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Content FROM IMITATION TO EXPERIENCE: CHANGING ASSUMPTIONS IN HUMANIST EDUCATION IN SEVENTEENTH-CENTURY ENGLAND by Grant M. Boswell A Dissertation Presented to the FACULTY OF THE GRADUATE SCHOOL UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY (English) May 19 86 Copyright Grant M. Boswell 1986 UMI Number: DP23110 All rights reserved INFORMATION TO ALL USERS The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted. In the unlikely event that the author did not send a complete manuscript and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed, a note will indicate the deletion. UMI' ' Dissertation Publishing'' UMI DP23110 Published by ProQuest LLC (2014). Copyright in the Dissertation held by the Author. Microform Edition © ProQuest LLC. All rights reserved. This work is protected against unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code ProQuest LLC. 789 East Eisenhower Parkway P.O. Box 1346 Ann Arbor, Ml 48106-1346 UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA THE GRADUATE SCHOOL UNIVERSITY PARK p t LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA 90089 ' ° , 3TH7 St^yA-3.^ 7 This dissertation, written by Grant M. Boswell under the direction of M s Dissertation Committee, and approved by all its members, has been presented to and accepted by The Graduate School, in partial fulfillment of re quirements for the degree of DO CTO R OF PH ILO SO PHY Studies D a te J u l y . j ? , . 1 9 £ 5 . . . . DISSERTATION COMMITTEE Chairperson f < L ■ D M n of Graduate ii Acknowledgements I cannot recall the precise moment at which I con ceived this dissertation topic, but I do remember that during the spring semester of 1982 I began puzzling about some things that did not seem to make sense to me. I clarified the problem in some early discussions on this topic with Professors Walter Fisher, Max Shulz, and Lawrence Green. I am endebted to them for these discussions as well as for the encouragement I received from them. I am particularly endebted to my committee, Professors Paul Alkon, Walter Fisher, and Lawrence Green for their careful reading of drafts of the manuscript and for their con scientious efforts to return chapters via mail in remark ably short time. I am particularly endebted to my chairman, Professor Green, without whose assistance this project would not have been completed. His scrutiny of ideas and presentation enabled me to clarify thoughts that would have otherwise been incomprehensible; his suggestions and comments always proved illuminating. There are also many others whom I must acknowledge. My mother, Norma Boswell, typed the entire revised draft at a time when neither I nor my wife could do the typing to meet a deadline. She also typed subsequent revisions of individual chapters. Several people of the Brigham iii Young University English Department were instrumental in teaching me how to use the computer. Lynda Schaelling of the department word processing center entered chapter two and most of the bibliography onto the computer. Sue White taught me the word processing software Word Perfect* and she together with Anne White and Kristy Weldon answered an interminable series of questions about computer proce dures. I am also grateful to three unnamed computer troubleshooters who removed a "glitch" from chapter three. Lastly I must acknowledge the great debt I owe to my wife who. besides typing the original draft* chapter revisions, and parts of the final version* had to put up with me during the two years this dissertation took to complete. Without her unfailing love and support, I could not have undertaken this project at all. Table of Contents 1. Understanding Seventeenth-Century English 1 Rhetoric: Problems and Method 2. The Humanist Background: Perpectives 35 and Context 3. Humanist Curricular Reform 101 4. The Rise of Educational Empiricism 169 5. The Quest for a Philosophical Language 222 6. Rhetoric* Politics* and Education 278 7. Epilogue 340 A Selected Bibliography 350 Understanding Seventeenth-Century English Rhetoric: l Problems and Method Chapter One I undertook this study because I was .unsatisfied with the accepted explanation of why the prestige and study of classical rhetoric diminished significantly in seventeenth- century England and why rhetorical theory took the direc tions it did in subsequent centuries. The usual explanation is that traditional rhetoric was irrevocably altered by sucJ influences as Baconian empiricism* the rise of science, and John Locke's 4R,£^^M-..,P.QhP.g,r.nAJR.S...Hman...UM.gX.g.taMAJag. My objection to this explanation is that it takes little account of what was happening within the rhetorical tradition itself. Since its inception in ancient Greece* jrhetoric had been exposed to millennia of thinkers and movements* major as well as minor. In every age the rhetorical tradition had adapted to the new demands that society had placed on it. Still, despite its many adaptations in form, the purpose and function of rhetoric remained remarkably intact. Underlying the teaching and practice of rhetoric were certain assumptions regarding the effect of language on human behavior, on knowledge, on government, and on soci ety. These assumptions are well illustrated in a myth of i I ! 1 1 the logos told by Isocrates and repeated by Cicero.1 The ' * * Isocrates, "Antidosis," Isocrates, trans. George iNorlin, 3 vols. (Loeb Classical Library: Harvard University Press, 1968) vol. II, 253-257, and Cicero, De Oratore» trans. E. W. Sutton and H. Rackham, 3 vols. (Loeb Classical jLibrary: Harvard University Press, 1976) I, viii, 34. 2 logos was responsible for redeeming man from savagery. By its power man had become civilized, had formed societies for protection, had founded arts and sciences, and had learned to comport himself. Language was essential to a definition of man; he was homo loauens— the speaking animal. Language had been instrumental in all the achievements of man. Language was inextricably linked to what man knew, how he behaved, what kind of society he lived in. and how he should be governed. This relationship of language to the epistemo- logical. behavioral, social, and political aspects of man may be termed the metalinguistic function of language. From the beginning, the metalinguistic function of language had informed rhetorical training, although there were ages in which it was more widely accepted than at other times. Renaissance humanists, for example, revived classical rhetoric because in their own time they sought the most effective use of language in society. The question I have sought to answer in this study is straightforward: given the longstanding resistance to funda-j mental change within the rhetorical tradition and given the Renaissance revival of classical rhetoric, how did traditional rhetoric, and with it its metalinguistic function, fall into disrepute by the end of the seventeenth century, particularly in England, only to give rise to completely ^different theories in the eighteenth century? I Treatments of seventeenth-century rhetoric by histo 3 rians tend to overlook the metalinguistic assumptions of humanist rhetoric and assume instead that traditional rhetoric became obsolete because of the direct influence of major thinkers and movements. While I do not want to deny any influence on rhetoric of such major thinkers as Bacon and Locke. I do want to argue that their influence is attributable to modifications of rhetoric, already occurring in the seventeenth century, which laid the epistemological framework for their ideas. New assumptions enabled the ideas of major thinkers to become acceptable; hence old assumptions had to be displaced. This is paricularly true of old assumptions about language. My argument throughout this study is that we cannot understand the decline of traditional rhetoric and the emergence of new rhetorical theories unless we first understand the metalinguistic function of humanist rhetoric and second, unless we examine how certain adaptations of the traditional rhetorical curriculum affected the metalinguistic function of rhetoric. More specifically. I contend that certain reforms and modifications in seventeenth-century education undermined the metalinguistic function of humanist rhetoric and thus enabled rhetorical theory to take a different shape in later periods, including the present day. In addition to the value my study has as an explanation of a historical phenomenon, it is relevant to contemporary efforts to reform the curriculum. Education is in the midst 4 of what some have called a literacy crisis. Educators have proposed many reforms to improve language skills. Rhetoric has been revived as one solution to literacy problems. Modern pedagogical reforms, however, have seventeenth-centu ry counterparts. Hence, in addition to tracing some of the steps education has taken to arrive in the twentieth century. I am arguing— implicitly— that modern attempts to reform and alter language pedagogy are pointless insofar as they do not address the metalinguistic function of language. My ultimate purpose, beyond the principal question of this study, is to acquaint readers with the assumptions which successfully informed rhetorical education in England for centuries in order that they can evaluate present attempts to reform the language curriculum. Mine is not a nostalgic attempt to revive the form of humanist rhetoric, but an attempt to make present day educators aware of the metalinguistic function of rhetoric and of the potential of its application in the curriculum. A major obstacle to my proposed investigation into the decline of traditional rhetoric is the conviction, now widely held, that rhetorical theory in the seventeenth century was relatively stable. The most careful and strongest proponent of this view is the historian Wilbur Samuel Howell, and my challenge to this view must meet Professor Howell on his own ground. The balance of this introductory chapter will review parts of Howell's works, and propose an approach 5 in which rhetoric is studied in terms of its function within a social context, and in which its theories are both adapted to the context and in turn adapted by the context. Morris Croll. Ray Nadeau, and Thomas 0. Sloane. while not fully agreeing with one another, have each suggested what such an approach might look like. But I will want to suggest that a more useful way to understand the decline of rhetoric is describing its application in an institution such as the grammar schools. Howell's major work. Logic and. Rhetoric in England. 1500-1700. remains the only extensive treatment of rhetoric in the seventeenth century, and when taken with his Eigh teenth Ce.n,t.ur.y..Jxi.,t.Lg.h..Loglc..-aM--.lk^fror..i-Q > Howell's two works trace the course of rhetorical theory from 1500 through 1900. Together they argue for a transition from the old rhetoric of the Renaissance (one derived from classical topics of invention. Ciceronian arrangement of discourse into six parts, classical theories of style embellished by tropes and figures of speech, delivery, and memory) to the new rhetoric of the eighteenth century (one interested iJ scientific induction, natural arrangement, and plain style characterized by clarity and precision). The two volume^ hinge on the division between old and new; underlying this division is the assumption that the old rhetoric was stable !throughout the seventeenth century, but that in the eighteenth 6 century the new rhetoric took over and changed the course of rhetorical history. It is this assumption of stability that I want to examine in Howell's work. Let me summarize the relevant positions regarding rhetoric in the pertinent chapters of Howell’s two major works. Howell's survey of logic and rhetoric in England from 1500-1700 groups logic and rhetoric texts into three continu ous traditions. In England there were stylistic rhetorics since Bede» Ciceronian rhetorics in both Latin and English versions during the sixteenth century* and formulary rhetoricsj in England since 1533.2 For Howell* in the seventeenth century all of the formerly extant types of rhetoric existed together. Yet* despite the conformity in the seventeenth^ century to existing theories of rhetoric* Howell admits that! the period already showed signs of heading in other directions. This tendency. Howell says, found an expression in the treatises of logic but not of rhetoric. The latter remained' basically the same with the exception of such innovators as Bacon* Lamy, Hobbes, and Glanville.3 The influence, however* of these figures is fairly late, and Howell leaves us to speculate about the conditions earlier in the century which Jcontributed to the acceptance of Bacon's work and of thJ others' reforms. Howell assumes the stability of the rhetorical 2 Howell. kc igl. Q , , . . aM-RJlg.t-QXlS. chapter three. i 3 Howell. Logic and Rhetoric, p. 364. For Howell's discussion of Bacon. Lamy, Glanville, and Hobbes, see ibid, .pp., 364-397. ____________________ ________________ 7 tradition in the seventeenth century and notes divergences as anomalous and adventitious. Consistent with his earlier thesis, in his later work Eigk t . , ! 3 . < m thr.£ftafc.U^ Howell proclaims 1695 a watershed year. Not only is 1695 near the end of the seventeenth century* it is the year that Locke published his SJC.fi&.aP Ai ♦ Locke, Howell argues, ushered in both the new logic and the new rhetoric.21 Since the new logic does not concern us directly, let us review Howell's description of the new rhetoric. Howell finds six attributes of the new rhetoric which I will review here. First, new rhetoric tended to encompass more than "persuasive popular discourse." It included ! 5 'learned and didactic discourse as well as poetry. Second, it included the non-artistic proofs, which Aristotle found of little interest in his conception of rhetoric, and dis 4 Howell, £i,^.h.t-g.giLt,hl -,ci g . n , . t . l ur.y. g.,rogis..„ai?d. Rhetoric (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971), pp. 441-502. See also his articles "John Locke and the New Rhetoric," Qlj.§X.t.felX...J.P.yrml.,..P.f. . . . , S p . § . e . g . b 53(1967), 319-333 and "John Locke and the New Logic," in Action and Conviction in E„ajrlx.llQ_d_exn Lur.9.P.P. ; . . . E . s . s a . y . . s . X „n. . .M.ejnp.r.y.. . .fiX.-EL-fl^-Hsmkl& £ > J 1 • ed. Theodore; K. Rabb and Jerrold Seigel (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1969), pp. 423-452. ! ^ "One important issue concerned the question whetherj rhetoric should continue to limit itself to persuasive popular discourse as exemplified by political, forensic, and' ceremonial speeches, or should expand its interests to( include learned and didactic discourses and perhaps even the Iforms of poetry." E .igh.t.e ,S.fl££n.C.eja.t U r y , „ B,p i„t j.sfa. . JLR-d' jRhetorio, p. 441, see also p. 442. couraged the use of classical topics of invention.^ Third, the new rhetoric rejected the enthymeme as the core of rhetorical proof and opted for induction as its method.^ Fourth, the old rhetoric had relied on probabilities for its premises, but the new rhetoric rejected the probabilities of uncritical and untrained observers for modern probabilities Q that "had the stamp of scientific methodology upon them."0 Fifth, the new rhetoric abandoned the six-part Ciceron ian format for discourse in favor of a simpler, less ritual istic. more rational organization.^ And finally, the newj rhetoric left the highly ornate style, embellished with tropes and figures of speech, for a plain style more suited5 ^ "A second issue concerned the question whether, rhetoric should continue to limit itself to the field ofj artistic proofs prescribed by classical theory, or should5 expand its interests to embrace and to use the nonartisticj proofs that classical theory had mentioned only to ignore." Ei g.h teenth-Cent_ur y British Logic ._and Rhetoric, p.442, see also p. 443. ^ "A third issue concerned the question whether the form of rhetorical proof should be described as fundamental-' ly enthymematic, with induction considered a mere variant of] the enthymeme, or whether it should be described as funda-j mentally inductive, with the enthymeme an auxiliary or, occasional form." Eighteenth-Century Brotish Logic and Rhetoric, p. 443, see also p. 444. 8 ElgJitg^Ji]Liad?ff.rLt.u]:.y.. &.Lg&jg...aiLd. .iUmkfixls» p. 445. ^ "A fifith important issue concerned the question whether a speech had to adhere to the six-part form so fully elaborated in Ciceronian rhetoric, or whether a simpler form was desirable." E.i^Jit^j],tft-Cgjafcmx,JB.rA.fcls.1 Logic and Rhetoric, p. 445, see also p. 446. . ' 9 1 n to the advancement of science and learning. Although these six characteristics of the new rhetoric are helpful in drawing distinctions between Howell's old and new rhetorics* there are problems with Howell's assumption that rhetoric can be divided and characterized as two stable phenomena— old and new. One problem is that Howell ascribes characteristics to the new rhetoric which were actually a part of what he calls the old rhetoric. Another problem is his reliance solely on the influences of major figures and historical trends to explain the new rhetoric. I will discuss each of these two points in order. Howell states that the new rhetoric, unlike the old. encompassed more than persuasive discourse, most notably poetry. Rhetoric, however, had maintained ties with poetry since Greek and Roman times. Not only did Aristotle cross reference the Rhetoric and Poetics. but the literary criticism of Longinus. Hermogenes, Dionysius of Halincarnassus. and Horace were part of the rhetorical tradition. This relationship continued through the Renaissance.^ Howell's fourth point "The sixth and final issue concerned the question whether rhetorical style should be ornate, intricate, and jheavily committed to the use of the tropes and figures, orj I should be plain and unstudied." Eighteenth-Century. British jLogic and Rhetoric, p. 446, ^ For classical connections between rhetoric anc poetry see D. A. Russell, Criticism in Antiquity. Berkeley: jUniversity of California Press, 1981; D. A. Russell and I Michael Winterbottom, eds. An<^igj3 .t.X.Lkg.PX.^^ iPrincipal T_&xts in New Translations. _ 0 x fo r d _ Cl a r e n don 10 regarding the adoption of scientific methodology raises an interesting question. The question is not. as Howell implies, why did rhetorical theorists delay in adopting scientific standards of probability, but what did science have to do with language in the first place?^2 This question invites more study regarding the origins of the Royal Society’s interest in language, and such a study takes us back to problems which emerge earlier in the Renaissance. Related to this point is Howell's sixth point. The Royal Society, Howell argues, exerted a tremendous influence on prose style and therefore on rhetoric. While this may be true, the Society was founded in 1662, rather late in the century, by Press, 1972; Rhys W. Roberts, Greek Rhetoric and Literary. Criticism. New York: Longmans, Green & Co., 1928. For! Medieval conections, see Geoffrey of Vinsauf, Poetria Nova' in Three Medieval Rhetorical Arts. Ed. James J. Murphy.| Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971; Matthew ofi [Vendome, Ars Versificatoria. Trans. Roger P. Parr. Medleyall X,t?. jp Ix.sLflJg.A.a.Li.-b.£ » No. 22 Milwakee,] Wisconsin: Marquette University Press, 1981; James J. Murphv,"Ars Poetriae: Preceptive Grammar, or the Rhetoric! of Verse-Writing." in his Rhetoric in the Middle.Ages: a Hi. s.t .QXY.— f i . £ — .Rh.s .t.BX i. c a. i I f a .. A„y&.u,g.£ i xts t..9 - Renaissance. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1974. For Renaissance connections, see George Puttenham, The Arte ofEnglish Poesie. Intro, by Baxter Hathaway. Kent English Reprints. Kent, Ohio: Kent State University Press, 1970; Joel B. Altman, The Tudor Plav of Mind: Rhetorical Inquiry and the Development of Elizabethan Drama. Berkeley:] University of California Press, 1978; Thomas 0. Sloane and Raymond B. Waddington, eds. The Rhetoric of Renaissance Poetry. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1974; Rosamond Tuve, El.i.&iLb..g,t. h.a .tL.. a.Ja.d....M-g.La.P.h Y 51Q Renaissance Poetic and Twentieth Century Critics. Chicago: Xhicago University Press, 1947; and Brian Vickers, Classical R h e tor i.c Ln English P o e t M . New York: Macmillan, St. Martin’s Press, 1970. ___ 1? EijLh-teenth-Century British Logic and Rhetoric, p. 445,. 11 which time prose reforms had already been discussed by earlier Puritan reformers. R. F. Jones, in an article not widely mentioned by historians of rhetoric, has described the curious and inexplicable movement in rhetorical theory toward a plain style during the 1640’s and 1650's.^ These changes were linked to the changing religious, educational, and political situations. Hence, the Royal Society was not the initiator of change, but the inheritor of a tradition of change. The earlier connection suggests that a plain prose style was an issue before the new rhetoric existed. By claiming that some of Howell’s characteristics of the new rhetoric actually belonged to an earlier period, I hope to blur his distinction between old and new rhetorics and suggest that the late Renaissance was a transitional stage in the development of rhetorical theory. His two points (four and six) concerning the influence of science and the preference for a plain style are particularly important because they force us to re-evaluate Howell’s assumption of a stable rhetorical tradition during the Renaissance. Both points require examination in light of the immediate past, especially in light of the educational and political contexts of the seventeenth century. Howell's tendency to see a clear distinction between i 1 *3 ! R. F. Jones, ’ ’The Humanist Defense of Learning in I the Mid-Seventeenth Century," in Reason and Imagination; iStudies in the History of Ideas, 1600-1800 (New York: ■Columbia University Press, 1962), pp. 71-92. 12 old and new rhetorics can be explained by his reliance primarily on major figures and trends to account for the differences between them. In his books. Howell discusses the influence on rhetoric of Bacon. Hobbes. Glanville. Lamy. the Port Royalists, the Royal Society, and Locke. While I do not want to deny that these are major figures and movements, their influence was not the necessary condition for change. Though each of these men and movements had something to contribute to rhetoric, their statements are easily mistaken as the agents of change rather than as manifestations of changes already taking place. For. while it is true that the major rhetorical theories of the eighteenth century differ substantially from Renaissance rhetorical theories, it is also true that intellectual movements do not blossom overnight and that major figures are seldom original, but are apt synthesizers of many currents of thought. There is usually soma societal or intellectual dissatisfaction aj preparation for new seeds to germinate. Indeed, the seventeenth century was not stable and univocal regarding language, education, or much else. We should expect then that the seventeenth century would be rife with controversy over language and rhetoric— as indeed it was. An examination of rhetoric in seventeenth-century England must take into account the social and intellectual climate of the late Renaissance in order to understand how Renaissance theories !of rhetoric, so well entrenched at the outset of the centuryj 13 could be so effectively displaced by the end of the century. This Howell does not do as thoroughly as he might. As cases in point* I want to discuss Howell's misleading treatments of the Royal Society and John Locke. In addition to inheriting attitudes toward rhetoric and style, the Royal Society inherited another tradition of lin guistic reform. Thomas Sprat's History of.the Royal Society declares its anti-rhetorical position on language.^4 The ornate style taught by rhetoric was to be eschewed and the plain style, useful to science, adopted. As part of their preference for a plain style, at least some members of the Society were interested in a denotative language devoid ol redundancies, ambiguities, and other problems of naturalj languages. Modern historians have noted that the latter language reform occupied the best scientific minds of the seventeenth century, including Bacon, Boyle. Wilkins. Newton, and Locke. As a result, language reform was a very important project of the Royal Society, second only to developing £ scientific method.1^ The primary figure in the Royal Society's 14 Thomas Sprat, Hj.,s,t^.ilL-iaX.-.A..hg„.R.P..Y.al-.S,Q.g.ig.ty. Eds. Jackson I. Cope and Harold Whitmore Jones. Saint Louis. Missouri: Washington University Studies, 1958. See the editors' introduction, xxv-xxx and pp. 111-115. ^ For the place of language reform in the Royal Society, see Benjamin DeMott, "The Sources and Development of Johr Wilkins' Philosophical Essay," JEGP, 57 (1958), 1-13; and R. F. Jones, "Science and English Prose Style in the Third Quarter of the Seventeenth Century," in The, Sev ent een thJLenturyjj studies.AH-tii&-Histpry pf„Jugli&h Thought a d -FJJte.raJaurs. f r q h Bacon to _P-Q_oe (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1951), pp. 75-110.____________________________________ ______________________ 14 linguistic reform was John Wilkins» one of the two secretaries to the Society, whose Essay Towards a Real Charac-ter— and___a Philosophical Language (1668) was published one year after Sprat's History and was presented formally to the Society. Wilkins, however, was not an innovator in trying to develop a perfectly denotative language for science. At Oxford, years.before the Society was chartered, Wilkins and others of the Society had been involved in developing a philosophical language. This Oxford group was only onej among many which were developing artificial languages, and there is no reason to think that the influence of the Royal Society was more direct than that of any other group, despite Howell's assumption. And the fact that there were earlierj instances of reform and change diminishes the force of Howell's assumption that the course of rhetoric, with the exception of Bacon and a few others, was merely a continua tion of sixteenth-century treatments. Howell does mention Wilkins and Sprat in his chapter on the Royal Society, but the discussion is limited for several reasons. Sprat's contribution is not as unique as it seems. There is good evidence to believe that Sprat was hired by Wilkins to write the History as a means of solicit ing financial backers for the Society's projects.^ Wilkins was the mastermind, Sprat the pen, and Sprat himself describes i I------------------------ , ^ Francis Christensen, "John Wilkins and the Royal jSociety's Reform of Prose Style. Part One," Modern Language (.1946), 185-186 ________ _____________________________ _J 15 how his pen was guided by the hand of another.^ Why would a society that espoused certain linguistic and methodological principles be more likely to receive financial backing than if it did not subscribe to certain attitudes toward method and language? At least since the Greeks, men have been aware that language differences mark certain speech communities which seek to establish and maintain their own social and political identity. We therefore have the opportunity to reappraise the Society's position on language not as a scientific declaration of the need for precision in communication* but as a strategy for establish ing a social and perhaps a political identity that would prove advantageous in promulgating the ideals of science. i (Howell's discussion of the Society's influence is limited to i the need for precision in language and avoids the sociological and political possibilities. Howell does in fact discuss at length the influence of John Wilkins on prose style. However* his treatment is confined exclusively to Wilkins' Ecclesiastes (1651). which is an essay on preaching. This treatise is a good indica tion of Wilkins' language interests, but it is an early and relatively insignificant document for any influence on the Society's language reforms. A much more important document |for discovering the Society's position in general and Wilkins' i I in particular is Wilkins' E s s, a y , . . , . X . O w. p. r . fl 5,. . 3. . . Re 3 . 1. g . J h . a . m.Q .t.g r... m c I------------------------- !..__ Y ! _ Christensen. „pp..179-187.. see especially p. 180. _____ 16 a Philosophica1 L an gu a Re. This is not only Wilkins' last public treatment of language, it was also published by the printer to the Society, presented formally to the Society, and it occupied several years of scrutiny and revision by a committee of the Society. Howell mentions the Essav but does not discuss it. Thus, there are several reasons for not accepting Howell’s discussion of the Royal Society's influence on! prose style. The rhetorical tradition was probably not as stable as Howell maintains, and the influence of science was not looking forward to the new rhetoric so much as it was popularizing issues for political and economic benefit that had grown out of the past. But there is another reason to re-open a discussion of seventeenth-century rhetoric, and it depends on Howell’s claim that John Locke’s Essav Concerning Human Understanding marks the beginnings of the new rheto ric. Howell maintains that Locke, more than Wilkins. Sprat, or any other member of the Royal Society, best exemplifies the ideals of the new rhetoric because Locke has something directly to say about five of the six issues at dispute between the old and the new rhetorics.^ Locke decried the stylistic rhetoric as a means of appealing to the under- i i standing, saying that figurative language was deceptive anc 18 Ei eh teenth-Centurv British Logic and Rhetoric, p. 489. „. J - 9 t h - c . g . p . t . u o . . . p . _48gJ 17 false "where Truth and Knowledge are concerned."2® He objected to the use of topics and preferred inference from facts. He wanted to model discourse after mathematics in order to adhere as closely as possible to reason and avoid probabilities. Locke wanted discourse to approach demon stration. eliminating persuasion as the primary function of discourse; language was merely to communicate ideas from one mind to another, quickly and without distortion. He made "argument subordinate to exposition, in the sense that the persuasiveness of a discourse becomes the side effect of its expository fidelity to idea and fact, and its expository fidelity becomes the major standard to which it must adhere even when it turns into persuasion or argument."2^ Howell mentions that Locke had been Praelector Rhetori- cus at Oxford in 1663. Since there are no records of Locke’s lectures on rhetoric. Howell assumes that Locke did not teach the old rhetoric, for doing so would have necessitated that he teach "the art of deceit and error." Locke would thus have been compromised. He therefore must have taught something like the plain style advocated by members of the Royal Society, or. more likely, he "could have taken the view which he himself was later to express. . .that there 20 Elghteenth-Centurv British Logic and Rhetoric, p. 490. For Locke’s own statement on the deceitfulness of rhetoric, see An , E . g . § . a y . S&nfijtcjilng aA,..UM.g.r,g.t.andiag> ch. X, III. 21 Eighteenth-Century British Logic and Rhetoric, p. 497. was on the one hand a rhetoric addressed to the passions and prone to involve distorted ideas, misdirected judgments, and highly colored expressions, while on the other was a rhetoric addressed to the reason and dedicated to the communication of truth and knowledge by means of coherent order and stylistic plainness.1,22 In the absence of any record of Locke’s lectures on rhetoric, Howell’s discussion is speculation. But what the historical record does show is that the distinction between false language which arouses the passions by addressing the fancy, and true language which addresses the reason (J distinction Locke maintains in the Essav) was commonplacej after the Restoration. Locke was therefore probably not thJ one who ushered in the new rhetoric at all. Rather LockJ emerged from a longstanding debate about rhetoric and language which Howell, for some reason, ignores. The influence of Locke on eighteenth-century rhetoric was enormous, but not at all in the manner urged by Howell, Locke was not the harbinger of the new rhetoric, and Howell can only proclaim Locke the innovator of all that is new, by automatically accepting as fact the conformity and uniform ity of the seventeenth century against which Locke seems to stand in relief. It is Howell’s assumption that rhetorical theory, with few exceptions, was stable that I want to (challenge, not Locke's influence. j | In summary, my objection to Howell's treatment of J I m u ljLl... j . . . . J-.± r . 1 1 111 t i L - 22 Eigfa-tfiSILfcil::Gftnt.uO..• .492. 19 rhetoric in the seventeenth century is twofold. First* in L.o-gi-Q-_and , Kh.^.t.ar.i.Q....i.n England 15.QQ.r..llQ.Q» Howell assumes a continuity in the seventeenth century because seventeenth- century rhetoric texts are all placed in categories which Howell derived to explain sixteenth-century rhetorics. These categories, Howell consistently argues, remained constant, though he notes that change was coming from sources outside the rhetorical tradition, most notably from Bacon, Lamy, Glanville, and Hobbes. I do not want to deny the influence of these major figures, but there is an apparent problem with this explanation. Bacon's influence came irelatively late and the others came later still. This fact would seem to indicate that the influence of these figures was conditioned and accommodated by certain changes I already taking place within the rhetorical tradition itself, especially as it was being taught and transmitted in the schools. Howell's treatment of the relationship between rhetoric and logic is a fundamental but incomplete means to under standing rhetoric in the late English Renaissance. Logic was taught in the upper forms of grammar school, if taught at all, and was often left to the university. Rhetoric, however, was a subject every grammar schoolboy had to confront. Rhetoric was introduced fairly early in the curriculum after i [grammar and was drilled throughout the grammar school curri- jculum. Thus, an important perspective on rhetoric is how it 20 was taught in the grammar schools and what relationship it had to grammar.23 The influence of language reform in the schools on the rhetorical tradition has yet to be explained. Second, in ^ i ^ t . e . g h , t ^ - c . g . n . t . u r . y . . I p Howell attributes major influence to the Royal Society, but, as I have been at pains to demonstrate, the Royal Society isj only one part of the linguistic picture. A thorough explanation^ of the changes in rhetoric during the seventeenth century will have to discuss other linguistic reforms of the day in their social and political contexts. In this same volume Howell names Locke as the one who best represents the new rhetoric. But Locke can just as easily be seen as the culmination and spokesman of a long tradition that occupied much of the seventeenth century rather than as an innovator who broke from tradition to set out onhis own. Locke is equivocal in his statements about rhetoric, denouncing it as false and deceitful on the one hand and recommending reading Cicero’s rhetorical works on the other. Locke is, to b€ sure, a pivotal figure, but his contributions to rhetorical theory need to be re-evaluated. Howell ’ s work, simply because of its monumental undertaking 23 Don Paul Abbot and Brian Vickers have mentioned the I need to study how rhetoric was taught and transmitted in the ischools. See Abbot’s bibliographical essay "The Renais-j {sance" in The Present State o_f___S_c_holarshin...in Hist-0 _ri.ca.l-a.nd 1 C-0.n.tempo_r_ary_ELhe_torio ed. Winifred Bryan Horner (Columbia,' ^Missouri: University of Missouri Press, 1983), pp. 91-93 and tBrian.Vickers, "On The Practicalities of Renaissance Rhet-j •oric,” in EfasMrl.S. M v.alUfid»' PP- 133-134. ‘ ■ 21 is then somewhat of a hindrance to understanding rhetoric i! the late English Renaissance. His books have become thi standard treatments of the period* and their assumption:' have simply been carried over rather than scrutinized anc evaluated.22* English rhetoric in the seventeenth century i needs to be re-examined* but from a different point of view. This does not mean* however* that there have not beer other scholarly attempts to characterize the seventeenth-century linguistic context. What I now propose is a brief survey of other scholars’ attempts to characterize some of the linguistic currents of the seventeenth century. These will be useful ti define my approach. The survey includes Croll’s* Nadeau’s* and Sloane’s attempts to define the chararacter of seven teenth-century rhetoric as well as scholars’ treatments of language reform in the grammar schools and of seventeenth- century language planners. In 1929 William P. Sandford published an article entitlec ’ ’English Rhetoric Reverts to Classicism. 1600-1650.”25 The thesis of the article is implied in the title. He notes the publication of several editions of Aristotle's Rhetoric ir the seventeenth century as well as of Cicero's De Oratorc Pil This is not true of Vickers who has pointed out the: need to re-examine the period and challenge some of Howell's assumptions. See his ” Rhetorical and anti-rhetorical! tropes: On writing the history of Criticism 3(1981), 111-118 and "On the Practicalities of Renaissance Rhetoric,” in Rhetoric Revalued, p. 139n. 25 Th.e.-Quart_erlv Journal of Speech, 15 (1929), 503-525. and Quintilian's Institutio. He maintains that rhetoric was taught in the schools and that school exercises included' invention from the topics in Aphthonius. He lists several Continental rhetorics which drew from classical sources and which were available in England. He even goes so far as to argue that Bacon's Advancement of Learning was influential in restoring a classical measure to rhetoric. Sandford lists eleven seventeenth-century English rhetorics in which he finds classical influences. We can> however, immediately question the usefulness of bothering with some of the texts from his list. Bacon, Jones, and Johnson for example. Bacon is hardly advocating classical rhetoric in Advancement of L&arn.Aag ; Basset Jones' thJ Rationality of the Art of Speaking (1659) is a grammar rather than a rhetoric; and Ralph Johnson's Scholars guide I from the accidence to the university, or, shortplain, .and school, etc. (1662) is an English progymnasmata, an incre mentally arranged sequence of language exercises intendec for imitation. The last book is classical in the sense that progymnasmata date to classical times, but Howell would calJ it a formulary. As for the others on the list, they seem no •more secure because Howell argues effectively against Sandford i | in Logic and Rhetoric in England 1500-1700, insisting that there was no such general reversion to classicism among -------------------------------------------------------------- — 73 seventeenth-century English rhetorics.2® Sandford's article, therefore, is of little use in characterizing seventeenth- century rhetoric. Probably the best known attempt to describe the seven teenth-century linguistic spirit is Morris Croll's now dated essay on Baroque style.27 Croll sees an anti-Ciceronianism operating which he calls the Baroque style. Baroque style manifests itself in two distinguishable ways— both anti- Ciceronian: the curt style and the loose style. Besides his description of anti-Ciceronian styles, Croll offers a few provocative but cryptic remarks. The loose style is historically significant because it indicates how form and function are linked to the intellectual context. Those who exhibited freedom of thought also exhibited the loose style. Their thought and style reflected investigation and, to a certain extent, licentiousness.2® Furthermore, 2® Howell, Logic and Rhetoric in England, 1500-1700. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1956), pp. 262, 318-335. Walter Ong and Howell independently have shown the rhetoric attributed to Hobbes is actually a Ramistic rhetoric of Dudley Fenner's, and Ong has also shown how Hobbes’ paraphrase of Aristotle's Rhetoric shows Ramistic influ ence. See Logic and Rhetoric, p.279 and Walter J. Ong, "Hobbes and Talon's Ramistic Rhetoric in English," Tran sactions of the Cambridge BibliographicalSociety, 1 (1951), 260-269. 27 Morris Croll, "The Baroque Style in Prose," reprint ed in Stvle, Rhetoric, and Rhvthym: Essavs b.y M.PXI11.S Croll. Eds. J. Max Patrick and Robert 0. Evans with John M. Wallace and R. J. Schoeck (Princeton: Princeton Univer sity Press, 1966), pp. 207-233. 2® Croll, "The Baroque Style in Prose," p. 232. rhetoric was the dominant mode in composition in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, but by the eighteenth century it was grammar. Hence Croll views the seventeenth century as a period of transition after which grammar was to triumph overj rhetoric, the well-formed sentence over the effective period.29 Croll’s essay is helpful because it identifies areas of investigation. The topics of licentiousness in language and the triumph of grammar over rhetoric are important and wilJ be discussed at length in later chapters. In response to Croll's remarks. Howell published an essay in which he takes Croll to task for trying to charac terize a Baroque rhetoric.30 Howell maintains his former' model and claims that seventeenth-century rhetoric cannot be characterized by a single term or a single rhetoric. It i£ a composite of four rhetorics all of which had antecedents. The four are Ramistic rhetorics, formulary rhetorics. Ciceronian 31 I rhetorics, and Fenelon's rhetoric. 1 Except for the addition of Fenelon, whom he discusses in Sl&fa&gfiiiLfrfar.S,ftn.kur.K. JBrlkUJ:: Logic and Rhetoric. Howell maintains the same position as he did in LQ^L<I...^l.JLIafi.torl . Q . . . . j - XL.£rig.l3,ad.,..15.QQl -lIQQ• The sevenj teenth century simply continued with the same strands of 29 Croll, "The Baroque Style," pp. 231-232. ! 30 Howell, "Baroque Rhetoric: A Concept At Odds With i Its Setting," £jTiil,g.s..Q.pJ^X..gI\d„Ebj£.tar:j - g » 15 (1982), 1-23. . | 3^ Howell. "Baroque Rhetoric," pp. 20-21. 25 rhetoric that existed in the sixteenth century.32 Like Croll's. Ray Nadeau's work is helpful in delineat ing areas of invesigation. In an essay on Farnaby’s concept of rhetorical practice, Nadeau claims that humanists in the sixteenth century were too preoccupied with classical models to consider how rhetoric should be taught in the class room.^ Pedagogical reforms such as Ramus’ were therefore inevitable because practice must always conform to the needs of the day. Nadeau implies that Farnaby's rhetoric, as well as other seventeenth-century rhetorics, were different in their attempts to adapt rhetorical theory to schoolroom practice.3^ in a second article on oratorical formularies in seventeenth-century England, Nadeau confirms the pedagog ical thrust of seventeenth-century rhetoric and proclaims the century as the age in which formulary rhetorics reachec their peak in the schools.35 In yet another article on Farnaby’s stylistic influence Nadeau provides the context for judging the seventeenth 's p J For a detailed discussion of the Ciceronian, Ramistic, and formulary rhetorics in England, see Logic anc Rhetoric, chapter three. 33 Ray Nadeau, ”A Renaissance Schoolmaster on Prac tice,” Speech Monographs, 17 (1950), 171. 31* Nadeau, ”A Renaissance Schoolmaster,11 p. 171. I OC ' Nadeau, ’’Oratorical Formulas in Seventeenth-Century England," Quarterly Journal of Speech, 38 (1952), 149-154. 26 century interest in pedagogy.36 Because of the influence of Ramism in the seventeenth century, rhetoricians used Farnaby's Index primarily as a treatment of tropes and figures for the schools. In other words* despite Farnaby's apparent clas sicism, his influence was Ramistic. Discounting the editions of the Index itself, the use of Farnaby's treatment of tropes and schemes reprinted alone and in the works of others totalled forty editions— more than all of the Ramistic rhetorics combined. Nadeau concludes that Farnaby's rhetoric was adapted for other textbooks and disseminated under the influence of Ramism. Nadeau's articles add to our understanding of seven teenth- century rhetoric a sense of the importance of rhetoric in the schools. He characterizes the seventeenth century as a time when classical and post-classical doctrines werej being adapted for use in the schools. The widespread use of Ramistic rhetorics therefore was not so much due to Ramus' influence as to the adaptability of Ramistic approaches for schools. Nadeau's insight on pedagogical application is important and must be borne in mind. I will devote chapters two, three, and four to explaining the significance of the educational context on the rhetorical tradition* I want to discuss one more article which is helpful ir j approaching the decline of traditional rhetoric in the ; 36 Nadeau, "Talaeus Versus Farnaby on Style," Speech , » 2'1 (1954), 59-63. i seventeenth century. Thomas 0. Sloane observes a gap between rhetorical theory and practice.37 English prose was vibrant and flourishing; rhetorical theories were wan and moribund. Sloane accounts for this discrepancy between theory and practice by arguing that rhetorical theory became the province of meditation because meditation took up the link» essential to rhetoric, between "verbal expression and the p a s s i o n s .”38 Sloane's argument is compelling, especially in light of Croll’s discussion of the loose style, one which Croll characterized as meditative. There is also a certain cor roboration between Nadeau’s position that rhetorical theory moved toward practice and Sloane’s observation that meditation filled a vacuum in rhetorical theory, Sloane also notes the psychological character of seventeenth-century meditational expression; interiorization of discourse is a quality not only of tracts on meditation but also of the rhetorical theory of Obadiah Walker.3® Sloane sees Walker’s rhetoric as an explicit precursor of the psychologicalepistemological eighteenth-century rheto rics influenced by Locke, and he implies that psychological forces shaped discourse theory. The influence of changing conceptions of psychology will be helpful in explicating not! j h in ................ ............................... I 37 Thomas 0. Sloane, "Rhetoric and meditation: three j case studies," T J3.g.,..„J _Q .y .r.n „a ... M ftd , i,g . Y 5>.l...^LD.d.....RfiJia fl.as.fi IStudies, 1 (1971), 45-58. 38 sloane, "Rhetoric and Meditation," p. 45. i _ _ .39 sloane, "Rhetoric and Meditation_» " pp^. 55-58. ____ 28 only the character of seventeenth-century discourse but also the impetus that shaped it. I treat the relationship between rhetoric and psychology in chapters three through six. This brief review emphasizes some of the problems in understanding seventeenth-century rhetorical theory. It is very difficult to understand rhetoric in the seventeenth- century categorically as Howell does. Any categories may in fact be imposed on the rhetorical tradition and not describe it at all. Since a categorical approach is problematic and hence not to be preferred in understanding seventeenth-century rhetoric* the review also suggests that rhetoric may be studied contextually. That is* Nadeau implied that rhetoric came to occupy occupy a different place in education than it had before. The result was that formulary approaches were more widespread in seventeenth-century education than ever before. If this is accurate, we need to investigate why there should be an increased need for formulary texts in the schools. Sloane argued that rhetorical theory ceased to exist largely because it ceased to be concerned with what rhetoric had always sought to understand— the relation ship between language and the passions. Meditation took up this concern and left rhetoric without a theoretical founda tion. Rhetoric, Sloane implies, needs to be studied in light of changing assumptions about the human psyche. We need to examine what forces were influencing men’s concep 29 tions of how humans learn. Both of these contextual approaches are too limited in their scope to comprehend the entire seventeenth century, but both raise provocative questions that need to be answered if we are to augment our understanding of rhetorical history. Let me now turn to other discussions of language in the seventeenth century. These discussions offer additional information regarding the educational and psychological contexts of the seventeenth century. They have been divided between treatments of grammar school reform and of language^ planning efforts. The attempts to reform the linguistic curriculum of the schools have been briefly noted in several works. T.W. Baldwin’s massive William Shakespere’s Small Latine And Lesse Greek gives a meticulous account of grammar school curricula from the end of the fifteenth through the middle of the seventeenth centuries. However. Baldwin is intent on inferring the education that Shakespeare must have receivec as a result of a fairly continuous grammar school tradition, and as a consequence he fails to notice the basic problems [which differentiate sixteenth from seventeen th-c en tu rjj grammar schools. He assumes a continuous tradition and ignores the seventeenth century’s dissatisfaction with ] the curriculum and its attempts to reform it. Donald Lemen Clark's treatment of Milton’s education in John Milton at 30 St. Paul’s School is again very informative on the specific details of the education that Milton* in all probability* received during the first decades of the seventeenth century. But* like Baldwin* Clark is interested in the education of a literary figure rather than in the attitudes that were at work to reshape the curriculum. Other treatments acknowledge the attempts to reform the linguistic curriculum, most notably Foster Watson’s survey of grammar schools, The English Grammar Schools to 1660. While the survey is very informative and useful* it has two drawbacks. First, Watson does not focus on the linguistic curriculum, except in a few chapters. And second* as he himself admits, his work is more bibliographical than critical or explanatory. Another useful work is Vivian Salmon’s The Study of I LsxLgaag£..ln...Sg.Y.eRMsjQtJadLen.twr.Y,...fin&land• This collection of articles traces several of the figures who tried to reforn language education. However* because her interest is the history of linguistics, she deliberately stops short of treating rhetoric because that, she believes, is a topic for the history of education. For my purpose, Murray Cohen's Sensible Words: Lin guistic Practice in England, 1640-1785 suffers from the same i jdisadvantage as Salmon’s work. It is focused on the changes I | jin linguistic practice and does not attempt an explanation jof how the changing conceptions of language affected the J — 31 discipline of rhetoric. The work is again descriptive rather than interpretive, and its:, time frame reduces its importance for my project. Contemporary with the efforts to reform the linguistic curriculum of the schools were the attempts by men of science to reform language. Their endeavor was to find or develop a universal means of expression which would aid the advancement of knowledge, but which would avoid the problems of all "natural" languages, especially synonymy, homonymy, and ambiguity. There are three major treatments of this phenomenon. Paul Cornelius' I M g g §.S . i n ll.feh-aM.Jlg.rlY 18, t,frC. cn Imaginary Voyages gives an interesting account of attempts to discover an ideal language for truly universal communication, but focuses too heavily on the influence of Chinese characters on language planning schemes. James Knowlson’s Universal L&tmiagg. ,S„c.,fram ea-.In-En& Iand, 9..cdL.£o.a.Q .g.;-. 1&Q.Q-IMS provides a j thorough account of the many schemes for language reform and corrects Cornelius by arguing that English stenographies were the direct antecedents of universal language schemes. But Knowlson fails to see Locke’s influence in successfully undercutting the Royal Society’s efforts at developing a perfectly denotative language and is left without an explanation for the sudden demise of the language planning efforts. :Mary Slaughter’s excellent book, Ujlj-.y.e.K.S.aA.. . Lan.gij.&&&S...3.0^ j |Scientific T.axonorov in the Seventeenth Century, successfully |argues Locke’s influence on the language planners, but the focus of her book is the changing concepts of science as they develop from Baconian empiricism to Newtonian physics. The weakness, rather the incompleteness, of all three of these studies is that they are not interested in the way scien tific language reform affected conceptions of rhetoric. Since all of the studies reviewed are too limited in one way or another to comprehend the influence of language reforms on the rhetorical curriculum of the schools. I must explain how I propose to approach this subject. In an important article on rhetoric as effective expression* Albert Duhamel explains that any theory of language entails larger considerations of human behavior,2*® These other considerations can be studied as politics, psychology, aesthetics, philosophy, ethics, and epistemology. For the historian of rhetoric this means that the study of rhetor ical theory and practice in a given period must take some account of these metalinguistic aspects of a theory of discourse. ' A theory or practice of language will then imply the 2*° Pierre Albert Duhamel, "The Function of Rhetoric as Effective Expression," Journal of the History of Ideas, 1C (1949), 344-356. 111 Other language scholars have noted that there are metalinguistic aspects for any theory of discourse: R. G.j Godfrey, " Late Medieval Linguistic Meta-Theory and (Chomsky's Syntactic Structures," Word, 21 (1965), 251-6; iSalmon, "Metalinguistic Models," rev. of Sensible Words: I mag.uiJ5L.tJt.fi Ex.a.Q.M.Q.g.fi i.n„ .England* IMfiblZJlS » by Murray (Cohen, Times Literary Supplement, 25 Aug. 1978, p. 946; and |Nancy Struever. I deal at length with Struever’s concept of 1 ai metalinguistic function of_discourse in chapter two. j --------- larger aspects of human behavior. But it is not the case that a new theory of language engenders a new political* social, and epistemological order, although if widely enough accepted a theory of language will have a formative influ ence on these aspects of human behavior. It is more accurate to state that language is one of the places where changes in the political, social, and epistemological order are regis tered. Consequently, we would expect the social, political, and epistemological upheavals of seventeenth-century England to be registered in various linguistic phenomena, one of which, prose style, has been widely studied. But certainly some effect would also be registered in the grammar schools which were the primary linguistic institutions of the day. In my study, I will attend particularly to how social, political, and epistemological concerns are manifested in linguistic education and will attempt to determine what effects these concerns had on attitudes toward and practices of rhetoric in the schools and in society. This approach will necessarily involve discussions of the political and social significance of a Latin grammar school education as well as discussions of how humans were thought to learn languages and what functions language was thought to perform. I will be tracing the gradual erosion of one set of meta linguistic assumptions and the slow sedimentation of another set of assumptions. This process of change, motivated by contextual forces, pervades the seventeenth century. 34 In order to proceed* however. I must discuss what the metalinguistic presumptions were which preceded the trans formation of the late Renaissance. In order to do this. I must specify the assumptions underlying Renaissance rheto ric. This discussion will be the subject of chapter two and will be couched in a debate concerning the relationship between humanism and rhetorical theory and practice. The Humanist Background: Perspectives and Context “35" Chapter Two In order to trace the decline of rhetoric in the seven teenth century, we must first locate rhetoric in its humanist context, for rhetoric and humanism are closely connected. Many fifteenth-century humanists repugned the title of philosopher for grammarian or rhetorician and took up the practice of rhetoric and poetry.^ The early Renaissance is deemed an oddity in the history of philosophy primarily because a large number of the educated writers were writing on grammar, rhetoric, and literature rather than on traditional philosophical subjects.2 The early Renaissance like other periods of literary productivity (most notably the Hellenic age and the Golden Age of Roman literature)» was epistemo- logically oriented to the discursory practices encompassed by rhetoric rather than to the rational methods of philosophy. By the end of the seventeenth century, however, the underlying principles of humanism had been replaced. The discursory competence that humanism had sought to develop had become devalued, and in its place other epistemological systems had arisen. Bacon, the Royal Society, Descartes, Newton, and Locke all offered epistemological principles 1 1 See James R. McNally, "Rector et Dux Populi: Italian Humanists and the Relationship Between Rhetoric and Logic." Modern Philoav 67(1969), 168-169. See also Jerold Seigel, Rhetoric and Philosophy in Renaissance Humanism; The Union of Eloquence and Wisdom, Petrarch to Valla. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1968, especially chapter five. Leonard A. Kennedy. Renaissance Philosophy. (The Hague: Mouton, 1973), pp.5-8._____________________________________ 36 during the seventeenth century which had a more philosophi cal appearance and which explicitly or implicitly renounced' humanism and rhetoric. Thus, in an important sense, rhetoric and Renaissance humanism are inextricable, and the decline of traditional rhetoric accompanies the waning of Renaissance humanism and its ideals. The seventeenth century was not conscious of the epistemo logical principles which at first valued and later devalued rhetoric because, like any age, the century was preoccupied with the more pressing matters of politics, economics, religion, and education. The decline of humanism might be traced by analyzing any of these disciplines, but since humanists were in general men committed to classical learning and its dissemination, I will focus on the grammar schools in order to trace the relationship between what was happening in humanist rhetorical education and how it affected the principles which underlay humanism. Seventeenth-century English grammar schools were at the center of a major dispute, concerning the ideals, goals, anc practices of educations There were many sides to the debate, but the issues can be summarized as follows: Was it better to use the standard texts or develop new ones? Was it I better to retain traditional teaching practices or develop new ones? Was grammar the best approach to learning a j | language? What were the alternatives? Was Latin the best ilanguage to be taught in the schools? Was classical literature 37 the most useful subject matter for schools? Were the schools to serve the state? the state to serve religion? What were the consequences for society of disharmony in the schools? The men involved in these disputes were more concerned with the particular issues at hand than they were with the epistemoligcal foundation of humanism. They approached their tasks of reforming and shoring up the schools without cognizance of the effect their actions might have on the humanist values they espoused. Nevertheless their actions did have consequences. The decisions, alterations, andj reforms they made, bit by bit, eroded the foundation of humanism and with it traditional rhetoric. To understand i the nature and impact of seventeenthcentury educational! reforms on the ideals and practices of humanism, we must have a reference point from which we can measure diver gences. My purpose in this chapter is to make explicit what was central to humanism and humanist education prior to the seventeenth century in order that in later chapters I can trace and evaluate the ways in which the seventeenth-centurj English schools turned away from their humanist heritage. I have divided this chapter into two major discus sions. The first treats the relationship between rhetoric and humanism in the cultural ideal of eloquence, explaining i the significance of eloquence for the civic-minded Renais- I isance man. This discussion draws primarily on secondary i isources which have attempted to define a core for humanism. __ - - - - 38 There are several ways to view humanism, each with different implications. The conservative view was proffered and has been maintained by Paul Oskar Kristeller. the noted historian of the Renaissance, who claims that Renaissance humanism is largely a literary movement that received its impetus from classical literary education as it was prac ticed and handed down through the rhetorical tradition. In opposition to this view are Nancy Struever and William J. Bouwsma who argue that the Renaissance was more philo sophically oriented than Kristeller admits. Struever maintains that humanism adopted a world view in which man’s capacity to impose order and meaning on the world was central and was due to man’s capacity to use language well. Thus rhetoric is essential to Struever’s concept of humanism. Bouwsma’s claim is that Renaissance humanism did not have a monolithicj character, but was primarily a local phenomenon adapted to local needs and circumstances. Nevertheless, the Renaissance did exhibit two competing and seemingly inconsistent world views: the Stoic and the Augustinian. One was hierarchical, universal and philosophical; the other egalitarian, particular, and rhetorical. A more moderate position is taken by Hanna Gray who finds a practical and cultural connection between humanism : I and rhetoric. Gray argues that Renaissance humanism espoused I j | rhetoric in the cultural ideal of eloquence as a means to I Imove men to belief and to virtuous action. i 39 What all these scholars say in common is that the relationship between rhetoric and humanism must be clarified in order not to misunderstand the Renaissance. However, most important for us here is that these positions need not be mutually exclusive and can help us arrive at a more precise understanding of the principles, goals, and idealJ of humanism and how rhetoric was perceived as advancing these principles, goals, and ideals. My purpose in review-] ing these positions will not be to settle any disputes regarding the particulars of humanist thought; I merely intend to characterize the major assumptions about language underlying humanism so as to be able to trace changes of attitude in the schools and the effects of these changes on i rhetorical education. My second discussion situates the practices of the schools within the humanist context at the beginning of thJ seventeenth century, for while humanism was based on epis temological assumptions, there were certain conditions which humanist educators in England had to confront in order to put their humanism into practice. We need to know what these conditions were in order to see what the seventeenth-j century educational reformers were attempting to accomplish and what they were reacting to. The major circumstancei j(all of which influenced the application of humanism in the ] schools) were the increasing numbers of Latin grammar schools :with their increased enrollments, the phenomenon known as ~4o| Ramism, the rise of vernacular education, and attempts to standardize language pedagogy by both authority and tradition. I have separated the discussions of the principles and practices of humanism, because as for any age, the currents* of thought and underlying assumptions were largely losJ amidst the practical problems of living. Only in retrospect* can these trends be seen with any clarity. And since I will argue a shift in perspective, my approach necessitates a discussion of underlying values and ideals if only to serve as a starting point for my argument. Yet despite our historical perspective on the seven teenth century and the definitional imperative for the sake of my argument, there is a significant relationship between parts one and two which the reader must keep in mind. Just as prevailing mores have influenced the curricula of modern schools within the last decades, so it was in the seven teenth century. Any world view, no matter how widely observed, will be manifest in the actions of its adherents. The reciprocal is also true. Actions imply a perspective on the world and on human behavior. This is especially true of institutions such as Renaissance grammar school education. The first part of this chapter is an explicit discus sion of the assumptions, largely implicit in schoolroom ; practices. The second part of the chapter details some of i j the changing circumstances of seventeenth-century English jeducation. When circumstances change institutions must adapt to them* and there are frequently tacit assessments and adjustments of the principles which underlie the insti tution. It is the assessment and adjustment of the world view implied by humanism and the effect on rhetoric of these assessments and adjustments that I will study here. I1 have chosen to focus on the schools as one place where thJ changes were registered. I ask* therefore* that the reader keep in mind the reciprocity between world view and institu tional practice while reading parts one and two of this chapter. I. PERSPECTIVES For many years Renaissance humanism was seen as merely a reaction against medieval scholasticism. And while this may be in part true* the Renaissance owes a great deal tJ classical antiquity. Paul Oskar Kristeller was one of thJ first Renaissance historians to demonstrate the RenaissancJ debts to classical culture. In a series of now famouJ lectures delivered at Oberlin College, Kristeller demon strated the influence of Aristotle, Plato* and Christianity on Renaissance thought. But more important in the present contex is Kristellerfs lecture entitled ,rThe Humanist Movement1’ in which he traces Renaissance humanism to classical literary education. Kristeller states that in its most general sense, humanism is a revival of classical learning and letters. He notes that any characterization of humanism confronts ,fJ 42 variety of currents and of individual writers, which defy any attempt at a general description."3 But this caveat is only intended to shift the emphasis from the discontinuity of Renaissance and medieval philosophy to the continuity of Renaissance thought and classical antiquity, for he does proceed to give a general description of the humanist movement. Kristeller explains that during the Middle Ages there was a conflict "between the representatives of the artes. that is, of the liberal arts and the scientific and philo sophical disciplines, and the followers of the authores, that is, of the great books" ( Hg.n JBULa&a JLfijB.. . . X f r . O . ugJlfc 7). Renaissance scholars, he maintains, continued and resumed the study of Latin authors, but expanded it beyond the treatment given by medieval grammarians. In addition to the Latin authors, Renaissance scholars studied the language and literature of Greek classicism, going beyond the mere studyj of Aristotle's Organon to the study of all Greek authors and all of their works. Renaissance humanists took their interest in literature from the studia humanitatis of Cicero, which included grammar, rhetoric, history, poetry, and moral philosophy (Renaissance Thought 7-10). Thus, Kristeller concludes that humanism was not a philosophical system like that of Aquinas, but "a cultural and educational program 3 Paul Oskar Kristeller, The Classics and Renaissance Thought. (Cambridge, Massachussetts: Published for Oberliri College by Harvard University Press, 1955). p. 5. Hereafter Renaissance. Thought. 43 which emphasized and developed an important but limited area of studies” (3fiaajUaajLfi.e. Xh.pughfr 10). Because humanism, according to Kristeller, excluded by definition logic, natural philosophy, metaphysics, mathemat ics, astronomy, and medicine, it was primarily a literary program. Humanists, he notes, were for the most part "teachers of the humanities in secondary schools or universities" or "secretaries to princes or cities" (Renaissance Thought 11). And as a literary movement, Kristeller points out thaJ "Renaissance humanism must be understood as a characteristiJ phase in what may be called the rhetorical tradition in I Western culture" (11). The rhetorical tradition was imparted to the humanists through the medieval dictatores who had preserved classical forms for their documents and letters and public speeches. And because the humanists had this link through the dictatores to classical civilization, theyj shared the same interests in rhetoric and the ideal ofj eloquence as expressed by various classical authors, but especially by Cicero. Thus Kristeller characterizes Renaissance humanism as a non-philosophical movement, the only common themes of which were an "emphasis on man, on his dignity and privileged place in the universe" (20). And because humanism was not | philosophical, but literary and its literariness was essentially classical, the humanists had a "taste for elegance, neatness, and clarity of style and literary form" (R^alagAQiL&-.Xhg.ttgJht 44 21). Kristeller characterizes Renaissance humanism as deriving its literary interests in ancient authors and iJ stylistic elegance from the humanist link to the rhetorical tradition. To study the Renaissance, therefore, is to study rhetoric.