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A research on water conservation and governance networks in Southern California

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A research on water conservation and governance networks in Southern California

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Content A RESEARCH ON WATER CONSERVATION AND GOVERNANCE NETWORKS IN
SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA

Elena Maggioni

August 13 2013

A Dissertation Presented to the
FACULTY OF THE USC GRADUATE SCHOOL
UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA
In Partial Fulfillment of the
Requirements for the Degree
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
(PUBLIC POLICY, PLANNING AND DEVELOPMENT)

Dissertation Committee

Prof. Daniel Mazmanian
Committee Chair

Prof. Paul Adler

Prof. Juliet Musso

To Angelo, ‘omen nomen’.

i

CONTENTS

Illustrations .................................................................................................................................... iv
Acknowledgements ......................................................................................................................... x
Acronyms ..................................................................................................................................... xiii
ABSTRACT ................................................................................................................................. xiv
Introduction ..................................................................................................................................... 1
PART 1 REVIEW OF WATER GOVERNANCE AND WATER MANAGEMENT
ACADEMIC LITERATURE AND RESEARCH METHOD ........................................................ 9
AREAS OF SCHOLARSHIP ....................................................................................................... 10
Institutions and Water ........................................................................................................... 10
Summary ........................................................................................................................... 10
The Nature of Water as a Human Right and an Economic Good ......................................... 12
Natural Resources and Institutions ....................................................................................... 14
Water and Institutions ........................................................................................................... 18
Water Rights ..................................................................................................................... 19
Water Law in California ............................................................................................... 19
Surface Water................................................................................................................ 19
Groundwater ................................................................................................................. 20
Water Management and Institutions ..................................................................................... 21
Methodological Studies .................................................................................................... 21
Empirical Research ........................................................................................................... 25
Institutional Analysis of Water Resources in Southern California ................................... 31
Models of Water Demand and Water Conservation ............................................................. 35
Summary ........................................................................................................................... 35
Price Elasticity of Water Demand..................................................................................... 37
Other Relevant Variables that Affect Water Demand ...................................................... 38
Models of Effectiveness of Non-Price Water Conservation ............................................. 40
Limitations of Non-Price Water Conservation Measures ................................................. 47
Belief Systems and Water Conservation........................................................................... 47
RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND METHOD ............................................................................... 49
Research Questions ............................................................................................................... 49
Research Approach and Methodology .................................................................................. 52
The Qualitative Stage ........................................................................................................ 53
ii

Hypotheses Testing ........................................................................................................... 54
PART 2 DESCRIPTION OF WATER SUPPLY GOVERNANCE AND OF WATER
CONSERVATION TOOLS AND STRATEGIES ....................................................................... 57
WATER SUPPLY IN SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA: PUBLIC ORGANIZATIONS AND
THEIR ROLE ........................................................................................................................... 58
The Federal Level ................................................................................................................. 58
California Water Governance ............................................................................................... 64
Southern California Regional Water Governance: Metropolitan Water District .................. 68
MWD’s Member Agencies: Retailers and Wholesalers ................................................... 76
MWD’s Member Agencies: the Retailers ......................................................................... 76
MWD’s Member Agencies: the Wholesalers ................................................................... 78
Groundwater, Watermasters and Management Plans ........................................................... 84
Water Retailers...................................................................................................................... 90
WATER CONSERVATION IN PRACTICE .......................................................................... 94
Water Conservation Tools ................................................................................................... 94
City Ordinances ................................................................................................................... 94
The Water Intensity of Planning .......................................................................................... 96
Water Saving Devices ......................................................................................................... 98
Devices to Reduce Indoor Residential Water Usage ...................................................... 100
Devices to Reduce Outdoor Water Usage ....................................................................... 109
Devices to Reduce Commercial Industrial and Institutional Water Usage ..................... 115
Pricing: Water Rates as Conservation Tool ....................................................................... 126
Other Pricing Strategies ..................................................................................................... 132
Smart Metering and the Technological Frontier ............................................................... 135
Other Market Instruments for Water Conservation ........................................................... 136
Education and Information: Teaching the Children and the Teachers and Raising Public
Awareness.......................................................................................................................... 137
REGULATORY AGENCIES AND WATER CONSERVATION STRATEGIES ................... 140
The role of Federal and State Organizations ....................................................................... 140
California Planning and Regulatory Framework for Water Conservation ......................... 142
Senate Bill x 7-7 and the Legislative Commitment to Control Water Usage in California
......................................................................................................................................... 147
From 2009 to 2012, New California Regulatory Actions for Water Conservation ........ 151
iii

The California Urban Water Conservation Council ........................................................... 153
The Role of MWD and the Basics Principles of its Conservation Strategies ..................... 156
A Short History of MWD’s Conservation Programs ...................................................... 159
MWD’s Long-Term Conservation Plan and Revised Policy Principles on Water
Conservation ................................................................................................................... 168
MWD Water Conservation Budget ................................................................................. 170
Relations between MWD and its Member Agencies ...................................................... 172
Wholesalers as engine of water conservation ..................................................................... 173
Wholesalers’ Participation to MWD’s Programs ........................................................... 174
Wholesalers’ Funding from External Sources ................................................................ 177
Wholesalers’ Involvement with the Retail Agencies ...................................................... 178
Role of Water Conservation in Planning Future Water Supply ...................................... 185
PART 3 ANALYSIS AND EVALUATION OF WATER CONSERVATION STRATEGIES IN
SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA ...................................................................................................... 186
WATER CONSERVATION THROUGH THE WORDS OF THE WATER AGENCIES... 187
The Evolution of Water Conservation: from Low Flow Showerheads Distribution to Water
Audits .................................................................................................................................. 187
Successful Conservation Strategies: How to “Get the Best Bang for your Buck” ............. 190
Has there ever Been an Unsuccessful Conservation Program? .......................................... 193
The Perceived Hurdles for Water Conservation ................................................................. 195
Funding, Governance and Collaboration ............................................................................ 199
Collaboration between MWD and its Member Agencies ............................................... 199
Collaboration among Wholesalers .................................................................................. 203
Collaboration between Wholesalers and Retail Water Agencies ................................... 204
Collaboration between Wholesalers, Retailers and other Agencies ............................... 207
The Future of Water Conservation ..................................................................................... 210
Conclusion .......................................................................................................................... 212
Discussion ........................................................................................................................... 214
STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF CHANGES IN DAILY PER CAPITA WATER USAGE .... 216
Model specification ............................................................................................................. 217
Data availability .............................................................................................................. 221
Water conservation policies ............................................................................................ 221
Water supply and demand ............................................................................................... 223
iv

Water rates ...................................................................................................................... 224
Residents in water retail agencies ................................................................................... 224
STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF CHANGES IN DAILY PER CAPITA WATER USAGE 216
Model Specification ............................................................................................................ 217
Data Availability ............................................................................................................. 221
Water Conservation Policies ........................................................................................... 221
Water Supply and Demand ............................................................................................. 223
Water Rates ..................................................................................................................... 224
Residents in Water Retail Agencies ................................................................................ 224
Weather Data .................................................................................................................. 225
Degree of Closeness ........................................................................................................ 226
Additional Variables ....................................................................................................... 228
Data description .................................................................................................................. 230
The Sample ..................................................................................................................... 230
Summary Statistics.......................................................................................................... 231
Statistical analysis ............................................................................................................... 235
Multivariate Linear Regression....................................................................................... 235
Panel Regression ............................................................................................................. 240
Testing for Fixed and Random Effects ........................................................................... 241
Panel Data with Fixed Effects......................................................................................... 243
Discussion ........................................................................................................................... 246
Methodological Reflection.............................................................................................. 252
Conclusions ......................................................................................................................... 253
CONCLUSIONS......................................................................................................................... 255
APPENDICES ............................................................................................................................ 268
APPENDIX A ......................................................................................................................... 269
APPENDIX B ......................................................................................................................... 270
APPENDIX C ......................................................................................................................... 272
APPENDIX D ......................................................................................................................... 273
APPENDIX E ......................................................................................................................... 276
APPENDIX F.......................................................................................................................... 277
APPENDIX G ......................................................................................................................... 278
REFERENCES ........................................................................................................................... 283
v

Illustrations

Figures

Figure 1. Southern California Water Governance Structure .......................................................... 6
Figure 2. Ostrom’s Framework for Institutional Analysis ............................................................ 16
Figure 3. Action situation embedded in a socio-ecological system .............................................. 17
Figure 4. Relationships among water districts, wholesalers, watermasters and cities .................. 34
Figure 5. Water supply in the Metropolitan Water District area .................................................. 70
Figure 6. MWD water rates (2003 – 2011) ................................................................................... 73
Figure 7. MWD rates at constant value (2011 dollars) ................................................................ 74
Figure 8. Metropolitan Water District and its member agencies .................................................. 76
Figure 9. Groundwater basins in Southern California .................................................................. 85
Figure 10. Nature of the water retailers in Southern California ................................................... 91
Figure 11. Number of residents in the service area of water retailers in Southern California
(2010) ........................................................................................................................... 91
Figure 12. Per capita daily water usage (2002 – 2007 average) ................................................... 92
Figure 13. Average percent rate of variation of daily per capita water usage (2002 – 2007
average) ........................................................................................................................ 92
Figure 14. Groundwater supply as a percentage of total supply (2002 – 2007 average) .............. 93
Figure 15. Water retailers reporting BMPs results to CUWCC ................................................... 93
Figure 16. Increasing block rates in Los Angeles and Cucamonga Valley Water District ........ 130
Figure 17. California hydrologic regions and their 2020 Targets .............................................. 164
Figure 18. Payments for Save Water Save a Buck rebates by MWD and member agencies
between 2004 and 2011 .............................................................................................. 164
Figure 19. Number of rebates funded by Save Water Save a Buck from program inception to FY
2010 – 2011 ................................................................................................................ 165
vi

Figure 20. Number of Residential rebates 1990 – 1991 to 2007-2008 ....................................... 166
Figure 21. MWD’s budget for water conservation rebate programs .......................................... 171
Figure 22. Financial contributions to the CII rebates program ................................................... 175
Figure 23. Wholesalers’ funding of CII rebates.......................................................................... 176
Figure 24. Distribution of the CII rebates in the wholesalers’ service areas .............................. 176
Figure 25. Distribution of residential rebates in the wholesalers’ service area from FY 2008-2009
to FY 2010-2011 (dollars) .......................................................................................... 177
Figure 26. Distribution of residential rebates in the wholesalers’ service area from FY 2008-2009
to FY 2010-2011 (number of rebates) ........................................................................ 177
Figure 27. Rain fall in MWD service area 2005 – 2010 ............................................................. 234
Tables

Table 1. Methods for the institutional analysis of water resources ............................................... 25
Table 2. Impact of institutions on water management .................................................................. 30
Table 3. Non price water demand management measures and their effectiveness ....................... 46
Table 4. Projects for water usage efficiency funded by US Bureau of Reclamation in Southern
California ...................................................................................................................... 61
Table 5. Retail water agencies member of MWD ......................................................................... 78
Table 6. Sources of revenues of water wholesalers (fy 2010 – 2011) .......................................... 80
Table 7. Characteristics of wholesalers, members of the Metropolitan Water District ................ 82
Table 8. Water recycling capacity of water wholesalers in Southern California .......................... 84
Table 9. Adjudication rules of groundwater basins in MWD service area ................................... 88
Table 10. Water efficiency standards according to EPA 1992 ..................................................... 99
Table 11. Water efficiency standards according to Water Sense Certification ............................ 99
Table 12. Residential indoor water usage ................................................................................... 101
Table 13. Characteristics and effects of residential water saving devices ......................... 105 - 108
vii

Table 14. Characteristics and effects of landscape water saving devices .......................... 112 - 114
Table 15. 2010 GDP in the US, California and Southern California Metropolitan Areas ......... 116
Table 16. Characteristics and effects of CII water saving devices .................................... 122 - 125
Table 17. Prevalence of rate structures in United States ............................................................ 130
Table 18. Legislative action to improve water conservation between 2005 and 2009 ............... 143
Table 19. Recommendations of 20 x 2020 plan ......................................................................... 146
Table 20. Performance standards for 2020 target water usage according to Method #2 ............ 149
Table 21. Definition of BMPS included in the Memorandum of Understanding ....................... 154
Table 22. New definitions of BMPS included in the Memorandum of Understanding ............ 155
Table 23. Water supply in 2020 according to MWD’s IRP ....................................................... 158
Table 24. Funds for ULFTs rebates and distribution .................................................................. 161
Table 25. Number of ULFTs funded by MWD between 1988 and 1998 ................................... 161
Table 26. Regional Commercial program rebates as of 7/1/2012 .............................................. 163
Table 27. Contribution to Save Water Save a Buck ................................................................... 164
Table 28. Residential rebates as of 7/1/2012 ............................................................................. 167
Table 29. Residential rebates from 2008-2009 to 2010-2011 ..................................................... 167
Table 30. Incentives for water conservation programs for member agencies as of 7/1/2012 .... 168
Table 31. Wholesalers’ contribution to MWD’s programs ........................................................ 174
Table 32. Wholesalers funded by external agencies ................................................................... 178
Table 33. Summary of wholesalers’ water conservation activities .................................... 181 - 184
Table 34. Comparison of sample and population ....................................................................... 231
Table 35. Summary statistics ...................................................................................................... 233
Table 36. Bi-variate correlations................................................................................................. 235
viii

Table 37. Correlation matrix ....................................................................................................... 236
Table 38. Simple OLS estimates ................................................................................................ 238
Table 39. Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) test ........................................................................... 238
Table 40. Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity ...................................... 239
Table 41. Robust OLS estimates ................................................................................................. 240
Table 42. Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian multiplier test for random effects estimated results . 241
Table 43. Hausman test estimates ............................................................................................... 242
Table 44. Summary statistics of the panel data........................................................................... 244
Table 45. Estimates of the panel data ......................................................................................... 245

ix

Acronyms

AF Acre Foot
ANSI American National Standard Institute
ASME American Society of Mechanical Engineers’
AWWA American Water Works Association
BEA Bureau of Economic Analysis
BMP Best Management Practices
BPP Basin Production Percentage
CDPH California Department of Public Health
CEE Consortium for Energy Efficiency
CERCLA Comprehensive Environmental Response Compensation and Liability Act
CII Commercial, Industrial and Institutional
CIMIS California Irrigation Management Information System
CMWD Calleguas Municipal Water District
CPR Common Pool Resources
CPUC California Public Utilities Commission
CRA Colorado River Aqueduct
CUWCC California Urban Water Conservation Council
CWA Clean Water Act
CWRB California Water Resources Control Board
DOF California Department of Finance
DSM Demand Side Management
DWR California Department of Water Resources
EPA Environmental Protection Agency
ET Evapotranspiration
GHG Greenhouse Gasses
gpcpd Gallons Per Capita Per Day
gpm Gallons per minute
HCF hundred cubic feet
HET High Efficiency Toilet
x

HEW High Efficiency Washer
HOA Home Owner Associations
IAD Institutional Analysis and Development
IBR Increasing Block Rate
IEUA Inland Empire Utilities Agency
IOU Investor Owned Utility
IRP Integrated Water Resources Plan
IRWD Irvine Ranch Water District in Orange County
LID Low Impact Development
LRMC Long Run Marginal Cost
MCBA Modified Cost Balancing Account
MOU Memorandum of Understanding
MSA Metropolitan Statistical Area
MWD Metropolitan Water District
MWDOC Municipal Water District of Orange County
OCWD Orange County Water District
OWUE Office of Water Use Efficiency
PAC Program Action Committees
PRSV pre rinse spray valves
PSP Public Sector Program
RA Replenishment Assessment
RUWMP Urban Regional Water Management Plan
RWCB Regional Water Quality Control Boards
SANDAG San Diego Association of Governments
SCAG Southern California Association of Governments
SDCWA San Diego County Water Authority
SDWA Safe Drinking Water Act
SWP State Water Project
SWRB State Water Resources Board
ULARA Upper Los Angeles River Area
ULFT Ultra Low Flow Toilet
xi

USBR Bureau of Reclamation
USGVMWD Upper San Gabriel Valley Municipal Water District
UWMP Urban Water Management Plans
WBIC Weather Based Irrigation Controllers
WF Water Factor
WRAM Water Revenue Adjustment Mechanism
WRD Water Replenishment District
WSICS Weather Sensitive Irrigation Controller Switches

xii

Acknowledgements
This dissertation is the result of a collaborative effort and I want to thank all those that have participated.
My deep thanks go to my dissertation committee. Professor Daniel Mazmanian has helped me through
my doctoral studies every step of the way. He has been available, supportive, patient, witty and
provocative. The best qualities one can wish in an advisor. Thanks to him I have published a journal
article, I have presented at major conferences and I have completed this dissertation. His dedication has
been invaluable. I’m looking forward to showing him that I learnt to walk on my own feet. Professor
Juliet Musso, an inspiring woman and a great teacher that supported my choice of pursuing a PhD from
the beginning. Professor Paul Adler with his questions has made me think and reflect over issues that I
glanced over, and this has made my work better. My thanks also go to Professor Hilda Blanco that has
sparked my interest in water issues and has supported my research. Working with her was instrumental at
learning most of what I know about water governance. And I want to thank Professor Gen Giuliano that
has rooted for me and has supported my first steps as a researcher. I am grateful to the Price School of
Public Policy, that has invested on my hopes and to the Haynes Foundation that has funded an entire year
of research.
This dissertation could not have been done without the contribution of the conservation coordinators and
water agencies officials that have spent time with me, answered my questions, provided data and
explained what they are doing. They are the real protagonists of the water conservation effort and their
dedication is admirable.
My peers have been very important: Felicity Chang Sit, Cheongsin Kim, Michael Lee, Jia Lu, Erin
McMorrow, Sanghee Park, Yu Jean Sho, Henry Yee. Thank you for being the group of friends and
colleagues that help each other, listen and support consistently. Special thanks goes to Noah Dormady,
with whom I have studied for exams, written papers, exchanged frank opinions and spent time on
freeways and planes. Noah has always been available and has helped me understand how statistical
models can be used meaningfully. His support has been irreplaceable. Finally, thanks to Brad Meier, that
has encouraged me to embrace my doubts rather than fighting them.
xiii

ABSTRACT

The goal of this research is to study the water conservation capabilities of Southern California
water agencies and the institutional responses that could enhance the regional system’s water
conservation capacity. Southern California water conservation capabilities are going to be tested
by the forecasted population growth, by the increasing demand of water for environmental
purposes and by climate change that will increase the uncertainty about the future consistency of
water supply. The growth of Southern California in the last century has been based on the
premise of abundant water supply, whose consistency has been provided by a complex
institutional arrangement. In recent year, aware of its future challenges, the system has enacted
conservation policies. It is interesting to test the system’s conservation effectiveness and to
understand whether it needs to change in order to improve its performance in terms of water
conservation. The research highlights that the Southern California water conservation effort is
small in terms of resources and effective only in case of emergency. Pricing strategies have been
put in place only after an emergency for drought has been declared, in response of the decline of
agencies’ revenues, and the per capita amount of rebates is too small to be significant. Only
water conservation ordinances, changes in precipitations and changes local economic indicators
are correlated with changes in per capita water usage.

xiv

Introduction
Water scarcity is a problem in many parts of the world. According to the UN (2006) by
2025, 1.8 billion people will be living in areas likely to experience absolute water scarcity. More
than 40% of the world’s population could face serious water shortages if they rely only on
locally available freshwater (Gleick, 2000). Some places will experience scarcity due to climate
and others because of lack of infrastructure. In some places, both issues are problematic.
In the South West, New Mexico, Arizona, Nevada, Utah and California, water
consumption is larger than snowfalls and, after diversion to consumptive uses what remains of
precipitations is insufficient to replenish groundwater basins. However, much of the recent
demographic growth is fueled by groundwater extractions that are likely to be insufficient to
support population and economic growth for the next 100 years (Akerman and Stanton 2011).
In California, in particular, water supply is in critical conditions due to a number of
reasons. More severe droughts have depleted the state water resources. The quality of
ecosystems has been constantly declining, many species living in California rivers and wetlands
have been included in the endangered species list and are on the verge of disappearing. About
60% of surface water bodies is listed as impaired and ground water basins are heavily
overdrafted (about 1.5 MAF/Y). Urban development has occurred in dry areas that depend on
their water supply from ageing infrastructures, at risk for natural events like floods and
earthquakes (DWR 2009a).
Multiple and conflicting water uses exacerbate this crisis (Hanak et al. 2010). Population,
which is estimated to grow from 35 to 53 million by 2050, agricultural uses, which make up
about 45% of water usage and are a vital part of the state economy, and environmental uses
compete for the same limited water supply. The future of water demand is highly uncertain.
1

According to the different scenarios described in the State Water Plan 2009 Update, by 2050
total water demand could decrease by 2.5 MAF/Y if strong water conservation and urban
development restrictions were applied, or could grow by 6 MAF/Y in a more expansive scenario
(DWR 2009a). In this uncertainty, however, one element is certain: urban water consumption is
going to increase under every possible future. The growth will be small in a conservative
scenario, but current demand could double if suburban growth is encouraged and water
conservation measures are not successful.
Climate change will influence water supply and water demand soon. According to
climate change science, water supply and demand will be affected by changes in temperatures
and in quantity, quality and frequency of precipitations (Cayan et al.2008; Hayhoe et al. 2004).
According to the California Climate Adaptation Strategy average temperatures could increase
between 4° F and 9 ° F by the end of the century (NRA 2009, 15), with hotter summers rather
than balmier winters and more pronounced warming in the inland areas rather than on the coast.
Precipitations are not likely to change much in quantity, but they are rather likely to be more
intense during the winter with drier summers, while the snowpack, that is now a precious water
reservoir, is likely to be severely reduced (Hayhoe et al. 2004). The estimates of water
availability vary according to the climate models on which they are based, but they all point out
that increasing uncertainty and extreme variability of available water supply is the future of
California water system (Groves, Matyac, and Hawkins 2005; Groves, Yates and Tebaldi 2008;
Harou et al. 2010; Medellin-Azuara et al. 2008; Tanaka, 2006; Vicuna et al. 2007; Vicuna and
Drakup 2007; Vicuna et al. 2010).
The water energy nexus is an additional element of crisis of the California water system
that climate change is likely to exasperate. About 19% of the energy demand in California is
2

related to water uses (conveyance, treatment, distribution and wastewater treatment). If climate
change reduces water supply, water districts are likely to opt for additional energy intensive
solutions such as water recycling or desalination, increasing energy demand. At the same time,
hydroelectric energy production is likely to be hindered by water shortages and coal fired power
plants could experience shortages of cooling water. Climate change would trigger a positive
feedback loop that would result in shortages of water and energy that would disrupt the state
economic growth and damage its communities.
To face the uncertain future, state and regional water plans heavily rely on water
conservation. The State Water Management Plan, for example, identifies urban water
conservation as the water management strategy that will be most effective at matching supply
and demand by 2050 and expects that urban water efficiency will yield between 1.2 and 3.1
MAF of savings a year. In its 2011 Urban Regional Water Management Plan (RUWMP), the
Metropolitan Water District (MWD) has highlighted that water conservation is going to be the
most relevant offset to water scarcity. According to the plan, by 2020, in Southern California,
different water efficiency policies will yield savings for about 1.3 MAF per year, more than the
projected supply augmentation that will be obtained from recycled or desalinated water (MWD
2010d).
Water scarcity is not new for California. The state’s history is characterized by the
constant pressure of economic development on limited water resources and punctuated by
droughts. Its precipitation regime is highly variable and prone to multi-year periods of below
average precipitation that extend for up to seven years and end in short periods of heavy rains
(McDonald 2007, 89). Throughout the 20
th
century the response to the mismatch between
development and a reliable, constant and clean water supply has been building infrastructures
3

that move water from where it is available to where it is needed for irrigation or urban uses.
Hanak et al. (2011) call the time frame between 1900 and 1982 the “hydraulic era” (26). Vincent
Ostrom (1953) details how each important decision about building water conveyance
infrastructure in California coincides with a drought. A drought at the end of XIX century was
one of the elements that pushed the city of Los Angeles to build the Los Angeles Aqueduct, a
drought at the end of the 1920s corresponds to the approval of funding for the Colorado River
Aqueduct and for the Central Valley Project and a drought at the end of the 1950s corresponds
with the approval of funding for the State Water Project.
The response to the more recent droughts, at the end of the 1980s, in the early 2000s
and more recently between 2007 and 2009 has been different. Hanak et al. (2011) describe how
the state’s economy has changed and many water intensive sectors of the economy have ceased
to increase their water usage and how new concerns about the environmental function of water
have become relevant. In addition, especially in the last 10 years, the fiscal crisis in California
has hindered public investments in infrastructure and urged policy makers to shift form a supply
side approach to water scarcity to a demand management approach and to look for a wider range
of policy tools to balance water demand and supply among which water conservation.
Water conservation is an attractive water management strategy because it can produce
multiple benefits. Water conservation can reduce or delay the capital cost of new infrastructure
to treat and deliver water. Reduced uses also lower the demand for wastewater treatment,
including capital costs and ongoing treatment costs. There may also be improvements in the
quality of receiving waters related to reduced discharge. Landscape water conservation can yield
multiple benefits including reduced use of fertilizers, pesticides, and herbicides and reduced
4

escape of these chemicals into surface waters through use of native plants and low water using
varieties, reduced production of green waste, and improved habitat value of urban landscapes.
In the early 1990s the shift was channeled through the voluntary commitment of many
water agencies to reduce their per capita water usage by implementing best management
practices. The effort, however, has not been as successful as expected. Lacking a precise goal
and accountability mechanisms the voluntary effort fell short of the expectations. Per capita
water usage had declined in the 1990s rebounded during the 1999 – 2002 drought and by 2007
was about the same as in 1992.
The 2007 – 2009 was a crucial time for water policy, facing a severe drought the
governor declared the state of emergency for drought and the legislature approved a package of
bills, among which SBx7-7, that requires water suppliers to reduce water usage by 20% by 2020,
a change of approach from the previous emphasis on infrastructures and voluntary programs.
The California State Water Resources Control Board has set the goal to reduce per
capita urban water consumption from 192 gallons per capita per day (gpcpd) to 154. For
Southern California, the mandated per capita reduction is from 180 to 149 gpcpd (DWR et al.
2010).
Urban water management governance in Southern California has guaranteed, to date,
the rapid economic development of the area, based on abundant supply of imported water. It is a
complex system, characterized by extreme decentralization of distribution and local water supply
and centralization of imported water supply.
Water supply results fragmented and layered (Fig. 1). There are about 215 retail water
organizations in Southern California. They serve on average about 120,000 customers, but some
serve as little as 500 people and 2 more than 1,000,000. Most of them are cities (85), but many
5

are special districts, divisions of investor owned utilities and mutual companies. The area relies
on water imported from the Colorado River and from the Bay Delta for 53% of its needs, on
water imported by the Los Angeles Aqueduct for 5%, on recycled water for 1% and on local
groundwater for about 41%.

Legend State jurisdiction Local jurisdiction Other
Figure 1. Southern California Water Governance Structure
Water demand is mostly for residential uses (about 68%) and daily per capita water usage
varies tremendously across the region. In low income and dense communities in South East Los
Angeles County it is as low as 85 gallons per capita per day and in wealthier communities in the
dry inland and on the coast, where lots are much larger, it is larger than 480 gallons per capita
per day.
Many features of the California groundwater institutional system have been object of the
scholarly literature (Blomquist 1992; Blomquist 2009; Blomquist et al. 2004; V. Ostrom 1953; E.
Ostrom 1990). Its polycentrism and its extreme decentralization have been interpreted as its
strength and as a paradigmatic case of the ability of stakeholders to manage common pool
6

resources in situations where property rights are not clear (Blomquist 1992; Blomquist 2009; V.
Ostrom 1953; E. Ostrom 1990). Most of the literature has highlighted how in Southern California
water producers have created a flexible, effective, relatively efficient and polycentric system to
manage groundwater basins that, rarely has been pointed out, is based on reliable availability of
imported water.
Little published research however exists on the effectiveness of this decentralized and
complex system in addressing increasing water scarcity and implementing completely different
water management tasks such as water demand management. This research intends to fill this
gap, supported by the existing literature on institutions and water supply and on water demand
management. Its goal is to understand the transition from water policies aimed at increasing
supply to water policies aimed at controlling water demand, by studying which characteristics of
the water governance system are correlated with successful water demand management policies
and to assess the effectiveness of water conservation strategies.
This research captures an important turning point of California water demand
management history, the transition from exclusively voluntary policies to mandated urban water
savings in a time frame characterized by a severe drought and by a severe economic recession.
It is innovative for three reasons. One is the methodological approach. Previous research
on water management and institutions has adopted either qualitative (Blomquist 1992; Erie 2006;
V. Ostrom 1953; E. Ostrom 1990), or quantitative methods (Hanak 2009; Heikkila et al. 2004;
Mullin 2009, Zetland 2008). This research, instead, adopts a mixed method design that combines
qualitative with quantitative analysis, with the possibility of asking explanatory and exploratory
question in the same study and to integrate the results of the two methods.
7

Another is the dependent variable. Previous research on water management organizations
from an institutional perspective analyzes factors correlated to policy adoption (Hanak 2009;
Heikkila et al. 2004; Mullin 2009) while this research focuses on policy outcomes.
The last is the unit of analysis. The existing literature on water demand management
focuses on the effects of water demand policies from the perspective of individual consumer,
Campbell, Johnson, and Hunt Larson 2004; Hanneman and Nauges 2005; Renwick and
Archibald 1998; Renwick and Green 2000; Tsai, Cohen, and Vogel 2011) while this research
analyzes the effects of water conservation strategies from the perspective of the organizations.
The following chapters include a review of the existing literature on institutions and
water management and on water demand management; a description of the methods used for this
research, a description of Southern California water governance system; a description of the most
widely used water conservation strategies; a short history of water conservation in California; a
description of how water conservation strategies have been implemented in Southern California;
the results of 30 interviews with water conservation managers and officials of water agencies in
Southern California and the results of a statistical analysis performed to test the hypotheses
derived from the analysis of the existing literature and from the interviews.

8

PART 1
REVIEW OF WATER GOVERNANCE AND WATER MANAGEMENT ACADEMIC
LITERATURE AND RESEARCH METHOD

9

TABLE OF CONTENTS
AREAS OF SCHOLARSHIP .......................................................................................................... 10
Institutions and Water ........................................................................................................... 10
Summary ........................................................................................................................... 10
The Nature of Water as a Human Right and an Economic Good ......................................... 12
Natural Resources and Institutions ....................................................................................... 14
Water and Institutions ........................................................................................................... 18
Water Rights ..................................................................................................................... 19
Water Law in California ............................................................................................... 19
Surface Water................................................................................................................ 19
Groundwater ................................................................................................................. 20
Water Management and Institutions ..................................................................................... 21
Methodological Studies .................................................................................................... 21
Empirical Research ........................................................................................................... 25
Institutional Analysis of Water Resources in Southern California ................................... 31
Models of Water Demand and Water Conservation ............................................................. 35
Summary ........................................................................................................................... 35
Price Elasticity of Water Demand..................................................................................... 37
Other Relevant Variables that Affect Water Demand ...................................................... 38
Models of Effectiveness of Non-Price Water Conservation ............................................. 40
Limitations of Non-Price Water Conservation Measures ................................................. 47
Belief Systems and Water Conservation........................................................................... 47

AREAS OF SCHOLARSHIP
Institutions and Water
Summary
This chapter includes the analysis of the theoretical foundation of institutional analysis,
summarizes the research on common pool resources, highlights its relevance for the study of
complex systems, in which human needs and natural resources collide, and underscores that
theory claims that polycentric governance systems are supposed to be adaptable to changing
natural conditions. An assessment of the analytical frameworks adopted by most studies on water
10

resources management system proposed in the literature reveals that norms, policy, and
organizations are the three subsystems one should take into account when studying institutional
systems of water management. An important finding is that the connections between the three
systems are important as much as the links of the institutional environment with the
characteristics of natural resources, and with the demographic and economic development.
It also highlights that research on organizational fragmentation and coordination is not
well developed, but it is important in considering the demand management strategy being put in
place today. This chapter summarizes the existing empirical research on institutions for water
management and explains how the effect of individual institutional characteristics on water
management has been analyzed. Tenure of water management organization is a predictor of its
water management performance, where public organizations are more likely to abide to State
mandates and to implement conservation measures. It also finds that the nature of the
organization affects its ability to implement water conservation measures, that special districts
are more likely to innovate than city departments and that organizations where the board is
directly elected by the public think about water more strategically than those where the board is
nominated by city or county officials. Although the research on the subject is limited, it finds that
fragmentation is not a predictor of more complex water management arrangements, that there are
economies of scale in providing them and only larger organizations are more likely to succeed.
Finally it takes into account the existing literature on the Southern California water
supply system, which has been the object of scholarly research for a long time and it finds that
groundwater basin management has been purported as an example of bottom up governance of
natural resources, but that it has been successful only thanks to the existence of the Metropolitan
Water District that provided ample supply of imported water. Now that this supply has become
11

less certain, while demographic pressure does not relent and water scarcity becomes a real
prospect, relationships within the district have become more difficult and the current agreements,
resulting from the history of the district, have become too rigid.
The Nature of Water as a Human Right and an Economic Good
The specific nature of water as an economic good is not straightforward. The complexity
of defining its nature reflects what Vincent Ostrom observed in 1961 about the effort of
classifying private goods and public goods: “the public or private nature of goods cannot be as
sharply made in the human experience” (835). Technical characteristics of specific goods
influence their uses and the degree to which they can be divided in individual parcels, while
technological innovation influences the degree to which their use can be rendered exclusive.
Livingston (1995) argues that the physical nature of water violates a number of economic
conditions. Three conditions, she explains, are necessary for markets to allocate resources
efficiently: (1) the resource user must be certain of the quantity, quality, location and timing of
resource availability; (2) the resource must be perfectly divisible; (3) resources must not affect,
nor be affected, by usage by another party. Water has a fugitive nature, she claims, because its
supply is strictly related to the water cycle, depends on weather and is generally uneven during
the year, in addition, it is quite difficult to estimate and predict water availability, as weather
forecasts are often incorrect and the relationship between precipitations and underground water
storage is not yet well understood. “Uncertainties as to the physical quantity of water available at
particular times and locations impede efficient resource use by lessening the expected value of
engaging in water activities.” (Livingston 1995, 205) Water, she adds, is not perfectly divisible
in terms of storage and transportation. Small quantities of water cannot be transported efficiently,
12

therefore to transport water where it is needed significant economies of scale are incurred and
generate situations of natural monopoly.
Griffin (2006) and Young (2005)clarify that water provides wide a range of services that
can be classified through the familiar lenses of the rival - non rival, excludable – non excludable
criteria (E.Ostrom 2005, 2010), and belong to a continuum that include the entire spectrum from
public to private goods. In some cases one person’s uses does not impede the usage by someone
else, in some cases it does. In some cases it is easy to exclude users from access, in others it is
not. Specifically, most inflow uses, uses that occur in natural water bodies, such as ecosystem
services, some recreational services, hydroelectric production, are non rival to a high degree
(Griffin 2006) and belong to a category that is defined “non-consumptive uses” (Young 2005, 6).
For some of these uses, such as ecosystem services and recreation, is difficult to exclude any
user, but for others, such as hydroelectric use it is not.
Many other water uses are rival, where the water used by one person cannot be used by
others (Griffin 2006, 108). Water used by industrial processes cannot be used by residential users
(at least not at the same time) the same as water used for irrigation or waste assimilation (Young
2005). These uses occur mainly outside natural water bodies (with the exclusion of waste
assimilation) and are defined “consumptive uses” (Young 2005, 7). When water is still in water
bodies like groundwater basins, rivers and lakes it is not always easy to exclude users from
accessing it and can be considered a common pool resource, while when contained in pipes and
removed from natural bodies it is not difficult to exclude users from access, therefore it is easy to
treat it as a private good.
13

When water uses are rival and excludable and water is treated like a private good,
externalities often arise; water pollution is the paradigmatic example. Also water production and
distribution is subject to economies of scale that generate natural monopolies (Griffin 2006).
Natural Resources and Institutions
To manage a scarce resource with complex uses, which has both private and public good
characteristics depending on context, a complex system of rules and organizations has evolved.
Simon (1949) explains that humans build sets of rules and communication patterns
(organizations) as tools to offset for bounded rationality, focus on the objective and lack of skills.
In his view, knowledge and institutions are substitutes. Coase (1960) buttresses the argument
claiming that institutions would be unnecessary only in a world of clearly defined property rights
and no transaction costs. North (1990) clarifies the difference between institutions as
organizations and institutions as formal and informal rules and claims that the latter are crucial
for economic performance and for the allocation of resources. In his words, formal and informal
rules “reduce uncertainty by establishing a stable (but not necessarily efficient) structure to
human interactions” (North 1990, 6). Institutions provide the framework that determines the cost
of transactions (North 1990, 43).
Natural resources management, where human knowledge is limited, property rights are ill
specified and public uses and externalities are the norm has been the field of analysis of many
institutional scholars. The focus, for many, is how to manage natural resource that having
conflicting uses give rise to the “tragedy of the commons” (Hardin 1968).
Heltberg (2001) proposes a framework to analyze the impact of institutions on natural
resources management that takes into account physical and technological characteristics of
resources and of users, institutional arrangements, human behaviors and interaction. He
14

highlights the relevance of formal and informal arrangements among users; however, his
empirical test does not support the hypothesis that the existence of informal arrangements
reduces the likelihood of resources degradation.
Elinor Ostrom (1990, 2005, 2010) provides a more complex framework to study the
diversity of human situations and the role of institutions in common pool resources management
that has largely been used to analyze the management of natural resources.
She defines institutions as “the prescriptions that humans use to organize all forms of
repetitive and structured interactions” (E. Ostrom 2005, 3). Her goal is to understand how the
rules or the absence of rules affect opportunities and constraints that humans face in any
particular situation (E. Ostrom 2005, 3). She is not interested in efficiency per se as an intrinsic
value to measure human endeavor, she is rather concerned with understanding how solutions to
collective action problems are generated when property rights are not well defined. To do so, she
proposes the Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) framework to analyze human
behavior. IAD takes into account:
a. the biophysical conditions in which the actions take place;
b. the characteristics of the community in which the action take place (that includes the history
of prior interactions and the social capital that has been built in the community);
c. the rules that participants use to organize their interactions (E. Ostrom 2005, 6-7; 2010, 15).
15

Attributes of
communities
Rules in
use
Action
Situations
Interactions
Evaluative
criteria
Outcomes
Biophysical
conditions
Common pool resource
Characteristics of actors involved
Position they hold
Amount of information available
Outcomes actors jointly affect
Set of functions that map actors decisions
Benefits and costs assigned to actions chosen
Conservation
Common
understanding of
who can take
action
History of prior
interactions, internal
homogeneity of key
attributes, social capital
Framework for Institutional Analysis and Development

Figure 2. Ostrom’s framework for institutional analysis
Adapted from Ostrom 2005, 6 and Ostrom 2010,15
Rules inform action situations and specifically determine the position of actors in the
situation. They also limit and determine actors’ action and prescribe how the position of actors in
a situation is linked to potential outcomes. Based on the analysis of numerous studies on
common pool resources, Ostrom groups the rules that determine outcomes of action situations in
seven different clusters:
a) Boundary rules that specify how actors can be chosen;
b) Position rules that specify a set of position and how many actors hold one;
c) Choice rules that specify which actions are assigned to an actor in a position;
d) Information rules that specify channels of communication among actors;
e) Scope rules that specify which outcomes can be influenced;
f) Aggregation rules that specify how decisions are taken;
g) Payoff rules that specify how benefits and costs are to be distributed to actors in
positions.
16

Most of Ostrom’s works has been based on common pool resources management in
simple settings, but her framework has been adapted for the analysis of complex socio-ecological
systems (E. Ostrom 2009).
Governance system Resource system
Action situation
Interactions - Outcomes
Users Resource units
Social, economic and political settings
Related ecosystems
Feedback Direct Causal Link

Figure 3. Action situation embedded in a socio-ecological system
Adapted from Ostrom 2010, 23
The updated version of the IAD is concerned with natural resources conservation and
with natural systems’ resilience. The focus of analysis is the relationships among the different
subsystems that constitute a socio ecological system, such as (i) the resource system (i.e. the
water cycle in a specific area); (2) resource units (such as the flow of water in a system); (iii) the
governance system (the organizations that manage the water resource); (iv) users (individuals
that use the resource) (E. Ostrom, 2009, 2010). Elinor Ostrom argues that stocks and flows of
environmental resources, existing governance systems and characteristics of users influence rules
17

and interaction in action situations and shape the relationship between humans and the
environment.
She also argues that there is no optimal property regime to manage natural resources. She
explains that in some cases clearly defined property rights work and in others governments a
central authority provide effective rules, while in many cases, when common pool resources are
involved, community control has been proven to foster long lasting regimes that have not
depleted said resources (E. Ostrom 2008, 2010). Based on Vincent Ostrom’s earlier work on the
organization of metropolitan services (V. Ostrom, Thiebou, and Warren 1961), she observes that
in order to manage complex systems, in which multiple actors interact, there is the need of
“complex, redundant, and layered institutions; a mix of institutional types; and designs that
facilitate experimentation, learning, and change” (Dietz et al. 2003).
Water and Institutions
The field of water institution research is rich and diverse. For the purpose of this work it
can be classified in two broad groups: one concerned with property rights and one with the
relationship among water management organizations. To the first group belong the comparative
analyses of water laws in different countries (Fredicksen 1992; Good 1989; Hutchins 1959; Le
Moigne et al. 1992; Liebcap 2007; Livingston 1995; Solanes and Gonzalez-Villareal 1999; Ward
and King 1998) and the effects of water property rights over specific water management
practices (Blomquist et al. 2004; Crase 2010; Hearne and Easter 1998). Another group is more
concerned with the relationships among water management organizations and to the interactions
between water management practices and rules with socio economic and political context (Adler
2009; Ingram et al. 1984; Blomquist 1992; Blomquist et al. 2004b; Blomquist 2009; Eire 2006;
18

Heikkila 2004; Kallis et al. 2009; Mullin 2009; V. Ostrom 1953; E. Ostrom 1990; Saleth and
Dinar 2004, 2008; Schluter and Pahl-Wostl 2007; Zetland 2009).
Water Rights
Water Law in California
In California, the constitution (Article XIV) establishes that water is property of the
people and declares as a matter of policy that water resources should be put at the fullest possible
use. Individuals can own and exchange usufructuary rights, but not full property rights over
water resources. The principle that water should be put to the fullest possible use is called the
“reasonable and beneficial use” principle and informs the entire California water doctrine. The
law defines 7 different typologies of water rights. It establishes two separate systems for the right
of using surface waters and groundwater and within the two systems distinguishes between rights
based on proximity (riparian rights) and rights based on usage (appropriative rights). It also
establishes groundwater correlative rights, groundwater prescriptive rights and pueblo rights. The
complexity of the law, reflected in the 30,000 sections of the water code, is exacerbated by the
fact that groundwater, when directly connected with surface water, is treated like surface water.
Surface Water
In California, the right to use surface water derives either from a property right over a
parcel of land adjacent to a body of water (river, lake or pond) or from a diversion of water from
a stream or a lake. Riparian rights are tied to land ownership, are not quantified, cannot be sold
separately from the land and do not expire if they are not used. However, they are limited by the
doctrine of “reasonable and beneficial use” (Blomquist, Schlager, and Hekkila 2004).
Users that divert water from streams and lakes to use it in areas not adjacent to the body
of water are granted appropriative rights, based on the doctrine of prior appropriation (“first in
19

time, first in right” – Good 1989) and on the doctrine of “reasonable and beneficial use” stated
by the California constitution (Art. X, 2). Appropriative rights are less binding than riparian
rights. In fact, in case of water shortages or drought, riparian right holders have priority over
holders of appropriative rights and are bounded by the reasonable and beneficial use doctrine, by
the prior appropriation doctrine and must be used continuously to be valid. Users that have
diverted water before 1914 had their rights recognized without going through an approval
process. After 1914, surface water appropriators need the approval of the California Water
Resources Control Board (CWRCB). They are required to apply to the board, motivate their
request and demonstrate that it does not interfere with existing rights. The CWRCB can decline
the application.
Riparian and appropriative rights are not the sole mean to access surface water. California
water law envisions four exceptions: 1) the operation of large surface water projects (water is
apportioned by contracts or compacts); 2) public trust (water diversion can be limited if it
threatens public values); 3) common law of public nuisance (water diversion can be limited if it
causes harms to the residents); 4) Pueblo rights (settlements recognized as pueblos by the
Spanish colonization of California were granted to use as much water as needed for the residents
of the pueblo as common property for domestic use, irrigation, and other purposes under
administration of town officials – Hutchins 1959).
Groundwater
California law distinguishes between underground flowing of surface streams and
“percolating groundwater” and attributes to users of underground flowing water that has the
same characteristics of a surface stream the same rights it recognizes to users of surface waters.
Percolating groundwater, on the other hand, is subject to a common law developed and enforced
20

by the courts (Blomquist, Schlager, and Hekkila 2004, 61). Owners of land overlaying a
groundwater basin have non quantified rights to use underground water for beneficial uses. If
they don’t exhaust the aquifer’s sustainable yields, other individuals can appropriate the water
and put it to use. Unlike in surface water, California water law has not created an entity that
authorizes appropriative uses of groundwater. In the last 130 years, in many circumstances the
indeterminateness of groundwater rights has generated conflict among users. These conflicts
have been resolved by court rulings that have taken into account the principle of reasonable and
beneficial use stated in the constitution, prescriptive rights (if a user pumps nonsurplus water
continuously for more than 5 years with no objection from overlying owners acquires an
appropriative right) and Pueblo rights. Court rulings have adjudicated water rights both for
overlaying owners and for appropriators, this means that in specific groundwater basins
individuals own rights to specific quantities of water that can be sold, leased and exchanged.
Water Management and Institutions
Methodological Studies
Among the studies that address the relationship among water management practices and
the socio economic and political context, some key methodological studies lay the foundations of
the institutional research in water management. Table 1 at the end of the section summarizes the
findings.
Ingram et al. (1984) describes how an institutional study should be done. The authors
argue that institutional problems are more critical for water management than technical and
physical problems and provide a guideline to operationalize institutional analysis in the water
context. They point out that institutional analyst should initially define the context and its own
limitations. It should then study the current institutional arrangement to identify current actors
21

and their stakes, the resources they own to advance their interests, (including legal arrangements,
prevailing values of public opinion, technical expertise and control of information) and the
decision making arenas through which actors can advance their agenda. Finally, it should
envision the means of overcoming current institutional impediments. This kind of analysis,
Ingram and her colleagues argue, would contribute to improving water governance, because it
will explain “how human beings are likely to behave and not how we might hope they would
behave” (Ingram et al. 1984, 333).
Ingram et al.’s framework could easily fit any institutional analysis and is very generic.
Blomquist, Heikkila, and Schlager (2004), based on their study on water rights and conjunctive
water management, are more specific from the methodological point of view, while at the same
time, more pragmatic. By comparing water rights in three different states, they find that ill
defined property rights make conjunctive management more difficult and that institutions are
very significant when a task requires coordination among organizations. They suggest that
institutional research on water resources should be based on comparative analysis of cases that
are different in terms of institutional conditions, but are in similar physical and economic
circumstances, in order to isolate institutional effects from other contextual influences
(Blomquist, Heikkila, and Schlager 2004, 928). They contend that it is more effective to study
cases where water policy reforms have just been enacted, because this maximizes the opportunity
to capture whether institutional arrangements facilitate institutional change. Also, they
recommend that researchers pay attention at how rules are set at the operational level, but also to
the institutional arrangements that guide the rule setting process, that they define “the
constitutional level of action” (Blomquist, Heikkila, and Schlager 2004, 930). Finally, they point
out that intergovernmental relations are crucial in water management systems. They explain that
22

“it is virtually impossible to identify a compelling water issue or setting that does not include an
intergovernmental component” (Blomquist, Heikkila, and Schlager 2004, 931). Different levels
of government invest resources and have their own agendas that sometimes collide and hinder
water management solutions.
Blomquist, Heikkila, and Schlager (2004) also provide useful indications for further
institutional research on water resources. Although the specification of water rights has been one
of the most analyzed issues in institutional research on water, they claim that further studies are
needed to understand whether flexibility of water rights delivers better results in terms of
sustainable water management than more prescriptive property rules. Also, they suggest that
public participation and user participation in water management systems need comparative
empirical research and so does the development of watershed management organizations.
Finally, they also point out that since water resource management responsibilities are divided
among several jurisdictions (Blomquist, Heikkila, and Schlager. 2004, 932), research on
organizational fragmentation and coordination is much necessary. They specify that the purpose
of these studies should be to study empirical concerns such as a) how different organizations
relate to different constituencies; b) how different organizations exchange information; c) the
degree to which organizations cooperate and the degree to which they compete; d) whether more
integrated systems perform better (Blomquist, Heikkila, and Schlager 2004, 933).
While Ingram (1984) and Blomquist, Heikkila, and Schlager et al. (2004) are mainly
concerned with the local dimension of water resources institutional analysis, Saleth and Dinar
(2004, 2008) and Blomquist, Schlager, and Heikkila (2004) address institutional questions at
national level, focusing on formal institutions and on macro institutions.
23

Saleth and Dinar (2004) provide a detailed framework for the analysis of water resources
institutions and make a systematic effort to be pragmatic and comprehensive. They treat
institutions like an ecosystem, for their internal linkages and their hierarchical and embedded
nature. They recognize that water resources institutions and their performance depend on
contextual factors like the characteristics of the environment, the political and the legal systems,
and the economic development of each nation, but their main focus is the creation of an
analytical framework to assess the performance of the water sector. They decompose the water
resources system in three components: water law, water policy and water administration and they
decompose each component in distinct aspects (Saleth and Dinar 2004, 95). Aspects like water
property rights, provisions for conflict resolution and provisions for accountability that are
usually included in the statutes of water actors belong to the first component. Operational rules
such as rules of pricing and cost recovery, intersectoral or interregional water transfers, and
users’ participation belong to the second. The third encompasses governance rules, like spatial
organization, regulatory and accountability mechanisms, functional capacity etc.. Unlike Ingram
et al. (1984) and Blomquist, Schlager, and Heikkila (2004), Saleth and Dinar (2004, 2005)
discuss the connections among different aspects of water resources institutions and explain that
the performance of the water system depends on the strength of these connections. Finally they
make an effort to define what they mean by “water sector performance” and posit that it is very
difficult to assess the performance of the system as a whole and analysts should evaluate its
physical performance, financial performance, economic efficiency and equity performance
independently and subsequently make an effort to define an overall measure of performance.
Saleth and Dinar’s method strength lies in its comprehensiveness and in the fact that it specifies
linkages among different elements.
24

Table 1. Methods for the institutional analysis of water resources
Author Elements of methods for water resources institutional analysis
Ingram et al. 1984 1. Define the context:
a. Define the problem and scope the assessment;
b. Understanding the limits of the analysis.
2. Analysis of current institutions:
a. Identify actors and their stakes;
b. Identify resources that actors have at their disposal
c. Identify biases of the decision making arenas through which actors may try to
achieve their goals.
3. Analysis of means of overcoming institutional impediments.

Blomquist et al. 2004 Water resources institutional analysis should be:
1. Based on comparative analysis of cases that are different in terms of institutional
conditions, but are in similar physical and economic conditions;
2. Conducted when water policy reform has been attempted to capture whether
institutional arrangements facilitate institutional change;
3. Attending to the operational and the constitutional levels of actions;
4. Minding the intergovernmental relations context.
Further institutional research in water resources:
1. Property rights and water policy reform;
2. Watershed user created organizations;
3. Public participation in water resources management;
4. Fragmentation and organizations’ coordination.

