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Content MANAGEMENT OF THE COURTS: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF COURT ADMINISTRATION AND THE PRESIDING JUDGE ROLE by STEVEN ALTMAN Dissertation presented to the FACULTY OF THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree DOCTOR OF BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION APRIL 1975 UMI Number: DP23917 All rights reserved INFORMATION TO ALL USERS The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted. In the unlikely event that the author did not send a complete manuscript and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed, a note will indicate the deletion. UMT Dissertation Publishing UMI DP23917 Published by ProQuest LLC (2014). Copyright in the Dissertation held by the Author. Microform Edition © ProQuest LLC. All rights reserved. This work is protected against unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code ProQuest ProQuest LLC. 789 East Eisenhower Parkway P.O. Box 1346 Ann Arbor, Ml 48106- 1346 @ Copyright by STEVEN ALTMAN 1975 c © DBA ' 75T This dissertation, written by STEVEN ALTMAN under the guidance of the faculty Committee, and approved by all its members, has been presented to and accepted by the Faculty of the Graduate School of Business Administra tion in partial fulfillment of the require ments for the degree of DOCTOR OF BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION Date Approved: Chairman Acknowledgment Several people deserve mention for their timely and helpful contribution to the completion of this work. I would like to thank the members of my committee: Dr. Milton G. Holmen, Dr. C. Jack Pounders and Dr. Daniel Kasper for their patience, support and encouragement throughout. Dr. Holmen especially provided inspiration in the final stages of my research and generally made my en tire job easier. The difficult job of typing the manuscript in such fine fashion was completed by Mrs. Ruth Chapman. Under sometimes terrible conditions she was diligent and hard working for which I am extremely grateful. My greatest thanks, however, go to my wife, Judy, who continually provided patient.support and help for what seemed to be a never-ending project. She made numerous sacrifices of her own time and was always available for help whenever I needed it. This project could not have been completed without her loving understanding and concern for getting the job done. TABLE OF CONTENTS ; Page A cknowledgment ........................................ ii LIST OF TABLES .........................................vii CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION .................................... 1 Purpose of Study ................................ 4 S c o p e .......................................... 6 The Organization of the Courts................. 6 The Management Organization of the Courts . . . 10 II. REVIEW OF PREVIOUS RESEARCH................... 16 Studies of Court Administration ............... 16 Literature on Role Conflict................... 21 Studies of Power................................ 28 Studies of Leadership ......................... 34 Research Hypotheses ............................ 40 Hypothesis 1: Conflict and Method of Selection............... 42 Hypothesis 2: Power and Method of Selection................. 42 Hypothesis 3: Conflict and Power ........ 43 Hypothesis 4: Presiding Judge Per ceived R o l e ............ . 44 Hypothesis 5: Presiding Judge Per ceived R o l e ............... 44 Hypothesis 6: Conflict and Court Congestion................. 44 Hypothesis 7: Power and Court Congestion................. 44 Hypothesis 8: Calendaring and Court Congestion................. 45 III. METHOD...................................... 46 The Mail Survey Sample...................... 46 Construction of Questionnaire ................. 49 Hill's Power Scale ....................... 50 Conflict Scale ............................ 51 Page Remaining Items ............................ 52 Pretest of Questionnaire ................. 53 Validity of Questionnaire Instruments . . . 54 Reliability of Questionnaire Instruments . 55 The Congestion Index ........................... 57 Method of Data Collection..................... 64 Analysis of Data................................ 65 The Interview P h a s e ........................... 70 IV. RESULTS........................................ 71 Characteristics of the Sample................. 71 Method of Selection....................... 71 Length of Term of Office................ 73 Court Sizes................................ 74 Summary.................................... 77 Tests of Hypotheses............................ 77 Hypothesis 1: Presiding Judge Role Conflict and Method of Selection................. 77 Hypothesis 2: Presiding Judge Perceived Power and Method of Selection................. 79 Hypothesis 3: Conflict and Power ........ 82 Hypothesis 4: Presiding Judge Perceived Role....................... 82 Hypothesis 5: Presiding Judge Perceived Role....................... 82 Hypothesis 6: Conflict and Court Congestion................. 8 5 Hypothesis 7: Power and Court Congestion . 8 5 Hypothesis 8: Calendaring and Court Congestion................. 89 Summary of Results of Hypothesis Tests ......... 91 Secondary Analysis .............................. 92 Conflict.................................. 92 Length of Service................... 93 Number of Judges in C o u r t ........... 94 Metropolitan Population ............. 95 Power...................................... 96 Length of Service................... 96 Number of Judges in C o u r t ........... 97 Metropolitan Population ............. 98 Summary of Secondary Tests on Conflict and Power ........ ........... 99 Summary of Open-Ended Questionnaire Items . . . .99 Results of Interviews 101 iv ( Page V. DISCUSSION ................................110 Limitation of the S t u d y ....................... 110 Generalizability ......................... 110 Sampling Bias..............................Ill Data Based on Self-Reports...............Ill Validity and Reliability of Power and Conflict Scales.................Ill Judicial Statistics ....................... 112 Investigator's Resources ................. 112 Discussion of Findings Regarding the Presiding Judge Role ............ . 113 Relationship of Presiding Judge Role to Court Efficiency......................... 121 Case Assignment System and Court Efficiency . . 125 Implications of Present Study to Organiza tional Theories of the Courts.............127 VI. RECOMMENDATIONS AND SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH ................................ 130 The Model Presiding Judge Role.................130 Recommendations ................................ 133 Court Administration..................... 133 Unification of State Courts ........ 13 3 Establishment of a Hierarchy ........ 134 Use of Individual Calendar...........137 Establishment of Statewide Center for Court Organizational Development..................... 139 Appointment of Judges ............... 140. Presiding Judges ....................... 141 Selection............................141 Term of Office....................... 141 Authority............................142 Court Personnel..................... 142 Establishment of Evaluation Procedures..................... 14 3 Establishment of Court Administrators. 14 8 Presiding Judge Training ............. 149 Suggestions fox Future Research ............... 150 Presiding Judge R o l e ........................151' More Complete Leader Description . . . 151 Role of Subordinates.................152 Use of Judge Teams...................153 Relationships of Leader Behavior to Court Efficiency ............. 153 v ; Page i ! Court Administration 154 ; Data Collection.........................154 Management Audits . ................. 154 The Planning Function ............... 155 Relationships to Other Segments of the Criminal Justice System . . . 155 Use of Paraprofessionals............... 156 Use of Videotape for Testimony .... 156 VII. SUMMARY........................................... 158 ! ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY.................................. 162 ;APPENDIX A: Questionnaire ............................ 177 I APPENDIX B: Initial Covering Letter ................. 184 APPENDIX C: Follow-up Letter ........................ 185 APPENDIX D: Interview Guide .......................... 18 6 APPENDIX E: States Represented in Sample ........... 18 8 vi LIST OF TABLES Table Page 1. Method of Selection 72 2. Method of Selection: Summarized 72 3. Term of Office 73 4. Term of Office: Summarized 73 5. Length of Actual Service: Summarized 74 6. Number of Judges in Court 75 7. Number of Judges in Court: Summarized 75 8. Metropolitan Population of Sample Courts 76 9. Metropolitan Population of Sample Courts: Summarized 76 H O • t-test: Presiding Judge Mean Conflict by Method of Selection 78 11. Absolute Differences Between Means on Selected Conflict Items 79 12. t-test: Presiding Judge Mean Perceived Power by Method of Selection 80 13. Absolute Differences Between Means on Selected Power Items 81 14. Rank Correlation Between Power and Conflict 82 15. Chi-Square Analysis: Presiding Judge Self- Perceived Role by Method of Selection 83 16. Chi-Square Analysis: Presiding Judge Self- Perceived Role by Method of Selection 83 17. Chi-Square Analysis: Presiding Judge Self- Perceived Role by Method of Selection 85 18. Rank Correlation Analysis: Conflict, Power and Court Congestion 86 19. Rank Correlation Analysis: Conflict, Power and Court Congestion by Demographic Factors 88 20. t-test: Calendar Method and Efficiency 89 21. t-test: Mean Conflict Scores by Case Assignment Method 90 22. t-test: Mean Perceived Conflict by Length of Service 93 23. t-test: Mean Conflict by Number of Judges in Court 94 24. t-test: Mean Conflict by Metropolitan Population 96 25. t-test: Mean Power by Length of Service 97 26. t-test: Mean Power by Number of Judges in Court 98 Page, 27. t-test: Mean Power by Metropolitan Population 99 i 28. Frequencies of Open-Ended Responses 100 29. Presiding Judges Conflict: Distribution of Responses from Interviews 106 viii CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION "The challenges to our systems of justice are colossal (and immediate and we must assign priorities. I would begin !by giving priority to methods and machinery, to procedure I |and techniques, to management and administration of judi cial resources even over the much needed re-examination of 'substantive legal institutions that are out of date."'*" The Chief Justice of the United States, like many be fore, him, has recognized the necessity for efficient admin-1 istration of the courts. It has been almost 70 years since Roscoe Pound delivered his famous speech in which he called 2 for modern management techniques for the courts. Forty years have passed since William Howard Taft asked for modern management processes to the business of administer- Warren E. Burger, "Deferred Maintenance," in United States, Department of Justice, Justice in the States : (St. Paul: West Publishing Company, 1971), p. 11. 2 Roscoe Pound, "The Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction ‘with the Administration of Justice," address before the 'American Bar Association, 1906, reprinted in Walter F. Murphy and C. H. Pritchett, Courts, Judges, and Politics , (New York: Random House, 1961), pp. 41-46. I 1 ~ i 'ing the courts. Earl Warren made the same plea twenty j ! 2 3 ! |years ago and Warren Burger is repeating it today. Un fortunately, the reason these distinguished Chief Justices j i are saying the same thing is because little has been done 1 'in response to their demands. The literature on court man agement is shallow to say the least; this field has rela- i itively no research base from which to progress. Most lit- i erature has taken the form of armchair theorizing, and it j jwas not until the late 1960's that any serious inquiry was 'undertaken. Today's courts have a number of administrative prob lems that contribute substantially to inefficient adminis tration of justice. The planning and control functions of jbasic management theory are just now being defined in terms of the judiciary. System-wide accountability is non-exis- i tent and authority structures are weak. The result of this 4 has been a "crisis in the .courts," with increasing back- Walter F. Murphy, "Chief Justice Taft and the Lower Court Bureaucracy," Journal of Politics, Vol. XXIV (1962), p . 453. 2 Earl Warren, "The Administration of the Courts," | Judicature, Vol. 51, No. 6 (January, 1968), p. 198. 3 ’ | Warren E. Burger, "Court Administrators - Where Would i iWe Find Them?," Judicature, Vol. 53, No. 4 (1970), p. 108. I 4 1 Howard James, "Crisis in the Courts," Judicature, ’ ;Vol. 51, No. 8 (March, 1968), p. 283. ilogs, judges who do not carry their fair share of the work-i I I |load, courts which open late and close early, delay, ob- jstruction to change and growing public dissatisfaction. i The problem is widespread. Rectification is limited by slow governmental machinery required before change can occur. The professional nature and fierce independence of judges further impedes attempts to change. ' The trial courts, however, are the keystone of a I state's system of criminal and civil justice. In addition, I they have considerable impact on the financing of various 1 local governmental services through the generation and dis tribution of court revenues. The importance of the courts ;to the public cannot be over-estimated; it is a matter of ivital concern that they operate efficiently, effectively |and according to the highest standards of judicial adminis tration. The presiding judge is a key role in the state court organization in that he is responsible for the operations of a multi-judge jurisdiction. The presiding judge is of particular interest to students of court management because it is the principal link between the judicial branch and ■the public it serves. The interests, priorities, and values of the judges who sit on the bench and the adminis trator are not, of course, always compatible. Consequent ly, one might expect the presiding judge role to be the locus of tension, ambiguity and, at times, conflict. 3 | There is already a small body of literature of a de scriptive nature which generally delineates the presiding ! 1 ' [judge's functions and responsibilities.. Much less atten- i jtion has been paid to the more dynamic aspects of the presiding judge role, and the impact this has on the effectiveness by which cases are handled. Moreover, as far as can be ascertained, there has been little investi gation to date regarding how the presiding judges feel in their role nor of the manner in which they carry out their .generally described duties. Purpose of Study I i The present study is an effort to remedy the lack of i comparative, systematic research on the presiding judge. The purpose of the investigation is to assess operational differences in court operation based on differences in the strength of leadership of the presiding judge, the method of his selection, and the authority by which he operates. Specifically, a major concern of the research is to deter mine if differences in the structure of various courts affect the amount of power the presiding judge has in his 'administrative decision-making, and the degree of conflict See for example, National Conference of Metropolitan [Courts, Standards Relating to the Office of Trial Court Chief Judge (Los Angeles, 1973), and American Bar Associa- tion, The Improvement in the Administration of Justice (Chicago, 1971). j he faces in making decisions affecting the rest of the 1 | I 1 court. Substantial power should enable the presiding | I j judge to expedite the case-load process thereby leading to ; t j 1 a more effectively run court. i j There are several reasons why this study represents a ;potentially important contribution to the field. First, i I jthere has been little empirical research reported to date on the presiding judge, yet he is generally acknowledged 'to be an important link in judicial administration.^ In : particular, research on power and conflict is crucial if 1 we are to better understand patterns of organization and 1 decision-making^ in the courts. These variables are now perceived as problems, but have been neglected in the : study of presiding judges. Second, there is a dearth of 1 | ! research that has compared the presiding judge role in ' ' different court systems. The literature is replete with references to "the presiding judge" as if the presiding judge were unaffected by differences in state law, local rule or institutional organization. It is important to recognize that situations differ, particularly in the : Ronald Fremlin and Jon D. Pevna, Williamsburg Con ference (Reno, Nevada: National College of State Trial ; Judges, 1971), p. 131. 2 . Decision-making refers generally to administrative I decision-making and should not be confused with the ad- i judicative function. 5 manner in which the leadership function is ultimately exer-I I icised. Third, although a few descriptive studies have beenj conducted, no theory-based, systematic research has been i ! attempted in this area. It is hoped that this study will j contribute to the cumulative development of theory and I i ; i jempirical findings on the organization and administration , ' \ lof the courts. Finally, this study deals with variables i I I that have direct implications for the improvement of ad- I Jministrative practice in the courts. Problems resulting in congestion and delay are due as much from the way courts operate as from safeguards (and quirks) in state law. If |understanding can be gained about organizational conditions ,that contribute to weaknesses in the system, then conceiv- | ably steps can be taken to deal with these problems. i i I Scope The purpose of this section is to provide the reader with an understanding of the organizational environment in which this study is conducted. First, the organization of state courts is described. This is followed by a brief, general account of the management structure of the courts. The Organization of the Courts i I i j Different meanings are attached to what is meant by I | I the organization of the courts. The manner in which one court is related to another, the authority to review the iwork of another and the jurisdictional differences which 1 exist generally describe the context of court organization. I ; Beyond the hierarchical considerations, however, there is an internal structure as in any other institution. Formal 'and informal interactions between judges, judges and the chief or presiding judge, state support groups, and those performing the nonjudicial operations comprise an organiza tion charged with local responsibility for the administra- jtion of justice. Both the relationships between courts and the rela tionships within courts are important when considering the organization of the courts. The focus of this study is the internal relationships, specifically examining the chief or presiding judge. However, understanding the context in which these individuals operate is conditional upon a sense of the external structure. The United States has a dual court system: the feder al and state courts. They are distinguished loosely by their jurisdiction. Generally, federal courts have the power to hear case’ s in which a federal question is in volved, or in which the parties on one side of the litiga- ,tion are citizens of different states from all the parties on the other side of the case. The latter group of cases jfalls under what is commonly referred to as diversity 7 1 ; jurisdiction. Access to the federal courts is usually j I ilimited to those controversies involving sums of money in j excess of $10,000. Exceptions to this requirement result \ i !from cases arising from suits of the United States, ad- I ' > jmiralty and maritime jurisdiction, civil rights, interstate' 2 matters, and other specialized areas of domain. f The state courts handle civil and criminal cases in a trial and appellate structure. Although the relationship between the federal and state courts is complex, the latter 1 iconcentrate on matters of a non-federal nature and form a separate system of justice. An overwhelming majority of cases filed are adjudicated by the state courts. | i ! All states have a multi-level court system, structured I in the form of a hierarchy. Lower courts are monitored by , I Ihigher courts. The purpose of the appellate hierarchy is 'to provide a quality control function of direct account ability for decisions which are made by lower courts. |Precedent established by higher courts is generally the deciding factor in many of the decisions of the lower ’courts. i "'"Robert N. Corley and Robert L. Black, The Legal En- Ivironment of Business (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company,i 11973), p. 26. i I 2 Bernard F. Cataldo, et. al., Introduction to Law and the Legal Process (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1965), pp. 168-169. I Trial courts settle most cases with finality either by; | I [promoting out-of-court settlements or by a judgment result-j i .1 1 jing from a formal trial. In cases where litigants desire ; 'to appeal the results of their trial, appeals courts have ' i i .been established in every state to deal with such cases. ! The initiation of most cases is with the court of general jurisdiction. Such courts generally have authority ,to try all types of cases and render decisions. The Supe- i irior Court of the State of California, the Circuit Court jof Florida and the Supreme Court of New York are examples 1 ! of courts of general jurisdiction. Courts of special (or limited) jurisdiction exist in virtually every state and handle cases of lower value or lesser seriousness. Al though the general subject matter of these courts is the j jsame as the court of general jurisdiction, they do not hold |jury trials. The Municipal Courts, or County Courts, are 'examples of courts of limited jurisdiction. For cases from the court of general jurisdiction which are appealed, twenty states have an intermediate appellate ;court. These District Courts of Appeal serve as a buffer between courts of general jurisdiction and the Supreme Court of the State. A similar structure exists in the I federal courts. Where intermediate state appellate courts ■ "''Herbert Jacob, Justice in America (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1965), p. 150. [exist, appeals usually must be directed to them before 1 I jbeing taken to the appropriate supreme court. I I j Supreme courts make the final decision in the judicialj I i i iprocess. The authority of supreme courts is to hear ap- i jpeals from the trial courts of general jurisdiction (or from a district court of appeals). Figure 1 is a diagram of the structure of state court systems. I j The Management Organization of the Courts I | | While the hierarchy of courts is well established, or-' ! Jganization of court systems for management purposes is non existent in most states. Except for poorly defined author- i t 'ity to gather statistics or to assign judges to temporary 'positions within the system, neither state nor federal 1 2 ,systems are well structured for management purposes. : Although there are a few exceptions, this peculiar situa- I tion exists because within each state, the administration of court operations at local levels is virtually indepen dent of the operations of other courts in the state. The reason for this is that until recently each court ■'■"The Three-Judge Court Reassessed: Changing Roles in Federal-State Relationships," Yale Law Journal, LXXII ; (1963), pp. 1646-61. 2 1 Ernest C. Friesen, Edward Gallas, and Nesta Gallas, ' Managing the Courts (Indianapolis, Indiana: Bobbs-Merrill, [1971), p. 31. Figure 1 THE STRUCTURE OF STATE COURTS COURT APPEALS APPEALS INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS (20 STATES) APPEALS COURTS OF GENERAL JURISDICTION T fs ~ APPEALS COURTS OF LIMITED (OR SPECIAL) JURISDICTION 1 in the nation governed itself. Each one formulated the i rules under which cases would be heard; each hired its own j auxiliary personnel; each judge determined for himself the i i jdays and the hours to hold court. No one had responsibil- i lity for the operation of the court system as a whole. No 'one collected statistics to determine which courts were I joverburdened and which were left unused. No one had the i authority to transfer a judge from one court to another to I i ialleviate delay in hearing trials. In sum, the system pro- i ;gressed through its own inertia. ! The trend through the 1960's and early 1970's has been itoward the development of unified court systems. Still, ^however, 40% of the states have no central administrative 2 structure to manage1 the courts. A consequence of this (diffusion of control over state courts is that responsi bility for judicial administration is not fixed and what remains is a "motley collection of fiercely independent courts, held together by the thin threads of appellate 3 review." Further, most states do not possess the means Arthur T. Vanderbilt, Minimum Standards of Judicial I Administration (New York: Law Center of New York Univer- jsity, 1949), pp. 29-90. i 2 I Delmar Karlen, Judicial Administration: The American ' Experience (New York: Oceana Publications, 1970), p. 16. 3 Glenn Winters, "The National Movement to Improve the ^Administration of Justice," Journal of the American Judica ture Society, Vol. 48, No. 17 (1964), p. 21. [to impose administrative controls over their courts. Each ! | i [judge is sovereign over his own courtroom, and may run it [virtually as he sees fit.'*' i [ Despite these grim foundations, the need for adminis- i I jtrative reform has created a new consciousness dedicated : 2 toward solving these problems. Awareness of the courts :as an organization, subject to classical organizational theory, has led to the establishment of numerous agencies, .task forces, commissions and schools whose collective aim t » 3 is to improve the way courts are managed. The focus of i 'these groups has been to determine, through a variety of •research studies, what the problems are, and then how they ;might be solved. In general, the locus of management in a multiple- |judge court — in contrast to a court system — is identi- ; 4 [fiable. Authority to manage rests wxth the judges acting ; 5 6 ; through a chief or presiding judge. Friesen and Saari report isolated cases where an executive officer or ■'"Jacob, Justice in America, p. 156. 2 David J. Saari, "Court Management and Administration of Justice," Trial (Feb.-March, 1970), p. 42. ^Ibid., p. 44. i 4 ; Frxesen, Gallas, Gallas, Managing the Courts, p. 39. ^Ibid., p. 107. ^Saari, "Court Management," p. 43. 13 iadministrator has been hired by the judges to assist in j j j 'court management. j ! The management function in the courts is similar to ! other institutions in that it is concerned with financial, ^personnel, and material resources. The sum of a number of goal-oriented tasks likewise defines the activities of the manager. With the courts, the input unit is the case. The !output goal is individual justice in individual cases. All iactivities ostensibly are directed toward this goal. In order to reach such a goal,, the manager must plan, program, implement and evaluate the court's progress constantly. ;In addition to the complex interactions among the employees ( •within a court, there are responsibilities concerning rela tionships with other units of government, professional Igroups and the public. i Management of the courts in terms of role relates to what tasks are appropriate as management tasks and how these tasks should be performed.^ A particular court may not perceive all tasks as appropriate, and hence, will not perform them. If they are performed, it is likely that I conflict or ambiguity may result in regard to management's role as well as how it is played. The essential question .then is whether the management role is concentrated in one ^"Friesen, Gallas, Gallas, Managing the Courts, p. 40. 14 person or a collection of persons, or whether it is dis- i i persed among several persons. Depending on the size of the , court, the management role may be assumed solo or in con- j i : cert. In general, courts serving large population centers ! S ' rely on the presiding judge to perform the management function. This study will concentrate exclusively on the pre- jsiding judges of courts of general jurisdiction. Further, ' I ; jit will be limited to large, metropolitan areas, serving |at least 350,000 people. It is' assumed that concentration I |on these communities will sufficiently highlight the prob- i ! lems which many urban courts share in the administration i jof justice. 15 ( CHAPTER II I I ! REVIEW OF PREVIOUS RESEARCH I i | It has been noted that there is a paucity of system- i jatic research on the role of the presiding judge. The I I jgreat majority of studies to date have concerned themselves I |with descriptive or prescriptive analyses of the courts in igeneral. Research that has related the presiding judge role to organizational variables has been neglected. The ‘literature reviewed below represents relevant findings in I the areas covered by this research. I I Studies of Court Administration Numerous recent studies of court administration have been initiated by concerned groups who have realized there are problems with the courts. These studies have been primarily exploratory in nature, attempting to define prob- I lem areas amenable to solution. The major theme that emerges is that the courts are jnot administered very well. In a study prepared by the 'President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administra- 16 tion of Justice,'*' urban courts were singled out for study as most in need of reform. The Task Force's intent was to study ways in which the courts could improve their opera tions to maintain the equilibrium between effectiveness 1 2 'and fairness. The report focused on subjects such as ;structural reorganization of the courts, better adminis- j jtrative practice, and better training of judges. It notes: i | There is widespread consciousness of the archaic j and inefficient methods used in many courts to process, schedule, and dispose of their business. Judges, attorneys and professional organizations i have pointed out ways in which the courts are . poorly structured and organized, instances in : which their administrative and business methods I are inadequate. The system is not as fair or as effective as it should be because it fails ! to work expeditiously. Undue delay is as incon sistent with the goals of the system as a hasty process in which decisions are made without i opportunity for deliberation.3 i Further investigation revealed judges who work only 'part of a day, inadequate procedures to balance the uneven workloads of judges, unstaggered vacation periods and ad ministrative burdens borne by non-administrators. The problems were compounded by confusion over judicial The President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, Task Force Report: The Courts (Washington, D. C.: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1967), p. 30. 