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The impact of social capital: a case study on the role of social capital in the restoration and recovery of communities after disasters

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The impact of social capital: a case study on the role of social capital in the restoration and recovery of communities after disasters

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Content THE IMPACT OF SOCIAL CAPITAL:

A CASE STUDY ON THE ROLE OF SOCIAL CAPITAL IN THE RESTORATION
AND RECOVERY OF COMMUNITIES AFTER DISASTERS

by

Jacob Anthony Avila

A Dissertation Presented to the
FACULTY OF THE USC SOL PRICE SCHOOL OF PUBLIC POLICY
UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA
In Partial Fulfillment of the
Requirements for the Degree
DOCTOR OF POLICY, PLANNING, AND DEVELOPMENT

December 2013

Copyright 2013 Jacob Anthony Avila

ii
Epigraph
“Social, not physical, infrastructure is the key to successful rebuilding.”
—Daniel Aldrich, Ph.D.

iii
Dedication
Dedicated to Becca, Jackson, Liv, and Jeremiah

iv
Table of Contents
Epigraph .............................................................................................................................. ii
Dedication .......................................................................................................................... iii
List of Tables .................................................................................................................... vii
List of Figures .................................................................................................................. viii
Abstract ............................................................................................................................... x
Preface................................................................................................................................ xi
Chapter One: Introduction .................................................................................................. 1
1.1 The Phenomenon Under Research ............................................................................ 1
1.2 Problem and Purpose ................................................................................................ 3
1.2.1 General remarks ................................................................................................. 3
1.2.2 Factors that influence disaster recovery ............................................................. 4
1.3 Structure of the Manuscript ...................................................................................... 8
1.4 Contributions to Practice ........................................................................................ 10
Chapter Two: Literature Review ...................................................................................... 12
2.1 New Orleans Disasters ............................................................................................ 12
2.1.1 Hurricanes ........................................................................................................ 12
2.1.2 Floods ............................................................................................................... 19
2.2 Factors That Influence the Disaster-Recovery Process .......................................... 20
2.2.1 Financial aid ..................................................................................................... 20
2.2.2 Damage levels .................................................................................................. 21
2.2.3 Political institutions ......................................................................................... 21
2.2.4 Mitigation ......................................................................................................... 22
2.2.5 Socioeconomic conditions ............................................................................... 22
2.2.6 Civil society ..................................................................................................... 23
2.3 Social Capital as a Major Factor ............................................................................. 23
2.3.1 Defining social capital ..................................................................................... 23
2.3.2 Measuring social capital................................................................................... 26
2.3.3 Developing social capital ................................................................................. 33
2.3.4 Leveraging social capital ................................................................................. 36
Chapter Three: Methodology ............................................................................................ 39
3.1 Methodological Approach ...................................................................................... 39
3.2 Discovery of the Research Questions ..................................................................... 41
3.3 Significance of the Research Questions .................................................................. 44
3.4 Methodological Challenges in Case Study and Social Capital Research ............... 45
3.4.1 Case study research has an inherent lack of rigor ............................................ 46
3.4.2 Case studies provide a limited basis for scientific generalization ................... 48
3.4.3 Case studies take too long ................................................................................ 49
v
3.4.4 Case studies are used improperly to examine causal relationships .................. 50
3.4.5 Challenges in social capital research ............................................................... 50
3.5 Description of Case Study Research and Its Suitability for this Study .................. 51
3.6 Criteria for Designing a Qualitative Study ............................................................. 53
3.6.1 Construct validity ............................................................................................. 54
3.6.2 Internal validity ................................................................................................ 54
3.6.3 External validity ............................................................................................... 55
3.6.4 Reliability ......................................................................................................... 56
3.7 Analyzing Qualitative Research ............................................................................. 56
3.7.1 Theoretical propositions ................................................................................... 56
3.7.2 Qualitative and quantitative data...................................................................... 57
3.8 Data Collection and Analysis ................................................................................. 58
3.8.1 Secondary data ................................................................................................. 58
3.8.2 Conceptual framework and data analysis......................................................... 62
3.8.3 Method for analyzing qualitative data ............................................................. 66
Chapter Four: Case Study ................................................................................................. 68
4.1 New Orleans ........................................................................................................... 68
4.1.1 Geography ........................................................................................................ 68
4.1.2 Hurricane and flood protection system ............................................................ 71
4.1.3 Demography ..................................................................................................... 78
4.2 Broadmoor .............................................................................................................. 81
4.2.1 Geography ........................................................................................................ 81
4.2.2 Flood protection system ................................................................................... 85
4.2.3 Demography ..................................................................................................... 88
4.3 Hurricane Katrina ................................................................................................... 92
4.3.1 Impact on New Orleans and the surrounding region ....................................... 98
4.3.2 Impact on Broadmoor .................................................................................... 103
Chapter Five: Broadmoor’s Recovery ............................................................................ 106
5.1 Call to action: BNOB and the “Green Dots” ........................................................ 108
5.2 Dimension: Strategic partnering ........................................................................... 113
5.2.1 Question: Strategic partnering ....................................................................... 113
5.2.2 Proposition: Strategic partnering ................................................................... 120
5.2.3 Method for developing social capital: Strategic partnering ........................... 127
5.2.4 Method for leveraging social capital: Strategic partnering ............................ 132
5.3 Dimension: Communication ................................................................................. 133
5.3.1 Question: Communication ............................................................................. 133
5.3.2 Proposition: Communication ......................................................................... 135
5.3.3 Method for developing social capital: Communication ................................. 137
5.3.4 Method for leveraging social capital: Communication .................................. 142
5.4 Dimension: Resource acquisition ......................................................................... 143
5.4.1 Question: Resource acquisition ...................................................................... 143
5.4.2 Proposition: Resource acquisition .................................................................. 144
5.4.3 Method for developing social capital: Resource acquisition ......................... 148
5.4.4 Method for leveraging social capital: Resource acquisition .......................... 149
vi
Chapter Six: Conclusions, Implications, and Recommendations ................................... 151
6.1 Conclusions ........................................................................................................... 151
6.1.1 Strategic partnering ........................................................................................ 153
6.1.2 Communication .............................................................................................. 154
6.1.3 Resource acquisition ...................................................................................... 154
6.2 Implications .......................................................................................................... 155
6.2.1 Strategic partnering dimension ...................................................................... 159
6.2.2 Communication dimension ............................................................................ 161
6.2.3 Resource acquisition dimension .................................................................... 163
6.3 Limitations and Recommendations for Future Research ...................................... 164
6.3.1 Quantitative methods ..................................................................................... 164
6.3.2 Theory building .............................................................................................. 166
6.4 Concluding Remarks ............................................................................................. 168
References ....................................................................................................................... 170
vii
List of Tables
Table 1: Factors Explaining Recovery Speed ................................................................. 5
Table 2: Three Recent “Super Catastrophes” in Comparison ......................................... 7
Table 3: One Year After the Disaster ............................................................................. 7
Table 4: Saffir/Simpson Hurricane-Scale Ranges ........................................................ 13
Table 5: Hurricane Activity Affecting New Orleans (Direct and Indirect) .................. 17
Table 6: Theories of Capital ......................................................................................... 25
Table 7: Coefficient for Model 1 of Population Growth Rate ...................................... 30
Table 8: Coefficient for Model 2 of population growth rate ........................................ 31
Table 9: Coefficient for Model 3 of population growth rate ........................................ 32
Table 10: Evaluating Quality of Research Designs ........................................................ 53
Table 11: Qualitative Data Analysis Matrix for Understanding the Impact of Social
Capital on the Disaster-Recovery Process ...................................................... 67
Table 12: Major Hurricanes Crossing Southeast Louisiana Vicinity (1851-2004) ........ 77
Table 13: Census of 2000 and 2010 New Orleans Statistics .......................................... 79
Table 14: Census of 2000 and 2010 Broadmoor Statistics ............................................. 89
Table 15: Saffir-Simpson Hurricane Wind Scale ........................................................... 95
Table 16: Qualitative Data Analysis Matrix for Understanding the Impact of Social
Capital on the Disaster-Recovery Process .................................................... 107
Table 17: Formal and informal partnerships ................................................................. 116
Table 18: Durations....................................................................................................... 117
Table 19: Partner Resources and Skills ........................................................................ 133
Table 20: Overview of findings .................................................................................... 152
Table 21: Mechanisms for enhancing social capital ..................................................... 158

viii
List of Figures
Figure 1. Structure of the manuscript. .............................................................................. 8
Figure 2. Hurricane landfalls in the United States, by state, 1900-1994 (hurricane
categories 1-5) ................................................................................................. 14
Figure 3. Research case study process ............................................................................ 48
Figure 4. A framework for understanding the affect of social capital on the disaster-
recovery process.............................................................................................. 65
Figure 5. Map of New Orleans in 1849 .......................................................................... 70
Figure 6. Contemporary map of New Orleans ................................................................ 70
Figure 7. USACE hurricane protection systems ............................................................. 72
Figure 8. Lake Pontchartrain, Louisiana, and vicinity Hurricane Protection Project ..... 74
Figure 9. West Bank and Vicinity, New Orleans, Louisiana, hurricane protection system
......................................................................................................................... 75
Figure 10. New Orleans to Venice, Louisiana, Hurricane Protection Project. ................. 76
Figure 11. Broadmoor boundary map ............................................................................... 82
Figure 12. Broadmoor area in 1829 prior to drainage and development .......................... 83
Figure 13. Broadmoor home being raised during restoration ........................................... 84
Figure 14. New Orleans drainage system in 1903 ............................................................ 86
Figure 15. New Orleans drainage system in 1992 ............................................................ 87
Figure 16. New Orleans levees and floodwalls as of August 29, 2005 ............................ 88
Figure 17. Map of Hurricane Katrina’s track.................................................................... 97
Figure 18. Precise path and intensity map of Hurricane Katrina ...................................... 98
Figure 19. New Orleans flood map after Hurricane Katrina. ........................................... 99
Figure 20. August 24-30, 2005 precipitation map .......................................................... 100
Figure 21. Mississippi River gage height ....................................................................... 101
Figure 22. Katrina’s diaspora .......................................................................................... 103
Figure 23. Elevation map of New Orleans and Broadmoor............................................ 104
Figure 24. The green dots. .............................................................................................. 109
Figure 25. Rebuilding Together New Orleans properties restored from 2009-2011 ...... 125
Figure 26. Rebuilding Broadmoor timeline. ................................................................... 126
Figure 27. Broadmoor committee organizational chart. ................................................. 140
Figure 28. Information process flow to community. ...................................................... 141
ix
Figure 29. Information process and data flow from committees to partner organizations ...
....................................................................................................................... 141

x
Abstract
Social science has recently begun to make significant advancements in the study and
understanding of the impact of social capital on the disaster recovery process. Social
capital has been found to be an influential factor that significantly enhances or impedes
the success of disaster recovery efforts. This study examined the capacity of one
neighborhood to rebuild and recover after Hurricane Katrina. Using a case study the
researcher investigated factors that facilitated disaster recovery efforts by examining
ways in which social capital was developed and leveraged. These findings have
implications for public policy, affected communities, and disaster recovery professionals.
Keywords: Social capital, disaster recovery, community recovery, redevelopment,
Hurricane Katrina

xi
Preface
This culminating project represents the intersection of ideas, a supportive
university, guidance and advice, experiences and stories, and a community of support.
Without each of these elements, the completion of this project would not have been
possible.
 The idea
The idea to complete my doctoral project on a disaster-related topic was rooted in
a lifetime of experiences working for my father, a disaster expert and pioneer in disaster
restoration and reconstruction management. Growing up, I worked for my father and
learned about rebuilding communities after disasters and redeveloping blighted
neighborhoods. My father taught me there was more to rebuilding communities than
restoring infrastructure and repairing damaged buildings. He introduced me to the human
side of disaster recovery and community redevelopment and explained that, as a
restoration and redevelopment professional, I had a responsibility to help restore lives
and relationships within the communities we were serving. Rebuilding structures was
certainly exciting for me; however, after finishing my undergraduate work at Pepperdine
University and taking a more permanent role within our family construction business, I
learned more about the dynamics and work involved with a holistic approach to helping
communities recover; this fueled a passion within me. Since then, I have maintained an
interest in working to understand how communities can recover from disasters more
effectively.
After years of working in industry, I had a strong desire to return to school to
study disaster recovery. I sought an institution where I could best contribute to the well-
xii
being of disaster-stricken communities through research, education, and practice. I was
in need of an institution with the resources and expertise and soon discovered there were
many reputable options, one of which was prestigious and had a doctoral program
designed for experienced practitioners seeking to make valuable contributions to their
fields.
 Supportive university
I was fortunate to meet Imran Farooq in 2009, then a doctoral student at the
University of Southern California, School of Policy, Planning, and Development (SPPD,
now the Sol Price School of Public Policy at USC). Through Imran, I learned about the
mission of the school and later established contact with Professor Martin Krieger. I am
indebted to them; through them, I was able to find a relevant and world-class program at
a world-renowned institution that would provide a path to contribute to the disaster
community through research, education, and practice. I am grateful to USC faculty, staff,
and classmates who have supported me through this endeavor.
The courses I attended provided opportunities to improve my skills and
collaborate with like-minded individuals on similar journeys. I want to thank Professor
Peter Robertson, Professor Rick Culley, Professor Harry Richardson, Professor Chet
Newland, and Professor Martin Krieger for facilitating challenging and memorable
sessions that made this an invaluable experience.
 Guidance and advice
I want to thank my committee chair, Professor Peter Robertson, who supported
me throughout this process. Thanks to his experience, availability, feedback, and
support, I was able to complete this project. In addition to my committee chair at USC, I
xiii
had the support of Professor Tridib Banerjee (USC), Professor Deborah Natoli (USC),
Professor Francois Jacobs (CBU), and Phillip Rosebrook, an industry consultant with
Business Mentors.
 Experiences and stories
The data collected for this project were secondary and collected through academic
and professional literature, technical reports, media, and videos. I am grateful to the
people of Broadmoor for sharing their amazing story of overcoming adversity and for
their willingness to teach others from personal experiences.
 Community of support
I owe my deepest thanks and gratitude to my lovely wife, Becca, who embraced
the entire journey through every accomplishment and obstacle. She supported me
through each phase of this project, and she made its completion possible. I am forever
grateful for all she sacrificed; therefore, this project and every step along the way
represent a shared achievement, and for that I am deeply appreciative and blessed. I love
her dearly.
I am grateful to my children—Jackson, Liv, and Jeremiah—who endured the ups
and downs of this journey as well. Thank you for inspiring and supporting me. My
father, Chuck Avila, is a tireless supporter and a true role model of a man of honesty,
integrity, and a strong work ethic. My mother, Naomi Avila, another tireless supporter,
modeled passion and a desire to care for and serve others, especially those in need. My
siblings—Aaron, Justin, Hannah, and Jesse—were some of my strongest supporters, each
of whom I can turn to for anything.
xiv
I am fortunate to have gone through this journey with exceptional peers who
challenged me and who have consistently been by my side throughout this academic
journey. I especially want to thank Keith Allen, Roya Azizi, Irma Becerra, Jamiko Bell,
Dave Carlson, Chantelle Frazee, John Holmes, Justin McCusker, Grace Nadel, Jeremy
Olson-Shelton, Marco Ramirez, Erroll Southers, Rob White, and Grace Williams.
This project has taught me a great deal about myself, my family, my friends, and
human nature. It is my hope that this project will provide a source of information and
understanding for communities, organizations, and individuals who want to advance the
means and methods used to help communities recover from disasters.

December 18, 2013 Jacob Anthony Avila

1
Chapter One: Introduction
1.1 The Phenomenon Under Research
Between 1980 and 2010, 640 natural disasters killed 12,366 people, affected
nearly 26,889,582 others, and created over $544,287,010,000.00 in economic damages in
the United States (PreventionWeb, 2012). Given the substantial loss of life, the people
affected, and the economic damages from disasters in the United States, it is easy to
understand why the effective management of disaster preparedness, response, and
recovery should be a top social priority. The purpose of this study is to understand
specific elements of disaster recovery and explore the means for improving the disaster
recovery process.
How does social capital influence the rate of recovery after disasters? Improving
the means, efficiency, and effectiveness by which disaster recovery efforts are managed
occupies the work of scholars and practitioners from the fields of sociology (Aldrich,
2011), economics (Cohen & Werker, 2008; Dacy & Kunreuther, 1969), organization
theory (Bryson, Crosby, & Stone, 2006), and urban planning (Schwab, Topping, Eadie,
Deyle, & Smith, 1998), to name a few. Financial aid (Dacy & Kunreuther, 1969),
population density (Haque, 2003), extent of damage (Dacy & Kunreuther, 1969), political
stability (Cohen & Werker, 2008), mitigation (Eoh, 1998; Nakabayashi, 2004;
Nakabayashi & Ichiko, 2004), socioeconomic conditions (Berke, Kartez, & Wenger,
1993; Ramakumar, 2008; Rossi, 1993; Wright, Rossi, Wright, & Weber-Burdin, 1979),
economic inequality (Aldrich, 2008; Cutter & Emrich, 2006), and civil society (Buckland
& Rahman, 1999; Nakagawa & Shaw, 2004) represent factors that are particularly
2
challenging to disaster recovery efforts, advancing or impeding a community’s capacity
to rebuild successfully after a disaster.
In light of these challenges, why does empirical evidence show that social, not
physical, infrastructure or financial resources is more vital to successful rebuilding and
that communities with high levels of social capital recover more quickly than
communities with low levels of social capital (Aldrich, 2008)? And, related to this, how
can communities develop and leverage social capital to improve the rate and
effectiveness of recovery after disasters? If social capital provides an effective means to
moving citizens into action and increasing the recovery rate, what practices exist that may
serve to help define a systematic approach to developing and leveraging social capital in
disaster recovery situations? How could a widely accepted means of developing and
leveraging social capital benefit communities recovering from disasters?
Within the literature investigating social capital’s effect on disaster recovery, the
means by which social capital may be developed and leveraged during the disaster-
recovery process appears to remain minimally addressed by systematic scientific
research. Much of the literature uses case studies when examining this phenomenon, and
it was not until recently that comparative research (Aldrich, 2008) has improved
understanding by generalizing understanding of the role of social capital in disaster
recovery. The field lacks a theoretically informed practical understanding as to how
social capital is developed and leveraged. Such understanding would be valuable
because it would inform the practice of developing and leveraging social capital within
the context of the disaster recovery process.
3
The need to understand the roles of communities, individuals, organizations, and
sectors as contributors to the disaster recovery process and, subsequently, how social
capital influences governance, processes, and recovery rates has caused the pursuit of this
topic in my doctoral research. I have a desire to understand what factors influence the
disaster-recovery process and to discover what it is that some communities do differently
from other communities. What is it that makes them different? How is it that some
communities recover more quickly than others? What are the sources of cohesion for
communities with high levels of social capital, and how can we create an environment
that allows this cohesion to develop naturally and more effectively when it is needed?
More specifically, I plan to devote this research to understanding how social capital
contributed to the restoration and recovery efforts of the Broadmoor neighborhood of
New Orleans after Hurricane Katrina. The above questions guided this research.
1.2 Problem and Purpose
1.2.1 General remarks
Each year, floods account for approximately 70 percent of presidentially declared
disasters in the United States (Schwab, 1998). Between 1990 and 2010 there was an
average of 31 floods per year that were presidentially declared disasters (FEMA, 2013).
The cause of flooding varies, as do the affected regions; however, many regions have
been affected repeatedly throughout history and have lived through the rebuilding and
recovery process multiple times. In 2005, Hurricane Katrina devastated the Gulf Coast,
leaving behind mass destruction spanning miles of coastline and crossing state lines. The
costliest natural disaster and one of the five deadliest hurricanes in the history of the
United States, Hurricane Katrina was not the first event to wreak havoc in New Orleans.
4
It left behind a living laboratory, an ideal setting for the study of disaster mitigation,
preparedness, response, and recovery.
Hurricane Katrina caused 1,833 deaths across state lines (Knabb, Rhome, &
Brown, 2008), flooded 80% of the City of New Orleans, and severely damaged or
destroyed nearly 80,000 housing units, 42% of the dwellings in the city (Steinberg &
Shields, 2007). The effects of Hurricane Katrina caused unprecedented damage in New
Orleans and the surrounding area, affected thousands of people in the United States, and
affected many more around the world.
Within the City of New Orleans, the Broadmoor community did not escape the
devastation. In Broadmoor, 100% of its 2,915 housing units sustained significant
damage, 90% of which would require major remediation and repairs to be inhabitable
again (Scott, 2008a). Government agencies, businesses, non-profits, and academia have
all documented and assumed various roles in the recovery and rebuilding efforts, and the
recovery of the Broadmoor community in New Orleans remains one of the most well-
documented recovery efforts in the wake of this storm.
1.2.2 Factors that influence disaster recovery
Theories have been advanced that indicate social networks offer valuable insight
into explaining the rate of recovery after disasters (Nakagawa & Shaw, 2004). The
recovery process requires long-term commitments from all sectors and stakeholders. It is
a complex undertaking and requires more effort and resources than what is required to
clean up and restore physical infrastructure after a disaster. Prevailing socioeconomic
conditions and structural constraints are highly influential factors that may impede on a
community’s capacity to recover from a disaster more quickly (Tobin, 1999; Tobin &
5
Montz, 1994); however, many other factors have been examined and studied to explore
ways in which communities may recover more quickly and effectively. The purpose of
this study is not to identify and examine every influential factor; rather, it is to examine
social capital (Aldrich, 2011; Dynes, 2005) through a case study and build on prior
research (Aldrich, 2008; 2010; 2011; Dynes, 2005) in terms of how social capital may be
effectively developed and leveraged in practice. Table 1 lists several factors that have
been advanced over the years to explain the rate of recovery after disasters.
Table 1: Factors Explaining Recovery Speed
Factor Logic Scholarship
Financial aid Affected communities with
greater support will recover
more quickly.
Dacy & Kunreuther, 1969
Damage levels Areas with greater damage
will recover more slowly.
Dacy & Kunreuther, 1969
Political institutions More efficient, less corrupt
agencies within the state will
coordinate a faster recovery.
Cohen & Werker, 2008
Mitigation Communities that have
previously encountered
disaster will be prepared and,
hence, recover more quickly
from future crises.
Eoh, 1998; Nakabayashi,
2004; Nakabayashi &
Ichiko, 2004
Socioeconomic
conditions
Wealthier neighborhoods and
cities will recover more
rapidly following disaster.
Berke, Beatley, & Feagin,
1993; Ramahumar, 2008;
Rossi, 1993; Wright et al.,
1979
Civil society Better connected communities
and neighborhoods will
recover faster.
Buckland & Rahman,
1999; Nakagawa & Shaw,
2004
Note. Adapted from The Need for Comparative Research in Disaster Studies: The Role
of Social, Not Physical, Infrastructure in Recovery, by D. P. Aldrich, 2008, Mumbai,
India: Jamsetji Tata Centre for Disaster Management Conference on Disasters, p. 15.
6
Each factor indicated in Table 1 has been supported by empirical evidence and
case study research. However, there have always been exceptions for each factor, and
none has held true universally. For example, in a comparative study of three cases,
Aldrich (2008) examined the socioeconomics of each case and discussed the differences
in the rate of recovery (Table 2). With the exception of the amount of aid received, Kobe
and Katrina had many similarities. Kobe caused more economic damage, fatalities, and
homelessness than Katrina. In addition, the victims of the Kobe earthquake received
billions less in financial aid than Katrina victims. The greatest similarity is the
socioeconomic per capita income of the areas affected by Kobe and Katrina. Aldrich
(2008) argued that socioeconomics, although important, is not the most influential factor
that affects the rate of recovery. The rate of recovery for Kobe significantly outpaced the
recovery rate for Katrina, so these data support Aldrich’s argument that aid may not be
one of the most influential factors (Table 3). Recovery commenced rather quickly in
each of the cases, despite various amounts and forms of aid to victims. Given the
implications that the cases did not support recovery rate theories based on the level of
damage, socioeconomic conditions, and the amount of aid, Aldrich (2008; 2011) sought
to examine the role of social capital and the affect social capital has on the rate and
effectiveness of recovery. The data from Aldrich’s (Aldrich, 2008; Aldrich, 2011)
studies suggests New Orleans, as a city, had lower levels of social capital than Kobe and
Tamil Nadu thereby suggesting New Orleans may not be an ideal case for examining a
phenomenon such as social capital. While this may be a logical conclusion at the city
level, this study examines a neighborhood within New Orleans and the evidence suggests
7
there are communities within New Orleans, such as Broadmoor, where social capital has
flourished.
Table 2: Three Recent “Super Catastrophes” in Comparison
Case Level of damage Socioeconomics Amount of aid
Earthquake in
Kobe, Japan
(1/17/1995)
$180 billion;
6,500 dead;
300,000 homeless
Per capita income
$28,000/year
None (to
individuals)
Tsunami in Tamil
Nadu, India
(12/26/2004)
$3 billion;
8,000 dead;
310,000 homeless
$700/year $2.1 billion to
survivors
Case Level of damage Socioeconomics Amount of aid
Hurricane Katrina
in New Orleans,
LA (8/29/2005)
$150 billion;
1,600 dead;
250,000 homeless
$27,000/year $16 billion to
survivors
Adapted from The Need for Comparative Research in Disaster Studies: The Role of
Social, Not Physical, Infrastructure in Recovery, by D. P. Aldrich, 2008, Mumbai, India:
Jamsetji Tata Centre for Disaster Management Conference on Disasters, p. 8.
Table 3: One Year After the Disaster
Case Business Sector Shops/Schools Housing
Kobe, Japan 80% exports, 90%
manufacturing
restored
80% of shops, most
schools reopened
Close to 85% in
permanent housing
Tamil Nadu, India Almost all
fishermen back at
work
Old schools rebuilt,
new schools being
created
50% housing
restored
New Orleans, LA Unemployment at
double the national
average
50% of schools,
40% of shops
rebuilt
100,000
households in
trailers
Adapted from The Need for Comparative Research in Disaster Studies: The Role of
Social, Not Physical, Infrastructure in Recovery, by D. P. Aldrich, 2008, Mumbai, India:
Jamsetji Tata Centre for Disaster Management Conference on Disasters, p. 16.
8
1.3 Structure of the Manuscript
The methodological choice of a research case study and the intent of the
professional doctorate degree, to make a contribution to practice, have significant
consequences for the organization of this manuscript; thereby necessitating remarks on
the way in which it is structured and organized, including the manner by which results
were obtained and analyzed and the sequence in which these results are presented in the
manuscript. The following figure and statements provide an overview of each chapter
and the respective characteristics.

Figure 1. Structure of the manuscript.

