University of Southern California Dissertations and Theses

Navigating a way out of program improvement: a case study analysis

(USC Thesis Other)

Navigating a way out of program improvement: a case study analysis

PDF

Download a page range

Download transcript

Copy asset link

Request this asset

Transcript (if available)

Content Running head: NAVIGATING A WAY OUT OF PROGRAM IMPROVEMENT 1

NAVIGATING A WAY OUT OF PROGRAM IMPROVEMENT:
A CASE STUDY ANALYSIS

by

Monica Muñoz

A Dissertation Presented to the
FACULTY OF THE USC ROSSIER SCHOOL OF EDUCATION
UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA
In Partial Fulfillment of the
Requirements for the Degree
DOCTOR OF EDUCATION

May 2013

Copyright 2013 Monica Muñoz
NAVIGATING A WAY OUT OF PROGRAM IMPROVEMENT 2

DEDICATION

I dedicate this dissertation to my parents, Ernest and Cecilia Muñoz—you are
my beginning. To my brother, Matthew Thomas Muñoz, who was there in the middle of
it all. Finally, to my nephew, Matthew Ian Muñoz, and my nieces, Olive Irene Muñoz,
Samaya Claire Alvarez, and Zaira Pearl Alvarez—you are the future.
NAVIGATING A WAY OUT OF PROGRAM IMPROVEMENT 3

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

When I was in 6th grade I had this pencil that I loved; it had “USC” emblazoned in
gold foil across its surface. I would work on classwork, homework, and projects thinking
that it was the power of the pencil —not me—that made me successful; it said,
“Fight On!” on it, after all. Many years later, I understand that it was me, and great
influences around me, that helped me to be where I am: successful, fulfilled, and happy.
This dissertation is the culmination of many years of hard work, intention, and attention
to my academic life.
In life, I learn repeatedly, that goals are not accomplished without help along the
way. While a dissertation is the result of one person’s time and investment into a project
for which one is passionate, many eyes, hands, and voices contribute to its final
iteration. In completing this labor of love, I have many to thank for their sacrifices on
my behalf.
I must first begin with my ending—my dissertation chair, Dr. Julie Slayton. I am
grateful for your patience (with my awkward sentence construction) and your
dedication to the message I sought to convey through my project. Dr. Rousseau, I am
thankful for your energy and passion for underserved students; this is the context from
which I emerged as a student and continue to serve as a professional. Dr. Strunk, I am
appreciative of your ability to critically analyze policy and the ways in which it directly
impacts our educational systems—I will never see public policy in the same way. And,
finally, to my dear friend Geoff, I am tremendously blessed to have had the opportunity
to walk (and drive) this final leg of my educational journey with you. Your presence
made this final pursuit all the more pleasurable. Cheers to Starbucks coffee and, Fight
NAVIGATING A WAY OUT OF PROGRAM IMPROVEMENT 4

On!! Special thanks to my friend and mentor, Maribel. Thank you for merely suggesting
the idea of a doctorate! Without your suggestion and kind nudge I might not have ever
pursued it. I extend warm thanks and hugs to my morning time coffee-friends who heard
my frustrations, challenges, and successes along the way.
There are friends and family who have ebbed and flowed through this journey
with me—too many to list and, sadly, some are no longer here. I am grateful for their
encouragement, for their pride in me even when I did not feel I deserved it, their
friendship and enduring support. I cannot wait to spend time with you all, again.
I extend special thanks and appreciation to my one and only, Justin. You saw
the good, the bad, and ugly through the most critical part of this journey and you are
STILL here! In my wildest dreams, I would not have imagined that the very year I
finished this would be the same year that I would meet you, fall in love, and make a
home with you. Thank you for wanting to be in my life as much as I want to be in
yours. I happily look forward to the adventures that await us in our life together.
I end with my beginning: my parents, Ernest and Cecilia Muñoz. Thank you for
always encouraging me and always giving me perspective. Your influence and example
are greater than you realize.
NAVIGATING A WAY OUT OF PROGRAM IMPROVEMENT 5

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Dedication ................................................................................................................... 2
Acknowledgements ..................................................................................................... 3
List of Tables .............................................................................................................. 6
List of Figures ............................................................................................................. 7
Abstract ....................................................................................................................... 8
Chapter 1: Introduction ............................................................................................ 9
Chapter 2: Literature Review ................................................................................. 28
Chapter 3: Methodology ........................................................................................ 77
Chapter 4: Findings ................................................................................................ 92
Chapter 5: Conclusion ......................................................................................... 159
References ............................................................................................................... 165
Appendices .............................................................................................................. 174
Appendix A: Essential Program Components .......................................... 174
Appendix B: Observation Protocol, Adapted from Creswell (2009) ....... 180
Appendix C: Interview Protocol for Teachers, Adapted from ................. 181
Creswell (2009)
Appendix D: Interview Protocol for Principals ........................................ 184
Appendix E: Informed Consent ................................................................ 187
NAVIGATING A WAY OUT OF PROGRAM IMPROVEMENT 6

LIST OF TABLES

Table 1.1: Stages of Program Improvement by Year ............................................. 17

Table 2.1: Leadership Oriented Decision Making: For Reform ............................. 72

Table 2.2: Leadership Decision Making: Against Reform ..................................... 75

Table 3.1: Participants in the Study ........................................................................ 82

Table 3.2: Matrix of Research Question to Instrument and Conceptual Frame ..... 83

Table 3.3: Timeline of the Study ............................................................................ 86

Table 4.1: Areas of Improvement at Clover School as per AGP 2008-2009 ....... 119
NAVIGATING A WAY OUT OF PROGRAM IMPROVEMENT 7

LIST OF FIGURES
Figure 2.1. Leadership decision making –for reform ............................................. 71
Figure 2.2. Leadership decision making – against reform ..................................... 74
NAVIGATING A WAY OUT OF PROGRAM IMPROVEMENT 8

ABSTRACT

This study was conducted to ascertain what leadership actions best position a
principal to facilitate his school’s exit from Program Improvement (PI) designation.
Existing research suggests that the pressures for change in a high-stakes accountability
setting, such as that of PI, are not only more difficult to implement, but also require a
different skill set on the part of the leader who is charged with navigating his school.
The study employed a case-study analysis with purposive sampling. The
researcher sought a school that was entrenched in the Program Improvement years
(specifically, PI Year 4+), in order to examine the interaction between external
accountability mandates, the leader(s) that would enforce them, and the teacher(s) that
would implement the mandates.
The case study revealed that leadership actions taken by the principal have a
bearing on a school’s culture and climate, and the extent to which teachers make efforts
to change. Such changes are sustained by the way that teachers are led and principals’
ability to engender and maintain a climate of trust at their schools.
NAVIGATING A WAY OUT OF PROGRAM IMPROVEMENT 9

CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
This study examined the dynamics of an under-researched area: the impact of
Program Improvement (PI) Year 4+ designation on a California school as it pertains to
the principal’s ability to lead, and the teachers who implement, this part of No Child
Left Behind (NCLB) (2001) law. Complexities arise in the implementation of NCLB
mandates when a school has been designated Program Improvement for many years.
These complexities present challenges for principals and teachers that are recognized by
researchers (Daly, 2009; Elmore, 2008; Knapp, Copland, Honig, Plecki, & Portin, 2010;
Marzano, Waters, & McNulty, 2005). While the research confirms that principals and
teachers need different types of skills to navigate their respective professions in the
context of NCLB, there is very little guidance on how principals and teachers should
best orient themselves to incorporate the changes mandated in the PI years. The
predominant guidance is a persistent message to change or improve practice, with very
little direction on how to do so (Elmore, 2008; Elmore, 2006). The problematic nature
of the aforementioned is highlighted by Strunk and McEachin (2011) when they write,
“…not all schools...have sufficient autonomy and flexibility to make changes that they
believe will have the most impact on students” (p. 872). Some of the limits to
autonomy are discussed in Chapter 2.
In this study, attention was given to both principals and teachers who were
involved with the implementation phase of Alternative Governance Plans (AGP) at a
Program Improvement Year 4+ school. NCLB has few supports embedded in it to
facilitate principals’ building of capacity so that they may appropriately respond to the
NAVIGATING A WAY OUT OF PROGRAM IMPROVEMENT 10

demands for organizational change at a PI Year 4+ school. In PI Year 4+ contexts,
principals not only have to orchestrate the reconfiguration of the school; they also have
to manage teachers’ reactions to the demands in PI Year 4+ at the school level. Existing
literature confirms the importance of the school principal in both leading and facilitating
implementation of various levels of change required by NCLB in the Program
Improvement phase(s) (Slayton & Mathis, 2010; Elmore, 2008; Knapp et al., 2010).
Before discussing PI Year 4+ complexities, it is important to provide
background and exploration of the problem, the unintended perceptions of NCLB, an
explication of sanctions under NCLB, and define critical elements of PI Year 4+ under
NCLB.
Background of the Problem

The origin of NCLB stems as far back as the publication of A Nation at Risk
(1983) by the United States Department of Education. This seminal report highlighted
several factors that contribute to students’ declining academic success: low scores in
core content areas, inability to make inferences, and an increase of remedial course
offerings at colleges. Recommendations in A Nation at Risk called for rigorous content,
higher academic expectations for students, more time for learning, and improved
teacher preparation programs. Later, the Improving America‘s Schools Act (1994) was
passed, and focused heavily on mitigating the differences in education quality among
poor and low-achieving students. Seeing a need to include all students, the Goals 2000:
Educate America Act was passed by President George Bush, Sr. this law required
“[s]tate and local efforts to set challenging content and performance standards”
(Jorgensen & Hoffman, 2003, p. 4). In 2001, Congress sought to further address
NAVIGATING A WAY OUT OF PROGRAM IMPROVEMENT 11

content and performance standards through the reauthorization of the Elementary and
Secondary Education Act (ESEA), through the No Child Left Behind Act (NCLB). In
NCLB, Congress added provisions that increased accountability for teachers, principals,
and school districts, with the aim of equalizing poor and minority students’ access to
educational opportunities. Accountability of principals, teachers, and students under
NCLB has been enforced through state-administered proficiency tests in
English/Language Arts, Mathematics, Science, and Social Science. Under this arm of
accountability, principals and teachers are charged with assuring that their students
meet annual proficiency targets. The way in which this accountability has been enforced
created a stir among stakeholders—namely, principals and teachers—because in this
construction it is externally driven and enforced. This has led to changed work
dynamics for principals and teachers, where seemingly disproportionate attention is
given to students’ attainment of proficiency, as measured by test results. The following
section will explore some of the perceptions of accountability under NCLB.
Unintended Perceptions of NCLB
While NCLB was conceived as a vehicle to facilitate access to educational
opportunity for all students, interpretation of what NCLB means for principals’ ability
to manage and lead, teachers’ practice, and districts’ role in implementation of NCLB
policies, is varied. Nevertheless, Linn, Baker, and Betebenner (2002) suggest that
mandates under NCLB (2001) “have implications for all educators and educational
researchers who focus on K-12 education” (pp. 3-4). The Center for Education Policy
(CEP) restates the impact of NCLB on principals and teachers, and describes how
external accountability affects them, in the following:
NAVIGATING A WAY OUT OF PROGRAM IMPROVEMENT 12

The constant pressure to raise test scores sometimes caused great stress for
teachers and that the labeling that comes with missing AYP targets was having a
negative effect on morale in some schools. Despite the additional flexibility
granted …states and districts continue to see the law’s accountability
requirements as their greatest challenge by far in implementing NCLB. (CEP,
2006, p. x)
A larger implication of NCLB that affects principals at PI schools is the complex nature
of complying with mandates in a substantive way that engenders positive momentum
for change. That accountability measures are external—not generated internally—
makes it even more challenging for those involved. Porter, Linn, and Trimble (2005),
and Linn et al. (2002), explain how oversight of schools using external accountability
systems can be challenging for the monitors themselves. They suggest that the
increasing number of schools entering sanction phases of PI will make it difficult to
monitor, not to mention provide special funding for these types of schools. While
management of PI schools, in general, may prove to be challenging for the enforcement
of external accountability measures, research has sought to address challenges specific
to principals at low-performing schools.
Though principals are regarded as the leaders of schools, and to have influence
over the direction of the school organization and its culture, Schoen and Fusarelli
(2011) relate principals’ anecdotal experiences that refute this assumption. In the wake
of increased accountability in NCLB, it is reported that principals experience less
autonomy, more stress, and a sense of high-threat in their work environment.
Additionally, as instructional leaders principals experience less professional autonomy
NAVIGATING A WAY OUT OF PROGRAM IMPROVEMENT 13

and curricular choice in selecting adoptions that best fit their students’ needs. Instead,
they have to select from a pre-determined list (Valenzuela, Prieto, & Hamilton, 2007;
Schoen & Fusarelli, 2011; Hollingworth, 2009). Detractors of NCLB legislation would
have us believe that, prior to such constraints on curricular choice, for example,
principals were equipped with the judgment and skills to facilitate “good decision-
making” to benefit students’ achievement, which is not entirely the case (Elmore, 2008;
Daly, 2009). Principals at PI schools are challenged to both advance and improve their
leadership skills, while enforcing the implementation of mandated actions that will
benefit the school organization, teachers’ practice, student achievement, and an ultimate
exit from PI Year 4+ designation. However, this does not guarantee that the principal is
skilled enough to align his or her leadership actions in the aforementioned ways.
Even though the goals of NCLB are to highlight and address disparities in
learning opportunities for poor and minority students through test-based accountability
measures, stakeholders (i.e., students, teachers, and principals) have experienced
unintended perceptions and consequences in the advent of NCLB (Hollingworth, 2009;
Schoen & Fusarelli, 2011). Fullan (2001) suggests that perceptions of reform are what
have caused aspects of NCLB to be maligned. Instead, Fullan and others offer that
teachers and principals should see reform as an opportunity to learn, grow, and change
(Al-Fadhi & Singh, 2011). In light of NCLB sanctions, researchers have sought to
summarize the more commonly identified unintended perceptions and consequences of
this reform effort.
Narrowing of the curriculum is the notion that instructional emphasis is placed
on testing, or that students’ instruction is differentiated such that they have extra
NAVIGATING A WAY OUT OF PROGRAM IMPROVEMENT 14

sections of Math or Language Arts. Students have experienced this in two different
ways since NCLB. The first type of narrowing of the curriculum has to do with
“teaching to the test” (Shoen & Fusarelli, 2011; O’Day & Smith, 1993). In this way,
students are not receiving the benefit of full instruction in the core content areas (i.e.,
Social Science, Mathematics, and Science). Much time and effort is spent teaching
students how to take the test at the expense of core content instruction. The second type
of narrowing of the curriculum has to do with reallocation of instructional minutes to
provide support for students who are falling behind in the subjects tested, such as Math
and Language Arts. The Center on Education Policy (2006) writes that at least 71% of
school districts admit to reducing minutes in another subject to allow students extra
time of Math and Language Arts. While struggling students may make Reading or Math
gains, they are not learning Science or Social Science.
1

Regarding teacher practice, researchers like Valenzuela et al. (2007) observe a
distinct difference in pedagogy used with students targeted for intervention, versus
those in general education courses. In their study they note that students are passive in
intervention settings. Teachers’ classroom practice is often scripted, and the nature of
classroom discussion is watered-down such that student responses reveal minimal
elaboration. Also, the seeming lack of rigor in this dynamic does not encourage high-
order thought processes in students. By contrast, teaching practice was drastically

1
A careful distinction needs to be made between struggling students who are not enrolled in content area
classes like Social Science and Science, and those students who experience “teaching to the test.” The
former is an example of students being targeted under a Response to Intervention model that facilitates
their ability to acquire language and / or access the curriculum in the interest of, later, being able to excel
in core content courses (i.e., Science, Social Science, and Language Arts). Whereas students that
experience “teaching to the test” are taught test-taking strategies at the expense of learning in their core
classes in order to make gains on state tests.
NAVIGATING A WAY OUT OF PROGRAM IMPROVEMENT 15

different in the general education classroom, suggesting that NCLB hinders rather than
facilitates the types of skills in students that will make them critical thinkers. O’Day and
Smith (1993) confirm this idea when they conclude that increasing emphasis on basic-
skills reduced teaching practice to variations of drill and practice exercises. These
factors, however, do not suggest that prior to the inception of NCLB (or its previous
iterations) teaching was more dynamic. NCLB—and the laws that preceded it—was
designed to address the learning needs of all students. It was created in response to an
overall sentiment that students of all types were not benefitting from the best possible
education.
Sanctions in NCLB

NCLB has sanction-driven penalties for schools and districts that fail to meet
their annual growth targets. Failure to meet the Annual Yearly Progress (AYP) targets is
measured by students’ annual test results. Porter and Polikoff (2007) explain that when
a school fails to meet its AYP targets for two years, it enters a phase of corrective action
in the third year; this is known as Program Improvement (PI) Year 1. In the early years
of PI designation, the school is obligated to notify the public of its standing and allow
parents of students to choose another, better-performing school, should they see fit. The
focus of this study pertains to the sixth and seventh years of Program Improvement, also
known as restructuring, or PI Year 4+. Sanctions during these two years become more
real, in that the school is subject to any type of large-scale penalty, including but not
limited to state take-over, closure and reopening as a charter school, or replacement of
most of the school staff responsible for the school’s low performance (California
Department of Education, 2010). Generally, principals are allowed to choose which of
NAVIGATING A WAY OUT OF PROGRAM IMPROVEMENT 16

the penalties they will absorb. More specifically, Mintrop and MacLellan (2002) found
that approximately 40% of principals elect Alternative Governance Plan (AGP)
authorship, and that this choice has yielded no better or worse results towards
improving PI Year 4+ schools than the other sanctions. Mathis (2009) points out that
the one study that sought to examine the effectiveness of AGPs was invalidated for
“poor quality of data” (pp. 15-16). Finally, Mathis (2009) affirms the purpose of this
study by stating, “our knowledge of …reconstitution is more limited and confounded”
(p. 17).
Explanation of the Program Improvement Years

Table 1.1 delineates the breakdown of the Program Improvement years. It is
included to aid readers’ understanding of how PI Years are determined. Essentially, a
school is allowed to fall short of AYP targets for two years. It is in the third year during
which a school does not meet AYP targets that it is labeled PI Year 1 (its first year of
program improvement). Table 1.1 explains the actions and processes that need to take
place once a school is in its first year (and beyond) of PI. This study will focus on
Restructuring Year 4, also known as PI Year 4+.
NAVIGATING A WAY OUT OF PROGRAM IMPROVEMENT 17

Table 1.1

Stages of Program Improvement by Year

Three Four Five Six Seven
School Improvement
Yr. 1
School Improvement
Yr. 2
Corrective Action
Yr. 3
Restructuring
Yr. 4
Restructuring
Yr. 5
LEA: LEA: LEA: LEA: LEA:
● Provides technical
assistance to PI
School
● Notifies parents of
PI status of school
/ school choice
● Sets aside a
minimum of 5%
for professional
development to
meet highly
qualified staff
requirements
● Provides choice to
attend another
public school in
the LEA that is not
PI
● Establishes peer
review process to
review revised
school plan
School:
Revises school
plan within 3
months, to cover
2-year period
Uses 10% of Title
I school funds for
staff professional
development
Implements plan
Technical
assistance
Parent notification
of PI status of
school, school
choice,
supplemental
services
Professional
development
School choice
LEA Adds:
Supplemental
educational
services to all
eligible students
School Continues:
● Plan
implementation
● Professional
Development
● Technical assistance
● Parent notification of PI
status of school, school
choice, supplemental
services
● Professional development
● School choice
● Supplemental services
LEA Adds:
● LEA identifies school for
corrective action and does
at least one of the
following:
o Replaces school staff
o Implements new
curriculum
o Decreases management
authority at school level
o Appoints outside school
expert
o Extends school year or
day
o Restructures internal
organizational structure
of school
● LEA informs parents and
public of corrective action
and allows comment.
● LEAs may provide
technical assistance to
school site councils in
developing school plans
School Continues:
● Professional development
● Collaboration with school
district to improve student
achievement
● Technical assistance
● Parent notification of
PI status of school,
school choice,
supplemental
services
● Professional
development
● School choice
● Supplemental
services
LEA and School Adds:
● During year 4,
prepare plan for
alternative
governance of
school. Select one of
the following:
o Reopen school as
a charter
o Replace all or
most staff
including
principal
o Contract with
outside entity to
manage school
o State takeover
o Any other major
restructuring
● LEA provides notice
to parents and
teachers and allows
comment
School continues:
● Professional
development
● Collaboration with
district to improve
student achievement
● Technical
assistance
● Parent
notification of PI
status of school,
school choice,
supplemental
services
● Professional
development
● School choice
● Supplemental
services
LEA and School Add:
● Implement
Alternative
governance plan
developed in year
4
● School continues
in PI and LEA
offers choice and
supplemental
services until
school makes
AYP for two
consecutive
years. School
exits PI after two
consecutive years
of making AYP.
NAVIGATING A WAY OUT OF PROGRAM IMPROVEMENT 18

Defining and Explaining Elements of PI Year 4+

A PI Year 4+ school has to write an Alternative Governance Plan (AGP) and
must choose one of the five options (sanctions) offered under NCLB: 1) reopen school
as a charter, 2) replace all or most staff including principal, 3) contract with outside
entity to manage school, 4) state takeover, or 5) any other major restructuring
(http://www.cde.ca.gov/ta/ac/ti/nclbpireq.asp). Existing literature confirms that many
school leaders opt for “any other major restructuring” (Mintrop & MacLellan, 2002). A
possible reason for this is that this option affords “…flexibility, and responsibility to
design and implement effective strategies for preparing their students to learn the
content of the curriculum frameworks to a high level performance” (O’Day & Smith,
1993, p. 251). Due to the complex work involved in both authoring and implementing
the AGP for the principal’s site in this study, this dissertation study focused on the final
option, “other major restructuring.”
An AGP serves as documentation of a school’s deficiencies in the nine Essential
Program Components (EPCs) (see Appendix A for further description). It is also a
commitment to make efforts toward organizational change. The AGP is informed by the
Academic Program Survey (APS), which is a tool used by PI schools in California to
inventory areas that either caused the school to miss AYP targets, or after completion
reveals curricular, organizational, or personnel needs for the school (Perlman, 2007;
California Department of Education, Planning for Year 4, 2010). To be more specific,
the EPCs relate to: the instructional program, instructional time, lesson planning and
pacing, school administrative instructional leadership, credentialed teachers and
opportunities for professional development, ongoing instructional support for teachers,
NAVIGATING A WAY OUT OF PROGRAM IMPROVEMENT 19

student achievement monitoring system, collaboration, and fiscal allocation (CDE, APS
Inventory-Middle Grades, 2009, pp. 1-39). Deficiencies are calculated in the APS
through a four-point ranking system.
2
The extent of a deficiency determines whether the
school must include the deficiency as something to correct in the AGP.
When writing the AGP, it is necessary for a school site stakeholders and
teachers to not only be aware of their deficiencies with regard to practice, instruction,
and student achievement, but also to be able to repair these deficiencies in a limited
amount of time. Paperwork related to PI Year 4+ asks the school to implement the
commitments to improve said domains in the AGP in the span of one academic year.
The District School Liaison Team (DSLT) gets one academic year to author the AGP,
and another academic year to implement the plan.
As of the 2010-2011 academic year, research reflects that California has a total
of 1,270 of 9,855 schools in restructure (PI Year 5), and that the majority of these
schools chose “other major restructure” as the focus of their AGP (Center on Innovation
and Improvement, 2011, p. 2). Researchers predict that this will continue to be the case
as 2014 nears (Center for Innovation and Improvement, 2010; Daly, 2009; Porter &
Polikoff, 2007). With respect to fiscal and technical assistance for PI Year 4+ schools,
Linn, Baker, and Bettebenner (2002) forecast that even if special funds allocated to
these types of schools were to be increased, it would be very challenging, if at all
possible, for external stakeholders to be able to provide these schools with “meaningful
assistance” (p. 8).

2
The four-point ranking system is phrased in terms of full (100%), progressing (75%), partial (50%), and
less than partial (>50%) implementation. It is a self-assessment tool for a school to both monitor and
inform its progress toward implementation or use of the elements of the APS document.
NAVIGATING A WAY OUT OF PROGRAM IMPROVEMENT 20

Statement of the Problem

Principals at schools in PI Year 4+, where AGP authorship and implementation
is chosen as a course of corrective action, experience organizational challenges. Many
of these challenges go unanticipated by principals, let alone the policymakers who
enforce compliance. Policymakers, the external accountability holders, assume it is both
a manageable and achievable feat for a principal to lead his school out of Program
Improvement. However, research confirms that such long-lasting and effective change
takes time. Perlman (2007) suggests that in order for these large-scale changes to take
place at a PI Year 4+ school, time is needed for the establishment of clear objectives to
be carried out by the parties involved, in order to achieve substantive compliance with
mandates to, ultimately, improve students’ achievement. A well-conceived AGP serves
as documentation of objectives the school will fulfill. Management of organizational,
curricular, and cultural changes required by the AGP assumes that the principal is
equipped with the knowledge and savvy to assess areas of need and facilitate—or
lead—his teachers through the change process. Researchers contend that a different skill
set is needed by principals at PI Schools to implement the changes they articulate in
their AGPs, as the dynamics of a high-stakes accountability setting pose greater
management challenges than those at a non-PI school (Elmore, 2000; Elmore, 2008;
Ramaley, 2002; Marzano, Waters, & McNulty, 2005).
Implicit in the mandate of organizational reflection and inventory (of resources,
interventions, and other supports) through the APS and AGP at a PI Year 4+ school is
the presupposition that the school leader already knows how to do this, and well. The
CDE Year-4 document (2010) attempts to address this assumption by adding language
NAVIGATING A WAY OUT OF PROGRAM IMPROVEMENT 21

suggestive of available support through a mechanism called the District School Liaison
Team (DSLT). However, the amount of support the DSLT provides to principals is
limited to writing of the AGP. It does not include capacity building or support for the
principal to build his own capacity or to facilitate principal-teacher interactions when it
comes time to implement the changes written into the AGP.
One might argue that school leaders should be able to adequately assess and
repair organizational or curricular deficiencies, in the interest of improving students’
ability to achieve at high levels, or facilitate opportunities for learning, and that these
tasks should be a regular part of the way in which the school functions. Yet, this is not
the case for schools designated PI, nor was it necessarily the case at these schools prior
to NCLB. PI designation implies that something in the machinery of the organization—
whether it is the principal’s leadership, the use of instructional minutes or materials, or
teaching practice—is not functioning in a way that impels and inspires students’
academic success, or best-first instruction on the part of teachers. Leaving a school’s
leader to resolve the organizational, instructional, curricular, and management issues
that may have contributed to students’ low achievement, without ample support to do
so, is counterintuitive to facilitating lasting reform. Elmore (2008) suggests that mere
awareness of a problem does not automatically equip a school leader (i.e., principal)
with the knowledge and skills to be able to fix the problem. In addition, as more
schools are designated PI, it will be more of a challenge to assure availability of
technical assistance as schools come under increased accountability by external
stakeholders.
NAVIGATING A WAY OUT OF PROGRAM IMPROVEMENT 22

There is a high concentration of urban schools in some phase of PI. It is
documented that students enrolled in urban schools are generally of low socio-economic
status and experience educational challenges that are out of their control. Moreover,
school districts often place ill-prepared principals and teachers at these urban schools,
offer students less-rigorous courses than their more affluent non-minority counterparts,
and such school environments are often unsafe (NCES, Executive Report, 2011). These
are some of the many factors that compromise students’ access to, and opportunity to
attain, better learning outcomes (NCES, Executive Report, 2011). For this reason it is
imperative to explore how to better position school principals to lead their schools out
of low-performance.
Purpose of the Study

This study focused on the leadership actions taken by principals at a school that
has been designated PI Year 4+, has experienced the phase of Alternative Governance
Plan (AGP) authorship, and is implementing or has implemented the AGP. The study
aimed to determine what leadership practices principals employ to help mediate the
changes called for in the AGP that impact how teachers work with each other and their
principal in a PI Year 4+ school. The focus was narrowed more specifically to the
nature of the principal’s leadership actions, and the extent to which his leadership
decisions affected how, and if, teachers responded to the demands in the AGP. Culture
was discussed as a consequence of the principal’s leadership actions, to the extent that
his actions may positively or negatively impact school culture and climate. Finally, the
study aimed to increase awareness of the complexities involved in PI Year 4+ AGPs. As
2014 approaches, increasing numbers of schools will be designated some level of PI.
NAVIGATING A WAY OUT OF PROGRAM IMPROVEMENT 23

Research Questions

The following research questions were posed for this study:

1. What leadership practices are (or are not) used by principals to help teachers
mediate the demands for change in the AGP in a climate of reform?
a. What are teachers’ perceptions of the principal’s efforts to respond to
the demands of PI Year 4+?
Importance of the Study

Existing literature confirms that there are unique challenges and / or barriers to a
principals’ ability to successfully lead in a high-stakes accountability setting, such as
that engendered by many years of PI (Porter & Polikoff, 2007; Elmore, 2008; Senge,
1990). In spite of this, the research is limited, and reports principals’ challenges with
little documentation of what is working in terms of their leadership decision-making
power. Implications of this study and its findings are potentially valuable to
administrators at school sites plagued with multiple years of PI designation. This study
aimed to add to the emerging research that considers the interplay between NCLB
sanctions, schools that have to reorganize themselves, and the leaders that have to
facilitate such reorganization. While the results of this study were not generalizable,
they may be used to inform principals of the ways in which they may usefully apply
their decision-making power to help teachers cope with change at such a critical time in
a school setting. In addition, because there is so little research in the area of PI schools
and the skills needed by principals working in the resulting high-stakes accountability
climate, this study aimed to add to the body of work on this topic.
NAVIGATING A WAY OUT OF PROGRAM IMPROVEMENT 24

Definition of Terms

What follows is a list of terms used throughout this dissertation. Definitions, for
the most part, are common meanings ascribed to terminology often used in the field.
However, there are one or two for which the researcher has provided a contextualized
definition, because without context interpretation may be skewed to include definitions
not required for this study.
Alternative Governance Plan (AGP): As per the California Department of
Education, this is a school-wide plan authored and implemented by schools or districts
in Year 4 and 5 of PI designation. The AGP requires self-evaluation with respect to
governance, curriculum, professional development, provision of assistance to students,
and programming—to name a few. If a school rates low in one of these domains it has
to articulate steps to improve that rating.
Annual Performance Index (API): “An API is an index (or score) ranging from
200 to 1000 that summarizes a school’s or LEA’s performance based on student results
on statewide assessments” (www.cde.ca.gov).
Annual Yearly Progress (AYP): …a set of annual academic performance
benchmarks that states, school districts, schools, and subpopulations of students are
supposed to achieve if the state receives federal funding under Title I, Part A of the
federal No Child Left Behind Act (NCLB). In California, the measures include: (1)
specified percentages of students scoring “proficient” or “advanced” on California
Standards Tests in English language, arts and math; (2) participation of at least 95% of
students on those tests; (3) specified Academic Performance Index scores or gains;
NAVIGATING A WAY OUT OF PROGRAM IMPROVEMENT 25

and (4) for high schools, a specified graduation rate or improvement in the rate.
(http://www.edsource.org/data_AYP-to-08.html)
Corrective action: A term used to label schools that have entered their third year
of Program Improvement. During this time they are required to make significant gains
toward meeting API and AYP targets for their sub-groups.
District stakeholders or stakeholders: For this study, the terms encompass the
following personnel: Local Education Agency (LEA), outside consultants hired to
facilitate and / or evaluate AGP authorship and implementation, school site
administrators, district level facilitators like superintendents of instruction, the district
superintendent, and any personnel directly and indirectly involved in facilitating AGP
authorship. Stakeholders include teachers and community members whose presence and
input is required for AGP generation. It also includes families whose students are
impacted by PI Year 4+.
District-School Liaison Team (DSLT): The DSLT is a group comprising
teachers, district personnel, community members, and a facilitator hired by the district
to aid in implementation and authorship of the AGP. The team meets regularly for the
duration of an academic year to write, revise, and discuss the AGP.
Essential Program Components (EPCs): According to the California
Department of Education document entitled Essential Program Components (2010),
there are nine research-based characteristics that, when fully implemented, poise
students for academic success. The nine EPCs are: instructional program, instructional
time, lesson planning and pacing, school administration instructional leadership
training, credentialed teachers and professional development, ongoing instructional
NAVIGATING A WAY OUT OF PROGRAM IMPROVEMENT 26

support for teachers, student achievement monitoring system, collaboration, and fiscal
allocations that benefit or enhance student learning. Schools in PI Year 4+ evaluate
themselves using the nine EPCs on a four-point scale to determine which of the EPCs
should be addressed in their Alternative Governance Plan.
LEA (Local Education Agency): The LEA is defined as the school district and
central offices that help to govern the school.
Program Improvement (PI) designation: PI takes place when a school fails to
meet state-established AYP targets after two consecutive years of low performance. It is
a penalty-laden designation whose stakes increase for every year a school continues to
be named PI.
PI Year 4+: Commonly known as restructuring, the label PI Year 4+ is used
when discussing schools that have failed to meet their AYP targets for 4 years or more.
I use this term interchangeably with low performing school.
Safe Harbor: The California Department of Education defines safe harbor as:

...the school, LEA, or subgroup current year‘s percent proficient or above level
must be higher than the previous year‘s percent proficient or above level. Safe
harbor for LEAs is applied for both grade spans and numerically significant
subgroups within grade spans of an LEA. A confidence interval adjustment of
75 percent is applied to safe harbor calculations. It is one of the alternative
methods approved by the Department of Education for meeting AMO targets.
(CDE, p. 45, 2010)
Urban schools: The National Center of Education Statistics (NCES) defines
such schools as those experiencing high concentrations of minorities of low socio-
NAVIGATING A WAY OUT OF PROGRAM IMPROVEMENT 27

economic status and that, generally speaking, benefit from programs like free and
reduced lunches. In addition, the NCES relates that achievement data for urban schools
may reflect low-achievement in Language Arts and Mathematics, localized to poor and
/ or minority students.

