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Moral development and enviro-ethics: an examination of the theories of Kohlberg and Gilligan
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Moral development and enviro-ethics: an examination of the theories of Kohlberg and Gilligan
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INFORMATION TO USERS This manuscript has been reproduced from the microfilm master. UMI films the text directly from the original or copy submitted. Thus, some thesis and dissertation copies are in typewriter face, while others may be from any type of computer printer. T he quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted. Broken or indistinct print, colored or poor quality illustrations and photographs, print bleed through, substandard margins, and improper alignment can adversely affect reproduction. In the unlikely event that the author did not send UMI a complete manuscript and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if unauthorized copyright material had to be removed, a note will indicate the deletion. Oversize materials (e.g., maps, drawings, charts) are reproduced by sectioning the original, beginning at the upper left-hand comer and continuing from left to right in equal sections with small overlaps. Each original is also photographed in one exposure and is included in reduced form at the back of the book. Photographs inchided in the original manuscript have been reproduced xerographically in this copy. Higher quality 6" x 9" black and white photographic prints are available for any photographs or illustrations appearing in this copy for an additional charge. Contact UMI directly to order. A Bell & Howell Information Company 300 North Zeeb Road. Ann Arbor. Ml 48106-1346 USA 313/761-4700 800/521-0600 MORAL DEVELOPMENT AND ENVIRO-ETHICS: AN EXAMINATION OF THE THEORIES OF KOHLBERG AND GILLIGAN by Mario L. Dollschnieder A Dissertation Presented to the FACULTY OF THE GRADUATE SCHOOL UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA In Partial Fulfillment o f the Requirements for the Degree DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY (Education - - Counseling Psychology) May 1995 UMI Number: 9616951 Copyright 1996 by Dollschnieder, Mario Leonard AH rights reserved. UMI Microform 9616951 Copyright 1996, by UMI Company. All rights reserved. This microform edition is protected against unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code. UMI 300 North Zeeb Road Ann Arbor, MI 48103 UNIVERSITY O F SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA THE GRADUATE SCHOOL UNIVERSITY PARK LOS ANGELES. CALIFORNIA 90007 This dissertation, written by ro. s t r . t . ? . .9 .0 5 . n.4 .. )).$ .,9 .h . 0 . 9 . ) . . 4 . r.r under the direction of h.x.%..... Dissertation Committee, and approved by all its members, has been presented to and accepted by The Graduate School, in partial fulfillment of re quirements for the degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY c . / £ U ^ Dean of Graduate Studies Qa[e February 14, 1995 DISSERTATION COMMITTEE Dedication This dissertation is dedicated to the two most important people in my life, Stephanie my friend, and wife, and Benjamin my son. Stephanie, Your committment to me and to this dissertation has been immense. You have been there in a myriad of ways and have worn many different hats. You have invested yourself and your energies often, even when it was very difficult for you to do so, and have been very creative and patient when things did not go as planned. I want you to know that I have felt your presence throughout the process and have felt very fortunate to have had you there, knowing that without your presence this project may never have been completed. For this and all the other things that you have done so very well I say, THANK YOU & I LOVE YOU.... Benjamin My son, I hope that when you are able to read this and the pages that follow, the world you live in will have begun to realize the damage that has been done to the earth and will have made significant changes with regard to respecting the health of the planet and its truly wonderful inhabitants. My other hope is that this project, while it often took me away from you, may contribute something to that environmental awareness. Throughout the process you have been a source of daily inspiration as well as an impetus to complete it. I love you very much.. ACKNOWLEDGMENTS I would like to acknowledge the efforts of those many individuals who have contributed to the process that culminated in this dissertation, including professors, family, friends and professional colleagues. A project of this nature is built upon more caring and commitment than I could have ever dreamed and would not have been completed without their many and varied efforts. To my chair Dr. Frank Fox — I want to thank you for many things. First for your continued and ongoing support and leadership. Your guidance and support took many forms and was always uplifting. You demonstrated a willingness to allow for the creative process without losing sight of the goals. You also demonstrated a confidence about the project that facilitated the process of working through the inevitable complications that arose. In addition, you helped me maintain perspective on the project when I seemed to lose it, both with the dissertation itself and all that goes along with it. To Dr. William Michael — Thank you for your quick responses at the times when the clock just seemed to run out, and for your many helpful suggestions throughout the revisions, as well as with the early development o f the dissertation. Furthermore your expertise in methodology and with publications provided me with confidence that the dissertation would ultimately meet university standards. To Dr. John Orr — Thank you for your consistent support and poignant suggestions, both for the dissertation and the process surrounding the completion o f it. Your guidance concerning key aspects o f the dissertation was invaluable and your representation regarding university policies made the process more clear and tenable. To Dr. George M arcoulides — Your guidance through this project was immense. Your unwavering commitment to see the process through gave to me the courage I needed when things were at their worst. Your skill o f asking the right questions at the right time also provided me with new ways of looking at the problems, and ultimately with finding the solutions to those problems. In addition, you helped me see the project in its proper context especially when I would lose that view. And the contribution o f your geniune friendship is something which sustained me and for which I will always be grateful and very honored. To my family, you gave to me moral support along many dimensions. You gave your time, your understanding and compassion, especially when I could not be there, not to mention the extra efforts you made whenever I asked for them. I am truly lucky to have family such as mine. Thank you Stephanie Dollschnieder, my wife, Roxanne Crosley, Adam Crosley, Bill Salsbury, Inge Salsbury, Dr. Greg Salsbury, Marian Salsbury, Douglas Salsbury, J.D. and Susan Salsbury, J.D. To my friends, Dr. Dan Staso, Mona Staso, Nickolas Dogris, Dr. Ed Kraus, W ayne Lundy, Barb Lundy, R.N., Paul Glass, J.D., Rebekah Glass, Dr. Clarence Williams, Lee Romaniszyn, M.F.C.C., Mike Romaniszyn, Dr. Darryl Stevens, Sandy Todd, Bill Hunt, M.F.C.C., M arilyn Evans, Todd Twogood, Dea Smith, a debt o f profound appreciation and gratitude for your friendship and for all that each o f you have contributed to this project. DEDICATION TABLE OF CONTENTS ii ACKNOW LEDGEM ENTS................................................................................. iii LIST OF TABLES................................................................................................................viii CHAPTER I. THE PROBLEM ............................................................................................1 Introduction Statement o f the Problem Background of the Problem Purpose o f the Study Importance o f the Study Research Questions Research Hypotheses Methodological Assumptions Conceptual Assumptions Definitions o f Terms Organization o f the Remainder o f the Dissertation II. REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE.........................................................27 Historical Relevance-Origins o f Paradigms o f Gender Differences Multi-Disciplinplinarian Descriptions o f Moral Development Cognitive-Developmental and Structural Approaches to Morality Kohlberg’s Theory Gilligan’s Theory Synthetic Approaches to Moral Development Philosophical Contributions to the Enviro-Ethical Construct Summary Ill METHODOLOGY 58 Research Design Sample Selection Instrumentataion The Flood Relative Presence Inventory and its Derivation Reliability and Validity o f the Measures o f the FRPI The Enviro-Ethics Scale EES Procedures Scale Development and Development o f Group Classification IV. RESULTS.....................................................................................................72 Profile of Sample Preliminary Factor Analysis and Scale Development Subscales Tests of Hypothesis Discriminant Analysis Limitations o f the Questionairre V. SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS........................................................................ 112 Summary Discussion Conclusions Recommendations REFERENCES................................................................................................................... 130 APPENDICES 136 Table LIST OF TABLES 1. Demographic Characteristics of the Sample: Gender, Marital Status, and Ethnicity..................................................................................................... 73 2. Demographic Characteristics of the Sample: Number of Children, Education, and Income..................................................................................... 75 3. Frequency Distribution on Age.................................................................... 76 4. Demographics Characteristics of the Sample (Education)......................77 5. Demographics Characteristics of the Sample (Annual Income).............78 6. Distributions on Justice-Care Orientations, Four Dilemmas.................. 81 7. Two-Way ANOVA With Ecological Orientation and Justice-Care Orientation (Dilemma I) as Independent Variable, Household Recycling as Dependent Variable...................................................................83 8. Two-Way ANOVA With Ecological Orientation and Justice-Care Orientation (Dilemma 1) as Independent Variable, Overall Environmentally Conscious Behaviors as Dependent Variable Mean Values on Overall Environmentally Conscious Behaviors................84 9. Two-Way ANOVA With Ecological Orientation and Care Orientation (Dilemma 2) as Independent Variables, Mean Values on Household Recycling Behaviors...................................................86 10. Two-Way ANOVA With Ecological Orientation and Care Orientation (Dilemma 2) as Independent Variables, Mean Values on Overall Environmentally Conscious Behaviors.......................... 87 11. Two-Way ANOVA With Ecological Orientation and Care Orientation (Dilemma 3) as Independent Variables, Mean Values on Household Recycling Behaviors...................................................88 12. Two-Way ANOVA With Ecological Orientation and Care Orientation (Dilemma 3) as Independent Variables, Mean Values on Overall Environmentally Conscious Behaviors...........................89 13. Two-Way ANOVA With Ecological Orientation and Care Orientation (Dilemma 4) as Independent Variables, Mean Values on Household Recycling Behaviors....................................................90 14. Two-Way ANOVA With Ecological Orientation and Care Orientation (Dilemma 4) as Independent Variables, Mean Values on Overall Environmentally Conscious Behaviors...........................91 15. Relationship Between Gender and Ecological Awareness and Environmentally Ethical Behaviors Mean Scores on Dependent Measures..............................................................................................................94 16. Relationship Between Gender and Ecological Awareness and Environmentally Ethical Behaviors Mean Scores on Dependent Measures (cont.)..................................................................................................95 17. Relationship Between Marital Status and Ecological Awareness and Environmentally Ethical Behaviors Mean Scores on Dependent Measures..............................................................................................................97 18. Relationship Between Marital Status and Ecological Awareness and Environmentally Ethical Behaviors Mean Scores on Dependent Measures (cont.)..................................................................................................98 19. Relationship Between Ethnicity and Ecological Awareness and Environmentally Ethical Behaviors Mean Scores on Dependent Measures............................................................................................................ 100 20. Relationship Between Ethnicity and Ecological Awareness and Environmentally Ethical Behaviors Mean Scores on Dependent Measures (cont.)................................................................................................101 21. Inter-Correlations of Number of Children, Income, and Education With Ecological Awareness and Environmentally Ethical Behaviors 103 22. Correlation Between Age and Ecological Awareness and Environmentally Ethical Behaviors................................................................. 104 23. Stepwise Discriminant Analysis # 1................................................................ 106 24. Stepwise Discriminant Analysis # 2 ................................................................ 108 ABSTRACT MORAL DEVELOPMENT AND ENVIRO-ETHICS AN EXAMINATION OF THE THEORIES OF KOHLBERG AND GILLIGAN by Mario L. Dollschnieder This study investigated moral development theory in its current anthropocentric context. It was argued that while both Kohlberg’s (1981) and Gilligan’s (1977, 1982) works are “important” contributors both theoretically and empirically to a biocentric theory of morality, neither theory of moral development by itself is sufficient to describe a morality that involves the environment. Nor does an extension or integration of the two theories suffice. A theoretical conceptualization of moral orientation to the environment was evaluated based upon the framework of Flood’s (1992) conceptualization of moral development, and was patterned after her scoring methodology. This approach allowed for the testing of moral orientations in an environmental context to determine whether moral orientation would remain the same in spite of dilemma differences, and to see whether those moral orientations could be factors in enviro-ethical attitudes and behaviors. Flood’s Relative Presence Inventory, an instrument which is based upon the work of Lyon’s (1982) and Langdale’s (1983) instruments, was utilized in conjunction with this author’s Enviro-Ethics Scale. This research reaffirms the validity of Flood’s instrument as well as the theoretical basis for this author’s instrument. This author’s instrument was designed to assess levels of environmental awareness both in attitudes and behaviors. Gender differences were found in moral orientation both in the solving of moral dilemmas in human to human as well as in human to environmental contexts. In addition, gender differences were found in levels o f enviro-ethical awareness and self reports of enviro-ethical behaviors. Moral orientations, while approaching significance levels, were not found to be significant in determining levels o f enviro-ethical awareness and eviro- ethical behaviors. These findings suggest the need for continued research to (a) discover what if any intervening variables are present that mediate moral responses, (b) redefine the models of moral reasoning/development utilizing an enviro-ethical context, (c) determine the extent that elements o f moral development are cognitive-developmental in nature vs. other developmental in nature, and (d) explore cross cultural contexts for moral reasoning Chapter I The Problem For years scientists, philosophers, and environmentalists have been warning members o f society o f the impending dangers to the mutual survival o f society associated with increasing population, unrestrained consumption o f natural resources, inappropriate means of waste disposal, air and water pollution, and irresponsible attitudes toward the environment (Berger, 1986; Carson, 1962; Fuller, 1992; Hawken, 1993; Johnson, 1993; Leopold, 1949; VanDeVeer & Pierce, 1994). For many, the dangers have reached crisis proportions (Berger, 1986; Carson, 1962; Fuller, 1992; Johnson, 1993; Leopold, 1949; VanDeVeer & Pierce, 1994) while for others these immediate dangers do not seem so real (Lovelock, 1987) or at crisis levels (Berger, 1986; Hawken, 1993). Nevertheless, environmental problems have recently escalated to such a degree that the United Nations has established an international committee to study the effects o f the Greenhouse Phenomenon and other concomitants o f consumption. In addition, agencies such as the National Aeronautics and Space Administration [NASA] have invested considerable time and money, and have utilized Space Shuttle missions to study ozone depletion and its sequelae (VanDeVeer & Pierce, 1994). Furthermore, the television media have recognized the import o f these events to such a degree that many broadcast networks have allocated a percentage o f their programming for environmental issues (Regional Education Television Advisory Council, [RETAC] 1982) and provide