Chapter 1 includes an introduction to the phenomenon under research, including a
description of the problem of disasters. It discusses the challenges associated with
recovery and how the research question was discovered and formalized. This chapter
also explains the contribution to practice the research will make and the implications for
advancing the practice of disaster recovery.
Chapter 2 contains a review of the relevant literature from the fields of disaster
recovery and social capital. It defines the concepts and theories used in this study and
discusses the relevance of social capital for increasing the efficiency, effectiveness, and
overall success of disaster recovery efforts.
Introduction (1) Literature Review (2) Methodology (3) Case study (4)
Broadmoor's
recovery (5)
Conclusions,
implications, and
recommendations (6)
9
Chapter 3 describes the research methodology used in this research. It discusses
the challenges associated with conducting qualitative research in both fields and the
manner by which such challenges are overcome. It includes discussion of the research
case study method in general and introduces the steps of case study research. The chapter
assesses the usefulness of secondary data and qualitative data analysis and introduces the
methodology used for the purpose of this study. It also discusses evaluative criteria for
case study research.
Chapter 4 discusses the results and details of the Broadmoor case relevant to this
study. The chapter includes a description of the Broadmoor neighborhood, including
statistics, culture, global position, history, and the events surrounding Hurricane Katrina.
This chapter describes the events leading up to Hurricane Katrina and how the hurricane
impacted New Orleans and the Broadmoor community.
Chapter 5 examines how the Broadmoor community rebuilt and recovered from
this disaster. Theoretical concepts and observations are examined in the context of
general themes to provide guidance to the reader by connecting research questions,
observations, and propositions to these overarching themes that are critical to the disaster
recovery process.
Finally, Chapter 6 discusses the results of the research and provides concluding
remarks. The chapter is organized so that concepts are summarized with supporting
evidence from the case. I then propose advancements to theory and practice as they
relate to disaster recovery.
10
1.4 Contributions to Practice
Understanding how communities recover from disasters is critically important to
survivors, relief organizations, businesses, governments, and researchers. In the past,
researchers and those involved in the recovery process have focused heavily on the
physical aspects of recovery and material resources. Their questions have focused on the
extent of the physical damage, the physical and monetary resources available, and where
and how the community would rebuild.
The physical aspects of recovery are important; however, social capital has been
identified as a significant and highly influential factor that enhances disaster-recovery
performance. Researchers are now starting to argue that social capital is perhaps the
most influential factor affecting the success and outcomes of the disaster-recovery
process (Aldrich, 2011). The examination of a cohesive community with high levels of
trust and reciprocity—social capital—may provide insight into how disaster-recovery
efforts may have unparalleled advantages, allowing for effective, low-cost, and
sustainable recovery strategies. Such an understanding may serve to advance practices
that affect planning, relief efforts, public policy, decisions related to resource allocation,
collaborative partnerships, and long-term recovery.
A stable and committed community base, with high levels of social capital, may
support the recovery efforts more effectively than any other factor. For example,
communities with high levels of social capital may be better equipped to deal with
adversity and overcome obstacles than communities with lower levels of social capital
but more financial resources or more robust physical infrastructure (Aldrich, 2008). In
addition, such communities may experience less conflict and infighting, possibly leading
11
to enhanced performance in the form of effective decision making, new collaborative
partnerships, increased civic engagement, improved outcomes, and overall better use of
available time and resources. Furthermore, communities with high levels of social capital
may leverage resources embedded in social networks to protect against unfavorable
policy decisions or increased crime, thereby mitigating the effect from additional losses
that would otherwise be risked if the community were vulnerable, temporarily
inhabitable, or partially abandoned.
Nakagawa and Shaw (2004) summarized the importance of social capital and why
it is critical that the understanding of social capital, especially in disaster situations, be
advanced:
Social capital, in general, refers to the trust, social norms, and networks which
affect social and economic activities. Although it is not a new idea that trust and
networks help reduce transaction costs and make things easier, the recent
argument concerning trust is quite sensational. Supporters of this new concept
believe that the level of trust, social norms and networks can be measured and a
high accumulation of such capital contributes significantly to social, political and
even economic performance (p. 2).
Trust, social norms, and networks are defining elements of social capital that influence
recovery performance, a “social and economic activity.” These elements affect the
community’s ability to capitalize on unique capabilities or resources of network
members. Thus, this study will contribute to practice by broadening understanding of
how social capital may be developed and leveraged. An enhanced understanding of
social capital will serve to help those involved in the disaster-recovery process to find
new and innovative ways in which they may use social capital to leverage various
competencies or resources in a unique set of strategic advantages for community recovery
efforts.
12
Chapter Two: Literature Review
2.1 New Orleans Disasters
Disasters in New Orleans have been occurring for nearly 300 years, during which
time the city has become familiar with the rebuilding and recovery process. During this
time, there have been many attempts to tame nature and artificially control waterways
and an exhaustive chronology of this history is beyond the scope of this study. More
recent attempts to protect the city from natural events using manmade systems have been
incremental and have done a better job of protecting the city from smaller events;
however, this incremental approach to disaster mitigation has also increased vulnerability
to large-scale events.
Risk analysis and management is a rather recent development; therefore, decision
makers of the past in New Orleans may not have been aware they were increasing the
city’s vulnerability to hazards of greater magnitude. Since the inception of the city, there
have been approximately 27 major river floods, averaging one every 11 years (Kates,
Colten, Laska, & Leatherman, 2006) and many more small events that have affected
neighborhoods and sections of the city. However, there is no question the city is most
vulnerable to hurricanes and mass flooding because of its location in the Gulf, inadequate
flood protection systems, and declining elevations. In addition, evidence indicates that
the frequency of storms in this region, especially hurricanes, has been on the rise for
several decades.
2.1.1 Hurricanes
Hurricanes are a powerful subset of coastal storms that form over the ocean.
Starting as a tropical storm, these coastal storms reach hurricane status when wind speeds
13
reach 75mph. Table 4 shows a detailed specification for each hurricane category in the
Saffir/Simpson Hurricane Scale. Hurricanes typically do not form above 30 degrees
latitude and begin losing energy on making landfall, quickly diminishing as they continue
inland. These storms depend on tropical winds above warm ocean temperatures of at
least 80 degrees Fahrenheit (Eagleman, 1983) and low central pressure in the eye of the
storm where down drafting occurs (Schwab et al., 1998). Because the formation of
hurricanes is dependent on weather-related factors, these coastal storms are seasonal and
generally occur between the months of June and November. In addition, some
geographic locations experience these storms more frequently than others. Every coastal
area in the United States is vulnerable and has some level of risk related to the effects of
hurricanes and coastal storms. Unlike other disasters, such as earthquakes, hurricanes
and weather systems that have the potential of elevating to hurricane status are
predictable, and with modern warning systems, communities often have several days to
prepare. Figure 2 shows the frequency of hurricane landfalls in the United States
between 1900 and 1994.
Table 4: Saffir/Simpson Hurricane-Scale Ranges
Scale
Number
(Category)
Central
(Millibar)
Pressure
(Inches)
Wind Speed
(Miles per
hour)
Storm
Surge
(Feet)
Potential
Damage
1 ≥ 980 ≥ 28.94 74–95 4–5 Minimal
2 965–979 28.50–28.91 96–110 6–8 Moderate
3 945–964 27.91–28.47 111–130 9–12 Extensive
4 920–944 27.17–27.88 131–155 13–18 Extreme
5 ˂ 920 ˂ 27.17 ˃ 155 ˃ 18 Catastrophic
Note. Adapted from Planning for Post-Disaster Recovery and Reconstruction, by J.
Schwab, K. C. Topping, C. C. Eadie, R. E. Deyle, and R. A. Smith, 1998, Chicago, IL:
American Planning Association, p. 200.
14

Figure 2. Hurricane landfalls in the United States, by state, 1900-1994 (hurricane
categories 1-5). From Planning for Post-Disaster Recovery and Reconstruction, by J.
Schwab, K. C. Topping, C. C. Eadie, R. E. Deyle, and R. A. Smith, 1998, Chicago, IL:
American Planning Association, p. 196.

Hurricanes carry their greatest force over water and tend to weaken at landfall,
diminishing in strength as they continue inland. Because of its coastal position and
elevation, New Orleans is especially vulnerable to damage from hurricanes. As
hurricanes approach, the region is affected by storm surges that intensify as hurricanes
pass over and disrupt the surrounding water. The effects of wind forces and storm surges
are mitigated by flood structures and levee systems designed to protect the city from such
natural forces. Over the past 150 years, multiple hurricanes have affected the New
Orleans region. The following list represents some of those that have had the greatest
effect on New Orleans, other than Hurricane Katrina. Hurricane Katrina will be
addressed at length in the chapters that follow:
163
79
30
19
287
13
33
136
31
7
2
31
23 20
33
39
4 8
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
TX LA MS AL FL GA SC NC VA MD DE NJ NY CT RI MA NH ME
Number of Occurences
Hurricanes
Hurricanes
15
1. August 1779: A hurricane hit New Orleans while Bernardo de Galvez was
Governor of New Orleans. The storm completely destroyed the city,
including homes, barges, boats, crops, and livestock. Spain had just declared
war on Great Britain, and the storm cost Bernardo de Galvez nearly his entire
fleet of ships. Most notably, William Dunbar, a relatively young scientist at
the time, was observing this particular storm and uncovered the true nature of
coastal storms. He observed that coastal storms had a progressive forward
movement and the winds revolved around a vortex. He later was inducted
into the American Philosophical Society in 1800 and presented his findings
from this storm in 1801 (Roth, 2010).
2. September 1915: A hurricane with sustained winds of 107mph and gusts
reaching 140mph hit New Orleans with a 12-foot storm surge and over 8
inches of rain. This hurricane caused 275 deaths and damaged nearly every
building in New Orleans. Most of the deaths occurred in low-lying areas that
were occupied by residents. There were over $13 million in total damages, $5
million of which were in New Orleans (Roth, 2010).
3. September 1947: A category-2 hurricane named George, with 90mph winds
and 112mph gusts, hit New Orleans, causing 7 feet of flooding. The hurricane
was also responsible for 51 deaths, 12 of which were in Louisiana, and caused
over $110 million in damages (Schleifstein, 2012).
4. Hurricane Betsy: In September of 1965, Hurricane Betsy approached New
Orleans at a rate of 22mph with 165mph wind gusts. When making landfall,
its sustained winds were at 125mph, with gusts reaching 145mph. Hurricane
16
Betsy caused damage statewide, destroying 27,000 homes, flooding 18
parishes, killing 81 people, and causing over $1.4 billion in damages (Roth,
2010).
5. Hurricane Camille: In August of 1969, Hurricane Camille, with top wind
speeds at approximately 210mph and a 15-foot storm surge, killed 9 people
and caused $250 million in damages (Schleifstein, 2012).
6. Hurricane Andrew: In August of 1992, Hurricane Andrew, with winds
approaching 173mph, killed 7 and injured 94 people and caused $1 billion in
damages.
7. Hurricane Rita: In September of 2005, shortly after Hurricane Katrina,
Hurricane Rita flooded parts of New Orleans that were just starting the
recovery process from the devastation that had occurred in the preceding
month. Rita had maximum sustained winds of approximately 175mph and
delivered up to 16 inches of rain in some areas. Storm surges ranged from 4
to 15 feet, and some areas of New Orleans were in water up to 6 feet deep.
Rita generated 90 tornados across four states and caused approximately $10
billion in damages (Roth, 2010).
8. Hurricane Gustav: In September of 2008, Hurricane Gustav, with wind gusts
of 117mph, brought 21 inches of rain to some parts of Louisiana and storm
surges ranging from 9 to 13 feet. Areas of the city were flooded as surges
overtopped levee walls. Eleven tornados spread across the state, and seven
people were killed (Roth, 2010).
17
9. Hurricane Ike: In September of 2008, shortly after Hurricane Gustav,
Hurricane Ike brought approximately 5 inches of rain and storm surges that
ranged from 3 to 17 feet. Hurricane Ike caused two deaths in Louisiana and
$19.3 billion in damages (Roth, 2010).
The following chart identifies hurricane activity in the Louisiana region during
the second half of the 20th century and the first part of the 21st century. The hurricane
names, active dates, category levels, deaths caused, and damages are indicated. The
category indicates the particular hurricane’s greatest strength, which in most instances
occurred when the center of the storm was offshore. In addition, death tolls and damages
are not limited to Louisiana or New Orleans but represent damages caused by the storm,
often across multiple states.
Table 5: Hurricane Activity Affecting New Orleans (Direct and Indirect)
Hurricane Date Category Deaths Damage
Flossy September 24, 1956 1 15 $22 million
Audrey June 27, 1957 5 416 $120 million
Ethel September 15, 1960 1 — —
Carla September 11-13, 1961 1 6 $25 million
Cindy September 16-19, 1963 — 1 $12.5 million
Hilda October 2-3, 1964 4 39 $100 million
Betsy September 9-10, 1965 4 81 $1.4 billion
Camille August 17-18, 1969 3 3 $199 million
Edith September 16, 1971 1 0 —
Carmen September 7-8, 1974 2 3 $150 million
Babe September 5, 1977 — — —
Bob July 11, 1979 1 1 $3.3 million
18
Hurricane Date Category Deaths Damage
Claudette July 24-27, 1979 — — No data
Danielle September 5, 1980 — 1 —
Danny August 15-16, 1985 2 0 $14 million
Elena September 2, 1985 — — —
Juan October 27-31, 1985 — 12 $300 million
Bonnie June 26, 1986 — 1 $10 million
Florence September 9, 1988 1 — $2.5 million
Andrew August 26, 1992 5 9 $1 billion
Opal October 4, 1995 — 0 —
Josephine October 5-8, 1996 — 0 $5.5 million
Danny July 17-18, 1997 1 — —
Frances September 10-14, 1998 1 — $10 million
Georges September 27-28, 1998 2 2 $2 billion
Allison June 4-11, 2001 — 1 —
Isidore September 23-27, 2002 3 — $330 million
Lili October 2-5, 2002 1 1 $830 million
Katrina August 29, 2005 4 1,833 $100 billion
Rita September 23-25, 2005 5 1 $10 billion
Humberto September 13-14, 2007 — — $50 million
Gustav August 31-September 3,
2008
2 7 —
Ike September 12-14, 2008 4 2 $19.3 billion
Note. From Louisiana hurricane history, by D. Roth, 2010, Camp Springs, MD: National
Weather Service, http://www.srh.noaa.gov/images/lch/tropical/lahurricanehistory.pdf.
19
2.1.2 Floods
Floods account for approximately 70 percent of presidentially declared disasters
in the United States (Witt, 1998), and several general types of flooding may occur. With
the exception of ice jam floods, all the flood types identified below contribute to
conditions that have caused severe flooding in New Orleans and other parts of the Gulf
Coast. Schwab (1998) distinguished four categories most floods fall within:
1. Riverine flooding,
2. Ice jam floods,
3. Ground saturation, and
4. Fluctuating lake levels.
Riverine flooding occurs when flood channels, including rivers and streams, overflow as
a result of excess water, usually from rain or rapid snow thaw. Thus, it is critical that
flood zones be mapped and properly identified. Factors that contribute to riverine
flooding include the following:
 Watershed,
 Development,
 Storm water runoff,
 Soil conditions,
 Topographical conditions, and
 Climate (Schwab et al., 1998, p. 209).
Ice jam floods are of greatest concern to regions that experience extreme cold
weather conditions. These floods are caused by ice dams that form in cold conditions and
block water flow, thereby impeding the natural flow of water downstream (Schwab et al.,
20
1998). Ground saturation occurs when water tables are high from low elevations, poor
drainage, flooding, or heavy rain fall. The ground is saturated when the soil no longer
has the capacity to absorb moisture. When this condition exists, flooding occurs as
additional water is introduced into the environment. Areas that are surrounded by large
bodies of water or that have experienced excessive rain are especially susceptible to these
conditions (Schwab et al., 1998). Finally, concerning fluctuating lake levels, “[i]nland
lakes are always subject to minor variations in water level simply as a function of
variations in seasonal temperatures and precipitation. For the most part, small variations
can be accommodated in most human waterfront activities, but prolonged wet weather
patterns can induct water-level rises that threaten lakeshore areas” (Schwab et al., 1998).
2.2 Factors That Influence the Disaster-Recovery Process
2.2.1 Financial aid
Disaster literature and practice has tied financial aid to the rate of recovery for
many years (Dacy & Kunreuther, 1969). Even today, the initial reaction of government
is to throw money at recovery efforts, an action that often leads to unnecessary waste,
over-spending, and misappropriations. Extant research (Aldrich, 2008) has supported the
position that the amount of aid does not necessarily lead to better or more expedient
outcomes in the disaster-recovery process. In fact, some of the most well-funded
recovery efforts have been those that have recovered at the slowest rate. In addition,
Cohen and Werker (2008) argued that “governments are more biased towards relief over
prevention compared to self-financing individual households” (p. 12). This argument
indicates that governments anticipated significant spending in this area and adopted this
practice as a way of managing disaster business.
21
2.2.2 Damage levels
Dacy and Kunreuther (1969) advanced the idea that “[i]t thus seems reasonable to
assume that the speed of recovery following a disaster will be determined primarily by
the magnitude of the physical damage” (p. 72). This argument is supported by the
rationale that the higher the percentage of destruction of capital, the longer it will take a
community to recover, especially when the availability of labor is taken into account.
Yasui (2007) offers a more simple explanation that communities with more damage will
require more time to recover than communities with less damage. Aldrich (2008; 2011)
challenged these theories by contending the extent of damage, while certainly an
influential factor, is not as critical as others have argued. He supported this argument by
conducting a cross-case analysis of Kobe, New Orleans, and Nadu (Aldrich, 2008),
which were similar in regard to extent of damage yet had very different recovery rates,
with the least privileged outperforming the wealthier in the rate of recovery.
2.2.3 Political institutions
Cohen and Werker (2008) argued that natural disasters “occur in a political space”
(p. 2) and the extent to which government is prepared for such events has a direct impact
on the extent of suffering affected populations will experience. Political institutions have
largely focused their efforts on disaster relief, often to the detriment of disaster
prevention. Literature on disasters has postulated that political factors have a significant
effect on the disaster-recovery process (Olson, 2000; Wright et al., 1979), and extant
research has argued that political factors influence half of federal disaster relief (Garrett,
2003) and electoral factors influence whether a president will declare a disaster (Cohen &
Werker, 2008; Reeves, 2005). In addition, disasters tend to be more severe in countries
22
that are improperly managed (Kahn, 2005; Stromberg, 2007). The lack of political
structure and effective management has an effect on legislation that influences building
practices, public safety, and the allocation of necessary resources for disaster stricken
populations—all factors that influence community resilience and the disaster-recovery
process.
2.2.4 Mitigation
The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA, 2013) defined hazard
mitigation as “the effort to reduce loss of life and property by lessening the impact of
disasters” (p. 1). Communities that invest in mitigation efforts often sustain less damage
from disasters because of advanced preparations. In many instances, communities that
have sustained damage in vulnerable regions take action to prevent damages from future
occurrences. For example, if a house is damaged from flooding because of being located
near a flood plain, certain precautions will be taken during the rebuilding process to
prevent those events from happening again. To mitigate such damages from occurring at
a future date, the house may be reconstructed in a safer location, or new building
standards may be applied to protect the house from damages in a future flooding event.
“The primary purpose of mitigation planning is to identify community policies, actions,
and tools for implementation over the long term that will result in a reduction in risk and
potential for future losses communitywide” (Schwab et al., 1998, p. 15).
2.2.5 Socioeconomic conditions
Disaster literature has emphasized the effect of socioeconomic conditions on the
disaster-recovery process (Berke, Beatley, et al., 1993; Ramahumar, 2008; Rossi, 1993;
Wright et al., 1979) and contended wealthier communities recover more quickly from
23
disasters. Empirical evidence indicates that welfare recipients may perish at a rate 5
times greater than that of nonwelfare recipients (Yasui, 2007), and case study research
has indicated that initial resources are often expended on helping those who already have
the greatest means for rebuilding and recovering (Scott, 2008c). Certainly, those who
have the means to rebuild after a disaster are the first to do so, and those from wealthier
communities are also more likely to have special insurance to help with the financial
burden of recovering. The significance of socioeconomic conditions is well supported;
however, there is evidence that such significance may be overstated (Aldrich, 2008).
Extant research has revealed that in many cases communities of lower socioeconomic
status with higher levels of social capital recover and repopulate at a faster rate than
wealthier communities.
2.2.6 Civil society
Literature on civil society has advanced the idea that communities with higher
levels of cohesion are better equipped to deal with adversity and, as a result, will recover
more quickly from disasters (Buckland & Rahman, 1999; Nakagawa & Shaw, 2004).
Although this is a compelling argument, there is also evidence that such communities
create adversity during the disaster-recovery process. In the process of pursuing a more
favorable outcome for themselves, a less favorable outcome may become the reality for a
neighboring community (Aldrich & Krook, 2008).
2.3 Social Capital as a Major Factor
2.3.1 Defining social capital
Many definitions of social capital have been advanced over the years, making it
important to discuss not only some of the perspectives but, most importantly, the context
24
and definition used to describe social capital in this study. First, for context, several
definitions advanced by scholars are discussed. Then social capital is defined for the
purpose of this study and within the context of the disaster recovery process.
Lin (1999) classified social capital, along with human capital and cultural capital,
as a neo-capital theory; each type of capital is distinct, but they have similarities and
differences with a classical, market-oriented theory of capital (see Table 6). The classical
theory of capital holds that capital represents two related yet distinct elements:
1. Capital represents a monetary surplus value generated from some form of
exchange and is a “product of process.”
2. Capital also represents an investment with an expected return on investment.
Lin (1999) called Marx’s theory on capital the classical theory of capital. It explains a
phenomenon in which a dominant class captures the surplus value of an investment by
exploiting social relations with another class.
Regardless of the context in which the fundamental component of capital is
applied, it represents a surplus value with expected returns. For example, according to
human capital theory, educated, trained, and healthy individuals will live more productive
lives, thereby making valuable contributions to economic growth and sustainability. If
the surplus value of human capital is low or negative, then such circumstances may have
an adverse effect on economic conditions. If the surplus of human capital is high, then it
is more likely such factors will serve to help the economy thrive. Similarly, cultural
capital theory holds that individuals and classes that embrace common symbols and
values may work more effectively toward common goals (Bourdieu, 1986; Bourdieu &
Passeron, 1977).

25
Table 6: Theories of Capital

Classical theory
Neo-capital theories
Human capital Cultural capital Social capital
Theorist Marx Schultz, Becker Bourdieu Lin, Burt, Marsden,
Flap, Coleman
Bourdieu,
Coleman, Putnam
Explanation Social relations:
Exploitation by the
capitalists (bourgeoisie)
of the proletariat.
Accumulation of
surplus value by
laborer
Reproduction of
dominant symbols
and meanings
(values)
Access to and use
of resources
embedded in social
networks
Solidarity and
reproduction of
group
Capital A. Part of surplus
value between the use
value (in consumption
market) and exchange
value (in production-
labor market) of the
commodity.
B. Investment in the
production and
circulation of
commodities.
Investment in
technical skills and
knowledge
Internalization or
misrecognition of
dominant values
Investment in
social networks
Investment in
mutual recognition
and
acknowledgment
Level of
analysis
Structural (classes) Individual Individual/class Individual Group/individual
Note. Adapted from Building a Network Theory of Social Capital, by N. Lin, 1999, Connections, 22(1), p. 32.

26
Social capital is a sociological term that has been advanced by scholars to explain
the value of trust, social relations, and resources embedded in social networks for
facilitating and enhancing collective action. The views on social capital vary; however,
despite such variances and criticisms, some consensus exists among scholars concerning
social capital consisting of resources embedded in social networks and social structure
that can be developed and leveraged by common actors for the purpose of facilitating and
enhancing collective action. Physical capital is generated by modifying physical
materials to develop some form of physical infrastructure with a surplus value (Aldrich,
2008; Dynes, 2005), human capital is generated by developing human assets to attain a
surplus value by leading productive lives through enhanced skills and abilities, and social
capital is generated when individuals form social networks that attain a surplus value
when collective action is needed (Coleman, 1990). Even more complicated than the
definition of social capital are the views concerning how it should be measured,
developed, and leveraged.
2.3.2 Measuring social capital
Physical capital is a tangible form of capital embedded in observable and easy to
measure forms. Human capital is a less tangible form of capital embedded in skills and
knowledge and is a relatively easy form of capital to measure. Social capital, on the
other hand, is a form of capital embedded in human social relations, thereby making it
one of the most difficult and controversial forms of capital to measure (Dynes, 2005).
Despite recent advancements in the understanding of social capital and its impact
on collective action, advancements related to how social capital should be measured have
lagged significantly in comparison. In fact, the current supply of proven and accurate

27
measures of social capital does not meet the demand (Aldrich, 2011; Rose, 1998). This
study will not seek to advance the understanding and practice of how social capital is
measured; however, a brief discussion is needed concerning practices and theories related
to how social capital has been measured, including inherent problems with prevailing
techniques for measuring this phenomenon.
2.3.2.1 Proximal and Distal Indicators
Indicators used to measure social capital can be classified in one of two
categories: proximal or distal. Both are used often in social capital research. Proximal
indicators are outcomes of social capital related to its core components of trust, networks,
and reciprocity (Stone, 2001). For example, when measuring social capital, researchers
may examine public participation, civic engagement, or other actions that demonstrate
elements of trust and reciprocity as proximal indicators of social capital. Distal
indicators are outcomes of social capital not directly related to its core components
(Stone, 2001). Distal indicators of social capital may include statistics related to crime,
population, employment rates, GDP, divorce, and other quantifiable factors.
Although the use of these indicators is widely accepted and substantial in the
social capital literature, the opportunities for misuse have not been investigated. A
significant challenge is the lack of theoretical precision in determining which indicator to
use and under what circumstances it should be used (Stone, 2001). For example, if using
civic engagement as a proximal indicator to measure social capital, researchers must
provide substantiating evidence of a correlation and consider other factors that may
influence civic engagement. A correlation between social capital and a high level of
civic engagement should not be assumed. Equally important, a reliable method of

28
measuring civic engagement needs to be used. In the same manner, when using distal
indicators to measure social capital, a correlation between social capital and low crime
statistics should not lead the investigator to assume a high level of social capital. This
issue raises the tautological problem that research dependent on an outcome of social
capital as an indicator will find social capital related to that outcome without an empirical
means for explaining the connection; therefore, social capital becomes tautologically
present whenever an outcome is observed (Portes, 1998; Stone, 2001).
To overcome these challenges when measuring social capital, Stone (2001)
recommended linking social capital directly to the theoretical understandings of the
concept. Doing so allows researchers to recognize that social capital is a
multidimensional concept comprising social networks, norms of trust, and norms of
reciprocity; understand social capital as a resource for action; and distinguish empirically
social capital from its perceived outcomes (Stone, 2001).
2.3.2.2 Recent developments in measuring social capital
Aldrich (2011) provided a framework for measuring social capital in post-disaster
situations. He drew on neighborhood rebuilding efforts in Kobe and used time-series
cross-sectional data and mini-case studies for measuring the rate of recovery and social
capital. Qualitative data were used to compare the actions of neighborhoods in response
to the events surrounding the earthquake and during the recovery process. Quantitative
data from various wards within Kobe allowed Aldrich to track various factors related to
population growth, extent of damage, welfare, nonprofit organizations (NPO), population
density, socioeconomic inequality, and social capital within each ward for comparative

29
purposes over time. The study used an autoregressive distributed lag (ADL) model that
accounts for time and unit information for both the independent and dependent variables:

The model sets the value of i (wards, the unit) and values of t (time, measured in years) at
1–18 (because the dataset contained 18 years of measurements). This autoregressive
model also contained a lagged Y (dependent variable) because of the presence of lagged X
(independent variables; Aldrich, 2011; Beck & Katz, 2009). The model controlled for
potential endogeneity between variable X and outcome Y at time T by using lagged
variables as explanatory factors and was designed to test the influence of earlier values of
X on later values of Y (Aldrich, 2011).
Table 7 (Model 1) used the standard fixed effects (FE) time-series cross-section
model. Table 8 (Model 2) used the panel-corrected standard errors (PCSE), and Table 9
(Model 3) used the Prais-Weinstein regression. The Prais-Weinstein regression model
adds first-order autocorrelation to the PCSE model (Aldrich, 2011).

