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Compromise, coalition, and conflict: the Nichiren sect in sixteenth-century Kyoto

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Compromise, coalition, and conflict: the Nichiren sect in sixteenth-century Kyoto

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Content Compromise, Coalition, and Conflict: The Nichiren Sect in Sixteenth-Century Kyoto by Dan Sherer A Dissertation Presented to the FACULTY OF THE GRADUATE SCHOOL UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY (HISTORY) August 2017 i Acknowledgements I would like to acknowledge the people whose kindness made this dissertation possible. I must first thank my committee, who all have helped me immensely. My chair, Professor Joan Piggott, has seen this project grow and evolve over the years, and her aid and counsel has been invaluable, both to the dissertation and to my growth as a scholar. Professor Lori Meeks taught one of the first classes I took on Japan as an undergraduate, and as such, I am pleased that she was part of this project, to say nothing of grateful for all the help over the years. Professor Bettine Birge has helped broaden my academic horizons and given important critiques that have vastly improved my work. I have had help in my research from numerous other scholars as well. Professor Takahashi Toshiko has practically been my second advisor, and not only advised me on my research, she has introduced me to other scholars, helped me learn to read script, and helped me navigate the voluminous but complex resources at Hensanjo. Dr. Janet Goodwin has helped me refine several chapters. Professor Kanda Chisato of Tōyō University allowed me to participate in his seminars and gave me valuable advice on my research. Professor Kawauchi Masayoshi of Nara University and Professor Amano Tadayuki of Kansai University have generously shared their research and their time with me. Professor Brett Sheehan has also offered help on several topics. My research was carried out at the Tokyo University Historiographical Institute. I not only had use of their excellent archives, but also access to their staff, which include some of the best historians in the world. I am grateful in particular to Professor Kurushima Noriko (then the head of the institute), Professor Endo Moto’o, Professor Takahashi Shin’ichirō, and the aforementioned Professor Takahashi Toshiko. I must also thank the Japan Foundation, the USC Project for Premodern Japanese Studies, who funded my research at the Institute. I am also grateful for my colleagues at USC, especially Jill Barndt, Michelle Damian, Kevin Wilson, Sachiko Kawaii, Kristina Buhrman, Nadia Kanagawa, and Emily Warren. They have helped me throughout my ii time in graduate school and I look forward to our future as scholars. Everyone who has joined me at a Kambun Workshop since 2008 has also contributed in no small way to this project. Of course, I could not have accomplished this without a great group of people in Japan. Hoshino Sensei and Iizuka Sensei from the Shūbukan dojo in Yokohama took me into their dojo and have treated me like family. Ton Onosaka, Mama-san, and Satoshi at Magic Land in Tokyo have introduced me to a new world of study and treated me like a fellow without any obligation to do so. Dr. Gaynor Sekimori opened her home to me and allowed my family to visit as well. I am also indebted to my friends and family at home. Cate and Mario Garcia have opened their home to me and treated me like part of the family. Erin has made the last two years something truly special. My parents continue to be a wealth of support and inspiration, and my sisters have been supportive and loving. I love and am grateful to you all. iii Contents Acknowledgements ............................................................................................................................................... i Maps and Figures ................................................................................................................................................. vi List of Abbreviations ............................................................................................................................................ xi Introduction .......................................................................................................................................................... 1 Debates in Sengoku History and the Nichiren Sect .......................................................................................... 3 Nichiren ........................................................................................................................................................... 11 Moving West ................................................................................................................................................... 14 Unitary and Hierarchy, Accepting and Subduing ............................................................................................ 19 The Capital and the Mountain: Sengoku Kyoto and the Nichiren Sect........................................................... 22 The Organization of this Dissertation ............................................................................................................. 29 Chapter 1 The Temples Burn: The Rise and Fall of Nichirenist Military and Political Power in the Capital ...... 33 The Shogunate Goes Missing – The Meiō Coup of 1493 and its Effects ......................................................... 36 Honganji Rising ............................................................................................................................................... 41 Uchimawari and the Destruction of Yamashina Honganji .............................................................................. 45 How Many Divisions Does the Abbot Have? Quite a Few, Actually ............................................................... 48 Taking the Fight to Ishiyama ........................................................................................................................... 54 Police and Taxation Powers ............................................................................................................................ 56 The Matsumoto Debate of 1536 ..................................................................................................................... 61 Enryakuji’s Army ............................................................................................................................................. 66 Banishment ..................................................................................................................................................... 69 Hokke vs. Ikkō ................................................................................................................................................. 70 Conclusion: What Are You Going to Do with the Land? ................................................................................. 71 Chapter 2 An Amenable Arrangement: The Unification of the Nichiren Sect in the Era of Miyoshi Warrior Governance ......................................................................................................................................................... 73 Return and Resurgence ................................................................................................................................... 74 The Miyoshi and the Shogun – The Background to Unification...................................................................... 77 The Miyoshi and the Eiroku Treaty of 1564 .................................................................................................... 84 The Council of Head Temples ......................................................................................................................... 92 Nichikō ............................................................................................................................................................ 97 Conclusion: From Many, One ....................................................................................................................... 101 iv Chapter 3 Fire and Gold: The Council of Head Temples Meets Oda Nobunaga .............................................. 103 Setting the Scene – The Shogunate Rises Again ........................................................................................... 104 Nobunaga vs. Buddhism ............................................................................................................................... 110 Friction .......................................................................................................................................................... 114 A Brief Aside on Luis Frois ............................................................................................................................. 119 The Tenshō Agreement ................................................................................................................................. 121 The Tenshō 4 (1576) Fundraising Drive ........................................................................................................ 122 Fundraising Documents ................................................................................................................................ 124 How the Fundraising Worked ....................................................................................................................... 134 The Reason for the Tenshō 4 Fundraiser ...................................................................................................... 136 Conclusion: A Policy of Suppression? ........................................................................................................... 141 Chapter 4 Unhealthy Debate: Reevaluating the Azuchi Shūron ....................................................................... 143 The Azuchi Religious Debate ......................................................................................................................... 144 The Ōmi Problem .......................................................................................................................................... 148 Tsuji Zennosuke’s Research and Reconstruction of the Azuchi Religious Debate ........................................ 150 Inga Koji’s Azuchi Mondō .............................................................................................................................. 151 Nichien’s Azuchi Shūron Jitsuroku................................................................................................................. 159 Pure Land Sources ......................................................................................................................................... 160 Yamashina Tokitsune .................................................................................................................................... 162 Character of ‘Myō,’ Fourth of the Teachings of the Vaipulya Teaching Seat ............................................... 164 In A Thicket ................................................................................................................................................... 165 The Wages of Failure .................................................................................................................................... 168 Suppression Revisited ................................................................................................................................... 171 Conclusion ..................................................................................................................................................... 176 Conclusion ......................................................................................................................................................... 178 Violence and Its Renunciation ...................................................................................................................... 179 Exclusivism and Its Limits .............................................................................................................................. 180 Proselytizing and Debates ............................................................................................................................. 182 A Monk’s Place in a Warriors’ World ............................................................................................................ 184 Sengoku Buddhism? ...................................................................................................................................... 186 In Closing ....................................................................................................................................................... 187 Appendix I The 21 Nichirenist Head Temples in Kyoto .................................................................................... 189 v Appendix II Tsuji Zennosuke’s List of Sources for the Azuchi Religious Debate from “Azuchi Shūron no Shinsō” .......................................................................................................................................................................... 191 Appendix III Tsuji Zennosuke’s Reconstruction of the Azuchi Shūron ............................................................. 193 Bibliography ...................................................................................................................................................... 199 vi Maps and Figures Figure 1 The Provinces of Premodern Japan (Courtesy Professor Joan Piggott) vii Figure 2 Map of Central Japan With Old Provinces and Large Cities Shown. The home provinces (Kinai) are Yamato, Yamashiro, Kawachi, Settsu, and Izumi. (Source: Murdoch, A History of Japan Volume 2) viii Figure 3 Map of Kyoto and its Periphery. Note that in this dissertation I use the transliteration “Tamba” rather than “Tanba.” (Source: Lamers and Elisonas, The Chronicle of Lord Nobunaga) ix Figure 4 The Nichiren Head Temples of Post- Ōnin Kyoto (Map from Gay, The Moneylenders of Late Medieval Kyoto, with my additions) x Figure 5 The Ashikaga Shogunal Genealogy (Number in Circle Is Order in Which the Family Member Held the Shogunal Position) xi Figure 6 The Hosokawa Keichō Line (Years indicate tenure as Shogunal Deputy) List of Abbreviations The following abbreviations are used in the notes below. See the bibliography for full publication information. D.D.B The Digital Dictionary of Buddhism SIM Sengoku ibun Miyoshi hen SIR Sengoku ibun Sasaki-Rokkaku hen Kyōdan zenshi Nichirenshū kyōdan zenshi, Volume 1. 1 Introduction But I, Nichiren, one man alone, declare that the recitation of the name of Amida Buddha is an action that leads to rebirth in the hell of incessant suffering, that the Zen school is the invention of the heavenly devil, that the Shingon school is an evil doctrine that will destroy the country, and that the Ritsu school and the observers of the precepts are traitors to the nation. Because I do so, from the sovereign on down to the common people, all people fear me more than they would an enemy of their parents, an enemy from a past existence, a plotter of treason, a night raider, or a bandit. They rage, they curse, they strike at me. Those who slander me are given grants of land, while those who praise me are driven from their areas or fined, and the people who desire to kill me are singled out for rewards. And on top of all this, I have twice incurred the wrath of the authorities. I am not only the strangest person alive in the world today; in the ninety reigns of human sovereigns, in the more than seven hundred years since the Buddhist teachings were first introduced to Japan, there has never been such a strange person. I, Nichiren, am like the great comet of the Bun’ei era (1264), a disorder of the heavens such as had never happened in Japan before that time. I, Nichiren, am like the great earthquake of the Shōka era (1257), a freak of the earth that had never before occurred in this land. -Nichiren, “Letter to Akimoto,” 1280 1 Despite having devoted years to the project of examining the Nichiren sect in Kyoto, 2 I still marvel at the fact that there is anything extant to study at all. Consider that the Nichiren sect arrived in Kyoto in the very late thirteenth century, at a time when the dominant religious institutions in the capital included the sects that Nichiren himself had specifically called out as evil and destructive, such as Shingon, Pure Land, and Zen. Consider that the nearby Buddhist center of Mt. Hiei had an outsized effect on the capital and saw in Nichirenism a perversion of Tendai teachings whose adherents had the audacity to steal from Tendai the appellation of “Lotus Sect.” Consider that the Nichiren sect had long had a strong faction within it that 1 Nichiren, The Writings of Nichiren Daishōnin, vol. 2, 1016. 2 In this dissertation, I use “Nichiren sect” to describe all the Buddhist traditions that derive from the ideas of Nichiren and his disciples. In the medieval period, the Nichiren sect was called by many names, but the preferred name within the sect was “Lotus Sect” ( 法華宗, Hokke shū). Today, the various lineages call themselves by several names, including Hokke shū and Nichiren shū. The term “Nichirenist” I use as shorthand to describe those who joined the Nichiren sect, in either a lay or a monastic capacity. When possible I try to make clear to whom exactly I am referring, but at times the sources refer to part of a “Nichirenist party” ( 日蓮党, Nichirentō) and it is impossible to differentiate monastic from lay, or wealthy from poor, or even lineage from lineage. In those cases, “Nichirenist” is probably the best possible term to use. I should also note that I am not connecting these people to the Meiji era 日蓮主義 Nichiren shugi movement, which is sometimes rendered as “Nichirenism” in English. See Stone, “Rebuking the Enemies of the Lotus” 2 forbade the worship of Shintō deities and that forbade worshiping in halls where Buddhas other than Shakyamuni were enshrined. Given all this, the Nichiren sect’s ability to maintain a presence in the capital is surprising. Even more surprising, however, is the Nichiren sect’s survival in the sixteenth century. In the 1530s, the shogunate quit the capital because of an internal conflict. In its absence, the dominant military in the capital became armies run by Nichirenist temples, known today as the “Lotus Leagues.” The Leagues participated in the shogunal civil war of the 1520s and 1530s and policed and taxed the city. In 1536, however, a Mt. Hiei-led force of soldiers burned the Nichiren sect’s temples to the ground, and the royal and shogunal courts both issued orders permanently banishing the sect from the capital. Even the display of Nichirenist amulets on a layman’s house would lead not only to that house’s confiscation but also to that of both neighboring houses. And yet the Nichiren sect would return to the capital not ten years later. This time, however, they were wary of taking up arms again, and the sect would instead focus on using its economic and political capital to protect itself. By 1564, the temples resolved the most important dispute within the sect peacefully, and by 1568 the sect had developed a governing body that would allow the temples more effectively to manage the sect’s relationship with powerful warriors. This governing body, the Council of Head Temples, would continue to function until the Meiji period (1868-1912). In the midst of this, the rise of the hegemon Oda Nobunaga (1534-1582) would prove a critical challenge for the nascent Council. Nonetheless, the Council found new ways to negotiate Nobunaga’s reign, including the first fundraising campaign in the sect’s history, to cover the cost of protecting the sect’s tradition of exclusivist practice. Eventually, however, the sect would find itself at odds with Nobunaga after a 1579 religious debate at Azuchi castle, which would lead to harsh consequences for the sect: Nobunaga would fine the sect heavily, force its representatives to sign pledges attesting to their own loss, and he even executed two Nichirenist patrons and one monk. Even then, the sect survived and prospered. 3 This project was born of my interest in two of these events in particular: the destruction of the Lotus Leagues and the Azuchi Religious Rebate of 1579. Each seemed like it might well have been the end of the Nichiren sect in the capital. And yet it continued to flourish well past the sixteenth century and indeed up to the present – it remains one of the major religious groups in Japan and the world today. The fundamental question I seek to answer is how the Nichiren sect, as a relative newcomer to the capital in the sixteenth century, survived and flourished there, despite entrenched and powerful enemies outside the sect and deep divisions within. While there are numerous potential approaches to this question, I have chosen to focus on exploring the developing organization of the sect as a whole. The Nichiren sect in Kyoto entered the sixteenth century as a collection of lineages with varying degrees of hostility to each other and to the rest of Japan’s Buddhist establishment. By the end of the sixteenth century, the sect had largely solved its most pervasive doctrinal dispute without bloodshed and had developed a robust governing body capable of large-scale undertakings and of handling crises like the Azuchi Religious Debate. Debates in Sengoku History and the Nichiren Sect This dissertation is a study of religious institutions in Japan’s Sengoku period. Historians have long argued about this period’s significance to Japan’s political development, its economic development, and its culture. In order to clarify where this dissertation sits in the larger field and what larger questions I am attempting to answer, I will briefly sketch out the larger issues in Sengoku history, with a focus on political and religious issues. It is a rare thing that we can say with some certainty that the name given by historians to a period was used by historical actors of that time. Sengoku 戦国, literally “warring states,” 3 was originally a term used by Chinese historians to describe the period between the collapse of the Zhou authority in eastern 3 There are some who translate this term in the Japanese context as “the country at war,” but I prefer to respect the classical Chinese reference (where there were clearly defined states at war). Also, until Hideyoshi unified Japan, the warrior organizations in most of Japan were sufficiently independent that treating them as individual states vying for power can be a useful view. 4 China (roughly 400 BC) and the unification of China by the Qin (221 BC). At that time there were several independent states vying for power. Seeing parallels, Japanese observers in the sixteenth century consciously used the term Sengoku to describe their own circumstances. This in turn fits in nicely with one of the overall historical narratives of the Sengoku period: just as the collapse of Zhou authority led to a period of war between small, independent polities that was ended by the Qin unification, the collapse of the Muromachi shogunate led to a period of war between small, independent polities that was ended by the Tokugawa reunification of Japan. We must be careful not to carry the parallel too far, however. For one thing, as David Spafford points out, the language of Sengoku documents is for the most part conservative in that it looks to the past rather than asserting a progressive notion of a better future. 4 Sengoku observers not only did not foresee the future Tokugawa order, but they were also not seeking it. In addition, the alternative term senkoku, written with the very same Chinese characters, was also common in the sixteenth century, and it is clear that the two terms were contemporary. According to the sixteenth-century Japanese-to-Portuguese dictionary Vocabulario da Lingo de Iapam, this term referred to “provinces at war which each other, or the provinces in which there is fighting.” 5 One of the most famous uses of the term sengoku in the Sengoku period is in Takeda Shingen’s house laws: “because the realm consists of warring states ( 天下戦国之上者, tenka sengoku no ue wa), it is of the utmost importance to keep one’s military equipment at the ready.” 6 Kanda Chisato argues that the characters in this case were more likely meant to be read senkoku; and that, therefore, a better translation would read, “because there is now fighting in the home provinces (tenka senkoku no ue wa), it is of the utmost importance to keep one’s military equipment at the ready.” 7 4 Spafford, A Sense of Place. 5 Hōyaku Nippō jisho, s.v. Xencocu. 6 Translation as per David Eason, “Warriors, Warlords, and Domains,” in Japan Emerging, 233. 7 Kanda, Sengoku jidai no jiriki to chitsujo, 150. For a discussion of why tenka more likely refers to “home provinces” than “realm,” see Chapter 3. 5 However we choose to parse the word sengoku, it is military in origin, and as such it should come as no surprise that the beginning and end of the Sengoku period were defined by war. The traditional dates for the beginning and the end of the period span the opening battles of the Ōnin-Bunmei War (1467-1477) and the Battle of Sekigahara (1600) that gave birth to the Tokugawa shogunate, respectively. This creates a neat narrative: one war saw the destruction of the Muromachi order and the other gave birth to the Edo order. Nevertheless, much (perhaps most) of the scholarship of the last fifty years has treated the period after Oda Nobunaga (1532-1580) ousted the last Muromachi shogun Yoshiaki (1537-1597) in 1573 as the beginnings of Japanese “early modernity,” and thus beyond the age of warring states. This period is often called the Azuchi- Momoyama 安土桃山 period – after the castles where Oda Nobunaga and Toyotomi Hideyoshi resided – or the Shokuhō 織豊 period, incorporating the first Chinese characters of the names Oda and Toyotomi. A smaller group of scholars has pushed the end of Sengoku period further forward, either to Tokugawa Ieyasu’s appointment as shogun in 1603 or even as late as the Summer and Winter Sieges of Osaka in 1614 and 1615. In the current scholarship in Japanese, the beginning of the Sengoku period is increasingly moving from the Ōnin War to the Meiō Coup of 1493. I will cover the Meiō Coup in some depth in Chapter 1, but as a brief note here, while previous shoguns had been assassinated, the Meiō Coup was the first time that a sitting shogun was deposed and replaced by a conspiracy of his subordinates, led in this case by Hosokawa Masamoto (1466-1507). Proponents argue that the ascendancy of the Hosokawa within the shogunate represents not only a clean break from the earlier Muromachi order but also the beginning of a new political organization. Also implicit is that whatever changes occurred after the Ōnin war were of less political significance than the changes after the Meiō Coup. 8 The major political developments of the Sengoku period are the emergence of the daimyō 大名, often translated as “warlord,” and what could be termed the “self-governance movements.” Like so many 8 For example, see Yamada Yasuhiro, Sengoku jidai no Ashikaga shōgun, 7. 6 historical terms, daimyō was not the term used by the historical actors to describe themselves, and, indeed, some scholars believe that the term should not be used. In any event, these warlords replaced the Muromachi era military governors (守護, shugo), whose prestige and power greatly declined after the Ōnin war. While many of what would become the daimyō families were old military-governor families, often they were deposed by their local representatives or by powerful provincial warrior families. A phrase often associated with this rise and fall of warrior leadership is the term gekokujō 下剋上, which literally means, “lower overcomes upper.” 9 While in common currency in the fourteenth century, gekokujō is now used primarily to describe conditions in the Sengoku period. The Sengoku daimyō created around themselves a vassal band. The vassal band owed the daimyō service and the daimyō owed the vassal rewards. 10 The second major political development of the Sengoku period is the development of a number of non-warrior political organizations. These included neighborhoods in the Kyoto capital, religious groups, and corporate villages in the countryside. These have been seen by historians as “self-rule” groups, and have traditionally been considered more egalitarian than the daimyō organization, as well as hostile to the daimyō. The example that has drawn the most attention is the Ikkō Ikki, Honganji-aligned leagues that controlled the province of Kaga and whose fortresses at Nagashima and Osaka repulsed numerous attacks from Oda Nobunaga (see Chapter 3). Indeed, Neil McMullin has argued that the conflict between Nobunaga and the Ikkō Ikki was the most important conflict of the Sengoku period. 11 The Ikkō Ikki itself has been the subject of numerous studies, most recently in English in the excellent work by Carol Tsang. 12 Hitomi Tonomura has explored the corporate village, another common self-rule group, in depth. 13 Notably, recent scholarship has 9 For more, including a summation of Japanese disorder from the late Heian period to the Sengoku period, see Souyri, The World Turned Upside down. 10 For a recent summation of the Sengoku daimyō in Japanese, see Kuroda Motoki, Sengoku daimyō. A summation of the state of the field in English can be found in Eason, “Warriors, Warlords, and Domains.” A more complete but dated treatment can be found in Arnesen, The Medieval Japanese Daimyo. 11 Mcmullin, Buddhism and the State in Sixteenth-Century Japan. 12 Tsang, War and Faith. 13 Hitomi Tonomura, Community and Commerce in Late Medieval Japan: The Corporate Villages of Tokuchin-Ho. 7 put to question the opposition between the daimyō and self-rule organizations, however. Kurushima Noriko has argued, for instance, that an Ikki (league) and a daimyō organization were quite similar. In Kurushima’s view, the most important distinction between the two was that a daimyō organization chose a leader (the daimyō himself), while an ikki did not. 14 Other scholars have noted, too, that many of the self-rule organizations were able to achieve their power only by cooperating with powerful warriors or even because warriors nurtured their power. My study here looks at two self-rule organizations: the Lotus Leagues (see Chapter 1) and the Council of Head Temples (the focus of the remainder of the dissertation) in depth. I show that warrior power was vital to the rise of self-rule organizations, and in the case of the rise of the Lotus Leagues, both the Ikkō Ikki and the Lotus Leagues went into battle at the behest of the same warrior, the shogunal deputy Hosokawa Harumoto. We shall see that the Council of Head Temples was independent from warriors, but the reason for its existence was to allow the sect to negotiate the vagaries of warrior rule in the capital. The critical question of the relationship between daimyō and self-rule organizations is part of the larger issue, how to assess the Sengoku period as a whole. Much of the scholarship on the Sengoku period treats it as a transitional period, focusing on how it shaped the ensuing Edo period (1600-1868). Indeed, this is the approach taken by John Hall and Nagahara Keiji, and it is an important theme in most of the essays in their Japan Before Tokugawa conference volume. 15 Even given that the development of Edo political and social systems is an important topic, this approach is too limiting: it reduces questions to be asked about a Sengoku history to their connection with Edo-period phenomena. Certainly, Sengoku historical actors did not think in such terms, nor did they see themselves as “transitional.” I want to focus herein on the lives, acts, and thinking of the Sengoku actors themselves, and especially smaller, non-daimyō groups. Chapter 3 and 4 of this study, which relate how the Council of Head Temples dealt with the unifier Oda Nobunaga, offer important insights on Nobunaga’s own thinking and actions. 14 Kurushima Noriko, Ikki to sengoku daimyō. 15 Hall, Nagahara, and Yamamura, Japan before Tokugawa; Hall, “Japan’s Sixteenth-Century Revolution.” 8 Privileging the parts of the Sengoku period that presaged the Edo period also exacerbates another problem pointed out by David Spafford: Sengoku studies are weighted heavily towards the latter half of the period, especially after 1550. 16 If one considers the Azuchi-Momoyama/Shokuhō (1573-1600) period as part of the Sengoku period, as I do, this bias is even more apparent. Spafford attempts to correct this by focusing his study of space and place in eastern Japan on the era before 1550. We need more work to correct this temporal bias. Hence, I ground the story of the Lotus Leagues in the political situation of the late fifteenth century. This dissertation is not only concerned with Sengoku politics but also with the politics of Sengoku religion, and specifically Sengoku Buddhism. Traditionally the Nichiren sect, along with the Pure Land and True Pure Land Sects, has been categorized as an element of “Kamakura New Buddhism” ( 鎌倉新仏教, Kamakura shinbukkyō). These new sects were attractive to warriors and commoners and, therefore, marked a major shift from older Buddhist schools that were mainly patronized by the nobility. This paradigm has been problematized by Kuroda Toshio (1923-1996), who argued that in terms of medieval Buddhism we should focus on what he called “esoteric-exoteric Buddhism” (kenmitsu bukkyō). In Kuroda’s view, the new sects of Kamakura represented extremist movements within the esoteric-exoteric sects, and he pushed the beginning of medieval Japanese Buddhism back from the twelfth century to the tenth. 17 Over the past two decades or so, Yuasa Haruhisa and Fujii Manabu have gone even further, arguing that the sects of “Kamakura New Buddhism” remained little more than small heretical branches of the Tendai School until the Sengoku period, when they developed large followings and real social and political power. Therefore, they argue, Nichiren Buddhism is more properly classified as “Sengoku Buddhism.” 18 Fujii has also proposed a “Lotus Culture” centered on Nichiren temples and patrons, which was popular in the Kyoto capital at the time. 19 16 Spafford, A Sense of Place. 17 Kuroda Toshio, “The Development of the Kenmitsu System as Japan’s Medieval Orthodoxy”; Taira Masayuki, “Kuroda Toshio and the Kenmitsu Taisei Theory.” 18 Yuasa Haruhisa, Sengoku Bukkyō. 19 Fujii Manabu, Hokke bunka no tenkai. 9 In general, I agree with Yuasa and Fujii, and I believe that part of the sect’s success in the Sengoku period was that it quickly amassed prestige in the capital and kept prestige even after their exile in 1536. The combination of a stable and resilient Council and the centuries of proselytizing the wealthy and powerful produced real dividends in the sixteenth century. While this study is focused on Kyoto, given that it was the economic and social center of Japan what was popular with Kyoto nobles and merchants had an outsized effect on the rest of Japan. We can see this well in the case of the Miyoshi warrior band. By encouraging the lineages of the Nichiren sect to make peace were able to put themselves forward as protectors of the sect throughout Japan (see Chapter 2). English-language studies of the Nichiren sect in the sixteenth century are scarce. There is, however, some scholarship on religion and religious institutions in the Sengoku period. Carol Tsangs’s work on the Ikkō Ikki provides insight on how the Amidist power center known as Honganji functioned during the period. Jeroen Lamers’s Japonious Tyrannus remains the best study in English on the life and rise to power of Oda Nobunaga and has an excellent section on his religious policies. Neil McMullin’s Buddhism, Warfare, and the State in Sixteenth Century Japan examines Nobunaga’s religious policies in detail, including the Azuchi Religious Debate. Japanese scholarship on the Nichiren sect in the Sengoku era has experienced a recent boom, driven by the work of Yuasa and Fujii. Kawauchi Masayoshi, who focuses on the history of the city of Kyoto, has clarified the nature of conflicts between Enryakuji and the Nichiren sect, fleshing out the role of the Council of Head Temples. 20 Amano Tadayuki, who focuses on the Miyoshi warrior family of Awa, has not only written on the relationship between the Miyoshi and the Nichiren sect but has also shown the way the sect took advantage of the political situation in the capital and the Osaka Bay area to achieve its own ends. 21 Both agree with Yuasa’s argument for “Sengoku Buddhism.” Earlier works also continue to be read and debated: 20 Kawauchi, Nichirenshū to sengoku Kyoto; Kawauchi, Chūsei Kyoto no minshū to shakai; Kawauchi, Chūsei Kyōto no toshi to shūkyō.; etc. 21 Amano, Sengokuki Miyoshi seiken no kenkyū; etc. 10 Itohisa Hōken’s work on the organization of the sect’s lineages remains the main reference on that subject. 22 Nakao Takashi has likewise explored a wide range of Nichiren-sect history – his work on the Council of Head Temples has been particularly valuable for this project. 23 While it is now somewhat dated, the first volume of the Nichiren kyōdan zenshi, compiled in in 1966 by scholars at Risshō University, remains an important text on the sect’s development. 24 This dissertation attempts not only to introduce the results of recent Japanese scholarship but also to reconcile it with earlier Japanese work and the Anglophone scholarship on Sengoku religion. Finally, I would like to provide an overview of the primary sources available for this study. Most Nichiren-sect temples, even fairly major ones, do not have extensive or accessible document collections. Honnōji, 25 Honkōji, 26 Myōkenji 27 and Chōmyōji, 28 however, have published their collections. Chōmyōji’s collection is particularly important as it includes the Documents for the Use of the Council of Head Temples, which has been so vital to this project. In addition, Honnōji and Honkokuji produced temple annals, the Ryōsan rekifu 29 and the Honkokuji nempu 30 respectively, which I have used extensively. There is also the mammoth Nichirenshū shūgaku zensho collection, which includes several document collections and chronicles. 31 When possible, I have also supplemented Nichirenist sources with other records, including 22 Itohisa, Kyōto Nichiren monryū shi no kenkyū. 23 Nakao Takashi, Nichiren shinseki ibun to jiin monjo.; etc. 24 Unfortunately, a promised second volume was never finished. As a result, I will not note the volume when citing this work. Fujii Manabu and Hatano Ikuo, Honnōji shiryō chūsei hen.. 26 Honkōji, ed., Honkōji monjo, vol. 1. 27 Myōkenji monjo hensan-kai, ed., Myōkenji monjo. 28 Chōmyōji monjo hensan-kai, ed., Chōmyōji monjo, Kyōto jūroku honzan kaigōyō shorui: Nichiren shōnin monka shoji monjo shūei. Hereafter Chōmyōji monjo. To make it easier for the reader to find the documents in this collection, I have cited them with page numbers. 29 Two variants of the Ryōsan rekifu can be found in Fujii, Hatano, and Honnōji, Honnōji shiryō kokiroku hen., 408- 609. 30 “Honkokuji nempu”; “Honkokuji nempu-2”; “Honkokuji nempu-3” 31 Risshō Daigaku, Nichirenshū Shūgaku Zensho. Hereafter NSZS. 11 courtier journals and biographies. Of particular use to this project have been the Sengoku ibun compilations, particularly those for the Miyoshi 32 and Rokkaku 33 warrior families. Before delving into the details of the Nichiren sect in the sixteenth century, however, first we need context. To that end, I will sketch a rough outline of the development of the Nichiren sect from the time of Nichiren (1222-1282) to 1500. Then I will turn to the circumstances of Sengoku Kyoto. Nichiren The monk Nichiren 日蓮 was born in Awa (modern Chiba prefecture) in 1222. While there are some disputes over his ancestry, his parents seem to have made their living by fishing. Nichiren described himself as “born poor and lowly to a chandāla family,” equating his parent’s station with the lowest Indian social caste, who killed animals for a living. 34 At the age of twelve, he entered the Tendai local temple Seichōji 清澄寺, 35 and took the tonsure at sixteen, with the name Zeshō-bō Renchō 是聖房蓮長. He then traveled to Kamakura and eventually to Kyoto and Nara. He studied Buddhism broadly, focusing on the Tendai sect but also studying Shingon, Zen, and Pure Land practice. He visited Mt. Hiei, Mt. Kōya, and other important temples. In his decade or so of study, the young Renchō concluded that the apex of Buddhist teachings was a holy text, the Lotus Sutra. This was not wholly new; the Tendai School had long given the Lotus Sutra a central position in its teachings. However, Tendai also allowed for a broad variety of teaching and practice, 32 Amano Tadayuki, ed., Sengoku ibun: Miyoshi-shi-hen. Hereafter SIM. In citing this compilation, I have used document numbers instead of page numbers (For Example, SIM 115). However, also included in this compilation are documents not written by the Miyoshi, but which the compiler though would be useful for reference. These documents for reference (sankō) are scattered throughout the multivolume work, and so would be impossible to find without the page number. Therefore, they are cited with a lower case “s” (for sankō) before the number and the volume and page numbers appended (For example, reference document number 87 is on page 59 of the second volume. I would cite it as “SIM s87 (V2. 59)”). 33 Murai Yuki, ed., Sengoku ibun: Sasaki Rokkaku-shi-hen. Hereafter SIR. In citing this compilation, I have followed the same convention as for SIM. 34 The Writings of Nichiren Daishonin, vol. 1, 303. 35 Seichōji is sometimes called Kiyosumidera. 12 and Pure Land teachings were very popular with its monks. Renchō viewed this cosmopolitanism with disdain. He held that all the scriptures expounded before the Lotus Sutra were expedients and that any practice not based on the Lotus Sutra was ineffectual, or even dangerous. By the time of his return to Seichōji in 1253, 36 he had settled on a new practice, that of chanting the Daimoku 題目. In what ironically seemed a mirror of Pure Land practice, he would chant, “I take my refuge in the Lotus Sutra” ( 南無妙法蓮華経, namu myōhō renge kyō). In the fourth month of 1253, Nichiren gave a sermon at Seichōji in which he publically denounced Zen and Pure Land practice, and he expounded on the importance of practice based on the Lotus Sutra. He also changed his name to Nichiren. This sermon has come to be considered the founding of the Nichiren sect. It also led to a major point of contention between the temple and the local land steward, who was apparently an ardent Amidist. The steward chased Nichiren out of the area. Nichiren then moved to the Matsubagaya 松葉谷 area of Kamakura in the eighth month of 1253, where he established a small hermitage. He went around the streets preaching, loudly denouncing the Zen and Pure Land schools. He managed to assemble a number of disciples at this stage, including several officials in the shogunate. He was also making enemies in the religious establishment and the Kamakura government. Only a few years after his arrival, Kamakura and eastern Japan would face a number of natural disasters. An earthquake tore through Kamakura in 1257. A fire broke out in 1258. There was a famine in 1259, accompanied by plague. To Nichiren, these were not coincidental but rather signs that bad practice had pulled Japan away from the protection of true Buddhism. He saw a simple, if explosive, solution. 36 In this dissertation, instead of converting every Japanese date into the Julian or Gregorian calendar, I shall follow the convention of using a corresponding Julian/Gregorian year for each Japanese one and exclusively use Japanese months and dates. This may mean that a date may technically not be in the Julian/Gregorian year (for example, the twelfth month, sixteenth day of Tenshō 10 (1582) is technically January 9, 1583), but would still be considered 1582. 13 In the seventh month of 1260, Nichiren sent a long essay entitled A Treatise on Pacifying the State by Establishing Orthodoxy ( 立正安国論, Risshō ankokuron) to the highest-ranking man in the shogunate, the retired regent Hōjō Tokiyori (1227−1263). In this polemic, which was structured as a dialogue, he argued that Pure Land practices had led the gods to abandon Japan. He predicted that if this were not corrected, there would be internal strife and foreign invasion. 37 Tokiyori did not give any particular response, but others did. In the eighth month, hundreds of Pure Land adherents, perhaps with the shogunate’s blessing, descended on Matsubagaya and burned down Nichiren’s hermitage. Nichiren escaped to Shimōsa (northern Chiba Prefecture), to stay at the home of one of his disciples. The next year the shogunate exiled Nichiren to Izu (modern Shizuoka Prefecture). He was pardoned in 1263 and he then returned to Awa. After another attempt on his life, he returned to Kamakura. He was again arrested in 1271 and sentenced to exile on Sado Island. Before he could leave, the official holding him decided to have him executed. A last-minute stay from the shogunate saved Nichiren’s life, though sectarian accounts say that the executioner had the sword in his hand and was poised to strike when strange lights in the sky terrified the swordsman so badly he could not continue. Nichiren remained on Sado for nearly three years, gathering new disciples and writing. In the interim, there was infighting among the ruling Hōjō, resulting in the execution and exile of several high-ranking shogunate officials. Nichiren’s prognostications were starting to sound accurate. Pardoned in 1274, he was summoned by the shogunate to speak with a council of high-ranking vassals. He was questioned on the impending Mongol invasion, which he predicted within the year (as it happened, the Mongols would invade six months after the date he prophesized). He also attempted, without success, to convince the officials that the government needed to stop supporting sects he deemed destructive. He was allowed to remain free but made no real effect on the council. Despairing of ever 37 The text can be found in The Writings of Nichiren Daishonin, vol. 1, 6-30. 14 changing the shogunate’s policies, he left Kamakura for good, settling on Mt. Minobu in Kai (modern Yamanashi prefecture) in the fifth month of 1274. This was intended to be a lonely retreat, but his followers, lay and monastic, followed, and Mt. Minobu became a lively religious center. Nichiren would largely remain on Mt. Minobu for the rest of his life, but his followers would continue to operate throughout the Kanto. Nichiren began to have health problems in 1278, and in 1282, while he was traveling to a hot spring in Hitachi, his condition worsened. He wrote out a will asking to be buried at Mt. Minobu. He requested, too, that his six main disciples take turns managing his tomb. Moving West At his death in 1282, Nichiren left his six most senior disciples, the so-called “Six Senior Priests” ( 六老僧, Rokurōsō), in charge of his movement. These six – Nisshō 日昭 (1221–1323), Nichirō 日朗 (1245–1320), Nikkō 日興 (1246–1333), Nikō 日向 (1253–1314), Nitchō 日頂 (1252–1317), and Nichiji 日持 (1250-?) — started to argue with each other almost immediately, with Nikkō initially opposing the other five. This resulted in four of the six senior monks (Nisshō, Nichirō, Nikō, and Nikkō) establishing what would become their own monastic lineages ( 門流, monryū). Still another lineage would be founded by another of Nichiren’s disciples, Nichijō 日常 (1216-1299), at Nakayama in modern Chiba. These five lineages would primarily be known by the names of their founders or the locations of their head temples. 38 They eventually split into other lineages, making the roughly fifteen groups of the present day. 39 38 The original five lineages and their founders are: Nishō’s Nishō/Hama Lineage based in Kamakura, Nichirō’s Nichirō/Hikigayatsu lineage based in Kamakura, Nikkō’s Nikkō/Fuji lineage based in Suruga, Nikō’s Minobu/Mobara Lineage based at Mobara, and Nichijō’s Nakayama lineage based in Shimōsa. 39 It is beyond the scope of this study to discuss all these schisms. For an in-depth account, see Risshō Daigaku Nichiren Kyōgaku Kenkyūjo, ed., Nichirenshū kyōdan zenshi, vol. 1. Komatsu and Hanano, ed., Nichiren kyōdan no seiritsu to tenkai; Fujii Manabu, Hokkeshū to machishū; Jacqueline Stone, Original Enlightenment and the Transformation of Medieval Japanese, 301-53. As there were never any further volumes in the Nichirenshū kyōdan zenshi, I have adopted the shorthand “Kyōdan zenshi” when citing this work. 15 These lineages were organized around a head temple ( 本山, honzan). The role of this head temple in the Kyoto lineages has been studied by Itohisa Hōken, in his Kyōto Nichiren monryū shi no kenkyū. Fundamentally, Itohisa argues, the Kyoto lineages (much like the Kantō lineages) were led by the head temple’s abbot ( 貫主, kanju), who had control over matters financial, managerial, and academic within the lineage. The resident clergy of the head temple ( 本寺大衆, honji daishu), however, had great power as well, as the abbot needed their approval to choose a successor. The resident clergy members were also the means by which the temple communicated with other lineages; in the three cases where we see sect-wide agreements, 40 agents from within the resident clergy, not the abbots, signed the agreements. The resident clergy also provided connections between the sect and with its patrons. 41 There were minor deviations, such as in the Nichiryū lineage (one of many that schismed from the Nichirō lineage), which considered both Honnōji (in Kyoto) and Honkōji (in Amagasaki, modern Osaka prefecture) as their head temples. Therefore, whenever someone was appointed abbot of one of the two head temples, he would become the newest “Master of Two Temples” ( 両山, ryōzan). Conflict was avoided by a division of labor, with Honkōji as the academic center of the lineage and Honnōji as the political and proselytizing center. Despite Nichiren’s success in the Kantō, the sect did not have a presence in Kyoto at the time of his death. This is partly explained by the fact that Nichiren, unique among the founders of the so-called “Kamakura Schools,” was an easterner by birth. The others, such as Hōnen and Shinran, were from western Japan. While Nichiren himself studied extensively in the west, he began his preaching in earnest after returning to the Kantō, and the centers of his movement were in Kai and Kamakura, with another center on the island of Sado in the Japan Sea. 40 These are: the Kanshō Agreement of 1466 (see page 27), the Eiroku Treaty of 1564 (see page 84), and the Tenshō Agreement of 1576 (see page 121). 41 “Patron” is my rendering for the Japanese terms danna 檀那 and dan’otsu 檀越, both of which refer to one who gives alms to a temple. 16 The first Nichirenist preacher to make an impact in Kyōto was Nichizō 日像 (1269-1342), who had trained under Nichiren’s disciple Nichirō. Nichizō arrived in the capital in 1294. He quickly found a powerful merchant patron, and over some ten years he gradually increased his following. However, in 1307 the retired sovereign Go-Uda (1267-1324), at the urging of Enryakuji, exiled Nicihizō to Shikoku. Nichizō, however, appealed this, and instead went to Yamasaki, just south of Kyoto, to await the response. He was pardoned in 1309 and returned to the capital, only to be exiled again in 1310, this time to Kii (modern Wakayama prefecture). Again, he was pardoned the next year and he returned to the capital. In both cases, large numbers of people in the capital worked to secure his pardon. He was again exiled for a little over ten days in 1321, and in the next year he founded Myōkenji 妙顕寺, Kyoto’s first Nichiren temple. Nichizō’s monastic lineage, called the Shijō 四条 lineage after the location of Myōkenji (see the map on page ix), would produce the vast majority of the powerful Nichirenist temples in Kyoto. Of the eventual twenty-one head temples, five were affiliated with the Shijō lineage, and three more were affiliated with lineages that had broken off from the Shijō lineage (the Nichiryū, 日隆, and Nisshin, 日真, lineages). Another five were from other lineages derived from the Nichirō lineage (the Nichirō lineage, the Rokujō, 六条, lineage and the Nichijin, 日陣, lineage). Briefly speaking, the other lineages lagged conspicuously behind that of Nichizō in establishing temples in Kyoto. The earliest appearance of another major Nichiren faction in the capital was in 1327, when a representative of Nikkō, Nichijun 日順, arrived to try to convert the sovereign. By the time the next major Nichirenist temple, Honkokuji 本圀寺, was built in 1337, Myōkenji had been officially commissioned by the royal families of both the southern and northern courts as well as by the Muromachi shogunate as a sanctioned prayer center (a chokuganji in the royal case and a kiganji in the Shogunal case). Meanwhile, 17 Honkokuji would become the center of the Rokujō 六条 lineage, and one of the most powerful Nichirenist temples. The first head temple that was established by a monk unassociated with the Nichirō lineage was the Jōgōin 上行院, which was established by Nichizon 日尊, a disciple of Nikkō, in 1339. Others would soon follow, and by 1500, the “Twenty-One Head Temples” (see Appendix I) made up the core of the sect in Kyoto and western Japan. Probably the best known of the early preachers in Kyoto was Nisshin 日親 (1407-1488). 42 Nisshin was known for his aggressive shakubuku preaching (see below) and hostility to other practices, so much so that despite being sent as the Nakayama lineage’s representative to the whole island of Kyushu at the age of nineteen, he was expelled from the lineage at the age of 30 because he had criticized not only the patrons of the lineage but his superior monks. By then he had already founded several temples, including Honpōji 本法寺, one of the future twenty-one head temples. He expanded his street preaching and made so many converts that he was able to secure an audience with the shogun Ashikaga Yoshinori in 1439. Nisshin told the Shogun to stop giving alms to non-Nichirenist temples. Yoshinori, who had been the Abbot of Mount Hiei before his appointment as shogun, responded by banning Nisshin from preaching. The next year Nisshin wrote a long work that he intended to give to Yoshinori on the thirty-third anniversary of the death of the late Shogun Yoshimitsu, but before he could send it, he was arrested for both his preaching and for sheltering the family of a warrior who had died in a failed coup against Yoshinori. Honpōji was destroyed, and Nisshin was tossed into prison. His sufferings in prison have become the stuff of legend. According to one account, his cell was low and the ceiling spiked to ensure that if he tried to stand up straight he would injure himself horribly. Most 42 This account follows Kyōdan zenshi, 262-70. 18 famously, his captors put a red-hot iron pot over his head because he would not renounce his beliefs, giving him the nickname “Nisshin, who wore an iron pot over his head” ( 鍋かむり日親, Nabe kamuri Nisshin). They also cut off the tip of his tongue, permanently impeding his speech. 43 Nisshin had set out in the knowledge that he would suffer for his preaching, however, and had been assaulted in the streets several times before, so he endured. Ashikaga Yoshinori was assassinated in 1441, and Nisshin was released. He went back to preaching in the streets throughout Japan, winning converts and making enemies from Kyushu to Kamakura. Along the way, he would be jailed two more times and released two more times. He would bring in some of the Nichiren sect’s most famous patrons, including the Hon’ami artisan family and the Kano family of painters. Honpōji would be rebuilt twice in his lifetime and would finally settle at Sanjō Madenokoji. Nisshin would die at the age of 82, having written several books on his life and philosophy and founded over thirty temples. His legacy continued in the success of the Nakayama lineage (which eventually reabsorbed his numerous temples within it). His most lasting legacy, however, was his popularization of exclusivism. In Nichirenism, this exclusivism is called fuju-fuse 不受不施 (literally “do not give, do not receive”). Followers of this practice refused to be involved with other sects, which will be discussed below. As should be obvious from the above, while these temples all considered themselves the spiritual heirs to Nichiren’s tradition, they were not necessarily friendly to each other. There were long-standing feuds based in doctrinal differences that could become heated and, on occasion, violent. Alternatively, in times of conflict with other sects – in particular with Enryakuji – the sect could and did temporarily act as a unit. 43 Several modern scholars, such as Nakao and Imatani, have raised doubts about this story. Imatani notes that, if anything, the tortures are more like those of the Edo period than the Muromachi. These tortures may also have been exaggerated owing to Ashikaga Yoshinori’s reputation as an autocrat. Imatani, Tembun hokke no ran, 30. 19 Unitary and Hierarchy, Accepting and Subduing The doctrine of Nichiren was complex and the doctrinal differences between the various lineages even more so. Traditionally, however, one doctrinal dispute defined the Nichiren sect lineages before the sixteenth century: that of the Unitary Faction ( 一致派, Icchi-ha) versus the Hierarchy Faction ( 勝劣派, Shōretsu-ha). The basis of the dispute arose out of a question about the Lotus Sutra. In the Tendai tradition that Nichiren and many of his later disciples studied, the Lotus Sutra was divided into two sections. In the first section (comprising the first fourteen chapters, from the Introduction to the “Peaceful Practices” chapter), 44 the Buddha Shakyamuni does not reveal his true nature, and instead appears to be bound by the laws of time and space. This section is called the “trace teaching,” or the Shakumon 迹門. 45 The second half of the work (the last fourteen chapters, from the “Emerging from the Earth” chapter to the “Encouragements of the Bodhisattva Universal Worthy” chapter), in which Shakyamuni reveals his true and eternal nature, is called the “origin teaching,” or Honmon 本門. 46 The question that troubled several of Nichiren’s students was whether the trace teaching was inferior to the origin teaching. In the Nichiren sect itself, the divide over this was almost immediate: it occurred in the first generation after Nichiren’s death, and it became increasingly important in the Muromachi period (1333-1573). Those who held that the whole of the Lotus Sutra was equivalent became known as the “Unitary Faction,” or Icchi-ha 一致派, and those who believed that the origin teaching was superior were called the “Hierarchy Faction,” or Shōretsu-ha 勝劣派. Even within the two factions there was, of course, variation. Among those of the Hierarchy Faction there was disagreement about which of the Origin Teaching chapters were superior. The Nichiryū lineage, for 44 In general, I have tried to remain consistent with Burton Watson’s translation in The Lotus Sutra. 45 Translation as per Jacqueline Stone, Original Enlightenment and the Transformation of Medieval Japanese Buddhism, 24. 46 Ibid. 20 example, became known as the “Eight Chapters Faction” ( 八品派, happon-ha) because they believed that first eight chapters of the Origin Teaching chapters were the most important. Others put forth all fourteen, or just one, or even one-and-one-half chapters as superior. 47 Likewise, those of the Unitary Faction took numerous positions, arguing that the difference between the two parts had to do not with the Buddha’s intent but with the capacity of the audience, or that while there were differences, both parts were one within the Daimoku. 48 For many Nichirenist scholars, however, the disagreement could get murky, as most Unitary Faction scholars acknowledged the superiority of the Origin Teaching on some level and most Hierarchy Faction scholars acknowledged that the Trace Teaching still had merit as part of the Lotus Sutra. Adding to this confusion was the fact that lineages of the Hierarchy Faction tended to schism off from Unitary Faction lineages (see Appendix I). Closely linked to the Unitary/Hierarchy question was the question of the relationship of the Nichiren sect with those who were not members of the sect, and how to proselytize to them. Two approaches were shōju 摂受 or accepting, and shakubuku 折伏, or subduing. Nichiren put the distinction in this way: Answer: Great Concentration and Insight says: “There are two ways to spread the Buddha’s teachings. The first is called shōju and the second is called shakubuku. When the ‘Peaceful Practices’ chapter [of the Lotus Sutra] says that one should not speak of the shortcomings of others, it is referring to the shōju method. But when the Nirvana Sutra says that one should carry swords and staves or that one should cut off their heads, it is referring to the shakubuku method. They differ in approach in that one is lenient and the other severe, but they both bring benefit.” … When the country is full of evil people without wisdom, then shōju is the primary method to be applied, as described in the “Peaceful Practices” chapter [of the Lotus Sutra]. But at a time when there are many people of perverse views who slander the Law, then shakubuku should come first, as described in the “Never Disparaging” chapter. It is like using cold water to cool yourself in the hot weather, or longing for a fire when the weather turns cold. Grass and trees are kindred to the sun— they suffer in the cold moonlight. Bodies of water are followers of the moon—they lose their true nature when the hot weather comes. 47 Ibid, 305. 48 Ibid. 21 In the Latter Day of the Law, however, both shōju and shakubuku are to be used. This is because there are two kinds of countries, the country that is passively evil, and the kind that actively seeks to destroy the Law. We must consider carefully to which category Japan at the present time belongs. 49 Within the various lineages, there was a wide divide as to how far to take the subduing posture and how much interaction with other sects to allow. Nichiren had advised his followers not only to refuse to give alms to those who were not believers in the Lotus Sutra, but to refuse alms from them as well. This exclusivist fuju-fuse policy was followed to various degrees by his disciples. The most extreme version of this view would become the basis of the Fuju-fuse Faction ( 不受不施派) in the Edo period (1600-1868) – it refused to have anything to do with non-Nichirenist Buddhist temples. Nevertheless, many Nichirenists were very comfortable studying at other sect’s temples, and some even went so far as to be ordained at major Tendai centers. Nichiryū, founder of Honnōji, laid out strict rules against interacting with those of other sects, including forbidding attendance at lectures, rites, and even bathing in charity baths that other sects furnished. 50 He forbade the sending of “even a sheet of paper or half a coin” to another sect’s rituals but made a specific exception in cases where the shogunate or the court ordered participation. Scholars refer to this policy (which is also to be found in the rules of Myōkakuji) as 王侯除外の不受不施制 or “fuju-fuse, exempting the nobility.” 51 As for the issue of kami-worship, some Nichirenist lineages forbade any worship of the kami, while others encouraged the worship of specific kami. Some forbade worshiping in halls that displayed any Buddha other than Shakyamuni, and others more strictly demanded that Shakyamuni have a specific set of four bodhisattva attendants. All the lineages also used the so-called “Great Mandala Image” ( 大曼荼羅本尊, Daimandara Honzon) designed by Nichiren, which had no images, but rather the Daimoku and the names of Buddhas and deities written around it. 49 The Writings of Nichiren Daishōnin, vol. 1, 284-5. 50 That is to say, free baths established to serve monks or the poor. 51 Kyōdan zenshi, 283-85. 22 The subduing proselytizing posture was sometimes very successful for the sect. One particularly powerful if dangerous proselytizing method in this mode was the public religious debate ( 宗論 shūron), in which Nichirenists, monks and laymen both, would argue with devotees of other sects on some subject of doctrine. Nichiren himself participated in these events, and among his extant writings are those giving advice on how to win in debates. 52 These debates were often held in front of local officials, giving them the air of a court case. They also had a tendency to turn violent; the accepted practice by the sixteenth century was that the winning side would tear the surplices off the participants on the losing side. Often losses were accompanied by rioting and looting of the temples of the losing side. 53 Nichirenists not only used this tactic against other sects, but they often also used it against each other, and in at least one case (1497) it lead to pitched battles between the Unitary and Hierarchy factions. 54 As a general rule, the Hierarchy Faction tended to be more focused on the subduing posture than was the Unitary Faction, which showed a greater tendency toward the accepting posture. The Capital and the Mountain: Sengoku Kyoto and the Nichiren Sect The city of Kyoto in 1500 was a very different city than it had been when it was founded at the end of the eighth century. 55 The ravages of the Ōnin War (1467-77) had so devastated the city that the old grid-like arrangement of streets was largely gone, and the city was now divided into two smaller fortified sections, the Upper Capital ( 上京, Kamigyō) to the north and the Lower Capital (下京, Shimogyō) to the south. These were surrounded by a set of fortifications known as kamae 構え and connected by a thin strip of inhabited 52 See for example The Writings of Nichiren Daishōnin, vol. 1, 854-58. 53 The best overview of Sengoku-era religious debates, their role, and their significance, can be found in Kanda Chisato, Sengoku jidai no jiriki to chitsujo, 42-60. 54 Kawauchi Masayoshi, Chūsei Kyōto no minshu to shakai, 146. 55 A more in depth analysis of Sengoku Kyoto can be found in Stavros, Kyoto; Berry, The Culture of Civil War in Kyoto; and the works of Kawauchi Masayoshi. 23 territory along the old Muromachi Avenue. Important temples, including Nichiren-sect temples, were often fortified, and in some cases they were right on the edge of the kamae. Within the city, there were over one hundred small communities called “neighborhoods” ( 町, machi). 56 Members of the same occupation and class often resided together therein. Often the neighborhoods were fortified, and many had gates that were closed at night, denying entry to non-residents. While these units were discrete, there was clearly a hierarchy, with some neighborhoods having a higher status than others. The neighborhoods served to defend their residents, and on several occasions massive fights occurred when one neighborhood had a dispute with another, or when a warrior tried to do harm to a resident of a neighborhood. A small number of officials, often called “elders” ( 宿老, shukurō), led the neighborhoods. The neighborhoods themselves comprised allied neighborhood groups ( 町組, machi gumi), with as few as three or as many as twenty-nine neighborhoods. The residents of these neighborhoods, called the machishū (literally, “the assembled neighborhood”), 57 were important to the Nichiren sect, as the sect was very popular with urban Kyotoites. Among the best known of these townsfolk were the Yanagi 柳 sake brewers and the Hon’ami 本阿弥 artisan family. The Yanagi, also called the Nakaoki 中興, were supposedly Nichizō’s first patrons, and were among the wealthiest of brewers – their production may have accounted for one tenth of the sake brewed in the Kyoto area in the late fifteenth century. They supposedly paid the shogunate a monthly duty of nearly sixty strings of cash in the year 1466. 58 They also are recorded in later sources as having donated a staggering thousand strings of cash to the rebuilding Myōkenji in the late fifteenth century. 59 56 Sometimes the reading chō is used instead. 57 Stavros, Kyoto, 148–49; Gay, The Moneylenders of Late Medieval Kyoto, 174–75. 58 Sixty strings is sixty thousand coins. Fujii, Hokkeshu to machishu, 46. 59 Kawauchi, Nichirenshū to sengoku Kyōto, 63-72. 24 The Hon’ami, on the other hand, were accomplished sword polishers and appraisers. Hon’ami Seishin supposedly met Nisshin while both were in jail in 1440 and they became close that way. Honnōji records list a Hon’ami among the patrons fighting to repel the 1536 raid on the Nichirenist temples led by Enryakuji (the subject of the Chapter 1), and numerous Hon’ami family members, all patrons of Honpōji, are listed as pledging money to the 1576 fundraiser (the subject of Chapter 3). 60 The most famous of the Hon’ami, Kōetsu 光悦 (1558-1637), was a renowned potter and calligrapher who designed the gardens at Honpōji and whose mansion became a branch temple of Honpōji after his death. The capital was also the seat of both the sovereign and the shogun. While the power of both outside the capital was greatly diminished by the beginning of the sixteenth century, within the capital both commanded influence. Courtiers were among the Nichiren sect’s most important patrons, vital in the sect’s attempts to gain legitimacy through the appointment of its monks to official ecclesiastical ranks or the designation of temples as venues for special prayers. By the sixteenth century, the Nichiren sect was sufficiently tied to the court that even traditionalist courtiers who could not countenance a prince or a regent’s son joining the Nichiren sect still had no choice but to be in contact with Nichiren-sect monks, because the sect had become a vital player in the capital’s courtier culture. 61 Among the courtiers, the most powerful patrons of the Nichiren sect were the Konoe 近衛. They were part of the Fujiwara clan, and often filled the positions of regent ( 関白, kampaku) and clan head. The first head of the Konoe family to have patronized Nichiren the sect was probably the regent Konoe Fusatsugu 房嗣 (1402-1488). The family became so ardently Nichirenist that Fusatsugu’s son, Masaie 政家 (1444-1505) sent statues of the Amida Buddha (the main image of the Pure Land schools) that had been in the family since the twelfth century away to Enryakuji. They mainly patronized Honmanji, which was founded by Nisshū 60 Kawauchi, Minshū to shakai, 182. 61 Itohisa Hōken, Kyōto Nichiren monryū shi no kenkyū, 58-82. 25 日秀 (1383-1450) – he was purportedly Konoe Fusatsugu’s uncle. The Konoe continued their involvement with the Nichiren sect throughout the sixteenth century, but they did not ignore other sects. Konoe Sakihisa 近衛前久 (1536-1612), for example, while very involved with the sect, was buried at Tōfukuji, and the family’s official gravesite is as Daitokuji, both Zen temples in the capital. 62 Kyoto had always been a major religious center, and it remained home to powerful temples of every stripe. However, no temple had an influence on the capital equal to that of Enryakuji, the powerful Tendai- sect temple northwest of the capital on Mt. Hiei. Founded by the monk Saichō in 788, it predated the founding of the capital by nine years, and the temple also served as the protector of the capital, since it covered the unlucky “demon gate” direction. Perhaps because of the perceived importance of the temple, Enryakuji’s monks had a long-standing tradition of being a thorn in the side of Japan’s rulers. The early- twelfth-century retired sovereign Shirakawa (1053-1129) is said to have remarked that “Three things refuse to obey my will: the waters of the Kamo River, the fall of the Backgammon dice, and the monks of the Enryakuji Temple.” 63 While the Heian era was long past in 1500, the temple still maintained a strong influence in the capital, so much so that the Muromachi shogunate had not only instituted the post of temple magistrate ( 寺奉行, tera bugyō) but also appointed a Mt. Hiei magistrate ( 山門奉行, sanmon bugyō) to liaise between the shogunate and Mt. Hiei. While much of Enryakuji’s power was symbolic and economic, its monastic community also maintained significant manpower in the capital, most notably through its control of the Gion Shrine. 64 Attached it were the “dog workers” ( 犬神人, inu jinin), outcasts who were responsible for menial and defiling jobs such as clearing corpses from the city. The Gion dog workers also had a monopoly on 62 Kawauchi, Nichirenshū to sengoku Kyōto, 103-8. 63 McCullough, The Tale of the Heike, 50. 64 Today it is called the Yasaka Shrine ( 八坂神社) 26 bowstring manufacture, and sometimes they also served in law enforcement roles in and around the shrine. For Enryakuji, the dog workers often served as muscle, attacking those whom Enryakuji disliked. 65 As perhaps the most important temple in Japan, Enryakuji often endeavored to suppress newer religious groups. This was true of the Pure Land and True Pure Land sects, but the Nichiren sect was particularly galling to Enryakuji. Nichiren had called out the monks of Mt. Hiei in particular for failing to uphold the legacy of the Tendai Sect, and specifically he blamed the defeat of retired sovereign Go-Toba (1180-1239) and the death of the child-sovereign Antoku (1178-1185) on Mt. Hiei’s decision to use Shingon ritual in their prayers to protect the sovereign. More irritatingly, the Nichiren sect often used the name “Lotus Sect,” which was one of the Tendai Sect’s traditional appellations. Finally, unlike the Amidist sects that generally remained respectful of Mt. Hiei, 66 the Nichiren sect often maintained a hostile posture towards other sects. Enryakuji’s first major move against the Nichirenists occurred in 1352, when the monks of Enryakuji’s western pagoda ordered the dog workers to destroy Myōkenji. 67 For reasons not recorded, the orders were abandoned. However, in 1387, they did destroy Myōkenji. 68 It was rebuilt shortly thereafter, but when its abbot received the ecclesiastical rank of first prelate (僧正, sōjō) in 1413, the dog workers and other menials attacked Myōkenji and destroyed it, confiscating the land for the Gion shrine. 69 Still another incident took place in 1465, when the abbot of Honkakuji attempted to admonish the shogun Ashikaga Yoshimasa (1436-1490) while he was visiting the famed Temple of the Golden Pavilion ( 金閣 65 Gay, The Moneylenders of Late Medieval Kyoto, 70; Kawauchi, Nichirenshū to sengoku Kyoto, 41. 66 Honganji eventually declared itself a branch of the western pagoda of Enryakuji. See note 67. 67 Traditionally, Enryakuji had three major sections, the Eastern Pagoda ( 東塔, tōtō), the Western Pagoda ( 西塔, saitō), and the Yokawa ( 横川). These are often referred to as the “Three Pagodas” (三塔 santō). They were somewhat independent of each other. 68 Myōkenji would be forced to change its name at this time to Myōponji 妙本寺, and would not revert to its original name until the the 1520s. 69 Kawauchi, Chūsei Kyōto no minshu to shakai, 149-50. 