daily Ultra Violet (UV) weather reports, based upon fluctuations in ozone levels. Finally, the true recognition of environmental issues as valid can be measured by their emergence during the 1992 presidential campaigns as major platform components for Clinton and Gore (Newton & Dillingham, 1994). It is this investigator's belief, and that of others (Flood, 1992; Fuller, 1992; Johnson, 1993; Newton & Dillingham, 1994; Swearingen, 1989; VanDeVeer & Pierce, 1994) that issues o f environmental concern are predominantly issues o f moral reasoning and moral development. Furthermore, the existing research literature on moral development and moral reasoning has not adequately addressed the significance o f these constructs (Flood, 1992; Swearingen, 1989) with regard to human nature (especially when it pertains to behaviors and attitudes toward the environment) and has, therefore, failed to understand the breadth and importance o f these two related moral constructs. Flood (1992) and Johnson (1993) have suggested that the rise in awareness of environmental issues as moral issues is a sign o f the emergence and existence of an environmentally ethical paradigm. The significance of an enviro-ethical paradigm is that this paradigm is to the planet and all o f its inhabitants what the the magna carta was for humans in the early 1200’s (Flood, 1992). Or, as Rolston (1991) stated, “environmental ethics stretches classical ethics to the breaking point...But environmental ethics in a deeper senses stands on a frontier, as radically theoretical as it is applied. It alone asks whether there can be nonhuman objects o f duty” (p.88) As an emerging paradigm, the enviro-ethical paradigm has certain lim itations.1 For example, in the developmental stage of a new paradigm, the language used often reflects much o f the language o f the older paradigms and constructs, and as a part o f its emergence, the new paradigm has to develop its own vocabulary. This vocabulary development process is reflected in this study. As an example o f this development of vocabulary, the terms “moral development” and “moral orientation” are referred to almost interchangeably throughout this study because new descriptors have not been developed to describe adequately the new ethic, and because the terms are intricately related. Moral development has typically referred to stage development in the writings o f numerous researchers such as Kohlberg (1981), Gilligan (1977, 1982), and others (Gibbs, 1992; Piaget, 1960; Rest, 1986; Rosen, 1980). In this investigation, the definition o f moral development is different from the definition described by Kohlberg (1981) and Gilligan (1977, 1982), Gilligan et al. 1988, and 1 The limitations are discussed throughout the dissertation. Limitations regarding gender arc discussed in Chapter II. Brown & Gilligan, (1992), and therefore reflects more than ju st a revision o f the older stage concept. That is, in this context, moral development more accurately represents a type o f development that allows for an increasing understanding and responsiveness to the environment, and therefore describes an ethic that is a recognition or moral responsibility that does not separate itself from those entities. In addition, this new enviro-ethical paradigm, although incorporating elements from the moral development paradigms o f Kohlberg (1981) and Gilligan (1977, 1982), Gilligan et al. (1988), and Brown & Gilligan, (1992), and others (Piaget, 1960), represents more than a combination or extension o f these paradigms. For example, the new paradigm is not necessarily age and stage dependent as are Kohlberg’s (1981) and Gillligan’s (1977, 1982), but rather is situationally dependent (though stages have some relevance for helping one understand the newer paradigm). Further, this new paradigm is not “anthropocentric”, but is “biocentric”or “ecocentric2,” and its roots come from evolutionary-biology and sociology not theology. Therefore, as a new paradigm, it represents a more comprehensive view o f moral reasoning and development. The intent o f this research project was to utilize the existing research literature on moral development to provide a basis for understanding the emerging paradigm o f enviro-ethics and to highlight where the previous paradigms o f moral 2 These delineations are not identical as they may appear. “Biocentric” represents the Deep Ecology movement and “Ecocentric” refers more to a Social Ecological philosophy. development are inadequate insofar as this new paradigm is concerned. Some of the inadequacy in the research literature is addressed within this dissertation by exploring the relationships between differing perspectives o f moral development (i.e., Kohlberg's (1981) justice perspective and Gilligan’s (1977, 1982), Gilligan et al. (1988), and Brown & Gilligan’s, (1992), care perspective to establish a baseline for the understanding o f a new enviro-ethical paradigm. In addition, these two perspectives are examined in order to establish whether and how they can be m odified to include a broader perspective o f environmental issues. This study represents an extension o f the work o f Flood (1992) who was able to discern and empirically to establish the links between moral development/orientation and the environment, and the roles that each moral orientation plays with respect to an ethics which includes the environment. In addition, this investigation focuses on defining some o f the situations in which differing orientations are used regarding environmental concerns. Lastly, this study includes a large component of behavioral information (i.e., moral response) that heretofore has been deficient in this area o f research (Flood, 1992; Quinn, 1984) Statement o f the Problem The current Zeitgeist reflects a high level o f concern about fears o f the future in relationship to environmental maladies. For example, fears o f being contaminated by toxics, or of developing cancer from exposure to toxics ranks nationally as the primary concern of the United States citizenry (Wandersman & Hallman, 1993). Furthermore, studies which surmise the impact of fears o f one’s personal demise have previously been established by assessing the threats posed by nuclear war and/or damage from nuclear reactor fallout3 (Henrichsen, 1993; Newcomb, 1986, 1989; Winner, 1986). Perpetuation o f the problem The studies that have examined fears about nuclear fallout and those that examined fears about one’s demise suggest that normal development in children may be seriously hampered as a result o f fears about the future, and that other factors such as depression, increased drug use, feelings o f powerlessness, and decreased life satisfaction in adults exist as concomitants to these fears (Newcomb, 1986, 1989, 1992). Likewise, it has been suggested that the fear of a stressful event's occurrence may be as damaging as experiencing the event itself (Lazarus, 1987). When these studies are considered and integrated, they suggest a potentially cyclical and self-perpetuating problem. That is, if environmental activism correlates highly with a person’s moral development and orientation (as this investigator contends), and if development in general can be arrested because of 3 This is in rcferencce to Three Mile Island and those threats posed (by the initial and currently revived concerns about) Chernobyl. fears about the future (Newcomb, 1986, 1989, 1992), then having fears about the future can contribute to a lack o f development in those specific areas which would encourage people to act in environmentally conscious ways. M ore simply put, if one's fears about the future are sufficient to cause a lack o f moral development or facility with moral orientations, then the likelihood that a person will recognize and make adequate moral decisions (and take associated actions) becomes severely diminished. And, if these moral decisions and actions involve behaviors pertaining to protecting the environment (enviro-ethical behaviors and attitudes), then manifesting those kinds o f behaviors is less likely. Background o f the Problem Historically, there exists an inadequate response on the part o f society with respect to environmental concerns (Berger, 1986; Fuller, 1992; Hawken, 1993; VanDeVeer & Pierce, 1994). This inadequate response has also occurred in many primitive cultures who have been romantically portrayed as being more in tune with the earth and its cycles (Lovelock, 1992). Furthermore, outside o f the discipline o f philosophy, there is often little or no recognition and understanding that environmental concerns past and present are directly related to moral and ethical development (Flood, 1992; Johnson, 1993; VanDeVeer & Pierce, 1994). 8 There are many reasons for the lack of “connection and integration” of these two areas of study. Both areas o f inquiry are complex and to some degree nascent in their development as subjects for science. This is not to say that the studies of moral development or ethics, and o f the environment are not without a significant history of investigation. It is, to say however, that the methods of studying these phenomena have not been from the scientific realm, but more from the areas of philosophy and metaphysics. For example, until the 1920s moral development was predominantly the domain of philosophy. It became of interest to psychology only shortly thereafter (Grcic, 1989). Environmentalism can also trace its roots to earlier historical periods. In 1949, Aldo Leapold produced the seminal work for environmental holism called the Sand County Almanac, but a considerable amount of time passed before many o f its tenets were truly comprehended and extended. Many say that the movement really began to gather momentum with the work of Rachel Carson’s, The Silent Spring in 1962 (Flood, 1992; List, 1993; Swearingen, 1989). What this sentence means, is that the relationship between environmentalism and moral development or what this investigator calls enviro-ethics is a fairly recent phenomenon. Anthropocentrism vs. Ecocentrism and Biocentrism One aspect of the problem o f society’s inadequate response to the environment is that the dominant moral paradigm has been, and is, “anthropocentric”, and that this paradigm has not allowed adequate response to environmental issues because o f its narrowness o f focus (Rolston, 1994). W hat this interpretation means is that moral and ethical principles and practices have been considered from the human-to-human point of view only, and have not included animals and the environment as viable components for ethical consideration (Johnson, 1993; Swearingen, 1989; VanDeVeer & Pierce, 1994). Flood’s (1992) study has also reiterated the point that moral and ethical concerns have historically been considered from predominantly an anthropocentric point of view, not from an ecocentric or more encompassing environmental perspective. Flood (1992) has also echoed what ecofeminists such as Merchant, (1993) Gray, (1993) and King, (1993) have said. These ecofeminists claim that not only is the paradigm an anthropocentric point of view, but that it is andropocentric as well. In other words, the reference to andropocentrism describes the narrowness of focus o f the human to human perspective as being further limited to a strictly and somewhat “constricted” view o f the masculine human to human perspective.4 A review o f the literature on enviro-ethics shows that most o f the research that utilizes moral development instruments uses Kolberg’s (1981) justice model for assessing moral development. Kohlberg’s model has been criticized for several 4 The constricted view of masculine moral development will be discussed in more detail in Chapter II in Maccoby and Jacklin and Firestone sections. reasons. Primarily it has been criticized as not being sensitive to traditional and contemporary feminine perspectives, or as Gilligan (1977, 1982), Gilligan et al. (1988), and Brown & Gilligan, (1992), have described it, “voice.” Kohlberg’s (1981) model has also been criticized for not being universal (i.e., culturally sensitive) and that the stages are not truly hard stages but have occasion to reflect regressions to earlier modes of development (Gibbs, 1992). And finally, philosophers have criticized Kohlberg’s (1981) approach for committing the “naturalistic fallacy”, and a focus soley on the justice perspective as “the” paramount moral focal point o f development. To summarize, the emergence o f a new paradigm that includes revisions of the existing moral developmental paradigms such that an ecocentric or enviro- ethical point o f view becomes the focus, would as Kuhn (1970) described it, represent a significant “shift” from the predominant moral paradigm (Berger, 1986; Flood, 1992). Fuller (1992) has emphasized that the predominant anthropocentric moral paradigm has existed since biblical times, and through the Adam and Eve myth and other religious interpretations, has continued to reinforce the idea o f Homo Sapiens as above and separate from nature. This paradigm is in contrast to evolutionary biology which indicates that one’s existence is more accurately, one o f m any parts o f nature upon which it is completely dependent. Fuller (1992) restated this idea simply by saying “from the one has come the m any” (p. 17) Other Variables that Perpetuate the Anthropocentric Paradigm o f M orality W hile the philosophical components o f moral development are very important to understanding the paradigms that guide an individual and ultimately a society, other factors are important to discern because of the influence they exert on the “expression” o f moral orientation and its subsequent behaviors. Some of these variables are subsumed under: (a) personality variables, (b) problems with dissemination o f information, (c) inaccurate portrayals of the participants’ issues by the m edia5 and its subsequent reinforcement o f inaccuracies, (d) the differences between factions of the environmental movement, and, (e) the significance o f role-taking ability as an important determinant in the process of moral development. These components are discussed at length in the following sections. Personality Variables Factors other than just a narrowness o f focus contribute to the problems associated with understanding and responding to environmental concerns. Lack of development o f some personality variables also reduces one's ability to respond to s The media referred to here includes the “unintentional misrcporting ” by the news media as well as the'’ intentional and commercial ” misrepresentation by multinational corporations of events and people regarding environmental concerns. one's environment (Lickona, 1976; Moore, 1992). Personality variables that may be involved with environmental concerns cover a wide range of constructs related to self development such as: self-esteem; attributional elements such as locus of control; gender issues; purpose in life; fears of the future, death anxiety, age- related issues; early development and attachment; socio-economic status; culture; levels of anxiety and depression and more. All o f these factors may play a part in the problems associated with environmental denial, but for this study moral development was chosen because of the amount of variability it can explain regarding responses to environmental problems. Moreover, moral development is a major component o f self development and influences much o f personality development. Problems Associated with Dissemination of Information on Environmental Issues The "problem " section of this study begins by noting that there is an inadequate response on the part o f society to environmental concerns which this investigator believes is primarily due to a narrowly focused paradigm of moral development. Another important aspect of the inadequate response to the environment is that gathering, understanding, and disseminating information on environmental issues constitutes a difficult task (VanDeVeer & Pierce, 1994) even when the information is available. There are several reasons for this difficulty. 13 The first reason is that the field of environmentalism is quite complex for which there is not a common language. Ecology, one o f the primary disciplines involved in environmentalism,6 as well as a field o f study that deals with environmental problems and the inter-relatedness o f all organisms, has itself been delineated into multiple classifications. These classifications include: surface and deep ecology; social ecology; bioregionalism and others. Further, these ecological groupings are factioned into other sub-groupings, each with its own philosophical underpinnings. Each of these sub-groupings has its own models and value structures for decision-making processes with respect to environmental concerns. It is important to note that these models may appear veiy similar at first glance because the terminology used appears to be the same and appears to have the same contexts. However, what is not often understood is that the jargon, though the same, may well carry “very” different meanings for each of the environmental groups. This circumstance means that there is a lack of a true common language for environmentalists and the ability to convey information accurately is subsequently diminished. The second reason is that most o f the basic tenets for these environmental groups spring from philosophy. Therefore, many of the principles are couched in 6 It should be noted here that environmentalism is viewed by many as being necessarily multidisciplinarian and integrative in nature (VanDcrVeer and Pierce, 1994). 