o t b u t remind us of th e c o n c e p t of
top os or lo cu s in c l a s s i c a l r h e t o r i c , and a com parison
134
betw een th e two ways of u s in g e x a c t l y th e same m etaphor
t u r n s o ut to be m u tu a lly i l l u m i n a t i n g .
D e s p ite th e im p o rtance of to p o s as a key co n cep t in
c l a s s i c a l r h e t o r i c , or p ro b a b ly b e c a u se of t h i s v e ry
p reem in ence of th e p o s i t i o n i t o c c u p ie s in th e s t r u c t u r e of
what B o e th iu s term s " th e s c i e n c e of d i s c o u r s e , "
r h e t o r i c i a n s have n ev er been a b l e to re a c h e d an agreem ent
on how to p o s sh o u ld be d e f i n e d . In h i s T o p i c a . which
p u r p o r t s to be a Roman r e n d i t i o n o f th e A r i s t o t e l i a n
T o p i c s . C ic e ro u n d e r t a k e s to d e f i n e th e term by way of a
com parison: " I t i s e asy to f i n d t h i n g s t h a t a r e h id d e n i f
th e h i d i n g p l a c e i s p o i n te d ou t and marked; s i m i l a r l y i f we
w ish to t r a c k down some argum ent we ought to know th e
p l a c e s or t o p i c s : f o r t h a t is th e name g iv e n by A r i s t o t l e
to th e ' r e g i o n s ' , a s i t were from which arg um en ts a r e
drawn" ( T o p i c a . I I . 7 ) . While C i c e r o ’s a t t r i b u t i o n of t h i s
"name" to A r i s t o t l e has n o t been c h a l l e n g e d , A r i s t o t l e does
n ot o f f e r , a s W illiam M. A. G rim ald i o b s e r v e s , "a
f o r t h r i g h t and form al d i s c u s s i o n of what he has in mind"
c o n c e rn in g th e d e f i n i t i o n of t h i s term in e i t h e r th e T opics
q
or th e R h e t o r i c . He n e v er b o t h e r s f o r m a l ly or r i g o r o u s l y
to d e f i n e th e v e ry s u b j e c t of h i s T o p i c s . He seems to
imply so many t h i n g s in p l a c e s where th e word i s used a s to
f r u s t r a t e a c o n s i s t e n t i n f e r e n c e of i t s meaning. The o n ly
t h i n g one can f i n d in th e A r i s t o t e l i a n c o rp u s which i s
135
s u g g e s t i v e of a form al d e f i n i t i o n of to p o s i s th e s t a te m e n t
in th e R h e to r i c " . . . I r e g a r d elem ent and t o p i c as
i d e n t i c a l , s i n c e elem en t ( o r t o p i c ) i s a head under which
s e v e r a l enthymemes a r e in c lu d e d " ( R h e to r i c I I . XXVI. 1.
1403a 1 7 -1 8 ). Yet in synonym izing " to p ic " w i t h " e le m e n t,"
t h i s s t a te m e n t f u r t h e r c o m p lic a te s our u n d e r s t a n d i n g of h i s
c o n c e p ti o n of to p o s. As a r e s u l t of t h i s in d e te r m in a c y ,
t h e r e has been an e x p l o s i o n of d i s c u s s i o n s on topos as an
A r i s t o t e l i a n term among modern s c h o l a r s . I t has been
u n d e r s to o d as r e f e r r i n g to a d i v e r s i t y of t h i n g s , r a n g in g
from " l o g i c a l fo rm s," " l i n e s of a rg u m e n t," " h e a d i n g s ," "a
p l a c e to look f o r a s t o r e of som ethin g, and th e s t o r e
i t s e l f , " "modes of r e a s o n in g " to "a r e l a t i o n a l p r i n c i p l e
e n a b l in g a p e rs o n to l o c a t e and a n a l y z e t h e ways in which
a s p e c i f i c p r e d i c a t e may be a t t r i b u t e d to a s u b j e c t . ' 1 0
A lthough none of t h e s e w id e ly d i f f e r i n g v iew s, a s Donovan
J . Ochs c o r r e c t l y p o i n t s o u t , i s " i n c o r r e c t , " none seems
q u i t e to c a t c h t h a t e l u s i v e som ething in A r i s t o t l e ’s
c o n c e p tio n e i t h e r which c a u s e s a l l th e d i f f i c u l t y in i t s
c o n s t r u a l and i n t e r p r e t a t i o n .
D e r r i d a ’ s d i s t i n c t i o n betw een a " lo cu s" and a
" n o n lo c u s ," o r betw een an " i n v a r i a b l e p re s e n c e " t h a t o f f e r s
a "fundam ental g r o u n d ” and a " r e a s s u r i n g c e r t i t u d e ” and an
a b se n c e by v i r t u e of which " e v e r y t h in g became d i s c o u r s e " or
became "a system in which th e c e n t r a l s i g n i f i e d . . . is
136
n ev er a b s o l u t e l y p r e s e n t o u t s i d e a system of d i f f e r e n c e s "
(W ritin g and D i f f e r e n c e 2 80 ), makes a v a i l a b l e a new
p e r s p e c t i v e f o r r e t h i n k i n g to p o s. I s th e c l a s s i c a l c o n ce p t
b e s t u n d e rs to o d as a w arehouse s to c k e d w ith s e l f - p r e s e n t
arg um en ts? As an empty m ansion h a u n te d by g h o s t l y "forms"
w a i t i n g to be r e i n c a r n a t e d ? Or t h e r e i s p e rh a p s n e i t h e r a
"house" no r any "form" a t all, and all t h a t is d e s i g n a t e d
by th e c o n c e p t i s a pow erful y e t i n t a n g i b l e and amorphous
f o r c e f i e l d c o n s t i t u t e d by "a system of d i f f e r e n c e s . "
While a c o n n e c tio n betw een th e A r i s t o t e l i a n to po i and th e
D e r r id e a n d i f f d r a n c e m ight sound f a r - f e t c h e d , t h e r e is
a c t u a l l y much more h i s t o r i c a l j u s t i f i c a t i o n th a n we te n d to
b e l i e v e . In h i s b r i l l i a n t stu d y of to po s in De t o p i c i s
d i f f e r e n t i i s . ^ f o r example, B o e th iu s d i s t i n g u i s h e s betw een
th e t o p i c s as "maximal and p r i n c i p a l p r o p o s i t i o n s
f u r n i s h i n g b e l i e f f o r o t h e r [ p r o p o s i t i o n s ] " and th e t o p i c s
a s " th e d i f f e r e n t i a e of maximal p r o p o s i t i o n s , " th e amazing
m o d e rn ity of t h i s d i s t i n c t i o n n o t o n ly t a k e s away from th e
D e r r id e a n d i s t i n c t i o n much of i t s o r i g i n a l i t y , but f u r t h e r
e s t a b l i s h e s a l i n e a l r e l a t i o n s h i p betw een th e D e r r id e a n
th o u g h t and th e r h e t o r i c a l t r a d i t i o n .
B o e th iu s s t a r t s out w ith th e f a i r l y c o n v e n tio n a l and
g e n e r a l d e f i n i t i o n of to po s as " th e s e a t of an argum ent, or
t h a t from which one draws an argum ent a p p r o p r i a t e to th e
q u e s t i o n u nd er c o n s i d e r a t i o n " (11 7 3 d ). He th e n r e d e f i n e s
137
i t a la C ic e ro a s " th e f o u n d a t i o n ( s e d e s ) of an a rg u m e n t."
Yet he h a s t e n s to o f f e r th e c l a r i f i c a t i o n t h a t the
f o u n d a t i o n of an argum ent "can be u n d e r s to o d p a r t l y as a
maximal p r o p o s i t i o n " and " p a r t l y as th e D i f f e r e n t i a of a
maximal p r o p o s i t i o n " (11 84 d), which s u g g e s t s t h a t h i s
seeming f o u n d a t i o n a l c o n c e p tio n is a n y th i n g b u t C ic e r o n ia n .
In one s e n s e , he t e l l s u s, a t o p i c i s a "maximal,
u n i v e r s a l , p r i n c i p a l , in d e m o n s tr a b le , and known p e r se
p r o p o s i t i o n , which in a rg u m e n ta tio n s g i v e s f o r c e to
argu m ents and to p r o p o s i t i o n s , [b ein g i t s e l f ] e i t h e r among
th e p r o p o s i t i o n s th e m s e lv e s or p o s i t e d o u t s i d e them"
(1185d). In a n o th e r s e n s e , t o p i c s a r e n o t t h e s e " u n i v e r s a l
and maximal p r o p o s i t i o n s , " but r a t h e r t h e i r " D i f f e r e n t i a e "
or what d i f f e r e n t i a t e s them from one a n o t h e r . And as if
t h i s p a r a l l e l to D e r r i d a ' s d i s t i n c t i o n betw een a
s e l f - p r e s e n t , f o u n d a t i o n a l and ordei—g i v i n g c e n t e r and a
" c e n t e r ” f u n c t i o n d i s p e r s e d th ro u g h a netw ork of
d i f f e r e n c e s were n o t s t r i k i n g and th o ro u g h enough, B o e th iu s
throw s more and more w eig ht onto th e " D i f f e r e n t i a e " s id e
u n t i l f i n a l l y he g i v e s up h i s e a r l i e r , d u a l i s t i c c o n c e p tio n
of topos and comes to e q u a te " D i f f e r e n t i a e of maximal
p r o p o s i t i o n s " w ith " [ a l l ] t o p i c s " (1186d):
There a r e many p r o p o s i t i o n s which a r e c a l l e d
maximal, and t h e s e d i f f e r among th e m s e lv e s ; and
a l l th e D i f f e r e n t i a e by which th e y d i f f e r among
th e m s e lv e s we c a l l T o p ic s . For i f t h e maximal
p r o p o s i t i o n s th e m s e lv e s a r e T opics of a rg u m e n ts,
138
t h e i r D i f f e r e n t i a e must a l s o be T o pics of
a rg u m e n ts. For th e s u b s ta n c e of a n y th in g
c o n s i s t s of i t s c h a r a c t e r i s t i c d i f f e r e n t i a e , as
th e s u b s ta n c e of man c o n s i s t s of r a t i o n a l i t y ,
which i s i t s d i f f e r e n t i a . The T o pics which a r e
th e D i f f e r e n t i a e of [maximal] p r o p o s i t i o n s a r e
more u n i v e r s a l th a n th o s e p r o p o s i t i o n s , j u s t as
r a t i o n a l i t y i s more u n i v e r s a l th a n man. (1186a)
As B o e th iu s s e e s i t , t h e n , th e u l t i m a t e " f o u n d a tio n " of an
argum ent i s de t o p i c i s d i f f e r e n t ! i s , as th e t i t l e of h i s
t r e a t i s e so a p t l y and s t r a i g h t f o r w a r d l y d e c l a r e s . For j u s t
as " th e s u b s ta n c e of a n y th in g " i s made up of i t s
" c h a r a c t e r i s t i c d i f f e r e n t i a e , " so what we b e l i e v e to be
" u n i v e r s a l and maximal p r o p o s i t i o n s , " th o s e t h a t can s e r v e
as m ajor p re m ise s o r c o n c l u s i o n s of enthym em es, a r e
th e m s e lv e s r e d u c i b l e to o r r e s t i n g on t h e i r " D i f f e r e n t i a e . "
And i t is by no means a sim p le s u b s t i t u t i o n of one
s t a b i l i z i n g " c e n t e r " f o r a n o th e r to r e l o c a t e th e
" f o u n d a tio n " of an argum ent from th e "maximal and
p r i n c i p a l " p r o p o s i t i o n s , which "not o n ly need no argum ent
from w i th o u t f o r b e l i e f b u t a l s o a r e g e n e r a l l y t h e s t a r t i n g
p o i n t f o r th e p ro o f of o t h e r t h in g s " (1 17 6d ), to th e
" D i f f e r e n t i a e " which a r e s a i d t o be "more u n i v e r s a l . " In
d e p r i v i n g th e "fundam ental p r o p o s i t i o n " of i t s s t a b i l i t y ,
p r i m i t i v e n e s s and s e 1f - r e f e r e n t i a 1i t y , or in showing t h a t
th e c e n t r a l s i g n i f i e d in a r h e t o r i c a l scheme i s i t s e l f n o t
beyond r h e t o r i c i t y , B o e th iu s has in f a c t c a l l e d i n to
q u e s t i o n th e p o s s i b i l i t y of an u l t i m a t e o n t o l o g i c a l u n i t y
139
in any c o n c e p t, i n c l u d i n g t h a t of a " d i f f e r e n t i a . " His
move to p o s i t th e " D i f f e r e n t i a e " or d i s t i n g u i s h i n g e 1ements
as th e " f o u n d a tio n " of r h e t o r i c a l i n v e n t i o n r e f e r s us b o th
to A r i s t o t l e ’s o t h e r w i s e o b sc u re and l i t t l e n o t i c e d
pronouncem ent t h a t t o p i c s a r e " i d e n t i c a l " w ith "e l e m e n t s ."
and to D e r r i d a ’s d e s c r i p t i o n of a s e l f - p r e s e n t " c e n t e r " as
th e " lo c u s " where " p e r m u ta tio n s and t r a n s f o r m a t i o n s of
e 1e m e n ts" a r e " f o r b i d d e n , " and i t is by no means
a c c i d e n t a l t h a t th e t h r e e t h e o r i s t s of d i s c o u r s e , d i f f e r i n g
so much in t h e i r h i s t o r i c a l background, sh o u ld have ended
up t a k i n g an i n t e r e s t in th e same c o n c e p t of " e le m e n ts ."
In a s e n s e , t h i s i s an i n t e r e s t s h a r e d by a l l r h e t o r i c i a n s
c o n ce rn e d w ith th e c o n d i t i o n s of p o s s i b i l i t y f o r c o pia in
r h e t o r i c a l i n v e n t i o n . B u r k e ’s d r a m a t i s t i c p e n ta d , f o r
exam ple, can w ell be u n d e rs to o d a s a s e t of such
" e le m e n ts ." And th e r e a s o n f o r t h i s i n t e r e s t i s not
d i f f i c u l t to f i n d . While th e term "elem ent" d e n o te s th e
s i m p l e s t , most b a s i c " p r i n c i p l e " t h a t has gone to th e
making of t h i n g s of r a d i c a 11y d i f f e r e n t chem ical makeup and
p r o p e r t y y e t has i t s e l f rem ained u n c h a n g e d , i t c o n n o te s not
so much a se n se of i n v a r i a b i l i t y o r i r r e d u c i b i I i t y as a
se n se of freedom to combine, to d i s s o c i a t e , to r e s h u f f l e ,
to r e a c t on o r to i n t e r a c t w ith each o t h e r f o r th e
p r o d u c t i o n of abundance and th e c r e a t i o n of d i v e r s i t y .
Embodied in "elem ent" a s a p r i v i l e g e d term , in o t h e r words,
140
i s an e n d l e s s l y p e rm u tin g , hence c o p io u s ly p r o d u c t i v e
" i n v a r i a b i l i t y " r a t h e r th a n an i n h i b i t i n g , hom ogenizing or
s t i f l i n g one. Compared w ith o t h e r s t a b i l i z i n g m etaphors
employed in th e c o n c e p t u a l i z a t i o n of d i s c o u r s e , such a s a
" c e n t e r " or a " f o u n d a t i o n , " t h i s one c l e a r l y imposes th e
l e a s t r e s t r a i n t on a c e n t r i f u g a l f o r c e and y e t e x p r e s s e s
j u s t a s well th e i n t e r - r e l a t e d n e s s , a f f i n i t y or sameness
deep down which makes sym bolic exchange p o s s i b l e . The
v a l o r i z a t i o n of t h i s term i n d i c a t e s , t h e r e f o r e , b o th an
a w are n ess of an u n d e r l y i n g i d e n t i f i c a t i o n between
i n t e r a c t i n g d i s c o u r s e s or i n t e r l o c u t o r s , and a d e s i r e to
m a i n t a i n th e g r e a t e s t p o s s i b l e f l e x i b i l i t y in i n v e n t i o n , or
to maximize th e i n v e n t i v e p o s s i b i l i t y .
T his d e s i r e i s e x p l i c i t l y e x p re s s e d when B o e th iu s
s t r e s s e s r e p e a t e d l y in th e same t e x t t h a t " [ t h e ] pu rp o se
of th e T o p ics is to r e v e a l . . . a bount i f u l su p p ly of
argu m ents which have th e a p p e a ra n c e of t r u t h , " t h a t
"ab un dan t and b o u n t i f u l m a t t e r f o r d i s c o u r s e must when th e
T o p i c s . . . have been d e s i g n a t e d , " and t h a t th e "knowledge of
th e T o pics . . . p r o v i d e s an abundance [of m a t e r i a l s ] f o r
sp e ec h Cora.tio') by means of th e d i s c o v e r y [of a rg u m e n ts ]"
(1 1 8 2 a-b , em phasis a d d e d ). He does not e l a b o r a t e on why
t h e "knowledge of th e T o pics" would p ro v id e "an abundance
of argum ents" th ro u g h " d i s c o v e r y ," y e t h i s em phasis on
c o p ia as th e t e l o s of t o p i c a l i n v e n t i o n and on th e
141
d i f f e r e n t i a l n a t u r e of th e t o p i c s does p r o v id e a c o n te x t
w i t h i n which th e c h r o n i c d i f f i c u l t y e n c o u n te r e d in a t t e m p t s
to d e f i n e th e c o n ce p t can be a t t a c k e d w ith f r e s h en erg y .
What th e co n tem p o rary d e f i n i t i o n s of to p o s — w hether i t be
" l o g i c a l fo rm s," " l i n e s of a r g u m e n t a t i o n ," "modes of
r e a s o n in g " or " h e a d in g s " — have in common i s t h e i r f a i l u r e
to ta k e t h i s o v e r r i d i n g p u rp o se of t o p i c a l i n v e n t i o n in to
a c c o u n t and t h e i r ten d e n cy to see th e t o p i c s as som ething
formal and s u b s t a n t i a l , such as " c o n t a i n e r s " of id e a s ,
" l o g i c a l forms" o r "p rim a ry , i n d i v i s i b l e and i n h e r e n t
I 7
components from which enthymemes a r e to be c o n s t r u c t e d . "
As a r e s u l t of t h i s n e g l i g e n c e , modern s t u d e n t s of
A r i s t o t l e te n d to o v e rlo o k what sh o u ld be an obvious
p o s s i b i l i t y in i n t e r p r e t i n g th e " t o p i c s , " t h a t i s , th e y a r e
meant by th e Greek sage to r e f e r to th e s e t of a v a i l a b l e
s t r a t e g i e s f o r d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n and a m p l i f i c a t i o n , or f o r
a m p l i f i c a t i o n th ro u g h d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n .
Even though he has m is ta k e n l y a s c r i b e d to A r i s t o t l e
th e com parison of to po s to a " h id in g p l a c e ” f o r argum ents
a l r e a d y f o r m u la te d , C ic e ro does c o r r e c t l y i d e n t i f y t h i s
p r i n c i p l e of " a m p l i f i c a t i o n th ro u g h d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n " when
he p o i n t s ou t in h i s r e n d i t i o n of t h e A r i s t o t e l i a n T opics
t h a t " s i n c e each of th e t o p i c s . . . has c e r t a i n
s u b d i v i s i o n s of i t s o w n ,” a d i s c u s s i o n on th e s u b j e c t
sh o u ld "hunt them [ t h e s e s u b d i v i s i o n s ] o u t even to th e
142
m i n u t e s t d e t a i l " so a s to " p ro v id e an abundance" of
m a t e r i a l s f o r th e a u d ie n c e (T o p i c a . V. 2 5 -2 6 ). Yet i t is
A r i s t o t l e ’s t e x t i t s e l f t h a t a rg u e s most e l o q u e n t l y fo r
such an u n d e r s t a n d i n g . What A r i s t o t l e does in t h i s t e x t
i s , b a s i c a l l y , to o f f e r a p l e t h o r a of "commonplace r u l e s "
f o r " a t t a c k i n g " or expanding on a g iv e n s u b j e c t ( i n t h i s
c a s e , th e g iv e n s u b j e c t happens to be th e " t o p i c s " i t s e l f ) ,
and u n l e s s we assume t h a t t h e s e " r u l e s " a r e th e " t o p ic s "
r e f e r r e d to in th e t i t l e , i t i s v e ry d i f f i c u l t to e x p l a i n
why th e t e x t sh o u ld have been s t r u c t u r e d th e way i t i s .
In Book I , A r i s t o t l e f i r s t d i s t i n g u i s h e s betw een
" p r o p o s i t i o n s " (what have been a g re e d upon) and "problem s"
(what s t i l l leave room f o r d o u b t) a s th e two fundam ental
s t r u c t u r a l c o n s t i t u e n t s or d i f f e r e n t ia e o f argu m en ts.
These two b a s i c components a r e th e n s a i d to be made of fo u r
" e le m e n ts ," t h a t i s , " d e f i n i t i o n , " " p r o p e r t y , " "genus" and
" a c c i d e n t , " which a r e i n t u r n red u ced t o t e n even more
e le m e n ta ry " c a t e g o r i e s of p r e d i c a t i o n , ” nam ely, "What a
t h i n g i s , Q u a n t it y , Q u a l i t y , R e l a t i o n , P la c e , Time,
P o s i t i o n , S t a t e , A c t i v i t y , P a s s i v i t y . " To t a l k about
"argument" as th e s u b j e c t of th e d i s c u s s i o n , t h e r e f o r e , one
may a n a ly z e i t in term s of i t s " p r o p o s i t i o n " and i t s
"p ro b lem ." Each of t h e s e two a s p e c t s i s th e n d i s c u s s e d in
term s of th e fo u r " e l e m e n t s ." And th e d i s c u s s i o n on each
of t h e s e e le m e n ts can be f u r t h e r e x te n d e d by b r i n g i n g in
143
th e " c a t e g o r i e s of p r e d i c a t i o n " a s new p l a y e r s to th e
d i f f e r e n t i a l game. The s p i n n i n g of t h i s t e r m i n i s t i c
netw ork shows t h a t th e s t a b i l i t y of a " b a s i c ” term i s on ly
r e l a t i v e or p r o v i s i o n a l , s i n c e any " e le m e n ta ry " c o n ce p t can
be f u r t h e r red u ced to i t s own d i f f e r e n t i a l " e l e m e n t s ." Yet
what c o n c e rn s th e t e x t h e re i s th e r h e t o r i c a l r a t h e r th a n
th e p h i l o s o p h i c a l i m p l i c a t i o n of such an e n d l e s s
d i v i s i b i l i t y . Or we may say t h a t th e q u e s t i o n b e in g ask ed
h e r e i s not "what i s th e n a t u r e of an a r g u m e n t? " , b u t "what
can we say a b o u t argum ent as a s u b j e c t ? " . Seen from t h i s
p e r s p e c t i v e , what we have h e re a p p e a rs to be l e s s a c a s e of
a s u b s t a n t i a l , w e l l - d e f i n e d t e r m i n i s t i c s t r u c t u r e b e in g
ta k e n a p a r t in s t e p a f t e r a n ato m ic s t e p to i t s b a s i c
components t h a n a c a se of an "empty" and amorphous s u b j e c t
(a doubt or an u n c e r t a i n t y about "argument" in th e p r e s e n t
c o n t e x t ) b e in g e n c lo s e d , s u b s t a n t i a t e d , augmented and
e n r i c h e d ; and t h e s e i n c r e a s i n g l y m in ute d i f f e r e n t i a e b e g in
to look l e s s l i k e th e p r o d u c t s of a s e r i e s of a n a l y t i c a l
o p e r a t i o n s th a n th e means or in s t r u m e n t s whereby a
d i s c o u r s e on "argument" i s c a l l e d i n t o b e in g or i n v e n te d .
The "ele m e n ts" and th e " c a t e g o r i e s of p r e d i c a t i o n s ”
f u n c t i o n , in o t h e r words, a s t o o l s or s t r a t e g i e s , a s w ell
a s raw m a t e r i a l s , which we employ in our e f f o r t to in v e n t J
a sp eech on "argument" or o t h e r s u b j e c t s , i n c l u d i n g
th e m s e lv e s a s th e s u b j e c t s . I t i s th e dominance of t h i s
144
in s t r u m e n t a l i n t e r e s t t h a t e x p l a i n s why a f t e r o n ly a b r i e f
d e f i n i t i o n of each of t h e s e term s in th e f i r s t p a r t of Book
I , A r i s t o t l e p ro c e e d s t o o f f e r one open-en ded s e t a f t e r
a n o th e r of what he term s "commonplace r u l e s , " or what could
more a c c u r a t e l y be c a l l e d i n v e n t i v e s t r a t e g i e s , whose
employment e n a b le s him t o keep " p r o b 1e m a t i z i n g ” th e fo u r
b a s i c "ele m e n ts" (g en u s, a c c i d e n t , d e f i n i t i o n and p r o p e r t y )
a s well a s o t h e r r e l a t e d c o n c e p ts o r i s s u e s , each of them
b e in g p r e s e n t e d a s a q u e s t i o n . and to t u r n th e o t h e r w is e
b r i e f and s k e tc h y d i s c u s s i o n on " t o p i c s " in to a f u l l y
d e v elo p ed t r e a t i s e i t s e l f e x e m p lif y in g th e a lm o st
i n e x h a u s t i b l e p o s s i b i l i t y of c o p io u s i n v e n t i o n .
For exam ple, A r i s t o t l e l i s t s in Book I more th an 15
"means" by which t h e "ways in which a term i s u s e d ” can be
d i s c u s s e d (106a 9-107b 37). These i n c l u d e "loo k and see if
i t s c o n t r a r y is used in many ways," "examine th e i n f l e c t e d
fo rm s," "Look a l s o a t th e c l a s s e s of th e p r e d i c a t e s
s i g n i f i e d by th e te rm ," and "see i f th e term s cann ot be
compared a s more o r l e s s or a s in l i k e d e g r e e s . " In Book
I I , he comes up w ith a long l i s t of "commonplace r u l e s " f o r
t a l k i n g about " a c c id e n t" b o th a s a s u b j e c t and a s t r a t e g y :
" to look and see i f a man has a s c r i b e d as an a c c i d e n t what
b e lo n g s in some o t h e r way;" "to examine a l l c a s e s where a
p r e d i c a t e has been s a i d to b e lo n g to a l l or none of
so m e th in g ;" "make th e problem i n t o a p r o p o s i t i o n , " and th e n
145
" b r in g an o b j e c t i o n a g a i n s t i t ; ” " d e te rm in e what k in d of
t h i n g s sh o u ld be c a l l e d as most men c a l l them, and what
sh o u ld n o t ; " " [ t a k e ] t h e s o p h i s t i c t u r n of argum ent,
whereby we draw our opponent i n to th e k in d of s t a te m e n t
a g a i n s t which we s h a l l be w ell s u p p l i e d w ith l i n e s of
a rg u m e n t;" and " a t t a c k by r e i n t e r p r e t i n g a word in r e s p e c t
of i t s a c c o u n t, w ith th e i m p l i c a t i o n t h a t i t i s most
f i t t i n g so to ta k e i t r a t h e r th a n in i t s e s t a b l i s h e d
meaning" (109a 3 4 - 1 15b 35). And in Book I I I , we have a g a in
a d e t a i l e d e n u m e ratio n of "commonplace” r u l e s f o r comparing
two or more t h i n g s so a s to d e te r m in e which one i s th e more
" d e s i r a b l e " or th e " b e t t e r " : " t h a t which i s more l a s t i n g or
s e c u r e i s more d e s i r a b l e t h a n t h a t which i s l e s s so, and so
i s t h a t which i s more l i k e l y to be chosen by th e p r u d e n t or
by th e good man o r by th e r i g h t law, or by men who a r e good
in any p a r t i c u l a r l i n e ; " " t h a t which i s d e s i r e d f o r i t s e l f
i s more d e s i r a b l e th a n t h a t which i s d e s i r e d f o r
so m e th in g ;" and "whenever two t h i n g s a r e v e ry much l i k e one
a n o t h e r , and we c an n o t see any s u p e r i o r i t y in th e one over
th e o t h e r of them, we sh o u ld look a t them from th e
s t a n d p o i n t of t h e i r c o n seq u en ces" . . . (116a 10-119a
2 0 ). The r e s t of th e e i g h t books t h a t co m p rise th e t e x t
a r e a l l made up of s i m i l a r l i s t s of "commonplace r u l e s " f o r
d e a l i n g w ith o t h e r p ro blem s.
