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The affective framing of tort reform: toward a theory of the mediating effects of emotion on attitude formation
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The affective framing of tort reform: toward a theory of the mediating effects of emotion on attitude formation
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Content
THE AFFECTIVE FRAMING OF TORT REFORM:
TOWARD A THEORY OF THE MEDIATING EFFECTS OF
EMOTION ON ATTITUDE FORMATION
by
Parker R. Hevron
A Dissertation Presented to the
FACULTY OF THE USC GRADUATE SCHOOL
UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA
In Partial Fulfillment of the
Requirements of the Degree
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
POLITICAL SCIENCE AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS PROGRAM
August 2013
Copyright 2013 Parker R. Hevron
ii
Dedication
To Eva, my wife and biggest supporter. You inspire me every day.
To Ken and Lynn Hevron, my parents and my foundation.
To Elizabeth Hevron, my little sister, who is well on her way to becoming
a “real” doctor.
Words cannot express how much I love you all.
iii
Acknowledgements
I would like to thank the three exemplary members of my committee –
Ann Crigler, Jeb Barnes, and G. Thomas Goodnight – for their steadfast support
of this dissertation. In particular, I would like to thank Professor Crigler for
believing in this project and for doing everything in her power to ensure its timely
completion. I would like to thank my fellow members of the Political Science and
International Relations Ph.D. Program at the University of Southern California –
those who have moved on to bigger and better things, those about to embark on
dissertations of their own, and those still trying to figure out the best places to
park on the University Park campus. In particular, I would like to thank Nicolas
de Zamaróczy, Justin Berry, and Simon Radford for their friendship, support, and
feedback on various aspects of this dissertation. Though it will undoubtedly be
quieter than VKC 213, my new office will be sorely lacking in the camaraderie
that you have provided every day for the past five years. I would like to thank the
POIR staff, particularly Cathy Ballard, Aurora Ramirez, and Veridiana Chavarin.
You have made going to “work” every day a joy. I would like to thank my family
– immediate and extended – for giving me the chance to thrive. Last, but certainly
not least, I would like to thank my wife, Eva, who has loved and supported me
every step of the way and is always ready for the next adventure.
iv
Table of Contents
Dedication ............................................................................................................... ii
Acknowledgements ................................................................................................ iii
List of Illustrations .................................................................................................. v
Chapter 1 -- Introduction …………………………………………………………1
Chapter 2 – Frames, Affect, and Tort Reform ...................................................... 18
Chapter 3 – Tort Reform in the Newspaper .......................................................... 61
Chapter 4 -- Experiment………………………………………………………...102
Chapter 5 – Conclusion & Next Steps ................................................................ 147
References…………………………………………………………...………….166
Appendix………………………………………………………………………..186
v
List of Illustrations
Figures
Chapter 3
Figure 1. Frame Types by Search Term 84
Figure 2. Episodic Frame Subjects 86
Figure 3. Creating a Thematic Index 89
Figure 4. Thematic Frame Types 90
Figure 5. Interest Groups by Tort Reform Stance 92
Figure 6. Pro-Tort Reform Interest Groups by Issue Area 94
Figure 7. Rate of Mentions per Group Type (Pro-Tort Reform) 96
Figure 8. Anti-Tort Reform Groups by Issue Area 97
Chapter 4
Figure 9. Experimental Design 111
Chapter 5
Figure 10. Parallel Design 153
Figure 11. Parallel Encouragement Design
154
Tables
Chapter 3
Table 1. Frame Appearance 82
Table 2. Episodic Frames 84
Table 3. Interest Groups Appearing More Than Once 93
Table 4. Interest Groups Mentioned in Articles 194
Chapter 4
Table 5. Emotional Response by Treatment Condition 125
Table 6. Emotional Response by Frame Type 128
Table 7. Emotional Response by Frame Tone 128
Table 8. Policy Views by Treatment Condition 130
Table 9. Policy Views by Frame Tone 140
Table 10. Policy Views by Frame Type 142
1
Chapter 1
Introduction
2
“How do people make sense of frames?”
-- Donald Kinder, 2007
This question of how ordinary citizens make sense of frames was posed in
a 2007 overview of the framing literature by the political scientist Donald Kinder.
His article, which included theoretical and methodological suggestions for the
future of the framing paradigm, appeared in a special issue of the Journal of
Communication devoted entirely to the state of framing literature (Kinder 2007).
1
Decades of research demonstrates that frames have tangible effects on how people
think about issues – both political and non-political (D'Angelo 2002; Hertog and
McLeod 2001; Scheufele and Tewksbury 2007; Shah, Domke, and Wackman
1996). Despite widespread agreement that frames can affect people’s opinions,
the conditions under which they do so are still the subject of much debate
(Carragee and Roefs 2004; Chong and Druckman 2007; Entman 1993; Scheufele
1999). The current state of the framing paradigm reflects this struggle; it is a
sometimes messy tangle of theoretical constructs and empirical applications of
1
The amount of framing research has sharply proliferated over the past twenty years (for a meta-
analysis of framing literature, see Borah 2011).
3
those constructs. Simplicity and parsimony are needed, particularly as researchers
uncover more evidence of frames in mass media communication, as well as
evidence that those frames have sometimes significant effects on the construction
of political attitudes. This dissertation sets aside some questions – frame
construction and frame identification, among others – to focus on one part of the
paradigm that still looms large in the orbit of framing effects research: the
psychological processes that underpin the questions of how, why, and when
frames can alter public opinion.
Affective Framing
Public issues become political issues when elites and advocates attempt to
impose their own meaning on issues (Gamson and Modigliani 1987; Nelson and
Kinder 1996). These meanings are then filtered to the public through mass media,
which is subject to market forces and other institutional concerns in deciding
whether (and how) to report political issues. Once disseminated by mass media,
the frames used by journalists to classify and explain political issues can assist
people in making sense of incoming information in an often confusing, chaotic
world. While recognizing that the universe of different forms of media
dissemination is vast (and growing as fast as new technology allows), this
dissertation is concerned with how one conduit between journalists and the public
(newspapers) have reported on one issue (tort reform in the United States) and
with what consequences on attitudes toward that issue.
4
Social scientists concerned with the process of attitude formation must
grapple with recent scholarship on emotion and affect that shows a symbiotic
relationship among emotion, cognition, and attitude formation (Angie et al. 2011;
Damasio 1994, 1999). Political scientists, drawing upon recent work in
economics, psychology, and the neurosciences, have begun examining the
affective and emotive qualities of politics and political messaging (Marcus,
Neuman, and MacKuen 2000; Marcus et al. 2000). Emotional reactions to media-
generated frames can affect political learning, political engagement, and policy
judgments (Aarøe 2011; Angie et al. 2011; Gross 2008; Gross and D’Ambrosio
2004; Kinder and Sanders 1990). Some scholars have hypothesized that emotional
reactions to frames play a mediating role in the existence and size of framing
effects (Aarøe 2011; Brader, Valentino, and Suhay 2008; Druckman and Nelson
2003; Gross 2008; Slothuus 2008).
2
Scholars at work in the framing effects paradigm have also begun to
identify emotion as an important aspect of the framing effects process (Aarøe
2011; Brader, Valentino, and Suhay 2008; Gross 2008). Individuals that may
appear similar before exposure to a treatment in the form of a frame may respond
to the frame in multiple (and sometimes difficult to measure) ways. Emotional
reactions are one such response and can lead to a variety of cognitive outcomes
(Aarøe 2011; Brader, Valentino, and Suhay 2008; DeSteno et al. 2004; Druckman
& Nelson 2003; Gross 2008; Lazarus 2001). By accounting for the role that
2
Mediators have been described as “a variable that is causally between two variables and that
accounts for the relationship between those two variables (Hayes 2005, p. 425).
5
emotion plays as an individual-level mediating variable of framing effects, the
present study attempts to overcome comparability problems that sometimes
plague experimental research by identifying and measuring the variables that
underlie causal relationships. In doing so, we will be able to better understand
how people make sense of incoming political information and to what ends they
use such information to construct political attitudes.
Framing Mediators
A surfeit of framing research over the past several decades clearly
demonstrates that the ways in which people are presented with information can
change their opinions regarding that information. Yet before we can analyze
causality and the relationship among mediating variables in the framing effects
process, we must address emotions and prior beliefs – two hypothesized
mediators of framing effects – and how they interact with frames in affecting
people’s political opinions (Aarøe 2011; Gross 2008).
A useful starting point to think about the best ways to analyze how
framing effects operate is to step back and examine the goal of most scientific
research: causal inference (Barnes and Weller forthcoming; Brady and Collier
2010; King, Keohane, and Verba 1994). Political scientists often use experiments
to estimate causal effects, or, the degree to which b is caused by a. The causal
relationship in the framing process is relatively straightforward. A person reads
(or views) a frame and that person’s attitude (sometimes) changes. In this
conception of framing effects, both the independent variable (the frame) and the
6
dependent variable (the effect) are clearly delineated. What remains contested,
however, is what happens between the frame and the effect, in what Kosuke Imai
and co-authors refer to as the “black box of causality” (Imai et al. 2011; Imai,
Keele, and Yamamoto 2010; Imai, Tingley, and Yamamoto 2013). Although
experiments are quite useful in helping researchers determine whether a treatment
causes changes in outcomes, they cannot tell us how or why. For framing effects
studies, this has usually meant finding various means to estimate framing effects.
Recently, scholars have begun to examine the mediators and moderators of
framing effects, wanting to locate, understand, and make predictions about causal
mechanisms –the “hidden” part of the framing effects process that allows (or does
not allow) a frame to alter someone’s opinion. These additional variables are
often studied post-treatment in experiments involving framing mediators and pre-
treatment in experiments involving framing moderators.
Debate over the nature of mediators and moderators of framing effects, as
well as the best ways to explore their role in the framing effects process, is a
hotly-contested area of framing scholarship (Chong and Druckman 2007, 2010,
2011; Druckman 2001; Imai et al. 2011; Imai, Keele, and Yamamoto 2010; Imai
and Yamamoto 2013; Nelson, Oxley, and Clawson 1997; Scheufele 1999;
Slothuus 2008). A recent meta-analytical overview of the framing literature (see
Borah 2011) identifies a number of different psychological processes employed
by researchers to examine the role of mediating variables, which include
accessibility (Iyengar 1991), priority explanation (Nelson, Oxley, and Clawson
7
1997), applicability (Price and Tewksbury 1997), readjusting explanation (Simon
2001), metaphorical reasoning (Lau and Schlesinger 2005), and usability (Pan and
Kosicki 2005).
Despite this attention, some researchers who have attempted to make
connections among the mediators and moderators of the framing effects process
(usually in the form of laboratory experiments) often fail to design their studies in
ways that allow for them to make claims about the mediating role of certain
variables, including discrete emotions (Brader, Valentino, and Suhay 2008;
Druckman and Nelson 2003; Imai and Yamamoto 2013; Slothuus 2008). The
shortcomings of most experimental framing research designed to penetrate the
causal arrow between a and b center on the failure to satisfy the assumptions that
are required to make the sort of claims that researchers hope to make (and often
claim to have successfully made). A later chapter in this dissertation addresses
these shortcomings in greater detail; for now, I address the rationale for using the
political issue of tort reform to explore affective framing and the role of mediating
variables.
Case Selection
Tort Reform
This dissertation uses mass media framing of the political issue of tort
reform in the United States as a lens through which to examine the persuasive
effects frames and emotion’s role as a mediating variable in the framing effects
8
process. Tort reform provides a compelling case for addressing these issue areas.
First, tort reform is an issue that is regularly covered by mass media in the United
States, yet outside of deeply entrenched advocates on both sides of the debate, it is
unlikely to elicit immoveable reactions among the general public. In other words,
the issue does not have strong, divided public opinion and may be open to
framing effects. Second, scholars of tort reform have identified “tort tales,” or
media-disseminated, individualized examples of how the system needs fixing, as a
primary causal mechanism in the construction of public attitudes toward tort
reform (Daniels and Martin 2000, 2004; Gavin 2008; Haltom 1998; Haltom and
McCann 1998; 2004). At the same time, they lament that statistical data that
refutes these tort tales are less likely to appear in media coverage and when they
do, are less likely to persuade readers than event-centered examples. The patterns
of media coverage they describe (and the claims about their effects on attitude
construction) map almost perfectly onto the episodic/thematic framing dichotomy
identified and tested by communications researchers (Aarøe 2011; Gross 2008;
Iyengar 1991).
The Republican Party has been publicly exhorting the need for legislation
to reform the American tort system since the 1970s. Indeed, passing tort reform
legislation has been an official plank of the Republican Party for over forty years.
Though the amount of attention journalists have given the issue has ebbed and
flowed, public opinion research finds that Americans’ attitudes about the court
system, in general, often reflect beliefs that the system is out-of-control or has run
9
amok (Burke 2002; Haltom and McCann 1998, 2004; Kagan 2001; Newton
1987).
Although public debates about tort reform legislation have flared at
various points in recent history, the issue remains on the political agenda. Tort
reform legislation continues to be introduced in state legislatures across the
United States (see Hubbard 2006 for an overview of tort reform efforts at the state
level). In February and March 2013, Arkansas lawmakers weighed competing
ballot measures to address rulings that overturned parts of a 2003 tort reform law
(DeMillo 2013). At the federal level, in debates over the Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act in 2009 and 2010, many conservatives insisted that any
overhaul of America’s healthcare system must include accompanying changes to
limit the scope of the tort system (Krauthammer 2009). The healthcare example
illustrates just how deeply the tort system’s tentacles extend into seemingly
unrelated political issue arenas.
The forty year-long public debate over tort reform in the United States
reflects not only an evolving conception about the proper role of the tort system in
redressing injustices, but tort reform as an open-ended site of discussion in which
various political institutions interact to shrink and enlarge the scope of the debate
over the issue. The ebbs and flows of the public salience of tort reform reflect
interplay between various institutions – interest groups, mass media, and
legislative bodies – that demonstrates Schattschneider’s (1960) maxim that “some
10
issues are organized into politics while others are organized out” (p. 69). The
result is an ongoing narrative that reflects the social construction of the meaning
of tort reform and serves as a window into the process of political contestation
among elites and the public (Gaventa 1982; Schattschneider 1960).
Those who have studied the evolution of tort reform as a political issue
note that public perception about the state of the tort system often does not match
up with reality. Americans consistently think that the system is, in essence, more
broken than it really is. Why do Americans find the need for tort reform more or
less compelling? Some have singled out mass media as the biggest reason behind
the disjuncture between reality and attitudes (Cox 1992; Galanter 1993, 1998;
Garber and Bower 1999; Haltom and McCann 2004; McCann and Engel 2009;
Robbenbolt and Studebaker 2003; Strasser 1987). This argument does not imply
intentional deception on the part of journalists. Rather, these researchers suggest
that several factors – including some that deal with the institutional constraints of
mass media – affect the reporting that shapes public opinion.
Despite the examples cited above, public law scholars have largely
overlooked insights from political communication and psychology that could be
useful in explaining variation in public opinion about law-related policies, though
there are exceptions. Bailis and MacCoun (1996), in a content analysis of media
coverage about tort reform, cite Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky’s (1981)
“availability heuristic,” which states that the ease of recalling something affects
11
how likely we think it is to occur. Yet their work is not aimed at the construction
of legal attitudes among the public (they examine potential litigants). Most public
law research on media effects is qualitative or anecdotal in nature and offers post
hoc explanations. None of the scholars who examine the public side of tort reform
have tested theories about the nature of media effects in controlled, laboratory
settings. Our understanding of how the public feels about tort reform and how the
media have shaped such feelings can be informed by such an approach – an
approach that includes recent research regarding the interplay of mass media,
affective responses, and public opinion. Thus, this project deigns to answer
several questions about the nature of tort reform as a public issue. To the extent
that mass media matter in leading people to feel a certain way about tort reform,
what role do certain news frames – episodic and thematic – play in such a
process? Moreover, do certain narrative frames that often appear in media
coverage of tort reform lead people to have certain affective and emotional
responses to coverage? Do those reactions serve as mediating variables in the
construction of attitudes toward tort reform?
In their 2004 book, Distorting the Law, political scientists William Haltom
and Michael McCann attribute attitude shifts in favor of reform, in part, to
increased media coverage of atypical lawsuits—the sort of examples that are
likely to conform to mass media’s institutional standards of newsworthiness.
Though this dissertation does not discount the effects of implicit agenda-setting
(McCombs and Reynolds 2009; McCombs and Shaw 1972) on public attitudes, it
12
takes a different tack in examining how media coverage may affect attitude
formation regarding tort reform. Put simply, Haltom and McCann may have
seized on the wrong component of the media effects literature to explain attitudes
toward tort reform. Rather than attributing causal inference solely to the relative
amount of media coverage that tort reform receives, I argue that an important part
of the tort reform puzzle is how journalists report about tort reform, the frames
they commonly employ when writing stories about tort reform legislation.
The next paragraph briefly introduces the application of framing theory to
our understanding of the construction of attitudes about tort reform. Applying
what we understand about two types of news frames—episodic and thematic—
may help us to better understand why media coverage of tort reform has the
effects that it does.
Certain narrative forms of media coverage may lead viewers to experience
different cognitive and affective reactions to the tort system and legislative efforts
to change it. In his seminal 1991 book on media effects, Is Anyone Responsible?
How Television Frames Political Issues, Shanto Iyengar identified episodic and
thematic frames as two forms of frames that are fundamental to news reporting
(Iyengar 1991). Other researchers have applied Iyengar’s news frame dichotomy
to framing experiments about political issues. Aarøe (2011) tested the effects of
episodic and thematic frames in stories about Danish immigration policy. Gross
(2008) examined episodic and thematic frames in the context of media coverage
13
of minimum sentencing requirements. They examine whether these frame types
lead people to have different cognitive and affective reactions to episodic and
thematic frames and find that in some cases, and under certain conditions, they
lead people to have quite different reactions (Aarøe 2011; Gross 2008). Their
findings suggest that episodic and thematic frames are a useful (and previously
overlooked) method of investigating why some forms of tort reform media
coverage seem to resonate with the public whereas others do not.
An aim of this dissertation is to ascertain which features of news reporting
about tort reform affect support for proposed tort reform legislation. Though some
researchers recognize that mass media coverage plays an important role in the
construction of tort reform as a political issue, none have seized upon Iyengar’s
(1991) theory of news frames to gain analytical purchase on differences in
opinion that may result from different types of media coverage about tort reform.
Following in the vein of Ted Brader and co-authors (2008), who coupled an
estimation of framing experiments with an inquiry as to why the effects happened,
the experiment in this dissertation is designed to identify the presence of
hypothesized mediators, specifically, discrete emotional responses to frames and
prior beliefs about the court system in the United States. This lays the foundation
for future experiments to analyze the relationship between them. Chapter 2 begins
with an overview of current research on frames, framing effects, and affective
framing, followed by a short discussion of the evolution of tort reform as a
political issue in the United States. It also expands on the rationale as to why mass
14
media coverage of tort reform is a ripe area to test theories about how emotions
factor into the persuasiveness of political frames. Next, the chapter examines the
current state of research on the relationship between emotion and affect and
political decision-making, laying the groundwork for the importance of
accounting for emotion as a mediator of framing effects.
Chapter 3 includes the results of a content analysis of media coverage of
tort reform, which analyzes the frequency and content of the kinds of frames used
in media coverage of tort reform. Though we have seen that past research
examines the broad contours of how mass media contribute to the social
construction of tort reform (see Bailis and MacCoun 1996; Haltom and McCann
2004), this dissertation represents the first effort at combining inductive
theoretical constructs with deductive analysis of the presence or absence of
specific frame types (thematic and episodic), whose specific effects political
psychologists and communication scholars have demonstrated in laboratory
experiments.
Chapter 4 assesses the results of an experiment designed to test the effects
of thematic and episodic frames on people’s opinions about tort reform. It also
tests for the presence and effect of mediating variables on the power of frames to
affect opinons. Experimentation and media and politics are in many ways a
natural fit. Problems of reciprocal causation that sometimes plague other subfields
are relatively absent in media studies that make use of experiments (Nelson,
15
Bryner, and Carnahan 2011). That is not to say that media experiments have not
been without their problems, one of which–the problem of omitted variables–is
addressed in this dissertation. Omitted variables consistently pose problems for
media effects experimentation, particularly when studies are concerned with
causality. Other problems endemic to experimental studies of media messaging,
such as selective exposure (e.g., people who avoid material that challenges their
political preconceptions in favor of “more ideologically congenital fare”, see
Nelson, Bryner, and Carnahan 2011, p. 367), are beyond the scope of this
dissertation. Yet by employing research designs that allow for the identification of
potentially mediating variables, this dissertation advances our understanding of
emotion and framing theory and lays the groundwork for future causal mediation
analysis experiments.
Chapter 5 re-visits Kinder’s question of how people make sense of frames.
It addresses how the experiment described in Chapter 4 lays the foundation for
implementing research designs by Kosuke Imai and co-authors to further analyze
the relationship among mediating variables (Imai et al. 2011; Imai, Keele, and
Yamamoto 2010; Imai and Yamamoto 2013). As has been discussed, while Imai
and co-authors generally applaud efforts to advance framing effects scholarship
through the study of casual mechanisms, they identify several methodological
limitations faced by scholars who purport to study framing effects mechanisms.
Indeed, they argue that current methodologies are mostly insufficient to answer
the questions in which their designers are interested. Based on the suggestions and
16
insights of Imai and co-authors, this dissertation suggests that an alternative
research design – a parallel encouragement design – can be used in future framing
effects experiments to overcome some of these limitations.
Next, Chapter 5 discusses the political ramifications of episodic and
thematic frames on the issue of tort reform. By portraying examples of the tort
system as primarily episodic or thematic, journalists play an important role in the
development of people’s political preferences; this has important implications not
only for tort reform, but other political issues, as well. How well people
understand the issues that are debated among political elites is directly correlated
to the public’s ability to hold elected officials and political institutions
accountable.
Finally, it discusses ways in which the research presented in this
dissertation can be extended. For example, rather than relying on subjects to self-
report measures of emotion, future research could use technological
advancements in brain science to examine the impact of frames on patterns of
brain activity. As it gets easier for social scientists to use cutting-edge
physiological measures of emotion, we will be able to do a better job of precisely
measuring various forms of psychological response to treatments, which may lead
to theories of political behavior that are better-specified and more easily
replicable.
17
Despite recent advancements in framing theory (including those reported
in this dissertation), Kinder’s question posed at the beginning of this chapter
remains fundamentally important – and its answer fundamentally contested. This
dissertation analyzes media coverage of one political issue, and uses it to
manipulate treatments in a survey experiment – treatments that are designed to
uncover patterns of framing effects and the mediating variables that may correlate
with larger (or smaller) effects. In other words, as profoundly important as
Kinder’s question is, its brevity belies the complexity in finding a satisfactory
answer. Successful efforts will be incremental and piecemeal, built as much on
the generation of hypotheses as the testing of hypotheses.
18
Chapter 2
Frames, Affect, and Tort Reform
19
Mass media frames are a communication tool with several uses. They
serve two core functions. First, they help people to make sense of a complex
world. Framing suggests that people use interpretive schemas to better understand
the world around them. These schemas are often created by mass media,
internalized by consumers, and then reconstituted in a feedback loop in which
frame consumers and creators categorize and reinterpret actions and events to fit
differing frameworks. Second, while frames undoubtedly do aid in
understanding, they also lead people to understand an issue or event according to
a specific interpretation put forth by the framer (with varying degrees of success).
The first function of frames – helping people to make sense of a complex
world – is reflected in many of the definitions of frames put forth by scholars over
the past twenty-five years. Frames have been described as a “central organizing
idea or story line that provides meaning to an unfolding strip of events, weaving a
connection among them.” (Gamson and Modigliani 1987, p. 143). An earlier
definition illustrates how frames assist humans in understanding the world beyond
what they can directly experience, helping make that distant world “look natural”
(Gitlin 1980, p. 6) Others seize on the ability of frames to bring order to the
world, arguing that frames make events “something that can be told about; they
have power because they make the world make sense” (Manoff 1986, p. 243).
Some touch on the fact that as long as issues have more than one side, frames will
exist; for example, Popkin (1994) argues that framing arises “whenever there is
more than one way to think about a subject” (p. 83). Robert Entman, the
20
influential political communication and framing scholar, wrote that a frame’s
purpose is, “to select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more
salient in a communicating context, in such a way as to promote a particular
problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment
recommendation for the item described” (Entman 1993, p. 52). Others argue that
frames draw their power from a shared sense of meaning: “Frames are organizing
principles that are socially shared and persistent over time, that work symbolically
to meaningfully structure the world” (Reese 2001, p. 11).
Communications research tends to include frames and framing effects
underneath the umbrella of “media effects” (Bryant and Oliver 2008). Media
effects research generally refers to three disparate, though sometimes connected,
concepts: agenda setting, priming, and framing. Before discussing various types
of frames and how scholars define and measure their effects, a brief discussion of
the evolution of media effects research will lay the groundwork for differentiating
frames from agenda setting and priming.
Agenda Setting, Priming, and Framing
An analogy made famous by the psychologist William James is useful in
conceptualizing the effects that modern mass media have on the public. In
Principles of Psychology, James described a newborn baby’s view of the world as
“one great, blooming, buzzing confusion.” (James 1890). Later scholars of
21
modern mass media, most notably Walter Lippmann in the 1920s, seized upon
James’ analogy as a useful parallel to the difficulty of making sense of the modern
world because the ever-increasing speed and volume of new information. The
information environment is complex, as is interpreting the opinions that people
form when faced with incoming information. Much as a child begins to categorize
and construct meaning from a widening realm of experiences, mass media can
(sometimes) help modern humans make order from a seemingly chaotic world.
Three theoretical approaches emerged among scholars who attempted to ascertain
the effects of mass media on the public in the postwar era: agenda setting,
priming, and framing. These approaches to media effects came to dominate
studies of the interaction between mass mediated information and human
behavior.
Although overviews of the media effects literature often group the three
approaches under the umbrella of “media effects,” there are key distinctions
among them. One of these differences is the location of the locus of effect for
each. In agenda setting studies the key point is the relative amount of media
attention an issue receives, rather than specific content (McCombs and Reynolds
2009; McCombs and Shaw 1972). Agenda setting theory argues that when people
make decisions they employ a memory-based consideration that is more
accessible than other considerations due to the relative saturation of media
exposure.
22
Priming refers to the change in standards that people use to make political
evaluations (Iyengar and Kinder 1987). News content suggests to audiences that
they ought to use specific benchmarks for evaluating the performance of political
actors and entities. The locus of effect, therefore, in both agenda setting and
priming, relies on a memory-based model of information processing (Scheufele
and Tewksbury 2007).
Conversely, framing does not rely on relative amounts of attention in order
to make information more accessible. Instead, framing effects rely on the way an
issue is described or labeled in news coverage. As Scheufele and Tewksbury
(2007) argue, “The primary difference on the psychological level between agenda
setting and priming, on the one hand, and framing, on the other hand, is therefore
the difference between whether we think about an issue and how we think about it
[italics added]” (p. 14).
Framing Effects
Scholars in a wide range of fields have demonstrated connections between
how stories are framed and citizens’ feelings about the subjects of those stories
(Aarøe 2011; Freedman 1997; Gross 2008; Kinder and Sanders 1990; Mendelberg
2001; Nelson and Kinder 1996; Nelson, Oxley, and Clawson 1997). These
connections are commonly called “framing effects” (Chong and Druckman 2007,
2010, 2011; Entman 1993; Scheufele 1999). Framing effects have been defined
23
as, “when (often small) changes in the presentation of an issue or an event
produce (sometimes large) changes of opinion” (Chong and Druckman 2007, p.
45). The framing literature is replete with studies demonstrating (sometimes)
lasting changes in public opinion after people are presented with differing frames.
Despite the many definitions of frames and the multitude of studies demonstrating
that framing effects can exist, about the only thing that scholars at work in the
framing paradigm can agree upon is that frames do matter—they matter
sometimes, among differing groups of people, and under certain conditions.
Political scientists Dennis Chong and Jamie Druckman contend that an
attitude toward an object is the weighted sum of a series of evaluated beliefs about
that object (Chong and Druckman 2007, 2010, 2011).