30
Table 7: Coefficient for Model 1 of Population Growth Rate
Dependent variable: Population growth rate Model 1: Fixed effects
Population growth rate (lagged) 0.13100***
0.04200
Percentage of population affected by the
earthquake
(dropped)
Welfare-dependent households per capita -0.98300***
0.33400
NPOs created per capita (lagged) 43.01000**
20.95000
Population density -0.00001
0.00000
Socioeconomic inequality (lagged) 0.02700
0.01800
_cons 0.07400
0.05900
sigma_u 0.02400
sigma_e 0.00300
rho 0.98900
Note. Standard errors are below the estimated coefficients. Adapted from “The Power of
People: Social Capital’s Role in Recovery from the 1995 Kobe Earthquake,” by D. P.
Aldrich, 2011, Natural Hazards, 56, p. 14.
**p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01.

31
Table 8: Coefficient for Model 2 of population growth rate
Dependent variable: Population growth rate Model 2: Panel-corrected SE
Population growth rate (lagged) 0.267000***
0.063000
Percentage of population affected by the
earthquake
0.011000**
0.004000
Welfare-dependent households per capita -1.730000***
0.388000
NPOs created per capita (lagged) 90.100000***
27.700000
Population density -0.000008***
0.000000
Socioeconomic inequality (lagged) 0.022000***
0.006000
_cons 0.035000
0.006000
sigma_u
sigma_e
rho
Note. Standard errors are below the estimated coefficients. Adapted from “The Power of
People: Social Capital’s Role in Recovery from the 1995 Kobe Earthquake,” by D. P.
Aldrich, 2011, Natural Hazards, 56, p. 14.
**p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01.

32
Table 9: Coefficient for Model 3 of population growth rate
Dependent variable: population growth rate Model 3: Prais-Winstein regression
Population growth rate (lagged) 0.230***
0.059
Percentage of population affected by the
earthquake
0.011**
0.005
Welfare-dependent households per capita -1.690***
0.414
NPOs created per capita (lagged) 84.700***
28.000
Population density 0.000***
0.000
Socioeconomic inequality (lagged) 0.021***
0.005
_cons 0.035
0.007
sigma_u
sigma_e
rho 0.215
Note. Standard errors are below the estimated coefficients. Adapted from “The Power of
People: Social Capital’s Role in Recovery from the 1995 Kobe Earthquake,” by D. P.
Aldrich, 2011, Natural Hazards, 56, p. 14.
**p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01.

33
The findings of Aldrich (2011) showed that measuring NPOs per capita created in
response to a disaster may be a means for measuring social capital. The correlation
between social capital and the number of NPOs will develop as future studies test and
apply the model Aldrich developed. An advantage of this model is it can be applied to
past studies to verify the correlation between social capital and NPOs created per capita.
For example, researchers can test this model against prior research that measured social
capital using other means such as surveys, statistical data, and public participation. The
goal in understanding social capital in this way is to detect recurring patterns using
multiple methods of measurement. These methods will allow investigators to identify
particular tools and their respective procedures, compare them among varying cases, and
develop an effective means of measuring social capital from the systematic comparison
of methods among cases.
2.3.3 Developing social capital
Despite overwhelming empirical evidence of social capital and its influence on
the disaster-recovery process, very little has been done by policy makers to implement
new policies that will aid in facilitating the development of social capital. In fact, many
practices used by government agencies and relief organizations have inherent obstacles
that impede the development of social capital in these types of situations. One example
of such a practice occurs when social network ties are severed as temporary shelter and
evacuation arrangements are being made. This disconnect in social network ties is
especially devastating to elderly populations, and some have argued that unnecessary
death often occurs because the elderly are separated from their normal support networks.
Even in younger populations, such severed ties remove people from established networks

34
that provide much-needed resources and support after having survived a disaster
(Aldrich, 2010).
Aldrich (2010) identified several ways to increase social capital during the
disaster-recovery process:
1. Be strategic by developing methodological mass departure and temporary shelter
plans;
2. Provide regular and clear communication to survivors through technology,
formal, and informal networks;
3. Provide the means for survivors to communicate through technology, formal, and
informal networks;
4. Provide the means and encouragement for communities to create local
organizations;
5. Provide the means and a forum for local leaders to stimulate communication,
trust, interactions, and the development of informal networks;
6. Encourage external organizations to contribute to the relief and recovery efforts;
7. Encourage citizens to volunteer and serve the community; and
8. Design the new community in a manner that will increase interactions among
residents.
First, departure and temporary shelter plans often remove survivors from critical
social networks that are vital to health, emotional support, resource acquisition, and other
help essential to daily living. Faster or uninterrupted access to survivors’ existing
networks may save lives and expedite the disaster-recovery process. Second, disaster
plans must identify clear communication channels that keep survivors informed of events

35
as they are unfolding. According to Aldrich (2010), evacuees of New Orleans during
Hurricane Katrina were transported to temporary shelters outside of town. While en
route, people did not know where they were headed and had no means of finding out.
Thus, some people arrived at camps not knowing whether loved ones might be there or
somewhere else.
Third, another means of preserving social networks may come from providing
communication channels. Aside from e-mail and cell phones, technology may provide
the means for survivors to communicate and reestablish contact via web-based platforms
and GIS systems. Fourth, local organizations provide a means for citizens to engage and
take ownership of the recovery process.
Fifth, leadership is essential for effective recovery management; therefore, it is
essential that community leaders be supported and a forum for establishing and
exercising leadership be provided and encouraged. Sixth, external organizations can
provide a different perspective and have access to networks and resources that otherwise
may not be available to disaster survivors. After Hurricane Katrina, many neighborhoods
in New Orleans received infusions of resources from outside organizations that helped
the recovery and rebuilding process.
Seventh, volunteers do a great deal of heavy lifting in the wake of disasters;
however, the most effective gains come from enhanced trust and relationships that are
developed during volunteer efforts. Finally, communities designed with interaction in
mind have an advantage of providing more opportunities to build relationships and trust
among members of the community.

36
2.3.4 Leveraging social capital
With the advancing argument that social capital provides the engine for effective
recovery, there is a need to understand more deeply how it can be leveraged. In
examining four disaster cases, Aldrich (2012) distinguished three ways in which social
capital shapes potential outcomes in the disaster-recovery process:
1. Social capital serves to provide informal insurance and promotes mutual
assistance after disasters.
2. Social capital helps communities solve problems by enhancing the
effectiveness of collective action.
3. Social capital strengthens the voice of the community and helps maintain
healthy population levels.
First, citizens often are the first line of defense in disaster situations. As
emergency responders and public safety professionals are working to find access to those
in need, communities are often well on their way to putting out fires, treating the
wounded, removing people from dangerous situations, identifying who is missing, and
determining who might be dead. Another critical component is the sharing of vital
resources among community members. People reach out to those in their network to find
access to tools, information, food, water, shelter, and other vital resources necessary for
survival. Following Hurricane Katrina, some neighborhoods expected the government to
save their community and finance the rebuilding efforts. It took some time for certain
areas to realize that help from the government would be minimal and that most
communities would have to rebuild themselves. The communities that took ownership of

37
the rebuilding efforts and sought to obtain resources from their own social networks
struggled less and recovered more quickly.
Second, following disasters, communities experience many complex problems.
Because residents are displaced, crime, power outages, debris, and pollution increase. In
addition, who will return and what the recovery process will entail are not known.
Following Katrina, community members in many neighborhoods came together and
created community-based systems for combating crime, making decisions, and planning
and coordinating the recovery efforts. For example, in Broadmoor, committees were
formed, the entire neighborhood was mapped, and residents were accounted for. This
foundational work provided committees and effective system for measuring the recovery
process and determining special needs. Committee members were assigned blocks, and
data were reported via a centralized system on a regular basis.
Third, strong social capital can influence the political environment through a
collective voice. Residents with strong ties tend to speak out more passionately about
decisions that may affect their communities, and they tend to find productive ways of
working through such challenges. Communities that leverage a strong collective voice
have a common purpose with high levels of cohesion. Such cohesion aids in the recovery
process because these communities are often more resilient and have the capacity to
overcome adversity and challenges effectively, emerging stronger than before. This
cohesion is also important because some communities are unable to retain residents. The
discouragement and political challenges following disasters present factors that influence
some residents’ decisions to leave and never come back. Social capital and high levels of
cohesion provide a sense of community that keeps many from moving. By staying,

38
members of the community are able to provide valuable and sustainable support systems
that are essential to ensure a more productive recovery process.
To summarize, Chapter 2 discussed various approaches to conceptualizing social
capital and the disaster recovery process. While many theories have been advanced on
which factors influence the recovery process most, emerging and extant research suggests
social capital is the engine that drives that disaster recovery process. Therefore, this
study examines the means by which social capital is developed and leveraged to enhance
the disaster recovery process.

39
Chapter Three: Methodology
3.1 Methodological Approach
I decided to examine social capital and recovery efforts using a case study and to
explore what happened, how the community recovered, how people and organizations
were motivated to action, and whether social capital made a difference. Therefore, the
purpose of this study is not solely to test theory or develop theoretical knowledge but to
develop theoretically informed practical knowledge about influential factors and best
practices for developing and leveraging social capital to improve the efficiency and
effectiveness of the disaster-recovery process. To achieve this end, I chose an applied
social research method that would support this approach, a research case study (Yin,
2009). A research case study “allows investigators to retain the holistic and meaningful
characteristics of real-life events—such as individual life cycles, small group behavior,
organizational and managerial processes, neighborhood change, school performance,
international relations, and the maturation of industries” (Yin, 2009). Yin further
explained that a research case study is best suited for studies in which the form of
research questions is how or why, the study does not require control of behavioral events,
and the focus is on contemporary events.
I chose this approach because it allows for such exploration and it enabled me to
build theoretically informed practical knowledge related to the influence of social capital
on the disaster-recovery process without impeding my efforts to understand this complex
social phenomenon. The practical knowledge gained through this approach is founded on
actual events from the perspective of multiple sources. This knowledge is later applied to

40
propose a more effective means of developing and leveraging social capital supported by
current theories and lessons from a contemporary event.
Research that builds theory often starts with data rather than a literature review to
avoid bias that could influence the researcher to force data in a particular direction
(Glaser, 1978). The method I chose starts with theory in the form of a literature review
and is followed by the thoughtful posing of research questions that are then validated or
invalidated by an empirical analysis of predetermined themes (Yin, 2009). A research
case study on the Broadmoor neighborhood of New Orleans seemed logical for the
purpose of this study for multiple reasons:
1. The neighborhoods of New Orleans have recovered from floods and
hurricanes for years; therefore, there is an expectation (assumption) that
lessons learned from past events influenced the behaviors and actions that
ensued during the recovery process following Hurricane Katrina. I believe
there is much to learn from the recovery efforts in terms of the actions and
organizing that took place.
2. Broadmoor is one of the lowest lying neighborhoods in New Orleans and was
subject to some of the greatest devastation. In addition, Broadmoor is one of
the poorest neighborhoods in New Orleans. It serves as a living laboratory of
a community with minimal financial resources undergoing significant
restoration, reconstruction, and community recovery. An argument advanced
by scholars suggests that communities with less damage recover more quickly
than communities with significant damage and communities with more
financial resources recover more quickly than communities with minimal

41
financial resources. Although these contingencies may be true in some
instances, examining a community with minimal damage and significant
financial resources may make it difficult to discern whether the rate of
recovery was a result of social capital, minimal damage, or wealth.
Examining a case with fewer factors known to have a positive effect on the
rate of recovery will probably help determine the effect of social capital on the
rate of recovery in Broadmoor.
3. Broadmoor represents a community within a larger metropolitan area with a
rich and diverse culture that has been studied quite extensively. Many studies
have been conducted on the neighborhoods in New Orleans since Hurricane
Katrina, providing a rich supply of information. Broadmoor is one of the
most studied and documented recovery efforts, but no one has specifically
examined the effect of social capital on Broadmoor.
3.2 Discovery of the Research Questions
Initially after reviewing the literature, I had an acknowledged bias that the rate of
recovery was largely contingent upon the extent of physical damage (Dacy &
Kunreuther, 1969), available resources (Ramakumar, 2008), and prior experience (Eoh,
1998) and the participation of multiple sectors of society (Bryson et al., 2006) with a
sophisticated governance structure (Donahue, 2004). I later discovered that, although
extant research has asserted such factors influence the rate of recovery, empirical
evidence from comparative study of disaster-recovery efforts has indicated social capital,
not economic capital or physical infrastructure, is paramount and perhaps more
influential in successful and expedient rebuilding and recovery (Aldrich, 2008).

42
A review of the literature revealed many case studies supporting the notion that
social capital was significant and highly influential in terms of driving the success and
rate of recovery. The following statements illustrate the importance of social capital
during the disaster-recovery process:
Three recent disasters provide telling evidence that social networks—and not aid
or damage levels—create efficient recoveries. Comparison of the one-year
anniversaries of the Kobe Earthquake, Hurricane Katrina, and the Indian Ocean
Tsunami demonstrates that recovery is linked neither to the scale of destruction
nor to the amount of financial assistance that flows into the country. Though the
1995 Kobe earthquake killed 6,500 and made 300,000 homeless, within a year the
city restored all utilities and resumed trade and exports at 80% and manufacturing
at 80% of pre-disaster levels. One year after the 2004 tsunami which caused
8,000 deaths and left 310,000 homeless, the Tamil Nadu region of India rebuilt
almost all of its schools, fixed 75% of the damaged housing stock, and put most
of its fishermen back to work. In New Orleans, however, one year after
Hurricane Katrina, which killed 1,600 and left 250,000 homeless, some
neighborhoods remained apparently untouched from the time waters struck, less
than half of the schools, restaurants, and stores were open across the city, and
employment hovered at less than two-thirds its pre-storm level. In some fields,
such as public transportation, hospital openings, and child care centers, rebuilding
all but ground to a halt. (Aldrich, 2010)
Recovery is also difficult when post-disaster reconstruction is imposed from
outside without the sanction of the local population. The Basque city of Guernica
in northern Spain failed to recover for an entire generation because rebuilding was
supported by a hated regime. (Campanella, 2006)
[C]ivil society in Sri Lanka [following the 2004 tsunami] proved remarkably
resilient and helped to hold the country together especially during the first few
weeks—apparently, the social capital embedded within traditional communities in
affected areas and throughout the nation, played a crucial role. After several
weeks, government relief efforts and assistance pouring in from abroad took on
the major burden of relief and recovery, although civil society continued to play a
significant role. (Munasinghe, 2007)
Two case studies of Kobe and Gujarat Earthquakes show that although the local
socioeconomic and cultural backgrounds are different in these two areas, the
recovery process of urban areas is quite similar. At every stage of the disaster
cycle (rescue, relief and rehabilitation), the communities played the most
important roles among other concerned stakeholders. (Nakagawa & Shaw, 2004)

43
These statements support the notion that social capital has a significant effect on the
disaster-recovery process, and despite criticisms, social capital is a worthy topic to
explore as a means to advance what we know about disaster recovery and to improve
practices within the disaster-recovery process.
The discovery of empirical evidence indicating social capital is perhaps one of the
most important factors for communities’ recovering from disasters caused me to divert
my efforts to examining ways in which social capital is developed and leveraged by
communities during the disaster-recovery process. How might social capital enhance the
effectiveness of other highly influential factors? How does social capital influence the
rate of recovery after disasters? How can the effectiveness of other influential factors be
improved or enhanced by social capital? Why does empirical evidence show that
social—not physical, infrastructure, or financial—resources are more vital to successful
rebuilding and that communities with high levels of social capital recover more quickly
than communities with low levels of social capital (Aldrich, 2008)? How can
communities develop and leverage social capital to improve the rate of recovery after
disasters? What observable practices can help define a systematic approach to
developing and leveraging social capital in disaster-recovery situations? What are the
sources of cohesion for communities with high levels of social capital, and how can
communities create an environment that allows this cohesion to develop more effectively
when it is needed?
The shift in my initial focus was a result of my encounter with the literature and
the desire to understand a social phenomenon within the context of disaster recovery.
This change allowed me to recognize what was actually happening as communities are

44
being rebuilt after disasters and what factors contribute most to successful recovery
efforts. Thus, I was confident I had discovered a worthy topic that was important to
communities across the world and this exploration would make a valuable contribution to
future recovery efforts and, more broadly, global society.
3.3 Significance of the Research Questions
The fact that developing and leveraging social capital was a major task for those
involved in the recovery process was a realization I had when I discovered the
complexity of interactions among organizations and individuals in disaster-recovery
situations. The cases I studied represented communities with great diversity and a wide
range of value and social systems, all varying in complexity. I discerned that social
capital was not a naturally occurring and flourishing phenomenon within some
communities; however, I also found that other communities demonstrated extraordinary
levels of social capital and the capacity to develop this phenomenon rather naturally.
Communities able to develop the capacity to increase social capital, regardless of
prior circumstances, seemed to overcome adversity and obstacles more effectively. That
developing and maintaining high levels of social capital appeared to come more naturally
to some communities, especially those communities that faired rather well in terms of the
recovery process, reinforced my belief that social capital is crucial to the disaster-
recovery process, perhaps more than most other influential factors identified in the
literature. Much of what I discovered in the literature served to affirm that social capital
is paramount for communities affected by disasters and it is a major influential factor in
recovery performance (Aldrich, 2011; Munasinghe, 2007). More specifically,
communities with strong social networks may provide those involved with the recovery

45
process an advantage of enhanced performance, allowing other influential factors to be
carried out more effectively (Lin, 1999). The questions that served to guide this study
and the discussion in Chapters 4 and 5 include the following:
1. How can communities develop and leverage partnering opportunities to
increase community capacity and enhance the effectiveness of the disaster
recovery process?
2. How does social capital enhance the initial communication process, including
the disbursement of vital information when recovering from a disaster?
3. How can social capital facilitate the acquisition of resources to aid in the
recovery process?
3.4 Methodological Challenges in Case Study and Social Capital Research
The following statement by Yin in 2004 describes the challenges and scrutiny
case study researchers have faced in general and when conducting research on social
capital and disaster recovery in particular. Research in these areas is dynamic and
complex, making it difficult for investigators to capture data and observations in discreet
units. In addition, there is a lack of a unifying and widely accepted understanding of
social capital in the context of the disaster recovery process by which to undertake
rigorous hypothesis testing. As a result, and as explained throughout Chapter 3, a
qualitative approach that allowed for investigation and theory building was chosen for
this study.
Although the case study is a distinctive form of empirical inquiry, many research
investigators nevertheless disdain the strategy. In other words, as a research
endeavor, case studies have been viewed as a less desirable form of inquiry than
either experiments or surveys. Why is this? (Yin, 2009, p. 14)

46
Yin (2009) identified four common criticisms of case studies and discussed the
arguments and rationales against the case study as a research methodology. The
criticisms of the research case study as a form of methodology include the following:
1. Case study research has an inherent lack of rigor;
2. Case studies provide little basis for scientific generalization;
3. Case studies take too long;
4. There is a growing and improper use of case studies to examine causal
relationships.
3.4.1 Case study research has an inherent lack of rigor
One of the most common criticisms of the case study as a form of research
methodology is a lack of rigor. Yin (2009) suggested the problems often criticized in
research case studies are no different from the problems encountered when using other
methods and it may be such problems are encountered more frequently and overcome
less frequently when using the case study. The main reasons for such problems,
according to Yin (2009), include the following:
1. A failure to follow systematic procedures and
2. The possibility that investigators lack a clear understanding of the difference
between case study teaching and case study research.
The argument that people may not have an accurate understanding of the different types
of case studies is compelling because of the frequent use of case studies as teaching tools
and the potential of assuming research case studies are identical to teaching case studies.
Case studies are often used as a teaching tool for students to learn practical elements in a
discipline by evaluating and analyzing an event that occurred and decisions that were

47
made surrounding that event. One reason such a misunderstanding would be problematic
is that facts and events must be accurately represented in a research case study, whereas it
is not critical that teaching case studies represent facts and events accurately (Yin, 2009).
If a teaching case study is being designed to teach on a particular point, the author may
decide to embellish a detail or be loose with the facts to keep the reader engaged. This is
an acceptable practice when developing case studies for teaching purposes. On the other
hand, it would not be an acceptable practice when developing a research case study.
Being loose with the facts would compromise the validity of the study. It is also possible
that such misunderstanding, as it relates to the differences between teaching case studies
and research case studies and perhaps a blending of techniques used in both, has led to a
negative perception of research case studies as a viable and respected form of research
methodology (Yin, 2009).
To overcome these vulnerabilities, it is important to acknowledge that, as with
other types of study, there must be an adherence to systematic procedures and defined
protocol. Perhaps one of the challenges case study research has faced is a lack of
understanding as to how to go about conducting such research. The resources available
to investigators seeking to learn more about this method have been limited until recently,
a situation that may be a contributing factor causing many to view this method as inferior
and less rigorous (Yin, 2009). Despite such challenges, it is critical that any form of
research, including a research case study, follow a well-defined and tested path that
accommodates the unique needs of case studies without compromising the quality and
rigor of the research, data collection, and analysis.

48

Figure 3. Research case study process. From Case Study Research: Design and
Methods (4th ed.), by R. Yin, 2009, Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.

3.4.2 Case studies provide a limited basis for scientific generalization
The argument that case studies provide a limited basis for scientific generalization
indicates a legitimate concern. Therefore, how can a single case study provide a basis for
scientific generalization? It is important to understand the context and purpose of
research case studies and how such factors (context and purpose) compare to the same
within experiments. In addition, the same question can be asked about an experiment or
any other form of methodology. How can a single experiment provide a basis for
scientific generalization? Certainly, answers may vary; however, the question is
legitimate and should be asked of all research methodologies.
The short answer is that case studies, like experiments, are generalizable to
theoretical propositions and not to populations or universes. In this sense, the
case study, like the experiment, does not represent a “sample,” and in doing a case
study, your goal will be to expand and generalize theories (analytic
generalization) and not to enumerate frequencies (statistical generalization). (Yin,
2009, p. 15)

49
One aim of this study is to build on the work of Aldrich (2008; 2010; 2011) and
Dynes (2005) in terms of affirming social capital as a critical factor in disaster recovery
and developing theoretical propositions concerning developing and leveraging social
capital. This study contributes to the literature and understanding of social capital. In
doing so, it will expand on and generalize theories about social capital, specifically in
terms of the role of social capital in helping communities recover from disaster. I agree
with critics of case studies in that it may be difficult to generalize from research case
studies, and I offer two perspectives to explain that, in the proper context, the value of the
case study is equally important in terms of generalizing practical and theoretical
advancements. First, single case studies help generalize and advance theory by affirming
or denying findings from prior case studies or experiments. Generalizing theory from a
single case study may be difficult; however, as a tool for theory building and within the
context of prior and ongoing research, case studies have an important role in helping to
generalize theory. Second, multiple case studies within the same study and cross-case
analysis studies naturally expand and generalize theory by design. These explanations
contradict arguments against using case study research (Yin, 2009).
3.4.3 Case studies take too long
The complaint that case studies take too long is frequently expressed by critics of
research case studies (Yin, 2009). Although this may be a common complaint, it is
biased, and it would be difficult to substantiate this statement as an accurate depiction of
research case studies. Too many variables affect how long a study will take. For
example, methods such as ethnographies and participant–observer studies require
substantial field work that often demands more time and resources than case studies;

50
however, not every case study warrants these elements. In fact, some case studies,
depending on the design, do not require the researcher to leave the confines of the library;
therefore, such statements should be deemed unsubstantiated and biased opinions.
3.4.4 Case studies are used improperly to examine causal relationships
The final criticism discussed here is that, at an increasing rate, researchers are
using case studies to explain causal relationships usually examined through experimental
methods. Critics have argued that research case studies do not have the means to address
certain issues directly; therefore, case studies used in this manner have limited value and
only affirm the beliefs of many critics that research case studies represent an inferior
research methodology (Yin, 2009).
Overlooked has been the possibility that case studies can offer important evidence
to compliment experiments. Some noted methodologists suggest, for instance,
that experiments, though establishing the efficacy of a treatment (or intervention),
are limited in their ability to explain “how” or “why” the treatment necessarily
worked, whereas case studies could investigate such issues (Shavelson & Townes,
2002). Case studies may therefore be valued “as adjuncts to experiments rather
than alternatives to them” (Cook & Payne, 2002). In clinical psychology, a “large
series of single case studies,” confirming predicted behavioral changes after the
inititation of treatment, even may provide additional evidence of efficaciousness.
(Veerman & van Yperen, 2007)
3.4.5 Challenges in social capital research
Stone (2001) provided a description of the challenges researchers face in their
efforts to study and identify an effective means for measuring, developing, and
leveraging social capital:
Despite its historical roots and considerable contemporary use, debate has seen
the conceptualization of social capital race ahead of the development of tools for
measuring it empirically. The present demand for empirical measures of social
capital exceeds supply (Rose, 1998). In turn, better understanding of the
empirical nature of social capital will promote further conceptual refinement.
Public policy, too, cannot aim to facilitate the growth of communities rich in
social capital with accuracy until we know, and are able to measure and describe,

51
what such communities look like and what role social capital plays within them.
(Stone, 2001)
Thus, research on social capital necessitates a dynamic process that, despite recent
advancements, has been difficult to realize. A lack of unifying and widely accepted
practices for measuring and studying social capital has generally impeded the ability of
researchers to conduct rigorous hypothesis testing outside of case study research. For
these reasons, a qualitative approach allowing for investigation in theory building was
chosen for this present study.
3.5 Description of Case Study Research and Its Suitability for this Study
In a discussion related to choosing appropriate research methodologies, Yin
(2009) examined three distinct components of five different forms of research
methodologies. Yin added that, even though each form of methodology is distinct, large
overlaps are found among them and the goal is to avoid misfits when planning and
deciding which methodology is most appropriate for a study. The three components are
the following:
1. The type of research question posed;
2. The extent of control the investigator has over behavioral events;
3. The degree of focus on contemporary as opposed to historical events.
The five research methodologies Yin examined in light of these three components include
the following:
1. Experiment;
2. Survey;
3. Archival analysis;
4. History;

52
5. Case study.
Any one of the above may be the sole methodology used in a single study; however,
depending on the aim and needs of a study, the investigator may use a few or all of the
above elements. For example, the study I am conducting is a research case study using
elements of an archival analysis and history as described by Yin (2009). Specific
protocol and elements, characteristic of research case studies, as detailed in this chapter,
are adhered to, but (a) the questions posed, (b) the lack of a need to control behavioral
events, and (c) the nature of this case involving the examination of a contemporary event
allow latitude to use elements of three different methodologies.
Research questions in a case study generally are focused on understanding
phenomena best understood by asking “how” and “why” questions. A case study does
not require control of behavioral events but tends to focus on a contemporary event (Yin,
2009). This case examines a neighborhood impacted by Hurricane Katrina, a
contemporary event, and discusses the behavior that ensued in the wake of the storm as
the recovery process commenced. The following are questions this study was focused on
examining and answering to varying degrees, depending on the data available and events
documented. In the following list, most of the items are “how” and “why” questions;
therefore, the use of a case study for this research was appropriate. The questions that
guided this study and the discussion in Chapters 4 and 5 are as follows:
1. How can communities develop and leverage partnering opportunities to
increase community capacity and enhance the effectiveness of the disaster-
recovery process?