14 philosophical terms and arguments which are difficult for the lay person who is unfamiliar with the study of philosophy to comprehend. Because o f the lack o f a common language and the philosophical basis o f environmentalism, the general public is frequently confused and frequently suspect o f information that is disseminated by environmentalist groups and other agencies.7 This confusion and suspicion are most readily seen in the portrayals o f environmentalists and o f those that this investigator calls environmental agnostics, environmental speciests, and racists. All three o f the latter classifications can more easily be understood as falling into the classification of perpetrators of environmental crimes, with the differences being that first one does so with ignorance of the outcomes. The others are aware, but are not influenced by this awareness. The third reason, then, for the inadequate response o f society to environmental problems is that people are fearful o f being classified as environmentalists or environmental perpetrators. The media frequently portray both o f these groups in the extreme (List, 1993). This fact has only contributed to the misinformation process and maintenance o f predominant moral paradigm. Environmental agnostics/speciests/racists are frequently portrayed as people who promote the expansion of business (and its concomitants of unrestrained consumption o f natural resources) to the point o f making it appear to be the 7 This suspicion was seen in many of the narrative responses in this study. See the discussion summary scction.s Western tradition and religion (what this investigator refers to as “manifest” capitalism). Furthermore, these proponents of business first, and environment last, are pictured as exhibiting inadequate planning with regard to the wastes produced in many manufacturing and distribution processes. In addition, they are portrayed as failing to recognize that many of the resources utilized in manufacturing are finite. Finally, few o f the environmental agnostics/speciests/racists are portrayed as being aware or concerned that there is a need for renewable or recyclable resources, and that once an area or ecosystem is sufficiently damaged, science can not always remedy the problem (Berger, 1986; VanDeVeer & Pierce, 1994; Winner, 1986). Environmentalists are frequently portrayed as wanting to go backward in time and are also seen as people on the fringe or zealots (Foreman, 1993; Watson, 1993). They are seen as people who want to save a remote habitat or obscure animal at the cost of families and or livelihoods. In addition, they are portrayed as wanting to diminish the American standard of living for the sake o f these creatures or habitats (List, 1993). Common to each paradigm is a lack of belief that significant, legitimate and ethical benefits and/or profits can be associated with the methodologies that promote amelioration of environmental concerns (Hawken, 1993). It is this investigator’s belief that most people fall somewhere along a continuum between 16 these two extremes, but are hesitant to be classified or ascribed to one or the other group. The fourth reason is that behaviors and attitudes associated with enviro- ethics are diverse, often in disagreement with, and direct in their contrast to dominant paradigms. The behaviors range from conservation to recycling, from voluntary simplicity to militancy, violence, and acts o f ecotage. (List, 1993) In addition, attitudes concerning pollution and its by-products vary along a continuum from the continued disbelief in the existence o f a problem, to views that the environment continues to be something to be conquered or saved by science, to extreme fears about the future and our mutual survival. (Carson, 1963; Naess, 1993). The final reason, and one that cannot be adequately addressed in this dissertation, is the role that major companies (with their enormous financial assets and political power) play in the “disinformation process”, and in the continued damaging of ecosystems for short term profits (Berger, 1986; Hawken, 1993). The Role o f Role-Taking in Response to Development o f Empathy and Moral Development and Orientation. Although the aforementioned elements have laid the groundwork for understanding the perpetuation o f the environmental problems (from the philosophical and informational aspects), there exists another important element to be addressed regarding an inadequate response to the treatment of the environment. That element can most easily be understood as one’s ability to take the role of the other, or what some have referred to as empathy. Gambone (1993) and Kohlberg (1981) have pointed out that one o f the critical elements in one’s moral development has to do with one’s ability to assume the role o f the other. Both Gilligan (1982) and Kohlberg (1981) have stated that the ability to assume the role of another is central to their theories. Kohlberg’s theory has been described as addressing role-taking ability as predominantly from the standpoint of the generalized other, wherein Gilligan(1988) addresses her role-taking from the standpoint o f the specific other. Lyons (1982) discussed the role o f the other somewhat differently from what Gilligan, did in that, assuming the role o f another can be done solely from the other’s point o f view, without the role-takers maintenance o f the “I” in the process. While each of these perspectives highlights important aspects of the development o f a moral orientation(s), all o f these role- taking viewpoints are inherently “anthropocentric”. Not until one considers another type of relationship, that of humans to the environment, does the viewpoint have a more encompassing “biocentric” or “ecocentric” point o f view. In other words, the question then becomes, how does one assume or empathize with the role of an animal, ecosystem or that o f the environment (and recognize 18 one’s roles as they “ought” to be). Assuming the role of the environment can include all three aforementioned perspectives as well. This difficulty of extending role-taking to the environment is a problem for philosophers and legal decision-makers, as well as for developmental psychologists insofar as enviro-ethics is concerned. This role taking perspective is, as Kuhn (1970) described, a significant “anomaly” that the existing paradigms of moral development cannot adequately address. And, as an anomaly of some significance, this form of role-taking contributes to the necessity of the formation of a new paradigm. Johnson (1993) has pointed out that individuals have only recently been able to account equality to other ethnicities, to races and to women, and have done an exceedingly poor job of this nationally, and worse in the international arenas. Johnson (1993) has further related that one’s ability to empathize with an animal’s pain has suffered from hundreds of years of Decartes’ philosophy, which promoted the idea that because animals were not rational beings they subsequently could not feel pain. Johnson (1993) was also quick to point out that many of the other moral paradigms that currently exist, do so, because o f a similar association with the ideas that because an animal or ecosystem has limited sentience or rational thought ability they likewise have limited “moral standing” and subsequently have limited moral privileges. 19 W hat this philosophical position means then, is that in spite o f one’s ability to understand animal suffering when one sees it, or to sense and feel connected to those things that are not so easily articulated such as pollution of a river, or the clearcutting of a forest, one (because of a outdated and insufficient moral philosophy) often denies one’s experience of empathy and response with those entities. As a result o f this denial, individuals continue to perpetuate the problems. Furthermore, Johnson (1993) has pointed out that the majority of thought about moral thinking has been, and continues to be, truly arbitrary. That much o f what one thinks is founded on sound philosophical principles of moral right is not philosophically sound in the least. Purpose o f the Study The main purpose of this study was twofold. It was (a) to determine whether there are significant relationships between moral development/orientation, and attitudes and behaviors that comprise enviro-ethics and (b) to explain how some o f these relationships are manifested. The focus was also to provide a baseline o f information about moral behaviors and their relationships to moral reasoning processes. Lastly, the purpose of the study was to provide a substantial review and integration of the literature on moral development/orientation and enviro-ethics. 20 Importance o f the Study This study was an important research investigation into the interrelationships among moral development, moral orientation and enviro-ethics. This study explored the relationships between the “justice” perspective and the “care” perspective o f moral development; how each contributes to a person’s moral orientation; and how each contributes to or limits enviro-ethical responses. The study was also important in that it furthered the research o f Flood (1992). Research Questions The primary research question was: W hat personality variables best explain behaviors that are environmentally- oriented in people who are environmentally active? A secondary research question was: Does a hierarchy exist with respect to manifestation o f enviro-ethical behaviors in those individuals? 21 Research Hypotheses This investigator believed that certain conditions must be satisfied before those behaviors associated with environmental ethics would be manifested in a consistent and purposeful manner. Likewise, this investigator hypothesized that the most significant contributor to enviro-ethics is that of moral development/orientation as described by Gilligan’s (1977, 1982), Gilligan et al. 1988, and Brown & Gilligan’s (1992) care perspective. In addition, it was believed that those factors ultimately affecting moral development would influence the levels of environmentally active behaviors and attitudes. The following hypotheses were tested in this study. Hypothesis 1. There would be a significant association between ecological awareness and the care orientations. Therefore, higher levels o f enviro-ethical awareness in conjunction with the care orientation mode of responding would be the optimal predictor of environmentally ethical behaviors. Hypothesis 2. There would be a significant difference between males and females on levels of ecological awareness and/or enviro-ethical behaviors. It is hypothesized that females would score higher than males. 22 Hypothesis 3. There would be no difference based on background/demographic variables on either ecological awareness or environmentally ethical behaviors. This hypothesis logically leads to five specific predictions: Prediction 1. There would be no difference due to marital status on either ecological awareness or environmentally ethical behaviors. Prediction 2. There would be no difference due to ethnicity on either ecological awareness or environmentally ethical behaviors Prediction 3. There would be no relationship between number of children in the home and either ecological awareness or environmentally ethical behaviors. Prediction 4. There would be no relationship between educational attainment and either ecological awareness or environmentally ethical behaviors. Prediction 5. There would be no relationship between reported annual income and either ecological awareness or environmentally ethical behaviors. Hypothesis 4. There would be significant positive correlations between age and both ecological awareness and environmentally ethical behaviors. Methodological Assumptions The following are assumptions that were incorporated in this study: 1. The multiple instruments utilized in this study had sufficient reliability and validity for purposes of the investigation. 2. The research methodology and the analyses o f the data in this study were appropriate. 3. The subjects responded to the questions on the questionnaire in an honest manner and did not attempt to deceive or give misinformation. 4. The administrations o f the research instruments at all sites were consistent across all subjects. Conceptual Asumptions It is assumed that environmentally ethical behaviors are best represented in a hierarchical fashion, in relationship to levels of moral development as described by Gilligan (1982) and, with levels of enviro-ethical awareness. In other words, the higher the levels o f moral development8 and enviro-ethical awareness within the individual, the more the likelihood of that same individual manifesting enviro- ethical behaviors. 8 The level referred to here is not a stage as represented in Kohlbcrg’s model but rather represents scores on Flood’s (1992) instrument. That scale ranges from .51-1.0 for the “care” perspective as described by Gilligan. 24 The concept of the construct of moral development is mediated by a host of other factors, as well, that for the purposes o f this study were not analyzed because o f the limited variance they could explain.. Definitions o f Terms Environmental Agnostics refers to those who for reasons o f ignorance and or fear are not aware o f the decline o f the environment and the ramifications o f that continued decline. Enviro -Ethics or (EE) pertains to the combination o f moral-ethical reasoning and environmental attitudes and behavior into a new paradigm. Environmental Racists describes those who perpetuate the process o f pollution and its sequelae for short term profits, but do so with the knowledge that minority populations are the primary recipients of the damage. Environmental Speciests designates those who are aware o f the environmental problems and who continue to support damaging the environment for short term profits without concern for the long term effects or effects on other species. Moral Development represents the level o f ethical development that a person has achieved. It comprises both care and justice moral reasoning processes. It further includes the idea that moral development is not just situation-specific but that it includes a pervasive way of being o f and by the individual. It is not limited by a 25 hard stage theory such as Piaget’s or Kohlberg’s. It also refers to three types of identification, “empathy”, “sympathy” and “being the other” in Lyon’s (1992) terms. Moral Reasoning Orientation (MRO) describes the orientation that a person uses predominantly when responding to situations that require moral responses including behaviors. The orientation, which can be in degrees is not a discrete or bipolar mode o f responding. Rather it represents under what circumstances how much a person uses a care and or a justice mode o f responding. Moral Response is concerned with the behaviors that an individual exhibits as a result o f their moral values and moral orientation in a given situation. Organization o f the Remainder of the Dissertation Chapter II continues the review o f the relevant literature and previous research findings and helps to provide the underlying structure for this investigation and the integration o f environmental concerns with moral developmental paradigms. Chapter III describes the methodology o f the study, the research design utilized, the process o f subject selection, the research instruments, including descriptions o f their developm ent, and the method o f data collection and analysis. Chapter IV presents the results of the different analyses (by hypotheses) and subsequent data tables. Chapter V The results are discussed in relation to the hypotheses. Summary statements and suggestions for future research are also suggested. 27 Chapter II Review O f The Literature This section continues the review o f the literature, specifically the empirical research and theories related to moral development, moral orientation, and enviro-ethics. In addition, the relevant historical antecedents of each theoretical perspective are exam ined.1 Further, this section examines and utilizes the existing research which focuses on the differences between types o f moral development and orientation, to emphasize the significance o f these differences, and to integrate them when possible, with other research highlighting environmental attitudes and behaviors. Finally, this chapter utilizes the existing research on the two constructs o f moral development/orientation and enviro-ethics to develop the theoretical rationale for further expansion o f moral development/orientation into an emerging enviro-ethical paradigm. 1 Historical antecedents of the critical constructs are reviewed because they illuminate the origins of many aspects of what is called the “self development process.” And, because of the wide use and acceptance of many of these tenets, these elements arc often not thought about or questioned as to their usefulness or efficacy now, they are in essence “habits”. 