3
This weighted sum must
include accounts of both object evaluation and the salience of the attribute
associated with the object. In other words, it must incorporate what people think
about an issue as well as how important the issue is to them. They suggest a three-
step process to explain the psychology behind framing effects—or, how a
consideration raised in a frame can influence an individual’s opinion (Arceneaux
2012, p. 273). First, a given consideration must be stored in memory to be
available for retrieval and use. Second, the consideration must be accessible.
Third, an individual must consciously evaluate the applicability of the accessible
consideration. Broadly, these three steps can be considered mediators of issue-
3
As Holbrook (2011) argues, the history of scholars trying to define “attitudes” is a long one, yet
Eagly and Chaiken have devised a definition that is widely used: An attitude is “a psychological
tendency that is expressed by evaluating a particular entity with some degree of favor or disfavor”
(Eagly and Chaiken 1993, p. 1).
24
based framing effects. Though these steps sometimes act in concert with one
another, Chong and Druckman (2007) argue that changes in any one of them
constitutes a framing effect.
Frame Types
Researchers use a wide range of approaches to conceptualize and identify
different types of frames. These approaches draw on literatures in sociology,
economics, psychology, cognitive linguistics, and communication. As Hertog and
McLeod (2001) point out, this range of multiple approaches is both a blessing and
a curse (Borah 2011, p. 246). While scholars still struggle with various theories
that attempt to explain the underpinnings of framing effects, consensus seems to
have formed around the existence of three different frame types, each of which
differs from the others conceptually as well as theoretically. They are:
equivalency frames, issue frames, and news frames.
Equivalency Frames
Equivalency frames include logically alike content that is presented or
phrased differently. Equivalency frames were first identified as such in the
groundbreaking work of Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman (1981, 1986) on
the role of cognitive bias in human decision-making.
25
The “Asian disease” problem, first described by Tversky and Kahneman
(1981), is a canonical example of an equivalency frame:
Imagine the United States is preparing for an outbreak of an unusual
Asian disease that is expected to kill 600 people. Two alternative
programs to combat the disease have been proposed. Scientific estimates
of the consequences of the program are as follows:
Positive frame:
If Program A is adopted, exactly 200 people will be saved.
If Program B is adopted, there is a 1 in 3 probability that all 600 people
will be saved and a 2 in 3 probability that no people will be saved.
Negative frame:
If Program C is adopted, exactly 400 people will die.
If Program D is adopted, there is a 1 in 3 probability that nobody will die
and a 2 in 3 probability that all 600 will die.
In this scenario, Tversky and Kahneman found that subtle differences in
presentation of alternatives led subjects to make drastically different choices.
Subjects who received the “Positive” frame (e.g., the “gain” frame) and were thus
inclined to think about the problem in terms of relative gains overwhelmingly
picked the seemingly less-risky sure thing in Program A, while subjects in the
“Negative” frame (e.g., the “loss” frame) overwhelmingly chose to pursue
Program B. In other words, people generally exhibit a tendency to be risk-seeking
when confronted with the negatively framed problem and risk-averse when
presented with positively framed problems (Tversky and Kahneman 1981).
Equivalency frames continue to comprise the bulk of the literature on
framing effects (e.g., Bartels 2002; Chong and Druckman, 2007; Druckman 2001;
26
Levy 2003; Nelson et al. 2010; Quattrone and Tversky 1988; Tversky and
Kahneman 1981, 1986). There are several reasons behind the popularity of
studying such frames. By choosing scenarios that are logically the same, yet
presented differently, researchers are able to avoid the confounding effects of
different information. Equivalency frames are relatively easy to operationalize in
a laboratory setting and often lead to differing effects that are statistically
significant.
Issue Frames
Public issues are inherently contested and multifaceted. Issue-based
frames stress alternative perspectives of complex phenomena. Scholars have
utilized numerous political phenomena to illustrate the nature of issue frames.
One such example comes from Nelson and Kinder’s (1996) research on the debate
over healthcare legislation in the United States during President Clinton’s first
term in office. They identify two frames, one that frames healthcare legislation as
helping the working poor and another that links the issue to an overly intrusive
government. In another example, Chong and Druckman (2010) use a Ku Klux
Klan rally to illustrate differences in issue frames. Are Klan marchers using the
rally to engage in hate speech, or are they exercising their First Amendment
rights? Clearly, they are doing both, yet to some people a piece of reporting that
emphasizes one frame over the other may lead to differences in how the person
views the event and how they categorize and store it in memory for future
cognitive use. How issue frames affect the storage of knowledge for future use is
27
touched upon by Druckman (2004) in a discussion about the importance of
studying issue frames. He argues that the effects of issue frames are “situations
where, by emphasizing a subset of potentially relevant considerations, a speaker
(or any other source of information, such as an article) leads individuals to focus
on these considerations when constructing their opinions” (Druckman 2004, p.
672). In the world of politics, where multiple sides of every issue exist, issue
frames have proven to be a particularly popular way of operationalizing framing
constructs.
Though issue frames are created by journalists (highlighting some under-
reported aspect of a policy, for example), they can also be explicitly partisan (e.g.,
by using quotes from political elites that cast a political issue in such a way that it
is linked to another issue or value). It is important to note that some recent
scholarship on issue-based frames stresses external validity by exposing subjects
to more than one kind of issue frame, as well as doing so over a longer period of
time (Chong and Druckman 2010). Laboratory studies of issue frames can be
more externally valid than equivalency frames, but still require the journalist to
primarily present a predominantly one-sided view of an issue or event in the news
story.
Thematic and Episodic Frames
A third type of frame—a news frame (or narrative or story-telling frame)
—is fundamental to news reporting. As we have seen, equivalency and issue
28
frames require the presence of certain information. For equivalency frames, the
same information has to be present twice in a story, though it must take a logically
different (often mathematical) form each time for it to lead to cognitive biases.
Issue frames require the presence of certain considerations pertaining to a policy
or issue that ostensibly prime readers to think about the issue in a certain way.
Unlike equivalency and issue frames, news frames do not require the presence of
differently presented information, nor particular considerations pertaining to an
issue. They are fundamental to story-telling and reflect tradeoffs by journalists in
how to present information to readers. Recall James’ description of a “blooming,
buzzing world of confusion” (James 1890). Equivalency and issue frames
(sometimes) encourage readers to make sense of a chaotic world by cognitively
choosing one similarly presented piece of information over another (equivalency
framing) or placing an issue in a previously understood context due to emphasis
on considerations (issue framing). News frames are even more fundamental.
By definition, they are present to a lesser or greater degree in almost every
news story, reflecting word-by-word choices that add up to distinctive forms of
storytelling. In an influential piece of political communication scholarship,
Iyengar identifies two forms of news frames: thematic and episodic frames
(Iyengar 1990, 1991). Kimberly Gross (2008) offered the following criteria by
which we can recognize thematic and episodic frames in the news (p. 171):
29
Thematic frames “place issues into a broader context (e.g., covering
unemployment by reporting on the latest unemployment figures
and offering commentary by economists or public officials on the
impact of the economy on unemployment).”
Episodic frames “present an issue by offering a specific example, case
study, or event oriented report (e.g., covering unemployment by
presenting a story on the plight of a particular unemployed
person).”
Because thematic and episodic frames are ways of telling a story, they can
exist in any part of the political process that involves communication. This
includes communication that comes directly from elites, or is mass mediated. An
example of an episodic frame in a partisan, non-media context would be a story in
a political stump speech about a specific person who may have lost her job or is
benefiting from the policies of the person running for re-election. A thematic
frame, on the other hand, would not focus on the plight of the specific person to
tell a story about joblessness. Instead, it would contextualize the issue. For
example, the politician speaking on the stump would not focus on the predicament
of one person who lost her job, but would instead paint a broader portrait of job
losses as a symptom of a struggling economy.
An example of a media-generated thematic news frame would be a
newspaper article on urban homelessness that paints an expansive picture of
homelessness in America. It would cite statistics about the prevalence of
homelessness, touch on its root causes, and perhaps identify ways in which cities
are successfully combatting it. A more episodic approach to a news frame would
30
examine the issue of homelessness through a much narrower lens. The story
might follow one particular homeless person, highlighting his everyday struggles
as well as the specific reasons why he is homeless.
Though Chapter 3 will provide a much more in-depth explanation of how
thematic and episodic frames look in media coverage of tort reform, the examples
cited above offer the broad outlines of thematic and episodic frames. A thematic
frame in tort reform coverage would focus on statistics; often, it would attempt to
place the issue of tort reform in a broader political context, or it might report on
aggregate statistics related to the tort system in the United States. On the other
hand, an episodic frame in tort reform coverage may focus on a specific case, or
the experiences of a specific party to a case, such as the plaintiff or defendant.
The book in which Iyengar first identified these frame types, Is Anyone
Responsible? How Television Frames Political Issues, is an examination of
frames used in political reporting on television. Despite Iyengar’s focus on that
medium, his concept of episodic and thematic frames and their differing effects
on readers and viewers has proven to be portable across other media formats,
including print journalism (Aarøe 2011; Gross 2008). Research demonstrates that
thematic and episodic frames lead readers and viewers to have differing cognitive
reactions in three areas. First, they lead people to attribute responsibility for the
problem addressed in the coverage. Second, they can dampen support for
governmental programs designed to address the problem in the coverage. Third,
31
they can lead to a “morselized” understanding of political problems by
“presenting recurring problems as discrete instances” (Gross 2008, p. 171;
Iyengar 1991, p. 136).
Emotion and Decision-Making
It is obvious to even a casual observer of politics that emotions play an
important role in political life. Indeed, imagining a political world without
emotions is an impossible task. After centuries of treating emotion and affect as
antithetical to sound political reasoning, political scientists are now willing to
grant that affect sometimes plays an important role in political decision-making
(Arceneaux 2012; Brader 2011; Crigler and Hevron forthcoming; Cushman,
Young, and Greene 2010; Marcus, Neuman, and MacKuen 2000, 2011; Neuman,
Marcus, and Keele 2007; Redlawsk 2006). Political scientists have not been the
only group of scholars historically to neglect the influence of emotion and affect
on judgment and decision-making (“JDM”).
4
JDM scholars have traditionally
viewed affect and emotion as “hot processes” that almost inevitably lead to
biased, irrational behavior (Peters et al. 2006) Yet, over the last fifteen years,
JDM scholars have begun to examine how affective feelings influence judgments
and decisions, without working from a priori assumptions that the inclusion of
4
Angie and co-authors (2011) define decision-making as being comprised of preferences that
depend on the subject utilities of anticipated outcomes that are weighted, overall, by their
probabilities (Angie et al. 2011). Observed differences among two types of cognitive tasks
(judgment and decision-making) may be related to the different ways in which citizens combine
desires (e.g., utilities, goals, and personal values) and beliefs (e.g., expectations, knowledge, and
means) to choose a course for action (Angie et al. 2011; Hastie 2012; Shafir and LeBoeuf 2002).
32
affect in decision-making processes is invariably negative. Using insights from
behavioral neuroscience—for example, that cognition and emotion are not distinct
functions of mental processing (Damasio 1999)—scholars have examined the
influence of discrete emotions on influence perception and behavior (Connolly
and Butler 2006; Lerner and Tiedens 2006), how mood influences everyday
choices (Caruso and Shafir 2006), and the impact of uncertainty on affective
reactions (van Dijk and Zeelenberg 2006).
What is an Emotion?
Emotions are the relatively short-term states or longer-term traits of
individuals or groups. They contain multiple components – perceptual, cognitive
or evaluative, expressive, physiological/neurological, or behavioral (Crigler and
Hevron forthcoming; Myers 2004; Planalp 1999). Emotions are primarily
modeled and measured in three ways: categorical, valence, or circumplex.
Categorical measures of emotion are often discrete emotions, like happiness or
sadness. Discrete emotions are short-lived, intense phenomena that have clear
cognitive content accessible to the person experiencing the emotion (Angie et al.
2011; Clore, Schwarz, and Conway 1994). Circumplex models provide a multi-
dimensional analytic structure to capture emotional response (Angie et al. 2011;
Crigler and Hevron forthcoming). One variant of the two-dimensional scheme has
positivity-negativity along one axis dimension and levels of arousal along
another.
33
The valence model was the dominant way of thinking about emotion’s
effects on behavior until JDM scholars began to find that valence was failing to
capture differences in cognitive outcomes for similarly valenced emotions, such
as anger and fear. As a result, the analytic focus of literature began (and continues
to) shift from valence conceptions of emotions that are one-dimensional and
bipolar conceptions to a more discrete-based model (Angie et al. 2011; Lerner and
Keltner 2000, 2001), or a circumplex model that accounts for differences in
cognitive reactions among similarly valenced emotions (Marcus, Neuman, and
MacKuen 2000).
Working from the premise that a primary purpose of the emotion system is
to engender adaptive responses to direct situational appraisals through
modifications of mental processing, motivation, and physiology, it seems likely
that discrete emotions can exert differing levels of influence that the positive-
negative dichotomy cannot capture (Damasio 1994; Frijda 1986; Herald and
Tomaka 2002; Keltner and Gross 1999; LeDoux and Phelps 2000; Schwarz and
Clore 1996). In recognizance of this, social psychologists developed the appraisal
model of emotion, which rely on latent appraisal tendencies of individuals to
explain different patterns of emotional response (Lazarus 2001). For example,
although sadness and anxiety are both negative emotions, the appraisals they
cause in humans who are experiencing them are quite different and can lead to
34
divergent behavioral outcomes (Angie et al. 2011; Arceneaux, 2012; Marcus,
Neuman, and MacKuen, 2000).
Affect and Decision-Making: Allies?
What is the relationship between affect and emotions and cognitive
outcomes like judgment and decision-making? A meta-review of the literature
conducted by Angie and co-authors (2011) finds two dominant approaches to
thinking about emotion and JDM. The first approach views emotion as a system
of discrete categories (Angie et al. 2011, p. 1395; Frijda 1986; Lazarus 2001) and
is driven by analysis of various appraisal dimensions underlying discrete
emotions. The second approach deals with the motivational system that generates
emotions. Angie and co-authors (2011) argue that this mode of research is built on
the evolution of emotions from action tendencies that “directly reflect activation
of aversive or appetitive responses” (Angie et al. 2011, p. 1395; Lang 1995; Lang
and Bradley 1990; Lang, Bradley, and Cuthbert 1992). Certain discrete emotions
can be associated with changes (or no changes) in activation. The expectations in
the behavioral component of this dissertation (described in Chapter 4) are derived
from the first approach – that affective reactions to frames stem from appraisal
tendencies in the reader.
35
The Four Roles of Affect
Judgment and decision making scholars have theorized that there are two
kinds of basic affective influences on judgment and choice: integral affect and
incidental affect (Lerner and Keltner, 2000, 2001; Peters et al. 2006). Integral
affects are the influences of subjective experiences that are relevant to personal
choices. Incidental affects are the sometimes puzzling influences of subjective
emotional experiences that should be irrelevant to personal judgment and choices.
Scholars have theorized that both integral and incidental forms of affect can have
four separable roles that are important to judgment and decision making (Peters et
al. 2006). First, affect can act as information (Clore, Gasper, and Garvin 2001).
Direct influences of incidental affect have been characterized as the “affect-as-
information” model. Present feelings are used as a heuristic to make complex
judgments, as long as the experienced feelings are perceived as relevant to the
object of the judgment. Specific emotions can inflate the expectancies for events
possessing matching emotional overtones. Thus, when messages framed to elicit
distinct emotions match the emotional state of the message receiver, attitudes can
change (DeSteno et al. 2004). Second, affect serves as a “common currency” in
judgments and decisions, allowing people to make comparisons of otherwise very
different decision options (Peters et al. 2006). Affect lets people boil complex
thoughts down to simpler affective evaluations (Lerner and Keltner 2000, 2001).
Third, affect acts as a spotlight in a two-step process. The extent or type of
discrete emotions can lead a person to focus on new information, which can then
guide the decision maker in making a judgment. Fourth, affect can motivate
36
information processing and behavior by activating appraisal tendencies in people
who are experiencing the emotion. For example, Marcus and co-authors (2000,
2001) found that negative political advertising can stimulate feelings of anxiety in
viewers, who are then prone to seeking out new sources of information about
candidates or policies – an outcome that is more normatively positive than
conventional wisdom about negative advertising leads people to believe.
Affect and Political Science
How have political scientists incorporated emotion into theories of
political decision-making? Political scientists have also used the tenets of
appraisal theory to inform their work about the role that emotion plays in
evaluating candidates and policies, as well as influencing political behavior
(Gross 2008; Gross and D'Ambrosio 2004; Marcus, Neuman, and MacKuen
2000). George Marcus and co-authors’ theory of Affective Intelligence borrows in
part from the traditions of appraisal theory (e.g., like appraisal theory, it rests on
the assumption that people can have different emotional reactions to the same
event). Marcus and co-authors argue that people have dual emotion systems of
disposition and surveillance that govern both thought and behavior (Marcus,
Neuman, and MacKuen 2000, p. 9). For example, depending on the amount of
anxiety induced by incoming information, Marcus and co-authors find that people
will rely less on habitual preferences and ideology and more on current
information and assessments. In other words, the emotion elicited by the stimulus
37
serves as a mechanism to induce a need in the subject to change his behavior.
5
Gross and D’Ambrosio (2004) argue that we can expect people to experience
different emotions after reading the same stimulus because when people evaluate
situations, they experience emotions according to the information and beliefs
accessible to them at the time, as well as their feelings of whether the situation
violates their values or affects their pursuit of a goal (goal-fulfillment also being a
central tenet of appraisal theory).
Much of the research that motivates the behavioral component of this
dissertation comes from Peters and co-authors’ (2006) third and fourth roles that
affect can play in judgment and decision-making: that discrete emotions can lead
a person to focus on new information, thus guiding behavior, and that affect itself
can serve as a motivator for information processing and behavior. Cognitive-
appraisal theories of emotion argue that discrete emotions trigger different
appraisals among people. Along with affective intelligence and valence theories
of emotion, research in this tradition comprises one strand of research on affect
and political choice (Crigler and Hevron forthcoming), with scholars attempting
to use it to demonstrate the centrality of emotions to citizens’ evaluations of
5
McDermott (2009) theorizes that there are at least four ways that emotion can act as a
mechanism for influencing decision-making. These mechanisms can occur at all stages of the
decision-making process; they can be directly influenced by the task at hand, or they can directly
influence human response to the task at hand. McDermott theorizes that the mechanisms can be
broken down and classified as follows: 1) As background (positive or negative mood states can
affect memory, attention, perception, beliefs, and decision strategies); 2) As social emotions,
which can arise in the decision-making process yet not be directly related to the outcome of
choice; 3) As anticipated emotions concerning possible outcomes, and 4) As actual emotions that
follow in the wake of a choice and which can influence future choices in a feedback loop
(McDermott 2004, 2009).
38
political candidates, groups, and issues. They assume that a range of cognitive
dimensions usefully differentiate emotional experience and effects.
Emotion and cognition work symbiotically to direct a person toward an
action that satisfies needs that arise from incoming information (such as viewing a
frame). Scholars have identified six cognitive dimensions that define patterns of
appraisal underlying different emotions: certainty, pleasantness, attentional
activity, control, anticipated effort, and responsibility (Smith and Ellsworth 1985).
These cognitive dimensions can usefully differentiate emotional experience and
effects. By linking affective appraisals to cognitive processing, Lerner and
Keltner argue that emotion is defined by a set of such dimensions and direct
cognition to address specific problems or opportunities (2000, 2001). Therefore,
each experienced emotion activates a cognitive predisposition to appraise future
events in line with the central appraisal dimensions that triggered the emotion—
the appraisal tendency. Research has demonstrated that people experiencing
induced emotions have differing cognitive appraisals of events (Bodenhausen,
Kramer, and Susser 1994; Bodenhausen, Sheppard, and Kramer 1994; DeSteno et
al. 2004). For example, appraisals can take the form of assessments about the
likelihood of future events (Angie et al. 2011). Thus, we can argue that judgment
and decision-making are goal-directed processes on which emotions exert effects
until the emotion-eliciting problem is resolved.
39
Emotion, Affect, and Framing Effects
As we have seen, most scholarly definitions of frames revolve around the
idea that to frame is to select some aspect of a perceived reality to convey to an
audience. Scholars in the framing effects paradigm must conceptualize the
process of framing effects as a dual process, in which cognition and affect play
equally important and often symbiotic functions. As Nelson and co-authors
(2012) argue, “Affect is considered a form of intelligence—it’s a force that helps
regulate the attention and action of the citizen, steering her along beneficial paths,
and pulling her out of danger” (Nelson et al. 2012). Broadly, this dissertation
builds on their work and, more narrowly, the work of other scholars that have
begun to examine the role of emotion and affect in framing effects (Aarøe 2011;
Druckman and McDermott 2008; Gross 2008; Gross and D'Ambrosio 2004; Nabi
2003).
Each frame type discussed in this chapter – equivalency, issue, and news
frames – has been the subject of scholarly work that examines the role that
emotion plays in these frames’ effects. For reasons that were previously touched
upon and will be further explained in Chapter 4, some of this work, despite
leading the framing paradigm down a potentially fruitful path, could be improved
upon. Nevertheless, these examples – such as research by Jamie Druckman and
Rose McDermott (2008) on emotion, risk, and framing (using equivalency frames
as an independent variable), research by Kimberly Gross (2008) and Lene Aarøe
(2011) on emotion and frame strength (using narrative and issue-based frames as
40
independent variables) – demonstrate that scholars in the framing paradigm
recognize what our colleagues in psychology, economics, and neuroscience also
have – that affect and emotions matter in the framing effects process as much as
in the rest of the political environment. In their research on emotion and
equivalency frames, Druckman and McDermott (2008) suggest that emotions can
play one of two roles in the effects of equivalency-based frames. They can
provide a competing influence with the frame on the cognitive interpretations of
choice, or they can exacerbate or ameliorate the influence of a particular frame
itself. Keller, Lipkus, and Rimer (2003) also touch upon the role that emotion can
play in the cognitive reaction to equivalency frames. They find that the
effectiveness of loss- versus gain-framed messages depends on the affective state
of the message recipient. In particular, persuasiveness of a message is dependent
on people’s affective state under conditions of high potential loss. Participants in
their study that were induced with a positive mood were more persuaded by the
loss-framed message, whereas participants induced with a negative mood were
more persuaded by the gain-framed message.
Emotion as Mediator
Recall for a third time James’ example of the “blooming, buzzing
confusion” of the world to a newborn baby. A human response to the aspect of
reality conveyed by a frame is conditional on certain factors, including past
experience, knowledge, and biological factors. People’s reactions to frames are
contingent on predispositions as well as information available to them in a given
41
frame. This dissertation hypothesizes that emotions can serve as a mediator of
framing effects by altering the persuasive impact of messages as a function of the
emotional framing of persuasive appeals (DeSteno et al. 2004). How does this
work? As Gross and D’Ambrosio (2004) argue, “People are not unthinking
consumers of frames; thus, their emotional responses are not completely the
mercy of media frames. Rather, their emotional reactions are conditioned by both
predispositions and the information available in a given frame” (p. 21). Such an
argument lends support to those who argue that framing effects are more nuanced
than mere accessibility models imply (Brewer 2001; Druckman 2001; Gross
2008). Marcus and co-authors’ Affective Intelligence Theory (AIT) argues that
people become more involved and interested when feeling enthusiasm, but more
attentive to external stimuli, information-seeking, and attitude change when they
experience anxiety-generating emotions (Marcus, Neuman, and MacKuen 2000).
Thus, when people feel anxious, they become more susceptible to external
information, such as frames. Aversion, on the other hand, is also a negative
emotion but has the opposite effect of anxiety. People tend to shut down and
become less receptive to external information when experiencing strong feelings
of aversion. Scholars thus expect different negative emotions to have distinct
effects in mediating the impact of frames (Druckman and McDermott 2008). The
experiment described in Chapter 4 uses appraisal theory to develop expectations
about the role that discrete emotions can play in explaining the differences in
cognitive and affective reactions to episodic and thematic frames.
42
Forty years of political battles over efforts to change the American civil
justice system provide a compelling case through which we can explore the role
that affect plays in the thematic and episodic framing process. The next section of
this chapter briefly defines torts and tort reform, the history behind some of the
key features of still-ongoing tort reform efforts, and expands on the rationale for
choosing media coverage of tort reform to serve as the case-study in this
dissertation. Scholars who study the civil justice system and the contours of the
policy battles to “reform” it have seized on changing public perception of the tort
system and its participants – plaintiffs, defendants, and attorneys – as among the
chief victories of tort reformers (Gavin 2008; Haltom and McCann 2004). This
dissertation concurs, also arguing that mass media has contributed to these
successes by framing tort issues in ways that lead people to have specific views
on the tort system and the efforts to reform it. Though we have seen that thematic
and episodic frames can be applied to many kinds of political issues, they serve as
a theoretical hook for applying the tenets of communication research and research
on affect and decision making to examinations of “tort tales” and their influence
on public attitudes (Haltom and McCann 2004; McCann and Engel 2009).
Tort Law: What Is It?
A tort is a civil wrong that causes injury for which the victim may sue to
recover damages. Torts include negligent acts, such as medical malpractice, and
acts, such as selling defective products, for which one can be held strictly liable
43
(e.g., liable even in the absence of negligence). Though tort claims can stem from
intentional harms, they usually involve accidental harms resulting from legitimate
activity. These harms can take the form of externalities that are common in
everyday life, from automobile accidents, production of goods that may
sometimes harm consumers, harmful by-products from the production of goods,
to careless or incompetent practices by professionals.
Though most potentially tortious incidents are resolved short of securing
legal representation or filing suit, once they do reach a court, the aggrieved party
becomes the plaintiff and the party blamed becomes the defendant. They proceed
according to a set of rules and practices that have evolved with the
professionalization of the civil justice system in concert with the industrialization
of the United States (McCann and Engel 2009; White 2003). Tort law reflects a
series of institutional choices by Congress and the justice system to address harms
that are endemic to an industrialized society. Early conceptions of tort law were
based in strict liability, which was borne of a time when little recourse existed for
externalities that were becoming increasingly more prevalent. Nineteenth century
doctrines of negligence and contract protected merchants and were accompanied
by social values and economic policies that supported business. The landscape
began to change as the pace of industrialization in the United States increased in
the second half of the nineteenth century. In the middle of twentieth century,
judges (and the public) began to recognize that the prevailing state of negligence
and contract principles afforded little protection to consumers. By 1970, the
44
President’s Commission on Product Safety had reported that roughly twenty
million Americans were injured each year as a result of incidents concerning
consumer products (Gavin 2008, p. 434).
Some argue that the changing judicial standards of responsibility
paralleled a general rise in the scope of government (Burke 2002). In two
landmark cases in the California Supreme Court, Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling
Company (1944) and Greenman v. Yuba Power Products (1963), the Court
eliminated the contributory negligence rule that had instructed juries to reduce
awards by the percentage that plaintiffs contributed to their injuries through their
own negligence. The Court’s rulings were enshrined two years later in the
Restatement of Torts, Second, a common law treatise prepared by the American
Law Institute (American Law Institute 1965).
Modern tort law was off and running.
The Political Backlash: Tort Reform
A political backlash inevitably followed. Tort reform refers to proposed
changes in common law civil justice systems that would reduce or otherwise
mitigate tort litigation or damages. Following a sharp increase in the number of
tort claims (and an increase in the number of litigable acts, due to the Civil Rights
Movement and the proliferation of antidiscrimination statutes) various actors
45
began to question the utility of litigation – both by usual suspects (the business
and manufacturing communities) and academics (who, despite being mostly
sympathetic as the courts’ roles expanded, had begun to suspect publicly whether
the courts were the best venue for protecting and advancing rights). By the late
1980s and 1990s, anti-litigation stances were commonplace in national politics
(Burke 2002).
6
In a speech to the American Bar Association (ABA) in 1988, Dan
Quayle famously remarked that America had 70 percent of the world’s attorneys,
who were responsible for 18 million new lawsuits coursing through the legal
system every year. John Curtin, the president of the ABA, countered, arguing,
“Anyone who believes a better day dawns when lawyers are eliminated has the
burden of explaining who will take their place. Who will protect the poor, the
injured, the victims of negligence, the victims of racial discrimination, and the
victims of racial violence?” (Burke 2002). A 1989 New York Times article about
creeping tort reform cited an article by two Cornell law professors in which they
went so far as to claim that a “quiet revolution” in the area of product liability was
sweeping across the nation, which referred to a gradual but pronounced shift away
from court cases in the 1960s and 1970s that expanded the rights of people injured
by products to lean heavily toward defendants in product-liability cases (Labaton
1989, p. A1).