53
2. How does social capital enhance the initial communication process, including
the disbursement of vital information when recovering from a disaster?
3. How can social capital facilitate the acquisition of resources to aid in the
recovery process?
3.6 Criteria for Designing a Qualitative Study
Yin (2009) described four logic tests for assessing the quality of empirical social
research, including case studies, as shown in Table 10.
Table 10: Evaluating Quality of Research Designs
Test Case study tactic
Phase of research when
tactic occurs
Construction validity  Use multiple sources of
evidence
 Establish chain of
evidence
 Have key informants
review drafts of case study
report
 Data collection

 Data collection
 Composition
Internal validity  Do pattern matching
 Do explanation building
 Do address rival
explanations
 Use logic models
 Data analysis
 Data analysis
 Data analysis

 Data analysis
External validity  Use theory in single-case
studies
 Use replication logic in
multiple-case studies
 Research design

 Research design
Reliability  Use case study protocol
 Develop case study
database
 Data collection
 Data collection
Note. Adapted from Case Study Research: Design and Methods (4th ed.), by R. Yin,
2009, Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.

54
3.6.1 Construct validity
Critics of case study research often argue that subjective means and evaluative
criteria are used in collecting qualitative data; therefore, it is difficult to determine
whether the claims and assertions from case studies provide an accurate depiction of
events or whether they are based on the investigator’s perceptions only (Yin, 2009). As a
result, it is imperative that the investigator adhere to each of the following to preserve the
validity of the study:
1. Use multiple sources of evidence;
2. Document origin of all sources, including the chain of custody;
3. Verify the reliability of the study by including witnesses and material experts
in the review process (Yin, 2009).
Yin (2009) explained that the manner in which data are categorized and measured
can affect the results of the study (Hipp, 2007). Therefore, to meet the test of construct
validity, when conducting social research on change in urban neighborhoods, the
investigator must do the following:
1. Define neighborhood changes in terms of specific concepts (and relate them to
the original objectives of the study);
2. Identify operational measures that match the concepts (preferably citing
published studies that make the same matches; Yin, 2009).
3.6.2 Internal validity
Internal validity is most threatened when conducting explanatory case studies
because of the use of inferences. If the investigator did not witness an event first-hand,
he or she must infer how or why it occurred based on data that were collected (Yin,

55
2009). Internal validity is thereby threatened when inferences are made, so various
precautions should be taken to preserve the internal validity of the study. Thus, to
preserve internal validity, when describing or explaining causal events, the investigator
should (a) match patterns, (b) build explanations, (c) analyze and discuss rival
explanations, and (d) incorporate logic models (Yin, 2009).
3.6.3 External validity
External validity involves the assessment and determination of whether the results
of a case study are generalizable. Do the results of the case apply to other events? The
challenge with case studies in terms of external validity is that the answer to this question
is not immediately known. A single case study by itself is not easily generalizable;
therefore, it must be examined within the context of multiple studies of a similar nature
(Yin, 2009). This is one reason multiple case studies are sometimes used. For these
reasons, some have come to view single case studies in a negative manner, viewing the
difficultly of generalizing the results of a single case study as a limitation. Although this
criticism of single case studies may be a widely advanced, every methodology has
limitations, and external validity can be compromised with any method if not used
properly and within the appropriate context. A single case study, supported by theory
and the results of prior case studies, may attain external validity. Another approach to
preserving external validity involves the use of multiple case studies to allow the
investigator to identify other cases to which the results may be generalizable; this
replication logic reflects the same logic underlying experiments and is a widely accepted
means of preserving external validity (Yin, 2009).

56
3.6.4 Reliability
Reliability is concerned with documenting procedures and steps taken so that later
researchers can replicate a study. The ultimate test of reliability is to replicate a study,
including all the steps taken. If the same results are repeatedly produced, then reliability
is established. A criticism of case studies has been they are often poorly documented,
resulting in a lack of substantiating evidence and records to allow for reliability tests. To
overcome these challenges, Yin (2009) suggested (a) creating and documenting steps that
are operational and (b) maintaining clarity and precision in documenting steps.
3.7 Analyzing Qualitative Research
3.7.1 Theoretical propositions
Building on the research of Aldrich (2011), this study relies on theoretical
propositions advanced in the literature. Such propositions ultimately led to this study,
thereby influencing a specific set of research questions, reviews of the literature, and
understanding of the relationship between social capital and disaster recovery. Based on
the work of Aldrich (2011), Chamlee-Wright (2010), and Dynes (2005), the following
propositions were explored and guide discussion in a later chapter:
Proposition 1: Benefits from social capital are enhanced when existing and
potential partner organizations develop and inventory relevant skills (Dynes,
2005).
Proposition 2: Social capital is likely to enhance the distribution of information to
citizens via communication processes derived from social networks (Chamlee-
Wright, 2010).

57
Proposition 3: Social capital provides access to resources that may not
immediately—or ever—be available from government agencies during the
disaster-recovery process (Aldrich, 2008; 2010; Scott, 2008a; 2008c).
3.7.2 Qualitative and quantitative data
According to Yin (2009), there are four general strategies for analyzing case study
evidence. Researchers’ strategies include relying on theoretical propositions, developing
case descriptions, using qualitative and quantitative data, and examining rival
explanations. Researchers deploy any one of these strategies depending on the needs and
objectives of a study; however, the combination of multiple strategies can be used to
strengthen an analytic strategy.
Certain case studies can include substantial amounts of quantitative data. If these
data are subjected to statistical analyses at the same time that qualitative data
nevertheless remain central to the entire case study, you will have successfully
followed a strong analytic strategy. (p. 132)
The primary objective of this study was to understand social capital and how it affects the
disaster-recovery process. This study is focused on developing a theoretical and practical
understanding of the disaster-recovery process and advancing the practice of how social
capital is developed and leveraged in the recovery process. In addition, the purpose of
this study was not to develop new theory but to draw on and extend theoretical and
practical understandings of social capital within the context of the disaster-recovery
process by testing theory, advancing propositions for future research, and extracting best
practices from the lessons of a contemporary event, Broadmoor’s recovery after
Hurricane Katrina. To accomplish this task, the study drew on propositions from the
literature, which led to the developing a specific set of research questions, then reviewing
the literature. Qualitative data were then used to describe the disaster-recovery process

58
for Broadmoor and to propose an improved means for helping communities recover from
disaster.
3.8 Data Collection and Analysis
3.8.1 Secondary data
3.8.1.1 Journalistic sources
I searched print media and Internet sources for articles and media reports about
the recovery efforts of the Broadmoor community. The intent was to obtain information
about Broadmoor and to have multiple types of records from multiple sources to cross-
reference what was documented among media, public records, academic literature,
popular books, technical reports, and other written accounts by those who were involved
in the recovery process and had an interest in publicly recording the recovery efforts.
While reviewing these sources, I found information and details about the recovery efforts,
including the following:
1. Neighborhood conflicts,
2. Committee meetings and meeting minutes,
3. Volunteer efforts,
4. Organizational contributions and involvement,
5. Progress of rebuilding efforts,
6. Community members, and
7. Key factors that affected Broadmoor’s recovery efforts.
In one instance, for example, The Times-Picayune (Donze & Russell, 2006) published a
newspaper article that reported Broadmoor had been identified in a formal report,
released by the Bring New Orleans Back (BNOB) Commission, as a community that may

59
be leveled and converted into a green space if the community could not prove its viability
within 4 months. The evidence from this newspaper article and the BNOB report was
used to advance my understanding of the events and to verify related information in
public record documents and helped to identify discrepancies that may have affected the
reliability of information contained in this study.
3.8.1.2 Public record documents
I gathered and analyzed relevant public record documents, such as government
census data, municipal documents, federal reports, communications, and outreach
material. The objective in collecting these types of data was to compile quantitative data,
verify and affirm other data sources, become more familiar with the Broadmoor case in a
different context, and gain insight into the government’s perception of its own role in the
recovery efforts. These data were critical in helping to assess the impact of Hurricane
Katrina on the population of New Orleans and, more specifically, Broadmoor. For
example, despite some positive reports on repopulating the city, it was important to
recognize that, over the past few decades, the population in New Orleans had been in
decline; therefore, Hurricane Katrina’s devastating effect on New Orleans would most
likely serve to advance this trend. It was reasonable to expect that the New Orleans
population would not return to pre-Katrina levels. Since Hurricane Katrina, the
populations of New Orleans and Broadmoor have yet to return to the pre-Katrina levels.
As of 2011 (Greater New Orleans Community Data Center, 2012), both have population
levels approximately 25 percent less than during the pre-Katrina years.

60
3.8.1.3 Academic literature
I gathered, analyzed, and synthesized academic literature related to the disaster-
recovery efforts in New Orleans and, more specifically, Broadmoor after Hurricane
Katrina. The intent of gathering and studying these data was to ensure this qualitative
study, designed to contribute to practice on the recovery efforts of Broadmoor,
maintained a form of academic integrity. It was important to ensure this contribution to
practice was informed by academic theory.
Many academics have taken interest in studying the aftermath of Hurricane
Katrina. Quite often, these efforts led researchers to Broadmoor, a community that
became known for its resilience and actions following Hurricane Katrina. Much of the
academic literature, specifically on Broadmoor, focused on collaborative governance,
public participation, grass roots efforts, and other factors that contributed to the recovery
of Broadmoor. In all that I reviewed, I did not find any other studies that focused
specifically on the effect of social capital on the recovery efforts of the Broadmoor
community. I reviewed the literature to contribute to research data and confirm
information gathered from other data sources. In addition, the academic literature was
vital in arriving at a definition of social capital and establishing the context of social
capital for this study.
3.8.1.4 Popular books
I studied and analyzed relevant popular books written about the history of New
Orleans, factors that contributed to the devastation related to Hurricane Katrina, risk
analysis, the recovery of Broadmoor, and other factors and accounts related to the
recovery efforts. The intent of this procedure was to collect data, become familiar with

61
the Broadmoor case, familiarize myself with the history of New Orleans, and verify
information gathered from other data sources. One book in particular (Wooten, 2012)
was a “book of stories” on the recovery efforts of several neighborhoods, including
Broadmoor, and was written by a former Harvard student who lived and worked in post-
Katrina Broadmoor after graduating from college.
3.8.1.5 YouTube videos
I watched video documentaries on the recovery of Broadmoor and interviews of
community members describing the events that unfolded. The videos captured moments
immediately following Hurricane Katrina, relief and recovery efforts, and reflections
years later. The emotions and thoughts of community members as they were in the midst
of the devastation were documented by many of the videographers. The intent of this
research procedure was to collect data and timelines, become familiar with the people of
Broadmoor, and gain a deeper understanding of what was experienced by the community.
3.8.1.6 Technical reports
I reviewed technical reports on the climatology, meteorology, and path of
Hurricane Katrina. In addition, I reviewed technical reports on the geology of the New
Orleans area, water management systems, levee engineering, and risk analysis. The
purpose for this procedure was to understand scientific and quantifiable explanations of
what happened and why. These reports were critical in providing technical explanations
and expanding my understanding of what contributed to the devastating effects of
Hurricane Katrina.

62
3.8.2 Conceptual framework and data analysis
Figure 4 indicates highly influential and pivotal social capital dimensions within
the disaster-recovery process and attempts to explain how social capital can improve or
enhance outcomes of each practice. The model is simple and does not reflect the
complexity of the disaster-recovery practices or all of the “moving parts” involved when
organizations and individuals come together. Table 11 provides a more robust model that
was used in analyzing various dimensions of social capital.
The presence of social capital, especially high levels of social capital, will
contribute to enhancing the overall disaster-recovery process and practices, including
better outcomes for communities. As communities rebuild, opportunities arise to
improve building, effect change, and have a sense of ownership in the decisions made for
the community. Social capital opens the door for effective and collaborative decision
making that may improve outcomes. If community members know they are part of the
decision process and are able to effect change, it is more likely they will want to
contribute to building a better community. In addition, as challenges are encountered,
communities with high levels of social capital are better equipped to overcome adversity
successfully and thrive in the wake of a disaster.
3.8.2.1 Strategic partnering
Strategic partnering following a disaster is, arguably, one of the most critical
components of the disaster-recovery process. The more connected a community is when
a disaster strikes, the better equipped it is to overcome the associated adversity
successfully. When most people think of disasters, they think of damage to the built

63
environment, storing food and water in their homes, and how those factors influence loss
mitigation and survival.
Communities need to consider social capital and the opportunities for partnering
embedded in social networks. The reality is that disasters pose a major threat to
communities and can cause significant damage, including loss of life. As seen in the
wake of storms, fires, earthquakes, and man-made events, it is impossible for any single
sector, organization, or individual to manage such adversity single-handedly. Thus,
community planning activities must not undermine the importance of leveraging
partnerships and seeking reciprocating relationships. Communities must initiate
developing strategic partnerships, a critical means for establishing effective
communication, obtaining resources, and creating synergy toward a common purpose.
Pre-disaster planning should involve taking inventory of leadership, skill sets, and
partnering opportunities. Depending on risk exposure and vulnerabilities, communities
may then set priorities and plan around partnerships that will form naturally following
such an event and those that will need to be formalized to provide the best protection
against risks. Strategic partnering should involve assessing what is needed, leveraging
existing partnerships, and acquiring or developing partnerships in areas of deficiency.
3.8.2.2 Communication
The response phase involves emergency response, relief efforts, and mitigation,
all of which are highly dependent on effective communication. Public safety is a top
priority, and in the wake of a large catastrophe, government resources are often exhausted
at a time when response is critical. After an earthquake, for example, access to victims
may be impeded by road closures, collapsed bridges, fires, and other events. In these

64
types of situations, the initial relief usually comes from the community immediately
surrounding the victims. Quite often, by the time emergency personnel reach victims,
many have already been saved, removed from rubble, or confirmed dead (Aldrich, 2012).
The formal and informal communication that takes place immediately following a
disaster is imperative and can enhance or impede the effectiveness of response and relief
efforts. Effective communication can save lives by warning communities of areas to
avoid or passing on other vital information. The effect of social capital on
communication processes can also improve the effectiveness of the rebuilding and
recovery efforts. Communities with higher levels of social capital are more likely to take
initiative under such circumstances, thereby creating positive results through saved lives,
trust building, and cohesion. Effective communication channels via formal information
processes can have on effect on the speed with which information is conveyed, the clarity
of the messages, and how they are received.
3.8.2.3 Resource acquisition
As communities recover from disaster, the need arises for resources to satisfy
various physical and nonphysical needs. For many people, their insurance companies
help to repair or rebuild homes and other structures that are part of the built environment.
Government agencies and the private sector work to restore utilities and roads. The
people who have the means to rebuild via insurance coverage or savings generally are
able to do so relatively quickly. There are very few options for those who do not have
such means, and the resources to recover may be found within the organizations and
individuals that comprise social networks.

65
Social capital provides an effective means for gaining access to resources that
otherwise may not have been available to people who need them. The final stage of
rebuilding and recovery efforts is often the most difficult. By the time a community is
nearing completion of the recovery efforts, the most desperate and least able people are in
need of assistance. Sometimes, insurance settlements are only enough to assist people
through part of their recovery, or government assistance does not cover a particular need
that would help others complete the recovery process. Social capital may provide access
to financial or other needed resources.

Figure 4. A framework for understanding the affect of social capital on the disaster-
recovery process.

66
3.8.3 Method for analyzing qualitative data
Table 11 contains a matrix to explain the method for analyzing qualitative data
used to examine and extract best practices and methods for enhancing social capital from
the recovery of Broadmoor after Hurricane Katrina. The first column specifies the social
capital dimension that applies to each row. In this study, three dimensions of social
capital are examined: strategic partnering, communication, and resource acquisition. The
second column identifies the research questions for this study. The research questions
guided the research and inquiry in a manner that supported or questioned the
propositions. The third column provides researchable propositions supported by theory,
prior case studies, or academic arguments that have been advanced by scholars. The final
two columns indicate corresponding behaviors observed in the case study. Observations
were then used to advance practice by generating mechanisms for enhancing each
dimension of social capital.

67
Table 11: Qualitative Data Analysis Matrix for Understanding the Impact of Social Capital on the Disaster-Recovery Process
Observations
Dimension Research question Observable proposition Method of developing Method of leveraging
Strategic partnering
RQ1: How can
communities develop and
leverage partnering
opportunities to increase
community capacity and
enhance the effectiveness
of the disaster recovery
process?
Proposition 1: Benefits from
social capital are enhanced
when existing and potential
partner organizations develop
and inventory relevant skills
(Dynes, 2005).
Solidify existing
partnerships and seek
opportunities to
develop new
partnerships.
Inventory skills and
abilities of partnering
organizations and
apply to developing
practical solutions.
Communication
RQ2: How does social
capital enhance the initial
communication process,
including the disbursement
of vital information when
recovering from a disaster?
Proposition 2: Social capital is
likely to enhance the
distribution of information to
citizens via communication
processes derived from social
networks (Chamlee-Wright,
2010).
Develop and provide a
centralized and clear
means of
communication.
Utilize formal and
informal channels of
communication to
engage community.
Resource acquisition
RQ3: How can social
capital facilitate the
acquisition of resources to
aid in the recovery
process?
Proposition 3: Social capital
provides access to resources
that may not be immediately,
or ever, available from
government agencies during
the disaster recovery process
(Scott, 2008a, 2008b; Aldrich,
2008, 2010)
Develop a means for
identifying available
resources and
opportunities for
obtaining resources
within social
networks.
Acquire and allocate
resources to aid in the
recovery efforts.

68
Chapter Four: Case Study
4.1 New Orleans
4.1.1 Geography
New Orleans was founded on May 7, 1718, by Spain and remained under Spanish
rule until 1801, when the French took over. The French sold the territory to the United
States in 1803. The transitions in power contributed to the rich diversity and architectural
influences evident in the city to this day. Early settlers saw the location of New Orleans
as advantageous because of the Mississippi River and the Gulf of Mexico. This location
made the transportation of goods easy and provided many opportunities for trade and
expansion.
New Orleans is a port city in southeastern Louisiana with a rich history. As a
port, New Orleans is a central hub for important imports and exports. Because of its
geographic location in relation to petroleum operations, it is a gateway for importing and
exporting petroleum products; however, other large imports include steel, copper, rubber,
cement, and coffee. Louisiana is one of the largest oil producers in the United States, and
some of the world’s largest companies maintain operations in New Orleans and provide
opportunities for economic growth, especially for the port. New Orleans has a strategic
advantage over other ports; because of its proximity to the Midwest states, it provides
excellent access for exporting food products from the Midwest.
Evidence indicates that the city is sinking in elevation; however, the average
elevation is 1–2 feet (0.5m) below sea level, with some areas as high as 20 feet (6m)
above sea level and lower areas about 7 feet (2m) below sea level. The city covers

69
approximately 350.2 square miles (907 km
2
), of which 180.6 square miles (467.6 km
2
)
are land and 169.7 square miles (439.4 km
2
) are water (U.S. Census Bureau, 2004).
4.1.1.1 Development
Prior to the 20th century, large sections of New Orleans were marshlands and
swamp. New levee systems were built as the city grew, and many areas with water were
drained. Development began to flourish in these drained areas, and building construction
practices evolved. However, many newer homes had not been built on elevated
foundations to protect from occasional flooding. After a few decades of minimal
exposure to flooding, people became comfortable and saw little need to take such
precautions.
The map in Figure 5 of New Orleans in 1849 shows much of New Orleans was
built adjacent to the Mississippi River. Just to the north of development on the map are
largely marshlands and swamp, covering areas where neighborhoods and part of the city
are currently situated. Figure 6 is a contemporary map of New Orleans showing
neighborhoods, parks, and other developments in the areas once covered in water.

70

Figure 5. Map of New Orleans in 1849. From The New Orleans Hurricane Protection
Systems: What Went Wrong and Why, by C. F. Andersen et al., 2008, Reston, VA:
American Society of Civil Engineers, p. 7.

Figure 6. Contemporary map of New Orleans. From The New Orleans Hurricane
Protection Systems: What Went Wrong and Why, by C. F. Andersen et al., 2008, Reston,
VA: American Society of Civil Engineers, p. 8.

71
4.1.1.2 Erosion
The land of New Orleans is eroding, causing the city to lose elevation every year
due to subsidence. Subsidence is the settling of ground surface and occurs naturally,
especially in areas like New Orleans with large areas of marshlands and swamp that are
characteristically soft and silt-like. Because of the natural conditions in this area and
man-made water management systems, subsidence has been estimated to occur at an
approximate rate of 0.15–0.2 inches per year; however, some areas are expected to have
subsidence in excess of 1 inch per year.
Historically, subsidence was not the cause of great concern because of the
proximity of a major river (Mississippi) flowing into a larger body of water (Gulf of
Mexico). The Mississippi used to provide an adequate counterbalance to natural
subsidence because sediments were constantly being brought down from river currents,
replenishing ground surface that was being lost to subsidence. Because of major flood
control structures—including levees, pumping stations, dams, and loss of ground water
from recently drained areas—, the sediments are now blocked and incapable of providing
a natural source to replenish the ground surface lost to subsidence, causing the city to
sink and lose elevation (Andersen et al., 2008).
4.1.2 Hurricane and flood protection system
In 1946, Congress authorized the commencement of the first major public works
project to address hurricane-related flooding in New Orleans. Since then, numerous
projects and various types of systems have been installed and erected to protect the city
from hurricanes, including drainage and pumping stations, the Mississippi River Levee
Flood Protection System, and non-USACE levee features (Andersen, et al., 2008). The

72
main agency that oversees flood protection systems in terms of design, construction, and
maintenance is the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE). In its efforts to protect
New Orleans from flooding and hurricanes, USACE designed and constructed a
multiproject levee system, with each project falling into one of three main categories:
1. Lake Pontchartrain, Louisiana and Vicinity Hurricane Protection Project;
2. West Bank and Vicinity, New Orleans, Louisiana, Hurricane Protection
Project; and
3. New Orleans to Venice, Louisiana, Hurricane Protection Project (Andersen, et
al., 2008).

Figure 7. USACE hurricane protection systems. From The New Orleans Hurricane
Protection Systems: What Went Wrong and Why, by C. F. Andersen et al., 2008, Reston,
VA: American Society of Civil Engineers, p. 17.

These projects were designed to withstand Category 3 hurricanes, which,
according to the Saffrin-Simpson Hurricane Wind Scale, have sustained winds speeds
between 111-129 mph (U.S. Army Corp of Engineers [USACE], 1984).

73
The Lake Pontchartrain, Louisiana, and Vicinity Hurricane Protection Project was
first authorized by Congress in the Flood Control Act of 1965.
The project was to construct a series of control structures, concrete floodwalls,
and levees to provide hurricane protection to areas around Lake Pontchartrain.
The project, when designed, was expected to take about 13 years to complete and
cost about $85 million. Although federally authorized, it was a joint federal,
state, and local effort. (U.S. Government Accountability Office [GAO], 2005)
A Final Environmental Impact Statement on the Lake Pontchartrain, Louisiana, and
Vicinity Hurricane Protection Project was published by USACE in 1974. This plan
addressed the design and construction of a barrier system of levees and flood walls to
protect the New Orleans area from hurricanes and hurricane-induced flooding.
There were many challenges related to design, environmental concerns, opposition from
environmentalist groups, and legal issues, all of which contributed to delays in the
project. By 1981, the project was approximately 50 percent complete, and the projected
date of completion had been revised to 2008. In addition, during this time, estimated
costs for completion grew from $85 million to over $757 million (GAO, 2005). In 2005,
the overall project cost to date was estimated at $738 million, and the completion date
was moved from 2013 to 2015 (USACE, 2005a). The estimated costs to complete are
difficult to determine as new challenges are addressed, one of which is building up
existing levees that are losing elevation because of settling.

74

Figure 8. Lake Pontchartrain, Louisiana, and vicinity Hurricane Protection Project.
From The New Orleans Hurricane Protection Systems: What Went Wrong and Why, by
C. F. Andersen et al., 2008, Reston, VA: American Society of Civil Engineers, p. 18.

The West Bank and Vicinity, New Orleans, Louisiana, Hurricane Protection
Project originally included 22 miles of earthen levee and 2 miles of flood walls (USACE,
2013a). The scope of work now calls for approximately 75 miles of levees, floodwalls,
floodgates, water control structures, and other risk-reduction features. Completion of this
project is expected to include over 50 construction contracts with a cumulative estimated
value of approximately $3 billion (USACE, 2011).

75

Figure 9. West Bank and Vicinity, New Orleans, Louisiana, hurricane protection system.
From West Bank and Vicinity—Fact Sheet, by U.S. Army Corp of Engineers, 2012, http://
www.mvn.usace.army.mil/pd/projectslist/reports.asp?projectID=115&projectP2=76230

The New Orleans to Venice, Louisiana, Hurricane Protection Project was
authorized under PL 874-87 on October 23, 1962, under the name of the Mississippi
River Delta at and below New Orleans, Louisiana, and was subsequently changed to the
New Orleans to Venice, Louisiana Hurricane Protection Project after the initial
authorization. The project was approximately 85 percent complete prior to Hurricane
Katrina in 2005 and had an estimated completion date of September 2018. It had
experienced similar setbacks as the other projects and has received the same heightened
sense of urgency and priority after Hurricane Katrina (United States Army Corp of
Engineers, 2005b; 2013).
The project will provide protection from hurricane tidal overflow for 100-year
storms. The current approved cost is $253 million. Information and reporting sections

76
concerning this project on the USACE website were blank, with the last update posted in
2005. As of 2005, the project had budget issues, and the final completion date was being
extended beyond the September 2018 estimated date of completion (United States Army
Corp of Engineers, 2005b).

Figure 10. New Orleans to Venice, Louisiana, Hurricane Protection Project. From The
New Orleans Hurricane Protection Systems: What Went Wrong and Why, by C. F.
Andersen et al., 2008, Reston, VA: American Society of Civil Engineers, p. 19.