27 寺, Kinkakuji) in the capital. In response, a group of Enryakuji monks barricaded themselves within one of their halls and held a meeting there. The result of this meeting was a demand that the Nichiren sect be destroyed, and the dog workers and other temple affiliates were asked to undertake the task. While such barricaded assemblies were usually held by small groups of monks protesting the policy of the temple as a whole (in this case, the temple’s inaction against the Nichiren sect), the Nichiren-sect temples were sufficiently concerned that they went to the shogunal Mt. Hiei administrator and asked him to intervene on their behalf. Shortly after, the monks of Enryakuji attacked the Amidist Honganji, leading those of the Nichiren sect to think that they would be next. In response, the Nichiren sect banded together, signing the first sect-wide agreement, the Kanshō Agreement ( 寛正盟約, Kanshō no meiyaku) of 1466, which declared the various lineages’ commitment to their faith, the subduing proselytizing posture, and the principle of fuju- fuse. 70 Barricaded assemblies demanding the destruction of the Nichiren sect continued to appear for the next few decades, but the only substantive action undertaken by Enryakuji against the Nichiren sect before the 1530s was securing a 1524 promise from the court that it would cease giving ecclesiastical ranks to Nichirenists. That promise would be broken quickly and frequently. 71 So, when the mountain finally moved to destroy the Nichiren sect in 1536, as we shall see in Chapter 1, tension had been building for a very long time. Meanwhile, the political situation in the capital in 1520 was complex and fluid. The head of state was the sovereign Go-Kashiwabara 後柏原, who had ascended to the throne on his father’s death in 1500 on the death of his father. Owing to the court’s strained finances, however, he would not have his official enthronement ceremony until 1526. There was both a regent (kampaku) and a prime minister (dajō daijin), but a major leader in the court was the shogun Ashikaga Yoshitane, who was posted as a provisional senior counselor ( 権大納言, gon dainagon) with the senior second court rank. Yoshitane was also the head of the 70 Ibid, 151. This newfound comradery would not last long, as by 1497 there were reports of pitched battles between Hierarchy and Unitary Faction adherents. 71 Ibid. 28 shogunate, the military apparatus that controlled the city and, nominally, the whole country. The dominant force in the shogunate itself was the shogunal deputy ( 管領, kanrei). In 1520, the deputy was Hosokawa Takakuni (1484-1531). Both the shogun and his deputy had taken circuitous routes to arrive at their current positions – Yoshitane had been shogun from 1490 to 1493, only to be deposed by senior shogunal officials while he was out of the capital. That Meiō coup put Takakuni’s father Hosokawa Masamoto into the position of deputy and Yoshitane’s cousin into the position of shogun. In 1507, Hosokawa Masamoto’s own son assassinated him, starting a bloody conflict inside the Hosokawa house. Ashikaga Yoshitane took advantage of the chaos and allied himself with Hosokawa Takakuni and the Ōuchi warrior clan of western Japan, and they took the capital. Yoshitane thus became the only person in Japanese history to serve as shogun twice. Takakuni became his deputy. While these two were now the most powerful men in Kyoto, their position was precarious in 1520 – the Ōuchi had abandoned them, and Takakuni’s brother Sumimoto was advancing on the capital. By 1530, the positions of sovereign, shogun, and deputy would all change hands. Only the sovereign’s succession would be peaceful. Of course, warriors from outside the capital were frequently part of the tumult within, and military intrusions into the city were commonplace. With these intrusions came the attendant depredations of pillage and extortion, along with a somewhat less dangerous but still problematic tendency of warriors to lodge their troops at temples. Temples tried to find ways to deal with these warriors, such as the “prohibition” ( 禁制, kinzei). It was a document that a warrior commander sent to temples, shrines, and sometimes villages and city neighborhoods, promising that his soldiers would not cause harm in an upcoming military action. While most of the extant copies are written paper, they were often sent along with a wooden sign that could be posted so that soldiers could see it. The documents were simple, laying out that (usually) pillage, violence, the taking of wood or bamboo, and the quartering of troops were forbidden in this place, and that soldiers violating these rules would be punished. Notably, warriors did not simply send these out. Those desiring a prohibition (in our case, a temple or group of temples) would negotiate a price for them with the issuer. This 29 worked out well for warriors as it allowed them a new revenue stream to pay for their battles, while it provided some peace of mind for the temples. 72 In some cases, one could simply barter for an exemption from quartering alone, as the Nichiren head temples did in the 1560s. 73 Indeed, the buying and selling of prohibitions and exemptions could amount to the difference between life and death, as we shall see in Chapter 3. The Organization of this Dissertation In this project I will argue that more than anything else, it was the development and maturation of the Council of Head Temples that allowed the Nichiren sect to persist and flourish in the sixteenth century in Kyoto, and it may well be the most important development in the sixteenth-century Nichiren. The following four chapters will show how the Nichiren sect’s organization in Kyoto developed from that of the military Lotus Leagues to that of the peaceful Council of Head Temples. Along the way, I will show the role played by outside forces, especially powerful warriors. The first chapter examines the rise and fall of the “Lotus Leagues.” Here I show how in the 1530s chaos within the shogunate led to the shogun’s quitting the capital. In this power vacuum, the Nichirenist temples in Kyoto became the dominant military and political force in Kyoto, destroying rival temples and fighting on behalf of one faction of the exiled shogunate. While some scholars have seen the Leagues as part- and-parcel of an urban self-governance movement, others have argued that the Leagues were the tools of warriors, and that they represented a top-down attempt by entrenched shogunal elites to use townsfolk for their own ends. I will argue here, however, that the Leagues were the sect’s response to an increasingly militarized and violent society. Using data from contemporary journals and documents, I reconstruct the command structure of the Nichirenist military and clarify the roles of each temple until their banishment 72 Kokugo daijiten, S.V. 禁制 73 Amano Tadayuki, “Miyoshi-shi to sengoku-ki no Hokkeshū kyōdan,” 47. 30 from the capital in 1536. I also demonstrate that Enryakuji’s role in the 1536 attack that destroyed the Leagues was more political than military. In the second chapter, I discuss the sect’s return to the capital after a period of exile, and its initiative towards unification. While the sect was able to reestablish itself in the capital in the 1540s, the political situation remained fluid, as the conflict inside the shogunate was not yet fully resolved. Instead of again attempting to acquire military power, the sect moved towards political and economic solutions, primarily achieved by paying warrior leaders for their favor. And in 1564, as a result of a growing movement from within the sect and pressure from the Miyoshi warrior family that was occupying Kyoto, the Nichirenist head temples signed a sect-wide agreement, the Eiroku Treaty, which ended nearly three centuries of conflict between the lineages of the Hierarchy and the Unitary factions. Shortly thereafter, they created the Council of Head Temples, as a governing body for the whole sect. This body was not merely deliberative. It undertook actions on its own and had its own operating budget separate from that of its constituent temples. As we shall see, the signing of the Eiroku Treaty involved complex interplay between the Miyoshi warrior family, Nichirenist factions in the capital, and even temples in the Kantō. I will analyze this interplay and explore how and when the Council arose and how it functioned. Chapters 3 and 4 detail the challenges faced by the nascent Council under the reign of the warrior hegemon Oda Nobunaga. Chapter 3 focuses on the first ten years of Oda’s reign in the capital, from 1568 to 1578. I argue against the line of scholarship that sees in Nobunaga’s policy a specific desire to suppress or eliminate Buddhism. Rather, I demonstrate that Nobunaga’s relationship with the Nichiren sect was largely accommodating, not hostile. I also explore the Nichiren sect’s first recorded kanjin fundraiser, which was held in 1576. This fundraiser was concerned with preserving the Nichiren sect’s exemption from participating in religious functions outside of the Nichiren sect, and especially from being compelled to participate in other sects’ fundraising campaigns. This Nichirenist fundraiser of 1576 was the largest project undertaken to date by the Council, and it represented the maturation of the Council as the sect’s governing body. 31 The final chapter is a reexamination of the well known (but little understood) Azuchi Religious Debate of 1579, in which a group of Pure Land monks defeated a group of Nichirenist monks. In the aftermath, a monk and several laymen were beheaded, rioting ensued in the capital, and the Nichiren sect was fined heavily and forced to sign pledges acknowledging their defeat while promising to eschew future debates. Older scholarship saw this event as a fraud, stage-managed by Nobunaga specifically to weaken the sect. In contrast, I argue that the assumptions made by scholars going back to the pre-war period are in need of reevaluation. I attempt to clarify the limits of what can be known about the Azuchi Religious Debate, its participants, and its chroniclers. Then, I consider what effect the debate had on the sect, both in terms of harm to finances and policy. In the Conclusion, I briefly trace the relationship of the sect and the governance of Oda’s successor Toyotomi Hideyoshi, and show the beginnings of what would become the crisis of the Fuju-fuse faction. I also examine Hideyoshi’s nullification of the pledges signed after the Azuchi Religious Debate and what that policy meant to the Council and the sect as a whole. As we begin our study, we find the Nichiren sect at the start of the sixteenth century with an uncertain future. It was divided and contentious but capable of unity under pressure. It was popular with the people of Kyoto but also hated by many of them. It was at once close to power and shunned by it. The political structures that had ruled Japan for over a century were showing signs of weakness, as the Ōnin War had ravaged the city and the Meiō Coup left a permanent divide in the shogun’s house. Worse, the powerful Hosokawa warrior family, which had dominated the shogunate after the Meiō Coup, was about to erupt into its own bloody civil war, and the resulting chaos would pull warriors from all over Japan into the conflict. Worse still, in trying to manage a conflict amongst his vassals, one Hosokawa general would convince the Amidist powerhouse Honganji to join the fray. Honganji’s army, once mobilized, could not be stopped, even by Honganji itself. Suddenly the specter of a Honganji attack on the capital loomed over the temples of the 32 Nichiren sect. The sect’s response to that threat irrevocably changed the landscape of Kyoto and the sect itself, as we shall see. Monks and patrons would march, and temples would burn. 33 Chapter 1 The Temples Burn: The Rise and Fall of Nichirenist Military and Political Power in the Capital Now in the realm there are two shogun, and two Hosokawa protecting them. One shogun [Yoshitsuna] has joined the Shikoku party around Sakai. The other [Yoshiharu] has joined the Rokkaku at Kannon in Ōmi. His lordship [Yoshiharu] had been protected from his infancy by Jōgō [the late Hosokawa Takakuni], so as he is now wandering in Ōmi, the other [Yoshitsuna] came to Sakai. Everything is still unclear. After Jōgō was struck down in Settsu, Hachirō [Harukuni] took his place, after which he became an enemy [of Yoshitsuna]. Because of this, Hachirō is probably in some backwater to the west. I do not know for sure, but while the Ikkō sect at Yamashina had in the past worked for Rokurō Sumimoto [Harumoto] 74 and gone to battle in Settsu, they became enemies of Sumimoto [Harumoto], and there was a rumor that they would destroy the Nichiren sect in the capital. The Lotus sect hatched a plot of rebellion, and joined with Rokurō’s forces. They mean to attack Yamashina. However, [Shōnyo, the patriarch of] Hōganji, is in Settsu. Yamamura, [the leader of the Nichiren forces,] was a follower of Yanagimoto. He now holds the power in the capital, owing to his military strength. 75 -First entry from Gion Shrine executor Tamajumaru, age sixteen, in the Gion Executor’s Journal ( 祇園執行日記, Gion shugyō nikki). 1532, seventh month, twenty-eighth day. Between the years of 1532 and 1536, the dominant military force in the capital was an army under the command of the Nichirenist head temples. This force, called “the Lotus Leagues” (Hokke Ikki, 法華一揆) 76 by modern historians, originally arose to fight the forces of the Amidist Honganji temple but then came to rule the city until their destruction at the hands of a massive army led by Enryakuji in 1536. In this chapter, I examine the rise and fall of the Lotus Leagues and the beginning and end of the Nichiren sect’s embrace of military power. I demonstrate that contrary to theories positing that the Lotus Leagues were products of the rise of an urban class, the Lotus Leagues were in fact the way in which the temples of the Nichiren sect responded to an increasingly militarized society and to the specific set of political circumstances in Kyoto in 1532. While I explore all these circumstances in some detail, the most important of these are the absence of the shogunate from the capital, the sudden and violent rise of Honganji as a military power, and the military impotence of traditional powers in the capital. The Lotus Leagues represent the Nichiren sect’s most 74 The author of this journal has mistaken Hosokawa Harumoto for his late father, Sumimoto. Both went by the name Rokurō. See below, page 36. 75 Gion shugyō nikki, Tembun 1 (1532) 7/28 76 Hokke Ikki is not a contemporary term. According to Kawauchi Masayoshi, it seems to have entered the Buddhist Studies field around 1928, and was popularized in historical studies by Fujii Manabu. See Kawauchi, Nichirenshū to sengoku Kyoto, 154. 34 extensive use of military power and violence and the high water mark for the power of their temples. However, the leagues also nearly lead to the destruction of the sect’s Kyoto contingent altogether. This terrible experience with violence left many indelible marks on the sect, the most important for my purposes here being that it would be the last time that the Nichiren sect in Kyoto would take up arms and the last time the sect made a clear alliance with any warrior faction The first question we need to address is what the phenomena we call “Lotus Leagues” actually were. Unfortunately, little is known of their internal structure and organization, as no documents exist to speak to a command structure beyond the barest of descriptions. A much-debated question surrounds their relationship to the machishū, the neighborhood governing bodies of Kyoto in the sixteenth century. 77 In his study of the creation of the Nichirenist lineages in Kyoto, Itohisa Hōken divides the main lines of argument about this relationship into three groups, which I call the democratic theory, the autocratic theory, and the sect theory. 78 The first of these, the democratic theory, has been articulated by historians Fujii Manabu 79 and Hayashiya Tatsusaburō, 80 who argued that the Lotus Leagues were a manifestation of the wish for self- governance and self-defense by the townsfolk of Kyoto. The townsfolk then became caught up in the larger political struggles of the age and were destroyed. Fujii, for example, says that, at least early on, it is an “unmovable fact” that the Lotus Leagues were townsfolk leagues. 81 Fujii also argues that by defeating the Ikkō Ikki at Yamashina (see below), the Lotus Leagues advanced the self-governance of the neighborhoods by the townsfolk. 82 77 A brief discussion of these associations can be found in Gay, The Moneylenders of Late Medieval Kyoto, 24-8. 78 Itohisa, 2. 79 Fujii, “Saikoku o chūshin to shita Muromachiki Hokke kyōdan no hakken,” 1-25. 80 Hayashiya, Machi shū. 81 Fujii, Hokkeshu to machishu, 249. 82 Ibid, 251. 35 The autocratic theory, argued by historians Imatani Akira 83 and Nishio Kazumi, 84 argues that the creation of the Lotus Leagues was not the townsfolk’s reaching for power – it was largely the Shogunal deputy Hosokawa Harumoto reaching down for support through the temples and their patrons. In their view, the machishū’s political aspirations were not as important as the political machinations of Hosokawa Harumoto in the military and political circumstances of the Kinai. The townsfolk may have participated in the Leagues, but they were neither in control of nor empowered by them. A third position, the sect theory, has been represented by scholar of Buddhism Miyazaki Eishū, sees the Leagues as a response by the sect itself to an increasingly violent society. A major factor in this move towards violence was the desire to defend against the periodic attempts by the monks of Enryakuji to expel the sect from the capital. 85 The important distinction is that instead of seeing the Leagues as a product of a specific class (specifically the merchant class) or new political communities (the machi), Miyazaki posits them as a product of the sect’s own need in dangerous times. This is the position taken by the editors of the Nichiren kyōdan zenshi, the Risshō University history of the Nichiren sect. Regardless of how closely aligned the townsfolk and the Lotus Leagues were, there is no question that the townsfolk’s leadership included many Nichirenist patrons and that the militarization of the townsfolk was an important component of the militarization of the Nichiren sect. For one thing, many Nichiren sect patrons were wealthy merchants – such as the Hon’ami and the Yanagi sake brewers – and courtiers – such as the Konoe family. In addition, a sort of militarization of the townsfolk had been ongoing since the peasant uprising ( 土一揆, tsuchi ikki) of the Kakitsu era (1441). At first, these attacks targeted moneylenders, but once they became larger and more destructive, the city as a whole was threatened. The result was that by 1485, as diarists in Kyoto noted, the neighborhoods themselves hardened their own defenses. In discussing 83 Imatani, Tembun hokke no ran. 84 Nishio Kazumi, “‘Machishū’-ron saikentō no kokoromi: hokke ikki o megutte.” 85 Kyōdan zenshi, 341-6. 36 the 1495 tsuchi ikki, a diarist lists a group of “townsfolk” fighting alongside the “moneylenders group,” suggesting a distinction between the two groups. 86 I will argue with what follows that the “sect theory” is most persuasive. The Leagues were under temple leadership, and the temples allied with Hosokawa Harumoto because it seemed like the safest option. The townsfolk were a large part of the financial and military strength of the Leagues, both because of the sect’s popularity in the capital and because the sect was the most powerful military entity operating in the capital at the time. Both the townsfolk and the temples had been militarizing for decades and had experience in military matters to various degrees. However, we will see, too, that the townsfolk and the temples organized for different reasons – the former, geographical and the latter religious – and for different functions. 87 Hosokawa Harumoto was critical to the rise of the Leagues – he not only provided rewards for military service but also had his vassals provide needed military leadership – treating the leagues either as a further development of the machishū or as “Harumoto’s running dogs” 88 ignores that the temples acted in their own interests, which were not always shared with the townsfolk or Hosokawa Harumoto. The Shogunate Goes Missing – The Meiō Coup of 1493 and its Effects In order to understand the rise of the Lotus Leagues, it is vital to understand their context. The rise of the Lotus Leagues took place in the context of the shogunate’s quitting Kyoto, a civil war inside of the shogunate itself, and the sudden rise of the Ikkō Ikki as a powerful and uncontrolled military force. Each of these circumstances is closely related and can in turn only be understood in the context of still earlier problems within the shogunate. This story takes us back almost forty years before the rise of the Leagues. The origins of these conflicts date back to the Meiō Coup ( 明応の政変, Meiō no seihen) of 1493, an event largely ignored in Western historiography but increasingly seen as a pivotal moment in Sengoku history 86 Imatani, Tembun hokke no ran, 61. 87 Kawauchi, Nichirenshū, 160. 88 Imatani, Tembun hokke no ran, 245. 37 in Japan. 89 Before detailing the coup, however, we must briefly go over the shogunal succession leading up to 1493. As this is a somewhat convoluted chain of events, the reader is encouraged to consult the genealogy of the Ashikaga shogunal line on page x. The result of the Ōnin war (1467-1477) 90 was that one of the candidates, Ashikaga Yoshihisa 義尚, was made shogun and the other, Ashikaga Yoshimi 義視, had to flee to Mino (modern Gifu prefecture). In 1489, however, the Shogun Yoshihisa came to be embroiled in a conflict with the Rokkaku warrior family of Ōmi, and, while leading the attack there, he fell ill and died. He was without issue. Ashikaga Yoshimi took advantage of Yoshihisa’s death by returning to the capital and putting up his son Ashikaga Yoshiki 義材 as a potential successor to the shogunate. Retired Shogun Yoshimasa supported another candidate, the monk Seikō, but Yoshimasa’s main wife Hino Tomiko 日野富子 (1440-1496) threw her support behind Yoshiki. There was a brief interregnum, but with Yoshimasa’s death in 1490, it was agreed that Yoshimi would retire and Yoshiki would become shogun. However, Tomiko and Yoshimi had a falling out over the disposition of Yoshihisa’s old residence, and Tomiko then distanced herself from Yoshiki. With Ashikaga Yoshimi’s death in 1491, the Shogun Yoshiki was able to take full control of the shogunate for a time. In 1493 (the second year of the Meiō era), Yoshiki decided to attack the important shogunal vassal Hatakeyama Yoshitoyo in Kawachi to settle a conflict within the Hatakeyama house. Several high-ranking officials in the shogunate were opposed to this plan, including Shogunal deputy (kanrei) Hosokawa Masamoto (1466-1507) and head of the shogun’s chancellery (mandokoro shitsuji) Ise Sadamune (1444-1509), both of whom had opposed Yoshiki’s candidacy in the first place. Yoshiki persisted and 89 While there is no mention of the Meiō coup in the Cambridge History of Japan nor in most of the English language textbooks, a good account can be found in Berry, The Culture of Civil War, 24-54. My account largely follows Berry and Imatani, Tembun hokke no ran. The reader is encouraged to consult the family trees of the Ashikaga and Hoskawa Houses provided for reference on page x and page xi, respectively. 90 At the time, the sitting shogun, Yoshimasa, was without issue, so he asked his brother Yoshimi to be the next shogun. Problems arose when Yoshimasa’s wife, Hino Tomiko, gave birth to a child, Yoshihisa, and began pushing for Yoshihisa to be the next shogun. Factions formed behind the two candidates – Yoshimi and Yoshihisa – and in 1467, a full-fledged war broke out in the streets of Kyoto. The war lasted a decade. 38 personally led an army out to Settsu just as the previous Shogun Yoshihisa had done. As with his predecessor’s military outing, the expedition proved ill-fated. Hosokawa Masamoto, left behind in the capital to run the government, connected with Hino Tomiko, Ise Sadamune, and others, and decided to depose the Shogun Yoshiki. They convinced Yoshiki’s cousin, the monk Seikō (who had been Yoshimasa’s candidate to replace the Shogun Yoshihisa previously), to return to lay life, and they put him forth as their candidate. They also had their troops kill Yoshiki’s younger brother, then a monk. Yoshiki returned to the capital, but was confined to the Ryōanji Zen temple. The next year, Seikō took the name Ashikaga Yoshitaka (義高) and was appointed shogun, with Masamoto as deputy. This was the Meiō Coup of 1493. The result of the Meiō Coup was that the Hosokawa would dominate the position of deputy in the Muromachi shogunate until 1563. This specific line of the Hosokawa family had traditionally held the court position of Right Capital commissioner ( 右京大夫, Ukyō no daifu), often called by the Sinicized name keichō 京兆. So the line of Hosokawa who monopolized the deputy position came to be called the “Keichō house” ( 京兆家 Keichō ke), and some Japanese historians speak of a “Keichō autocracy” ( 京兆専制, keichō sensei). 91 Complicating matters was the deposed Shogun Yoshiki’s escape from confinement shortly after Yoshitaka’s appointment. Yoshiki escaped to the northern province of Etchū (modern Toyama prefecture), and at various times stayed with the Jimbo and Asakura families. Hosokawa Masamoto did not forget the danger posed by Yoshiki, at one time attempting to make peace with him and at another trying to kill him. But given Yoshiki’s distance from the capital and Masamoto’s position of control there, both parties seemed willing to ignore the situation. During one round of peace negotiations, Yoshiki changed his name to Yoshitada. 91 Imatani, Tembun hokke no ran, 41. 39 Hosokawa Masamoto was a devotee of Shugendō asceticism, and as a result he never took a wife and was without issue. Instead he adopted three sons: Hosokawa Takakuni (from a collateral line of the Keichō line), Hosokawa Sumiyuki (a minor son of the Kujō courtier family), and Hosokawa Sumimoto (a son of the former shugo of Awa (modern Tokushima prefecture), from the Hosokawa main line). The lack of an obvious and legitimate heir meant that factions within the Hosokawa family began to squabble over candidates. After a good deal of debate in which it seemed that Masamoto was leaning towards Sumimoto, one of Sumiyuki’s supporters assassinated Masamoto in 1507. Sumiyuki was in turn killed by supporters of Sumimoto, who was declared the heir and appointed deputy. In the chaos that followed, the deposed Shogun Yoshitada allied with the Ōuchi warrior family of Suō (modern Yamaguchi prefecture), who attacked the capital. Sumimoto and Yoshitaka fled to Ōmi. Takakuni, now allied with Yoshitada, assumed the position of deputy, and Yoshitada became shogun a second time, changing his name yet again to Ashikaga Yoshitane. Yoshitane’s position was heavily dependent on support from the Ōuchi and from Takakuni, and at one time a conflict with these benefactors led him to quit the capital. Nonetheless, he reigned as shogun until 1522. Meanwhile, the deposed Shogun Yoshitaka, who late in life styled himself Yoshizumi, died in exile in 1511, leaving behind his five-month-old son. Owing to problems in their home provinces, the Ōuchi had to withdraw military support from the sitting Shogun Yoshitane in 1518. Seeing his opportunity, Hosokawa Sumimoto and his Awa vassal, Miyoshi Yukinaga, invaded Settsu (modern Osaka and Hyōgo prefectures) a year later, moving towards the capital, which they entered in 1520. Shogunal deputy Takakuni fled to Sakamoto at the foot of Mt. Hiei in Ōmi. Yoshitane, however, allied with Sumimoto and Yukinaga. Takakuni was able to rally forces in Ōmi and to push the Awa forces back from the mainland within a year. Yukinaga was captured and executed, and Sumitomo died in exile. Sensing that his position had become very dangerous, the Shogun Yoshitane quit the capital and took up residence in the trading port of Sakai in the third month of 1521. This removed him from the capital at an inopportune time: later that same month was the sovereign Go-Kashiwabara’s enthronement 40 ceremony, 92 and his Majesty was both offended by Yoshitane’s absence and concerned that the shogunate would not provide the funds for the event. The ceremony did happen, but Takakuni used the outrage over mistreatment of the sovereign to justify putting forward his own candidate to replace him. He chose Ashikaga Yoshiharu, the son of the late Shogun Yoshizumi. In response, the sitting Shogun Yoshitane fled west. He raised a small army to attack Takakuni and Yoshiharu, but his attack was stillborn, and he would never return even to Sakai, let alone Kyoto. There were still small remnants of Hosokawa Sumimoto’s party in the Kinai, but for the most part the situation was stable for a few years. In 1526, however, shogunal deputy Takakuni’s administration fell apart. Takakuni’s brother, Hosokawa Tadakata, accused a vassal, Kōzai Motomori, of being in league with Sumimoto’s faction. Sources suggest that Tadakata not only invented the accusation but actually forged documents to shore it up. In response, Takakuni had Motomori killed, and then Motomori’s brothers, Yanagimoto Kataharu and Hatano Tanemichi, raised the flag of revolt in Tamba. Shortly thereafter the forces of Miyoshi Motonaga (Yukinaga’s grandson) and Hosokawa Rokurō Harumoto (Sumimoto’s son, still only twelve years old) 93 made landfall in Settsu. By 1527 Hosokawa Takakuni was in real fear of losing the capital when his forces were defeated at Katsurakawara, and he quit the capital in the second month, taking the Shogun Yoshiharu with him to Ōmi. Meanwhile, Hosokawa Harumoto’s faction brought Ashikaga Yoshitsuna (Yoshiharu’s brother and Yoshitane’s adopted son) to Sakai in preparation for making him the new shogun. He would never officially hold the post, but would obtain most of the precursor court positions and begin issuing shogunal documents anyway. Fighting continued for some time, and it was very clear that the coalition that underpinned the Sakai administration, while militarily powerful, was fragile. The two warlords Yanagimoto Kataharu and Miyoshi 92 Go-Kashiwabara had become reigning sovereign some 21 years earlier, but it was only now that the enthronement became feasible, with a combination of shogunate money and donations from Honganji. 93 Most of this chapter takes place while Hosokawa Harumoto was between twelve and twenty-two years old. While I will treat him as the head of his faction and as the primary decision maker for same, this is not necessarily the case early on. 41 Motonaga were at odds almost immediately. Perhaps sensing this, in the tenth month of 1527 Yoshiharu returned to the capital. Shortly thereafter Hosokawa Takakuni went out to seek allies, and he proved fairly successful. When Motonaga attempted to push the Shogun Yoshiharu and his allies out of the capital in the eleventh month, there was an indecisive but destructive battle, which continued sporadically for a few months. Eventually, Yoshiharu escaped to Kutsuki in Ōmi. While Miyoshi Motonaga was in the capital, his erstwhile ally Yanagimoto Kataharu was at Hosokawa Harumoto’s headquarters in Sakai, accusing Motonaga of treason. Within a month, the two were in open conflict. Motonaga even briefly tried to make peace with Hosokawa Takakuni but failed. Motonaga did battle with Kataharu for a year and then returned to Awa in 1529, leaving a few retainers in the capital and Settsu. Shortly after Motonaga left the scene, Takakuni, who had fled to Iga shortly before, was able to raise a new force and invade Harima. He defeated and killed Kataharu in 1530 and advanced to the capital. Hosokawa Harumoto sent Motonaga letters begging him to return. Motonaga made landfall at Sakai in 1531. Within four months his forces had utterly defeated Takakuni. Finally, at a battle that has come to be called the “collapse at Daimotsu “( 大物崩れ, Daimotsu kuzure), 94 Takakuni was compelled to commit suicide. The situation in 1531, then, was that the shogunate was still split, though the end seemed to be in sight in the conflict between the two Hosokawa. However, Hosokawa Takakuni’s faction was not fully defeated, and Hosokawa Harumoto’s Sakai faction was not as stable as he might have hoped. Honganji Rising The next important series of events that led to the creation of the Lotus Leagues was the rise of the military power of Amidist powerhouse Honganji. Hosokawa Harumoto would call upon Honganji to help him put 94 Daimotsu no ura was a bay on the coast of Amagasaki, though the area was filled in and is now part of Amagasaki city. 42 down two of his own generals, only to find that the new army was soon out of his control, casting a threatening shadow on the capital in general and the Nichiren sect in particular. The Sakai faction would not be able to savor its victory long. One of Hosokawa Harumoto’s vassals, Kizawa Nagamasa, had previously been a vassal of Hosokawa Harumoto’s enemy Hatakeyama Yoshitaka 95 but had defected to Hosokawa Harumoto in 1530. Yoshitaka besieged Nagamasa’s home castle at Iimori-yama 96 飯盛山 in 1531. Given that Hosokawa Harumoto’s sister was Yoshitaka’s wife, Yoshitaka assumed that Hosokawa Harumoto would not interfere. Miyoshi Motonaga, who had long had issues with Nagamasa, sent troops to aid in the siege. Both Motonaga and Yoshitaka miscalculated. Hosokawa Harumoto sent troops to relieve the siege, which quickly collapsed. However, Miyoshi Motonaga had become increasingly bold. The next year (1532) he sent vassals to the capital, where they killed the late Yanagimoto Kataharu’s son. Hosokawa Harumoto was about to move on Motonaga, but a close advisor convinced Motonaga and eighty of his vassals to shave their heads in a gesture of contrition. Still, when Hatakeyama Yoshitaka moved on Kizawa Nagamasa again, Motonaga sent a relative to Yoshitaka’s aid. This time the siege was much more effective, and, as the castle was close to falling, a messenger reached Hosokawa Harumoto, who was unsure of what to do. His generals concluded that they needed new allies, and so they turned to Honganji. At this time, Honganji’s headquarters were at its massive temple complex in Yamashina, just east of the capital. It was headed by the patriarch Shōnyo, who was just seventeen years old at the time. 97 In the past, Honganji-associated military leagues, called Ikkō Ikki (literally “single-directed league”) 98 had proven powerful military forces, which could prove a decisive factor in the battle. Previous patriarchs had avoided joining in these sorts of attacks, but Shōnyo readily acquiesced. He, along with several thousand troops, 95 Also called Yoshinobu. 96 In modern Higashi city, Osaka prefecture. 97 For an in-depth analysis of this conflict from the Honganji perspective, see Tsang, War and Faith, 167-189. 98 The best study of the Ikkō Ikki in English is Tsang, War and Faith. 43 departed Yamashina and collected sectarians from Izumi, Settsu, and Kawachi. These troops, possibly numbering in the 10,000s, joined up with Hosokawa Harumoto’s forces and attacked Hatakeyama Yoshitaka’s army on the fifteenth day of the sixth month. Yoshitaka’s forces dispersed almost immediately. Hosokawa Harumoto had been hearing from several vassals that Miyoshi Motonaga was a threat, so, with momentum from the victory and several thousand fresh soldiers, he moved immediately. Motonaga had fortified himself at Sakai, but with the Honganji sectarians, Hosokawa Harumoto was able to defeat him easily. On the twentieth day of the sixth month, he attacked Sakai. Motonaga, having sent his wife and child back to Awa, fought one last battle at the Nichirenist Kemponji temple and then killed himself. This battle not only destroyed Miyoshi Motonaga, but it also did real damage to Ashikaga Yoshitsuna’s Sakai regime. For one, a large number of his direct vassals perished in the fighting, which had spread to his residence in Sakai. At least one source describes him as being so distraught with Motonaga’s death that he declared that he, too, would kill himself, but Hosokawa Harumoto stopped him. Having defeated Miyoshi Motonaga, the Honganji forces had fulfilled their usefulness to Hosokawa Harumoto, but the Ikkō Ikki proved difficult to control. Roughly twenty days after the fall of Sakai, on the sixth day of the seventh month, another Ikkō Ikki arose in the city of Nara. 99 This Ikkō Ikki in Nara was disturbing to Harumoto for several reasons. First, it seemed likely that this large-scale uprising was undertaken without the approval, or even knowledge, of the Honganji patriarch Shōnyo. 100 Indeed, the historian Fujii Manabu has pointed out that Shōnyo had little to gain from such an attack. 101 It had only been a month since the patriarch had actively raised an army for the first time, and already he had lost control. Further, this was the first example of an urban Ikkō Ikki: most previous Ikkō Ikki had been centered in rural areas, while this one occurred in one of the largest cities in Japan. Even more concerning was that it was in 99 It is unclear why this happened, although some scholars have conjectured that it was a response to the oppressive policies of Kōfukuji’s military forces, the Roppōshū. See Imatani, Tembun hokke no ran, 55. See also Tsang, War and Faith, 171–74. 100 This seems consistent across most sources, including Shōnyo’s own communications with the shogunate. 101 Fujii, Hokkeshu to Machishu, 235. 44 Nara. Nara, and the surrounding Yamato province, had been effectively a holding of the powerful temple Kōfukuji since the Kamakura period. Neither the Kamakura nor Muromachi shogunates had ever appointed a military governor to Yamato province. Kōfukuji took advantage of its power largely to exclude the newer sects from the province, and what little presence Honganji had in Yamato province was, until this point, mostly confined to the area near the Kawachi border. In this regard, Imatani argues that the power Kōfukuji wielded in and around Nara was far greater than that of Enryakuji near the capital. 102 And yet a massive rebellion arose, and tore through Kōfukuji and the adjacent Kasuga shrine. Unwittingly, Shōnyo had not only destroyed his usefulness to Harumoto, but he had made himself and his congregation very dangerous. He had also pushed Harumoto towards alliance with an old enemy: the Shogun Yoshiharu. The exiled Shogun Ashikaga Yoshiharu and his protectors, the Rokkaku warrior family of Ōmi, were also deeply concerned by the troubles in Nara. With Hosokawa Takakuni now dead, Yoshiharu had no alternate deputy to Hosokawa Harumoto. The shogun and Harumoto began to push for the destruction of Honganji’s newfound military power, and both would turn towards the Nichiren temples of the capital for help. Two weeks after the attack on Nara, Yoshiharu sent a letter to Honmanji 本満寺 through a subordinate, asking for military help in defeating the ikki. 103 As we shall see, Honmanji forces would prove vital in the destruction of Yamashina Honganji and would eventually participate in Harumoto’s attack on Ishiyama Honganji the next year. About this time, rumors began to circulate in Kyoto that Ikkō Ikki forces were advancing to destroy the Nichirenist temples. At the same time, a rumor circulated that the Ikkō Ikki had already begun fighting with Hosokawa Harumoto in Sakai. In response, Kizawa Nagamasa, Harumoto’s representative in the capital, left to reinforce Sakai. On the fourth day of the eighth month, his troops and an army of Honganji sectarians met on the road to Sakai, and battle broke out. He routed the enemy and burned down a large Honganji- 102 Imatani, Tembun hokke no ran, 54-5. 103 Fujii, 236. Yoshiharu uses the term “Tsuchi ikki´ to describe Honganji sectarians. I should note that several sources date this letter 1533 (a year later), but both Imatani and Fujii date it 1531. 45 affiliated temple, the Senkō dōjō, on the outskirts of Sakai, along with several nearby villages. In response, Honganji declared all-out war on Harumoto, and its sectarians from all over the Kinai descended on Sakai to besiege it. We have seen how in the middle of 1532, Hosokawa Harumoto’s faction collapsed amidst internecine fighting. Miyoshi Motonaga in particular worried Harumoto, and Harumoto turned to Honganji to help him put Motonaga down. However, in sowing the wind of a sectarian army, he found that he had reaped the whirlwind: the Honganji army proved uncontrollable and turned on him. In September 1532, not only was the shogun gone from the capital, but also the deputy was isolated in Sakai, and, while he had forces in the capital, they were insufficient to protect it. There was a power vacuum, and someone needed to fill it. Uchimawari and the Destruction of Yamashina Honganji The speed with which the Lotus Leagues formed and took action was breathtaking. Three days after Kizawa burned down the Honganji-affiliated Senkō Dōjō (1532, eighth month, seventh day), courtier Washio Takayasu recorded the following in his journal, the Nisuiki: At the hour of the horse (roughly noon), I invited [the Courtier] Madenokoji to sightsee with me at [the Nichirenist temple] Honkokuji on Rokujō Avenue. Today the Yanagimoto vassals, along with townsfolk from within the city, raised troops, and there was an uchimawari. I heard that three or four thousand people were there. There is a rumor that the Ikkō sect will attack the Lotus sect, so they are running about fortifying Honkokuji. It is all very strange. 104 Per Imatani and Fujii, this represents the first reference to the Lotus Leagues in a reliable source. 105 Within three weeks, they would raze Honganji. One part of the entry in particular has given many scholars pause. What Washio and Madenokoji saw was an “uchimawari” 打廻, but what exactly was that? It was some sort of procession, military in nature. Also 104 Fujii 242. Original in Nisuiki, Tembun 1 (1532) 8/7. See also Berry, 146, for her translation. 105 Imatani, Tembun hokke no ran, 82; Fujii, 240. The entry from The Gion Executor’s Journal in the epigraph to this chapter would be earlier, but Fujii argues that in fact that page of the original has been repaired incorrectly. See Fujii 269, note 43. 46 clear is that it was a means of raising troops. It is similarly clear that the Lotus Leagues made frequent use of them: the majority of uchimawari in known sources are Lotus League-related, and none of them took place after the Leagues were defeated. This has led some scholars to see them as a specifically religious ritual. The word uchi means, “to strike,” and one of the common religious rituals in the Nichiren sect is to beat a small drum called an uchiwadaiko while chanting the Daimoku, the Nichirenist chant to the glory of the Lotus Sutra. Yamaori Tetsuo has argued that these processions were named for the drums and chanting – in other words, “to process (mawari) while drumming (uchi).” 106 However, this theory has several problems. For one, the word uchi can also mean, “to kill,” or it can serve as an emphatic prefix. Furthermore, the term uchimawari predates the Leagues by over twenty years: the first reference in the historical record appears in 1511 and has no sectarian implications at all. 107 There are also records of an Ikkō Ikki uchimawari just before the destruction of Yamashina, so it seems unlikely that the word had a particularly Nichirenist association in the minds of Sengoku diarists. 108 Mary Elizabeth Berry defines uchimawari as a “circular procession,” arguing that uchi means “interior” and that mawari means to circle. But the character used in the sources for uchi is that for “strike,” not “inner.” Furthermore, many of the demonstrations were not circular – they started in one place and ended up in another. Several of them were the precursors to military action, such as that which ended up at Yamashina. 109 Yet another scholar, Imatani Akira, defines uchimawari as a demonstration of military power unique to the townsfolk of sixteenth-century Kyoto, 110 and Fujii takes a similar tack. 111 I agree with this definition, although I would not localize uchimawari to Kyoto, given that there were a number of uchimawari outside of the capital. It is also possible that the Nichirenist uchimawari did indeed include much chanting of the 106 Imatani, Tembun hokke no ran, 63. 107 It appears in the the journal of the courtier Sanjōnishi Sanetaka. See Sanetakakōki, Eishō 8 (1511), 7/18. 108 Fujii, 245. Original in Kyōshō hōin nikki, Tembun 1 (1532) 8/17. 109 For example, a 1533 uchimawari led by Kizawa Nagamasa was noted in the journal of one Honganji monk as “coming this way.” Shishinki Tembun 2 (1533) 11/16. 110 Imatani, Tembun hokke no ran, 63. 111 Fujii, 242. 47 Daimoku, and there is certainly evidence that later uchimawari had banners with the Daimoku printed on them. 112 However, the processions led by Kizawa Nagamasa to Honganji may not have been religious in character at all, and the ones led by Honganji sectarians almost certainly differed from Nichirenist ones. The goal of the eighth month, seventh day uchimawari seems to have been to show force and fortify the eastern entrances to Kyoto. 113 Hostilities finally broke out on the tenth, when another uchimawari, led by Yamamura Masatsugu, left the capital and began burning Honganji-affiliated temples in Kyoto’s eastern outskirts. Yamashina Honganji began to evacuate, beginning with the wives of monks. The patriarch Shōnyo had gone with his entourage to Osaka several months before to oversee the war. Yamamura led uchimawari in the Higashiyama area that continued over the next two days, and there are reports of evacuees from Yamashina being waylaid. Equally concerning for those still at Yamashina was that Rokkaku warriors from Ōmi had been moving towards them, camping at Sakamoto on the eleventh , and burning a Honganji-affiliated temple in Ōtsu, on the shores of Lake Biwa, on the twelfth. Even worse, the Honganji siege of Sakai had collapsed some days before. Yamashina Honganji was now being pressed from both sides. In response, an Amidist uchimawari left Yamashina on the fifteenth and moved into the Higashiyama area. This force of several thousand occupied the Kyoto temples of Kiyomizudera and Seikanji and set several fires in the Gojō neighborhood. Fighting began on the sixteenth, with a force from Honganji attacking Shōgunzuka. This army was repelled by a force from within the city, reported as “mostly Nichirenist” by the courtier-diarist Washio Takayasu. Still another uchimawari from Yamashina was sent out on the seventeenth and likewise repelled. 112 Fujii, 260. 113 Fujii plots the course of this uchimawari thus: it left Honkokuji on Rokujō avenue, went east across the Kamo river, then it turned north at the western foothills of Higashiyama and reinforced the Shinhie and Shirutani entrances to the capital. It then passed the Gion Shrine while heading through Shimogawara, and passed through the Kurita entrance to the Sanjō-machi neighborhood. See Fujii, 244. 48 Shōnyo did try to relieve his besieged temple, sending soldiers to Yamazaki. 114 They were met by a force of Nichirenists from the capital and Hosokawa Harumoto’s troops from Sakai, and they were forced to withdraw to Settsu in defeat. One Kyoto diarist records that the Kyoto party was preparing to deliver the final blow to Yamashina on the twenty-first, but they were delayed for some reason. Regardless, the final assault began on the twenty-third. Both the Kyoto forces – those of the Yanagimoto and the Nichirenist temples as well as the Ōmi Rokkaku – attacked together. By the twenty-fourth of the eighth month of 1532, Yamashina Honganji was no more. How Many Divisions Does the Abbot Have? Quite a Few, Actually At this point it should be asked: were the Lotus Leagues really military entities, or were they more like disorganized rioters? In this section I will argue that the forces that the Nichirenist temples commanded were in fact proper armies – that is to say similarly equipped, organized, and of comparable effectiveness to the armies fighting alongside them. Consider in this regard a letter from Hosokawa Harumoto to Honmanji in Kyoto: I arrived at my camp at Ikeda castle [in Settsu] today. Now, as to the matter of deploying troops 115 to Osaka [Honganji], because we must settle things by this coming fifteenth day, I would be overjoyed if you would assemble your patrons and set out for battle quickly. Miyoshi Echigo [Nagahisa] will explain this. With awe and respect, [Tembun 2, 1533] 4 th Month, 7 th Day Rokurō [Harumoto] <cypher> [To:] Honmanji 116 Were the Honmanji forces so powerful that Hosokawa Harumoto’s faction saw them as useful allies, or was the main value of the temples in their control of the city of Kyoto? I would argue that the temples had a 114 Yamzaki was southwest of the capital on the Yodo river, near the Settsu border. See the map on page viii. 115 SIM uses the word “error” ( 手違) here, but having consulted with other experts I feel that it is likely “to send troops” ( 手遣). 116 SIM 103 49 powerful military force on par with that of a large military family at the time of the battles with Honganji. This is supported by most descriptions of the uchimawari processions. However, while there was a sort of commander-in-chief of the Nichirenist armies, there is no evidence of a single command or recruiting structure, nor can we be sure that all or even most of the Nichirenist head temples were involved. Who, then, was in command of the Nichirenist army? Several Kyoto diarists report that early on this was a man named Yamamura Gorō Saemon Masatsugu 山村五郎左衛門正次. The best description of his background is in the Gion Executor’s Journal (cited as the epigraph of this chapter). He had apparently once been a follower of Yanagimoto Kataharu but had likely taken advantage of his superior’s death to increase his own stature in Hosokawa Harumoto’s administration. There is no evidence that Yamamura was a Nichirenist himself, nor that he had had any particular relationship with the Nichiren-sect temples. His place of origin seems to have been in Tamba. Several documents referring to him still exist, including several in the Tōji hyakugō monjo collection, 117 but none bear on the sect in any way. How he came to lead the army of the Lotus Leagues can only be speculated upon. However, the historian Fujii Manabu suggests that the Nichiren temples who were raising an army to fight the Ikkō Ikki needed a leader who had experience fighting pitched battles, and that, as one of their ally Harumoto’s powerful followers who was in the city at the time, Yamamura was a natural choice. 118 He would disappear from the historical record in 1533 – Fujii suggests that he was killed in the defeat of the Kyoto forces by Ikkō Ikki forces at Yamazaki. Until then, he was probably the commander of Nichirenist forces. Indeed, as seen in the epigraph, the executor of the Gion shrine saw him as “holding the power at the time” ( 当時の権). That phrase had been used previously to describe Yanagimoto Kataharu, Miyoshi Motonaga, and Kizawa Nagamasa. It was Yamamura’s command of the forces in the capital that allowed him to be considered in such high-powered company. 117 For example, Hiragana hi box, # 225. 118 Fujii, 243. 50 Next is the question of the makeup of the armies themselves. There can be no question, based on numerous journals and war tales written in the period, that Nichirenist townsfolk made up a large portion of the army. However, others were clearly involved. In his journal, the calligrapher Toriikōji Tsuneatsu notes that in the attack on Yamashina the forces of “fifty-or-so villages” amassed at the Shirutani entrance to the capital. 119 This is likely a reference to villages north of the capital. While we cannot know the religious persuasion of these villages, Fujii points out that the rural areas immediately around the capital included several known Nichirenist groups, including the Kaide party ( 鶏冠井一党, Kaide ittō) of Nishioka. These villages likely included many landowners and warriors who were Nichirenist patrons and who therefore put their resources and, when possible, the resources of their villages behind the defense of the temples and the city of Kyoto. 120 It is likely that there was also an urban component to the Lotus Leagues. It is also possible that patrons from farther afield also joined the effort. For example, the Nichirenist layman who set in motion the events that led to Enryakuji’s attack, Matsumoto Hisayoshi (see page 61), may well have been in Kyoto as part of an effort to recruit patrons for military duty. If Matsumoto was in town for this reason, it was after a long-distance trip: Matsumoto was supposedly from Kazusa (modern Chiba prefecture). That said, the only source that explains Matsumoto’s purpose in Kyoto states that he was in Kyoto “sight-seeing.” In addition, the Nichirenist populations in Bizen (such as those in Uchimado), were much closer than Kazusa and could well have participated. 121 Fujii speculates, too, that local warriors in Yamashiro – the Yamashiro kokushū – were likely aiding the Kyoto faction at least in the attack on Yamashina. 122 119 Fujii, 249. Original in Kyōshō hōin nikki, Tembun 1 (1532) 8/23, in Shiseki shoran, v.25, 421. 120 It should be noted that at this time the Japanese corporate village was well into its development. For more on this, see Tonomura, Community and Commerce in Late Medieval Japan. 121 One assessment of the Chūgoku region’s religious proclivities is the phrase “Bizen Lotus [sectarians] and Aki [Honganji] monto” ( 備前法華と安芸門徒). Bizen is modern Okayama prefecture and Aki is modern Hiroshima prefecture. See Itohisa, 125. 122 Fujii, 233. 51 It is not known whether all twenty-one of the Nichirenist head temples participated militarily. Indeed, there is no documentation of any temples joining in the attack on Honganji other than Honmanji and Honnōji. 123 It should also be noted that there is no documentation of an inter-temple agreement of any kind in the Tembun era (1532-1555). Fujii argues that Honkokuji was the center of the Leagues, both in terms of raising the most troops and in terms of where uchimawari processions were centered. It thus seems likely that while the other head temples were involved, the military centers of the Lotus Leagues were Honkokuji, Honnōji, and Honmanji. Some sort of unified command structure, perhaps by a council of the temples, is possible – they may have been under the command of the “Group of the Assembly” (about which see page 59). I see no evidence of such a council early on, however, when Honkokuji and Honmanji seem to have dominated military decision-making, as they seem to have recruited most of the troops. 124 After the fall of Honganji, conflict did not cease. Early in the ninth month there were fires near the Gion Shrine and other places, and they were assumed to be have been set by Honganji sectarians. Imatani asserts that these were preliminary to an attack by Hosokawa Takakuni’s adopted son Harukuni, who had been in contact with Honganji. 125 In any case, another uchimawari procession was held on the seventh day of the ninth month, which marched to Akutagawa in Settsu and back. On the twelfth, partisans of Hosokawa Harukuni appeared in north Kyoto and began putting up signs, leading to fears of an attack from northwest Kyoto. On the twenty-sixth of the ninth month of 1532, the Settsu Ikkō Ikki marched to Yamazaki near the Settsu-Yamashiro border. At the same time, courtier-diarist Washio Takayasu reported that contact with 123 Fujii asserts that Honnōji had not yet begun raising troops when Honmanji was receiving rewards for the attack on Yamashina. However, the Honnōji collection includes a letter from Ashikaga Yoshiharu praising the military action of Honnōji in the attack on Yamashina (specifically at the Shirutani checkpoint). See Fujii, 236, and Honnōji shiryō chūsei hen #91. 124 A letter from late in 1535 in the Chōfukuji monjo collection is addressed to “The Five Temples within the Lotus Sect” ( 五カ寺法花宗中). While Imatani uses this to suggest a division of which temples were administering which section of Kyoto, I would suggest that perhaps it could be read as “the 5 temples which command the bulk of the power within the sect.” See Imatani, Tembun hokke no ran, 171. 125 Imatani, Tembun hokke no ran, 116 52 Sakai had been cut off. 126 Panic arose in the city, and a large council was held on the twenty-eighth in temples in the upper and lower parts of the capital, at the Kōdō 127 and Rokkakudō 128 respectively. 129 This should give us pause, as these meetings have often been seen as an important moment in the Lotus Leagues’ development, but, notably, the two temples where these meetings were held were not Nichirenist temples. Imatani, however, notes that these two temples served as “machidō” 町堂, a sort of town assembly place, 130 for their respective sections of the capital. This would, of course, support the argument that the Lotus Leagues were in fact townsfolk leagues. On that same day a large group of townsfolk left the city and met with Yakushiji Kuninaga, the deputy military governor of Settsu, and the remaining Yanagimoto forces. This combined force moved towards Yamazaki. Another group of townsfolk remained in the city, holding an uchimawari procession near Tōji. On the twenty-eighth, the Kyoto forces clashed with the Honganji army. The latter won handily, destroying the Yanagimoto force and killing numerous townsfolk. As we saw earlier, Fujii argues that Yamamura Masatsugu was among the dead. An important factor in the Settsu Honganji army’s victory was that the Honganji army had the backing of local Yamashiro warriors who had previously been aligned with the Kyoto faction. 131 While the attack on the twenty-eighth was not identified as explicitly Nichirenist, both the executor of the Gion Shrine and Washio Takayasu identified the force that left Kyoto on the twenty-ninth as exclusively Nichirenist. 132 This force did not engage the Ikkō Ikki, but it did march through the area to the southwest of the capital and show force. The Ikkō Ikki forces did not advance past Yamazaki. 126 Nisuiki, Tembun 1 (1532) 9/26 127 An alternate name for Gyōganji, a Tendai temple. 128 An alternate name for Chōhōji, another Tendai temple. 129 Nisuiki, Tembun 1 (1532) 9/28. 130 This is likely unrelated, but the characters for machidō would be translated literally as “town hall.” 131 Fujii, 252. 132 Imatani, Tembun hokke no ran, 119; Nisuiki, Tembun 1 (1532) 9/29; Gion shugyō nikki, Tembun 1 (1532) 9/29. 53 On the second day of the tenth month, bonfires were spotted to the northwest, and it was believed that Hosokawa Harukuni would attack the capital. In response, what remained of Hosokawa Harumoto’s forces in the capital — a few Yanagimoto, the Yakushiji, and others — left Kyoto for Tamba on the fourteenth. In doing so, they left the city in the hands of the armies raised by the Nichiren sect. 133 In the interim, these armies would on several occasions engage the Ikkō Ikki in Nishioka, and Hosokawa Harumoto sent his thanks to Honmanji on the twentieth. 134 In the eleventh month of 1532 Hosokawa Harumoto’s large-scale battle with Honganji continued in Osaka, but the situation in the capital itself was fairly calm. During this brief lull, the Nichiren sect received an honor it had not received in a century. On the twenty-seventh day of the eleventh month, Nikkei 日経 of Ryūhonji 立本寺 was allowed to visit the royal palace. Nikkei was the brother of the sovereign’s beloved consort Jōrō no Tsubone, which may explain why he was chosen to receive the honor. 135 Nevertheless, the occasion was met with opposition from several high-ranking courtiers, including Washio Takeyasu and Sanjōnishi Sanetaka, who both noted the event in their journals with distaste. Though Washio described the event in detail, Sanjōnishi was terse: “One of the Nichirenist party visited the palace today. I have no words.” 136 Then, in the twelfth month of 1532, a debt-relief uprising (tokusei ikki) arose to the west of the capital. Courtier Washio Takayasu noted that a “moneylenders’ force” and a “Kyoto force” both attacked the uprising, that these forces numbered ten or twenty thousand, and that they set fires in towns around the 133 Imatani, Tembun hokke no ran, 122. 134 Ibid. 135 Ibid, 124. 136 Nisuiki, Tembun 1 (1532) 11/27; Sanetaka kyōki, Tembun 1 (1532) 11/27. Sanjōnishi Sanetaka was a dedicated Pure Land Buddhist who on numerous occasions opposed giving court favor to the Nichiren sect. However, he was also close to the abbot Nichiō of Myōrenji and attended functions at Nichiren temples. See Itohisa, 59-84. 54 capital, including Uzumasa and Tokiwa. It is generally agreed that the force that marched out against the uprising was made up partly of the Lotus Leagues. 137 By later in the twelfth month, Honganji records note that warriors from Settsu who had supported the Ikkō Ikki suddenly turned on them. 138 Yakushiji Kuninaga’s efforts in Tamba likewise had calmed concerns from the north. The Ikkō Ikki’s days seemed numbered, Kyoto was calm, and the Nichiren sect was collecting rewards from the shogunate and the court. Perhaps they saw themselves already victorious. Taking the Fight to Ishiyama The war, however, was not yet won. As the new year of 1533 dawned, the Ikkō Ikki found new life. They laid siege to and captured Daimotsu castle in Amagasaki, and in doing so they reestablished control in the area around Osaka. An attack by Nichirenists led by Yakushiji Kuninaga on Tomita in Settsu was easily repelled. By the tenth day of the second month of 1533, the Ikkō Ikki army bore down on Sakai with such power that Hosokawa Harumoto was compelled to retreat to the island of Awaji. In Kyoto, rumors flew that Hosokawa Harumoto had died along with Kizawa Nagamasa and others. 139 In response, a military buildup began in the capital. On the seventh day of the third month, Yamashina Tokitsugu reported a Nichirenist uchimawari of 10,000 men including 400 horsemen and enough military equipment that he was greatly surprised. 140 Two weeks later (on the twenty-forth), the supposedly deceased Kizawa Nagamasa arrived in the capital. He was concerned with Itami castle, an allied holding under Honganji siege in Settsu. He rallied the Nichirenists and left the capital on the twenty-seventh. They marched nearly 25 137 Fujii, 255. Even though no primary source links the force directly to the temples or the sect, I am inclined to agree with this assessment because the other large military forces had departed the capital in the tenth month. 138 Fujii, 256. 139 Imatani, Tokitsugu kyōki, 89. 140 Fujii, 259; Imatani, Tembun Hokke no Ran, 136-7; Imatani, Tokitsugu kyōki: kuge shakai to machi shū bunka no setten, 90; Berry, 159. Other sources likewise refer to a Nichirenist uchimawari on this date, including the Gion executor’s Journal. 55 miles to Itami. Fighting began on the twenty-eighth, and the besieging army was dispersed by the thirtieth. 141 The Nichirenist army returned to Kyoto on the first day of the fourth month. On the seventh day of the fourth month, Hosokawa Harumoto, who had been absent from the Kinai for nearly two months, returned to Settsu, taking residence in Ikeda castle. He immediately prepared for an all-out attack on Ishiyama Honganji. Again, he contacted the Nichirenist temples asking for troops for an attack on the fifteenth. As before, only the letter to Honmanji survives (see above, page 48). Kizawa Nagamasa was likewise in Kyoto, likely recruiting among the Nichirenist temples. 142 Hosokawa Harumoto’s letter was optimistic, as the fifteenth came and went without an attack. However, a Nichirenist force left Kyoto on the twenty-sixth, and Harumoto retook Sakai on the twenty-ninth. Honmanji forces participated in that battle. 143 Harumoto’s forces also managed to push through and besiege the fortress at Ishiyama Honganji, where Honmanji forces remained part of that siege for several months. 144 It seems that Hosokawa Harumoto’s forces would easily have starved the patriarch Shōnyo out, but Honganji’s alliance with Hosokawa Harukuni proved a saving grace. Late in the fifth month, Harukuni began to threaten the capital. The Gion executor Tamajumaru notes in his journal that a force of three thousand camped on Mt. Takao (Jingoji) and Mt. Togano’o (Kōzanji). He also notes that with the Nichirenist forces at the siege of Osaka, “Kyoto has no forces.” 145 Over the next few days, these soldiers on Takao would set fires at Kitano and elsewhere. And on the thirtieth Tamajumaru recorded “Nichirenist forces and Rokurō [Harumoto]’s forces” going out to Takao, only to be rebuffed. They tried again on the eighteenth of the sixth month with disastrous results: Yakushiji Kuninaga and some 300 men in his command died. An uchimawari procession held the next day remained in the city – likely, as Fujii argues, because Harukuni’s soldiers denied 141 Fujii, 260-261. 142 Imatani, Tembun Hokke no Ran, 140. 143 Fujii, 262. 144 Ibid. Other temples likely participated as well, but only Honmanji still has the letters from Hosokawa Harumoto thanking them for their services. 145 Fujii, 263; Gion shugyō nikki, Tembun 2 (1533), 5/28. 56 them access to the area beyond. 146 The next day, Harukuni’s soldiers entered the city and attacked Myōkenji, burning a few of the buildings. 147 This new activity in and around the capital probably forced Hosokawa Harumoto’s hand. He made peace with Shōnyo on the twentieth day of the sixth month. It is worth noting that the mediator in that negotiation was Senkumamaru 千熊丸, the eleven-year-old son of Miyoshi Motonaga. Senkumamaru would later take the name Nagayoshi and have a profound effect on the growth of the Nichiren sect. For now, however, he was beginning a new role as vassal to the very man who had killed his father. The peace allowed the Kyoto forces to return to the capital, though the threat of an attack from Hosokawa Harukuni continued until late that year. The last major military action by the Nichirenist army before the attack by Enryakuji in 1536 came in the twelfth month of 1533 — it was an uchimawari procession, which marched out to a number of villages west of the capital and burned them, likely to deny Harukuni’s forces access to them in the future. 148 The war between Hosokawa Harumoto and the patriarch Shōnyo would occasionally flare up again over the next few years. However, no evidence can be found of Nichirenist temple involvement in the hostilities, which was now much reduced in scale. But the military might of the temples was not Harumoto’s only use for them. Police and Taxation Powers In the years between 1530 and 1533, Hosokawa Harumoto’s ability to manage the capital was greatly diminished. This was doubly true during his confrontation with Honganji. Further, issues began to arise in and around the capital relating to rent and tax payments. Some sources suggest that the Nichirenists themselves 146 Fujii, 265 147 Ibid. 148 Ibid. 57 were impeding the payments, or at least that they did nothing to encourage payment. 149 Imatani Akira argues that the townsfolk and villagers who had been part of the attacks on Yamashina and Osaka expected tax reductions or exemptions as part of their rewards – such rewards had been promised in the past to the townsfolk and nearby farmers recruited as soldiers – and that they had simply reduced their payments accordingly. 150 Indeed, such payment issues began almost immediately after the fall of Yamashina Honganji. Late in 1532, documents sent from the shogunate to officials on holdings of Tōji and the Tsuchimikado courtier family around the capital assert that the villagers were withholding rents, calling it hanzei 半済, meaning that they were paying half of the total owed. 151 The shogunate demanded that the taxes be paid in full, but, alas, the issue was not resolved. 152 Imatani believes that the debt-cancellation uprising in the twelfth month of 1532 (see above, page 53) was a response to the shogunate’s insistence on payment of these debts, while the fact that an army of townsfolk (likely a heavily Nichirenist army) crushed them may explain why the Nichirenists had problems operating outside of the capital in 1533 (see page 55): villagers involved in the uprising had withdrawn their support. 153 Inside the city, nonpayment of rents was rampant. Imatani argues that to some extent Hosokawa Harumoto tolerated the nonpayment: while there are some 50 extant documents from Harumoto or his vassals in the period from 1533-1536, not one aims to curb nonpayment within the city. This makes sense given how valuable the townsfolk were in the battles with Honganji. Even years later when his position was secure, it was still very difficult for Harumoto to force townsfolk to pay rent. 154 149 For several examples see Berry, 159-60. 150 Imatani, Tembun hokke no ran, 150. 151 These are the same Chinese characters as those for the hanzei whereby Muromachi-era military governors confiscated estates, but is a different concept, a reward for military service. 152 Imatani, Tembun hokke no ran, 151-2. Translation of some of these documents is in Berry, 159-60. 153 Imatani, Tembun hokke no ran, 158. 154 Ibid, 162-3. 58 In terms of tax collection, even before the rise of Nichirenist armies a political connection between the Nichirenist temples and Hosokawa Harumoto’s regime already existed. In 1529 and 1530, the retired Inner Palace Minister Sanjōnishi Sanetaka had to deal with two issues concerning taxes in different areas of Kyoto. In both cases, Sanetaka needed to contact a high-ranking member of Hosokawa Harumoto’s administration, and in both cases, the mediator was the Nichirenist temple Honkakuji (then called Myōkakuji), serving as the link between the city of Kyoto and the upper echelons of Harumoto’s administration. 155 The Nichirenist temples appear to have tried to capitalize on the destruction of Honganji as well. For instance, in the third month of 1534, Yamashina Tokitsugu relates in his journal that the Nichirenists had asked Kizawa Nagamasa and the Rokkaku to ask the shogunate to grant them land in the areas of Yamashina, Uji, and Higashiyama. These included Tokitsugu’s own family holdings (from which his surname is derived). His source (another courtier) reported that the shogunate was likely to grant the land to the Nichirenists. 156 The court successfully intervened on Tokitsugu’s behalf, but it is unclear what became of the remaining land. 157 Even more interesting is the fact that Hosokawa Harumoto appears to have declared the Nichiren sect the official protector of Kyoto. When Hosokawa Harukuni threatened the capital in the twelfth month of 1533, Harumoto sent a letter to Tōji (and presumably other temples, though only the Tōji copy remains) ordering Tōji to raise troops and ally with the Lotus sect. 158 Imatani argues that this was likely because of the importance that Nichiren temples had in maintaining the fortress-like enclosure around Kyoto, the kamae 構. He also argues that they had control over the seven entrances to the capital, which they could use as military 155 Imatani, Tembun hokke no ran, 69; Sanetaka kōki, Kyōroku 2 (1529) and Kyōroku 3 (1530) 156 Imatani, Tokitsugu kyō-ki, 93. Berry, 160. 157 Imatani, Tokitsugu, 94. 158 Imatani, Tembun hokke no ran, 168. Original reproduced therein. 59 chokepoints. 159 Imatani even proposes a division of labor based on the location of the twenty-one head temples relative to the areas they were defending, though I believe this over-reads the evidence. 160 This Nichirenist protective role in the capital of 1532-1536 was not only military. For instance, when there were issues with rent collection in Tsuchimikado Ariharu’s holdings as well as concerning his control over checkpoint revenue in 1534, Hosokawa Harumoto did not turn to Kizawa Nagamasa to fix them. He instead sent the letters addressed to the Nichirenist temples and their patrons. 161 This was late in 1534, when both Kizawa and the shogun were already in the capital. The Nichirenists may have taken over the policing of the city as well. In 1533, for instance, the courtier Sanjōnishi Sanetaka recorded in his journal that the abbot of the Honganji branch temple Saihōji in Fushimi was apprehended on the road by a force from Ryūhonji. This would have passed unnoticed, but the captured abbot was the son of the wet nurse of Kujō Tsuneko, who was the wife of the former regent Nijō Tadafusa. Tsuneko mobilized several high-ranking courtiers immediately to beg for the abbot’s release. Sanetaka also joined in the effort. The next day he recorded that, despite all this, the abbot had been executed. 162 This may seem like, as Imatani asserts, “a lynching,” 163 but recall that this was in the immediate aftermath of Hosokawa Harumoto’s retreat from Sakai. Brutal as it may seem, a Honganji-aligned monk’s trying to enter the city would certainly have been seen as suspicious. Another execution carried out by the Nichirenists, this one recorded by Yamashina Tokitsugu, took place three days later. 164 In their capacity as likely protectors and administrators of the city, how did the Nichirenist temples make decisions? There are hints in the sources. Tokitsugu says there was “an assembly” ( 集会, shue) 165 that 159 Ibid, 168-9 160 Ibid, 169-70. The evidence is the letter cited in note 124. 161 Imatani, Tokitsugu, 91. One of these documents is translated in Berry, 159-60. 162 Sanetaka kōki, Tembun 2 (1533) 2/14-15 163 Imatani, Tembun Hokke no Ran, 130-131. 164 Berry, 159. Tokitsugu kyōki, Tembun 2 (1533) 2/18. 165 Berry uses the more modern reading of shūkai, but Kawauchi uses the reading shue. 60 he went to see. A somewhat more detailed account is to be found in the Zachū Tembunki, an account of a Tembun era (1532-1555) dispute within the Tōdōza (the blind guild). 166 In the entry for 1535, there is a description of the Nichiren sect’s hold on the capital: Around this time, the Lotus sect took control of the capital. Because of the governance of the Kubō [Ashikaga Yoshiharu] and the Kanrei [Hosokawa Harumoto], all the governance within and around the capital was at the command of the Lotus sect…Every day, they sent 50 or so men to the city entrances at Ōtsu and Yamanaka, and elsewhere…Among the Lotus sect patrons there was the ‘Group of the Assembly’ (衆会 167 の衆, shue no shu), and it was they who took power… 168 This might suggest that the decision-making process done by the assembled patrons. However, while the patrons were certainly involved, Nichirenist temple monks often employed patrons as their representatives when dealing with other temples and warriors. This could well be an early example of that pattern, which is also reflected in letters sent during the dispute over the courtier Tsuchimikado Ariharu’s holdings in 1534. One letter from shogunate officials was addressed to all Nichirenist patrons. 