6
Though large-scale tort reform efforts did not materialize until the 1970s, a 2008 article in the
New York Times cites John Witt, a law professor at Columbia University, who said that the seeds
of the modern tort reform movement can be traced back to the 1890s, when some attorneys
bemoaned the rise of contingency-fee lawyers, “There are commencement addresses in the 1890s
where old railroad lawyers are lamenting the rise of a new class of oftentimes immigrant lawyers
who don’t have access to the old ways of getting clients, and they strike out in this new business
model of actively seeking clients and charging them a fee that is a percentage of whatever was
won in court” (Glater 2008).
46
Tort law evolved with jurists doing much of the heavy lifting. Judges
altered standards of tort and conceptions of negligence through landmark cases
such as Escola and Greenman. Yet some contend that the brunt of the action to
reform tort law has taken place in a very different court—the court of public
opinion (Daniels and Martin 2004; Gavin 2008). Those who wish to change the
tort system in the U.S. (“tort reformers”) have two primary courses of action: they
can alter the rules of the game (by enacting legislation that affects tort doctrine),
or they can work from the ground up to change public norms, expectations, and
opinion. Although tort reform has been an official plank of the Republican Party’s
national platform for decades, tort reformers have achieved few legislative
victories at the federal level (see Daniels and Martin 2004 and Gavin 2008 for
overviews). They have, however, achieved success in two other arenas: new
legislation at the state level and in the realm of public opinion. This dissertation is
concerned with the latter—what Gavin (2008) calls “stealth tort reform”—the
success that tort reformers, outside the courtroom and aided by common story-
telling and framing devices employed by journalists in their coverage of tort
reform, have had in moving public opinion toward their cause.
After several post-war decades in which Americans brought increasing
numbers of tort claims to court, public opinion has shifted in favor of those who
wish to “reform” the tort system (Galanter 1974; Gavin 2008; Kagan 2001). Polls
from the past three decades suggest that people believe that there are not only too
many “frivolous” lawsuits, but that there has been a “litigation explosion”
47
(Daniels and Martin 2000, 2004; Haltom and McCann 2004). Other polling data
describe a public that believes the current state of civil litigation is inherently
unfair, favoring plaintiffs at the expense of “deep pocket” defendants or that
awards made by juries are excessive (Daniels and Martin 2004; Gavin 2008).
Some researchers argue that the court of public opinion has in fact been
the primary focus all along for tort reformers, with tort reform being as much
about “altering the cultural environment surrounding civil litigation as it has been
about formal rules (Daniels and Martin 2004, p. 491). The deliberate waging of a
public campaign designed to make people think that the civil justice is corrupted,
that it restricts the economy, that lawyers foment excessive litigation and that
juries systematically tilt toward plaintiffs and against businesses in awarding large
money judgments has had a significant impact (Nockleby and Curreri 2004).
A Natural Fit: Tort Reform and Framing
Why should people care about the framing of tort reform? As observers of
the American political landscape have long observed, American politics is
legalistic (de Tocqueville [1835] 1999; Kagan 2001). As Robert Kagan points out
in his book, Adversarial Legalism: The American Way of Law, the legalistic
nature of American politics is an outlier among comparably developed nations, in
that the American justice system has evolved to assume a larger role in the
political process than justice systems in comparable countries (Kagan 2001). As
both Thomas Burke and Robert Kagan argue, high levels of legislative
48
polarization in modern American politics, combined with a deep-rooted mistrust
of centralized authority, leaves American courts with more leeway to make policy
than those in comparably industrialized nations. Indeed, litigation has become a
de facto method of governance that allows the American state to foist policy
problems onto the courts in a way that lets them be handled “off-budget” (Burke
2002; Farhang 2011; Hacker 2004; Kagan 2001).
Despite conflicting statistics, there is a perception that the American
justice system, particularly in the realm of tort law, is running amok. As this
section will explore, the size and scope of the tort system in the United States has
become a divisive political issue. As a result, media coverage of tort reform
serves at least two functions. First, depending on how events unfold with regard
to tort reform legislation, media coverage often portrays one political party (or
collection of interest groups) as political winners and their opponents as losers.
Such coverage can have ramifications on perceived mandates, elections, and the
course and content of future legislation. Second, in a political system where the
judiciary plays a large role in the policy-making process, how mass media covers
tort reform (and, more broadly, the legal system as a whole) can have affect
public opinion on the scope of the American state (Farhang 2011; Hacker 2004),
the propriety of the courts vis-à-vis political activities (Burke 2002; Haltom and
McCann 2004), and the more abstract conceptions of justice and fairness (Engle
Merry 1990) The civil justice system also serves as an access point through which
49
citizens can effect change, though some have doubted whether the courts are an
effective forum for policy change (Rosenberg 1991; cf. McCann 1994).
Observers of the American judiciary system often bemoan the fact that the
third branch of government is less understood by average Americans than the
executive and legislative branches. Much of the knowledge that Americans do
possess about the courts and legal system is driven by portrayals of the courts in
popular culture. Examples include the widespread popularity of lawyer jokes,
procedural courtroom dramas on television (more of which seem to appear every
year), and popular movies (Ewick and Silbey 1995, 1998; Haltom and McCann
1998, 2004; McCann and Engel 2009). As a cog in this knowledge-diffusion
process, mass media disseminate legal-related issues to the public, packaging
them in ways that they hope draw the public’s interest (Haltom 1998). In deciding
which aspects of the court system deserve public attention, journalists (and the
market and institutional forces to which they are subjected), are a key component
in the construction of popular legal knowledge. In addition to deciding how they
should report on legal issues like tort reform, journalists play an important
gatekeeping role in deciding which cases and issues should be reported to the
public. Institutional issues factor into the gatekeeping criteria used by journalists,
as well as which routes they choose to go down once they have decided that a
story is newsworthy. These institutional factors, which prominent media scholars
(Bennett 2012; Graber 2010; Graber, McQuail, and Norris 2007) have identified
as conflict, proximity, timeliness, impact, and familiarity, have a significant effect
50
on which stories journalists choose to cover. Once stories make it past the
newsworthiness barrier, journalists once again have decisions to make in choosing
how to cover stories.
Efforts to move public opinion away from expansion (or protection) of the
tort system and toward the views advocated by tort reformers did not go
unnoticed by journalists, as this except from the a 1993 New York Times article
illustrates, “We’ve also done direct mail to small business owners and to
professionals,” Mr. McDonough said, emphasizing that the organization [New
Jersey Citizens Against Lawsuit Abuse] is not a lobbying group, but one that is
designed to bring about change by the force of public opinion. “What we want to
do is to raise public awareness about the problem and try to motivate individuals
and organizations to make their voice heard over the trial bar [emphasis added]”
(Romano 1993, p. A1).
An Episodic Tort Tale: The “Hot Coffee” Case
The well-known case of Liebeck v. McDonald’s Restaurants (Stella
Liebeck v. McDonald's Restaurants, P.T.S., Inc. and McDonald's International,
Inc., 1994) is a telling example of these criteria in action and also serves as a
useful case study to illustrate the broader themes that this dissertation discusses.
Stella Liebeck’s lawsuit concerned her spilling hot coffee on herself,
suffering third-degree burns, suing McDonald’s, and being awarded almost $2.7
51
million in punitive damages from a jury. Even if most people wouldn’t recognize
her name (they may instead think of it as the “McDonald’s hot coffee case), her
case is well-known among Americans, even if they may wrongly understand the
facts leading up to the case.
The short version is this: Stella Liebeck was a 79-year-old woman who
lived in New Mexico. She was driven to McDonald’s by her grandson in order to
buy a cup of coffee. She ordered the coffee in the drive-thru. After paying and
receiving the drink, her grandson drove forward into a parking spot so that
Liebeck could remove the lid on the coffee cup in order to put creamer in the
drink. Importantly, she placed the coffee cup between her legs in order to remove
the lid, at which point the coffee spilled on her legs, groin, and buttocks,
eventually covering six percent of her body in third-degree burns that required
surgery and skin grafts. Her first action was not to file a lawsuit, she only turned
to the legal system after futilely and repeatedly contacting McDonald’s to
complain that though she was the one who spilled the coffee, its temperature was
at a dangerously high level. In her original claim, she asked the jury to award
damages only to cover her medical fees, which were approximately $10,000. Had
the jury found in her favor and awarded only that amount in damages, the case
would probably still be unknown except to its participants. Instead, the jury
awarded her $2.86 million, of which more than $2.7 million were punitive
damages. As many chronicles of the case have pointed out, the details of the case
52
were immediately picked up by the news wires. Journalists, recognizing a
newsworthy topic when they see one, instantly pounced.
The Liebeck case eventually wound its way from the district court in New
Mexico to the front pages of newspapers like the New York Times and the
monologues of late-night comedians David Letterman and Jay Leno, and into the
national consciousness of Americans. Indeed, few cases have penetrated the
national consciousness to such a degree. By the time opponents of tort reform
attempted to mount a campaign to correct some of the widely reported
misconceptions of the Liebeck case, they were were too late. The case had taken
root as a prime example of a tort system run amok. It is, as Haltom and McCann
(2004) argue, the perfect tort tale. Why did journalists view the Liebeck case as
newsworthy? The case did not result in the financial ruin of McDonald’s, nor did
the plaintiff die of her injuries. Instead, the case seemed to serve as a perfect
example for the necessity of the tort reform movement, which at the time was
twenty years old and in the midst of a political renaissance. Newt Gingrich, and
fellow Republicans who were on the verge of taking over the House of
Representatives in the fall of 1994, used the case to inject new life into the debate
over tort reform. Tort reform was a key component in the Republican-crafted
document, the “Contract with America,” (Gayner 1995). In making the issue
interesting to the general public, journalists and the Republican leadership (with
the assistance of interest groups) had found in Liebeck v. McDonald’s Restaurants
a seemingly perfect case. At its core, the case, as reported by the media and re-
53
told by political partisans, exemplified the growing view of a wide disjuncture
between personal responsibility and the monetary awards handed out by juries.
The fact that Liebeck was drinking coffee, a task that millions of Americans
accomplish every day without suffering third-degree burns, only added to the
newsworthiness and salience of the story.
Tort Reform and Framing: The Missing Causal Link?
A theoretical gap exists between the descriptive approach undertaken by
William Haltom and Michael McCann (2004) regarding litigation coverage and
the psychological mechanisms that explain differences in framing effects.
Analyses of mass media constructions of law are a logical extension of legal
studies that address commonplace knowledge about law in routine social
interaction (Ewick and Silbey 1998; Haltom and McCann 2004; Silbey and Sarat
1987). An important link exists between media coverage of the judicial system
and how Americans view the role of the courts. Although researchers suspect that
the systematically skewed nature of media coverage about tort has had
ramifications on public attitudes toward tort reform and the judicial system, they
fail to isolate the mechanisms behind the perceived effects (Daniels and Martin,
2004; Epp 2010; Gavin 2008; Haltom and McCann 2004; Rhode 2004). Missing
from many accounts of mass media’s role in the social construction of legal
meaning are critical insights from the political communication literature on
framing effects (Bartels 2002; Entman 1993; Sniderman and Theriault 2004;
Zaller 1992) and the political and the social psychology literatures to which
54
scholars have increasingly turned to explain framing effects (Chong and
Druckman 2007, 2011; Nelson and Oxley 1999; Nelson, Oxley, and Clawson
1997; Scheufele 1999). In Distorting the Law, Haltom and McCann (2004) are
explicit about this lacuna in their work, arguing that their emphasis is on the mass
production of legal knowledge, rather than the variable ways that knowledge can
become meaningful in the legal consciousness of variously situated citizens. They
write, “To the extent that widely circulated story lines figure prominently in the
cognitive archives from which media-attentive citizens actively construct legal
meaning, the narratives we identify can be expected to matter a great deal (p. 13).
Scholars have examined mass media-generated narratives in attempts to
link mass media coverage to the contours of specific policy battles in the United
States (Brader, Valentino, and Suhay 2008; Druckman and Nelson 2003; Slothuus
2008). Despite the increasing popularity of such studies (or perhaps because of it),
Chong and Druckman (2007) contend that in order to be worthy of a framing
study, political issues must meet two criteria. First, researchers must have a
substantive rationale for studying the issue that is being framed—the issue must
be particularly susceptible to framing effects. Second, the effects of such framing
must also be normatively important.
55
Substantive Reasons to Examine Tort Reform
Research has demonstrated that frames can have powerful effects when
they invoke specific causal arguments for political problems (Gross and
D'Ambrosio 2004; Iyengar 1991). Frames can “shape individual understanding
and opinion concerning an issue by stressing specific elements or features of a
broader controversy, reducing a usually complex issue down to one or two central
aspects” (Nelson, Oxley, and Clawson 1997, p. 563). In the past few decades, tort
reform efforts have garnered the attention of Congress
7
, the public, and scholars.
8
As a political issue, tort reform is particularly predisposed to framing effects,
particularly the dichotomy of episodic versus thematic-based issue frames, which
were touched on earlier in this chapter. Journalistic norms dovetail with tort
reformers’ goals of presenting simple narrative accounts of supposedly egregious
litigation harms. Journalists privilege news narratives that dramatize, personalize,
fragment, and normalize the presentation of events and relationships, thus
reconstructing complex social relations and policy issues in simplistic, often
systematically skewed ways (Bennett 2012). These stories are influential, as
readers are likely to take news accounts of issues to be “accurate, trustworthy, and
real” (Neuman, Just, and Crigler 1992).
From a substantive standpoint, tort law and tort reform are complex,
multi-faceted issues. Mass media have a number of decisions to make when
7
Examples include the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Compensation Act of 1986, the
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (Superfund), and the
Class Action Fairness Act of 2005.
8
Scholarly work includes Galanter (1993, 1998), Garber and Bower (1999), and Haltom and
McCann (2004).
56
deciding how to report on the tort system and tort reform. They could report on
the heroic side of tort: a group of families successfully suing a large corporation
that has been dumping chemicals into groundwater and sickening citizens. Or they
could report on the burglar who breaks into a house, accidentally crashes through
a coffee table, and sues the homeowner after breaking his leg. Perhaps they could
also write about the bevy of statistics demonstrating that Americans do not sue
each other as much as they used to, and that the rest of the world is quickly
approaching American litigation rates. Finally, they could write about public
opinion polls demonstrating that Americans are tired of the tort system, believing
that America suffers from an excess of “frivolous litigation.” A nuanced reading
of the current state of American tort law would likely incorporate aspects of all
four of these examples, yet such reporting is rarely found in American mass
media (Haltom and McCann 2004).
Normative Importance
The mere existence of a political issue—like tort reform—is an
insufficient reason to conduct a framing study about the issue. The public salience
of political issues ebbs and flows. Accordingly, scholars must choose the subjects
of framing studies with an eye toward the normative importance of the issue;
political issues do not exist in a vacuum and those that have little salience among
the public are less likely to influence public attitudes. Thus, in order to tell a
meaningful story about the framing of an issue, the researcher must have a reason,
57
a priori, for suspecting that the framing of the issue actually matters. In the case
of tort reform, media coverage reflects interplay among elite institutions (e.g.,
mass media, entrenched interest groups, and legislators) that has clearly affected
how the public conceives of the place of tort reform in modern society (Gaventa
1982; Schattschneider 1960). Some scholars have used the democratic processes
that link politicians and other opinion leaders to the public (primarily through
mass media) as an impetus for framing studies (Chong and Druckman 2007). Do
the democratic processes connected to the political battles over tort reform fit the
criteria?
To begin to answer that question, this dissertation borrows from the
inclusive traditions of the “law and society” literature. Rather than focusing on
two separate “realities”: the way the law actually is and the seemingly very
different accounts of legal reality circulated by mass media, this dissertation
argues that studying each in isolation provides a misleading account of both.
Culture plays an important role in the social construction of the law. Indeed, some
scholars argue that citizens understand law through a framework of interpretive
schemas (Ewick and Silbey 1998), a phrase that framing scholars have used to
explain how citizens employ frames to better understand the world. The approach
that this dissertation takes to studying tort reform is rooted in research by scholars
who study the law’s effect on society from a social constructionist approach,
rather than by studying “black-letter” conceptions of regulative law (Engle Merry
1990; Ewick and Silbey 1998; Silverstein 2009; Tyler 1991). In this vein, law
58
gains meaning and power constitutively—from the ground up. Studies of law’s
constitutive power recognize that strategic legal action “expresses, reflects, and
often deepens” the reliance on legal frames of meaning-making (Silverstein 2009,
p. 9). Legal consciousness is embedded in the practical constitution of everyday
life, part and parcel of the process whereby the law is constituted by sociocultural
forms (Engle Merry 1990). Researchers must recognize that law consists of
“diverse forms of specialized knowledge that permeate and structure practices
throughout contemporary society” (Haltom and McCann 2004, p. 10).
Although the effects of mass media have heretofore occupied a small part
in the public law literature, there is reason to believe that an important (and, as of
yet, not fully explored) link exists between framing of tort reform and public
attitudes about the issue. Haltom and McCann (2004) argue that prevailing
currents of legal knowledge “have encouraged particular ideological frames from
contesting parties” (p. 285). Indeed, an earlier section of this chapter makes the
argument that tort reformers have made tort reform a salient public issue primarily
by using mass media as a vehicle for spreading knowledge of the issue. The way
in which mass media choose to report on the issue has important ramifications for
how people make sense of tort reform, as well as how they view the proper place
of the courts in American political society. Burke (2002) takes mass media to task
for their portrayal of a tort system gone awry, writing, “In castigating Americans
for being too individualistic and sue crazy, commentators have themselves
committed the sin of methodological individualism: focusing on individual
59
behavior while downplaying the significance of social structures” (p. 4). The
cultural impact of tort reforms affects people’s opinions of the tort system, as well
as basic conceptions of what it means to be injured, to whom we should blame for
being injured, and how to respond to what others do regarding jury compensation
(Daniels and Martin 2004).
There are three common units of analysis in research about the effects of
media coverage of tort reform: media content, attorneys, and the public. With the
exception of Guthrie’s (2000) experimental work on the effect of media coverage
on litigant behavior in settlement negotiations, most published studies have been
concerned with either describing the contours of media coverage or the effects of
that coverage on practicing attorneys. Galanter (1993, 1998) examined the effects
of news coverage of tort on public debate about the issue, as well as the effects of
contemporary legends about the civil justice system on the system itself. Others
analyzed newspaper coverage of products liability verdicts concerning cars from
1983 to 1996, finding that verdicts in favor of manufacturers were covered
disproportionately less than verdicts in favor of plaintiffs (Garber and Bower
1999). Bailis and MacCoun (1996) conducted a content analysis of media
coverage of tort and found that media overrepresented the frequency of
controversial forms of litigation and the proportion of disputes resolved by trail.
Guthrie (2000) examined the effects of “frivolous” litigation on potential litigants,
rather than from the perspective of the average citizen. He found that the frames
used to cover “frivolous” litigation induced risk-seeking behavior in plaintiffs and
risk-averse behavior in defendants, thus giving plaintiffs psychological leverage
60
in settlement negotiations. Research has shown that among plaintiffs’ attorneys,
the public relations campaigns of tort reformers have been very successful. In
surveys conducted among Texas plaintiffs’ attorneys, researchers found that
almost 91 percent of attorneys surveyed believed that publicity campaigns have
had a negative (26 percent) or strongly negative (65 percent) impact on their
practices. Although these campaigns affect attorneys in a number of ways (see
Daniels and Martin 2000 for an overview
9
), researchers find that attorneys believe
the greatest effects to be on the attitudes of juries (Daniels and Martin 2004). In
other words, the social construction of opinions about American tort law has had a
strongly perceived impact on those who are often tasked with deciding about
justice and fairness.
This chapter has brought together two somewhat disparate strands of
research: media effects (frames), and our changing understanding of judgment
and decision making (affect must be accounted for), to explain how they can
inform our understanding of the effects of mass media coverage on public opinion
in the ongoing debate about tort reform policy. Next, we turn attention to the
nature of mass media coverage of tort reform – what it looks like, who is often
mentioned in coverage, and which types of news frames predominate – a
necessary first step before determining how such coverage affects readers.
9
Understanding the effects of tort reform campaigns on plaintiffs’ attorneys is important because
it is these lawyers who are the gatekeepers to the judicial system (Daniels and Martin 2000; see
also Galanter 1974). If they react to perceptions about the way the public views tort reform then
they may alter their practices, thus changing the nature of access to the law (Daniels and Martin
2000, p. 457).
61
Chapter 3
Tort Reform in the Newspaper
62
People who attempt to make sense of political issues face an increasingly
large and potentially bewildering volume of information. Journalists confront
their own set of challenges when deciding which political issues deserve the
public’s attention and how to portray them to both reflect reality and draw
readers’ interest. They can emphasize a component of a political issue that may
lead people to care about that issue more than if the component had not been
emphasized (e.g., a story about a political demonstration that stresses the First
Amendment rights of the demonstrators may appeal to someone who considers
free speech of paramount importance). The same demonstration, framed to
emphasize another element, may not hold as much appeal to that person (Chong
and Druckman 2007). Other examples include stories that employ statistics to
appeal to the proclivities of some news consumers to view issues in terms of gains
or losses (Druckman and McDermott 2008). A consumer who is prone to viewing
political phenomena in this way may find a thematically-framed story about the
same political demonstration far more interesting and persuasive than a story that
episodically describes the proceedings or emphasizes the right to free speech.
How people conceptualize the political issue of tort reform, as Chapters 1
and 2 discuss, is particularly susceptible to the ways in which journalists report
the issue. Can the entirety of such a complex issue be illustrated by an account of
one person’s experience in the tort system? Does this form of reporting, which has
been hypothesized to be more effective at garnering the attention of news
consumers (Gross 2008), lead to false understanding? Before we can answer these
63
questions, which deal with people’s behavior after reading various forms of news
reporting, we must understand how journalists have chosen to report on tort issues
and tort reform. How have journalists reconciled the need to appeal to to the
interests of readers with portraying an overview of the tort system that accounts
for the issue’s intricacies and complexity?
Earlier chapters broadly discuss the two complementary approaches:
content analysis and an experiment, employed in this dissertation to examine the
effects of news frames about tort reform on political attitudes. This chapter
describes the first approach – a content analysis of media coverage of news
frames about tort reform, which is meant to uncover patterns and characteristics
of frame appearance in newspaper articles about the issue. Content analyses of
newspaper articles to identify frames have been utilized in studies about myriad
policy issues (Boydstun 2006; Chong and Druckman 2010; de Vreese 2004;
Gamson and Modigliani 1987; Shah et al. 2002).
Regarding tort reform, prior research demonstrates a strong link between
media coverage of tort issues and public attitudes about the civil justice system in
the United States. Data indicate that mass media serve as people’s primary source
of information about the court system (Roberts and Doob 1990; Yankelovich,
Skelly, and White, Inc. 1978). In this respect, the courts are fundamentally
different from other political issues in that people are less likely to have direct
contact with the legal system than with other political issues (voting, for
64
example). In a 1997 article that examines the relative frequency of controversial
forms of litigation, the proportion of disputes resolved by trial, the plaintiff
victory rate, and mean and median jury awards, Daniel Bailis and Robert J.
MacCoun seize upon newspaper coverage as playing a major role in the decision
making process of most potential litigants. They argue that media coverage, in
particular, is an important source of information into this process, primarily
because there is a paucity of valid base rate information about tort reform and that
“systematic analyses of current trends in jury verdicts are unlikely to play a major
role in the decision making process” (Bailis and MacCoun 1996, p. 420). In other
words, the best place to look in trying to figure out why average people feel the
way they do about the courts is where many people get political information:
mass media. Other reearch that embraces the link between mass media and
attitudes about the civil justice system include a content analysis concerning
reporting on the scope of jury awards (Garber and Bower 1999).
Though scholars who study the American legal system have not always
embraced social constructionism, there has emerged a recent strain of sociolegal
scholarship whose practitioners are more likely than their predecessors to attribute
shifts of legal attitudes to extra-legal circumstances. One piece of influential
scholarship in that vein is the aforementioned 2004 book by William Haltom and
Michael McCann, Distorting the Law: Politics, Media, and the Litigation Crisis.
Their argument is that attitudes about the tort system are based on “multiple,
65
interrelated paths through which legal knowledge is created, disseminated, and
entrenched in cultural practice” (p. 13).
The scope of their research bears out the ambitious nature of the project.
They examine a diverse range of avenues of knowledge dissemination, from
commonly-told “lawyer” jokes, to press releases from organizations like the
American Tort Reform Association (ATRA), to traditional media coverage of tort
reform found in newspapers. Taken together, these sources of knowledge lead to
the now “common sense” stance that the tort system is broken. Common sense,
defined by Merriam-Webster as, “sound and prudent judgment based on a simple
perception of the situation or facts,” is another way of referring to the
entrenchment of attitudes about the tort system and tort reform legislation. Social
constructionism, despite being subjected to concept-stretching, can broadly be
considered as occurring when the meaning of something is reliant on the social
context in which the meaning-maker is located. Ian Hacking (1999) argues that
when something is said to be “socially constructed,” the author is often referring
to the following formulation: “In the present state of affairs, X is taken for
granted; X appears to be inevitable,” followed by, “X need not have existed, or
need not be at all as it is. X, or X as it is at present, is not determined by the nature
of things; it is not inevitable” (Hacking 1999, p. 6).
In other words, the tort system, as it is presently understood, is not an
inevitable result of the black letter law, but instead contingent on social processes
66
that shape, constitute, and reconstitute attitudes. Here, we see echoes of
Schattschneider’s (1960) seminal work on the contestation of political issues. By
encouaraging people to think about the tort system according to changing
standards of “common sense,” tort reformers have found in mass media a vehicle
through which they can change the scope of the conflict over tort reform. To that
end, mass media coverage presented in this chapter resonates beyond the issue of
tort reform and can be used in future analyses of the power struggles over other
political issues in which advocates and elites use the story-telling frames that are
endemic to journalism to change the scope of debate over political issues.
Without discounting the importance of examining a broad array of sources
of legal knowledge, this chapter uses many of Haltom and McCann’s findings
about the institutional constraints faced by journalists to re-examine the contours
of one form of traditional mass media reporting: newspaper articles. Even in an
increasingly fragmented media landscape, traditional newspapers (including their
web presence) still play a powerful gatekeeping and agenda-setting role (de Waal
and Schoenbach 2008). Accordingly, this chapter applies the tenets of framing
theory, which are present in much of Haltom and McCann’s (2004) research but
are rarely recognized as such, to media coverage of tort reform. The remainder of
this chapter reviews previous research on the contours of tort reform coverage to
demonstrate why I expect different frame types to appear in differing patterns of
coverage. Based on that literature, I generate hypotheses about these expectations.
Finally, this chapter reports on the findings of the content analysis and discusses
67
the implications of the results for future examinations of tort reform coverage as
well as coverage of other political issues.
Media Coverage of Tort Reform
Haltom and McCann (2004) argue that the dissemination of cultural
knowledge about tort reform can be ascribed to two different explanations. The
first are instrumental efforts by policy advocates to advance their agendas. The
second is the institutional aspects of news reporting, such as profit and
newsworthiness. These two strands sometimes overlap, such as when Haltom and
McCann (2004) note the tendencies of journalists to sometimes use data and
talking points provided to them by tort reformers like the United States Chamber
of Commerce and the Institute for Legal Reform. In other words, journalists are
sometimes complicit (whether intentionally or not) in the instrumental efforts of
organized interests. The next two sections of this chapter will examine each strand
(instrumental and institutional) and will then discuss why the hypotheses
presented later in this chapter derive from what we know about the ways in which
the tort reformers, mass media, and the public interact.
Instrumental
When it comes to reporting on tort issues and tort reform, how passive are
mass media? Haltom and McCann (2004) uncover some examples of journalists
acting instrumentally and seemingly in concert with the agendas of tort reformers.