2Ibid., p. 1. 2Ibid., p. 80. : independence, manifested by an absence of administrative j ! i Icontrol. I I A judge must be independent to make decisions on the , I jmerits of a case, regardless of outside pressures. From j I i jthis, it came to be assumed that judges should be complete- (ly independent in general. Hence, they should be indepen- ' ! 1 ident in their time and schedules and in the administration of their courts. As a result, in most state courts, no one i ‘ i : |is in charge. ! A critical assertion of the Task Force, and of this ! study, is that the above does not hold; that independence jin rendering decisions should not be carried over into ! administration. The lack of centralized control is felt to be a prime ; - i ^determinant of the delay in the courts,'- but no quantita tive data have supported this view. To this end, the Task i Force recommended unifying state court systems, and the development of clear and centralized administrative and rule-making authority vested in a presiding judge. Noting the general lack of administrative experience among judges, they further recommend training of presiding judges in graduate schools of business administration. j Numerous other researchers have called for "power to i 1 ;the presiding judge" to better administer the courts. "^ Ibid. , p. 84. 18 Chantryl states that the authority now held by a presiding I ! judge is not sufficient for accomplishing the task for j I which he is responsible and that judges need a boss. ! 2 j Tauro maintains that an administrative head is essential ' i 'and that judicial independence is "not impaired in the least by the presence, the helpful advice, and if need be, |the reproof of such an administrative superior." Senator i 3 .Joseph D. Tydmgs xs more explicxt xn hxs suggestxons for f Jminimizing delay in the courts: ! | ... each court system must have a supervising 1 judge with the power and personnel to make and implement administrative decisions. Judicial j efficiency and centralized administration are j inseparable. I 4 Adams, Clark, McConnell, and Wilson repeat this theme: ; Honorable K. N. Chantry, "Effective Uses of Present 'Resources," in U. S. Department of Justice, Justice in the ;States (Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office, '1971), p. 158. 2 Honorable G. Joseph Tauro, "The Few and the Many," ■ Judicature, Vol. 51, No. 6 (January, 1968), p. 218. 3 Senator J. D. Tydings, "A Fresh Approach to Judicial Administration," Judicature, Vol. 50, No. 2 (August- September, 1966), p. 46. 4 Arlin N. Adams, "Generating Judxcxal Reform from IWithin," Judicature, Vol. 55, No. 5 (December, 1971), ip. 198; Honorable Thomas Clark, "The Federal Judicial Cen- : ter," Judicature, Vol. 53, No. 3 (October, 1969), p. 100; iEdward B. McConnell, "The Administration of a State Court i .System," Judicature, Vol. 51, No. 7 (February, 1968), ! 'p. 253; and Charles H. Wilson, Jr., "Delay and Congestion ! in the Criminal Courts," Florida Bar Journal, Vol. 46, No. 2 (February, 1972), p. 88. 19 but offer no empirical evidence that delay can be alle- j I I viated by greater authority of a presiding judge. This i I I assumed state of affairs is intuitively appealing, but no j i test has been undertaken. The issue was alluded to in a j survey of thirty-two presiding judges conducted by the National Conference of Metropolitan Courts,'*' but data was 2 purely subjective in nature. The Court Management Study found a definite link between delay and backlog in the District of Columbia Courts and the degree of control iexercised by the administrators of the courts. The focus i ;of this study was inefficiencies in the calendar manage ment system presently in use. The inescapable conclusion ! • jwas that it was the responsibility of the presiding judge to insure these operations were coordinated and controlled.' ! Related to the recurrent theme that the presiding i | judge should have responsibility and authority for admin- jistering court operations is the issue of the selection of (the presiding judge. Every major study in judicial admin istration addresses this issue, although most refer to the 1 National Conference of Metropolitan Courts, Standards Relating to the Office of Trial Court Chief Judge (Chicago, 1973), pp. 21-43. 2 | U. S. Congress, Senate, Committee on the District of ‘Columbia, Court Management Study (91st Congress, 2nd Ses sion, May, 1970) , pp. 60-61. 20 [trial judge who has no administrative responsibilities. ! The relevant issue is the selection of the presiding judge and concomitant authority and behavior due to the manner [of selection. The method by which the presiding judge is i i ^selected affects the way he performs his role. Descrip- [tive studies of the National Conference of Metropolitan i 2 .Courts indicate varied selection procedures including election by peers, seniority, rotation, and appointment, f iwith a one-year term of office in general. The feeling of 3 (participants at the Williamsburg Conference was that some [form of an elective procedure, or appointment was most 'appropriate with significantly longer terms of office. i However, recognition that the selection of the pre siding judge is a significant issue in court administration [seems to have been the extent of investigation. No study ihas demonstrated that selection methods bear on the role prescription of the presiding judge and have a direct effect on how the court is run. Literature on Role Conflict At least three studies portray the presiding judge > ^Friesen, Gallas, and Gallas, Managing the Courts, ip. 141. 2 National Conference of Metropolitan Courts, Stan dards , p. 21. 3 Fremlin and Pevna, Williamsburg Conference, p. 9. 21 [role as one of inherent conflict.^" The basic struggle of j i . ! jnot having authority commensurate with responsibility in a j 'hierarchical structure confronts the presiding judge. Peer1 ' ! ■expectations regarding judicial independence further im- ;pedes the presiding judge's effectiveness. The presiding \ judge must, as well, maintain distinct but united identi fies as an administrator and as a jurist. In many ways, the literature on professionals in com- I iplex organizations is germane to the judicial setting. iLike the physician in the hospital or the scientist in in- i 2 'dustry, the presiding judge functions within a quasi- jbureaucratic organizational structure. But the procedures, ; rules, and standards of bureaucracy are in many respects antithetical to professional norms of autonomy and freedom. i Consequently, professionals in bureaucratic organizations tend to develop their own organizational sub-structures to protect and nurture the conditions essential to profession al productivity. It has been pointed out that in studying professionals in complex organizations one is concerned National Conference of Metropolitan Courts, Stan dards, p. 21; Friesen, Gallas, and Gallas, Managing the I Courts, p. 239; President's Commission, The Courts, p. 83. 2 ! For a discussion of the problems of scientific pro fessionals in industry, see William Kornhauser, Scientists ‘in Industry; Conflict and Accommodation (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1962). 22 jwith the "relation between two institutions, not merely between organizations and individuals. Moreover, as Scott has observed, "the profession and the bureaucracy irest on fundamentally different principles of organization, [and these divergent principles generate conflict between I I ! professionals and their employers in certain specific i 2 areas." Durkheim identified this difference as resultant | ;from the societal transition from mechanical to organic ! 3 I solidarity; from homogeneity to heterogeneity. Differ ences in role separation and specialization follow from .this distinction. In the judicial system it would appear that one poten tial area of conflict between the bureaucracy and the pro- i •fessions is the process of decision making in matters that iaffect the professional unit. The primary purpose of the corps of judges is to render decisions in an unbiased en vironment, virtually inconsiderate of matters of effi ciency. The court pursues this purpose by securing the "*"Ibid. , p. 8 Italics in the original. 2 W. Richard Scott, "Professionals in Bureaucracies: :Areas of Conflict," in Professionalism, ed. by H. M. Vollmer and D. L. Mills (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Pren- tice-Hall, 1966), p. 266. i I ^Emile Durkheim, The Division of Labor in Society, 'translated by George Simpson (Glencoe, 111.: Free Press, ;1949) . (First published in 1893.) 23 jlargest share of institutional resources it can and by j I zealously guarding its autonomy. In contrast, the purpose j i , j I of the administrative unit is to further the goals of the ; > i institution as a whole, which necessitates a degree of ! ;coordination and control. The countervailing forces of 'professional autonomy and needs for control makes the ad- j I jministrative task difficult. "Every sub-system of an or- I iganization with its own.distinctive functions develops its ' 'own norms and values and is characterized by its own dynam- I lies.... These differing orientations are one built-in source of conflict."^ Thus, the organizational structure of judicial institutions seems to make conflicts of inter est, values, and priorities between the administrator and the other judges inevitable. A focal point of such con flict would appear to be the presiding judge's role. Kahn .has noted that "nearness to departmental boundary and fre quency of dealings across such boundaries are associated i t 2 with felt conflict and with experienced tension. it fol lows that the presiding judge would be expected to feel the brunt of conflict with higher court levels, other state Robert L. Kahn, et. al., Organizational Stress: Studies in Role Conflict and Ambiguity (New York: John IWiley and Sons, 1964), p. 99. I i ^Ibid., p. 381. By department, Kahn meant any organizational sub-unit. agencies, and:the various publics in reaching decisions i |that affect the court. ! There is evidence that role conflict leads to de creased individual and organizational effectiveness. Al- i I : though no examination has been conducted in the judicial setting, several studies reach this conclusion. Blau and !Scott‘ S point out that role conflict is found from existence of two sources of authority in the organization; one based :on position power, the other, by professional expertise which is enforced by collegial authority. Multiple author ity, however, disrupts the individual's orientation to his organization or to his profession by requiring him to 2 3 choose between the two. Similar research in hospitals led to similar conclusions and reiteration of the loss of organizational efficiency and effectiveness. However, Peter M. Blau and W. Richard Scott, Formal Organiza tions (San Francisco: Chandler Publishing Co., 1962), p. 142. 2 Norman Kaplan, "The Role of the Research Administra tor," Administrative Science Quarterly, Vol. 4 (1959), pp. 20-41; and William Evans, "Role Strain and the Norm of Reciprocity in Research Organizations," American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 68 (1962), pp. 346-354. 3 Charles Perrow, "Hospitals, Technology, Structure, and Goals," in Handbook of Organizations, ed. by James G. (March (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1965), pp. 910-971; and ,J. S. Zawacki, "A System of Unofficial Rules of a Bureau cracy: A Study of Hospitals." (Unpublished doctoral dis- sertaion, University of Pittsburgh, 1963). I Rizzo, House, and Lirtzman^ assert that these dysfunctions i jmay be necessary concomitants and costs of providing pro- { I ‘ jfessional control over the technical aspects of the organi-I zation's activities. j i i Other examples may be noted. Perhaps the most famous is the foreman's position of being caught between conflict- ' 2 3 jing forces, described by Roethlisberger. Both Frank and : 4 ;Ditz found that conflicting directions made it necessary ;for managers to use multiple criteria in judging personnel i [performance; however, the necessary criteria could not be ^specified, even theoretically, and thus posed a dilemma for |the manager attempting to promulgate performance guide- 1 < jlines. Conflicting or ambiguous organizational goals re- « 5 jduce the effectiveness of performance. Dalton classified jexecutives as strong or weak according to the behavior they ! 1 John Rizzo, Robert J. House, and Sidney I. Lirtzman, "Role Conflict and Ambiguity in Complex Organizations," Administrative Science Quarterly, Vol. 15, No. 2 (1970), p. 152. 2 Fritz Roethlisberger, "The Foreman: Master and Vic tim of Double Talk," Harvard Business Review, Vol. 45, No. 1 (1965), p. 22ff. 3 | Andrew G. Frank, "Goal Ambiguity and Conflicting standards: Approach to the Study of Organizations," Human Organization, Vol. 17 (1958), pp. 8-13. 4 i Gerhard W. Ditz, "Industrial Organization m Commu nist East Europe," Administrative Science Quarterly, Vol. 4 (1959), pp. 82-96. 5 Melville Dalton, "Managing the Managers," Human Organization, Vol. 14 (1955), pp. 4-10. 26 ' (displayed in reconciling role conflict. Strong executives I I ihad a high tolerance for conflict, and unlike the weak ! ! I iexecutives, were more able to effectively control the : ! i ^operation of the organizational unit. ! « 1 j j Though the many formulations of role conflict appear to be consistent with the role of the presiding judge, the t Existence of such role conflict must, strictly speaking, be labeled an assumption or a hypothesis. One of the pur- 1 poses of this study is to empirically validate this hypoth- [ lesis. i ' Nevertheless, the plausibility of the role conflict hypothesis is considerable, especially when viewed in terms of the organizational structure of the judicial system. The linking-pin job requirement, dual orientations ‘ (profession vs. organization) and multiple authority roles ! bolster this conception. Katz and Kahn^ distinguish between role conflict which’ is intrasender, intersender, person-role, and interrole. They refer to interrole conflict as a situation where sent expectations for one role are in conflict with those for another role played by the same person. In the case of 'the presiding judge, the expectations for performance as a • * (jurist are in conflict with those expectations of him as Daniel Katz and Robert L. Kahn, The Social Psychology1 of Organizations (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1966), p. 185. an administrator and leader. This conceptualization will be useful since the focus of this investigation is on the presiding judge per se. i I | Studies of Power i References in the initial section of this chapter to 'the power and authority of presiding judges indicate that .such structures are weak. While no studies specifically .address the presiding judge role, other findings are 'relevant. I | Effectuation of compliance to organizational needs and goals is central to the leadership function."*' Com pliance results from an influence process in which an in dividual's behavior alters the behavior, attitudes, feel- 2 . lings, etc. of another. Previously cited researchers :pointed to situations where the inability to effectively influence others led to conditions of role conflict. Closely related to the notion of influence is power. Power is generally defined as the potential to exert in- 3 fluence. While there is some debate regarding an opera- ! Henry L. Tosi and W. Clay Hamner, Organizational Be- : : havior and Management: A Contingency Approach (Chicago: St. Clair Press, 1974), p. 424. ; : 2 John B. Miner, The Management Process: Theory, j Research, and Practice (New York: The MacMillan Co., 1973), p. 298. 3 Katz and Kahn, Social Psychology of Organizations, p. 220. ; 28 i tional definition of power,-*- the preceding should suffice. ' I i j The fact that power is referred to as a potential force I implies various sanctions available to the leader. The | ; I extent to which subordinates perceived either positive or : negative results for themselves, as a result of the exer- icise of these sanctions, measures to some extent the de- ,gree of power held. Also related to the above concepts is the concept of t authority. Authority is generally viewed as legitimate power, power which is vested in a particular person or position, which is recognized as so vested, and which is !accepted as appropriate not only by the wielder of power 2 but by others xn the system. Precepts of authority are well recognized in the judiciary, owing to historical constitutional rights as well as modern day statutes. The 'authority of a judge to render a decision in the judicial process is unquestioned, and serves as the very foundation for their existence. Authority and power in the adjudicative sense is ap parently well understood; transferrence to the administra tive setting seems to be more difficult. However, only Darwin Cartwright, "A Field Theoretical Conception of Power," in Studies of Social Power, ed. by Darwin Cartwright (Ann Arbor: Institute for Social Research, ’1959),, pp. 183-187. 2 Katz and Kahn, Social Psychology of Organizations, p. 203. 29 'when information is known regarding the type of power ‘ i utilized can prediction be made about the likelihood of J ;one party accepting direction from another. i 1 French and Raven"*" identify five bases of power: ,reward, coercive, legitimate, referent and expert. The extent to which power bases are appropriately matched to \ !organizational settings is related to effective role be- 2 haviors of subordinates. For example, Lawrence and Lorsch .report that attempts to use coercive power on research and development scientists results in dysfunctional conse- f jquences. Similarly, a variety of studies have attempted j to investigate relationships between types of power and jthe resultant consequences. In a study that combined data from a number of inves- . 3 tigations, Bachman, Bowers, and Marcus reported on forty- eight different organizations and over 2,800 people. They found that when dealing with individuals, the most impor tant reasons for complying with an organizational superior John R. P. French and Bertram Raven, "The Bases of Social Power," in Studies in Social Power, ed. by Dorwin Cartwright (Ann Arbor: Institute for Social Research, 1959), pp. 150-167. 2 Paul Lawrence and Jay Lorsch, Organizational and En- 'vironment (Boston: Harvard University Press, 1967), p. 218. 3 Jerald Bachman, David Bowers, and Philip Marcus, "Bases of Supervisory Power: A Comparative Study in Five Organizational Settings," in A. Tannenbaum, Control in Organization (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1968), pp. 228-240. 30 jwere based on legitimate and expert power. Of lesser im- j ! ! iportance were referent and reward power, and the least im- j iportant in all cases was coercive power. J In studies investigating the relationship of work | jgroup effectiveness and various power bases, Student'*' re- ! 1 iports referent and expert power most consistently related i i i ; to positive performance in production settings. Bachman, 2 Smith and Slesmger support these findings in sales ! 3 joffices, and Bachman reports similar results in liberal i i I arts colleges. i I Although these studies consistently support the use !of nonformal sources of referent and expert type power over; ; i :the more formal bases, all agree that legitimate power tends to be the predominant basis in administrative organi-; izations. j 4 A second typology of power is offered by Etziom. ■*"K. R. Student, "Supervisory Influence and Work-Group Performance," Journal of Applied Psychology, Vol. 52 (1968), pp. 188-194. 2 J. G. Bachman, C. G. Smith and J. A. Slesmger, "Control, Performance and Satisfaction: An Analysis of Structural and Individual Effects," Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, Vol. 4 (1966) , pp. 127-136. 3 Jerald Bachman, "Faculty Satisfaction and the Dean's ilnfluence," Journal of Applied Psychology, Vol. 52 (1968), :pp. 58-61. 4 Amitai Etzioni, A Comparative Analysis of Complex Organizations (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1961). 31 !Three basic means of exerting power are identified: coer- I ;cive (or physical), remunerative (or material) and norma tive (or symbolic). Although organizations may be in a position to use all three means of exercising power, gen- i ierally one predominates. Since coercive power generally irelates to lower order needs, remunerative power to a 'flexible monetary reward system, it is assumed that the ;courts are most concerned with a normative power basis. ‘ while the use of a symbolic reward structure for behavior ! 1 .change has some appeal, institutional norms in the courts may be so strong as to limit this influence. | Peabody‘ S reported results from a police department, a .welfare office and an elementary school into four cate gories of power. These were legitimate, position, compe tence, and person. These findings are roughly consistent with those of French and Raven. Legitimate and position power were reported as important bases in all three organi' 2 zations. Filley and Grimes identified eleven bases in R. L. Peabody, "Perceptions of Organizational Author ity: A Comparative Analysis," Administrative Science Quarterly, Vol. 6 (1962), pp. 463-482. 2 Alan C. Filley and A. J. Grimes, "The Bases of Power in Decision Processes," in Promising Research Directions, Academy of Management Proceedings, ed. by R. W. Millman and M. P. Hottenstein (1968), pp. 133-160. 'professional organizations, and again, legitimate power was1 I I j !noted most frequently. j | | i That legitimate power should be a pervasive force in | I i ■organizations is not a surprise. In addition, the in- * ■creased attention given to variants of expert and referent power consistent with movement toward more participative ;structures represent additions to organizational effective- i ness because they are available to all members of the or ganization.'*' Peer influence may be more easily accepted ithan influence from organizational superiors. With the relatively recent advent of presiding judges, and the generally administrative role prescriptions they 'carry, we might expect their power base to be lodged in the ■ i •formal organization. Yet as a professional organization, ■movement to other modes may be more effective, since in dividuals oriented primarily to professional norms are more critical of the organization and what it represents, and are more likely to ignore what are considered to be admin- 2 istrative details. The power base used by the adnunis- See for example, Rensis Likert, New Patterns of Management (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1961) , Douglas ; McGregor, The Human Side of Enterprise (New York: McGraw- Hill, 1960T7 and Chris Argyris, Interpersonal Competence and Organizational Effectiveness (Homewood, 111.: Irwin- ' Dorsey, 1962). 2 Blau and Scott, Formal Organizations, p. 180. 33 itrator, then, bears both on role conflict considerations i i jas well as organizational effectiveness. Studies of Leadership Leadership is closely related to concepts of role .behavior, power and authority, and organizational effec tiveness. Leadership is commonly defined as the exercise of influence by one person over another in obtaining ! 1 goals. Beyond this definition, there has been consider- i .able debate and refinement currently m the literature m 'attempts to more precisely understand the nature of lead- jership.^ I i Although this study is not designed to be a descrip tion of leader behavior on the order of either the Ohio 3 . 4 ;State Leadership Studies or the Illinois School, there ''■Joseph Litterer, The Analysis of Organizations, 'Second Edition (New York: Wiley and Sons, 1973), p. 168. 2 Edwin A. Fleishman and James G. Hunt, eds., Current Developments in the Study of Leadership (Carbondale, 111.: Southern Illinois University Press, 1973) . 3 See for example, R. M. Stogdill, "Personal Factors Associated with Leadership: A Survey of the Literature," Journal of Psychology, Vol. 25 (1948), pp. 35-71; J. K. Hemphill, "Leadership Behavior Associated with the Adminis-; trative Population of College Departments," Journal of Edu cational Psychology, Vol. 46 (1955), pp. 385-40; or E. A. :Fleishman, E. F. Harris and H. E. Burtt, Leadership and Supervision in Industry (Columbus, Ohio: Bureau of Educa tional Research, Ohio State University, 1955). i A Probably the leading exponent is F. E. Fiedler, A Theory of Leadership Effectiveness (New York: McGraw- Hill, 1967). I is recognition (at least in the normative sense) of the t ! :leadership role which the presiding judge assumes. A brief! ! I ! review of relevant work will aid in the understanding of I [ this role. ' i i i Behavioral scientists have long recognized the impor- 'tance of situational factors to an explanation of leader effectiveness. Stogdill,^ for example, after an extensive literature review, concluded that the traits and skills required by the leader are determined to a large extent, by the situation in which he is to exercise leadership. !Similarly, no one style of leadership, such as authoritari- i ian or democratic, has been found to be universally effec- 2 tive. This finding led Tannenbaum and Schmidt to conclude that "effective leadership depends on the leader, his fol lowers, the situation and the inter-relationships between them." In spite of this general acceptance of the importance of situational dimensions in leader effectiveness, there have been few attempts to establish controls for such 3 4 factors. The work of Fiedler and House are exceptions. ^R. M. Stogdill, "Personal Factors," p. 68. 2 R. Tannenbaum and W. H. Schmidt, "How to Choose a :Leadership Pattern," Harvard Business Review (March-April, , 1958), pp. 95-101. i 3 ; Fiedler, Leadership Effectiveness. 4 R. J. House, "A Path-Goal Theory of Leadership," Ad ministrative Science Quarterly, Vol. 16 (September, 1971), pp. 321-338. 35 ;Consequently, there are a series of studies in which the i I observed relationships between leader and subordinate be- !havior are generally applicable to a unique research set- Iting.^ No study roughly approximates the setting of the ;courts. At least three trends emerge from the literature that deserve consideration. First is the notion of leader structure, generally composed of initiating structure and 1 2 'consideration structure. Leader initiating structure is ;used to describe the degree to which the leader initiates 'psychological structure for subordinates by doing such ithings as assigning particular tasks, specifying procedures to be followed, clarifying his expectations of subordin- i 3 ates, and scheduling work to be done. Consideration seems jto involve behavior indicating friendship, mutual trust, irespect, and development of a supportive work environment.4 The preponderance of research findings indicate that a high structure - high consideration pattern optimizes G. S. Dessler, "An Investigation of a Path-Goal Theory of Leadership," (Unpublished doctoral dissertation, •City University of New York, 1973), pp. 1-2. 2 E. A. Fleishman, "Twenty Years of Consideration and Structure," in Current Developments in the Study of Leader- ;ship, edited by E. A. Fleishman and J. G. Hunt (Carbondale, :Ill.: Southern Illinois University Press, 1973), p. 1-37. 3 Ibid., p. 8. 4Ibid., pp. 7-8. 36 ;more different effectiveness criteria, whereas the low I structure - low consideration pattern most often appears j i i as least desirable. However, these findings are moderated i iby various situational variables, such as the nature of the ! j | Itask, and the skill level of employees. i Filley and House"*" report that leaders who initiate [structure for subordinates are generally rated highly by superiors and have higher producing work groups than lead- •ers low on initiating structure; and that leaders who are i jconsiderate of subordinates have more satisfied employees. ;Similar studies indicate, however, that initiating struc ture is frequently resented by unskilled and semiskilled I [employees and is a source of dissatisfaction, grievances 1 2 and turnover. Oaklander and Flexshman found initiating i Istructure to be negatively correlated with intergroup con- 3 !flict. Rizzo, House and Lirtzman further found initiating i ^structure to be negatively related to role conflict and J lambiguity among higher level employees. A second trend stresses leader style flexibility and ^A. C. Filley and R. J. House, Managerial Process and ^ Organizational Behavior (Glenview, 111. : Scott, Foresman, 11969) . I 2 ' | H. Oaklander and E. A. Fleishman, "Patterns of Lead ership Related to Organizational Stress in Hospital Set- ! ;tings," Administrative Science Quarterly, Vol. 8 (1964), pp. 520-532. 3 Rizzo, House, and Lirtzman, "Role Ambiguity," p. 162.1 37 [behavior contingent on the situation. The question posed ! i :initially is whether a leader can behave flexibly enough to! i ! 'cope with varied situations, or whether it is necessary to i |either replace the leader as the situation changes or to modify the situation to fit the leader's capabilities."*' There is a disagreement over this issue. Tannenbaum and 2 Schmidt suggest that a leader is capable of exhibiting 3 a wide range of behaviors, while Fiedler does not feel 1 (that a leader is capable of varying his behavior to a large degree. 4 To reconcile this dilemma, Hill reported data ob tained from three different companies to learn whether subordinates perceive their leaders using the same leader ship style for a variety of problems or whether they per ceive their leaders altering their style when confronted by different situations. The evidence suggested that mana gers do not use the same leadership style for all problems, nor do they use one style for certain problems and another, different style, for other problems. There was a tendency W. A. Hill, "Leadership Style Flexibility, Satis faction, and Performance," in Fleishman and Hunt, Current iDevelopments, p. 64. 2 Tannenbaum and Schmidt, "Leadership Pattern," p. 100.' 3 Fiedler, Leadership Effectiveness, p. 120. 4 Hill, Leader Style Flexibility, p. 80. 38 for supervisors to use one style for certain types of prob-j J j lems more than others. Hill concluded with the interpreta-; i tion of considerable leadership style flexibility among I managers in his sample. ! I . ' A third trend has been the increasing acceptance of |the work of House'*' and his associates in constructing a I path-goal theory of leadership. Basically, this theory states that the motivational functions of a leader consist i I Ilargely of increasing personal pay-offs to subordinates for I : work goal attainment and of making the path to these pay- |offs easier to travel. The extent to which the leader must I jexercise these functions is seen as depending largely on !the ambiguity and uncertainty inherent in the subordinates task environment. ! The contribution of path-goal theory to the present |study is in the work on leader structure and role conflict 1 : 2 ;and ambiguity. Dessler summaries that ambiguous tasks are stressful and dissatisfying, and that leader structure can be influential in reducing such ambiguity. In addi tion, subordinates can "sense" when a task is unstructured and requires structuring by the leader, and further, sub ordinates can "sense" when structure provided by the leader' ^House, "Path-Goal Theory," pp. 321-338. 