^ While Kristeller’s definition of humanism is attractive in many respects because it focuses on the importance of rhetoric for understanding humanism, it has undergone several revisions by scholars. Kristeller’s position that humanism was primarily a literary movement has been amended by two historians who offer a more radical definition of humanism. Nancy Struever and William J. Bouwsma have argued that philosophical world views pervade the Renaissance and that the Renaissance was epistemologically and ideologically oriented rather than being merely a literary phenomenon. At issue is not the rhetorical character of humanist endeavors so much as the seope of rhetoric and the importance of rhetoric to the humanists. Nancy Struever has made a compelling case by identify ing the metalinguistic function of rhetoric as the organiz ing and motivating force of humanism. In The Language of History in the Renaissance and in a series of articles, she has outlined a theory of language, knowledge, and history _________________________ ^ Kristeller makes this point explicitly in ’ ’Part Five: Philosophy and Rhetoric from Antiquity to the Renais-j jsance" in his RAn.aJLss.anoe Thought .and Its Sources (New [York: Columbia University Press. 1979), pp. 217-259. _ . - 4 _5 which I would like to develop since it will serve as the central component to the definition of humanism I want to arrive at. Her point is that any theory of language and its structure "relates to the structure of knowledge and thus to the definition of historical reality."^ And building upon this premise, she arrives at a thorough description of thJ values and practices of humanism. The Language of History in the Renaissance begins by. outlining the history of a dispute which Struever claims influences all aspects of Western thought about pedagogy. linguistics* and history. The dispute is between rhetoric and philosophy and occurs in pre-Socratic Athens. Struever*s focus is on Gorgias and Isocrates because these two rhetoricians accept a maxim that will become the basis of Struever’s i | argument concerning humanism. The maxim is the Protagorean statement that man is the measure of his world. In order tJ grasp the significance of the anthropocentrism of the Sophists, it is important to understand their conception of the world. The Sophists accepted the Pythagorean conception of the world composed not of essences, but of contraries (kairos) which were in constant flux. Thus the world was incompre hensible because it was never the same at any one moment. Rather than concerning himself with the impossible task of I— --------------------- 5 Nancy S. Struever, The Language of History in the tp.r Is,., and tU.g.t.or Florentine Humanism. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, j1970), p. 3. Hereafter Language of History. knowing an incomprehensible world, the rhetorician had to bJ concerned with the probabilities' and the appropriate* (ts prepon) in any given circumstance. The power of logos depended upon the rhetor's mastery of the to prepon. Thus man was the measure in so far as the probable and appropriate were so in his own eyes. Plato's objection to Gorgianic rhetoric was that it precluded absolute knowledge and was susceptible to corrup tion because it could not; teach virtue. Consequently, the dispute between rhetoric and philosophy ensued. Isocrates answered Plato's criticism by making philosophical concerns part of rhetoric. For Isocrates, rhetoric was the founda tion of Greek culture, and the ultimate goal of Greek culture was eloquence, which for Isocrates, had a moral content and value. Struever states in summary that the rhetoric of Gorgias and Isocrates was a way of imposing form and meaning on a world which is constantly changing. Indeed. SophistiJ rhetoric underscores the maxim of man as the measure because it emphasizes free will and choice, the creativity of the rhetor, and the conviction that discourse can never arrive at reality, only at the appropriate and probable in a given situation.^ Struever traces these Sophistic notions of language in historians contemporary with the Sophists. Thucydides in ! ® A similar point is made by William J. Bouwsma in 'Venice and the Defense of Republican Liberty. Berkeley:’ [University__of .CaJL.ifornlia^Press..1968. See chapter -one. ___| * 47 particular. She concludes that when the Sophistic notions of discourse prevail, reflecting man’s attempts to give form to the kairotic, the result is that history, and all other discursory practices, are regarded as measures of man. Struever continues to trace the Sophistic premises about language through Greek and Roman rhetoric, then connects the Protagorean maxim of "man as the measure" through Cicero to the Renaissance humanists. During the Middle Ages, philosophy and theology had prevailed over rhetoric, and the theology of the middle ages was static, full of absolute knowledge and first principles. In their rejection of medieval notions, the humanists revived Ciceronian practical philosophy which stressed civic duty and action. As eloquence had been the basis for Cicero’s practical philosophy, so eloquence became the central concern of the humanists. Rhetoric became at one the foundation of the studia humani- tatis. And just as man’s ability to exercise control over the probable and appropriate was the measure of civilization and personal competence in Sophistic times, so eloquence became the measure of virtu for the humanists. The importance of tracing the Sophistic concerns about language demonstrates that discursory activity flourishes when man is not confined by absolute principles and static 7 | world views.' Given the need to create, man will achieve ! I | | ^ Struever and Bouwsma seem to agree on the function of [language in a free state. Compare Bouwsma, Venice an the > chapter one. ______ j 48j the most appropriate forms of discourse for his needs. For Struever. the most basic assumption about humanist discourse is the capacity to use language to regulate and impose order on the changing conditions of human experience. Hence forj Struever the study of Renaissance history is the study of man’s capacity to attribute meaning to an otherwise chaotic world. Meaning is the central problem of historiography; the rhetorical tenet which reinforces this insight is that! the formless is insignificant. Rhetorical habits freed the historian to correlate the attribution of meaning and the creation of form; the act of giving form is an act of virtu of the protagonist and a responsibility ofj the historian. (Language of History 92-93) Having rejected the method of medieval theology* the humanists became conscious of their ability to shape actions and events through discourse. This new-found linguistic consciousness is reflected in the humanists’ enthusiasm for rhetoric. In subsequent chapters* she argues that Coluccio Salutati’s concept of history* Leonardo Bruni’s concept of politics* and Poggio Bracciolini's concept of ethics are all determined by humanist concepts of rhetoric. For Struever* Sophistic rhetoric serves as a starting point for her inquiry because it allows man to use his i creative powers and his knowledge of the appropriate and probable to attribute meaning. Her conclusion is that the > j world view influences the attitudes people have toward i I language and its potential. Because the humanists rejected j Medieval philosophy and adopted the Roman model of rhetoric,1 49 which had been adapted from the Greek model* the study of humanist eloquence represents* par excellence, man’s ability to shape his world through discourse. A study of Renaissance humanism is then a study of language, and the study of language necessitates studying how rhetoric informs all discursory practices of the humanists. In subsequent articles, Struever extends her discussion of humanist rhetoric by comparing it to recent language^ theories, and in so doing she sharpens our understanding of humanism. I will return to Struever1s conception of humanism later in this chapter and will discuss in detail how her concept of humanism has developed, but now I want to review Bouwsma’s corrective treatment of Renaissance humanism. In a series of articles, Bouwsma argues that humanism was not a univocal movement, but "assumed a variety of forms as it passed through successive stages and was influenced by differing local conditions.” The result was that "although [humanism] was not identical with the more profound tendencies^ of Renaissance culture, it was nevertheless likely to give them notable expression, and for reasons that were not accidental but directly related to the rhetorical tradi- O tion."° Bouwsma acknowledges the identification in recent ! « i Bouwsma, ’ ’Renaissance and Reformation: An Essay in jTheir Affinities and Connections" in Luther and the Dawn of I y3i&Jlatern..fiLca.;..-f.ap.ers Lv. r . . . t k . .1 jxfcg.r.n.g_t n&L-C. QB-gr.ss ; = 'for* Luther Research, ed. Heiko Oberman. (Leiden: E. J. {Brill, 1974), p. 128. Hereafter "Ren. and Ref." 50 studies of the rhetorical nature of humanism, but he maintains his earlier distinction between humanism and "the more profound tendencies of Renaissance culture" to claim that rhetoric did not occupy the central position for humanism, but for the Renaissance* Contrasting the modern pejorative sense of rhetoric, he writes: But for the Renaissance there was nothing shallow about rhetoric. Based on a set of profound as sumptions about the nature, competence, and destiny of man, rhetoric gave expression to the deepest tendencies of Renaissance culture, tendencies by no means confined to men clearly identifiable as humanists, nor always expressed by men who have generally been considered humanists. ("Ren. and Ref." 129) Bouwsma next characterizes the deeper tendencies of the Renaissance in order to make his argument that the Reforma- i tion had Renaissance antecedents, and that rhetoric ir particular was one of the antecedents. A summary of his argument follows. Because of the commercialization and political re alignment of Europe, man lost his sense of certainty anc stability; he lost his belief that the social order was consonant with the cosmic order. Instead, change and flux seemed to be a natural part of life. But as man lost his place in the divine hierarchy, he found it in the human community. Renaissance man sensed his freedom and poten tial.^ He looked at change as a dynamic expression of I 1 '■■■'■'iiuJLJiiini- . l li r — • ,mmmm i ! Q • 9 See Lorenzo Valla’s "Dialogue on Free Will" and Pico Della Mirandola’s "Oration on the Dignity of Man" in The Renaissance Philosophy of Man. ed s_. ,_E r ns.t _ Cass ir er .__Paul 51 human possibility and progress. He substituted a life of action for one of contemplation. Humanism in this milieu merely supported this world view. In philology, humanists noted changes in languages and texts; in history, they recounted the flux of human affairs ("Ren. and Ref." ISO- IBM). Furthermore, there was a tendency to view man more as an animal of passions rather than only of reason. Because the world was fluctuating and because man was basically an emotional being, communication was not intended to convey truth; it was to be persuasive; "it had to affect the will by swaying the passions, rather than merely to convince the mind" ("Ren. and Ref." 135). This world-view of flux and uncertainty strained religious dogma and necessitated a „return to faith and to the precepts i J of the ancient and therefore spiritual church. And because I the Renaissance saw man as'a complex personality, the church needed a means to transform man’s personality and enable him to find expression in Christian acts of service and charity. It looked to rhetoric because, "as in the world, the essential means for such a transformation was not rational appeal to the intellect but rhetorical appeal to those deeper levels in man that alone could move the will."” *® Oskar Kristeller. and John Herman Randall. Jr. (Chicago: jUniversity of Chicago Press. 1948), pp. 147-182 and ppj 215-254. ; 10 "Ren. and Ref.," p. 139. For a detailed study of jthe Renaissance reappraisal of rhetoric and the will, see I J ohn_W_. Q_! MalJeyj^„Exiai.a.fi...j8LnjjL.BlaBA«lil &fiJELa.l,g.SAMLfi Rome,;1 Bouwsma then claims that this world view changed as a result of the wars and political tensions of the Quattro cento. And* in almost a reprisal against the earlier freedom* there began to be a greater need and therefore a greater expression of order* Philosophy reappeared and joined with theology to take religious thought away from the masses and put it back in the hands of the experts. Absolute truth was once again part of churc'h teaching ("Ren. and Ref.” 140-42). But as this change was being made in Italy, some of the earlier tendencies persisted in the North. Hence the trends I of the Renaissance become ambiguous. The thought of Erasmus, who is normally thought of as the quintessential humanist, is fraught with contradictions produced from these two | tendencies of the Renaissance. He attacked the scholas tics, not only for their barbarous style, but for their incomprehensible theology and for lfthe irrelevance of their speculations to the urgent needs of spiritual life; yet in a moment of personal crisis forced on him by Luther, he turned to scholastic theology and rebuked Luther for his sweeping criticism of Aristotle” (”Ren. and Ref." 143). Bouwsma is not interested in criticizing Erasmus for his contradic- itions, he simply wants Erasmus to be an example of both i | jearly and late Renaissance tendencies. Erasmus, Bouwsma I ' I Rfre.tg.r.A.c,.and RefQO^.B-.-kfae.-Sac.re.d , Qr 3 fcar.fi., pf...fr,hs ; PapalCpwr..t.* e_^-_ 1450-1521 . Durham, North Carolina: Duke ! University Press, 1979. __.See_ chapter two_especially.________j 53 cautions» might be more a Reformation than a Renaissance man. In the end» Bouwsma argues, the Renaissance posec religious problems it could not solve. "[The Renaissance's] utilitarian conception of the knowledge appropriate to the human condition, and its clear separation between philosophy and religious belief, found expression in the Protestant insistence that the Scriptures alone communicate what is necessary for salvation" ("Ren. and Ref." 145). The result of this religious impasses is that the Reformers were able to take Renaissance concepts and employ them in a new theology. Such is the case with rhetoric: Man, for the Reformers, was the complex unity of Renaissance thought, but now even more sharply defined; the core of his being was certainly not his reason, and indeed even his will responded to deeper impulses. The Reformers tried to convey their meaning here, like some Italian humanists, by frequent references to the heart, the mysteri ous center of the personality, which determines man's beliefs and actions alike. And they shared the conviction of the rhetoricians of the Renais sance that the essential problem of communication lay in penetrating this vital core. Like Renaissance oratory, the gospel had to be conveyed into the hearts of the many rather than into the intellects of the few, for it had to transform lives rather than— merely— to change minds. The living word of Christ was not dialectic but rhetoric. ("Ren. and Ref." 147) So much is the Reformation imbued with the Renaissance tendency to elevate rhetoric that "the God of Luther, anc even more of Calvin, may be seen as a transcendent expres sion of the Renaissance ideal of the orator. . . .God's discourse is not couched in the timeless abstractions of _____ 1 54! logic. He appeals rather to the imagination than to the intellect" ("Ren. and Ref." 148). In subsequent articles. Bouwsma makes the same distinc tion between world views. The one which reflects order, hierarchy, and philosophy- derives from the Stoics. And the one which represents change, individual freedom and poten tial, and rhetoric derives from St. Augustine.^ If Bouwsma is correct, then it seems less likely that we can charac terize humanism in any general sense at all, as others have tried to do. For Bouwsma has argued repeatedly that humanism is a varied and local phenomenon of the Renaissance, a distinction which he maintains. But, there are certain weaknesses in Bouwsma’s characterization of humanism and rhetoric that I would now like to note. It seems just as elegant to explain the Augustinian tendency in Renaissance thought in terms of humanist interest in rhetoric as it does to characterize rhetoric as one of the profound tendencies of the Renaissance and leave humanism as a coincidental factor. Given the social foundation of language and the consensual nature of social understanding, it would seem plausible that the Augustinian strain of 1 1 Cf. "Changing Assumptions in Later Renaissance Culture," Viator 7(1975), 421-440 and "The Two Faces of 'Humanism: Stoicism and Augustinianism in Renaissance Thought," in Itinerarium Italioum; The Profile of the U^§Li.ian._B.en_ajj5£.an.c.e in, t.h.e..Mrx-aL-9.f. . . 1 . ts..Ei?.p.gan.. J j i a n . s . f - Q j c f f l r a t i on s, ed. Heiko A. Oberman with Thomas A. Brady, JrJ ;(Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1975), pp. 3-60. Subsequent refer- ■ ences will be made in the text. i _ _ _ __ _ . '-------55 thought was nurtured, if not produced, by humanist rhetorical theory and practice. There are other grounds, however, for questioning the whole of Bouwsma’s argument. When he points out that Erasmus is an equivocal figure, he does so only as an example of the changing assumptions of the Renaissance. But it seems to me to be a weak point, one which he admits himself in wThe Two Faces of Humanism” (52-60). That Erasmus was equivocal seems more explicable as a rhetorical necessity than as aJ example of a historical trend. When Erasmus, as the defender of good letters and fine style against the scholastics, draws upon scholastic theology to rebuke Luther, this is not contradiction but decorum. Erasmus, consummate rhetoriciaJ that he was, would use authority which Luther, a scholastically trained theologian, would find acceptable.^2 As Bouwsma admits, the two poles of Stoicism and Augustinianism can be illustrated in any one figure (’ ’Two Faces" 53). Thus the two poles of Renaissance thought may not be unique to the Renaissance, but part of the contradictory set of beliefs to which we all subscribe. "A penny -saved is a penny earned’1 contradicts "nothing ventured nothing gained." "Absence 1 P For a discussin of Luther’s Scholastic training anc his attitude toward humanism, see W. Scharz, "Studies in Luther’s Attitude Towards Humanism," Journal of .The.ologl.ca3! | Studies 6(1955), 66-76. For a more protracted discussion of I the same, see Scwarz, EcJjifiJLjBlfig and....Erofr.lsros Xb.lAcaJi IT_ra_n.s.1 at.iP_nJ5_o_me Reformation Controversies and Their IBackeround. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1955),' j pp. 167-212. makes the heart grow fonder" grates against "out of sight out of mind." Yet most people believe these contradictoryj dicta to some extent and employ them when appropriate. Thus contradictions in individuals are probably not the best indicators of large historical movements. I do not want to carp at Bouwsma's distinction because I find it useful* but I do want to be cautious about excluding a rhetorical core from humanism on the basis of contradictory beliefs in the Renaissance. Bouwsma's insightful work illuminates differences in Renaissance humanism that will be useful in understanding the situation at the beginning of the seventeenth century in England. Bouwsma* for example* says that the Renaissance in England "most conspicuously" partook more from the Augus tinian world view than from the Stoic world view ("Changing Assumptions" 439). And he* as does Struever* notes the | changes in attitudes toward eloquence .from civic.responsibi lity to a prestige marker of the upper class ("Changing Assumptions" 428-29). But he does not provide compelling reasons to exclude rhetoric from a definition of humanism.^ Other scholars take a more moderate approach in describing the relationship between rhetoric and humanism. Hanna Grajr and Charles Trinkaus amend Kristeller's characterization of I i ■■■■■■. . . - . ■ ■ ■ ■ — ,■■. 1 13 I In his AjcJLg.^-t.A.g„, .a.h.d— (Cambridge, JMassachussts: Published for Oberlin College by Harvard University Press, 1983), Charles B. Scmitt accepts Kristeller's definition of humanism, though not without; reseryajtions_. „ See.jp. 4.__ j 57 humanism by giving prominent place to rhetoric as a moral substitute for philosophy and to eloquence as a cultural ideal. Gray contends that from the humanist perspective eloquence cannot be divorced from wisdom, and that the two are necessary to conduce men to virtue.^ The conjunction of eloquence and wisdom was a direct result of the scholastic’s failure to attempt to effect any moral change in man’s behavior by their dry and labored philosophizing.- The turn to the studia humanitat is represented the humanists' attempt tc discover a new foundation for moral goodness and action. The classical authors furnished this foundation precisely because of their preoccupation with moral philosophy and civic duty. Consequently the humanists revived the study ofj classical letters because they provided the models and expression of moral action. In particular the humanists l looked to Cicero for their statements regarding the role of eloquence to induce moral action and to Quintilian for the role of education to promote eloquence. Gray amends Krx.tell.r*. notron that eloquence was a penchant for literary style as well as his conception of rhetoric as an exclusive discipline. Eloquence was a culturaJ and pervasive reaction to the inadequacies of medieval scholastic philosophy for Christian living. Gray notes that !the opposition of scholasticism and humanism was perceivec * * ^ Hanna Gray. "Renaissance Humanism: The Pursuit of j Eloquence." iLoiirnalof the History of Ideas 24(1963), 498J Uler®after £Pursuit..n _____ I 58 as being "’merely intellectual* on the one side* [and] ’actively persuasive’ on the other" ("Pursuit" 501). She quotes Petrarch as an exemplar of the humanist attitudJ when he stated "The object of the will is to be good; that of the intellect is truth. It is better to will the good than to know the truth" ("Pursuit" 501).^ The ideal orator* the man of eloquence* was a man whose capacity with language enabled him to persuade all men, in all situation* to goodness. He not only had to be wise in that he must have copious stores of wisdom from wise and respected sources* but he had to be able to adapt his wisdom to each situation in which he was engaged. Thus eloquence I embraced the notion of Decorum, or fitting the matter and words to the circumstances. Gray contends that the role of an orator was a potent one. It was capable of moving men to godly action; it demanded wisdom from the ancients; it presupposed a mastery with language; it necessitated a sense of decorum or an acute ability to judge and adapt to circum stances ("Pursuit" 508-13). The cultural imperative which underlay the humanist ideal of eloquence was an ethical one, and it prescribed foij the society a capacity* which could be instilled partly through education* known as virtu. This capacity of virtu. i | jas Charles Trinkaus has noted, was similar to the Homeric concept of arete, which connoted an energy and desire for ! ic L .J Renaissance Philosophy, of Man, d ^.IPA:________________ - . . . - - - - 59 victory through competence and excellence.^ This concept of virtu was re-shaped in Christian terms to become a "spiritual force making its impact upon the world" (In Our Likeness 164). A virtuous man was then one "actively casting his own reflection on the world about him rather than passively absorbing the world" (In Our Likeness 164). A virtuous mar was one who made his impact upon the world through eloquence. Erasmus, who was known for his eloquence and virtue. provides an example of how eloquence and virtue were to be employed by the Christian humanist for social impact. On January 6, 1504. Erasmus presented to Archduke Philip of Burgandy a panegyric entitled simply P.aflggarJLfinfi• Erasmus immediately drew criticism. His detractors accused him of flattering princes for the purpose of self-aggrandizement. In a letter to Jean Desmarez, the university orator of Louvain. Erasmus answers the charge of flattery and in so doing explains how eloquence should be used. First of all. those who believe panegyrics are nothing but flattery seem to be unaware of the purpose and aim of the extremely farsighted men who invented this kind of composition, which consists in presenting princes with a pattern of goodness, in such a way as to reform bad rulers, improve the good, educate the boorish, reprove the erring, arouse the indolent, and cause even the hopelessly vicious to feel some inward stirrings of shame...How much easier it is,to lead a generous spirit than to compel it. and how much better to improve matter by compliments rather than abuse. And what method of exhortation is more effective. Charles Trinkaus. In Our Likeness— gJLd— Xffl.a. g. . e (Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 1976). I. 160-161.J , n e r e -a f ter In.. ,y>vrL iKg-IigLSS______________ J or rather* what other method has in fact become habitual to men of wisdom* than to credit people with possessing already in large measure the attractive qualities they urge them to cultivate? Surely 1 virtue, when praised. grows great; and boundless is the spur of fame.’1' So much were eloquence and virtue a part of the Renaissance ideal that William Kempe in his treatise The Education of Children in Learning (1500) declared that the goals of education were to instill virtue and eloquence and extricate their opposites, vice and barbarism.^8 Kempe, Erasmus, and other humanists equated virtue with eloquence, and the use of eloquence promoted virtue.^ What all of these scholars have demonstrated is the centrality of rhetoric to Renaissance culture. And with the exception of Bouwsma, all have aligned rhetoric with humanism. But what is most important for us here is what function rhetoric occupied in humanist thought because merely identifying rhetoric with humanism thought will not help us understand fully the importance of rhetoric in the schools. Knowing the function of rhetoric will help us comprehend why humanists ^ Desiderius Erasmus, Letters (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1978), I, 81. 18 Kempe, Xhs, .fi.flq.p.ati ..q.£...Chi 1 t i , Uzar,nAjag in Esjae TudorBooks on Education, introd. Robert D. Pepper (Gainsville, Florida: Scholars' Facsimilies & Reprints, 1966), p. 219. ^ Seigel has tried to explain the humanist reconcilia- jtion of wisdom and eloquence, but it does not suit mjr jpurpose here because he examines the relation ship between (eloquence and wisdom rather than between eloquence and virtue. See Rhetoric and PhlLosonhy in.-R.ena.las.anee.JlmanjLaiD J emphasized a rhetorical education and what capacity they intended to endow on their young scholars. Struever has characterized the function of humanist rhetoric, and I would now like to return to Struever's characterization of humanist rhetoric because it will inforJ my epistemological description of humanism in England at the beginning of the seventeenth century. Struever’s analysis and description of humanist rhetoric is based on her critique of modern theories of language. This procedure has the advantage of making her characterization less remote, but at the same time it has the disadvantage of borrowing terms which are unfamiliar to the non-specialist reader. I have tried to avoid or explain troublesome words and concepts where they occur. Struever’s most strident criticism of modern theories of discourse attack the private and subjective assumptions that many language theorists and practitioners presume. She has mordant criticism for the disciplines of history and literary theory because they attempt to re-create a private vision of history or a personal reading of a literary work.2£ Neither discipline attempts to engage its readers on issues of mutual importance. The two characteristics of humanist discourse that Struever identifies are "publicity” and ’ ’inclusiveness.’ ’ By 20 Nancy S. Struever, "Classical Investigations," New iiA.tfixa cy- flla lQ jcy 5 ( 197 4 ) , 5 1 7 -5 2 3 . 62 "publicity” Struever means nothing more than that the humanist ought to be apprised of the problems which have general public import and be engaged in solving them. However, the concept of publicity is crucial to understanding Struever’s concept of humanism because, once the shared problem has been grasped, there is a responsibility for the solution tJ satisfy the rational implications of the problem as well as to achieve public assent. And because the solution must not only solve the problem but satisfy the public, there must be a 11 resemantic ization" of the public lexicon. That is, language has to be coined which connotes the solution to the problem, the restoration of former loss, and the transcendence of the impasse.2^ Perhaps a good example of publicity in /, j this sense is Martin Luther King’s civil rights rhetoric which infused the phrase "civil rights" with such meaning; that it remains potent. The "inclusiveness" of humanist discourse is a counter part to the concept of publicity. Not only does the humanist apply his language competence for the solving of important social problems to the satisfaction of his audience, he seeks to augment his social responsibility by including within it all aspects of language. The failure of modern language theory. Struever claims, has been the attempt to i P 1 c 1 "Classical Investigations," p. 516, see also her "Vico, Valla, and the Logic of Humanist Inquiry," in Giambatt i.S-ta Vico’s Science of Humanity, ed. Giorgio Tagliacozzo and Donald Phillip Verene (Baltimore: Johns Jippkins University Press^ 1976J, p. 180. _ __ __ J “63 develop artificial languages and linguistic theories which exclude natural language and literature. Building on these two characteristics of humanist rhetoric* Struever outlines her most comprehensive charac terization of humanism in an article entitled "Humanities and Humanists." She begins by defining humanism as essen tially inclusive to the point that it has no disciplinary core. It is not a discipline so much as metadiscipline which establishes a metalanguage "in which we can discuss and then come to terms with the shape and effect of particu lar formulae or linguistic strategies.”22 The Humanities occupy "an empty or residual space" in which their duty is to maneuver* "establishing perimeters or securing vantage points; it is the domain in which disciplines, and l interdisciplinary study must prove their worth" ("Humanists’ 1 26). This metadisciplinary stance is important: the humanist, with his freedom from an allegiance to any one ideology or methodology, can better evaluate problems because he has a wider perspective; he can offer more acceptable solutions because he entertains more possibilities; and he can present his case more forcefully because he is not steeped in jargon and specialized language. She then develops three "tasks" which are essential to humanism* which I can only treat !perfunctorily here. 22 "Humanities and Humanists," Humanities in Society, il (1978), 25. Hereafter "Humanists." 64j The first task is a ’’critique of method, a critique which is peculiarly contentious in tone, where the humanist seeks out compensatory strategies, even oxymoronic stances’ 1 {"Humanists” 26). Because the humanist occupies no specific domain, he is not obliged to adopt any particular ideology or conform to any particular methodology. All methods are both suspect and useful; he is free to play both sides ofj the fence, against each other if necessary, to suit his purpose. His goal is not consistency in method but the ’’complementarity” of methods to preserve his metadisciplin- ary stance. The next task is "the determination of the prior or primary allegiances of a mode of inquiry; here inclusiveness fosters insight into discordance, not complementarity’ (’’Humanists” 27). This task demands the ability to analyze an inquiry in terms of the inquirer, his background, values, politics, etc. It requires a willingness to see the inversions, perversions, and the question-begging tactics which lurk in governing metaphors; to note how aims jar with methods, undermine, and eventually rob a disciplinary language of its usefulness. It often reveals the interdisciplinary nature of the relation between premise and activity: the psych ological presupposition of metaphysics, the meta physical presuppositions of natural science, and the moral allegiances of the social sciences. ("Humanists” 27) |Struever sees this task as a rhetorical analysis which looks { for disjunctions, the effect being "that it would be shrewd I j !to invest in sensitivity to one’s own language before setting 65l about a critique of the principles of inquiry” ("Humanists" 28). This sensitivity to language forms the basis of the humanist’s third task which is ’ ’not so much a specific duty as a constraint on the other tasks of critique and orienta tion” ("Humanists" 29). The third task, or constraint in this case, recalls Struever’s earlier insight that resemanticization of the i public lexicon re-orients social knowledge. It is based or what was "an article of faith with the Italian Humanists," "the interdependence of verba and res” ("Humanists” 29). There is no separation of form from content. The humanist has an overriding concern for style, not simply as a diagnostiJ tool as in the second task of locating rhetorical disjunc tions, but as a means of expression. Struever bases her reasoning on the work done by Hintikka’s "'possible world’ semantics, which deals with the relation of a sentence to the speaker’s structures of knowledge and belief" ("Humanists’ j 29). Any text may present to a reader a "range of possible worlds." A humanist must therefore be a master of his own style insofar as he is able to anticipate the reader’s interpretation, or misinterpretation, of the text based on the reader’s possible worlds. Failure to anticipate and shut off undesired states of affairs construed by the reader ,is the humanist’s failure. "The inquirer is responsible for the ’state of affairs’ he realizes; thus it would be illegi timate simply to take the premises of other modes of inquiry and use them as metaphors* not integrating them into a strong .theory" ("Humanists" 30). Struever cites "the sloppy contemporary usage of 'deep’ and 'surface* structure" as an example of a stylistic failure which has been particularly unproductive. More current examples abound in both literary and composition theory. The uncritical borrowing of terms from post-structuralist criticism* such as "indeterminate meaning" and "abyss*" have resulted in much uneventful work from American deconstructionists* and similar borrowings by compositionists from cognitive psychology and hemispheric neurology vindicate Struever’s statement that "perhaps the only authentic interdisciplinary work would be new work" ("Human ists" 30). The contribution of this characterization of humanism is twofold. First* Struever argues that "any theory of Humanist work" is "essentially linguistic work." She uses "linguistic" in an inclusive sense which encompasses all- theories and practices of language. humanism is inherently metalinguistic in that it seeks to comprehend all discoursej both theoretical and practical. But* because the humanist is compelled by the stylistic imperative to express himself responsibly as well as to diagnose rhetorical disfunctions] he cannot be content in "’mind wrought’ inquiry." He must : ' - 1 produce texts of his own that adhere to the characteristics i I | of humanist discourse; he must be especially conscious of 1 I ^"publicity." He must attempt to solve an important problem] 67 and he must at the same time engage the public. Hence there should be no gap between the texts of humanism and the texts of humanist inquiry. Humanists* writing is always intended to bring about a desired state of affairs. "Meta linguistic initiatives represent primarily an explanatory rather than a descriptive moment; they are in aid of the lexicon and syntax of the inquirer, not the inquiree. Just as Renaissance Humanism began in pursuit of eloquence, the contemporary Humanist, still, persists in trying to write well" ("Humanists" 33-34). While the first consequence of Struever’s characteriza tion is a thorough and useful manifesto of contemporary humanist metalinguistics, the second consequence is a de scription of rhetoric as the metalinguistic discipline of our humanist forebears. In Gray’s characterization rhetoric encompassed the ideal of eloquence; in Struever’s we have explicated the function of rhetoric in Renaissance human-' ism. Rhetoric provided the Renaissance humanists with "a Quintilianesque strategy of embedding grammar and logic within a rhetorical frame, of fitting the study of correctj ness and authoritative usage as well as the structures of valid inference into an inclusive investigation of the means I and effect of persuasion, of communicative competence” ("Humanists" 25). Thus, for the humanists, rhetoric was "the first of the artes sermocinales"; it had an organizing and motivating force upon all other linguistic arts. 68 23 sciences. J The Renaissance Humanists were engaged in a review of the scietitl.ae sermocinales, the arts of language, and concentrated on linguistic problems: literary interpretation, philological investigation, textual criticism, the revision of the Tri.vi.um with an eye to pedagogy, the characterizations of literary styles— High, Middle, and Low. ("Humanists” 25) It is this identification of rhetoric as the metalinguistic, the organizing and motivating function of humanism, which is so useful and proceeds directly from Kristeller’s original insight that "Renaissance humanism must be understood as a characteristic phase in what may be called the rhetorical tradition in Western culture."22* And it is Struever’s concept of rhetoric as metalinguistic which I want to posit as the center of my discussion of Humanism, rhetoric, and linguistic reform in the seventeenth century. In summary, Struever*s description of humanist rhetoric as metalinguistic entails the social nature of language, the social foundation of knowledge, the importance of language for achieving consensus and assent, and the importance of language for human behavior. Language is a conventional means by which people come to agree about what is signifi cant in their lives and world, and their agreement regarding what is worth knowing affects what they believe and how they act. The language competence which the Renaissance school! 2^ Struever, "Vico, Valla, and the Logic of Humanist Inquiry," p. 175. 21* See note 8 above. sought to give students reflected these ideals. The well- educated man would be ready with stores of wisdom collected from assiduous reading to be employed in any situation that might arise. He was to apply his competence to move men tc belief and action that would serve the state, the church, and mankind. II. CONTEXT In order to proceed to an account of the specific circumstances and problems of humanist education in seven teenth-century England, I must discuss briefly four impor tant phenomena, all of which have very practical conse quences for rhetorical education. My discussion of these: i four phenomena will comprise the remainder of this chapter. First is the dramatic increase in the number of schools founded from Henry VIII’s reign to the civil war. The schools became instruments of the state; England’s popula-j tion increased from approximately three to four million between 1530 and 1600, increasing the demand for schools.2- The new learning offered preparation for this life rathe| than hope for the next; and most importantly from 1560 to 25 John Lawson and Harold Silver, A Social History of KilUfiakA.dn in England (London: Methuen & Co. Ltd. , 1973), p. 94 J 70 1640 schools became a popular charity for wealthy merchants.2^ As a result of all of these forces, new schools were founded and filled with scholars. This large increase in schools and scholars placed heavy demands on educators and forced changes in pedagogy. The second phenomenon is Ramism within the context of English grammar school education. Ramism iJ England was fairly widespread, and many school textbooks of rhetoric and grammar were written from a Ramistic perspective. The effects, however, of Ramism in the grammar schools might easily be exaggerated unless we see Ramism in light of actual schoolroom practice. Thus we need to know the common practices in English grammar schools. The third phenomenor is itself a part of the effort to appropriate power for the throne and institutionalize it in the schools: Henry VIII prescribed that all schoolmasters of public schools teach Lily’s Latin Grammar. His attempt to standardize education by edict had profound effects for the language curriculum of the schools. The last phenomenon is the increasing importance of the English language and of English language education. English schools appealed to merchants and to Puritans who wanted a quick and practical education which the grammar schools did not provide. Grammar schools were forced to i adopt English as one of the subjects in the curriculum, and they had to respond to the pressure for practical abilities I 26 A— Hoc.ia 1 History ofEducation, p. 104. See also |Louis B. Wright, ’ ’The Renaissance Middle-Class Concern over [I-earning_, ” *._9 J .1930_K 273^296.________] • 73 such as balancing account books that Latin literature did not! provide. The effect of all of these circumstances was tJ encourage re-evaluation and reform of the grammar school curriculum* the final consequence of which was to undermine rhetoric and enthrone grammar in the schools. The forces which increased the numbers of schools were varied and fortuitous. Henry's dissolution of the monaster ies and his acts to ensure compliance of the universities were means of weakening ecclesiastical power and investing the sovereign with supreme authority. Education, tradition ally administered through the church, was increasingly controlled by the throne.2^ The schools became the instru ment of the sovereign both to strengthen his authority and indoctrinate his subjects. This plural function of the schools was reinforced during the reign of Edward VI when he suppressed chanceries, religious guilds and colleges of priests. Mary tried to reassert ecclesiastical control over schools, but with the ascent of Elizabeth there was again a vigorous attempt to manipulate the schools to conform to her authority and to her religious sentiment. The sover eign's authority over and the compliance of the universities was secured as a result of the royal v i s i o n s to the universities as well as by the queen's appointment of chan-’ 2 7 A..JSflfiJ.aJL.JUsfrprv < ? . l M u p -a U .ftn > p p . 9 5 - 1 0 5 . 72 P 8 cellors over them. ° Furthermore graduates of the universities after 1563 were required to take an Oath of Supremacy aJ proof of o r t h o d o x y . The consequence of this political appropriation of the schools was to increase their importance to the state. At the same time that education was the object of political manipulation* there were social forces which I contributed to the need for additional schools. As mention ed earlier* part of the need was a result of demographic change. In addition to an increase in population from 3 tc 4 million* there was a concentration in population. Market towns increased in importance* though not always in size* and became regional commercial centers which necessitated grammar schools. Such schools were usually locally funded and became known simply as "market schools." London alsi changed in demography. By 1600 it is estimated that London exceeded 200,000, a fourfold increase in less than one hundred years. And it would double in size again by 1630.^ Thus the need for schools in the London area also increasec markedly. Complementing the increased political prestige of the schools and social need* humanism encouraged the growth of schools because it taught an essentially practical doctrine 28 A-£-p-Q.i.3,l .ftifftgry Ajplp> p- 102. 29 A-SofiJLal. History of Education* p. 102. ______ 30 A__&ss_laJL_History of Education, p. 94. _______________ p ”~ ^ 7“ .. of service to one’s prince and commonwealth. Coincidentally many noblemen’s sons were being excluded from inheritances as a result of more frequent use of primogeniture among the gentry.3^ Therefore, humanist education offered promise of employment in the clergy, military, or government as well as prestige to many of the otherwise dislocated nobility. Perhaps most important for the schools was the fact that, as England's economy expanded under Elizabeth, many wealthy merchants sought appropriate charities to support. The increased importance and prestige of education made schools such a charity, and donations were designated for education as never before.3^ Stone has stated that charit able donations to schools and social welfare during the late 16th and early 17th centuries "did more to alter the pattern of English life and thought than the whole of Tudor legisla tion put together.”33 All of these factors in combinatior fostered the tremendous growth of education at the beginning of the 17th century. W. K. Jordan has studied charitable contributions of all kinds made in ten counties during the period 14801660.31 During this period donors in the ten counties bequeathec 31 Hj.g.t.ary o , f » p p* 145-146. i 32 a,l .PXsfrQry, Q.f...,.£.d,yQati.Q.n» pp. 103-107 anc Wright, "The Renaissance Middle-Class Concern over Learning.' 33 Quoted from A„So, q. g.t.ory ,g.£J£dJjlfi.4Lfci.C>J3» P. 103. I 34 w. k. Gordon, EkHauJkhjr.ppy EnsJrend,..-lMQ-,l 1 f i . t i [j London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1959), pp. 240-322.____ 74 the sum of L.833,493 12s for education. Jordan describes the donations of the first four decades of the Stuart period as "the great, the prodigal, outpouring."35 During these decades the huge sum of L.383,594 1s was provided for educa tional use, and of this account almost 58 percent or L220»599 15s was given for founding grammar schools in England. The zenith of the early Stuart period was the two decades 1611-1630 during which L.249,331 11s was donated for education. "In other words, very nearly 30 per cent of the vast sum given during the full course of our period (1480-1660) for the founding of a system of education in the realm was vested during this brief interval (1611-1630),"3^ It might be thought that donations fell off consider ably during the revolutionary period, but Jordan records that during the Puritan revolution L130,461 9s was donated for education, and almost L90,000 of this sum was stipulated for founding yet more grammar schools.3^ In fact the amount bequeathed for education during the revolution nearly totaled the amount for education given during the whole of Elizabeth's 38 reign. 35 Philanthropy in England, p. 283. 36 Philanthropyin England, p. 283. It must be noted that this period was one of substantial inflation. Jordan does not adjust for inflation because information on prices is too scanty to draw any definite conclusions. See his explanation on pages 34-36. 37 Philanthropy in England, p. 283. 30 Philanthropy in England, p. 284.________________________ 75j The breakdown for founding grammar schools in these ten counties is equally remarkable. From 1480 to 1540 L436.292 13s was vested for grammar schools. During the Reformation L29.399 10s was donated, and an amazing L21.172 18s was given during Edward’s reign. During the Elizabethan yearJ L72.736 13s was donated for grammar schools. But during the early Stuart period L220.599 15s was donated* mostly by Londoners, for founding grammar schools in England. As a measure of the seventeenth-century educational context, nearly half of the total funds donated during the period 1480-1660 for grammar schools came during the first four decades of the seventeenth century, and well over a third (35.84 per cent) was donated during two decades, 1611-1630. Jordan estimates that ”L500 would build and endow a school of fair strength; L1000 was quite sufficient for a school of notable resources."^® Jordan estimates that in the ten counties during the period of his study 437 schools were founded and endowed. And an additional 105 schools were aided by donations. The total then is 542 grammar1 schools which were either endowed or partially aided by charitable contributions. If the ten counties Jordan studied were typical, it is jclear than grammar schools were being founded at a prodigi- 39 Philanthropy in England, p. 288. t L _____ 4.P._.EfcUanfcJhropy ip...England» p.p •.JL 8 9 -2 9 o .__________________ ous rate. Christopher Wase mentions 704 free grammar schools in his study conducted in the 1670s. W.A.L. Vincent lists 1320 existing free grammar schools in England and Wales between 1600 and 1 6 6 0 . Vincent mentions that Wallis has estimated that, "including the private fee-paying estab lishments, there were more than four thousand grammar schools in the seventeenth century. Although the exact figures may be unattainable, it is safe to say that new grammar schools burgeoned as never before. Jordan has claimed that It is not too much to say that private charity in the years under study literally founded a system of secular education in England, which at the close of our period ( 1660) was at once more competent and comprehensive than the nation was to possess again until deep in the nineteenth century. The reason attributed by Jordan and others to the generous donations was that the benefactors believed that education was the means to a sound state. Education was social rehabil itation.*1^ In response to this phenomenal growth, educators had to re-evaluate their pedagogy. In order to handle classrooms full of students instead of individual students in tutor-' 41 W. A. L. Vincent, Ifa8JfflJmSLr„-SLs.hQ.P.lJS-A.,. I Continuing Tradition, 1660-1714 (London: Cox and Wyman Ltd., 1969), pp. 6-7. iiP i T h-e.-,G rammar Sc ho oXs, p. 7. 43 PJiHgnt.hLg.p.y,„ 1 n„, England. p. 279. 44 F.bv.LLgiifcJacp.py, i n EnsJkan.d* p p . 2 8 1 - 2 8 5 . 77 ials. schoolmasters had to come to a uniform and systematic method of teaching. Already present in the Renaissance was the tendency to methodize, but the overwhelming demands of growth on public education accelerated, if not engendered, the need for method in the English grammar schools.1*5 Part of the Renaissance trend toward method was encouraged by Peter Ramus, an educational reformer whose impact on Europe was considerable. Ramus’ effect on English grammar schools, however, needs to be weighed carefully in context. Peter Ramus is known for his reform of Aristotle's logic anc for his reform of the trivial curriculum. He had stipulatec that according to a law he named Justice, there should be no infringement of one discipline on the other. This was a particularly bold move because for centuries the three language arts of the trivium had overlapped. Grammar was composed of orthography, prosody, etymology, and syntax, corresponding to the units of speech: letters, syllables, words, and sentences. The study of prosody, however, also involved the study of meter, and syntax included knowing hovj to vary phrases. Thus both prosody and syntax overlapped rhetoric in that both meter and figures of speech were also studied under the rhetorical canon elocutio or style. |Rhetoric was composed of five canons: invention, arrange- 1------------------------- I h k I 3 For a treatment of method in the Renaissance, see Neal W. Gilbert, Rena i s sance Concepts of Me.fcJaod. New York: Columbia University Press, 1960. As method applies specifically to the teaching of grammar and rhetoric, see pages, 77-78._ ___________ J 78 ment. style, delivery, and memory. However, much of invention and arrangement duplicated the two parts of logic, invention and judgment. And to make matters more confusing, logic dealt with the definitions of words which was also included in the grammatical study of etymology, and the rhetorical figures of thought corresponded to some of the places of both logical and rhetorical invention.^ But those who followed Ramus reduced grammar to orthography and etymology— syntax and prosody falling within the domains of rhetoric and poetry respectively. Rhetoric was pared to style and delivery, while invention and arrangement were assigned to logic and memory was dropped. Logic held exclusive rights to invention and judgment. Thus Ramus stipulated that each of the linguistic arts be distinct and on an equal! footing. Howell notes that the Ramists in England were fairly strong, and that Ramism increased in popularity toward the end of the sixteenth and beginning of the seventeenth century. Ramus’ method of dichotomizing lent itself to charts and diagrams in printed books. Hence Ong argues that Ramus marks the shift of an oral culture to a print culture and that it was the adaptability of Ramism to print.that is responsible for the decline of oral discourse. I would also ! ^ For a full account of Ramus’ attempts to separate j the language arts, see Walter J. Ong, Ramus, Method, and the P . fts. ay . . Reason (Cambrigde, Massachussetts: Harvard University Press,1 1958), pp. 258-269. suggest that the adaptability of Ramism to print lent itself to textbooks for the schools.1*^ While Ong’s claim is interesting. I would also contend that Ramus had another effect on discursory practice. His law of Justice undermined the metalinguistic function of rhetoric; limiting rhetoric to style and delivery reduced the inclusiveness of rhetoric with respect to the other arts. This is not to say that Ramism eliminated rhetoric as "the first of the artes sermocinales"; it simply weakenec rhetoric’s metalinguistic position. There were still man) traditional formulations of rhetoric in use which were being published through the seventeenth and into the eighteenth, JiO century. ° Nevertheless, we must recognize that Ramism die have an impact on general attitudes toward rhetoric simply by limiting rhetoric to style and delivery. Ramus’ effect on humanist rhetorical education, however, was limited. If Struever is correct in claiming that devel opments in language reflect developments in social institutions and that social developments influence linguistic institutions, then we should also be able to feel the linguistic pulse of humanism by examining how the language arts were taught in the schools, for it is in the schools that the ideals of humanism found their daily application. Kristeller states ^ Nadeau. "A Renaissance Schoolmaster." p. 171. i ii ft see Howeii, s.tL..L<?jsA.<L..am Rhetoric, chapter three. that most humanists were teachers; Struever says that the humanists revised ’ ’the Trivium with an eye to pedagogy1 ’; and others have noted the educational impetus of humanism.**9 sJ it is the linguistic curriculum of the schools which provides the field of inquiry for a discussion of changing assumptions about rhetoric. Hence we must know the educational context of the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries. In the schools of the late sixteenth century. humanism and rhetoric were well entrenched. Ramism notwithstanding, there was still a very strong traditional current regarding rhetoric, logic, and grammar at Cambridge, and an interest ing circumvention of Ramism in the grammar schools.-5® Logic was not usually taught in the grammar schools, but at the University. If it was taught at all in the grammar school, it was not taught until the upper forms. Ramus’ Law of Justice and the practice of not teaching logical invention before students had to compose themes and other exercises would seem to present the students with a rhetorical impasse. Since most of the rhetoric textbooks used in the seventeenth century were Ramistic. the students would be left without recourse to invent the substance of their composition. But 49 See Kristeller, HftftaJ-.ag.an<?> p. » anc Struever. "Humanists.1 1 p ; see also G. A. Padley. Grammat- ifiJU-JULgiCLEX. in .. 15&£hJL£Qfl (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 1976), pp. 5-57. 50 William T. Costello, S.J., Th,9,-&S.b.9.3>g.S^,i,S..Xl3r.n,i,P.P,l.Uffi at Earlv _ Seventeenth-Century Cambridge (Cambridge, Massa- chussetts: Harvard University Press, 1958), pp. 55-64. this was not the case. There was an awareness among school masters that before students were able to write themes, theyj had to have matter about which to write. The humanist educators’ solution to the Ramistic separation of the art of invention from the art of rhetoric was to apply in their pedagogy the assumption that matter and words are inseparably connected. John Brinsley* though recommending the Ramistic rhetorics of Butler. Talaeus, and Dugald* mentions the necessity of rhetorical invention for students.52 But invention took on l a different cast for Brinsley. It was not a knowledge of the logical topics that would enable students to generate the matter for their themes, but of phrases, examples* and proverbs derived form reading pithy authors, phrases either committed to memory or recorded in a copy book or phrase book. The practice of systematically copying weighty phrases from the best authors in a copy book provided the student with his own resource file on any topic from the most respected sources. This practice was common throughout the Renaissance and was highly recommended by Erasmus in De Copia.5^ This means of invention depended on the widespread assumption K 1 See Struever* ’’Humanists*" p. 29 and Vickers, "Rhetorical and anti-rhetorical tropes." John Brinsley, Sc.hoa.le (London, 1612), pp. 172-174... For the practice of using Renaissance copy books, see Sister Joan Marie Lerchner, O.S.U., Rfinaiaaance Concepts of the Commonplace (New York: Paeent Press, 1962). pp. 153-225.' 82; that there was no real separation between res and verba» matter and words. John Clarke, one of Brinsley's followers and an author of school textbooks which were widely used, compiled an English-Latin phrase book for use in the grammar schools, the subtitle of which reads: Proverbs English ant In the letter to the reader, Clarke makes it clear that the proverbs have many uses for "1. Philosophy, being reliques and fragments thereof, preserved hitherto for their a. brevity, b. festivity. 2. oratory to persuade. 3. ornaments, and beautifying of speech. 4. Under standing of the best authors.”51* He enjoins schoolmasters to exercise their scholars every day on one or two of the "heads,” to have the students interpret them, and to "appose1 his scholars to each other; then he explains This will both teach and remind them of all learning, history, and antiquity: and be a synopsis of most useful and delightful passages in their whole life. And the benefit hereof will soon be found incredibly great, especially in the higher forms, useful in all their exercises, giving luster, as so many orient pearls, or rich Diamonds set in gold: for herein is couched and contracted the QJAjJQjL&£g.SJa£g» marrow, e££§ffi» flower, and uLtJQ of learning, eloquence and wisdom: our wise fore-fathers, and the learned in all ages, briefly transmitting to us in Proverbs, the treasures of their experience, and knowledge, like gold, much in a little: as 54 [John Clarke], Paraemiologia Anglo-La tin a In-.us.um < Scholarum concinnata. or Proverbs English and Latlnel Methodically disposed according to the Coromon-place he_adsj I (London, 1639), sig. A2r-A4r. 82 the confluence of light in one Sun* of heat in one Ci£g. Any pithy sentence, proverb or phrase, whether recorded in a copy book, committed to memory, or compiled in a textbook was then a compressed essay. The words of the phrase could generate the matter of a theme because they were "contracted" so as to contain "much in a little." Thus in an apt phrase, . ■ i eloquence and wisdom were conjoined, and the student need only to be able to interpret and. elaborate the phrase for the matter of his discourse.^ In another context, Clarke is providing the same sort of list, not from classical authors, but from the Bible. His purpose here is to encourage a Christian eloquence. His point is that Christian preaching should exhibit the same, if not higher, eloquence as pagan letters. Hence he offers a list of Biblical verses for the same purpose "as other Phrase-books, out of Orators, and Poets," that it may prove profitable to those who use it. And in describing the use, Clarke more explicitly states the Renaissance conception of res and verba, invention and style, matter and fine phrases. . . . the various expression of the same things, not only furnish a Preacher with heavenly and &E&g£ Elegancies; (£.QX>.la....Y.e r [sic] sacrorum; ) but also very much enrich his Inven tion , with store of divine matter, and happiljr bring to mind some choice notions, on which may profitably insist; Being indeed a Logical Concord- i — ................... —— | 55 Clarke, £ji9.ygxbjg...5Jlgj[j.&h.jan±..L^lQg» sig. B1r-B2r. I On this point see Vickers, "Rhetorical and anti- | rhetorical tropes," pp. 105-_132._ J 8 . 4 ance> in the very phrase whereof* much excellent matter lieth couched; and in the chase* and choice of wprds* some variety of concepts will afresH start up* and offer ttLqjnselves» to His further pursuit and observation. ' Thus the effect of Ramism on rhetoric in the curriculum was to a large extent mollified by the humanist conception of wisdom and eloquence being conjoined in apt* pithy sen tences. Students were to invent the substance of their themes from sayings which they had recorded from their reading of the best authors. But this conjunction of eloquence and wisdom* style and invention* necessitated wide and deep reading of authors. The ideal of eloquence was therefore preserved in the goal of knowing the canon of respectec classical authors and their works* and of imitating their style. For my discussion of the reforms in the humanist curri culum, it is necessary to underscore the application of humanism in the schools as the study of the best classical authors for their wisdom as well as for their eloquence. I Humanist educators took as their goals to immerse their students in classical literature and to cultivate a refinec style by imitation of authors. Around these two goals of humanism, the conjoining of wisdom and eloquence* sprang a pedagogy derived from classical education* but imbued with the vigor of the new learning. In order to revive classical i I jauthors, it was also necessary to revive the study of classical I------------------------- j ^ Clarke, "Letter to the Reader," Hol-v Ovle for The ■ La.tnp.es- o.f-tJie--Sanctuarie; Or, Scrioture-Phrases Alphabetic [cally d 1 sp.Q&ed (London,!630).___ __________________________ 85 languages. The curriculum which would bring students to a knowledge of authors in their original language was twofold. Though encompassed by the rubric "Grammar school." the curriculum was actually divided into the reading of authors and the imitation of their style. Hence, the reception of discourse, grammar, necessitated learning Latin and Greek. But the term "grammar" was not so confined as it is today, for it was clearly the ability to read authors that humanist educators were interested in rather than merely in the knowledge of declensions and conjugations and of how to parse and construe a sentence. Grammar, then, was an intro duction to classical literature that required, as a prereq uisite. knowledge of Latin, and of Greek. The second goal of grammar school was to cultivate in the students the ability to speak and write fine Latin. Hence rhetoric wae an intregral part of grammar school education. Despite Ramus' law of Justice, these two elements, the reception anc production of fine Latin discourse, literature and imitation, grammar and rhetoric were inextricable in the curriculum. And although grammar was an aid to learning the classical languages, it was meant only as a necessary introduction tc reading authors. Knowing the best authors and imitating their style were the goals of humanist education, but grammar would become an obstacle to achieving these goals. To put these goals into practice, however, humanists developed their own pedagogy. The humanists had rebelled 86 against Scholasticism because their intent was to educate by instilling an appreciation of classical literature rather, than a facility with the forms of the syllogism; the method' they recommended was education by understanding rather thaJ by memorizing rules and precepts.’ This is a common theme inj the educational writings of the great humanist educators' Vives and Erasmus. Erasmus, for example, repugned memoriza tion for its own sake. But if memorization was required, he advocated that the young scholars first understand the material before committing it to memory. If possible. Erasmus recommended that school boys not be forced to commit a passage of Latin to memory, but that they read it several times--once for sense, again for grammar, then for rhetoric. i always for moral import. After multiple readings. Erasmus says that the students will have effectively memorized the passage. 4 To humanist educators teaching with understanding meant teaching by example rather than merely by precept. Educa tion by understanding rather than by memorizing precepts was a common theme amongst English humanist educators as well. John Colet. the first master of St. Paul's School, perceivec the need for an introductory Grammar text for his school because the old ones, Priscian and Donatus. which had been I used for centuries, were too advanced for the tender wits of I the young boys. In 1527 he published his own grammar. ! .entitled Aedito, for school boys. Colet's advice on how the 871 book should be used is important for two reasons. First he boldly states that the goals of an education should consist of authors and good Latin. Secondly, he asserts that the way students are to learn these things is by example. The passage is worth quoting at length not only to catch Colet’s full significance, but because Colet's text, in modified form, became by royal proclamation, the standard latin grammar text book from 1540 to the end of the eighteenth century.*5® After explaining the parts of speech, Colet gives the following advice: Of these viii parts of speech in order well construed be made reasons and sentences and long orations. But how, and in what manner, and with what con struction of words, and all the varieties and diversities and changes in latin speech (which be innumberable) if any man will know, and by that knowledge attain to understand latin books, and to speak, and to write the clean latin. Let him above all busily learn and read good latin authors of chosen poets and orators. And note wisely how they wrote and spake and study alway to follow them: desiring none other rules, but their examples. For in the beginning, men spake not latin because such rules were made, but contrariwise. Because men spake such latin. Upon that followed the rules were made. That is to say latin speech was before the rules, not the rules before the latin speech. Wherefore well beloved masters and teachers of grammar after the parts of speech sufficiently known in your schools. Read and expound plainly unto your scholars good authors, and show to them every word and in every sentence what they shall note and observe, warning them busily to follow and to do like both in writing, and in speaking. And be to them your own self also speaking with them the pure latin very present, and leave the rules. For reading of good books, diligent in- 58 Foster Watson, o frQ&1S.J&.Q..JM.Q i (Cambridge, 1908; rpt. London: Frank Cass & Co. Ltd., 1968),' I f>P-*„243-259. _ _ j 88j formation of taught masters* studious advertence and taking heed of learners, hearing eloquent men speak, and finally easy imitation with tongue and pen more availeth shortly to get the true eloquent speech than_all the traditions, rules, and precepts of masters. It is an interesting historical note that Colet's advice. though an echo of other humanists, was not followed. Colet's text underwent circuitous composition and revision by a number of authors including John Lily. Erasmus, and Richard Cox. And because it had been so heavily revised and appended by others. Colet did not wish to claim it. The result is that, with several additions, it became know as Lily's Latir Grammar. ^0 But quite apart from its composition is the curious place it achieved in the grammar school curriculum. In 1540 Henry VIII proclaimed that Lily's Grammar, and none other, was to be used in all the grammar schools. This proclamation was in effect until 1758 when Lily's Grammar f i 1 | became known as the Eton. Latin Grammar.0 1 Partly due to weight of royal edict and partly to duration, Lily's Grammar became entrenched in the curriculum, and the humanist pedagogy was ignored. Students were forced to memorize Lilv and John Colet, Aedito, English Linguistics 1500-1800 (A Collection of Facsimile Reprints). No. 298, ed. R. C. Alston (1527; rpt. Menston. England: The Scholar Press Limited,} 1971). sig. D6v-D7r. I have modernized the spelling for convenience. I ft n ou On the composition of Lilv's Grammar, see Watson, The._£n£liiLh_ Grammar Schools to 1660, pp. 243-256. 61 Watson, The English Grammar Schools to -1660, p. 259 and Padley, Grammatical Theory inWestern Europe 1500-1700, i P - „.24_.