28 Historical Relevance — Origins o f Paradigms o f Gender Differences in Moral Reasoning and Development Many criteria need to be comprehended in order to understand how a new paradigm comes to replace existing paradigms (Kuhn, 1970; McNeill & Freiberger, 1993). According to Kuhn, understanding how one paradigm replaces another requires that one must first understand a broader concept that for many is difficult to grasp, namely, the true nature o f the scientific discovery process. Kuhn states that the scientific process is not so orderly nor is it so much based upon general principles as is believed by most people. Most people believe that science proceeds in a systematic and highly ordered fashion, and that the research questions generated at any given time in history are based upon an understood progression of accumulated facts. Kuhn would argue that the aforementioned statement is more myth than reality. His hypothesis is that science is paradigm driven, and that much of what is occurring in scientific research has more to do with the dominant paradigms o f that time, than with the evaluation and integration o f an accumulated body o f knowledge. Therefore, it becomes essential to understand that at any given time in history, a paradigm that predominates has many factors that contribute to its existence, and to the tenacity which it is adhered to by researchers (despite new and possible conflicting evidence) (McNeill & Freiberger, 1993). These factors 29 include but are not limited to: an understanding o f the Zeitgeist o f the times; the prominent features and constructs o f the existing paradigm and the kinds of research questions it answers and tries to answer; the history o f its development; and sometimes even the paradigms that the existing paradigm has displaced. Perhaps another and crucial element to place in perspective are the anornalie(s) that the current paradigm cannot address or explain. Anomalies are crucial elements to the revision or abandonment o f the predominant paradigm, and often create a subsequent crisis period until the newer paradigm is more fully articulated and understood. Therefore, in the next section a brief regression will follow to illustrate the origins o f the predominant moral paradigm and to highlight some o f the changes that the predominant moral paradigm has undergone, as well as some o f the limitations that it cannot address. The predominant “anthropocentric” moral paradigm is a construct that has its written genesis with the early “historic” Greeks2 and Romans. In fact, the early Greeks were portrayed as being sensitive to the presence o f what may be referred to as the justice and care/response perspectives (Flood, 1992; Gilligan, 1988) in their “historic” mythology. Being sensitive to the presence o f both o f these perspectives o f moral development did not mean that these perspectives were 2 A distinction is made here between the historic Greeks and those such as the Minoans of Crete. The Minoans prior to the time of Aeschylus were believed to have had a goddess centered religion and males and females were treated as equals in their society. accorded equal validity during the times o f the early Greeks however. And now, as in the times o f historic Greece, sensitivity to these types o f moral orientations by itself is not sufficient to assure that both perspectives are valued and utilized in the development of societal ethics, especially in the domain o f environmentalism.3 Surprisingly, a deep understanding and sensitivity to these two components of moral development (the care and justice perspectives) was portrayed dramatically in early Greek and Roman myths such as the Aeneid by Virgil. In the Aeneid, Virgil4 discerned and described these elements of moral development and depicted them as a tension created by the choice between maintaining relationships and pursuing idealistic and individualistic goals, (Gilligan et al. 1988). The alternation between these two components o f moral development and the subsequent tension involved with having to choose one over the other are well depicted by Virgil’s characters. Furthermore, as a tragedy it depicts another aspect o f the human struggle which is, the inevitability that when facing moral conflicts, one must make decisions, even if deciding not to act, and that one must ultimately deal with the consequences o f those decisions. In other words, one can not avoid the process o f having to make moral decisions and the 3 The categorical delineations of carc vs. justice orientations are more thoroughly addressed later in this dissertation in the integration and synthesis section. 4 Virgil was actually a Roman who wrote in the fashion of the renowned Greek, Homer 31 frequency o f one’s having to make moral decisions increases with one’s increasing awareness. This inescapable process o f having to make moral choices is an integral part o f being and o f self-development. And in the process o f moral choosing sometimes the absence o f one or the other orientation or de-emphasis o f its importance (during the evaluation process) can have significant and lasting consequences.5 This depiction o f the tensions between alternate forms o f moral reasoning/development involved in making moral decisions is well illustrated in the story o f the Aeneid. In the Aeneid, Aeneas had deep ties to the city o f Troy. W hen the city o f Troy fell, Aeneas felt it was his destiny6 to found another city (Latium) which later became Rome. But to pursue this founding quest, he had to leave his beloved second wife Dido Queen o f Carthage. She begged him not to leave her, but he felt drawn by his duty, his destiny. So he left. During his founding quest, Aeneas traveled to the underworld (the land o f the dead) in search o f his father. It was there that the distinct (goal/ideal-oriented) and (relationship/response-oriented) facets of moral development are depicted in the cruel paradox that was revealed to him. 5 The process of moral choosing is discussed more throughout the remainder of the dissertation and will highlight the differences between what has traditionally and “incorrectly” been referred to as the masculine and feminine aspects of moral reasoning and development 6 This destiny also involved the influence of the gods (Fitzgerald, 1983) 32 While in the underworld, Aeneas unexpectedly came upon Dido. He then learned that she had mortally wounded herself as a result of her deep feelings of loss at his departure. When Aeneas realized what had happened, he saw himself as a victim of his own destiny, caught in a paradox. He felt responsible for Dido's death because she had begged him not to go, and had he not left her, she would not have been so overtaken by grief as to take her own life. Nonetheless, he had felt that it was his destiny to found the city of Latium. Yet following that destiny brought about the loss of his beloved Dido. One o f the things that is not clear from this dramatic tale is whether or not these masculine and feminine dimensions are believed to be biologic in nature or derived from socio-cultural context(s) or from some combination o f the two. For the purposes of this dissertation, it is assumed that these differences are socio cultural in nature and are referred to as a gender difference, not a sex-linked difference. The rationale for assuming that these differences are socio-cultural in nature is explained in the next section. It is important to note that this delineation of gender with respect to orientation is not one that is completely discrete in nature. That is, to say, research such as Lyons (1982), Langdale (1983), and Flood (1992) has revealed that while “justice and care” orientations tend to break down by usage into predominantly male and female categories, respectively, there is also overlap between these categories. Males can and do use a care orientation o f moral development in certain moral dilemmas, and females use justice orientations o f moral development to solve certain moral dilemmas. This overlapping or facility o f use between orientations may be significant and may reflect changes in the predominant moral paradigm. This recognition in the research may also reflect that this type of moral choosing has occurred before but as a result o f the predominant moral paradigm has not been recognized as having existed or as having been valid for analysis. In an exhaustive analysis and review of research on sex and gender differences, Maccoby and Jacklin (1987) have found that throughout the research literature little or no significant gender difference exists among adults regarding their intelligence and psycho-sociological development. In their comprehensive review o f the research literature including moral development they found no significant differences with the exception that women did not appear to be so extensively represented as males above stage three in their scores on Kohlberg’s measures. Maccoby and Jacklin did not elaborate on these moral development differences “purposely” because they indicated that not enough information was available to discern the reasons for this slight variation. Firestone (1987, 1989) and Catlett (1989) have noted in their longitudinal research studies o f a community (spanning 20 years), that after deciding to live 34 their lives in a honest and open fashion the male and females in that community showed no significant gender related differences.7 This lack of differences was especially true in the areas that are promoted in the media and in the larger culture as being different (i.e., self development, sexuality, competitiveness, affiliation and more). On the contrary, quite often their results were surprising even to them. Firestone (1987, 1989) and Catlett (1989) have indicated that the primary emphasis for the establishment of “gender” based differences is that of social learning and reinforcement and early attachment. This position at first appears incongruent with this investigation and that of others such as Gilligan (1992) and Flood (1992). However, this appearance is not really the case. When examined more closely, it becomes clear that Firestone’s (1987, 1989) and Catlett’s (1989) research indicated that these gender differences which were learned did not represent biological propensities. Firestone’s (1987, 1989) and Catlett’s (1989) research further revealed the strength of social conditioning and the methods that can be used to change the harmful effects of this conditioning. Since the time of Virgil, moral development and its concomitants have been primary foci of philosophers and researchers. Most recently, around the 1920’s, a resurgence of interest was manifested in the moral reasoning process. Much of 7 This community has relied on the utilization of weekly group meetings and individual growth/therapy sessions which have as a main focus the lowering of defense mechanisms and the realization of self- development and sufficiency. It should also be noted that the majority of the community have participated in this growth process throughout a 20 year time frame this period o f renewed interest in moral development was (for the purposes o f this research) not addressed because little empirical information was contributed during that time. In the previous historical section, depictions o f the Aeneid serve to illustrate that although an awareness o f differing moral orientations has existed for m any hundreds o f years, it has taken a long time for the predominant existing moral paradigm to begin to shift. M ulti-Disciplinarian Descriptions of Moral Development -- their Contributions to the Predominant Moral Paradigm Theorists have referred to moral development by different names and have suggested different levels o f importance in the role that moral development has played in personality formation. Some o f these constructions of moral development and moral orientation that are relevant to the understanding o f enviro-ethics are discussed in the subsequent sections. Further, attempts to contrast the differing views o f moral development and orientation are attempted to discern those areas where integration into an enviro-ethical paradigm is possible. Contrasting the different constructions o f moral development also helps to establish a framework for understanding how a morality that includes the environment can be conceptualized. 36 Psvchodvnamic Approaches Moral development has been and continues to be most commonly referred to as "the conscience." However, Freud referred to the conscience as the "superego." This new psychical agency continues to carry on the functions which have hitherto been performed by the people (the abandoned objects) in the external world: it observes the ego gives it orders, threatens it with punishment exactly like the parent whose place it has taken. We call this agency the super-ego and are aware o f it in its judicial functions as our conscience (emphasis original), (p. 62) (cited in Quinn, 1986 ) Freud’s Theory It is difficult to determine the degree and accuracy o f Freud's contribution to the area called moral developm ent Because he never abandoned his instinctual theoretical platform, it is hard to know whether Freud would have been able to give the Ego or the S elf the value and level o f importance that current Neo- Freudians, Ego-theorists, and Self Psychologists have given it. The emphasis on “se lf’-development that today's theorists hold is especially important when one examines the area o f making choices within moral domains. According to Gilligan et al.(1988) and others (Langdale 1983; Lyons, 1982; Naess, 1988) moral development is synonymous with self-development. In Lyons 1982 study she tested this hypothesis and found a significant correlation between descriptions o f self and moral orientation or mode. Regarding the importance o f the self and its relationship to moral development, others before Gilligan have noted problems with Freud’s failure to grasp the relationship. Guntrip (1973) indicated that one o f Freud's major theoretical mistakes was to not have abandoned the instinct theory, especially where the ego was concerned. The failure to abandon would have increased the likelihood o f Freud's having given more importance to the role o f the ego and ultimately to its importance in self development. Problems arise with Freud’s system o f instinctual self-regulation both philosophically and practically, especially when one considers that often the mores o f society reflect the pathology o f the individual members o f that society (Firestone & Catlett, 1989). Further, that these societal norms may actually be damaging to the fabric and successful maintenance o f that society (as is abusing the environment for short term gain) is evident. And if these mores were at one time useful they may have existed beyond their usefulness (Chodorow, 1978). Examples from the former o f this pathology that are societal mores include phenomena like McCarthyism, the Holocaust, problems encountered with the Viet Nam W ar’s atrocities and the subsequent protests, institutionalized racism, sexism, ageism, and a host o f others, including anti-environmental issues. Some system o f moral development or self-development must be present in order to supersede 38 these societal norms or to allow for their continued evolution. This investigator believes that the lack o f a system o f moral development is one o f the shortcomings o f Freud's instinct-based theory, and that Freud’s theoiy can not adequately explain racism, sexism, etc. or their transitions on a societal level. Other critics o f Freud's theory, especially those involved in the psychology o f women, say that he more accurately represented the misogynistic ideologies o f a patriarchal society rather than discerned the role(s) o f conscience or moral development in its more complete contexts (Baker, 1986). Anna Freud’s Theory W hile extending many her father’s tenets, Anna Freud introduced the importance o f the continued ego-development that occurs during adolescence (Freud, 1988). She, however, was not able to discern a more realistic approach to wom en’s development than her father had. Freud’s (1988) concept of identification with the aggressor has implications for the continuation o f certain behavioral norms within the individual and the society. The process o f identification with the aggressor also has relevance with regard to challenging the predominant paradigms that are in opposition to enviro-ethical concerns. This process can explain some of the tenacity with which a society will cling to belief systems despite significant evidence to the contraiy. 39 Choderow’s Theory Choderow's (1978) work is an important contributor to understanding the origins of differences in moral orientations as well as the process of continued feminine and masculine moral development. This is important because her work has described the origins of gender differences8 in childhood (from infancy onward), and the “mothering process” involved with derivation o f gender differences. Combined with socio-cultural influences her theory provides a map for understanding how some gender differences are manifested and maintained in adult life. In other words, Chodorow has extensively explored the process of “mothering”— a process that has been and continues to be the domain o f women. She also explored the consequences o f that role distinction.9 Choderow pointed out that the “mothering” responsibility need not rest with women or there is significant evidence that mothering processes are not necessarily linked to the ability to have a child or to lactate.1 0 Yet society continue to relegate mothering duties nearly exclusively to women. Her research has led her to suggest that the process o f “mothering” males versus females is also significantly different, despite a plethora of research in 8 This gender reference is socio-cultural in nature not “biologic” 9 Choderow’s theory also helps set the stage for the care orientation discussed by Gilligan (1982) and give some clues for understanding differing moral orientations toward the environment. 