Dinar and Saleth, 2004

Source: Saleth and Dinar 2004, 51

Empirical Research
Empirical research on the role of institutions in water management has been conducted in
developing countries dealing with problems of irrigation (Joshi et al. 2000; Meizen-Dick 2007;
Tang 1992), fisheries (Schlager 1994) and country water resources management (Saleth 1996).
Water Organization
•Government layers
•Structure of water administration
•Finance/staff patterns
•Pricing
•Regulation/Accountability
•Information capability
•Technical capacity
Water Law
•Inter source Links
•Inter resource links
•Water rights
•Conflict resolution
•Accountability
•Scope for private participation
Water Policy
•Use priority
•Project selection
•Cost recovery
•Water transfers
•Turnover/Devolution
•Privatization
•Technology Policy
25

This section, instead, is focused on the empirical research that has been conducted at global level
and in the United States and that has targeted institutional aspects of water resources
management in the western world. Table 2 at the end of the section summarizes the findings.
Saleth and Dinar (2004) apply their framework to the water management systems of 39
countries and 4 US states. They interview 127 representatives of the water sector and collect
information and opinions on each aspect of water resources management included in their
framework. They also collect the experts’ opinion on the performance of the individual
component and build a systemic model to assess how the different aspects affect the performance
of each component. They find that overall performance of the water sector as perceived by water
experts depends directly from its ability to recover costs and from the seriousness of budget
constraints (Saleth and Dinar 2004). Other aspects, like effective conflict resolution, tendency to
centralization and user participation have an indirect effect.
Although their research is based only on the opinions of experts in the field and is very
generic, Saleth and Dinar’s (2004) work has the benefit of having a wide geographical scope, of
being comprehensive and of taking into account the complexity of the institutional components
that might affect the performance of the water sector. Many other studies in the field, instead,
have a much narrower geographical context or focus on specific institutional components and
specific policies (Heikkila 2004; Hanak 2009; Kallis et al. 2010; Mullin 2009; Schlüter and Pahl-
Wostl 2007).
With a much narrower geographical context, Hanak (2009) has analyzed the performance
of California water districts and has measured it by assessing the quality of the Urban Water
Management Plans (UWMP) the district completed in 2000. The analysis does not follow an
institutional approach, but takes into account some structural characteristics of water suppliers.
26

These structural characteristics, their technical capacity to diversify water supply, their
administrative nature (whether they are special district or municipalities and whether they are
private or public), are strong predictors of both the ability of the supplier to complete a UWMP
and of the quality of the plan. Utilities that have the technical capacity of diversifying water
supply by recycling wastewater, public utilities and specifically special districts are more likely
to complete a water management plan and to abide to the Department of Water Resources
guidelines, while municipalities and private water providers are less likely to abide to the state
rules.
The role of private and public organizations has been analyzed by other studies and with
different methodologies, with a focus on how tenure influences specific policies. Private
operators are expected in theory to be more flexible in providing water services and to be able to
respond to market conditions more efficiently, and therefore should be quicker to implement
conservation measures in times of drought (Kallis et al. 2010). Research has found instead that
privately owned utilities have less freedom to implement conservation measures and are less
likely to do so than are publicly owned utilities. The fact that every action of the private operator
has to be approved by the State utility commission and that they do not have other income source
but water rates is a disincentive for reducing consumption. Private operators are therefore less
flexible than public bodies in responding to drought (Kallis et al. 2010). Although Kallis et al.
(2010) provide a single case study, their work nonetheless illuminates how rules concerning
market power influence water districts’ conservation potential and the relevance of tenure in a
water conservation model.
A part from the role of tenure, empirical research has been done also assuming that the
administrative nature of water supply organizations influence water suppliers’ policies. Water
27

supply is managed by local organizations, in many cases cities, that provide water services to
households directly, together with the wide array of services a city produces. In many other cases
water management is provided by special districts that have the sole scope of distributing water
or managing the water cycle. Special districts have been found to be more likely to implement
policies that “advance equity and conservation” (Mullin 2009, 80) than cities, because they are
more accountable to their costumers for issues specifically pertaining water, while city
governments are accountable to citizens for a wide range of issues (Mullin 2009). The type of
special district is also a decisive factor for water policy making. Districts whose board is elected
directly by costumers are more likely to be active on water policy issues that go beyond the day
to day operations and to cooperate with other water suppliers, while districts whose board has
been nominated by city or county officials are not likely to be engaged in comprehensive
strategies. A special attention has been given to the problem of jurisdictional overlap as a
measure of the issues related to institutional fragmentation (Mullin 2009). Based on a number of
case study, Mullin (2009) finds that the overlap of jurisdiction over urban development where a
water district and a city have authority over the same area has generated conflict rather than
cooperation. Supporters and opponents of a project seek the venue most favorable to their views
and take advantage of differences between agencies to pursue their objectives.
Institutional fragmentation has emerged as a topic of interest as suggested by Blomquist
Heikkila and Schlager (2004) and has not been studied accurately. Whether institutional
fragmentation is a hindrance for effective water management is still not very well understood.
Heikkila (2004) addresses the problem as a question of fit of the administrative jurisdiction with
the boundaries of a natural resource. She compares water policies of water districts that
encompass the totality of a groundwater basin and of water districts that have jurisdiction over a
28

small portion. She finds that water districts whose boundaries correspond to a groundwater basin
are more likely to practice conjuctive water management (a practice that allows to use
groundwater basins as reservoirs in times of water abundance) than smaller districts. Although
contrary to Elinor Ostrom’s theoretical assumption, empirical research suggests that there are
economies of scale in complex water arrangements and that centralized organizations are more
likely to pursue them. An agent based modeling exercise that simulates two different water
management organizational structures in the Amudarya River in Central Asia confirms the
findings and suggests that centralized structures are more flexible and manage water supply
according to the fluctuations of water availability more effectively, as long as water availability
follows a predictable pattern. Decentralized water governance systems, on the other hand, do not
enhance the system’s resilience, moreover, increasing the number of agents taking individual
decisions increases inequality among the agents (Schlüter and Pahl-Wostl 2007).

29

Table 2. Impact of institutions on water management
Author Method and
geographical scope
Results
Saleth and Dinar
2004
Survey of water 127
experts in 43 countries
OLS, 3SLS
Performance of legal component depends directly on:
a. Effectiveness of conflict resolution;
b. Tendency to centralize;
c. Legal integration.
Depends indirectly from:
a. Effectiveness of participation;
b. Balanced functional specialization.
c. Information adequacy
Performance of policy component depends directly on:
a. Cost-recovery status
b. Effectiveness of water transfer;
c. Strength of law – policy nexus;
d. Effectiveness of privatization policies.
Depends indirectly from:
a. Water rights;
b. Effectiveness of users’ participation;
c. Technology applications;
d. Information adequacy;
e. Independent water pricing body;
f. Balanced functional specialization.
Performance of administrative component depends directly on:
a. Balanced functional specialization;
b. Technology application;
c. Information adequacy.
The overall water sector performance depends on:
a. Seriousness of budget constraint;
b. Cost recovery status.
Depends indirectly from:
a. Effective conflict resolution;
b. Tendency to centralization;
c. User participation;
d. Balanced functional specialization;
e. Adequate information;
f. Technology specialization.
Heikkila 2004 Logit + QCA, water
districts in California
Two types of jurisdictional arrangements engage in complex
water management practices:
1. Administrative jurisdictions that share groundwater
basins boundaries;
2. Administrative jurisdictions that have co-ordination
agreements.
Hanak 2009 OLS, water districts in
California
Strong predictors of both the ability of the supplier to complete a
UWMP and of its quality:
• Technical capacity to diversify water supply;
• Special district or municipality; and
• Private or public.
Kallis et al. 2010 Survey and interviews,
2 water districts in
California
• Attitudes towards water conservation measures required by
private water suppliers are not different from attitudes
towards water conservation measures required by public
water suppliers.
• Existing regulations on private utilities are a disincentive to
water conservation measures implementation.

30

Table 2. Impact of institutions on water management (continued)
Author Method and
geographical scope
Results
Mullin 2009 OLS, US water
districts and 5 case
studies in California
and Pennsylvania
• Special districts are more likely to implement conservation
measures than city utilities departments.
• Directly elected districts are likely to consider wider policy
options and to cooperate with other entities than appointed
water districts.
• Jurisdictional overlapping is prone to conflict rather than to
cooperation when urban development is concerned
Schlüter and Pahl-
Wostl 2007
Agent based modeling,
Amudarya River
Centralized institutions provide natural resources management
that takes into account a differentiated range of water needs.

Institutional Analysis of Water Resources in Southern California
The Los Angeles area and its water supply arrangements have been the center of attention
of water scholars for many years.
In his 1953 “Water and politics”, Vincent Ostrom has sketched a portrait of the
institutional system that organizes water supply in Los Angeles. His research unveils the
relationship between natural resources, institutional and infrastructural settings of the current
water supply arrangements. Three powerful connections between natural resources and
institutions have played a crucial role: (1) water rights have supported Los Angeles’ growth; (2)
hydrologic units have influenced the annexation policies of the Metropolitan Water District, and
(3) general conditions of the physical environment are correlated with every major development
in water resources programs.
Water availability and pueblo water rights were a factor in advancing the growth of early
Los Angeles
1
, while the boundaries city of Los Angeles were deliberately conceived to build an
administrative unit that could control the basic hydrologic unit of the upper Los Angeles River.
Once Los Angeles had become a power broker in the West, its energy needs lead to the creation
of the Metropolitan Water District as the conduit to facilitate the construction of Hoover Dam,
1
“On the basis of pueblo rights, the City of Los Angeles was able to monopolize the water resources of the Los Angeles River
basin to concentrate economic growth and development within the confines of a single community rather than permit the
development of a large number of smaller communities in San Fernando Valley and the upper coastal plain area” (Ostrom 1953,
231)
31

and argues that the use of hydrologic units as the area of water management agencies has been
the basis of annexation policies of the Metropolitan Water District. Finally, Ostrom points out
that major droughts have been the motivational drive of much of the water supply infrastructure:
the 1893 – 1904 drought led to the construction of the Los Angeles Aqueduct, the 1920s’
droughts were a powerful motivation to convince the US Congress to provide funding for the
Boulder Canyon Project and the Colorado River Aqueduct, and the droughts of the 40s are the
drive behind a cycle of annexations of new water agencies to the Metropolitan Water District.
Ostrom also describes the complexity of the water governance system and how, at
different administrative levels lack of leadership, unclear rules and local politics have played a
relevant role in shaping it. He finds that the lack of leadership of the Federal Government that, in
the first half of the last century, led to unresolved political conflicts among states about the
Colorado River water, still project uncertainties on water availability today (V. Ostrom 1953).
Elinor Ostrom, on her part, describes the struggle of Southern California ground water
basins between the forties and sixties. She brings the case as an example of the ability of multiple
users of a common pool resource (CPR) to “make a binding contract to commit themselves to a
cooperative strategy that they themselves will work out” (E. Ostrom 1990, 28). At that time most
local ground water basins were largely overdrafted, with undefined property rights over
groundwater, strong conflicts between owners of land overlaying the basins and cities, called in
this context “water appropriators”, high risks of saltwater intrusion, very little information about
individual users’ withdrawals, and of hydrologic characteristics of the basins. She points out that
the water users of the Raymond Basin, the West Basin and the Central Basin in the Southern
California coastal plain were facing a typical CPR problem. In a situation in which property
rights for groundwater were not defined, each user had the incentive to pump more water to
32

strengthen its property rights, while at the same time reducing the amount of water available for
other users, decreasing the level of the underground water table and imposing increasing
pumping costs toon all the other users. Faced with the prospect of increasing pumping costs and
saltwater intrusion, water users voluntarily created private associations, incurred costly litigation,
invested in knowledge and science, drafted legislation and found support for legislation,
apportioned water rights and created new institutions (watermasters and special districts) to
monitor ground water pumping. She underlines the fact that the process was sequential and
incremental and implied constant communication between users of the same basin and learning
from adjacent basins.
Blomquist (1992) describes how the polycentric groundwater governance system of
Southern California developed from the early 20s to the late 70s. He points out that “the
processes of institutional design and development were marked by innovation, adaptation,
learning and entrepreneurial skill” (Blomquist 1992, 8). He assesses the performance of the
institutional arrangements that have been set up to manage Southern California groundwater
basins based on compliance, effectiveness, efficiency in administration, efficiency in resources
use, equity and adaptability. He claims that groundwater basins’ users have consistently
complied with the court rulings that have apportioned their rights and that these rulings included
flexibility measures that allowed compliance through droughts and wet periods. He describes the
complex network of organizations that manage groundwater in Southern California and
concludes that that polycentric governance system has taken advantage of specialization of a
range of actors at different scales, has made use of general and specific local knowledge and
maximized individual users’ utility, while avoiding the risk of creating rent seeking institutions.
At the same time he acknowledges that issues of unfairness and transparency in decision making
33

processes in those groundwater basin management agencies that respond only to water users are
possible and have generated water quality problems in some of the basins.
Blomquist (1992) provides information to characterize the network of relationships
between specific water organizations in the area that are reported in figure 4

Figure 4. Relationships among water districts, wholesalers, watermasters and cities
While Elinor Ostrom (1990) and Blomquist (1992) analyze the groundwater basin
management system, Erie (2006) studies and describes the role of the Metropolitan Water
District and how MET has changed its mission and its practices during the years. Instituted by
law in 1928, the District had the goal to build the Colorado River Aqueduct and to provide
Southern California with ample supply of water. Erie underlines two main critical elements of
MWD governance system and the process of adaptation of this system to new challenges. First of
all he points out that initially, MWD collected the resources to fund the construction of the
MWD
WEST COAST
WATERMASTER
CENTRAL BASIN
WATERMASTER
CENTRAL AND
WESTERN
REPLENISHMENT
DISTRICT
WEST BASIN MWD
CENTRAL BASIN
MWD
CITY OF COMPTON
SAN GABRIEL
VALLEY
WATERMASTER
CITY OF LONG BEACH
LAC DEPARTMENT
OF PUBLIC WORKS
24
CITIES
18
CITIES
UPPER SAN GARIEL
RIVER MWD
17
CITIES
MWD
WEST COAST
WATERMASTER
CENTRAL BASIN
WATERMASTER
CENTRAL AND
WESTERN
REPLENISHMENT
DISTRICT
CITY OF COMPTON
SAN GABRIEL
VALLEY
WATERMASTER
CITY OF LONG BEACH
LAC DEPARTMENT
OF PUBLIC WORKS
CITY OF LOS
ANGELES
SAN FERNANDO
BASIN
WATERMASTER
MWD
CITY OF SANTA
MONICA
MWD
SAN DIEGO COUNTY
WATER AUTHORITY
IMPERIAL
IRRIGATION DISTRICT
17
DISTRICTS 6 CITIES
Unappropriated groundwater basins
34

Colorado River Aqueduct through property taxes and annexation fees. Los Angeles, at that time,
had the greatest assessed valuation in the district, therefore its taxpayers financed a large portion
of the aqueduct (42%). In the 60s, once most of Southern California communities had joined the
district, Los Angeles pushed to change the funding mechanism and to pass from a tax based
system to a system based on water sales.
Zetland (2008, 2009) also analyzes the actions of the Metropolitan Water District and
provides a critical view of its role. MWD has been a powerful engine of Southern California
development, its internal rules and regulation, however, inject rigidity in the water supply system
now that future water availability is uncertain and adaptability should be the goal of every water
supplier. The agency has financial obligations with the Department of Water Resources for
building and maintaining the State Water Project and financial obligations for the maintenance of
its own infrastructure. In order to secure revenues in advance it bounds member agencies to long
term advance contracts. This system has worked well for years, when it was possible to use
surplus water from the Colorado River and water was cheaper. When drought pushed the system
capacity to the limit, the cooperative agreements at the base of MWD existence proved to be
inadequate.
Models of Water Demand and Water Conservation
Summary
This section analyzes the existing research on water demand and water conservation to
identify dominant models of analysis. An extensive body of literature around the world has
focused on the estimation of residential water demand functions and on the implications for
water conservation. Arbues, Garcia-Valiñas and M ar tınez-Espiñeira (2003) and Worthington and
Hoffman (2008) have summarized the studies conducted between the 60s and the 90s and have
35

identified major themes of inquiry, challenges and gaps in the research. Both papers point out
that household water consumption is the unit of analysis of most studies and that only a limited
number of researchers have analyzed aggregated demand at city or district scale. They also
underscore that price elasticity has been at the core of urban water demand empirical analysis for
quite a long time and that other variables such as income, weather, household composition,
housing characteristics, frequency of billing and type of outdoor irrigation are the typical
components of household water consumption models have been tested to affect residential water
demand. Only more recently the effectiveness of water conservation measures has become the
object of empirical testing (Worthington and Hoffman 2008).
Studies on water conservation are geographically limited to a city or a small number of
cities and can be categorized in three groups: (a) studies that add water conservation measures to
traditional water demand models; (b) studies that measure water usage of households that adopt
conservation measures and simulate water consumption without conservation; and (c) studies
that use control groups to assess effectiveness of water conservation policies. Generally they all
find that conservation policies reduce water consumption, but the reductions are smaller than
expected.
A newer group of studies, finally, takes into account consumers’ behaviors and attitudes
and analyzes consumer believes as one of the important group of variables that influences water
consumption. Results of this research are sparse and not unequivocal. Ideological traits have
been found to influence water consumption, but whether water conservation is correlated to
higher incomes and education is not well understood.
36

Price Elasticity of Water Demand
Arbues, Garcia-Valiñas, and Martinez-Espiñeras (2003) and Worthington and Hoffman
(2008) point out that the structure of water pricing is one of the challenges of estimating price
elasticities of water demand. Generally water rates are much lower than the marginal cost of
water supply (Olmstead and Stavins 2008), but most water rates are complex. In the simplest
case they are composed of a fixed charge invariant with the level of consumption and a variable
part related to water consumption (volumetric charge). In many cases variable charges are
segmented in blocks. With this system the rate consists of a sequence of different marginal prices
for different consumption blocks. The block rate can be ascending (the higher is consumption the
higher the rate) or descending (higher consumption corresponds to lower rates). Summary
studies have found that price elasticity is higher when ascending block pricing is implemented
(Dalhuisen et al. 2003; Olmstead, Hanemann, and Stavins 2007).
Block rates create problems of simultaneity in water demand models that have not been
completely resolved in the existing literature. Some authors have tried to overcome this
limitation with model specification, others with statistical methods. To the first group belong
those researchers that have used marginal prices, or average rates, or both. To this group belong
also the authors that have used the “rate structure premium” defined as the difference between
the total bill less what the amount the bill would have been if the water quantity was consumed at
the marginal price” (Worthington and Hoffman 2008, 860). To the other, those that have
estimated price elasticities using maximum likelihood, 2 SLS and probit models (Arbues, Garcia-
Valiñas, and Martinez-Espiñeras 2003).
Different specifications notwithstanding, most studies estimate that at current water rates
urban water demand is inelastic (less than one) and negative and ranges between -0.002 and -
37

1.67 (Arbues, Garcia-Valiñas, and Martinez-Espiñeras 2003) or -0.02 and -0.77 (Worthington
and Hoffman 2008). However the measure has high variability studies using the same method
report highly variable results (Worthington and Hoffman, 2008). Only a small number of studies
that have modeled water usage as the result of a discrete choice estimates elasticities higher than
-1 (Hewitt and Hanemann 1995).
Existing studies have concluded that external elements influence price elasticity. Long –
run elasticity is higher than short run (Hoffmann, Worthington, and Higgs 2006), because in the
long run households will replace water intensive with more efficient appliances. Winter price
elasticity is smaller than summer price elasticity (Hanemann and Nauges 2005) and elasticities
are different for renters (lower) and homeowners (higher); low income (lower) and high income
(higher) households (Duke, Eheman, and Mackenzie 2002; Grafton et al. 2010; Renwick and
Archibald 1998; Worthington and Hoffman 2008). Outdoor uses are more elastic than indoor
uses (Mansur and Olmstead 2007). Information is an enhancing factor, in fact, when rates are
explicitly reported on the bill, price elasticity increases (Gaudin 2006).
Other Relevant Variables that Affect Water Demand
Among other variables that are usually significant in water demand models (Haneman
1999), income has received a great attention. Most authors agree that water demand is not very
sensitive to income, because it corresponds at about 1% of average incomes (Bell and Griffin
2008). Generally the elasticities estimated by the models are between -0.01 and -0.77 (Arbues,
Garcia-Valiñas, and Martinez-Espiñeras 2003; Worthington and Hoffman. 2008). Only in the
‘80s Billings (1982) had estimated elasticities higher than -1.
Weather is considered an important variable, especially in countries where single family
houses with backyards are the main dwelling pattern, because household water demand
38

comprises two components: non-discretionary and discretionary. Non-discretionary uses include
most indoor uses such as drinking, cooking and grooming. Discretionary uses include most
outdoor uses such as watering gardens, filling swimming pools and spas. Outdoor uses largely
depend on weather conditions, such as temperature and rain. The number of rainy days is
considered a good explanatory variable, because users seem to respond more to the mere
occurrence of rainfall than to the actual quantity of rain fall (Arbues, Garcia-Valiñas, and
Martinez-Espiñeras 2003).
Housing characteristics have emerged as a very relevant element of water demand
modeling. The proportion of single family homes is a useful indicator of the penetration of
individual metering and of the possibility for households to control their own water consumption,
especially in those areas where multifamily buildings have collective meters. For the volumetric
price to influence water consumption consumers must be metered. Nauges and Thomas (2000)
calculate that a one per cent increase in the proportion of single housing units (all of which have
water meters) in 116 French communities would, all else equal, result in a 0.44 per cent
reduction in residential water demand. Lot dimension is used as a proxy of outdoor water needs,
assuming that larger lots mean larger yards and more outdoor watering needs (Hanneman and
Nauges 2005; Harlan et al. 2008).
To corroborate the relevance of housing characteristics, some studies use spatial analysis
techniques. In Phoenix (AZ) a study finds that there is spatial correlation between water usage
patterns and that neighboring census tracts exhibit similar water consumption behavior (Wentz
and Gober 2007). In South East Queensland (Australia) neighborhood with similar lot size,
regulated by land use policies, reveal similar water consumption (Shearer 2009). In Portland
(OR), water usage has been associated to lots’ land use. The research finds statistically
39

significant correlation between land use and water usage and estimates that an increase of 100 ft2
of single family housing development results in an increase of almost 3 acre-feet (approximately
978 000 gallons or 3.7 million liters) of water consumed per year and that increased density is
strongly correlated with reductions in water consumption (Shandas and Parandvash 2010, 10). In
Ipswich (MA), spatial clusters of households in large lots (> 2.24 acres) adopt similar water
usage behaviors both during wet periods and during months in which the City mandates outdoor
watering restrictions. Neighbor effect is less binding for households in small and medium size
lots. It is strong during normal times of the year, but weak in times of water emergency
(Ramachandran and Johnson 2011).
Although Newton and Meyer (2010) claim that individuals’ attributes are less influential
on water demands than contextual factors, households’ social characteristics is also a growing
area of interest of water demand modelers. Authors, however, not always agree over the
influence that these could have. Some have pointed out that economies of scale make the
relationship between water usage and families’ size not linear, but that, on the other hand,
families with children are expected to consume more water. Age has also been a topic of
contentious results. Research in Australia estimates that older households consume more water
than younger families, because their members are not aware of water scarcity and grew up when
water was widely available (Beal, Stewart and Huang 2010). Studies in Spain estimate that older
households are more cautious and thrifty and use less water than younger generations (March,
Perarnau, and Saurí et al. 2010).
Models of Effectiveness of Non-Price Water Conservation
During the 90s increasing costs of water infrastructures and very severe droughts lead
cities and water districts to implement conservation measures that are still the core of today’s
40

water conservation strategies. Many of them are aimed at reducing domestic use inside the home
and can be mandatory, such as building codes that mandate low flow shower-heads, shower flow
restrictors, faucet aerators, low- and ultra-low flush toilets, dual flush toilets, low-pressure supply
connections, pressure-reducing valves, and insulation of hot-water pipes. Others can be
implemented on a voluntary basis through rebates for the purchase of water saving fixtures or
horizontal axis washing machines. Many target outdoor water uses and include mandatory
measures such as restrictions in landscape watering and car washing and rebates for the
installation of technical solutions like micro-spray and drip irrigation systems, soil-moisture
sensors, laser assisted field leveling, evapotranspiration-driven irrigation schedules and low
water demand vegetation, water efficient landscape (Dziagilievski et al. 2010).
The assessment of non-price conservation measures has become a major topic of
research, but methods and focus of inquiry are not consistent. Many authors assess effectiveness
of water conservation measures by adding them to more traditional water demand models that
include prices, weather, characteristics of the buildings and characteristics of the households,
others have simulated water usage without conservation measures and compared it with water
demand when saving policies had been implemented, while others have tried experimental
methods comparing water conservation users with control groups. Most target individual users
and very rarely the organizations that implement them. Table 3 at the end of the section
summarizes the findings.
All in all conservation measures have been proven to reduce households’ water
consumption, but the savings are often less than expected.
Michelsen, McGuckin, and Stumpf (1999) measure the impact of the number of non-
price conservation programs implemented in an 11 year period in 7 major cities in the
41

southwestern United States and conclude that each additional program would reduce water
demand in a range between 1.1 to 4 percent, however they do not specify the type of program
and their implementation. Some authors focus on the effectiveness of specific water saving
technical devices. In their empirical research of household water demand in Santa Barbara and
Goleta, California, Renwick, and Archibald (1998) found that installing low flow toilets reduced
consumption by 10% (per toilet), low flow showerheads by 8% (per fixture), and adoption of
water efficient irrigation technologies by 11%. Syme et al. (2000) have argued that the possible
interactions of non-price campaigns with other policy instruments make it difficult to evaluate
their effectiveness, but Renwick and Green (2000) have examined pricing and demand
management policies in 8 California cities in the 90s and found that voluntary water conservation
measures yield water savings also when they are implemented together with increased water
rates. They also conclude that voluntary water demand side management (DSM) practices
coupled with small rates increases achieve moderate water consumption reductions (between 5%
and 15%, Renwick and Green 2000, 51), while mandatory water use restrictions coupled with
significant increases of water rates achieve much more relevant reductions. Coleman (2009) in
its effort to estimate the impact of DSM and price observes that information campaigns are also
effective and that they provide about 7% additional reduction in water consumption.
Millock and Nauges (2009) also analyze the relationship between water pricing and non-
price water conservation policies. Using survey data of 10,000 households in 10 OECD
countries, find that higher water prices encourage households to invest in water efficient
equipment.
Campbell, Johson, and Hunt Larson (2004) test the effectiveness a wider range of
conservation measures implemented in Phoenix in the early 21
st
century, including an
42

environmental charge, two mandatory programs such as a low flow fixtures ordinance and an
outdoor water restriction ordinance and a number of voluntary programs aimed at seniors and
low income neighbors and city wide voluntary programs. They conclude that the programs and
mandatory ordinances have reduced water usage, but citywide voluntary programs have
generated offsetting behaviors and are correlated to increased water usage. Wallander (2007)
examines the rebound effect of aerated showerheads, aerated faucets and low flow toilets. He
concludes that low flow fixtures reduce water demand much less than expected. He reports that
standard comparisons suggest that with water saving obtained by the plumbing fixture efficiency
standards that became law with the 1992 Energy Policy Act toilet water demand and shower
water demand would be reduced respectively by 48% and by 33%. Using data from 16 different
utilities in the US, however, he found that in homes that had adopted the standards toilet water
demand was reduced by 29% and shower and faucet water demand was not reduced at all.
He estimates a rebound effect for shower water demand at about 0.35.
Using an experimental methodology Tsai, Cohen, and Vogel (2011) assess the water
savings of outdoors conservation measures. They analyze 4 different water conservation devices:
1) weather sensitive irrigation controller switches (WSICS), 2) rainwater harvesting systems
(rain barrels); 3) water demand audit and rebates for water saving fixtures (low flow toilets and ;
4) soil amendments to retain moisture. They compare two groups: a group of experimental
households that have adopted these conservation strategies and a control group made of
households that have not adopted the conservation strategy and are located in the same area. In
order to standardize the data they perform the analysis for a period of time prior the installation
of the devices and post-installation and conclude that households with high irrigation needs were
likely to conserve more water than households with low irrigation needs using WSICS and that
43

rain barrels were effective in capturing rainwater, but their effect on the total water usage of
generic household is very small. They also test the effectiveness of water audits and rebate for
low flow toilets and low flow washing machines and conclude that water savings are quite
modest.
A small pool or research is focused on the results of city ordinances that mandate water
usage restrictions. Kenney, Klein, and Clark (2004) assess the effectiveness of voluntary and
mandatory outdoor watering restrictions during a drought in Colorado. The restrictions specified
times of day and maximum length of watering, limited car washing and set rules for filling or
refilling swimming pools. They estimate households’ water consumption without restriction,
with similar climatic conditions and they compare the result of city ordinances reducing outdoor
water use with actual water utilities data. They conclude that water restrictions are very effective
(the estimated net water savings range between 15% and 55%), but of course they are more
effective when they are mandatory. However, they point out that although water restriction
ordinances achieve good results during droughts, could not be as effective in wet years. In a later
study, Kenney et al. (2008) assess outdoor water restriction policies that took place in the city of
Aurora, Colorado, between 2000 and 2005, classify water users based on their water usage in
previous years and conclude that big users are more flexible and when mandatory restrictions are
put in place significantly reduce water consumption. Households that use a small amount of
water, instead, have fewer opportunities to save and react to drought consuming more water,
mandatory restrictions notwithstanding.
Hughes (2012) analyzes the effect of California best practices for water conservation. A
voluntary program launched on the tail of the 1989-1992 drought in California. In order to avoid
mandated water usage targets, many water agencies signed a memorandum of understanding that
44

committed them to 14 best management practices that included pricing, information and
education for their customers, rebates for water saving devices, free distribution of water saving
devices and pricing. She finds that the type of governance, dependence from imported water and
size are predictors of the willingness of signing the memorandum of understanding. Private
utilities, special districts, large utilities and utilities highly dependent on imported water are more
likely to have signed the memorandum of understanding than the others. However, she finds that
this commitment to abide to 14 best management practices is not correlated with effective
reduction in per capita water usage.

45

Table 3. Non price water demand management measures and their effectiveness
Author and year Geographical scope Type of measure Method Coefficient
Renwick and Archibald 1998 City of Goleta Outdoor watering restriction 2SLS -6.6
and Santa Barbara Water budget -1.86
Traditional irrigation techniques 1.46
Water efficient irrigation techniques -1.76
Showerheads reductions adopted -0.8
Toilet reductions adopted -1.25
Michelsen, McGuckin and
Stumpf 1999
Los Angeles, San Diego,
Denver, Albuquerque,
San Francisco
Additional conservation measures ML -0.011 to -0.040
Renwick and Green 2000 Cities in California Public Information Campaign 3SLS -0.08
Ultra low flow toilets rebates n.s.
Free retrofit kits -0.09
Water budgets -0.21
Outdoor watering restrictions -0.34
Campbell et al. 2004 Phoenix (AZ) Mandatory low flow fixtures OLS -0.039

Outdoor watering restrictions 0.029

Free retrofit kits 1 0.046

Free retrofit kits 2 0.038

Free retrofit kits 3 -0.001

Free low water seeds 0.004

Information 0.046

Neighborhoods initiatives 1 -0.064

Neighborhoods initiatives 2 -0.024
Kenney et al. 2004 Denver (CO) and
suburbs
Water saved with mandatory outdoor
restrictions
Expected
values
-13% to -17%
Water saved with voluntary restrictions Expected
values
7% to -3%
Hanneman and Nauges 2005 Los Angeles (CA) Mandatory conservation OLS -0.239 to -0.324
Voluntary conservation -0.061 to -0.132
Kenney et al. 2008 Aurora (CO) Indoor rebates OLS -0.1
Outdoor rebates n.s.
Smart meter 0.16
Tsai et al. 2011 Ipswitch (MA) Weather sensitive irrigation devices Experiment /
control group
n.s.
Water harvesting systems Undetectable
Indoor audit and retrofit 4.93 m3 per quarter
Indoor rebates audit and retrofit 5.01 m3 per quarter
Indoor rebates 5.15 m3 per quarter
Hughes 2012 California Memorandum of understanding with 14 best
management practices

n.s.
46

Limitations of Non-Price Water Conservation Measures
Limited effectiveness is not the only limitation to non-price water DSM practices. A small
pool of authors has analyzed the economic losses from command and control policies such as low
flow standards or outdoor watering restrictions. Timmins (2003) simulates the comparison
between a mandatory low-flow appliance regulation and a modest water tax, using aggregate
consumption data from 13 groundwater-dependent California cities located in the Central Valley.
Under all but the least realistic of assumptions, he finds the tax to be more cost-effective than the
technology standard in reducing groundwater aquifer lift-height in the long run. Mansur and
Olmstead (2007) study 11 urban areas in the United States and in Canada and simulate a
comparison of outdoor watering restrictions with a drought pricing scheme and conclude that a
drought pricing scheme would result in $81 in gains for each family, if compared to command and
control policies. Command and control water conservation policies have little advantages over
pricing. They have unpredictable results as much as pricing policies, due to the rebound effect and
to the cost of monitoring compliance. They have limited equity advantages, because pricing
policies can be designed to reduce their regressive impact on lower income households through ad
hoc rebates. However, they are more politically feasible, and combined with pricing policies could
yield more stable results (Olmstead and Stavins 2008).
Belief Systems and Water Conservation
Many authors believe that policies targeted to specific groups of people, tailored according
to their belief system and their socio economic characteristics, would be more effective in
protecting natural resources. Water conservation research has adopted this perspective and has
analyzed how believes systems of individuals are likely to affect their attitudes towards water
conservation. At first studies were concerned on the relationship between socio economic
47

characteristics (income, education, house type, tenancy and political affiliation) and water
conservation in time of drought (Berk et al. 1993). They surveyed families and asked about their
perceived water conservation and their socio economic characteristics. Results were controversial,
but converged over the fact that perceived water conservation is correlated with politically liberal
small families, that live in small units and own their own home.
More recently the focus has shifted to analyzing the relationship between water saving
behaviors and attitudes toward the environment and the hypothesis that belief systems matter has
been confirmed, but the relationship between behaviors and socio economic characteristics still
results contentious. Based on the type and intensity of conservation behaviors, Gilg and Bar
(2006), using cluster analysis, find that committed conservationists are generally older
homeowners with high income, liberals ideas and believe in public engagement with an
environmental agenda. Non savers are generally young, low income tenants that do not believe in
social commitment to protect the environment. Mondejar Jimenez et al. (2011), instead, using a
system of structural equations estimate that although environmental awareness is correlated with
many water saving behaviors, it is also correlated to a thrifty lifestyle and that higher income and
education are not related to water saving behaviors.
Finally, citizens’ attitudes have also been taken into account when assessing the public’s
perception of water conservation measures (Atwood, Kreutzwiser, and De Loë 2007).

48

TABLE OF CONTENTS
RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND METHOD ............................................................................... 49
Research Questions ............................................................................................................... 49
Research Approach and Methodology .................................................................................. 52
The Qualitative Stage ........................................................................................................ 53
Hypotheses Testing ........................................................................................................... 54

RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND METHOD
Research Questions
The project is based on two types of observations. One is the contextual observation that
the existing water management system has shifted its focus from supply management to demand
management. The other is the theoretical understanding that research on water management from
an institutional perspective has focused mainly on how water organizations manage their supply
rather than their demand.
It has the overarching purpose of filling a gap in the literature on water governance. The
goal is to understand the transition from water policies aimed at increasing supply to water
policies aimed at managing water demand analyzing how structural characteristics of a water
governance system influence the implementation of water demand management strategies, with
specific attention to some of the issues emerged from the literature review such as the influence
of the nature of the organization (Hanak 2009; Mullin 2009), the relevance of economies of scale
(Heikkila 2004; Schlüter and Pahl-Wostl 2007) and of a polycentric governance system (Dietz,
E. Ostrom, and Stern. 2003; McGinnis 2000; Ostrom 2010; V. Ostrom, Thiebout and Warren.
1961) and the effectiveness of market oriented demand management strategies and of mandates
(Hanneman and Nauges 2005; Kenney, Klein, and Clark 2004, Kenney et al. 2008; Renwick and
Archibald 1998; and Renwick and Green 2000).
49

Southern California has an extremely fragmented and decentralized water supply
governance system, with layered organizations, a mix of administrative types, where many actors
overlap and interact. The system has performed in times of growth, when water supply was
considered almost unlimited and resources to solve water problems building conveyance
infrastructures were available, but now needs to readjust in order to face future water supply
uncertainties, in which demand management has become very important.
Local groundwater basin management agreements have been purported as an example
of bottom up flexible governance of limited natural resources, but the success of this model has
been backed by a strong supply of imported water and could be increasingly stressed if water
districts need to compensate the lack of cheap imported water with less expensive groundwater.
The first part of the research is specifically aimed at understanding the Southern
California water management system, how water supply is connected with water conservation,
the size of the Southern California conservation effort and the role of water retailers in
implementing water conservation measures. The research questions that will be address are the
following:
• How have water demand management strategies evolved in Southern California, what are
the drivers of success and failure of water demand management practices?
• Do the different agents in the Southern California water management system have
different objectives in terms of water conservation and do these objectives collide?
The second part of the research tests empirically how structural elements of this
governance system influence water conservation and whether the conservation strategies
implemented by Southern California water agencies during the last drought have been effective.
The research questions addressed are the following:
50

• Hanak (2008) and Mullin (2009) claim that the governance form of the retail water
agency is a predictor of its effectiveness in delivering innovative water management
strategies and abiding to state’s mandate while Saleth and Dinar (2004) claim that
political economic and environmental factors are predictors of water agencies’
performance: which characteristics of the current water management governance system
support reductions in per capita water usage?
• Heikkila (2004) and Schlüter and Pahl-Wostl (2007) found that there are economies of
scale in water management systems and that larger agencies perform complex water
management tasks better than small agencies. On the other hand, McGinnis (2000), and
Elinor Ostrom (2010) have described polycentric systems that provide services very
effectively thanks to a thick system of formal and informal rules. Are larger water
retailers more successful than smaller and fragmented organizations in implementing
water conservation strategies or the close network of informal relationships among water
agencies and other local organization is as effective in supporting water conservation
efforts?
• The Ostrom’s framework for institutional analysis development (2005, 2010) includes the
resource system as one of the elements of the analysis of complex socio ecological
systems, does the local endowment of natural resources affect the agencies’ ability to
improve their conservation performance?
• Hanneman and Nauges (2005), Kenney, Klein, and Clark 2004, Kenney et al. 2008,
Renwick and Archibald (1998), and Renwick and Green (2000) claim that ordinances are
very effective in reducing households’ water demand, while rebates for water saving
devices are not always effective. At the same time a wide literature argues that, although
51

water is price inelastic, customers react to water pricing. Which water conservation
strategies are effective? Are mandates more effective in reducing per capita water usage
than market oriented measures like water pricing and rebates on water saving devices?
Research Approach and Methodology
The geographic area of research is the service area of the Southern California Water
Management District that includes parts of Ventura, Los Angeles, San Bernardino, Riverside,
Orange and San Diego counties. The choice of this area is supported by Blomquist, Heikkila, and
Schlager’s (2004) suggestion that institutional research on water resources should be based on
comparative analysis of cases that are different in terms of institutional conditions, but are in
similar physical and economic circumstances, in order to isolate institutional effects from other
contextual influences. Objects of inquiry are the water agencies and districts that purchase water
from the Metropolitan Water District (about 215 among cities, retailers and wholesalers), that are
under similar socio-economic circumstances, face the same water scarcity issues, but are
institutionally diverse.
Research about institutional systems has mainly been conducted through the analysis of
individual case studies, but most recently, surveys and meta-analyses have adopted quantitative
methods to explore the relationship between governance systems and policy outcomes. The
research presented here will combine qualitative and quantitative methods using a sequential
explanatory design.
According to Teddlie and Tashakkori (2011) and to Creswell (2009), mixed methods
sequential designs, although lengthy and cumbersome in the execution, have the advantage of
being clear and straight forward, easily described and reported.
52

Among the advantages of mixed method design, the possibility of asking explanatory and
exploratory question in the same study is the more attractive. In this case, understanding how
institutional characteristics influence the performance of water districts can be better harnessed
through a sequential mixed method design. In practice, the first part of the study will be
dedicated to the assembly of data about water conservation performance and characteristics of
Southern California water districts and interview the representatives of water agencies. The
second will test hypotheses generated by the existing review on the institutional approach to
water management and by the water demand management literature..
The Qualitative Stage
The qualitative analysis reports the results of 30 interviews to water conservation
coordinators of water wholesalers, cities and water districts, to watermasters, to general
managers and to board members of water agencies. Thirty representatives in total were
interviewed. Twenty seven are staff members and three are board members. The subjects were
chosen based on their role in Southern California water conservation domain. The larger group
of staff members (9) includes the conservation coordinators of water wholesalers, members of
Metropolitan Water District (MWD). They have been selected because MWD’s member
agencies formulate the districts’ water conservation strategies and implement them at local level
either directly or through their customer agencies. Two wholesalers are missing, although they
have been contacted. One is restructuring its management and the other declined to be
interviewed. The second group includes water retailers (7). Two are MWD’s member agencies,
that have been selected because extremely active in water conservation. Five are representatives
of retail agencies that purchase water from MWD through its wholesaler member agencies. They
have been selected because they work in communities where per capita water usage has declined
53

significantly between 2002 and 2007 or because per capita water usage in their community has
increased significantly. Three are representatives of MWD. Two of them are currently working
and directing water conservation; one has played a relevant role in the organization, but is
currently retired. Three are representatives of water masters, that have been selected because
they regulate groundwater pumping in the areas where the retailers selected to been interviewed
for this research operate. Two are conservation coordinators of Investors Owned Utilities that
play a role that is quite similar to the wholesalers. One is the General Manager of a wholesaler.
Three are board members, respectively of MWD, of a wholesaler and of a retailer (Appendix A).
The subjects were interviewed between June 2012 and March 2013 following an open
interview script (Appendix B).
The interviews were recorded and transcribed. Their content was coded and summarized
in a content matrix. The responses have been analyzed and compared according to the type of
conservation strategy and the type of organization.
Hypotheses Testing
Based on the existing literature the quantitative section of this research and on the
interviews with the water conservation coordinators and water managers of the largest
organizations that manage water supply in Southern California is going to test seven hypotheses.
Four are related to the institutional water management literature. Hanak (2009) and Mullin
(2009) claim that special districts are more likely to abide to states’ mandates and to implement
innovative water management policies. Therefore hypothesis 1 is formulated as follows.
H1 Special districts are more likely to innovate than cities, therefore they are more
effective in reducing per capita residential water usage.
54

Heikkila (2004) and Schlüter and Pahl-Wostl (2007) claim that there are economies of
scale in water management systems and that larger agencies perform complex water management
tasks better than small agencies. Therefore hypothesis 2 is formulated as follows.
H2 Size matters, large retailers are more effective in reducing residential water usage than
smaller retailers.
McGinnis’ (2000), Vincent Ostrom, Theibout, and Warren (1961) description of
polycentric systems where small agencies provide services very effectively thanks to a thick
system of formal and informal rules and Dietz, Elinor Ostrom, and Stern’s (2003) claim in order
to manage complex systems, in which multiple actors interact, there is the need of a complex and
layered system of organizations, support the formulation of hypothesis 3
H3 Water retailers with a dense network or relationships with other entities are more
effective in reducing per capita water usage.
Elinor Ostrom’s framework for institutional analysis development (2005, 2010) includes
the resource system as one of the elements of the analysis of complex socio ecological systems
supports the formulation of hypotheses 4.
H4 Water retailers with higher dependency from ground water are less effective in
reducing per capita water usage.
Hypotheses 5, 6 and 7 draw from the water demand management literature that claims
that water demand is affected by prices (Arbues, Garcia-Valiñas, and Martinez-Espiñeira 2003;
Dalhusienet al. 2003; Duke, Eheman and McKenzie 2002; Grafton et al. 2011; Hewitt and
Hanemann 1995; Hoffman, Worthington, and Higgs 2006; Mansur and Olmstead 2007;
Olmstead, Hanemann and Stavins. 2007; Worthington and Hoffman 2008), but also that
mandatory water restrictions achieve relevant water reductions, but rebates for water saving
55

devices are not always effective (Campbell, Johnson and Hunt Larson 2004; Kenney, Klein, and
Clark 2004; Renwick and Archibald 1998; Renwick and Green 2000).
H5 Higher water rates are correlated with higher reductions of per capita residential water
usage.
H6 Higher per capita rebates distributed by water agencies to their customers to purchase
water saving devices are correlated with higher water usage reduction.
H7 Mandates to permanently reduce outdoor water usage are correlated with water usage
reduction.

56

PART 2
DESCRIPTION OF WATER SUPPLY GOVERNANCE AND OF WATER
CONSERVATION TOOLS AND STRATEGIES
57

TABLE OF CONTENTS
WATER SUPPLY IN SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA: PUBLIC ORGANIZATIONS AND THEIR
ROLE ............................................................................................................................................ 58
The Federal Level ................................................................................................................. 58
California Water Governance ............................................................................................... 64
Southern California Regional Water Governance: Metropolitan Water District .................. 68
MWD’s Member Agencies: Retailers and Wholesalers ................................................... 76
MWD’s Member Agencies: the Retailers ......................................................................... 76
MWD’s Member Agencies: the Wholesalers ................................................................... 78
Groundwater, Watermasters and Management Plans ........................................................... 84
Water Retailers...................................................................................................................... 90

WATER SUPPLY IN SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA: PUBLIC
ORGANIZATIONS AND THEIR ROLE

This chapter describes the roles and the scope of the organizations that manage water
supply in the area served by the Metropolitan Water District of Southern California. It is really
focused on the local structure of the water supply chain, but will give some broad information on
the Federal and State water governance structure and will highlight: the legal character of each
organization, its functional role in the water supply chain (wholesaler, watermaster, retailer,
regulator, service provider) and the interconnection with other organizations.
The Federal Level
Federal oversight over water resources is shared by 37 different agencies (Fiero 2007).
However, only a smaller group has water as its primary mission (Adler 2009). Water supply is
under the supervision of the Bureau of Reclamation (USBR), flood protection is mandated to the
US Army Corps of Engineers (USACE), while water quality is regulated by the Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA).
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The Bureau of Reclamation was instituted in 1902 as an agency within the Department of
Interior with the task to support settlers in the West and reclaim arid lands to agriculture. The
Bureau is the watermaster of the Colorado River and mediates the numerous water allocation
disputes among the States that have riparian rights over the river, but most of all has been the
force behind numerous water reclamation projects that play a relevant role for the water supply
in Southern California.
Historically, the Bureau was had a leading role in shaping Southern California water
supply infrastructure. In the 1920s USBR was the force behind the Boulder Canyon Project that
led to the construction of the Hoover Dam and Lake Mead, the current storage for the Colorado
River water that is used by the Lower Colorado River Basin States (Arizona, Nevada and
California) and one of the most important providers of hydroelectric power to Southern
California, Nevada and Arizona. Other large infrastructural projects built the Bureau and include
the All American Canal and the Coachella Canal that connect the Colorado River with the
Imperial and Coachella Valleys.
The USBR also shared the costs of building the Parker Dam and Lake Havasu, the
heading point to the Colorado River Aqueduct (CRA) that conveys the water of the Colorado
River to Southern California and was instrumental in funding the connection between the CRA
and the San Diego area.
Today the Bureau develops rural and tribal water supply projects, maintains existing
dams and improves their safety, is deeply involved in ecosystem restoration and supports water
efficiency projects at local level, such as project that combine water and energy efficiency,
desalination of brackish water or reclamation of impaired water.
59

Many of its projects are very relevant for Southern California water supply, such as the
maintenance foe the Central Valley Project, the restoration of the San Joaquin River, the
restoration of the San Joaquin and Sacramento Rivers Delta and the Lower Colorado River
ecosystem conservation programs. Others are aimed at co-financing projects and feasibility
studies to expand the use of recycled water and a relevant number is aimed at improving water
and energy efficiency. In the last 8 years the Bureau has become one of the most relevant source
of funding for water conservation projects in Southern California. By coupling water and energy
efficiency as one of its goals it has a funded program to distribute weather based irrigation
controllers, to update water meters, to provide rebates for high efficiency toilets and high
efficiency clothes washers and has supported a number of water agencies in the design of water
conservation plans. A list of the project aimed at water and energy efficiency co-financed by the
USBR and local water agencies is in the following table (Tab. 4).