Organization of the Study

There are five chapters in this dissertation. Chapter 1 presented the problem
statement and purpose of the study. Chapter 2 reviewed the literature in four areas:
responses to change, the impact of policy on school climate / culture, transformational
leadership by principals, and the influence of school reform on principals. Chapter 3
addresses participant sampling, data collection, instrument development, methodology,
and qualitative procedures used. Chapters 4 and 5 explain the findings and discuss the
implications for further study generated from the case study analysis.
NAVIGATING A WAY OUT OF PROGRAM IMPROVEMENT 28

CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW
This literature review addresses the presence and absence of research related to
principals’ leadership actions at Program Improvement (PI) Year 4+ schools. I aim to
highlight the importance of my study and illustrate that the literature is on the cusp of
revealing insight into the challenge of moving a school out of Program Improvement
(PI) in a context of high-stakes accountability. The urgency to add to the literature is
supported by the statistic that only 89 of fifth-year (or more) Program Improvement
schools out of a total of 3,866 schools in PI Year 5+ have successfully exited PI
(http://www.cde.ca.gov/ta/ac/ay/tistatesum11.asp).
Introduction

The sections presented in this review of literature are by no means exhaustive.
The intention is to provide the reader with a base of research that informed this research
study, and highlight what is missing from the existing literature. The literature review
covers elements that inform a qualitative case-study analysis of an under-researched
area: principals’ ability to re-organize a school in a context of high-stakes
accountability, and teachers’ perceptions of principals’ efforts toward change.
Currently, the literature suggests that principals at low-performing schools experience
different challenges than those at better-performing schools (Elmore, 2000; Clark, 2003;
Stein & Nelson, 2003). Because there is so little research that specifically addresses the
challenges faced by principals at schools in PI Year 4+, the literature review will
address the following topics: (1) responses to organizational change, (2) accountability:
external versus internal, (3) school culture and climate, (4) leadership: transformational
NAVIGATING A WAY OUT OF PROGRAM IMPROVEMENT 29

and instructional, (5) barriers to leadership, and (6) trust. These topics will contextualize
the nuanced and tenuous dynamic faced by principals at PI Year 4+ schools. In addition,
the topics will explore facets that facilitate or impede principals’ ability to lead in low-
performing schools (i.e., PI Year 4+ schools) and will show how varied the needs of PI
schools are.
Very little research, “has inquired to the effects of matching interventions,
policies of improvement strategies to the differentiated needs of schools” (Hallinger &
Heck, 2010, p. 673). Once the literature has been presented, a conceptual frame of
analysis will be offered.
Responses to Organizational Change: Principals and Teachers

This section will explore the responses to organizational change experienced by
teachers—and which may also apply to principals. Principals’ and teachers’ responses
to organizational change often get ignored by external accountability holders in the
interest of advancing sweeping reforms. It is also not unusual for principals themselves
to ignore, or not take into account, the ways in which teachers process the types of
changes being demanded of them in a high-stakes accountability setting. It is often
suggested to principals that “quick-wins” be embraced as one way to inspire reform
efforts (Marzano et al., 2005). Meanwhile, the literature recognizes that change is a
process and takes time (Perlman, 2007; Fullan, 2001). By presenting this set of
literature I aim to increase awareness of the effect teachers’ reactions may have on
principals’ ability to successfully coordinate and implement large-scale change at a PI
Year 4+ school—and vice versa.
NAVIGATING A WAY OUT OF PROGRAM IMPROVEMENT 30

Types of Threat-Rigidity

Threat-rigidity is the notion that, as pressure mounts due to increased
accountability, those under pressure become more constrained or rigid in the way they
work with one another, communicate, and share information (Daly, 2009; Olsen &
Sexton, 2009). Examples of such constraints might be a tendency to isolate oneself
instead of openly sharing and collaborating with colleagues, truncating the type and
amount of information communicated to others, distorting the truth, or limiting how
much information is shared. While much of the literature presented in this section
focuses on teachers, it is important to be mindful of the possibility that principals can
also act in threat rigid ways.
Daly (2009) examines the impact of NCLB on teachers’ perceptions of
increased accountability. He compares a PI school with a non-PI school. The concepts
of trust and leadership behavior were posed against a theoretical frame of threat rigid
response. His hypothesis is that as the PI schools in his study continue being labeled as
such, the teachers’ response to threat (understood as PI sanctions) increase or decrease
based on the presence of organizational trust and key leadership traits displayed by the
school’s administrator.
Daly’s (2009) findings are as follows: (1) PI schools perceived a more threat-
rigid response than did the non-PI schools, (2) PI schools at the building level perceived
significantly less trust of their leader and one another, and (3) mixed messages from
administrators regarding teaching practice and performance were consistent across PI
and non-PI schools. Daly concluded that “[s]chools labeled program improvement can
NAVIGATING A WAY OUT OF PROGRAM IMPROVEMENT 31

be considered potential turbulent environments that may benefit from drawing on the
resources that trust provides” (2009, p. 205).
A limitation of Daly’s (2009) work is that there is little empirical evidence
regarding teachers’ perceptions of PI schools to corroborate his conclusions. The
findings in Daly’s (2009) study, then, point to an under-researched area to which my
study seeks to add. His work provides an initial glance at how policy affects PI schools.
In addition, Daly (2009) provides a foundation for a greater understanding of schools
having difficulty exiting PI. The conclusions generated by Daly’s (2009) study reinforce
the intention of my study, which is to provide, “practical insights into why exiting PI
proves elusive for so many schools” (p. 210).
Olsen and Sexton (2009) conducted a study of teachers at a reforming high
school. Their work is situated in the context of NCLB and how increased accountability
impacts organizational behavior, as teachers respond to mandates. Olsen and Sexton
(2009) sought to understand how teachers’ perceptions of school reform affect them,
and how their reactions affect the overall school climate. They describe the dynamics at
a school that is in the “throes of experiencing [a] top-down federal push for school
reform,” using threat rigidity as their frame (p. 32). The researchers clarify that the
school featured in their study was not a PI school; it was, however, a school
experiencing pressure to change because of a poor accreditation rating.
In their study, Olsen and Sexton (2009) characterize threat rigidity as

“centralizing and restricting the flow of information, by constricting control, by
emphasizing routinized and simplified instructional/assessment practices, and by
applying strong pressure for school personnel to conform” (p. 14). They found that the
NAVIGATING A WAY OUT OF PROGRAM IMPROVEMENT 32

actions taken by the principal (to comply with externally-generated mandates) increased
teachers’ perceived levels of stress, exacerbated underlying issues in collegial
relationships, created resentments, and promoted isolation (ibid., 2009). Because the
push for change was so great, and the school experienced so many changes in
principals, it was difficult to create and sustain momentum for positive organizational
change. Olsen and Sexton (2009) reported that the principal was removed from the
school site.
Olsen and Sexton (2009) acknowledge a primary limitation of their study: that
they were never able to communicate with the principal of the school, and instead relied
heavily on reports of the principal’s actions by the teachers and / or newspaper articles.
My study will address this limitation by conducting interviews with the principals to
understand their perceptions of what teachers might be experiencing in the context of
large-scale reform at a PI Year 4+ school.
Resource rigidity. Staw, Sandelands, and Dutton (1981) corroborated the
previous definitions and characterizations of threat rigidity. Their early work also
revealed that when people are pressured to change, they revert to comfortable ways of
behaving, even if these are counterproductive to the organization or do not yield desired
results.
Resource rigidity, a variation of threat rigidity, is documented in the literature as
another way in which managers respond to pressures for change. In this case, a leader /
manager may limit access to, or funding of materials needed by personnel to facilitate
task completion (Gilbert, 2005). Limited access to workplace materials engenders
NAVIGATING A WAY OUT OF PROGRAM IMPROVEMENT 33

workplace inertia, causing personnel to be at a standstill and unable to be productive. In
Gilbert’s work, however, resource rigidity did not include school settings.
Deficit thinking as threat rigidity. Bensimon (2005) advanced the idea of
cognitive deficit thinking to explain teachers’ preconceived notions of students, and how
these notions influence the way students are (or are not) treated by their teachers.
Cognitive deficit thinking is the idea that teachers may blame the inability of minority
students, in particular, to achieve at high levels on factors that are out of the students’
control (e.g., socio-economic status, race, or parental educational background). More
specifically, Bensimon (2005) wrote that people who engage the cognitive deficit
frame,
may value diversity and have positive attitudes toward increasing minority
student participation in…education, but they are inclined to attribute differences
in educational outcomes for black, Hispanic, and Native American students,
such as lower rates of retention or degree completion, to cultural stereotypes,
inadequate socialization, or lack of motivation and initiative on the part of the
students. (p. 102)
Bensimon’s conception of cognitive deficit thinking is included in the literature review
as an aspect of threat rigidity for several reasons. First, it is another form of blame that
may be used by a school leader or teacher to explain his school’s low performance.
Second, it addresses the fact that many Program Improvement schools are situated in
urban neighborhoods where high concentrations of minority students reside—and
students may experience this sort of treatment. Finally, her conception recognizes that
NAVIGATING A WAY OUT OF PROGRAM IMPROVEMENT 34

school leaders and teachers carry biases that can influence the way in which they take
up their personal efforts to change.
Challenged Professional Identity

It is documented that sanction-driven reform under NCLB asks teachers to
change the way in which they work, both with one another and with students (Marzano
et al., 2005; Elmore, 2000, 2008; Murnane & Papay, 2010). Mandates that ask teachers
to work collaboratively, either in grade-level teams or in life spans, pose a threat to their
professional identities (Daly, 2009; Valli & Buese, 2007; Blasé & Blasé, 1999).
Teachers and principals alike are being asked to eliminate the threat rigid action of
working in isolation, in the interest of sharing strategies and vulnerabilities, so that the
school and students can improve. This section will explore the ways in which
principals’ and teachers’ professional identities have been challenged in the wake of
high-stakes accountability. The exploration may not address PI Year 4+ schools
specifically, as analysis of the dynamics between teachers, their work, and their
principals in PI Year 4+ is relatively new.
Heightened emotions. Van Den Berg’s (2002) study contextualizes teachers’
identities regarding their practice in the face of ever-changing educational mandates.
His assertion is that a teacher’s identity is intrinsically tied to emotional, social,
personal, and individual interactions that shape what and how teachers are in their
practice (Van Den Berg, 2002). He also claims that schools as organizational entities
are largely “arenas of emotion”, and that those who exist in them have to navigate
emotionally-charged decisions. Van Den Berg’s (2002) findings reveal that the context
of reform efforts proves especially challenging to teachers, because the mere presence
NAVIGATING A WAY OUT OF PROGRAM IMPROVEMENT 35

of reform at the school site calls into question their professional identity, and either
encourages or discourages feelings of self-efficacy, depending on how a teacher
perceives the reform or innovation. He concludes that the importance of exploring this
dynamic in educational settings has implications for policymakers and principals
seeking to reform schools.
While Van Den Berg’s (2002) work has implications for how to better navigate
large-scale change at a PI Year 4+ school, a limitation of his study is that his treatment
of teachers experiencing low self-efficacy was specialized, and targeted professional
development to meet their emotional needs regarding innovation—not professional
development to meet their pedagogical needs. This is a departure from conventional
notions of professional development, and cannot be generalized to a PI Year 4+ school.
In addition, Van Den Berg (2002) does not explore the role of the principal in
facilitating teachers’ ability to experience or feel greater self-efficacy related to reform
or innovation. My study addresses these limitations by focusing on how principals and
teachers negotiate their relationships in the context of reform.
Kelchtermans (2005) conducted a study of teachers and their emotions,
suggesting that “reform agendas that impose different normative beliefs may not only
trigger intense feelings, but also elicit micro political actions of resistance of practice
attempts to influence and change one‘s working conditions” (p. 995). She suggests—
not unlike Van Den Berg (2002)—that teachers’ professional identities are closely
linked with their emotions. She goes further, suggesting that the cultural context of the
school can mediate these emotional reactions as a teacher seeks to understand the
reform at hand (Kelchtermans, 2005). Her recommendation is that policymakers should
strongly
NAVIGATING A WAY OUT OF PROGRAM IMPROVEMENT 36

consider the possibility that teachers have to undergo a set of negotiations—with their
emotional and professional selves—to decide how they will react and enact change in
an educational reform context.
A limitation of Kelchtermans’ (2005) study is that evidentiary support is not
provided for the claims she makes. It would have served her claims better to provide
anecdotal or biographical evidence of the tenuousness teachers experienced.
Increased workload. Valli and Buese (2007) conducted a study of the impact
on teachers of working in a context of high-stakes accountability, through task analysis
of teachers’ work over a four-year period. While the findings reveal that, in fact, work-
related tasks increased around the same time NCLB passed, of interest were the
reactions that teachers had to the increase in workload. Valli and Buese (2007) found
that teachers’ roles became more hierarchically controlled as instruction became more
closely monitored, such that they lost a lot of classroom autonomy (p. 551)—very
similar to what happens under a climate of threat rigidity. In addition, they reported
increased levels of stress and anxiety experienced among teachers at the schools in the
study (Valli & Buese, 2007). They indicate, however, that these reactions speak more to
the organizational culture of the school, and not the psychology of the teachers in the
study. A limitation of this study is an exploration of the principal’s role in relation to
teachers’ work intensification. Valli and Buese (2007) do not discuss processes used by
the principal to mitigate the perception of work intensification experienced by the
teachers.
Zembylas and Baker (2007) conducted a study of teachers’ negative reactions
towards reform. They found that when a principal provided space and time to
NAVIGATING A WAY OUT OF PROGRAM IMPROVEMENT 37

collaborate, often the time would be used, instead, to “subvert reform efforts” (Zembylas
& Baker, 2007, p. 246). Their research invites us to consider more carefully the role
that emotions play in adjusting to reform. The authors of the study warn that:
allowing emerging feelings to be dealt with is not about helping teachers to “feel

better” about reform pressures, but is a valuable contribution to teachers because
it helps them practically to find ways of integrating and / or reconciling
opposing or conflicting feelings about reform. (Zembylas & Baker, 2007, pp.
251-252)
A limitation of their study is that they do not discuss the principal’s role in shaping the
dynamic of collegial reactions—even when reform goals are being subverted.
Burnout. Dworkin’s (2001) study focused on burnout—feeling worn out by
increased stressors at work—as one type of reaction to reform efforts. In his study, he
found that, just after the passage of NCLB, many teachers experienced heightened
levels of burnout as their work increased with the goal of meeting policy demands. He
cites constraints to professional autonomy, limited resources, and general feelings of
meaningless as being elements that heightened teachers’ feelings of burnout. While
Dworkin (2001) concludes that many teachers dealt with their feelings of burnout
related to reform by ignoring it, his work is limited in that he does not explore what the
principal did to influence teachers’ behaviors more positively.
Alignment and convergence. Mintrop (2012) offers the notions of alignment
and convergence as institutional responses to accountability. I include this in the
literature review because it is a documented way that principals and teachers have
responded to externally-enforced accountability. Mintrop found that alignment with
NAVIGATING A WAY OUT OF PROGRAM IMPROVEMENT 38

external accountability is a passive response to taking up demands for change, which
occurs most commonly in low-performing schools in urban locales. The contrast is
convergence—the idea that an organization and those that lead it are more apt to rally
around the idea of external demands and, similar to Knapp & Feldman (2012), to create
a sense of organizational ownership so that the changes are assimilated and then
executed.
Mintrop (2012) found that convergence was achieved easily in organizations
equipped with sufficient internal capacity to respond to external pressures (p. 698).
Notions of integrity and morality underpin alignment and convergence. Mintrop
suggests that convergence presupposes a more moral reaction—an alignment of
personal values. Alignment is an act that resembles passive compliance—those
operating in alignment may be more prone to compromise their integrity by working out
of compliance, and less out of a regard for what is right. To illustrate the tension, he
wrote:
Because educators in their work settings act out a public role that is defined by
institutional task structures and values, we are not only concerned with personal
integrity, but also with public integrity. Moreover, we are concerned with the
behavior of organizations that have specific cultures and adhere to shared core
philosophies and programmatic commitments that may be in tension with their
environment. (ibid., 2012, p. 700)
The element of institutional integrity has implications for the ways in which a leader
does or does not take up externally- or internally-driven accountability. The next section
will address the challenges related to accountability enforcement.
NAVIGATING A WAY OUT OF PROGRAM IMPROVEMENT 39

Accountability Enforcement

The current construct of accountability enforcement in California schools is
generated by policy mandates underpinned by a system of sanctions and rewards
(Knapp & Feldman, 2012; Elmore, 2000). More often than not, schools, the principals
that lead them, and the teachers that implement change mandates are at the mercy of
sanctions due to state financial constraints that prevent districts and states from offering
financial incentives to teachers, and to schools that meet annual growth targets
consistently (Porter & Polikoff, 2007). Moreover, accountability, or compliance with
mandates, is monitored externally—not generated and monitored internally. This
section will explore the tension between external and internal accountability specific to
low-performing schools; the interaction between principals, accountability, and reform;
and the way in which this bears on school culture and climate.
External and Internal Accountability

Elmore (2000) wrote, “I should be expected to perform at the limits of my
capacity, but I should not be expected to do those things for which I do not have the
capacity unless you accept joint responsibility with me to create that capacity” (p. 11).
His statement reflects the tension between external and internal accountability. External
accountability mandates and those that enforce them, whether principals or
policymakers, expect people in schools to respond to accountability demands. The
expectation of a response to accountability demands persists even when those that have
to respond are not prepared or equipped with the skills that would allow them to meet
the demands. Elmore’s work implores practitioners to respond in supportive rather than
punitive ways when it is revealed that leaders or teachers lack the skills needed to
NAVIGATING A WAY OUT OF PROGRAM IMPROVEMENT 40

adequately respond to accountability demands. The implication of this is that
accountability enforcers would have to reformulate their orientation to how
accountability is enforced at low-performing schools.
Knapp and Feldman (2012) explore the challenges related to leading in a climate
of high-stakes, externally-enforced accountability. They sought to answer two critical
questions in the wake of NCLB (2001) accountability standards:
1. How do school leaders negotiate and navigate the intersection of internal and
external accountability systems?
2. What consequences do their actions at this intersection have for efforts to
improve teaching practice and student learning outcomes?
They found that principals are charged with the significant task of balancing externally-
generated accountability demands with the schools’ internally-generated sense of
accountability. They surmise that the resulting dynamic poses inadvertent challenges to
school culture and climate, where teachers and principals did not generate the measures
of accountability internally. In this construct, external accountability is intrusive to the
school’s culture and climate.
Results of their study suggest that the presence of external accountability
demands increased API scores (Knapp & Feldman, 2012). They assert that, while this
would be a positive outcome of externally-generated accountability, the increase in API
scores is temporary, and suggest that this sort of accountability is effective for only so
long before scores plateau and this type of inducement no longer impels people to work
to meet externally-driven goals. The presence of internal accountability is key.
NAVIGATING A WAY OUT OF PROGRAM IMPROVEMENT 41

Knapp and Feldman (2012) offer a definition of internal accountability. In their
view, internal accountability is generated by one‘s sense of “the right thing to do” (ibid.,
2012). Regarding the merit of internal accountability, they write that “internal
accountability is thus more likely to favor intrinsic motivation, as it often presumes a
sense of mutual responsibility for the quality of work” (ibid., p. 673). In spite of
challenges like resistance or paltry buy-in from teachers, the researchers found that the
principal himself needed to have internalized and created a sense of ownership of the
externally-mandated accountability, in order for it to take hold in the organization (ibid.,
2012). Knapp and Feldman (2012) cite specific leadership practices that signal
ownership of external accountability demands. Two notable practices were sharing of
data in public spaces, and evaluative observations conducted with a video camera.
Sharing of data in public spaces created a climate / culture of accountability in and
among grade levels, and generated organic conversations about teaching practices that
were and were not working with groups of students. Conducting video-taped
observations served to remove the dynamic of evaluation that traditionally puts the
teacher on the defense, and created an observation that was more collaborative, and
more informative for the teachers’ practice. Knapp and Feldman cited that these
practices, among others, were valuable to teachers in facilitating a better match between
what they thought they were doing related to teaching practice, and what they were
really doing.
Louis and Robinson (2012) conducted a study of the way in which school
principals take up externally-driven accountability at their school sites. Their work was
guided by four questions. The two most salient to this study are:
NAVIGATING A WAY OUT OF PROGRAM IMPROVEMENT 42

1. Do school leaders’ perceptions of state or district school-improvement
policies and procedures influence how they lead their schools?
2. Are those school leaders who perceive their accountability context (state or
district) as supportive more likely to behave as instructional leaders? (p. 630)
They conceive of the school leader as not so much a manager from the top-down,
relaying mandates for change, but rather as a mediator of external accountability
demands. They conclude, like Knapp and Feldman (2012), that external accountability
enforcement can be positive for the school, and benefits students’ learning outcomes.
They warn that the only way for this to happen is if the principal has internalized and
taken ownership of the challenge to improve; this recalls Mintrop (2012), who relayed a
similar concept with the added nuance of integrity. Louis and Robinson‘s work suggests
that more consideration be given to how external demands for change are perceived by
the school leader, and the extent to which the leader and teachers feel supported
(internally and by district personnel) in meeting those demands. They write that “[h]ow a
leader understands a policy, in other words, is partly a function of what they already
understand and value” (Louis & Robinson, 2012, p. 632).
Mintrop (2012) focuses on the tension that external accountability demands
place on principals, and how this challenges principals’ integrity. His research hinges on
two concepts: coherence and integrity. He posits that “[c]oherence by itself implies unity,
an active forging of productive congruence and consensus between external demands
and internal programs and orientations” (p. 702). What this means is that those that
work in an organization can actively assimilate or marry external accountability
demands to those that were generated internally. The implication of his work is that
NAVIGATING A WAY OUT OF PROGRAM IMPROVEMENT 43

leaders must be grounded in a way that allows them to mediate the dissonance that
emerges when coherence with accountability demands is not achieved. A climate for
teachers should be created so that they can grapple with and make sense of the work in
the interest of school improvement.
Principals, Accountability and Reform

Given that increased accountability has changed the ways in which schools need
to be managed by principals, it follows that a different skill-set is essential for
successful execution of policy mandates, and communication from the principal to
his/her teachers. This section will examine the interface between principals and efforts
towards school reform. Again, PI Year 4+ will not be addressed specifically, because
there is little research on principals’ relationship to this phase of NCLB sanctions
(Finnigan & Stewart, 2009); however, in many cases the schools and case studies
described here have characteristics and qualities that mirror those of PI Year 4+ schools.
Mintrop and MacLellan (2002) examined the types of school improvement plans
created by low-performing schools in Maryland. The study was conducted using 46
plans for school improvement at seven schools that were eligible for reconstitution.
Such plans for improvement very much mirror the Academic Program Survey (APS),
which requires inventory of such elements as organization, governance, climate and
attendance, parents and community, curriculum and instruction, professional
development, and teacher performance (Mintrop & MacLellan, 2002, p. 285). Chief
among their findings was that whereas school plans were intended to be created
collaboratively, only “a small core of administrators and activists did so in seven
schools…” In addition, content of the plans corresponds to conditions of strong
external steering, and, “regular classroom teachers…exhibit only superficial knowledge
of their school’s SIP [School Improvement Plan]” (ibid., 2002, pp. 295-296).
NAVIGATING A WAY OUT OF PROGRAM IMPROVEMENT 44

The authors suggest that the presence of the SIP served as more of a distraction than a
tool to aid and inform site-level improvements (ibid., 2002, p. 296). A limitation of this
research is what was done by site administrators to mitigate overwhelming teacher
sentiment that the SIP was an “albatross” was not fully explored. Instead, the
researchers point out that principals were responsible for 57% of the activities related
to the implementation of the improvement plan, and teachers were accountable for 61%
of the activities, resulting in an imbalance of responsibility. Another limitation is the
absence of a discussion of whether or not there were supports in place for principals to
facilitate their efforts to change teachers’ perceptions of the SIP albatross, or for the
workload involved in reforming the school.
While Blasé and Blasé‘s (1999) research predated NCLB (2001) legislation,
their work is relevant to the challenges faced by site-level administrators entering into
PI Year 4+. Their study highlights the thoughts, feelings, and ideas generated by
exemplary principals working in or seeking to create shared governance environments
at League of Professional Schools member schools. Some of the significant challenges
faced by principals were: (1) ceding control to teachers in a balanced manner, (2)
mitigating conflicting values between district and school site personnel, (3) making the
best use of limited time, and (4) being better listeners to employee needs (ibid., 1999).
While the study reflects attention to the pre-existing problem of sharing control and
resolving conflict, it is noteworthy—and also a limitation of the study—that the
principals studied were considered exemplary in their practice and ability to manage
NAVIGATING A WAY OUT OF PROGRAM IMPROVEMENT 45

schools and teachers. Blasé and Blasé (1999) did not discuss any of the complications
faced by principals considered average or less than average to illustrate the complexities
involved—regardless of leadership ability—in managing a school undergoing large-
scale reform.
Al-Fadhi and Singh (2011) conducted a study that compared two high-
performing schools with two low-performing schools, for the purpose of examining
district- and school-level efforts to comply with NCLB. Of interest was the interaction
of the school principal with NCLB implementation at both low- and high-performing
schools. Al-Fadhi and Singh (2011) found that principals at the different schools had
different experiences with and opinions of school governance—i.e., “professional
development, curriculum alignment, changes in school climate, and community
involvement” (p. 755). The differences were related to the type of school and
allocation of funds. Another finding revealed that across all schools in the study,
principals felt pressure to narrow both curriculum and instruction. They acknowledged
that “narrowing of the curriculum and instruction, focusing on test-taking skills, and
teaching to the test was not desirable but necessary to maintain funding and avoid
sanctions” (Al-Fadhi & Singh, 2011, p. 760). A limitation of this study was that the
researchers did not address what leadership skills facilitated principals’ efforts to
comply with NCLB, and instead focused on available funding as the primary influence
for adherence to reform.
School Culture/Climate and Accountability

Drago-Severson (2012) makes a distinction between climate and culture.
Climate is defined as the “…perceived environmental factors that impact behavior—and
NAVIGATING A WAY OUT OF PROGRAM IMPROVEMENT 46

thus may be more amenable to influence and change” (p. 3). Culture “refers to norms,
values, and beliefs that exist and can be very difficult to change or measure” (ibid.,
2012, p. 3). In this study, culture and climate will be used jointly as an idea that is both
/ and. Specifically, norms, values, and beliefs influence environment; environment
influences norms, values, and beliefs.
Camacho and Eilers (2007) conducted a study of a principal’s ability to re-shape
culture at a PI Year 4+ school to one which values student learning, collaboration, and
data analysis. They found that the organizational choices made by the principal were
central to re-shaping school culture. In this case, the principal made his priorities for the
school organization very clear, and sought assistance to realize his priorities—
professional development for his teachers, creating time for collaboration in the school
day, and curriculum mapping, to name a few—at the school site level. Camacho and
Eilers (2007) reveal that, during a two-year period, in domains such as professional
communities of practice, collaborative leadership, and evidence-based practice—
measures of school culture change—teachers at the school exceeded the district average
in terms of readiness to engage. This study suggests an overlap between best leadership
practices and how traits such as valuing collaborative leadership might facilitate
decisions that benefit the school’s culture.
A limitation of this study is absence of discussion about what was done by the
principal to deal with teachers who did not want to engage with the cultural reforms
undertaken by the principal. People both influence and are influenced by culture,
therefore it would have been valuable to hear how the principal managed dissenters.
NAVIGATING A WAY OUT OF PROGRAM IMPROVEMENT 47

Firestone (2009) wrote of the relationship between culture and accountability.
He explained that NCLB and the approaching 2014 deadline changed the way in which
districts work, suggesting a change in workplace culture. In this vein, the notion of
accountability has shifted from loosely-coupled culture to an accountability culture. An
accountability culture is predicated on the idea that the “[school] district play a key role
in improving teaching and learning” (Firestone, 2009, p. 670). Firestone contended that
there are layers and types of accountability to which involved parties (i.e., district,
consultants, teachers, and principals alike) must respond. His work illustrated that either
of the aforementioned cultural archetypes (loosely-coupled culture or accountability
culture) can determine how teachers respond—and to what—in the context of NCLB
sanctions.
Strunk and McEachin (2011) provide compelling evidence which suggests that
union-negotiated teachers’ contracts have bearing on culture and climate. Sometimes
the way in which teachers’ contracts are negotiated determines the extent to which
principals can or cannot enforce accountability measures. Their research suggests that
the more rigid the contract is (in favor of teacher rights), the more difficult it is for the
principal to enforce processes that will yield positive achievement results in students.
Strunk and McEachin (2011) also found that union-negotiated contracts, and the loyalty
with which teachers ascribe to them, have a bearing on the espoused values shared by
the teaching population. They found that this dynamic is most prevalent in urban
settings—which makes it more challenging for principals to create a momentum for
reform. The implication is that principals may have to work strategically to implement
reform efforts, and to create buy-in from teachers.
NAVIGATING A WAY OUT OF PROGRAM IMPROVEMENT 48

Reculturing. Fullan (2000) offered the idea of reculturing, which, in this
conception, is more difficult than restructuring. According to Fullan, restructuring is a
mechanism typically engaged by policy and underpinned by changing easy elements
(i.e., curriculum or staff). Fullan proposes that reculturing involves changing minds and
ways of working, and is predicated on strategic and informed decision-making in the
interest of changing the culture and climate of a school. He suggests that teachers
should work in small groups to discuss students’ achievement, or that training should
take place in small groups, as approaches towards reculturing a school. In this way,
teachers and their leader learn and work in productive ways.
The Relationship Between Leadership and Principals

The relationship between school reform, the concept of leadership, and the ways
principals use their leadership to inspire or enforce accountability, is tenuous.
Accountability “includes sanctions and rewards, such as bonuses and recognition”
(http://www2.ed.gov/policy/elsec/leg/esea02/pg2.html). Very little research addresses
the leadership skills necessary for a principal to orchestrate and implement
organizational change at a PI Year 4+ school. And, as Elmore (2000) says, “When
accountability systems require schools to perform at levels that exceed their current
capacity, the authority of those systems and the people who run them, is thereby
diminished” (p. 11).
“Schools depend on leadership throughout the organization to shape productive
futures through a process of self-renewal” (Marks & Printy, 2003,
p. 370). It is possible that NCLB seeks to inspire self-renewal at struggling schools
through positive and negative inducements to change. While there is research which
NAVIGATING A WAY OUT OF PROGRAM IMPROVEMENT 49

recognizes that leadership practices are among the elements that influence student
achievement, Goldring, Porter, Murphy, Elliott, and Cravens (2007) write that
measuring leadership performance continues to be a challenge. The reason for this may
be that there are dynamics and challenges that exceed the ability of school leaders,
regardless of how well prepared they may be. Finnigan and Stewart (2009) confirm the
need for continued study of leadership in climates of reform; they point to the difference
in practices and choices made by principals at schools in the sanctions phase. Very little
literature explores precisely what it is that ineffective principals are doing at their
school sites—most literature points to lack of experience or poor placement as the
primary culprit that drives a school into, or perpetuates, low performance (Elmore,
2000; Bensimon, 2005).
Leadership

The topic of leadership as it pertains to education is vast. Because this is the
case, I have selected instructional leadership and transformational leadership as my
primary emphases for the scope of this study. This section will address instructional and
transformational leadership, best leadership practices, the principals’ role in the context
of schools that demonstrate gains toward positive reform, and barriers that impede
principals’ decision-making at struggling or reforming schools.
Instructional and transformational leadership. Heck and Marcoulides (1993)
researched principals and their behavior related to school achievement. In their study,
they controlled for extant factors such as socio-economic status and geographic location
(ibid., 1993). They found that “patterns of secondary or elementary principal’s
instructional leadership behavior may be critical to the academic achievement of the
NAVIGATING A WAY OUT OF PROGRAM IMPROVEMENT 50