169 It is notable, too, that the Zachū Tembunki records that patrons were expected to do guard duty at checkpoints around the city and that monks were expected to join as well. 170 This suggests a fairly developed watch system and even hints at a chain of command in which older or more established patrons were at the top and younger or newer patrons were sent out on patrol under the command of monks. The shogun Yoshiharu returned to the capital in 1534. However, affairs had not yet returned to normal. Hosokawa Harumoto remained outside the capital until 1536, and Harukuni remained a threat until 166 The Tōdōza was a guild of blind men in Muromachi and Edo- era Japan. These men tended to hold a number of careers believed to be suited for the blind, including the lute players who recited The Tale of the Heike and other works, masseurs, and acupuncturists. It had official sanction and support, and it was a fairly wealthy organization. An incident is involving the guild and Oda Nobunaga is mentioned briefly in chapter four, on page 168. 167 It is generally accepted that this is equivalent to 集会 168 Imatani, Tembun hokke no ran, 172-3. Parts of this are translated in Berry, 160. 169 Imatani, Tokitsugu, 91 170 Specifically, it asserts that one faction in the guild dispute was having relatives become Nichirenist patrons so that they would be sent to watch duty at these checkpoints, where they could then hassle members of the rival faction. See Imatani, Tembun hokke no Ran, 172-3. 61 his death shortly before Harumoto’s return. The Lotus sect seems to have continued its administration of the capital without interruption, despite the end of the crisis that necessitated their formation. The Matsumoto Debate of 1536 The beginning of the end for the Nichirenist armies was a religious debate. While we have no contemporary description, fortunately, there is a later account, the Tembun hōran Matsumoto mondō-ki 天文法乱松本問答記 of Edo vintage and of Nichirenist persuasion. 171 Given that in-depth accounts of debates are rare, briefly summarizing it here shows how this very important tool of Nichirenist proselytizing worked. Per this record, in the third month of 1536, beginning on the third day, a monk of the Enryakuji’s Western Pagoda named Geō-bō 華王房 gave a series of lectures at a temple called the Kannondō 観音堂 in the Ichijō Karasuma area of Kyoto. 172 His talks apparently were well-received, and as the days passed people came from near and far to hear Geō-bō, who was now rumored to be the second coming of the Shakyamuni Buddha. 173 It happened that a Nichirenist named Matsumoto Shinsaemon Hisayoshi 松本新左衛門久吉, 174 a patron of Myōkōji 妙光寺 175 in Kazusa province (modern Chiba), was in the capital, and he and two other laymen went to hear the talk on the eleventh. Matsumoto and his friends were horrified that the Tendai monk was insulting the Nichiren sect and advocating the Shingon version of “becoming a Buddha in the present body.” 176 Nichiren himself had argued 171 Imatani, Tembun hokke no Ran, 177. 172 This account follows the Tembun hōran matsumoto mondo-ki as well as the interpretation of same in Imatani, Tembun Hokke no Ran, 176-195. 173 The historical Buddha, Siddharta Gautma. 174 Imatani notes that the character for “Matsu” in this name and “Sugi” in the name in the other source are very similar, especially in script. 175 Today it is called Sogenji ( 藻原寺). 176 That is to say the one in the Mahavairocana Sutra, as opposed to the that in the Lotus Sutra. 62 that Shingon practices would ruin the country, 177 since the Shingonists downplayed the importance of the Lotus Sutra, calling it unenlightened and childish compared with the Mahavairocana sutra, 178 and they stressed the Vairocana Buddha over Shakyamuni. Unable to contain himself, Matsumoto began to argue with Geō-bō. He first denied that the Shingon idea of enlightenment in the present body had any merit. When Geō-bō raised the point that Kūkai had himself achieved it, Matsumoto retorted that Kūkai’s enlightenment was the invention of his disciple Shinzei 真済 (800-860). 179 The two briefly clashed on the relative merits of Vairocana Buddha (which Geō-bō favored, in keeping with the Shingon teachings) versus those of Shakyamuni Buddha (who Matsumoto insisted was the only Buddha who had ever preached to mankind). Matsumoto displayed a dazzling array of scriptural knowledge and demanded to know how a monk of Enryakuji could turn his back on the teachings of Saichō while preaching the nation-destroying teachings of Kūkai. Moreover, when Geō-bō pressed Matsumoto for proof that Shingon was ruinous to the nation, Matsumoto followed Nichiren’s example and noted that the sovereign Antoku’s death in 1185 at the battle of Dan no Ura as well as retired sovereign Go- Toba’s defeat in the Jokyū revolt of 1221 were the results of the abbots of Mt. Hiei using Shingon rituals to pray for victory over the Genji and the Hōjō, respectively. Matsumoto then pressed Geō-bō on the idea of “other power” (tariki), stressing that the hearing of the Lotus Sutra constitutes not only self-power (jiriki) but the best means of achieving enlightenment. Matsumoto then asked Geō-bō if he also followed Pure-Land practices. Geō-bō stated that he did not but that Buddhas are all equal and that belittling Amida as the Nichirenists did was itself the sin of belittling a Buddha. Matsumoto responded by noting that Kūkai and Hōnen, each in their own way, belittled the Lotus Sutra. He also explained how the suffering of Hōnen for his 177 This he had argued in his famous “Four Sayings,” in his letter entitled “Reprimanding Hachiman.” The four sayings are: “True Word [Shingon] will ruin the nation, Nembutsu leads to the hell of incessant suffering, Zen is the work of the heavenly devil, and the Precepts [Ritsu] priests are traitors to the nation.” See The Writtings of Nichiren Daishōnin, vol. 2, 952. 178 In Japanese, the Dainichikyō. 179 Shinzei was greatly hated by Nichiren, who makes numerous references to Shinzei in his letters as variously evil and ineffective. 63 blasphemy was different from the suffering of Nichiren for trying to spread the wisdom of the Lotus Sutra. Geō-bō responded that Nichiren had called for the burning of the Kamakura Daibutsu, which should itself be seen as a sin. Matsumoto responded that this was shallow thinking and proceeded to justify Nichiren’s call for the destruction of that temple as necessary and even merciful. A brief discussion of whether it was acceptable for Nichiren to call for the deaths of those monks he accused of slandering the law ensued, followed by a discussion of the efficacy of nembutsu practice and why Nichiren had claimed that Amidists were damned to hell. Geō-bō made one last defense of Hōnen, which Matsumoto dismissed as inimical to Tendai values, noting that the monks of Mt. Hiei had called Honen’s writings heretical and tried to burn every copy in the capital in 1227. When Geō-bō found himself unable to respond, Matsumoto followed the usual protocol for the victor in a religious debate — he stripped Geō-bō of his surplice. As already noted, this late account is extremely suspect. Matsumoto’s quickness with Buddhist doctrine is startling for a layman, and Geō-bō’s views seem tailor-made to be a Nichirenist’s bogey-man: a Mt. Hiei priest who is actually a crypto-Shingonist with Pure Land sympathies. Geō-bō’s argument, for a man who was supposed to be a renowned preacher, is remarkably lackluster. Moreover, the only corroborating journal entries that mention a debate give different topics for Geō-bō’s talk (one lists the Lotus Sutra, and another the Amida Buddha). However, research by Satō Hironobu and Kanmuri Ken’ichi suggest that a debate did take place. 180 The sources indicate that Geō-bō’s defeat greatly angered the monks of Mt. Hiei. According to one account, they expelled Geō-bō. 181 Shōnyo, the patriarch of Honganji, noted that it was becoming difficult to 180 For the relevant research by Sato and Kanmuri, see Sato, “Rekishi techō – ‘Matsumotomondō’ to Mobara no Sōgenji.” and Kanmuri, Kyoto machishu to hokke shinkō. Regarding the debate: two diarists do note that there was some manner of debate early in 1536. One, a vassal of the abbot of the Ichijōin at Kōfukuji, even noted the names of the participants: a monk of the Geōin 花王院 and a Nichirenist layman called Sugimoto. Nijō jishukaki bassui, Tembun 5 (1536). 181 Imatani, Tembun hokke no Ran, 177. I should note that this particular account refers to Geō-in, not Geō-bō, but the only difference is 院 for 房, which often functioned interchangeably. 64 move goods into the capital in the second month because the Nichiren sect was reacting to “rumors.” 182 Things became even more tense in the fifth month. The sovereign Go-Nara, among others, noted in his journal rumors that a confrontation between Enryakuji and the Nichiren sect was in the offing. 183 The warlord Rokkaku Sadayori attempted to quiet things down by sending messengers to both sides, to no avail. 184 It was in the sixth month of 1536 when substantive action seems to have begun. On the first day of that month, the monks of the three pagodas of Enryakuji met in council and sent out documents demanding the destruction of the Nichiren sect in the capital. 185 These were sent to several other temples in the area, including Onjōji, Heisenji, and even Honganji. Enryakuji formally presented the request to sovereign Go-Nara on the fifteenth, through two of its princely monks: the Kajii-no-Miya monzeki and the abbot. 186 Among other complaints, the monks of Enryakuji repeated their old complaint that the Nichiren sect’s use of the sobriquet “Lotus Sect” was insulting, since it infringed on their own use of that title. Imatani suggests that the reason that three months passed before any real action was that Enryakuji attempted to re-litigate the “Lotus” issue and failed in the interim. 187 The Kyōdan zenshi, citing an entry in Myōkenji’s records, suggests that some litigation on this front began in 1535, though there is no other documentation. 188 The call for allies here is remarkable. In the past, when Enryakuji had wished to do harm to the Nichiren sect, they could employ the dog workers or their menials in the city. This time, however, Enryakuji had to call in help from its branch temples, other temples (including temples to which it had been historically hostile, such as Onjōji or Honganji) and warriors. 189 Clearly, the Enryakuji monks did not believe that destroying the Nichiren sect in the capital would be easy. 182 Kawauchi, Toshi to shūkyō, 185. Original in Tembun nikki, Tembun 5 (1536) 2/22. 183 Ibid; Go-Nara Tennō shinki, Tembun 5 (1536) 5/21. 184 Kyōdan zenshi, 359. Original in Rokuon nichiroku, Tembun 5 (1536) 5/23. 185 Kawauchi, Toshi to shūkyō, 190. 186 Kawauchi, Toshi to shūkyō, 188; Go-Nara Tennō shinki, Tembun 5 (1536) 6/15. 187 Imatani, Tembun hokke no ran, 208. 188 Kyōdan zenshi, 356. 189 A full list of temples Enryakuji is known to have approached for troops is in Imatani, Tembun hokke no ran, 216. 65 In Kyoto, the Nichirenists continued to harden their defenses in response. On the twenty-second day of the seventh month, there was one last uchimawari from the capital into the Higashiyama area. The Nichirenists set up military encampments at various exits to the capital and at temples throughout the city the next day. 190 Enryakuji’s forces descended the mountain that same day and encamped in the Higashiyama area, defeating a Nichirenist garrison stationed there. Fighting began in the city on the twenty-fifth, with Enryakuji forces descending to the Higashikawara section of the capital. However, the battles seem to have been fairly small: sources report death tolls of fifty or fewer for both sides. 191 The twenty-sixth saw movement by Enryakuji forces but no fighting. Indeed, Go- Nara reported in his journal that he had heard that the Rokkaku had successfully negotiated a peace. 192 In fact, no peace had been negotiated, and the Rokkaku were finished playing peacemakers. Rokkaku forces joined the attack on Kyoto on the twenty-seventh and immediately made a massive impact. They focused their attack on the lower capital, while the Enryakuji forces focused on the upper capital. 193 When the battle was done, the lower capital was in ruins. Honkokuji held out until the twenty- eighth, but by then there were already reports of the Rokkaku forces looting the other Nichirenist temples. The Zachū Tembunki reports that people were slaughtered en masse, with no real attempt to single-out Nichirenists. Several thousand people fled to the royal palace to avoid the slaughter. Several diarists list death tolls in the thousands. The high-ranking clergy of the Nichirenist temples who could escape did so, primarily to branch temples in Sakai .194 After four years of dominating the capital, the Nichiren temples were defeated. 190 Imatani, Tembun hokke no ran, 228; Kawauchi, Nichirenshū, 170. This uchimawari was noted in the Go-Nara Tennō shinki and the Oyudono no ue no nikki. 191 Imatani, Tembun hokke no ran, 232; Kawauchi, Nichirenshū, 170-1; Go-Nara Tennō shinki, Tembun 5 (1536) 7/25; Go-hōjōji Kanpaku ki, Tembun 5 (1536) 7/25. 192 Imatani, Tembun hokke no ran, 232-3; Go-Nara Tennō shinki, Tembun 5 (1536) 7/26. 193 Imatani, Tembun hokke no ran, 232-3; Go-Nara Tennō shinki, Tembun 5 (1536) 7/27; Gonjo Daisōjōki Tembun 5 (1536), 7/27. 194 Kawauchi, Nichirenshū, 172-4. 66 Enryakuji’s Army What was the nature of the army that burned the Nichirenists out of the capital? It is clear that the initiator of the attack was Enryakuji. As noted earlier, however, Enryakuji sent numerous requests for aid to numerous temples and warriors. Imatani has a list of estimates of forces sent, divided by source, which is reproduced here, with some alterations. 195 Table 1 The Composition of Enryakuji's Forces Named Forces 196 Number Source “Enryakuji, the temples of Echizen, and the province of Ōmi” 150,000 Sukesono kishō 祐園記抄 197 “Ōmi forces” 60,000 Gonjo Daisōjōki 厳助大僧正記 198 “Mt. Hiei and its branches” 30,000 (3000 from Onjōji) Nijō jishukaki bassui 二条寺主家記抜粋 199 The Rokkaku 30,000 Nijō jishukaki bassui 二条寺主家記抜粋 200 195 Imatani, Tembun hokke no ran, 231. 196 Imatani groups the first three entries in a general “Enryakuji” (Sanmon) category. I have deliberately preserved the exact wording from the journal entries here. 197 Sukesono kishō, Tembun 5 (1536), 7/23. 198 Gonjo Daisōjōki Tembun 5 (1536), 7/23 199 Nijō jishukaki bassui, Tembun 5 (1536). 200 Ibid. 67 We should ignore for the moment that these numbers are probably inflated. With one exception, none of these sources make distinctions between the Rokkaku and other forces in the attack. Only one actually lists numbers for Onjōji. Several imply that all the military forces of Ōmi were on the march. In terms of actual forces fielded, the Rokkaku made up a very large proportion (perhaps even a majority) of the forces that attacked Kyoto. Indeed, until the Rokkaku joined the fight on the twenty-seventh, the battles seem to have been small scale, with total casualty numbers under 100 people. Deaths on the twenty-seventh then increased by orders of magnitude. The state of Enryakuji’s military strength is important looking ahead to the burning of Enryakuji by Oda Nobunaga in 1571. Studies such as Jeroen Lamers’s Japonius Tyrannus and Neil McMullin’s Buddhist and the State in Sixteenth Century Japan both refer to the power of Enryakuji in explicitly military terms, even in cases where the sources do not speak of anything military. 201 When Nobunaga’s army attacked the mountain, however, the mountain put up no real resistance. It is odd that in thirty-five years Enryakuji seems to have gone from a military powerhouse capable of defeating the fortified and ready Nichrenist temples in Kyoto to a force that could not effectively oppose Oda Nobunaga’s forces on Mt. Hiei. 202 Certainly, the political situation in the capital and Ōmi would change dramatically in that time, but Enryakuji was still a large and powerful landholder in 1571. What was the actual state of Enryakuji’s army? I submit that Enryakuji was not, at any point in the sixteenth century, a particularly potent military force. Enryakuji’s power in the region was primarily economic and political. For the most part, the monks could depend on the dog workers and local menials to uphold their interests in the capital. When actual military might was needed, as in 1536, Enryakuji negotiated military power through alliances with local 201 Specifically, both translate Item 9 of Oda Nobunaga’s rules for the shogun Ashikaga Yoshiaki’s administration as banning either “sōhei” (McMullin) or “the warrior monks of Mt. Hiei” (Lamers).” The original Japanese, sanmon shuto ( 山門衆徒), refers to the upper echelons of the Enryakuji clergy. The proscription is political, not military. See McMullin, 69; Lamers, 64.; Nihon Kokugo Daijiten, s.v. 衆徒. 202 The only estimate for casualties in Nobunaga’s army in the attack on Enryakuji is Luis Frois’s estimate of 150 injured. He estimated 3000 dead on Mt. Hiei. See Cooper, They Came to Japan, 99. 68 warriors, including the Rokkaku, the Asai, and the Asakura, 203 as well as with local warriors with less firm connections to any one lord, the so-called “Ōmi kokushu.” What could not be gotten from allied warriors could be gotten by using cash, either to hire mercenaries or to allow for lower rents on their land to entice tenants into action. 204 Another question worth asking here is why the Rokkaku joined the attack of 1536. I believe the answer is twofold. First, they had connections with Enryakuji, necessitated by proximity as well as the Rokkaku’s connection to Kyoto politics. Second, they were following fairly standard protocol for religious debates in the Sengoku period: punishing the belligerents, in this case the Nichirenists. In general, warriors were not fond of these debates and would often punish the belligerents if there were trouble. 205 I have stressed throughout this chapter that the Lotus Leagues were formed as a result of a specific set of political circumstances. The shogunal civil war and the lack of warrior leadership in the capital were among these circumstances, but I would argue that the Enryakuji’s lack of a proper army was also important. As a religious and economic entity, Enryakuji could apply considerable pressure on the capital, the court, the shogunate, as well as on the Nichiren sect under normal circumstances. However, as a military nonentity, Enryakuji could neither prevent the 1530s power vacuum nor could they fill it. This gave the Nichiren sect leeway to do so. Indeed, there is no suggestion that Enryakuji filed a complaint with anyone about the Nichiren sect’s assumption of power in the capital until the Ikkō Ikki were no longer a threat and the shogun 203 There is no evidence of Asai involvement in the attack on Kyoto in 1536, but the Asakura were contacted to provide aid. See Imatani, Tembun hokke no ran, 228. 204 One major difference between 1536 and 1571 was that the Rokkaku had suffered a vassals’ revolt in the 1560s and thus collapsed immediately when Nobunaga moved on the capital. Further, Nobunaga’s establishment of warriors in Ōmi on a permanent basis in 1570 probably had the effect of pinning down the kokushu, denying Enryakuji that alliance. However, when Nobunaga resolved to attack the temple in 1571, they still had wealth, and so the monks attempted to appease him with gold and silver. This is often read as an act of desperation, but in fact it was standard operating procedure for the Mt. Hiei monks when dealing with warriors. See Ikegami, Oda Nobunaga, 36. 205 Kanda, Sengoku jidai no jiriki to shitsujo, 58. 69 had returned to Kyoto in 1534. It was only because the situation in the region had calmed that Enryakuji was able to convince the Rokkaku and others that the issue of the Nichiren sect’s power had to be dealt with. Banishment Hosokawa Harumoto entered the capital in the ninth month of 1536. He had made peace with old enemies Honganji and the shogun Ashikaga Yoshiharu. Hosokawa Harukuni had died in the eighth month. As one diarist said on Harumoto’s return to the capital, “His enemies have all scattered.” 206 Harumoto’s relationship with the Enryakuji-led attack is light on documentation, though Imatani argues that Harumoto encouraged the attack so that he could enter the capital without having to reestablish his own control in areas the Nichirenists would be loath to let go. 207 Certainly, he made no attempt to aid the Nichirenists as former allies. It seems likely that at that point Harumoto considered them among the scattered enemies. Indeed, in the intercalary tenth month, he sent out this order through a vassal: Decided: Item: Any Nichirenist monks or members of the assembly who remain in the capital or its surroundings shall be punished in keeping with the Shogun’s will. If the monks return to lay life or join another sect, they are equally guilty. Further, any who sympathize with them are criminals as well. Item: Any house displaying a Nichirenist amulet or oath shall be confiscated, along with those neighboring it (three in total). 208 Item: The reestablishment of the Nichiren parties or temples is prohibited. Anyone who violates the above shall be punished. So ordered by the Shogun. Tembun 5 (1536), Intercalary Tenth Month, Seventh Day 206 Kawauchi, Nichirenshū, 174. Original in Yukitsune Sukuneki, Tembun 5 (1536) 9/24. 207 Tembun hokke no ran, 208-9. 208 The Japanese term here is tonarisanken 隣三間. Berry suggests that this term meant not only the violator’s house and that of his neighbors but also the three facing houses. In contrast, Kawauchi Masayoshi defines it as the offender’s house and those of his two neighbors. See Berry, 166-7, and Kawauchi, “Sengokuki Kyoto ni mieru ‘tonarisanken’ o megutte,” 20-1. 70 Kōzuke no kami Miyoshi 209 no Ason <Io Motoyuki 210 > <Cypher> 211 The initiator of Nichirenist power in the capital had thus sealed its downfall. Hokke vs. Ikkō At this point it would be prudent to consider the Nichirenist Hokke Ikki that we have been analyzing here in comparison to Honganji’s Ikkō Ikki. We need to remember that “Hokke Ikki” was not a contemporary usage. While I have seen “ikki” (league) used to describe the Nichirenists, 212 contemporary sources overwhelmingly refer to “Lotus Forces” ( 法華衆, Hokkeshu), the “Lotus sect” ( 法華宗, Hokkeshū), “Nichirenist forces” (日蓮衆, Nichirenshu), the “Nichiren sect” (日蓮宗, Nichiren shū) or the “Nichirenist party” ( 日蓮党, Nichiren tō). The Hokke Ikki were not ikki in the minds of contemporaries. In her excellent treatment of the question, Carol Tsang stresses differences in command structure: the Ikkō Ikki ultimately reported to one temple (Honganji) under one monk (the patriarch). 213 The Nichirenist forces in the capital, however, reported to their respective temples, probably through different monks, because, at the time, patrons were closely linked to individual high-ranking monks. 214 Further, much of the decision-making process seems to have been delegated to elite patrons, which we know as “the Group of the Assembly,” further muddling who was actually in charge in the capital. Another important difference is that the Ikkō Ikki was primarily rural while the Hokke Ikki was urban. This seems obvious, but it hides an important point: Tsang argues that much of what the Nichirenists did in the capital, including their takeover of police and tax functions, seems much more radical precisely because 209 This Miyoshi 三善 is no relation to the Awa Miyoshi 三好: the characters are very different. 210 Io Motoyuki was a member of the shogun’s administration who often signed documents with the Miyoshi surname. 211 Honnōji shiryō chūsei hen # 95. For Berry’s translation, see Berry, 166-7. 212 For example, Gion shugyō nikki, Tembun 1 (1532) 8/2. 213 Tsang, War and Faith, 184-189. 214 This would eventually change, and the patron was tied to the temple, rather than the monk. 71 of the urban (capital) setting. In rural areas, it was not unusual for locals to exercise such functions. That said, there were rural components to the military and political power of the Nichirenist temples, not only because of rural patrons but also because of the involvement of the villages around the capital, especially in the fight with Yamashina, where they were absolutely vital. Conclusion: What Are You Going to Do with the Land? A series of splits in the shogunate and the Hosokawa house required that someone else defend the capital in 1532, and the Nichirenist temples of the capital rose to meet this need. From the first rumors of a Honganji attack, those temples put together a powerful army, and within a few years they had a working if not yet routinized system in place for governing the city. However, in doing so they alienated Hosokawa Harumoto, Enryakuji, and the Rokkaku. This led, ultimately, to the destruction of their primacy as protectors of the capital in 1536. In the years following the attack, Kyoto recovered and rebuilt. However, the land formerly occupied by the Nichirenist temples was not given to someone else. Enryakuji attempted to get the land for itself immediately after the attack, but two years later they inquired after it again, having seen no movement on the issue. 215 For whatever reason, Hosokawa Harumoto seemed unwilling to parcel out the land, despite having banned the sect from the capital in perpetuity. Perhaps he was not as hostile to the temples as it seemed. In fact, a movement to reverse the ban was up and running almost immediately. The temples, temporarily relocated to the port of Sakai, began prayers for their return to the capital. The temples not only mobilized courtier patrons to petition the sovereign but also warrior patrons to petition Hosokawa Harumoto and the shogun Yoshiharu. Eventually, all three authorities would approve the return of the temples to the capital by 1547. 215 Kawauchi, Nichirenshū, 175. 72 But something changed during the exile to Sakai. After their return to the capital, the Nichirenist temples would be military non-entities for the remainder of the sixteenth century, and, while there would be Nichirenists in Kyoto’s local city government, the Nichirenist temples would not figure largely in political policy processes. Instead, as we shall see, they developed a coherent and sect-wide governing body dedicated to the preservation of the sect through non-military means. The sect’s unification and the important role played by the warlord Miyoshi Nagayoshi therein is the subject of the next chapter. 73 Chapter 2 An Amenable Arrangement: The Unification of the Nichiren Sect in the Era of Miyoshi Warrior Governance These are the terms of the peace between the Hierarchy Faction (shōretsu-ha) and the Unitary Faction (Itchi- ha): Item: All shall, as one, pray for the wide transmission and spread of “Namu Myōhō Renge Kyō,” which is the essence of the one volume, eight fascicles, and 28 chapters of the Lotus Sutra as transmitted by the Bodhisattva Jōgyō. 216 Item: The principles of the Dharma are already unified, and therefore among our factions, praising oneself and disparaging others 217 and selfish slander are forbidden. Item: Because our lineages are now at peace, let there be no poaching of believers or patrons (from either the head or the branch temples). As to the above, we will stringently follow these rules. If there is someone in violation of these rules, then his temple must take action. If there is to be mercy, it must be agreed to by all the temples. Thus, let our signatures stand immutable for all time. Eiroku Seven [1564] … Eighth Month, Twentieth Day Signed in accordance with drawn lots, Agent for Myōkenji, Jūjōin Nichien <Cypher> Agent for Myōkakuji, Renjōin Nichitoku <Cypher> Agent for Myōrenji, Butsujōin Nisshō <Cypher> Agent for Myōdenji, Myōhōbō Nichigen <Cypher> Agent for Myōmanji, Shin’nyobō Nichishū <Cypher> Agent for Myōsenbō, 218 Jōsenbū Nichien <Cypher> Agent for Honkokuji, Shōrin’in Nichiei <Cypher> Agent for Honryūji, Jōsei’in Nichiyū <Cypher> Agent for Yōhōji, Shinjōbō Nichikei <Cypher> Agent for Honmanji, Kazōbō Nichiri <Cypher> Agent for Honzenji, Jōsenbō Kosei <Cypher> Agent for Chōmyōji, Shinjōin Nichijin <Cypher> Agent for Honpōji, Kyōgyōbō Nichiju <Cypher> Agent for Honnōji, Honzōin Nichiken <Cypher> Agent for Ryūhonji, Shōkakuin Nichiken Nichijin <Cypher> Seishun 219 -The Eiroku Treaty, 1564 The events of 1536 had been difficult for the Nichiren sect in Kyoto, but as we shall now see all was not lost. The sect returned to Kyoto within a decade, but with a change – the Lotus Leagues had given it a distaste for military power. So the question was, going forward, how would the sect negotiate the violent world of the sixteenth century without military power? The solution that the sect hit on was political and economic: the 216 This is the Japanese rendering of Vishishtachāritra, a boddhisattva who made an appearance in chapter 15 of the Lotus Sutra. He is said to have promised to return to the world in a time of evil. Nichiren believed himself to be Jogyō’s reincarnation, and in this case it is Nichiren specifically to whom the term refers. DDB S.V. 上行菩薩 217 This is a prohibited act in the precepts. DDB S.V. 自讚毀他 218 This is probably Myōsenji. 219 Honnōji shiryō chūsei hen # 145. 74 sect would ingratiate itself to warriors in power – rather than joining one side in a conflict – and it would seek to buy protection from anyone who might threaten them. In addition, rather than doing this temple-by- temple, the sect began to act as a unit, with an independent governing body for the whole sect. This chapter details how the Nichiren sect unified in the 1560s and assembled the Council of Head Temples, which would endure into the nineteenth century. The path to unification did not prove an easy one. The shogunate and the court had to reverse their banishment of the sect. The sect then had to deal with the Miyoshi warrior family, who ruled the capital for many years at this time. The Miyoshi were important Nichirenist patrons and saw themselves as guardians of the Nichiren sect throughout Japan. This chapter traces the process of unification, beginning with the Eiroku Treaty’s negotiations. While traditional scholarship has posited that the Miyoshi imposed the treaty on the sect, in fact the main forces behind the Treaty were Nichirenist monks both in the capital and in the Kantō. After its creation, the Council of Head Temples set sect-wide policy, negotiated with powerful warriors, and did what it could to maintain the security and prestige of the sect. Finally, we shall look at the abbot Nichikō of Chōmyōji, who was a key figure in this council, to see what the leaders of the Nichiren sect in this period did. Return and Resurgence Shogunate proclamations notwithstanding, the Nichiren sect was not forever banned from the capital. For one thing, the patrons in the city were still there, and those in court positions began lobbying for a reversal of the ban fairly quickly. Furthermore, the large networks of branch temples spread throughout Japan allowed the evacuated monks of most of the head temples a place to stay while they were looking for a way back. For the most part, these temporary headquarters were at the trade hub of Sakai, east of modern Osaka. Some temples showed signs of ceding the capital permanently: the Sakai Myōmanji branch temple Shōkōji 照光寺 was briefly renamed Myōmanji, and the Sakai Honkokuji branch temple Jōjūji 成就寺 began to call itself 75 “Rokujō,” after Honkokuji’s location in Kyoto. 220 This was early in the exile, however, before patrons and courtiers could begin to mount a campaign for the sect’s reinstatement. This effort was aided by a series of natural disasters in 1539-40, which the Nichirenists argued was a sign of divine retribution. Eventually the royal and shogunal courts were convinced that exiling the Nichirenists had been unwise. 221 According to its own records, Myōdenji was the first to return, in 1541. It circumvented the rules against returning by using bribery to declare itself a branch temple of Enryakuji. Meanwhile, the abbot of Honnōji, Nichiryo, received permission from the shogunate to rebuild Honnōji in the intercalary third month of 1542, 222 and he was back in the capital during that year, preparing to rebuild. The abbot of Honkokuji likewise returned in that same year and built a small hermitage near Daikokuji. 223 In the eleventh month of 1542, a royal edict was delivered to the twenty-one head temples. It requested that the temples return immediately to the capital and reoccupy their old land. 224 Within a year, Honnōji was rebuilt with shogunal blessing. The fifteen temples that would return were all rebuilt and back in operation by 1546, though only five were on their original sites. 225 Enryakuji was opposed, of course, and its monks petitioned the shogunate to force the Nichiren sect to submit to their leadership. Negotiations would follow in which the Rokkaku warrior family of Ōmi served as interlocutors, but these petered out without results. 226 While the temples did indeed return to the capital and again amass political power, wealth, and prestige, the sect was permanently changed by exile. For example, before the exile, there were twenty-one head temples. Afterward, while there are still letters addressed to the “Twenty-One Head Temples,” in fact six temples (Daimyōji, Gugyōji, Hōkokuji, Jōkōin, Jūhonji, and Gakuyōji) simply ceased to exist. Of these, four 220 Kyōdan zenshi, 364. 221 Ibid 365-6. 222 Kyōdan zenshi, 382. 223 Ibid. 224 Ibid, 382. 225 Ibid, 388. 226 These negotiations are discussed in detail by Kawauchi, Toshi to shūkyō, 195-200. 76 were Unitary Faction (itchi-ha) temples (Daimyōji, Gugyōji, Hōkokuji, and Gakuyōji) and two (Jōkōin and Jūhonji) were Hierarchy Faction (shōretsu-ha) temples. Jōkōin and Jūhonji did not actually disappear but rather merged into a new temple called Yōhōji. In addition, looking at the negotiations between Enryakuji, the Rokkaku, and the sect, three temples served to represent the sect in those negotiations: Honkokuji, Myōkakuji, and Honnōji. And still later, according to documents relating to the negotiations of the Eiroku Treaty of 1564, we see clearly that five of the head temples are clearly superior to the other ten: Honkokuji, Myōkenji, Ryūhonji, Myōkakuji, and Honnōji. 227 We can still see continuity with the 1530s: Honnōji was the dominant Hierarchy Faction head temple both before and after the exile, and Honkokuji (the likely center of the Lotus Leagues) was still the powerhouse in the Unitary Faction. Myōkakuji remained a major player, though perhaps somewhat diminished: during the time of the Lotus Leagues, the temple had served as the main conduit between the city’s upper echelon and Hosokawa Harumoto, but it was not the representative in later negotiations. In addition, Honmanji, which was a dominant military power in the battles with Honganji, seems to have lost some of its prestige in exile. The historian Amano Tadayuki suggests that the “Five Temples” cited in the documents from the time of the Lotus Leagues are the same five dominant temples in the Eiroku period (1558-1570). 228 My guess, however, is that the waning Honmanji was probably among the earlier five, 229 and that the Hierarchy Faction’s relative power in the sect increased after the exile. One indication is the fact that it had lost fewer major temples. Also, when we look at the language of the Eiroku Treaty, as seen in the epigraph of this chapter, we see a remarkably diplomatic avoidance of the issue of which faction is actually correct – indeed, concepts valued by both sides are present in the opening item – while the earlier Kanshō Agreement of 1466 had opened with an effective declaration of Unitary Faction principles. 227 Amano, “Miyoshi-shi to sengoku Hokke kyōdan,” 44. 228 Ibid. 229 I argue this on the assumption that Honmanji’s military dominance reflected political dominance as well. 77 In sum, the temples had returned to the capital still bearing scars from their nearly decade-long exile. The Hierarchy Faction had seen a particular increase in power within the sect, and both factions were now committed to avoiding violence. The politics of the capital changed as well – as the shogunal deputy Hosokawa Harumoto fell before the might of his former vassal, the Awa warlord Miyoshi Nagayoshi. The Miyoshi and the Shogun – The Background to Unification The Nichiren sect’s return to the capital and its unification occurred while the capital was under the rule of Miyoshi Nagayoshi. As mentioned in Chapter 1, the Miyoshi of Awa were important figures in the war between the Hosokawa. Their effect on the home provinces was profound: for the period between 1549 and 1568, the Miyoshi dominated the capital, presaging the authority of the “three unifiers” by nearly two decades. Even after Miyoshi governance disintegrated after 1568, Miyoshi vassals and family members continued to be important figures in the region, particularly those vassals who worked under Matsunaga Hisahide. The Miyoshi also had close links to the Nichiren sect, and made a concerted attempt to show themselves guardians of the sect. Because of this, in order to understand the changes in the Nichiren sect we must also understand the history of Miyoshi governance over the home provinces. The end of the Lotus Leagues seemed a sure sign that Hosokawa Harumoto would finally cement his hold on the capital and the Kinai. This was not to be, however. Miyoshi Yukinaga, dead after Harumoto directed the Ikkō Ikki at him, had left behind several sons, the oldest of whom would one day be called Miyoshi Nagayoshi (1522-1564). Until 1539, Nagayoshi was a nominal vassal of Harumoto. In the sixth month of 1539, however, Hosokawa Harumoto upset the situation when he gave one of his vassals the position of deputy military governor ( 守護代, shugodai) for several locations in Kawachi that had belonged to Motonaga. The son Nagayoshi protested that the locations were his. He, Harumoto, and the Rokkaku all subsequently mobilized their forces in preparation for the attack. The Shogun Yoshiharu tried to negotiate a peace, but Nagayoshi moved on the capital in the intercalary sixth month. Small battles on the outskirts of Kyoto raged in the seventh month, followed by a successful peace negotiation by the Shogun. Nagayoshi 78 agreed to withdraw his troops from the area of the capital and to turn the recently captured Akutagawa castle over to the Rokkaku. Unlike his father and grandfather, who had always returned to Awa when things went poorly in the Kinai, Miyoshi Nagayoshi remained in the Kinai for the rest of his life. Despite the 1539 conflict, he also continued to fight alongside Hosokawa Harumoto through the next few years. In 1543, the Shogun Yoshiharu broke with Harumoto and fled the capital for Ōmi. He would return the next year after a peace with Harumoto. In 1544, Hosokawa Takakuni’s (see previous chapter) cousin and adopted son Hosokawa Ujitsuna raised his own revolt, during which Nagayoshi was probably the most important of Harumoto’s generals. The Shogun again fled to Ōmi at this time. The, in 1546, Hosokawa Ujitsuna and several other powerful warriors joined the shogun and attempted to destroy Hosokawa Harumoto’s administration. For most of the year, Ujitsuna handed Harumoto and Nagayoshi defeat after defeat. Nagayoshi was briefly pinned in Sakai and had to go through city’s ruling council to make a peace with Ujitsuna, allowing him a hasty retreat. Harumoto had to quit the capital, escaping to Tamba. In the tenth month, however, 500 ships arrived in the port city of Sakai, with an army of 20,000 men led by Nagayoshi’s brother, Miyoshi Jikkyū (1526−1562). Jikkyū marched towards the capital, reaching nearby Ōyamazaki on the Yodo River within a month. He had already begun issuing prohibitions ( 禁制, kinzei) to temples in the capital the next month, 230 suggesting he was planning to occupy the capital soon. In response, the shogun advanced to Mt. Shōgunjizō just outside the capital and began construction of a fortress. Nonetheless, the situation was still clearly in Hosokawa Harumoto’s favor. Dejected, in the twelfth month of 1546, the shogun Yoshiharu held a coming of age ceremony for his son and heir, Ashikaga Yoshifuji (later Yoshiteru), and the next day Yoshiharu ceded the position of shogun to him. Battles continued through the beginning of 1547, with Miyoshi Nagayoshi and Hosokawa Harumoto collecting most of the victories. In the third month, Nagayoshi and his brothers entered Yamashiro (modern Kyoto prefecture). In the fifth month, the Ōmi warrior Rokkaku Sadayori, who had long been Ashikaga 230 For example, see Honnōji shiryō chūsei hen #115. 79 Yoshiharu’s guardian, defected to Harumoto’s faction. In the sixth month, Yoshiharu and the Shogun Yoshiteru ordered the Mt. Shōgunjizō castle burned to the ground and escaped to Sakamoto at the base of Mt. Hiei. In the seventh month, there was one last large battle at Shariji in Settsu, and the Shogun’s faction was so badly defeated that while some of its members would cause trouble again, they were for the most part scattered. In the fourth month of 1548, the Rokkaku negotiated a peace between one of the last members of the shogun’s faction still fighting, Yusa Naganori, and Hosokawa Harumoto. Nagayoshi’s armies withdrew to his castles, and his brother Jikkyū returned to Awa. Any peace would be short lived, however. In the fifth month of 1548, Hosokawa Harumoto accused one of his vassals, Ikeda Nobumasa, of supporting Hosokawa Ujitsuna, and he forced him to commit suicide. Nobumasa’s son and heir was a relative of one of Miyoshi Nagayoshi’s enemies, and Nagayoshi began to attempt to recruit part of Harumoto’s vassal band to attack his enemies in the band. Harumoto, worried by Nagayoshi’s aggression, tried to maneuver around him politically, even briefly securing the alliance of Nagayoshi’s younger brother Sogō Kazumasa 十河一存. Miyoshi Nagayoshi finally moved militarily against Hosokawa Harumoto in the eleventh month of 1548, and allied himself with Harumoto’s rival, Hosokawa Ujitsuna. Nagayoshi and his allies were subsequently so successful through 1548 and 1549 that Harumoto, the shogun Yoshiteru, the retired shogun Yoshiharu, and a number of high-ranking courtiers all quit the capital and sought refuge in Sakamoto, near Mt. Hiei. Such was the context when Miyoshi Nagayoshi and his allies entered the capital in the seventh month of 1549, with Hosokawa Ujitsuna in tow. Still, Hosokawa Harumoto and the shogun Yoshiteru did not give up the fight, as battles in and near the capital and assassination attempts on Nagayoshi proceeded over the next year. Ashikaga Yoshiharu died in the fifth month of 1550. The death of Ōmi warlord Rokkaku 80 Sadayori in the first month of 1552 put his son Rokkaku Yoshikata in command of the family. Yoshikata quickly moved to make peace between the Miyoshi and the Shogun that year. Under this agreement, Hosokawa Ujitsuna was made the official heir to the Keichō lineage of the Hosokawa family, receiving the position of right city commissioner (keichō) and the fifth court rank. Hosokawa Harumoto took the tonsure, and eventually fled to Wakasa province (modern Fukui prefecture). His son remained in the capital as Miyoshi Nagayoshi’s hostage. Yoshiteru arrived in the capital, escorted by an army led by the brothers Matsunaga Hisahide (1510-1577) and Nagayori (?-1565) on the twenty-eighth day of the second month. Nagayoshi was declared a direct vassal of the shogun, no longer a vassal of the Hosokawa. This was a significant promotion in status. Needless to say, Hosokawa Harumoto was not pleased with this arrangement, and his supporters did not stop the fighting. Opposition to Miyoshi Nagayoshi’s new order arose in several provinces near the capital. Harumoto’s allies would push into the capital itself several times over the next year, and worse, late in 1553, the shogun Yoshiteru aligned himself with Harumoto. Nagayoshi was able to hold the capital militarily and chased Yoshiteru to the seemingly permanent shogun-in-exile residence of Kutsuki in Ōmi. Miyoshi Nagayoshi then held the capital almost constantly for the rest of his life. While Miyoshi Nagayoshi was now firmly ensconced as master of the Kinai, he would not make the capital his residence. In theory, this should have left an opening for Hosokawa Ujitsuna to have some degree of control, but, in reality, Nagayoshi was firmly in control of the city and much of the business of the capital was handled through him or his subordinates. Matsunaga Hisahide, who will figure heavily into the events of the Eiroku Treaty of 1564 that is described below, was particularly important in this regard. His prominence was such that warriors in the provinces who wished to receive court rank were going through the Miyoshi and bypassing the shogun altogether. This continued as the Tembun period became the Kōji era in 1555, and up to the first year of Eiroku (1558). In that year, facing a prolonged fight and fresh troops from Awa making landfall in Settsu, Rokkaku 81 Yoshikata again proposed a peace with Miyoshi Nagayoshi. It was agreed upon late in the year, and again Hosokawa Harumoto was left out of the bargain. The Shogun Yoshiteru left his fortress and took up residence at Myōkakuji, however. In his time in exile the Shogun had become more connected to provincial warriors, and 1559 saw a number of them come to the capital to visit him, including Oda Nobunaga, Saitō Yoshitatsu (son and usurper of Saitō Dōsan), and Nagao Kagetora (better known as Uesugi Kenshin). Miyoshi Nagayoshi, for his part, cemented his hold on Kawachi and took over Yamato in the same year. By 1561, the Miyoshi controlled part or all of 10 provinces. Nevertheless, the year 1561 saw a number of setbacks for the Miyoshi. Miyoshi Nagayoshi’s brother Sogō Kazumasa died of a sudden illness in the fifth month. The Rokkaku and the Hatakeyama warrior families subsequently seized on this opportunity to prepare to attack the Miyoshi from the north and south. Nagayoshi responded by making peace with Hosokawa Harumoto and moving him to a temple in Settsu (modern Osaka prefecture), denying the Rokkaku alliance a chance to use his cause as their rallying cry. However, the Rokkaku and the Hatakeyama were able to inflict real harm on the Miyoshi, killing his brother Miyoshi Jikkyū in 1562 and forcing the Miyoshi out of the capital. The forces of Nagayoshi’s son Yoshioki and Matsunaga Hisahide were nonetheless able to retake the capital quickly, and the Hatakeyama were dispatched from Kawachi. A Rokkaku-initiated 1562 peace and the death of Hosokawa Harumoto in the third month of 1563 seemed to show that the Miyoshi had weathered the storm. Until the sixth month of 1563, when Miyoshi Yoshioki fell ill, that is. Over the next few months, the Miyoshi would go to great lengths to cure him, hiring famed Shintō priest Yoshida Kanemigi to hold prayers for Yoshioki’s health, having another such ritual held at the Gion shrine, procuring the services of famed physician Manase Dōsan 曲直瀬道三, and even convincing the sovereign to sponsor a Kagura dance for his health. Regardless, Yoshioki would succumb to his illness in the eighth month, at the age of 22. 231 Miyoshi 231 There is a longstanding rumor, popularized by Edo-period historians, that Matsunaga Hisahide poisoned Yoshioki. This is largely rejected by modern scholarship, which sees Hisahide as being close to Yoshioki. See Amano, Miyoshi Nagayoshi¸131-2. 82 Nagayoshi had no other sons to succeed him, so from a number of candidates he chose Sogō Kazumasa’s son, whom he adopted and named Miyoshi Yoshitsugu 義継. The next year, Nagayoshi murdered his own brother Adaki Fuyuyasu, likely concerned that Fuyuyasu would imperil Yoshitsugu’s succession. Two months later, Miyoshi Nagayoshi himself fell ill and died. He was 43. Yoshitsugu’s main advisors and protectors were Matsunaga Hisahide, Miyoshi Masayasu 政康 (1529- 1615), Miyoshi Nagayasu 長逸 (dates unknown), and Iwanari Tomomichi 岩成友通 (?-1573). The latter three became known as the “Miyoshi triumvirs” ( 三好三人衆, Miyoshi san’nin shū). 232 Very quickly, it became clear that the two major factions in the Miyoshi house (at least in the Kinai) were those of the Matsunaga warriors and the Triumvirs, but they did not turn on each other immediately – they had other worries. The shogun had, in the wake of Miyoshi Nagayoshi’s death, begun to take a stronger interest in other warlords, both by sending warring warlords requests to cease battle and by distributing shogunal positions among them. Likely sensing that the Shogun was preparing to raise an army to destroy them, the Miyoshi moved first. In the fifth month of 1565, Yoshitsugu, Nagayasu, and Hisahide’s son Matsunaga Hisamichi marched into the capital with several thousand men. They encamped at temples throughout the city, pretending to be on pilgrimages. Early on the morning of the nineteenth, the armies of the three men bore down on Yoshiteru’s residence. He seemed to have no inkling of what was coming, so he was not well defended. Legend has it that he was a very skilled swordsman, and that he fought on his own for some time, breaking numerous swords before he was brought down. The Miyoshi would also kill the shogun Yoshiteru’s youngest brother Shūkō 周暠, who was a ranking priest at the Zen temple Shōkokuji at the time. Curiously, the life of middle brother Kakukei 覚慶, a monk at 232 Translation as per Jeroen Lamers, Tyranius Japonius. 83 the temple Ichijōin in Nara, was spared, likely at Hisahide’s request. 233 Kakukei would escape Yamato, and travel about much of Japan seeking warrior help to push the Miyoshi out and become Shogun himself. He would find success after changing his name to Yoshiaki 義昭 and enlisting the aid of Oda Nobunaga. Perhaps because of his failure to keep Yoshiaki under his control, and perhaps because he was not of Miyoshi blood, the Triumvirs decided to cut ties with Matsunaga Hisahide. On the fifteenth day of the eleventh month of 1565, the Triumvirs marched an army into Yoshitsugu’s castle, killed one of his advisors, and forced him to forsake Hisahide. They managed to push Hisahide’s forces out of the area around Sakai and to deny him the capital. The future shogun Yoshiaki even decided to ally with Hisahide, convincing armies to come to his aid from as far afield as Owari. Nonetheless, the triumvirs would nonetheless successfully push Hisahide back into Yamato and keep him away from the capital for a time. The Triumvirs and the Miyoshi faction still in Awa then began to push for Ashikaga Yoshihide 義栄 (1540-1568), the son of abortive shogunal candidate Yoshitsuna (see Chapter 1), to be put up as shogun. In the first month of 1567, Yoshihide received the prerequisite court rank and position to be appointed Shogun. Possibly in response, Yoshitsugu broke with the Triumvirs and allied with Hisahide in the second month. This put him in opposition with the Triumvirs and the Miyoshi forces remaining in Awa, led by Jikkyū’s son Miyoshi Nagaharu 長治. War continued in the Kinai for the next few years, during which Hisahide and the Triumvirs did battle on the grounds of Tōdaiji in Nara, burning the Great Buddha there to the ground, but the Triumvirs and Awa forces were able to hold the capital and formally install Yoshihide as shogun in the second month of 1568. His tenure would last seven months, until Oda Nobunaga, having conquered Mino and marched effortlessly through Ōmi, arrived in the capital in the ninth month to formally install Ashikaga Yoshiaki, Yoshihide’s cousin, as shogun. Thereby, Nobunaga ended the Miyoshi’s hold on the capital. 233 Amano suggests that Hisahide was opposed to the assassination in the first place, but that he was able to convince Hisamichi to ensure the safety of Kakukei. Miyoshi Ichizoku to Oda Nobunaga, 60-2. 84 The Miyoshi and the Eiroku Treaty of 1564 Through all this, the Miyoshi were involved with the Nichiren sect intimately. While Miyoshi Nagayoshi did not exclusively patronize the Nichiren sect (he was closely tied to Zen powerhouse Daikokuji as well), his main temple was Kemponji, Honnōji’s branch temple (and temporary headquarters in exile) in Sakai. This was closely connected to the fact that Kemponji was the site of his father’s last stand in 1531. His brother, Jikkyū, was a patron of the monk Nichikō of Chōmyōji (see below, page 97). After Nagayoshi’s death and the withdrawal of the Miyoshi from the capital, Jikkyū’s son Nagaharu would effectively make Awa an exclusively Nichirenist province and would employ Nichikō in this project. Meanwhile, Matsunaga Hisahide was a patron of Honkokuji. Amano Tadayuki ties these religious preferences of high-ranking Miyoshi warriors to their function within the house. Nagayoshi, as ruler of Awa and the Kinai, would have been deeply concerned with ensuring that transfer of goods and men between Awa and the Kinai remained open. As such, it was vital that he have allies in Osaka bay port cities such as Amagasaki, Sakai, and Hyōgo. All these cities had large Nichiryū lineage temples, and as such, patronizing them made sense. Jikkyū, on the other hand, was the primary administrator for the region of Sakai and southward. As such, he could focus on the merchants of Sakai, and the merchant’s son Nichikō as well as the merchant-funded temple Myōkokuji represented useful allies for Jikkyū. Matsunaga Hisahide, on the other hand, was likely born in the Kinai and had no particular interest in the Osaka bay ports. His primary roles in the Miyoshi organization were to administer Yamato and parts of Settsu, and to serve as the Miyoshi contact person with the shogunate and royal court. As such, he naturally focused on the capital and offered patronage to Unitary Faction leader Honkokuji. 85 Of special importance to us now is the Miyoshi role in the signing of the Eiroku Treaty. In 1564, representatives of the fifteen head temples met at the mansion of Imamura Yoshimitsu 今村慶満 (dates unknown) 234 in the Shijō Higashi-no-Tōin neighborhood, and they signed the agreement that serves as the epigraph to this chapter. While there had been inter-temple agreements before, this one was an explicit attempt to address the major theological divide in the sect: the divide between the Hierarchy Faction and the Unitary Faction (see above, page 19). It did so by first declaring that all the temples were to work together for the wider transmission of Nichirenist practice, 235 which all agreed was their goal. With this in mind, the temples agreed that other Nichirenists were no longer to be “slandered” (in other words, Nichirenist preachers would not use their pulpits to criticize other Nichirenists), and that the temples would no longer attempt to poach patrons from one another. The treaty laid the responsibility for punishing offenders on 234 The Kyōdan zenshi lists his name as Yasuhisa, but Amano uses Yoshimitsu. The first name is not in the original source, but he is listed as Imamura Kii no kami. Imamura Yoshimitsu was an important Miyoshi vassal. 235 In particular, the chanting of the Daimoku (see page 12) Major Nichiren Temples in the Eiroku Period (1558-1570) and their Locations Unitary Faction Hama Lineage: Hokkeji (Kamakura) Nichirō Subsect: Myōhonji (Kamakura) Honmonji (Ikegami, Musashi Province) Hondoji (Hiraga, Shimōsa province) Nichizō Lineage: Myōkenji (Kyoto) Myōkakuji (Kyoto) Ryūhonji (Kyoto) Rokujō Lineage: Honkokuji (Kyoto) Honmanji (Kyoto) Minobu Lineage: Minobu Kuonji (Kai Province) Sōgenji (Mobara, Kazusa Province) Myōdenji (Kyoto) Nakayama Lineage: Hokkekyōji (Nakayama, Shimōsa Province) Chōmyōji (Kyoto) Honpōji (Kyoto) Hierarchy Faction Nikkō Lineage: Daisekiji (Fuji, Suruga) Honmonji (Fuji, Suruga) Myōhonji (Awa Province, Kantoō) Yōhōji (Kyoto) Nichijū Lineage: Myōmanji (Kyoto) Myōsenji (Kyoto) Nichijin Lineage: Honjōji (Echigo Province) Honzenji (Kyoto) Nichiryū Lineage: Honkōji (Amagasaki, Settsu Province) Honnōji (Kyoto) Myōrenji (Kyōto) Nichishin Lineage: Honryūji (Kyoto) Underlined Temples are signatories to the Eiroku Treaty. Source: Tsumori, 69-70. 86 their home temples and only allowed mercy when all the signatories agreed. In order to ensure no ill feelings were aroused by having one temple sign the treaty before another, the order of signatures was chosen by drawing lots. This was a major change in the way the sect had conducted itself and, indeed, it was the first time in the history of the sect in Kyoto when we can speak with certainty of its acting as a unit. While the Eiroku Agreement did not end theological debates within the sect, it effectively ended the battles between the two largest segments in the capital. Less certain is the path to the treaty. The Nichiren kyōdan zenshi recounts the standard account. This account uses an early Edo-period account of the peace archived at Honnōji called A Record of the Origins of the Eiroku Seven (1564) Peace ( 永禄七年和睦之記録濫觴, Eiroku nana nen waboku no kiroku ranshō), 236 as well as the Honnōji/Honkōji record known as the Ryōsan fudaiki (also of Edo vintage) as main sources for its narrative, as well as other documents in the Honkokuji archive. In brief, early in the Eiroku period (1558- 1570), there was a sudden flurry of debate between the Unitary and Hierarchy factions, and in the second month of 1564, the retired abbot of unitary faction powerhouse Honkokuji, Nichishō 日勝, petitioned his patron, Matsunaga Hisahide, to ask Miyoshi Nagayoshi to intervene. The Miyoshi brought the matter to the attention of the Shogun Yoshiteru, who ordered the Miyoshi to mediate a peace. The Miyoshi were able to convince Nichikō (see below) and others to go from temple to temple and negotiate terms. These terms seem to have been largely decided by the beginning of the eighth month, when Miyoshi Nagayoshi sent a missive to Honkokuji noting the Shogun's interest in the matter. 237 On the twentieth day of the eighth month, at the mansion of Miyoshi vassal Imamura Yoshimitsu, and, in the presence of the courtier Takeuchi Sueharu as well as Miyoshi vassal Koizumi Hidekiyo, the treaty was signed. 236 Honnōji shiryō chūsei hen #146 237 SIM 916. I should note that while this is the traditional dating for this is 1564, Amano dates it as a year earlier. See below, page 91. 87 This sequence of events suggests that the Miyoshi or the shogunate were the main actors in the peace. The Kyōdan zenshi goes even further, declaring the actions of the Nichirenist temples as "completely devoid of independence" 238 in the matter, speculating that perhaps they could not arrange the peace on their own. The Nichiren sect had to be dragged, kicking and screaming, into the peace agreement. Historian Tsumori Kiichi, however, has taken issue with this line of argument. Instead of focusing on sources in Honnōji's collection, he has found documents that paint a very different picture of the background to the peace. One, account, formerly held by Myōkenji and now held by the Fuju-fuse Faction temple Hōsenji in modern Okayama prefecture, is called Copies of the Order of the Old Agreement of Eiroku ( 永様之旧規勝劣一致和隆之次第案文, Eiroku no kyūki shōretsu itchi wakon no shidai anmon, hereafter the Anmon). 239 It consists of twenty-two documents that trace the agreement not to Honkokuji but to a conflict far away from the capital, over a temple in Tōgane in Kazusa (modern Chiba prefecture). Tsumori uses the Anmon and other sources to argue that the Eiroku peace was borne out of negotiations over the theft of the Tōgane temple. Monks from the Kantō, seeking to solve their own local problem, came to the capital and successfully sought support for a peace between the Unitary and Hierarchy factions. The Miyoshi and the shogunate were involved, but they were not the driving force in the agreement. According to the Anmon, at some point before 1563, followers of a branch of Kyoto Hierarchy Faction head temple Myōmanji took over a branch of Hiraga Hondoji 平賀本土寺 in Tōgane. Hiraga Hondoji was a powerful Shimōsa temple founded by Nichiren’s disciple Nichirō. It is also revered as the birthplace of Kyoto sect pioneer Nichizō, and as such was a popular pilgrimage destination even for Kansai Nichirenists. 240 238 Kyōdan zenshi, 418. 239 The Anmon is held by Hōsenji in Okayama. A microfilm copy can be found at the Okayama prefectural library. Several of the documents are also available in SIM 892, 895, 897, 898, 899, 901, 902, s87 (vol. 2, 59), 949, 952, 953, 959, 961, 962, 1137. 240 Tsumori, 54. 88 The abbot of Hondoji, Nichiryū 日隆, 241 went to the local proprietor, one Sakai Tanetoshi 酒井胤敏 242 (then in the service of the Odawara Hōjō), and asked him to force the Myōmanji followers to return the temple to Hondōji. Sakai was a Myōmanji follower, however, and refused (indeed, his later correspondence on the matter seems to suggest he was part of the armed takeover). Thwarted, Nichiryū took another tack. In 1563 he sent a letter to the Kyoto Unitary Faction powerhouse Honkokuji and asked if they could intervene. Honkokuji approached their patron Matsunaga Hisahide, who was the effective second-in-command of the Miyoshi family, especially in the capital. Hisahide in turn sent a letter to Myōmanji, 243 accusing Sakai of wrongdoing and asking Myōmanji to tell Sakai to return the branch temple to its rightful owners. Myōmanji sent a letter to Hisahide, agreeing to do as he said but asking that he provide his own messengers to help the monks that Myōmanji would send. Sakai Tanetoshi was not pleased with the letter. In his response to Myōmanji, 244 he refused outright to return the branch temple. He declared that, as the temple was on his land, he could do with it as he pleased, and, as one in a long line of patrons of Myōmanji, it was only right that this temple become a branch of Myōmanji. He also suggested that Myōmanji should itself take a more aggressive stance and warned them that Hisahide was not to be trusted. At the same time, the closing to his letter was markedly meek: “If I am deemed to be in disagreement with the temple, then please toss me aside.” Myōmanji and Hondoji did not stop trying to resolve the issue. At one point they brought in the head of the main line of the Sakai warrior family (Tanetoshi was the head of a collateral line), Sakai Taneharu 胤治, 241 This is the same name as the founder of Honnōji and Honkōji, but it is a different man who lived a century later in the Kanto. 242 Sakai is listed in the Anmon as Tanetaka 胤敬, but Hōjō documents use Tanetoshi. It is thus believed that the Anmon is confusing two similar characters. 243 SIM 892 244 Tsumori, 57; SIM s87 (V2. 59) 89 to negotiate with Sakai Tanetoshi. 245 It is unclear exactly how this went, but according to letters sent by Nichiryō to Honkokuji in the ninth month and a letter sent by Nichiryū’s subordinate Yakusoin Nichisen 薬草院日扇 to Matsunaga vassal Matsuda Ichibei 松田市兵衛 in the twelfth month, Taneharu was in favor of returning the temple to Hondoji. Tanetoshi, however, dug his heels in. As a result, Myōmanji cut ties with Tanetoshi. Furthermore, the Nichisen letter also explained that representatives of a local Hierarchy Faction temple had also sat in on the negotiations and agreed with Hondoji’s position. On the twenty-second day of the ninth month, Nichiryū sent Nichisen to the capital to look after the peace negotiations. Before heading west, Nichisen went to various Kantō temples to ensure their support for the cause. He obtained a letter cosigned by the abbots of the other two great temples founded by Nichirō in the area, which he would eventually delivered to Honkokuji. 246 Nichisen arrived in the capital on the tenth day of the twelfth month. He met with Hisahide on the twenty-fourth and wrote the above-mentioned letter to Matsuda Ichibei the next day. On the eighth day of the intercalary twelfth month, Nichisen and representatives of the eight Unitary Faction temples met at Myōkakuji to discuss the peace. Nichisen then went to Sakai, presumably to gather support from the large Nichirenist community there. In the first month of 1564, he visited Nara. 247 At this point, Nichisen disappears from the documentary record for six months. Tsumori suggests that he was going from temple to temple in the capital and had nothing to report. There are also no Anmon documents until the eighth month of the new year. There are other sources that can help fill the gap, 245 The two lines of the Sakai family clearly showed some connection (both were dedicated Nichirenists, for example), but while the main-line Sakai were allied with the Odawara Hōjō family, the Togane Sakai had fought against the Hōjō when the Uesugi attacked in 1561. 246 Tsumori, 61. The original is held by Honkokuji. No copy of this is in the Anmon. 247 His purpose in Nara is not listed, but presumably he was there to visit Hisahide at his castle on Mt. Tamon. Mt. Tamon was Hisahide’s main castle in Yamato. He remained there until 1572 when he surrendered it to Oda Nobunaga as part of the terms of his surrender after an unsuccessful revolt. 90 however. Honkokuji received a letter 248 from Matsunaga Hisahide in the third month, which reported that he was continuing to work towards the peace. By this time, negotiations had already begun. A letter of the eighth day of the fourth month was sent from Honkōji, 249 the Nichiryū lineage academic head temple in Amagasaki, to the political head temple Honnōji on the subject of how the first clause of the peace would be worded. The same letter shows that within the larger framework of negotiations about the peace, the temples themselves were brokering deals. Keirinbō Nichiryū had founded Honnōji and Honkōji after he had left Myōkenji in protest of the abbot’s leniency towards non-believers. Not surprisingly, this meant that Honnōji and Myōkenji had been fairly hostile to each other. Nonetheless, as part of the peace negotiations, Myōkenji agreed to put up a memorial tablet to Nichiryū on its grounds. The abbot of Honnōji, Nichishō 日承, is believed by several scholars, including Tsumori, to have been a motive force behind the negotiations. He was a son of the Fushimi-no-miya 伏見宮 princely lineage, 250 which gave him a political and cultural gravitas both within the sect and outside. On the eighteenth day of the seventh month, the Anmon notes a meeting at Myōkakuji, presumably of the head temples. On the fifth day of the eighth month, former Chōmyōji abbot Nichikō (see below, page 97) left his current lodgings at Myōkokuji in Sakai, and he arrived the next day in Kyōto, where he immediately went about from temple to temple discussing the peace. 251 A letter of the seventh day of the eighth month from Miyoshi Nagayoshi 252 in the Honkokuji zatsuyōroku suggests that there was still some contention, as he seems to be suggesting that the Hierarchy Faction should surrender altogether. Tsumori suggests, however, that the copy of this letter may well be a later forgery containing wishful thinking from the Unitary Faction. 248 SIM 992. 249 Hōnnōji shiryō chusei hen # 143. Also in Tsumori, 63-64. 250 Tsumori, 64. 251 Yanai, 62. 252 SIM 916. 91 It was finally on the twentieth day of the eighth month when the accord was finalized. Takeuchi Sueharu, the ranking Nichirenist at the court, 253 was listed as the “executor” ( 執行, shikkō). According to the Anmon, the monks sat in order of age. Those above sixty wore purple surplices, while those over fifty wore colored surplices. Like the Honnōji records, the Anmon lists the number of representatives as 35, with five temples having sent three representatives and ten sending two. 254 The treaty was signed. Tsumori argues that the Eiroku treaty was not the product of the Miyoshi and the shogunate meddling in the largely compliant sect’s affairs but rather the result of a desire for a peace between the two factions borne of the negotiations over Hondoji’s branch temple. While these negotiations ultimately fell apart, the desire to solve the underlying problem of the Unitary/Hierarchy conflict spurred Nichiryū and Nichisen to do something about the problem. They turned to Honkokuji, who turned to the Miyoshi. Not only was the Eiroku Treaty not imposed on the sect by outside forces, but it was born of its Kantō, rather than its capital, congregation. In contrast, Amano Tadayuki has a number of criticisms of Tsumori’s narrative. For one, he regards the Anmon as a very limited source: it reflects very little of the intent of the Kyoto temples. For another, the decisions of the Kyoto temples in Tsumori’s account are problematic: why should Myōmanji cut off ties with Sakai? Why would Honkokuji, on the basis of a request from a temple outside of its lineage (Hondoji), spend its own resources and risk a relationship with a vital patron (Hisahide)? Also, why would Hondoji turn to another lineage? Even if the temples were active participants, what does the intervention of the Miyoshi mean? Furthermore, Amano argues that the Miyoshi Nagayoshi letter that has traditionally been dated to the seventh day of the eighth month of 1564 (13 days before the agreement was signed) was not written in 1564. As with most letters of its type, it is dated but lacking note of the year. Tsumori, following older scholarship, dates the letter in 1564, 255 but Amano notes that Miyoshi Nagayoshi had died in the seventh month of that 253 For more on Takeuchi, see below, page 114 254 The five temples with three representatives were Honkokuji, Myōkenji, Ryūhonji, Myōkakuji, and Honnōji. 255 As I noted above, Tsumori also notes the possibility that the letter is a later forgery. See Tsumori, 63. 92 year, so it is unlikely that this was when the letter was written. He argues instead that it should be dated to 1563.This theory vastly changes the timeline, since it means that Miyoshi Nagayoshi was involved before Sakai Tanetoshi sent his missive (on the ninth day of the ninth month of 1563). Amano presents the following explanation. The initial move towards peace between the two factions was initiated by Nichiren sect temples in the capital as they began more and more to meet in councils (as we shall see). The Hondoji situation allowed those in the capital who supported a peace to use their connections with the Miyoshi to advance their own agenda towards peace. The Miyoshi, for their part, succeeded in expanding their relationship with the Nichiren sect from guardians and patrons of sect in the Kinai to guardians and patrons of the sect throughout Japan. 256 While the sect was not a passive participant (as older scholarship had suggested), the Miyoshi intervention was necessary at that time. My view is that Amano’s reading has merit. Tsumori and Amano have both demonstrated that the sect was an active participant in the peace. Outside interference by the Miyoshi was necessary to make the peace happen as it did. Some manner of peace would likely have occurred without it, but there would have been some intransigence, especially from the increasingly powerful Hierarchy Faction. Indeed, there is no certainty that Nichishō of Honnōji would have been as active in pushing the peace if Miyoshi Nagayoshi had not been his most important patron. The Council of Head Temples In 1982, a group of scholars taking inventory of the documents in the treasure house at Chōmyōji discovered a large wooden box. Within it was a lacquered paulownia box with gold fittings, marked, “Documents for the Use of the Council of Sixteen Head Temples” ( 十六本山会合用書類, Jūroku honzan kaigōyō shorui). The box contained several hundred documents in various formats that had been used by or concerned with a council of the Nichiren head temples. Indeed the documents – numbering about 550 or so – revealed a self-sufficient 256 Amano, “Miyoshi shi to sengokuki no hokke shudan.” 93 governing council of the Nichiren head temples in the capital. The documents also show that this council continued until the Meiji Period, and they shed new light on the Nichiren sect’s response to Oda Nobunaga, the Fuju-Fuse controversy, and Tokugawa policy. The release of the first studies of the council documents (led by Nakao Takashi), 257 changed how scholars viewed the Nichiren sect’s development. To be sure, it was clear that some sort of council was in place even before the discovery of the Documents for the Use. First of all, the agreements in the Eiroku and Tenshō periods had required at least occasional meeting of head temples. Secondly, documents sent to all the Nichiren head temples often referred to “All the [Nichiren] Temples” ( 諸寺, shoji) and “the representative of all the [Nichiren] temples” ( 諸寺代, shojidai), suggesting a group with representatives. Most concretely, the Honnōji/Honkōji chronicle Ryōsan fudaiki says that after the signing of the Eiroku Agreement, the temples began meeting every three years. 258 The nature of those meetings was unknown until the 1982 discovery, however. Nakao Takashi has provided the best analysis of the Documents and of the workings of the Council. 259 The most important role in the Council was played by the temple at which the meetings were held. This temple was usually called the “venue temple” ( 会本, kaimoto or 会跡, kaiseki), and sometimes the “[temple] on duty” (当番, tōban). Usually, the venue temple would hold this position usually for a year, during which it held the “money box” ( 銭箱, zeni bako), containing the money that the member temples put into the budget of the Council. When the Council would agree on a proposal, the venue temple would arrange to have the proposal written out as an official document and signed by the agents of each temple. The original document would go into the money box, and copies were distributed to the member temples. At the next meeting of the Council, agents of the previous venue temple would pass the money box to the new 257 Nakao, Nichiren shinseki ibun to jiin monjo. 258 Honnōji shiryō kokirokuhen, 450; 568. 259 Nakao, 227-250. 94 venue temple. In some documents, the previous venue temple was noted as well. 260 It is not clear if the role of kaimoto was the same as the role of the representative (shojidai) that was often seen in letters to the sect, but it was likely that it was. As Amano has noted, the fact that the Council had its own budget allowed the role of representative to pass to temples other than the “Five Temples” (see page 76 above). 261 Another role of the venue temple was to keep financial records, which appear both as memos and as parts of the bound books in the Council documents. The venue temple rotation was probably set early, though the earliest extant document with a clear list of the order was written in 1591. 262 The order, listing the fourteen temples in the Council at the time, seems to be random, suggesting that, as with the Eiroku Agreement, it was decided by lot. Over time, the money box was replaced by the document box, that is, the gilded paulownia box that survives to this day. Documents therein describe the budgeting for both the original money box and the document box. 263 So, how and when did this structure develop? Nakao argued that the Council began operating in 1565. He based his argument on the oldest dated document in the collection: a note recording gifts for warriors dated 1565, eighth month, thirteenth day. Here it is in full: 264 Eiroku Eight [1565] Kinoto ushi Eighth Month Thirteenth, day Given as gifts: 300 mon 265 Take[uchi] San[mi] [Sueharu], in lieu of sake 1 kanmon 266 Lord Miyoshi Hyūga [Nagayasu] 100 mon Intermediary for same 472 mon Road costs for the messenger monks <Myōmanji agents> 1 kanmon [Rokkaku] Shōtei 300 mon <Migumo> Shinzaemon no jō [Katamochi] 200 mon Same family, Tsushima 1 kanmon Lord [Migumo] Shirō 300 mon Gamō Shimozuke [Sadahide] 260 For example Chōmyōji monjo vol. 2, 225. 261 Amano, “Miyoshi shi to sengokuki no hokke shudan,” 45. 262 Chōmyōji monjo vol. 2, 30. 