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Table 4. Projects for water usausage efficiency funded by US Bureau of Reclamation in Southern
California
Type of funding Project description
Water-Energy
Efficiency
Projects that seek to conserve and use water more efficiently, increase the use of
renewable energy, protect endangered species, or facilitate water markets.
• City of Corona, installation of 5,560 advanced water meters, resulting in real-time
meter reading capabilities at residential, commercial, and landscape sites.
• Inland Empire Utilities Agency, installation of high-efficiency, weather-based
irrigation controllers and high efficiency sprinkler nozzles for 400 residential water
users.
• City of Huntington Beach, California, installation of new irrigation controllers and
computer systems to reduce runoff in 45 parks throughout the City.
• Irvine Ranch Water District: development of groundwater banking facilities on the
Strand Ranch.
• Municipal Water District of Orange County provides rebates to facilitate the
installation of 800 commercial and 475 residential Smart Irrigation Timers.
• Municipal Water District of Orange County provides rebates for installation of
residential water efficiency improvements in over 700 households, including advanced
irrigation timers and rotating nozzles.
• Eastern Municipal Water District: installation of approximately 1,700 high-efficiency
residential washing machines to replace older models.
• Eastern Municipal Water District: building a facility to treat water that is currently
discharged to the sewer.
• Rancho California Water installation of 500 Weather Based Irrigation Controllers.
• West Basin Municipal Water District expansion of an existing program to retrofit
toilets, urinals, and faucets in older buildings.
• West Basin Municipal Water District: installation of 558 Evapotranspiration (ET)
Irrigation Controllers for urban landscapes that are 1 acre or greater in size.
• City of Santa Monica: Development of a Sustainable Water Master Plan to Achieve
Local Water Self-Sufficiency in the City of Santa Monica.
• City of Pasadena: develop landscape mapping coverage to support ongoing
conservation efforts using high resolution imagery.
• City of Torrance, construction of wetlands and infiltration areas, installation of new
pumps and other water management improvements, at existing storm water basins.
• Calleguas Municipal Water District: installation of automated monitoring devices to
23 water retailers to allow the District to implement new rate structures.
• San Diego County Water Authority: develop water budget software potentially
connecting to water billing system.
• San Diego County Water Authority: water audits for commercial landscapes.
Source: USBR 2012

The US Army Corps of Engineers is a planning agency of the Department of Defense. A
part from military construction, the Corps’ mission includes planning, designing, building and
operating water resources works projects such as flood control, environmental protection,
disaster response, etc. The primary purpose of USACE water projects is to promote and protect
navigation on the nation’s waters, but many of its projects were often justified economically to
provide multiple purposes. In Southern California the Corps’ role in the water supply chain is
61

tied to the groundwater replenishment process. USACE manages 11 reservoirs, some of them
with the single purpose of controlling flood risks, others with the double function of water
reservoir and flood control. Specifically, in agreement with Los Angeles County Department of
Public Works, the Corps manages the Santa Fe Dam and 2 dams at the Whittier Narrows on the
San Gabriel River and on Rio Hondo to enable groundwater replenishment operations of the
Main San Gabriel Basin and of the Central Basin. The Corps also manages Prado Dam on the
Santa Ana River in agreement with Orange County Water District, to provide constant water
flow to spreading grounds along the Santa Ana River that replenish the Orange County
Groundwater Basin and San Antonio Dam, in accord with Pomona Valley Protective
Association, Mountain View Company and San Bernardino Flood Control District.
The Environmental Protection Agency has the task of administering and enforcing most
Federal environmental pollution statutes, among which the Clean Water Act and its amendments
(CWA) and the Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA).
The Clean Water Act protects chemical, biological and physical quality of US surface
water with the goal of supporting their ecological and recreational functions and gives the EPA
the mandate to regulate the discharge of many pollutants from a wide range of sources and
activities, while the SDWA puts EPA in charge of establishing drinking water quality standards.
Both CWA and SDWA are mainly implemented through a form of cooperative federalism
between states and EPA. States have the authority to set their own water quality standards, but
EPA has to approve them. If states fail to adopt them, EPA has the authority to intervene
directly.
Some of EPA programs are focused on augmenting water supply. Through the
Comprehensive Environmental Response Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA), more
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commonly known as “Superfund”, EPA has the goal of facilitating and regulating the cleanup of
hazardous substances, and allocating liability and responsibility for those clean-ups. In most
cases, hazardous substances contamination has reached local aquifers, and EPA’s activities have
been focused in cleaning up groundwater and making it available for human consumption.
In Southern California there are 26 superfund sites where EPA and other agencies are
managing groundwater clean-up, some of which are providing groundwater water supply to
entire communities.
The most well-known are the four superfund sites in the San Fernando Valley and the
South El Monte contaminated area. In the San Fernando Valley one of the sites has been
remediated by building a treatment plan that delivers drinking water to Glendale and Burbank,
while another has reduced groundwater availability of the San Fernando Valley groundwater
basin for Los Angeles by 50%. The Whittier contaminated area has been remediated with a
treatment plan that provides drinking quality water to the Suburban Water System, a private
water provider for the city of Whittier.
EPA has also jurisdiction over groundwater quality by directly regulating injection wells,
used in Southern California to protect the aquifers from sea water intrusion, and regulating
supporting and subsidizing low impact development that has the goal of reducing runoff and
increasing water percolation into groundwater basins.
EPA does not fund water conservation directly, but runs three programs that support water
efficiency. CWA and SDWA provide revolving funds that finance projects and programs that
improve water quality, support water recycling, and enhance water conservation (such as
metering replacement) (EPA 2012). Also, EPA promotes the Water Sense Partnership. The
agency labels products like plumbing fixtures and irrigation devices that use 20% less water than
63

the average product in that category and partners with manufacturers and retailers to support
their distribution. The program includes certification of certification programs for landscape
irrigation professionals that verify professional proficiency in water-efficient irrigation system
design, installation/maintenance, and auditing. EPA has a regional office with oversight over
California, Nevada, Arizona, Hawaii and Pacific Territories. The office collaborates to initiatives
to protect water quality and have oversight over injection wells that protect local aquifers from
salt water intrusion.
California Water Governance
Three major state agencies have jurisdiction over water matters: the Natural Resources
Agency, the Environmental Protection Agency and the Health and Human Services Agency.
The Natural Resources Agency, whose mission is to protect natural, historical and cultural
resources, hosts two departments that are vital for water resources management: the Department
of Water Resources (DWR) and the Department of Fish and Game. The Department of Water
Resources performs a wide array of water related functions that range from water resources
planning to flood control to managing the State Water Project. DWR is responsible for three vital
sources of California’s water supply: the implementation of the Colorado River Quantification
Settlement Agreement and Salton Sea ecosystem restoration; planning and implementing actions
to improve water quality in San Joaquin and Sacramento Delta; and running the State Water
Project. Moreover, the Department carries out numerous tasks related to planning water usage,
such as providing scientific analysis in support of water management, offering guidance and
assistance to local and regional organizations with water planning and engineering and planning
the State water strategies. Every five years the Department issues the California Water Plan, a
policy document that includes an analysis of the current status of water supply and demand,
64

examines future water availability scenarios and identifies strategies that guide State investments
in technological innovation, infrastructures and integrated water management. DWR also carries
out important operative tasks such as managing flood control and issuing grants and loans for
water supply and water quality enhancement.
DWR has a specific office that handles Southern California issues. Besides supporting
water planning at local level, its Southern Branch is the water-master of the West Basin and of
the Central Basin, two of the widest aquifers that underlie the Los Angeles River and San
Gabriel River plains.
DWR role in water conservation is strictly related to its planning activities, to its role in
managing the water quality in San Joaquin and Sacramento Delta and to its ability of disbursing
funds. As the State water resource planner the District provides scientific and technical backing
to California’s water strategies that largely rely on water conservation to balance demand and
supply in the future. As part of its stewardship of the Delta process, DWR has promoted and
funded numerous water conservation activities in Southern California, in agreement with the
Metropolitan Water District (MWD) and with many wholesalers. Moreover, though its grants
and funds the department has funded pilot studies about water efficiency and water conservation
projects.
The Department of Fish and Game has assumed a very important role in determining
California water supply and, although not directly responsible for water conservation, it is one of
the important actors that determine California’s water uses. As the agency responsible for
implementing the Endangered Species Act, responsible for protecting habitat quality to support
all species and natural communities, the department has the responsibility for developing
65

instream flow recommendations that are considered by the Water Board in regulatory actions
related to appropriation of water and other planning activities.
The California Environmental Protection Agency hosts the State Water Resources Board
(SWRB), responsible for allocating water rights and for protecting water quality. The SWRB has
jurisdiction over the allocation of surface water rights established after 1914 and for maintaining
records of all surface water usages. Also, the Board has the responsibility of overseeing water
quality standards and by regulating wastewater discharges to surface water (rivers, ocean, etc.)
and to groundwater. Its structure is decentralized: the task of developing and implementing water
quality standards is carried out by nine Regional Water Quality Control Boards (RWCB). The
Regional Boards develop “basin plans” for their hydrologic areas, issue waste discharge
requirements, take enforcement action against violators, and monitor water quality. They
regulate storm water discharges from construction, industrial, and municipal activities;
discharges from irrigated agriculture; dredge and fill activities and the alteration of any federal
water body. The State Water Control Board is in charge of approving the plans and overseeing
their implementation.
Southern California is under the jurisdiction of three RWCB: Los Angeles RWCB that
includes most of Los Angeles and Ventura counties; Santa Ana RWCB that oversees the Santa
Ana River watershed across Riverside, San Bernardino and Orange counties; San Diego RWCB
that encompasses most of San Diego county and parts of southwestern Riverside Orange
counties.
SWRB has jurisdiction over a number of grants and loans derived from the CWA and the
CDWA to improve water quality, implement water recycling and protecting groundwater.
Although most of them are aimed at financing infrastructures for wastewater management, a
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growing portion of these resources is aimed at reducing water consumption (especially outdoor
residential irrigation), at containing water runoff and controlling its quality.
The California Health and Human Services Agency includes Department of Public Health
that encompasses the Division of Drinking Water and Environmental Management, which has
the main task of protecting drinking water quality by regulating public water systems, water
recycling projects and the use of recycled water for groundwater replenishment; certifying
residential water treatment devices and other actions. Although its tasks mainly concern the
quality of water supply, the Division runs a water conservation program that monitors public
water systems’ water losses and encourages public water systems to implement structural
measures (such as metering and pricing) to reduce water usage. The Division of Drinking Water
and Environmental Management acts locally through 23 districts. Ventura, Orange, Riverside
and San Bernardino counties each correspond to one district, while Los Angeles County is
divided in four districts.
Private water retailers in Southern California are under the jurisdiction of the California
Public Utilities Commission (CPUC), the entity that has oversight over privately owned
companies that provide services such as telecommunications, electricity, natural gas, railroads,
rail transit, passenger transportation and water retail. CPUC regulates the quality of services
provided and the rates private companies apply, it is committed to consumer and environmental
protection, but also to fair rates of return for the services providers.
The water section of the CPUC monitors and regulates water and sewer system service
quality issues, provides auditing, financial and advisory services to the regulated utilities and
processes rate change requests.
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The influence of CPUC on water conservation is not marginal. By having oversight over
rates any decision that influence costumers’ rates and rates of return comes under its scrutiny. In
its 2005 Water Action Plan, the CPUC adopted the principle of efficient use of water and set the
objective of strengthening water conservation programs to a level comparable to those of energy
utilities (CPUC 2005). The Commission outlined several actions to reach this goal, such as
promoting metered water service, encouraging direct participation by major water utilities in the
California Urban Water Conservation Council (CUWCC) and encouraging increasing
conservation and efficiency rate designs.
In recent years, the Commission has approved increasing tiered rates and conservation
programs such as rebates for water efficient appliances for the largest private water utilities. It
has also experimented with tools to decouple water sales from revenues, in order to remove
obstacles to water conservation (CPUC 2008). The most controversial measures are the Water
Revenue Adjustment Mechanism (WRAM) and the Modified Cost Balancing Account (MCBA)
through which private water utilities can recuperate their losses if their revenues are lower than
what CPUC expects due to lower sales, but have the mandate of refund their customers if their
revenues are higher than expected due to higher rates (Ericson and Leventis 2010).
The energy section of the CPUC is also partially involved with water conservation. In fact
it has launched several pilot programs for energy utilities to address water conservation as a tool
to save energy and reduce GHG emissions and is currently discussing a program that would fund
these initiatives consistently, with a relevant stream of resources.
Southern California Regional Water Governance: Metropolitan Water District
Southern California largest water agency is the Metropolitan Water District of Southern
California (MWD). The agency provides water for about 18.6 million people in a 5.2 thousand
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square miles area between the City of Oxnard and the US border with Mexico and includes large
portions of the Ventura, Los Angeles, San Bernardino, Orange and San Diego Counties.
MWD was instituted by the California legislature that passed the Metropolitan Water
District Act in 1927, and was incorporated in 1928 after a ballot measure passed in its initial
member communities
2
. The District was defined as a public corporation that had the goal of
building the infrastructure to transport water from the Colorado River to Southern California and
to sell and deliver water at wholesale for municipal and domestic uses
3
. Its funding was to be
secured by taxes on assessed values
4
, annexation fees, bonds and water rates. Through the years,
after building the Colorado River Aqueduct (CRA), MWD has grown its service area to 5,200sq
mls, has added the State Water Project (SWP)
5
to its sources of water; has entered contracts with
other agencies to supply water to Southern California and covers about 41% of its service area
water demand, an average of 2.1 Million Acre Feet per Year (MAFY) between 2001 and 2010
(Fig. 5).
2
Beverly Hills, Burbank, Glendale, Los Angeles, Pasadena, San Marino, San Bernardino, Colton, Anaheim and
Santa Ana (Ostrom, V. 1953)
3
Imported water is specifically reserved for residential, commercial, industrial and institutional uses. A very small
quantity has been used for agriculture.
4
Taxes on assessed valuation levied by MWD to fund its investments exceed the limit of Prop. 13 and are set every
year, for 2011 they were set at 0.0037%.
5
State Water Project is the infrastructure that delivers water from the Sacramento – San Joaquin rivers Delta to
Southern California. MWD has contracted 45% of its water deliveries and is bound to repay 45% of the investment.
The SWP has never delivered as much water as expected and its capacity has been drastically reduced by a court
order meant to protect endangered species in the Sacramento- San Joaquin Delta. At the same time, however, its
contractors are committed to repay the initial investment.
69

Figure 5. Water supply in the Metropolitan Water District area
Source: MWD 2010e
The District is now formed by 26 agencies: 15 retailers (14 cities and one municipal water
district) and 11 wholesalers. Each member agency has a seat in the 37 member board, while the
remaining 11 seats are shared between the agencies with the larger assessed property values and
assigned according to said assessed property values
6
. Directors are appointed by the agencies
they represent and usually have a 4 years mandate that can be renewed. MWD’s representation
system was originally designed to protect the interests of the agencies that had initially
contributed to the construction of the Colorado River Aqueduct. In fact not all the board
members’ votes weight the same. The weight of each board member’s vote depends on the
assessed property values of the agency he/she represents, with a ratio of one vote for each $10
million of assessed property values
7
.
Starting 1960 the district has transformed its sources of revenues and its range of influence.
While initially it was funded mainly by property taxes on the assessed values of its member
6
An additional representative is assigned for each full 5% of the assessed property values, for example: Los
Angeles, San Diego County Water Authority and Municipal Water District of Orange County account respectively
for 19.5%, 17.9% and 16.9% of the total assessed property values of the district and are assigned 3 additional
representatives each.
7
For example, in 2012, the vote of the representative of the city of Beverly Hills was worth 1.09% out of 208,000 of
the available votes, the vote of the representative of the City of Compton was worth 0.16% and the vote of the four
representatives of the City of Los Angeles was worth 19.7%.
70

areas, now water sales revenues cover about 90% of its $1.2billion budget (MWD 2012c). Its
scope of action has also changed. New functions have been incorporated in its funding document
and, along with providing imported water, MWD is now mandated to engage in water
conservation, water recycling, groundwater replenishment and storage, watershed management,
habitat restoration, and environmentally compatible community development.
The task of providing imported water for its member agencies, nevertheless, is the core
business of the agency and the largest part of its revenues and expenses. MWD owns the 232
miles Colorado River Aqueduct with a capacity of 1.2 MAFY, 16 power plans, 5 treatment
plans, about 820 miles of distribution lines and 9 reservoirs with a total capacity of 1,072,000
AF.
By analyzing the District’s budgets between fiscal year 2005-2006 and fiscal year 2010-
2011, between 25% and 31% of its yearly revenues are spent to honor the State Water Contract
to access SWP water, between 14% and 20% is spent in operations and maintenance, between
16% and 19% is dedicated to repaying existing debt, between 28% and 16% is reserved for new
investments and only between 2% and 3.7% is used for demand management (MWD 2007a,
MWD 2008c, MWD 2009a, MWD 2010b). Of this (about $ 48 Million in FY 2010 – 2011), the
largest portion is dedicated to support recycling water and groundwater clean up projects and
only $ 20 million is reserved for water conservation (MWD 2010b).
MWD is a very influential organization and its influence reverberates over the State water
supply decisions and over its member agencies. Its most influential tools in the relationship with
its members are: the annexation process, the water rates, the water allocation process in case of
water shortages and water management incentives.
71

Through the annexation process entities that want to join MWD agree to pay an annexation
charge that takes into account previous investments, to use water purchased from MWD only
within their boundaries and to abide to the District’s board rules in terms of billing, rates and
water uses. Since 1992, they also agree to maximize water conservation practices and the usage
of recycled water (MWD 2012a). On the other hand, MWD pledges to “provide its service area
with adequate supplies of water to meet expanding and increasing needs in the years ahead.
When and as additional water resources are required to meet increasing needs for domestic,
industrial and municipal water, the District will be prepared to deliver such supplies.”
8
, but does
not guarantee that the district will be able to provide all the water supply needed in the annexing
areas (MWD 2012a).
In 2001 MWD’s board restructured its rates and, in order to apply a tiered rate system and
guarantee more stability to water demand, proposed its member agencies to agree to buy a
certain amount of water every year for a specific rate. Purchases exceeding a threshold were
subject to a higher rate. Agencies were requested to estimate a base water demand and to commit
to buy a minimum amount of water in a 10 year period (60% of the base demand x 10, between
2003 and 2012), while not exceeding 90% of the base year demand in every single year. Water
purchases within 90% of the base year were subject to a Tier 1 rate, while purchases over that
threshold would trigger Tier 2 rates. Entities that don’t commit to the purchase order are charged
Tier 2 rates when their yearly purchases exceed 60% of the base year demand (MWD 2002).
Twenty-four out of twenty six member agencies agreed to the system and are now on
schedule to complete the purchase order.
The linchpin of the new rate system was the new two tiered “unbundled” water rate. Tier 1
is charged on each purchased AF and it is calculated at the average cost of water. Tier 1 recovers
8
Administrative Code § 4202
72

operations and maintenance costs, energy costs both for the Colorado River Aqueduct and the
State Water Project, and the costs associated with the State Water Project contract. In addition,
Tier 1 rate includes a “water stewardship” component, the revenues of which are reserved for
funding water recycling projects of member agencies and conservation measures. An additional
average cost is added for treatment. Tier 2 is the estimated marginal cost for acquiring new water
and is based on the rates of water transfers (Figure 6).

Figure 6. MWD water rates (2003 – 2011)
Source: MWD 2012d
Two additional fixed charges are charged to the member agencies:
• Readiness To Serve Charge: covers costs for MWD’s emergency storage and conveyance
standby, it is a lump sum and is allocated among the member agencies based on each
agency’s 10-year rolling average demand (in 2012 it amounts to $ 125 million divided
between the 26 agencies);
• Capacity Reservation Charge that recovers costs for peak capacity on MWD’s
distribution system. Each member agency reserves summer (May through September)
peak capacity and pays the charge based on capacity reserved on a cubic feet per second
basis (MWD 2001).
73

Lower rates are established for water purchased to replenish aquifers and for a very limited
agricultural program (MWD 2012c).
Water rates are a constant source of concern for member agencies, because in the last two
years MWD has increased rates while providing less water. However, between 1997 and 2009
even if California was going through drought spells, MWD’s rate in real terms had declined and
began to climb back only in 2010 (Figure 7) at the tail of the last drought.

Figure 7. MWD rates at constant value (2011 dollars)
Source: BLS 2012; MWD 2012d
Rates are also a source of internal struggle for MWD. With the last round of rate increases
San Diego County Water Authority, the largest member agency in the district, has sued MWD,
arguing that the its rates for using its infrastructure to transport water are unfair.
Another contentious issue within member agencies is the system used to allocate water to
member agencies in case of drought. When a long drought reduces water availability, the district
is forced to ration water. In case of water shortages, the staff at MWD determines the Regional
shortage level and water deliveries are reduced accordingly for one year. The formula to
calculate the amount of water allotted to each member agency is based on the last three year
retail demand of each member, adjusted for severity of the shortage, for conservation measures
74

adopted and for the level of the member’s dependency from imported water (MWD 2008a). The
mechanism has been applied during the last drought (2007 – 2011), but has stirred a lot of
controversies among member agencies and has been reviewed in 2010 (MWD 2010a) and 2011
MWD 2011b).
Since the late 80s MWD has funded a range of water reclamation and water conservation
initiatives for its member agencies. The bulk of the financial effort (about $316 million in the last
20 years) has been focused towards water storage. When surplus water is available, the district
provides imported water at a discounted price to be stored in groundwater basins or to be used in
substitution of groundwater. Water conservation programs have been funded with approximately
$293 million in the last 20 years. The description of MWD’s specific activities is included in a
different section. Since the early 90s, the district has provided educational and informational
support to wholesalers and retailers, has supported a wide indoor residential water fixtures
replacement program, has created a rebate programs for water saving devices for commercial,
industrial and institutional customers; has implemented water conservation and landscape
training and has occasionally funded local conservation initiatives aimed at outdoor water usage.
Funding for these actions came from water revenues and external sources such as USBR and
DWR. Member agencies and other retailers participated to MWD’s programs and tailored them
to their service area, either adding funding onto existing programs or creating their own. More
recently, MWD has streamlined its programs and outsourced the administration to a third party
and focused on the evaluation of existing and pilot programs. Through the years the District has
strengthened the relationship with the member agencies’ staff by instituting monthly meetings of
the conservation coordinators and a program advisory committee of member agencies that should
provide input to innovate water conservation programs.
75

MWD’s Member Agencies: Retailers and Wholesalers
Fourteen cities and one municipal water district are water retailers that buy imported
water directly from MWD and sell it to households and businesses, while twelve Municipal
Water District and one County Authority are wholesalers that buy from MWD and sell to
retailers (Figure 8).

Figure 8. Metropolitan Water District and its member agencies
MWD’s Member Agencies: the Retailers
The retailers are the original core agencies that funded MWD. They own extensive water pipes
networks, water rights over groundwater, wells, pumps, meters, reservoirs, and, in some cases,
water recycling operations. They manage the entire water supply chain in their service area. They
76

vary in size, in their reliance on imported water and in how water demand management is
embedded in their organizational structure. San Fernando, San Marino and Compton are small
retailers both in terms of population and water demand and are also the least dependent on
MWD. Santa Monica and Beverly Hills are also small in terms of water demand, but they depend
on imported water for more than 78% of their supply. For mid-sized cities in terms of both
residents and water demand like Fullerton, Torrance and Pasadena the reliance on MWD water
ranges from 30% to 64%; while for larger cities like Long Beach, Anaheim and Santa Ana
imported water supplies between 32% and 40% of local demand. Los Angeles is by far the
largest water user among the retailers and relies on MWD for 51% of its water supply.
For most retailers the water function is embedded in the public utilities or the public
works department, while for Los Angeles, Burbank, Long Beach water is embedded in a
department that has jurisdiction also on electricity. These cities’ departments have a board
nominated by the mayor that takes decisions about water supply strategies. Only one among the
retailers has outsourced water operations to a private operator (Tab. 5).

77

Table 5. Retail water agencies member of MWD
Name of retailer
Number of
Residents
(2010) Type of governance
% imported
water (2010 –
2011)
Water
Demand 2010
– 2011 (AF)
Joined
MWD
Anaheim 364,921 Board nominated by the
Mayor for the Utilities
Department in which water is
an embedded function
30% 74,824 1928
Beverly Hills 45,000 Function embedded in
department public works
91% 11,320 1928
Burbank 108,469 Board nominated by Mayor 40% 18,786 1928
Compton 81,963 Department of Water and
Waste
21% 8,713 1928
Glendale 210,293 Department of Water and
Power
60% 28,170 1928
Fullerton 138,600 Function embedded in Public
Utilities department
33% 30,171 1928
Las Virgenes
Municipal Water
District
75,384 Board Elected by residents 89% 28,461 1958
Los Angeles 4,100,260 Board nominated by Mayor 51% 397,903 1928
Long Beach 462,257 Board nominated by Mayor 42% 65,773 1928
Pasadena 175,957 Department of Water and
Power
61% 31,061 1928
San Fernando 23,650 Function embedded in
department Public Works
2% 3,555 1973
San Marino 55,558 Outsourced 10% 4,452 1928
Santa Ana 358,136 Function embedded in
department Public Works
31% 42,317 1928
Santa Monica 89,736 Function embedded in
department Public Works
78% 10,528 1928
Torrance 145,438 Function embedded in
department Public Works
64% 27,229 1928
Source: California American Water 2012; City of Anaheim 2011, City of Beverly Hills 2011; City of Burbank 2011;
City of Compton 2011; City of Glendale 2011; City of Fullerton 2011; Las Virgenes Municipal Water District 2011;
LADWP 2011; City of Long Beach 2011; City of Pasadena 2011; City of San Fernando 2011; San Marino; City of
Santa Ana 2011; City of Santa Monica 2011; City of Torrance 2011; MWD 2011,

MWD’s Member Agencies: the Wholesalers
While cities are multipurpose entities, with a wide variety of functions, wholesalers are
special districts, established with the sole purpose of managing water supply. Originally they
managed only the imported wholesale water supply of their service area but with time most of
them have developed infrastructure to treat wastewater to reusable standards or to distribute
recycled water treated by other organizations. Two of them are in some degree involved in the
78

entire water supply chain that involves groundwater, recycled and imported water and two
provide retail service to a portion of their service area.
Ten of them are Municipal Water Districts, organized under the provisions of the
Municipal Water District Act of 1911 (California Water Code §71000 - 73001), and one is a
County Authority organized under the County Water Authority Act (California Water Code
§30000 – 30901). They have been incorporated through elections in their service area and
established with the purpose of delivering imported water to respond to the growing water
demand for urban development that could not be sustained by existing groundwater resources.
Most Municipal water districts joined the MWD right after the Colorado River Aqueduct became
operational, between 1947 and 1954. Only Calleguas Municipal Water District (CMWD), that
includes part of Ventura County, joined when the State Water Project was being built in 1960.
Municipal water districts as well as the County Authority are allowed to acquire, control,
distribute, store, reclaim and recapture any water (included wastewater) for the benefit of their
service area. They have the power of eminent domain, they can charge rates for the services they
provide and they can fund their investments through property taxes and a stand-by charge on real
estate parcels in their areas. The representation system for Municipal water districts is
completely different for the representation system of MWD and of the County Agency.
According to the Water Code, Municipal water districts board members are elected by the
residents of their service area. According to Section 71160 of the water code, upon formation
Municipal water districts are divided in 5 divisions and their 5 board members are elected by the
residents of each division (Orange County Municipal Water District and Three Valleys
Municipal Water District are special cases). In other words they represent the retailers’
79

customers. MWD and the County Agency, on the other hand, have a much larger board, whose
members are nominated in representation of the member agencies (not the local residents).
Wholesalers are a very diverse group. They differ in the scope of their activity, their
diversification of revenues, size, the percentage of water demand they supply in their service area
and in how they charge their customers.
Most of them own only a limited amount of main water lines and serve only wholesale
customers, but two of them serve also retail customers and provide them with sewage and
wastewater treatment.
Municipal water districts and the county authority are allowed to levy taxes and stand-by-
charges to cover their capital costs. Most of them rely on a small percentage of the property tax
levied by the counties within the limits of Prop. 13 (California water code §72090) and some
levy a stand by charge up to $10.00 per parcel in their service area (Tab. 6).
Table 6. Sources of revenues of water wholesalers (FY 2010 – 2011)
Wholesalers Property taxes
Stand by
Charges
% of water revenues on
total revenues (2010 –
2011)
Calleguas Municipal Water District Yes Yes 77.4%
Central Basin Municipal Water
District
No Yes 80.8%
Eastern Municipal Water District Yes Yes 42.9%**
Foothill Municipal Water District Yes 87.7%
Inland Empire Utilities Agency
Municipal Water District
N.A. N.A. N.A.
Orange County Municipal Water
District
Yes * 92.4%
San Diego County Water Authority Yes Yes 81.1%
Three Valleys Municipal Water
District
Yes 84.5%
Upper San Gabriel Basin Municipal
Water District
Yes Yes 85.9%
West Basin Municipal Water District No Yes 76.1%
Western Municipal Water District Yes 71.0%
* Adopted in 2011 for FY 2011 - 2012
** Sales include wastewater service
Source: CMWD 2012; CBMWD 2010; EMWD 2011b; FMWD 2012; IEUA 2012b; MWDOC 2011b; SDCWA
2012; TVMWD 2011a; USGVMWD 2012; WBMWD 2011b; WMWD 2011b
80

San Diego County Water Authority (SDCWA) and Orange County Municipal Water
District (MWDOC) are the largest wholesalers in terms of population and imported water usage.
SDCWA is MWD’s largest customer, depends from imported water for more than 80% of its
members’ water usage and charges wide ranges of surcharges over MWD rates. Foothill is the
smallest, relies on MWD for about 40% of its supply and divides its operating expenses among
member agencies based on the usage they make of the investments.
Many wholesalers have a very fragmented customer base. Central Basin, for example, has
a service area of 553,000 residents and 39 customer agencies, many of which serve less than
3,000 accounts each. Calleguas and Upper San Gabriel Basin also have a small resident base and
a large number of customers.
There is a wide variability among the wholesalers on the amount they surcharge MWD’s
rate to fund their operations. Some of them don’t apply any surcharge, because the amount of
imported they sell is very small and others, like Calleguas, charge more than $200 per each acre
foot of sold water (Tab. 7).

81

Table 7. Characteristics of wholesalers, members of the Metropolitan Water District
Wholesalers
Residents
2010
Number
of
customers Funded in
Joined
MWD
Number
of Board
Members
% imported
water on total
water supply
(2010 - 2011)
Water
Demand
2010 -
2011 (AF)
2010 - 2011
Revenues
Surcharge on MWD
Tier 1 treated water
rates in 2011
Calleguas MWD 632,399 19 1953 1960 5 67% 135,906 $121,285,860 $237 per AF+
capacity reservation
charge
Central Basin
MWD
553,727 32 1952 1954 5 22% 278,644 $58,937,616 $ 86 per AF+ service
charges
Eastern MWD 695,932 7 1950 1951 5 40% 222,671 $234,753,588* 0
Foothill MWD 87,876 7 1952 1953 5 46% 19,145 $12,489,715 Administrative
expenses are divided
among members
Inland Empire
Utilities Agency
849,150 8 1950 1950 5 20% 264,304 $26,934,679 $12 per AF + $1.555
per retail meter
Orange County 2,300,021 28 1951 1951 7 49% 451,722 $161,470,231 $3.75 per AF + $7.2
per retail meter
San Diego
County Water
Authority
3,200,000 24 1940 1947 36 83% 493,338 $929,492,000 $43 + Customer
Service, Storage and
Infrastructure Access
charge
Three Valleys
MWD
573,800 14 1945 1950 7 59% 111,289 $51,648,183 $10 per AF+ historic
use charge + small
meter charge
Upper San
Gabriel Valley
MWD
903,000 29 1960 1963 5 27% 143,528 $30,062,037 $96 + Connection and
Replenishment charge
West Basin
MWD
853,377 8 1947 1947 5 66% 176,818 $151,324,200 $125 per AF + $66
per AF + water
service charge
Western MWD 860,000 9 1954 1954 5 28% 275,050 $94,345,177 $18.45 + $3.50
Gravity Line Fee
* includes wastewater collection and treatment
+ SDCWA does not apply 1
st
and 2
nd
tiers rate s
Sources: CMWD 2011, 2012; CBMWD 2010, 2011; EMWD 2011a; 2011b; FMWD 2011; 2012; IEUA 2011; 2012b; MWDOC 2011a; 2011b; SDCWA 2011;
2012; TVMWD 2011a; 2011b; USGVMWD 2011; 2012; WBMWD 2011a; 2011b; WMWD 2011a; 2011b
82

Wholesalers are generally committed to water conservation strategies. They participate to
shaping MWD’s water efficiency programs, they use programs developed by MWD, but they
also develop their own, and they apply for funding without the assistance of the regional agency.
A few wholesalers (West Basin, Central Basin, Inland Empire Utilities Agency, Western
and Eastern) have developed their own recycling plans and distribution lines. Those who have
not acted have left the initiative to the individual retailers in their areas or to other local agencies
Typically, Municipal water districts that have developed their own recycling capability sell
recycled water to their imported water customers (cities and water districts) and to individual
entities like industrial plans, Caltrans, cemeteries, etc., but they also use it for groundwater
replenishment. West Basin sells its purified water (about 27% of its recycled water sales, at $533
per AF, WBMWD, 2011b) to Los Angeles County Flood District that manages the West coast
barrier, a series of injection wells along the coast between the Los Angeles International Airport
and the Palos Verdes Peninsula that protects the groundwater basin from salt water intrusion.
Inland Empire Utilities Agency sells its recycled water to the Chino Basin Water-master that
spreads water in percolating basins owned by the Chino Basin Water Conservation District (at a
$ 145 per AF rate, IEUA 2012)(Table 8).

83

Table 8. Water recycling capacity of water wholesalers in Southern California
Wholesalers Water Recycling capacity
Calleguas Municipal Water District Some of its customers buy recycled water from local wastewater district
Central Basin Municipal Water
District
Buys wastewater from Los Angeles County treated at secondary level and
treats it at tertiary level. Owns an extensive recycled water pipeline
network, sells groundwater to a range of customers and to the Water
Replenishment District. Operates a groundwater treatment plan that serves
the cities of Whittier, Santa Fe Springs and Pico Rivera
Eastern Municipal Water District The district collects and treats wastewater, owns a recycling plan and an
extensive recycled water pipeline network.
Foothill Municipal Water District None
Inland Empire Utilities Agency The agency collects and treats wastewater, owns water recycling plans,
extensive recycled water pipeline network, is partner in a small
desalination operation, is partner in a water treatment plan.
Orange County Municipal Water
District
Some of its customers buy recycled water from local wastewater district.
Some of its customers have built and share a recycling plan
San Diego County Water Authority Some of its customers buy recycled water from local wastewater districts
Three Valleys Municipal Water
District
Some of its customers buy recycled water from Los Angeles County
Sanitation District
Upper San Gabriel Basin Municipal
Water District
Buys recycled water from Los Angeles County Sanitation District and
from Central Basin Municipal Water District and resells it to its customers
West Basin Municipal Water District Recycles City of Los Angeles wastewater at 7 different degrees of
purification, owns recycled water pipes, sells recycled water to a range of
customers and injects purified water in sea water intrusion barriers
Western Municipal Water District Buys secondary treated water from Los Angeles Department of Sanitation,
owns a recycling plan and a recycled water pipeline network, a small
desalination operation and a water treatment plan.
Source: CMWD 2011; CBMWD 2011; EMWD 2011a; FMWD 2011; IEUA 2011; MWDOC 2011a; SDCWA
2011; TVMWD 2011b; USGVMWD 2011; WBMWD 2011a; WMWD 2011a
Central Basin Municipal Water District and Upper San Gabriel Valley Municipal Water
Districts have developed a mutual relationship. The first sells recycled water to the latter at a rate
that ranges between $480 and $ 526 per AF (CBMWD 2011).
Recycled rates, in all cases, are subsidized by MWD, that provides Municipal Water
Districts a $250 rebate for every AF of recycled water sold (WBMWD 2011a).
Groundwater, Watermasters and Management Plans
As explained previously, MWD provides about 41% of the water supply for its service
area, the rest is provided by limited recycling operations and by groundwater. Cities and water
districts own their own pumping wells and draw water to sell to their customers.
Although according to California water law there is no general rule for assigning property
rights over groundwater, groundwater pumping in Southern California is highly regulated. There
84

are 47 groundwater basins in the MWD service area. Seventeen of them (mainly located in San
Diego County) have low quality water and are too small to be used for domestic and industrial
usage, while the other 30 actively supply water for urban usage. Out of these 30, twelve have
been adjudicated
9
by a court order, one is managed by a special district, six are unadjudicated,
but managed through mutual agreements and management plans, three are under court
jurisdiction, and eight are unadjudicated (generally small and used only by one entity –Figure 9,
DWR 2003; MWD 2007b, Appendix A).

Figure 9. Groundwater basins in Southern California
Source: MWD 2007b
9
In some California groundwater basins, as the demand for groundwater exceeded supply, landowners and other
entities turned to the courts to determine how much groundwater each party could extract. The courts stud yavailable
data to arrive at a distribution of the groundwater that is available each year, usually based on the California law of
overlying use and appropriation. Many of these cases have been resolved with a court-approved negotiated
settlement, called a stipulated judgment that guarantees to each party a proportionate share of the groundwater that is
available each year. Adjudications one of the strongest forms of groundwater management in California.
85

Basins that have been adjudicated are managed by a court appointed watermaster.
Watermasters administer the judgment, monitor water extraction, have oversight over water
storage, water rights sales and leases, make sure that all the parties abide to the judgment rules
and assess a fee according to the water each party extracts to cover their administrative costs.
Watermasters are a diversified range of organizations that often rely on cities and wholesalers for
administrative structures and personnel. DWR, through its local offices, acts as watermaster for
West and Central Basin. Upper Los Angeles River Area (ULARA) watermaster has oversight
over four groundwater basin including the San Fernando Basin, is a professional hydrogeologist
supported by LADWP. Six Basins, Raymond Basin, Main San Gabriel Basin and Chino Basin
watermasters are a 9 members board nominated by the parties of the judgment and ratified by the
courts. Raymond Basin’s relies on the administrative support of the Main San Gabriel Basin
Watermaster, Six Basins has outsourced the basin’s management to a professional organization
and Chino Basin watermaster, which plays also the role of Cucamonga Basin watermaster, relies
on the technical and administrative support of the Inland Empire Utilities Agency. The Orange
County Basin is not managed by a watermaster, but has a unique water management system.
Water extraction is regulated by an ad hoc organism, the Orange County Water District
(OCWD), instituted in 1933 by a State law that puts OCWD in charge of managing the
groundwater basin, to conserve the quality and quantity of water, to control stormwaters and to
reclaim water for beneficial uses. To fulfill this mission, the district has been attributed the
power to buy and sell water and to assess replenishment fees.
Groundwater management strategies adopted by the courts and implemented by the
watermasters are quite diverse. Most basins have been adjudicated with a fixed pumping
allocation above the native safe yield of the basin, if the hydrological conditions don’t support
86

the safe yield set by the judgment, recharge water, recycled or imported, must be purchased and
percolated into the basin. The amount of supplemental recharge is dependent upon annual
hydrologic conditions and from the pumping activity of rights holders. Usually watermasters
assess a management fee for their operations and additional charges for replenishment water,
based on the amount of each party’s overpumping (Tab. 9).
Watermasters do not manage replenishment on their own, they rely on other
organizations. For the Central Basin and the West Basin, the watermaster function is focused on
strict accounting of water extractions. The Water Replenishment District (WRD) of Southern
California manages the replenishment of the two basins and monitors water quality. To replenish
the two aquifers WRD purchases water from Central Basin Municipal Water District and from
West Basin Municipal Water District and bills the parties responsible for over-pumping. WRD,
however, relies on Los Angeles County Department of Public Work to operate spreading
grounds where imported water and water from the San Gabriel River and from the Rio Hondo is
diverted and percolated (CBMWD 2011a). For Chino Basin, the watermaster accounts for the
water used by each party, but also monitors water quality, negotiates agreements to manage the
transfer of water rights from agricultural to urban uses and initiates operations to improve water
quality in the basin. To fulfill these agreements, the watermaster purchases imported and
recycled water to be spread, but relies on a different organization, the Chino Basin Conservation
District to actually manage the spreading basins. Chino Basin Watermaster levies Production
Assessments to cover administrative costs, special projects and water quality monitoring and
Optimum Basin Management fees that cover water replenishment operations (IEUA 2011).

87

Table 9. Adjudication rules of groundwater basins in MWD service area
Name of
Basin
Date of
adjudication Watermaster
Type of
yield Replenishment
Storage and carry
over
Sylmar 1979 Professional Safe yield Storage allowed
San
Fernando
1979 Professional Safe yield Only Los Angeles is allowed to
overproduce and replenish.
Allowed, recently
limited by an
agreement among the
parties
Verdugo 1979 Professional Safe yield Storage allowed
Eagle Rock 1979 Professional Storage allowed
Raymond 1944 9 members
board
Safe yield Parties allowed to recapture
80% of spreaded water.
Replenishment required for
allowed 10% overproduction
Carry over only 10%
for one year, no
storage allowed
West 1965 DWR Safe yield Carry over only 10%
for one year, no
storage allowed
Central 1961 DWR Safe yield Replenishment through
stormwater recapture and
imported water purchased by
parties that overproduce
Carry over only 20%
for one year, no
storage allowed
Main San
Gabriel
1973 9 members
board
Operating
safe yield
changes
every year
Watermaster purchases
replacement water to
compensate for overpumping
and collects a replacement
assessment
Unlimited carryover
for 1 year
Six Basins 1998 Outsourced Operating
safe yield
changes
every year
Operating plan determines
spreading operations and need
for replacement water
Carry over allowed
to a max 25% of
adjudicated rights for
unlimited time
Chino 1978 9 members
board
Safe yield Replenishment operations are
manged to improve water
quality. Parties who overpump
pay for additional
replenishment water
Storage allowed
Cucamonga 1958 Chino Basin
Watermaster
Safe yield Replenishment is determined
by watermaster
Storage allowed
Orange
County
1933 5 members
board special
district
Basin
Production
Percentage
changes
every year
OCWD maximizes
replenishment opportunities
through surface water and
stormwater recapture and by
spreading imported water
Carryover and
storage allowed
Source: DWR 2003 and MWD 2007b
The San Fernando Judgment (1979) and the Sylmar Basin Stipulation (1984), define the
rights over San Fernando, Sylmar and Eagle Rock basins (the Upper Los Angeles River Area).
According to the two Superior court acts, the city of Los Angeles has pueblo rights
10
to all native
water of the San Fernando Basin and has additional rights to a quantity equal to 20.8% of the
10
Rights over the entire safe yield of the Basin
88

water imported by the City in the area (with the assumption that imported water percolates in the
groundwater basin). Glendale and Burbank also have the right to extract water from San
Fernando Basin, but do not have any right to native waters, they rather have right to specific
amounts of return water. The watermaster is a professional hydrogeologist, supported by
LADWP’s administrative structure that does not provide any replenishment service. According
to the judgment, only the City of Los Angeles is allowed to extract more water than its allotment,
provided that it replenishes the basin when replenishment water is available. Replenishment
services are provided by Los Angeles County Department of Public Works (LADWP 2011).
In Orange county basin, the District monitors the natural replenishment of the
groundwater basin, controls the pumping activities of its users, manages replenishment water
activities in various forms, such as spreading basins and injection wells and uses economic
incentives to regulate groundwater usage. Every year OCWD establishes the allowable Basin
Production Percentage (BPP), the percentage of each Producer’s total water supply that comes
from groundwater pumped from the basin and is compatible with a sustainable groundwater level
(between 62% and 78.6% in the last 5 years). The process that determines a sustainable level of
pumping takes into account the natural recharge process, current groundwater levels and the
availability of replenishment water from MWD and other sources. The BPP is and is set
uniformly for all producers. The District’s activity is supported by property taxes and user fees.
Users pay a Replenishment Assessment (RA) based on the amount of water they pump and a
Basin Equity Assessment (BEA), that is due only if they pump more water than the established
BPP. With this system, no user is assigned fixed water right, but there is an economic incentive
to pump within the established BPP.
89

Water Retailers
In MWD service area, the retailers providing water to households and businesses are 215.
Eighty five are cities, 57 special districts, 33 are divisions of Investor Owned Utilities (IOUs), 32
are mutual companies, 4 are county waterworks district and 4 are other institutions such as the
Boy Scouts, Camp Pendleton Marine Base and universities.
Many retailers (67), mostly mutual companies, are very small. No statistical information
is available on the number of accounts they serve and the amount of water they sell. The vast
majority of retailers (148) serves more than 3,000 residents or sells more than 3,000 AF of water
per year and has filed Urban Water Management Plans
11
(UWMP) in 2011. UWMPs include
information about the residents in their service area, the amount of water sold, the water supply
mix and the type of water usage. Figures 10 through 15 illustrate these data
12
.

11
Required by the Division 6 Part 2.6 of the Water Code §10610 - 10656
12
The 2010 UWMPs of all the water agencies in California are available at
http://www.water.ca.gov/urbanwatermanagement/2010uwmps/
90

Figure 10. Nature of the water retailers in Southern California

Figure 11. Number of residents in the service area of water retailers in Southern California (2010)
91

Figure 12. Per capita daily water usage (2002 – 2007 average)

Figure 13. Average percent rate of variation of daily per capita water usage (2002 – 2007)

92

Figure 14. Groundwater supply as a percentage of total supply (2002 – 2007 average)

Figure 15. Water retailers reporting BMPs results to CUWCC

93

TABLE OF CONTENTS
WATER CONSERVATION IN PRACTICE ........................................................................... 94
Water Conservation Tools .................................................................................................... 94
City Ordinances .................................................................................................................... 94
The Water Intensity of Planning ........................................................................................... 96
Water Saving Devices ........................................................................................................... 98
Devices to Reduce Indoor Residential Water Usage ...................................................... 100
Devices to Reduce Outdoor Water Usage ...................................................................... 109
Devices to Reduce Commercial Industrial and Institutional Water Usage ..................... 115
Pricing: Water Rates as Conservation Tool ........................................................................ 126
Other Pricing Strategies .................................................................................................. 132
Smart Metering and the Technological Frontier ............................................................. 135
Other Market Instruments for Water Conservation ........................................................ 136
Education and Information: Teaching the Children and the Teachers and Raising Public
Awareness ........................................................................................................................... 137

WATER CONSERVATION IN PRACTICE

Water Conservation Tools
A wide body of tools is currently used to reduce urban water usage. Most of them can be
classified as mandates, such as water rationing tools like ordinances and required water flows for
certain plumbing devices or capacity for toilet tanks. A few of them are market based, such as
different types of water rates and conservation credits markets. The next paragraphs describe the
different tool and illustrate the research on their effectiveness.
City Ordinances
In many arid regions two relevant city ordinances have been widely used as water
conservation instruments: the water waste ordinances and the landscape ordinances.
Water waste ordinances are generally adopted by cities and special districts. They
regulate basic uses of water by limiting wasteful uses. In the South West waste water ordinances
usually set irrigation rules (such as prohibiting watering when it rains and setting time and length
94

of lawn irrigation); prohibit water runoff from gardening and other uses and overfilling of
swimming pools and spas; prohibit the use of water to clean hard surfaces such as driveways or
to wash vehicles of any kind unless using a hose with an automatic shut off device; set time
limits for fixing leaks, require recirculating system for fountains; require restaurant to serve
water only if requested and hotels to offer customers the option of not laundering towels and
linens daily and other similar measures. Most ordinances in Southern California include
requirements for car washing establishments and envision stricter criteria as level of droughts or
water shortages become more severe.
Big cities like Los Angeles have also enacted plumbing ordinances that set water
standards for residential and non-residential buildings and require property owners to install
indoor water saving devices before closing escrow (LADWP 2011).
Enforcement rules for these ordinances vary throughout the South West, but can be as
low as a warning for the first offence, up to a $1,280 fine for the fifth offence of a mean
residential user or $2,800 for a large residential user (LVVDD 2012).
In California, landscape efficient water ordinances are a result of the Water Conservation
in Landscaping Act of 1991 that required the Department of Water Resources (DWR) to adopt a
model ordinance that local agencies could adopt to address outdoor water usages. The latest
version of the model ordinance was adopted in September 2010, at the peak of a drought and
includes the following rules for new large landscape projects (over 2,500 sqft):
• Landscape must be carefully planned, matching type of soil with suitable plants
and water efficient irrigation solutions.
• To encourage the efficient use of water, native species are highly recommended.
95

• Projects must estimate their water usage taking into account the type of plants,
their surface and the local climatic characteristics, but their water budget cannot
exceed a set budget (about 43% of the water needed if they included 100% high
water use plants);
• Irrigation projects must include weather based irrigation controllers and separate
landscape meters, but irrigation should be limited to the time frame between 8:00
am and 10 am.
• Recycled water must be used where possible, especially in water features, while
areas irrigated with recycled water are exempt from water restrictions.
• Runoff is prohibited, while mulch is required in non-turf areas and water
structures that facilitate storm-water retention are encouraged.
For existing landscapes, the ordinance reinforces the mandate to avoid runoff and
requires that local agencies audit projects that exceed 1 acre. Following the audit procedure,
agencies should set practices similar to those enacted for new landscaped areas
12
.
The effect of ordinances has not been empirically tested and their effectiveness depends
on the agencies’ commitment to communication to the customers and to enforcement.
Anecdotally, in 2009, when the city of Los Angeles limited outdoor irrigation to a very short
time window, the response was such that when all the residents were watering at the same time
underground mains suffered the sudden pressure variations and burst.
The Water Intensity of Planning
Housing and land use characteristics have emerged as a very relevant element of water
demand (Breyer, Chang, and Parandvash 2012; House-Peters, Pratt and Chang 2010; Nauges and
12
California Code of Regulations, Title 23, Waters Division 2, Department of Water Resources Chapter 2.7, Model
Water Efficient Landscape Ordinance, available at http://www.water.ca.gov/wateruseefficiency/docs/MWELO09-
10-09.pdf
96

Thomas 2003; Ramachandran and Johnson 2011; Shandas and Pavarandash 2010; Shearer 2009;
Wentz and Gober 2007).
The correlation between outdoor space and household water demand has been tested in
numerous instances (Guhathakurta and Gober 2007; Hanak and Davis 2006; House-Peters and
Chang 2011; Kenney et al. 2008; Syme et al. 2004), as well as the correlation between lot size,
density, building size and water demand patterns (Fox, McIntosh, and Jeffrey 2009; Polebitski,
Palmer, and Waddel 2010).
Planners advocate that water demand models should take land use planning into account
(Polebitski and Palmer 2010) and claim that in order to use less water “one planning suggestion
is to decrease the number of detached homes with their own gardens and instead increase the
number of townhouse style homes. The recommended [urban] design should maximize the ratio
of building size to lot size and include communal outdoor garden space that is shared by a
number of homes” (House Peters and Chang 2011, 470).
The relationship between land use and water demand, however, is not simple. Studies
show that dense urbanization, that implies extensive impervious surfaces, is correlated with
intensive runoff, disruption of groundwater recharge and worsening of water quality (Mishra et
al. 2010). Furthermore, research underscores temperature sensitivity of water uses varies across
regions. It is correlated to residential density in humid climates and is almost inexistent in hot
and dry areas (Breyer, Chang, and Parandvash. 2012). Finally, some water intensive uses like
tree coverage, while requiring considerable amounts of water, improve nighttime cooling in dry
areas and reduce heat island effect (Gober et al. 2012).
Any recourse to land use planning to influence water usage therefore needs to take into
account density and lot size, alternative ways of collecting rain water, but also elements of Low
97

Impact Development (LID) techniques (Dietz 2007) to allow for groundwater replenishment and
existing issues of urban heat island.
Water Saving Devices
The standardization and the efficiency of water using devices have been at the center of
the water conservation efforts in the last 30 years, especially in the residential domain. The most
intensive regulatory effort has been focused on plumbing devices.
The performance of plumbing devices such as toilets, faucets and showerheads is
regulated by national standards established by the American National Standard Institute (ANSI)
and by the American Society of Mechanical Engineers’ (ASME), but their performance has also
been regulated by the Congress and by EPA. ANSI and ASME test the effectiveness of the
devices, while the Congress and EPA set performance standards aimed at energy and water
efficiency.
The 1992 Federal Energy Policy Act
13
mandated efficiency standards for showerheads,
faucets, and toilets that entered into effect between 1994 and 1997, as summarized in table 10.
13
H.R.776 -- Energy Policy Act of 1992
98

Table 10. Water efficiency standards according to EPA 1992
Plumbing fixture Pre 1992 Energy Policy Act of 1992
Lavatory faucets From 3.5 to 5.5 gallons per minute 2.5 gallons per minute
Lavatory replacement aerators 2.5 gallons per minute
Metering faucets 0.25 gallons per cycle
Kitchen faucets From 3.5 to 7.0 gallons per minute 2.5 gallons per minute
Kitchen replacement aerators 2.5 gallons per minute
Gravity tank-type toilets From 3.5 to 7.0 gallons per flush 1.6 gallons per flush
Flushometer tank toilets 1.6 gallons per flush
Electromechanical hydraulic toilets 1.6 gallons per flush
Blowout toilets 3.5 gallons per flush
Urinals From 1.5 to 5 gallons per flush 1 gallon per flush
Source: 42 U.S.C. Code § 6295
Also, EPA manages a water certification program called “Water Sense” that follows strict
procedures to certify water using devices that exceed the limits mandated by the Energy Policy
Act of 1992 (Tab. 11).
Table 11. Water efficiency standards according to Water Sense Certification
Plumbing fixture Energy Policy Act of 1992
a
Water Sense
b

Lavatory faucets 2.5 gallons per minute 1.5 gallons per minute
Lavatory replacement aerators 2.5 gallons per minute 2.0 gallons per minute
Kitchen faucets 2.5 gallons per minute 1.5 gallons per minute
Gravity tank-type toilets 1.6 gallons per flush 1.28 gallons per flush
Urinals 1 gallon per flush 0.5 gallons per flush
a
Source: 42 U.S.C. Code § 6295
b
Source: EPA 2013
Water efficiency standards of these devices have been included in many state and local
building codes and in local water conservation ordinances, but it is still difficult to assess their
effectiveness. Most analysis of water usage reductions are still not based on large samples, with
the comparison between a treatment group and a control group, in different geographic situations
and for a sizable number of years, controlling for possible events that might change water usage,
such as water rates, weather number of member of the household. They are rather based on the
water usage reductions that result from the application of the device on the individual fixture,
sometimes controlling for weather, very often on a very small sample.
99

The following sections collect the available information on devices used to conserve
water in residential, landscape, commercial, institutional and industrial settings. Where possible,
data about effective water savings has been collected, with the caveat that comparative studies
have not yet been conducted, unless it is specifically reported.
Devices to Reduce Indoor Residential Water Usage
Residential and industrial uses (excluding mining and energy production) make 11% of
US water uses and 22% of California’s (Kenny et al. 2008), while in the Metropolitan Water
District of Southern California service area they account for 94% of total potable water
consumption, with single family and multifamily residential customers using about 68% of it.
Being residential the largest among urban uses, a large effort has been deployed in engineering
water saving devices tailored for household uses.
To describe existing water saving devices a first distinction needs to be made between
those that are aimed at indoor uses and those that are aimed at outdoor uses. Mayer and DeOreo
(1998) estimate that about 42% that US residential water use is done indoors and 58% is done for
landscaping and other outdoor uses. More recently, DeOreo et al. (2011, 135) assess that in
California indoor water usage accounts for 47% of single family uses and outdoors for 53%.
Water is used in homes for flushing toilets, washing clothes and dishes, bathing and
showering, and satisfying a variety of other uses (Tab. 12) and many devices have been
engineered to actively reduce these uses.
100

Table 12. Residential indoor water usage
Use US 1998
a
Single Family California 2005
b

Toilet 28% 20%
Clothes Washers 22% 18%
Showers 17% 20%
Faucets 16% 19%
Leaks 14% 18%
Dishwashing 1% 1%
Bath 2% 2%
Other 2% 2%
a
Source: Mayer and DeOreo 1998, 167
b
Source: DeOreo, et al. 2011, 135
Water efficient toilets, faucets, showerheads and clothes washers have been highly used
in many water conservation policy interventions.
Reducing the amount of water used to flush toilets results as the most effective tool to
reduce indoor water usage, because it does not require any behavioral change and delivers the
water saving results technically achievable by the device. Early toilet tanks used up to 5 gallons
of water and through the years the amount of water used to dispose of toilet waste has been
reduced first to 1.6 gallons (Ultra Low Flow Toilets – ULFTs), then to 1.28 gallon (High
Efficiency Toilets – HET) and now down to 0.8 gallon. Performance issues of plumbing devices
raised when low flow toilets were initially introduced have been mostly resolved, and most
certification systems in the US and other countries guarantee that even the most extreme water
saving solutions work effectively, deliver the alleged saving when operating “in the field”,
operate at different pressure thresholds and do not clog sewer lines (Williams, Dunham –
Whitehead, and Lutz 2013). The studies that have examined the substitution of old toilets with
fixtures that use 1.6 gallons
14
have revealed that water for toilet use has declined between 50%
and 58% and that there is still room to improve toilets’ performances .
Technology has also improved the delivery of water through faucets and showerheads,
but results in term of water savings are controversial. Aerators that mix water with air and low
14
At the time of the study HET were not widely marketed.
101

flow faucets and showerheads, as mandated by federal standards, allow for lower water flows,
down from pre 1992 5 gpm to mandatory 2.5 gpm, Water Sense certified 2.0 gpm and extreme
saving devices that use 1.5 gpm (PG&E

et al. 2011). The installation of these devices, however,
results in different use patterns that reduce their effectiveness. In fact, studies that have examined
the replacement of faucets and showerheads report that, in spite of the fact that low flow devices
use even less water than the technical standard (PG&E 2011), the reduction in water usage is
quite small, maybe due to the fact that to rinse people use faucets longer or take longer showers.
Water Sense approved showerheads models are tested for pressure compensation to avoid abrupt
change in water temperature when pressure changes, for spray force and for spray coverage, but
“in field” performances do not always match test results (Williams, Dunham-Whitehead, and
Lutz 2013, E57). More recently, doubts have been raised by the use of multi-head showers and
the issue has been addressed in may green building codes by setting limits on flow per square
inch of shower compartment rather than for gallons per unit of time (Williams, Dunham-
Whitehead, and Lutz 2013, E58).
In addition to limiting the showerheads’ water flow, countries with limited water supply
recommend water timers and hot water recirculation systems that recirculate the water wasted in
showers and baths while waiting for hot water to displace cold water accumulated in the pipes
(Williams, Dunham-Whithead, and Lutz 2013, E57). Their effectiveness has hardly been studied.
Small n studies suggest that outcomes could be as promising as a 30% in shower water use
reductions, but also very limited, as small as 5% (Ally, Tomlinson, and Ward 2003).
Clothes washing is also a water intensive process and techniques to reduce its water
intensity are widely available on the market. Efficiency of clothes washers is rated using the term
"Water Factor" (WF). WF is measured by the quantity of water (gallons) used to wash each cubic
102

foot of laundry. A typical residential clothes washer has a capacity of 3.5 cubic feet, so a washer
using about 40 gallons of water per wash has a WF of 11 and one using 15 gallons per wash has
a WF of 4. Although washing machines’ energy savings are rated by EPA’s Energy Star program
and Water Star clothes washers WF must be less than 6, their water intensity is not officially
certified by a government entity, but it is only rated by private organizations. The Consortium for
Energy Efficiency (CEE- a private non profit) rates washers according to energy and water
efficiency. According to CEE, standard washers have a WF equal to 9.5, while CEE Tier 3 has a
WF of 4 (CEE 2011).
Traditional washers use up to 40 gallons per wash, but new machines now on the market
have WF equal to 4. The outcomes of replacing old washers with new models have been studied
in depth. Small n studies gave the idea that new models could provide a 40% reduction in water
usage, but larger studies, more statistically relevant, revealed that the savings were in reality
much smaller, around 7% (Tab. 13).
The reuse of gray water for indoor purposes is a tool to reduce the use of drinking water
for sanitary uses. Gray water includes waste water from clothes washers, bathtubs, showers,
bathroom, washbasins and laundry tubs. It is less contaminated that waste water and could be
used for sanitation. Experimental installations include water systems that catch rainwater and use
it for bathing lead the waste water into interior botanical cells (indoor planters) that release clean
water used for flushing a toilet. The waste water is then piped to exterior botanical cells and is
used for landscape purposes. Other simpler systems capture waste water from a sink, and use it
to flush a toilet. Devices that reuse faucet wastewater for sanitation are on the market and are
accepted by water labeling institutes in New Zealand (Williams, Dunham-Whitehead, and Lutz
2013, E55), Australia and Israel (Yu et al. 2012). In the US, however, the regulatory framework,
103

left to each individual state, is much more confused. Standards and certifications of the devices
are available through the National Sanitation Federation (NSF 2004), but each state decides
whether and how to allow their use. Although 41 states mention gray water in their water use
regulations, definitions of gray water are not consistent, nor are they consistent throughout
plumbing standards and water quality regulations. The main difference is whether to include
dishwasher and/or dish washing waste, or to exclude it. Collection and usage of gray water are
also inconsistent. Three of the 41 states that address gray water prohibit its collections, while of
the other 38 states some allow waste water collection only for building that are not connected to
a sewer system and some do not explicitly mention the issue. The final usage of gray water is
also uneven. Some states allow indoor uses and others don’t, some set limits for the quantity of
water that can be reused and others don’t.
California Plumbing Code Title 24, Part 5, Chapter 16A regulates gray-water systems and
allows collection of clothes washers, showers, bathtub and faucets water only for outdoor
subsurface irrigation, while it requires water quality standards for indoor uses, making it almost
impossible to use gray-water for sanitation purposes (Tab. 13). The code states that simple gray
water systems (clothes washers only) can be installed without permits, that gray-water will not
be used to irrigate food or in spray irrigation, it will not be allowed to pond or runoff and will not
reach any storm sewer system or any surface water.

