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Homegrown violent extremism: designing a community-based model to reduce the risk of recruitment and radicalization

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Homegrown violent extremism: designing a community-based model to reduce the risk of recruitment and radicalization

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HOMEGROWN VIOLENT EXTREMISM:

DESIGNING A COMMUNITY–BASED MODEL

TO REDUCE THE RISK OF RECRUITMENT AND RADICALIZATION

By

Erroll Gregory Southers

A Thesis Presented to the
FACULTY OF THE USC SOL PRICE SCHOOL OF PUBLIC POLICY
UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA
In Partial Fulfillment of the
Requirements for the Degree
DOCTOR OF POLICY, PLANNING AND DEVELOPMENT

December 2013

Copyright 2013 Erroll Gregory Southers

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DEDICATION
I have the honor of presenting this thesis to the university as a result of the many people
who went before me, some of whom I have never known, who made this possible. I owe
a great debt of gratitude and am humbled by those who struggled so that I might stand
upon their shoulders, positioned to earn a doctoral degree and contribute to the greater
good.

My deepest gratitude goes to my doctoral committee, Drs. Eric Heikkila, Boaz Ganor,
Michael Orosz, Peter Robertson and Milind Tambe, all accomplished academicians in
their own right, who have mentored me throughout my career. Words cannot express my
thanks to Dr. Heikkila, who taught me how to look at counterterrorism from a truly
scholarly perspective. His patience for my questions, unwavering academic rigor,
confidence that this work could truly change this discipline and encouragement through
numerous personal challenges during this journey, have resulted in my utmost respect
and admiration for him as a friend that could not have been anticipated. Because of his
wisdom, I have my first book and I would be honored to co-author with him someday.

Lastly, I am blessed to have family and friends who provided unconditional support
during this, the most challenging endeavor in my life. My mother, father and Caryn never
wavered during a process that at times appeared to lack a beginning and seemed it might
never end. I could not have done this without their inspiration. In the words of my father,
“Education is the only thing that can make a difference and they can never take it away.”

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TABLE
OF
CONTENTS

Dedication………………………………………………………………………………...ii
List of Figures…………………………………………………………………………..vii
Abstract………………………………………………………………………………...viii
Introduction........................................................................................................................1
• Overcoming the “Other” Mindset……………………………………………...….3
• Understanding the Radicalization Pathway……………………………………….6
• Fostering Community Engagement……………………………………………...10
• Towards an Academic Study of Homegrown Violent Extremism………………12
Chapter 1 - Defining Homegrown Violent Extremism……………………………….16
• What is Terrorism?................................................................................................17
• What is Violent Extremism?..................................................................................21
• What
is
Homegrown?..............................................................................................................29

• What Motivates Homegrown Violent Extremism?................................................31
• Considerations for Attack Utility……………………………………………...…34
o Critical Infrastructure Disruption – The DC Metro Plot……………………..36
o Economic Consequences – The 9/11 Attacks………………………………..39
o Psychological Impact – The Mumbai Attacks……………………………….40
• References………………………………………………………………………..43
Chapter 2 – Ideological Motivation……………………………………………………54
• Racial Ideology…………………………………………………………………..57
o Black Separatist……………………………………………………………...59
o New Black Panther Party…………………………………………………….62
o Ku Klux Klan………………………………………………………………...64
o Neo-Confederates……………………………………………………………66

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o Neo-Nazis……………………………………………………………………69
o White Power Skinheads………………………………………………...........72
o White Nationalists……………………………………………………………74
• Religious Ideology……………………………………………………………….76
o Christian Identity…………………………………………………………….76
o Aryan Nations………………………………………………………………..79
o The Creativity Movement……………………………………………………80
o Muslim Identity………………………………………………………………82
o Jewish Defense League………………………………………………………90
o Aum Shinrikyo…………………………………………………….…………92
• Issue-Oriented Ideology………………………………………………………….94
o Anti-Government…………………………………………………………….95
o Anti-Abortion……………………………………………………...................99
o Environmentalists…………………………………………………………..102
• References………………………………………………………………………105
Chapter 3 – The Radicalization Pathway……………………………………………123
• Components of the Radicalization Process……………………………………..129
o Alienated and Altruistic Individuals………………………………………..129
o Legitimizing Ideology……………………………………………................131
o Enabling Community……………………………………………….............132
• The Role of Moral Principle……………………………………………………135
• The Role of Leadership in Radicalization…………………………….………..137
o Transformational Leadership…………………………………………...140
o Charismatic Leadership……...………………………………………....141
o Situational Leadership…………………………………….....................143
• The Role of Group Behavior……………………………………………………145
o Groupthink………………………………………………………………….147
o Groupthink and HVE……………………………………………………….150

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o General Group Problem Solving Model……………………………………153
o General Group Problem Solving Outcomes………………………………..156
• References………………………………………………………………………160
Chapter 4 – Leveraging Disciplines Toward a Counterterrorism Profession……..164
• The Humanities and Counterterrorism………………………………………….165
• The Sciences and Counterterrorism…………………………………………….169
• The Social Sciences and Counterterrorism……………………………………..170
o The Scientific Method in the Study of Terrorists…………………………..173
o Micro Analysis – The Terrorist……………………………………………..174
o Macro Analysis – The Terrorist Organization……………………………...177
o Hybrid Analysis – Terrorist Choices……………………………………….179
• Social Network Characteristics…………………………………………………181
• The Community Nexus…………………………………………………………183
• References………………………………………………………………………188
Chapter 5 – A Mosaic of Engagement………………………………………………..192
• A United Kingdom Model…………………………………………...................195
• A United States Model………………………………………………………….199
• A Safety Initiative as a Prelude to a Mosaic of Engagement...............................201
• Exerting Positive Influences on the Environment……………………………...203
• Objectives, Scope and Methodology for a Mosaic of Engagement…………….205
o Phase 1: Scope………………………………………...................................208
o Phase 2: Consensus…………………………………………………………210
o Phase 3: Performance Measures……………………………………………212
o Phase 4: Community Engagement………………………………………….214
o Phase 5: Information Sharing……………………………………………….216
o Phase 6: Sustainability…………………………………………...................217
• Ongoing Challenges for Risk Reduction……………………………………….219
• References………………………………………………………………………222

vi

Conclusion……………………………………………………………………..226

vii

List of Figures
Figure 2.0 – Unaddressed threats, terrorist incidents occurring in the United States since
1995 by perpetrator ideology…………………………………………………………….55
Figure 2.1 – Terrorism-related defendants in the U.S. from 2002 – 2012………………57
Figure 3.1 – Schematic of the General Group Problem Solving (GGPS) Model….…..154

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Abstract
This thesis intends to explore morality, leadership and group behavioral constructs
capable of supporting a terrorism resistant community model. This is a timeworn
problem, with numerous theoretical and practical examples that underscore the difficulty
of developing a model intended to engage, educate, and sustain a group designed to act
for the good of society. The model will be based on the capacity of the community to
deter the threat of homegrown violent extremism (HVE).

Unlike similar government-driven programs exclusively designed to reduce HVE
activities, this structure introduces the concept of a Mosaic of Engagement, embracing the
experience, energy, and ideas of the whole community, shifting the burden for deterring
catastrophic attacks onto those who have the capacity and moral responsibility to prevent
them. The model examines the achievements and shortcomings of the United Kingdom’s
counterterrorism program, as well as drawing from best-practice outcomes from a public
safety program in City Heights, San Diego. Mosaic incorporates lessons-learned from
both programs to propose the design for a community and school-based HVE risk
reduction model.

The advance of practice of this thesis is to operationalize the notion of homeland security
with an understanding of the growing threat of HVE. Since the attacks on September 11,
2001, terror and extremist organizations have adapted and evolved in response to security
policies, processes and technology implemented in the United States. This thesis defines

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HVE more holistically, acknowledging the challenges of a democratic society associated
with Constitutional protections in place for extremist activities. The associated elements
of the individuals who may be subject to recruitment and the radicalization pathway they
undertake are examined for the purpose of determining coherent educational messaging
and actions to reduce the risk of the target population.

Terrorism requires a combination of an alienated and altruistic individual, a legitimizing
ideology and a complicit or enabling society. Of the three, it is the society that is most
susceptible to positive influence proposed by this model, supported by appropriate
policies and behaviors, designed to detect and deter the risk of passive recruitment and
HVE. The issue of the complicit society will be addressed in terms of enhancing societal
morality and community integrity, with the intended outcome of facilitating community-
based efforts to identify and develop solutions to quality of life challenges. Recognizing
the importance of the identified ideology or hybrid ideologies, the intent is to influence
the potential radicalization process through the use of the environment.

HVE is a threat that has the capacity to leverage a diverse collection of academic
disciplines. In response, counterterrorism should evolve in professional practice. This
thesis examines the core questions and research methodologies in the humanities,
sciences and social sciences to identity the respective value proposition of each discipline
and how these areas of study may be leveraged into HVE research. Consideration of the

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scientific method is critical, when applied to the study of extremists and extremist group
relationships as it relates to developing strategies for countering extremist ideologies.

The United States, like many other nations, faces a challenge from terrorism and violent
extremism. As homeland security has evolved in response to an intelligent and adaptive
adversary, dogmatic zealotry has imbedded itself into the fabric of some communities
around the world, spawning a threat which is now homegrown. However, United States’
military engagements abroad do have an effect on ideological motivational factors at
home. Those conflicts are important, however they will not be the primary focus of this
thesis. Most important, it is a small minority of alienated individuals that seek to harm
innocent people in the name of an ideology, which causes division, hatred and violence.
This thesis articulates that a security response alone is insufficient; as with so many
challenges a response led by and driven by the community is also vital.

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Introduction
Since September 11, 2011, security experts, law enforcement professionals and
government leaders have been expecting another terrorist attack. Even as the United
States and other countries have vastly improved their security posture through billions of
dollars in technology and operational investments, training, and policy improvements,
there has been a solemn recognition that no matter how advanced and coordinated a
country’s security efforts, eventually, a terrorist would find vulnerability in the system
and exploit it.

On April 15, 2013, in Boston, the inevitable occurred. Two men – Tamerlan and
Dzhokhar Tsarnaev – placed pressure cooker bombs amid the crowd gathered at the
finish line of the Boston Marathon. Spectator cameras were recording when these bombs
exploded, sending fireballs into the air and hurling shrapnel into the hundreds of people
nearby. The blasts killed three people and injured 264 others. It was the first successful
attack on US soil since 9/11, and it was the first attack on a sporting event since the 1996
Olympic Games.

While an attack of some form had been expected for years, the big questions for security
professionals were always where, when and from whom would an attack come? Osama
bin Laden and al Qaeda dominated the public gaze for nearly a decade. The wars in
Afghanistan and Iraq, as well as joint operations in Yemen, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and
other countries, focused the military response to transnational terrorism squarely on the al

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Qaeda threat. This severely disrupted the primary organization and its satellites (such as
al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula). Funding was cut off, leaders were killed, and
communications were intercepted. While there remains some vestige of the terrorist
organization, it is a shell of what it was on 9/11. The United States, with the help of its
allies, put an end to core al Qaeda. But we did not end terrorism. That is, tragically,
impossible.

There is limited capacity and opportunity for international terrorists to plot and launch
attacks against the United States from abroad. Aviation and immigration security, far-
reaching intelligence gathering, and an increasingly aware and alert public make another
9/11-style attack a remote possibility. While violent extremists operating in lawless,
poverty-stricken, failing states have little chance of planning and executing a major
terrorist attack, the United States and other countries have always feared another kind of
threat – one that is vastly more difficult to anticipate and interrupt. As seen in Boston,
when terrorism arises from within a domestic population, there is often little warning.
Once homegrown adversaries are in motion, it is incredibly difficult to detect and stop
them.

Within the context of America, this homegrown violent extremism (HVE) is terrorist
activity or plots targeting the United States and U.S. assets by American citizens or
residents who have embraced their extremist ideology largely within this country. This
threat is diverse and growing.

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As a basis for any thoughtful analysis of HVE, it must be accepted that total security –
that is, the permanent absence of a terrorist threat – is unobtainable. No matter how
effective the security technology or refined the processes, we as a society can never be
fully free of the threat from violent extremism. There are, however, ways to reduce risk
and improve our counterterrorism efforts. This necessitates a robust understanding of
HVE and radicalization, which is the purpose of this thesis.

Overcoming the “Other” Mindset
Any terrorist attack causes a predictable level of chaos and uncertainty. Immediately after
the Boston bombing, law enforcement, the FBI and other intelligence organizations
shifted into high gear. The Boston police department communications center dispatched a
constant stream of reports about suspicious packages and unknown individuals. Every
potential unattended bag or unidentified person became suspect, and for hours after the
attack, police rushed from one location to another, assuming out of necessity that there
were more bombs waiting to explode. Thankfully, there were not.

Within hours of the attack, law enforcement identified a “Saudi national” who had been
at the marathon as a person of interest. This man had been wounded by shrapnel, and he
was kept under armed guard at the hospital. Ultimately, we learned that he was just one
of the hundreds of bombing victims. Yet, that he became a person of interest to begin

4

with shows where suspicion fell before all the facts were available. We were looking for
foreigners, particularly foreigners of Middle Eastern descent with Islamic extremist
views.

This reveals a critical flaw in our collective understanding of terrorism, a misplaced
belief that evil-doers necessarily only come from other countries. They must look
different, practice a different faith, and hold a different nationality. They are “other” than
us. Yet, the attack in Boston showed this to be a miscalculation. The origin of the
ideology is irrelevant in determining homegrown versus international terrorism; what
matters is where it is embraced.

After several days, video surveillance identified the Tsarnaev brothers as the attackers,
and the ensuing manhunt ended with a dramatic shootout and standoff. While the brothers
were born in another country, they had been living in the United States for more than a
decade. Both men grew up in the United States, without any overt indications that they
would someday choose a life of terrorism. The older brother, Tamerlan, was a legal U.S.
resident who had found some difficulty attaining citizenship. The younger brother,
Dzhokhar, however, was an American, having taken the oath of citizenship, ironically, on
September 11, 2012.

It is believed these men traversed a process of self-radicalization in the United States,
perhaps enhanced by skills gained during Tamerlan’s overseas trip just months before the

5

attack. Regardless, the brothers were locals, educated, living and working in the area. The
Tsarnaevs walked into infamy alone and within U.S. borders, making them, by definition,
homegrown violent extremists and a shift that only occurs for a few.

The terrorist threat to the United States is not as neat and clearly defined as we would
like. If the terrorists of the world all looked the same, followed the same ideology and
used the same tactics, America might be able to achieve total security. An infallible
security system and a uniform terrorist threat, however, do not exist. There is no single
group on which we can focus our counterterrorism efforts. There is no easy way to know
in advance who among us will lead a peaceful existence and who will endeavor to cause
mass death, destruction, and fear. Terrorism messaging has benefited significantly from
globalization. Ideas that might seem distant and foreign are also right here, at home.
Likewise, the ideologies that grow in the United States also reach around the world.
Whenever we attempt to fit the terrorist threat into clear-cut borders and definitions, we
fail to anticipate the whole threat, which has no common nationality, motivation or
profile.

To address the broader challenge of preventing terrorist attacks that originate with
citizens and residents (rather than foreign adversaries), we must take on a more nuanced,
thoughtful and intelligent perspective of homegrown violent extremism, its origins, and
the methods for interrupting those on a pathway to violence. Part of this strategy includes

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focused efforts to counter the extremist ideologies and messages that propel individuals
through the radicalization process.

Understanding the Radicalization Pathway
As the world learned, the Tsarnaev brothers were motivated by an extremist Muslim
Identity ideology. For many, this seemed to be an indication that irrespective of
nationality, the terrorist threat is predominantly driven by an extremist interpretation of
Islamic beliefs. To be sure, there are myriad examples of terrorists who fall within this
camp, but maintaining a limited focus on Muslim Identity creates a profound blind spot
in our national security efforts.

Since the start of the Obama Administration, there has been an unprecedented increase in
domestic extremist groups. The election of an African American president with an Arabic
sounding name and a Muslim father, as well as public debate over his place of birth,
fueled anti-government sentiment and extremist ideologies. This has swelled the ranks of
groups that view the federal government as the enemy, feeding ideologies that see the
government as an illegitimate corporation of elites planning to implement a “one-world
government.” While the terrorist threat these groups pose has not received broad
coverage in mainstream media reporting, their thwarted plots include the intended
bombing of federal buildings, assassination of public officials, attacks on uniformed law
enforcement, and the use of biological agents against the public.

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For many, violent extremism has become synonymous with Islamic radicalism, but this is
a woefully myopic view. Religious belief is only one example of legitimizing ideology
that can contribute to violent activity. Ultimately, it is not the ideology itself that propels
HVE; it is a combination of many factors that together create conditions under which
someone might cross the line from extremist rhetoric to violent action. This is the
radicalization pathway.

HVE radicalization is not a conveyor belt that starts with a set of grievances and ends
with violence, with easily discernible signposts along the way. It is a path through a
complex and changing social and psychological landscape that is unique to every
individual. What causes one person to embrace violent extremism may not have the same
effect on another. There is no HVE checklist that can be used to identify someone in the
midst of the radicalization process and determine whether they will turn violent.

In the investigation into the Boston bombing, authorities have focused on Tamerlan
Tsarnaev’s six-month trip to Chechnya, which preceded the attack. Whatever he did there
and whomever he met with likely contributed to Tsarnaev’s plans, but we can be
reasonably assured that his path to HVE began long before his trip to his family’s
motherland. Like other violent extremists, Tsarnaev’s radicalization was a long
progression of experiences and grievances, nearly all of which occurred within the United
States.

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The radicalization process often begins with a “cognitive opening,” an event or
experience that yields a personal grievance, which in turn makes someone more
susceptible to accepting an extremist ideology. Grievances take many forms, such as
conflicted identities, injustice, oppression or socio-economic exclusion. Critically, there
is no way of knowing what an individual will internalize as a life-changing grievance.
What is devastating to one person may be irrelevant to another.

Even as grievance may lead to a broader openness to an ideology, it is not simply the
belief in extremist ideologies that leads to HVE. There are many people who hold
extremist views but do not engage in violent activity. While understanding how
grievances can feed into an ideology is one potential avenue for addressing the potential
for violent extremism, the radicalization pathway is not limited to any one racial,
religious or issue-oriented group. It is a crosscutting phenomenon with an ever-uncertain
end. It is often impossible to know who will exit the radicalization pathway as a violent
extremist until they do so.

It is important to note the role online media can play in fostering violent extremism.
Arguably, the Internet’s capacity for propelling extremists through the radicalization
process is the single most important and dangerous innovation to the terrorist threat since
the 9/11 attacks. Future attacks against the United States and its interests will likely
involve adversaries who have traversed the radicalization process, at least in part, online.

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In searching for a comprehensive understanding of violent extremism and those engaged
in the radicalization process, history teaches valuable lessons, if we are willing to learn.
After the bombing of Pearl Harbor, the United States declared martial law and interned
110,000 Japanese Americans. More than two-thirds of those interned were American
citizens, and half of them were children. In some cases, family members were separated
and sent to different camps. None had ever shown disloyalty to the nation, and
throughout the war, none of the people convicted of spying for Japan were of Japanese or
Asian ancestry. The internment was a monumental policy failure on a number of levels.
The lesson with regard to HVE is that attempts to identify and disrupt threats must be
evidence-based. Often, targeting potential adversaries according to one broad category
(such as ethnicity or religion) leads to unjust scrutiny of innocent individuals.

Terrorism requires a combination of three things: an alienated individual, a legitimizing
ideology (engaged through radicalization), and an enabling environment. Of the three, it
is the environment that is most susceptible to positive influences. While it is tempting to
focus counterterrorism efforts on alienated, extremist individuals, recognizing that the
goal is to contain terrorism and not simply stop terrorists, we must support and
collaborate with communities to identify people on the path to violent extremism. Indeed,
working with communities, we have the potential to disrupt the radicalization pathway
altogether.

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Fostering Community Engagement
Our best chance for preventing terrorist incidents is to embrace a more holistic,
community-based effort. Counterterrorism and law enforcement professionals have
limited resources. Given the plethora of threats to a safe society, as well as the foggy,
often-unseen radicalization process that can take place anywhere, anytime, those with the
greatest capacity to identify and help disrupt the path to violent extremism are the very
communities from which potential terrorists arise.

Every terrorist has a family, a network of friends and acquaintances, and a local
environment where they live and work. Knowing that the path to violent extremism is
long and complex, it is essential that those charged with preventing terrorism work with
communities to implement programs and foster transparency and information sharing.
This can help identify individuals who are susceptible to turning violent – but critically,
before they do so.

This community-based effort should help policy makers and community members
identify challenges and develop collaborative strategies to improve the community’s
general wellbeing. What is more, the community-based effort is not focused solely on
reducing the risk of HVE, nor is it driven by law enforcement. Unlike traditional
community-based policing, which has shown some positive results, this strategy enhances
relationship building and information sharing, emphasizing an overall improvement in
the community’s quality of life.

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Public awareness and engagement is an effective supplement to the dedicated work of
America’s security, intelligence and law enforcement professionals. No one knows an
area better than the local community, and no one is more attuned to troubling changes in
an individual’s beliefs and behavior than those who know them on a personal level.
Extremist beliefs are as individual and varied as the people who embrace them. As such,
we must build the public vigilance and capacity to identify potentially threatening
individuals, creating a mosaic of engagement that supports and amplifies our national
security.

Community inaction – either through tacit approval of extremist ideas or a hesitancy to
speak up when encountering an individual exploring a legitimizing ideology – provides
an enabling environment that allows extremism to fester and sometimes mature into
violence. Conversely, engaged and alert community members who are willing to report
suspicious activities provide an invaluable resource in the broader national security effort.
They can help disrupt the radicalization process, thereby undermining terrorism. This
means addressing grievances, as well as recognizing and encouraging stakeholder
engagement. We should seek out opportunities to empower communities to this end.

Doing so effectively requires strong bonds between law enforcement, security
professionals and the communities they strive to protect. Singling out a person or entire
community as suspect based on limited criteria (such as religion alone) undermines the
public cohesion that is essential to collective efforts and information sharing. When

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individuals or communities feel marginalized by profiling, they become increasingly
unwilling to share knowledge of potentially violent extremist activity. Additionally, this
may create opportunities for extremist groups to recruit individuals who feel victimized
by oppressive public policies. Thus, not only is a focus on one legitimizing ideology over
another inadequate in terms of assessing and preparing for a range of potential threats, it
can also hinder the community collaboration that might disrupt the radicalization process
and prevent terrorist activity.

Towards an Academic Study of Homegrown Violent Extremism
The information and analysis presented here is intended to build a comprehensive
understanding of HVE. Perhaps one of the greatest challenges to a discipline-wide
discussion of HVE is a definition of the phenomenon itself. To that end, Chapter 1
introduces the complexities of defining terrorism generally and homegrown violent
extremism specifically. Violent extremism as a phenomenon is explored through its
multifaceted characteristics, the role of a legitimizing ideology and the factors that
contribute to violent action.

With a clearer understanding of precisely what is meant by the term HVE, Chapter 2
investigates the numerous groups that embrace a range of extremist doctrines. Race,
religion and issue-oriented ideologies come in many forms, as do the groups that espouse
beliefs in line with these ideologies. Looking closely at HVE ideological motivations,
missions and long-term objectives helps reveal the central factors that become associated

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with terrorist acts. As shown, it is clear that ideological adherents can come to embrace a
hybrid of beliefs, and some of the most troubling extremist ideologies are followed and
spread by non-Muslim Identity groups. These groups employ sophisticated strategies for
furthering their extremist beliefs and objectives under the guise of constitutionally
protected activities.

With knowledge of the diverse ideologies followed by different groups throughout the
United States, and indeed, the world, Chapter 3 examines the complex components in the
radicalization process. As a part of this, the chapter also looks closely at the role of
community in the trajectory towards violent extremism. As the community is the one
element that may reduce the potential for recruitment and radicalization, contributing
factors and challenges are examined with a view towards the development of a
community-based, risk-reduction model. Essential elements facilitating the model, such
as leadership styles, group behavior research, and associated theoretical structures,
illustrate areas where research and policy challenges need to be addressed.

Chapter 4 discusses how counterterrorism should evolve in professional practice. The
development of security and counterterrorism tactics has not necessarily yielded a true
academic discipline focused on understanding and countering violent extremism. To
encourage a more robust field, the chapter examines core questions and research
methodologies in the humanities, sciences and social sciences. This helps reveal each
discipline’s value proposition and how these diverse areas of study may be leveraged into

14

HVE research. The scientific method and critical theory, when applied to the study of
extremists and extremist group relationships, provide the capacity to identify appropriate
research questions critical to strategies for countering extremist ideologies.

Finally, Chapter 5 introduces the Mosaic of Engagement model, a “whole of community”
concept designed to improve community quality of life by enhancing public safety
generally, while challenging and containing violent extremism specifically. The model
examines the achievements and shortcomings of the United Kingdom’s Preventing
Violent Extremism (Prevent) Strategy, which was considered one of the most innovative
counterterrorism programs in the world when it was first implemented. As well as
drawing from the best-practice outcomes of the “community indicators” model in City
Heights, San Diego, Mosaic incorporates lessons-learned from both programs to develop
a community and school-based model for limiting circumstances and factors that can
facilitate HVE recruitment and radicalization.

As shown throughout this thesis, HVE is hardly a fully defined and exhaustively
researched phenomenon. Indeed, academia and the security professions are just beginning
to understand this evolving challenge to public safety. The threat requires a risk-based
response; there is no comprehensive strategy that yields 100 percent security. Rather, we
are challenged to approach the terrorist threat in a new way, with a more nuanced
understanding of how violent extremism originates and erupts.

15

Notwithstanding the serious threats to national security posed by al Qaeda and its
affiliates, we focus only on this specific group (and Muslim Identity ideologies) at our
great peril. HVE is defining the 21
st
century terrorist threat. The United States and many
other countries face creative, adaptive adversaries. Some we have identified; others
continue to operate in the shadows.

If the Boston marathon bombing taught us anything about HVE, it is that we cannot hope
to thwart terrorist attacks by using only our current models of terrorism. We have an
obligation to update our understanding of terrorism and violent extremism such that it
accurately reflects the nature of the evolving threat. This thesis is intended to be a catalyst
that will keep our collective efforts moving forward, towards a more effective response to
the ever-present threat from homegrown violent extremism.

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Chapter 1 - Defining Homegrown Violent Extremism
Homegrown violent extremism (HVE) represents the next challenge for counterterrorism,
but addressing the threat with effective risk-reduction and intelligence-driven security
demands a clear understanding of what constitutes HVE. What is “homegrown?” Is HVE
synonymous with domestic terrorism?

Much like the word “terrorism,” there is no comprehensive definition for HVE. For
homegrown and foreign actors alike, there is no consistency with regard to race, religious
belief, national origin, ethnicity, gender, sexual orientation or indeed, any other
characteristic (aside from the desire to attack structures or people to achieve an
ideologically driven societal, governmental, or economic goal).

Recognizing that one size does not fit all in the counterterrorism lexicon, this thesis uses
the following definition as a baseline for comparative analysis of the homegrown
phenomenon, where United States HVE is the focus:

HVE describes a terrorist act within the context of ideologically motivated
violence or plots, perpetrated within the United States or abroad by American
citizens, residents or visitors, who have embraced their legitimizing extremist
ideology largely within the United States.

17

Within this definition are three primary terms requiring further description. These are: a
definition of a “terrorist act;” an examination of what constitutes extremism and violent
extremism; and the characteristics of a “homegrown” adversary.

What is Terrorism?
There are few words more emotionally or politically charged than “terrorism.” Even
before the world entered the post-9/11 era, attempts to define terrorism confounded
academics. There is a general agreement that terrorism is bad and associated with non-
acceptable, criminal behavior. Yet, there is a long history behind terrorist action, raising a
multitude of definitional gray areas.

Historically, the term is of French origin, first used to describe the state-sponsored tactics
employed by the Committee of Public Safety and the Revolutionary Tribunal under
Robespierre’s so-called Regime de la Terreur (“Reign of Terror”). Robespierre used
terrorism as a national security strategy, which consisted of widespread surveillance and
the threat and use of brutal, often lethal, tactics that deterred domestic anarchy. For
Robespierre, terrorisme implied a sense of altruism and collective benefit, which resulted
in nearly half a million arrests (by some estimates) and tens of thousands of dead French
citizens.

While the term originated in relation to state-sponsored activities, in contemporary usage,
terrorism is more commonly applied to the actions of individuals or non-governmental

18

groups. Yet, there is not a consistent definition in use around the world, which raises
challenges for counterterrorism efforts. After the Sixtieth General Assembly of the
United Nations convened in 2005, the representative for Iceland, Hjalmar Hannesson,
concisely defined the dilemma posed by inconsistent definitions. He said, “nations had to
come to agreement on a definition of the term ‘terrorism,’ for without a consensus of
what constituted terrorism, nations could not unite against it.”
1
The Malaysian Delegate
Mohd Puad Zarkashi added that, “until all countries agreed on the enemy they sought to
defeat, there would always be loopholes and safe havens for those criminals to escape
justice and the rule of law.”
2

Even within the United States, there is a lack of agreement between government
organizations on how to define terrorism.
• The FBI deems terrorism as “the unlawful use of force or violence against persons
or property to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, or any
segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social objectives.”
3

• The U.S. Department of Defense defines it as “the calculated use of unlawful
violence or threat of unlawful violence to inculcate fear; intended to coerce or to
intimidate governments or societies in the pursuit of goals that are generally
political, religious, or ideological.”
4

• The Central Intelligence Agency considers terrorism to be “premeditated,
politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by
subnational groups or clandestine agents.”
5

1
United Nations General Assembly Press Release: Agreed Definition of Term ‘Terrorism’ Said To Be
Needed for Consensus on Completing Comprehensive Convention Against It. Department of Public
Information, News and Media Division, New York. 7 July 2005.
2
Ibid.
3
United States Code of Federal Regulations: 28 C.F.R. Section 0.85
4
Terrorism Research. What is Terrorism? International Terrorism and Security Research
5
Central Intelligence Agency. CIA & The War on Terrorism - Terrorism FAQs

19

• And different still, the Department of Homeland Security calls terrorism “any
activity that involves an act that is dangerous to human life or potentially
destructive to critical infrastructure or key resources, and is a violation of the
criminal laws of the United States or of any state or other subdivision of the
United States and appears to be intended to intimidate or coerce a civilian
population to influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion, or
to affect the conduct of a government by mass destruction, assassination, or
kidnapping.”
6

There is equally no agreement on definition between noted academic experts. Inasmuch
as there is a political dimension to terrorist behavior, there are also religious, sociological,
and even psychological elements that play into how activity is employed and devised.
Scholars from the myriad disciplines that have examined the phenomenon have yielded
as many attempts at a definition.

To further muddy the definitional waters, media references to catastrophic events are
often framed as terrorism before all the facts are known. A bombing of a building is not
inherently terroristic; a narcotics cartel’s violent tactics are not necessarily narco-
terrorism; and the disruption of power to energy infrastructure is not prima facie cyber-
terrorism. Yet, current events are sometimes presented broadly as terrorist in nature, often
to enhance the scope of the incident and consequently, the interest of concerned media
consumers.