Examples include major newspapers’ propensity to allow tort reform
68
spokespeople to publish editorials decrying the current state of the American tort
system and advocating for its reform. In another instance, a number of major
American newspapers, including the New York Times and Wall Street Journal, ran
print advertisements in the 1980s exhorting the need for action to address a “tort
crisis.” Haltom and McCann also note that interviews affirmed that journalists
had received reading material from tort reform groups and often included
anecdotes and statistics in their stories sourced from these reports, despite
struggling to ascertain their veracity (2004, p. 153).
Institutional
Mass media coverage is the most accessible source of information for
average citizens about the tort system and tort reform. Yet, such coverage comes
replete with tradeoffs made by journalists. Despite evidence of journalists acting
instrumentally (if not purposively) to advance tort reform agendas, Haltom and
McCann (2004) argue that the institutional norms of mass media play the primary
role in shaping the dissemination of tort information. Though it is an important
part of the tort reform story, this dissertation does not directly investigate claims
about why journalists choose to report on tort reform in certain ways. As Nelson,
Bryner, and Carnahan (2011) have recently argued, questions about the “social,
economic, and organizational factors” that determine mass media content are
relevant, yet, in their words, “such questions eventually beget questions about the
ultimate impact of that content on individuals and political processes and
institutions” (p. 365). This dissertation follows in the same vein; its primary foci
69
are the contours of mass media content and its effects on individual attitudes and
behavior. For studies chiefly concerned with frame-building, see Scheufele (1999)
or Carragee and Roefs (2004).
Yet this dissertation does operate from the assumption that the institutional
norms of journalism play an important role in this process. Given the economics
of news reporting, we can assume that when journalists report on the tort system
and tort reform, they do so with notions of storytelling in mind. Accordingly,
newspaper articles about tort issues and tort reform must either include or exclude
various points of view and pieces of information, which I argue, often take the
form of episodic and thematic frames (Iyengar 1991a, 1991b). As a result,
reporting on tort reform can lead readers down a path in which they are subjected
to framing effects associated with these frame types, particularly that 1) frames
can be powerful when they invoke specific causal arguments for political
problems (Gross and D'Ambrosio 2004; Iyengar 1991); and 2) that frames that
reconstruct complex social relations and policy issues in simplistic, sometimes
systematically skewed ways can lead people to make biased assessments of issues
(e.g., the “fundamental attribution error”) (Bennett 2012; Robbenbolt and
Studebaker 2003). Extant research demonstrates that thematically framed
coverage of political issues leads people to hold societal-level forces responsible
for the issue, whereas episodically framed coverage leads people to hold the
individuals featured in the frame responsible for their plight (Gross 2008; Iyengar
70
1991). The use of such frames in coverage serves to delimit the bounds of
political conflict.
Event-Centered Reporting
Public law scholars argue that institutional aspects of journalistic norms
often lead to “event-centered” reporting, in which the system in which a given
event is embedded is rarely considered (Robbenbolt and Studebaker 2003;
Wilkins and Patterson 1987). Though extant literature does not recognize the
similarities between the propensity for “event-centered” reporting and episodic
frames, this dissertation argues that we can use the thematic/episodic framing
dichotomy to not only describe the forms of tort reform coverage, but to formulate
hypotheses about the effects of such reporting.
Lance Bennett (2012) refers to “event-centered” reporting on the part of
journalists as fragmentation. Fragmented reporting treats events as self-contained.
Broader context (including systemic relations and institutional power) is often lost
at the expense of discrete vignettes that are relatable and easy to document
(Haltom and McCann 2004, p. 157). As Bailis and MacCoun (1996) argue, certain
tenets of reporting, including newsworthiness and audience interest, have meant
that in terms of the volume of coverage, “jury trials outrank settlements, unusually
large jury awards outrank very modest jury awards, and accidents involving
malfunctioning professionals or products outrank run-of-the-mill fender benders
eand slip and falls” (p. 420). In other words, tort issues, despite being parts of a
71
large, complex, and interconnected sphere of public policy, are often presented by
journalists in ways that lead readers to misleadingly reduce the issue while
simultaneously drawing their interest.
A 2002 article in the New York Times by veteran court reporter Adam
Liptak is particularly illustrative of this point. The article purports to be an
overview of the complexities of tort reform, yet it makes use of episodic examples
of cases that contain outsized jury awards. It references a $28 billion jury award
by a Los Angeles jury to a single plaintiff in a tobacco lawsuit, and another in
which a plaintiff sued Universal Studies in Orlando, Florida because the haunted
house at the theme park was too scary. The specific examples in the article do not
stop there. Liptak also notes that the Supreme Court of California in 2002
declined to hear a challenge to the largest punitive award ever affirmed in a
personal injury case (the award in question was $290 million directed to a
California family that lost three family members in a rollover crash of a Ford
Bronco in 1993). Finally, he references a United States Supreme Court case in
which the justices considered whether a $147 million verdict against State Farm
Insurance in the case of a car accident insurance dispute should stand. It should be
noted Liptak counters these anecdotes, or “tort tales,” by citing research that these
types of awards are extremely rare and should not be considered indicative of the
entire system (Liptak 2012, p. A1). Yet, in the face of these memorable lawsuits
and thematically-framed data to counteract them, which parts of the article is the
average reader going to remember? Moreover, this example demonstrates
72
journalists’ inclination toward writing about issues in a way that includes vivid,
episodic examples that are likely to attract audiences.
Expectations
Haltom and McCann’s (2004, p. 160) findings of tort coverage as a
“highly selective, skewed sample of events presented in ways that parallel or
converge with the simplistic, dramatic, decontextualized, individualized morality
tales of tort reformers” provides a theoretical jumping-off point to discuss
expectations for the present study. Research is mostly inconclusive as to whether
episodic or thematic frames are more persuasive. Of course, other variables come
into play when episodic and thematic frames are presented to experimental
subjects. The content analysis in this chapter broadly examines tort reform media
coverage in order to uncover patterns not only about frame type, but also the
inclusion or exclusion of interest groups in media coverage, who are most likely
to be subjects of episodic frames, and what types of data are often included in
thematic frames. In so doing, this chapter addresses a critical gap in the literature
by demonstrating that media coverage of tort reform may contain rates of episodic
and thematic frame appearance that may not comport to prior assumptions.
73
Hypothesis 1 (Episodic versus Thematic Frames):
Given extant research on the event-centered nature of tort reporting, the
propensity of journalists to focus on outsized, atypical jury awards, and the
general sense of Haltom and McCann (and others) that tort reporting is generally
skewed, I hypothesize that episodic frames will appear more frequently than
thematic frames. I propose that journalists, due primarily to institutional factors,
will likely create event-centered stories that center on the episodic experiences of
different people involved in the tort system.
Hypothesis 2 (Nature of Thematic Frames):
Haltom and McCann (2004) spend a significant portion of their book
lamenting the fact that thematically framed data refuting the claim that the tort
system is in a perpetual state of crisis is not more prevalent in media coverage.
They cite numerous statistics and studies (usually published by academics) which
include data indicating a leveling-off of tort claims after the 1980s. They attribute
this discrepancy in coverage to the fact that statistical data (e.g., thematically-
framed information) is less salient to readers and thus less likely to be included in
newspaper articles that, in addition to informing readers, are designed to sell
newspapers. Moreover, thematically-framed data that indicates a lessening of tort
rates does not comport with salient stories that include episodic examples of tort
system abuse. Accordingly, I expect that thematic frames indicating either a
leveling-off or a decline in tort rates will appear less frequently than those
indicating a rise in tort claims (which are often put forth by advocates for tort
74
reform). Though this data will also be thematically-framed, it speaks to the
instrumental efforts by tort reform advocates, which the next three hypotheses
address.
Hypotheses 3, 3a, 3b (Interest Groups):
Some scholars argue that much of the public salience of tort can be traced
to the instrumental efforts of interest groups and their ability to use mass media as
a bullhorn to propagate their agendas (Haltom and McCann 2004; McCann and
Engel 2009). These scholars argue that tort reform advocates have been far more
effective than those who oppose reform at getting their viewpoints into stories
about tort issues. To that end, I expect that pro-tort reform interest groups will be
mentioned more often in the newspaper articles in the sample.
Hypothesis 3a (Nature of Interest Group Mentions – Pro-Tort Reform):
Though extensive publicity is not a prerequisite for an interest group to
successfully advance its agenda, it can be a key component of the social
construction of attitudes (Baumgartner and Jones 2009). Given that the business
and medical communities are two groups that have much to gain in reducing
liability for defendants, I expect that mentions of interest groups representing
these industries and professions will outnumber mentions of other groups.
75
Hypothesis 3b (Nature of Interest Group Mentions – Anti-Tort Reform):
Hypothesis 3b concerns the nature of anti-tort reform groups. Some
scholars demonize tort reformers for closely aligning trial attorneys with
defending the tort system (Haltom and McCann 2004). They argue that the social
construction of the issue is closely related with the sometimes-dim view that
people take of trial attorneys. Despite perhaps being unfairly maligned by tort
reformers, I hypothesize that trial attorneys, similar to the business and medical
groups in Hypothesis 3a, will be the most mentioned anti-tort reform groups in the
articles.
Sample
This chapter derived data from newspaper articles found in the New York
Times between September 15, 1985 and January 8, 2013. It identifies 55 articles
from the New York Times by use of LexisNexis Academic and the ProQuest
Historical Newspapers database, specifically, the database of New York Times
articles (1851-2009). These articles were drawn from a general keyword search
for “tort reform legislation.” As discussed in Chapter 2, organized tort reform
efforts did not begin in earnest until conservatives began reacting to the expansion
of rights that occurred in the 1950s and 1960s. Federal legislative efforts to
“reform” the tort system ramped up in the 1980s under President Reagan and
continued in earnest into the 1990s and 2000s under Speaker of the House Newt
Gingrich (R-GA) and President George W. Bush. As a result, the dates included
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in this sampling frame (1985 to 2013) represent almost the entirety of the history
of organized tort reform efforts at the federal legislative level. The 55 articles
include diverse tort topics, from wide-ranging overviews of decades of federal tort
reform efforts to articles about specific pieces of tort reform legislation, like the
Childhood Vaccine Injury Compensation Act of 1986 and a number state-level
effort to impose limits on monetary awards by juries.
Scholars have used the New York Times as a sampling frame in content
analyses of a wide array of political issues – from newspaper coverage of civil
rights (Winter and Eyal 1981) to biotechnology issues (Matthes and Kohring
2008). Haltom and McCann (2004) make two points about the social construction
of attitudes about tort reform that lead the present study to use the Times as part of
the sampling frame for media coverage. First, they argue that mass-mediated
information about tort reform is the most common way for people to learn about
tort reform issues. Second, they argue that the shared standards that loosely
govern the contours of media content play an important role in shaping the
character of media coverage about tort reform. To that end, the Times, in its self-
proclaimed yet widely accepted role as America’s “newspaper of record,” does
serve as an excellent repository of information about the nature of tort reform
coverage, generally, and frame appearance, specifically. If Haltom and McCann
(2004) hold the tenets and institutional standards of modern reporting partially
responsible for patterns of coverage, then it makes sense to examine how a
77
leading newspaper in the United States – the New York Times – tells the story of
tort reform.
While limiting the content analysis to the Times means that findings are
not broadly generalizable to the overall nature of media coverage of tort reform in
the United States, the Times does serve as a likely case for evidence of Haltom
and McCann’s “tort tales,” (provided their arguments about the marriage between
journalistic standards and tort reform coverage are valid). Additionally, research
demonstrates a “New York Times Effect,” meaning that the paper effectively
serves as an agenda-setter for other media outlets both online and in print
(Roberts, Wanta, and Tzong-Horng 2002). Patterns of frame usage in the Times,
once uncovered, can be used in other studies as both an empirical benchmark and
to increase generalizability of frame appearance in policy coverage, as well as tort
reform coverage in other forms of media.
Though the sampling frame in this content analysis is designed to gather a
broad swath of articles that are generally about tort reform efforts, it is useful to
briefly discuss various pieces of tort reform legislation to understand what efforts
to reform the system look like. Some deal with broad efforts to reform the system
by capping monetary recovery or discouraging potential plaintiffs from filing
lawsuits, while others deal with curbing litigation in a specific issue area. The
National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986 is an example of the latter. It was
aimed at reducing the potential financial liability of vaccine makers due to a sharp
78
rise in vaccine injury claims in the 1980s over the use of the DPT vaccine. The
legislation’s supporters claimed that it would stabilize the worldwide supply of
vaccines by encouraging vaccine makers not to leave the market, as well as
provide cost-effective arbitration for vaccine injury claims. The Act mandated
that arbitration over vaccine claims take place in the “vaccine court,” which refers
to the Office of Special Masters of the U.S. Court of Federal Claims. The Special
Masters administer a no-fault system for litigating vaccine injury claims. Indeed,
claims against vaccine makers cannot be filed in state or federal civil courts, and
instead must be heard in the Court of Claims. An excise tax of 75 cents on every
purchased dose of covered vaccine has funded the program since 1988.
Another example of federal tort reform legislation is the Private Securities
Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA), which was passed by Congress in 1995 and is
designed to limit frivolous securities lawsuits. It was originally part of Newt
Gingrich’s “Contract With America,” of which tort reform was a centerpiece. The
Act was enacted into law over a veto by President Bill Clinton. Every Republican
in the House of Representatives voted in favor of the legislation (which approved
the bill by a 319-100 margin). Only four Republicans in the Senate voted against
it. Congress successfully overrode only one other of Clinton’s 37 vetoes during
his eight years in office. In a statement to the House on December 20, 1995,
Clinton explained that despite supporting tort reform that would result in fewer
frivolous lawsuits, he felt that the PSLRA would “close the courthouse door on
investors [with] legitimate claims.” The PSLRA became the subject of renewed
79
scrutiny in Washington, D.C. once more after the auction-rate securities market
collapsed beginning in 2008 at the start of the financial crisis. Buyers (largely
corporations) of short-term securities that had long been considered low-risk by
analysts were suddenly faced with increasingly worthless investments and no
legal recourse. Many of the investors who faced steep losses due to the collapse
were the same corporations who, thirteen years before, had advocated for the
passage of PSLRA. It was, as one New York Times article quoted, a classic case of
“Be careful what you ask for. You might get it” (Norris 2009, p. B1).
Method
Under various guises, political scientists have employed systematic
content analysis as an analytical tool since World War II. As the fields of
communication and political science have evolved, so has the definition of
content analysis. In an early and influential work, Berelson emphasized its most
useful features as its objectivity, systematic nature, and quantifiable results
(Berelson 1952). Holsti conceived of content analysis as any technique for
making inferences by objectively and systematically identifying specified
characteristics of messages (Holsti 1969). Some view the emphasis that
quantitative analysis places on replicability as a primary strength of the approach
(Grimmer and Stewart forthcoming), others argue that purely quantitative content
analysis places too great an emphasis on frequency of appearance, at the cost of
other ways that a message may be considered “strong” besides appearing in
80
content many times (Mayring 2000). Critics also argue that the presence (or
absence) of a single word or symbol can be more important than the comparative
frequency of another word or symbol (Holsti 1969).
The key to the qualitative approach to content analysis can be seen in
Holsti’s (1969) definition of latent coding, which Riffe and co-authors (1998)
liken to “reading between the lines” (Riffe, Lacy, and Fico 1998). The qualitative
approach places greater focus on the intentionality behind text and its
implications. Holsti goes on to state that quantification often leads to
trivialization; problems or patterns are studied only because they are quantifiable.
For the purposes of this dissertation, the existence of episodic and
thematic frames is not distinguishable by hunting for one word or phrase in a
newspaper article. Instead, each article was examined inductively for the presence
or absence of frames, the content of the frames if found, and whether interest
groups were mentioned and for which side of the tort reform debate. The coding
of the articles did not include visuals, except in the articles drawn from the
ProQuest database, which appeared to be scans of how the article actually
appeared in the newspaper. No accompanying photos were analyzed, though in
some instances graphs or charts (always buttressing a thematic frame) were
included. Finally, the results include analyses of entire articles (unit of analyses)
as well as the nature of individual frames. Multiple frames sometimes appeared in
the same article.
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Episodic Frames
The presence or absence of episodic frames was detected inductively. If
the stories included even one sentence about an individual, or family, or very
small collection of individuals in a specific dispute (including details of that
dispute), then that sentence, or collection of sentences, was coded as an episodic
frame. For stories in the sample that primarily concerned legislation dealing with
corporations (e.g., the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995), episodic
frames were only coded as such when a segment of the article humanized the
controversy over the legislation. An example of this might be the experience of a
specific shareholder who became embroiled in a lawsuit.
Thematic Frames
The presence or absence of thematic frames was also coded inductively,
yet the process was more straight-forward than locating episodic frames. The
presence of thematic frames was often indicated by the inclusion of statistics in
the article and certain key words, such as: rate, volume, poll, average, percentage,
study, graphic, cost, decline, or increase. The thematic frames had to include a
focus that was broader than an individual plaintiff or defendant. They often
included statistical portraits of an issue bounded by time (“the rate of bankruptcies
has increased three-fold over the past year”) or issue area (“the filing of class-
action lawsuits outpaced other causes of action”). A later section of this chapter
will discuss in greater detail the character of the thematic frames found in the
82
sample, how their appearance correlates with the appearance of episodic frames
and mentions of interest groups.
Findings
Table 1. Frame Appearance
Source
N
(articles)
Time
period
Episodic
Only
Thematic
Only
Both
Neither
Tort Reform
Legislation
55
September
15, 1985 to
January 8,
2013
8
(15%)
23
(42%)
20
(36%)
2
(4%)
Comparisons of Frames Appearance
Table 1 describes the characteristics of the sample, which contains 55
articles. With respect to frame appearance, an article could fall into four
categories: containing only episodic frames, only thematic frames, both, or
neither.
Hypothesis 1: Thematic Versus Episodic Frame Appearance
Forty-two percent of the articles included only thematic frames, which
represents the largest percentage among the four categories. When including
articles that included both thematic and episodic frames, the percentage increases
to 78 percent. This is 27 percent more than the proportion of articles that included
episodic frames (51 percent). Articles that only include episodic frames comprise
just 15 percent of the sample, which suggests that episodic frames are not
83
predominant in tort reform coverage, thus refuting Hypothesis 1. Given the extant
literature on the inclination for tort reform reporting to be “event-centered” (a
proxy for episodic frames) (Haltom and McCann 2004; Robbenbolt and
Studebaker 2003), this is a surprising finding and suggests that tort reform
coverage does not comport with expectations drawn from prior literature.
Only eight of the 55 “tort reform legislation” articles contained a stand-
alone episodic frame. As would be expected, using “tort reform legislation” as the
search term yielded a large number of articles purporting to be “overviews” of the
tort system, so it is perhaps not surprising that episodic frames alone were rarely
considered sufficient to fully portray the issue. One such article is particularly
illustrative of the mostly thematic nature of the articles. In an article headlined,
“Study Disputes View of Costly Surge In Class-Action Suits,” journalist Jonathan
Glater cites multiple studies refuting tort reformers’ claims that an increase in
“frivolous” class-action suits are flooding the court system. In the first paragraph,
he writes of a “new study” that has concluded that both the average price of
settling class-action lawsuits and the average fee paid to lawyers who bring them
have held steady for a decade, “even though companies have said the suits are
driving up the cost of doing business, hurting the economy, and lining lawyers’
pockets” (Glater 2008, p. C1).
Figure 1 presents similar data to Table 1, only in the form of a bar chart
for ease of comparison.
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Figure 1. Frame Types by Search Term
Episodic Frames
Table 2 describes the average number of episodic frames contained in
each article in the sampling frame.
Table 2. Episodic Frames
Source
N
(articles)
Number of
Episodic
Frames
Average Number of
Episodic Frames
(per article)
Average Number of
Episodic Frames
(per article in articles that
included at least one
episodic frame)
Tort Reform
Legislation
55
52
.95
1.86
The “Number of Episodic Frames” column includes the total number of
episodic frames found in articles by search term (note: an article can contain more
8
23
20
2
0
5
10
15
20
25
Tort Reform Legislation
Episodic Frames Thematic Frames Both Neither
85
ethan one episodic frame). The “Average Number of Episodic Frames” column,
unsurprisingly, represents the average number of episodic frames found per
article. The next column, the second “Average Number of Episodic Frames”
column represents the average number of episodic frames per article that included
at least one episodic frame. In other words, when journalists deemed it
appropriate to tell a story using an episodic frame, did they stop at one, or were
multiple episodic frames usually included? The articles in the sampling frame had
an average of .95 episodic frames per article. In articles that included at least one
episodic frame, the average number of frames increased to 1.86 per article.
Though the motives of journalists are outside the scope of this project, this
may suggest that journalists usually felt that one episodic frame per article was
insufficient. This may have to do with criteria of newsworthiness – a singular
example may not be considered sufficiently newsworthy. Or perhaps journalists
may not consider only one episodic frame to sufficiently illustrate the
complexities of the issue. Another reason may be that journalists may think that
only including one episodic frame may be less persuasive than including multiple
episodic frames.
86
Figure 2. Episodic Frame Subjects
When journalists employed episodic frames in the articles, who were the
most likely subjects? Figure 2 demonstrates that episodic frames dealing with
medical malpractice were the most numerous (n=10), which is not particularly
surprising given that the medical community has been one of the most vociferous
supporters of tort reform legislation (a later section of this chapter examines the
nature of interest group mentions in the articles). Many of the medical malpractice
episodic frame examples employ particularly tragic stories about medical
procedures gone awry – from a 17-year-old girl whose face was ruined by
botched surgeries, to a woman whose breasts were removed unnecessarily after a
misdiagnosis by a doctor (Stolberg 2003, p. A21). Interestingly, lobbyists and
lawmakers also used medical-related examples of episodic frames to argue in
favor of tort reform—examples that were then quoted by reporters. For example,
Senator John Ensign (R-NV) argued in 2003 that there were victims on both sides
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
Number of Episodic Frame Subjects
Subjects of Episodic Frames
87
of the debate. Yet rather than citing thematic data about medical professionals
forced to curb their practices because of rising insurance premiums or the threat
of litigation, he mentions a Las Vegas resident whose father died in an emergency
room following a car accident the day after high insurance premiums forced a
local trauma center to close.
The second most common episodic frame subjects were people and
companies engaged in product liability disputes. The rate of inclusion among for
these subjects speaks to two separate areas, both of which have face validity given
our assumptions about the institutional aspects of mass media reporting. First,
each issue area is particularly well-suited to episodic frames (even though
thematic frames predominate, as we have seen). Mass media coverage is replete
with sometimes horrific stories of everyday products harming consumers, from
tire blowouts leading to rollover car crashes, to pool drains maiming swimmers’
appendages. These episodic vignettes are seemingly everywhere and would be
easy examples for journalists to cite when discussing efforts to curb “frivolous
litigation.” Similarly, stories of doctors accidentally harming patients are also
quite common, particularly as counter-examples in newspaper stories in which
doctors bemoan the cost of rising insurance premiums. Second, as we will see
later in this chapter, both the business and medical communities are well-
organized and well-represented by powerful lobbying organizations like the
United States Chamber of Commerce and the American Medical Association,
each of which has proven to be quite successful at being mentioned in the
88
newspaper articles in this sample. Often accompanying their names are tort tales
about outlying product liability and medical malpractice cases.
In episodic frames about these issues – medical malpractice and products
liability – the subjects of the frames were overwhelmingly likely to include
specific people (rather than corporations). Though corporations were also
represented, particularly in the products liability cases and usually as defendants
in litigation, almost every frame in these two categories included a person (or
multiple people) as a subject (or subjects). In the medical malpractice instances,
nine of the ten frames (90 percent) cited an example of a specific person’s story
about a medical procedure gone awry—from botched surgeries to fatal
misdiagnoses. Similarly, seven of the nine products liability episodic frames were
examples of specific people injured by a product—from blown-out tires causing
rollover car crashes to the aforementioned dangers of drains in public swimming
pools. That these frames are so likely to include specific people as the subjects
has important ramifications for how people assess the underlying issues that the
articles address. As previously mentioned, Iyengar (1991) found that when people
were presented with episodic frames that included individuals, they were more
likely to hold them accountable for whatever was occurring in the frame.
89
Thematic Frames
Forty-three articles included thematic frames, which represents 78 percent
of the total number of articles in the sampling frame (See Table 1 on page 82)..
Figure 3. Creating a Thematic Index
Thematic Keywords
“Average claim”
“Median claim”
“Rate per year”
“Total cost”
“Profits”
“Total rate”
“Award rate”
“Compensation”
“Declining rate”
“Declining awards”
“Declining claims”
“Increasing rate”
“Increasing awards”
“Increasing claims”
Figure 3 provides a snapshot into the coding process of thematic frames.
In an inductive content analysis in which the researcher approaches coding with
little by way of a priori expectations, coding articles through an iterative process
is helpful for identifying different types of certain variables. For thematic frames,
after coding all of the articles one time through and examining the data, it became
clear that the coding of thematic frames was collapsible into three categories:
average rates, declining rates, and increasing rates of tort activity.
Average, median, total, or yearly rate
of awards, claims, and/or costs
Declining rate of awards, claims,
and/or costs
Increasing rate of awards, claims,
and/or costs
Explanation of recoding thematic frame type variable.
90
Figure 4. Thematic Frame Types
Note: “Average rate” refers to any thematic frame that mentions the average, median, total, or
yearly rate of awards, claims, and/or costs (including attorney compensation). It does not include
thematic frames that mention a change (either +/-) in the number(s) included in the frame.
“Declining rate” refers to any thematic frame that mentions a declining rate of awards, claims,
and/or costs (including attorney compensation). “Increasing rate” refers to any thematic frame that
mentions an increasing rate of awards, claims and/or costs (including attorney compensation).
Hypothesis 2: Nature of Thematic Frames
Figure 4 illustrates the most commonly found subjects of thematic frames.
Thematic frames that mentioned a rate or number that was neither rising nor
falling were the most frequent, appearing in the articles 26 times. As Figure 4
explains, “Average rate” refers to thematically-presented data that indicates a rate
of something tort-related (e.g., lawsuit filings, settlements, etc.), but does not
indicate whether the rate is rising or falling. In other words, the reader is left to
her own devices, potentially by using contextual information elsewhere in the
article like quotes or the headline, to determine how this frame fits into the
narrative of the story. This falls in line with Bennett’s (2012) critique of
26
2
13
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
Thematic Frame Types
Average Rate
Declining Rate
Increasing Rate
91
decontextualized news. Without comparative data, readers, unless very well-
informed, are unable to place the thematic data in a meaningful context. An
example of such a thematic frame is
“Increasing rate” was the second most common thematic frame subject,
which suggests that Hypothesis 2, in which I hypothesize that thematic frames
that discuss increasing tort claims would be more common than thematic frames
that indicated they were decreasing, is supported. Rising rates were more than six
times more likely to be included in thematic frames than “declining rates,” even
though academic retorts to tort reformers are replete with statistical data that
largely demonstrates declining rates in tort claims after the 1980s (Daniels and
Martin 2000, 2004; Haltom 1998; Haltom and McCann 2004). A 2008 article with
the headline, “To the Trenches: The Tort Reform War is Raging On,” author
Jonathan Glater cites data indicating that the number of class-action lawsuits filed
in 88 federal courts rose 72 percent from 2001 to 2007 (Glater 2008, p. BU1). In
almost every instance, the mention of a rising or increasing rate correlated with
quotes or interest group mentions associated with increasing the need for tort
reform. The example cited above was immediately followed by a quote from a
spokesman for American Association for Tort Reform, who said that such data
indicates that tort reform is more necessary than ever.
Despite myriad statistical studies that indicate that tort claims and awards
have largely leveled off, the articles are more likely to include statistical portraits
92
that indicate otherwise. This suggests that before this leveling-off, tort reform
advocates were effective at getting journalists to publish their data and that after
the leveling-off anti-tort reform advocates were not nearly as successful.
Both Episodic and Thematic Frames
The percentage of articles that included both frame types – episodic and
thematic – is less prevalent in tort reform coverage than articles including one
type of frame at the expense of the other. Nevertheless, future research can build
on the work of Chong and Druckman (2011) and others who examine competitive
framing (e.g., operationalizing sequences of different frames as treatments) by
examining the ramifications of people reading both frames on affect and
persuasion.