As project design and planning commenced, the intent was to design the system to
protect against a Standard Project Hurricane (SPH), which was then thought to be a
Category 3 and was estimated to occur once every 200 years (USACE, 1974; von
Winterfeldt, 2006). The problem with this assessment was that two environmental
impact statements (USACE, 1974, 1984) listed seven monumental hurricanes in New

77
Orleans and the surrounding area which caused 262 fatalities in 1969 (von Winterfeldt,
2006). In addition, since 1855, the Southeast Louisiana area, had been impacted by 11 or
more hurricanes that, based on historical records of wind speed and damage, were
estimated to be Category 3 or stronger at landfall (Andersen, et al., 2008; Blake,
Rappaport, Jarrell, & Landsea, 2005). Five out of the eleven indicated in Table 12 were
Category 4 or greater; therefore, the magnitude and frequency of hurricanes of this
magnitude were severely underestimated by USACE (1974, 1984). The likelihood of
Standard Project Hurricane (SPH) of Category 3 force hurricane impacting the immediate
area once every 200 years was a gross miscalculation. There was a lack of evidence in
support of this calculation and the evidence used at the time, indicated there had been 11
Category 3 or greater hurricanes in the area over a 114 year period. The reason for the
miscalculation is unknown.
Table 12: Major Hurricanes Crossing Southeast Louisiana Vicinity (1851-2004)
Hurricane Year
Category at
first landfall
Central pressure at first
landfall (millibars)
LA/MS 1855 3 950
LA (Last Island) 1856 4 934
LA/MS/AL 1860 3 950
LA 1879 3 950
LA (Chenier Caminanda) 1893 3 948
LA (Grand Isle) 1909 3 952
LA (New Orleans) 1915 4 931
SE FL/SE LA/MS 1947 4 940
Audrey 1957 4 945

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Hurricane Year
Category at
first landfall
Central pressure at first
landfall (millibars)
Betsy (SE FL/SE LA) 1965 3 948
Camille 1969 5 909
Andrew 1992 5* 922
Katrina 2005 3 920
*Hurricane Andrew was a Category 5 hurricane at first landfall in Florida and was a
Category 3 upon reaching Louisiana. Adapted from The Deadliest, Costliest, and Most
Intense United States Trophical Cyclones From 1851 to 2004, by E. S. Blake, E. N.
Rappaport, J. D. Jarrell, and C. W. Landsea, 2005, Miami, FL: National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Administration, Tropical Prediction Center, p. 7.
4.1.3 Demography
New Orleans is the largest city and metropolitan area in the state of Louisiana. At
the time of the 2000 Census, New Orleans was home to approximately 484,674 people,
and the population density was 1,384/mi
2
(534/km
2
), with a total area of 350.2 mi
2
or
907.01 km
2
(land and water). If the calculation is based on only land mass of 180.6 mi
2

(467.75 km
2
), then the population density was 2,684/mi
2
(1,036/km
2
). There were
188,251 households, 112,977 of which were family households in New Orleans (Greater
New Orleans Community Data Center, 2012). The racial composition was 66.6% Black
or African American, 26.6% White, 2.3% Asian, 0.2% American Indian, 0.2% from other
races, and 1.0% from two or more races. Hispanics (any race) made up 3.1% of the
population (Greater New Orleans Community Data Center, 2012).
At the time of the 2010 Census, New Orleans was home to approximately
343,829 people (Greater New Orleans Community Data Center, 2012) and the
metropolitan area was the 46th largest in the United States, with an estimated population
of 1,191,089 (Greater New Orleans Community Data Center, 2012). There was a

79
population decrease of approximately 29 percent since the 2000 Census. The population
density was 982/mi
2
(379/km
2
) when calculating total area of 350.2 mi
2
or 907.01 km
2

(land and water). If the calculation is based on only land mass of 180.6 mi
2
(467.75
km
2
), then the population density is 1,904/mi
2
(735/km
2
). There were 142,158
households, 76,643 of which were family households residing in New Orleans (Greater
New Orleans Community Data Center, 2012). The racial composition was 59.6% Black
or African American, 30.5% White, 2.9% Asian, 0.2% American Indian, 0.3% from other
races, and 1.3% from two or more races. Hispanics (any race) made up 5.2% of the
population (Greater New Orleans Community Data Center, 2012).
Table 13: Census of 2000 and 2010 New Orleans Statistics
Demographics 2000 2010 Change
Population 484,674 343,829 -29.60%
Total households 188,251 142,158 -24.48%
Family households 112,977 76,643 -32.16%
Gender
Female 53.1% 51.6% -2.82%
Male 46.9% 48.4% 3.20%
Age
5 years old and under 8.4% 7.6% -9.52%
6-11 years old 9.2% 6.8% -26.09%
12-17 years old 9.1% 6.9% -24.18%
18-34 years old 25.9% 29.2% 12.74%
35-49 years old 21.9% 19.2% -12.33%
50-64 years old 13.8% 19.4% 40.58%
65-74 years old 6.0% 6.1% 1.67%
75-84 years old 4.2% 3.4% -19.05%
85 years old and older 1.5% 1.5% 0.00%
Racial & ethnic diversity
Black or African American 66.6% 59.6% -10.51%
White 26.6% 30.5% 14.66%

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Demographics 2000 2010 Change
Asian 2.3% 2.9% 26.09%
American Indian 0.2% 0.2% 0.00%
Other 0.2% 0.3% 50.00%
2 race categories 1.0% 1.3% 30.00%
Hispanic (any race) 3.1% 5.2% 67.74%
Households by type
Total households 188,251 142,158 -24.48%
Female householder (no husband
present) with children under 18
17.7% 13.7% -22.60%
Male householder (no wife
present) with children under 18
2.5% 2.7% 8.00%
Married-couple family, with
children under 18
14.8% 11.1% -25.00%
Nonfamily households, with
children under 18
0.3% 0.2% -33.33%
Households with no people under
18 years
64.7% 72.3% 11.75%
Children in households
Population under 18 years in
households
128,785 72,917 -43.38%
Children living as head of
household
0.1% 0.1% 0.00%
Children living with mother only 39.2% 39.6% 1.02%
Children living with father only 4.7% 6.7% 42.55%
Children living with married
parents
35.9% 34.3% -4.46%
Children living with grandparents 14.9% 14.2% -4.70%
Children living with other
relatives
3.7% 4.0% 8.11%
Children living with non-relatives 1.5% 1.2% -20.00%
Elderly in households
Elderly in households 53,375 36,152 -32.27%
Living alone 34.2% 32.9% -3.80%
Living in family households 62.6% 62.9% -0.48%
Living in non-family households 3.2% 4.2% 31.25%

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Demographics 2000 2010 Change
Occupancy status
Total housing units (full count) 215,091 189,896 -11.71%
Occupied housing units 87.5% 74.9% -14.40%
Vacant housing units 12.5% 25.1% 100.80%
Renters and owners
Total occupied housing units 188,251 142,158 -24.48%
Owner occupied 46.5% 47.8% 2.80%
Renter occupied 53.5% 52.2% -2.43%
Mortgage status
Owned with a mortgage or a loan 67.0% 60.8% -9.25%
Owned free and clear 33.0% 39.2% 18.79%
Household income type
Wage or salary income 73.3% 74.1% 1.09%
Self-employment income 8.7% 11.4% 31.03%
Interest, dividends, or net rental
income
23.7% 19.6% -17.30%
Social Security income 24.7% 24.5% -0.81%
Supplemental security income 7.8% 5.7% -26.92%
Public assistance income 5.4% 2.6% -51.85%
Retirement income 13.4% 13.6% 1.49%
Other types of income 12.4% 11.6% -6.45%
Average household income (2010 $) $56,497 $59,952 6.12%
Population in poverty
People living in poverty 27.9% 24.4% -12.54%
People living at or above poverty 72.1% 75.6% 4.85%
Source: (Greater New Orleans Community Data Center, 2012)

4.2 Broadmoor
4.2.1 Geography
The Broadmoor neighborhood is one of 72 neighborhoods in the City of New
Orleans and is in Planning District 3, Uptown/Carrollton. It has an elevation of 2 feet
(1m) and covers approximately .56 mi
2
(1.4504 k
2
). Its boundaries, as defined by the

82
Broadmoor Improvement Association (BIA), are Washington and South Jefferson Davis
Parkway intersection to the north, Washington Avenue and Toledano Street to the east,
South Claiborne Avenue to the south, and South Jefferson Davis Parkway and Nashville
Avenue to the west (Figure 11).

Figure 11. Broadmoor boundary map. From Map of Broadmoor, by Broadmoor
Improvement Association, 2013,
http://broadmoorimprovement.com/Broadmoor%20Map.pdf.

One of the lowest lying areas in New Orleans, Broadmoor used to be a large
marsh area and fishing spot for local fishermen (see Figure 12). During the early part of
the 20th century, improved drainage systems and pumping began drying the area out and
development started to flourish. Initially, most of the homes in Broadmoor were built on
raised foundations to protect them from flooding. As years went by and the fear of
flooding faded, structures built at or near grade level increased, leaving little protection
against future floods, thereby contributing to the structural devastation of homes and
buildings from Hurricane Katrina. Figure 13 is an example of a Broadmoor home,

83
surrounded by homes built at grade level, being raised during the restoration process in
2008, a few years after Hurricane Katrina.

Figure 12. Broadmoor area in 1829 prior to drainage and development. From
Investigation of the Performance of the New Orleans Flood Protection Systems in
Hurricane Katrina on August 29, 2005, by Independent Levee Investigation Team, 2006,
Berkeley: University of California, Berkeley, http://www.ce.berkeley.edu/projects/
neworleans/report/CH_4.pdf, p. 41.

84

Figure 13. Broadmoor home being raised during restoration. From David Martin on
Martin, 2006, by David Martin, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:April06_040.jpg#file.

4.2.1.1 Development
Plans to drain the area that is now Broadmoor, which was once covered by woods
and marshland, took form in 1895. The original intent was not to make room for
development or expand the landscapes of New Orleans. Rather, the intent was to put an
end to Yellow Fever, a disease that has killed thousands of New Orleanians and is spread
by mosquitoes, which thrive in swampy areas. In 1895, the City of New Orleans adopted
and moved forward with a plan to drain marshes within the city. Construction on the
infrastructure to implement this plan commenced in 1897 and continued through 1915.
The efforts were successful in draining the marshes, and Yellow Fever was no longer a

85
significant threat to people living in New Orleans (Broadmoor Improvement Association,
2006).
Development in Broadmoor started in 1910, 5 years before the completion of the
drainage infrastructure. Between 1920 and 1924, Broadmoor saw the largest influx of
building construction it has ever seen in such a short span of time. During those 4 years,
the neighborhood developed hundreds of homes, approximately 35 percent of all new
construction that has occurred to date. During these 4 years, the Andrew H. Wilson
School, a landmark within the community, was built and opened in 1922 (Broadmoor
Improvement Association, 2006).
4.2.2 Flood protection system
Drainage and flooding issues were problematic for the City of New Orleans since
its inception. The city took many precautions in designing the infrastructure to mitigate
potential losses and mass flooding; however, even the most extreme measures were
inadequate to protect Broadmoor from the inevitable extreme weather conditions. Prior
to the May 8, 1995, Louisiana Flood, there was minimal protection for Broadmoor other
than the main levee system that surrounded the city. The first substantial effort to drain
the area consisted of a canal built in 1857 along what is now Claiborne Avenue. In 1915,
two pumps were installed at Pumping Station No. 1 on Broad Street (Broadmoor
Improvement Association, 2006); however, these were only the beginning of many
infrastructure and construction projects that would be required to keep Broadmoor
protected from flooding, especially hurricane-induced flooding.

86

Figure 14. New Orleans drainage system in 1903. From Investigation of the
performance of the New Orleans flood protection systems in Hurricane Katrina on
August 29, 2005, by Independent Levee Investigation Team, 2006, Berkeley: University of
California, Berkeley, http://www.ce.berkeley.edu/projects/neworleans/report/CH_4 .pdf,
p. 46.

Over the years, drainage systems and pumps had proven to be somewhat effective
for mitigating minor flooding and the infrastructure improvements to the draining
systems seemed to provide better flood protection after the Louisiana Flood. Regardless,
the well-being of Broadmoor and the protection of neighborhood homes remain largely
dependent on the structural integrity of the levees, flood gates, water control systems, and
building construction that uses raised foundation systems.

87

Figure 15. New Orleans drainage system in 1992. From Investigation of the
performance of the New Orleans flood protection systems in Hurricane Katrina on
August 29, 2005, by Independent Levee Investigation Team, 2006, Berkeley: University of
California, Berkeley, http://www.ce.berkeley.edu/projects/neworleans/report/CH_4 .pdf,
p. 47.

88

Figure 16. New Orleans levees and floodwalls as of August 29, 2005. From
Investigation of the performance of the New Orleans flood protection systems in
Hurricane Katrina on August 29, 2005, by Independent Levee Investigation Team, 2006,
Berkeley: University of California, Berkeley, http://www.ce.berkeley.edu/projects/
neworleans/report/CH_4.pdf, p. 50.

4.2.3 Demography
Broadmoor is culturally diverse and the demographics of the neighborhood are
similar and representative of the demographics of the City of New Orleans. As of the
2010 census the neighborhood has not yet returned to the pre-Katrina population levels;
however, those who chose to return have had the opportunity participate in the planning
and rebuilding of Broadmoor. In addition, the community has gained economic stability
while maintaining cultural and ethnic diversity; hallmarks of Broadmoor and the city of
New Orleans.

89
At the time of the 2000 Census, Broadmoor was home to approximately 7,232
people, and the population density was 12,914/mi
2
(4,986/km
2
). There were 2,915
households, 1,788 of which were family households living in the neighborhood (Greater
New Orleans Community Data Center, 2012). The racial composition was 68.2% Black
or African American, 25.8% White, 0.6% Asian, 0.2% American Indian, 0.2% from other
races, and 1.3% from two or more races. Hispanic and Latinos made up 3.7% of the
population (Greater New Orleans Community Data Center, 2012).
At the time of the 2010 Census, Broadmoor was home to approximately 5,381
people, and the population density was 9,609/mi
2
(3,710/km
2
). There were 2,203
households, 1,275 of which were family households living in the neighborhood (Greater
New Orleans Community Data Center, 2012). The racial composition was 61.1% Black
or African American, 28.8% White, 1.0% Asian, 0.3% American Indian, 0.4% from other
races, and 1.6% from two or more races. Hispanic and Latinos made up 6.7% of the
population (Greater New Orleans Community Data Center, 2012).
Table 14: Census of 2000 and 2010 Broadmoor Statistics
Demographics 2000 2010 Change
Population 7,232 5,381 -25.6%
Total households 2,915 2,203 -24.4%
Family households 1,788 1,275 -28.7%
Gender
Female 55.4% 53.3% -3.8%
Male 44.6% 46.7% 4.7%
Age
5 years old and under 7.3% 6.4% -12.3%
6-11 years old 7.9% 7.2% -8.9%
12-17 years old 9.1% 8.6% -5.5%
18-34 years old 25.3% 30.4% 20.2%
35-49 years old 22.0% 18.9% -14.1%

90
Demographics 2000 2010 Change
50-64 years old 15.0% 18.1% 20.7%
65-74 years old 6.9% 5.7% -17.4%
75-84 years old 5.1% 3.4% -33.3%
85 years old and older 1.4% 1.3% -7.1%
Racial & ethnic diversity
Black or African American 68.2% 61.1% -10.4%
White 25.8% 28.8% 11.6%
Asian 0.6% 1.0% 66.7%
American Indian 0.2% 0.3% 50.0%
Other 0.2% 0.4% 100.0%
2 race categories 1.3% 1.6% 23.1%
Hispanic (any race) 3.7% 6.7% 81.1%
Households by type
Total households 2,915 2,203 -24.4%
Female householder (no husband
present) with children under 18
17.2% 17.3% 0.6%
Male householder (no wife
present) with children under 18
2.3% 3.3% 43.5%
Married-couple family, with
children under 18
13.2% 9.9% -25.0%
Nonfamily households, with
children under 18
0.2% 0.4% 100%
Children in households
Population under 18 years in
households
1,744 1,194 -31.5%
Children living as head of
household
0.2% 0.1% -50.0%
Children living with mother only 37.4% 44.5% 19.0%
Children living with father only 4.7% 6.4% 36.2%
Children living with married
parents
31.6% 26.8% -15.2%
Children living with grandparents 19.0% 15.2% -20.0%
Children living with other
relatives
5.9% 5.3% -10.2%
Children living with non-relatives 1.2% 1.8% 50.0%

91
Demographics 2000 2010 Change
Elderly in households
Elderly in households 966 557 -42.3%
Living alone 28.2% 29.4% 4.3%
Living in family households 69.2% 65.7% -5.1%
Living in non-family households 2.6% 4.8% 84.6%
Occupancy status
Total housing units (full count) 3,222 3,183 -1.2%
Occupied housing units 90.5% 69.2% -23.5%
Vacant housing units 9.5% 30.8% 224.2%
Renters and owners
Total occupied housing units 2,915 2,203 -24.4%
Owner occupied 48.1% 47.8% -0.6%
Renter occupied 51.9% 52.2% 0.6%
Mortgage status
Owned with a mortgage or a loan 67.8% 59.2% -12.7%
Owned free and clear 32.2% 40.8% 26.7%
Household income type
Wage or salary income 70% 80.0% 14.3%
Self-employment income 8.2% 19.4% 136.6%
Interest, dividends, or net rental
income
22.0% 23.0% 4.5%
Social Security income 8.5% 8.4% -1.2%
Supplemental security income 8.5% 8.4% -1.2%
Public assistance income 4.6% 3.2% -30.4%
Retirement income 14.1% 13.8% -2.1%
Other types of income 13.1% 8.0% -38.9%
Average household income (2010 $) $47,629 $64,247 34.9%
Population in poverty
People living in poverty 31.8% 14.0% -56.0%
People living at or above poverty 68.2% 86.0% 26.1%
Source: (Greater New Orleans Community Data Center, 2012)

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4.3 Hurricane Katrina
In 2005, Hurricane Katrina devastated the Gulf Coast, leaving behind mass
destruction spanning miles of coastline and crossing state lines (Florida, Mississippi,
Alabama, and Louisiana). The costliest natural disaster and one of the five deadliest
hurricanes in the history of the United States, Hurricane Katrina left behind a living
laboratory, an ideal setting for the study of disaster preparedness, mitigation, response
and recovery. Many documented hurricanes made landfall while sustaining greater force
than Hurricane Katrina. Despite the devastation Katrina brought on the Gulf Coast, it is
important to recognize there were multiple factors beyond the force of Katrina that led to
such significant loss of life and property damage in New Orleans. The following
hurricanes provide a point of comparison to help illustrate the force of Katrina and how
other factors contributed to substantial losses in the wake of Katrina.
On September 8, 1900, the Galveston Hurricane touched ground in Texas as a
Category 4 with winds approaching 145 mph. The Galveston Hurricane was the most
deadly hurricane on U.S. soil and was the cause of approximately 8,000 deaths, with
other estimates ranging from 6,000 to 12,000 deaths. Over 30,000 people were left
homeless, and estimated costs were around $100 billion (unadjusted). On September 2,
1935, the Labor Day Hurricane came ashore in the Florida Keys as a Category 5, at
892millibar (mb) and with winds approaching 200mph. The hurricane killed more than
400 people and caused over $6 million (unadjusted) in damages. On August 17, 1969,
Hurricane Camille touched ground in Mississippi as a Category 5, at 909mb, with winds
approaching 190mph. Hurricane Camille caused 256 deaths and $1.42 billion
(unadjusted) in damages. The hurricane injured 8,931 people, destroyed 5,662 homes,

93
and severely damaged 13,915 other homes. On August 24, 1992, Hurricane Andrew
touched ground in southeast Florida as a Category 5, at 922mb, with winds approaching
165mph. Hurricane Andrew caused 23 deaths, destroyed 25,525 homes, and damaged
101,241 other homes. The costs resulting from this hurricane were estimated at $26
billion. On August 13, 2004, Hurricane Charley came ashore in Punta Gorda, Florida, as
a Category 4, at 941mb, with winds approaching 150mph. This hurricane caused 10
deaths and $15.4 billion in damages; eight of the fatalities were in Florida as were 792
injuries (National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, Climatic Data Center
[NOAA], 2012; Ross & Lott, 2003).
Hurricane Katrina started as a tropical depression on August 23, 2005, and
developed into a tropical storm on August 24, 2005, coming through the central
Bahamas. As Katrina moved west, it became a Category 1 hurricane when it was 15
miles northeast of Fort Lauderdale on August 25, 2005. At the time Hurricane Katrina
came ashore in Florida, between Hallandale Beach and North Miami Beach, it had
sustained winds estimated at 80mph and gusts above 90mph. While making its way
across Florida, Hurricane Katrina caused significant damage and took the lives of 14
people (NOAA, 2012).
The storm continued to grow more intense, and on August 26, 2005, Hurricane
Katrina attained major hurricane status. On August 27, 2005, Katrina continued to
strengthen, and a hurricane warning was issued for the north central Gulf, from Morgan
City to the Alabama–Florida border. It attained Category 5 status on August 28, 2005,
with wind speeds of 160–175mph and pressures of 908–902mb. While a Category 5
hurricane, Katrina was not on shore; it had hurricane force winds approximately 105

94
miles from the center of the storm and tropical storm force winds approximately 230
miles from the center of the storm. At the time, Katrina had not made landfall and did
not touch ground until August 29, 2005.
Hurricane Katrina touched ground in Plaquemines Parish with wind speeds at
approximately 127mph and a central pressure of 920mb. Despite such force, by this
time, it had been downgraded to a strong Category 3 hurricane and should not have
caused the damage that ensued because levee walls were designed to withstand Category
3 hurricanes. From Louisiana, Katrina continued northeast and weakened as it continued
inland (Graumann et al., 2005). There are conflicting reports as to the strength of
Hurricane Katrina as it made land fall on August 29, 2005. Some reports classified
Hurricane Katrina as a Category 3 at the time it made landfall; however, others reported it
as a Category 4.
Based on the technical reports, evaluations, and observations (Andersen, et al.,
2008; Kates, Colten, Laska, & Leatherman, 2006; Knauer, 2012), this study
acknowledges Hurricane Katrina as a Category 3 hurricane at the time it made landfall in
New Orleans. The rationale for accepting this status is supported by technical and
meteorological reports classifying Hurricane Katrina as a Category 3 just before it
touched ground in New Orleans (Graumann et al., 2005; Knabb et al., 2008).
Table 15 shows a detailed description of how category classifications are determined.
The rating is based on a hurricane’s sustained wind speed. No evidence was found to
support Katrina had sustained winds in excess of 130mph when it made land fall in New
Orleans. In addition, Figures 17 and 18 illustrate that the intensity of Katrina was

95
transitioning about the time it was making landfall, and as it progressed, it was
weakening at a drastic rate.
Table 15: Saffir-Simpson Hurricane Wind Scale
Category Sustained winds Types of damage due to hurricane winds
1 74-95 mph
64-82 kt
119-153 km/h
Very dangerous winds will produce some damage:
Well-constructed frame homes could have damage
to roof, shingles, vinyl siding and gutters. Large
branches of trees will snap and shallowly rooted
trees may be toppled. Extensive damage to power
lines and poles likely will result in power outages
that could last a few to several days.
2 96-110 mph
83-95 kt
154-177 km/h
Extremely dangerous winds will cause extensive
damage: Well-constructed frame homes could
sustain major roof and siding damage. Many
shallowly rooted trees will be snapped or uprooted
and block numerous roads. Near-total power loss
is expected with outages that could last from
several days to weeks.
3
(major)
111-129 mph
96-112 kt
178-208 km/h
Devastating damage will occur: Well-built framed
homes may incur major damage or removal of roof
decking and gable ends. Many trees will be
snapped or uprooted, blocking numerous roads.
Electricity and water will be unavailable for
several days to weeks after the storm passes.
4
(major)
130-156 mph
113-136 kt
209-251 km/h
Catastrophic damage will occur: Well-built framed
homes can sustain severe damage with loss of
most of the roof structure and/or some exterior
walls. Most trees will be snapped or uprooted and
power poles downed. Fallen trees and power poles
will isolate residential areas. Power outages will
last weeks to possibly months. Most of the area
will be uninhabitable for weeks or months.

96
Category Sustained winds Types of damage due to hurricane winds
5
(major)
157 mph or higher
137 kt or higher
252 km/h or higher
Catastrophic damage will occur: A high
percentage of framed homes will be destroyed,
with total roof failure and wall collapse. Fallen
trees and power poles will isolate residential areas.
Power outages will last for weeks to possibly
months. Most of the area will be uninhabitable for
weeks or months.
Note. From Saffir-Simpson Hurricane Wind Scale, by National Weather Service, National
Hurricane Center, 2012, http://www.nhc.noaa.gov/aboutsshws.php
According to the National Weather Service, National Hurricane Center (2012):
The Saffir-Simpson Hurricane Wind Scale is a 1 to 5 rating based on a hurricane's
sustained wind speed. This scale estimates potential property damage.
Hurricanes reaching Category 3 and higher are considered major hurricanes
because of their potential for significant loss of life and damage. Category 1 and
2 storms are still dangerous, however, and require preventative measures. In the
western North Pacific, the term "super typhoon" is used for tropical cyclones with
sustained winds exceeding 150 mph.
In addition, it was slightly modified for 2012 to address conversion problems across the
different types of units used to indicate wind speed. The modification changed Category
4 slightly, expanding it “by one mile per hour (mph) at each end of the range, yielding a
new range of 130-156 mph” (National Weather Service, National Hurricane Center
[NWSNHC], 2012). Category assignments for previous storms on record were not
changed, and the change should not affect future storm category assignments (NWSNHC,
2012).

97

Figure 17. Map of Hurricane Katrina’s track. From Hurricane Katrina by National
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, National Climatic Data Center, 2012, http://
www.ncdc.noaa.gov/special-reports/katrina.html

98

Figure 18. Precise path and intensity map of Hurricane Katrina. From Hurricane
Katrina: A Climatological Perspective, by A Graumann et al., 2005, Washington, DC:
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, http://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/oa/
reports/tech-report-200501z.pdf, p. 3.

4.3.1 Impact on New Orleans and the surrounding region
In August 2005, the impact of Hurricane Katrina caused 1,833 deaths, 1,577 of
which were in Louisiana (Graumann et al., 2005; Knabb et al., 2008); flooded 80% of the
City of New Orleans; and severely damaged or destroyed nearly 80 thousand housing
units, 42% of the dwellings in the city (Steinberg & Shields, 2007). Figure 19 shows the
extent of flooding from Katrina after the levees and flood control systems failed.

99

Figure 19. New Orleans flood map after Hurricane Katrina. From Orleans Parish Sept
11th Flood Extent With Neighborhoods & Major Roads, by Greater New Orleans
Community Data Center, 2005b, https://gnocdc.s3.amazonaws.com/maps/PDFs/
flood_extent.pdf.

Storm surges ranged from 10–19 feet, and rain fall was reported at 10–12 inches
(Figure 20). The added stress overwhelmed levee and drainage systems. Following the
levee failures, water depths reached 20 feet in some areas, and the Mississippi River gage
height nearly quadrupled (Figure 21) as Katrina was moving through Louisiana
(Graumann, et al., 2005).

100

Figure 20. August 24-30, 2005 precipitation map. From Hurricane Katrina: A
Climatological Perspective, by A Graumann et al., 2005, Washington, DC: National
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, http://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/oa/ reports/tech-
report-200501z.pdf, p. 10.

101

Figure 21. Mississippi River gage height. From Hurricane Katrina: A Climatological
Perspective, by A Graumann et al., 2005, Washington, DC: National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Administration, http://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/oa/ reports/tech-report-
200501z.pdf, p. 6.

In addition, the events that unfolded caused many people to consider what the
future of New Orleans would look like and whether it was safe to return, especially if the
levee system was not going to be upgraded. Residents of New Orleans contemplated
whether rebuilding was wise if future hurricanes of equal and greater magnitude were
inevitable. They questioned whether it was safe to rebuild and whether they would be in
the same position and assume the same risks (loss of life and property) if the levee system
were not upgraded before the next big hurricane (Nossiter, 2005c; Steinhauer, 2005).