2 Dessler, "Investigation of Path-Goal Theory," p. 14. 39 ;is appropriate to the task and therefore legitimate. Under jconditions of high task certainty, initiating structure .will be viewed as redundant, unnecessary, and negatively related to subordinate path-goal clarity and satisfaction. ' 1 .Consideration does not alter the results for such groups. One empirical study in the courts seems to corroborate I 'the above findings. The conference and assignment experi- 2 ment tested xn the New York Supreme Court consciously re duced presiding judge initiating structure and allowed i itask teams to be responsible for their own initiation. ! |within slightly more than one year, a situation character ized by extensive role conflict and ambiguity emerged as a i Inational model and reduced court congestion by 85%. Al- 1 though no sophisticated measurement devices were used, ijudges report very satisfying experiences. I Research Hypotheses The method of selection of the presiding judge bears heavily on the role prescriptions he ultimately assumes. It is assumed that these behaviors also bear directly on the way a particular court is run. The problem of pre- ^House, "Path-Goal Theory," p. 326. 2 Honorable Edward Thompson, "New York Breaks Court Backlog," Selected Readings in Court Congestion and Delay, .edited by Glen R. Winters (Chicago: American Judicature Society, 1971), p. 136. 40 ,siding judge selection and the potential effects from this ‘ ! ;selection has been alluded to in other studies. No study, i jhowever, has systematically addressed itself to this point. !As earlier studies have pointed out, we should expect the :presiding judge role to be one of built-in ambiguity and conflict. Reports of weak authority and power structures also need confirmation. Karlen'*' suggests following the British system, and ,"vest the power to select judges in an officer directly responsible for the operation of the judicial system." 'This individual would have intimate knowledge of the quali fies required and he would have a personal stake in the selection process, because the functioning of the system for which he'was responsible would depend on the quality of individual he chose. Such a method would similarly create a system of accountability. Further, there is some precedent for such an appointment process in the federal courts as well as a limited number of state jurisdictions. 2 McConnell takes a similar position. He states "any method of selecting an administrative judge on the basis Delmar Karlen, Judicial Administration; The American Experience (New York: Oceana Publishing Co., 1970) , pp. 30-31. 2 Edward McConnell, "Court Administration," m The Im provement in the Administration of Justice, ed. by G. N. Stevens (Chicago: American Bar Association, 1971), p. 18. 41 iof seniority, or imminence of expiration of term, or peri odic rotation is not calculated to recognize and utilize needed administrative talents for the good of the court system." There is a growing feeling that the way the presiding judge is selected affects his role. Specifically, it is t i jbelieved to impact on his degree of felt role conflict, |and self-perceived power and authority. Notice that con- :cern is with self-perceived power. There are no theoret ical or empirical grounds for assuming that the presiding I ■judge's perceptions of his own power would be much differ ent from the.perception of his subordinates or superiors. I !Even should presiding judges as a group tend to exaggerate ;or underestimate their power, this would be of little con- Icern here since the focus of the investigation was on dif ferences in power related to organizational effectiveness rather than on obtaining some estimate of actual power. The first two hypotheses focus on the interaction be tween method of selection, role conflict and power. 1. Presiding judges appointed or elected by a higher court level or authority will experience less role conflict than presiding judges who assume office based on election by peers, seniority or rotation. 2. Presiding judges appointed or elected by a higher court level or authority will perceive greater power in the operation and regulation ; of court activities than presiding judges who ; assume office based on election by peers, 1 seniority or rotation. 42 ! j An indirect corrollary of the above is that a rela- : | I |tionshxp exists between conflict and power. It would seem ; j ! jnatural that a presiding judge who perceives he has sub- I i t Istantial power to subsequently feel less conflict than his I i l f I I counterpart who feels he has relatively little power. In » !order to test this assertion, the following hypothesis is •proposed: 3. Presiding judges who perceive they have 1 greater power will experience less con- i flict than presiding judges who perceive ! they have less power. Stated alternativelyhypothesis three (3) asserts a : negative correlation between perceived power and perceived i i I : jconflict. ; i i An important assumption in the formulation of this in-: vestigation is that the strength of leadership of the pre- j siding judge has an impact on the effectiveness of the f I •court. Effectiveness has been an elusive concept in judi cial administration because of notions of measurement of i 'the various stages of the process, especially, the decision itself. Previous studies indicated the biggest problem to 1 :be the massive delay and congestion in the courts. Based on this notion, more precise terminology would refer to the efficiency of the courts as an administrative process, ; rather than the effectiveness criterion of whether justice ! is served. I 43 I The influence of the presiding judge on court effi- t jciency will likely be (at a minimum) a function of his I jleadership style, authority, power base, self-perceived jrole, and situational variables. No attempt will be made !to assess the various situational factors which exist in many different settings nationally, and leadership style ,can only be imputed. However, a relationship is posited between method of selection and self-perceived role of the presiding judge, as well as a relationship between these ! :factors and the efficiency of the court. The following hypotheses are related to these factors: ! 4. Presiding judges appointed or elected by a higher court level or authority more often ! see their role as one of active leadership ! than do presiding judges selected by other means. 5. Presiding judges elected by their peers, or who assumed office by seniority or rotation, more often see their role as an administra tive chore-doer than do presiding judges selected by other means. 6. The greater the felt role conflict of the presiding judge, the higher the congestion index for that court. 7. The greater the self-perceived power of the presiding judge, the lower the congestion index for that court. i It is apparent that other factors besides the pre siding judge role mediate the efficiency by which courts are administered. One significant factor seems to be the method of case assignment used in a court. 44 Essentially two methods are used. Most courts use a master calendar system for case assignment. This system has its foundations in queuing theory and works on the iprinciple of a central control center which assigns cases i ■to whomever can hear them at a given time. Alternatively, i Ian individual calendar system is sometimes used whereby 'cases, once assigned to a judge, remain with him through ^its various phases to conclusion. j While not directly related to considerations of the [presiding judge role, its importance in court administra- |tion is significant. Therefore, an attempt will be made ! ^to relate the method of case assignment to the courts' i 'congestion index. This can be stated in the following i I ihypothesis: i 8. Use of an individual calendar method of ! case assignment will result in a lower : congestion index for a court. i 45 j CHAPTER III j . METHOD I ! This chapter describes the sample, the sampling meth- I ;od, the measurement instrument, the method of data collec- i I {tion, and the method of analysis. ! The nature of the research dictated two possible meth- I jods of data collection: a mail survey or field research t .using interview techniques. It was decided to use a mail !survey to obtain comparable, quantitative data from a na tional sample of presiding judges. In addition, it was decided that a smaller number of presiding judges would be interviewed to obtain qualitative data that would add depth to the study, particularly in the area of role conflict and 'perhaps suggest additional ways.of analyzing the question naire data. The Mail Survey Sample ; Numerous sources cited the most pressing problem area jin the courts to be the administration of large urban ;courts. It was necessary to select a sample of presiding judges that would yield data that would be representative 46 jof the segment of the courts which affect the greatest num-! I i Jber of people. Definition of a "large urban court" is j | i |somewhat arbitrary. The National Conference of Metropoli- i tan Courts'*' used courts serving a population base of ! 800,000 people or more as a working definition of a large ’ urban court. However, this definition was adopted in part, |to be consistent with resources available for projects ■underway. Only thirty-eight such centers existed in the !United States. The investigator felt more comprehensive I Idata could be gathered by expanding the target population. It was reported by the director of the research staff ! 2 ;of NCMC that courts serving a population base of 350,000 l ; people or more generally face the same class of common problems: delay, congestion, poor administration, and ! existence of a presiding judge. Further, the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and the Administration of : 3 Justice also notes the commonality of problems associated with metropolitan courts. While no population figure is identified explicitly, reference is made to jurisdictions ; 1 National Conference of Metropolitan Courts, Standards :Relating to the Office of Trial Court Chief Judge (1973) , : ;p. 21. i ' 2 Hon. K. N. Chantry (personal Communication, 1972). 1 3 President's Commission, Task Force Report: The j tCourts, p. 8 0. ! ! ' i 47 ' ;studied that in fact serve a population base of as low as i X !350,000 people. j It was decided then to establish the target population. i ;as presiding judges of courts of general jurisdiction in 'jurisdictions of 350,000 people or more. Jurisdictions were normally defined as the county which the court served. Data obtained from the 1970 Census indicated 108 such jurisdictions served by a trial court with one or more di visions. These jurisdictions represented a wide geographi cal distribution and included thirty-three states. I Since a mail questionnaire would be the primary means 'of data collection, it was necessary to include every met ropolitan court in the sampling frame to assure representa- ■ 2 tiveness. It was felt that a well distributed sample of these jurisdictions would be sufficient for purposes of this study. Distribution by size of population base was I , considered the most important characteristic. It should be noted that only courts of general juris diction were included. Courts of limited jurisdiction and federal courts were outside the scope of this investigation owing to different organizational structures and adminis trative procedures. ^Corrected to 1970 Census data. 2 Kerlinger has stated that "responses to mail ques tionnaires are generally poor. Returns of less than 40 to 50 percent are common. Higher percentages are rare." See Fred N. Kerlinger, Foundations of Behavioral Research (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1964), p. 397. 48 Construction of Questionnaire Initial attention was given to the development of in struments to measure presiding judge self-perceived power land role-conflict. It was decided to forego attempts to [measure leader behavior"*- in the more general sense until I 'more was known about what the presiding judge actually jdoes. i j | It was not possible to locate an existing instrument ] !specifically designed to measure presiding judge power and i ;authority. Preliminary attempts only at such descriptive measurement were found used by the National Conference of I I |Metropolitan Courts. Their questionnaire, however, only i i (identified areas of concern and did not attempt to shade I : differences. I 2 Further research revealed a study by Hill which in volved the construction of a power scale. Although the | focus of Hill's study was another setting, he was concern ed with assessing power and conflict in a professional or ganization that bears similarity to the courts. Forces on ■*"By use of the Ohio State Leader Behavior Description Questionnaire, for example. ■ 2 Winston N. Hill, "Some Organizational Correlates of i Sanctions Perceived by Professors to be Available to Their Department Chairmen: A Study in Power" (Unpublished doc toral dissertation, University of Washington, 1965), Appendix A. ■ the department chairman of an academic institution are sim- i : i ilar to the presiding judge in terms of occupational levels, 'methods of selection and perceived power. It was found ! !that with modifications, Hill's scale could be adapted to ithe present study. The primary means of modification was 'to substitute, where appropriate, areas of concern identi- ■ fied by the National Conference of Metropolitan Courts for counterpart concerns in academe. i t ] • Hill's Power Scale Hill's instrument is a Likert-type, summated rating scale consisting of thirty-one items. Each item repre- Isents a sanction that is potentially available to the de partment chairman. Like the present study, Hill had de fined power in terms of potential sanctions available to his department chairman on a five point continuum ranging from "little or no degree" to "a very great degree." The imputed power of the chairman is measured by the sum of the thirty-one items. Hill reported a split-half reliability coefficient of .95 for the thirty-one item instrument.^" In addition, he !was able to obtain an independent measure of validity by ;correlating the power scale with a different measure of chairman power in another section of his questionnaire. 1Ibid., p. 116. 50 jThe resulting correlation coefficient was reported as I Hill's scale, designed to measure power on the basis 1 i 1 ; i iof sanctions available to department chairmen, was reported1 ! i jto be highly reliable and valid. It appeared that the •scale could be easily adapted for this research by simply ! ; :changing the wording of each item focus. Thus, instead of i the faculty member rating the chairman's power, the pre siding judge would rate his own power. These factors were i I ,judged as cogent reasons for adapting Hill's instrument to the purposes of the present study. Conflict Scale | Hill's power scale provided a starting point for the 1 'development of an instrument to measure conflict felt by I the presiding judge in carrying out his responsibility. Many of the sanctions that comprised Hill's (modified) scale were specific to various decision-making areas in volving administration of the courts.., It was reasoned that1 areas where the presiding judge is able to impose sanctions are also areas of potential conflict. Consequently, it was, decided to begin construction of a conflict scale with those items that were empirically identified by Hill as ; I involving sanctions in specific areas. ^Ibid., p. 119. I Of the thirty-one items in the power scale, fifteen i 'referred explicitly to decision-making areas. It was ap- Jparent, however, that a number of additional items would |be required in order to develop a comprehensive scale. I Additional items were suggested by the research staff of the National Conference of Metropolitan Courts, and by mem bers of the investigator's committee. I ' The initial version of the conflict scale consisted of forty-six items. The respondent was asked to indicate on i :a five-point scale ranging from "never" to "always" the degree of conflict actually experienced. I 1 Remaining Items i Most of the remaining items that comprised the ques tionnaire were designed to test the other hypotheses of the study. The data necessary to test each hypothesis re quired a single structured item. Open-ended" questions were included to permit greater expansion of any areas of in terest, and also to provide additional data which could be used in interviews with a sample of presiding judges. Cat egorical and demographic questions were also included to permit alternative analysis of the data should promising ileads develop. 52 | Pretest of Questionnaire ! • A pretest was undertaken to refine the questionnaire and to further check on the validity of the items. A sec- jondary purpose of the pretest was to gain additional infor mation from presiding judges about conditions that affect ■their role for use in developing an instrument for the in- i Iterview phase of the study. j To avoid contamination of the results in the current I 'situation where all presiding judges of metropolitan courts i jwould potentially be included in the sample, care was taken I | in selecting pretest participants. Cooperation was re- Iceived from two current presiding judges, two retired pre- i i :siding judges, one ex-presiding judge who is still active i on the bench, and one research staff member of the National !Conference of Metropolitan Courts. The questionnaire was i filled out, discussed and suggestions for changes made. As a result of pretesting, a few items on the power scale were eliminated as being irrelevant. Several items on the conflict scale were also eliminated as being redun dant, or confusing. In a few cases, items were reworded for better clarity. Members of the investigator's commit tee made other helpful recommendations to improve the quality of the instrument. One such improvement was a 53 revision of the scales from a five-point base to a seven- : j point base to permit a wider range of responses. ; The revised questionnaire consisted of twenty-three , i ,items on the power scale, and thirty-three items on the 1 I I conflict scale. Four questions comprised the perceived ! !role items. | i i Validity of Questionnaire Instruments i ' An instrument is valid when it actually measures what i lit is intended to measure.'*' Although the concept of valid- lity is a simple one, evidence of the validity of a measur- > 2 |mg device is often difficult. | ; I There is good evidence for the logical validity of the i ' |questionnaire used in this study. Logical validity, as | 'Goode and Hatt have noted, "automatically springs from the 'careful definition of the continuum and the selection of 3 the items." The method of logical validation is dubious when applied to instruments that purport to measure ex tremely complex variables, for example, personality attri butes such as authoritarianism. The variables in this i "^Kerlinger, Foundations of Behavioral Research, p. 444. 2 William J. Goode and Paul K. Hatt, Methods in Social Research (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1952), p. 237. ' 3 . 1 Ibid., p. 237. |study, however, were relatively uncomplicated. The items i ! | |that comprise the conflict scale referred to specific areasj |of concern to presiding judges. These areas were care- \ I ; ! fully selected on the basis of the available literature in . ! ! ithe field. The power scale items were likewise carefully selected to measure potential sanctions available to pre siding judges. Further evidence of the validity of the .scales was derived from the pretesting process. < I | Reliability of Questionnaire Instruments i ' Reliability refers to the accuracy or precision of a Imeasuring instrument.'*' In order to be accurate and pre- I ;cise, a scale must be internally consistent, that is, the items must be homogeneous or unidimensional. This form 1 'of reliability is computed by a split-half correlation i procedure. The scale is split into sub-scales. Usually the odd items comprise one sub-scale and the even items the other. The reliability of the instrument is computed by taking the average intercorrelations of the items, cor- 2 rected by the Spearman-Brown formula. Hill reported a split-half reliability coefficient of ' ; "''Kerlinger, Foundations of Behavioral Research, p. 430. ; ; “ I ^Ibid., p. 439-440. 55 ' *.95 for his power scale.-*- Hill's scale was altered in for- ' i i ! i Imat and the number of items was reduced from thirty-one to twenty-three. It was necessary, therefore, to obtain an estimate of the reliability of the modified scale. A i isplit-half procedure was used for fifty-one cases. The jreliability coefficient was .74, corrected by the Spearman- Brown formula. The discrepancy between this figure and ,that reported by Hill for the original scale could have jbeen due in large part to the considerable reduction in the f .number of items used, and the expansion of the scale to |seven points. It should further be noted that the power jscale contained only twenty-three items, which is close to 'the minimum recommended for computing a split-half coef ficient. ^ The reliability of the conflict scale was also estim ated by the split-half method. The corrected correlation coefficient for fifty-one cases was .52. Although the reliability coefficients for the two scales incorporated in the questionnaire are not high, they are probably to some degree artifacts of the relatively 3 small number of items that comprised each scale. In ^Hill, "Organizational Correlates," p. 116. 2 Goode and Hatt recommend a minimum of sixteen to twenty items. 3 : Kerlinger, Foundations of Behavioral Research, notes that reliability of an instrument is related to the total number of items. 56 [addition, both scales were designed to measure variables ! I that are difficult to operationalize with precision. In I j I such circumstances, as Thorndike and Hagen have pointed i |out, it is necessary to accept a lower reliability than | i i (one would expect, for example, in a standardized mathemat- Los The Congestion Index i j A relatively accurate statistical measure of how well t :a court expedites cases from filing to disposition provides ;data for planning and control purposes. Identification of ' istrong and weak elements of the case flow process allows !correction where appropriate. As a general measure of a court's efficiency, such a scale was constructed for this ; study. • No similar measure has been constructed for either isummary purposes or to test interactions between a court's efficiency and other dependent variables. Ideally, such an index should be comprised of several factors, enumerated belowi ■ (1) A measure of the number of cases pending on a ;specific date, for which a certificate of readiness or an at-issue memorandum (indicating both parties are prepared i ■ _____________________ I j ! "''Robert L. Thorndike and Elizabeth Hagen, Measurement and Evaluation in Psychology and Education, Second..Edition (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1961), p. 189. __________ _ 57 to go to trial) has been filed. This is commonly referred |to as the backlog. Backlog figures should be expressed on ! !a per judge basis, and should be separated by civil and •criminal actions. i i (2) A measure of the elapsed time from filing to case ^disposition, commonly known as delay. Delay figures should again be separated for civil and criminal proceedings. The definition and use of the term delay deserves icaution. Measuring the interval from the filing of various documents to trial implies that cases are ready and waiting to be tried at the point of filing. In fact, very few !cases are trial-ready at the time such documents are filed. As a result, the interval includes not only the time the courts need to ready a case for trial, but also the time ;after filing required for attorneys to prepare for trial. Thus, descriptions of this entire time as court delay are imisleading since they imply that the time measured results from internal conditions controllable by the courts. De lay exists only when elapsed time is unreasonably long, beyond some normal standards. The President's Commission recommended that a normal time period for civil cases from filing to final disposi tion including appeals should be one year. For criminal |actions, they recommended four months as the period from arrest to trial, and another five months from trial to !appellate disposition.1 There has been substantial dis- J agreement regarding these figures, as-either being too long' or too short. All parties agree that these standards can- . {not be rigidly applied because local conditions vary sig- j \ - 2 ' ;mficantly. In fact, the timetable for criminal action i I disposition is fixed by state statute in many cases, and I ■the recommendation of the President's Commission is in ex- i ,cess of these statutory limitations. i I Thus, a paradox exists. Uniform standards have not i ! i been established, but without some standard, delay cannot I be measured since it is defined as time in excess of such , a standard. The presence of delay is alleged prior to any {assessment of what it is. i To resolve the paradox, a series of corrections can be' made, reflecting each jurisdiction's assessment of standard time. Where such an assessment is not available, the rec- ; 'ommendations of the President's Commission can be used. iThis will be the method employed in constructing this in dex. (3) A measure reflecting anticipated court time to dispose of current backlog. ^President's Commission, Task Force Report: The Courts, pp. 84-87. ^Ibid., p. 87. i (4) Weighted caseload figures, per judge. Such fig- | f (ures reflect the differences in time required to hear dif ferent types of cases. | (5) Number of cases disposed of, per judge, per year, to get a sense of productivity. I (6) Percentage disposition of cases at pre-trial con-; i j :ferences, or through arbitration. (7) Average number of continuances per case. (8) Usage of physical plant facilities to capacity. (9) Extent to which judges are shifted to other courts to meet demand in other departments of a multi-court ; structure. i (10) Cost data, reflecting per case and per type of lease information. (11) Number of judges'per 50,000 population. ' i The above factors, if properly combined, would provide' jan excellent measure of a court's efficiency. Collection of the above data in jurisdictions which responded to the mail questionnaire was attempted. Unfor tunately, no state agency collects, or publishes, much of the above data. In fact, it was found to be most unusual tor figures on just one or two of these items to be avail- ,able. Groose found the quality of state judicial statis tics to be abyssmal.^ In a national study assessing ^David Groose, The Quality of State Judicial Statis tics (Chicago: American Judicature Society, 1969), p. 5. 60 iavailable statistical data, he found only six states to : i ' I publish information that could be classified as minimally j I ! (acceptable. Other states had information that was either 1 non-interpretable because of a lack of detail, or just not j collected at all.^ For example, most states did not dis tinguish between civil and criminal cases. Therefore, plans for a sophisticated index to measure court efficiency had to be foregone. The literature suggests clearly, however, that the two I - imost important components of how well a court is performing, 2 3 its function are backlog and delay. Accordingly, an in- Idex to approximate court efficiency was constructed by |gathering data on backlog and delay. The index is a meas- 1 ure of court congestion. : ! The congestion index is based on four factors: back log per judge in civil cases, backlog per judge in criminal tases, delay in months for civil cases, and delay in months i for criminal cases. ^Ibid., p. 5. 2 Exclusive of quality considerations. It is assumed that judges, when hearing a case, do so with all profes sional competence. 3 See for example, President's Commission, Task Force Report; Glenn Winters, ed., Court Congestion and Delay (Chicago: American Judicature Society, 1971); U. S. Department of Justice, Reducing Court Delay (Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1973); and Ernest Friesen, ed., Court Administration (Reno, Nevada: Nation al College of State Trial Judges, 1971). 61 j The most recent available data was collected from ! I ! twenty-two jurisdictions from published material, and per- i sonal communication. One weakness of the data is that the j i jmost recent information was not consistently of the same I |date. Fourteen of the twenty-two courts were able to pro- i I j I |vide data as of June, 19 73. The remaining eight courts' i !data covered various dates in late 1972 or 1973. However, ( given the relatively low proportion of jurisdictions which ’ I !reported any data, the latter figures were used, recogniz- j iing problems in comparability. | Since civil cases comprise approximately 85% of all ifilings, it was necessary to weight data on civil matters i |to reflect the substantial impact such cases have on court ! I congestion. Figures for delay were corrected to reflect a i |time period beyond that which could be considered normal ’and which would represent "court delay." Statutory re quirements or the norms of the President's Commission were used to determine net delay by type of case by jurisdic tion. For example, if a particular court experienced an average time period of thirty-six months from filing to disposition of a civil case, and no state requirements ex isted, net delay was taken to be twenty-four months (thir ty- six months minus twelve months standard of President's i :Commission). 62 The following formula was used to determine raw : scores for the congestion index for each court: ! i R -5- 5 pF) + ^ + 5- 5 ( NDc^ + ndc m I | where i , R = raw congestion score I j Bcv = total backlog of civil cases J = number of judges in court BCM = tota^ - backlog of criminal cases ! NDcv = net delay f°r civil cases, in months NDCM = net delay f°r criminal cases, in months Raw scores were logrithmically scaled to a base of ,100. The court with the greatest degree of congestion had : a score of 100; the court with the least congestion had an index of 55.4.^ It is apparent that there are some limitations in the ; interpretation of the congestion index. Data on only twenty-two jurisdictions is included, and comparability is weakened by time of survey. Further, additivity of back log and delay figures is questionable. However, two state court administrators were subsequently contacted for their . Civil backlog per judge in'the congestion sample ranged from 30.3 cases to 2,404 cases; criminal backlog 'per judge ranged from 6.6 cases to 778 cases. Net civil delay ranged from as low as one month up to fifty-four months; net criminal delay ranged from two weeks to . fifteen months. 