104

Table 13. Characteristics and effects of residential water saving devices
Definition and description
% of Single
Family indoor use Regulations of their characteristics Effects
Lavatory Faucet
(Lavatory is the terminology used
in the Energy Policy Act of 1992
and ASME A112.18.1 and refers to
any bathroom sink faucets intended
for private use)
US 1998:
a

16%
California 2005:
b

19%
EPAct 92 and subsequent rulings by the U.S.
Department of Energy (DOE) set the maximum
lavatory faucet flow rate at 2.2-gallons per minute
when measured at 60 pounds per square inch of
flowing water pressure. In its “Water Sense”
Program EPA certifies high efficiency faucets
with a flow of 1.5 gallons per minute.
c

The latest faucet aerators on the market are
available in a variety of flow rates, ranging from
0.5 gpm (for bathroom faucets) to 2.5 gpm.
d

Small n studies on the effects of water efficiency
measures report that retrofitting old faucets with
aerators or replacing them with low flow devices can
reduce their water usage by 13%
e
, but also can have
no effect
f
.
Low flow showers and
shower aerators: Shower flow
restrictors are simple orifices
intended to lower the flow rate of
the showerhead and thereby reduce
total consumption.
US 1998:
g

17%
California 2005:
h

20%
Prior to 1992, the standard flow rate was 5 gpm.
The National Energy Policy Act of 1992
mandates that new faucets not exceed a flow rate
of 2.5 gpm. Other showerheads are available that
use 1.0 gpm . California’s CalGreen code, limits
flow for residential showers to 2.0 gpm.
Since 2010 states and local jurisdictions in the
U.S. are free to set their own showerhead
performance requirements.
The effects of low flow showers are not always
straightforward. The REUW study
i
reports that low
flow showerheads reduced water usage in showers by
30%, a 2011 study
j
reports that households having all
low-flow showerheads use on average about nine
percent less water than households without these
fixtures, small n studies report that retrofitting with
low flow showers can reduce water usage in showers
by 11%
k
or have no effect at all
l
.
Shower timers One study shows that the average shower volume fell
by 27 % when alarming visual display shower
monitors were installed
m
.

a
Source: Mayer and DeOreo 1998, 167
b
Source: DeOreo, et al. 2011, 135
c
Source: These standards are included in ANSI’s and ASME’s standards for plumbing fixtures.
d
Source: DeOreo et al. 2011, 260
e
Source: Mayer, DeOreo, and Lewis 2000, 95
f
Source: Mayer et al. 2003, 100
g
Source: Mayer and DeOreo 1998, 167
h
Source: DeOreo et al. 2011, 135
i
Source: Mayer and DeOreo 1998
j
Source: Lee 2011, 21
k
Source: Mayer et al. 2003, 100
l
Source: Mayer, DeOreo, and Lewis 2000, 95
m
Source: Willis et al. 2010, 1125
105

Table 13. Characteristics and effects of residential water saving devices (continued)
Definition and description
% of Single
Family indoor use Regulations of their characteristics Effects
Hot water recirculation
systems
Devices that allow hot water to
recirculate to the hot water tank
while not in use in order to reduce
the amount of water wasted while
waiting for the unit to warm water
at the appropriate temperature.
There are two types of systems. One connects hot
water and cold water pipes with a pump activated
by an electric switch. A few minutes before using
hot water the pump is activated and by the time
the hot water faucet is turned on the water is
immediately at the desired temperature.
The other implies the installation of a “return
pipe” that returns the hot water to the heater
before the hot water is turned on.
Small n studies report water savings between 5% and
30%
n
.
Toilets
Ultra Low Flow Toilets
(ULFT) with 1.6 gallons per flush
(gpf)
US 1998:
o

28%
California 2005:
p

20%
EPAct 92 mandates that all toilets sold in the U.S.
by 1994 be ULFTs.
Small n studies report that water usage by toilets
declined by between 50% and 58%
q
after retrofitting
older toilets with ULFTs.
High Efficiency Toilets
(HET) with 1.28 (gpf)
Dual-flush toilets with a two-button
mechanism; one for liquid waste
flushes at about 0.9 gallons; one for
solid waste flushes 1.6 gal.
The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency’s
WaterSense Program specification for toilets
includes only HETs and provides for certification
of HET models against a rigorous set of
performance requirements.
Retrofitting multifamily housing with HET resulted
in a 17% decline in total water usage.
r

Ultra High Efficiency
Toilets with 0.8 (gpf)
Estimated water savings for replacing 1.6 gpf fixtures
with the 0.8 gpf amounted to approximately 14
gallons per capita per day
s
.
Composting toilets
A system that provides an
environment for aerobic (in the
presence of oxygen)
decomposition.
ANSI standards have been issued in 2005 and
updated in 2011.
They reduce water usage, but they need to be
connected to a wastewater system
t

n
Ally, Tomlinson, and Ward 2002
o
Mayer and DeOreo 1998, 167
p
DeOreo et al. 2011, 135
q
Mayer, DeOreo, and Lewis 2000, xv; Mayer et al. 2003, xv
r
Morgan-Perales and Zamora 2012
s
Koeller and Company and Veritec Consulting Inc. 2011
t
EPA 1999
106

Table 13. Characteristics and effects of residential water saving devices (continued)
Definition and description
% of Single
Family indoor use Regulations of their characteristics Effects
High Efficiency Washers
(HEW)
Efficiency of clothes washers is
rated using the term "Water Factor"
(WF). WF is measured by the
quantity of water (gallons) used to
wash each cubic foot of laundry. A
typical residential clothes washer
has a capacity of 3.5 cubic feet, so
a washer using about 40 gallons of
water per wash has a WF of 11 and
one using 15 gallons per wash has a
WF of 4.
US 1998:
u

22%
California 2005:
v

18%
There are no water efficiency standards for
clothes washers in the US. As of January 8, 2013,
Energy Star® qualified washers must not exceed
a WF of 6.0 gallons per cycle
w
. The Consortium
for Energy Efficiency (CEE- a private non profit)
rates washers according to energy and water
efficiency. According to CEE, standard washers
have a WF equal to 9.5, while CEE Tier 3 has a
WF of 4
y
.
A typical family of four using a standard sized
washer generates more than 300 loads per year,
consuming approximately 12,000 gallons of water
annually. High-Efficiency Washers (HEW) reduce
this water use by more than 6,000 gallons per year.
Small n studies report that water usage by clothes
washers declined by about 40%
z
after retrofitting
with HEW.
Larger studies claim that HEW reduced households’
water consumption by 7% the first year and by an
additional 8% the second year
aa
.
Leaks US 1998:
cc

14%
California 2005:
dd

18%
Some leaks are apparent, such as dripping faucets
and leaking water heaters, but leaks in pipes and
fixtures are not detected by meters unless they
exceed 1 pint per minute.
Water audits can establish the existence of leaks
and local ordinances regulate how swiftly leaks
are repaired.
To reduce short term leaks the best strategy is to
improve the performance of fixtures and appliances.
Small n studies report that leakages were reduced by
replacing toilets.
bb

Dishwashers US 1998:
ee

1%
California 2005:
ff

1%
No regulation The presence of a dishwasher reduces daily faucet
use by 14 gpd, or 500 gallons per year.
gg

u
Mayer and DeOreo 1998, 167
v
DeOreo et al. 2011, 135
w
Energy Star 2012
y
CEE 2011
z
Mayer, DeOreo, and Lewis 2000, xv; Mayer et al. 2003, xv
aa
Lee, 2011, 21
cc
Mayer and DeOreo 1998, 167
dd
DeOreo et al. 2011, 135
bb
Mayer, DeOreo, and Lewis 2000, 96
ee
Mayer and DeOreo 1998, 167
ff
DeOreo et al. 2011, 135
gg
DeOreo et al. 2011, 261
107

Table 13. Characteristics and effects of residential water saving devices (continued)
Definition and description
% of Single
Family indoor use Regulations of their characteristics Effects
Indoor gray-water use
Indoor grey-water use mainly
recycles water for flushing toilets.
Water can be used four times. First
it is catch off the roof and can be
used for bathing. From there it
drains into interior botanical cells
(indoor planters). The plants use
and clean the water, which is then
used for flushing toilet and is sent
to exterior botanical cells. Other
systems capture waste water from a
sink, and use it to flush a toilet.
Laws regarding grey-water are often a “gray
issue” and liability concerns slow the adoption of
this technology. In California, the Plumbing
Code, (Title 24, Part 5, Chapter 16A, Section
1612.A.01) states that treated gray-water for use
indoors must meet the standards of tertiary treated
water.

Non-potable Water Reuse
Systems
Gray water includes waste water
from bathtubs, showers, bathroom
wash basins, washing machines,
and laundry tubs. It has not come in
contact with toilet waste and does
not include waste water from
kitchen sinks, photo lab sinks,
dishwashers, or laundry water from
soiled diapers. Gray-water is
usually filtered and then used for
watering landscape.
California Plumbing Code Title 24, Part 5,
Chapter 16A regulates gray-water systems. The
code states that gray-water will not be used to
irrigate food or in spray irrigation, it will not be
allowed to pond or runoff and will not reach any
storm sewer system or any surface water. Simple
gray water systems (clothes washers only) can be
installed without permits. The National Sanitation
Federation has adopted standards and provides
certification for residential water reuse
technologies
hh
.
The daily generated volume of household gray-water
depends on personal habits and use of water-saving
devices, but water potentially reusable as gray-water
constitute about 50% of indoor water usage (175
gphpd is the total indoor water usage in California
ii
).
Concerns about safety are still unresolved, while
gray-water can be contaminated by detergents, that
can increase graywater salinity, chlorine that can lead
to zinc leaching from plumbing fixtures, and
sunscreen and deodorants, that can elevate the
concentration of zinc
kk

jj

hh
NSF 2004
ii
De Oreo et al. 2011, 26
kk
Yu et al. 2012
jj
Maimon et al. 2010
108

Devices to Reduce Outdoor Water Usage
The science and practice of outdoor water usage reduction is less solid than the science
and practice of indoor water efficiency. Although in time many strategies and devices to render
outdoors water usage more efficient have been deployed, there is less certainty about their
effectiveness and many empirical studies reveal that two elements really make an irrigation
system more efficient: a good project, that matches species with soil types and irrigation needs,
and constant maintenance and update with new technologies. Landscape water audits, in fact, are
deemed one of the most effective tools to reduce water usage. Even the best, most water efficient
controller cannot make up for poor system design, installation, and maintenance.
As far as devices are concerned, the heart of an irrigation system is the irrigation
controller that regulates the delivery of water through a network pipes to a number of sprinklers
placed on a landscaped area. The market has produced a wide range of controllers of irrigation
systems that make a more efficient use of water compared to those based exclusively on timers.
Some of them are connected either to weather satellites or to local weather stations and activate
irrigation according to local weather characteristics and to the plants needing watering. Others
have sensors planted where irrigation is needed and deliver water according to the soil’s
humidity. The real issue with these devices is that, in order to use water efficiently, they need to
be accurately programmed. Most users, however, don’t pay attention to the technical details, and
if not properly trained, are not able to take advantage of their potential water savings.
Weather based irrigation controllers (WBIC) have been extensively used to reduce water
usage in Southern California and their effectiveness has been studied in depth (Tab. 14). Most
studies, however, have not tested the controllers’ performance against control groups, but have
compared water usage after the installation of the device to water usage prior the installation,
controlling for evapotranspiration (Mayer et al. 2009). Small n studies and lab testing suggest
109

that they have the potential to reduce water used for irrigation between 15% and 34%. Large n
studies, instead, reveal that water savings actually achieved by their installation amount in the
average only to 6.1%. There are many reasons behind this reality. Many landscaped areas are in
reality under-watered before the installation of weather based controllers, therefore when the
new device is installed they require more water rather than less. Self-installed controllers are not
always connected to weather stations or are adjusted to settle a landscaped area, thus requiring
large quantities of water, and never readjusted to maintain it, therefore they never apply water
efficiently (Tab. 14).
In addition, until recently there was no quality standard for most of these products and the
efficiency varied between different brands. EPA has recently issued protocols for testing smart
controllers, and some of them have been certified.
Water distribution also plays an important part in water efficient landscaping and rotating
sprinklers nozzles improve water distribution uniformity (Tab. 14) and can theoretically reduce
water usage by 22% as compared to spray sprinklers (St. Hilaire et al. 2008).
Until a few years ago the conservation effort was uniquely concentrated on technical
devices, but more recently more attention has been given to systems that instead of delivering
water more efficiently, replace the use of potable water for outside irrigation with gray water or
rain (St. Hilaire et al. 2008).
Rain water harvesting is widely used both in wet and in dry areas. During a rain event
approximately 0.62 gallons per square foot of collection surface (roof) per inch of rainfall can be
collected (Georgia Rainwater Harvesting Guidelines Committee 2009), with a loss coefficient as
small as 5% (Waterfall n.d.). Their long run effectiveness, has not yet been tested, but studies
show that even in a dry area like Barcelona with precipitations around 24 inches per year, rain
110

barrels can provide about 61.7% (Domènech and Saurí 2011, 602) of the water needed to irrigate
a 3,200 sqft yard. The payback period of the investment, however, is more than 30 years.
Numerous issues had been raised over water rights and rain barrels, but most of them
have been resolved (Brodhal and Shutkin 2011). Their water quality has been found good in
terms of minerals and metals but issues about biological contaminants (bird droppings on the
roof) and mosquito breeding are still unresolved.
White (2009) reports that, in Australia, about 40% of South East Queenland households
has adopted them and that they have been an icon of Australians’ conservation efforts. They are
not widely diffused in the US, but ANSI and ASME have initiated a procedure to standardize
their characteristics (Tab. 14).
A strategy to reduce water usage for landscape purposes that has given results is the
conversion of existing lawns in drought resistant plants gardens. In some cases the entire
landscaped area is transformed, in others the turf area is partially replaced with drought resistant
plants while low water grass is planted in turf areas. The practice is of difficult implementation
because it takes a relevant upfront investment and drought resistant landscapes are not widely
accepted by the public yet (Cook, Hall, and Larson 2012), however, its potential to reduce
outdoor water usage is relevant and consistent in time (Tab. 14).
111

Table 14. Characteristics and effects of landscape water saving devices
Definition and description
% of Single
Family use Characteristics Effects
Irrigation systems
Weather Based Irrigation
Systems (WBIC)
WBIC is a sprinkler control device
that automatically adjusts irrigation
schedules in response to changing
weather.
US 1998:
a

58%
California 2005:
b

53%
Some are connected with weather
satellites; others have a local
weather station.
Testing procedures have been
established by EPA in its Water
Sense program
c
and certified
products are on the market.
On average smart controllers are moderately effective measures for
reducing the amount of water applied by automatic irrigation
systems, while maintaining the health appearance of landscapes
d
.
Early small n studies suggested that outdoor water usage could drop
between 15% and 27%
efg
. Tests performed on lawn plots with control
plots claim that WBIC could save up to 34% of outdoor water usage
h
.
More recent studies, with larger n, report that WBIC provide a 6.1%
drop in outdoor water usage the first year, with water savings
increasing over time. Others claim that water savings amount to 9.4%
at single family residential sites and 27.5 percent at CII sites
i
. They
warn however that where landscapes were previously underwatered,
WBICs increase water usage and that an holistic approach to
landscaping is needed to effectively reduce water usage for outdoor
irrigation. They also point out that correct installation and operation
are key to achieving consistent water savings
j
.
Soil moisture based
irrigation controllers
Sprinkler control device that
automatically adjusts irrigation
schedules in response to soil
moisture.
Different studies conducted between 1984 and 2007 report that soil
moisture based controllers save between 0% and 82% of water,
compared to traditional timers, with a concentration of studies that set
the savings around 25%.
k

a
Source: Mayer and DeOreo. 1998, 167
b
Source: DeOreo et al. 2011, 135
c
Source: EPA 2011b
d
Source: Mayer et al. 2009
e
Source: USBR 2008
f
Source: Bamezai 2004
g
Source: Devitt, Carstensen, and Morris 2008
h
Source: Dukes 2012
i
Source: MWDOC 2011d
j
Source: Mayer et al. 2009, xvii
k
Source: USBR 2008
112

Table 14. Characteristics and effects of landscape water saving devices (continued)
Definition and description
% of Single
Family use Characteristics Effects
Drip Irrigation
A system of pipes and emitters that
delivers water directly to the
plants’ roots. Drip irrigation may
also use devices called micro-spray
heads, which spray water in a small
area, instead of dripping emitters.
Typical emitter flow rates are
from 0.16 to 4.0 U.S. gallons per
hour (0.6 to 16 L/h). In many
emitters, flow will vary with
pressure, while some emitters are
pressure compensating.

Rotary Sprinklers Nozzles
Provide a more uniform
distribution of water than other
nozzles. As a consequence, less
time is needed to irrigate the same
surface evenly.
Rotary sprinkler nozzles can theoretically reduce water usage by 22%
as compared to spray sprinklers
l
.
Irrigation Audits
Procedures used to collect and
provide information about the
uniformity of application, rate of
precipitation, and overall condition
of an irrigation system.
Formal audits are conducted by an
independent certified landscape
irrigation auditor, but landscape
managers use audit methodologies
to perform ongoing system
checks. There is no standard
procedure, although the Irrigation
Association has drafted guidelines
to standardize the process.
The process consists of: visual inspection of the system, evaluation of
the uniformity of distribution of irrigation, determination of
precipitation rate of the system, determination of watering needs and
reviewing and setting a watering schedule. There are no studies on
the effects of irrigation audits, but there is evidence that many
irrigation systems are mismanaged
m
and irrigation audits have the
potential to render them more efficient.
Synthetic turf (playing
fields)
Synthetic turf is a crumb rubber
infill type system in which crumb
rubber granules are added to a
flexible synthetic grass carpet to
hold the carpet in place, stand the
synthetic blades in place and
provide a cushioned playing
surface. The synthetic grass and
infill are underlain with a crushed
stone base and drainage pipes to
facilitate rapid drainage of the
playing surface. For small
residential solutions sanitized sand
substitutes for crumb rubber.
The Synthetic Turf Association
(STA) has adopted testing
standards for synthetic turfs.
The amount of water saved depends on the surface. However, water
is needed to wash and sanitize artificial turf and to cool it down when
hot
n
.
l
Source: Solomonvv et al. 2007
m
Source: Maheshwari 2012
n
Source: Luz 2008
113

Table 14. Characteristics and effects of landscape water saving devices (continued)
Definition and description
% of Single
Family use Characteristics Effects
Rainwater harvesting
Residential harvesting systems
collect rain from the roof and
channel it to a storage system such
as a barrel or cistern to collect the
water until needed for irrigation
purposes.
International Association of
Plumbing and Mechanical
Officials (IAPMO) and the
American Rainwater Catchment
Systems Association (ARCSA)
with the American Society of
Plumbing Engineers (ASPE),
have developed standards.
Recently the American National
Standard Institute has initiated a
standard making process.
Approximately 0.62 gallons per square foot of collection surface
(roof) per inch of rainfall can be collected during a rain event
o
. A
runoff coefficient must also be taken into account, but most roofs
have a 0.95 coefficient
p
.
Numerous issues had been raised over water rights and rain barrels,
but most of them have been resolved
q
. Their water quality has been
found good in terms of minerals and metals but issues about
biological contaminants (bird droppings on the roof) and mosquito
breeding are still unresolved.
Pool spas and fountains Reducing wind exposure, pool
covers and reducing filtration can
reduce water usage.

Sub-metering Installing a meter dedicated to
landscape irrigation.

Water budgets Assign a specific amount of water
to a landscaped area, based on the
surface to be irrigated to the
plants and to historical data about
evapotranspiration.

Turf replacement with
xeriscape
Xeric landscaping is principally
composed of a combination of
desert-adapted shrubs, trees, some
ornamental grasses, and mulch
(often rock)
Landscaping with drought
resistant plants requires planning,
choosing the right kind of soil,
adjusting irrigation and constant
maintenance.
Studies have estimated that in the South West households that switch
to a drought friendly garden reduce annual water consumption by
30%
r
.
o
Source: Georgia Rainwater Harvesting Guidelines Committee 2009
p
Source: Waterfall (not dated)
q
Source: Brodahl 2011
r
Source: Sovocool, Morgan, and Bennett 2006
114

Devices to Reduce Commercial Industrial and Institutional Water Usage
Commercial, institutional and industrial (CII) users include businesses, commercial
establishments that range from small shops to large warehouses, government buildings, mines
and factories from small manufacturing shops to thermoelectric plans and paper plans. Many
industrial users, where possible, rely on saline water rather than freshwater (99% of
thermoelectric power plans water supply comes from saline water in California, and 28% in the
Nation), or on own water rights over ground or surface water (self-provided water accounts of
0.2% of total water usage in California and 4.4% in the Nation) (Kenny et al. 2009, 8). Most
analysis of water usage agree that it is in fact difficult to determine how much water they use, in
part because of the they often combine two sources of water, water purchased from utilities and
water autonomously pumped from the ground or from streams and rivers, but also because it is
difficult to estimate CII uses provided by utilities. In fact, the definition of the sector varies
among water utilities and in water use literature (Dziegielewsky et al. 2000).
The US Geological Service estimates that in 2005 CII accounted for 42% of urban uses in
the US and 43% in California (Kenny et al. 2009, 17) and that total CII uses in California,
excluding mining and thermoelectric plans and including self-provided water, would amount to
3.4 million AF (MAF), about 7% of freshwater and saline water usage (to 41.1 MAF and 9% of
water usage in the Nation). The Department of Water Resources, instead, estimates that CII
water usage is lower, about 2.6 MAF, in average, between 1998 and 2005 (NRA 2012a, 22),
about 6% of total human water consumption.
Due to the differences in local classification of CII usages, there are no estimates of CII
uses in Southern California, but according to GDP data, Southern California’s economy is based
on the service sector, traditionally less water intensive than the industrial sector, more than the
State economy, while sectors traditionally water intensive like health care, hospitality and some
115

manufacturing are not as relevant as in the rest of the State (Tab. 15), therefore it is legitimate to
expect that CII water usage is smaller than 6% of the total water needs in the area.
Table 15. 2010 GDP in the US, California and Southern California Metropolitan Areas
Sectors US California
Los Angeles
Metropolitan Area
San Diego
Metropolitan Area
Agriculture and mining 2.9% 2.5% 1.4% 0.6%
Utilities 1.6% 1.3% 0.9% 1.6%
Construction 3.4% 2.9% 2.5% 3.4%
Manufacturing 12.4% 12.7% 10.4% 9.4%
Trade and transportation 14.9% 14.1% 15.7% 11.5%
Services 53.6% 56.8% 60.0% 64.4%
Education 1.0% 0.9% 0.9% 0.7%
Health care 7.4% 6.3% 5.8% 5.4%
Hospitality 2.8% 2.6% 2.3% 3.0%
Total 100.0% 100.1% 99.9% 100.0%
Source: BEA 2013
Studies on CII water usage summarize that in commercial, institutional and industrial
establishments water is used for 8 basic functions:
1. Cooling & boilers;
2. Cleaning;
3. Process, that includes any water uses unique to a particular industry for producing a
product or service;
4. Sanitation;
5. In-plant conveyance that includes water;
6. Cogeneration and energy recovery;
7. Environmental controls;
8. Irrigation of landscape.
The petrochemical industry, petroleum refineries and the agro industries have a
reputation as the most water intensive industries in California (Gleick et al. 2003). There is
consensus that industrial consumption has a very high variability and although some water
usages, like cleaning, sanitizing and landscaping, can be reduced with devices and best practices
common to all sectors, every plant is unique and different from the others in the same industry,
therefore in need of an ad hoc assessment of its water conservation potential (NRA 2012b).
Generally, water reuse, such as using relatively clean water output from processes for non
116

drinking purposes and replacement of drinking water with recycled water are the best
management practices suggested (NRA 2012b).
The EPA estimates that, among commercial and institutional subsectors and excluding
heavy water using industries, hospitality (including hotels and restaurants) is the most water
intensive, followed by office buildings and by hospitals and healthcare facilities. Schools,
laundries and car washes, by comparison, are less water intensive (EPA 2009, 4). By assembling
different sources, EPA also estimates that landscaping, restrooms, cooking and cooling are the
most water intensive end uses of water (EPA 2009, 8-10).
Landscaping devices to reduce water consumption for CII users are no different than
those used for residential users illustrated in table 14. Table 16, instead, illustrates the most
widely known techniques and tools that CII account holders can adopt to reduce end water uses
related to managing the buildings, sanitation, cooking and other specific processes. Although
their technical characteristics have been standardized by ANSI and ASME and they are included
in the WaterSense program, the effectiveness of these devices has not been tested in depth on the
field and most studies only report the characteristics of the device and the expectations of their
water saving potentials (NRA 2012b; EPA 2009).
Gleick et al. (2003) estimate that larger savings could be achieved in every sector
(hospitality, health care, office buildings and schools), by reducing the amount of water used in
cooling processes, by installing devices that reduce the use of water in air conditioning systems.
By carefully managing the chemical balance of the water used in cooling systems there would be
much less need for water recharge and savings could be consistent, depending on the quality of
the local water supply.
117

Numerous solutions are available for sanitation devices, also used in every CII sector,
similar to those used for residential customers and with the same EPA standards. Relevant
savings can be achieved by replacing plumbing devices installed before 1994 with EPA standard
items or even more with new WaterSense certified fixtures. Timers for lavatories and showers,
zero-water urinals, dual flush toilets and flushometers, specifically designed for CII uses, are
widely available on the market and many water agencies offer rebates to install them. Some
technologies, however, are not yet working as expected. Motions sensor shut off valves have
been found to increase water usage rather than reduce it (Williams, Dunham, and Lutz 2011,
E56), but more efficient shut off regulations, based on time of water flow rather than on quantity,
are available in Europe and Japan. Dual flush toilets have also been found much less effective
than expected due to faulty design (Arocha and McCann 2013).
The cooking process in restaurants, schools, hospitals and collective dwellings is a water
intensive process and a wide range of devices can be adopted to reduce its water usage. Well
known devices can be used to reduce water used for washing dishes, but only faucets and pre
rinse spray valves (PRSV) are actually regulated by a federal mandate. PRSV are spray nozzles
that use water under high pressure, connected to a hose and to a pressurizer and equipped with a
handler clip to operate continuously. They are generally used to rinse plates, pots and pans
before they are placed in the dishwasher. The Energy Policy Act 2005
15
mandates a 1.6 gpm
flow rate. Just replacing an old model with a flow rate of 4.5 gpm with a new device is proven to
reduce water usage, but not as much as expected, because in order to obtain the results of older
devices use time increases. A garbage grinder sensor, a device that senses the grinder motor’s
load and regulate the amount of water necessary to complete the disposal task, can also reduce
the amount of water used to rinse kitchen utensils by reducing the flow rate when the garbage
15
Energy Policy Act of 2005. 42 USC 15801
118

disposal is not in use from between 2.0 to 15 gpm to as low as 1.0 gpm. But also eliminating the
grinder and replacing it with a strainer can reduce water usage effectively.
Dishwashers are among the largest water users in an industrial kitchen. Size and models
are very different and use different amounts of water. There are no federal standards limiting the
water or energy consumption of commercial dishwashers, but it is known that Energy Star®
qualified dishwashers are reported to use 25% less water than conventional models. Although not
reporting exact expected savings, studies estimate that the potential for water savings by
optimizing dishwasher usage and by using Energy Star® equipment are larger for small and
medium size machines (typically used in restaurant that serve between 100 and 300 customers
per day), because larger machines are mostly built with water saving mechanisms that recirculate
water used for the final rinse to be used in the initial phase of the washing process (NRA 2012b,
86).
Some cooking methods are water intensive, but technologies to reduce their water usage
are available. Food steamers, steam kettles and combination ovens are connected to a boiler and
discard hot water after use. They waste water by dispersing steam and leeching hot water
constantly, but can be replaced by boiler-less equipment or can be retrofitted with condensate
return systems. Studies show that a traditional boiler-based steam cooker may use as much as 40
gallons of water per hour. Switching to an Energy Star® qualified steam cooker can reduce that
water use to 3.0 gallons of water per hour or less (NRA 2012b, 107). Conventional wok stoves
also are water intensive, because they use water jets to enable cooling water to flow at
approximately 1.0 gpm per burner across the cook top to absorb the heat. Waterless wok stoves,
a relatively new technology, are air cooled and do not require cooling water, but water savings
can be achieved simply reducing flow rate and duration of water usage. Air cooling technology
119

works also to reduce water intensity of ice machines. Ice machines use water for the cooling
process and discard it. Commercial ice machines that have earned the Energy Star® label are
15% more energy efficient and 10% more water efficient than standard air-cooled models (NRA
2012b, 91).
Some water saving devices are specific to health care facilities. Water recirculating
systems for the development of x rays were introduced in the 90s, but since digital imaging has
almost completely replaced film images are not in use anymore. More interesting are the devices
that reduce water usage in the sterilization process and dry pumps. Installing a tempering device
that turns cold water on only at the end of the sterilization can save between 68% and 98% of the
water used by the equipment (CUWCC 2004, 31). Dry pumps completely eliminate the use of
water, which in old equipment is used to seal the vacuum chamber.
Car washers are not major water users, however California regulations require that they
install water saving technology. In this sector, water use depends on the type of equipment, on
water pressure, speed, nozzle size, and on the presence or lack of an on-site recirculation system.
Technically, self-service washers use less water than bay and conveyor systems and
washing and rinsing cars by hand uses less water compared to using an automatic systems (Ones
2010). However, for bay or conveyor systems, if an on-site recirculation system is in place, water
savings can be substantial. Self-service washers typically cannot be equipped with a recirculation
system, but field research shows that efficient bay or conveyor belt car washers can recirculate
up to 82% of the water used for each vehicle (NRA 2012b, 180).
For commercial washers, the technology to reduce water usage depends from the size of
the washing machine that ranges from those in use at laundormats (similar to household
equipment) to those in use in industrial clothes washing establishments. Commercial washers
120

installed in Laundromat are not regulated and the Energy Star® certification is the only
benchmark available. As of February 2, 2013, Energy Star® qualified commercial washers must
not exceed a WF of 4.5 gallons per cycle (Energy Star 2013). For Laundromat type washers,
systems that mix Ozone with water are also deemed to save water. Ozone based systems take
advantage of the whitening and disinfection of Ozone and require less water for rinsing.
Typically they can yield water savings between 15% and 20% and in some cases they have been
reported to save up to 60% of the water needed for a washing cycle (NRA 2012b, 128).
However, since Ozone works better at normal temperature, they can be used only for lightly
soiled laundering at low temperatures, therefore they have not been widely commercialized
(NRA 2012b, 129).
For large industrial equipment, rinse water recirculation is the water saving method of
choice. A simple water recirculation system can save as much as 25% of a washer’s potable
water demand by diverting rinse water to a storage tank for later reuse as wash water. Complex
recirculate systems, instead, treat reclaimed water from wash and rinse cycles for use in all
cycles of the next load and can save more than 85% of water needed in the process (NRA 2012b,
129).

121

Table 16. Characteristics and effects of CII water saving devices
Category Areas of intervention/Device Characteristics Estimated effects
Buildings Plumbing (toilets, urinals, faucets,
showerheads)
For toilets, faucets and showers the
standards are the same as for residences.
Low water urinals are regulated by the
EPAct 92 (1 gallon per flush). High
Efficiency Urinals are available and use
0.125 gal per flush.
Studies have shown that hands-free sensor-activated
valves actually increase water use when replacing
conventional manually activated valves. As such, sensors
themselves provide no additional water-efficiency
a
.
Cooling towers
Water is used to cool the equipment and is
lost by evaporation and by continuous
leeching.
Devices such as Ph controllers,
conductivity controllers and managing
techniques optimize the use and reuse of
water in cooling towers. Geothermal
systems to dissipate heat are also being
installed.

Water brooms A device with a broom like shape, but
instead of bristles there are a number of
low flow nozzles very close to the floor
surface.

Cleaning techniques Soaking and scrubbing instead than
hosing.

Submetering Tracking actual use through a building
management system connected to a series
of submeters can disclose operating issues
such as leaks and equipment malfunctions
that might have remained undiscovered.

Alternate sources of water To make use of relatively clean water
from cooling jackets, rainwater tanks or
another nearby process in pre rinsing,
cleaning of floors, and hosing outdoor
areas.

Food Boiler-less food steamers, steam
kettles and combination ovens.
Most steamers are connected to a boiler and
discard hot water after use. They waste water
by dispersing steam and leeching hot water
constantly replaced by cooler water to avoid
scaling.
Most boiler based devices can be replaced
by boiler-less equipment or can be
retrofitted with condensate return
systems.
Traditional boiler-based steam cookers may use as much
as 40 gallons of water per hour. Switching to an Energy
Star® qualified steam cooker can reduce that water use to
3.0 gallons of water per hour or less
b
.
a
Source: NRA 2012b, 316
b
Source: NRA 2012b, 107
122

Table 16. Characteristics and effects of CII water saving devices (continued)
Category Areas of intervention/Device Characteristics Estimated effects
Pre rinse spray valves (PRSV)
Commercial PRSVs consist of spray nozzles
that use water under high pressure. They are
connected to a hose and to a pressurizer and
are equipped with a handler clip to operate
continuously.
Automatic shutoff is useful in ensuring
that even in the case of a busy workplace
or a careless operator, leakage or
continual flow is avoided. Since 2005, the
Federal energy policy act (EPAct)
requires that spray valves use no more
than 1.6 gpm. New models have even
lower flow rates.
Frequency and duration are often influenced by technical
and time factors also. A recent EPA analysis in a small n
study claims that, in general, water use decreases when
high-efficiency PRSVs are used, but not as much as
expected, because use time increases
c
.
Garbage grinder sensor Devices that sense the grinder motor’s
load and regulate the amount of water
necessary to complete the disposal task.
These devices can reduce the idle flow rate when the
garbage disposal is not in use, from between 2.0 to 15
gpm to as low as 1.0 gpm, saving a significant amount of
water
d
.
Ice machines
They typically use water for cooling the
refrigeration unit and making ice. Water-
cooled ice machines pass water through the
machine once to cool it, and then dispose of it
down the drain.
Commercial ice machines that have
earned the Energy Star® label are 15%
more energy efficient and 10% more
water efficient than standard air-cooled
models
e
.
A facility will see the most water savings from replacing
a water-cooled ice machine with an Energy Star®
qualified air-cooled model.
Industrial dish washers There are no federal standards limiting the
water or energy consumption of
commercial dishwashers. Energy Star®
qualified dishwashers are reported to use
25% less water than conventional
models
f
. The evolution of hot water use
efficiency to wash, rinse, sanitize can be
summarized as follows
• 1990s - 2.5 gallons per rack
• 2000 - 1.2 gallons per rack
• 2010 - 0.3 gallons per rack
g

Studies estimate that the potential for water savings by
optimizing dishwasher usage and by using Energy Star®
equipment are larger for small (bar-type machines) and
medium size machines (typically used in restaurant that
serve between 100 and 300 customers per day).
h

c
Source: EPA 2011a
d
Source: NRA 2012b, 66
e
Source: NRA 2012b, 91
f
Source: NRA 2012b, 84
g
Source: NRA 2012b,
h
Source: NRA 2012b, 86
123

Table 16. Characteristics and effects of CII water saving devices (continued)
Category Areas of intervention/Device Characteristics Estimated effects
Flow restrictor for dipper well
Devices used for rinsing ice cream
scoops, spoons and other utensils.
They are connected with a spigot
that runs water continuously to
reduce the potential for bacterial
growth.
Dipper wells usually have flow rates
between 0.5 and 1.0 gpm. In-line flow
restrictor to reduce the flow rate from 1.0
gpm to 0.3 gpm.
i

Waterless Wok
In a conventional wok stove, water
jets are installed to enable cooling
water to flow at approximately 1.0
gpm per burner across the cook top
to absorb the heat.
Waterless wok stoves, a relatively new
technology, are air cooled and do not
require cooling water. Another technique
is reducing the flow rate and duration of
water usage.

Health X rays and film processing
Although digital technology has rendered
xrays and film processing obsolete these
water intensive techniques are still in use.
Some X-ray film processing machines require
a constant stream of cooling water flowing at
a rate of 0.5 to 2.5 gallons per minute (gpm)
to as much as 3.0 to 4.0 25 gpm93 to ensure
acceptable image quality
j
.
In the past, special "WaterSaver"
recirculation equipment became available
and is still on the market.

Tabletop and freestanding steam
sterilizers
In old sterilizers cool water was kept
running to cool down the condensed
steam at the end of the sterilization
process. New systems have a tempering
device that allows water to flow only
when the sterilizer opens.
Installing a tempering device can save between 68% and
98% of the water used by the sterilizer
k
.
Vacuum pumps
Wet pumps use a closed impeller that is
sealed with water to generate the vacuum
Dry pumps do not use water to generate
the seal for the vacuum, so they do not
connect to a water supply.
Substituting dry pumps for wet pumps refrains from
using water.

i
Source: East Bay Municipal Utility District 2008, FOOD8-FOOD9
j
Source: NRA 2012b, 152
k
Source: CUWCC 2004, 31
124

Table 16. Characteristics and effects of CII water saving devices (continued)
Category Areas of intervention/Device Characteristics Estimated effects
Lab equipment Vivarium equipment washers,
instrument, glassware, cage, rack,
and bottle washers and west
scrubbers for laboratory fume hoods
Dry scrubbers can replace wet scrubbers.
Washers that recycle the water used for
rinsing can also be installed.

Commercial
laundries
The technology to reduce water
usage depends from the size of the
washing machines that range from
those in use at laundormats (similar
to household equipment to those in
use in industrial clothes washing
establishments).
As of February 2, 2013, Energy Star®
qualified commercial washers must not
exceed a WF of 4.5 gallons per cycle
l
.
For large industrial equipment rinse water
recirculation is usually adopted.
Ozone systems can also save water, but
they are effective only at low
temperatures.
Water recirculation systems can save as much as 25% of
a washer’s potable water demand by diverting rinse water
to a storage tank for later reuse as wash water.
Complex recirculate systems treat reclaimed water from
wash and rinse cycles for use in all cycles of the next
load and can save more than 85% of water used
m

Car washers

Water use is controlled by type of
equipment, water pressure, speed,
nozzle size, and presence or lack of
an on-site reclamation system.
Self service washers use less water than
bay and conveyor systems, but reclaim
systems for self service are usually not
avaliable.
In conveyor systems reclaiming rinse
water is easier and less expensive than in
bay systems.
Larger vehicles washing systems have
also been outfitted with rain capturing
systems.
The carwash sites where staff where employed to wash
and high-pressure rinse vehicles by hand were found to
use approximately 57 litres per wash, vs 168 litres per
wash for automatic
n
systems.
The data from the 2002 ICA study showed that the
lowest amount of water recirculated in a carwash was
nine percent of total gpv, and the highest was 82 % of
water used per vehicle
o
.
l
Source: Energy Star 2012
m
Source: NRA 2012b, 129
n
Source: Ones 2010
o
Source: NRA 2012b, 180
125

Pricing: Water Rates as Conservation Tool
The efficiency of market tools in regulating emissions and managing natural resources
has been theoretically demonstrated (Coase, 1937; Karp and Gaulding, 1995; Revesz and Stavins
2007) and empirically tested (Ellerman 2003, Ellerman and Montero 2007; Freeman and Kolstad
2006; Revesz and Stavins 2007; Stavins 2007; Tietemberg 2003; Tietemberg and Lewis 2000).
Charging water at efficient market price, that corresponds to long run marginal cost, to
reduce water usage has also been addressed (Griffin 2006) and theoretically proven more
effective than command and control strategies (Mansur and Olmstead 2007; Olmstead 2010,
Olmstead and Stavins 2009; Timmins 2003) even though water is relatively price inelastic
(Dalhuisen 2003).
Long run marginal cost for urban uses should reflect the full economic cost of providing
water, including the cost of energy for pumping, partial costs of storage, the cost of transmission,
of treatment and distribution, the opportunity cost of using water for other uses, including natural
and ecological uses and future costs of water depletion (Griffin 2006; Olmstead and Stavins
2009, 1), but even supporters of pricing water at LRCM agree that utilities’ efforts of pricing
water at marginal cost are quite difficult (Griffin 2006).
In reality water rates are mostly lower than long run marginal cost (Griffin 2006;
Olmstead and Stavins 2009, 1; Timmins 2003) and utilities price water with a different set of
objectives in mind. The first objective is to cover the “cost of service”, that includes operating
costs and capital requirements
16
. “Breaking even” is very important for utilities managers.
Obviously there is a commitment to running a financially solvent operation, where revenues are
possibly stable and predictable in order to allow more efficient water management, but also
16
Operating costs include salaries, chemical supplies, electricity and taxes. Capital costs include capital needed for
system expansion, upgrades and equipment replacement.
126

agencies need good credit ratings to access credit easily when issuing bonds to build new
infrastructure or maintaining their assets and credit ratings are better when revenues are stable
and budget consistently balanced.
Equity and fairness are also an important concern. The principle generally applied to
water rates is that consumers with similar characteristics pay the same amount for similar
amounts of water purchased.
A third objective is efficient water usage (Bauman, Boland ,and Hanemann 1997; Griffin
2006, 251). Utilities managers realize that it is difficult to access credit to increase water supply
and that the most cost effective tool to manage existing resources is to use them more efficiently.
With all or some of these objectives in mind, water rates are set in different forms. Some
utilities do not monitor water usage and charge only a flat rate, not related to water consumption
that is likely to break even with the cost of service, but is no use for controlling water usage.
According to Hoehn (2011, 140) “Flat rates result in significant water waste and large economic
costs. Users not only use water inefficiently, they also find it financially unwise to prevent
‘unintentional’ waste”.
In order to charge customers according to the amount of water they use, the first and most
important strategy is metering. Installing a meter per se has been shown to be a water
conservation strategy (Inman and Jeffrey 2007, 133) and that installing a meter can reduce water
usage by 20%, at least in the first year.
Most water agencies monitor water usage and support fix and variable costs with a two
component rate: a fix rate and a volumetric rate. To account for the different weight each
customer poses on fixed costs, the fix rate is proportional to the size of the meter installed, where
smaller meters pay a smaller fee and larger meters pay much higher rates.
127

The volumetric rate is applied to the volume of water consumed by the user and is usually
charged by units that correspond to hundred cubic feet (HCF)
17
. Volumetric rates have different
structures: decreasing block, uniform, increasing block, seasonal or budget based, with possible
of combinations of different structures.
In some cases, based on the assumption that long run marginal costs are variable, utilities
have opted to charge only volumetric rates to enhance the connection between water usage and
water charges. However, in order to cover all costs an exclusively volumetric rate is higher than
a two components rate and could lead to excessive water usage reduction, making the agency
financially unsustainable (Hoehn 2011, 139).
A decreasing block rate (DBR) is a set of volumetric charges that decrease as water use
increases. Water use is divided into intervals of units, called blocks, and each block is priced
differently on a declining curve. The first block, which corresponds to the lower water usage, is
charged more, while increasing water usages are charged less. A decreasing block rate can cover
economic costs, but it is does not encourage efficient water use and conservation (Hoehn 2011).
A uniform rate applies the same price to all water use. Many times uniform rates are
differentiated among customers, so residential customers pay a rate that is different from
commercial customers.
An increasing block rate (IBR) is a set of volumetric charges that increase as water
consumption grows. As in decreasing block rates water usage is aggregated in blocks. Charge for
units in the first block is usually very low and grows for units in any additional block.
The functional rationale for adopting an IBR is the fact that peak water usage requires
large infrastructural investments that increase the cost of water and these costs should be
supported by peak water users. IBR is also commonly used as a “conservation tool”, especially
17
1 HCF = 748 gallons
128

in times of drought, under the assumption that higher tiers of water usage are more elastic to
prices and higher rates should reduce inefficient uses.
In practice, according to the Association of Water Efficiency (AWE) “under revenue
constraint, increasing block rates allow agencies to charge efficient prices (equal or close to the
long run marginal cost) to more customers than would otherwise be possible” (AWE 2008, 6) at
the same time, many utilities don’t have any idea about their marginal cost of water and by
implementing inclining block rates utilities “attempt to provide a politically acceptable
conservation price signal” (AWE 2008, 6).
IBR has been criticized for being unfair and for not being really effective. Some claim
that high water users might be large poor families that end up paying higher rates (Dahan and
Nuisen 2007), although in practice many cities establish life lines for larger families (LADWP
2013). Others argue that block rates are ineffective because users of the first block usually have
no incentive for water conservation (Hoehn 2011) and often the first block is much larger than
average needs (Chica-Olmo, González-Gómez and Guardiola 2012). In reality, IBRs can be very
different and charge customers low rates for high volumes of water. The cases presented in
figure 2 illustrates how in Los Angeles the average residential water usage, about 11 units per
month, is within the first block, and only very high water users are charged 2
nd
tier rates. In
Rancho Cucamonga the average user (21 units per month) reaches the second tier, but the
difference between the first and second tier is irrelevant, and does not really encourage massive
water savings, because the fixed rate plays a very important role for low water users. On the
other end, high water users in Los Angeles pay more than twice the amount paid by high water
users in Rancho Cucamonga and might have a real incentive to reduce their water consumption.
129

Los Angeles Department of Water and Power
a

Rates for a single family home with lot size < 7,500 sqft
between June 1st and October 31st 2012
Cucamonga Valley Water District
b

Rates for a 3/4 " meter size starting 5/1/2012

Legend
Low temperature zone first block up to 27 units
Medium temperature zone first block up to 31 units
High temperature zone first block up to 32 units
1
st
block = $ 3.629 per unit
2
nd
block = $5.922 per unit
Block 1 = $1.46 per unit up to 10 units
Block 2 = $ 1.72 from 11 to 40 units
Block 3 = $ 2.05 from 41 to 100 units
Block 4 - $ 2.35 over 101 units
Monthly service charge for a ¾” meter= $25.73
MWD surcharge = $0.16 per unit
Figure 16. Increasing block rates in Los Angeles and Cucamonga Valley Water District
a
Source: Los Angeles Department of Water and Power, “Water rates” accessed January 31
st
2013
at https://www.ladwp.com/ladwp/faces/wcnav_externalId/a-fr-watr-
rate;jsessionid=0MdnRKzRT1Bx2sVSsDSWm9wQPl6MFGqlqpnnnpz6GhWqTLphJcR2!667559316?_afrLoop
=1022834989549000&_afrWindowMode=0&_afrWindowId=null#%40%3F_afrWindowId%3Dnull%26_afrLoo
p%3D1022834989549000%26_afrWindowMode%3D0%26_adf.ctrl-state%3Dm6bd8533l_4
b
Source:

Cucamonga Valley Water District, “Water rates”, accessed January 31
st
2013
at http://www.cvwdwater.com/index.aspx?page=53
Criticism notwithstanding, IBR is now prevalent among US utilities. According to the
American Water Works Associations (AWWA) 2010 survey on water utilities rates, about 49%
of US utilities have adopted increasing block rates, 31% have uniform rates and only 19% have
declining block rates. In the last 12 years the balance between DBR and IBR has been
completely overturned, while in 1998 the majority of water utilities had DBRs, in recent years a
wide majority has transitioned to IBRs (Tab. 17).
Table 17. Prevalence of rate structures in United States
Rate Structure 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010
Decreasing block 35% 35% 31% 25% 24% 28% 19%
Uniform 34% 36% 37% 39% 40% 32% 31%
Increasing block 31% 29% 32% 36% 36% 40% 49%
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
Source: AWWA and Raftelis Inc. 2011, 7
130

A number of studies have analyzed the effectiveness of IBRs and their adoption.
Empirical research shows that water demand of customers of utilities with IBRs is more sensitive
to price than water demand of customers of utilities with uniform rates (Olmstead, Hanemann,
and Stavins 2007, 191) and that when the water provider adopts a two tiered rate structure, with
the second tier doubling the existing rates, second tier users reduce their water consumption
much more of first tier water users, that had their billing unit increased of a few cents (Nataraj
and Hanneman 2011).
Some research has been done on the contextual and institutional characteristics of
agencies that adopt IBRs. Size of the utility is consistently a predictor of the adoption of IBRs or
seasonal rates (Aubuchon and Roberts 2012; Boyer et al. 2012; Teodoro 2010). Water agencies
with a larger customer base are more likely than smaller agencies to switch from a uniform rate
or DBR to an IBR, because they have the resources to change their billing systems and to fund
the customer service needed to accommodate the transition. In a research that limits its field of
inquiry to municipal utilities, Aubuchon and Roberts (2012) positively test the hypothesis that
utilities that have faced a fast growth in their customer base are most likely to adopt an IBR or a
seasonal rate and explain that in many cases the underlying motivation is the need to smooth
peak demand and to guarantee a degree of stability and predictability to water revenues.
Increases of variable costs like treatment costs have also been found a significant factor
that motivates utilities to transition to IBRs (Boyer et al. 2012).
In a research that includes cities and special district, Teodoro (2010) claims that local
climatic condition and ratio between peak demand and average demand are strong predictors of
the adoption of both IBRs and landscape audit programs. He also reveals that utilities whose
board is elected by the general public are more likely to implement IBRs than utilities where the
131

board is elected by ward residents (board members are elected only by the residents of the
district or sub-area they represent) and that cities with a council-manager charter structure are
also more likely to implement conservation pricing than cities with mayor-council charters. He
explains that IBRs benefit the public at large, by stabilizing utilities’ revenues and keeping lower
tier rates affordable, while a small portion of the customer base pays the price and boards elected
by the public at large are willing to impose a burden on a small group to benefit the community.
Also, in most cities, users of high volumes of water tend to live in the same areas, therefore ward
elected boards are more likely to be conflicted about adopting rates that impose higher costs on a
specific cluster of customers (Teodoro 2010).
Other Pricing Strategies
Combinations of IBRs and seasonal rates have been experimented by many utilities. In
recent years “water budget rates” have become popular among water utilities as a tool to stabilize
revenues and promote water efficiency, reducing discretionary uses.
Water budget-based rates are inclining block rates, individualized, goal-based, and
customer specific: “Water budget-based rate structures can be thought of as an increasing block
rate structure where the block definition is different for each customer based on an efficient level
of water use for that customer” (Mayer et al. 2008, 2).
In practice, water budgets are mostly implemented for residential customers and are
aimed at making outdoor usage more efficient. In some cases, water providers use budgets as
communication tools, to explain customers what the efficient water usage should be and how
much they could save by using water more efficiently.
To set budget based water rates utilities estimate theoretical indoor and outdoor usage
separately. Indoor usage is based on the household’s size (typically a family of 4 is assigned 55
gallons per day). Outdoor optimal water needs are based on the size of the landscaped area and
132

on local evapotranspiration (ET)
18
, a measure of the water needed for the plants to grow and
thrive in a specific climate. Water providers assign each customer a water budget based on these
estimate and establish a base rate for the allotted water usage. Higher rates are applied when
water usage is higher than the budget, with progressively increasing blocks.
For example, the Irvine Ranch Water District in Orange County (IRWD) manages its
water rate as follows (the description refers to a single family account, but the agency applies the
same system to multifamily residential, landscape, irrigation and commercial and industrial
customers). Each single family account is allotted 55 gallons per day for indoor water usage,
based on a family size of 4 (if the family is larger the account holder can request an adjustment).
Outdoor water usage is allocated based on daily ET specifically calculated for coastal, central
and foothill areas, multiplied by a turf grass coefficient, by an adjustment factor to account for
irrigation systems malfunction (that increases the ET by 40%), and by the actual surface of the
landscaped area (minimum 1,306 sq ft). The total water budget is estimated by multiplying the
daily indoor allotment by the number of days in the month and by adding each daily outdoor
water allotment. Rates are set in such a way that every account pays a $9 service charge. The
average 4 member household with a 1,306 sqft landscaped area pays the first 40% of its total
water allotment a very low rate ($0.91 per unit) and the remaining 60% a fairly low rate ($1.24
per unit). Rates for higher uses are much steeper. If the average household’s over budget uses
amount to less than 50% of the initial allotment the additional units are charged $2.76 each, if the
household uses between 150% and 200% of the initial allowance each unit between 150% and
18
Evapotranspiration is the loss of water to the atmosphere by the combined processes of evaporation (from soil and
plant surfaces) and transpiration (from plant tissues). Many factors are used to estimate ET including: weather
parameters such as solar radiation, air temperature, relative humidity, and wind speed; soil factors such as soil
texture, structure, density, and chemistry; and plant factors such as plant type, root depth and foliar density, height,
and stage of growth. ETc is estimated by weather stations and multiplied by a crop factor (turf grass for urban water
budget purposes) and by the surface of the landscaped area.
http://wwwcimis.water.ca.gov/cimis/infoEtoOverview.jsp;jsessionid=F1DA336DFB3B360685C19858DF67EE90
133