146
I f we fo llo w th e t r a d i t i o n a l l i n e s of i n q u i r y , we
m ight be tem pted to ta k e what A r i s t o t l e says of to p o s in
th e R h e t o r i c l i t e r a l l y , and to se e th e fo u r ‘'e le m en ts"
a lo n e a s what have been d e s i g n a t e d th e " t o p i c s " w h ile to
look upon th e " r u l e s " l i s t e d in th e t e x t a s the
"enthymemes" in c lu d e d under t h e s e "e 1e m e n ts "- c u m -"h e a d s ."
Yet s u g g e s t i o n s such as " d e te rm in e what kind of t h i n g s
sh o u ld be c a l l e d as most men c a l l them and what sh o u ld no t"
or "draw our opponent i n t o th e k in d of s t a te m e n t a g a i n s t
which we s h a l l be w ell s u p p l i e d w ith l i n e s of argum ent" can
h a r d l y be c a l l e d "enthymemes" o r a rg u m e n ts. And i t i s
c l e a r t h a t t h e s e "ele m e n ts" by no means f u n c t i o n in th e
t e x t as " c o n t a i n e r s " or " s t o r a g e s " f o r a l i m i t e d and
s p e c i f i c s e t of " r u l e s " a l r e a d y o r g a n iz e d under t h e i r
r e s p e c t i v e r u b r i c s , to be drawn f o r a p p l i c a t i o n e ls e w h e r e .
R a th e r , th e y th e m se lv e s a r e f i r s t employed as s t r a t e g i e s
f o r a t t a c k i n g th e s u b j e c t " arg u m e n t," and th e n in t u r n
s e r v e as t h e s u b j e c t s of d i s c u s s i o n to which a d i v e r s e and
open-ended s e t of "commonplace r u l e s , " f o r m u la te d a c c o r d in g
to th e s p e c i f i c r h e t o r i c a l s i t u a t i o n , can be b ro u g h t to
b e a r . As th e s u b j e c t s , th e y a r e th e f o c a l p o i n t s f o r a
d i v e r s i t y of "commonplace r u l e s " to co n v erg e, and can
t h e r e f o r e be u n d e rs to o d as th e " c e n t e r s " of th e r h e t o r i c a l
s t r u c t u r e s e s t a b l i s h e d in th e p r o c e s s of t o p i c a l i n v e n t i o n .
Yet th e y a r e by no means th e kind of s e l f - p r e s e n t c e n t e r s
147
t h a t , in D e r r id e a n te rm s, " f o r b id " th e " p e r m u ta tio n s and
t r a n s f o r m a t i o n s of e le m e n ts" by imposing an " o rd e r" on them
or by a s s i g n i n g a f i x e d " p la c e " f o r each of them. On th e
c o n t r a r y , th e o n ly " c e n t e r " t h a t th e s t r u c t u r e knows i s an
o r i g i n a t i v e d oubt ( e . g . "w hether t h e a t t r i b u t e s t a t e d is or
is not a p r o p e r t y " ) or problem ( i n th e se n se t h a t "th e
s u b j e c t s on which d e d u c t io n s ta k e p l a c e a r e p r o b l e m s , ” 101b
15). Such a " c e n t e r " n o t o n ly a l l o w s , bu t a c t u a l l y
i n v i t e s , en co u rag e s and indeed c a l l s upon th e d i f f e r e n t i a l
com ponents, e le m e n ts , and c a t e g o r i e s to " p l a y , " to combine
and to a s s o c i a t e f o r th e g e n e r a t i o n of th e maximum number
of "commonplace r u l e s " or i n v e n t i v e s t r a t e g i e s . We may even
say t h a t in th e i n t e r e s t of p ro d u c in g an abundance of
a rg u m e n ts, i t p ro vo kes a s e 1f - p r o b 1e m a tiz in g p r o c e s s by
i t s e l f s e r v i n g a s th e t a r g e t f o r " a t t a c k s " from a l l
d i r e c t i o n s , or " a t t a c k s " c a r r i e d out by em ploying as many
" r u l e s " a s can be f o r m u la te d .
For a l l t h e i r a p p e a ra n c e of i n d i v i s i b i l i t y and
i n v a r i a b i l i t y , t h e s e " c e n t e r s " a r e a c t u a l l y nonloci t h a t
s i g n i f y a d i f f e r e n c e , a d i s p a r i t y or a gap betw een two
p o s i t i o n s , t h a t i s , betw een th e d i f f e r i n g p o s i t i o n s h e ld by
th e r h e t o r i c i a n and h e r a u d ie n c e r e s p e c t i v e l y . A ltho ug h we
have long become n e g l i g e n t of what sho uld be an obvious
f a c t , th e f a c t rem ain s t h a t w ith o u t such a d i f f e r e n c e t h e r e
would be no need a t a l l to make a speech : th e d i f f e r e n c e
148
i s , in t h i s s e n s e , th e o r i g i n , th e m o tiv a t i o n , th e u l t i m a t e
excuse and th e fundam ental j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r r h e t o r i c a l
i n v e n t i o n . As soon a s a co m p lete c o n sen su s was re a c h e d on
a p a r t i c u l a r i s s u e , i t would become im p o s s ib le f o r anyone
to f i n d a n y th in g i n t e r e s t i n g to say a b o u t i t . The moment
a l l " m is u n d e r s ta n d in g s " were e l i m i n a t e d , we would lo s e th e
ra ison d ' e t r e f o r en gag in g o u r s e l v e s in i n t e r p r e t a t i o n ,
e x p o s i t i o n and indeed d i s c o u r s e in g e n e r a l . And were a
g e n e ra l and perm anent agreem ent rea ch e d on a l l i s s u e s , a
d e a d ly s i l e n c e would c e r t a i n l y descen d on u s. For a l l our
p r o t e s t a t i o n s to th e c o n t r a r y , t h e r e f o r e , we a r e even more
i n t e r e s t e d in se e k in g out d i f f e r e n c e s and c r e a t i n g problem s
th a n in r e a c h i n g ag re em e n ts and s o l v i n g problem s. I t must
be a t a c i t r e c o g n i t i o n of t h i s p a r a d o x i c a l s i t u a t i o n t h a t
has led an A r i s t o t l e to d e v o te h i s T op ics alm ost e n t i r e l y
to th e i d e n t i f i c a t i o n and f o r m u l a t i o n of s t r a t e g i e s f o r
" p r o b 1e m a t i z i n g " any s u b j e c t , a B o e th iu s to e q u a te th e
" t o p i c s " w ith t h e i r " d i f f e r e n t i a e , " and in our tim e , a
D e r r id a to t r y to j a r us i n t o a new aw aren ess of t h i s
o r i g i n a r y gap w ith h i s o f t e n cacophonous n o n - c o n c e p ts such
as nonlocus, d i f f d r a n c e and d e c o n s t r u c t i o n .
I f D e r r i d a ’ s n o t io n of a nonlocus and h i s em phasis on
" s t r a t e g i e s " have p o i n te d to a new d i r e c t i o n in our
u n d e r s t a n d i n g of th e c l a s s i c a l r h e t o r i c a l c o n ce p t t o p o s , to
149
r e s i t u a t e him in th e r h e t o r i c a l (a s opposed to the
p h i l o s o p h i c a l or th e l i t e r a r y )
c o n te x t in t u r n p ro m ises to throw new l i g h t onto h i s h ig h ly
c o n t r o v e r s i a l t h o u g h t. D e r rid a i s , to be s u r e , a
p h i l o s o p h e r or a p h i l o s o p h i c a l c r i t i c in t h e f i r s t p l a c e ,
which e x p l a i n s why he sh o u ld s c o f f a t th e n o t i o n of a
p o s i t i v e c e r t i t u d e on ly to seek to r e p l a c e i t w ith the
n o t i o n of a n e g a t i v e c e r t i t u d e ( " f o r fundam ental r e a s o n s ,
t h e r e c o u ld be no p r o b l e m a t i c s of d e c o n s t r u c t i o n " [A
D e r r id a Reader 2171), or why he sh o u ld r e j e c t th e co ncep t
of " t r u t h " y e t f a i l to come to term s w ith doxa e i t h e r ("We
need h e re to d i s t i n g u i s h v e r y c a r e f u l l y [betw een th e p o l i c e
and a r e p r e s s i v e p o l i t i c s ] i f we a r e no t to succumb to the
f a c i l e s o l u t i o n s and i d e o l o g i c a l con sen su s of th e doxai of
r i g h t or l e f t " [L im ite d Inc 1 3 2 ]). With h i s p r e o c c u p a t io n
w ith a l l t h e o r e t i c a l i s s u e s in v o lv e d in d i s c u r s i v e
p r a c t i c e s , h i s involvem ent in and r e f l e c t i o n s on p o le m ic s ,
and e s p e c i a l l y h i s s p e c i a l i n t e r e s t in th e c o n c e p t of
in v e n ti o , however, t h e r e i s no deny in g a l s o t h a t he has
e s t a b l i s h e d h im s e lf as one of th e most im p o rta n t r h e t o r i c a l
t h e o r i s t s of our tim e. F a i l u r e to ta k e b o th a s p e c t s in to
c o n s i d e r a t i o n or to r e c o g n iz e t h a t some of h i s most
c o n t r o v e r s i a l hence most p r o d u c t i v e id e a s have in f a c t come
out of h i s e f f o r t to n e g o t i a t e a dynamic b a la n c e between
t h e s e two c o n f l i c t i n g modes of c o n c e p t u a l i z a t i o n o f t e n
150
le a d s to a d i s t o r t e d image of th e t h i n k e r and h i s th o u g h t.
As D e r r id a h im s e lf o b s e r v e s , "p eo p le who re a d me and th in k
I ’m p l a y i n g w ith or t r a n s g r e s s i n g n orm s. . . u s u a 11y d o n ’t
know what I know: t h a t a l l of t h i s has no t o n ly been made
p o s s i b l e by b ut i s c o n s t a n t l y in c o n t a c t w ith v e ry
c l a s s i c a l , r i g o r o u s , demanding d i s c i p l i n e in w r i t i n g , in
' d e m o n s t r a t i n g , ' in r h e t o r i c ” ( " JAC I n te rv ie w " 4, em phasis
a d d e d . ) .
Nowhere i s t h i s e n a b l in g " c o n t a c t " w ith th e c l a s s i c a l
d i s c i p l i n e in r h e t o r i c more e v i d e n t th a n in h i s e f f o r t to
r e - c o n c e p t u a l i z e th e c o n ce p t of i n v e n t i o n . D e r r id a is
i n t r i g u e d by what he term s ” [a] s t r a n g e r e t u r n of a d e s i r e
f o r i n v e n tio n " in our tim e , by th e f a c t t h a t th e word
" i n v e n t i o n " "imposes i t s e 1f . . . more q u i c k l y and more o f t e n
th a n o t h e r n e ig h b o r in g words ( ' d i s c o v e r , ' ' c r e a t e , '
'i m a g i n e , ' 'p r o d u c e , ' and so o n )" : he wonders out loud "why
i s th e word ' i n v e n t i o n , ' t h a t t i r e d , w orn-out c l a s s i c a l
word, to d ay e x p e r i e n c in g a r e v i v a l , a new f a s h i o n a b l e n e s s ,
and a new way of l i f e " ( D e r r id a Reader 2 1 7 -1 8 ). He s t a r t s
an i n v e s t i g a t i o n , and h i s stu d y of " th e s t a t u s of
i n v e n t i o n ” lea d s him to th e i d e n t i f i c a t i o n of a p a r a l y z i n g
s e l f - c o n t r a d i c t i o n in what he c a l l s th e "commonsense"
c o n c e p tio n of in v e n tio . On th e one hand, he t e l l s u s, "we
a r e a u t h o r i z e d t o in v e n t o n ly w i t h i n th e s t a t u t o r y l i m i t s j
a s s i g n e d by th e c o n t r a c t [betw een "the a u th o r and th e
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r e a d e r , ” " th e s i g n a t o r y and th e c o u n t e r s i g n a t o r y " ] and by
th e t i t l e , " and an i n v e n t i o n " r e f u s i n g to be d i c t a t e d ,
o r d e r e d , programmed by t h e s e c o n v e n tio n s would be o ut of
p l a c e , o u t of p h a se, out of o r d e r , i m p e r t i n e n t ,
t r a n s g r e s s i v e ." On th e o t h e r hand, " t h e r e w i l l be no
i n v e n t i o n h e re today u n l e s s t h a t b re a k w ith c o n v e n tio n ,
i n t o i m p r o p r i e t y , i s made," or we may say t h a t " t h e r e w ill
be i n v e n t i o n o n ly on c o n d i t i o n t h a t th e i n v e n t i o n
t r a n s g r e s s , in o r d e r to be i n v e n t i v e , th e s t a t u s and th e
program s w ith which i t was supposed to comply" ( D e r r id a
Reader 216). S in c e we co u ld n o t have b o th p r o p r i e t y and
i n v e n t i v e n e s s a t th e same tim e , We a r e th u s c o n f r o n t e d w ith
a dilemma whenever we t r y to in v e n t .
Such a c o n c e p tio n h a s , n e e d l e s s to say, n o th in g to do
w ith i n v e n tio as a "w orn-out c l a s s i c a l w ord." For n e i t h e r
th e r i g o r o u s d i c h o t o m i z a t i o n of th e i n v e n t i v e s i t u a t i o n nor
th e c h o ic e between two e q u a l l y u n d e s i r a b l e a l t e r n a t i v e s is
s u s t a i n a b l e by an e x a m in a tio n of t h e h i s t o r y of th e co n cep t
in q u e s t i o n . Even th e Romans, who a t t a c h e d much im po rtance
to th e p r i n c i p l e of decorum, d id n o t see i n v e n t i o n in term s
of an i r r e c o n c i l a b l e c o n f r o n t a t i o n betw een a r e s t r i c t i v e ,
s t i f l i n g c o n fo r m ity and an " im p r o p e r ," " i m p e r ti n e n t"
t r a n s g r e s s i o n . "The t a s k of th e p u b l i c s p e a k e r is to
d i s c u s s c a p a b ly th o s e m a t t e r s which law and custom have
f i x e d f o r th e u se s of c i t i z e n s h i p , and to s e c u r e a s f a r as
152
p o s s i b l e th e agreem ent of h i s h e a r e r s , " Ad Herennium so
d e c l a r e s ( I . I I . 2 ) , y e t f o r h i s em phasis on r e s p e c t f o r
" law ," "custom" and " c i t i z e n s h i p , " t h e r e has n e v e r been
any doubt on th e p a r t of th e a u th o r t h a t a d i s c u r s i v e space
does e x i s t in th e " m a tte r s " s a i d to have been " f i x e d , " and
c l e a r l y u n d e rs to o d in t h i s s ta te m e n t i s th e p o s s i b i l i t y of
g e n u in e d is a g r e e m e n ts w i t h i n t h e s e c o n v e n t io n s , betw een th e
r h e t o r i c i a n and " h is h e a r e r s . ” Then f o r Q u i n t i l i a n , who
se e s a rg u m e n ta tio n a s a m a t t e r of " [c o n f ir m in g ] f a c t s which
a r e u n c e r t a i n by r e f e r e n c e to f a c t s which a r e c e r t a i n , "
" th o s e t h i n g s which a r e e s t a b l i s h e d by law or have p a sse d
i n t o c u r r e n t usage" a r e j u s t one of th e fo u r k in d s of
f o u n d a t i o n a l " c e r t a i n t i e s , " th e o t h e r t h r e e b e in g " th o se
t h i n g s which we p e r c e i v e by th e s e n s e s t h o s e t h i n g s about
which t h e r e is g e n e r a l agreem ent" and " th e t h i n g s which a r e
a d m itte d by e i t h e r p a r t y " CI n s t i t u t i o O r a t o r i a V. X.
1 1 -14 ). The u n m is ta k a b le i m p l i c a t i o n of t h i s c o n c e p ti o n is
t h a t a s long as th e p o i n t of d e p a r t u r e i s an
a g re e m e n t— however s p e c i f i c , lo c a l or p r o v i s i o n a l such an
agreem ent may be, one can have th e freedom to t r a n s f e r a
c o n se n t from one t h i n g to a n o th e r w ith o u t h a v in g to worry
a bout th e d anger of com m ittin g a " t r a n s g r e s s i o n . " And
s i n c e A r i s t o t l e f i n d s i t a l t o g e t h e r a p p r o p r i a t e and p ro p e r
in i n v e n t i o n to a d o p t such s t r a t e g i e s a s " [ a t t a c k i n g ] by
r e i n t e r p r e t i n g a word in r e s p e c t of i t s a c c o u n t, w ith th e
153
i m p l i c a t i o n t h a t i t i s most f i t t i n g so to ta k e i t r a t h e r
t h a n in i t s e s t a b l i s h e d m eaning," i t is u n l i k e l y t h a t he
would c o n s i d e r r e f u s i n g to be " d i c t a t e d " and " o rd ere d " by
th e e s t a b l i s h e d norms "out of p l a c e " or "out of o r d e r . "
The s t r i k i n g d i s c r e p a n c y betw een th e t r a d i t i o n a l
p e r s p e c t i v e and what D e r r id a term s th e "commonsense" view
on i n v e n t i o n may prompt us to s u s p e c t D e r r id a , as G e rald
G r a f f and some of h i s o t h e r c r i t i c s do, of r e s o r t i n g to th e
f 0
t a c t i c of a s c r i b i n g "a s t a t e of 'i d e a l p u r i t y ' " to an
a l l e g e d "p o p u la r" c o n c e p tio n of i n v e n t i o n , so t h a t he may
l a t e r p r o b l e m a t i z e and d e c o n s t r u c t t h i s n o n - e x i s t e n t
c o n s t r u c t w ith e a se and g l e e . In o t h e r words, we may b e g in
to s u s p e c t t h a t i t i s D e r r id a h im s e l f who imposes a g r e a t
d i v i d e on to th e o t h e r w is e i n t i m a t e l y i n te r m i n g l e d , a c t i v e l y
i n t e r a c t i n g and c o n s t a n t l y m ob ile "ele m e n ts" or
d i f f e r e n t i a e of th e co ncep t of " i n v e n t i o n , " and t h a t i t is
he who s t i p u l a t e s t h a t no i n t e r c o u r s e betw een th e two s i d e s
th u s d i v id e d is e i t h e r le g a l or p o s s i b l e , so t h a t he might
s e t up a t h e o r e t i c a l dou ble bin d or c r e a t e a p r a g m a tic
a b s u r d i t y t h a t s e r v e s a s a c o n v e n ie n t t a r g e t f o r h i s
d e c o n s t r u c t i v e o p e r a t i o n . Yet i f we ta k e i n t o a cc o u n t th e
ambiguous p o s i t i o n i n v e n tio o c c u p ie s somewhere between
" d is c o v e ry " on th e one s i d e and " c r e a t i o n " on th e o t h e r ,
and e s p e c i a l l y i f we come to t h i n k a b o u t th e i m p l i c a t i o n of
th e p o l a r i z e d o p p o s i t i o n betw een th e H aberm asian model and
154
th e R o rtyan model, i t does no t seem j u s t i f i e d to a s c r i b e
t h a t "commonsense" c o n c e p tio n e n t i r e l y to D e r r i d a ’s
im a g in a tio n . N e i th e r Habermas nor R o rty i s d e l i v e r i n g an
i n t e r i o r monologue when th e y u n d e rta k e to c o n s t r u c t t h e i r
own models of d i s c u r s i v e p r o d u c t i o n . R a th e r , th e y a r e
engaged in c o n v e r s a t i o n s w ith o t h e r d i s c o u r s e s and a r e in
a se n se re s p o n d in g to th e k in d of p re d ic a m e n t d e s c r i b e d by
D e r r id a . They each p ro p o se a way ou t of th e dilemma, and
t h e two ways th e y s u g g e s t t u r n o ut to be in two
d i a m e t r i c a l l y opposed d i r e c t i o n s . When R o rty s u g g e s t s t h a t
one can f r e e l y " r e d e s c r i b e " t h i n g s and f o r m u la te a new
v o c a b u la r y which s h a r e s no c r i t e r i a w ith th e e x i s t i n g
" v o c a b u l a r i e s , " he i s in f a c t a d v i s i n g us to d i s r e g a r d the
" s t a t u t o r y l i m i t s a s s i g n e d by th e c o n t r a c t and by the
t i t l e , " and to c r o s s th e boundary of o n e ’ s o ld s e t of
l i n g u i s t i c and r h e t o r i c a l c o n v e n tio n s a t w i l l , w ith o u t
c a r i n g abo ut th e need f o r a u t h o r i z a t i o n and th e
c o n seq u e n ce s of t r a n s g r e s s i o n . Habermas, on th e o t h e r
hand, i s e v i d e n t l y t r y i n g to c u t th e same G ord ian knot from
t h e o p p o s i t e a n g le when he h o ld s i n s t e a d t h a t one can n ever
hope to s t e p o u t s i d e o n e ’s l i f e w o r l d , and y e t w i t h i n the
h o r i z o n of th e l i f e w o r l d or th e l i m i t s of c o n v e n tio n s one
can have g e n u in e i n v e n t i o n j u s t by c o n s t a n t l y i d e n t i f y i n g ,
c l a r i f y i n g and r e a f f i r m i n g th e h id d en v a l i d i t y c la im s and
c u l t u r e - and l a n g u a g e - s p e c i f i c " i n t e r p r e t i v e p a t t e r n s . "
155
The s o l u t i o n s o f f e r e d h e re make l i t t l e r h e t o r i c a l
s e n s e , and one has j u s t to c o n s i d e r a p r o t o t y p i c a l a c t of
i n v e n t i o n in o r d e r to see t h e i r i n f e a s i b i l i t y . A sp e ec h is
alw ays a d d r e s s e d to an a u d ie n c e and i t i s alw ays i n i t i a t e d
by a d i f f e r e n c e between th e o p i n i o n s of th e s p e a k e r and
th o s e of th e a u d ie n c e . In making a sp e ec h , th e s p e a k e r
sh o u ld aim a t changing th e c o n v e n tio n a l mind in c e r t a i n
r e s p e c t , y e t to su cceed in th e p e r s u a s i o n , she has to o f f e r
arg um en ts u n d e r s t a n d a b l e to and a c c e p t a b l e by th e a u d ie n c e .
I t would t h e r e f o r e be j u s t as p o i n t l e s s t r y i n g to p e rs u a d e
th e a u d ie n c e to a c c e p t som ething i t h a s a l r e a d y h e ld f i r m l y
(even though u n c o n s c i o u s ly ) as i t i s a b su rd a t t e m p t i n g to
make th e p e r s u a s i o n or c o n v e r s i o n by a d d r e s s i n g th e
a u d ie n c e in a " v o ca b u lary " i t does n o t u n d e rs ta n d or w ith
argu m en ts i t f i n d s u t t e r l y u n r e a s o n a b l e . D e r r id a i s
r h e t o r i c a l l y too s o p h i s t i c a t e d to ig n o re th e a u d ie n c e
f a c t o r or to d i s r e g a r d th e i m p e r a tiv e of p e r s u a s i o n in
i n v e n t i o n . He p l a c e s th e " c o n t r a c t " betw een th e a u th o r and
th e a u d ie n c e on to p of h i s l i s t of th e " s t a t u t o r y l i m i t s , "
and he s e e s th e problem i n h e r e n t in th e "commonsense"
c o n c e p ti o n of i n v e n t i o n as th e problem of " th e whole
en vironm ent of r e c e p t i o n t h a t by d e f i n i t i o n ought n e v er to
be read y to welcome an a u t h e n t i c in n o v a tio n " (Derr ida
Reader 217). For him, th e r e c e p t i v e s i d e of i n v e n t i o n ( t h e
a u d ie n c e ) "by d e f i n i t i o n " alw ays c o n s t i t u t e s a r e s i s t a n c e
156
a g a i n s t any change in i t s c u r r e n t c o n f i g u r a t i o n of
o p i n i o n s , and what th e p r o d u c t i v e s i d e ( t h e s p e a k e r) should
do in th e i n v e n t i v e p r o c e s s is p r e c i s e l y to t r y t o overcome
t h i s r h e t o r i c a l i n e r t i a : th e more r a d i c a l th e change one
t r i e s to b r i n g a b o u t (" a n a u t h e n t i c i n n o v a t i o n " ) , th e
to u g h e r such a r e s i s t a n c e w i l l be. He can n e v er b r in g
h im s e l f to a g re e w ith any model (su c h as R o r t y ’s) which
f a i l s to ta k e i n t o s e r i o u s a cc o u n t t h i s "whole environm ent
of r e c e p t i o n " and which b e l i e v e s t h a t new id e a s can be
c r e a t e d w ith o u t any r e f e r e n c e to t h i s whole community of
a u d ie n c e . Nor can D e r r id a a c c e p t th e view, such as
H aberm as’s , t h a t to in v e n t i s , in th e f i n a l a n a l y s i s , to
" a c t u a l i z e " or to “renew" th e " sto c k " of c u l t u r e - and
l a n g u a g e - s p e c i f i c i n t e r p r e t i v e s t r a t e g i e s , n o th in g more,
n o th in g l e s s . I t i s h i s fir m c o n v i c t i o n t h a t i n v e n t i o n
ought to b r i n g g en u in e change or " a u t h e n t i c in n o v a tio n " to
th e system of c o n v e n tio n s t h a t a u t h o r i z e i t in th e f i r s t
p l a c e , t h a t "th e in a u g u ra l i n v e n t i o n ought to o v e rflo w ,
o v e rlo o k , t r a n s g r e s s , n e g a t e . . . t h e s t a t u s t h a t p e o p le would
have wanted to a s s i g n to i t or g r a n t i t in a d v a n c e ;" and
t h a t " i t ought to o v e r s t e p th e space in which t h a t s t a t u s
i t s e l f t a k e s on i t s meaning and i t s l e g itim a c y " ( D e r r id a
Reader 217).