6

Interestingly, DHS notes that “there is no one definition of terrorism accepted by the federal government,
the definition may even vary within the United States Intelligence Community."
United States Department
of Homeland Security (10 November 2011). (U/FOUO) Domestic Terrorism and Homegrown Violent
Extremism Lexicon. Office of Intelligence and Analysis.

20

It is equally important to consider the issue of oppressive governments or government
agencies, when discussing the definition of terrorism. Could the police or government
military forces be considered terrorist organizations? The notion of “One man’s terrorist
is another man’s freedom fighter” and apartheid South Africa is instructive in this regard.

During the 1970s and 80s, Nelson Mandela led the anti-apartheid African National
Congress (ANC) in its efforts to remove the oppressive South African government.
Bombing and other acts of violence often involving civilians resulted in the ANC being
designated as a terrorist organization by South Africa, the United States and other
nations. However, Mandela framed the response progressive response of the ANC quite
differently. He states, “A freedom fighter learns the hard way that it is the oppressor who
defines the nature of the struggle, and the oppressed is often left no recourse but to use
methods that mirror those of the oppressor. At a certain point, one can only fight fire with
fire.”
7
Mr. Mandela would go on to become a Nobel Peace Prize winner and president of
South Africa.

While acknowledging democratic forms are less than perfect, the assumption here is that
the state takes on a sense of legitimacy. Taking into account these long-running
deliberations over how to define terrorism, any comprehensive definition should be based
on three important elements:

7
Mandela, N. (1995). Long Walk to Freedom. The Autobiography of Nelson Mandela. Little, Brown and
Company, New York, Kindle position 2782.

21

1. The essence of the activity is the use or threatened use of violence. Violence –
actual or potential – supports one critical result of terrorism: fear. Citizens
generally believe that their government has the capacity and capability to protect
them, and violence that eludes the government protector shakes societal support
for that government, and consequently, its policies and activities. The fear of
violence is as effective in impacting government activity as violence itself.

2. The targets of activity are civilians. Under International Humanitarian Law (IHL),
a civilian is a person who is not a member of his or her country’s armed forces.
This would include members of law enforcement. An important element is that
the act is purposely directed at civilians; actions that accidentally cause civilian
casualties because individuals stumbled into an area of violent political activity
are not necessarily terrorism.

3. The objective of activity is political. Terrorist action strives for specific
ideological goals or political expectations, which can be centered on race,
religion, national origin, or other systems of issue-oriented priorities. Implicitly,
every ideology entails a political tendency, and thus, by its very nature, terrorism
is also political.

What is violent extremism?
Extremism is a primary feature of terrorist behavior. It is an ideology or a viewpoint that
is, as scholar Gus Martin writes, “radical in opinion, especially in political matters…

22

characterized by intolerance toward opposing interests and divergent opinions.”
8
As it
relates to power and oppressive government structures, the notion of who decides what it
radical is instructive. However, violent extremism occurs when individuals or groups
openly express their ideological beliefs through violence or a call for violence.

An important point is that while extremism may be a precursor to terrorism, ideological
beliefs do not independently reach the threshold for an act of terrorism. There is a distinct
difference between “terrorist” and “extremist” organizations. So long as extremist groups
do not explicitly endorse violence, their beliefs and ideology is protected under the First
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.

Yet, the freedom and protections of speech, including overt “hate speech,” present
significant challenges for providing constitutional protections, both for people espousing
biased opinions as well as for those who may become victimized in furtherance of those
subjective ideologies. The latter are in some cases called “hate crimes,” which are
deemed to have occurred when someone is targeted because of their perceived
membership in a certain social group (race, religion, sexual orientation, etc.).

Understanding that advocating or using violence is central to the idea of violent
extremism, it is important to clarify characteristics manifested by extremists writ large.
Some of the most frequently occurring include:

8
Martin, G. (2011). Terrorism and Homeland Security. SAGE Publications, Thousand Oaks, California. p.
4

23

• Intolerance and superiority: Extremists assume the moral high ground associated
with their basic ideology. Most common are racial, religious and ethnic claims of
superiority, which are espoused to illuminate their noble place in society. The
overriding belief is that “the world is theirs,” and the rest of the human race is
fortunate to live in it and may continue to do so as long as they understand their
place.

o Stormfront advertises itself as an organization for, “White Nationalists
who support true diversity and a homeland for all peoples.”
9
Their website
articulates an ideological objective intended to promote their ethnic
heritage as “the voice of the new, embattled White minority.” The
inconsistency in their messaging of alleged tolerance as a supporter of
diversity is drowned out by their consistent espousal of racial superiority.
For example, a link to the site is entitled, “Why We Are Superior.”
10

Further illustrations of exclusionism are demonstrated as instructional
pieces explaining why “whites are generally better than others,” describing
Asians as “Intelligent but weak,” Blacks as “Fit but unintelligent” and
Hispanics as “More intelligent than blacks, less intelligent than Asians.
More physically able than Asians, less physically able than blacks.”

9
Stormfront.org. http://www.stormfront.org/forum/ (Retrieved: 7 July 2013)
10
Stormfront.org. Ideology and Philosophy. http://www.stormfront.org/forum/t876297/ (Retrieved 7 July
2013)

24

Whites are evaluated as “Intelligent AND Strong.”
11
They actually cite
evolutionary adaptation to harsh weather and terrain since the Ice Ages as
the reason for the resultant physical attributes possessed by Whites,
providing them with the requisite intelligence to secure food (over the
Ages) as a further demonstration of superiority in the modern world.

• Otherism: This is a presumption that a given social segment or group does not
belong to the mainstream. It manifests in personal attacks that question one’s
motives, qualifications, experience or expertise. Social scientists call this
“microaggression.” Derogatory epithets such as hajji, kike, Mud people, referring
to people of Middle Eastern, Jewish and non-European descent respectively, are
commonly used to label opponents while diverting attention from viewpoints
opposed to the extremist ideology.

o The aforementioned epithets represent “racial microaggressions,” a term
first coined by psychiatrist Chester Pierce, M.D. in the 1970s. Additional
research has identified three current types of racial microagressions,
12
each
attributing to the notion of Otherism and superiority:
1. Microassaults: Conscious and intentional discriminatory
actions such as using racial epithets, displaying supremacist

11
Stormfront.org. Ideology and Philosophy. http://www.stormfront.org/forum/t876297/ (Retrieved 7 July
2013).
12
Sue, D. (5 October 2010). Racial Microaggressions in Everyday Life. Is subtle bias harmless?
Psychology Today.

25

symbols e.g., swastikas - or preventing one’s children from
socializing outside their race.
2. Microinsults: Verbal, nonverbal, and environmental
communications that subtly convey rudeness and insensitivity
that demean a person’s racial heritage or identity. Examples
include what is known in some circles as “the resume test” –
asking another employee how they came to be employed,
suggesting that affirmative action or some other mechanism
other than merit resulted in their selection.
3. Microinvalidations: Communications that subtly exclude,
negate or nullify the thoughts, feelings or experiential reality of
a person of color. Anti-immigrant adherents may ask Latinos
where they were born, conveying the message that despite
residency or the completion of the Naturalization process, they
will always be the “other” or foreigners in America.

• Absolutism: Extremists embrace a Manichaean worldview – that is, one of moral,
religious or philosophical dualism. Their position is one of moral absolutes, and
their messages are designed to reinforce the notion that their opponents are “bad.”
This negates a need for discussion or debate on ideological validity because
adversaries inherently have nothing in common. As a result, extremists view their
own cause as noble while any opponents are necessarily always antagonistic.

26

o Although commonly associated with Islam when referring to “non-
believers,” the term “infidel” may be used when referring to anyone who
does not believe in religion. Originating in the late 15
th
century, the word
“originally denoted a person of a religion other than ones own, specifically
a Muslim (to a Christian), a Christian (to a Muslim), or a Gentile (to a
Jew).”
13
Extremists utilize this term today, in the same context. This
labeling classification becomes the basis for relegating persons to a class
unworthy of consideration or acknowledgment based on their lack of faith.

• Generalizations lacking foundation: Extremists paint people, things and events
with a broad brush, though lacking any evidence to support their claims. Rather
than discuss facts and ideas that contradict these generalizations, extremists will
simply ignore them, avoiding debate. This characteristic leads to false
conclusions, which further the biased, ideological agenda.

o One of the most interesting generalizations post-9/11, was the one first
voiced by Abdulrahman Al-Rashed, head of the Saudi-owned news
channel, Al Arabiya after 9/11 when he proclaimed, “It is a fact that not all
Muslims are terrorists,” he said. “But it is equally certain, and
exceptionally painful, that almost all terrorists are Muslims.”
14
On the

13
Oxford Dictionaries. Infidel. http://oxforddictionaries.com/us/definition/american_english/infidel
(Retrieved: 7 July 2013)
14

Brit (27 May 2013). Murdoch’s Mouthpiece: “Almost All Terrorists are Muslims” Daily Kos.

27

global scale, nothing could be further from the truth, with examples of
Anders Breivik’s attack in Oslo and Otoya, the deadliest terror attack in
Europe, and the fact that more people have been killed (in the U.K. as well
as the U.S.) because of racist attacks on Muslims (or Sikhs) than any other
al Qaeda-inspired attack.
15
The bias that extremism is monopolized by one
ideology, faith, ethnicity or other demographic, unfortunately paints an
inaccurate picture, limiting the recognition of the scope of the challenge
and the possibilities for a solution.

• Doomsday scenarios and conspiracy theories: Extremists tend to describe an
apocalyptic outcome from a failure to pursue their mission. This can include an
invasion of the United States, an overthrow of the U.S. government by a foreign
force, or the villainizing of the U.S. government itself. Conspiracy theories, such
as the idea that the government was directly responsible for the 9/11 terrorist
attacks, present a foundation and motivation for adhering to the extremist
ideology in defense of the group.

o The Covenant Sword and the Arm of the Lord (CSA), a racist right-wing
cult whose objective was the overthrow of the United States government,
believed in a doomsday scenario. As a result, they essentially became

15
Brit (27 May 2013). Murdoch’s Mouthpiece: “Almost All Terrorists are Muslims” Daily Kos.

28

“Christian Survivalists.”
16
In preparation, they built a 224-acre compound,
complete with water, power, supplies, weapons and trained for the final
day. The group was peacefully taken into custody on April 19
th
1985 after
a standoff with the FBI after being convinced an ensuing gun battle would
be futile

• Code speak: Extremist groups use particular language to denigrate their
opponents. Loaded terms and clichéd phrases help them quickly relay ideological
beliefs without the need for critical thought or explanation. This bolsters
confidence by reinforcing prejudices, as well as a sense of self-righteousness.

o ZOG, or Zionist Occupied Government, as an example of code speak, is
used to describe the anti-Semitic conspiracy theory that Jews control a
given nation, while the government serves as a proxy for its operations.
The introduction of the term first appeared in 1976 article entitled,
“Welcome to ZOG-World”
17
by American neo-Nazi Erick Thomson, as he
attempted to paint a “picture of the enemy.” ZOG gained in clarity and
usage in 1984 after the white supremacist group The Order, engaged in
bank robberies to fund their war against the United States Government,

16
Noble, K. (1998). Tabernacle of Hate, Why They Bombed Oklahoma City. Voyager Publishing, p. 73.
17
Thompson, E. Welcome to ZOG-World.

29

identified as a “Zionist Occupied Government.”
18
The term resonated with
a number of other extremist groups such as Aryan Nations and Posse
Commitatus choosing to use the term. The 1996 Aryan Nations
Declaration of Independence described the urgency of the situation stating,
“The history of the present Zionist Occupied Government of the United
States of America is a history of repeated injuries and usurpations [sic], all
having a direct object – the establishment of an absolute tyranny over
these states; moreover throughout the world.”
19
Sometimes covertly
presented, as illustrated when the American Nazi Party fails to identify
ZOG by name, but the target and message is undeniable. They state,
“…this evil, corrupt Judeo-Capitalist system – where basically 3% of the
population, control 85% of the nation’s wealth…”
20

What is homegrown?
To best define the homegrown characteristic, it is useful to begin by defining what it is
not. A general definition of international terrorism is a terrorist act committed against a
foreign country by an actor not native to that country. Yet, an act of international
terrorism does not require an actor to leave their native country. For example, an actor
could target individuals with an international profile who are in the actor’s home country,
such as foreign ambassadors, tourists, business representatives or even academics.

18
King, W. (27 December 1984). Links of Anti-Semitic Band Provoke 6-state Parley. The New York
Times, p. 7.
19
Anti-Defamation League (2 March 1998). Aryan Nations.
20
American Nazi Party website.

30

Conversely, homegrown terrorists target individuals who are members or representatives
of their own country. Timothy McVeigh, who parked a truck bomb in front of the Alfred
P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City, killing 168 people and injuring 680 more,
is an example.

Another critical element in determining international versus homegrown terrorism is
where and when the attacker embraced their legitimizing ideology, as well as the
intended political objectives. In that regard, an attacker’s place of birth may not be the
determining factor as it relates to classifying an attack and actor. A foreign national who
immigrates to and resides in the United States for a period of time, and then embraces a
violent extremist ideology with violent actions directed at Americans, is in fact
homegrown. They may have started life elsewhere, but their life as a violent extremist is
entirely American.

What is more, the birthplace of the ideology is not a criterion in determining homegrown
versus international terrorism. The origin of the ideology is irrelevant; what matters is
where it is embraced. For example, while an American or long-term resident may swear
allegiance to the al Qaeda ideology (which has its roots and much of its following on the
international stage), if they pick up that terrorist banner and act within the United States,
they are homegrown.

31

What Motivates Homegrown Violent Extremism?
Regardless of different ideologies, nationalities, political objectives and targets (foreign
and domestic), motivation for violent extremism generally arises from similar origins.
Recognizing that there are always aberrations, HVE is most often driven by retribution or
altruism. These powerful forces fit within a context of extremist ideology to propel
individuals or groups into violent action.

The notion of retribution – near synonymous with a desire for revenge – is a rallying cry
for the disenchanted who perceive a grave slight to those whom they identify as among
their ideological group. Al Qaeda presents a perfect example. The U.S.-led war in Iraq
came on top of a decades-long troubled history between dominant western economies
(i.e., American and European) and politically unstable Middle Eastern nations. Some
Muslim ideologues (throughout the world) encapsulated these complex relationships in a
derogatory narrative, positing that U.S. actions abroad were designed to oppress and kill
Muslims.

For years, even before 9/11, Osama bin Laden was the most widely known figure
preaching this narrative, and he was clear in his motivation for attacking U.S. citizens,
allies, and interests. In 2002, bin Laden published a letter, writing:
“Why are we fighting and opposing you? The answer is very simple:

32

(1) Because you attacked us and continue to attack us.
(a) You attacked us in Palestine

(b) You attacked us in Somalia; you supported the Russian atrocities against
us in Chechnya, the Indian oppression against us in Kashmir, and the
Jewish aggression against us in Lebanon.

(c) Under your supervision, consent, and orders, the governments of our
countries which act as your collaborators, attack us on a daily basis.

(d) You steal our wealth and oil at paltry prices because of your international
influence and military threats. This theft is indeed the biggest theft ever
witnessed by mankind in the history of the world.

(e) Your forces occupy our countries; you spread your military bases
throughout them; you corrupt our lands, and you besiege our sanctuaries.

2. These tragedies and calamities are only a few examples of your oppression and
aggression against us. It is commanded by our religion and intellect that the
oppressed have a right to respond to aggression. Do not expect anything from us
but jihad, resistance, and revenge. Is it in any way rational to expect that after
America has attacked us for more than half a century that we will then leave her
to live in security and peace?”

His use of “us” in this case refers to the international Muslim community. While bin
Laden and al Qaeda embraced a particularly vicious ideological bias, he and other
members of the terrorist organization perceived their activities to be on behalf of a
threatened global Muslim population. In this instance, the reason for the terrorist action
was to exact retribution that could force a change in the U.S. government’s actions. Bin
Laden’s letter continues:

“(a) The American people are the ones who pay the taxes which fund the
planes that bomb us in Afghanistan, the tanks that strike and destroy our
homes in Palestine, the armies which occupy our lands in the Arabian Gulf,
and the fleets which endorse the blockade of Iraq. These tax dollars are given
to Israel for it to continue attacking us and invade our lands.

33

(b) Also, the American army is part of the American people. It is the very
same people who are shamelessly helping the Jews fight against us.

(c) The American people are the ones who employ both their men and their
women in the American forces which attack us.”
21

As retribution for U.S. government action, bin Laden employed violent extremism to
encourage a political end, which aligns with the aforementioned definitions for terrorism.
While al Qaeda was born abroad, and with regard to the United States, most of its
adherents can be deemed international terrorists, this same desire for revenge is often the
driving motivation for homegrown violence. It is not, however, the only motivation.

Altruism is also a powerful motivation for HVE, albeit somewhat less obvious. Looking
to regions where violent conflict is common, some violent extremists view their terrorist
acts as a way of perpetuating a future safety for individual families, the cohesiveness of
whole communities or the liberation of entire countries.

Israeli psychologist Ariel Merari identified and interviewed the social network
surrounding Palestinian suicide attackers, including those whose detonation attempts had
failed. He found that these individuals did not exhibit the characteristics of suicidal
individuals (depression, drug or alcohol abuse, signs of mental illness, etc.). What is
more, despite common assumptions, the terrorists did not often cite religion as a
motivating factor in their planned or attempted attack. Rather, they viewed their action as
a courageous method for advancing the cause from which their community or country

21
Lawrence, B. (2005). Messages to the World, The Statements of Osama bin Laden.

34

could benefit. These clearly violent extremists were driven by a sense of altruism as it
relates to the security concerns of their own societies.

A similar motivation is seen with Patriot Movement adherents, who cite the
government’s position on gun control legislation, welfare (and illegal immigration),
abortion, same-sex marriage, and a lack of congressional fiscal responsibility as
justification for potential civil unrest and state secession from the Union’s activities.
22

Considerations for Attack Utility
HVE and international terrorism are similar in many respects, and the overriding dynamic
is anti-government. This can include opposition to U.S. foreign policy, though it might
also be driven by adherence to religious, racial or other legitimizing ideologies. While the
impetus for attack is rooted in beliefs, a terrorist’s selection of how and where to attack,
in addition to the likelihood of the attack succeeding, is based on a consideration of
utility. This is the estimate of an attack’s consequences with respect to the intended
target’s value as a domestic or international interest and the political impact the attack
will have on the intended audience.

22
Republic Magazine (9 May 2013). Civil Unrest and State Secession.

35

Utility is a primary consideration for extremists during preparation for an attack,
weighing desired results against the investment in activities to plan, rehearse and execute
an operation. Always mindful of the aftermath, utility weighs heavily in the decision-
making process of target selection, possible attack paths, methodologies and execution.

From the perspective of the attacker, fear provides a dual utility enhancing terrorism’s
psychological impact. The first utility, is that fear encourages societies to believe that,
regardless of security investments, they will never be safe. The intent is to encourage a
population to demand a change in whichever political activity a terrorist opposes.

The second utility is the persistent shaking of public confidence and trust in the security
system, particularly because of “non-events” – those incidents that are highly publicized
and scrutinized but that are largely anticlimactic. Examples of non-events include the
2006 liquid bomb plot, designed to destroy at least seven commercial airliners in flight
traveling from the United Kingdom to the United States and Canada, or Pakistani-
American Faisal Shahzad’s 2010 attempted car bomb plot targeting New York City’s
Times Square. Persistent non-events occurring repeatedly and within the same specific
infrastructure degrade trust and confidence in public sector capabilities.

36

Yet, while counterterrorism professionals can assess the utility that HVE groups and
individuals might find in a range of potential targets, continuing efforts to predictively
model their decisions and consequential actions must include the inherently unpredictable
and impossible-to-profile “Human Element.” In an adversary, the Human Element
describes that psychological component of unexpected or seemingly irrational decision-
making that is inherently human and impossible to replicate in a laboratory-generated
simulation-based model. Despite the detection of HVE characteristics or behaviors, it is
exceedingly difficult to anticipate a likely attack path.

While any terrorist attack is generally designed to induce widespread fear and
uncertainty, attack utility often hinges on how it will affect three primary outcomes:
critical infrastructure disruption; economic consequences; and psychological impact.
Target selection and attack path methodologies seek to optimize the impact on these three
potential outcomes. Critically, capitalizing on the reactive nature of the counterterrorism
agencies and policies, even thwarted plots have realized the same benefits of a successful
attack. Indeed, there is no such thing as a failed attack. To illustrate how HVE attacks can
impact the three potential outcomes, consider these past examples.

Critical Infrastructure Disruption – The DC Metro Plot
Critical infrastructure comprises systems and assets (physical or virtual) that are so vital

37

to the United States that their failure or destruction would have an incapacitating and far-
reaching impact on security, the economy, and/or public health and safety. The thwarted
plot to bomb multiple Metrorail stations and hotels in the Washington, DC, area is an
instructive example of the potential for overall system impact as a result of a design to
maximize attack utility.

In 2010, Farooque Ahmed, a naturalized U.S. citizen born in Pakistan, was arrested for
planning to bomb the Arlington Cemetery, Court House, Crystal City and Pentagon City
metro stations. These stations were selected for a specific reason – Pentagon employees,
largely uniformed military personnel, use them daily. Unlike previous rail attacks in
Madrid (2004), London (2005) and Mumbai (2008), Ahmed “suggested using rolling
suitcases rather than backpacks to kill as many people as possible.”
23
This innovation on
tactics is a perfect example of what is meant by “adaptive adversary.”

According to the indictment filed after his arrest, Ahmed participated in surveillance and
recorded video images of Metrorail stations on four occasions and forwarded the
information on a thumb drive to a person he believed was an al Qaeda operative.
Additionally, he planned to use at least one hotel that offered a vantage point for
surveillance. The goal of the surveillance was to determine the security and busiest

23
Caldwell, Alicia A. (27 October 2010). Farooque Ahmed Arrested for Plotting DC Terrorist Attack.
Huffington Post.

38

periods of all of the potential targets. The hotel itself may have provided an additional
target.

While the plot was interrupted, the impact on the rail system could have been significant.
The average weekday ridership for the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority
in 2010 was 750,654 passengers. The loss of life, injuries and economic consequences
would have been devastating, to say nothing of the disruption to a critical transportation
system used by a sizeable population of government employees in the DC area.

Ahmed had all of the hallmark qualities of a homegrown terrorist. Educated in the United
States, he earned a bachelor’s degree in computer science from City University of New
York and was pursuing a graduate degree online in risk management and data security at
Aspen University.
24
He was employed as a contractor in Northern Virginia for Ericsson, a
telecommunication company. Unlike some other U.S. citizens implicated in terror plots,
Ahmed did not appear to have received overseas training from al Qaeda or any of its
affiliates.
25

24
Finn, Peter; Spencer S. Hsu and Caitlin Gibson (28 October 2010). Feds arrest N.Va. man in D.C. Metro
bomb plot. The Washington Post.
25
Ibid.

39

Economic Consequences – The 9/11 Attacks
Respecting the horrific loss of life on American soil on September 11, 2001, there were
unprecedented economic impacts as well. Following the attack, there was a four-day
shutdown of the aviation system. Estimates on the massive economic losses in trading,
business productivity, revenue and jobs range widely. A sense of the scope of impact,
however, can be gleaned from an academic study estimating the economic impacts of a
hypothetical terrorist attack on the U.S. commercial air transport system.
26
The
simulation modeled a seven-day shutdown of the entire U.S. commercial air
transportation system, followed by a two-year recovery period. The predicted losses
ranged from $12.5 billion to $21.3 billion, with net system losses during the 24-month
recovery ranging from $214 billion to $420 billion.”
27

The economic impact of 9/11 was instructive for violent extremists targeting the United
States, and the ensuing prioritization of economic considerations in the terrorist decision-
making phase was articulated in the November 2010 Special Issue of Inspire magazine, al
Qaeda’s online publication. An article entitled, “The Objective of Operation
Hemorrhage,” outlined the utility of asymmetric warfare against a superpower (i.e., the
United States) and the expected security costs the country would bear to mitigate a new
threat and associated risks. The Inspire “Letter from the Editor” advised, “This strategy

26

Gordon, Peter; James E. Moore, II, Ji Young Park and Harry W. Richardson (2006) The Economic
Impacts of a Terrorist Attack on the U.S. Commercial Aviation System.

27
Ibid.

40

of attacking the enemy with smaller but more frequent operations is what some may refer
to as the strategy of a thousand cuts. The aim is to bleed the enemy to death.”
28

Psychological Impact – The Mumbai Attacks
The first and most immediate effects of actual terror attacks are psychological.
29

Increased stress levels, decreased feelings of safety, heightened perceptions of threat and
behavioral changes have all been noted in communities following terrorist incidents. Fear
can influence decisions, alter lifestyles and affect entire cultures.

The November 26, 2008 attacks in Mumbai represent the potential of a terrorist trifecta –
critical infrastructure disruption, economic consequences and psychological impact. The
Mumbai attacks, also known as “26/11,” consisted of 11 coordinated active-shooter and
bombing attacks across India’s largest city. Ten heavily armed members of the Pakistan-
based terrorist organization Lashkar-e-Taiba (LT) attacked a diverse collection of targets,
holding the city, country, and the world hostage to their rampage for three days, killing
164 people and wounding at least 308.
30

28
Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (November 2010) The Objectives of Operation Hemorrhage, Inspire,
Issue 3. p 3
29
Waxman, D. (2011). Living with terror, not Living in Terror: The Impact of Chronic Terrorism on Israeli
Society. Perspectives on Terrorism – a journal of the Terrorism Research Initiative. Vol. 5, No. 5-6.
30

Press Information Bureau – Government of India (11 December 2008). HM announces measures to
enhance security (Press release)

41

The immediate halt of all citizen and commercial movement throughout the city was
expected and necessary. Yet, the city and the country showed remarkable resilience in the
attack’s aftermath. Rail service was fully restored the day after the incident ended, and
flights into and out of Mumbai never stopped during the 60-plus hours of cleanup
operation. Psychologically, it seems, Mumbai specifically, and India overall, was better
prepared to deal with such a tragedy than was the United States in the aftermath of 9/11.
31

Yet, as nations began to consider the potential impacts of violent extremism, the
psychological outcome yielded a more global impact on the counterterrorism community.
Several elements of the 26/11 attack demonstrated how terrorists could leverage strategy
and tactics, given appropriate intelligence information. For example, the Mumbai
attackers used a military tactic known as “swarming” – using a decentralized force in a
way that emphasizes mobility, communication, unit autonomy, and coordination or
synchronization.
32
As a result, counterterrorism units around the world developed
responses to this commando tactic, which was subsequently labeled a “Mumbai-style
attack.” The counterterrorism community came to recognize that such a tactic would be
particularly devastating if executed by assailants possessing an intimate knowledge of the
target by virtue of living or working near the location.

31

Panagaria, A. (29 November 2008) The Economic Cost of the Mumbai Tragedy – Extrapolating from
9/11 and New York City. Forbes.com
32
Edwards, S. (2000). Swarming on the Battlefield, Past, Present and Future

42

Fear of another Mumbai-style attack caught on quickly. In 2011, federal authorities
warned hotels in major U.S. cities to be vigilant after intelligence indicated al Qaeda
planned to launch a Mumbai-style attack on an upscale hotel in London.
33
Police
agencies, such as the New York Police Department, began training to respond to this
evolved tactic in drills simulating multiple bombs and shooters, as well as a bomb under a
vehicle.
34
The Los Angeles Police Department responded by engaging in a combination
of aggressive intelligence operations and community outreach.
35
The Mumbai attacks
were a game-changer on the local and international level.

With so many factors, motivations, and targets associated with terrorism and violent
extremism, there is hardly an academic discipline unattached to the issue of HVE. It is an
emerging, crosscutting issue with which societies (democratic ones in particular) must
come to grips. With a general appreciation for what HVE is, how extremists are
motivated, and to what end, the next step is to discern the presence and scope of HVE in
the United States and the groups that have long been engaged in domestic terrorism.

33
Levine, M. and Griffin, J. (17 June 2011). Hotels Warned of ‘Mumbai-style Terror Threat. Fox News
34
Esposito, R. and Eslocker, A. (14 October 2010). As Terror Alert Continues, NYPD Holds Drill to Prep
for Mumbai Style Attack. ABC News
35
Gertz, B. (11 April 2011). L.A. police use intel networks against terror. The Washington Times

43

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Von Winterfeldt, D. and O’Sullivan, T. (June 2006). Should We Protect Commercial
Airplanes Against Surface-to-Air Missile Attacks by Terrorists? Decision Analysis Vol.
3, No. 2, pp. 63–75.

USA Patriot Act of 2001 (42 U.S.C. 5195c(e) section 1016 (e).

United States Code of Federal Regulations: 28 C.F.R. Section 0.85.

USA Today. Associated Press. 20 June 2001. Victims of the Oklahoma City Bombing:
http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/nation/2001-06-11-mcveigh-victims.htm
(Retrieved: 13 October 13, 2012).

Waxman, D. (2011). Living with terror, not Living in Terror: The Impact of Chronic
Terrorism on Israeli Society. Perspectives on Terrorism – a journal of the Terrorism
Research Initiative. Vol. 5, No. 5-6.

Whitaker, D.J. ed. (2001). The Terrorism Reader. New York: Routledge.

Wilcox, L. (1997). The Watchdogs: A Close Look At Anti-Racist "Watchdog" Groups.
Self-published through Editorial Research Service.

Wilcox, L. (1996). “What Is Extremism? Style and Tactics Matter More Than Goals.”
American Extremists: Militias, Supremacists, Klansmen, Communists and Others, eds.
John George and Laird Wilcox. Amherst, New York: Prometheus.

Wilcox, L. Laird Wilcox on Extremist Traits:
http://www.lairdwilcox.com/news/hoaxerproject.html (Retrieved: 7 October 2012).

54

Chapter 2 – Ideological Motivation
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) report, “Rightwing Extremism: Current
Economic and Political Climate Fueling Resurgence in Radicalization and Recruitment”
was leaked in 2009.
36
The report was coordinated by the FBI and prepared by the DHS
Extremism and Radicalization Branch, Homeland Environment Threat Analysis Division,
which studied domestic terrorism, neo-Nazis, and white supremacists. It noted that white
supremacist and violent anti-government groups could potentially be pushed beyond
rhetoric as the recent financial crisis and election of the first African American president
offered unprecedented impetus for rightwing radicalization and recruitment.

Citing the example of Timothy McVeigh, the report suggested that “the possible passage
of new restrictions on firearms and the return of military veterans facing significant
challenges reintegrating into their communities could lead to the potential emergence of
terrorist groups or lone wolf extremists capable of carrying out violent attacks.”

In the ensuing political firestorm, given the perceived focus on all veterans, DHS
Secretary Janet Napolitano withdrew the report, explaining that the threat was limited to a
small number of returning soldiers. Yet, the reality is that the report did not state that
conservatives or veterans are a “suspect” class. Rather, the report revealed that white
supremacist groups are interested in returning veterans because of their skills. While the

36
U.S. Department of Homeland Security Assessment (7 April 2009). Rightwing Extremism: Current
Economic and Political Climate Fueling Resurgence in Radicalization and Recruitment.