Interest Groups
Figure 5. Interest Groups by Tort Reform Stance
16
30
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
Interest Groups
Anti-Reform
Pro-Reform
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Hypothesis 3: Interest Group Mentions
Figure 5 indicates which side of the tort reform debate was more effective
at getting its interest groups quoted or mentioned in the articles in the sample. Of
the 46 interest groups that were mentioned in the articles in the sample (n=55), 30
are pro-tort reform and 16 are anti-tort reform, which suggests that tort reform
advocates achieved greater success at providing quotes that journalists deemed
useful and worthy of inclusion in their stories and that Hypothesis 3 is confirmed.
Table 4 in the Appendix has a complete list of interest groups mentioned in the
articles in the sample. Table 3 includes the interest groups that were mentioned or
quoted more than once.
Table 3. Interest Groups Appearing More Than Once
Interest Groups
Frequency
Stance
American Medical Association 8 Pro-Reform
U.S. Chamber of Commerce 7 Pro-Reform
Institute for Legal Reform 5 Pro-Reform
American Tort Reform Association 5 Pro-Reform
Association of Trial Lawyers of America 5 Anti-Reform
American Bar Association 4 Anti-Reform
American Trial Lawyers Association 3 Anti-Reform
American Hospital Association 2 Pro-Reform
Center for Justice and Democracy 2 Anti-Reform
Class Action Fairness Coalition 2 Pro-Reform
Insurance Information Institute 2 Pro-Reform
National Association of Manufacturers 2 Pro-Reform
New York State Trial Lawyers Association 2 Anti-Reform
Physician Insurers of America 2 Pro-Reform
Public Citizen 2 Anti-Reform
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Figure 6. Pro-Tort Reform Interest Groups by Issue Area
Hypothesis 3a: Pro-Tort Reform Interest Groups
Figure 6 illustrates the breakdown of interest groups advocating in favor
of tort reform. Among these groups, organizations representing business interests
were the most numerous (n=11), followed by groups representing the interests of
medical professionals (n=10), which suggests that Hypothesis 3a is confirmed.
Groups representing businesses and groups representing medical professionals are
two of the largest stakeholders in the tort reform process. Their ability to have
journalists mention the names of their groups suggests that they are an integral
component in driving tort reform narratives. Groups concerned with the law
(n=7), and the insurance industries (n=2) were also represented in the sample (see
Figure 6). The 11 different pro-tort reform business groups were mentioned in the
articles a combined 22 times. There were almost as many medical-related groups
mentioned in the articles as business groups (11 and 10, respectively), but the
0
5
10
15
20
25
Business Medicine Law Insurance
Number of Groups
Total Number of Mentions
95
medical groups were quoted far less frequently than business groups. The
medical-related interest groups were mentioned 19 times, or an average of 1.9
mentions per group (compared to 2.0 for the pro-reform business groups) (see
Figure 7 below). Here, evidence suggests that interest groups (groups of political
elites) are interacting with another group of political elites (mass media) to control
the terms and scope of the debate—the “common sense” construction of tort
reform.
One example of a frequently-cited and important stakeholder in the tort
reform debate is the American Tort Reform Association. The ATRA, founded in
1986, is one of the most influential lobbying groups regarding reform of the
American tort system. They engage in all the activities one would expect from a
lobbying organization with a substantial track record of legislative successes.
These activities include not only lobbying, but strategizing, coordinating, and
facilitating (Baumgartner et al. 2009; Baumgartner and Leech 1998; Haltom and
McCann 2004; Stefancic and Delgado 1996). Despite its successes as a
conventional clearinghouse for tort reform efforts, the argument has been made
that ATRA’s greatest successes have come in its role as a re-shaper of the notion
of “common sense” about the tort system (Daniels and Martin 2000, 2004;
Haltom and McCann 2004; Gavin 2008).
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Figure 7. Rate of Mentions Per Group Type (Pro-Tort Reform)
Hypothesis 3b: Anti-Tort Reform Interest Groups
Figure 8 illustrates the inclusion of anti-tort reform lobbyists in the
articles. Of the 16anti-tort reform lobbyist organizations mentioned, groups
representing trial attorneys were the most numerous (n=8), followed by groups
representing consumer interests and the legal profession more generally (n=4 for
both).
10
The 16 anti-tort reform groups were mentioned in the articles a combined
28 times. Among them, organizations representing trial attorneys were the most
10
Tort reform advocates never waste an opportunity to point out that the tort system’s most ardent
defenders are trial attorneys. In what is no doubt a nod to the associative power of certain words or
phrases (the phrase “tort tales” also comes to mind), the Association of Trial Lawyers of America
(“ATLA”) started calling itself the American Association for Justice in November 2006. Lobbying
groups involved in tort reform efforts, particularly those representing the interests of trial
attorneys, have a long history of name changes. Before it started calling itself the ATLA, it was
known as the National Association of Claimants’ Compensation Attorneys in the late 1940s, then
the National Association of Claimants’ Counsel of America in 1960, and, finally, in 1964 they
changed their name to the American Trial Lawyers Association. In 1972, they settled on ATLA.
As John Witt, professor of law at Columbia argues, “The problem for trial attorney is that the
genius of the tort system – its capacity to marshal the entrepreneurial energies of the bar – is also
its greatest public relations liability” (Witt 2006).
2.00
1.90
1.74
1.50
0.00
0.50
1.00
1.50
2.00
2.50
Business Medicine Law Insurance
Average Mentions Per Group Type
97
frequently cited (15 times, or an average of 1.88 mentions per group), which
suggests support for Hypothesis 3b. Not only was the total number of trial
attorney groups higher than the total number of groups for any other interest, the
total number of mentions of trial attorney groups was twice as high the next
highest group-types (consumer groups and general law interest groups). This
suggests that trial attorneys, at least by this measure, are among the most closely
aligned groups to anti-tort reform efforts and that scholars should not be surprised
when the public closely associates them with tort battles.
Figure 8. Anti-Tort Reform Groups by Issue Area
Conclusion
Recall that Haltom and McCann (2004) make an argument about the
implicit agenda-setting power of mass media (e.g., episodic “tort tales” appear
more frequently than thematically-framed data). The findings presented here
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
Trial Attorneys Consumer Groups Law
Number of Groups
Total Number of Mentions
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suggest that despite Haltom and McCann’s claims that instances of “tort tales” are
the modal form of tort coverage, the articles in the sampling frame include more
thematic frames than episodic frames. This is not to suggest that thematic frames,
by virtue of appearing more frequently, are more persuasive than episodic frames
(something that Chapter 4 directly addresses), only that they are more common in
newspaper coverage of tort reform than the extant literature would lead us to
believe (Bailis and MacCoun 1996; Haltom 1998; Haltom and McCann 1998,
2004; McCann and Engel 2009). Apocryphal tort tales have no doubt served to re-
orient Americans’ thinking about tort issues and the civil justice system as a
whole, yet they remain in the minority when it comes to journalists deciding on
how to report tort issues.
The results supports the hypothesis that when journalists do include
thematic frames, they will be more likely to suggest that tort claims and damage
awards are rising rather than falling. The results of this hypothesis are closely
related to Haltom and McCann’s (2004) claims about the power of interest groups
and the institutional “best practices” of journalists. As the next paragraph
discusses, pro-tort reform interest groups were better represented in the sampling
frame than anti-tort reform groups. These groups were in fact more likely to cite
thematic data supporting their claims that the tort system is out-of-control than
apocryphal episodic vignettes that may lead readers to believe that outliers are
indeed the norm. Second, it may be easier for journalists to think to include
thematic data that is packaged and delivered to them by pro-reform interest
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groups, rather than hunting through academic studies that may be more accurate
and empirically rigorous, but much denser and harder to comprehend.
Finally, the results of the content analysis support the related claim that
pro-tort reform interest groups have been more effective at using mass media to
disseminate their agenda. Each side of the tort reform debate includes well-funded
groups that spend millions of dollars attempting to not only pass legislation at
both the state and federal levels, but sway public opinion (recall Gavin’s concept
of “stealth tort reform”). The articles included in this content analysis suggest that
tort reformers have indeed been more successful at inserting their views into New
York Times articles about the issue. Future analysis of tort reform media coverage
could sample media coverage of specific pieces of tort reform legislation that
were both successfully passed (i.e., the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of
1986) and unsuccessfully passed (i.e., various federal tort reform efforts in the
104
th
Congress of 1995-1996) to examine whether meaningful differences in
coverage existed among successful and failed bills.
The present study leaves open several avenues for future research. The
sampling frame in this chapter was primarily designed to include articles that
represented (almost) the entirety of the time period in which tort reform has been
a salient issue in American politics. There is some evidence to suggest that the
structure of compensation schemes (such as the Vaccine Injury Act) may also
engender different patterns of media coverage and interest group involvement.
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Some suspect that the difficulty in reforming the tort system is centered on the
feedback loops associated with the entrenchment of these compensation structures
(Barnes, 2011). Future analysis could center on the design of these structures and
examine the role that interest groups and journalists play in framing them for
public consumption.
Future analysis could also examine the presence and absence of episodic
and thematic frames in media coverage of other political issues. As we have seen,
tort reform provides a particularly interesting case to assess the rate of appearance
of episodic and thematic frames. Scholars such as Haltom and McCann had
already recognized that certain forms of coverage seemed to be more effective
than others at permeating the legal consciousness of average citizens, but had yet
to link their wide-reaching analyses to framing theory. In thinking about the
applicability of episodic and thematic frames to other issue areas, Former Speaker
of the House Tip O’Neill’s famous maxim, “All politics is local,” comes to mind,
as do countless pieces of political rhetoric that attempt to localize and personalize
issues. Examples run the gamut, from John McCain’s foisting of “Joe the
Plumber” onto the national stage as an emblem of the struggles of small business
owners, to the American citizens who are invited to sit with the First Lady during
the President’s State of the Union address and are then mentioned by name by the
president as symbolic political tokens. To the extent that other issues are prone to
episodic and thematic framing, future research should broaden the scope in order
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to better understand how, when, and why these frames are likely to appear in mass
media coverage.
102
Chapter 4
Experiment
103
The experiment described in this chapter and the sequence described in the
next have three objectives. First, the experiment in the present chapter is meant to
replicate and extend certain aspects of extant research on the effects of episodic
and thematic research to suggest that when tone is held steady, episodic and
thematic frames about a political issue can lead people to have different affective
reactions to the political issue in the frame (Aarøe 2011; Gross 2008; Nabi 2003).
Second, that episodic and thematic frames about the same political issue, when
controlling for direction of tone, can lead people to have different cognitive
reactions to the political issue in the frame (Brader, Valentino, and Suhay 2008;
Chong and Druckman 2007; Druckman 2004). Third, the second and third
experiments in the sequence, which are to be the next step in this research agenda,
take the form of a parallel encouragement design, allow for further exploration of
the relationship between emotion and belief change as potential mediating
variables of framing effects.
Political scientists are increasingly likely to use experiments as a research
tool to address a wide range of issues. As Jamie Druckman and co-editors point
out in the Cambridge Handbook of Experimental Political Science (2011),
political scientists have implemented experiments in a number of contexts,
including voter mobilization (e.g., Gerber and Green 2000), voting (e.g.,
McGraw, Lodge, and Stroh 1990), congressional and bureaucratic rules (e.g.,
Miller, Hammond, and Kile 1996), and media effects (e.g., Iyengar and Kinder
1987). As the propensity for political scientists to use experimental designs to test
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assumptions has increased, framing effects researchers have also turned to
experiments to ascertain whether frames can affect people’s views on political
(Chong and Druckman 2007, 2010, 2011; Gross 2008; Gross and Brewer 2007;
Iyengar 1991). Simplified, most framing effects experiments are primarily
concerned with causal inference, or the degree to which variable x causes
outcome y (Barnes and Weller forthcoming). Most framing effects studies that
conceptualize attitude change as the dependent variable consider the frame to be
variable x and attitude change as outcome y. As we have seen, a framing effect is
a process with multiple components and thresholds that must be met in order for
the frame to have an effect. In this respect, framing is similar to many
examinations of political phenomena conducted by researchers who are concerned
with causal inference.
Researchers in a wide range of disciplines using many different
conceptions of frames have estimated the existence of framing effects. Yet, as
researchers attempt to move beyond merely acknowledging that framing effects
exist, a new frontier is emerging in framing effects research that harkens back to
Donald Kinder’s question quoted at the beginning of Chapter 1. This question, it
is important to note, is not formulated to ask whether framing effects exist, but,
instead, how they exist. To that end, recent framing effects research has drawn on
insights from psychology, economics, and neuroscience to explore the
mechanisms and pathways by which frame x affects outcome y.
105
Grappling with Kinder’s question of how people make sense of frames
requires researchers to develop and test theories about how people form opinions.
If different news frames about political issues do indeed lead to differing
cognitive assessments of those issues, then it stands to reason that certain
mechanisms – of which prior beliefs and emotions are two – figure prominently
into such assessments. Researchers have hypothesized that emotions can serve as
a mediating variable on the causal pathway to opinion formation (Brader,
Valentino, and Suhay 2008; Druckman and Nelson 2003; Gross 2008). As
Chapter 2 discusses, researchers in neuroscience, economics, and psychology now
recognize that emotions and cognition are not distinct functions of mental
processing. Yet, the common practice among experimental researchers (in the
framing paradigm and elsewhere) is to assume that no causal relationship exists
among a series of alternative mechanisms (e.g., beliefs and emotion). As a result,
some framing effects studies suffer from an omitted variable problem. This
assumption of a non-relationship is not always rooted in theory, as Imai and co-
authors (2010, 2011, 2013) argue. For reasons that this chapter touches on the
next explains in greater detail, standard experimental designs do not allow
researchers to test fully whether a relationship exists among mechanisms. This is
because the standard experimental approach is a path-analytic method that
necessarily assumes the absence of causal relationships between hypothesized
mediators. Past research has attempted to address this problem by using structural
equation models (for examples, see Druckman and Nelson 2003 or Brader,
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Valentino, and Suhay 2008) to examine the statistical significance of
corresponding path coefficients.
This chapter derives hypotheses about the effects of episodic and thematic
tort reform frames on people’s attitudes about tort reform policy, their emotional
and affective reactions to episodic and thematic frames, as well as the role that
affect and prior beliefs may play in mediating the effects of episodic and thematic
frames. It tests these hypotheses using an experiment, where the treatments are
informed by the results of the content analysis presented in Chapter 3. This
experiment represents the first empirical test of anecdotal theories of how
dominant modes of tort reform coverage may affect people’s opinions about tort
reform as a political issue. It also serves as groundwork for the next steps in this
research agenda, which are discussed in Chapter 5. The results from the
experiment in this chapter will inform future experiments, which as Chapter 5
describes, are rooted in new methods designed by Imai and co-authors (2010,
2011, 2013). Chapter 5 discusses these methods in greater detail, as well as future
avenues of research to address the role of emotions as mediators of framing
effects.
Next, I address the design of the experiment presented in this chapter,
which begins with discussion of the tradeoffs in external and internal validity
involved in developing treatments based on frame types commonly found in
newspaper coverage.
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External Versus Internal Validity
Framing researchers have many choices to make when deciding how to
operationalize frames as a treatment in an experiment. One of the most hotly
debated decisions in the world of experimental political science involves the
tradeoff between internal and external validity (Druckman et al. 2011; McDermott
2011) This has long been a concern of media effects researchers, who grapple
with using treatments that are reflective of the realities of the mass media
information environment.
Extant research on framing effects falls on a continuum between
maximizing external validity and maximizing internal validity. Framing effects
experiments rooted in Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky’s original
equivalency framing work pay great heed to internal validity, as differences in
treatment conditions often reflect only subtle changes, keeping all other factual
elements of the framed message constant. In other words, most equivalency
framing experiments attempt to maximize internal validity by “ensuring that the
observed differences are driven solely by the shift in frame and not other factors
that could change between stories” (Vraga et al. 2010, p. 3). Those who approach
framing from a more sociological perspective argue that in the quest for
maximum internal validity, experimenters must not lose sight of the importance of
external validity. In this vein, a frame is not created by merely altering one or two
words in a sentence. Rather, a frame is considered the “complete news story that
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is produced from a specific perspective, including the facts that apply to that
frame” (Vraga et al. 2010, p. 4). In other words, media effects researchers are not
immune to the problems faced by the rest of the world of experimental political
science involving the concessions that the researcher must make in designing
experiments.
The treatments employed in this experiment are based on news frames
commonly found in coverage of tort reform in the United States. News frames, as
Gross (2008) argues, can be a “general rhetorical device – ways of telling a story
to make it more understandable, accessible, and compelling to the audience” (p.
170). By mimicking patterns of coverage (presented in Chapter 3’s content
analysis), the treatments are theoretically-motivated and empirically-grounded,
which strengthens their external validity. Moreover, what these frames lack in
internal validity is countered by their portability across a wide range of issues.
Though we have seen that tort reform is a compelling case to test their effects,
episodic and thematic frames (unlike issue frames, for example) are not only
endemic only to tort reform coverage. External validity, though not entirely
discounted, is of less importance to the experiments in this dissertation for one
primary reason: these experiments contribute to theory-generation.
As previously argued, researchers are still grappling with how best to
understand the mechanisms that underline the causal relationship between a
treatment and an outcome variable. Once this relationship is more fully
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understood future experiments can follow the lead of Iyengar and Kinder (1987)
and others who examined causal mechanisms in highly realistic settings in order
to maximize external validity. These experiments can build on the experiment
described in this chapter by using a sample drawn from the general population (as
opposed to undergraduates), actual media content (as opposed to treatments based
on illustrative frame examples and hypothetical legislation), and a setting that
more closely mimics “real-world” media consumption (as opposed to the
somewhat artificial setting of a computer-based experiment).
Overview of Experiment
Scholars have identified multiple components and thresholds that must be
met for frames to make a difference in some conception of outcome y. As
mentioned in Chapter 2, examples of thresholds include the availability,
accessibility, and applicability of a given consideration to a person’s evaluation of
a particular frame (Chong and Druckman 2007). Taken together, these thresholds
can be considered mediators of framing effects – they mediate the effects of frame
x on outcome y. Cognitive appraisal models of emotion suggest that individual
and situational factors can lead to different patterns of emotional response among
people when presented with different forms of information (Lazarus 2001).
Researchers who examine the psychological antecedents of framing effects have
recognized that the tenets of appraisal theory can be applied to better ascertain the
when, why, and how of emotional responses to frames (Aarøe 2011; Gross 2008).
110
This dissertation examines the emotional and cognitive reactions elicited
by two types of news (or story-telling) frames: episodic and thematic. As Chapter
2 discusses, these frame types were identified by Iyengar (1991) and offer
different ways of portraying information about an issue or an event. Like all
frames, episodic and thematic frames share two components: a subject and a
context. Where they differ is in the scope of the context. Recall Gross’s (2008, p.
171) definitions of episodic and thematic frames, which were noted in Chapter 2
and again here:
Episodic frames “present an issue by offering a specific example, case
study, or event oriented report (e.g., covering unemployment by
presenting a story on the plight of a particular unemployed
person).”
Thematic frames “place issues into a broader context (e.g., covering
unemployment by reporting on the latest unemployment figures
and offering commentary by economists or public officials on the
impact of the economy on unemployment).”
It is not hard to imagine that to journalists – the creators of news frames –
differences in context have important ramifications. Though the institutional
factors that lead to frame production are not the primary focus of this dissertation,
there is no doubt that journalists choose to use episodic and thematic frames for
specific reasons. Gross (2008) hypothesizes that when journalists choose to use
episodic frames, they do so out of the belief that they are more compelling and
thus more likely to make a reader interested in the story and the issue that is the
subject of the story. Thematic frames, on the other hand, may appeal to readers
111
who prefer a broader, less personal way of understanding an issue. Yet which of
these frame types are more likely to lead people to have certain opinions about
policy? Which of them are more likely to elicit emotional responses? How do the
responses to these frame types – both in terms of affective response and policy
view – comport with prior research on the role played by mass media in the
construction of political attitudes about tort reform?
Method
Design
Figure 9. Experimental Design
Tone
Type
Thematic/Pro
(n=31)
Episodic/Pro
(n=32)
Thematic/Anti
(n=45)
Episodic/Anti
(n=57)
Control Condition
(n=39)
112
To explore how mass media frames can affect emotional response and
policy views, I conducted an online, survey-based
11
experiment with students at
the University of Southern California who had previously expressed interest in
participating in social science research. The experiment was designed as a
standard mixed-factorial 2x2 experimental design in which subjects’ attitudes
toward the tort system and reform of the tort system were observed both before
and after being randomly assigned to receive one of five treatments (including a
control condition), which were modeled after newspaper articles on tort and tort
reform (see Figure 9)
12
. The treatments include a policy suggestion at the end of
the vignette, which reflects a typology employed by Aarøe (2011) in testing the
effects of episodic and thematic frames on Danish immigration policy. The policy
suggestions argue both for and against the passage of hypothetical tort reform
legislation (the “Class Action Fairness Act of 2013”). Despite this addition, the
rest of the texts of the treatments are modeled after the commonly found frame
types discussed in Chapter 3.
11
Research demonstrates that framing does influence responses to survey questions (Bleich 2007;
Schneider and Ingram 1990; Schuman and Presser 1981).
12
The treatment typology does not include a condition that includes both episodic and thematic
frames. Research suggests that competition among frame types may elicit different results than
treatments representing only one frame type (Chong and Druckman 2006). Future research could
employ designs in which subjects are presented with multiple frame types, thus more closely
mimicking patterns of media consumption over time.
113
Text of the four treatments can be found in the Appendix. Each of the four
treatments was preceded by a common introduction:
The Class Action Fairness Act of 2013 is a piece of
legislation currently under debate in the U.S.
Congress.
Most who keep a close watch on Congress expect it
to pass during the next legislative session. It will
curb the amount of damages that juries can award
in civil lawsuits and will make it more difficult for
people to file class action lawsuits against
corporations. The necessity of the Act has been
much debated by groups representing consumers,
businesses, and attorneys.
In a debate article in the New York Times on March
9, 2013, the following point of view appeared…
A subset of subjects was also randomly assigned to a control condition, in
which they received the same introduction to the vignette as those in the treatment
conditions received, but without direction in terms of tone (anti-tort reform/pro-
tort reform) and without an episodic or thematic frame. This introduction
represents the entirety of the treatment for those in the control condition.
Treatments
The episodically framed columns argue for and against the passage of
proposed federal tort reform legislation by providing details about two specific
cases that are meant to illustrate the argument that too many lawsuits are wasteful,
time-consuming, frivolous, and injurious to businesses (the pro-reform argument)
or the argument that sometimes the courts are the only place for people to turn to
114
receive compensation and justice when they have been subjected to a tragedy due
to the negligence of someone else (the anti-reform argument). In constructing the
episodic frames I feature a business hurt by a seemingly frivolous lawsuit, as well
as a family that had suffered the loss of their son due to negligence on the part of
an Illinois utility.
The Episodic/Pro-Reform frame features a fictional cruise ship company
faced with curbing the scope of its operations because of a lawsuit filed by a man
who claimed that the hot decks of the ship severely burned his feet. Though I alter
the details, its subject is based on a 2012 lawsuit filed by a Carnival Cruise Lines
passenger who claimed that he suffered mental anguish, pain, and injuries as a
result of burning his feet on the cruise ship deck during a “Hairy Man” contest
(Tayler 2012).
The Episodic/Anti-Reform frame features a family whose son was killed
due to negligence by an Illinois utility. The frame describes how a utility truck
owned by the Illinois Department of Water and Power struck and killed a five-
year-old boy as he was crossing the street. The subsequent lawsuit filed by his
parents uncovered a “pattern of negligence” on the part of the utility, who
routinely hired drivers without conducting background checks. The frame also
describes how the child’s parents turned to the court system only after being
repeatedly told that Illinois legislators could not do anything to help them.
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The thematically framed columns argue for and against the passage of the
proposed legislation by providing details on rising (or falling) rates of litigation,
the large discrepancy in jury awards for cases involving similar damages, and the
high (or low) percentage of small business owners who see lawsuits as a threat to
their livelihood. The thematic frames also feature statistics about the rates of new
tort claims being filed, as well as data on mean and median jury awards.
The Thematic/Pro-Reform frame features fictitious data about the rising
rate of tort claims filed in U.S. courts relative to other industrialized nations. It
also mentions the wide range of jury awards handed out in cases involving
plaintiffs with mesothelioma, which is the disease commonly contracted by
people after long exposure to asbestos.
The Thematic/Anti-Reform frame also features fictitious data, prefaced by
a claim that the court system is not as “out-of-control” as some fear. It cites data
indicating that the percentage of tort lawsuits makes up less than 5 percent of all
civil cases filed in 2008, a number that represents a 25 percent decline between
1999 and 2008. It also features thematically-framed data from the National
Federation of Independent Businesses (which is an actual firm that lobbies on
behalf of small business owners) that states that “being threatened by a lawsuit”
ranks only sixty-fifth on a recent list of small business owners’ worries.
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Sample
A total of 204 subjects completed the pretest, the experimental procedure,
and the posttest. Sixty-seven percent were women. Fifty percent were white, 26
percent were Asian, 7 percent were Hispanic, and 4 percent were black. Fifty-six
percent identified themselves as Democrats, 23 percent as Republicans, and 16
percent as Independents. Participants ranged in age from 18 to 24. There were no
statistically significant differences across conditions on these characteristics. The
use of a student sample raises questions about the generalizability of results to
broader populations (e.g., Sears 1986).
13
As was the case in other framing effects
studies that employed a student subject pool in an experiment (see Gross and
Brewer 2007), the focus in this dissertation was not on the absolute levels of
emotional responses to frames; rather, it was on the relative differences in such
responses across experimentally induced conditions.
Procedures
The experiments were embedded in online surveys in which participants
received the stimuli in the semi-controlled setting of web-based surveys
13
Experiments in which undergraduates serve as the subjects and experiments in which the
subjects are exposed to the treatment within a survey are each subject to methodological
challenges. While many political scientists bemoan the use of “on campus” subjects, research has
found that the validity of the experiments does not increase if undergraduates are used
(particularly if the researcher accounts for the representativeness of the sample) (Sears 1986).
Moreover, the experiments used in this dissertation are not designed to mimic the setting in which
most people consume news (though subjecting people to a treatment based on an online
newspaper article is certainly more externally valid today than even five years ago). Instead, these
experiments are designed to isolate and account for the role played by emotion as a mediating
variable in the framing effects process. Once this relationship is located and established, future
research can determine if its existence or strength is moderated by the settting in which consumers
receive the treatment.
117
implemented through Qualtrics. The experiment took place in March and April
2013. Participants were compensated with gift cards for participating in the study.
The procedure began with a pretest that contained measures designed to
test characteristics of the subjects in three different areas: demographic
information, political knowledge, and political beliefs (specifically, beliefs about
the state of tort law in the United States). Political beliefs, the last component of
the pre-test, will be discussed in greater detail later in the chapter as they are a
potential mediator of the effects of the treatment. Next, participants were
randomly assigned one of five treatment conditions that, as previously mentioned,
varied in terms of tone (pro-tort reform, anti-tort reform) and frame (episodic,
thematic).
Mediators (Emotions)
Following the administering of the treatment, participants answered a
series of posttest questions about the presence or absence of feeling discrete
emotions after reading the treatment (pity, disgust, worry, anger, and sympathy).
These emotions were selected because extant research suggests that they are
commonly evoked emotions in episodic and thematically framed newspaper
articles about public policy (Aarøe 2011; Gross 2008) and tort reform (Bailis and
MacCoun 1996). Additionally, apart from prior research, I anticipate that they are
the emotions most likely to be evoked by the details of the columns. Respondents
were asked whether they felt the emotion (in the form of a binary yes/no
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response) and, for those who indicated that they felt emotion, a follow-up
question was asked about the strength of that emotional response (measured on a
nine-point Likert scale). In the analysis, the binary variable and the strength of
response variable was combined and recoded, where 0 indicates no emotional
response on the part of the respondent (a “no” answer to the binary variable) and
1 equals a “strongly felt” response to the follow-up “degree of emotional
response” questions. These discrete emotion measures were asked only in the
post-test portion of the experiment (though before respondents were asked the
dependent variable questions). Consequently, the results of the emotion mediators
are only valid for between-case comparisons, rather than within-case
comparisons. This differs from the analysis of the second set of mediating
variables, beliefs about the court system, which are explained in the next section.