As a r h e t o r i c i a n , D e r r id a i s k e e n ly aware of th e need
to s t a r t from a c o n d i t i o n a l i d e n t i f i c a t i o n w ith th e
157
"environm ent of r e c e p t i o n . ” As he se e s i t , d i s c u r s i v e
i n v e n t i o n alw ays t a k e s p l a c e in " p r a g m a t i c a l l y d e te rm in e d
s i t u a t i o n s " and i t is n e c e s s a r y to subm it " i n la r g e
m easure" to "th e norms of th e c o n t e x t t h a t r e q u i r e s one to
p ro v e , to d e m o n s tr a te , to p ro c e e d c o r r e c t l y , to conform to
th e r u l e s of language and t o a g r e a t number of o t h e r
s o c i a l , e t h i c a l , po 1 i t i c a 1 - i n s t i t u t i o n a 1 r u l e s ” ( Limi te d
Inc 150). Such a c o n t e x t " c o n s t i t u t e s th e o b j e c t of
ag re em e n ts s u f f i c i e n t l y c o n firm ed so t h a t one m ight count
on t i e s t h a t a r e s t a b l e , and hence d e m o n s tr a b le , l i n k i n g
words, c o n c e p ts and t h i n g s , as w ell as on th e d i f f e r e n c e
betw een th e t r u e and th e f a l s e " ( L im ited Inc 151). W ithout
such an " o b j e c t of a g reem en ts" and th e " t i e s " i t e n t a i l s ,
a p p a r e n t l y , i t i s im p o s s ib le to say a n y th i n g a t a l l
i n t e l l i g e n t l y to any a u d ie n c e . The em phasis on th e need
f o r a s t a b i l i z e d " c o n t r a c t , " however, does no t " n e c e s s a r i l y
mean to choose or a c c e p t o r t r y to c o n se rv e th e s t a b i l i t y "
of th e r h e t o r i c a l c o n te x t and a l l th e speakei—a u d ie n c e
a g re em e n ts i t embodies. R a th e r , th e " t i e s betw een words,
c o n c e p ts , and t h i n g s , t r u t h and r e f e r e n c e " f o r him a r e not
"a b s o l u t e l y and p u r e l y g u a r a n te e d by some m e t a c o n t e x t u a 1i t y
or m e t a d i s c u r s i v i t y ," and i t i s im p o rta n t to r e a l i z e t h a t
"however s t a b i l i z e d , complex, and o v e rd e te rm in e d i t may be,
[ th e c o n t e x t ] i s o n ly r e l a t i v e l y f ir m , n e i t h e r a b s o l u t e l y
s o l i d nor e n t i r e l y c lo s e d " : in i t t h e r e is alw ays "a m argin
158
of p l a y , of d i f f e r e n c e , an opening" ( L im ite d Inc 151). The
m a s s iv e ly d e te rm in e d " o b j e c t of a g r e e m e n ts ," in o t h e r
w ords, i s in i t s "margin" open to th e "play" of
" d i f f e r e n c e " or i s a c t u a l l y c o n ta m in a te d by th e p r i n c i p l e
of u n d e c i d a b i l i t y . To see t h i s "opening" of d i f f e r e n c e or
c o n ta m in a tio n of u n d e c i d a b i l i t y a s o n ly " m a r g i n a l ” to a
" c o n t r a c t u a l " body of ag reem en ts i s to a f f i r m what Burke
has s t r e s s e d a s a fundam ental r h e t o r i c a l p r i n c i p l e : t h a t
th e sp e a k e r has to i d e n t i f y w ith th e a u d ie n c e in a l l o t h e r
"ways” in o r d e r to change i t s o p i n io n in one way. And f o r
D e r r id a , th e f u n c t i o n of t h i s " u n d e c i d a b i l i t y " i s p r e c i s e l y
to open up a space where i t is p o s s i b l e to fo r m u la te and
a r t i c u l a t e an abundance of a l t e r n a t i v e s and c h o ic e s b e f o r e
a d e c i s i o n i s f i n a l l y made, r a t h e r th a n to re n d e r
im p o s s ib le such a d e c i s i o n :
. [ i n one s e n s e , u n d e c i d a b i l i t y ] opens th e
f i e l d of d e c i s i o n or of d e c i d a b i l i t y . I t c a l l s
f o r d e c i s i o n in th e o r d e r of e t h i c a l - p o l i t i c a l
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y . I t is even i t s n e c e s s a r y
c o n d i t i o n . A d e c i s i o n can o n ly come i n t o bein g
in a sp ace t h a t exceeds th e c a l c u l a b l e program
t h a t would d e s t r o y a l l r e s p o n s i b i l i t y by
t r a n s f o r m i n g i t i n to a programmable e f f e c t of
d e te r m i n a t e c a u s e s . ( L im ited In c 116)
Were t h e r e n o t th e u n d e c i d a b i l i t y and th e c h o ic e s i t
e n t a i l s , t h a t i s , t h e r e would not be any need f o r a
d e c i s i o n , f o r e v e r y t h i n g would have a l r e a d y been so
"pre-programmed" t h a t w hatev er we d i d , we were m erely
p ro d u c in g th e "programmable e f f e c t of d e te r m i n a t e c a u s e s . "
159
Though not e x a c t l y couched in r h e t o r i c a l term s,
D e r r i d a ’s a cc o u n t f o r th e p a r a d o x i c a l r e l a t i o n s h i p between
u n d e c i d a b i l i t y and d e c i s i o n p o i n t s to th e same t h i n g as
P e r e lm a n ’s c o n t r a s t betw een a form al system and th e n a t u r a l
language. A formal system , Perelm an t e l l s u s , i s comm itted
to imposing a " u n i v o c i t y of s ig n s " t h a t e l i m i n a t e s a l l
" a m b i g u i t i e s ” and " m is u n d e rs ta n d in g s " a t th e expense of
l i m i t i n g th e " p o s s i b i l i t i e s of e x p r e s s i o n . " Under th e
system , e v e r y t h i n g i s so p r e - d e c i d e d t h a t one can never
hope to a sk any q u e s t i o n w ith o u t t h e r e a l r e a d y b e in g th e
answ er. The n a t u r a l lan g u ag e, on th e o t h e r hand, is
c h a r a c t e r i z e d by a m b ig u ity and polysemy and i s t h e r e f o r e
n e v er t o t a l l y d e c i d a b l e . The "fu zzy n o t io n s " i t c o n t a i n s
w i l l g iv e r i s e to "numerous i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s " or " v a r ie d
d e f i n i t i o n s " : w h ile i t i s th u s n e c e s s a r y to d e c id e on an
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n or a d e f i n i t i o n , to make and to j u s t i f y
" c h o ic e s and d e c i s i o n s " i s p r e c i s e l y what r h e t o r i c is
a b o u t. Like Perelm an, D e r r id a does n ot b e l i e v e t h a t "what
we c a l l language or sp eech a c t s can ever be e x h a u s t i v e l y
d e te rm in e d by an e n t i r e l y o b j e c t i v e s c i e n c e or t h e o r y , " and
he f i n d s any " g e n e ra l th e o ry " or i n t e r p r e t i v e model
" i n s u f f i c i e n t " and "weak" which "does n ot i n t e g r a t e th e
poss i b i 1i t y of b o r d e r l i n e c a s e s , th e e s s e n t i a 1 p o s s i b i l i t y
of th o s e c a s e s c a l l e d 'm a r g i n a l , ' of a c c i d e n t s , a n o m a lie s ,
c o n t a m i n a ti o n s , p a r a s i t i s m " ( L im ite d Inc 118). An
160
i n t e g r a t i o n of t h e s e " m a r g in a l," " a c c i d e n t a l , " "abnorm al"
c a s e s , or what Perelm an c a l l s th e " r e c a l c i t r a n t , " would of
c o u rs e make th e th e o r y or th e model " p r o b l e m a t i c ," b u t th e n
D e r r id a is n ot i n t e r e s t e d in a p h i l o s o p h i c a l q u e s t f o r
c o n c e p tu a l c e r t i t u d e or t h e o r e t i c a l s t a b i l i t y , and f o r him,
w heth er you l i k e i t or n o t , " a l l language and
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n " a r e in f a c t " in some profou nd way
p r o b le m a tiz e d " :
Don’t you b e l i e v e t h a t a l l language and a l l
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n a r e p r o b l e m a t i c ? More th a n
p r o b l e m a t i c even, which i s to sa y , p e rh a p s of an
o r d e r o t h e r th a n p r o b l e m a t i c i t y ? I s n ’ t t h i s
a l s o a s t r o k e of luck? O th e rw is e , why sp eak,
why d i s c u s s ? How e l s e would what we c a l l
" m is u n d e rs ta n d in g " be p o s s i b l e ? That we may or
may n o t be in agreem ent on t h i s s u b j e c t a t t e s t s
by i t s e l f to t h i s more th a n p r o b le m a tic
p r o b l e m a t i c i t y . ( L im ited Inc 120)
What t h e s e r h e t o r i c a l q u e s t i o n s d e m o n s tra te i s th e
e x t e n t to which D e r r id a has r e f l e c t e d on th e i s s u e of
i n v e n t i o n and th e e x t e n t to which he i s comm itted to th e
id e a l of copia. J u s t a s f o r A r i s t o t l e , t h e r e is n o th in g
r e a l l y " p r o b l e m a t i c ” about the "pro blem ," n o th in g r e a l l y
du bio us a b o u t " d o u b t," a s th e "problem" o r th e "doubt" is
what in e f f e c t e n a b le s r h e t o r i c a l i n v e n t i o n to " ta k e
p l a c e , " so D e r r id a r e f u s e s to see th e " p ro b le m a tic " as
som ething n e g a t i v e , tro u b le so m e o r u n d e s i r a b l e , to be
e l i m i n a t e d o r f i n i s h e d o f f as q u i c k l y as p o s s i b l e . He
f i n d s in th e probIem at ic i n s t e a d "an o r d e r o t h e r th an
161
p r o b 1e m a t i c i t y " and he b e l i e v e s t h a t t h i s
" p r o b l e m a t i z a b i 1ity " of " a l l language and a l l
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n " is in f a c t th e c o n d i t i o n of p o s s i b i l i t y fo r
d i s c o u r s e to ta k e p l a c e . He s e e s u n d e c i d a b i l i t y as an
" o s c i 1l a t i o n between p o s s i b i 1 i t i e s " of "meaning" and " a c ts "
( L im ited Inc 148). And he i s t h e r e f o r e c o n v in c ed t h a t i t is
by v i r t u e of hav ing t h i s "more th a n p r o b le m a tic
p r o b l e m a t i c i t y " or t h i s more th a n u n d e c id a b le
u n d e c i d a b i l i t y b u i l t i n t o our d i s c o u r s e t h a t we a r e a b le to
have th e " m is u n d e r s ta n d in g s ," th e a g re e m e n ts and
d i s a g r e e m e n ts , c o n f r o n t i n g us and g i v i n g us th e need, th e
m o t i v a t i o n , th e excu se and th e j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r go ing on
"speak ing " and " d i s c u s s i n g , " f o r a v a i l i n g o u r s e l v e s of a l l
th e " p o s s i b i l i t i e s of meaning and a c t s , " t h a t i s , f o r
p e r p e t u a t i n g and a m p lif y in g d i s c u r s i v e i n v e n t i o n . In t h i s
s e n s e , and in t h i s se n se a l o n e , can we u n d e r s t a n d why t h i s
" p r o b l e m a t i c i t y " or " u n d e c i d a b i l i t y " sh o u ld be "a s t r o k e of
lu c k ," and why D e r r id a sh o u ld d e c l a r e t h a t th e
c h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n of th e d e c o n s t r u c t i o n i s t as a
" s k e p t i c - r e l a t i v i s t - n i h i 1i s t " who "does n o t b e l i e v e in
t r u t h , s t a b i l i t y , or th e u n i t y of meaning, in i n t e n t i o n or
' m e a n i n g - t o - s a y *" is a " f a l s e and f e e b l e " d e f i n i t i o n
( L im ite d Inc 146).
A key term in D e r r i d a ’s d i s c o u r s e , d e co n stru c t ion has
been ta k e n by h i s d e t r a c t o r s as a v i r t u a l synonym of
162
" d e s t r u c t i o n . " Even f o r s y m p a th e tic com m entators who
r e j e c t i t s c o n s t r u a l a s "a form of t e x t u a l v a n d a lism
d e s ig n e d to prove t h a t meaning is i m p o s s i b l e , " ^ t h e r e
seems to be no den ying i t s c o n n o t a t i o n of " d e m o l i t i o n , "
"undoing" or in any c a se " d is m a n tlin g " of a c o n s t r u c t i o n .
Gregory L. Ulmer in h i s A p plied Grammato1o g y , f o r i n s t a n c e ,
d i s t i n g u i s h e s betw een " w r i t in g " and " d e c o n s t r u c t i o n ” a s two
a n tin o m ic a s p e c t s of D e r r i d a ’ s d i s c u r s i v e p r a c t i c e s ,
c o n te n d in g t h a t th e l a t t e r i s a s u b v e r s i v e "mode of
a n a l y s i s " whereas th e form er a lo n e p r o v id e s a p r o d u c t i v e
"mode of c o m p o sitio n " p e r t a i n i n g to th e c o n ce p t of i n v e n t i o
1 S
"or even ' c r e a t i v i t y ’ ." As D e r r id a h im s e l f s e e s i t ,
however, " d e c o n s t r u c t i o n i s n e i t h e r an a n a l y s i s nor a
c r i t i q u e . . . I t i s n ot an a n a l y s i s in p a r t i c u l a r because
th e d i s m a n t l i n g of a s t r u c t u r e i s not a r e g r e s s i o n toward
a sim ple elem ent" (D e r r id a Reader 273). R a th e r,
" d e c o n s t r u c t i o n i s i n v e n t i v e or i t is n o th in g a t a l l ” :
i t does n ot s e t t l e f o r m eth o d ica l p r o c e d u r e s , i t
opens up passagew ay, i t marches ahead and marks
a t r a i l ; i t s w r i t i n g i s n o t o n ly p e r f o r m a t i v e ,
i t p ro d u ce s r u l e s — o t h e r c o n v e n t io n s — f o r new
p e r f o r m a t i v e and n e v e r i n s t a l l s i t s e l f in th e
t h e o r e t i c a l a s s u r a n c e of a sim p le o p p o s i t i o n
betw een p e r f o r m a t i v e and c o n s t a t i v e . I t s
p r o c e s s in v o lv e s an a f f i r m a t i o n , t h i s l a t t e r
b e in g lin k e d to th e c o m i n g . . . i n e v e n t, a d v e n t,
i n v e n t i o n . But i t can o n ly make i t by
d e c o n s t r u c t i n g a c o n c e p tu a l and i n s t i t u t i o n a l
s t r u c t u r e of i n v e n t i o n t h a t would n e u t r a l i z e by
p u t t i n g th e stamp of r e a s o n on some a s p e c t of
i n v e n t i o n , of i n v e n t i v e power: as i f i t were
n e c e s s a r y , o v e r and beyond a c e r t a i n t r a d i t i o n a l
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s t a t u s of i n v e n t i o n , to r e i n v e n t th e f u t u r e .
( D e r r id a Reader 218)
D e c o n s tr u c t io n i s out and out i n v e n t i v e , th e n , b e c a u se i t
l e a d s to more r a t h e r th a n l e s s d i s c u r s i v e p r o d u c t i o n and
c o n s t r u c t i o n . I t i s n o t o n ly an i n v e n t i v e a c t ( " i t s
w r i t i n g is n ot o n ly p e r f o r m a t i v e " ) , b ut a model of
in v e n t ion ( " i t p ro d u ce s r u l e s . . . f o r new p e r f o r m a t i v e " ) and
a m e t a - d i s c o u r s e on i n v e n t i o n a l s o ( " i t can o n ly make i t by
d e c o n s t r u c t i n g a c o n c e p tu a l and i n s t i t u t i o n a l s t r u c t u r e of
i n v e n t i o n " ) . D e c o n s tr u c t io n i s a v e ry s p e c i a l i n v e n t i v e
a c t , f o r i t "opens up a passageway" and le a d s to "th e
c o m i n g . . . i n e v e n t, a d v e n t, i n v e n t i o n . " I t i s n o t an
o r d i n a r y model of i n v e n t i o n , f o r i t r e f u s e s to s e t t l e fo r
“m eth o d ica l p r o c e d u r e s , ” and th e new " r u l e s " or
" c o n v e n tio n s " i t pro d u ce s a r e n o t f o r m u la te d on t h e b a s i s
of g e n e r a l l y assumed b i n a r y o p p o s i t i o n s such a s t h a t
betw een th e p e r f o r m a t i v e and th e c o n s t a t i v e . And i t sh ou ld
n o t be seen a s an o r d i n a r y m e t a d is c o u r s e on i n v e n t i o n
e i t h e r , f o r i t i s no t c o n ce rn e d ab ou t a t h e o r e t i c a l
r e f l e c t i o n on o r a c r i t i c a l e x a m in a tio n of th e e x i s t i n g
m odels, nor is i t d e v o te d to th e c o d i f i c a t i o n of th e
o r i g i n a r y a ssu m p tio n s about i n v e n t i o n . R a th e r , i t i s bent
on q u e s t i o n i n g th e " c o n c e p tu a l and i n s t i t u t i o n a l s t r u c t u r e
of i n v e n tio n " or th e c o n c e p tu a l and i n s t i t u t i o n a l framework
w i t h i n which th e d i v e r s e e x i s t i n g models on i n v e n t i o n have
164
been c o n s t r u c t e d . I t i s by way of d e s t a b i l i z i n g t h i s
f o u n d a t i o n a l c o re " s t r u c t u r e " t h a t th e p r o d u c t i o n of new
r u l e s and th e op en in g up of new passagew ays become
p o ss i b 1e .
T his c o n c e p tio n of d e c o n s t r u c t i o n a s an " a f f i r m a t i v e "
i n v e n t i v e p r o c e s s r e f e r s us back to th e ap o r ia D e r r id a has
found in th e "commonsense" a ssu m p tio n a b o u t i n v e n t i o , which
e m b a rra s s e s i t s e l f by a t once b an n in g and demanding a
t r a n s g r e s s i o n and y e t c o n ti n u i n g to make p r e t e n s i o n s to
b e in g a c o n s i s t e n t , l o g i c a l and s y s t e m a t i c c o n c e p tio n . In
synonym izing " d e c o n s t r u c t i o n " w ith " i n v e n t i o n , " D e r r id a is
in f a c t p r o p o s in g a s o l u t i o n to th e q u e s t i o n of "to
t r a n s g r e s s or n o t to t r a n s g r e s s , " which th e i n v e n t o r has to
and y e t i s q u i t e u n a b le to answ er. The o n ly way out of
t h i s l o g i c a l im passe, he s u g g e s t s , i s to t u r n inward and
upward r a t h e r th a n ou tw ard. That i s , r a t h e r th a n t r y i n g in
v a in to b rea k out i n t o a new " s i t e " o r a new d i s c u r s i v e
space which i s in r a d i c a l e x t e r i o r i t y to th e e x i s t i n g
r h e t o r i c a l framework, we t u r n our g aze inward and upward,
to th e dom inant and c e n t r a l "c o n c e p tu a l and i n s t i t u t i o n a l
s t r u c t u r e " of our own i n v e n t i o n . That i s , we s u b j e c t th e
unexamined, t a k e n - f o r - g r a n t e d c o re of a s s u m p tio n s to a
c r i t i c a l s c r u t i n y , so as to become aware of i t s ten d e n cy to
" n e u t r a l i z e " i n v e n t i o n by " p u t t i n g th e stamp of r e a s o n on
some a s p e c t of i n v e n t i o n , of i n v e n t i v e po w er." Even i f we
165
have to a b id e by th e " s t a b i l i z e d s o l i d i t y of numerous
c o n t r a c t s " a s an i n d i s p e n s a b l e p r e c o n d i t i o n of sym bolic
exchange, and to invoke " c r i t e r i a of d i s c u s s i o n and of
c o n s e n s u s , good f a i t h , l u c i d i t y , r i g o r , c r i t i c i s m and
pedagogy" ( L im ite d Inc 146) in a c t u a l i n v e n t i v e a c t s , we
can "march ahead and mark a t r a i l " w i t h i n th e " s t a t u t o r y
l i m i t s " sim ply by a d o p ti n g , f o r example, th e two w ell-know n
D e r r id e a n s t r a t e g i e s : 1 .) s tu d y i n g th e h i s t o r y of th e key
c o n c e p ts in v o lv e d r a t h e r th a n t a k i n g them f o r a h i s t o r i c a l ,
c o n t e x t - f r e e g i v e n s ; and 2 . ) borrow ing from th e system of
c o n v e n tio n s th e r e s o u r c e s n e c e s s a r y f o r th e d e c o n s t r u c t i o n
of th e system i t s e l f by c o n s t a n t l y p o sin g th e problem of
" s t a t u s " of t h e s e " c o n v e n t io n s ." The f i r s t s t r a t e g y would
h e i g h t e n our s e n s i t i v i t y to th e h i s t o r i c i t y and c o n tin g e n c y
of th e key te rm s, and would th u s h e lp to d e s t a b i l i z e th o s e
seem in g ly i n v a r i a b l e and immovable "fo un din g c o n c e p t s . "
With th e second s t r a t e g y t h e s e c o n v e n tio n s a r e d e p r i v e d of
t h e i r t r u t h v a lu e and a r e t r e a t e d a s mere t o o l s . Once
t h e s e " c o n v e n tio n s " a r e no lo n g er looked upon a s t i m e l e s s ,
t r a n s c e n d e n t a l t r u t h s , t h e i r r e v i s i o n , abandonment and
re p la c e m e n t a r e o n ly to be e x p e c te d .
For D e r r i d a , t h e r e f o r e , d e c o n s t r u c t i o n i s th e way of
b r i n g i n g a b o u t r a d i c a l , i n n o v a t i v e i n v e n t i o n s w i t h i n the
same r h e t o r i c a l framework. C e n tr a l to a
d e c o n s t r u c t i v e - i n v e n t i v e p r o j e c t i s th e e f f o r t to p r e v e n t
166
th e " c o n c e p tu a l and I n s t i t u t i o n a l s t r u c t u r e of i n v e n t i o n ”
from " n e u t r a l i z i n g " th e i n v e n t i v e a c t or from " p u t t i n g th e
stamp of re a so n " on "some a s p e c t of in v e n t i o n " o r of
" i n v e n t i v e power" o n ly . As D e r r id a s e e s i t , t h i s c o re
" s t r u c t u r e " has a ten d e n cy to h a rd e n i n t o a " c e n t e r " t h a t
" c l o s e s o f f th e p la y which [ i r o n i c a l l y ] i t opens up and
makes p o s s i b l e , " o r to s o l i d i f y i n g i n t o a p o i n t where "th e
p e rm u t a t i o n or th e t r a n s f o r m a t i o n of e l e m e n t s . . . i s
f o r b id d e n . " I t has th e ten d e n cy to a u t h o r i z e o r to
p r i v i l e g e o n ly one s e t of " r u l e s " o r " c o n v e n tio n s " a s th e
" r a t i o n a l " or th e " c o r r e c t " and th u s to ban o t h e r s from
p a r t i c i p a t i n g in th e i n v e n t i v e games and to work a g a i n s t
th e i n t e r e s t of c o p io u s i n v e n t i o n . Even though we cannot
go beyond t h i s r h e t o r i c a l framework, t h a t i s , even though
we have to u se lan g u ag e, employ r h e t o r i c a l s t r a t e g i e s and
r e l y on a s s u m p tio n s about d i s c o u r s e in much th e same
c o n v e n tio n a l way so a s to e n s u re th e i n t e l l i g i b i l i t y and
p e r s u a s i v e n e s s of our d i s c o u r s e , o r th e u n d e r s t a n d i n g and
a c c e p ta n c e of t h e a u d ie n c e , we can alw ays manage to f i n d an
abundance of new and e x c i t i n g t h i n g s to say o r t o p i c s to
d i s c u s s by c o n s t a n t l y rem ind in g o u r s e l v e s , and rem ind in g
our a u d ie n c e th r o u g h a "double g e s t u r e " a l s o , t h a t a l l
t h e s e means of p e r s u a s i o n on which we r e l y a r e s t r u c t u r e d
in p r o b a b i l i t y and c o n tin g e n c y ; t h a t th e h id d en
" a x io m a tic s " which we ta k e f o r g r a n t e d a r e , a s A r i s t o t l e
167
p o i n t s o u t , more o f t e n th a n n o t e x p r e s s i o n s " i n g e n e r a l
what i s n o t g e n e r a l " ( R h e to r i c 1395a 10); t h a t t h e r e i s
t h e r e f o r e no r e a s o n why th e r u l e s we a r e c u r r e n t l y a p p ly in g
and ob ey in g sh o u ld n o t be r e v i s e d and changed from tim e to
tim e so t h a t new "passagew ays" can be opened up, new
" p e r f o r m a t i v e s " can be c a r r i e d o u t , e n t i r e l y d i f f e r e n t
language games can be p la y e d o u t on th e same a r e n a .
D e r r i d a ’s c o n c e p ti o n of i n v e n t i o n f e a t u r e s a
t h r e e - t i e r e d s t r u c t u r e . The c o re of th e s t r u c t u r e i s a
body of p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s a b o u t i n v e n t i o n . T h is c o re
c o n s t i t u t e s th e b a s i s on which to f o r m u la te d i f f e r e n t
"models" o r s e t s of r u l e s and c o n v e n tio n s , and i s i t s e l f
su rro u n d e d by th e "m odels." These d i v e r s e r u l e s and
c o n v e n tio n s in t u r n e n a b le , g u id e and l i m i t th e scope of
t h e a c t u a l " p e r f o r m a t i v e s " or i n v e n t i v e a c t s . Covered by
l a y e r a f t e r la y e r of t e r m i n i s t i c o u tg r o w th s , th e
p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s in th e c o re ten d to p a ss th e m s e lv e s o f f f o r
u n i v e r s a l and perm anent " t r u t h s , " which t h r e a t e n s to
p e t r i f y t h e c o re i n t o a s e l f - p r e s e n t " c e n t e r " f o r t h i s
s t r u c t u r e which i s i t s e l f above " s t r u c t u r a l i t y ." A
p e t r i f i e d " c e n t e r ” w o u ld c l o s e o f f t h e
g e n e r a t i v e - t r a n s f o r m a t i o n a l p r o c e s s of i n v e n t i o n i t s e t s in
m otion by p u t t i n g th e "stamp of re a so n " on c e r t a i n a s p e c t
of i n v e n t i v e power o n ly . I t i s n e c e s s a r y t h e r e f o r e to keep
c a l l i n g a t t e n t i o n to " u n d e c i d a b i l i t y " as th e s t r u c t u r i n g
168
p r i n c i p l e o f t h e s t r u c t u r e , and to s u b j e c t t h i s t e r m i n i s t i c
n u c le u s to c o n s t a n t d e c o n s t r u c t i v e "bombardment" by
c h a n n e l l i n g p a r t of th e i n v e n t i v e e n erg y which t h i s v e ry
c o re g e n e r a t e s back to where i t came from. In t h i s way, i t
i s p o s s i b l e t o s u s t a i n and to a c c e l e r a t e th e r e l e a s e of
f r e s h i n v e n t i v e e n erg y , to i n t e n s i f y th e " p e r m u ta tio n and
t r a n s f o r m a t i o n " of th e s e c o n d a ry r u l e s and c o n v e n tio n s , and
to d i v e r s i f y , p r o l i f e r a t e and a m p lify d i s c u r s i v e p r a c t i c e s .