School” (ibid., 1993, p. 25). This has implications for the way in which a climate of
increased accountability alters the workload and way of working for principals.
Heck (1992) conducted another study that examined instructional leadership
practice as related to school performance. He sought to answer the following: (1) What
are the most important instructional leadership predictors of school achievement? (2) To
what extent do the instructional leadership profiles of new principals in consistently
high and low achieving schools tend to mirror the norms for principal behavior in each
type of school? (p. 22). His findings were consistent with the prevailing consensus
opinion that “strong principal leadership influences school academic achievement at least
indirectly” (Heck, 1992, pp. 21-22). Heck (1992) asserted that:
Principals must not only be capable of providing strong leadership when
required but must also understand how the larger environment shapes their
organizational and individual interactions and the relationship between those
interactions and resulting school outcomes. (p. 22)
The implications for education policy and how principals work are significant. Heck‘s
work emphasizes how important it is for principals to be aware, not just of the
organizational change at hand, but also how this influences teachers to the extent that
they feel confident enough to work toward the desired reforms.
There are many interpretations of instructional leadership. For the purpose of
this study, instructional leadership will be defined according to Marks and Printy
(2003): “Instructional leadership viewed the principal as the primary source of
educational expertise”(p. 372). They add that:
NAVIGATING A WAY OUT OF PROGRAM IMPROVEMENT 51

Aimed at standardizing the practice of effective teaching, the principal’s role

was to maintain high expectations for teachers and students, supervise classroom
instruction, coordinate the school’s curriculum, and monitor student progress.
(p. 372)
Their construct of instructional leadership positions the principal in a top-down
management style where he serves as overseer of instructional activities carried out by
teachers. Marks and Printy (2003) point out that this type of management presents
limitations, in that it presupposes the principal is sufficiently current on educational
strategies and techniques that they are able to answer all teachers’ instructional queries.
This is not a realistic proposition, as principals have other duties to which they must
attend. They conclude that, “For principals who lacked the skills to accomplish these
tasks, coaching and on-site assistance were in short supply” (ibid., p. 372). This
positions the principal at a greater disadvantage, to the degree that they have the
appearance of deficient skills. That the supply of additional assistance is weak
emphasizes this appearance even more.
Stein and Nelson (2003) distinguish between content knowledge and leadership
content knowledge. They surmise that, just as it is important for teachers to have a
strong understanding of content area expertise, along with an understanding of what
impels students’ learning, it is equally important for a principal to know and understand
how teachers learn to effect school improvement. They argue that “administrators who
profess to be instructional leaders—superintendents; deputy, assistant, or area
superintendents; and principals—must have some degree of understanding of the
NAVIGATING A WAY OUT OF PROGRAM IMPROVEMENT 52

various subject areas under their purview” (Stein & Nelson, 2003, p. 424). Theirs was
an amalgamation of two separate studies each researcher conducted independently.
Stein and Nelson (2003) conclude that principals who do not have strong
understanding of leadership content knowledge negatively impact the teacher’s ability
to improve, as measured by students’ test scores, as this is closely tied with the
principals’ inability to impart content area knowledge. They recommend that leaders be
cognizant of the following leadership traits: (1) Understanding the learning needs of
individuals, (2) Arranging interactive social environments that embody the right mix of
expertise and appropriate tasks to spur [professional] learning, (3) Putting the right mix
of incentives and sanctions into the environment to motivate individuals to learn, and (4)
Ensuring that there are adequate resources available to support learning (p. 426).
Implications for this are that principals can be better equipped to create strategic
arrangements to maximize professional learning in teachers, among other things.
Marks and Printy (2003) conducted a study testing the effects of principals’ use
of both transformational and shared instructional leadership practices to lead their
schools. Their position was that shared instructional leadership or transformational
leadership used alone do not elicit the greatest possible impact on teacher efficacy and
student achievement. Stated more clearly, they wrote that instructional leadership
conflicted with the participative nature of shared leadership, and that instructional
leadership was better served by melding it with transformational leadership, which
called for inclusion of teachers in such decision-making roles as school site councils
and curriculum development in an effort to improve a school (Marks & Printy, 2003).
NAVIGATING A WAY OUT OF PROGRAM IMPROVEMENT 53

In this vein, overall school culture was improved to the extent that teachers were more
engaged and embraced school improvement as part of their work.
Best Leadership Practices

There is extensive research that addresses what characteristics best position
principals to have the greatest impact and to achieve success in schools. A few will be
explicated here, as some ideas discussed in this section informed the conceptual
framework devised for this study.
Knapp et al. (2010) establish five key traits as being the most conducive to the
success of principals (and other types of school leaders) at schools whose dynamics
mirror those of PI Year 4+ schools: professional learning, instructional leadership,
leadership practice, creation of relationships, and evidence-based decision making.
They posit that each trait requires support mechanisms in order for change to be
embraced and take hold. The support mechanisms are: (1) resource allocation, (2)
support for professional learning, (3) relationship brokerage, (4) response to leaders’
needs, and (5) legitimizing learning-focused leadership.
The traits described by Knapp et al. are not founded on the purchase of
curriculum, or tools to facilitate leaders’ capacity building, and the five support
mechanisms seem to be predicated on time, effort, and stewardship of the mission to
forward student and professional capacity. Relationship brokerage is the strategy of
pairing leaders (i.e., principals or teachers) with a mentor who serves as advisor and
sounding-board. In this vein, Knapp et al. establish that professional learning is not
isolated to one- or two-day sessions; learning happens in the midst of the environment.
Responding to leaders’ needs presents a unique shift in the dynamic between the state
NAVIGATING A WAY OUT OF PROGRAM IMPROVEMENT 54

(which acts as accountability enforcer) and the schools and districts that carry out their
demands under NCLB sanctions. Knapp et al. (2010) would have us conceive of the
dynamic differently: that the state should work to meet the needs of the district and/or
school seeking to be NCLB compliant.
Learning-centered leadership is grounded in the acknowledgement that
principals and teacher-leaders seeking to implement change at urban schools require a
different type of support, and that in order for second-order change to take place,
ongoing professional learning using different modes and contexts is crucial to both
facilitating and managing the change (Knapp et al., 2010). They “didn’t take for granted
that teacher leaders, school principals, or central office staff would know how to lead
effectively or would have the means and legitimacy to engage others in learning
improvement” (ibid., 2010, p. 18).
Marzano, Waters, and McNulty (2005) compiled a list of 21 leadership traits
documented by other studies as being common practices among principals at successful
schools. A distinction they make, while acknowledging that these traits are not new to
the research on educational leadership, is that attached to these traits are specific actions
tied to each responsibility when used by a principal at his/her school site. For example,
they list input as one such responsibility, and suggest that if a principal is in fact
soliciting input from teachers, then teachers are involved in the design or
implementation of key decisions at the school.
One limitation of Marzano et al. (2005) is that theirs is a meta-analysis. Another
limitation is that they do not discuss the urgent need for these traits in principals at
schools undergoing large-scale reform in response to policy sanctions. Finally, they do
NAVIGATING A WAY OUT OF PROGRAM IMPROVEMENT 55

not address how these traits might be developed in principals at schools requiring large-
scale change, the way that Knapp et al. (2010) do.
Finnigan and Stewart (2009) conducted a two-year study of 10 low-performing
elementary schools in Chicago. Even though their research was conducted prior to the
implementation of NCLB, they note that the characteristics that deemed the schools
low-performing mirror those of NCLB sanctions. Finnigan and Stewart (2009) found
significant differences in the leadership styles of principals at schools that stagnated in
their performance—that is, which did not experience a quick exit from probationary
status, if at all. Some of these differences had to do with leadership and management
styles. The researchers report that the less successful schools had principals that
engaged in top-down management, as opposed to shared or learning centered
leadership. One principal ―increased the monitoring of teacher practices—for example,
by reviewing the 10-week assessments given by teachers and observing classrooms to
see “if instruction is happening” (ibid., 2009, p. 4). They conclude that the principals at
schools that did not exit from probation tended to focus more on compliance monitoring
than improvement (ibid., 2009, p. 6). A limitation of their research is that they focus on
elementary schools and perceptions of leadership, as opposed to observed leadership
behavior (ibid., 2009). My study addresses these limitations by focusing on a middle
school, and will add to the literature on leadership practices at middle schools.
Crum, Sherman, and Myran (2009) conducted a study seeking to understand
which best practices are used by elementary school principals in the context of
increased accountability. They suggest that with increased accountability, the principal
is beholden to diversified responsibilities that encompass not just students and teachers,
NAVIGATING A WAY OUT OF PROGRAM IMPROVEMENT 56

but also the community, district personnel, and knowledge of instructional leadership.
Notwithstanding being able to create school climates that yield optimal results, Crum et
al. (2009) find that principals in their study still require—and are not receiving—
support in data-based decision making and instructional leadership. In spite of this
challenge, principals at these schools still experienced success. Crum et al. (2009) find
five characteristics that facilitated the principals’ success: “Leadership with data;
honesty and relationships; fostering ownership and collaboration; recognizing and
developing leadership; instructional awareness and involvement” (p. 59). While this
study focused exclusively on the experiences of successful principals, a limitation is
that they do not discuss how such skills might translate to a challenging environment,
such as that of a school experiencing sanctions under NCLB. To be more specific, the
researchers might have explicated the challenges of principalship at a school facing
organizational change, and might have recommended how the five characteristics could
be used to facilitate change at a restructuring school. My study addresses this limitation
by exploring the presence of leadership traits in a principal already working at a
restructuring (PI Year 4+) school, to highlight the importance of recognizing the
managerial challenges to implementing large-scale change on a campus that is already
fraught with upheaval.
Sherman, Sanzo, and Clayton (2011) conducted a similar study of effective
leadership practices used by principals at middle schools. Their study, similar to the
previous, contextualizes the importance of examining leadership practice in increased
accountability under NCLB, citing a lack of research on principals during the NCLB era
(Sanzo et al., 2011). They found four themes that encapsulate best practices used by
NAVIGATING A WAY OUT OF PROGRAM IMPROVEMENT 57

middle school principals: “sharing leadership, facilitating professional development,
leading with an instructional orientation, and acting openly and honestly” (Sanzo et al.,
2011, p. 9). While their findings reveal similar characteristics as those previously
delineated in this section, one item does not get reconciled in their study. One principal
in the study indicates surprise and shock when a teacher acknowledges an inability to
use data to inform instruction. The study does not reflect what the principal did in
response to the teacher’s difficulty with data-analysis. I would identify this as a
limitation of the study; if the goal was to ascertain which best practices inform
successful school organizations and principals, then the researchers should have
explicated what the principal did to ameliorate the learning gap the teacher experienced.
Instead, the researchers focused on the principals’ use of data to make school-wide
decisions. My study addresses this limitation by analyzing the interactions between
principal and teacher in the context of challenging situations resulting from PI Year 4+
designation. In a PI Year 4+ school, principals and teachers are especially vulnerable to
the ways in which the sanctions ask them to work; therefore, it is important to look at
what principals do to help teachers increase their understanding.
Another limitation of Sanzo et al. (2011) is that they do not address
communication (of goals, direction) as being important for a successful principal. This
lack is addressed in my study through analysis of documents and observation of critical
meetings pertaining to PI Year 4+ designation.
Arlestig (2007) conducted a study that examines the importance and variety of
communications used by principals at improving schools. This work is situated in the
understanding that while principals have the ability to shape the direction in which the
NAVIGATING A WAY OUT OF PROGRAM IMPROVEMENT 58

school and its teachers are headed, a key component to being able to accomplish
organizational goals is the ability to engage in different types of communication. Her
claim is that “effective, successful leaders must have a realistic view of communication
and its direct and indirect effects” (Arlestig, 2007, p. 265). Arlestig’s (2007) findings
reveal that, despite the use of multiple methods of communication (e.g., bulletins, staff
meetings, small group meetings, walk-throughs, one-on-one meetings), there was a
disconnect between what the principals perceived they were communicating to their
teachers, and what teachers understood to be important or a priority at the school. For
example, principals believed that they were clear about the school’s mission and vision,
and that their actions were in alignment with their beliefs. However, teachers believed
that the “…principals were not interested in their teaching. Feedback on issues such as
teamwork, grades, and instructional questions were rare” (Arlestig, 2007, p. 271).
Whereas items like rules, comfort (of students and teachers), and action plans were
discussed anywhere between weekly and one or two times a month, more pressing items
like school improvement, curriculum, quality (of instruction), and school vision were
discussed with even less frequency—1 or 2 times a semester (Arlestig, 2007).
A limitation of the study is that the researcher acknowledges the challenges
involved in clear communication at a school organization seeking to improve, but does
not address what the principals in the study could have done to mitigate the mismatch
between what they thought they communicated to their teachers, and what was actually
communicated. My study addresses this limitation by analyzing documents related to PI
Year 4+ planning and elucidating how principals can more clearly communicate
alignment of organizational goals, whilst maintaining sensitivity to teaching staff.
NAVIGATING A WAY OUT OF PROGRAM IMPROVEMENT 59

To conclude, this section addressed the best leadership practices used by
principals at successful schools. In presenting the research in this manner—as a
construct of what is known in the field of educational leadership to work at successful
schools—the goal was to elicit greater consideration of what happens at low-performing
schools when a principal is not equipped with the best leadership practices. Low-
performing schools (such as PI Year 4+ schools) and those that work in them are broken
in many ways. Meanwhile, they are mandated to fix or change what is broken without
the skills that will facilitate their success. The next section addresses the types of
challenges encountered by principals in schools experiencing sanction-based reform.
Barriers that Impede Leadership Actions

It is documented that there exist barriers that can and do prevent a principal from
enacting decisions, regardless of his skill, level of preparation, and work context (PI
school, union heavy, high-achieving school). This section will explore how unions can
pose an unintended barrier by challenging the actions that a school leader can and
cannot enact in the interest of improving his school and / or teacher practice.
Unions

Strunk (2012) conducted a study that sought to understand the effect that union-
negotiated contracts have on principals’ ability to lead in a high-stakes accountability
setting in California. Her work analyzed the contents of 465 Collective Bargaining
Agreements (CBAs) and coded them for characteristics that might make a school “hard
to staff ” (Strunk, 2012, p. 1). Strunk revealed that, while collective bargaining
agreements are designed to protect workplace conditions for teachers, they also
constrain principals’ abilities to lead a school in the manner they see fit—limiting their
NAVIGATING A WAY OUT OF PROGRAM IMPROVEMENT 60

autonomy and decision-making power. For example, because a CBA is designed to
protect a teacher, a principal would be unable to hire or fire a teacher at will—even if
firing the teacher would benefit students’ learning outcomes. Strunk wrote that contracts
can “restrict local district administrators‘ abilities to implement education reforms that
are necessary to raise student achievement and efficiently use limited resources” (p. 3).
A distinguishing feature of her work is the identification of a collection of elements in
the CBAs that are found in hard-to-staff districts. That is to say, many students may
negatively benefit from provisions included in CBAs.
It is easy to assume that perceived limitations exhibited by a school leader are
the result of a lack of skill. In this case, another element is a factor: CBAs serve to
inform, to a degree, limitations to principals’ leadership. The role that unions played in
the school studied for this dissertation will be explored in Chapter 5.
Trust

In this section, definitions and ideas surrounding trust will be presented. Trust
emerges as an idea that underpins all of the concepts presented up to this point. In order
for leaders to be perceived as effective, for teachers to be able to grow in their practice,
and for schools to eventually be able to succeed on all levels (academic, social,
cultural), trust needs to have developed in such a way that those in the organization can
operate and respond to demands for change in healthy ways.
Byrk and Schneider (2003) conducted a study of Chicago elementary schools.
Through interviews, surveys, and observations they concluded that of utmost
importance to these teacher’s success was relational trust. They define relational trust
as the idea that anyone in a given role (i.e. teacher, principal, or student) has a clear
NAVIGATING A WAY OUT OF PROGRAM IMPROVEMENT 61

understanding of his or her position as it relates to another. The result is a climate and
culture of dependence and support. Bryk and Schneider (2003) wrote, “Such
dependencies create a sense of mutual vulnerability for all individuals involved.
Consequently, deliberate actions taken by any party to reduce this sense of vulnerability
in others—to make them feel safe and secure—builds trust across the community” (p.
41). Bryk and Schneider (2003) describe four ideals: respect, personal regard,
competence, and integrity as being integral to a school leader‘s ability to promote and
built trust.
Interpersonal respect is the idea that those who work in a school community
have the freedom to engage in discourse of all types. They write that, “Even when people
disagree, individuals can still feel valued if others respect their opinions” (Bryk &
Schneider, 2003, p. 41). Conversely, when people feel disrespected, they “typically
avoid demeaning situations if they can. When they don’t have this option, sustained
conflict may erupt” (p. 41).
Personal regard has to do with the willingness one has to extend him or herself
in the interest of advancing school community ideals. Specifically Bryk and Schneider
(2003) wrote it is the, “…willingness of participants to extend themselves beyond the
formal requirements of a job definition or union contract” (p. 42). One’s willingness to
extend him or herself demonstrates a commitment (to the school, students, teachers) to
do whatever necessary to improve the school. They cite this as one way school climate
can be altered significantly. The researchers provided examples of how relational trust
can be fostered and destroyed. One way Byrk and Schneider (2003) captured positive
relational trust had to do with the way a principal managed to change school staff. They
NAVIGATING A WAY OUT OF PROGRAM IMPROVEMENT 62

wrote, “attaining relational trust may require the principal to jump-start change. …the
principal may need to reshape the composition of the school staff by hiring strong
people into staff vacancies, and where necessary, counseling out those whose practice
remains inconsistent with the school’s mission and values” (p. 44). Conversely, they
wrote that if a principal even has the appearance of inaction regarding personnel
behavior(s) (i.e. a tolerance for offensive teachers) that this can severely undermine the
level of relational trust on a campus. The result is that the principal has not secured buy-
in from his teachers regarding the work of school improvement. Bryk and Schneider
(2003) wrote that generally, “parents and community leaders became less distrustful
because they could not understand how the professional staff would tolerate such
behavior” (p. 44).
Byrk and Schneider (2003) also ranked competence in core responsibilities as an
element that figured heavily in creating a climate of relational trust. They related that
stakeholders like parents and teacher expect to see results or “desired outcomes” (p. 42).
They assert that, “Instances of negligence of incompetence, if allowed to persist,
undermine trust” (p. 42). Finally, Byrk and Schneider (2003) wrote of one’s personal
integrity as being paramount to creating a climate of relational trust as one has to
depend heavily on his or her morals and ethics to inform how one works in the face of
conflicts and political situations.
Bird, Wang, Watson, and Murray (2009) wrote of the links between principal’s
authentic leadership, the extent to which this creates a climate of trust in and among
teachers and how this informs teachers’ workplace engagement. Bird et al (2009) draw
their definition of leadership from three core ideas: (1) Does the leader know who he /
NAVIGATING A WAY OUT OF PROGRAM IMPROVEMENT 63

she is? (2) Does the leader make objectives challenging yet attainable? and (3) Does
the leader have an attitude that is matched by his / her employees? In their study they
found a significant relationship between principals’ authentic leadership practices and
teachers’ levels of trust and workplace engagement. Key findings were the following:
(1) “Teacher’s trust in the principal is enhanced when the principal consistently
performs to the expectation of the teacher”, (2) “…Teacher trust increases when the
principal acts in a supportive manner”, and (3) “Trust is furthered by principals
displaying unbiased decision making” (Bird et al, 2009, p. 166).
In summary, Bird et al (2009) emphasize the importance of trust related to how
hard teachers will work. It recalls Elmore’s (2000) work who stated that a climate of
reciprocity needs to exist in order for teachers to be productive members of the school
community. Just as with students, teachers needs must be met. Teachers, in this case,
needed to be assured that their principal was confident in their skills. Confidence was
demonstrated by the principal’s ability to make teachers feel listened-to or by
principals’ execution of tasks. Bird et al (2009) wrote, “Principals behaviors of
encouraging all to speak their minds, displaying emotions in line with feelings, and
soliciting views that challenge their deeply held positions seem to align with teachers’
passions” (p. 166). What this means is that teachers need to have the feeling that their
leader will not only challenge them but will also respect them when dissonance
emerges. Of less importance was whether teachers felt the same level of trust related to
their colleagues. While Bird et al (2009) endeavored to change the way in which
principal preparation programs are designed, their work is important to this
NAVIGATING A WAY OUT OF PROGRAM IMPROVEMENT 64

study because it imparts the importance of trust and its relationship to authentic
leadership.
Hoy and Taschannen-Moran (1999) determined that there are, “common
conditions of trust” (p. 186). They are: (1) Willingness to risk, (2) Benevolence, (3)
Reliability, (4) Competence, (5) Honesty, and (6) Openness. Hoy & Tschannen-Moran
(1999) frame the concept of willingness to risk in terms of a leader, or principal’s ability
to make him or herself vulnerable to the teaching staff. The researchers explain the
difficulty in determining, then, where and how trust is created in an individual’s choice
to take a risk. Does trust increase when the individual makes himself vulnerable? Or,
does trust grow when one agrees to trust another? Hoy & Tschannen-Moran (1999)
continue by defining benevolence as, “the confidence that one’s well-being or something
one cares about will be protected by the trusted person or group” (p. 187). Here, they
explain how important it is for one who is trusted not to exploit those who have made
themselves vulnerable in the interest of creating or maintaining, “good will” (ibid, 1999,
p. 187). According to the researchers, reliability is the extent to which one is able to be
consistent. They make the distinction that there are good and bad forms of reliability.
Hence, it is important for the leader to be reliable so that, “a person believes that
outcomes will be forthcoming and positive, reflects the extent of trust” (ibid, 1999,
p. 188). Honesty and openness are concepts that are intertwined. As one is honest, or
truthful, one is also demonstrating openness.
The researchers found that there existed different levels of trust in school
organizations and that teachers’ level of trust in the principal was more significant to
achieving school improvement, than teachers’ trust in their peers. Hoy & Tschannen-
NAVIGATING A WAY OUT OF PROGRAM IMPROVEMENT 65

Moran (1999) determined that three levels of trust were in operation at the school they
studied. Those levels were: (1) trust in the principal, (2) trust in colleagues, and (3) trust
in clients.
Their work was underpinned by the understanding that trust is “fundamental to
human survival and functioning in a complex and interdependent society” (Hoy &
Tschannen-Moran, 1999, p. 185). Their idea echoes Elmore’s (2000) research which
brings the concept of reciprocity to the fore. Aside from determining three levels of
trust, the researchers found the following:
When teachers trust their principal, for example, they are also more likely to
trust each other and their clients [i.e parents, students]. Conversely, distrust also
tends to breed distrust. Broken trust is likely to ripple through the system
(Hoy & Tschannen-Moran, 1999, p. 204).
The ideas offered by Hoy and Tschannen-Moran are important to consider because they
reveal how fragile relationships can be at the school level by virtue of small acts of trust
or distrust.
Adams and Forsyth (2009) sought to establish and, “advance a theoretical model
of the nature and function of trust in schools” (p. 126). Their work was underpinned by
the assumption that any reform to be undertaken at the school level could only be
accomplished by using various strategies. Secondly, they establish, “[b]loated mandates,
changing demographics, and social problems are institutional conditions that affect that
social context of schools” (p. 127). The aforementioned is the context under which
schools have always operated. Now, more than ever, this is especially relevant as
NAVIGATING A WAY OUT OF PROGRAM IMPROVEMENT 66

external mandates have greater influence on the way in which schools are run. Adams
and Forsyth (2009) add that collective efficacy—the perceived ability to effect change
on students’ academic outcomes—is informed by teachers’ prior experiences. They
wrote, “Just as individuals consider their abilities within a context, a teaching faculty
assesses its capabilities within the context of a teaching environment. Context is a
powerful determinant of collective efficacy” (p. 133). The researchers contend that in
order to establish a context (for students and teachers) that yields high levels of
efficacy, a culture of trust is needed.
Hoy (2012) summarized forty years of research which focused on key traits that
make a difference in students’ academic achievement. Three chief ideas emerged from
his compendium of research: school climate, efficacy, and organizational trust. He
concluded that the presence of these elements determines the extent of organizational
health and institutional integrity. Hoy explained organizational health can be measured
at three different levels: (1) institutional (i.e. the organization), (2) managerial (i.e. the
manager’s ability to broker relationships and resources), and (3) technical (i.e. teacher
morale). Healthy presence of the aforementioned traits, then informs levels of
institutional integrity. Institutional integrity, Hoy (2012) wrote, is when a “school has the
ability to cope with its environment in positive ways” (p. 79). The implication of
Hoy’s work is that externally driven factors—like, demands for change or reform—
should be manageable by school principals and the teachers when the school’s culture is
driven by a trusting attitude. Further, his work implies that healthy organizations might
orient themselves differently to demands for change than, say, an organization with low
levels of institutional integrity.
NAVIGATING A WAY OUT OF PROGRAM IMPROVEMENT 67

Connell, Ferres, and Travaglione (2003) researched the concept of trust in the
workplace. Their work was founded on the idea that little research treating the origins
of trust in workplace settings. Connell et al. (2003) begin with a definition of trust that
mirrors those already mentioned in this section. In their definition of trust, they include
ethics and principles as key tenets to the establishment of trust in a workplace
organization. Underlying these two concepts are expectation of reliability and
“willingness to be vulnerable” (Connell et al., 2003, p. 114)—key characteristics
delineated in Hoy & Tschannen-Moran (1999) and Bird et al., (2009).
Their work centered on the ways in which trust manifested itself in the
organization. They found that trust demonstrated itself in three different ways: (1)
disposition to trust, (2) interpersonal trust, and (3) situational trust (Connell et al.,
2003). The researchers explain that disposition to trust is the extent to which one has a
trusting personality. Interpersonal trust is the extent to which trust exists within the
organization, and within and among groups in the organization. Finally, situational trust
has to do with the existence of a culture of trust in the organization. Specifically, the
researchers determined that situational trust had to do with how the culture of the
organization either engenders or deters a climate of trust.
Unlike previously cited researchers, Connell et al. (2003) added the nuance of
support as a key idea that served to increase or decrease levels of perceived support in
workplace employees and those in management. First they determined that definitions
of support were different depending on one’s position in the organization. For instance,
those in management perceived support to be generated from and by other managers, or
from “organizational processes and systems” (ibid, 2003, p. 115). Those who were not
NAVIGATING A WAY OUT OF PROGRAM IMPROVEMENT 68

in management positions conceived support as stemming from their peers in the form of
listening to one another or feelings of empowerment from management. Worthy of note
are the differing perceptions of support between those in management and non-
management positions. The researchers conclude, “…that when individuals felt they
were, or were not trusted or supported, this resulted in a particular response” (ibid,
2003, p. 115). Examples of the responses are distrust or increased trust, self- respect or
lack of motivation, and increased or decreased efficacy depending on the way in which
trust was or was not communicated.
An implication of Connell and colleagues’ research is the idea that there exist
nuanced perceptions of support and trust. Their work brings to light the importance of
considering how big and small decisions and actions committed on the part of the
manager have significant bearing on workplace morale and attitudes.
Kramer and Cook (2007) researched the concept of trust as it related to
businesses. They determined that in the business sector and in other organizations trust
is generated (or not) in two different ways: relationships or individuals’ character.
Relationship-based trust is hinged on the cultivation of relationship between superior
and subordinate. It is largely informed by the way in which one orients himself to the
other. Kramer and Cook (2007) report, “such things as salience of a shared identity,
recognition of a common background, and history of cooperative interaction” (p. 5) as
being key elements that positively contribute to a trusting relationship. Character-based
trust is largely informed by perception—a concept also offered in Connell et al. (2003).
Specifically, the researchers relate that compliance from subordinate to superior as
being the crux of how the character-based trust relationship is developed. Implied in
NAVIGATING A WAY OUT OF PROGRAM IMPROVEMENT 69

this are traits like reciprocity, offered by Elmore (2000) and reliability, offered by (Hoy

& Tschannen-Moran (2009).

Finally, Kramer and Cook offer the concept of support as being integral to the
development of organizational and interpersonal trust. They suggest that when support
exists, the element of protection is implied. An example offered by the researchers is in
the following: “…subordinates’ sense of protection from outside interference was a
strong predictor of trust in the supervisor” (Kramer & Cook, 2007, p. 6). Trust is a
nuanced concept especially when one considers the organizational dynamics that
potentially add to, or take away from its development in organizations. Many of these
dynamics are out of school principals and teachers’ control. Key ideas gleaned from this
topic will be used to inform the conceptual framework offered in this chapter. Some of
those ideas are: support (Connell et al., 2003), condition of trust (Hoy & Tschannen-
Moran, 2009), and character-based trust and the role that perception plays in attainment
of trust (Kramer & Cook, 2007).
Conceptual Frame

This section presents the conceptual framework for this study. The goal of the
study was to determine whether there are specific leadership practices that enable a
principal at a low-performing school to lead his/her school out of PI (or result in
moving further into it). I have constructed a conceptual framework that draws on key
ideas advanced in the literature review: (1) climate / culture, (2) professional needs, (3)
empowerment / efficacy, and (4) accountability. I offset these ideas with the concept of
threat rigidity, the definition of which I drew from various sources (Bensimon, 2005;
Daly, 2009; Staw et al., 1981).
NAVIGATING A WAY OUT OF PROGRAM IMPROVEMENT 70

This section is organized as follows: First, I define and explain four areas that a
good leader would seek to improve in order to create a momentum of change. The areas
are: (1) climate / culture, (2) professional needs, (3) empowerment / efficacy, and (4)
accountability. I envision that improvement in these areas is needed in order for a leader
to position himself to lead effectively, to advance principals’ and teachers’ ability to
implement the changes being asked of them, and get his school out of Program
Improvement. To this end, a principal would be better positioned to enforce
accountability measures as teachers’ self-efficacy improves and their professional needs
are met. Phrased differently, we cannot ask teachers and leaders to change their
practices without providing them with ample support and tools to facilitate such change
(Elmore, 2000). Second, I explain what threat rigidity looks like in a context of school
reform. Finally, I discuss the ways in which these two concepts (leadership actions /
threat rigidity) inform lasting reform.
Decision Making for Reform

Elmore‘s (2000) research focuses on how policy such as NCLB asks school
leaders to change so that their schools can get better. He writes that “failing schools
confront widely varying conditions and are being forced to operate under relatively
uniform expectations” (Elmore, 2000, p. 6). His statement invites us to consider the
principal’s role, and the decisions s/he does and does not make in the interest of
improving a failing school. I have devised two constructs based on my understanding of
what good and bad leaders do in response to large-scale reform. The first construct
focuses on decisions that principals make in the interest of advancing reform at the
school site. The domains of accountability, efficacy, professional need, and climate /
NAVIGATING A WAY OUT OF PROGRAM IMPROVEMENT 71

culture carry equal importance with respect to a school’s improvement (See Figure 2.1),
though this does not necessarily mean that the domains must always change or improve
at the same rate.

climate /
culture

professional
needs

empowerment
/ efficacy

accountability
Momentum
of Reform

Building Trust

Figure 2.1. Leadership decision making – for reform

In this construct, all four areas—(1) climate / culture, (2) professional needs, (3)
empowerment / efficacy, and (4) accountability—operate interdependently in the
interest of effecting a momentum of reform. It is to be understood that combined
momentum of reform can increase or decrease dependent on the rate of growth of any
of the specific areas. Meanwhile, organizational and relational trust are being built.
NAVIGATING A WAY OUT OF PROGRAM IMPROVEMENT 72

Table 2.1

Leadership Oriented Decision Making: For Reform

Accountability

Efficacy /
Empowerment

Professional Needs

Climate / Culture

Definition

Acceptance of
responsibility
for actions &
inactions that
lent to students’
low achievement
/ or sub-par

Personal sense of
ability to achieve
a goal and/or
complete a task
that advances
professional
learning and/or

Materials, supplies,
and training that
enhance or improve
professional learning
or facilitate work
processes to the end
of students’

Climate: “…perceived
environmental factors that
impact behavior— and
thus may be more
amenable to influence and
change” (Drago-
Severson, 2012, p. 3)

work
performance.
student
achievement.
achievement and
teachers’
empowerment /
efficacy.
Culture: “refers to norms,
values, and beliefs that
exist and can be very
difficult to change or
measure” (ibid., 2012, p.
3)

What does
it look
like?

Making
decisions
informed by
data.

Providing
teachers with
opportunity to
share, improve

Assures teachers’ get
necessary supplies.
When not available,
a clear reason is

Climate is not accepted
as an excuse for
schools’ / teachers’ poor
performance.

Ego-aside.
with support. given.
Culture is shaped by
Transparency
(data, thoughts).

Sharing is
encouraged in
private, small
and large group
settings.
Teachers /
principals are
proactive; see
problems as
opportunities.

Celebrates
progress and
people.
Professional
development is
relevant to school /
district goals: in-
house as much as
possible.

Time is given to
teachers to problem
solve.

Instructional time is
protected / respected.
principal through
creation and
maintenance of
celebratory and
professional rituals
(i.e., award assemblies
to celebrate students,
protected time for
professional meetings
with teachers,
individual and small
group).