Mediators (Prior Beliefs)
In attempting to determine what mediates policy responses to different
combinations of news frame type and tone, research suggests that activation of
prior beliefs, in addition to emotions, can play a mediating role in framing effects
(Aarøe 2011; Druckman and Nelson 2003; Gross 2008; Slothuus 2008). In order
to measure respondents’ beliefs about the court system (beliefs that may mediate
views about a specific piece of legislation involving the “reform” of one area of
the court system – torts), I asked respondents to answer four questions, both pre-
and post-test, that relate to concerns held by those who are tort reform advocates
and those who advocate against tort reform. The four belief mediators are adapted
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from research that examines jury verdicts in business trials (Hans 2000). Hans
attempts to ascertain whether jury verdicts are influenced more by perceptions of
a corporation’s negligence or sympathy that the jury has for the plaintiffs. In
interviews with civil jurors, she asks the jurors to respond to four statements to
guage their beliefs about the justice system. The four statements, which I adapt to
use as measures of belief mediators, are as follows:
(1): “There are too many frivolous lawsuits in the United States.”
(Frivolous)
(2): “Lawsuits interfere with the development of new and useful
products.” (Development)
(3): “Most people who sue others in court have legitimate grievances.”
(Grievances)
(4): “By making it easier to sue, the courts have made this a safer
society.” (Safer)
Respondents in the present experiment were asked to rate the degree to
which they agreed or disagreed with these four statements, measured on a 7-point
Likert scale. Similar to the discrete emotional responses, in the analysis their
responses were recoded between 0 and 1, in which a score of 0 indicates that the
respondent strongly agreed with the statement and a score of 1 indicates that the
respondent strongly disagreed with the statement. These statements were
presented to respondents both before and after the administering of the treatment,
which allows for both within-case and between-case analysis among respondents
and across treatment conditions.
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Dependent Variables
After the treatment was administered respondents answered two questions
about their levels of support for proposed tort reform legislation that was
mentioned in the treatment. The first measure of the dependent variable
(“Dependent Variable 1”) was a statement meant to gauge general support for the
core tenets of the proposed tort reform legislation:
Dependent Variable 1:
“The proposed legislation to reform the tort system
(Class Action Fairness Act of 2013) is a good idea.”
The second dependent variable measure tested whether or not respondents
believed that Congress should pass the proposed legislation:
Dependent Variable 2:
“Congress should pass the Class Action Fairness Act of 2013.”
Respondents were asked whether they agreed or disagreed with both
statements. Responses to both questions were on a 7-point Likert-scaled item and
were recoded for analysis between 0 and 1, where 0 indicated that the respondent
strongly agreed with the statement and 1 indicated that they strongly disagreed
with the statement. As the dependent variables were measured only in the post-
test, I can only make comparisons between, as opposed to within, cases.
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Expectations
As previously mentioned, scholars have only anecdotally surmised about
the influence of media coverage on attitudes about tort reform (Haltom and
McCann 2004; McCann and Engel 2009). Recent research that incorporates affect
and the episodic/thematic framing dichotomy finds that respondents who read
episodic stories about certain policies are more likely to have an emotional
response than respondents who read thematic stories about the same issue (Aarøe
2011; Gross 2008), which leads to Hypothesis 1.
Hypothesis 1: I expect that episodic frames about tort reform will lead to
stronger emotional responses than thematic frames about tort reform.
As Gross (2008) argues, the “human interest” details of an episodic frame
should be more emotionally engaging than the “pallid statistics” of a thematic
frame (p. 172), yet the results of the content analysis presented in Chapter 3
suggest that despite the anecdotal claims that episodic frames are more likely to
engage the emotions of readers, they are not as common in news coverage of tort
reform as thematic frames.
Hypothesis 2
a
: I expect both episodic frames to elicit sympathy and pity,
emotions that share a similar valence but are semantically different
(Gerdes 2011).
Pity has been defined as “a condescending, or contemptuous form of
feeling sorry for someone, often directed at people who are perceived as pathetic
or having brought about their own misery” (Geller 2006; Gerdes 2011). On the
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other hand, sympathy has been defined as “expression or concern or sorrow about
distressful events in a person’s life” (Clark 2010; Gerdes 2011). Despite these
differences, I expect subjects in the Episodic/Pro-Reform frame to direct these
discrete emotional responses toward the defendants (the cruise ship company) and
those in the Episodic/Anti-Reform frame to direct them toward the plaintiffs (the
parents of the deceased child).
14
While episodic frames may engender emotions such as sympathy or pity,
their individualistic, event-oriented nature often leads respondents to make
individual attributions for the situation in which the subject of the frame finds
herself (Iyengar 1991; Gross 2008). Episodic frames can also encourage
incomplete understanding of a broad, complicated, and complex policy area.
If episodic frames are more effective than thematic frames at eliciting
sympathy and pity, then I expect them to also be more effective at eliciting
emotions that have the opposite valence: anger and disgust.
Hypothesis 2
b
: I expect both episodic frames to also be more likely to
elicit anger and disgust than thematic frames and among those in the
control condition.
These emotional reactions may coincide with sympathy and pity, yet
would be directed at different objects. In the case of the Episodic/Pro-Reform
14
Future research on discrete emotional responses to framing effects should carefully parse the
object of emotional response within frame types. Testing emotional responses in this way is
beyond the scope of this dissertation.
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frame, these emotional reactions would be directed toward the plaintiff (the man
with the burned feet) and in the Episodic/Anti-Reform frame they would be
directed toward the defendant (the Illinois utility company).
The existing research is inconclusive as to whether episodic or thematic
frames are more effective in leading people toward or away from specific
appraisals of policy (Aarøe 2011; Gross 2008). Some scholars posit that thematic
frames are more persuasive than episodic frames, while others argue that because
episodic frames are more likely to elicit an emotional response, they are more
useful as a tool of persuasion (Iyengar 1991; cf. Aarøe 2011; Gross 2008). A
central tenet of Iyengar’s (1991) early work on episodic and thematic framing
suggests that one of the most important differences in the reactions elicited by the
two frame types is the attribution of responsibility for the policy that is the subject
of the frame. Episodic frames lead people to make individual attributions for
policy problems and thematic frames lead people to attribute societal-level causes
for the same policy problem. The result of this difference, according to Iyengar, is
that thematic frames lead people to be more likely to support government
solutions for policy problems.
It may be presumptuous to assume that journalists, by employing thematic
frames more commonly in their articles than episodic frames, are making an
implicit argument that thematic frames are more persuasive than episodic frames.
As we have seen, institutional factors, such as newsworthiness and interest groups
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most likely play an important role in the use of frames in coverage. Nevertheless,
the prevalence of thematic frames in tort reform coverage leads to Hypothesis 3:
Hypothesis 3:
I expect thematic frames to be more persuasive than
episodic frames in altering people’s views of proposed tort reform
legislation when compared to a control condition.
This dissertation does not derive hypotheses about the mediating role of
the belief variables discussed in a preceding section of this chapter. With respect
to the roles played by potentially mediating variables in the framing effects
process, this dissertation is more an exercise in hypothesis-generation than
hypothesis-testing. Although it tests for differences among respondents’ answers
with respect to how much they agreed or disagreed with the four mediating
variables (and calculated differences among pre- and post-test answers), the
experiment described in Chapter 5 will address how to empirically test the roles
played by these mediating variables.
Next, I discuss the results of the experiment and how they comport to the
expectations presented in this section, beginning with differences in the discrete
emotional responses elicited by the five treatment conditions. Then I will discuss
the results of the experiment with respect to the persuasiveness of the treatment
conditions. The chapter concludes with discussion of the subjects’ responses to
the four belief variables and also considers how the next steps in this research
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agenda plan to incorporate the findings of the present experiment as the
groundwork for future experiments on the mediating variables of framing effects.
Findings
Table 5. Emotional Response by Treatment Condition
Emotion
Episodic Frame
Anti Tort Reform
Thematic Frame
Anti Tort Reform
Episodic Frame
Pro Tort Reform
Thematic Frame
Pro Tort Reform
Control
Sympathy .15 (.27) .10 (.23) .43*** (.38) .05 (.16) .13 (.25)
Pity .14 (.26)
.06 (.16)
.28 (.36)**
.05 (.15)
.12 (.24)
Anger .10 (.22) .17* (.28) .17 (.28) .05 (.15) .07 (.03)
Disgust .19 (.30) .13 (.27) .20 (.34) .08 (.20) .16 (.28)
Worry .15 (.27) .24 (.28) .23 (.32) .12 (.20) .18 (.29)
N=57 N=45 N=32 N=31 N=39
Note: Table entry is mean emotional response by frame and tone with standard deviation in
parentheses. Emotional reactions are coded to range between 0 and 1, where 0 indicates that the
respondent did not feel the emotional reaction and 1 indicates that they strongly felt the emotion.
Asterisks indicate that the treatment condition differs significantly from the control condition (t-
test on means): ***p < .01 **p < .05 *p < .10.
Table 5 presents mean emotional reactions by frame condition with
standard deviation in parentheses. Following convention, emotional reaction
variables were recoded to range between 0 and 1, where 1 signals stronger
emotional response. The table reports emotional reactions for individual
emotions. The results in Table 5 suggest support for Hypothesis 1. Episodic
framing alters emotional response relative to a control condition on the same
topic. This comports with the anecdotal claims made by other tort reform
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researchers (e.g., Haltom and McCann 2004), who believe that “event-centered”
tort reform reporting is more likely to lead people to have affective reactions
about tort reform than comparatively more dry, statistics-based reporting (e.g.,
thematic frames).
Those who read a column that featured an episodic frame that was in favor
of passing tort reform legislation (Episodic/Pro-Reform) were significantly more
likely to express the emotions of pity and sympathy than those in the control
condition (28 to .12 and .43 to .13 and ., respectively). Pity differed significantly
from the control condition at the p < .05 level, whereas sympathy differed
significantly from the control condition at the p < .01 level, both of which suggest
support for Hypothesis 2a. Next, I discuss why this may be the case, as well as
differences among pity and sympathy responses by treatment condition (including
when the treatment conditions are collapsed both by tone and frame type).
Pity
Interestingly, the elicitation of pity seems to be entirely reliant on the
specific frame type/tone combination (Episodic/Pro Reform). When collapsing
the treatments by frame type, episodic frames failed to elicit pity to a degree that
differed from those in the control condition (see Table 6). Moreover, when
collapsing the treatments by tone, pro-reform frames did not elicit pity to a degree
that differed from the control condition (see Table 7). Extant research has
examined the affective components of frames (Gross 2008; Nabi 2003), but has
127
failed to explore whether the affective components of episodic frames are
conditional on the tone of the frame. Past research has found that elicitations of
sympathy and pity were conditional on certain components of the frame, one of
which was the race of the person described in the frame (Brader, Valentino, and
Suhay 2008; Gross 2008). The effects of frame tone on sympathy and pity have
not been empirically tested.
In the case of tort reform media coverage, it may be that the specific frame
combination (Episodic/Pro Reform) used as a treatment in this experiment is
particularly effective at eliciting pity, or it may be that Haltom and McCann’s
(2004) assumptions are correct: even in a sample that is more Democratic than
Republican, people are more likely to feel pity that is aimed at defendants in an
episodic/pro-reform condition than pity aimed at plaintiffs in an episodic/anti-
reform condition. In other words, pro-tort reform narratives dominate the social
construction of people’s feelings about the issue. This potentially spells trouble
for anti-tort reformers who may attempt to counteract negative episodic examples
propagated by pro-reform groups (Haltom and McCann’s (2004) ‘tort tales’) with
episodic examples of their own that tout the heroic side of American tort law
(e.g., “David versus Goliath”-themed stories).
128
Table 6. Emotional Response by Frame Type.
Emotion
Episodic Frame
Thematic Frame
Control Condition
Sympathy .25** (.34) .08 (.21) .13 (.25)
Pity .19 (.31) .06* (.12) .11 (.24)
Anger .12 (.24) .12 (.24) .08 (.21)
Disgust .19 (.31) .11 (.24) .15 (.28)
Worry .18 (.29) .19 (.26) .19 (.29)
N=89 N=76 N=39
Note: Table entry is mean emotional response by frame and tone with standard deviation in
parentheses. Emotional reactions are coded to range between 0 and 1. Asterisks indicate that the
treatment condition differs significantly from the control condition (t-test on means):
***p < .01 **p < .05 *p < .1.
Table 7. Emotional Response by Frame Tone.
Emotion
Anti Tort Reform
Pro Tort Reform
Control Condition
Sympathy .25* (.35) .13 (.25) .13 (.25)
Pity .17 (.30) .10 (.22) .11 (.24)
Anger .11 (.23) .13 (.25) .07 (.21)
Disgust .15 (.28) .16 (.29) .15 (.28)
Worry .18 (.27) .19 (.28) .19 (.29)
N=63 N=102 N=39
Note: Table entry is mean emotional response by frame and tone with standard deviation in
parentheses. Emotional reactions are coded to range between 0 and 1. Asterisks indicate that the
treatment condition differs significantly from the control condition (t-test on means):
***p < .01 **p < .05 *p < .10
129
Sympathy
We have seen that the combination of an episodically-framed treatment
that is anti-tort reform is likely to elicit strong feelings of sympathy among
respondents. Unlike pity, sympathy does not appear to be conditional on the
specific Episodic/Anti-Reform treatment condition. When collapsing the
treatments by frame type, episodic frames are still more likely to elicit sympathy
than the control condition (mean response of .25 to .13, respectively, which is
significant at the p < .05 level). When collapsing the treatments by frame tone,
anti-tort reform frames are also still more likely to elicit sympathy than the
control condition (mean response of .25 to .13, respectively, which is significant
at the p < .10 level).
As Hypothesis 2a demonstrates, I expected that episodic frames would be
more likely to elicit sympathy and pity than the control condition, but I did not
have a priori expectations that pity would be reliant on a specific frame
combination, whereas sympathy would prove to be significant across frame type
and tone. As sympathy and pity share a similar valence, the findings suggest, at
least in this case, that appraisal-based models of emotional response (Lazarus
2001) are necessary (recall that appraisal theory suggests that there can be
different patterns of response regarding similarly-valenced emotions). Future
research should examine exactly why pity and sympathy responses seem to differ
with respect to mass media coverage of tort reform, paying particular attention to
130
the subtle differences in the definitions of both terms that were cited in the
formulation of Hypothesis 2a on page 129.
Despite eliciting sympathy and pity (suggesting support for Hypothesis
2a), we see that anger and disgust were not elicited by the episodic frames at a
level that differs significantly from the control condition, which suggests that
Hypothesis 2b is not supported by the results of the experiment (See Table 5).
One aspect of the rationale for the case-selection of tort reform is that public
opinion on the issue is not immoveable, though perhaps the flip side is that
despite its importance to elites such as party leaders, it simply fails to elicit strong
negative emotional reactions like anger and disgust among the public.
Dependent Variables (Policy Views)
Next, I analyzed the effects of the different framing conditions on the
persuasive appeal of the treatment by examining views about passage of the
fictional “Class Action Fairness Act of 2013.” Recall that all participants were
asked two questions designed to measure their policy views. The first question
asked participants to rate the degree with which they agreed with the following
statement: “The proposed legislation to reform the tort system in the United States
(the Class Action Fairness Act of 2013) is a good idea.” The second policy
measure asked participants to rate the degree to which they agreed with the
following statement: “Congress should pass the Class Action Fairness Act of
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2013.” Responses to these questions were measured on a 7-point Likert scale and
were recoded to range between 0 and 1, where 1 represents those who strongly
agree with the statements (in other words, that they support passage of the
proposed legislation) and 0 represents those who strongly disagree with the
statement (meaning that they do not support passage of the legislation).
Results
As Gross (2008) argues, if emotional reactions influence judgments, then
the sympathy aroused by the episodic frames should lead to increased opposition
to tort reform relative to the control condition. As previously stated, Iyengar’s
work on episodic and thematic frames suggests that this may not be the case; that
episodic frames are not as persuasive as thematic frames (Iyengar 1991). We have
seen that the episodic framing conditions were more likely to elicit discrete
emotional responses than the control condition and that the anti-tort
reform/episodic condition was particularly likely to elicit sympathy and pity when
compared with the control conditions, yet of the four treatment conditions, which
were persuasive? Table 8 represents mean opinion on the dependent variables –
proposed tort reform legislation – by framing condition.
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Table 8. Policy Views by Treatment Condition
Episodic Frame
Anti Tort Reform
Episodic Frame
Pro Tort Reform
Thematic Frame
Anti Tort Reform
Thematic Frame
Pro Tort Reform
Control
Condition
Post test Opinion on Proposed Legislation (DV #1)
.46* (.19) .46* (.18) .38*** (.20) .48 (.19) .54 (.21)
N=38 N=31 N=41 N=27 N=37
Post test Opinion on Proposed Legislation (DV #2)
.48 (.21) .47 (.16) .40*** (.18) .50 (.18) .52 (.20)
N=38 N=31 N=43 N=28 N=37
Post test Belief #1 (Frivolous Lawsuits, Negatively Phrased)
.52*** (.38) .27 (.19) .25 (.21) .32* (.21) .25 (.16)
N=52 N=32 N=43 N=29 N=38
Change in Belief Pretest to Posttest (Frivolous Lawsuits, Negatively Phrased)
.08* (.23) .02 (.11) -.03* (.15) .09* (.23) .02 (.07)
N=53 N=32 N=42 N=29 N=36
Post Test Belief #2 (Product Development, Negatively Phrased)
.59** (.33) .47 (.28) .43 (.29) .49 (.22) .46 (.19)
N=50 N=30 N=42 N=27 N=37
Change in Belief Pretest to Posttest (Product Development, Negatively Phrased)
-.01 (.14) .06*** (.18) -.02 (.14) .06*** (.14) -.03 (.08)
N=50 N=29 N=40 N=25 N=36
Post Test Belief #3 (Legitimate Grievances, Positively Phrased)
.68** (.29) .37*** (.18) .48 (.26) .51 (.21) .53 (.22)
N=54 N=31 N=44 N=29 N=38
Change in Belief Pretest to Posttest (Legitimate Grievances, Positively Phrased)
.079* (.23) -.06 (.18) .02 (.21) -.01 (.15) .00 (.19)
N=53 N=29 N=44 N=28 N=37
Post Test Belief #4 (Courts Make Society Safer, Positively Phrased)
.69 (.29) .53* (.24) .61 (.23) .68 (.21) .62 (.20)
N=53 N=32 N=44 N=27 N=36
Change in Belief Pretest to Posttest (Courts Make Society Safer, Positively Phrased)
.01 (.20) -.01 (.19) .03 (.18) .02 (.18) .01 (.12)
N=53 N=30 N=44 N=27 N=35
Note. The first two rows of table entries are mean opinion on proposed tort reform legislation with standard deviation in
parentheses. Opinion on the proposed tort reform legislation is coded to range between 0 to 1 where 1 represents those who
strongly believe that Congress should pass proposed tort reform legislation. The remaining rows of table entries are mean
opinion on four items relating to the state of the tort system in the United States. Opinion on these statements is coded to
range between 0 and 1 where 1 represents those who strongly agree with the statement. Post test Belief #1 was phrased as
follows: “There are too many frivolous lawsuits in the United States.” Post test Belief #2: “Lawsuits interfere with the
development of new and useful products.” Post test Belief #3: “Most people who sue others in court have legitimate
grievances.” Post test Belief #4: “By making it easier to sue, the courts have made this a safer society.” Asterisks indicate
that a t-test of means shows framed condition differs significantly from control condition, ***p < .01 **p < .05 *p < .10
(two tail test).
The results presented in Table 8 suggest that, when controlling for tone,
one of the thematic framing conditions is more persuasive than the episodic
framing conditions, thus partially confirming Hypothesis 3. Though the
Thematic/Anti-Reform column proved to be the most persuasive relative to the
control condition, the Thematic/Pro-Reform column failed to move opinion
relative to the control condition at a statistically significant level. The
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Episodic/Pro-Reform column and the Episodic/Anti-Reform column also differed
significantly from the control condition, though to a lesser degree than the
Thematic/Anti-Reform condition.
Participants who received the Thematic/Anti-Reform frame were 16
percent less likely than those in the control condition to believe that the proposed
legislation was a good idea, which was significant at p < .01 (two-tail test). Those
in the Thematic/Anti-Reform condition were also 12 percent less likely than those
in the control condition to believe that Congress should pass the Class Action
Fairness Act of 2013, which was also significant at p < .01 (two-tail test). As
Table 8 demonstrates, the mean score for the first dependent variable was .38
(standard deviation of .20), compared to .54 (standard deviation of .21) for those
in the control condition, which represents a difference .16. The mean score for the
second dependent variable was .40 (standard deviation of .18), compared to .52
(standard deviation of .20) for those in the control condition. This represents a
difference of .12, which, similar to the first dependent variable, was significant at
p < .01 (two-tail test).
The mean results of the first dependent variable in the Episodic conditions
were also statistically significant at p < .10 (two-tail test), but less so than the
Thematic/Anti-Reform column. Those in the Episodic/Anti-Reform condition
reported a mean score on Dependent Variable 1 of .46 (with a standard deviation
.19). This was significant compared to mean responses in the control condition at
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p > .10. The mean responses for Dependent Variable 2 did not differ significantly
compared to the control condition, though considering how similar the measures
were, I do not have reasons, a priori or post-hoc, for why this is the case.
Respondents in the Episodic/Pro-Reform condition reported also reported a mean
score of .46 on Dependent Variable 1 (standard deviation of .18), which, similar
to the Episodic/Anti-Reform condition, significantly differed from those in the
control condition at p < .10. The mean responses for Dependent Variable 2 did not
differ significantly compared to the control condition.
Interestingly, the thematically framed, pro-tort reform (Thematic/Pro-
Reform) column did not significantly differ compared to the control condition
with respect to either measure of the dependent variable, suggesting that frame
tone plays an important role in affecting policy views when partnered with frame
type (at least in the case of thematic frames).
Mediating Variables (Beliefs)
This section analyzes the role that prior belief variables played with
respect to each of the four treatment conditions, beginning with the treatment
condition that received the most statistically significant different responses to the
dependent variables with respect to the control condition: the Thematic/Anti-
Reform condition. As previously mentioned, the belief variables were measured
both pre and post-treatment. In addition to including post-test mean scores of the
belief variables, Table 8 also includes the average change in means (delta score)
135
between the post-test and pre-test questions. The means for the post-test belief
responses were compared to the post-test mean responses in the control condition
using two-tailed t-tests. The mean responses for the change scores were also
compared to those in the control condition using two-tailed t-tests.
Thematic Frame/Anti Tort Reform
We have seen that those who received the Thematic/Anti-Reform column
had mean scores on both dependent variables that differed significantly from
those in the control condition at p < .01 (two-tail test), which represents the most
drastic differences between a treatment condition and the control condition,
suggesting that the Thematic/Anti-Reform treatment was the most persuasive of
all four treatments. Which belief variables, if any, may have mediated these
differences?
None of the post-test emotional responses differed significantly from those
in the control condition. The only belief variable that differed significantly from
the control condition (at p < .10, two-tail test) was the first: “There are too many
frivolous lawsuits in the United States.” The change score for this variable from
pre to post-test was -.03, compared to .02 for those in the control condition. The
belief variable that was statistically significant (“frivolous lawsuits”) is a
dominant component of the social construction of people’s views about the tort
system (Haltom and McCann 2004).
136
Episodic Frame/Anti Tort Reform
The mean responses for Dependent Variable 1 differed from the control
condition at the statistically significant level of p < .10 (two-tail test), though the
difference between the second dependent variable and the control condition was
not statistically significant.
Similar to the Thematic/Anti-Reform condition, none of mean responses
for the post-test emotion variables in the Episodic/Anti-Reform condition
significantly differed from the control condition. Extant research on framing and
emotions suggests that we should not necessarily be surprised that this was the
case in the thematically-framed conditions, yet it is surprising that the
Episodic/Anti-Reform was unable to garner mean emotional responses that
differed from the control condition. One might expect those who would natural
empathize with plaintiffs to experience sympathy or pity aimed at plaintiffs. This
was not the case.
Which of the four hypothesized “belief” variables may have played a
mediating role in making these responses significantly different from the control
condition? The mean response to the first belief variable (“there are too many
frivolous lawsuits”) differed from the control condition at the p > .01 level (two-
tail test). The second and third belief variables, “lawsuits interfere with the
development of new and useful products” and “most people who sue others in
court have legitimate grievances” had mean scores that also differed from the
137
control condition, at the slightly less statistically significant level of p > .05 (two-
tail test), suggesting that in frames of a different type, yet similar valence, the
same belief variable can play a similar mediating role.
The change scores for the first and third belief variables were significantly
different than the control condition at p < .05 (two-tail test). This suggests that
changes in beliefs about the overall role of the court system with respect to the
first and third belief variables (“there are too many frivolous lawsuits” and “most
people who sue others in court have legitimate grievances”), when correlated with
significantly different mean responses for policy views, may serve a mediating
function in the Episodic/Anti-Reform condition.
Episodic Frame/Pro Tort Reform
The mean responses to the first dependent variable for those who received
an episodic frame in favor of tort reform differed from the control condition at the
statistically significant level of p < .10 (two-tail test), though they were not
statistically significant with respect to the second dependent variable.
Unlike the two treatment conditions described above, discrete emotional
reactions to the Episodic/Pro-Reform did significantly differ with respect to the
control condition. In particular, those in the Episodic/Pro-Reform condition
reported a mean score on the “Sympathy” variable of .43 (standard deviation of
.38), compared to .13 in the control condition (standard deviation of .25). This
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difference was statistically significant at the p > .01 level. Respondents also
reported a mean score of “Pity” at .28 (standard deviation of .36), which differed
from the mean response of the control condition (.12, standard deviation .24) at
the statistically significant level of p < .10.
Which of the four hypothesized “belief variables” were statistically
significant when compared to the control condition? The only belief variable that
had a statistically significant change score from pre to post-test when compared to
the control condition was the second belief variable (“Lawsuits interfere with the
development of new and useful products”). The average change for this variable
was .06 (standard deviation of .18), compared to -.03 for those in the control
condition (standard deviation of .08), which was significant at p < .01. Given the
content of the treatment condition (a cruise ship company hurt by a “frivolous”
lawsuit), we should not be surprised that this treatment condition triggered mean
responses that significantly differed from the control condition. It also suggests
that future laboratory experiments that test the impact of episodic frames should
pay careful attention not only to policy-oriented dependent variables, but
variables that measure how prior beliefs that are ancillary to the dependent
variable may be activated by episodic frames.
Thematic Frame/Pro Tort Reform
Neither dependent variable for those in the Thematic/Pro-Reform
condition proved to be significantly different than those in the control condition.
Nevertheless, two of the belief variables had change scores that were significantly
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different than those in the control condition. The two variables are: 1) There are
too many frivolous lawsuits in the United States, which was significant at p < .01
(two-tail test), and 2) Lawsuits interfere with the development of new and useful
products, which was significant at p < .01 (two-tail test). Despite the differences
in means for these variables relative to the control condition, neither dependent
variable was significantly different than the control condition, which suggests that
despite altering the ancillary beliefs of the respondents in this condition, neither
belief was sufficiently powerful as a mediator to change the opinions of the
respondents regarding the proposed legislation.