______ _ j learn their Latin by memorizing rule and precept without understanding what they were memorizing. It is a sad commentary on education that such good advice was so soon forgotten. But the slavish devotion to Lily’s Grammar meant that gener ations of school boys committed it to memory. They learnec what Latin they did by memorizing precepts rather than by reading good examples. Such was the state of the grammar schools toward the end of the sixteenth century. Students of Elizabethan education can immediately think of two works. very much in the humanist vein* which also recommend education by practice and example and which would seem to contravene the unhealthy use of Lily’s Grammar. Sir' Thomas Elyot’s ThfcJELflf t J & . . . N.aE?Jg.d..,fche . ,Q9V5ThPUT (1531) and Rogej Ascham’s The Scholemaster (1570) both continue the spirit of early humanist educators. Ascham makes the point several! times that examples are better than precepts. He warns that a student who does not steep himself in classical literature I and who tries to take a shorter way to learning will come up wanting. Yea. I do wish that all rules for young scholars were shorter then they be. For without doubt grammatica itself is sooner and surer learned by examples of good authors than by the naked rules of grammarians.... But to dwell in epitomes and books of commonplaces, and not to bind himself daily by orderly study to read with all diligence principally the holiest scriptures and withal the best doctors, and so to learn to make true difference betwixt the authority of the one and the counsel of the other, maketh so many seeming and sunburnt ministers as we have, whose learning is gotten in a summer heat and washed away with a , gg Christmas snow again. But Ascham’s comments can be taken as a corrective to the current practice in grammar schools of memorizing Lily and learning authors from epitomes and commonplace books. In recommending a way to improve the situation* Ascham states that the best way to learn Latin is by his method of double translation, acknowledged as taken from Cicero, by way of Sturm. The way to cultivate a fine Latin style is by imitation of authors. Since humanists assumed that humans learn bj imitation rather than by precept, it was necessary for students to have good models to learn from. But, because there were no native speakers of Latin, humanists used classical authors as models. Thus’to learn Latin, students had only to imitate authors. Beside teaching fine Latin] imitation pedagogy had the added advantage of acquainting the students with the wisdom of the ancients. With thii pedagogy, therefore students learned both wisdom and eloquence. All languages, both learned and mother tongues, be gotten and gotten only, by imitation. For as ye use to hear, so ye learn to speak; if ye hear no other, ye speak not yourself, and whom ye only hear, of them ye only learn. And therefore if ye would speak as the best and wisest do, ye must be conversant where the best and wisest are, but if you be born or brought up in a rude country, ye shall not choose but speak rudely. The rudest man of all knoweth this to be true. Yet nevertheless the rudeness of common and mother tongues is no bar for wise speaking. For in the Roger Ascham, The Schoolmaster (Charlottsville: Viginia: The University Press of Virginia, 1974), p. 1 0 7 . j 91 rudest country and most barbarous mother language many be found can speak very wisely, but in the Greek and Latin tongue, the two only learned tongues which be kept not in common talk but in private books, we find always wisdom and elo quence, good matter and good utterance, never or seldom asunder. For all such authors as be fullest of good matter and right judgment in doctrine be likewise always most proper in words, most apt in sentence, most plain and pure in uttering the same. Ascham's opinion is that wisdom and eloquence are complements of one another— a common sentiment among human ists. One learns by imitation of examples provided by the author’s themselves, and the best matter is always expressed eloquently. A bad and barbarous style signals a bad mind. But Ascham1 s comments must be seen in context. Both his and Elyot's books were never used in grammar schools, where Lily's Grammar had sole place. Both Ascham and Elyot were writing to private tutors who were employed by noble men to teach their sons. Henry VIII's proclamation had no effect on tutors. Foster Watson has already made the point in his study of grammar school curricula that Ascham and Elyot wrote for tutors of well-bred students and not for use in the grammar schools.^ Elyot's title, The Booked Named the Governour, belies that it was not intended for the schools. And Ascham's subtitle is directed to the same student: The Scholemaster, one plain and perfect wav of teaching children, to understand, write, ajid ■§P_e.aiLt the Latin tongue, but specially purposed ^ Ascham, The Schoolmaster, pp. 114-115. 64 Watson, The English Grammar Schools to 1660, p. 264. 92] d e . n . U - g f f l & g and Noble mens. houses, and commodious also for all such, as have forgot the Latin tongue , and wQuld-, bv themselves, without a Scholemaster , in a short ...sinal A ,.. ,p a A n a * ...r_e£LQisjii.„ ability to understand, writet .and-jsne.alt-l^inu Ascham’s title, in fact, gives us additional insight intoj another purpose of the book. Not only was the book intended for the tutors of private students, it was also intended for those who "forgot the Latin tongue." This is also a commentary| on grammar school education. In fact, it would be a common criticism during the early seventeenth century that either the students learned little Latin in school, or they soon forgot it for lack of use.^ In either ease, the ideals of humanism toward the end of the sixteenth century were notj being realized in English grammar schools. Students were forced to memorize a grammar book which they could not understand, they learned by precept rather than by example, and the Latin they were taught was poorly learned or soon forgotten. And for rhetoric, given the students' difficulty in learning Latin, the hope for eloquence was meager School boys became adept at fooling the schoolmaster rather1 than at their Latin composition.66 6^ This criticism of Latin education is well made in Richard Carew’s account of his Latin training. Carew’s account, with that of others, appears in Samuel Harlib’s The Txyjg— .^Jl...Lg.M.i.fi,,..Wa.y....T.s.,.JUg.ax.Q.g....^hg .kaliJ3.e-lQng.Ug (London, 1654), pp. 45-49. 66 John Newton describes in detail how schoolboys usee to cheat on their themes by borrowing exordia, arguments and sentences from Clarke’s Formulae Oratoriae and Farnaby’s Index Rhetorious. See "To the Reader,” An.,. Int.r.PJly.S.ki.P.n..,£i - , _ - g 3 - It is important to understand that. Erasmus. Vives. Colet* Elyot. and Ascham notwithstanding, the English grammar school curriculum was in a sorry state at the end of the sixteenth century. Watson comments that the net effect of Lily’s Grammar was to stultify language learning and1 language use in the classroom. He claims that the authori zation of Lily’s grammar was against the Renaissance spirit of enquiry. It was a mere substitution of Lily for Donatus and Priscian by royal authority. It perpetuated the stereotype of grammar education from the Middle Ages. The study of Latin was divorced from the study of Latin authors.**7 The study of form was divorced from the ideal of eloquence. Verba was being wrested from res. Grammar as the introduction to literature was replaced by grammar as the study of language, and rhetoric was left isolated. Besides the ineffectual pedagogy of the grammar schools, there were other forces in operation which reduced the importance of a grammatico-rhetorieal education. The vernaculaij was gaining importance as the language of politics, trade and education. But more importantly, if eloquence was the vehicle for achieving communal assent, the vernacular had to be made eloquent.**® This meant that English had to have legitimate status in the schools. Humanists, therefore, the Art of Rhetorick (London, 1671). 67 Watson, The English Grammar ScJaQ_Qls. pp. 260-261. Bouwsma. "Renaissance and Reformation.” p. 135. 94 sought to make education* in some form, available to as many people as possible. All need not learn the Biblical languages, but all should read the Holy Writ in their own tongue as an example of Christian eloquence. Erasmus had envisioned in "Paraclesis," the preface to his Greek New Testament, that everyone should have access to the Scriptures.^9 ThiJ humanistic endeavor was responsible for Tyndale and Coverdale’s translations of the Bible into English, and many other attempts to translate the scriptures into English and other vernaculars. This spirit conjoined with the nationalistic ethos of Renaissance Europe gave the vernacular a presti gious place in the community. Authors of Shakespeare’s magnitude began writing with regularity in the mother tongue. R. F. Jones has characterized this as an age of Rediscovered | Eloquence.7® Just as classical authors were considered I eloquent in their mother tongues, there was a deliberate attempt to demonstrate that English could be as eloquent a means of expression as Latin and Greek. In fact, this seems to be the avowed purpose of such writers on rhetoric as Thomas Wilson, George Puttenham, and Richard Cox. The fact that they were making available in English the colors of ^9 Desederius Erasmus, "Paraclesis," in Christian Humanism and—the Reformation: Selected Writings of,.JELra.sm.usJ ed. John C. Olin (New York: Forham University Press, 1980), pp. 96-98. 70 Richard Foster Jones, The Triumph of the. English Language (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1953), pp. 168-213. 95 rhetoric was an open invitation to prove that English could be as eloquent as the classical languages. While this trend might explain the rise of the vernacu lar and depreciation of Latin* it does not explain the pedagogical methods that continued to be used in the grammar schools. But Jones also notes that the effort to make English an eloquent tongue was soon followed by a fierce attempt to regulate and codify English Grammar. The first grammarians had been influential in setting forth the rules and order of Latin and Greek before the classical age of eloquence* and Elizabethans likewise perceived a need to impose order on their native tongue. In order for English to be an eloquent tongue* it too must be ordered and regu lated.71 With the rise of vernacular eloquence and the communal agreement that English should be set in order by grammar* there arose many English schools* the intent of which was not to replace grammar schools* but to insure that the mother tongue got its due. Richard Mulcaster in 1582 published The First Part of the Elementary, which entreateth of the right writing of our English tune. In this treatise on English elementary education* Mulcaster states "that the entry to language and the judgment thereof by grammar is the end of the Elementarie." Mulcaster expresses how he sees grammar operating on a language: 71 The Triumph of the English Language, p p . 272-292. 96 For by course of nature and use of antiquity grammar travaileth first to have the naturall tung of each countrie fined to that best, and most certaine direction, which the ordinarie custom of the country which useth the tongue, can lead her unto: As how to reduce our English tongue to some certain rule, for writing and reading, for words and speaking, for sentence and ornament, that men may know, when they write or speak right."'2 Besides his explicit statement that grammar is neces sary to reduce the "English tongue to some certain rule that men may know when they write or speak right," Mulcaster is arguing for the place of the vernacular in the curriculum. The native tongue must be learned first, and by "learned" Mulcaster means English grammar in the most pedantic sense. Students were to learn English orthography, penmanship, anc accidence. Without such a foundation they could not succeec in learning Latin. To justify the study of English as a bona fide intel lectual endeavor, Mulcaster offers a long treatment of the I history of the English language. It is not the first treatment of the history of English, but no more laudatory can be found. His argument is that English, because of its long history, deserves scholarly attention, and because of its long history, English has developed through custom certain grammatical rules which must be taught in the schools. Mulcaster’s point is that the English language is a legitimate subject matter for the schools, and the right approach to | ------------------------- 72 Richard Mulcaster, (London. 1582), pp 49-50. 97 studying English and other languages is grammar, in the most rule-bound sense of that term. But Mulcaster is only one of many voices which extol English grammatical education. Another such voice, and one which provides a sharp contrast with Ascham. is Edmund Coote. Edmund Coote published his book The English Schoole- Master in 1596. and it went through forty-eight editions.7- The full title reads: Thg..£ai.iJrJg.b,§fi.h.Q.9l^3^.tex. J.,^ag.fai.ng..^,i ,ii l, 11 e rs yifL-jBflflJi. g .£ > ,s . !.?>,. aJ hflr.ftj i .and p.ffx,£ec..t. ..ord ,. .fl &,a f r An p.fe .. our English, tongue, that hath ever vet been knowne 9 x . pj«,b3ljLafaftd-toL.aji3e* Coote follows Mulcaster in ordering his curriculum. Firstj the students learn the vowels, then the consonants, then two letter syllables composed of the first consonant nbn and alJ the other vowels in turn: ba. be. bi. bo. bu. and so on through the rest of the consonants. To this he adds another consonant at the end. bab. then clusters of consonants, blab, until all the possible combinations are practiced by the students. The students learn the eight parts of speech in English, then Coote includes a few practice readings from the Psalms and other religious and moral works. No attention is given Latin, none to classical literature, anc none to rhetoric. Although Mulcaster. Coote and their ilk originally 73 David cressy, jr.asx-.axLd...feks.-£^0-laJL..QxdP,a aridn 1 and Writingin Tudor and Stuart England (Cambridge: Cam-} bridge University Press, 1980), p. 38. 98 intended English instruction for school boys to give English equal treatment and as an introduction to Latin, the overall effect, as Jones has noted, was to give prominence to English over Latin such that later in the seventeenth century, Latin was taught through English. English became the language of the schools even though Latin was the subject matter. The reason for the present discussion of Mulcaster, Coote, and the vernacular movement is that it has direct bearing on the humanist education characterized earlier. First, Latin was depreciated in prestige to the point that it required a foundation in the vernacular. Second, the reading of classical authors was never a part of Mulcaster’s curriculum, not of Coote’s, nor of most other "English grammarians." Third, the method employed was a strict adherence to grammar as the means of learning English. And English grammars were not much more than translations and adaptations to the English language of parts of Lily’s Grammar. Most significantly, English grammar was taught without any attempt at composition. Rhetoric and grammar were no longer inextricable. Despite the ideals of humanism and the Elizabethan flair for elegance, the actual practice in grammar schools was quite different from what Colet would have wanted. The vernacular movement and English schools only reinforced the slavish adherence to rules and precepts in grammar schools, which had already been encouraged by Henry VIII’s royal 99 fiat. But what is more important is that both the royal proclamation and the vernacular schools made grammar de facto the primary linguistic art. Grammar was not auxiliary to reading authors; it became an end in itself. Grammar and rhetoric were not complementary phases of eloquence. Watson’J truculent commentary though lengthy and directed at the consequences of Lily's Grammar, is quite appropriate here as a summation of the state of grammar schools at the beginning of the seventeenth century. [Lily’s Grammar] tended to discourage, if not to render impracticable, the methods of teaching the Latin grammar concurrently with the reading of authors. . . .It is around this questions in its simplest form, Grammar versus classical authors, that the fiercest disputes in the 16th and 17th centuries, in connection with Lily's Grammar took place. The old Donatus was simplicity itself compared with Lily. With the increase of know ledge of the Renascence, the boy of the post-Renascence times compared with the Mediaeval boy had to undergo a martyrdom of despotism. The exercise of memory necessary to the Mediaeval lack of printed books, was intensified in Renascence instruction, because the Grammar had become much more comprehensive in scope. The English post- Renaseence boy had to stop any impulse to reason, and to simply get the Grammar known by heart, as a preliminary to higher work. This was the tendency of the authorized Grammar; as we shall see, en lightened teachers‘from time to time, rose superior to any thraldom to Lily, but the definiteness of mechanical methods always secures a large clientele from the less qualified teachers, and attracts a strong conservative element, who resist, to the uttermost, the reforming innovator. . . .The glory thus surrounding the [Early Humanist] idea of grammar permeated the learned world--and the grammarians who narrowed themselves to the acceptance of an authorized Grammar such as that of Lily, readily appropriated the prestige of the name given by the early Renascence writers to the wider conception of the subject, although the later grammarian had come to regard his function in the 100 narrow limitation of the knowledge of a text-book from which rules were to be learned* however meagre the child’s experience in the reading of authors.74 The problem of humanism was then how to teach elo quence. in the broadest* most non-methodical sense of absorbing classical literature and cultivating a fine style; in school rooms, which demanded a pedagogy for teaching a number of pupils in the most methodized and systematic way; by school masters* who did not fully understand the cultural implications of humanism. The prestigious title of Grammarian was appro priated by pedants teaching the accidence of Latin grammar, who may not have had much background* expertise* or even interest in classical letters. This pedagogy* as we shall see* not only begot public dissatisfaction for being inef fective. but it aggrandized the role of grammar to the point that it challenged the metalingustic function of rhetoric. Discourse was not so much a means of conducting one’s civic responsibilities as a marker of prestige, a sign of an educated gentlemen or someone who was upwardly mobile. The grammar schools, by emphasizing correctness and rules* were ignoring eloquence. Education had become an entrance to polite society rather than a preparation for a life of civic action. 74 Watson, .SsliP-Q.l.a» pp. 261-262. Humanism and Curricular Reform Chapter 3 Humanist ideals, however difficult to attain in practice* were still maintained by many seventeenth-century educators. But these educators, though committed to humanist ideals, belonged to the seventeenth-century and not to the sixteenth- century. Hence they were not untainted by the pressures of their age. The humanist educators of the seventeenth-century had to reconcile their committment to classical authors with the increased prestige of the vernacular, with increased enrollments, and with the increased importance of grammar as the discipline which received the most attention in the school curriculum. As a result of these pressures, educators in the seven teenth-century adapted the grammar schools to allow the vernacular as a means to learn Latin; they systematized pedagogy for easy application to a classroom setting; and they conformed to the requirement to use Lily's Grammar' while concurrently employing others means to enhance Latin learning. The coincidence of vernacular education, increas ed enrollments, and a prescribed grammar text, however, affected more than just the curriculum of the schools; it also influenced the society's attitudes about language in general. Struever's insight regarding language, society and knowledge is that all three are interrelated such that a shift in epistemology affects attitudes toward language and 102 its function in society. Likewise a shift in a society's use of language encourages a change in its attitudes toward language and its conception of how language and knowledge are related. The reciprocity of language* society* and knowledge is well exemplified by the struggle of the English grammar schools to adapt to different needs and by the manner in which these adaptations fostered different attitudes regarding the study of languages and other subjects. Hence this chapter will have a twofold purpose: first* to trace the effect on pedagogy of the seventeenth-century social context* and second* to suggest how these changes in linguistic education affected the society’s attitudes toward language use and its conception of what was worth knowing. Let me comment briefly on each of these two topics. The increasing use and prestige of the vernacular forced educators to find a place for English in the curricu lum* and the fact that Lily’s Grammar was required but difficult for students provided the opportunity that educators needed. Students could learn the accidents of grammar first in English then in Latin. Furthermore, the difficult rules of Latin gender, tense, supines* and syntax could more readily be taught in English translation than in Latin. The students would thus learn Lily's Grammar, but first they would learn it in English. In this way the place of the vernacular was secured while complying with the mandate to teach Lily. 103 Since many educators had a commitment to Latin litera ture and eloquence, they retained the study of classical authors. But the already difficult study of authors and the imitation of their style was made additionally troublesome by the classroom setting. How could a single master ensure that his scholars were translating correctly and imitating closely when he had dozens of scholars rather than one or two? The amount of time spent correcting a student’s double translation exercise could be justified with one or two tutored pupils, but to do the same for entire classes of students from the first to the sixth forms was simply unfea sible. Perhaps the sheer burden of correcting exercises was one of the reasons grammar became so important; it was methodical and therefore easy to present and easy to correct. But most educators were not willing to ignore completely the study of literature and the cultivation of a refined style. Hence, a method had to be developed which could be applied to the entire curriculum in order that education might be complete in its scope, yet without overtaxing either scholars or masters— a method which would not only be feasible for the classroom, but would also incorporate the vernacular without slighting grammar. This chapter traces the development of this method. In addition to tracing the development of a pedagogical method for public schools, this chapter has the additionaJ purpose of explaining what the consequences of changing 104 language education were on attitudes towards language and on conceptions of how humans learn language. For only by understanding language education in relation to society and epistemology can we begin to understand how the cultural ideal of eloquence could dissipate and fall into disrepute. This chapter attempts to account for a shift from rhetoric to grammar in what Struever calls "the metalinguistic disci pline. " This shift from rhetoric to grammar has been little noted by historians of rhetoric and linguistics. Linguists reckon the beginnings of modern linguistics from this period, for the seventeenth century is the beginning of universal and rational grammars. But very few linguists attempt to understand the nature and reasons of the emergence of grammar in conjunction with the decline of rhetoric. Padley. for example, treats the Renaissance penchant for eloquence anc pedagogy with a linguist’s condescension as an unfortunate aberration in the medieval tradition of speculative grammar. Nor have scholars of rhetorical history investigated this problem. Watson mentions the shift briefly in his introduction, but he does so only to note that the importance of grammar1 in the seventeenthcentury curriculum is an oddity in the development of the trivial arts. He mentions only that grammar assumed its importance not from logic, as one might expect, but from rhetoric which had its heyday in the schools m 5 . p of the Tudor and Stuart periods.41 Thus, the second purpose of this chapter is to explain how the school reforms contributed I to the decline of rhetoric as metalinguistic and encouraged grammar. 1 will discuss four educators: John Brinsley (fl. 1633). Joseph Webbe (fl. 1612-1633). John Clarke (d. 1658), anc Charles Hoole (1610-1667). No attempt is made at a compre hensive survey; my purpose is to trace trends and influences. I will therefore limit my, discussion to two trends. One trend illustrates how educators worked within the grammatical tradition established by Lily’s Grammar. Within this trend there is a direct line of influence from the humanist pedagogy developed in Ascham’s The Scholemaster through Brinsley and Clarke to Hoole. though the pedagogy is much altered in form and function from beginning to end. These are schoolmasters l who try to work within the tradition, necessity rather, of using Lily’s Grammar. My discussion of these educators will focus on the consequences of the increased pedagogical attention given to grammar, on rhetoric in the curriculum, and on the metalinguistic function of rhetoric as discussed in the preceding chapter. The second trend is Joseph Webbe’s attempt to found by patent from Parliament humanist-oriented schools without any grammar instruction. Though Webbe is by no means the only English educator to condemn grammar during the seventeenth century, he is the most unique because hi 2 The English Grammar Schools, pp. 2-3. 106 offers an alternative. My discussion of Webbe will focus on his reaction to the prestige grammar was acquiring in the schools as well as on his own method of Latin instruction. I. John Brinsley's place in the history of education has been treated before. Watson sees Brinsley as a major figure in seventeenth-century education because his works give us the clearest picture of what was actually transpiring in English classrooms during the early decades of the century. But because Watson's avowed purpose is bibliographical, he does little more than use Brinsley as a source to describe the curriculum at the time. Watson doe.s not attempt to place him in the humanist tradition, although he does mention Brinsley as one of many seventeenth-century educators who amended, translated, or supplemented Lily's Grammar.^ R. F. Jones also treats Brinsley briefly in his examination of the rise of the vernacular. But because Jones' focus is on the displacement of Latin by the vernacular, he treats Brinsley in cursory fashion as one who simply recommended that English be adopted into the curriculum.^ Vivian Salmon has dealt with Brinsley’s method of teaching languages. Her article does not bear directly on the present discussion because she refuses to analyze Brinsley's suggestions for composition. These, she believes, more properly belong to 3 The.-English Grammar Schools, p. 19. ______11 The Triumph of the English Language, p. 281.__________ 107" the history of education than to the history of linguistics.-* And T. W. Baldwin mentions Brinsley in his monumental work» Shakspere!s Small Latine and Lesse Greek. But Baldwin is intent on arguing that English grammar school education was basically the same from 1530 until well into the seventeenth century, and does so in part because as long as he can make a case for the continuity of grammar school curricula, in the absence of any hard records form Stratford-upon-Avon, hej can draw inferences as to the kind of education Shakespeare must have had. But in so reasoning. Baldwin misses the significant differences in grammar school education from the beginning of the sixteenth to the end of the seventeenth centuries. Hence Baldwin's main point with respect to Brinsley is that he teaches the same authors in nearly the same order as were taught in 1530 at Eton.^ In none of the above treatments is there an attempt to see Brinsley as both a continuer of humanist education and reformer in light of the new pressures of the seventeenth century. No one tries to analyze the shift in humanist pedagogy that is apparent in Brinsley and continues through John Clarke to Charles Hoole. But an understanding of the attitudes toward rhetoric in education in the seventeenth -* Vivian Salmon. "John Brinsley: 17th-Century Pioneer in Applied Linguistics," The Study of Language in 17th-* (Amsterdam: J. Benjamin, 1979), p. 40. 6 T. W. Baldwin, William ShalcesDexe.l-S...Small ■La.tine am Lesse Greek (Urbana, Illinois: University of Illinois Press. 1944), I, 450-452. I 108 century depends on understanding how Brinsley and others sought to solve the problems already existing in grammar schools while preserving the humanist curriculum. Conse quently my treatment of Brinsley will focus on his pedagogi cal reforms, the intended effects of reform on humanist ideals, and the implicit justification for the reforms. Jones has already noted that the attack on antiquity was well under way at the close of Elizabeth’s reign.7 The attack was not widespread, but there were already mans' voices denouncing the authority of the ancients and calling for educational reforms. Similarly, by the seventeenth century, many were suggesting new and better ways to learn Latin, although Lily’s Grammar still had official sanction. In fact it appears that many schoolmasters were publishing as subsidiary texts to Lily the methods that they had developec O in their own classrooms. Criticism of the curriculum anc the emergence of alternate methods of teaching Latin grammar, along with the general decline in the use of Latin, made the traditional humanist curriculum extremely vulnerable to criticism. Brinsley, perceiving the problem, attempted to shore up the curriculum with reform while preserving the emphasis on reading authors and imitating their style. 7 Richard Foster Jones. Ancients ..and Moderns: A Study Q.X. ..t.h,g.. . . . . J U U s— SfiJLent i f,ic M < ?vgn ? .g n -t. 1.n Sm L ftu JL & ftfltix .4 Century England (St. Louis: Washington University Studies,' 1961). pp. 3-21. 8 See Watson, Ifagfingj.iUft-* PP- 260-30* and Salmon, IbA-Studx .of Language, p. 4. ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- , --------------------------nn As in the cases of other schoolmasters, the title of Brinsley’s book is revealing: Lucius Literarius: or The Grammar Schoole; Shewing How to Proceede from the first entrance into learning, to the highest perfection required in the Grammar Schooles, with ease, certainty and delight both to Masters and Schollars: only according to our common G-nammar../. land ardinajcY c„i,a, s, $, j, Q qi.i Aj ufej a. ot t r . j g . ? Begun la le Sought out At The desire of some worthy savourers of learning, by searching the experiments of sundry most profitable Schoolemasters and other learned, and confirmed by trvall: q£. kto younger. M r.t-.pf. . . . . leafihftca*. and of allSchollers, with all other desirous of learning; for the perpetuall benefit of Church and Commonwealth (1612). This title reveals both Brinsley’s allegiance to Lily as well as his desire to remedy some of this ills of the grammar schools. Hence, Brinsley lists thirty-three goals of the grammar school. These ’ ’points, chiefly aimed at” declare Brinsley’s grammar school to be firmly in the humanist tradition. Not only do these goals necessitate a command of classical Latin and a thorough acquaintance with Cicero, Ovid, and Virgil, they also insist on the ability to imitate the style of these authors with such facility as to compose in. classical style on demand.9 The goals of humanist education, the 9 Among the thirty-three goals are the following: ”7. To enter surely in making Latin, without danger of making false Latin, or using any barbarous phrase." ”8. To make true 110 knowledge of classical authors and the ability to imitate their style are the heart of Brinsley's grammar school. How, then does Brinsley's pedagogy differ from Colet's or Ascham's? Brinsley proposes several reforms. The format of the book is a dialogue between two schoolmasters, Spoudeus and Philoponus. Spoudeus is the conservative master represent ing the common practices of the day. Philoponus represents the reformer who, as a result of his own experience, has changed his approach in the classroom with dramatic re sults. Philoponus advocates that boys should enter school at five instead of seven. In most grammar schools, the boys entered at seven, and then could enter the university by fifteen years of age. Philoponus claims that by entering at Latin, and pure Tully's phrase, and to prove it to be true and pure. To do this in ordinary moral matters by that time that they have been but two years in construction." "9. To make Epistles imitating Tully, short and pithy, in Tully's Latin and familiar." "10. To translate into English, according to propriety both of words and sense: and out of the English to read the Latin again, to prove it, and give a reason of every thing." "11. To take a piece of Tully, or of any other familiar, easy Author, Grammatically translated, and in propriety of words, and to turn the same out of the translation into good Latin, and very near unto the words of the Author; so as in most you shall hardly discern, whether it be the Author's Latin, or the scholar's." "20. To write Themes full of good matter, in pure Latin, and with judg ment." "21. To enter to make a verse with delight, without any podging at all; and furnish with copy of Poetical phrase, out of Ovid, Virgil, and other the best Poets." "22. So to imitate and express Ovid or Virgil, as you shall hardly discern, unless you know the places, whether the verses be the Author's or the scholar's; and to write verses ex tempore of any ordinary Theme." I have modernized the spelling for convenience. "The Contents in General," Ludus Literarius (London, 1612). Hereafter Ludus. Ill five the boys will take delight in their learning. will be more easily molded* will learn more readily, will avoid learning undesirable traits like shrewdness and idleness, and will thereby have more time to prepare for the university (Ludus 9-11). Philoponus. besides adding two years to the grammar school curriculum, also proposed that each town found its own English school. He claims that grammar schools are toJ burdened with unprepared students who do not know their ABC’s. He proposes that the first training be devoted to teaching the boys to read and write English and that they not be admitted to a grammar school until they can read English well. Part of this proposed reform can be attri buted to the increasing importance of the vernacular, and Brinsley makes a point of emphasizing the need to know how to read and write the mother tongue. But Brinsley is also responding to another need in his society: the . frustration of learning Latin when the practice of memorizing Lily waJ not yielding good results. Brinsley argues that learning English can thus be a ,great help in learning Latin. Latin grammar is made easier if the young scholars already know their accidents in English, and. furthermore, only when the school boys can read an English translation of Lily’s rules can they ’’learn to construe and to keep their Grammar rules" (Ludus 23). That is, English provides a good introduction to Latin grammar, first because Latin grammar is analogous to English grammar* which the boys will learn before grammar school* and second* because the rules of Latin syntax can be read in an English translation of Lily.10 Brinsley claims! that, if this procedure is followed, the scholars can learn Lily’s rules in half the time it would take without thJ translated rules. In effect* Brinsley has given a new twist to the humanist adage that a child must understand before he can learn. For Brinsley, understanding implies the use of the child’s mother tongue. Thus Lily’s rules are translated, and applied in English until the child knows them well. In basing his pedagogy on the vernacular* Brinsley is doing more than merely emphasizing the vernacular. He is implying thatj students learn faster and better when they can learn unfamiliar matter in terms which are already familiar to them. The student then can understand from the perspective of his own experience. The rules of Latin grammar can be understood in terms of ’ ’analogous" rules in English grammar. And English grammar is already made easy by the student’s familiarity with the mother tongue. Though this pedagogical foundation in terms of the student's mother tongue is common sense for Brinsley, and is not a thoroughgoing theory which underlies 1 0 Brinsley says that each boy should "have a book of the construing of Lily’s rules, and each to read over his rule* so oft upon that book until he can construe without: it, or else after a time, to try how he can beat it out of himself, and be helped by that book where he sticketh.’ j Ludus Literarius, p. 71. 113 the whole work, it will become such a theory in Brinsley’s follower. Charles Hoole. But more significant is Brinsley’s attempt to circum vent what had become education dogma: that Lily’s grammar must be learned in Latin without book.. His attempt to reform this grammar school practice, while still under obligation to use Lily’s Grammar, forces him to base his new pedagogy entirely on grammar. Lily’s rules can be learned in translation (as can some of the authors) because "one rule, so learned with understanding, is more profitable, than if they could say every word in a hundreth; and could but only repeat them over as parrots, without any knowledge to make the right use thereof” (Ludus 84). Brinsley'£ approach to learning Latin is not merely due to the influ ence of the vernacular movement; it is an attempt to comply with the edict to use Lily’s Grammar in the classroom. Tc teach Lily’s rules in translation, Brinsley developed his method of ’ ’grammatical translation" which he says is the basis for learning to read the "first School Authors" and to imitate their style. Grammatical translation is therefore I the key to Brinsley’s pedagogy. Let us now investigate what Brinsley means by "grammatical translations." In one of the short introductory passages to Ludus entitled simply "Of Grammatical Translations." Brinsley explains his purpose. He first acknowledges the benefit of the double translation exercises which Ascham recommends. 1U] But he adds the Ascham's methods are too difficult for the common schools because there is simply not enough time for the master "to compare every scholar’s translation" and give them new pieces to translate, especially new pieces that are appropriate for every form ("Of Gr. Trans" Ludus). But he adds that he has found a way of overcoming the difficultiej of double translation in the schools by teaching his scholars how to translate grammatically: The manner of hereof I have set down in the 8. Chap ter, and others following. therefore since the time that God made these known unto me (which was about some four years ago or not much above, upon the occasion of a late worthy experiment related unto me, confirming the testimony of Mr. Askam) I have laboured in these translations above all other things, First to find out the Grammar rule of construing truly, and whereupon they chiefly depend: Secondly, to find out the particular uses and benefits of them: Thirdly, to find out and set down such directions, as whereby to frame the translations to serve for all the uses most plainly: Fourthly, to translate so many of our first Authors after the same manner, as since that time I have had occasion for my scholars in each form to ready: Fifthly, to have certain trial and experience of everything, so much as in this time I could; and upon trial to commend them to Schools, to help hereby to bring into Schools that excellence way of learning, which he [Ascham] so highly commendeth, and whereof I have very great which I unfainedly wish and pray for. ("Of Gr. Trans." LMus) This passage confirms Watson’s contention that Ascham’s book was not used in the schools. But, according to Brinsley, the reason Ascham's double translation was not used is that it was unsuitable for a class with many scholars. Howeverj because the benefits derived form translating classical authors are great, Brinsley proposes a new method of grammatical 115 translations which can be used to good effect in the school rooms. This method, he says, came after much trial and experience. To prepare the scholars for Brinsley’s method of gram matical translation, it is necessary for the scholars to know the accidence and rules of syntax well. Hence the first seven chapters of Ludus are an introduction and review of grammar which lead up to chapter eight, the chapter in which he explains his method.^ To this point, grammar means the knowledge of the parts of speech, declensions, and conjugations, and Lily’s rules. Chapter eight is entitled "Of Construction; how to make all the way thereof most easy and plain." "Construction" is the nominal form of the verb phrase "construing Authors" or translating. Part of the school room practice was to construe and parse the daily lectures out of the authors. To construe was to translate the Latin passage, probably word by word. To parse was to ^ The initial seven chapters cover such topics as "when the scholar should be sent to school"; "how the scholar may be taught to read English well and speedily, to fit him the sooner and better for the Grammar school"; "how the Master may direct his scholars to write fair, though himself be no good pen-man"; how "certain general observations [are] to be known of Schoolmasters, and practiced carefully, chiefly in all Grammar learning: That scholars may be taught to do all things with understanding, and to have a general knowledge of the matter before;" "how to make children perfect in the Accidence;" and "how to make Scholars perfect in Grammar." "The Contents," Ludus Liter.arius, pp. 313-320. 116 explain the Latin and translation in terms of the rules of 12 grammar. Spoudeus begins the chapter voicing what must have beer common complaints by schoolmasters regarding the difficulty of teaching students how to construe authors. Among his complaints is that it is very difficult for the scholars to remember how the authors were construed, which makes the scholars make many errors and cause the master to be angry and the scholars to be fearful. From this complaint and Spoudeus* other comments, we can infer that the master reac and construed the passage for the students after which the students were expected to be able to construe the same passage. Philoponus*. and thus Brinsley’s, answer to this practice is this: Surely. Sir. all this may be done, by the perfect knowledge of their Accidence and Grammar rules first, and then the practice of the golden rule of construing, together with Grammatical Translations of the first ordinary school Authors, framed according to the same rule, if they be translated rightly in propriety of words, phrase and sense. <LMus 91) Building upon the grammatical basis of the first seven chapters. Brinsley proposes a "golden rule of construing" to be used in conjunction with "Grammatical Translations of the 1 P Brinsley devotes chapter nine to parsing. Ludus hi.tsr.arlu.s» pp. 125-147. TT7I first ordinary school Authors."^ Spoudeus' interest is. of course, piqued. He wants to know what the golden rule of construing is. Philoponus is amazed that he should not know it since "it is set down by sundry learned Grammarians" (Ludus 92). Nevertheless Philoponus consents to give the rule according to Master Leech, then according to Crusius.^ ^ This is part of the pedagogy which Brinsley explain ed in "Of Grammatical Translations." He proposed to trans late all of the first authors used in grammar school according to his method. Consequently. Brinsley published Pueriles Confabulatinculae: Or Children's Dialogues (1617), Ovids Metamorphosis translated grammatically, and also according to the propriety of our English tongue (1618), Virgils Eclogues, With His Book De Apibus concerning the, government and ordering of Bees (1620), Cato translated grammatically. Directing for unjLejrstanding, construing, parsing, making, and proving the same Latin (1622), The first Booke of Tullies Offices Translated Grammatically (1631), and Corderius Dialogues Translated Grammatically (1636). Though published later than Ludus, these were probably implemented in his curriculum much earlier. 1 2 1 "Phil. The sum is this; to read over the sentence distinctly to a full point; observing carefully all the points and proper names, with the drift and meaning; but chiefly to mark the principal Verb, because that pointeth out the right Nominative case, and directed all the sen tence: also to mark if there be any Vocative case. Then the order giveth this: 1. If there be a Vocative case, to construe that first, with whatsoever agreeth with it, or is governed of it, or whatsoever is put in the place of it; as in Interjection of Exclamation or calling, or an Adverb of calling. 2. To take the Nominative case of the principal Verb, or whatsoever is put in stead of it, and to adjoin to it whatsoever hangeth on it: as the Adjective or Parti ciple, and such words as they govern. 3. To make the principal Verb, and whatsoever hangeth on it, each in the right order; as if there follow an Infinitive mood, to take that next: then the Adverb; after, the case which the Verb properly governeth (which is commonly the Accusative case) and whatsoever hangeth on that. Lastly, all other cases in order: first the Genitive, secondly the Dative, and lastly the Ablative. 4. If there be not all these Verbs, to take so many of them as are in the sentence, and in this order. 5. That this order is changed by Interrogatives and__________ 118 Brinsley says that the Grammatical rule explained is simply this: that "the very child may see every principal word going before, governing or ordering that which followeth" (Ludus 126). Thus the rule is based on the principles of government and agreement, each principal word governs what follows, and all words adjoined to the principle words, such as adjectives, and participles, must agree in number, gender, and case. So in construing and parsing Latin texts, the students were not to rely solely on memory but were to adhere to Brinsley’s rules of grammatical translation. In addition to construing authors by this method, Brinsley also recommends that the rules of grammatical translation be used in imitation exercises. Chapter ten is. entitled "Of making Latine; how to enter children therein with delight and certainty, without danger of false Latine, barbarous phrase, or any other like inconvenience." One of the goals of humanist education, and one of the goals explicitly stated by Brinsley, was to teach students to write fine Latin prose and verse in imitation of the classical authors. In accordance with these goals, Brinsley recommends daily practice of reading from the English grammatical transla- Relatives, Indefinites, Partitives, and some Conjunctions with Adverbs of likeness: as Quemaedmodum, u£> SiSldi» etc. having sic, q j ; itg, to answer them in the second part of the sentence; because those words use to go beforeJ Lastly, to take the Substantive and Adjective together,1 unless the Adjective pass over his signification unto some other word, which it governeth; and so likewise the Preposij tion with his case." Ludus Literarius, p. 99. --------------------------------------------------------------- rrai tions of the authors* construing the lectures into grammatical Latin* then turning the grammatical Latin into rhetorical Latin. As part of this practice. Brinsley has the students rule their pages into three sections. The students copy a passage of grammatically translated English from their books into the first section. Or. to in sure that the students do not cheat, the master can dictate a passage in grammatical English from a source unknown to his students. The exercises completed would be as follows. Dictating accor- Ordo Grammaticus. Ordo ding to the na- Cicieronianus fe.y .r a l l .orde r _________________________________________________________ No man hath Nem. p, fy.it-. MP.r N- PfflP. f f l .aiUm s . . ; g-lELS been ever great quam maanus si- aliouo afflatu without some ne afflatu ali- divino uroauam fuit. divine inspir- quo Divino. de Nat. Peor. tion. There is no- Es.t.n i h i l PPPd....N.ih. 11.est 3„UQ.d,JPe- thing which God Deus non possit us efficere non cannot effect, efficere*& qui- possit, & gulden and truely with- dem sine labore sine labore ullc out any labour. ullo. 3. de Nat. Deor. God cannot be Deus non potest Ianorare Deus nor ignorant of what i g n.P-0.r.et, G Ltta potest, oua ouisoue minde every one mente ouisaue, mente sit. 2. de is. fiit^, Rivinat,i..ph.p.» Spoudeus is naturally impressed, but wants to know upon what principles the students go from grammatical to rhetori cal Latin. Philoponus responds by giving the precepts of composition "as they are set down by Macropedius in the end of his method of making epistles." For each precept, Brinsley gives first an example of the grammatical order, then the 120 artificial order.^ Brinsley adds a hasty qualification that the precepts are only intended as an aid to young scholars.^ To these rules Brinsley adds some additional precepts later from Talaeus' Rhetoric de Numero Oratorio, chapters 17 and 18. These suggestions are for the purpose of making The precepts are presented here in condensed form and without examples: ’ ’The I. Precept. Of placing the Nominative case, the Verb, and the oblique case. . . .1. The oblique cases (that is. all besides the Nominative and the Vocative) are commonly placed in the beginning, the Nomina tive case in the midst, the Verb in the end. . . .The II. Precept. The Adjective is ordinarily to be placed before the Substantive. And between the Adjective and the Substan tive may be fitly placed the Genetive case of the latter of two Substantives. . . .Also between the Adjective and the Substantive of the Genetive case, the word governing the Genetive case, may be elegantly placed. . . .The III. Pre cept. Between the Adjective and the Substantive, Tully sometime placeth the Verb in like manner; sometime the Adverb, sometime the Conjunction, sometime the Preposition alone, or with his case. . . .The IIII. Precept. Of Adverbs and Prepositions. Adverbs and Prepositions with their cases may be placed anywhere, wheresoever they shall seem to stand most fitly to please the ear: yet most elegantly before the Verb or Participle which they declare. . . .These are the principal of his rules which are necessary. To these may be added, 1. That this is to be observed very usually: that the word governed is commonly placed before the words governing, contrary to the Grammatical order. . . .Also if in a sentence there be mention of two persons, the one as it were an agent, the other a patient, they stand together most usually and elegantly, the agent commonly first. . . ." Ludus. Literarius, pp. 159-161. ^ "These Precepts are set down, to the end to direct young Scholars; yet so as we must not think, as I said, that these are ever to be followed strictly; because neither Tully, nor Caesar himself, nor any who have been most curious, did ever observe the same: for that should be a fault rather, as we shall see after. Notwithstanding, by practice in composing, and observation in Tully, Caesar, and the best Authors, and trying how near we can come unto them in translating into Latin, by comparing ours with theirs; and finally weighing how every sentence may so fall as may best please the ear; Scholars may attain much certainty and commendation herein." Ludus Literarius, pp. 161-162._________ 121 prose sound pleasing to the ear but without approaching verse* Poetic effects such as rhyme and meter should be avoided. Sentences should not end in the same feet, and so on. He also gives some suggestions as to what kind of words are pleasing to the ear. Especially noted are verbals, compounds, superlatives, and words of more than one sylla ble (Ludus 162-63). In all of these suggestions it is clear that Brinsley believed that imitation of a fine style could be learned from precepts derived from grammar. Thus the rules which Brinsley gives for construing are crucial to hisj entire linguistic framework; upon this rule he bases the practice of construing, parsing, and imitating authors. We have seen how. in an attempt to comply with the injunction to teach Lily in grammar schools, Brinsley was forced to apply the pedagogy that had already been developed in the English schools by Mulcaster and Coote in order to learn Latin grammar. For Brinsley the humanist dictum that students should understand before they learn meant that students should understand English grammar in order to learn Lily’s Latin grammar. Consequently Brinsley added a two-yeaij English school to the curriculum in which the rudiments of English grammar were learned. The scholars then underwent the transition from English to Latin grammar until they were perfected in their knowledge of Lily's Grammar. The reason for learning the grammar so thoroughly was then to be able to use the double translation method in construing, parsing^ 122 and imitation exercises. The net effect* however* of Brinsley’s use of grammar to adapt double translation for the schools was to increase the students' dependence on the rules and precepts of grammar. Instead of learning by example* the students learned by precept. The students began to rely more and more on textbooks and epitomes and formularies instead of developing a facility with language and a sense of decorum, for any pedagogy based on rules and precepts would be an inherent contradiction of the capacity the humanists called virtu. ^ Virtu was a human capacity and potential that required a command of knowledge and a facility with language as well as an acute sense of decorum. It was a mastery of material; not a reliance on rules,1® It was an independence of method; not a dependence on form. To the extent that Brinsley's pedagogy relied on grammatical rules* it depreciated the humanist concept of virtu. This is why both Colet and Ascham recom mended against any pedagogy which was essentially rule bound. Thus* since Brinsley proclaimed humanist goals for his grammar school* what may be of more significance than Brinsley's pedagogy is his implicit justification for the rule of grammatical translations. 17 Nadeau has noted that the use of formulary rhetorics reahed its peak in the seventeenth-century schools. See his "Oratorical Formulas in Seventeenth-Century England*" QJS. 38 (1952), 154. 18 See Struever’s The Language of History in the Renaissance, p p . 45, 59-60, 120-121* 162._______________________ 123 The most important claim that Brinsley makes for the rule is that it orders words "according to the plain and proper nature of speech, in which they are used to express any matter: which is the very order which Grammar teach- eth." Grammar then is the art of discovering the natural order of speech. This order is plain and proper. Brinsley’s process of learning to read the authors and imitate them is first an application of rules to reduce the Latin of an author to the natural order of speech, next to construe the Latin into "grammatical English," which the student can readily understand, and finally to reverse the process. This practice is called analysis and genesis.^ The rule of construing facilitates the double transla tion method which Ascham recommended but which Brinsley found impractical for the schools without modification. However, "Grammar" has become more than a set of rules to be learned to aid in learning Latin. It has become the natural ^ "1. Of the Analysis or resolving a sentence; first, the resolving it out of the Rhetorical order of the author, into the first proper, natural and Grammatical order. 2. Construing, turning or translating it into English, according to the same order; giving the true sense and force of each word and phrase. 3. Parsing as we construe. So of the Genesis or making up again are three parts. 1. The making the same Latin again, according to the order of the translation and the words of the author; that they may go surely. 2. To prove it to be true Latin, after the manner of parsing, by the same order. 3. To compose all again for the Rhetorical placing of the words, according to the order of the Author; by the help of a few rules, and by comparing with the Author; that a child may have a confident boldness, to stand against the most learned, to justify that which he hath done." Ludus Literarius, p. 104. 124 and proper order of all speech. A language, any language, so ordered by grammar and translated is immediately compre hensible. it is a striking parallel to the now much qualified concept of deep structure. All languages, so the reasoning of linguists in the 1960’s went, could be resolved into a single deep structure the various transformations of which would yield the various languages. The concept of surface structure and deep structure so familiar to linguists of the 1960’s and 1970’s are a close parallel to the concepts Brinsley proposes.2® Only Brinsley’s terms are different. The surface structure is what Brinsley calls the Rhetorical order and the deep structure would be the Grammatical order. The former is artificial; the latter is natural. Brinsley has to re-define grammar as explicating the natural order of language for two reasons. First, his concept of English grammar as preparatory for Latin grammar would seem ill-founded unless the two languages were analogous at the grammatical level. Second, a ruledgoverned practice of double translation does not make sense unless scholars could rely on the fact that at the grammatical level Latin and English were the same. Hence. Brinsley’s pedagogy necessitates that grammar be re-defined not as the art of speaking correctly, but as the method of getting to the 20 For the similarities between seventeenth-centurjr grammatical theory and modern grammatical theory, see Salmon. "Pre-Cartesian Linguistcs,’ ’ The Study of Language ir 17th-Century ■■England. pp. 63-85. 125 natural order of language. This is why the Art of Grammar is so highly praised in the "commendatory preface": "As Arts are to perfection of knowledge; so is Grammar to all Arts" ("Comm. Preface" Ludus). The definition of grammar in terms of the natural order of speech or universal grammar becomes increasingly important in the seventeenth century, as does the place of Grammar in the Schools. Grammar, and not Rhetoric, became the dominant language art in the curriculum because it was based in the nature of language. Before summarizing my discussion of Brinsley, I want to digress for a moment to mention his advice on invention and reading. Ramus had separated logic, rhetoric, and grammar, and most grammar schools taught only grammar and rhetoric. Since logic was not taught in most grammar schools, this left students without any formal means to invent the substance of their themes. Chapter twelve, "Of making theames full of good matter, in a pure stile, and with judgment," is therefore worth examining. The question which Spoudeus poses is how does the master teach rhetorical invention? Spoudeus says that he commonly has his students read Aphthonius and begin writing Fables or Chreia. But Philoponus declares that the method is inadequate. Philoponus’ objection to using Aphthonius is that the children are asked the "logic places in Aphthonius" before being "acquainted by reading with matter and phrase" fit for themes. Philoponus then discusses the evils of asking students to write before they know 126 enough to write about. The matter for writing* he says* does not come from knowing the places— empty spaces that must be filled; matter comes of extensive reading. Philo ponus, speaking for Brinsley* recommends several texts to be read thoroughly which should aid rhetorical invention (Ludus 182-83). His comment regarding school masters who require students to write without first having read is rare and deserves to be quoted. Besides* to follow the Logic places in Aphthonius in a philosophical discourse, doth require both some insight in Logic, and reading in such Authors as have written of such Moral matters. And therefore herein many a Master deserves rather to be beaten than the scholar* for driving the child by cruelty* to do that which he himself can see no reason how the poor child should be able to do it. It must of necessity either drive the scholar to use all devices to leave the school* or else cause him to live in continual horror and hatred of learning; and to account the school not Ludus literar- l , , y . . 9» but carnificina or pistrinum literarium. (Ludus 174) Philoponus’ objection is very much in the humanist tradition and echoes Ascham’s warning that students should not rely on epitomes and commonplaces to make their discourse, but on thorough knowledge of classical authors. I mention Brinsley’s insistence on wide reading not merely to emphasize his humanist commitment* but because his remarks have significance for what will follow in the century, and to a certain extent for our own day. Although Brinsley maintains a humanist outlook on reading authors for their wisdom and to provide a store of material for later use, his pedagogy had consequences which 127 contravened humanist ideals. He was a humanist who saw the educational problems of his times. Grammar schools as envisioned in the sixteenth century by Erasmus* Vives, Colet. Ascham and other humanists were different from the grammar schools of the seventeenth century as taught by unknown pedants whose practice of making their students learn Lily’s rules and construe the first school authors without book must indeed have instilled "horror and hatred of learning." Caught between the opposing forces of Henry VIII’s proclamation to use Lily in the public schools and the goals of humanist education. Brinsley attempted to reform the curriculum. He tried to find a better method of teaching the rules of Latin Grammar and thus proposed that English grammar be taught before the grammar school so the students could learn Lily by analogy to English grammar. He also taught Lily in translation. Moreover, he adapted Ascham’s method of double translation for use in the schools. The effect, though not the intent, of these reforms was twofold. First, the reforms erected grammar as the primary linguistic discipline of the curriculum. Learning Latin and imitating authors became functions of grammar. Second, in order to justify the prestigious place he gave to grammar. Brinsley effectively re-defined it in terms that had universal implications. Grammar teaches the natural order of speech which is common to all languages. What authors write and speakers speak is different from the order of grammar in 128 that it has undergone rhetorical transformation. Grammar is natural; rhetoric is artificial. Rhetoric is the facade added to the grammatical superstructure. This implicit definition of both grammar and rhetoric was substantially different from the the usual humanist stance that grammar is based on use and custom and that eloquence and wisdom are conjoined in a single phrase. Now grammar was ontological, and rhetoric accidental. Semantics and structure were separate. The second consequence of Brinsley’s reform was the unfortunate, but predictable, result of methodizing pedagogy for the classroom. Despite Brinsley's suggestion to the contrary, given the nature of students held against their will in a classroom, few students ever got beyond the rules and precepts. They came to rely so heavily on the method that additional pedagogical aids became necessary. We will see the fulfullment of this trend in John Clarke’s peda gogy. But it is important to emphasize how much the reliance on rules ran contrary to humanist ideals. No student could attain mastery over classical literature and Latin by learning rules. No student could develop the competence that humanism required by precepts. This is why both Colet and Ascham warned against any pedagogy that relied on rules. The results of Brinsley’s reforms were therefore to depreciate substantially the ideals of humanism, and specifically to undercut the metalinguistic function of rhetoric. 12S Salmon notes that* shortly after Brinsley had written Ludus* many other schoolmasters were advertising their the benefits and advantages of their own methods of teaching.2^ This fact reveals the gravity of the problems with the grammar school curriculum as well as the dissatisfaction of society. One such schoolmaster was John Clarke, who. like Brinsley, was committed to a grammatically based curricu lum. Clarke, though espousing humanist ideals, also con tributed to their decline in the classroom. His Formulae Oratoriae. in usum scolarum concinnatae enjoyed consid erable success. It was first published in 1629. and the eleventh edition was published in 1673. Hool recommends Clarke’s Forulae in his A New Discovery of the old Art of Teaching Schoole (1660). and John Newton remembers Clarke’s Formulae as being useful for schoolboys who wanted to cheat on their Latin themes and fool their master.22 In addition to the Formulae. Clarke published several books of sentences, proverbs, and phrases to be used in the schools.2^ He also published Dux Grammaticus Tvronem or. A Two-Fold Praxis of the WholeLatine Syntax (1633). In Dux Grammaticus we see carried out the seventeenth- century impulse to regulate. Clarke had read Binsley carefully and acknowledged his influence in the letter ”To the Reader.’ ’ 21 Salmon, Language in 17th-Century England, p. 4. 22 See note 66. page 93 above. 2^ See notes 54, 55, and 57. pages 82-84 above._________ , "130 Furthermore, Clarke recommends the method of double translation which Brinsley had adapted for the public schools.22* After quoting Brinsley on the benefit of translation. Clarke sets out his own enterprise. Clarke’s purpose is to put into one short volume all the rules of syntax and figurative language. He recommends translation as the means of learning these rules. Hence his textbook consists of contrived examples designed to exercise the rule to be learned. The students, by translating these sentences, learn the precept.2^ Brinsley and most other humanist educators drilled the grammatical precepts of Latin by construing and parsing classical texts. The problem with this practice for Clarke was that there was "needless repetition of some few common rules in Grammar." That is. a passage excerpted from Cicero’s letters might demonstrate several instances of adjectival concord and participle formation. But to learn other points on "Of the use and profit of translations, in general, I will refer thee to worthy Master Brinslev»s professed Tractate of that argument, in his Grammar-school, Cha.8 pa. 105. 