263 Nakao, 243; Chōmyōji monjo vol. 2, 20. 264 Chōmyōji monjo vol. 2, 19. 265 A mon was the basic monetary unit in Japan, representing a single copper coin. 266 A kanmon is a “string” of cash, which is to say 1000 coins strung together (East Asian coins usually have a hole in the middle for this purpose). It is thus equivalent to 1000 mon. 95 200 mon Same family, Saemon no suke 100 mon Gamō Sanji Nakao pointed out five letters in the Council collection written by warriors on this list, namely Miyoshi Nagayasu, 267 Rokkaku Shōtei, 268 Rokkaku Yoshisuke (later Yoshiharu), 269 Migumo Katamochi, 270 and Gamō Sadahide. 271 None of these letters note the year in which they were written, but the amounts in the letters do match up with the above list when we can compare them. For instance, Miyoshi Nagayasu’s letter among the five thanks Myōmanji for 100 hiki 272 of coin and promises not to quarter troops in any Nichirenist temples. Meanwhile, the document above records 1 kanmon of coin given to Nagayasu, which is equivalent to 100 hiki. There seems little question that the expenditure listed in 1565 is the money Nagayasu is thanking Myōmanji for, and that therefore that the letter likely dates from 1565. The other four letters, all written by members of the Rokkaku house, thank the “representative of the temples” for gifts of money and paper. While the letters from the Council do not remain, the letters from the Rokkaku do not suggest the usual quid-pro-quo of money for prohibitions or exemptions from quartering. They merely note that the gifts were in celebration of an “expedition” ( 出張, shucchō). Nakao believed that the letters were written in 1565 and that the “expedition” was an upcoming battle between the Miyoshi and the Rokkaku in response to the assassination of Ashikaga Yoshiteru. Thus, Nakao argued that the Council was born as the temples attempted to deal with the sudden instability in the wake of the shogun’s death by sending bribes to all potential parties involved in the upcoming conflict. A previous irregular meeting 267 Chōmyōji monjo vol. 1, 100. 268 Ibid, 105. 269 Ibid, 107. 270 Ibid, 106. 271 Ibid, 108. 272 A hiki is 10 mon. It is often used in documents describing gifts. 96 structure was quickly made regular and used to fund what the temples needed to arrange for their own defense. 273 Amano Tadayuki, 274 however, takes issue with Nakao’s arguments for 1565 as the start of the Council. While he agrees that the Miyoshi Nagayasu letter is likely of 1565 vintage, he disagrees with the 1565 dating on the Rokkaku letters. While it is not beyond belief that there was fear of a Rokkaku-Miyoshi war in 1565, none actually materialized. Each of the letters is nonetheless explicit that there actually had been an “expedition.” In other words, Amano argues that these letters definitely did not come from 1565. So, when were these letters written? One other clue in the letters is that one missive is signed Rokkaku Yoshisuke 義弼. However, Yoshisuke changed his name to Yoshiharu 義治 in 1566, so it must have been before then. Amano posits that the most likely date for the letters was 1561, when, in the seventh and eighth month, the Rokkaku advanced on the capital, camping at Ōyamazaki. Amano argues that this is the best match for the expedition noted in the letters. Murai Yūki, the compiler of the Sengoku ibun volume of Rokkaku documents, seems to agree with Amano, as he dates all four of the letters to 1561 as well. 275 If this is so, however, then these five documents in the Council collection predate not only the earliest of the documents produced by the Council in that collection, but also the Eiroku Agreement (1564) by three years. Why were they in the box of Council documents? Amano argues that Nakao was correct in that Rokkaku military pressure was the major force behind the creation of a regular temple council, but that it was the 1561 campaign, not the chaos after Yoshiteru’s death, which was the main impetus. Amano argues, too, that this threat led to increasingly regular council meetings among the head temples, as the temples increasingly met to cover the costs of bribing warriors. This turns Nakao’s and to some extent Tsumori’s theses on their heads by making the Eiroku agreement a result of the formation of the Council –increased 273 Nakao, 240-243. 274 Amano, “Miyoshi shi to sengokuki no hokke shudan.” 275 SIR 843, 844, 845, 846. 97 familiarity helped to create a group with a desire for peace inside the sect. When this group (which included the Abbot of Honkokuji and likely of Honnōji) received the reports of the Tōgane crisis, they pressed for a formal peace and went to the Miyoshi for aid in the process. This led not only to the Eiroku Treaty but also to more meetings of the head temples, eventually resulting in the venue temple arrangement. As Amano puts it, “The Eiroku Treaty was not the Council’s predecessor but rather its starting point.” 276 Amano may slightly be overstating the idea. My view is that the Council of Head Temples did not develop into a regular institution until 1565. The Rokkaku documents in the box suggest, however, that the structure that matured after 1565 saw itself having continuity with the earlier structure that was formed in 1561 – the irregular meetings of the early Eiroku era were, as Amano argues, vital for both the later regular councils and for the Eiroku Treaty. All this, of course, does not really challenge one of Tsumori’s vital contributions: the Eiroku Treaty was not an imposed one and the Nichiren head temples, or at least some of them, were the driving force behind the Treaty and the Council, even if Miyoshi support was important. Nichikō Unfortunately, while there is official documentation from many monks in the Nichiren sect, it is exceedingly rare to find anything that is in any way personal. This is why Nichikō 日珖, abbot of Chōmyōji and founder of Myōkokuji in Sakai, is so exceptional. Nichikō’s personal journal, the Kogyōki, 277 is a detailed account of Nichikō’s activities from 1561 to 1585. While not as detailed as courtier journals such as that of Yamashina Tokitsugu, it does allow us largely to trace his movements over two decades in which he was one of the most important figures in the Nichiren sect. To close this chapter, I would like to briefly sketch his life, as an example of the life of an important member of the Nichiren sect and the nascent Council. What we can see 276 Amano, “Miyoshi shi to sengokuki no hokke shudan,” 51. 277 While the whole of the journal is available in several collections, the best version is the Myōkakuji copy in Yanai. The account below largely relies on Yanai. 98 clearly from his journal is that Nichikō’s main concerns were the building of temples, his relationships with powerful patrons, the holding of sermons and debates, and (especially later in his life) the general political state of affairs. First, some biographical detail. 278 Nichikō was born the son of the wealthy Sakai oil merchant Date Tsunetoki 伊達常言 in 1533. He took Buddhist orders early, studying under Nichiden 日沾 of Chōgenji. He showed an aptitude for study, studying Tendai and Abhidharma scholarship at Miidera and Enryakuji, the precepts at the great temples at Nara, and Yoshida Shintō with Yoshida Kanemigi. At the age of twenty-four in 1555, he became the third abbot of Kyoto head temple Chōmyōji. In 1568, Nichikō’s father paid for the founding of a new temple, Myōkokuji 妙国寺 in Sakai, and Nichikō was installed as its first abbot. When Chōmyōji was burned down in 1573, he spent part of the next two years in Sakamoto and in Awa, debating with other religious sects and proselytizing. In 1579, he was involved in the Azuchi religious debate (see Chapter 4), and he was briefly confined to Azuchi after the sect’s defeat. He would eventually go to the Kantō in 1593 at Tokugawa Ieyasu’s request. He was also appointed the abbot of Nakayama lineage head temple Hokkekyōji in modern Chiba, setting up a system in which the abbotship of that temple rotated between the head of Kyoto temples Chōmyōji, Myōkokuji, and Honpōji. He died in 1598. Nichikō’s skill as a lecturer and debater was widely known. Along with Sankōin Nissen 山光院日詮 and fellow Azuchi religious debate participant Jōkōin Nittai 常光院日諦, he frequently gave sermons on the three authoritative texts of the Tendai sect ( 天台三大部, Tendai sandaibu) 279 – these sermons came to be 278 The most in depth treatment of Nichikō’s early life is Takagi, “Azuchi shūron shui.” Here I follow that account, with additions from his biography in Nichiren-shū shūgaku zensho vol. 20; and Kawauchi, “Sengoku Kinai ni okeru itchi hokkesō no dōkō.” 279 DDB SV 三大部 99 called “The Masterless Assembly of the Three Kō” 280 ( 三光無師会, Sankō mushi e). While he was likely a moderate in terms of how accepting to outsiders a Nichirenist could be, he was also known for his use of aggressive Shakubuku tactics, especially early in his career. He was sufficiently aggressive that his former mentors at Miidera expressed disdain for his hostility to Pure Land practice. Thanks to his journal, we can track much of his life. The extant entries run from 1561 to 1585. The entries are terse, especially in comparison to the verbose and detailed entries of court diarists such as Yamashina Tokitsugu and Kujō Kanezane. Sadly, this means that Nichikō rarely gives us opinions on events, even those that directly affected him, such as the entry from 1579, which recorded his defeat in the Azuchi religious debate, his confinement in Azuchi, and his brother’s death. He does detail his lodgings and travels, however, giving us a good idea of his activities from roughly the peak of the period of Miyoshi power in the Kinai to early in the rule of Toyotomi Hideyoshi in the 1580s. For the most part, Nichikō’s time was spent in Sakai. 281 He was also in the capital every few years, especially in the Tenshō period, when he was there multiple times in a year. He was also occasionally in Sakamoto to proselytize and fundraise, though only after the destruction of Enryakuji and for the most part after Chōmyōji burned down. Nichikō also spent a good deal of his time around Miyoshi Jikkyū, Miyoshi Nagayoshi’s younger brother. Jikkyū first appears in the journal in the third month of 1561, when Nichikō visited Jikkyū’s Takaya castle in Kawachi. Nichikō would remain there for most of that year and even build a small facility for himself within the castle. On several occasions, he joined Jikkyū on military expeditions. Over that year, Nichikō records nearly twenty people in Jikkyū’s retinue (including Jikkyū himself) whom he ordained. Nichikō also 280 This is because all three of them had the character “to shine” ( 光, kō) in their name. It is part of Nittai and Nissen’s cloister name (Jōkōin and Sankōin, respectively), and also in Nichikō (though in Nichikō’s case it is not this character specifically, but a character referring to a kind of jewel which includes the “shine” character in it and is pronounced the same). 281 Kawauchi Masayoshi has done a brief but thorough analysis of the Gyōkōki which includes a chart showing Nichikō’s location at any given time. See “Sengoku makki ni okeru itchi hokkeshū sō no dōkō.” 100 spent the first two months of 1562 at Takaya. When Jikkyū was killed on the fifth day of the third month of that year, he strangely did not record it in the journal. However, he did record this: During the night of the Third Month, Fifth Day, I withdrew from [Takaya] castle. I accomplished the achievement of leading all the men and women holed up in the castle safely into Sakai. Nichikō would hold a number of services for Jikkyū later in the year, including his 100 th day service. On the seventh anniversary of Jikkyū’s death (1568), Jikkyū’s son Miyoshi Yoshiharu 義治, Yoshiharu’s son and heir to the Sogō family Masayasu 存保, and both their mothers came to Sakai to attend a sutra reading. Even after the last of the Miyoshi castles in the Kinai were destroyed in 1575, Masayasu visited Nichikō’s temple Myōkakuji in Sakai in 1577, on the occasion of his mother’s death. The year 1575 was a particularly busy one for Nichikō. Two years before, Chōmyōji had burned down, and much of the time since was spent in or around the capital to ensure its reconstruction. He spent much of 1574 and 1575 in Sakamoto, giving sermons and engaging in religious debates. On his way back from one of these trips in the ninth month, he received a message from the Miyoshi in Awa, asking him to go there to hold religious debates. According to other sources, Miyoshi Nagaharu had decided to make Awa a Nichirenist-only province, with one source going as far as to say, “Everyone in Awa, down to the newborn children, was made a member of the Nichiren sect, received a copy of the Lotus Sutra, and were forbidden entry to temples of the other sects.” 282 Nichikō was brought in around this time and, according to his journal, he debated Pure Land opponents as well as a monk from Mt. Kōya, defeating both. He also met with Nagaharu and other ranking Miyoshi warriors before returning to Sakai. It is not entirely clear how far along the Miyoshi got in their Nichirenization of Awa, as Nagaharu was killed in battle in 1576, but clearly Nichikō was a vital part of the plan. Overall, Nichikō’s journal demonstrates that his main concerns involved building temples, ordaining powerful patrons, and holding sermons and debates. Later entries are increasingly political, with more 282 Kawauchi,” Sengoku makki ni okeru itchi Hokkeshū sō no dōkō,” 7; Miyoshi betsuki, 486. 101 attention paid to the movements of Oda Nobunaga and other warriors. Interestingly, one aspect of his life that must have consumed much of his time is not recorded: fundraising. Fundraising will be a major theme in the next two chapters. Conclusion: From Many, One As the year of 1568 began, the home provinces were in chaos. Matsunaga Hisahide and the Miyoshi Triumvirs had just fought battles that left the Nara Daibutsu in ashes. Miyoshi Nagayoshi’s heir, Yoshitsugu, had followed the precedent of the Ōnin war and actually fought for both sides. The late shogun’s younger brother was gallivanting about in the East, trying to assemble a new army that would likely just burn the capital down again. The Rokkaku warrior family, formerly one of the powerful players in Kyoto politics, had just suffered a vassal revolt that included the head of the family being briefly banished from his own castle. 283 In Mino, the Saitō family that had wrested power from the Rokkaku-allied Toki family had, after another internal revolt, fallen to Oda Nobunaga, a new powerhouse. To an astute observer of Kyoto politics, there were numerous reasons to be pessimistic. And yet, members of the Nichiren sect could say that their own future looked relatively bright. Their brief banishment had ended, and neither Hosokawa Harumoto, Enryakuji, nor the shogun could successfully prevent their return to the capital. The single most important institutional and doctrinal divide in the sect had been solved without bloodshed or either side looking like a loser. At the same time, the Nichirenists had succeeded in creating a robust governing structure for the sect as a whole. Nonetheless, 1568 would bring a new challenge. In the ninth month, the last Ashikaga shogun, Ashikaga Yoshiaki, would make his way into the capital. At his side was the warlord Oda Nobunaga, who had pushed back the Rokkaku and the Triumvirs with the aid of Matsunaga Hisahide and Miyoshi Yoshitsugu. 283 A copy of a letter from the former head of the family (Rokkaku Yoshikata) to his vassals to try to smooth over the conflict is a fascinating document for several reasons, not least of which being the most detailed history of the Saitō family of Mino by a contemporary. See SIR, 801. 102 Yoshiaki’s reign would be brief and inglorious – he would again be seeking an army to retake the capital in five short years, but without success. It was the warrior who rode at his side who would dominate the capital for the next fourteen years. In the next chapter, we will investigate how this new player in Kyoto politics would interact with the newly unified Nichiren sect. 103 Chapter 3 Fire and Gold: The Council of Head Temples Meets Oda Nobunaga The Governor of Owari would be about 37 years old, tall, thin, sparsely bearded, extremely war-like and much given to military exercises, inclined to works of justice and mercy, sensitive about his honor, reticent about his plans, an expert in military strategy, unwilling to receive advice from it to others, brusque in his manner, despises all the other Japanese kings and princes and speaks to them over his shoulder in a loud voice as if they were lowly servants, obeyed by all as the absolute lord, has good understanding and good judgement. He despises the kami and hotoke and all other pagan superstitions. Nominally belonging to the Hokke sect, he openly denies the existence of the creator of the universe, the immortality of the soul and life after death. He is upright and prudent in all his dealings and intensely dislikes any delays or long speeches. Not even a prince may appear before him with a sword. He is always accompanied by at least two thousand men on horseback, yet converses quite familiarly with the lowest and most miserable servant. His father was merely the lord of Owari, but by his immense energy he had seized control of 17 to 18 provinces, including the eight principal provinces of Gokinai and its neighbor fiefs, overcoming them in a very short time. -Luis Frois SJ, Missionary, 1575. 284 Nobunaga, callous, forceful, masterful, the veritable Übermensch of his time, was of the breed of Attila... His dominant passion was power; the chief means he employed to attain it was destruction; his usual device for rendering an opponent harmless, the banal device of extermination. -James Murdoch, Scottish journalist and historian, 1903 285 This chapter focuses on the relationship between the Nichiren sect and Oda Nobunaga from the latter’s arrival in the capital in 1568 until roughly 1579. Nobunaga’s relationship with religious groups has been the subject of numerous studies, and he looms large in the story of the Nichiren sect as well. The purpose of this chapter is twofold. First, I examine the Nichiren sect’s relationship with Oda Nobunaga, and show that, contrary to much of the scholarship that argues that Nobunaga was hostile to Buddhism in general and the Nichiren sect in particular, Nobunaga’s relationship to the Nichiren sect was marked by an accommodationist stance. Second, I examine the citywide fundraiser that the Council of Head Temples undertook in 1576, the first in the sect’s history. In this fundraiser the sect raised money to pay Nobunaga’s regime to preserve the sect’s privilege to exclude itself from other sects’ religious functions, especially those sects’ fundraisers. The fundraiser raised almost one-and-a-half million coins in a few months, making it one of the largest undertakings in the sect’s history, and certainly the largest in the history of the Council to date. I believe that 284 Cooper, They Came to Japan, 93. 285 Murdoch, A History of Japan, vol. 2, 184. 104 this also shows us that the Council of Head Temples was no longer a mere deliberative body: it could now assemble the manpower and know-how necessary to undertake large-scale projects. This represents the maturation of the Council into the entity that would endure for three centuries. I begin by briefly examining Nobunaga’s advance on Kyoto and his subsequent policies towards religion and religious organizations. I then turn to early signs of friction between the Nichiren sect and Nobunaga. The remainder of the chapter focuses on the 1575 fundraising campaign. In the Conclusion, I revisit the question of Nobunaga’s “suppression” of Buddhism. Setting the Scene – The Shogunate Rises Again On the fourteenth day of the tenth month of 1568, Ashikaga Yoshiaki 足利義昭, formerly the monk Kakukei, marched into the capital along with several thousand troops from Mino and Owari. 286 His journey to this point had been a rocky one. His older brother, the Shogun Yoshiteru, had been slain by the Miyoshi and Matsunaga in 1565, along with another brother who was a monk at Shōkokuji. It was only his distance from the capital and the protection of Matsunaga Hisahide that had spared him the same fate. He escaped from Yamato to Ōmi, seeking and receiving the protection of the Rokkaku warrior family. He began to attempt to gather support for his own candidacy as shogun, seeking aid from the Uesugi, the Takeda, and others. He even began to attempt to play the role of warrior leader by urging peace among the Takeda, Uesugi, and Hōjō in the east. He changed his name to Yoshiaki ( 義秋, pronounced the same as above but written with different characters) in 1566, and received court ranks commensurate to becoming shogun shortly thereafter. When his protectors in Ōmi proved insufficiently active in achieving his goal, Yoshiaki went elsewhere, eventually settling in Echizen (modern Fukui prefecture) in the territory of the Asakura warrior 286 The narrative that follows is based on Lamers, Japonius Tyrannus; Ikegami, Oda Nobunaga; Matsushita, Oda Nobunaga: sono kyozō to jitsuzō. 105 family. While there, he underwent his formal coming-of-age ceremony and took the new name Yoshiaki 義昭. Eventually, however, the Asakura failed to provide him with the backing he needed, and in the seventh month of 1568 he proceeded to Gifu, there to meet his new military backer, Oda Nobunaga. Nobunaga would raise an army of thousands and march with Yoshiaki to the capital, Kyoto. As of 1568, Oda Nobunaga was a rising star among warrior leaders. When he took control of the Danjō no Jō (Kiyosu) branch of the Owari Oda house, it was one of several branches vying for supremacy in Owari (the western part of modern Aichi prefecture), and Nobunaga had to kill several vassals and close family members in order to solidify his hold on his late father’s holdings. For the most part, he had managed to unify Owari and eliminate or subdue the other Oda lineages by 1560, when he was attacked by the combined armies of Suruga (modern Shizuoka prefecture) and Mikawa (the eastern half of modern Aichi prefecture) under the Imagawa warrior family of Suruga. Despite being outnumbered, Oda forces beat back the Imagawa and killed the warlord Imagawa Yoshimoto at the famed battle of Okehazama. 287 This set in motion the collapse of the Imagawa and the ascendency in Mikawa of the Tokugawa, a former vassal family of the Imagawa. Nobunaga negotiated a quick and lasting alliance with the Tokugawa and turned his attention to Mino, which he conquered between 1564 and 1567. 288 Nobunaga had been contacted by Yoshiaki beforehand, and, with Mino firmly in hand, he agreed to move on the capital. Nobunaga’s march to the capital was swift. He left Gifu on the seventh of the ninth month of 1568. On the twelfth, as he approached the Rokkaku home castle of Kannonji, the Rokkaku withdrew without a fight, and Nobunaga occupied the castle on the thirteenth. This was known in Kyoto the next day, when Yamashina Tokitsugu reported that Ōmi was aflame. Yoshiaki remained in Ōmi near the town of Azuchi. 287 Often this is presented as a surprise attack by the Oda on an Imagawa camp deep in Oda territory. The surprise attack thesis has been largely discredited. The only source with details of the battle, the problematic opening chapter of Nobunaga’s biography, the Shinchō kōki, reports it as a fairly simple battle wherein Oda forces met Imagawa forces on the road, in contested territory that had been an Imagawa holding fairly recently. 288 This is indeed a three-year gap but scholars debate when Nobunaga conquered Inabayama (which he would rename “Gifu”), and when his hold on Mino was complete, although the 1567 thesis is the dominant one in recent scholarship. See Ikegami, 20-28; Matsushita, 32. 106 Nobunaga entered the capital on the twenty-sixth. Within a few days, he was moving against Miyoshi and Matsunaga strongholds throughout the Kinai. By the fourth day of the tenth month, Matsunaga Hisahide (along with Miyoshi Yoshitsugu, with whom he was, for the moment, allied) surrendered to Nobunaga. Within a month of leaving Gifu, Nobunaga had taken control of the capital and the Osaka Bay area, thereby establishing himself as the dominant figure in central Japan. Yoshiaki himself would enter the capital on fourteenth day of the tenth month. On the nineteenth, he was granted the position of shogun by the court. Nobunaga immediately began to assert his role in Yoshiaki’s government, issuing documents in the next year that largely encouraged Yoshiaki to follow older shogunal precedents. In 1570, the court changed the era name to Genki 元亀. The Genki era proved to be a particularly trying time for Nobunaga, so much so that many historians refer to “the Genki Troubles” (Genki sōran). First, in 1570, Nobunaga went to attack the Asakura family in Echizen, who had refused to respond to his demand that they visit the shogun. Nobunaga left the capital on the twentieth day of the fourth month, only to find that his ally and brother-in-law Asai Nagamasa had betrayed him and was bearing down on his rear. 289 Cut off from Gifu, he had to beat a hasty retreat through Wakasa (the southern portion of modern Fukui prefecture) to the capital. Nobunaga then returned to Gifu. 290 In the sixth month, Nobunaga moved on the Asai and the Asakura, defeating them at Anegawa but not putting them out of the fight. The Miyoshi triumvirs again invaded Settsu in the seventh month, and Nobunaga responded by attacking Miyoshi holdings in the Osaka area. 291 In response to this, and possibly because of a 1568 duty Nobunaga had levied on Honganji, the patriarch Kennyo of Honganji attacked Nobunaga’s forces in the ninth month. Worse still, only a week later the Asai and Asakura moved on Nobunaga’s forces in Ōmi, forcing him to retreat to the capital to guard it from capture. He immediately set out for Ōmi, but the Asai and the Asakura denied him a decisive battle. Instead, they set up camp atop Mt. Hiei at the temple of Enryakuji. 289 Lamers uses the alternate pronunciation “Azai” for Asai. It is uncertain which is correct. 290 On the way, a skilled marksman named Sugitani Zenjūbō, having been hired by the Rokkaku, lay in wait for Nobunaga at Chikusa pass. He hit Nobunaga with two bullets, but both bullets only grazed him. 291 The Miyoshi Triumvirs were Miyoshi Nagayuki, Iwanari Tomomichi, and Miyoshi Masayasu. See page 82. 107 Nobunaga sent messages to Enryakuji, laying out three options for its monks. They could ally with him and receive back lands Nobunaga had earlier confiscated. They could declare themselves neutral (as befitting the clergy), and no harm would come to them. Alternatively, they could oppose him, and he would raze the entire mountain. Enryakuji made no formal response. Nobunaga took this as opposition. The resulting siege of Mt. Hiei was destructive to both sides – numerous soldiers died of the cold – and it prevented the flow of goods into Kyoto, causing panic there. As the siege continued, the Miyoshi tried repeatedly to press the attack but were held back by Nobunaga’s defenses in Settsu. In the eleventh month, a Honganji-aligned Ikkō Ikki revolt arose at Nagashima in Ise, killing Nobunaga’s brother. In the twelfth month, the Shogun Yoshiaki negotiated a peace settlement between Nobunaga and the Asai-Asakura forces, and the sovereign Ōgimachi ordered the interested parties to follow it. Nobunaga agreed not to act against the temple and withdrew to Gifu; the Asai and Asakura left the mountain a day later. Nobunaga licked his wounds in Gifu for almost a year. 1571 brought with it new problems: in the second month, the master of an Asai castle in Ōmi defected to Nobunaga, and, in the fifth month, the Asai attempted to retake the castle, only to be repelled by Oda forces. In the same month, Nobunaga attacked the Ikkō Ikki at Nagashima in Ise again, only to be repelled again. In the eighth month, Nobunaga had a series of successful engagements with Asai forces, but then turned south. On the eleventh day of the ninth month, Nobunaga set up camp on the grounds of Onjōji on the shores of Lake Biwa, and his forces surrounded Mt. Hiei. According to Luis Frois, the monks of Enryakuji attempted to placate Nobunaga’s anger with a massive payment of gold and silver, to no avail. The next day, his troops marched up the mountain, razing the temple and killing several thousand people, both monastic and lay. Nobunaga then returned to the capital and continued to Gifu, stopping in Nagahara to execute the courtier Takeuchi Sueharu (whom I will discuss further below). In 1572 the conflict intensified. The Rokkaku were active in Ōmi in the first month, and Kennyo of Honganji made contact with the warlord Takeda Shingen of Kai, urging him to move on Nobunaga’s rear to 108 reduce pressure on Osaka. In the third month, Nobunaga moved on the Asai in Ōmi and then set up fortresses nearby. He arrived in the capital on the twelfth, only to find that Matsunaga Hisahide and Miyoshi Yoshitsugu had betrayed him by attacking his forces in Kawachi, though without major effect. Nobunaga briefly returned to Gifu in the fifth month, but in the seventh month he was again fighting the Asai in Ōmi. While no one was able to push Nobunaga’s forces out of the capital, at the same time Takeda Shingen had finally begun to move against Nobunaga’s ally Tokugawa Ieyasu, and he handed Ieyasu several defeats. Worse still, cracks had clearly begun to form in the Shogun Yoshiaki and Nobunaga’s relationship. Takeda Shingen had been in contact with Yoshiaki, and Yoshiaki had, in the fifth month, encouraged him to take action “for the peace of the realm.” While this may not have been an approval of Shingen’s attack on Nobunaga’s allies, Nobunaga developed antipathy towards the shogun. In the ninth month, Nobunaga sent Yoshiaki a list of seventeen complaints about his administration. These were wide-ranging, but many dealt with how Yoshiaki rewarded or failed to reward his own followers, with actions that Nobunaga warned were perceived as avaricious. Several items accused Yoshiaki of neglecting the royal court. Several more accused him of showing hostility to Nobunaga and his men. Two items made overt comparisons to previous shogun Ashikaga Yoshiteru and Yoshinori, who both had been assassinated. 292 The year 1573 did not show any signs of improvement in Nobunaga’s situation. In the first month, Nagashima Honganji adherents advanced deep into Mino, setting up fortresses near Gifu, while other Honganji aligned troops were fighting alongside the Asai in Ōmi. Takeda Shingen began advancing westward in the second month and was able to take several castles while also encouraging several other castles in eastern Mino to defect to him, before becoming sick and retreating. He died in the fourth month in Suruga, but his death was kept secret for four years. 292 Original in Okuno, Oda Nobunaga monjo no Kenkyū, vol. 1, 565-76. Translated in Lamers and Ellisonas, The Chronicle of Lord Nobunaga, 178-82. 109 Emboldened by Takeda Shingen’s 1573 advance, the Shogun Yoshiaki began communicating with the Asai and the Asakura, calling for troops. Nobunaga, still in Gifu, proposed a peace agreement with the Shogun involving hostages, which Yoshiaki accepted. By the third month, however, Yoshiaki gave up on the agreement and turned to the mighty Mōri and Kobayakawa warriors of western Japan, asking them for troops to fight Nobunaga. Nobunaga’s response was, as might have been expected, explosive. Once it was clear that Takeda Shingen had halted his advance, Nobunaga left Gifu for the capital. He attempted to renegotiate a peace, but the Shogun Yoshiaki did not respond. Nobunaga surrounded the shogun’s lodgings and, presumably to show his own determination, put the entire upper capital to the torch. Yoshiaki was now more amenable, and another peace was negotiated. Nobunaga left the capital, but this time he also made preparations should Yoshiaki turn on him again, including building a fleet of massive boats to allow his army quick passage across Lake Biwa. In the seventh month, Yoshiaki left his lodgings at Nijō and holed up at Makinoshima, south of the capital. Nobunaga attacked two weeks later, and Yoshiaki again surrendered. Thereafter, Yoshiaki would move westward, eventually settling under the protection of the Mōri in Bingo (modern Hiroshima prefecture). For all intents and purposes, the Muromachi shogunate was dead. On Nobunaga’s return to the capital, the court changed the era name from Genki to Tenshō 天正. Nobunaga had long been pushing for a change in era name, and the Tenshō era represented the cementing of his authority in the capital. Wasting no time, Nobunaga moved on the Asakura, handing them defeat after defeat, until Asakura Yoshikage was betrayed by his cousin and forced to commit suicide. Nobunaga then defeated Asai Nagamasa and his father, who both committed suicide. Nobunaga then turned on Miyoshi Yoshitsugu, who also committed suicide. A month later, Matsunaga Hisahide surrendered to Nobunaga. Nobunaga’s hold on the capital would not be challenged again until his assassination. 110 Nobunaga vs. Buddhism There is an odd lacuna in the documents of the Council of Head Temples: there are no Council documents relating to Nobunaga directly until after he had ousted the Shogun Yoshiaki. This is not to say that Nobunaga had no relationship with individual temples, however. Documents signed by Nobunaga in the Honnōji archive go back as far as his arrival in the capital in 1568. The first of these is a standard prohibition, issued more or less upon his entry to the capital. 293 Honnōji also sent Nobunaga a painted screen the next year that Nobunaga said, “made [his] lodgings magnificent.” 294 Late in 1570 we see a document laying out the rules that must be followed at Honnōji while Nobunaga lodged there. It seems likely that Nobunaga was a concern of the Council, but perhaps they focused more on the shogun, who was the traditional ruler of the capital and nominally Nobunaga’s superior. Nobunaga’s relationship with religious organizations has drawn a great deal of scrutiny. In Japanese scholarship, this goes back at least as far as the historian of religion Tsuji Zennosuke’s Meiji-era writings. 295 Post-war scholars have tended to see Nobunaga as anti-Buddhist, either because he saw Buddhist temples as a threat to his power, or because of his rationalist or atheistic ideology, or even because of Nobunaga’s awareness of his own role in bringing about a new historical order. 296 In English, Neil McMullin’s work has asserted that Nobunaga’s conflict with religious groups, particularly Honganji, was the defining conflict of the Sengoku period, because it destroyed the ōbō-buppō (Royal law – Buddhist teachings) interdependence ideal that had characterized earlier relations between secular and religious authority. This scholarly view is heavily tied to general historiographical trends after the Second World War, which viewed Nobunaga as a revolutionary. Hisashi Fujiki, for example, held that Nobunaga was attempting to “eradicate Sengoku characteristics among the daimyo who made up his regime.” 297 In summarizing Naitō Akira’s view of 293 Honnōji shiryō chūsei hen, #159. Honkōji also received a prohibition that month. 294 Honnōji shiryō chūsei hen, #161. 295 Tsuji Zennosuke was an extremely influential Meiji era scholar of Japanese history and Buddhism. See for example Tsuji, Nihon Bukkyōshi kenkyū kinsei hen vol. 1. 296 Takayanagi, “The Glory That Was Azuchi,” 524. 297 Fujiki and Ellison, “The Political Posture of Oda Nobunaga,” 186. 111 Nobunaga, Takayanagi Shun’ichi states that “Professor Naitō stresses the rich and buoyant vitality of Nobunaga's ideology; he not only originated this ideology but sought to enact it. He was both the supreme actor and the divine dramaturge.” 298 In other words, Nobunaga was consciously trying to destroy the old order and replace it with his own vision of the world. Over the past twenty years or so, however, studies of Nobunaga have moved away from this view. For example, the text of the famous “Tenka Fubu” 天下布武 seal, which Nobunaga used in documents issued after his takeover of Gifu, was long interpreted as meaning, “unite the realm through military force.” The most recent biographies by Ikegami and Matsushita both reject this reading, however. More recent scholarship largely treats tenka as either a synonym for the home provinces or the limited realm of direct shogunal or royal authority (these two definitions obviously overlap significantly). The arguments for this further point out that if the seal actually referred to militarily unifying the realm, then almost every letter Nobunaga wrote from 1565 onwards could be read as a declaration of war against the recipient. None of the warriors to whom Nobunaga wrote letters seemed to have interpreted the term in that way, so it is unlikely that Nobunaga’s seal had any aggressive meaning. 299 The notion of a “way of heaven” ( 天道, tentō) ideology, “influenced, perhaps inspired, by the Christian concept of God,” 300 has also largely disappeared from historical analysis. As Jeroen Lamers points out, the linking of the term “way of heaven” to Nobunaga is more a result of Ōta Gyuichi’s biography of Nobunaga (The Shinchō kōki) than Nobunaga’s writing. 301 Furthermore, the word “tentō” was ubiquitous in the Sengoku period: it appears in so many different places that Kanda Chisato has referred to it as the most important religious term of the Sengoku period. Christian missionaries did not popularize the term, but, rather appropriated it. 302 298 Takayanagi Shun’ichi, “The Glory That Was Azuchi,” 524. 299 Ikegami, 59-60; Matsushita, 35-39. 300 Takayanagi, 524. 301 Lamers, 128. 302 Kanda, Shūkyō de yomu sengoku jidai. 112 Nobunaga’s image as an innovator has suffered as well in recent historiography. For instance, the famed raku-ichi raku-za laws that banned guilds and helped commerce in Gifu and Azuchi were long seen as part of Nobunaga’s contribution to Japan’s economic advance, but it is now clear that the Rokkaku were promulgating such laws decades earlier. It is also quite possible that both locations where Nobunaga promulgated those laws, in Gifu and Azuchi, had similar laws in place before he took them over. 303 Looking specifically at Nobunaga’s relationship with Buddhism, the dominant scholarly view for most of the twentieth century has been that Oda Nobunaga was actively anti-Buddhist. This is hardly surprising. His “ten-year war” with Honganji and the Ikkō Ikki is the subject of numerous studies in Japanese and English. 304 In addition, his destruction of Mt. Hiei was shocking to contemporary chroniclers – even usually sympathetic chroniclers like Ōta Gyūichi could not defend the attack. He also planned an attack on Mt. Kōya and killed a number of the monks of that temple. Finally, in what can be seen as the ultimate affront to all religions, he deified himself, and had the townsfolk of Azuchi make offerings to him on his birthday. The Nichiren kyōdan zenshi puts it this way: “Nobunaga’s attitude towards all the sects was one that tended towards suppression and persecution. When a matter arose, it was always attended by slaughter. His character was merciless and conniving, and he was suspicious of everyone. He could not allow a grudge to go unavenged.” 305 This harsh judgement is not, however, as straightforward as it may seem. First, let us deal with the deification story. Jeroen Lamers has plainly shown that it is false and is almost certainly the invention of the Jesuit Missionary Luis Frois. 306 It has no corroboration in any native source and no corroboration in the letters 303 Ikegami, 226-48. The Rokkaku document relating to the Ishidera market in Mino is SIR 676. 304 In English, Lamers and McMullin provide the most in-depth analyses of the “ten-year war.” In Japanese, see Kanda Chisato, Nobunaga to Ishiyama kassen, etc. 305 Kyōdan zenshi, 442. 306 Lamers, 217-24. 113 of other Jesuits. It was once accepted widely among scholars, but Matsushita rejects it, and Ikegami makes no mention of it. 307 Moreover, as Ikegami notes, in general Nobunaga’s policy towards temples in areas he took over was to guarantee whatever prerogatives they had enjoyed before his arrival. 308 He was also close to many monks and temples, including several that he founded. 309 Even Frois, while proclaiming that Nobunaga was dismissive of all Japanese religion, stated that Nobunaga claimed to be a member of the Lotus (Nichiren) sect. 310 Later on in life, however, Nobunaga was closer to the Pure Land sect, which may well have been a factor in the Azuchi religious debate of 1579, as we shall see later. On the whole the assessment of McMullin and Lamers that Nobunaga’s religious policy was driven by opportunism is, I think, well founded. 311 McMullin’s view, drawing on older Japanese scholarship, that Nobunaga considered himself the “highest being in whatever pantheon of beings there may have been,” 312 ignores much evidence to the contrary, however. Nobunaga was perhaps not the most pious man of his age, but he was a frequent donor to the Atsuta and Ise Shintō shrines. McMullin suggests that Nobunaga’s “philosophy of life” might best be summed up in the line from Atsumori that Nobunaga sang on leaving to fight the battle of Okehazama: “The human lifespan, fifty years, compared to that enjoyed by the dwellers of the lowest heavens, is like a dream, a phantasm. Can there be anything, once given life, that does not perish in the end!” 313 The fact is that this line is Buddhist to its core, being the one uttered by the twelfth century warrior Kumagai Naozane as he decides to abandon the life of a warrior and become a monk. 314 One could, 307 McMullin, 88; Matsushita, 133-5. 308 Ikegami, 42. 309 McMullin, 87. 310 There is some evidence that Nobunaga, and Nobuhide before him, had been patrons of the Nichiren sect, though the most direct evidence of this (a letter in the collection of Nagoya Hokkeji) may be an Edo-period creation. 311 McMullin, 88; Lamers, 170. 312 McMullin, 88-89. 313 Translation as per Lamers and Elisonas (trans.), The Chronicles of Lord Nobunaga, 85-86. McMullin uses a different translation. See McMullin, 88. 314 The piece Nobunaga sang is derived from a scene in the Tale of the Heike. See McCullough, 315-18 114 as Lamers does, explain Nobunaga’s positive religious relationships as a means of social control, 315 but I see no reason why this should be to the exclusion of his having a normal religious life (at least, normal for a sixteenth-century Japanese warlord). In the previous chapter, I noted that the Miyoshi warriors supported the Eiroku treaty between the Nichirenist temples (see above, page vi), and argued that they did so in order to gain the prestige of being the sect’s protector throughout Japan. However, I think that the Miyoshi’s connection to Kemponji in Sakai and their decision to use Nichikō to convert all of Awa to the Nichiren sect demonstrates that they had some manner of connection to the religion beyond politics. I see no reason to assume that this does not apply to Nobunaga as well. Friction Several events in Nobunaga’s early reign in the capital have been seen as evidence of his hostility towards the Nichiren sect. Perhaps the earliest is a story related by Frois in a letter of 1569, which discusses Nobunaga’s actions in building the new Nijō palace for the shogun: Among the temples [of the Lotus sect], those who commit the worst offences are those of the wealthy Rochio [Rokujō Honkokuji]. As you no doubt know, at the time when Danjō-dono [Matsunaga Hisahide] killed the Kubō-sama [Ashikaga Yoshiteru], they [Honkokuji] sent him [Hisahide] 1500 cruzado 316 to ask him to order Father Gaspar Vilela and myself killed … [Nobunaga] destroyed that temple’s mansions and other rooms [to pillage the stone] without hesitation, and took all their screens and beautiful paintings to decorate to Kubō-sama [Ashikaga Yoshiaki]’s castle. The monks went to Danjō-dono for a pardon, and asked him to speak to Nobunaga, but he replied that he could not do this, as when the king 317 made a decision it could not be changed. Roughly 1500 Nichirenists from the city assembled in council, and in keeping with his majesty’s wishes sent great amounts of gold and silver, and they begged Nobunaga to cease such humiliation of a temple so famous throughout Japan. They even got the pardon of the Kubō-sama and the Dairi [sovereign], but it had no effect. It was totally destroyed, and the monks wept. 318 315 Lamers, 170. 316 A Portuguese coin minted in both gold and silver, and equivalent to several hundred Real. Perhaps this is a rough equivalent to taels (ryō) or pieces (mai) of gold or silver in Japanese. If so, it is a princely sum. 317 As in the epigraph, Frois and the other Jesuits referred to what we call daimyō as “kings” or “princes.” They also tended to refer to the shogun as an emperor. The sovereign’s title varied, though early on he was often referred to as “pope.” See Kanda, Shūkyō de yomu sengoku jidai, 17-22. 318 Yasokaishi Nihon Tsūshi, vol. 1, 436-9. 115 In fact taking building materials from temples was a common practice in the Sengoku period. 319 Nobunaga’s contemporary biographer, Ōta Gyūichi, notes in his Shinchō kōki that, in the construction of the Nijō palace, stones and materials were taken from nearby towns and provinces and that famous gardens in the capital gave up their stones for the construction. 320 There are also examples from Nobunaga’s castle at Azuchi, where some of the stones in the stairs are clearly repurposed Buddhist statuary. 321 As Honkokuji survived the 1560s, it is clear that the whole of Honkokuji was not destroyed, and no record of the council or the destruction of Honkokuji is in the Honkokuji nempu or the Ryōzan rekifū. It seems likely that Nobunaga’s men confiscated stones and art from Honkokuji, and the Council of Head Temples requested that Honkokuji be exempted from having its materials confiscated. Perhaps this request was denied. The suggestion that all the art and building materials at Honkokuji were confiscated nonetheless strains credulity. Then there is the matter of the courtier Takeuchi Sueharu 竹内季治 (1518-1571). On the sixteenth day of the ninth month of 1571, courtier diarist Yamashina Tokitsugu reported that Nobunaga’s warriors had arrested Takeuchi Sueharu. Sueharu was a high-ranking (third rank) courtier and Nichirenist patron. He had presided over the signing of the Eiroku treaty and was among the first to receive a gift from the Council in 1565. Tokitsugu reported that the arrest was ordered by the shogun and that no one knew the reason for it. Frois and the author of the palace journal Oyudono no ue nikki both reported that Takeuchi had slandered Nobunaga in front of shogun. 322 Nobunaga was on the way from the capital back to Gifu at the time, and when his army stopped in Nagahara in Ōmi on the nineteenth, they executed Takeuchi. The reasons for Takeuchi’s death seem simple enough: he spoke ill of Nobunaga in the shogun’s presence. It seems quite likely that the shogun signed off on his death (as suggested by Yamashina Tokitsugu). As this followed hot on the heels of the burning of Mt. Hiei, it seems likely that Nobunaga was settling as many scores in the capital as he could before returning to Gifu. It should also be noted that a 319 McMullin, 86. 320 Ōta, 95-96. 321 There is a clearly marked example that the author has seen personally at Azuchi castle. 322 Kawauchi, Toshi to shūkyō, 252. 116 reading of Tokitsugu’s journal as well as in Takeuchi’s final Kugyō bunin entry allows for Yoshiaki to have been the main instigator in Takeuchi’s death. 323 The meaning of the event, however, remains unclear. Kawauchi, for example, sees this as evidence that Nobunaga was starting to worry that the Nichirenists saw him as hostile (although he also argues that the Nichiren sect was most certainly not hostile to Nobunaga). 324 Many, perhaps most, studies of Nobunaga ignore the incident altogether, with neither Ikegami nor Matsushita addressing Takeuchi’s death in their recent biographies. Neil McMullin makes no mention of Takeuchi at all, and Jeroen Lamers mentions him as an afterthought to the destruction of Mt. Hiei, with no discussion of his religious connections. 325 Despite his being a high-ranking courtier, Takeuchi’s death is not mentioned in Imatani Akira’s Nobunaga to Tennō, nor does he appear in Butler’s Emperor and Aristocracy in Japan, 1467-1680. The Kyōdan zenshi ignores his death as well. The overall silence of secondary scholarship on the subject can be explained by the fact that other than the sources noted above, there is little documentation of the event. It is not mentioned in Gyūichi’s biography of Nobunaga, nor in Nichikō’s journal, nor in the Ryōsanrekifu. The Honkokuji nenpu, the chronicle of the temple Takeuchi patronized, contains mention of his death, but notes only that “the Holy Man Shinteki [Takeuchi Sueharu] passed away on the nineteenth.” 326 It is surprising enough that a third-rank courtier was summarily executed in this way, but the lack of reaction in these sources, especially the Honkokuji nenpu, is shocking. In my view any attempt to link the execution of Takeuchi Sueharu to Nichirenism does not rise above conjecture. I also do not agree with Kawauchi’s suggestion that Takeuchi’s behavior helped turned Nobunaga 323 The Dainihon shiryō entry title for the event is “…because of Yoshiaki’s orders [Nobunaga] kills Takeuchi Sueharu in Nagahara in Ōmi.” The Kugyō bunin entry is Eiroku 10 (1567) and the note on the shogun ordering the death is not in all variants. 324 Toshi to shūkyō, 252-54. 325 Tyrannus Japonius, 77. 326 “Honkokuji nenpu,” pt. 1, 177. 117 against the sect. The contemporary sources, where they even mention the event, do not note his religious tendencies. Nobunaga killed Takeuchi Sueharu because he considered him a threat at court, and Takeuchi’s choice of temple was irrelevant. Table 2 Nobunaga's Lodgings in the Capital, 1568-1582 Another issue often raised as a point of conflict between Nobunaga and the sect is Nobunaga’s choice of lodgings. Looking at Table 1 above, we can see that Nichirenist head temple Myōkakuji was his 327 Sources disagree here, reporting his lodging at both places. See Ikegami, 35. 328 Yoshiaki insisted on beginning groundwork for a permanent residence for Nobunaga in the capital. Nobunaga does not appear to have ever stayed there, but work seems to have begun just after Nobunaga arrived at the capital in 1572. Year Date Lodging Buddhist Denomination (if a temple) 1568 9/28 Tōfukuji/Tōji 327 Rinzai Zen/ Shingon 1570 3/5 The residence of Nakarai Roan in the Upper Capital 1570 8/23 Honnōji Nichiren sect 1572 3/12 Myōkakuji Nichiren sect 1572 3/12 Construction begins at “an empty lot at Musha no Kōji that had been held by a princely temple” 328 1573 7/7 Myōkakuji Nichiren sect 1573 11/4 Myōkakuji Nichiren sect 1574 3/? Shōkokuji Rinzai Zen 1575 3/2 Shōkokuji Rinzai Zen 1575 6/27 Shōkokuji Rinzai Zen 1575 10/12 Myōkakuji Nichiren sect 1576 4? Construction begins at Nijō Palace 1576 4/30 Myōkakuji Nichiren sect 1576 6/5 Myōkakuji Nichiren sect 1576 11/4 Myōkakuji Nichiren sect 1577 1/14 Myōkakuji Nichiren sect 1577 2/9 Myōkakuji Nichiren sect 1577 3/25 Myōkakuji Nichiren sect 1577 7/6 Nijō Palace 1577 10/12 Myōkakuji Nichiren sect 1577 11/13 Nijō Palace 1578 3/23 Nijō Palace 1578 9/24 Nijō Palace 1578 10/1 Nijō Palace 1579 2/18 Nijō Palace 1579 9/18 Nijō Palace 1579 11/3 The Nijō Palace is given to prince Sanehito 1579 11/16 Myōkakuji Nichiren sect 1579 11/22 Sanehito moves to Nijō Palace 1579 12/14 Myōkakuji Nichiren sect 1580 2/21 Myōkakuji Nichiren sect 1580 2/26 Construction begins at the dedicated Honnōji residence. 1580 3/8 Myōkakuji Nichiren sect 1580 3/9 Honnōji Nichiren sect 1581 2/19 Myōkakuji Nichiren sect 1581 2/20 Honnōji Nichiren sect 1582 6/2 Honnōji Nichiren sect Source: Kawauchi, Nobunaga ga mita sengoku Kyoto, 159. 118 favored place to stay in the capital. Further, Yoshiaki was initially installed at Honkokuji, and Nobunaga’s heir Nobutada stayed at Myōkakuji on several occasions as well. Nobunaga likely favored Nichirenist temples for some specific purpose – likely to demonstrate power: by occupying the wealthy and fortified Nichiren sect temples, Nobunaga demonstrated to the capital his own superior power. Some scholars have suggested that he was specifically trying to humiliate the sect. Recall that temples frequently sought exemptions from quartering troops. By ignoring these requests, Nobunaga perhaps demonstrated to the sect that he would do as he pleased and that he did not value their requests. There is, I think, a gesture of dominance in Nobunaga’s stays at Myōkakuji and Honnōji. Spite, however, was not the foremost motive. Kawauchi argues that the pattern of stays demonstrates that, at least initially, Nobunaga had no real interest in a permanent base in the capital. Even the Nijō palace was eventually given to Prince Sanehito, and the land in Musha-no-kōji does not seem to have gone past the early stages of construction. Before 1580, Nobunaga’s lodgings in the capital were temporary. 329 Cost was likely another reason: Nobunaga was frequently in the midst of expensive wars and construction projects in this period, so a premade lodging was preferable to spending treasure that could go towards Azuchi or fighting the Ikkō Ikki. The effect of Nobunaga’s stay on the temple can be seen from a document in the Honnōji collection: 330 Items Honnōji Item: While [this temple] is the dedicated lodging, no others may lodge here. In addition, the cutting of trees and bamboo or the fences is forbidden. Item: As to the matter of goods donated for offerings to the ancestors, keep to the generations of orders [from the shogun]; there should be no deviation. Item: The levying of inappropriate duties is forbidden. As to the above items, those who violate them shall be swiftly and harshly punished. So ordered. 329 Kawauchi, Nobunaga ga mita sengoku Kyoto, 158-60. 330 Honnōji shiryō chusei hen #164. 119 Genki 1 [1570] Twelfth Month Day Danjō no jō [Oda Nobunaga] (Seal) Certainly, we can see that Nobunaga and his retinue were an imposition. Based on the first item Itohisa Hōken has argued that the monks of the temple were expelled while Nobunaga was present. 331 The overall tenor of the document is more likely a limit on Nobunaga than the temple, however. The first item is Nobunaga’s promise to minimize his footprint at the temple by limiting the troops there to his own retinue and forbidding them from taking resources from the temple. The second item affirms some previous orders relating to rituals at the temple. The third forbids his men from taking money from the monks. In fact, but for the fact that Nobunaga was lodging at the temple, this document is formally identical to a prohibition, and it has similar language. 332 Prohibitions were documents that restricted the issuing party, not the party who received them (which is why temples and villages would pay warriors to issue them). I believe that this document suggests that Nobunaga was not attempting to humiliate the sect. His stay was likely somewhat disruptive, but in all likelihood it did not prevent much of the day-to-day business of the temple. The only limit on the temple was on having other lodgers. There is little to suggest malice towards Buddhism in general or towards the Nichiren sect in particular in the confiscation of materials from Honkokuji, the execution of Takeuchi Sueharu, or Nobunaga using the temples as lodging. Rather, the common thread here is opportunism and, in the case of Takeuchi’s execution, the desperate circumstances of the Genki era. A Brief Aside on Luis Frois Earlier, I discussed a number of instances in which the writings of Luis Frois prove problematic as sources. While the deification story is the most egregious example, 333 I think that much of what Frois says, especially on the subject of Japanese religion and Nobunaga’s relationship with it, is suspect. This would apply to a 331 Itohisa, 42-43. 332 A good basis for comparison is Nobunaga’s 1568 prohibition in the Honnōji collection, which has an identical closing line and final item. Honnōji shiryō chūsei hen #159. 333 Lamers, 217-224. 120 number of other Jesuit writers as well, but as the writer of the Historia and one of the more prolific letter writers among the Jesuits, Frois must bear the brunt of our scrutiny. For example, one often repeated story from Frois is that, in 1573, Takeda Shingen wrote Nobunaga a letter that he signed, “The Tendai Abbott [of Mt. Hiei], the monk Shingen,” to which Nobunaga responded with a letter signed “King Mara of the Sixth Heaven of the Desire Realm, Nobunaga.” Effectively, Shingen is showing his piety by signing as the highest- ranking Buddhist monk in Japan, and Nobunaga is showing his irreverence by signing his letter as the closest thing Buddhism has to a Satan. 334 This story, however, does not stand up to scrutiny. For one, even if Nobunaga was prone to such irreverence, it defies any kind of credulity that Shingen would, in an attempt to look pious, claim the position of abbot of Mt. Hiei. For one, the actual abbot was under his protection. For another, this would be a rather absurd title to claim, and Shingen knew it. It is likewise unlikely that in such a highly formalized letter exchange that Shingen would insert the title as a joke. Further, Nobunaga’s response flies in the face of his normal style of writing letters, which was to sign following general letter-writing conventions. Declaring oneself to be Satan in one’s signature does not comport with those conventions. Furthermore, there is no record in native sources of correspondence between Nobunaga and Shingen in 1573 to back Frois’s account. To be sure, I am not suggesting expunging Frois from the list of historical sources to be read and considered. Frois’s accounts are invaluable in many ways for the study of sixteenth-century Japan. However, many scholars, Japanese and non-Japanese alike, have been lax in their interrogation of Frois’s writings as sources, especially when, as in the case of the self-deification story, there is no Japanese source that agrees with the Jesuit sources, and where Frois may have had motive to lie, exaggerate, or report rumors that confirmed his own biases. More of the problems with Frois’s writings will be clear in the next chapter. 334 Kawauchi, Toshi to shūkyō, 251, original in Yasokaishi Nihon tsūshi, vol. 2, 256. Frois was not trying to paint Shingen as irreverent here but rather as a pious Buddhist, whose main goal in attacking Nobunaga was the reestablishment of Mt. Hiei. 121 The Tenshō Agreement In 1575, eleven years after the Eiroku Treaty, representatives of the fifteen head temples signed this document: 335 The Rules for all the Temples: Item: Foolish debates on the principles of the Dharma by monks or patrons, without a request from all the temples, are forbidden. However, if there is something that must be said, all the temples must be informed, and then there should be a debate. Item: When there is a religious debate, the participants in the questions and answers shall be decided by all the temples. In addition, there shall be discussion on the content of letters of criticism. Item: At the time of a religious debate, if there is shame and cost [of a loss], then let the costs be paid out half by the temple of the person who lost (along with that temple’s patrons) and half by the Council. However, this may vary according to circumstance. Item: As before, the role of venue temple shall rotate from temple to temple. In addition, all shall receive a simple meal and sake twice [during the Council]. Item: During discussion, selected people from among the patrons of all the temples shall attend without fail. The above shall be strictly enforced. If there be any violators, let them be expelled from the tradition of all the lineages. The letter of decision is so decided. Tenshō 3 [1575] Eighth Month Day Signed in accordance with drawn lots [Names omitted] 336 This agreement, which has come to be called the Tenshō Agreement ( 天正盟約, Tenshō no meiyaku), seems straightforward. In some ways, it can be seen as an extension of the Eiroku Treaty. Whereas the latter forced hostile lineages to stop fighting each other, this Tenshō Agreement forbade those lineages to fight other sects unilaterally. It also lays down the specific penalties for failure, asking the temple of the loser and the Council to shoulder equal portions of any indemnities due if they lost. 335 Honnōji shiryō chusei hen, #175. I should note that it is a copy for which the original has been lost. 336 Agents from the same 15 temples as those who signed the Eiroku Treaty also signed this agreement. In several cases, it was the same agent. 122 Traditionally, this Tenshō Agreement has been seen as the sect moderating its aggressive tendencies, not only because of Nobunaga’s hostility but also because of a trend towards warriors across Japan banning religious debates, and because of the risks to the Nichiren sect from those debates. Tsumori Kiichi, however, disagrees: he believes that the temples were actively seeking out opportunities for religious debate and were making sure that they could use the tactic to maximum effect. 337 While the great number of Nichirenist monks who were still pursuing aggressive shakubuku proselytizing tactics bolsters Tsumori’s position, 338 there is some truth in both views. It was becoming abundantly clear in the late sixteenth century that warrior rulers had become impatient with large-scale religious debates as a tool of proselytizing, and the risks involved in both instigating or participating in these debates were great. Nonetheless, the dangers involved were commensurate with the rewards: a large-scale debate would visibly humiliate the losers and elevate the winners. The monopoly on potentially antagonizing religious debates by the Council of Head Temples allowed them to decide as a sect if a given debate was worth the risk. Furthermore, the provision that the temple responsible for the loss should shoulder half the costs was a strong incentive to refuse debates. In theory, this agreement both kept the sect safe from angry warriors and ensured its best chance to reap the benefit of a winnable debate. Unfortunately, every debate was still a gamble, as in the case of the Azuchi religious debate of 1579, our subject in the next chapter. The Tenshō 4 (1576) Fundraising Drive In Tenshō 4 (1576), the Council of Head Temples ran a citywide fundraising campaign ( 勧進 kanjin). In the Upper Capital alone, some thirteen hundred Nichirenist patrons pledged over one-and-a-half thousand strings of cash. 339 Patrons of Honkokuji pledged the most money, over 180 strings of cash. Myōsenji pledged the least, only raising one string of cash. If we look at money raised per household, Honnōji was the clear 337 Tsumori, “Shūron to shūgi ronsō,” 336. 338 Ibid, 336-37; Kyōdan zenshi 462-466. 339 A “string” (kan) is 1,000 copper coins (mon). Based on my math in the next chapter (see page 168), this is roughly enough money to buy enough rice to feed 3800 people for a year. 123 leader, with over 3000 coins pledged per household, and Honzenji, with just over 300 coins per household, the loser. The money the Council raised was then distributed as gifts to various powerful warriors in the shogunate and Nobunaga’s regime. I believe that this fundraiser is one of the most significant events in the history of the Nichiren sect and represents the maturation of the Council of Head Temples. Those with knowledge of the history of Japanese Buddhism may be surprised to see the significance I place on this fundraiser. Fundraising campaigns were not uncommon in medieval Japan. There were campaigns to rebuild the great Buddha hall at Tōdaiji in after it burned down in the twelfth and sixteenth centuries. There were numerous campaigns to repair buildings at Mt. Kōya and Tōji. There was the 1462 fundraising campaign held by the monk Gan’ami to feed famine victims assembled in Kyoto. Oda Nobunaga even promised the monk Seigyoku, who was raising funds to rebuild Tōdaiji, that everyone on his holdings would donate at least one coin every month. The Nichiren sect’s 1576 fundraising campaign was unique in a number of ways, however. First of all, fundraising campaigns at this time almost always had a specific goal, usually the construction or repair of a temple building. Nevertheless, none of the documentation of the 1576 campaign notes a specific purpose, and payments from the funds raised seem to have been made on something of an ad-hoc basis, as we shall see. Another odd feature of this campaign was that fundraising campaigns had rarely, if ever, been sect- exclusive. Campaigns such as Gan’ami’s or Seigyoku’s sought donations from everyone. Looking closely at medieval Kyoto, Kawauchi Masayoshi has noted that these earlier campaigns were often built on what could be described as the “one man, one coin” model, 340 wherein the goal was to collect a certain amount from every person in the capital. 341 In contrast, this 1576 campaign targeted Nichirenists exclusively. While this may fit in nicely with the Nichirenist idea of exclusivity, it severely limited the potential income from the 340 Kawauchi, “Tenshō yonen no rakuchu kanjin saikō,” 260. 341 That amount varied from campaign to campaign, but was often referred to as 1 hon 本, and in some cases, donations were recorded in the unit of hon. Ibid. 124 campaign. This exclusivity may also explain the lack of sources outside the Council collection that record the campaign. Another distinguishing feature of the 1576 campaign is that Nichirenists did not run fundraisers. As far as can be ascertained from the sources, this is the first such campaign the Nichiren sect ever attempted. The Nichiren sect in Kyoto subsisted on constant (if irregular) donations, 342 so a large campaign like this one might seem redundant (or indeed, overbearing) from the patron’s perspective. The remainder of this chapter will be devoted to this fundraising campaign. I will first explain the extant sources, with a special focus on the document that details how the money was spent. I will then use those sources to reconstruct how the fundraising was conducted and what the goal of the Council was in initiating it. To anticipate the conclusion, I show here that the main objective was to persuade the recipients to continue the Nichirenists’ exemption from participating in rituals and functions of other sects, in particular, other sects’ fundraising campaigns. Fundraising Documents We must closely examine the five groups of documentary materials in the Council collection that bear on the 1576 fundraising drive. They are: A. Records of the Fundraising Campaign in the Capital 洛中勧進記録 343 342 This was not always the case outside the capital, as can be seen at Ushimado Honrenji, which had substantial landholdings. See Itohisa, 162-68. 343 A is reproduced in Chōmyōji monjo vol. 3, 172-253. However, note that the compilers of the collection included the documents on pages 249-50 in error. The compilers considered the document on page 249 (#201) to be the entry for the Shinzaike neighborhood, but in fact, all the names listed are vassals of Oda Nobunaga, and the final line has been misread to show received instead of money given. Furthermore, even if this was money pledged, the Shinzaike entries in B show a combined 78 kanmon pledged for the two Shinzaike neighborhoods, while the total in this document is 8.6 kanmon. We can be sure that this document is a record of gifts to these vassals (Hasegawa Hidekazu, Hori Hidemasa, and the monk Ichiun’sai Hariami) and their intermediaries. Its only connection to the Shinzaike is that the man who signed it, a patron named Shimizu Kurōjirō (he is in fact listed in the B entry for Shinzaike Naka-machi as pledging 70 monme of silver), was from Shinzaike and put the neighborhood in front of his name. Furukawa says that there is no extant A document for the Shinzaike Neighborhood. The document on page 250 (#202) is glossed by the compiler as “A Warrior Fundraiser” and likewise is money paid out, not received, 125 B. All Temple Fundraising Campaign Account Books 諸寺勧進帳 344 C. The Paid-Up Portion of the All Temple Fundraising Campaign 諸寺勧進銭万納分 345 D. The Outstanding Portion of the All Temple Fundraising Campaign 諸寺勧進之未進分 346 E. Expenditures Paid from the All Temple Fundraising Campaign 諸寺勧進之内遣方 347 Document A: Records of the Fundraising Campaign in the Capital The “Records of the Fundraising Campaign in the Capital“ (hereafter “Document A”) is a large collection of loose, one-page documents. Each page shows the pledged amount for a small number of neighborhoods (machi), though most indicate only one machi. They are not consistent in format. Some are folded paper (origami) and some are unfolded. There were also clearly a large number of scribes involved. Two documents are signed, 348 but the remaining are not. Only in the case of the Shinmachi-benzaiten neighborhood 349 is the signer – one Sōfuku, a patron of Honkokuji’s Kajōbō – listed as a donor. 350 Sōfuku, who pledged 500 mon, is also listed as having collected the pledges, including a 100-mon pledge from his mother. Most of the documents in Document A look something like this example for the Chōmyōji-no-mae neighborhood: ○Chōmyōji-no-mae-machi 351 and it was sent to the very same vassals named in the previous document (along with Sugaya Naganori, Yabe Iesada, Iio Nobumune, Inoko Takanari, Matsui Yūkan, Akechi Mitsuhide, Nakao Gentarō, and Kataoka Chō’unsai (probably Chō’unken Myōsō)). 344 B is reproduced in Chōmyōji monjo vol. 4, 10-97. 345 C is reproduced in Chōmyōji monjo vol. 4, 98-103. 346 D is reproduced in Chōmyōji monjo vol. 4, 102-5. 347 E is reproduced in Chōmyōji monjo vol. 4, 106-11. 348 Chōmyōji monjo vol. 3, 216 and 214 349 There is a discrepancy here between Document A and Document B. Document B’s entry lists the name of the neighborhood as Shin-yashiki-Benzaiten-machi, but the names and amounts pledges match perfectly, so this is clearly the same entry. 350 The record for the Shiragumo neighborhood is signed by one Ōtorii Tateiri Sukenobu, who is not included among the donors for that neighborhood or any other. See Chōmyōji monjo vol. 3, 214. 351 Chōmyōji monjo vol. 3, 220. This is also the example given in Furukawa, 17. 126 100 mon Chōmyōji Kakurin-bō Shinkurō 200 mon Honmanji Jitsusō-bō Matasaemon no jō 300 mon Chōmyōji Zenzō-bō Shōun 200 mon Myōmanji Yōsen-bō Shinpei <…> In total, 1 kan, 350 mon Fully paid. As seen in this example, each document lists, for each neighborhood, a list of amounts pledged and the donor who pledged them, with the name of the temple and cloister the donor patronized. Several documents in A do not list temples and several give additional information (for example, how many households were in the neighborhood, how many households were occupied by Nichirenists, etc.). Document B: The All Temple Fundraising Campaign Account Books The “All Temple Fundraising Campaign Account Books” (hereafter “Document B”) is a set of four bound books, with each containing pledge records for between 14 and 27 neighborhoods. 352 On the cover of each is written, “All Temple Fundraising Campaign Account Books: Initiated in the year of Hinoe ne 353 , tenth month, tenth day.” This allows us to date the fundraising to 1576. It is unclear how the neighborhoods were arranged in the books, as there is no apparent geographical or political pattern. The formatting across the books is fairly consistent, however. Here is the entry in that matches the above excerpt from the Campaign Records (Document A): Chōmyōji-no-mae-machi 354 352 The first book (Chōmyōji monjo vol. 4, 10-33) contains 27 neighborhoods. The second book (Chōmyōji monjo vol. 4, 34-55) contains 16. The third (Chōmyōji monjo vol. 4, 56-77), 14; and the fourth (Chōmyōji monjo vol. 4, 78- 97), 16. 353 “Year of the older brother of fire and the rat,” the 13th step in the sexegenary cycle. The only hinoe ne year in Nobunaga’s lifetime was 1576, so it is the only year that matches that step in the cycle. 354 Chōmyōji monjo vol. 3, 220; Furukawa, 17. 127 Chōmyōji Kakurin-bō 100 mon ni Shinkurō Honmanji 200 mon i Matasaemon Chōmyōji Zenzō-bō 300 mon ni Shōun Myōmanji Yōsen-bō 200 mon yo Shinpei <…> In total, 1 kan, 350 mon All paid. Like Document A, Document B lists the temple and cloister patronized by the donor, the amount pledged, a single kana character, and the donor’s name. The kana character is a code for the temple, in the old i-ro-ha order, which allowed for a quick tallying of the patrons by temple. 355 At the end of each book there is an accounting of the number of households patronizing each temple and how much they had pledged. Where they can be compared, the Documents in the A and B groups largely agree, although there are discrepancies in the records for five neighborhoods, with the greatest discrepancy being 200 mon between the two entries for Takanotsukasa-Muromachi (17.7 kan to 17.5 kan). Twenty-one of the neighborhoods listed in Document B have no matching record in Document A. Of those, eight have shorter entries in Document B that include only the amount pledged for the neighborhood as a whole, with no individual donors or temples listed. Five neighborhoods in the Document A group are not present in the Document B group. Document C: The Paid-Up Portion of the All Temple Fundraising Campaign “The Paid-Up Portion of the All-Temple Fundraising Campaign” (“Document C”) is another bound book, which is dated the twentieth day of the tenth month of 1576. It lists the neighborhoods that had met their pledge obligations to the fundraiser at the time of the signing. As above, there is no apparent rhyme or reason to the order of the neighborhoods, as it does not line up with the Account Books (Document B) or the date on which 355 Furukawa has identified the code thus: I: Honmanji. Ro: Honpōji. Ha: Ryūhonji. Ni: Chōmyōji. Ho: Isoku (Likely what would become the 16th Head temple, Jakōji, in 1591). He: Honryūji. To: Myōkenji. Chi: Honnōji. Ri: Honkokuji. Nu: Myōrenji. Ru: Myōkakuji. Wo: Myōdenji. Wa: Yōhōji. Ka: Honzenji. Yo: Myōmanji. Ta: Myōsenji. 128 the pledges were paid (as far as we can know from notes in Document B). Each of the neighborhoods is noted as having either paid in full or being in arrears, the exact amount paid is listed, and it is clear that payment was made in both cash and kind. Sometimes this in-kind payment is simply listed as in-kind with the cash value listed; items include clothes, rice, brushes, paper, gold, and (most commonly) silver. 