55

DHS report became politically charged, its findings were congruous with previous studies
indicating that every year in the United States (with the exception of 2001), right wing
extremism is responsible for more instances of violence than Islamic extremism.
37

Figure 2.0 illustrates fifty-six percent of domestic terrorist attacks and plots in the U.S.
since 1995 have been perpetrated by right-wing extremists, who are often members of
hate groups targeting immigrants, LGBT communities, people of color and religious
minorities, as compared to 30 percent by ecoterrorists and 12 percent by Islamic
extremists. Right-wing extremism has been responsible for the greatest number of
terrorist incidents in the U.S. in 13 of the 17 years since the Oklahoma City bombing.
38

Figure 2.0

37
Center for American Progress – Thinkprogress (19 April 2012) CHART: 17 Years After Oklahoma City
Bombing, Right-Wing Extremism Is Significant Domestic Terror Threat.
38
Ibid.

56

The New America Foundation published a subsequent report, determining that while the
law enforcement focus on “jihadi groups” was appropriate in the aftermath of 9/11,
today, the scope should be broadened to include “nonjihadist” extremists.
39
It should be
noted that Muslim Identity ideology groups in their messaging and outreach consistently
use the term “jihadist”. Nonjihadists are defined as right-wing and left-wing extremists
who oppose the government, as well as neo-Nazis, anti-Gay, anti-abortion, and violent
animal and environmental activists. The report (Figure 2.1) found that from September
2001 through September 2012, jihadist and nonjihadist terrorists killed about the same
number of people in the United States. Nonjihadist extremists, however, committed 10
attacks, while jihadists committed just four. More than 60 percent of the 127 people
indicted on terrorism-related weapons charges were nonjihadist, and there were 11
anarchists, white supremacist, or right-wing extremists indicted for possessing chemical
or biological materials. Meanwhile, no jihadist terrorists have acquired chemical or
biological weapons, nor are any publically known to have tried to acquire them.

39
Bergen, Peter and Jennifer Rowland (11 September 2012). 11 years after 9/11: Who are the terrorists?
CNN Opinion

57

Figure 2.1

Despite the increasing threat from nonjihadist groups, there has been a continued outsized
focus on jihadists as the exclusive HVE risk to the United States. There are numerous
extremist groups embracing a range of doctrines, while many groups and individuals
bond with more than one ideological proclivity. Given this broad range of ideologies and
factions, the growing HVE threat demands a more comprehensive categorization of
extremist groups in the United States. There are numerous examples, and these are best
understood from the perspectives of three ideological motivations: race, religion and
issue orientation.

Racial Ideology
Extremist organizations founded on racial lines have a long history in the United States.
The post-9/11 era in particular has yielded an increase in associated rhetoric or “hate
speech” and responses in recruitment and membership. The race category refers to groups

58

and associated individuals espousing racial supremacy as the foundation of their
ideological principles (recognizing that groups and individuals may embrace philosophies
that crossover into other categories, such as religion).

Nearly half of the 6,222 hate crimes reported in 2011 were racially motivated, according
to FBI figures, with nearly three-fourths directed at African Americans. Meanwhile, more
than 16 percent of hate crimes were driven by an anti-white bias.
40
This level of racial
extremism can be traced to the primary drivers described in the aforementioned DHS
report – a challenging economy and an African American president.

Interestingly, extremists and scholars alike cite recent economic dislocations, as well as
political and cultural developments, as the impetuses for increasing racial polarity and
interest in extremist organizations. August Kreis, who resigned as leader of an Aryan
Nations faction after his conviction on veteran’s benefits fraud, explained, “The worse
the economy gets, the more the groups are going to grow…White people are arming
themselves – and black people too. I believe eventually it’s going to come down to civil
war.”
41

At the same time, one of the most galvanizing forces for racial extremists (as well as
across religion and issue-oriented categories) was “the Obama factor;” that is, the

40
Ryan, D. (10 December 2012). Hate crimes down in 2011, but anti-gay violence up, FBI says. The Los
Angeles Times.
41
Intelligence Report (2012) The Year in Hate and Extremism, The ‘Patriot” Movement Explodes. The
Southern Poverty Law Center. Spring 2012/Issue 145.

59

tectonic shifts in American politics that allowed a black man with a foreign-sounding
name and a Muslim-born father to occupy the Oval Office. He became a rallying symbol
for racial identity adherents, and the extremist intolerance and conspiratorial perceptions
were further enhanced when the president appointed Rahm Emanuel as White House
Chief of Staff. This was a nightmare scenario for many racial ideologues, as the so-called
Zionist Occupied Government (ZOG) was in the hands of an African American and a
Modern Orthodox Jew. Within his first 8 months in office, President Obama became the
target of more than 30 death threats a day, a 400 percent increase from about 3,000 a year
during the George W. Bush Administration.
42

The growing interest and fellowship in numerous extremist groups presents significant
challenges for efforts to counter and prevent HVE. While racial ideological groups are
numerous, some of the most prevalent include:

Black Separatists
These are groups whose ideologies include principles of racially based hatred, black
supremacy and/or black separatist ideologies. Although these groups increasingly claim
doctrines that seem to exempt them from the laws of the land, racial superiority
dominates their ideology. Black separatist groups can be found across the nation, with the
Nation of Islam and the New Black Panther Party being most prevalent.

42
Harnden, T. (3 August 2009). Barack Obama faces 30 death threats a day, stretching US Secret Service.
The Telegraph.

60

The Nation of Islam arose from the preaching of Elijah Poole in Detroit, later titled the
Honorable Elijah Muhammad. It was founded on the general themes of peace and
harmony, with an emphasis on religion and the importance of God. Academic and social
priorities were placed on mathematics and respect for the law respectively, and in that
regard, it was specifically affirmed that one is never to be armed or to engage in war as
the aggressor, for to do so is contrary to what was deemed righteous.

Elijah Muhammad’s son, Warith Deen Mohammed, was declared the Nation’s leader
after his father’s death. He instituted a number of substantial changes, embracing a more
traditional interpretation of Islam (largely Sunni) and notably welcomed white
worshippers while also reaching out to Christians and Jews. Louis Farrakhan (born Louis
Eugene Wolcott) converted to Nation of Islam and quickly rose through the ranks,
becoming an assistant minister after only nine months. He later became the official
spokesperson for the Nation until Elijah Muhammad’s death in 1975.

In 1978, however, following Warith Deen Mohammed’s organizational changes,
Farrakhan decided to walk away from the Nation with the intention of restoring the group
to its original foundation and purpose. He became increasingly anti-government, anti-
Semitic, homophobic and racist. Although Farrakhan has often come out against violence
in the black community, he can hardly be embraced as a beacon of peace and love. His
willingness to denigrate other races, religions and people of differing sexual orientations
clearly illustrates an intolerant ideology emblematic of extremist organizations.

61

The Nation of Islam has always found the American prison system a source of a sizeable
pool of talent vulnerable to recruitment and potentially radicalization. The conversion of
Malcolm Little to Malcolm X, from pimp and drug dealer to charismatic leader, is
demonstrative of the potential of a careful indoctrination process, targeting the right
individual. However, it is equally important to note prison conversions are often as much
a survival mechanism while incarcerated than any thing else.

The Nation of Islam and prison-based extremist groups often become attractive to
inmates described as “searchers” by prison researcher Mark Hamm. The “most prevalent
type of conversion discovered in his research was this spiritual quest…primarily
motivated by a search for identity and meaning in their lives.”
43
Analysis reveals that
individuals potentially attracted to this pathway tend to be “better educated, better read
and more articulate than other converts.” Former deputy inspector general Patrick
Dunleavy of the Criminal Intelligence Unit of the New York State Department of
Correctional Services concludes, “Incarcerated individuals are probably particularly
receptive to using violence against a government by which they feel they have been
wronged.”
44
However, although prison may be the environment for the conversion, the
process begins long before these individuals ever become incarcerated. Thus, there is a
level of complexity, as well as culture in the conversion process.

43
Hamm, Mark (December 2007). Terrorism Recruitment in American Correctional Institutions: An
Exploratory Study of Non-Traditional Faith Groups Final Report, p. 67.
44
Dunleavy, Patrick (2011). The Fertile Soil of Jihad, Terrorism’s Prison Connection. Potomac Books,
Virginia, p. 23.

62

New Black Panther Party
The New Black Panther Party (NBPP) or New Black Panther Party for Self-Defense was
founded in Dallas, Texas in 1989. The NBPP ideology endorses revolution and black
unity based on self-determination, drawing on a socialist doctrine known as collective
economics. Unlike the original Black Panther Party, the NBPP is anti-white, anti-Semitic
and embraces what is essentially a Black supremacy platform.

It is of importance as it relates to Black Separatist ideological and political motivations,
to understand that although similar in name, it is not the successor to the Black Panther
Party. The Black Panther Party also known as the Black Panther Party for Self-Defense
was created in Oakland, California as an African-American revolutionary socialist
organization in 1966. They were part of the larger Black Power movement created to
protect African-American communities against police brutality. In describing the
paradigm shift created by the emergence of the Black Panthers, Pulitzer Prize winner
Louis “Studs” Terkel’s work on Race stated, “They made white America aware that all
blacks were not docile. All blacks were not of the same mind. All blacks did not go to
church and pray.”
45
Despite their aggressive stance on armed self-defense and black
pride, “the Black Panther Party evolved to embrace a broader agenda based on socialism,
deemphasizing racial exclusivity.
46

45

Terkel, S. (1992). Race, How Blacks and Whites Think and Feel About the American Obsession, pp.
299-300.

46
Seale, B. (September 1997). Seize the Time.

63

The notion of racial intolerance is the most important ideological divide between the
similarly named Black Panther groups and would explain why the Black Panther Party
would not be considered an extremist organization, whereas the NBPP would qualify.
Racial pride, characteristic of the Black Panther Party, as compared to racial supremacy,
a foundational component of the NBPP, clearly delineates the two groups. In fact, upon
the creation of the NBPP, The Dr. Huey P. Newton Foundation, posted an open letter
declaring the illegitimacy of the NBPP stating, “There is no new Black Panther Party.”
47

The NBPP advocates a separate nation that will allow members to, among other things,
implement their own laws, provide reparations to African Americans for slavery, and win
the freedom of incarcerated black inmates.

Although reportedly small in size (claiming a
few thousand members across the country), they avail themselves of media opportunities
by making racist, anti-Semitic pronouncements.
48

Characteristic of extremist organizations, the NBPP embraces some of the conspiracy
theories similar to their neo-Nazi and white supremacist counterparts, most notably, that
Jews received advance warning of the 9/11 attacks. Unlike some extremist organizations,
however, the NBPP does not shy away from advocating violence. In March 2012, after
placing a $10,000 bounty on the head of George Zimmerman (a white Sanford, Florida
neighborhood watch volunteer who killed 17-year-old African American Trayvon

47
The Dr. Huey P. Newton Foundation. There Is No New Black Panther Party: An Open Letter from the
Dr. Huey P. Newton Foundation.
48
Southern Poverty Law Center. New Black Panther Party.

64

Martin), the NBPP held a press conference, circulating “wanted dead or alive” posters for
Zimmerman.
49

Ku Klux Klan
Founded in1865, the Ku Klux Klan’s (KKK) primary advocacy centers on white
supremacy and white nationalism, but it also includes anti-Semitic, anti-Catholic, anti-
immigrant, and homophobic ideologies, as well as Nativism and Neo-Confederate
beliefs. Cross burnings largely go unreported, although their significance as a fear and
violence-based strategy of terror via intimidation harkens back to the lynching and church
bombing of the civil rights era.

Ku Klux Klan presence and recruitment efforts across the country present interesting
facts. Current documented locations of the Ku Klux Klan (KKK) across the United States
illustrate a presence across the southern states and north toward the Great Lakes region.
There are two (2) or less documented KKK chapters in thirty (30) states, with declines
noted in the number of chapters and membership across the country.
50
However, there
has been a surge in membership for several reasons. According to the grand dragon of the
Ku Klux Klan’s National Knights in Wisconsin, “The Sept. 11 terrorist attacks have
made recruitment easier for white supremacist groups across the United States.”
51

Responding to the threat to national security, particularly as it relates to a foreign threat,

49
Pulaski, R. (23 March 2012). New Black Panther Party Issues “Wanted Dead or Alive” Posters for
George Zimmerman. US Message Board.
50
Ibid.
51
Stormfront website (30 January 2002). KKK sees surge in recruitment following 9/11, state leader says.

65

provides a useful message. However, during the past decade, increasing numbers of
immigrants, decreasing employment and a shrinking or “minoritization” of the White
population in America are also fueling the “Otherism” factor.

Evidence of a reinvigorated Klan and their trepidation over “the Obama factor” emerged
just two days after the President’s re-election, when The Knight’s Party website stated:
“This election has offered positive proof that white Christian people have lost control of
this former Republic. Contrary to what you have been taught in school and in church,
America was founded as a White Christian homeland.”
52
Extremist organizations
repeated declarations regarding “taking the country back” are as much political as
demographic, referring to sobering statistics of racial and ethnic minorities comprising
about half of the nation’s under-5 age group.
53
This represents “a historic shift that
shows how many young people are at the forefront of sweeping changes by race and
class.”
54
Evidence of the concerns regarding this report is illustrated in a response posted
on the White supremacist site Stormfront advising, “It is NOT central America or Mexico

52
The Knights Party website (8 November 2012). America’s White Future Begins Here
53
U.S. News (13 June 2013). Census: White majority in U.S. gone by 2043.
54
Ibid. The latest census numbers show:
• The population younger than 5 stood at 49.9 percent minority in 2012.
• For the first time in more than a century, the number of deaths now exceeds births among white
Americans.
• As a whole, the nonwhite population increased by 1.9 percent to 116 million, or 37 percent of the
U.S. The fastest percentage growth is among multiracial Americans, followed by Asians and
Hispanics. Non-Hispanic whites make up 63 percent of the U.S.; Hispanics, 17 percent; blacks,
12.3 percent; Asians, 5 percent; and multiracial Americans, 2.4 percent.
• About 353 of the nation’s 3,143 counties, or 11 percent, are now “majority-minority.”

66

that makes people third world, but the people. We will be a third world nation within 50
years. Mark my words.”
55

Neo-Confederates
These are groups that seek to return to the racist principles of the pre-Civil War South.
The foundation of the neo-Confederate movement is to honor the Confederate States of
America and veterans of the Confederacy, as established during the U.S. Civil War. Neo-
Confederates believe they preserve the true spirit of the Union, with the Confederacy
being a rational, legitimate successor to the original government borne of the American
Revolution. Some neo-Confederates view the Civil War as a conflict between a secular
North and a Christian South.
56

The essence of this movement is based on secession and related group interpretation that
the Constitution provides for states to secede from the United States and create an
independent government. The state of Texas maintains a section of the State Constitution
that says Texans have the right “to alter, reform or abolish their government in such
manner as they may think expedient.”
57
However, Texas is not alone and secessionist
actions are nothing new. Throughout history and decades before the Southern
Confederacy,
58
numerous organizations have sought independence from the U.S., in an

55
Stormfront website. Demographics: Decline in US White population

56
MacLean, N. (2010). "Neo-Confederacy versus the New Deal: The Regional Utopia of the Modern
American Right" in The Myth of Southern Exceptionalism. p. 309
57

Fernandez, M. (15 January 2013). White House Rejects Petitions to Secede, but Texans Fight On. The
New York Times.
58
The Essex Junto, a group of politicians, attorneys and tradesman originating in Essex County,
Massachusetts and a powerful force within the Federalist Party, considered separating from the Union. The

67

effort to establish self-governing communities. The issue to be considered involves the
legality of secession and the nexus it has, if any, to the notion of treason.

Treason conjures up discussions of betrayal to one’s country, but does that include
actions that involve a democratic process, particularly if the actions are non-violent? In a
White House response to an online petition in 2013, generating more than 100,000
signatures asking for Texas to secede, the White House stated the founding fathers
established the United States as a “perpetual union.” Although open to debate on the
concept, the White House cited “legal arguments against secession, including Texas v.
White, an 1869 Supreme Court ruling that found that individual states did not have the
right to secede.”
59
Under Article III, Section 3, of the Constitution, “Treason against the
United States, shall consist only in levying War against them, or in adhering to their
Enemies, giving them Aid and Comfort.” Thus, it would seem secessionist activities,
absent acts of violence, should not inherently be deemed treasonous, but certainly invoke
warranted concerns of national loyalty. As summed up in the White House statement to
the Texas petition:
“Our founding fathers established the Constitution of the United States ‘in order
to form a more perfect union’ through the hard and frustrating but necessary work
of self-government. They enshrined in that document the right to change our
national government through the power of the ballot – a right that generations of
Americans have fought to secure for all. But they did not provide a right to walk
away from it.”
60

contemplated a Northern secession comprised from the Southern states. The new Northern republic would
be comprised of New England, New York, New Jersey and Canada.(Lauren Davis, 10 Movements to
Secede from the United States).
59
Fernandez, M. (15 January 2013). White House Rejects Petitions to Secede, but Texans Fight On. The
New York Times
60

Ibid.

68

The heart of the neo-Confederate movement, largely represented by the Alabama-based
League of the South (LOS), is reportedly decreasing in membership, with chapters in 16
states.
61
Yet, the group is also becoming more radical,
62
publicly espousing anger at
blacks and other minorities. The LOS opposes racial diversity, particularly racial
intermarriage, and seeks to establish a society composed of “general European cultural
hegemony.”
63
It is this component of cultural exclusion that facilitates engagement by a
fringe element predisposed to violence or who embraces extremist intergroup affiliations,
that would suggest more aggressive tactics than an online petition is necessary. Michael
Hill, a professor of British history, first established LOS at the University of Alabama,
his alma mater, where he was initially joined by a number of other Southern university
professors. The group’s ultimate political goal of a “free and independent Southern
republic” seeks to legitimize their ideological efforts, but as the rhetoric became
increasingly racist, many of the academics abandoned the movement, leaving a less
scholarly core to evolve and shape the mission.

Examples of the racist supremacy and intolerance are evident in a 2012 essay, in which
Hill claimed that white people are endowed with a “God-ordained superiority.” Whites of
“honor, genius and principle” left us with a “glorious heritage,” while black people “have
never created anything approximating a civilization.” Slavery, he wrote, was

61
Southern Poverty Law Center. Hate Map.
62
Potok, M. (Spring 2012). The Year in Hate & Extremism. Southern Poverty Law Center, Intelligence
Report, Issue 145.
63
Ibid.

69

“successfully defended from a Biblical standpoint” until “the institution’s legitimacy was
systematically undermined in the name of ‘equality’ and misappropriated ‘Christian
ethics.’”
64

Neo-Nazis
Neo-Nazis are groups or individuals seeking to restore Nazism based on a modern
National Socialism ideology. This ideology is founded on the legacy of the Nazi Third
Reich and includes a veneration of Adolf Hitler and aggressive nationalism.
65
Neo-
Nazism encompasses radical nationalism that furthers an agenda of anti-Semitism,
homophobia, racism and xenophobia. Anti-Semitism is one of the foundational elements,
and Holocaust denial is among those features intrinsic to the belief system. It is a global
phenomenon with a presence in Asia, Europe and the Americas.

There is a resurgence of Nazism across Europe, the former Soviet Union and in the
United States. A number of key elements are resonating with a receptive alienated
population, most importantly challenging socioeconomic situations and the fear of the
minoritization of White populations in their respective homelands. For example, there has
been a notable increase in the number of Nazi movements in Greece, where this extremist
ideology has been able to manifest itself in an environment steeped in “otherism.” The
causality is attributed to “unacceptable” immigration of racial, religious or ethnic

64
Southern Poverty Law Center. Michael Hill. Intelligence Files.
65
“Neo-Nazism” (2002). Faculty of Humanities at Charles University in Prague, Department of Civil
Society Studies

70

minorities. It is of particular importance to note the demographic embracing this
extremist ideology and why. Greece has a youth unemployment rate of more than 62
percent, which they attribute at least in part, to the increasing immigrant population as
competition for employment. It is also interesting to note the political nexus to the
movements’ escalating visibility and clout. The Golden Dawn, a right wing extremist
political party whose membership includes Neo-Nazis, holds seats in the Greek
parliament. Golden Dawn “has become more aggressive, more dangerous and more
popular”
66
than ever before. The rise of groups like this in Europe have generated
concern globally for what may be in store for other nations facing similar demographic
shifts and socioeconomic challenges.

The issue of the minoritization of White America is a useful recruiting tool for extremist
organizations steeped in ideologies that denigrate minorities and particularly immigrants.
Under the veil of ethnocentrism, articulated by Neo-Confederate Michael Hill as “a
natural affection for one’s own kind,”
67
the point is to embrace racial segregation, while
reducing the fear of being called racist. As stated during the analysis of the Black Panther
Party and the New Black Panther Party, there is a difference between racial pride, racial
exclusivity and racial supremacy. The ethnocentric message comes across as a circle-the-
wagons response to the changing demographics of America and the need to keep
America “pure.”

66
Flock, Elizabeth (4 June 2013). Lawmakers: Neo-Nazi Movements Resurging in U.S., Europe. U.S. News
67
Southern Poverty Law Center. League of the South. Intelligence Files.

71

Concerns of minoritization are evident in pronouncements by the American Nazi Party
pointing out, “Currently, America has an estimated 20 MILLION brown, mestizo
ILLEGAL ALIENS who have INVADED OUR NATION…Every year, our White
children’s expected life-style – is declining – compared to previous generations.”
68
The
connotation denotes a fear of racial extinction, if action is not taken to stem to tide of
immigration. More important, are concerns regarding future social, political and
economic parity at the hands of a minority majority. They explain, “By 2025 WHITE
AMERICA will be a total MINORITY in a nation that WAS ONCE THEIR
BIRTHRIGHT! Does this please you? ‘HOW’ do you think a White MINORITY will be
TREATED – once it’s an established fact? Do you think that life for your children, and
their children will be ‘business as usual’?”
69

The American Nazi movement’s historical beginnings can be traced to a nationalist
organization identified as the German American Bund, which existed prior to World War
II. The Nazi movement went underground until the formation of the American Nazi Party
(ANP) in the United States.
70
Robert Brannon, member of the ANP before its decline,
founded the National Socialist Movement (NSM) in 1974.
71
As early as 2004, the NSM
dominated the national scene as a result of the internal disarray of the National Alliance,

68

American Nazi Party website. http://www.anp14.com (Retrieved: 14 July 2013)
69

Ibid.
70
Gods of the Third Reich website (23 February 2012). Nazism: Still Alive in the USA.
71
Ibid.

72

which was founded by William Pierce, author of The Turner Diaries. Today, the NSM is
self-described as the largest and most active National Socialist party in America.
72

The NSM advocates violence circuitously, presumably to limit attention from federal law
enforcement agencies and watchdog groups. NSM Commander Jeff Schoep’s admonition
on the group’s website warns, “Acts of violence or terrorism against America or its
Citizens is unacceptable and not tolerated within the ranks of the National Socialist
Movement.”
73
Nevertheless, they have been known to respond in uniform, armed, and
with the intent to enforce the law or patrol the neighborhood streets. This was
demonstrated in the 2011 counter-protest of the Occupy Phoenix demonstration
74
and
also in response to the 2012 New Black Panther Party’s bounty for the apprehension of
George Zimmerman.
75

White Power Skinheads
The original Skinhead subculture emerged in the 1960s, largely in Europe, and was not
defined by race. It is important to note that initially, the Skinhead movement had no
nexus with White nationalism or the neo-Nazi ideologies. As the movement spread across
the world, however, one neo-Nazi Skinhead faction found a home in the United States.

72
National Socialist Movement website
73
Ibid.
74
Phoenix Class War Council (15 October 2011). The National Socialist Movement scum show up armed to
counter protest #occupyphoenix.
75
Shahid, A. (7 April 2012). Neo-Nazis patrolling streets of Sanford, Fla., where Trayvon shot and killed.
New York Daily News.

73

In the 1990s, the racist skinhead movement picked up where more traditional groups
(such as the KKK, neo-Nazis and the White Aryan Resistance) left off. Their philosophy
was reminiscent of the message in the Turner Diaries – to engage in violent acts with the
intent of igniting a U.S. race war. Employing the leaderless resistance strategy of Texan
white nationalist Louis Beam, the long-term objective was to remove Jews, minorities,
liberals and their white conspirators of the ZOG from power. Increasing in lethality since
9/11 and continuing to attack immigrants and desecrate synagogues, Skinheads have
rejected their trademarked shaved head and steel-toed boots and adopted a more
contemporary look.

Although the groups are not rooted in religion, they leveraged the 9/11 terror attacks to
suit their ideological goals. They chose to emulate the successes of Islamic extremists,
understanding the power of a movement based on religious fervor. This religious
evolution gained considerable traction by the skinheads housed in America’s prisons.
Unfortunately, most often skinheads who are taken off the streets, prosecuted and
convicted under strict hate crime statutes become a force-multiplier once incarcerated.
Being housed with their most violent colleagues facilitates unprecedented personal
bonding, a new proving ground and unique opportunities. In addition to the race-based
crimes inside and outside of prison, groups such as the Nazi Low Riders morphed into
criminal enterprises, profiting in narcotics trafficking, identity theft, and murder.

74

The zeal for their religiosity is matched only in their engagement in their trademark hate
music, which includes white power, Heavy Metal, Celtic and folk genres. The diversity
of the Racist Skinhead movement presents a complex counterterrorism dilemma.

White Nationalists
This is a broad ideological category, including groups whose principles revolve around
racially based hatred, white supremacy and/or white separatist ideologies. These groups
actively exploit the aforementioned concerns associated with the minoritization of White
America and a government no longer representative or concerned with the ideals of the
Founding Fathers. The roots of contemporary White Nationalism are traced to the
National Alliance (NA), founded in Hillsboro, West Virginia, by university physics
professor Dr. William Luther Pierce in 1974. As a former associate of George Lincoln
Rockwell, the assassinated leader of the American Nazi Party, Pierce took advantage of
group infighting and commandeered the largest faction, reorganizing it into the NA. They
adopted the slogans, "Free Men Are Not Equal" and "Equal Men Are Not Free."

Anti-Semitism is a core element of the NA ideology, which also asserts: Jews rule
America and control its news and mass media outlets; support of the State of Israel was
the genesis of the 9/11 attacks; and Israel’s Mossad intelligence agency initiated the 2001
anthrax attacks to facilitate the U.S. 2003 invasion of Iraq.
76
NA goals include creating a
“white living space” (not unlike South Africa’s apartheid), an Aryan-based society, a

76
Pate, R. (2004). The Anthrax Mystery: Solved. National Vanguard, Issue 122.

75

white racially autonomous government, an educational system that teaches these racial
principals, and a racially based economic policy. Although some violent neo-Nazis and
other reactionaries may have been inspired by the NA’s message, no acts of terrorism or
hate crimes have been directly linked to the original group.
77

Another White Nationalist group was born in 1983 when Robert Jay Matthews founded
The Order, also known as the Bruder Schweigen (German for “Brothers Keep Silent”) or
Silent Brotherhood. Their goal was to establish a homeland free of Jews and other non-
whites to separate themselves from the ZOG. They believed the only way to achieve this
objective was through revolution. Matthews led The Order into a counterfeiting
operation, robberies and other crimes for the purpose of funding future operations.
Eventually, the group bombed the Congregation Ahavath Israel Synagogue in Boise,
Idaho.

The violence escalated to murder when Matthews directed the killing of Order member
Walter Edward West, who was thought to have shared the groups’ secret operations while
drunk. The Order was also suspected in the murder of Jewish talk show host Alan Berg,
targeting him not only because he was Jewish but also because he ridiculed The Order on
air.
78

77
Martin, G. (2011). Terrorism and Homeland Security. SAGE Publications, Thousand Oaks, California.
78
The Denver Post (18 June 2009). The murder of Alan Berg in Denver: 25 years later.

76

In 1984, the FBI arrested Thomas Martinez, who became an informant. During the
attempted arrest of Matthews, the group founder managed to escape to his bunker at
Whidbey Island in Washington. This led to a 36-hour shootout with the FBI, where
Matthews eventually died when the structure caught fire. News reports about the siege on
Whidbey Island were the first time the American public learned about The Order and
their war against the ZOG.
79

Religious Ideology
Violent motivations bleed across ideological lines, and racial and religious inspirations
often work in concert to propel HVE. Recognizing the inherently messy ideological
landscape, some of the religious motivations draw on radical interpretations of major
world religions.

Christian Identity
The term “Christian Identity” has two distinct meanings.
80
Anglo-Israelism (also called
British-Israelism) is a belief that the Anglo-Saxon, Celtic, Scandinavian, Germanic and
associated cultures are the racial descendants of the tribes of Israel. Christian Identity also
refers to racist, Christian-based faith groups. A number of small, ultra-conservative
Fundamentalist Christian denominations have accepted Anglo-Israelism, and grafted it to

79

HistoryLink.org Robert Jay Mathews, founder of the white-supremacist group The Order, is killed
during an FBI siege on Whidbey Island on December 8, 1984.
80
Religious Tolerance website. Christian Identity Movement.

77

racist, sexist, anti-communist, and homophobic beliefs. They also view the Jewish people
as descendants of Satan.

In the context of North America, the latter definition has become dominant, associated
with churches, religious organizations, extreme right-wing political groups, and in some
instances, survivalists. Christian Identity adherents hold that “non-whites are soulless
beasts also called the Mud People.”
81
Dr. Michael Barkun, a leading expert on the
Christian Identity movement, writes that "this virulent racist and anti-Semitic theology,
which is practiced by over 50,000 people in the United States alone, is prevalent among
many right wing extremist groups and has been called the 'glue' of the racist right."
82

Christian Identity is particularly dangerous because it presents hate as a religious duty
and murder as an act of faith.
83

The Christian Identity movement sits at the nexus of normally antagonistic segments of
the far right, providing a vehicle to unite groups that were previously at odds. Christian
Identity offered a way for varying groups to align crosscutting objectives, such as efforts
against the ZOG. As previously mentioned regarding the notion of “searchers,” those
inmates in prison settings seeking identity and meaning in their lives, Christian Identity
recruits share a similar radicalization pathway. Kerry Noble, former second-in-command
of the Covenant Sword and Arm of the Lord (CSA) corroborates the recruitment dynamic
explaining, “people often join groups like this because they are discontent with or

81
Martin, Gus (2011). Terrorism and Homeland Security. SAGE Publications, Thousand Oaks, California.
82

Religious Tolerance website. Christian Identity Movement.
83
Coulson, Danny O. (2001) No Heroes: Inside the FBI’s Secret Counter-Terrorism Force.

78

alienated from society, and to find a community-sense of belonging.” Referring to the
important infusion of scripture as a nexus to the recruit’s personal questions and related
challenges he explains further, “…here was the first ingredient necessary for creating an
extremist: a philosophical or theological premise, based upon discontent, fear, unbelief,
hate, despair, or some other negative emotion. In other words, a person’s view of the
present and the future had to be dark and bleak.”
84

Before the turn of the millennium, the FBI produced a report analyzing organizations that
believed the year 2000 would bring the end of the world. The domestic terrorism report
was entitled “Project Megiddo.” The report presents Wesley A. Swift as the most
significant figure in the early Christian Identity movement in the United States. A former
Methodist minister, Swift founded the White Identity Church of Jesus Christ–Christian in
the 1940s (later renamed the Church of Jesus Christ Christian).
85
Other Christian Identity
churches have arisen, all preaching a similar belief that Aryans are a chosen race.
86

Foundational Christian Identity objectives include preparation for the end of the world, in
which the chosen group will play a fundamental role. The Megiddo Report states
“Christian Identity adherents…believe they are among those chosen by God to wage this
battle during Armageddon, and they will be the last line of defense for the white race and

84
Noble, K. (1998). Tabernacle of Hate, Why They Bombed Oklahoma City. Voyageur Publishing, Ontario,
p. 28.
85
FBI (20 October 1999). Project Megiddo. Christian Identity. Center for Studies on New Religions.
86

Ibid.