106. where he reckons up 21 several and singular benefits off such translations; worth the reading and the practicing." "To the Reader," Dux Grammaticus, sig. A2r-v. 2^ "Now if translation in general be so very profitable to young Latinists, where yet there be a thousand tautolo gies, and needless repetition of some few common rules in Grammar (perhaps many Rules of, both use and elegancy, not falling into practice all this while;) What shall I not be bold to hope, and affirm of these two Praxes where (in a short and small room) all the Rules of the whole Svntaxis, and Fieura too, are purposely contrived, practicing every Rule, as well as in other larger books some few rules; and so their whole Syntax be perfectly understood by them." ’ ’To the Reader," Dux Grammaticus, sig. A3r. Hereafter Dux. ~T31 of grammar, the master would have to provide many additional excerpts from classical literature. Hence this type of exercise was redundant because not systematic. No author systematically exemplified one precept in his writing. In addition to this problem, there was some redundancy in the rules themselves, and there were some "rules" of use and elegance which were simply not to be found in many of the grammatical texts of the day. Consequently Clarke proposes his book of contrived examples which systematically demon strates (comprehends) all of the Latin rules of syntax. Thus his book is shorter, yet more comprehensive, than most. It packs all the necessary examples in systematically, without having to read troublesome examples from many authors. The students were to learn and practice the rules by translating the contrived sentences from Latin to English and back to Latin again. This is an application of Ascham’s double translating, but in a form Ascham would probably not recognize, let alone approve. For Ascham, double translation was a means of absorbing the literature while gaining a feel for the Latin phrasing. For Clarke, double translation is a quick way of learning Latin syntactical precepts from contrived sentences by following Brinsley’s rules of construing. It is the form of humanist education with the vitality departed; the corpse, but no soul. And if there is any doubt as to the proper procedure in learning Latin composition, Clarke sets out 132 policy for the new student in his first exercise, which of course the student was to translate into English and back to Latin again. My child, give diligent heed to these instruc tions. Imitation of authors without precepts and rules, is but a long beating about the bush, and loss of time to a young beginner. It is a waste labor, if a Carpenter, without compass, rule, line, and plummet, should attempt to square timber, frame and rear any building. That Teacher setteth the cart before the horse, that preferreth imitation before precepts. Children brought up only by imitation, wander blundering as a blind man, without his staff or guide. Tender wits with such dark ambages are made as dull as a beetle. The labor is as grievous as the burden of Atlas. A Scholar by such trifling hath as much loss in one day as he getteth profit in four days. (Dux 1-2 ) Clarke continues denigrating imitation without precepts, and his comments are worth noting for the implicit analogy they make with to grammar. In Clarke's mind, imitation of authors partook of the same regularity to which syntax had been reduced. Grammar encompassed imitation because imitation was governed by the same or similar rules. Many fresh wits, by that blind imitation be deceived, all labor and cost lost: whereof their teachers, may be both sorrv and ashamed. The common way that our elders did use, is by precepts. . . . Precepts are the chief, and most expedient bringing up of a young grammarian. This busy ambages of imitation is an extreme pain to the teacher, and no small profit or small to the learners. . . . Grammar, which is the well of sciences liberal, is groundedly to be looked upon. (Dux 3-5) For Clarke, grammar is the "well of the liberal sciences," the font, because it delineates the method that all other sciences should follow. They, like Grammar, should be m founded on precepts and rules. This makes learning easier for both master and student. We detect the note of the pedant in Clarke’s complaint that imitation without rules is hard on the teacher. It is too much work to tailor educa tion to students, so a method is needed. It should be noted that Clarke's other school text books. including several books of phrases and proverbs, and a rhetorical formulary, all exhibit the same spirit. The tendency is to turn away from reading the authors and focus on form and method. Clarke is certainly not of the same mind as Colet who admonished that rules and precepts be forsaken and the examples of orators and poets be constantly before the scholars. Nor is Clarke in harmony with Ascham's advice to avoid the precepts of grammar. Instead he seems to exemplify the very thing that Ascham condemns— someone who learns his Latin from Grammar and his Authors from "epitomes and commonplace books." The development of method and the prominence of grammar in the schools is one way in which educators tried to manage an increasing number of students. Schools were being founded with frequency and the tendency therefore was to try various approaches to grammar: to explicate it. write commentaries on it. translate it. simplify it. But all these attempts simply reinforced the study of the rules and precepts of grammar. Hence, most masters were intent on the best way to learn Latin grammar rather than on reading authors and 134 cultivating a refined style. The net effect of seventeenth-century grammar school pedagogy was to turn out increasing numbers of students who had little ability to use Latin. The more students left school without achieving a mastery of Latin» the more the concentration on rules intensified. And the more that complaints were heard, the more schoolmasters tightened their grammatical grip. The issue of the schools and their effectiveness would come to a head among the Puritan reform ers (and such reforms will be the subject of the next chap ter), so it is not surprising that the next defense of Authors does not occur for nearly thirty years. In 1660 Charles Hoole, the next humanist educator to be discussed, had to rediscover the "old art of teaching school." Hoole’s book is a testament to both the radical changes in education during the central decades of the century and to the ineluctable momentum of those reforms. Although Hoole tries to revitalize the study of classical languages and of authors, his attempt represents a significant departure from other attempts to provide a humanistic education in the public schools because he adapts the traditional curriculum to fit the psychology implicit in the empiricism of Puritan pedagogy. Given the importance attributed to grammar by seventeenth-century schoolmasters, it is not surprising that the bulk of Hoole's publications are attempts to improve grammar instruction. He tries, however, to ground language 135 learning in a theory of human nature. Hoole’s grammatical instruction is important and will be discussed at length as it is set forth in A New Discovery of the Old Art of Teaching Schoole (1660). Hoole's treatment of the art of teaching is a composite of four separate treatises. The four treatises cover the petty school and the grammar school. The titles are ”A petty Schoole," ’’The Ushers Duty," "The Masters Method," and "Scholastick Discipline." The Hoole’s work is a valuable glimpse of seventeenth-century education because in it he discusses the common practices to which he proposes re forms. The sections of the book devoted to the grammar school curriculum ("The Ushers Duty" and "The Masters Method") explain in detail the curriculum, texts, and exercises of forms one through six. And at the beginning of the book he lists the textbooks for each form under the headings Classical" and "Subsidiary." This is as comprehensive a list of textbooks and their uses as we have.^^ Hoole also gives us some indication regarding whether or not the texts he recommends are in widespread use. He laments, for example, the disrepute "of that excellent book of Erasmus de copia verborum, which was purposely by him intended, and contrived for the benefit- of Paul * s Schoole, and [he is] sorry to see it so little ^ Watson, The English Grammar Schools, pp. 301-304. 136 made use of in most of the Grammar Sehooles in England."27 And again regarding Aphthonius’ Progvmnasmata he remarks. "I would have them exercised in Aphthonius (if it can be gotten, as I desire it may be reprinted) both in Greek and Latine."2^ But in addition to providing valuable insight and information about the classroom of seventeenth-century England, Hoole attempts to ground his pedagogy on a theoretical basis, and it is this theoretical foundation which is most important to a study of linguistic attitudes in the seventeenth century. My discussion of Hoole will first briefly describe his pedagogy as outlined in the first three books of A New Discovery then explain the theory of learning which underlies it. Hoole knew the works of his forebears well. He refers to the humanist educators Erasmus, Vives, Melancthon, as well as to his own countrymen, Ascham, Mulcaster, and Brinsley. In fact, Hoole saw himself as a successor to Brinsley because he adopts almost in its entirety Brinsley's grammatical approach. Although Hoole’s grammar school appears similar to Brinsley's in form, it differs in function. Whereas Brinsley relied heavily on the precepts of grammar, 27 Charles Hoole, A New Discovery Of the old Art of Teaching Schoole (London, 1660), p. 152. Hereafter New Discovery. P 8 A New Discovery, p. 172. Hoole's observation on Aphthonius corroborates Donald Lemen Clark's study "The Rise and Fall of Progvmnasmata in Sixteenth and Seventeenth Century Grammar Schools," Speech Monographs, 19 (1952), 259-263. Clark observes that by the end of the seventeenth century Aphthonius’ Progvmnasmata was becoming scarce, and after 1695 there were no more editions._________________________ 13/ Hoole relies on the practice of grammatical precepts.^ The first treatise, "The Petty Schoole," is nearly the same as Brinsley’s discussion of what kind of education should precede grammar school. Hoole recommends Brinsley’s methods of teaching English reading, spelling, and penman ship. The only notable differences in Hoole are his recom mendation that part of the English reading curriculum consists of some English authors and that Petty School Students be introduced to Latin. His admonition that some Latin be taught in petty school is an interesting comment on his times. He accuses of being out of touch with the times those who denigrate the study of Latin as being impractical for students intended for trades. For, according to Hoole, any student can profit by Latin since it aids his understanding of English authors and of the conversation of men who "delight to slant" their ^ Watson, The English Grammar Schools, pp. 298-300. on In the Elementarie, Mulcaster advised that students read excerpts from Psalms and translations of other books with a moral message. Hoole is no less sensitive to the need for moral education. He recommends for reading The Practice of Pietv, The Practice of Quietnesse, and The Whole Duty of Man. He also recommends "delightful books of English History; as, The History of Queen Elizabeth: or Poetry, as Herberts Poems, Quarl's Emblems' and by this means [students] will gain such a habit of the delight in reading, as to make it their chief recreation, when liberty is afforded them." A New Discovery, p. 27. This is probably the first recommendation by an English educator that English literary authors be part of the curriculum. See Baldwin* Shakspere’s Small Latine and Lesse Greek, II, 399. 138 O 1 speech in Latin.In the next chapter we shall see some of the Puritan impetus for a "practical” education, which meant no Latin or Greek. Hoole is arguing against the Puritan influence in that no matter how "practical" education may become some knowledge of Latin is still useful for reading English authors and conducting business in a world where some Latin is used as a marker of prestige. That Hoole could argue the utility of Latin for reading English could only mean that English had become very impor tant. Both Brinsley and Hoole caution schoolmasters to take care not to allow their students to learn Latin at the expense of English. But Hoole is especially sensitive to English language education while he discusses the students' long, wearisome years during which they learned the acci dents of Latin grammar. He warns, in the interim of getting the Accidents bv heart (if great care be not taken) they loose that ability of Reading English, which they brought from the PettySchoole; and this makes the Parents cry out against Learning Latin, and complain of their Children's not profiting at the grammar O 1 Jl "It is a fond conceit of many, that have either not attained, or by their own negligence have utterly lost the use of the Latin Tongue, to think it altogether unnecessary for such children to learn it, as are intended for Trades, or to be kept as drudges at home, or employed about husband ry. For there are few children, but (in their playing years, and before they can be capable of any serious employment in the meanest calling that is) may be so far grounded in the Latin, as to find that little smattering they have of it, to be a singular use of them both for the understanding of the English Authors (which abound now a days with borrowed words) and the holding discourse with a sort of men that delight to slant it in Latin." A New Discovery, p p . 23-24. 13S Schools, whence they are therefore sometimes taken and sent back again to a Misstress or Dame to learn English better. (New Discovery 15) The importance of reading English must have been great indeed if Hoole considers it worth cautioning school masters against losing their students to English schools. The fact that Latin was losing prestige is essential to the present study for several reasons. That English displaced Latin is the least significant reason, and enough has been written on this phenomenon.32 But the reasons that Latin was under attack are important for the historian of rhetoric. The study of Latin was associated with traditional education which was seen as increasingly impractical for seventeenth- century society. This reflects a change in society’s attitudes toward the learning of which rhetoric had been a significant part. As grammar became more prominent in the schools and as the students continued to leave school with minimal competence in Latin, the public questioned the efficacy of the schools in general and of Latin in particular. With Latin under attack* the goals of humanist education— a command of classical literature and the cultivation of a fine style, wisdom and eloquence— were simply seen by some as remote and impractical. By others the study of authors and the ability to write on both sides of an issue were more than impractical; these skills were considered a threat to the stability of a troubled Commonwealth. 32 See Jones. The Triumph of the English Language. Latin was also under attack from some who wanted a more universal language. Those of this opinion did not want to replace Latin with a vernacular so much as with an idea] language. Hence* the decline of Latin* against which Brinsley. Webbe* and Hoole were fighting, is the necessary condition for what followed in the remaining decades of the century. But the implications of Hoole’s English Petty School have: taken us far from a discussion of his pedagogical theory to which we must now return. The title to Hoole’s second treatise identifies Hoole's initial concern for grammar school students: "The Usher’s Duty, or a Plat-Form of Teaching Lilv ’s Grammar." We mustj recall that Hoole. as other schoolmasters were, was under obligation to teach Lily’s Grammar. Brinsley had circum vented the usual means of teaching it "without book" by having the students learn the rules in English translation. Hoole proposed another means for learning Lily’s Grammar. Hoole began by having the students read "the introduction of the eight parts of speech" by which he probably meant the introduction to the section on parts of speech in The Acci dents. He then provided examples of all the parts of speech in English. He exercised the students in drills which were designed to help the students arrive at the grammatical precepts inductively. After repeated practice with English examples, the precepts of grammar would be learned almostj unconsciously. There was no need for memorizing precepts 141 when extensive practice would allow the precepts to be absorbed by the students unawares. Hoole’s pedagogy then was built around practice rather than precept, and to justify his method he provided a theoretical backdrop. Hoole made a distinction between the understanding and the memory as faculties of the mind. The understanding is the faculty governed by reason and the memory, fancy, or imagination are governed by sensory impressions. The best way to teach children is to appeal to the faculty which is most developed in children.^3 The faculty most developed in children is the imagination which enables children to play and learn at the same time. This idea is reminiscent of the concept underlying Brinsley's Ludus Literarius, in which Brinsley wanted learning to be a pleasant pastime for students. But now it begins to take shape as a theory with psychological underpinnings. Hoole discusses how something can slip into the understanding unawares and how play is work. "Now forasmuch as the way of working hereby is, when the inward senses of the Child are instructed bv the outward, and the more help one hath of the outward, the surer and firmer the instruction is within (New Hoole quotes Woodward’s Light to Grammar. The purpose of grammar is "To teach a Child to carry a Torch or Lanthorn in his hand, that thereby the understanding may do its office, and put the memory to do hers: to slip into a Child’s understanding before he be aware, so as he shall have done his task, before he shall suspect that any was imposed; he shall do his work playing, and play working; he shall seem idle and think he is in sport, when he is indeed seriously and well employed." A New Dlcoverv, dp. 5-6._______ 142 Discovery 6). The outward senses, especially the eyes, were considered entrances to the inward senses, or the understanding, memory, and imagination. Since the imagination was believed to be the most developed faculty in children, and since the imagination was the faculty that governed play, the children I would learn most readily by playing because the senses provided a direct conduit to the child’s receptive imagination. By playing the child would absorb all that he observed without being aware that he was learning. Thus Hoole recommends Comenius’ Orbis Pictus as "a most rare device for Teaching I of a child at once to know things and words by pictures, *j In the next chapter we will look at Comenius* linguistic theory in depth, but briefly the idea in Orbis was to teach children to learn Latin vocabulary by having them look at a picture. The picture was labeled with Latin terms and had accompanying vernacular and Latin dialogues about the scene • 3 |l in the picture. Brinsley had advocated learning Latin via English translations, but there was no substantial theory behind it. In Hoole's pedagogy, however, we find a psychology of language learning that is amplified throughout the book. In accordance with his psychology of learning. Hoole formulates three principles for grammar school teachers to remember. 3 Hoole was the translater of the English edition of Comenius* Orbis Sensualium Pictus (London. 1659). 143 1• There is a great difference betwixt a man that teaeheth> and a Child that is to be taught ....that the more condescension is made to a Child’s capacity, bv proceeding orderly form what he knoweth already, to what doth naturally and necessarily follow thereupon, the more easily he will learn. (New Discovery 8-9) This is the principle that underlies Hoole’s whole approach. It is inductive in that it leads the child from lower to higher levels of abstraction, but more importantly it gives a basis for starting with the mother tongue and proceeding to Latin. This pedagogical principle explains why students must prepare for grammar school by attending a petty school where English reading, spelling, and penmanship are taught. These same skills are necessary for grammar school, but must be mastered in terms of the vernacular, which the child already knows. The same approach is used in learning Latin vocabulary and studying Latin authors. First the student learns the name of something in Latin because he associates the Latin name with an image of the thing already known from his experience and which he can name in his native tongue. Next the student learns to appreciate the classical authors first in translation then in Latin. Herein is a theoretical justification for double translation. Rather than merely an exercise which produces a facility for writing Latin that approximates the original author’s, in Hoole's opinion, double translation now will enable the student to learn quicker, retain longer, understand better, all because it involves his mother tongue. 144 The master therefore, must not impede the scholar by presenting him with a task for which he is not prepared. He should only allow his students to do things for which they already have an understanding. Hoole is repeating the humanist precept of learning. Erasmus had said the same thing of children reading classical Latin. They must under stand, not merely memorize. But Erasmus meant something different from Hoole. Erasmus meant that the scholars should have the sense of the passage explained before they know the grammar, rhetoric, and moral import of it. Hoole means that the students have to relate what they are learning to what they already know from their own experience. The boys can learn the Latin terms for plants because they have seen these plants and can identify them by name in their own tongue first. Understanding now means having had sensory experience of objects from the real world. The second principle builds on the first. 2. There is a great disproportion betwixt a Child's capacity and the accidents it self. Children are lead mostly by sense, and the Gram- mar-rules, consisting in general-Doctrines are too subtle for them; Children's wits are weak, active, and lively, whereas Grammar notions are abstractive, dull, and lifeless; boys find no sap, nor sweetness in them, because they know not what they mean; and tell them the meaning of the same rule never so often over, their memories are so waterish, that the impression (if any were made in the brain) is quickly gone out again. Roat runneth on a pace and mindeth nothing so much as play; and....[a child] will profit more by continual practice and being kept (as he loves to be) doing, than by knowing why, and being called upon to consider the causes wherefore he doth this or that. (New Discovery 1 0 - 1 1 )__________ _____________ , _ Hoole here refers to the practice of teaching students Latin by having them memorize Lily’s rules of Latin gram mar. This is the phenomenon that Brinsley* Webbe, and Hoole were all reacting to. Because Hoole and others believed in a faculty psychology in which children’s wits were too weak for the abstract principles of grammar and their memories were too ’’waterish” to retain rules for very long* the only way to make children learn was to engage them in exercises that resembled play. It is hard to see how Hoole’s tortur ous series of exercises made the work play, but he tries to apply his first pedagogical principle to his second. The students acquire an understanding of the parts of speech and rules of grammar by ’'playful” exercises in English. The students come to understand grammar by much practice rather than by explanation. Whereas Brinsley sought to teach Lily in translation only, Hoole added the concept of practice. His students therefore practiced everything until they came to know it without book.^-5 The third principle is an attempt to disarm critics of grammar. 3. It is one thine to learn the Latin Tongue, or anv other Language, and another to learn the Grammar, as a guide to it or a means to attain the reason of it. (New Discovery 12) "I think it not amiss therefore to show, how it [Grammar] may be all gotten understandingly by heart, and settled in the memory by continual practice, which is the life of all learning." A New Discovery, p. 56. 146 Hoole distinguishes between learning a language and learning the principles of a language. It is one things to learn a language by imitation as all children do and quite another to learn the principles and reasons behind a language. One way is natural; the other artificial.3^ Since there was not a natural environment for learning classical Latin, if Latin was to be learned it had to be learned by grammar. Hoole*s point is simply that it is not grammar that needs to be eradicated, but the way grammar was being taught. A student learns Latin not by imitation as he did his native tongue, but by thoroughly practicing grammat ical principles. In a sense, Hoole denies the efficacy of humanist imitation pedagogy. Since there are no native speakers of Latin, it is impossible for children to learn Latin by imitating Authors. This does not mean that Latin authors were not worth reading. It simply means that imitating then was not the way to learn a language.3^ O f . **And the reason hereof is, because the first [native language] is a work of the imagination and memory, which are apt to take and keep impressions, having the senses to help them, but the other [grammatical education] belongs to the understanding, which for want of the strength of reason to assist it, is hard to be wrought upon in a child, and till the memory and understanding go hand in hand, a child learns nothing to any purpose. "The Usher’s Duty," A New Discovery, p. 12. 3^ "And now if one should ask me before I conclude this book, [Usher’s Duty] and begin with the next, whether it be not possible for men or children to learn Latin, as well as English without Grammar-Rules. I answer. First, that it is hardly possible, because the Latin tongue is not so famil 147 The rest of Hoole1s curriculum resembles Brinsley's and other humanist educators' though without the same emphasis. The same authors are read* copy books are advised* and exercises in writing epistles, themes, orations, and verse are mentioned but are treated in a perfunctory manner. Hoole states in "Scholastic Discipline" that his primary purpose is to teach "grammar, Authors, and exercises" (New Discovery 306). Note, however, the conspicuous absence of style and eloquence. Rhetorical exercises are discussed in A New Discovery, but they occupy a very minor part of the book. Students were not to be exercised in rhetoric until the fourth form for a half-year on Mondays, Tuesdays, and Wednesdays in the morning (New Discovery 132-34). And double translation exercises were also withheld until the fourth form when the students had received enough background in grammar. Translation and imitation exercises were then practiced on Tuesdays and Thursdays in the afternoon (New Discovery 144-46). In the fifth and sixth forms, the students were also exercised in writing themes, letters, verse, and iarly spoken, as English; which is gotten only by hearing and imitation. 2. That is not the better way, partly because they that are well acquainted with Grammar, know when they or others speak well, and when they speak ill; whereas they that are ignorant of the Rules, take any Latin for good, be it never so barbarous or full of Solecisms, and partly, because they that are skillful in Grammar, are able to do something in reading Authors, or translating, or writing Epistles, or the like, by themselves; whereas they that learn Latin without any Rule, are able to do nothing surely if there Teacher be away." "The Usher's Duty," A New Discovery, p. 123. . _ _ r 4 8 . speeches, but it was only two days a week for a half day. These aspects of humanist education, the rhetorical under pinnings of eloquence, take a subordinate place to learning grammar. Hoole is significant in the history of education because he represents one of the last of a long line of seventeenth- century educators professing humanist goals. Hoole added practice to the pedagogy of grammar. And his pedagogy ofj practice caused him to provide a theoretical foundation for his methods in order to answer the critics of teaching grammar. Children learn by practice and use. facilitated by the imagination and memory. Precepts, which are abstract, appeal only to the reason and are therefore not conducive to learning. Children learn by associating new information to old sensory experiences stored in the memory. Hence the grammatical curriculum and the exercises must be ordered incrementally, pushing rhetorical exercises into a more remote position in the latter forms. Hoole is an interesting culmination of our discussion of humanist educators who sought to comply with the mandate to use Lily's Grammar. Hoole differs from Brinsley and Clarke in the emphasis on practice. He differs from both in that he attempts to found his pedagogy on a theory of learning. And it is this theory of learning which is most significant. Children learn best form what they already know from their own experience. This doctrine of experience was to become 149 the dominant theory of science and philosophy* but it certainly had an early foothold in education. Despite Hoole’s use of exercises rather than precepts to teach grammar* his pedagogy further enhanced the place in the curriculum that Brinsley had given to grammar. For in basing his method of grammar instruction on a theory of learning and human psychology, Hoole justified Brinsley’s assertion that grammar set out the natural order of speech because, if languages are learned best by appealing to human nature, and if human nature could discover the principles of language inductively through practice in the nature tongue, then the same principles could be applied' to other lan guages. Firmly based in an empirical theory that had pro ponents from education, philosophy, and science, grammar was more intractable than ever. Its methods and practices might be disputed, rules and precepts might have to concede to exper-j ience, but grammar had been established as the first of the Artes sermocinales in the school curriculum. And as the attention to the best methods for teaching Latin intensified, the goals of humanism were subordinated. Authors were still taught, but the emphasis was on learning Latin, not on reading the authors so as to command their wisdom and their eloquence. 15C II. Although the situation in the schools was a topic of great concern, the educators discussed above proposed reforms and modifications that maintained a prominent place in the curriculum for Lily's Grammar. Some, however, opposed grammatical instruction altogether. Joseph Webbe was an early opponent to the trend which aggrandized the place of grammar in the curriculum. Webbe vociferously denounced the stature grammar had achieved at the expense of Authors and eloquence and proposed his own method of teaching Authors and eloquence. But Webbe’s method of teaching Latin was very different and brought him censure from some.^ Neverthe less, he boldly published two appeals to reform the grammar school curriculum: An Appeale to Truth, In the Controversie between Art, and Use; About the best and most expedient Course in Languages (1622) and A Petition to the High Court of Parliament, in behalfe of auncient and authentiaue Authors, For the Universal and perpetual good of every man and his posterity (1623). He also published several textbooks in which he expounds his own methods of teaching Latin. My discussion of Webbe is divided between his reaction to grammar as the core of the curriculum and his alternative to grammatical instruction. Brinsley’s book Ludus Literarius appeared in 1612 and argued his position from the assumption that "Arts are the only helps toward human perfection. Those therefore which ______38 Salm_on, Language in 17th-Century England, dp. 3-14. 151 are the helps toward the easiness, maturitie, perfection of Arts, deserve best of mankind. . . .As Arts are to perfec tion of knowledge; so is Grammar to all Arts."-^ As we have seen. Brinsley's reform consisted of a re-emphasis of grammar with a new definition implied. Joseph Webbe. however, usee other grounds for his attempted reform of the grammar schools. His Appeale to Truth was published in 1622. one decade after' Brinsley, but in it he attacked the very notion of an art. favoring instead the notion of practice or. in his words, or "use." There is no indication, however, that Webbe was attacking Brinsley himself, but rather that the grammar^ school curriculum was perceived by many to be in need of reform. Brinsley tried to reform from within, by redefining the art of grammar. Webbe's reform came from without) I undercutting the notion of an art and using authority to strengthen the notion of use. Both agreed on the importance of authors in the curriculum and on the imitation of theiij style. They disagreed, however, on the importance of grammar to achieve these ends. i n AiLJLag.ea3l.ft-Ji.fi.. T Art.. and Use. Webbe attacks the "Opinion taken on trustj rather than grounded on due examination" that the art of grammar is of any use to scholars learning Latin, or any I other language. Webbe begins by giving a brief history of grammar in which he tries to show how grammar, originally a »A~Commendator-v—P-reface, I'- Ludus-Li terarius. ------ 152 simple art. had grown into a usurping and arrogant art. Thou knowest (0 Truth) that Grammar (an Art whereby( Languages are now commonly held to be sufficiently taught in every Nation) was not in use amongst the ancient Romans; much less in any reputation. And wherj it had accesse unto their children, it was at the first full of humility; and took upon it no more than the name Sr.ap.a.Ufil (translated LitQr.at.wra or literatoria) ! could well warrant: which was (not to teach the lan-j guages; for that was tiheir own already, but) to teach the letters, syllables and words (thereof) and how to pronounce, write, and place them rightly (not according to any man's new found precepts, but) after ancient received custom. . . .Primers, horne books, and the like, may be truly said to teach the Grammar: for these were the uttermost limits of the first Grammarians. c The vituperative tone of this statement contrasts sharpljj with Brinsley's "As Arts are to perfection of knowledge; so is Grammar to all Arts." Brinsley praises grammar as the perfection of all the arts, but Webbe accuses grammar of "usurpting] the function and the right of others." Webbe's first argument against grammar is taken from the grammarians themselves. He enumerates dozens of gram marians. stating rather than illustrating that they all disagree on a number of grammatical points. These grammar ians claim that other grammarians have corrupted authors by their meddling; they have aggrandized themselves "with the spoils of Lexicons and other arts; and adorned their plumes I with filched feathers:" they have broken the backs of young scholars "with the burden of unnecessary precepts." and they have upheld each others errors (Appeale 9). On this last Joseph Webbe, An Appeale to Truth (London, 1622), pp. 1-2. Hereafter Appeale. 153 point Webbe cites Cominius whom he uses throughout his treatise implying that this criticism of perpetuating errors applies to Lily as well as other grammarians.^ He contin ues to inveigh against grammar, citing Cominius and using ancient authorities such as Cicero. His conclusion is "that in following Grammar, we abandon elegancy, and the pleasure of the ears; and speak with Grammar-latin , English-latin, Dutch-latin, French-latin: and, in a word, every nation, by this Art, writes its own peculiar latin; and not the latin of the Latins, nor any other language as it should be" (Appeale 14). He continues by claiming that grammar has hindered the study of Poets by making them more obscure such that those who want to read them become discouraged and withdraw leaving only those who must learn Latin for "gain and commodity" by means of grammar. He claims that the study and appreciation of authors and eloquence is diminished by grammar. Furthermore, Webbe argues that it would be better and easier to follow the example of Cicero, Livy, Salust, Virgil, Ovid, Plautus, and Terence than to compare 4 1 ' "And therefore, saith Cominius, (though somewhat roughly) [the grammarians] have hitherto deceived us, and are themselves full oft deceived. Neither doth he exclude our new writers from the censure: for he holds that they have nothing, but what they have taken from others. And he wrote since Lilv * s Grammar was composed." Appeale, p. 11. Cominius was a humanist in the sixteenth century of Erasmus1 circle and is not to be confused with Johann Amos Comenius, the protestant reformer of the seventeenth century. See Salmon, "Joseph Webbe: Some Seventeenth-Century views on Language-Teaching and the Nature of Meaning," in Language in 17th-Century England, pp. 16, 31. 154 grammatical commentaries. A student who follows the precepts of grammar will be unable to judge which commentaries are useful and will thus fail to discern the merit of Priseian because condemned by Valla, and Valla because accused by Perettus. until "(to be short) by further inquisition he will neglect our common Grammar, as taxed by him that hat! collected centum errores Lily: And as well it as all other Grammar now is use: as branded by Julius Caesar Scaliger, in above seven hundred and fifty noted errors" (Appeale 17). It is clear that besides .inveighing against grammar and grammarians. Webbe repeatedly placed Lily’s Grammar in this tradition of perpetuated errors. Webbe next attacks grammar by citing other ancient authorities who were not grammarians. His point is simply that the greatest men from the past do not credit grammar for their greatness, neither do they recommend it. The ancients did not learn their language from art. but the art followed after long use and custom. His conclusion: Thus it appears, saith Cominius» that this Grammar, which gives rules and law of speaking; that now every where is taught, is a deceitful, vain and unprofitable art; drawing men on. only by likelihood. . . .Where-j fore, saith he. I cannot but grieve and lament, that in so cloudy and so false an Art. so many men. and of so exquisite an understanding, should thus long be deceived and stupified. And that which makes me grieve the more, is that by it all ancient elegancy, the Art of Oratory. Rhetoric, and many other Arts and knowledges,' have perished, been stifled, and abandoned. (Appeale 25) Here we see Webbe’s main complaint. Grammar has usurped the place of Rhetoric; eloquence is lost to correctness and 155 rules. In order to remedy the ravages of grammar. Webbe contends that all that is needed is the study of authors. Since all language and eloquence originate from use. and since there are no longer speakers of the ancient languages, the best way to learn the languages and imitate classical style is to study how the authors wrote. Speaking of the benefits of learning languages by use and custom. Webbe writes, quoting Cominius: For. saith Cominius, if we exercise our selves in Use and Custom, we shall sooner, easier, and more S A/I 1 1 VIA 1 I T n V m M VI ^ /\ U A A 1 A / T A W A W A ^ ^ I n A 1 Q (• 1 n 1 n w I securely attain unto the elegancy of the latin lan 38) Specifically the three benefits to be had of Use and Custom are a truer knowledge of declining and conjugating words without labor, a "taste of the manner of speaking used by the Ancients, together with the elegancy, grace, pleasure, and delightfulness of the Latin," and "the judgment of the ear. and retain the same: which, Grammar cannot help us to; in that it is imperfect, and beguileth us" (Appeale 38). Webbe is trying to rid education of learning rules and reinfuse it with the capacity to use language and judge its appropriateness. Concerning the development of a fine style, Webbe claims that if it be well examined, we shall find few scholars arrived to a laudable style of writing, but have forgot the most part of their Grammar precepts. And indeed,} the sooner they leave them, and fall to reading, and after it to writing; the sooner do they come to their perf ecti on.—(Appeal e-~39)------------------------ _ ---1 156 In all of these claims. Webbe is arguing against the thingj for which Brinsley and other schoolmasters stood. The pedagogy of Brinsley and others hinged on grammar; students must before all else learn the rules of grammar. However. Brinsley also prescribed rules for imitating a classical style, and this is the point where Webbe and Brinsley most disagree. Even though Brinsley advocates the study of authors as a goal of his school, he cannot be entirely free from the accusations that Webbe makes regarding the dimin ished study of authors. But there are four special reasons, alledged by my author [Cominius]; why few, or none perceive the custom of the Ancients. First, they put whatso ever they would speak, word for word, into another language, in the same order wherein they speak it in their won. Secondly, though such as. follow Grammar, and are a middle sort of Scholars, do not always translate verbally; yet they speak not by the order and custom of the Ancients; but, place their words after a grammatical order, and construc tion; rather obeying the rules, and precepts of Grammarians, than the custom of the Ancients, and the judgment of hearing which is contrary to the precepts of Cicero. Thirdly: though the learned sort, and such as would be called Poets and Orators, translate not always word for word, nor do every where observe a grammatical construction: yet they come not near the Latin elegancy; as having been brought up from their, childhood by the Art of Grammar and Ana logy. They take a pride to frame new words,, without regard unto the judgment of the ear. . .•■ . Fourthly: the greater.part of men, and especially of the learneder sort, are ashamed forsooth, to speak in the same words, and in the same order placed, that the Ancients s_pake them; lest it might be cast in their teeth, that they know not how to speak of themselves, without using the sayes, and words of others. (Appeale 34-35) Brinsley does recommend construing or word for word trans-j .157 lating; his grammatical method of translation does resemble English word order; and his grammatical translations are bound by rules and precepts* but Brinsley is nowhere mentioned by Webbe. Yet it is as if Webbe has Brinsley specifically in mind. But since the tract seems to be a paraphrase of Cominius, who lived one hundred years earlier, it is very likely that the problems of the seventeenth century hac occurred before. In the seventeenth century, however, the problem seems to have been exacerbated by the need for method in the public schools. Thus Webbe was attacking the current practices of the schools, which he does refer to several times; hence indirectly he attacks Brinsley. Webbe's is a more radical reform than Brinsley's. Brinsley's aim is pedagogical; whereas Webbe's is cultural.1 Brinsley, faced with a class full of scholars and the obligation to teach Lily's rules, tried to go about teaching as best he could while implementing a method of translation into the curriculum for the study of authors. The vehemence of Webbe's attack implies that the study of authors and the ideal of eloquence, implicitly challenged by Brinsley's pedagogy, had been denigrated even more by 1622. Webbe is trying to restore authors and eloquence by attacking what he j feels is responsible for the problems in the first place: the art of grammar as taught in the schools. He recommends use and custom, but in An.Appeal to Truth no real pedagogij cal intent is manifest. Webbe did have specific intentions 15S to reform the curriculum, but to implement them he would have to petition Parliament. In 1623, Webbe did in fact petition Parliament for a patent on his method of teaching Latin without rules. His A Petition To The High Court of Parliament, In the behalfe of Auncient and authentiaue Authors (1623) is somewhat more conciliatory in tone. He states his petition in two parts. First he denies that grammar should be eliminated since it has such a long tradition. He merely asserts that grammar cannot teach elegant Latin.^ Second, he explains that for eighteen years he has worked on a method of teaching, but that he fears ruin unless he be granted a patent from Parliament and a license to teach according to his method for 21 years.^ Webbe does not detail what the "manifest ^ "Wherefore mv petition is to the High Court of Parliament, (not that Grammar should be questioned, in that it is our old acquaintance, and hath a long time been a ledger here amongst us, on the behalfe of these Authors; but, considering it is not able to give us Author's Latin) that these Authors whom we seem to have so much respected in our Schooles and Universities, coming themselves as it were in person, and offering to dwell amongst us, may to their deserved honor and our desired benefit, bv now received, priviledged and admitted to tell their own Latin." A Petition to the High Court of Parliament, In behalf of auncient an authentiaue Authors, For the universal and perpetual good of every man and his posterity (1623), p. 2. Hereafter Petition. «[i] cannot as yet find any way to compass it, without manifest danger of ruining myself and mine assis tants, unlesse by favor of this high and honorable Court: I_ may be allowed father of mine own children, and author of mine own words and invention: that is, that no man else may print them or import them nor any man teach Languages by that method that I propose, but such as I thinke fitting; and that these priviledges may continue for the space of 21 159 danger” of ruining himself was. It may have been that by opening schools which did not use Lily’s Grammar, he woulc be liable for prosecution. Or perhaps he was worried that, given the attitude shared by many that some reform in language teaching was needed, inept pedants would rush to use thl method and ruin it by their incompetence, or that enterprising and underpaid schoolmasters would reap the financial benefit! of copying his method for other authors and other languages. The wording of the petition suggests the latter. Nevertheless, the patent was granted, and Webbe did open the schools ir which he taught Latin according to his method. The schools lasted a few years, but were not successful, as Webbe admits, largely because the school masters, pressured, by financial con straints. did not follow the method diligently What is unusual about the petition is that it advances a method of reading authors which he intends to replace grammar. Webbe’s ’’grammar" is taken from Cicero, who, hj says, "was the first that taught me to divide the man, or body of speech into the parts thereof and knittings" (Petitior years after the publication of every book of this nature that shall be published whether the term of years before specified; with prohibition that no man shall hereafter, during that time, attempt the same way in any other Author Language, without my special allowance." A Petition, p. 2. ^ "To the Indifferent and Equal Reader," The First Comedy of Pub. Terentius, Called Andria, Or, The Woman of Andros (London, 1629). :'- •160 4). He is not referring to the eight parts of speech taught by grammar, but to "Cicer-o»s Grammar,11 which has only one part of speech, that is "clauses, which are undeclined" (Petition 4). Webbe argues that traditional grammar with its eight parts of speech, four of which are declined, would take much more labor and effort in learning than Cicero’s grammar with only one part, the clause. Webbe reasons that the clause should be the basis of translation rather than the word because all languages are different in the words they have to signify things. If we could express the things themselves, there would be no problem. But since we must use letters, syllables, and words, each step "removed rather down a crooked path in a different tongue, no two languages in the world do perpetu ally and infallibly meet in words: wherefore we must go a step further, till we come at our fo.undation,- which, is laid in sense or .meaning; which consisteth not always of simple words but now of simple now composed" (Re&itton 7). Since language does not provide names which directly correspond to things, he proposes that meaning be the foundation of language study. Meaning, he says, is predicated. Thus for Webbe the basic unit of meaning is the clause. Webbe says that Cicero taught him how to reduce sentences to clauses, but just how to define a clause consistently and reliably was a problem 161 for Webbe’s method. J Nevertheless* Webbe claims that his clausulary method of translation will enable students to learn better Latin (that is* Author-latin as opposed to Grammar-latin)» and it will also ’’give any man a real power of writing rightly the first day he sets upon it11 (Petition 9-10). Webbe insists upon language learning from use and custom rather than by precept and rule. He makes the basic unit of meaning the clause rather than the word. Webbe claimed that a student could learn a clause with the same facility that he could learn a word. In the preface to The First Comedy of Pub Terence, called Andri.a, he remarks I would have a Scholar so familiar through all the Authors, that as he is able to tell you out of every Grammar of Dictionary, that manus is a hand, and a hand is manus: so out of Terence* The poet conceived, is, ? ancl .Efl& fc j s l j e E.£dA.k.i» is, The Poet conceived*.or the same sense with any other words expressed. 6 Webbe took the humanist practice of copying phrases fron authors as models of wisdom and elegance and made it a method of learning Latin. Traditionally the students' rhetorical training began after the students had been groundec in grammar. Consequently the practice of copying phrases in a copy book was introduced after the students had some competence in the language. But Webbe began with clauses. Salmon, ’’Problems of Language-Teaching," in Language in 17th-century England, pp. 4-14. ! ^ "To the Indifferent and Equal Reader," Andria. 162 His students were to learn clauses not only as models of eloquent expression, but also as vocabulary items for their mental lexicons as they learned the language. The following example is the first of his exercises in Lessons__and Exe,rcisfes Out.of Cicero (1627). Touching our a. 1 1. 1. Rs.tjJy._sjo.is sute, qg.str.ag» whereof I know a. 1 1. 2. auam tibi. amnmae you very careful; q ur.as. gg.ag.as.igA this is the state, a. 1 1. 3 h u iy g .jg .g d i.mtisLjaai » so farre as hitherto a. 1 1. 4 auodadhue may be coniectured. a. 1 1. 5 c on i e c t u r a.„„D_ myJLderi p.o.g.aii. Publius Gal ha one- a. 1 1. 6 prensA.%...m&§ P. Ga 1 ba, ly solliciteth, without colour or a. 1 1. 7 sine fuco ac deceit, fai2gL9.iJ.gA after the custome a. 1 1. 8 more maxorum of our Ancestors. He is denied. a. 1 1. 9 N e g a iu r ^ As ’ tis thought, a. 1 1.10 U t coin o _es.t.._h.omiiiumj. this his over-hasty a. 1 1.11 npn..g2igqg., „ rat negotiating was no nostrae fuiTillius hindrance to our ha ec Dr a eDroDexa proceeding; pre.p.s.at,i£U for a. 1 1. 12 nam they commonly a. 1 1.13 illi .ita ..p.e£a.nt ,.v.ulgQ. so refuse [him] that they tell [him] a. 1 1.14 ut mi hi ae _de,b exe they are ingaged to me. ' Webbe claims that his clausulary method enabled students to become proficient in Latin composition much faster than by traditional methods. In the exercise portion of the book, Webbe explains that he has two types of exercises. The first is administered to the boys immediately upor 47 Webbe, kg_S.£-QJtLg- E, . X. e. J C g.iJ Sg . g. . . . 3. W. k. .Stf CXfig. E -Q -.As ^Atticum (London, 1627), p. 1. 163 matriculation "to try their present abilities." This implies prior experience in learning latin. The second exercise is composition. administered some time after matriculation. The intent is to demonstrate how advanced his pupils are. Webbe gives examples of this exercise* and beside each example are the student’s initials* the date, and how long he had studied Latin. The effect is to say that G.B. having studied Latin for only 4 years* after one month with Webbe’s method writes Latin comparably to a student who has been in a regular grammar school seven or eight years. To deal with the intricacies of Latin syntax in English translation, Webbe developed a unique way of diagramming his clausulary translation. In Pueriles Conf abulatin.sjil.ag C1620) Webbe illustrates his clausulary method by developing a two dimensional grid read left to right from top to bottom. I pray you hunc 1 seeke to mend this man quaeso ne ■ propter tmprobi- tatera lest I begin to hate him odisse Inci- piam for his naugh- tinesso \ eraen dare stude l i I ------------- 48. Webbe’s ingenuity notwithstanding, his schools and his method of teaching Latin did not catch on, although there 48 Webbe. Pueriles Confab.ulatiiLC.ula..e., or Children.,’ .s Talk (London, 1627). *3v, taken from Salmon, t*3ILgJiag£_Jj2 17th-Century En^Land. p. 26.__________ j 164 were several who praised his efforts. Perhaps Webbe’s lack of success was due to his patented method which prevented its wide dissemination, or perhaps it was the method itself which was unfeasible. R. F. Jones has attributed another cause to Webbe’s obscurity— the protestant reformer Comenius from Czechoslovakia.Comenius' influence in England was great, and he plays an important role in the turn away from the study of authors in the grammar school curriculum, the quest for a universal language, and the formation of the Royal Society. His work will occupy most of the next chapter p I of the present study, but I mention him now as one explanation of how his success contributed to Webbe’s obscurity. But before discussing other linguistic trends in the seventeenth century. I want to summarize Webbe's contribution to a study of seventeenth century attitudes towards language. For some scholars Webbe is an eccentric. His methods are unorthodox; his writing is outspoken. But there is in Webbe's ideas a strong sensiblity which makes him attrac-j tive. His vehement attack on grammar is based in wide reading of authors, classical and contemporary, who had much to say about language learning and language use. A thor- oughly humanistic educator, it is not surprising that he refers constantly to Cicero, Quintilian. Erasmus. Vivesi and. his favorite. Cominius. It is also not coincidental 49 T:b.g...Xr.i.umjih...9.f the English kansaage* p. 278. 16E that he was Catholic.-*® As we shall see, the line drawn between the conservators of the past and the harbingers of the future was frequently drawn on religious grounds. Nevertheless, his pedagogy based on use and custom is another indication that the grammar school curriculum had become inefficient and sluggish. Webbe, like Brinsley and others, was trying to reinstill the humanist values of a literary education into the curriculum. Language learning and use was at the heart of that curriculum. Grammar schools had lost sight of the humanist goals and had become, in Brinsley’s words, carnificina literarium, a literary slaughterhouse, a place where students underwent the most painful and stultifying education; a place where the ideals of humanism were tor- turously taught. Webbe correctly blamed grammar in the sense of learning the precepts and rules imposed on language. Memorization of Lily had become more important than immersion in Cicero; recitation of rules during a parsing exercise became more important than fluid and elegant composition. But most significant of all, Webbe’s attempt to revitalize the study of authors and his attempt to replace the art of grammar with his own clausulary art demonstrates how much grammar had arrogated the metalinguistic discipline in education. Eloquence as a cultural ideal had been lost in the pedagogical shuffle, and all that remained were rules and precepts. Certainly other factors diminished ______-*® Salmon, Language in 17th-Century England, p. 16. 1661 the aims of humanism, but none was as pernicious as the inept pedagogical devotion to grammar in the schools. Webbe died before he had finished his work. He had promised to publish books to aid students in the imitation of classical authors. He never published them. But his work is an interesting and revealing example of the declin-j ing interest in humanist education and of one man's attempts to renew the ideals of humanism. And, though the ideals of humane education did not die with Webbe, they were altered by the pressures of the times and by the protestant educa tional reforms which Comenius brought with him to England ir the mid-seventeenth century. But to explain the decline of humanism in English schools and with it the metalinguistic function of rhetoric solely in terms of a foreign invasion from Czechoslovakia as Jones and Salmon imply, is inaccu rate. Comenius1 influence was great, but it was great because there was already extant in England the tendency to methodize and regularize pedagogy. This tendency was a continuation of the "ambitious" role of grammar promulgatec by Brinsley's followers. The teaching of Latin, as we have seen, is synecdochal- ly connected to the traditional methods of education. To change drastically how Latin was taught was to change the conception of education. And to change how Latin was taught was also to revolutionize attitudes toward language and its 167 use* In effect, the story of Brinsley, Clarke, Hoole, and Webbe is the story of a tradition that was trying to cling to its goals and adapt to changing circumstances. The profusion of grammar schools and the necessity of using Lily in them had resulted in the practice of learning Lily without book, a remarkably inefficient means of learning latin. - The consequence was a predictable deficiency in Latin among school boys. Reacting to this situation, many educators proposed reforms. Webbe repugned grammar, but his methoc was too radical and too problematic to catch on, though his was the most humanistic. Brinsley and Clarke reformed their pedagogies by making the rules and precepts of grammar the basis for all other instruction, and Hoole gave grammar a psychological foundation. The net effect of these reforms, however, was to aggrandize grammar at the expense of rhetoric. It was not a complete displacement of rhetoric, merely a shift in emphasis. But the metalinguistic function of rhetoric in the schools had been compromised and grammar hac won out. Scholars went to grammar school to learn Latin as an entrance into polite society or as training for trade and commodity rather than as preparation to be wise and eloquent statesmen. To meet the need for better latin instruction] educators scrambled to develop the fastest and best methoc to teach Latin rather than seeking to imbue their students with a language competence to be put to social use. And while the reaction of English educators was conservative in 168 its devotion to grammar, foreigners, not under the same constraint to use Lily, were more likely to develop entirely different methods of grammar instruction. Johann Amos Comenius was one such foreign reformer who had a remarkable impact all over Europe, but especially in England. Hoole recognizes both the English tradition as well as Comenius' impact when he writes Mr. Brinslev seemeth to have made a discovery of a more perfect method, than was in his time used, or is yet generally received. > Mr.t—ilflhD Clerke and some others, have facilitated the way further; but Mr. John Comenius hath lately contrived a shorter course of teaching which many of late endeavor to follow, and others have more contem platively written what they have thought of learning the Latin tongue in the easiest manner. (New Discovery 305) It is now time to turn our attention to Comenius' linguistic reforms and their reception in England. The Rise or Educational Empiricism ' —lgc Chapter Four If Lily’s Grammar was the only sanctioned grammar text for English schools, it was by no means the only Latin grammar available. There were dozens of Latin grammar texts available and in use. On the Continent, where Lily’s Grammar was not well known, there were many Latin grammars in use in the schools. But despite the variety of textbooks, the Continental schools too had problems. Humanist imitation pedagogy had also degenerated in European schools. School boys there were also expected to learn Latin by reading over a Latin text without understanding it, and they also had to learn the grammar without book after hearing the schoolmaster pronounce the lesson in Latin.^ For dull-witted boys there was severe punishment. The effect of this pedagogy was to make Continental schools nearly as unpleasant and ineffec tive as English schools. Johann Amos Comenius, a protestant of the Moravian brethren, evidently attended such a school. He reported that he ’ ’was but one of the thousands whose p youth was wasted in these 'slaughterhouses’ of the young.1’ In reviewing his childhood, Comenius often wished that his youth had been spent more profitably.^ 1 Walter J. Ong, ’’Ramistic Classroom Procedure and the Nature of Reality," in Rhetoric, Romance, and Technology. (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1971), p. 155. p M. W. Keatinge, trans., The great Didactic: Now for the First Time Englished (London: Adam and Charles Black, 1896), p. 2. ______^ Keatinee, The Great Didactic, pp. 2-3.__________________ 170 However* as a result of his experience* Comenius authored several textbooks to reform grammar schools and* as a result* became one of the most well-known* well-respected* and most sought after educational reformers in Europe. His textbooks were very popular all over Europe. Janua Lineuarum (1628), his first Latin textbook* was translated from Comenius’ native Czech into nearly all the European vernaculars as well as into some exotic languages: Greek, Bohemian* Polish, German* English, Swedish* Belgian* French, Spanish, Italian, and Hungarian; Arabic, Turkish. Persian, and Mongolian.2* Had Comenius published no other book* his fame and reputation would have been secure.-* Comenius traveled to England* Sweden, and Hungary by invitation to lend his expertise to educational reforms being considered in each of these countries. In 1641, after his productive early years in Poland, Comenius went to England in order to aid the Puritan effort to reform the schools. Although his stay in England was short and his immediate impact minimal, with time Comenius’ reforms became very influential. Comenius' three textbooks, Janua Lin- guarum, Vestibulum, and Orbis Pictus, and several tracts on education were translated* interpreted, and appended by various English editors. The first English/Latin edition of Janua was translated and published almost immediately in The Great Didactic, p. 23. ______5 Keatinge* The Great Didactic* p. 24.____________________ 171 1631 by John Anchorum. All told there were twenty-two printings of Janua between 1631 and 1685 in England alone. Comenius’ texts and method became widely used in the schools and thereby helped to shape seventeenth-century attitudes about language. In this chapter I examine the reception of Comenius’ reforms in England in order to trace the influence of Comenius’ pedagogy as it was received and interpreted by Englishmen and especially to trace the assumptions anc dissemination of assumptions made about language. This chapter is organized in three sections. In order to provide background for my discussion of the impact of Comenius’ reforms in England* I will first describe the intent* method and scope of his Latin pedagogy. Since Comenius' language reforms were only one part of his larger1 educational and religious reforms* I will next describe how his religious beliefs shaped his educational program and his attitudes about language. Finally. I will discuss how Comenius' pedagogy was advanced* interpreted, modified, and amplified by his English editors and followers. This discussion will include two of his tracts published in 1641 by Samuel Hartlib as & Reformation q£ Schooles and remarks about Comenius1 work by two editors* Charles Hoole and John RobothamJ Traditionally, school boys learned Latin with the aic of a Grammar textbook and a collection of simple Latin j conversational writings* or colloquies. There were as man}? 172 Latin colloquies in circulation as there were Latin gram mars.^ The intent of both the grammars and the colloquies was to acquaint the young scholars with as many of the forms of Latin expression as possible. Comenius. however, attempted to give schoolboys mastery not of phrases, but of things. The format of his books was quite simple. On one column or page a passage would be printed in the vernacular and would treat a subject such as "things at home" or "things in the city and country." On the adjoining column or facing page would be the same passage in Latin. The intent of the book was to acquaint students with the Latin tongue by allowing them to compare a vernacular passage on a familiar topic to the same passage in Latin. The emphasis was on learning the Latin names of familiar things. The opening passage of Janua is partially quoted below because it makes a position statement which characterizes Comenius1 method. The Gate of Tongues opened I. The Entrie, or Entrance 1. God save thee loving Reader, 2. If thou askest whats to be learned? Have for answer, To know the differences of things, and to be able to give its name unto everything. 3. Is there nothing more? Truly nothing at all. 4. He hath laid the grounds and foundation of all learning, that hath thoroughly learned the nomenclature or surnames of things. What follows in subsequent chapters is an ordered Keatinge, The Great Didactic, pp. 103-104. For the conversational nature of Renaissance Latin education, see Ong, "Ramistic Classroom Procedure," pp. 155-164. ^ Johann Amos Comenius, The Gate of Tongues Unlocked and Opened, trans. John Anchoram (London, 1631), p. 1. description of all the things that the student needs to know. Properly Janua begins in the beginning* with thJ creation of the world* then of the elements* the firmament, fire, meteors* waters, earth, stones, and so on, until all inanimate things are named and described. Next come plants, then creatures, and finally man with all his attributes of body, mind and character. This comprises approximately one fourth of the book. Then various trades are described. For example, there is a chapter on ’ ’the husbandman, and husband ry, tillage or plowing” and ”0f Butchers Trade." All of thej arts and sciences are also described. Comenius’ purpose was O to give students a knowledge of all things. Comenius’ method in Janua was quite simple. Because Comenius was under no obligation to use a prescribed grammar as his English counterparts were, he developed a language pedagogy devoid of grammatical instruction. Comenius hadj combed through all the Latin authors and had selected 500Q of the most important words for students to know. Comenius’ choices are telling, for they are words which the student^ already knew in their vernacular tongues rather than words that would be useful in reading Latin literature. Thus thJ students were able to learn the "essential" Latin vocabulary without any grammar and without reading all of the authors. Q Comenius’ descriptions of grammar and rhetoric are not revealing. Grammar deals with orthography, syntax, and pure speaking; Rhetoric with expressions for eloquence, style, and proper arrangement. The Gate of Tongues, pp. 163, U6 5________________________________ ______________________________________ ‘174 The essential vocabulary was preeminently practical. Comenius* intent was to shorten the time spent in learning Latin, and he claimed that he could teach students Latin in a much shorter time by his method. Thus, what is distinctive abouJ Comenius* method is his focus on things before authors; he wants to obviate the tediousness of searching through authors to learn phrases and words. And he. like others we havJ seen before, shows the dislike of learning Latin by memorizing grammatical rules in a language not yet understood. Comenius* pedagogy is therefore different from the humanist pedagogy of the preceding century, not so much in substance as in emphasis. Authors are still a part of his curriculum in thJ latter forms as is imitation of their style, but it is only one of several foci rather than the heart of the educational process. Instead of authors, or even grammar. Comenius would have students first learn the names of things. JLflmflfi Linguarum is not the only successful text ir which Comenius teaches the knowledge of things rather than words. He published two additional works which were alsc widely known. His second textbook, the Yestibulum. or Porch, is merely a scaled down and simplified version of Janua. One of the drawbacks of the Janua. which Comenius himself realized, was that it was too demanding for an entry level Latin textbook.^ Consequently he wrote the Vestibu- lum. which included only 1000 of the most important words ------— Kea t i n g e .— Xfafissg rTe q t-P j q a g t As .-P — 2-9---------------------- 175 and an accompanying simple and practical child's grammar.10 The text was designed to be used for the first six months of instruction, two in the vernacular and four in Latin. After the Vestibulum the students were ready to graduate tc the more demanding Japua. 11 Although the Vestibulum was] very successful and was published in English* German. Hungarian, and Swedish translations, it was never as successful as was jLsnus.12 Comenius' third text which displays the doctrine of things was published much later in 1653 and enjoyed even more success than had Janua. Orbis Pictus was a condensed and illustrated version of Janua and was used as a means tc! teach children to read. The letters and the pronunciation were given in picture form. The letter "A", for example, was given next to a picture of a crow because the crow in his call makes the sound "ah." Similarly, the letter "B" isj next to a picture of a sheep because the sheep makes the sound of "B" when he "blaiteth." But more to the point, each passage was illustrated such that the objects in the picture were numbered to correspond to the vernacular and Latin names for the objects illustrated. Thus in addition to learning the names of common things in Latin, the studentsj could also associate the Latin names with pictures. Orbis 10 Keatinge, T.h.g., Q.rgat. . P.ldJ3S.klQ» p. 72. 11 Keatinge, Ike. Qrgak.Mkag.kAS> P- 73. ------lg-_Kea-t i n g e ' Efr&r-Qf-33 fr-P A4 3<?-U d.— p— 30-------------------- 176 continued to be published well into the eighteenth century. In England Orbis was translated by Charles Hoole in 1659 and recommended for use in his 4 New Discovery &£ the Old Art Qjf Teaching (1660). Hoole's translation of Comenius1 preface underscores Comenius' preference for learning Latin by associating the names of things with pictures. The ground of this Business is, that sensual objects be rightly _n.r_ee.e_n_teh__t.o_. fchfi— s_ejxse.s for fear they might not be received. I say, and say it again aloud, that this last is the foundation of all the rest: because we can neither act nor speak wisely, unless we first rightly..understand a 11 the t h i ngs__ which are. . . to. be don e_t_- .an.d w.hgrjL__Qi: we are to speak. Lp.w.-t.Jaex,S. A.P.—t.h.9 Understanding which was not before ..jui-the J S - g J i . s e - , . And ■ ■therefore, to exercise the Senses well-.ahout the right perceiving the differences. of thinKS-». will be to lav the ground for all, .wisdom* an.cl-all wisdom, and, all wis.e_ _d_lsc_Qurse_» aj3iL.aH...<3i . . 3 . f i . . C . S . e & act Ion in ones c o u r s. e o. f life. . Which, because it is commonly neglected in Schools, and the things that are to be learned are offered to Scholars, without being understood or being rightly presented to the sense, it cometh to pass, that the work of teaching and learning goeth heavily onward, and affordeth little benefit. 3 Comenius continues that the book will have several advantages. It will be pleasurable for children to read and learn. It will "stir up the Attention, w h i Q. fr.-j, § tQ ks fast e n e d u p.o n things, 3_nd.__e.ye_r t o. be.