Table 2.1 delineates definitions and characteristics of the aforementioned
domains, drawn from existing literature. It is my conception that in order for (internal or
external) accountability to be enforced, teachers and administrators need to feel or
engender a sense of efficacy and / or empowerment in their schools, such that it
NAVIGATING A WAY OUT OF PROGRAM IMPROVEMENT 73

positively affects culture. In order for these elements to improve, however, professional
needs need to be met, which implies a level of existing support from the school
principal, support personnel on-site, or from the district. When these needs are met
trust ensues and a momentum of reform begins (Hoy, 2012; Hoy & Tschannen-Moran,
1999). The ideas presented in Table 2.1 are underpinned by the inextricable relationship
between culture / climate and accountability. Existing research reflects how intertwined
these two ideas are (Mintrop, 2012; Knapp & Feldman, 2012; Elmore, 2000).
Decision Making Against Reform

The second construct devised for this study was generated from existing
research concerning threat rigidity (Daly, 2009; Staw, 1981; Gilbert, 2005) and deficit
cognitive thinking (Bensimon, 2005). Figure 2.2 addresses what happens when a
principal makes decisions but is hindered by threat rigidity. For this study I define
threat rigidity as the act of constraining information or resources, blaming others for
lack of performance, and working in isolation because the perceived threat is too
overwhelming.
Threat rigidity—in any of its iterations—can act as a blockage that complicates,
slows, or stops altogether any type of reform effort. This construct is predicated on the
understanding that the ability to enforce accountability is nuanced as it is (Mintrop,
2012; Elmore, 2000; Strunk, 2012; Senge, 1990). Existing research says that a leader‘s
willingness to enforce accountability measures is determined by internal and external
forces. More specifically, a leader is wont to enforce accountability measures if they are
generated internally (within the organization) as opposed to if they are generated
NAVIGATING A WAY OUT OF PROGRAM IMPROVEMENT 74

externally (imposed by someone outside the organization) (Knapp & Feldman, 2012;
Mintrop, 2012).

Threat
Rigid
Actions &
Decisions

climate
/
culture

professional
needs

empowerment
/ efficacy

accountability

Compromised Trust

Figure 2.2. Leadership decision making — against reform

Figure 2.2 is a representation of the way in which threat-rigid actions slow or
stop the momentum of reform. It is possible that a leader could make efforts to change
by empowering his teachers, meeting professional needs, changing the climate / culture
of the school, and enforcing accountability. However, these efforts could be hampered
or skewed by threat rigidity. Threat-rigid actions can confuse those on the receiving end
to the extent that they may not completely understand the sort of work that needs to be
done. Worse, mixed messages about organizational goals are sent, because the sender—
in this case, the principal—is unsure himself of how to approach the goals, or does not
believe in them. Hence, dissonance is created between the intended message to
teaching staff and the message they receive, and it becomes a challenge to create a
NAVIGATING A WAY OUT OF PROGRAM IMPROVEMENT 75

momentum of reform. Meanwhile, organizational and interpersonal trust becomes
compromised, or it is challenging for the person in charge to create a climate of trust.

Table 2.2

Leadership Decision Making: Against Reform

Accountability

Efficacy /
Empowerment

Professional Needs

Climate / Culture

Definition

Acceptance of

Personal sense of

Any materials,

Climate: perceived

responsibility for ability to achieve supplies, and environmental factors

actions & a goal and/or training that that impact behavior—

inactions that lent complete a task enhance or improve and thus may be more

to students’ low that advances professional amenable to influence

achievement / or professional learning or facilitate and change‖ (Drago-

sub-par work learning and/or work processes to Severson, 2012, p. 3).

performance. student the end of students’

achievement. achievement and

Culture: ―refers to

teachers’
norms, values, and

empowerment /
beliefs that exist and

efficacy.
can be very difficult to
change or measure‖
(ibid., 2012, p. 3).

What does
it look
like?
Threat Rigidity (Daly, 2009)
Resource Rigidity (Staw et al., 1981)
Deficit-Cognitive Thinking (Bensimon, 2005)

Blaming others.

Cognitive deficit
thinking.
Low levels of
efficacy.

Low sense of
empowerment.
Resource rigidity. Negative climate.

Culture of blame.
Perpetuated status-quo.
Culture of distrust.

Table 2.2 delineates what decision making against reform might look like.
Whereas the traits—accountability, efficacy / empowerment, professional needs, and
climate / culture—are defined in the same way as in Table 2.1, the actions or decisions
made by the principal are different in these contexts. For example, a principal may
NAVIGATING A WAY OUT OF PROGRAM IMPROVEMENT 76

make an effort to empower his teachers by giving them added responsibility, but his
lack of support for the teachers could undermine empowerment efforts and make
teachers feel unappreciated. The result might be seeming gestures towards reform that
are garbled by threat-rigid actions. Threat-rigid actions, then, undermine efforts to
inspire or build trust in an organization, as these actions can sometimes give the
appearance of inconsistency, isolation, or blame. These are characteristics that,
according to Hoy and Tschannen-Moran (1999), in their opposite forms inspire trust
(i.e., reliability, openness, vulnerability or acceptance of responsibility).
Conclusion

Exploration of key ideas related to leadership and decision making were
provided to illustrate the challenges faced by principals in Program Improvement (PI)
Year 4+ schools. The purpose was to illustrate the contexts that need to be considered
when aiming to implement and assimilate externally-driven accountability in the
interest of creating momentum for reform. The research presented in this chapter
established the importance of treating differently the leadership challenges faced by and
skills needed by principals at low-performing schools. The next chapter will discuss the
methodology used to conduct this study.
NAVIGATING A WAY OUT OF PROGRAM IMPROVEMENT 77

CHAPTER 3
METHODOLOGY
In order to conduct a qualitative case-study analysis of a Program Improvement
(PI) Year 4+ school, various approaches were taken to provide a thorough
understanding of the impact PI Year 4+ designation has on principals as they seek to
lead their teachers in a climate of large-scale reform. This chapter describes the nature
of the study, sample and participants, instrumentation, data collection methods, data
analysis, and limitations and delimitations. The statement of the problem, and the
literature review, provided background and context from which this analysis was
conducted. The data collected will add to the emerging literature that addresses
leadership challenges in a PI Year 4+ school, and may be useful to leaders working in
this context. This study was conducted against a backdrop of the conceptual frame
advanced in Chapter 2, and sought to answer the following research questions:
1. What leadership practices are (or are not) used by principals to help teachers
mediate the demands for change in the AGP in a climate of reform?
a. What are teachers’ perceptions of the principal’s efforts to respond to
the demands of PI Year 4+?
Nature of the Study

This was a qualitative single-case study conducted with two units of study: two
principals, and teachers that worked with them. I employed purposive and snowball
sampling. A qualitative approach was used to capture the lived experiences of the two
principals, and teachers, at a PI Year 4+ school (Patton, 2002). Patton (2002) explains
that naturalistic inquiry rests on the understanding that the researcher must position
NAVIGATING A WAY OUT OF PROGRAM IMPROVEMENT 78

himself to the case being studied in a “real world setting”, such that “the researcher does
not attempt to manipulate the phenomenon of interest (e.g., a group, event, program,
community, relationship, or interaction)” (p. 39). The goal was to observe and achieve
inductive analysis about the leadership decision-making skills of two principals at a PI
Year 4+ school, and how their decision-making impacted teachers’ ability to mediate
change. Specifically, it was important to observe how two principals at the same school
used their decision-making power to lead in a climate of large-scale reform, and
facilitate their school’s exit from PI. The researcher also sought to record teachers’
reactions to the decisions made by the principals, in order to understand the impact that
the principals’ decisions had on their ability to work in a PI Year 4+ context.
Sample and Population
Sample
Purposive sampling. Patton (2002) suggests that purposive sampling is one
way of examining a phenomenon or process. This study analyzed the leadership skills
and knowledge of principals as they related to their teachers in a climate of reform (i.e.,
PI Year 4+). Of particular interest were the interactions between the principals and
teachers, and whether the principals were able to facilitate the teachers’ ability to
implement the changes called for in the AGP, in the interest of exiting PI. To achieve
purposive sampling, criteria for school site selection were created, as the researcher
sought a school site that was already in PI and had implemented some or all of the AGP.
As such, the researcher borrowed criteria of PI schools as defined by the California
Department of Education (CDE). The following descriptors were used to select a school
site:
NAVIGATING A WAY OUT OF PROGRAM IMPROVEMENT 79

1. The school must not have meet Adequate Yearly Progress (AYP) targets for
six academic years, translated as Year 4 of PI designation.
2. Must have chosen Option 4, ―Implement any other major restructuring of the
school’s governance arrangement that makes fundamental reforms and leads
to improved student achievement.‖
3. In Option 4, the school must have chosen to author an Alternative
Governance Plan as the strategy for improving students’ opportunities to
learn. (CDE, 2010, Year 4 PI Document, p. 2)
Further, I sought a school located in an urban area. It is well documented that many
schools in PI are located in urban settings. Crane, Huang, Derby, Makkonen, and Goel
(2008) confirmed that California schools in PI most commonly ―have higher
proportions of Hispanic, Black, English language learner, and socioeconomically
disadvantaged students‖ (p. iv). In addition, the Center for Education Policy (2006)
documented that “90% of the schools in restructuring, the last stage of NCLB‘s
sanctions, are in urban districts” (p. ix). Because I wanted to explore the leadership
challenges faced by principals in low-performing, urban schools, I added this to my
school-site selection criteria. The school selected for the study met all of the above
criteria: many years of PI, opted for other major restructuring, had a high concentration
of minority students, and was located in an urban setting.
I carried out a search on the California Department of Education website to
locate schools that met these criteria. From there I began cold-calling schools and
district offices of schools I was interested in.
NAVIGATING A WAY OUT OF PROGRAM IMPROVEMENT 80

Snowball sampling. In order to generate interview subjects for the study, I
began with cold-calls to local districts that had schools in many years of PI. Snowball
sampling is a documented way of conveniently gathering sometimes hard-to-find
subjects for an interview. After using purposive sampling to find a school, I made
contact with AAA District‘s Chief Academic Officer, whose responsibility it was to
oversee schools designated as PI. After describing the purpose of the study and the
school-site criteria, she put me in contact with Principal May at Clover School.
An initial phone conversation with Principal May, during which I explained the
nature of the study, led to an in-person conversation to discuss in more detail the type of
information I sought. From here, snowball sampling began, and she put me in contact
with two teachers she thought would be willing to participate in the study. These
teachers then connected me with others who were willing to share their experiences
with Principal Leed and Principal May.
The individuals contacted and interviewed for this study had no other
connection to the researcher outside of the scope of this study. Interview participants
were given informed consent. Their identity and comments were treated with ethical
care as per USC IRB standards (see Appendix E).
Sample size. The sample-size for this study was restricted to one K-8 school
that served a total of roughly 900 students. The aim of the study was to analyze one
principal’s leadership skills and knowledge of leading a school in a climate of large-
scale reform (PI Year 4+). The study originally sought to analyze the actions of one
principal at a school PI Year 4+ school; however, because of snowball sampling, two
principals, who served jointly for two academic years, were studied.
NAVIGATING A WAY OUT OF PROGRAM IMPROVEMENT 81

Participants

This section describes the participants used for the sample, their total number,
and reason for inclusion in the study. Whereas the original design of the study sought to
understand the actions of one principal, two were studied because of snowball sampling.
The participants consisted of the two principals, who served at Clover School
simultaneously for a short time, and seven teachers, some of whom were on the District
School Liaison Team (DSLT) and / or part of the Alternative Governance Plan (AGP).
The total number of teacher participants was a limited sample proportional to the size of
the school, to elicit a reasonable representation of opinions and experiences related to
the DSLT and the AGP. Because group membership was not controlled by the
researcher, some teachers were familiar with the DSLT and/or the AGP, and others
were not. Their perspectives were valuable nonetheless, because the ways in which the
principals did or did not lead affected all the teachers. I did not establish criteria that
required a minimum number years as a teacher, subjects taught, or grade-level taught.
Instead, I aimed to have a balance of teachers who had varied involvement with and
awareness of the school’s AGP. Table 3.1 explains the interview subjects’ orientation to
the DSLT.
NAVIGATING A WAY OUT OF PROGRAM IMPROVEMENT 82

Table 3.1

Participants in the Study

Principal / Teacher

Number of Years
Leading / Teaching

Familiarity with AGP

On DSLT Team

Principal Leed

25

Very familiar

Yes

Principal May

15

Very familiar

Yes

Teacher Jones

10

Somewhat

No

Teacher Mann

20

Very Familiar

Yes

Teacher Glen

6

Somewhat

No

Teacher Warren

10

Somewhat

Yes

Teacher Martz

13

Very familiar

Yes

Teacher Eisen

25

Somewhat

No

Teacher Danes

13

Very familiar

No

Instrumentation

Three instruments were used for this study—interviews, observations, and
documents— in order to triangulate data in such a way that the reader would understand
how leadership knowledge and skill affected the teachers and the climate of reform in a
PI Year 4+ School. The goal was to be able to provide readers with insights to aid their
understanding of the complexities of implementing reform at a school that already had
organizational challenges. A detailed explanation of the instruments, and their
relationship to the research questions, is presented in Table 3.2.
NAVIGATING A WAY OUT OF PROGRAM IMPROVEMENT 83

Table 3.2

Matrix of Research Question to Instrument and Conceptual Frame

Instrument

Interview

Observation(s)

Documents

Definition of
Instrument

Principals and
teachers

Principal May was
observed at a staff
meeting and three
days of compelling
conversations.

The Alternative
Governance Plan.

Staff meeting Data
Analysis sheet.

Research
Question

1. 1a.

1.

1. 1a.

Element of
Conceptual
Frame
Culture / climate
Empowerment /
efficacy

Professional need(s)
Accountability

Culture / Climate
Empowerment /
efficacy

Professional need(s)
Accountability

Accountability

Data Collection

This section outlines the process by which data were collected for the study.
Three types of data were collected: interviews, observations, and documents. Each will
be addressed in turn, as their relevance to the study is explained.
Interviews

Interviews served as the primary source of data collection, because they were
the best way of capturing what the principals and teachers experienced. The aim was to
capture, as authentically as possible, the actions and reactions between principals and
teachers. They also served as one way of establishing validity. Interview transcripts
revealed confirming and disconfirming information between the two units of study.
NAVIGATING A WAY OUT OF PROGRAM IMPROVEMENT 84

Interviews were conducted with the current principal of Clover School
(Principal May), a now-retired principal (Principal Leed), and with seven teachers,
some of whom were part of writing the AGP, and some of whom were not. Principal
May and Principal Leed were interviewed to gain understanding of the leadership
decisions they made in the context of PI Year 4+. Teachers were interviewed to
understand their perceptions of how each principal applied their decision-making power
during the PI years. The interview questions for the principals and teachers were
similar, so that information could be confirmed or disconfirmed between the groups
(Patton, 2002). Interviews were structured in a standardized, open-ended format to
allow for elaboration of questions when needed by the researcher. They took place over
the span of three months, at times and places that best suited the interview subjects’
convenience.
Interview protocols were administered in one sitting (See Appendices C and D
for principal and teacher interview protocols). In cases where more time was needed,
follow-up interviews were scheduled accordingly. All interviews were voice recorded
with the participants’ permission. Most interviews lasted between 45 minutes and an
hour. Anonymity of interview subjects was preserved with pseudonyms. Each interview
subject had the opportunity to review transcripts to ensure that their words were
transcribed accurately, and, if needed, to strike information from the transcripts that
they felt threatened the way in which they represented themselves, their school, or their
principal.
NAVIGATING A WAY OUT OF PROGRAM IMPROVEMENT 85

Observations

Four observations were conducted. The elements observed were: a staff
meeting; and a series of compelling conversations spanning three days, for a total of
seven hours. The observations were conducted as a “complete observer-researcher
observes without participating in a natural setting” (Creswell, 2009, p. 179). This
afforded opportunities to observe the leadership practices used by Principal May, the
interactions between Principal May and the teachers, and the overall culture and climate
at Clover School. Observations were conducted in the interest of achieving triangulation
between interview transcripts and documents collected. See Appendix B for the
observation protocol.
Documents

Documents, according to Patton (2002) afford the “evaluator with information
about many things that cannot be observed. They may reveal things that have taken
place before the evaluation began” (p. 293). With this in mind, documents such as the
Alternative Governance Plan (AGP) and the Data Analysis Sheet were collected.
The AGP was a document that had long since been completed by the time the
study was conducted, but looking at the document provided an understanding of the
context and climate under which it was written, who the key actors were, and what
aspects of the AGP were or were not implemented. Because the researcher was not at
the school site when the school entered PI Year 4+, the AGP served as an artifact that
confirmed and disconfirmed data shared in the interviews.
The Data Analysis Sheet provided insight regarding the working relationships in
real time between the current principal and teachers. It also revealed the ways in which
NAVIGATING A WAY OUT OF PROGRAM IMPROVEMENT 86

the school’s climate shifted because of the questions asked of teachers on the document.
The documents will be referenced in Chapter 4.
Table 3.3 delineates the timeline for administration of the study, interviews,
observations, and document collection.

Table 3.3

Timeline of the Study

Event

Date

Research Methods

Take Qualifying Exam

August 4, 2011

IRB Process

January, 2012

Establish contact with a school for the study

October, 2011

Phone contact with Principal May at Clover
School

October 2011

Conduct interview #1 with teachers
Conduct interview #1 with principals
If the principal has draft of AGP sheet,
collect at this time

March - May 2012

● Interview

● Document
Collection

Attend staff meetings

Attend compelling conversations

March - May 2012

● Observation

● Document
collection

Conduct data analysis and report findings

May – September
2012

Final defense of dissertation

October 23, 2012

NAVIGATING A WAY OUT OF PROGRAM IMPROVEMENT 87

Data Analysis

Data analysis was an iterative process that changed as the conceptual framework
offered in Chapter 2 evolved (Knapp & Feldman, 2012). Corbin and Strauss (2008)
describe this process in the folowing: “Process is integral to our study because we know
that experience and therefore any action / interaction that follows is likely to be formed
and transformed as a response to consequence and contingency” (p. 8). After
interviews, observations, and documents were collected, each element of data was
coded to allow themes to emerge. Principals’ interview transcripts were compared with
ideas advanced in the initial conceptual framework, to corroborate the existence of
structural, human resources, political, and symbolic elements of the school’s dynamic
that could be matched among the data sets. However, a different coding system and
different conceptual frame emerged as an outgrowth of data analysis. A grounded
theory approach was used to address the evolution of the concepts addressed in
Chapter 2.
Once interviews, observations, and documents were collected, analysis of results
generated from the three instruments began. A single-case analysis of each principal’s
response was conducted, to understand his or her decision-making capacity. Later, the
findings were cross-analyzed with what teachers said about them in their interviews.
The following section describes the approach to data analysis taken for this study. It
will cover each type of data collected: interviews, observations, and documents. In
addition, limitations and delimitations, validity and reliability will be discussed.
NAVIGATING A WAY OUT OF PROGRAM IMPROVEMENT 88

Interviews

The interviews were coded for language and themes that illuminated the area of
study: principals’ leadership capacity in a climate of reform at a PI Year 4+ school.
Creswell (2009) notes that coding is a legitimate way of analyzing data gathered from
interviews, and adds that one can apply different strategies for analysis of the themes.
The goal was to provide robust themes relevant to the execution of and / or challenges
to reform under PI Year 4+ designation. To prepare interview data for analysis, they
were transcribed, and read multiple times, before finally being sorted or coded for
themes and categories (Creswell, 2009). Coding was informed by ideas advanced in the
conceptual frame in Chapter 2.
Kennedy (2004) notes a difference between espoused beliefs—those beliefs we
deem core to our values—and what we actually do. Often, there is a significant
mismatch between the two. Under this premise, documents and observational records of
meeting proceedings shed light on the school’s culture and value system in the context
of PI Year 4+ large-scale reform efforts, and on the differences in leadership decision-
making capacity of the two principals featured in this study.
Observations and Documents

Observations confirmed the data generated from interviews with Principal May
and teachers. The observation notes afforded the researcher a chance to see the
interactions between the principal and teachers to confirm or disconfirm the existence of
certain leadership practices—for example, the presence or absence of threat rigidity.
The observations also allowed the researcher to understand the culture and climate at
Clover School.
NAVIGATING A WAY OUT OF PROGRAM IMPROVEMENT 89

The Alternative Governance Plan (AGP) was the primary document collected
for this study. While it was not a unit of analysis for this study, it served as a tool to
confirm or disconfirm what was said in interviews with teachers and the principals,
regarding what had or had not been implemented. The AGP was analyzed in terms of
presence or absence; for instance, curriculum was or was not implemented, the principal
did or did not provide resources to teachers. Observation notes and the AGP were read
and re-read for emerging themes that added further support to the cases presented.
Limitations
Interviews
An individual‘s affect may be altered during an interview out of bias,
vulnerability, or sheer nervousness (Patton, 2002). Affect might skew responses to
questions, or the questions asked may not yield results that match what was being
studied (Creswell, 2009). Moreover, because of the timing of what was studied, an
interview subject‘s memory might not accurately reflect events as they actually
occurred. Other limitations of this study were (lack of) time, access to key personnel
and manpower to facilitate the interviews and conduct observations. In one instance, a
former assistant principal of Clover School expressed interest in participating in the
study, but when it came time to schedule an interview the researcher was unable to
establish contact with her.
Observations

A limitation to observations conducted is the possibility that the observer, “may
affect the situation [or persons] being observed in unknown ways….” (Patton, 2002, p.
306). In addition, observations only present external behaviors that may not be directly
NAVIGATING A WAY OUT OF PROGRAM IMPROVEMENT 90

attributable to the situation being observed (i.e., staff meeting and compelling
conversations).
Documents

As previously stated, the AGP was the primary document collected in this study.
According to Creswell (2009), limitations to document use are that: information may be
private or confidential; it may be hard to access; and documents may be incomplete or
drafts, and therefore may not reflect the full spectrum of information needed.
Delimitations

Because it is predicted that schools labeled PI will tend to be in urban settings,
this study was delimited to an urban school already labeled PI Year 4+, to facilitate
exploration of the PI dynamic. Second, because the study sought to understand the
interaction between teachers and principals at a PI Year 4+ school, the study excluded
parents—even though their perceptions are important. Third, because there is a lack of
literature concerning middle school principals, this study was delimited to include a
middle school. Finally, the study was delimited to the extent that not enough teachers
were interviewed to represent a true sampling of the school’s teaching population and
their opinions. Snowball sampling—where one refers another to participate in the
study—was also a delimitation in that those who participated may have had biases
pertaining to either of the two principals studied or to their orientation and familiarity
with the AGP.
Validity and Reliability

Validity and reliability of the data collected were ensured via triangulation.
Triangulation is the idea that various types of data are collected, for the purpose of
NAVIGATING A WAY OUT OF PROGRAM IMPROVEMENT 91

confirming and / or disconfirming information that may have been revealed through
other types of data (Patton, 2002; Merriam, 2001). Validity was established through
member checks (Merriam, 2001). Member checks allowed the subjects interviewed to
read their interview transcripts in the interest of assuring that their words were
represented accurately. In most cases, a hard copy of the transcript was given; in a
single case a transcript was emailed.
Reliability of data is the extent to which results can be reasonably applied to
another, similar situation. Because qualitative data can be so contextual, and the same
data set can generate different results depending on theoretical orientation, the goal was
to illustrate that, “the results generated were consistent with the data collected”
(Merrian, 2001, p. 206). That said, the goal for this qualitative case study was to
describe, and not make a case for generalizability of, the results gathered.
NAVIGATING A WAY OUT OF PROGRAM IMPROVEMENT 92

CHAPTER 4
FINDINGS
The purpose of this study was to examine how principals use their leadership
skills to facilitate teachers’ implementation of the AGP at a PI Year 4+ school. The first
chapter of this dissertation provided background and an introduction to the challenges
related to externally-enforced and mandated accountability and AGP implementation at
PI schools, as experienced by principals and teachers. The second chapter was a review
of the literature surrounding what is and is not known about the dynamics in schools
that have been in PI for many years, leadership practices in general, and how high-
stakes accountability demands impact school culture, interpersonal and organizational
trust, teachers and principals; and presented the conceptual framework for this study.
Chapter 3 was an explication of the methodology and approach used in conducting this
study. This chapter will present the findings that emerged from the data collected, using
the conceptual framework I devised for this study.
Much of the literature reflects that, as we approach 2014, more schools will be
labeled failing or low-performing under NCLB requirements that ask them attain 100%
proficiency in English/Language Arts and Mathematics (Porter & Polikoff, 2007; CEP,
2006). It will be important for principals to be equipped with the right leadership skills
and decision-making capacity to lead schools into reform and out of PI. Current
literature reflects that the technical assistance afforded by provisions in NCLB will be
limited at best (Strunk et al., 2011). What follows is a discussion of findings related to a
case-study analysis of two principals at a PI Year 4+ school, and how their leadership
decisions yielded very different results as both sought to create a climate of reform.
NAVIGATING A WAY OUT OF PROGRAM IMPROVEMENT 93

This was a qualitative case-study analysis of a school in many years of PI. Data
were generated by and collected through interviews, observations, and document
analysis, then coded using a matrix of themes on an Excel spreadsheet. Participants’
identities, and the school location, were kept anonymous through the use of
pseudonyms. To begin, background information on the case will be presented. Then,
findings will be described in sections related to the theoretical frame presented in
Chapter 2.
All findings presented in this study answer the following research questions:

1. What leadership practices are (or are not) used by principals to help teachers
mediate the demands for change in the AGP in a climate of reform?
a. What are teachers’ perceptions of the principal’s efforts to respond to
the demands of PI Year 4+?
Clover School Background: A Perfect Storm

Clover School is a kindergarten through eighth grade urban school situated in
Los Angeles County. Its total student population was at 800 at the time of this study,
down from 950 in 2008. Decline in enrollment was attributed to student mobility and
implementation of QEIA funding, which allowed for class-size reduction (personal
interview, Principal May, March 25, 2012). The demographics of Clover School at the
time of this study were: 85% students of Latino/Hispanic descent; 13% of Asian
descent; less than 1% of remaining students were Native American, White, or Other
(http://www.greatschools.org/cgi-bin/ca/other/1713#toc). Ninety percent of students at
Clover School were eligible for free / reduced lunch, while 45% of students were
English Language Learners (http://www.greatschools.org). The breakdown of home
NAVIGATING A WAY OUT OF PROGRAM IMPROVEMENT 94

languages was: 94% Spanish, 3% Vietnamese, 1% Cantonese, <1% Cambodian,
Mandarin, and Indonesian (www.greatschools.org).
The school’s current Annual Performance Index (API) is 839
(www.greatschools.org), and rose for three consecutive years since the 2006-2007
academic year. As of the 2011-2012 academic year, Clover School was in its seventh
year of PI. Prior to that year, Clover School implemented improvement strategies /
actions based on NCLB requirements for not meeting API goals. In response to the
mandate, the school principals had to do the following: notify the public of the school’s
low performance; write and implement the AGP; and be monitored by an external
consultant for compliance with the AGP and to ensure reform efforts were enacted.
After Clover School entered PI, the district Superintendent reformulated how the
principals would be used. At one point, the school used a two-principal model, where
one oversaw the K-5 side of the campus, and the other oversaw 6th-8th grade, virtually
creating two campuses in one. This model was in existence until 2007-2008, when it
was mandated that a co-principal model be adopted in the interest of uniting both
“sides” of the campus. In 2009-2010, the model was changed yet again, to reflect a
principal and dean of students model, where the dean of students handled student
discipline, truancy (with the aid of an outreach consultant), and playground supervision
on a daily basis. In the midst of these organizational changes, the school saw four
different administrators function as co-principal or dean of students within four
academic years. The effect of this was a lot of flux for the teachers who had to work
with and through the different personnel assigned to Clover in an effort to bring it out of
PI.
NAVIGATING A WAY OUT OF PROGRAM IMPROVEMENT 95

In their journey through Program Improvement, the two principals featured in
this case study analysis had to work in contexts that may have influenced how teachers
perceived them and their leadership capacity, and might have challenged their
respective abilities to repair and develop a climate of trust at Clover. Both principals
led in school climates that were influenced by internal workplace pressures (e.g.,
teacher union negotiations), externally-driven demands for change (e.g.,
superintendents’ directives, collaboration with outside consultants) and legally
mandated demands for change (i.e., No Child Left Behind). For example, near the end
of his career at Clover, Principal Leed led in a contentious environment resulting from
union negotiations gone awry, while in the midst of many years of PI designation.
Principal May might have been received more positively by teachers once Principal
Leed left Clover School, simply because Principal Leed worked at Clover for so long.
When Principal May began her work at Clover School it was right after union
negotiations ended, and just before QEIA monies were disbursed to the school. In
effect, she might have been viewed by teachers as the one who implemented and
engineered all of the changes that Principal Leed and other teachers wrote into their
AGP before her arrival. That Principal May arrived at Clover School during a “perfect
storm” of events may have poised her to facilitate the school’s eventual exit from PI.
In addition, elements emerged from the data that the researcher felt may have
had a bearing on the success experienced by Principal May with the teachers and
students of Clover School. Some elements were not terribly unique to other schools in
California, but when coupled with the aforementioned dynamics seemed to make for the
just right combination of events.
NAVIGATING A WAY OUT OF PROGRAM IMPROVEMENT 96

The Alternative Governance Plan articulated a number of restructure options.
One such option was the leader‘s ability to fire personnel deemed responsible for the
school’s failure. Neither Principal Leed nor Principal May enacted this option in Clover
School’s AGP. However, there was a confluence of events that caused staff members to
leave the school. They are delineated herein.
Subjects interviewed for the study referenced tensions between teachers and the
Superintendent that were engendered by some of his personnel decisions. In short,
teachers perceived that the Superintendent gave the teaching staff false assurances about
an Assistant Principal that had been placed at Clover before Principal May’s
appointment. According to teachers, she appeared unskilled, and was blamed by
teachers for the problems at Clover School (personal interview, Teacher Jones, April 5,
2012). According to one teacher interview, the Superintendent promoted this assistant
principal as being high capacity, when, in the teachers’ and Principal Leed’s estimation,
she was not (personal interview, May 4, 2012). This happened against a backdrop of
union negotiations that were not going well. Meanwhile, it was related by Principal
May that, during that time, school closures allowed senior teachers to displace teachers
at Clover School. Then, the district offered “golden handshake” retirements to alleviate
what was a constrained budget. These incidents resulted in a “perfect storm” that, in part,
poised Principal May for the success she experienced at Clover School. In this case, it is
coincidental that many of the harshest actions offered in the sanctions phase of PI Year
4+ were not elected by the school’s DSLT team; rather, they happened to the school.
NAVIGATING A WAY OUT OF PROGRAM IMPROVEMENT 97

Clover School experienced a high rate of teaching staff turnover due to
retirement and school closures within the district. When the AGP was being written,
Principal Leed commented that there were many teachers closely involved with the
union who were willing to “test the waters,” to the extent that the state would / would
not take action against the school (i.e., take over the school). According to Principal
May, many of these people retired, and altered the climate in such a way that newer
teachers were unaffected by pressures to take one side (administration) over the other
(teachers).
The PI label exacerbated pre-existing issues between teaching staff, the district,
and key personnel involved in seeing Clover School out of PI; this phenomenon was
consistent with existing literature (Olsen & Sexton, 2009). In this case, exacerbation of
issues benefitted the school, since when Principal May arrived she was able to help
teachers work through the negative feelings and distrust that flourished under—but
were not necessarily caused by—Principal Leed.
It is as if things at Clover School had to get worse before they could get better.
The AGP served as a reminder to those involved of the elements requiring first- and
second-order change, so that the school could begin to operate more functionally.
Avenues of communication, information, and objectives needed to be created, shared,
and established so that the school could begin to rebuild trust that had been lost, and
begin the real work of taking on reform efforts.
Overview

The findings presented here tell a story about two distinctly different leaders,
and the ways in which they applied their decision-making power and leadership
NAVIGATING A WAY OUT OF PROGRAM IMPROVEMENT 98

capacity during the school’s PI years. The principals served jointly for two academic
years. During their tenure, their leadership decisions yielded very different results with
respect to teacher morale, response to reform efforts, and student achievement. These
differences will be discussed in my findings. The principals will be presented in turn, as
I explain how their actions or inactions as leaders complicated or facilitated their and
their teachers’ efforts to change the way they worked, in order to create and maintain a
climate of reform during PI Year 4+ and beyond. The themes presented here draw on
ideas presented in the conceptual framework offered in Chapter 2: (1) culture / climate,
(2) professional needs, (3) empowerment / efficacy, and (4) accountability. Each of
these concepts will be presented on a backdrop of trust. Trust—teacher to administrator
and vice versa—emerged as an outgrowth of how Clover School was being led during
the most turbulent part of PI, when the school had to write the AGP and implement
aspects of it.
Case #1: Principal Leed

The data presented here regarding Principal Leed is not intended to highlight
weaknesses in leadership style. Rather, the data is intended to illustrate for the reader
the nuanced layers of circumstances engendered by the label, and the implication, of
Program Improvement standing. It is not the researcher’s intent to assign fault by how
the data are presented. The goal is to communicate and illustrate the challenges
experienced by Principal Leed and his teachers during the most critical phase of
Program Improvement. Principal Leed—as may be the case with many principals at
schools in PI—had to manage a host of feelings and dynamics with very little time on
his side.
NAVIGATING A WAY OUT OF PROGRAM IMPROVEMENT 99

Theme #1: A leader’s leadership skill / knowledge of how to lead in reform can
have a positive or negative bearing on school climate. That is to say, his actions /
inactions can impact the extent to which teachers will work towards reform.
Researchers in education and leadership stress the importance of a school leader
being equipped with the right leadership skills when leading in a climate of reform—
such as that brought on by NCLB (2001)—when schools are deemed low performing or
failing (Elmore, 2008; Stein & Nelson, 2003). My first theme identifies trends in action
and inaction, and the culture created by Principal Leed as he sought to lead his school
out of Program Improvement and enact an exit plan (the AGP). Underlying this theme
is the role that trust plays in the school organization. I present threat-rigidity as an
element that compromised the trust that Principal Leed sought to promote at Clover
School.
Culture and climate at Clover School: threat-rigidity and trust.