63 i comments regarding the index. Both agreed that poor data ' • i | availability makes such an index difficult to compile, but { felt the contribution in a single number measurement was > i substantial. One administrator has taken steps to include I i the index in forthcoming state statistical summaries. Al- : ! ithough reliance on a single number, by itself, to measure icourt efficiency is a little misleading, insuring that the ,underlying data for its construction is accumulated repre- 'sents an advance in state statistical data collection. Method of Data Collection The 108 questionnaires were mailed during the second !week of February, 1973. The names of presiding judges i I were obtained from the 1973 Judicial Directory from juris- 1 j dictions in the sample. A covering letter that explained the purpose of the research, assured anonymity, and urged 1 cooperation was included.^ This letter also included a trequest that the questionnaire be forwarded to the current .presiding judge if the recipient no longer held that post. A stamped, self-addressed return envelope was enclosed with the questionnaire. About 40% of the 108 presiding judges returned com pleted questionnaires within three weeks of the first ; < : I mailing. Four weeks after the first mailing, a second j -*-See Appendix B for initial covering letter. 64 jcopy of the questionnaire and a second covering letter were! i j 'mailed to each nonrespondent. About 40% of this group ; I I 'returned completed questionnaires within another three ! j _ i ;weeks. Total returns were sixty-three of the 10 8, a re- Isponse rate of 58%. ^ Upon inspection, eight judges returned questionnaires i lindicating they either had no presiding judges, or could ■not complete the questionnaire for a variety of reasons. Another four questionnaires were thrown out as being un- t |usable. Thus, fifty-one usable returns were received. Further analysis of the returns indicated only slight I differences in the proportion of respondents by state. All: major jurisdictions were accounted for and, therefore, the isample could be considered relatively free of sampling ;bias. It is possible, therefore, to generalize from the 'findings with some degree of confidence. Analysis of Data The completed questionnaires were coded and the data punched on IBM cards. Data analysis was accomplished at the Southeast Regional Data Center, housed at Florida International University. , i i i ; ---------------------------------------------------------------- I ! 1 ! See Appendix C for follow-up letter. 65 | Several forms of analysis were used. The sample was !dichotomized by demographic variables for a number of tests i j i |concerning conflict and power. Distinctions between more j I i : detailed sample representatives were not deemed important i t I !to the study• For example, when testing conflict or power i by method of selection, it was not necessary to test the I data by the five or six methods of selection. The impor tant characteristic was whether presiding judges came from ;the same court level or were appointed from higher levels. i Similar reasoning held for other variables. Hence, in or der to test for significant differences between two means, j !t-tests were used to allow the researcher to draw infer- i fences about the population. | i The t-test was selected as the appropriate hypothesis ' jtest because of the unknown nature of the population dis tribution, and the necessity to estimate population stan dard deviations. The general formula used for the two- sample test for difference between means was where x^ and x^ represent respective sample means, and S-?" — is the estimated standard error of the difference ; 1 ~ 2 i ' [between the two means. Because of the necessity to assume I domoscedasticity, sample variances were pooled to find a weighted-average common variance. The formulas used for this pooling were: where ^ - 1)S12 + (n2 - D S 22 nl + n2 “ 2 Computed t-scores were matched to tabled values of t jfor (n^ + n2 - 2) degrees of freedom. ! j References in the following chapter to "mean conflict 'scores," or "mean power scores" deserve explanation. It was noted earlier that conflict and power scores could be j lobtained by summary of the score on individual items on i |each scale. However, a few respondents did not respond to ;a couple of individual items; either because the item was ■not applicable, or they could not make a judgment. Thus, simple summing would tend to distort the relative degrees ,of felt conflict and perceived power. To counter this | problem, scores on each scale were summed, but then divided by the actual number of questions responded to, to obtain more comparable figures. Conflict and power scores, then, iare mean values for each class of respondent. Investigation of items related to the congestion index attempted to discern whether associations or relationships existed. Again, since the population distribution is un known, the degree of relationship between two variables 67 cannot be determined by the Pearson product-moment correla tion coefficient. Therefore, the covariability (or lack of it) between variables was computed by use of Spearman's rank correlation coefficient. I I Spearman's rank correlation coefficient is especially useful given the nature of the congestion index. Ordinal rankings appear to have more meaning than actual quantita tive scores given the manner of construction of the con- I i gestion index. Scores were rank ordered from highest to I slowest. Ties were treated by assigning mean ranks to sets i jof tied scores. The Spearman rank correlation coefficient, r , was computed by the following formula: O 6Zd. 2 r_ = 1 - s , 2 • n _ ( n -1) i i where the d^'s are the difference in ranks between paired items, and n is the total sample size. To test the significance of r , the following formula s was used: r t - 3 A -2 J 1-r ~ ~ T s which is approximately distributed as Students' t with n-2 degrees of freedom. Significance of r means rejection of s ;the hypothesis rs = 0. ; Finally, some of the data were analyzed by use of the Chi-square test for independence. Data were tested for ;self-perceived role under the assumption that the perceived i |role was independent of the method of presiding judge se lection. Contingency tables were set up, and the Chi- !square statistic calculated as follows: i ! Theoretical cell frequencies were computed by Er. Ec. f. . = * 1 13 T where f.. = the theoretical frequency for a cell 1- ' in row i and column j. Er^ = the total of frequencies in row i. ECj = the total of frequencies in column j. T = the total of all frequencies. 2 The x statistic was then computed by: (f -f )^ x2 _-z. <f0(ij) V ij where f^.. = observed frequency for cell in row i and column j. f . . .. = corresponding theoretical frequency in cell at row i and column j. 2 The value of x is distributed with (r-1) (c-1) degrees of freedom where r = number of rows c = number of columns The Interview^Phase Limited resources necessitated a relatively small sam ple for this phase of the research. However, five presid- 69 jing judges were selected for interviews, reflecting a vari-' | ety of selection techniques, periods of time as presiding judge, size of court, and accessability to the investiga- i ‘ !tor. 1 j | The interviews were conceived as complementing the f mail survey by facilitating deeper, more detailed insights |into the variables of the study. It was decided, accord ingly, to sacrifice some degree of comparability in the ;data in order to permit probing beneath the surface of the :problems under investigation. The semi-structured interview seemed most appropriate for obtaining the data. The. interview guide that was de veloped consisted of twenty-two open-ended items.'*" The interviews ranged in duration from forty-five min utes to■two hours. Before the interview began, the inves tigator briefly explained the purpose of the study, and as- :sured anonymity. Each of the presiding judges was very cooperative and seemed very interested in the study. The investigator took notes as the interview progressed. The notes were analyzed for the purpose of identifying common properties and relationships. "*"See Appendix D for interview guide. 70 i CHAPTER IV 1 | RESULTS i i In this chapter, data representing sample characteris tics will be presented. In addition, each hypothesis that I !was tested is restated, the data relevant to it are pre- I sented, and conclusions are formulated. Additional data analysis beyond originally stated hypotheses are presented ito provide greater depth. Finally, the findings of the in terview phase of the study are outlined. ! Characteristics of the Sample f i The purpose of this section is to describe the sample from which the data were drawn. Fifty-one usable question naires comprise the sample. Method of Selection Questions were posed relating to the method by which the presiding judge was selected. Table 1 provides the distribution of selection methods in the sample. 71 Table 1 Method of Selection f % election by peers 26 51. 0 appointed by Chief Justice 16 31. 3 rotation 3 5.9 appointed by Governor 3 5.9 appointed by another presiding judge 2 3.9 seniority 1 2.0 TOTAL 51 100. 0 ; For comparative purposes, there are two major methods I I ,of selection of the presiding judge. He can be selected by mechanisms existing at the same court level (from the same icourt of general jurisdiction), or he may be selected by a higher authority. Election by peers, seniority and rota tion represent selection from the same court level. Ap- 'pointment by the Chief Justice of the State, the Governor of the State, or by the presiding judge of a higher court represent selection from higher levels. This distinction is quite important in the subsequent analysis. Table 2, therefore, presents the data in summarized form. Table 2 Method of Selection: Summarized f % selected from same level 30 58.8 selected from higher level 21 41. 2 TOTAL 51 100. 0 t 72 j Length of Term of Office ! i ! Terms of office vary from state to state. Table 3 i ipresents the distribution of terms of office reported by i (presiding judges. i Table 3 Term of Office f 9- o less than one year 5 9.8 one year 16 31. 4 two years 2 3.9 three years 8 15. 7 indefinite 20 39. 2 TOTAL 51 100. 0 Nearly 55% of the sample serve for terms in excess of i ;two years. A term of more than two years is considered lengthy by current norms, and generally distinguishes be- 'tween terms of sufficient length to have an administrative •impact. Table 4 summarizes term of office data. Table 4 Length of Office: Summarized f % two years or less 23 45.1 more than two years 28 54.9 TOTAL 51 100.0 j Regardless of the official term of office period, 94% iof the presiding judges may succeed themselves in office for at least one term. It was interesting to note how much actual service the respondents in the sample had in their role of presiding judge. Table 5 presents this data in jsummary form. I | , Table 5 ' Length of Actual Service: Summarized f % two years or less - 26 51. 0 more than two years 25 49. 0 TOTAL 51 100. 0 The sample, then, is nearly divided between presiding Ijudges who have served a relative short period in their irole, and those who have served for a relatively long (more than two years) period. Court Sizes To assess the sizes of the courts studied, a question was asked regarding the number of judges serving in each particular jurisdiction. The judgment that the data in Table 6 represents relative spans of control would be un warranted because of divisional judges serving at the pleasure of, and directly responsible to, the presiding ■ judge. Data in Table 6 help frame the overall setting for i 74 1 total subordinates of the presiding judges. Table 6 Number of Judges in Court f % 10 or less 11 21. 5 11 - 20 21 41. 2 21 - 30 12 23.5 31 - 50 5 9. 8 51 - 75 1 2.0 76 - 100 0 0 over 100 1 2.0 TOTAL 51 100. 0 For summary purposes, Table 7 distinguishes between ismall and large courts. Courts with twenty-five or more judges are considered large. Table 7 Number of Judges in Court: Summarized f % small courts (24 or less) 37 72.5 large courts (more than 24) 14' 27. 5 TOTAL 51 100. 0 Table 7 indicates that only 27.5% of the courts in the sample are large, by this arbitrary distinction. This may I be as much as anomaly of state allocation formulas than a reflection of an imbalanced sample. Table 8 shows the dis tribution of metropolitan area populations. The wide range ]of population sizes indicates that some states are not as closely tied to allocating judges based on population as others. i Table 8 Metropolitan Population of Sample Courts f % less than 400,000 7 13. 7 400,000 to 600,000 12 23.5 600,000 to 800,000 9 17. 6 800,000 to 1,000,000 10 19. 6 1,000,000 to 1,500,000 8 15.8 over 1,500,000 5 9.8 TOTAL 51 100.0 For summary purposes, it is useful to distinguish ar bitrarily between large and small metropolitan areas. Six > . hundred thousand people -was selected as the dividing point !to conform with the data actually gathered by the National Conference of Metropolitan Courts. Table 9 presents popu lation sizes in summary form. Table 9 Metropolitan Population of Sample Courts: Summarized f Q , ~ o small large county county (600,000 or less) (more than 600,000) 19 32 37.2 62. 8 TOTAL 51 100. 0 76 Summary Analysis of the sample characteristics indicated a jgood distribution of attributes. Presiding judges in the ;sample represent a variety of selection processes, terms of [office, and actual tenure as presiding judge. Courts of different sizes are included, although most are courts with jless than twenty-five judges. However, there may be evi- jdence of unequal distribution of workloads between juris- I dictions due to much more varied population bases. | Tests of Hypotheses hypothesis 1: Presiding judge role conflict and method of selection It was hypothesized that presiding judges who were ap pointed or elected by a higher court level or authority would experience less role conflict than presiding judges who assume office by election by peers, seniority or rota tion. Mean conflict scores were computed for each respon dent by method of selection. The results of a t-test for difference between means on the conflict scale are present- i 'ed in Table 10. ; Table 10 indicates that there is a significant differ- l ence between conflict scores depending on the method of the presiding judge's selection. The results are in the Table 10 t-test: Presiding Judge Mean Conflict by Method of Selection Method of Selection N X SD t from higher level 21 2.17 1. 25 2.02 from same level 30 2.84 1. 11 *p~ < 05 ^hypothesized direction, and show presiding judges selected from a higher authority level experience less conflict than .presiding judges selected from the same level. It can be 'concluded, therefore, that Hypothesis 1 is supported by the 'data. Secondary item analysis attempted to identify particu lar areas that judges perceived to cause the greatest con flict. Nine items contributed most significantly to the 'difference in felt conflict. Table 11 presents these items in descending order by difference between means. In all cases, the differences represent greater conflict felt by ipresiding judges selected from the same level. It is of.further interest to note that items relating to judge productivity, sanctions for poor performance, size of case backlog or amount of delay involved in bringing a jcase to trial did not yield significant differences. Abso- jlute differences between means on these items ranged from :.014 to .493. The greatest conflict items regardless of Table 11 5 Absolute Differences Between Means on Selected Conflict Items Item Difference* Insufficient power of presiding judge 1. 726 Expectations of other judges on how responsibilities carried out 1. 294 Establishing court rules 1. 283 Introduction of automating devices 1.168 Relationships with local law enforcement officials 1.133 Hiring court personnel 1.114 Firing court personnel 1. 030 Case assignment procedures . 950 Transferring judges to other courts . 920 *A11 differences are significant at p < .01. I I 1 .method of selection were introduction of major organiza tional change, granting of continuances, size of case back-! i | 'log and relationships with trial attorneys. f I Hypothesis 2; Presiding judge perceived power and method of selection It was hypothesized that presiding judges appointed or elected by a higher court level or authority would perceive greater power in the operation and regulation of court ac tivities than presiding judges who assume office from the same level. Mean power scale scores for each respondent .were computed. The results of a t-test for the difference i , , * jbetween means on the power scale are presented in Table 12., 79' Table 12 t-test: Mean Perceived Power by Method of Selection Level N X SD t:. from higher level 21 4. 928 1. 32 2.81' from same level 30 3. 830 1. 41 *p < .01 ( Table 12 indicates that there is a significant differ- i i jence between the mean perceived power scores depending on Ithe method of the presiding judge's selection. The results [are in the hypothesized direction, and show presiding ! judges appointed from a higher level perceived that they I .possess greater power in the operation and regulation of 1 I court activities. Based on these results, it can be con cluded that hypothesis 2 is supported by the data. Item analysis was undertaken to identify particular factors that presiding judges felt contributed most signif icantly to their feelings of power. Table 13 presents ,those factors for which there was the greatest difference in mean score by method of selection. Individual items which did not yield significant dif ferences by method of selection included power to secure (adequate facilities, supplies and personnel, power to sane- I .tion judges, ability to initiate dismissal or promotion proceedings, and power to change court rules. One item 80 Table 13 Differences Between Means on Selected Power Items Item Difference* Authority to modify calendaring system 2.174 Influence to control productivity 2. 023 Power to enforce court working hours 2. 005 Control over case assignments 1. 843 Authority to formally evaluate performance 1. 786 Ability to counsel judges regarding problems 1.753 Power to schedule vacation periods 1. 685 Influence in determining case loads 1. 634 *A11 differences significant at p < .01. !yielded a significant difference in the non-hypothesized ! (direction: power to form committees and make committee iassignments. I Items reflecting greatest power for the presiding judges, regardless of method of selection, were ability to I counsel other judges regarding operating problems, estab lishment of contacts with higher court administration, con trol over case assignments and power to form committees and make committee assignments. Items indicating lowest per- ;ceived power regardless of method of selection were influ ence in obtaining promotions to higher courts, authority to I 'formally evaluate judicial performance, and power to sane- 1 ■tion judges who don't work. IHypothesis 3: Power and Conflict i 1 ". . . . . . . . . . 1 It was hypothesized that a negative correlation -would; | exist between perceived power and perceived conflict. In ' i I other words, presiding judges feeling they have the great- , ;est power will also feel the least conflict. Scores on the jpower scale and the conflict scale were summed. Scores I | 1 ,were rank ordered, and the Spearman rank-correlation coef- t 1 ficient was computed. A t-test was performed to test for .significance. Table 14 presents the results of this test. Table 14 Rank Correlation Between Power and Conflict All Respondents (N=51) Conflict t Power -.33 -2.52* *p < .01. Table 14 indicates there is a significant inverse re lationship between power and conflict. Based on these re sults, we can conclude that hypothesis 3 is supported. Hypotheses 4 and 5: Self-perceived role Hypothesis 4 asserted that presiding judges appointed ,by a higher court level or authority more often see their ■role as one of active leadership than do presiding judges ' I ' !selected from the same level. Each presiding judge was i 1 asked to rank order four role descriptions on the basis of i i 82 ’ how closely each description approximated his actual role. ! The description ranked first was considered to be the pre- j i siding judge's self-perceived role. A chi-square test of j :these data is presented in Table 15. ' I > Table 15 Chi-Square Analysis: Presiding Judge Self-Perceived Role by Method of Selection Perception of Role Frequencies by Selection Method By .'higher level By same level Total Leader 14 10 24 All others 6 18 24 Total 20 28 48 X2 = 5.48 df = 1, p < .05 I The data from Table 15 indicate that the hypothesis on i ;self-perceived role was supported by the data. Hypothesis 5 asserted that presiding judges who as- ! !sumed office by election of peers, seniority or rotation would more often see their role as an administrative chore-, I doer than would presiding judges selected by other means. Data was obtained from the same rankings described above. A chi-square test of these data is presented in Table 16. Table 16 Chi-Square Analysis: Self-Perceived Role by Method of Selection Perception of Role Frequencies by Selection Method By higher level By same level Total Chore-doer 2 6 8 All others 18 22 40 Total 20 28 48 — 2-------------------------------------- X = 1.004 df = 1 Not significant. 83 j The data from Table 16 indicate that the hypothesis I Iwas not supported by the data. i j Both of the preceding tests used collapsed data in f computation, since expected cell frequencies of all role i descriptions except leader roles were less than five (see Table 17). The chi-square test is most sensitive in the tails and hence these other categories were combined. Us- ^ing this process, the data presented in Table 15 is such |that all cells have expected frequencies greater than five. 1 i However, Table 16 is composed of two cells with expected 'frequencies less than five, and should*-therefore be viewed |with suspicion. The hypothesis was not supported, in any jevent, that presiding judges who assumed office from the i ;same level more often see their role as chore-doer. | The other two role descriptions, mediator and officer :of the court, do not have strong theoretical bases and were thus not tested explicitly. It is clear, however, that a near majority of presiding judges from both selection meth ods see themselves primarily in a leadership role. It is possible that this phenomenon is influenced by a social ;desirability factor. Perhaps presiding judges in general ;believe that their role should be one of active leadership Expected frequency for chore-doer selected by higher ' level is 3.33; expected frequency for chore-doer selected by same level is 4.67. in court affairs and tend to see themselves this way, |whether or not it is actually the case. j Full disclosure of the data accumulated is presented ! ! in Table 17. J Table 17 Chi-Square Analysis: Self-Perceived Role by Method of Selection Role Method of Selection From higher level From same level Total chore-doer 2 6 8 leader 14 10 24 mediator 0 8 8 officer of court 4 4 4 Total 20 28 48 X2 = 9.85 df = 3 p < .05 Table 17 indicates, overall, a difference in self perceived roles by presiding judges selected differently. However, due to cell sizes, care should be taken in inter preting such data, and conclusions withheld for additional study. Hypotheses 6 and 7: Court Efficiency Hypothesis 6 stated that greater role conflict felt by. the presiding judge would result in a higher congestion in- , dex for that court. I j I Similarly, it was hypothesized that the greater the j i self-perceived power of the presiding judge, the lower the ■ congestion index would be. To test these hypotheses, conflict scores for each of the judges in the twenty-two ; I ! jurisdictions covered by the congestion index were computed; i by summing the thirty-three items on the conflict scale. ; Conflict scores were paired with the respective congestion | I .index for each court, and ranked. Spearman's rank order I |correlation coefficient was similarly computed and tested I for significance. Table 18 presents the results of this analysis. Table 18 Rank Correlation Analysis: Conflict, Power and Court Congestion Rank correlation between All respondents congestion index and N = 22 felt conflict -.08* perceived power -.41* *not significant i Table 18 indicates that the rank correlation coeffi- 1 I ;cient for the relationship between the congestion index and ;the presiding judge's felt conflict and perceived power is not significant. The results for the power dimension are in the hypothesized direction, but not so*for the conflict j scale. From the data, we would have to conclude that there, ,is no support for hypotheses 6 and 7. I j Further analysis was attempted to discern whether ; I i other variables mediated the above relationships. Accord- i ingly, rank correlation analysis was prepared to measure ; ;the correlation between the congestion index and the power , jand conflict scales by method of presiding judge selection,.! i I I inumber of judges in the court, population size of the met- I i i jropolitan area, and length of service as presiding judge. ! ; [Scores for each dimension were paired with the respective ! i ! congestion index and values of Spearman's rank correlation ■coefficient computed and tested for significance. Table 19 presents the results of this analysis. Table 19 demonstrates no significant relationships be- jtween the congestion index and items on the conflict scale, ! by any of the tested demographic factors. However, a sig- I nificant relationship is found for the congestion index and items on the power scale by method of presiding judges se lection. The data indicates that presiding judges selected! 'from a higher authority or court level who had higher ! scores on the power scale had courts with a lower conges tion index. Judges selected from the same level with high- ; er scores on the power scale, also had lower congestion indices, but this relationship was not significant. t In addition, judges who have served relatively longer periods of time as presiding judge had scores which reflect :a significant relationship between perceived power and .court congestion. Higher power scores, in general, were t imatched with lower congestion scores for judges with more | ! ! .than two years service. 87 I Table 19 Rank Correlation Analysis: Conflict, Power, and Congestion by Demographic Factors Rank Correlation By Selection Method Size # Size Population Actual Service between conges tion and Higher N=10 Same N=12 Large Small N=12 N=1Q Large N=18 Small N=4 Two years or less N=ll More than two years N=ll felt conflict perceived power -.37 -.72** + . 32 -.30 -.31 -.04 -.12 -.11 -.10 -.09 +. 80 ' -.40 + .41 -.39 + .37 -.66* i * p < .05 ** p < .01 co 00 1 I 1 _ j ! In summary, although no overall relationships were I ■found to support hypotheses 6 and 7, more detailed analysis i l I lends credence to the possibility that method of selection I ■and length of service do have a significant impact on this relationship. Further, it should be pointed out that many other factors besides conflict or power have an impact on overall court congestion, and the congestion index only measured twenty-two of the study's fifty-one jurisdictions. I iThus, strong conclusions should be reserved for further I f I research. t Hypothesis 8: Calendaring. i i It was hypothesized that an individual calendar method l of case assignment will result in a lower congestion index for a court. Courts use either an individual calendar method or a master calendar method. Mean efficiency in- ,dices for each method were computed, and a t-test for dif ference between means was computed. The results of this test are presented in Table 20. Table 20 t-test: Calendar Method and Efficiency Method N X SD t individual 11 70. 7 11. 0 1. 83* master 11 79. 6 11. 8 *p < .10 89 j Table 20 indicates a significant difference (although I • ■not highly significant) between mean congestion indices fori (courts which use an individual calendar system and those j I i using a master calendar. As hypothesized, courts using an | individual calendar system, wherein each judge retains itotal responsibility and authority for case disposition, ■had a lower congestion index. This can be interpreted as ■meaning courts with individual calendar systems can gener ally be expected to experience lower backlog rates and less i jnet delay in case disposition. ; The development of greater personal responsibility for i the individual judge should also have an impact on the pre-' tsiding judge. If individual judges feel more committed to their jobs, as is assumed by an individual calendar system,! ■it would be expected that presiding judges should experi- " I ence less conflict in performing their job. To test this .assumption, conflict scores for presiding judges in courts using an individual calendar system were compared to the like scores for presiding judges whose courts use a master calendar system. A t-test for difference between means was performed. Table 21 presents the results of this test. :Table 21 t-test: Mean Conflict Scores by Case Assignment Method N X SD t individual calendar 19 1. 95 . 93 2.75 master calendar 30 2. 75 1. 01 *p < .01 90 Table 21 indicates a significant difference between I [mean conflict scores by case assignment method. Presiding [ ;judges of courts using individual calendar systems report less felt conflict than presiding judges using master cal- i endar systems. | There is reason to believe that the difference would ! jbe even greater had more current data been available for I the congestion index. At least three courts moved, or were :in the process of moving to an individual calendar from master calendar systems after data were collected. Data would be expected to show substantial reductions in conges- i ;tion because of this shift. Again, the same cautions in ■the use of the congestion index apply to this test. Summary of Results of Hypotheses Tests The findings provided considerable support for the :general thesis of this study regarding role analysis of the presiding judge. Four of the five relevant hypotheses were supported by the data. Findings related to issues of gen eral court operation, namely backlog, delay and calendar ing, show less support. One hypothesis was not supported outright, another supported only by detailed analysis, and the third, supported but not strongly. Difficulty in the construction of the congestion index is believed to be responsible in part for the lack of bet- iter relationships between the conflict and power scales and !court efficiency. 