79

Christian America.” Readying the group for this important role entails survivalist and
paramilitary training, in addition to storing food, supplies, weapons, and ammunition.
87

Aryan Nations
Richard Butler established the Aryan Nations as a “political counterpart to his Christian
Identity sect, called the Church of Jesus Christ Christian.”
88
The organization was
originally based in Hayden Lake, Idaho, a 20-acre compound that served as headquarters,
hosting the annual World Congress of Aryan Nations, attended by direct members and
those of similar groups.
89
The meeting brought together Klansman from across the
country, Posse Comitatus leaders, tax resisters, National Socialist groups, Christian
Identity church delegations and other right-wing, unaffiliated individuals.
90
In 2001, FBI
Director Louis Freeh identified Aryan Nations as a continuing terrorist threat,
91
and the
RAND Corporation deemed them “the first truly nationwide terrorist network.”
92

Butler raised the bar, making the Aryan Nation’s one of the most well known Christian
Identity organizations in the nation. Under his leadership, they leveraged several
extremist ideologies – anti-Semitism, neo-Nazi and white nationalism, becoming a hub

87
FBI (20 October 1999). Project Megiddo. Christian Identity. Center for Studies on New Religions.
87

Ibid.
88
Martin, G. (2011). Terrorism and Homeland Security. SAGE Publications, Thousand Oaks, California.
89
Anti-Defamation League. Aryan Nations/Church of Jesus Christ Christian.
90
Coates, James (1987). Armed and Dangerous, The Rise of the Survivalist Right. Hill and Wang, New
York.

91
FBI Congressional Statement (10 May 2001). Statement for the Record, Louis J. Freeh, Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation on the Threat of Terrorism to the United States before the United States
Senate Committees on Appropriations, Armed Services, and Select Committee on Intelligence.
92
START – National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism. Aryan Nations
(AN).

80

for a range of far-right extremists. Most notably, he decided to militarize their strategy.
Perhaps due to his background, a World War II veteran, who later collaborated with
William Potter Gale, a retired colonel who lead the California Rangers and founded Posse
Comitatus, Butler surrounded himself with followers attired in uniforms, with
accouterments representing the group.

Later, he issued his “Call to the Nations,” reminiscent of phraseology invoked by other
extremist leaders such as Malcolm X (Nation of Islam) and Rabbi Meir Kahane (Jewish
Defense League), declaring his commitment to pursue, “a national racial state. We shall
have it at whatever price is necessary. Just as our forefathers purchased their freedom in
blood so must we…We will have to kill the bastards.”
93
This open invitation and
incitement of violence was welcome news to adherents clamoring for an endorsement and
a leader who would show them the way. It was a departure from other extremist groups
who had developed remote fortified compounds, choosing to isolate themselves from
society. Butler’s approach was more pre-emptive, willing to bring the fight to the enemy,
thereby dictating the theater for the racial holy war.

The Creativity Movement
Ben Klassen founded the Creativity Movement (originally the World Church of the
Creator), whose ideologies are influential in the Christian Identity movement. Klassen
declared that the white race is doomed if it does not change course and avoid being

93
Anti-Defamation League. Extremism in America. Aryan Nations/Church of Jesus Christ Christian.

81

overcome by people of color, described as crossbreeds. The Creativity Movement goes so
far as to propose a rejection of Christianity, which some adherents believe was created as
a Jewish conspiracy to enslave whites.
94

Another Creativity Movement leader was Matthew Hale, identified as the church's
supreme leader and Pontifex Maximus. The articulate, charismatic and handsome Hale
leveraged every media opportunity, always cautious to skirt the issue of directly
advocating violence. He routinely shared his messages of white supremacy and hate
during television interviews. He was also one of the first ideological extremists to take
advantage of the Internet, using it to recruit women and children with sites directly
catering to those demographics. Although many of their followers (Creators) were
incarcerated, Hale understood the importance of messaging and educating his youthful
base, eventually developing website contacts in Australia, Austria, Canada, France,
Germany Poland, Russia and Switzerland. His most noteworthy literary effort includes
“The White Man’s Bible.”

Hale’s prioritization of the organizational objective is demonstrated by his disdain for
Christianity, while understanding the need to leverage its base to support his ideology. In
this regard, the Creators entered unchartered territory. Unlike the Christian Identity
adherents who supported their extremist views with scripture, Creators promoted a
conspiratorial belief that Christianity was a fabrication that Jews were utilizing as a

94
Martin, Gus (2011). Terrorism and Homeland Security. SAGE Publications, Thousand Oaks, California.

82

“tremendous weapon in the worldwide Jewish drive of race-mixing.” Creators believed
that people were being duped by the religion, inasmuch as they claimed there was no
proof that Jesus even existed. However, the criticality of the Christian base cannot be
overstated, thus prioritizing the movement’s marketing strategy of anti-Semitism and
racism, despite their contempt for the religious foundation of their intended audience.

On April 6, 2005, Hale was sentenced to a 40-year prison term for soliciting an
undercover FBI informant to kill federal judge Joan Lefkow, who was presiding over a
copyright case regarding the name of his organization.
95

Muslim Identity
Following the 9/11 terrorist attacks, Islam came to be viewed by many as somehow
inherently violent. It is important to note that the overwhelming majority of the Muslim
community is not joining or supporting factions of radical Islamic groups. Muslims
around the world have rejected extremist movements and voice their opposition,
sometimes at great risk of physical harm. Recognizing that people use a religious
framework to justify violent activity (and not the other way around), “Muslim Identity”
refers specifically to the individuals and the ideologies associated with HVE.

The organizing principal behind Muslim Identity is a worldview that there is a predatory
relationship between “the West” (broadly, the United States and Europe) and the Islamic

95
Wilogren, Jodi (9 January 2003). White Supremacist Is Held in Ordering Judge's Death. New York
Times.

83

world (Muslim-majority nations). The perceived motivations for western aggression
include control of natural resources, as well as the destruction of Islam as a religious or
political force.
96
Terrorism expert Peter Bergen, who interviewed Osama bin Laden,
wrote that, “For bin Laden and his followers, the world is explained by the idea that Islam
is under assault by the West, in particular the United States, and that only by attacking
America will this state of affairs ever be reversed.”
97

Unlike other extremist groups discussed here, Muslim Identity adherents often do not
belong to a cohesive group. The perceived West-versus-Islam dichotomy, however, does
yield a unifying idea and common ideological basis. Central to this philosophical
framework is the complex notion of jihad.

Jihad is fundamentally a religious duty, but its meaning and interpretation have been
inconsistent across the centuries. The word conveys a “struggle,” literally meaning
"striving" or "determined effort."
98
There are two broad interpretations: the greater and
lesser jihad.
99
The “greater jihad” is an internal struggle by the believer to fulfill their
religious obligations. There is no violent element in this interpretation. The “lesser jihad”
is the physical struggle against enemies of Islam.

96
Ibish, H. (2010). Muslim extremism stems from alienation. The Washington Post.
97
Bergen, P. (2011). The Longest War, The Enduring Conflict Between America and Al-Qaeda.
98
Streusand, D. (September 1997). What Does Jihad Mean? The Middle East Quarterly, Volume IV:
Number 3, pp. 9-17
99
Mo r g a n , D . (2 0 1 0 ). Es s e n t i a l I s l a m : A C o m p r e h e n s i v e G u i d e t o Be l i e f a n d Pr a c t i c e . Praeger . p . 8 7

84

Muslim Identity proponents focus almost exclusively on the lesser jihad.
100
What is more,
their interpretation of the lesser jihad departs significantly from historically traditional
views, which held that the lesser jihad was only applicable when resisting an invading
force that prohibited the free practice of Islam. For Muslim Identity adherents, the lesser
jihad came to include offensive action in foreign lands with a much broader and
increasingly vague notion of what constituted an invading force that threatened Islamic
practice.

Offensive jihad found its most significant advocate in al Qaeda, whose escalating terror
attacks against the United States, culminating on 9/11, captured worldwide attention and
amplified the group’s Muslim Identity ideology. The message that Islam was in peril in
the face of western hegemony cut across historical and sectarian lines, drawing
membership from all strata of society. Ideologically, al Qaeda demonstrated a remarkable
capacity to render Sunni-Shia differences irrelevant, focusing on western nations and
their influence on regional regimes, viewed as apostate for their alliance with the United
States and Europe, as well as their more secular method of rule.

In May 2007, in a profound demonstration of al Qaeda’s capacity as an adaptive
adversary, Ayman al-Zawahiri, al Qaeda’s second-in-command, reached out to African
Americans. In an interview with Al Sahab Media, al-Zawahiri invoked speeches by

100
Streusand, D. (September 1997). What Does Jihad Mean? The Middle East Quarterly, Volume IV:
Number 3.

85

Malcolm X, linking the idea of global jihad with the continued struggle of oppressed
African Americans.
101

Initial impressions concluded this was an ineffective tactic on a non-receptive audience;
however, the creation of African American Muslim extremist organizations before and
since al-Zawahiri’s outreach cannot be ignored. Homegrown groups such as Jam'iyyat
Ul-Islam Is-Saheeh (JIS), the terror cell formed in a California State prison, and Jamaat
ul-Fuqra (JF), a paramilitary organization of African Americans based in Pakistan and the
United States, have resonated with certain demographics, most of all inmates in the
United States.

After the 1993 World Trade Center attack, JF was considered “perhaps the most
dangerous fundamentalist sect operating in the United States.”
102
Arabic for “community
of the impoverished,” JF was founded by Shaykh Mubarak ‘Ali Gilani. United States and
Pakistani intelligence officials have accused JF of militant and criminal activities in the
United States and abroad, including the murder of religious and ideological rivals on
United States soil.
103
Prior to his abduction and eventual murder, American journalist
Daniel Pearl was on his way to interview Gilani to investigate reports that shoe bomber
Richard C. Reid studied under him in Lahore, Pakistan.
104

101
Al Sahab Media (16 June 2007). Interview with Shaykh Ayman al-Zawahiri.
102
Hosenball, M. (27 February 1994). Another Holy War, Waged On American Soil. Newsweek Magazine.
103
Komerath, N. (2002). Pakistani Role in Terrorism Against the U.S.A. Bharat Rakshak Monitor, Vol. 5,
September-October.
104
Zambelis, C. (11 August 2006). Radical Trends in African-American Islam. Terrorism Monitor Volume:
4 Issue: 16.

86

A critical core of violent extremism is framed by consistent and effective messaging.
Muslim Identity extremists understood the extraordinary value of recruiting American
citizens to their ranks. Increasing challenges to international travel as a result of U.S.
immigration enforcement after 9/11, forced an organizational shift focusing on
homegrown talent. Their efforts yielded impressive results, with a number of American-
born adherents who became noteworthy contributors to their outreach efforts:

• Adam Yahiya Gadahn (born Adam Perlman), also known as Azzam al-Amriki.
He is a senior operative who has been a continued spokesman and media advisor
for al Qaeda since 2004. He is alleged to be hiding in Yemen.
• Omar Hammami (born Omar Shafik Hammami), also known as Abu Mansoor Al-
Amriki. He moved to Somalia in 2006, joining the al Qaeda affiliate al-Shabaab
to become their media spokesperson, employing speeches and rap videos to draw
potential recruits.
• Samir Khan, a Pakistani-American who grew up in New York. He became editor
and publisher of Inspire, the English-language online magazine published by al
Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP).
• Anwar al-Awlaki (born Anwar bin Nasser bin Abdulla al-Aulaqi) was an imam
and senior al Qaeda recruiter with incredible influence. Al-Awlaki’s ability to
connect with a diverse population of adherents on several continents was

87

profound. He was linked to a series of attacks and plots across the world and was
killed along with Samir Khan by a U.S. drone strike in Yemen in 2011.

Furthering the examples of the aforementioned individuals, two issues are worthy of
closer examination. They highlight the alleged motivations of the homegrown attackers
involved in the 2013 Boston Marathon bombings and the reaction of the American public
to the incident.

Despite the death of Osama bin Laden and Anwar al-Awlaki, the Boston Marathon
bombings serve as a reminder of the continued influence and success of spawning HVEs
inspired by al Qaeda’s ideology. Their messaging continues to resonate, serving as an
important recruiting tool for alienated HVEs. More interesting is the retribution
motivation related to the United States’ military engagement in Afghanistan and Iraq.
This visceral response continues, despite the fact that the U.S. has withdrawn from Iraq
and the departure from Afghanistan is imminent. In the Boston Marathon bombings, the
younger (surviving) brother in the attack cited
105
the need to avenge the violence being
inflicted on Muslims, shortly before his capture and as he thought he might die.

105
Esposito, R. and McClam, E. (16 May 2013). Dzhokhar Tsarnaev scribbled note inside boat where he
was hiding, sources say. NBC News.

88

Since 2009, there were four attempted or serious attacks
106
on U.S. soil by Muslim
Identity adherents, each of them citing violence against Muslims resultant of the Iraq and
Afghanistan war as the motivation for their actions. All of these incidents occurred while
the United States and its Allies remained engaged in the region. Several points for future
consideration and analysis are whether the U.S. withdrawal from the region means
anything or has it become a perpetual factor in the radicalization and engagement of
Muslim Identity HVEs?

The public reaction to the Boston bombings was equally as intriguing. A poll
107
was
initiated after the incident, to gauge public opinion regarding the likelihood of future
terror incidents as well as the nation’s counterterrorism efforts related to civil liberties
and privacy. Respondents were asked if terrorists will always find a way to launch major
attacks no matter what the U.S. government does, or can the U.S. government eventually
prevent all major attacks if it works hard enough at it. Sixty-three percent (63%)
responded, “Terrorists will always find a way,” fifty-eight percent (58%), the
“Government can prevent attacks,” and five percent (5%) “No opinion.” These figures
represent an increase from responses to the same questions in 2006 yielding results of
fifty-seven percent (57%), forty-one percent (41%) and two percent (2%), respectively.
The figures generated one year after the 9/11 attacks yielded sixty percent (60%), thirty-

106
“Underwear bomber” Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab (2009), Fort Hood shooter Nidal Hasan (2009),
attempted New York City subway bomber Najibullah Zazi (2009) and attempted Times Square bomber
Faisal Shahzad (2010).
107
CNN Time Poll (30 April 2013) http://i2.cdn.turner.com/cnn/2013/images/05/01/top5.pdf (Retrieved: 15
July 2013)

89

seven percent (37%) and three percent, respectively. Essentially, there may be a feeling
amongst some Americans of increasing acceptance that counterterrorism is a risk
management proposition and security is never absolute. Despite slight increases in public
confidence during the past several years, the feelings of anxiety and concern immediately
after 9/11 have returned.

The civil liberties responses illustrate a notable shift regarding the public’s support or
tolerance of counterterrorism measures. It should be noted that the polls examined in this
instance were conducted after the Boston bombings and the 1995 Oklahoma City
bombing. Although both incidents involved HVEs, the attack motivations were different.
Poll responses to “What concerns you more right now?” after the Boston attacks resulted
in thirty-one percent (31%) believing the “Government will fail to enact new anti
terrorism policies,” sixty-one percent (61%) “New policies will restrict civil liberties,”
four percent (4%) “Neither” and four percent (4%) “No opinion.” The results after the
Oklahoma City bombing (with slightly different questions) yielded forty percent (40%)
“Fail to enact new laws,” forty-four (44%) “Enact laws which restrict civil liberties,” four
percent (4%) “Neither” and twelve percent “No opinion.” Broadly speaking, although the
public appeared more knowledgeable and accepting of terrorism risk, they were more
concerned about the adoption of restrictive civil liberties countermeasures.

90

Jewish Defense League
While Christian and Muslim Identity groups constitute the majority of extremist groups
operating in the United States, other groups following other religious beliefs have
presented a domestic threat. The Jewish Defense League (JDL) espoused a variation of a
Malcolm X mantra – protecting Jews from anti-Semitism “by any means necessary.”
108

Founded in 1968 by Rabbi Meir Kahane, the Jewish militant group’s expressed purpose
(interestingly, much like the original Black Panther Party at that time) was to mitigate the
failed efforts of the U.S. government to safeguard American Jews. Kahane’s oratory
rhetoric mirrored Malcolm X’s early racist, violent and political extremist overtones,
engaged in a mission to create an environment of fear amongst non-Jews.

The group’s objective was the protection of Jewish people by targeting facilities,
organizations and people identified as enemies. The diversity of their domestic adversary
list cannot be understated, as it included Arab and Soviet properties, neo-Nazis, people of
Middle Eastern descent, African-Americans, and even other Jews. Early efforts primarily
targeted Soviets, eventually expanding to diplomats of any nation that supported the
United Nations’ effort to present Zionism as on par with racism. There was no group
beyond reproach, demonstrated by the JDL’s occupation of the American Civil Liberties
Union Atlanta offices in 1981 to protest their representation of neo-Nazis in court,
assaulting National Socialist Movement leader Harold Covington one year later as he

108
Anti-Defamation League. About the Jewish Defense League.

91

arrived at a studio building to appear on NBC. Later that evening on the Tomorrow show,
Covington said, “All Jews should be gassed.”
109

Internationally, the JDL opposed any efforts by the State of Israel that would grant
Palestinian claims to land in the region. One of their most noteworthy incidents occurred
in 1994, when JDL member Baruch Goldstein killed 29 Palestinian Muslims kneeling in
prayer in a West Bank mosque. It is reported that the JDL website justified Goldstein’s
mass murder by stating, “Goldstein took a preventative measure against yet another Arab
attack on Jews.”
110

The FBI designated the JDL as a “right-wing terrorist group”
111
and “a known violent
extremist Jewish organization”
112
in 2001 and 2004 respectively. Despite mirroring other
extremist organizations with a zero-tolerance policy against terrorism, violence, and other
felonious acts,
113
the organization was active in plotting and executing several acts of
domestic terrorism, predominantly bombings. In the wake of the 9/11 attacks, the JDL
targeted locations in California, including the King Fahd Mosque in Culver City, the
Muslim Public Affairs Council in Los Angeles, and the San Clemente office of
Congressman Darrell Issa, who is of Lebanese descent. JDL leader Irv Rubin and JDL
member Earl Krugel were arrested for the plot. Taped conversations of Krugel included a

109

Southern Poverty Law Center. Jewish Defense League.

110

Southern Poverty Law Center. Jewish Defense League.

111
FBI website. Terrorism 2000/2001.Reports and Publications.
112
Statement of John Pistole before the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States
(14 April 2004).
113
Several sources make note of this disclaimer, quoting a JDL website that is no longer online.

92

statement that the attacks would serve as “a wakeup call” to Arabs.
114
Rubin allegedly
committed suicide in prison under unusual circumstances –slitting his throat before
jumping out of a window. Unknown assailants later killed Krugel in prison.

Aum Shinrikyo
Another telling example of religiously motivated extremism is Aum Shinrikyo, a
Japanese religious cult that evolved into a violent extremist, anti-government movement.
Shoko Asahara, a legally blind former yoga instructor, originally seeking to organize and
develop the group using the government’s guidelines for religious organizations, founded
Aum Shinrikyo in 1984. In addition to tax breaks, organizations in Japan granted
“religious group” status were exempted from future government investigations regarding
their ideology or activities.

The importance of charismatic leadership was not wasted on Asahara, who declared
himself “Christ” and a fully enlightened master of an ideology based on a variety of
Eastern and Western mystic religious beliefs, including the works of 16
th
century French
astronomer Nostradamus.
115
Emblematic of extremist organizations, he recruited
adherents by prophesizing a Doomsday scenario, accompanied by conspiracies associated
with the British Royal Family, the Dutch, Freemasons, Jews and competing groups.
116

114
Bohn, M. (2004). The Achille Lauro hijacking: lessons in the politics and prejudice of terrorism. pp.
176–7
115
Snow, R. (2003). Deadly Cults: The Crimes of True Believers, p. 17.
116
Goldwag, A. (2009). Cults, Conspiracies, and Secret Societies: The Straight Scoop on Freemasons, the
Illuminati, Skull and Bones, Black Helicopters, the New World Order, and Many, Many More. Random
House. p. 15.

93

Under the cover of religion, the cult grew in size and scope from 10,000 members in
1992 to approximately 50,000 worldwide in 1995, with a presence in six countries and a
net worth of more than $1 billion.
117

In 1990, twenty-five Aum Shinrikyo members, including Asahara, were defeated in an
election bid for parliament. This was a tipping point for the group, fueling conspiratorial
government rhetoric and further isolating the group from societal interaction. It drove
recruitment activity and lethal (albeit innovative) plans for attacks on the Japanese
population. Biological agents became Aum Shinrikyo’s signature.

The group initially sought to aerosolize anthrax to create an inhalation anthrax epidemic.
Reminiscent of other extremist groups bent on Doomsday scenarios, they believed this
would trigger a global war, positioning Asahara to ascend as the leader of the world. The
first attack occurred in Matsumoto (1994) surrounding a real estate lawsuit involving
Aum Shinrikyo. Choosing to deploy sarin, a deadly nerve agent, the group used a
converted refrigerator truck as a delivery platform to disperse a cloud of sarin near the
homes of the presiding judges who were likely to rule against Aum Shinrikyo. The attack
killed seven and injured more than 500 people.
118

117
Senate Government Affairs Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations. (31 October 1995). Global
Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: A Case Study on the Aum Shinrikyo.
118
CDC website, Centers for Disease Control. Aum Shinrikyo: Once and Future Threat?

94

Continuing their focus on the government, specifically the Japanese police department,
Aum Shinrikyo set their sights on the Tokyo districts of Kasumigaseki and Nagatacho,
home to the country’s government offices, including the Prime Minister’s residence. On
March 20, 1995, ten Aum Shinrikyo adherents launched a coordinated, simultaneous
multi-pronged attack, releasing sarin on five trains in the Tokyo subway system. The
attack killed 12 people and injured almost 3,800 more.
119

Although the 1995 attack was the most deadly, the group’s research and development
efforts spanned the globe, including forays into West Africa in an attempt to weaponize
the Ebola virus, as well as experimentation with a variety of biological agent dispersal
methods in and around Tokyo. Aum Shinrikyo is a perfect example of a violent extremist
organization that possessed the necessary ingredients for terrorist action: alienated
individuals inspired by a charismatic leader, following a legitimizing ideology that
targeted the government, with the encouragement of an enabling environment, the
supportive familial structure of Aum itself.

Issue-Oriented Ideology
This category includes a number of groups and ideologies targeting a range of constructs
(including the U.S. government) driven by specific grievances and single-issue priorities.
As with race and religion, the issue-oriented category is often crosscutting, touching on
more than one legitimizing ideology.

119
CDC website, Centers for Disease Control. Aum Shinrikyo: Once and Future Threat?

95

Anti-Government
Sovereign Citizen is a loosely affiliated group and ideology based on conspiratorial
beliefs regarding the legitimacy of the founding of the United States. The premise, called
“Redemption Theory,” claims the U.S. government went bankrupt when it abandoned the
gold standard in 1933.
120
The theory proposes the existence of direct accounts in the
Treasury Department that belong to “straw men” acting in the name of unsuspecting
people as part of a currency conspiracy.

The Sovereign Citizen ideology posits that adherents are not subject to the local, state, or
federal laws of the United States and may refuse to recognize the authority of the courts.
Some followers even believe they can use armed force to resist police arrest.
121
A 2011
FBI bulletin notes that since 2000, lone-offender Sovereign Citizen extremists have killed
six law enforcement officers. Timothy McVeigh's co-conspirator in the Oklahoma City
bombing, Terry Nichols, was a Sovereign Citizen
122
and both men had attended Michigan
Militia meetings.
123
Sovereign citizens do not represent an anarchist group, nor are they
necessarily a militia, although they sometimes use or buy illegal weapons.
124

120
U.S. Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Domestic Terrorism Operations Unit II
(2010). Sovereign Citizens: An Introduction for Law Enforcement
121
Bennett, B. (23 February 2012). ‘Sovereign citizen’ movement now on FBI’s radar. Los Angeles Times.
122
Schendel, S. Since 2000, lone-offender sovereign-citizen extremists have killed six law enforcement
officers. Murrow News Service.
123
D’Oro, R. (20 November 2009). Militia movement resurfaces across nation. Associated Press.
124
FBI website (2011). Sovereign Citizens A Growing Domestic Threat to Law Enforcement. FBI
Counterterrorism Analysis Section.

96

A number of issues regarding the threat potential for this group concern the escalation to
violence and the lack of a geographic or demographic profile. The FBI has said that the
Sovereign Citizen ideology “intrinsically deals with the rejection, complete rejection, of
the constitutional authority of the United States or any other government for that matter
... that when you have an encounter with law enforcement, we have seen that has a
potential to go high and right very fast." Amplifying the threat is the challenge of
discerning membership and location, inasmuch as Sovereign Citizens are not localized in
any one part of the country and vary by age, gender, and race.
125

Extremist organizations willing to engage or target law enforcement officials represent a
very different and lethal threat. Most extremist groups would prefer to shift attention
away from their organization and violent agenda, by presenting a defensive posture
during interactions with the police. In their heyday, the Black Panther Party advocated
self-defense, including a willingness to kill police officers in response, as opposed to
initiating the action. Conversely, Sovereign Citizens may intentionally initiate the contact
with law enforcement, consistent with an assessment that they will target police
officers.
126

Intelligence has determined this trend is not exclusive to Sovereign Citizen adherents. As
described previously, Muslim Identity extremists remain fixated on the Iraq and

125
Sullivan, E. (6 February 2012). Sovereign Citizens Are Extremists Watched By FBI. Huffington Post.
126

FBI Intelligence Bulletin (1 June 2012). Recent Sovereign Citizen Extremist Targeting of Law
Enforcement Highlights Potential for Violence during Traffic Stops.

97

Afghanistan Wars as justification for attack. Accordingly, they have shifted their strategy
to mirror that of Sovereigns, targeting U.S. law enforcement entities as part of a very
interesting evolution. Due to the overwhelming amount of available open source
information regarding security practices and counterterrorism tactics, some HVEs have
used this same knowledge to counter homeland security efforts. In this instance, “Law
enforcement entities are being identified as both strategic targets and targets of
opportunity, mainly because a core element of the HVE subculture perceives that
persecution by U.S. law enforcement reflects the West’s inherent aggression toward
Islam, which reinforces the violent opposition by HVEs to law enforcement.”
127

The political resistance strategy of Sovereign Citizens is reminiscent of Louis Beam’s
“leaderless resistance” or covert cell structure and is considered the first important
advocate for this strategy.
128
Leaderless resistance followers may engage in a variety of
actions, including non-violent disruption and civil disobedience, as well as acts of terror,
such as bombings and targeted assassinations. This arrangement allows adherents to
operate autonomously, lacking a formal hierarchical command and control structure, and
only gathering in groups as necessary to train and share ideology.

Sovereign Citizens adhere to a concept that the county sheriff is the highest legitimate
law enforcement officer in the land. Daniel Levitas, author of The Terrorist Next Door, a

127

NCTC Online Current (2 August 2012). HVEs Targeting Law-Enforcement Officers.

128
Laqueur, Walter (2000). The New Terrorism: Fanaticism and the Arms of Mass Destruction. Oxford
University Press. p. 110.

98

book that chronicles the racist underpinnings of the militia movements of the 1990s,
writes that “ever since the notion of the supremacy of the county sheriff became
popularized, it has continued to remain attractive – although when people hear it they
don’t understand that what is behind it is violent lawlessness and vigilantism.”
129

Also under the anti-government umbrella is the Patriot social movement, which is
characterized as independent, conservative, and may consist of individual or
combinations of several groups, such as Christian Identity, tax protesters, Sovereign
Citizens, militia members and others. The ideology espouses that American liberties are
in jeopardy and that elected officials (as well as the government itself) are illegitimate.

The 1992 Ruby Ridge standoff in northern Idaho and the 1993 siege of the Branch
Davidian compound in Waco were rallying events for the Patriot movement. Following
these events, the Patriot and Militia movements became active in all 50 states, with
numbers increasing significantly – between 20,000 and 60,000 adherents.
130
Activity
waned during the George W. Bush administration, but since the election of President
Obama, the number of Patriot and militia organizations in the United States has swelled
to 1,274, nearly 10 times that under President Bush.
131

129
Lenz, Ryan (2012). Resurrection. Intelligence Report. Winter 2012, Issue 148, p. 18
130
Berlet, Chip and Lyons, Matthew (2000). Right Wing Populism in America: Too Close for Comfort.
131
Me m m o t t , Ma r k ( 8 Ma r c h 2 0 1 2 ) . Report: 'Explosive' Growth Of 'Patriot Movement' And Militias Continues.
NPR.

99

Anti-abortion
Anti-abortion violence as it relates to HVE is somewhat unique to the United States and
related incidents have been notably absent from government terrorism databases. This
may be attributed to two ongoing concerns: the continuing debate over the definition of
terrorism; and the often partisan debate challenging the ”politically motivated violence”
being advanced during these attacks. The consternation over the nexus between anti-
abortion attacks and terrorism was exacerbated in the 1980s when, despite documented
patterns of escalating violence, FBI Director William Webster declared that the spate of
clinic bombings and attacks by anti-abortionists did not conform to the federal definition
of terrorism and therefore was not a priority for federal investigation.
132

Inasmuch as race or issue-oriented motivations are often drivers associated with anti-
abortion extremist violence, it would suggest these incidents meet the HVE threshold.
What is more, the political objectives associated with violence meant to influence
legislation that limits or prohibits choice or access to appropriate medical care certainly
seems to meet the parameters of the definition of terrorism used here.

132
Kushner, Harvey (2003). Encyclopedia of Terrorism. Sage Publications, Thousand Oaks, CA, pp. 38–
39.

100

The Army of God (AOG) is the best example of the escalating extremist activities
associated with anti-abortion groups. Don Benny Anderson first mentioned AOG when
he, along with Matthew and Wayne Moore, kidnapped an Illinois abortion provider and
his wife. Ultimately, the couple was released unharmed, though the three were previously
responsible for abortion clinic arsons.
133
Beginning in 1982, the AOG launched a series
of bombings and arson attacks on clinics in Florida,
134
Virginia, and Washington, DC, as
well as issued a death threat to Supreme Court Justice Harry Blackmun, a Republican and
the author of Roe v. Wade.
135

In 1993, Rachelle Ranae "Shelley" Shannon, an anti-abortion activist, shot Dr. George
Tiller in both arms outside his abortion clinic in Wichita, Kansas.
136
The AOG website
describes Shannon as a “soldier” and “part of Operation Rescue,” responsible for 35
different violent anti-abortion actions.
137
She later blew up an abortion clinic, causing
$175,000 in damage and forcing the clinic to relocate. She also sent a letter to Life
Advocate magazine, in which she likened destruction and casualties to collateral damage,
characterizing the attacks as war.
138

133
National Abortion Federation website. Anti-Abortion Extremists/The Army of God and Justifiable
Homicide.
134
Kushner. Encyclopedia of Terrorism. p. 38.
135
Yarbrough, Tinsley (2008). Harry A. Blackmun: The Outsider Justice: Oxford University Press, New
York, p. 281
136
Philips, D. (22 August 1993). Violence Hardly Ruffled Protest Ritual. The Washington Post.
137
Army of God website. Who is Shelley Shannon?
138
Ibid.