The following data set shows the ways in which Principal Leed—while he may
have seemed threat-rigid—sought to create or repair levels of trust at Clover School, as
he and his teachers sought to find a way out of PI. Regarding the work being done to
plan an exit from PI, he said:
After the AGP was written I was re-assigned as the sole principal of the entire
K-8 school. I saw it as an opportunity to lead the school as ―one voice‖ and
foster the type of climate that I felt works best with a teaching staff. Just before
the school year opened the district assigned an administrator on special
assignment to our school. While the person was personally helpful to me, the
perception that the principal was now being watched from the district office
NAVIGATING A WAY OUT OF PROGRAM IMPROVEMENT 100

made it more difficult to lead. When the administrator on special assignment
would meet with other staff members, the message would sometimes conflict
with mine, making it difficult for staff members as well. The goal of having one
voice now became a challenge, and her style, when meeting with staff, was not
like mine. (personal communication, May 4, 2012)
Principal Leed’s desire to reshape the climate was evident in how he wanted to lead
Clover School with one voice. However, two conflicting dynamics emerged: threat-
rigidity, and compromised trust. As Principal Leed sought to create a climate in which
teachers would be unified under his desire to create one voice, the level of trust needed
to accomplish this was compromised by two things: (1) the placement of an
administrator on special assignment at Clover School, and (2) teachers’ perceptions that
their principal of many years was being watched or monitored. Bryk and Schneider
(2003) posit that one way trust can be compromised in an organization is when a leader
gives the appearance of tolerating unacceptable behavior. Principal Leed’s statement
revealed that alignment didn’t exist between what he and the administrator on special
assignment communicated to the teaching staff. That Principal Leed did not attempt to
correct what was miscommunicated by the adminstrator on special assignment might
have compromised the teachers’ trust in him as a leader.
Actions and inactions by Principal Leed perpetuated a distrustful and threat-rigid
climate. Evidence in the data set reveals that people at Clover School felt demoralized.
Regarding Clover School’s standing during the PI years, Teacher Eisen expressed
feelings of low morale:
NAVIGATING A WAY OUT OF PROGRAM IMPROVEMENT 101

I just remember feeling like lower than dirt because it just—I don’t think I was
alone in that feeling—I think a lot of people felt that way but I think; I’m being
honest in saying, “What have I been doing in the last—at that point—twenty
something years?”
Here, Teacher Eisen calls into question her teaching practice up to and through the
Program Improvement years under Principal Leed. Her statement reveals how Principal
Leed perpetuated an egregious disconnect between the school’s actual standing and
what had been perceived by teachers all along. Overall, it seemed he led his teachers to
believe that they—as professionals—and the students—academically—had been
performing better than what was the case.
Regarding how he dealt with or led his teachers, Principal Leed said, “I felt I
could be frank and honest [with teachers about the school] and at the same time
motivate teachers to reach our goals” (personal communication, May 4, 2012). Even
though Principal Leed stated that he believed in being honest with his teachers about the
school’s standing, he contradicted himself in his next statement. He said, “I have never
felt that pointing out failures is actually productive and often it is an inaccurate picture”
(personal communication, May 4, 2012). In these two statements, Principal Leed
demonstrates what Agyris (1976) called espoused theories versus theories in use. Their
research revealed a distinct difference between an individual‘s purported beliefs, and
their actions. In this case, Principal Leed allowed his espoused theory—that which
governed what he would or would not do about his failing school—to prevail. The
disconnect in his beliefs (truth and candor) and actions (hedging from the truth,
sugarcoating the reality) were felt by his teaching staff, and resulted in problems:
NAVIGATING A WAY OUT OF PROGRAM IMPROVEMENT 102

distrust, seeming lack of follow-through on his part, and lack of direction—all
variations of threat-rigid responses. Teacher Eisen‘s statement confirms just how
pervasive Principal Leed’s threat-rigid actions were.
Principal Leed demonstrated understanding that something needed to be done in
order to help his school exit PI. One such solution he offered is in the following
statement: “the key to getting into Safe Harbor and out of Program Improvement was
establishing productive grade level and department teams who know how to use the
Professional Learning Community [PLC] model effectively.” To that end, Principal
Leed was in alignment with a research-based effective practice. Fullan (2000)
recommended that teachers and leaders alike need to learn to work collaboratively in
the effort to respond to accountability demands. What was missing from Principal
Leed’s solution was enactment and implementation of the Professional Learning
Communities with his teachers. In this case, functional PLCs might serve as one of
many solutions or systems needed to move Clover out of PI. Regarding implementation
and use of PLCs, Principal May related that teachers were sent to training on how to run
and be a part of PLCs, but that it would be a few years before they would be used
effectively (personal communication, March 25, 2012). In light of trust issues stemming
from reasons stated in the introduction to this chapter, it may have been a challenge for
Principal Leed to get teachers to buy into full engagement of PLCs at Clover School.
Meanwhile, Principal Leed expressed a desire to see his teaching staff work in a
more united manner. One way unification was sought was by the Superintendent’s
move to join both sides (i.e., K-5 and 6-8) of the campus. The other way was in how the
principals were used at Clover. Principal Leed said, “Once the school became a one
NAVIGATING A WAY OUT OF PROGRAM IMPROVEMENT 103

principal school with a new assistant principal I feel we should have been given the
opportunity to make it work” (personal communication, May 4, 2012). Unifying both
how the school was organized, and how the teachers worked (i.e., through PLCs),
would serve as attempts to create a shared vision.
Senge (1990) wrote that “[a] shared vision…uplifts people‘s aspirations”(p.
207). It would be another academic year before teachers interviewed for this study
would feel uplifted, and as if they could meet the challenges set forth in the AGP.
Attempts to create and maintain a shared vision might have been undermined. The
following decisions were not ideas initiated by Principal Leed: (1) unification of the
campus, (2) change to school site administration, and (3) PLCs. They were externally
driven by the Superintendent. Central to creating and / or repairing a climate of trust is a
sense of reciprocity, where involved parties have confidence that they and their work
are treated with integrity. Bryk and Schneider (2003) wrote:
Through their words and actions, school participants show their sense of their
obligations toward others, and others discern these intentions. Trust grows
through exchanges in which actions validate these expectations. (p. 44)
The situation where the principal was not the originator of the most important decisions
to impact Clover School might have caused teachers to question his obligation to Clover
School, or to them as professionals. With the goal of seeking to improve morale,
Principal Leed reported that he “invited the superintendent to the school to quell concerns
regarding signing it [the AGP] and obligations that went along with that” (personal
communication, May 4, 2012). Here, Principal Leed demonstrated a desire to create
unity on his campus. Unfortunately, he unintentionally and unwittingly
NAVIGATING A WAY OUT OF PROGRAM IMPROVEMENT 104

undermined his own goals by bringing in an external accountability holder—the
Superintendent—to engage in a most important conversation with his staff. The
Superintendent was not highly regarded by the staff at Clover. According to Teacher
Jones, teachers blamed the Superintendent for placing an unskilled Assistant Principal,
in spite of his promise that the Assistant Principal was very skilled and a good fit for
Clover (personal communication, April 5, 2012). Teacher Jones said:
When [Assistant Principal] got here, we were promised by [the Superintendent]
that she could do this [manage Clover School], and instead he sent us this person
who had only ever been an Assistant Principal, and she was in over her head;
she was just trying to survive the two foot stack of paper in her office and
survive the fact that almost all the staff didn’t want her here [at Clover School].
(personal communication, April 5, 2012)
In this instance, Principal Leed had no choice but to comply with the Superintendent’s
decision to place another assistant principal at Clover School. That Principal Leed did
not or could not push back on the Superintendent‘s placement of this person at Clover,
may have given teachers the appearance that Leed passively complied with the
Superintendent’s decision. Further, the Assistant Principal was perceived by teachers to
be ineffective in her leadership skill and practice. This gave teachers fodder with which
to express resistance, or to act in threat-rigid ways regarding changing their practices
during the PI years.
Senge (1990) wrote, “There is a propensity in each of us to find someone or
something to blame when things go wrong” (p. 19). The next data set illustrates how
Principal Leed acted in a threat-rigid manner related to the placement of additional
NAVIGATING A WAY OUT OF PROGRAM IMPROVEMENT 105

administrative staff—intended to aid his management of the teachers and resources—at
Clover School. Regarding his perception of the role of the Principal on Special
Assignment, Principal Leed said:
The tensions I had to deal with mostly stemmed from trying to lead and show
confidence in capable staff members who were also getting messages of
inadequacy from the administrator on special assignment and the language arts
consultant. I felt that had my new assistant principal [later Principal May] and I
been left to strategize and lead our school out of PI, that we were perfectly
capable of it. (personal communication, May 4, 2012)
Principal Leed demonstrated threat-rigidity by suggesting that negative messages
communicated to staff by the Principal on Special Assignment and Language Arts
Consultant hindered his—and the new assistant principal’s—ability to lead Clover
School. He did not recognize how he might have contributed to the school’s tense
climate by not clearing up miscommunicated messages. By the same token, Principal
Leed demonstrated a desire to be trusted in his statement that, “had my new assistant
principal [May] and I been left to strategize and lead our school out of PI...we were
perfectly capable of it.” At what was then such a late stage of overall poor performance
on many levels at Clover School, Principal Leed’s autonomy was taken away in gradual
stages. Existing research recognizes the feeling of diminished autonomy as one of many
factors that impact morale and constrain a principal’s ability to run their school (Louis
& Robinson, 2012; Olsen & Sexton, 2009; Dworkin, 2001).

Another instance in which Principal Leed demonstrated threat-rigidity was in his
assessment of students’ performance during the PI years. He said: “I have never felt that
NAVIGATING A WAY OUT OF PROGRAM IMPROVEMENT 106

pointing out failures is actually productive, and often it is an inaccurate picture. Not all
students who are non-proficient are a product of your school for their entire K-8
experience” (personal communication, May 5, 2012). Principal Leed engaged three
characteristics of threat-rigidity in this statement: eschewing responsibility, distortion of
the truth, and excuse-making. Even though Principal Leed was not responding to his
school’s performance data, he blames or uses the students’ backgrounds as an excuse
for poor performance. Existing research confirms that it is common for school leaders
and teachers to use students’ demographics to explain poor academic performance
(Bensimon, 2005). He also surmised that telling the truth about one’s standing was not
productive, and was inaccurate—yet another threat-rigid response.
Principal Leed’s reaction to Clover School’s performance was in alignment with
Mintrop’s (2012) work, which suggests that, in addition to personal integrity,
organizational integrity plays a large part in how groups of people react to externally-
imposed demands, and also that leaders in low-performing and impoverished schools
are prone to act with less integrity in the interest of aligning (read as complying) with
externally-imposed demands.
Sowing the seeds of a threat-rigid culture.

Data analysis revealed that Principal Leed’s efforts to manage and shift the
school climate were undermined by an overwhelming presence of threat-rigidity on his
part. An underlying element of threat-rigidity is trust. As threat-rigidity—or, generally
speaking, resistance to change—emerges, establishment and/or repair of trust becomes
complicated. This dynamic is explicated herein. Daly (2009) explains that when one
reacts in a threat-rigid way it is because one is overwhelmed with demands for change.
NAVIGATING A WAY OUT OF PROGRAM IMPROVEMENT 107

In response, the individual has certain reactions. Some of these reactions—blaming
others, truncating or not sharing information, working in isolation, increased levels of
stress or anxiety, and stalling—are ways in which people avoid taking responsibility for
necessary changes, or for enacting changes. These actions can engender distrust among
people in an organization. What results is the perception that mere gestures towards
change are made, but do not take hold for very long or inspire buy-in from others. Or,
worse, that people react, or enact solutions, in ways that are most familiar to them—
even when it is evident that their solutions do not work (Staw, Sandelands, & Dutton,
1981).
There were several instances where Principal Leed’s actions and inactions
embodied some of the characteristics of threat-rigidity that might have perpetuated a
negative school culture and distrust at Clover School. To begin, Teacher Warren’Ss
perception of the climate at Clover School illustrates how the teachers did or did not
work with one another. He said:
Up until the AGP people could do what they wanted to do; every classroom was
its own island. We had all these things that came along with the AGP and I just
think there was a whole lot of resistance and people felt like it was infringing on
their freedom. It was change. It was change! (personal communication, April 15,
2012)
This statement makes clear the presence of a threat-rigid culture where teachers and
principal alike worked in isolation and had a false sense of autonomy. In Teacher
Warren‘s statement it is evident that teachers were not only used to working on their
own, but perceived that any sort of assistance was (1) unfamiliar to them, and (2)
NAVIGATING A WAY OUT OF PROGRAM IMPROVEMENT 108

perceived as encroachment on their autonomy. Bird et al. (2009) wrote that, “Principals
engender the trust of staff by appropriately responding to them” (p. 166). In order for
Principal Leed to expect his teachers to respond positively to the professional assistance
offered to them, he would have had to lay a foundation for this sort of workplace
engagement. The dynamic at the time did not make this possible, as both Principal Leed
and his teachers had to meet demands and make changes that were externally-imposed,
and did not match what he thought needed to be done.
Principal Leed commented on a desire to see more focus given to the
implementation and use of Professional Learning Communities at Clover School, and
related that this was not honored by the consultants who facilitated the writing of the
AGP. He said, “I would have liked to have seen more of a focus on utilizing the PLC
approach, since that was what the entire district was trained in, as well as using
common formative assessments and the new student data system” (personal
communication, May 4, 2012). Document analysis revealed that PLCs were included in
the AGP, but were not the primary method by which Clover would exit PI. This reveals
a lack of alignment between external and internal demands for change, and illustrates
the difficulty in shifting culture with ideas that were not generated by Principal Leed
himself. It also demonstrates a professional challenge faced by Principal Leed—how to
utilize or implement externally-driven changes (e.g., use of PLCs and common
formative assessments) that teachers were taught and trained in, while essentially being
given the message—by the very same stakeholders—to do something different. The
cultural shifts were not organic to Clover School and the teachers. Teacher Warren‘s
comment further supports this idea. He said, “We had all these things that came along
NAVIGATING A WAY OUT OF PROGRAM IMPROVEMENT 109

with the AGP” (personal communication, April 15, 2012). Teacher Warren’s statement
suggests that he perceived it was the AGP, and not a needed cultural shift, that caused
him and his colleagues to change the way in which they worked. What can be noted of
Principal Leed is that he appeared to be challenged by shifting culture in a direction that
had been mandated by the district. He did not seem to be given the freedom to shift the
culture in a way that might have been more readily accepted by his teaching staff.
Again, this recalls Dworkin (2001), who researched the negative impact of constrained
autonomy.
Distrust in a school cannot be felt only by teachers and principals. It can also be
felt by students. One way distrust can be engendered is through how teachers and
principals treat the very students for whom they are responsible. Cognitive deficit
thinking is characterized by how educators treat their students (Bensimon, 2005). For
example, a teacher might make his class less rigorous because he assumes his students
might not grasp the material, because of their ethnic or socio-economic background. In
this study, cognitive deficit frame is used as a subset of threat-rigidity.
Cognitive deficit tendencies manifested themselves in how teachers and
Principal Leed spoke of the students for whom they worked at Clover School.
Regarding the students’ ability to perform academically, Teacher Mann said:
When I first got here [assigned to Clover School] people would say to me—
because I didn’t have books—people would say to me, “Why are we going to
give them books if they can‘t read them, anyway?” (personal communication,
April 5, 2012)
NAVIGATING A WAY OUT OF PROGRAM IMPROVEMENT 110

In this statement, Teacher Mann reveals that the then administrator (Principal Leed),
and colleagues, had a status quo and cognitive deficit stance regarding students at
Clover School. The message communicated was that those students were only capable
of achieving and learning so much, therefore not much could be done to help them.
Bensimon (2005) defines deficit thinking as the idea that teachers “focus on stereotypical
characteristics associated with the culture of disadvantage and poverty” (p. 103). Even
worse are the negative assumptions about the students’ academic ability embedded in
her statement. The principal and teachers at Clover School assumed that students were
unable to read, let alone learn, even if given the proper materials. Treatment of students
in a less-than way can engender relational distrust from students to teachers, and from
parents to the school organization. This study did not specifically examine these
dynamics. However, they begged mention nonetheless because of the connection to
trust and threat-rigidity.
Research conducted by Bryk and Schneider (2003) says, “Trust grows through
exchanges in which actions validate these expectations [alignment of words and
actions]….In this respect, increasing trust and deepening organizational change support
each other” (p. 43). While Bryk and Schneider researched the relationship between the
principal and his teachers, this same model—actions validating expectations—can apply
to the way in which the teachers at Clover dealt with their students. If teachers’ actions
aligned with high expectations of their students, then one could reasonably expect better
output from students. Bryk and Schneider (2003) further explain that:
because of the class and race differences between school professionals and
parents in most urban areas, conditions can be ripe for misunderstanding and
NAVIGATING A WAY OUT OF PROGRAM IMPROVEMENT 111

distrust. Effective urban schools need teachers who not only know their students
well but also have an empathetic understanding of their parents’ situations and
the interpersonal skills needed to engage adults effectively.
(p. 44)

A final example of threat-rigid culture and climate was revealed in Teacher
Mann’s statement about the school’s standing at the time. Regarding the school’s low
performance, she said:
Well, I pretty much knew [the school’s standing] when I came here. And part of
that was my information about income and who‘s poor and the neighborhood—
this is pretty much what I knew when I came here [to Clover School]. (personal
communication, April 5, 2012)
Here, Teacher Mann operated in Bensimon’s (2005) cognitive deficit frame, and used
students’ demographics, income, and poverty as an excuse for Clover School’s overall
low performance.
The existence of threat-rigidity and deficit thinking in teachers was corroborated
by Teacher Eisen, who—regarding the PI label—said:
If you’re in PI that means you’re not getting your job done with the students.
There has to be a little caveat there because there are students that have stuff
[poverty, challenged home lives] that prevent them from reaching what you
hope is their potential. (personal communication, April 4, 2012)
In the first part of her statement, Teacher Eisen demonstrates recognition that more
needed to be done by teachers on behalf of students’ learning outcomes. Yet, she
finishes her statement about students’ academic ability in a threat-rigid way by seeming
NAVIGATING A WAY OUT OF PROGRAM IMPROVEMENT 112

to blame the students for Clover’s poor performance. The aforementioned are examples
of the ways in which threat-rigid actions were manifested in teachers at Clover School,
and allowed the threat-rigid climate to persist. The data presented are not intended to
represent all teachers at Clover School.
Threat-rigid actions and attitudes from Principal Leed and some of the teachers
at Clover School posed a greater challenge to the school organization as it sought a way
out of Program Improvement. Unwittingly, the teachers and Principal seemed to get
their own way because of the perspective they had of their students, and even their own
ability to see their way out of PI. Relational trust needed to be recreated so that all
involved parties would feel more confident about their work. Throughout his tenure,
Principal Leed seemed to position himself with respect to Clover School, the teachers,
and improvements needed at the school, in a threat-rigid way. Whether they knew it or
not, many of the teachers interviewed for this study had a propensity for threat-rigid
actions or thoughts, which inevitably informed their practice and ability to maintain
strong levels of relational trust during Principal Leed’s tenure. Teachers became
accustomed to blaming students for the school’s poor performance under Principal
Leed. Teacher Jones established this when he said:
There was this reality check, like maybe we’re not as good as we thought we
were. But I think everybody was buying into the excuses of, “Look at the
educational dynamic of the families, look at the financial”—that this is
basically—that poor kids—the kids can’t do this because they come from low-
income families, they can’t do this because they are first generation English
NAVIGATING A WAY OUT OF PROGRAM IMPROVEMENT 113

speakers. I think it seemed logical to think that at first because that’s always
been the assumption. (personal communication, April 5, 2012)
Much of the excuse-making seemed to be perpetuated and allowed by Principal Leed.
This is reinforced by his feeling that it was “unfair to point out deficiencies”, and he did
not actively take responsibility for students’ poor educational outcomes.
Shaping culture and climate.

Principal Leed expressed little personal influence over his ability to shape
climate and culture at Clover School. When asked about the ways in which he was able
to effect change in school climate and culture, he said:
for the most part I was the K-5 co-principal, I don‘t think I can take too much
credit for how things were in the middle school. As the K-5 co-principal I
regularly recognized students and classes for high attendance rates, citizenship,
and academic achievement. I also made it a point to be very visible to students at
recess and lunch times and to parents before and after school. I also attended
every [School Site Council] meeting and ELAC meeting. (personal
communication, May 4, 2012)
Principal Leed did not take responsibility for his influence on climate and culture in this
statement. Instead, he used the fact that he oversaw one section (K-5) of the school as a
reason for not being able to take credit for climate and culture in the middle school
section. What is striking is that Principal Leed worked at Clover School for more than
twenty years. Despite being the most senior administrator—in terms of time spent at
Clover School and experience as principal—he didn’t recognize that his influence over
NAVIGATING A WAY OUT OF PROGRAM IMPROVEMENT 114

his teaching staff would be greater than that of a new person assigned to Clover School
during his tenure.
Finally, the literature on culture and climate makes clear the bearing that it has
on teacher morale, and how culture and climate as mitigating factors can be shaped or
influenced by the school’s leader (i.e., principal) (Senge, 1990). Data analysis revealed
that the overall climate was threat-rigid under Principal Leed’s leadership. This was
best characterized by Teacher Glen, who said:
there was a very negative attitude toward admin [Principals Leed and another
not included in this study] and toward students. Everyone was always just
complaining about everything; everybody just made excuses for everything.
People worked in isolation; it was always a discussion about what’s wrong with
[administration] or a discussion about how bad the kids are. (personal
communication, April 2, 2012)
Teacher Glen‘s statement reveals several characteristics of threat rigidity—working in
isolation, excuse making, and blame—that were embedded in the school’s climate.
These qualities were the very definition advanced by Daly (2009), Olsen and Sexton
(2009), and Staw et al. (1981).
Theme #2: In order for teachers to be equipped to meet the demands of reform,
their professional needs must be met by the principal.
Elmore (2000) asserts that in order for reform to take place there needs to be a
climate of reciprocity. That is to say, if accountability is being enforced, then there
needs to be a mutually supported sense of commitment by the enforcer to the enforcee
to not only create awareness of expectations, but also to be able to support personnel
NAVIGATING A WAY OUT OF PROGRAM IMPROVEMENT 115

when challenges arise in meeting those expectations. This notion is underpinned by Hoy
and Tschannen-Moran (1999), who researched the role that trust plays in reciprocal
relationships (i.e., principal to teacher, teacher to student, and teacher to parents) at the
school level. They write, “People who are guarded in the information they share
provoke suspicion; others wonder what is being hidden and why. Distrust breeds
distrust” (Hoy & Tschannen-Moran, 1999, p. 188). In this study, supports are defined
as the principal’s ability to “meet professional needs.” I define professional needs as a
range of necessities, beginning at a basic level (e.g., supplies, textbooks, and materials),
and ending with more complex needs that may require professional development. These
professional needs are flexible, and evolve and regress, as do the needs of the teacher or
school.
Materials for teachers.

In many circumstances, Principal Leed made it apparent that he was unaware of
what his teachers needed in order to respond to the call for change. Starting at base level
needs, Teacher Eisen and Principal May described the challenge involved in ensuring
that teachers had basic work supplies. Principal May recalled:
Myself and [administrator on special assignment] met with teachers in Principal
Leed’s absence. They needed our help in acquiring the most basic of supplies. I
remember—it was my first year there as [Assistant Principal]—being appalled
that the teachers couldn’t get their hands on markers or didn’t have enough
copies to get through the month. At AAA School—where I came from—those
things were easily accessible. I didn’t believe in treating teachers like kids, so I
NAVIGATING A WAY OUT OF PROGRAM IMPROVEMENT 116

made sure they could get what they needed without having to beg for it, the way
they did with [Principal Leed].
(personal communication, March 25, 2012)

Because it was so difficult for teachers to get access to materials, they relied on the
administrator on special assignment and Principal May to facilitate their eventual access
to these materials. In response to how open the access was, Teacher Eisen said:
I remember distinctly in that meeting thinking, “We can do that? We‘re going to
get these materials!?” I remember it was like, “Huh? And when we ask a question
you‘re actually going to be there to answer it?” Now we don‘t need that much—
it doesn’t mean that we won’t in the future—but for the last three or four years
we understood more about the idea of being self-reliant as a grade level.
(personal communication, April 4, 2012)
Teacher Eisen’s surprised reaction indicates that these needs were unmet for quite a
long time. The difficulty of acquiring routine workplace supplies was corroborated by
Teacher Mann, an upper grade teacher, who stated, “When [Principal Leed] was here we
pretty much had to beg for things and then he might decide you were using too much
and then you couldn’t have it” (personal communication, April 5, 2012). Teacher
Eisen’s statement reveals threat-rigid actions by Principal Leed. In this instance he
limited control of and access to materials. In addition, Teacher Mann reported that
Principal Leed did not have a system in place by which teachers could access material;
it was typically on a whim, with no grounded reason why teachers could or could not
get the materials they needed. Principal Leed’s unresponsiveness was an example of
resource rigidity—the idea that resources get under-used or used inappropriately in
NAVIGATING A WAY OUT OF PROGRAM IMPROVEMENT 117

response to perceived threat (Gilbert, 2005). Finally, Clark’s (2003) research suggests
that micro-management of workplace supplies is an “arbitrary and seemingly
unnecessary rule” that only serves to hinder work processes and “demotivate” personnel
(p. 4).
Another example of how professional needs were not addressed is in the context
of teachers’ professional development. In one case, a teacher did not feel sufficiently
challenged in her assigned position. This is best captured by my interview with Teacher
Martz. She was hired by Principal Leed to conduct program design to meet the needs of
students in English/Language Arts and English Language Development. About a third
of the way through the school year, she felt like she was being under-utilized and
developed a plan that would serve more students. She recalled:
At one point in time—because I had so many opens in my schedule—I created a
plan that would allow me to work with far more than the 25 students I was
seeing daily. This plan fit elementary and upper grade students who were
struggling in reading. I remember I approached Principal Leed and [assistant
principal placed by Superintendent] with my plan—I had it all worked out; days,
times, rotations. I was so bummed when all I got back from [Principal Leed]
was, “Well…what you’re showing me is that I haven’t really thought about this.
Let me get back to you.” (personal communication, May 4, 2012)
According to Teacher Martz, Principal Leed never did get back to her. His inaction
might have elicited distrust, and is an example of threat-rigidity under the
characteristics of avoidance and lack of follow-through. He was unable to respond to his
NAVIGATING A WAY OUT OF PROGRAM IMPROVEMENT 118

teachers’ need for a more rigorous work environment. In this case, Principal Leed did
little to inspire a sense of empowerment or efficacy in his teacher.
Use of tools: AGP / district and other personnel.

Appropriate use of tools that facilitate successful task-completion requires savvy
on the leader‘s part. I will present data which suggests that the tools (district support,
additional personnel, and the AGP) afforded to Principal Leed in PI Year 4+ were used
in a threat-rigid way.
Alternative Governance Plan (AGP).

The first example is of how Principal Leed took up the AGP—a tool intended to
give Clover School direction to exit PI—in a threat-rigid way. A resistant attitude was
revealed by Principal Leed’s overall sentiment of the AGP, which is evidenced in the
following:
I think that there may have been too much minutiae in the document, that is,
things that did not impact the big picture. Part of that may have been built into
the actual AGP process itself as we were actually guided by trained consultants
when we wrote the document. (personal communication, Principal Leed, May 4,
2012)
Here, Principal Leed operated in a threat-rigid and distrustful way. First, he didn’t feel
the AGP captured what he thought was important (i.e., too much minutiae). Second, he
seemed to question the trained consultants’ intentions by suggesting how the plan was
written had been engineered by the consultants. It is possible that his sentiment caused
him to react in a resistant or threat-rigid way. The changes being asked of him and his
teachers were not generated at the school level. As previously stated, they were
NAVIGATING A WAY OUT OF PROGRAM IMPROVEMENT 119

externally-driven by trained consultants in this case, and the Superintendent in other
cases. Research emphasizes the importance of the principal being central to any change
initiative (Bryk & Schneider, 2003).

Table 4.1

Areas of Improvement at Clover School as per AGP 2008-2009

Instruction Curriculum Systemic
Adequate time in Math core
grades 6-8.
Provide a consistent ELD
instructional program using
state adopted and approved
curriculum.
Minimize / eliminate interruption
to core classes.
During weekly walk-throughs
principal will monitor instruction
of ELs use of oral language,
academic language and
opportunities to use oral language
skills.
Replace intervention
curriculum with one that is
state approved.
Provide pacing schedule, created
and followed by all grades for
reading.
Provide consistent K-8 ELA
focused intervention program
during the school day;
communicate criteria for student
placement.

Assure that material used for
intervention (Reading / Math) is
appropriate and research-based.
Ensure appropriate time
allocation in school day for
reading intervention
Increase instructional minutes—
all grade levels.
NAVIGATING A WAY OUT OF PROGRAM IMPROVEMENT 120

Analysis of the AGP revealed that there were, in fact, elements that were part of
the “big picture.” A few of the areas that were demarcated for improvement are outlined
in Table 4.1.
Examination of the AGP revealed that elements included for improvement were
in fact very much needed (e.g., new curriculum to meet ELL students’ needs) or were
not in place to begin with (e.g., adding additional minutes to mathematics). Even more
striking was the fact that the AGP included very specific systemic changes that would
change how Principal Leed was accustomed to working (e.g., protecting instructional
minutes, especially in Language Arts and Math), had he been willing to engage them.
According to Teacher Martz, it was not unusual for the Language Arts or English
Language Development time to be interrupted or cut short in the interest of student
assemblies. This happened so often that one group of students never did finish their
curriculum. She related:
I think one of the things that was really hard to deal with at Clover was how
often class time was interrupted for student-recognition assemblies or guest
speakers. Now, I’m not at all opposed to those types of activities—but when it’s
your class that’s being interrupted all the time it gets to be frustrating. Here I
was, working with students who were struggling in Language Arts and they had
the least amount of instructional minutes in a class that they needed to spend as
much time as possible in. That said, we never did get through the curriculum for
the year. (personal communication, Teacher Martz, May 6, 2012)
Teacher Martz also related that she and other teachers were working with an incomplete
curriculum, making it a challenge to teach students. Whether Principal Leed did this
NAVIGATING A WAY OUT OF PROGRAM IMPROVEMENT 121

intentionally, or was constrained by school budgets, is not known, however seeming
inaction to address this could give the appearance of lack of forethought or follow-
through. In addition, it limited teachers’ ability to work effectively, and compromised
students’ ability to access the material. Existing research confirms that these sorts of
actions on the part of the leader can create or add to a climate of distrust—even if his
intentions are the complete opposite (Bryk & Schneider, 2003).
Clark (2003) writes, “Avoid even the appearance of dishonesty, hypocrisy, and
unfairness: Organizations don’t have to lie or cheat to be unfair—they only have to be
perceived in this way to destroy motivation” (p. 4). All teachers interviewed for this
study who were part of the Alternative Governance Plan (AGP) team reported that
input was sought form them by Principal Leed to be included in the AGP. This was
confirmed by my interview with Principal Leed. He said, “An AGP team was formed
and teachers [members of the AGP team] were expected to share this information
[progress on writing the AGP] with their designated grade level or department teams”
(personal communication, May 4, 2012). Whereas Principal Leed’s statement reflects
that he allowed and solicited teacher input on the AGP—and this could be perceived as
an effort to create relational trust—he might have undermined his own intent. Teacher
Danes’ statement regarding his experience working on the AGP revealed the seeming
appearance of unfairness or lack of regard for teachers’ work. Regarding his
knowledge of the final AGP, Teacher Danes stated:
Even the original AGP has been lost. I remember going to a meeting when they
were presenting the AGP—it wasn’t the original AGP we had created—this was
during the previous administrator [Principal Leed and Assistant Principal
NAVIGATING A WAY OUT OF PROGRAM IMPROVEMENT 122

appointed by Superintendent]. I was very adamant about tracking down the
original and never could. I remember talking with my colleagues where we sat at
a meeting thinking, “That’s not the original one”—but it’s what we had and
that’s what we went with. (personal communication, April 5, 2012)

Teacher Dane‘s statement reveals that he felt his work (and that of others) on the AGP
team was devalued as a result of his perception that Principal Leed allegedly lost the
AGP. If the purpose of the AGP was, as Principal Leed stated, “allowing a voice to every
individual in the writing of the plan” (personal communication, May 4, 2012), it was
undermined by the appearance that he did not take teachers’ input seriously when they
wrote the AGP. Clark (2003) would say that the appearance of dishonesty can create a
snowball effect, essentially asking—or making it acceptable—for those in an
organization to act in kind.
District and other personnel.