356 The neighborhoods are arranged in three sections, each of which is tallied separately, with a general total for the Upper Capital at the end. There is also, at the end of the document, a total for the Lower Capital, which the only mention of the lower capital in all the other documents relating to the campaign. Document D: The Outstanding Portion of the All Temple Fundraising Campaign “The Outstanding Portion of the All-Temple Fundraising Campaign” (hereafter “Document D”) is the counterpart to the paid-up record, and it was created nine months later on the twenty-ninth day of the seventh month, 1577. It lists the neighborhoods that had not yet paid their full portion together with the amount outstanding for each. A comparison with Document C and Document B shows no major inconsistencies. Document E: Expenditures Paid from the All-Temple Fundraising Campaign The “Expenditures Paid from the All Temples Fundraising Campaign” (hereafter “Document E”) is a smaller booklet showing how the funds raised by the campaign were spent. This is a remarkably detailed account record, showing even the costs of putting together the books of Document B. 357 Another remarkable fact is that the budget lines up perfectly with the amount collected in Document C. Document C totals funds at 5,811 monme, 358 2 bu of silver (with 8 monme of silver spent on sake), and Document E shows a total of 356 Gold and silver were, at this time, clearly currency, and as such they do not really qualify as “in-kind.” However, they are listed separately from cash in this document. 357 Chōmyōji monjo vol. 4, 110. 358 It is not clear why the Council took pledges in mon (copper coin), and listed everything else in monme of silver. However, the exchange rate based on the expenditures is roughly 33 monme to 10,000 coins. See Furukawa, 20. 129 5,766 monme 9 bu 6 rin 5 mō of silver with 36 monme 2 bu 3 rin 5 mō of silver 359 unaccounted for (totaling 5803 monme 2 bu of silver, or the same as the amount in Document C after sake had been bought). Since there were no explicitly stated goals for this campaign, the best evidence we have for the reasoning behind it are the contents of this document. Consequently, we will analyze the 65 listed expenditures in 17 categories. 360 They are: 1. Gifts sent to Nobunaga and his men at their camp on Torakose yama in Ōmi. Nobunaga used Torakose yama in Ōmi as a base during his battles with the Asai and the Asakura from 1572 on. Likely, these gifts were sent in that year. Shijira cloth was sent to Nobunaga, Yabe Iesada, and Takei Sekian, and Katairo cloth was sent to Chō’unken Myōso. 361 The messengers’ guide, a man named Yasuke, was given a sash. 362 Also listed are expenditures for the messenger’s expenses on the road and lodging (also paid with a sash). In total, the expenditures for the gifts sent to Torakose yama are 410.96 monme of silver. 2. Gift sent in thanks for exemption from a citywide levy. It is unclear which levy this was and whether the exemption was unique to the Nichiren sect or universal, but once again the Council’s liaison was Yabe Iesada, though in this case the gift was to his vassal, Saizō. The gift was 3 koku of rice, 363 valued at 53 monme of silver. 3. A number of expenditures relating to the Daibutsu Tōdaiji had been trying to get the Daibutsu at Nara rebuilt since it burned down in 1567. This was a specific outlay of rice to be given to the Council of Head Temples, valued at 26.5 monme of silver. It was likely in response to the monk Seigyoku’s fundraising drive, which 359 Silver is measured by weight here in these documents. The units are as follows: 1 monme = 10 bu = 100 rin = 1000 mō. A monme is roughly 3.75 grams. 360 Furukawa lists 20 categories, but I feel a few of his categories can be combined. See Furukawa, 26. 361 Shijira cloth is a fabric with pronounced vertical stripes, often given as a gift. Katairo cloth is a fabric where the weft and the warp are different colors. Also frequently given as a gift. 362 This is not the most famous Yasuke in Nobunaga’s retinue, an African slave given to him by the Jesuits, as that Yasuke first appears in the historical record in 1581. 363 Roughly 835 liters. 130 began in 1570. In a letter to Seigyoku in 1572, Nobunaga guaranteed that each person in his holdings would each contribute one coin each month. 364 4. Gifts to the shogun Nobunaga ousted the Shogun Yoshiaki in 1573, so this set of gifts seems out of place in a 1576-or-later document. Yoshiaki was given four pieces of gold, and 16 taels of gold were paid as interest on same (presumably charged by the moneychanger). Silver was given to a vassal named Fujimura and to the shogun’s wife, who served as intermediaries to the shogun. The sum of 1200 mon was paid as “money given for a command” ( 下知銭, gechisen). It is impossible to date this with certainty, but I believe that the command being referenced is the 1571 letter in the Honnōji collection, 365 which acknowledges the tradition in the Nichiren sect of not participating in the rituals of other sects and their exemption from participating in fundraisers in particular. The letter is addressed to the sect as a whole. Total expenditures, including money to the capital, were 2,809.5 monme of silver. 5. Money to Sakai when the Daibutsu fundraiser was being pushed. Presumably, this refers to Nobunaga’s 1572 pledge to include everyone in his domains in fundraising for the Nara Daibutsu. It is unclear why the money was sent to Sakai, but Nichikō was in Sakai at this time, and in the twelfth month of that same year he notes in his journal that he was working to end Nichirenist involvement with the Daibutsu fundraising. 366 The Shogun’s 1571 order was probably sufficient to exempt them, but perhaps this was meant to pay the costs associated with sending officials in the shogunate or Nobunaga’s administration documents reminding them of the exemption. Total expenditures were 23.5 monme of silver 364 Kawauchi, “Tenshō yonen no rakuchū kanjin saikō,” 260. Original in Okuno, Oda Nobunaga monjo no Kenkyū, vol 1, 544. 365 Honnōji shiryō chūseihen #166. 366 Yanai, 59. 131 6. Gifts on “The Fiftieth Anniversary” This likely concerned the fiftieth anniversary of someone’s death. Again, it cannot be determined for certain, but two candidates would be the anniversary of the death of Fujiwara Eishi (the mother of the reigning sovereign Ōgimachi) in 1572, or the anniversary of the death of sovereign Go-Kashiwabara in 1575. In this case, gold pieces were sent to Murai Sadakatsu and others, along with other gifts of cloth and tatami mats. Total expenditures were 893.175 monme of silver. 7. Gifts sent to Nobunaga and his men in Echizen As with the earlier expenditures to the Torakose yama camp, this was a series of gifts sent to Nobunaga on campaign. Nobunaga was in Echizen three times, in 1570, 1573, and 1575. Expenditures included cloth for Nobunaga, and the boat fare at Sakamoto. They totaled 145.31 monme of silver. 8. A fur coat as a gift The recipient was Manmi Shigemoto (listed under his childhood name, Sen’chiyo), one of Nobunaga’s former pages who frequently served in administrative roles. Total expenditures were 33 monme of silver. 9. A gift to Manmi Shigemoto on his arrival in the capital after recuperating at a hot spring A fur item and a small gift to Manmi’s representative amounted to an expenditure of 45.6 monme of silver. 10. A gift of tin bowls to several of Nobunaga’s men at an indeterminate time Tin bowls given to Hashiba (later Toyotomi) Hideyoshi, Yabe Iesada, and Kusunoki Chōan, for a total expenditure 38 monme of silver. 11. Gifts to Nobunaga and his men during his campaign against Saiga 132 Nobunaga marched against the Ikkō Ikki in Saiga in the second month of 1577. The Council provided Nobunaga with 10 kin 367 of gunpowder while he was at his camp, along with cloth for him when he stayed at Myōkakuji on the way to battle. Yabe Iesada also received a gift of cloth. Based on the timing, this was probably the precursor to the next item, as Murai’s letter comes mere days before Nobunaga went on campaign. The total expenditure was 215 monme of silver. 12. Gifts in thanks for the document excluding the sect from other sects’ fundraisers This was gold given to Murai Sadakatsu for arranging Nobunaga’s approval for the sect’s exemption from other sects’ fundraisers and rituals. The letter, which I will discuss later in some detail, is in the Council collection. Matsui Yūkan also received some dyed leather. The total expenditure was 492.7 monme of silver. 13. Money for the Shijō bridge levy. The Shijō Bridge was washed away in both 1576 and 1578, but Yoshida Kanemi notes a levy like this one in 1576 was managed by Murai Sadakatsu. The Council paid out 85.8 monme of silver. 14. A payment to Katō It is unclear which Katō this was, but a gift of two sashes was sent, for a total expenditure of 1.32 monme of silver. 15. Money for incense It is unclear why incense was being sent, but ten bundles went to Murai Sadakatsu and one to his representative for a total expenditure of 55 monme of silver. 16. A confirmation of the [exemption] document from Matsui Yūkan 367 A kin is a unit of weight equivalent to roughly six kilograms (about 13 pounds). This would be enough for somewhere between 400 and 600 gunshots. 133 This payment was made to Murai Sadakatsu’s vassal Hayato (probably Nakamura Hayato no Suke), who was serving as Matsui Yūkan’s representative. This was a cash payment of 3000 mon, listed as an expenditure of 3.3 monme of silver. 17. Additional expenditures These expenditures seem to relate to the fundraising campaign itself. Gifts of cloth to the “three administrators” and to someone at Azuchi fit the usual pattern of gifts in this document, but the remaining items have no listed recipient. Also included in this section is the budget for the Account Books (Document B), and brushes and cloth. They total 212.7 monme of silver. The biggest recipient of funds noted in Document E was the Shogun Yoshiaki, who received 1869 monme’s worth of gifts, followed by Murai Sadakatsu, who received 1194.95 monme. 368 Oda Nobunaga was third with 465 monme, and one Fujimura-dono (likely a member of Yoshiaki’s court) was fourth. Less well paid but appearing frequently were Nobunaga’s vassals Matsui Yūkan, Takei Sekian, Manmi Shigemoto, Chōunken Myōso, and Kusunoki Chōan. Document E is a particularly problematic document, as it is very difficult to date the expenditures, and those that can be dated are all from well before the initiation of the fundraising campaign. Also, there are only two corroborating documents for the expenditures: the letter in the Honnōji collection and Murai Sadakatsu’s letter. Document E does provide a look into the relationship between the Council and Nobunaga’s regime, however. It is clear that Murai Sadakatsu, who had been posted as Nobunaga’s Kyoto deputy, was an important point of contact, so much so that Murai was given more money in gifts than was Nobunaga. Yabe Iesada may have received less in total than Murai, but he received the most payments (five). 368 Furukawa splits this up into two entries (Chōshū-dono and Murai-dono) on his table, but I think these are the same person (Murai Sadakatsu). Even if they are not, Murai-dono was likely a member of Murai’s retinue. 134 How the Fundraising Worked While these sources are patchy, they can be used to tease out the machinery of the fundraising effort. It is clear here that the neighborhood was the main unit of the fundraising. While individual patrons made the pledges, Document D (the outstanding portion) lists no patrons, only neighborhoods. In addition, in the case of Rakanburo-machi 羅漢風呂町, the neighborhood confraternity ( 講 , kō) made up a shortfall of 900 mon. 369 Based on this, Furukawa argues that not only was the neighborhood the basic unit of the campaign, but also that the amount each neighborhood owed was set by the Council, likely based on the number of Nichirenist households therein. In support, he notes that several entries in both Document A (the Records) and the Document B (the Account Books) list the number of houses, which Furukawa believes is a potential baseline. 370 The ratio of money pledged to households in the two cases where we have household numbers are 727 mon per household for Kasuga-machi 371 and 696 mon per household for Takatsukasa-machi. 372 If we take these numbers as representative, it suggests that the temple expected roughly 700 mon per household; 373 although with only two neighborhoods as examples, I am not prepared to treat that as standard. Adding complexity to this issue is the fact that households did not make the pledges; rather, individual donors did. The documents do suggest a rough timeline. The beginning of the fundraising was likely early in the tenth month of 1576. Based on the twenty neighborhoods listed with dates, the bulk of the funds were likely collected by the middle of the eleventh month. 374 During this time, the Council produced Document C (the Paid-Up Portion), which was dated on the twentieth day of the tenth month. Document C was likely put together to allow collectors to dun more effectively for pledged money, perhaps through confraternities like 369 Furukawa, 24. Chōmyōji monjo vol. 4, 48. 370 Furukawa, 24. 371 Chōmyōji monjo vol. 3, 199. 372 Chōmyōji monjo vol. 3, 218. 373 This was roughly the amount of money needed to buy enough rice to feed two people for a year. 374 Furukawa, 18-19. 135 that noted in the Rakanaburo-machi entry. 375 There must have been some sort of neighborhood-level organization or there would be no reason to produce these documents. 376 Dunning likely continued until the seventh month of the next year, when the Council put together Document D (the Outstanding Portion), ending the fundraising campaign. It should be noted, too, that all of the documents in the Council collection relate to fundraising from the Upper Capital (Kamigyō). Neither Document B (the Account Books) nor Document A (the Records) has any details concerning the Lower Capital (Shimogyō). Nevertheless, we can be sure that there was also a fundraiser in the Lower Capital, as Document C (Paid-Up Portion) notes (“also, 360 kanmon from the Lower Capital”). 377 The total from the Upper Capital was 873 kan 445 mon. Recall that in 1573, Oda Nobunaga had put the Upper Capital to the torch as part of his attempt to intimidate the Shogun Yoshiaki, and that despite this, the Upper Capital raised more than double the Lower Capital in the fundraiser of 1576. This fundraising discrepancy between the Lower and Upper Capitals cannot be explained by the location of the temples, as the three highest grossing temples in the campaign were all in the Lower Capital. 378 It is obvious that despite the 1573 arson, the Upper Capital was much wealthier than the Lower Capital. 379 Looking at the documents in detail, we can also extract information about the nature of Nichirenist temple-patron relations in the Sengoku period. Kawauchi notes stark contrasts with the later Edo paradigm, in which a household was permanently and irrevocably attached to a temple. In looking at the account books, we see that patrons were not connected to the temple but to individual monks (the heads of individual cloisters). There are a few exceptions (as in the Chōmyōji-no-mae-machi entry above), but the vast majority of entries link the patron to a monk, not to a temple. Further, contrary to the circumstances of the Edo 375 This mention of confraternities is the first in any Nichirenist context in the capital. Sadly, how they functioned and how they were funded remains unclear. 376 Kawauchi, “Tenshō yonen no rakuchū kanjin saikō,” 269. 377 Chōmyōji monjo vol. 4, 103. 378 Honkokuji, Ryūhonji, and Myōkenji were the best grossing temples based on the totals at the end of the four volumes of the Account Books. 379 Furukawa, 25. 136 period, it is clear that these patrons were acting on their own and not as family representatives. For example, in the case of the Tamaya family in Nishidaiji-machi, Tamaya Hikojirō was a patron of Ryūhonji’s Jissōbō cloister, while Tamaya Shinpei-dono was a patron of Myōkakuji’s Junyoin cloister. 380 There are also numerous women listed in the donor rolls, listed as “wife” ( 内方, uchikata), “mother” ( かゝ, kaka), “widow” ( 後家, goke) and even “a group of women” ( 女衆, onna shu). 381 Looking more closely, where we can compare these women to the rest of their families, we again see that they, as individual patrons, did not necessarily follow the men in their families. For example, in the entry for Ōimikado-Muromachi-Kagamiya-machi in Document B, we see the example of the Kise family: 382 [Yōhōji] [Jissō-bō] 200 mon wa Wife of Kise Same [temple] Shinjō-bō 1 kanmon wa Same family, wife of the mirror-maker 383 Same [temple] Same [cloister] 1 kanmon wa Same family, Sukejiemon no jō This not only shows how family ties did not guarantee patronage ties, but it also demonstrates that the fundraiser was a sect-wide affair. The Reason for the Tenshō 4 Fundraiser The sources do not give us a direct narrative of the events nor a summary of the objectives of the fundraiser. Nonetheless, I believe that the facts we do have allow us to build a fairly good understanding of the objectives of the campaign. The objective of the campaign was the exemption of the Nichiren sect from the religious activities of other sects in general and other sects’ fundraising campaigns in particular. To 380 Kawauchi, “Tenshō yonen no rakuchū kanjin” saikō, 268. Original Chōmyōji monjo vol. 4, 40. 381 Furukawa, 21. 382 Chōmyōji monjo vol. 4, 20. 383 One wonders if this is the wife of the celebrated mirror maker Kise Jōami the First, who died in 1618. 137 demonstrate this, first we should look at a document in the Council collection, a copy of a letter by Murai Sadakatsu: 384 As to the matter of the Lotus Sect, since the time of the founder [Nichiren], it has been a rule that one neither gives nor receives according to the will of other sects, and especially that one does not give to fundraising campaigns, etc. We are in agreement with this. From this point on, no matter what is said, in both the Upper and Lower capital, this sect is exempt. So ordered. Tenshō 5 [1577] Second Month, First Day Murai Nagato no kami [Sadakatsu] cypher To the Lotus Sect, both monastic and lay Looking at Document E (Expenditures), of events that can be dated with certainty, only three of the seventeen groups of expenditures are dated after the campaign’s start date, the tenth month of 1576: clusters 11, 12, and 16. Clusters 12 and 16 are clearly expenses related to obtaining the exemption document above, and I believe that the gifts in cluster 11 were in gratitude for Murai’s letter. Also, as a thank you to Nobunaga, the Council provided arms to be used against his hated enemy (and theirs), the Ikkō Ikki. This letter, along with a similar shogunal order from 1571 in the Honnōji collection, 385 are indeed the keys to understanding why the 1576 fundraising drive was undertaken. Returning to Nobunaga’s arrival in the capital in 1568, the express purpose of Nobunaga’s march westward was to make Yoshiaki shogun. At that time, the temples were already in contact with both Nobunaga and Yoshiaki, obtaining prohibitions and exemptions from quartering troops. Also, Yoshiaki lodged at Honkokuji, so there was immediate and frequent contact with the shogun. The Council, however, was less active. There are no Council documents relating to Nobunaga or his regime from the Eiroku or Genki eras. The first major initiative the Council made was probably the one that resulted in the 1571 letter in the Honnōji archive discussed above. This was likely not the first time that the sect had obtained such a pledge, as the letter says, “for generations his lordship [the shogun] has agreed, and your exemption has been granted.” I have been unable to find an earlier letter, but 384 Chōmyōji monjo vol. 1, 110 385 Honnōji shiryō chūseihen #166. 138 it is likely that there was also a pledge written by the Shogun Yoshiharu or Yoshiteru. The Council expended an exorbitant sum on getting this exemption from Yoshiaki, and they did so just in time: in the sixth month of the next year, Nobunaga made his pledge to Seigyoku to make everyone in his holdings participate in the fundraiser for the Nara Daibutsu. The shogun’s exemption order likely worked, but the Council still had to pay out to ensure that it did, as can be seen above in category 5 of Document E. As the years passed, the Council became more involved with Nobunaga’s regime, giving money to him for various military campaigns. As Nobunaga and Yoshiaki grew apart, the Council found itself with new problems. Particularly difficult was Nobunaga’s burning of the Upper Capital in 1573. This not only meant that several temples (such as Chōmyōji) had to be rebuilt. It also meant that the temple’s patrons in the Upper Capital were impoverished and unable to donate as much. This pressure on the budgets of the temples and patrons likely meant that the Council itself lacked funds. Worse still, the sudden expulsion of the shogun meant that their exemption from other sect’s fundraisers had to be confirmed by Nobunaga – difficult, because it amounted to backing up an order of his enemy, Ashikaga Yoshiaki. The Council likely made the decision to conduct the fundraiser in 1575, the year before it began. By that point the Upper Capital had largely been rebuilt, as had Chōmyōji. 386 Furthermore, the Council had been active in other ways, by signing the Tenshō Agreement in that same year. The Tenshō Agreement’s strict control of religious debates was likely a sign of the negative reaction that religious debates were provoking throughout Japan, but another objective may well have been to show Oda Nobunaga that the Nichiren sect was going to be orderly and friendly to his regime. It was also the first step towards getting the exemption confirmation from Murai Sadakatsu. To conclude this section, the fundraiser was designed to do two things: 1) recoup lost Council funds that had gone to the shogun and Nobunaga’s men in the past, and 2) give the Council enough capital to make a push for Nobunaga’s regime to acknowledge the Nichiren sect’s exemption from future fundraising by 386 Nichikō’s journal shows the repairs in progress by 1574. 139 other sects. The Council knew (partly based on the expense of obtaining the 1571 letter) that this would be a major undertaking, and it was probably unsure that it could manage the needed expenditures. Therefore, they first signed the Tenshō agreement to ingratiate themselves to the Nobunaga regime, and then they raised as much money as they could. In the end, this strategy was a success: seven months after the fundraiser started, Murai signed the letter giving Nobunaga’s imprimatur to the sect’s right not to support the affairs of other sects, and moreover, the amount raised made up for expenditures going back five years. The Council’s financial health, at least, was much improved. But why all this effort for an exemption from other sects’ fundraising? A good possibility is that this exemption was extremely important for retaining patrons. Looking closely at both Murai’s order and the shogunal one, we can see that the letter was not addressed to the temples exclusively. Murai’s letter was addressed “To the Lotus Sect, both monastic and lay [members],” and the shogunal order opens, “as to the monks of this sect, be they in the city or the country, at the main temple or at a branch temple, and the patrons of same.” 387 Lay patrons, then, were also exempted from participating in the affairs of other sects and in particular fundraisers. One might assume that this focus on fundraisers was odd, because after all, could one not simply refuse to participate? In reality, one could not. Nobunaga, for example, guaranteed that each person in his domain would give one mon a month to Seigyoku’s campaign to rebuild the Nara Daibutsu. Kawauchi Masayoshi notes that most fundraising campaigns were viewed as universal, according to the rhetoric of “one man, one coin.” 388 While, clearly, there was no one approaching every man, woman, and child in Kyoto to demand money, there was major pressure to participate in these events, and wealthy people were expected to give large donations. This means that becoming a Nichirenist patron allowed a Sengoku 387 Emphasis is my own. 388 Kawauchi, “Tenshō yonen no rakuchū kanjin saikō,” 260. 140 townsman (or woman) to exempt him or herself from what was otherwise seen as a universal responsibility. What is more, this exemption was supported by the legal authority of the shogun and Nobunaga. The fundraiser was, then, a fundraiser to avoid fundraisers, and it was an important part of the sect’s appeal to townsfolk. The significance of the fundraising campaign, however, goes beyond mere finances. A fundraising campaign of this type was a major undertaking. If we look at the actions of the Council since its founding, we primarily see two modes of action: bribing warriors to obtain protection, and sect-wide agreements. Both of these were complex undertakings as well. Each of the head temples had had experience bribing warriors for protection on their own, however, and the Council only allowed them to do so for the sect as a whole, and thus more efficiently. The agreements, while certainly complex and time consuming, were negotiated by a very small number of monk agents, who then sought and received the approval of the abbots and resident clergy at their own temples before signing. 389 On the other hand, this fundraising campaign was an undertaking on a scale far larger than the previous work of the Council. In the Upper Capital alone, the relative wealth and donation power of the patrons of 78 neighborhoods had to be ascertained and agreed upon. Over 1300 patrons of these neighborhoods then had to be convinced to pledge towards that total. This probably required a small army of monks and patrons going door-to-door. Having obtained the pledges, they then had to go about the business of actually collecting that money. By the time that Document C (the Paid-Up Portion) was completed, nearly three quarters of the pledged total had been collected, along with additional money from other sources. From the initiation of the fundraising campaign to that point, less than a month had passed. We have no documents for the Lower Capital, but we know that fundraising was going on there too, and there is no reason to believe that the procedure was any different. In sum, the fact that the Council successfully 389 For more on the role of the resident clergy at the temples, see page 14. 141 undertook this project is a definite sign that it had passed from being merely a deliberative body of temples to becoming an organization that could do large-scale projects on its own. In my opinion, this makes the 1576 fundraising campaign the most significant event in the Kyoto Nichiren sect’s history during the Sengoku period. It shows us that the shifts in policy that began after the military adventures of the Lotus Leagues ended in disaster had come to full fruition. The Council was formed in the 1560s, but the Council that would survive until the Meiji period actually had its start here. The experience of the fundraising campaign would have another significance: three years later, the Nichiren sect would lose a religious debate at Azuchi and be heavily fined by Oda Nobunaga. They would run another fundraiser then, and the experience of raising some one-and-a-half million coins in one month certainly helped them raise a substantially larger sum in the aftermath of that debate, as we shall see in Chapter 4. Conclusion: A Policy of Suppression? Looking back from 1579, I do not believe that we can see in the policies of Oda Nobunaga a deliberate attempt to suppress the wealth or power of the Nichiren sect. The best evidence of this is that, through Murai Sadakatsu, he exempted every member of the sect from the fundraisers and other religious functions of other sects. If Nobunaga had wanted to suppress the wealth of the sect, he could have simply refused the request. Indeed, this exemption was granted after Nobunaga had promised Seigyoku that everyone in his domain was going to give money. Agreeing to the fuju-fuse request not only publicly nullified Nobunaga’s promise to Seigyoku (though admittedly, some time had passed and it is not clear what actually became of that promise) but also gave Nobunaga’s imprimatur to the Nichiren sect’s refusal to be involved with other sects. This not only gave the sect a financial advantage (an exemption from participating in other sect’s fundraisers) that other Buddhist sects lacked. It must also have emboldened aggressive elements within the sect. If Nobunaga approved of exempting them from a universal duty – giving money to an otherwise universal fundraising campaign – then it seems possible that Nichirenists believed that Nobunaga would take 142 a hands-off approach to religious debates and aggressive proselytizing. While this assumption would prove incorrect, it is abundantly clear that for the period before 1579, the watchword for Nobunaga’s policies towards the Nichiren sect is not “suppression” but rather “accommodation.” In 1576, Nobunaga began construction on his new castle at Azuchi in Ōmi. The castle, high atop a hill, took three years to finish. Its most striking feature was the keep, which towered five stories into the air over its mountain perch, overlooking Lake Biwa and the town below. Unusually, Nobunaga made his residence in the upper stories of the keep instead of in a dedicated residence nearby. Down below, the town of Azuchi boomed, partly aided by the promulgation of laws allowing non-guild merchants to sell in the marketplace. 390 As the town grew, temples began to appear as well. The Nichiren sect was among the new arrivals, with the temple Renkeiji being moved there in 1575 by the salt merchant Ōwaki Densuke. Nobunaga himself invited the Pure Land temple Jōgon’in to Azuchi in 1577. It was at the Jōgon’in itself that Ōwaki Densuke would discover the limits of Nobunaga’s accommodation towards the Nichiren sect in 1579. The Azuchi religious debate will be the subject of our last chapter, were I shall revisit the question of suppression of the sect by Oda Nobunaga. 390 Ikegami, 226-8. 143 Chapter 4 Unhealthy Debate: Reevaluating the Azuchi Shūron At Azuchi castle, there was a debate held between the Pure Land sect and the Nichiren party by the Former Minister of the Right [Oda Nobunaga]. It was held at the hour of the hare. The Nichiren party lost. Further, Fuden and the salt merchant Densuke were killed. About 1000 Nichirenists have been cornered in a place called the Kuon’in, and numerous commoners in Kyoto have likewise been cornered. Because of this, the capital is in unusual unrest. Sawaji Hayaudo, [Ogawa] Zentaiyu, [Ogawa] Yoroku, as well as Hayamizu, Gomura, Ofuji and Kurokawa of the Shinzaike [neighborhood] group came here in great numbers, and a few brought with them their tools and wives. -From the Journal of Yamashina Tokitsune, 1579, fifth month, twenty-eighth day 391 In the fifth month of 1579, the Nichiren sect, led by the Council of Head Temples, challenged the Pure Land school to a religious debate at Azuchi, the castle where Nobunaga resided. The Azuchi Religious Debate ( 安土宗論, Azuchi Shūron), as it has come to be known, proved a disaster for the Nichiren sect. Two wealthy Nichirenist patrons and their teacher were executed, and Nobunaga imposed a heavy fine on the sect as punishment. The Council, through the agents it sent to the debate, was forced to explicitly announce their defeat in writing, as well as to pledge never to debate other sects again. What we shall see, however, is that as the 1576 fundraiser showed the Council’s maturity; the response to the Azuchi Religious Debate showed its resilience. After the debate, the temples reached out to patrons in the capital and branch temples in Sakai, and raised three times as much as they had raised in 1576. Despite their having incurred the wrath of Oda Nobunaga, no temples burned, no land was confiscated, and there were no major changes to the structure of the temples or the Council. One must, however, temper this triumphant narrative with a simple question: was the sect actually in danger as a result of the debate? Without clarifying the nature of the Azuchi Religious Debate and the punishments Nobunaga imposed, we cannot hope to understand the sect’s response. Therefore, we must again delve into the question of Nobunaga’s motivation –did he pursue a policy of suppressing the Nichiren sect? Most scholars who have looked at this event have argued not only that Nobunaga attempting to 391 Tokitsune kyō-ki, Tenshō 7 (1579), 5/28. 144 suppress the Nichiren sect in the aftermath of the debate, but also that he fixed the debate to benefit the Pure Land side. My view is that both of these points need revision. The last major effort to catalogue and analyze the sources for the Azuchi religious debate was made in 1911 by Tsuji Zennosuke, who reconstructed the debate primarily using an account by one of the Nichiren-sect representatives and another account by one of the judges whom Nobunaga had appointed. Based on these, Tsuji concluded that Nobunaga had ordered the judge to pester the Nichiren sect’s representative and to shield the Pure Land representative from criticism. He further argued that Nobunaga did this because of his anti-Buddhist stance. His essay has long been regarded as the standard account of the debate. I will argue here, however, that the sources that Tsuji used to make this argument are problematic, as was his use of them. In what follows I offer my own observations on the debate, wherein Nobunaga did not act out of enmity with the sect. Rather, he punished the sect for initiating a potentially dangerous religious debate and then losing it. Furthermore, while the fines he assessed were heavy, they were not sufficient to bankrupt the Council. They were in fact quickly paid using the same sort of fundraising that the sect had used in 1576, this time expanded to include the Nichirenists of Sakai. The Azuchi Religious Debate A brief outline of the Debate itself forms the context of the analysis. In 1579, a monk of the Pure Land sect named Gyokunen Reiyo 玉念霊誉 left his temple in Kazusa province for a tour of the area around the capital. Early in the fifth month, he stopped to preach in Azuchi, where Oda Nobunaga had recently built his castle. Among those who heard him speak were two wealthy townsfolk: a salt merchant and formal vassal of 145 Nobunaga named Ōwaki Densuke 大脇伝助 392 and a townsman named Takebe Shōchi 建部紹智. 393 At some point during the sermon, Ōwaki and Takebe began to loudly criticize Reiyo and his teachings. Takebe and Ōwaki were both devout Nichiren sect members and patrons. Specifically, they were patrons of Fuden’in Nichimon 普伝院日門, a popular Nichirenist preacher originally from Kyushu. Fuden (as he is usually called) 394 had long been active in the Kantō, but he had come to the capital region some years before. He had, in 1571, served an important function in a multi-day rite held by Nichikō at Myōkokuji in Sakai. 395 He had also, in 1578, been called by Nichikō to serve as a tutor to the courtier Konoe Sakihisa. 396 Whether he supported or instigated his patrons’ behavior in this matter is not recorded. Reiyo’s response to being criticized by laymen was to be dismissive. He said that if there was to be an argument, then the Nichirenists should send monks, with whom he would gladly debate. There seems to have been an agreement on this matter and a tentative date later in the month was set for a debate. Nobunaga then became publically involved, taking command of the whole affair. Most of the sources that comment on the matter suggest that Nobunaga attempted to settle the matter without a debate, but that the Nichirenists insisted on one. In response, Nobunaga ordered several vassals to take command of the 392 Ōwaki Densuke is a somewhat mysterious figure, but he appears in the record long before this debate. When Yamashina Tokitsugu (1507-1579) was in Gifu in 1569 to raise money for the services on the thirteenth anniversary of the late Retired sovereign Go-Nara’s death, he lodged with Ōwaki Densuke, and described him as a member of Oda Nobunaga’s Horse Guards ( 馬廻, uma mawari). He was also responsible for the moving of the Nichirenist temple Renkeiji from Kannoji to Azuchi in 1575. See Takagi, “Azuchi Shūron Shūi,” 57, and see Lamers, 30 for a description of the Horse Guards. Also, the Shinchō-kōki suggests that Reiyo was lodging at his house. See Shinchō- kōki, 275. 393 While Ōwaki Densuke is relatively well documented, no records can be found concerning Takebe. Takagi notes, however, that in Ōmi there was an estate called Takebe no shō, which had a strong connection with travelling merchants, suggesting that Takebe was perhaps one of them. 394 Usually just the first two characters of Fuden’in, but the Shinchō-kōki occasionally uses 不伝. For some reason, the Jesuits tended to spell the name Funden. 395 Kyōdan zenshi, 464 396 There is some dispute about this. The person who received the lectures is listed in the Kogyōki as “Lord Konoe” ( 近衛殿), but the one available manuscript for a time seemed to read “Lord [?]kiyo” ( □ 清殿), as it appeared in the NSZS Vol 19. Based on comparisons to other copies, Takagi argued for “Lord Konoe,” and the most recently released study of the Myōkakuji copy of the Kogyōki supports this reading. Kyōdan zenshi, 464; Yanai 56. 146 affair, setting three of them ( 菅屋長頼, Sugaya Nagayori, 長谷川秀一, Hasegawa Hidekazu, and 堀秀政, Hori Hidemasa) as his personal representatives, and bringing in Zen monks to serve as judges, led by Keishū Tesshu 景秀鉄叟, the head of Nanzenji 南禅寺. Also included among the judges was a layman named Inga Koji 因果居士. 397 The Nichirenists sent several of their best debaters to the affair, including Nichikō 日珖 398 , who would do the majority of the actual debating. Fuden, who would seem a natural candidate for the Nichiren team, seems only to have watched the debate. The Pure Land temples also sent representatives from the Chion’in 知恩院 in the capital. Reiyo, as the most senior of the Pure Land monks, was a natural candidate to lead the Pure Land side, but a powerful monk of the Azuchi Pure Land temple Jōgon’in 浄厳院 named Teian 399 貞安 seems to have taken that role. The debate was held at the Jōgon’in on the morning of the twenty-seventh day of the fifth month of 1579. 400 Nobunaga was not present, though one of his nephews ( 織田信澄, Oda Nobusumi) was. While sources disagree on specific time (see below), it is safe to say that the affair took several hours. According to all the extant records, the debate centered on whether or not the Amida sutras on which the Pure Land sect’s doctrines relied were “expedient means” and therefore inferior to the Lotus Sutra that the Nichirenists considered the supreme Buddhist text. Expedient means, 401 roughly defined, is the idea that the Buddha, or other advanced entities such as bodhisattvas, would vary their teachings depending on the capabilities and tendencies of the audience. In the Lotus Sutra, this is exemplified in the “Parable of the 397 See below for more on Inga. 398 See above, page 97. 399 Lamers and McMullin use Jōan as the reading for this name, but Lamers and Elisonas’s recent translation of the Shinchō kōki and all the references I have seen use Teian. See Lamers and Elisonas, The Chronicle of Lord Nobunaga, 400 June 21, 1579. 401 Often translated as “skill in means” or “skillful means.” These are approximations of the Sanskrit “upāya- kauśalya,” usually rendered in Japanese as hōben 方便. 147 Burning House,” 402 wherein a father, seeing that his house is on fire, entices his children out of the house by promising each of them a luxurious cart, each drawn by a different animal. When they emerge, he instead provides them with a single cart that is even more ornate than the three he had promised. 403 The father, who stands in for the Buddha, has lied to his children, but he has led them out of the burning house, a metaphor for the cycle of rebirth. 404 The stated Nichirenist position was that all the sutras expounded by the Buddha in the years before the Lotus Sutra 405 – the vast majority of the Buddhist cannon – were merely expedient means designed by the Buddha to prepare the world for the ultimate truth of the Lotus Sutra. 406 The Nichiren sect representatives quickly pressed in this direction. Teian’s response was novel. He asked if this rejection of everything before the Lotus Sutra included the rejection of something he called “hōza daishi no myō no ichiji” ( 方座第四ノ妙ノ一字). 407 The Lotus sect representatives (and indeed, most everyone since) had no idea what Teian meant, and they asked to which of the numerous “myō” ( 妙) Teian was referring. 408 Teian’s response was, “to the myō of the lotus. Don’t you know it?” The Nichiren representatives seem to have been unable to respond, making them the losers in the debate. 402 There are in fact seven parables in the Lotus Sutra, and several of them touch on expedient means in some form. Another particularly good example is the “Parable of the Phantom City,” which is in the seventh chapter. 403 The carts in the parable represent the three paths to enlightenment touted by so called “hinayana” schools, those of śrāvaka (one who is taught by a Buddha), pratyekabuddha (one who comes to enlightenment on their own), and the bodhisattva. The single, better cart, is the single path (the “great vehicle” or Mahayana) of the Lotus Sutra. 404 The Lotus Sutra, trans. Watson. 56-62. 405 This period is called nizen 爾前. 406 Indeed, as noted earlier, such striations occurred even within the Lotus Sutra itself according to some of the Nichirenists. 407 For more on this mysterious term, see below, page 164. 408 The character 妙 in Buddhist thought represents a wide variety of concepts, but largely refers to the mysterious, the sublime, and the pure. It is also the headword of the full name of the Lotus sutra used by Nichirenists, Myōhō renge-kyō 妙法蓮華経. 148 The Pure Land representatives, in keeping with custom, moved to strip the surplices off the Nichiren monks. Much of the audience seems to have rushed the monks as well, as one of the Nichiren representatives (Nichien) reported having his face bloodied. The Shinchō-kōki reports that several of the monks’ scriptures were torn apart. Nobunaga’s men eventually restored order, and Nobunaga then arrived, showered the winners and the judges with gifts and praise, and sent them on their way. As he was generous to the victors, Nobunaga was harsh towards the losers. He had the two laymen who instigated the debate, Ōwaki Densuke and Takebe Shōchi, executed. Takebe escaped to Sakai, so he was executed after his capture a few weeks later. Nobunaga accused Fuden, who had no role in the debate, of taking bribes and defrauding his patrons, and he, too, was beheaded. Oda then extracted from the Nichiren representatives an explicit acknowledgement of their defeat, as well as a vow signed by all the head temples represented in the Council. In this document, they promised to cease all religious debates and to pay a fine of 200 pieces of gold. It is the reason for Nobunaga’s punishment of the Nichiren sect that has been questioned and argued by many historians, including Tsuji. The Ōmi Problem Ōmi province (modern Shiga Prefecture) figured large in the life of Oda Nobunaga. It was a vital supply route from the Osaka Honganji headquarters to the Ikkō Ikki controlled lands in Kaga, on the Japan sea coast. 409 Ōmi was an extremely important transportation hub for trade in Japan. It was also the home of the Asai warrior clan, with whom Nobunaga battled for years, and of the Rokkaku, as well – the latter would not only cause Nobunaga trouble for years but would actually survive him. Nobunaga’s grand Azuchi castle was built on former Rokkaku lands, probably on an already extant settlement. Until Nobunaga arrived, however, Ōmi was dominated by Enryakuji, the massive and powerful Tendai monastic complex atop Mount Hiei. Enryakuji was the largest landholder in Ōmi, and Enryakuji was, 409 McMullin, 107. 149 like Mt Kōya in Kii, close enough to its properties to maintain a hold on them even when many of the older religious institutions were not so successful. Also, their proximity to the capital ensured that Enryakuji had the attention of the court and the shogunate – indeed, the Muromachi shogunate had a special office just for dealing with Enryakuji, the Sanmon bugyō ( 山門奉行). Mount Hiei also had a strong hold on the capital itself, through its control of the Gion Shrine and its affiliated Dog Workers, the Inu jinin, outcastes with a monopoly on bowstring production and other services. The Dog Workers were not only an important financial aid to Enryakuji, but they also provided it with muscle. The practical result of all this for the Nichiren sect was that until Nobunaga razed Enryakuji in 1571, proselytizing in Ōmi was both difficult and dangerous. Extant Nichiren temples in Ōmi predating 1571 are exceedingly rare; indeed, I have found none in any of the large temple directories. However, once Nobunaga razed Enryakuji, there was no longer a barrier, and with relatively stable communities in Sakamoto, where Akechi Mitsuhide had his castle, and Azuchi, there were large and wealthy groups to serve as Nichirenist parishioners. In a real sense, Nobunaga gave the Nichiren sect a massive gift by burning Mt. Hiei, but perhaps the resulting expansion of the sect led to a growing rift between him and the sect. 410 It is unclear precisely when the increase of Nichirenist proselytizing began. For one thing, much of Ōmi was still a war zone until the fall of the Asai and the Asakura in 1573, and there was still Rokkaku resistance until about the same time. Also, it is unclear if the Kyoto head temples were even involved with the initial wave of proselytizers. For one thing, there was a large group of unaffiliated “Lotus Sutra preachers” active all over Japan, with various degrees of friendliness to the Nichiren sect itself. For another, there were 410 It is unclear how the Nichirenists felt about the burning of Mt. Hiei. On the one hand, given the history Enryakuji had of using all available means to destroy them and the Nichirenist belief that they were the true heirs to the Tendai tradition, some degree of pleasure might have been expected. On the other hand, Enryakuji was still widely viewed as the center of the Japanese Buddhist tradition, and to the Tendai tradition in particular. The only Nichirenist source from the period that mentions the event that I have seen is Nichikō’s Kogyōki, which only says that Enryakuji burned down, and provides no comment. The Honkokuji Nempu, composed later, takes a mournful tone, though it was composed in the Edo period. See Yanai, 59; “Honkokuji Nempu-2,” 177. 150 also Nichirenist preachers who were not affiliated with any specific temple. Fuden’in Nichimon, who was executed after the Azuchi Religious Debate, was part of this wave of unaffiliated Nichiren preachers who descended on Ōmi. These monks were particularly worrisome both to the sect and to the political authorities, Nobunaga specifically. Unaffiliated with any temple, they operated outside of the Council’s protection, and also outside of its control. Specifically, they could ignore the Tenshō agreement, and they could hold disruptive debates and take an aggressive approach in their preaching. The agreements they ignored, it should be recalled, were not only created under pressure from warriors like Nobunaga. They were also the result of a large and growing group within the sect opposed to that kind of proselytizing, or at least to engaging in it recklessly. Even if the Council was not particularly concerned with the risks posed, they were certainly unhappy with having their authority ignored. Whether or not they were pleased with the independent preachers, at least some of the Council temples were willing to make use of them from time to time. For instance, Fuden eventually joined the Nisshin Lineage, headed by Council member Honryūji. 411 The Shinchō-kōki records Nobunaga decrying that Fuden was bribed to join the sect, which may well have been the case – although the negative term “bribe” may assume that being paid to join a temple was actually seen as nefarious, of which we cannot be sure. Indeed, if Honryūji did indeed pay him, there is a good chance that others put in a bid. He would have been an important recruit for his preaching success. Tsuji Zennosuke’s Research and Reconstruction of the Azuchi Religious Debate Few prewar scholars (indeed, few postwar scholars) have had the impact on the field of Japanese history that the historian of religion Tsuji Zennosuke has had. He was the first head of the Tokyo University Historiographical Institute and a prolific writer. Among his best known works is his multivolume Nihon 411 Nichirenshu jiten S.V. 日門. A few sources do seem to suggest he joined Nichikō’s Myōkakuji, but in either case he definitely joined the sect in an official capacity shortly before the debate. 151 Bukkyōshi kenkyū, within which is an essay that Tsuji composed very late in the Meiji period, 412 called “Azuchi Shūron no shinsō” (The True Facts of the Azuchi Religious Debate). This essay still represents the most in- depth academic study of the debate itself written in the last century. 413 In it, Tsuji provided a brief overview of Nobunaga’s policies towards Buddhism, his policies towards the Nichiren sect in particular, the sources that contain information on the debate, and his assessment of what actually happened as per those sources. To briefly summarize his views, Tsuji believed Nobunaga intended from the beginning of his involvement in the debate to suppress the Nichiren sect, and that he opposed them as part of a general anti-Buddhist stance. He also argued that the best sources for reconstructing the debate were Inga Koji’s Azuchi mondō and Nichien’s Azuchi shūron jitsuroku. He created his own reconstruction of the debate based on a combination of these sources’ narratives. Tsuji’s article became the definitive study in the following years. Even most postwar scholars (Takagi, Nakao, etc.) cite his essay approvingly. Therefore, his conclusions have largely remained undebated. I believe, however, that Tsuji’s thesis needs revision, beginning with his classification and use of sources. Tsuji divided the sources into three categories: Nichiren-sect affiliated, Pure Land affiliated, and neutral. The full list of sources from his article can be found in Appendix II. Inga Koji’s Azuchi Mondō A source that Tsuji used heavily for his reconstruction is called the Azuchi Mondō 安土問答, written by the lay monk Inga Koji 因果居士. 414 “Lay monk,” while apparently a contradiction in terms, is a good descriptor here. An early Edo biography of Nobunaga, Ose Hoan’s Shinchōki, refers to him as “a monk with hair on his 412 Initially, it was a talk given in 1911, and published that same year over several issues of the journal Bukkyōshi gaku. It was then reworked slightly in 1918. Slightly modified versions have been published in numerous places as well. 413 Tanaka Chigaku’s work on the debate, published in 1936, was perhaps more in-depth, but it was rather clearly a Nichiren sect apologia published in a journal that billed itself as the Nichiren sect’s propaganda organ. Other scholarship on the event since then has largely been on specific facets of the debate rather than the debate as a whole. 414 This, at least, is the entry header in the Kokusho sōmokuroku. 152 head” ( 烏髪の僧, ūbatsu no sō). 415 Koji 居士, more often seen now as a suffix for Buddhist posthumous names, at the time referred to a layman who was an active and accomplished Buddhist practitioner, especially in the Zen sect. The Vocabulário da Língoa de Iapam, an early sixteenth-century Japanese- Portuguese Dictionary, defines the word as “a monastic rank,” which seems a sensible reading from a Jesuit viewpoint. 416 Little is known of Inga Koji’s life, as he appears in the historical record only twice: during the Azuchi debate, and as a visitor to Sumpu Castle in the last years of Tokugawa Ieyasu’s life. We can thus be sure that he lived a very long life and was considered a knowledgeable and influential Buddhist practitioner. The Inga Koji account covers only the debate itself, ignoring how all the parties came to be in Azuchi and why the debate was held. This may well have been because Inga Koji was only visiting Azuchi at the time, just as the Shinchō-kōki attests. Largely, the account is in keeping with the Shinchō-kōki and Tokitsune narratives. A major difference, however, is that Inga Koji asserts that he was secretly told by Nobunaga to criticize only the answers of the Nichiren-sect, and that he so aggressively pushed the Nichiren representatives that Teian, who floundered early in the debate, was able to restructure his argument and ask the question that discombobulated the Nichirenist side. One of the versions of Inga’s account also states that Keishū (the head of Nanzenji and the head judge of the debate) was deaf and thus unable to contribute anything to the debate. We should, however, be wary of trusting this account, as we shall see. There are, to my knowledge, three manuscript copies of Inga Koji’s account, excluding the traced copies in university collections. The first is in the Sonkeikaku Bunko, which was the document collection of the Maeda family that ruled the Kaga, Noto, and Toyama domains in the Edo period (hereafter, the Maeda Copy). Another was, as of 1900, in the collection of the Niino 新野 family, 417 who as of 1900 lived in Yoita 415 Nihon kokugo daijiten, s.v. 居士 416 Hōyaku Nippo jisho, s.v. 居士; Kokugo daijiten, DDB s.v. 居士. 417 I should note that while I have tried to look into the owner of this document, I have not even found a definitive answer on how to pronounce the name. I have settled on Niino, but another potential reading is Arano, as in the Aranoya candy shop that has been in Niigata since the Meiji period. 153 town in Niigata prefecture (hereafter, the Niino copy). The version in the Dai Nihon Bukkyō zensho collection is the Niino copy. 418 The third is part of a compilation held by the Kuonji temple in Yamanashi prefecture, called the Kuonji kyūki (hereafter the Kuonji copy). Tsuji’s original article only acknowledged the first two. Likely, he did not know about the Kuonji kyūki version when he wrote his article. 419 Physically, the documents look very different. The Maeda copy is a scroll. The Kuonji kyūki copy is part of a larger book with several other accounts copied in it. The Niino copy is a hanging scroll, measuring 1.29 meters vertically and 0.51 meters horizontally. We can be sure that it is not a normal scroll that has been cut up and pasted in that way because the lettering runs from top to bottom. 420 On the other hand, the accounts are largely identical. Indeed, all the accounts contain a rather bizarre kanji phrase: 不干口. Only the Niino copy has a gloss into Japanese – the Maeda copy has a gloss in the “Chinese” (on) reading. My view is that the phrase is an odd way of writing the expression shita mo kawakanu ( 舌も乾かぬ処 , literally “before the tongue can dry out”), referring to a quick response. 421 Nevertheless, there are two notable differences in the three variants. First, the dates are different. The Maeda and Kuonji copies both give the wrong year for the debate, Tenshō 8 (1580) instead of Tenshō 7 (1579), although the copyist of the Kuonji copy helpfully added a correction. The Niino copy, in contrast, has the correct date. The Niino copy also notes that Keishū was deaf and includes this heartfelt apology by Inga Koji: “By the way of the heavens, none may doubt me, as it was this way [as I recorded here]. I made the 418 Dai Nihon Bukkyō zensho, vol. 97, 108-110. This is my own assessment based on the content; the bibliographical volume of Dai Nihon Bukkyō zensho lists the original as unknown, and there are several minor differences. Dai Nihon Bukkyō zensho, vol. 98, 202. 419 According to the Shiryō hensanjo Database, the copy of the Kuonji Kyūki in their archives was made in 1919, the same year the Tsuji article was rewritten. 420 I should note that these observations are based on the copy in the Shiryō hensanjo archives, as I have been unable to track down the original as of this time. 421 Both the Maeda and Kuonji copies are even closer to the standard expression, being written 不干口処. Also, the Maeda copy glosses it as フカンセツ, suggesting that the character mouth ( 口) is a mistake for tongue ( 舌) which can be read setsu. The Dai Nihon Bukkyō zensho text uses 不干舌処. 不干舌 appears in several Buddhist treatises. See Dai Nihon Bukkyō zensho, vol. 97, 109. 154 criticisms I did in accordance with General Nobunaga’s deeply secret orders. It was not my doing at all, and everyone in the [judges’] seats knew this for certain.” One more contrast is that the Maeda copy has more extensive notes and criticisms than the Niino version, and Nobunaga’s orders are cited only in one of those notes. Indeed, one of the notes in the Maeda copy seems to disagree with the claim of Keishū’s deafness, since Keishū is said to have written down a response to the argument at one point during the debate. There are also minor differences in character use; for example, the Niino copy uses the characters 旭然 for “Gyokunen,” whereas the Maeda copy uses 玉念, the same characters as the Pure Land sources. Signatures on the three copies are another point of difference. The Maeda copy has a pair of vermillion seals over the author’s signature, one round and one square; the copy in the Kuonji kyūki has a notation that vermillion seals are present on the original ( 朱印有り), and the Niino copy has a cypher (kaō). Fortunately, the signatures allow us to compare the three documents to other extant documents by Inga Koji. A number of such texts exist, in the collection of Prof. Hatano Yukihiko, the calligraphy expert, as well as in several other small collections. 422 These include a copy that Inga made of a famous letter from the Zen master Musō Sōseki (1275-1351) to Ashikaga Takauji (1305-1358), as well as other letters. The Musō letter has no signature by Inga Koji, but it is stamped twice, by seals that match the seals in the Maeda copy of the Azuchi Mondo. Another document (also in the Hatano Collection) has both a cypher and two seals. Both seals match those of the Maeda copy. The cypher is vastly different from the one in the Niino copy of the Inga Koji account. Being as the Niino copy lacks the seals and has an unknown cypher, I think it likely that the Niino copy is actually a forgery created by someone who had read the Maeda copy and the Nichien 422 Shiryō Hensanjo holds photographs of these, but one example was published as the frontispiece of Nihon rekishi, No. 285, February 1972. 155 account, as that is the only other account that includes the accusation that Keishū was deaf and the Maeda copy. 423 I also believe that the Maeda copy is exactly what it purports to be: Inga Koji’s hand-written account. Figure 7: The signature from the Maeda Copy (Shiry ō hensanjo collection facsimile). Note the two seals. Figure 8: The Signature from the Niino Copy (Shiry ō hensanjo collection facsimile). Note the cypher. 423 While the creator of the Niino copy could have read the Kuonji copy for content, the penmanship of the Niino copy is so much like that of the Maeda copy that I think they must have read the Maeda copy. Also, the Niino copy was in modern Niigata prefecture, as was the Maeda copy. The Kuonji copy was much farther away, in modern Yamanashi prefecture. 156 Figure 10: Signature from a letter written by Inga Koji. Note both the two seals that match the Maeda copy and the cypher that is vastly different from the one in the Niino copy. From the collection of Hatano Yukihiko. When and why was the Maeda copy written? This is not clear, but a number of facts are apparent. First, the wrong year suggests that the writing of the account was a few years removed from the debate, likely more than a decade. 424 While good sources are scarce, Inga Koji certainly lived into the Edo period, as he visited Tokugawa Ieyasu in Sumpu in 1613, some thirty-four years after the debate. At that time, according to the Sumpuki, 425 Inga told Ieyasu that he was 88 years old (probably 87 years old as we count age in the modern West), making his date of birth 1525. 426 This agrees with a portrait drawn of him in the late 424 The Tenshō period lasted 20 years. Working off of the assumption that it was more likely Inga forgot the proper year if the Tenshō period had ended, it’s more likely over 20 years. 425 The Sumpuki is a chronicle of Tokugawa Ieyasu’s retirement at Sumpu castle from 1611-1616. 426 Todaiki Sumpuki, 237-38 Figure 9: Signature from a letter written by Inga Koji. Note the seals that match the Maeda copy. From the collection of Hatano Yukihiko. 157 Edo period with a caption that says that Inga Koji died in 1617, at the age of 93 (92 by our reckoning). 427 The account therefore was likely written between 1590 (giving him a decade to forget exactly which year the debate took place) and 1620 (as he was likely dead by then). I have avoided discussing the Kuonji copy until this point because it is an almost character-by- character duplicate of the Maeda copy. Unlike the other two copies, however, it contains a postscript by the copyist, one Sassa Masanobu 佐々正業. 428 According to the postscript, Sassa, a resident of Kanazawa in the Kaga domain, visited the temple Sennenji 専念寺 in Imizu district of Toyama domain (Modern Imizu Town in Toyama Prefecture) in 1643. While there, he became close friends with the abbot, Zesan 是三. 429 One night, Zesan confided in Sassa about a curious writing “passed down in our house.” 430 According to Zesan, Inga Koji passed through the area and, having stopped for the night, wrote down his account of having manipulated the debate under Nobunaga’s orders to assure a Pure Land victory. Sassa asked for a copy, but was initially rebuffed. At the urgings of his teacher, a monk named Nichiiu 日迶, Sassa again returned and was able to make a copy of the account in 1647, however. Unfortunately, this does not help us narrow the dates of the original account much, since the Maeda family who ruled the Toyama domain as well as the nearby Kaga and Noto domains had been firmly ensconced in the region since well before 1590. Nevertheless, I think it very 427 In Japan, one was traditionally born at the age of one, and one’s age increased by one at the start of each year. 428 1661-1731. The full signature reads 加陽金沢佐々喜藤次源正業 (Kaga Province, Kanazawa, Sassa Kitōji Minamoto no Masanobu). He appears in the records of Kaga domain as Kitōji Masanobu ( 喜藤次正寅). The reading of “nobu” can be used for both 業 and 寅. In any case, based on these records, we can verify birth and death dates as well as relative status. Sassa had started out as a page (okukoshō) to the Maeda and quickly rose in the ranks. He left the page group in 1670 and was appointed Commissioner of Land Surveys ( 検地奉行) in 1702. The events he recalls in the Kuonji postscript took place in 1643, and, while his position at that point is unknown, it is clear that he was in Toyama at the orders of Maeda Tsunanori, the head of the Kaga domain. Tsuda et al, Shoshi keifu, vol. 5, 168. 429 According to the internal records of Sennenji, Zesan was the eighth abbot. He assumed the role of abbot in 1683. He died in 1695 at the age of 38. 430 This refers to the house of the daimyō (the Maeda family). 158 likely that the Maeda copy was written well after the founding of the Tokugawa shogunate, probably between 1610 and 1620. That said, while I feel certain that Inga Koji did in fact write the document that bears his name in the Maeda collection, there is still much in the source that encourages skepticism. It is beyond credulity that if Inga Koji was the cause of the Nichiren sect’s loss (and indeed, so blatantly that Nichikō specifically accused him of one-sided criticism) none of the Nichiren sect sources mention him. Also, the other sources that mention him (e.g., the Jonen account, or that in the Shinchō-kōki) treat him as a minor character in the proceedings. Admittedly, these sources would have reason to minimize his role if there had been a conspiracy between Nobunaga and Inga Koji, but only if Jonen was aware of that arrangement. However, even if Keishū was deaf (which is not mentioned in the Maeda copy), 431 why did neither of the other two Zen monk judges – both accomplished scholars – offer any criticism of their own? All of them could well have been in on the plan, but why would they let the one layman represent them? Zen monks were also subject to harsh and belligerent criticism from the Nichiren sect. If the judges were already in on the plot, why not go for the jugular, rather than playing a sort of non-role as they seem to do in every account? 432 Admittedly, I can think of little reason for Inga Koji to fake his account after the fact, except possibly to enhance his own role in the proceedings. 433 Even so, I think we should avoid taking Inga Koji’s account at face value, as Tsuji does. 431 In fairness, there is a mention in the Maeda copy of the record keepers being for Keishu’s benefit, but it is unclear if this was because of his deafness or for some other reason. 432 I have discussed this event with several scholars of Japanese religious history, and all seem to agree that the judges do not seem to have decided victory, nor posed questions, nor refereed the event in any meaningful way. This raises the question of why they were even there, which at this point I cannot answer. 433 This is the argument taken by the popular historian Izawa Motohiko in his dismissal of the source. See Gyakusetsu no Nihonshi 10: Tenka fubu to Nobunaga no nazo. (Tokyo: Shogakkan, 2007), 190-91. 159 Nichien’s Azuchi Shūron Jitsuroku The other source that Tsuji used for his reconstruction was the account by the monk Nichien 日淵, called the A True Record of the Azuchi Religious Debate ( 安土宗論実録, Azuchi shūron jitsuroku). 434 Nichien himself is a bit of an enigma. Tsuji and others noted that the monk listed in all the other primary sources as participating from Nichien’s temple, the Kuon’in 久遠院, 435 was called Nichiyū 日雄, not Nichien. However, another of Nichien’s writings, the Gimon ruiju 義文類聚 says, “after picking the character yū, I named myself en” ( 雄、撰後号淵, yū erabu nochi en to gōsu.). 436 Hence, it seems likely that Nichien and Nichiyū were the same person, and the author of the account. Nichien/Nichiyū was indeed the founder of the Kuon’in (later 寂光寺, Jakkōji), and a former abbot of Myōmanji. It is impossible, however, to date the account with any specificity. The copy in the Shiryō hensanjo archives, a tracing of Jakkōji’s copy, 437 was made in 1741, and the copy that served as the basis for the text in the Dai Nihon Bukkyō zensho compilation was written in the nineteenth century. 438 Of the extant primary sources, the Nichien account is perhaps the most detailed, and it includes not only a description of the debate but also of Nobunaga’s orders, where the participants sat during the debate itself, and who spoke. The only account that even approaches this level of detail is Jonen’s account (see below, page 160), and Jonen includes almost nothing on the beginnings and repercussions of the debate. 434 Dai Nihon Bukkyō Zensho, vol. 97, 115–26. 435 Kuon’in would eventually become a full-fledged temple called Jakōji 寂光寺 and join the Council of Head temples as its sixteenth member. It would also effectively merge with Myōsenji, which left the Council in 1579. 436 Kyōdan zenshi, 473. The character “Nichi” 日 is almost de rigueur for Nichiren monks. 437 The tracing at Shiryō hensanjo is marked “Jakkōin” 寂光院, but the address given ( 京都市上京区二［仁］王門通新高倉東) is that of Jakkōji. There is a Jakkōin in Kyoto, but it has never been near that neighborhood and is a Tendai temple. 438 The copy in Dainihon Bukkyō zensho vol. 97, 115-26 is of unknown origin, though it may replicate the copy in the Ōsa archives. In any case, though it seems likely Tsuji used the tracing in the Shiryō hensanjo collection. The differences are trivial. See Dai Nihon Bukkyō zensho, vol. 98, 203. 160 The biggest difference between Nichien’s account and those of the Shinchō-kōki or Yamashina Tokitsune is that Nichien denies that the Nichiren sect lost the debate. His recounting has it that after Teian announced “The Myō of the Lotus of course! Don’t you know it?” Nichien responded, “You are a fool. You ask the Lotus sect whether they would reject the myō of the Lotus? The Lotus sect arises from the myō of the Lotus. All else we totally reject. Is it because you have nothing to say that you speak nonsense?” Nichien then turned to Nobunaga’s presiding officials and repeated it to them. Reiyo, who in most accounts says nothing, then attempted to save the argument, but the Nichiren monks, all three in quick succession, came out with several quick verbal attacks, with Nichien giving occasional play-by-play to the officials. When the Pure Land sect monks stopped responding, Nittai stood in preparation to strip them of their surplices. Suddenly, Reiyo leapt to his feet and shouted that he had won. In response, all the people in the temple moved to batter and strip the Nichiren monks. Inga Koji does not appear in the account at all. Keishū, for his part, is too deaf to hear the end of the argument and says as much to Nobunaga. In addition, several additional lines are given to Nichien near the end of the debate. This source, too, needs careful consideration. As with Inga Koji, Nichien seems to have expanded his own role, making himself a very important participant in the debate and its aftermath. Nichien even gives himself the last line in the debate, as well as the perfect verbal counter to Teian’s question, the very question that, per other accounts, sunk the great debaters Nichikō and Nittai. The likely goal of this account was not only to make the Nichiren sect the winner but also to elevate Nichien over Nichikō, suggesting issues between their two lineages in the early Edo period. Pure Land Sources Turning now to the Pure Land School’s sources: these have received far less attention than have the documents in the other two categories defined by Tsuji. This is largely in keeping with Tsuji’s correct observation that sources such as the Shinchō-kōki and Tokitsune generally agree with the Pure Land sources. Indeed, the closest thing to an official record of the event is the record kept by the monk Jonen ( 助念) of the 161 Chion’in, 439 a powerful Pure Land temple in Kyoto. According to his records, Jonen was one of the record keepers on the Pure Land side of the debate. His account is actually more detailed on the participants than those of both Inga Koji and Nichien. 440 To my knowledge there are two extant accounts written by Jonen. One, a copy, is dated 1579, sixth month, first day, and it is in the collection of Jōunji in Kōzuke (modern Gunma prefecture). The original account was composed for a wealthy donor, and the copy somehow made its way to Jōunji. The second, which seems to be in Jonen’s own hand, is in the collection of the Jōgon’in in Azuchi, and it is dated 1581, eleventh month, second day. In terms of content, there is little if any difference between the two. Both include: 1) an account of the debate, with names of all participants and their positions. In both cases, a fourth Nichirenist representative is listed. The Jōunji account lists him as the record keeper, and lists his temple as Myōkenji. In both accounts he is referred to as Daisōbō 大僧坊, noting that he ran off after the debate and no one could get his name. 2) a copy of the letter of apology signed in blood by representatives of thirteen of the Nichirenist head temples (Nichikō was included as the former head of Chōmyōji, and Nichiyū/Nichien was included as the head of the Kuon'in, which was not yet a head temple but would become one within twenty years). It was addressed to the three representatives of Nobunaga (Sugaya, Hori, Hasegawa). The Jōunji account says that the original letter of apology was not written in the usual form for a vow (kishōmon). Rather, it was on the back of a calligraphic mandala hand written by Nichiren himself. 441 439 Specifically, he is listed as the head of the Isshin’in 一心院 a branch of the Chion’in in the Higashiyama area of Kyoto. 440 Inga Koji does not put a name to the “Seidō” (literally “Western Hall,” refering to a monk who had retired from the post of abbot at one temple and now resides at another) ranked monk accompanying Keishū; Jonen does. Likewise, Nichien does not list the name of the record keepers on either side of the debate, as well as most of the judges. 441 A copy of this document is also in the archives of the Chion’in. The original is long since lost, and whether it was on such a mandala or not is unknown. As we shall see in the conclusion, it was returned to the sect in 1585. Letters detailing the return are in the collection of Chōmyōji. See page 179. 162 3) a copy of a letter of apology signed by Nichikō, Nichiyū, and Nittai (all three of the listed representatives, excluding the aforementioned and fleet-footed Daisōbō). In addition, the Jōgon’in account includes a copy of a black-seal letter from Oda Nobunaga to Murai Sadakatsu (then posted as his Kyoto deputy). In it, Nobunaga explained that he was sending copies of the two letters along and ordered Murai to publicize results of the debate and the Nichiren-sect’s acknowledgement of defeat in the capital, while providing the Pure Land School headquarters at the Chion’in with a copy of the documents. 442 My view is that the older of these two accounts was the one that made the rounds in Kyoto and formed the basis of both the first account in Tokitsune’s journal and the Shinchō-kōki. Yamashina Tokitsune The courtier Tokitsune first notes the debate in an entry on the twenty-eighth day of the fifth month, the day after the debate itself. In the entry, he notes that there had been a debate, that Fuden and Ōwaki Densuke had been killed, and that several thousand Nichirenists had fled the ensuing riots to Nichiyū’s Kuon’in temple and other Nichiren-sect temples. Several had even fled to Tokitsune’s house, with their wives and goods in tow. Then, on the second day of the sixth month, Tokitsune recorded the following: 1) an account of the debate. 2) a copy of the letter of apology signed in blood by representatives of thirteen of the head temples. 3) a copy of a letter of apology signed by Nichikō, Nichiyū, and Nittai 4) a copy of the black-seal letter to Murai Sadakatsu. 442 Copies of all these documents are in the Chion’in archives. A copy of the letter signed by the three Nichiren representatives with Murai’s cypher is among them. Also in Chion’in’s archives is the original of Nobunaga’s letter to Murai. 163 Documents 2, 3, and 4 are identical to those in the Chion’in archives and the Jonen record. It is not stated where and when Tokitsune got these documents, but in his entry for the first day of the sixth month he says that he met with Murai personally. 443 He was likely able to arrange for copies then. Nevertheless, the account of the debate that Tokitsune provides is subtly different from all others. For one, unlike the Jonen accounts and that in the Chion’in archives, Tokitsune’s entry lists Nichikō by name – and has him failing to return answers from early on in the debate, while an unnamed Nichirenist provides the answers behind him. 444 Given that Tokitsune’s source for information was likely Murai, it is odd that there is a discrepancy there. Also odd is the fact that Tokitsune received another account of the debate on the twelfth day of the sixth month, from Kōgon 公厳 of the Bishamondō 毘沙門堂, a Tendai-sect temple in the capital. Kōgon’s account, on a separate piece of folded paper attached to the journal itself, is much more like Jonen’s, except that the only speakers are Nichikō and Teian, while the last two lines (“Which of the myō?” “The myō of the Lotus”) are missing. 