1 0 These attributions may have had some validity at some time in the evolution of humans, they have since outlived their original utility psychology which indicates there are no gender differences.1 1 The differences Choderow related take the form of, but are not limited to the fact that females have a protracted pre-oedipal phase and do not encounter the same impetus to individuate as males; while their male counterparts are, by virtue o f issues involved in the oedipal triangle (mother, father and son), forced to individuate much more quickly. Female children do not have the same boundaries between themselves and the mother as do male children. Additionally, the pre-oedipal and oedipal conditions exist longer for females than for m ales12. Chodorow (1978) has also highlighted the importance o f the “mothering” process insofar as it forms the basis for the establishment o f a type o f relatedness to others that tends to become the predominant mode o f ‘fem ales’ self development. W hile males are exposed to this relatedness mode, via the m othering process, their exposure is significantly less than that o f the female children. In addition, Chodorow (1978) illuminated something similar to what Gilligan (1982) has said in her reference to the concept that women have a “different voice” in moral reasoning. That is, unless one is prepared to look at the 1 1 Chodorow (1978) makes the distinction that much of the research on gender differences that has been cited in traditional psychological experiments lacked abilities to discern psychoanalytic principles, and therefore is and has not been able to capture these gender differences and their subtlety of expressions. She relics on case histories of prominent analysts to describe the inequities. 12 It is this investigators belief that the extended pre-oedipal phase for females predisposes females to a different moral orientation and ultimately self-definition than males. 41 differences between male and female moral reasoning processes in non-traditional ways, vital information can be missed or misinterpreted. Many of Chodorow’s (1978) contemporaries have missed the significance of gender of the child in the mothering process. Gilligan reiterated this point regarding moral development, by pointing out that only a limited range of experience has been explored regarding gender differences, and that the limited results have been accepted as the sine qua non o f the construct o f moral development. Cognitive-Developmental and Structural Approaches to Morality Since the time of historic Greece, morality has been considered an element for study predominantly in the domain o f philosophy (Grcic, 1989; Modgil & Modgil, 1985). More recently, psychologists who delved into this subject to find the empirical components o f this construct have met with and continue to meet with disdain as well as with skepticism regarding their attempts (Modgil & Modgil, 1985). This discipline-related separateness makes the attempts by Piaget (1960), Kohlberg (1981) and others to integrate and illuminate a theory o f morality based upon philosophical and psychological principles, all the more significant with respect to understanding the relevance and importance of enviro-ethics. Integration o f psychology and philosophy also presents multiple problems with language and meanings associated with the respective disciplines. It requires that 42 the participants from each discipline have a “willingness” to look at their work through different lenses (Modgil & Modgil, 1985). W hether a “true morality” (in the philosophic sense) can ever be discerned from empirical results or not, is not the focus o f this dissertation. However, whether or not empirical evidence has the ability to contribute information and yield a better understanding o f what constitutes a “true theoiy o f morality” is of relevance here. It is this investigator’s belief that empirical evidence is necessary to guide the philosophical, and vice versa, so that neither discipline becomes devoid of the human/environmental experience. Piaget’s Theory One of the main differences between the study o f morality o f “justice” in the philosophic realm and that o f the psychologic one is that in psychology the construct of autonomy (as an integral component of moral development) has been considered from a unitary and more general form, not in the diverse forms that philosophers have described (Petrovich, 1985). Piaget (1960) indicated that autonomy was the sign of mature moral development. He made distinctions that were hierarchical in nature regarding arrival at the stage of autonomy (Petrovich, 1985). These delineations consisted o f (a) heteronomous, (b) semi-autonomous, (c) autonomous modes o f moral reasoning. According to Piaget ‘heteronomous” thought refers to obedience to the adult. ‘Semi-autonomous’ thought refers to 43 obedience to the rule itself, even though this is not entirely complete, because the child views the rule as coming from or being imposed from the outside and not as a product o f internal psychological processes. W hereas ‘autonom ous’ thought is a recognition of the child’s discovering that truthfulness is necessary to the relations of sympathy and mutual respect. His definition o f autonomy included: (a) An individual is morally autonomous if independent o f any external influences, especially o f adult authority. He has an autonomous conscience which is in reciprocal relationships with others and feels ‘from within the desire to treat others, as he him self would wish to be treated’...(b) Standard, rule, principle, law or value is said to be 'autonomous' if it is internal to the child's own conscience... (c) General attitude to rules, laws, etc., can be heteronomous, semi-autonomous or autonomous, according to the manner with which an individual relates to moral standards. (Piaget, 1965, p. 194 cited in Petrovich 1985) Piaget’s conceptions are reflective o f the justice perspective o f moral development. They also have some relevance to enviro-ethics, as they provide one framework for evaluating enviro-ethical dilemmas. Furthermore, these conceptions are critical to the construction of Kohlberg’s (1981) theory. Kohlberg’s Theory In present day research the dominant theory of moral development is Kohlberg’s (1981) (Flood, 1992; Lyons 1982; Mogdil & Mogdil, 1985). Kohlberg’s cognitive developmental theory is derived from several sources. Kohlberg was heavily influenced by Aristotle, Kant, Freud, Piaget, Rawls, and others (Flood, 1992; Modgil & Modgil, 1985). His theory has been considered an invariant or hard stage theory consisting o f three stages, each o f which contains two levels or substages. These stages are known as the preconventional, the conventional and the post conventional. Levels 1 and 2 refer to Stage I; and levels 3 and 4 refer to stage II; and levels 5 and 6 refer to Stage III. (Kohlberg had a level 7 but abandoned it because of problems with its empirical description and validation). He ultimately abandoned levels 5 and 6 as hard stage dependent also, because of his inability to describe and to demonstrate these levels empirically without age regressions. Kohlberg’s (1981) original claims were that the stages were ‘universal’. That is, all people go through these stages one a t .. time as a result of developmental changes, without skipping any o f the stages because the stages have a unique and invariant sequencing to them .1 3 Further these stages are considered as ‘structural wholes’. W hat this term means is that the stages represent total ways of thinking, and are not just attitudinally and situationally dependent. Another very important aspect o f his theory is that Kohlberg (1981) indicated that each successive stage was more morally adequate than the preceding one. The higher the level o f attainment o f moral ‘ justice’ reasoning the better or more adequate psychologically a person is.1 4 13 To attain a certain level or stage, the preceding stagc(s) must be passed through completely and without exception. 14 For a more extensive review of Kohlberg’s stages and their derivations the reader is referred to Kohlberg (1981) see references, or Gibbs 1992 also in references. 45 Criticisms o f Kohlberg’s Theory Criticisms o f Kohlberg’s theory arise from a variety of disciplines. This circumstance is due, in part, to his attempts to find a point of integration between philosophy and developmental psychology and because of his belief that ‘ justice’ reasoning was and continues to be at the core of moral reasoning. Furthermore his openly declared denial o f committing a ‘naturalistic fallacy’ by describing his theory as isomorphic with that of normative ethics, has angered many and been a source of continued debate (Carter, 1985; Locke, 1985). Gibbs et al. (1992) have pointed out some of the problems and contradictions in Kohlberg’s (1981) theory. Some o f these criticisms have focused on the inconsistencies and improbabilities with key concepts— concepts such as the idea o f “natural development.” Kohlberg took the position that it was incorrect to assume that the process o f moral development is simply a result o f the inculcation o f societal or cultural norms. He stated, It is evident that natural moral development is grossly defined by a trend toward and increasingly internal orientation to norms. Our moral stages...clearly represent increasingly interiorized orientations...but this development cannot be defined as a direct internalization o f external cultural norms. If students of socialization ignore [the] maturity components o f social development in favor of simpler conformity or internalization concepts, they will ... fail to describe “ natural development” correctly. (Kohlberg, 1984, pp. 90-93 cited in Gibbs et al, 1992) 46 Gibbs et al. (1992) have pointed out the inconsistencies dealing with the concept o f natural development by saying that internalization of the initially external rules and expectations o f others is explicitly referred to by Kohlberg in accounting for the preconventional-to- conventional transition. On the other hand, as noted earlier, Kohlberg suggested that “natural” moral development (presumably even at the lower levels) “ cannot be defined as a direct internalization o f external cultural norms” (p.93; cited in Gibbs et al. , 1992) Gibbs et al (1992) have also discerned problems with the hard or invariant stage reasoning o f Kohlberg, and have suggested that the preconventional, conventional and post-conventional frameworks be eliminated. They described the process by noting some o f the more recent longitudinal research that has indicated stage regressions. In addition, they have noted that other cultures have failed to demonstrate higher stage development (as Piaget has described) as being constitutive o f the “universal principles” o f stage development. Although there are other critics o f Kohlberg in other disciplines, none has created more discussion and evaluation o f the empirical research than has a previous colleague o f Kohlberg, Carol Gilligan (Siegel, 1985). Gilligan’s Theory. As previously mentioned, the most dominant and m ost cited theory of moral development is that of Kohlberg (Flood, 1992; Gibbs, 1992; Lyons, 1988; Modgil & Modgil, 1985). Although Kohlberg's theory has been preeminent both in the description and in the definition o f moral development (Modgil & Modgil, 1985) , for some, his focus has continued to lack both empirical reliability and validity, especially for women (Brown & Gilligan, 1992, Gilligan, 1977, 1982, Gilligan et al. 1988, and Langdale, 1983; Lyons, 1982). With research, such as that o f Gilligan et al. (1988), the awareness o f being autonomous yet connected, as earlier described about Aeneas, forms an impetus for a reconsideration of the predominant view concerning moral development as well as highlights the emergence o f a new paradigm of moral development that includes components o f Kohlberg (1981) and Gilligan (1977, 1982). Gilligan (1977, 1982), Gilligan et al. 1988, and Brown & Gilligan, (1992), Gilligan (1977, 1982), and others (Lyons, 1982; Langdale, 1983) have augmented the paradigm of moral development such that neglected factors have been explored. More importance has been given to the role that moral development plays within personality formation. Gilligan (1977, 1982), Gilligan et al. 1988, and Brown & Gilligan’s, (1992), augmentations to theories such as Kohlberg's (1981) moral development have made it possible to see how moral development can be understood as being synonymous with self-development, and how this refocusing makes it a more significant element in the prediction o f enviro-ethics. Another way of stating this conclusion is that development in the moral domain can be more than just a process o f choosing in the moment the correct thing to do based upon rules, ideals or principles i.e., ‘structured wholes’. Rather, it can represent a mode of being or responding in which many types o f choices are considered. Furthermore, this process can be and often is ongoing and evolving within the individual throughout the lifespan. Genesis o f Gilligan’s Theory (Overview) As previously mentioned, Gilligan (1977, 1982), Gilligan et al. 1988, and Brown & Gilligan, (1992), described a moral development model (and method for assessment) that has essential features which differ significantly from Kohlberg's (1981) model o f moral development. She became aware o f these differences in moral development after having worked with Kohlberg, and as a result o f having done her own investigations o f moral development. W hile she was working with women and girls on issue(s) related to abortion, she became aware o f a moral choice process that differed from Kohlberg’s model o f moral choosing. She related that women demonstrated a “voice” that had as central to the process o f moral choosing, not just the rules for justice and fairness based upon reciprocity, but a high level o f consideration for the well-being o f the specific other involved in the moral dilemma. As a result of becoming aware o f this differing voice, she proposed that what may have been appropriate for measuring moral development in males is actually inappropriate when it is the only m ethod utilized to describe moral development in females. She came to describe her model as a care perspective. She has also delineated specific stages of this feminine type of moral development that differ significantly from the other established theoretical models. These stages have not been proven empirically and continue to be a source of controversy (Gambone, 1992), while other aspects of her theory continue to gain support (Flood, 1992; Gambone, 1992). Brown and Gilligan (1992) have countered the argument by saying that much o f what has been discovered is not readily testable in the same traditional methods, as are other aspects o f moral development. In other words, traditional methods o f empirical research miss much of what she describes as the “voice”. In addition, because of Gilligan’s contentions regarding the difficulties involved in discerning this other voice, refinements in Kohlberg’s (1981), Rest’s (1986) and Gibbs’(1992) scales (all of which are derived from Kohlberg’s original theory) have been made which, according to those schools, addressed this issue o f gender more thoroughly (Gibbs, 1992). Brown and Gilligan (1992) have continued to believe, however, that the models used for assessment o f moral development to date are deficient and inaccurate with respect to a perspective that women tend to use more frequently than men. This distinct care perspective has as its foundation a base that is fundamentally different from that of other major theorists. It is also Gilligan's (1977, 1982,) contention that the present systems o f evaluation (e.g., Kohlberg's) base themselves upon an incomplete association with a certain facet o f cognitive development as being synonymous with moral development. Gilligan believes that because Kohlberg's (1981) theory is heavily weighted with Piagetian stages o f intellectual development which focus on certain attributes such as mathematics skills, this theory may not be the most efficacious for describing moral development especially though not exclusively for women Gilligan (1977, 1982) asserted that a more complete view of the process o f moral development includes a recognition o f the ongoing tension between the need for attachment and the need for autonomy and, as has been previously mentioned in the description o f the Aeneid, moral development is synonymous with self development. In other words, it is similar to viewing the picture used often in psychology experiments o f the ambiguous figure that can be seen as a vase and/or as faces. Gilligan et al.