200% is charged $4.70 and any usage that exceeds 200% of the budget is charged $ 9.84 per unit
(IRWD 2012). Third, fourth and fifth block rates are explicitly defined respectively “Inefficient”,
“Excessive” and “Wasteful” on the water bill.
San Juan Capistrano, a nearby city, has chosen budget based rate with a different
approach. Each single family residential customer is allotted 6 units per month at a base rate. In
an effort to encourage customers to reduce their outdoor usage additional water is allotted
differently according to the lot size. Single family homes with landscaped areas up to 3,636 sqft
are allotted a quantity of water based on the local ET and 70% of a lawn multiplier. This quantity
is charged at a tier 1 rate. The water exceeding the base and first allotments is charged twice the
base rate up to double the 1 tier allotment and water exceeding 200% the first allotment is
charged $11.33 per unit. Customers with larger lots are granted the 6 HCF base share, but their
outdoor budget is incrementally lower. They are granted the same amount of water of a medium
lot customer plus, for the additional surface, their share is based on the local ET, multiplied by
50% of the lawn multiplier and by the surface of the landscaped lot up to ½ acre and by 30% of
the lawn multiplier for any surface that exceeds ½ acre. The mechanism to determine 2
nd
and 3
rd

tier is the same as for the smaller homes. For water consumption that exceds the budget, water
rates are double the base rate and for water usage that exceeds 200% of the budget water rate is
$11.33 per unit (City of San Juan Capistrano 2012).
The two examples clearly illustrate how water budgets have the potential for stabilizing
water revenues, and how the outdoor estimates can be flexible. Revenue reliability is guaranteed
by the allotted water budgets and the agency can use the additional revenues coming from over
budget accounts to fund rebates on water saving devices or capital investments. Outdoor budgets
can be a tool to improve water efficiency. In IRWD service area, when the program was
134

launched in the early 90s’ outdoor water usage per account declined by 34% (Pekelney and
Chesnutt 1997, 4-8) as compared to water usage in the late ‘80s. However, the current
mechanism does not increase efficiency. Large estates are assigned large amounts of water at
low price, because their outdoor budget is determined by lot size and by a generous multiplier,
therefore the mechanisms fails to encourage the transition to less water intensive landscape
choices. In the case of San Juan Capistrano the multiplier is restrictive and incrementally lower,
larger lot owners are motivated to reduce their outdoor usage, to transform their landscape and to
use water more wisely.
Although more flexible than “traditional” IRBs, budget based rates have not been widely
adopted yet. In fact, managing budget based rates is more complex and more costly than
managing IBRs or uniform rates. Implementation costs are higher, because water providers need
to acquire and maintain more information about the account holders. Billing systems must be
updated and integrated. Technical equipment to estimate local ET must be acquired and
maintained. Customer service representatives must be trained to answer different questions and
to a more intense exchange with the public to maintain updated information.
Smart Metering and the Technological Frontier
Smart meters have been adopted by electricity providers to charge peak load prices and to
smooth energy uses throughout the day. Smart water meters are also available and could be used
to monitor and report water usage. They have a fine resolution (1 quart), can report with very
short intervals (down to 7 seconds) according to the utilities’ needs and through wireless
technology report directly to a control center, no reading needed (Steward and al. 2010).
Current technology can be used by the water agency for leak detection, for monitoring
households’ consumption in order to suggest appropriate water efficiency solutions, to enforce
watering restrictions in times of drought or water emergency and for peak pricing. It can also be
135

used by the individual customer to view its own daily, weekly and monthly consumption as well
as to understand the family’s water use patterns for categories of water end use and to compare it
with average regional and local metrics (Stewart 2010).
A part from the advantages of additional and specific knowledge smart meters would be
crucial for pricing water at different rates throughout the day to incorporate the energy costs of
water distribution and to control water usage. Although big smart metering installations are not
in existence, peak pricing has been proven to be effective to reduce water consumption in
experimental settings.
House (2012) describe that homes equipped with smart meters that were offered a rebate
if they reduced peak water usage, effectively reduced their peak usage by 50% and their overall
water consumption of about 17%. An interesting observation after the study is that “Reductions
in peak and total water use for the residential intervention group persisted after the study was
completed” (House 2012, 1).
Other Market Instruments for Water Conservation
In the wake of the introduction of market based strategies such as cap and trade to reduce
air pollution and greenhouse gasses emissions, conservation offsets have emerged as a possible
water conservation strategy that has not yet been implemented but could be promising. A
conservation offset is a requirement for a developer to partially or fully offset the increased water
demand created by a new development. The offset is generally accomplished by the
implementation of conservation measures elsewhere in the community, or payment by the
developer into a water conservation fund administered by the local water supplier or local
government. Cities in California and New Mexico have experimented with them and have
allowed the construction of new developments under the condition that the developer funded
water conservation rebates. Since 2003, Soquel Creek Water District, in the Monterey Peninsula,
136

requires every applicant to a new water service to offset 1.2 times its estimated water usage. The
“Conservation offset fee” can be reduced if the applicant adopts exceptional water conservation
measures (Water Sense certified plumbing fixtures, gray-water irrigation, rain water barrels etc.).
Conservation offsets are now sold for $18,000 per AF and the revenues are used to purchase and
install high efficiency fixtures in existing buildings and to offer rebates to existing customers to
replace water intensive with water saving devices (Green Cities California 2012, SCWD 2013).
In 2008, California legislature considered to pass AB 2153 (Krekorian)
19
, that required
conservation offsets for new development throughout the state. New water demand could be
offset by a wide number of projects, such as (1) indoor and outdoor water saving devices, (2)
infrastructure rehabilitation such as replacing leaking pipes; (3) construction of recycled water
facilities or (4) groundwater remediation and treatment facilities; (5) Stormwater capture
facilities; (6) gray-water systems. The concern over possible housing costs increases in time of a
recession, however, stopped the bill.
Education and Information: Teaching the Children and the Teachers and Raising Public
Awareness
A large part of the conservation effort deployed by water agencies consists in educational
programs directed to children, teachers and more generally to water users that is usually
combined with information campaigns about water saving devices and water saving behaviors.
Programs addressed to children include school presentations, plays, contests for the best
water conservation related art work (posters, video or compositions) and visits to local utilities
19
http://www.legix.info/us-ca/measures;2007-08;ab2153
137

and to native plants gardens. Programs directed to teachers include intensive courses that
introduce water conservation principles in the science curriculum. Education aimed generally at
water users includes courses about water saving gardening techniques and plants. Information
campaigns are deployed through paid water advertisements, water agencies’ presence at local
fairs and events, leaflets or newsletters inserted in water bills to inform customers about water
issues and the maintenance of websites that carry tips to reduce water usage in the home, from
shutting water off while brushing one’s teeth to programming irrigation controllers. A growing
group of information techniques rely on social networks and community pressure to use social
norms to change behaviors (CUWCC, nd).
The effectiveness of education has been tested in a small number of instances, has been
focused to determining whether education interventions have changed the subjects’ attitude, and
has given inconclusive results. Research shows that students that attend intensive water related
workshops become more aware of water issues and that intensive workshops also increase
students’ knowledge of water related problems and their engagement in water conservation
behaviors as compared to a control group (Middlestat et al. 2001). However, it reveals that it is
difficult to assess whether students that have participated to these activities retain the information
three months after the intervention (Ҫoban et al. 2011).
Although many water agencies are very proud of their information campaigns, the
research about their effectiveness is sparse, and shades doubts over their outcomes. Campaigns
perform well in improving peoples’ attitudes toward water conservation (Dolnicar and
Hurlimann 2011) and result effective when self-reported water conservation behaviors are used
as an indicator of success (Martínez-Espiñeira and García-Valiñas 2012). The positive attitudes
they generate, however, are not translated into actual measurable behaviors (Dolnicar and
138

Hurlimann 2011) consistently. Studies using different methodologies give conflicting results,
where quantitative studies show no correlation between information campaigns and water usage
reductions, qualitative analyses show reductions ranging between 15% and 20% (Syme 2000).
Education and information have the final objective to change attitudes and beliefs of
water users, however it is not yet clear if change of attitudes and beliefs generate measurable
water savings. Research has demonstrated that attitudes are predictors of the intention of
conserving water (Corral-Verdugo, Fraijo-Sing, and Pinheiro 2006, 146; Russel and Fielding,
2010; 3) and studies claim that environmental beliefs specifically regarding water issues play a
role in determining water conservation behaviors like shorter showers and a lower number of
washings per week (Corral-Verdugo et al. 2008; Russel and Fielding 2010). Research also shows
that perceived social norms and identification with one’s community foster at least the intention
of both engage in water saving behaviors and in purchasing water efficient devices, but they
don’t yet connect change in attitudes with measurable per capita water use reductions.

139

TABLE OF CONTENTS
REGULATORY AGENCIES AND WATER CONSERVATION STRATEGIES ............... 140
The role of Federal and State Organizations ....................................................................... 140
California Planning and Regulatory Framework for Water Conservation ......................... 142
Senate Bill x 7-7 and the Legislative Commitment to Control Water Usage in California
......................................................................................................................................... 147
From 2009 to 2012, New California Regulatory Actions for Water Conservation ........ 151
The California Urban Water Conservation Council ........................................................... 153
The Role of MWD and the Basics Principles of its Conservation Strategies ..................... 156
A Short History of MWD’s Conservation Programs ...................................................... 159
MWD’s Long-Term Conservation Plan and Revised Policy Principles on Water
Conservation ................................................................................................................... 168
MWD Water Conservation Budget ................................................................................. 170
Relations between MWD and its Member Agencies ...................................................... 172
Wholesalers as engine of water conservation ..................................................................... 173
Wholesalers’ Participation to MWD’s Programs ........................................................... 174
Wholesalers’ Funding from External Sources ................................................................ 177
Wholesalers’ Involvement with the Retail Agencies ...................................................... 178
Role of Water Conservation in Planning Future Water Supply ...................................... 185

REGULATORY AGENCIES AND WATER CONSERVATION
STRATEGIES

The role of Federal and State Organizations
As mentioned in the previous chapter, Federal organizations that manage water do not
have regulatory power over local water conservation. There is only one major Federal act that
has strongly influenced water usage. The 1992 Federal Energy Policy Act mandated efficiency
standards for showerheads, faucets, toilets and urinals that entered into effect between 1994 and
1997, as previously summarized.
The Federal Government encourages water conservation through two actions: voluntary
measures and funding for water conservation initiatives.
140

In 2006, EPA launched its “WaterSense” certification program, with the mission of
promoting water efficiency and supporting the market for water-efficient products, programs,
and practices. Through the program, EPA partners with manufacturers, retailers, distributors and
utilities and provides certification for products that use at least 20 percent less water than
standard models, for buildings and for irrigation professionals.
The agency requires independent testing of products and services for both efficiency and
performance by third party licensed certifying bodies, which certify product conformance to
WaterSense specifications, authorize use of the WaterSense label, and conduct periodic market
surveillance.
According to its last activity report, WaterSense certifies about 4,500 different products,
mostly faucets, and has about 1,200 irrigation partners throughout the US.
Since 1997, USBR instead, provides funding, information, education and support to
irrigation and water districts, States and other entities in the western United States to implement
projects that use water more efficiently. USBR’s activities range from technical support for water
management planning by designing surveys or facilitating partnerships, to education initiatives,
to assistance with research, evaluation and demonstration of new technologies. In 2010 the
Bureau launched a Water Smart (Sustain and Manage America’s Resources for Tomorrow)
initiative that funded research on climate change effects on water and water resource adaptation
to the changing climate, advanced water treatment plans, water distribution systems optimization
and initiatives aimed at addressing the connection between water and electricity usage. Among
the latter, a small number of projects had the task to reduce water consumption and co-funded
water delivery agencies on a 50/50 basis.
141

California Planning and Regulatory Framework for Water Conservation
California has a long history of laws, policies and practices that promote water
conservation and was first in the West to recognize water conservation as a tool for water
management.
The first step in recognizing the relevance of water conservation was to make clarity. In
1979, the legislature adapted the water rights system to facilitate the lease of agricultural water
rights to urban water users and recognized that water right holders that use less than their water
rights thanks to water conservation efforts do not lose their right to the water they conserve and
may sell, lease or transfer said right.
20

As early as 1990 the State approved the Water Conservation in Landscaping Act that
acknowledged that conservation and water use efficiency are policies of the state and mandated
the California Department of Water Resources (DWR) and other entities to draft a model “water
conservation ordinance” that had to be adopted by local agencies. The water conservation
ordinance set rules about landscape design and irrigation, but addressed also recycled water
usage for irrigation purposes and broader measure of water efficiency. Throughout the 90s the
legislature explicitly included wholesalers among of the entities that could implement
conservation measures
21
. In the early 2000, the CALFED process, the collaborative process put
in place by state and federal agencies to address the San Joaquin – Sacramento Delta
environmental issues, dedicated unprecedented funding to urban and agricultural policies to
increase water efficiency (DWR, 2006), but a more intense regulatory actions occurred in the last
8 years, partially due to subsequent droughts.
20
California Water Code §1011
21
AB 1712 1993 http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/93-94/bill/asm/ab_1701-1750/ab_1712_bill_930826_chaptered
142

A number of regulations were passed between 2005 and 2009 to facilitate and accelerate
the implementation of effective conservation strategies, as summarized in table 18.
Table 18. Legislative action to improve water conservation between 2005 and 2009
Law
Type of
incentive Content
AB 1881 (2006) Mandate Requires the State to update the model water‐ efficient landscape
ordinance and requires local agencies to adopt and enforce local water‐ efficient landscape ordinances by January 2010
Key elements in the updated ordinances include: a water budget approach
and applies to large, new and redeveloped landscapes which require a
permit, reducing the evapotranspiration adjustment factor used in the
calculation of a the water budget to at least 0.7, increasing the public’s
awareness of the importance of water use efficiency in landscaping,
requiring Smart Controllers, and adopting and enforcing statewide
prohibitions on overspray and runoff.
AB 1420 (2007) Financial Requires that that, in order to be eligible for State grants and loans
awarded or administered by DWR, State Water Resources Control Board,
or California Bay-Delta Authority water suppliers are implementing the
Best Management Practices included in the California Urban Water
Conservation Council’s Memorandum for Understanding
AB 1420 (2007) Mandate Requires DWR, in consultation with the CUWCC, to provide information
and recommendations to the Department and the Legislature on new
demand management measures, technologies and approaches no later than
January 1, 2010 and each five years thereafter.
AB 715 (2007) Mandate It requires that, after January 1, 2014, all water closets and all urinals, sold
or installed in California be high-efficiency water closets (1.28 gpf) and
urinals (0.5 gpf).
AB 2882 (2008) Mandate This law authorizes a public entity to adopt allocation-based conservation
water pricing. It clarifies the legal requirements for implementing tiered
rate structures under the Constitutional mandate for reasonable use of
water and provides an option for water rate structures that encourage
water conservation, by determining a “basic use allocation” and charging
more for increments of metered use above that allocation, to pay the costs
of conservation measures and overuse. It also preserves local agencies’
authority to impose fixed charges for fixed costs.
SB 407 (2009) Mandate This bill requires that after January 1, 2014, when improving and altering
any building built before 1994, water-conserving plumbing fixtures
replace other noncompliant plumbing fixtures.
Also it requires that, by January 1, 2017, all noncompliant plumbing
fixtures in single-family residential homes be replaced by the property
owner with water-conserving plumbing fixtures. The same requirement
for multi-family residential and commercial buildings is extended to
January 1, 2019.
Finally, it requires that by 2017 sellers must notify buyers about the status
of existing plumbing fixtures.
AB 474 (2009) Fiscal This bill authorizes the legislative bodies of water agencies to designate an
area within which city officials and property owners may enter into
contractual agreements to finance the installation of water efficiency
improvements permanently fixed to real property. In practice, this law
allows public entities to provide initial funding for water usage reduction
projects that some property owners might not be able to fund, but requires
said property owners to refund the public entity that is making the upfront
investment.
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Table 18. Legislative action to improve water conservation between 2005 and 2009 (continued)
Law
Type of
incentive Content
AB 1061 (2009) Mandate This act reconciles the existing landscape ordinances with contradictory
Home Owner Associations (HOA) landscape guidelines and provides that
HOAs’ rules about landscaping will not prevent the use of low water
plants.
As a result of this legislative activity, the 2009 California Water Plan Update (DWR
2009a) estimated that urban water efficiency will yield between 1.2 and 3.1 MAF of savings a
year, more than any other water supply augmentation strategy such as water recycling or
desalination.
The year 2009 was a crucial year for water conservation. In 2008, a year into a severe
drought, California Governor declared the state of emergency for drought and envisioned the
need for a plan to reduce urban water usage in the state by 20% by 2020. A working group
including the California Department of Water Resources, the State Water Resources Control
Board (State Water Board), the California Energy Commission (CEC), the California
Department of Public Health (CDPH), the California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC) and
the Bureau of Reclamation (USBR) was established and the following year produced a plan to
reduce per capita water usage by 20% by 2010.
The plan addresses only potable water use and water used within retail agencies,
establishes a baseline water usage and sets per capita water usage reduction targets for the entire
state and for 8 hydrologic regions in California (Figure 17).
144

Figure 17. California hydrologic regions and their 2020 targets
Source: DWR et al. 2010
The statewide baseline water use, in gallons per capita per day (GPCD), is 192 GPCD
and the targets are:
• Interim Statewide Target = 192 GPCD (Statewide Baseline) minus 10 percent = 173
GPCD;
• Final Statewide Target = 192 GPCD (Statewide Baseline) minus 20 percent = 154 GPCD
(DWR et al. 2010).
The plan also estimates the amount of savings that will be attributable to water
conservation measures existing in 2009 such as the implementation of CUWCC’s BMPs,
145

building codes, and landscape ordinances and recognizes that additional measures will be needed
to produce the amount of savings recommended.
Additional measures envisioned by the plan include: improving water conservation
governance, a stronger action to reduce landscape irrigation water usage, reduce water waste and
leaks, improving information and awareness campaigns (Tab. 19).
Table 19. Recommendations of 20 x 2020 plan
Additional conservation
measures Actions
Improve water conservation
governance
• The legislature establishes binding conservation goals
• DWR takes charge as the leading agency for water conservation
• DWR establishes a uniform system for data collection
• Establish a stakeholder forum
• CEC obtains the authority of establishing state water efficiency
standards for clothes washers
• Provide grants and rebates to wholesale and retail agencies
• Require implementation of water conservation measures to be
eligible for state funds
• Provide enforcement tools to special districts
• Increase the resources to prevent unreasonable use of water
Reduce landscape irrigation
demand
• Revise model landscape ordinance
• Transform current BMPs on landscape irrigation in mandates;
• Require water efficient landscape for all state properties
• Set water efficiency standards for irrigation devices
Reduce water waste • Accelerate water metering
• Establish a state standard for water metering
• Change method of estimating acceptable water losses in a
distribution system
Upgrade existing standards • Accelerate the rate of substitution of water intensive plumbing
fixtures
• Encourage the adoption of conservation rates
Investigate the implementation of
flexible measures
• Water conservation offsets
• Water conservation cap and trade
Source: DWR et al. 2010, 31-45
Later in 2009, the legislature, in the Seventh Extraordinary Session of the 2009-2010
Legislative Session made the first step forward in applying the plan’s recommendations about
binding conservation goals and passed legislation (SBx7 7) requiring that the state reduce urban
water per capita use, not total urban use, by 20 percent by December 31 2020 and that each urban
retail water supplier in California contribute to reach this goal.
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Senate Bill x 7-7 and the Legislative Commitment to Control Water Usage in California
Although the 20x2020 plan was aimed exclusively to urban uses, SBx7-7 targets urban
and agricultural water usage separately. It mandates urban retail water suppliers to set water
reduction targets and provides directions about how to establish baselines and targets. It directs
agricultural water suppliers to implement efficient water management practices and to produce
agricultural management plans. It also picks up some the plan’s directions about governance by
rendering urban water reduction and agricultural water planning binding. Urban water retailers
that do not meet their per capita water usage targets and agricultural water suppliers that do not
meet the requirements are not eligible for state funding of water infrastructures. On the
governance side, SBx 7-7 also strengthens the role of DWR by requiring the department to
collect data about water usage, to direct the implementation of reduction targets and agricultural
management plans and to monitor their execution.
As far as urban water usage is concerned, SBx7-7 is directed to “water supplier, either
publicly or privately owned, that directly provides potable municipal water to more than 3,000
end users or that supplies more than 3,000 acre-feet of potable water annually at retail for
municipal purpose”
22
. The law requires urban water retailers to develop a baseline water usage, a
2020 target and a 2015 interim target. The latter becomes binding for the agencies to be eligible
for state funding.
In order to take into account different hydrological and climatic conditions of water
retailers across the state and to recognize the effort of the retailers that have implemented
conservation strategies, SBx7 7 offers a wide variety of flexible mechanisms to estimate urban
water usage and to set 2020 targets. It also provides water retailers the possibility to set their
22
SBx7-7 10608.12. (p)“Urban wholesale water supplier,” means a water supplier, either publicly or privately
owned, that provides more than 3,000 acre-feet of water annually at wholesale for potable municipal purposes.
147

targets individually or on a regional basis and offers an “escape route” for those retailers that do
not meet their commitments.
DWR has perfected SBx7-7’s mechanisms and integrated them in its guidebook (DWR,
2011) for the redaction of the 2010 Urban Water Management Plan (UWMP)
23
. The guidebook
breaks the process of setting the targets in three phases: (a) establishing the baseline; b) setting
the target; and c) validating the target.
To establish the baseline, water retailers need to estimate the population
24
of their service
area, their gross water usage and the timeframe. Flexibility in determining the baseline is granted
in two different ways: a) in determining gross water usage; b) in determining the timeframe.
Common to all urban retailers is the requirement that they take into consideration the
entire amount of water entering their system, excluding recycled water, recycled water used for
groundwater recharge
25
, water sold to other agencies and water placed in long term storage.
Some leeway is provided by the possibility of excluding process industrial water usage and
agricultural water usage. Industrial water usage can be excluded under the following conditions:
1. Industrial customers use more than 12% of the total water supplied by the retailer
2. Industrial water uses account to more than 15 gpcpd
3. Non-industrial water use is equal to or less than 120 gallons per capita per day, if the
retailer has self-certified its water conservation program with DWR
4. The population as a whole within the supplier’s service area meets the criteria for a
disadvantaged community.
26

23
SBx7-7 10608.20. (j) allows urban water retailers an extension on the deadline to complete their 2010 UWMP to
include per capita water usage reduction targets
24
Many water retailers’ service areas do not correspond to administrative boundaries, therefore the retailers have to
estimate their population by using data produced by DWR or by the COGS.
25
Retailers must provide an estimate of the amount of groundwater they extract that is available thanks to
groundwater recharge with recycled water
26
California Water Commission (2011) California Code of Regulations Title 23. Waters Division 2. Department of
Water Resources Chapter 5.1. Water Conservation Act of 2009 Article 1. Industrial Process Water Exclusion in the
Calculation of Gross Water Use, Sacramento, CA, available at
http://www.water.ca.gov/wateruseefficiency/sb7/docs/FinalTextRegulation.pdf
148

Water used for agriculture is also excluded from the baseline estimate as a rule, but those
retailers that want to include it in their baseline must use very strict parameters to gage its
estimate.
Water retailers also have the possibility to choose the timeframe that maximizes their
possibility to reach the 2020 target. The baseline is a multiyear average of per capita water usage.
Water retailers that in 2008 used recycled water to cover more than 10% of their demand
calculate their baseline on a 15 year average, while all the others calculate their base line on a 10
year base. The 15 or 10 year period must end between 2004 and 2010, but every water retailer is
free to choose the end date. So, for retailers using a small percentage or no recycled water,
baselines estimates 10 year averages range from 1995 – 2004 to 2001 – 2010.
Once the baseline has been estimated, retailers can choose 4 different methods to calculate
their 20 by 2020 targets. The first and the simplest is to calculate 80% of their baseline. The
second is based on performance standards (Table 20).
Table 20. Performance standards for 2020 target water usage according to Method #2
a b

Water usage Standard
Indoor residential water usage 55 gpcpd
Per capita outdoor residential
water usage according to the
water efficiency standard of the
Model water efficient landscape
ordinance
Existing landscaped area until 2009 x local yearly evapotranspiration x
an adjustment factor (80%) x transformation factor (0.62) / 365
+
Projected landscape area in 2020 x local yearly evapotranspiration x an
adjustment factor (70%) x transformation factor (0.62) / 365
/ population in 2020
Per capita Commercial Industrial,
and Institutional water usage
90% of baseline commercial industrial and institutional
a
SBx 7-7 10608.20 (b) (2)
b
DWR et al. 2010
Method 3 corresponds to 95% of the applicable state hydrologic region target as stated in
the 20x2020 Water Conservation Plan.
Method 4 is based on projected actual water saving. The method has been developed by
DWR and by a stakeholder committee and has been released to the public on August 2011.
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Method 4 directs urban water retailers to estimate potential water savings related to metering,
and to specific targets for each sector (residential, commercial industrial and institutional, and
landscape). Retailers that choose this method are expected to reduce water usage for landscape
irrigation by 21.6%, water usage for CII by 10% and to reach 85% saturation for water saving
residential fixtures such as HET and high efficiency washers and 95% saturation for high
efficiency showerheads (DWR 2011b).
Finally, after setting their target, water retailers must assess its validity. Their 2020
target should be lower than the 95% the average per capita water usage calculated over a
continuous five-year period ending no earlier than December 31, 2007, and no later than
December 31, 2010
27
.
Water retailers have also been offered the opportunity to establish water usage targets
through a regional alliance, based on a common wholesaler, on the participation to regional
water conservation agencies, or to regional integrated water management funding areas
28
.
Retailers can estimate their own target and agree to a regional target. If the region as a whole is
not in compliance, but the individual agency meets its own target the retailer is considered in
compliance.
The flexibility in determining the baseline and the variety of methods for setting the 20 x
2020 targets has generated doubts over the effectiveness of SBx 7-7 in reducing California’s
urban water usage by 20% by 2020. Most water retailers have in fact chosen a baseline that is
way higher than their water usage in the last five years, making it easy to reach their target, but
not necessarily reducing water demand to the level envisioned by the plan.
27
SBx 7-7 10608.22
28
SBx 7-7 10608.28 mentions water wholesalers, hydrologic regions, integrated regional water management areas
150

From 2009 to 2012, New California Regulatory Actions for Water Conservation
Some guidelines included in the 20x2020 plan have become effective very recently, and
will be very influential in reducing water usage in the future.
In 2009 the State Water Resources Control Board adopted a resolution that facilitates the
use of recycled water for landscape irrigation (WRCB 2009).
In 2010, becoming effective January 1
st
2011, the California Building Standard
Commission adopted the new California Green Building Standards Code
29
(also called
CalGreen) that regulates some of the characteristics of all the new constructed buildings in the
State. The code sets mandatory minimum Green Building Standards valid throughout the state
(Tier 1) and additional stricter standards (Tier 2) that cities or counties are allowed to adopt to
adapt to the local environmental conditions. To comply with Tier 1 standards new residential and
non residential buildings must reduce indoor water usage by 20% compared to those built before
the adoption of the new code and install plumbing fixtures that reduce water usage. To reduce
outdoor water usage CalGreen requires that in new buildings irrigation controllers must be
weather- or soil moisture-based and automatically adjust irrigation according to plants’ needs as
weather conditions change (Appendix F).
Non residential buildings, in addition to the mandatory 20% reduction of water usage, are
required to reduce wastewater production by 20%, by adopting water saving plumbing fixtures
and by using grey-water systems for outdoor irrigation. For outdoor water usage, builders have to
develop water budgets and if the building occupies areas larger than 1,000 sqft, they have to
install separate meters for outdoor potable water usage.
Voluntary measures included in Tier 2 take into account a much wider range of tools and
fixtures related to water conservation. For residential buildings, cities and counties can add
29
California Code of Regulations Part 11 of Title 24
151

requirements relative to permeable paved spaces to reduce runoff, to high efficiency
dishwashers, to low-water irrigation systems, to rainwater capture and re-use systems, to
irrigation systems that eliminate the use of potable water, to gray-water systems and dual water
piping. For non residential buildings, local governments can establish additional standards such
as requiring 30% or 40% indoor water use reduction, mandating water saving equipment for
clothes washers and food processing, mandate landscaping characteristics and eliminating
potable water usage for irrigation.
In 2010 the new plumbing code
30
also became effective, and is expected to accelerate the
market penetration of high efficiency plumbing fixtures and to facilitate the use of recycled
water. The code, in fact, requires that new toilets installed after July 2011 meet EPA’s
WaterSense performance standards
31
and allows the use of recycled water for waste flushing in
commercial, in office building, in school and other collective dwellings
32
. Also, it regulates the
installation of gray-water systems
33
and allows the installation of simple systems that divert
clothes washers’ water to outdoor irrigation, without building permits. To resolve ambiguities
about rain barrels and gray water system, California legislature passed the Rainwater Capture
Act of 2011, but Governor Brown vetoed it claiming that the law would establish an interim
standard for rainwater capture system that should instead be regulated by the Building Standard
Commission.
Finally, in 2009 the California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC) has also instructed
Investors Owned Utilities (IOUs) on how to address rationing and service connection moratoria
30
California Code of Regulations Title 24, Part 5, available at
http://www.iapmo.org/Pages/2010CaliforniaPlumbingCode.aspx
31
California Code of Regulations Title 24, Part 5, 402.2.2; 402.3.2
32
California Code of Regulations Title 24, Part 5, Chapter 6,
33
California Code of Regulations Title 24, Part 5, Chapter 16A available at
http://www.hcd.ca.gov/codes/shl/2007CPC_Graywater_Complete_2-2-10.pdf
152

in case of drought, streamlining the procedures to adopt rationing measures and providing tools
to enforce rationing (CPUC 2009). With a new Water Action Plan (CPUC 2010) it also
committed to establish financial incentives for the IOUs that meet water conservation targets or
participate in research on water conservation practices. It pledged establish penalties for those
utilities that do not meet conservation targets to further encourage metering and to design
increasing block rates for smaller IOUs.
The California Urban Water Conservation Council
In 1991, in the middle of a multiyear drought, California urban water agencies, with the
support of DWR, signed a memorandum of understanding (MOU), committed to aggressively
implement a list of 14 water best management practices (BMPs) and to report the results of their
effort every year to a new entity, the California Urban Water Conservation Council (CUWCC).
The agreement was an attempt to consolidate the water conservation effort that urban
water agencies had initiated during the drought by making it consistent over time, by committing
the agencies’ human and monetary resources and by rendering the agencies accountable to a
group of peers. It was also a political experiment: urban water agencies and environmental
groups were trying to build common ground and to work together to cope with the limits of
California water supply and to address the issue of in stream water needs.
Members of the CUWCC are the water agencies signatories of the MOU, 184 retailers
and 30 wholesalers as of December 2008, some environmental groups (19) and industry groups
(88). The organization, funded by its members’ contributions, by a DWR grant and by USBR,
supports water agencies in implementing the BMPs and, when necessary, updates the BMPs’
characteristics.
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The BMPs are policies and practices that are generally accepted by all water agencies,
that have been proven to be effective and reliable and that are technically and economically
reasonable and well accepted socially (CUWCC, 2009).
Until 2009 the 14 BMPs were a list of actions the water agencies needed to implement,
that included water surveys for residential and landscape customers, programs aimed at replacing
old toilets with ULFTs or HETs, rebates for residential customers to buy high efficiency
washers, education and information campaign, metering and charging customers with rates based
on the quantity of water usage, rebates for commercial, industrial and institutional customers to
purchase water saving equipment and the adoption of water waste prohibition ordinances (Tab.
21).
Table 21. Definition of BMPS included in the Memorandum of Understanding
BMPs Definition
1. Water Survey Programs for Single-Family Residential and Multi-Family Residential Customers
2. Residential Plumbing Retrofit
3. System Water Audits, Leak Detection and Repair
4. Metering with Commodity Rates for All New Connections and Retrofit of Existing Connections
5. Large Landscape Conservation Programs and Incentives
6. High-Efficiency Clothes Washing Machine Financial Incentive Programs
7. Public Information Programs
8. School Education Programs
9. Conservation Programs for Commercial, Industrial, and Institutional (CII) Accounts
10. Wholesale Agency Assistance Programs
11. Retail Conservation Pricing
12. Conservation Coordinator
13. Water Waste Prohibition
14. Residential ULFT Replacement Programs
Source:

CUWCC 2009
Water agencies were encouraged to sign the MOU as a part of the efforts to stabilize the
hydrological conditions of the Sacramento-San Joaquin Delta, but in 2006 an assessment of its
effectiveness showed that its impact on water use had been uneven throughout the state, that a
process to certify compliance with BMPs had not been put in place and therefore compliance
was low (DWR 2006).
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In 2007, to render the MOU and its BMPs more compelling, compliance with the BMPs
was required to have access to funds administered by DWR, by the State Water Resources
Control Board, or by California Bay-Delta Authority.
In 2009 the MOU was reorganized and the BMPs were rearranged and grouped in two
classes: foundational, that aggregates those related to the organization and programmatic, that
groups measures directed to support customers’ actions (Tab. 22). More importantly, the MOU
was reformed and it now dictates specific implementation steps and coverage requirements for
each BMP.
Table 22. New definitions of BMPs included in the Memorandum of Understanding
New Category BMPs Definition
Foundational: Utility Operations: Operations Wholesale Agency Assistance Programs
Foundational: Utility Operations: Operations Conservation Coordinator
Foundational: Utility Operations: Operations Water Waste Prohibition
Foundational: Utility Operations: Water Loss Control System Water Audits, Leak Detection and Repair
Foundational: Utility Operations: Metering Metering with Commodity Rates for All New Connections
and Retrofit of Existing Connections
Foundational: Utility Operations: Pricing Retail Conservation Pricing
Foundational: Education Public Information Programs
Foundational: Education School Education Programs
Programmatic: Residential Water Survey Programs for Single-Family Residential and
Multi-Family Residential Customers
Programmatic: Residential Residential Plumbing Retrofit
Programmatic: Residential High-Efficiency Clothes Washing Machine Financial
Incentive Programs
Programmatic: Residential Residential WaterSense Toilets Replacement Programs
Programmatic: Landscape Large Landscape Conservation Programs and Incentives
Programmatic: CII Conservation Programs for CII Accounts
Source: CUWCC 2009
For example, former BMP 11 “Retail Conservation Pricing” has become a foundational
measures related to utilities operations. Signatory agencies must charge their customers based on
their water usage and adopt some form of conservation pricing. They have a deadline: they must
adopt conservation rates within a year from signing the MOU or they must have adopted them by
2007 if they had signed the MOU before 2008. They are free to choose between uniform rates,
inclining block rates, seasonal rates and budget based rates, their variable rates must account for
more than 70% of the total revenues.
155

Agencies can opt out from any BMP if they can prove that the measure is not cost
effective for them, that they don’t have the legal authority to implement it or if they don’t have
enough funds. They have also the possibility to adopt strategies that are different from the BMPs
but that yield the same water saving results and still be considered in compliance with the MOU.
It is not clear whether these changes have been effective. With the passage of SBx7-97,
CUWCC has lost its centrality. With the new water law, in order to be eligible for DWR funding,
water agencies need to comply with their targets, no matter how this goal is reached. The BMPs
are not compelling anymore and the organization has not found a way to regain relevance.
The Role of MWD and the Basics Principles of its Conservation Strategies
MWD is the strongest actor in Southern California’s effort to reduce water consumption.
Metropolitan started its conservation effort in the ‘80s and, since the early years, has increased,
improved and reshaped its programs adding focus to its actions and learning from them through
its experience. Thanks to its financial strength and its ability to secure grants from other agencies
such as DWR and the USBR, MWD puts in place a coordinated set of actions aimed at reduce
water usage in its entire service area.
In the last 3 years the agency has deployed about $60 million in a wide range of
conservation programs for residential and commercial customers.
Its portfolio includes (MWD 2012f):
• two regional rebate programs, one geared toward residential retail customers and one
directed to commercial, industrial and institutional (CII) retail customers (about $10
million a year for the last three years);
• one performance based water conservation program aimed at agricultural retail users;
• funding for member agencies’ rebate or outreach programs;
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• research on innovative water saving technologies (currently MWD participates in a
demonstration study of a new water demand/conservation forecasting technology for a
retail agency);
• marketing research (with a $150,000 grant from USBR, Metropolitan is currently
conducting a conservation market study to analyze the commercial and large landscape
markets and education initiatives);
• evaluation of water saving technologies and programs’ effectiveness (with a $60,000 grant
from USBR, Metropolitan is conducting research on landscape water use efficiency,
including water savings for smart controllers and residential customer awareness of
outdoor water use);
• outreach and community partnering programs (MWD co-sponsors water-related initiatives
organized by non-profit organizations public agencies, professional associations and
educational institutions);
• education (school curriculum supplements on water conservation, student contests and
information materials);
• support for of water legislation and regulation (in 2012 MWD supported two state bills to
advance water use efficiency.: AB 2230 would require new car washes to use at least 60
percent recycled water and AB 1750 would enact the Rainwater Capture Act of 2012 to
encourage the capture and use of rainwater for landscape irrigation and indoor non-potable
uses consistent with changes to the California Building Code).
The agency’s first structured goal for its conservation efforts was established in 1996
with the first Integrated Water Resources Plan (IRP) (MWD 1996b). In that document,
Metropolitan estimated that in order to guarantee reliable water supply by 2025, given the
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agency’s assumptions about future water demand, the conservation effort should have resulted in
about 882,000 AF of water savings. The target could be reached through the current (at the time)
and additional conservation programs and trough the implementation of new plumbing codes.
Specifically, the plan advocated for commercial and industrial rebates and anticipated that by
2005 the conservation budget would have reached $29 per year. The 2004 update of the IRP
(MWD 2004b) established a higher goal. By 2020 Southern California should save about 1.028
million AF, partially through additional conservation measures, specifically targeting outdoor
water use, and through pricing measures. The latest IRP update of 2010 (MWD 2010c)
acknowledges SBx 7 7 and the 20% water reduction goals, but claims that in order to guarantee
water reliability, the region should save 1.032 million AF by 2025 and at least 1.158 million AF
by 2035. According to the plan, water conservation could play a strategic role in guaranteeing an
additional 200,000 AF buffer, to mitigate future uncertainties related to the San Joaquin Delta
water supply (Tab. 23).
Table 23. Water supply in 2020 according to MWD’s IRP
Source 1996
a
2004
b
2010
c

Conservation 882,000 1,028,000 1,545,000
- Active 692,000
- Passive 190,000
- Active and Passive 965,000
- SBx7 7 380,000
- Buffer 200,000

Recycling and
Groundwater recovery
and Desalination
500,000 750,000 595,000
Groundwater
conjunctive use
330,000 300,000
Local Production 1,530,000 1,530,000 1,749,000
SWP 700,000 650,000 581,000
CRA 1,200,000 1,250,000 1,250,000
Transfers 300,000 620,000 980,000
a
Source: MWD 1996b, 3-35
b
Source: MWD 2004b, ES-3
c
Source: MWD 2010c,4-3

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A Short History of MWD’s Conservation Programs
Since the 80s MWD has been implementing conservation programs. Initially the agency
would put in place outreach and information actions, but with its Regional Urban Water
Management Plan in 1985, Metropolitan identified a series of conservation strategies that needed
to be implemented and evaluated. These included plumbing retrofit, California Irrigation
Management Information System (CIMIS), encouraging xeriscape, improve leak detection, and
promote water conservation in the industrial sector. In 1987, although Metropolitan had not yet
launched structured programs, the board added a formal water conservation policy to the
agency’s Administrative Code, integrating water conservation into the District’s core functions
34
.
The first structured programs started in the early 90s and relied strongly on the
organizational capacity of the member agencies. MWD acted as the technical and strategic
advisor and provided partial financial support, while operations were mainly managed by
member agencies or local water retailers. The programs consisted in the distribution of simple
water saving devices like aerated showerheads, toilet flappers, leak detection tablets and the like.
Metropolitan provided 50% of the funding, while the member agencies matched the remaining
50% by supporting the organizational burden of distributing the devices. To facilitate the
financial relationship with its member agencies, MWD put in place a system of conservation
credits through which it advanced money for conservation programs and the money would be
reimbursed by the member agencies through their water service billing (MWD 1988). The
conservation credit became the main financial instrument for funding member agencies’
programs and is still widely used.
In 1990, MWD introduced Ultra Low Flow Toilets (ULFT) in its portfolio of supported
devices and launched two programs. The first was a rebate program for member agencies. MWD
34
Administrative Code, section 4209
159

would reimburse member agencies up to 66% of the cost of programs that included rebates to
retail customers to purchase ULFTs or direct purchase and distribution of ULFTs. Member
agencies entered in a contract with MWD and received a conservation credit
35
. They purchased
ULFTs and distributed with their own means to local customers. The yearly amount of funds
available for this program was allocated to each member agency based on the urban water
demand in Metropolitan’s service area (MWD 1992). The program was highly successful (the
first year of implementation member agencies requests for funding exceeded MWD’s budgeted
funds by 70%) and while transformed into a co-pay form of incentive, changed type of fixture
(High Efficiency Toilets have replaced ULFT) and bundled in a regional rebate program has
been active until 2011.
The second was a toilet distribution program, initially called “non-rebate ULFT
program”, funded by MWD, but managed by a third party. The program was launched in 1992
(MWD 1992), when Federal regulations that mandated the adoption of ULFT were approved and
implied that by 1994 new buildings had to adopt the new standards. The new Federal regulations
were taking care of new constructions, but the bulk of the housing stock was still equipped with
water intensive toilets. The “non-rebate ULFTs programs” were a structured response to the need
to encourage low income households to exchange existing fixtures with new devices, in order to
accelerate the process of natural substitution. The “non-rebate ULFT program” was 100%
funded by MWD and was directed both to smaller agencies that did not have resources and
personnel to manage a toilet replacement initiatives and to community based organizations. To
facilitate the distribution of ULFT, the agency had a contract with a vendor. Local retailers,
35
Conditions and amount of credits varied throughout the length of the program and where tailored to the member
agencies’ fiscal conditions. Advances on the total amount of the program were at first authorized, then stopped and
eventually reinstated, with a 25% of the contract limit and the condition that member agencies pay interest on the
sums MWD had anticipated. Initially the co-founding was limited to 50%, it was then increased to two thirds,
reached 100% in isolated cases and was eventually set at $ 60 per toilet in 1993 (MWD 1998b)
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wholesalers or community based organizations that wanted to take advantage of the program
would sign a contract with MWD organize “Toilet distribution” days or week ends in schools or
public spaces. The contracted vendor would purchase and distribute new toilets and require that
the beneficiary bring the old toilet back, so the old fixtures could be disposed of appropriately.
The contractor would than bill MWD based on the number of toilets distributed. The program
was very successful. About 150,293 toilets were distributed in 1993 and 1994. MWD increased
the amount of funding budgeted for the activity, but also had to tweak its relationship with the
vendor constantly in order to control billing practices and relationships with community based
organizations. At the end, in 1996, Metropolitan did not renew funding.
The water conservation effort was relevant. By 1998, MWD had contributed with about
$70 million to the program (Table 24), had supported the installation of 958,000 ULFTs and was
committed to the installation of additional 433,000 (Table 25).
Table 24. Funds for ULFTs rebates and distribution
Year Amount
1992-93 $11,600,000
1993-94 $12,000,000
1994-95 $17,500,000
1995-96 $13,645,000
1996-97 $8,338,200
1997-98 $7,186,000
Source:

MWD 1998b
Table 25. Number of ULFTs funded by MWD between 1988 and 1998
Status Number
Projected to be installed through rebates 1,031,161
Installed toilets through rebates 617,325
Distributed 340,608
Source:

MWD 1996a; MWD 1998b
Starting in1991, Metropolitan was instrumental in setting up the California Urban
Conservation Council (CUWCC), as explained earlier. Its member agencies and retailers were
also involved in the creation of the CUWCC, but every agency had its own programs, with no
much coordination.
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In the second half of the 90s MWD launched a number of programs targeted at
supporting its member agencies in implementing the BMPs included in the CUWCC
memorandum of understanding. In 1993 the agency started its support of outdoor water audits
(MWD 1995); in 1995 initiated a rebate program for High Efficiency Washers (HEW) (MWD,
1999) and in 1998 launched integrated water audits with irrigation controllers retrofits.
The residential programs were offered to the member agencies that had the responsibility
to bring them to fruition to their own customers
To implement water conservation programs aimed to Commercial, Institutional and
Industrial (CII) customers, Metropolitan adopted a different approach. CII programs had
different economies of scale that required a regional approach and MWD’s direct commitment.
In 2000, supported by grants by the USBR and by DWR, the agency started its commercial
program “Save water save a buck”. In designing the intervention, the agency hired specialists
that audited 900 different businesses to understand their water usage and which most common
water intensive fixtures that could be replaced with more efficient ones and decided to have more
control on its implementation. The program, still currently active, is directed by MWD, but its
implementation is contracted to a third party, because for bureaucratic reasons it is easier for a
different subject to handle cash and relationships with vendors.
The schedule of incentives has changed through the years, according to the development
of new technologies and the obsolescence of others. Most rebates that were available at the
program’s inception are no longer there today. The current schedule is reported in table 26.
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Table 26. Regional Commercial Program Rebates as of 7/1/2012
Item Rebate Price of the device
Weather-Based or Central Computer Irrigation
Controller
$25 per station From $200 to $1,500
Large Rotary Nozzles $13 per set Minimum 8 sets
per application

Rotating Nozzles for pop-up spray head retrofits $4 Minimum 15 per
application
From $5.5 to $11.50
High Efficiency Toilet (Tank-Type) $50 From $200 to $ 3,000
High Efficiency Toilet (Flushometer) $100
Urinals – Zero Water Use and Ultra Low Water Use (0
– 0.125 gal/flush)
$200 From $200 to $500
Dry Vacuum Pump $125 per 0.5 hp
Connectionless Food Steamer $485 per compartment
Cooling Tower pH Controller $1,750
Cooling Tower Conductivity Controller $625
Ice Machine $1,0001 From $1,100 to $5,000
In-Stem Flow Regulator $1 Minimum 25 per
application

Laminar flow restrictors $10 per restrictor
Source: MWD 2012c
MWD’s member agencies and retailers have the possibility to supplement the rebates
with additional resources to encourage local businesses to apply.
Between the inception of the program and 2010-2011 MWD and its member agencies
have invested about $64 million ($10.7 million per year) in “Save water save a buck” and
rebated 625,635 (MWD 2011e) devices which saved an estimated 303,491 acre-feet in lifetime
water savings. Metropolitan’s share was 62%, about $ 39 million ($6.5 million per year),
member agencies’, including wholesalers and cities, have contributed with about $25 million
($4.2 million per year) (Tab. 27).
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Table 27. Contribution to Save Water Save a Buck
Fiscal year Member agencies MWD Total
2004-2005 $892,600 $1,563,985 $2,456,585
2005-2006 $938,365 $2,137,544 $2,934,604
2006-2007 $1,653,637 $4,943,434 $6,411,507
2007-2008 $2,107,206 $6,750,855 $8,610,494
2008-2009 $2,628,691 $13,237,714 $15,247,037
2009-2010 $15,871,537 $8,470,189 $23,712,859
2010-2011 $1,754,411 $1,937,310 $3,674,121
Total $25,846,446 $39,041,031 $63,047,207
Source: MWD 2005c, 2006b, 2007c, 2008c, 2009b, 2010e, 2011e
Figure 18 illustrates MWD’s and member agencies’ investments in CII rebates between
FY 2004- 2005 and FY 2010 – 2011. According to the available data, between 2007 and 2010
the department included rebates for retrofitting residential multifamily buildings in the program,
but stopped in 2010 -2011. Although the data referring to 2010 – 2011 do not include rebates
reservations for about $4.1 million, it is clear that the request for commercial rebates has
increased until 2008-2009 and has gradually declined since. FY 2009 – 2010’s spike is correlated
with a large investment in multifamily retrofitting co-funded by the Los Angeles Department of
Water and Power.

Figure 18. Payments for Save Water Save a Buck rebates by MWD and member agencies between
2004 and 2011
Source: MWD 2005c, 2006b, 2007c, 2008c, 2009b, 2010e, 2011e

$0.00
$5,000,000.00
$10,000,000.00
$15,000,000.00
$20,000,000.00
$25,000,000.00
$30,000,000.00
Overheads
Member agencies
MWD
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So far, rotating nozzles are by far the most popular item, because any new installation
requires an average of 300 of them. Excluding rotating nozzles, plumbing fixtures and high
efficiency washers are the most widely requested rebates (Figure 19), while equipment that
reduces water usage in industrial processes are a marginal part of the rebate program.

Figure 19. Number of rebates funded by Save Water Save a Buck from program inception to FY
2010 - 2011
Source: MWD 2005c, 2006b, 2007c, 2008c, 2009b, 2010e, 2011e
In 2007, MWD launched the Public Sector Program (PSP). This intervention provided
upfront incentives to motivate cities, counties, agencies, schools, and others, to purchase and
install water-use efficiency devices. In order to participate in this program, MWD required each
city to pass a Water Waste Prohibition Ordinance. The PSP was funded with a total of $30
million and phased out in 2010.
The commercial program has been and still is very successful. The residential program,
although the ULFTs rebates were highly popular, has been modified and streamlined. Most of its
implementation was a responsibility of the member agencies, but not all of them were equally
active, so the benefits of the program were not evenly distributed. Also, MWD had added new
rebates, new water saving devices were appearing on the market and MWD wanted to support a
wider adoption of water saving technologies throughout the region. In 2002 the agency had
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launched a program targeted to large landscapes: member agencies could enter in agreement with
large landscape owners, audit the irrigation system, implement measures to reduce water usage
and received $154 per acre foot of water saved, up to 50% of the cost the project (MWD 1998a).
In the same time period the district was funding training courses for landscape maintenance
professionals, research on native plants and was providing grants to member agencies and other
entities to explore potential water saving strategies and new water conserving technologies
(MWD 2001b). In 2003, thanks to a DWR grant, MWD started a pilot program of rebates on
weather based irrigation controllers (WBIC) (MWD 2003b) and in 2006 the agency received an
additional CALFED grant to increase its commitment to support the introduction of WBICs in
Southern California. Water saving technologies for outdoor irrigation were becoming more
easily accessible and Metropolitan, with its member agencies, was aware it was time to shift
focus from indoor to outdoor water savings.
Until 2008, however, the overwhelming majority of the rebates were adjudicated to
reduce the cost of indoor fixtures, while outdoor water conservation devices were only marginal
(Fig. 20).