445 My opinion is that the account Tokitsune wrote for the second day is based on the Jonen account dated sixth month first day, but it was likely amended based on rumors Tokitsune heard. Nichikō’s participation in the debate as the lead Nichirenist debater must have been well known in the capital before the first day of the sixth month. This begs the question of why the account should differ, since the documents are perfectly copied. Perhaps the documents were more important to Tokitsune than the account, as the latter had no value as precedent. As to the account Tokitsune received from Kōgon, it was likely based on the 443 Tokitsune does not note why he met with Murai. 444 This does not match the Inga Koji or Nichien accounts either. 445 There does not seem to be any signs that these lines faded away or were erased. Tokitsune likely did not think the last few lines important, or perhaps never got around to finishing the copy. In return for this document, Tokitsune sent over some medicine. 164 Jonen account as well, with Kōgon adding the names into the account and leaving the rest as Jonen had it. The Bishamondō was probably one of the temples to which Murai sent messengers. Character of ‘Myō,’ Fourth of the Teachings of the Vaipulya Teaching Seat There is also the question of what, if anything, Teian was talking about when he asked about “hōza daishi no myō no ichiji.” Following Tsuji, the general academic view has been that it was nonsense, created by Teian as a trap. Tanaka Chigaku, writing in a Nichirenist propaganda organ in the Taishō period, described the phrase as unrecognizable even to the Buddha himself. 446 Several years after Tanaka wrote his essay, Hayashi Hikoaki wrote a response in a Pure Land sect organ published by the Chion’in. 447 Hayashi quoted Tanaka at length and notes that Tanaka actually offered up a solution, which he expressed as this string of characters: 方等会座四教並説中第四円教所談の妙 (Hōtō eza Shikyō berasetsu-chū dai yon engyō shodan no myō). 448 Hayashi explains as follows: 方等会座 (Hōtō eza): In Tendai-sect studies, the life of the Buddha is divided into five phases. The fifth, the Lotus and Nirvana phase ( 法華涅槃時), 449 is the one the Nichiren sect privileges, in which the Lotus and Nirvana Sutras were expounded. The third is called the hōtō (Sanskrit: Vaipulya) phase. 450 四教並説中第四円教 (Shikyō berasetsu-chū dai yon engyō): Tendai scholarship divides the four general teachings during the hōtō phase into four categories: 藏 (zō, tripitika), 通 (tsū, shared), 別 (betsu, distinct),and 圓 (en, perfection). Some Tendai scholars argued that while the first three were Hinayana 446 Tanaka Chigaku, “Azuchi honan,” Dokku, vol. 1 no. 6, 67. 447 Hayashi Hikoaki, “Azuchi Shūron no shinsō ni tsuite,” Senju gakuhō, no. 1, 1-23. 448 Tanaka, 68; Hayashi, 17. 449 D.D.B., S.V. 法華涅槃時. 450 DDB S.V. 方等;S.V. 方等時 165 teachings, the fourth, perfection, must include the Mahayana teachings, as no perfect teachings could not include them. It must, therefore, include the Lotus Sutra. Hayashi, followed by popular historian Izawa Motohiko, 451 argued that while this would be odd phrasing, the concept that Teian used is grounded in Tendai scholarship, and Nichirenist scholars were often expert in Tendai scholarship. Hayashi finds support for this thesis in early Chinese Tien’tai texts, which assert that the truths of the earlier eras were not distinct from the truths of the Lotus. Hayashi and Izawa’s position, while logical, is certainly not bulletproof. For one, I have seen no pre- twentieth-century sources that follow Hayashi or Izawa’s line. For another, there is no question that all the sources agree that the Nichirenist representatives at the debate were unclear as to what Teian meant. Nevertheless, Tanaka and Tsuji’s position that the line was a creation of Teian raises several additional issues. For one, while Hayashi’s thesis has no pre-twentieth-century champions, a 1797 illustrated biography of Toyotomi Hideyoshi argues along a similar line, noting that the founder of the Tien’tai school argued that the “truth” of the earlier periods was the same as that of the Lotus Sutra. 452 At the very least, the Nichirenists should have known that argument, given that study of Tendai texts was so important to their sect. In A Thicket I have argued that Tsuji’s reconstruction based on Inga Koji and Nichien’s accounts is fundamentally flawed. 453 Tsuji largely accepted Inga Koji’s claim that he protected the Pure Land debaters long enough for Teian to produce the last question, but Tsuji also accepted that Nichien managed to get in the last word and win before the Pure Land representatives falsely claimed victory. The problem is that these sources’ 451 Izawa, 198-200. 452 Okada Gyokuzan, Ehon Taikōki, part 3, vol. 6, 48-51. 453 To make this easier to understand, I have provided Tsuji’s reconstruction, in translation in Appendix III. I have marked the source where possible. 166 narratives cannot be combined cavalierly: they are mutually exclusive descriptions. For either of the accounts to be true, the other must be false. It is possible that Nichien could forget that Inga Koji was present at the debate if Nichien’s account of the debate were true. However, if Inga Koji’s account were true, then Nichien could not possibly have forgotten that one of the judges was actively arguing against his side so blatantly that Nichikō specifically complained about it in the course of the debate. It is entirely possible, as Nichien says, that Keishū was deaf and that Reiyo managed to cheat his way to victory by loudly screaming that he had won. However, Inga Koji would have no reason not to acknowledge the Nichirenists’ victory, especially in an account written decades after the fact that never saw a wide audience (indeed, the Kuonji copy suggests that it was effectively held as a secret. Certainly it did not see print until the twentieth century). One other concern is that we have yet to establish that either of those accounts is true, as they both conflict with the Pure Land and other unaffiliated sources. There is nothing inherently less trustworthy about the Pure Land sources excepting a cynical assumption that the winners must be lying. I do not feel that a perfect reconstruction in the manner of Tsuji’s article, complete with the inner thoughts of Inga Koji and the exact speakers of each line is possible with the available sources. Nevertheless, certain details run through all of the accounts, allowing us to state some facts with certainty: 1) Representatives The Nichiren sect was represented at the debate by several monks, but most of the arguments were made by Nichikō. It seems likely that the very first response given by the sect was by someone else (as per the accounts of Inga Koji and Nichien). Fuden’in Nichimon, who was beheaded after the debate, was not a participant. The Pure Land sect was represented by several monks, but all the arguing was done by Teian. 2) The General Argument 167 All of the accounts agree concerning the general line of argument. What follows is not a reconstruction of the events, as I am certain that additional lines are needed for both parties, but I am certain that the following exchange took place: Teian opened the debate, attempting to trap the Nichiren sect by forcing them to reconcile their rejection of nembutsu practice with the presence of nembutsu practice in the Lotus Sutra. The Nichiren sect turned this around by asking if, by rejecting the Lotus Sutra, the Pure Land school were not rejecting the Amida Buddha, who appears in that sutra. Teian clarified that they did not reject Amida, they just rejected extraneous practices. The Nichiren sect representative now pressed for evidence from the sutras to support the Pure Land School’s assertion that one should practice nembutsu exclusively. Teian replied with two references from the Sutra of Infinite Life ( 無量寿経, Muryōju kyō). This was exactly what the Nichiren representative wanted, as he then quoted a section of the Sutra of Innumerable Meanings ( 無量義経, Muryōgi kyō), 454 which stated in no uncertain terms that all the sutras expounded before it were expedient means, and therefore not truth. In response, Teian presented the question, “If you reject all that the Buddha said in those forty years, do you also reject the character myō, fourth of the teachings of the Vaipulya teaching seat?” 455 The Nichiren sect representatives, confused, asked to which myō the Pure Land representative was referring. Teian then said, “To the myō of the Lotus, of course! Don’t you know it?” Confounded by this, the Nichiren sect representative was silent, and the Pure Land monks stripped off the Nichirenist’s surplices. 454 This is the sutra expounded immediately before the Lotus Sutra. 455 I am using Hayashi’s thesis as a placeholder here. 168 Of course, the Inga Koji account includes the author’s own berating of the Nichiren sect for its answers, and the Nichien account gives Nichien a snappy comeback to the last line, followed by a few additional attempts by the Pure Land Buddhists to save their sinking arguments, after which Reiyo cheats the Nichirenists of their hard earned win. The Wages of Failure Leaving aside the issue of whether the debate was a plot by Oda Nobunaga to weaken the sect, another question is the financial damage of the fines Oda imposed. The Japanese sources, and Frois, too, suggest a fine of 200 gold pieces in total for the sect. 456 Organtino’s letter to Frois suggests 2600 gold pieces, or 200 gold pieces per temple in the Council. 457 Frois says that Nobunaga also fined the Sakai temples even more and that the fines would break the sect. I have not seen any Japanese sources that note separate fines on the Sakai temples, however, nor any that agree that the money was impossible to raise. The only sources that deal with the fines and the Sakai temples are fundraising documents in the Council collections, which seem to show the head temples in Kyoto reaching out to Sakai for help paying their own fines. I believe Frois was exaggerating or misunderstood the situation in Sakai. But what of the value of the gold? Unfortunately, it is difficult to get a good sense of the relative value, beyond its being a very large sum. Kawauchi Masayoshi has noted an entry in Nobunaga’s biography, the Shinchō-kōki, for the ninth month of 1579 in which the Blind Guild 458 brought a suit before Nobunaga about a former moneylender from the port city of Hyōgo who had bribed his way to his high position in the 456 Chōmyōji monjo, vol. 2, 27 (Doc 9.). 457 Murakami, Yasokai-shi Nihon tsūshin, vol. 3, 448. Thirteen participating temples (and members of the Council) were signatories to the letters of apology. 458 The Tōdōza was a guild of blind men in Muromachi and Edo era Japan. These men tended to hold a number of careers believed to be suited for the blind, including the lute players who recited The Tale of the Heike and other works, masseurs, and acupuncturists. It had official sanction and support and was a fairly wealthy organization 169 guild. 459 Nobunaga ruled against him and fined him 200 gold pieces. Nobunaga then immediately used that money to build a bridge across the Uji River in front of the Byōdōin temple in Uji. 460 Two hundred gold pieces, then, likely represents the cost to complete a high-quality and expensive construction project. Furthermore, an earlier entry in the Shinchō-kōki notes that Nobunaga had given one of his vassals in Harima 200 pieces of gold “in lieu of a sword.” 461 However, this vassal also received a very valuable sword (indeed, the very sword Imagawa Yoshimoto was wearing when he was killed by Nobunaga’s troops) as well as a valuable fief. 462 There is another option for estimating the value. A piece of gold ( 枚, mai) was equivalent to ten taels ( 両, ryō). 463 In the Eiroku period (1558-1570), the Odawara Hōjō family consistently paid 1500 copper coins for a tael of gold. 464 If we use this as a baseline, this means that 200 pieces of gold was roughly equivalent to three million copper coins, or 3000 strings of cash. 465 Entries in the Japanese National History Museum Ancient-Medieval Price Database suggest that the price of rice in the 1570s and 1580s in Kyoto was roughly four copper coins per shō. 466 One koku, which could theoretically feed a man for a year, was 100 shō, and thus cost roughly 400 copper coins. Therefore, 200 pieces of gold were roughly enough to feed 7,500 people for a year. Could the temples afford this exorbitant sum? I would argue yes. For one thing, if we look at the case of the Blind Guild, we see that the party who lost the suit was a moneylender from Hyōgo, and he had spent 1,000,000 copper coins to buy his position. Admittedly, this allowed him to live off the guild for life, but if he could spend 1,000,000 copper coins, one presumes that he had more than that (especially since he then paid 459 He was also apparently perfectly sighted, but this was less of a concern. Irrelevant to my argument but highly amusing is that the name of the moneylender was Tsunemi 常見, which could be translated as “always sees.” 460 Kawauchi, Toshi to Shūkyō, 257. The story is in Shinchō-kōki, 283-84. 461 御太刀代 462 Shinchō-kōki, 261. 463 Kokugodaijiten, S.V. Ryō 464 Japanese National History Museum Ancient-Medieval Price Database. This price seems to have been for gold as a material, not necessarily in currency. 465 1500 copper coins *10 taels * 200 pieces of gold = 3000000 Copper coins 466 One shō is roughly 1.8 liters. 170 out 200 gold pieces as a fine). Considering that the Nichiren sect counted several of the wealthiest moneylenders in Kyoto – the biggest city in Japan – among its patrons, 467 one can presume that the money was there. Recall, too, that these temples had far-reaching networks throughout the Kansai and points west, which regularly brought donations to the temples. Furthermore, recall that in the 1576 fundraiser, the amounts given to Nobunaga’s troops were often in the range of multiple strings of cash. While it was a large amount of money and certainly a sizeable chunk of their worth, the fine imposed after the Azuchi Religious Debate did not bankrupt any of the head temples. Indeed, it seems to have been collected fairly quickly. According to Nichikō’s journal, the 200 gold pieces were paid on the sixteenth day of the ninth month of 1579 – roughly four months after the debate – on the occasion of Nobunaga’s visit to the capital. 468 This is corroborated by the Shinchō-kōki, which notes that Nobunaga used the money to pay bonuses to soldiers fighting at fortresses in Setsu and Harima. 469 However, a copy of an undated letter from the Council addressed to the five largest Sakai Nichirenist temples sheds some light on the payment and the collections: 470 As to our sect’s pardon, [Lord Nobunaga] has sent letters demanding 200 gold pieces as our gratuity for the pardon. While this is difficult, there is nothing for it. In keeping with [Nobunaga’s] will, on the last eighth day [month unknown], we sent up 100 gold pieces. However, it will be hard for us to get together the remaining 100 gold pieces here, so we ask that you run a fundraising campaign in your harbor [Sakai].These five temples have already begun negotiations, and we beg for your aid in Kyoto if our sect is to endure. The messenger monks will fill you in on the details. [To:] Keiōji 471 Myōkokuji 472 Seishūji 473 467 Kawauchi, Toshi to shakai, 127-41. 468 Yanai, 56. 469 Shinchō-kōki, 284. 470 Kawauchi, Toshi to shukyō, 266. Original in Chōmyōji monjo, vol. 3, 21 (Doc 6.). 471 A branch temple of Honkakuji. 472 A branch of Chōmyōji, founded by Nichikō. 473 A branch of Myōkakuji. 171 Kemponji 474 Myōhōji 475 It seems likely, then, that the payments were piecemeal and that the payment in the ninth month was either the last payment or just Nobunaga’s official receipt of the fine already paid. It is also possible that the Council paid quickly out of its own cash reserves and the conducted a fundraising campaign to make up the loss. Officials of Nobunaga’s administration, however, were involved in the process much earlier. Kawauchi Masayoshi, for instance, notes that a letter in the Council archives thanks Matsui Yūkan, who often was the Nichiren sect’s liaison with Nobunaga, for his help in the Sakai fundraising. 476 The nature of his involvement is unclear, but likely it put an official imprimatur on the whole process. Suppression Revisited The Azuchi Religious Debate has been used by numerous scholars to illustrate Nobunaga’s hostility towards Buddhist Institutions, and as a sign of his general policy towards them. 477 For instance, these policies, in Neil McMullin’s eyes, generated a change that not only reduced the power and wealth of Buddhist institutions but also fundamentally changed the relationship between Buddhism and the state, making the Buddhist institutions subservient rather than interdependent. 478 Let us then ask this question: to what extent can we see a real reduction of the power and wealth of the Nichiren sect in the aftermath of the debate – what McMullin has termed “the quantitative change”? 479 474 A branch temple of Honnōji. 475 A branch temple of Myōkenji. 476 Kawauchi, Shukyō, 268. Original in Chōmyōji monjo, vol. 1, 142 (Doc 46.). 477 McMullin is the most obvious example in English, but Japanese scholarship along this line goes at least as far back as Tsuji and probably further. 478 McMullin, 254-55. 479 As an aside, there is some suggestion that even in the case of the True Pure Land sect Nobunaga did not fundamentally change the structure of the sect even after the fall of Osaka, and that after his death several 172 As we have seen, the debate was obviously financially costly to the sect, though probably not ruinously. There was also damage done by rioting and looting at Nichiren temples in the capital and in Azuchi, which Organtino reports as spreading through several provinces. What other consequences were there? At this point, the letters signed by the Nichiren sect after the debate are instructive. First, consider a vow signed by twelve of the fourteen temples then in the Council: 480 Item: This time, at the Jōgon’in in Gōshū, 481 in a debate held with the Pure Land Sect, the Lotus sect lost. Item: From this time forth, we shall not ever persecute 482 other sects. Item: As for the Lotus [sect], the decision that we be allowed to endure fills us with awe and gratitude. 483 Here, Item One is an acknowledgement of defeat, which is important given that in previous religious debates both sides would sometimes claim victory after the fact. 484 Item Two is more substantive, a declaration that the sect would no longer sanction religious debates of this type. Item Three can be read as an acknowledgement of Nobunaga’s power over the sect. The letter from the three representatives at Azuchi, written while they were still being held by Nobunaga’s men, is even stronger on this point: We are filled with awe and gratitude that our sect was allowed to endure, and as such, we vow that we will hold true to our vow to never again persecute the other sects. If, from now on, we make some incorrect utterance, then based on this letter, let the sect as a whole be punished and we shall not raise our voices in the slightest against [Nobunaga’s] anger. Let this be widely made known. 485 warriors called on the head of Honganji to raise the Ikko Ikki again. This would suggest that even there the “quantitative” changes are overstated. Kanda, Nobunaga to Ishiyama kassen, 2-5. 480 There are 13 signatures. Missing from the signers are Honpōji, and Honmanji. The extra signature is for the Kuon’in, which was not yet a head temple but would become one (called Jakkōji) in 1595. Jakkoji would also bring back Myōsenji, which had left the Council sometime around the time of the debate. 481 This is an alternate name for the province of Ōmi. 482 法難 (hōnan). In this case, it refers to aggressive criticism. 483 Kyōdan zenshi, 483. The original is lost, but there are copies in numerous places, including the Chion’in collection and the Tokitsune kyōki. I have omitted only the pro-forma listing of dieties who will punish those who break the vow and the names of the signatories. 484 Indeed, we shall see that the Nichiren sect would in fact do so in this debate as well, vows notwithstanding. 485 Kyōdan zenshi, 483. As above, these can be found in the Tokitsune kyōki and the Chion’in collection. 173 Nobunaga clearly pressed the Nichiren sect representatives for a statement that acknowledged that he could, if he wished, eliminate the sect. None of the documents require any change in how the sect functioned or governed itself, however. There is also no mention of confiscation of property, closure of temples, forced conversions, or exile. Nobunaga did execute a monk and two patrons, but while the monk (Fuden) was well known, he was not particularly highly ranked in the temple hierarchy – recall that he had only joined the sect a few years before – and the patrons (Ōwaki Densuke and Takebe Shōchi) were specifically Fuden’s patrons. Certainly, the debate represented a loss of wealth and prestige for the Nichiren sect, but practically the temples and the Council seemed to have changed little as a result. The post-debate fundraising drive was a large undertaking, but it followed the patterns of the earlier Tenshō period fundraiser: to give gifts to Nobunaga’s officers. In addition, Nobunaga made no unusual demands of the sect during that period. Nobunaga had, in the past, threatened the Christian daimyō Takayama Ukon with the expulsion of all Christians if he did not switch to Nobunaga’s side in an upcoming battle, but he made no attempt to use the Nichiren sect, now at his mercy, to force the hand of Nichirenist warriors in his enemies’ bands. It is, indeed, strange and telling, I think, that he so ruthlessly deal with the religion to which he was friendly but not with the one to which he was said to be hostile. 486 Contextualizing the debate further complicates the issue. Lamers notes that Takeda Shingen’s (1521- 1573) house law codes specifically banned debates between the Nichiren sect and the Pure Land sect, and McMullin notes that most daimyō banned religious debates outright. 487 Consequently, even in banning debates by the Nichiren sect specifically, Nobunaga did not break major precedent. 488 Nor did he break precedent by punishing the belligerents harshly, as the Rokkaku had done in the aftermath of the Tembun- era Matsumoto debate. 489 Kanda Chisato argues, and I agree, that the prime aim of Nobunaga’s decrees after 486 That Nobunaga was friendly to Christianity is an idea that goes back at least as far as Tsuji (for example in the very article I noted above) and has been very popular in popular imaginings of Nobunaga. Nobunaga threatening Takayama is documented in the Shinchō kōki, 256. 487 Lamers 180; McMullin 205. 488 Kanda, Sengoku Jidai no jiriki to shitsujo, 58. 489 Ibid, 53-54. 174 the debate had more to do with stopping religious debates in his domain than with any special hostility towards the Nichiren sect. 490 Also, it is important to note that there is no suggestion that this changed how the sect behaved outside of Nobunaga’s domain, where there were numerous branches of Council temples. 491 This is not to argue that Nobunaga did not impose his will on the Nichiren sect. In a very real sense the sect’s continuation in the Kinai region was effectively at Nobunaga’s whim. However, this was the case well before the Azuchi debate, just as it was true for Enryakuji, or the Christian community, or the Pure Land School, or Mt. Kōya, or any number of other religious institutions. It was equally true of more or less all of Kyoto, as Nobunaga burned down large swathes of the city on more than one occasion. Notably, however, Nobunaga did not obliterate the Nichirenists as he did Enryakuji. This is probably because Enryakuji allied with his enemies at what may well have been the most dangerous phase in Nobunaga’s lifetime in the Kinai. The Nichirenists, in contrast, caused a riot at a time when Nobunaga’s position was relatively secure. I should note that there is some evidence that supports the assertion that Nobunaga was quietly moving behind the scenes to arrange for the debate. Historian Handa Minoru’s research supports this proposition. 492 Handa finds evidence that Gyokunen Reiyo was summoned by Nobunaga to provoke a debate. Handa also finds evidence that Teian was very close to Nobunaga and that Nobunaga was effectively one of Teian’s patrons. Handa argues, as Tsuji did, that the debate was specifically meant to lead to suppression. But while the argument that Teian and Nobunaga were close is sound, the evidence that Nobunaga played puppet-master at the debate comes from later, Edo-period sources. 493 Contemporary sources do not support this theory. I am also wary of an argument that Nobunaga went about his plans with such secrecy. Nobunaga could, at a whim, levy heavy taxes on temples, as he did on Honganji in 1568. 494 He could execute high- 490 Ibid, 57-59. 491 Just looking at the Nichiryū lineage shows temples on Shikoku and Tanegashima, both well outside Nobunaga’s reach in 1579. 492 Handa, “Azuchi Shūron ni tsuite,” Nenpō chuseishi kenkyū, 1980, 114-25. 493 Primarily local histories and gazetteers, either of temples or of regions. 494 McMullin, 103; Lamers 74 175 ranking courtiers for slandering him. 495 He had already burnt down Enryakuji and deposed the shogun. 496 If he wished to weaken the Nichiren sect, he could have done so, by way of either fine or fire, without a resort to skullduggery. We should not forget either that such skullduggery could well have backfired if the Nichirenists had been more successful in the debate or if the resulting riot in Azuchi had done more damage. I am simply not convinced that weakening the Nichiren sect was Nobunaga’s goal. There was, to be sure, a major change in how the Nichiren sect operated and how it dealt with outside forces in the course of the sixteenth century. However, it was not a result of “suppression” by Oda Nobunaga. Nobunaga may perhaps have accelerated it, but the change had already begun in the aftermath of the 1536 raid – a move away from debates as proselytizing, an abandonment of military power, and preventing patrons from moving from one temple to another, 497 and a policy of bribing and befriending whoever was in charge. 498 These trends continued through the Miyoshi reign in the capital, Oda Nobunaga’s rule there, and even into Hideyoshi’s era. Also, it was Hideyoshi, not Nobunaga, who would force the large Nichiren temples to abandon their stately grounds and move to more cramped quarters in designated areas. 499 When Tokugawa Ieyasu wanted to suppress the Honganji sect, he razed their temples and banned the sect from Mikawa for twenty years. 500 Nobunaga did not do that to the Nichiren sect; he did not even do that to Honganji after taking over their fortress at Osaka. 495 See the discussion of the execution of Takeuchi Sueharu in Chapter 3. 496 In the act of deposing the shogun, he burnt down half of Kyoto and Chōmyōji along with it. See Chapter 3. 497 On this point, Kawauchi Masayoshi has argued that in the immediate aftermath of the debate Council documents show a major change in temple policy towards patrons. Specifically, while the Eiroku agreement had banned the poaching of patrons, during the fundraising there are documents banning patrons from visiting temples other than the one they patronize. Kawauchi argues that the cost of paying all the fines and bribes necessitated tying the patron more firmly to the temple. I cannot argue with this, but I see it as part of the same larger trend and believe that this would have become sect policy with or without Oda Nobunaga. See Kawauchi, Minshū to shakai, 215-17. 498 See Chapter 3. 499 Honnōji’s small patch of land in the Teramachi district is a good case in point. 500 Carol Tsang, War and Faith, 217. 176 Conclusion In writing this chapter, I have sought to address two issues. First, most scholarship on the Azuchi Religious Debate takes as a given that the Debate was one of Nobunaga’s ploys for suppressing the Nichiren sect, and that the outcome was rigged in favor of the Pure Land sect. Contemporary sources for the Debate give a far more complex view of the situation. While I cannot lightly dismiss the argument that Nobunaga rigged the debate, I can say that the sources are by no means conclusive on the matter, and I have demonstrated that Tsuji’s reconstruction of the Debate, which has served as the basis of years of research, is flawed. Second, this chapter continues the project of the previous chapter: defining the relationship between the Council of Head Temples and Oda Nobunaga. I have argued that Nobunaga’s policies were largely accommodating to the Nichiren sect and that he displayed no obvious hostility to the sect in the first ten years of his reign. I have also showed how the Council dealt with Nobunaga, both through the new tool of fundraising and through the adoption of the Tenshō agreement. This chapter describes a point where Nobunaga singled out the Nichiren sect for punishment. I have shown here that the outcome of the debate cannot be taken as an indicator of Nobunaga’s policies or inclinations as relates to the Nichiren sect (or to Buddhism altogether). Nobunaga’s main concern not only in dealing with the Azuchi Religious Debate but with the Nichiren sect as a whole in was not the institutional or economic power of Buddhist temples. It was maintaining order in his domain. In approaching the Azuchi Religious Debates, I have taken a number of angles. First, I have evaluated Tsuji Zennosuke’s analysis and reconstruction of the debate. I have clarified the provenance of the variants of the Inga Koji account and shown that the only published variant is a later forgery. I have also demonstrated that Tsuji’s two main sources for his reconstruction are incompatible and have proposed as an alternative to reconstruction a set of certain facts. I have shown, in doing so, that the standard thesis – that Nobunaga manipulated the results of the debate – is not very well supported by contemporary sources when examined as a whole. 177 As for what the penalties imposed after the debate meant in practical terms, and how the sect assembled the money for the fines, I have been able to put the cash value of the gold at roughly 3,000 strings of cash. I have also provided a rough timeline for the collection and payments of this money, as well as examined the role of Nobunaga’s subordinates in the fundraising. Finally, I have revisited the discussion begun in the last chapter on whether Nobunaga’s actions in this affair represent suppression of the Nichiren sect in particular and of Buddhism in general. I noted the arguments in favor of this advanced by McMullin, Handa, and others and made clear my objections to the argument. I do not believe that Nobunaga had any particular interest in eliminating or weakening the Nichiren sect. He did wish to stop the religious debates, which was indeed the only change in temple policy that was mandated by the vows signed after the Debate. Nobunaga ruled the Kinai for three years after the debate. He had already ceded the headship of the Oda house to his son Nobutada, and he had resigned his highest court post as minister of the right some years before. Along with the position of head of house, he gave Nobutada control over Owari and Minō. Nobunaga himself largely moved between Azuchi and Kyoto. He would continue to lodge at Honnōji, eventually building himself a small building on the grounds for his own use. And with a small number of men, he was lodging in this building in June of 1582 when his vassal Akechi Mitsuhide betrayed him, attacking with a force of thousands. Nobunaga killed himself, and Honnōji was lost to the flames. As Nobunaga’s vassals fought amongst themselves, the monks of Honnōji and Myōkakuji would rebuild, and the Council would ensure that whoever came out the winner, they would be prepared to follow the tried and tested method of negotiating with warriors. Mitsuhide would eventually fall to Nobunaga’s lieutenant, Hashiba Hideyoshi, who would take Nobunaga’s place as ruler of the Kinai, and eventually unify all of Japan. Hideyoshi would also return to the sect the written vows that they had written in the aftermath of the debate. The meaning of this return, and a sketch of the beginnings of the Nichiren sect’s emerging Fuju-Fuse faction, will conclude this study. 178 Conclusion To this day, the Nichiren sect maintains the characteristics of its founder. It is pugnacious, defiant, proud, as he was. -James Murdoch, Scottish journalist and historian, 1903 501 The unified Nichiren sect that responded to the Azuchi Religious Debate in 1579 was, clearly, a different entity than the military powerhouse that had destroyed Yamashina Honganji in 1532. The creation of the Council of Head Temples was not merely a repudiation of military power but a reimagining of the structure of the sect. The sect had been fragmented since the death of Nichiren in 1282, but by 1579 working together had become commonplace for the various lineages. This was in stark contrast to a century earlier, when the lineages could work together in the face of outside pressure but also fought pitched battles with one another. The Nichiren sect of 1579, while still pugnacious and at times discordant, was finished with battles. Partly this was because the leadership had memories of the Lotus Leagues, and were now wary of military power. However, another reason was that the Council was effective enough in advancing the sect’s interests that military action was unnecessary. The position of the sect in the city was secure, even when Oda Nobunaga punished it. A Nichirenist military was no longer possible, but neither was a repeat of the destructive 1536 raid against it. The turning point at which the Nichiren sect cemented its position in the capital was not when the sovereign and the shogun asked them to return to the capital in 1542; after all, Nichirenist temples had been royally and shogunally sanctioned since the fourteenth century. Nor was it when the sect had rebuilt its grand temples, nor when Enryakuji gave up on imposing its will in negotiations after the sect’s return. Rather, the turning point was the Eiroku Peace of 1564, when the sect turned inward and declared that their main duty was the propagation of the Lotus Sutra, not squabbling amongst themselves. This in turn was the starting point of the Council of Head Temples, which began a means of liaising with those in power, but then 501 Murdoch, A History of Japan, vol. 1, 484. 179 quickly became something more. The 1576 Fundraiser shows that the Council was not only mature but that its mission had expanded: it was undertaking large-scale projects that the Nichiren sect could not have even considered earlier. It also shows how unified the sect had become, as patrons of all fifteen head temples contributed to the event. A mere fifteen years before, the Hierarchy and Unitary factions had been at each other’s’ throats. Now they worked towards a common goal. Now, to conclude this dissertation, I would like to highlight a few themes that have been particularly important to this study. Violence and Its Renunciation Violence has been a major theme in this study. As noted in the Introduction, the Sengoku period is defined by war, and the city of Kyoto was a battlefield more than once during the period of this study. Nevertheless, the Nichiren sect abandoned military power. As we have seen, the sect’s brief embrace of military power – the Lotus Leagues – was itself a consequence of a specific set of circumstances, these being the absence of the shogunate, an increasingly militarized society, the imminent threat of Honganji, and the military impotence of other power centers in the capital. Faced with these circumstances, the temples made themselves a part of Hosokawa Harumoto’s military machine. This led them to great power but also exposed them to great danger. So, on their return to the capital in 1542, they laid violence aside. This was not because others would no longer do violence onto them, nor because the situation around the capital had become peaceful. What they found was that they could protect themselves and their interests by buying the favor of powerful warriors. This abandonment of violence also likely made the Council more palatable to warrior authority. While the sect had good reason to abandon violence, the battles of the years between 1536 and 1568 around the capital make it surprising that the sect did not maintain even a token force. Despite how badly things had gone, the Lotus Leagues had fielded an army that could stand alongside any raised by a 180 powerful warrior. And in contrast, the enemy of the Lotus Leagues, Honganji, not only maintained a military presence after their battle with Hosokawa Harumoto, they saw action until 1580. Within the larger Nichiren sect itself, there were still violent elements, such as the Myōmanji patrons who took the over Hiraga Hondoji’s Tōgane branch temple. 502 Still, this sort of thing did not manifest in the capital. Indeed, unlike Honganji, which warriors often saw in military terms, the post-1536 Nichiren sect was purely civilian. The comparison with Honganji is particularly instructive here, as after Oda Nobunaga’s death several warriors approached the now defanged Honganji, asking them to again raise the Ikkō Ikki to fight against Nobnaga’s successor, Toyotomi Hideyoshi (1537-1598). 503 There is no record of the Nichiren sect being approached in this way at any time after 1536 by anyone. Their transformation into a non-military entity was complete, both in their practice and in the minds of contemporaries. Exclusivism and Its Limits Another theme that has turned up repeatedly in this dissertation is exclusivism. Exclusivism has been a characteristic of the Nichiren sect since Nichiren, and was, I have argued, an important part of the sect’s appeal. I have shown that the purpose of the 1576 fundraiser was to ensure that Oda Nobunaga gave his official imprimatur to the sect’s exclusivist policies. I should note, however, that while exclusivism was important, it was not the sect’s only concern, and it may not even have been the primary one. While Nisshin is often given credit for popularizing the concept, Myōkakuji already had set rules forbidding contact with other sects in 1413 (Nisshin was born in 1407), going so far even as to require that husbands who married non-believer wives had three years to convert them or both would be expelled from the sect. However, even these rather strict rules had an out: if the government commanded that one participate in the rituals of another sect, or the wife in question was part of a high-ranking family, exceptions were made. 504 Further, 502 See page 84. 503 Kanda, Nobunaga to Ishiyama kassen, 4-5. 504 Kyōdan zenshi, 280-5. The Honnōji rules set by founder Nichiryū in 1451 are similar, both in strictness and in terms of the exceptions. 181 some temples had no such exclusivist rules, and monks like Nichikō of Chōmyōji studied at Mt. Hiei and other non-Nichirenist temples. Being unusual in Japanese Buddhism, exclusivism will always get scholarly attention, but it was by no means the sect’s only strategy. Further, enforcing a hard exclusivist stance would, as Nichiryū and others clearly understood, effectively make it impossible for a high-ranking courtier to be a patron. This may seem like compromising the core beliefs of the sect, but this is not necessarily the case. Recall the binary concepts of shakubuku (subduing) and shōjū (acceptance) presented in the Introduction of this dissertation. 505 Nichiren himself made clear that there was a time and place for both, and the debate over when to apply each has been debated in the Nichiren sect from the very beginning. 506 To put it another way: while some Nichirenists believed in strict exclusivism, to many if not most Nichirenists, exclusivity was only one of many ways to worship the Lotus Sutra. Nichikō’s position on this was clearly complicated as he both studied Buddhism widely and was fond of aggressive shakubuku proselytizing, but he seems to have managed this tension without much trouble. Flexibility on this issue was also essential to the work of the Council, as one had to forgive the massive payments to warriors who were not part of the Nichiren sect. That said, the sect as a whole embraced exclusivism on some level, and this did not change after 1579: in 1587, Toyotomi Hideyoshi’s regime would reaffirm the sect’s exemption from participation in other sect’s religious rites and fundraisers. 507 The question of exclusivism would come to a head in 1595, when Toyotomi Hideyoshi held a thousand-monk assembly ( 千僧会, sensōe) 508 for the new massive Buddha hall he had built in the capital. Hideyoshi invited representatives of all sects to participate, and the decision of the sect to take part in the 505 See page vi. 506 Stone, “Rebuking the Enemies of the Lotus: Nichirenist Exclusivism in Historical Perspective.” 507 Chōmyōji monjo vol.1, 115. 508 As it often is in such terms, the number 1000 should not be taken literally, though in this case there were likely at least 800 participants. 182 rite enraged Nichiō 日奥 (1565-1630), abbot of Myōkakuji. Nichiō refused to participate, and was harshly critical of the rite itself and of the monks who supported it. 509 This would lead to a split in the sect, and the creation of the Fuju-fuse faction ( 不受不施派, fuju fuse ha) of the Nichiren sect. This group would have the somewhat dubious honor of being explicitly banned by the Tokugawa shogunate in 1665, making it the only Buddhist sect that the Tokugawa shogunate put in the same dangerous category as Christianity. And like Christianity, it would survive underground until the Meiji period. The rise of the Fuju-fuse faction is outside the scope of this project, but the Council’s involvement in the discussion is clear from the documentary record, and thus would make an excellent subject for further study. 510 Proselytizing and Debates A major concern of the Nichiren sect was the recruitment and retention of its patrons. In this dissertation, I have paid particular attention to one specific mode of proselytizing: the religious debate. As we have seen, it was a high stakes affair, one that could demonstrate the sect’s dominance over another but just as easily humiliate it. In either case, these debates could frequently lead to riots and retaliation. Nevertheless, debates persisted, even when it was clear that powerful warriors disliked the practice and were likely to punish belligerents. Even the sect grew wary of them. Despite this, the sect persisted in these debates. The repercussions of the Azuchi Religious Debate were, to be sure, extreme, but in fact they were nothing compared to the repercussions of the earlier Matsumoto Religious Debate of 1536. It had resulted in the sect’s exile from the capital, several temples permanent destrction, and numerous dead. One question I have wrestled with while writing this is why debates remained so popular until Nobunaga banned them forty years later. 509 It should be noted that every other head temple sent representatives. 510 Some work has already been done on this, most notably Nakao Takashi, Nichiren shinseki ibun to jiin monjo, 260-282; Kawauchi, Hideyoshi no Daibutsu zōritsu, 60-110; Kawauchi, Minshū to shakai, 227-262. 183 The obvious answer is that this was a high risk, high reward proposition. But there is something to consider as well. Monks like Nisshin, who were tortured and jailed for their actions, did not assume that they would be treated kindly. They assumed that they were believers in the Lotus Sutra who would be attacked by a benighted world. One can imagine Nisshin, his face scarred by horrible burns from the iron pot, his speech slurred because part of his tongue had been cut off, his back bent from being kept in a short cage for a year, standing on a street corner, screaming at non-believers. For many Nichirenists, this sort of aggressive shakubuku proselytizing was the essence of their sect, and violent reprisals only served to justify their actions. But as with exclusivism, this glorification of aggressive shakubuku proselytizing was always in tension with another strain in the sect, one of accepting shōjū proselytizing. Nichirenist preachers were often more conciliatory. For example, in 1460, a monk of Honnōji named Nitten 日典, who was originally from the far western island of Tanegashima, went home to try to convert the people there. His approach was so hostile that the locals that they buried him up to his neck on one of the beaches and stoned him to death in 1462. When another Honnōji monk, Nichryō 日良, arrived in 1464, he focused on first getting close to the ruling Tanegashima family, passing his time teaching tea ceremony and not even mentioning religion. After three years, he finally broached the subject of religion and managed to convert Tanegashima Tokiuji, the head of the family, who converted his entire family to the Nichiren sect. In 1469, Nichiryō, with the help of the Tanegashima family, founded Hongenji 本源寺, and the island became a Nichirenist center. 511 The nature of shakubuku proselytizing ensured that it would spark outrage and get more attention, both in contemporary sources and in modern scholarship. Nevertheless, we should also take note of the quieter work of monks like Nichiryō. The profile of Nichikō in Chapter 2 should help serve this purpose. While 511 Kyōdan zenshi, 247-9 184 Nichikō occasionally used more aggressive tactics and participated in many debates, he was also a fundraiser and a builder, and he was willing to learn from non-believers. A Monk’s Place in a Warriors’ World Another theme that I have explored is the place of the sect in a warrior’s world. Even as the sect abandoned military power, we do not see obvious subservience. The Lotus Leagues were part of Hosokawa Harumoto’s military organization: they were led by a Hosokawa vassal – Yamamura Masatsugu – and received rewards for military service from Hosokawa Harumoto. They also served as Harumoto’s conduit to the city. After 1536, we see, perhaps surprisingly, an increased independence. This is not to say that warriors did not impose their own will on the sect. As we have seen in Chapter 2, the Miyoshi deliberately put themselves in the negotiations that led to the Eiroku Peace. However, the peace was not imposed by the Miyoshi or anyone else. Rather, it was born of a movement within the sect to resolve the conflict between the Hierarchy and Unitary factions. The Council of Head Temples, likewise, was not subservient to the Miyoshi or to any other warrior organization. In preparing this dissertation on the Sixteenth-Century Nichiren sect in Kyoto, I was introduced to the underappreciated role that the Miyoshi played in Sengoku history. While the three unifiers, the Hōjō, the Uesugi, and the Takeda are household names in Japan, Miyoshi Nagayoshi is a largely unknown figure. However, Nagayoshi could well be seen as the fourth unifier, having taken control of the capital and inserted himself and his vassals into the shogunate’s higher ranks. The Miyoshi had an outsized effect on the sect, as both rulers and patrons. They also may have been the only Sengoku daimyō to impose Nichirenism on the populace of their home province. It would be to the benefit of English language scholarship if the Miyoshi were better known to those interested in premodern Japanese history. Oda Nobunaga’s relationship with the sect has been an important issue in this dissertation. Previous historiography has characterized Nobunaga’s relationship with Buddhism as hostile. Indeed, much of the 185 recent scholarship shows him to be less revolutionary, but more complex and interesting. I have argued here that Nobunaga was content to accommodate the sect if it did not cause him problems. The Nichiren sect attempted to ingratiate itself with Nobunaga as the new master of the capital. They limited their use of religious debates and showered Nobunaga and his men with gifts. I hope that my work on Nobunaga’s relationship with the sect will serve to correct the general view of Nobunaga’s relationship with the sect. Partly I have done this by noting his own policies, but I think that by clarifying how and why the sect acted I also shed light on how Nobunaga interacted with it. Nobunaga’s assassination in 1582 led to the rise of his lieutenant Toyotomi Hideyoshi (1537-1598), 512 who unified all of Japan. He is often described as more conciliatory to Buddhism than Nobunaga had been. 513 One general feature of the transition between Oda Nobunaga’ government and Hideyoshi’s was the return and destruction of written vows ( 起請文, kishōmon) that had been given to Nobunaga. This is often called “the breaking of vows” ( 起請破り, kishōyaburi) or “returning vows “( 起請返し, kishōgaeshi), by which vows were nullified by Hideyoshi’s regime. 514 For instance, in 1585, Hideyoshi’s Kyoto administrator Maeda Gen’i (1539-1602) sent a letter to the sect: 515 Ever since the debate at Azuchi some years ago, you have been restrained. His lordship orders that the written vows [you signed in the aftermath of the debate], etc., now be destroyed, and that things be as before. Another letter in the same collection, also from Maeda, specifically states that the mysterious “character of ‘myō,’ fourth of the Teachings of the Vaipulya Teaching Seat” used by Teian in the Azuchi Religious Debate was “unquestionably fake” and it encouraged the Nichiren sect to proselytize as before. 516 This last document is considered to be a later forgery by Tsuji and Kawauchi (Tsuji notes that the language is inappropriate for 512 The classic study of Toyotomi Hideyoshi in English is Berry, Hideyoshi. 513 For example, see Tsuji, “Azuchi Shūron no shinsō,” 157-8. 514 Kawauchi, Minshū to shakai, 217-8 515 Chōmyōji monjo, vol. 1, 87. This letter is in the Chōmyōji collection (though not in the Council Documents collection). A similar missive, addressed to Nichikō, can be seen in Ibid, 88. 516 Chōmyōji monjo vol. 1, 89. 186 the time period), 517 although Chōmyōji so firmly stands behind the document that a wood-carved copy is to this day displayed on the temple’s main gate. 518 Tsuji pronounced this an example of Hideyoshi reversing Nobunaga’s religious policies. On the issue of religious debates, it was. However, as with Hideyoshi’s reaffirmation of the sect’s exclusivist privileges, Hideyoshi was in fact doing what Nobunaga had usually done: affirming precedent. Further, the return of the vows did not simply release the sect from any obligation. As scholars such as Chijiwa Itaru have noted, the destruction of the old vows was not a sign that the sect was finally free of the agreement. Rather, the agreement was still in place, but it was now Hideyoshi that had life or death control over the sect. And for its part, the sect followed its own precedent: the Council of Head Temples paid a hefty sum to arrange for all this. 519 As part of a city-wide campaign to beautify Kyoto under his rule, Hideyoshi forced several of the head temples to move to newly designated temple districts, such as the Teramachi 寺町 to the west (now home to Honnōji, among others) and Teranouchi 寺之内 to the north (now home to Myōkenji, among others). Their new locations were often smaller than the old ones. Hideyoshi also gave some of Honkokuji’s land to Honganji for a new Kyoto headquarters. 520 Sengoku Buddhism? At the beginning of this dissertation, I raised the argument championed by Yuasa Haruhisa and Fujii Manabu that the Nichiren sect should not be categorized as “Kamakura Buddhism,” but rather as “Sengoku Buddhism” This is because, while Nichiren founded the sect in the Kamakura period, the sect was in essence 517 Tsuji, “Azuchi Shūron no shinsō,” 158. 518 When the carving was first put on the gate is unclear, but the current gate and carving date to the nineteenth century. Both Tsuji and Kawauchi agree that the other Maeda Gen’i documents in the Chōmyōji collection are legitimate. See Kawauchi, Minshū to shakai, 218. 519 Kawauchi, Minshū to shakai, 218. 520 Kawauchi, Nichirenshū to Sengoku Kyoto, 264-66. 187 a small, heretical offshoot of Enryakuji throughout the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. Only in the Sengoku period did Nichiren’s disciples stand fully on their own. 521 There are several problems with this thesis. The sect developed lineages and patron networks well before the Sengoku period. The sect was in the capital in the late Kamakura period, and Myōkenji had been officially commissioned by the royal families of both the southern and northern courts as well as by the Muromachi shogunate as a sanctioned prayer center before 1350. There was certainly a robust Nichirenist establishment in the capital and the Kantō well before the Sengoku period. However, I believe my work here supports the Sengoku Buddhism thesis. To reiterate, the sect’s place in Kyoto was cemented in the 1560s, when the Nichiren sect unified itself. The creation of the Council of Head Temples so changed the sect both in terms of its structure and its relationship with other entities that the sect that emerged from the sixteenth century was a new entity. In other words, the Nichiren sect that exists today was, indeed, a creation of the Sengoku period. In Closing In this dissertation, I have argued that unification, culminating in the creation and maturation of the Council of Head Temples, was the mechanism through which the Nichiren sect’s Kyoto temples survived the turbulent sixteenth century. The earlier strategy of active military engagement in the 1530s had merely invited military reprisal. Further, the earlier structure of separate lineages would allow the lineages to do damage to each other while still exposing all the lineages to collective punishment when one of them angered Enryakuji or a powerful warrior family. Even the destruction of the temples and banishment of the sect did not bring about a concerted move towards unification. It was later councils, coupled with pressure from warriors, friendly and hostile, that finally led to the coalescence of the Council of Head Temples. 521 Yuasa, 4-9. 188 The development of the Council of Head Temples was not merely a matter of a new bureaucracy and efficient budgeting. The terms of the Eiroku and Tenshō agreements represented fundamental changes in the sect’s makeup: the Eiroku agreement of 1567 effectively ended the Unitary Faction/Hierarchy conflict and forced the lineages within the sect to stop competing with each other, and the Tenshō agreement of 1575 took from the individual lineages the right to use their most potent rhetorical weapon against other sects. Sengoku Kyoto was wracked by unrest and war. It was permanently altered by the fires of Ōnin, becoming a pair of walled cities full of walled neighborhoods. Within this tense and partially destroyed capital city, the position of the Nichiren sect was particularly precarious, as it was by nature hostile to other sects and had a habit of openly rebuking government officials. In the 1530s, the Nichirenist temples, like many in Sengoku society, took up arms and became potent military entities. When this led to the destruction of their temples and their banishment, they changed tack, and instead focused on bringing the sect’s political and economic power to bear as a unit, leading to the creation of the Council of Head Temples. The Council allowed the sect to solidify its position in the capital through the last years of Miyoshi reign and the arrival of the hegemons. Despite the catastrophic results of the Azuchi Religious Debate of 1579, Hideyoshi’s forced relocation of the Kyoto temples, and the fuju-fuse controversy, at no time after the founding of the Council was there serious discussion of expelling the sect from the capital. When Nobunaga and Hideyoshi had come and gone, and the Tokugawa had established their new order, the Nichiren sect, the eastern interloper surrounded by powerful and entrenched enemies, had become a permanent part of Kyoto life. 189 Appendix I The 21 Nichirenist Head Temples in Kyoto Temple Lineage Hierarchy/Unitary Descended from Nichirō Lineage? Founded 妙顕寺 Myōkenji 四条門流 Shijō Unitary Yes (Through Nichizō) 1321 妙覚寺 Myōkakuji 四条門流 Shijō Unitary Yes (Through Nichizō) 1378 本覚寺 Honkakuji 四条門流 Shijō Unitary Yes (Through Nichizō) 1444 本能寺 Honnōji 日隆門流 Nichiryū Hierarchy Yes (Through Shijō lineage) 1429 (alternately 1415) 立本寺 Ryūhonji 四条門流 Unitary Yes (Through Nichizō) 1321 妙蓮寺 Myōrenji 日隆門流 Hierarchy Yes (Through Shijō lineage) Late in the Ōei era (1394-1427) 本隆寺 Honryūji 本隆寺派・日真門流 Hierarchy Yes (Through Shijō lineage) 1488 大妙寺 Daimyōji 日朗門流 Unitary Yes (part of Nichirō lineage) 1340 弘経寺 Gugyōji 四条門流 Unitary Yes 1375 本圀寺 Honkokuji 六条門流 Unitary Yes (Through Nichi’in) 1345 (Founded in Kamakura before, moved to 190 Kyoto in this year) 宝国寺 Hōkokuji 六条門流 Unitary Yes (Through Nichiden) ~1401 本禅寺 Honzenji 日陣門流 Hierarchy Yes (Through Rokujō lineage) 1406 本満寺 Honmanji 六条門流 Unitary Yes (Through Nichiden) 1410 上行院 Jōgōin 日尊門流 Hierarchy No (Fuji/Nikkō Lineage derived) 1339 住本寺 Jūhon’ji 日尊門流 Hierarchy No (Fuji/Nikkō Lineage derived) Sometime after 1339 妙満寺 Myōmanji 日什門流 Hierarchy No (Nakayama Nichijō lineage derived) 1385 妙泉寺 Myōsenji 日什門流 Hierarchy No (Nakayama Nichijō lineage derived) 1431 本法寺 Honpōji 日親門流 Unitary No (Nakayama/ Nichijō lineage derived) 1436 頂妙寺 Chōmyōji 中山／日常門流 Unitary No (part of Nakayama/ Nichijō lineage) 1495 学養寺 Gakuyōji 身延門流 Unitary No (Nikō lineage) 1427 or 1450s (sources differ) 妙伝寺 Myōdenji 身延門流 Unitary No (Nikō lineage) 1477 Source: Nichirenshū Jiten 191 Appendix II Tsuji Zennosuke’s List of Sources for the Azuchi Religious Debate from “Azuchi Shūron no Shinsō” Nichiren-sect Affiliated Sources Azuchi Shūron jitsuroku (A True Record of the Azuchi Shūron) 『安土問答実録』：The account of the Nichiren sect representative Nichien of Kuonji, inscribed by Teigen. This can be found in Dai Nihon Bukkyō zensho V. 97. Kogyōki 『己行記』: The journal of the Nichiren sect representative Nichikō of Myokokuji. See Chapter 3 for more on this source. Kinzanshō kindangi tsuika hamon 『金山抄禁断義追加破文』: A Nichiren sect apologia designed to counter anti-Nichiren arguments. Published 1662 Sanshu meiseki shi 『山州名跡志』: A gazetteer of Yamashiro province published in the Hōei (1704-11) Era. Has information on the debate in its entry on the Nichirenist head temple Chōmyōji. Minyu keshu roku 『愍諭繋珠録』： A Nichiren Sect apologia specifically designed to counter Pure Land criticisms of the Nichiren sect, published in 1712. Chōmyōji kiroku 『頂妙寺記録』: A chronicle produced at Chōmyōji, written in 1812. Azuchi mondō ki 『安土問答記』：Supposedly Nichikō’s own record of the debate. However, numerous errors and odd word usage for the period suggest it is a forgery, probably composed by someone who read Nichien’s account (listed above). Also to be found in Dai Nihon Bukkyō zensho , V.97. Nagoya Hokkeji kiroku 『名古屋法華寺記録』：The chronicle of Nagoya Hokkeji. Contains a letter supposedly written to Nobunaga by a Nichiren priest right after the debate. The letter explains that Nobunaga’s family has been close to the Nichiren sect for generations, in an attempt to temper his treatment of the sect after the debate. However, Tsuji believed that the letter was a later forgery, and I am inclined to agree. Pure Land Sources Chion’in monjo 『知恩院文書』：The Chion’in was a leading Pure Land temple in Kyoto, and there are several documents in their collection relating to the debate. Daiun’in monjo 『大雲院文書』：The Daiun’in was the temple of Teian, one of the Pure Land sect representatives. Teian’s own record of the event is in their collection. 192 Jōun’ji 『浄運寺文書』：This temple in Kōzuke has a copy of Jonen’s account dated several days after the debate. Jōgon’in Monjo 『浄厳院文書』：The documents of the temple at which the debate was held. Contains Jonen’s account of 1581. Neutral Sources: Shinchō-kōki 『信長公記』：The biography of Oda Nobunaga, written by his vassal Ōta Gyūichi a decade or so after Nobunaga’s death. Contains an entry on the debate. Shinchō-ki 『信長記』：A biography of Oda Nobunaga written in the early Edo period by the Neo-Confucian scholar Ose Hōan. Generally, seen as less reliable than Gyūichi’s Shinchō-kōki. Has an entry on the debate Azuchi Mondō (Niino Copy) 『安土問答』（新野家本）：Inga Koji’s account of the debate, held by the Niino family of Katagai village in Niigata prefecture (as of 1919). The account is written on a large hanging scroll. It is (I believe) the basis of the text in Dai Nihon Bukkyō zensho vol.97. As I will explain below, I believe this to be a later forgery. Azuchi Mondō (Maeda Copy) 『安土問答』（前田家本）：Inga Koji’s account of the debate, held by the Sonkeikaku Bunkō, which was once the holdings of the Maeda family who ruled the Kaga, Toyama, and Noto domains in the Edo period. As I will explain below, I believe this to be Inga’s actual account. To the above I would add these additional sources not in Tsuji’s list: Nichiren-sect Affiliated Sources The Kuonji kyūki 『久遠寺旧記』：A collection of documents held by the head temple of the Nichiren sect, Minobu-san Kuonji. Contains a copy of Inga Koji’s account that largely follows the Maeda-copy, transcribed by Sassa Masanobu Neutral Sources Ehon Taikōki 『絵本太閤記』: A mid-Edo-period account of the life of Toyotomi Hideyoshi. Contains an account of the debate and an explanation of the Pure Land sect’s victory. Historia de Iapam: Jesuit Missionary Luis Frois’s long book on Japanese history. Has a short entry on the debate. Letter from Organtino to Frois, June 1579: Gnecchi‐Soldo Organtino, a Jesuit then in Kyoto, sent this account of the debate to Luis Frois, then in Kyushu. It seems unlikely Organtino was present at the debate, and likely he had access to a copy of Jonen’s account, on which he based his account. This in turn was likely Frois’s source for his account in the Historia. 193 Appendix III Tsuji Zennosuke’s Reconstruction of the Azuchi Shūron The following text is my translation of Tsuji Zennosuke’s reconstruction of the Azuchi Religious Debate from the article “Azuchi Shūron no shinsō.” I have gone through it and compared it to the sources that he used in order to determine which parts of the reconstruction come from which source. The sources are Nichien’s Azuchi Shūron Jitsuroku (“Nichien”), the Maeda variant of Inga Koji’s Azuchi Mondō (“Inga Koji (Maeda)”), and the Niino variant of the Azuchi Mondō (“Inga Koji (Niino)”). It is my belief that seeing the transition from one source to another helps to makes clear the problems with the reconstruction. Sources Pure Land School, Teian: Is there nembutsu in the 8 volumes of the Lotus Sutra? Nichien Nichiren sect, an elder monk (Nittai? 522 ): When you refer to nembutsu, to which do you refer? Teian slightly hesitated but did not answer. Some other person from the Nichiren sect: There is nembutsu. 523 The above-mentioned Nichiren elder monk (Nittai?) got excited or embarrassed, and started to criticize his own allies. Inga Koji, in criticism: It is not only the Amidists, as all follow the practice of thinking deeply (nen) on the Buddha (butsu). However, of late, most of the schools have people who call out the name of Amida, called nembutsusha. Even in the Lotus Sutra, the great Boddhisattva preaches that Amida will cause immediate rebirth in paradise, so there is nembutsu. 524 Teian: If there is nembutsu, why does the Lotus [sect] teach that those who chant the nembutusu will fall into the unceasing hell? 525 Inga Koji (Maeda) 522 This line is not in Nichien’s jitsuroku, but the jitsuroku has Nittai as speaking the early debate lines. Therefore, while the line is only found in the Maeda variant of Inga Koji’s account, Tsuji makes the speaker Nittai based on Nichien’s account. 523 The entire exchange between the question “is there nembutsu?” and the answer “there is nembutsu” is not present in either the Niino copy of the Inga Koji account or Nichien’s account. 524 This is presumably a reference to chapter 23 of the Lotus Sutra. 525 This line is in all accounts, but the phrasing most closely matches the Maeda variant of the Inga Koji account. 194 At this the Lotus sect was silent, so Inga Koji believed that they should be dismissed, but the victory seemed fragile, so he ceased his criticism. Nichikō (In the Jitsuroku, Nittai): Is the Amida of the Lotus the same as the Amida of the Pure Land? Or is he different? Teian: Amida is the same no matter where he is. Inga Koji noted that this is a terrible answer, but owing to secret orders from his lordship [Nobunaga], he did not criticize it. 526 Nichikō: If this is so, why does the Pure Land school say “Discard, close, disregard, and abandon” 527 the Amida of the Lotus? Teian: “Discard, close, disregard, and abandon” does not mean to throw away nembutsu, but rather that before one practices nembutsu one should “discard, close, disregard, and abandon” all other practices than nembutsu. Inga Koji thought: “This is also a bad answer. As I said above, there is no practice that avoids thinking on the Buddha. All Buddhist practices are nembutsu practice.” 528 In other words, Teian’s answer was not good, but as before, because of the orders from above he did not criticize and let it be. Inga Koji (Maeda) At this time, in Nichien’s Jitsuroku, on the Nichirenist side, everyone began to argue that they should be next to speak. Nichien said, “I should certainly speak here.” Nittai said, “No, that is unreasonable.” Finally, Nichikō took control and said “Nichien, give an answer.” Nichien then spoke. Nichien: In what sutra or commentary is there any evidence for the assertion that one should abandon the Lotus sutra before doing nembutsu? Surely there is not even one character or phrase in support of this in all the sutras of the Thus-come-one’s life. Just shut your mouth. 529 Nichien Teian: There is! In the three Pure Land Sutras, it says, “using well used expedient means, lead all sentient beings to enlightenment.” Also, it is said, “single-mindedly think of the Buddha of infinite life.” Inga Koji thought: “This is an even worse answer than before. The three [Pure Land] sutras are from thirty years before the Lotus Sutra. Terrible, terrible.” However, he did not criticize this. Inga Koji (Maeda) 526 Inga Koji provides no reasoning behind his assessment. 527 A phrase used by Honen in exhorting his followers towards exclusive nembutsu practice. 528 Tsuji has these phrases out of order. 529 In all other sources, Nichikō says this line, though the last (rather belligerent) phrase is only in the jitsuroku 195 Nichikō: It says in the Immeasurable Meanings Sutra, 530 “I made use of the power of expedient means. But in these more than forty years, I have not yet revealed the truth.” 531 Therefore, the sutras of the time before [the Lotus Sutra] are to be abandoned and the Pure Land Sutras are expedient means. Common to all three sources. The Pure Land school suddenly became uncertain, and Teian and Gyokunen began to argue. The Nichirenist sect side began to raise victory cheers and stand up, at which point Inga Koji began to directly criticize the Nichiren sect. Facing them, he spoke. Inga Koji: Are you saying that before the Lotus there is no true achievement of Buddhahood? 532 Nichikō: No, there is no true achievement of Buddhahood. 533 Inga Koji: Do you not know that there are sutras and passages wherein there is true achievement of Buddhahood? 534 Nichikō: Which sutras? Which phrases? 535 Inga Koji, with great speed and intensity: First, in the Flower Garland Sutra, it says that the triple realm is nothing but the one mind, and there is nothing separate from the one mind. The mind, the Buddha, and all living beings— there is no distinction among the three. At that time, those whose circumstances did not match the great vehicle of the Mahayana by and by received the teachings of the two vehicles or three vehicles. In the Lotus Sutra, it says, “In the Buddha lands of the ten directions there is only the law of the one vehicle, there are not two, there are not three.” 536 Is this not a phrase supporting the unity of the 3 [vehicles]? Do you understand? Further, the Flower Garland and the Lotus are called by different names but have the same meaning. Shōtoku Taishi said in his Seppō myōgenron, “The founder of Nanten said to me: ‘if you desire to quickly leave life and death, you must learn that which is called the fundamental single vehicle, and know it. The true meaning of the single vehicle is the mind of the Buddha. If you do not study this single vehicle, then there is no means for you to escape life and death. Further, know that I am a holder of the Lotus, and that the true meaning of the Lotus is found in the Flower Garland Sutra.” Are you saying that the Dharma king Shōtoku Inga Koji (Maeda) 530 The introductory sutra (that is, it immediately precedes it) to the Lotus Sutra. 531 Translation as per Watson, 15. 532 The Niino variant line is more or less the same, but the specific phrasing is from the Maeda variant. 533 The Niino variant has “Even if there are examples of this in the texts, they are all expedient means.” 534 Niino variant instead says, “Is there really a difference between true Buddhahood and expedient-means Buddhahood?” 535 The Niino variant line is more or less the same, but the specific phrasing is from the Maeda variant. 536 Translation as per Watson, 69. 196 Taishi was lying? With all this, try and support the notion that in the time before the Lotus Sutra the truth was not made clear. 537 Teian, taking advantage of the help, now asked Nichikō a question. Teian: If you reject the writings of the forty years, and reject the sutras that came before the Lotus, do you reject do you also reject the character myō, 4 th of the teachings of the Vaipulya teaching seat? The Nichiren sect side had never heard this phrase, and began fighting amongst themselves, saying, “shall I speak? Shall someone else speak?” Inga Koji (Maeda) Nichikō: So, we have decided that the three Pure Land sutras do not yet reveal the truth? Or is there further doubt? Teian: Let’s return to that later. Nichikō: This is a disagreement between the three Pure Land sutras and the Lotus Sutra. First, let us settle the matter that the three sutras that support nembutsu do not yet reveal the truth. Teian: We shall return to that later. Do you not know the fourth myō of the Vaipulya teaching seat? At this time Oda Shichibei no jō Nobusumi spoke up. Nobusumi: He said we shall return to that. First, answer this. Nichikō only kept repeating that the sutras do not yet reveal the truth. Nichien Inga Koji: If this matter comes from the myō of truth, then you have seen the myō of the Lotus. Stop this. Hearing this, Nichikō, annoyed shouts that that “the criticism is one sided!” and is angered by the unfair criticism. Inga Koji: Do you not know the Lotus? In the first fascicle of the Lotus [the Buddha] says “Stop, stop, no need to speak! My Law is wonderful and difficult to ponder.” 538 Therefor what you think in your heart is not the myō. Have you nothing to say? To this brilliant and speedy response, [the Nichirenists] made no attempt to speak or preach. So, the Lotus sect has lost. Stop this. Inga Koji (Maeda) Inga Koji Maeda At this time, Nichien rose, and approached the ministers and Nobusumi. Teian was about half a ken away. Nichien 537 The Niino variant line is more or less the same, but the specific phrasing is from the Maeda variant. 538 Translation as per Watson, 62. 197 Nichien: Even though the matter of the truth not being revealed has been settled, you keep saying, “We will return to that later.” And to speak further, if in the more than forty years the truth was not revealed, then are not all those practices discarded? Now, what is this character myō, 4 th of the teachings of the Vaipulya teaching seat? Teian: Is that so? Nichien: As to myō, there are four myō. Which myō is this? 539 Nichien, Inga Koji (both variants) At this time, Inga Koji began his criticism. Inga Koji: What do you mean four myō? Of those which are equivalent to the fourth myō, or which distinguish it, there are ten myō in the original text and another ten myō in the commentaries. This makes twenty myō, or sixty myō, or 120 myō. You cannot possible have an answer that rises to the level of the myō that arises from “the truth is not yet revealed.” Stop this. 540 Inga Koji (Maeda) At this time, the Lotus sect representative was dumbfounded, and Teian stood up from his seat. Inga Koji (both variants) Teian: Do you not know it? It is the myō of the Lotus! Nichien: You are a fool. You ask the Lotus sect if we reject the myō of the Lotus? The Lotus sect arises from the myō of the Lotus. All other practices we reject. Is it because you have nothing to say that you speak nonsense? The Pure Land representatives did not speak for a time, and sat embarrassed. Nichien turned to the magistrates and said “Listen, we have silenced them with or arguments!” For the Pure Land Sect, Gyokunen: “This myō or that myō, the meaning of all myō is without distinction.” 541 All the myō are the same. Nittai: But what about “however, based on whether expedient means are employed or expedient means are not employed, there is a difference”? 542 Nichikō: The elder monk just said this, but his voice is quiet, so I repeat: “However, based on expedient means etc.” If you combine it into one sentence, then the maters differ. Now, it is only the myō of the Lotus. The other myō are not truth. Nichien Nichien 539 This line is from both of the Inga Koji variants, but is attributed to “the Nichiren record keeper.” Nichien has a line here in his account, but it is “there are numerous myō, to which do you refer?” 540 The Niino variant line is more or less the same, but the specific phrasing is from the Maeda variant. 541 Quoting the 妙法蓮華經玄義. T1716_.33.0696c04 542 The quote immediately following Gyokunen’s in the previous line. 198 The Pure Land school is silent. Nichien turns to the magistrates, declares that he has silenced both of them, and moves to take their surplices. Gyokunen silently rises, and then shouts, “We have won! We have won!” twice, and at the same time everyone raised their voices in a cheer, and tore off Nittai’s five panel surplice. Inga Koji’s record says that Nichikō’s surplice was also torn off. That probably happened at the same time. Inga Koji (both) 199 Bibliography Primary Sources Amano Tadayuki, ed. Sengoku ibun Miyoshi-shi hen. Tokyo: Tōkyōdō shuppan, 2013. Bussho kankōkai, ed. Dai Nihon Bukkyō zensho. 100 vols. Tokyo: Bussho kankōkai, 1912. Chōmyōji monjo hensan-kai, ed. Chōmyōji monjo, Kyōto jūroku honzan kaigōyō shorui: Nichiren shōnin monka shoji monjo shūei. Tokyo: Ōtsuka kōgeisha, 1987. Cooper, Michael, ed. They Came to Japan; an Anthology of European Reports on Japan, 1543-1640. Ann Arbor: Center for Japanese Studies, The University of Michigan, 1995. Fróis, Luís. Gan’yaku Furoisu Nihon shi. Translated by Matsuda Kiichi and Kawasaki Momota. Tokyo: Heibonsha, 1977. Fujii Manabu and Hatano Ikuo, eds. 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Abstract (if available)