-s.h.§.r.pe.ti§,d mar g -and more. . . .because tin childhood] the mind doth not as yet raise up itself to an abstract contemplation of 13 Comenius, P_r_bis__.Sensual ium Pictus, trans. Charles Hoole (London, 1659), sig. A3r-v. 177 1 l i things. . . .° And it will encourage children to learn such that they "may.be furnishedwiththe knowledge of the the world, by sport and merry pas- I time.111J This passage is evidence that Hoole’s psychology of learning was influenced heavily by Comenius. Because children’s minds are not capable of retaining and under standing abstract precepts, teachers must appeal to their senses. And by so doing the children will learn the important matters of everyday life without tedious labor. Comenius’ pedagogy based on things is certainly reminiscentj of Bacon’s philosophy of things. In fact Comenius’ use of the sentence ’ ’nothing is in the Understanding that was not before in the Sense’ * is Bacon's. But I do not want tc! argue, as others have, that Comenius is simply following Bacon's lead. To do so not only ignores the tradition froir which Comenius springs, but it is interested in aggrandizing Bacon's position in the matter of educational reform. It is sufficient to note that Comenius was aware of and impressed by Bacon, but probably not influenced by him in founding^ Latin teaching on things rather than authors. This had already been suggested by others, most notable of whom was Comenius1 master, Alstead.^ On the contrary it is entirely possible that Comenius' pedagogy enhanced Bacon's reputation. li+ Comenius, Orbis Pictus, sig. A4r. 15 Comenius, Orbis Pictus, sig. A4v. ------U L k ea t i n g e, —The-G r-e a t-D i d a c t i c,— p p— 136--t37-------------- --------------------------- 178 Bacon did not receive immediate acclaim for several reasons. William Gilbert* the leading scientist of the day* did not think highly of Bacon. And Charles I was much more interested in the arts than in science.^ Thus it is plausible to imagine Bacon becoming more widely known and respected as a result of Comenius' popularity and his similarity in the doctrine of things. It would be a mistake to view Comenius' reforms of Latin learning simply as a pedagogical endeavor* though that was certainly part of it. Comenius intended his curriculuir to be structured in increments so as to embrace all know ledge. Comenius' curriculum was to prepare students for instruction in the natural sciences* metaphysics, and theology. His educational program was thereby influenced by his Protestantj religious beliefs. In a revised edition of Janua. he makes clear the relationship he perceives among language* metaphysics, and theology. In the prefatory remarks to schoolmasters concerning the foundation laid in the Vestibulum. or Porch. Comenius makes the following statement regarding the Janpa as rendered by his English translator William Du-Gard. The foundations of the structure of THINGS, and q£ man's UNDERSTANDING about things* and of WORDS of the whole tongue's inservient to both, have been laid in the PORCH OF TONGUES. We must now building hereupon, in the name of God:that there ------ 1^— Jon PP— 14-24---------------- 179 may raise up a fuller frame of Things* and brighter Ugfr% ...ttattec&fcaiifling,i and,a.a-.l.fc...wgr.,^ e.n,t,i^ Body of the Tongue. 4JU.^fch.9.Sfi the native countenance of things* and to form the genuine conceits of things* and to get the plain use of the Tongue sufficient to the necessary expression of things. Herein Comenius* attitude is unequivocally expressed. The V. - e . a f c A. frulUIP* or P„QHPJa.-.Q. f . . . . X 9 . n j g »ftg » laid the foundation for the fuller "frame of things*" which he then presents in his revised edition of Janua. The goals of the new Janua are "tJ discover the native countenance of things," "to form the genuine coneits of things," and to acquire the most straight forward use of Latin "sufficient to the necessary expression of things." The implication here is that language must be transparent so as to enable us to see clearly the matter which it re-presents to our senses. In order to give a "fuller frame of things," Comenius includes a number of tables which have the appearance of Ramistic dichotomies. In each table the general categories of things are divided into subcategories until everything is classified. Each table is indexed to a chapter for easy access. The Gate of Tongues (JLamm) has three major subdi visions: the entry which is an "invitation to pass the denomination of things"; the passage through things anc actions; and the egress* which shows the proper use of things. Rather than discuss each subdivision in turn, 3 Comenius, "To the Masters of Latin Learning*" Januz Linauarum* trans. William Du-Gard (London* 1656). 180 would like simply to focus on ’ ’The Entry to the Gate of Tongues” because in it Comenius gives a metaphysical justifica tion for approaching languages in this way. Because Comenius was a bishop of the Moravian Church and a known Protestant reformer who wanted to bring all of Europe under Protestant rule, Comenius was adamant in the belief, then current among Protestants, that the Protestants would take over Europe and that his Moravian Church would be permitted to return to Czechlosovakia. His belief made him susceptible to every charlatan or lunatic who prophesied the Protestant takeover of Europe. Comenius’ later reputation suffered greatly from his associations with those who turned out to be madmen and opportunistic deceivers* but because he held this belief, he was motivated to envision the day when all would come to a complete understanding of God and His wisdom. His larger educational scheme was to frame the way to this universal wisdom which he called ’ ’pansophia.” His reform of the language curriculum was the initial step on the way to this universal knowledge. Thus the justification for learning languages begins on a spiritual foundation. God created the world* full of the works of wigwam;, and ptU c . eq Man In f c f r . s . . B u , . a. s t , < ? , f „ t, h , e „c,rs, 3 f c u. re. g . t . fc.ka.fc_.b-X Contemplating them, and Using them, and Discoursing of them, he might have delight.. There is therefore a threefold end of our life in the World, namely we view the works of God; that we learn to use them well; we propagate to others such knowledge and use, by the help of tongues wherefore we learn to Speak (with one tongue or ______more) that we mav attain the knowledge of Things:______ 181 but we seek. .the knowledge of Things, that we mav . U.SS*. . . Therefore mark well. To know . TQAgUfiS-iLs— e g f f l . e I . - Y . ; mor..e. comely, to understand the thing-S— ttiemse.lves* whereof it is to be spoken; but_ro-Q-£-L-_c_offl..e1 y to .Jcn.ow how to use the knowledge ft£. f e . O . t f o * Toimues . therefore-. ought to be learned, nQ.t_-W-lthout_tJie_Jkno^l-edge of. Things, but together Comenius* language reform is premised on the belief that God created the world and all things in it. Man's place is to view the things of God* learn to use them well* and propagate knowledge of things by means of language. Language therefore had to reflect accurately the things created by God. Knowledge of tongues without the proper knowledge of things was therefore a dangerous and potential ly damning mistake. Comenius* consequently* reformed the study of languages partly to make learning Latin easier for children and to develop a method of instruction more effective than grammar* but also because languages had to reflect thJ order of God's world. It is important to note that Comenius originally believec that Latin was the best language for achieving universal knowledge. During his stay in England* however, he encouragec the development of a universal language other than Latin.^ Later in his life he reasserted his belief that Latin was to be the language of a Protestant Europe. Comenius' connectior to the language planners in England is only mentioned here 19 Comenius, Jjgja.U9„.JLlnglj.ar.UiP> trans. Du-Gard ( 1656), pp. 3-5. gO_K ea t i n g e *— The-G r-ea-t-D 1 dac t ic *— p— 46-------------------- 182 to frame his attitude toward language within his pansophical ideals. Comenius' reforms of the language curriculum cannot b€ separated from his Protestant theology. In fact one of his projects later in life was to write a Janua Rerum, or The Gate of Things, to accompany his Janu-a Lingua rum. This was a failed attempt to provide a Protestant physics text for his schools, but the intent was clearly to make language serviceable to those who would see the order of God's creation. Language could not reflect the conceits of men, but had tc present clearly the "native countenance of things." To turr a phrase was tantamount to distorting the perception of the divine order of things. Language, if it was to reveal, hac to be transparent. Beside the metaphor of language as a window to God's world, Comenius’ pedagogy implied two other significant conceptions about language. First, content and form were separable and had to be so. God's creation was independent of and theologically prior to man's perception and knowledge of it. Language, the means to communicate knowledge of the world, was twice removed from the actual creation of things. Creation, perception, and communication formed a hierarch} that put language and things on different levels. Thus words and things were philosophically separate. Second, language could not be a social phenomenon which was determinec by use, custom, agreement, and assent. It had to reflect the divine order. It was based on necessity not use, and men came to know via an accurate re-presentation of matter rather than by assent. Hence Comenius1 pedagogy weakened the social foundations of language on which the humanist curriculum rested. Whether or not Comenius intended to diminish the humanist, assumptions about language, it is clear that his Latin pedagogy was received as implying such. And there were those on English soil who wanted to promote this image and promote Comenius in England. Samuel Hartlib was the most! influential of Comenius1 supporters and was very active ir spreading Comenius1 fame as a reformer. Hartlib was a German immigrant to England and spent his life and fortune seeking out new talent which could help him reform the curriculum, place the new empirical philosophy at the heart of the schools, and establish a bureau of communication for the new Puritan government. Hartlib had become aware of Comenius after the publica tion of the first English translation of Janua by Johr Anchoram in 1631. Hartlib immediately struck up a corre spondence with Comenius and urged him to come to England. In 1641, after twelve productive years in Poland, Comenius was invited to England to help Parliament reform the English schools and to establish a college of the experimental science. Comenius went, but was frustrated. Parliament was -184 too preoccupied with internal strife to attend to education al reform. Discouraged. Comenius made plans to go else where. But Hartlib. as part of his desire to keep ComeniUE in England and spread Comenius’ reputation to the English reading public, translated and published Comenius* Delineatio and U ± . l . U £ ± f l 3 . & l £ > in 1642 as A . &S in two treatises. This publication gave impetus to Comenius' reputation as a reformer as well as to English educational reformers. It was also a straightforward statement attacking some of the premises of humanist education. The first premise attacked is the sufficiency of classical learning for modern times. The parts of A Reformation of Schooles are first "The great necessity of a general Reformation of Common Learning. What grounds of hope there are for such a Reformation. How it may be brought to pass.” The seconc is a refutation of the "objections ordinarily made against such undertaking, and describes the several Parts and Titles of Works which are shortly to follow." Addressing the first topic posed— the great necessity of a general Reformation of Common Learning— Comenius makes several comments quoting Cicero, Horace, and Seneca, ir which he lays the necessity for wisdom before his reader. He recognizes the accomplishments of the ancients then adds that modern man is in a position to raise himself above th€ ancients because of the vastness of modern man's experi ence. God "hath moreover preserved unto this our age the _ 185- knowledge of humane learning, by which the study of wisdon is cherished, and transmitted unto us from our Progenitors;: yea and hath made it.to flourish more now, than ever hereto fore.11^ Comenius* age had the full benefit of all that hag gone before him. Next he reasons that wisdom is acquired b^ experience. Experience is an essential concept to Comenius* educational theory, and thus he contends that all of the experience of his day surpasses the knowledge of the ancients in some respects.22 As evidence he notes the many inventionJ of his day which the ancients had no knowledge of. Ir particular, the ancients had no knowledge of printing. Thus, his age, having the benefit of all that the ancient world had to offer and having vast experience of its own, was in a position to supersede the wisdom of the ancients.2- 21 Comenius, 4 Pg.fQ.TO9tAPR , trans. Samuel Hartlib (London, 1642), p. 3. Hereafter Reformation. P P "For wisdom is gained by much experience; and: experience requireth length of time, and variety of occur ences. Now the longer a man liveth, the more varieties still pass him, whence his experience is increased the more,| and by his experince his wisdom, accordingly to that of] Jesus the son of syrach, A man of experience will think of] many things: And that of the Poet, Per casus varios Artem experientia fecit. Chance hinteth many useful things, Which to an Art experience brings." Reformation, p. 3. P * 3 "We therefore in this present age being so well stored with experience, as no former ages could have th^ like, why should we not raise our thoughts unto some higher, aim? For not only by the benefit of Printing (which Art God seems not without some Mystery, to have reserved to these! latter times) whatsoever was ingeniously invented by the Ancients (though long buried in obscurity) is now come to light: but also modern men being stirred up by new occa sions, have attempted new inventions: and Wisdom hath been, Land— is— dail-y— mir-acul-ous 1-y— m-u.l-t-i-p.l-i.e-d— w-i-t-h— v~a r-i-e-t-y— of 186 Having thus laid the foundation for expanding the scope of wisdom beyond the revival of classical learning to includJ modern discoveries and inventions, he next shows how thJ school curriculum is inadequate to meet the needs of society. He criticizes the schools for their lack of practicality as well as for the prolixity and verbal contentiousness thaJ the schools encourage. Studies in the schools* he contends* are disproportionate to the lives and capacities of the students, to the things of the world, to the practical uses pa of knowledge in life* and to God Himself. In identifying how studies are not proportionate to the advancements in the knowledge of the age. Comenius estab- experiments." Reformation, p. 3. i»it is now the common complaint of many, that the learning which is now taught in Schools, is a ting tod tedious, and long in regard of the shortness of life, toc^ laborious for common capacities, too narrow in respect of) the amplitude of things* and in regard of the sublity, and solidity of their truth many ways defective. And the wiserj sort have noted, that it is not answerable to the propose^ end; seldom attaining to any substantial uses of life, but rather ending in the smoke of opinionative brawlings, and contentions: which that they are not idle sayings and surmises, but even real defects, we must first declare, be fore we undertake to seek remedies to redress them. We must, I say, make it good, that the studies of learning ad they are now managed, and commonly taught in Schools, ard not well proportioned." 1. To our life: in regard of theirj tedious prolixity. 2. To our capacities: in regard of their| difficulty. 3. To things themselves: in regard of often mistakings. 4. To the Use of life: because of the great! difficulty of reducing things therein taught into practice,! and of reconciling and applying them to things that are to be done in life. 5. To God himself; they being not suffici ently subordinate to the scope of eternity." Reformation, pp.— 5-6.---------------------------------------------------------- ------ 187 lishes a hierarchy, which will be important throughout this chapter. Students' lives are encumbered by language study and the things of God's world are neglected. The first problem therefore with the schools is that they are engaged too much in tedious prolixity. More emphasis should be given to substance than to words. "The first argument of their prolixity I take from the common confession of all.*1 he says. "For who is there that hath not usually in his mouth that saying of Hippocrates. Life is short, but Art is long?" (Reformation 6). He is referring to the long time spent in mastering the verbal arts of grammar and rhetoric and logic. Comenius then goes on to condemn books which arj amplified beyond necessity and capacity to comprehend.^" The result of such education is that students do not learn the substance of their discipline because they have spent too much time on the trivial arts. "Some will be Natural ists not regarding the Mathematics: and others will be Moral Philosophers, without any knowledge of natural things; They will be accounted Logicians. Rhetoricians, and Poets, though they have scarce a whit of real Science in them" (Reformation 6). Using the theme employed by Brinsley. Comenius complains that schools are not places where students take pleasure in learning, but are a place where "stripes. ^ "Good God! what vast volumes are compiled almost of every matter, which if they were laid together, would raise such hepas. that many millions of years would be required to peruse them?" Reformation, p. 6. 188 lashings, and outcries” continually ring (Reformation 7). He would make the schools ”Scholas & ludos literarios,” as in former times, "meaning that the study of learning was but a pleasant pains-taking, or serious recreation” (Reformation 7). Thus the first fault of schools is their "tedious prolixity” which imputes blame to the trivial arts. Hence it is no surprise that Comenius discusses the verbal arts of logic and rhetoric as examples of all that is wrong with the curriculum. The study of Logic and Rhetoric should indeed be more appropriated unto the affairs of our life, seeing they are intended as directors of reason, and speech, on which two bonds all human things so much depend. But the testimony of Jacobus Acontius is too truly verified. 'There is everywhere, saith he, a great number of logicians, but if you observe their writings, and disputations, you will find but little logic in them. And again, You may observe many well seen in Rhetoric, whose speeches and orations, though they be copious, elegant, well trimmed, and significant, yet you will find the strength and power of persuasion wanting.1 And we may pass the same judgment of the other Arts and Sciences: that we are rather busied and detained about them than that they do any ways promote the business of our life. (Reformation 9-10) In this passage Comenius reveals two important attitudes towards linguistic education that characterize his reforms. First, he contends that a speech can be "copious, elegant, well trimmed, and significant” but wanting in "strength and power of persuasion." To most humanists of the sixteenth century, to add copiousness, elegance, and well-trimmed figures of speech was to add the very essence of strength and power to the discourse. Erasmus* De Copia is a textbook 189 on how to add copiousness and elegance to discourse thereby adding effectiveness of expression. Ascham viewed elegance as a necessary part of successful writing. Yet Comenius does not. Copiousness of expression is one thing and effective ness quite another. Second, Comenius objects to the imprac- ticality of traditional learning. Yet only a hundred years earlier* good Latin and a command over the authors were both a mark of an educated man and the very minimum for an active life of service to one’s country* church* and God. The verj curriculum which Comenius decries as nearly useless was. one hundred years earlier, the very essence of Christian util ity. This attitude is a sign not necessarily of the povertjj of education, though that, .as we have seen-, was certainly part of it. but of the changes in society which brought about changed expectations of .the schools. The capacity called virtu and the linguistic competence that it entailed had been first recommended for Christiar princes, then for noblemen, and finally for courtiers anc those who advised rulers and magistrates.2^ Hence wisdon and eloquence were associated with nobility and statesman ship. With the rise of the middle class, those sons of merchants who went to grammar school were seeking knowledge to help them in the world of trade and traffic, rather thar to help them be good rulers and statesmen. Traditions] 26 Joan Simon. ih ...Ijfldar■ ■ .EngiLftnj; (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1966), pp. 333-368. 190j learning did not necessarily meet their needs» and eloquence became simply a social marker of prestige and urbanity.27 Comenius' conclusion is that the curriculum as taughtj for hundreds of years was of little use. Specifically mentioned as unnecessary and "hot of the essence of learn ing' are the vanities of the Gentiles* the name of their petty Dieties together with their lying histories* and fables. Next* such things as weary out men’s brains to little benefit, of which sort are most of the rules of Grammar* which overburden child ren's minds* and consume their years* and other things of like nature, which have no use but only in Schools. Lastly* all circumlocutions, and windings* and turnings of expression, which fetch not out the kernel, but only make a few assays upon the shell. (HgjLorma.tl . Q J D 12) This statement, interpreted and applied* would eviscerate the grammar school curriculum Ovid's Metamorphoses* Aesop's fables, and other such "lying histories and fables," which were primer texts, would presumably go by the wayside as would most of grammar and rhetoric. To remedy the curriculum, Comenius makes several propo sals. All of them favor the shift away from useless learning* away from words* to things. To rectify the uselessness of 27 Struever, Xhfi„.JUajngJULg-ft-JJL.fll S . t s r Y» PP. 7 0 , 161, 190. This concept of rhetoric is fairly explicit ir George Snell's Tixe Right Teaching of Useful Knowledge,__ fjLt-_S-C-hol_arjs— Xor. som honest _dr.ofession (London, 1649). Snell's avowed purpose is to provide a description of the studies necessary to advance a rustic man into polite* society. Hence his description of rhetoric is that too mucli is bad because a skilled orator can make his audience believe anything. But some study of rhetoric is necessary in order to be pleasant and witty (p. 212). 191 "the vanities of the Gentiles." of grammar, and of rhetoric he proposes to "compose a Seminary of learning of such things, and words, as are of solid, true, and certain use: For you shall have as great increase of one acre of ground sown with clean wheat, as if you should mix ten times as much chaffe therewith, and sow it in ten acres." The remedy to the labyrinthine, traditional course of study, is "to bring all things both great, and small, which are to be learned, into such a perspicuous order, that students may have them before their face, as plain as their own fingers." And to remedy the "vastness and prolixity of study" is "to frame such a book, wherein by a true Anatomy of the universe, all things that can be thought of may be reduced to their general kind and species: and so, that whatsoever is to be said of any thing, may at once be said of all things, whereof it can be said" (Reformation 12-13). Learning proceeds from perceiv ing the order of things in the universe. In every case, Comenius tends toward a doctrine of things. The knowledge around which the traditional curricu lum was based is useless, hard to learn, and too vast--too prolix— because traditional education had been too much concerned with words. The knowledge based on the authority of the ancients is thus overthrown for knowledge based on pO real, tangible, categorizable, classifiable, material things. "Secondly, a great part of this difficulty [of the curriculum] lies herein, that things are not presented to the very eyes and hands of those that are learners, but 192 The new knowledge is thoroughly based in sensory experience! rather than in the trivial curriculum. This* in part,is a justification for the approach to learning Latin as presentee in his textbooks (first in J^nua with its emphasis on things and finally in Opbis with its pictorial depictions of things), but it is also a disavowal of reading authors as a way of coming to knowledge. If sensory experience is the only wajj to know something, then merely reading about it is vastly inferior to experiencing it first hand. All of the writter accounts that are contained in the authors are no substitute for personal experience. Summing up the disproportionate emphasis in the traditional curriculum, Comenius says: The reason why truth is so estranged, and scarcely to be found in the whole compass of the Sciences, seemeth to be threefold. 1. The tearing of the Sciences to pieces. 2. Want of due fitting of the method unto the things themselves. 3. The carelessness, and extravagancies of expressions and style. (Reformation 13) Regarding the fragmentation of science, Comenius* argument is relatively simple. Since all knowledge is intercon- rather delivered to them in vast, and dull narrations, which make little impression upon the understanding, and are hardly retained by the memory: so that they either easily vanish again, or only a confused species of them remains. The remedy hereof will be to represent every thing to its proper sense, visible things to the eyes, things that may b^ tasted to the palate, and so for the rest. For by onc^ looking at an elephant, or at least upon his picture, a man may more easily, and firmly apprehend his form, than if it! had been told him ten times over, what manner of beast: he is." Reformation, p. 14. . 193 nected* no science can be studied in ignorance of the other arts and sciences. He says* "Can any man be a good natural ist* that is not seen in the Metaphysics? or a good Moral ist* who is not a Naturalist (at least in the knowledge of human nature) or a Logician* who is ignorant of real Sciences or a Divine* a Lawyer* or a Physician* that is no philoso pher? or an Orator, or Poet, who is not accomplished witn them all?" (Reformation 16). Concerning the lack of method in the approach to things. Comenius again reveals his attitude that knowledge of the material world is most important. The traditional curriculum is immethodical because it had strayed too far from the tangible world in which things can be classified.2^ This is essentially a language problem. Men misperceive things because they lack a methodical language. The true methoc would allow writers to render the things themselves rather than permit the kind of verbal conceits of which Comenius I complains. The method which Comenius would apply in order to be faithful to the things themselves is not the new empirical philosophy of Bacon* but a deductive "Christian ? Q "The second cause, why Truth is so staggering, anc uncertain I before declared to be the looseness of Method.J that Writers do not wholly tie themselves unto the things themselves* to deliver them, as they are constantly ir| themselves* but rather draw them unto some trim and neat concepts oftheir own to express them by, abusing them a thousand ways: which is nothing else, but to wrest and transfigure things from their native, into strange forms,! even in the face of the mind: and what then can it behold*! but monsters instead of things themselves." Reformation.1 Lpp— 1.7-.18-------------------------------------------------------------- 1 194 philosophy" which postulates that "all things arise out of unmoveable principles unto unmoveable an stable Truth1 1 (Reformation 10). This fact somewhat negates the arguments of some that Comenius is merely recapitulating Baconian ideas.3® Also important is Comenius opinion that misperceiving things causes men to misrepresent them; lack of methoc encourages the abuse of language. His objection that things are wrested from their native forms by incautious writers leads him to discuss the "carelessness and extravagancies of expressions and style." The third thing whereby Truth is prejudiced, is. as I said, either the careless, or luxuriance of the style wherein things are expressed. We call that a luxuriating style, when in the explication of things, improper, tropical hyperbolical, and allusive words and sentences, or expressions are used: especially when Poets, or Orators (and sometimes Philosophers and Divines acting their parts) falling upon any subject, which they would amplify, or extenuate according to their manner, use with their figures, and colors so to alter things, that for the most part they appear not in their native , but in a borrowed, and adventitious form. Which is nothing else, but a painting, and a false glass, whereas truth ought to be held with a pure, and unfaltering light. Carelessness of style is, when obscure words are used, or terms borrowed from a language which is not understood, such as Greek words are to the most part of men: or lastly, if such things as are not stable Truths, are set to sail, as the rules of Truth. Of which sort (we must needs confess, though it be shameful to speak) the books of Philosophers and Divines are too full. (Reformation 19) 30 Salmon has argued that Comenius language views were inspired by Bacon. See her article on Wilkins in Language n t i - » —p p— 97--10- I -------------------- 1 195 Besides the apparent antipathy to rhetorical devices* we see in this passage an explicit* rather than implied. statemenJ of how language was to function. It was not to cover thi identity of things as a painting might, rendering a merJ image of the thing itself, distorted and false. Language was to function as glass does* transparent so as to enable the clear and distinct perception of the reality that lies on the other side of words. This metaphor will become the basis for subsequent studies and attempts to plan for and develop an absolutely transparent language. Of the faults of the curriculum discussed above, two oft them have to do specifically with the improper use of language* causing students to misperceive and misrepresent things. The curriculum is disproportionate specifically in its emphasis on the verbal arts, grammar* rhetoric, and logic.- instead of on the natural sciences. ^1 This attitude, associated O 1 "The next thing is, that learning is not enough accommodated to the uses of our life, to teach us how tc behave our selves' in the occureneces thereof. The faultj whereof must be laid on that inveterate custom, or ratherj disease of Schools, whereby all the time of youth is spent in Grammatical, Rhetorical, and Logical toys; those things that are real, and fit to enlighten men’s minds, thati forsooth, their judgements being more ripe, and they able to undertake such things, they make the more happy progress.! But it comes to pass for the most part, that as soon as th4 heat of youth is over, every man settles upon his severai way, and faculty, never minding any due preparation, orj accomplishment for it. Yea, and most of such as intend to be Divines, Politicians, or Physicians, do of set purpose skip over the studies of the Metaphysics, Mathematics»j and Natural Philosophy, as if they would be improfitable stays and hindrances in their way, whereas it is a greatl error in them, seeing a solid judgement can never be La t ta i ned—wi thou t-sol Id—l ea rn inc..-’ ’— Ref orma t ion , — p„_20..--- 1 196 with Puritan pragmatism, is characteristic of many of the later reformers, but in Comenius we find an early proponent! of the modern curriculum wherein the verbal arts are subord inated to the sciences. The remedy for excessive attentior to words in the schools is to have students engage in very practical exercises where they learn by seeing, not by listening, by observing the material world, not by imitating authors. In order to facilitate learning by experience anc observation, Comenius proposes to classify all things in the universe. This design is the logical extension of his doctrine of things, of his antipathy to the verbal arts, anc of his preference for the natural sciences. When one turns away from authors and languages as the source of knowledge, and turns to things themselves, there is a great need tc make all things accessible and knowable. This necessitates that things be categorized in order that they can be definec with precision. Part of Comenius* plan to found knowledge on the doctrine O p "Or (that I may otherwise express my desires) 1 think that seeing God hath ordered all things in number, measure, and weight, we ought also to take care. I, That all things that are, were, or shall be throughout the world,! may be numbered, and summed up, that nothing escape our? knowledge. II. That the just proportion of all things, as well as respect for the universe, as also among themselves may be laid open before our eyes. III. That the weights of| causes may be evident, and extant among us. whereby we may make exact trial of the truth of all things. The first will! make learning to be universal, which is our first inten-j tion. The second will make it clear, and distinct, which we also earnestly seek. And the third will be a means to hav4 it true and solid, which is our chief desire.” Reformation, ! -pp.— 24-25.------------------------------------------------------------- 1 197 of things was to obviate the need for fruitless verbal disputes and arguments. Logic and rhetoric had provided the foundation for knowledge by way of syllogisms* enthymemes, authority* and examples. Knowledge was the result of verbal disputes the purpose of which was to achieve consensus on a matter by advancing* rebutting, and evaluating arguments. But Comenius and others saw this as little more than wrangling. If knowledge could be founded on material things, and those things be known classified, and ordered, then knowledge could go forward with the clarity and precision of mathematical demonstration..In fact, the idea that philosophy coulc develop a method of inquiry as precise and as clear as mathematics really belongs to Leibniz and other rationalists, but it interesting to note that Comenius was already looking in that direction, and it is also interesting to note that! Leibniz was very familiar with Comenius’ pansophical schemes and even admired them.^ As the epistemological foundation shifted from authors to things, and the means of carrying on learned discussions inclined away from logic and rhetoric to something attempt ing to imitate geometry, rhetoric, in fact all the verbal arts as traditionally taught, lost its prestige and place in the schools. This change was gradually taking shape during the seventeenth century, and Comenius was a major force ir changing the curriculum bit by bit. Comenius’ suggestions ij-K e at i nge,—The-Gr-e at-Di da c-t ic,— p— 94-------------------- 198 for reform thus become constituents of the episteme of his day. He outlines eighteen rules of Truth and tells how the rules are to be "disposed of." The rules of Truth stipulati the necessity for "anatomizing the universe" in order that the true significance of words can be known. That is, after the elements of the universe are categorized, they car be paired unambiguously with words. Then, and only then car rules and laws be derived.^ The principles Comenius lays down mark a break from the way things had traditionally been done. He certainly was not the only one to say such things, or even the first, but ^ "It follows now, that we declare the manner how they [the rules] are to be disposed of. For we think such a method is necessary for our Pansophy. as is absolutely perfect, whereunto nothing may be added, and such an one as may so knot men’s minds unto the things themselves, that! they may find no end but in the end, And may first reap some solid fruit of their endeavors, before they perceive an^ difficulties therein; which we conceive may be attained, 1. By an accurate Anatomizing of the whole Universe, if all the veins, and joins thereof be so cleared, and laid bare, that! there may nothing lie hid from our sight, but everything may appeare in his proper place without any confusion. 2. It is necessary, that the true signification of words (especially such as are of more general use) be fully agreecj upon, that homonymy and ambiguous expressions breed no more dissensions; and this will be effected by accurate defini-j tions of things, such as Mathematicians usually premise before their demonstrations. 3. Next after the division^ and definitions of things shall fllow their Rules, Laws, and Canons, with their demonstrations annexed. 4. It is also requisite, that both divisions, definitions, and Canons,] should be 1. very clear and perspicuous, 2. of certain us^ and benefit, 3. Altogether true, in themselves, in all times and places. For the want of these three conditions, hatti not without cause been hitherto excepted against, both in the writings of Philosophers and Divines. Many things arq set down so obscurely, that even Mercury himself would want another Mercury to explain them." Reformation, pp.42-43J 199 his voice was popular and widely heard, and his influence was great. Not only was Philosophy to be founded on the things of nature rather than on the wisdom of authors, learned discourse was to proceed from definitions rather than from premises, probabilities, and topical places. Words were therefore to be made unambiguous and homonyms eradicated so that there would be no misunderstanding and nc dissension. Proof was to be as absolute as mathematical demonstration. And this entire enterprise depended or "the accurate definition of things." The ideal language needed for this project, intimated here by Comenius anc elsewhere by others, would become one of the two major projects of the Royal Society. What started as a pedagogy to supplant the tedious grammatical learning of Latin became bit by bit. an epistemology and then a project. And i would be a project that would dominate many decades anc the best minds of the seventeenth century.35 Speaking of his attempt not only at a Gate of Tongues but also at a Gate of Things. Comenius sums up the relation ship between language and knowledge. If the tongue, that nimble interpreter of the mind, when it doth most luxuriate in variety of expressions, is yet so bounded, that of necessity it must utter all conceptions of the mind in a few words. Why may not also those wandering concep tions be reduced, and brought into bounds accord ing to the nature of things themselves. For although things as they are in themselves may seem 35 See Ralph W. ¥. Elliott. "Isaac Newton’s 'Of Ar -Unive rsa 1-La nguage ..-Ui-Mod e nn-L a n eua g e-Revi ew»-52-(-1-9 5-7-)-.— 200 to have a certain infinity in them, yet is it not so indeed: for the world it self (that admirable work of God) is framed of a few elements, and some few kinds of forms: and all Arts whatsoever had been invented, may easily be reduced unto a summary and general method. Because therefore things them selves. and their Conceptions, and Words the expressions of those Conceptions are parallel one to the other, and in each of them there are certain fundamentals from which the rest of them result: I thought that it is not impossible, to collect also the fundamentals of Things themselves, and their conceptions, as well as hath been done already in words. (Reformation 47-48) Comenius* plan for universal knowledge rests in the belief that things can be known perfectly, that words can express perfectly the conceptions of those things, and that know ledge of things and the use of words to express those things can be reduced to a method. That is, there should be no slippage between the thing and its conception, between the concept of the thing and its verbal representation. Comenius* scheme for universal knowledge is based on a correspondence between thing and word, and the implication of this scheme pervades his pedagogical treatises (Reformation 48-49). That Comenius had an impact in England is certain. Many English authors cite and refer to the methods Comenius propounds. And Vincent records that by Comenius* texts were commonplace in English schools. Widespread use of Comenius’ texts in schools was instrumental in moving seventeenth- century England away from humanist assumptions about language. With Comenius* texts in demand in the schools, there was a market for English editions of his texts. Translators 201 of Comenius' works often appended prefaces and letters to the readers in which they expressed their own ideas about the usefulness of Comenius1 approach. Sometimes they advocate methods and procedures which indirectly challenge the precepts of humanism; sometimes they directly challenge the value olj humanist learning. Charles Hoole. whom we already discussed in chapter three* was one whose translation and use ofj Comenius texts indirectly challenged some of the tenets of traditional education. Hoole translated Orbis Pictus into English in 1658 anc may have used it in his school room somewhat earlier. As to Hoole’s debt to Comenius there is little question. In his 4 New Discovery (1660) Hoole recommends Orbis in the first! form and Janua in the third> fourth* and fifth forms. In chapter three* we saw that Hoole's contribution to the I humanist strain of educational reform was his emphasis on l practice. To justify practice. Hoole adopted a theory of learning based on sensory experience. This theory* wholly empirical, is derived* in part, from Comenius. In hii translation of Orbis Pictus. Hoole notes in his preface to "judicious and industrious School-Masters" the widespreac use of Comenius' books, then notes that most schoolmaster believe Comenius' "formerly extant" books to be of "singular use."36 36 "There are few of you (I think) but have seen, anc with great willingness made use of, (or at least perused.) -many— of— t h e-bo o k s— o f— this—we 11— d e se r-v-i ng— Author— Mr-.— John 2Q2>| The works "formerly extant" which Hoole is referring to are Janua and Vestihulujn. both of which he considers adequate for those who have had some Latin* but inadequate for children. Hoole then notes that Comenius has moved "retrograde" ir that his later works* especially Orbis. are intended tc "come nearer the reach of tender wits" (Orbis A7r). Orbis is* in Hoole’s judgment, the best introduction to Latin for children because it appeals directly to their sense and does not puzzle children with abstract notions.^ Comraenius. which* for their profitableness to the speedj attainment of a Language* have been translated in several Countries out of Latin into their own native Tongues. Nov the general verdict (after trial made) that hath passed touching those formerly extant* is this* that they are jjifljBLgjfl and. ,y.sr.x a&y.an&aiLg.o.u.a.--fe<a thaas of more discretion* (especially to such* as. have already jmt ..Mp tfreir .ffteffiQ.rie.s tfi..refrain,.Mi they have scattering!v got here and there. . . . ” Qx M j E Riff.tM.S» sig. A6v. Hereafter Qrklg. "[Comenius] hath descended to the very bottom of? what is to be taught* and proceeded (as Nature it self doth)| in an orderly way; first to exercise the senses well, b^ presenting their objects to them* and then to fasten upon the Intellect by impressing the first notions of things upon it. and linking them on to another by a rational discourse.] Whereas indeed. We generally missing this way. do teach children, as we do Parrats. to speak they know not what*] nay, which is worse, we, taking the Wa_y_-Qf_ teaching 1 itt.Le q Re s.. . fr y., ,.ammip.ar. . . q j i I.i,..9.,t....^h.s-.flrs-t > <*p pu.zz.is their, Amagijaad tlaja5, , .wifcJa,..afrgtLa.Q.k-.ksx&£.,3M.. js.eson<3ar,y,Jjafcshfclgns ? wh ti_ll-_t.hey_Jb^-- somewhat .acquainted with ■things,, and . the Wox-di belonging to them, in the Language whic.ti_.tiiey. .■learn* they c ann o t annnehen d what they me an. . . .You then that have] the care of little Children, do not much trouble their thoughts and clog their memories with bare Grammar Rudi-j ments* which to them are harsh in getting, and fluid in retaining;(because indeed to them they signify nothing, butl a more swimming notion of a general term, which they know not what it meaneth* till they comprehend also particlars.j but by this or the like subsidary* inform them* first with -s ome— knowle d g e— o f— things,— and—wo rds—wherewith— t o— exp re s s ■203 Hoole both paraphrases Comenius’ theory of learning via the senses and condemns Grammar as the first introduction tc language study. He made the perception of things the pro paedeutic of all that followed in his curriculum. His students did not begin the study of Lily’s Grammar until the second form after they had been grounded in the Orbis. ThuJ Hoole’s new pedagogy, despite its apparent commitment to humanist goals, enforced learning as the proper perceptior and proper naming of things. His use and recommendation of Comenius’ pedagogy indirectly undercuts the humanist curriculum because it accepts an alternate psychology of learning in which a person’s sensory experience supplants his vicarious experience of reading authors. Though Hoole’s pedagogical reform was an implicit attack on humanist education, other editors and translators were explicit in their denunciation of humane learning. John Robotham translated and edited a revised edition of Jan.ua for the English schools. In it we see an overt attack on humanism. Speaking of the long path of art, especially as it is lengthened by ignorance and folly, Robotham makes them, and then their Rules of speaking will be better understood, and more firmly kept in mind. Else, how should a Child conceive, what a Rule meaneth, when he neither knoweth what the Latin word importeth, nor whati manner of thing it is which is signified to him in his owrj native Language, which is given him thereby to understand the Rule? For Rules, consisting of generalities, are delivered (as I may say), at a third hand, presuming first! the things, and then the words to be already apprehended, touching which they are made." Orbis, sig. A7r» B1r-v. 204 the following comment: No marvel if it be so long before we can reacheth pith of matter, when so much time is misspent on the back of words: yea when the only study of the Latin tongue (whose highest preferment is to be but the Muse1s trunch-man» and the common carrier between the Learned) drains up a quarter of a competent age: and if so large a space be wasted in the mi.tiLki.Qll of a mere verbalist: how many ages will be requisite to the perfection of a realist?30 This a fortiori argument is interesting in that it presup poses the hierarchy of values which Comenius imputed in 4 R & f P . f .MJSLsJhaolfia• In order for the force of this argument to be persuasive, the reader must assent that th^ time spent learning Latin in the grammar school is much too long. This was a common complaint of the seventeenthcentury, and many (including Webbe, Hoole, Milton and Comenius) had it in mind to shorten the time spent learning Latin. The reader must also assent that the knowledge of words, that is of grammar and rhetoric, is less valuable than the materia] knowledge of a realist. And the reader must assent that if so much time is spent trying to imitate a mere verbalist, such as Cicero or any other classical author who was read in the schools, then ever so much more time would need to be spent on the pith of matter, which is of things. Robotham uses this position to attack traditional education. Robotham claims that the only possible reasons that we 38 John Robotham, ed., Janua Ling.uarum JBLeserata, b4 Johann Amos Comenius, trans. Thomas Horn (London, 1643) J ! sig. C4r. Hereafter Janna..RfiafcCalifi• 205 persist in this unnecessarily long form of learning are that "we take such pleasure discere dediscenda, to learn such things as should be learned otherwise; or such as are not worth the learning* but must be unlearned again" (Janus Reserata C4r). He then enumerates all the things learned in grammar school that need to be unlearned. Spelling and pronunciation have no standard and are often taught amiss. Students memorize verse rules of grammar which are intended to be easy to commit to memory* but have no regard to perspicu ity. Children are expected to learn abstruse concepts before they are capable of understanding them. And childrer are taught without any respect for order such that less useful matters are taught before useful ones and no discrimina tion is made as to whether what is to be learned is useful or not. As far as grammar and authors are concerned, the student should approach his text to gain an understanding of the meaning more than an appreciation of the phrase, and masters are enjoined To sow in [the student] the seeds of anv commend able knowledge* and upon occasion of the word* to imprint in him the notion of the thing: so he can never too soon nor too often beat into him this general maxim that he l.s.a.rn.5 E L fl....g?,c>X .e.... UJld.e.P..t.aiid.£; that the end of his pains is not w m t e > b u t ma.t.ks.r• (< 1 anus..Jteaftcafca c6r) This injunction is an unfortunate but revealing commentarj on the state of humane letters in the eyes of one criticj representative of his age. Grammar schools had devoted 206 their exclusive attention to learning Latin without remem bering why Latin was to be learned and authors to be read. The ability to turn a phrase and to display stylistic virtuosity had become more important than the use in social discourse of the wisdom contained in the classical authors. Showmanship with language was admired more than virtu. Consequently. Robotham continues, the linguistic arts are not to be considered as ends in themselves but as a "prae- ludium and a prologue to the study of deeper arts.” Therefore to keep a student long at the languages is not to make a Scholar. but to teach a parrot; and under pretense of advancing him to the credit of a Linguist, degrade him indeed from being a man; enlarging the liberty of his tongue, but withall stopping him of the use of his reason. (Janua Reserata C6r) This is one instance of how the literary curriculum was losing prestige. The facility with language and the wisdom of the ancients which the humanist curriculum sought to conjoin were being repudiated, and in their place reason was asserted. But if these accusations against a literary education were not enough. Robotham ends his criticism with what he felt was the '’heaviest clog to retard a student's profici ency." which was the circuitous route a student must take to acquire Latin. Dictionaries were unsuitable because they required endless labor when used in translating and compos ing. The other method of getting Latin was wide reading. But Robotham has the following to say about reading authors: 207 A farther help hath been in practice, since the last reviving of good literature, to wit, the reading of choice and elegant Authors. But to get all such, is over-chargeable; to peruse all exactly, is very tedious, if not impossible; and withall a waste of so much precious time, that the gain (if it be little more than words) will scarce be able to weigh charges; and though it be an excellent way to polish, yet not sufficient to perfect the very style, nor able to furnish us with words for every subject. (Janua Reserata C6r) Here is the death knell of humanist education. The thought of reading all the authors is seen as "over-chargeable” and "tedious” if not impossible. Erasmus, in De Copia, had declared that every educated man should read all the authors at least once. We have already seen how important reading authors was for Brinsley and other humanist educators. Wide reading provided the store of matter for Latin composition and for educated discourse. Robotham, however, reflects an entirely different attitude. Not only is it night impos sible to read all the authors, it would be a waste of time. Reading the authors may add polish to a student's style, but cannot perfect it. This would have been heresy a hundred years earlier. The authors were models, the very apotheo sis, of good style. The only way to acquire a fine style at all, let alone perfect it, was to imitate the author’s style, especially Cicero’s. And the claim that reading authors is not able to furnish words on every subject is strange indeed, even for a translator of Comenius. For humanists, the authors had said nearly all that was worth saying on every subject. The extreme humanist position, 208 those who claimed to have the pure Ciceronian style, would not use any word that could not be found in Cicero, so complete was Cicero’s grasp of every subject. Even Comenius had combed through all the authors when writing and revising the Vestibulum and Janua in order to glean from the authors the most important words for school boys to learn. Robotham’s claim of inadequacy seems to fly in the face of the very work he is commenting on. The only way to understand his claim regarding the inadequacy of words is to put his remarks into context. His was the age of the new knowledge, the ’’advancement of learning." the Novum Organon, the empirical philosophy. The ancient authors simply repeated what was known and their wisdom could not accommodate the new knowledge and new discoveries of Robotham’s age. Matter came of observation. not from reading. Robotham thus charges all humanists with Ciceronianism by mocking the inadequacy of classical Latin for a Christian society. Since the aim of Humanity is to wait on Divinity. how can the ancient Latin serve our turn to the f all» seeing the gloss of it was lost, and the purity corrupted » before ever it was applied to Christian use? Unless any should affect the vein of Bembus. to call the holy Ghost Divinae aurae particulum; or of that spruce Ciceronian, whom Erasmus fancieth (for fear of polluting his Tulli- anism) to turn this divine sentence, Christ the Word and Son of the Father, according to the Prophets, being made man, yie 1 d hims3. 1 f„ , t, 9 ASitkhj redeemed his Church, and pacified the wrath of God, that being .justified bv faith, and delivered from the tvrannv of Satan, after death, we might obtain the Kingdom of Heaven, Thus, in ______the old pure heathenish Latin. . . . (Janua Reserata------ 209 C6r-v) Robotham then renders the sentence into pure Ciceronian Latin the point of which is to demonstrate the ridiculous ness and pretentiousness of those who claim a pure style. The Christian concepts and terms have no Ciceronian counter parts* so the translation must use the nearest Latin equiva lents* "Jove" for "God.” or circumlocutions and paraphrases.^" The result is an obvious distortion of the meaning* anc therein lies the charge of pretension to those who woulc speak only the "pure” Latin. Robotham then asks rhetorically* Will any man believe that Tully himself, if he were now, to speak of such a subject* would ever use such putrid expressions? And not rather frame his style to such phrases as are now enfranchised by modern use, and pass for current among the learned and most able in their several profes sions? for the structure of a speech may be truly Ciceronian (id est, ma.g.cyjjixce, &jl.p.e&y» spritelv, pure) notwithstanding the mixture of some words; which once were barbarous or not extant, but bred since upon emergent occasions, and by the neces sity of after ages. (Janua Reserata C6v) Robotham's argument is incisive* but not entirely new as he acknowledges. Erasmus had made the same mockery in his Ciceronianus to which Robotham refers. But Robotham adds the concept of socio-linguistic change, adding a reliance on societal norms and audiences’ sensibilities that.Cicero 39 Jo vis QDJt. max. i ntexj3_n.es. iuria~JLaJuaJQ 1 responsa, ..homines assumpta fieura, diis manibus.se devovit,1 concionem- s_lve civitatem in capita nostra vibratum restinxJ it: ut persuasione ad innoceti^m^rcparat_l^_ & a ^:uc^_Dhan:bae dominatu manutnisi, auum fata nos.. hinc evocarLph.— iji .decrum immortalium consorta rerum summa potiamur ( C6v). 210 himself would have agreed with.1*® He then concludes with at analogy to the student as a voyager in which he hopes to demonstrate the wasted effort in the customary practice of reading authors. The sum of this dispute riseth to this issue, that since the common passage is so tedious and irksome* before a student can be matriculated among the smatterers in Latin* it is therefore the readier and safer way to sail by compass* rather than to rove at random: to take a shorter and nearer cut by the help of some abstract* which may be epitome totius Latinismi. than to traverse so many volumes* for no other purpose but to learn. Latin: better to peruse the world in a map* and measure the parts of it by a scale* rather than by sea to cross the line, and encircle the globe by navigation* only to know the compass of the earth* and situation of several climates: better to view all creatures in Noaftt s ark* where they are shut up by pairs, and confined to a narrow walk* than to gad from Land to Land, till a man light on here one. and there another at a venture, merely out of a desire to see them all. (Janua Reserata C6v) Since the authors merely repeated what was known anc could not anticipate the new discoveries of the age. they could not advance knowledge in any way. Therefore* authors need not be read for their wisdom, for theirs was no wisdom at all, but platitude. Authors could not be read for their style because they did not anticipate contemporary taste for phrases* expressions, and words. The only reason remaining for reading authors was to learn Latin. But as Robotham exclaims, to read volumes in order to learn a few words is a For a discussion of Cicero's attitudes towarc changing tastes in language use, see E. H. Gombrich, "The Debate on Primitivism in Ancient Rhetoric,” Journal of thq Warburg and Courtauld Institute* 29 (1966), 24-38. 211 very inefficient way of building a vocabulary. The best wajj to approach learning Latin was through a book that condensed and compiled all the necessary information into a singli volume. This Comenius had done. Robotham claims that Mthe best attempt as yet extant, to make this project feasible, is this Janua of J. A. Comenius.” Robotham explains whjj Comenius' Janua is best, and his explanation is worth noting i because it will have a bearing on our later discussion of the seventeenthcentury search for a universal, then philo sophical, language. In this edition of Janua Comenius hac included a list of Latin primitives. There was a great search in the seventeenth century for the language which had the most primitive words or the most materially indexec radicals. The ideal language would be one in which the wore revealed the meaning, the substance, or matter referred to. Language was to be a window through which we could view the material world. In Robotham's opinion Comenius' approach to Latin is best because there is a deliberate attempt tc ii i compile these primitive words. The second reason is that "great care is taken to use words in their original primary significations" so that the "All primitive words, together with the chiefest anc most usual derivatives and compounds, that make up the body of the Latin tongue, are so applied, to their proper subject, for which they were intended, that the matter helps to hold in the word, and the word the matter; to whicH purpose contraries are so linked and set a cross in the same sentence, that the one serveth to clear the natural sense of the other." JanuaReserata, sig. C7r. 23.2 other significations which are "borrowed and tropical will be easily discerned." Robotham admits that in some cases it is preferable to know the sense in use. But the "proper1 sense" is that which "either appears by an evident etymology (solving the word into the first materials, as they lie callow and newly hatched in the nest) or which is mosi frequented by the common practice of the Learned" (Janue Reserata C7r). This reasoning is an interesting bit of legerdemain. Having already refuted Ciceronianism reasoning that language changes to fit different uses and needs irj various societies, Robotham would be contradicting himsel| to assert that there is only one signification for every word. Consequently, he distinguishes between the "original primary signification" and "borrowed and tropical” signifi cations. The primary significations are to be preferrecj because they, like newly hatched birds, lie bald, bare, ancj unfledged. Though Robotham prefers significations which are bald, bare, and unencumbered, he knows that not all words can be so reduced. There is the sticky problem of use. Therefore, his second option is to rely on the use of the learned rather than the vulgar. Use notwithstanding it. is his intention that words adhere to their original primary significations as closely as possible. This coincides witl his attitude that students should be taught matter notj phrases. If words correspond in a bald and callow way tcj the things they represent, there will be no equivocation, no 213 difficulty in learning, no deferment to words. The matter itself will be accurately rendered and accurately learned, if accurately named. In essence Robotham recommends Janua because he believes in its epistemology. The aim of education is things. Words are only for the purpose of conveying accurate representationJ of the ordered universe. This epistemology is a move away from humanism toward the systematic description of the worlc in which language merely corresponds to the thing apprehended. Man’s place in this world is as a passive observer rather than as an active creator. Language is no longer a measure of human judgment and ability; it is a window to the world. The net effect of Comenius’ pedagogy in England was great indeed. Not only were his textbooks translated, published and reprinted throughout the seventeenth century, his educational theory became widely accepted. This theory, translated into pedagogy was intended to enhance grammar school education in three ways. First, it was intended to stop the memorizing of grammar rules in Latin, for Comenius was trying to respond in a different way to the same forces that Brinsley and Webbe had. Second, it was intended to make Latin learning easier by compiling all the necessary words from all the Latin authors and making them available in a convenient form for school boys. The intent here was to obviate the tedious reading of authors to learn th« necessary words. Third, learning by imitation was supplant 214 ed by sensory experience. The fact that even schoolmasters thought reading the authors was tedious and imitating authors mere parroting reveals how different the seventeenth century was from the sixteenth. Although Comenius’ reforms were a major force in replacing, humanist pedagogy and thereby vitiating humanist assumptioni about language, it would be unfair to attribute the decline of the rhetorical curriculum and the study of authors solely to Comenius. His intent was to delay the study of authors until the students knew enough Latin to read them with ease and to reduce the importance of authors by adding the natural sciences to the curriculum. It would also be unfair to say that Comenius was an advocate of the plain style. His earljj works, primarily the Vestibulum and Janua. it is true, might lead one to believe that Comenius had little interest in authors and style. But this is not entirely the case. As one of those quirks of history, Comenius' complete education program, tl&gjQa.. > or The., QrO.a.t.. > begun between 1628 and 1632 at the same time as he was writing the first edition of Janua, was written in Czech and was not published until 1658 in German. The work was also translated into Latin, included in Didactica Opera Omnia, and published in Amsterdam in 1657, but it was not as well known in EnglanJ as JanV3> Vestibulum, and Qr_fal_s. It was translated into English as late as 1896. In The Great Didactic Comenius outlines a graded curri- _ 215 culum, the first stage of which is the Vestibular school. The primary text is* of course, the Vestibulum. Following the Vestibular school is the Janual school* which is centered on the Janua. And as the third stage of the curriculum there is the Atrial school. This school is founded on Comenius’ Atrium, which is a text on elegant style written late in his career while in Hungary. By this time Comenius had mollified many of his early* radical opinions. The motto over the door was to read: ’ ’Let no one enter who cannot speak." The walls were covered with maxims anc sentences exemplifying adorned speech* and the textbooks were Comenius’ and Xhs,,■ Jil.Sgailfi.fi* The boys were taught Latin verse and were exercised in imitating ali h p Latin authors. But Comenius did not give primary place to style in his curriculum as some of his humanist predecessors had; this is primarily because Comenius viewed elegant style as only one of the gradations in his curriculum. Following the Atrial school were the philosophical* logical* politi cal. and theological schools. In these subsequent schools* students read the classical authors and performed exercises in style. In England* however* Comenius was not known for his l l ? Late in his career. Comenius tempered some of the ideas he had had as a younger man. Among the ideas he changed his mind about was the place of Latin as the universal language of Christendom. As part of this changecj in attitude, he seems to have countenanced rhetoric more favoably. See Keatinge, The Great Didactic, p. 142. I 216 Great Didactic. His reputation was based on Janua, on Vestibulum, on Orbis* and on A Reformation of Schools. And in all of these permeated the doctrine of things and the implication that reading authors was tedious and imitation unnecessary. In reality Comenius’ position was that reading authors and rhetorical exercises were tedious and unneces sary for children, but the English lack of familiarity with Comenius’ entire curriculum led many of his English transla tors and editors to assert that authors and imitation were simply tedious and unnecessary. Thus the reception of Comenius in England, as we have seen in Robotham and Hoole, was associated with anti-Ciceronianism, aversion to authors, and the need in education for matter rather than mere words and phrases. Comenius’ work did in fact foster these attitudes which were already latent in the English schools. That Comenius was identified as being anti-classical is evidenced by two phenomena. Milton directed an innuendo at Comenius in his Tractate on Education; ”To tell you there fore what I have benefited herein among old renowned Authors, I shall spare; and to search what many modern Janua*s and Didactics more than ever I shall read, have projected, my inclination leads me not."43 And Comenius' greatest critics were those who accused him of bad Latinity and of restoring the barbarous Latin of the Middle Ages.1 *2 * These criticisms 43 Quoted by Keatinge in The Great Didactic, p. 24. ______ 44 Keatinge, The Great Didactic, p. 24.___________________ 217 did not seem to diminish Comenius’ popularity and reputation, though he was prompted to write a defense of his Latinity. Although Comenius did not want to eradicate rhetoric from the curriculum entirely, there are several marked differences between Comenius’ reforms and the humanist approaches to learning which should help to clarify the shifting conceptions of language in the seventeenth cen tury. Whereas English humanist educators sought to teach pure style and wisdom by authors, Comenius taught things and their names. As Ong has argued, the many colloquies, and books of phrases, idioms, adages, and proverbs were intended to give the students enough Latin to be able to speak Latir and have something to say on almost any occasion.2*^ Comenius’ purpose was not to initiate students into a literate anc learned culture, but to supply the boys with practical knowledge for everyday use. For the Protestant, knowledge of the things of God’s world was more important than mere words. There was an analogous difference in pedagogical method. Humanists sought to immerse their students in classical culture; whereas Comenius developed a method for eclucating children in the fastest, most efficient way possible. The humanist concept of cultural immersion was responsible for teaching the boys only in Latin and for expecting them tc learn without book by imitation. Although this pedagogy bv itself proved unsuccessful in the schools and had to b€ -»LRamis tic—Classroom—Procedure,-!!— pp.— 155--159-.--------- 218 systematized according to rules, precepts, and formularies, the idea was that children learned by imitation rather than by sensory experience. Humanist education was essentially conservative, trying to evoke and preserve and modify ideals from classical Rome for Christian Europe. Comenius* pedagogy looked forward to the Protestant transformation of Europe. His intent was to prepare for the future rather than to revitalize the past. Donald Lemen Clark has sugested that the linguistic educa tion of antiquity held its place for so long because it perpetuated and inculcated the values of a homogeneous culture.