Such a c o n c e p tio n i s q u i n t e s s e n t i a 11y r h e t o r i c a l . As has
been p o i n te d o u t, D e r r i d a ’s em phasis on " u n d e c i d a b i l i t y " or
" in d e te rm in a c y " a s t h a t which makes c h o ic e p o s s i b l e and
hence a s th e e n a b l in g c o n d i t i o n of "sp eakin g" and
" d i s c u s s i n g " i s s i m i l a r to th e em phasis made by
r h e t o r i c i a n s from A r i s t o t l e to Kenneth Burke on p r o b a b i 1i t y
or ambigui t y as th e e n a b l in g c o n d i t i o n of r h e t o r i c a l
i n v e n t i o n . In h i s s u g g e s t i o n t h a t " a l l language and a l l
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n a r e p r o b le m a tic " and t h a t a q u i z z i c a l look
i n t o th e c e n t r a l p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s of our own i n v e n t i o n would
y i e l d new en ergy f o r g r e a t e r m o b i l i t y and more
t r a n s f o r m a t i o n in i n v e n t i o n , we f i n d an u n m is ta k a b le
p a r a l l e l w ith P e re lm a n ’s view t h a t th e "commonplaces,"
a b o u t which we seem to have a g e n e r a l c o n se n s u s, a c t u a l l y
"co n c e rn v a g u e , sc ram b led , c o n t r o v e r s i a l n o t i o n s from which
one c an n o t draw co nsequ ences w ith o u t se e k in g to c l a r i f y
them ." Perelm an d i s t i n g u i s h e s betw een a t r u t h - s e e k i n g
169
p h i l o s o p h i c a l d i s c o u r s e t h a t s t a r t s from " u n c o n tr o v e r te d
a x io m s," and a c o p i a - o r i e n t e d r h e t o r i c a l d i s c o u r s e t h a t
s t a r t s from "commonplaces," th o s e "scram b led " hence
p r o b l e m a t i z a b l e a g re e m e n ts which te n d to g e n e r a t e
d i s a g r e e m e n ts in t h e i r v e ry " c l a r i f i c a t i o n . " What
D e r r i d a ’s co n cep t of d e c o n s t r u c t i o n aims a t i s p r e c i s e l y to
p r e v e n t th e "commonplaces" from prom o tin g th e m se lv e s to th e
s t a t u s of " u n c o n t r o v e r te d axioms" and th u s r e s t r i c t i n g the
f u l l r e l e a s e of " i n v e n t i v e pow er." I t i s in t h i s
commitment to th e r h e t o r i c a l id e a l of c o p ia t h a t we f i n d
t h e u l t i m a t e j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r s e e i n g d e c o n s t r u c t i o n as an
" a f f i r m a t i v e " i n v e n t i v e p r o j e c t and f o r lo o k in g upon
D e r r id a as a m ajor r h e t o r i c a l t h e o r i s t of our tim e.
"One must i n v e n t , ” D e r r id a d e c l a r e s , "not so much
c r e a t e , im agine, p ro d u ce , i n s t i t u t e , bu t r a t h e r i n v e n t ."
And i t i s " i n th e i n t e r v a l betw een t h e s e m eanings ( i n v e n t ,
c r e a t e ; i n v e n t , im agine; in v e n t p ro d u ce ; i n v e n t , i n s t i t u t e ;
e t c . ) t h a t th e u n iq u e n e s s of t h i s d e s i r e t o in v e n t d w e lls"
( D e r r id a Reader 2 1 8 ). D e s p ite h i s i n s i g h t t h a t th e
" d e s i r e " ( m o t i v a t i o n , e n erg y , f o r c e ) to in v e n t "dw ells"
o n ly in th e d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n of " in v e n t i o n " from " c r e a t e "
or "im agine" on t h e one hand and "produce" or " d is c o v e r " on
th e o t h e r , and d e s p i t e h i s aw aren ess t h a t i n v e n t i o n
in v o lv e s b o th " c o n t r a c t s of a g reem en ts" and d if f d r a n c e ,
D e r r id a does not seem to have a p p l i e d h i m s e l f v i g o r o u s l y
170
enough to d i s t i n g u i s h i n g among " i n v e n t i o n , " " c r e a t i o n " and
" d is c o v e ry " a s a c r u c i a l t h e o r e t i c a l i s s u e , and in h i s own
r h e t o r i c a l p r a c t i c e , he i s f r e q u e n t l y c a r r i e d away by h i s
d e s i r e e i t h e r to " d is c o v e r " what is "always a l r e a d y " t h e r e
o r to " c r e a t e " som ething e n t i r e l y new, t h a t i s , to r e a f f i r m
o r r e i n s t i t u t e som ething beyond and above th e s u b j e c t i v e
and f i c k l e d o x a i , a s Habermas does w ith h i s t h e o r y of
com m unicative a c t i o n , or to c o n s t r u c t a r a d i c a l l y d i f f e r e n t
" c o n c e p tu a l and i n s t i t u t i o n a l s t r u c t u r e of i n v e n tio n " t h a t
s h a r e s n o t h in g w ith th e e x i s t i n g sy s te m s, a s R orty
a d v o c a te s in h i s v i s i o n of a v o c a b u la r y s h i f t . For a l l h i s
p r o t e s t a t i o n s to th e c o n t r a r y , D e r r id a seems to c h e r i s h th e
n o t i o n of c e r t i t u d e and o b j e c t i v i t y in d i s c u r s i v e
p r o d u c t i o n , and t h i s s e c r e t commitment m a n i f e s t s i t s e l f in
seem in g ly c o n t r a d i c t o r y ways. On th e one hand, he keeps
c a l l i n g a t t e n t i o n to what he s e e s as th e n e c e s s a r y
o m nipresence of th e dom inant system of m e ta p h y s ic s .
P h i l o s o p h i c a l d i s c o u r s e "has alw ays i n s i s t e d upon a s s u r i n g
i t s e l f m a s te ry ov er th e l i m i t . . . I t s own l i m i t had n o t
to rem ain f o r e i g n to i t . " I t has "always i n s i s t e d upon
t h i s : t h i n k i n g i t s o t h e r . " And one should know b e t t e r th a n
to a tt e m p t "to s e p a r a t e o n e s e l f ” from p h ilo s o p h y " i n th e
d i r e c t i o n of th e a b s o l u t e e x t e r i o r i t y of a n o th e r p la c e " so
a s " to d e s c r i b e and d e c ry i t s law," f o r " e x t e r i o r i t y and
a l t e r i t y a r e c o n c e p ts which by th em se lv e s have n e v er
171
s u r p r i s e d p h i l o s o p h i c a l d i s c o u r s e " ( M argins of P h ilo so p h y
x i i - x i i i ) . On th e o t h e r hand, he i n s i s t s t h a t th e term s
t h a t make up h i s own d e c o n s t r u c t i v e " v o c a b u la r y ," such a s
d iffF ra n c e , t r a c e , su p p le m e n t, i t e r a b i l i t y , a r e "more
g e n e r a l , c l a s s i c a l l y one would say more ‘ f u n d a m e n ta l’ ," a s
th e y d e s i g n a t e "a s o r t of i r r e d u c i b l e d i v i s i b i l i t y "
( L im ite d In c 152). E njo ying t h i s v e ry s p e c i a l s t a t u s as a
s e t of c o u n t e r - t e r m s d e s i g n a t i n g th e "fundam ental" or th e
" u l t i m a t e " (b e c a u se " i r r e d u c i b l e " ) d i v i s i b i l i t y , th e y
th e m se lv e s a r e immune from th e k in d of c o n c e p t u a l i z a t i o n ,
p r o b l e m a t i z a t i o n , and d e c o n s t r u c t i o n to which a l l th e
" c o n t i n g e n t , " " h i s t o r i c i z e d " p h i l o s o p h i c a l c o n c e p ts a r e
s u b j e c t e d , and th e y a r e th u s a b l e to o r g a n i z e a
" t h e o r e t i c a l s p a c e " of t h e i r own i n a
q u a s i ' - t r a n s c e n d e n t a l manner" ( L im ite d In c 127). What
t h e s e two s e l f - c o n t r a d i c t o r y p o s i t i o n s have in common i s a
b e l i e f in a c o n c e p tu a l c o rp u s t o which one has to a g re e ,
w i l l y - n i l l y , whenever she t r i e s to say a n y th in g , or a
r h e t o r i c a l h o r i z o n from which t h e r e can be no e s c a p e , and
w i t h i n which e v e r y t h i n g i s " p r e - i n t e r p r e t e d ." The way
D e r r id a se e s i t , d e c o n s t r u c t i o n i s som ething which
" im p o s e tsl i t s e l f on u s . " I t j u s t " ta k e s p l a c e . " I t is
"an e v e n t t h a t does n o t a w a it th e d e l i b e r a t i o n ,
c o n s c i o u s n e s s , or o r g a n i z a t i o n of a s u b j e c t , or even of
m o d e r n i ty ” ( D e r r id a Reader 274). P ro b a b ly unknown to th e
172
a r c h - d e c o n s t r u c t i o n i s t h i m s e l f , t h e r e f o r e , t h e c o n c e p tu a l
c o re of d e c o n s t r u c t i o n i s m i s t h r e a t e n i n g t o h a rd e n i n t o a
c o u n t e r - c e n t e r which has n e v e r t h e l e s s th e same e f f e c t of
making th e p e rm u t a t i o n and t r a n s f o r m a t i o n o f d i s c u r s i v e
e le m e n ts im p o s s ib le .
These c o u n t e r - t e r m s , m oreover, a r e s a i d to be
d i f f e r e n t in k in d from a l l term s c u r r e n t l y in u sa g e,
b e ca u se th e y a r e "not e n t i r e l y words or c o n c e p ts " or th ey
a r e " a c o n c e p tu a l c o n c e p t [ s i or a n o th e r k in d of c o n c e p t,
h e te r o g e n e o u s to th e p h i l o s o p h i c a l co n cep t of th e con cep t"
( L im ited Inc 11 7-118). A " t e r m i n i s t i c s c r e e n " made up of
t h e s e n o n -c o n c e p ts i s t h e r e f o r e a R orty an "new v o c a b u la ry "
t h a t has n o th in g w h atso ev er in common w ith th e e x i s t i n g
s c r e e n s , and we a r e th u s rem inded of th e o p p o s i t e ten den cy
to c r e a t e r a t h e r th a n t o in v e n t in D e r r i d a ' s d i s c u r s i v e
p r a c t i c e s . D e r r id a i s q u i t e c e r t a i n t h a t to a tt e m p t a
d e c o n s t r u c t i o n w ith o u t "changing t e r r a i n " i s to r i s k
" c e a s e l e s s l y " c o n f ir m in g , c o n s o l i d a t i n g , r e l i f t i n g . . . t h a t
which one a l l e g e d l y d e c o n s t r u c t s " ( M argins of P h ilo so p h y
135). While he h a r b o r s no i l l u s i o n abo ut th e p o s s i b i l i t y
to "change t e r r a i n , in a d i s c o n t i n u o u s and i r r u p t i v e
f a s h i o n , by b r u t a l l y p l a c i n g o n e s e l f o u t s i d e , and by
a f f i r m i n g an a b s o l u t e b rea k and d i f f e r e n c e , " he seems t o be
making th e same e f f o r t s which he says a r e doomed to
f u t i l i t y . J u s t as h i s c la im in g of a v e ry unique
173
a c o n c e p t u a l . n o n - t e r m i n i s t i c n a t u r e f o r h i s s p e c i a l l e x ic o n
im p lie s e x a c t l y such an a tt e m p t f o r an " a b s o l u t e b r e a k , " so
h i s c h a r a c t e r i s t i c e l o c u t i o f r e q u e n t l y shows a r a d i c a l
d i s r e g a r d f o r th e s t y l i s t i c norms which c o n s t i t u t e an
e s s e n t i a l p a r t of what he term s th e " c o n t r a c t of
a g r e e m e n t s . ” He c a l l s f o r "a change of ' s t y l e ' a s "what we
n e e d ” in o r d e r to a v o id " s i n k i n g i n to th e a u tis m of th e
c l o s u r e " (M argins of P h ilo s o p h y 135), and in h i s w r i t i n g ,
a s B a rb ara Johnson p o i n t s o u t , he "mimes th e movement of
d e s i r e r a t h e r th a n i t s f u l f i l l m e n t , r e f u s i n g to s t o p and
t o t a l i z e i t s e l f , or d o in g so on ly by feint."*®
S t y l i s t i c a l l y , Johnson n o t e s , D e r r id a "does n o t conform to
t r a d i t i o n a l b i n a r y n o t i o n s of ' c l a r i t y ' " and " c o n s t a n t l y
f r u s t r a t e s th e d e s i r e to ' g e t to th e p o in t* " w ith f e a t u r e s
r a n g in g from "u n sp e ak a b le grammar," " m u l t i p l e c o h e r e n c e s ,"
"n o n b in ary lo g ic " to h a v in g i n t r o d u c t i o n s and c o n c l u s i o n s
" c r y p t i c a l l y l i t e r a r y , a lm o st l y r i c a l . " * 7 J o h n s o n ’s
c h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n i s co nfirm ed by th e e x p e r ie n c e of th e
m a j o r i t y o f D e r r i d a ’ s r e a d e r s , i n c l u d i n g h i g h l y
s o p h i s t i c a t e d r e a d e r s not u n s y m p a th e tic to th e D e r r id e a n
p r o j e c t . R o rty f o r one o b s e r v e s t h a t "th e l a t e r D e r r id a
p r i v a t i z e s h i s p h i l o s o p h i c a l t h i n k i n g . . . He sim p ly d ro p s
t h e o r y — th e a tte m p t to see h i s p r e d e c e s s o r s s t e a d i l y and
whole— in fa v o r of f a n t a s i z i n g a b o u t th o s e p r e d e c e s s o r s ,
p l a y i n g w ith them, g i v in g f r e e r e i n to th e t r a i n s of
174
f Q
a s s o c i a t i o n s th e y p r o d u c e R o r t y se e s such " f a n t a s i z i n g "
as th e c u lm i n a t io n of an e f f o r t to " c r e a t e a s t y l e so
d i f f e r e n t a s to make o n e ’s books incom m ensurable w ith th o se
of o n e ’s p r e c u r s o r s , " and he t a k e s D e r r i d a ’ s im portance to
" l i e in h i s h av in g had th e co urag e to g i v e up th e a tte m p t
to u n i t e th e p r i v a t e and th e p u b l i c , to s t o p t r y i n g to
b r i n g t o g e t h e r a q u e s t f o r p r i v a t e autonomy and an a tte m p t
a t p u b l i c re s o n a n c e and u t i l i t y . " * 9
R o r t y ’ s comments a r e of p a r t i c u l a r p e r t i n e n c e because
in i d e n t i f y i n g D e r r id a a s th e v e ry epitom e o f a w i l l to
" c r e a t e " a t o t a l l y "incom m ensurable" v o c a b u la r y or to
" p r i v a t i z e " th e d i s c o u r s e , he shows th e e x t e n t to which
D e r r id a has o s c i l l a t e d , a t tim e s , t o th e " c r e a t i o n " s i d e of
d i s c o u r s e p r o d u c t i o n o r has f o r g o t t e n a l l a bo ut th e
p r i n c i p l e of i d e n t i f i c a t i o n w ith h i s a u d ie n c e . To
" p r i v a t i z e " th e d i s c o u r s e , a s R orty has s t r e s s e d
r e p e a t e d l y , i s to r e j e c t c o m p le te ly a l l th e g e n e r a l l y
a c c e p te d " c r i t e r i a " o r what D e r r id a h i m s e l f d e f i n e s as th e
d i s c u r s i v e norms to which we must a l l s u b m i t - - t h e s e t of
norms, t h a t i s , which " r e q u i r e s one to p ro v e, to
d e m o n s tr a te , to p ro ce ed c o r r e c t l y , to conform t o th e r u l e s
of language and to a g r e a t number of o t h e r s o c i a l , e t h i c a l ,
p o l i t i c a l - i n s t i t u t i o n a l r u l e s . " In r e j e c t i n g t h e s e norms,
one v e n t u r e s beyond th e " s t a t u t o r y l i m i t s " o r shows a t o t a l
d i s r e g a r d f o r th e e n t i r e "environm ent of r e c e p t i o n . " Such
175
a t r a n s g r e s s i v e a c t , a c c o rd in g to D e r r id a h i m s e l f , can
n e v er go un p u n ish e d . The a u d ie n c e i s p u z z le d and
a n ta g o n iz e d and th e " c o n t r a c t of a g reem en ts" d e l i b e r a t e l y
b re a c h e d when, f o r example, " p a r e n t h e s e s go on f o r pages"
in some of D e r r i d a ’s t e x t , and th e r e a d e r s a r e l e f t to
g r a p p l e u n a id e d w ith a " m o b i l i z a t i o n of unnamed s o u r c e s and
2fl
a d d r e s s e e s . " What r e s u l t s , a s D e r r id a h im s e l f o b s e r v e s ,
is "a s i t u a t i o n t h a t i s u n f o r t u n a t e l y t y p i c a l — and
p o l i t i c a l l y v e ry s e r i o u s , " a s i t u a t i o n in which everyw here,
" i n p a r t i c u l a r in th e U n ite d S t a t e s and in Europe, th e
s e 1f - d e c l a r e d phi 1o s o p h e r s , t h e o r e t i c i a n s , and i d e o l o g i s t s
of com m unication, d i a l o g u e , and c o n se n su s, of u n i v o c i t y and
t r a n s p a r e n c y . . . excu se th e m se lv e s from a t t e n t i v e l y r e a d in g
and l i s t e n i n g ” to him w h ile d i s t o r t i n g th e meaning o f h i s
t e x t s and making " f a l s e " a c c u s a t i o n s a g a i n s t him, such as
th e one made by Habermas t h a t " in h i s b u s i n e s s of
d e c o n s t r u c t i o n , D e r r id a does no t p ro ceed a n a l y t i c a l l y , "
i n s t e a d , he "p ro ceed s by a c r i t i q u e of s t y l e ” ( L im ited Inc
157). I n s t e a d l a r g e l y of a case of a " p r i v a t e " d i s c o u r s e
a s p i r i n g f o r " p u b lic " a c c e p ta n c e y e t f a i l i n g to g e t i t s e l f
a c r o s s to th e a u d ie n c e , D e r r id a se e s in t h e s i t u a t i o n a
d e l i b e r a t e , pol i t i c a l ly m o tiv a te d m is r e a d in g and d i s t o r t i o n
on th e p a r t of c o n s e r v a t i v e r e a d e r s h o s t i l e to h i s
p o s i t i o n , or in h i s own te rm s, of a " c o r p o r a t io n " of
r e a d e r s "who a r e not e x a c t l y consumed by th e d e s i r e to
176
u n d e rs ta n d me or in any c a se to approve of me" ( L im ited Inc
111). Yet i t i s an e x tr e m e ly odd t e x t which p re s u p p o se s as
a c o n d i t i o n f o r i t s " c o r r e c t ” i n t e r p r e t a t i o n a r e a d e r
"consumed by th e d e s i r e to u n d e rs ta n d " and w i l l i n g to g r a n t
her ap p ro v a l anyway, j u s t a s i t i s an e x tre m e ly odd
r h e t o r i c i a n who r e q u i r e s t h a t an a u d ie n c e be made up of h e r
bel i e v e r s o n ly as a p r e c o n d i t i o n f o r th e s u c c e s s of her
" p e r s u a s i o n . " S c h o la r s such as R o rty and B a rb ara Johnson
h a r d l y f i t i n to th e c a t e g o r y of th e h o s t i l e a u d ie n c e . And
i f , as D e r r id a p o i n t s o u t in a d i s c u s s i o n on th e
" m is u n d e rs ta n d in g " of h i s view, " th e most f e r o c i o u s
c r i t i c s " of h i s work, who " r e a c t vehem ently and
p a s s i o n a t e l y and sometimes w ith h a t r e d , ” o f t e n " u n d e rs ta n d
more th a n [ h i s ] s u p p o r t e r s d o ” ( " JAC I n te r v ie w " 20) th e n
th e " m i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n " or " m is u n d e rs ta n d in g " of h i s t e x t s
does n o t seem to be c o n fin e d to th e c o n s e r v a t i v e camp o n ly .
R a th e r , i t i s " u n f o r t u n a t e l y t y p i c a l " of th e r e a d i n g p u b l i c
as a whole, and such w id e sp re a d " m i s c o n s t r u a l " r a i s e s
s e r i o u s doubt as to w hether or n ot he su c c e e d s in c r e a t i n g
a " g e n u in e ly " new d i s c o u r s e . A d i s c o u r s e does no t e x i s t in
p r i n t , nor does i t e x i s t in a b s t r a c t . I t s v e ry e x i s t e n c e
i s p r e d i c a t e d on i t s a c c e p ta n c e by a community of r e a d e r s .
A g e n u in e i n v e n t i o n i s , in t h i s s e n s e , alw ays a s u c c e s s f u l
p e r s u a s i o n which can n e v er be e f f e c t e d w ith o u t p a y in g th e
177
c l o s e s t a t t e n t i o n to what D e r r id a th e r h e t o r i c i a n has
c o r r e c t l y d e f i n e d as th e " c o n t r a c t of a g re e m e n ts ."
In D e r r id a , t h e r e f o r e , we have a t r i n i t y of a
" d i s c o v e r e r " b e n t on b r i n g i n g to l i g h t some o b s c u re " t r u t h "
which i s n e v e r t h e l e s s "always a lr e a d y " t h e r e , a " c r e a t o r "
engaged in b u i l d i n g a " p r i v a t e " d i s c o u r s e o u t of
t e r m i n i s t i c m a t e r i a l s n e v e r b e f o r e in e x i s t e n c e , and an
i n v e n t o r t r y i n g to b r i n g ab ou t som ething new w i t h i n th e
" s t a t u t o r y l i m i t s " s e t by th e d i s c o u r s e community. These
f a c e t s p r e s e n t th e m se lv e s in such a m in d -b o g g iin g
p h a n ta sm a g o ria a s o f t e n to b a f f l e our a tt e m p t to c a p t u r e
th e " t r u e f e a t u r e s " of th e m a s te r d e c o n s t r u c t i o n i s t .
G regory Ulmer, in a move s i m i l a r to what R o rty has ta k e n ,
l o c a t e s D e r r i d a ’s g e n u in e and most s i g n i f i c a n t " i n v e n tio n "
in a body of s t y l i s t i c a l l y d e v i a n t t e x t s . F in d in g in t h e s e
t e x t s "a program a s d i f f e r e n t from t r a d i t i o n a l academ ic
d i s c o u r s e and a ssu m p tio n s a s i t is p r o d u c t i v e in i t s own
term s of knowledge and i n s i g h t , " Ulmer c o n c lu d e s t h a t
" [ t h i s k in d o f] w r i t i n g . . . i s no t a method o f a n a l y s i s or
c r i t i c i s m bu t of i n v e n t i o n (and h e r e W ritin g d e p a r t s from
21
d e c o n s t r u c t i o n ) . From such a p o s i t i o n D e r r id a d i s t a n c e s
h im s e l f f i r m l y though p o l i t e l y when he s u g g e s t s t h a t
a lt h o u g h he " g r e a t l y a d m i r e t s ] " Ulmer, th e l a t t e r a c t u a l l y
"moves v e ry f a r f r o m . . . t h e [D e rrid e a n ] p re m ise s" in h i s
A pp lied Grammatology ( " JAC I n te r v ie w " 9 ). D e r r id a r e f u s e s
178
to approve o f U lm er’s p e r s p e c t i v e a p p a r e n t l y b e ca u se in
p i t t i n g "W ritin g " a g a i n s t " d e c o n s t r u c t i o n , " th e l a t t e r
f a i l s to se e t h a t " d e c o n s t r u c t i o n i s i n v e n t i v e or i t is
n o t h i n g . " And y e t i t i s obv io us a l s o t h a t what Ulmer has
d e f i n e d a s th e i n v e n t i o - o r i e n t e d "W ritin g " i s a c t u a l l y th e
l e a s t r h e t o r i c a l and hence th e l e a s t i n v e n t i v e p a r t of th e
e n t i r e D e r r id e a n c o rp u s . The h i g h l y i d i o s y n c r a t i c s t y l e
f a i l s to "produce r u l e s — o t h e r c o n v e n t io n s — f o r new
p e r f o r m a t i v e s , " as D e r r id a say s a g e n u in e i n v e n t i o n sh o u ld .
These s t y l i s t i c i d i o s y n c r a s i e s f a i l to g e t i m i t a t e d even in
w r i t i n g s of h i s a d m ir e r s and s u p p o r t e r s , and th e y th u s f a i l
to s e t up new "c o n v e n tio n s " f o r d i s c u r s i v e i n v e n t i o n .
R a th e r , th e y ten d to a l i e n a t e o r even a n ta g o n iz e th e
a u d ie n c e in g e n e r a l and to t u r n them o f f from " a t t e n t i v e l y
r e a d in g and l i s t e n i n g to" him. In miming th e "movement of
d e s i r e r a t h e r th a n i t s f u l f i l l m e n t " th ro u g h , f o r example,
having " p a r e n t h e s e s go on f o r pages" or h a v in g a s e n te n c e
s t a r t on p . 319 and end on p . 323 of D i s s e m i n a t i o n . D e r r id a
seems to grow o b l i v i o u s of th e p a r a d o x i c a l im p e r a tiv e t h a t
in o r d e r to s u s t a i n i t s "movement," d e s i r e has to " ta k e a
r e s t " from tim e t o tim e or to be s a t i s f i e d a t i n t e r v a l s .
What is abandoned h e re in c l u d e s a l s o D e r r i d a ’s fa v o re d
s t r a t e g y of b orrow in g from th e system th e r e s o u r c e s
n e c e s s a r y f o r t h e r e c o n s t r u c t i o n ( r e - i n v e n t i o n ? ) of t h a t
v e ry system . When b o th th e " c o n c e p tu a l and i n s t i t u t i o n a l "
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a ssu m p tio n s and th e s t y l i s t i c norms of t h e "system" a r e
s i m u lt a n e o u s ly and r a d i c a l l y r e j e c t e d , where a r e th e
" r e s o u r c e s " to be borrowed? When no b a s i s of
i d e n t i f i c a t i o n e x i s t s f o r a p e r s u a s i o n or a c o n v e r s i o n , how
can th e " sy s te m ," lo c a te d in nowhere b ut th e mind of th e
a u d ie n c e , be e f f e c t i v e l y " d e c o n s t r u c te d " ?