102
They were also concerned with how this disaster would change the makeup of the city
and its design (Nossiter, 2005a; Powell, 2007).
As a practical matter, people questioned whether property owners would be able
to obtain insurance on property and possessions if they were “rolling the dice” every
hurricane season. If so, the concern was whether the premiums would be affordable. The
people of New Orleans proved to be highly resilient (Scott, 2008a) as they worked to
reassemble their lives; however, their situation proved to be more complex than many
other disaster-recovery efforts because of the location and infrastructure surrounding
New Orleans. For those who had the means to rebuild, the question loomed as to whether
they should rebuild. Many chose to stay; however, a 29.6% decrease in population from
2000–2010 indicates a significant number of New Orleaneans either chose or had to live
elsewhere after Hurricane Katrina (Nossiter, 2005b). Figure 22 shows the population
dispersion that immediately followed Hurricane Katrina.
The devastation was not a direct result of hurricane winds and weather conditions.
Rather, the damages and loss of life were the result of multiple factors, including failure
of systems designed to protect New Orleans from such an event. On August 29, 2005, 28
levee failures were reported, and more than 50 were reported in the days that followed
(Andersen, et al., 2008; Knauer, 2012). The failures were the result of many factors,
including wind, rainfall, storm surges, and system design that underestimated
probabilities and consequences of extreme hurricane events (Andersen, et al., 2008; von
Winterfeldt, 2006). Reports varied concerning the number of breaches; nevertheless, the
breaches revealed the levee system could not withstand the stress from the conditions and
allowed water to enter where it should not. The infrastructure and investments in

103
drainage systems and pumping stations were not designed to reroute such large amounts
of water, and the most critical system for protection failed (Independent Levee
Investigation Team, 2006).

Figure 22. Katrina’s diaspora. From “Katrina’s Diaspora,” by M. Ericson, A. Tse, and
J. Wilgoren, 2005, The New York Times,
http://www.nytimes.com/imagepages/2005/10/02/
national/nationalspecial/20051002diaspora_graphic.html.

4.3.2 Impact on Broadmoor
The Broadmoor community was no exception to the devastation experienced by
the city. When the levees were breached, Broadmoor was completely inundated with
water because of its low elevation and dependence on the outer levee and flood control
system for protection. Figure 23 shows elevations throughout the city. As indicated in
the figure, most of Broadmoor is at or below sea level (Scott, 2008a).

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Figure 23. Elevation map of New Orleans and Broadmoor. From New Orleans
elevation by neighborhood with major roads, by Greater New Orleans Community Data
Center, 2005a, https://gnocdc.s3.amazonaws.com/maps/PDFs/neworleans_elevation.pdf

In Broadmoor, 100% of the 2,915 housing units sustained significant damage;
90% of them would require major repair to be inhabitable again (Scott, 2008a). Nearly
everything had been touched by water and was contaminated by such hazardous materials
as chemicals, fuel, sewage, and other substances and materials the water had contacted.
Some homes were salvageable; however, others had to be completely rebuilt because
damage was too severe, or structures had to be destroyed because of extensive mold
problems. In certain instances, some contended it was more cost effective to rebuild or
buy out homeowners then level entire neighborhoods; therefore, such plans needed to be
considered. Others argued efforts to preserve and restore structures of historical

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significance were paramount and needed to be considered regardless of costs (Nossiter,
2005a). The people of Broadmoor faced difficult decisions as the community began to
emerge from a state of devastation and adversity to recovery and resilience.

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Chapter Five: Broadmoor’s Recovery
The intent and structure of Chapter 5 necessitates discussion on the organization
and analysis in 5.1-5.4. As discussed in Chapter 3, adherence to protocol for conducting
a research case study was imperative and involves the presentation of theoretical concepts
followed by the presentation and discussion of evidence from the data. Therefore, it is
important to understand that (1) the theoretical concepts, beginning with research
questions and then propositions, emerged from the literature review process; and (2) the
mechanisms for developing and leveraging social capital emerged from data analysis.
Section 5.1discusses a pivotal point for the Broadmoor community and
establishes context for analyzing the case in the sections that immediately follow.
Sections 5.2-5.4 are each structured in a manner that analyzes each practice in light of (1)
research questions, (2) propositions from the literature, and (3) mechanisms for
developing and leveraging social capital. The mechanisms were extracted from the data
through the process of searching for realistic solutions to address each of the research
questions and the analysis of each proposition. Table 16 provides the matrix which
served to guide this study and discussion later in this section.

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Table 16: Qualitative Data Analysis Matrix for Understanding the Impact of Social Capital on the Disaster-Recovery Process
Observations
Dimension Research question Observable proposition Method of developing Method of leveraging
Strategic partnering
RQ1: How can
communities develop and
leverage partnering
opportunities to increase
community capacity and
enhance the effectiveness
of the disaster recovery
process?
Proposition 1: Benefits from
social capital are enhanced
when existing and potential
partner organizations develop
and inventory relevant skills
(Dynes, 2005).
Solidify existing
partnerships and seek
opportunities to
develop new
partnerships.
Inventory skills and
abilities of partnering
organizations and
apply to developing
practical solutions.
Communication
RQ2: How does social
capital enhance the initial
communication process,
including the disbursement
of vital information when
recovering from a disaster?
Proposition 2: Social capital is
likely to enhance the
distribution of information to
citizens via communication
processes derived from social
networks (Chamlee-Wright,
2010).
Develop and provide a
centralized and clear
means of
communication.
Utilize formal and
informal channels of
communication to
engage community.
Resource acquisition
RQ3: How can social
capital facilitate the
acquisition of resources to
aid in the recovery
process?
Proposition 3: Social capital
provides access to resources
that may not be immediately,
or ever, available from
government agencies during
the disaster recovery process
(Scott, 2008a, 2008b; Aldrich,
2008, 2010)
Develop a means for
identifying available
resources and
opportunities for
obtaining resources
within social
networks.
Acquire and allocate
resources to aid in the
recovery efforts.

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5.1 Call to action: BNOB and the “Green Dots”
In January 2006, several months after Katrina hit, the City of New Orleans
released a report drafted by the Urban Planning Committee of the Bring New Orleans
Back (BNOB) Commission. The Commission was appointed by Mayor Ray Nagin with
the purpose of developing a plan for rebuilding New Orleans. The Commission was
divided into nine subcommittees, each of which was responsible for preparing and
presenting a formal report to Mayor Nagin. The following committees submitted their
respective reports on the dates indicated:
1. Cultural Committee, January 17, 2006
2. Economic Development Committee, February 3, 2006
3. Education Committee, January 17, 2006
4. Government Effectiveness Committee, January 19, 2006
5. Health and Social Services Committee, January 18, 2006
6. Infrastructure Committee: Levees and Flood Protection, January 18, 2006
7. Infrastructure Committee: Public Transit, January 18, 2006
8. Urban Planning Committee, January 11, 2006. (Columbia University, 2013)
Each of the plans had many details; however, for the Broadmoor neighborhood,
one stood out more than the rest: the Urban Planning Committee plan. Within this plan
was a map with six green dots in various locations of the city, one of which covered
Broadmoor. Each dot indicated a low-lying neighborhood or area under consideration for
converting into parks and green spaces. At this point, the future of Broadmoor was
already uncertain because many residents were still finding their way back to Broadmoor
and there were few physical signs of residents returning to rebuild. This situation was an

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unexpected blow to the residents of Broadmoor that would become a source of
aggravation, motivation, bonding, and resilience for the community (Scott, 2008b).

Figure 24. The green dots. From Action Plan for New Orleans: The New American City,
by Bring New Orleans Back Commission, http://www.columbia.edu/itc/journalism/cases/
katrina/City of New Orleans/Bring New Orleans Back Commission/BNOB Urban
Planning Report 1-11-06.pdf, p. 31.

In Broadmoor’s case, the City of New Orleans was giving the people four months
to prove the neighborhood was a viable investment for the city to rebuild. In addition to
meeting building permit moratoriums and other rebuilding requirements, Broadmoor
residents had to demonstrate people would want to move back or that they could recruit
enough new residents to repopulate the area. In fact, one of the key metrics to measuring
the viability of the neighborhood would be whether more than 50% of pre-Katrina
residents would commit to returning. If they could not convince the commission of the
viability of the community, then the future of the neighborhood would be in jeopardy

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because the city could not afford to maintain such high-risk, low-lying areas with few
residents (Scott, 2008a; Steinhauer, 2005).
The Urban Planning Committee report had eight steps for the recovery of New
Orleans that detailed actions and a timeline for neighborhoods to submit required
deliverables. One of the challenges for New Orleans neighborhoods was the lack of
specific direction and guidance in each of the steps. The reason for the lack of such
detailed specifications is not known; however, Step 1 and the events that ensued suggest
the BNOB Commission may have been under pressure to perform under an unattainable
timeline to secure federal redevelopment funds. The eight steps were as follows:
1. The Crescent City Recovery Corporation should receive and expend federal
redevelopment funds immediately and allocate the funds toward providing aid
in preparing a comprehensive redevelopment plan and administering all other
redevelopment related activities (Bring New Orleans Back Commission,
2006).
2. “Aggressively support a modified Baker bill to accommodate buy-out of
homeowners in heavily flooded and damaged areas for 100% of pre-Katrina
market value, less insurance recovery proceeds and mortgage” (Bring New
Orleans Back Commission, 2006, p. 52).
3. Advise the City of New Orleans to withhold the issuance of permits to repair
and rebuild in heavily flooded areas until (a) “Advisory Base Flood
Elevations” were issued by FEMA; (b) neighborhood planning teams have
completed and submitted redevelopment plans; and (c) adequate utilities have

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been made available to such designated areas (Bring New Orleans Back
Commission, 2006, p. 52).
4. Begin the neighborhood planning process by completing neighborhood and
city-wide plans by June 20, 2006 (Bring New Orleans Back Commission,
2006).
5. Design the rapid transit system and secure funding commitments no later than
January 1, 2007 (Bring New Orleans Back Commission, 2006).
6. “Develop finance programs to assist homeowners, business owners, and
investors to implement the Recovery Plan” (Bring New Orleans Back
Commission, 2006, p. 54).
7. “Provide predictable development rules and link to the Recovery Corporation”
(Bring New Orleans Back Commission, 2006, p. 55).
8. “Identify and facilitate financially responsible developers to develop large
numbers of houses quickly in Target Development Areas” (Bring New
Orleans Back Commission, 2006, p. 56).
In addition, the timeline and schedule in Table 16 would guide neighborhoods throughout
the planning process and provide definitive due dates for specified deliverables.
Table 16: Timeline and Schedule for Planning Planning Process
Target date Task
January 20, 2006 Start formation of neighborhood planning teams; refine
scope of work and schedule.
Start data collection and analysis for neighborhood
plans and city-wide coordination.
February 20, 2006 Neighborhood planning teams start work.
Neighborhood plans coordinated city-wide.
Plan to identify committed returning residents.

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Target date Task
March 20, 2006 Complete identification of residents committed to
return.
April 20, 2006 Funding for residential buy-out passed by Congress (by
April 10th).
May 20, 2006 Neighborhood plans completed.
Continue city-wide neighborhood plan consolidation.
June 20, 2006 Consolidated BNOBC plan recommended to City
Planning Commission.
August 20, 2006 Complete financial analysis and secure funding for
reconstruction.
Begin property acquisition.
Begin neighborhood reconstruction.
Note. Adapted from Action Plan for New Orleans: The New American City, by Bring
New Orleans Back Commission, 2006, http://www.columbia.edu/itc/journalism/cases/
katrina/City of New Orleans/Bring New Orleans Back Commission/BNOB Urban
Planning Report 1-11-06.pdf, pp. 58-60.
The residents of Broadmoor were devastated and frustrated by the report. They
already felt betrayed and let down by their city, state, and the federal government.
“When we got back to the city,” said Broadmoor resident, Hal Rourk, “I think we had a
hope . . . that at least our own people would treat us right . . . So when Nagin’s
handpicked committee came out with the green dots, it was the final straw” (Scott,
2008a). In response to this adversity, Hal Rourk committed many hours to studying the
BNOB Commission’s plan and the requirements Broadmoor was going to have to meet to
prove the community was worth saving. He organized the requirements and generated a
list of action items and priorities the community would need to address, then presented
his idea to Latoya Cantrell, executive director of the Broadmoor Improvement
Association (Scott, 2008a). The idea was well received and provided a basis and

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common purpose from which to organize their efforts. In addition, Hal’s efforts
contributed to each of the following, all of which were critical as community planning
efforts commenced:
1. Clear and organized priorities contributed to productive meetings.
2. Priorities were developed to address specific challenges from the BNOB
report. This provided an opportunity for the community to unite and work
toward a common purpose with clear objectives and goals.
3. The action items and priorities provided a basis from which to identify and
assess specific needs of the community and individual households.
5.2 Dimension: Strategic partnering
5.2.1 Question: Strategic partnering
The first research question guiding this study was as follows: How can
communities develop and leverage partnering opportunities to increase community
capacity and enhance the effectiveness of the disaster-recovery process? Communities
can create opportunities to increase community capacity by forming strategic partnering
relationships and can maximize the benefits from such arrangements by establishing a
formal governance structure to guide the purpose and the decision-making process.
Before discussing the dynamics of strategic partnerships, it is important to understand the
context of partnering opportunities in Broadmoor. Of the many forms of partnerships,
Broadmoor adopted an approach that was collaborative and cross-sectoral, thereby
necessitating a unique governance structure.
“The essence of Collaborative Governance is a new level of social/political
engagement between and among the several sectors of society that constitutes a
more effective way to address many of modern societies’ needs beyond anything

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that the several sectors have heretofore been able to achieve on their own”
(Donahue, 2004, p. 3).
Collaborative governance brings public and private stakeholders together in
collective forums with public agencies to engage in consensus-oriented decision making
(Ansell & Gash, 2007); it is a response to the failure of traditional mechanisms to
adequately meet the needs of society (Zadek, 2008). The magnitude and scope of many
of today’s social problems are too large for any sector or organization to manage
effectively single handedly. Thus, intersectoral and interorganizational collaborations
have developed as mechanisms for solving such problems (Gray, 1989; Initiatives, 1983),
and at an increasing rate, people who seek to address tough social problems are beginning
to understand that multiple sectors of society—business, non-governmental
organizations, and government—must collaborate to deal effectively with these
challenges (Bryson et al., 2006).
Donahue (2004) identified dimensions or attributes by which collaborative
governance may be examined and further defined. With the exception of valence, a term
from the field of chemistry referring “to the number of distinct players linked together in
a collaboration and the number of links among them” (Donahue, 2004, p. 3) and
initiative, each dimension is defined and then discussed in the context of Broadmoor’s
actions and recovery efforts. Broadmoor’s partnering opportunities were collaborative
and cross-sectoral; therefore, the following was used as a framework to gain an
understanding of the nature of Broadmoor’s partnerships.
Formality. This term refers to the level or extent of formality among participants
as it relates to contracts, responsibilities, procedures, goals, and objectives.
Arrangements among participants are diverse, and no two are identical. Some

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collaborations are solidified through formal written agreements and others by a simple
handshake. Donahue (2004) suggested that, to advance research and discussion on
collaborative governance, a minimum threshold of formality has become increasingly
important. A lack of formality makes collaborations difficult to distinguish among other
forms of public-private partnerships and creates obstacles for analysis.
The following table shows the sector, formality, and nature of relationship
pertaining to each of the organizations that partnered with Broadmoor. Data regarding
the specific contractual nature of agreements were not available; therefore, the degree of
formality (formal or informal) was determined based upon confirmed commitments,
participation, procedures, goals, and objectives as specified in the column that describes
the nature of each relationship to the Broadmoor community. The evidence suggests that
each of the organizations made valuable and substantial contributions to the recovery of
Broadmoor and that there was a high level of commitment.

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Table 17: Formal and informal partnerships
Organization Sector Formality Nature of relationship
Broadmoor
Improvement
Association
Non-profit Formal Officially represented the
interests of the community.
Free Church of
the
Annunciation
Non-profit Formal Provided ministry outreach and
temporary facilities for BIA to
conduct business.
Harvard
Kennedy School
of Government
Non-profit Formal Provided advising services,
manpower for special projects,
and opportunities to develop
partnerships with for-profit
organizations.
Rebuilding
Together New
Orleans
Non-profit Formal Provided aid in rebuilding and
restoring damaged properties.
Broadmoor
Development
Corporation
Non-profit Formal Provided case management
services and served as a
mechanism for receiving and
allocating donations for
redeveloping Broadmoor.
Clinton Global
Initiative
Non-profit Formal Provided aid in developing
partnerships and securing
resources for rebuilding and
recovery.

Duration. Collaborations may have a well-defined duration that may be short-
term or long-term, depending on the purpose. However, some may have an ill-defined
duration with a perception of permanence and others may simply fade or come to an end
after failing or living out the purpose. The data did not reveal arrangements with
specifically defined durations. It appeared that most were open-ended and would
continue for as long as it made sense for the community as well as the respective groups
and organizations.

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Table 18: Durations
Organization Duration Rationale
Broadmoor
Improvement
Association
Indefinite The BIA had been a community organization for
decades and there were no indications that its
involvement would cease, even if Broadmoor
reached the 100% restoration/recovery mark.
Free Church of
the
Annunciation
Indefinite The church continues to manage a volunteer service
program that provides lodging and planning services
for groups who want to travel to Broadmoor and
participate in the ongoing recovery efforts.
Harvard
Kennedy School
of Government
Indefinite Harvard continues to hold a course that includes a
field component where students visit Broadmoor
and perform specific service projects.
Rebuilding
Together New
Orleans
Indefinite After Katrina, Rebuilding Together New Orleans
redrafted its mission to include an element that
stated the organization was committed to helping
communities recover from Hurricane Katrina. The
organization continues to take on projects in the
Broadmoor neighborhood and has contributed to
over 50 projects in Broadmoor alone.
Broadmoor
Development
Corporation
Indefinite This corporation was formed to provide aid in
handling some of the more challenging cases which
were being encountered more as Broadmoor
approached the 70% rebuilding mark. It continues
to serve in this capacity.
Clinton Global
Initiative
Indefinite CGI made its initial $5 million commitment and has
since extended its commitment which suggests the
partnership may continue as long as it makes sense
for CGI and the Broadmoor community.

Focus. The focus of the collaboration is related to scope and purpose. It defines
whether the collaboration will address a single issue or multiple issues. Broadmoor’s
recovery campaign following Hurricane Katrina provided a common and focused
purpose. Initially the scope of Broadmoor’s efforts was focused on saving the
neighborhood from being bought out by the government and converted into parks and
green space. Rebuilding was not going to happen if the neighborhood could not be

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saved. While the scope involved many obstacles, thereby making the recovery
challenging and complex, the focus of the collaboration eventually was on rebuilding
Broadmoor better than before.
Institutional diversity. According to Donahue (2004), there is a minimum
threshold for diversity among participants: “at least one public and one private player—is
the price of entry for collaborative governance” (p. 3). Throughout Broadmoor’s
recovery there have been multiple organizations within each sector, public, private, and
non-profit, that have contributed to their progress. Institutional diversity, while a
defining characteristic of collaborative governance, is necessary for addressing such large
scale problems with varying degrees of complexity. Many problems, like those of
Broadmoor, are not practically resolved by one single sector or organization. The
involvement of every sector and multiple organizations is necessary to effectively address
many modern issues. Some of the public sector organizations that contributed to the
efforts included the City of New Orleans, State of Louisiana, and FEMA. Private sector
organizations included CH2M Hill, General Motors Company, Coca-Cola Company,
Digitas, Inc., Chevron Corporation, Shell Exploration and Production Company,
Travelocity, Plan Ready, Inc. Non-profit organizations included Harvard Kennedy
School of Government, Clinton Global Initiative, Broadmoor Improvement Association,
Broadmoor Development Corporation, Bard College, Keller Family Foundation, Mercy
Corp, Motorola Foundation, Rebuilding Together New Orleans, Free Church of the
Annunciation, and The Carnegie Corporation (Clinton Foundation, 2007).
Stability versus volatility. “A collaboration is stable to the extent its members
share a normative view of successful governance, and volatile to the extent members’

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norms or interests diverge” (Donahue, 2004, p. 3). The collaboration was extremely
volatile initially. Broadmoor and the City of New Orleans had diverging interests due to
residents wanting to rebuild and the city’s proposal to eliminate the neighborhood. It was
almost certain that Broadmoor would stay when FEMA withdrew its funding in March of
2006. The funding was initially an influential factor in prompting the creation of the
BNOB initiative and one of its aims to buy out neighborhoods in order to convert certain
areas into parks and green space. As funding for such efforts was withdrawn an
opportunity was created that allowed the interests of Broadmoor and the city to align.
The residents of Broadmoor continued to want to rebuild and it was in the best interest of
the city to support Broadmoor in achieving success. For instance, aside from the city’s
legal and ethical obligation to not impede progress for Broadmoor, the costs associated
with having to provide city services to a mostly abandoned neighborhood generating
minimal tax revenue would have only served to place unnecessary financial strain on the
city. Therefore, it behooved the city to ease up on building moratoriums and other
obstacles that were unique to struggling neighborhoods such as Broadmoor.
Problem-driven versus opportunity-driven. This element deals with defining
whether the collaboration is defensive, “problem-driven,” or offensive, “opportunity-
driven.” The question is whether success is “defined as maintaining, or as improving
upon, the status quo?” (Donahue, 2004, p. 4). There was an abundance of challenges;
however, rebuilding Broadmoor provided many opportunities. Broadmoor and its
partners were aware that the community had the opportunity to rebuild schools, figure out
how the neighborhood was going to reduce crime, and develop a long-term
redevelopment plan for improving the neighborhood.

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5.2.2 Proposition: Strategic partnering
Proposition 1 is as follows: Benefits from social capital are enhanced when
existing and potential partner organizations develop and inventory relevant skills (Dynes,
2005). In response to the 4-month deadline imposed on Broadmoor, the residents acted
quickly, realizing 4 months was a limited amount of time in which to save their
community. In addition, many questions and other unexpected challenges arose with the
news of the green dots. It was difficult for residents to judge the seriousness of the
report, especially because the mayor had not officially signed off on the green dots.
Nevertheless, for all intents and planning purposes, it behooved the community to take
the news seriously and assume the city would find the means for eliminating the
neighborhood if they could not show their viability as a populated and thriving
community. Even more frustrating for the Broadmoor community was the obstacle the
report created for attracting residents back. The report moved many Broadmoorians into
action; however, it also created a significant challenge for all the people of Broadmoor.
How could Broadmoor repopulate and attract new residents if everyone knew the
neighborhood may be on the chopping block in just a few months?
The community was eager to move forward, and several leaders emerged who
were well qualified for the task. Many residents were prepared to contribute hard work
toward the efforts of saving the neighborhood, and becoming more apparent was the need
for organizations to come together and help. For years, the interests of Broadmoor had
been represented primarily by the Broadmoor Improvement Association; however,
immediately following Katrina and until everyone received news about the green dots,
there had been little movement from the organization and little collective action from the

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residents. There was talk about what the BIA was prepared to do to help save the
neighborhood, and some residents discussed starting a new neighborhood organization in
light of the recent events.
Virginia Saussy organized the first meeting to save Broadmoor on January 14,
2006, and notified the media that the BIA would have another meeting for the community
on January 18, 2006. As activity started to increase, it became apparent that the response
from the community would have greater effect if it was collective and unified. It would
not be prudent or advantageous for Broadmoor to have several community organizations
writing independent redevelopment plans. The BNOB Commission demanded a plan
from each neighborhood. In addition, if Broadmoor could not communicate a clear and
united vision for the future of the neighborhood, its chances of survival would be
compromised.
As partnering organizations emerged it became apparent that strategic
partnerships were going to be a pivotal enhancement to the recovery efforts in
Broadmoor. Such partnerships provided Broadmoor access to skill sets and resources
that would not have been available had the community addressed the redevelopment
efforts on their own. The governance structure that guided partnerships of the BIA was
subsequently formalized and, the following organizations, each with its own skill sets and
assets, made substantial contributions to the recovery of Broadmoor. These organizations
do not represent all that were involved. They are merely a sample of the many
organizations that contributed to the recovery of Broadmoor. These organizations were
selected because of the extent of their involvement and the frequency with which each
was mentioned by documented sources.

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5.2.2.1 The Broadmoor Improvement Association
With roots dating back to 1930, the BIA had evolved a great deal from when it
was first founded. Over the years, it served many purposes, primarily the needs of the
Broadmoor community; however, according to the BIA (2013):
Since Katrina, the BIA has become known as a ‘grassroots powerhouse.’
Broadmoor has built partnerships and was recognized at the 2006 Clinton Global
Initiative. The BIA is here to address the needs of the residents by engaging the
community and building consensus among residents as to their vision for a
revitalized neighborhood that is ‘Better than Before.’ Broadmoor has become a
model for citizen-led recovery efforts.
Most importantly, the BIA was led by a resident of Broadmoor, Latoya Cantrell, who was
well known within the community. She was a leader within the community, and many of
the residents trusted her. Years ago, she started a community organization, The
Louisiana Parkway Area Association, that was born from frustrations she had with the
BIA because she felt the BIA was not having a valuable impact on real issues within the
community (Scott, 2008a). Her commitment to the neighborhood was evident through
her work with both community organizations.
The BIA had a leader, Cantrell, who was ready to serve and represent the
community. She was known to be a passionate advocate for the community and had a
skill set that made her effective when dealing with such matters. Despite the concerns of
some community members regarding the initial response of the BIA in the months that
immediately followed Hurricane Katrina, the BIA, as a community organization, had a
long history and a record of serving and representing the neighborhoods interests.
Neither Cantrell nor the BIA had helped Broadmoor recover from anything as
unprecedented as Hurricane Katrina; nevertheless, they were effective at addressing

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community issues and were decidedly the best leadership for the community to unite
behind.
5.2.2.2 Free Church of the Annunciation (Father Jerry)
The Free Church of the Annunciation is an Episcopal Church in Broadmoor led
by Father Jerry. While the neighborhood was still flooded, Father Jerry took a row boat
to see the condition of the church. He was determined to help the community however
possible, and the church was an excellent mechanism for distributing resources to the
residents of Broadmoor (Kramer, 2010). In addition to providing office space and
equipment for the BIA operation after Katrina, the church served an estimated 85,000
visitors in the year and a half following Hurricane Katrina by distributing food, water,
bleach, and other supplies (Scott, 2008a).
5.2.2.3 The Harvard John F. Kennedy School of Government
Harvard University’s involvement and efforts through the John F. Kennedy
School of Government were led by Doug Alhers, a New Orleans resident and part-time
lecturer at Harvard. Every year, Alhers leads a group of Harvard students to Broadmoor
to serve the community and perform valuable service projects. Over the years, students
have helped generate databases for managing and documenting the recovery process;
aided in restoring properties by providing physical labor, design services, and planning
guidance; and participated in many other special projects (Alhers, 2011). Harvard’s
involvement is part of the Clinton Global Initiatives (CGI) commitment to serving
Broadmoor and helping the community recover from Hurricane Katrina (Cantrell et al.,
2007). The CGI partnered with Harvard to help the community establish and leverage
strategic partnerships with organizations from every sector (Clinton Foundation, 2007).

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5.2.2.4 Rebuilding Together New Orleans
Rebuilding Together is a nationwide nonprofit committed to redevelopment
efforts and helping communities rebuild after disasters. Rebuilding Together New
Orleans is a program of the Preservation Resource Center of New Orleans. The
organization began its work in the city in 1988 with the help of volunteers, community
groups, and corporate partnerships. Prior to Katrina, the organization worked on nearly
1,000 homes, seven schools, six community centers, a courthouse, and other projects that
were part of the public trust (Rebuilding Together New Orleans, 2009a). Since Katrina
struck, Rebuilding Together New Orleans has modified the organization’s mission to
include helping those who were displaced by the storm and has contributed and
concentrated significant efforts to restoring and rebuilding properties throughout
Broadmoor and several other neighborhoods. In fact, the organization has specifically
focused its program on several target neighborhoods, including (1) Broadmoor, (2)
Esplanade Ridge and Treme, (3) Faubourg St. Roch, (4) Gentilly, (5) Hollygrove, (6)
Holly Cross, (7) McClendonville, and (8) Mid-City.
Rebuilding Together New Orleans has facilitated volunteer service projects and
organized coordinated efforts, one step at a time, to help rebuild each of the communities.
As of 2009, within Broadmoor, the organization had helped to complete the restoration
and rebuilding of over 50 homes in the neighborhood. The map in Figure 25 shows
projects completed in Broadmoor from early 2009 to 2011. The pink, turquoise, and
purple represent 2009, 2010, and 2011, respectively (Rebuilding Together New Orleans,
2009b).