91 Summary of hypothesis 1 indicated that method of se- , lection of the presiding judge bears significantly on felt I conflict. Hypothesis 2 supported the relationship between i ! method of selection and perceived power. Judges, overall, i 'who perceived they had greater power generally felt less 'conflict in performing their roles. Hypothesis 4 confirmed >that presiding judges selected from a higher authority gen erally saw their role as a leader, while hypothesis 5 fail- .ed to support the notion that judges selected from the same level more often see their role as a chore-doer. ; Secondary Analysis I Additional data was available from the survey instru ments to provide richer analysis of the presiding judge role. The purpose of this section is to present these ad ditional findings. The major variables (power and conflict) of the pre siding judge role may be affected in ways other than method of selection. These variables will be tested against sev eral other demographic factors to attempt a more complete description of the role. Conflict The conflict variable will be tested for difference between means by the following: length of service as pre siding judge, number of judges in court and size of the metropolitan area served. 92 Length of Service i j To determine whether the degree of presiding judge ■ felt conflict differs depending on the length of time the individual has served, a t-test for difference between means was performed. Data were summarized on length of iservice. The results of the test are presented in Table |22. j i Table 2 2 i t-test: Mean Perceived Conflict by Length of Service Time served N X SD t two years or less more than two years 23 28 2.74 2.22 1.05 . 91 1. 86* *p < .05 Table 22 indicates that there is a significant differ ence between mean conflict scores depending on length of service. Presiding judges who have served for two years or less experience more conflict than do those who have served for longer periods. This should not be a surprising re sult. Previous research has frequently supported the posi tion that new entrants to a leadership position experience greater conflict. ! Items showing greatest distinctions were analyzed. Significant differences were greatest for presiding judges 93 serving two years or less on the following items: expecta-i j tions of other judges for how their role is carried out, j i | jinsufficient power of presiding judge, establishing court j ' i ■rules, introduction of automating devices, introduction of : I jmajor organizational changes and case assignment procedures. Number of Judges in Court The number of subordinates serving under the presiding I judge may have an impact on felt conflict. Given the rela tively unbalanced distribution of judges serving in a court i 'by population, it may be expected that a variety of pres sures build up. To test this possibility, a t-test for i I jdifference between means in felt conflict by number of j judges serving in the court was performed. Table 23 pre sents the results. . Table 23 I t-test: Mean Conflict by Number of Judges in Court Size of Court N X SD t 24 judges or less more than 24 judges 37 14 2. 425 2.767 1. 02 1. 09 1. 06* *not significant ; Although the mean conflict score for larger courts was .higher than for smaller courts, Table 23 demonstrates that :the difference is not significant. Thus, we may not con clude that the number of judges serving in the court has an 94 (appreciable impact on the level of felt conflict of the . 1 i i (presiding judge. ! i j These results may be explained by two possibilities. j One, counterbalancing effects may be operating to mediate the differences. For some factors, generally external re- I lationships, presiding judge conflict was greater in larger i I (courts. Other factors, mainly court assignments and inter nal relationships, show presiding judges in smaller courts |to experience greater conflict. i I i A second explanation for lack of significant differ- I (ences may be the greater levels of decentralization found 'in larger courts. In effect, buffers are established be- 1 'tween the judges on the bench and the presiding judge which’ I may serve to reduce the conflict felt by an otherwise more 'complex situation. Metropolitan Population The size of the metropolitan population served by the court may have an impact on the conflict felt by the pre siding judge. Although all jurisdictions covered by this study are defined as large, there are still wide differ ences in the size of the metropolitan areas served. To test for possible differences, a t-test was performed, I ^ stratifying by population. Table 24 presents the results. ! 95 Table 24 t-test: Mean Conflict by Metropolitan Population Size N X SD t 600,000 people or less 19 2.28 . 86 1. 24* more than 600,000 people 32 2.64 1.10 *not significant . Although the mean conflict score for presiding judges jwas higher in larger metropolitan areas, Table 24 indicates that the difference is not significant. Therefore, there is no reason to conclude that metropolitan population has an impact on the presiding judge felt conflict. Further, no discernible patterns emerge from item analysis. Power The power variable similarly will be tested against three demographic factors: length of service, number of judges in court, and size of the metropolitan population. Length of Service To determine whether the length of time the presiding judge has served has an effect on his perceived power a t- test for differences between means on the power scale was performed. The results are presented in Table 25. 96 Table 25 t-test: Mean Power by Length of Service Time Served N X SD t two years or less 23 4.12 1. 82 .66* more than two years 28 4.49 2.10 *not significant Table 25 indicates that judges who have served for i more than two years perceived they have more power than [presiding judges who have served less time. Although the difference is in the expected direction, it is not signifi cant. It cannot be concluded, then, that length of time iserved has a direct impact on perceived power. I One explanation for this result may be the constraints iPlaced on presiding judges by state statute, which is not J affected by length of service. In other words, the presid ing judge must follow regulations which limit his role throughout his tenure, and unless such statutes change, his perceptions of power should remain relatively unchanged. Number of Judges in Court The number of judges sitting in the court may have an |impact on the perceived power of the presiding judge. iTable 26 presents the results of the test for differences .between means in perceived power by number of judges. Table 26 t-test: Mean Power by Number of Judges in Court Number of judges N X SD t 24 or less 37 4.44 1. 56 ,963* more than 24 14 3. 93 2. 00 *not significant Table 26 indicates that there is no significant dif ference between perceived power by presiding judges by num- I ber of subordinates. Smaller court presiding judges had a higher mean score. Analysis of items on the power scale indicate a divi- Ision between power items by number of judges. Smaller court presiding judges had higher means on fourteen items, larger court presiding judges on nine. In general, larger court presiding judges ranked items higher that dealt with .internal relationships with other judges in the court. Metropolitan Population A test was performed to determine whether there were any differences in perceived power between presiding judges of large metropolitan areas and presiding judges of smaller areas. Table 27 presents these findings. I I \ Table 27 t-test: Mean Power by Metropolitan Population Population N X SD t 600,000 or less 19 4.69 1. 81 1.16* , more than 600,000 32 4.10 1.72 *not significant Table 27 indicates that presiding judges in smaller metropolitan areas perceive they have greater power, but |the difference is not significant. Perhaps the greater I visibility of a presiding judge in a smaller community par tially explains the direction of the difference. Summary of Secondary Tests on Conflict and Power Six additional tests on the conflict and power varia bles were performed on various demographic factors. Only one of the six tests, felt conflict by length of service, showed a significant difference. The remaining insignifi cant differences were all in explainable directions. Summary of Open-Ended Questionnaire Items Included in the survey instrument were three open- ended questions pertaining to the presiding judge role. ,The questions primarily concerned suggestions for improve ment of the presiding judge role. Approximately half of the respondents made one or more comments. The responses 99 were analyzed for general class characteristics, and coded. | Table 2 8 presents frequency counts of issues mentioned. | Table 2 8 Frequencies of Open-Ended Responses I tern f % Presiding judge needs more authority 13 25. 0 Presiding judge needs more meaning ful sanctions 9 17. 4 All court personnel should be under direction of the court 8 15. 4 Presiding judge needs stronger rules from Supreme Court or state statute 6 11. 5 Need unification of state courts 6 11. 5 Presiding judge should have re duced case load 3 5.8 Weak rules mean overreliance on concensus for decision-making 3 5.8 Presiding judge needs administra tive training 2 3.8 Presiding judge needs longer term of office 2 3.8 Total responses 52 100. 0 Table 28 points out a few important presiding judge concerns, with some degree of consistency. The first four items, comprising nearly 70% of the responses, dealt with the need for more power and authority for the presiding judge. Specific issues beyond the general desire for more power included the need for greater sanctions toward judges 'who fail to carry their fair share, and the need for con- I 'trol over other court personnel by the court. Considering .the number of different "bosses" for court personnel (sher- i iff, county clerk, city managers, mayors, state justice 100 |departments, etc.) this latter point is probably quite im- i 'portant to the efficient operation of the court. ! Also noted was the realization of the individual trial j court as part of a larger system of state-wide justice. |The increasing complexity of maintaining separate units jleads to recommendations calling for unification of the i ‘court system. In addition to smoothing inconsistencies in judicial administration, unified courts could provide a more clearly defined hierarchy, and take greater advantage of economies of scale. Examples of unified systems in New |Jersey and Florida show wide satisfaction by all analysts as well as more efficient operation. Several of the respondents who mentioned the desire for more authority followed their comment by a notation on the decision-making process which resulted. Most indicated ■the reliance on concensus for decision-making in the ab sence of rule-making authority for the presiding judge. In these instances, the presiding judge was just "one among many" in the process. Results of Interviews It was decided at the time the study was planned to secure additional data through interviews with presiding .judges in several locations. The purpose of the interviews was to obtain a deeper understanding of the dynamics of the ■presiding judge role, particularly in relation to power and ;conflict. 101 j Five presiding judges were interviewed from four j i I ! states. Two of the judges were elected by peers, two ap- : ' “ i I ipointed by the Chief Justice of the State, and one assumed , ' I I s office by seniority. The range of service as presiding , judge was from four months to three years. Four of the .courts served over 600,000 people; all had twenty or more judges serving. In general, respondents reacted very similarly to (their questionnaire responses on the questions related to power and authority. They indicated almost uniformly the i perceived expectation that they are responsible for insur ing a smoothly run operation. Yet, four of the five indi cated they did not have the authority to see that things went as planned. The three judges selected from the same level were strongest in this assertion, while one of the judges appointed by the higher authority agreed more moder-' ately that that was the case. The fifth judge, from a state with a strongly unified court system, felt he had more power than he needed to do his job. The bulk of the comments here related to the presiding judge"s inability to do anything about a situation involv ing one of his subordinates. About the only sanction that had any force was the capacity to transfer a judge to a less desirable location, but even here, presiding judges felt this would not solve problems of "short" court days, ; and judges who do not do their share of the work. In 102 igeneral, the presiding judges iridicated that without sane- ; | 1 ,tions of some kind available to them, even if they did not 1 use them, their.position was weakened. They had to rely on; | a personal power base which was satisfactory for minor ac- ' i I tivities, but which lacked clout when "the chips were down." The two judges who were appointed by their respective chief justices indicated wider flexibility available to I - Ithem to administer their courts. While still noting that i 'they should have more power, they felt it was easier to in- i ;troduce change into the system. In one case, the "charge" ,of the presiding judge was to automate the operations of the court. This included an integrated information system 1 ! and a case scheduling system. Although this was a major i change, he reported little problem with other judges resis- i ting the introduction of the system. In the other case, the presiding judge was in the pro- cess of moving to an individual calendar system of case as signment. Part of this change included establishing for judges goals for case clearance by certain dates. State rules provide the presiding judge with total authority for jcalendar management, and thus both legitimate and per- ' . sonal power formed the basis for this change. Several I months after the system was operational, this presiding 103 ‘judge indicated that after minimal initial resistance, the i , i system was a success. Attempts to introduce change by the other three pre siding judges were not so successful. One indicated he was iso new he really had not yet had a chance to try anything. A second reported that he has not, and would not, attempt I anything, because he has neither the power, authority, nor ■mandate to do so. The third reported limited success in i |two change efforts. In one, an attempt to decentralize a i I ^fairly large court was upset by the Executive Committee of !the court. The Executive Committee consisted of five se- Inior judges vested with decision-making authority on the local level. The presiding judge seemed a little bitter by this experience, and passed it off as "irresponsible jud- ,ges." A second attempt to modify procedures in the county clerk's office failed outright when the Clerk flatly re fused. The presiding judge reported "they didn't want to change from the way they've always done it." Questions related to general leadership style were posed. Three of the judges described their roles as a true leadership function,* planning, organizing, directing, and sto some extent controlling. One characterized himself as a :"benevolent autocrat" in the way he performed his role. ^"Personal communication to the investigator. 104 "I try to be sure the buck stops here," he reported. Two |others stressed a more democratic style: one because he I I was forced to because of his limited authority, and the jother because he preferred such a style. Each of the three I felt that he had considerable influence on important deci- ■sions, in comparison with other judges. I The other two judges were not as positive.' One des cribed himself as a "gatekeeper, insuring that the lid stays on," but there was really little he could do as pre siding judge. The second indicated there was so little he ; Icould do he was really just a figurehead. "A frustrated figurehead, at that," he said. Both reported personal in fluence played a key role in trying to achieve consensus, but that this was a very difficult task. In summary, the existence of legitimate bases of auth ority and power seemed to distinguish the judges. Coinci dent with this was support from higher levels of authority, and clearer definition of role requirements. The general lack of power was noted in enabling the presiding judge to take more direct action. Respondents were asked, in the first of a series of Iquestions regarding felt conflict, to react to a character ization of the presiding judge role as a "man in the mid- i . I die" in terms of their own experience. Additional ques tions probed for awareness of differing expectations and 105 jfeelings of ambivalence in decision making. Analysis of j i I |the interview data revealed three major modes of response: \ j (1) denial of awareness of conflicting expectations and no| felt conflict; (2) awareness of conflicting expectations | I jand some felt conflict; and (3) awareness of conflicting expectations and great felt conflict. Table 29 gives a ;breakdown of these responses by method of selection. Table 2 9 Presiding Judge Conflict: Distribution of Responses From Interviews Response Higher level Same level No conflicting expec tations, no felt conflict 1 1 Conflicting expecta tions, some felt conflict 1 1 Conflicting expecta tions, great felt conflict 0 1 In the administrative structure of the courts, the presiding judge is a "middle-man" position. Nevertheless, Table 29 indicates that two of the five presiding judges who were interviewed denied feeling in the middle. Some conflict was admitted by two others. ! With one exception, it was very difficult to discuss jdirectly issues regarding personal conflict with the jud- { 'ges. Although their descriptions were lucid when talking i about power and authority, it was much more difficult for 106 jthem to relate to their personal feelings. Perhaps train- ; | . i jmg as jurists has affected their perceptions of their own > | I ifeelings, since most of their lives have been spent resolv-1 i ling other people's conflicts. The psychological defense !created by the necessity for objectivity on the bench seems to interfere. After distinguishing between conflict they ipersonally feel, and conflict they observe, the presiding “judges were more able to discuss the issue. 1 Two of the three presiding judges interviewed indica ted an awareness of conflicting expectations, but did not !feel acutely uncomfortable in their roles. They seemed to ;have adjusted to being in the middle. As one stated, "I ! guess that's part of the job." One presiding judge expressed grave concerns over the conflicting expectations and concomitant personal conflict he felt. Almost naively he remarked that he did not expect; the job to be like he found it when he actually took over, and expressed the future relief he would feel when his term ended. "How can anybody expect me to do anything when I have no authority to do so," he said. He continued, "I have to make decisions in dealing with, the clerk, the bail-• iffs, the (court) reporters, the legislature, budget mat ters, attorneys and case assignments, but everytime I have to run back to the judges en banc to get a consensus judg ment. It's an impossible situation!" 107 I The other presiding judges tended to view being in the 1 ! i 'middle somewhat philosophically. When asked if being in : I t jthe middle caused them to feel ambivalent in decision-mak- j i .ing, one said: "It's part of the job. You don't take a job like this if you're not willing to face that." Another stated in a similar vein: "It would be nice if everyone agreed on everything - it would reduce the pressures. But .it's a built-in part of this kind of job." A third was 1 perhaps less sanguine: "It really doesn't cause much prob- jlem at all, in fact, things are quite easy. My responsi- I ibility is very limited, my authority is almost non-exis- 'tent, so why do I have to worry? I'm just a figure head. .. ." Two of the judges indicated that they realized their jobs might be more complex if they had the authority they desired, but were willing to accept these consequences. All of the three judges who perceived conflict emphatically agreed they could be more effective if they had more auth ority. They felt, in this case, they could better deal with their various publics and be more responsive to prior ities. The questions regarding role conflict suggested, then, that role conflict can be a major problem for some presid ing judges, a less serious problem for others, and no prob lem for some. It was interesting to note that role con flict was most pronounced among those with the least tenure 108 as presiding judge. Perhaps, as the literature suggests, their orientations are more directed to the role of trial judge instead of an administrator, and hence they have not made the necessary psychological transition to their new i l irole. I A final question related to the state of the art of ^judicial administration. Presiding judges were hopeful in ,the trends they saw. One described the field as "making i 'great strides." Another said, "we're trying very hard, but .there's a long way to go." Finally, one said, "'judicial ^administration is in its infancy; we're just now defining the problems. But with places like the Institute for Judi cial Administration, and the National College of State Trial Judges, we're on the right track. I'd be a lot more effective if I knew what I was doing." 109 CHAPTER V ' DISCUSSION The limitations of the study are discussed in the first part of this chapter. In subsequent sections the im plications of the findings for research on the presiding judge role and court administration are discussed. Limitations of the Study 1 Generalizability The sample of presiding judges was selected to permit !a considerable degree of generalization of the findings. However, there are some limitations on the external valid ity of the study. It should be noted that the courts stud ied represented relatively large metropolitan operations in courts of general jurisdiction. The results of this study cannot be generalized to courts of limited jurisdiction, appellate levels or to small (by population) jurisdictions. The sample consisted of presiding judges in fifty-one !locations. Although numerous consistencies were found, differences in state law are often such that particular is sues are not germane to that jurisdiction. Further, some 110 |courts distinguish between the presiding judge and the cal endar, or assignment judge. The findings contained here j ! apply, strictly speaking, to. only presiding judges. i i ( Sampling Bias ! j J Although the response rate was relatively.high for a 'mail questionnaire survey, and analysis of returns showed ; little variation from the target population by method of 'selection, size of courts, population bases, and calendar- ing methods, it is possible that non-response bias could have affected the results in an unknown way. I pata Based on Self-Reports I It should be noted that the bulk of the data consisted Jof self-reports by presiding judges. It is possible that presiding judge perceptions of their own power, felt con flict and other phenomena are not completely consonant with the realities of the judicial social setting. Especially given the difficulty judges had in identifying their own conflict found in the interviews, it is possible that the same effect carried over into responses on the conflict scale. i Validity and Reliability of Power and Conflict Scales i ! The original power scale developed by Hill was design ed to measure academic department chairman power. An 111 effort was made to adapt this scale to the judicial set- ; ting. However, it is possible that the instrument did not : adequately measure the power dimensions being sought by the i I investigator. Similarly, the conflict scale may not have \ jbeen worded strongly enough to elicit true feelings of felt I jconflict by presiding judges. The relatively few questions ! that comprised each scale may be a further limitation of the instruments. i I I (Judicial Statistics i . . . I ■ n..— — ■■■■....... .h i • | The state of judicial statistical information weakened jthe construction of the congestion index.^ Data could only |be collected from twenty-two of the fifty-one jurisdictions' i ! covered by the sample. Different reporting dates compound- ! !ed the problem of comparability, and. makes generalization : . r - • |even more difficult for this phase of the study. Investigator's Resources The limited resources of the investigator prohibited a more ambitious,nationwide interviewing phase which may have provided more depth to the study. See Groose, The Quality of State Judicial Statistics, for further explanation of the type of statistical report- ' ;ing which would rectify this situation. 112 Discussion of Findings > I j I Regarding the Presiding Judge Role I ------------------------------------ i This study seems to confirm a number of hypotheses re-, J garding the role of the presiding judge in metropolitan i Icourts. The method of selection of the presiding judge has an impact both on the degree of felt conflict as well as jperceived power in administration. Judges who assumed the 'presiding judge role from a higher authority or court level' 'felt significantly more power to lead, and felt signifi cantly less conflict in the exercise of their leadership. Similarly, these presiding judges tended to view their role j •more positively as a leader than did presiding judges se lected from the same level. There may be several explanations for these findings. It appeared that presiding judges selected from a higher level came from states where a more unified court system had been implemented. With such unification, it would be expected that more thought and effort had gone into the definition of the presiding judge role, and more authority vested in it as a consequence. Greater feelings of power in administration probably emerged because those states granted more power by rule to begin. Thus, greater role clarity, greater legitimate authority and hence, less felt conflict. 113 In contrast, judges selected either by elective pro- icess, by seniority or rotation felt less power and author- i ity to lead, experienced less role clarity and consequently !felt greater conflict. One exception to this otherwise general comment is the case of the presiding judges from ithe state of California. Although presiding judges are [elected by their peers, the state Legislature significantly i ;strengthened the presiding judge role approximately six months prior to this study. With the substantial increase 'in presiding judge power, judges in California reported !similar scores on the power scale as other judges appointed 'from higher authority. Conflict scores were still higher, l and may have been a reflection of the system in transition. It is the conclusion of the investigator that presid ing judges should be selected from a higher authority, pre ferably within the judicial system. Such selection estab lishes an administrative hierarchy to complement the exist ing adjudicative hierarchy, and therefore becomes a begin ning in the formation of a formal organization which can more ably cope with managerial problems. The importance of the method of selection was further iunderscored by the secondary analysis of power and conflict data. Only one of six tests showed a significant differ ence when presiding judges were separated by other demo graphic variables. The fact that both original tests were 114 :significant when considered by method of selection lends ; I i I greater credibility to these hypotheses. ■ \ ' I The most important considerations in the selection of ■ ! I I j ia presiding judge are his administrative abilities and his ■ I t ;leadership. The qualities that make a person a good judge do not necessarily insure a good leader. But administra- ' tive ability alone is not sufficient for a presiding judge. Because of the "separate but equal" relationship among his fellow judges, he must also be able to gain support for his. decisions and his administration without undue friction or 'resentment among them. Although seniority is the basis for selection in the I |federal court system, and in some states, it is considered to be inappropriate for two reasons. One reason is that such selection does not take into account qualities other than experience on the bench. Long judicial experience, which emphasizes the importance of judicial independence, may actually decrease a judge's ability to plan and make sound decisions regarding the court which must be viewed as an integrated system. The other objection to seniority as the basis for selection is that the duties imposed on the presiding judge may be enormously burdensome, especially in t the large courts. It is neither fair nor wise to impose isuch burdens on judges who in all probability are the most elderly members of the court. 