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Table 9. Policy Views by Frame Tone
Anti Tort Reform
Pro Tort Reform
Control Condition
Post test Opinion on Proposed Legislation (DV #1)
.47* (.19)
N=58
.42*** (.20)
N=79
.54 (.21)
N=37
Post test Opinion on Proposed Legislation (DV#2)
.49 (.17)
N=59
.44** (.20)
N=81
.52 (.20)
N=37
Post test Belief #1 (Frivolous Lawsuits, Negatively Phrased)
.29 (.20)
N=61
.39*** (.34)
N=96
.25 (.16)
N=38
Change in Belief Pretest to Posttest (Frivolous Lawsuits, Negatively Phrased)
.05 (.18)
N=61
.03 (.20)
N=95
.02 (.07)
N=36
Post Test Belief #2 (Product Development, Negatively Phrased)
.48 (.25)
N=57
.52 (.32)
N=92
.46 (.19)
N=37
Change in Belief Pretest to Posttest (Product Development, Negatively Phrased)
.06*** (.16)
N=54
-.01 (.14)
N=90
-.03 (.08)
N=36
Post Test Belief #3 (Legitimate Grievances, Positively Phrased)
.44** (.21)
N=59
.53 (.22)
N=98
.53 (.22)
N=36
Change in Belief Pretest to Posttest (Legitimate Grievances, Positively Phrased)
-.04 (.17)
N=57
.05 (.22)
N=97
-.005 (.19)
N=37
Post Test Belief #4 (Courts Make Society Safer, Positively Phrased)
.60 (.24)
N=59
.62 (.20)
N=97
.61 (.20)
N=36
Change in Belief Pretest to Posttest (Courts Make Society Safer, Positively Phrased)
.01 (19)
N=57
.02 (.19)
N=97
.01 (.12)
N=35
Note. The first two rows of table entries are mean opinion on proposed tort reform legislation with standard deviation in
parentheses. Opinion on the proposed tort reform legislation is coded to range between 0 to 1 where 1 represents those who
strongly believe that Congress should pass proposed tort reform legislation. The remaining rows of table entries are mean
opinion on four items relating to the state of the tort system in the United States. Opinion on these statements is coded to
range between 0 and 1 where 1 represents those who strongly agree with the statement. Post test Belief #1 was phrased as
follows: “There are too many frivolous lawsuits in the United States.” Post test Belief #2: “Lawsuits interfere with the
development of new and useful products.” Post test Belief #3: “Most people who sue others in court have legitimate
grievances.” Post test Belief #4: “By making it easier to sue, the courts have made this a safer society.” Asterisks indicate
that a t-test on means shows framed condition differs significantly from control condition, ***p < .01 **p < .05 *p < .10
(two tail test).
Results
Table 9 presents the same mean responses as Table 8, with the only
difference being that the four treatment conditions are collapsed by tone (Anti-
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/Pro-Reform). Mean responses in both tone conditions that indicated whether
subjects felt the Class Action Fairness Act of 2013 was a good idea proved to be
statistically significant compared to the control condition. Mean responses to the
Anti-Reform conditions differed from responses to the control condition at the
statistically significant level of p > .10 (two-tail test), whereas mean responses to
the Pro-Reform conditions also differed from responses to the control at a greater
level of statistical significance than the Anti-Reform conditions (p > .01, two-tail
test). Despite these differences, mean responses for both collapsed tones were
lower than the mean score for those in the control condition, perhaps because the
control condition indicated that the legislation was likely to be passed by
Congress. As a result, subjects may have been willing to grant that passing the
legislation was a good idea (e.g., “If Congress is probably going to pass the
legislation, anyway, then I guess it’s a good idea”). Future research on the effects
of tort reform coverage could address this in two ways. First, content analyses of
media coverage about tort reform legislation could include measures that indicate
whether the journalist offered predictions for likelihood of passage. Because the
sample in the content analysis in Chapter 3 included articles both before and after
the pieces of legislation were enacted (and also included a category in “tort
reform legislation” that sometimes failed to refer to specific pieces of legislation),
such measures are beyond the scope of this project. Furthermore, future research
could further tease out this potential bias by making the control condition neutral
with respect to the chance of passage for hypothetical legislation.
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Table 10. Policy Views by Frame Type
Episodic Frame
Thematic Frame
Control Condition
Post test Opinion on Proposed Legislation (DV #1)
.46** (.19)
N=69
.42** (.20)
N=68
.54 (.21)
N=37
Post test Opinion on Proposed Legislation (DV#2)
.48 (.19)
N=69
.44** (.18)
N=71
.52 (.20)
N=37
Post test Belief #1 (Frivolous Lawsuits, Negatively Phrased)
.42*** (.34)
N=85
.28 (.21)
N=72
.24 (.16)
N=38
Change in Belief Pretest to Posttest (Frivolous Lawsuits, Negatively Phrased)
.06 (.19)
N=85
.02 (.19)
N=71
.02 (.07)
N=36
Post Test Belief #2 (Product Development, Negatively Phrased)
.55 (.31)
N=80
.45 (.26)
N=69
.46 (.19)
N=37
Change in Belief Pretest to Posttest (Product Development, Negatively Phrased)
.02* (.16)
N=79
.01 (.15)
N=65
-.03 (.08)
N=36
Post Test Belief #3 (Legitimate Grievances, Positively Phrased)
.56 (.30)
N=85
.49 (.24)
N=73
.53 (.22)
N=38
Change in Belief Pretest to Posttest (Legitimate Grievances, Positively Phrased)
.03 (.23)
N=82
.01 (.19)
N=72
-.005 (.19)
N=37
Post Test Belief #4 (Courts Make Society Safer, Positively Phrased)
.63 (.28)
N=85
.64 (.22)
N=71
.54 (.21)
N=36
Change in Belief Pretest to Posttest (Courts Make Society Safer, Positively Phrased)
.00 (.19)
N=83
.03 (.18)
N=71
.01 (.12)
N=35
Note. The first two rows of table entries are mean opinion on proposed tort reform legislation with standard deviation in
parentheses. Opinion on the proposed tort reform legislation is coded to range between 0 to 1 where 1 represents those who
strongly believe that Congress should pass proposed tort reform legislation. The remaining rows of table entries are mean
opinion on four items relating to the state of the tort system in the United States. Opinion on these statements is coded to
range between 0 and 1 where 1 represents those who strongly agree with the statement. Post test Belief #1 was phrased as
follows: “There are too many frivolous lawsuits in the United States.” Post test Belief #2: “Lawsuits interfere with the
development of new and useful products.” Post test Belief #3: “Most people who sue others in court have legitimate
grievances.” Post test Belief #4: “By making it easier to sue, the courts have made this a safer society.” Asterisks indicate
that a t-test on means shows framed condition differs significantly from control condition, ***p < .01 **p < .05 *p < .10
(two tail test).
Results
Table 10 presents the mean scores of the treatment conditions collapsed by
frame type (episodic/thematic). With respect to whether the subjects felt that
Class Action Fairness Act of 2013 is a good idea, the mean results from each
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frame type were statistically significant at the p > .05 level compared to the
control condition. Those in the thematic conditions were slightly less likely than
those in the episodic conditions to believe that the Class Action Fairness Act of
2013 is a good idea (two-tail test, .42 to .46, respectively). Similar to the results
presented in Table 9, respondents in both the thematic and the episodic conditions
were 12 and 8 percent less likely to think the legislation is a good idea,
respectively, than those in the control condition (which had a mean score of .54).
The same caveats discussed in the previous paragraph apply here. Subjects’
responses to this dependent variable measure may have been biased by the control
condition indicating that the legislation was likely to pass.
The mean results of responses to the second dependent variables
(“Congress should pass the Class Action Fairness Act of 2013”) are more mixed.
Those in the episodic conditions did not differ significantly from those in the
control condition in their assessments (two-tail test, .48 to .52, respectively).
However, the mean responses for those in the thematic conditions did differ
significantly from the control condition at the p > .05 level (two-tail test, .44 to
.52, respectively), which suggests that when the pro and anti-reform thematic
frames were combined, people were not only less likely than those in the control
condition to agree that Congress should pass the legislation, but also less likely
than those in episodic conditions.
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Discussion
The results of this experiment advance our understanding about the ability
of news frames to elicit emotional responses in viewers and the persuasiveness of
news frames, and may also help to explain why, counter to expectations, thematic
frames about tort reform are more common in newspaper coverage than episodic
frames (at least in the sample of articles in Chapter 3). Finally, the experiment
identifies potentially mediating variables for future tort reform framing
experiments.
Respondents in the episodic treatment conditions were more likely to
report having discrete emotional reactions to the treatments than those in the
thematic treatment conditions. Pity and sympathy were particularly likely to be
elicited, which suggests that these emotional responses may play an important
role in determining why the “tort tales” identified by Haltom and McCann (2004)
prove so resonant. Future research should pay careful attention to differences
between sympathy and pity. Despite sharing a common valence, sympathy proved
to be statistically significant across both episodic treatment conditions, whereas
pity did not.
As previously argued, extant research is inconclusive regarding the
persuasiveness of thematic and episodic frames. At least in the case of tort reform,
the results of this experiment suggest that thematic frames are generally more
persuasive than thematic frames, a finding that echoes some prior research (Aarøe
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2011; Gross 2008). By subjecting theories about tort reform coverage that had
previously been only anecdotal in nature (Bailis and MacCoun 1996; Haltom and
McCann 2004) to empirical testing, this experiment advances our knowledge of
exactly which forms of tort reform coverage are most effective at changing
people’s opinions about tort reform. Though the study supports the claim that
episodic frames can move opinions relative to information without an episodic
frame, episodic frames are less effective at this when compared to thematic
frames. Despite Haltom and McCann‘s (2004) focus on the resonance of “tort
tales,” we see that thematically framed data about the tort system also plays an
important role in the attitude construction process.
Finally, by identifying variables – beliefs and emotion – that potentially
mediate the relationship between episodic and thematic frames of coverage of tort
reform and people’s attitudes about tort reform, this experiment lays groundwork
for future experiments to further tease out the relationship among these variables.
Chapter 5 discusses the next steps in this research agenda. It describes research
methods designed and employed by Kosuke Imai and co-authors to test for
relationships among mediating variables. For the present study, the next step as
part of a larger research agenda will be to subject the mediating variables to
analysis using a semiparametric model that allows for coefficients to arbitrarily
vary across coefficients. Conducting this step is not possible without the data
presented in this chapter. Thus, we can argue that the identification of ancillary
beliefs about the court system and emotional responses represents an important
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advancement in a research agenda that contributes both to our understanding of
the mediating role of certain variables in framing effects studies and how media
coverage of tort reform contributes to opinions about the American tort system.
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Chapter 5
Conclusion & Next Steps
148
This dissertation contributes to our understanding of three distinct areas
within the political science and communications literatures: framing effects
(including affective responses to frames, see Aarøe 2011; Gross 2008; Iyengar
1991), how we should locate (and eventually test) the mediating role of different
variables on framing effects (Brader, Valentino, and Suhay 2008; Druckman and
Nelson 2003; Imai et al. 2010, 2011; Imai and Yamamoto 2013; Slothuus 2008),
and how attitudes toward tort reform are affected by mass media conceptions of
the issue (Bailis and MacCoun 1996; Haltom and McCann 2004; Gavin 2008;
Guthrie 2000; Robbenbolt and Studebaker 2003).
Extant research discussed primarily in Chapter 2 but also throughout the
rest of the dissertation suggests that political scientists (and, indeed, practitioners
in any discipline concerned with trying to understand why people do the things
they do) should ignore emotion at their own peril. Though other studies have
examined the propensity of episodic and thematic frames to elicit emotional
responses (Aarøe 2011; Gross 2008; Nabi 2003), the findings in this dissertation
suggest that affective responses to frames, at least in the case of tort reform, may
not be associated with their persuasiveness and may not comport with prior
assumptions about the effects of commonly-cited “tort tales” (Haltom and
McCann 2004). By testing the effects of tort reform frames on the emotional
reactions of experimental subjects, this dissertation identifies sympathy and pity
as affective responses that are likely to be elicited by mass media tort reform
coverage. As Chapter 4 discusses, these affective reactions are most likely to be
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elicited in articles that are pro-tort reform, which suggests that tort reform
advocates attempting to move public opinion in their favor should perhaps steer
clear of episodic examples of the “good” side of tort reform. Regardless, the
experiment in Chapter 4 also sets the stage for future research on the relationship
between prior beliefs about the state of the American court system and affect
when determining how framing effects are mediated by these variables.
Additionally, the findings presented in this dissertation add an empirical
component to largely anecdotal understandings of the effects of mass media
coverage of tort reform. Indeed, the findings suggest that “tort tales,” despite
being a convenient scapegoat for those who believe that the tort system is unfairly
maligned through joint efforts between the instrumental actions of pro-reform
interest groups and the institutional tenets of modern journalism, may actually be
less common in media coverage than their reputation would suggest, and also less
persuasive. Haltom and McCann (2004) cite the difficulty that anti-tort reform
advocates have in getting thematically-themed anti-tort reform data to reach the
public. As evidenced by the large number of thematically-framed pro-tort reform
frames in the articles in Chapter 3’s content analysis, pro-tort reform advocates
clearly have not had similar trouble. This suggests that future research should pay
careful attention to the role that interest groups have played in battles over tort
reform policy, as well as other policy battles. If pro-tort reform groups have been
effective in getting journalists to employ thematic frames, then perhaps the
problem does not lie with thematic frames themselves (e.g., thematic frames are
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somehow more boring and less persuasive than thematic frames), but rather how
anti-tort reform groups advocate through mass media for their position. Next, this
chapter turns its attention toward future experiments that can use the results
presented in Chapter 4 to account for the relationship between the mediating
variables of affect and prior beliefs.
We have seen that experiments are an effective research tool to determine
whether a relationship exists between a treatment variable and an outcome
variable, but are rather less effective at explaining why the effect is present or how
the effect works. The tenets of experimental research stress the necessity of
randomizing exposure to the treatment, yet despite the criteria of a “successful”
experiment (i.e., randomized exposure to the treatment), much of the current
experimental research in framing effects cannot make claims about how or why a
frame causes a change in outcome, despite professing to accomplish just that
(Imai and Yamamoto forthcoming). Though the framing paradigm has largely
moved beyond estimating the existence of framing effects and toward trying to
understand underlying causal relationships, it is important that the goals of
experimental research in framing effects not outpace its methodological
capabilities. To that end, causal mediation analysis – the study of intervening
variables between treatment x and outcome y – may provide an answer toward
overcoming limitations of experimental research and truly advancing our
understanding of how frames work. Causal mediation analysis has been used in a
diversity of disciplines to specify an intermediate variable or mediator that lies on
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the causal pathway between the treatment and the outcome variable, from
consumer marketing research (Ahearne et al. 2010) to media effects (Brader,
Valentino, and Suhay 2008; Druckman and Nelson 2003). This chapter describes
the next steps in this dissertation’s research agenda and discusses how Imai and
co-authors’ methods can be applied to the present study.
Causal Mechanisms
A causal mechanism is a process in which a causal variable of interest,
i.e., a treatment, influences an outcome. Political scientists have several different
tools at their disposal, both qualitative and quantitative, to investigate causal
mechanisms. Qualitative studies can employ process tracing, a method that allows
researchers to carefully tease out the existence of mechanisms through qualitative
analysis of causal pathways (Barnes and Weller forthcoming; Mahoney 2012).
Early quantitative causal mediation research, specifically a 1986 article by Baron
and Kenny, established the following framework for causal mediation analysis: an
independent variable x affects some mediator m that in turn affects some
dependent variable y (Baron and Kenny 1986). Subsequent quantitative research
has primarily used structural equation models within this framework to estimate
the effects of mediating variables (Brader, Valentino, and Suhay 2008; Druckman
and Nelson 2003; Slothuus 2008). The most commonly used structural equation
model is based on a set of linear equations in which researchers often use the
product of coefficients obtained by separately fitting least squares regressions, or
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by the difference of coefficients method, which uses the difference of coefficients
pre and post-treatment to estimate average causal mediation effects (ACME).
15
In a series of recent articles, Imai and co-authors question the propriety of
using structural equation models in causal mediation analysis (Imai et al. 2010,
2011; Imai and Yamamoto 2013). They identify limitations of the structural
equation approach, one of which is its failure to meet the assumption of sequential
ignorability. Sequential ignorability assumes that the observed mediator is
ignorable conditional on the treatment and pretreatment covariates, or, that
multiple causal mechanisms operate independent of one another. They advocate
for replacing structural equation models, which, again, fail to meet assumptions
that may not even be testable in the first place, with a semiparametric linear
structural equation model. Second, they argue that causal mediation researchers
should replace standard experimental designs with parallel designs that, given
baseline covariates and the randomization of the treatment, allow for the
randomization of the mediator. Yet randomizing both the treatment and mediator
still does not allow researchers to meet assumptions of sequential ignorability,
which is why they argue that parallel designs in which the treatment is
randomized and a random sample of subjects are encouraged to have a high or
low value of the mediator, may be an answer to the shortcomings of current
causal mediation analysis.
15
Baron and Kenny (1986) proposed a series of three regressions, showing: x affects m; x affects
y; and when x and m are included in the same regressions, there is a significant partial effect of m
and the partial (direct) effect of x on y that is less than the effect of x on y without controlling for
m. When the partial effect of x on y is reduced to nonsignificance, there is evidence for mediation
(Zhao, Lynch, and Chen 2010).
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Pure Parallel and Parallel Encouragement Designs
Figure 10. Parallel Design
Randomly
Split Sample
Experiment 1 Experiment 2
1. Randomize Treatment
2. Measure Mediator
3. Measure Outcome
1. Randomize Treatment
2. Randomize Mediator
3. Measure Outcome
Both pure parallel and parallel encouragement designs allow for either
direct or indirect manipulation of the mediator, which allows for the coefficients
to vary arbitrarily across units. A key assumption of the pure parallel design is
that there must not be an effect on the outcome variable of manipulating the
mediator other than through the mediator value. Researchers in other fields who
are also concerned with causal mediators have employed such designs. Imai and
Yamamoto (2013) cite, in particular, research in behavioral neuroscience, in
which the experimenters manipulate a region in the brain that is related to fairness
that becomes more active when an “unfair” offer is received in an ultimatum
game (Knoch et al. 2006). Other brain researchers employ technology called
transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS), which “uses repeated magnetic pulses to
localized portions of the brain to manipulate activation of the region” (Imai,
Tingley, and Yamamoto 2013, p. 15). TMS allows for researchers to make
inferential claims about brain activity that are more convincing than simply
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looking at the evidence provided by imaging techniques, such as fMRI, this is
often associational (Camerer, Lowenstein, and Prelec 2005; Martin and Gotts
2005).
Figure 11. Parallel Encouragement Design
Randomly
Split Sample
Experiment 1 Experiment 2
Randomize Treatment
Measure Mediator
Measure Outcome
Randomize Treatment
ENCOURAGE Mediator
Measure Outcome
The parallel encouragement design can be employed by researchers when
direct manipulation of the mediator proves difficult, which is the case in this
dissertation. Though the neuroscience models discussed in the previous section
that employ parallel designs offer useful examples for how a neurophysiological
mediator may operate, social science (and psychology) experiments do not have
the luxury of being able to “turn off” potential mediators. To that end, the parallel
encouragement designed outlined in Figure 11 may be a more useful design for
exploring the relationship among psychological mediators of framing effects.
Recall the experiment from Chapter 4. By hypothesizing that emotion is a
mediator of framing effects, I rely on subjects to self-report measures of emotion.
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When the mediator is psychological in nature, researchers have no valid way to
“turn it off” and estimate the existence of the framing effect without the mediator.
The parallel encouragement design addresses this limitation by encouraging a
randomly assigned subset of subjects to take on a higher value of the mediator.
This encouragement must not 1) discourage anyone, or, 2) directly affect the
outcome. Though this approach is less informative than the parallel design, when
working with subjects who are self-reporting values of the mediator, it is perhaps
our best hope for a more accurate understanding of the mediators of framing
effects.
The experiment described in Chapter 4 represents an important first step in
the causal mediation process, which is identifying variables that can serve a
potentially mediating role in the attitude formation process. By identifying
sympathy and pity as emotions that are likely to be elicited by episodic frames
(and thus potentially leading to differences in how persuasive people find a
certain frame with respect to a piece of hypothetical legislation), the experiment
described in Chapter 4 advances our understanding of the affective components of
episodic and thematic framing, as well as identifies the emotional responses that
are likely to be elicited by certain forms of tort coverage that is episodically
framed. In addition to this contribution, which will eventually allow for the
implementation of the parallel encouragement design described in this chapter, it
contributes to our understanding of why certain forms of tort reform coverage
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resonate with the public and which variables may be responsible for interacting
with episodic and thematic frames to lead people to hold different opinions.
The next section describes extant research on causal mediation analysis.
Specifically, it discusses three articles selected by Imai and co-authors (2010,
2011) that serve as examples of framing effects studies whose claims about
mediation could be informed by employing their research design and analytical
approaches.
Extant Research on Framing Mediators
In a recent article in Political Analysis , Kosuke Imai and Teppei
Yamamoto revisit three framing effects experiments that purport to identify causal
mechanisms in the multi-part process of framing effects (Brader, Valentino, and
Suhay 2008; Druckman and Nelson 2003; Slothuus 2008). All three experiments
were published in top journals and serve as benchmark pieces of scholarship for
those in the framing effects paradigm who are concerned with how frames
operate. These pieces of research, which will be explained in greater detail in the
next section of this chapter, stand as important examples of how Imai and
Yamamoto’s methods can be applied to future framing experiments that will serve
as the next step in this research agenda.
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Dependent variables
In all three studies, the outcome (or dependent) variable involves some
form of cognitive evaluation about an issue being framed, from overall levels of
support for proposed campaign finance reform (Druckman and Nelson 2003), to
whether, and to what extent, the people agree or disagree with proposed welfare
reform (Slothuus 2008), to subjects’ opinions and behavioral reactions to
increases in immigration (Brader, Valentino, and Suhay 2008).
Mediators
In the Druckman and Nelson (2003) study, the authors identify two
mediators of framing effects: 1) the perceived importance of the issue being
framed, and 2) the content of people’s beliefs about an issue. Slothuus (2008) also
identifies two framing effects mediators: 1) the perceived importance of the issue
being framed and 2) the content of people’s beliefs about the issue. Finally,
Brader and co-authors (2008) identify two mediators, as well: 1) participants’
belief about the negative impact of immigration, and 2) participants’ feelings
about increased immigration. Each article uses linear regression in the form of a
structural equation model (recall the discussion of the prevalence of this approach,
which was first implemented by Baron and Kenny in 1986) to examine statistical
significance of corresponding path coefficients.
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Findings
Druckman and Nelson (2003) find that the framing effect is mediated by
the importance mechanism but not by the belief content mechanism. Imai and
Yamamoto (2013) argue that a potential problem with Druckman and Nelson’s
study is that the estimated effects of the mediator may be biased due to
unobserved pre-treatment confounding between the mediator and the outcome
variable. The treatment in this particular study is a “freedom of speech” frame in a
news article about campaign finance reform. Imai and Yamamoto cite an example
of potential confounding: participants who have libertarian-leaning ideology may
think freedom of speech more important than non-libertarian participants, and at
the same time they may also be more opposed to campaign finance reform. If the
available pre-treatment covariates fail to adjust for libertarianism, the estimated
causal mediation effect may be upward biased. Nevertheless, in replicating
Druckman and Nelson’s findings under the assumption that the causal
mechanisms are independent, they find, like the original authors, that the
perceived importance of free speech does indeed mediate the framing effect.
Another problem identified by Imai and Yamamoto is that both of Druckman and
Nelson’s (2003) hypothesized mediators – the importance mechanism and the
content belief mechanism—may be linked. If the change in the content of
participants’ beliefs about reform due to framing differences then caused any
changes in the perceived importance of free speech, then the two mediators are
bound by a causal linkage, thus violating the assumption of independent causal
mechanisms.
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Unlike Druckman and Nelson, Slothuus (2008) finds evidence that both
mediators in his study—importance and content—are indeed causal mediators of
the framing effect. Slothuus (2008) faces the same problem as Druckman and
Nelson—the assumption that causal mechanisms are independent of one another.
Again, an example: There is an assumption violation if the participants’
considerations about welfare reform (the subject of the frame in Slothuus’ study)
may not only directly affect their opinions but also influence the perceived
importance of work incentives, thereby also affecting the outcome indirectly
through further changes in the importance mediator.
Brader and co-authors (2008) find that a combination of Latino cues and
negative framing changed the participants’ opinions and behavior in the anti-
immigration direction. Participants who read an article that included portrayals of
Latino immigrants and emphasized the negative consequences of immigration
became more opposed to increased immigration than the rest of the participants.
What mediated such an effect? Brader and co-authors (2008) tested for two
different mechanisms—perceived harm and anxiety—and found, through a
structural equation modeling approach (based on Baron and Kenny 1986)
evidence that the presence of anxiety works as more of a mediating variable than
perceived harm. Similar to the past two studies, this also raises questions about
violations of the sequential ignorability assumption. In Brader and co-authors’
(2008) framing effects study, this means that the researchers assumed that the
160
participants’ conscious beliefs about the negative impact of increased
immigration—a separate mechanism under examination—is assumed to have no
impact on their levels of anxiety. For that matter, the assumption requires that
there are no unmeasured pretreatment or post-treatment covariates that confound
the relationship between the levels of anxiety and the subjects’ immigration
opinions. For this assumption to be met Brader and co-authors would have to
measure the complete set of covariates that affect both anxiety and immigration
opinions and they cannot be at all affected by the treatment.
16
Such measurements
are theoretically and practically impossible, given the current theory about
framing mediators and the plausibility of accounting for all potential covariates.
Overview of Future Experiments
The structure of the parallel encouragement design splits subjects into two
experiments, which are run in parallel (See Figure 11). The first experiment will
use the standard single-experiment design that consists of three basic steps: 1) a
treatment is randomly assigned to subjects; 2) a mediating variable is measured
after the treatment has been administered; and 3) an outcome variable is
measured. The second experiment also randomly assigns subjects to the treatment
and control conditions. Then, within each condition, a random subset of subjects
16
An example of such a violation, as pointed out by Imai et al. (2011): both one’s anxiety and
immigration opinions could be affected by the fear disposition. Subjects of the treatment group
that have high fear disposition may exhibit higher levels of anxiety, which becomes problematic
when taking into account research that demonstrates that high fear dispositions has been directly
linked to a variety of political attitudes, including attitudes toward out-groups (which, obviously,
is highly salient in a study about immigration attitudes and anxiety).
161
is encouraged to take on a high or low value of the mediator. Finally, both the
mediator and outcome variable will be observed.
These experiments will employ a parallel encouragement design, as
previously discussed, will allows for the testing of the relationship among the
mediating variables of prior (ancillary) beliefs about the court system and the
affective responses to specific frames that are drawn from analyses of mass media
coverage of tort reform. A crucial component of the parallel encouragement
design is that the treatment combinations in both the second and third experiments
will use the most effective combinations of treatments from the first experiment.
The researcher uses a priori theoretical expectations to design the treatment
combinations. The second crucial component of the parallel encouragement
design is that it uses experiments in which treatments are randomly assigned to
groups of subjects and experiments in which the researcher randomly encourages
some respondents to have a heightened value of the pity and sympathy variables
(Albertson and Lawrence 2009; Imai and Yamamoto forthcoming; Imai, Keele,
and Yamamoto 2010; Mullainathan, Washington, and Azari 2010).
Future experiments will include one treatment group (who receives the
most salient combination of frames from the first experiment) and a control group
(who receives the least salient combination of frames from the first experiment.
Attitudinal outcomes will be measured as the dependent variable. The third
experiment will be identical to the second, with one key difference. Using
162
suggestions by Kosuke Imai and co-authors (2010, 2011, 2013) the treatment
group in the third experiment that receives the most salient frame combination
will, post-treatment, be encouraged to take on larger values of the key mediating
variable: discrete emotional response. This will be accomplished by using mood
induction procedures created by Tiedens and Linton (2001). Most framing effects
studies interested in mediating variables employ linear structural equation
modeling (Baron and Kenny 1986; Brader, Valentino, and Suhay 2008). This
approach violates the untestable assumption of sequential ignorability—the
assumption that post-treatment confounders (or mediators) have no causal
relationship. By using a flexible (semi-parametric) linear model to examine the
relationship between mediators, the analysis of these experiments will help
researchers better understand the nature of the psychological underpinnings of
framing effects.
Avenues of Future Research & Contributions
Although this dissertation has discussed future experiments that address
the role of mediating variables using a parallel encouragement research design,
future research may also be able to make use of technological advancements in
neuroscience to induce one of the hypothesized mediators – emotional response.