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Figure 25. Rebuilding Together New Orleans properties restored from 2009-2011.
From RT completed homes, by Rebuilding Together New Orleans, 2009,
http://www.rtno.org/ neighborhoods/rt-completed-homes/

5.2.2.5 Broadmoor Development Corporation
The Broadmoor Development Corporation was formed during the summer of
2007 to provide additional assistance and to meet the needs of the Broadmoor community
members. As the community commenced its redevelopment efforts following Katrina,
residents were in an emergency response mode, and most of the efforts were focused on
helping those who had the means and resources to rebuild. The people who did not have
the means to do so were helped second. This situation created some issues because as the
neighborhood was nearing the 75% rebuilding and repopulation mark progress began to

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slow significantly. As outlined in Figure 26 the most difficult and challenging cases were
in the final 30% of projects. To keep community redevelopment moving, the community
decided to create the Broadmoor Development Corporation, an entity that could raise
money and help those who did not have the means to rebuild or finish rebuilding.

Figure 26. Rebuilding Broadmoor timeline.

5.2.2.6 Clinton Global Initiative
The Clinton Global Initiative (CGI) was instrumental in helping Broadmoor
recover from Katrina. It provides an annual conference whereby attendees pledge to
adopt a project as a condition of invitation to the annual conference. According to the
CGI (2013):

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Established in 2005 by President Bill Clinton, the Clinton Global Initiative (CGI),
an initiative of the Clinton Foundation, convenes global leaders to create and
implement innovative solutions to the world's most pressing challenges. CGI
Annual Meetings have brought together more than 150 heads of state, 20 Nobel
Prize laureates, and hundreds of leading CEOs, heads of foundations and NGOs,
major philanthropists, and members of the media. To date CGI members have
made more than 2,300 commitments, which have improved the lives of over 400
million people in more than 180 countries. When fully funded and implemented,
these commitments will be valued at more than $73.1 billion.

Doug Alhers, a part-time resident of New Orleans leveraged the CGI to bring
partners in to help Broadmoor rebuild and recover from Hurricane Katrina. Part of
Harvard’s commitment to Broadmoor was to help the neighborhood develop strategic
partnerships by allowing Broadmoor to publicize these two key partnerships (Harvard
Kennedy and CGI) to add legitimacy to their efforts, facilitating connections, and
providing resources to help Broadmoor develop new relationships. Through the CGI,
Broadmoor received one of the largest pledges of outside aid among all the
neighborhoods in New Orleans, totaling a minimum of $5 million. Not limited strictly to
money, the $5 million could come in the form of donations, construction materials, labor,
equipment, partnerships, and other resources. Alhers’ work through the Harvard
Kennedy School of Government was part of the CGI commitment to help Broadmoor
form strategic partnerships with all sectors to aid in the recovery of the neighborhood
(Nolan, 2006).
5.2.3 Method for developing social capital: Strategic partnering
One method for developing social capital is to solidify existing partnerships and
seek opportunities to develop new partnerships. One of the first people from outside to
recognize the devastation in Broadmoor was Doug Alhers, a part-time New Orleans
resident and professor at Harvard University. He recognized that Broadmoor was doing

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an adequate job of organizing from within to develop a plan for rebuilding the
community. Equally important, he was keenly aware of the hard work and sacrifice that
was forthcoming. He had been tasked by the Harvard Kennedy School of Government to
begin service projects in New Orleans as a way for the school, through its faculty and
students, to live out its purpose as a public policy school (Scott, 2008a).
Alhers knew he wanted the project to focus on helping a single group of people
work on all their problems; however, he had yet to decide on which group
(neighborhood) the Kennedy School would commit to helping. On February 9, 2006,
Alhers met with Walter Isaacson in Washington, DC, to discuss the recovery of New
Orleans and the project Alhers had been chosen to lead on behalf of the Kennedy School.
Isaacson, a Harvard graduate, was vice chair of the Louisiana Recovery Authority (LRA),
the state agency responsible for reconstruction following Katrina. Isaacson was the
former head of CNN, among many other highly influential roles he had held. It was
during this meeting that Alhers learned that Isaacson grew up in Broadmoor and had
family living there. He was immediately put in touch with the BIA by Isaacson (Scott,
2008a).
As Alhers and the Kennedy School became formally committed and involved
with the recovery efforts, he encouraged the community to continue to organize and to
plan on having to do all the work themselves. He did not want the residents of
Broadmoor to rely on government aid to make it through the recovery efforts.
Interestingly, in March of 2006, FEMA, which provided the federal backing for Mayor
Ray Nagin’s BNOB Commission, withdrew all funding, thereby ending the BNOB

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initiative. The residents were going to have to make things happen on their own, and
Harvard would help them through whatever challenges were ahead (Scott, 2008a).
This initial partnership with the Kennedy School proved to be a pivotal
development for the Broadmoor community. Through Harvard, Broadmoor was
presented at the CGI, and one of the primary objectives of this initial collaboration was to
specifically help Broadmoor develop strategic partnerships to aid in its recovery.
Through the CGI, the Kennedy School, and the residents of Broadmoor, the community
developed partnerships with the following (Clinton Foundation, 2007):
 Bard College,
 CH2M Hill,
 General Motors Company,
 Coca-Cola Company,
 Digitas, Inc.,
 Chevron Corporation,
 Shell Exploration and Production Company,
 Travelocity,
 Plan Ready, Inc.,
 Keller Family Foundation,
 Mercy Corp,
 Motorola Foundation,
 Rebuilding Together,
 Free Church of the Annunciation, and
 The Carnegie Corporation.

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In its efforts to form strategic partnerships, Broadmoor did some critical things
exceptionally well, possibly contributing to its success in securing valuable strategic
partnerships. The following four points include pivotal actions that influenced the
trajectory and success of Broadmoor’s efforts. The list is intentionally selective and is
not intended to be exhaustive. The intent was to extract and learn from actions and
events that appeared to be highly influential in Broadmoor achieving successful
outcomes:
1. Broadmoor organized partnerships and recovery efforts around an established
organization with a common purpose: By using the BIA as a common vehicle
for advocating for the neighborhood, Broadmoor demonstrated unity and
cohesiveness. As community organizing commenced, Virginia Saussy had
contemplated starting a different community organization because of
disappointment she felt toward the BIA and its apparent inactivity
immediately following Katrina. The formation of a new entity working
toward a similar goal of rebuilding the community could have been
problematic. For instance, if two organizations represented the same
neighborhood, competition for strategic partnerships could have ensued, with
resources being wasted on duplicated work or multiple organizations
representing conflicting interests for the same neighborhood. By having
established, well-organized, and cohesive representation, Broadmoor was an
attractive prospect for outside organizations wanting to get involved with the
recovery efforts after Hurricane Katrina.

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2. Community rallies: As recovery efforts began in earnest, the community
rallied to decide how it was going to respond to the “Green dots” and develop
a unified plan moving forward. The rallies provided an opportunity to
organize, form subcommittees, track and report recovery progress, and build
trust and cohesion among community members. These efforts demonstrated
that the residents of Broadmoor were committed to helping themselves and
that they had the capacity to work toward establishing an effective governance
structure that could enhance self-management and democratic decision-
making.
3. Developed partnerships: Broadmoor was intentional in its efforts to develop
specific partnerships to fulfill certain purposes. As a community they were
keenly aware of their needs and; therefore, prepared to identify and recruit the
right partners for the recovery efforts. Initially, the professionalism,
organization, social relations, and the high participation level of residents
helped attract a few strong partners. This laid the foundation for future
recruitment efforts.
4. Inventory members of the community: Before making his decision to support
Broadmoor through the Kennedy School, Doug Alhers had the opportunity to
see a list of professional skill sets represented by Broadmoorians who were
prepared to contribute to the recovery efforts of the neighborhood. He learned
that Broadmoor, despite being a relatively poor community, had many highly
educated professionals who were committed to saving the community. Within
Broadmoor were public servants, lawyers, engineers, marketing and PR

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professionals, teachers, and business owners. This skill pool made
Broadmoor an appealing prospect for external organizations. Broadmoor
demonstrated that it possessed the necessary skill sets to be relatively self-
reliant and self-sustaining if the community could find a way to bring all of
these skills together working in a collaborative and effective manner (Scott,
2008a).
5.2.4 Method for leveraging social capital: Strategic partnering
A method for leveraging social capital is to inventory skills and abilities of
partnering organizations and focus on developing practical solutions. The residents of
Broadmoor were deliberate and prudent in forming meaningful partnerships that would
have valuable and lasting effects on the recovery efforts. The planning efforts of the
community increased the awareness of core issues and allowed them to develop effective
solutions. By having a keen awareness of its needs and screening the strengths of
potential partners, Broadmoor was in a position of strength when it came to identifying
strong partners that would have relevant effects on areas of need.

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Table 19: Partner Resources and Skills
Organization Resources Skills Problem solved
Broadmoor
Improvement
Association
Administrative
labor, skilled labor
Leadership,
community
representation, and
problem solving
Organization and
united community
representation
Free Church of
the Annunciation
Food, water,
cleaning supplies,
lodging, office space
Community service Basic supplies
Harvard Kennedy
School of
Government
Knowledge,
expertise, funding,
labor
Planning, design,
writing, software
programming,
geographic
information
systems,
collaboration,
political activism,
and developing
strategic
partnerships
Technical
knowledge
deficiencies, access
to informed
counsel, facilitating
access to and the
development of
strategic
partnerships
Rebuilding
Together New
Orleans
Volunteers, skilled
labor, and building
materials
Construction
expertise and
building restoration
Home restoration
and reconstruction
Broadmoor
Development
Corporation
Funding, building
materials, and
appliances
Redevelopment and
fundraising
Case management
Clinton Global
Initiative
Funding, material,
equipment, and
strategic
partnerships
Fundraising,
strategic partnering,
and collaborative
governance
Fundraising and
strategic
partnerships

5.3 Dimension: Communication
5.3.1 Question: Communication
The second research question was as follows: How does social capital enhance the
initial communication process, including the disbursement of vital information when
recovering from a disaster? The initial communication process began with rallies and
meetings at the community level. These gatherings provided a forum for residents to

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meet and discuss next steps, communication protocol, and the redevelopment plan for
recovery. The time devoted to these meetings served to enhance social relations which
naturally created and strengthened informal and formal communication channels. As
people interacted they increased the connectivity among members of the community.
Residents were now developing deep relationships with people they had not interacted
with before and strengthening ties to pre-existing connections. As a result, cohesion and
the health of relationships among community members improved and this served to build
trust and enhance social relations which ultimately enhanced the quality of decisions,
how decisions were made, how challenges were addressed, and how quickly information
was dispersed. Residents experienced enhancements to how information was exchanged,
needs were discussed, and in how quickly they were able to identify problems and extend
support to others. The effectiveness of the initial communication process enhanced the
recovery process by increasing the effectiveness of the process and structure of
communication channels. Without effective communication, the efforts would probably
have been impeded and perhaps unsuccessful.
Early in the recovery process, the BIA was identified as the central hub for the
rebuilding efforts which also served to simply and enhance communication. For
example, rebuilding and repopulation data collected by the respective committees were
immediately reported to the BIA and logged accordingly. This system and structure
provided a valuable database at a centralized location, thereby preserving the quality of
the data and maintaining ease of access. Doing so provided decision makers, committee
members, and meeting planners with vital information to assess progress related to
rebuilding and population metrics.

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In addition, the communication structure provided advantages for dispersing vital
information. The BIA had teams gathering information on available resources and
researching government programs to aid in the recovery process. This information
proved valuable because there were members of the community who did not have the
means for finding this information and determining how to make it most useful.
Community members had a valuable resource for searching and acquiring such
information. The BIA, as the official representing organization of the community, would
receive notification of vital information, thereby providing the public access to a
communication channel by which members of the community could receive information
updates regarding policy changes or announcements that would affect their community.
5.3.2 Proposition: Communication
Proposition 2 is as follows: Social capital is likely to enhance the distribution of
information to citizens via communication processes derived from social networks
(Chamlee-Wright, 2010). In the months that immediately followed Hurricane Katrina,
there was minimal movement from Broadmoor residents related to communicating and
organizing at the community level. Every structure had been touched, and the
neighborhood was devastated by the effects of the storm. Resident were trying to piece
their lives back together and; therefore, were more focused on the most immediate and
pressing needs. In addition, a great deal of uncertainty surrounded the fate of Broadmoor.
Residents did not know who would be returning or how many would come back. They
did not know whether it was worth the time, effort, and resources to rebuild or whether it
was safe to live in Broadmoor. They did not know whether the levees were going to be
repaired and, if so, whether the repaired levee system would provide the necessary

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protection to keep residents from living in constant fear every time there was a storm.
Finally, they did not know whether the government was going to help.
Some residents started cleaning out their homes and commenced the rebuilding
process despite weak signs of a healthy recovery. Other residents waited for more certain
indicators that Broadmoor was going to be rebuilt. The uncertainty compounded the
effects of the complacency, and the neighborhood was suffering for it. A lack of physical
signs of recovery, limited communication, and an increasing crime rate made matters
worse. Despite the outrage of residents when the Times-Picayune printed the news about
the green dots, there probably could not have been a more effective prompting to move
residents into action for a common purpose. The green dots motivated residents to fight
to save their neighborhood. The green dots gave them a purpose, resulting in their
harnessing their efforts to bring positive results and finding a vehicle that would facilitate
communication and organization.
Because of the organization’s history in the neighborhood, most people knew of
the BIA. Some were disappointed in the initial response from the BIA following
Hurricane Katrina; however, most agreed that the BIA would be an effective vehicle for
communicating and organizing their efforts (Scott, 2008a, 2008b). On January 18, 2006,
the BIA had its first formal meeting following Hurricane Katrina. At this meeting,
community recovery began taking shape, and the rate of recovery accelerated. During
the first meetings, committees were formed and communication channels were
established. The BIA would represent the neighborhood regarding all matters related to
the recovery efforts. The committees’ purpose was driven by two primary objectives,
each of which needed to be completed within four months:

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1. Define and articulate a clear plan for the future of Broadmoor.
2. Attract enough former and new residents to attain 50% of the neighborhood’s
pre-Hurricane Katrina population levels.
The BIA was a valuable asset to Broadmoor’s efforts for several reasons. First, it became
a unifying entity trusted by the community to represent the interests of the entire
community. Second, the BIA understood Broadmoor from a historical context. Third, it
understood the values and cultures represented by the community and had the capacity
and desire to preserve those elements throughout the planning and redevelopment
process. Finally, it had extensive experience representing the interests of the community
and had a successful track record overcoming similar obstacles of a smaller magnitude.
5.3.3 Method for developing social capital: Communication
The methods for developing social capital to enhance the communication process
should include (1) the provision of an open forum for discussion and deliberation among
members of the community and organizations that are contributing to the recovery efforts
and (2) developing an environment that fosters transparency when presenting challenges
and finding an effective way for dealing with them. For instance, as the BIA was holding
meetings to prepare the redevelopment plan, a resident was outspoken about his opinion
that the plan include bike paths as a priority. While no one disagreed that bike paths were
a good idea, someone contended that even if the community had bike paths they would
not be used due to safety concerns related to crime in the neighborhood (Scott, 2008b).
The environment provided the opportunity to communicate in an open forum and discuss
underlying issues that needed to be addressed for the residents of Broadmoor to rebuild
their community.

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It is also imperative for communities to develop and provide a centralized and
clear means of communication. The organization (Figure 27) and communication
structures (Figures 28 and 29) established by the BIA had inherent advantages. The
organizational structure provided a framework that aided in the recovery efforts as
follows:
1. Reporting protocol – The structure provided reporting protocol that delineated
where directives were issued from and where committees, subcommittees, and
teams were to report progress. As information was gathered by the respective
groups it was then reported and analyzed. For instance, repopulation data was
a significant metric determined by the BNOB commission; therefore, the
repopulation committee, upon gathering data, reported to leaders of the BIA
who then were informed and able to speak intelligently on repopulation
progress.
2. Task and responsibility management – The structure provided a framework
for managing tasks and distributing responsibilities. This increased the
efficiency and effectiveness of the how the recovery efforts were managed,
but also helped in the recruitment of volunteers. By having responsibilities
clearly delineated it was easy to identify areas of deficiency so recruitment
efforts and work assignments could be focused accordingly. Residents and
outside organizations could provide aid to the committees, subcommittees, or
teams they desired or where they could put their strengths to the greatest use.
3. Expertise building – The redevelopment plan was a significant undertaking
that required the use of many skill sets to prepare. The structure allowed the

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BIA the flexibility to place individuals and organizations in their area of
expertise, thereby making them content experts in their specific areas.
The communication structure as diagrammed in Figures 28 and 29 illustrate how the BIA
was used as a centralized means for gathering, organizing, and dispersing information.
Ultimately, the BIA became the community channel for all forms of official and
unofficial communication. Through the BIA, community members and external parties
had a channel by which they could effectively disseminate vital information. Their
efforts yielded current contact information that may not have otherwise been available.
As contacts were made with individuals, they were logged and statuses were updated.
Through committees, the BIA tracked rebuilding and repopulation data and distributed
relevant information to the community.
The redevelopment committee meetings provided an open, public forum for
dispersing vital information and facilitating public deliberation. The leadership provided
opportunities to discuss collective actions and progress with the redevelopment plan.
This type of transparency contributed to the efforts by providing the community with
current and accurate information essential to the recovery process. With current and
accurate information, community members could assess progress and identify core issues,
thereby enhancing the recovery process by allowing them to work toward relevant and
realistic solutions to problems.

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Figure 27. Broadmoor committee organizational chart. Adapted from "Broadmoor Lives": A New Orleans Neighborhood's batter to
recover from Hurricane Katrina (A), by E. Scott, 2008a, Cambridge, MA: Harvard Kennedy School of Government Case Program, p.
22.

Teams
Subcommittees
Committees
Organization
BIA
Media advisory Repopulation Revitalization
Education
Economic
development
Urban planning
Housing
Flood
mitigation
Community
development
Urban
design/land
use
Transportation
Emergency
preparedness
Final
documentation
Legal advisory

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Figure 28. Information process flow to community.

Figure 29. Information process and data flow from committees
to partner organizations and members of the community.

BIA
Government
information
Strategic partner
information
Internal information
Special announcements
BIA
Media advisory committee
Repopulation committee
Revialization committee
Legal advisory committee
Broadmoor
community
Partner
organizations
Broadmoor
community

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5.3.4 Method for leveraging social capital: Communication
As the formal meeting process began in January of 2006, the BIA relied on formal
and informal communication channels to make initial contact with members and those
directly involved with the BIA. In addition, the BIA seized the opportunity to make
contact with residents during the meeting that was coordinated by Virginia Saussy. At
the time Virginia held her meeting she was contemplating starting her own community
organization due to frustrations stemming from her perception that the BIA had not been
doing enough to help the community. Through these formal communication channels,
informal channels were then used and leveraged to reach members of the community.

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5.4 Dimension: Resource acquisition
5.4.1 Question: Resource acquisition
The third research question was as follows: How can social capital facilitate the
acquisition of resources to aid in the recovery process? Social capital facilitates the
acquisition of resources in two critical ways; through partnerships founded upon trust and
by enhancing the ability to utilize resources efficiently and effectively. Before discussing
the role of social capital in acquiring resources it is important to note the effectiveness of
resource acquisition efforts is dependent upon the success of strategic partnering efforts.
Having the right partners creates more opportunities to obtain valuable and relevant
resources.
Trust and social networks are vital components to acquiring resources from
internal stakeholders and external parties. The BIA and Broadmoor residents built trust
in each other by proactively engaging in planning activities and demonstrating the
competence and capacity to conduct successful recovery efforts. Trust is foundational to
any meaningful and productive relationship, and from an internal stakeholder perspective,
the trust among key stakeholders in Broadmoor created opportunities for networking and
for identifying and acquiring resources and contacts. For instance, Walter Isaacson,
former head of CNN, former Managing Editor of TIME, and a famous biographer, had
family members living in Broadmoor. Isaacson’s father, Irwin, a resident living in
Broadmoor, hosted the first BIA meeting on his front lawn. Through Irwin Isaacson, the
BIA was introduced to Harvard University, via Walter (Scott, 2008a).
From the perspective of managing external relations, it is important that
communities build trust with individuals and organizations that want to help. Social

144
networks provide access and exposure to external parties; however, it is through trust that
progress finds sustenance and resource acquisition efforts begin to materialize. One of
the factors that made Broadmoor appealing to external parties was the make-up of the
residents in terms of skill sets and expertise. The community was composed of many
skilled professionals, which was a great start. The primary challenge was harnessing the
efforts of these individuals toward a common goal and purpose. The initial response of
Broadmoor to the BNOB’s report demonstrated that the community was prepared to work
to save their homes and community. As planning and recovery efforts progressed
Broadmoor residents demonstrated the ability to work effectively as a community and the
capacity to maximize the use of resources. Finally, the community had an established
community organization, the BIA, with a successful track record of representing the
community’s interests. This demonstrated that the community had the capacity to self-
organize and address its own problems. These factors provided objective evidence for
Broadmoor to publicize to gain the trust and respect of prospective partners and external
parties. From an external donor perspective, Broadmoor was an attractive prospect
(Scott, 2008a).
5.4.2 Proposition: Resource acquisition
Proposition 3 is as follows: Social capital provides access to resources that may
not be immediately, or ever, available from government agencies during the disaster
recovery process (Scott, 2008a, 2008b; Aldrich, 2008, 2010). Immediately following
Hurricane Katrina there was talk amongst the residents of Broadmoor about what
assistance could be expected from the government if the city was not going to buy-out
everyone and convert the neighborhood into green space. There were two factors that

145
contributed to affirming Broadmoor’s decision to address their issues as a community and
accept the reality that the government, at every level, would provide minimal to no aid in
their efforts.
First, the initial plans to institute the BNOB commission were an effort funded by
FEMA. The agency committed to funding the planning process thereby prompting
Mayor Nagin to appoint the BNOB commission. The commission published the
controversial “Green Dot” report which commenced the planning process. Planning
efforts began in earnest and, for some neighborhoods, it was an effort for survival, to
avoid being converted into parks and green space, while for others it was an opportunity
for people to have a voice in how their community was going to be rebuilt. Then in
March of 2006, FEMA withdrew its offer of funding which left every neighborhood in a
state of confusion and no official recovery authority to report planning progress. The
BNOB commission had distinct deadlines and expectations and, upon dissolving the
commission, there was a lack of clear direction on how to proceed. This was a
devastating blow to Broadmoor’s efforts. LaToya Cantrell and Hal Rourk had thought
that, if the BIA fulfilled its obligation in producing the redevelopment plan, then the
federal government would provide additional financial support to help the community
execute the plan. These events served to affirm that their expectations of what the
government was going to do were wrong and provided an expanding pool of evidence
suggesting Broadmoor was going to have to find a way to acquire its own resources for
rebuilding and recovery (Scott, 2008a).
Second, upon meeting with Doug Alhers of Harvard University, Broadmoor
residents learned that much of the funds designated to Hurricane Katrina relief and

146
recovery efforts were actually going toward reimbursing federal agencies for relief and
initial recovery efforts (Scott, 2008a). Alhers researched congressional bills and
specifically found that much of the money was going toward the following:
 Coast Guard reimbursements,
 National Guard reimbursements,
 FEMA,
 military base repairs,
 debris removal, and
 flood insurance guarantees to insurance companies (Scott, 2008a).
At this point, Alhers made it clear to Broadmoorians that federal money was not coming
and they needed to plan accordingly. He challenged them to search for answers to a
pressing dilemma and question – “There is going to be no money; there will be no federal
cavalry coming over the hill with millions of dollars, and that’s bad news, and you’ve got
to figure out a way to deal with that. How are you going to deal with that” (Scott, 2008a,
p. 18)?
In response to these challenges Broadmoor residents became exceptionally
resourceful and creative. The partnership with Harvard Kennedy School of Government
was instrumental in providing access to many resources. Harvard provided student labor,
faculty expertise, and access to organizations through its own partnership with the
Clinton Global Initiative. Broadmoor’s efforts to establish strategic partnerships with the
(1) Free Church of the Annunciation, (2) Harvard Kennedy School of Government, (3)
Rebuilding Together New Orleans, (4) Broadmoor Development Corporation, and (5)
Clinton Global Initiative, through the BIA, also laid a valuable foundation that enabled

147
them to acquire resources essential to their rebuilding and recovery efforts. The BIA
created and executed its plan for recovery and their partners helped them figure out how
to get tasks done or how and where to obtain critical resources when needed. The
resources acquired by Broadmoor were valuable to the rebuilding efforts and significant
in value. The primary groups that provided resources were as follows:
 Free Church of the Annunciation – The church provided food, water,
cleaning supplies, and office space. As a permanent member of the
community the church was effective as a community service organization
and provided significant help to the community in obtaining basic yet
necessary supplies.
 Harvard Kennedy School of Government – Harvard provided knowledge,
expertise, access to funding, and labor. As a partner organization committed
to the recovery of Broadmoor, Harvard was effective in providing training
and services in planning, urban design, software programming, geographic
information systems, collaborative governance, political activism,
developing strategic partnerships, and fundraising activities.
 Rebuilding Together New Orleans – Originally came to New Orleans in
1988 with a broad mission to revitalize the area by meeting the home repair
needs of those who lacked the ability and resources to adequately care for
their homes. This organization changed its mission in the wake of
Hurricane Katrina to include a commitment to help communities recover
from Katrina. The organization provided volunteers, skilled labor, project
planning services, and building materials. As an established development

148
non-profit in New Orleans they were highly skilled in construction and
building restoration, especially while working under conditions that are
unique to the area.
 Broadmoor Development Corporation (BDC) – The BDC was formed to
take on challenging cases in the community. As recovery in Broadmoor
approached the 75% recovery mark the cases became more challenging.
The cases that had the means to recover were either complete or well on
their way and those that did not were struggling to find a way to recover.
The BDC became a vehicle for acquiring properties, case management, fund
raising, and redevelopment.
 Clinton Global Initiative (CGI) – The CGI provided access to funding,
resources, and strategic partnerships. The organization allowed Broadmoor
access to skills of the CGI in fundraising and developing partnerships to aid
in the recovery efforts.
5.4.3 Method for developing social capital: Resource acquisition
Observations of the role of social capital in acquiring resources for rebuilding
suggest that the ability to acquire resources is dependent upon strategic partnering with
the right groups and organizations. While this is foundational, trust among partners is the
operational component of developing social capital to acquire resources. Opportunities to
build trust with internal stakeholders and external parties must be fostered and embraced.
Broadmoor built trust with these players by doing the following:
1. self-organizing;
2. demonstrating initiative and competence;

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3. demonstrating unity, cohesion and common purpose;
4. utilizing internal skills and resources; and
5. demonstrating strong and ethical leadership.
Trust among residents and partner organizations provided Broadmoor with access to
more resources than what was otherwise available. One aspect that enhanced the
perceived trustworthiness of Broadmoor to aid organizations stemmed from their
involvement with Harvard; however, even more important was their ability to work
effectively with Harvard to solve and address their own problems. Broadmoor developed
social capital and acquired resources by building trust with partner groups and
organizations.
5.4.4 Method for leveraging social capital: Resource acquisition
Broadmoor leveraged social capital by tapping into resources embedded in their
social network and creating win-win opportunities with network members, including
partners. This aided in their recovery efforts by (1) acquiring resources for recovery, (2)
strengthening partners by increasing the value of their resources, (3) building trust with
existing and new partners thereby providing opportunities for expanded access to other
resources and contacts, and (4) demonstrating the community wanted to foster
relationships that were reciprocal in nature by creating a value for value exchange. Trust
building contributed to effective and productive recovery efforts and to creating a
positive experience with partners thereby enabling Broadmoor to attract new partners.
Broadmoor leveraged the help and resources extended to aid those who had most of the
means needed to rebuild first, then to the more desperate cases second. This move
contributed to the trust building efforts by demonstrating the ability to make difficult, yet

150
practical, decisions in the best interest of the entire community. The community also
made use of every resource that was extended to them. For example, Harvard made it
clear that the university was not a granting institution; therefore, they were not to expect
aid in the form of money to be coming from the university. Harvard committed to
providing aid in many other forms and Broadmoor seized the opportunity. The
community utilized the expertise of students to build databases and track residents using
data that were gathered by the committees. They also leveraged the Harvard network to
gain access to individuals and organizations that were in a position to donate money to
the recovery efforts. While Harvard may not have written a check to Broadmoor, in a
sense, the university indirectly gave by providing access to groups and organizations with
such resources.