NCLB makes provision for technical support to leaders at schools labeled PI,
especially in PI Year 4+. This provision is underpinned by a seeming understanding on
the part of policymakers of the significant task involved in creating and sustaining
reform. Principal Leed had the benefit of several types of personnel at his disposal:
AAA District Superintendent, consultants assigned to Clover School, a Principal on
Special Assignment, and a Reading Coach. Data analysis revealed that it might have
been challenging for Principal Leed to successfully broker key personnel in a way that
would achieve maximal benefit for the teachers and the school during the PI years. A
key tenet in creating and maintaining relational trust and in demonstrating leadership
NAVIGATING A WAY OUT OF PROGRAM IMPROVEMENT 123

skill is having the discernment to both “distribute control” (Bird et al., 2009, p. 157) and
maintain the integrity of relationships in an organization (Bryk & Schneider, 2003).
Principal Leed commented that the AAA District Superintendent was available
as a source of support. He related that he called on the District Superintendent to “quell”
teachers’ concerns with buying in to the AGP. In this situation, Principal Leed
demonstrated the capacity to use available personnel to support, or communicate the
need for teachers’ compliance with external demands. In the interest of allaying
teachers’ fears of what they might be committing to, professionally, Principal Leed
unwittingly resurrected contentious feelings against the district in teachers by bringing
in the Superintendent—an external accountability holder.
Teachers interviewed related, in different ways, that the climate at Clover
School was challenging. They often stated their feelings in relation to “the district”,
defensively. An example is in Teacher Glen’s statement:
[W]hen the school was labeled PI, it’s a direct affront to all the teachers, on
everybody. So I think everyone‘s natural instinct was to become defensive and
even combative. And so when you have this outside force coming in to change
something at your school, a lot of teachers had this reaction of shutting down,
closing down or fighting anything—just rebelling any type of change out of
refusal to acknowledge that they might be a part of the problem. (personal
communication, April 2, 2012)
Teacher Glen’s statement reveals the importance of teachers needing to feel as though
their work is valued. And, when it was evident to the teachers that their work needed to
improve, they acted in defensive, or threat-rigid ways. Teacher Glen’s statement shows
NAVIGATING A WAY OUT OF PROGRAM IMPROVEMENT 124

that even when an “outside” person came to Clover—in this case, to allay fears or
provide encouragement—they were met with resistance by the teachers. Hence,
communication of any sort of support or encouragement was not well-received by
teachers. Research on relational trust and reciprocity confirms that when an
organizational relationship is one-sided, it is difficult to create momentum to the end of
a culture of trust (Elmore, 2000; Bird et al., 2009; Bryk & Schneider, 2003).
Because of the school’s poor performance and renewed focus on Language Arts,
a Reading Coach was hired through the district to work with Principal Leed and the
teachers at Clover School. Principal Leed expressed his opinion of the Reading Coach
in this statement: “Her effectiveness, especially when considering the time invested and
the cost, is still questionable to me” (personal communication, May 4, 2012). Here,
Principal Leed illustrated that he didn’t know how to utilize the personnel made
available to him in the best possible way. Instead, he focused on a negative
characterization of her utility on campus. He emphasized how this person:
comes in and says they [teachers] are inadequate without knowing all of the facts
they are only making it difficult for themselves. Certainly no-one on the staff
would deny that we could improve but to point out that we were below the
NCLB criteria as evidence and comparing us to schools in other districts…was
seen as unfair and uninformed. (Principal Leed, personal communication, May
4, 2012)
Once again, Principal Leed distanced himself because he did not redirect the message of
inadequacy communicated to teachers by the Reading Coach. Instead, he allowed
himself and the teachers to feel that “NCLB was manipulating all of us” by allowing
NAVIGATING A WAY OUT OF PROGRAM IMPROVEMENT 125

claims to be made about the school and its teachers (Principal Leed, personal
communication, May 4, 2012).
Principal Leed communicated his perception of the Principal on Special
Assignment assigned to Clover School in the following way:
When the Principal on Special Assignment would meet with other staff
members the message would sometimes conflict with mine, making it difficult
for staff members to, as well. The goal of having one voice now became a
challenge, and her style, when meeting with staff, was not like mine…I have
never felt that pointing out failures is actually productive and often it is an
inaccurate picture. Not all students who are non-proficient are a product of your
school for their entire K-8 experience. (personal communication, May 4, 2012)
Several factors emerge from this comment. First, Principal Leed doesn’t indicate
what—if anything—he did to clarify the mixed messages imparted by the Principal on
Special Assignment to teaching staff. Second, seeming to sugar-coat the school’s
failings by being unwilling to speak of them candidly did more harm than good to the
teaching staff, and perpetuated a climate of low-performance.
Teacher Eisen pointed out in her interview that when the administrator on
special assignment and Principal May presented school standings ranked by Math and
Language Arts, sorted by grade-level, homeroom, and school, it was the best possible
thing that could have happened, in spite of how much it initially hurt. She said, “that was
really hard because Clover School is a really proud place. So it was really tough on
those of us who have been here a long time and thought we were doing okay”
(personal communication, April 4, 2012). Whereas Principal Leed was hesitant to be as
candid with teachers about the school’s standing as the administrator on special

NAVIGATING A WAY OUT OF PROGRAM IMPROVEMENT 126

assignment, Teacher Eisen appreciated that she was dealt with candidly:
I still think that the best AGP that hit this school was the K-8 meeting with the
data right up there saying, ―hey, this is where you were, here is where you are;
what are you going to do about it?‖...it turned out to be one of the best years of
my career. (personal communication, April 4, 2012)
The meeting to which Teacher Eisen referred was not engineered by Principal Leed,
which shows that—up to the point where other personnel (Principal on Special
Assignment and Assistant Principal May) were assigned to the school—by default he
managed to perpetuate an inaccurate picture of Clover School’s standing to his teachers
by not presenting data. This was the first time that one layer of threat-rigidity was
removed, because data were finally made transparent by key personnel: then-Assistant
Principal May and the administrator on special assignment.
Regarding his work with the administrator on special assignment, Principal Leed
said: “In general I tried to make the best of it but I don‘t believe that her role was a
necessary one” (personal communication, May 4, 2012). This is a capstone statement of
how he was unable to see the intrinsic value of additional support at his school site.
Theme #3: The principal has / has not an understanding of how to nurture
teachers / empowerment / self-efficacy
Empowerment and efficacy are terms that I use interchangeably to characterize
how teachers feel about their ability to complete a task or attain a goal. In this case, the
task / goal was to see Clover School exit PI. In the context of Clover School, however,
the teachers were misled (literally and figuratively) by Principal Leed further into PI,
NAVIGATING A WAY OUT OF PROGRAM IMPROVEMENT 127

and into believing that they were performing better than the data indicated. Once it was
revealed by a third party (Principal on Special Assignment and Assistant Principal May)
in plain terms where the school stood, empowerment and efficacy needed to be rebuilt
in the teachers at Clover. Relational trust research says that, “Talking honestly with
colleagues about what‘s working and what‘s not means exposing your own ignorance
and making yourself vulnerable. Without trust, genuine conversations of this sort
remain unlikely” (Bryk & Schneider, 2003, p. 43).
Principal Leed made decisions that, on the surface, seemed to inspire
empowerment and efficacy in his teachers, but in reality he acted with threat-rigidity
and defensiveness. One such example of seeking to create empowerment in his teachers
was by including them on the AGP team. Implicit in their inclusion on the team was the
idea that, if the teachers were collaborating on a document that was otherwise
externally-imposed, there might exist the possibility that teachers would “feel safe to
experiment with new practices” (Bryk & Schneider, 2003, p. 43). Regarding allowing
teachers to work on the AGP, Principal Leed stated, “The primary benefit [of the AGP]
was allowing a voice to every individual in the writing of the plan…the team members
were to report back and get feedback from their grade level and department members”
(Principal Leed, personal communication, May 4, 2012). By creating a team of teachers
to create the AGP, Principal Leed demonstrated trust in his teachers and a desire to give
voice to his teachers during the PI years. Bryk and Schneider (2003) relate the
importance of a principal’s ability to “actively listen to concerns” (p. 43) in the interest
of creating relational trust. In addition to serving as a plan for Clover School’s exit from
NAVIGATING A WAY OUT OF PROGRAM IMPROVEMENT 128

PI, the AGP also could have acted as a vehicle allowing Principal Leed to actively listen
to teachers’ concerns.
In spite of Principal Leed’s seeming intention to create a sense of empowerment
among his teachers through the AGP, the opposite happened. Bryk and Schneider
(2003) emphasize that integral to creating and sustaining relational trust, importance is
equally placed on vision and behavior that aligns with that vision on the principal’s part.
At Clover School, teachers more than once reported that the AGP was completed as a
matter of compliance. The perception among teachers regarding the AGP, even if
intended as an exit plan and accountability tool, was that “a lot of the stuff [in the AGP]
wasn’t carried out; it was like we just did it to get it done” (Teacher Mann, personal
communication, April 5, 2012). A similar sentiment was echoed by Teacher Glen, who
stated, “compared to the other administrator [Principal May] I think he [Principal Leed]
was just drowning in problems that he didn’t even really have time to even think about
the AGP” (personal communication, April 2, 2012). In Teacher Glen’s statement it is
evident that Principal Leed might have been overwhelmed by the all the dynamics at
Clover School to give the AGP the attention it merited, let alone implement its
elements, or create and communicate a clear vision for the teachers to buy into in order
to validate the AGP.
The unintended consequence of Principal Leed’s use of teachers on the AGP
was that those on the team felt the brunt of frustrated teachers. This was evidenced by
Teacher Mann, who said, “they [teachers] wouldn’t say anything [add input or
objections] and we‘d made decisions and then they’d be mad about the decisions we
made” (personal communication, April 5, 2012). Second, and perhaps more
significant, was the perception by teachers that Principal Leed did not take the AGP

NAVIGATING A WAY OUT OF PROGRAM IMPROVEMENT 129

as seriously as he should have, mostly because of how he positioned himself to the
AGP. Teacher Jones said, “I think that [Principal Leed] had this more of a hands-off
approach. I think he just felt that people would do the right thing” (personal
communication, April 5, 2012). In his statement, Teacher Jones suggests Principal
Leed’s overall trust in staff that they would do the right thing. What is missing from
Principal Leed is the enforcement of accountability, or seeking assurance from his
teachers that they, in fact, know what to do and are doing the right thing.
Teacher Danes related that, under Principal Leed, “it’s [the culture at Clover]
always been like, ‘here’s what we need to do and don’t worry, we are going to get
through this’; we have a plan and we’re going to get through it, don’t worry’” (personal
communication, April 4, 2012). Teacher Danes’ statement recalls Hoy and Tschannen-
Moran’s (1999) research, which cautions against operating on good intentions. They
write, “There are times when good intentions are not enough. When a person is
dependent on another and some level of skill is involved in fulfilling an expectation,
then a person who means well may nonetheless not be trusted” (p. 188).
Principal Leed made positive statements about the teachers’ capacity,
knowledge and skill, and demonstrated that he trusted them. However, he was not able
to demonstrate how he capitalized on or maximized their capacity, knowledge, and skill
to inspire a climate of trust so that reform could be achieved. He said, “A principal’s job
is to lead, motivate, and inspire…It becomes even more important that the principal be
an instructional leader” (Principal Leed, personal communication, May 4, 2012). Here,
he demonstrated understanding of what he needed to be able to inspire in his teachers,
NAVIGATING A WAY OUT OF PROGRAM IMPROVEMENT 130

yet data did not show that he was, in fact, an instructional leader. He said, “As an
instructional leader I always kept my office door open for staff members and enjoyed
talking to teachers about teaching strategies, curriculum, and individual students”
(personal communication, May 4, 2012). Hallinger (2003) posited that an instructional
leader facilitates the creation of clear, focused and time-based academic goals in the
interest of improving school-wide outcomes (p. 347). Regarding instructional
leadership, Principal Leed presented himself as such by engaging in conversations that
discussed academics, but he never spoke of setting goals—professional or student-
based—with teachers that came to see him. His lack of focus or emphasis on
instructional improvement was highlighted earlier, when he referred to the AGP (a
document filled with instructional improvement goals) as “minutiae,” and also when he
spoke of symbolic gestures towards improving school culture by attending students’
award assemblies and meetings with parents. Barth (2002) stated that “probably the most
important—and the most difficult—job of an instructional leader is to change the
prevailing culture of a school” (p. 6). The data presented illustrates that this changing
culture was, indeed, a challenge for Principal Leed.
Conclusion

Principal Leed’s leadership decision-making capacity was compromised by: (1)
threat-rigid behaviors in himself and the teachers; and (2) a climate of distrust, possibly
engendered by threat-rigidity. The existence of these two factors possibly made it
difficult for Principal Leed to make significant ground in creating a momentum for
reform of Clover School and the way that teachers worked. As a leader, he
demonstrated knowledge or awareness that the school’s culture needed to change, in
NAVIGATING A WAY OUT OF PROGRAM IMPROVEMENT 131

order for it to gain ground. Implementation of actionable steps was missing or
undermined by his threat-rigidity or that of the teachers. The majority of subjects
interviewed felt that Principal Leed’s actions were “too little, too late” (personal
communication, Teacher Warren, April 15, 2012). Principal Leed did not use the
school’s standing as a chance to improve conditions for teachers and students at Clover
School. Instead, he saw it as a matter of compliance, and did not gain maximal benefit
from the experience—even if he did admit that the support personnel afforded him was
ultimately helpful. His defensive actions perpetuated a climate of threat-rigidity, which
engendered status quo achievement in his teachers and students for many years.
The data reveal that Principal Leed was not regarded as a strong leader. Teacher
Glen described him in the following way: “he was maintaining status quo, not really
implementing any profound changes. I would say also it was a lot less intellectual”
(personal communication, April 2, 2012). What happened with Principal Leed and the
teachers that worked at Clover School is reflected in existing literature. Knapp and
Feldman (2012) write that “school leaders who had been leading popular public schools
suddenly found themselves leading ‘failing schools,’ in which teachers who had seen
themselves as successful suddenly found themselves with a new identity defined by
external expectations” (p. 670). The next case will explicate what happened to the
teachers, and how climate / culture, empowerment / efficacy, and professional needs
changed or gained momentum under a new leader.
Case #2: Principal May

The data presented here regarding Principal May is not intended to showcase her
skill-set as being better than that of Principal Leed. Rather, it is presented in a manner
NAVIGATING A WAY OUT OF PROGRAM IMPROVEMENT 132

intended to demonstrate the ways in which she repaired relationships, developed
institutional and inter-personal trust, and helped a school and the teachers in it realize a
different reality from which they emerged. To be clear, she is not the sole reason for the
mostly positive gains and experiences had by teachers, just as Principal Leed is not the
sole reason that Clover School landed in PI.
Theme #1: A leader’s leadership skill / knowledge of how to lead in reform can
have a positive or negative bearing on school climate. That is to say, his actions /
inactions can impact the extent to which teachers will work towards reform.
Existing research confirms the importance of making the right leadership
moves, especially in a high-stakes accountability setting (Elmore, 2000). Senge (1990)
writes, “Much of the leverage leaders can actually exert lies in helping people achieve
more accurate, more insightful, and more empowering views of reality” (p. 11). In
order to successfully achieve such a paradigm shift, there needs to exist some level of
trust in the organization among stakeholders. Researchers, like Hoy and Tschannen-
Moran (1999) and Hoy (2012), confirm the importance of trust by relating that a
principal must have the ability to establish him or herself as reliable, vulnerable, and
benevolent in the eyes of teachers, and stakeholders—such as parents.
Moving away from threat-rigidity and rebuilding trust.

Principal May demonstrated the capacity for rebuilding trust among the teachers
at Clover School. Existing research confirms that trust is an element necessary for the
rebuilding of an organization and reinvigoration of morale (Connell et al., 2003). The
data presented here represent Principal May’s efforts to shift Clover School culture
from threat-rigid (i.e., distrustful), to trustful. She worked in a way that would help
NAVIGATING A WAY OUT OF PROGRAM IMPROVEMENT 133

teachers discover accurate views about the reality at Clover School. The new reality she
aimed to communicate was they would have to change the way they worked with each
other, and that the school was not doing as well as they had perceived or had been led to
believe under Principal Leed.
One way that Principal May sought to create a new reality was by presenting
school data to communicate the school’s performance and standings during the PI years.
These data were presented in relation to similarly-situated middle schools. Teacher Eisen
reported that the greatest AGP was seeing the school’s data—slides of disaggregated
data by grade level, content area, and similar schools comparisons. The researcher
understood this to mean that Teacher Eisen appreciated seeing all of the school’s data,
and that this account of the school’s journey through PI—up to that point—was
informative to her practice. She stated, “it was the best year of my career.” It is important
to note that it was not just the presentation of data that made it such a good year for
Teacher Eisen; it was also the conversations with her colleagues that emerged as a result
of the data that made her year so great. She reflected by saying:
She [Principal May] really helped us because we are all really good teachers, we
just weren’t on the right path; and it [the data] really helped us. I think we
learned that a lot of the responsibility was something we had to take on.
…We’re the ones that have to go beyond the data to view the students. We’re
the ones that have the data to drive the plans, the interventions, the plans that
will help the first graders meet requirements for first grade. So, it’s a different
kind of view than we had prior. (personal communication, April 4, 2012).
NAVIGATING A WAY OUT OF PROGRAM IMPROVEMENT 134

Teacher Eisen’s statement reflects that she perceived Principal May as having
redirected teachers onto the right course. We see in this case that Teacher Eisen felt
empowered by the data presented, as demonstrated by her claim that it [the data] gave
her and the teachers a different vantage point. In addition, she reflects a sense of
professional responsibility by saying that the data helped her to become cognizant of
students’ academic needs. The feeling of empowerment is reflected in the literature as
an element that facilitates the building of trust in organizations. Connell et al. (2003)
write that “empowerment and autonomy relates to the notion that supervisors/managers
empower through giving information, power, authority, and responsibility” (p. 117). In
the data presented, we see evidence that Principal May gave information to her teachers,
gave them authority to drive plans—as Teacher Eisen related—and gave them
responsibility.
Teacher Martz corroborated the significance of transparency of data in Principal
May’s decision to show teachers the data in the way that she did, when she said:
The information presented at that meeting wasn’t new to us as teachers. Every
year we get a copy of the STAR report—so as teachers we knew how we were
doing at the classroom level. What was SO different about that meeting,
compared to others, is that that was the first time we really saw ourselves for
what we were—we were failing…more than that, we were failing our students.
Maybe what made us see the data with new eyes was that this time around we
had to come up with a plan to improve ourselves, our school. (personal
communication, May 5, 2012)
NAVIGATING A WAY OUT OF PROGRAM IMPROVEMENT 135

Teacher Martz’s statement reveals that, whereas the teachers may have had an
awareness of their individual performance level based on their students’ performance,
they had not previously been given direction from Principal Leed on how to make
meaning of the data. The teachers needed to be led into a different way of seeing their
reality, and this was facilitated by the presentation of data given by Principal May and
the Principal on Special Assignment. As Teacher Martz stated, the data were not new,
but the way in which they were presented was new. The value of Principal May’s
leadership decision to create clarity and be transparent with data was underscored by
Teacher Jones’s statement: “…It was like a wake-up call” (personal communication,
April 5, 2012). In the instances presented, we see that Principal May is perceived by the
teachers as demonstrating transparency. This trait speaks to Principal May’s ability to
begin the work of creating a climate of trust and repairing relationships between
administration and staff. With respect to relational trust, it is said that “positive
sentiments and the behaviors those sentiments foster can be reciprocated, resulting in
the building of mutual trust over time” (Kramer & Cook, 2007, p. 5).
Teacher Warren conceived of the meeting where the data were presented as a
call to meet a professional challenge among colleagues. He said:
When you’re put in a position and you have a problem that is only going to be
solved by planning together and working together and making sure that you stay
on the same page with common assessments. Out of that I think is going to come
to a collegial relationship—not to say that it’s perfect—because there’s plenty of
disagreement about certain things, now and again. (personal communication,
April 15, 2012)
NAVIGATING A WAY OUT OF PROGRAM IMPROVEMENT 136

Teacher Warren’s statement reflects the beginning of a more trusting culture / climate
shift under Principal May. It also uses language indicative of the beginning of repaired
relationships (e.g., collegial relationships, planning together, staying on the same page).
Implicit in this is—in spite of professional disagreements—the ability to persist toward
a long-term goal (exiting PI). All of these ideas are elements of relational trust (Bryk &
Schneider, 2003).
Teacher Warren speaks of working together—not in isolation. He also
acknowledges that there were disagreements, but the fact that relationships were
collegial suggests that there were parameters of engagement that were maybe newly
established under Principal May, and possibly had not existed during Principal Leed’s
tenure.
It was observed during Principal May’s meetings with teachers that students’
benchmark scores were posted by grade level on walls in the teachers’ resource room.
This was referenced during the grade-level compelling conversations as an anchor to the
conversation topic: What are we going to do to make sure all of our students are
experiencing success? The act of showing data openly is in alignment with Knapp and
Feldman (2012), whose work revealed that this is a best practice used by principals
seeking to encourage a greater sense of internal accountability (p. 682). It is not known
how teachers felt about their students’ data being presented openly, and it is possible
that the seeming forced vulnerability could have had negative impacts on their overall
feelings of efficacy. Another way in which Principal May encouraged forward
momentum towards a change and shift in school culture was evident in how she
facilitated teachers’ and students’ ability to set goals. Clark (2003) says that
NAVIGATING A WAY OUT OF PROGRAM IMPROVEMENT 137

“[i]ncreased work motivation is supported by concrete and challenging work goals that
are focused on the near term (today, this week or this month). Everyone should know
what they are expected to do this month and next” (p. 4). An example of clear goal-
setting was evidenced by the school’s marquee, which read “Countdown to the CSTs,”
with the number of days left until the CSTs and the desired API goal. A student making
morning time announcements implored students to say the school chant. The school’s
API goal was clearly stated as part of the chant, and had obviously been memorized by
students, as they were heard chanting aloud. A student’s agenda revealed his prior CST
score and his desired CST score, which suggested that he had an awareness of what was
expected of him as a student at Clover School. The messages on the marquee, and in the
daily announcements, were reminders to students that they should have academic goals
in mind. It was obvious from these verbal and visual cues that everyone, including
students, knew that they were a part of the school’s plan to exit PI and had clear goals to
which to aspire.
Principal May sought to shift the climate of Clover School to being more data-
driven, by providing teachers with an opportunity to analyze data and set goals for
students. One example of her efforts to this end was seen at a staff meeting. Teachers
were instructed to manipulate their class data as they sought responses to questions
given to them by Principal May. Teachers were overheard saying, “Don’t we already
have a program that does this?” Or, “What is this going to tell me that I don’t already
know?” And, “You expect us to get all this done in one hour?!” In statements like these
it was evident that some threat-rigidity existed, as they resisted the task by suggesting
the information was already known, or by blaming insufficient time. In this exchange it
NAVIGATING A WAY OUT OF PROGRAM IMPROVEMENT 138

is evident that Principal May had faith in their capacity or efficacy. However, the power
of the activity was diminished as teachers seemed to demonstrate lack of faith in their
efficacy.
Principal May’s response to these statements reiterated the purpose of the
exercise: “The goal is to operate with precision...and to make sure that we are reaching all
of our students.” In this instance, Principal May kept the intention clear: to create a
precise plan for the students who were not where they should be, academically. It was
not enough to know who the students were, there needed to be an articulated plan and a
commitment from the teachers that something would be done to benefit these students’
educational outcomes.
While there were teachers who experienced frustration in the activity, Principal
May made a concerted effort to encourage her teachers to think and respond with—as
she stated—precision, regarding students’ potential for academic success. She
demonstrated the ability to admit mistakes when she wondered aloud to her Dean of
Students:
You know what [Dean]? I think this was too much for them to do in a short
amount of time; as it was I had to give the directions REALLY fast…I think we
need to follow up with an email and re-explain the purpose of this exercise.
Even though the exercise was a challenge to some of the teachers, Principal May got her
teachers to at least begin to talk openly about their students, and teaching practices
related to them—something that was not in regular practice under Principal Leed. In
addition, Principal May took responsibility for what did not go well in this exercise—
the time constraint. Rather than blame teachers for not being skilled enough at
NAVIGATING A WAY OUT OF PROGRAM IMPROVEMENT 139

manipulating data, or for not working fast enough, she did several things to ameliorate
the situation. First, she enabled more productive dialogue surrounding students than had
taken place previously. This was demonstrated by a conversation overheard among fifth
grade teachers, who were discussing with support personnel the possibility of creating
differentiated groups to better serve students whose academic performance had
plateaued in Mathematics. Second, she assumed responsibility for what had gone
wrong, by admitting that she went too fast with the directions because time was limited,
and corrected this by providing teachers with extra time to complete the exercise.
Finally, she maintained accountability by asking them to present the finished document
(i.e., responses to the questions asked) at compelling conversations that were held a
week later. By seeking to correct her error in not providing ample time, and over-
estimating how teachers would receive the activity, Principal May demonstrated
honesty and authenticity—key elements of organizational trust (Hoy & Tschannen-
Moran, 1999).
Compelling conversations were meetings held by Principal May and the Dean
with grade level teams. Support personnel, like the Reading Coach and Teacher Martz,
were also present. Principal May indicated that the intended purpose of the compelling
conversations was to create a time and space for teachers to discuss professional
challenges, create educational plans for students achieving at all levels, set goals, and to
let Principal May (and other support personnel present) know what sort of support, if
any, was needed.
An example of how Principal May sought to shift the way in which teachers
responded to students was evidenced by an exchange overheard between her and a sixth
NAVIGATING A WAY OUT OF PROGRAM IMPROVEMENT 140

grade teacher. They were discussing the marked lack of progress in Mathematics in a
cohort of students who received Special Education services. To explain why one student
hadn‘t progressed in the way he should, the teacher said, “I only pick and choose the
[state] standards that I know they can access because everything beyond that will be too
hard for them.” Principal May responded with:
I have a bit of a problem with what you‘re saying [Teacher DM], because no
matter what we have an obligation to make sure that these students have
exposure to the standards. Otherwise when they get to seventh grade we are
picking and choosing who will succeed and who will not. I need you to take a
look at that again and see how you can catch these kids up, okay?
Teacher DM replied:

Okay, but it’s going to be a challenge. We already know that these kids are
really, really behind. I just don’t see how they’re going to master all those
standards if they don’t have the basics before CSTs.
In the above exchange, it is evident that Teacher DM was acting in a cognitive deficit
way. I defined this in my conceptual frame as a form of threat-rigidity. His stated
beliefs—that the students could only access so much information; that it was going to
be a challenge to move these students; and that the students were behind—indicated a
cognitive deficit orientation to the students in question.
Principal May expressed her dissatisfaction with this attitude by encouraging
him to re-examine the constraint he had placed on his students: Teacher DM had
effectively determined who would experience success by virtue of what he would or
would not teach them. In the exchange, Principal May made clear her expectation that
NAVIGATING A WAY OUT OF PROGRAM IMPROVEMENT 141

Teacher DM would make an effort to change how he worked with those students, and
offered him assistance from the support personnel present at the meeting. Even if his
thought process was not in full alignment with hers, she was not going to allow him to
perpetuate deficit thinking with regard to his students. It was evident that Principal May
was not satisfied with the status quo—an anti-threat-rigid action. Her efforts to create a
change in the school climate were consistent, even if not always immediately
successful. In the exchange she had with Teacher DM with the goal of improving
student outcomes, and therefore the school climate, Principal May demonstrated
qualities of shared transformational leadership, “active collaboration of principal and
teachers on curriculum, instruction and assessment” (Marks & Printy, 2003, p. 371).
Theme #2: In order for teachers to be equipped to meet the demands of reform,
their professional needs must be met by the principal.
In order for people to be able to function in their work environments, they need
to have access to materials to work towards reform, or to invent creative ways to work
more productively (Clark & Estes, 2008; Elmore, 2008). To go further, Spillane,
Halverson, and Diamond (2004) claim that ―leadership involves the identification,
acquisition, allocation, coordination, and use of the social, material, and cultural
resources necessary to establish the conditions for the possibility of teaching and
learning‖ (pp. 11-12). This notion is also supported by Knapp and Feldman (2012) who
write that allocation of resources must be done intelligently.
Principal May displayed an understanding of how to allocate materials,
resources, and personnel in a way that may have led to improved conditions and climate
/ culture at Clover School. In addition, Principal May also demonstrated that she both
NAVIGATING A WAY OUT OF PROGRAM IMPROVEMENT 142

supported and respected her teachers. Existing research confirms that teachers feel
empowered and efficacious when there is a climate of trust, respect, and support
(Kelchtermans, 2005; Daly, 2009; Bryk & Schneider, 2003; Bird et al., 2009).
Materials / tools for teachers.

In addition to the provision of workplace supplies like paper, dry erase markers,
copy paper, and unlimited access to copy machines, Principal May demonstrated that
she understood the value of meeting teachers’ professional needs.
Of Principal May’s ability to meet professional needs with regard to supplies,
Teacher Mann said:
I mean her whole outlook is that if we want something for our classroom that’s
going to help us attain those goals then we should have it and we shouldn’t have
to ask for it. And pretty much whatever we need is out there for us to use.
(personal communication, April 4, 2012)
In this case, it is evident that Principal May’s perspective on supplies for teachers was
that of openness—a key characteristic of trust development (Hoy & Tschannen-Moran,
1999; Hoy, 2012; Connell et al., 2003). Implied in making workplace supplies easily
accessible to teachers is trust that teachers would not take the supplies for granted.
Teacher Mann used the words “out there” to refer to the availability of supplies under
Principal May. Whereas it was related that Principal Leed had no system in place for
how teachers would acquire supplies, Principal May asked that her teachers have an
informed justification (underpinned by school goals) for their need for additional
materials (e.g., paper, dry erase markers, pencils). Teacher Mann’s statement
emphasized Principal May’s belief that teachers should not have to ask for the very
NAVIGATING A WAY OUT OF PROGRAM IMPROVEMENT 143

things that will facilitate their ability to work—especially if it was to the end of helping
teachers and students meet educational goals. Clark (2003) proposed the idea that one
way to demotivate is to create arbitrary rules. Hoy and Tschannen-Moran (1999)
proposed that limiting or controlling access to supplies also suggests distrust from
superior to subordinate (principal to teacher). In this case, Principal May demonstrated
understanding that teachers needed to feel trusted, by lifting the arbitrary rules
concerning supply use implemented under Principal Leed.
Professional support.

It is important for teachers and administrators to feel supported—even more so
when the pressure for reform is great (Elmore, 2000; Daly et al., 2009). Implicit in
Principal May’s value of meeting professional needs is the concept of support as a
quality necessary for the establishment or growth of organizational and interpersonal
trust. Kramer and Cook (2007) write that “trust entails support and support entails
protection” (p. 6). Teachers interviewed regarding Principal May stated more than once
that they felt supported by her. Key to the statements made was an implied sense of
reciprocity felt by teachers. Reciprocity is the idea that if one is being asked to complete
a task or achieve a goal, then one is given the necessary supplies or support to be able to
accomplish the task (Elmore, 2000). The concept of reciprocity is reflected in the
literature as another element that aids in the development of relational trust.
One example of how Principal May helped teachers feel supported was found in
a statement made by Teacher Danes, who said:
I feel like support has been there for what we ask for. But, I don’t know if we
ask for the things that we really need. Because—I just—with the administrator I
NAVIGATING A WAY OUT OF PROGRAM IMPROVEMENT 144

have today [Principal May] I get the sense of, “if you don’t like the way I’m
doing things, then let me know how I can do better and how I can support you.”
She has always been 100% about that—which is a great thing. (personal
communication, April 4, 2012)
It is evident from Teacher Danes’ statement that Principal May embodied a sense of
reciprocity: support is there for what we ask for. While he admitted that, as
professionals, teachers might not always know what to ask for, the concept of
reciprocity extended deeper in how Principal May asked her teachers for support in
order to better support them. Here, we see three ways in which threat-rigidity was
eliminated, and how this might have contributed to the development of organizational
trust. First, Teacher Danes did not blame Principal May when his needs were unmet.
Instead, he took responsibility for not knowing what he needed. Second, by asking how
she could do better, Principal May paved the way for inter-collegial transparency and
collaboration—she asked her teachers to tell her how she could improve, not because
she did not know how, but because she sought additional input. Finally, by offering
teachers professional support, she demonstrated that she was willing to take
responsibility (herself or by finding the appropriate personnel) by filling in the gaps
when teachers did not know what to ask for. Principal May demonstrated behavior that
aligns with research on relational trust by creating a climate of openness (Bryk &
Schneider, 2003), support (Connell et al., 2003), and vulnerability (Hoy, 2012).
A key aspect of authentic leadership is the ability to demonstrate respect in such
interactions as collaboration and exchange of ideas (Bird et al., 2009). Implied in the act
of encouraging collaboration and exchange of ideas is a sense of respect for the ideas
NAVIGATING A WAY OUT OF PROGRAM IMPROVEMENT 145

being shared (Daly, 2009). Principal May demonstrated respect for teachers’
professional opinions by how she was willing to hear what was or was not going well
from their perspectives.
Professional development.