^ The reason, he implies, that traditional education died out is that society was no longer homogeneous. Nev factions did not identify with traditional values. Reformers such as Comenius adopted different assumptions about language as part of their new identity. The new attitudes, pedagogj and perceptions were founded in the belief that language was not a social phenomenon based in use, custom, and authority. So with the rise of Comenius* pedagogical approach, the tacit assumption that language was founded in use and society gradually eroded. The effect of this shift in perception was to undermine I humanist concepts of language and give prominence to empiricism in the curriculum. And, oddly enough, educational empiricism 46 ii^he Rise and Fall of Proavmnasmata in Sixteenth anc Seventeenth Century Grammar Schools,” p. 262. 219 was the culmination of a long series of events which begar with earlier humanist curricular reforms. As greater numbers of public schools were established, there was a greater neec for a methodical approach to learning languages. Circumstances in England necessitated that the approach be essentially grammatical. As grammar became more entrenched it became more ineffective as pedagogy and begot public dissatisfaction. Dissatisfaction encouraged reform in all its variations, anc Comenius’ Protestant reform partly due to its identificatior with science and partly due to its freedom to develop while not under any constraints, embraced the doctrine of things. Thus the foundation of the humanist curriculum, the reading of authors and the imitation of their style, grammar anc rhetoric, the reception and production of discourse, was replaced by the doctrine of things. Grammar, rhetoric, and logic, however, had not beer merely the basis of the humanist curriculum, but also of knowledge. Knowledge was the result of communal assent anc was thus invented, disputed, communicated, and reformulatec by means of the language arts. But in the doctrine of things, language played an entirely different role. Language was meant only to convey the things which the sense perceive. Language was to be a glass through which we observe the world of things. Things themselves were the very grounds of knowledge rather than men’s conceptions and beliefs anc discourse of them. Language thus became an instrument of ~220j science to convey the "kernels" discovered by its methods. No longer was language viewed as a functional and cohesive aspect of society, but only as a conduit to transfer knowledge from one to another. Language had no constitutive function of men's conceptions of their world and of their behavior; it only represented things to those who viewed the worlc through its medium. But equally as significant as the wizened image of the humanist curriculum is the fact that the major spokesmen or language in the mid-seventeenth century were not humanists writing grammars or treatises on style and rhetoric. Instead, language became one of the primary interests of the reformers and of the scientific community. Language theory and practice had come into the hands of those who wanted to develop c language that would be useful for "the advancement of know ledge." These were primarily men interested in science, who subscribed to the doctrine of things. Language theory had fallen into the hands of language planners and scientistl who had different applications in mind than did the humanists. This is not to say that humanist books on grammar and rhetoric were not available and read, simply that their significance and hence their demand had been diminished. By 1660 we have already read how Charles Hoole laments that Erasmus* cJ Copia was too little used in the English schools. HoolJ also bemoans that Aphthonius' Progvmnasmata. the mainstay of the rhetorical curriculum for centuries, was useful bu! scarcely found in print. Donald L. Clark has documented the rise and fall of the progymnasmata. and his findings correlate with and corroborate Hoole’s statement. By the mid-seventeenth century, Aphthonius was available, but editions were scarce and few being published. By 1695, the same year Locke published his An Essav Concerning Human Understanding, there were no more editions of the Progymnasmata printed. ^ As far as rhetorical theory is concerned, the seventeenth century is nearly a vacuum. Not so for grammar, but grammar had changed its character under the influence of the curricular reforms, from the art of speaking correctly to the scientif ic study of language. The major argument of this chapter is that as classical authority lost its ground and the observational philosophy gained prominence and acceptance, the language arts, grammar and rhetoric and also logic, changed drastically. The doctrine of things pervaded educational and linguistic thought to the extent that many of the major treatises on language were being written by scientists rather than men of letters and by language planners rather than humanist educa tors. Their interests were in replacing Latin with a means of communication which would represent the material world clearly, would be truly universal, and which would advance learning. We will now turn to these attempts to develop a universal language. U7 ______ See Clark’s f,The Rise and Fall of Progymnasmata.” The Quest for a Philosophical Language 222 Chapter Five The pedagogical problems of the grammar schools were an important factor in shaping linguistic attitudes of the seventeenth century* for the schools provided the first conscious encounter with learning languages for most people. Despite all of the other factors that contributed to language reform* the justification most frequently made for reform was couched in educational terms. Most of the reforms were directed at the learned languages, especially Latin, and it is not surprising to see the extent to which Latin learning lost prestige during the century. During the course of the century, the problems with Latin education prompted educators and language planners to consider alternatives to Latin as the language of learning. At first other natural languages were considered* but each of the languages had its problems. Some language planners had the idea to develop a language of their own which did not have any of the disadvantages of natural languages. The present chapter traces some of the major developments in man-made languages and details the assumptions made by the language planners. Briefly, when language planners first attempted to develop a language* they adhered to their models of natural language. Thus these early attempts were basically grammatical. But when language planners rejected natural language as a model, they substituted mathemat ics and logic. Hence these later languages aspired to be 223 philosophical. In tracing the language schemes of the century* my intent in this chapter is to record how thoroughly empirical epistemology replaced humanist epistemology in matters of language. It is important to remember, however, that at each step specific pedagogical claims were made. Empiric ists never forgot the context that gave their plans impe tus. The necessary condition, however, for a thoroughgoing empirical philosophy of language was the attenuation of Latin education. Before discussing the language schemes let me reiterate the forces which combined to vitiate Latin. In addition to the dissatisfaction with the way Latin was being taught in the schools, there were several other reasons why Latin lost prestige as the language of learn ing. Some Puritans attacked the fables and follies of pagans which students were forced to read. John Webster was vociferously anti-classical in his viewpoint, and there werej other Puritans who felt the same way. The influence of Protestant radicals, however, was mollified by other Puritans who believed that the classics were an aid to education. Watson concludes in his survey of grammar schools thatj religious influence was the primary force behind curricularj change, but that the radical Puritans were tempered by other, more moderate, Puritans who wanted merely to de-em- phasized classical literature by adding religious readings to the curriculum. Thus classical learning became subservient 224 to religious training. The Puritan influence, though a factor, was not the sole cause for the decline of Latin.^ The changing sociological and political structures had made English very important for education, commerce, and government. As we have seen, the number of English schools increased dramatically in response to the perceived need for English language instruction. Many of the Puritan reformers did not want to do away with the grammar schools as much as provide education for the poor in the form of charity schools. These schools would become common in the eighteenth century, but the impetus for them can be traced to such seventeenth- century reformers as John Dury and William Petty, the latter proposing ergastula literaria. or literary workhouses, where poor children could be taught to read and write English while learning a trade.^ Consequently. Latin also had to contend with the ever increasing importance of the vernacular. As mentioned briefly in the last chapter, some lin guists of the seventeenth century believed that there was a language of nature that would unfold the book of nature tc any who could interpret it. Although belief in this language of nature can be traced to Rosecrucianism. there were many others who. in a similar spirit, were eager to recover the lost language of Adam, believing that it held the key to thj 1 Watson, The English Grammar, Schools, pp. 534-539. 2 Adviee of W .P. to Samuel-Hartllb (London, 1648), pp. 3-4, on Clark Library Microfilm 93, no. 5. 225 relationship between words and things. There were several candidates for the Edenic language, although Hebrew was the favorite. Others argued that Latin, Greek, Arabic, Egyptian, and other languages were the original. There was even a faction, Mulcaster among them, which proposed that Teutonic was the first human language.3 Hence there are many explicit statements by language planners- of their intention to remedy the confusion of tongues at Babel and restore a common language that the earth might again be of one tongue. Insofar as these other languages were proposed as the language of Adam, Latin had less claim to universality. The rise of science also had an impact on. language reform. Baconian empiricism sought to turn away from a! deductive philosophy founded on propositions which had no more claim to truth than that they could be found in Aristotle or that they were upheld by tradition. Instead, Bacon proposed an inductive method.^ This method began with observation of particulars, proceeded to classify and cate- ........... gorize; then it generalized about the common propertie^ in each of the divisions. This method necessitated clarity 3 James Knowlson, UnXV, ftr-gjSll.JLflflgU3 and Frace, 1600-1800 {Toronto: Toronto University Press, 1975), pp. 12-13, and Richard Mulcaster, The First Part of the Elementary (London, 1582), pp. 79-80. M. M. Slaughter has argued that Bacon's empiricisn was merely Aristotelian induction made method. See Univer sal Languages and- Scientific Taxonomy in the Seventeeth Century (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), pp. 87-96, ~ 226j and precision so as to make the classifications accurate and distinct. This enterprise was essentially taxonomic and required that the language used to describe the categories also be accurate and precise.^ The two primary projects of the Royal Society were tc develop a scientific method and a scientific language. aJ a result of their interests in precise language, the scien tists of the Royal Society were influential in cultivating taste in the plain style and in discouraging the stylistic! exuberance of the age. But. however hard they tried, the scientists could not avoid the problems of natural lan guage. They found that even Latin was plagued with the same problems as the vulgar tongues. It was ambiguous and redun dant: some words had more than one signification and others could be interchanged with little appreciable change iJ meaning. There were also potentially confusing homonyms. Clearly Latin was unsuitable for science because it lacked the accuracy and precision that science required. Finally, another force which weakened Latin’s claim tc universality came from the Orient. The Renaissance had witnessed many new discoveries and heard reports of voyages to many exotic lands. With the help of the printing press, accounts of travel to various places soon became popular. But along with a taste for travel literature, Europeans alsc For another discussion of the taxonomic enterprise of the seventeenth century see Michel Foucault, The Order of -Things— N e w—Yo rk-:— Ra n d om-H ou s e, — 19-7-0.----------------------------- 1 Ill developed an awareness that they were not the only civilized people in the world. There had been great civilizations ir the middle east as well as the far east, and interest in these exotic civilizations engendered interest in their languages.^ Consequently, Hebrew, Arabic, Egyptian, and Chinese were studied as possible languages which could supplant Latin as being truly universal. The speculation concerning the'universal potential of these languages, however, had to do more with how they were written than with the number of people that spoke them, None of these languages employs an alphabetic writing system; instead they are syllabic or ideographic, and claims about the universality of written characters often depended upon current mathematical symbols. It is no mere coincidencJ that mathematical symbols were appearing at about the samJ time.7 Languages that had non-alphabetic writing systems resembled mathematics because their symbols had an ideationai value rather than merely a phonological one. Hence, language planners sought in Hebrew, Egyptian, and Chinese a writter character that had the same universality as numerals and mathematical symbols. Each of the languages had its proponents, and various arguments and defenses were made regarding which 6 Paul Cornelius. U niversal Language Sc hemes in Travel Literature in the Seventeethand Eighteenth Centuries (Geneva: Librarie Droz, 1965), pp. 27-29. 7 For the relationship of language to mathematics, see Lodowick below. _ , : language was truly more universal than the others. Chinese seems to have been regarded at first as the most likely candidate. It was thought that the Chinese characters were actual pictures of the thing they repre sented* and that* no matter how stylized the characters had become over the years, they still corresponded to a concept that had a real world referent. This referential quality of Chinese characters seemed to make Chinese less corrupted byj ambiguity and redundancy. Moreover* there were accounts of the characters’ universality in the far east. In a Jesuit missionary's accounts* Chinain the Sixteenth Centurv: the JjQ_U-r_nals of Matthew Ricci: 1583-1610, Ricci reported that someone living in a distant province of China and speaking a dialect altogether different from someone in another provincJ O could read the same characters and understand them. For s while. European language planners anticipated that Chinese characters would remedy the confusion of tongues. However, they soon realized that Chinese was no significant improvement: over Latin, especially in the ease with which it could be learned and the time spent in mastering it. Instead of learning a few letters which could be used in an infinite number of combinations, students would have to learn thousand^ of different characters. The initial enthusiasm over Chinese characters soon waned. If the confusion of tongues was to Q ° Knowlson, p 24; see also Salmon* Language in 17th- Century England, pp. 186-87, 229 be set aright> if Latin was to be replaced as the language of learning* if science was to have a language perfectly denotative and unambiguous, men would have to invent a new language. Knowlson has already recounted the development of universal language schemes from the arts of stenography and shorthand. Nevertheless, it is important to see how the attempts to develop a universal written character were appropriated by the efforts to make language a tool for science. My focus in this chapter will be the change from inventing a universal character to developing a philosophi cal language--one which would suit the taxonomic needs of empirical science. I will be treating four English language planners: Francis Lodowick (1619-1694), Cave Beck (1623- 1706?), George Dalgarno (16267-1687), and John Wilkins (1614-1672). I. In 1647 Samuel Hartlib published Francis Lodowick’s A Common Writing: Whereby two, although not understanding one the others Language, vet bv the helpe thereof, mav communi cate their minds to one another. The intent of Lodowick’s system was to enable persons speaking different languages to communicate with one another having no knowledge of any language other than their own mother tongue. He hoped that his writing system would be the means whereby communication could take place with the same facility enjoyed by mathe- maticians and physicians, ’’whose numerical characters are 230 still the same, although described by those of differential languages, as the figure of five (5) is still alike describ ed, whether written by a Dutchman, Englishman, Frenchman, etc.1' and whose medicinal weights are alike characterized, whether in French, English, or Latin author."9 Lodowick’s system was not, therefore, to be effable, but instead was to be like numbers and weight measures which have a standard ideational content irrespective of the language spoken. In order to develop such a system, Lodowick simply adopted the notion of linguistic radicals and derivatives from languages such as Hebrew and gave them a pictorial form.^ He justified the universal potential of his scheme by referring to it not as an alphabetical scheme, but as a hieroglyphic one. Each word would have its radical charac ter and any derivative would employ the radical character with modifications.^ In this scheme Lodowick explains that 9 Francis Lodowick, A Common Writing (1647), sig. A2v. Hereafter M r llillS . 10 John Wilkins was the first to suggest such a scheme! in his M.sx.p.v.r.Yi o x „ y ig .-.S ecr^ fr and, SwlLt.-.Jie.ff.senger (London, 1641), pp. 108-109. 1 1 "The reason hereof is, for that this writing hath nc reference to letters, or their Conjunctions in word, according to the several languages, but, being a kind of hieroglyphical representation of words, by so many Charac ters, for each word a Character, and that not at Random, but as each word is either Radical or derivative, the Radical,] have their radical Characters, the derivatives bear the Character of the Radix of their descent, with some differen tial addition, whereby they may be differnced, from other derivatives, proceeding to the said Radix." Writing, sig. A2r-v. 23: radices either signify action or do not. The first type are verbal radices such as "to write." "to stand." etc. ThJ second type of radical comprehends four sub- categories: nouns; pronouns; adjectives; and the four undeclined parts of Grammar: adverbs, prepositions, interjections, and' con junctions (Writing 1). Nouns and adjectives derive from verbs. In establishing his types and categories. Lodowick simply appropriated and adapted the traditional eight parts of speech to his explanation of radicals. It is possible for one radical to bear a semantic similarity to another radical. For example, the radix for "to drink" is similar to the noun "drink." and this semanticj similarity will be reflected in the graphic similarity off the radicals. Consequently. Lodowick proposes that a lexicor be compiled and all such words as have similar meanings be reduced to a single radical. Verbs, he claims, are semantically similar according to four types of affinities: 1. Anagogical, afl-fcft and tja.Jsn.flyr. 2. -Synonimical, as to-lamen t, - f r . ewja'AJ » KgUILft&fl» £&S • 3. Contradictional, as to curse, to bless, etc. 4. In respect of the substance wherewith it is acted. * fcg.-H.ftfc» t f i > ,bgr.s£>,rin.kJ-.g» to baptize; the substance wherewith all these is acted. i s r n.Qi„ s-t-y,,r.e• (I r ifc ijig 2 ) The affinities are signified by certain marks which inter pret the radical. For example, the verbal radical "tcj water" has one radical. However, if the radical were meant to signify an action done by means of water such as "tcj sprinkle" or "baptize," the radical would bear the mark of 232 the fourth affinity. Lodowick’s table is reproduced below. The symbol 118” signifies the verbal radical "to make." The signs of the four abbreviatures of the Radices are these: Anagogical, whose sign is N Synonimical, <' Contradictional, ! Relatival. * " The Augmentation of them is For the first \ thus V more \a second / A /V third i ■n in fourth V Ur LUr Their place is on the head of the Radix thus: \ 1 u 8 8 8 8 V A • n u - 8 8 8 8 (Writing 18) There are five additional distinguishable senses of the verbal radical, each with its own mark placed under the radical: customary action (8); simulation or imitation, as "to Platonize" which is to imitate Plato (8); inchoation or the incipient state of the action, as "to begin to make" (8); a desire to act (8); and a diminuition of the action, as "to make a little" (8) (Writing 2,3,19). Concerned that this scheme not become too cumbersome and difficult to learn, Lodowick tries to provide a way of distinguishing subtle shades of meaning without multiplying the number of radicals. However, his grammatical model necessitated additional categories; hence Lodowick elabor ates many other distinctions, permutations, and augmenta tions that can be made on the radicals and assigns each a mark. For example, "to drink" is assigned the character " £ ." This character can be augmented with other marks 233 which add signification. 1. 3“° The actor Drinker (Masculine. Feminine) 2. cT3 That wherein, or wherewith is acted Drink 3. 5® The Inclination A Drunkard 4. 3? ) The abstract of the denominative adjective Drunkenness 5. oF* The act The Drinking 6. ® The place customary to the action A drink-house I drink we drink +$ my thou drinkest , 4 d ye drink ^ thy "cP* he drinketh '"3 they drink their i ' H z p (Writing 8,20,23) ° In addition to these, there are marks to signify other grammatical phenomena, such as moods, tenses, participles, case, and gender. The characters with their accompanying marks can become so laden with signification that misinter pretation is possible unless precaution is taken to insure that each mark is in the correct place. To insure that the marks are placed correctly, Lodowick proposes that each character be written within five parallel horizontal lines which resemble a music score. The radical is written between the second and fourth lines, and additional marks, in this case tense markers, are placed within other lines. a a - a . a These characters denote the present, imperfect, perfect, plubperfect, and future tenses of "to drink" (Writing 19,26). Radical adverbs, prepositions, interjections, and conjunc 234 tions along with relative pronouns are to be written between the third and fourth lines (Writing 27). As can be imagined the characters in text could be quite cumbersome and frightful. Below are the first eight verses of the Gospel of John written according to Lodowick’s characters. x iX. 3 - S ' 7 Q2 lou 1 3 . 13 1 4 - i / i t X < S ' 17 i s io il 22. 03 442. $ - 2. C , i7 as 30 ‘ J i 3X--3334- 3S~ 36 37 3332 4 0 4-14 = -4 5 4 4 -1 B ^ - cr : %^K47 4» 4? -£? >4 * IW#« nwiiwr/pn^ii »#•*< iE 2a femr^frr&Tn ti wittm: 68 gp 70 7172.73 74 ^ 76^ Lodowick’s system for common writing was only one of many. It derived in part from current discussions about language* like Hebrew, which were composed of radical words and derivatives, and Lodowick deliberately attempted to imitate a hieroglyphic system rather than an alphabetical one. Lodowick realized that his scheme was only a begin ning, so he proposed that a lexicon of all English words be collected and indexed in order that his scheme could be functional. Despite his efforts his scheme was complex and clumsy. If his scheme was to be a working language* there was the additional task of compiling lexicons for all thi vernacular languages. Then there was the frustration of syntax. Lodowick’s language, as interesting as it was ti seventeenth-century language planners, was hopelessly unfea sible. But, while Lodowick’s written characters derivec from a hieroglyphic system and had its problems, other language planners tried to obviate the problems by adopting a different model for their characters. In 1657 Cave Beck proposed one such writing system with characters based or numbers. II. Cave Beck, a loyalist, evidently had been at Oxforc with the garrisoned King Charles some time during 1642- 1646. An honorary degree was conferred upon him there, presumably for his services around the Court. There were several scholars at Oxford at the time who were working on s universal character: Dalgarno. Ward, and Wilkins. While at Oxford Beck may have heard about and become interested in the universal character.^2 It is possible, though there is no concrete evidence ir support, that Beck met John Wilkins sometime during this period. But it is clear that Beck knew of Wilkins’ interest I in the universal character because he sent Wilkins a copy of his Universal Character for criticism. And, though Wilkins 12 Salmon, Langutagein 17th-Centurv England, pp. 179-180. 236 encouraged Beck not to publish the treatise. Beck thought highly of Wilkins' similar efforts and was one of those who attempted to improve Wilkins1 language scheme after the latter’s death.^3 It is equally possible that Beck had become aware of Wilkins' interest in a universal character from the publication of Wilkins' essay Mercury, or the secret and swift messenger (1641). Beck and Wilkins each clearly knew the other's work. Beck was an astute critic and continuer of Wilkins' work; Wilkins did not think highly of Beck’s work. The reason for Wilkins' disdain is not difficult to determine. Beck's Universal Character was intended as an aid to travelers and merchants and was not intended for use by the Royal Society. The full title of Beck's work makes his purpose clear: The Universal Character. Bv which all the Nations in the world mav understand one anothers Concep tions. Reading out of one Common Writing their own Mother Tongues (1657). The rest of the title page proceeds to claim that the use of this method may be obtained after only two hours, if the grammatical directions are observed. The character is written in numerals 0-9. and its grammatical distinctions are made by adding letters. For example "r1743" denotes the noun "eloquence." Beck's character is an im provement on Lodowick's scheme in several respects: it is effable, it has a fairly complete lexicon, and it does ______ 13 Salmon, Language in 17th-Century England, p. 186.___ 237 attempt to deal with the problem of syntax. Salmon has called Beck’s Universal Character "the first complete 'Universal Character' to be printed not only in Britain but* in all likelihood, in the whole of Europe."^ But, beside the numerical model employed by Beck, like Lodowick, he attempted to develop his universal language scheme on grammatical rather than philosophical principles, and this is why Wilkins though so little of it. I want to comment on Beck’s preface because in it he outlines many of the attitudes which are only implicitly stated in other works. He begins by noting how much attention has been given to the universal character. This last Century of years, much hath been the discourse and expectation of learned men, concern ing the finding out of an Universal Character, which if happily contrived, so as to avoid all Equivocal words, Anomalous variations, and super fluous Synonomas (with which all Languages are encumbered, and rendered difficult to the learner) would much advantage mankind in their civil commerce, and be a singular means of propagating all sorts of Learning and true Religion in the world. 5 He then contrasts the ’ ’few weeks" it would take to master his character to the years Latin requires, noting that Latin "is the only Language many ages have in vain labored to make common, but hath proved attainable to few" (Charac ter A7v). The remedy is, he says, the "Invention of some easy Character" which will "direct us out of this Labyrinth Salmon, Language in 17th-Century England, p. 190. 15 Cave Beck, The Universal Character (London, 1657), sig. A7r-v. Hereafter Character.________________________________ 238 of Languages" (Character A7v). He notes that encouragement for such a character had already been given, and the marginal gloss identifies "Piccius," "L. Bacon." and "D. Wilkins" as: those who have made such invitations. Beck quickly eliminates the earlier hopes for finding such a character in natural l a n g u a g e s . ^ The Egyptians hac a "symbolic way of writing" which might have been of use. but it was "so hard to learn, and tedious in the practice* (Character A8r). The Egyptian hieroglyphics, he adds, have the problem of being "Cataehrestical" because "the Picture showts] one thing to the eye. and a quite different sense [is] imposed upon it" (A8r). Likewise the Chinese have a character which serves them, but has "no proportion o i l Method." Thus the same difficulty that characterizes Latir learning also typifies Chinese: the immethodical nature of their characters "causes them to spend many years, beginning in their Childhood, in learning of it" (Blv). In contrast to the problems of Latin, Egyptian, anc Chinese, Beck states that his character would avoid all of the inconveniences of these languages, while enabling the learner, if he follows the grammatical directions, to " b i perfectly Learned" in the fundamentals within "an Hour or two" (Character B1v-B2r). Beck tells of the lexicon he added to facilitate the use of his character, and he warns ^ The term "natural language" refers to languages at one time spoken. It is not to be confused with the term -H.1 a n g u a g e-o f— nature.-*?------------------------------------------------1 against trying to memorize the Dictionary* promising that he will publish* "within a few Months* a small Treatise* in the nature of Comenius*s Janua. set forth with the Vulgar Languagi on one side, and the Character on the other, by which a child of ten years old, learning five sentences a day, maj in four month's space be perfect in the whole Character1 1 (B1r). An adult could presumably learn it even faster. The reason his character can be so easily learned is that "it is \ a character that will fright no Eye with an unusual shape." The numbers and letters used in the characters are already known to all alike (B1v-B2r). The significance of the preface is its deliberate attempt to offer a man-made alternative language to Egyptiar and Chinese* as well as to Latin, primarily because lan guages are hard to learn. In one sense the language planning efforts can be said to be a direct result of the failure of I the schools to teach Latin. Since the schools had been ineffective in teaching Latin, other languages had beer sought out. But in each case* the cumbersome writing systems of these languages did not augur well for pedagogical success. The only recourse remaining was to invent a language that could be learned easily. But in another sense* the language planning efforts are a witness to the end of humanism. There was no literature I written in these languages; they were merely to be means of communication rather than the way to assimilate a culture. 240 There was no purpose to writing other than to transmit knowledge. Language was pure form rather than a measure of human potential. Despite the differences in purposes of humanist educators and language planners* there are some familiar concepts in Beck's treatise. The first is Comenius' pedagogy. Although Beck never published his version of Comenius' Janua. he was; . . . . « . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . equally so. It is somewhat amusing to consider Beck's caveat that no one attempt to memorize the dictionary of characters because it would be much easier to learn them through the vernacular. It may strike us as odd that Beck believed that learning a passage of numbers by comparing it to an equivalent passage in English would be easier than simply memorizing the numbers* but Beck's implicit faith in this means of instruction demonstrates the pervasiveness of Comenius' theories. At the same time, his warning reminds us how tempting it must have been for some of his fellov[ schoolmaster readers to teach his characters "without book.' The second familiar concept is grammar. Beck cautions that the character can only be learned quickly if the gram matical directions are observed, and the grammatical directions are* not surprisingly* taken from Latin grammar. Accordingly, chapter one is an orthography which shows how to write the numbers 0-9* letters, and marks of punctuation. Chapters 241 two through five teach etymology, or the parts of speech, gender, number, case, person, and tense. There are the familiar paradigms: the number 3 denotes the verb "abate," and the letter "p" in front signifies a noun. The vowels mark the case, and the letter "s" indicates plural. Nominative an Abater(s) p3(s). Genitive (of) an Abater(s) pa3(s). Dative to an Abater(s) pe3(s). Accusative (a or the) Abater(s) pi3(s). Vocative Co) Abater(s) po3(s). Ablative (from an) Abater(s) pu3(s). (Character B1v-B2r) The only difference in Beck’s treatment of etymology is that there are seven parts of speech rather than eight: interjec tion is combined with adverbs.^ Chapter six is devoted to syntax which is defined as "the joining together of two, or more words in a sentence." Syntax is based on the traditional Latin concepts of concord and government. Beck cautions, however, that "Howsoever the words in a Sentence be placed for Elegancy, or the Idiom of any language, they must be reduced to a plain Grammatical order, that their Syntax or construction may be known." Beck makes the same distinction between grammatical order and rhetorical order that Brinsley made. Brinsley is not mentioned, but the fact that Beck gives primary status to grammatical order without specifying how this order is obtained indicates that both Beck and his readers must have been well acquainted with something akin to Brinsley’s ^ Salmon, Language in 17th-Century England, p. 188. 242 golden rule of construing. Chapter seven, the last chapter before the lexicon, deals with prosody. For Beck "prosody teacheth how to speak and pronounce this Character" rather than how to write verse (Charac ter 32). The rules for pronunciation are simple. The sounds are taken from the English monosyllable for each of the numbers, though somewhat simplified for foreigners: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 on. too.or [to] tre. for. or [fo] fi» sic. sen. at. nin. 0. The letters are pronounced as they are in English, and rules are given for placing stress on polysyllabic words (Charac ter 32-33). Beck mentions that the grammar and lexicon had already been translated into French and expects that other translations would shortly be made (Character 34). As mentioned earlier, these straightforward attempts to provide short and easy learning of a universal written character were some of many remedies to the failure of the grammar schools to teach Latin. They were invented systems of communication which derived from grammar, but, despite the authors' claims to universality and ease of learning, it is difficult to see how these schemes were any improvement on natural languages. Lodowick's character did not have any real advantage over Chinese, in spite of his attempts to limit the number of radicals. The many subdistinctions for each radical seem to complicate rather than simplify the 243* problem. And Beck’s scheme* more complete though it be* does not offer a feasible solution to the problem of learning it. Learning a vocabulary consisting primarily of numbers does not nece,ssarily simplify the task for students. To adc to the difficulty* the words which are semantically relatec have different numbers rather than a similar one. For instance ”to fly" is "1940,” but "to fly" as "to run away 1 1 is "ul436," a fly, the insect, is "41941," an Ox fly "r1942,’, a candle fly "r1943," a fire fly "rl944," a butterfly "r1945»" and a Spanish horse fly is "Gantharides" (Character G2r). The only possible result would be a mind boggling attempt to keep things straight. Both Lodowick’s and Beck’s schemes, if used, would have resulted in years of logomachies. Many were aware of the problems of current language schemes. Seth Ward, for example, had chastised Webster for his recommendation that a universal character be taught ir 18 the schools.10 Ward pointed out that the number of possible referents was unlimited; therefore, the potential number of characters would also have to be unlimited. An infinitude of characters could not be the basis for an easily learnec universal character. Instead of aligning characters to referents, he proposed that a notional alphabet be develop ed. Instead of recursively-used letters, there would be £ 1 R Webster was not the only one to recommend that £ universal language be taught in the schools. William Petty had also recommended that a universal character be taught to children. See Advice of W.P.to -Samuel Hartlib, p. 5. 244j finite set of notional primes which could be combined and arranged to form compound concepts. If the charactersj denoted primary notions* rather than real world referents* a! universal language might be developed. All that needed t c j be done was to reduce meaning to semantic primes. This* he proposed, could be done according to the principles of logic and mathematics. This speculation of Ward’s was probably the first conception of a universal language founded or philosophical principles rather than on grammar. But, though Ward first speculated about it* a Scot* George Dalgarno, was first to attempt a philosophical language.^ III. Dalgarno’s initial intention was not to develop a philosophical language, but to improve upon a stenography that had come to his attention in 1657 through Faustus Norstyn* a Pole studying at Oxford.20 Dalgarno was aware of the many arts of stenography published in England* was alsc aware of Lodowick's Common Writing (1647), and had seen the manuscript of Beck's Universal Character (1657) when it had been sent to John Wilkins, who regarded it as nothing more than "an enigmatical way of writing English."2^ Dalgarnc preferred Lodowick's work but felt that it was incomplete. ^ For Seth Ward's attack on Webster and his ideas about a universal language, see IA M I S la A, AJBUCJJ Q (Oxford, 1654), pp. 20-22. 20 Salmon, Language in 17th-CenturyEngland, p. 158. — — Salm on,—Langua ge-l-n-1-7-t h-Centur-v-Engl an d- , — d— 1.6-1---- 245 Thus he attempted a more thorough system of universal writing. Dalgarno’s work and associations in Oxford, however, brought him into contact with three influential men there who had an interest and some experience in evaluating and; developing universal language schemes. All three were part of the Oxford Philosophical Society, which would become the Royal Society; all three had interests in a philosophical language. Ward had already published his opinions on universal language in VindA.g.i,9e„ Acatig,m,i^rM,m. Wallis published GcammaJiAfifl linguae analicanae which is the first scientific treatment of English grammar and phonology. And Wilkins had a long standing interest in language reform; he would use his influence as one of the two secretaries of the Royal Society, and Thomas Sprat’s (1667) tc shape the Society’s linguistic credo. These three members of the Oxford Philosophical Society, all of whom saw Dalgarno’s manuscript in various stages, had a profound influence on shaping the philosophical nature of Dalgarno's work. It is not clear, however, what part the three played ir the composition of Dalgarno’s work. Samuel Hartlib recordec in his diary that ”Dr. Ward et Wallis are assisting a Scotchmar PP to perfect his investigation of Real Characters.” Dalgarno acknowledges Ward’s help on some tables in the Ars Sigporun (1661), and Wilkins claims to have helped on the same tables PP Hartlib, as quoted in Salmon, Language in 17th-Cen- tur.y En&La.na, p. 161. _ __ 246 in his e_5j l3.x -..tsw9r As a, Language (1668). Salmon reconstructs the situation arguing that while Dalgarno was trying to draw up a table of hiJ radical nouns* there was some disagreement regarding how best to go about it. Salmon speculates that because Dalgarno did not intend a philosophical language* he was not predisposed to any philosophical ordering of the tables. In correspond ence to another party, Dalgarno explains "manie learned persons here advyse me to order the simple notions in a philosophical method withal joyning the memorative helps cheifflie Doctor Wilkins advyses this and is taking painea himselff to put them in a praedicamental order, this method P - I did choose in the beginning but thereafter deserted it." “ Evidently Dalgarno* who had chosen not to develop a philosophical language, reaffirmed this intention to Ware and Wilkins. Nevertheless* Dalgarno's Tables of the universal character was circulating among those in Hartlib’s circle and would receive criticism by Lodowick and others. This would cause Dalgarno to change his mind. Furthermore* John Wallis had told Dalgarno in late 1657 that "this I Djil_V-g-rs.aX-__Character must be in the Nature of a Ug.V.„.Lgjqr guaee. "2i* And Wallis later wrote that Dalgarno had adaptec 23 Dalgarno* as quoted in Salmon, L axiguagJS...i.n..,17.t.h-£e&: taar.3L. E n g la n d > p. 167. p i i John Wallis, as quoted in Salmon, Language 11 17.tJ3r.P..gjqt-uxy...Eji£l.an.d* p. 173. 247 the universal character to his advice.25 In 1658 Dalgarno published an advertisement to attract subscriptions to help finance publication. The announcement was entitled N s , W , S , . . ,. t o , tM.Jjh-Q.Ig, .the.. Universal Character, and a rie_w.__JB_§t_i.onaX--La.n£.iiag_e. The advertisement refers interested persons to Hartlib’s house for additional information and mentions Seth Ward and Hartlib’s friend William Petty* but not Wilkins. But the title already indicates Dalgarno’s inclusion of "a new Rational Language” in his plans.25 The result of these events was that Dalgarno adopted a "predicamental order" for his radical nouns from Aristote lian logic. This methodical approach to language was what Wilkins had suggested before* but Dalgarno had originally decided against such a philosophical method. Despite Dalgarno’s original intention simply to develop the universal character* Salmon attributes Dalgarno’s final work* the Ars Signorurn* to the influence English stenography and the cumulative influence of Hartlib's circle, but especially of the members of the Oxford Philosophical Society, Ward* Wallis* anc Wilkins.27 Dalgarno’s most explicit statement regarding; those who influenced him is as follows: I recall that a chosen number of very learned men 25 Salmon, Language in 17th-Century England, p. 173. 26 Salmon, Language in 17th-Century England, pp. 168-169. 21— sa 1mon ,-Languag-in-1-7-th-Cen tur-y-En_Rland ,-pp— 1-7-2 = - 1 -7 - 4 .. 248 at the University of Oxford, to whom I first communicated this discovery, when they saw out lined of the whole art displayed on a single page, with characters added, were astonished by its unbelievable brevity; and especially that part which contained the particles. One of them, the very distinguished Seth Ward, Doctor of Theology and professor of astronomy in the Uni versity, afterwards communicated to me the Philo sophical Tables of Concepts (Notionum) that he himself had composed when he was working on this art; and although he had not yet come down to an explanation of particles and the structuring of speech by them, it is nevertheless very probable that in the course of time his labors would sooner or later have brought this art into the public light. Afterwards, indeed, I was told of the projects of others in this regard; for about the same time there appeared a book in English called Universal Character, which in truth taught nothing new but how to write or speak in English in a much more difficult way than is usual. Francis Lodowyck, a London citizen, had published his thoughts about this art with much greater ingenui ty; but to tell the truth, he was unequal to the undertaking, being without art, and without sound education (extra Scholas natus). ° What is conspicuous by absence is the name of John Wilkins. We know there was some contention between Dalgarno and Wilkins. Dalgarno rejected Wilkins' suggestions to adopt a predicamental order, so Wilkins decided to do it himself. Dalgarno complained to Hartlib that Wilkins was plagiariz ing, and Wilkins finally claimed credit for the philosophi cal order in Dalgarno's Ars Signorum.^^ Thus the omission of Wilkins' name is explicable. Dalgarno wanted to slight Wilkins. There is no doubt, however, that Dalgarno was P 8 Dalgarno, as translated by and quoted from Wayne Shumaker, Renaissance Curiosa (Binghamton, New York: Center for Medieval and Early Renaissance Studies, 1982), p. 138. ______^ Salmon, Language in 17th-Centurv England, d p. 170-171. ■ ' 24? influenced by his colleagues and contacts, especially Wilkins. Since we will want to look at Wilkins’ Essay in depth* it will be helpful to describe briefly Dalgarno’J 4£§.Jgi.gjagr.uffl. The first part of Ars Sienorum is a description of sounds. The second part, however, is the more interesting and was the source of the controversy with Wilkins. Dalgarno had to develop a systematic way of forming words in his nev language. Two of the criticisms Dalgarno had received from circulating the manuscript were Culpeper’s objection that ir the original TaJaJLg.fi..fifc-t.i.V,-^J:.ag.l-Jl,ha.r.a.Q. tff.r» there was n<j "analogy" between the symbol and the object, and Lodowick’s criticism that the characters needed to be self-explanatory. These criticisms together with the insistence of Ward, Wallis, and Wilkins on some kind of philosophical method made Dalgarno resort to the predicaments from logic. Dalgarno, however, opted for the predicaments as they had been simplified by Ramus, who, in Dalgarno’s judgment, was "the sharpest of the writers on logic. To arrive at a word for something, one must know the predicament, sub-category, and genus of the concept to be named. For example, the word for "animosity" is pot. Tcj recognize this, a student would have to know that animosity is an accident. The seven predicaments in Dalgarno's scheme o n " M.e L o g i c o. r urn _Sc r i p t o r urn a c u t i s s i ro.ua. » j Dalgarno, Ars Sjgnorum (London, 1661), p. 53, as quoted in Shumaker-,— p.— 142.-----------------------------------------------------1 250 are as follows: Av Ens, Res Hv Substantia Ev Accidens Iv Ens comDletum, vel concretum Ov Corpus Yv Spiritus Vv ComDositum: id est, Homo^1 ’’Animosity" is not a self-subsistent being; thus it does not fall under the predicament Ens. Res. Neither is it a substance (Substantia). It is. however, a characteristic of. or something that happens to, a subject. Thus, it is an accident of a subject. The sub-categories of accidents are eight, each being distinguished by its initial consonant.^ S Accidens Commune B Accidens Mathematicum D Accidens Phvsicum Generale G Accidens Qualitas sensibilis P Accidens Sensitiva T Accidens Rationale ST Accidens OEconomicum K Accidens Politicum^-* '’Animosity*' belongs to the fifth sub-category. Accidens Sensitiva. Within each sub-category are several genera. The category Accidens Sensitiva contains nine genera, the vowel distinguishing each genus. PAs Generalis PHs Motus Animalis PEs Sensus Interni Pis Inclinatio Naturalis POs Passiones PrinciDalis ^ Shumaker, p. 11 and appendix. op For a fuller explanation of Dalgarno's word forming method, see Shumaker, pp. 142-43 and appendix. O O , Shumaker, appendix.__________________________________________ . . 251! PYs PasslQD.es minus Principalis PUs Passlones Affines spas e i f e.gjaj.a„.^as.§4 on mb SPhs Alii Effectus3^ '‘Animosity” belongs tho the genus Passiones Principalis, anc this genus is also subdivided into nine species, the final consonant distinguishing each species. pon qi Ro.r.,Lxl ..a.fillum pof 5P.SS. ■ . r . . f c ...gj?ly,i5 pob ga.ud lum . . . r , . . . . .lae-kiti-S pod pog pudorr. gloria pop agjg.tmg.kiQ r. QQ.ntjg.mp.us *pot afllffi.gLaiitas pok lifre r.e 3 - i taa. 3 D The entire table, the full title of which reads ir English G x . m m . a M 0 Q . . z P . h U , o § p . p h t : . ,l,a,b.i,e. and of All Simple. . .and General. Concepts Both Artificial..anc Natural.Including Reasons and More Common Aspects Arraneec bv a Practical Method, could be diagrammed in Ramistic fashion on one page, and something approximating this may be what Dalgarno showed to Ward and Wilkins. Dalgarno explains each of the predicaments starting from the highest degree of abstraction to the most con crete. He also deals with prepositions, compound words, anc other topics that need not concern us here. What is of 31f Shumaker, appendix. O C Shumaker, appendix. In some of the examples two words are paired. The ”r” between the two words denotes ari opposition. For example, in Dalgarno’s scheme pon denotes "love,” but pron denotes “hate." Shumaker, p. 145. ---------------------- -— — ------------- . 252 primary importance is to understand Dalgarno* Ars Sienorun as the crucial link in the movement from a universal character to a philosophical language, a language that laid claim to methodizing the relationship between words and things as far as the latter had been classified by logic. But in conjunction with this view of language came a different attitude toward elegant speech which is worth noting. Language would be virtually transparent, allowing immediate access to things. The advantage of a philosophi cal language is that it would be completely unambiguous anc regular. There would be no irregularities and anomalies, and learning would thus be accelerated. Students would only have to learn the system of word formation. There would be no need of rules and endless memorization. New words could be coined, and their significance would immediately be reflected by the form of the word itself. Thus, the elegance to be found in this language is the perfect regularity and rationality of the system: "all elegance is found in the perfect conformity of the external logos to the internal. The only truly eloquent speaker, therefore, is the gooc logician who can analyze language into its logical categor ies. This does not mean that a peasant who knows no logic cannot be understood; it simply means that his meaning i i less immediately apprehended and less easily followed. Eloquence, therefore, consists of the most precise corre -?7~-Shumaker, p. -159.---------- -— -— ---------------------------------- 253 spondence between word and thing. Dalgarno even goes so far as to suggest that the illogical idioms of ordinary speech be replaced by their logical equivalents. To effect this reform of colloquial speech, he suggests compiling logical sentences in a phrase book.^® Dalgarno’s suggestion is antithetical to humanist pedagogy and cannot escape our notice. Not only does Dalgarno re-define eloquence, he would supplant the entire basis of humanist pedagogy. Ever since Erasmus had written his Adages and Colloquies and recommended copy books, schoolboys had been recording and learning pithy Latin phrases. Now all the books of proverbs, all the phrase books, all the copy books, all the pedagogical aids that had been developed for more than a century would be supplanted by a compilation of logical phrases. Dalgarno’s philosophical language and the attitudes that shaped it are contrary to humanist ideals. But the best seventeenthcentury representative of a philo sophical language is probably Wilkins’ Essav towards a Real Character and a Philosophical Language (1668). In it, therefore, we will see the deliberate exclusion of humanist assumptions about language and the arrogation of humanist forms of discourse to logic and philosophical grammar. More will be said about the relationship between rhetoric and seventeenth-century language planners at the end of this chapter. Now, however, I will examine the work of Dalgarno’s ______ ^ Shumaker, p. 159.____________________________________________ 254 colleague and the competitor he tried to slight* John Wilkins. IV. Wilkins had a prolonged interest in language reform. His minor part in the Webster-Ward debate of 1654 does not adequately indicate the duration of Wilkins’ interests in linguistic matters. As early as 1641, while Comenius was in England to aid the reformation of schools, Wilkins published his treatment on cryptic systems of writing, entitled Mercury, or the Secret and Swift Messenger: shewing, How a Man mav with Privacy and Speed communicate his Thoughts to a Friend at anv distance. Most of the work is a curious enumeration of schemes for ciphering and deciphering messages. Chapter thirteen, however, is of interest. Its title is "Concerning an universall Character, that may be legible to all nations and languages. The Benefit, and possibility of this." This is one of the first mentions of the universal character in England.^ This chapter of Wilkins' deserves attention in order to contrast his initial interest in the universal character and his subsequent interest in a philosophical language. The chapter begins with a discussion of man’s fallen Benjamin Demott claims that the inspiration for a universal character came from Comenius' Via Lucis. See "The Sources and Development of John Wilkin's Philosophical Language," Journal of English and German Philology, 57 (1958), 1-13. Salmon argues that it came from Bacon. Wilkins' mention of the universal character seems to support Salmon, who has already made her case in an article on Wilkins. See Salmon, Language in 17th-Century England, pp. 97-99._____________________________________________________________ 255 state. Since the fall of Adam, man has been cursed doubly. The first curse was mankind’s subjection to labor after the expulsion from Eden. The second curse was the confusion of I tongues at Babel. Against the first curse, man has "Arts and Professions." Against the other, the best help that we can boast of, is the Latin tongue, and the learned lan guages, which by reason of their generality, do somewhat restore us from the first confusion. But now, if there were such an universal character, to express things and notions, as might be legible to all people and countries, so that men of several Nations might with the same ease, both write and read it; this invention would be a far greater advantage in this particular, and mightily conduce to the spreading and promoting of all Arts and Sciences: because that great part of our time, which is now required to the Learning of words, might then be employed in the study of things. Nay, the confusion at Babel might this way have been remedied, if every one could have expressed his own meaning by the same kind of Character. (Mercury 105-6) Wilkins adds that there are already nations which us.e this kind of a character referring to Chinese characters, which I he believes are also understood in Japan. And, after discussing several similar characters with universal comprehension, he discusses a scheme in which "there must be as many several characters as there are primitive words" (Mercury 108-9), He notes that Hebrew is one such language. To each primi tive character marks could be attached to distinguish gram matical categories. Wilkins does not conceive of this 256 character as being affable.**® And he adds that learning this character would not be any more difficult than learning any other language "because there needs not be more signs for the expression of things* than there is now for the expression of words. Amongst those in China and Japani there is said to be about seven or eight thousand" (Mercury 110) . The case made here by Wilkins was that the universal, characters had many advantages and no more disadvantages than a language such as Latin already had. Men could have a truly universal means of communication to promote arts and sciences and to remedy the confusion of tongues, yet it would present no more problem than learning Latin. It need not be repeated how much this argument fails to understand the cultural goals which the humanists were trying to accom- plish. But it does intimate Wilkins’ awareness of the problems in the schools. That a universal character needed to be invented or discovered meant that Latin was inadequate and that learning Latin was an issue of some discussion. In 1646 Wilkins published another work that demon strates his interest in language. It was a treatise on preaching entitled E^eXes lashes.,or, A Discourse concerning tJae._.Glft.__oi:__Preaching as it fals under the rules of Art, This was a slight departure from the rhetorical tradition in **® Each nation could "differ in the expression of things, yet they all agree in the same conceit of them.? p , 110 .— ---- 1 257 that he advocated four canons for preaching: method, matter, expression, and memory. To analyze this work in depth would take us too far from the present topic of a philosophical language, but the work is important insofar as it character izes an attitude toward rhetoric which will show up again in Sprat’s History of the Roval Society, which Wilkins had a significant role in writing.^ In the discussion of expression, which is the equi valent of elocution, its rhetorical counterpart, there is no discussion of how to achieve elegance and propriety of speech. ’ ’The phrase should be plain, full, wholesome, and affectionate." To the modern reader, this list of adjec tives does not necessarily exclude the florid style of John Donne or Jeremy Taylor, but Wilkins’ attitude becomes clearer when he contrasts the style he advocates to the rhetorical style then employed by many preachers. "It should be plain and natural, not darkened with the affectation of Scholastical harshness, or Rhetorical flourishes.Thus Wilkins was already disposed against stylistic rhetoric before the foundation of the Royal Society. This attitude he would carry with him and make a part of the Society’s credo. At this point, his disposition against rhetoric had no theoretical /I 1 1 For a discussion of Wilkins' part in writing The History of the Roval Society see Francis Christensen, pp. 179-87. For a more detailed discussion of Wilkins' Ecclesiastes, see Howell's Eiahteenth-Centurv British Logic and Rhetoric, pp. 451-458. U p ______ Wilkins, Ecclesiastes (London, 1646), p. 72._________ 258j justification; the justification would come when he began in earnest to work on a real character and a philosophical language. During the 1650s Wilkins maintained an interest in' language matters, though he was not actively engaged iJ developing a language scheme until after his contact with) Dalgarno in 1657. But Wilkins must have recognized the immediate appeal to scientists and educators of a methodical (philosophical) treatment of the relationship between words and things. And since Dalgarno had rejected his proposal to classify nouns according to a predicamental order. Wilkins no doubt felt that he should do it himself. In the "EpistlJ Dedicatory" of his An Essav Toward a Real Character and Philosophical Language (1668), Wilkins compares the efforts of the Royal Society to develop a philosophical language with the efforts of the French Academy and the Italian Academy to regulate their national languages. As part of the Society's efforts to regulate English, Wilkins sets in sequence three ratios and assigns a relative value to each. Just as it is without question that the general good of mankind is more important than the specific good of particular nations, so things are more important than words and real knowledge is more important than elegance ii ^ i of speech. J Wilkins is setting up a hierarchy of values n o "Now if those famous Assemblies consisting of great Wits of their Age and Nations, did judge this Work of ' > for the polishing of their Language,! 259 much as Comenius had done in A Reformation of Schooles. In both cases real knowledge, whether of things or ideas, is valued as more important than a knack with language. Wilkins is not merely referring to the French and Italian designs to purify their language, he is repudiating the rhetorical tradition with its emphasis on eloquence and wisdom— wisdom. it need be added, only attainable through language training. A philosophical language had to be based on philosophical principles, not on linguistic ones. The parallel here between Comenius1 tract and Wilkins' essay is not superficial, for language is charged with the same capacity for deceit and misrepresentation in both works. Beside being advantageous for science and commerce. the philosophical language will contribute much to the clearing of some of our Modern differences in Religion, by unmasking many wild errors, that shelter themselves under the disguise of affected phrases; which being Philo sophically unfolded, and rendered according to the genuine and natural importance of Words, will appear to be inconsistencies and contradictions. And several of those pretended, mysterious, profound notions, expressed in great swelling words, whereby some men set up for reputation, being this way examined, will appear to be, either nonsense, or very flat and jejune. (EhlL»«-Lang* B1r) worthy of their united labor and studies; Certainly then, the Design here proposed, ought not to be thought unworthy( of such assistance; it being as much to be preferred before that, as things are better than words, as real knowledge is1 beyond elegancy of speech, as the general good of mankind, is beyond that of any particular Country or Nation.” Wilkins, jAn Essav Towards a Real Character and a Philosophical Language [(London, 1668)^ _sig._A2rJL Hereafter Phil. Lane. ___________ 260 Wilkins then adds that if the essay is of no other use than exposing the poverty of great swelling phrases, it would be well worth "a man’s pains and study* considering the Common mischief that is done, and the many impostures and cheats that are put upon men, under the disguise of affected insig nificant Phrases” (B1r-v). These statements indicate fairly i clearly Wilkins’ antipathy to the ideals for which rhetorical education had come to stand. But his attitude, it is important to emphasize, could not develop as long as humanistic con ceptions of language prevailed. Language had to be based on a foundation more solid than societal use, and content had to be wrested free of form. This is why Wilkins’ hierarchy had to be established. In order for philosophy to taki l command of the language curriculum, things had to be elevated over words and "real” knowledge had to be held in greater esteem than elegance of phrase. This is a necessary tactic in developing a philosophical language. The old linguistic structure had to be razed to make way for the new. In order to lay the foundation for the philosophical language as well as to enhance his own credibility, Wilkins traces his development of the real character, acknowledging the influence of his colleagues most of whom were scientist! and members of the Royal Society. Wilkins acknowledges the other attempts to found a universal character, but he adds that they all made the same mistake that he had made in Mercury where he suggested that a universal character could 261 be constructed after the model of a natural language with the fewest radicals. Hebrew had been recommended as "the fittest ground work for such a design" (Phil. Lang. B2r). He then explains how Seth Ward exerted much influence on his design. It was Ward* says Wilkins, who first set him aright regarding the errors of other learned men's attempts to discover or invent a universal character. These other » efforts attempted to frame a language without regard "to the nature of things.All those who had preceded Wilkins had been barking up the wrong tree. Natural languages had been the source of all the confusion. Not only were languages difficult to learn and full of deceitfulness and mischief- making, they were inimical to real knowledge. Hence any I attempt to advance knowledge could not begin with natural languages, or with grammar, but had to be based in the philosophy of things. Besides "the many Private conferences" Wilkins had with Ward, he also acknowledges Ward’s public account of a philo sophical language and how it might be developed as given in ^ Wilkins says. "In the time of that daily anti intimate converse which I then injoyed. with that most Learned and excellent Person Dr. Seth Ward....But for all such attempts to this purpose, which he [Ward] had either seen or heard of. the Authors of them did generally mistake in their first foundations; whilst they did propose to themselves the framing of such a Character, from a Dietj.pn4 ary of Words, according to some particular Language, without reference to the nature of things, and that common Notion of them, wherein Mankind does agree, which must chiefly be respected, before any attempt of this nature could signify I any things, as to the main end of it." Pftil. Lang. , sigi '-B2-r—------------ - - J 262 Vindiciae Academiarum (Phil. Lang. B2v). In addition to mentioning Ward. Wilkins describes working "to give assis tance to another person, who was willing to engage in this design of framing a real Character, from the Natural notion of things" (Phil. Lang. B2v). Wilkins is referring to his soured relationship with Dalgarno and claims to have drawn up the Tables of Substance, or the species of Natural Bodies, but purposely omits any reference to Dalgarno by name. He also acknowledges Francis Willoughby, who had drawn up a taxonomy of Animals; John Ray, who had done much work on classifying plants; and William Lloyd, who had appended a dictionary to the Essav and suited it to the Tables. It is clear from Wilkins' acknowledgements that the study of language had become a scientific endeavor. John Ward. Francis Willoughby and John Ray were fellow members with Wilkins in the Royal Society, and their participation lent credibility to the entire endeavor. To aid the development of a philosophical language, Wilkins also acknowledges the influence of what he calls "Natural Grammar." Natural grammar is intended to discrimi nate a philosophical language from natural languages because instituted languages, or natural languages, are plagued with many unnecessary rules and other inconveniences; natural 2 1 E j "But he for whom I had done this, not liking this method, as being of too great a Compass, conceiving that he could sufficiently provide for all the chief Radicals, in a much brief and more easy way, did not think it fit to make use of these Tables." Phil. Lane., sis. B2v_.------------------- . 263 grammar would abstract the rules of language according to philosophical principles.^ The dissociation of a philosophical language from natural languages underlies the four parts of Wilkins' book. The first part is a prolegomenon on natural lan guages, The second part contains the Universal Philosophy. The third part develops the Philosophical, or Naturalj Grammar. And the final part explains the Real Character and Philosophical language. I will briefly summarize each of the parts for the reader's convenience in understanding Wilkins' intent to supplant the linguistic foundation of human knowledge and behavior. The first part is a review of the existing knowledge of comparative linguistics. But the intent is not simply to survey the existing body of knowledge of natural languages. The purpose is to demonstrate the inadequacy of natural languages so as to conclude that studying natural languages will not conduce to real knowledge.