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Chapter Six: Conclusions, Implications, and Recommendations
6.1 Conclusions
The means by which social capital is developed and leveraged, in practice, during
the disaster-recovery process have been minimally explored in social capital and disaster-
recovery research. The lack of research is a problem because the frequency of disasters
affecting society and the extent of damages are increasing and social capital has been
identified as a vital component in enhancing the disaster-recovery process (Aldrich,
2012). A significant factor for communities seeking to enhance the effectiveness of
disaster-recovery efforts is their capacity to develop and leverage social capital.
However, social capital and the benefits derived from social capital are constantly
threatened by conflicting interests, lack of leadership, underdeveloped social networks,
and a lack of trust and cohesion among members of the affected community.
Particularly when communities are at a disadvantage concerning such factors as
financial aid, extent of damage, political stability, mitigation, socioeconomics, and civil
society, all of which have been identified by scholars as critical factors that enhance the
recovery process, the question arises as to what communities can do to enhance the
disaster-recovery process in the absence of many or all of these factors. What are the
factors that enhance social capital and the benefits derived from social capital? Why does
empirical evidence show that social infrastructure, not physical infrastructure or financial
resources, is more vital to successful rebuilding and that communities with high levels of
social capital recover more quickly than communities with low levels of social capital
(Aldrich, 2008)? Furthermore, related to this question, how can communities develop
and leverage social capital to improve the rate and effectiveness of recovery after

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disasters? If social capital provides an effective means to moving citizens into action and
increasing the recovery rate, what practices exist that may serve to help define a
systematic approach to developing and leveraging social capital in disaster-recovery
situations?
This study was concerned with finding answers to these questions by
investigating social capital in a single research case study. Given the trust and resources
embedded in social networks, the Broadmoor community successfully managed to
develop and leverage social capital, thereby providing a rich and valuable case of the
practices and mechanisms for developing and leveraging social capital. The objective of
this study was to extract social capital enhancing mechanisms and to understand the
underlying conditions that contributed to their ability to use social capital effectively.
The following table provides an overview of each of the dimensions of this study and the
practices for developing and leveraging social capital to enhance the value and
effectiveness of each dimension.
Table 20: Overview of findings
Dimensions
Means for developing social
capital to enhance
dimension
Means for leveraging social
capital to enhance
dimension
Strategic partnering –
Formalizing and expanding
social networks.
Solidify existing
partnerships. Seek
opportunities to develop
new partnerships.
Inventory skills and abilities
of partners. Develop
practical solutions that
capitalize on skills and
abilities.

Communication –
Distributing information
and forming a collective
and unified voice.

Provide forum for
discussion and deliberation.
Foster an environment that
embraces transparency.
Utilize formal and informal
social networks to distribute
information. Increase
message strength by
forming a collective voice
to speak on behalf of the
group.

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Dimensions
Means for developing social
capital to enhance
dimension
Means for leveraging social
capital to enhance
dimension
Resource acquisition –
Accessing and obtaining
skills and resources.
Seize opportunities for
building trust. Demonstrate
competence and ability to
utilize resources efficiently
and effectively.
Acquire material resources
for rebuilding and recovery
efforts. Recruit skills and
expertise for executing and
managing rebuilding and
recovery efforts.

6.1.1 Strategic partnering
The strategic partnering dimension can be described as the process of formalizing
and expanding a social network. This dimension requires trust and commitment in
partnering arrangements and the ability to leverage existing contacts to expand and
develop new relationships. The benefits of this dimension are maximized when the skills
and abilities embedded in partnerships can be accounted for and systematically
categorized for the purpose of applying them toward their most relevant use when solving
problems and addressing challenges. Some antecedents are beyond the control of
individual group members and subgroups. For instance, a factor that impacts the capacity
to develop strategic partnerships is how well connected or networked individuals and
subgroups are prior to the need to develop such partnerships. A community comprised of
individuals with naturally developed networks that are healthy may have a less difficult
time reaching out to their networks and building new relationships than a community that
was comprised of individuals with lesser developed networks. Due to its fundamental
nature, this dimension has inherent consequences for the other two dimensions and the
disaster recovery process in general. Mechanisms that enhance strategic partnering
include strong leadership, opportunities for building trust, regular meetings, and the

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involvement of the right partners who are committed to making a valuable contribution to
the overall goals and objectives.
6.1.2 Communication
The communication dimension involves the utilization of social networks to
distribute vital information and the process of forming a collective and unified voice.
This dimension requires formal and informal channels for distributing information,
opportunities to discuss issues in an open forum, trust and mutual respect among group
members, and an environment that embraces transparency. The advantages gained by
this dimension are enhanced when social networks can be utilized to distribute
information and when there is a need to form a collective voice to advocate on behalf of
the group. An antecedent to the communication dimension is a culture of trust and
reciprocity that is unified and transparent. Trust is a foundational component of
relationships and it enhances the communication process. The lack of trust and
transparency may break down the communication process as information passes through
the communication channels. Deficiencies in these areas may lead to the questioning of
the reliability of information, motives, and consideration of the well-being of the entire
group. Mechanisms that enhance communication include trust, transparency, formal and
informal networks, and organizational and communication structures.
6.1.3 Resource acquisition
The resource acquisition dimension can be described as the process of accessing
and obtaining skills and resources. The effectiveness of this dimension is dependent
upon the resources embedded in social networks, health of strategic partnerships, and the
ability to maximize the benefits gained from all forms of resources. The benefits of

155
resource acquisition are enhanced when there has been a comprehensive and accurate
assessment of needs. A clear understanding of needs provides the opportunity to develop
informed priorities and can help in focusing efforts and determining where resources may
be obtained and from where skill sets may be recruited. In practice these factors aid in
the acquisition of resources by suggesting that the resources acquired will be utilized
responsibly and effectively. Strategic partners, volunteers, and philanthropists are more
inclined to provide resources and support to efforts that are going to put their
contributions to use in a responsible and cost effective manner. Therefore planning is a
significant mechanism that enhances resource acquisition.
6.2 Implications
The findings from this study confirm that social capital is the engine that drives
the disaster recovery process. The social capital engine describes the manner in which
social capital operates, in a self-sustaining and perpetual manner, and enhances the
function of critical “moving parts” during the disaster recovery process. The affirmation
of these interactions represents a contribution to current theoretical knowledge and the
practical understanding of social capital. The study also contributes to social capital
research by advancing the understanding of how social capital is developed and leveraged
in the disaster recovery context. The mechanisms identified during the course of this
study could contribute to the development of widely accepted industry best practices for
professionals and communities recovering from disaster.
More specifically, the contributions to the theoretical and practical understanding
of social capital during the disaster recovery process were the result of four distinct
developments from this study. The developments were as follows:

156
1. Research questions aligned with the identified propositions.
2. Researchable propositions were extracted from the literature on social capital.
3. Mechanisms were extracted from data to illustrate the means by which social
capital is developed in alignment with the respective proposition and question.
4. Practices were extracted from data to illustrate the means by which social
capital is leveraged in alignment with the respective proposition and question.
The findings of this study also add to research on the contribution of social capital to the
disaster recovery process by providing evidence that various mechanisms enhance the
social capital dimensions of strategic partnering, communication processes, and the
acquisition of critical sources, all of which are vital to successful rebuilding and recovery
efforts. These distinctions may be beneficial in examining circumstances in which social
capital may have a greater impact. By separating each of these dimensions and
enhancing mechanisms, future studies may focus on which practices reap the greatest
benefit for communities or determining which dimensions and mechanisms produce
particular results. In this study, evidence shows that the enhancing mechanisms are
essential components for effectively developing and leveraging each of the three
dimensions.
Disaster professionals benefit from the findings of this study by having
theoretically informed knowledge from which to generate priorities for organizing
citizens into action and working effectively with members of the community and
organizations that commit to the recovery efforts. In addition, from the events that
transpired in Broadmoor following Hurricane Katrina, professionals will gain a better
understanding of community behavior in a post-disaster setting. First, the means by

157
which communities develop and seek new strategic partnering opportunities has a
significant impact on the value of social capital and the effectiveness of the recovery
efforts. Therefore, communities should be strategic in their actions to pursue such
opportunities and should not do anything that would compromise their credibility with
prospective partners. Second, the communication dimension of social capital can be
enhanced by mechanisms rooted in structure, systems, and clearly defined
communication protocol that allow information to flow in multiple directions. Lastly,
social capital provides an effective means for acquiring necessary resources for
rebuilding. Communities obtain access to resources that may not have otherwise been
available due to a lack of resources, developed social networks, insurance, or government
aid.
The case analyzed three dimensions of social capital in the context of the
Broadmoor community in New Orleans. Through Broadmoor we have seen that the
dimensions are interdependent and have different underlying antecedents that influence
their respective values. In the following table and discussion, I present an overview of
the three dimensions and provide mechanisms for enhancing each of the dimensions.
These implications are general in nature and, while they were extracted from the
Broadmoor case, from this point they will be discussed outside of the context of
Broadmoor. The intent is to discuss the implications of the findings for communities, in
general, that have been impacted by disasters. The goal is to provide communities with
an inventory of social capital enhancing mechanisms that can be used to enhance social
capital along each of the three dimensions to increase the efficiency and effectiveness of
their disaster recovery efforts.

158
The inventory list is not comprehensive; rather, it reflects observations from the
Broadmoor case that are generalizable and serves as a list of mechanisms that
communities may consult and adapt to particular needs and situations when recovering
from disasters. In addition, the effectiveness of these mechanisms, when applied to
enhancing the social capital dimensions, requires attention to specific needs of the
community and acknowledging that each of the dimensions of social capital and their
enhancing mechanisms are interdependent. For instance, a significant, disproportionate,
or unnecessary emphasis on one mechanism may impede the value of social capital and
curtail the enhancement of a mechanism within one of the other dimensions.
Communities should consider the circumstances and influential factors unique to their
situations when applying the following social capital enhancing mechanisms.
Table 21: Mechanisms for enhancing social capital dimensions
Social capital dimension Social capital enhancing mechanisms
Strategic partnering Identify and recruit strong leaders
Develop and articulate shared values
Develop a unified effort
Partnership recruiting is an ongoing effort
Determining “fit” is an ongoing effort
Governance structure
Inventory special skills and abilities
Create win-win opportunities
Celebrate milestones and accomplishments
Communication Create a communication structure
Regular meetings
Meeting protocol
Hold informal social gatherings
Reinforce shared values
Utilize multiple delivery modes
Resource acquisition Identify and acknowledge needs (be specific and always
know the status)
Develop vehicles for acquiring resources (i.e. CDC)
Create easy to use systems for volunteers (remove
obstacles/barriers to entry)
Prepare partners to tap into extended networks for support

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Social capital dimension Social capital enhancing mechanisms
and resources (connections, physical resources)

6.2.1 Strategic partnering dimension
Strategic partnering is a highly influential dimension of social capital that can
significantly enhance or impede the overall value of social capital. For instance, the
number of partners, commitment level of partners, and access to resources through
partners can have a tremendous impact on the effectiveness of communication and the
ability to acquire resources for recovery. In order for partnering efforts to develop in a
productive manner it is essential that the right leaders be in place. Leaders assume an
important role in developing relationships with partners and in the community’s efforts to
recruit new partners. Effective leaders have the capacity to communicate effectively,
build consensus, and manage adversity in a manner that will mitigate the negative impact
of setbacks. Effective leadership is especially important in developing and articulating
shared values that partners will want to contribute to and that the community will
passionately support. If the community can embrace shared values it will help ensure
their efforts remain focused and those values may also serve as a source of inspiration
during challenges. In addition, shared values contribute to developing a unified effort. A
community that can remain unified and work toward a common goal with partners is
more powerful and capable of accomplishing much more than a fractioned community
with diverging interests and values.
Partnership recruiting is an essential and ongoing effort. The needs of the
community are constantly changing and priorities shift. Partners will remain engaged as
long as they believe they are adding value or as long as it makes sense to them; therefore,

160
it is important that recruiting efforts continue regardless of past accomplishments and that
community efforts not be built upon the identity of partners. Certainly it may be
advantageous to publicly associate with some partners, but the community must use high
profile associations to boost its own image first since partnerships tend to be seasonal as
needs and priorities change. Related to this, communities should always consider “fit,”
that is, brining on the right partners at the right time. The right partners will bring the
right skills at the right time and recognize the needs of the community come first; the
community should never undermine this, regardless of who wants to join their efforts.
For instance, some partners come with a “wow” factor that may convince some people
that they are the right partner simply because of their name and beliefs of what may be
accomplished through a partnership. Despite such factors it is critical that “fit” and
timing be considered to avoid the risk of needlessly overshadowing the work and efforts
of other partners. There must be “fit” with the community and “fit” must be considered
in light of existing and future potential partnerships. In addition, partners should have
some involvement and respect the governing guidelines established by the community as
it relates to decision making and determining all courses of action. Governing guidelines
should be well articulated, clear, and understood by all parties. The input of partners
should be sought and valued; however, partnerships are seasonal and the community
must take complete ownership of their own recovery efforts. If the recovery process is
driven by a partner, the community risks taking on the burden of inheriting the visions of
someone else and picking up the pieces should such a partnership come to a premature
end.

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Recognizing the needs of the community as the top priority must be balanced with
creating “win” opportunities for partners. If the community seeks to be the only party
gaining from the experience then a valuable partnership may be strained or lost.
Therefore, it is important that the needs and priorities of partners be acknowledged and
that the community help partners benefit from the experience provided such efforts are
reasonable and do not detract too much from advancing the recovery efforts. Finally, all
achievements represent joint accomplishments of the group and should be celebrated
appropriately and in an inclusive manner. Such celebrations may serve as opportunities
to strengthen networks, build social relations, and energize and inspire future work.
6.2.2 Communication dimension
The means for enhancing the communication dimension of social capital is rooted
in structure, regular meetings, and utilizing multiple delivery modes when
communicating. It is essential to create a communication structure that allows
information to flow in multiple directions. For instance, information should not flow in a
single direction such as from top to bottom. Rather, there should be a means for
information to be communicated in multiple directions. Recovery efforts often take on a
bottom-up approach, that is, members of the community take an active role in
participating and contributing to the recovery efforts. Part of fostering such an
environment requires that there be opportunities for communication to flow from the
bottom-up as well. This gives a sense of ownership to the community and may also help
identify and resolve problems more quickly.
Meetings should be held regularly with adherence to established protocol for
facilitating the meetings. Protocol should govern how meetings are conducted and

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dictate proper etiquette. In addition, opportunities for informal gatherings should be
capitalized upon as such gatherings provide opportunities to build social relations and to
reinforce shared values. Social relations may be enhanced by social interactions at
gatherings and connecting with new people. Shared values are reinforced when members
of the community come together and experience living out their values. For instance, if a
community values and embraces mutual respect among its members at some point those
values will be tested. Meeting in formal and informal settings provides an outstanding
opportunity for such values to be reinforced. If there is dissention in a meeting on a
particular issue residents will be tested and will either rise to the occasion and embrace
mutual respect or not. Either way, the value of mutual respect can be reinforced.
When communicating it is important to acknowledge and be sensitive to how
different people send and receive information. It is likely that multiple generations are
represented in most communities and; therefore, will have different needs related to
communication. For instance, one generation may be more prone to acquiring news
updates via mobile devices while another generation gets their news from the newspaper.
Such factors have significant implications for how the distribution of information is
prioritized and managed. The community should be surveyed to identify communication
needs and to decide on how information should be sent and received. The availability
and reliability of technology and information systems is critical, especially in disaster
recovery situations as it may take weeks or months for these systems to be fully
operational again. Ideally, several modalities will be used; however, most importantly it
must be clear to everyone how information will be transmitted and which modalities are
available.

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6.2.3 Resource acquisition dimension
It is essential that communities been keenly aware of specific needs, how needs
will be met, when needs will be met, and the precise status of meeting such needs.
Having such an awareness of needs will aid in recruiting the right partners in terms of
access to resources and in soliciting access to resources within existing networks.
Related to this, it is important to examine the vehicles in place for acquiring resources.
For instance, a local non-profit with a track record of serving the community’s political
interests may not be the most efficient vehicle for taking on fundraising, rebuilding,
redevelopment, and managing volunteer efforts. Such efforts may necessitate a new
entity be formed for fundraising and managing these types of activities.
The more dependent the community is on volunteer efforts the greater the need
will be for a manageable system and a means for accommodating teams of volunteers.
Communities dependent upon volunteers should make it a priority to remove barriers by
clearly articulating their needs and having user friendly systems for volunteers to sign-up
and arrange visits. It may help to invest in creating an experience for volunteers and
marketing that experience as an opportunity to serve others with an emphasis on personal
and professional development. Related to this, universities have tremendous resources
within faculty and student bodies and such opportunities provide access to such resources
along with a win-win situation. The win for faculty may come in the form of
opportunities to conduct research and teach fields-based classes. The win for students
often comes in the form of gaining practical and valuable life experiences. Students are
hungry for real world experience and are eager to apply what they are learning in school.
Working in such a setting may provide opportunities for nursing students to work in

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health clinics, construction students to build, architecture and planning students to work
on redevelopment and design plans, policy students to work with government, and social
work students to serve the community. Disaster stricken communities provide a living
laboratory for emerging generations to develop skills. The win for communities comes in
the form of access to skill sets and resources that may not have otherwise been available.
The value of this dimension of social capital is highly dependent upon the value of
resources held by their partners and the community’s ability to successfully solicit aid.
The value of partnerships extends to the connections of partners and the resources
embedded in extended networks. A resourceful community will earn the trust of their
partners and develop a healthy bond that will provide access to extended networks and
resources.
6.3 Limitations and Recommendations for Future Research
Limitations and suggestions for future research will be addressed in two general
areas: Quantitative methods and theory building. The section on quantitative methods
deals with ways in which findings can be confirmed quantitatively and addresses
limitations within this study surrounding the decision to exclude theoretical
advancements in quantitatively measuring social capital. The theory building section
deals with limitations regarding ways in which the findings from this study will not be
generalizable due to inherent characteristics of utilizing a single case for this study.
6.3.1 Quantitative methods
A limitation of this study involves the lack of quantitative data for measuring
social capital. As mentioned earlier, the field lacks a uniform and widely accepted means
for measuring social capital, and despite recent progress and advancements in this area,

165
theory building related to measuring social capital was beyond the scope of this study.
The underlying purpose of this study was to make a contribution to practice by examining
ways in which social capital is developed and leveraged during disaster recovery. Future
case study research should continue down this path; however, it is also paramount that
advancements continue to be made in the area of measuring social capital. A uniform
and widely accepted means for measuring social capital will contribute to the
understanding and study of this phenomenon in many contexts, including disaster
recovery. This would allow researchers to measure more precisely what changes in
communities after disasters, how social capital is affected by disasters, and how
communities develop and leverage social capital during the recovery phase.
Like many social phenomenon of this nature, communities are natural and
dynamic groups with many complexities, and the frequency of disasters in urban settings
ensures there is no shortage of living laboratories to study this phenomenon. The field is
rich with cases that require no man-made inducements, as in quasi-experiments, thereby
making the research case study an excellent vehicle to contribute to such advancements
in the field. Studies that measure social capital could be carried out in two ways. One
way to measure social capital is through proximal indicators which focus on behaviors
that manifest themselves as a result of social capital such as public participation, civic
engagement, and other elements that reflect high levels of trust and reciprocity. A second
way to measure social capital is by distal indicators which rely on statistical data related
to crime, socioeconomics, GDP, population figures, and other easily quantifiable factors.
The research by Aldrich (2011) provides a means by which social capital may be
measured by quantifying the number of NGOs formed in response to a disaster.

166
Examining social capital in this context in the Kobe earthquake case allowed Aldrich to
look closely at a factor that is easily quantifiable and may have correlation to both
proximal and distal indicators. In this regard, efforts to advance the understanding and
means by which social capital is measured will strengthen the theoretical understanding
of this phenomenon for those who will research issues related to social capital in the
future.
It is also important to consider that most attempts to quantify social capital in the
disaster literature are done post-disaster. This is logical considering the fact that the time,
place, and extent of damage are not easily predictable; therefore, given the technology for
predicting disasters and current tools for measuring social capital, it would be difficult to
quantify social capital in a pre-disaster context. Aldrich (2011) examines NGOs created
per capita in response to a disaster to measure social capital in a post-disaster setting.
Similarly, it would be interesting to explore whether the number of churches and
religious organizations per capita provide a means for measuring social capital in a pre-
disaster setting. Furthermore, what are the implications for communities when disasters
strike? Do communities with more churches and religious organizations per capita
respond more effectively? Are more NGOs created per capita in response to disasters in
these areas? How do churches and religious organizations influence the behaviors of
communities that have been impacted by disaster?
6.3.2 Theory building
The understanding of social capital in disaster recovery from this study shows
how social capital was developed and leveraged in one of over seventy neighborhoods in
New Orleans. The study has only identified and examined three practices that contribute

167
to enhancing the disaster recovery process and does not specifically address factors that
impede the means by which social capital is developed and leveraged. The case certainly
contains information as to which factors adversely affect social capital; however, to
preserve focus in this study, I decided to limit the study to positive factors that enhance
social capital during disaster recovery. The assessment of negative factors in future
studies should seek information related to factors that impede the development of
strategic partnerships, communication, and the acquisition of resources. For example, it
would be beneficial to examine cases that experienced failed partnerships or cases that
were not approached by external third parties seeking to help during the recovery process.
The research case study is an excellent vehicle for investigating such cases.
The geographic location of this study imposes other limitations to the
generalizability of the findings. This could have been a cross-case analysis examining
multiple cases across neighborhood, city, county, state, or international boundaries. I
limited this study to a single case study after evaluating the benefits of analyzing a single
case and considering the contributions to practice central to this study. For example, the
cultural differences would add another dynamic for variation in the ways in which social
capital was developed and leveraged in disaster recovery. This case involves one
neighborhood in New Orleans and despite diversity amongst members of the community,
readers were to assume the New Orleans culture and lifestyle to be the dominant one.
The transfer of examining social capital in the disaster recovery context to other cultural
settings would be a valuable step in future research.
Future research may also pursue the transfer of the findings to other cases in New
Orleans after Hurricane Katrina or in entirely different settings. The aim behind such

168
research is to see if the means by which social capital is developed and leveraged differs
from Broadmoor. These studies could also examine alternative types of data (i.e.,
observational, historical), explore types of relationships (i.e., individual, inter-individual,
individual-group, and inter-group relationships), and account for cultural differences. In
addition, in order to counter balance the perspectives on social capital, future research
should also assess negative aspects of social capital. Potentially harmful effects of social
capital need to be considered.
Finally, examining the means by which social capital is developed and leveraged
in other contexts would make the theoretical framework more robust and could result in
further advancements to the practice of enhancing social capital in other settings. For
instance, if social capital is the engine that drives the disaster recovery process, will we
find that social capital is the engine that drives educational reform? Ending poverty?
Reducing crime? More broadly, if social capital provides a framework and model for
solving complex social problems, what other problems could we solve or improve by
having a better understanding of how social capital is developed and leveraged?
6.4 Concluding Remarks
My goal for this study was to understand the effect and role of social capital on
the disaster-recovery process and to make a theoretically informed contribution to
practice. This was my first attempt at a study of this nature, and any advancements and
contributions to practice from this study are modest at best. Kuhn (1962) stated that a
theory’s only replacement is a better theory, and I believe the same applies to practice; a
practice’s only replacement is a better practice. Therefore, I encourage fellow
practitioners and scholars to advance the practical and theoretical evidence presented in

169
this study, as I will continue to do by exploring this phenomenon through further practice
and research.

170
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Abstract (if available)

Abstract Social science has recently begun to make significant advancements in the study and understanding of the impact of social capital on the disaster recovery process. Social capital has been found to be an influential factor that significantly enhances or impedes the success of disaster recovery efforts. This study examined the capacity of one neighborhood to rebuild and recover after Hurricane Katrina. Using a case study the researcher investigated factors that facilitated disaster recovery efforts by examining ways in which social capital was developed and leveraged. These findings have implications for public policy, affected communities, and disaster recovery professionals.

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Asset Metadata

Creator Avila, Jacob Anthony (author)

Core Title The impact of social capital: a case study on the role of social capital in the restoration and recovery of communities after disasters

School School of Policy, Planning and Development

Degree Doctor of Policy, Planning & Development

Degree Program Policy, Planning, and Development

Publication Date 09/13/2013

Defense Date 07/23/2013

Publisher University of Southern California (original), University of Southern California. Libraries (digital)

Tag community recovery,disaster recovery,Hurricane Katrina,OAI-PMH Harvest,redevelopment,social capital

Format application/pdf (imt)

Language English

Contributor Electronically uploaded by the author (provenance)

Advisor Robertson, Peter John (committee chair), Banerjee, Tridib K. (committee member), Jacobs, Francois (committee member), Rosebrook, Phillip (committee member)

Creator Email ja@caconstruction.net,jacobavi@usc.edu

Permanent Link (DOI) https://doi.org/10.25549/usctheses-c3-327093

Unique identifier UC11293259

Identifier etd-AvilaJacob-2034.pdf (filename),usctheses-c3-327093 (legacy record id)

Legacy Identifier etd-AvilaJacob-2034.pdf

Dmrecord 327093

Document Type Dissertation

Format application/pdf (imt)

Rights Avila, Jacob Anthony

Type texts

Source University of Southern California (contributing entity), University of Southern California Dissertations and Theses (collection)

Access Conditions The author retains rights to his/her dissertation, thesis or other graduate work according to U.S. copyright law. Electronic access is being provided by the USC Libraries in agreement with the a...

Repository Name University of Southern California Digital Library

Repository Location USC Digital Library, University of Southern California, University Park Campus MC 2810, 3434 South Grand Avenue, 2nd Floor, Los Angeles, California 90089-2810, USA