A nother c a se e x e m p lif y in g th e d i f f i c u l t y of t r y i n g to
c h a r a c t e r i z e D e r r id a i s found in H aberm as’ s o b s e r v a t i o n
t h a t " D e rrid a i s p a r t i c u l a r l y i n t e r e s t e d in s t a n d i n g th e
prim acy of l o g i c over r h e t o r i c . . . on i t s h e a d , " ^ which is
a g a i n d e n ie d by D e r r id a h im s e lf who c h a l l e n g e s Habermas to
prove th e p r e s e n c e in h i s work of t h e "prim acy of
r h e t o r i c , " c o n te n d in g t h a t " c o n t r a r y to what some peo ple
t h i n k I t h i n k — f o r i n s t a n c e , Habermas— I would be on th e
s i d e of p h ilo s o p h y , l o g i c , t r u t h , r e f e r e n c e , e t c . ” and t h a t
when "I q u e s t i o n phi l o s o p h y . . . i t i s no t in th e name of
s o p h i s t i c s [ i n th e se n se t h a t P l a t o wanted t o d e f i n e them]"
("JAC I n te rv ie w " 16). To th e e x t e n t t h a t D e r r id a has
dropped c o n v e n tio n a l l o g i c in f a v o r of what B a rb ara Johnson
term s "n o n b in ary lo g ic " in many of h i s w r i t i n g s and has
d e c l a r e d t h a t d e c o n s t r u c t i o n i s i n v e n t i o n , t h e r e does seem
to be c o n c l u s i v e e v id e n c e t h a t D e rrid a h as r e v e r s e d th e
t r a d i t i o n a l h i e r a r c h y of th e l o g i c / r h e t o r i c o p p o s i t i o n .
Yet i t is obv iou s t h a t in r e j e c t i n g H aberm as’s comment and
c la im in g h i s s o l i d a r i t y w ith " p h ilo s o p h y ," D e r r id a i s not
180
so much to deny th e a f f i n i t y of h i s tho u g h t to r h e t o r i c as
such a s to t r y to fend o f f th e a c c u s a t i o n t h a t he i s
p r e a c h in g a f r e e - w h e e l i n g b ran d of a n t i - f o u d a t i o n a l i s m and
r e l a t i v i s m , or a com plete t e r m i n i s t i c " f r e e p l a y , " a t th e
expense of a c o n c e p tu a l and d i s c u r s i v e s t a b i l i t y s i g n i f i e d
t r a d i t i o n a l l y by such term s a s " p h ilo s o p h y ," " r e f e r e n c e , "
" l o g ic " and " t r u t h . " What he d i s t a n c e s h im s e l f from, in
o t h e r words, i s th e s o p h i s t i c a l r h e t o r i c a s i s d e s c r i b e d by
P l a t o . D e s p ite h i s p r o f e s s e d s o l i d a r i t y w ith th e
t r a d i t i o n a l c o n c e p tio n of " p h i lo s o p h y ," t h e r e i s no denying
th e f a c t t h a t h i s o v e r r i d i n g c o n c e rn w ith i n v e n t i o n or w ith
i t s c o n d i t i o n s of p o s s i b i l i t y h as s e n s i t i z e d him, a t l e a s t
in th e o r y , to b o th th e need to have a r e l a t i v e s t a b i l i t y in
th e form of a " c o n t r a c t of a g reem en ts" b in d in g th e a u th o r
to h i s a u d ie n c e , and th e need to keep a " p r o c e s s of
p e r m u t a t i o n and t r a n s f o r m a t i o n " going by p r o b l e m a t i z i n g th e
o ld "convent i o n s ."
When th e r h e t o r i c i a n in him g e t s th e upper hand over
th e " p h ilo s o p h e r " or th e " c r e a t i v e w r i t e r , ” th e two o t h e r
s i d e s of h i s m u l t i - f a c e t e d d i s c u r s i v e ego, he even comes to
th e c o n s c io u s r e a l i z a t i o n t h a t sym bolic p r o d u c t i o n i s
p e r s u a s i v e in n a t u r e , t h a t we p e rs u a d e , as Burke t e l l s u s,
o n ly in so f a r as we can t a l k th e a u d i e n c e ’s "lan g u a g e by
sp e ec h , g e s t u r e , t o n a l i t y , o r d e r , image," i d e n t i f y i n g our
ways w ith t h e i r s :
181
Whenever one f e e l s o b l ig e d to s to p [ f o llo w in g
th e c o n v e n tio n s ] (as happens to me when I speak
of d i f f d r a n c e , of mark, of su p p le m e n t, of
i t e r a b i l i t y and of a l l th e y e n t a i l ) , i t is
b e t t e r to make e x p l i c i t in th e most c o n c e p tu a l,
r i g o r o u s , f o r m a l i z i n g and p e d a g o g ic a l manner
p o s s i b l e th e re a s o n s one has f o r d oin g so, f o r
th u s changing th e r u l e s and th e c o n te x t of
d i s c o u r s e . T h is is b e t t e r f o r th o u g h t and f o r
th e r e l a t i o n to th e o t h e r , th e two of which I do
n ot s e p a r a t e h e re : n e i t h e r from each o t h e r nor
from th e " e x p e rie n c e " of d i f f S r a n c e . ( L im ited
Inc 117).
C l e a r l y im p lied in th e s u g g e s t i o n t h a t " th o u g h t" and
th e " r e l a t i o n to th e o t h e r " a r e i n s e p a r a b l e i s th e
r h e t o r i c a l p r i n c i p l e t h a t th e p r o d u c t i o n o f d i s c o u r s e i s
n e c e s s a r i l y o r i e n t e d tow ard th e a u d ie n c e , and to say t h a t
"changing th e r u l e s " r e q u i r e s " re a s o n s " e x p l i c i t l y
u n d e r s t a n d a b le and a c c e p t a b l e to th e a u d ie n c e i s to s t r e s s
th e need f o r th e d e c o n s t r u c t i o n - c u m - i n v e n t i o n to p ro ceed
from a b a s i s of a g re em e n ts. D e rr id a does no t make e x p l i c i t
what i t i s t h a t " o b lig e s " us to change th e " r u l e s , " y e t in
view of what we have found in h i s w r i t i n g s , i t is u n l i k e l y
t h a t he would have in h i s mind e i t h e r "a w i l l to t r u t h " or
any c o m p e llin g moral i m p e r a t i v e . He m ig ht, in a l l
l i k e l i h o o d , have sh a re d w ith Perelm an th e b e l i e f t h a t i t is
u l t i m a t e l y th e need to in v e n t t h a t " o b l ig e s " us to v i o l a t e
th e g e n e r a l l y a g re e d -u p o n "ways." J u s t a s Perelm an ta k e s
an i n t e r e s t in th e r h e t o r i c a l i m p l i c a t i o n of th e g e n e ra l
a ssu m p tio n t h a t a change in meaning r e q u i r e s j u s t i f i c a t i o n ,
and " th e b u rden of p ro o f b e f a l l s th e opponent to the
182
custom ary m ea n in g ," so D e r r id a might f i n d i n h i s o p p o s i t i o n
a g a i n s t th e "c o n v e n tio n s " th e " o r i g i n a r y e v en t" which not
o n ly le a d s to th e a r t i c u l a t i o n of th e " r e a s o n s ” by th e
"opponent" of th e norms, b u t " s e r v e s above a l l as an
i n v i t a t i o n to o t h e r s , in th e c o u rs e of a d i s c u s s i o n t h a t is
b o th open and y e t to come” ( L im ited Inc 111). T here is
th u s an a d d i t i o n a l se n se in which d e c o n s t r u c t i o n can be
u n d e rs to o d as " i n v e n t i v e " : i t i s meant to in v o lv e o t h e r
i n t e r l o c u t o r s and t o provoke d i f f e r i n g o p i n io n s in th e
i n t e r e s t of p ro d u c in g an abundance of a rg u m e n ts.
183
E p ilo g u e : Toward a New Copia of Words and I d e a s
R e f l e c t i n g on h i s own way of r e d e s c r i b i n g l o g ic ,
S teph en Toulmin t e l l s h i s r e a d e r s in th e " I n t r o d u c t i o n " to
The Uses of Argument t h a t what he w i l l be d oing th ro u g h o u t
th e stu d y i s "to r a i s e prob lem s, no t to s o lv e them, t o draw
a t t e n t i o n to a f i e l d of i n q u i r y , r a t h e r th a n to su rv e y i t
f u l l y ; and to provoke d i s c u s s i o n r a t h e r th a n to
[ o f f e r ] a s y s t e m a t i c t r e a t i s e . " He c a u t i o n s them a g a i n s t
e x p e c ti n g to f i n d in th e book a n y th in g o t h e r th a n some
t r i a l b a l l o o n s " d esig n ed to draw f i r e of o t h e r s . " And
a p p a r e n t l y in a n t i c i p a t i o n of th e kind of o u t r a g e h i s
q u e s t i o n i n g of th e co ncept of a " u n i v e r s a l " l o g ic would
have l a t e r provoked, he d e c l a r e s t h a t "I s h a l l have
f u l f i l l e d my p u rp o se i f my r e s u l t s a r e found s u g g e s t i v e .
I f th ey a r e a l s o found p ro v o k in g , so much th e b e t t e r " (1 ).
While th e to ne of t h e s e op ening rem arks may be
s e l f - a s s e r t i v e and d e f i a n t , th e p o s t u r e Toulmin assumes
h e re is d e f e n s i v e . And t h i s u n e asy dou ble g e s t u r e is
r e n d e r e d more p a l p a b l e in th e "C onclusion" of th e book
where he, w h ile c o n ti n u i n g to draw a t t e n t i o n to h i s
" e x p e rim e n ta l i n c u r s i o n s , " f i n d s i t n e c e s s a r y to a d d r e s s
l u r k in g d o u b ts abo ut th e a p p r o p r i a t e n e s s of h i s a p p ro a ch :
184
The f i r s t , i n d i s p e n s a b l e s t e p s in any
p h i l o s o p h i c a l i n q u i r y a r e l i a b l e to seem
e n t i r e l y n e g a t i v e , b o th in i n t e n t i o n and in
e f f e c t . D i s t i n c t i o n s a r e made, o b j e c t i o n s a r e
p r e s s e d , a c c e p te d d o c t r i n e s a r e found w an tin g ,
and such a p p e a ra n c e of o r d e r a s t h e r e was in th e
f i e l d i s d e s t r o y e d , and w hat, a s k s a c r i t i c , can
be th e use of t h a t ? . . .
In t h e s e p r e s e n t i n q u i r i e s , . . . we may
seem to have been p re o c c u p ie d e n t i r e l y w ith
n e g a t i v e q u e s t i o n s . . . But, i f t h i s has been
so , i t i s no t from any love of d i s t i n c t i o n s and
o b j e c t i o n s f o r t h e i r own sa k e s . I f a l l were
well (and c l e a r l y w e l l ) in p h i l o s o p h i c a l l o g ic ,
t h e r e would be no p o i n t in embarking on th e s e
i n v e s t i g a t i o n s : our ex cuse l i e s in th e
c o n v i c t i o n t h a t a r a d i c a l r e - o r d e r i n g of l o g ic a l
th e o r y is needed in o r d e r to b r i n g i t more
n e a r l y i n t o l i n e w ith c r i t i c a l p r a c t i c e , and our
j u s t i f i c a t i o n w i l l come o n ly i f th e d i s t i n c t i o n s
and o b j e c t i o n s i n s i s t e d on h e re b r i n g such a
r e - o r d e r i n g n e a r e r . (253)
Toulmin c o n c e d e s— and y e t in so d o in g c a l l s f u r t h e r
a t t e n t i o n to th e f a c t — t h a t h i s i s a " n e g a tiv e " app roach
b e n t on making " d i s t i n c t i o n s and o b j e c t i o n s , " b re a k in g down
" a n a l o g ie s and c o n n e c t i o n s , " o v e rth ro w in g "ac c ep ted
d o c t r i n e s " and d e s t r o y i n g th e "ap p e a ra n c e of o r d e r . " I f
h i s c o n c e s s io n s u g g e s ts t h a t he i s no t unaware of th e
i l l i c i t , t r a n s g r e s s i v e n a t u r e of such an ap p ro a ch , he
s ta n d s n e v e r t h e l e s s by h i s chosen c o u rs e of a c t i o n when he
i n s i s t s t h a t th e a s k in g of " n e g a t iv e q u e s t i o n s " i s an
" i n d i s p e n s a b l e " and " i n e v i t a b l e " s t e p in any p h i l o s o p h i c a l
i n q u ir y . As he s t r u g g l e s to f i n d an "excuse" f o r an
u n c o n v e n tio n a l d i s c u r s i v e p r a c t i c e , which he seems to be
t o u t i n g th e same tim e , i t becomes i n c r e a s i n g l y c l e a r t h a t
185
he i s t o r n by what a p p e a rs to him to be two c o n f l i c t i n g
paradigm s of i n v e n t i o n in p h i l o s o p h i c a l d i s c o u r s e , or in
any d i s c o u r s e f o r t h a t m a t t e r . There i s , on th e one hand,
th e n o rm a tiv e paradigm t h a t p r i v i l e g e s a " p o s i t i v e , "
" c o n s t r u c t i v e , " " s y s te m a t i c " ap p ro a ch to d i s c u r s i v e
p r o d u c t i o n and is o r i e n t e d toward s o l v i n g w h a tev e r problem s
t h e r e may e x i s t w i t h i n t h e system so t h a t a s t a t e of
p e r f e c t i o n could e v e n t u a l l y be a c h ie v e d . D i a m e t r i c a l l y
opposed to t h i s paradigm , on th e o t h e r hand, i s th e model
t h a t r e j e c t s th e demands f o r s o l u t i o n s , c o n c l u s i o n s or
" s y s te m a t i c t r e a t i s e s " in fa v o r of r a i s i n g problem s,
r e l e a s i n g " t r i a l b a ll o o n s " or draw ing " f i r e , " w ith a
" r a d i c a l r e - o r d e r i n g " a s th e aim f o r which i t s t r i v e s . The
" r a t h e r t h a n ’s" w ith which Toulmin d e f i n e s h i s own
m ethodology in th e opening rem arks show h i s ten d e n cy to see
t h e s e two models a s m u tu a lly in c o m p a tib le or e x c l u s i v e , and
a s t r o n g d e s i r e on h i s p a r t to promote th e outlaw ed
d e c o n s t r u c t i v e mode of i n v e n t i o n . Yet h i s se n se of g u i l t
and th e m e t a - d i s c u r s i v e comments he o f f e r s s u b s e q u e n t ly in
th e "C onclusion" b o th s u g g e s t t h a t he can n ev er b rin g
h im s e l f to r e j e c t th e c o n s t r u c t i v e model o u t r i g h t , as he
does d i s c u r s i v e l y when he c h a l le n g e s th e v a l i d i t y of th e
dom inant m ath em a tica l paradigm of lo g ic and a d v o c a te s i t s
re p la c e m e n t by th e c o n ce p t of a p l u r a l i t y of l o g i c s .
D e s p ite h i s obv iou s p r e f e r e n c e f o r a p r o b l e m - r a i s i n g
186
paradigm , he rem ains committed to th e p r o b le m - s o lv in g one
as th e d i s c u r s i v e norm. And i t i s th e t e n s i o n c r e a t e d thu s
by a s p l i t l o y a l t y t h a t e x p l a i n s h i s o f t e n p u z z l in g
g e s t u r e s s i m u lt a n e o u s ly to show o f f and to g l o s s o v e r, to
a s s e r t and to a p o lo g i z e , to d i f f e r e n t i a t e and t o r e c o n c i l e ,
as th e a b o v e -q u o te d p a ssa g e from th e "C o nclusio n" so
v i v i d l y i l l u s t r a t e s .
What Toulmin t r i e s to do in th e p a ssa g e i s to f i n d a
t h e o r e t i c a l s o l u t i o n f o r th e a p p a r e n t i n c o m p a t i b i l i t y
betw een th e two models of d i s c u r s i v e p r o d u c t i o n , so t h a t
h i s c h o ic e o f th e p r o b l e m a t i z i n g mode may be j u s t i f i e d
w ith o u t h a v in g to renounce th e c o n s t r u c t i v e one a t th e same
tim e . For t h i s p u rp o se he b a s i c a l l y employs t h r e e
r h e t o r i c a l s t r a t e g i e s . He a r r a n g e s th e two i n v e n t i v e modes
in a tem poral sequence so a s to a v o id t h e i r m eeting in a
h e ad -o n c l a s h when he s u g g e s ts t h a t to b rea k down e x i s t i n g
" a n a l o g ie s and c o n n e c t i o n s ” or to d e s t r o y w hatever
sem blance of o r d e r t h e r e e x i s t s in th e f i e l d i s th e
" i n i t i a l " or th e " f i r s t " s t e p s tow ard th e achievem ent of a
"new and improved" o r d e r . He s e p a r a t e s them s p a t i a l l y by
f o re g r o u n d in g th e " n e g a tiv e " mode w h ile p l a c i n g i t w i t h i n
th e framework of th e " p o s i t i v e ” one. Most i m p o r t a n t l y , he
t r a c e s th e o r i g i n of b o th models to th e same s e t of
fundam ental a ssu m p tio n s , r e n d e r i n g s u p e r f i c i a l t h e i r
seem in gly i r r e c o n c i l a b l e d i f f e r e n c e s . When he s t a t e s t h a t
187
th e o n ly "excuse" f o r h i s a tte m p t to b r i n g ab ou t a " r a d i c a l
r e - o r d e r i n g of l o g i c a l th e o ry " i s th e f a i l u r e of th e th e o ry
to be " in l i n e w ith c r i t i c a l p r a c t i c e , " and e s p e c i a l l y when
he s u g g e s ts t h a t i f p h i l o s o p h i c a l lo g ic were "w ell" or
" c l e a r l y w e l l , " t h e r e would be no p o i n t a t a l l f o r
embarking on any i n v e s t i g a t i o n , he i s assum ing t h a t the
" n e g a tiv e " q u e s t i o n i n g is based on th e same s e t o f c r i t e r i a
which has gone i n t o th e c o n s t r u c t i o n of th e d i s c o u r s e in
th e f i r s t p l a c e ( i . e . , th e o ry sh o u ld be in l i n e w ith
p r a c t i c e ) , t h a t i t i s a p a t h o l o g i c a l c o n d i t i o n or in any
c a se a c o n d i t i o n of d e f i c i e n c y or i m p e r f e c t i o n on th e p a r t
of th e e x i s t i n g d i s c u r s i v e p r a c t i c e t h a t n e c e s s i t a t e s and
w a r r a n t s t h e a d o p ti o n of a p r o b l e m a t i z i n g mode, and t h a t to
a c h ie v e a s t a t e of d i s c u r s i v e " h e a l th " or p e r f e c t i o n
d e f i n a b l e by t h e s e same c r i t e r i a i s th e u l t i m a t e and
u n i f y i n g t e l o s f o r b o th modes of i n v e n t i o n .
While i n d i v i d u a l l y , t h e s e argum ents do show t h a t
p r o b l e m a t i z i n g and p r o b le m - s o lv in g a r e n o t n e c e s s a r i l y
in c o m p a tib le , t o g e t h e r th e y f a i l to a d d r e s s a d e q u a t e l y and
c o h e r e n t l y th e t h e o r e t i c a l d i f f i c u l t i e s e n t a i l e d by h i s
p o l a r i z a t i o n of th e two modes of i n v e n t i o n and h i s e f f o r t
to f i n d a way to prom ote one w ith o u t a t th e same time
dem oting th e o t h e r . He s t r e s s e s th e t h e r a p e u t i c or
a m e l i o r a t i v e f u n c t i o n of th e " n e g a tiv e " q u e s t i o n i n g in an
a tt e m p t to r e c o n c i l e i t w ith th e " p o s i t i v e , " " c o n s t r u c t i v e "
188
norm, y e t w hether th e p r o b l e m a t i z a t i o n aims a t r e s t o r i n g an
o ld , somewhat d e g e n e ra te d o r d e r to th e v i g o r and v i t a l i t y
i t once e n jo y e d , or a t im proving on an o rd e r t h a t has n ev er
q u i t e l i v e d up to i t s own fou nd in g p r i n c i p l e s , th e t e l o s
does n ot j u s t i f y a " r a d i c a l " a p p ro a c h t h a t would n o t even
s t a r t to c o n s id e r th e q u e s t i o n of r e c o n s t r u c t i o n u n t i l i t
has f i r s t t o r n down or ta k e n a p a r t th e e n t i r e e x i s t i n g
a p p a r a t u s . The kind of sweeping d e m o l i ti o n im p lie d in
Toulmin*s d e s c r i p t i o n of h i s " n e g a tiv e q u e s t i o n i n g " i s
j u s t i f i a b l e o n ly by th e need to o v e rth ro w , a s opposed t o
th e need to b o l s t e r up, a d i s c u r s i v e system . Toulmin,
however, i s r e l u c t a n t to r e c o g n i z e t h i s , and h i s r e f u s a l to
see h i s own p r o j e c t in term s of an e f f o r t to r e p l a c e th e
c u r r e n t system w ith a new one f o r c e s him f u r t h e r i n to a
r h e t o r i c a l impasse. No s o o n e r, f o r example, has he
s t r e s s e d th e " r a d i c a l n e s s " of h i s ap p ro a ch and d e f i n e d h i s
own endeavor as to "break down" th e o l d , e x i s t i n g
" a n a l o g ie s and c o n n e c t i o n s " th a n he se ek s to r e a s s u r e h i s
c r i t i c s t h a t th e r e - c o n c e p t u a l i z a t i o n of l o g ic a l th e o r y he
i s a d v o c a tin g is a bo ut as " r a d i c a l " a s th e r e s h u f f l i n g of
th e same books on th e same l i b r a r y s h e lv e s and t h a t th e
whole o p e r a t i o n of " r e - o r d e r i n g " aims m erely a t " r e p l a c i n g
th e . . . volumes in a new and more p r a c t i c a l arran gem en t"
(254) and would in v o lv e o n ly th o s e books which, though
189
p la c e d s i d e by s i d e a t p r e s e n t , have a c t u a l l y "no r e a l
c o n n e c tio n " (2 53 ).
Odd a s th e y a r e in th e work of a l o g i c i a n , such
i n c o n s i s t e n c i e s a r e n o th in g compared w ith th e f a c t t h a t i t
i s Toulmin*s " m i s r e p r e s e n t a t i o n " of h i s own i n v e n t i v e mode
t h a t has p a i n t e d him in to a t h e o r e t i c a l c o r n e r in th e f i r s t
p l a c e . Even th e most f a s t i d i o u s and c r i t i c a l of h i s
r e a d e r s would no t a c c u se him, as a m a t t e r of f a c t , of
e n d e a v o rin g o n ly to p r o b l e m a t i z e , to provoke or to "draw
f i r e s from o t h e r s " in h i s stu d y of l o g i c s . He c o n s t r u c t s
( e . g . a new f i e l d - v a r i a n t paradigm of l o g i c a l th e o r y ) as
well as d e c o n s t r u c t s . He o f f e r s answ ers and s o l u t i o n s ,
however t e n t a t i v e th ey may be, to th e q u e s t i o n s he has
r a i s e d and th e problem s he has c r e a t e d ( " . . . The f u l l
answer would be a v e ry long a f f a i r ; b ut some g e n e ra l
rem arks can be made h e re a b o u t th e p r i n c i p l e s which w ill
g ov ern any r e - o r d e r i n g . . . " [2 5 4 ]). He i s by no means
d e v o te d to provoking " f i r e s " or f r u s t r a t i n g e x p e c t a t i o n s .
As he h im s e lf acknow ledges e ls e w h e re , th e " i n t e n t i o n s " of
h i s book m ight be " r a d i c a l , " bu t "th e arg um ents in i t a re
l a r g e l y u n o r i g i n a l , " and th e s t r a t e g y he a d o p ts i s in f a c t
one of borrow ing "many l i n e s of th o ug ht" from h i s fe llo w
p h i l o s o p h e r s and " fo llo w in g out" th e h i t h e r t o u n re c o g n iz e d
p o i n t "on which t h e s e l i n e s of argum ents converge"
( " P r e f a c e " ) . Why, th e n , should he o f f e r an a p p a r e n t l y
190
m is le a d i n g r e p r e s e n t a t i o n of h i s own mode of i n v e n t i o n by
draw ing a t t e n t i o n o n ly t o , and p l a y i n g up th e im portance
m erely o f , th e " n e g a t i v e , " p r o v o c a t i v e , d e c o n s t r u c t i v e s i d e
of h i s d i s c o u r s e , and t h i s d e s p i t e h i s avowed b e l i e f t h a t
t h e o r y sh o u ld be b ro u g h t in l i n e w ith d i s c u r s i v e p r a c t i c e ?
Even more p u z z l in g : why i s t h i s opening gam bit fo llo w ed
im m ed iately by a counter-m ove t h a t r e - a s s i g n s an a c c e s s o r y
and s u b s e r v i e n t s t a t u s to th e " n e g a tiv e " mode which he has
j u s t v a l o r i z e d , th u s p u t t i n g h i s own p o s i t i o n in double
je o p a rd y ?