115 ! Rotation as a basis for selection falls prey to many I ! of the same problems outlined above. Such a system does not account for administrative ability which may be present t i in some judges, and not in others. ' ■ Selection of the presiding judge by peer election may | avoid some of the problems encountered by the other two ! techniques of seniority and rotation. The main drawback to the election process is the absence of a link of accounta bility to higher court levels on an administrative basis, i ;The presiding judge is not responsible to higher authority and hence, is not led himself. The possibility of a popu larity contest where electors may have a stake in insuring I !a presiding judge who won't make them work very hard cer tainly exists. ' Perhaps a well defined set of rules by which the pre siding judge operates would alleviate the above problem. In other words, stronger initiating structure provided for the presiding judge would reduce role conflict and increase the probability of effective decision-making. The absence of such rules leads the presiding judge to rely exclusively on a personal power base with relatively little clout be- jhind his decisions. I I A presiding judge selected by a higher authority would. ; i 1 seem to alleviate problems encountered by selection from , 'the same level. Judges could combine legitimate authority 116 jwith personal characteristics to effectively perform their role. Appointments would be made by individuals with a stake in insuring the system performs up to standards t f ! sought. | The question of standards or performance expectations is a difficult one, both for the presiding judge and the i judges who comprise the court. The parameters of what is expected have not been articulated in all but four of the jurisdictions studied. Presiding judges indicated that the bulk of their power was applied to external interactions i and relationships in addition to the generally found auth- i ority to assign cases and form committees. Yet, the weak- i jest power dimensions were those that could be considered ;as consequences to poor performance on these duties. Very little, if any, recourse was indicated for the ability to ■take action should a judge not perform well. Thus, cases could be assigned, but there was no way to insure they would be heard; committees would be formed, but there was no way to have members participate; judges felt they could control productivity but had little power to evaluate or sanction poor performers. Even in a few of the external relationship areas, pre siding judges have difficulty. Supposedly charged with responsibility for efficient court operations, virtually , all jurisdictions have barriers to actual integration of 117 jsuch activity. In particular, the lack of power, and the ! [consequent conflict felt by the many court personnel serv- ing different "masters" complicates effective coordination. iThis throwback to F. W. Taylor's "functional foremanship" does not allow for sufficient authority to be lodged in one i place and contributes to disparate parts pursuing conflict ing organizational goals. The lack of performance guide lines so common to other professional organizations appears to be just as strong in the courts. t The results of such deficiencies similarly have sup- i i ;port in the literature. The path-goal theory of leadership 'asserts that the leader tries to ease- the paths to accom plishing various organizational goals by maximizing person- I al psychological payoffs. Both the absence of goals and the ambiguous state of personal payoffs typifies the pre siding judge role, and consequently impedes the leadership function. Presiding judges frequently cited the lack of power they felt. This could be interpreted as an inability to prescribe the "paths" in the first place. The problem is more complex, however. The presiding judge selected from the same court level and essentially not responsible to higher authority, finds himself the ob ject of a low consideration-low initiating structure situa tion. Research to date has indicated this to be an inef fective mode of leadership, prone to increased role con flict and ambiguity. The results of this study seem to 118 bear out this notion, Continuuing with this argument, these presiding judges apparently are low initiators themselves. This is supported by results from the conflict scales and the personal interviews. The relatively low recognition ofj conflict (between two and three on a seven-point scale) seems to reflect two factors. The first is the general un willingness to perceive or admit to feeling conflict. This has been discussed previously. Secondly, in those cases where significantly more conflict was indicated, the focal points of such conflict were relatively "safe" fac tors, beyond general statements of conflicting expecta tions. The tough issues, evaluating performance, sanction ing poor performance, congestion, delay, etc. received rel atively low scores and might imply that presiding judges do not deal with such issues explicitly. Many seem to indi cate that they think about things such as the above a great deal, but do not actually confront their colleagues for remedial action. Thus, little initiating structure and probably moder ate consideration structure appears to be evident in the courts. Previous research indicates low initiating struc ture to be generally inappropriate for effective perfor mance of high level employees. Moderate to high consider ation structures generally lead to more satisfied employees but with mixed results on task performance. 119 j Only two states, California and New York, have at- I i . ! itempted to deal with this problem. The respective weighted ; t case-load standards provides a base of expected activity ! !per judge. These standards, as well as actual monthly re- ! i tsults, are published and thus provide some degree of pres sure to produce. i ! It appears, then, that most presiding judges have fal len into some aberration of participative or democratic leadership, without the expected philosophy or model of imanagement directing their motives. Rather, the lack of a .formal authority base by default requires presiding judges to operate by consensus or majority rule. As a cure to the often cited bane of bureaucracy, this might appear to be a ! beneficial happenstance. However, although research on t .participative management shows marked success from a norma- i tive base, its success has been more modest in practice. The situation is significant, and participative styles seem to be best where tasks are unstructured and ambiguous. Such is not the case for the judge. His task is quite de fined, almost routine, such as to question the appropriate ness of such a leadership style. Perhaps more important is the basis by which such a style emerges. A true participa-i tive system, based on democratic values, still relies on I 'the existence of a hierarchy, and focus of authority. Ac- ( countability for performance is still demanded, although the mode for achieving such accountability is one of help- 120 ling and support, rather than control. In more pejorative i ! terms, though, "the buck has to stop somewhere." The presiding judge requires both legitimate and per- I jsonal (or expert) power to operate an effectively adminis- itered court. He needs the flexibility to innovate, the 'capacity to create a cohesive social system among the many !court employees, the strength to lead and the ability to motivate, the authority to act, and of course, the desire >to promote effective judicial administration. The results f i ,of parts of this investigation reveal serious lapses among i |a number of these components. i i I Relationship of Presiding Judge Role to Court Efficiency It has been asserted that the strength of leadership iof the presiding judge has an important impact on the man ner by which the court is administered. Further, the meth od of presiding judge selection was found to contribute .significantly to the strength of this role. While the data did not support the notion of the relationship between the two major variables reflecting strength of leadership, con- iflict and power, and court efficiency as measured by the : congestion index, a significant relationship was found when ! I respondents were stratified by method of selection. Spe-- l cifically, presiding judges selected by a higher authority 121 [demonstrated an inverse relationship between perceived I x . , I 'power and court congestion.J Thus, those judges who felt j ! ' I [they had significantly more power also had courts with ! i j t lower congestion indices. | In addition, these same presiding judges more often jsaw their role as a leader, rather than other less assert- |ive role descriptions offered them. It would appear, then, that strength of leadership does have an impact on court jefficiency. Two caveats must be offered at this point. The first [concerns the reliability of the congestion index as a meas- ■ iure of court efficiency. More complete data would have al-1 'leviated this situation. However, certain patterns were clear. Several courts where the judge was selected from the same level, where the presiding judge felt little power,: I land had been in office for a relatively short time, also had median net delay rates of three or four years for dis position of civil cases, and backlogs of over 2,000 cases per judge. A second issue also concerns the relationship between the presiding judge and court efficiency. It would be pre mature to assert that the presiding judge is the only in fluence on court efficiency, or even to state without cau tion the significant role he can play. Many other varia bles obviously enter the picture. Local conditions, state support, support of other agencies, prevailing state laws 122 ■and rules, and judges themselves bear on whether a court is. : I ultimately efficient. In addition, there are times when 1 i I •concern for quality outweigh those for quantity. In other, I 1 words, some delay will be tolerated to insure justice. i . The interviews as well as open-ended data revealed, i however, that presiding judges felt they could make their courts more efficient if they could assume stronger roles. Most expressed frustration with the limits of their author ity. In two cases judges who felt that they could play •strong roles were able to implement major changes that had ■ direct impacts on improving court efficiency. In addition, | four states have or are in the process of strengthening the1 rules governing presiding judges. Activity of this sort from the state level also is directed toward the belief of 1 I .better court efficiency from stronger leadership. Coincident with the slight moves toward greater pre siding judge authority is the need to recognize the impor tance of other managerial functions. The planning and con trol functions are getting increased attention, yet the foundation of both functions, goal setting, still appears largely non-existent. Necessity to coordinate various court functions as well as desire to have more direct con trol over staffing has fared better, but also has been stalled by the authority problem. Perhaps the most fundamental management activity, in the administrative sense, is decision-making. Good 123 'decision-making implies both goal setting, as well as data j I | (analysis. It is this latter point that was found most dis-; i ; (appointing. Data on which to identify performance factors, i to assess operations, to make judgments to improve adminis- ! itrative functioning are virtually nil. Collection of such data is rare, and must frustrate court administrators as it' did this investigator. Information provides a power base .essential to a leader. Without information, decisions to improve operations are based on hunch, guess, and experi ence. Scientific or rational decision-making is fueled by 'information, and the lack of it will keep the courts in an ; administrative quagmire. Such absenses of information hampered the construction1 of the congestion index. However, it is felt to be a sig nificant start in the development of a device to assess a court's performance. Further, it is felt that the rankings which emerged from the index are fairly reflective of a court's efficiency in an ordinal sense. Certainly other factors must be considered, and not all are within the do main of the presiding judge. Yet, the data accumulated in this study seems to support the notion that the presiding judge role is important. Case Assignment System and Court Efficiency The method of case assignment techniques also appears to have an impact on a court's ability to expedite cases. i jIndividual calendar systems tend to be related to shorter jcourt delay and reduced backlog. i ! An individual calendar system operates such that a : judge, once assigned a case, remains as the sole arbiter to jdisposition. Granting of continuances does not send a case 'back to a central pool to be reassigned. Hence, the par- I I ties to the action are discouraged from "judge shopping," I :a delay technique designed to have a case heard by a judge known to have a lenient attitude toward particular cases. The original judge retains responsibility through all phases of the proceedings. Hence, each judge becomes ac countable for cases assigned to him, and has a stake in their conclusion. Time is not lost by having a new judge become familiar with each new case. In addition, the judge under an individual calendar system knows the history of the proceedings and is in a better position to render a decision. The philosophy behind an individual calendar system is similar to that being advocated for the presiding judge. A workload and accountability for its disposition is estab lished. The amount of work can be based on measurable jdata: weighted case load figures. The judge is responsi- : |ble and, therefore, the central actor in the process. If ; i | |he completes all of his cases, it is a credit to him; if . I jnot, only he is to blame. He knows where he stands be- ! I cause the data is always available to him. I Several states have recently shifted to individual icalendar systems, and reported results are often astound ing. One court in New York cleared a four-year backlog I plus regularly assigned cases in fifteen months. Another i •New Jersey court cleared a two-year backlog plus normal •loads in one year. j Of course, the presence of an individual calendar sys- i ;tern by itself does not bring miracles. The system must be supported by a series of tough policies regarding continu ances, time goals for disposition, existence of facilities and strong organizational support from colleagues and su periors. A master calendar system could, in theory, do the' same thing, yet judges report the adverse affect of dis tancing themselves from cases when they are only involved in parts of the total action required. The assumption is 'made that the judge who knows he retains a case until final disposition is inclined toward action rather than inaction.. Action further can be taken at any time, instead of having , ! t I to wait through the queue. Rather than avoiding a decision by granting delays, efforts are directed toward expediting ; matters pertinent to the case. 126' ' The individual calendar approach serves also to main- |tain the integrity of the individual judge. By putting him I in complete control of the decision-making process, his ! :competence is affirmed and his professional stature is en hanced. The data further indicates the positive effect I 'this has on the presiding judge as demonstrated by lower conflict scores. Implications of Present Study to Organizational Theories of the Courts Although the literature on organizational design models for the courts are weak, the present study revealed interesting results. The conception of the courts as a .laissez-faire organization, partially masked as participa tive in operation, springs from diffused leadership and lack of control. This conception is countered by the i(implied) recommendation that the courts require a more bureaucratic structure to be effective. However, neither end of the continuum totally avoids the charge of over simplicity. Rather, the courts should be viewed as a complex or ganization with both collegial and bureaucratic sub-struc tures. One model or the other alone would appear to be inappropriate for such a highly professionalized organiza tion. Professionally oriented interactions can exist in iconcert with bureaucratically organized administrative sub-units. I The courts would not be the first organization to be ! j i icharacterized by such a combination. Hospitals, scientif- i : |ically-based industrial firms, universxtxes, and other highly professional organizations are similar to the courts: ;in this respect. The literature on professionalized organ- :izations underscores the limitations of the simple bureau- .cratic model as an adequate explanation of how such organi zations actually operate. A major focus of this literature has been on the process by which bureaucratic and profes sional modes of organization are integrated to enable the organization to remain viable. The issue in the courts seems to be dual-pronged. jFirst, a bureaucratic organizational base needs to be es- I tablished to fill the existing vacuum. However, by stop ping at this point, the courts would be subject to all the same problems of other like organizations. Namely, the in-1 tegration of sub-structures must proceed simultaneously. In many ways the courts demonstrate a reverse situation. The trend in industry is to move highly bureaucratic struc tures to more collegially-based structures. This process is made difficult by the existence of strongly held bureau cratic values on the part of management. In effect, the value shift is from bureaucratic to democratic. In the courts, democratic values are well established and the move entails a shift to more bureaucratic values. 128 Administration of the courts will require cooperation, informed judgment, flexibility as well as an organized authority base and systems of rules. The complex relation ships identified here leave much work yet to be performed to find the ideal mix and integration of these various sub units. CHAPTER VI RECOMMENDATIONS AND SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH The purposes of this chapter are to describe the model presiding judge role based on findings from this research, ■to suggest recommendations regarding the presiding judge and court administration, and finally, to indicate areas where further research is required. The Model Presiding Judge Role The findings of this investigation provide a number of normative role descriptions for the presiding judge of a :metropolitan court. Presiding judges do seem to differ both in their roles and the impact of the way these roles are acted out. The method of presiding judge selection has obviously played a major part in this study. It is apparent that the presiding judge selected from a higher court level in the state system feels a greater sense of power and less role conflict than other presiding judges. The selection of the presiding judge should be one link in the establishment of a chain of command for state courts. This result would emerge from a unified court system being in existence. 130 The presiding judge should have a term of office of at least two years, and be able to succeed himself upon demon stration of administrative skill. The number of judges re porting to him and the size of the metropolitan area served do not appear to influence his perceived role or his im pact. The presiding judge is a leader. He is responsible for planning, coordinating and controlling the activities of the court. To do so, he must have the power and author ity to act. Some of the components of this power and authority include: 1) the ability to assign judges to particular courts 2) maintenance of the court calendar, court records and other data to monitor case flows 3) the authority to regulate and enforce hours for court operation 4) control and general supervision of all court employees 5) power to form committees and make committee assignments 6) authority to approve activities of other judges (meetings, vacations) which cause them to be absent from the court during working hours 7) * authority to monitor and control productivity of judges 131 j 8) power to sanction poor performance ^ 9) power to evaluate judicial performance | 10) representation of the court in functions with I i other branches of government, other courts, ^ the news media, and outside groups concerned ! with the courts 11) all fiscal matters Because the presiding judge can be authoritative, this jdoes not mean that he is'autocratic. Rather, he should i 1 ;utilize a style most reflective of himself and recognize the professional nature of his subordinates, j The ideal presiding judge role is clearly defined by state statute or rules of higher courts. Role ambiguity is reduced by such definition. The presiding judge makes the final decision on matters pertaining to court adminis tration, upon advice from other members of the court. He i is similarly accountable for his actions and for court efficiency to higher authority. The presiding judge's court uses an individual calen dar system. The use of this system is supported by a i !strong policy against continuances, and state law requiring ;mandatory case settlement in prescribed time periods. ; Active data collection regarding court operation is | ongoing. A statistical support group provides information I relevant to better decision-making, and control of case- j i ' i 132! ___ __ _ ________ __ ._ . _ _ . j 'flows. Standards for productivity based on weighted case- 1 1 ! loads are known and publicized. j In sum, the presiding judge is a leader. He modifies ' , ihis leadership style to fit the situation, and demonstrates high initiating and/or high consideration structure where appropriate. Goals are clarified, and he can direct activ ities toward meeting these goals. Recommendations t I The following are action recommendations based on this i •study to improve the operation of the courts. They are divided by those recommendations particularly germane to ;general court administration and those related to the pre siding judge role. Court Administration Unification of State Courts State courts should be viewed as an interdependent system, whereby rules, procedures, funding and coordination are consistent and centralized. The existence of indepen dent units complicates administrative efficiency and fails i to reflect changing population trends. State courts should ■^The Annual Report of the California Judicial Council is a good example of such reporting. 133 jhe organized into a unified judicial system financed by and- i . ‘ * ' i iacting under the authority of the state government, not |units of local government. i ; ! The state supreme court should possess power to pro- ! I mulgate rules of procedure and rules of administration. It 'should possess power to delegate administrative duties to | local judges and local administrators. Judges should be available for temporary service anywhere in the state to meet shifting demands. While responsibility for operations should reside in !the supreme court, the responsibility for administrative I ;support should be fixed in a state-wide Judicial Council i j(as in California) or Administrative Office of the Courts ; (in New Jersey). The function of such an agency would be- • ! iprimarily to collect information, prepare statistics, de- ;velop recommendations for the courts regarding more effi cient operation, and responsibility for ongoing research programs to improve the administration of the courts. Thus, unification of state courts would fix both ad ministrative and adjudicative responsibility at one level, and form the basis for other reforms in the system. Establishment of a Hierarchy Closely related to the issue of state unification is the need to formally establish a chain of command for the 134 :court system. An effectively managed organization requires I i coordinated activity from the highest level to the lowest jlevel. The same is true for the court system. An estab- i | lished hierarchy formalizes authority relationships and ! ! sets up lines of accountability. Without such a network, j component parts of the system operate in disparate ways i iwhich often are contradictory. I The court system generally has little control over its I Imembers in non-judicial matters. State courts adopting a i junified structure which fixed responsibility for adminis- jtrative matters in the supreme court of the state eliminate ithis problem. j The chief justice of the supreme court should be the :chief executive officer of the courts and bear ultimate re- f Isponsibility for making the system effective. The chief i justice should be empowered by the state constitution to ; fix rules of administration as well as policies and prac tices for court operation. He should be assisted in the day-to-day administration by the above mentioned state ad ministrative office of the courts. The chief justice should be responsible for appointing the presiding judge of the next lower level appellate court. This presiding judge, as a member of the lower ap pellate court, shall be responsible to the chief justice and have authority on all administrative matters within his, 135 'court. His selection should be based on capability as an ■ | I administrator and a leader. A modest salary incentive j i I I ishould be authorized for his additional responsibilities. ! He, in turn, should appoint the presiding judge for 1 I .each of the courts of general jurisdiction on either a |county or other regional basis. Again, these presiding ;judges should be appointed on the basis of merit alone, and for a term of sufficient length, at least two years, to Jdevelop an administrative framework. They should be re sponsible to the presiding judge of the intermediate appel-■ l 'late court, and have authority over all judges within their j jregion. The presiding judge in multi-court divisions may .appoint district judges who act as intermediaries between himself and other judges. Again, some salary differential .would be appropriate. For example, the presiding judge of the Los Angeles Superior Court would be appointed by the presiding judge of the State Court of Appeals. The former has authority in all non-judicial activities within his court, and may ap point district judges in each of the nine Superior Court Districts. He will delegate his authority to these dis trict judges who will report to the presiding judge on a regular basis. The advantage of this method would be that no new judges would Be-required," and cost increases would be mini-' ,mal. Authority relationships are more formal since the I presiding judge would be the designate of a higher court, > i # ! land hence directly responsible to it. The presiding judge | I would still be set apart from the other judges in his court1 1 i by his salary differential and the higher status of being i I I jrecognized by the next highest level court. | Commensurate with the establishment of a hierarchy in i i I the court system is the necessity for the development of rules and procedures for the effective operation of the i ;courts. Policy guidelines, flexibly drawn and allowing for i jsome consideration of local needs, should be sufficiently explicit regarding expectations for performance from lower courts. Courts should be "charged" with the necessity to 'expedite case disposition. Use of Individual Calendar .Wherever - possible, state courts should be encouraged to utilize individual calendar methods of case assignment. Such a system seems to speed the administration of justice and reduce feelings of conflict among presiding judges. It further extends the notions of accountability that should exist throughout the system to individual judges by j fixing responsibility for case disposition. ; A modification of an individual calendar system is ,recommended for unusually large courts with severe backlog , I iproblems. Such a method is based on the New York confer- ence and assignment system of case disposition. Its use has been confined to courts of limited jurisdiction, but shows sufficient appeal to be used at the court of general jurisdiction level. The conference and assignment method is based on a team approach that can better utilize time, space and ef fort. It allows the court to work continuously in dispos ing of masses of cases which could and should be adjusted without trial, and to try those cases which must be tried. Basically, the system establishes a number of three-judge teams consisting of a conference judge and two assignment judges. Each judge serves in succeeding one month terms as the conference judge. The conference judge calls twenty-eight to fifty cases per day for four days per week. He seeks to settle, adjust or dispose of 70% to 80% of these, without trial. The bal ance of the cases are assigned for trial to assignment judges or held for further conference. The jury is ordered selected by the conference judge. The benefits of this system derive from no cases being remanded to the calendar clerk, each team being responsible to dispose of all cases assigned each week, an absolute limit of sixty days for holding a case, all trials fixed and set for a specific day, and the ultimate responsibility of the judge to whom the case is assigned to dispose of it. Additionally, every judge is part of a team that has an op portunity to develop and maintain cohesiveness as well as |providing each judge the chance to participate to his capa-| I j |bility within the context of a social structure. j ! The development of a team approach relieves the pre- ' I I siding judge of the burden for supervision over all judges j I i of the court, and replaces that chore by a more decentral ized structure with built-in accountability. However, the .skill required to develop effective teamwork may become an added responsibility of the presiding' judge for which he is not sufficiently trained. A concerted training effort i in the dynamics of group processes would be a beneficial I advent in the training of presiding judges. Establishment of State-Wide Center for Court Organizational Development The growing recognition of the importance of the man- ,agement structure of the courts requires some diversion of 'resources to meet this new challenge. Specialists should be available to help and support efforts to deal with or ganizational problems, to foster integrating collegial- ibureaucratic structures and to provide a research base for i further development of the court management structure. [Assistance in planning and evaluation of organizational .performance could be another service. It is felt that most states could establish such a center for approximately $100,000 per year. Expansion of [ a growing cadre of professionals in court management could provide the necessary staffing of personnel, and recogni tion of this functional specialty. ! j Individual courts, especially the very large ones, !would be well advised to establish similar local centers. i These centers could be branch offices affiliated with the !state system. More direct attention could then be given I to immediate and unique problems of large metropolitan !courts, and the use of more current information would ex- i .pedite this process. , A few similar centers, such as the Institute for Court! t ^Management, or the Institute for Judicial Administration :exist now. However, these are nationally oriented organi- t ‘ 1 izations, not related directly to state or local court prob lems. Their work has been an admirable start, but much more is needed. Perhaps in the future these Institutes could function as a national clearing house for state court I 1 information. Appointment of Judges Judges should be appointed by the governor of the state, rather than standing for election. Judges who are elected owe their allegiance to the public rather than the i court itself. Traditionally, the public has insufficient i data by which their decisions are made on election day. j Appointment of judges further insures accountability ! i I ;to the system. Involvement of concerned groups can be in- |sured by use of the Missouri Plan for merit selection. !Problems of popularity contests can be reduced or elimina- : ; ted. I I i I Presiding Judges , Several of the following recommendations regarding the' i presiding judge have been discussed previously, and hence, i i I will only be summarized here. I : Selection j -------------------------------- i The presiding judge should be selected by the presid- i ing judge of the intermediate appellate court, based on his: :administrative and leadership skills, and his reputation as’ a jurist. If no intermediate appellate level exists in a ;state, the chief justice of the supreme court should ap point the presiding judge. Term of Office The presiding judge should be selected for a term of office of at least two years. He should further be allowed to succeed himself upon demonstration of effective leader- iship. 