^ In order to approach ^ Natural grammar must "be suited to the Philosophy of Speech, absracting from those many unnecessary rules belonging to instituted Language; which proved a matter of no small difficulty, considering the little-help to be had for it, from those few Authors who had before undertaken to do any thing in this kind." Phil. Lang, sig. B2v, Wilkins states that the first part is intended to be a rationale or a "Praecognita, concerning such Tongues and Letters as are already in being, particularly concerning those various defects and imperfections in them, which ought to be supplied and provided against, in any such Language or Character, as is to be invented according to the rules of Art." p.bJLLu.JLang,i. p. 1. ] 264] his subject thus* he proposes four lines of inquiry: of the existing languages* which is the Original? what are "their' several kinds?" what are "the various changes and corruptions to which they are liable?" and what are "the manifold defects belonging to them?" (Phil. Lang. 2). The intent is to eliminate the claim of any natural language to universality. In discussing which language is the original* Wilkins says that "there is scarce any subject that hath been more thoroughly scanned and debated amongst Learned men* than the Original of Languages and Letters" (Piu.lt .lang-t 2). He lists all of the mother tongues extant. These are languages which do not derive from* depend on* or have an affinity with each other, and are to be distinguished from derivative tongues. Latin is a mother tongue* Portuguese a deriva tive. Most of the mother tongues, however, are Indo-Euro pean* but comparative linguistics had not yet establishet language families. Wilkins1 point is simply that of all the mother tongues* Hebrew is the oldest, and "from the several, defects and imperfections which seem to be in this Language it may be guessed not to be the same which was con-created with our first Parents* and spoken by Adam in Paradise" (Phil. Lang. 5). Having eliminated any claim that any one natural language is the Edenic tongue* Wilkins takes up the questions of linguistic change and corruption to prove that i no language has remained stable since the confusion of tonguesj This inquiry is divided into three queries: 1. Whether 265 the purest of the mother tongues remains unchanged since the confounding of tongues at Babel, 2. Whether and how many mother tongues have been lost, and 3. Whether and how many new languages have arisen since Babel (Phil. Lang. 6-10). To answer the first query, Wilkins traces the develop ments and changes in English as it was used to record the Lords Prayer from about 700 A.D. to the King James Bible (1611). Beside a fascinating demonstration of linguistic change, Wilkins is employing an argument from historical examples to conclude that no mother tongue has remained unchange since Babel. He likewise demonstrates from historical sources that many languages in antiquity were lost and many have come into being. His conclusion is that natural languages are so full of changes and corruptions that none can be traced to the confusion of tongues at Babel (Phil. Lane. 6-10). The final inquiry concerns the many defects of natural languages. He considers writing systems, phonology, and semantics and concludes that all languages are subject to equivocation, synonymy, homonymy, ambiguity, and redundancy, as well as to inadequate writing systems. Therefore, in light of the need for religious harmony, international commerce and the advancement of knowledge, the only compen sation for the inadequacies of natural languages is to develop a systematic, regular, rational language with characters that have an iconic relationship to their referents, referents which have been categorized according to reason. This is : ■ ~ 2 ’6 ' 6 possible because "as men do generally agree in the same Principle of Reason* so do they likewise agree in the same Internal Notion or Apprehension of things" (Phil. Lane. 20). Herein lies the justification for the real character. All men have been endowed with reason* for man is by definition' the rational animal. Furthermore, all men have the samJ sensory apparatus. Hence the annoying flux and inconsistency of natural languages can be supplanted by the constancy and stability of the world of things as they are perceived by mankind. Wilkins' task then is clear. He must suit the philosophical language to the "nature of things" (Phil. Lang. 2 1) . In the second part, Wilkins sets forth the hundreds ofj tables he had prepared "conteining a regular enumeration and description of all those things and notions to which names are to be assigned" (Phil. Lane. 22). The table is quite elaborate* but has been condensed into Ramistic dichotomies for simplification. The table in full appears below (Phil. Lajflg,, 23) : All kinds of things and notions* to which names are to be assigned* may be distributed into such as are either more | General; namely those Universal notions, whether belonging more properly to [ GENERAL. I RELATION MIXED. II RELATION OF ACTION. Ill [Words: DISCOURSE. IV .Sp.e.si.fll; denoting either (•CREATOR. V LQXSSjairs; namely such things as were either created or concreated by God, not excluding several of those notions, which are framed by the minds of men, considered either 267 rGfljg . ftftJlLUgly; WORLD. VI jDi.stribu.tlv.eXy; according to the several kinds of Beings, whether such as do belong to r Substance: rlaanlmsJLs; element, vii |Animate; considered according to their several rSa&sias; whether [STONE. VIII rXmagjr.Cgjft.t; as tiiiigjiaXs. {m e ta l. Ix Perfect: as Eimt» HERB consid accord.to the Leaf, x FLOWER.XI SEED VESSEL.XII BIRD. XVII BEAST. XVIII SHRUB. XIII TREE. XIV EXANGUIOUS. XV .FISH. XVI Sanguineous:' [PECULIAR. XIX Parts:\GENERAL. XX . Age.idesnt; MAGNITUDE. XXI SPACE. XXII MEASURE. XXIII NATURAL POWER. XXIV Quant. ; Q uslUJlx; Whether HABIT. XXV MANNERS. XXVI SENSIBLE QUALITY. XXVII SICKNESS. XXVIII SPIRITUAL. XXIX CORPOREAL. XXX MOTION. XXXI OPERATION. XXX RslaJtlac; whether more OECONOMICAL. XXXIII Private..{POSSESSIONS. XXXIV PROVISIONS. XXV [CIVIL. XXXVI JUDICIAL. XXXVII MILITARY. XXXVIII NAVAL. XXXIX ECCLESIASTICAL. XL Wilkins distinguishes between the predicaments and the st six genera which* "by reason of their Generalness, .are above all those common heads of things callec hO Predicaments. Of interest is the fourth genus, Discourse. Wilkins’ diagram of the discursory species should be revealing of how he countenances rhetoric. Language is subdividec into parts* modes, and kinds. Parts and modes of discourse need not concern us here, for they are dealing with letters and punctuation and what may be termed speech acts such as affirmation, negation, supposition, and concession. ThJ kinds of discourse, however, are important. There are three species listed under kinds of discourse: Grammatical. Logical, and Common to Both (Phil. Lane. 44). The "mixed notions of discourse belonging both tc Grammar and Logic" are listed in schematic form. Nearly the complete list follows: Adage. Oration, Epistle. Narration, Interpretation, translation, Paraphrase, Commentary, Epitome, Prologue, Epilogue, Transition, Digression (Phil. Lang. 49). Almost all of these "mixed notions of discourse" had been part of the humanist rhetorical tradition. Anc almost all of these discursory types had been practiced bj schoolboys in Renaissance grammar schools. Of interest, therefore, is the conspicuous absence of any reference to J l i O "In the precedent Scheme, all the several things orj notions, to which names are to be assigned, are reduced to forty Genus’s. The first six of which do comprehend sucti matters, as by reason of their Generalness, or in some other] respect, are above all those common heads of things called Predicaments; The rest belonging to the several Predica-j ments, of which I reckon only five. Amongst these, Sub stance doth take in fourteen Genus's, Quantity three, Quality five, Action four, and Relation eight." Phil. Lang., p. 24, see table. 269 rhetoric. These humanist rhetorical practices have beer apportioned to grammar and logic, and. in Wilkins’ system of a philosophical language, rhetoric has been systematically excluded. ’’Rhetoric” is not even a concept admissible ir Wilkins' scheme. Whether or not Wilkins intentionally excluded rhetoric from his systematic treatment of all that was worth naming, and thus worth talking about, is impossible to judge, but we have seen his prolonged antipathy to the ideals on which rhetoric depended. Eloquence (wisdom as recorded in learnec languages), decorum (awareness of context and audience), anc the social rather than philosophical foundation of language are all denied. In addition to these attacks on rhetoric. we have Thomas Sprat’s History of. the Roval Society (1667) in which the doctrine of things is upheld against the mere predilection for words. And Wilkins was. as Sprat acknow ledges. the hand that guided Sprat's hand.2*^ Consequently, in several senses. Wilkins' Essav can be seen as an anti rhetoric in that it was intended to replace rhetoric bj arrogating all linguistic concerns to logic and grammar, anc it established an epistemological foundation in the materia) world rather than in communal assent and belief. Language is a conduit for ideas; no functional quality of language iJ recognized other than to transfer thoughts from one mind to another. All hints of humanist exhortation to action are ------liL_C h riste n s e n»— p — 1-7-9 -.1.8-7-___________________________________ 270 gone; all means of affecting readers or auditors are missing. In the third part of the Essav» "Concerning Natural Grammar." it is interesting how Wilkins intends natural grammar to articulate with the foregoing enumeration of things and notions. The Universal Philosophy was to supplj the matter for discourse by enumerating and describing all the things and notions which were worth discoursing about. Natural grammar would then be the instrument for forming simple notions into complex propositions and discourses. Philosophy has responsibility for invention, and grammar for composition. Rhetoric has no place.50 Natural grammar had to be distinguished from tradi tional grammar. Just as Wilkins dissociates a philosophical language from all other languages, so he dissociates naturaJ grammar from instituted or particular grammar.5^ Tradi tional grammar only deals with the particulars of individual R 0 "Having now dispatched the second thing proposed to be treated of. namely, the Scientifical part, containing a regular enumeration and description of such things ancj notions, as are to be known, and to which names are to be assigned, which may be styled Universal Philosophy; I proceed in the next place to the Organical part, or an inquiry after such kind of necessary helps, whereby as bjj instruments we must be assisted in the forming these more simple notions into complex Propositions and Discourses, which may be styled Grammar, containing the Art of Words or Discourse." Phil. Lang., p.297. C 1 "Natural grammar which may likewise be stylec philosophical, Rational, and Universal should contain all such Grounds and Rules, as do naturally and necessarily belong to the Philosophy of Letters and speech in the LGen e r-a 1.. P- .— 297-------------------------------------- 1 27ll languages and "is defined by [Julius Caesar] Scaliger to be &gjJUlfcla,.J.CLq-UgMA— &X-US.U" (Phil. Lang. 297). Whereas insti tutional grammar is based in usage and custom, a philosophi cal grammar is founded on principles that are general anc absolute and inhere in all languages. Wilkins' discussion of syntax makes the same distinc tion. Syntax is defined as "the proper way of Union or right Construction of words, into Propositions, or continued Speech" (Phil. Lang. 354). It can be divided into two kinds. "1. That which is Customary and figurative: or 2. That which is Natural and regular” (354). Wilkins explains that in customary syntax words are "put together according to £ Metaphorical and translatitious sense of them” (354). He gives as examples phrases in Latin and English which cannot be translated word for word.52 In contrast to the customary order of speech is the natural, or regular, order. Wilkins writes, "That structure may be called Regular, which i£ according to the natural sense and order of the words” (355). The natural order is then given and closely approximates Brinsley's Grammatical order.5^ Throughout Wilkins' treatise 5 P "Breaking a jist, Hedging in a Debt, Taking one's heels and flying away, Being brought to bed, Lying in, Being in Labor or travail, etc.” Phil. Lane., p. 354. "The General Rule for this order amongst Integrals is, That which governs should precede; The Nominative Caso before the Verb, and the Accusative after; The Substantive before the Adjective: Only Adjective Pronouns being Part-j icles and affixed, may without inconvenience be put indif-j ferently either before or after. Derived Adverbs should -f-o l-l-o w— that— which— is— called— the— V-er-b»— as— denoting— the 272 on language* the institutional* usual* customary* and social is discarded for the absolute, regular* natural, and philo sophical. It is thus not surprising that Wilkins cites Scotus’ Grammatica s decuLativa as one of his sources. The specula tive tradition of medieval grammar is particularly apt for Wilkins* purpose. The ’’speculum*" or mirror, which grammar employs should accurately reflect the material world.5i| Hence* in a very real sense, Wilkins is trying to reintro duce the medieval grammatical tradition, one that the humanists found entirely useless.5^ The fourth part of the Essay, "Concerning a Real Character and a Philosophical Language," is the application of parts two and three. The character here is termed "Real" rather than "Universal" as in other schemes because this character corresponds to the real categories of things and notions outlined in part two. It is a philosophical language because it is based in general principles and is consistent* systematic, rational, and it avoids the problems of natural languages. It is designed to be effable and has its own writing system. There are marks for each of the forty genera with ways of quality or manner of the Act." Phil.Lang., p. 355. 54 Salmon, kajagMagg.,,l.q...ll.t.h-.^ntyry .,fing;u.nri> pp. 97-98, 102-106. 55 For a fuller discussion of Wilkins’ Natural Grammar, see Salmon, pp. 97-126, and G.A.Padley, G r a mm a tioal . T h e o r \ in .We s t.er.n Europe, 1500-1700: The Latin Tradition ( Cam-] Lbr-idge:— Cambr-idge—Univer-sity— P-r-ess,— 1-97-6-)-*— pp.— 1-94-209.------1 273 demarcating differences and species. After demonstrating the character by rendering the Lords Prayer and the Creed in it. Wilkins begins a compari son of his language with other languages. His language is first compared in ’’euphonicalness” to forty nine other languages. And taken altogether, the Philosophical Language compares with the best of them (Phil. Lane. 440). In addition to its euphony, the Philosophical language is also easy to learn, unlike natural languages (441-442). It has the added advantage that "every word [is] a description of the thing signified by it; Every letter [is] significant, either as to the Nature of the thing, or the Grammatical Variations of the Word, which cannot be said of any of the rest; besides the constant Analogy observed in all kind of Derivations and Inflexions" (440). The philosophical language is better than any other because it is iconic to the world of things. Finally, Wilkins compares his language to Latin, Chinese characters, and other attempts at a universal character. In every way Wilkins’ philosophical language outdistances its competitors. And on the final pages with particular emphasis, Wilkins reasserts the ease of learning his language over learning Latin. Now for the Latin Grammar, it doth in the common way of Teaching take up several of our first years, not without great toil and vexation of the mind, under the hard tyranny of the School, before we arrive to a tolerable skill in it....So that by this it appears, that in point of easiness betwixt this and Latin, there is a proposition of one to ______forty; that is, a man of an ordinary capacity may______ 1 274 more easily learn to express himself this way in one Month, than he can by the Latin in forty Months. (Phil. Lane. 453-454) What began as a problem of teaching schoolboys Latin ir the grammar schools developed into a philosophical language intended to replace Latin as the language of learning and intended to suit the needs of the empirical science. Along the way* however, the manner in which language was conceived changed drastically. In part this change was a result of the empirical philosophy, but it was also a result of the reforn of language pedagogy, and especially Comenius' pedagogy. These two. however, converged in the philosophical lan guage. But more significant than the ways languages were taught were the assumptions that lay behind them. For the humanist educators, language was always governed by use. custom, and societal conventions. For the language plan ners, language had to be regulated, systematized, and decon- textualized. The first and necessary step was to divide language into form and content, words and things. Things were given priority and associated with the material word which was stable, constant, and analyzable. Once things had been classified systematically, it was a matter of assigning words to things. To insure a perfect match, words were made an object, something that could be sculpted to fit a referent. And here the metaphor of kernel and shell, so prominent ir seventeenth-century discussions of language, is particularly apt. Once language had become an object of scientific study 275 it too could be classified and general principles drawn from it. Thus, as it became more an object of study, language lost its social function, and achieved a universal status; which became prominent in the seventeenth-century rational and universal grammars. Language was reduced to a vehicle for transmitting thoughts about things. And as languagi became more and more decontextualized. its social foundation, so important to humanists, collapsed. The new epistemology stipulated that knowledge and human action were not affectec in any way by language. Knowledge inhered in things, anc human action remained inexplicable until Locke's An Essav G.QaQjtr.nl.n&..Huffl3.n JJLnderstgnding (1695) gave it a psychological foundation. All of the premises upon which rhetoric was built and flourished in the sixteenth century were bit bj bit undercut until rhetoric could be excluded from Wilkins1 Essay and railed against in Sprat's History without so much c f . as a significant defense. In many respects the language planning movement was the antithesis of humanism, but the anti-rhetorical character of the seventeenth-century language reforms was in a sensj Henry Stubbe did attack the Royal Society for itj anti-rhetorical doctrines, but Stubbs' defense has not beeri seriously considered, neither in his own day nor in oursJ See [Henry Stubbe], A Censure upon Certaine Passages Co.n.t.a.AnQti— in- the History of the Roval Socitv, A§..i ,D,e.A.n& Destructive to.-the Established Religion and Church of EflgJjMld (Oxford, 1670), pp. 40-52; and .fiamflanftJJLa. Rg.VA 0r_a.H-E.nQuir y into the History of the Roval__S_ociety_,_-WhetJher thfi_Vlrtaaai-t]3LftCfi_jdlQ not pursue, the Projects of...Campanella f _ a r _ _ -R-e-d.U-.C-ing_—of England unto Popery (London, 1670),! _pp..— 12--14. ------------------------------------------------------1 276 motivated. The motivation is manifest in the subtle re alignment of the language arts curriculum first to allow grammar to assert itself as the metalinguistic discipline, then, with the language planners, to allow philosophy to vie for the spot. Both attempts by grammar and philosophy to impose order on language cannot be seen apart from the political context. The linguistic willfulness of the grammar schools and the religious turmoil of the mid-century were associated in seventeenth-century minds. We have seer how Wilkins blamed the religious disputes of his day or uncontrolled discourse. Thus, the attempts to replaee rhetoric as the metalinguistic discipline are attempts not! only to restore order to language, but are also attempts to restore order to the commonwealth.^ This attempt to control people, by controlling their language, is at the base of the anti-rhetorical language reforms. Rhetoric, especially humanist rhetoric, sought to endow man with a capacity which would have social impact— what the humanists meant by virtu. The humanists assumed, perhaps naively, that the social impact of eloquent men would be salutary. But, history does not bear out this assumption. Bouwsma reminds us that it was the wars and dissensions in Italy that preempted rhetoric 57 ^ Bouwsma describes the same kind of events in the Italian Quattrocento in "Changing Assumptions in Later Renaissance Culture," pp. 436-440. Ill and brought philosophy back into favor.As the conflicts; in England came to civil war. the competence rhetoric hac striven to give students was tacitly blamed for the problems. It is interesting that 1668, the year of the publication of John Wilkins' Essay, is so near to the end of the Commonwealth. This argument, though cautiously advanced here, will bi argued at length in the next chapter where I trace thi effects of the language reforms on language education in the; latter decades of the seventeenth century. Bouwsma, "Changing Assumptions in Later Renaissance Culture," pp. 437-38. Rhetoric, Politics, and education 276 Chapter Six In chapters two and three I argued that, as a result of the founding of many more grammar schools and of the shift from private to public education in England, Latin learning, and with it the rhetorical capacity the humanists called virtu, waned. The need to methodize pedagogy as the schools increased in both number and enrollments resulted in teaching by rule and precept, the model of which was grammar. The recourse to rules was, by its very nature, inimical to the competence the humanists sought to develop. Moreover, the received method of having the scholars get their Latin grammar by memorization, in conjunction with the legal necessity of using Lily’s Latin Grammar (which many considered too advanced for schoolboys), begot only confusion and ineptitude among schoolboys. And the more that schoolmasters and critics complained about the little Latin the schoolboys had learned, the more attention was focused on grammar, with the concomitant subordination of rhetoric. The profusion of animadversions, simplifications, corrections, and translations of Lily's Grammar, as well as the commentaries, helps, and alternatives to Lily— contrasted with the relative paucity of significant treatments of rhetoric— is evidence of seven teenth-century England’s overwhelming concern with grammar. This was the situation in which Webbe, Comenius, Hartlib, and others tried to offer an alternative to the grammatical despotism of the schools. Comenius’ pedagogy of things was widely accepted. But, despite his opposition to the emphasis 279 that grammar had received. Comenius did little to enhance the place of rhetoric in the curriculum. Rhetoric was delayed while other subjects were introduced, and the net effect was a further de-emphasis of rhetoric. The consequence of Comenius' pedagogy was to alter the purpose of the grammar school from developing language competence to inculcating practical knowledge of all subjects, particularly the sciences. The consequences in England of Comenius1 reforms were mixed. Some, like Hoole. incorporated Comenius1 texts into a fairly traditional curriculum. Others, however, saw Comenius’ reforms as a means to extirpate humanist language education altogether. The overall result, however, of all these reforms was to focus attention on language learning rather1 than language use. Educators and philologists were trying to find either in traditional grammar or the empirical psychology the best and fastest method to teach Latin, and. in the resultant confusion, the reasons for learning Latin were neglected. Humanist goals— thorough reading of classics] authors, the imitation of their style, and the ability to speak and write effectively whenever the situation demanded it— were supposedly beyond the capabilities of most younjj scholars. Schoolmasters therefore would have to adapt their pedagogy to the tender wits of the boys and be satisfied if their students could learn the rudiments of Latin grammar. The systematic subordination of rhetoric in the curriculum is significant to the decline of traditional rhetoric, but - --------------------------- . 28'0j this subordination alone does not explain the antipathy to rhetoric in the Royal Society and the late seventeenth century in general. In order to understand how rhetoric! acquired the pejorative connotation it did by the end of the seventeenth century* we must trace the development of the humanist and empirico-humanist strains of Latin teaching reform after the Restoration. Tracing the reforms in thj language curriculum after the Restoration will enable us tJ see more clearly the diminished status of rhetoric near th^ end of the century, and it will also shed some light on why rhetorical education was a matter for social contempt. By the Restoration, problems in the schools had been politicized and, as a result, attitudes toward rhetoric wer^ shaped by the political climate. In this chapter I trace the relationship of traditional humanist rhetorical educa tion and the new empiricism to the political situation. I will subdivide the discussion in this chapter into three parts: a description of the increased importance of empiric ism in Restoration language reforms, an explanation of the position rhetoric came to occupy in education, and an expla-j nation of attitudes toward rhetoric as a result of political! attitudes. I will first briefly describe the pedagogies of three textbook authors, each distinct in his solution to the grammatical problems of teaching young scholars the Latir tongue: Christopher Wase (1625-1690), William Walker (1623- 281 1684) » and Mark Lewis (fl. 1678). Tracing the different, methods of language pedagogy in these three figures will allow me to pose the central question of this chapter: how did rhetoric obtain the pejorative sense that it did within the political context of the late seventeenth century? To answer this question, I will next compare two authors on education who wrote at different times yet to a similar audience: Henry Peacham (15767-^1643?) and Obadiah Walker (1616-1699). Finally, I will substantiate the conclusionr based on my analysis of these authors with evidence from several tracts and popular writers on education. I. In 1660, the same year that Hoole published his A Nev DjLaqp.y.qr.y.. g.f wase pubiishec Me.tho.di, Practicae Specimen, An Essay of a Practical Grammar, which was popular till the end of the century (it went through eight editions to 1690). At that time Wase was serving as headmaster of Dedham royal free school in Essex and from 1662-1668 would serve as headmaster at Tonbridge - I | school.1 His essay is important because he is aware of the grammar controversy and his place in it. In the preface ti the reader, Wase delineates the trouble in English schools as he sees it.c Wase's complaint is simply this: notwith 1 QMJB, XX, 896. P "It must not be denied, That the present Age hath brought to light great helps to the instruction of-.Youth in jt.he L.a_tin_T_o.ng.uej Fjqr those who in_]Lojr_ei.gn__pArjDs hav4 282 standing the many important reforms in teaching tongues* including Comenius’. too little effort in the schools was given to "Making Latin"— the term for the school exercises which required students to write or speak Latin.^ No matter how simple and plain the phrases might have been, making Latin was the beginning of the practice of rhetoric. Wase objects that making Latin had become less exercised than parsing and construing. In effect, the schoolroom practice of rhetoric was being neglected for grammatical parsing anc construing. Wase gives three reasons for this problem, which I wili briefly discuss. First is "That there are wholly wanting assistances of Technical Books which might draw on childrer to the exercise of the several or most principal operations i of Grammar in train; for translating out of the Vulgar into Latin" (Methodi A2r-v). That is, Wase recommends transla tion as a means of making Latin, but he does not recommenc double translation as the earlier humanists had done. Instead he recommends translating only from the vulgar into ' invented means for the expediting of this, it may suffice to instance in that great Regulator of School-Policy, who hatti much matured the Learning of Tongues, the Reverend and Singularly Ingenious Comenius. At home diverse happy pieces have been published; with all which, it might farther; conduce to the facilitating that employment, if the work of making Latin were put into an orderly and artificial j course: Which seems to have been left too much at large, not; (with us only, but in other parts, as far as I can understand." Christopher Wase, Methodi -Practicae Snecimer (London, 1660), sig. A2r. Hereafter Methodi. q ______ z . .See. B r i n si ey.,... c hap.te r_ thre.e . ab.o.v e_._______________________ 283 Latin, and this is why there are no textbooks. The seconc: reason is "That it is more difficult to learn the Reason of the Latin Tongue by parsing of Authors, than by making Latines" (Methodi A2v). It is not Authors that Wase finds wanting, but the parsing of them. He explains that it is much easier to learn to compose themes simply by writing them than by beginning with grammatical rules and cate gories. The common practice was. as Wase implies, to learr to parse by the rules of Grammar before being exercised ir composition. The final reason for the problem is that I schoolmasters had opted either for art— teaching grammar by rules— or else for practice— teaching by use. Wase contends that it is best to combine the two.1 * His method of instruction is to reduce Grammar to problems which are "more comprehensible to a narrow-sighted understanding, and more portable for the weak memory of a Child" (Methodi A3r). He intends to adapt the difficulty of the exercise to the capacity of the scholar, and while this is no innovation, he justifies himself on psychological terms, attempting "to rivet into the understanding and memory, that rule, upon which it depends in the working: And the several heads of sense serve the more to clench it 11 "But the most easy, speedy, and familiar way is, after very short, general Instructions, concerning the terms of that Art permitted, if the Learner, put his hand to the! work; that particular Problems be laid down in clear direction; this followed with manifold working, that reviewed and polished with continual correction." Methodi - A 2 v - A 3 r .-------- — ----------------- ------- ---- 284 down" (Methodi A3v). The notion of appealing to the inner senses via the outer senses is also not new. It was taught by Comenius. Woodward, and Hoole, but the appearance of the empirical theory of learning here simply demonstrates how widely accepted it had become. Wase comments that the "received method" is only useful "to discover the inequality of memories" rather than to try the quickness of the understanding (Methodi A4r). His method will reverse the emphasis and appeal to the students’ understanding. In order to appeal most successfully to the apprehending faculty of the students, "the examples are not very coherent, not classical, but plain" (Methodi A4r). By "coherent" Wase is referring to the coherence of a passage of text. He intends to offer as examples individual sentences, which are therefore not coherent and which he has contrived to make a grammatical point. The students will make Latin /t by translating the English sentences into Latin, thereby practicing the point of gramamr to be learned. Wase's use of translation and of examples, "cast. . .rather than to no advantage, ambitiously [collected], from the Authors of Latine," resembles John Clarke's pedagogy of the 1630s. 5 Methodi A4v. For Clarke's pedagogy see chapter three above. It is also interesting that Wase defends his choice to contrive examples by asking "Why must it be stood upon to attest the constant and ordinary expressions of the Tongue from the pure Writers? or what are Tullv, Seneca, Terence, Virgil, Ovid, to him that enters on his Accidents? Is not the Master's authority to him more known and more impor tant?" (A4v). Wase's attitude here, different from the early humanists', is worth noting. 285 However* there are differences which I want to underscore. Clarke did not conceive of pedagogy on psychological, but on practical gounds. Clarke’s pedagogy was entirely rule- oriented whereas Wase tries to mix art and practice with the empirical theory of learning. And most importantly. Clarke recommended double translation, while Wase insists on making Latin only from English to Latin. For Wase, to begin with n Latin sentence would be to begin in confusion. In all, Wase presents a slightly different pedagogy from any we have seen thus far. It is a blend of humanisl double translation and empirical psychology, of art and practice. Wase even shows an awareness of his position in the tradition when he remarks, ”1 have herein asserted freedom to Grammar, which the Writers of other Arts take to themselves, and Comenius the great advancer of Didactice does ordinarily challenge” (A4v). He is referring to the charge made by Webbe, Comenius, Hartlib. and others that grammar had assimilated to itself other arts rightfully belonging elsewhere, and in so doing he places himself firmly in the English reform tradition which had alwayg given grammar primary place in the curriculum. Wase closes his preface with a note that he had just received a copy of Hoole’s A New Discovery and cites page references where he believes that he and Hoole are saying the same thing. Anc he is accurate. Of all the educators treated thus far, he is most like Hoole in trying to adapt traditional pedagogy 286 to the empirical theory of learning. If there is a differ ence. it is one of emphasis. Wase wants to emphasize the making of Latin in a series of exercises which are graded ir complexity. The idea of gradation in the curriculum was part of Comenius’ and Hoole’s reforms, but had not beer specifically developed in a textbook for making Latin sen tences. This is Wase’s contribution to grammar pedagogy. 3 will return to Wase at the end of the chapter when I mentior his defense of grammar schools in which he speaks approvingly of the next educator I will discuss, William Walker. Walker is important for several reasons. He is the author of many grammar texts and phrase books, he is the only one of the humanist educators so far discussed to write textbooks on rhetoric, and he is the direct descendant ofj the seventeenth-century humanist educators from Brinsley through Clarke. Clarke was his "ever to be honored Mas- Like his master Clarke. Walker published phrase books, books of proverbs, and books of idioms, the expressed purpose of which was to excise barbarisms from the language of 6 W. Walker, Some Improvements to the Art of Teaching (London, 1669), p. 217. As far as I know Walker’s rhetori-j cal texts, Troposchematologiae rhetoricae ( 1668) andJQe Areumentorum Inventione (1672), have largely been ignored. They are not mentioned by Howell in Logic and Rhetoric in S n g L a nsb .. 1 5 QQt I.ZP.O» and are only briefly mentioned by Nadeau in connection with Farnaby. See "Talaeus Versus Farnaby on Style," p. 63. According to Nadeau, De Argumentorum Inventione derives from Johann Gerard Vossius’ works ori invention 287 students who were learning Latin. Walker, in imitation of Clarke, went so far as to publish his Paroemiologia in the same volume with Thomas Willis's Phraseoloeia Anleo- Latina just as Clarke had done. Thus, it is not surprising that Walker’s Some Improvements To the Art of Teaching Especially in The First Grounding of a voune Scholar in Grammar Learning (1669) is largely a re-statement of much of Clarke's Dux Grammaticus (1633).^ Walker employs double translation as a means of teaching grammar by using con trived examples, recommends the rules of construing by first arranging the syntax of passages in its natural order from its artificial order. He outlines steps for "making plain Latin."® The only innovation in Walker's text is the inclusion of phrases for use in epistles and twenty steps for varying phrases. He recommends Clarke’s Dux Grammaticus, Erasmus' Colloquies, and other works on style including Comenius' Artis Oratoriae sive Grammaticae Elegantis. Walker is the only one of the three later educators to show a concern for style. In matters of Grammar, Walker is also conservative. ^ Cf. Walker's pedagogy with Clarke's in chapter three above. ® W. Walker, pp.37-60, 117. In the preface to another work, Walker notes the importance of translation as an exercise and recalls Ascham as the one to make it known to Englishmen. He also declines to justify the use of transla tion because he says that the reasons are well known. See English Examples of the Latine Svntaxis (London, 1686), sig. A1r. 288 Wase had offered what he believed was a new approach based on empirical psychology adapted to traditional methods of instruction such as translation. But Walker finds Lily’s Grammar as good as any of the new grammars, although he does change the format to explain Lily's rules by question and answer, providing a lengthy commentary on the three most troublesome books in Lily: Propria auae maribus. Quae genus, and As in Praesenti. Regarding the Grammar controversy. Walker explains that the many new grammars prompted him to examine many learned authors on the subject, and he con cludes that they all have merits, but he cannot justify replacing Lily’s Grammar with any one of the new grammars.^ Walker's text, however conservative, is valuable for the commentary it gives on grammatical points, frequently citing many grammarians in support of or in disagreement with Lily. This was a book intended, no doubt, for the more advanced scholar or schoolmaster, rather than for the novice. In contrast to both Wase, the innovative adaptor, and Walker, the traditionalist, is Mark Lewis. Lewis is another who attempted a complete break with tradition by founding grammar completely on the senses. Lewis' textbook is the ^ "Having observed, whilst I was a Schoolmaster for many years in Louth, new Gramamrs ever and anon coming forth: I concluded somewhat was amiss in the old, for why else whould the learned Authors of them spend their pains in composition of new?" He concludes "that any of them would serve to do the business they were framed for, but none of them would do it so much better, as that there was any necessity to lay by the old, to give place to any new." W. Walker, Some Improvements, A3r-v._____________________ 289 r-e.cl.uQ.tio ad absurdum of the innovations that Woodward anc Hoole tried to make. His title tells all: An Essav to F.a,ci 1-itate the ..E.d.u.cation of___ Xouth, b.Y___Br_i_n^lng . down the Ru-diments. oi* Gnamniar.. to the sense of Seeing, which ought to U.g— .imRr.o.Yfed. , . . f r y . S-Y.ns,rigiS (1674). Unlike Brinsley, Clarke, and Walker, all of whom believed that grammar was the foundation of all education, Lewis asserts that "Grammar in the Notion and Theory of it, is one of the most•difficult of the Liberal Sciences."^® Lewis charges that the reason school boys cannot learn Latin as expected is the complexity o| grammar, arguing that the nature of grammar is too subtle for children and examples are too troublesome.^ By embracing neither art nor practice, Lewis is trying to break from the rule/example controversy of his predecessors. Teaching grammar involved neither rules as Brinsley advocated, nor examples as Hoole commended. The entire process "may be made very short and easy if we proceed according to the Latj of Nature by these two Didactic Principles, Sense and Syncrisis1 I o ,v/ Lewis, Essav, p. 1. Cf. Brinsley’s on grammar ir chapter three above, and Walker who referred to grammar as that "which is most necessary to be well minded, and yet o^ all other the most neglected which is the very First Grounding of the Scholar, and laying the Foundation of al] his future attainments." W. Walker, Some Improvements, A4v. II "Doubtless the Doctrine of Grammar is too subtle for? Children, because it is communicated by Logical Definitions in the Etymology, and by the signification of words in th4 Syntax, neither of which Children can reach who cannot use Abstraction; for Examples and Precepts are alike difficult,! the one being as strange and unknown as the other," Lewis, p. 1. 290 (Essay 1). Lewis founds his pedagogy on human nature. He particu larly favors sight as the most useful sense for learning grammar* although the sense of hearing may also be useful. And syncrisis is simply ’’comparing what they are to learn with comething already known.” or the incrementally orga nized curriculum that Comenius propounded (Essav 2). The psychology at work is the empirical psychology.^2 When Lewis actually attempts to explain parts of speech and points of grammar in terms of seeing* the treatment becomeJ absurd. Nevertheless, his comments on the grammar schools and their problems are enlightening because they corroborate those we have already seen. For example, before launching a truculent attack on Lily's Grammar* Lewis observes the need for an alternative^ 1 ^ I to Lily. He enumerates various deficiencies of Lily’s Grammar, all of which can be reduced to violations of sensJ and syncrisis. Lewis blames Lily's Grammar for all of the 1 P "The use of the outward Senses is, to be mediums, to let in Notions to the inward. When the Understnad ing is enlightened through the Senses, the Memory freely keeps anything for use laid up in it" (Essav 1). 1 ^ "I do confess this attempt is dangerous, to suggest anything contrary to the practice of so many Learned Men,| employed in teaching School, who have the generality of Scholars in England, bred up in this Method, on their sides: But the various attempts of several Eminent Persons to mend Lily, to set up a Light to Lily, to translate Lily, and the genera]] complaints that they think there may be found a better and shorter way, than that generally used, encourages me to make these Essays" (Lewis. Essav 15). i 291 school ills. He explains that those who may learn Latin in the schools do so by habit rather than by memorizing "a huge fardle of useless Rules"; students soon forget their Latin because Lily's rules of syntax are too cumbersome; and Lily's Grammar is the cause of students' doing parsing exercises rather than making Latin. This last complaint is particularly important because it corroborates Wase's obser vation that students spend too much time doing grammatical drills at the expense of composition. Lewis asks rhetoric ally, "Consider, Whether the impossibilities of using Lilv* s Syntax is not the reason, why all neglect Lily’s Directions, to make Latin, before they begin to Parse?"^ Lewis enlarges upon this query by pointing out the contradiction between the recieved practice of parsing and Lily’s own advice. Lily's preface to his treatment of syntax had recommended Latin composition exercises before grammatical exercises in parsing, but the advice was not being followed.^ Lewis attributes this practice to the complexity of the rules. Whatever the reason, it is further evidence of the entrenchment of grammar over rhetoric in the curriculum. Considering both Lewis' aversion to grammar, particu larly to Lily's, and his pedagogy based in inward and outward 1 il Lewis, Plain and Short Rules for Pointing Periods, and Reading Sentences Grammatically, with Great Use of them (1675), p. 7. Hereafter Rules. i c A sirailiar point was made earlier by Thomas Grantham in his Discourse in Derision of the Teaching in Free Schooles, and other common Schooles (London, 1644), p. 7._______________ 292 senses, it is no surprise that he mentions Comenius in favorable terms. In Plain and Short Rules, he does not cite Comenius as a source, but as someone who extended this pedagogy beyond anything he himself had done. Comenius hath prescribed a Method for the gaining the Copia Verborum, beyond what I have seen. His Vestibulum and Orbis Pictus contain the primitive words. His lexicon Januale teaches to Decline Derivatives from their Primitives. His Janua comprehends Primitives, and Derivatives in their proper signification. His Atrium teaches the Elegancy, and Idiom of the Tongue. (7) This passage not only shows an awareness of Comenius and his textbooks, it employs a humanist phrase with a slightly different signification, or at least a more inclusive one. "Copia Verborum” was what the sixteenth-century humanist educators had sought to provide their students. Erasmus' work De copia utraaue verborum ac rerum is the apogee of this tradition. Students who acquired copia of words had a rich store of linguistic structures to add depth and flexi bility to their linguistic prowess. Erasmus gives 150 ways of saying "your letter pleased me greatly." This facility with language was not simply an ability to vary and amplify phrases, it also included a sense of decorum to draw phrases and sentences appropriately from a repertoire of the respected authors. Lewis, however, in referring to Comenius' texts as a means of "gaining the Copia Verborum" means something quite different from Erasmus. Comenius had provided the names of things in his books. Hence, in recommending Comenius textbooks, Lewis uses Copia Verborum to refer primarily to 293 vocabulary building. Lewis next declares his epistemological stance bj opposing words to things, and a grammatical education to one of substance. Real knowledge is preferred to verbal know ledge.^ And. in addition to the practical and intellectual benefits of real knowledge. Lewis claims that the emphasis in education on the sensory apprehension of things will "make Learning pleasant." and. through a system of rewards to the most diligent, "the school may be made Ludus literar- ius." In opposing "appelatives" to things. Lewis is yet another who would found knowledge on substances rather than on mere words. Together these three Restoration educators indicate that the grammar controversy continued through the end of the seventeenth century and into the eighteenth. Humanist pedagogy, represented by Walker, dwindled considerably; the adaptation of empiricism to traditional pedagogy also ebbed;; and the empirical aversion to grammar, fueled by the prominence of empirical dogma in science and other disciplines, waxec In this sense. Lewis' use of copia verborum if similiar to Robotham’s. See chapter four above. "Doubtless one thus instructed in the knowledge of things, and initiated in all Arts and Sciences (especially in Arithmetic and ..Geometry) is like to make better progress, when he is advanced to the University; or probably will be s. wise man. when he is otherwise disposed of in the world, than another, who learns only Anellatives. and a little History, but knows nothing of things: seein he hath laid the Foundation of real Knowledge; and will improve it by his daily converse in the world" (Rules 7-8). --------- strong. This is not to say that grammars did not exist in abundance. It merely means that the use of grammar to teach languages remained unpopular and had to be justified on other grounds.^ Traditional grammar* as we have seen in Wilkins and Wallis* became grounded in scientific principles and made universal claims.^ The fact that today Walker and Wase are both forgotten, while Lewis' naive attempt to found grammar upon sight lives on, evidences the success of empiricism over humanism in the curriculum as elsewhere.^® This trend in education, which For other refernces to grammar as an ineffective means of learning languages see Locke, Some Thoughts Concerning Education (London, 1693), pp. 195-201. ^ Richard Johnson insists on changing the definition of grammar from the "art of speaking correctly" to the "Art of Expressing the Relation of Things in Constructions, with due Accent in speaking, and Orthography in Writing, accord ing to the Custom of those whose Language we learn." See his Grammatical Commentaries: being an Apparatuss To a New National Grammar: Bv wav of Animadversions upon the Falsi ties, Obscurities, Redundancies, and Defects of Lilly's System Now in Use (London, 1706), pp. 1-3. Walker's Roval Grammar Explained (1670) went through three editions; his Some Improvements To the Art of Teaching (1669) had seven editions; and his Treatise of English Particles (1655) saw eleven editions in the seventeenth century. As mentioned earlier, Walker's rhetorics were used in the schools, but today he is virtually unknown, and Howell does not mention his rhetorical works at all. Likewise, Wase is remembered for his defense of schools (1678), but his Essav of Practical Grammar had nine editions from 1660 to 1690 and his A Compendious Dictionary, Enelish- Latin and Latin-Enel i sh ( 1662) saw two editions. His Senarius, sive de leeibus et licentia veterum poetarum (1685) had only one edition, yet all these have been neg lected. Contrast the publication history of Lewis, whose Essav had two editions, 1670 and 1674; his Plain and Short Rules one, 1675; Lewis is recorded in Watson and Padley, Walker and Wase are not. ____________________________ _ m employed methods and systematic approaches* which justified itself in terms of an empirical psychology* and which took over the grammar schools, now poses an important question for historians of rhetoric. Beside the gradual subordina tion of rhetoric to grammar, what impact did the empirical psychology have on the discipline of rhetoric and how did it shape the attitudes towards rhetoric in the last half of the seventeenth century? II. This question is made difficult by the fact that few of the treatises on rhetoric during this period are more than re-statements of Ciceronian or Ramistic rhetoric.^ We can detect however, a shift in perspective by comparing and analyzing statements about education, for in them we will find implicit, and sometimes explicit, statements regarding the function of rhetoric in the curriculum. I propose a comparison of two such authors on education who wrote for a similar audience, but at different times during the cen tury. The works of both authors were reprinted in several editions. The first author is Henry Peacham, whose The Compleat Gentleman was first published in 1622, with a second edition in 1627 (reissued in 1634), and third edition in 1661. The second author is Obadiah Walker, whose Some Instructions Concerning the Art of Oratory saw two editions, the first published in 1659, the second in two issues for P 1 ______ See Howell, Logic and Rhetoric, pp. 318-41.__________ 2961 different book sellers in 1682, and whose Of Education, Especially of Young Gentlemen was first published in 1673 with a second edition the same year and subsequent editions in 1677, 1683, 1687, and 1699.22 Peacham’s treatise is entirely humanist and was consc iously designed to be such. In the preface to the reader he acknowledges the similarity of his work to other humanists who had preceded him, including Erasmus, Vives, Elyot, and Ascham.2^ Peacham has various explanations why one might write on a subject which so many other illustrious writers have written on, but he disregards them and instead relates his justification in the form of a personal anecdote. He had been in France at the house of "a noble person age" who was both a good soldier and "an excellent scholar." While there, a young English nobleman came to the house and, wanting means "for his return home as was fitting," requested to be taken into the French noble’s service. Peacham served as interpreter for the Frenchman, who asked the English youth what he could do, saying he would keep no one who p p The sixth edition, 1699, also had two issues for different book sellers, one "to be sold by Bernard Lintott, the other "to be sold by Francis Hicks, in Cambridge." Short Title Catalogue. p O "I am not ignorant (judicious Reader) how many pieces of the most curious Masters have been uttered to the world of this Subject, as Plutarch,Erasmus,Vives, Sadolet, Sturmius, Osorius. Sir Thomas Elvot. M. Ascham with sundry others; so that my small Taper among so many torches, were as good out, as seeming to give no light all. I confess it true." Peacham, The Compleat Gentleman (London, 1622), sig. Blr. Hereafter Gentleman._________________________________________ 297 could not be commended for something. Peacham enumerates the various skilled and scholarly guests who were kept at a generous allowance for their services. The Englishman replied. "Sir, I am a Gentleman born, and can only attend you in your Chamber, or wait upon your Lordship abroad" (Gentl eman B1v). The Frenchman took the opportunity to comment on the lack of any quality to prefer English nobles and the lack of Latin, the latter of which was the minimum expected. Peacham, deeply embarrassed, had to make excuses for his countryman, although he knew the accusation "generally to be true." Hence, the justification for Peacham's writing this treatise on education for noblemen is a direct result of the failure of the English educational system.^ Not surprisingly, then, Peacham devotes chapters three and four to the "Duty of Masters, and What the Fittest Method to Be Observed" and "the Duties of Parents in their Children's Education." Chapter four on the parents' duties need not occupy our attention; chapter three, however, is of interest on "Hereby I only give to know, that there is nothing more deplorable, than the breeding in general of our Gentlemen, none any more miserable than one of them, if he fall into misery in a strange Country. Which I can impute to no other thing, than the remissness of Parents, and negligence of Masters in their youth. Wherefore at my coming over, considering the great forwardness and proficiency of children in other Countries, the backwardness and rawness of ours; the industry of masters there, the ignorance and idleness of most of ours; the exceeding care of parents in their children's education, the negligence of ours; . . .1 employed upon this discourse for the private use of a noble young gentleman. ..." Gentleman, Blv-B2r.___________________________ 298 because it gives us yet another perspective on the situation in the schools. Peacham enumerates four faults common to English School masters. "The first and main Error of Masters* is want of discretion* when in such variety of Natures as different as their countenances, the Master never laboreth to try the t strength of every capacity by it self, which . . .must have the rule fitted to it, not that brought to the rules" (Gentleman 22). "A second over-sight nigh akin to the former, is indiscretion in correction, in using all Natures alike, and that with immoderation, or rather plain cruelty (Gentleman 24).^ The third complaint is that masters keep their scholars at book all day without recreation (Gentleman 25-26). And finally Peacham objects to some masters who are remiss in giving scholars too much recreation and not giving them "due attendance" while in school (26). The first two observations underscore the tendency to systematize education thereby treating all natures alike, a situation of which Peacham disapproves. Consequently he does not recommend using Lily’s Grammar exclusively. Beside, most of them want that good and direct Method, whereby in shortest time and with least labor, the Scholar may attain unto perfection; some teaching ^ Peacham also compares English schools to German schools: "In Germany the School is, and as the name impor- teth, it ought to be merely Ludus literarius, a very pastime of learning, where it is a rare thing to see a Rod stirring" (24). For additional comment on the severity of discipline in the schools, see Walter Ong, "The Ramistic Classroom," pp. 142-62._____________________________________________ 299 privately* use a Grammar of their own making; some again, none at all: the most Lilv1 s. but preposter-j ously posted over, that the boy is in his Quantity of! Syllables, before he knoweth the Quality of any one part of speech; for he profiteth no more than he masterethj by his understanding. Nor is it my meaning that I would all Masters to be tied to one Method, no more* than all the Shires of England to come up to London by one highway; there be many equally alike good. (Gentleman 27) Peacham blames schoolmasters for the failure of schoolboys to arrive at a command of Latin: "Instead of many good [masters] they have infinite bad." with the result that boys go from master to master until they find "one of skill" (28). The boys, he says, need to be grounded solidly in grammar, "every rule made familiar and fast, by short ancj pleasant examples" (28). The exercise most to be preferred in developing a "well knit style both in writing and speaking" is translation.^^ The student is to read and translate good authors so that he can by reading "enrich his understanding. and learn haurire ex iosis font1bus" (to draw from the very sources themselves) (29). This mastered, the students should be exercised in themes and declamations: "The. old method of teaching Grammar, saith Suetonius, was disputation; in the fore-noon, and declamation in the after-noon; buJ this I leave to the discretion of the judicious master (29). Despite Peacham's advice to learn the grammar rules, he 26 itF0r i know nothing that benefiteth a Scholar more than [translation], first by translating out of Latin intoj English, which laid by for some time, let him translate out of English into Latin again varying as oft as he can both his words and Phrases." Gentleman, p. 28. 300' is basically presenting a humanist curriculum in which learning Latin is not an end in itself but a propaedeutic tc literature and language use. The literature was to culti vate a fine style and provide matter, both of which were tc some purpose. The exercises in themes, disputations, and declamations were preparation for life in public service, most likely in legal or political arenas. This is the life for which a young gentleman must be prepared. Thus grammar and rhetoric overlapped in the humanist curriculum. Grammar provided the examples of authors and their style, rhetoric provided additional training with the emphasis on practice. Grammar and rhetoric were thus two sides of the same coin— the reception and production of refined and effective discourse. To underscore this union and to put the blame for inadequate training on school masters, Peacham draws an analogy {which he states in the form of a Draeb.eritiQ) with seeking medical treatment from an inept physician. I pass over the insufficiencies of many of them with ill example of life (which Plato wisheth above all things to be respected and looked into) whereof as of Physic and ill Physicians, there is many times more danger than of the disease it self; many of them being no Grammarians at all, much less (as Quintilian requireth in a Schoolmas ter) Rhetoricians to expound with proper and purest English, An Eloquent Latin or Greek Author, unfold his invention: and handling of the subject, shew the form and fluency of the style, the apt disposition of figures, the propriety of words, the weight of grave and deep Sentences which are nervi,.or ation,i.s, the sinews of discourse. (29) As part of their duty to expound authors and analyze style, .sc ho.o 1 ma s.t.e.r_s_s ho.u 1 d__a 1 s.o_ ha v„e_s.om e exp.er_t.is.e__in_mus.ic for 301 prosody, astronomy for authors who treat the heavens, and natural and moral philosophy to "understand Tullv*s Offices, or, Aesop1s Fables, as familiar as they seem" (Gentleman 29). The schoolmaster, though he teaches the reception and production of discourse, cannot be ignorant of other sciences which may aid in explicating authors. In other words, he must know considerably more than Lily’s Grammar. Peacham then explains that he does not want to be construed as denigrating Grammar or as inveighing against "the learned and worthy Masters" of the public schools. To put this remark in context, Peacham’s book was published at the height of the grammar controversy. The first edition was published the same year as Webbe’s Appeal to Truth (1622). Instead of derogating all schoolmasters, he says, I inveigh against the pitifull abuse of our Nation by such, who bv their ignorance and negligence deceive the Church and Common-wealth of service able members, Parents of their Money, poor Child ren of their time, esteem in the world, and per haps means of living all their lives after. (30) It appears that there were many inept schoolmasters, and such incompetence, he believed, had dire effects for student and state. The effect on the state was especially grave because Peacham lists eloquence as one of the necessary attributes in order for the nobility to govern the common wealth properly. The social significance of eloquence in education requires additional comment. In the first chapters in which Peacham discusses some of the characteristics of nobility, he explains -the impor 302 tance of virtue for nobility. He begins by stating that nobility is a result of some service to the community. Peacham gives examples of virtue in acts of Justice and Magnificence, and continues: To proceed, no less respect and honor is to be attributed to Eloquence, whereby so many have raised their esteem and fortunes, as able to draw Civility out of Barbarism, and sway whole kingdoms by leading with Celtic Hercules, the rude multi tude by the ears. . .And much hurt it may do, if like a mad man’s sword, it be used by a turbulent and mutinous Orator; otherwise we must hold it a principal means of correcting ill manners, reforming laws, humbling aspiring minds, and upholding all vertue. For as Serpents are charmed with words, so the most savage and cruel natures bv Eloquence: which some interpret to be the meaning of Mercuries golden Rod, with those Serpents wreathed about it. Much therefore it concerneth Princes, not only to countenance honest and eloquent Orators, but to maintain such near about them, as no mean props (if occasion serve) to uphold a State, and the only keys to bring in tune a discordant Common wealth. (8) P 7 1 "More particularly, and in the genuine sense, Nobility is the Honor of blood in a Race or Lineage, conferred formerly upon some one or more of that Family, either by the Prince, the Laws, customs of that Land or Place, whereby either out of knowledge, culture of the mind, or by some glorious Action performed, they have been useful and beneficial to the Common-wealth and places where they live. For since all Vertue consisteth in Action, and no man is born for himself, we add, beneficial and useful to his Country; for hardly they are to be admitted for Noble, who (though of never so excellent parts) consume their light, as in a dark Lanthorn in contemplation, and a Stoical re tiredness." Gentleman, p. 2. P f t The marginal gloss to this passage reads: "Described by Lucian to be aged, bald, and wrinkled, brown colored, clad with a Lion’s skin, holding in his right hand a club, in his left a bow, with a Quiver at his back and long small chains of Gold and Amber fastened through little holes to the tip of his tongue, drawing a multitude of people willing to follow after him, only shadowing unto us the power of Eloquence." Gentleman, p. 8.___________________________ 303 If nobility is manifest in virtuous action which serves the commonwealth, then the duty of nobility is to cultivate Eloquence in order to serve the prince and preserve the state. Eloquence is not merely verbal nicety; it is politi cal and social necessity. Peacham hopes proper education can restore virtue to English nobles. One of the manifestations of virtue is a refined style. Peacham’s treatment of style is character istically humanist insofar as he is unwilling to separate form and content. After a caveat to develop a good style in both English and Latin because "speech is the Character of e man." Peacham paraphrases Cicero’s description of an eloquent style jJUUHftlftMfl f.A.k&JUlg Q.£. ..CilftlftS d ..isj? ..Q .sx sb frh ,9 s a p s ... r ? . g . ..ufc.fr. ¥.a.i s.s . CGsnlLsmss 42) Peacham decries "that same ampullous and Scenical pompe. with emptiness of phrase, wherewith the Stage, and our petty Poetic Pamplets sound so big" (42). and then cites Plutarch who cautioned that only after the auditor’s thirst is quenched do they "look upon the enameling and workmanship of the bowl” (Gentleman 42-43). Then, after a warning to satisfy the hearers’ desire for matter. Peacham says that the forn of words and phrases often "fall in of themselves to matter well contrived" (43). And quoting Horace’s Art of Poe'trv. he adds "RemXene dispositam vel verba invita seouuntur. Tc , 304 matter well disposed* words of themselves do fall” (43). Peacham again advises: "Let your style therefore be furnish ed with solid matter, and compact of the best, choice, and most familiar words; taking heed of speaking, or writing such words, as men shall rather admire than understand” (43). Peacham cites good and bad examples of eloquence in both Latin and English and advocates a style which is not "an apish and superstitious imitation of Tullv,” yet which is "the riches allow" of the best authors in oratory as well as history. Peacham ranks several Latin authors. At the top of the list is, of course, Cicero, then Caesar, Tacitus, and other Roman historians (Gentleman 44). Peacham is clearly a proponent of humanist eloquence. His sources are all traditional and weighty to humanist readers. He insists that eloquence consists of an insepar ability of content and form, matter and style. He upholds the ideal of eloquence as the human capacity to impose order on and regulate society through effective discourse. On this last point Peacham is again emphatic by repetition. In suggesting historical models for imitation, Peacham notes that his list of Roman historians serves two purposes. The authors are models for stylistic imitation, and they are sources of information regarding the care and regulation of state politics.^ And, just as the Roman authors combine P Q "Hitherto have I given you a taste (at your own choice) as well for universal History, as your imitation in writing and speaking. That I account universal, which 305 pith and style in political acumen, the students are also tc cultivate a fine English style and combine it with knowledge of political history in order to lead an active life of service rather than one of scholarly contemplation. Peacham simply assumes that, as men from noble fami lies. his readers will be employed in the service of the commonwealth. Thus the learned languages, though necessary for education, are not to be pursued as a profession. Rather, his readers should develop eloquence in their native tongue, for with such they will be of more use to the kingdom. Any strife in the commonwealth would, therefore, be not only a failure of the nobility, but a failure of eloquence. Peacham's The Compleat Gentleman rehearses humanist tenets and values which had been held in England for more than a hundred years, yet just over fifty years from the first impression of The Compleat Gentlemen, and only twelve years from the last. Obadiah Walker’s • essay Of Education. Eflttfifi.jLa3v3La, ...oXJf.OHng. (1673) was published. We will want to contrast Peacham and Walker’s views on rhetoric in education, but in order to make this comparison. I woulc entreateth of the beginning, increase, government, anc alteration of Monarchies. Kingdoms, and Commonsealths." CteafcLgJuaii» p. 50. on "Again, while you are intent to foreign Authors and Languages..forget not to speak and write your own properlj/j and eloquently: whereof (to say the truth) you shall have the greatest use. (since you are like to live an Eminent person in your Country, and mean to make no profession of scholarship.)” Gentleman, pp. 52-53. _____ . 306 like to introduce a middle term to my argument and mentior briefly Walker’s treatise on rhetoric published in 1659, Some .Instr.uc.tipjaa_Cflnc.firning the. Art of Oratory. His treatment of rhetoric is intended to be practical and. thus yields no overarching statements about the purpose and function of rhetoric, yet it is important because it is mid-way between two poles. 3^ The Art of Oratory at first appears to be a traditional Ciceronian rhetoric and Howell describes it as part of the Neo-Ciceronian movement of the seventeenth century.32 Yet Walker characterizes rhetoric ir two canons, invention and style, rather than the Ciceronian five.33 The justification for reducing the canons of rhetoric from five to two is significant because it is supported or psychological grounds. Thus Walker’s text is not properly Ciceronian because in it he is adapting traditional rhetorical categories to the new, empirical psychology. It is this adaptation of rhetoric to psychology that is of present conern. Walker divides the parts of oratory into Invention and 3^ I do not intend to invoke Howell’s treatment of the seventeenth-century compromise in logic between Aristote-j lians and Ramists. Howell's chapter dealing with these treatments is entitled "Middle Ground Between Contradic tions." See L,g&i,g, anfl.JLhftfcarJ.fi In En&land> pp. 282-317. 32 Howell, Logic and Rhetoric in England, pp. 324-325. 33 Howell is aware of Walker's reduction of the five canons to two. but he fails to see the significance of it. If Howell had seen the importance of Walker's categories he would not have classified Walker's rhetoric as Ciceronian.) Cf. Thomas 0. Sloane, "Rhetoric and Meditaion: Three Case Studies," pp. 57-58. 307 Elocution, and gives this explanation: 1. The parts of oratory are ImL&llkA.Qn> taking care for the Matter; and Elocution, for the Wortjs and stvle. 2. Invention consists in an acute Consideration, and particular weighing of all circumstances, etc. out of which any argument may be raised to advance the subject in hand. The description itself yields no obvious reason why such £ division needs to be made. Walker's rather vague phrase "taking care for the Matter" admittedly is broad enough to encompass both invention and arrangement, but there is nc compelling reason for doing so. But the division of rhetoricj into invention and elocution does make sense when we understand it as part of the increasing influence of empiricism. Invention is associated with matter, and elocution is associated with words. This is the familiar word/thing dichotomy simply applied to rhetoric. And as part of this division of words and things, we can expect the discussion of things and matter to be given some psychological validity. This is, in fact what Walker does. After defining invention as the "consideration, and particular weighing of all circumstances, etc. of which any argument may be raised to advance the subject in hand," Walker gives this curious illative: Therefore your Fancy, in this ought not to be committed, and left, to change; gazing about, and waiting, as it were, what may by sudden Enthusiasm drop into it, but to be excited and guided by Reason; diligently beating and examining the 3 » walker, g..mg....J.n.t.j:.u.Q.Lk.Qjftjg , C.QJifi.eruing . fr.h-e~Ax.fr.„.o.f Oratory, (London, 1659), pp. 1-2. Hereafter Oratory. 308 Causes* Effects* Adjuncts* and whatever may have relation to your subject* that Cat least) some of them may afford materials to your design. Brief Tables of which, and sufficiently exact, in all the three kinds of Discourses, Demonstrative* Judicial* Deliberative, see in Quintil. 1 ib. §.