One e x p l a n a t i o n i s t h a t in t r y i n g to c o n c e p t u a l i z e h i s
own d i s c o u r s e , Toulmin g e t s locked in a v i r t u a l d o u b le bind
d e s p i t e h i m s e l f . Here we have a c l a s s i c a l c ase of what
m ight be term ed th e dilemma of i n v e n t i o n , to which a l l
i n v e n t o r s , champions of r e v o l u t i o n a r y changes in d i s c u r s i v e
p r a c t i c e s , a u t h o r s in s e a r c h of an i n d i v i d u a l s t y l e and
even s t u d e n t w r i t e r s working h a rd to sound b o th " a u t h e n t i c "
and " a p p r o p r i a t e , " a r e a l i k e s u b j e c t e d . They a r e t o r n
between two c o n f l i c t i n g demands in term s of t h e i r
r e l a t i o n s h i p w ith th e d i s c u r s i v e norm. On th e one hand,
th e y a r e e x p e c te d to d i f f e r from t h e i r a u d ie n c e or from
what i s n o rm a tiv e , c o n v e n tio n a l or s t a n d a r d f o r t h e i r
a u d ie n c e . To j u s t i f y t h e i r a c t of b o u n d a r y - c r o s s in g , i t i s
n e c e s s a r y f o r them to p ro p o se a change in th e norms,
c o n v e n tio n s or s t a n d a r d s . Yet in o r d e r f o r such a p ro p o sa l
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to be a c c e p t e d , th e i n v e n t o r s a r e under r e l e n t l e s s p r e s s u r e
a l s o to i d e n t i f y w ith t h e i r a u d ie n c e , to a b id e by th e r u l e s
of th e " s ta n d a r d " language and to comply w ith th e
"community c o n v e n t io n s ." What r e s u l t s i s t h e p red ic am en t
t h a t , a s D e r r id a o b s e r v e s , th e i n v e n t o r f i n d s h e r s e l f under
o b l i g a t i o n to t r a n s g r e s s th e c o n v e n tio n s w i t h which she i s
n e v e r t h e l e s s e x p e c te d to comply. Toulmin i s k e e n ly aware
of t h e s e two c o n f l i c t i n g demands. He s y s t e m a t i z e s and
r e i f i e s them a s two oppo sin g paradigm s of d i s c u r s i v e
p r o d u c t i o n when he comes to r e f l e c t on h i s mode of
i n v e n t i o n . In o r d e r to s e t o f f th e "newness" or
in n o v a t i v e n e s s of h i s d i s c o u r s e , he p la y s up i t s
p r o b le m a tic or p r o v o c a t i v e s i d e to such an e x t e n t t h a t th e
whole p r o j e c t i s s a i d to be a l l r a d i c a l q u e s t i o n i n g and no
answ ers. In re s p o n s e to th e second i m p e r a t i v e , however, he
r e a f f i r m s h i s a l l e g i a n c e to th e c o n v e n tio n a l c r i t e r i a , and
hence r e a f f i r m s h i s fundam ental i d e n t i f i c a t i o n w ith h i s
a u d ie n c e , by r e l e g a t i n g th e p r o b l e m a t i z i n g o p e r a t i o n to a
mere p r e p a r a t o r y , t h e r a p e u t i c or sc a v e n g in g r o l e w ith a
s e c r e t agenda to s t r e n g t h e n r a t h e r th a n to o v e rth ro w th e
d i s c u r s i v e norms.
T h is , of c o u r s e , i s a g e n e r a l i z e d , even somewhat
o v e r s i m p l i f i e d s c e n a r i o of what is g o in g on in T o ulm in’s
m e t a - d i s c u r s i v e s e l f - r e f l e c t i o n s . His a p o l o g e t i c to n e ,
d e f e n s i v e g e s t u r e and e s p e c i a l l y h i s op enly e x p re ss e d
192
a n x i e t y over th e need to f i n d an "excuse" f o r h i s
" n e g a t i v e ” ap p ro a ch a l l p o i n t to th e f a c t t h a t in a more
s p e c i f i c s e n s e , i t is th e o b l i g a t i o n to j u s t i f y a d e v i a t i o n
from th e n o rm a tiv e t h a t has led Toulmin, s t e p by s t e p , i n to
th e do ub le b in d . In d e l i b e r a t e l y f o r e g r o u n d in g an a c u t e l y
u n c o n v e n tio n a l a p pro ach in th e " I n t r o d u c t i o n , ” Toulmin
f l i e s in th e fa c e of th e c o n v e n tio n a l a ssu m p tio n t h a t
d i s c u r s i v e p r o d u c t i o n sh o u ld and can o n ly be o r i e n t e d
toward a " s o l u t i o n , " a " c o n c lu sio n " or in any c a se a
"knowledge c la im ." C l e a r l y im p lied in th e d e f i a n t
d e c l a r a t i o n t h a t h i s own stu d y i s n e i t h e r " s y s te m a t i c " nor
" c o n c lu s iv e " i s an e x h o r t a t i o n t h a t we change our custom ary
c o n c e p tio n of i n v e n t i o n , a c c e p t " n e g a tiv e " q u e s t i o n i n g as
a l e g i t i m a t e modus operandi and no longer look down on
" i n c o n c lu s iv e n e s s " as a s t y l i s t i c s i n so long a s more
o p in io n s a r e provoked. Toulmin knows t h a t th e change of
th e c o n v e n tio n a l id e a s cann ot ta k e p l a c e w ith o u t good
r e a s o n s . He does n ot sim ply i s s u e a c a l l f o r a major
change, hoping t h a t th e new id e a s he has o u t l i n e d would
somehow c a t c h on. R a th e r , he i s p r e o c c u p ie d w ith th e
problem of j u s t i f i c a t i o n and t h i s p r e o c c u p a t io n is
r e f l e c t e d even in h i s c e l e b r a t e d r e - d e f i n i t i o n of lo g ic :
" l o g i c i s concerned n o t w ith th e manner of our i n f e r r i n g ,
or w ith q u e s t i o n s of t e c h n i q u e : i t s p rim a ry b u s i n e s s i s a
r e t r o s p e c t i v e , j u s t i f i c a t o r y one— w ith th e argum ents we can
193
pu t forw ard a f t e r w a r d s to make good our claim t h a t th e
c o n c l u s i o n s a r r i v e d a t a r e a c c e p t a b l e , b ecau se j u s t i f i a b l e ,
c o n c lu s io n s " ( 6 ) . As soon as he p ro c e e d s to o f f e r
j u s t i f i c a t o r y argum ents f o r h i s c a l l f o r a com plete
" r e - o r d e r i n g " of th e d i s c u r s i v e norms, however, he f i n d s
h im s e lf in a Catch-22 s i t u a t i o n : th e "good" r e a s o n s
a v a i l a b l e to him a r e on ly a s "good" a s th e y a r e re c o g n iz e d
and a c c e p te d as such by th e o ld o r d e r , or a s R ich ard R o rty
p u ts i t , argum ents a g a i n s t "a f a m i l i a r and tim e -h o n o re d
v o c a b u la ry " a r e "ex p e c te d to be p h ra s e d in t h a t v e ry
v o c a b u la ry " ( 8 ) . For a l l h i s l o g i c a l r i g o r and
a rg u m e n ta tiv e s o p h i s t i c a t i o n , Toulmin can o n ly j u s t i f y th e
r a d i c a l l y n e g a t i v e ap p ro a ch he f a v o r s on th e b a s i s t h a t th e
dom inant o r d e r i s not "well or c l e a r l y w e l l , " which
i n s t a n t l y tr a n s f o r m s h i s program from a r e v o l u t i o n a r y
b a t t l e - c r y f o r d oing away w ith th e o ld system to a
r e f o r m i s t u rg e f o r im proving, r e n o v a t in g and e v e n t u a l l y
p e r f e c t i n g th e e x i s t i n g framework— an u rg e t h a t r e n d e r s
u n j u s t i f i a b l e h i s own d e c o n s t r u c t i v e mode of i n v e n t i o n .
At tim e s , i t looks a s i f Toulmin was t r y i n g to b re a k
th e g r i d l o c k by a p p e a li n g to a s e t of a p r i o r i s t i c c r i t e r i a
t r a n s c e n d i n g th e c u r r e n t norm. T his is e v i d e n t , f o r
i n s t a n c e , in h i s sw itc h from th e c o n f e s s i o n t h a t he i s
indeed engaged in "b re a k in g down" e x i s t i n g " a n a l o g ie s and
c o n n e c t i o n s , " which a r e d e f i n e d by and in t u r n d e f i n i n g th e
194
o ld " o r d e r , " to th e s u g g e s t i o n t h a t t h e r e - o r d e r i n g is
n e c e s s a r y b ecause many c u r r e n t l y r e l a t e d i d e a s , j u s t l i k e
many books ly in g s i d e by s i d e on l i b r a r y s h e l v e s , have
a c t u a l l y "no r e a l c o n n e c tio n " among them and i t i s h i s
i n t e n t i o n t h e r e f o r e to r e a r r a n g e t h i s randomly amassed or
" f a l s e l y " g a th e r e d col l e c t i o n a c c o r d in g to t h e i r " n a t u r a l "
or " i n h e r e n t" l i n k . T h is ambiguous p o s t u r e of h o v e rin g
between two s e t s of c r i t e r i a has c au g h t th e a t t e n t i o n o f,
among o t h e r t h e o r i s t s , Habermas. In h i s comments on th e
th e o r y of a rg u m e n ta tio n , Habermas o b s e r v e s t h a t Toulmin
"aims a t a ' c r i t i q u e of c o l l e c t i v e r e a s o n '" y e t "does no t
want to pay th e p r i c e of r e l a t i v i s m f o r shunning
a p r i o r i s t i c s t a n d a r d s of r e a s o n , " which a c c o u n ts f o r th e
l a t t e r ’s f a i l u r e to " c l e a r l y [ s e p a r a t e ] c o n v e n tio n a l c la im s
. . . from u n i v e r s a l v a l i d i t y c l a i m s " and f o r h i s i n a b i l i t y
to a c h ie v e what he h im s e lf i d e n t i f i e s as th e " i m p a r ti a l
s t a n d p o i n t of r a t i o n a l jud gm en t." "So long a s Toulmin does
not c l a r i f y th e g e n e ra l p ra g m a tic p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s and
p r o c e d u r e s of th e c o o p e r a t i v e s e a r c h f o r t r u t h , " Habermas
c o n c lu d e s , "he i s n ot in a p o s i t i o n to s p e c i f y what i t
means f o r a p a r t i c i p a n t in a rg u m e n ta tio n to a do pt an
i m p a r ti a l s t a n d p o i n t " ( Theory 1 :3 4 -3 6 , emphasis ad d ed ).
T h is i s tantam ou nt to s u g g e s t i n g t h a t th e key to a
s a t i s f a c t o r y j u s t i f i c a t i o n of T o ulm in’s " r e c o n s t r u c t i v e
i n t e n t " l i e s in an unambiguous commitment t o th e " s e a rc h
195
f o r t r u t h " as th e paramount m o ti v a ti o n of d i s c u r s i v e
p r o d u c t i o n and t h a t in t r y i n g to r e c o n c e p t u a 1iz e i n v e n t i o n ,
th e most im p o rta n t t h i n g i s to " c l a r i f y " th e " g en e ral
. . . p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s and p ro c e d u re s " of t h i s " c o o p e r a t i v e
s e a r c h ."
Such a s t r a t e g y i s in c o m p a tib le w ith and t h e r e f o r e
u n l i k e l y to add any p e r s u a s i v e n e s s to T o u lm in 's fa v o re d
model. From th e p e r s p e c t i v e of an a rg u m e n ta tio n t h e o r y , a
s e a r c h f o r " t r u t h " i s an e f f o r t to f i n d som ething which
w i l l command th e a s s e n t of a u n i v e r s a l a u d ie n c e "
r e g a r d l e s s , whereas th e mode of i n v e n t i o n championed by
Toulmin i s one of " p ro v o k in g ” c o n t r o v e r s i e s among and
"drawing f i r e s " from h i s a u d ie n c e , and hence one o r i e n t e d
toward d i s s e n t . And by p r o v o c a t i v e l y d i s r e g a r d i n g th e
c o n v e n tio n a l e x p e c t a t i o n f o r s o l u t i o n and c o n c l u s i o n , he
has made c l e a r t h a t h i s i n t e n t i s p r e c i s e l y to change the
" p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s and p r o c e d u r e s " of a t r u t h - o r i e n t e d
i n v e n t i o n , r a t h e r th a n to " c l a r i f y " them and th u s to
r e a f f i r m th e u n d e r l y i n g " u n i v e r s a l v a l i d i t y cla im s" of th e
c u r r e n t d i s c o u r s e . What has d r i v e n Toulmin i n to a
t h e o r e t i c a l impasse i s no t a w avering on h i s commitment to
" a p r i o r i s t i c s t a n d a r d s of r e a s o n , ” but h i s f a i l u r e to
r e a l i z e t h a t th e o ld o r i g i n a r y a ssu m p tio n ab ou t " t r u t h "
b e in g th e one and th e o n ly t e l o s of d i s c o u r s e w i l l n ever
j u s t i f y h i s p ro p o sa l f o r a r a d i c a l r e c o n c e p t u a l i z a t i o n of
196
i n v e n t i o . I t ta k e s an a l t e r n a t i v e g o d -te rm , and a new
" f i n a l v o c a b u la ry " b u i l t around i t , to g iv e f u l l b a ck in g to
th e kind of " r e - o r d e r i n g " Toulmin e n v i s i o n s . T h is
a l t e r n a t i v e g o d-term sh ou ld s a t i s f y a t h r e e - f o l d
r e q u ir e m e n t: i t sh o u ld be s u f f i c i e n t l y d i f f e r e n t from th e
c u r r e n t go d -term ( " t r u t h " or "knowledge") a s t o q u a l i f y as
an " a l t e r n a t i v e ; " i t sho uld p o s s e s s enough j u s t i f i c a t o r y
power to redeem th e proposed t r a n s g r e s s i v e mode of
in v e n t i o n ; and i t sho uld be a c c e p t a b l e by th e a u d ie n c e .
Because of th e u n c h a lle n g e d dominance of th e co n cep t of
" t r u t h , " t o f i n d such a new god -term co uld not be e a sy , but
i t i s by no means im p o s s ib le . Toulmin has had, in f a c t , a
c l o s e e n c o u n te r w ith one when he p r o t e s t e d t h a t i f he had
been p re o c c u p ie d w ith " n e g a tiv e q u e s t i o n s , " i t was not
"from any love of d i s t i n c t i o n s . . . f o r t h e i r own s a k e s ,"
or when he co ncluded h i s " I n t r o d u c t i o n " w ith th e hope t h a t
some of h i s new id ea s would keep a p l a c e in th e " f i n i s h e d
mosaic" in th e f u t u r e (1 0 ) , or in p a r t i c u l a r , when he
d e c l a r e d t h a t th e s o l e pu rp ose of h i s s t u d i e s was to r a i s e
p rob lem s, to provoke d i s c u s s i o n and to r e l e a s e some " t r i a l
b a ll o o n s d e s ig n e d t o draw th e f i r e of th e o t h e r s . " For
what i s s t r u g g l i n g to e x p re s s i t s e l f h e r e , w hether in th e
form of a solemn c o n f i r m a t i o n or of an o s t e n s i b l e d e n i a l ,
is a b a r e l y s u p p re s s e d y e a r n in g f o r a r i g h t to love
d i s c u r s i v e d i f f e r e n c e , v a r i e t y and p l e n i t u d e f o r t h e i r own
197
s a k e . or a t h i n l y v e i l e d d e s i r e to r e i n s t a t e th e r h e t o r i c a l
id e a l of copia as th e new sel f - j u s t i f ied and j u s t i f y i n g
su p e r c o n c e p t. Toulmin may no t f u l l y u n d e rs ta n d what he
has tou ched in h i s g ro p in g f o r a j u s t i f i c a t i o n , but as i t
t u r n s o u t, copia f u l f i l l s a l l th e t h r e e r e q u ir e m e n ts l i s t e d
a b o v e .
The c o n ce p t of copia i s by no means y e t a n o th e r
synonym f o r " t r u t h " ( e . g . , "knowledge," " r e a s o n ," " r e a l i t y "
e t c . ) . Whereas a q u e s t f o r th e l a t t e r i s a s t r i v i n g f o r
what i s " r e a l l y " th e c a s e , and hence f o r c e r t a i n t y o r f o r
freedom from doubt and c o n tr o v e r s y , what th e form er is
i n t e r e s t e d in is grow th and e x p ansion : i t i s a p u r s u i t of
s e l f - e n r i c h m e n t and an endeavor to a v o id m eag ern ess,
monotony and in p a r t i c u l a r , s t a g n a t i o n , in th e p r o d u c t i o n
of d i s c o u r s e . "T ruth" i s d e f i n e d v i s - a - v i s f a l s i t y , th e
mode of a t r u t h - o r i e n t e d i n v e n t i o n is t h e r e f o r e one of
c o r r e c t i n g th e "m istaken" and r i g h t i n g th e "wrong." Copia,
on th e o t h e r hand, p i t s i t s e l f a g a i n s t a c e s s a t i o n in
developm ent and a complacency w ith any s t a t u s quo, i t s
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c mode of i n v e n t i o n i s c o n s t a n t l y p rov o k in g
more o p in io n s and c o n s t a n t l y i n i t i a t i n g new i n q u i r i e s .
"T ruth" a s an o b j e c t i v e e x i s t e n c e can o n ly be " d i s c o v e r e d ,"
and i t s d i s c o v e r y is th e c u lm in a tio n of a b a s i c a l l y
c e n t r i p e t a l , c o n v erg in g and g r a d u a l l y c o n t r a c t i n g p r o c e s s .
As an open-ended c o n c e p t, however, c o pia can only be
198
a s p i r e d f o r th ro u g h an e v e r d i v e r g i n g , c e n t r i f u g a l and
e x p a n siv e p r o c e s s . In o t h e r words, a " t r u t h " is
n e c e s s a r i l y a d e f i n i t i v e c o n c l u s i o n , whose e v e n tu a l
d i s c o v e r y would re n d e r u n n e c e s s a r y any f u r t h e r
i n v e s t i g a t i o n s , c o n t r o v e r s i e s and d e b a t e s on th e r e l a t e d
s u b j e c t s o r t o p i c s . Copia, in c o n t r a s t , knows no bounds by
i t s d e f i n i t i o n and i t can r e a l i z e i t s e l f o n ly in and
th ro u g h a s e 1f - p e r p e t u a t i n g p r o c e s s of sym bolic a c t i o n . I t
t h r i v e s on c o n t r o v e r s i e s and i t s w o rst d read i s a
" u n i v e r s a l " agreem ent t h a t we have f i n a l l y d i s c o v e r e d th e
" t r u t h , " f o r such a s i t u a t i o n would d e p r iv e o u r s e l v e s of
any " p o i n t , " to use Toulmin*s words, f o r "embarking on [any
f u r t h e r ] i n v e s t i g a t i o n s " or f o r eng agin g in any f u r t h e r
i n v e n t i v e a c t i o n .
Nowhere i s th e d i s p a r i t y betw een th e two term s more
c l e a r l y d e m o n s tra te d th a n in th e two r a d i c a l l y d i f f e r e n t
p o i n t s of view th e y make a v a i l a b l e to s c h o l a r s of
d i s c o u r s e . Taking i t f o r g r a n t e d t h a t d i s c o u r s e i s
t r u t h - o r i e n t e d , I. A. R ic h a rd s b e l i e v e s t h a t r h e t o r i c
"sho uld be a stu d y of m is u n d e r s ta n d in g and i t s rem edies"
( 3 ) . In h i s probe i n t o th e way we u n d e rs ta n d m etaphor, he
is a p p a l l e d by a "backward s t a t e of th e stu dy " m a n if e s te d
in what he d e s c r i b e s as '[ o n e ] of th e o d d e st of th e many
odd t h in g s about th e whole t o p i c , " t h a t i s , "we have no
a g re e d d i s t i n g u i s h i n g term s" f o r th e "two h a lv e s of a
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metaphor in s p i t e of th e immense c o n v e n ie n c e , a lm o st th e
n e c e s s i t y , of such term s i f we a r e to make any a n a l y s e s
w ith o u t c o n f u s i o n " (96, emphasis a d d ed ). He wonders out
loud "why r h e t o r i c i a n s have no t long ago rem edied t h i s
d e f e c t of language f o r t h e i r p u rp o s e ," and q u o tin g G. E.
Moore, he f i n d s i t "very c u rio u s " t h a t th e same form of
"v e rb a l e x p r e s s io n " sh o u ld be used to "convey such
d i f f e r e n t meanings" and t h a t "language sho uld have grown up
as i f i t were e x p r e s s l y d e sig n e d to m is le a d p h i l o s o p h e r s ”
(97, emphasis ad d ed ). As he se es i t , t h e r e f o r e , th e t h in g
to do in our stu d y of how m etaphor works i s to r e p l a c e
" s l i p p e r y term s" w ith " r i g i d t e c h n i c a l i t i e s " (97, 99) so
t h a t one can pu t an end to a s e n s e l e s s and c o n fu s in g
t e r m i n i s t i c e x p lo s io n and re n d e r th e d i s c o u r s e on tr o p e s
c r y s t a 1- c 1 e a r . Not everyone would see eye to eye w ith
R ic h a rd s . When G erard G e n e tte t u r n s h i s a t t e n t i o n to the
same s u b j e c t w i t h i n th e same c o n te x t of r e t h i n k i n g
r h e t o r i c , what u p s e t s him i s m e ta p h o r’s ascen dan cy to th e
s t a t u s of th e " tr o p e of t r o p e s " or th e " f i g u r e of f i g u r e s , "
and th e ev er i n c r e a s i n g p o s s i b i l i t y of i t s b e in g a c c e p te d
as "th e k e r n e l , th e h e a r t , and u l t i m a t e l y th e e sse n c e and
alm o st th e whole of r h e t o r i c " (1 1 3 ). He d e t e c t s a
"profound d e s i r e " on th e p a r t of "a whole modern p o e t i c s "
to " s u p p re s s th e d i v i s i o n s and to e s t a b l i s h th e a b s o l u t e ,
u n d iv id e d r u l e of m etaphor" (1 1 7 ). His e x p l a n a t i o n f o r th e
200
t r e n d to e s t a b l i s h metaphor a s th e " c e n t r a l f i g u r e of a l l
r h e t o r i c " i s t h a t p s y c h o l o g i c a l l y , " i t s u i t s th e mind, in
i t s w eakness, t h a t a l l t h i n g s , even f i g u r e s , sho uld have a
c e n t e r , " and h i s t o r i c a l l y , th e " a b s o l u t e v a l o r i z a t i o n of
m etaphor" is th e c u lm i n a t io n of an " a g e -o ld ten d e n cy of
r h e t o r i c to r e d u c t io n " (117-18).* To c o u n te r t h i s
r e d u c t i v e ten d e n cy , he s t r e s s e s , i t i s im p o rta n t n ot on ly
t o see m etaphor a s "m erely one form among many [ o t h e r
t r o p o l o g i c a l f o r m s ] ," but a l s o to see th e f i g u r e as a "gap
between s i g n and meaning" and hence a s " th e in n e r sp ace of
language" (113, 49).
Concerned p r i m a r i l y w ith t h e copia of d i s c o u r s e ,
G e n e tte a d o p ts a p o s i t i o n c o m p le te ly d i f f e r e n t from
R i c h a r d s ’s. Whereas R ic h a rd s s i n g l e s out m etaphor as th e
"o m n ip re se n t p r i n c i p l e of language" (92) and in so d oing
g r a n t s i t a s p e c i a l , p r i v i l e g e d s t a t u s w i t h i n th e framework
of r h e t o r i c a l s t u d i e s , G e n e tte , in th e name of th e freedom
f o r a l l t r o p o l o g i c a l forms to d e v elo p to t h e i r f u l l e s t
p o t e n t i a l , c a l l s f o r a r e v e r s a l of th e tend en cy to a s s i g n
a " c e n t e r " to th e f i g u r e s . R ic h a rd s looks upon a p l e t h o r a
of term s in th e stu d y of m etaphor as a " d e f e c t of
la n g u a g e ," som ething to be "rem edied" o r , ind eed, f i x e d .
G e n e tte h a i l s what he term s th e " p a s s io n to name" in
r h e t o r i c as "a mode of s e l f - e x p a n s i o n and
s e 1f - j u s t i f i c a t i o n " which e n a b le s d i s c o u r s e to " [ o p e r a t e ]
201
by i n c r e a s i n g th e number of o b j e c t s in o n e ’s purview" (5 3 ).
For G e n e tte , th e key q u e s t i o n in th e p r o b l e m a t i c s of
f i g u r a t i v e language, and of r h e t o r i c in g e n e r a l , should be
how th e " in n e r space of language" has been and can be
f u r t h e r "expanded." For R ic h a rd s , th e predo m in ant co ncern
of a tr o p o lo g y sh ou ld be th e " a c c u r a te " d e t e r m i n a t i o n of
th e " tr u e " meaning of a m etaphor, th e e l i m i n a t i o n of
" m is u n d e r s ta n d in g s ," and th e s t a b i l i z a t i o n of
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n .
In G e n e t t e ’s d e s c r i p t i o n of a s e l f - e x p a n d i n g and
s e 1f - j u s t i f y i n g mode d e d i c a t e d to " i n c r e a s i n g th e number of
o b j e c t s " w i t h i n th e d i s c u r s i v e h o r i z o n , we have in f a c t a
s u c c i n c t c h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n of th e r h e t o r i c of i n v e n t i o n of
which th e p r e s e n t stu d y has been t r y i n g to o f f e r a more
s y s te m a t i c d e f i n i t i o n . A c o p i a - o r i e n t e d model of
d i s c o u r s e , th e r h e t o r i c of i n v e n t i o n h o ld s t h a t to s a t i s f y
th e need f o r d i s c o u r s e to renew and to e n r i c h i t s e l f
c o n s t a n t l y , r a t h e r th a n to ap p ro x im ate th e " t r u t h " f u r t h e r
by making up f o r th e " d e f i c i e n c i e s " of or s o lv in g th e
"problems" in th e e x i s t i n g d i s c o u r s e , i s th e u l t i m a t e t e l o s
of and th e f i n a l m o ti v a ti o n f o r sym bolic p r o d u c tio n .
A r i s t o t l e d id not u n d e rta k e to w r i t e p h i l o s o p h i c a l
t r e a t i s e s b e ca u se P l a t o ’s th e o r y was "out of lin e " w ith th e
a n c i e n t Greek " c r i t i c a l p r a c t i c e . " L o ck e ’s An Essay
Concerning Human U n d e rsta n d in g does n ot in any sen se
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" r e c t i f y " an " erro n e o u s" C a r t e s i a n c o n c e p tio n of knowledge.
The H e g e lia n A b so lu te can h a r d l y be seen as an
"improvement" on, f o r example, S p i n o z a ’s Deus s i v e Natura.
And a s Freud o b se rv e s in C i v i l i z a t i o n and I t s D i s c o n t e n t s ,
what " p o i n t s th e d i r e c t i o n " to h i s p s y c h o a n a l y ti c
r e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of th e cau se of human h a p p in e s s and
s u f f e r i n g i s th e aw aren ess t h a t " to u r ] e n q u ir y c o n c e rn in g
h a p p in e s s has no t so f a r ta u g h t us much t h a t i s n ot a l r e a d y
common knowledge" and t h a t "even i f we p ro ce ed from i t to
th e problem of why i t i s so hard fo r men to be happy, t h e r e
seems no g r e a t e r p r o s p e c t of l e a r n in g a n y th in g new" (3 5 ).