Figure 20. Number of residential rebates 1990 – 1991 to 2007-2008
Source: MWD 2009c, 2010f
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MWD was handling an array of different programs with different involvement of the
member agencies and not enough control over the allocation of funds. To improve the programs’
coordination, MWD and its member agencies decided to implement a residential program similar
to Save Water Save a Buck and they created SoCal Water $mart. Through SoCal Water $mart,
the agency offers now a number of rebates on different items (HEW, turf removal, rotating
nozzles, sprinklers’ controllers etc.) to all the residential customers of its service area. A third
party coordinates the implementation of the program and every retail customers in MWD’s
service area has direct access to the rebates through a web site.
MWD provides the rebates summarized in table 28, but wholesalers and retailers can
supplement with additional funds to tailor the programs to their service area.
Table 28. Residential rebates as of 7/1/2012
Item Rebate Actual cost of the
device
Weather-Based Irrigation Controller – under 1 acre $80 From $200 to $1,500
Weather-Based Irrigation Controller – 1 acre or larger $25 per station
Rotating Nozzles for pop-up spray head retrofits $4 Minimum 15 per
application
From $5.5 to $11.50
High Efficiency Clothes Washer – (Water Factor ≤ 4.0) $85 From $ 500 to $2,000
Source: MWD 2012c
The focus of Southern California consumers however, has not yet shifted. Rebates for
indoor fixtures are still the most requested. High efficiency washers, rather than toilets, have
become the item of choice. In 2010 – 2011 MWD has decided to stop offering rebates for toilets
at the regional scale and is now offering rebates for washing machines, for rotary nozzles and for
WBICs (Tab. 29).
Table 29. Residential rebates from 2008-2009 to 2010-2011
Item 2008-2009 2009-2010 2010-2011 Total
Toilets 19,721 16,056 35,777
Toilet Upgrade (1.6 gpf to 1.28 gpf) 336 381 717
Clothes Washers 30,474 20,974 61,087 112,535
Rotating Nozzles 1,002 1,543 1,141 3,686
WBIC 525 655 819 1,999
Synthetic turf 1,880 923 2,803
Source: MWD 2009c 2010g, 2011f
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In the last three years the total contribution to the residential program has amounted to
$27.8 million (about $9 million per year). MWD has contributed 59% of the resources: $16.4
million ($5.5 million per year) and the member agencies have paid $ 11.4 million ($3.5 million
per year).
While the regional rebates program are directed to water retail customers, other incentive
programs are available to the member agencies on an ad hoc basis. As summarized in table 18
member agencies receive financial support if they want to implement a HET program, or if they
want to launch a water usage survey campaign. They also receive support for a range of outdoor
irrigation evaluations both for residential and non residential customers. Funds are also available
for customized projects targeted to specific water intensive customers.
Table 30. Incentives for water conservation programs for member agencies as of 7/1/2012
Item Incentive
Residential Irrigation Evaluation (without irrigation timer) $8 (per evaluation)
Residential Irrigation Evaluation (with irrigation timer) $18 (per evaluation)
Single-Family Indoor Survey $12.50 (per survey)
Residential High-Efficiency Toilet – Single and Multifamily $50 (per toilet)
Commercial Landscape Survey $200 per acre
Water Use Accountability $3.50 per acre per month
Rotating Nozzles for pop-up spray head retrofits $4 Up to cost of device plus project
administrative costs
Industrial Improvement and Large Landscape Projects $150 per AF of Estimated water savings or
$195 per AF of Measured water savings
Customized Projects $195 per AF of water saved
Turf Removal $0.30 per square foot
Incentives Eligible in Agricultural Conservation Program
Agricultural Projects $195 per AF
Incentives Eligible in Pay for Performance Contracts
Industrial Improvement and Large Landscape Projects $150 per AF of Estimated water savings or
$195 per AF of Measured water savings
Source: MWD 2012c
Member agencies that take advantage of these programs still use the conservation credits.
MWD’s Long-Term Conservation Plan and Revised Policy Principles on Water Conservation
Since the early 2000 MWD framed its water conservation strategies in a broader
conservation plan. The last version of this document has been approved in 2011(MWD 2011c).
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For MWD, like for all the water agencies, the 20% water reduction by year 2020
mandated by SBx7-7 (Steinberg, Chapter 4, Statutes of 2009) was a reminder that, although a
considerable voluntary attempt had been made to reduce water usage, a much more intense effort
needs to be done to guarantee water reliability while facing uncertainties about future water
supply and about the effects of climate change. In addition, MWD’s Regional Urban Water
Management Plan (RUWMP) (MWD 2010f) and its IRP (MWD 2010c) call for much larger
water savings than those required by SBx7-7. The agency realized that to comply with the
mandate a much more structured water conservation program is needed and designed the Long
Term Conservation Plan (LTP) whose objectives can be summarized as follows:
1. Achieve the 2010 IRP Update conservation target (MWD 2010c), that is lower (141
gpcpd) than the SBx7-7 mandate (145 gpcpd).
2. Increase the diffusion of advanced technologies in water conservation, by testing new
technologies and by establishing new mandates.
3. Transform consumers’ behavior through increased awareness of the value of water in
Southern California.
The plan, however, is rather generic and, while identifying strategies and objectives, does
not connect them to a specific financial commitment and to specific benchmarks for evaluation.
The LTP identifies five strategies that will inspire the development of new programs and
their implementation. According to MWD, the district and its member agencies should act as
catalyst of market transformation through “strategic alliances, outreach and education, codes and
standards, retail rate structures, and device and performance-based incentives” (MWD 2011c, 2).
The plan envisions more collaboration with manufacturers, retailers, and contractors; it supports
the use of conservation based retail rate structures, and calls for a larger role of MWD and its
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member agencies in influencing state and federal policies when they establish water efficiency
standards.
To achieve its goals, it recommends more research and creativity in using outreach and
communication instruments and more collaboration with other water quality and water supply
agencies. It also stresses the importance of information sharing among member agencies and, at
the same time, with a wide range of stakeholders, from the power companies to environmental
groups.
To implement its strategies, the agency should pursue its “traditional” incentives
programs, but should also add “strategic focus programs” that should accelerate the market
adoption of new technologies and experiment interagency collaboration (MWD 2011c, 8).
The plan also acknowledges the need for research in different fields, from techniques to
monitor the plan implementation and assess its performance, to tools to induce behavioral
change, to research on the effects of climate change on water supply.
MWD Water Conservation Budget
Funding for MWD’s water conservation rebate programs comes from different sources.
Until 2003 conservation programs were funded by MWD’s general revenues, but since 2003,
with the implementation of the new rate structure, $43 per AF of water sold to the member
agencies is earmarked for water stewardship programs. In addition, MWD competes for grants
from DWR and from the USBR.
Since 2000 the budget for rebate programs has hovered around 1% of MWD’s budget
(Fig. 21).
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Figure 21. MWD’s budget for water conservation rebate programs
Source: MWD 2001a, 2002b, 2003a, 2004a, 2005a, 2006a, 2007a, 2008b, 2009a, 2010b, 2011b, 2012b
In the early 2000, the budget for water conservation rebates ranged between$11 and $18
million a year, peaking in 2003-2004, as a reaction to the 1999 – 2002 drought, and reaching its
lowest point in fiscal year 2006-2007. Since 2010 it has been set between $19 and $20 million a
year. Until 2008-2009 conservation programs were run on a “pay as you go” basis. MWD’s
board would set a budget, but the programs were funded even if the demand for rebates was
higher than expected. In 2008-2009 the Department’s revenue dropped significantly, as a
consequence of the recession, of the effort to reduce water usage at the peak of a drought and of
the uncertainty regarding water supplies from Northern California. At the same time, as a
reaction to the drought and to the uncertainty, MWD’s member agencies increased their effort to
reach customers with rebate programs and the customer responded. In addition, plumbing
companies realized that the rebate offered by MWD was very convenient and added increasing
pressure to the programs. As a consequence, the demand for rebates spiked and MWD’s board
doubled the funds initially budgeted for the conservation program. The following years, the
board monitored the program more closely and capped the funding. Now the rebates have a
reservation process that warns the district in advance if the requests top the budget and is
distributed on a “first come – first serve” basis.
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Relations between MWD and its Member Agencies
When MWD launched its first conservation programs, member agencies were responsible
for initiating programs in their service area, Metropolitan provided funding, but did not act
directly. At that time toilet substitution was the core program and water conservation was
voluntary. When MWD decided to support water conservation in the CII sector, the variety of
issues was too wide to be addressed by member agencies, therefore MWD engineered a regional
program that could be outsourced and controlled. Later on, when the range of residential
programs became wider and the approach of the member agencies grew uneven, it became
difficult to have a coherent strategy. Moreover, the introduction of the new rate structure made
all member agencies more aware that the conservation budget was correlated to their own water
purchases and raised the issue of how the stewardship component of the water rate was
redistributed to each member agency. In fact, smaller agencies did not have enough resources to
initiate programs, while larger member agencies were using up most of the resources. MWD
took control of the programs in its own hand, and instituted regional programs also for residential
customers. By contracting the actual issue of the rebates to an external agent MWD reduced the
administrative costs of the programs and put the member agencies on a more even keel. Every
member agency and every retailer can add resources to the existing regional program, but every
agency is spared the organizational burden of setting up a program. At the same time, agencies
with more resources and more initiative can design their own programs and fund them with their
resources. Common to all the agencies is the effort to market the programs to their customers.
Finally, more recently, responding to the requests that member agencies whose customers
did not take advantage of the regional rebates, MWD has diversified the funding mechanism. It
still retains control over the regional programs, where member agencies and other retailers can
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provide supplemental funding, but allocates about half of its conservation budget to the
individual member agencies that can develop their own conservation programs, aimed at the
specific profile of their service area.
The relationship with the member agencies, however, has not become less intense. Member
agencies participate to different Program Action Committees (PAC) that strategize about water
saving devices to be tested through pilot programs and decide which devices become
“mainstream” and should be included in the regional programs.
MWD water conservation staff also meets monthly with member agencies’ and retailers
conservation coordinators to keep them updated on its legislative efforts, on the research on
water conservation technologies and marketing techniques and MWD’s board decisions.
Wholesalers as engine of water conservation
Wholesalers have been involved in conservation programs since their inception. The
evolution of their water use efficiency programs is intertwined with MWD’s strategic decisions,
but each wholesaler has adapted them to the characteristics of the local climate, of the housing
stock and of the local economy.
All wholesalers participate to MWD’s programs and manage their own information and
education outreach activities, but their attitude towards water conservation differs along many
dimensions. In the following paragraphs I will analyze it through the following dimensions:
• their participation to the MWD’s programs with additional funding;
• the way they fund the programs and their access to funding from organizations different
from MWD;
• their involvement with the retail agencies they serve; and
• how strategic conservation is in their future planning.
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Wholesalers’ Participation to MWD’s Programs
All the wholesalers participate to MWD’s regional programs and the retail customers in
their service area are eligible to the rebates offered by MWD
36
. Only SDCWA and Western
MWD have decided to invest their resources in different programs and don’t add supplemental
funding to the residential and non-residential rebate programs. The other 9 wholesalers
supplement MWD’s rebates with their own funding. Three Valleys MWD and Calleguas MWD
supplement only the residential program, USGVMWD and Central Basin MWC supplement only
the CII rebates, while the rest provide additional funding to both programs (Tab. 31).
Table 31. Wholesalers’ contribution to MWD’s programs
Agency
Local Funds added to Regional
Incentives
Residential CII
Calleguas MWD Yes No
Central Basin MWD No Yes
Eastern MWD Yes Yes
Foothill MWD Yes Yes
Inland Empire Utilities Agency Yes Yes
MWD Orange County Yes Yes
San Diego County Water Authority No No
Three Valleys MWD Yes No
Upper San Gabriel Basin MWD No Yes
West Basin MWD Yes Yes
Western MWD No No
Source: MWD 2010d, 5
MWD provides data about the amount of resources the wholesalers invested into the non
residential program between FY 2004-2005 and 2010-2011 (MWD 2010d, 5). In that time frame,
customers in the wholesalers’ service area have received about 52% of the non-residential
rebates issued by the program, but wholesalers have contributed with 6% of the resources (Fig.
22).
36
In 2011 MWD’s board discussed whether to terminate the agreement about the regional rebate programs between
MWD and SDCWA, and approved a motion to continue to provide rebates for all the customers SDCWA service
area.
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Figure 22. Financial contributions to the CII rebates program
Source: MWD 2005c, 2006b, 2007c, 2008c, 2009b, 2010e, 2011e
This does not mean that wholesalers have taken advantage of the contributions of other
member agencies, but rather that customers in wholesalers’ service area have received smaller
rebates.
The amount of the wholesalers’ add-on is up the wholesaler’s board and its range of can
be wide: supplemental funds can double or triple MWD’s base contribution. Until 2010 MWD’s
reports have not included information about the amount of resources that MWD has deployed in
each member agency’s service area, however, in 2010 – 2011 we know that wholesalers’ funds
constitute only 30% of the total amount of rebates delivered in the wholesalers’ service area.
Wholesalers have contributed a total $3.7 million ($532,000 a year) to the $63 million
program, with big differences between agencies that have added resources consistently
throughout the 6 years and agencies that have done it sporadically (Fig. 23).
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Figure 23. Wholesalers’ funding of CII rebates
Source: MWD 2005c, 2006b, 2007c, 2008c, 2009b, 2010e, 2011e
The distribution of the rebates is similar to the distribution of the resources added to the
basic MWD program (Fig. 24).

Figure 24. Distribution of the CII rebates in the wholesalers’ service areas
Source: MWD 2005c, 2006b, 2007c, 2008c, 2009b, 2010e, 2011e
MWD of Orange County and Eastern MWD have leveraged MWD’s funds to finance a
wide number of outdoor water efficiency projects, IEUA has supported a large multifamily
retrofit program, while in Central and Western Basin and USGVMWD the rebates have been
used to retrofit plumbing and indoor devices.
MWD’s reports do not break down the individual agency’s contribution to the regional
residential program. The available reports relate that customers in the wholesalers’ service area
received about $16 million worth of rebates (about 54% of the total resources provided by MWD
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and its member agencies) and had access to about 114,000 rebates (about 74% of the total),
mainly concentrated in SDCWA’s and MWDOC’s service areas (Fig. 24 and Fig. 25).

Figure 25. Distribution of residential rebates in the wholesalers’ service area from FY 2008-2009 to
FY 2010-2011 (dollars)
Source: 2009c 2010g, 2011f

Figure 26. Distribution of residential rebates in the wholesalers’ service area from FY 2008-2009 to
FY 2010-2011 (number of rebates)
Source: MWD 2009c 2010g, 2011f

Wholesalers’ Funding from External Sources
Wholesalers fund the conservation effort with their own resources and with grants from
MWD, from DWR and from the USBR. Most wholesalers draw “in house” resources from their
general fund. As explained in Chapter 1 wholesalers apply a surcharge to the price they pay for
water and the revenues are placed in a general fund. The board decides annually how the funds
are allocated based on staff’s requests and the amount of funding dedicated to conservation is set
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yearly. Only two wholesalers have decided to fund water conservation by earmarking a fixed
part of their revenues for conservation. Calleguas MWD reserves $1 for every AF of water sold
(decision however reversed in 2011) and IEUA $4 (out of $12).
Most wholesalers also receive grants from DWR and USBR. Only Foothills MWD, Three
Valleys and Calleguas have not been awarded external resources recently. Usually agencies
leverage MWD and their own funding to apply for matching grants and fund initiatives such as
direct install of HET or HEW, the evaluation of programs (MWDOC is installing WBICs and
evaluating the results), pilot projects to support water use efficiency (SDCWA has funded a pilot
project to design and install software to implement budget billing) and to accelerate the adoption
of water efficient fixtures (Central Basin has used external funding to increase the rebates offered
by MWD and to support local cities to install water efficient plumbing and irrigation controllers,
West Basin is implementing a program that includes water survey and free installation of
WBICs) (Table 32).
Table 32. Wholesalers funded by external agencies
Agency Grant-funded Programs
Calleguas MWD No
Central Basin MWD DWR and DOE
Eastern MWD DWR
Foothill MWD No
IEUA USBR and DWR
MWD Orange County USBR, DWR and SWRCB
SDCWA USBR, DWR, SDG&E and Margaret Doe Charitable
Trust
Three Valleys MWD No
Upper San Gabriel Basin MWD USBR, DWR and CALFED
West Basin MWD USBR and DWR
Western MWD n.a.
Source: MWD, 2010, 5d

Wholesalers’ Involvement with the Retail Agencies
The relationship between retailers and wholesalers is dictated by the nature of the
organization, by the characteristics of the retailers and by historical factors.
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Excluding the case of SDCWA, where retailers are member agencies represented in the
board of directors and have a say in every strategic decision of the agency, retailers are not
formally involved in the decision making process of wholesalers and their rapport could be
limited to the sole commercial transaction of buying water. In reality, wholesalers are in constant
contact with retailers and to a certain extent coordinate their actions and represent them.
For water conservation, many wholesalers have taken a strong leadership. It is the case of
IEUA, that pays 50% of the CUWCC dues for its retailers, has promoted a regional alliance to
meet the targets of SBx7 7, has designed a conservation business plan, provides funding to the
retailers for information campaigns and provides them services like running their programs if
they don’t have the administrative capacity. It is as well the case of MWDOC, that has also
promoted a regional alliance to meet the targets of SBx7 7, provides resources to the retailers
that can organize their own conservation programs and has drafted a model water conservation
ordinance to help its retailers to manage water shortages. It is the case of West Basin MWD and
Central Basin MWD, both initiators of regional alliances and promoters of strong collaboration
with retailers through local water efficiency plans.
Others have a lesser degree of involvement with the retailers, either because they are
themselves retailers (Western MWD) or because the retailers in their service area are very small
(USGVMWD). A lesser involvement, however, does not mean lack of leadership: they have
produced water use efficiency plans, model landscape water use efficiency ordinances and
provide strong technical support for the implementation of conservation programs, information
campaigns and education.
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The smaller wholesalers focus more on information dissemination and education. They
do support retailers in case they intend to promote water conservation programs, but they are
seldom the initiators (Tab. 33).
180

Table 33. Summary of wholesalers’ water conservation activities
Wholesaler Residential CII
Support to
customer agencies Information Education
Funding and
grants
Relations with
other entities
Calleguas
MWD
Participates to
regional
program and
supplements
funding for all
fixtures
Participates to
regional program, no
supplemental funding
Regional programs
only
Information
campaign
Class
presentations and
distribution of
MWD’s
educational
programs
$1.00 every AF
of water sold.
Discontinued in
summer 2011

Central Basin
MWD
Participates to
regional
program, free
HET
distribution
and direct
install program
Participates to
regional program,
provides
supplemental funding,
supports cities in
water friendly make
over, free water
brooms distribution
Water waste task
force, SBx 7 7
regional alliance;
Partners with
private companies
for direct install
program.
Demonstration
garden
Landscape
workshops,
school programs
Grants from
DWR and DOE

Eastern MWD Participates to
regional
program,
supplemental
funding for
HEW
Participates to
regional program and
provides
supplemental funding
Provides GIS
mapping and
training for sub-
agencies
Demonstration
garden
Landscape and
irrigation
specialist
workshops,
classroom
presentations;
conservation kits
to school children
Grants from
USBR
Landscaping
competition and
Inland Empire
Garden Friendly
initiative with
with IEUA and
Western MWD.
Foothill MWD Participates to
regional
program,
supplemental
funding for
WBIC
Participates to
regional program, no
supplemental funding
California
friendly landscape
training, Student
art contest

181

Table 33. Summary of wholesalers’ water conservation activities (continued)
Wholesaler Residential CII
Support to
customer agencies Information Education
Funding and
grants
Relations with
other entities
Inland Empire
Utilities
Agency
Participates to
regional
program, co-
pay HET
replacement
program
Participates to
regional program and
provides
supplemental funding
Pays 50% of
CUWCC dues for
sub-agencies,
regional alliance
provides resources
to sub-agencies for
local info
campaigns, runs
programs for
retailers
Water
conservation
garden
Member of
WeWac, provides
education to
teachers
$4 per AF of
water sold and
readiness to
serve charge
funds
conservation;
DWR grants
Landscaping
competition and
Inland Empire
Garden Friendly
initiative with
with IEUA and
Western MWD.
Collaboration
with Water
Conservation
District
MWD of
Orange County
Participates to
regional
program
Supplemental
funding for
landscape
Post WBIC
installation
verification
program,
Water Smart
Landscape
Program
Participates to
regional program and
provides
supplemental funding;
Water Smart Hotel
Program; pay per
performance program
Provides sub-
agencies with
funding; studied
budget rates for a
number of sub
agencies; promotes
SBx7 7 regional
alliance
Model water
conservation and
model landscape
ordinances; meets
regularly with sub
agencies
O.C. Water
Hero Program,
Water Advisory
committee of
Orange County;
trips to water
facilities
California
friendly landscape
training, both for
residential
customers and
professionals,
Children water
education festival,
poster and slogan
contest; school
programs with
Discovery Center
Grants from
USBR and
SWRCB
Collaboration
with Mission
Resource
Conservation
District
San Diego
County Water
Authority
Own vouchers
for HET and
HEW until
2008, now
participates to
regional
program
funding for
landscape audit
Participates to
regional program and
provides
supplemental funding
Collaboration with
member agencies
on specific
programs (water
budgets);
Meets regularly
with sub agencies
Water
conservation
garden; 20
gallon challenge
campaign,
surveys,
branding;
developing
relationships
with local
associations
Landscape auditor
internship
program, school
programs,
programs for
teachers
Grants from
USBR and
DWR
Collaborates with
SDG&E;
collaborates with
landscape
industry

182

Table 32. Summary of wholesalers’ water conservation activities (continued)
Wholesaler Residential CII
Support to
customer agencies Information Education
Funding and
grants
Relations with
other entities
Three Valleys
MWD
Participates to
regional
programs,
supplemental
funding for
WBIC
Participates to
regional program no
supplemental funding
Administrative
support to sub-
agencies. Meets
quarterly with sub
agencies
Newsletter,
inserts in bills,
poster contest
Member of
WeWac. Training
for landscapers,
provides school
programs.

Upper San
Gabriel Valley
MWD
Participates to
regional
programs, no
supplemental
funding
Participates to
regional program and
provides
supplemental funding.
Synthetic Turf Grant
School Program
Provides technical
support by
conducting
workshops for
various water
conservation
programs.
Brochures and
posters, oral
presentations,
and workshops,
paid advertising,
press releases,
news ads, media
events, and
through the
Speaker's
Bureau
Water festival,
water awareness
art contest, t-shirt
contest. Provides
MWD’s
educational
programs
Grants from
USBR, DWR
and CALFED

West Basin
MWD
Participates to
regional
programs, no
supplemental
funding.
Multifamily
HET direct
install
program. Free
audits for large
landscape. Free
WBIC and
landscape
audits
Participates to
regional program and
provides
supplemental funding.
Free audits for food
service facilities
Collaboration with
individual sub
agencies on specific
programs, promotes
SBx7 7 regional
alliance
Speakers
Bureau,
Imported Water
Supply Tours,
Water Harvest
Festival, Smart
Landscape
Expo, Tours, ,
New Native
Plant
Demonstration
Gardens,
California
Water
Awareness
Campaign
Water saving kits
distributed to
school children,
landscape training
for professionals,
student art contest
Ocean Friendly
Garden Classes

Grants from
DWR and
USBR
Collaborates with
South Bay
Association of
Governments,
WRD and
Surfrider
Foundation

183

Table 33. Summary of wholesalers’ water conservation activities (continued)
Wholesaler Residential CII
Support to
customer agencies Information Education
Funding and
grants
Relations with
other entities
Western MWD Participates to
regional
programs, no
supplemental
funding. HET
direct install
program.
Participates to
regional programs, no
supplemental funding.
Partners directly
with sub-agencies
on specific
programs.
Participated to a
county task force
developing a
landscape water use
efficiency
ordinance adopted
by local cities.
Pays for 50% of all
retailers’ CUWCC
membership dues.
Press releases
for events,
newsletter,
speakers’
bureau, student
art contest
Training for
landscape
irrigation,
conservation
garden
Landscaping
competition and
Inland Empire
Garden Friendly
initiative with
IEUA and Eastern
MWD.
Collaborates with
County task force
184

Role of Water Conservation in Planning Future Water Supply
Although they every wholesaler participates to the regional programs and each one is
committed to meet the 20 x 2020 targets, they have different attitudes towards water
conservation and its role in the future.
As a group they don’t acknowledge that in order to balance water demand and supply by
2020, conservation measures that go well beyond the requirements of SBx 7-7 will be needed.
Their UWMPs summarize the results of their past demand management programs and list their
accomplishments, but, when discussing of the future of water supply most of them rely on
MWD’s projections, but do not recognize that MWD’s RUWMP and IRP underline that the
amount of water conserved under SBx 7-7 is not enough to guarantee a reliable supply.
Six out of eleven have taken concrete steps to bound conservation commitments to some
kind of measurement.
Eastern MWD has pledged to reduce water usage more than the state requirement and
promises to reduce outdoor water usage by 30% and indoor water usage by 10% by 2035.
A small group, formed by Central Basin MWD, West Basin MWD, IEUA, USGVMWD
and MWDOC have made the effort of measuring their water conservation potential and to design
a plan that will guide them in reaching the 20 by 2020 goals.
On the other hand, SDCWA is even skeptical that water efficiency will go beyond a 20%
reduction by 2020 and claims that due to “demand hardening” in the future it will become harder
and harder to achieve results from additional conservation programs and the others assume that
SBx7 7 targets will be met and do not make any specific plan to reach them, nor any estimate of
how many resources will be needed.
185

PART 3
ANALYSIS AND EVALUATION OF WATER CONSERVATION
STRATEGIES IN SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA

186

TABLE OF CONTENTS
WATER CONSERVATION THROUGH THE WORDS OF THE WATER AGENCIES....... 187
The Evolution of Water Conservation: from Low Flow Showerheads Distribution to Water
Audits .................................................................................................................................. 187
Successful Conservation Strategies: How to “Get the Best Bang for your Buck” ............. 190
Has there ever Been an Unsuccessful Conservation Program? .......................................... 193
The Perceived Hurdles for Water Conservation ................................................................. 195
Funding, Governance and Collaboration ............................................................................ 199
Collaboration between MWD and its Member Agencies ............................................... 199
Collaboration among Wholesalers .................................................................................. 203
Collaboration between Wholesalers and Retail Water Agencies ................................... 204
Collaboration between Wholesalers, Retailers and other Agencies ............................... 207
The Future of Water Conservation ..................................................................................... 210
Conclusion .......................................................................................................................... 212
Discussion ........................................................................................................................... 214

WATER CONSERVATION THROUGH THE WORDS OF THE WATER
AGENCIES

The Evolution of Water Conservation: from Low Flow Showerheads Distribution to Water
Audits
All the organizations interviewed for this research are in some way committed to water
conservation. Even watermasters that do not have direct relations with retail customers either
contribute to wholesalers’ water conservation efforts by providing resources or directly fostering
conservation by organizing gardening training.
All the subjects interviewed for this research agree on the history of water conservation in
Southern California. They share the same persuasion that the drought between 1986 and 1992
was a turning point for water conservation. In 1991, the debate on how State water resources
were being used by agricultural and urban users, by Northern California and by Southern
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California users, urged the foundation of the California Urban Water Conservation Council that
devised 14 Best Management Practices aimed at improving the water conservation effort of
urban users and have been the backbone of conservation strategies since.
MWD was deeply involved in the debate. Its conservation department was embedded in
the State Water Project division and was invested with proving to the State that Southern
California was using imported water resources wisely. As one of the conservation programs
officers explains:
“At the time we were threatened with the possibility of significant regulation and
legislation to mandate forms of conservation very similar to the way that the
California Public Utilities Commission regulates energy efficiency. But we,
along with several other water agencies, met in cooperation with a number of
public interest organizations, the Natural Resources Defense Council, Sierra
Club, Heal the Bay, the League of Women Voters and others to form the
California Urban Water Conservation Council because at the time nobody knew
what to do.”
MWD was one of the promoters of the CUWCC, as well as most of its member agencies
(wholesalers and cities) and two of the largest Investors Owned Utilities (IOU) in Southern
California. Most of the interviewees agree that from the early 1990s on water conservation
efforts became more structured and more consistent. As previously described, indoor water usage
was heavily targeted. Low flow devices distribution and toilet replacement programs constituted
the bulk of the conservation effort coming from MWD. Other initiatives were launched al local
levels, such as budget based rates, relevant investments on infrastructure maintenance, watershed
maintenance to protect groundwater and local ordinances that mandated the substitution of old
bathroom fixtures with new, less water intensive devices. Only at the end of the 1990s devices
that targeted commercial customers and outdoor water usage became widely available and
became part of the water conservation effort. In addition, agreement among federal, state and
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stakeholder representatives negotiating the CALFED Bay-Delta Program Record of Decision
provided unprecedented funding.
The 2007-2009 drought and the 2008-2010 recession highlighted some problems of the
existing conservation programs and transformed some of the agencies’ approach. During the
2007 – 2009 drought, MWD rationed imported water and increased its rates. Many member
agencies also rationed water and the public became abruptly aware of how precarious Southern
California water supply is. The demand for rebates for water saving devices increased rapidly,
while MWD did not have the tools to predict and control the amount of resources needed for its
conservation programs. As a consequence, MWD was forced to shut down some of its programs
and to restructure them while member agencies started looking for additional funding from
different sources, such as the California Department of Water Resources (DWR) and the Bureau
of Reclamation (USBR). At the same time it became clear that the shift from indoor to outdoor
water conservation had not produced the expected results and that the distribution of weather
based irrigation controllers (WBIC) was not reducing water usage as much as the toilet
distribution programs had. In addition, while water restrictions were enacted throughout the
region, foreclosures and the economic recession were reducing residential and commercial water
usage, leading to relevant declines of water sales and water agencies’ revenues.
Some agencies were prepared for the drop in water sales, but for others it meant halting
their conservation programs and rethinking the scope of these programs. The unanimous result of
this transition is a different relationship with customers and a more careful planning of
conservation programs. Wholesalers and retailers unanimous agree that indoor residential water
conservation programs have been successful and that in many areas, especially in areas
developed after the 1990s, have saturated the market. To attain the same results with commercial
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customers and outdoor water conservation, they all concur, requires a different, more targeted
approach. Outdoor water conservation, they claim, requires customers to change their behavior:
more attention to irrigation controllers and their schedule, different plants choices for their
landscape, active monitoring of water usage and more personalized relationship with the water
agency. It means to be concerned about water usage rather than taking unlimited supply of cheap
water for granted. For many agencies, the tool of choice to accelerate this behavioral change is
the water audit. Often agencies target specifically their largest users, survey individual
households’ water usage and provide a list of water saving suggestions, the access to rebates or
other funding mechanisms for the installation of WBICs, instructions on how to program the new
controller and continuous monitoring of water usage.
Successful Conservation Strategies: How to “Get the Best Bang for your Buck”
There is a general consensus among conservation coordinators at all levels and in every
institutional setting that there is no a single optimal conservation strategy. Certainly, SBx 7-7,
with the mandate of reducing water usage by 20% by 2020, has been a crucial wake up call, that
has raised the attention of public and private administrators on water conservation, but in terms
of strategies that water agencies can use to reach their conservation targets, only a mix of actions
that include ordinances, public outreach, price signals and rebates is considered the most
effective way to improve water conservation. “Effectiveness is about being fluid, because you
will have to constantly change the tools that you’re using once you saturate your area with the
easiest ones” is a comment from one of the conservation coordinator, subscribed by all the
others.
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The characteristics of the organizations, their size and their position in the Southern
California water conservation system, however, influence the perception of the effectiveness of
individual conservation strategies.
Larger water wholesalers are well aware that plumbing codes and standardization of
water using fixtures are important and have made the difference throughout the years. They
claim that the rebates on water saving devices per se do not extensively affect water usage, but
play two important roles, one more technical and one more promotional. They are a testing
ground for equipment that eventually will be standardized and included in plumbing codes. “As
things go, we’re able to move things into regulation and into standards very quickly. One of the
unbelievably fast conversions was […] the pre-rinse spray valve. And we converted that from a
concept to a federal plumbing standard in about three or four years. That’s unbelievable market
transformation. So, the fact is we are always looking to transform the market such that we don’t
have to spend our money endlessly on an incentive” is the exemplary explanation of one of the
wholesalers. Rebates on devices are also a part of a “soft policy” strategy, made of leading by
example, educating and exhorting consumers to use water more efficiently. Proving to customers
that devices that reduce water usage are cost-effective and supporting their penetration in the
market is very important.
Cities, both small and large, concur that ordinances are a big part of the conservation
effort, both in time of drought and in normal years. In time of drought, they have an immediate,
controllable and enforceable effect. In normal years they can accelerate the penetration of
technological advances. The mandate to retrofit homes with high efficiency toilets (HET) before
they go in escrow or to install water saving devices within a certain amount of time are both
relevant for Los Angeles (a large retailer) and Manhattan Beach (a small retailer).
191

Special districts, since they do not have the regulatory powers that cities have, count on
pricing. Many conservation coordinators think that rates are a very important component of
water conservation practices and that through appropriate water rating schemes it is possible to
achieve water conservation targets without jeopardizing the agency’s revenues. Special districts
put emphasis on the power of budget based rates to reduce water usage, while keeping revenues
predictable and collecting resources to implement conservation programs. They also specify that
the board’s support is crucial in policy implementation and only if an agency’s board is
committed to water conservation will the staff be highly motivated.
Private utilities, also lacking the regulatory power that cities have, underscore the
importance of rates and point out the link between water pricing and rebates. “Only when we
increased our water rates, our rebates on water saving devices or the adoption of water friendly
outdoor habits became more attractive to our customers” comments one of the IOU’s
representatives.
Other strategies have been mentioned as successful, but not as consistently as ordinances
and pricing. Not many have mentioned the need for infrastructure maintenance that is in fact one
of the unspoken issues of water conservation. According to the CUWCC an efficient water
system should leak less than 10% of its total supply and most agencies in SoCal are within that
limit, nevertheless, by replacing old water lines it is possible to achieve considerable savings.
The direct experience of the conservation coordinators provides some clues on how the
way conservation programs are implemented makes a difference. There is wide agreement that
targeting high volume customers and going where the high savings are is a successful strategy.
Especially to promote outdoor water conservation, many agencies rank their higher using
customers, target them with mailings proposing free on site water use evaluation, propose
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adjustments and offer rebates and monitoring. Some agencies find that the upfront cost of
installing WBICs is too high and offer to pay the cost of a new irrigation controller upfront and
to offer their customers the possibility of repaying the investment over time.
There is however disagreement over the practice of providing the toilet and hiring and
paying a contractor to install the device in the customer’s home (direct install). Some districts try
to stay away from it, because it increases their liability, others, including privately owned
utilities have implemented successful direct install programs in multi-family housing.
There is also no unanimous standing on education and outreach. Although education
programs directed at teachers and students and outreach programs directed at customers are
practiced by all the agencies interviewed for this research, some coordinators see it as the
fundamental tool to change customers’ behaviors, while others perceive it only as short lived and
doubt its cost effectiveness. “A device that is plugand-play, without education about where our
water comes from and how uncertain is our supply, does not really change the customers’
attitude“, is the vision of one of the wholesaler. “The contact with the customer is gold! They
might not be ready today to do something with their landscape, but they may be ready to do
something indoors. That is the basis, the foundation of providing services to customers” adds
another. On the other hand, a conservation coordinator comments that “The effects of education
are only temporary; you need to constantly renew the message”.
Has there ever Been an Unsuccessful Conservation Program?
It is difficult to find a conservation coordinator that admits a program really went wrong.
“We plan our programs pretty carefully, before we implement them” is the response of most of
the coordinators and board members throughout the spectrum of agencies interviewed for this
research. Generally, if a program does not perform as expected, agencies claim they transform
193

the failure in a good opportunity to learn, to tweak the program, to change the course. All in all,
the organizations seem quite resilient and adaptable, maybe because conservation is a very
marginal part of their activities (less than 1% of their budgets). However, another explanation of
the reluctance to admit failure could reside in the nature of the interview process: the
interviewees do not want “to look bad” or to denigrate their organization with an outsider.
Some of the coordinators point to the obvious limitations of some of the conservation
strategies. They claim that rebates only go to a very small fraction of the customer base,
generally those who are already sensitive to the conservation message. Others feel that the effect
of pricing alone generally wanes over time and is not really predictable, unless customers are
assigned a budget and steep pricing increases in the higher tiers.
One of the coordinators is concerned with the cost effectiveness of high efficiency
washers: “There is only one washer per family and I think that with high efficiency washers
people use their machine more often, there is no restrain in washing just one item at the time
instead of optimizing the load. The machines, on the other hand, are expensive and in order to
make the program attractive the rebates have become too large”, he claims.
Others explain what their organization has learned from programs that have not worked
as expected. As an example, large rebates programs at a certain point have “run wild”, in the
words of one of the coordinators, and the implementing agency was not able to control them,
going over budget unexpectedly. This has led to better accounting, more strict regulation of the
relationship with third parties and to more bureaucratic control over spending practices.
The insufficient results of WBICs rebates have led more awareness on customers’
attitude and have convinced water agencies that single family households need to be audited,
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supported and educated to install and use WBICs and possibly monitored for quite some time to
give them feedback and understand their behaviors better.
Self-administered programs have also had negative results. The distribution of devices
without verification has led to serious embezzlement problems, noncompliance and waste of
resources. A conservation coordinator remembers what occurred in the late ‘90s in a water
agency when a project manager confessed he had submitted false invoices for rebates on water
conservation equipment that had never been installed (Gottlieb 1998). A coordinator’s
observation about showerheads is exemplary: “we know that a whole bunch of those
showerheads that we gave away were just sitting on somebody’s shelf and never installed
because they didn’t have any stake in it”. The complaint is echoed by another coordinator’s
assessment that outdoor water conservation kits that were distributed to the district’s customers
and required feed-back were not successful.
The Perceived Hurdles for Water Conservation
As illustrated above, the perception of the most effective conservation strategy is
different for cities, special districts and IOUs. The perception of what makes conservation
difficult to implement is different for large and small organizations.
Small cities lament the lack of involvement of the political leadership “Government
officials don’t put it as a priority, citizens are not involved. For the majority of local politicians
water conservation and resources stewardship is not a priority.” This complaint is shared also by
some wholesalers. Their coordinators point out that the organizational culture of some agencies
is anchored on water production and distribution and the idea of reducing sales does not really
resonate with board members and city councils. “Our board supports water conservation, but is
really concentrated on water recycling”, points out one of them. A particularly critical
195

coordinator has also points out that the emphasis MWD puts on infrastructural projects is
detrimental to water conservation and does not send a clear message about priorities to the
member agencies and to the retailers.
Lack of resources and qualified staff is also mentioned as an important constraint that,
together with the public’s apathy and lack of awareness, takes a toll especially on conservation
specialists of smaller retailers. “It is only me, and I’m doing waste collection, energy savings and
water conservation”, “We have not yet understood how to reach the vast majority of our
customers”, “It is a daily grind, I have to fight with the public, that is not interested, with my
colleagues, and with council members that don’t have [conservation] as a priority” are the
comments of the small cities’ representatives. A wholesaler’s conservation coordinator that sees
things from the outside comments: “small cities have the ordinances, but do not have the
resources to enforce mandates, only a small part of the population abides by them”. Wholesalers
also comment that retailers, especially small cities, don’t have a strategic perspective on their
water supply and on their rates. When water usage goes down they tend to reduce water
conservation efforts and don’t have the capacity to manage demand’s volatility and long term
investments.
Budget issues, on the other hand, have been a problem for large and small organizations.
When revenues started to drop due to the effects of water rationing and of the economic
recession many organizations had to reduce their investments in conservation and reduce
personnel, the State halted grant disbursement and the programs were put on hold right in the
middle of a three year drought.
Larger retailers and the majority of wholesalers agree that some intrinsic characteristics
of the programs are very good on paper but problematic in practice. Pricing, reducing outdoor
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irrigation and conservation programs aimed at commercial customers are considered particularly
problematic. Some coordinators underscore that pricing strategies are unpopular and, especially
in times of elections, elected officials are very reluctant to adopt them. Although it would be
rational to use rates to improve water conservation, many agencies explicitly choose not to use
pricing as a conservation tool because it is too politically risky. For public agencies rate increases
are also subject to Prop. 218, that requires special districts and cities to go through a public
hearing process to be able to increase rates and renders them vulnerable to the initiatives of small
groups of citizens that monopolize public hearings.
Using rates as a water conservation tool also faces technical hurdles. The implementation
of budget based rates requires advanced billing systems, the ability to manage high volumes of
information and to improve customer service. The agencies that have implemented them, in fact,
underline that they conducted intense outreach campaigns directed to their customers before
deploying them. When the rate became effective they then had to ramp up their customer service
activity to assist with requests of budget increases, emerging leaks problems and general support.
Many agencies are small, have very old billing systems and lack the organizational strength to
support effective data management and intense customer service.
Antiquated billing systems are not only a problem for small water retailers. A mid-size
city, for example, reports that its own billing system is very old and does not support tiered rates
for the commercial customers. The water department has been waiting for years to implement a
new system that has recently been installed and will eventually enable new rates.
Wholesalers and large retailers reveal that while the easiest programs have been
exhausted, tapping into the conservation potential of outdoor water usage and commercial
customers present practical hurdles and greater uncertainties. For example, free distribution of
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controllers and sprinklers has not produced the conservation results agencies were expecting.
Although in lab settings the weather based irrigation controllers effectively use less water, in
practice there is uncertainty regarding their overall contribution to water conservation.
Wholesalers and large retailers agree that WBIC are complicated mechanisms. “A WBIC is more
like a VCR, and nobody wants to read the instructions” is the comment of a conservation
coordinator. They concur that customers do not have time to dedicate to learning how their
controller works and that often rely on the developers’ settings that are adjusted to establish turf,
rather than maintaining it. Introducing WBIC successfully, therefore, requires much more
customer care and produces less immediate results.
Understanding water savings achievable by commercial customers also requires specific
arrangements. Larger savings for residential customers can be obtained by modifying production
processes to recirculate water and reuse the same water for different phases of the production
process. To estimate these kinds of savings agencies need to visit sites and to acquire the
individual customer’s trust, with uncertain results from the conservation point of view. In
addition commercial customers demand more certainty about times of returns on investments,
while providing less reliability on water savings. One of MWD’s officers exemplifies the
difficulties a program targeted to commercial customers can encounter.
MWD has a program “where we give a check to a corporation at an industrial
plant to do industrial recirculation to reduce their water use, […]. It didn’t go
well in the first generation. The second generation was equally abysmal. Now
we seem to be in a better spot. We’ve simplified the program. […] One of the
big problems in the past was that it was a measured water savings program,
which basically said ‘you put in all this effort, measure your water use for a
year and at the end of the year we’ll see how much water you saved, and if you
saved water, we’ll give you a check.’ So, […] [our counterpart says]; I’m out
[with] the money, what happens if my production goes up over the next year?
So we gave them two paths: one […] is essentially “we’ll give you half the
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money upfront based on an engineering estimate and we’ll participate with you
on the engineering estimate of that savings. No matter what, you get half of
the money. At the end of the year, based on actual water savings, we’ll give
you the balance.” […] Conversely, we gave them an alternative path, which
was, “We’ll participate with you on an engineering estimate, and we’ll give
you 75 percent of that engineering estimate upfront. It doesn’t matter how you
perform. You install this device and operate it. Now if your business goes up,
it doesn’t matter. We don’t need to worry about that. You can do as good as
you can do with your business.”
Funding, Governance and Collaboration
The general perception about the governance of the water conservation effort in Southern
California is that “MWD is apparently the brain behind the conservation effort, but the effort is
really a collaborative endeavor”. It is unanimous that MWD has been the leader in launching
programs that the member agencies have followed closely and contributed actively and many
retailers have experimented, tested new devices and contributed to the overall endeavor.
Collaboration is the key of the conservation effort. It happens at different levels and
among a range of different subjects. According to the majority of the agencies interviewed for
this research it is the element that makes this fragmented system effective. It happens vertically
and horizontally, between organizations of the same level and size and between large
organizations that support small agencies. The joint effort of MWD and its member agencies is
crucial to the design and the implementation of the conservation programs, the relationship
between wholesalers and retailers is the conduit to reach individual customers and the support of
other organizations contributes substantially to implement the programs.
Collaboration between MWD and its Member Agencies
Although many decisions about conservation are taken by MWD, the role of
Metropolitan is not perceived as overpowering. Its member agencies are aware they have the
power to steer the organization’s decisions over budget allocations and strategies. As an example
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of how member agencies can drive MWD’s decisions, specifically talking about conservation
funding, one of the coordinators reports that “At a certain point Metropolitan wanted to cut the
conservation budget in half, but member agencies did not allow.” Metropolitan is a cooperative
entity and the member agencies have a double sided relation with the organization. On one hand
they have decisional power, because they are all represented in the board of directors. On the
other they are customers and rely on MWD’s staff to provide services and information. One of
the coordinators effectively renders the nature of this relationship “The most effective way to
have MWD do something is to go to our own board and ask them to bring up requests to MWD’s
board.”
Conservation coordinators report that the relationship between MWD and its member
agencies is dynamic, collaborative and rarely confrontational. MWD controls a large part of the
funding, that come from a $43 water stewardship fee for every AF of water sold and is reserved
to investments in conservation, recycling and desalination, and the member agencies are well
aware that the funding for the conservation programs comes from their customers and ultimately
from water sales in their service area. Other sources of funding are grants awarded by DWR and
USBR, and additional member agencies’ contributions.
Throughout the 90s Metropolitan provided resources to member agencies to implement
specific programs (free showerheads, toilet rebates or giveaway, washers rebates, weather based
irrigation controllers and sprinkler nozzles), and member agencies would initiate their own
programs with their own funds. With the introduction of the commercial regional program in
2001 and of the residential regional program in 2008, member agencies receive funding from
MWD and have more resources to design their own conservation initiatives or to target specific
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initiatives included in the regional program that are likely to be appealing to the customers in
their service area.
MWD’s wholesalers play a very important role. Although most of them do not have
direct contact with water customers, indirectly they serve about two thirds of MWD’s service
area and they transfer conservation resources to retailers and individual customers. After MWD
has implemented residential and commercial regional programs, member agencies add their own
resources to the rebates offered by MWD to make them more attractive to the residents in their
service area, package the rebates to render them more appealing and also look for grants and
funding on their own. One example of how the wholesalers leverage in house MWD’s and other
organizations’ resources is the multifamily toilet direct install program managed by one of the
wholesalers that uses funds from DWR, MWD and its own reserves and has replaced about
18,000 (IEUA 2012, 13-17) old toilets with HETs between 2006 and 2011. Another example is
another organization’s WBIC installation and verification program, funded by a wholesaler,
DWR, MWD and by the United States Department of Agriculture Natural Resource
Conservation Service. It resulted in the installation of 248 new controllers for residential
customers and 588 for commercial customers between 2008 and 2010 (MWDOC 2011, 10).
Many wholesalers that add their own resources to the programs have established funding
mechanisms that anchor their financial effort to their revenues. A wholesaler, for example, uses
the revenues from a stand by charge of $8 per parcel to fund water conservation and water
recycling. Another devotes $4 out of the $12 surcharge to MWD’s water rates to a water
conservation fund that is then used to finance the agency’s conservation activities.
To maintain close contacts among the member agencies, MWD organizes a monthly
meeting open to all the conservation coordinators in the area, where all the issues about programs
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and funding are discussed. Once a year a Programs Advisory Committee, formed by
conservation coordinators of the member agencies, meets and discusses the strategies for the
following year, decides the studies MWD should fund and the programs that should be
implemented. Other Program Advisory Committees are formed “ad hoc” throughout the year to
deal with specific programs. All the coordinators agree that these are very important venues for
exchange of information and experience; it is where they can discuss conservation hurdles
frankly and openly, where they find inspiration for new programs and for ways to improve
existing initiatives.
The coordinators concur that only a large organization like MWD can have political clout
both at State and Federal level and absorb the financial responsibility of conducting studies on
the cost effectiveness and the effects of water conservation devices. They claim that the
existence of the regional programs reinforces the collaborative atmosphere and that it is
important to have a conservation message consistent throughout the area. They agree that in
order to change attitudes towards water usage consistently, only a larger organization has the
financial and organizational strength to implement information and outreach campaigns that
reach a large number of customers.
None of the subjects interviewed for this research mentioned any real conflict between
MWD and the member agencies regarding conservation strategies or programs. All the subjects
interviewed consider the collaborative spirit of the conservation coordinators exceptionally
strong. It is well known that a serious conflict jeopardizing MWD’s unity is based on the refusal
of San Diego County Water Authority (SDCWA) to pay the stewardship fee included in the rate
MWD requires to transport water that SDWCA purchases from another water agency. In fact,
MWD has reduced the amount of rebates and conservation resources available to SDWCA.
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Nevertheless, SDCWA representatives participate in the monthly meetings and to the
information exchange as much as before the conflict occurred.
Some disagreements occurred below the surface when MWD decided to allocate funds to
each member agency to pursue their own conservation programs. The formula used to apportion
the resources is based on previous water purchases and agencies that use more water receive
more funding, regardless their ability to make the better use of it. However the final solution
apparently appeases everyone, because nobody has mentioned it as a problem during the
interviews.
Collaboration among Wholesalers
Wholesalers are generally willing to collaborate without the participation of MWD to
propose or to implement programs. In the past this type of horizontal collaboration was limited to
organizing toilet distribution events in bordering areas, but now it has reached beyond. Some
recent examples are the “Freesprinklernozzles.com” program initiated by Western MWD, and
the Inland Empire Garden Friendly initiative in which all the water agencies in the Inland Empire
collaborate.
Freespriklernozzles.com was initiated by Western MWD in collaboration with the Toro
Company, a Minnesota based provider of construction and landscape equipment. Western was
aware that Toro produced sprinkler nozzles that distribute water minimizing runoff and
vaporization and use less water to irrigate effectively. They were also aware that customers need
to be guided in the process of replacing inefficient equipment and that distributing free nozzles
without training was not very effective. The agency partnered with the city of Riverside and set
up a website with all the information that enables residential customers to assess their irrigation
system and teaches them how to replace existing sprinkler nozzles. Toro provided content for the
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web site and videos that clearly explain the nozzles’ technical details. Through the website,
residential and commercial customer access vouchers for free sprinkler nozzles that can be
redeemed at a wide range of warehouse stores. Western pays for the nozzles with resources
provided by MWD and takes care of the administrative costs. Other wholesalers and retailers
took notice of the program and signed a MOU with Western to use the website for their
customers. They provide the financial resources to fund the voucher system and reimburse
Western for the administrative costs of up keeping the website. IOUs also joined the program
that is now active in 17 counties throughout California.
The Inland Empire Garden Friendly initiative is sponsored by a number of companies
that manufacture landscape management products and promotes the use of native plants in
residential landscaped areas. Thanks to the companies’ contribution, the water agencies of the
Inland Empire organize public workshops about gardening with California native plants and
sales of native plants.
Collaboration between Wholesalers and Retail Water Agencies
The partners in co-funded conservation programs are generally wholesalers and state of
federal agencies. Only large retailers like Los Angeles Department of Water and Power
(LADWP), the City of San Diego, the cities of Santa Monica, Pasadena, Long Beach Burbank
and Glendale or Irvine Ranch Water District (IRWD) have enough resources to add to MWD’s
programs and enough organizational capacity to bid for state and federal funding.
Smaller retailers generally market programs designed by MWD or by their wholesaler
and occasionally add funding to the residential regional program. Their interaction with the
wholesalers varies in intensity.
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According to the degree of collaboration with their customer agencies, wholesalers can
be grouped in 3 categories.
Some wholesalers are “hands on” organizations that run conservation programs for their
customer agencies, providing funding, information and human resources. “There are big
economies of scale in this arrangement” comments one of the coordinators. Even if some
customer agencies have their own financial resources they entrust the wholesalers with the
implementation of their programs and pay the wholesaler an administrative fee because they are
confident in its experience. In this group, the wholesaler is so involved in the conservation effort
that even MWD member agencies rely on its organizational expertise. The cities of Fullerton,
Anaheim and Santa Ana, for example, rely on MWDOC for implementing conservation
programs and City of Torrance relies on West Basin. This group of agencies has taken the lead
and has promoted regional alliances to meet the SBx7 7 target of reducing water usage by 20%
by 2020 and has involved customer agencies in designing sub-regional conservation plans. The
relationship, however, is not exclusively top down. One of the coordinators provides a vivid
description of the role its agency plays: “Retailers have worked together […] to develop a
conservation business plan that is the blueprint for our activity. The development of programs is
a collaborative work of the member agencies with the wholesaler and the wholesaler does the
legwork”.
In the last few years the nature of the ties between wholesalers and customer agencies has
been changing. Since retailers are now responsible for reducing their water usage, even “hands
on” wholesalers require more active participation. “We used to be the agency that generated
ideas and programs, but more recently the effort is to go out and stimulate the retailers” says one
of the coordinators. “We have a conservation plan that is very ambitious, we have consulted with
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them and they agreed on it, now it is time for our retailers to step up and do what needs to be
done, staff wise, resources wise” adds another. “We will run the programs, but the retail agencies
must market them to their customers, and the competition for resources among them is good. It is
in their interest, because it is them that have to meet the 20 by 2020 target and the money that
will be used to implement the programs comes from their customers’ pocket” specifies another.
Another group tends to coordinate the programs and take the leadership of the
conservation effort, but if member agencies want to implement conservation initiatives on their
own they provide human and financial resources “on demand”. One of the coordinators describes
how member agencies and the wholesaler are engaged in managing a program: “for example, a
high efficiency direct install that happens in […] one of the cities benefits from a $50.00
incentive from Metropolitan. The difference is split by the city […] and […] the wholesaler […].
It’s free to the end user”. For this group of wholesalers the introduction of the residential
regional program has meant that customer agencies have decided to support specific rebates, by
adding funds to specific programs in addition to the rebates offered by MWD and by the
wholesalers. In the service area of one of these wholesalers, for example, in 2010-2011 MWD
rebate on HEW was $100, the wholesaler added $50, therefore throughout the wholesaler’s
service are the rebate was $150. In some areas, however, local retailers added supplementary
funds and the total rebate amounted to $200 or $235.
Another group interprets the wholesaler’s role more like that of a “support agency” and
provides services for customer agencies. They delegate organizational tasks to the retailers. One
of the coordinators describes the job as follows: “Part of my job is just customer service. I’m on
the phone and on email quite a bit with the other conservation coordinators just answering their
questions, providing support, maybe downloading some data and organizing it and sending it.”
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The relationship between wholesalers’ conservation coordinators and member agencies is
maintained through regular meetings in which information about programs and available funding
is passed down. The majority of the customer agencies does not have the resources and the staff
to implement water conservation programs and is happy to rely on the wholesalers and on MWD.
A few of them, however, defend their independence and “want to put their face on the
conservation effort”, while some would like more autonomy from the wholesaler and a direct
relationship with MWD in order to have access to more resources directly.
IOUs have participated in this collaborative process, both as customer agencies of larger
wholesalers and like large organizations with commitments that are partially different from the
other retailers. “In terms of strategy, we follow the lead of MWD generally because we need to
get the most water savings” and “We don’t necessarily participate in all the programs the
wholesalers offer. In some cases we add money to the wholesaler’s programs or provide for more
rebates in our area” their representatives explain. They attend MWD’s monthly meeting, but
more recently have pulled out of the regional programs and have found that they can deliver
rebates themselves at lower administrative costs. Although their water systems are rather small,
each private utility owns a number of them throughout California and can take advantage of their
own economies of scale, rather than relying on the wholesalers and on MWD.
Collaboration between Wholesalers, Retailers and other Agencies
Wholesalers involve numerous organizations that are not water retailers in the
conservation effort. Wholesalers enlist watermasters, conservation and replenishment districts,
local governments and nonprofit organization to reach retail customers. These subjects are
generally instrumental to the conservation process and not really involved in designing
strategies.
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Watermasters, although not directly involved in water distribution, play a role in water
conservation by contributing with funding to information campaigns and specific programs. The
Water Replenishment District (the organization that replenishes West and Central Basin with
imported water) has actively funded conservation programs, by adding resources to the CII
regional program managed by MWD since the early 2000 and organizing numerous training
courses for professional landscapers and residential customers. The Chino Basin Water
Conservation District performs water audits and supports the IEUA’s programs aimed at
reducing outdoor water usage by organizing landscape training programs and maintaining native
plants gardens.
Local Council of Governments and nonprofit organizations are also involved. In the
South Bay the local council of government has instituted an Environmental Services Center, co-
funded by Southern California Edison. The center supports the local wholesaler’s outreach to the
cities and to the water customers. “The South Bay Center is conducting kitchen audits for
commercial customers, they take RSVP for classes and provide lunches for the courses we
organize. We also are members of the Surfrider Foundations and they organize landscaping
courses for us” says the conservation coordinator of the wholesalers.
Lately wholesalers have been involved in the Integrated Water Resources Management
(IRWM) process initiated in 2002 by DWR. The process gives access to funds to reduce runoff
and prevent floods. Some agencies are using them to support storm-water capture and to build
demonstration gardens. In order to access funding they participate in watershed wide planning
processes and are gaining a wider perspective on water management. “It is really interesting for
us to get in touch with cities, county and all the other subjects involved” claims one of the
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coordinators, “we were all presenting similar projects to DWR, but now we have the opportunity
of coordinating more effectively with other subjects”.
Another realm of collaboration for water agencies is the relationship between water
management and land use that has become relevant when reducing outdoor water usage became
the new water conservation frontier. Many agencies have reached out to the cities in their service
area and to planning departments in different ways. There is, of course, a difference between the
relationship that special districts, wholesalers and IOUs are able to establish with cities and the
relationships between water department and planning departments of the same city.
Some wholesalers and IOUs feel that even though they have reached out to park
departments to promote native plants landscapes and to promote weather based irrigation
controllers and have supported local governments and school districts with water saving retrofits,
the relationship is not consistent in time and that local governments, since they are not invested
in providing the service, are not very responsive. Others, which have been involved with county
and association of governments to design water efficient landscape ordinances, claim that they
have more influence over local cities’ water policies and that collaboration with planning and
park departments of the cities in their service area is improving.
Cities report that some of the conservation programs implemented by the municipal
utilities require interaction with the planning department, but there are not precedents to guide
the collaboration and turf battles are always ready to spur. A city water department describes
clearly the type of conflict that arises between water management department and planning
department and how it can be solved creatively: “When we launched our turf replacement
program we realized that our planning department had requirements for parkways and to change
those parkways customers had to pay $100. We streamlined the procedure, agreed on four
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different design options with our planning department and obtained a reduction of that fee for
those customers that choose one of the design options”.
The Future of Water Conservation
The water agencies’ vision of the future of water conservation ranges from a fatalistic
view to a more active stance, mixed with some concern about the future of regulations.
Some representatives of the organizations interviewed for this research are “cynically
optimistic” and think that the future is not going to be much different from the present. They
claim that many forecasts about future growth have been wrong, that population growth is going
to be weaker than expected and that agricultural water will be available for urban uses in the
future. “There is something irrational about wanting to know too much about the future,
especially for a mid-size organization. It is too expensive for us to make predictions that have a
large range of uncertainty and do not really help us to design strategies” is the observation of one
of the coordinators.
Retailers are more concerned with how to enhance the effectiveness of their programs:
“we are concentrated in figuring out how to use social networks to encourage our customer to
change their behavior” comments one of the coordinators. “We have our goals and we are going
to pursue them, our road for the future is not very different from our recent past” adds another.
Wholesalers on their part still see wide room for improvement of the current
conservation effort. All of them expect a rebound of water usage from the 2010 levels:
“Foreclosed homes are being sold, unemployment is slowing declining and our mission is to
maintain the water savings we have accumulated in these years” summarizes one of the
coordinators. Future programs will be very similar to the one existing now, because “there is still
room for increasing water usage efficiency. We have saturated the market for indoor water
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saving devices by installing and distributing more than a million of low flow or high efficiency
toilets, but for outdoor and commercial water use we are nowhere near the penetration of water
efficient devices”. “I can see us working on making our commercial programs more effective for
the next 30 or 20 years” explains one of the coordinators. Wholesalers are also expecting that
rates will play a larger role in water conservation. One of the coordinators explains how this
could happen: “We had a program that supported our agencies in implementing budget based
rates that was shut down for lack of funding. We had college students interning with the agencies
to update their databases and a couple of them eventually were hired. I wish we could do more
programs like that in the future”.
Wholesalers and large retailers are also aware of the need to increase local supply to
reduce the Southern California dependency on imported water. Storm-water capture to increase
the availability of groundwater and recycled or desalinated water are on the mind and in the
programs of all the large agencies, but at the same time many are concerned about the role of
MWD: “Most agencies are trying to reduce their dependency on Metropolitan, because the price
of imported water is constantly growing, but we cannot imagine the consequences of a weaker
MWD.”
Some wholesalers and large retailers acknowledge that future funding for water
conservation is rather uncertain, that public resources are going to be less and less available yet
new resources can be tapped. They cite the “Soquel Creek Water District” model of conservation
offsets, where, in order to build new housing, developers pay for water conservation measures to
be implemented in the district’s service area. “One way to improve the conservation effort is to
make growth ‘water neutral’. Some developer could build in water poor areas, but would retrofit
built out communities and use the water saved through these retrofits” suggest some water
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agencies’ representatives. “Senate Bill (SB) 610 and SB 221 already require that large
developments demonstrate adequate long-term water supplies before approval. If instead we
required water offsets we would ease the pressure on our natural resources, increase the
investments in water conservation and profit from all the side effects like technology
improvement and standardization of water saving devices.”
IOUs, more than others, have regulatory issues on their mind. They are concerned with
the future regulatory framework and assert that there is uncertainty about what DWR will decide
after 2020, whether the Department will increase the penalties for not compliance with SBx7 7
and what will be the future commitment for reducing water usage: “2020 is not the end of water
conservation, agencies will be mandated to maintain low levels of water usage and there will be
increasing restrictions if droughts are going to be longer and closer to one another”.
Conclusion
The interviews with conservation coordinators, board members and other officials from a
wide range of organizations involved in water conservation in Southern California reveal that
institutional characteristics drive how different organization think about effectiveness and
challenges of the conservation effort. They also show that a tight network of collaborative
relations among organizations is at the heart of water conservation policies implementation.
There is general consensus that only a mix of strategies that combines mandates, standards,
pricing, outreach, rebates and education is effective in reducing urban water usage consistently
and permanently. However large wholesalers claim that standardizing water efficient devices in
plumbing codes is the most effective, long term, conservation strategy. Cities perceive that
mandates and ordinances are their most valuable tool. Special districts, in turn, say that pricing is
the most helpful instrument for reducing water usage.
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The perception of hurdles that reduce the effectiveness of water conservation strategies is
driven by the size of the organization. Small water agencies mostly perceive obstacles internal to
their organization and state that lack of resources (funds and personnel), workloads, the public’s
apathy and elected officials’ insufficient support hamper the implementation of conservation
programs. Larger organizations, both retailers and wholesalers, focus instead on the nature of the
programs they implement, and frame the challenge as an administrative and marketing problem.
They point out that administering programs effectively and targeting measures to specific groups
of water users have become their most urgent challenges. Only a small minority of the
wholesalers perceives lack of political support and their boards’ preference for infrastructural
projects as a problem.
Collaboration and communality of intent is the basis of the conservation effort in Southern
California. All the representatives of the organizations interviewed for this research declare that
cooperation with other subjects is the basis of their activity. MWD is the leader, but its member
agencies, small retailers and other subjects involved with water management all participate. The
vast majority of the funding for water conservation is collected through water rates and property
taxes and is redistributed among wholesalers and retailers by MWD. USBR and DWR also
contribute with grants both for regional programs managed by MWD and for local programs
managed by wholesalers and retailers. Decisions about conservation programs are taken by
MWD. Nevertheless, given the cooperative characteristics of Metropolitan, member agencies are
de facto the decision makers.
The interviews underline the role of the wholesalers. They indirectly serve about two thirds
of the customers in MWD’s service area, participate in designing conservation programs, support
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the conservation effort of retail agencies, apply for grants and fund some of them with their own
resources.
The research has found that wholesalers have different approaches to the relationship with
the retailers. Some of them are directly involved, they manage the conservation programs for the
retailers in their service area, have produced water conservation plans and promoted regional
alliances to support their retailers in meeting the requirements of SB7 x7. Others are more
passive. They tend to manage conservation programs directly for their entire service area, but if
retailers want to act autonomously they support them with funding. Others instead function as a
“support agency”, and leave the organizational tasks to the retailers.
Collaboration also happens horizontally, among wholesalers, with nonprofit organizations,
watermasters and with conservation and replenishment districts.
The interviews portray a closely knitted community of agencies. They have been working
together since the 1990s, guided by a MOU that ties them to 14 BMPs and interact constantly.
None of the subjects mentioned conflicts and competition for the allocation of funding among
agencies. Even though within MWD conflict have risen about how water rates incorporate a levy
dedicated to conservation and one agency has had its funds for water conservation reduced, its
representatives participate to regional meetings and committees and have not seen their influence
decline.
Discussion
The outcomes of the interviews offer additional perspectives to some of the findings of the
literature review. The analysis of the existing literature about water management reveals that the
nature of the organization affects its ability to implement water conservation measures and that
special districts are more likely to innovate than city departments (Hanak 2008, Mullin 2009).
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The interviews have shown that organizations of different nature have different opinions on the
effectiveness of conservation strategies. Large wholesalers claim that standardization and
inclusion of water saving devices in building codes is the most effective, cities underline the
importance of ordinances and special districts instead believe that pricing is more successful.
According to the literature, the fragmentation of the water supply chain does not result in
polycentric water management arrangements to implement innovative water management
strategies. Instead, economies of scale drive innovation in water management and larger
organizations are more likely to be innovative than small organizations (Heikkila et al. 2004;
Schlüter and Pahl-Wostl 2007). The interviews offer insight on different perceptions of small and
large organizations. Small water agencies perceive that their biggest hurdles come from inside
the organization (lack of resources, elected officials’ lack of interest) and can hardly be affected.
Larger water agencies see their implementation problems related to the characteristics of the
programs that can be tweaked and changed to become more effective.
The interviews also highlight that collaboration among agencies is at the heart of the
conservation effort. This finding partially supports Elinor Ostrom’s (1964) findings that
polycentric systems deliver service effectively when supported by dense formal and informal
communication network and Dietz et al.’s (2003) suggestion that in order to manage complex
systems, in which multiple actors interact, there is the need of “complex, redundant, and layered
institutions; a mix of institutional types; and designs that facilitate experimentation, learning, and
change” (1907).
The following chapter will explore how different degrees of collaboration influence water
organizations’ conservation performance.