101

Before 9/11 abortion providers and activists received 77 letters threatening anthrax
attacks. However, anthrax attacks were not considered an act of terrorism by the media
until after journalists and members of Congress received such letters. After 9/11, Planned
Parenthood and other abortion rights groups received 554 envelopes containing white
powder with death threats signed by the Army of God.
139

The reluctance to identify these attacks as terrorism was clearly demonstrated when an
incident involving the suicide car bomb attack occurred on the fifth anniversary of 9/11.
After weeks of surveillance on the Edgerton Women’s Health Care Center in Davenport,
Iowa, David McMenemy crashed his car into the lobby, doused the interior of the vehicle
with gasoline in an attempt to light it on fire and die in the inferno. The ineptitude of
McMenemy is not only limited to his strategy. Despite his intelligence gathering efforts,
it was determined the Edgerton Women’s Health Center doesn't perform abortions or
even provide referrals for abortions.

Subsequently, despite the essential HVE elements associated with the incident,
McMenemy was sentenced to five years in federal prison on arson charges. The intent to
attack an abortion provider, the associated pre-attack surveillance, nor the date was
enough to yield a charge of domestic terrorism. This was in contrast to the car bomb
attack on Glasgow Airport the following year, which was considered an act of terrorism

139

Pozner, J. (8 October 2006). Media Ignore Anti-Abortion Terrorists: WIMN op-ed in Newsday.

102

as soon as it occurred. The target and the suspects are noteworthy – an airport and
Muslim men. America’s consistent avoidance to invoke the terrorism label when the
actor(s) are non-Muslim generally and when the target(s) are related to abortion rights
continues to be problematic. The 9/11-anniversary date is considered a “tactical alert” for
major city law enforcement agencies and will remain as such for the remainder of our
existence. However in 2006, despite an enhanced security presence and increased media
sensitivity to incidents occurring on or around that date, “No national newspaper,
magazine or network newscast reported this attempted suicide bombing, though an AP
wire story was available.”
140

Environmentalists
There are several groups that claim to be champions of single-issue causes. Single-issue
extremists, such as the Animal Liberation Front (ALF) and Earth Liberation Front (ELF),
have escalated their rhetoric and tactics and are becoming progressively more dangerous
in their potential for violence. During 2002 congressional testimony, the FBI stated that
“special interest extremism,” such as the ALF and ELF, is a “serious terrorist threat.”
141

Acts committed in furtherance of their mission are also known as Eco-terrorism or
ecotage, and the adherents are sometimes referred to as Eco-terrorists, or "ecoteurs.” As
is common with previously mentioned groups, ALF and ELF often share members and

140

Pozner, Jennifer (8 October 2006). Media Ignore Anti-Abortion Terrorists: WIMN op-ed in Newsday.

141
FBI Congressional Testimony (12 February 2002). Testimony of James F. Jarboe, Domestic Terrorism
Section Chief, Counterterrorism Division, FBI, Before the House Resources Committee, Subcommittee on
Forests and Forest Health, "The Threat of Eco-Terrorism."

103

may coordinate their activities. The ALF mission is “to effectively allocate resources
(time and money) to end the ‘property’ status of nonhuman animals.”
142
ALF argues that
subjecting animals to property status is “speciesism,”
143
a term coined by Richard Ryder,
British writer and psychologist, to describe the exclusion of nonhuman animals from the
protections available to human beings.

Using a leaderless resistance cell structure, ALF has a presence in more than 40
countries,
144
and although engaging in violent tactics resulting in property damage, they
maintain a strict code of not harming people.
145
They have published their activities via
the magazine Bite Back, which describes itself as “dedicated to the advocacy of those
caught or currently in the underground for animal liberation.” In 2004, Direct Action
Report claimed that “17,262 animals were ‘liberated’ and 554 acts of sabotage, vandalism
and arson were carried out.”
146

The origin of the Earth Liberation Front (ELF) is unclear. Their relationship with ALF,
however, as described by the Animal Liberation Press Office, declares the groups share a
common approach of using direct action to interrupt those profiting from (and in their
words, “plundering”) the natural environment. Both organizations are organized into cells

142
Animal Liberation Front website. About ALF, Mission Statement.
143
Ryder, R. (2009). Speciesism, in Marc Bekoff. Encyclopedia of Animal Rights and Animal Welfare. p.
320
144
Bite Back (2011). Diary of Actions.
145
Blejwas, A., Griggs, A., and Potok, M.. (2005). Terror From the Right
Almost 60 terrorist plots uncovered in the U.S.
146
Anti-Defamation League. Radical animal rights magazine issues 2004 "Direct Action" report.

104

known only to their members.
147

The numerous extremist groups organized under racial, religious and issue-oriented
ideologies present serious concerns for countering HVE. Yet, while ideologies are a
critical component of violent extremism, they do not on their own create terrorists.
Indeed, while there are tens of thousands of Americans actively involved with the above-
mentioned groups, a comparatively small number of their members use violence to
further their ideological goals. The reason some extremists turn violent while others do
not is best investigated through an analysis of the radicalization pathway.

147
North American Animal Liberation Front Press Office. Frequently Asked Questions About the North
American Animal Liberation Press Office.

105

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community-islamic-center-incredibly-valuable-contribution?_s=PM:OPINION
(Retrieved: 24 December 2012).

123

Chapter 3 – The Radicalization Pathway
With a clearer understanding of the kinds of ideological motivations that can attract and
influence extremist views, it is possible to further investigate how an individual might
shift from simply harboring extreme opinions and beliefs to taking violent action in
furtherance of their ideological aspirations or goals.

Most people who hold extremist views do not engage in violence. The proposition in this
work is that the extremist ideology is embraced before, during and after activism. An
examination of the radicalization process yields broader questions regarding how a
person becomes engaged, stays engaged, or may actually disengage from the group and
the ideology. Little attention has been given in the scholarly and policy literature to
defining criteria for which extremist ideologies pose a threat to national or global
security, or whether extremist ideologies matter at all in the absence of violent action. It
is interesting to note that a 2009 U.S. Presidential Task Force on Confronting the
Ideology of Radical Extremism recommends that the administration expand its focus
from violent to nonviolent extremism.
148

As noted in the Bipartisan Policy Center’s Preventing Violent Radicalization in America,
there is a difference between extremist ideas (cognitive radicalization) and extremist

148
Task Force on Confronting the Ideology of Radical Extremism (March 2009). Rewriting the Narrative:
An Integrated Strategy for Counterradicalization. Washington, D.C.: Washington Institute for Near East
Policy.

124

methods (violent radicalization).
149
Yet, the two are decisively connected. It is important
to define the distinctions between extremist ideologies and methods so they can be
examined in light of what is known, and guide what needs to be known, about the
evolution from radicalization to violent extremism.
150

Like the term “terrorism,” radicalization is widely used but remains poorly defined. The
term is often used as a synonym for extremist activities associated exclusively with
Muslim Identity adherents. This view, however, is shortsighted, in that it does not
recognize that radicalization is a process that is not limited to any one ideology. Anyone
can potentially traverse the radicalization pathway if the requisite mindset, ideology and
environment are present.

In the context of this thesis, radicalization is the process through which individuals
identify, embrace, and engage in furthering extremist ideologies and goals. It is important
to note at the outset, however, that the radicalization pathway is not a fixed trajectory
with specific, identifiable indicators that can be acknowledged on an itemized checklist
of “suspicious activities.” No single theory can comprehensively explain radicalization.
Consequently, counterterrorism officials and policymakers must understand the
overarching concept of radicalization and adopt interdisciplinary approaches when

149
Lorenzo, V. (2010). Countering Radicalization in America, Lessons from Europe.
150
Borum, R. (2011). Radicalization into Violent Extremism I: A Review of Social Science Theories.
Journal of Strategic Security, Volume 4, Issue 4 2011, pp. 7-36.

125

working to reduce opportunities for people to evolve from extremist adherent to violent
actor.

Perhaps as a result of the ideology involved, the description of the radicalization pathway
varies between countries, though there are some consistencies. Every nation and
associated agency facing a threat from HVE is seeking commonality. Yet, despite the
impetus to outline a terrorist profile or hallmarks of radicalization, empirical research has
repeatedly concluded that there is no such profile and no easily identifiable
representations. Government studies and scholars alike have highlighted the difficulty of
predicting which individuals are likely to commit violent acts.

One of the most widely discussed radicalization pathway presentations on HVE in the
post-9/11 era was the NYPD’s 2007 report, Radicalization in the West: The Homegrown
Threat. The study’s objective was to understand “a point where we believe the potential
terrorist or group of terrorists begin and progress through a process of radicalization. The
culmination of this process is a terrorist attack.”
151
In focusing on the human element in
the equation, the effort sought to understand the process whereby “unremarkable” people
become terrorists.
152

151
Silber, Mitchell D. and Arvin Bhatt (2007). Radicalization in the West: The Homegrown Threat. New
York Police Department, Intelligence Division, p. 5.
152
Ibid.

126

The report assesses “Jihadist or jihadi-Salafi ideology” motivating young people, born or
living in the West, to conduct terrorist attacks against their country of residence.
153

According to the NYPD assessment, the radicalization process consists of four distinct
phases: Pre-Radicalization, Self-Identification, Indoctrination and Jihadization.
154
The
effort to understand this phenomenon was noble, but a number of other long-term studies
have concluded that there are no such hallmarks of radicalization.

The NYPD report was championed and attacked in a variety of forums and on various
levels, but it reveals a critical question about the radicalization process: Does
radicalization depend on ideology? One way of answering this employs the theory of
social movement mobilization. There is a popular notion, such as that used in the NYPD
model, of an “ideas first” or a “center of gravity” continuum, whereby the extremist
belief precedes the action. This is a concept in Ziad Munson’s social movement theory,
which offers three interpretations of the power of ideas.
155
Mobilization depends on:

• The degree to which a movement’s ideology appeals to the existing beliefs
(framing theory);
• Expressing a subculture’s beliefs and identities (new social movement theory); or
• Offering a substantial probability of social change in a favored direction (rational
choice theory).

153
Silber, Mitchell D. and Arvin Bhatt (2007). Radicalization in the West: The Homegrown Threat. New
York Police Department, Intelligence Division, p. 6.
154
Ibid.
155
Munson, Ziad (2008). The Making of Pro-Life Activists: How Social Movement Mobilization Works.

127

An alternative position, as proposed by Munson, suggests ideology is mostly learned in
and after activism (e.g., attending a meeting or a worship service). One of the most
interesting outcomes of the study (which looks specifically at pro-life activism) is that
“activism does not mobilize only those with existing [beliefs].”
156
If activists are not
mobilized only out of those with strong beliefs, how is an individual moved to activism?

Clark McCauley seeks to explain this progression in four-step process (where no step is a
prerequisite for the next).
157

1. There is a contact with a stream of the movement that comes at a
“turning point,” when the individual’s everyday life is changing because
of a significant personal adjustment.

2. The individual participates in some kind of activism, such as a meeting,
a protest, a counseling session or a rally.

3. There is a development of considered and consistent beliefs. This is
entirely consistent with social psychological experiments demonstrating
the human tendency to find reasons for what we do.
158

4. The individual engages in regular and routinized participation in a
stream of activism.

One of the most interesting observations noted by McCauley is the consideration of
religion in this transformative pathway. He notes that “participation in a [group] can
provide contact with activists – only rarely does activism emerge directly from a
conversion experience. More often, activists acquire deeper religious beliefs in the course

156
Munson, Ziad (2008). The Making of Pro-Life Activists: How Social Movement Mobilization Works.
157
McCauley, Clark (2009). Does political radicalization depend on ideology? Dynamics of Asymmetric
Conflict, 2:3, 213 – 215.
158
Aronson, E. (1969). The Theory of Cognitive Dissonance: A Current Perspective. In L. Berkowitz (Ed.),
Advances in Experimental Social Psychology.

128

of activist experience. Munson’s comparisons of activists and non-activists found no
difference in religiosity or religious activities.”
159

While pre-existing beliefs are not a prerequisite for activism, there are certainly factors
that can make an individual more susceptible to radicalization, or at least, facilitate the
process. An analysis by the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) suggests these
factors arise on five distinct levels.
160
These are: personal-level (psychological issues,
demographic backgrounds, personal history); group-level (social networks, group
dynamics); community-level (alienation, marginalization, diaspora relationships);
sociopolitical-level (collective grievances, foreign policy, and external events); and
ideological-level (appeal of a justifying narrative, charismatic ideologues).
161

It is a combination of factors that ultimately contribute to a person’s vulnerability to the
radicalization process. Independently, any one of these factors will not necessarily lead
an individual to violence, but when joined, they could produce a higher likelihood. Yet,
given that the number of non-violent extremists vastly outnumbers those who are violent,
even a combination of factors cannot fully explain why some individuals turn violent
while others do not.

159
McCauley, C. (2009). Does political radicalization depend on ideology? Dynamics of Asymmetric
Conflict, 2:3, 213 – 215.
160
National Counterterrorism Center (June 2012) Radicalization Dynamics, A Primer.
161
Ibid.

129

Components of the Radicalization Process
All attempts to model the human element and identify one’s propensity toward
radicalization or mobilization-to-violence have invariably failed. Nevertheless,
radicalization factors point to a number of complex, supportive issues that facilitate the
development of a terrorist. In concurrence with Louise Richard’s work in the area, the
road to violent extremism is cleared by three essential components: an alienated and
altruistic individual; a legitimizing ideology; and an enabling community.
162

Alienated and Altruistic Individuals
A central component in the process is a sense of alienation from the existing state of
affairs, accompanied by a sense of altruism, as well as a desire and belief that the status
quo can be changed. How does the feeling develop and when is an individual most
susceptible to a new narrative that fills the void and provides hope for fulfilling a new
purpose?

Extremist thought and action operate on individual, group and organizational levels.
Individuals contribute inspiration and commitment to the advancement of the political
objective; groups facilitate the community component, enabling socialization into the
extremist ideologies; and organizations provide the structure and internal processes
essential for group sustainability.

162
Richardson, Louise (2006). What Terrorists Want, Understanding the Enemy, Containing the Threat.
Random House. New York.

130

Terrorist and extremist organizations present ideologies as noble causes, promising to
fulfill their supporters’ social and psychological needs. Although the difference between
“terrorist” and “extremist” groups may be their respective active or passive support of
violence (e.g., Irish Republican Army vs. Sinn Féin), terrorist groups characteristically
express active engagement, while extremist organizations offer disclaimers articulating
the lack of endorsement of violent acts. Yet, the desired outcomes of both kinds of groups
(to attract adherents willing to embrace the ideology in furtherance of the political
objectives) are indistinguishable.

Potential adherents are often socially alienated individuals, estranged from their
communities, who have chosen to distance themselves from others, even those who may
be important to them, such as family members and friends. This alienation from
mainstream society, culture or government policies prepare an individual for an interest
in extremist ideology.

An examination of a number of violent extremists in the post-9/11 era indicates that
“distancing” is a common factor. For example, al Qaeda spokesperson Adam Gadahn, al
Qaeda’s Inspire Editor-in-Chief Samir Kahn, and Boston bomber Tamerlan Tsarnaev all
separated from their mosques and families before departing the United States or
committing a terrorist act. Given that there are alienated individuals in any group or
community, however, what further propels an individual to engage in violence?

131

One explanation may be personalities on the edge of the group (the fringe) who have
adopted the ideology in a manner that requires a demonstration of their commitment
through violence. Extremist groups find these individuals most attractive. In the militia
movement, “those most inclined toward violence sometimes call themselves Three
Percenters, a small vanguard that dares to match deeds to words.”
163
This notion of Three
Percenters comes from Mike Vanderboegh, based on the concept that about three percent
of the population fought for independence during the Revolutionary War.
164
The
violence-prone fringe element is seeking an ideological common ground when joining an
extremist group whose foundational beliefs are not identical to their own.

Legitimizing Ideology
The perception of a grievance, such as conflicted identities, injustice, oppression, or
socio-economic exclusion, can make people receptive to extremist ideas.
165
These
moments often arise during a crisis, be it a personal experience or one with which the
subject identifies. This can inspire an individual to adopt an extremist narrative or
ideology that addresses their grievance and offers a rationale for action.
166
A crisis can
produce what Quintan Wiktorowicz calls a “cognitive opening.” Previously held beliefs
are shaken, making an individual receptive to alternative ideas.
167

163
Gellman, B. (30 September 2010). The Secret World of Extreme Militias. Time Magazine.
164
Three Percenter website. About Three Percenter.
165

Wiktorowicz, Quintan (2005). Radical Islam Rising, Muslim Extremism in the West.
166
Brachman, J. (2005). Global Jihadism: Theory and Practice. London and New York: Routledge, pp. 52-
78.
167
Wiktorowicz, Q. Radical Islam Rising.

132

The crisis that prompts a cognitive opening is not exclusive to any one of the HVE
motivations (race, religion or issue orientation), but there are some common types, like
economic, social or cultural challenges, and political repression or discrimination.
168

Personal situations also yield cognitive openings, produced by idiosyncratic experiences,
such as a death in the family or victimization by crime. This is particularly critical if the
personal situation is perceived to have been caused by the U.S. government.

The rationale for embracing an ideology, much like the radicalization process itself, is
complex and perhaps unique to the adherent. Embracing the ideology, however, is as
complicated as understanding the psychology of group dynamics. The necessary
sustainability to fuel an act of terrorism requires reinforcement from the group. Stern
notes that some individuals join extremist groups out of ideological conviction and later
become violent as the emotional or material benefits become more important than the
beliefs.
169

Enabling Community
Cognitive openings may be leveraged when economic, social, cultural, political, and
personal situations are recognized as traumatic and may be exploited. In these situations,
a supportive environment (group or community) can facilitate overt or passive
recruitment of the affected individuals by using the influence of the group members or

168
Wiktorowicz, Radical Islam Rising.
169
Stern, Jessica (January/February 2010). Mind Over Martyr: How to Deradicalize Islamist Extremists.
Foreign Affairs. Volume 89, No.1, p. 103

133

their leadership. In an examination of this dynamic, scholar Jerrold Post interviewed 35
imprisoned Middle Eastern terrorists and found a process that yields an overarching sense
of the collective and consensus on contributory characteristics for cognitive openings. In
South Asia, there is another example, where religion and promises of paradise in the
afterlife have nothing to do with those who volunteer to be suicide terrorists. Sri Lanka is
the home of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) or Tamil Tigers, the separatist
militant organization that made suicide terrorism an integral component of their strategy.
LTTE adherents join to pursue revenge, to take part in national liberation and even for
self-glorification. They have been “personally affected by the conflict in which they live,
because their community supports their action, and because their movement’s ideology
legitimizes it.”
170

The nature of the political objectives and the relationship to the broader community are
critically important to the psychology of the enabling environment. Post concludes there
are demonstrable psychological differences between those who are furthering the work of
their parents (ethnonationalist groups) and those who are trying to destroy the world of
their parents (social revolutionary groups).
171
The lifespan of these two groups are
somewhat predictable.

170
Richardson, L. (2006). What Terrorists Want, Understanding the Enemy, Containing the Threat.
171
Post, J. (1984). Notes on a Psychodynamic Theory of Terrorist Behavior. Terrorism: An International
Journal 7, 3: 242-256.

134

Ethnonationalist terrorist groups are able to endure because of their close ties to the
supportive community. Thus, the ideology and associated behaviors develop over time
and are not always considered extreme. Conversely, social revolutionary groups tend not
to have an “external source of information or security, nor any perspective with which to
question the dictates of the movement.”
172
As a result, the isolated nature of these groups
facilitates the creation of their own desired sense of reality, requiring limited external
input that would put into question the rationality of their ideology.

For both social revolutionaries and ethnonationalists, supportive and complicit
environments are important infrastructure for broad-based, ideological movements. In
many cases, the broader community shares a terrorist group’s goals, though they may not
endorse the methods for meeting them.
173
The development of “compounds” in several
locations and associated with a variety of groups across the country serve as extreme
illustrations of complicit communities. In other cases, the greater community is aware of
particular extremist activities and knowingly allows them to grow. This passive support is
essentially an endorsement, inasmuch as restraints are non-existent.

The 21
st
century provided a new foundation for the enabling community – online, open
source extremism. The use of the Internet is perhaps the most dangerous extremist and
terrorist radicalization and recruitment innovation since 9/11. Online radicalization

172
Richardson, L. (2006). What Terrorists Want, Understanding the Enemy, Containing the Threat, p. 49
173
Ibid.

135

facilitates the sharing of ideas and tactics, it develops and enhances social networks, it
conscripts new recruits, and it may inspire illegal and violent action. Inspire magazine
(which exists exclusively online) targets U.S. and other Western governments by
motivating homegrown terrorists. The dissemination of their so-called “auto-propaganda”
was intended to encourage community support for al Qaeda’s ideology.

Given the central role of a complicit community in the radicalization process, it is
important to examine the morality, leadership and group behavioral constructs capable of
supporting a terrorism-resistant community model.

The Role of Moral Principle
Louise Richardson describes an enabling (“complicit”) society that facilitates terrorist
operational activities (e.g., employment, travel, and most importantly, living within a
community perhaps at greater risk of extremist recruitment). To most accurately
understand the notion of complicity, the issues with which communities must grapple are
those of morality and cultivating a moral society.

Morality is characterized as “proper behavior” and used normatively, “morality refers to
a code of conduct that applies to all who can understand it and can govern their behavior
by it.”
174
Diverse societies have come to interpret these codes differently, particularly as
they relate to issues of law, religious practices and community etiquette. Yet, morality is

174
Gert, B. The Definition of Morality. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2011 Edition),
Edward N. Zalta (ed.). Retrieved: http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2011/entries/morality-definition/.

136

not a guide for everyone to follow. It is a code that may be offered by an individual for
consideration by the larger community.

Noam Chomsky writes that one of the most common moral principles is universality: “If
something's right for me, it's right for you; if it's wrong for you, it's wrong for me.”
175

The discussion of morality in the normative context presents an opportunity for a
community developed code of conduct. Morality in the normative sense describes an
accepted code of conduct that the group agrees to abide by and offers no ambiguity. For
example, theft in society in general and in the FBI Academy specifically is understood to
be morally wrong. The fact that dormitory doors at the Academy would not have locks
implies an Academy morality in the normative sense that locks are unnecessary because
theft would not occur. This is reinforced by the fact that rationality in these instances is
assumed. As a result, all rational people would endorse a code of conduct, as in the case
of the FBI Academy dormitory having no concern for theft as a moral code.

The importance of communities, like the residents of the FBI Academy or other similar
environments, is the understanding that neighborhoods have the capacity to establish their
own respective morality. In that sense, there could be a code of conduct developed and
implemented by the affected community regarding behaviors deemed unacceptable.
Unlike the public safety laws already in place, these codes would address additional
concerns determined by the “community” in an effort to eliminate or at least reduce the

175
Chomsky, N. (2007) “Responsibility and War Guilt”, Conference Interview with Noam Chomsky, The
Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

137

risk of occurrence. Public safety is understandably reasonably easy to endorse, but
extremist behaviors including hate speech, intolerance and other extremist characteristics
would be more challenging, unless determined to be part of the community morality. This
is a premise that would benefit greatly from additional research opportunities to support
the underlying hypothesis. The notion is that communities embracing morality
normatively would simultaneously articulate their intolerance for extremist behaviors that
violate the code.

The Role of Leadership in Radicalization
Social science research examines the underlying laws of human behavior and is geared
toward evidence-based information. These analyses focus on the notion of testable
hypothesis about human behavior. While there are many factors that contribute to societal
morality, with regard to radicalization, leadership has a significant impact.

Leadership associated with the disparate extremist ideologies can be but are not
necessarily critical to messaging success. There are instances when a group leader
connects with the person seeking meaning and provides an opportunity and environment
in which they can learn about an extremist ideology. A U.K. Home Office study
evaluating what makes an individual more vulnerable to al Qaeda-influenced violent

138

extremism concludes that charismatic individuals play an important role, delivering the
persuasive ideology while also helping individuals join an extremist group.
176

These charismatic leaders offer a unique opportunity for potential recruits to prove
themselves to someone they admire. This may be particularly true for individuals who
have previously failed to establish a positive identity and status in school, work, sports, or
other social activities and settings. Association with a group and embracing an extremist
ideology legitimizes their efforts to earn respect and contribute to a cause. Extremist
characteristics like intolerance, superiority, “otherism,” moral absolutes, generalizations
lacking foundation, doomsday scenarios, conspiracy theories, and code speak are at the
core of leadership outreach, in part because they can offer an attractive context through
which an individual understands their crisis, helping to mitigate or make sense of a
cognitive dilemma or personal trauma.

Conversely, the UK study also showed research that highlights the potential for terrorist
groups to develop without a clear leader or central figure. Marc Sageman found no
evidence of a formal top-down recruitment of individuals to terrorist groups, with like-
minded individuals forming groups that go on to become more extreme in their views.
177

Looking for the common bond for group cohesion, he conducted a social network

176
UK Home Office (2011). Understanding vulnerability and resilience in individuals to the influence of Al
Qa’ida violent extremism, A Rapid Evidence Assessment to inform policy and practice in preventing violent
extremism. Office for Security and Counter-Terrorism.
177
Sageman, M. (2004) Understanding Terror Networks.

139

analysis of 400 terrorists connected with the 1998 embassy bombings in Kenya and
Tanzania, who targeted the U.S. as opposed to their own governments.

Sageman found the majority were college educated (63 percent), from upper or middle
class families (75 percent), and whose families were caring and intact (90 percent).
Family and job responsibilities were also apparent, as 73 percent were married and most
had children. They were not religious initially. Rather, 70 percent became religious after
leaving their home country. Becoming homesick, they drifted toward the local mosque,
seeking friendship more than religion. Exposure to more militant scripts advocating
violence to overthrow corrupt regimes transformed their relationships and their goals.
Group dynamics developed in this way tend to operate independently, rather than
receiving orders from a central command.

While a central leader is not a prerequisite for radicalization, a charismatic leader can
play a fundamental role in the process. There are a number of leadership styles, and the
type that leaders adopt is based on their core beliefs, values, and preferences. The
resulting leadership action is designed to influence the community norms and culture.
There is no comprehensive style that addresses all circumstances present in a community.
Given the dynamic and complex nature of recruitment, radicalization, and retention of
violent extremists, a hybridized version of the three leadership styles discussed below
(transformational, situational and charismatic) equips a leader with the tools to appeal to
a broad audience.

140

Transformational Leadership
Transformational leadership is based on the premise that change is essential and the
status quo must be eliminated. Transformational individuals are people of action,
embracing an understanding for urgency in the need for progress. Yet, transformational
leadership does not necessarily lead to positive change. Suicide bombers, for example,
believe they are acting in ways that facilitate the greater good. Historically, there have
been a number of transformational leaders who believed in their own brand of progress,
accomplished to the detriment of others. Individuals like Adolf Hitler, Genghis Khan,
Mao Tse-Tung, and Joseph Stalin are a few whose transformational objectives were
achieved by indoctrinating or killing the opposition. Thus, it seems transformational
leaders operate at great personal risk of resistance and defeat from without and within.

Researcher Bernard Bass expanded on these ideas in his Transformational Leadership
Theory.
178
For Bass, transformational leadership holds four primary elements:
“individualized consideration, intellectual stimulation, inspirational motivation and
idealized influence.”
179
He also identifies charisma and vision as defining qualities. It is
interesting that the most defining and recurring quality mentioned in a diverse collection
of leadership styles is also the most difficult to define – charisma.

178
Bass, B. (1985). Leadership and Performance. New York: Free Press.
179
Bass, B. and Bruce Avolio (1994) Improving organizational effectiveness through transformational
leadership. SAGE Publications.

141

Charismatic Leadership
Charisma is a constant for leaders responsible for significant change. It is an essential
character trait supporting other leadership styles, sometimes employed as a style in its
own right. Skillful and influential charismatic leaders appeal to their audience’s values,
which is what allows them to succeed.
180
German political economist, legal historian and
sociologist Max Weber viewed charisma as consistent with the concept of genius.
Referring to charisma as a “gift of grace,” he described charismatic leaders as self-
appointed individuals “who are followed by those who are in distress and who need to
follow the leader because they believe him to be extraordinarily qualified.”
181
This
leadership mode fosters follower empowerment of the kind required to embrace harsh
tactics necessary for significant social change. It is this kind of political outcome that
validates and legitimizes the ideology and the subsequent violent action.

Charismatic leadership is often a component of a diverse collection of leadership styles.
The danger associated with this style is the development of a group emboldened by a
superiority mindset. In a number of racial, religious and issue-oriented extremist
ideologies, this is in fact the intended outcome. Given a range of ideologies,
organizational objectives, and the political context in which an extremist group is
developed, adherents’ attraction rests on their embrace of the message and the messenger.
As the group develops and matures, the charismatic leader aligns their identity with that

180
Palshikar, K. Charismatic Leadership. Retrieved:
www.unc.edu/~ketan/documents/Charismatic%20Leadership.pdf
181
Weber, M. (1991). From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology. Psychology Press, p. 52.

142

of the group. In that regard, group membership and allegiance to the leader essentially
become one and the same. While extremist thought operates on individual, group and
organizational levels, the element that binds is leadership.

Interest is garnered and sustained inasmuch as the leader is viewed as interpreting the
ideology, deciphering the complexity of related issues and offering feasible remedies,
often with violent responses to the identified challenges. Individual needs are met as the
ideology gains clarity, the process of socialization enhances group dynamics and the
organization provides the critical element of structure to one’s life. A hybrid of leadership
styles is most effective in accomplishing this progression, if an individual who is savvy
enough to implement the appropriate style delivers it at the ideal time.

Anwar al-Awlaki is an example of extraordinary leadership appeal. Although his
American heritage removed the potential for actual organizational leadership with core al
Qaeda, his charismatic attraction came as a result of demonstrating scholarship, patience
and consistent messaging. His ability to hybridize his leadership style was demonstrated
in his personal and virtual encounters, as he provided spiritual guidance to several 9/11
hijackers and by working online, enlisted a cadre of followers around the world (whom
he never met).
Al-Awlaki’s demonstration of hybrid leadership illustrates the remarkable outcome
potential when the appropriate leadership engagement is matched with the corresponding
maturity level. The ability to move between leadership engagements requiring directing,

143

coaching, supporting, and delegating to an audience of low, medium, and high maturity
levels demonstrates his capacity and the importance of truly understanding leadership on
a cognitive level.

Situational Leadership
The Hershey-Blanchard Situational Leadership Theory (created by Paul Hershey and Ken
Blanchard) suggests that successful leaders change leadership styles to suit their
audience’s maturity and the specifics of the task.
182
The theory is based on Task Behavior
and Relationship Behavior, provided to the group by the leader. Leadership can be
categorized into four behavior types:
183

o Telling - Characterized by one-way communication in which the leader
defines the roles of the individual or group and provides the what, how, why,
when, and where to do the task.

o Selling – The leader uses two-way communication and provides the socio-
emotional support that allows the individual or group to buy in to the process.

o Participating – The leader engages in a participative style to accomplish the
task, less delegation of tasks to the group while maintaining a high
relationship with them.

o Delegating – The leader is involved in decisions and monitors progress, but
the process and responsibility are passed to the individual or group.