Even though in d iv i d u a l c o n t r i b u t o r s to th e developm ent of
human d i s c o u r s e might b e l i e v e , as Toulmin d i d , t h a t th e y
were c o r r e c t i n g m is ta k e s o r c l a r i f y i n g c o n fu s io n s or
u n v e i l i n g new knowledge o r , more t y p i c a l l y , s e a r c h i n g fo r
" t r u t h , " what has m o tiv a te d t h e i r sym bolic a c t i o n s might
well be th e im p e r a tiv e to in v e n t r a t h e r th a n th e
i r r e s i s t i b l e a l l u r e of th e ev er e l u s i v e " t r u t h . " While we
tend to e x p e c t i n t e r p r e t e r s to r e v e a l th e " tr u e " meaning of
a t e x t , f o r example, to i n t e r p r e t i s n ot so much to so lv e
th e "problem" of " m is u n d e rs ta n d in g " and "incom prehension"
a s to r e d e s c r i b e th e t e x t c o n s t a n t l y . As Paul R icoeur
p o i n t s o u t, "th e t a s k of an a r t of i n t e r p r e t a t i o n . . . is to
a llo w a t e x t to s i g n i f y as much as i t can, n ot to s i g n i f y
one th in g r a t h e r th a n a n o t h e r , but to ' s i g n i f y m o r e ', and
203
th u s to make us 't h i n k m o r e '” (1 4 7 ). And even in th o s e
seem ingly c l e a r - c u t c a s e s of " p ro b le m -so lv in g " or
" c o n f u s i o n - c l a r i f y i n g , " th e p a r a d o x ic a l f a c t is t h a t th e
" s o l u t i o n s " or " c l a r i f i c a t i o n s " b e in g o f f e r e d a r e , a s Locke
o b se rv e s in h i s comment on B i b l i c a l h e rm e n e u tic s , more
o f t e n p r e l i m i n a r y s t e p s to th e opening up of new d i s c u r s i v e
space th ro u g h p rov o k in g more q u e s t i o n s or c r e a t i n g f r e s h
d o u b t s :
[many] a man who was p r e t t y well s a t i s f i e d of
th e meaning of a t e x t of S c r i p t u r e or c la u s e in
th e Code, a t f i r s t r e a d i n g , h a s , by c o n s u l t i n g
com m entators, q u i t e l o s t th e se n se of i t and by
t h e s e e l u c i d a t i o n s g iv e n r i s e or i n c r e a s e to h i s
d o u b ts and drawn o b s c u r i t y upon th e p l a c e .
The r h e t o r i c of in v e n t i o n p r e f e r s n o t to see th e
p r o d u c t i o n of d i s c o u r s e in term s of a lo n e ly in v e n to r
t u r n i n g i n s i d e to dredge up some s t o r e d words or th o u g h ts
or t u r n i n g o u t s i d e to c o n f r o n t c e r t a i n a b s t r a c t c o n s t r u c t ,
an im personal " s o c i e t y , " some disem bodied id e a s , or a
p o t e n t y e t fo rm le s s f o r c e f i e l d or power s t r u c t u r e .
R a th e r, i t m a i n t a i n s t h a t w hether we a r e c o n s c i o u s ly aware
. of i t or n o t , th e p o in t of i n v e n t i o n i s to p e rsu a d e an
a u d ie n c e to change t h e i r "mind" in some r e s p e c t , and th e
on ly way we can hope to a l t e r th e c o n f i g u r a t i o n of
o p i n io n s , s t r u c t u r e of in f o r m a tio n or fo r m a tio n of
s e n s i b i l i t i e s c h a r a c t e r i z i n g our a u d ie n c e is th ro u g h
a p p e a li n g to what th e y have a l r e a d y a g re e d to or th ro u g h a
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t r a n s f e r e n c e of a s s e n t . S ince th e need to change the
a u d i e n c e ’s mind p re s u p p o se s a d i f f e r e n c e between the
p o s i t i o n s h e ld by th e a u d ie n c e and th e s p e a k e r / w r i t e r
r e s p e c t i v e l y , an i n v e n t i v e a c t can be c o n c e p t u a l i z e d only
as a s u s t a i n e d p r o c e s s of d i s a g r e e i n g p la y e d ou t a g a i n s t
th e background o f , and o r i e n t toward, an agreem ent
( i n c l u d i n g an agreem ent to d i s a g r e e ) . I t has to be a
p r o c e s s of d isa g re e m e n t b ecau se once a com plete agreem ent
has been rea ch e d between th e a u d ie n c e and the
s p e a k e r / w r i t e r , w hatever the l a t t e r say s would be so
t e d i o u s l y p r e d i c t a b l e and red u n d a n t t h a t she m ight j u s t as
w ell rem ain s i l e n t . Yet t h i s p r o c e s s of d is a g r e e m e n t w ill
go nowhere u n l e s s t h e r e is an agreem ent a s b o th i t s
s t a r t i n g p o i n t and th e end i t aims a t , f o r w ith o u t such a
c o n te x t of agreem ents one can n e i t h e r d e f i n e th e
d isa g re e m e n t nor e f f e c t any p e r s u a s i o n . A body of
agreem en ts and a s u s t a i n e d d isa g re e m e n t a r e , in t h i s s e n s e ,
th e two c o n d i t i o n s of p o s s i b i l i t y f o r any i n v e n t i v e a c t .
I t has been a common p r a c t i c e of v i r t u a l l y a l l
d i s c o u r s e t h e o r i s t s to d e s c r i b e in v e n t i v e dynamism in term s
of two c o n f l i c t i n g , o f t e n in c o m p a tib le , t h r u s t s . These two
t h r u s t s f i n d t h e i r u b i q u i t o u s though p r o t e a n p r e s e n c e in
such f a m i l i a r o p p o s i t i o n s as s o c i a l / i n d i v i d u a l ,
p u b l i c / p r i v a t e , c e n t r i p e t a l / c e n t r i f u g a l , f a c t / v a l u e ,
p r o b l e m - s o l v i n g / p r o b l e m - r a i s i n g ,
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c o n s t r u c t i v e / d e c o n s t r u c t i v e . W h i l e t h e
a g re e m e n t/d is a g re e m e n t dichotom y, to o , s u g g e s ts two
d i v e r g i n g t e n d e n c i e s , i t d i s t i n g u i s h e s i t s e l f from o t h e r
b in a r y schem ata in a number of ways. Since i t alw ays
ta k e s two a c t i v e p a r t i e s to a g re e or d i s a g r e e , t h i s
dichotom y r e c o g n iz e s th e i n t e r a c t i o n a l and t r a n s a c t i o n a l
n a t u r e of sym bolic a c t i o n s as no o t h e r p a i r of o p p o s i t e s
does: i t makes a f a r more d i r e c t and e x p l i c i t r e f e r e n c e to
th e s p e a k e r / w r i t e r and h e r a u d ie n c e as th e i n d is p e n s a b l e
p a r t n e r / o p p o n e n t , f o r example, th a n th e s o c i a l / i n d i v i d u a l
p a i r , which i d e n t i f i e s i n v e n t i o n e i t h e r w ith a c o n c e rte d
e f f o r t by a whole community in q u e s t of an u l t i m a t e
co nsensus on w ith th e o r i g i n a t i v e a c t of b r i n g in g out
som ething r a d i c a l l y new and d i f f e r e n t by a lo n e ly c r e a t i v e
g e n iu s . With t h e i r c o n n o t a t i o n s of t e m p o r a l i t y ,
impermance, l o c a l i t y and c o n tin g e n c y , th e term s "agreem ent"
and " d isa g re e m e n t" av o id th e a b s o l u t e n e s s and r i g i d i t y of
t e r m i n i s t i c o p p o s i t e s such a s t r u t h / f a l s i t y or f a c t / v a l u e .
I t does n ot have th e a n ti p o d e a n c o n n o ta ti o n of th e
c e n t r i p e t a 1/ c e n t r i f u g a 1 dichotom y, nor does i t have th e
c o n f r o n t a t i o n a l i m p l i c a t i o n of t h e
c o n s t r u c t i v e / d e c o n s t r u c t i v e p a i r . And in i t s r e f u s a l to
v a l o r i z e one a s p e c t over a n o t h e r , i t does n o t demand th e
kin d of h i e r a r c h i z a t i o n r e q u i r e d by many o t h e r schem ata.
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Having "agreem ent” and "d isa g re e m e n t" as i t s two
c o n c e p tu a l c o o r d i n a t e s , th e r h e t o r i c of i n v e n t i o n i s a b le
to o f f e r r e d e s c r i p t i o n s of t h e o r e t i c a l c o n s t r u c t s ,
i n s t i t u t i o n a l f a c t s or d i s c u r s i v e modes in ways not
a v a i l a b l e w i t h i n o t h e r c o n c e p tu a l fram eworks. I t
r e - s i t u a t e s many key term s back in t h e i r o r i g i n a l ,
r h e t o r i c a l l o c i . Thus a s e a r c h fo r " f a c t ” or " t r u t h " would
s i g n i f y more a s e a r c h f o r a u n i v e r s a l and permanent
agreem ent among a l l th o s e who p a r t i c i p a t e in d i s c o u r s e than
a s e a r c h f o r some p r e - e x i s t e n t , o b j e c t i v e s t a t e of being
ind ep end ent of human i n t e r p r e t a t i o n ; th e r e c o g n i t i o n t h a t
what we b e l i e v e to be t i m e l e s s "truth s'" a r e a c t u a l l y
" s o c i a l c o n s t r u c t s " would be a r e c o g n i t i o n t h a t i t is
im p o s sib le to a c h ie v e a g e n u in e ly u n i v e r s a l and e nd uring
c o n sen su s; w h ile to " d i s c o v e r ," r e g a r d l e s s o f i t s s p e c i f i c
o b j e c t i v e ( e . g . a t r u t h , a s o l u t i o n , e t c . ) , would alw ays be
to seek out som ething t h a t would command an agreem ent of
c o n s i d e r a b l e g e n e r a l i t y and d u r a t i o n . C o n v e rse ly , the
s e a r c h fo r " i n d i v i d u a l i t y , " f o r a " p r i v a t e d i s c o u r s e " or
f o r " c r e a t i v i t y ” would be u n d e rs to o d as a s e a r c h fo r
d isa g re e m e n t of v a r y in g d e g re e s . To c u l t i v a t e an
" i n d i v i d u a l " s t y l e , c o n t r a r y to a g e n e ra l b e lie f , is not to
speak in " o n e ’s own v o ic e " ( f o r t h a t "v oice" c o u ld , q u i t e
c o n c e iv a b ly , c o i n c i d e s w ith o th e r " v o i c e s " ) , but to t r y to
speak in a "voice" d i s t i n c t i v e or d i f f e r e n t from the
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"common v o ice " or from a l l o t h e r i d e n t i f i a b l e " v o i c e s . "
S i m i l a r l y , to d e v elo p a " p r i v a t e " d i s c o u r s e i s n ev er to
b u i l d on term s of o n e ’s own c h o ic e , but to speak a p a r l a n c e
e n t i r e l y d i f f e r e n t from o t h e r known " v o c a b u l a r i e s . " And
s i n c e to " c r e a t e " means to b r i n g f o r t h th in g s never b e f o r e
e x i s t i n g , th e only way to show o n e ’s " c r e a t i v i t y " is
th ro u g h a r e l e n t l e s s d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n from a l l known t h in g s
or known ways of doing or t h i n k i n g or sp e ak in g about
t h i n g s . T his e x p l a i n s why in " c r e a t i v e " w r i t i n g s , fo r
i n s t a n c e , " p r e d i c t a b i l i t y " is a bane w h ile f r u s t r a t i n g the
a u d i e n c e ’s e x p e c t a t i o n i s o f t e n e q u a te d w ith p o e t i c v a lu e .
The r h e t o r i c of i n v e n t i o n a l s o p r o v id e s a unique
p e r s p e c t i v e from which f a m i l i a r t h e o r e t i c a l c o n s t r u c t s can
be re-e x am in ed . I t c h a l l e n g e s , f o r example, th e v a l i d i t y
of some p o p u la r n o t io n s abo ut a " d is c o u r s e community."
With th e h e ig h te n e d aw aren ess t h a t " [ r e c o u r s e ] to
a rg u m e n ta tio n assumes th e e s t a b l i s h m e n t of a community of
minds" (Perelm an, New R h e to r i c 55) or t h a t "judgement
r e q u i r e s a community" (Booth, The Company We Keep 7 2 ), the
con cep t of "community" o c c u p ie s an i n c r e a s i n g l y im p o rta n t
p o s i t i o n in contem porary r h e t o r i c a l and d i s c o u r s e t h e o r i e s .
N o ta b le among r e c e n t s c h o l a r l y o p in io n s on t h i s s u b j e c t a re
1) a community i s made up of th o s e who sh a re th e same s e t
of " s t a n d a r d s of c o n v ic ti o n " (Booth, Modern Dogma 8 0 ); 2)
th e f u n c t i o n of a community is to e n fo r c e r h e t o r i c a l norms,
208
m a i n t a i n d i s c u r s i v e o r d e r and s t a b i l i z e meaning ("members
of th e same comm unities w i l l n e c e s s a r i l y a g r e e b ecau se they
w i l l s e e . . . e v e r y t h in g in r e l a t i o n to t h a t community’s
assumed p u rp o se s and g o a ls ; and c o n v e r s e l y , members of
d i f f e r e n t comm unities w i l l d i s a g r e e " [ F is h 6 ] ) , and 3)
because members of th e same community n e c e s s a r i l y s h a r e the
same " i n t e r p r e t i v e s t r a t e g i e s f or . . . w r i t i n g t e x t s , f o r
c o n s t i t u t i n g t h e i r p r o p e r t i e s " ( F is h 3 ) , "community" is
what makes i n v e n t i o n p o s s i b l e or what c o n s t i t u t e s the
e n a b lin g c o n d i t i o n of i n v e n t i o n . While t h e s e id e a s a r e
p o p u l a r l y a c c e p te d and g e n e r a l l y assumed, t h e i r
u n t e n a b i l i t y i s r e n d e re d obvious when th e y a r e p la c e d
w i t h i n th e framework of an i n v e n t i o n - c e n t e r e d r h e t o r i c . I f
a "community" was to s e r v e as th e e n a b lin g c o n d i t i o n of
i n v e n t i o n , i t would have to p erform th e dual f u n c t i o n of
making p o s s i b l e no t j u s t ag re em e n t, c o n v i c t i o n and
c o n se n su s, bu t a l s o d is a g re e m e n t, c o n t r o v e r s y , e n d le s s
q u a r r e l l i n g or even s p o r a d ic o u tb re a k of " d i s c u r s i v e
v i o l e n c e . " I t sh o u ld con cern i t s e l f , in o t h e r words, w ith
n o t j u s t th e s o l u t i o n , but th e c r e a t i o n , of problem s: in no
se n se can i t be u n d e rs to o d as th e g u a r a n t o r of agreem ent
o n l y .
In o r d e r to be p r o d u c t i v e , a community needs must be
h e te r o g e n e o u s , or i t should n e c e s s a r i l y s a n c t i o n
c o n f l i c t i n g c r i t e r i a so as to make g e n u in e d i f f e r e n c e s
209
p o s s i b l e . No community can a f f o r d to be d e f in e d by a s e t
of homogeneous " s t a n d a r d s of c o n v ic tio n " or by one
"v o ca b u lary " only . B a k h tin o f f e r s a t e l l i n g i l l u s t r a t i o n
to t h i s p o i n t . He c o n clu d es in h i s stu d y of l i t e r a r y
g e n re s t h a t " t h e r e n ever was a s i n g l e s t r i c t l y
s t r a i g h t f o r w a r d g e n re , no s i n g l e typ e of d i r e c t
d i s c o u r s e — a r t i s t i c , r h e t o r i c a l , p h i l o s o p h i c a l , r e l i g i o u s ,
o r d i n a r y ev ery d ay — t h a t d id n ot have i t s own p a ro d y in g and
t r a v e s t y i n g d o u b le, i t s own c o m i c - i r o n i c c o n t r e - p a r t i e . "
The p a r o d i c - t r a v e s t y i n g l i t e r a t u r e " i n t r o d u c e s th e
perm anent c o r r e c t i v e of l a u g h t e r , or a c r i t i q u e on th e
o n e - s id e d s e r i o u s n e s s of th e l o f t y d i r e c t word." As t h i s
" c r i t i q u e " i s i n d i s p e n s a b l e i f th e n o v e l i s t i c d i s c o u r s e i s
to g iv e e x p r e s s io n to a " r e a l i t y " t h a t i s always " r i c h e r , "
" to o c o n t r a d i c t o r y and h e t e r o g l o t " f o r a " s t r a i g h t f o r w a r d
g e n r e ," t h e s e " p a ro d ic d o u b les" of th e " d i r e c t word" were
f r e q u e n t l y " j u s t as s a n c t i o n e d by t r a d i t i o n and j u s t as
c an o n ize d a s t h e i r e l e v a t e d models" (53, 55). A lthough
what B a k h tin p o i n t s out h e re i s th e f a c t t h a t th e l i t e r a r y
"community" has a u t h o r i z e d in c o m p a tib le , c o n f l i c t i n g s e t s
of v a l i d i t y c la im s in o rd e r to do j u s t i c e to an ever
r i c h e r , e v e r more v a r i e d " r e a l i t y , " or to in v en t ev er more
c o p io u s ly , i t i s obvious t h a t th e same p r i n c i p l e of
h e t e r o g e n e i t y is a p p l i c a b l e to th e f o rm a tio n of o th e r
d i s c o u r s e comm unities as w e l l.
210
A community should be d e fi n e d not so much by th e
p r i n c i p l e of s h a r i n g as by th e p r i n c i p l e of engagement,
which i s c l e a r l y embodied in th e a g re e m e n t/d isa g re e m e n t
dichotom y. To be in th e same community i s never to sh a re
th e same s t a n d a r d s , s t r a t e g i e s and a t t i t u d e s , f o r a
community so based would be condemned to d i s c u r s i v e
b a r r e n n e s s and s t e r i l i t y . I t is r a t h e r th e a b i l i t y to
engage each o t h e r in the common e f f o r t to " s i g n i f y m ore”
t h a t c h a r a c t e r i z e s members of th e same community. We
b elo ng to th e same r h e t o r i c a l community w ith anyone whose
d i s c o u r s e happens to engage our i n t e r e s t — e i t h e r in th e
p o si t ive se n se of s t r i k i n g us as " i n t e r e s t i n g , " "sens i b l e ,"
" e n l i g h t e n i n g , ” " e l o q u e n t , " " p e r s u a s i v e ; " or in the
n e g a t i v e se n se of sounding " p r o b l e m a t i c ," " f a l l a c i o u s , "
" s o p h i s t i c , " " u n s e t t l i n g , " "o u trag e o u s" or even " a b s u rd ."
For th e p r o v o c a t io n of new i n t e r e s t and th e p a s s in g of a
judgment a r e a l i k e in v e n t i v e a c t s , whose perform ance
p re s u p p o se s an agreem ent ( e . g . , s h a r i n g a t th e v e ry l e a s t
a common s e t of p r o b l e m a t i c s ) as well a s a d is a g r e e m e n t,
which is th e b a s i s f o r th e f e e l i n g of e i t h e r " i n t e r e s t i n g "
or " o u tr a g e o u s ." Only speech es to which we f e e l u t t e r l y
i n d i f f e r e n t can s a f e l y be s a id to have been produced by
p e o p le o t h e r th a n c a r d - c a r r y i n g f e llo w members or " s e c r e t
s h a r e r s " of our community.
211
As a model of sym bolic p r o d u c t i o n , th e r h e t o r i c of
i n v e n t i o n o f f e r s y e t a n o th e r v a n ta g e p o i n t from which to
o b se rv e and r e f l e c t on d i s c u r s i v e p r a c t i c e s . I t makes i t
e a s i e r , f o r example, to u n d e r s ta n d why s t u d e n t w r i t e r s a r e
e x p ec te d to sound a t once " o r i g i n a l " and " a p p r o p r i a t e , " and
why th e f i e l d of c o m p o sitio n th e o r y is b ein g p o l a r i z e d in to
th e camp en co u rag in g " e x p r e s s io n s " in th e w r i t e r ’s
" a u t h e n t i c v o ice " (which, a s has been p o in te d o u t, should
not be m ista k e n f o r sp e ak in g o n e ’ s own m ind), and th e
opposing camp dev oted to im p a rtin g or imposing th e
"community c o n v e n tio n s" t o th e s t u d e n t s . From th e
(
p e r s p e c t i v e of t h i s m o d el, i t i s th e same t e n s i o n between
th e im p e r a tiv e to a g re e and th e im p e r a tiv e to d i s a g r e e t h a t
e x p l a i n s T o ulm in’s "double g e s t u r e . " Toulmin has
a p p a r e n t l y a keen se n se t h a t th e f u r t h e r he d i f f e r s from
th e c o n v e n tio n a l view, th e g r e a t e r i n v e n t i v e space he would
make a v a i l a b l e f o r h i m s e l f , which a c c o u n ts f o r h i s
d e l i b e r a t e f o re g ro u n d in g of th e " r a d i c a l n e s s " of h i s
p r o p o s a l . He i s , a t th e same tim e , f u l l y aware of th e
p e r s u a s i v e or j u s t i f i c a t o r y n a t u r e of i n v e n tio n , of th e
f a c t t h a t th e e f f o r t to d i f f e r i s made p o s s i b l e and
s i g n i f i c a n t on ly by an e q u a l l y d e te rm in e d e f f o r t to
i d e n t i f y , which i s why he is c o n s t a n t l y t r y i n g to a p p eal to
th e same c o n v e n tio n a l c r i t e r i a he i s v i o l a t i n g , even a t th e
expense of having to c o n t r a d i c t h i m s e l f . Yet he seems to
212
have s u b s c r ib e d to th e n o t io n t h a t what backs up the
c u r r e n t norms i s th e on ly v a l i d " f i n a l v o c a b u la r y ."
I n s t e a d of s e a r c h in g f o r an a l t e r n a t i v e t e r m i n i s t i c s c r e e n
a l s o a c c e p t a b l e to th e d i s c o u r s e community, he seek s to
j u s t i f y h i s c a l l f o r a sweeping and c h a o t i c r e - o r d e r i n g
w ith th e law of th e c u r r e n t o r d e r . I t is l i t t l e wonder
t h a t he sho uld be h a u nted by a profound se n se of g u i l t and
a t tim es he should sound a s i f he was t r y i n g to f i n d an
"excuse" r a t h e r than to o f f e r a j u s t i f i c a t i o n .
Had th e r h e t o r i c of in v e n tio n been a c c e p te d a s a v a l i d
a l t e r n a t i v e model of d i s c o u r s e , Toulmin would not have
su g g e ste d t h a t h i s e s s a y s a r e a l l q u e s t i o n i n g , prov ok in g,
p r o b l e m a t i z i n g , j u s t as R ichard R o rty would not have
b e li e v e d t h a t i t i s p o s s i b l e to s t a r t a "vo cabu lary" a l l
anew w ith o u t r e g a r d i n g th e c u r r e n t c r i t e r i a , Jtirgen
Habermas would no t have m a in ta in e d t h a t a l l communicative
a c t s f u n c t i o n to r e a f f i r m th e " u n i v e r s a l v a l i d i t y claim s"
t h a t a r e a l r e a d y t h e r e , and Wayne Booth would c e r t a i n l y no t
have d e c l a r e d in The Company We Keep t h a t he i s d e d ic a t e d
on ly to " t u r n in g up what seems obvious" or " [ d i s c o v e r i n g ]
what sh a re d grounds rem ain a f t e r th e v a r i o u s c h a l le n g i n g
d e m o l i ti o n jo b s of r e c e n t y e a r s " (2 0 ). In d e p lo r i n g "th e
c u r r e n t c r i t i c a l scene" f o r a llo w in g "most 'o b v io u s '
b e l i e f s " to be " p ro b le m a tiz e d " (2 0 ), Booth a p p e a rs to be
th e d i a m e t r i c a l o p p o s i t e of Toulmin in term s of t h e i r
213
ap pro ach to d i s c o u r s e . A c l o s e ex am in a tio n shows, however,
t h a t they sh a re much more th a n th ey d i f f e r from each o t h e r .
Booth, l ik e Toulmin, te n d s to m is r e p r e s e n t h i s own mode of
in v e n t i o n . While t h e r e i s no denying h i s c o n s e r v a t i v e
s t a n c e , one must n o t ta k e th e abo ve-qu oted s t a t e m e n t s too
1i t e r a l l y and b e l i e v e t h a t a r h e t o r i c i a n of B o o th 's s t a t u r e
sho uld have c o n s id e re d i t j u s t i f i e d , d e s i r a b l e or
w o rth w h ile to dwell upon th e "obvious" in a d d r e s s in g an
a u d ie n c e . He d i s m is s e s " p r o b l e m a t i z a ti o n " as a f a d d is h
p r a c t i c e in p r e f e r e n c e fo r a " p o s i t i v e " a f f i r m a t i o n of t h a t
to which we a l l a g re e , f o r i n s t a n c e , y e t in th e same
t r e a t i s e on th e " e t h i c s of f i c t i o n , " he f i n d s Matthew
A r n o ld ’s "oft-m ocked a s s e r t i o n t h a t p o e tr y i s 'a c r i t i c i s m
of l i f e ' . . . p ro fo u n d ly r i g h t , " and he goes on to t e l l us
t h a t "[each ] f i c t i o n is a c r i t i c i s m of l i f e by b e in g a
c r i t i c i s m of o t h e r f i c t i o n s " (345, emphasis a d d ed ). And
d e s p i t e h i s p r o f e s s e d commitment to th e "sh a re d g ro u n d s ,"
he e nd eavo rs to d i f f e r e n t i a t e h im s e lf n ot j u s t from the
w id e ly a c c e p te d [ " f a s h i o n a b l e " ] t h e o r e t i c a l a ssu m p tio n s of
th e postm odern d i s c o u r s e , but from such tim e -h o n o re d
c l a s s i c a l p r i n c i p l e s of methodology as d e d u c tio n and
in d u c t i o n . He d e c l a r e s a t a c r i t i c a l j u n c t u r e of h i s
d i s c u s s i o n t h a t th e " lo g ic " we depend on in making e t h i c a l
a p p r a i s a l s of f i c t i o n " i s n e i t h e r d e d u c tio n from c l e a r
p r e m i s e s . . .nor i n d u c t i o n from a s e r i e s of p r e c i s e l y d e f i n e d
214
and i s o l a t e d i n s t a n c e s , " r a t h e r , " i t i s alw ays th e r e s u l t
of a d i r e c t se n se t h a t som ething now b e f o r e us has y i e l d e d
an e x p e r ie n c e t h a t we f i n d comparat i v e ly d e s i r a b l e .
o r , on th e o t h e r hand, c o m p a ra tiv e ly rep ug nan t" (7 1 ). T his
c o n c e p tio n i s so d i f f e r e n t from a l l e x i s t i n g a p p ro ach es to
e t h i c a l e v a l u a t i o n as to r e q u i r e a n eologism " c o d u c tio n ,"
which he d e f i n e s as
what we do whenever we say to the w orld .