215

TABLE OF CONTENTS
STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF CHANGES IN DAILY PER CAPITA WATER USAGE 216
Model Specification ............................................................................................................ 217
Data Availability ............................................................................................................. 221
Water Conservation Policies ........................................................................................... 221
Water Supply and Demand ............................................................................................. 223
Water Rates ..................................................................................................................... 224
Residents in Water Retail Agencies ................................................................................ 224
Weather Data .................................................................................................................. 225
Degree of Closeness ........................................................................................................ 226
Additional Variables ....................................................................................................... 228
Data description .................................................................................................................. 230
The Sample ..................................................................................................................... 230
Summary Statistics.......................................................................................................... 231
Statistical analysis ............................................................................................................... 235
Multivariate Linear Regression....................................................................................... 235
Panel Regression ............................................................................................................. 240
Testing for Fixed and Random Effects ........................................................................... 241
Panel Data with Fixed Effects......................................................................................... 243
Discussion ........................................................................................................................... 246
Methodological Reflection.............................................................................................. 252
Conclusions ......................................................................................................................... 253

STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF CHANGES IN DAILY PER CAPITA
WATER USAGE

This chapter reports on the statistical analysis performed to test the hypotheses derived
from the review of the existing literature and from the interviews conducted. It presents the
model specification, the issues regarding data availability and operationalization and the
summary statistics. The statistical model selection is discussed in terms of the results as well as
consideration the possible biases.
216

Model Specification
As specified in the method section, the geographic area object of this analysis is the
service area of the Southern California Water Management District (MWD) that includes parts of
Ventura, Los Angeles, San Bernardino, Riverside, Orange and San Diego counties. The unit of
analysis is the individual water retail agency. However, due to limitations in the availability of
data, explained in the following paragraphs, the geographic scope of the analysis has been
reduced to water agencies located in Orange County, in San Diego County and in the Western
part of San Bernardino County.
The dependent variable in the analysis is the yearly percent change of per capita
residential water consumption between 2006 and 2010. The analysis is limited to residential
water usage for two reasons. Residential water usage makes up 68% of urban water usage in the
region and is relatively simple to standardize by weighting it on the number of residents in the
agencies’ service area. Also, residential rates are generally homogeneous for every residential
customer and can be estimated more accurately. Industrial water usage should be standardized
based on local employment, but there is no available data on employment that could be
aggregated at the water district level. In addition, industrial and commercial water rates are often
negotiated and are not uniform throughout the customer base.
Water demand data is provided by the California Department of Water Resources (DWR
2012). The population data by the US Census (US Census 2011), adjusted with the estimated
produced by the California Department of Finance (DOF 2012) and with data included in water
agencies’ Urban Water Management Plans (UWMP)
37
. In the statistical analysis the name of the
variable is PERCAPITA
Independent variables are the following:
37
A list of the UWMPs used in this section is in Appendix G
217

• Yearly percentage change in water rates between 2005 and 2010 (source of data: water
agencies, AWWA and Raftelis Inc. 2013a, 2013b 2013; Orange County Water Agencies,
Orange County Water Association, and MWDOC 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010).
Variable name is RATENEW
• The governance of the water agency, whether the agency is a city or a special district (source
of data: California State Controller Office 2011 and agencies’ web sites). Variable name is
GOV
• Percentage of total water demand supplied through groundwater in 2006 through 2010
(source of data: IEUA 2012c, MWDOC 2012, SDCWA 2012a). Variable name is
SUPPLYGROUND.
• Amount of rebates for residential customers to purchase High Efficiency Washers (HEW),
High Efficiency Toilets (HET), Weather Based Irrigation Controllers (WBIC), rotating
nozzles and to replace natural turf with synthetic turf in 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009 and 2010
(source of data: IEUA 2012a, MWDOC 2012, SDCWA 2013) weighted on the number of
residents of each retailer. Variable name is PCREBATE.
• A measure of the interconnectedness of the water agencies (a closeness measure that has
been estimated through a network analysis, based on information provided by water retailers’
UWMP). Variable name is nClose.
• Population served, a measure of the size of each water retail agency (source of data: US
Census 2011, DOF 2012 and water retailers’ UWMP). Variable name is Poplog.
Control variables:
• Yearly percentage change in precipitation for the timeframe between 2006 and 2010 (source
of data: PRISM 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011). Variable name is PREC.
218

• Population density for each year between 2006 and 2010 (source of data: US Census
2011, DOF 2012, IEUA 2012d, MWDOC 2011d, San Diego County Assessor - Mapping
Division 2011 and water agencies’ UWMPs). Variable name is Popdensity.
The model tested in the following sections can be summarized as follows:
Y
it
= β - βR
it
+ βG
it
- βC
i
- βPCR
it
- βPD
it
– βClo
i
- βLnP
it
- βPr
it
+ ε
it

Where:
Y
it =
Yearly percentage change in per-capita residential water consumption in each water
retail agency.
R
it
= Yearly percentage change in average residential water rates in each water retail agency.
The expectation is a negative sign to signify that by increasing water rates per capita
water usage will decline.
C
i
= The water retail agency is a city (1) or another form of governance (0). The expectation
is a positive sign, because special districts are expected to be more effective than cities
in implementing water conservation strategies because more focused on their core
activity, while cities are expected to be less effective, because of their more generalist
focus.
G
it
= Percentage

of water supply from groundwater in each water retail agency. The
expectation is a positive sign, because water agencies that depend more on groundwater
will be less interested in water usage reduction strategies for two reasons: First, they are
less dependent on imported water, hence their water supply is less expensive, and they
are not as exposed to MWD’s rates increases as agencies that depend on imported water
for the a large percent of their supply. Therefore, they don’t have the incentive to lower
their costs. Second,, if they don’t use the groundwater for which they have appropriative
219

rights they lose it. As a consequence, a larger percentage of water supplied from
groundwater is expected to correlate with a smaller changes (effort to conserve) in per
capita water usage..
PCR
it
= Per capita rebates for water saving devices distributed in the service area of each retail
agency. The expectation is a negative sign, to signify that in water retail agencies that
are able to secure more resources for rebates for water saving devices per capita
residential water usage declines faster.
Clo
i
= Degree of closeness of each water retail agency with other water agencies. The
expectation is a negative sign, to signify that retail water agencies that are more
connected with other entities are more effective in implementing water conservation
strategies and their per capita residential water usage declines faster than the water
usage of less connected water agencies.
PD
it
= Population density in each retail agency service area. The expectation is a negative sign,
because in denser urban areas water usage declines faster.
LnP
it
= Natural logarithm of the population resident in each retail agency service area. The
expectation is a negative sign, because larger water retail agencies are assumed to be
more effective in implementing water conservation strategies because they have more
staff and more resources.
Pr
it
= Yearly percentage change in rain precipitations in each retail agency service area. The
expected sign is negative, because in rainier years households use less water for outdoor
irrigation.
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Data Availability
The availability of data on different aspects of water demand and supply has limited the
analysis to 56 retail water retail agencies.
The limitations of the available information on water demand are well known (DWR
2009, 6-6), but the lack of data to quantify water conservation policies at local level is even more
severe and has been a serious problem of this research. Specifically, the absence of consistent
quantitative data about the conservation efforts of the water retail agencies throughout the area
has thwarted a more statistically sound quantitative analysis. Requests were made to all the water
wholesalers with the hope of consistent information about the rebate activities of their customer
agencies, but the response rate has been very low.
Water Conservation Policies
As described earlier, conservation policies include ordinances, standards, rebates on
water saving devices and pricing. Four different information sources of this kind of data were
examined and through the process, the information provided by three wholesalers resulted more
consistent and reliable. Water management is extremely decentralized and only retail agencies
have information on the complete range of policy tools they adopt. However, as a source, retail
agencies were not considered reliable and consistent because they don’t have the resources to
keep track of the number and amount of rebates that other organizations like MWD and its
wholesaler members distribute in their service areas.
The California Urban Water Conservation Council (CUWCC) has been collecting
information about the implementation of 14 best management practices (BMP) included in the
Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) since 1991 that many water agencies in Southern
California have signed. The report each agency is expected to send back to CUWCC every year
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includes whether the agency has approved water saving ordinances, the quantity and amount of
rebates for water saving toilets, showerheads and high efficiency washers distributed in the
signatory agencies’ service areas and the amount of resources invested in information and
education. However, the information is limited to the agencies that have signed the MOU and
does not include those agencies that practice water conservation without a commitment, in
addition, CUWCC does not control the quality of the reported information and many agencies do
not fill in the reports consistently. As a consequence this information is not deemed reliable and
the Council has been excluded as a source. Above all, agencies do not report to the CUWCC data
on rebates on outdoor irrigation devices that have become a large part of the water conservation
effort in the last few years.
MWD, the largest provider of funds for conservation policies, does not collect
information on ordinances and educational efforts of local agencies and is not willing to share
detailed information on its rebates. The agency has provided data about its non-residential
regional programs since 2000, but this information available only for each member agency (11
wholesalers and 15 cities), but not for each retail agency. MWD’s officers claim that the
agency’s administrative system is not designed to extract data on the rebates distributed in the
individual retail agency service areas both for the residential and the non -residential regional
programs. In addition, they say that the agency is not equipped to share historical information on
the funds distributed to its member agencies for residential programs before 2008.
Only three wholesalers out of eleven, specifically and Inland Empire Utilities Agency
(IEUA 2012c), Municipal Water District of Orange County (MWDOC 2012b) and San Diego
County Water Authority (SDCWA 2013), have been able to provide consistent information on
the complete range of devices and on the amount of rebates that have been distributed to
222

residential customers in the retail agencies’ service areas in the time frame between 2006 and
2010. Given these limitations, the field of inquiry is restricted to 56 retail agencies located in
Orange, San Diego, and San Bernardino counties and the conservation effort is represented only
by the per capita amount of rebates for water saving devices (low flow and high efficiency
toilets, high efficiency toilets, rotating nozzles, weather based and synthetic turf) distributed to
the single family and multifamily residential customers in the service area of these 56 agencies.
Water Supply and Demand
Inconsistent availability of a complete time series of data on water demand and supply,
and on water rates and population of water agencies has conditioned the collection of data to
quantify the dependent and independent variables. Urban Water Management Plans (UWMP)
were at first considered a primary data source. For the 2010 UWMP, DWR issued complete
guidelines to water agencies requiring them to provide, among others, data about their
groundwater supply from 2005 through 2010, about water demand by type of customer
(residential, industrial, commercial and institutional, landscape and other) in 2005 and 2010 and
about per capita water demand on a rolling time frame between 1995 and 2010 (DWR 2010).
Only information about groundwater supply resulted useful to this research. This data has been
validated by comparing it with data on water supply provided by wholesalers. Information about
residential water demand included in UWMPs is not sufficient for this research because it refers
only to two data points (2005 and 2010) and does not cover the time frame 2006-2009.
For water demand, multiple state departments collect information from water retailers,
but not all the retailers report their data consistently. In addition, historical data is not always
available in electronic format. California DWR collects information about monthly water
demand by type of customer through its form 38E (reported in Appendix C) every year and
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provides easily accessible electronic tables. This data set is more consistent and reliable (DWR
2012). Some of the 56 agencies considered in this analysis, however, did not report to DWR
consistently. In these cases residential water usage was estimated based on information provided
by the agency’s 2010 UWMP.
Water Rates
Data on water rates is also difficult to access, because there is no active water rate
monitoring by any official data source. The California-Nevada section of the American Water
Works Association (AWWA), however, has been reporting water rates in California and Nevada
in 2005, 2007, 2009 and 2011. The earlier reports include a limited number of agencies, but the
latest include most water agencies in the state. Locally, MWDOC has been monitoring its
customer agencies’ rates since 2000. Both agencies agreed to share their data for this research
(AWWA 2005, 2007, 2009 and 2011) (Orange County Water Agencies, Orange County Water
Association, and MWDOC 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009 and 2010). Where the information was
not sufficient, individual water agencies were contacted. In order to capture the differences
between rates an average monthly water usage per account throughout the area was estimated (25
units per month per account). Water rates for every water retail agency used in this analysis were
estimated based on the average consumption per account multiplied by the commodity rate
charged in every water retail agency and added to the fixed monthly fee that almost every agency
charges on the account. The percentage yearly difference was hence calculated.
Residents in Water Retail Agencies
Data on the amount of residents living in water agencies service area is not readily
available and does not correspond to data provided by traditional data sources like the US
Census, because special districts serve multiple sections of different cities and unincorporated
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areas while cities often provide water services also to areas outside their administrative
boundaries. The “Guidebook to Assist Urban Water Suppliers to Prepare a 2010 Urban Water
Management Plan” (DWR 2010) provides guidelines for estimating water agencies’ population
and suggests the agencies use California Department of Finance (DOF) population estimates.
Most UWMPs therefore include population estimates for water agencies’ residents based on US
Census 2000 and DOF’s estimates between 2000 and 2010. DOF’s estimates on demographic
dynamics between 2000 and 2010, however, have changed after UWMPs have been approved.
To make the estimates more accurate, the data used in this analysis is based on year 2000 data
included in the agencies’ UWMPs, but has been adjusted to the new DOF’s estimates (DOF
2012).Where there have been uncertainties, data included in the UWMPs has been triangulated
with estimates of 2010 population using table x of the US Census that reports population by
block group. Using ARCGis 10.1, 2010 US Census SF1 blockgroup count of population (US
Census 2011) for Orange County, San Diego County and San Bernardino County was
intercepted with GIS maps of the water retail agencies provided by the wholesalers (IEUA
2012d, MWDOC 2011d, San Diego County Assessor - Mapping Division 2011).
Weather Data
Weather data used in this research are limited to average precipitation within the
boundaries of each water agency. More sophisticated weather data such as evapotranspiration
38

is not available with the detail required for the research. The National Weather Service network
of weather stations and the California Irrigation Management Information System (CIMIS), a
program in the Office of Water Use Efficiency (OWUE) at DWR, are the most reliable data
sources for weather characteristics in California. Their monitoring stations record data about
38
Evapotranspiration (Eto) is the loss of water to the atmosphere by the combined processes of evaporation (from
soil and plant surfaces) and transpiration (from plant tissues). It is an indicator of how much water your crops, lawn,
garden, and trees need for healthy growth and productivity
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precipitations, temperatures, wind strength and direction, relative humidity, solar radiation, soil
temperature and evapotranspiration. However they are not distributed throughout the area of
interest of this research. Only two weather stations are located in Orange County, and they don’t
cover the coastal area. The 5 located in San Diego County are mostly in coastal communities and
there is none in the portion of San Bernardino County included in this analysis.
Instead, Oregon State University, in cooperation with the Northwest Alliance for
Computational Science & Engineering, produces PRISM, a knowledge-based system that uses
point measurements of precipitation, temperature, and other climatic factors to produce estimates
of monthly, yearly, and event-based climatic parameters on a 4km by 4 km grid. Rain is
expressed in hundreds of millimeters. The system incorporates point data, a digital elevation
model, and expert knowledge of complex climatic extremes, including rain shadows, coastal
effects, and temperature inversions. Annual data for precipitations in the US for years 2006
through 2010 was downloaded (PRISM 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009 and 2010). With ARCGis
10.1, data for Southern California included within 116°00’ and 119°60’ of longitude West and
within 32° 00’ and 34°50’ latitude Nord were extracted. A map of water retail agencies in
MWD’s service area was intercepted with the resulting map so that each cell of the PRISM grid
was attributed to a water retail agency. An average yearly precipitation for each water retail
agency was calculated and transformed in inches. Subsequently yearly percentage differences for
each retail agency were calculated (table and figure in Appendix D).
Degree of Closeness
Network analysis provides different measurements of the nature and strength of the
relationships among individuals or organizations. The network of Southern California water
agencies was built based on the information provided by the water retail agencies’ UWMPs that
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stated which other agency or relevant organization the retailer contacted to collect data for the
plan or to exchange information about the plan and includes both water agencies and other public
organizations. So, for example, to design its UWMP, a special district whose service area
includes parts of different cities has exchanged information with every city and each one of them
is in the network. The nodes of the network analyzed in this research are therefore the water
retail agencies that provide water services to the residents of MWD service area and all the
organizations that have been contacted, have provided information and have been informed of
the preparation of the 2010 UWMP.
There are three most commonly used metrics used to evaluate the role of each node
within the network. The actors’ degree centrality is often used as a measure of the “popularity”
of an individual or an organization, because it weights the number of ties a node has over the
number of possible ties that can be created among all the nodes of a network (Monge and
Contractor 2003; Wassermann and Faust 1994). The actors’ betweenness centrality measures the
role of an actor as a broker of information and as a bridge among other actors, because it
measures the probability that an actor is on the communication path of other actors (Wasserman
and Faust 1994). The actors’ closeness centrality measures instead the degree of direct and
indirect connections of an actor. Closeness centrality measures strong and weak ties, it increases
when a weakly connected actor is connected to another with high degree of centrality. According
to Monge and Contractor (2003) “Closeness is interpreted as a useful measure a node’s ability to
access information directly or indirectly ‘through the grapevine’.” (39). Therefore it has been
chosen as the indicator that interprets more closely the collaborative and relationship-dense
world of water conservation. Many conservation mangers have underscored the importance of
the dense network of collaboration and information exchange with colleagues of other
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organizations and closeness is the measure of this kind of relationships, because it captures the
number of connections with other entities, but also the relevance of the entities with which an
actor is connected. A water agency could be connected with a large number of other agencies
that are not very well connected to the network and could have a lower closeness than an agency
that does not have many connections with others but is directly connected to a wholesaler or to
MWD and has access to the information that these other well connected agencies have. In order
to take into account the complexity of the water supply network, the closeness of the 56 agencies
analyzed in this research is referred to the entire Southern California water supply network.
Considering only the Orange County network for MWDOC’s customer agencies, the San Diego
County network for the SDCWA’s member agencies and the San Bernardino network for the
IEUA’s member agencies the direct connections with a central subject such as MWD would have
been lost.
Additional Variables
Initially, the quantitative analysis intended to include the percentage of agency
investments on revenues. However, city and special districts report investments in different
forms. Special district budgets report annual investments and debts that are clearly referred to the
water services they are providing, while cities report their investments and debts in an aggregate
form not clearly referable to specific revenue centers. Therefore this variable has been dropped.
Land use and changes in land use have also been taken into consideration. Southern
California Association of Governments (SCAG) provides GIS based data on land-use in 2005
and 2008, but the two data bases are not comparable. Although San Diego Association of
Governments (SANDAG) provides comparable data for 2004, 2008 and 2010, since the
228

information is not consistent throughout the area this variable has been dropped and replaced by
a less precise population density.
During the interviews, wholesalers’ conservation managers agreed that in the last eight
years two important facts have influenced water usage. From 2007 through 2009 California was
in a severe drought and all water agencies were involved in an extraordinary conservation effort.
In June 2008, Governor Schwarzenegger declared California in a drought and gave DWR order,
among others, to increase funding for water conservation measures and to launch an information
campaign to reduce urban and agricultural water usage (DWR 2010). In April 2009, the
Governor declared the state of emergency for drought, reinforced the communication effort and
gave order to all local agencies to increase their conservation effort (DWR 2010). At the same
time, the California Department of Water Resources had reduced the amount of water delivered
to Southern California through the State Water Project to 20% of its original capacity, in 2008
MWD had adopted a state of water supply alert and encouraged its member agencies to adopt
ordinances to reduce local water usage (MWD 2008) and, in April 2009, decided to increase its
water conservation effort by reducing its deliveries to its member agencies by 15% starting in
June 2009 (MWD 2009). Throughout 2009 many local water retailers voted ordinances including
permanent outdoor irrigation limitations and other measured aimed at reducing water usage. The
local ordinances have been modeled with a dummy variable with value 0 for every agency that
put in place a water usage restriction ordinance from 2006 through 2010. Ordinances adopted
during the first semester were attributed to the year of approval, ordinances adopted from July on
were attributed to the following year. Name of the variable is ORDI.
The financial crisis of 2007-2008 and the ensuing economic recession have led to a
general contraction of consumption and widespread foreclosures that might have influenced per
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capita residential water consumption. Many families have moved from single family homes with
sizable outdoor areas to apartment buildings with less landscaped areas or might have doubled up
with other families and reduced per capita water usage. It is complicated to model economic
variables at city and special district level. In this case the variations of per capita GDP for the
three metropolitan areas that include the study area have been used as a proxy of local economic
trends. Per capita real GDP rate of change 2005-2006, 2006-2007, 2007-2008, 2008-2009 and
2009-2010 in San Bernardino – Riverside Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA) defines changes
in economic output for water retail agencies in San Bernardino County, changes in GDP in Los
Angeles, Long Beach and Santa Ana MSA represent changes in Orange County water retail
agencies’ economic output and changes in San Diego MSA represent changes in San Diego
County water retailers. Data source is the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA 2013). Name of
the variable is GDP00.
Data description
The Sample
The sample includes data for 56 different water agencies for 5 consecutive years for an n
of 280 observations. The yearly percentage differences of per capita water consumption,
precipitation, and rates are referred to the time frame between December 31 2005 and December
31 2006 (2006-2007, 2007-2008, 2008-2009, and 2009-2010). The number of residents,
percentage of groundwater, and amount of rebates are provided for 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009 and
2010. Closeness and type of governance are invariant across time.
A comparison between the sample and the entire population of the region is summarized
in Table 34.
230

Table 34. Comparison of sample and population
Item Sample Population
Average number of residents in 2007 115,014 158,267
Average per capita water usage in 2008 (gpcpd) 224 198
Average total water demand in 2010 (AFY) 20,593 20,609
Percentage residential water demand in 2010 68.4% 69.7%
Average percentage groundwater supply 2005-2010 36.5% 44.4%
Average yearly precipitations 2005 - 2010 (inches) 12.9 15.5
Average normalized closeness 28.990 27.390
Percentage of cities 44.8% 45.0%
N 56 145
Source: Water retailers’ UWMPs
Although the sample has been selected based on data availability, it represents the entire
population fairly well. The sample water agencies, in fact, are very similar to the total
population. They are slightly smaller, slightly drier and depend on imported water slightly more
than the total population, but their governance structure (less than 50% are cities), the percentage
of residential water demand on total water demand and their degree of connectivity with other
agencies matches the entire population.
Summary Statistics
Daily residential per capita water usage has declined an average 3.1% per year. As many
conservation managers have underscored in the interviews, water usage proves to be quite
volatile, with a maximum yearly increase of 17.6%, when a very dry year follows a wet year, and
a maximum decline of 20.2% when the opposite happens.
Residential water rates have increased by a yearly average of 8.6%. Water rates changes
are not at all consistent in time. Some water agencies keep their rates unchanged for a few years
and then, all of a sudden, they increase them rapidly, others are able to pace rate increases more
regularly. In some areas, between 2005 and 2006, when drought was not an emergency, rates had
declined, while more recently they have registered a generalized growth.
On average, the water retail agencies considered in the analysis depend on groundwater
for about 36.5% of their supply although there a wide variance among them. Many do not have
231

any local source of water and are totally dependent from imported water and only a few can rely
on local water to respond to nearly 100% of their demand.
Per capita rebates for water saving devices amount, on average, to $0.91 per person per
year for every resident in the water retail agencies’ service area. In some areas, where water
agencies have not been active in promoting water saving rebates, residents have not been able to
access any resources at all, while in other areas local residents and water agencies have been
very effective and have been able to secure up to $7.33 per person per year.
Average population density is 6.5 residents per acre (6.2 residents per acre is the
population density in the city of Los Angeles) with very low densities in the San Diego county
inland areas and much higher densities in the dense urban core of Orange County.
Normalized closeness in average is 28.99, with very small variations included between
18.87 and 34.91.
Due to a very dry 2009 followed by a very rainy 2010, average change of precipitation
between 2005 and 2010 is a positive 38.3%, with strong changes throughout the time frame of
the analysis. Figure 27 represents precipitations from 2005 to 2010 in Metropolitan Water
District (MWD) service area and shows how they have dramatically changed from 2009, a very
dry year, to 2010, a very wet year.
Average number of residents per water retailer is 120,116, but the sample includes a wide
range of agencies in terms of size, as small as serving 3,584 people and as big as San Diego, with
its 1.2 million residents.
Per capita GDP change throughout the entire area, for the time frame included between
2006 and 2010, amounts to -1.1% per year. Earlier in 2005-2006, per capita GDP was still
232

growing at a rate of 4.3% a year in the Los Angeles, Long Beach and Santa Ana MSA, but in
2008-2009 it reached -8.64% in Riverside – San Bernardino- Ontario MSA (Tab. 35).
Table 35. Summary statistics
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Per-capita residential water usage: yearly %
change
280 -3.1% 0.075 -20.2% 17.6%
Rates: yearly percentage change 280 8.6% 0.067 -13.0% 45.2%
Governance: City = 1 280 0.46 0.500 0 1
Water supply: % of groundwater 280 36.5% 0.313 0.0% 100.0%
Per capita amount of rebates for water saving
devices distributed in service area
280 0.91 0.94 0.00 7.33
Population density 280 6.51 4.21 0.37 18.78
Normalized Closeness 280 28.99 4.23 18.87 34.91
Precipitations: yearly % change 280 38.3% 1.027 -62.9% 251.2%
Number of residents 280 120,116 170,363 3,584 1,245,929
Natural logarithm of number of residents 280 11.18 1.04 8.18 14.04
Local water restriction ordinances = 1 280 0.36 0.48 0 1
Per capita GDP change 280 -1.1% .032 -8.64% 4.27%

233

Figure 27. Rain fall in MWD service area 2005 - 2010
Source: PRISM Climate Group, Oregon State University, http://prism.oregonstate.edu, created June 7 2006, May 14
2007, June 12 2008, May 11 2009, June 8 2010 and April 8 2011

234

Statistical analysis
Multivariate Linear Regression
The statistical analysis of the data about water conservation in the 56 water retailers
includes a bivariate analysis, a correlation matrix, a linear regression model, multicollinearity
and heteroskedasticity tests and a Breush and Pagan Lagrange multiplier test for random effects,
an Hausman test for fixed effect and a robust panel regression with fixed effects.
Bivariate statistics show negative statistically significant correlation between the change
in daily per capita water usage and the change in precipitations, change in residential water rates,
change in metropolitan area GDP and with local decisions to adopt water allocation measures
and positive, non-statistically significant correlation between per capita change in water usage
and the type of governance, the groundwater proportion of water supply and the amount of per
capita rebates for water saving devices received by local residents (Tab. 36).
Table 36. Bi-variate correlations
Dependent variable Independent variables t value p > ItI Adj R2
Percapita % change
in water usage
Yearly % change in domestic water rates -5.37 0.000 0.0908
Governance 0.71 0.480 -0.0018
% of groundwater in water supply 0.31 0.760 -0.0033
Percapita rebates 0.51 0.608 -0.0026
Population density 0.14 0.887 -0.0035
Closeness 1.40 0.162 0.0035
Natural log of population 180.25 0.000 0.0000
Yearly % change in precipitation -9.04 0.000 0.2224
Local Ordinances -10.96 0.000 0.2993

The correlation matrix (Tab. 37) highlights correlation between governance and four
other variables and of population density with other 5 other variables. To streamline the model,
population density, with very little explanatory power, has been dropped.

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Tab. 37. Correlation matrix
PERCAP RATESNEW GOV SUPPLY PCREBATE Popdens nClose Poplog PREC ORDI GDP00
PERCAPITA 1.00

RATESNEW -0.31* 1.00

GOV 0.04 0.03 1.00

SUPPLY 0.02 -0.00 0.39* 1.00

PCREBATE 0.03 -0.11 -0.09 -0.06 1.00

Popdensity 0.09 0.04 0.46* 0.52* 0.29* 1.00
nClose 0.08 -0.06 0.30* 0.44* -0.15 0.39* 1.00

Poplog -0.02 -0.06 0.23* 0.05 -0.04 0.35* 0.10 1.00

PREC -0.48* 0.33* 0.03 0.10 -0.26* -0.04 0.03 0.00 1.00

ORDI -0.48* 0.33* -0.01 0.03 0.03 0.04 -0.03 0.03 0.45* 1.00

GDP00 0.40* -0.10 0.02 -0.08 -0.22 0.07 0.03 -0.05 -0.01 -0.40* 1.00

Pooled OLS regression that considers only local characteristics of water retail agencies
such as the rate of change of their water rates, their governance, the characteristics of their water
supply, their degree of interconnection with other agencies and the per capita amount of rebates
their residents had access to, has an adjusted R
2
0.2530 and highlights that changes in the
amount of rain, in domestic water rates and the per capita amount of rebates for water saving
devices are significantly and negatively correlated with changes in per capita residential water
usage. All other variables being the same, the increase of rain falls in the water retailers service
area is correlated with a reduction in daily per capita water usage as water customers tend to
need less water to maintain their landscaped areas. Also, all other factors being the same, a water
rates increase is correlated with water usage decline, as customers respond to the price signal as
expected. Finally, larger amounts of rebates per water customer are correlated with higher water
usage declines, as water saving devices are more widely used. The model’s estimates highlight
that some structural characteristics, such as water retailers’ governance model, their supply mix
and their size is not correlated to their performance in terms of water conservation. Although not
all the independent variables are correlated with the dependent variables at a statistically
significant level however, the model matches the initial expectations. Excluding the degree of
closeness, all the non-statistically significant coefficients have the signs initially expected.
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By adding local water usage restrictions the model’s fit improves (Adj. R
2
= 0.3133).
Overall the model is stable, as the coefficients’ signs don’t change and the ordinances’
coefficient is negative and highly statistically significant. Changes in precipitations result
negatively correlated with changes in water usage at a significant level as well as changes in
water rates. The amount of rebates local water customers are able to access, however, is no
longer correlated to the dependent variable at a statistically significant level. All the other
independent variables are not correlated at a statistically significant rate. By adding the proxy
variable for changes in local economic output and controlling for changes in the local economic
climate, the model’s fit improves yet again (Adj. R
2
= 0.4048). Local economic trends result
significantly correlated with water usage. Local economic growth is correlated with higher per
capita residential water usage and low and negative economic trends are correlated with lower
per capita residential water use. The correlation coefficients between changes in precipitations,
changes in rates, the dummy variable that represents local ordinances and per capita residential
water usage are again statistically significant, while those of the other independent variables are
not, i.e. coefficient of per capita rebates, the indicator of information exchange with other
agencies (Tab. 38).

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Table 38. Simple OLS estimates
Variables OLS
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Yearly % change of residential water
rates
-0.145*** -0.093** -0.084**
(-3.09) (-2.02) (-1.98)
Governance 0.006 0.004 0.002
(0.63) (0.50) (0.24)
Groundwater % of water supply 0.005 0.006 0.016
(0.34) (0.41) (1.23)
Percapita amount of rebates for
residential water saving devices
-0.007* -0.004 0.001
(-1.72) (-0.88) (0.18)
Closeness 0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.98) (1.00) (0.85)
Yearly % change in precipitations -0.033*** -0.045*** -0.028***
(-0.87) (-5.47) (-6.90)
Natural log of population -0.003 -0.002 -0.001
(-7.94) (-0.62) (-0.27)
Local ordinances limiting outdoor
water irrigation
-0.045*** -0.020***
(-4.99) (-2.18)
Yearly % change of MSA real per
capita GDP
0.802***
(6.53)
Constant 0.004 -0.001 -0.017
(0.07) (-0.03) (-0.36)
Adjusted R2 0.2530 0.3133 0.4048
R2 0.2717 0.3330 0.4240
p>F 0.000 0.000 0.000

N 280 280 280
*p < 0.1 **p < 0.05 ***p < 0.01
(t-value in parentheses)
Tested for multicollinearity with the Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) test, the model
presents very limited collinearity bias (Tab. 39).
Table 39. Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) test
Variable VIF 1/VIF
Local ordinances limiting outdoor water irrigation 1.65 0.605763
Yearly % change in precipitations 1.49 0.669618
Groundwater % of water supply 1.41 0.710941
Yearly % change of MSA real per capita GDP 1.31 0.761608
Closeness 1.31 0.765769
Governance 1.28 0.782967
Yearly % change of residential water rates 1.2 0.836803
Percapita amount of rebates for residential water saving devices 1.17 0.852208
Natural log of population 1.07 0.933027
Mean VIF 1.32

However, the Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test highlights significant
heteroskedasticity (Tab. 40).
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Table 40. Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity
Ho: Constant variance
Variables: RATESNEW GOV SUPPLYGROUND PCREBATE nClose Poplog PREC ORDI GDP00
chi2(9) = 46.63
Prob > chi2 = 0.0000
A robust OLS, that relaxes the requirements for the standard error, takes into account
heteroskedasticity and confirms the results of the simple pooled OLS. The correlation
coefficients between changes in daily per capita residential water usage and contextual variables
such as changes in rain precipitations, strong water conservation mandates and changes in per
capita GDP are negative and statistically significant (Tab. 41), as well as the correlation
coefficient between changes in rates and the dependent variable. According to this model, the
amount of rebates residents in water retail agencies are able to access, the type of governance,
the supply mix, the size and the degree of interconnection with other subjects, instead, are not
statistically correlated with the reduction of residential water usage at a statistically significant
level.
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Table 41. Robust OLS estimates
Robust OLS
Variables Model 1a Model 2a Model 3a
Yearly % change of residential
water rates
-0.145*** -0.093* -0.084*
(-2.84) (-1.84) (-1.66)
Governance 0.006 0.004 0.002
(0.63) (0.50) (0.25)
Groundwater %of water supply 0.005 0.006 0.016
(0.32) (0.37) (1.06)
Percapita amount of rebates for
residential water saving devices
-0.007 -0.004 0.001
(-1.13) (-0.59) (0.14)
Closeness 0.001 0.001 0.001
(1.00) (1.01) (0.84)
Yearly % change in precipitation -0.033*** -0.024*** -0.028***
(-8.81) (-6.05) (-6.96)
Natural log of population -0.003 -0.002 -0.001
(-0.85) (-0.60) (-0.27)
Local ordinances limiting outdoor
water irrigation
-0.045*** -0.020**
(-5.26) (-2.29)
Yearly % change of MSA real per
capita GDP
0.802***
(6.05)
Constant 0.004 0.002 -0.017
(0.07) (-0.03) (-0.35)
Adjusted R2
R2 0.2717 0.3330 0.4240
p>F 0.000 0.000 0.000

N 280 280 280
*p < 0.1 **p < 0.05 ***p < 0.01
(t-value in parentheses)

Panel Regression
Given that the sample includes data related to the same agencies observed for 5
consecutive years and that many variables that could influence water conservation have not been
modeled for lack of data, the opportunity to use a panel regression model was tested. Panel data
regression takes into account the diversity of individual cases and controls for variables that
cannot be observed but recur regularly across cases, or for variables that change slowly and can
be difficult to measure (Baltagi 2008, 6). Panel regression, for example, can account for cultural
or local characteristics that could influence water usage but could be difficult to measure or hard
to obtain, for the slow change in residential lot sizes, for the degree of market penetration of
water saving devices, for the influence of education and information campaigns.
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Testing for Fixed and Random Effects
Two types of panel regression models could be applied in this case, random effects and
fixed effects. Random effects panel regression assumes that the variation across entities is
uncorrelated with independent variables included in the model.
Fixed effects models, instead, assume that the undetectable characteristics of the
individual might influence the dependent or the independent variables and control for these fixed
effects. Fixed effects could control for a number of variables that have not been quantified in this
research. It could account for the effects of lot sizes, an individual characteristic of each retail
agency that changes very slowly and could affect the flexibility of water demand. It could control
for the rate of natural substitution of old water fixtures with water saving fixtures through home
renovations, that is not considered in this analysis and is likely correlated with economic growth,
or for the influence of information campaigns whose magnitude in terms of resources is
correlated with the water agency’s size.
The Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian multiplier test for random effects ascertains whether
a random effect panel model provides more precise coefficients than a regular OLS. The result of
the test is summarized in table 42.
Table 42. Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian multiplier test for random effects estimated results
PERCAPITA[FID_NAMES,t] = Xb + u[FID_NAMES] + e[FID_NAMES,t]
Var sd = sqrt(Var)
Yearly % change of per capita
residential daily water usage
0.005582 0.074710
e 0.003374 0.058087
u 0 0
Test: Var (u) = 0
chibar2(01) = 0
Prob > chibar2 =1.0000

241

The null hypothesis of the test is that there are no random systematic effects biasing the
coefficients. The interpretation is that robust OLS provides accurate results as compared with a
random effects panel regression.
The Hausman test establishes the existence of fixed effects and guides the analysis
whether to opt for a fixed effect panel regression model.
The null hypothesis of the Hausman test is that there is not systematic difference in
coefficients of a random and a fixed effect panel regression. The chi2 value resulting from the
test is 16.78, so that the null hypothesis is rejected. The conclusion is that coefficients estimated
with a fixed effect model would provide less biased coefficients (Tab. 43) and will be more
appropriate.
Table 43. Hausman test estimates
Coefficients
(b) (B) (b-B) sqrt(diag(V_b-V_B))
Variables fixed random Difference S.E.
Yearly % change of residential water rates -0.0686352 -0.0848709 0.0162357 0.0209766
Groundwater %of water supply 0.0287249 0.0161227 0.0126022 0.0414902
Percapita amount of rebates for residential
water saving devices
0.0048308 0.0007289 0.0041019 0.0034228
Natural log of polulation -0.9976377 -0.0009457 -0.996692 0.2934871
Yearly % change in precipitations -0.0237033 -0.0283303 0.0046269 0.0022642
Local ordinances limiting outdoor water
irrigation
-0.0150749 -0.0200501 0.0049752 0.0054898
Yearly % change of MSA real per capita
GDP
0.7523049 0.8026033 -0.0502985 0.0681052
b = consistent under Ho and Ha; obtained from xtreg
B = inconsistent under Ha, efficient under Ho; obtained from xtreg
Test: Ho: difference in coefficients not systematic
chi2(7) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B)
= 16.78
Prob>chi2 = 0.0189

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Panel Data with Fixed Effects
Controlling for fixed effects that have not been quantified for lack of data, the fixed effect
panel regression model provides a different angle of the factors that are correlated with changes
in water usage.
The summary statistics table highlights the differences across individual water agencies
(between) and among different time periods (within). In this case, variance across time is
generally higher than variance across entities and confirms that the fixed panel model gives a
more efficient explanation of the correlation among variables (Tab. 44).