(1988) argued that, like the figure, there appears to be two ways o f perceiving self in relation to others, both grounded in reality, but each imposing on that reality a different organization. But as with the perception o f the ambiguous figure, when one configuration o f self emerges the other seems to temporarily vanish, (p.8-9) 51 The Role o f Paradigms and the Impact that they have in the Maintenance of Specific Scientific and Philosophical Positions The preceding sections addressed theoretical positions that were more unitary in their focus. That is, each had a specific focus or orientation to use as a guideline for describing moral development. This unitary focus, allows for a greater understanding o f a particular set of phenomena. However, it does little for understanding how various discipline-specific contributions can be integrated into a more comprehensive view o f behavior. The subsequent section describes an integrative methodology for understanding moral development including behavior. Synthetic Approach to Moral Development Quinn (1984) indicated that moral behaviors were, in essence, determined by several factors acting in concert with each other. He reasoned that moral or “principled behavior” comprises “rational, conative and affective” elements all of which act together simultaneously to produce what he called the ’’natural conscience.” Quinn stated that integration and developmental changes had to occur within these three areas of experience before consistent moral behaviors would be manifested by the individual. Quinn (1984) described the “conative” component as having Maslow’s (1954) hierarchy of needs as its core. In other words, principled moral behaviors 52 or the “naturalistic conscience” results in part from having one’s basic human needs satisfied. When these basic needs are satisfied, the needs for achieving and maintaining genuine self-esteem and the need to be loving are more likely to be manifested. Quinn declared that both of these higher states (needs) of actualization are integral to moral behaviors. The affective component o f the natural conscience that Quinn (1984) referred to represents one’s level of empathy and nurturance. Quinn stated that personality constructs such as empathy and nurturance were developmental in nature, and that they were a primary component of the naturalistic conscience.1 5 The final component of the naturalistic conscience, the “rational” Quinn (1984) declared to be the cognitive developmental structures o f the personality. In other words, it is the stage level o f moral development in Kohlberg’s (1981) terms that a person had achieved. He stated that this component served to be the feedback mechanism o f the personality involved with the naturalistic conscience and moral behavior, as well as a descriptor of the level o f moral development achieved by the person. Furthermore, Quinn (1984) indicated that contemporary theories by not addressing the complexity of moral behaviors are, in essence, committing what Allport (1937) (cited in Quinn, 1984) has called clipping, “Better to expand and 1 5 The dimensions of empathy and nurturance correspond highly to Gilligan’s (1982) Lyon’s (1982) and Langdale’s (1983) view of the care orientation 53 refashion one's theories until they do some measure o f justice to the richness and dignity o f human personality, than to clip and compress personality until it fits one closed system o f thought” (p. vii). Quinn (1984) reviewed the current theories o f moral choosing and found them to be inadequate with respect to their ability to predict behaviors associated with activism. He studied participants that were involved in the Diablo Canyon protest. The Diablo Canyon incident was a predominantly non-violent protest against having a Nuclear Reactor at Diablo Creek go on-line with its service. The protest was based on the belief that because o f its location (on a major earthquake fault line) the reactor posed a threat to the nearby populace. Quinn studied the participants, and those who chose not to participate, by utilizing and integrating three major theoretical paradigms. His results showed that no singular theory could predict a person's behavior. He did find that interactions took place based upon a person's level of development in key areas. These key areas consisted o f the kinds o f childhood traumas they experienced and the kind o f socialization that took place in the home. In addition, he also found that much of a person’ s ability to act regarding moral beliefs was correlated with the kind o f childrearing that that person had 54 received. Unfortunately, as Quinn’ s number o f subjects was small, his results were not, therefore, generalizable to a larger population. Philosophical Contributions to the Enviro-Ethical Construct o f Moral Development Ironically, one o f the sources of the emerging enviro-ethical paradigm appears to have its roots in evolutionary biology (Fuller, 1992). That is to say, the very thing that is endangered and damaged (i.e., the environment and all o f its progeny) is the entity that can provide society with the most clues to assist with the amelioration o f these environmental problems (Naess, 1988; Sessions, 1985). Fuller (1992) states that humans have as a part o f their phylogenetic make-up, structures that promote a form of reciprocal caring (what he calls altruistic ethics) between members of the species. One o f the reasons for the existence o f these structures is the promotion and the continued evolution of the species. He cited D arw in’s principle o f natural selection and free variation (mutation) as a justification for the existence o f this form o f caring. Looking to the earth and its ecosystems can provide some insight for remediation o f environmental problems. Some feminist philosophers have taken the position that the awareness of connection to the earth has been available for many years but ju st ignored (Davion; 1994; Shiva, 1988; W arren, 1990) . 55 Ecofeminism Ecofeminists would argue that the tradition o f diminishing or ignoring what this author and others (Flood, 1992; Langdale, 1983; Lyons, 1982) call the “care” orientation extends further back into history than even the period Gilligan describes. Ecofeminists have declared that as long as there has been a perceived connection between women and the earth and as long as there has been oppression o f women, there have been beliefs and actions that have harmed the environment and those who have been most closely connected to it (Davion, 1994; W arren, 1990). Further, that as a result to this connection between the two entities, developing an understanding o f either feminism or environmentalism necessarily illuminates aspects o f the problems o f the other. Likewise, as Brown and Gilligan (1992) discerned, beliefs that stem from fear o f something or someone, can often lead to some sort o f confrontive action or attempts to conquer or subjugate the feared element(s) rather than to understand or coexist with them. Contemporary Contributions from Other Disciplines As an example o f the process o f making moral decisions based upon the considerations o f others, W alker and M ehr (1992) studied the life and career choices that exceptionally gifted women (from Hunter High School and College) made, and the reasons for these choices. They studied women from many 56 different cohort groups and demographic backgrounds. They found that in spite of these women having exceptionally high IQ’ s and talent (which would more readily allow them access to increased career opportunities) often their choice-making processes were more heavily weighted with considerations for the well-being of others or for the role expectations set for them by society, than by discrete choices made in response to certain events. This choice-making behavior is different from that o f males. Linguistics and its Contribution Confluent with the idea that differences between the sexes exist within a social learning context, research in other disciplines such as linguistics has contributed information that may shed light on moral development and ultimately enviro-ethics. Theorists such as Tannen (1990) have elaborated on the role that language has played in the maintenance of areas o f development. She asserted that although the language may be the same in any interaction between the sexes, the context(s) and the meaning(s) o f a given situation will vary significantly based again upon the differences between the sexes and the social learning that has taken place with each. 57 Summary Throughout this chapter multiple conceptions o f the construct o f moral development were discussed. In addition, the relevance o f these differing views of moral development were examined for their contribution to the maintenance o f the predominant moral paradigm and for their possible contribution to the emerging enviro-ethical paradigm. This approach was taken, as those who develop an emerging moral paradigm would necessarily examine the existing moral development theories as well as other approaches to moral development. In addition, they would have to be able to provide answers to the anomalous situations that occur within the predominant paradigm(s) It is clear from this review that moral development/orientation is a complex issue. Furthermore, it is clear that no one theory can adequately describe the importance o f this construct and its sequelae. Although this shortcoming is true, areas o f integration between the differing theories and disciplines can be useful in understanding important aspects o f this area o f personality development as it relates to enviro-ethics. Integration involving the differing theories o f moral development is necessary if one is to comprehend an “ethic that stretches the limits o f all other ethics.” In the next section the methodology o f the investigation is discussed in detail. 58 Chapter III Methodology This chapter details the methodology o f the study. Specific focus is given to the research design, collection o f data, instrumentation, description o f the sample populations, the procedures used in collecting the data, the treatment of the data regarding analytic procedures, and the subsequent limitations o f the study. As mentioned previously, this study attempted to assess several different, yet related, aspects o f self-development (i.e., care vs. justice components o f moral development), and the ways in which these components o f self-development are related to each other, and subsequently with variables found in enviro-ethics. The combination o f instruments used in this study to measure these components o f self development were designed to yield data that help explain some of the components o f enviro-ethics including helping to discern differences between behaviors and attitudes. Research Design A non-experimental, cross sectional research design was utilized, through the use o f a multipart questionnaire. The questionnaire was constructed with a demographics section (see appendix B) and two inventories which consisted of forty-one questions. Twelve o f the questions were essay type that required 59 answers to moral dilemmas. The other twenty-nine questions asked respondents to rate their responses on a 6 point Likert scale. The twenty-nine questions elicited responses to environmentally-related content areas. M easures were taken at one point in time on the two constructs o f moral development/orientation utilizing the Flood Relative Presence Inventory FRPI (1992) (see appendix C) and this investigator’s measure on self-reported environmental attitudes and behaviors the Enviro Ethics Scale, EES (see appendix D). The moral developmental constructs that are represented in Flood’s Relative Presence Inventory are those of Gilligan's (1977, 1982,) “care” perspective, and Kohlberg's (1981) “justice” perspective. The measure representing the dependent variable, enviro-ethics, was developed by this investigator for the purpose o f this study as a means of assessing environmental awareness and environmentally aware behaviors. Sample Selection The sample selected from the population represented differing cohort groups ranging in age from “young adult”- 18 years, to "old age"- 70 years and older. These cohort groups were delineated into age groups consisting o f 5 year spans (or roughly equivalent to cohorts) that have been examined in the research and popular literature. Both males and females were tested to discern the effects o f gender differences on both the care and justice perspectives as well as levels on 60 the EES. Approximately 160 subjects were sampled, 80 from recycling centers and 80 from a shopping mall. Ethnic background, SES, and other specific demographic subject information was also obtained. Subjects were chosen from several locations in Orange County, California: two recycling centers (one in Huntington Beach, another at California State University Long Beach recycling center), and at a local shopping center in Laguna Niguel. The reasons for choosing these locations were: (a) to see whether or not people who actually demonstrated certain enviro-ethical behaviors like recycling would score differently from those in the general populace, and (b) to obtain a diverse enough sample from a shopping mall to make the results more generalizable. The sizes o f each sample (though not equivalent as described subsequently) did yield an interesting finding regarding return rate and completion. Total num ber o f questionnaires given out was 515; 40 were distributed at the Huntington recycling center; 125, at the California State University Long Beach Recycling Center; and 350, at the shopping mall. The num ber o f respondents returning the inventories consisted o f 54 completed and usable forms (with an additional 11 questionnaires that were returned but were unusable) from the recycling centers, and 70 completed and usable questionnaires (with another 40 that were not usable for the dilemma components) from the shopping mall. The return rate percentage 61 was higher from the recycling centers 32% to 20 %, despite the fact that all respondents were given the same instrument, instructions, and postage paid return envelopes. Potential respondents were asked whether they would participate in doctoral research. The respondents were informed that the study was examining recycling and other environmentally related areas, both in attitudes and behaviors. The respondents were not informed further o f the remaining content o f the study. The phone number where they could reach this investigator was given in the event that they had other questions about the study or regarding the results of the study. In addition, the informed consent requirement was discussed with each prospective respondent prior to giving the subject the questionnaire. Those who agreed to participate were given the questionnaire to complete in the privacy of their own homes. Included in the packet with the questionnaire was a return postage paid mailing envelope for the respondent to return the instrument to this investigator. Permission to survey these populations was granted by facility supervisors and by the participants themselves. Permission to use the Flood Relative Presence Inventory was granted by Dr. Ann Flood. Human subjects review at the University o f Southern California granted permission to use the survey. Instrumentation A moral development assessment instrument developed by Flood (1992) that measures both Kohlberg's (1981) justice perspective and Gilligan's (1977, 1982) care perspective and environmentally related components was utilized. In addition, this investigator constructed a measure o f enviro-ethical attitudes and behaviors called the Enviro-Ethics Scale (EES). The Flood Relative Presence Inventory and its Derivation The Flood Relative Presence Scoring Method was utilized in this investigation because it assesses the strengths of the types o f responses to moral dilemmas and because it facilitates the assessment of differences in types o f responding, (i.e., care vs. justice). In addition, because this instrument utilizes a relative presence scoring method, it also delineates a score o f a person on both the dimensions o f justice and care and his or her relative weights on each dimension. Included in these dilemmas are dilemmas that focus on human-to- environment specific dilemmas, as well as human-to-human only dilemmas. The human-to-environment dilemmas are based upon Flood's (1992) extension of Lyon's (1982) and Langdale’s (1983) work on moral and self-development. The FRPI instrument consists o f four dilemmas, two human-to-environment based, and two human-to-human based dilemmas. These dilemmas are presented first to the reader who is asked to comment on three specific content areas: (1) the construction o f the problem; (2) the formulation o f the resolution of the problem and, (3) an evaluation of the process including the resolution. The responses that are elicited from the questionnaire are designed to be ethically based. In other words, because o f the manner in which the questions are formulated, moral processes can be discerned, and the outcomes of these processes can likewise be coded insofar as the type of moral orientation. Scoring is completed by evaluating each o f the three response categories: (a) the construction of the problem, (b) the resolution of the problem, and (c) the evaluation of the resolutions. These scores are tabulated to determine the number of care versus justice responses in each category for each dilemma. From this tabulation a relative presence o f care versus justice scores is derived by dividing the number of care responses by the total number of considerations in each dilemma. The Relative Presence of Care (RPC) vs. Justice scores are derived by the formula RPC = 1 - RPJ, or the Relative Presence o f Justice (RPJ) can be determined from the formula RPJ -1 - RPC. In other words, the instrument utilizes a 0.00 to +1.00 range for the determination of scoring on this construct. Because the scoring is a presence type o f scoring procedure, knowing a person’s score on one dimension allows one to determine their score on the other. In addition, these scores do not describe a 64 moral stage o f development inasmuch as they describe a moral orientation that an individual uses most often in resolving certain kinds of moral dilemmas such as the ones described in this instrument. Reliability and Validity of the Measures of the Flood Relative Presence Inventory In order to assess the reliability and validity of Flood’s measure it is necessary to first examine the work of those researchers that preceded her in the development of her measure. Flood (1992), as previously mentioned, modified Lyons’ (1982) and Langdales’s (1983) instruments by extending them to include environmental dilemmas. This extension and revision permit for an analysis of moral reasoning on the human to environmental level and establishes the first extension of moral reasoning (i.e., the care perspective) in the environmental domain. In addition, Flood’s instrument utilizes approximately equal interval levels of measurement not found in the previous instruments. The Flood Relative Presence Scoring Methodology as the third in a series o f instruments that are able to discern a “care perspective” (as an additional perspective in moral reasoning), further supports Gilligan’s theory that “justice reasoning” is only one aspect of moral development. The first instrument started with the work of Lyons (1982) who developed the Predominance Method of scoring moral