141 |Authority i I The authority for the existence of a presiding judge, I and specification of his role requirements should be estab lished by state statute or rules emanating from the supreme i ;court of the state. The presiding judge's authority for court administration should be broad and of sufficient I scope to allow him to lead with strength. i I Rules for the presiding judge should eliminate multi ple authority relationships that currently exist in the i courts. The presiding judge should be the final arbiter oni matters pertaining to his court's administration. Court Personnel The presiding judge should have the responsibility for all court personnel. This includes hiring, termination and all other activities related to the personnel function. The presiding judge may delegate actual line responsibility for this to a court administrator, but should retain con trol over court employees normally associated with the .county clerk's office, the sheriff's office, probation of ficials, counselors, investigators, reporters and other I county employees. This recommendation is geared toward ef-! fective integration of various functions directly related 'to case disposition, and attempts to eliminate multiple 142 .authority relationships which create problems in some ma- i i 'trix-like organizations. I : i i i % i iEstablishment of Evaluation Procedures I The establishment of a hierarchy will serve as only i ithe beginning unless some evaluative procedure is imple- 'mented. Evaluation of judges in dispatching operations is i ;required, not as a punitive system, but rather as a way to i |document what is and can be accomplished. Friesen noted |that, "The challenge for effective use of judicial manpower is not in devising ways to make judges work. What is want- ■ 1 ing are strategies for making judicial time productive." 'Yet only with measurable criteria can productivity be I ■ assessed. It must be stressed that the only means of evaluation being discussed here deal with non-judicial activities. Decision-making must remain the independent providence of ;each judge and no attempt will be made to impair the qual ity or effectiveness of this function. Yet, the courts at present are a complex system with out control. The judiciary is held together by "gentle man's agreements" at best. There is no way to reward good performance nor deter poor performance. And there is no ^Friesen, Gallas and Gallas, Managing the Courts, p. 152. way to determine whether the parties to the judicial pro- j 1 i loess are getting what they rightly deserve. ; j I Thus, what is recommended is a system of checks and i j I 'balances within the system to supplement this same role the' |court plays in this country's method of governance, j It is clear that any presiding judge, after being in |office only a short time, could specify who the strong and ; ;weak members of the court are, and further he could prob- \ i jably rank order them. By formalizing and promulgating some i ■of these criteria to other judges within the court, and by !providing incentives for those who contribute most to im proving the quality of justice, the professional spirit of ;the judiciary should be aroused such that peer pressure I alone will deter those few who give so many a bad name. There are some specific evaluation devices that can be beneficially integrated into the system. First, all new judges should be required to undergo an official, formal evaluation of their performance at the end of their first year on the bench. Such an evaluation should be conducted ■ by a newly created "Judicial Commission," composed of lay- !men and judges serving to improve judicial performance. The presiding judge of the court should be the chairman of ,the Commission. The purpose of this evaluation would be to1 .certify the performance of the judge and remove some of the! political onus attached to some appointments. The Commis sion should have the authority (from the Constitution) to 144 ; recommend the retention (or rejection) of the judge to the t ; i I tchief justice of the state supreme court for final action. ' | j [Establishment of criteria for this evaluation shall be the ; I responsibility of the Commission. Once certified, a judge has no right to waste taxpayer Imoney. Accountability to the court remains. Thus, proce- t idures are needed by which the presiding judge maintains control. These procedures take the form of time reports } I [submitted bi-weekly to the presiding judge, committee at tendance and performance reports submitted by the committee |chairman, case completion records compiled by the adminis- 'trative officer, professional conference attendance re- iports, and a general assessment of the judge's demeanor •prepared by the presiding judge to name a few. This data 1 ,should be used to provide a written evaluation for the pre siding judge on an annual basis. It should be the respon sibility of the presiding judge to recommend, in addition, commendations and sanctions for performance as a matter of , public record. It is, of course, recognized that these techniques [would not be embraced with great affection by members of the judiciary, but nevertheless, they are necessary for good management. In fact, such recommendations are not as I radical as they sound. For example, time reports have been, 145 ;used in the Federal Courts for over three years now,-*- case j i . 1 ' ! (disposition records are already used by approximately 35% |of the courts surveyed in this study, professional develop-\ ment conferences are cleared by the administrative judge in nearly 60% of the cases, and certainly records of committee (attendance are kept as a matter of course. Thus, what is being called for is merely integration of existing practices in order to more clearly define the i ’activities of the court. Accountability is being estab lished to fit within the newly created hierarchy for pur poses of more effective administration. 1 The use of the above suggested data with other rele vant information could be made suitable for the formation of an overall rating for each judge. For this rating to be effective, there must be some incentive for the individ ual, other than professional pride, for achieving a high 'rating over a low one. The incentive that can be used is assignments. In stead of the current practice of the presiding judge making all assignments, allow each judge to choose his assignment. (Choices shall be made in order of the judges rating. For I example, the judge rated highest will have his first choice i ; ,of assignment, while the judge rated lowest will get what- ^Adams, "Judicial Reform from Within," p. 199. 14 6' jever is left. Thus, each judge has a personal stake in his; j . ! 'performance and can be rewarded for it. He is, to some ex-■ I ■tent, the master of his own fate. I . Should a judge, for two consecutive years, show poor performance, the presiding judge will be empowered to call I the Judicial Commission into session for purposes of deter- , mining judicial competency. The outcome of such a session may be a recommendation to take no action, public sanction, ,or removal from the bench. It is important that activities i i of the Commission at all times be fair and non-political. |The inclusion of laymen in the process will add additional [perspective to the case at hand. I | The results of this evaluative process may be used as i a further incentive for an individual judge if such ratings !are strongly weighted in the determination of which judges i are to be promoted to a higher court level. Thus, a judge : from a court of general jurisdiction must secure consist ently high ratings over a number of years to be considered for appointment to the appellate level. In addition, his performance is reported to the presiding judge, represent ing the higher court on a yearly basis such that strengths and weaknesses are documented over time. The fact that, in general, there are no formal evalua tions of judges does not mean that judges are not evalua ted. They are. But without a formal review, some judges 147 |feel (perhaps justifiably) that no recourse can be taken i !against them short of removal. More formal systems opera- jting within an established hierarchy, public sanctions, un favorable assignments and little chance for promotion to a I higher court level will result in either renewed vigor to- i jward non-judicial activities or a dismal professional ex- i perience. If lackluster performance is noted, the system has a legitimate way to deal with the problem using higher jauthority. No judge will want to subject himself to any j form of censure from his colleagues or his public. The i 'mere fact that such a mechanism exists should be a strong .deterrent to activities which may create this type of situ- ; ation. i At the same time, an informal system of norms and ivalues will emerge as ways to "beat the system." But since the system will now have sufficient control devices, behav iors will be directed toward constructive action which will ■benefit everyone. The existence of a hierarchy legitimized at the state level and procedures to implement authority structures at the local level all form together for a more unified management system. Establishment of Court Administrators. Presiding judges should appoint a professional admin istrator to assume delegated responsibility for non judicial functions. A court administrative officer should be a support role to the presiding judge. He should coor- : j I :dinate data collection, fiscal planning, non-judge person- ! I 1 jnel, facilities management and any other administrative ! j activities at the‘pleasure of the presiding judge. Court administrators should reduce the daily administrative bur den of the presiding judge, and allow the latter to concen trate his efforts on the substance of case disposition. . Presiding Judge Training i I I Recognition of the leadership role of the presiding 'judge, and selection based on leadership and administrative !skills requires a mechanism to provide opportunity for such, ,training. University training, institutes, or management training programs should be mandatory prior to selection as jpresiding judge. Beyond exposure to substantive functional' i ‘areas of administration, the presiding judge should become 'familiar with the strategies for managing a professional organization. The necessity for open communication net works, behavioral skills, and development of a collegial- bureaucracy should be stressed. The presiding judge should1 learn about himself as a manager, and have practice in the Icombined use of legitimate and personal power.'*' ' The National College of State Trial Judges, in Reno, Nevada, is one organization already equipped for such , training. / 149 ! The importance of leadership training for presiding judges cannot be emphasized enough. Judges by nature re- i |sist control and are not likely candidates for submitting i iingloriously to rules developed in a one-way fashion. Pre siding judges will need special attributes and sensitivi- jties to lead and cope with a relatively resistant group of ; subordinates. It is felt that the above recommendations will I strengthen the management of the courts, and the role of i ,the presiding judge. All recommendations are, in the opin ion of the investigator, feasible. However, there is still j ,a long way to go in establishing new norms, attitudes and jvalues toward the courts. The following section provides i recommendations for future research to expedite this pro cess. i Suggestions for Future Research 1 It was indicated in Chapter I that the courts have not been the object of much systematic research in the past. The difficulty encountered in collecting data has also been noted. Obviously, this lack of research provides an ex cellent basis, as more data becomes available, for the ex pansion of the work reported here by other researchers, and i opportunity to fill other gaps necessary to understand the courts. Only one piece of a complex system was studied 150 |here, leaving a vast number of other relationships and in teractions to be explored. i 1 i This section provides suggestions for future research l on the management of the courts. An attempt will be made only to highlight a few of the more significant avenues for research. Issues involving the presiding judge role and court administration in general will be addressed. j Presiding Judge Role i More Complete Leader Description i ; 1 It is a continued belief that the presiding judge i I ;plays an important role in court administration. A more complete leader role description would add to the knowl edge base about this position. Research utilizing the Ohio' ! 'State Leadership Behavior Description Questionnaire, auth- I 1 oritarianism scales, satisfaction scales, among others, could add to the list of significant variables affecting the presiding judge role. Determination of optimal levels of presiding judge initiation-consideration structure, and measurement of situational variables will help refine the analysis. I I ! It would be important to identify in more detail lead-- er dynamics in various settings in an attempt to better un derstand the effects of statutes and rules on the presiding judge. As public pressure for accountability pervades the 151 !courts, the system must respond through its leadership. ^ i (Consequently, the forces impinging on the presiding judge ; I : iwill probably increase, and without understanding his role i ■ ; well, the outcomes may be less than satisfactory for the Ipublic as well as the judge himself. Related to future research on general role descrip tions of the presiding judge is work that could be done to refine the power and conflict scales used in this study. t jStudy could be directed at other sanctions and uses of I I ipower at the disposal of the presiding judge, behavioral !adjustments to role conflict situations, mechanisms for i iresolving conflict, conflict or polarity which might result' » t I (from other demographic variables, or relationships between conflict, morale and productivity. Finally, additional re-: :search could focus on the presiding judge's decision-making' processes. Ample work has described decision-making behav-: 'ior of the jurist on the bench, but this could be comple mented by study from this other perspective, as well. Role of Subordinates This study did not consider extensively the role of subordinate judges on the behavior of the presiding judge, ,or on court efficiency. Yet, many critics rightfully as- i sign subordinate behavior a high importance ranking in con sidering leader effectiveness. i 152 1 Given the high professional level of a presiding 1 i I jjudge's subordinates, it would seem appropriate also to I .judge the leader's role from the point of view of the led. ! ; Determination of the extent to which they allow the leader to act, apply pressure on his decisions, and how they also view the system would help our understanding. Further, assessing the attitudes of judges would assist in predict ing the outcome of planned change efforts designed to irtod- lernize the court. .Use of Judge Teams It was recommended that the use of judge teams could I i expedite case disposition. A team approach may further re direct essentially cosmopolitan attitudes toward local 1 needs and requirements, strengthen cohesion toward achieve-' ; ment of organizational goals, and secure greater participa-' 'tion in the decision-making process. Future study could be directed at the formation, development, and evaluation of such teams. :Relationship of Leader Behavior to Court Efficiency ' Additional study aimed at further establishing the re lationship between leader behavior and court efficiency ' i icould be undertaken. To do so would require more complete i leader role descriptions (as identified in "More Complete I Leader Description" above) as well as better measures of i i I icourt efficiency. Both seem to be worthy projects. i jCourt Administration ! Data Collection Much additional work is needed in the collection of I |data relevant to judicial operations, for research and de- icision-making purposes. Such data should be developed con- i i sistent with the design of information systems to support i court operations. Similarly, a more refined court effi ciency index deserves greater study. However, the aware- ■ :ness of the< need for more data is paramount to the develop- i :ment of such an instrument. ; . i [ Management Audits Complete management audits have been accomplished in Washington, D. C., New York and New Jersey. Such audits directed toward structural and behavioral aspects of court administration serve as outstanding steps to clean up the courts. This would be a large, and expensive undertaking, but also worthwhile in identifying problem areas and cor rective measures. Perhaps the proposed state centers could 'assume responsibility for this function, following the gen eral model of the United States General Accounting Office, for example. 154 The Planning Function I Related to the notion of management audits is the nec- I essity to study and strengthen the planning function of the I 'courts. Attention to goal setting for productivity, policy ! making for administration and strategy planning for long- r ■ run survival could be investigated. This appears to be an ^specially weak link at present. Further, as more data be comes available, peak load analyses could be undertaken to J better understand trends in case flows and lead to better scheduling, More attention has been directed to the con- ,trol and coordination functions, but both rely directly and ,strongly on sound planning as the first step. Relationships to Other Segments of the Criminal Justice System The court does not exist in a vacuum. It must inter act with agencies of the police, prosecutors, defense at torneys, probation, prisons, mental hospitals, among oth ers. These interactions frequently bear on how the courts do business. Administration of justice is a system relying on coordinated activity of' its various subsystems. Perhaps more attention has been given to problems of police and prisons than the courts, but also this may have been a re sult of greater problems and needs of these institutions. 155 jHowever, to insure quality justice for all, the entire sys- Jtem must be better integrated. This will involve not only Structural reorganization, but reconciliation of conflict ing value structures as well. i i Use of Paraprofessionals It would appear that greater use could be made of !paraprofessionals in the courts. Research could explore ! ,the uses of attorneys who could have responsibility for i 'early phases of case judgments, arbitration of disputes ^without trial, and general support assistance to judges. ■Further, research could investigate the expanded role of court administrators as a necessary adjunct to court opera tions . i : Use of Videotape for Testimony I Increased attention has been devoted to the use of videotaping testimony prior to trials as a way of expedit ing cases and eliminating bias. Basically, the deposi tions could be taken outside the presence of the judge without the necessity or inconvenience of all witnesses |having to appear at the same time, edited for objections sustained and played for a jury. Experiments have begun to assess the merit of such plans, and research should contin ue as one means of eliminating court delay. 156 | The above suggestions are only a start in the theory I jbuilding needed for the courts. It is hoped that an eclec tic approach to future research can carve a core of theory ,and tested knowledge about the courts that can be in the ibest interests of the participants in the system as well as ithe public. 157 ! CHAPTER VII SUMMARY I The purpose of this chapter is to briefly summarize what has been presented in preceding chapters. : The study was designed to investigate the role of the i i (presiding judge in courts of general jurisdiction, and to i !relate these findings to general court administration. ;Large metropolitan courts were selected for study because ;of the severe problems of backlog, delay and poor adminis tration which exists there. : A review of previous research indicated a lack of com- ! parative, theory-based investigation of court administra tion. No previous research had been reported beyond mere descriptions of the function of a presiding judge. Re search had, however, established the importance of the leader role, and the significance of power and conflict feelings as variables influencing behavior. It was be- Ilieved further, that the method of presiding judge selec- i tion played a large part in the way role expectations were :acted out. : Leader behavior, once described, was related to a i 'general measure of court efficiency to determine the extent i jby which the presiding judge influenced operations. A con- i gestion index comprising data on backlog and delay opera tionalized this concept. The merits of either a master or 'individual method of case assignment had been debated in « the literature, but no test of the relationship between i calendaring and court efficiency had been undertaken. ' It was hypothesized that presiding judges selected Jfrom a higher authority or court level would experience > 1) less felt conflict in performing their duties, 2) per- Iceive feelings of greater power, and 3) see their role more as a leadership function than presiding judges select- ! ed from the same court level. The latter judges were hy pothesized to feel 1) more conflict, 2) less power, and 3) more like chore-doers in self-perceived role descrip tions. As a consistency check, an inverse relationship was hypothesized between felt conflict and perceived power. Hypotheses 6 and 7 tested the relationships between court congestion and the conflict and power variables. It was believed that feelings of greater conflict and less power would result in higher congestion scores. Finally, hypoth esis 8 asserted individual calendar systems to result in .less court congestion and feelings of less conflict on the part of presiding judges. j The target population included all presiding judges in courts of general jurisdiction serving population cen ters of at least 350,000 people. Mail questionnaires were | sent to each presiding judge. The questionnaire contained i i ■ summated rating scales to measure presiding judge power land conflict. Individual questions relating to specific l ‘ hypotheses, open-ended questions for greater depth and de- j ■mographic data questions comprised the remainder of the I questionnaire. A 58% response rate provided fifty-one us- i iable questionnaires. Differences in response rate by size of metropolitan area were negligible. The questionnaire data were coded and analyzed. Sca lar data were tested by a t-test for differences between means, frequency data were tested by the chi-square method, and relationships established by computing Spearman's rank order correlation coefficient and subsequent t-tests for significance. Six of the eight hypotheses were confirmed wholly or in part by statistical analysis. The results indicated support for hypotheses testing for less felt conflict, greater power and feelings of leader role for presiding 'judges selected from higher authority. Also supported was the test for the inverse relationship between power and i (conflict. The greater efficiency of courts using individ ual calendar methods of case assignment was barely support ed. Hypotheses concerned with self-perceived role of 160 ^presiding judges selected from the same level, and the re lationship between felt conflict and court congestion were i |not supported. The hypothesis relating court congestion ;and power was not supported until presiding judges were i 'stratified by method of selection. A significant inverse 'relationship was established between feelings of power and .court congestion among judges selected from a higher level. A limited personal interview process confirmed the ques- I Itionnaire data. I Presiding judges generally referred to the lack of power and authority they had to deal with administering the jcourts. It was felt that available sanctions were insuf ficient to perform their task effectively. The results were interpreted as evidence for strength ening hierarchical relationships by unifying state court systems. Also stressed was the need to maintain collegial- 1 bureaucratic structures, but with greater built-in account ability for all employees. Other implications for improv ing the management of the courts were discussed as well as suggestions for future research. 161 ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY Abrahamson, Mark. The Professional in the Organization. Chicago: Rand McNally, 1967. A collection of articles dealing with problems of professionals in organizations. Adams, Arlin M. "Generating Judicial'Reform from Within." Judicature, Vol. 55, No. 5 (1971), 198-199. 1 Suggests administrative changes in structure of ' courts; suggests active role of presiding judge. iAmerican Bar Association Project on Standards for Criminal | Justice. Fair Trial and Free Press. New York: In stitute of Judicial Administration, 1968. Standards relating to fair trials amid the influ ence of the media. American Bar Association Project on Standards for Criminal Justice. The Function of the Trial Judge. New York: Institute of Judicial Administration, 1972. Standards for role of trial judges. iAmerican Bar Association. The Improvement of the Adminis tration of Justice, 5th ed. Chicago: 1971. Collection of papers on simplification of court structure, administration, judicial selection, juries rule-making and trial practice. American College of Trial Lawyers. "Metropolitan Court Judges Explore Means of Solving Urban Problems." Judicature, Vol. 52, No. 5 (December 1968), 206-209. Problems of delay and congestion of metropolitan courts, with possible remedies recommended. iAmerican Justice Institute. Survey of Role Perceptions for Operational Criminal Justice Personnel. 1972. , Superficial treatment of roles of police, prose cutors, attorneys, judges in administration of jus tice. ;Argyris, Chris. Interpersonal Competence and Organization-! i al Effectiveness. Homewood, Illinois: Irwin-Dorsey, i j 1962. ; Continuation of development of author's person- ■ ality vs. organization model. ! :Bachman, Jerald. "Faculty Satisfaction and the Dean's Influence." Journal of Applied Psychology, Vol. 52 i (1968), 58-61. Study of various power bases and reactions of I subordinates in academic setting. ! .Bachman, Jerald'; Bowers, David; and Marcus, Philip. "Bases of Supervisory Power: A Comparative Study in Five Organizational Settings." Control In Organiza tions . Edited by Robert Tannenbaum. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1968. Study of mean ratings of power in production, college, insurance, utility and branch office organi zations. Surveyed 4 8 different organizations and 2,800 people to discover sources of influence in dif ferent settings. Bachman, Jerald; Smith, C. G.; and Slesinger, J. A. "An Analysis of Structural and Individual Effects." Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, Vol. 4 (1966), 127-136. Study of bases of power to determine consistent patterns in organizations. 'Bianchi, Carl F. "Effects of Progressive Court Administra tion on Legal Services and the Poor in New Jersey." Judicature, Vol. 55, No. 6 (1972), 227-235. Stresses improved relationships which can emerge between the courts and outside agencies if the court is Willing to do its share. Blaine, Gerald S. "Computer Based Information Systems Can Help Solve Urban Court Problems." Judicature, Vol. 54, No. 4 (1970), 146-153. IBM staff specialist lists purposes for which computers can be programmed to aid the courts. ;Blau, Peter M. and Scott, W. Richard. Formal Organiza tions: A Comparative Approach. San Francisco: Chandler Publishing Company, 1962. jBurger, Warren E. "Court Administrators - Where Would We i ! Find Thera?" Judicature, Vol. 53, No. 4 (1970), | 108-114. How poor court administration slows work of courts; gives examples of how to set up training pro- ! ! grams for court executives and specialists. iCartwright, Dorwin, Ed. Studies in Social Power. Ann | Arbor: Institute for Social Research, 1959. ; Collection of essays in social power by variety of experts. Cataldo, Bernard F. et al. Introduction to Law and the Legal Process. New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1965. I Chandler, Henry P.; McConnell, Edward B. ; and Tolman, : Leland L. "Administering the Courts — Federal, j State and Local." Journal of the American Judicature I Society, Vol. 42, No. 1 (1958), 13-19. 1 Fine review of court structures and requirements for needed reform. Chartrand, Robert L. "Systems Technology and Judicial Ad ministration. Judicature, Vol. 52, No. 5 (1968), 194-198. Report on application of EDP to courts, shows potential for state and local use of computers, lists successful projects to date. Clark, Tom C. "The Federal Judicial Center." Judicature, ! Vol. r : 5 3, No. 3 (1969), 99-102. The Director recounts the scientific research by the Center on calendaring. Describes preference for individual calendaring, need for computer data pro cessing in the courts, weighted caseload study and training programs in administration. Cook, Beverly Blair. "The Politics of Piecemeal Reform of Kansas Courts." Judicature, Vol. 53, No. 7 (1970), 274-281. Description of difficult process of court reform 1 in Kansas. Reports floundering unification attempts. ■Corley, Robert N. and Black, Robert L. The Legal Environ ment of Business, Third Ed. New York: McGraw-Hill, : 1973. 164 Dalton, Melville. "Managing the Managers." Human Organi zation, Vol. 14 (1955), 4-10. Problems in leadership as individual is elevated up the organizational hierarchy. Sees basically same principles operating, but requirement for different styles of managing. Daynes, Byron W. Congestion and Delay in the State Appel late Courts. Chicago: American Judicature Society, 1969. Report of attitudes of judges on causes and remedies of court delay and congestion. Dessler, Gary S. "An Investigation of a Path-Goal Theory of Leadership." Unpublished Ph. D. dissertation, City University of New York, 1973. i A test of House's path-goal hypothesis. Found j support for theory but recommends improved task cer- ! tainty moderating scales, as well as controls for ! leader consideration and individual subordinate dif- ! ferences. .Ditz, Gerhard W. "Industrial Organization in Communist East Europe." Administrative Science Quarterly, Vol. ! 4 (1959), 82-96. Study of role and leadership patterns of factory managers in East Europe. Economic Development Council Task Force. Organization Study of the New York City Criminal Court. New York: 1970. Report of organization study of New York criminal court. Etzioni, Amitai. A Comparative Analysis of Complex Organi zations . New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1961. Evans, William. "Role Strain and the Norm of Reciprocity in Research Organizations." American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 68 (1962), 346-354. Studies of role conflict and behavior of profes sionals in research organizations. Fiedler, Fred E. A Theory of Leadership Effectiveness. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1967. Description of contingency model of leadership; measures leader orientation by LPC, measures situation variables of power, task certainty and leader-member relationships. Posits effective matching of leader with appropriate situation. 