Though some psychologists, notably Smith and Ellsworth (1985) and Tiedens and
Linton (2001), have demonstrated that researchers are able to reliably induce
targeted emotional states in subjects, their claims are still reliant on the subjects
163
not only experiencing a different affective state, but being able to recognize and
make note of it in the controlled, often sterile setting of a laboratory. Future
research could use as a theoretical baseline the work of DeSteno and co-authors
about the role of emotion and persuasion, and then subject respondents to
transcranial magnetic stimulation to induce affective states (DeSteno et al.
2004).These analyses, in the form of a pure parallel design, would allow
researchers to explore the mediating role of emotions in framing effects without
relying on subjects to self-report their emotional states.
A step down from such an approach would be subjecting respondents to
traditional imaging techniques, such as fMRI, to determine whether their patterns
of brain activity actually correlate to their self-reported indicators of experiencing
emotions. Though these patterns of emotional response may not map perfectly to
self-report indicators, research demonstrates that scholars are able to find
evidence of affective framing in neuroimaging data (Zheng, Wang, and Zhu
2010). Cognitive neuroscientists have already demonstrated that neural processes
within the medial prefrontal cortex of the brain can play an important role in
assessing how susceptible people are to using formally irrelevant framing
information when making decisions (Deppe et al. 2005). Other physiological
markers, such as electroencephalography (EEG), could serve a similar function.
Despite these promising avenues of future research, political psychologists have
urged researchers eager to employ techniques such as fMRI to exercise caution. In
particular, McDermott (2009) urges researchers to not overstate the claims that
164
can stem from fMRI (p. 79). Particularly, using blood flow in the brain as signals
of processes is not possible. fMRI only informs observers as to the place in the
brain where activation takes place. Most models in political psychology are
processes. In other words, while fMRI can tell us a great deal about where in the
brain a process takes place, it cannot tell us as much about why. Finally, fMRI
data present aggregate data of subjects undergoing analysis. As a result,
individual differences that may exist are lost in the aggregate. Researchers can
reduce individual variability in results by restricting the task problems and
making them very narrow, which involves tradeoffs between external and internal
validity.
Finally, future research on the political issue of tort reform could follow
suggestions discussed at the conclusion of Chapter 3. Though tort reform efforts
have broadly been concerned with decreasing liability for defendants, some
suggest that the most salient aspects of tort reform legislation may come in the
form of the structures of compensation programs for victims of externalities
(Barnes 2011). Research demonstrates that the American civil justice system is
quite different from systems in other industrialized nations. Provided that mass
media in other industrialized nations (e.g., Germany, the United Kingdom, and
Japan) are subject to similar market and institutional forces as media in the United
States, future research could examine media coverage of compensation schemes
in these countries to examine differences from similar coverage in the United
States. In addition to providing variation on compensation structures, citizens in
165
other nations may possess different attitudes toward their civil justice system than
Americans do toward our own (Kagan 2001). By extending future analysis to
different countries who treat tort and victim compensation differently, we may be
able to better understand which aspects of American media coverage of tort and
compensation regimes are important in explaining attitudes.
Finally, this dissertation suggests that researchers must not lose sight of
the bigger ramifications of the framing of political issues. When the institutions of
mass media, interest groups, and legislative bodies interact to frame political
issues, citizens are affected both cognitively and emotionally. Patterns of
sustained coverage can lead to a reconfiguration of the scope of debate about
political issues. As political scientists like E. E. Schnattschneider so astutely
argued over fifty years ago, the contestation of political issues among elites does
not happen in a vacuum. By relying on certain forms of narrative coverage about
tort reform, mass media can have a great impact on the construction of political
attitudes among the public.
166
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Appendix
187
Treatment 1 (Episodic/Pro-Reform):
American Society Will Not Accept Frivolous
Lawsuits: Overhaul American Tort Law Now
“This is ridiculous. There is no reason that we
should have to go out of business because of such a
ludicrous claim.” These were the words of a
Mediterranean Cruise Lines director, who asserted
that because of a lawsuit in which a customer
claimed the hot decks of the ship had burned his
feet, the 65-year-old cruise line based in New
Orleans may have to severely curb operations.
The story of the 45-year-old Alabama man who
successfully sued the cruise line in 2010 because of
burned feet has been used by associations and
lobbying groups to illustrate the need to overhaul
the American tort system. There is some evidence
that despite third-degree burns on a small part of
his feet, the man knew exactly how hot the deck was
and bragged to his wife that he was going to walk
across it anyway.
The man with the burned feet is just one example of
a system gone awry. In its current state, American
tort law is broken: too many people receive too
much money for actions that are completely
preventable.
In response to these and other stories like it,
Congress must pass the Class Action Fairness Act
of 2013.”
188
Treatment 2 (Thematic/Pro-Reform):
The Evidence is Overwhelming: New Studies
Substantiate the Need to Overhaul American Tort
Law
A series of new studies indicate that the American
tort system is in need of a dramatic overhaul.
Figures from the American Justice Institute show
that over the past three decades, the number of tort
claims filed in U.S. courts has risen by 67 percent.
Other industrialized nations, like the United
Kingdom, Germany, and Japan, have passed
similar legislation, which has dropped the number
of new filings in their courts by more than 40
percent.
Additionally, the system that the United States
currently has just isn’t fair. For example, a recent
report shows that in cases involving mesothelioma,
which is the disease that people supposedly contract
from prolonged exposure to asbestos, the amount of
awards given to plaintiffs ranged from $36,000 in a
handful of cases to more than $50 million in others.
How is that fair?
The numbers don’t lie – the American court system
must be changed.
It is up to the United States Congress to pass the
Class Action Fairness Act of 2013.
189
Treatment 3 (Episodic/Anti-Reform):
Protect Hard-Working Families: Congress Should
Say ‘No’ to Tort Legislation
The other day, TV showed an item about Mary and
Peter Franklin of Naperville, Illinois, who recently
sued the Illinois Department of Water and Power
for $14.6 million for the wrongful death of their
five-year-old son, Connor.
Connor was killed in 2010 when a Department of
Water and Power truck driver hit him as he was
crossing the street. Mary and Peter's lawsuit
exposed a pattern of negligence by the Department
of Water and Power that the presiding judge called,
"grossly inappropriate." The Department had
routinely hired drivers without conducting
background checks. An internal audit of the
Department's audit of the Department's practices
mandated by the court found that a majority of their
drivers had criminal records and that management
routinely encouraged drivers to cover up accidents.
Peter and Mary filed their lawsuit only after being
told many times that legislators' hands were tied
over the matter. Parents should be allowed
protection for their children. This basic,
unalienable right will be violated if the Class Action
Fairness Act of 2013 passes.
Congress should just say no to the Class Action
Fairness Act of 2013.
190
Treatment 4 (Thematic/Anti-Reform):
The Evidence is Overwhelming: New Studies
Refute Class Action Fairness Act.
New studies indicate that the American court
system isn't nearly as out-of-control as some fear.
According to the non-partisan National Center for
State Courts, tort cases accounted for just 4.4
percent of all civil cases filed in 2008, and actually
declined by 25 percent between 1999 and 2008. For
example, a report released by the Court Statistics
Project shows that tort filings in California have
actually sharply declined over the past decade, from
75,243 in 2001 to fewer than 58,000 in 2012. Also,
a 2008 survey from the National Federation of
Independent Businesses shows that "costs and
frequency of lawsuits/threatened lawsuits" ranked
65th on a list of small business owners' worries.
The facts don't lie. American tort law is not in need
of reform.
Legislators should vote no on the Class Action
Fairness Act of
2013.
191
Table 1. Frame Appearance
Source
N
(articles)
Time
period
Episodic
Only
Thematic
Only
Both
Neither
Tort Reform
Legislation
55
September
15, 1985 to
January 8,
2013
8
(15%)
23
(42%)
20
(36%)
2
(4%)
192
Table 2. Episodic Frames
Source
N
(articles)
Number of
Episodic
Frames
Average Number of
Episodic Frames
(per article)
Average Number of
Episodic Frames
(per article in articles that
included at least one
episodic frame)
Tort Reform
Legislation
55
52
.95
1.86
193
Table 3. Interest Groups Appearing More Than Once
Interest Groups
Frequency
Stance
American Medical Association 8 Pro-Reform
U.S. Chamber of Commerce 7 Pro-Reform
Institute for Legal Reform 5 Pro-Reform
American Tort Reform Association 5 Pro-Reform
Association of Trial Lawyers of America 5 Anti-Reform
American Bar Association 4 Anti-Reform
American Trial Lawyers Association 3 Anti-Reform
American Hospital Association 2 Pro-Reform
Center for Justice and Democracy 2 Anti-Reform
Class Action Fairness Coalition 2 Pro-Reform
Insurance Information Institute 2 Pro-Reform
National Association of Manufacturers 2 Pro-Reform
New York State Trial Lawyers Association 2 Anti-Reform
Physician Insurers of America 2 Pro-Reform
Public Citizen 2 Anti-Reform
194
Table 4. Interest Groups Mentioned in Articles
Interest Groups
AFL-CIO American Association for Justice
American Association of Health Plans American Bar Association
American Bar Foundation American Hospital Association
American Justice Partnership American Medical Association
American Tort Reform Association American Trial Lawyers Association
Association of Trial Lawyers of America California Medical Association
California Trial Lawyers Association Center for Justice and Democracy
Class Action Fairness Coalition Coalition for Affordable and Reliable Health Care
Coalition for Asbestos reform Connecticut Business and Industry Association
Consumer Federation of America Consumers Union
Federalist Society Federation of American Hospitals
Institute for Civil Justice Institute for Legal Reform
Insurance Information Institute Manhattan Institute
Medical Liability Monitor Medical Society of New Jersey
Medical Society of New York Missouri Association of Trial Attorneys
National Association of Manufacturers New Jersey Business and Industry Association
New Jersey Citizens Against Lawsuit Abuse New Jersey Food Council
New Jersey Hospital Association New Jersey Retail Merchants Association
New Jersey State Bar Association New Jersey State Chamber of Commerce
New York State Trial Lawyers Association Pennsylvania Trial Lawyers Association
Physician Insurers of America Public Citizen
Texas Civil Justice League Trial Lawyers of America
U.S. Chamber of Commerce Washington Legal Foundation
N=46.
195
Table 5. Emotional Response by Treatment Condition
Emotion
Episodic Frame
Anti Tort Reform
Thematic Frame
Anti Tort Reform
Episodic Frame
Pro Tort Reform
Thematic Frame
Pro Tort Reform
Control
Sympathy .15 (.27) .10 (.23) .43*** (.38) .05 (.16) .13 (.25)
Pity .14 (.26)
.06 (.16)
.28 (.36)**
.05 (.15)
.12 (.24)
Anger .10 (.22) .17* (.28) .17 (.28) .05 (.15) .07 (.03)
Disgust .19 (.30) .13 (.27) .20 (.34) .08 (.20) .16 (.28)
Worry .15 (.27) .24 (.28) .23 (.32) .12 (.20) .18 (.29)
N=57 N=45 N=32 N=31 N=39
Note: Table entry is mean emotional response by frame and tone with standard deviation in
parentheses. Emotional reactions are coded to range between 0 and 1, where 0 indicates that the
respondent did not feel the emotional reaction and 1 indicates that they strongly felt the emotion.
Asterisks indicate that the treatment condition differs significantly from the control condition (t-
test on means): ***p < .01 **p < .05 *p < .10.
196
Table 6. Emotional Response by Frame Type.
Emotion
Episodic Frame
Thematic Frame
Control Condition
Sympathy .25** (.34) .08 (.21) .13 (.25)
Pity .19 (.31) .06* (.12) .11 (.24)
Anger .12 (.24) .12 (.24) .08 (.21)
Disgust .19 (.31) .11 (.24) .15 (.28)
Worry .18 (.29) .19 (.26) .19 (.29)
N=89 N=76 N=39
Note: Table entry is mean emotional response by frame and tone with standard deviation in
parentheses. Emotional reactions are coded to range between 0 and 1. Asterisks indicate that the
treatment condition differs significantly from the control condition (t-test on means):
***p < .01 **p < .05 *p < .1.
197
Table 7. Emotional Response by Frame Tone.
Emotion
Anti Tort Reform
Pro Tort Reform
Control Condition
Sympathy .25* (.35) .13 (.25) .13 (.25)
Pity .17 (.30) .10 (.22) .11 (.24)
Anger .11 (.23) .13 (.25) .07 (.21)
Disgust .15 (.28) .16 (.29) .15 (.28)
Worry .18 (.27) .19 (.28) .19 (.29)
N=63 N=102 N=39
Note: Table entry is mean emotional response by frame and tone with standard deviation in
parentheses. Emotional reactions are coded to range between 0 and 1. Asterisks indicate that the
treatment condition differs significantly from the control condition (t-test on means):
***p < .01 **p < .05 *p < .10
198
Table 8. Policy Views by Treatment Condition
Episodic Frame
Anti Tort Reform
Episodic Frame
Pro Tort Reform
Thematic Frame
Anti Tort Reform
Thematic Frame
Pro Tort Reform
Control
Condition
Post test Opinion on Proposed Legislation (DV #1)
.46* (.19) .46* (.18) .38*** (.20) .48 (.19) .54 (.21)
N=38 N=31 N=41 N=27 N=37
Post test Opinion on Proposed Legislation (DV #2)
.48 (.21) .47 (.16) .40*** (.18) .50 (.18) .52 (.20)
N=38 N=31 N=43 N=28 N=37
Post test Belief #1 (Frivolous Lawsuits, Negatively Phrased)
.52*** (.38) .27 (.19) .25 (.21) .32* (.21) .25 (.16)
N=52 N=32 N=43 N=29 N=38
Change in Belief Pretest to Posttest (Frivolous Lawsuits, Negatively Phrased)
.08* (.23) .02 (.11) -.03* (.15) .09* (.23) .02 (.07)
N=53 N=32 N=42 N=29 N=36
Post Test Belief #2 (Product Development, Negatively Phrased)
.59** (.33) .47 (.28) .43 (.29) .49 (.22) .46 (.19)
N=50 N=30 N=42 N=27 N=37
Change in Belief Pretest to Posttest (Product Development, Negatively Phrased)
-.01 (.14) .06*** (.18) -.02 (.14) .06*** (.14) -.03 (.08)
N=50 N=29 N=40 N=25 N=36
Post Test Belief #3 (Legitimate Grievances, Positively Phrased)
.68** (.29) .37*** (.18) .48 (.26) .51 (.21) .53 (.22)
N=54 N=31 N=44 N=29 N=38
Change in Belief Pretest to Posttest (Legitimate Grievances, Positively Phrased)
.079* (.23) -.06 (.18) .02 (.21) -.01 (.15) .00 (.19)
N=53 N=29 N=44 N=28 N=37
Post Test Belief #4 (Courts Make Society Safer, Positively Phrased)
.69 (.29) .53* (.24) .61 (.23) .68 (.21) .62 (.20)
N=53 N=32 N=44 N=27 N=36
Change in Belief Pretest to Posttest (Courts Make Society Safer, Positively Phrased)
.01 (.20) -.01 (.19) .03 (.18) .02 (.18) .01 (.12)
N=53 N=30 N=44 N=27 N=35
Note. The first two rows of table entries are mean opinion on proposed tort reform legislation with standard deviation in
parentheses. Opinion on the proposed tort reform legislation is coded to range between 0 to 1 where 1 represents those who
strongly believe that Congress should pass proposed tort reform legislation. The remaining rows of table entries are mean
opinion on four items relating to the state of the tort system in the United States. Opinion on these statements is coded to
range between 0 and 1 where 1 represents those who strongly agree with the statement. Post test Belief #1 was phrased as
follows: “There are too many frivolous lawsuits in the United States.” Post test Belief #2: “Lawsuits interfere with the
development of new and useful products.” Post test Belief #3: “Most people who sue others in court have legitimate
grievances.” Post test Belief #4: “By making it easier to sue, the courts have made this a safer society.” Asterisks indicate
that a t-test of means shows framed condition differs significantly from control condition, ***p < .01 **p < .05 *p < .10
(two tail test).
199
Table 9. Policy Views by Frame Tone
Anti Tort Reform
Pro Tort Reform
Control Condition
Post test Opinion on Proposed Legislation (DV #1)
.47* (.19)
N=58
.42*** (.20)
N=79
.54 (.21)
N=37
Post test Opinion on Proposed Legislation (DV#2)
.49 (.17)
N=59
.44** (.20)
N=81
.52 (.20)
N=37
Post test Belief #1 (Frivolous Lawsuits, Negatively Phrased)
.29 (.20)
N=61
.39*** (.34)
N=96
.25 (.16)
N=38
Change in Belief Pretest to Posttest (Frivolous Lawsuits, Negatively Phrased)
.05 (.18)
N=61
.03 (.20)
N=95
.02 (.07)
N=36
Post Test Belief #2 (Product Development, Negatively Phrased)
.48 (.25)
N=57
.52 (.32)
N=92
.46 (.19)
N=37
Change in Belief Pretest to Posttest (Product Development, Negatively Phrased)
.06*** (.16)
N=54
-.01 (.14)
N=90
-.03 (.08)
N=36
Post Test Belief #3 (Legitimate Grievances, Positively Phrased)
.44** (.21)
N=59
.53 (.22)
N=98
.53 (.22)
N=36
Change in Belief Pretest to Posttest (Legitimate Grievances, Positively Phrased)
-.04 (.17)
N=57
.05 (.22)
N=97
-.005 (.19)
N=37
Post Test Belief #4 (Courts Make Society Safer, Positively Phrased)
.60 (.24)
N=59
.62 (.20)
N=97
.61 (.20)
N=36
Change in Belief Pretest to Posttest (Courts Make Society Safer, Positively Phrased)
.01 (19)
N=57
.02 (.19)
N=97
.01 (.12)
N=35
Note. The first two rows of table entries are mean opinion on proposed tort reform legislation with standard deviation in
parentheses. Opinion on the proposed tort reform legislation is coded to range between 0 to 1 where 1 represents those who
strongly believe that Congress should pass proposed tort reform legislation. The remaining rows of table entries are mean
opinion on four items relating to the state of the tort system in the United States. Opinion on these statements is coded to
range between 0 and 1 where 1 represents those who strongly agree with the statement. Post test Belief #1 was phrased as
follows: “There are too many frivolous lawsuits in the United States.” Post test Belief #2: “Lawsuits interfere with the
development of new and useful products.” Post test Belief #3: “Most people who sue others in court have legitimate
grievances.” Post test Belief #4: “By making it easier to sue, the courts have made this a safer society.” Asterisks indicate
that a t-test on means shows framed condition differs significantly from control condition, ***p < .01 **p < .05 *p < .10
(two tail test).
200
Table 10. Policy Views by Frame Type
Episodic Frame
Thematic Frame
Control Condition
Post test Opinion on Proposed Legislation (DV #1)
.46** (.19)
N=69
.42** (.20)
N=68
.54 (.21)
N=37
Post test Opinion on Proposed Legislation (DV#2)
.48 (.19)
N=69
.44** (.18)
N=71
.52 (.20)
N=37
Post test Belief #1 (Frivolous Lawsuits, Negatively Phrased)
.42*** (.34)
N=85
.28 (.21)
N=72
.24 (.16)
N=38
Change in Belief Pretest to Posttest (Frivolous Lawsuits, Negatively Phrased)
.06 (.19)
N=85
.02 (.19)
N=71
.02 (.07)
N=36
Post Test Belief #2 (Product Development, Negatively Phrased)
.55 (.31)
N=80
.45 (.26)
N=69
.46 (.19)
N=37
Change in Belief Pretest to Posttest (Product Development, Negatively Phrased)
.02* (.16)
N=79
.01 (.15)
N=65
-.03 (.08)
N=36
Post Test Belief #3 (Legitimate Grievances, Positively Phrased)
.56 (.30)
N=85
.49 (.24)
N=73
.53 (.22)
N=38
Change in Belief Pretest to Posttest (Legitimate Grievances, Positively Phrased)
.03 (.23)
N=82
.01 (.19)
N=72
-.005 (.19)
N=37
Post Test Belief #4 (Courts Make Society Safer, Positively Phrased)
.63 (.28)
N=85
.64 (.22)
N=71
.54 (.21)
N=36
Change in Belief Pretest to Posttest (Courts Make Society Safer, Positively Phrased)
.00 (.19)
N=83
.03 (.18)
N=71
.01 (.12)
N=35
Note. The first two rows of table entries are mean opinion on proposed tort reform legislation with standard deviation in
parentheses. Opinion on the proposed tort reform legislation is coded to range between 0 to 1 where 1 represents those who
strongly believe that Congress should pass proposed tort reform legislation. The remaining rows of table entries are mean
opinion on four items relating to the state of the tort system in the United States. Opinion on these statements is coded to
range between 0 and 1 where 1 represents those who strongly agree with the statement. Post test Belief #1 was phrased as
follows: “There are too many frivolous lawsuits in the United States.” Post test Belief #2: “Lawsuits interfere with the
development of new and useful products.” Post test Belief #3: “Most people who sue others in court have legitimate
grievances.” Post test Belief #4: “By making it easier to sue, the courts have made this a safer society.” Asterisks indicate
that a t-test on means shows framed condition differs significantly from control condition, ***p < .01 **p < .05 *p < .10
(two tail test).
201
Figure 2. Frame Types by Search Term
8
23
20
2
0
5
10
15
20
25
Tort Reform Legislation
Episodic Frames Thematic Frames Both Neither
202
Figure 2. Episodic Frame Subjects
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
Number of Episodic Frame Subjects
Subjects of Episodic Frames
203
Figure 3. Creating a Thematic Index
Thematic Keywords
“Average claim”
“Median claim”
“Rate per year”
“Total cost”
“Profits”
“Total rate”
“Award rate”
“Compensation”
“Declining rate”
“Declining awards”
“Declining claims”
“Increasing rate”
“Increasing awards”
“Increasing claims”
Average, median, total, or yearly rate
of awards, claims, and/or costs
Declining rate of awards, claims,
and/or costs
Increasing rate of awards, claims,
and/or costs
Explanation of recoding thematic frame type variable.
204
Figure 4. Thematic Frame Types
Note: “Average rate” refers to any thematic frame that mentions the average, median, total, or
yearly rate of awards, claims, and/or costs (including attorney compensation). It does not include
thematic frames that mention a change (either +/-) in the number(s) included in the frame.
“Declining rate” refers to any thematic frame that mentions a declining rate of awards, claims,
and/or costs (including attorney compensation). “Increasing rate” refers to any thematic frame that
mentions an increasing rate of awards, claims and/or costs (including attorney compensation).
26
2
13
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
Thematic Frame Types
Average Rate
Declining Rate
Increasing Rate
205
Figure 5. Interest Groups by Tort Reform Stance
16
30
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
Interest Groups
Anti-Reform
Pro-Reform
206
Figure 6. Pro-Tort Reform Interest Groups by Issue Area
0
5
10
15
20
25
Business Medicine Law Insurance
Number of Groups
Total Number of Mentions
207
Figure 7. Rate of Mentions Per Group Type (Pro-Tort Reform)
2.00
1.90
1.74
1.50
0.00
0.50
1.00
1.50
2.00
2.50
Business Medicine Law Insurance
Average Mentions Per Group Type
208
Figure 8. Anti-Tort Reform Groups by Issue Area
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
Trial Attorneys Consumer Groups Law
Number of Groups
Total Number of Mentions
209
Figure 9. Experimental Design
Tone
Type
Thematic/Pro
(n=31)
Episodic/Pro
(n=32)
Thematic/Anti
(n=45)
Episodic/Anti
(n=57)
Control Condition
(n=39)
210
Figure 10. Parallel Design
Randomly
Split Sample
Experiment 1 Experiment 2
4. Randomize Treatment
5. Measure Mediator
6. Measure Outcome
4. Randomize Treatment
5. Randomize Mediator
6. Measure Outcome
211
Figure 11. Parallel Encouragement Design
Randomly
Split Sample
Experiment 1 Experiment 2
Randomize Treatment
Measure Mediator
Measure Outcome
Randomize Treatment
ENCOURAGE Mediator
Measure Outcome
212
Figure 12. Pity by Treatment Condition
N=188
This chart shows whether subjects experienced the discrete emotion of pity by
treatment condition. In the Episodic/Anti-Reform frame, 32.6 percent of subjects
reported feeling pity, compared to only 13.6 percent in the Thematic/Anti-Reform
frame. From an affective standpoint, this is unsurprising, as the thematic frame
does not include an object toward which one could feel pity. In the Episodic/Pro-
Reform frame, 40.6 percent of subjects reported feeling pity, whereas only 12.9
reported feeling pity in the Thematic/Pro-Reform frame. Combined, an average of
36.6 percent of subjects indicated that they felt pity in the two Episodic
conditions, whereas an average of only 13.25 percent reported experiencing pity
in the Thematic conditions. In the control condition (indicated by the solid black
line on the chart), 21.1 percent of subjects reported feeling pity.
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
Anti/Episodic Anti/Thematic Pro/Episodic Pro/Thematic
Yes
No
Decline to Answer
Control
213
Figure 13. Disgust by Treatment Condition
N=188
In the Episodic/Anti-Reform frame, 44.2 percent of subjects reported feeling
disgust, compared to only 27.9 percent in the Thematic/Anti-Reform frame. From
an affective standpoint, this is unsurprising, as the thematic frame does not
include an object toward which one could feel disgust. In the Episodic/Pro-
Reform frame, 31.2 percent of subjects reported feeling disgust, whereas only
16.9 reported feeling disgust in the Thematic/Pro-Reform frame. In the control
condition, (indicated by the solid black line on the chart), 25.6 percent of subjects
reported feeling disgust.
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
Anti/Episodic Anti/Thematic Pro/Episodic Pro/Thematic
Yes
No
Decline to Answer
Control
214
Figure 14. Worry by Treatment Condition
N=188
In the Episodic/Anti-Reform frame, 35.7 percent of subjects reported feeling
worry, compared to only 52.3 percent in the Thematic/Anti-Reform frame. In the
Episodic/Pro-Reform frame, 37.5 percent of subjects reported feeling worry,
whereas 32.3 reported feeling worry in the Thematic/Pro-Reform frame. In the
control condition (indicated by the solid black line on the chart), 35.9 percent of
subjects reported feeling worry.
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
Anti/Episodic Anti/Thematic Pro/Episodic Pro/Thematic
Yes
No
Decline to Answer
Control
215
Figure 15. Anger by Treatment Condition
N=188
In the Episodic/Anti-Reform treatment condition, 33.3 percent reported feeling
anger, compared to 35.6 percent of subjects in the Thematic/Anti-Reform
condition. In the Pro-Reform conditions, 31.2 percent of those who received an
Episodic/Pro-Reform frame reported feeling anger, whereas only 12.9 percent of
those who received a Thematic/Pro-Reform frame reported feelings of anger. Of
those in the control condition, 20.5 percent reported feeling anger, which is
indicated on the chart by the black line.
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
Anti/Episodic Anti/Thematic Pro/Episodic Pro/Thematic
Yes
No
Decline to Answer
Control
216
Figure 16. Sympathy by Treatment Condition
N=188
In the Episodic/Anti-Reform treatment condition, 35.7 percent of subjects
reported feeling sympathy. In Thematic/Anti-Reform condition, 20.5 percent of
subjects reported feeling sympathy. In the Episodic/Pro-Reform treatment
condition, 62.5 percent of subjects reported feeling sympathy, whereas in the
Thematic/Pro-Reform treatment condition only 12.9 percent reported feeling
sympathy.
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
Anti/Episodic Anti/Thematic Pro/Episodic Pro/Thematic
Yes
No
Decline to Answer
Control
Abstract (if available)
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Asset Metadata
Creator
Hevron, Parker R.
(author)
Core Title
The affective framing of tort reform: toward a theory of the mediating effects of emotion on attitude formation
School
College of Letters, Arts and Sciences
Degree
Doctor of Philosophy
Degree Program
Politics and International Relations
Publication Date
08/01/2013
Defense Date
06/17/2013
Publisher
University of Southern California
(original),
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(digital)
Tag
affect,causal mediation,causal relationships,content analysis,Emotions,experiment,framing,Law,mass media,OAI-PMH Harvest,political psychology,Politics,priming,tort reform
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Advisor
Crigler, Ann N. (
committee chair
), Barnes, John E. (
committee member
), Goodnight, Gerald Thomas (
committee member
)
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Tags
affect
causal mediation
causal relationships
content analysis
framing
mass media
political psychology
priming
tort reform