dilemmas. Lyons utilized a methodology that was able to delineate the two different modes of moral responding (i.e., justice and care). Her method, while seminal in nature, did not describe the ranges and differing ways in which people used both perspectives and to what degree a person uses one over the other or equally. She utilized a well established instrument, that o f Kohlberg’s (1981) Heinz dilemma, and added to it other dilemmas, i.e., the Sara-Mary dilemmas. These dilemmas were also coupled with other data that consisted o f asking people from various age groups across the life span about personal dilemmas they had faced and ultimately how they had resolved these conflicts. Flood’s inter-reliability components were similar. They consisted of interrater reliabilities on each o f the four dilemmas and of each of the dilemmas’ subcomponents. These subcomponents consisted of the numbers o f considerations or “units of analysis” for each o f the three separate components of each dilemma, and the type of consideration of these units of analyses. Another way o f stating this mode o f analysis that the “number” of considerations from the construction o f the problem, the resolution o f the problem and the evaluation of the resolution were all checked for interrater reliabilities. Then, the interrater reliabilities were checked regarding the “category” o f response given (i.e., justice vs.. care). This type of coding is more stringent than that done in other studies that 66 are only concerned with the resolution scores. Flood’s (1992) interrater reliabilities for scores were as follows: Identifying Considerations Old Growth 86.2 % Canyon 90.1 % Heinz 88.3% Sara 86.2 % Langdale’s Modification of Lyons Method Langdale (1983) recognized the inability o f Lyons (1982) method to describe those people who use both methods equally and devised the presence method of scoring. This method allowed for the detection o f “splits” (i.e., people who use each orientation more or less equally when faced with moral conflicts). Lyons likewise used moral dilemmas (with both open ended and closed “structured” response sets) and self reported moral dilemma of the subjects that were described in the respondents own terms. Categorizing Considerations 91.3% 90.1% 86.5% 88.5% 67 Problems Associated with the Use of Dilemmas: Gibbs et al, (1993) and others Flood (1992) have described some of the problems associated with the use of dilemmas in the determination of moral development and orientation. Some of these considerations have taken the form of a realization that in the construction of the dilemma a pull toward a given moral perspective can be presented to the respondent. For example, in the Heinz dilemma the druggist is already approached by Heinz for the purpose of negotiating a settlement. In the construction of this dilemma, a solution that may be conducive to all parties is already a part of the scenario., Therefore those considerations of response and care have already been eliminated from the possibilities that a given respondent may give. This circumstance is also true of the Sara dilemma in that the married boyfriend has already said that he would not support Sara or the child eliminating this type of consideration from the list of potential responses. Another limitation in the use of dilemmas is that intensive training is required of scorers. This training is due to the fact that the instruments use open ended questions and that the response sets are only minimally focused. In this investigation, lengthy and repeated training sessions were required to train scorers so that inter-rater reliabilities would be sufficient for data analysis. Although the time to learn this methodology is quicker than that of case interviews, as used in 68 the previous related studies, it still represents a problem insofar as wide usage for the instrument. The Enviro-Ethics Scale (EES) This author developed a questionnaire (utilizing a pilot study o f 30 subjects; see results section for reliability estimates) to delineate environmentally aware attitudes and behaviors. This pencil and paper instrument was devised to help discern those factors that make the discriminations between those that manifest ecologically aware attitudes and enviro-ethical aware behaviors (i.e., recycling, political choices and consumer related decisions) and those that do not. This instrument was further tested with individuals who manifest enviro- ethical behaviors by recycling, at a recycling center. The recycling center was one in which the people who recycled there did not receive money as a motivator for their behaviors.1 Procedures Subjects from all locations, the recycling centers and the shopping mall- were approached by this researcher and asked to participate in doctoral research 1 After analyzing the data for location no significant differences were found. This finding is most likely because the populations sampled at the shopping center also contained people who recycled and had varying levels of enviro-ethical awareness. If a clear group of non-rccylers could have been identified it is possible a difference may have been found. study. Subjects who agreed to participate were given the instrument which consisted o f the two separate inventories: the (a) Flood Relative Presence Inventoiy (see Appendix B) which asked them to evaluate moral dilemmas (two human to human and two human to environment), and (b) an instrument that helps to describe their attitudes and behaviors regarding environmental issues, the EES (See Appendix C). As the questionnaire was completed in an anonymous fashion, no names were requested or recorded. Respondents were coded only by the number on the questionnaire and with other specific demographics that are relevant to the study. These demographics, when supplied by the respondents and did not reveal the respondents’ identity. After having the informed consents explained to the potential respondents and after answering their basic questions, the respondents were informed that they would not receive any further interaction with the researcher until returning the questionnaire. Completed questionnaires were evaluated to the type o f moral development/orientation, and various environmentally related behaviors and attitudes using multiple statistical techniques. These techniques included factor analyses, Pearson’s correlation, Analysis of Variance (ANOVA), discriminant analysis procedures, were utilized according to the hypothesis being tested. 70 Scale Development and Development o f Group Classification As mentioned previously, a twenty-nine question instrument was developed by this investigator to assess levels of ecological attitude awareness on several dimensions as well as a enviro-ethical behavior scale to determine types of environmentally related behaviors and their level of association with attitudes. Reliabilities of the Measures in this Study Initial reliabilities of the pilot sample were as follows: Identifying Categorizing Considerations Considerations Old Growth Canyon Heinz 86.3% 83.7 % 89.2 % 87.0% 85.6% 85.4% Sara 91.4% 70.9% Pilot Study of Enviro-Ethics Initial reliability of the EES instrument was tested on a sample of 30 subjects. The results were an Alpha of .70 on all of the 14 attitude items and .71 on all o f the behavior items. This alpha level indicated sufficient reliability2 o f attitude and behavioral items. In the next section, Chapter IV, the results o f the data collection and analysis are presented in conjunction with the hypotheses tested. 2Marcoulidcs (1989, 1993) describes reliability and validity as existing on a continuum with reliability describing one pole of the continuum and validity the other. Therefore the higher the reliability of an instrument the more one can infer higher levels of validity. 72 CHAPTER 4 RESULTS Profile of Sample The sample consisted of 164 subjects who were obtained following the procedures outlined in the previous chapter. Data for die Flood Relative Presence Inventory were available only for 127 subjects; thus, the statistical analysis on the first hypothesis was conducted only on this subsample (i.e., all available subjects for whom data were available on both die Flood instrument and the Enviro-Etiiics Scale). The demographic characteristics of the full sample (N = 164) are shown in Table 1. Gender distribution was approximately equal (53.1% male, 46.9% female). The majority of subjects (57.3%) were married. For purposes of data analysis, two of the categories on marital status were recoded yielding three total categories. Specifically, the categories for analysis were (a) single (N = 36, 22.1%), (b) married or remarried (N=102, 62.6%), and (c) divorced or widowed (N = 25, 15.3%). In terms of ethnicity, 83.4% of subjects were white, with small numbers of subjects falling in the other six ethnic categories. For purposes of statistical analysis, ethnicity was recoded into white (N = 136) and nonwhite (N = 28) groups. The initial groupings are reported for purposes of illustrating the breakdown of responses. The analysis was done with the recoded variables 73 Table 1 Demographic Characteristics of the Sample: Gender. Marital Status, and Ethnicity Gender Male Female Number 86 76 Percentage 53.1% 46.9% Mari L a i Status Single Married Divorced Remarried Widowed Ethnicity White African American Latino Asian Middle- Eastern Native American Other Number 36 94 24 8 1 Number 136 10 7 1 1 8 Percentage 2 2 . 1% 57.3% 14.7% 4.9% 0.6% Percentage 83.4% 6.1% 4.3% 0.6% 0.6% 0.6% 4.9% 74 Additional background variables are shown in Table 2, which has frequency distributions on number of children, education, and income. Each of these variables is treated as being at the interval level o f measurement for the statistical analysis. Table 3 shows the age distribution of the study sample. As can be seen, there was a broad distribution on age, with all age groups represented. Largest representation was of subjects in their thirties (29.4%) and forties (29.4%). As age was also treated as an interval level variable, it was appropriate for use in correlation and discriminant analysis, the results for which are detailed later in this chapter. Other demographic data related to education attainment are presented in Table 4. Information pertaining to income level is set forth in Table 5 Preliminary Factor Analysis and Scale Development Before testing the hypotheses statistically, the investigator found it necessary to conduct a number of exploratory analyses to confirm study subscales and classification of subjects. Initially, the 29 items of the Enviro-Ethics scale were content analyzed, and classified as tapping either attitudes or behaviors. Specifically, these items were classified as follows: "Attitude” Items: 2, 3,4, 5, 7, 8, 9, 10, 13, 16, 19, 21, 23, 26, 29. "Behavior" Items: 1, 6,9, 11, 12, 14, 15, 17, 18, 20,22, 24, 25, 27, 28 Table 2 Demographic Characteristics of the Sample: Number o f Children. Education, and Income Number o f Children Number Percentage None 74 45.4% 1 19 11.7% 2 44 27.0% 3 15 9.2% 4 8 4.9% 5 1 0.6% 6 or more 2 1.2% Table 3 Frequency Distribution on Ace fN = 167) Age Group Number Percentage 16-20 4 2.5% 21-25 5 3.1% 26-30 20 12.3% 31-35 24 14.7% 36-40 24 14.7% 41-45 25 15.3% 46-50 23 14.1% 51-55 12 7.4% 56-60 14 8.6% 61-65 6 3.7% 66-70 4 2.5% 71 & Above 1 0.6% 77 Table 4 Demographics Characteristics of the Sample (cont.) Educational Attainment Number Percentage Junior High 1 0.6% High School 25 15.3% 2-year degree 33 20.2% Bachelors 53 32.5% Masters 39 23.8% Ph.D./MD 12 7.4% Table 5 Demographic Characteristics o f the Sample (cont.) Annual Income Number Percentage Under $20,000 27 16.6% $20-30,000 18 11.1% $31-40,000 34 21.0% $41-50,000 26 16.0% $51-60,000 15 9.3% $60,000 and Above 42 25.9% 79 Evaluation of reliability using the Cronbach's alpha coefficient showed reliability of 0.638 for this attitude scale, and 0.743 for the behavior scale. Subscales Subscales may be described as follows. Ecological Awareness. This independent variable was derived based on the results of both the factor analysis and evaluation of interitem correlations among the 14 attitude items. Initial analysis of the 14 items identified as reflecting environmental attitudes showed a reliability coefficient of 0.638. Interitem correlations and the results of the factor analysis were used to remove one of the attitude subscales (which was used in the discriminant function), and to identify a nine-item "ecological awareness" scale (items 2, 3, 4, 5, 7, 8, 9, 13, 19, and 23). The reliability estimate for scores on this scale was 0.674; this was the highest reliability obtainable with the available attitude items. Scores on the nine-item ecological awareness scale were determined and the sample of 163 subjects with available data was divided into three approximately balanced categories: Low Ecological Awareness: 53 subjects (32.5%) Moderate Ecological Awareness: 52 subjects (31.9%) High Ecological Awareness: 58 subjects (35.6%) 80 This ordinal level variable was then used as an independent variable in the first hypothesis. In addition, it was employed as the primary grouping variable for the exploratory discriminant analysis presented following the hypotheses tests. Care Orientation. This variable was defined based on the open-ended responses to the four dilemmas. Each of the four care-justice scales was recoded, with 0 to 0.5 being coded 1 ("justice orientation") and scores from 0.51 to 1.0 being coded 2 ("care orientation). These scores were distributed as shown in Table 6. These nominal level (dichotomous) variables were then used as the second independent variable in the first hypothesis test. Given the lack o f theoretical integration, it was decided to keep these variable separate, and to not combine any o f the Justice-Care variables. Environmentally Ethical Behavior. Two operational measures of environmentally ethical behaviors, the dependent variable, were developed: 1. Household recycling behavior. This scale, which was based on the results o f the factor analysis, consisted o f Items 17, 24, 27, and 28. Reliability of scores, as assessed with the Cronbach's alpha coefficient, was 0.732. 2. Overall environmentally conscious behaviors. This scale consisted of all 15 behavior items (items I, 6, 9, 11, 12, 14, 15, 17, 18, 20, 22, 24, 25, 27, and 28). Reliability o f scores, as assessed with the Cronbach's alpha coefficient, was 0.743. Table 6 Distributions on Justice-Care Orientation. Four Dilemmas Dilemma 1: Forest Justice 78 (61.4%) Caring49 (38.6%) Dilemma 2: Canyon Justice 63 (49.6%) Caring 64 (50.4%) Dilemma 3: Heinz Justice 96 (75.6%) Caring 31 (24.4%) Dilemma 4: Sara Justice 53 (41.9%) Caring 74 (58.3%) 82 These two alternative measures of the dependent variable, when were considered sound both theoretically and statistically, were used throughout the hypothesis testing process. Tests of Hypothesis Each study hypothesis was evaluated at the g < .05 level of significance. The first hypothesis stated that: Ecological awareness and care orientation will be significant predictors of environmentally ethical behaviors. Using the definitions described in the previous section, led to the specification of eight 2 x 3 ANOVA models. In each case, the dependent variables were the two scales of environmentally conscious behavior. Independent variables were (a) the three-category variable of ecological awareness, and (b) each of the four 2-category Justice-Care orientations. More specifically, the models tested were as follows. 1. Dependent variable = Household Recycling Behavior; Independent variables = ecological awareness group (3 levels) and Justice Care orientation on Dilemma 1 (Table 7). 2. Dependent variable = Overall Environmentally Conscious Behaviors. Independent variables = ecological awareness group (3 levels) and Justice Care orientation on Dilemma 1 (Table 8). Table 7 Two-Way ANQVA With Ecological Orientation and Justice-Care Orientation (Dilemma O as Independent Variables, Household Recycling as Dependent Variable Mean Values on Household Recycling Behaviors Dilemma 1 Justice-Care Level o f Ecological Awareness Orientation Low Medium High Justice 17.88 18.29 21.04 (N=24) (N=28) (N=26) Care 16.25 19.13 21.75 (N=8) (N=16) (N=24) Analysis of Variance Table Dependent Variable: Household Recycling Behavior Source ss df MS F Ecological Awareness 323.12 2 161.56 20.96 Care Orientation (Dilemma 1) 2.06 1 2.06 0.27 Interaction 27.28 2 13.64 1.77 Residual 925.05 120 7.71 0.0001 0.607 0.175 Table 8 Two-Way ANQVA With Ecological Orientation and Justice-Care Orientation (Dilemma 1J as Independent Variables. Overall Environmentally Conscious Behaviors as Dependent Variable Mean Values on Overall Environmentally Conscious Behaviors Dilemma 1 Justice-Care Level of Ecological Awareness Orientation Low Medium High Justice 59.54 63.11 72.81 (N=24) (N=28) (N=26) Care 57.38 65.94 75.25 (N=8) (N=16) (N=24) Analysis o f Variance Table Dependent Variable: Overall Environmentally Conscious Behaviors Source SS df MS F g Ecological Awareness 4453.66 2 2226.83 49.32 .0001 Care Orientation (Dilemma 1) 74.79 1 74.79 1.66 .201 Interaction 109.39 2 54.69 1.21 .301 Residual 5417.99 120 45.15 3. Dependent variable = Household Recycling Behavior; Independent variables ecological awareness group (3 levels) and Justice Care orientation on Dilemma 2 (Table 9). 4. Dependent variable = Overall Environmentally Conscious Behaviors. Independent variables = ecological awareness group (3 levels) and Justice Care orientation on Dilemma 2 (Table 10). 5. Dependent variable = Household Recycling Behavior; Independent variables ecological awareness group (3 levels) and Justice Care orientation on Dilemma 3 (Table 11). 6. Dependent variable = Overall Environmentally Conscious Behaviors. Independent variables = ecological awareness group (3 levels) and Justice Care orientation on Dilemma 3 (Table 12). 