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Table 44. Summary statistics of the panel data
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Observations

PERCAPITA overall -0.03 0.0747 -0.20 0.18 N = 280
between 0.0196 -0.08 0.02 N = 56
within 0.0721 -0.19 0.18 T = 5
Yearly % change of
residential water
rates
overall 0.09 0.0881 -0.13 0.45 N = 280
between 0.0322 0.00 0.16 N = 56
within 0.0821 -0.13 0.39 T = 5

Governance overall 0.46 0.4996 0 1 N = 280
between 0.5032 0 1 N = 56
within 0.0000 0.46 0.46 T = 5

Groundwater % of
water supply
overall 0.37 0.3126 0 1 N = 280
between 0.3024 0 1 N = 56
within 0.0872 0.07 0.67 T = 5

Percapita amount
of rebates for
residential water
saving devices
overall 0.91 0.9374 0.00 7.33 N = 280
between 0.5910 0.10 3.08 N = 56
within 0.7310 -1.31 6.59 T = 5

Closeness overall 28.99 4.2277 18.87 34.91 N = 280
between 4.2583 18.87 34.91 N = 56
within 0.0000 28.99 28.99 T = 5

Natural log of
population
overall 11.18 1.0375 8.18 14.04 N = 280
between 1.0450 8.19 14.02 N = 56
within 0.0147 11.09 11.22 T = 5

Yearly % change in
precipitations
overall 0.38 1.0274 -0.63 2.51 N = 280
between 0.0759 0.28 0.57 N = 56
within 1.0246 -0.82 2.37 T = 5

Local ordinances
limiting outdoor
water irrigation
overall 0.40 0.4908 0 1 N = 280
between 0.0000 0.4 0.4 N = 56
within 0.4908 0 1 T = 5

Yearly % change of
MSA real per
capita GDP
overall -0.01 0.0322 -0.09 0.04 N = 280
between 0.0100 -0.03 0.00 N = 56
within 0.0306 -0.07 0.04 T = 5

The within R2 of the panel regression with fixed effects is 0.4863 and the statistically
significant coefficients are different from the robust OLS. Contextual factors such as change in
precipitations and local economic trends are still negatively correlated with changes in daily per
capita residential water usage. Local ordinances are also still correlated with decline in
residential per capita water usage, while the correlation coefficients of the mix of local water
supply, together with per capita amount of rebates for water saving devices and with changes in
244

water rates are not statistically significant. The sign of the relationship between per capita rebates
for water saving devices and changes in per capita daily residential water use is different than
expected.
The fixed effects panel model frames the size of water agencies in a new perspective. The
regression’s correlation coefficient of the natural logarithm of population with changes in daily
residential per capita water usage is highly statistically significant and negative. According to
this model, all other variables remaining the same, the size of a water agency is correlated with
its water conservation performance at a statistically significant level. The larger the agency, the
larger its effectiveness in reducing per capita residential water use (Tab. 45).
Table 45. Estimates of the panel data
Variables
Model 4
Fixed effects coefficients
Model 4a
Robust fixed effects
coefficients
Yearly % change of residential water rates -0.069 -0.069
(-1.44) (-1.22)
% of groundwater in water supply 0.029 0.029
(0.66) (0.71)
Percapita amount of rebates for residential
water saving devices
0.005 0.005
(0.92) (0.74)
Yearly % change in precipitation -0.024*** -0.024***
(-5.06) (-5.11)
Natural log of population -0.998*** -0.998***
(-3.40) (-3.35)
Local ordinances limiting outdoor water
irrigation
-0.015* -0.015*
(-1.41) (-1.79)
Yearly % change of MSA real per capita
GDP
0.752*** 0.752***
(5.36) (5.70)
Constant 11.133*** 11.133***
(3.39) (3.35)
Governance Omitted for collinearity Omitted for collinearity
Closeness Omitted for collienarity Omitted for collienarity

Within R2 0.4863 0.4863
Between R2 0.0024
Overall R2 0.0021

p> F (7, 55) 0.000 0.000
N 280 280
*p < 0.1 **p < 0.05 ***p < 0.01
(t-value in parentheses)

245

Discussion
This analysis examines policy and structural factors that are correlated with water retail
agencies’ ability to reduce daily per capita water usage in their service area. The study focuses
on the 2006-2010 time period and captures a very crucial moment of Southern California water
history, characterized by a very severe dry spell between 2007 and 2009, by a drought
emergency gubernatorial declaration in 2008, by restrictions of State Water Project water
deliveries in 2009 and by MWD’s rationing of its deliveries to its member agencies (DWR
2010). For lack of comprehensive data, it captures the behavior of a group of agencies that are
slightly different from the average Southern California water agency, but also have some
similarities. They are smaller, but more committed to water conservation because slightly drier
and depend on imported water slightly more than the average Southern California retail water
retailer. At the same time they have a similar governance structure, a similar water demand
profile and a similar degree of exchange of information with other agencies.
The analysis takes into consideration a range of local water conservation policies,
agencies’ structural characteristics, and contextual factors that can affect changes in water usage
patterns.
The first consideration is about the model’s specification. This research is different from
most research on water demand. Most research in this field models individual households’
demand, rather than per capita residential water demand in an agency’s service area, and focuses
on households’ characteristics and prices to understand the relationship between prices and
demand (Arbues, Garcia-Valiñas, and Martinez-Espiñeira 2003; Dalhusien et al. 2003; Duke,
Ehemann, and Mackenzie 2002; Grafton et al. 2006; Hewitt and Hanemann 1995; Hoffman
2006; Mansur and Olmstead 2007; Olmstead, Hanemann and Stavins 2007; Worthington and
246

Hoffman 2008). The research that takes into effect other forms of water demand management is
limited, equally focused on the individual household and usually models demand management
measures as a dummy variable. The strength of this kind of research is the large n, which allows
the use of many independent variables that define the households’ characteristics (Campbell,
Johnson, and Larson 2004) and of numerous attributes that control for the seasonality of water
consumption (Renwick and Archibald 1998, Renwick and Green 2000). The weakness is that,
while it models the final effects of water demand management strategies, it obviously does not
take into account how the characteristics of local water management organizations can be
correlated with the final policy result. The strength of the specification proposed in this analysis
is that it takes into account the amount of resources that water organizations have made available
for water customers to purchase water saving devices, a variable that, due to data limitations, had
not been used before.
The choice of a fixed effects panel regression has been guided by a number of statistical
tests and is appropriate to the data availability and especially to the lack of data about key
variables such as the rate of market penetration of water saving devices, changes of residential
lot sizes and changes in household habits. All these variables change very slowly and can be
controlled by this choice of modeling technique. The downside of the fixed effect panel
regression is that stable variables like the nature of the water retailer and its degree of connection
to the other agencies are dropped, because the same values are repeated every year and generate
multicollinearity.
Four hypotheses formulated through the review of the current literature on institutions
and water management focus on institutional and structural characteristics of the water agencies.
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H1: Special districts are more likely to innovate than cities, therefore they are more
effective in reducing per capita residential water usage, formulated after Hanak 2009 and Mullin
2009, is not supported by this analysis. The correlation coefficient of this factor with the
dependent variable has not resulted statistically significant in any statistical model, although the
sign of the coefficient was negative as expected. These results are not consistent with the
literature on water institutions (Hanak 2009; Mullin 2009) that finds that special districts are
more likely to adopt innovative strategies and to comply to state mandates. Hughes (2012) also
found that special districts have been more likely to adopt the CUWCC MOU than cities.
However, these authors generally address the adoption of a specific policy, not its
implementation. The analysis in this study, instead, measures the results of adopted strategies,
and does not find any difference between the effectiveness of cities and special districts.
H2: Size matters, large retailers are more effective in reducing residential water usage
than smaller retailers, is the initial hypothesis supported by the statistical analysis. This
phenomenon is largely explained by the literature on economies of scale (Schlüter and Pahl-
Wostl (2007) and by Heikkila (2004) that points out that up to certain size water agencies are
more efficient in providing their services. According to the model, however, the reduction in
daily per capita residential water use correlated with the agencies’ size is very small. By almost
tripling the number of residents, per capita water usage decline would increase by 1%.
H3: Water retailers with a dense network or relationships with other entities are more
effective in reducing per capita water usage was inspired by the literature on common pool
resources, per Heikkila’s (2004) findings that water agencies that have cooperative agreements
are more likely to adopt complex water management solutions and by the opinions expressed by
the conservation coordinators of water wholesalers that have highlighted the importance of the
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informational network of their peers in their daily activity. The results of the statistical models do
not support this hypothesis. The correlation coefficient of the closeness factor is never
statistically significant and its sign is positive, while it was initially expected to be negative.
This unexpected result could be related to how the network has been built. In the research
presented here, the informational network of Southern California water agencies was built based
on the information provided by the water retail agencies’ UWMPs that stated which other agency
or relevant organization the retailer had contacted to collaborate to the plan or exchange
information and includes both water agencies and other public organizations. So, for example, to
design its UWMP, a special district whose service area includes parts of different cities has
exchanged information with every city and each one of them is in the network. Closeness
measures the degree of direct and indirect connections of the water retail agencies and the
extension of their reach through first and second degree connections, but includes a number of
organizations that are not necessarily involved with water conservation. Rather than being a
proxy of the tightness of the informal information network of the water agencies, here closeness
could in fact be a proxy for that jurisdictional overlapping that is more an hindrance to policy
implementation that a support, described by Mullin (2009).
Three hypotheses formulated through the review of the current literature on water
demand management address the effectiveness of water conservation strategies.
H4: water retailers with higher dependency from ground water are less effective in
reducing per capita water usage because their cost of water is lower and can supply the lack of
imported water by pumping additional groundwater, drawn from Ostrom’s (2005, 2010) IAD, is
not supported. Nonetheless, the sign of the coefficient was positive as expected. This result,
however, could be influenced by the fact that many of the water agencies included in the sample
249

(both in San Diego and Orange County) have very little groundwater and by the fact that water
agencies in North Orange County have very similar water supply mix.
H5: Higher water rates are correlated with higher reductions of daily per capita
residential water usage is not supported by the statistical analysis. In fact, robust OLS finds a
statistically significant correlation between changes in rates and changes in per capita water
consumption, but controlling for the fixed effects of factors that are not quantifiable, rates lose
their explicatory power.
The lack of significance of the correlation of changes in pricing to changes in per capita
water consumption is not consistent with the existing literature (Arbues, Garcia-Valiñas, and
Martinez-Espiñeira 2003; Dalhusien et al. 2003; Duke, Ehemann, and Mackenzie 2002; Grafton
et al. 2006; Hewitt and Hanemann 1995; Hoffman 2006; Mansur and Olmstead 2007; Olmstead,
Hanemann and Stavins 2007; Worthington and Hoffman 2008), where water rates have been
found to have a consistently statistically significant negative correlation with water demand. One
of the reasons for the results of the research presented here is that changes of water rates have
been modeled on an average monthly water usage that is uniform throughout the agencies (25
HCF per month) every year. This prevents endogeneity, but does not capture different reaction to
rates at different levels of monthly usage. Estimating water rates changes for each quartile of the
average monthly water usage could improve the significance of the rates’ coefficient. Also, rates
are not actually used as a water conservation tool and they are often raised after water
consumption has declined, to compensate for loss of revenues. Lagging the rate variables could
also be an option, although the literature does not report a general use of the lagging technique to
study the price elasticity of water demand. An alternative explanation is that rates have grown
250

very quickly in the last two years and their correlation with changes in water related behaviors
needs to be measured on a longer time span.
H6: Higher per capita rebates distributed by water agencies to their customers to purchase
water saving devices are correlated with higher water usage reduction is not supported. The
amount of rebates is 90% significant in model 1a that does not include local ordinances and local
economic trends and has a heteroskedasticity bias. But when all factors are considered, their
correlation coefficient does not result statistically significant and the sign is different from what
would be expected according to Renwick and Archibald (1998) and Renwick and Green (2000).
The results confirm the results of Kenny et al. (2008) that claim that rebates on outdoor water
saving devices do not have a statistically significant correlation with water usage. Based on these
results the conclusion is that rebates, per se, are a very small component of the conservation
effort. The amount of resources water wholesalers and retailers deploy is not sufficient to have
any influence on local water consumption.
Instead, H7 is supported. Changes in per capita water usage are rather correlated with the
approval of local ordinances that restrict water usage by limiting outdoor watering and water
waste. They have a complex genesis and are not originated locally. Starting in 2008, after the
California governor had declared the state of emergency for drought, MWD exhorted retail water
agencies to approve water conservation ordinances. Many retailers complied by June 2009,
others complied only when MWD, due to the ongoing drought, had to reduce its water delivery
by 15%, in the summer of 2009
39
. They are the short term response to what is perceived as a
contingent water scarcity. The statistical analysis, indeed, speaks to their effectiveness.
39
Initially the cluster of ordinances and measures implemented following the declaration of state emergency for
drought had been modeled with a dummy variable that had value 1 for every agency in 2009 and 2010 and value 0
in 2006, 2007 and 2008. The correlation coefficient of this variable also resulted highly statistically significant.
However, its validity as a proxy was tested by creating another dummy variable with the value of 1 of the years
251

The finding that a strong mandate is very strongly correlated with water usage reductions
confirms the conclusions of most research on non-price water conservation strategies. Hanneman
and Nauges (2005), Renwick and Archibald (1998), Renwick and Green (2000) had estimated
that outdoor water usage restrictions were more effective in reducing water usage than any other
water conservation strategy. The problem with strong mandates issued in a crisis, however, is
whether they can yield consistent results in the long term. This analysis has not addressed this
issue.
Methodological Reflection
There are some limitations to the reliability of the statistical analysis. The most relevant
is the quality of the data available to study water related issues at the retail level. The concern is
mainly about the dependent variable. Data about daily per capita water usage is the result of
many assumptions. Data about water demand is not recorded consistently. Although DWR
makes an effort in collecting data from the water agencies, water agencies don’t report their
activity every year. To fill the reporting gaps of the agencies included in this analysis, data on
water demand has been estimated based on other available information and this has been done in
about 20% of the cases. Data about residents in cities intra census is also based on assumptions
and estimates. Intra census demographic data for census blocks or blockgroup, that could be
aggregated to estimate the number of residents of water agencies service area, is not available.
Assumptions have to be made to attribute to small sub areas rate of demographic change of cities
for which estimates are available through California DOF. Additional concerns are about the data
change of GDP. BEA provides data about change of per capita GDP down to the Metropolitan
2007 and 2008. The correlation coefficient of this variable also resulted statistically significant. This result signals
that dummy variables indiscriminately attributed to every agency represent some fixed effect that is not necessarily
the policy that needs to be analyzed. The indicator was replaced with a dummy variable that represents local actions
more closely, that assumes different values in different years.
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Statistical Area that is much larger than the individual water agency. In addition, Orange County
is included in the Los Angeles, Long Beach, Santa Ana MSA and the data might not represent
actual changes in Orange County. Furthermore, there is no data available to control for social
characteristics of the residents and to estimate whether local wealth of specific attitudes might
influence water related behaviors.
The choice of the model could also be questioned. By choosing a panel model that
corrects for fixed effects it has not been possible to test two relevant hypotheses related to the
institutional analysis of water management: whether the type of governance is correlated with
trends in per capita water usage and whether an agency well connected in the water conservation
information network has better results in reducing residential water usage. The alternative would
have been to limit the results to an OLS with a serious “omitted variables” bias, that was tested
with the Ramsey specification error test. The choice has been to seek for unbiased coefficients
and opt for the fixed effects panel regression.
Finally the sample selection could also bias the results. The sample has not been selected
randomly and the agencies considered in this analysis could be a subgroup of agencies more
committed to water conservation because more dependent from imported water and located in
slightly drier areas that the average
Conclusions
The reduction in per capita water usage that water agencies have experienced in Southern
California in recent years is strongly correlated with changes in local weather, with local
economic trends, and with the timing of local water usage restriction ordinances. The results of a
robust fixed effect panel regression model supports the hypothesis that ordinances aimed at
permanently controlling outdoor water irrigation are correlated to the changes in percapita
253

residential daily water usage. The result is in line with the current literature on water demand
management (Hanneman and Nauges 2005; Renwick and Archibald 1998; Renwick and Green
2000). Other water conservation policies like changes in water rates and rebates for water saving
devices are not significantly correlated with changes in per capita water consumption. The result
confirms the conclusions reached by Kenny et al. (2008), but is not supported by the literature on
water price elasticity (Arbues, Garcia-Valiñas, and Martinez-Espiñeira 2003; Dalhusien et al.
2003; Duke, Ehemann, and Mackenzie 2002; Grafton et al. 2006; Hewitt and Hanemann 1995;
Hoffman 2006; Mansur and Olmstead 2007; Olmstead, Hanemann and Stavins 2007;
Worthington and Hoffman 2008). Among the institutional characteristics of the water agencies
only size matters. The decline in water usage is statistically correlated with agencies with larger
service base as predicted by Heikkila (2004), but the effect of size is very small.
Also, the model that better analyzes the available data, drops the variables that represent
the type of governance and the degree of connection of the water agencies to the others.

254

CONCLUSIONS
This research has examined the water supply governance system in Southern California
and has analyzed how water agencies implements water conservation policies. Its goal is to
understand the transition from water policies aimed at increasing supply to water policies aimed
at controlling water demand, by assessing how structural characteristics of water governance
influence water retailers’ water demand management effort and the effectiveness of different
water demand management strategies implemented by water retailers.
The examination has been untaken in context of the theoretical literature on water and
institutions guided by Elinor Ostrom’s IAD framework and, specifically, a group of studies
concerned with the relationships among water management organizations and with the
interactions between rules, socio economic, political and environmental context, as highlighted
in chapter 1 (Adler 2009; Ingram et al. 1984; Blomquist 1992; Blomquist, Heikkila and Schlager
2004; Blomquist 2009; Eire 2006; Heikkila 2004; Kallis et al. 2009; Mullin 2009; E. Ostrom
1990; V. Ostrom 1953; Saleth and Dinar 2004, 2005; Schlüter and Pahl-Wostl 2007; Zetland
2009).
It also draws from the literature on water demand management that analyzes the elasticity
of water demand to price (Arbues, Garcia-Valiñas, and Martınez-Espiñeira 2003; Dalhuisen et al.
2003; Duke, Ehemann, and Mackenzie 2002; Grafton et al. 2010; Hewitt and Hanemann 1995;
Mansur and Olmstead 2007; Olmstead, Hanemann and Stavins 2007; Olmstead and Stavins
2009; Worthington and Hoffman 2008) and the effects of water demand management strategies
(Campbell, Johson, and Hunt Larson 2004; Hanneman and Nauges 2005; Hughes 2012; Kenney
et al. 2004, 2008; Michelsen, McGuckin, and Stumpf 1999; Renwick and Archibald 1998;
Renwick and Green 2000; Tsai, Cohen and Vogel 2011).
255

The analysis of the existing literature highlights that studies on water management from
an institutional perspective are focused on formal and informal norms, policy, and organizations
as well as on with the relationships among stakeholders and on the links of the institutional
environment with the characteristics local natural resources (Adler 2009; Blomquist 2009;
Ingram et al. 1984, E. Ostrom 1990). It also finds that empirical research has found correlation
between the characteristics of the environment, the political and the legal systems, and the
economic development of nations and their water management systems (Saleth and Dinar 2004,
2005), a correlation between the nature of water agencies (Hanak 2009; Mullin 2009) and their
performance and that larger agencies are more likely to implement complex water management
arrangements than smaller agencies (Heikkila 2004; Schluter and Pahl-Wostl 2007). Special
districts, thanks to their exclusive focus on water issues, are more likely to adopt innovative
water management strategies, to be concerned about equity and water conservation and to abide
to state mandates, rather than cities, that are concerned with a plurality of issues. Agencies with a
larger customer base have more resources and more access to information and are more likely to
implement conjunctive water management than smaller organizations.
The analysis of water demand management literature highlights that weather, household
composition, housing characteristics, frequency of billing and type of outdoor irrigation are the
typical components of household water consumption models, that water has a very low elasticity
to price (Arbues, Garcia-Valiñas and Martınez-Espiñeira 2003; Duke, Ehemann, and Mackenzie
2002; Grafton et al. 2010; Hewitt and Hanemann 1995, Olmstead, Hanemann and Stavins 2007;
Olmstead and Stavins 2009; Worthington and Hoffman 2008), that water saving technologies,
although being effective, produce less water savings than expected (Campbell, Johson, and Hunt
Larson 2004; Renwick and Archibald 1998; Renwick and Green 2000; Tsai, Cohen, and Vogel
256

2011; Wallander 2007, 2009), that voluntary water demand management commitments are not
effective (Hughes 2012) and that local ordinances that limit outdoor irrigation are very effective
(Hanneman and Nauges 2005; Kenny et al. 2008; Renwick and Archibald 1998; Renwick and
Green 2000).
Research about institutional systems has mainly been conducted through the analysis of
individual case studies, but most recently, surveys and meta-analyses have adopted quantitative
methods to explore the relationship between governance systems and policy outcomes. This
research combines qualitative and quantitative methods using a sequential explanatory design.
The geographic area of analysis is the service area of the Southern California Water
Management District that includes parts of Ventura, Los Angeles, San Bernardino, Riverside,
Orange and San Diego counties. The qualitative stage includes 30 interviews to water
conservation coordinators of water wholesalers, cities and water districts, to watermasters, to
general managers and to board members of water agencies. The quantitative section has the
individual water retail agency as the unit of analysis and, due to limitations in the availability of
data, includes 56 water agencies located in Orange County, in San Diego County and in the
Western part of San Bernardino County.
Based on the existing literature and on the interviews with the water conservation
coordinators and water managers of the largest organizations that manage water supply in
Southern California the quantitative section of this research tests the following hypotheses:
H1 Special districts are more likely to innovate than cities, therefore they are more
effective in reducing per capita residential water usage.
H2 Size matters, large retailers are more effective in reducing residential water usage than
smaller retailers.
257

H3 Water retailers with higher dependency from ground water are less effective in
reducing per capita water usage.
H4 Water retailers with a dense network or relationships with other entities are more
effective in reducing per capita water usage.
H5 Higher water rates are correlated with higher reductions of per capita residential water
usage.
H6 Higher per capita rebates distributed by water agencies to their customers to purchase
water saving devices are correlated with higher water usage reduction.
H7 Mandates to permanently reduce outdoor water usage are correlated with water usage
reduction.
The research includes a description of the Southern California water management system
as the product of the interaction of a highly centralized system that manages imported water, a
self-governed system that manages groundwater and a decentralized system that sells water to
retail customers. Water availability is regulated by major Federal, State and local agreements.
Water imported from the Colorado River and from the Bay Delta is managed by one large
monopolist, Metropolitan Water District (MWD), and sold exclusively to its member agencies
(15 cities and 11 wholesalers). Local groundwater rights have been mostly adjudicated to local
users among which cities and special districts. The use of water rights is managed by a system of
watermasters, water replenishment special districts, counties and federal agencies. These
organizations monitor the activities of water rights holders and compensate for excessive
pumping by buying imported water from MWD and letting it percolate back to the aquifers.
Recycled water still covers a very low percentage of the local needs is produced and distributed
258

by water wholesalers and in some instances by water retailers. The description is reported in
chapter 3.
Chapter 4 describes strategies and tools that are commonly used do design water
conservation policies: ordinances, water saving devices, education, information and pricing. It
finds that there is a growing number of water saving devices that are being certified, standardized
and are entering the main stream of household fixtures, but their actual effectiveness is usually
less than expected. It also highlights that inclining block water rates are becoming prevalent in
the US and that budget based block rates are considered the most effective tool to control water
rates and water agencies’ revenues.
Chapter 5 describes the water conservation policies enacted by federal state and local
agencies. California DWR and local water organizations agree that water conservation is the key
to address future water uncertainties, but the effort to reduce water usage is not well funded, and,
at the retail level is neither well organized nor consistent. Starting in the early 1990s through
2009 water conservation was only a voluntary effort that water retailers and wholesalers carried
out coordinated by a voluntary organization, with no mandated reporting and no accountability
mechanisms. Conservation policies were essentially limited to rebates on water saving devices
and to information campaigns. There was coordination among water wholesalers and large
retailers, but small retailers, that serve the vast majority of Southern California customers, were
essentially passive subjects. A powerful force that influenced water consumption was instead a
federal standard for showerheads, faucets and toilets, included in the Energy Protection Act of
1992.
In 2009, at the tail of a severe drought and facing the failure of the voluntary effort, the
state legislature passed the mandate to reduce per capita water consumption by 20% by 2020 and
259

secured the water agencies’ commitment by requiring that they meet an interim target to be
eligible for state funding for water infrastructures. MWD, the local water wholesaler, had to
ration its water sales and pressured local water agencies to pass ordinances to permanently
regulate outdoor water usage. Since 2009, however, policies on the ground have not changed
drastically. The 20 by 2020 mandate results weak, for it includes methods to establish baselines
and targets that are very generous, water saving devices for outdoor irrigation have resulted less
effective than expected and pricing is considered a politically infeasible instrument to reduce
water usage. A new California building code is likely to influence water usage in the long term,
but local water agencies appear not to be in control.
Chapter 6 summarizes the results of the interviews with conservation coordinators and
officials of water wholesalers and some retailers of different size and of different nature (cities
and special districts). The outcomes of the interviews offer additional perspectives to some of the
findings of the literature review. The analysis of the existing literature about water management
reveals that the nature of the organization affects its ability to implement water conservation
measures and that special districts are more likely to innovate than city departments (Hanak
2009; Mullins 2009). The interviews have shown that organizations of different nature have
different opinions about the effectiveness of conservation strategies. Large wholesalers claim
that standardization and inclusion of water saving devices in building codes is the most effective,
cities underline the importance of ordinances and special districts instead believe that pricing is
more successful.
According to the literature, the fragmentation of the water supply chain does not result in
polycentric water management arrangements to implement innovative water management
strategies. Instead, economies of scale drive innovation in water management and larger
260

organizations are more likely to be innovative than small organizations (Heikkila 2004 and
Schlüter and Pahl-Wostl, 2007). The interviews validate this assessment and offer insight on
different perceptions of small and large organizations. Small water agencies perceive that their
biggest hurdles come from inside the organization (lack of resources, elected officials’ lack of
interest) and can hardly be affected by the organization itself. Larger water agencies see their
implementation problems related to the characteristics of the programs that can be tweaked and
changed to become more effective and have the perception of being more in control of the
conservation effort.
The interviews also highlight that collaboration among agencies is at the heart of the
conservation effort partially supporting McGinnis’ (2000) and Ostrom, Tiebout, and Warrens’
(1961) findings that polycentric systems deliver service effectively when supported by dense
formal and informal communication network.
Chapter 7 analyzes the statistical relationship between the conservation effort policy
output, represented by variations in per capita residential water usage and a number of
independent variables identified in the literature review and through the interviews with water
agencies’ officials. The dependent variable in the analysis is the yearly percentage change of per
capita residential water consumption between 2006 and 2010.
Independent variables are the following:
• Yearly percentage change in water rates.
• The governance of the water agency, whether the agency is a city or a special district.
• Percentage of total water demand supplied through groundwater.
• Amount of rebates for residential customers to purchase High Efficiency Washers (HEW),
High Efficiency Toilets (HET), Weather Based Irrigation Controllers (WBIC), rotating
261

nozzles and to replace natural turf with synthetic turf distributed in each water agency’s
service area, weighted on the number of residents of each water agency.
• A measure of the interconnectedness of the water agencies (a closeness measure that has
been estimated through a network analysis).
• Population served (a measure of the size of each water retail agency).
• Yearly percentage change in precipitation.
• Population density.
• Local Ordinances that mandate permanent outdoor irrigation limits.
• Per capita real GDP rate of change in the MSA where the retail agency is located.
The reduction in per capita water usage that water agencies have experienced in Southern
California in recent years results strongly correlated with changes in local weather, with local
economic trends, and with the timing of local water usage restriction ordinances. The results of a
robust fixed effect panel regression model supports the hypothesis that the correlation coefficient
of ordinances aimed at permanently controlling outdoor water irrigation and variations in
percapita residential daily water usage is statistically significant. The result is in line with the
current literature on water demand management (Hanneman and Nauges 2005; Renwick and
Archibald 1998; Renwick and Green 2000). Other water conservation policies like changes in
water rates and rebates for water saving devices are not significantly correlated with changes in
per capita water consumption. The result confirms the conclusions about rebates for water saving
devices reached by Kenny et al. (2008), but is not supported by the literature on water price
elasticity (Arbues, Garcia-Valiñas and Martınez-Espiñeira 2003; Dalhuisen et al. 2003;
Olmstead, Hanemann, and Stavins 2007; Worthington and Hoffman 2008). Among the
institutional characteristics of the water agencies only size matters. The decline in water usage is
262

statistically correlated with agencies with larger service base as predicted by Heikkila (2004) and
Schlüter and Pahl-Wostl (2007), but the effect of size is very small.
Also, the model that better analyzes the available data drops the variables that represent
the type of governance and the degree of connection of the water agencies to the others and does
not allow the assessment of the relationship between these two important factors and water
usage.
This research captures an important turning point of California water demand
management history, the transition from exclusively voluntary policies to mandated urban water
savings in a time frame characterized by a severe drought and by a severe economic recession.
It is innovative for three main reasons. Compared to previous research on water
management and institutions that adopts either qualitative (Blomquist 1992; Erie 2006; V.
Ostrom 1953; E. Ostrom 1990), or quantitative methods (Hanak 2009; Hiekkila 2004; Mullin
2009, Zetland 2008) it adopts a mixed method design that combines qualitative with quantitative
analysis, with the possibility of asking explanatory and exploratory question in the same study
and to integrate the results of the two methods. Compared to previous research that study water
management organizations it analyzes the factors that are correlated to policy outcomes rather
than those correlated to policy adoption (Hanak 2009; Heikkila 2004; Mullin 2009, Salet and
Dinar 2004). Compared to the existing literature on water demand management it focuses on the
effects of water demand policies from the perspective of the organizations rather than the
perspective of the individual water consumer (Campbell, Johson, and Hunt Larson 2004;
Hanneman and Nauges 2005; Renwick and Archibald 1998; Renwick and Green 2000; Tsai,
Cohen, and Vogel 2011).
263

Some of its results confirm previous findings. Saleth and Dinar (2004) argue that water
resources institutions and their performance are dependent on contextual factors like the
characteristics of the environment, the political and the legal systems, and the economic
development of each nation. This research confirms that these conclusions are partially valid for
smaller water management systems and can be applied to water conservation. Weather, rules and
wealth in fact affect the outcomes of water demand management policies.
As far as the effectiveness of specific water demand management instruments is
concerned, the research analyzes the effect of ordinances, rebates for water saving devices and
pricing. The interviews to water agencies’ officials find that rebates per se have limited effect on
water usage, that most coordinators believe that a combination of water saving tools is more
effective and that cities and special districts have different perceptions of the effectiveness of
demand management policies. Cities judge that ordinances are more effective, large wholesalers
claim that standardization and inclusion of water saving devices in building codes is the most
effective strategy and special districts believe that pricing is more successful. The statistical
analysis finds statistically significant correlation coefficients only for ordinances that
permanently regulate outdoor water usage. The amount of rebates and pricing are not influential.
This partially confirms what has been found by Hanneman and Nauges 2005; Renwick and
Archibald 1998; Renwick and Green 2000. The existing literature is not unanimous, and finds
that ordinances are always significantly correlated with changes in water usage, rebates for water
saving devices are effective for managing indoor water demand and that water demand’s price
elasticity, although small, is mostly negative (Arbues, Garcia-Valiñas and Martınez-Espiñeira
2003, Dalhuisen et al. 2003; Olmstead, Hanemann and Stavins 2007; Worthington and Hoffman
2008). The analysis of the performance of water saving devices explains that one of the reasons
264

why rebates are not very relevant is because some of the technologies they support are not very
effective. The interviews, also, clarify the disconnection between prices and water demand. The
water agencies’ officers explain that pricing is seldom used as a water conservation tool and that
sometime water agencies are reluctant to increase prices until their revenues start to decline and
increase prices only after a drop in water sales rather than as a regulatory tool. A more careful
modeling of water rates could analyze in depth the relationship between agencies’ choices and
water usage.
Among the variables that describe the institutional characteristics of the water agencies,
the statistical model that is more suitable for the available data has tested only the correlation
between size of the agency’s customer base and changes in daily per capita residential water
usage and has found a statistically significant negative correlation. A larger costumer base is
correlated with larger reduction in per capita water usage. This finding mirrors what Heikkila et
al. (2004) found when analyzing which agencies were more likely to adopt conjunctive
management.
The panel regression with fixed effects has dropped two very important variables that are
fixed in time: the nature of the organizations that manage retail water and the degree of
integration in the information network of local water supplier. The robust OLS model found that
the governance variable’s correlation with changes in per capita water usage is not significant.
This result does not support Hanak’s (2009) and Mullin’s (2009) studies, that find that cities and
special districts perform differently. Hanak (2009) claims that utilities special districts are more
likely to complete a water management plan and to abide to the Department of Water Resources
guidelines, while municipalities and private water providers are less likely to abide to the state
rules. Mullin finds that special districts are more likely to implement policies that “advance
265

equity and conservation” (Mullin 2009, 80) than cities, because they are more accountable to
their customers for issues specifically pertaining water, while city governments are accountable
to citizens for a wider range of issues (Mullin 2009).
Finally, robust OLS found that their degree of connectivity of the information network is
not correlated with the agencies’ conservation performance. Although the qualitative interviews
reveal that the conservation coordinators attribute very much importance to the collaborative
spirit that supports their activity, the hypothesis that intense interaction and information sharing
is correlated with a policy outcome drawn from Elinor Ostrom (1964) and Dietz, Ostrom, and
Stern (2003) is not supported and remains an anecdotal finding.
The research on the effects of water demand management strategies from the perspective
of water organizations is scarce and mostly takes into account policy adoption. This research,
that has policy outcomes as the focus of analysis, adds a different perspective to this literature
and confirms that mandates are an effective tool to reduce water usage, while pricing and rebates
are not effective and that there are economies of scale also in the implementation of water
conservation strategies.
Additional research is needed to explore the role of different form of governance and how
collaboration and dense information networks influence agencies’ performance using
longitudinal data. Additional research is also needed to clarify how water agencies make
decisions about pricing and which pricing methods are more effective in controlling water usage.
In a policy perspective, the transition from a water supply to a water demand
management oriented strategy appears guided by contextual factors such as the economic cycle
and the weather, which occur outside the water governance system, rather than by water
management strategies decided by policy makers. In effect, this is not very different from the
266

past when water infrastructure investments were decided at the peak of droughts. Clearly the
transition from supply to demand side management is far from complete.
As we move into a future where droughts are projected to be more frequent and
intensive, it is reasonable to assume that demand side strategies will continue to evolve as water
management agencies learn and change, with the likelihood of even greater water rationing and
landscaping restrictions. A balanced approach in accomplishing the needed reduction in per
capita and possible overall water consumption in the region will likely require an increased use
of ever steeper rates, combined with the effectiveness of caps on use, the consolidations of
smaller agencies, and rebates on more effective devices to reduce outdoor irrigation.

267

APPENDICES

268

APPENDIX A

List of interviewees
Steve Sabbe Calleguas Municipal Water District Resource Specialist
Joseph Legaspi Central Basin Municipal Water District Interim Public Affairs Manager
Elizabeth Lovsted Eastern Municipal Water District Conservation Coordinator
Lisa Morgan Perales Inland Empire Utility Agency Water Resources Analyst
Joe Berg MWD Orange County Water use Efficiency Programs Manager
Cindy De Chaine Three Valleys Municipal Water District Conservation and Resource Analyst
Shane Chapman Upper San Gabriel Valley MWD General Manager
Elena Layugan Upper San Gabriel Valley MWD Conservation Coordinator
Gus Meza West Basin Municipal Water District Water Use Efficiency Specialist
Tim Barr Western Municipal Water District Water Use Efficiency Manager
Penny Falcon Los Angeles Dept. of Water and Power Water Conservation Policy Manager
Matthew Lyons Long Beach Water Department Director, Planning & Water
Conservation
Ken Jenkins California Water Service Company Conservation Manager
Edwin De Leon Golden State Water Company Water Use Efficiency Manager
Alice Webb-Cole Metropolitan Water District Senior Resource Specialist
Tim Blair Metropolitan Water District Water Use Efficiency Manager
Ron Gastelum Metropolitan Water District Former General Manager
Julie Carver City of Pomona Environmental Programs Coordinator
Raul Garibay City of Pomona
Sona Kalapura City of Manhattan Beach Environmental Programs Manager
Alison Loukeh City of Upland Water Conservation Specialist
Fiona Sanchez Irvine Ranch Water District Conservation Manager
Tim Brick Metropolitan Water District Former Chairman of the Board
Susan Hinman MWD Orange County Board Member
Mary
Eileen
Matheis Irvine Ranch Water District Board Member
Elsa Lopez Water Replenishment District External Affairs Manager
Mike Marcus Orange County Water District General Manager
Ken Jeske Chino Basin Watermaster General Manager
Eunice Ulloa Chino Basin Water Conservation
District
General Manager
Deborah Whitney US Bureau of Reclamation

269

APPENDIX B

QUESTIONS FOR WATER DISTRICTS AND CITIES
Primary question Secondary question
Can you talk about the conservation strategies in
your organization. Please describe the initiatives,
when and how they have been implemented and
explain the degree of commitment of your
organization to conservation strategies

It would be nice if you could describe the
programs shortly
Probe if they rather outreach, give rebates or
work on rates;
Probe if conservation is strategic to the
organization or if it is just a mandate.
Probe if they consider their organization
successful in water conservation

How does the district fund water conservation
activities?
Is a fixed share of the revenues reserved for
water conservation?

What do you consider the most effective
strategies your organization has implemented
Probe if market based strategies are
considered more effective or mandates are
preferred

Please describe what are the factors of success
of conservation strategies and explain the
reasons behind your assessment
Probe how organizational, financial and
serendipitous conditions interplay

What do you consider “failed strategies” Probe whether “demand hardening” is
something they consider relevant or not

What are the biggest hurdles in implementing
water conservation policies
Same as before, but also explore the
constraints related to existing agreements
such as Purchase Order with MWD, water
rights and reduction of revenues.

Have you seen your revenues reduced due to
reduced demand?
Probe if reduced demand and revenues
creates tensions with MWD

270

Does your organization interact with other
organizations to design and implement
conservation policies
This is partially related to Q1 and the goal is
to understand:
a) If the organization branches out;
b) If the motivation for conservation
strategies stems from MWD or the
wholesaler.
A follow up question could be if interactions
with others would make conservation easier
or more effective.
Ask if they attend the MWD meetings, if
there are similar initiatives in the area.
If the answer is yes ask for a description of
the activity, the reasons behind the choice of
working with others, how the collaboration
takes place, who initiated it.
Relations with EPA
Relations with USACE
Relations with USBoR
Relations with DWR
Relations with Cal EPA
Relations with DPH
Relations with County
Relations with Local Council of Government
Relations with other wholesalers
Relations with retailers Is there a difference between private and
public agencies? Do they respond differently
to water conservation actions?
How does the funding partnership with local
agencies work?
Relations with Cities’ Planning Department
Relations with watermasters
Relations with others such as Gas company
Relations with MWD Ask if they attend the MWD meetings, if
there are similar initiatives in the area.
Where do you get information about
conservation programs (other than MWD)

Do you collaborate with other water agencies for
other water supply initiatives
Recycling, desalination. Etc. ask for a
description of the activity, the reasons behind
the choice of working with others, how the
collaboration takes place, who initiated it,
what are the hurdles of working with other
agencies.

271

APPENDIX C

State of California The Resources Agency
Calendar Year 2005
1. General Information 2. Active Service Connections
Please follow the guidelines on the Customer Class Recycled Potable Water
back of this form. Water
Metered Unmetered Metered Unmetered Metered Unmetered
Contact : Single Family Residential
Title: Multi-family Residential
Phone: Commercial/Institutional
Fax: Industrial
E-mail: Landscape Irrigation
Website: Other
Communities served: Agricultural Irrigation
County:
Population served TOTAL
3. Total Water Into the System - Units of production:
Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Total
Wells
Potable
Surface
Purchased
1/
Total Potable
Recycled
2/
1/ Potable wholesale supplier(s): 2/ Recycled wholesale supplier(s):
Level of treatment:
4. Metered Water Deliveries - Units of delivery:
Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Total
A. Single Family Residential
B. Multi-family Residential
C. Commercial/Institutional
D. Industrial
E. Landscape Irrigation
F. Other
Total Urban Retail (A thru F)
Agricultural Irrigation
Wholesale(to other agencies)
DWR 38 (Rev. 4/05) Page 1 of 2
Mailing Label
To return to the next line while in the mailing
label cell, hold down the "Alt" key and press
"Enter" key
Department of Water Resources
PUBLIC WATER SYSTEM STATISTICS
Complete this portion if the system serves all
or part of an incorporated city
Inside City Limits Outside City Limits
acre-feet million gallons hundred cubic feet
acre-feet million gallons hundred cubic feet
272

APPENDIX D

273

274

275

APPENDIX E
Status of groundwater basins in MWD service area
Name of Basin Used for water supply Type of management
Sylmar Yes Adjudicated
San Fernando Yes Adjudicated
Verdugo Yes Adjudicated
Eagle Rock Yes Adjudicated
Raymond Yes Adjudicated
West Yes Adjudicated
Central Yes Adjudicated
Main San Gabriel Yes Adjudicated
Six Basins Yes Adjudicated
Chino Yes Adjudicated
Cucamonga Yes Adjudicated
Puente No Adjudicated
Orange County Yes Unadjudicated
Temescal Yes Court Jurisdiction
Temecula Valley Yes Court Jurisdiction
Santa Margarita Valley Yes Court Jurisdiction
West Las Posas Valley Yes Management Plan
East Las Posas Valley Yes Management Plan
South Las Posas Valley Yes Management Plan
Oxnard Plain Yes Management Plan
Elsinore Yes Management Plan
San Juan Valley Yes Management Plan
Poway Valley Yes Unadjudicated
Santa Monica Yes Unadjudicated
Spadra Yes Unadjudicated
Riverside-Arlington Yes Unadjudicated
Conejo Valley Yes Unadjudicated
La Habra Yes Unadjudicated
Thousand Oaks Yes Unadjudicated
Hidden Valley Yes Unadjudicated
Malibu Valley No Unadjudicated
Hollywood No Unadjudicated
San Mateo Valley No Unadjudicated
San Onofre Valley No Unadjudicated
San Luis Rey Valley No Unadjudicated
Escondido Valley No Unadjudicated
San Dieguito Creek No Unadjudicated
Mission Valley No Unadjudicated
San Diego River Valley No Unadjudicated
El Cajon Valley No Unadjudicated
Sweetwater Valley No Unadjudicated
Otay Valley No Unadjudicated
Tijuana No Unadjudicated
Batiquitos Lagoon Valley No Unadjudicated
San Elijo Valley No Unadjudicated
San Marcos Area No Unadjudicated
Simi Valley No Unadjudicated
Source: MWD, 2007

276

APPENDIX F
Flow standards according to Cal Green
FIXTURE TYPE
1
FLOW RATE MAXIMUM FLOW RATE
AT 20 percent
REDUCTION

Showerheads 2.5 gpm @ 80 psi 2 gpm @ 80 psi
Lavatory faucets, residential 2.2 gpm @ 60 psi 1.5 gpm @ 60 psi2
Kitchen faucets 2.2 gpm @ 60 psi 1.8 gpm @ 60 psi
Gravity tank-type water closets 1.6 gallons/flush 1.28 gallons/flush1
Flushometer tank water closets 1.6 gallons/flush 1.28 gallons/flush1
Flushometer valve water closets 1.6 gallons/flush 1.28 gallons/flush1
Electromechanical hydraulic water closets 1.6 gallons/flush 1.28 gallons/flush1
Urinals 1.0 gallon/flush .5 gallon/flush

1
Source: Data from California Building Standard Commission (2010) Green Building Standard Code, Sacramento:
CA, (p.18)available at http://www.documents.dgs.ca.gov/bsc/CALGreen/2010_CA_Green_Bldg.pdf
277

APPENDIX G
List of UWMPs consulted for the statistical analysis

Carlsbad Municipal Water District 2011. 2010 Urban Water Management Plan UWMP.
Carlsbad: CA. Accessed May 1, 2013,
http://www.water.ca.gov/urbanwatermanagement/2010uwmps/.
City of Anaheim. 2011. 2010 Urban Water Management Plan UWMP. Anaheim: CA.
Accessed May 2, 2013
http://www.water.ca.gov/urbanwatermanagement/2010uwmps/.
City of Brea. 2011. 2010 Urban Water Management Plan UWMP. Brea: CA. Accessed May 2,
2013, http://www.water.ca.gov/urbanwatermanagement/2010uwmps/.
City of Buena Park. 2011. 2010 Urban Water Management Plan UWMP. Buena Park: CA.
Accessed May 2, 2013,
http://www.water.ca.gov/urbanwatermanagement/2010uwmps/.
City of Chino. 2011. 2010 Urban Water Management Plan UWMP. Chino: CA. Accessed May
3, 2013, http://www.water.ca.gov/urbanwatermanagement/2010uwmps/.
City of Chino Hills. 2012. 2010 Urban Water Management Plan UWMP. Orange: CA.
Accessed May 3, 2013,
http://www.water.ca.gov/urbanwatermanagement/2010uwmps/.
City of Escondido. 2011. 2010 Urban Water Management Plan UWMP. Escondido: CA.
Accessed May 1, 2013,
http://www.water.ca.gov/urbanwatermanagement/2010uwmps/.
City of Fountain Valley. 2011. 2010 Urban Water Management Plan UWMP. Fountain Valley:
CA. Accessed May 2, 2013,
http://www.water.ca.gov/urbanwatermanagement/2010uwmps/.
City of Fullerton. 2011. 2010 Urban Water Management Plan UWMP. Fullerton: CA.
Accessed May 2, 2013,
http://www.water.ca.gov/urbanwatermanagement/2010uwmps/.
City of Garden Grove. 2011. 2010 Urban Water Management Plan UWMP. Garden Grove:
CA. Accessed May 2, 2013,
http://www.water.ca.gov/urbanwatermanagement/2010uwmps/.
City of Huntington Beach. 2011. 2010 Urban Water Management Plan UWMP. Huntington
Beach: CA. Accessed May 2, 2013,
http://www.water.ca.gov/urbanwatermanagement/2010uwmps/.
City of La Habra. 2011. 2010 Urban Water Management Plan UWMP. La Habra: CA.
Accessed May 2, 2013,
278

http://www.water.ca.gov/urbanwatermanagement/2010uwmps/.
City of La Palma. 2011. 2010 Urban Water Management Plan UWMP. La Palma: CA.
Accessed May 2, 2013,
http://www.water.ca.gov/urbanwatermanagement/2010uwmps/.
City of Newport Beach. 2011. 2010 Urban Water Management Plan UWMP. Newport Beach:
CA. Accessed May 2, 2013,
http://www.water.ca.gov/urbanwatermanagement/2010uwmps/.
City of Oceanside. 2011. 2010 Urban Water Management Plan UWMP. Oceanside: CA.
Accessed May 1, 2013,
http://www.water.ca.gov/urbanwatermanagement/2010uwmps/.
City of Ontario. 2011. 2010 Urban Water Management Plan UWMP. Ontario: CA. Accessed
May 3, 2013, http://www.water.ca.gov/urbanwatermanagement/2010uwmps/.
City of Orange. 2011. 2010 Urban Water Management Plan UWMP. Orange: CA. Accessed
May 2, 2013, http://www.water.ca.gov/urbanwatermanagement/2010uwmps/.
City of Poway. 2011. 2010 Urban Water Management Plan UWMP. Poway: CA. Accessed
May 1, 2013, http://www.water.ca.gov/urbanwatermanagement/2010uwmps/.
City of San Clemente. 2011. 2010 Urban Water Management Plan UWMP. San Clemente: CA.
Accessed May 2, 2013,
http://www.water.ca.gov/urbanwatermanagement/2010uwmps/.
City of San Diego. 2011. 2010 Urban Water Management Plan UWMP. San Diego: CA.
Accessed May 1, 2013,
http://www.water.ca.gov/urbanwatermanagement/2010uwmps/.
City of San Juan Capistrano. 2011. 2010 Urban Water Management Plan UWMP. San Juan
Capistrano: CA. Accessed May 2, 2013,
http://www.water.ca.gov/urbanwatermanagement/2010uwmps/.
City of Santa Ana 2011. 2010 Urban Water Management Plan UWMP. Santa Ana: CA.
Accessed May 2, 2013,
http://www.water.ca.gov/urbanwatermanagement/2010uwmps/.
City of Seal Beach. 2011. 2010 Urban Water Management Plan UWMP. Seal Beach: CA.
Accessed May 2, 2013,
http://www.water.ca.gov/urbanwatermanagement/2010uwmps/.
City of Tustin. 2011. 2010 Urban Water Management Plan UWMP. Tustin: CA. Accessed
May 2, 2013, http://www.water.ca.gov/urbanwatermanagement/2010uwmps/.
City of Upland. 2011. 2010 Urban Water Management Plan UWMP. Orange: CA. Accessed
279

May 2, 2013, http://www.water.ca.gov/urbanwatermanagement/2010uwmps/.
City of Westminster. 2011. 2010 Urban Water Management Plan UWMP. Westminster: CA.
Accessed May 2, 2013,
http://www.water.ca.gov/urbanwatermanagement/2010uwmps/.
Cucamonga Valley Water District. 2011. 2010 Urban Water Management Plan UWMP. Rancho
Cucamonga: CA. Accessed May 3, 2013,
http://www.water.ca.gov/urbanwatermanagement/2010uwmps/.
East Orange County Water District. 2011. 2010 Urban Water Management Plan UWMP.
Orange: CA. Accessed May 2, 2013,
http://www.water.ca.gov/urbanwatermanagement/2010uwmps/.
El Toro Water District. 2011. 2010 Urban Water Management Plan UWMP. Lake Forest: CA.
Accessed May 2, 2013,
http://www.water.ca.gov/urbanwatermanagement/2010uwmps/.
Fallbrook Public Utilities District. 2011. 2010 Urban Water Management Plan UWMP.
Fallbrook: CA. Accessed May 1, 2013,
http://www.water.ca.gov/urbanwatermanagement/2010uwmps/.
Fontana Water Company. 2011. 2010 Urban Water Management Plan UWMP. Fontana: CA.
Accessed May 3, 2013,
http://www.water.ca.gov/urbanwatermanagement/2010uwmps/.
Golden State Water Company Cowan Heights. 2011. 2010 Urban Water Management Plan
UWMP. San Dimas: CA. Accessed May 2, 2013,
http://www.water.ca.gov/urbanwatermanagement/2010uwmps/.
Golden State Water Company Placentia. 2011. 2010 Urban Water Management Plan UWMP. San
Dimas: CA. Accessed May 1, 2013,
http://www.water.ca.gov/urbanwatermanagement/2010uwmps/.
Golden State Water Company West Orange County . 2011. 2010 Urban Water Management Plan
UWMP. San Dimas: CA. Accessed May 1, 2013,
http://www.water.ca.gov/urbanwatermanagement/2010uwmps/.
Helix Water District. 2011. 2010 Urban Water Management Plan UWMP. La Mesa: CA.
Accessed May 1, 2013,
http://www.water.ca.gov/urbanwatermanagement/2010uwmps/
Irvine Ranch Water District. 2011. 2010 Urban Water Management Plan UWMP. Irvine: CA.
Accessed May 3, 2013,
http://www.water.ca.gov/urbanwatermanagement/2010uwmps/.
Laguna Beach County Water District.2011. 2010 Urban Water Management Plan UWMP.
Laguna Beach: CA. Accessed May 2, 2013,
280

http://www.water.ca.gov/urbanwatermanagement/2010uwmps/.
Lakeside Water District. 2011. 2010 Urban Water Management Plan UWMP. Lakeside: CA.
Accessed July 27th 2012
http://www.water.ca.gov/urbanwatermanagement/2010uwmps/
Mesa Consolidated Water District. 2011. 2010 Urban Water Management Plan UWMP.
Escondido: CA. Accessed May 1, 2013,
http://www.water.ca.gov/urbanwatermanagement/2010uwmps/.
Monte Vista Water District. 2011. 2010 Urban Water Management Plan UWMP. Montclair:
CA. Accessed May 3, 2013,
http://www.water.ca.gov/urbanwatermanagement/2010uwmps/.
Moulton Niguel Water District. 2011. 2010 Urban Water Management Plan UWMP. Laguna
Niguel: CA. Accessed May 2, 2013,
http://www.water.ca.gov/urbanwatermanagement/2010uwmps/.
Olivenhein Municipal Water District. 2011. 2010 Urban Water Management Plan UWMP.
Encinitas: CA. Accessed May 1, 2013
http://www.water.ca.gov/urbanwatermanagement/2010uwmps/
Otay Water District 2011. 2010 Urban Water Management Plan UWMP. Spring Valley: CA.
Accessed May 1, 2013,
http://www.water.ca.gov/urbanwatermanagement/2010uwmps/
Padre Dam Municipal Water District. 2011. 2010 Urban Water Management Plan UWMP.
Santee: CA. Accessed May 1, 2013,
http://www.water.ca.gov/urbanwatermanagement/2010uwmps/
Rainbow Municipal Water District. 2011. 2010 Urban Water Management Plan UWMP.
Fallbrook: CA. Accessed May 1, 2013,
http://www.water.ca.gov/urbanwatermanagement/2010uwmps/.
Ramona Municipal Water District. 2011. 2010 Urban Water Management Plan UWMP.
Ramona: CA. Accessed May 1, 2013,
http://www.water.ca.gov/urbanwatermanagement/2010uwmps/
Rincon Del Diablo Municipal Water District. 2011. 2010 Urban Water Management Plan
UWMP. Escondido: CA. Accessed May 1, 2013,
http://www.water.ca.gov/urbanwatermanagement/2010uwmps/.
San Dieguito Water District. 2011. 2010 Urban Water Management Plan UWMP. Encinitas:
CA. Accessed May 1, 2013,
http://www.water.ca.gov/urbanwatermanagement/2010uwmps/.
Santa Fe Irrigation District 2011. 2010 Urban Water Management Plan UWMP. Rancho Santa
Fe: CA. Accessed May 1, 2013,
281

http://www.water.ca.gov/urbanwatermanagement/2010uwmps/.
Santa Margarita Water District. 2011. 2010 Urban Water Management Plan UWMP. Rancho
Santa Margarita: CA. Accessed May 2, 2013,
http://www.water.ca.gov/urbanwatermanagement/2010uwmps/.
Serrano Water District. 2011. 2010 Urban Water Management Plan UWMP. Villa Park: CA.
Accessed May 2, 2013,
http://www.water.ca.gov/urbanwatermanagement/2010uwmps/.
South Coast Water District. 2011. 2010 Urban Water Management Plan UWMP. Laguna
Beach: CA. Accessed May 1, 2013,
http://www.water.ca.gov/urbanwatermanagement/2010uwmps/.
Sweetwater Authority2011. 2010 Urban Water Management Plan UWMP. Chula Vista: CA.
Accessed May 1, 2013,
http://www.water.ca.gov/urbanwatermanagement/2010uwmps/.
Trabuco Canyon Water District. 2011. 2010 Urban Water Management Plan UWMP. Trabuco
Canyon: CA. Accessed May 2, 2013,
http://www.water.ca.gov/urbanwatermanagement/2010uwmps/.
Vallecitos Water District. 2011. 2010 Urban Water Management Plan UWMP. San Marcos:
CA. Accessed May 1, 2013,
http://www.water.ca.gov/urbanwatermanagement/2010uwmps/.
Valley Center Municipal Water District. 2011. 2010 Urban Water Management Plan UWMP.
Valley Center: CA. Accessed May 1, 2013,
http://www.water.ca.gov/urbanwatermanagement/2010uwmps/.
Vista Irrigation District 2011. 2010 Urban Water Management Plan UWMP. Vista: CA.
Accessed May 1, 2013,
http://www.water.ca.gov/urbanwatermanagement/2010uwmps/
Yorba Linda Water District. 2011. 2010 Urban Water Management Plan UWMP. Placentia:
CA. Accessed May 2, 2013,
http://www.water.ca.gov/urbanwatermanagement/2010uwmps/.

282

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326

Abstract (if available)

Abstract The goal of this research is to study the water conservation capabilities of Southern California water agencies and the institutional responses that could enhance the regional system's water conservation capacity. Southern California water conservation capabilities are going to be tested by the forecasted population growth, by the increasing demand of water for environmental purposes and by climate change that will increase the uncertainty about the future consistency of water supply. The growth of Southern California in the last century has been based on the premise of abundant water supply, whose consistency has been provided by a complex institutional arrangement. In recent year, aware of its future challenges, the system has enacted conservation policies. It is interesting to test the system's conservation effectiveness and to understand whether it needs to change in order to improve its performance in terms of water conservation. The research highlights that the Southern California water conservation effort is small in terms of resources and effective only in case of emergency. Pricing strategies have been put in place only after an emergency for drought has been declared, in response of the decline of agencies' revenues, and the per capita amount of rebates is too small to be significant. Only water conservation ordinances, changes in precipitations and changes local economic indicators are correlated with changes in per capita water usage.

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Asset Metadata

Creator Maggioni, Elena (author)

Core Title A research on water conservation and governance networks in Southern California

School School of Policy, Planning and Development

Degree Doctor of Philosophy

Degree Program Policy, Planning, and Development

Publication Date 07/30/2013

Defense Date 06/30/2013

Publisher University of Southern California (original), University of Southern California. Libraries (digital)

Tag mixed methods,OAI-PMH Harvest,water and institutions,Water conservation,water demand management,water in Southern California

Format application/pdf (imt)

Language English

Contributor Electronically uploaded by the author (provenance)

Advisor Mazmanian, Daniel A. (committee chair), Adler, Paul S. (committee member), Musso, Juliet A. (committee member)

Creator Email maggioni.el@gmail.com,maggioni@usc.edu

Permanent Link (DOI) https://doi.org/10.25549/usctheses-c3-306835

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Legacy Identifier etd-MaggioniEl-1891.pdf

Dmrecord 306835

Document Type Dissertation

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Rights Maggioni, Elena

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Access Conditions The author retains rights to his/her dissertation, thesis or other graduate work according to U.S. copyright law. Electronic access is being provided by the USC Libraries in agreement with the a...

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