Abstract This dissertation seeks to answer how the Nichiren sect, as a relative newcomer to Japan’s old capital of Kyoto, survived and flourished in the sixteenth century despite having entrenched and powerful enemies outside the sect and deep divisions within it. To answer this question, I have focused on the organization of the sect itself. At the beginning of the sixteenth century, the sect was primarily organized around monastic lineages, each one presided over by a head temple. Despite occasional cooperation among the lineages, there was no unified structure within the sect, and deep-seated divisions kept the lineages at each other’s throats. A marked change occurred after the sect’s decade of exile from the capital from 1536 to 1547. Unlike the 1530s, when the sect sought military solutions to its problems, now the sect sought political solutions. Specifically, the temples began to meet regularly in council, combining their resources to deal with warrior elites, primarily by paying for protection. This trend culminated in 1564, when the lineages signed a sect wide agreement that prevented the various lineages from turning on each other and instead required them to present a united front against the other sects. By 1568, the lineages established the Council of Head Temples, the first governing body for all the Nichiren temples in Kyoto. I argue that this council was a turning point in the sect’s history. It was not merely a repudiation of military power but a reimagining of the structure of the sect. This dissertation focuses on the creation of the Council of Head Temples in the 1560s and then details how the Council steered the sect through the dangerous reign of the unifier Oda Nobunaga. Through this, I show that that unification, culminating in the creation and maturation of the Council of Head Temples, was the mechanism through which the Nichiren sect’s Kyoto temples survived the turbulent sixteenth century.