182
Hersey, P. (1984) The Situational Leader. New York: Center for Leadership Studies, Binghamton
University.
183
Mind Tools™. The Hersey-Blanchard Situational Leadership
®
Theory Choosing the Right Leadership
Style for the Right People. Retrieved: http://www.mindtools.com/pages/article/newLDR_44.htm

144

The Hersey-Blanchard Situational Leadership Theory is most effective when leaders
understand the audience’s maturity level. There are four primary maturity levels:
184

o M1 – Individuals lack the knowledge, skills, or confidence to work on their
own, and they often need to be pushed to take on a task.

o M2 – Followers might be willing to work on the task but lack the skills to do
it successfully.

o M3 – Followers are ready and willing to help with the task, possessing more
skills than the M2 group but lacking confidence in their abilities.

o M4 – Followers are able to work on their own, have high confidence and
strong skills, and are committed to the task.

The subsequent model maps the aforementioned leadership styles with appropriate
maturity levels that best yield the desired outcome:

Leadership Engagement Maturity Level

S1: Telling / Directing

M1: Low maturity

S2: Selling / Coaching

M2: Medium maturity, limited skills

S3: Participating / Supporting

M3: Medium maturity, higher skills but
lacking confidence

S4: Delegating

M4: High maturity

Ali al-Timimi, a former biologist and Islamic scholar born in Washington, DC,
demonstrated tremendous range in leadership engagement in the way he recruited
followers to join the Taliban to fight U.S. troops. Timimi, who had an international

184
Ibid.

145

following, was described as enjoying “rock star status”
185
among a group of followers in
Virginia. Despite his academic acumen and global reach, he understood the importance of
building trust from the ground up. Inasmuch as his followers could be described as
possessing “medium maturity,” and lacked the confidence or background to consider
joining a war effort overseas, Timimi embarked on a “participating/supporting”
engagement. He facilitated their recruitment by holding regular paintball outings.
Although the followers were told they were preparing for holy war around the globe,
Timimi realized the potential of the relationship building outcomes. Although none of the
followers ultimately joined the Taliban, four of the men traveled to Pakistan just weeks
after the 9/11 attacks and trained with the Kashmir-focused Lashkar-e-Taiba (LT).
Timimi was subsequently convicted of inciting terrorism and sentenced to life
imprisonment.

The Role of Group Behavior
History and research have demonstrated that groups, motivated by their ideology, moral
code, convenience or survival, can be negatively influenced to violent ends. Hostile
actions against those not within a group is not only accepted but morally and legally
sanctioned. Such is the case in Myanmar, where the homegrown neo-Nazi Buddhist
movement, 969, led by fascist, skinhead monks is engaged in an ethnic cleansing of
Rohingya Muslims. The fact that Muslim pilgrims have been slaughtered in broad
daylight, absent any arrests, speaks to the apparent complicity of the Myanmar

185
Barakat, M. (27 April 2005). Islamic scholar convicted of advocating war on US. The Boston Globe.

146

government security forces, the media and the majority community, who are supportive
of a pure Buddhist state.

A community’s capacity to reduce the risk of radicalization requires group behaviors and
appropriate leadership coalescing to establish community consensus on the immorality of
violent extremist behaviors. Consensus on this issue of community action, as it relates to
the social network engaged in the life of the HVE actor, cannot be overstated. Recalling
that terrorism requires an alienated individual following a legitimizing ideology,
operating within an enabling, complicit society, it is the community that is most
susceptible to positive influence proposed by a risk-reduction model.

There are a number of theories on group decision making. Group problem analysis and
proper leadership can be managed to induce positive outcomes but only if appropriate
consensus building processes are in place to facilitate the identification and selection of
intelligent alternatives to violent extremism. The essence of counterterrorism policies is
based on reducing the risk and containing the threat of an attack. Community engagement
is critical to reducing that risk. A comparative analysis of relevant theoretical structures
helps reveal their capacity to engender positive moral group actions and counter
malicious activity.

147

Groupthink
Particularly as it relates to the risk of HVE, decision process characteristics are the
underpinnings of meaningful efforts towards community safety. Yale University research
psychologist Irving Janis focused on the concept of groupthink. Janis defined the term as
“a mode of thinking that people engage in when they are deeply involved in a cohesive
ingoup, when the members’ striving for unanimity override their motivation to
realistically appraise alternative courses of action.”
186
He documented eight symptoms of
groupthink:

1. Illusion of invulnerability – Creates excessive optimism that encourages
extreme risk taking.
2. Collective rationalization – Members discount warnings and do not
reconsider their assumptions.
3. Belief in inherent morality – Members believe in the rightness of their
cause and ignore the ethical or moral consequences of their decisions.
4. Stereotyped views of out-groups – Negative views of the “enemy”
eliminate the need or desire to respond to dissenting opinions.
5. Direct pressure on dissenters – Members are under pressure not to
express arguments against any of the group’s views.
6. Self-censorship – Doubts and deviations from the perceived group
consensus are not expressed.
7. Illusion of unanimity – The majority view and judgments are assumed to
be unanimous.
8. Self-appointed “mindguards” – Members protect the group and the
leader from information that is problematic or contradictory to the group’s
cohesiveness, view, and/or decisions.
187

186
Janis, I. (1972). Victims of Groupthink: a Psychological Study of Foreign-Policy Decisions and
Fiascoes. Boston: Houghton Mifflin
187
Hart, P. (1998). Preventing groupthink revisited: evaluating and reforming groups in government.
Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 73: 306–326.

148

The forfeiture of a person’s individual thoughts or original concepts is a desired outcome
of HVE leadership, as they strive to exploit potential cognitive openings detected in those
subjects seeking additional knowledge regarding the respective ideology. The resultant
community environment is one of collective optimism accompanied by collective
avoidance, as the group molds its thinking to reflect the majority consensus.

There have been several social science experiments that tested the power of community
impact on decision making. Social scientist Solomon Asch designed an experiment to
determine the extent to which group pressure could be exerted to influence an
individual’s perception. In the experiment, participants were given two cards. One card
held a single vertical line; the second held several. Participants were asked which vertical
line in the second card matched the length of the vertical line in the first.

Participants were told the experiment was being conducted to test visual acuity and each
of the students was asked to provide their answers aloud. All but one of the students,
labeled “confederates,” were instructed to give correct and incorrect answers in the initial
trials and to provide exclusively incorrect responses in “staged” trials. Asch designed the
seating arrangement so that the real subject was the next-to-the-last person to respond in
each group.

The results showed that one-third of responses followed the erroneous majority, while
there were almost no errors in the control group: “some subjects always defied the group,

149

some always went along with them. 25 percent were completely independent, 33 percent
were more than half with the erroneous majority.”
188

Asch surmised that the tendency to conform outweighs intelligence and perception.
189

Continued research identified and quantified the situational factors that influence
conformity, such as group size and cohesiveness. For Asch, individuals conform for two
primary reasons: because they want to be liked by the group; and because they believe
the group is better informed.
190

As another example of how individual behavior may be influenced, Yale University
psychologist Stanley Milgram’s now-famous experiment was designed to measure the
compliance of study participants to obey instructions from an authority figure to inflict
pain (electric shocks) on others, even when those individuals begged not to be
shocked.
191

The theory of conformism, based on Asch’s work, was a key factor in explaining the
individual decisions observed in Milgram’s experiment. The theory of conformism
explains how the participants, lacking decision-making authority, will leave the decision

188
Asch, S. E., (1951) Effects of Group Pressure Upon the Modification and Distortion of Judgments. In H.
Guetzkow (ed.) Groups, Leadership, and Men. Retrieved:
http://faculty.babson.edu/krollag/org_site/soc_psych/asch_conform.html
189
Solomon Asch experiment (1958), A study of conformity. Retrieved: http://www.age-of-the-
sage.org/psychology/social/asch_conformity.html
190
Ibid.
191
Milgram, S. (1974) Obedience to Authority; An Experimental View. New York: HarperCollins
Publishers.

150

to the individual and its hierarchy. Thus, the group becomes the participant’s behavioral
model.

Milgram concluded that any individual can become an agent in a “terrible destructive
process. Moreover, even when the destructive effects of their work become patently
clear, and they are asked to carry out actions incompatible with fundamental standards of
morality, relatively few people have the resources needed to resist authority.”
192
Thus, it
becomes increasingly clear how HVE adherents, despite an acceptance of morality in the
normative sense, will respond without question to directions from strong leadership. The
task of furthering the ideological political objective at all costs, accompanied by the
acknowledgment of the associated catastrophic human losses, illustrates the conflict
between basic human morals and the HVE mission.

Groupthink and HVE
The racist, right-wing cult, the Covenant, Sword and the Arm of the Lord (CSA),
demonstrates the power of groupthink socialization and the potentially deadly outcomes.
Kerry Noble, CSA’s second in command, has revealed much about the CSA
radicalization process and the group’s goal of overthrowing the U.S. government. Now
separated from the violent Christian Identity movement, Noble’s book (Tabernacle of

192
Milgram, S. (1974). The Perils of Obedience. Harper's Magazine. Abridged and adapted from
Obedience to Authority.

151

Hate, Why They Bombed Oklahoma City) and lectures provide unique insight into why
people join and may come to disengage from violent extremist groups.

Predicated on a doomsday scenario, the CSA engaged its followers in several critical
steps to develop unquestionable loyalty to their beliefs. Generally, people who ultimately
join extremist movements are searching for something. In the case of CSA, its deeply
religious foundation seduced followers into accepting the scripted responses to their
important questions on faith. CSA’s charismatic leadership, invoked by Jim Ellison,
explained that everything a person would want to know is based in scripture. Ellison’s
faith was based on the knowledge that God was directing him and the group.

Ellison’s patience with group members was extraordinary, inviting questions but always
delivering definitive and final responses to their queries. He explained that innocuous
things seen or heard during the course of their daily routing – numbers, letters, and
seemingly unimportant phrases – all had a nexus to scripture, and those who understood
and followed his guidance would someday see their loyalty rewarded.

A critical first step in the CSA radicalization process involved a sense of “oneness” with
God. Members were told individuality was counterproductive. Only when the members
divested personal artifacts and separated from the past, becoming one “Body,” could they
hope to allow God to accomplish his mission through them. Acknowledging the “Body”
was most important – group members sold everything of value. They burned photos. Men

152

shaved their heads and swore allegiance to CSA. Cultivating this sense of oneness is a
common practice among extremist groups and cults, as it consequently facilitates
groupthink.

One of CSA’s final radicalization steps included societal isolation. CSA is emblematic of
other isolationist extremist groups, choosing to build compounds, home school their
children with a curriculum that implanted the ideology, and eventually, identify an
enemy. In this case, the enemy was the government, causing CSA to initiate weapons and
tactics training under the guise of preparing to defend themselves on the prophesized day
of destruction. Allowing only limited and filtered information to reach the group
enhanced the societal isolation. This was accomplished by removing all sources of media
from the environment. Thus, the stage was set. The CSA had its savior, an ideology and
an enemy.

The CSA groupthink mentality was based on hate, a common ideology for HVE groups.
Circling the wagons against their adversaries, the battle lines were drawn – Jews were
controlling the country’s financial systems; Blacks, supported by welfare, were
destroying America’s cities; and Asians were taking the remaining high-paying jobs.
CSA legitimized its ideology with the support of the U.S. Constitution, declaring income
tax was illegal, allowing them to avoid paying taxes, and the Second Amendment
provided legal justification to possess unregistered machine guns. These beliefs and

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practices facilitated hate based on cultivation of fear from perceived threats, a hallmark
characteristic of HVE groups.

Ultimately, CSA’s foundational premise of becoming the “Body” was extolled using
common extremist group characteristics, including intolerance, moral absolutes,
generalizations lacking foundation, doomsday scenarios and code speak. The standoff
between CSA and government agencies on April 19, 1985 would have been a bloody
disaster were it not for Noble, who by this time was at odds with Ellison. Noble
challenged CSA’s hypocrisy, its criminal, (including terrorist) activities, which included
murder, bombings and robberies; and the obsession with setting doomsday dates for the
destruction of the nation, such as August 1978, spring 1979 and summer 1979. Despite
the psychological pressure bearing on the group, they coalesced around Ellison’s
leadership and were ready to die when the time came. Noble concluded that it was the
controlled inflow of information and the isolation from society that facilitated CSA’s
notion of group safety, security and sanity. Were it not for his uncommon rejection of a
group of which he was a part and desire for peaceful negotiation, the 1985 standoff could
have ended much differently and with a great deal of bloodshed.

General Group Problem Solving Model
The General Group Problem Solving (GGPS)-Model is a four-phase process developed in
response to the limited focus and isolated framing of existing group decision-making
models. It is presented for consideration of the development of a model in anticipation of

154

Groupthink dynamics and outcomes. The phases consist of Antecedents, Emergent Group
Characteristics, Decision Process Characteristics and Outcomes.
193
(Figure 3.1)

Figure 3.1

The lack of real-world application (versus theoretical frameworks) was an important
issue in a broader context as proposed by GGPS authors Aldag and Fuller. They claim
that “the groupthink model is overly deterministic and an unrealistically restrictive
depiction of the group problem-solving process.”
194
In other words, the methodology of
the GGPS-Model is designed to identify the desired outcome, identify the gap(s) between
the goal and the current situation, and design a plan to achieve the objective.

193

Aldag, R.J. & Fuller, S.R. (2001). The GGPS model: Broadening the perspective on group problem
solving. In M. Turner (Ed.), Groups at work: theory and research. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Ass.
194
Ibid.

155

The advantages and shortcomings of groupthink, such as cohesiveness, homogeneity,
insulation and leader impartiality, are identified characteristics in the “Group Structure”
component of the GGPS-Model’s “Antecedent” phase. However, the potential
advantages of the GGPS-Model are revealed in the subsequent phase – Emergent Group
Characteristics.

The model identifies two categories of Emergent Group Characteristics: “Perceptions of”
and “Processes.” Recalling the significant groupthink challenges presented by ingroup
hostility toward outgroups, the basis of the antagonism was centered on an inherent group
“morality,” which then justified and supported actions against any opposing groups. The
advantages of the GGPS-Model are the processes designed to reduce group isolation and
potential groupthink by identifying and discussing appropriate “responses to negative
feedback, treatment of dissenters, self-censorship and the use of mindguards.”

The subsequent and perhaps most important component of the GGPS-Model is identified
as the “Decision Process Characteristics.” In this regard, the issue of problem
identification and the task of engaging in a predecisional information search, survey of
objectives, and explicit problem definition risks being unduly influenced by group
morality, member unanimity, and attitudes towards opposing groups. The importance of
considering alternatives, leading to evaluation and choice, is a critical element of the

156

community decision process in a democratic society, particularly as it relates to the risk
of HVE

General Group Problem Solving Outcomes
Looking toward community-based risk reduction strategies for radicalization and HVE,
the advantages of the GGPS-Model in response to the contributing components of
groupthink are important. GGPS is designed to reduce group isolation, providing
appropriate opportunities for debate and even dissent by group members. Group
leadership decisions using the GGPS model provide for decision, political and affective
outcomes.
Decision outcomes include acceptance of the decision by those affected by it and/or
those who have to implement it, adherence to the decision, implementation success, and
decision quality. For example, if the leader of the group is not satisfied with the decision,
he/she might unilaterally reverse it.

Political outcomes include future motivation of the leader, future motivation of the
group and future use of the group. For example, if an outcome does not satisfy the
political agenda of the leader, he/she might use the group less or not at all in the future.

Affective outcomes include satisfaction with the leader, satisfaction with the group
process and satisfaction with the decision. For example, consensus is achieved regarding
the leader, the group and the decision process.

The GGPS-Model offers some insight into a theoretical and practical approach to
developing a model that can engage, lead, and monitor a stakeholder group that
contributes to community activities and improves the quality of life. While it potentially
provides an effective basis for countering the negative outcomes from groupthink

157

decision making, any construct of a moral community rests upon addressing two basic
issues: the group and its leadership.

The dangers of group cohesiveness and group insulation, as demonstrated by the CSA
example, are apparent. These characteristics discourage dissent, consider fewer
alternatives and encourage groupthink. Developing a group dynamic that recognizes the
long-term benefits of public diplomacy, focused on understanding the shortcomings of
policies intended to enhance public safety and reduce violent extremism, is the initial step
in reducing feelings of group vulnerability and the associated need for self-censorship
during the decision-making process. The GGPS model offers a potentially effective
starting point for faith-based or immigrant groups, which are perhaps already challenged
by negative stereotypes, perpetuated by misinformation.

Communities placing a priority on the improvement of their quality of life stand to
succeed if collective actions match the group’s values or agreed-upon community norms.
The stakeholder engagement process begins by inviting analysis and criticism from
disparate elements of the group, challenging related safety and security policies. A
willingness to openly address grievances related to these government decisions, such as
military intervention abroad or aggressive domestic policing strategies, reduces
opportunities for opposing groups to exploit perceived or real inconsistent actions.
Consensus building is a key element of this process, insomuch as what may appear to be

158

unsolvable problems allow for the consideration of alternative responses that would
normally go unnoticed.

A true commitment to democracy requires the fortitude to make hard decisions in the face
of emotional adversity. The safety and security quotient are the cornerstone of a
community seeking to improve its quality of life, reducing crime generally and the risk of
HVE recruitment specifically.

The remaining element in response to the risk of HVE involves addressing group
leadership and the importance of impartial, “non-directive” leaders. This component
cannot be overstated. “Directive” leaders prone to groupthink have been shown to use
less available information, consider fewer alternatives to problems and are be prone to
mind-guarding, as demonstrated by the evolution of CSA. Unfortunately, these directive
leaders, in the interest of expediency, influence the group to acquiesce instead of
presenting a diverse collection of viable alternatives. Thus, leadership is critical, and
“non-directive” leaders committed to achieving “effective outcomes” stand to point the
moral compass of the group in a direction for the good of the community.

The development of an effective model for reducing the risk of radicalization and HVE is
complex. While the above discussion offers important insight into how communities and
organizations might adjust their dynamic and decision-making process to yield more
effective risk-reduction by reducing Groupthink issues, additional work remains. Further

159

theoretical and practical development of these important concepts will necessarily
involve scholars and policymakers from a range of disciplines. To more fully address the
growing threat of radicalization and HVE, what is needed is focused study and research
from all academic arenas and indeed, the development of counterterrorism as a true
profession.

160

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Chapter 4 – Leveraging Disciplines Toward a Counterterrorism Profession
Events since the 9/11 terror attacks have demonstrated the dynamic nature of terrorism.
Terrorist actors have proven to be adaptive and intelligent in their responses to physical
and technological countermeasures. Despite lacking a comprehensive definition,
terrorism as a phenomenon can be analyzed through a multitude of academic disciplines.
By understanding the scholarly value these disciplines offer, with particular emphasis on
the human element, it is possible to explore future interdisciplinary educational
approaches to the counterterrorism imperative.

America responded to the 9/11 attacks with military, intelligence and law enforcement.
As military action in Afghanistan and Iraq ramped up, the Department of Homeland
Security (DHS) was created, representing the nation’s largest government reorganization
in decades. In addition, there was an interdisciplinary outgrowth of public and private
sector education and research efforts intended to meet the anticipated demand for security
solutions. In one sense, Osama bin Laden created an industry, one that continues to grow.

Terrorism-related study and research in particular is expanding, but is it helping to reduce
or contain the risk of another attack? The 2013 bombing of the Boston Marathon could be
seen as evidence that homeland security and counterterrorism efforts are lagging behind
the threat. Yet, there have been dozens of disrupted plots and attempted attacks revealing
that more than a decade of terrorism study and research has not been for naught. Even
still, there is always room for improvement.

165

Facing an ever-present threat, adaptive adversaries, and the increasing risk of HVE
recruitment and radicalization, the United States must professionalize counterterrorism as
it leverages security tactics, policies, and technology. As an emerging profession,
counterterrorism can be examined through the core mission of three broad academic
realms: the humanities; the sciences; and the social sciences. By considering the focus of
each academic area and its methodology of study, it is possible to establish each
discipline’s value proposition and how these diverse areas might be employed in
terrorism research to support a community-based resistance model.

A better understanding of terrorism must come through a multi-disciplinary approach,
because such a method can better identify research gaps, in turn leading to more
comprehensive and effective counterterrorism strategies.
195
Research in the humanities,
the sciences and the social sciences overlaps, as do their potential application in response
to the threat of terrorism. To prioritize areas most appropriate for future exploration in the
development of counterterrorism as a profession, it is important to weigh how each
academic foundation applies to existing security challenges, particularly with regard to
the unpredictable human element.

The Humanities and Counterterrorism
The humanities comprise a collection of disciplines devoted to the study of the human

195
Benard, C. (Ed.) (2005). A future for the young: Options for helping Middle Eastern youth escape the
trap of radicalization. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, WR-354. Retrieved from
http://www.rand.org/pubs/working_papers/WR-354/ p. 172

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condition. The notion of humanity describes the essence of who we are as a rational,
creative, intelligent species and the essence of what it means to be human. Humanity
encompasses race, gender, and culture, core elements of the human condition that give
rise to language, literature, philosophy, religion, art, and by consequence of all of these,
history.

As an academic discipline, the humanities engage an “analytical, critical or speculative”
approach to the exploration of the human condition. Until recently, study in the
humanities was based largely on historical data and research. The increasing availability
and importance of digital data, however, provides new opportunities for research efforts,
potentially yielding unique and significant contributions to the discipline in the future.

Study of the humanities offers value in part through critical theory, first described by
Max Horkheimer in of the Frankfurt School of Sociology. According to Horkheimer’s
1937 essay, Traditional and Critical Theory, critical theory is “oriented toward critiquing
and changing society as a whole, in contrast to traditional theory oriented only to the
understanding or explaining it.” In either case, the value of much of the research in the
humanities aligns with the basic requirements of the scientific method – using theory
(critical or traditional) to develop hypotheses, which are in turn tested against facts.

The notion of a “theory” reveals the nexus between the humanities and terrorism.
Examining this concept from the perspective of the adversary, it is plausible that through
a process of rational decision-making, terrorists theorize how best to advance their
political objective based on the anticipated consequences of a planned action. This kind

167

of analysis by a defender (e.g., government protective forces or counterterrorism efforts)
provides a deeper understanding of HVE as a phenomenon.

The use of a theory, either by the adversary or the defender, reveals a great deal about the
actor. Policies, processes and technologies aimed at reducing the threat of terrorism often
say more about who we are than what we actually propose to achieve. The increasing
acceptance of actions that might question the foundations of democratic principles
suggests that societies facing increasing threats to their safety and security become more
tolerant of aggressive actions. For example, the use of so-called enhanced interrogation
techniques (sometimes called torture) in the pursuit of intelligence in some ways run
counter to the principles and mores that have long-guided U.S. respect for human rights
and life. Thus, to engage Horkheimer’s critical theory model is to consider examining and
changing our society as it relates to the threat of terrorism.

Events of the past several decades have shown how terrorist organizations adapt
organizationally, operationally and ideologically to changing security approaches. They
have moved from hierarchical, top-down traditional command and control structures to
decentralized, self-organizing, and resilient designs. Operational schemes employing long
and sophisticated planning, surveillance cycles, developed for teams or “cells” with
focused training on one target, evolved into solo or “lone-wolf” attackers, encouraged to
engage a number of targets as often as possible. The transnational threat of terrorism is
evolving to originate less frequently in lawless, economically deprived, remote areas (as

168

seen with core al Qaeda and its affiliates) and is shifting to attacks that are planned and
launched in the country of origin (i.e., homegrown).

The 2013 Boston Marathon bombing was followed five weeks later by the murder of a
British soldier by a self-proclaimed extremist in the southeast London district of
Woolwich. The interesting nexus between these incidents involving Dzhokhar and
Tamerlan Tsarnaev in Boston, and Michael Adebowale and Michael Adebolajo in
London, are the political motivations behind the attacks. Surviving brother Dzhokhar
Tsarnaev, an American citizen and resident of Boston for more than half of his life, cited
the U.S. war in Iraq and Afghanistan as cause for the attack. After the fatal hatchet
assault on British Drummer Lee Rigby, Abdebowale remained at the scene to be filmed
by a witness, declaring the attack was a response to Muslims dying around the world at
the behest of Western governments.

The researchable question regarding these and every incident of HVE is associated with
identifying their respective radicalization trajectories. The suspects were all homegrown,
choosing motivations based on retribution and the notion that Muslims were being
victimized as a result of U.S. and UK foreign policy. Inasmuch as these men were largely
self-radicalized, however, what were the traumatic events preceding their cognitive
openings, making them susceptible to embracing extremist ideologies and choosing to
engage in violent action? Could the humanities or other disciplines provide valuable
answers?

169

The Sciences and Counterterrorism
Research in the sciences requires evidence-based methodologies using the scientific
method – quantitative knowledge established on observable events or trends with results
measured against rigorous re-examination under the same conditions. When applied to
the study of terrorism, the scientific method offers an opportunity to research theories
associated with pre-incident indicators that suggest behaviors consistent with individuals
prone to recruitment and radicalization.

The sciences are concerned with fact. The values of the research community, the
researcher, and the sponsoring institution, however, present an opportunity to influence
the resulting data, fact or not. It is analogous to a situation where intelligence analysts are
given a policy that their intelligence gathering and analysis is intended to support. The
policy is driving the intelligence as opposed to the alternative, as the process is designed
to work. The ideal research setting is one in which science is unbiased and free of
personal values or intent.

The objectivity of science as a bias and value-free discipline is essential for HVE
research. The difference between quantitative and qualitative research does not preclude
the researcher’s inevitable subjective influence. As a result of the potential for bias,
challenges have ensued regarding whether science truly is value-free, raising questions

170

about the impartial nature and authority of the scientific method.
196
Literature in this area
supports the fact that there are personal cognitive values that influence scientific research,
and “the notion that science is driven exclusively by objectivity in practice and method is
not entirely accurate.”
197

The need for unbiased research questions is as important as the scientific method itself.
Science-centered research engenders desired outcomes such as testability, reliability,
accuracy and exploratory capacities. As science is increasingly engaged and embraced by
counterterrorism researchers and practitioners, it could yield reliable knowledge for the
consideration of subsequent polices, processes, and technology.

The Social Sciences and Counterterrorism
The social sciences are devoted to the study of the individual and collective relationships
in human society. As an academic discipline, it addresses the related studies of
anthropology, economics, history, political science, psychology and sociology. Terrorism
generally, and HVE specifically, has the capacity to leverage each of these areas to
recruit new adherents, in addition to enhancing their organizational capacity and
objectives. At the same time, if political scientists or psychologists are involved in
decision-making, it could influence the planning process for a government response to an
attack on a building.

196
Allchin, D. (1998) “Values in Science and in Science Education,” in International Handbook of Science
Education, B.J. Fraser and K.G. Tobin (eds.), 2: 1083-1092. Kluwer Academic Publishers. Retrieved from
http://www1.umn.edu/ships/ethics/values.htm
197
Ibid.

171

Understanding the important role of a legitimizing ideology is at the core of the risk-
reduction challenge. Engaging the social sciences (perhaps even more so than other
disciplines) is essential to developing community-based risk reduction strategies that
counter legitimizing ideologies. Using the social sciences to understand extremists’
relationships, developed face-to-face or online, is central to generating the appropriate
and necessary research questions.

The social sciences apply the scientific method to the study of human behavior and social
patterns. Of the aforementioned areas of study, it is psychology that may provide the
most critical answers to the issue of recruitment, radicalization, cognitive openings and
decisions for violent action. Psychological research has the potential to begin to reveal
the social and psychological dimensions of HVE behavior. Research in this area has the
capacity to explore some of the previously described critical recruitment elements – such
as leadership, group dynamics and cohesion – to explain why some adherents passively
support the cause, while others, bent on violent action, become the operational fringe.
From a counterterrorism perspective, this research helps frame the question: “What kinds
of behaviors are we trying to inhibit?”

Extremist social networks are often complex. Accordingly, the foundational hypothesis
for the responding psychological “experiment” is not straightforward. There is a
difference between a psychological experiment and experimental psychology.

172

Conducting a psychological experiment requires the scientific method, basing
conclusions on empirical evidence. For example, Solomon Asch’s aforementioned
conformity experiments that demonstrated how the larger group influences an
individual’s opinions may provide a foundation for understanding extremist group
decision-making.
198
Experimental psychology uses the scientific method to research the
mind and behavior, as demonstrated in the research on “Intertemporal Decision Making,”
which posits that people prefer immediate smaller rewards over larger rewards delivered
later.
199
This work may be instructive as it relates to understanding choice action
dynamics of extremist actions. Both of these methodologies offer value in identifying
important behavioral processes that extremist organizations and their leaders consider
when determining messages that appeal to their target audiences.

The diversity of terrorists’ backgrounds and the lack of “field” research to support
theories of recruitment, radicalization, and disengagement, exacerbate the challenges of
responding to this complicated phenomenon. Thus, an improved understanding of social
network psychology sets the stage for communities and government to counter the
extremist narrative. In this regard, governments will be better positioned to address
grievances of marginalized communities that are often the target of extremist messaging.

198

Asch, S.E. (1951). Effects of group pressure on the modification and distortion of judgments. In H.
Guetzkow (Ed.), Groups, leadership and men (pp. 177-190). Pittsburgh, PA: Carnegie Press. Asch, S.E.
(1952). Social Psychology.
199

Dshemuchadse, Maja; Stefan Scherbaum and Thomas Goschke (2013). How Decisions Emerge: Action
Dynamics in Intertemporal Decision Making. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General 2013, Vol.
142, No. 1, p. 93.

173

The post-9/11 era has generated myriad counterterrorism policies, strategies and
technology at a hefty price tag. While these endeavors are important, it is just as crucial
to quantify their cost-effectiveness. Serious questions regarding actual and measurable
detection, deterrence and defense mitigation must be asked to appropriately prioritize
future work and investment. Additionally, an improved understanding of the human
element will facilitate increased knowledge of extremist engagement, as well as actions
to develop community resistance and reduce related risks. Research that gathers and
analyzes relevant data using innovative methodologies can inform the implementation of
relevant policies and programs.

The Scientific Method and the Study of Terrorists
Since 1994, Marc Sageman has been in the private practice of forensic and clinical
psychiatry and has had the opportunity to evaluate approximately 500 murderers. After
9/11, he began collecting biographical material on 400 al Qaeda terrorists to test the
validity of the conventional wisdom on terrorism. Sageman argues that much of the
international counterterrorism effort and published literature focuses unnecessarily on
defining terrorism. Our collective efforts, he says, would be more effectively employed if
we focused study on the terrorists themselves. He writes, “the key to unlocking the
mysteries surrounding terrorism is found in social science methods – statistics, sampling
theory, survey techniques, measurement and data analysis.”
200

200
Sageman, M. (2008) Leaderless Jihad, Terror Networks in the Twenty-First Century. Philadelphia:
University of Pennsylvania Press. p. 14.