• cap. 10. and in Farnaby's and other Modern Rhetorics. (Oratory 2) Walker would seem to be discounting the imaginative play of the Fancy in favor of the traditional places of rhetoric. But this is not the case. It becomes clear that Walker wants rhetorical invention to oscillate between Reason and Fancy. Reason is manifest in the systematic and orderly rhetorical topoi* which he discusses in a perfunctory manner. But these places are simply meant to provide the parameters within which the fancy operates. Walker only treats a fev of the commonplaces because there are an infinite number* and "many of the places do not furnish any one subject* except with very trivial and common matter (which is to be rejected)" (Oratory 8). The places are only "to give hints to your invention" as to which places are most applicable tc the subject at hand. With practice, the mind will go directly to those places which are "chiefly serviceable, and less I accommodable to other subjects, without at all saluting the rest" (Oratory 8). But once the mind has settled on the places which are most useful, there remains the problem ofj coming up with things to say. This is where the fancy comes in to play. Directed by reason and the commonplaces, the fancy can begin bringing forth matter stored in the memory from personal experience. But Walker cautions that care needs to be taken in invention because the Fancy can becomJ over-taxed.^5 Walker next delineates what could be termed s "composing process"; students are to write freely without regard to form and detail* "rather than reserve [ their l| compositions in [their] mind till they are exactly formed" (Oratory 11). This unburdens the mind from attending tc many tasks at once and allows the mind to behold its conception^ "clearly and distinctly." This process allows the mind "more room to perfect" and "more ease to range" over the work (12). Writing involves a different psychological process than does oratory; writing is not simply inscribed rhetoric. Variety of good matter is essential* and thus itj is not good to linger on any one argument too long. "It is "In inventing take heed of torturing your fancy too much at first either in the quest of more curious matter* on in setting it down in the msot exact form. For. besides] that the mind doth mroe heavily and less accurately* perform many things at once; the Wit especially, is of so delicate a] sharpness* that any forcing rpesently turns the edge; and; where we make too much difficulty, it becomes only amazed; and astonished; and thys circumscribed and limited to none' but extraordinary productions* like a sent flame* it blazetri not the more for this* but is rather choked and put out-j ....The best way therefore is* to give it leave to expatiate it self in its work* and heat, and grow more active by] degrees; to take what it spontaneously produceth; and pass( by* what it doth not readily pass through; which (like the deficient memory) at another attempt* or* by and by. at the same, answereth of its own accord our formerly frustrat-j ed expectation. What orderly matter* therefore, it shall! (unforced) offer you* set down; that by this* as a lower] step, the Fancy may ascend, and screw it self up to some thing more choice; which it cannot so easily mount unto at] the first, without taking, by the way this meaner rise." Qr3t<?ry» pp. 9 -11 . 310' convenient therefore, often to break off the thread you are spinning; and set your imagination on work afresh, upon some other new circumstance, as if nothing at all had been meditatec before. All which variety of in-cohering matter is to be jointed and set together in the second review” (13). SincJ invention depends upon the fancy as much as, if not more than, the topics, and since the fancy cannot be overworked lest the inventive font dry up, the process of compositior needs to be haphazard and erratic. The resulting incoherent snippets can be joined together later; consequently, Walker outlines ways of adjoining unrelated snippets by use of transitions. His suggestions are all ways of tying the otherwise separate strands of discourse into a seemingly continuous thread (18-23). The psychological process of invention is so important to Walker that it becomes primary. Students are admonished to rely on their own imaginations first rather than or books.^ The consequence of this advice, if followed strictly, qr "After the exercising of your own thoughts upon your subject (and not before) use the help of other mens whose Writings you find to have handled something pertinent to it. For, if you exercise your own Meditation, after yoij have read thers, most-what, the wit is not so active and loving of trouble; but that, like other bodies in motion, its will follow a Track and Rote made before it; rather, than its own Bias, and Force; And as unlikely as it is, before the seeing what others in the first place have done, that! your inventions should coincidate with theirs; so difficult! it is, after, that yours should vary from them. beware therefore of accepting in the first place the auxiliaries off your Books or of your memory: which (doing it without! pains) is always ready with the tendering of her provi-j sions, though never so mean, to prevent the labors of the 311 would severely disrupt the kind of education that had tra ditionally been administered in English grammar schools. The already attenuated humanist curriculum would be vitiated even more. The phrase books and proverbs diligently copied and memorized would be of auxiliary rather than primary use. The wisdom of the authors would be set aside for the genius of the individual because matter for compositior comes from the senses* in this case the inward senses* rather than from authoritative sources. Knowledge is personal rather than communal. This psychology would also have a drastic effect on the humanist concept of style as the embodiment of wisdom. No longer would matter be the skeletor upon which the "sinews of discours" are strung to produce vital poetry and prose. Now matter is engendered in the mind and can be dissociated from form in a Cartesianlike duality. Matter has a life of its own. Hence the discussior of style can include pronunciation and action (traditionally delivery in Ciceronian rhetoric) because elocution is merely everything that can be appended to matter once it is invented. It is therefore consistent with the word/thing dichotomy that Walker subscribes to the corresponding division between a grammatical and rhetorical order in syntax: one allows access to meaning, the other varies the form.37 Some I.n- fancy." OrjiLdxy* p. 14. 37 "Next concerning the placing of the several words ir a Period: Transposition of them diverse from the Grawma.t.Lfi.al con,s.tr_uct. io.n,* e.s.p_e_c_La.Ll.y i.n la,n.g.ua^.es d_i.sjLiJlgu_LsAi.nJ — 312 s^r_uc_tlctnj5L__xni-JJifi-Ar.t of Oratory is yet another example of how empirical psychology undercut the foundation of humanism; empiricism provided the rationale for separating words anc things. In Walker's textbook on rhetoric, psychology hac already made significant inroads in adapting the Ciceroniar canons of rhetoric to a new form. But Walker's textbook is mild in its implications when compared to his later work. QX Education (1673). The psychological foundation implied ir S f l f l i g . . . I .Q xa& flO .. becomes explicit ir Of Education and provides the premises for an outright attack on humanist rhetoric. Let us now turn our attentior to Walker’s 0_f .Ed.uc.ation. Walker's book on education provides a particularly aptj comparison to Peacham’s The Compleat Gentleman, not only because it also went through several editions and was written in the same century, on the same subject, and for the same kind of audience, but also because Walker shares the same purpose as Peacham. He is not interested in perfecting young gentlemen in sciences and speculative learning, but in furnishing "some rules and principles of Active life.1,38 Walker begins by stating the three traditional aspects of learning: "1. » l£JL5^5» Cases, by their proper terminations. . . hath always been practiced, and is of much use (provided that our style by this be not much obscured)." Oratory, p. 41. 38 0. Walker, "The Preface," Of Education,__&sn.eciallv of Young Gentlemen (Oxford, 1673).. Hereafter Of Education. , 3T3 2 . t-C-UQ-.tj-.p,n. 3 . Ejse.r.gXgiS .m d MLSHS.%1 " He defines capacity as consisting "1. in Fancy or Invention. 2. Memory. And 3. Judgment11 (QjL_Mjj£^MSJ3 1). This defini tion realigns the rhetorical canons under natural ability. As parts of the arts of rhetoric and logic, invention, judgment, and memory were arts insofar as they could be taught. But in Walker’s scheme, these three are "gifts of Nature" which cannot be improved by art or practice (Q| Education 1-4). It is true that education can bring to their fullest potential the capacities given to every person, but it cannot alter them. Invention is linked to a mental faculty, the fancy. What was suggested in The Art of Oratory is now posited as a major assumption on which the rest of the work depends. By declaring these faculties to be natural, Walker is not trying to diminish education and practice as means of learning, he is encompassing them into a more comprehensive theory of learning than any we have seen heretofore in the disputes about learning languages. Rather than opting for art or practice, Walker, like Wase. attempts to join the two for more effective learning. A schoolmaster prescribes the end of learning, offers examples, and provides exercises for OQ practice. * In prescribing the end and offering rules anc 39 "These two last (Instruction, and Practise) ares comprehended in Education. There is but one yrav and manner, of learning, be the subject whatever it will. In iflanuall Arts the Master first sheweth his Apprentice what he is td dp_; next works it himself in his presence, and gives him 314 precepts* the educator is appealing to the reason. By presenting examples and patterns* he appeals to the fancy, for the fancy enables learning by imitation (Of Education 3). And by practice* the educator is helping to engrave the lessons into the memory. The many disputes over how to teach Latin could now be resolved by appealing to the various faculties of the mind. The three faculties form the basis of education and each has its own function. The fancy or wit apprehends and invents, the memory retains, and the judgment compares and discerns likeness.1*® A discussion of all the faculties would take us too far from our inquiry, but, since the fancy is associated with rhetorical invention* it will be helpful to see how Walker characterizes the fancy. Walker describes four categories of persons who are by nature extraordinarily endowed with wit or fancy. Some are imaginative to the point of being volatile, others are precocious and of ’ ’small duration,’’ yeti others are loquacious, and finally a few are given to ’ ’some rules, and then sets him to work. The same is the way of breeding a gjmkJ-man» or a SfiMlar. The Educator prescri-[ beth his ; gives him rules and preceotjs; presents him examples and patterns; and then sets him to act according to what was before taught him." Of Education, p. 9. **® "And first take notice, that the goodness of Wit is seen in first, quick apprehending what is proposed; and 21yj ready, pertinent, and copious invention. A Memqrv then isj counted excellent, when it quickly embraceth, and long retaineth, what is committed to it. And that Judgment is! commended, which subtly compareth, and accurately discerns^ between things that are alike." Of Education, p. 98. Note that Walker uses wit, fancy and imagination interchangeably. 315 particular science” (Of Education 97-104). All but the last are unenviable traits. The third characteristic, volubility of words, is particularly noteworthy. 3. THERE is another sort who have not so great parts, but have a yalnkl.l. j , f r , . Y . - Q£- -1. .9 n& UflJBe, are able upon a suddain to speak dg.. . gffinl..,eji,^.^._X)o.n..-.^ te^. and of them too, pro & con. This passeth amongst . Women and ordinary people for Eloquence and great parts, but amongst discreet and serious persons, for impertinence. And the rather, because these Men chuse to talk commonly of things they under stand not, or are most improper and unknown to the company, and of them also, without order, or method; and have, when at a non plus, certain common places to retire to lest they should fall into that terrible disgrace of having no more to say. (Qf...E.d,yg.atj., op 103) The competence humanists sought to develop in their stu dents, the ability to speak copiously for or against any subject, is termed impertinence rather than eloquence and is attributed to an over abundance of fancy. Fancy is useful, but in excess it is untrustworthy and cannot be allowed tc dominate the other faculties.^ Fancy, in particular needs to be tempered by judgment. Fancy consists in perspicacity and versability, which is a kind of mental dexterity or the ability to put "one thing instead of another, with like dexterity, as a juggler dotfc his balls” (Of Education 122). Thus fancy can deceive by legerdemain unless kept in check by Judgment. Fancy differs very much from .judgment; that is more perspicacious, this more profound; that more 4 1 For the pejorative senses of the fancy, see James Engell, The, Creative Imagination. (Cambridge: Harvard) University Press, 1982), chapter one.____________________________ I 316 quick, this more stable; that chiefly considers appearances, this reality; that produceth admira tion and popular applause, this profit and real advantage. Ingenious men are commonly impatient of thinking, and therefore take appearances for reality; and their fancy still suggesting new conceits, suffers them not to weigh or compare reasons. . . .And if ingenious men do come to consider seriously, or to deliberate, they are able to say so much for either side, that they have no rfes.Q2.U-ti.f i p; they d,i.§mtLfe.w£2i > but QO.ftfil.ud-Q nothing. . . . Whereas the Judicious man is fitted for any employment, considers what dangers and evils may happen, and avoids them; consequently is prosperous, brings about his designs, advanceth himself and his family. . . .In sum, the one is best in a Tavern or Coffee-house, the pther at a Council-table: the one is a facetious companion, fcJlfe— fefcJlSJ: a faithful friend; tJsifi—fl&fi a good droll, the other a good Patriot; the one makes us merry, the other wise. . . .Wit is the mother of facetiousness, conceits, jests, raillery, satiri calness, (which is almost synonymum to wit) drollery, quick reparties, quaint Metaphors, and the like, in conversation. Of projects, new Inventions, Mechanical Instruments, etc. And in learning is the great Nurse of Poetry, Oratory, Music, Painting, Acting, and the like. weighing and comparing of one sub.iect, one appearance, op.fe-Xfefefi.Qib.— ,.t.hfer.febJ...l.Q..-lls.QfeXfi.-fend QJxQ.ftfi.fi-..kEjafe f.r .,p m .. .fa. i . g.s... g .p .fl.d frm..J3.ad.t and. m ao true and good from lesser. (QO.d.U.Q.fetj.QH 122-23, 125) Thus, by extension, rhetoric is culpable of all the weak nesses of the fancy. It is inconstant, irresolute, and imprudent. To educate students with the competence to write or speak on both sides of a question, to use conceits, metaphors, and other figures of speech, and to write or speak copiously on any subject would be to exercise and strengthen the fancy to the neglect of the other faculties. Judgment especially needs to be developed and the fancy checked. This can be done by introducing more solid, demanding, and rational subjects into the curriculum. _____________ 317 Although Walker identifies rhetoric with fancy and all of its pejorative connotations, he does not propose tc eliminate rhetoric from the curriculum. In fact Walker is very conservative in the sense that he sees education as a discursory rather than experimental endeavor, but this is a result of his belief that discussion and disputation sharper the judgment.Nevertheless, just as the capricious fancy needs to be subjugated to judgment, rhetoric needs to bej counter-balanced in the curriculum with the other discourse arts: logic and mathematics. It is necessary that a student learn rhetoric which is the ability "to aftftak -JM L T S P iiC W QV§ll.i decently, and persuasively." but he must also be able "toj discourse pertinently and rationally" in order to "dissolve a sophism" which is logic. Most of all he must master "the Rra„c.tls.s Pf , fllafijSUlEaJLag> or the seeking after truth by Evidence, which is Mathematics. Geometry, especially" (Q| Education 109-110, 113). Walker is particularly emphatic that a young gentleman learn mathematics so as to mold all of his discourse because "Algebra [is] the pinnacle of "This is it [Argumentation pro and contra] which brings a question to a point, and discovers the very center and knot of the difficulty. This warms and activates the spirit in the search of truth, excites notions, and by! replying and frequent beating upon it, cleanseth it from the ashes, and makes it shine and flame out the clearer. . . . But indeed in natural Phil.o_s.CLP.hy (wherein the greatest! liberty is given) what is there that is not disputable? and even they, who most pretend to experiments, will find it' difficult to produce one new, or conjure an old. univer-j sal proposition; and when they shall discover one. they| shall find it disputed both with contrary reasons andi experiments." Of Education, p p . 119, 120._______________________ ) 318 4 ^ argumentation." Rhetoric* therefore, like fancy can be useful so long as it is not practiced in excess. It needs to be broughtj into balance with other discursive practices which guard against the wanton effects of an over-exercised fancy. Logic will ferret out sophisms. Mathematics will exercise proper invention thereby fixing the fancy and keeping it from straying onto dangerous ground, and mathematics will train the mind how to enquire in all discourse after truth. The mode, consequently, of disputation and argumentation is neither logic nor rhetoric, but algebra. Language must seek the precision of an algebraic formula or a geometric proof.^ The function of language therefore was accuracy, and the function of language education became discernment of error and the discovery of truth. By emphasizing authors and language, humanists had J "I mean not a superficial taking upon trust the Propositions, or the practical part only, or Instrument, . . .but the high road of Demonstration. This is the first part of the building that appears above gorund; it is practicing them in the greatest Instances of invention that- we know; it fixeth the fancy, it accustometh to thinking, and enquiring after truth in all discourses. Analvtica is; the gage of a man's parts, and A1eebra the pinnacle of argumentation.11 Of Education, p. 114. ^ Note this is a reversal of Aristotle's conception of] the language arts. Both dialectic and rhetoric were based on probable premises, which was as close to certainty as could be reached through language. Demonstration was forj science. In the seventeenth century, however, language] planners in search of a philosophical language, men such as Wilkins, Wallis, Ward, and Dalgarno, and educators such ad Walker attempted to make language capable of demonstration. 319 fallen into great error, exercising the wrong mental facultiesj at the expense of reason. Humanist education sought to enhance the memory by having students retain phrases fron authors, and it sought to develop the capricious fancy by exercising students in rhetoric. Proper emphasis therefore had to be restored in education to reason and judgment.^1 Consonant with the purpose of educating gentlemen to discern error and discover truth. Walker suggests ways of directing the three faculties: fancy, memory, and judg ment. ^ The entire thrust of Walker's treatment of the "The true method of studying to render anyone s learned man, I conceive afii to be, to 4A..i,ud-.aium ...AaJfc.. . . m s . mAnka.s.g..,.a 1 iu rn.gmi.Qlsg? ,.esfe aommissam memoriae custodire: at scire est & sua auaecue facere, nec ab alio exemplari pendere. And these differ ae much as digesting our meat, and reserving it in a cupboard. Wherefore ne.ifehe.r is it to be able to quote many Authors, nor tell their opinions, nor to repeat their petty sentences or profound subtilties: as qgJAhftE J h . f i nor to say them by heart, is to be a Scholar: but to digest what is read, and to be able to know where a difficulty lies, and how to solve it, lg. to make it your own, and to be able tc satisfy your self and others in that which you conceive tc be truth." Qf Education, pp. 122-123. ^ To aid the memory, Walker suggests that all lessons be "got by heart" and offers the mnemonic devices familiar from classical rhetoric. Walker states that "Invention 1^ bettered by pjr.agfr,i.Q.S» by reading, by 3JHjLk&£ifiJD» and by] common-places. Practice is to be had under the tutelage ofj someone with "considerable dexterity." The tutor is to give certain exercises for the fancy and is not to send him reading to books. Reading and imitation are given perfunc-j tory treatment in one paragraph each. Reading "inventive Authors" is recommended, but Walker cautions that th^ student should "use his own invention before he reads upon his subject." He recommends imitating "by translating, pa,r.3.B.hr..a,S-.i,n.g, epitomizing, and composing upon his owr subject somewhat like the other.". Next come the common places. Considering Walker's emphasis on the fancy’s role| in invention, it may seem curious that Walker discusses the faculties and their role in education is to ensure that the wit» judgment, and memory function together, with judgment having the supervisory function. Any imbalance in these faculties will bring about undesired consequences. Walker does not actually enumerate the dangers of an over-active memory. He simply denies that the memory alone conduces tc learning. For the fancy, however, the consequences are specified; they are inconstancy, irresoluteness, and indeci sion. Any education, therefore, which exercised the fancy at the expense of judgment would result in dire consequences for the individuals, and more importantly, for the state. Fanciful subjects such as poetry and rhetoric could prove detrimental to society if they formed the bulk of the curri culum. This is why Walker emphasizes other disciplines suet commonplaces, at all. Walker is aware of this apparent contradiction because he acknowledges the differing opinions on the usefulness of commonplaces; then he makes a very] important distinction. He distinguishes his purpose by dividing the use of topics for inventing arguments from the use of topics to discern the nature of things. Like Wilkins, Ward, and Dalgarno, Walker sees the topics as a* means of discovering the attributes, characteristics, anc constituents of things so they can be accurately described, named, and classified. (Howell treats Walker's discussion of the topics without recognizing this function. See Logic and JLhetoric in England, p. 317.) Walker also says that the! topics are for "ordinary wits" who otherwise have trouble "pumpEing] out what is to serve their occasions." But in order to reassert his original purpose he. states that the topics do not merely generate words, but increase under-! standing. Judgment is the means "whereby we discern> ie.l Judge of, true and false, good and bad, better and less good." Judgment oversees the reasons on all sides of a question as propsed by the fancy and considers similars instances from the past as recollected by memory, then makes a decision. Qf Education, pp. 130-36, 172-73. 321 as logic and mathematics. He must balance the psychological stability of his students by balancing their curriculum. Consequently. Walker is cautious of the activities taught in the humanist grammar schools. Walker discourages reading authors for matter. The students must form their own mindsj before reading the works of others. Students must not memorize authors, or sentences and phrases from authors, nor must they recite them. Speaking and writing copiously on every topic, pro and con. is considered impertinence rather than eloquence. The language arts are still essential to education, but they must be compensated by more training in logic and mathematics. The traditional commonplaces are not meant solely to be used for inventing discourses, but also for coming to a better understanding of things, their properties and essences. Walker warns that a domineering fancy coulc be very dangerous and in so doing identifies eloquence as. the potential malefactor. But if Hit be jftinafljHAt,h..B.ower, it is very dangerous to the public. SAal&BJU.,a. ' . . J S l A P . e.,.. g2. q.q U .§apisuila Q b . . S . f i fc. P.r.ode s.t..,,aURQ.U.affi • saith Cic. 1.1. de Invent. I think I may truly add, that all mischiefs in Commonwealths proceed from these Wits; for wise men will nqt disturb government, and fools gjtm ftfr• ( Q.f. EflMfiflfcifln 123) Any political strife or turmoil therfore can be blamed on the eloquence of overly fanciful men who lack resolution, judgment, and good counsel. Although I have contrasted Peacham’s and Walker's j;rjsa-tis.es_in__te.r.ms_o.f their support and disapproval of thJ 322 goals and ideals of the humanist tradition, the conclusion that can be drawn from each is the same: rhetoric failed to preserve the seventeenth-century commonwealth. From Peacham'£ point of view before the civil war, eloquence was essentia] to preserving the harmony of the kingdom, for by its power eloquent orators would uphold the state and "bring to tune £ discordant Commonwealth." After the civil war, Walker associates eloquence with doing damage to the commonwealth and implicates the grammar schools as fomenters of the the disunion. Whereas Peacham sought prevention from political malady through eloquence, Walker diagnosed eloquence as the cause of political malady and explained its cure in terms of a more varied curriculum that could be justified on psycho logical grounds. The implicit conclusion of Walker’s treatise on the faculties and their role in education is that thJ curriculum needs to be changed from the linguistically oriented humanist curriculum to a rationally oriented one, from emphasis on the fancy to emphasis on reason. Walker's implied accusation is that the grammar schools and the language competence they sought to give their scholars had been the cause of the civil war. III. Although Walker's implicit charge against the schools and against eloquence may seem specious today, it was not considered so in the seventeenth century. In fact the implicit charge made by Walker was repeatedly and explicitly! made by others. We have already seen Wilkins’ accusation! that the religious strife of the day was chargeable to the! incautious and inappropriate use of language.^ But there were others making the same claim* and, it apperars with some justification. To trace the origin if these claims will take us back full circle to the grammar controversy and to Henry VIII's decree that Lily’s Grammar be the sole grammar used in the schools. In chapter two I mentioned briefly that the schools had become instruments of the states. In the preface to Duc.ti._o_n Qf. (1542), which is one of the, several treatises comprising Lily's Grammar, Lily gives a; specific explanation of why King Henry had commissioned and instituted a single grammar for use in the schools. Thej reason was in part to standardize pedagogy, but it was also l i f t to prevent religious, and therefore political, disharmony. ° ^ See chapter five above. ^ ® ’ ’And as his majesty purposeth to establish hi Sj people in one consent and harmony of true religion: so his tender goodness toward the youth and chidhood of the realm, enticeth to have it brought up under one absolute and uniform sort of learning. For his majesty considering the great encumberance and confusion of the young and tender wits, by reason of the diversity of grammar rules and teachings (For heretofore every master had his grammar, and every school diverse teachings, and changings of masters and schools did many times utterly undo good wits) hat)| appointed certain learned men meet for such a purpose, to compile one brief, plain , and uniform grammar, which only (all other set apart) for the more speediness, and less trouble of young wits, his highness hath commanded alii schoolmasters and teachers of grammar within his realm, and other dominions, to teach their scholars." William Lily, "To the Reader," Duction of the Evaht Partes of SpeecJa (London,] 324 Henry’s commision of Lily’s Grammar was an attempt to settle by decree a controversy similar to the one that re-emerged in the seventeenth century as a result of Lily’s Grammar. But in the king’s mind the problem was not merely pedagogical, for education was to prepare scholars for service in the realm. Dull-witted scholars would make dull-witted counselors^ and ambassadors and secretaries. If the confusion over grammar undid the schoolboys’ wits, it would eventually undo the realm, and dissent and political confusion would follow. The only way to prevent future religious and political turmoil would be to restore order to schools by adopting a uniform Latin grammar. Uniformity of language instruction^ would yield union of polity. Lily consequently exhorts young scholars to diligent study in order that the commonwealth may profit thereby.^ It is now easier to understand the longevity of Henry's proclamation and the tenacious support of Lily's Grammar in the schools despite overwhelming opposition and seemingly irrefutable support for the view that the grammar was inadequate! for the students- abilities. It is also easy to understan^ why Comenius’ pedagogy became so popular in 1641 and remained 1542). Hereafter Duction. ^ "You tender babes of England, shake off slothful ness. set wantonness apart, apply your wits wholly to learning and vertue. whereby you may do your duty to God and' your king, and make glad your parents, profit yourselves, and much advance the common weal of your country." "To the Reader," RMafcLflP. 325 so throughout the Commonwealth period. In the English mind. Lily's Grammar and» by extension, grammar schools in genera] were the means of training youth for service to the monarchy and of preventing political disunion by providing uniform instruction. Schools were symbols of the monarch's sover eignty. To diverge from the received method of instruction, therefore, not only repudiated tradition, but also one's loyalty to the throne. Analogously». during the Commonwealth period, Hartlib and his followers sought educational reform as a means of re-indoctrination. Puritan reformers sought to break the tyranny of grammar . in the schools just as theji had broken the tyranny of the monarch. Comenius' pedagogy provided the perfect model because it was not based or grammar (and was even anti-grammatical), and Comenius was himself a protestant. (We must recall that Webbe alscl denounced that grammar vociferously, but he upheld traditional ideals of eloquence and was a Catholic.) Thus, it waj assumed by loyalists and rebels alike that order of whatever kind in the schools produced order in the state. Therefore any political turmoil ultimately cast suspicion upon the schools. This frame of mind which links sedition with education, and dissent with language learning appears repeatedly after the violence of the 1640's until the end of the century. For example, Marchamont Nedham in his A Discourse Concerning Schools andSchool-Masters (1663), calls for a re-emphasis 326 of the humane studies in lieu of training for preachers and attributes the religious disputes to factitiousness in the schools. They do almost in all Countries entertain the same’ Grammar* and go by a certain rule of teaching; Despauter obtains in France, AJxar.e.z in Sp,aA,n» and all England over heretofore, Lily and Qaffid&D were in the hands of Youth. And indeed there is the same reason for uniformitv in School, as in Church: the variety of Methods (supposing they were all severally in themselves very good) doing very much mischief, by not only distracting young heads, and discouraging them, and putting them back upon their removes to new Masters; but also making a fundamental difference in their course as they proceed to other studies. I have heard a Bishop, at an examination in a public School, receiving an answer out of the common road, from a child, which had come lately from a private School, made this Reply, What, says he, Puritanism in Schools, too? And so it is with us now, since these licentious times have overthrown all order, and broken us into so many sects and factions; the Schools have been infected with the Fanatic Itch, and like Independent Congregations have been variously administered by new lights, according to the fancy of the several Teachers, that I dare say there are as many Grammars taught as there are Grammarians to teach, if not more. It would Nedham's call for a humane education is important, if only to demonstrate how out of favor humanist values had, already become. Referring to scholars he argues that, if schools were set aright, "They would practice to talk Latin fluently, that they might readily entertain any stranger, (which now many that have the Reputation of good Scholars are but clumsy in) and pour forth Verses and Declamations extempore; they would study Classical Authors thoroughly and! digest them, acquaint themselves with all the Critical parts of Philology, and the Elegancies of the Language, and the Customs of Antiquity: How many Erasmus.ses, and HslaiieJlfcLQILfi» and S.Q.%11 » and Puteans, and V. . Q ,ssiu.s.sc.s> should we have amongst us in a short time, if literature were but thusj encouraged? whereas now generally the Pulpit is made theirj ultimate Design; and when they set once a preaching, they lay their studies of Humanity aside." [Marchamont Nedham], a| Discourse Concerning Schools,_and Sc.hO-Ql-Masters (London, 1663), p. 10. Hereafter School-Masters.__________________________ 327 be well if these loose brooms were gathered again, if not into the old. yet into some one Model . . . .1 shall appeal to any man of sober Judg ment, whether it be consistent with the Nation's good, to banish schism out of the Church, and Countenance it in Schools; and whether our English Youth, which is nursed up in faction, is like to be well taught. (School-Masters 5-6) Indeed the purpose of Nedham's tract is to suggest financial and administrative reforms for the schools so as to elimin ate the confusion in them, because "it [is] found a task almost impossible by all Methods the Church of England car use to recover those persons to a sound Orthodox Sense, whose Childhood hath been poisoned, and prepossessed with Schism" (SlMU&dllaaJbftCa 16). As the century wore on, however, the identification of schism was not solely attributed to the grammar controversy, but also to the entire humane curriculum. William Walker, whom I discussed earlier in this chapter, had opted in favor of Lily's Grammar, but was wary of the humanities, and so insisted that grammar schools teach religion along with the traditional studies. Thus the purpose of schools is to make good scholars so by the by to make them also good men. Which two things are the two great Aims, which every Institution of Youth should mainly and intentionally drive at: And where the one is without the other, namely Learning without Religion, it serves many times but to make men the more desperately debauched, and the more mischiev- iously wicked, as we see by the too many and too sad Instances thereof in this present Age of ours; an Age, which I know not well whether more rightly t o c a l l , A n .,. A & & Q f P .g J ? - - a m f t . e .. d - - .. L £ g .r f l i n g * o r q_£ Le_arn_e_d___D_ebaucherv. Assuredly never was there so much of both, if ever so much of either, in any preterlapsed Age, as in this. And consequently ______the more need there is of the Teacher’s utmost______ 328 care and pains, to breed up the children committed to his charge unto Religion as well as unto 1 , 3 . 9 . . rrun&+ and as far as the nature of matters will bear, to read to them a Lecture of Divinity upon every Sub ject of Humanity, and to temper all his Olgc.puraejs of Philology with lafr.sr.sp.e.rgJLpna..Q.f Morality.g In Walker's opinion, humanist language education was insuf ficient to make men good and was therefore suspect of sedition. Its potential for debauchery would have to be compensated with lectures on religion. These attitudes were not limited to educators exclu sively. They were disseminated at large by two very popular books which were read more as books of advice, general information and social commentary, than as works on educa tion itself. Francis Osborne's Advice to a Son. first published in 1656, saw nine editions by 1689. And Edward Chamberlayne ' s Angliae__Noti't_ia The .Present $fca_k_3-._.ai England (1669). had gone through twenty editions by 1702 and had sixteen subsequent editions in the eighteenth century. Osborne's style is aphoristic and therefore provides few extended remarks about the topics on which he writes. Nevertheless, he is without doubt a subscriber to the new empiricism and a detractor of humanist values. His advice to his son on the value of education is a case in point. Since a too universally dilated Learning hath been found upon trial, in all Ages, no fast friend either to policy or Religion: being no less ready to dAs.Qgy.gX Blemishes in the one, than InOQP-gXJAlr ties in the other. SQp M . f f . f c . e . r ; , £ like the CantgJELS of 51 William Walker, English Ex a bid 1 e s , o f JJie.. JLiiJtJja el Svntaxis (London,____1686), sig. A4r. _______________________ I ------------- , 329 the Swiss, becoming willing upon the least appre hension of advantage, to plant the same Engines and ttft&Bflna against the w .r_Q .ng.-g.A .fiL g £$ the right. And not seldom with as good success. This is the same charge laid against men of fancy that Obadiah Walker made. Men who are trained to argue both sides of a proposition do more damage than good. They frequently are more persuasive when arguing for the wrong than for the right. The marginal gloss to this section reads ’’Learning makes men factious. The learning he is referring to is humanist learning of Authors and languages. Consequently, the advice given to his son is full of statements derogating the practices of humane education. Wisdom, for example, is a product of experience, ’ ’one example prevailing more upon the Memory, than ten Rules; and one that is for the pr-ejs.efl.tLJkCL..tig. S f i j f t P x than twenty found in Ql.d-.M .t.MCJS1 1 (Advice 180). Osborne recommends against wide reading and is especially contemptuous of historians (7-8). Instead, Mathematics is the ’ ’Queen of Truth," and "as for other human Learning, so much of it as is not hewed out of this rock [mathematics], is nothing but Lumber and Forms, owned for the majesty and employment only of Academies, and of little better use than to find Discourse by the fire sides" (5-6). 52 Francis Osborne, Ad.Y-j--Q-e-.jLQ . -a-Sfih» in T.Lq -W-Q.r.^- S— PJ 7th ed. (London, 1673), pp. 190-91. Hereafter Advj.ce. In the 1673 edition the gloss actually reads "Learning makes men famous." This is rectified in the index where "factious" is printed. Advice, R4v. i---------------------- - " ~ • 330 He condemns those who . "rattle" with Latin and- Greek anc advises against them as models* "for the more you seem to U a . y . . e . . y. p. ui natural Parts” (9). In matters of style. Authors are not to be imitated. "Books stately, writ debase your style" (Advice 10). "The way to Elegancy of style, is to employ your Pen upon every Errand; and the more trivial and dry it is. the more Brains must be allowed for Sauce" (11). That is. an elegant stylej is the product of forcing the mind to write on matters that do not normally allow amplification. By constant practice the Reason will check "all ordinary Invention," thereby culling affectation, so "as do not dare to present you but with what is excellent" (11). No models are needed; one need only have recourse to reason and practice to develop anj elegant style. Osborne points out the consequences of trying to model one’s style after learned and stately authors by referring to King James and his son Charles. James became so impressed with his own learning that he succumbed to flatterers, "yet in this he was so far exceeded bv his son" who "attained a Pen more Majestical, than the Crown he lost" (10-11). Thus Osborne concludes that "Experience is s better tutor t.han Buchanan" (11).54 Stylistic imitation, 54 George Buchanan (1506-1582) was a noted scholar whose translation of Psalms or Latin grammar would be well known to almost anyone who had attended a grammar school. See DNB, III, 186-93. 331 authors* and language competence were to be avoided in education because they were dangerous both to the realm for supporting good and ill indiscriminately* and to the individual for making him lose his perspective and exaggerate his own importance. Chamberlayne1s exceedingly successful book Aneliae Notitia* or. The Present State of England (1669) was yet! another book which promulgated the suspicion that England’s religious and political troubles were chargeable to th^ grammar schools. Chamberlayne's complaint is not against the endowed grammar schools* such as St. Pauls* Westminis ter* Eton* Merchant-Tailors. and the Charter-house* all of which were well-endowed and could therefore prefer capable students to be collegiate fellows in one of the universi ties* but against the market-town grammar schools where children were to be educated gratis at the expense of thej state. Such schools could not provide preferment to the universities and in most cases neither could the parents. The result, according to Chamberlayne. was that the boys became useless* lazy, and unfit for labor. Most of thesej scholars therefore turned away.from the plough and decent labor to professions such as clerks for lawyers and justices "where they learn much Chicanery, they become cunning Petty- foggors, multiplying Law Suits, and cozen their Country."-55 55 Edward Chamberlayne, Anglia Notitia: or, The Present State of England, 9th ed. (London, 1676), II, 282. Here-! after Present State._________________________________________________ I , , 332 The little learning they receive in these market schools makes them proud* stiffnecked* disobedient* and "apt to embrace every new Doctrine* Heresy* Schism* Sect* and Faction" (Present State 2: 282). And those who happen to make it to. the university from these schools lack the means for as proper education and leave only half-educated. Consequently they have "a propensity to preach Faction. Sedition* and Rebellion, to seduce those that are more ignorant tharl themselves, as was evident in our late unhappy troubles, where it was observed, that the Seducers were generally such as had been from those Har.kg.t-La.t.i. j a . . . S . Q . h . Q . P . X . S ..." (E.Eg.5 State 3: 282). Although in Chamberlayne1s diatribe against market grammar schools he does not single out rhetoric for blame, rhetoric is guilty by association* first with fancy and second with sedition. The preface to the reader begins: In this small Treatise, the Reader may not reasonably expect to have his Fancy much delighted, (Ornari res ipsa negat, contents doceri,) but only to have his uM.sr.S.fc,a]n.d.j;nLg informed; and therefore the Author hath industriously avoided all curious Flowers of Rhetoric, and made it his whole business to feed his Reader with abundant variety of excellent EJCMJUfca. (A3r-v ) Here again the thing/word dichotomy is applied and is inter preted in terms of the empirical psychology and two of the three aims of rhetoric: to delight and instruct. Chamberlayne' s purpose is not to delight the fancy with verbal ornaments* but to instruct the understanding with solid matter. Rhetoric is verbal delight and is opposed by] 333j material understanding. Hence there is an inherent distrust of rhetoric which surfaces later in his discussion of the Royal Society and the attempt of its members to report in their weekly meetings the findings of their experiments in the most straight-forward way. In their discoursing* they -lay aside all set Speeches* and eloquent Harangues* (as fit to be banished out of all Civil Assemblies* as a thing found by woeful experience, especially in England> fatal to Peace and good Manners) and every one endeavors to express his opinion or desire, in the plainest* and most concise manner. (Present State 1: 304) Thus, rhetorical speeches and eloquent harangues are fatal to peace and are to be extirpated from all civil gather ings. The Royal Society is therefore the model of modern society. It is a place which exercises control over itsj language to establish and maintain order in its proceed ings. England* if it is to endure without the sufferings of the past must therefore follow the example of the Royal Society and take control over its language, which is to say that England must control its language institutions— the schools. Concise though Osborne’s and Chamberlayne’s remarks be, it was their broad appeal rather than their protracted treatment that was so influential, so influential in fact] that Christophor Wase thought them worthy of a reply. Wase’s purpose in Considerations Concerning Fre_e___S_cJaQ£ljs (1678) was not simply to defend the schools, but also to . . assure the rich that schools were still an honorable charity. Wase's task was twofold: he had to refute the charge that learning was useless and harmful to religion and state, as well as argue that there was not an over-abundance of schools for English youth and for the needs of the society. Potential donors would be hesitant to give money to an institution suspected by the state and the church. And if there were indeed too many schools, donors might find other, more expedient charities for their money.^7 In refuting the first charge that learning fosters dissent. Wase enumerates the complaints against learning as if speaking for the opposition. They are the same com plaints registered in Osborne and Chamberlayne. Both Arts and Labor are necessary to the prosperity of any nation. Work is essential and reading and writing are important insofar as they support commerce. 56 "Free-schools. " though free to the scholars were heavily dependent on charitable donations. In fact the risej in the number of schools during the 16th and 17th centuries’ was due to the heightened status of schools as worthyj charities and to a wealthy merchant class which was looking for such appropriate charities. See chapter 2 above. Wase's own statement of purpose is "Now because thes public Peace, and increase of Commerce are desirable to any Nation; and Parents, in particular, make it a principal concern, that their children be brought up to sound prin ciples. and employment, which may be hopeful of an honest livelyhood. it may be convenient to call under examination whether the free schools of England be so notoriously multiply'.d beyond their occasion, as is demanded we should! believe; if first their usefulness can be evinced to a! reasonable satisfaction." Considerations Concerning Free’ Schools (Oxford, 1678), p. 2. Hereafter Considerations. -------------------------------------------------------------------------- 335 B-gt___,tc>— BLak-g___a__P_rofes_s 1 on of _t eaching obsolete Languages» Poetical Fancies, or, what hath more aaB,earan.g..e..-ist£...g.r,a y U y ? the.Ar-t-.of Suiting coior- aM.e....A.rXumfija.fr.S..i Whereby to hold anv question in matterssacred or civil either wavs indiffer- g . o . Mols-tJ3.r^]jjJiQ.p .t , . f c . Q — th is BijLr^.Q.g-g-» and b.y r.ej/.a£As....take._o_i:x ,.th e..X. o,ujm..Xr.0B f-Q.Lj-QW,j.h,g-.LAb.,Q,r t,p._g^.(j^J3.t^o, JjhllS-JbhS £ . i . e . l . . d, . s (they say) want hands to till them: is this a benefit to the public, or a grievance?to be encouraged or redrest? (Qfijasldgxa.tlQJQff 4-5) This is the most direct statement against the value of a rhetorical education, and Wase poses the question, no doubt* because it had been repeatedly posed before. Wase's answer to the question, however, is not as direct as one might want, for he sees the statement as not an attack on rhetoric itself, but on education, so closely were the two identi fied. Hence Wase defends the value of education, which by association is a defense of rhetoric. His first argument in defense is historical. In ancient times both monarchies and free states employed "Professors of Philosophy and Rhetoric" to reclaim the people from theirj "natural wildness" and to insure the smooth functioning of society. Rhetoric enabled the civil law to operate properly and philosophy informed the mind of "things human and divine" (Cons id e ra t i o ns 16). Wase traces the benefits of education to society through all past ages to his own, including heathen and Christian societies, concluding that learning well the first rudiments of Religion, and bearing the yoke of Government, prepares a people to be more docile under their proper Ministers, staid in judgment, and compliant with the Disci pline, as well as the Doctrine of their Spiritual! ____________Pastors. (Considerations 34-35)______ | 33? The second half of the treatise adduces statistical evidence to determine that the number of free schools is not disproportionate to the needs of society. The importance, however* of Wase’s defense of free grammar schools is that it takes the claims against humane education seriously. Had the accusations in Osborne. Chamberlayne and others been specious or otherwise unacceptable, there would have been nc need to refute them. The fact, however, that Wase felt it worthy of a response is significant, for Wase was not merely a schoolmaster, but had become beadle of Oxford University and overseer of the Oxford Press. His position therefore merited respect, but also placed on him the responsibility to defend education. Not less than his stature and rank were his abilities. The author of several textbooks for schools as well as fluent in the classical languages, he was described by a peer as "an eminent philologer.”^8 Thus the historical significance of Wase’s defense should not be^ overlooked, because it validates the accusations made against the schools. There were many who believed that the grammar schoolsj had been the cause of England's troubles. And despite Wase’s serious rebuttal, this belief continued. Grammar schools were never eliminated, but they were primarily a place for learning classical languages rather than an insti tution for cultivating eloquence. Thus it is not surprising 58 DNB, XX, 896.______________________________________________________ 337 to find Ralph Johnson* an obscure schoolmaster* complain in the preface to his 1679 English progymnasmata that* although there were many suitable textbooks available* few students were being exercised in rhetoric.59 The effect of empiricism on humanist education in the final decades of the seventeenth.century was two-fold. Empiricism thoroughly replaced humanism as the dominant world view. The empirical psychology changed traditional language instruction in the schools, and it brought about artificial languages which challenged the metalinguistic function of humanist rhetoric. These philosophical lan guages propounded characters having an iconic relationship, to the material world. Empiricism in effect altered humanist assumptions about language and its function. Empiricism also provided an explanation of the violent events and of the psychology of the civil war, an epoch most Englishmen were glad to put behind them. The violence and 59 After acknowledging that many had already written on grammar school education* Johnson justifies his textbook by explaining that schoolmasters are remiss in teaching their students: "But whoso looketh into our Grammar! Schooles* may more justly wonder to see so little improve ment of those worthy means which this Age enjoys. Many who take in hand to instruct Youth* requiring no Exercise at all, or however no way suitable to the Books that are readj in their schools: others exacting Brick, but affording no straw, charging Exercise upon their Scholars* yet neither, showing how it may* nor (which is worse) observing that it may be performed.” Ralph Johnson* "To the Reader," The Scholars Guide From the Accidence to the University (London, 1679). 33£ factiousness of the Puritan Rebellion could be explained as a consequence of the humanist curriculum. Humanist schools were ineffective and in need of reform. The grammar con troversy had provided the ground in which the seeds of rebellion germinated. Disharmony in the schools had accustomed an entire generation to dissent and disunion. For some the schools had provided more than the opportunity for sedition* they had nurtured it. The schools* after all, had taught their students how to argue all sides of a question without teaching them how to decide which side was right. Hence it was alleged that those who came from the schools could cozen their countrymen with their speeches, but they could propose no remedy to the confusion. Moreover, those who did not lead others astray were not able to discern truth from error. All were hapless victims of an ill-founded curricu lum. As a result of these events, the schools, and with them, the rhetorical competence they had striven to provide, were blamed for the rebellion. Rhetorical education, however, was not merely a scapegoat for the violence of an age better forgotten. The empirical psychology explained more than the events of the rebellion, it also explained the psychological deficiencies of the humanist curriculum. Because it emphasized reading authors and the practice of rhetoric, the humanist curriculum had exercised the fancy to the neglect of reason. As a result, the students of these schools were given to irresoluteness 339 and indecision. They were volatile and impertinent. The minds of students, and therefore their behavior, were out of balance, and the impact had been felt throughout the common wealth. Such reasoning made rhetoric culpable for all the political strife that England had suffered. Even those who subscribed to humanist values must have felt somewhat betrayed. The schools, they believed, gave them an ability to defend themselves against deceit. Rhetoric was to protect them from error; instead it seemed to promulgate falsehood and dissension. Eloquence was to preserve thJ state, not to dissolve it. From the first decades of the seventeenth century, wej have seen how the values which girded humanist education had been attacked gradually. Consequently, the accusations of sedition made in the final decades were not solely respon sible for the pejorative connotations attributed to rhetoric at the end of the century. These, accusations were merely the victors’ final shots into the fleeing hosts. Empiricism had taken control precisely where humanism had laid its greatest hopes and its greatest expectations— in education, and as a result its adherents were able to condemn humanist rhetoric at will. Epilogue 340 The events of the seventeenth century have more than historical significance; they allow us to evaluate the linguistic dogma of our own day. In the process of tracing some of the developments in seventeenth-century education. I have argued that reforms within rhetorical education itself were the instruments of change. Humanists hoped that rhetorical education would have a salutary effect on society by teaching the effective use of language, but the combina tion of factors, such as the increased number of schools and the use of English as a learned language, caused humanist education to adapt to different needs. Seventeenth-century humanists such as Brinsley undertook reforms and adaptations of the grammar school curriculum which ultimately had consequences just the opposite of their expectations and goals. It is these unexpected consequences that have significance for our own time. I have argued throughout this study that our knowledge of these events increases our understanding of rhetorical history, and as an epilogue I propose that modern education is in a position to restore rhetoric to a central role in the curriculum. Rhetoric held a prestigious place in humanist education because rhetoric was supported and maintained by certain assumptions about language and its use. These assumptions concern the relationship among language, knowledge, and behavior. Human Knowledge and behavior were both defined in 3411 social terms; both were based on a consensus and an assent which was transmitted and achieved by means of language. Hence the primary measure of language use-was not its cor rectness or truth value with respect to an independent reality. That measure was social effectiveness# and it was achieved when form and content worked in concert. Such assumptions underlie what I have called the metalinguistic function of language. Because humanists sought effective expression# they turned to rhetoric for a model, and in humanist education rhetoric occupied the metalinguistiJ position with respect to the other language arts. Humanists believed that rhetoric encompassed rules of correctness# standards of usage and propriety# and rules of inference in order to effect the most beneficial changes in society. Rhetoric as metalinguistic was not a discipline as much as a perspective on life and a way of thinking about important questions. Humanists believed that knowledge was advancec not by an understanding of objects# but by understanding people’s viewpoints after conversing at length with them. Behavior was influenced not by an objective demonstration of fact# but by an appeal based on character# reason, anc emotion to win the auditor’s assent# or its religious coun terparts. belief and faith. This perspective necessitatec verbal dexterity# wide reading# and an ability to perceive the demands and constraints of the occasion. This is the reason that the ability to speak copiously on all sides off 342 any question was so admired by humanists. As the assumptions which girded this perspective loosened* the relationship among knowledge* behavior, and language changed. On the one hand, knowledge was thought to b^ advanced by an accurate description and classification of the objects in nature independent of social consensus. This epistemological stance shifted the foundations of knowledge from communal assent to objective standards of individual observation, experience, and ratiocination. On the other hand, behavior was thought to be affected by the workings of the mind independent of social assent. This psychological stance shifted the foundations of religion and ethics frorr tradition and belief to subjective standards of personal introspection and individual mental operations. Language could either become transparent so as to enable the world of objects to be perceived as clearly as possible, or it coulc appeal to man’s mind awakening in him a sense of the sublime, the beautiful, and the grand. Both the objective and subjectivej directions in language study became important in subsequent theories of language. These latter assumptions about language are those that have carried over to our own day. Their vestiges can be seen in the organization of university disciplines in whici the humanities occupy one building, the social and natural sciences other buildings. But more than the organization of disciplines, these assumptions can be seen in the expecta- . 343 tions that our society has of education. Students graduat ing from universities expect to come away with a command of a body of knowledge rather than with an ability to think methodically and express themselves effectively about a problem. It is as if students are to come in empty anc leave filled. Humanist schools admitted students who were unskilled and sought to equip them with skills for living. The reason my study is relevant to today's situation is that in recent years there has been a re-awakening of some of the metalinguistic assumptions of traditional rhetoric. Philosophers have become increasingly interested in ordinary language rather than in symbolic logic. The ordinary language philosophers* Wittgenstein* Austin* Searle* Grimes* and others* have forced philosophers to re-evaluate traditional philosophical problems. Richard Rorty* for example* has- argued at length that philosophy does not have any core composed of philosophical questions* it only has topics that can be argued. The function of philosophy* he says* is tJ conduct arguments, not to solve philosophical problems.^ Compatible with this trend in Anglo-American philosophy is the "deconstructionist" approach of contemporary French philosophy. Jacques Derrida has contended that all disci plines are ideological insofar as they attempt to lure their adherents into adopting certain methodological axia as 1 Richard Rorty* "Philosophy in America Today," The American Scholar* 51 (1982), 183-200. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------„ m' facts. He attributes their success to rhetoric rather thar to logic or demonstration of fact. He has even gone so far as to deconstruct Plato’s philosophy by showing that Plato’s methods are not philosophical but rhetorical.2 Likewise German hermeneutics has developed a concept called intersubjectivity* attempting to solve the problems caused by claiming that knowledge is either objective or subjective. An intersubjective understanding is consensual, and until recently* the linguistic implications of intersub jectivity had yet to be explored. But such hermeneutic philosophers as Karl-Otto Apel, Hans Georg Gadamer, and Jurgen Habermas have maintained that an intersubjective understanding is largely dependent on language use.^ Influenced in part by these philosophies* modern literary criticism has become decidedly more rhetorical. Not only is "rhetoric" more frequently found in works of contemporary criticism, but critics have even begun studying the rhetoric of their colleagues as a legitimate scholarly pursuit. Sucij critics as Stanley Fish and Paul DeMan have argued that literature as we know it is a product of the critics' making. p Jacques Derrida* "The time of a thesis*: punctua tions," in Philosophy in France Today, ed. Alan Montefiore (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press* 1983). pp. 34-50. J See Karl-Otto Apel* "The Transcendental Conception of Language-Communication and the Idea of a First Philo-j sophy," in ajU.fr.Q.ry . p . f . . . L in&PiaM . q J . f r . Q . u g . f r t . . - jiM .Cmfrej p . R . cxajry Linguistics* ed. Herman Perret (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter,j 1976), pp. 32-61; and Jurgen Habermas, Communication and the Evolution of Society, trans. Thomas McCarthy (Boston: Beacon Press* 1979), pp. 1-68._____________________________________________ I 345 Literary works and figures exist because of the critics’ effectiveness in arguing their case rather than merely because of the artists’ merit.21 Thus, contemporary assumptions are aligning themselves more and more with the assumptions formerly held by humanisJ educators. Language plays a significant part in how we! perceive, understand, and know our world. But, although there are similarities between contemporary and humanist assumptions about the function of language, these similari ties have not been translated into the curriculum. Despite claims of a literacy crisis and inadequate education, educators have been slow to respond. Critical thinking movements have become popular nationwide, but many of these attempts to teach critical thinking are based on fallacies and developmental psychology rather than effective language use. Students are taught to recognize an invalid! inference, but are not exercised in effective expression. Or they practice cognitive skills in the order which devel opmental psychologists postulate for normal cognitive devel opment. The belief in this case is that some people have not acquired certain cognitive strategies because they skipped a level or reversed levels of normal cognitivej development. Neither approach to critical thinking gives ^ See. Stanley Fish, Tsr.J -.T-h^,nre.n:.va^vT;e^trv,;^n^T-fe--i^T-':£-l.-&a-s3 (Cambridge, Massachussetts: Harvard University Press, 1980), pp. 356-371 ; and Paul de Man, Al~legories ;ofReading;:Figural L-a-nguage^ in-^ous;sea4i , - :N.-ie t z,scfoe-,;a,R 1 l;ke~» and . P roust (NeW Haven: Yale University Press, 1979), pp. 3-19. 346 attention to addressing an audience effectively on a matter' of shared significance. Even in composition pedagogy* educators have been slow to apply current assumptions about language to classroom practices. The watchword of composition theorists for the last decade has been "process* not product." This is a useful distinction which allows for the possibility of teaching the strategic use of language. Most process theories* however* have concentrated on psychological processes rather than social and interactional ones. Hence, research has been conducted by constructing psychological models of thi composing process and by inferring cognitive functions fron student writing habits. There are books on writer’s block and other such phenomena that define the process as essentially psychological. Some researchers have studied the coherence of texts as a manifestation of the cognitive development oJ the writer. The assumption is that an incoherent text iJ the result of a cognitively underdeveloped student. The solutions to this problem range from teaching cognitive strategies to psychotherapy. Only recently have compositior theorists begun to study language as an interaction betweer reader and writer.^ For an example of how pschological processes have been adapted to explain the writing process* see James Moffet, "Writing* Inner Speech, and Meditation," College English* 44 (1982), 231-46. For a critique of psychological! models to explain writing processes* see Marilyn Cooper and; Michael Holzman* "Talking About Protocols," tion and Communication, 34 (1983), 284-93^ 347 Because modern assumptions about language use are conforming more closely than before to humanist assumptions about language, and because the literacy crisis has promptec society to scrutinize the effectiveness of schools, the climate seems right for a re-appraisal of language pedagogy and for a re-evaluation of our expectations of education. The popularity of critical thinking programs suggests that society wants students to be trained to think about signifi cant problems. The cry for increased literacy suggests that society wants students to be more proficient readers anc writers. I believe something akin to humanist rhetorical education meets both these needs. It would not be desireable, or even feasible, to re-insti- tute the Latin grammars schools. But this hardly neec happen in order to meet society's demands. General educatior programs could be revised to emphasize critical reading of the important texts and effective writing about the issues in any discipline. As it is now, most general educatior programs hope to acquaint students with a general knowledge of many subjects, but this is not as important as training them to read and write well. In effect, general educatior could be re-structured without difficulty to train students to be effective readers and writers. Students would still study a variety of subjects, but the emphasis would remair on effective communication. What then do the events of the seventeenth century have ---------------- .----------------------- --- . 34g to do with the current situation in education? In my treatment, of language education# I have shown the origins of moderr education. It was a time when knowledge of things began to replace training in effective expression. I have also made the assumptions of humanist education explicit in the hopes that modern education can build upon the assumptions# but not necessarily the forms# of humanist education. But I especially want to address those who# for some reason# feel that the changes in education here suggested are worrisome. Not only did metalinguistic assumptions inform humanist education# they also influenced education in the earlier classical and medieval periods. Ability with language has been a prerequisite to advanced study for nearly the length of educational history. But just as important as the longevity of a- language curriculum are the circumstances that interrupted it. The adaptations of the seventeenth-century curriculum were all the results of unpredictable circumstances such as increased donations to schools# inappropriate teaching methods# and politically charged reforms. These circumstances were fortuitous rather than designed. Hence our educational inheritance derives from a combination of historical accidents. As such# thJ curriculum need not be perceived as inviolable and sacred. We have the same opportunity to re-evaluate the curriculum in light of current needs. Our modern awareness of how much language shapes what we know and what we believe# and thej 349 felt crisis in literacy in this country suggest that rhetoric can profitably be restored to its metalinguistic position ii education. A Selected Bibliography 350 Primary Sources Ascham, Roger. The Schoole Master. London. 1570. Beck. Cave. The Universal Character. London, 1657. Braithwaite. Richard. A Survey of Historv: Or, A Nurserv for Gentrv. London, 1638. Brightland, John. A Grammar of the English Tongue with the Artes of Logick. Rhetorick, Poetrv. etc. London. 1714. Brinslev. John. A Consolation for our Grammar Schooles. London. 1622. Cato Translated Grammatically. London, 1622 * Corderius Dialogues Translated Grammatically. London. 1615. • Ludus Literarius: or. The Grammar Schoole. London. 1612. The Posing of the Parts. London, 1615. • Tullies Offices Translated Grammatically. London. 1616. ...... .... • Ovids Metamorohoses Translated Grammitcallv, and also to the ProDrietv of our English Tongue. London. 1618. • Pueriles Confabulatinculae: Or Children’s Dialogues. London. 1617. Carew, Richard. The Survey of Cornwall and An EDistle Concerning the Excellencies of the English Tongue. London. 1723. Chamberlavne. Edward. Angliae Notitia: or. The Present State of England. Ninth ed. London. 1676. Clarke. John Dux Grammaticus Tvronem Scholasticum. 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