"Of th e works of t h i s g e n e ra l kin d t h a t I have
e x p e r ie n c e d , comparing my e x p e r ie n c e w ith o t h e r
more or l e s s q u a l i f i e d o b s e r v e r s , t h i s one seem
to me among th e b e t t e r (or weaker) o n e s, or th e
b e s t (or w o r s t ) . Here a r e my r e a s o n s . " Every
such s ta te m e n t i m p l i c i t l y c a l l s fo r c o n tin u in g
c o n v e r s a t io n : "How does my c o d u c tio n compare
w ith yo u rs? . . . The v a l i d i t y of our c o d u c tio n s
must alw ays be c o r r e c t e d in c o n v e r s a t i o n s about
th e c o d u c tio n s of o t h e r s whom we t r u s t . They
w ill th u s alw ays be s u b j e c t to th e c o r r e c t i o n s
of tim e. (72-73)
Far from r e h a s h in g th e "obvious" to h i s r e a d e r s and s t a k i n g
out th e "sh a red g ro u n d s ," Booth in The Company Me Keep is
engaged in p r o b l e m a t i z i n g th e " g o in g ” p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s and
in c h a l l e n g i n g th e emerging new c o n se n s u s, as he as a
s c h o l a r - a u t h o r has been doing a l l th e tim e. His
i n f l u e n t i a l e s s a y "The R h e to r i c a l S ta n c e ," f o r example,
ta k e s shape as a r e s u l t of h i s c r i t i q u i n g o f "two or t h r e e
c o r r u p t i o n s , u n b alanced s t a n c e s o f t e n assumed by p e o p le who
th in k th e y a r e p r a c t i c i n g th e a r t s of p e rs u a s io n "
(Winterowd 75). In Modern Dogma and th e R h e to r ic of
A s s e n t . a n o th e r of h i s major works on r h e t o r i c , he f i n d s
215
h im s e lf " g ra p p lin g " w ith "unspoken assu m p tio n s" of th e then
dominant m o d e rn ist d i s c o u r s e , in p a r t i c u l a r w ith "some
v e r s i o n of th e m o d e rn ist dogmas about b e l i e f and d o u b t ”
whose r e f u t a t i o n he makes " c e n t r a l " in th e d i s c u s s i o n ( i x ) .
His avowed commitment to a " r h e t o r i c of a s s e n t " b e l i e s ,
t h e r e f o r e , a p en chant f o r r a d i c a l l y q u e s t i o n i n g the
v a l i d i t y of what is commonly assumed in th e c u r r e n t
d i s c u r s i v e p r a c t i c e s . And in h i s c o n s t a n t " la p s e " in to a
" n e g a tiv e " mode, m algre h i m s e l f , we have y e t a n o th e r
te s tim o n y to th e o f t - f o r g o t t e n r h e t o r i c a l p rem ise t h a t a
d isa g re e m e n t between th e sp e ak e r and th e a u d ie n c e is what
makes th e in v e n tio n of a speech n e c e s s a r y , j u s t i f i a b l e and
s u s t a i n a b l e in th e f i r s t p l a c e .
Even though m e t a - d i s c u r s i v e l y , Booth could be as
o n e -s id e d as Toulmin sometimes i s , h i s works, j u s t a s th o se
of T o ulm in’s, bear w it n e s s to the "c o n s u b s t a n t i a l i t y " of
a s s e n t and d i s s e n t as a g e n e r a t i n g p r i n c i p l e of r h e t o r i c a l
in v e n t i o n . Booth i s no t p a r t i c u l a r l y d e v oted to d e f i n i n g
th e "common grounds" he s h a r e s w ith th o se whose o p in io n s he
d i s m is s e s as " f a s h io n a b le " and " d e m o lis h in g ," a s our
d i s c u s s i o n has d i s c l o s e d , y e t th e r h e t o r i c a l im p e r a tiv e to
a d d r e s s th e a u d ie n c e does f o r c e him to t a l k in a language
u n d e r s t a n d a b le to a p ost-m od ern r e a d e r s h i p . In th e
" I n t r o d u c t io n " to The Company Ve K eep. he s u g g e s t s t h a t i t
is on b e h a l f o f , among o t h e r s , " f e m i n is t c r i t i c s a sk in g
216
e m b a rra ss in g q u e s t i o n s about a m ale-dom inated l i t e r a r y
c an on ," "black c r i t i c s p u r s u i n g . . . [ q u e s t i o n s ] about racism
in American c l a s s i c s " and "n e o -M a rx ists e x p lo r i n g c l a s s
b i a s e s in European l i t e r a r y t r a d i t i o n s " (5) t h a t he
u n d e r ta k e s to defend " e t h i c a l c r i t i c i s m " a g a i n s t a
w id e sp rea d " t h e o r e t i c a l s u s p ic io n " r e s p o n s i b l e f o r i t s
b e in g p r a c t i c e d today only " s u r r e p t i t i o u s l y , o f t e n
g u i l t i l y , and o f t e n badly" (1 9 ). And a lth o u g h he i s most
u n s p a r in g w ith th e d e c o n s t r u c t i o n i s t s , he i d e n t i f i e s them
w ith h i s p o s i t i o n n o n e th e le s s by p o i n t i n g out t h a t th e y too
"have an e t h i c a l program in mind" and, more i n t e r e s t i n g l y ,
by q u i e t l y i n c o r p o r a t i n g th e D e r r id e a n co n cep t of
d i f f S r a n c e i n to h i s new m eth o d o lo g ic al p r i n c i p l e of
co d u c tio n , which s t i p u l a t e s t h a t e t h i c a l judgem ents a re
alw ays d i f f e r e n t i a 1 ([They a r e rea c h e d on th e b a s i s of]
"comparing my e x p e r ie n c e w ith o t h e r more or l e s s q u a l i f i e d
o b s e r v e r s . . . The v a l i d i t y of our c o d u c tio n s must always
be c o r r e c t e d in c o n v e r s a t io n s about th e c o d u c tio n s of
o t h e r s whom we t r u s t " ) and d e f e r r e d ("Every such s ta te m e n t
i m p l i c i t l y c a l l s f o r c o n tin u in g c o n v e r s a t io n
[C o du ctio ns] w i l l always be s u b j e c t to the c o r r e c t i o n s of
tim e: tim e a lo n e can y i e l d th e f u r t h e r com parisons t h a t can
te a c h u s, a g a in by c o d u c tio n , w hether our o r i g i n a l
a p p r a i s a l s can con firm them selves in f u r t h e r e x p e r i e n c e " ) .
T h is , of c o u rs e , does not mean t h a t Booth can in any
217
se n se be seen as a d e c o n s t r u c t i o n i s t in d i s g u i s e . Whereas
D e r rid a i s i n t e r e s t e d in e v e n t u a l l y d e m o lish in g "a
co n c e p tu a l and i n s t i t u t i o n a l s t r u c t u r e of i n v e n t i o n t h a t
would n e u t r a l i z e by p u t t i n g th e stamp of re a s o n on some
a s p e c t of i n v e n t i o n , " Booth u s u a l l y a l l i e s h im s e lf w ith
Habermas and i s a p p a r e n t l y in fav o r of c o n tin u o u s ly
improving and p e r f e c t i n g such a s t r u c t u r e and of keeping
"th e stamp of reaso n " i n t a c t . Such a p o s i t i o n is im plied
in h i s d e f i n i t i o n of r h e t o r i c , in Modern Dogma and the
R h e to r ic of A s s e n t , as " th e a r t of d is c o v e r ing w a r r a n t a b l e
b e l i e f s and improving th o s e b e l i e f s in s h a re d d i s c o u r s e , "
and in h i s d e c l a r a t i o n t h a t th e " r h e t o r i c of a s s e n t ” he has
been championing " a tte m p ts m erely to be a commonsensical
d e fe n se of th e way we n a t u r a l l y . i n e s c a p a b l y . work upon
each o t h e r , because we a r e made n r h e t o r i c " ( x i i i , 141,
emphasis a d d ed). I t i s a l s o d e m o n stra te d in h i s
s t i p u l a t i o n in The Company We Keep t h a t th e " c o d u c tio n ,"
which s i g n i f i e s in e f f e c t B o o th ’s c o n c e p tio n of the
in v e n t i o n a l p r o c e s s , sho uld be c a r r i e d out by comparing
n o te s w ith on ly th e "more or l e s s q u a l i f i e d o b s e r v e r s " or
w ith only " o th e r s whom we t r u s t , " presum ably n o t in c lu d in g
th o s e whose d e v o tio n to a " r h e t o r i c of doubt" or
p r e o c c u p a t io n w ith " c h a lle n g in g d e m o litio n j o b s ” has
re n d e re d them u n t r u s t w o r t h y . For in s u g g e s t i n g t h a t
r h e t o r i c a l i n v e n tio n should aim a t " im p ro v in g ” d i s c o v e r a b l e
218
or p r e - e x i s t e n t " b e l i e f s " as well as d e fe n d in g th e
" n a t u r a l " way of working upon each o t h e r , or t h a t i t should
be o r i e n t e d toward th e lik e -m in d e d and th e t r u s t e d a s th e
a u d ie n c e and th e ju d g es, he a p p e a rs to be p ro p o sin g a model
of i n v e n t i o t h a t p o i n t s to th e d i r e c t i o n of what D e rrid a
condemns as th e " c lo s u r e of a u ti s m ."
His good r h e t o r i c a l s e n se , however, checks t h i s
a u t i s t i c ten den cy and f o r c e s him to make a number of
t h e o r e t i c a l moves i n c o n s i s t e n t w ith h i s p r o f e s s e d
commitment to th e "com m onsensical" or th e " o b v io u s." He
i n s i s t s t h a t d i s c u r s i v e p r a c t i c e sh ou ld be o r i e n t e d toward
"th e d is c o v e r y t h a t a g iv e n b e l i e f t h a t f i t s our own
s t r u c t u r e s of p e r c e p t i o n and b e l i e f i s su p p o rte d by th o se
q u a l i f i e d to know," or th e d i s c o v e r y of an agreem ent,
a s s e n t , a f f i n i t y t h a t a f f i r m s our own “f i n a l v o c ab u lary " as
th e " n a t u r a l " or th e " c o r r e c t " one. Yet he a l s o i n s t i l l s
a h e a l t h y doubt i n to t h i s p r o c e s s of a f f i r m a t i o n when he
warns a g a i n s t th e t e m p t a t io n to make th e " m is ta k e ” of
" c o n f e r r in g the s t a t u s of q u a l i f i e d e x p e r t on someone
because he a g re e s w ith us" (Modern Dogma 108). In a more
s p e c i f i c d i s c u s s i o n on how such a c o n v e r s a t i o n is a c t u a l l y
con du cted , he even goes so f a r as to s u g g e st t h a t f o r a l l
our p r e f e r e n c e f o r a g re e m e n t. what c o n f r o n t s us in e s c a p a b ly
and u l t i m a t e l y i s an u n s o lv a b le d i s a g r e e m e n t :
219
When any b e l i e f seems s e l f - e v i d e n t and we
f i n d e m p i r i c a l l y t h a t we can t h in k of nobody who
in f a c t d o u b ts i t , we w ill be su re about i t ;
when we f i n d , a s we u s u a l l y w i l l , t h a t some men
deny what we a l l a g re e t o , we w i l l be l e s s s u re
but s t i l l a b l e to a c t on our knowledge w ith
c o n fid e n c e , so long as we th in k we c ou ld
p e rsu a d e any r e a s o n a b l e p e rs o n . But when we
f i n d o u r s e l v e s or th e p o s t u l a t e d e x p e r t s
d i s a g r e e i n g , we w ill become more t e n t a t i v e . . .
And f i n a l l y , we w i l l be aware t h a t t h e r e can be
a genuine c o n f l i c t of t h i s kin d of
k n o w le d g e .. .we have no re a so n to assume t h a t th e
world i s r a t i o n a l in th e se n se of h arm on izing
a l l of our " l o c a l" v a lu e s : in f a c t we know t h a t
a t ev ery moment i t p r e s e n t s . . . sh a rp c l a s h e s
among good r e a s o n s . (Modern Dogma 110, emphasis
added)
D e s p ite h i s r e p u t a t i o n as a c o n s e r v a t i v e f o u n d a t i o n a l i s t ,
th e "supreme purpose" of r h e t o r i c is f o r him, s u r p r i s i n g l y
enough, n e i t h e r th e d i s c o v e r y of "good re a so n s " nor the
f o r g i n g of an ever expanding c o n sen su s. R a th e r, i t l i e s in
th e need "always . . . to perform as well as p o s s i b l e in
th e same prim al sym bolic d a n ce ." And as he se es i t , the
"p r o c e s s of i n q u ir y th ro u g h d is c o u r s e " is "more im p o rtan t
th a n any p o s s i b l e c o n c l u s i o n s , and w hatever s t u l t i f i e s such
f u l f i l l m e n t becomes d e m o n stra b ly wrong" (Modern Dogma 137).
While i t is d i f f i c u l t to see how t h e s e o p in io n s can
sq u a re w ith h i s i n s i s t e n c e to f i n d in w i l l i n g n e s s to a g re e
a supreme v i r t u e and to see a p r o p e n s i ty to d i s a g r e e in a
v e ry n e g a t iv e l i g h t , th ey do show Booth a t h i s r h e t o r i c a l
b e s t . For in t h e i r a r t i c u l a t i o n he q u i e t l y p a r t s company
w ith h i s p u b l i c image a s a t i r e l e s s champion of b e l i e f and
220
agreem ent, and p ro ves h im s e lf c a p a b le of t r a n s g r e s s i n g h i s
own co n ce p tu a l framework of a " s y s te m a t i c a s s e n t , " c a p a b le
of d i s a g r e e i n g r a d i c a l l y , t h a t i s , even w ith h im s e lf when
d i s s e n t i s r e q u i r e d or w a rra n te d by th e im p e r a tiv e to
in v e n t. At tim e s, h i s d e ep ly h e ld b e l i e f t h a t "we a r e made
in r h e t o r i c " e n a b le s him to tr a n s c e n d a p e r s i s t e n t , w i s t f u l
y e a rn in g f o r a s o l i d co n ce p tu a l a n c h o rin g . The co n ce p tu a l
framework w i t h in which he c o nd ucts h i s s e a r c h f o r "sh ared
grounds" le a d s to h i s i r o n i c a l r e a l i z a t i o n t h a t "we" is
d e f i n a b l e more by th e r e a l i t y of " d is a g r e e in g " or "genuine
c o n f l i c t " th an by th e id eal of a p r e v a i l i n g c o n sen su s, and
t h a t "good r e a s o n s ," i n s t e a d of b e in g co m p a tib le w ith one
a n o th e r , do come a l l th e tim e i n to "sh a rp c l a s h e s . " Booth
has not shown any s u s t a i n e d i n t e r e s t in f o llo w in g up and
e x p lo r i n g h i s n o t i o n of a "primal sym bolic d a n ce ." He
p ro b a b ly w i l l n ever fo llo w Erasmus in g r a n t i n g copia th e
s t a t u s of a " d iv in e e x c e lle n c e " CDe Copia 11). Nor i s i t
l i k e l y t h a t he would ever j o i n r h e t o r i c i a n s of h i s own
tim e , such as W . Ross Winterowd, in c o n f e s s in g t h e i r "love
f o r chaos and freedom" in i n v e n tio n and in m a in ta in in g t h a t
" to p ic s " should " l i b e r a t e " r a t h e r th a n " sh a c k le th e mind"
(Winterowd 48). Yet in h i s pronouncement t h a t "whatever
s t u l t i f i e s [ th e f u l f i l l m e n t of in v e n t i v e p ro c e s s ] becomes
de m o n stra b ly w ro n g ,” we do have a n o th e r appeal f o r "a r i c h
copia of th o u g h ts and words o v e rflo w in g in a golden
221
s tr e a m ," which Erasmus f i n d s "more a d m ira b le or more
s p le n d id " than any o t h e r t h in g d i s c u r s i v e ( De Copia 11).
222
NOTES
I n t r o d u c t ion
1 Although t h i s c o n te x tu a l ex pansion has
s i g n i f i c a n t l y changed th e scope and o b j e c t of r h e t o r i c a l
i n q u ir y , i t has so f a r f a i l e d to draw a t t e n t i o n from
c o m p arativ e s t u d i e s of c l a s s i c a l and modern d i s c o u r s e
t h e o r i e s . For a c r i t i c a l commentary on c u r r e n t e f f o r t s to
d i f f e r e n t i a t e t h e s e two p hases in th e h i s t o r y of r h e t o r i c ,
see Andrea A. L unsford and L is a S. Ede, "On D i s t i n c t i o n s
between C l a s s i c a l and Modern R h e to r i c , " E ssays on C l a s s i c a l
R h e to r ic and Modern D i s c o u r s e , ed. R obert J . Connors e t a l .
CCarbondale, IL: Sou th ern I l l i n o i s UP, 1984) 37-49.
2 I t i s Vico t h a t made a d i s t i n c t i o n between ingenium
and r a t i o in h i s h u m a n is tic c o n c e p tio n of r h e t o r i c . V ic o ’s
d i s c u s s i o n on ingenium, however, is f u l l y i n c o r p o r a te d in to
G r a s s i ’ s own th e o r y .
3 In h i s p r o f i l e of R ichard McKeon, f o r i n s t a n c e ,
Thomas M. Conley s u g g e s ts t h a t th e l a t e p h i l o s o p h e r ’s
" se a rc h f o r p r i n c i p l e d a p p l i c a t i o n s of p h i lo s o p h ic a l
t h in k i n g to th e problem s of th e contem porary world" had led
him "from d i a l e c t i c to r h e t o r i c , " and t h a t h i s is a
" r h e t o r i c of in v e n tio n " s u i t a b l e f o r "the d i s c u s s i o n and
r e s o l u t i o n of problem s p e c u l i a r to th e age of i n t e r n a t i o n a l
c o n f l i c t and c o o p e r a t i o n , t e c h n o lo g i c a l in n o v a tio n , and
r a p i d change." See Conley, 285-291. And Frank J. D’Angelo
c i t e s F o u c a u l t ’s "What I s an Author?" in su p p o rt of the
t h e s i s t h a t in v e n t i o n is a " s o c i a l a c t , " w ith o u t
c o n s id e r in g how th e concept of th e " o r i g i n a t o r s of
d is c o u r s e " can be made to sq u a re w ith th e c o n c e p tio n of
w r i t i n g as " s o c i a l a c t i v i t i e s . " See Frank J . D’Angelo,
"Foreword," in Karen Burke LeFevre, I n v e n t i o n as a Social
Act (C arbo nd ale, IL: S outhern I l l i n o i s UP, 1987).
4 E r ic C h a rle s White, Kaironomia: On th e W i l l - t o -
In v en t ( I t h a c a , N. Y , : C o rn e ll UP, 1987).
C hapter I I
1 See in p a r t i c u l a r th e " I n t r o d u c t i o n " to A Grammar
of M o tiv e s .
223
Chapter I I I
1 R orty 8n. R orty t a k e s b o th N ie tz sc h e and D e rrid a
to ta s k f o r th e " c o n fu s io n s " th ey c r e a t e when th ey deny the
k n o w a b ility of " r e a l i t y " and th e e x is te n c e of " t r u t h " y e t
c o n tin u e to make e x p l i c i t or i m p l i c i t c la im s f o r t h e i r
knowledge of th e " r e a l" or th e " t r u e . "
2 W. K. Wimsatt and Monroe C. B e a rd s le y , "The
I n t e n t i o n a l F a l l a c y , " C r i t i c a l Theory S ince P l a t o , ed.
Hazard Adams (San Diego: H a rco u rt Brace Jo v a n o v ich , 1971)
1022. According to Wimsatt and B e a rd sle y , th e meaning of
a t e x t has n o th in g to do w ith th e t e x t ’s o r i g i n , the
i n t e n t i o n of i t s a u th o r and th e r e a d e r ’s re s p o n se to i t .
To in v o lv e th e s e " i r r e l e v a n t " p o i n t s in th e b u s i n e s s of
r e a d in g and i n t e r p r e t i n g , in t h e i r o p in io n , is to
compromise th e autonomy of th e t e x t .
3 Roland B a r th e s , "The Death of th e A u th o r," Modern
L i t e r a r y T h e o ry , e d . P h i l i p Rice and P a t r i c i a Waugh
(London: Edward A rnold, 1989) 118.
4 S ta n le y F is h , " I n t r o d u c t i o n , " Is There a Text in
T his C lass? (Cambridge, M ass.: H arvard UP, 1980).
5 Jane P. Tompkins, "An I n t r o d u c t i o n to
Reader-R esponse C r i t i c i s m , " R eader-Response C r i t i c i s m , e d .
Jane P. Tompkins (B a ltim o re : The Johns Hopkins UP, 1980)
xi i .
6 Michel F o u c a u lt, The A rchaeology of Knowledge (New
York: Pantheon Books, 1972) 5.
7 Edward S a id , " S e c u la r C r i t i c i s m , " The World, the
Text and th e C r i t i c (New York: Faber and Faber, 1984)
28-29.
8 D e sp ite th e enormous i n t e r e s t r h e t o r i c i a n s and
c o m p o s i t i o n i s t s have shown in Jacques D e rr id a , t h e i r
s t u d i e s of h i s works tend to a c c e p t as t h e i r p o i n t of
d e p a r t u r e a p h i lo s o p h ic a l or a l i t e r a r y p e r s p e c t i v e on the
d e c o n s t r u c t i o n i s t . J a s p e r Neel in h i s P l a t o . D e r r id a and
W ritin g (C arbondale: S o uth ern I l l i n o i s UP, 1988), fo r
i n s t a n c e , se e s D e rrid a c h i e f l y as th e a l t e r ego of P l a to
b e n t on r e - a p p r o p r i a t i n g w r i t i n g in th e name of p h ilo s o p h y .
And in h i s App1i ed Grammato1ogy (B a ltim o re : The Johns
Hopkins UP, 1985), Gregory L. Ulmer l o c a te s a "new r h e t o r i c
of in v e n tio n " in th o se of D e r r i d a ’s s t y l i s t i c " in n o v a tio n s "
which, d i s c o u r a g in g a l l b ut th e most de te rm in e d r e a d e r s
224
from g iv in g many of h i s t e x t s an a t t e n t i v e r e a d in g , a re in
e f f e c t r h e t o r i c a l l y c o u n te r p r o d u c t iv e . D e rrid a h im s e lf
p e r c e i v e s of r h e t o r i c in term s e i t h e r of a s o p h i s t i c a l
" p la y fu l te c h n iq u e " or of a d i s c i p l i n e concerned only w ith
f i g u r e s and t r o p e s , and t h i s m is p e r c e p tio n might in p a r t be
r e s p o n s i b l e f o r th e lack of a tt e m p t s to see him from a
r h e t o r i c a l p o in t of view.
9 W illiam M. A. G rim a ld i, "The A r i s t o t e l i a n T o p ic s,"
A r i s t o t l e : The C l a s s i c a l H e r ita g e of R h e t o r i c , ed. K eith V.
E ric k so n (Metuchen, N .J .: The Scarecrow P r e s s , 1974) 176.
10 For an overview of t h e s e s c h o l a r l y o p in io n s , see
Donovan J . Ochs, " A r i s t o t l e ’s Concept of Formal T o p ic s ," in
K e ith V. E ric k so n e d . , A r i s t o t 1e 194-204.
11 All r e f e r e n c e s a re to B o e th iu s , De T o p ic is
D i f f e r e n t i i s . t r a n s . E leonore Stump ( I t h a c a : C ornell UP,
1978). B o e th iu s is unique in s t r e s s i n g th e d i f f e r e n t i a l
n a tu r e of t o p o i , y e t h i s o r i g i n a l i t y has y e t to be
p r o p e r l y re c o g n iz e d . In h i s b r i e f comment on De T o n ic is
D i f f e r e n t i i s in C l a s s i c a l R h e to ric and I t s C h r i s t i a n and
S e c u la r T r a d i t i o n From A ncient to Modern Times (Chapel
H i l l , N.C.: The U. of North C a ro lin a P . , 1980), fo r
i n s t a n c e , George A. Kennedy makes no m ention a t a l l of t h i s
s t r i k i n g p e r s p e c t i v e . And a lth o u g h Conley in h i s R h e to ric
in th e European T r a d i t i o n does r e f e r to B o e t h i u s ’s
d i s t i n c t i o n between th e " t o p ic a l p r i n c i p l e " and the
" t o p i c a l d i f f e r e n c e , " he too m isse s th e p o i n t when he
s u g g e s ts t h a t "Because th e number of such p r i n c i p l e s is
g r e a t , B o e th iu s i n tr o d u c e s th e n o t io n of t o p i c a l
d i f f e r e n c e s , which p ro v id e s him w ith a method of g ro uping
and a r r a n g i n g p r i n c i p l e s in a manageable way" (79 ).
12 Ochs 195.
13 See, in p a r t i c u l a r , G erald G r a f f ’s p o in te d
q u e s t i o n in "Afterw ord: Toward an E th ic of D isc u ss io n " in
L im ited Inc (E van sto n, IL: N o rth w e stern UP, 1988) 114.
14 B arbara Johnson, " T r a n s l a t o r ’s I n t r o d u c t i o n , "
D is s e m in a tio n (Chicago: The U. of Chicago P ., 1981) x iv.
15 Gregory L. Ulmer, Ap p 1ied Grammato1ogy x i i .
16 Johnson x v i.
17 Johnson x v i - x v i i .
225
18 R orty 125.
19 R orty 125-126.
20 Johnson x v i - x v i i .
21 Ulmer xi i .
22 Ju rg e n Habermas, The P h i l o s o p h ic a l D isc o u rse of
M o d e rn ity . t r a n s . F. Lawrence (Cambridge, Mass: MIT P r e s s ,
1987) 187.
E p ilo gu e
1 In h i s e s s a y s " R h e to ric R e s tr a in e d " and " F i g u r e s ,"
G e n ette se e s th e "promotion" of metaphor to th e s t a t u s of
th e su p er f i g u r e as th e r e s u l t of a r e d u c t i v e h i s t o r i c a l
p r o c e s s t h a t g r a d u a l l y narrow s down the scope of r h e t o r i c
u n t i l i t i s i d e n t i f i e d w ith no more th an th e stu d y of a
s i n g l e tr o p e . G e n ette would l i k e to see t h i s p ro c e ss
r e v e r s e d . He b e l i e v e s t h a t s t a r t i n g from a
r e c o n c e p t u a l i z a t i o n of metaphor as m erely one among many
f i g u r e s , we can succeed in u s h e r in g in a "new r h e t o r i c "
which would be "a s e m io t i c s of d i s c o u r s e s . . . [ o f ] a l l
d i s c o u r s e s . " For him, "[what] can be r e t a i n e d of th e old
r h e t o r i c i s not . . . i t s c o n te n t, but i t s example, i t s
form, i t s p a ra d o x ic a l idea of l i t e r a t u r e as an o r d e r based
on the a m b ig u ity of s i g n s , on th e t i n y , b ut v e r t i g i n o u s
space t h a t opens up between two words h aving th e same
meaning, two meanings of th e same word: two languages in
th e same lan g u ag e." For a c l o s e r look a t G e n e t t e ’s
c o n c e p tio n of a r h e t o r i c l i b e r a t e d , see in p a r t i c u l a r
G e n e tte , 1982 45-60, 103-126.
2 Quoted by Perelm an (The New R h e to r ic 125) in
su p p o rt of h i s i n t e r e s t i n g s u g g e s t i o n t h a t "th e im p re ssio n
of c l a r i t y , lin k e d w ith u n i v o c i t y , is th e p ro d u c t of
ign oran ce o r of lack of i m a g i n a t i o n . ” From th e p e r s p e c t i v e
of our d i s c u s s i o n , i t i s obvious t h a t th e im p re ss io n of
c l a r i t y i s symptomatic a l s o of a lack of i n v e n t i v e
p o s s i b i 1i t y .
226
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