165 ,Filley, Alan C. and Grimes, A. J. "The Bases of Power in | Decision Processes." Promising Research Directions, Academy of Management Proceedings. Edited by Millman, I R. W. and Hottenstein, M. P. 1968, 133-160. I Study of experiments on decision-making where ! group members operate from different power bases. Filley, Alan C. and House, Robert J. Managerial Process and Organizational Behavior. Glenview, Illinois: Scott Foresman, 1969. ;Fleishman, Edwin A. "Twenty Years of Consideration and ; Structure." Current Developments in the Study of ! Leadership. Edited by Fleishman, Edwin A. and Hunt, James G. Carbondale, Illinois: Southern Illinois Press, 1973. I ' i Review of leadership literature from start at j Ohio State, through the present. 'Fleishman, Edwin A.; Harris, E. F.; and Burtt, H. E. ' Leadership and Supervision in Industry. Columbus, Ohio: Bureau of Educational Research, Ohio State University, 1955. Description of use of Leader Behavior Description Questionnaire. Fleishman, Edwin A. and Hunt, James G., eds. Current De velopments in the Study of Leadership. Carbondale, Illinois: Southern Illinois University Press, 1973. Excellent collection of articles reflecting cur rent state of the art in leadership theory. Contains papers by Fleishman, Fiedler, House, Hill, and Hunt I and Hill, presented at SIU symposium on leadership. Foschio, Leslie G. "Empirical Research and the Problems of Court Delay." In U. S. Department of Justice, Reducing Court Delay. Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1973, 35-44. Describes lack of empirical research on the courts and reports results from study in two Indiana counties. ;Frank, Andrew G. "Goal Ambiguity and Conflicting Stand ards: An Approach to the Study of Organizations." Human Organization, Vol. 17 (1958), 8-13. Case analysis of goal ambiguity in organizations 1 in Communist countries. 166 |Fremlin, Ronald and Pevna, Jon D. Report for the Civil I Court of the City of New York. New York: National [ College of State Trial Judges, -1971. ! Report of first phase of study of New York I courts. Consists mainly of descriptions of problem ; identification exercises. iFremlin, Ronald and Pevna, Jon D., Eds. Williamsburg Con- : ference. Reno, Nevada: National College of State Trial Judges, 1971. Collection of speeches presented by emminent scholars in judicial administration. i J Fremlin, Ronald and Pevna, Jon D. Williamsburg Action Links. Reno, Nevada: National College of State Trial Judges, 1972. I Report of small group follow-up to Williamsburg | Conference on goal setting exercises for improving ; courts. i jFremlin, Ronald and Pevna, Jon D. Williamsburg Action j Links II. Reno, Nevada: National College of State Trial Judges, 1972. Another follow-up on Williamsburg Conference to j assess progress toward goals established during " ac- | tion-links" session. French, John R. P. and Raven, Bertram. "The Bases of So- 1 cial Power." Studies in Social Power. Edited by Darwin Cartwright. Ann Arbor, Michigan: Institute for Social Research, 1959. Classic work distinguishing between five types of social power used in organizations. Friesen, Ernest C. Court Administration. Reno, Nevada: National College of State Trial Judges, 1971. Article addressing need for increased conscious ness toward role of court administration. Friesen, Ernest C.; Gallas, Edward.C.? and Gallas, Nesta M. Managing the Courts. IndianapolisIndiana: Bobbs- Merrill, 19 71. An outstanding,,complete work on management of the courts, from a managerial perspective. .Goode, William J. and Hatt, Paul K. Methods in Social Re- : search. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1952. 167 jGroose, David. The Quality of State Judicial Statistics. Chicago: American Judicature Society Report 27, 1969. Report of a survey attempting to identify factors making for good collection and reporting of statisti cal information. Finds general lack of data. !Hamburg, Morris. Statistical Analysis for Decision Making. New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1970. 1 Hemphill, John K. "Leadership Behavior Associated with the Administrative Reputation of College Departments." ! Journal of Educational Psychology, Vol. 46 (1955), 385-401. ; Part of early work at Ohio State in development of characteristics of good leader styles. Hill, Walter A. "Leadership Style Flexibility, Satisfac- j tion, and Performance." Current Developments in the i Study of Leadership. Edited by Fleishman, Edwin A. j and Hunt, James G. Carbondale, Illinois: Southern Illinois University Press, 1973. Report of experiment to determine if leaders ad just their style to meet the situation and if so, what effect this has on group productivity and satisfac tion. Hill found leaders are flexible in their style, and productivity and satisfaction are at higher levels because of this factor. ,Hill, Winston W. "Some Organizational Correlates of Sanc tions Perceived by Professors to be Available to Their Department Chairman." Unpublished doctoral disserta tion, University of Washington, 1965. Study, of power in academic setting. Enumerates sanctions perceived to be available to department chairmen, and resultant feelings of faculty members. House, Robert J. "A Path-Goal Theory of Leader Effective ness." Administrative Science Quarterly, Vol. 16 (September 1971), 321-338. Main exposition of House's theory of leadership. Reports support for various hypotheses related to leader style, initiating and consideration structure, i and implications for practice. i ,Jacob, Herbert. Justice in America. Boston: Little, l Brown and Company, 1965. Primer on the functions of the courts, lawyers and the judicial process in the U. S. !James, Howard. "Crisis in the Courts." Judicature, Vol. j 51, No. 8 (1968), 283-287. j Collection of articles from Christian Science | Monitor on delay, congestion, poor administration i and undermining public respect for the courts. i i (Judicial Council of California. Proceedings of Workshop for Presiding Judges of the Metropolitan Superior Courts. San Francisco: 1966. Collection of articles related to presiding judge role. Stresses needs for leadership and ad ministrative skill. Suggests options for streamlining congestion in courts. Judicial Council of California. 1974 Annual Report. Sacramento, California: 1974. Collection of statistics related to operation of the courts in California for 1973. 'Judicial Council of California. 1973 Annual Report. Sacramento, California: 1973. Collection of statistics related to operation of the courts in California for 1972. Kaplan, Norman. "The Role of the Research Administrator." Administrative Science Quarterly, Vol. 4 (1959), 20-41. Report on leadership problems -in professional organizations. Kahn, Robert L. et al. Organizational Stress: Studies in Role Conflict and Ambiguity. New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1964. Excellent book defining parameters of study into role conflict and ambiguity. Karlen, Delmar. Judicial Administration: The American Experience. New York: Oceana Publications, 1970. Comparison of American system of justice to the English. Finds deficiencies in U. S. courts. Covers state and federal courts, judges, court personnel, delay, congestion, and approaches for reform. ;Katz, Daniel and Kahn, Robert L. The Social Psychology of , Organizations. New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1966. 169 Kaufman, Irving R. "The Judicial Crisis, Court Delay and the Para-Judge." Judicature, Vol. 54, No. 4 (1970), 145-148. Suggests providing judges with substantial assis tance from professionally law-trained officials to reduce judge's workloa.d. Kerlinger, Fred N. Foundations of Behavioral Research. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1964. Lascher, Edward L. "Society's Most Important Group?" Judicature, Vol. 53, No. 9 (April-May 1970), 282-287. Article criticizing the aloof and "prima-donna" attitudes of judges. Blames them for problems of the courts. Lawrence, Paul and Lorsch, Jay. Organization and Environ ment. Boston: Harvard University Press, 1967. Exposition of authors' differentiation and inte gration theory of organization. Role of the environ ment on organization structure, strategies for con flict resolution. Likert, Rensis. New Patterns of Management. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1961 Classic in behavioral literature. Describes four systems of organization from autocratic to open and participation. Recommends system 4 organization. Litterer, Joseph A. The Analysis of Organizations. 2nd ed. New York: John Wiley and Sons, 197 3. McConnell, Edward B. "The Administration of a State Court System." Judicature, Vol. 51, No. 7 (1968), 253-256. Describes unification attempts in New Jersey, and revision of court rules for more effective admin istration. McConnell, Edward B. "Court Administration." The Improve ment in the Administration of Justice. Edited by Stevens, G. N. Chicago: American Bar Association, 1971, 18-24. Describes results of court unification in New Jersey and recommends similar approaches in other states. McGregor, Douglas. The Human Side of Enterprise. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1960. Another classic in the behavioral science litera ture . 170 Mayer, John P. "Two Problems in Appellate Court Delay in Ohio." Unpublished Manuscript. Denver: Institute for Court Management, 1970. Study of delay at appellate level in Ohio. Cites poor administration and poor coordination with lower courts. Miner, John B. The Management Process; Theory, Research, and Practice. New York: The Macmillan Company, 19 73. Murphy, Walter F. "Chief Justice Taft and the Lower Court Bureaucracy." Journal of Politics, Vol. XXIV (1962), 453-461. A summary of the effects of Chief Justice Taft to improve the administration of justice in the nation's courts. National Conference on the Judiciary. "Consensus State ment." Judicature, Vol. 55, No. 1 (1971), 29-31. Modern statement on court organization, authority of presiding judges and standards for judges. National Conference of Metropolitan Courts. Standards Re lating to the Office of Trial Court Chief Judge. Chicago: 1973. Describes role of presiding judge, reports on descriptive questionnaire regarding presiding judge role, presents examples of law from California and New Jersey, regarding the presiding judge. Oaklander, H., and Fleishman, Edwin A. "Patterns of Lead ership Related to Organizational Stress in Hospital Settings." Administrative Science Quarterly, Vol. 8 (1964), 520-532. Role of leader in relation to his style, his sub ordinates and particular situations. Peabody, R. L. "Perceptions of Organizational Authority: A Comparative Analysis." Administrative Science Quar terly, Vol. 6 (1962), 463-482. Comparative study of organizations with different authority patterns and relationships. Found multiple- authority problems leading to role conflict. Perrow, Charles. "Hospitals, Technology, Structure, and Goals." Handbook of Organizations. Edited by March, James G. Chicago: Rand McNally, 1965. Thorough review of literature on hospital organi zations; their unique problems diagnosed and sugges tions made for more effective operation. 171 Pound, Roscoe. "Causes of Dissatisfaction with the Admin- 1 istration of Justice." Reprinted in Murphy, Walter F. ■ and Pritchett, C. H., Courts, Judges and Politics. - New York: Random House, 1961. Reprint of Pound's classic speech. Acknowledged as first awareness for necessity for good administra tion of the courts. :President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administra tion of Justice. Task Force Report: The Courts. Washington, D. C.: U. S. Government Printing Office, j 1967. Full exposure of every phase of the criminal and 1 civil court operation. Fine research and summary. ;Rizzo, John R.; House, Robert J.; and Lirtzman, Sidney I. "Role Conflict and Ambiguity in Complex Organiza tions." Administrative Science Quarterly, Vol. 15, No. 2 (1970), 150-163. I Excellent article detailing dimensions of role I conflict and ambiguity. Describes validation of meas urement instrument. ;Roethlisberger, Fritz. "The Foreman: Master and Victim of : Doubletalk." Harvard Business Review, Vol. 45, No. 1 (1965), 22-31. Classic description of the middle-man role of the foreman. Saari, David J. "Management and Courts: A Perplexing Nexus." The American University Law Review, Vol. 20 ! (1970-71), 601-619. Enumerates the elements of a management model for a court system. Distinguishes between authoritarian and participative management. Saari, David J. "Court Management and Administration of Justice." Trial, Vol. 6 (February-March 1970), 41-45. Describes tasks of court management, how to or ganize departments of the court, and predictions of growth of the court executive officer position. Saari, David J. Modern Court Management: Trends in the Role of the Court Executive. Washington, D. C.: U. S. Department of Justice, 1970. Suggestion of role of court executive officer to handle administration of court activities. Seagraves, Roy W. "Is Punishment an Adequate Deterrent to Crime?" Judicature, Vol. 55, Number 6 (1972), 236- 243. Provocative article that makes case that poor ad ministration and sure congestion and delay of courts frequently means continued freedom for offender. Author feels as long as courts are run poorly, the threat of punishment is not a strong deterrent to ! crime. iSimmons, Robert L. "An Answer to Trial Delay." Judica ture, Vol. 53, No. 7 (1970), 282-284. Routine call for better administration of the courts. Stogdill, Ralph M. "Personal Factors Associated with Lead- | ership: A Survey of the Literature." Journal of j Psychology, Vol. 25 (1948), 35-71. I Extensive survey of literature to 1948. One of the first articles reflective of the Ohio State school of leadership. •Student, K. R. "Supervisory Influence and Work Group Per formance." Journal of Applied Psychology, Vol. 52 (1968), 188-194. Relationship of power bases to productivity. Found legitimate and personal power most frequently cited in high productivity groups. I 'Tannenbaum, Robert,and Schmidt, Warren H. "How to Choose ! a Leadership Pattern." Harvard Business Review (March-April 1958), 95-101. Fine article describing continuum of leadership styles as a function of the leader, the led and the situation. ■Tauro, G. Joseph. "The Few and the Many." Judicature, Vol. 51, No. 6 (1968), 215-218. Pretty good article addressing internal problems of courts. Takes a hard line against judges who don't’ work as hard as they should. i"The Three-Judge Court Reassessed: Changing Roles in Fed eral-State Relationships." Yale Law Review, Vol. ; LXXII (1963), 1646-1661. . Describes relationships, and lack of relation ships between federal-state courts. Recommends greater unification. 173 Thompson, Hon. Edward. "New York Breaks Court Backlog." I Selected Readings in Court Congestion and Delay. Ed ited by Winters, Glen R. Chicago: American Judica- | ture Society, 1971. I Description of New York's Conference and Assign ment Method for case disposition. Reports remarkable results in clearing backlog. , Thorndike, Robert L., and Hagin, Elizabeth. Measurement and Evaluation in Psychology and Education, Second Ed. New York: John Wiley, 1961. Tosi, Henry L., and Hamner, W. Clay, eds. Organizational Behavior and Management, A Contingency Approach. Chicago: St. Clair Press, 1974. Good collection of current readings on the con- * tingency approach to management. Tydings, Joseph D. "A Fresh Approach to Judicial Adminis- I tration." Judicature, Vol. 50, No. 2 (1966), 44-49. Fine article by leading Congressional exponent of court reform. Describes formation and operation ! of Federal Judicial Center. ;U. S. Department of Agriculture. The 1969-70 Federal Dis trict Court Time Study. Washington, D. C.: The Federal Judicial Center, 1971. Detailed report of time study in Washington, D.C. U. S. Congressional Committee for the District of Columbia. Report on the Administration of Justice in the Dis trict of Columbia. Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1970. Text and recommendations from Washington, D. C. time study project. Recommends sweeping changes in court calendaring and administration. U. S. Department of Justice. Law Enforcement Assistance Administration. Justice in the States: Addresses and Papers of the National Conference on the Judici ary. St. Paul, Minnesota: West Publishing Company, 1971. Good collection of addresses from excellent jur ists on the state of the courts in the U. S. Focuses on organization and administration of state trial courts. 174 |U. S. Department of Justice. Law Enforcement Assistance ; Administration. Reducing Court Delay. Washington, ; J D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1973. i Five reports presenting different suggestions forj i reducing court delay. Only one report details an em- : pirical research effort. Uhlenhopp, R. "Better Management of the Judicial System." ' Trial Judges Journal, Vol. 5 (January 1966). Stresses need for existence of a chief judge for each court, and method of selection should be appoint ment from chief justice based on administrative abil ity. I Vanderbilt, Arthur T. Minimum Standards of Judicial Admin istration . New York: Law Center of New York Univer- i sity, 1949. j Cohesive statement of the structure of the ; courts, the processes for attaining justice and sug gestions for court reform. .Warren, Earl. "The Administration of the Courts." Judica- ! ture, Vol. 51, No. 6 (1968), 196-201. The then-Chief Justice's remarks at the Harvard Law School on the need for change in the court system. Empahsis is on administration. Weston, Paul B./ and Wells, Kenneth M. The Administration ! of Justice. Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice- Hall, 1973. Basic text concerning functions of police, pros ecutors, courts, probation and parole agencies. Good introductory work. White, Susan D. The Use of Electronic Data Processing in Court Administration. American Judicature Society Report 31. Chicago, May 1971. Describes advantages of introduction of computers into the courts. Wilson, Charles H. "Delay and Congestion in the Criminal Courts." Florida Bar Journal, Vol. 46, No. 2 (1972), 88-92. Sees delay and congestion resultant from soft continuance policies, short court hours, judge shop ping and poor administration. 1 175 jWinters, Glen R.,.ed. Selected Readings - Court Congestion and Delay. Chicago: The American Judicature Society, ' 1971. I Good collection of articles on various aspects of j court congestion and delay. ;Zawacki, J. S. "A System of Unofficial Rules of a Bureau cracy: A Study of Hospitals." Unpublished doctoral dissertation, University of Pittsburg, 1963. Found existence of role conflict and ambiguity in hospitals as a result of dual hierarchy. 176 APPENDIX A QUESTIONNAIRE ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGE STUDY 1. By what method did you become administrative judge of your court? a) election by peers_____________________ _______ b) appointment by Chief Justice of highest state court _______ c) seniority _______ d) rotation _______ e) appointment by some other authority _______ please specify 2. What is the length of your term of office? _______ 3. Can you succeed yourself? Yes _______ No 4. How long have you currently served as administrative judge? 5. How many judges serve in your court? 6. What is the approximate population of the area served by your court? 7. Name of your court 8. Location ________________________________________________ 9. Have there been any major organizational changes in your court during 1972? If so, please describe briefly and indicate when this change took place. 177 ) | ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGE STUDY ' PART I An administrative or presiding judge has available certain personal and organizational resources such as influence, jconnections, authority, sanctions and controls which enable !him to perform his job effectively. Below is a list of some of these items. For each one, please write the number ! from the following scale which best indicates the degree to iwhich these resources are avialable to you. .1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Not at all To a To a To a very little degree great degree great degree I "To what degree do you as administrative judge have avail able the following resources?" i 1. Power to form committees and make committee assignments______________________________________________ } 2. Authority to specify court working hours ______ 3. Power to enforce court working hours ______ 4. Influence to expedite promotions to higher courts___________________________________________________ 5. Ability to establish contacts with higher state court administration_______________________ ______ 6. Power to secure adequate facilities and supplies_________________________________________________ 7. Power to secure adequate personnel support services_________________________________________________ 8. Power to obtain judge travel funds for ; professional meetings or conferences ______ 9. Ability to counsel other judges regarding operating problems______________________________________ 10. Authority to formally evaluate judicial performance ______ 178 |ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGE STUDY 'Page 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Not at all To a To a To a very little degree great degree great degree 11. Authority to assign judges to specific ; courts ______ 12. Authority to transfer judges from one ! court to another ______ 13. Power to implement court committee recom- ; mendations ______ |14. Influence in determining case loads ______ 1 15. Authority to modify calendaring practices ______ 16. Control over case assignments____________________ ______ 17. Power to sanction judges who don't work_________ ______ 18. Ability to ;initiate:'dismissal proceedings . <19. Authority to hire and direct court admin istrative officer ______ 20. Power to schedule vacation periods_____________________ 21. Influence to control productivity______________________ 22. Power to change local court rules______________________ 23. Influence to effect broader court rules from authority of higher court_________________________ Please use the following space for any comments you have regarding any of the above issues, including those which do not appear above. Also, if anything regarding the power of the administrative judge needs further elaboration, I would appreciate your comments here. ______________________________ I f 179 ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGE STUDY j PART II I I iSometimes in court management, the administrative or pre siding judge may find that his interests and the interests i of judges in his court do not completely coincide. As a iresult, the administrative judge may experience some con flict with other judges before final decisions are made re garding a number of issues. 'Below are listed a number of decision-making areas in which |conflict is possible. Please write the number from the .following scale which best indicates the degree of conflict j |with other judges or personnel in your court which you, as ;administrative judge, have experienced in the decision-mak- !ing process. If you play no part in making decisions in a i particular area, please write zero (0) in the space pro vided. 1 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Never very Quite often often Always "To what degree do you as administrative judge experience conflict with others in the following areas?" 1. Case assignment procedures 2. Voir dire procedures 3. Compliance with court working hours 4. Productivity of judges 5. Assignments of judges to particular courts 6. Scheduling vacation periods 7. Introducing major organizational changes 8. Hiring court personnel 9. Firing court personnel 10. Sanctions based on poor performance 180 j PART II I Page 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 Never Not. very Quite often Always often 11. Establishing court rules 12. Introduction of mechanical devices or automation into courtroom activities 13. Justifying and expending the budget ,14. Relationships with state bar association ^15. Relationships with local law enforcement i officials 16. Scheduling time off for state judicial conferences, trial judges1 schools, A.B.A. meetings, judge seminars or other judicial meetings ’17. Relationships with trial attorneys i 18. Transfer of judges from one court division to another 19. Granting of continuances 20. Court committee assignments >21. Implementation of committee recommendations 22. Building and space allocation 23. Authority of court executive officer 24. Dissemination of information to the news media about prisoners 25. Size of case backlog 26. Amount of delay in bringing a case to trial 27. Communication regarding court rules and policies 28. Independent county departments serving the court with personnel 29. Juror utilization 30. Insufficient power of administrative judge 31. Use of commissioners 181 | PART II ;Page 3 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Never Not very Quite often Always often 32. Relationships with state legislators ,33. Expectations of other judges regarding how you should carry out your responsibilities please use the following space for any comments you have ; regarding conflict that arises for the presiding judge. 18 2 ! ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGE STUDY jPART III i 1. Rank order the following descriptions, assigning one i (1) to the description which most closely approximates the way you see your actual role as presiding judge, assigning two (2) to the phrase which is the second best description of how you see your role, and so on. Do not hesitate to write your own role description if you feel that none below accurately resembles how you feel. ______ a. My role is to perform administrative chores , expediting the decisions of the other judges 1 in my court. ! ______ b. I see myself in a leadership role with op portunity to take the initiative and consid erable influence in making decisions. ______ c. I see my function basically as mediating and facilitating consensus. ______ d. In my role as presiding judge, I am an of ficer of the court, responsible for imple menting court policies and decisions. ______ e. Other. (Piease explain) 2. What are your recommendations regarding how the posi tion of presiding judge might be improved?____________ THANK YOU. 183 APPENDIX B ,FLORIDA INTERNATIONAL UNIVERSITY iTamiarai Trail, Miami, Florida 33144 (305) 223-2300 There has been increasing concern about the role of admin- ,istrative and presiding judges in terms of the power they have, and the way they make administrative decisions in various judicial settings. To date, a lack of necessary data has created unnecessary controversy. For this reason, ,I am conducting a study of a national sample of administra tive and presiding judges of state courts in hopes of clar ifying a number of issues. ■The presiding judge, obviously, is in a key position in judicial administration. This is why I am asking for your .help by filling in the enclosed questionnaire. Your re sponse is important if the results are to be representative of presiding judges throughout the country. I assure you .that your responses will be kept strictly confidential. ■The questionnaire can be completed in about 15 minutes and :I think you will find it to be interesting. Your prompt return will facilitate early analysis and availability of results. Should you like a summary of the results, please write your name and address on the stamped, self-addressed envelope I have provided. One final item. If you are no longer the presiding judge of your court, or if you have only recently become the pre siding judge and feel that you cannot yet give a fair eval- :uation, would you be so good as to pass this request to the appropriate individual? !Your contribution to the success of this study is greatly • appreciated. Sincerely yours, Steve Altman, Chairman Division of Management 184 APPENDIX C Follow-up Letter : FLORIDA INTERNATIONAL UNIVERSITY jTamiami Trail, Miami, Florida 33144 (305) 223-2300 .Several weeks ago you received a questionnaire from me con cerned with aspects of the presiding judge's role in var ious leadership activities. Perhaps you meant to respond .but haven't had a chance to yet with your busy schedule. I've enclosed a second copy of the questionnaire in case you misplaced the first one. Completing this questionnaire will take only fifteen min utes of your time. In view of the importance of the pre siding judge role and the lack of research in this area, I hope you will take the necessary few minutes to respond. Your cooperation is important if the results are to be .representative of presiding judges throughout the country. Please be assured that your responses will be kept com pletely confidential. If you wish a summary of the results please write your name and address on the return envelope. Your contribution to the success of this study is greatly appreciated. Sincerely yours, Steve Altman, Chairman Division of Management 185 APPENDIX D Court Judge ;Date_ 1. I would like to begin by asking how you were selected 1 to be presiding judge of this court. 2. How long have you served in this capacity? 3. Have you served in any other administrative capacity before? ; 4. Are you satisfied with the progress you've been able | to achieve here? I ( t 5. Could you describe how you feel about how quickly jus tice is served here? In particular, do you experience much of a problem with backlog or delay? 6. How would you characterize, in general, your role as presiding judge? 7. How would you characterize your leadership style? 8. How do you think the judges serving under you feel about you and your position? 9. Have you attempted any changes designed to speed up case disposition? (If no, skip to number 12.) INTERVIEW GUIDE PRESIDING JUDGE STUDY ________________ Time begun Time ended 10. What did you do? !INTERVIEW GUIDE !Page 2 I i '11. What were the results? i 12. Do you feel that you have the power or authority to make the kind of changes you'd like to? 13. To what extent are you limited in what you do by state statute? Other rules? :14. Thinking of your role as presiding judge, how would , you characterize your influence on important decisions j in comparison with other judges? ^15. In many ways, you're like a "man in the middle" be cause you are expected to act one way by your judicial, colleagues, and another way by your other publics. How do you feel about this characterization? 16. Are you aware of these conflicting expectations? 17. What is the nature of these conflicting expectations? 18. Do you feel your colleagues (others) expectations are reasonable? 19. Is it hard to make decisions because of this situa-' tion? 20. Could you describe some of the problems you face in your position? ,21. What could be done to alleviate some of these prob lems? 22. How would you describe the "state of the art" of judi cial administration? 187 APPENDIX E STATES REPRESENTED IN SAMPLE (Number of Jurisdictions in Parentheses) Arizona (3) California (7) Colorado Connecticut Florida (2) Illinois Kansas Kentucky Maryland (2) Massachusetts (2) Michigan (3) Minnesota Missouri (2) Nebraska New Jersey (7) New Mexico New York Ohio (4) Oklahoma Pennsylvania (2) Rhode Island Tennessee Texas (2) Virginia Wisconsin Washington

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