174

Some terrorism “experts” have migrated from the field of journalism or intelligence, but
they sometimes lack an academic or operational acumen, including the use of social
science methodology, the scientific method, and the field experience of managing,
investigating, or prosecuting terrorism-related cases. As a result, they may be limited to
perfunctory opinions on the subject itself. Their outlooks, usually anecdotal illustrations,
merely serve to illustrate, rather than analyze, a specific point. Ultimately, opinions by
what may be termed “academic practitioners” – those authorities with years of
operational experience and expertise, enhanced by scholarly research – may be the future
of counterterrorism as a discipline. Regardless of their professional beginnings, social
sciences researchers may be better prepared to ask the “right” questions. Why does a
person join a terrorist organization? What do they want to accomplish? Is there an
alternative non-violent strategy? What is their metric for success? Sageman postulates,
there are three levels of analysis on which future research should be focused: Micro
Analysis (the terrorist); Macro Analysis (the terrorist organization); and Hybrid Analysis
(terrorist choices).

Micro Analysis – The Terrorist
For Sageman, the micro-level analysis approach is the most common. The assumption is
that behaviors, particularly those associated with decision-making processes, are different
in terrorists than in others. When examined by clinical psychologists or psychiatrists, the

175

research question is positioned around determining what is wrong with the individual.
This necessarily underscores two assumptions: there is something wrong with the
terrorists and the explanation for what went wrong can be found in their background.
201

From a research perspective, we are left with little in the way of empirical data and
supportive evidence by examining terrorists collectively or individually. This fact is
exacerbated by two additional challenges: terrorists comprise a small percentage of the
general population; and of that small number of terrorists, those who are willing to
engage in suicide operations is even less. Although there are some data on membership in
terrorist organizations, no one is certain just how large or small these representative
groups really are.

Micro Analysis also focuses on sanity and rationality, which may not be appropriate for
understanding terrorists. Criminal behavior assumes some individuals are different from
the mainstream population. Sageman explains that this is a rejection of what is called the
null hypothesis, which posits that a sample is representative of the whole.
202

Psychologists, researchers and counterterrorism officials often suggest a “terrorist
personality” that is different from the mainstream and representative of some larger
abnormality. Yet, contrary to conventional wisdom, it has been previously illustrated that
ordinary people can be motivated to do dreadful things. Thus, terrorism research has yet

201
Sageman, M. (2008) Leaderless Jihad, Terror Networks in the Twenty-First Century. Philadelphia:
University of Pennsylvania Press. p. 16.
202
Ibid. p. 17

176

to reveal a terrorist personality. No study has been able to substantiate that terrorism is a
function of an abnormal personality.

While there is merit to understanding how traumatic events can potentially lead to a
cognitive opening, we cannot necessarily predict which individuals are predisposed to
becoming terrorists. Sageman writes that explanations attributing “bad behaviors to
personal disposition while blaming our own on external situations is what social
psychologists call the fundamental error of attribution.”
203
Thus, future research efforts
must include an examination of situational factors involved in the recruitment,
radicalization and even disengagement continuum to achieve a more holistic, and
therefore relevant, study of terrorism.

Finally, Micro Analysis methodology assumes that rational decision-making processes
are inherent and that they are used when individuals decide to become terrorists, in some
cases killing others and themselves. Yet, individual decision-making may become
secondary to those of a larger group. Returning to the aforementioned Milgram
experiment, a driving factor in the compliance seen in the experiment participants has
been described as the theory of conformism, which describes the relationship between the
group or network and the individual.
204
The theory of conformism explains how the
participants, lacking decision-making authority, will leave the decision to the group and

203
Sageman, M. (2008) Leaderless Jihad, Terror Networks in the Twenty-First Century. Philadelphia:
University of Pennsylvania Press. p. 18.
204
Asch, S. (1955) Opinions and Social Pressure. Scientific American. 193 (5): 31-35.

177

its hierarchy. Thus, the group becomes the participant’s behavioral model. Social
psychology inquiries will be critical to core curriculum for study in the area of terrorism
and terrorist behavior. Critical questions in this regard would be, what is it that is so
unique about terrorists that cause these factors to motivate violent extremism and what is
the root cause of radicalization?

Macro Analysis – The Terrorist Organization
Studies examining the terrorist’s environment have yielded expansive sociological
explanations for the causes of terrorism. The public would prefer that terrorism, if
afforded the same resources and prioritization as other societal ills, would be diminished
or eliminated over time. Unfortunately, this will never be the case. We are reminded that
we are managing risk, and instances of terrorism are as different as the individuals
embracing the concept.

Attempts to profile a terrorist based on socio-economic factors, religion, education,
economic opportunities or susceptibility to seductive sermons offered by charismatic
leaders has yielded one result – there is no profile. From a macro level, radicalization
causalities are linked with traditional organizational command and control constructs as
factors that encourage individuals to become terrorists. In other words, individuals enter
the group dynamic at the lower echelon and over time are provided guidance and
instruction designed to increase their loyalty and engagement. Interesting questions result
from this process. What kind of social or group structure facilitates or encourages

178

terrorism? If the same factors (social, economic, political or cultural) impact millions of
people, why do so few become terrorists?
205

There are societies that have developed a resistance to terrorist influences because of a
deterrence quotient that psychologically empowers its constituents. The lethality of a
bombing incident on Jaffa Street in Israel in 2012 was significantly minimized by the
actions of a bystander. The citizen observed an unattended bag at a bus stop and rather
than notifying the authorities, he demanded people nearby to evacuate the area. The
bomb was remotely detonated as the bus arrived, killing one person; however, many
more would have died had the citizen failed to take charge. Israel’s community norm of
taking care of each other and the practice that everyone is a first-responder, is at the core
of its terrorism resistant culture.

All research examinations require contemplation of terrorism’s root cause. Extremism is
always a factor of terrorist behavior. Although extremism (particularly political
extremism) is a radical expression of political values characterized by opposing views or
interests, it is not always accompanied by violence, revolution, or transnational goals.
Inasmuch as it is such an important element of terrorist engagement, central research
questions are: How does groupthink engage? How do individuals form a cell, willing to
fit into a literal or virtual organizational structure, awaiting orders outlining the next
attack? In other words, what is the root cause of radicalization?

205
Sageman, M. (2008) Leaderless Jihad, Terror Networks in the Twenty-First Century. Philadelphia:
University of Pennsylvania Press. p. 21

179

We are presented with two challenging research inquiries: identifying the societal
influences leading to terrorism and investigating the road to radicalization, which is
eventually shared by a group. Although appealing endeavors, the low frequency of
terrorist incidents exacerbates the research challenge. Terrorism is not a constant
phenomenon. The ebb and flow of terrorist incidents fails to provide adequate
information to determine how terrorists evaluate their milieu and develop the need and
means to explore alternative actions, some of which are violent.

Hybrid Analysis – Terrorist Choices
The micro and macro approaches fail to provide the necessary analysis for a
comprehensive research outcome. A hybrid of these two methodologies, however, may
be a better tool for understanding the human element. A hybrid approach can focus on
what terrorists have in common with regard to recruitment, social network composition,
familial affiliation, and first encounters with the ideology. As some terrorist organizations
have evolved into a more decentralized, bottom-up structure, the hybrid research design
would take the same approach in an attempt to better understand the actors who comprise
the organization and its actions.

A hybrid approach focuses on the terrorist pathway with respect to pre-radicalization,
recruitment, indoctrination, violent action and even disengagement, asking: “Why do
people become terrorists; if not, why not?” These are complex questions insomuch as
terrorist groups and their respective ideologies are vastly different. From a collective

180

viewpoint, terrorist groups, particularly operational cells, maintain a tight social network.
Operational security and the development of trust require a bond that facilitates their
ability to function as an effective unit. Examples such as the terrorists responsible for the
2004 Madrid train bombings and the 2005 London attacks, who all knew one another
over a lifetime, having grown up and attended the same school, provided a certain level
of trust and mutual respect. Natural groups such as these, under the influence of
groupthink socialization and conformism, would explain their collective radicalization
pathway.

Although the hybrid approach would seem intuitive toward an understanding of how
homegrown groups create their collective identity, Sageman cautions: “There is no
academic discipline that has conducted comprehensive studies of natural groups, as
opposed to groups of strangers that can be manipulated experimentally.”

The discipline and science of counterterrorism lacks data, an essential element if the
scientific method is to be applied. It is rare that experts talk to, investigate, prosecute or
visit with a terrorist in their natural environment – their community. Personal experience
and expertise dictates that the researcher has to engage on an individual, communal and
organizational level with terrorists if the inquiry is to be valid. This is a difficult
proposition, as due to the personal and national security issues associated with such
interactions with terrorists, opportunities for experts to conduct direct research are few
and far between. Obtaining data presents a formidable task.

181

Social Network Characteristics
As stated previously, terrorist organizations, particularly al-Qaeda, have demonstrated
extraordinary organizational adaptability in the face of adversity. The evolution from a
hierarchical, top-down structure to one that is essentially “leaderless” is explained in
Sageman’s exhaustive study on the issue. His work challenges conventional wisdom
about terrorism, observing that the key to mounting an effective counterstrategy against
future attacks requires a thorough understanding of the networks that allow these new
terrorists to exist.

Terrorist networks are resilient, due in large part to their dynamic capacity to evolve and
adapt. Examples such as the terrorist tactical responses to security countermeasures in the
aviation domain (concealing explosives in shoes, undergarments on commercial flights
and choosing to target cargo aircraft), or messaging techniques using chat rooms and
other online resources, clearly demonstrate terrorist networks’ innovative capacity.
Although these tactical improvements are noteworthy, messaging is the heartbeat of their
survival and growth. Extremist ideologies associated with terrorism and HVE can be
propelled through social networking. In that regard, the evolution of social networking
has the potential to enable one central character to inspire many others. Al Qaeda senior
recruiter and operational planner Anwar al-Awlaki’s network is a case in point.

Al-Awlaki was a spiritual advisor for terrorists Nawaf al-Hazmi and Khalid al-Mihdhar
while they were in San Diego training for the “Planes Operation.” This was to become
the plan for the 9/11 attacks. After the attack, al-Awlaki became an extraordinary

182

recruiter, leveraging the hyper-connectivity of our modern society via the Internet.
206
His
ability to coach and inspire other would-be terrorists is evidenced in incidents occurring
eight years after the 9/11 attacks.

September 24, 2009 – Michael Finton, also known as Talib Islam, attempted to bomb the
Paul Findley Federal Building and the nearby offices of Congressman Aaron Schock in
Springfield, Illinois.

November 5, 2009 – Major Nidal Hasan was the sole suspect in a mass shooting at Fort
Hood in Texas, killing 13 people and wounding 29 others.

December 25, 2009 – Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, also known as “the Underwear
Bomber,” attempted to detonate an improvised explosive device concealed in his
underwear aboard Northwest Airlines Flight 253 en route from Amsterdam to Detroit.

April 2010 – Zachary Adam Chesser, also known as Abu Talhah al-Amrikee, posted a
warning to the creators of the television show South Park, threatening to kill them for
depicting the prophet Muhammad in the 200
th
episode. He was arrested three months
later for aiding al-Shabaab, an affiliate of al Qaeda.

May 14, 2010 – Roshana Choudhry stabbed British politician Stephen Creswell Timms
as punishment for voting to support the Iraq War and as revenge for the Iraqi people.

June 5, 2010 – Omar Eduardo Almonte and Mohamed Alessa were arrested at JFK
Airport as they attempted to board flights to travel from Egypt to Somalia to join al-
Shabaab with the stated intent to kill American troops.

All of these individuals, some of them Americans, had one thing in common – they were
influenced by online sermons delivered by Anwar al-Awlaki. This group may be viewed
as a network or connected nodes. As described by Sageman, “Some nodes are more
popular and are attached to more links, connecting them to more isolated nodes. These

206
Bipartisan Policy Center (December 2012). Countering Online Radicalization in America. National
Security Program, Homeland Security Project.

183

more connected nodes, called hubs, are important components of the terrorist
network.”
207

From an organizational perspective, the individuals in al-Awlaki’s network represent
nodes, and al-Awlaki himself served as a hub in the al Qaeda hierarchy. This represents
what is defined as a small world network. Sageman suggests, it is the “robustness of the
network” that may provide insight regarding research efforts to contain or reduce the
threat of terrorism. Using al-Awlaki’s example, removing him from the network provides
the potential for the nodes to become disconnected, reducing their capability to organize a
sophisticated attack. Lacking a hub, the nodes would be reduced to autonomous
operations, often by lone actors. Al-Awlaki’s role was critical, as he served as the
communications center for the system, particularly as it related to ideological guidance
and motivation for violent action.

The Community Nexus
Evidence-based research is critical to leveraging academic disciplines in support of
effective polices that will encourage communities to engage in a culture of cooperation.
As this research and empirical data is generally, HVE responses will continue to be
considered and implemented based on biased and sometimes politicized information.
This misinformation affects the very communities needed for engagement and risks their
marginalization, possibly fueling a negative sentiment towards the identified population.

207
Sageman, M. (2004) Understanding Terror Networks. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press. p.
137

184

As residents perceive government bias based on insensitive policies, programs, or
rhetoric, the foundation for personal or group grievances is developed, potentially
creating a cognitive opening for radicalization. The necessary data to help inform risk-
reduction strategies will only result from communities that are empowered to engage and
define the problem-set.

It is critically important that we examine a diversity of environments that lead to HVE.
Understanding the complexities of HVE is an education and awareness process that
should be shared with the intended community and stakeholders (e.g., community
members, researchers, government representatives, private organizations, etc.). Inasmuch
as any community may have an individual or group with the potential to consider or
engage in HVE, there is no “target” population. Communities engaged and committed to
improving their quality of life, prioritizing safety and security, serve as much as a
potential test population as those neighborhoods lacking cohesion or leadership. The
“Green Bay Way,”
208
implemented in Green Bay, Wisconsin, in 1995, is considered a
best practice for Community Oriented Policing (COP). The COP program places officers
on foot in the neighborhood in an effort to develop a relationship with the community and
reduce crime. The Green Bay Way developed successful community partnerships,
resulting in private sector funding for a variety of innovative programs. Conversely,
despite continuing efforts for an effective COP program, Wilmington, Delaware, has

208
Arts, J. (1995) Best Practices in Community Oriented Policing. The “Green Bay Way.”
http://www.innovativepolicing.com/files/Best%20Practices%20in%20Community%20Policing.pdf
(Retrieved: 27 June 2013).

185

fared far worse. While Delaware overall ranked moderately well in the peace index
(which looked at factors such as police per capita), Wilmington earned the number one
spot
209
for highest rate of violent crimes per 100,000 people in 2012. In either case, the
repeated need for comparative data is critical, as is the ability to use basic inquiries
associated with the humanities, sciences and social sciences in a manner that “shares” the
process with the stakeholders.

Communities have become particularly sensitive to grant-funded research efforts,
complaining of researchers’ lack of sustained interest or participation at the end of a
funding cycle. They abhor feeling like nothing more than subjects in an “experiment.”
Additionally, assumptions are made that disadvantaged communities, with the day-to-day
challenges they may face due to poverty, unemployment and crime, are not interested in
something as specific as HVE. Finally, introducing a study pronouncing a myopic focus
on HVE, failing to consider “nuisance” activities (e.g., graffiti, loitering, trash, etc.) as
having a higher priority to local residents, may create an initial relationship disconnect
that is deemed irrevocable. These communities seek general public safety (as any
community would), and the sciences can provide research vehicles to facilitate the initial
conversation, if broached intelligently.

The essence of the study of the humanities as an engagement in critical theory, orientated
toward critiquing and changing society as a whole, lends itself to a beginning dialogue

209
Top Ten Most Dangerous Cities in America. Parenting Magazine.
http://www.parenting.com/gallery/most-dangerous-cities-in-america-2012 (Retrieved: 27 June 2013).

186

regarding the ills of the community partnered in the effort. Well-intended government
programs (such as the U.K.’s Prevent Program, discussed in the next chapter) that are
developed without stakeholder input on the challenges, scope, and potential impact of the
program may face resistance and rejection. Research studies are no different, often
enlisting idealistic and naïve researchers who lack any insight about the environment and
demonstrate behaviors that confirm they are on a data-gathering quest, leading subjects to
perceive that personal relationships are not important or quantifiable components of the
study. Critically, it is the relationships that will yield the baseline information that
identifies the challenges that need to be targeted for community change.

Engagement in sciences and social sciences research, that is community-based and
participative, provides for community opportunities to assist in the identification of
knowledge gaps related to HVE pathways. Questions associated with social factors
regarding who becomes involved, psychological considerations for why people become
involved, and the situational elements regarding how people become engaged can only be
informed by individuals, groups, and the community. Understanding that the
radicalization pathways may be as individual as the people themselves, every piece of
information provides another element of critical data. These data are essential if the study
of HVE is to be served by the application of the scientific method.

Community-based, risk-reduction designs targeting HVE cannot be identified, discussed
or considered for implementation without the affected community’s involvement in

187

problem identification. The examination of the human element and social network
characteristics regarding individual and collective relationships in human society are best
served by social sciences engagement. As the radicalization pathway is a multi-step
process, so too is the effort to identify strategies to reduce or contain the threat. There is
no one-size-fits-all strategy. The identification of community characteristics determined
to be more resistant to extremist ideologies should be challenged to withstand academic
and scientific rigor, if they are to be deemed valid and potentially worthy of replication
and “best-practice” consideration.

With these considerations and approaches in mind, it is possible to begin developing a
model for community engagement and risk reduction. While no model can be applied
wholesale to every potentially threatened community, there are some core elements that
can prove essential in the focused effort to interrupt the radicalization pathway and
reduce the risk of HVE.

188

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Chapter 5 – A Mosaic of Engagement
Homegrown violent extremists all have families and live in communities that, complicit
or not, possess the potential to reduce the risk of a deadly attack. With an appreciation of
how charismatic figures, group dynamics and the radicalization pathway contribute to the
emergence of HVE, it is essential to understand and leverage a community’s identified
priorities as a means to enhance public safety. Doing so requires a new kind of
community-based strategy. Presented here is such a model: Mosaic of Engagement.

The goal of the Mosaic of Engagement model is to challenge and contain violent
extremism and radicalization, and to reduce the threat to local public safety and national
security. Although some Community Oriented Policing (COP) models have been
successful, the Mosaic approach holds all of the stakeholders as equal partners. It is a
model developed on decades of research and professional practice addressing the issues
of street gangs and terrorism. The resulting phases leverage best practices and introduce
critical activities missing from similar efforts. Much of this work can be done in schools,
focused on grades K-12. Efforts to reduce the risk of HVE are best accomplished when
incorporated into the public safety framework, employing existing programs that address
crime and violence while safeguarding children and the overall community.

The COP model was the result of law enforcement acknowledging the organizational and
cultural disconnect with the basic community to be served. More specifically, as “results-
oriented” management became increasingly popular the past two decades, critical

193

questions arose regarding “ Who was defining the results and how were they being
measured?” It should be noted that, “Community policing is a philosophy that promotes
organizational strategies, which support the systematic use of partnerships and problem-
solving techniques, to proactively address the immediate conditions that give rise to
public safety issues such as crime, social disorder, and fear of crime.”
210
Despite best
intentions, the Community Oriented Policing model is a government-driven engagement,
most often constrained by law enforcement priorities, namely crime and other nefarious
activities and not necessarily focusing on “whole of community” strategies or outcomes.

The COP problem solving methodology
211
consists of a) scanning (identifying and
prioritizing problems), b) analysis (researching what is known about the problem, c)
response (developing solutions to bring about lasting reduction in the number and extent
of problems, d) assessment (evaluating the success of the responses). All of these
elements are utilized to triangulate the identified public safety challenge(s), employing a
victim-offender-location methodology. However, when associated issues such as
community and business development, unemployment, health care, immigrant anxieties
and nuisance concerns, fail to maintain equal footing on the list of priorities, the COP
approach may lack the initial engagement and suffer the subsequent lack of endorsement
by the intended neighborhood or demographic. As this relates to HVE, one major failing
in counterterrorism-focused efforts is the omission of community relationships and the

210
United States Department of Justice. Community Policing Defined, p. 3.
211
Ibid. p. 4.

194

importance of quality-of-life issues in the development of the risk-reduction design. This
was an acute lesson-learned in U.K. subsequent to the implementation of their innovative
“Preventing Violent Extremism Strategy” program.

The concept of a Mosaic program draws in part from the United Kingdom’s Preventing
Violent Extremism Strategy (Prevent), considered one of the best in the world when it
was implemented in 2003. Yet, the program did have its shortcomings. It was perceived
to have a negative impact on Muslim communities, as they were the only communities
identified as being at risk for HVE recruitment and radicalization. Given what has already
been established about the nature of HVE (that it cuts across numerous motivating
factors, religions and ethnicities), for such a program to be effective in the United States,
it necessarily requires expanding the scope while endorsing a clearer methodology for
identifying risk.

In addition to public perception, Prevent was limited in the evaluation process and was
challenged to measure prevention. Measuring crime prevention generally, and HVE
recruitment and radicalization specifically, is vitally important to determine a program’s
efficiency and effectiveness vis-à-vis costs and benefits. For future programs, such as
Mosaic, evaluation standards and principles must be in place, not just to provide evidence
of the effectiveness of a program but also to prevent the kind of narrow community focus
seen in the UK program.

195

Despite its shortcomings, between 2005 and 2010, Prevent became the most widely
imitated counter-radicalization strategy. Similar programs were used in Denmark,
Australia, and Canada, with Germany and Sweden incorporating some aspects in their
respective counterterrorism policies.
212
Because Prevent was the prototype and catalyst
for programs that use the community engagement approach to disrupting the
radicalization pathway, the UK program offers a rare case study that can reveal how a
similar community-based framework might be implemented in the United States. In that
regard, we look specifically at leveraging the successful “community indicators” model
implemented in City Heights, San Diego regarding the applicability and effectiveness of
Mosaic.

A United Kingdom Model
In an effort to reduce the risk of “al Qaeda-inspired” recruitment, radicalization, and
related terrorist incidents in the aftermath of numerous attempted and successful attacks
in the United States, Europe, and around the world, the United Kingdom launched the
Prevent strategy. At its core, Prevent focused on radicalization and recruitment
prevention (rather than simply HVE detection) and acknowledged the importance of
enlisting the community in the fight against terrorism. In the words of Charles Farr, the
head of the UK’s Office for Security and Counter-terrorism, Prevent “was the
Government’s recognition that as a nation, we cannot arrest our way out of the terrorist

212
Bipartisan Policy Center (2011). Preventing Violent Radicalization in America. National Security
Preparedness Group, p. 21.

196

threat we face” nor can we “protect ourselves physically to the point where the threat is
mitigated entirely.”
213

Before the turn of the century, al Qaeda’s UK media network broadcast rhetoric that
emphasized, in extremist terms, the supposed inherent conflict between Islam and the
West.
214
In 1996 and 1998, Osama bin Laden gave interviews to the London-based Al
Quds al-Arabia newspaper, announcing his so-called fatwas, declaring war on Zionists
and Western crusaders.
215

After the 9/11 attacks, this kind of message in the public forum became that much more
prevalent, with increasingly vocal (and thereby visible) extremist preachers referencing
oppressive conditions suffered by Bosnian Muslims or subjugation in Algeria and
Chechnya. These and other increases in activism swirled into a perfect storm, fueled
further by the UK’s invasion of Iraq in 2003. British extremists plotted attacks within the
country and actually traveled to the region to fight the Coalition Forces. The UK
Government realized the importance of working from within their country and from the
ground up, which led to Prevent.

While an innovative and insightful approach to the growing potential for HVE in the UK,
the initial strategy was criticized for four primary problems:

213
Farr, C. (19 January 2010). Communities and Local Government Committee: Evidence.
214
Nacos, B. (2007). Al-Qaeda’s Propaganda Advantage and How to Counter It. Perspectives on
Terrorism, Vol. 1, No. 4.
215
Omand, Sir David (2012). The Terrorist Threat to the UK in the Post-9/11 Decade. Journal of Terrorism
Research, Volume 3, Issue 1.

197

1. The strategy’s concept of radicalization: There was a lack of consensus or
conceptual clarity on the definition of radicalization. As already discussed, there
is no consistent definition of what it means. In the case of Prevent, the potential
for HVE was defined exclusively by religious affiliation.
2. A narrow focus on Muslims: The original program looked exclusively at the
Muslim community. This revealed flawed assumptions, foremost that only
Muslims in the UK had the potential to engage in HVE. This labeled all Muslims
as potentially “at-risk” while ignoring other groups engaged in extremist
activities.
3. The implementation methodology: The program funded efforts in Muslim
communities based on the size of the Muslim population in a given area.
Inasmuch as the additional risk factors
216
were ignored (particularly other
domestic sources of extremism), the community perceived that the program was
intended to “spy on Muslims.”
217

4. Negative program consequences: In considering the Muslim population as a
unified community and viewing all Muslims as suspect (irrespective of behavior),
the program inadvertently created a relationship of mistrust. This compromised
the goal of community engagement and support and potentially helped create an
environment ripe for extremist recruitment based on resentment of the British
government.

216
Kundani, A. (2007). Spooked. Preventing Violent Extremism – Winning hearts and minds. pp. 12-14/
217
Dodd, V. (2009). Government anti-terrorism strategy ‘spies’ on innocent. Guardian

198

In response to the flaws of the original program, the UK Government’s Home Secretary,
minister in charge of the Home Office, reviewed Prevent in 2011, which is responsible for
immigration, security and law enforcement. A comprehensive set of data collection
methods was employed, including consultation events, focus groups and an online
questionnaire. This came in addition to a 2010 House of Commons Communities and
Local Government Select Committee report, Preventing Violent Extremism, which found
that the focus on the Muslim community had been unhelpful, stigmatizing, and alienating
and could be perceived as legitimizing the extreme right. It also found that resource
allocation was not based on risk. Overall, the review determined that the program
“confused the delivery of Government policy to promote integration with Government
policy to prevent terrorism.”
218

The strategy was revised following this review, and the amended program seeks to:
• Respond to the ideological challenge of terrorism and aspects of extremism, and the
threat faced from those who promote these views;
• Provide practical help to prevent people from being drawn into terrorism and ensure
they are given appropriate advice and support; and
• Work with a wide range of sectors where there are risks of radicalization, employing
tactics via education, criminal justice, faith, charities, the Internet and health.
219

218
Council on Foreign Relations (2011). UK Counterterrorism Strategy, 2011.
219
Home Office website. Prevent strategy 2011.

199

These are important improvements that, when paired with an understanding of the initial
failings, offer powerful lessons for the development of a U.S.-specific community
engagement program to prevent HVE.

A United States Model
As discussed, HVE can arise from myriad ideologies, grievances and communities.
Changing demographics in City Heights, San Diego indicate a growing propensity for
radicalization and recruitment in the area due to an influx of residents from challenged
African and Asian nations and the existing Latino gang situation. Indeed, there are
already examples emerging from the community that show the threat is real. In 2013, four
residents of City Heights were found guilty of supporting the terrorist group al-
Shabaab.
220

Located in the eastern part of San Diego, California, City Heights’ strength and potential
weakness is its ethnic diversity. City Heights is a business and residential area, including
16 distinct, densely populated neighborhoods: Corridor, Teralta West, Teralta East
Colima Park, Cherokee Point, Castle, Fairmont Village, Fox Canyon, Chollas Creek,
Azalea Park, Swan Canyon, Islenair (a city-designated historic district), Hollywood Park,
Ridgeview, Fairmount Park and Bayridge.

220

Brumfield, B. (23 February 2013). Four Somalis in U.S. found guilty of supporting terrorists back
home. CNN U.S.

200

City Heights is one of the most ethnically diverse areas of the country, including both
native-born and immigrant residents. More than 40 percent have immigrated from Latin
America, Asia, and Africa, with many of these residents being newly arrived and some
from failing states.
221
Only 63 percent of adults have a high school diploma, 33 percent
are not fluent in English and 27 percent live in poverty.
222
In 2009, the household median
income was $26,232, with 28 percent of all households earning less than $15,000 and
another 30 percent earning between $15,000 and $29,999 a year. In short, nearly half of
the community is made up of immigrants from troubled lands, facing new social and
economic challenges to finding success in America.

City Heights is an older neighborhood, and for a time, crime was on the rise. The
economy suffered, and the area was all but abandoned. In 1993, however, Sol Price,
founder of Price Club and FedMart, spearheaded redevelopment projects via a Smart
Growth strategy implemented by the City of San Diego.
223
The projects attempted to
enhance the quality of life by leveraging community diversity and engagement to address
crime, education, urban development, and economic improvements.

221
Price Charities website: http://www.pricecharities.com/City-Heights-Initiative/
222
Ibid.
223
Author is an adjunct professor in the Sol Price School of Public Policy at the University of Southern
California.

201

A Safety Initiative as a Prelude to a Mosaic of Engagement
Created in January 2012, the City Heights Safety Initiative was the product of a joint
effort between Price Charities (a public non-profit), Price Family Charitable Fund (a
private family foundation), and the City Heights community. Led by the Consensus
Organizing Center at San Diego State University, the initiative is focused on reducing
crime and helping people feel safe in their neighborhoods.
224
To implement the initiative,
the city employed the charities as tipping point connectors; that is, “strategically located
people who are committed, competent and connected.”

This is representative of a “community indicators” model, which empowers non-profit
organizations in the community to measure quality of life outcomes through self-
organized efforts, leveraging existing partnerships between non-profit, government and
business coalitions. This is a particularly effective approach, as it reduces the concerns of
bias or politicized outcomes expressed during the discussion of science-based research.
Simply put, programs deemed unsuccessful will cease to be funded. For example,
evaluators claiming reduced homicide rates, while violent and property crimes increase,
offer a skewed illustration of programmatic success. The opportunity for policy makers to
highlight desired outcomes while failing to present the entire picture is reduced as a result
of this holistic community approach.

224
City Heights Safety Initiative website.

202

At the outset, the program's leadership met with stakeholders to prepare for the two-year
process. A series of meetings included community representatives, law enforcement,
academics, policy makers, and leaders from across different sectors in large and small
groups. This collective effort led to the initiative’s comprehensive framework. Initially,
stakeholders organized into four groups to identify and prioritize safety issues and
develop a strategic plan of action.

To prioritize community needs, the project groups engaged processes of asset mapping,
resident interviews, safety audits and crime statistics analysis. After two months, the
groups shared their findings, and it was clear that while crime and gang violence were a
concern, the community’s more salient problems were largely “nuisance” issues, such as
the need for trash cans, skate parks, and crosswalks.
225

The intermediate outcomes yielded Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design
(CPTED) recommended solutions. CPTED is an interdisciplinary approach to public
safety and deterring criminal behavior through environmental design. The design is
intended to influence adversarial decisions preceding criminal acts.
226

225
This kind of outcome is reminiscent of the “Broken Windows Theory,” a theory introduced in a 1982
article by social scientists George L. Kelling and James Q. Wilson, proposing that efforts to monitor and
improve urban environments may further stop vandalism and the potential for other more serious crime.
226
This process is intended to reduce the presence of obtrusive physical security barriers, such as
barricades, fencing topped with razor ribbon, and intimidating signage, by using items such as trees, line-
of-sight open spaces, and vehicular traffic flow designs to discourage the would-be offender while also
enhancing public safety.