Because Clover School was a Title I school, the teachers, and to a degree the
principals, had to undergo professional development. Title I funds afforded monies that
were earmarked for specific things, one of them being professional development. The
school did not necessarily have a choice as to the nature and duration of professional
development. In spite of this, Principal May maintained a philosophy of, “home-grown
professional development is better because it empowers teachers.” Her philosophy was
underpinned by a belief that “we have a lot of talent here [at Clover School]. We need to
celebrate that and take advantage of what teachers have to offer each other,
professionally speaking” (personal communication, March 25, 2012). This statement is
aligned with notions of transformational leadership that involve a leader cultivating and
offering opportunities of professional learning and teaching from among the teaching
staff to their colleagues (Knapp & Feldman, 2012; Marks & Printy, 2003). By offering
teachers the opportunity to present to their colleagues in a professional development
setting, Principal May demonstrated the following: (1) trust in teachers’ capacity, (2)
shared control (Hoy & Tschannen-Moran, 1999), (3) professional encouragement /
recognition (Connell et al., 2003). Each of these concepts lend themselves to the
cultivation of organizational and interpersonal trust.
While it was not directly observed how Principal May used her teachers to
conduct professional development, it was noted in observation of compelling
NAVIGATING A WAY OUT OF PROGRAM IMPROVEMENT 146

conversations that Teacher Martz and the Reading Coach were present to offer teaching
strategies, time, and classroom assistance to teachers of various grade levels. By
including support personnel in the compelling conversations, the implication was that
there was openness and receptiveness to their professional opinions by their teaching
colleagues. In addition, Teacher Martz reported that she had been given opportunities to
educate her colleagues in various contexts throughout the year. When Teacher Martz
responded to a question about the type of support available at Clover School, she
mentioned herself: “Ever since Principal May started working with us, my role changed a
lot. I went from only working in the classroom to doing trainings for teachers;
sometimes I would [train] them alone or work with our Reading Coach on
presentations” (personal communication, May 5, 2012). Principal May commented
“teachers have received support. The intervention teacher and Reading Coach are
supports to the teachers. I mean, I think that we’ve created these positions where that’s
all you do—support” (personal communication, March 25, 2012).
By encouraging teachers to share with each other at Professional Learning
Community (PLC) meetings, staff meetings, and compelling conversations, Principal
May had begun to eliminate working in isolation—one of the characteristics of threat-
rigidity. She also identified internal resources—the teachers, themselves—that would
facilitate professional development, while gradually building empowerment among the
teachers. An added benefit of in-house professional development was that school-level
and teacher-level needs were met, to the extent that the professional development
offered was not a “one-size-fits-all” mandate coming from the district because of a
compliance issue. This is in alignment with Fullan (2000), who suggests that principals
NAVIGATING A WAY OUT OF PROGRAM IMPROVEMENT 147

lead their teachers in such a way that they can collaborate in small groups.
Collaboration reinforces the cultivation of a trusting environment within which teachers
can take professional risks or be mutually vulnerable (Hoy & Tschannen-Moran, 1999).
Alternative Governance Plan.

Regarding the AGP, the teachers interviewed stated that it had not been in active
use at Clover School since Principal May became the school’s sole principal. That said,
many subjects reported that the AGP itself was not necessary, to the extent that the
school was in a different and better place since its inception. Still, teachers reported that
the AGP was valuable, and believed that Principal May was using it to some extent to
inform her decisions in leading Clover School. The data revealed that Principal May
had a non-threat-rigid view of the AGP. Existing research says that the intention of the
AGP is to allow a school to take inventory of what needs to improve (CDE, 2012). To
this end, Principal May said:
The PI piece [years in PI and AGP document] forced us to look at the data and
to uncover the real [teaching] practices that were taking place because the staff
thought that they were doing the best possible job and they were blaming all of
the issues on everyone but the way they taught or the way we functioned as a
school; the systems, right? So I think that PI forced us to look at the data and
uncover all the issues. The skill set we have had to learn as a result of being a PI
school has been beneficial. (personal communication, March 25, 2012)
In this statement, Principal May reveals that she believed the AGP was valuable, as it
enabled teachers to see themselves more transparently (i.e., uncovering the real teaching
practices), and that it engendered an opportunity to learn a new skill set. This is in
NAVIGATING A WAY OUT OF PROGRAM IMPROVEMENT 148

alignment with research conducted by Fullan (2000), Mintrop (2012), and Knapp and
Feldman (2012), who suggest that taking advantage of opportunities for professional
learning to better assimilate and internalize external accountability demands is a
productive practice. Additionally, Principal May’s orientation or attitude about the
AGP—she perceived it as a tool, not a mandate—may have facilitated teachers’ ability
to view the AGP differently than when they were under Principal Leed’s charge.
Principal May admitted that it was not easy during this time (the PI years), as
teachers were also seeking to maintain leverage—or act with threat-rigid resistance—
with respect to the changes that were coming. Principal May suggested that this sort of
behavior was something that was freely allowed under the prior administrator, Principal
Leed. This was corroborated by a statement she made:
I think the staff was coasting on PI status, on year 5. I mean if you ask me, they
weren’t sweating it. Even when it came to the AGP they weren’t embarrassed.
Here we were a failing school and they were fighting for rights and issues and
trying to negotiate stuff in the contract. Instead of saying, “We messed up; we
weren’t doing our job; we haven’t been doing the right thing.” …When people
are making comments about trying to negotiate how things happen at a school—
in a failing school—you’re really giving them the permission to keep doing what
they’ve been doing forever. You’re just making things a little bit more
comfortable for them. (personal communication, March 25, 2012)
Principal May used the AGP as leverage to get the teachers to respond to the school’s
failing status in a different way. Whereas Principal Leed asked teachers to tell him what
to do about the school’s status, Principal May used the AGP as an opportunity to, as she
NAVIGATING A WAY OUT OF PROGRAM IMPROVEMENT 149

stated, “uncover the real teaching practices” (personal communication, March 25, 2012).
She mentioned the resistance she experienced from math teachers, for example, when
she began doing walk-throughs. They made statements like, “You don’t know the
content. You don’t know math.” She did not allow these comments to deter her. Since
then, she said, “The biggest transformation is that there’s a bit more trust and mutual
respect” (Principal May, personal communication, March 25, 2012).
Theme #3: The principal has / has not an understanding of how to nurture
teachers / empowerment / self-efficacy
Existing research supports the importance of self-efficacy and empowerment in
teachers, to the extent that it impacts the ways in which they work and positively
impacts students’ achievement (Hoy, 2012). While the school leader cannot be held
accountable for all that stands to influence teachers’ levels of empowerment and
efficaciousness, she can facilitate opportunities that serve to empower teachers or
inspire efficaciousness (Van Den Berg, 2002; Hoy, 2012). The first way that Principal
May demonstrated an understanding of this process was in her statement of the way in
which she led Clover School. She said:
I think there are things that you have to be tight about and things that you have
to be loose about. I think that’s the perfect way to manage. There are some
things that are non-negotiables and then there are other things that you give
people the autonomy for—and so I think for me that’s how I’ve been able to
make sense of it [working in a PI climate]. The things that I feel are really
important I try to hang on to and there are things that I feel like, “Okay…you
NAVIGATING A WAY OUT OF PROGRAM IMPROVEMENT 150

want that, go for it, or do what makes sense for you.” (personal communication,
March 25, 2012)
While Principal May did not state explicitly that her leadership philosophy inspired
empowerment and / or efficacy in her teachers, it was implied by her statement of loose
and tight management of people. She allowed her teachers freedom within the
constraints she established at her school. Her stance is supported by research conducted
by Adams and Forsyth (2009), who posit that some level of autonomy engenders
efficacy and increases trust among teachers. Evidence of autonomy at Clover School is
corroborated by a statement made by Teacher Danes:
[Principal May] has respect for teachers to ask us, “What can we do to change
things?” not just saying “This is what we are going to do.” Of course, like
anything else if you give teachers that freedom, the creative process is going to
be off the roof. (personal communication, April 4, 2012)
This statement implies that Principal May was likely to proffer an idea for teachers’
consideration, but would allow them professional autonomy to execute the idea in a way
that would be unique to them. This is in alignment with organizational trust advanced
by Connell et al. (2003), who write that empowerment is generated when
responsibilities are delegated in such a way that communicates trust in an individual’s
ability.
Interestingly, delegation of activities was not directly observed in Principal May
during this study. And, the following—indicative of a somewhat tight locus of
control—was related by Teacher Warren:
NAVIGATING A WAY OUT OF PROGRAM IMPROVEMENT 151

I think Principal May would be well advised to say, “Staff meetings are history,
we are going to get together once a month at 7:30 to take care of the stuff we
need to take care of.” But these staff meetings where we bring you in and try to
train you…forget it! What you need to do as a teacher you do in your PLCs
which is what [a former administrator] did. (personal communication, April 15,
2012)
Teacher Warren’s statement is demonstrative of craving autonomy. While it is evident
that under Principal May he felt professionally constrained by what he should be
addressing in his PLC meetings and the content of staff meetings, it is important to note
that the seeming laissez faire attitude was one that he was used to, under Principal Leed.
An example of how Principal May seemed to offer opportunities for professional
autonomy to those other than Teacher Martz and the Reading Coach was the CST
Rally—a play acted out by teachers, whose message communicated test-taking strategies
and good school-going habits to students at Clover School. Each year the CST Rally
theme would be different, and kept secret from students, as they looked forward to it,
too. Teacher Danes reported that teachers looked forward to this event because, “it takes
away demoralization…and [Principal May] giving them time to be creative is a
motivating thing for them [teachers] and they love it; it motivates them” (personal
communication, April 4, 2012). Affording teachers the freedom to create a play,
however, while it may promote feelings of empowerment, does not indicate development
of self-efficacy to the end of improving instructional practice.
Teacher Jones characterized Principal May’s ability to nurture her teachers when
he said, “She doesn’t micromanage; she assumes you’re a professional and doesn’t
NAVIGATING A WAY OUT OF PROGRAM IMPROVEMENT 152

assume this watchdog persona. I don’t think this staff responds to someone breathing
down their neck. They want someone they know is going to be supportive” (personal
communication, April 4, 2012). Teacher Jones made evident that Principal May
respected her teachers (“she assumes you‘re a professional”). This was corroborated by
Principal May’s earlier statement that “there are things you give them autonomy for.” A
sense of trust is implied by Principal May’s statement about how she worked with her
teachers.
Another way in which Principal May empowered her teachers was through
home-grown professional development—the use of teachers to facilitate professional
learning. She said, “We’ve made a conscious effort to do home-grown professional
development—so we don’t use consultants; we are forced to spend money on
professional development. We’ve skirted around that” (personal communication,
March 25, 2012). This is a substantive example of the way in which Principal May
created opportunities for teachers to demonstrate their talent, thus empowering them.
This is aligned with Knapp and Feldman (2012), who postulate that professional
learning should be aligned with need. Principal May’s statement implies trust and
respect for teachers and their craft, because she sought to use them as trainers. In
addition, her statement demonstrates an understanding that a consultant might offer
professional learning in a generic manner not suited to the needs of the teachers at
Clover School. In this theme it was evident that not all interviewees believed that
Principal May created an atmosphere that inspired empowerment or self-efficacy.
Because only two additional personnel were observed to be used innovatively, it is
difficult to ascertain how well- aligned Principal May was to this particular theme.
NAVIGATING A WAY OUT OF PROGRAM IMPROVEMENT 153

Regarding elements that influenced school culture and morale, however, it was evident
that Principal May afforded teachers to develop empowerment in those contexts (i.e., the
play for the CSTs).
Conclusion

Principal May demonstrated that she had the leadership skills necessary to begin
the work of steering the teachers under her charge in a different and positive direction.
She effected positive change to culture and climate by seeming to increase levels of
organizational and interpersonal trust at Clover School. As previously stated, there were
very specific elements she made sure to change to benefit the teachers’ ability to work
more effectively under her leadership. First, she demonstrated respect for teachers’
ideas by actively soliciting them and enacting them; she made resources available to
teachers; and she changed the school culture / climate so that levels of trust were
repaired and overall the school began moving in a more academically-focused direction.
The changes she made were underpinned by the idea that all of these actions served the
goal of eventually enforcing a more stringent system of internal accountability. As
teachers gradually let go of their threat-rigid thinking about students’ academic ability
and became more trusting, they can eventually be held more accountable for their
teaching practice. In this vein, Principal May has begun—slowly but surely—the
dialogue with teachers about practice and ways they could improve.
Something missing from this analysis is direct address of students’ opportunities
for authentic learning. The data reveal that Principal May made successful efforts to
shift the culture at Clover School. It was stated that students, in particular, had goals for
the CSTs and that there were visual cues regarding the school’s API goal for the year.
Knapp and Feldman (2012) suggest that focusing too heavily on this aspect—students’
NAVIGATING A WAY OUT OF PROGRAM IMPROVEMENT 154

test scores—can undermine efforts to create a climate of authentic learning. Fullan
(2000) advances the idea of reculturing, and suggests that this is a more challenging
venture than, say, restructuring, because reculturing involves changing minds.
Whereas meeting and exceeding AYP targets is used as the barometer of a
school’s success on a state and federal level, Elmore (2000) argues that this is not an
authentic way of gauging students’ learning. Furthermore, high API scores are not a
true barometer of a school’s organizational health.
Principal May’s ability to inculcate the school with a trusting culture and climate
was perhaps captured by Elmore (2000) when he wrote that “one does not get to lead in
education without being well socialized to the norms, values, predispositions, and
routines of the organization one is leading” (p.3 ). The background of Principal May’s
orientation to Clover School gave her a rare, if not unique position. She was once a
student and, later, a teacher at the very school she led. In this way, she had multiple
avenues by which to socialize herself to the norms, values, and routines of this
organization. That she spent some time away from Clover School, before returning as
its eventual principal, perhaps gave her new eyes with which to see her former
colleagues, and the culture engendered by Principal Leed.
By having been so entrenched with the teaching staff at Clover in different
capacities (i.e., her former teachers later became colleagues and eventually
subordinates) she was afforded many vantage points from which to reflect, once she
began leading and managing Clover School, in spite of an initially distrustful climate.
With respect to interpersonal trust, Kramer and Cook (2007) write that “the social bond
between leaders and followers includes such things as salience of a shared identity,
NAVIGATING A WAY OUT OF PROGRAM IMPROVEMENT 155

recognition of a common background, and a history of cooperative interaction” (p. 5).
By once having been a teacher at the very same school she led, she demonstrates all
three characteristics of the social bond previously delineated. This might have afforded
Principal May a huge advantage in how she was able to broker and manage the teaching
staff, because she knew them so well.
Adams and Forsyth (2009) propose that groups have four phases of
development. They explain that initially a group is comprised of individuals with ideas
and “social orientations” that in many cases do not match group objectives (ibid., 2009,
p. 130). In the second phase, the group begins to coalesce as ideas begin to meld and
defenses are dropped. Third, “shared norms, instead of individual orientations, begin to
serve as the regulating mechanism for individual and group behavior” (ibid., 2009, p.
130). In the last phase, the organization realizes group actualization—the idea that all
are motivated to achieve “stability and sustainability” (ibid., 2009, p. 130).
The AGP can be seen as an interruption to a group of teachers who, up to its
introduction, had the appearance of functioning relatively well—absent test scores that
proved otherwise. Upon this interruption, the group likely had differing ideas and
thoughts about the AGP, which recall data presented in this chapter (e.g., surprise, a
wake-up call, low morale) suggestive of the first phase of group development proposed
by Adams and Forsyth (2009). It appears that Principal May’s entry point at Clover
School was in the second phase, where teachers’ defenses are dropped and they begin to
take on the challenges to improve practice embedded and called for in the AGP.
Comparatively speaking, it is easy to see how Principal Leed would have had a more
challenging time leading in such a turbulent group dynamic, whereas Principal May
NAVIGATING A WAY OUT OF PROGRAM IMPROVEMENT 156

entered at a time when the group had arrived at some level of understanding of the
situation.
Efforts to Create Accountability

Principal Leed and Principal May applied their decision-making capacity to
respond to and enact externally-driven accountability in different ways. Principal
Leed’s response to accountability demands was based in passive compliance and a
broad assumption that his teachers would do the right thing, whether he monitored them
or not. To a degree, he demonstrated that he trusted his teachers. When he sought to
enforce accountability at Clover School it was demanded from teachers by way of the
AGP—an externally-driven contract. He presented them with the work to be done as a
matter of law. Teacher Warren reported that “[Principal Leed] was a little too lax for
some people. I think when it started to go south was when the AGP came along and you
had him saying, ‘We need to do this.’” (personal communication, April 15, 2012).
Teacher Warren’s statement reveals that Principal Leed decided to enforce
accountability when the stakes were already high, by which time enforcement would
prove to be difficult—especially because he was not used to managing his teachers in
that way. This dynamic is reflected in the literature as a professional challenge faced by
schools and organizations in settings where externally-driven demands are made.
Kramer and Cook (2007) relate that contracts and the situations in which they are
presented have a bearing on how individuals receive contracts and whether or not they
cooperate with what is being asked of them. Bluntly stated, contracts can “potentially
impede or slow the development of interpersonal trust” (Kramer & Cook, 2007, p. 15).
In Clover School’s case, the AGP served as a contract that dictated how and to what end
NAVIGATING A WAY OUT OF PROGRAM IMPROVEMENT 157

teachers would work. The organizational response was resistance, and—for a while—
distrust in the school organization and leader.
Perhaps the best evidence of Principal Leed’s seeming challenge to assume
direct accountability was when he said that his school, and those in it, could not be
responsible for a child‘s entire K-8 experience. Many of the most underserved students
at Clover School were enrolled for their entire academic career—all under Principal
Leed’s leadership.
Data analysis reveals that Principal Leed’s efforts to enforce accountability
came too late. He presented the AGP as a “matter of law, not discussion” (personal
communication, Principal Leed, May 4, 2012), when, according to others interviewed,
he had been very easy-going up to that point. Also, the consensus was that the
accountability tool (the AGP) was hardly, if ever, revisited. This was stated in different
ways by Teachers Glen, Martz, Mann, Eisen, and Danes. It was ultimately left to
teachers to feel the sense of urgency, alarm, and accountability, as evidenced by a
statement made by Principal Leed regarding Clover School’s status: “I wanted to create
a sense of need” (personal communication, May 4, 2012). This sort of response is
documented in the literature as being common. Senge (1990) wrote that “Many
charismatic leaders manage almost exclusively at the level of events. They deal in
visions and in crises and little in between. Under their leadership, an organization
hurdles from crisis to crisis” (p. 16). Regarding her orientation to enforcing
accountability, Principal May stated:
I don’t know any different. Over here it’s like, we’re turning in meeting minutes,
we’re turning in ELD reports, we’re managing all these pieces but I don’t know
NAVIGATING A WAY OUT OF PROGRAM IMPROVEMENT 158

any different as a principal. I think we’ve changed the way we do things to a
certain degree—the accountability. (personal communication, March 25, 2012)
In this statement, Principal May describes how she sought to enforce accountability at
Clover School. Her claim that “I don’t know any different” suggests that she
internalized and owned the external accountability demands. Knapp and Feldman
(2012) cite this sense of ownership as the key quality of leaders who are able to support
teachers and create a momentum for reform at low-performing schools. Principal May
operationalized convergence of her personal values with accountability demands
(Honig, 2012). Her behavior is consistent with data provided in previous sections,
especially when she worked with teachers to improve students’ learning outcomes. She
challenged a teacher’s deficit cognitive orientation towards a student in the interest of
advancing the notion of doing the right thing on the student’s behalf.
NAVIGATING A WAY OUT OF PROGRAM IMPROVEMENT 159

CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSION
This study examined the ways in which two different principals at the same
school took up their decision-making power in the interest of leading the school out of
Program Improvement designation. Attention was paid to the nature and type of the
decisions each made, in the context of their ability to promote teachers in the following
four areas: culture / climate, professional needs, self-efficacy / empowerment, and
accountability. A qualitative study employing a single case-study analysis was used in
an attempt to answer the following research questions:
1. What leadership practices are (or are not) used by principals to help teachers
mediate the demands for change in a climate of reform?
a. What are teachers’ perceptions of the principal’s efforts to respond to
the demands of PI Year 4+?
In order to answer the research questions, several types of data— interviews,
documents, and observations—were collected for the purpose of triangulation (Patton,
2002). Anonymity of the school site, principals, and teachers interviewed was preserved
through the use of pseudonyms. All interview and observation data collected were
transcribed and coded for emergent themes delineated in the conceptual framework
presented in Chapter 2, using an Excel spreadsheet (Merriam, 2001; Patton, 2002). In
this chapter, the findings will be summarized, background commentary will be
provided, implications for practice will be discussed, future research will be suggested,
and concluding remarks will be made.
NAVIGATING A WAY OUT OF PROGRAM IMPROVEMENT 160

Summary of Findings

The data revealed a distinct difference between the ways that the two leaders
charged with the same challenge took up their decision-making power. Principal Leed
engaged threat rigidity, which suggested that he perceived a high level of threat to the
external accountability measures used at Clover School during his tenure. His
responses—seeming to blame others, eschew responsibility, and seeming to hedge
around the truth—resulted in a negative or distrusful climate and culture regarding
students’ ability to achieve at high levels. Many of his teachers adopted a similar
perspective and worked in isolation, or blamed students’ backgrounds for the school’s
low performance. It became evident that, as the school’s leader, the first principal
strongly influenced his teachers to think and work in the same way he was used to.
Principal May, who served at the same time, and eventually succeeded Principal
Leed, had a markedly different attitude about the school’s standing. While she admitted
that the school’s standing posed challenges for everyone involved, it was evident that
she saw it as an opportunity to facilitate improvement at Clover School. She worked
deliberately to shift the school’s culture to one that was less teacher-centered and more
student-centered. In addition, she sought to repair damaged relationships by entrusting
teachers with opportunities to train others, thus empowering them so that work towards
establishing internal accountability could begin. Her ability to begin the work in this
area emerged as an outgrowth from how she internalized the accountability demands.
Clover School served as evidence that, “…there are several different patterns in
the growth trajectories of schools. …different strategies may be in order for schools that
are at different points in their journeys” (Cochran-Smith & Lytle, 2006, p. 673).
NAVIGATING A WAY OUT OF PROGRAM IMPROVEMENT 161

Implications for Practice

Mintrop (2012) wrote that, “It’s time to recognize the convergence of internal
values with how it interplays organically and inorganically with what policy would ask
us to do” (p. 698). The results generated from this study not only reveal the importance
of a leader‘s ability to shift culture / climate whilst empowering teachers, but also how
important it is to recognize one’s personal barriers to reform, and the extent to which
they hinder the very processes that aim to aid Program Improvement schools. What this
means is that leaders need to be more cognizant of the internal compass that informs
their ability and willingness to take up decision-making in a high-stakes climate, like
that of a PI Year 4+ school. Sometimes—as was the case with Principal Leed—there
was a seeming misalignment between one’s internal values and what accountability
would ask one to do, professionally. Greater attention needs to be given to this level of
professional dissonance as practitioners.
The way in which accountability demands are presented to school leaders offers
very little to leaders who find meeting the demands difficult to realize. Currently,
Program Improvement schools, and the leaders that run them, are given the mandate to
change or improve in a fixed time, without so much as considering that people in
schools do not improve at the same rate, or in the same way. The implication to practice
is best expressed in the following:
No formal external accountability system can have an impact in the long run
unless it has a capacity-building philosophy. While this is the primary goal, the
external accountability system must also have the responsibility of intervening
in persistently failing schools. Balancing accountability support and
NAVIGATING A WAY OUT OF PROGRAM IMPROVEMENT 162

accountability intervention is a tough call, but this is precisely how sophisticated
the external infrastructure must become. (Fullan, 2000, p. 7)
Fullan recognizes that there is a missing link—capacity building—in our current system
of accountability. The way our system is configured asks principals to not only diagnose
the problems, but fix them, and learn how to do so—all at the same time.
Recommendations for Future Study

What follow are recommendations for further study in the contexts presented in
Chapter 4. I will address recommendations for the following domains: leading in a
climate of reform, professional needs, external accountability, and empowerment / self-
efficacy. Each of these topics emerged as a theme in my findings. I will discuss them in
turn, as I make recommendations for consideration in future studies.
Leading in a Climate of Reform: Skill(s)

No doubt, there are significant challenges to leading in a climate of reform.
Many of these challenges are difficult to anticipate, even for the most skilled leader. It
has been predicted that schools, whether high-achieving or not, will enter Program
Improvement. It is recommended that would-be principals are trained to be aware of
psychological barriers that may prevent their ability to act in ways that move their
teachers and students in progressive ways. In addition, it is important to elucidate the
myriad challenges posed to leaders and leadership in a climate of high-stakes
accountability.
Professional Needs: The Role of External Accountability

As previously stated, the literature reflects more and more the types of
considerations that need to be undertaken when external accountability is enforced at a
NAVIGATING A WAY OUT OF PROGRAM IMPROVEMENT 163

school site. Understanding that change takes time, it would behoove external
accountability holders to make their approach in enforcing accountability measures in a
different way. Currently, the charge is to change (how one works and the type of work
one does) without much consideration for the ways in which people process these types
of change, or whether or not they possess the skills and willingness to take up the
changes requested. It is recommended that alignment of accountability mandates be
matched in such a way that facilitates incremental change. Currently, the AGP as an
accountability tool asks for broad and immediate change. It is suggested that more work
be done by policymakers to create a context in which regular interventions take place,
to better facilitate the process of meeting accountability demands (Honig, 2012).
Empowerment / Self-Efficacy
Existing research suggests an inextricable link between teachers’ emotions and
culture / climate. One influences the other. It is recommended that, when schools are
faced with a high-stakes accountability context, an emotional inventory take place in
time with the changes taking place at the school. Leaders are encouraged to be
cognizant of the importance of creating opportunities for teachers to feel and be
empowered and efficacious in the interest of lasting reform so that trust can be re-
established and deeper work regarding students’ authentic learning can begin.
Conclusion

The findings of this study confirm the importance of a leader’s perspective about
change, actions to change, and ability to repair or create a climate of trust in a high-
stakes accountability setting. More specifically, the way in which a leader positions
himself to external accountability demands, and how a leader takes up his or her
NAVIGATING A WAY OUT OF PROGRAM IMPROVEMENT 164

decision-making power, can influence the school culture and climate to the degree that
teachers will (or won’t) buy in to the demands for change. In this case study, two
dynamics emerged. Principal Leed had a threat rigid response to what was being asked
of him as a school leader (i.e., restructure the school) while trying to manage a school
whose personnel had strong beliefs about their performance that went challenged by
external forces. He had to manage this in a climate where trust had been severely
compromised.
Principal May had a non-threat-rigid response to the same charge and began the
work of repairing teachers’ sense of trust in their school as an organization. She worked
to improve school culture / climate, to the extent that it improved teacher morale
(empowerment / efficaciousness) and yielded positive school results, revealed by steady
and significant gains in API since her placement as principal of Clover School. She
began the substantive work of reculturing (Fullan, 2000).
NAVIGATING A WAY OUT OF PROGRAM IMPROVEMENT 165

REFERENCES

Adams, C.M., & Forsyth, P.B. (2009). The nature and function of trust in schools.

Jounal of School Leadership, 19(2), 126-151.

Al-Fadhi, H., & Singh, M. (2011). Does school leadership matter in the NCLB era?

Journal of Black Studies, 42(5), 751-767. doi: 10.1177/002193471032895.
Agyris, C. (1976). Single-loop and double-loop models in research on decision making.
Administrative Science Quarterly, 21(3), 363-375.

Barth, R. (2002). The culture builder. Educational Leadership, 59(8), 6-11.

Bensimon, E.M. (2005). Closing the achievement gap in higher education: An
organizational learning perspective. New Directions for Higher Education, 131,
99-110.
Bird, J.J., Wang, C., Watson J.R., & Murray, L. (2009). Relationships among principal
authentic leadership and teacher trust engagement levels. Journal of School
Leadership, 19, 153-171.
Blasé, J., & Blasé, J.B. (1999). Implementation of shared governance for instructional
improvement: Principals’ perspectives. Journal of Educational Administration,
37(5), 1-17.
Byrk, A.S., & Schneider, B. (2003). Trust in schools: A core resource for reform.

Educational Leadership, 6(60), 40-45.

California Department of Education. (2009). Academic program survey—middle
grades. 1-39. Retrieved from http://www.cde.ca.gov/ta/ac/ti/stateassesspi.asp
NAVIGATING A WAY OUT OF PROGRAM IMPROVEMENT 166

California Department of Education. (2010). 2010 adequate yearly progress report:
Information guide. 1-85. Retrieved May 23, 2012 from
http://www.cde.ca.gov/ta/ac/ay/documents/infoguide10.pdf#search=safe%20har
bor%20ayp%20california&view=FitH&pagemode=none
California Department of Education. (2010). Year 4 – planning for restructuring /
alternative governance. 1-30. Retrieved April 21, 2011 from
www.cde.ca.gov/ta/lp/vl/documents/pitrngyr4and5.do
California Department of Education. (2011). 2011-2012 PI status statewide summary.

Retrieved August 9, 2012 from http://www.cde.ca.gov/ta/ac/ay/tistatesum11.asp.

Camacho, A., & Eilers, A.M. (2007). School culture change in the making: Leadership
factors that matter. Urban Education, 42(6), 616-637.
doi: 10.1177/004208590730490

Clark, R.E. (2003). Fostering the work motivation of individuals and teams.

Performance Improvement, 42(3), 21-29.

Cochran-Smtih, M., & Lytle, S.L. (2006). Troubling images of teaching in No Child
Left Behind. Harvard Educational Review, 76(4), 668-726.
Connell, J., Ferres, N., & Travaglione, T. (2003). Trust in the workplace: The
importance of interpersonal and organizational support. Journal of Management
Research, 3(3), 113-118.
Corbin, J., & Strauss, A. (2008). Basics of qualitative research, 3rd edition. Sage
Publications: Thousand Oaks, CA.
NAVIGATING A WAY OUT OF PROGRAM IMPROVEMENT 167

Crane, E.W., Huang, C.W., Derby, K., Makkonon, R., & Goel, A.M. (2008).

Characteristics of California school districts in program improvement (Issues &
Answers Report, REL 2008-No. 055). Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of
Education, Institute of Education Sciences, National Center for Education
Evaluation and Regional Assistance, Regional Educational Laboratory West.
Retrieved from http://ies.ed.gov/ncee/edlabs
Creswell, J.W. (2009). Research design: Qualitative, quantitative, and mixed-methods
approaches. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications.
Crum, K.S., Sherman, W.H., & Myran S. (2009). Best practices of successful
elementary school leaders. Journal of Educational Administration, 48(1), 48-63.
doi: 10.1108/09578231011015412
Daly, A.J. (2009). Rigid response in an age of accountability: The potential of
leadership and trust. Educational Administration Quarterly, 45, 169-216.
Dworkin, A.G. (2001). Perspectives on teacher burnout and school reform.

International Education Journal, 2(2), 69-78.

EdSource. (2011). Title I schools in program improvement over time. Retrieved August
7, 2012 from http://www.edsource.org/data-title-i-program-improvement-
ca.html
Elmore, R.F. (2000). Doing the right thing, knowing the right thing to do: The problem
of failing schools and performance-based accountability. Consortium for Policy
Research in Education.
NAVIGATING A WAY OUT OF PROGRAM IMPROVEMENT 168

Elmore, R.F. (2008). Leadership as the practice of improvement. In Beatriz Pon, B.,
Deborah Nusche D., & Hopkins, D. (Eds.), Improving School Leadership,
Volume 2. OECD, 37-64.
Finnigan, K.S., & Stewart, T.J. (2009). Leading change under pressure: An examination
of principal leadership in low-performing schools. Journal of School
Leadership, 19(5), 586-619.
Fullan, M. (2000) Three stories of education reform. Retrieved from
http://pil.numplus.com/SchoolLeadership/04
fullan/Resources/The_Three_Stories_of_Education_Reform.pdf
Fullan, M. (2001). Leading in a culture of change. San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass.