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Creator Sherer, Dan (author)

Core Title Compromise, coalition, and conflict: the Nichiren sect in sixteenth-century Kyoto

School College of Letters, Arts and Sciences

Degree Doctor of Philosophy

Degree Program History

Publication Date 07/22/2017

Defense Date 07/17/2017

Publisher University of Southern California (original), University of Southern California. Libraries (digital)

Tag Azuchi religious debate,Buddhism,Council of Head Temples,Eiroku Peace,Japan,Kyoto,Miyoshi family,Nichiren sect,OAI-PMH Harvest,Oda Nobunaga,Sengoku period,sixteenth century

Language English

Contributor Electronically uploaded by the author (provenance)

Advisor Piggott, Joan (committee chair), Birge, Bettine (committee member), Meeks, Lori (committee member)

Creator Email dsherer@usc.edu,torgotheonehanded@gmail.com

Permanent Link (DOI) https://doi.org/10.25549/usctheses-c40-410236

Unique identifier UC11265559

Identifier etd-ShererDan-5587.pdf (filename),usctheses-c40-410236 (legacy record id)

Legacy Identifier etd-ShererDan-5587.pdf

Dmrecord 410236

Document Type Dissertation

Rights Sherer, Dan

Type texts

Source University of Southern California (contributing entity), University of Southern California Dissertations and Theses (collection)

Access Conditions The author retains rights to his/her dissertation, thesis or other graduate work according to U.S. copyright law. Electronic access is being provided by the USC Libraries in agreement with the a...

Repository Name University of Southern California Digital Library

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