203

Returning to the challenge of transitioning Prevent to a U.S.-specific Mosaic strategy, the
importance of the kind of commitment seen in City Heights cannot be overstated.
Engaging residents to identify and determine problem areas is an essential first step to
any effective program. As mentioned previously, counterterrorism-focused efforts are at a
significant disadvantage upon failing to emphasize relationship building and the
importance of quality-of-life issues as core elements of the strategy. These factors drive
the public safety discussion, and they are the foundation of community conversations
about HVE. When stakeholders can agree that public safety is an essential element in the
community’s quality of life, that consensus provides the best opportunity for reducing the
risk of violent extremism recruitment and radicalization. These activities put a “human
face” on the personal community experiences and information to be used as data.
Additionally, consensus facilitates an informed civil discourse, revealing shared civic
goals.

Exerting Positive Influence on the Environment
As noted, terrorism is the product of an alienated individual, a legitimizing ideology and
an enabling environment. The environment (i.e., the community) is most susceptible to
positive influence to reduce the risk of HVE. The issue of the enabling environment must
be addressed in terms of enhancing social morality, responsibility, and community
integrity, with the intended outcome of facilitating community-based efforts to identify
and explore solutions to the continuing challenges.

204

Many motivations for propelling an individual through the radicalization pathway
towards HVE are associated with grievances, such as conflicted identity, injustice,
oppression or socio-economic exclusion. These are all likely hurdles faced by immigrants
to a new society, such as those in City Heights. Yet, each community encounters
circumstances unique to their demographic, citizen makeup and other characteristics. As
well as understanding how grievances can lead to HVE, effective strategies for
preventing radicalization must address the specific environment in which they are
implemented. The challenges for City Heights, for example, are likely different from
other at-risk communities across the country. The fact that as there is a lack of a terrorist
profile, there is no one model to respond to this challenge. The Mosaic of Engagement
has to be tailored to the specifics and dynamic nature of the community considering its
implementation.

Looking to the Prevent strategy, it is clear one major error was a failure to engage
stakeholders before implementation to determine the challenges unique to the area. What
is more, the evaluation of Prevent occurred only after widespread criticism of the
strategy’s shortcomings. Ongoing community engagement not only would have better
identified areas for program focus but would have also solicited ongoing feedback that
could have been used to continually improve the strategy. This would have been the more
effective approach, rather than waiting to review the strategy after several years of effort,
funding and unfortunate community estrangement. Drawing on these lessons learned, it is
possible to create a community-based program tailored to U.S. environments.

205

Objectives, Scope and Methodology for a Mosaic of Engagement
The threat of HVE will not dissipate independently. As well as law enforcement and
intelligence work to stop individuals already plotting violent extremism, the United States
can enhance its security posture by implementing strategies that work with communities
to deter radicalization in the first place. This is the Mosaic of Engagement.

The program objective is to use a community-based strategy to improve the quality of life
by reducing the risk of extremist recruitment, radicalization and related criminal activity.
This goal is only feasible through engagement of tipping point stakeholders via
Neighborhood Alliances, as well as community consensus that HVE reduction is the
desired byproduct of a safe community. Neighborhood Alliances depend on social
networks representing a community-based hybrid of Soft Power and Capillaries of Power
concepts.

Soft Power is achieving a goal through attraction rather than coercion or payment.
227

Certainly, residents of any community want to enjoy the sense and experience of safety
and security. When groups use relationships to collectively work towards an objective,
policies that express certain values are more likely to be attractive when the values are
shared. For example, Americans believe in volunteerism, as demonstrated in a 2012
Corporation for National and Community Service (CNCS) report.
228
More than 64

227
Nye, Jr., J.S. (2004). Soft Power, The Means to Success in World Politics.
228
Corporation for National & Community Service (12 December 2012). Volunteering Among Americans
Hits Five-Year High.

206

million Americans (a 5-year high) volunteered through a formal organization. The
resulting dynamic is one of mobilizing cooperation, achieving desired outcomes without
forcing groups to change their behavior.
229
Unfortunately, criminal elements (such as
gangs, extremists and terrorist organizations) have realized that they can also use soft
power as a means to garner support and new recruits.
230
The winner in the battles of soft
power will be determined through self-organization. A community-driven effort is
critical, as any suggestion of a “hard power,” government-driven mandate may hinder
willing stakeholder engagement, insomuch as they sense a lack of ownership in the
process.

The process used to drive this soft power is best facilitated by a paradigm described by
French philosopher and social theorist Michel Foucault, whose theories addressed the
nature of power and the manner in which it functions.
231
Foucault’s notion of capillaries
of power is instructive with regard to the implementation of a community-based safety
and security program. Governments typically engage in a hierarchical, top-down
approach, whereas a capillary methodology assumes an individual is an active member
who is not reduced to passive involvement because of their position in the organizational
or community structure. Thus, the issue of control in this respect is not simply a matter of
strong dominating the weak, but a collective effort between individuals and others as a
result of organized behaviors. Foucault points out, “We have yet to fully comprehend the

229
Corporation for National & Community Service (12 December 2012). Volunteering Among Americans
Hits Five-Year High, p. 15
230

Nye, Jr., J.S. (2004). Soft Power, The Means to Success in World Politics, p. 25.

231
Kumar, K. (2009) Foucault, Disciplinary Power, and the ‘Decentering’ of Political Thought: A Marxian
View.

207

nature of power” and we should examine “the relays through which it operates and the
extent of its influence on the often insignificant aspects of the hierarchy.”
232

For Foucault, “power is not a hierarchical construct that is held by a dominant group and
then wielded over the oppressed.”
233
Rather, if society were a body, the power would
circulate through the arteries and capillaries of society. He explains, “Power is employed
and exercised through a net-like organization. And not only to individuals circulate
between threads; they are always in the position of simultaneously undergoing and
exercising this power.”
234
The resulting institution is the concept of a Neighborhood
Alliance, built upon the notion of capillaries of power. The community capillaries of
power are the individual stakeholders themselves who become the source of power,
choosing to organize, engage, identify, and prioritize challenges and develop solutions as
demonstrated in City Heights. Unfortunately, as with soft power, this capillaries of power
concept has also been leveraged by extremist and terrorist organizations that understand
the tactical advantages and recruitment potential of a self-organizing, decentralized group
(e.g., terror cells) that agrees on a common objective – good or evil.

Drawing on the results of the Prevent strategy review, it is possible to develop a Mosaic
of Engagement strategy in the United States. As described here, the Mosaic program

232
Foucault, M. (1983). Afterword: The Subject and Power. In Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and
Hermeneutics, p. 213.
233
Frielick, S. (15 October 2005). Capillaries of Power.
234
Foucault, M. (1980). Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings 1972-1977. Edited by
Colin Gordon. New York: Pantheon, p. 98.

208

consists of six critical phases, which although engaged linearly, actually function
concurrently.

Phase 1: Scope
This strategy begins with a comprehensive effort to determine the scope of the
community to be engaged. Social media and other technologies will be critical to this
component. With the understanding that there have been numerous advantages from the
advent of the Internet, with regard to HVE, there have also been drawbacks. With social
interaction increasingly occurring online, many people no longer know their next-door
neighbors. This contributes to the potential for an HVE-enabling environment. The lack
of personal residential relationships, coupled with the easy access to online organizations
and ideologies, presents a formidable challenge to community-based efforts. Indeed,
because one of the Internet’s primary functions is to connect people and facilitate
information sharing, the Bipartisan Policy Center wrote, “the use of the Internet to
radicalize and recruit homegrown terrorists is the single-most important and dangerous
innovation since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001.”
235

Whether radicalization and recruitment occurs online or within a community,
implementing a Mosaic strategy requires ideas that counter the extremist ideology, as
well as personal contact and face-to-face interaction via focus groups. This is where
tipping point connectors are essential, particularly in immigrant communities. For

235
Bipartisan Policy Center (2012). Countering Online Radicalization in America. National Security
Program, Homeland Security Project.

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instance, the examples of Adam Gadhan, Samir Khan and Tamerlan Tsarnaev
disconnecting with their respective mosques before moving on to infamy suggests the
religious leaders of those mosques were potential tipping point connectors. They
challenged the extremist interpretations and protestations of the young men to the point
where the latter were no longer welcome among the congregation. Positively speaking,
they were able to isolate potential problem members of the congregation. However, in
each instance, despite their interaction and discussions with these individuals, they
departed from the congregation and subsequently the community, which further enhanced
their zeal toward their violent agenda.

While online capabilities can play an important part in implementing Mosaic (such as
through online questionnaires, consultation and e-mail), focus groups give all participants
the real-world, in-person relationships that are a critical part of the overall strategy.
Removing the anonymous and impersonal interactions associated with online
engagements is important. Face-to-face interactions facilitated by focus groups may reap
the benefits of a collection of social and psychological activities borne of the forum itself.
Important outcomes may yield: increased personal participation; important non-verbal
cues; personal commitment to the process; the ability to adapt the intended agenda to the
needs of the group; and most importantly, the opportunity for the group to interact with
each other.

210

The goal for these focus groups is to generate a range of ideas and perspectives, not
necessarily to achieve consensus. The insights and experiences help define the
community landscape and its challenges. Focus group engagement should be a dynamic
process, reconvened on a pre-determined timeline to maintain interest, information
sharing and relationship building.

Phase 2: Consensus
The identification of tipping point connectors is essential. By engaging the right people
and helping them work together, communities can leverage their collective experience,
energy, and ideas. This process shifts the burden for detecting and deterring
neighborhood safety and security issues onto those who have the capacity and moral
responsibility to prevent them – the community. Success means striving for a safer
community, which has a direct impact on reducing HVE. Individual and group behaviors
to enhance and sustain a safe environment suggest these neighborhoods share a
“community norm,” strengthened by the bond of the basic human need for security.
Although HVE is a subset of larger societal issues, families play an important role,
particularly if they coalesce around the notion of a safe society. The literature
demonstrates that family relationships can influence people to reconsider membership in
terrorist or extremist organizations.
236

236

Jacobson, M. (January 2010). Terrorist Dropouts, Learning from Those Who Have Left. The
Washington Institute for Near East Policy, p. 31

211

This consensus phase employs the soft power approach, establishing Neighborhood
Alliances with the expressed goal of creating and sustaining a safe community. This does
not necessarily mean formally developing a new group or organization. Rather,
communities can engage existing organizations that are involved with the “whole
community,” those that work at the nexus between community and government. These
groups might include: civil liberties and privacy organizations (ACLU); community
safety organizations (Neighborhood Watch); fire services; social services; faith-based
organizations; K-12 schools, as well as colleges and universities; health agencies and
services; youth services and youth offender programs; probation and parole agencies;
local businesses; and transportation services.

Each of these groups has a stake in identifying and prioritizing community challenges. To
ensure the consensus building efforts are seen as legitimate and possible, great care must
be taken to explain the process and its appropriateness to the task. If the process and
outcomes are seen as pre-determined, there is a great risk to process legitimacy. Lack of
stakeholder engagement in the UK, exacerbated by an existing climate of fear, resulted in
suspicions on the part of the Muslim community with regard to the implementation of
Prevent. Despite the program’s stated goal of supporting “at-risk” communities, Muslims
viewed the program as a solicitation to act as informants who provide intelligence on
their own community, with everyone deemed suspect. Community involvement in the
development of the program could have reduced this perception.

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Consensus building is the process of arriving at unanimous agreement, allowing
stakeholders to identify and collectively address crosscutting issues or concerns.
Consensus means all engaged parties are satisfied with the result because it has been
designed to meet the needs of all interested stakeholders. In the case of community
safety, a consensus might include sharing contact information to facilitate a neighborhood
safety newsletter. It might also include designating “block captains” as representatives
who communicate directly with law enforcement officers assigned to the area. As the
saying goes, you can’t please all of the people all of the time. Thus, in the spirit of
democracy (and for the sake of reality), the goal of consensus building is to strive for
support and agreement from most stakeholders. If an objective is achieved, it yields
sustainable relationships that have the capacity to present a unified response to
identifying and responding to community challenges.

Phase 3: Performance Measures
Although crime-related economic impact, recidivism and violent crime are critical issues,
Mosaic’s success is to be measured by how communities coalesce around these issues;
this as opposed to championing decreasing negative outcomes. The implementation
criteria for performance measures must have a combination of quantitative metrics and
finely granulated qualitative indicators. Examples include: an increase in school
enrollment by age and grade, rather than measurement of truancy rates; increases in
employment for a specific age group, rather than incidence of gang-related arrests; or an
increase in the number of participants in an after-school program, rather than non-arrest

213

police contacts. Each of these measures provides Neighborhood Alliances with
opportunities to share in the use of their resources for improving quality of life, which
can be more valuable and inspirational than focusing on a reduction in the negative
consequences of criminal activity. This differs from most traditional measurements of
public safety programs. Crime statistics can offer some insight on progress, but
neighborhood pride and sustained efforts are enhanced when this progress is identified
and shared, consequently motivating the community to find other avenues for success.

The evaluation dimensions for this strategy are cross-sectional, exploratory and
interventional. A cross-sectional evaluation offers a targeted view of a portion of the
community, yielding a situational analysis of the program status. Public safety challenges
are fluid, requiring real-time status information. Reviews of the past through a
retrospective evaluation paired against a prospective idea of what the program hopes to
yield are simply not timely enough to offer actionable, valuable insight. Exploratory
dimensions search for answers or best practices, and interventional dimensions are used
when the study is intended to change (or intervene on) something in the program or
policy.

Quantitative values can be definitive and instructive and might be facilitated via
measurement instruments, such as surveys and citizen interviews. Analysis of this kind of
feedback facilitates decisions and justification for program revision or adjustment. This is

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another component of the process where stakeholders maintain ownership of program
measurement, analysis and modifications.

Phase 4: Community Engagement
Community Engagement is designed on a theme of “taking care of each other.” The
success of a community-based program aimed at reducing crime generally (and the
recruitment to extremist organizations specifically) is based on the level of community
engagement. This is a valuable take-away from the Prevent experience, inasmuch as the
design of that program put itself at odds with the community it was intended to protect.
As has been discussed, legitimizing ideologies and their narratives present an “us” and
“them” perspective that separates groups from the broader community. This establishes a
hostile relationship with government and society. Engaging focus groups helps determine
the scope of the challenges and the people most at risk or impacted by those challenges.
In City Heights, the citizens initiated the process as a result of the high crime rates and
associated gang violence. Advertising the need for help, they were met by a police
department seeking an opportunity, focused on the immediate challenge of drive-by
shootings. Timing is everything. The groups came together, enlisting the assistance of the
non-profit organizations that were willing to fund the innovative initiative that became an
impetus for an innovative movement.

Regardless of where Mosaic is implemented, it will be most effective if the details of the
engagement are unique to the location. While some approaches will be similar across

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threatened areas, they must be tailored to the needs and makeup of the community where
the strategy is put in action. For example, there are successes in City Heights as a result
of the Safety Initiative that can be used to facilitate education and awareness of crime and
extremism. Demographics suggest schools are the logical starting point.

The City Heights 2001–2010 stakeholder analysis shows one-third of the population was
17 years old or younger, with half of the population under the age of 30. What is not
reflected in these numbers is the increasing presence of immigrants from Asia and Africa,
specifically Pakistan and Somalia, nations that are experiencing significant security
concerns. To reach the younger demographic and expose these age groups to the
importance of a safe society, it made sense for City Heights to focus on schools as a place
to focus their efforts. Going forward, this is also the logical environment where Mosaic
may facilitate the risk reduction of future public safety challenges.

Inasmuch as City Heights has created a “School in the Park” in addition to “School-based
Health Centers,” the schools have also taken on an identity and feeling of a safe haven for
members of the community. Parent Centers in the City Heights neighborhood emphasize
the issue of family. The focus on and support for the family unit is a critical element in
reducing the risk of HVE. As mentioned previously, every would-be terrorist has a
family. Disjointed, unorganized communities create fertile ground for radicalization and
recruitment. Conversely, communities that offer the capacity to unite and support
families stand a better chance of disrupting or preventing susceptibility to the

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radicalization pathway in the first place. Like most urban street gangs, extremist groups
attempt to become a “family,” offering acceptance, appreciation and providing an
opportunity for an individual to feel important. These groups fill the gap for alienated
individuals living in unorganized and disconnected communities.

Phase 5: Information Sharing
Public safety issues for focus groups, consultation events, and online questionnaires
should be framed to obtain and share information on the following issues:
• Outlining the current status of crime and the identified risks;
• Briefing the community on the steps being taken to address those issues;
• Informing the community on how they can take part in crime reduction;
• Outlining where HVE is occurring (on the local, state, national and global
levels);
• Explain which groups in the community are most vulnerable to being drawn
into violent extremism and why;
• Explain which section(s) of the community are most likely to need support in
resisting overtures from violent extremists;

As an example of why information sharing is critical, interviews with City Heights public
safety personnel noted that property crime reporting was lower than the city average,
suggesting unreported crimes.
237
This is common in immigrant communities, particularly

237
Interview with City Heights Security Director (15 August 2012).

217

when residents are living and working in the country illegally and therefore refrain from
activities that could draw attention to their legal status. Additionally, immigrants who
fled war-torn states often experienced brutal police tactics that are sometimes deadly.
This can breed a culture of mistrust with police. For these reasons, the community may
be more apt to live with crime rather than report it. By sharing information, however, it is
possible to focus on previously unidentified threats to public safety, in turn enhancing the
capacity to disrupt and prevent radicalization and recruitment.

Information sharing, however, is not only about identifying problems. It is also critical
for distributing focus group findings, recommendations and improvements.
Neighborhood Alliances can receive and disseminate information, such as the results of
pre-determined performance periods. Technology (social media networks and other
online communication) can also be useful in sharing information about the ongoing
activities and status of the performance evaluation.

Phase 6: Sustainability
Daily priorities, waning interest and the transient nature of many community residents
make sustaining a public safety program challenging. The Price Charities partnered
facilitators from San Diego State University with residents to enhance further evaluation
efforts and to begin the process of program sustainability. These volunteers not only
completed the Safety Initiative Community Evaluations, but more importantly, trained
residents to serve as evaluation facilitators themselves.

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Some of the more critical elements of reducing the risk of crime and HVE are activities
designed to counter rhetoric. The soft power and capillaries of power hybrid can serve a
critical purpose at this juncture in the program implementation and evaluation. It is
important to establish consistent messaging that makes full use of community resources,
expertise and talent. Slogans that become part of the daily vernacular and are
intergenerational can be invaluable (e.g., “Let’s Take Care of Each Other” or “Making
See Something, Say Something, Mean Something”), particularly if the community
collectively creates their own motto. One way to achieve this kind of messaging is
through a community website. City Heights developed such a site, which also included
links to a variety of informational sources. Most important on the site are the entries
touting community public safety successes.

Such a website and message, however, is rendered ineffective without community access
to computers. Recognizing this, Price Charities donated 300 computers, along with
requisite safety training, to the City Heights residents. This was a valuable investment in
developing trust, independence and community responsibility. The Internet, however, can
be a channel of extremist rhetoric and radicalization, and maintaining a community-led
Internet safety effort is critical, particularly as it relates to protecting children from online
exploitation and radicalization.

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Ongoing Challenges for Risk Reduction
The dynamic of HVE leaves much to be understood and researched. We know that it
requires a foundational ideology, and that once embraced, it may progress along a
radicalization trajectory toward violent action. Regardless of whether the enabling
environment is physical or virtual, extremists do not live alone, and in their quest for
answers and purpose, there may be opportunities for communities to reduce chances of a
cognitive opening. As much as extremists seek communities, they also live in them. An
extremist’s contact (statements, behaviors, etc.) with other community members may
offer an opportunity to disconnect from a legitimizing ideology.

Education and awareness on the issue of terrorism in the United States has been lacking,
despite the extreme media focus on the threat from al Qaeda and the nation’s homeland
security efforts. Reactive in nature, the public rarely knows what threats the country faces
and often only learns of such threats when law enforcement and counterterrorism
professionals are responding to an incident. Opportunities to learn about, plan for and
disrupt activities that are harmful to the community continue to be woefully insufficient.
As equal partners, the community and the government can facilitate a system that may
guard against irresponsible accusations of neighbors being engaged in suspicious
activities. What is more, when a top-down government effort to prevent HVE focuses
only on one community element (such as religion), the effort fails to address a
community’s basic need for public safety and potentially marginalizes the residents who
are so critical for effective risk-reduction programs.

220

Lessons learned from the United Kingdom’s Prevent program, accompanied by
successful public safety activities across the nation, such as in City Heights, provide
opportunities for a Mosaic of Engagement. Mosaic acknowledges the diversity of
extremist ideologies and is designed with necessary flexibility to respond to the different
priorities of a community. The six stages of the process take great care and caution
regarding a number of critical issues. It is as important to engage the community at the
onset, developing metrics to determine outcomes, as it is to build trust. The most essential
elements of such an effort depend on focusing on and responding to:

1. Cultural issues, as a result of the higher-risk population possibly consisting of an
immigrant community.

2. Resistance from the dominant citizen population regarding the allocation of
resources to support a program tasked to address a challenge seen as imported by
the “at-risk” immigrant or target community.

3. Establishing the necessary stakeholder trust for the purpose of participating in
surveys and focus groups.

4. Allowing the group to guide itself in a truly community-based and grassroots
manner.

Although participation from the adult population is critical, every effort to introduce
Mosaic into the school environment should be taken. This sets the stage for lifelong
learning regarding safety and security, develops stronger familial bonds, and builds
community pride. The chances of being perceived as a government intelligence-gathering
program are removed if the community determines the activities, metrics and responses.

221

The resulting group consensus also yields important information regarding processes and
activities deemed successful – program elements that could be replicated in future
endeavors. Most important, these activities set the stage for additional academic
disciplines to consider related research to enhance our understanding of HVE.

Mosaic is built on successes, not failures. Metrics emphasizing an increasing high school
graduation rate (as opposed to the dropout percentage) or summer intern enrollment (in
contrast to the juvenile arrest rate) builds community pride. There is nothing better than
the feeling of being engaged in something special, particularly if it is for the greater good.
The collective strength of a community and the resilience of a nation can resist and
reduce the risk of HVE. Communities should unapologetically challenge everything
violent extremists stand for. Understanding the threat is the first step for positive action.

222

References – Chapter Five
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Conclusion
The Chinese warrior and philosopher Sun Tzu said, “If you know others and know
yourself, you will not be imperiled in a hundred battles.”
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It is not sufficient to simply
“know your enemy,” as some have posited with regard to terrorism. With regards to
HVE, the adversary and the target are one and the same. Addressing homegrown violence
means we must look within our own society to identify threats and find ways to mitigate
them.

In as much as (regretfully) extremist ideologies are part of the fabric that makes up our
diverse national tapestry, it is our reliance on democratic values that can help unravel the
homegrown violence that threatens us. Programs designed to facilitate community and
national coalescence on reducing the risk of HVE are enhanced by the very ideals we
uphold as a democratic society. Securing a democracy is challenging, but there is a
widespread and erroneous view that democracies are particularly vulnerable to terrorism
and that we should curtail our rights and become something else in an effort to defend our
nation. Recurrent recommendations for racial profiling suggesting, “Why can’t we go
through that model in order to narrow down who that perpetrator might be?”
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would
have been wasteful in the case of the Tsarnaev brothers, inasmuch a search for suspects
of Middle Eastern descent would have removed them from a possible list.

238
Tzu, Sun (1988). The Art of War. Translated by Thomas Cleary. Shambhala Publications, Inc.
239
Jones, Sarah (22 April 2013). Fox News Unwittingly Calls for Racial Profiling of Caucasians to Prevent
Terrorism.

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To be sure, national security approaches must be balanced with our cherished rights of
free practice of religion, free speech, right to privacy and all the freedoms that make the
United States a great country. Yet, the fact is that no system of government (or absence of
liberty) can guarantee complete security against violent extremists. What is more, no
matter how effective our security policies and tactics, how advanced our technology and
well-trained our law enforcement, future attacks will occur.

To alter our government’s view of liberty – indeed, to disrupt who we are as a nation – in
response to the threat of HVE is to concede victory to the adversary. Terrorists seek a
reaction and to reward their violence with a response that changes how we govern our
citizens and residents grants power to the adversary. As this thesis has shown, the threat
of HVE and the radicalization pathway is not limited to any one group or ideology. It is a
crosscutting phenomenon that has the potential to impact all segments of our society. One
cannot deny that Muslim Identity ideology played a major part in the terrorist threat of
the last decade, but to focus the a majority of our attention on that ideology, or worse
still, to unfairly suspect a Muslim community of birthing violent extremists, is a woefully
insufficient approach to the threat of 21
st
century violent extremism. More than that, in
focusing on one group more than another, we begin to tread on the values of freedom and
equality. In some cases, this kind of narrow focus on a specific community also betrays
our proud history as a nation of immigrants.

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Abandoning our principles at the first sign of adversity demonstrates to our adversary that
we maintain a double standard – one for ourselves and one for “others,” whoever that
may be. Targeting entire communities for investigation based on erroneous stereotypes
produces flawed intelligence, marginalizes the community that needs support, and
emboldens opportunities for extremists to recruit. The simple truth is there is no terrorist
profile, and we do a grave injustice to our national security efforts and our country if we
act as if there were.

Our security programs must be based on evidence and facts. The evolution of
counterterrorism into an evidence-based discipline will engender public support and
credibility. Understanding the people, processes, and outcomes associated with HVE
recruitment, radicalization, and violent action arms communities with important
knowledge. Messaging – real or virtual – is the strongest weapon our adversaries possess,
but words and ideas can be overcome. They can also be identified and countered.
Terrorists do not operate in a vacuum. Every homegrown violent extremist has a family,
one that can either facilitate radicalization by inaction or halt it through knowledge and
public and community support. Shared information regarding the groups, their ideologies
and their objectives goes a long way towards creating an environment that is more
resistant to HVE.

Communities do not need a government to dictate their shared values and principles.
Who we are as a country is not bestowed on us; it grows out of our population. Yet, all

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communities can benefit from guidance on best practices, effective services and accurate
knowledge that can enhance safety (and by consequence, reduce opportunities for
grievances to mature into violence). A holistic community approach enhances public
safety, and it addresses the threat of HVE in a way that can prevent terrorism and not just
stop terrorists. We have a tremendous interdisciplinary capacity, using a plethora of tools,
technology and personal conversations, to educate and assist communities with efforts to
improve their quality of life.

While many of the ideas and concepts presented in this thesis are important for
addressing the growing threat of HVE, more work remains. The United States needs
academics and professionals from all disciplines to take a more focused, nuanced look at
violent extremism and continue to study and understand how ideology and grievances
breed the potential for violence and terrorism. We must better understand how
individuals traverse the radicalization pathway and develop more approaches for helping
disrupt that dangerous evolution. Much like the community focus described in the Mosaic
of Engagement strategy, it will take all professionals and scholars working in concert to
continue pushing us towards a greater understanding of HVE and the most effective ways
to address and prevent it.

Abstract (if available)

Abstract This thesis intends to explore morality, leadership and group behavioral constructs capable of supporting a terrorism resistant community model. This is a timeworn problem, with numerous theoretical and practical examples that underscore the difficulty of developing a model intended to engage, educate, and sustain a group designed to act for the good of society. The model will be based on the capacity of the community to deter the threat of homegrown violent extremism (HVE). ❧ Unlike similar government-driven programs exclusively designed to reduce HVE activities, this structure introduces the concept of a Mosaic of Engagement, embracing the experience, energy, and ideas of the whole community, shifting the burden for deterring catastrophic attacks onto those who have the capacity and moral responsibility to prevent them. The model examines the achievements and shortcomings of the United Kingdom’s counterterrorism program, as well as drawing from best-practice outcomes from a public safety program in City Heights, San Diego. Mosaic incorporates lessons-learned from both programs to propose the design for a community and school-based HVE risk reduction model. ❧ The advance of practice of this thesis is to operationalize the notion of homeland security with an understanding of the growing threat of HVE. Since the attacks on September 11, 2001, terror and extremist organizations have adapted and evolved in response to security policies, processes and technology implemented in the United States. This thesis defines HVE more holistically, acknowledging the challenges of a democratic society associated with Constitutional protections in place for extremist activities. The associated elements of the individuals who may be subject to recruitment and the radicalization pathway they undertake are examined for the purpose of determining coherent educational messaging and actions to reduce the risk of the target population. ❧ Terrorism requires a combination of an alienated and altruistic individual, a legitimizing ideology and a complicit or enabling society. Of the three, it is the society that is most susceptible to positive influence proposed by this model, supported by appropriate policies and behaviors, designed to detect and deter the risk of passive recruitment and HVE. The issue of the complicit society will be addressed in terms of enhancing societal morality and community integrity, with the intended outcome of facilitating community-based efforts to identify and develop solutions to quality of life challenges. Recognizing the importance of the identified ideology or hybrid ideologies, the intent is to influence the potential radicalization process through the use of the environment. ❧ HVE is a threat that has the capacity to leverage a diverse collection of academic disciplines. In response, counterterrorism should evolve in professional practice. This thesis examines the core questions and research methodologies in the humanities, sciences and social sciences to identity the respective value proposition of each discipline and how these areas of study may be leveraged into HVE research. Consideration of the scientific method is critical, when applied to the study of extremists and extremist group relationships as it relates to developing strategies for countering extremist ideologies. ❧ The United States, like many other nations, faces a challenge from terrorism and violent extremism. As homeland security has evolved in response to an intelligent and adaptive adversary, dogmatic zealotry has imbedded itself into the fabric of some communities around the world, spawning a threat which is now homegrown. However, United States’ military engagements abroad do have an effect on ideological motivational factors at home. Those conflicts are important, however they will not be the primary focus of this thesis. Most important, it is a small minority of alienated individuals that seek to harm innocent people in the name of an ideology, which causes division, hatred and violence. This thesis articulates that a security response alone is insufficient

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Asset Metadata

Creator Southers, Erroll Gregory (author)

Core Title Homegrown violent extremism: designing a community-based model to reduce the risk of recruitment and radicalization

School School of Policy, Planning and Development

Degree Doctor of Policy, Planning & Development

Degree Program Public Policy

Publication Date 09/16/2013

Defense Date 08/29/2013

Publisher University of Southern California (original), University of Southern California. Libraries (digital)

Tag extremism,homegrown,OAI-PMH Harvest,radicalization,terrorism

Format application/pdf (imt)

Language English

Contributor Electronically uploaded by the author (provenance)

Advisor Heikkila, Eric J. (committee chair), Ganor, Boaz (committee member), Orosz, Michael (committee member), Robertson, Peter John (committee member), Tambe, Milind (committee member)

Creator Email esouthers1@gmail.com,southers@usc.edu

Permanent Link (DOI) https://doi.org/10.25549/usctheses-c3-328935

Unique identifier UC11293802

Identifier etd-SouthersEr-2042.pdf (filename),usctheses-c3-328935 (legacy record id)

Legacy Identifier etd-SouthersEr-2042.pdf

Dmrecord 328935

Document Type Dissertation

Format application/pdf (imt)

Rights Southers, Erroll Gregory

Type texts

Source University of Southern California (contributing entity), University of Southern California Dissertations and Theses (collection)

Access Conditions The author retains rights to his/her dissertation, thesis or other graduate work according to U.S. copyright law. Electronic access is being provided by the USC Libraries in agreement with the a...

Repository Name University of Southern California Digital Library

Repository Location USC Digital Library, University of Southern California, University Park Campus MC 2810, 3434 South Grand Avenue, 2nd Floor, Los Angeles, California 90089-2810, USA