Goldring, E., Porter, A.C., Murphy, J., Elliot, S.N., & Cravens, X. (2007). Assessing
learning-centered leadership:Connections to research, professional standards,
and current practices. Vanderbilt University: The Wallace Foundation.
Hallinger, P. (2003). Leading educational change: Reflections on the practice of
instructional and transformational leadership. Cambridge Journal of Education,
33(3), 329-351.
Hallinger, P., & Heck, R.H. (2010). Leadership for learning: Does collaborative
leadership make a difference in school improvement? Educational Management
Administration & Leadership, 38(6), 656-678. doi: 10.1177/1741143210379060
Heck, R., & Marcoulides, G.A. (1993). Principal leadership behaviors and school
achievement. NASSP Bulletin, 77(553), 20-28.
Hollingworth, L. (2009). Unintended educational and social consequences of the No
Child Left Behind Act. Gender Race & Justice, 3(22), 311-327.
NAVIGATING A WAY OUT OF PROGRAM IMPROVEMENT 169

Hoy, W. (2012). School characteristics that make a difference for the achievement of all
students: A 40-year odyssey. Journal of Educational Administration, 1(50), 76-
97. doi: 10.1108/095782312111196078.
Hoy, W., & Tschannen-Moran, M. (1999). Five faces of trust: An empirical
confirmation in urban elementary schools. Journal of School Leaderhip, 9, 184-
207.
Jorgensen, M.A., & Hoffman, J. (2003). History of the No Child Left Behind Act of
2001 (NCLB). Pearson Education, 2-8. Retrieved from
http://www.pearsonassessments.com/NR/rdonlyres/D8E33AAE-BED1-4743-
98A1-BDF4D49D7274/0/HistoryofNCLB.pdf
Kelchtermans, G. (2005). Teachers’ emotions in educational reforms: Self-
understanding, vulnerable commitment and micropolitical literacy. Teaching
and Teacher Education, 21, 995-1006.
Knapp, M.S., Copland, M.A., Honig, M.I., Plecki, M.L., & Portin, B.S. (2010).

Learning-focused leadership: Meaning and practice in urban systems. Wallace
Foundation.
Knapp, M.S., & Feldman, S.B. (2012). Managing the intersection of internal and
external accountability: Challenge for urban school leadership in the United
States. Journal of Educational Administration, 50(5), 666-694.
Kramer, R.M., & Cook, K.S. (2007). Trust and distrust in organizations: Dilemmas and
approaches. Retrieved October 23, 2012 from
https://www.russellsage.org/sites/all/files/kramer_chapter1_pdf_0.pdf
NAVIGATING A WAY OUT OF PROGRAM IMPROVEMENT 170

Linn, R.L., Baker, E.L., & Betebenner, D.W. (2002). Accountability systems:
Implications of requirements of the No Child Left Behind Act of 2001.
American Education Research Association, 31(6), 3-16.
Louis, K.S., & Robinson, V.M. (2012). External mandates and instructional leadership.

Journal of Educational Administration, 50(5), 629-665.

Marks, H.M., & Printy, S.M. (2003) Principal leadership and school performance: An
integration of transformational and instructional leadership. Educational
Administration Quarterly, 39(3), 370-397. doi: 10.1177/0013161X03253412.
Marzano, R.J., McNulty, B.A., & Waters, T. (2005). School leadership that works:
From research to results. ACSD.
Mathis, W.J. (2009). NCLB‘s ultimate restructuring alternatives: Do they improve the
quality of education? East Lansing, MI: Great Lakes Center for Education
Research and Practice.
Merriam, S.B. (2001). Qualitative research and case study applications in education.

San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass Publishers.

Mintrop, H. (2012). Bridging accountability obligations, professional values, and
(perceived) student needs with integrity. Journal of Educational Administration,
50(5), 695-726.
Mintrop, H., & MacLellan, A.M. (2002). School improvement plans in elementary and
middle schools on probation. The Elementary School Journal, 102(4), 275-300.
NAVIGATING A WAY OUT OF PROGRAM IMPROVEMENT 171

Murnane, R.J., & Papay, J.P. (2010). Teachers’ Views on No Child Left Behind:
Support for the Principles, Concerns about the Practices. Journal of Economic
Perspectives, 24(3), 151-166.
National Center for Education Statistics. Urban schools: The challenge of location and
poverty, Executive summary. Retrieved October 13, 2011 from
http://nces.ed.gov/pubs/web/96184ex.asp
O’Day, J.A., & Smith, M.S. (1993). Systemic reform and educational opportunity. In
Furhman, S.H. (Ed.), Designing coherent education policy: Improving the
system, pp. 250-311. San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass Publishers.
Patton, M.Q. (2002). Qualitative research & evaluation methods, 3rd edition. Thousand
Oaks, CA: Sage Publications.
Perlman, C.L. (2007). Restructuring options and change process. In H.J. Walhberg
(Ed.), Handbook on restructuring and substantial school improvement, pp. 53-
70. Lincoln, IL: Center on Educational Improvement.

Porter, A.C., Polikoff, M.S. (2007). NCLB: State interpretations, early effects, and
suggestions for reauthorization. Social Policy Report, 3-15.
Ramaley, J.A. (2002) Moving mountains: Institutional culture and transformational
change. In A field guide to academic leadership.
Senge, P. (1990). The leader‘s new work: Building learning organizations. Sloan
Management Review, 7-23.
Sherman, W.H., Clayton, J., & Sanzo, K.L. (2011). Leadership practices of successful
middle school principals. Journal of Educational Administration, 49(1), 31-45.
NAVIGATING A WAY OUT OF PROGRAM IMPROVEMENT 172

Sherman, W.H., Crum, K.S., & Myran, S. (2009). Best practices of elementary school
leaders. Journal of Educational Administration, 48(1), 48-63.
doi: 10.1108/09578231011015412

Shoen, L., & Fusarelli, L.D. (2011). Innovation, NCLB, and the fear factor. Educational
Policy, 22(181), 181-203.
Slayton, J., & Mathis, J. (2010). Building the leaders we need: The role of presence,
learning conditions, and andragogy in developing leaders who can change the
face of public pre-k though 12 education. Global Perspectives on Educational
Leadership Reform: The Development and Preparation of Leaders of Learning
and Learners of Leadership, 11, 23-45.
Spillane, J.P., Halverson, R., & Diamond, J.B. (2004). Towards a theory of leadership
practice: A distributed perspective. Journal of Curriculum Studies, 36(1), 3 – 34.
doi: 10.1080/0022027032000106726.
Staw, B.M., Sandelands, L.E., & Dutton, J.E. (1981). Administrative Science Quarterly,
26, 501-524. doi: 00018392/81/2604-0501/$00-75.
Stein, M.K., & Nelson, B.S. (2003). Leadership content knowledge. Educational
Evaluation and Policy Analysis, 25(4), 423-448.
Strunk, K.O. (2012). Policy poison or promise: Exploring the dual nature of California
school district collective bargaining agreements. Educational Administration
Quarterly, 1-42. doi: 10.1177/0013161X11432923.
NAVIGATING A WAY OUT OF PROGRAM IMPROVEMENT 173

Strunk, K.O., & McEachin, A. (2011). Accountability under constraint: The relationship
between collective bargaining agreements and California schools‘ and districts‘
performance under No Child Left Behind. American Educational Research
Journal, 48(4), 871-903.
United States Department of Education. (n.d.). Preliminary overview of programs and
changes included in the No Child Left Behind Act of 2001. Retrieved April 21,
2011 from http://www2.ed.gov/nclb/overview/intro/progsum/sum_pg3.html
Valenzuela, A., Prieto, L., & Hamilton, M.P. (2007). Introduction to the special issue:
No Child Left Behind (NCLB) and minority youth: What the qualitative
evidence suggests. Anthropology & Education Quarterly, 38(1), 1-8. doi:
10.1525/aeg.2007.38.1.1.
Valli, L., & Buese, D. (2007).The changing roles of teachers in an era of high-stakes
accountability. American Educational Research Journal, 44(3), 519-558.
Van Den Berg, R. (2002). Teachers’ meanings regarding educational practice. Review
of Educational Research, 72(4), 577-625.
Zembylas, M., & Baker, H. (2007). Teachers’ spaces for coping with change in the
context of a reform effort. Journal of Educational Change. doi: 10.1007/s/10833-
007-9025-y.
NAVIGATING A WAY OUT OF PROGRAM IMPROVEMENT 174

APPENDIX A

ESSENTIAL PROGRAM COMPONENTS

California Department of Education (http://www.cde.ca.gov/ta/lp/vl/essentialcomp.asp)
Page Generated: 7/17/2011 9:51:50 PM

Essential Program Components

Nine essential program components supporting academic student achievement.

Introduction

The Essential Program Components (EPC) support academic student achievement in
English/reading/language arts and mathematics as measured through grade-span
Academic Program Survey (APS). The EPCs are designed to meet the needs of all
students, including English learners and students with disabilities through State Board
of Education (SBE)-adopted standards-based and/or standards-aligned (grades nine
through twelve) instructional materials including interventions and English Language
Development materials, appropriate instructional time and pacing schedules,
professional development for teachers and administrators, assignment of fully
credentialed highly qualified teachers, ongoing instructional support in the use of data
obtained from a student achievement monitoring system, teacher collaboration, and
fiscal support.

Nine Essential Program Components

1. Use of standards-based State Board of Education (SBE)-adopted (kindergarten
through grade eight) or standards-aligned (grade nine through twelve)
English/reading/language arts and mathematics instructional materials,
including intensive interventions and * English Language Development
materials.

Elementary School Level: The school/district provides the current SBE-adopted basic
core instructional programs, including ancillary materials for universal access, for
Reading/Language Arts/English Language Development (RLA/ELD)(2002, 2005
[follow-up] or 2008 adoptions) and for mathematics (2001, 2005 [follow-up] or 2007
adoptions). The school/district also provides the current SBE-adopted intensive
interventions for Grades 4-8 in RLA/ELD and Grades 4-7 and Grade 8 Algebra
Readiness in mathematics. These programs are to be implemented as designed and
documented to be in daily use in every classroom with materials for every student.

Middle School Level: The school/district provides the current SBE-adopted basic core
instructional programs in Reading/Language Arts/ English Language Development
(2002, 2005 [follow-up], or 2008 adoptions) and for mathematics (2001, 2005 [follow-
NAVIGATING A WAY OUT OF PROGRAM IMPROVEMENT 175

up], or 2007 adoptions). The school/district also provides the current SBE-adopted
intensive interventions for Grades 6-8 in RLA/ELD and Grades 6-7 and Grade 8
Algebra Readiness in mathematics. These programs are to be implemented as designed
and documented to be in daily use in every classroom with materials for every student.

High School Level: The school/district provides the current district adopted, standards-
aligned textbooks and instructional materials, including ancillary materials for universal
access for all ninth and tenth grade English/Language Arts courses as well as an SBE-
adopted intensive reading intervention course; and for mathematics SBE-adopted
mathematics textbooks in all classrooms for all students enrolled in Algebra Readiness,
Algebra Strategic Support and Algebra I. These programs are implemented as designed
and documented to be in daily use in all classrooms with materials for every student.

Note: For English/Language Arts, state-monitored high schools are to select high school
level (articulated) texts and programs from publishers listed on the core and intensive
intervention SBE-adopted materials lists for grades 7 and 8.

*English Language Development: Depending on the grade level and year of adoption,
school/district may also use ELD materials found on the SBE approved supplementary
materials list (includes Assembly Bill 1802 materials) to provide ELD instruction to
English Learners.

2. Implementation of instructional minutes for basic core Reading/Language Arts
and mathematics programs, intensive intervention and strategic support
courses as well as additional instructional time for structured English
Language Development at all grade levels.

Elementary School Level: The school/district complies with and monitors the daily
implementation of instructional time for the adopted RLA and mathematics basic core
programs, the intensive interventions as well as additional time for strategic support and
ELD for identified English Learners. This time should be given priority and be
protected from interruptions.

Middle School Level: The school/district complies with and monitors the daily
implementation of instructional time for the adopted RLA and mathematics basic core
programs, the intensive interventions as well as additional time for strategic support and
ELD for identified English Learners. This time should be given priority and be
protected from interruptions.
High School Level: Through the school’s master schedule, the school/district complies
with and monitors the daily implementation of instructional time for the adopted grade-
level 9th and 10th ELA and Algebra I programs, the intensive interventions as well as
additional time for strategic support, ELD for identified English Learners, and support
to master the required skills to pass the related components on the California High
School Exit Examination (CAHSEE). This time should be given priority and be
protected from interruptions.
NAVIGATING A WAY OUT OF PROGRAM IMPROVEMENT 176

3. Use of an annual district instructional/assessment pacing guide for grades K-8
and high school.

Elementary School Level: The school/district prepares, distributes, and monitors the
use of an annual district-instructional/assessment pacing guide documented to be in use
for each grade level (kindergarten through grade eight) for the SBE-adopted basic core
RLA/ELD, strategic support and intensive intervention programs and SBE-adopted
mathematics basic core, strategic, and Grades 4-7 and Algebra Readiness intensive
intervention programs in order for all teachers to follow a common sequence of
instruction and assessment.

Middle School Level: The school/district prepares, distributes, and monitors the use of
an annual district instructional/ assessment pacing guide documented to be in use for
each grade level (sixth through grade eight) for the SBE-adopted basic core RLA/ELD,
strategic support and intensive intervention programs and SBE-adopted mathematics
basic core, strategic, and Grades 6-7 and Algebra Readiness intensive intervention
programs in order for all teachers to follow a common sequence of instruction and
assessment.

High School Level: The school/district prepares, distributes, and monitors the use of an
annual district instructional/assessment pacing guide for the current district-adopted
ELA Grade 9 and 10 core, strategic support and the intensive reading intervention
courses and for the current SBE-adopted Algebra I, Algebra I strategic support and
Algebra Readiness courses in order for all teachers to follow a common sequence of
instruction and assessment.

4. Implementation of School Administrator Instructional Leadership Training
Program- Instructional materials based professional development and ongoing
targeted professional development and support for instructional leaders to
ensure the full implementation of the district adopted program and the EPCs.

Elementary School Level: The district provides the principal and vice-principal(s) with
an 80-hour instructional materials-based administrative training, Module I in leadership,
support and monitoring needed for the full implementation of the SBE-adopted
RLA/ELD and mathematics basic core and intervention program materials. This
requirement is fulfilled when the administrator(s) completes 80 hours of training
institute and 80 hours of structured practicum in the school/district-adopted
Reading/Language Arts (elementary school core program K-6) including the intensive
intervention and the core and intervention mathematics programs. The district also
provides targeted professional development and support beyond the administrator
training practicum to increase the principal’s and vice-principal’s instructional
leadership skills to monitor and support the full implementation of the EPCs. Modules 2
and 3 are optional but recommended.
NAVIGATING A WAY OUT OF PROGRAM IMPROVEMENT 177

Middle School Level: The district provides the principal and vice-principal(s) with a
40-hour instructional materials-based administrative training, Module I in leadership,
support and monitoring needed for the full implementation of the SBE-adopted
RLA/ELD and mathematics basic core and intervention program materials. This
requirement is fulfilled when the administrator(s) completes 40 hours of training
institute and 40 hours of structured practicum in the school/district-adopted
reading/language arts (core program 7-8) or the reading intervention and the
mathematics core or intervention programs. The district also provides targeted
professional development and support beyond the administrator training practicum to
increase the principal’s and vice-principal’s instructional leadership skills to monitor
and support the full implementation of the EPCs. Modules 2 and 3 are optional but
recommended.

High School Level: The district provides the principal and vice-principal(s) with a 40-
hour instructional materials-based administrative training, Module I in leadership,
support and monitoring needed for the full implementation of the SBE-adopted
RLA/ELD and mathematics basic core and intervention program materials. This
requirement is fulfilled when the administrator(s) completes 40 hours of training
institute and 40 hours of structured practicum in the district-adopted reading/language
arts (grades 9-10), Algebra I and/or reading and Algebra Readiness intensive
interventions. The district also provides targeted professional development and support
beyond the administrator training practicum to increase the principal’s and vice-
principal’s instructional leadership skills to monitor and support the full implementation
of the EPCs. Modules 2 and 3 are optional but recommended.

5. Fully credentialed, highly qualified teachers, per the requirements of the
Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA) and professional
development on SBE-adopted instructional materials.

Highly Qualified Teachers: All classrooms are staffed with fully credentialed,
highly qualified teachers per the requirements of the ESEA. Requirements for No
Child Left Behind (NCLB) Teacher Compliance: Teachers of core academic subjects
must have: a bachelor‘s degree; hold an appropriate credential or intern certificate (must
be currently enrolled in an approved California Commission on Teacher Credentialing
[CCTC] intern program); and demonstrate subject matter competence.

Implementation of Instructional Materials-Based Professional Development: The
school/district provides teachers of RLA/ELD (K-10) and mathematics K-8 through
Algebra I (in all grade levels and programs, including special education and ELD) with
a 40-hour instructional materials professional development program provided by a
knowledgeable and experienced provider for the SBE-adopted basic core RLA/ELD and
mathematics programs and/or SBE-adopted reading or mathematics intensive
intervention instructional programs in use at the school.
NAVIGATING A WAY OUT OF PROGRAM IMPROVEMENT 178

The school/ district also validates that each teacher completes an 80-hour structured
practicum based on the implementation of the instructional materials and the EPCs.

6. Implementation of ongoing instructional assistance and support for R/LA, ELD
and mathematics teachers through the use of content experts, specialists, and
instructional coaches.

The schools/district provide instructional assistance and ongoing support to all teachers
of Reading/Language Arts/ELD and mathematics. Specifically, elementary, middle, and
ninth and tenth grade Reading/Language Arts, intensive reading intervention, K-7
mathematics, Algebra 1, Algebra Readiness and Algebra strategic support teachers
receive ongoing support offered by the school and district. Possible options for
providing support include trained coaches, content experts, and specialists who are
knowledgeable about the adopted program, and work inside the classrooms to support
teachers and deepen their knowledge about the content and the delivery of instruction.

7. For all grade levels, implementation of a student achievement monitoring
system that provides timely data from common formative and curriculum-
embedded and summative assessments for teachers and principals to use to
monitor ongoing student progress, identify student needs, inform instruction
and determine effectiveness of instructional practices and implementation of
the adopted programs.

The school/district uses an ongoing assessment and monitoring system that provides
timely data from common assessments based on the SBE-adopted RLA/ELD and
mathematics basic core and intensive intervention programs. Student achievement
results from assessments (i.e., entry-level placement and/or diagnostic; progress
monitoring, including frequent formative and curriculum-embedded; and summative
assessments) are used to inform teachers and principals on student placement,
diagnosis, progress, and effectiveness of instruction.
8. Implementation of monthly structured teacher collaboration for all RLA/ELD
and mathematics teachers by grade level (K-8) and common course and
department levels (9-12) facilitated by the principal.

The school/district facilitates and supports a one-hour structured collaboration meeting
(preferably two) per month in order for all teachers of reading and language arts and
mathematics, including strategic and intensive intervention, special education, and ELD
teachers to analyze, discuss, and utilize the results of the school/district assessment
system to guide student placement, instructional planning and delivery, and progress
monitoring, within the SBE-adopted RLA/ELD and mathematics programs.
NAVIGATING A WAY OUT OF PROGRAM IMPROVEMENT 179

9. Implementation of Fiscal Support aligned to full implementation of EPCs.

The school/district‘s general and categorical funds are coordinated, prioritized, and
allocated to align with the full implementation of the EPCs in RLA/ELD, mathematics,
and the Single Plan for Student Achievement (SPSA).

Questions: District Improvement Office | 916-319-0836
Last Reviewed: Monday, April 04, 2011
NAVIGATING A WAY OUT OF PROGRAM IMPROVEMENT 180

APPENDIX B

OBSERVATION PROTOCOL, ADAPTED FROM CRESWELL (2009)

Date: Location:

Purpose: Parties Present:

Descriptive Notes (location,
setting, environment)

Reflective Notes
(impressions, dialogue)

Evidence of Threat Ridigity
or Building Trust

NAVIGATING A WAY OUT OF PROGRAM IMPROVEMENT 181

APPENDIX C

INTERVIEW PROTOCOL FOR TEACHERS, ADAPTED FROM CRESWELL (2009)

Interview Protocol:

Date: Time: Person Interviewed:

Location:

*Directions: After asking preliminary questions regarding years of service at the school
and general demographic information, proceed to these questions.

AGP/PI Year 4

1. How would you describe the professional relationships between you, your
colleagues, and the principal before your school became a PI Year 4 school?

2. Or, if you were already working at the school in the midst of PI, how would you
describe the professional relationships at the height of PI when writing the AGP?

3. How would you describe the relationships now—a few years into PI and after
having written the AGP?
3.1. If they are different do you think any of those differences are the result of PI
designation and / or AGP authorship?
3.2. Or are there other reasons those relationships might have changed?

4. What does PI Year 4+ mean to you? (that is, do you see PI Year 4+ being different
from any other year of PI?)
4.1. How if at all, has PI Year 4+ changed the way you work?
4.2. Do you have to work with colleagues more?
4.3. Do you have to report to / meet with your administrator more?
4.4. Do you have more papers to grade?

5. Are there aspects of PI Year 4+ or AGP that have created more tension than others?
5.1. What are those aspects and how would you describe the tensions they create?
5.2. How have those been dealt with over time?

6. Since your school was designated a PI Year 4+ school has there been anything
especially challenging for you to implement as a teacher?
6.1. If so what type of support was provided to you?
6.2. How beneficial was the support?
6.3. Who provided the support?
6.4. If the support wasn’t what you needed, what do you think would have helped
you?
NAVIGATING A WAY OUT OF PROGRAM IMPROVEMENT 182

6.5. What of your administrator? – Are you aware of any available support to your
principal since PI?
6.6. If so, can you describe the type(s) of support to the best of you knowledge?
6.7. If there isn’t existing support what do you think would help your principal?

7. Do you see a benefit to the AGP or PI Year 4+ ?
7.1. If so, can you describe how it has benefitted your school?
7.2. Your teaching practice?
7.3. If not, please describe the disadvantage of the AGP / PI Year 4.

PI & Leadership

1. Describe how you became aware that your school was a low-performing school?
1.1. Who communicated this to you?
1.2. Can you describe how you and your colleagues reacted?
1.3. If you reaction and that of your colleagues was negative was anything done by
current or prior leadership to alleviate your feelings or to improve morale?
1.4. What was the overall climate?
1.5. Was there any pivotal event in the school’s low performance?

2. Describe how—if ever—the AGP was presented to the teaching staff.
2.1. What sort of message do you think your principal was trying to convey to you
and your colleagues about the AGP and PI Year 4+ (i.e. compliance? Ready
acceptance? Indifference?)
2.2. Can you describe your understanding of the relationship between the AGP and
PI Year 4+

3. The AGP is like a school-wide inventory that asks for schools to figure out what
they will focus on for the coming academic years as they try to exit PI. What was
chosen as the areas of focus at your school?
3.1. Do you agree with the areas of focus?
3.2. If not please explain what you think would have been important to focus on.
3.3. How and by who was input on the AGP solicited?
4. How seriously do you think your current /prior administrator takes the contents of
the AGP (*or: How seriously do you think your administrator takes the demands of
PI Year 4+? ).
4.1. Is there evidence on campus, or in how you are asked to work—for instance—
that confirms the seriousness (or not) of the AGP?
4.2. In the years since PI Year 4+ designation how often does your principal
reference the AGP in decision making at the school?
4.3. If is not often, why do you think this is the case?

5. How would you describe your previous / current principal’s leadership style
before the AGP and PI Year 4+?
NAVIGATING A WAY OUT OF PROGRAM IMPROVEMENT 183

6. Can you describe what changes might have looked like over the time that the school
had to create and implement the AGP? (i.e. attention to uniform policy, compliance
with school policies).

7. In the years since PI Year 4+ can you describe the way(s) in which your school
culture or environment has changed because of changes that your principal
initiated?
7.1. Describe how the principal achieved change to school culture / environment
related to students? Teachers?
7.2. What kinds of things get celebrated?
NAVIGATING A WAY OUT OF PROGRAM IMPROVEMENT 184

APPENDIX D

INTERVIEW PROTOCOL FOR PRINCIPALS

Interview Protocol:

Date: Time: Person Interviewed:

Location:

*Directions: After asking preliminary questions regarding years of service at the school
and general demographic information, proceed to these questions.

1. How would you describe the professional relationships between you and the
teaching staff prior to PI Year 4+
1.1. What about during PI Year 4+ and the writing of the AGP?
1.2. If the relationships are different do you think any of those differences are the
result of PI Year 4+ demands and writing the AGP?
1.3. Or are there other reasons?

2. What did PI Year 4+ mean to you?
2.1. Did you see it as being different than any other year of PI?
2.2. How did PI Year 4 change the way you worked? – Did you have to respond to
the district more? Did you have to work with consultants more?

3. Were there any aspects of the AGP that created more tension than others?
3.1. What were those aspects and how would you describe those tensions?
3.2. How were the tensions dealt with by you as the administrator?

4. Since PI Year 4 designation what would you say was the most challenging thing for
you to implement pertaining to AGP or demands of PI Year 4+ as a principal?
4.1. Was any support provided to you?
4.2. What was it and how beneficial was it to you?
4.3. Was this support there because of the school’s standing or did it already exist?

5. If the support wasn’t what you needed at the time, what do you think would have
helped you?
5.1. What about your teaching staff—at the time—what sort of support was
available to them?
NAVIGATING A WAY OUT OF PROGRAM IMPROVEMENT 185

6. Did you see a benefit to the AGP or PI Year 4+?
6.1. If so can you describe how it benefitted the school when you were there?
6.2. Your leadership practice?
6.3. If not, please describe the disadvantages.

PI & Leadership

1. Can you describe—in the context of AGP / PI Year 4+ writing—the most pivotal
event good or bad in the school’s journey through multiple years of PI?

2. Can you describe your feelings / reaction once the school arrived at PI?
2.1. Was anything done by the district or district personnel to alleviate your feelings
or improve your morale?

3. As principal how did you communicate the school’s standing to teaching staff in PI
Year 4+--that being the year the AGP needed to be written?
3.1. What were their reactions?
3.2. Was there anything you or KL tried to do to alleviate their concerns or fears?

4. When it came time to make the school’s low-performance public how did you
communicate this?
4.1. How did the public react to the school’s standing?
4.2. What did you do as the school’s leader to quell fears / concerns / anger on
the part of parents and other community members?
4.3. Describe how, if at all, district personnel supported you in communicating the
school’s standing at this critical juncture?
4.4. How did they help you deal with the concerns for which the community might
hold you directly accountable?
4.5. If nothing was done what could the district have done to better support you in
this context?

5. Describe how you presented the AGP to teaching staff.
5.1. What sort of message were you trying to convey to the teachers about the AGP
and PI Year 4+ (i.e. compliance?, ready acceptance?, indifference?)
5.2. If the AGP was never presented to staff, please address the reason(s) why you
choose not to introduce the document in part or in full?
5.3. How did you convey to teachers the work that needed to be done in PI Year 4+
in response to AGP—as opposed to showing the entire document?
5.4. How do you think teachers received the message of the work that needed to be
done?

6. Was there any support given to you in helping you to write the AGP—if, so please
describe the nature, source, and type of support given.
NAVIGATING A WAY OUT OF PROGRAM IMPROVEMENT 186

7. Many people I interviewed mentioned POSA LR. Can you comment on her role on
your campus during this phase of PI Year 4?
7.1. Why was she there?
7.2. How did it feel to have her there?
7.3. Was her presence effective to what her intended purpose was?
7.4. How do you think teachers received her presence?
7.5. If it was negative, was there anything you did to support them through her
being on campus?

8. What was chosen as the areas of focus on the AGP?
8.1. How and by whom was input solicited?
8.2. Did teachers agree with the areas of focus?
8.3. If not, please explain what they communicated as being important and in what
ways this was shared (i.e. staff meetings, or one on one meetings).

9. How seriously did you take the contents of the AGP?
9.1. What things did you try to do to either on campus or in your actions to convey /
confirm the seriousness of the AGP?
9.2. In the year or two after the AGP was written how often did you consult it in
decision making about the campus?
9.2.1. If not much, can you explain why not?

10. How would you describe your leadership style before PI Year 4? After?
10.1. If your leadership style changed at all, can you give an example of what
these changes in your practice might have looked like?

11. A year or so removed from writing the AGP can you describe the ways in which
your school culture / environment changed because of things you initiated?
11.1. Can you describe the steps you took to achieve these changes to culture/
environment for students? Teachers?
11.2. What sorts of things did you actively celebrate and recognize when you
were working at the school?
NAVIGATING A WAY OUT OF PROGRAM IMPROVEMENT 187

APPENDIX E
INFORMED CONSENT

Dear [Name],

My name is Monica Muñoz, and I am a doctoral candidate in the Rossier School of
Education at the University of Southern California. I am conducting a research study as
part of my dissertation, focusing on the type of leadership skills needed by a principal at
a low-performing school seeking a way out of Program Improvement designation. The
study will hone in on the sanctions phase under No Child Left Behind (NCLB) in
Program Improvement Year 4+. The principal(s) and teachers will be interviewed for
their ―spin‖ on the Alternative Governance Plan and its bearing on teaching and
leadership practices. You are invited to participate in the study. If you agree, you are
invited to participate in two interviews scheduled at times and locales that are
convenient to you.

The interview(s) are anticipated to take no more than an hour each to complete and will
be audio-recorded. You will be asked to read the transcript of the interview to check for
accuracy.

Participation in this study is voluntary. Your identity as a participant will remain
confidential at all times during and after the study.

If you have questions or would like to participate, please contact me at (626) 991-9260.
Thank you for your participation.

Sincerely,

Monica Muñoz
monicamu@usc.edu
University of Southern California

Abstract (if available)

Abstract This study was conducted to ascertain what leadership actions best position a principal to facilitate his school‘s exit from Program Improvement (PI) designation. Existing research suggests that the pressures for change in a high-stakes accountability setting, such as that of PI, are not only more difficult to implement, but also require a different skill set on the part of the leader who is charged with navigating his school. ❧ The study employed a case-study analysis with purposive sampling. The researcher sought a school that was entrenched in the Program Improvement years (specifically, PI Year 4+), in order to examine the interaction between external accountability mandates, the leader(s) that would enforce them, and the teacher(s) that would implement the mandates. ❧ The case study revealed that leadership actions taken by the principal have a bearing on a school‘s culture and climate, and the extent to which teachers make efforts to change. Such changes are sustained by the way that teachers are led and the way in which their principals create or repair a climate of trust.

Linked assets

University of Southern California Dissertations and Theses

Conceptually similar

PDF

Mandated privatization through program improvement: a case study of the relationship between Action Learning Systems and the Buena Park School District

PDF

Organizational alignment in charter school settings: investigation of a three-tier model for linking leadership, culture, and change toward instructional improvement

PDF

The role of leadership in using data to inform instruction: a case study

PDF

An examination of teacher leadership in public schools

PDF

A tale of two principals: the complexity of fostering and achieving organizational improvement

PDF

Role of a principal supervisor in fostering principal development to support instructional improvement and a positive school climate

PDF

School leaders' use of data-driven decision-making for school improvement: a study of promising practices in two California charter schools

PDF

Secondary school reform and improved math achievement: a case study of site efforts at Mission Valley High School

PDF

A case study of the instructional leader's role in leading change: preparing for the implementation of Common Core State Standards in elementary schools

PDF

High school reform to improve mathematics achievement

PDF

A story of achievement in areas where others fail: a case study of secondary school reform in mathematics at Pacific North High School

PDF

A case study of promising leadership practices employed by principals of Knowledge Is Power Program Los Angeles (KIPP LA) charter school to improve student achievement

PDF

Contracting for special education: a case study of a charter school contract for special education

PDF

Data-driven decision-making practices that secondary principals use to improve student achievement

PDF

A case study of one poʻokumu kaiapuni

PDF

The relationship between ethnicity, self-efficacy, and beliefs about diversity to instructional and transformational leadership practices of urban school principals

PDF

Cognitively guided instruction: an mplementation case study of a high performing school district

PDF

Leading the way: the effective implementation of reform strategies and best practices to improve student achievement in math

PDF

Improving professional learning for teachers

PDF

A new era of leadership: preparing leaders for urban schools & the 21st century

Asset Metadata

Creator Muñoz, Monica (author)

Core Title Navigating a way out of program improvement: a case study analysis

School Rossier School of Education

Degree Doctor of Education

Degree Program Education (Leadership)

Publication Date 02/23/2014

Defense Date 10/23/2012

Publisher University of Southern California (original), University of Southern California. Libraries (digital)

Tag leadership,NCLB,OAI-PMH Harvest,principals,program improvement,Teachers,Trust

Language English

Contributor Electronically uploaded by the author (provenance)

Advisor Slayton, Julie M. (committee chair), Rousseau, Sylvia G. (committee member), Strunk, Katharine O. (committee member)

Creator Email mmunoz@emcsd.org,monimun6@aol.com

Permanent Link (DOI) https://doi.org/10.25549/usctheses-c3-221642

Unique identifier UC11292682

Identifier usctheses-c3-221642 (legacy record id)

Legacy Identifier etd-MuozMonica-1448.pdf

Dmrecord 221642

Document Type Dissertation

Rights Muñoz, Monica

Type texts

Source University of Southern California (contributing entity), University of Southern California Dissertations and Theses (collection)

Access Conditions The author retains rights to his/her dissertation, thesis or other graduate work according to U.S. copyright law. Electronic access is being provided by the USC Libraries in agreement with the a...

Repository Name University of Southern California Digital Library

Repository Location USC Digital Library, University of Southern California, University Park Campus MC 2810, 3434 South Grand Avenue, 2nd Floor, Los Angeles, California 90089-2810, USA