7. Dependent variable = Household Recycling Behavior; Independent variables = ecological awareness group (3 levels) and Justice Care orientation on Dilemma 4 (Table 13). 8. Dependent variable = Overall Environmentally Conscious Behaviors. Independent variables = ecological awareness group (3 levels) and Justice Care orientation on Dilemma 4 (Table 14). Table 9 Two-Way ANOVA With Ecological Orientation and Care Orientation (Dilemma 2) as Independent Variables Mean Values on Household Recycling Behaviors Dilemma 2 Justice-Care Level of Ecological Awareness Orientation Low Medium Hieh Justice 18.75 17.85 21.43 (N=16) (N=26) (N=21) Care 16.19 19.67 21.34 (N=16) (N=18) (N=29) Analysis of Variance Table Dependent Variable: Household Recycling Behavior Source SS df MS F E Ecological Awareness 341.73 2 170.87 23.66 .000 Care Orientation (Dilemma 2) 0.15 1 0.15 .02 .885 Interaction 87.72 2 43.86 6.07 .003 Residual 866.52 120 7.22 Table 10 Two-Way ANOVA With Ecological Orientation and Care Orientation (Dilemma 21 as Independent Variables Mean Values on Overall Environmentally Conscious Behaviors Dilemma 2 Justice-Care Level of Ecological Awareness Orientation Low Medium High Justice 60.75 62.50 73.74 (N=16) (N=26) (N=21) Care 57.25 66.50 74.14 (N=16) (N=18) (N=29) Analysis of Variance Table Dependent Variable: Overall Environmentally Conscious Behaviors Source SS df MS F p Ecological Awareness 4739.22 2 Care Orientation (Dilemma 2) 11.87 1 Interaction 258.03 2 Residual 10438.36 120 2369.71 53.33 .0001 11.87 0.27 .606 129.02 2.90 .059 44.44 Table 11 Two-Way ANQVA With Ecological Orientation and Care Orientation (Dilemma 3 ~ ) as Independent Variables Mean Values on Household Recycling Behaviors Dilemma 3 Justice-Care Level of Ecological Awareness Orientation Low Medium High Justice 17.79 18.71 21.35 (N=24) (N=34) (N=37) Care 16.50 18.20 21.46 (N=8) (N=10) (N=13) Analysis of Variance Table Dependent Variable: Household Recycling Behavior Source SS df MS F g Ecological Awareness 345.66 2 172.83 22.02 .0001 Care Orientation (Dilemma 3) 4.81 1 4.81 .61 .435 Interaction 7.29 2 3.65 .46 .630 Residual 942.28 120 7.85 Table 12 Two-Way ANOVA With Ecological Orientation and Care Orientation (Dilemma 3) as Independent Variables Mean Values on Overall Environmentally Conscious Behaviors Dilemma 3 Justice-Care Level of Ecological Awareness Orientation Low Medium High Justice 59.33 64.56 74.27 (N=24) (N=34) (N=37) Care 58.00 62.70 73.15 (N=8) (N=I0) (N=13) Analysis o f Variance Table Dependent Variable: Overall Environmentally Conscious Behaviors Source SS df MS F p Ecological Awareness 4852.22 2 2426.11 52.43 . 0001 Care Orientation (Dilemma 3) 46.95 1 46.95 1.01 .316 Interaction 2.42 2 1.21 .03 .974 Residual 5552.81 120 46.27 Table 13 Two-Way ANOVA With Ecological Orientation and Care Orientation fDiletnma 4) as Independent Variables Mean Values on Household Recycling Behaviors Dilemma 4 Justice-Care Orientation Level of Ecological Awareness Low Medium High Justice 18.11 (N=19) 18.76 (N=17) 22.06 (N— 17) Care 16.54 (N=13) 18.48 (N=27) 21.03 (N=33) Analysis o f Variance Table Dependent Variable: Household Recycling Behavior Source SS d f MS F E Ecological Awareness 365.51 2 182.76 23.77 .0001 Care Orientation (Dilemma 4) 24.07 1 24.07 3.13 .079 Interaction 7.58 2 3.79 .49 .612 Residual 922.73 120 7.69 Table 14 Two-Way ANOVA With Ecological Orientation and Care Orientation (Dilemma 4) as Independent Variables Mean Values on Overall Environmentally Conscious Behaviors Dilemma 4 Justice-Care Level o f Ecological Awareness Orientation Low Medium High Justice 59.21 65.82 75.35 (N=19) (N=17) (N=17) Care 58.70 63.07 73.27 (N=13) (N=27) (N=33) Analysis o f Variance Table Dependent Variable: Overall Environmentally Conscious Behaviors Source SS df MS F p Ecological Awareness 4938.27 2 Care Orientation (Dilemma 4) 106.86 1 Interaction 22.63 2 Residual 5472.68 120 2469.14 54.14 . 0001 106.86 2.34 .128 11.31 .25 .781 45.61 92 Results for Hypothesis 1 Each of the ANOVA tables for Hypothesis 1 shows mean values on the dependent variable, broken down by both level of ecological awareness and justice- care orientation. This information is followed by an ANOVA table showing both main and interaction effects. Tables 7 and 8 show ANOVA models with the Justice-Care orientation for Dilemma 1 as independent variable. Results revealed that higher levels of ecological awareness were systematically associated with both more household recycling behaviors F (2, 120) = 20.96, p < .001 and more overall environmentally conscious behaviors F (2, 120) = 48.32, p < .001. However, in neither ANOVA model was there any effect of Justice-Care orientation. Additional ANOVA results for Hypothesis 1, shown in Table 9 through 14, consistently revealed that the systematic differences among the ecological awareness groups were significant, while there was no effect of a justice as opposed to a care orientation. This outcome was true for Dilemmas 2, 3, and 4. Thus, the results of these ANOVA models supported the hypothesis with regard to the predictive effects of ecological awareness. However, there was no support for the hypothesized predictive relationship of justice-care orientation or environmentally sound behaviors. 93 Results for Hypothesis 2 The second hypothesis stated that there would be a significant difference between males and females on levels of either ecological awareness or environmentally ethical behaviors with females scoring higher on both scales. This hypothesis was evaluated by comparing mean scores for males and females on the three measures: ecological awareness, household recycling behaviors, and overall environmentally conscious behaviors (Table 15). Statistical significance was evaluated using a one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) model. Results are shown in Table 16. Findings were that females scored higher than males on ecological awareness F (I, 159) = 8.41, p = .004, household recycling behaviors F (1, 159) = 12.09, p = .001, and overall environmentally conscious behaviors F (1, 159) = 13.68, p = .0001. These results then, did support the second hypothesis, which stated that there would be an effect of gender. These results suggest that female subjects were both more ecologically aware (attitudes), and more likely to demonstrate self-reported environmentally sensitive behaviors. Results for Hypothesis 3 The third hypothesis stated that there would be no difference by background/demographic variables on either ecological awareness or environmentally Table 15 Relationship Between Gender and Ecological Awareness and Environmentally Ethical Behaviors Mean Scores on Dependent Measures ________ Gender_________ Dependent Male Female Measure fN=85~) 0^=761 Ecological Awareness 41.24 43.93 Household Recycling Behaviors 18.34 20.11 Overall Environmentally Conscious Behaviors 63.01 68.39 95 Table 16 Relationship Between Gender and Ecological Awareness and Environmentally Ethical Behaviors Mean Scores on Dependent Measures (conO ANOVA Model #1: Ecological Awareness as Dependent Variable Source SS df MS F 2 Gender Main Effect 292.27 1 292.27 8.41 .004 Residual 5525.96 159 34.75 ANOVA Model #2: Household Recycling Behaviors as Dependent Variable Source SS df MS F E Gender Main Effect 124.87 1 124.87 12.09 .001 Residual 1642.26 159 10.33 ANOVA Model #3: Overall Environmentally Conscious Behaviors as Dependent Variable Source SS d f MS F E Gender Main Effect 1162.65 1 1162.65 13.68 .0001 Residual 13509.15 159 85.96 96 ethical behaviors. There were five relevant background variables to be tested, and the hypothesized results were stated as a series o f predictions. Prediction 1. There would be no difference by marital status on either ecological awareness or environmentally ethical behaviors. This prediction involves a potential relationship between an independent variable which is at the nominal level (3 categories), and dependent variables which were scales at the interval level of measurement. The appropriate statistical test, then, consisted of one-way analysis of variance models. Three such models were evaluated, one for each dependent variable measure. Results o f the analysis by marital status are shown in Table 17 (descriptive data) and in Table 18 (ANOVA results) revealed similar scores by marital status on all three o f the dependent measures; none of the small observed differences were significant. These results, then, supported this particular prediction. Table 17 Relationship Between Marital Status and Ecological Awareness and Environmentally Ethical Behaviors Mean Scores on Dependent Measures ___________ Marital Status______ Dependent Single Married Prev. Married Measure (N=36) (N =10n (N=25^ Ecological Awareness 43.64 42.31 42.36 Household Recycling Behaviors 19.78 19.00 19.32 Overall Environmentally Conscious Behaviors 67.78 64.85 66.20 98 Table 18 Relationship Between Marital Status and Ecological Awareness and Environmentally Ethical Behaviors Mean Scores on Dependent Measures ANOVA Model # 1: Ecological Awareness as Dependent Variable Source SS df MS F E Marital Status Main Effect 48.95 2 24.47 .66 .520 Residual 5929.55 159 37.29 ANOVA Model #2: Household Recvcline Behaviors as Dependent Variable Source SS df MS F E Marital Status Main Effect 15.04 2 7.52 .69 .505 Residual 1742.57 159 10.96 ANOVA Model #3: Overall Environmentally Conscious Behaviors as Dependent Variable Source SS df MS F q Marital Status Main Effect 244.81 2 122.40 1.34 .265 Residua] 14536.86 159 91.43 99 Prediction 2. There would be no difference by ethnicity on either ecological awareness or environmentally ethical behaviors. Descriptive statistics are set forth in Table 19. The prediction was tested using an ANOVA with ethnicity (recoded into white vs. nonwhite) as the independent variable and the three different measures as dependent variables. That is, three separate ANOVAs were run utilizing the independent variable ethnicity. Findings are shown in Table 20. Results revealed some unexpected differences. Whites tended to score higher on ecological awareness, although the difference was not significant (p = .081). There was a statistically significant difference on household recycling behaviors, with whites more likely to engage in such behaviors F (1, 160) = 3.85, p = .051. There was no difference on overall environmentally conscious behaviors. The next three predictions can be considered simultaneously: Prediction 3. There would be no relationship between number of children and either ecological awareness or environmentally ethical behaviors. Prediction 4. There would be no relationship between educational attainment and either ecological awareness or environmentally ethical behaviors. Prediction 5. There would be no relationship between reported annual income and either ecological awareness or environmentally ethical behaviors. Table 19 Relationship Between Ethnicity and Ecological Awareness and Environmentally Ethical Behaviors Mean Scores on Dependent Measures _________ Ethnicity Dependent White Non-White Measure (N=135) (N=2T) Ecological Awareness 42.99 40.74 Household Recycling Behaviors 19.44 18.11 Overall Environmentally Conscious Behaviors 65.92 64.63 101 Table 20 Relationship Between Ethnicity and Ecological Awareness and Environmentally Ethical Behaviors Mean Scores on Dependent Measures ANOVA Model # 1: Ecological Awareness as Dependent Variable Source SS df MS F E Ethnicity Main Effect 113.34 1 113.34 3.09 0.081 Residual 5865.16 160 36.66 ANOVA Model #2: Household Recycling Behaviors as Dependent Variable Source ss df MS F £ Ethnicity Main Effect 41.34 1 41.34 3.85 .051 Residual 1716.27 160 10.73 ANOVA Model #3: Overall Environmentallv Conscious Behaviors as Depen Variable Source SS df MS F E Ethnicity Main Effect 35.26 1 35.26 .38 .537 Residual 14746.40 160 92.16 102 These three predictions all involved a potential relationship between two variables, with each variable measured at the interval level. To assess the importance of these relationships, the Pearson product-moment correlation coefficient was used. Results of the correlation analysis evaluating these predictions are shown in Table 21. Findings revealed several significant correlations. Higher numbers of children per household were found to be inversely correlated with both ecological awareness r = -0.26, p < .001 and with overall environmentally conscious behaviors r = -0.22, p < .01. Education was found to be positively correlated with ecological awareness r = 0.29, p < .001. Finally, income was inversely correlated with household recycling behaviors r = -0.21, p < .01. These results, which revealed several relationships between these demographic variables and the dependent measures, did not support the hypothesized relationships. Results for Hypothesis 4 The fourth and final hypothesis stated that there would be a significant positive correlation between age and both ecological awareness and environmentally ethical behaviors. This hypothesis was assessed by calculating the Pearson product -moment correlation coefficient between age and each of the three dependent variable measures. Results, shown in Table 22, indicated no significant correlation. That is, age was associated with neither ecological awareness nor environmentally ethical behaviors; this finding did not support Hypothesis 4. 103 Table 21 Inter-Correlations of Number of Children. Income, and Education With Ecological Awareness and Environmentally Ethical Behaviors Number of Children Education Ecological Awareness -0.26** 0.29** Household Recycling Behaviors -0.08 0.13 Overall Environmentally Conscious Behaviors -0.22* 0.15 Income - 0.11 -0. 21* - 0.10 *£<.01 * * £ < .001 Table 22 Correlation Between Age and Ecological Awareness and Environmentally Ethical Behaviors Ecological Awareness Household Recycling Behaviors Overall Environmentally Conscious Behaviors Correlation With Age - 0.10 -0.04 -0.09 105 Discriminant Analysis In order to explore further the data, and to develop a predictive capability, discriminant analysis was conducted. Two alternative discriminant models were utilized. In the first discriminant model, shown in Table 23, the full sample of 164 cases was utilized. Items available for the first discriminant analysis included: 14 behavior items; the 5 attitude items deleted from the ecological awareness scale for reliability reasons; age, income, and education. Results of the stepwise discriminant analysis identified 13 predictor variables which met the statistical criterion for inclusion in the model. This discriminant model, which was significant, was able to classify correctly 77.02% of cases accurately in terms of their level o f ecological awareness. The second discriminant model was designed in order to explore further any possible effect o f the justice-care orientation for any o f the four dilemmas. Thus, this discriminant model was calculated using the subsample of 127 cases having data for both scales. Results of this stepwise discriminant model, shown in Table 24, identified 15 predictor variables which met the statistical criterion for inclusion in the model. This discriminant model which was significant, was able to classify correctly 75.93% o f cases accurately in terms o f their level of ecological awareness. However, none 106 Table 23 Stepwise Discriminant Analysis #1: For Sample N = 161 23 Variables Entered in Stepwise Model: All Behavior items (Items 1, 6, 9, 11, 12, 14, 15, 17, 18, 20, 22, 24, 25, 27, 28); Five Attitude Items (Items 10, 16, 21,26,29); Age, Education, Income Standardized Discriminating Discriminant Function Coefficients Variable Function 1 Function 2 Item 1 .241 .063 Item 6 .394 .129 Item 11 .179 -.362 Item 12 .315 -.046 Item 15 .173 .157 Item 17 -.006 -.284 Item 18 .169 -.351 Item 24 .249 .176 Item 25 .447 .346 Item 21 .196 -.284 Item 26 .113 .506 Item 29 -.167 .515 Age -.159 -.242 Education .252 .283 Income -.195 .203 Statistical Characteristics of Discriminant Functions: Canonical Correlations: Function 1 = 0.770 Function 2 - 0.521 Chi-Square: Function 1 = 183.44, g < .0001 Function 2 = 47.84, g < .0001 Table 23 (cont.) Classification Results (Function IV: No. of Predicted Group Membership Actual Group Cases 1 2 3 1 Low Ecological Awareness 53 40(75.5% ) 10(18.9%) 3(5.7% ) 2 Moderate Ecological Awareness 50 6(12.0% ) 37(74.0% ) 7(14.0%) 3 High Ecological Awareness 58 1(1.7%) 10 (17.2%) 47 (81.0%) Percentage of "grouped" cases correctly classified: 77.02% 108 Table 24 Stepwise Discriminant Analysis #2: For Sample N = 124 27 Variables Entered in Stepwise Model: All Behavior items (Items 1, 6, 9, 11, 12, 14, 15, 17, 18, 20, 22, 24, 25, 27, 28); Five Attitude Items (Items 10, 16, 21, 26, 29); Age, Education, Income; Scores on the Judgment-Care continuum for each o f the 4 dilemmas Standardized Discriminating Discriminant Function Coefficients Variable Function 1 Function 2 Item 1 .233 .077 Item 6 .349 .171 Item 11 .287 -.399 Item 12 .285 .084 Item 18 .375 -.432 Item 22 -.175 .152 Item 25 .433 .457 Item 27 .327 -.061 Item 21 .456 -.300 Item 26 -.252 -.239 Item 29 -.143 .456 Age -.252 -.238 Education .173 .445 Statistical Characteristics of Discriminant Functions: Canonical Correlations: Function 1 = 0.779 Function 2 = 0.563 Chi-Square: Function 1 = 151.22, p < .0001 Function 2 = 43.93, p < .0001 Table 24 (cont.) Classification Results (Function O: No. of Predicted Group Membership Actual Group Cases 1 2 3 1 Low Ecological Awareness 53 43 (81.1%) 6(11.3% ) 4(7.5% ) 2 Moderate Ecological Awareness 51 7(13.7% ) 35(68.6%) 9(17.6% ) 3 High Ecological Awareness 58 3(5.2% ) 10 (17.2%) 45 (77.6%) Percentage of "grouped" cases correctly classified: 75.93% 110 of the justice-care variables for the four dilemmas was selected. Thus, it would appear that those dimensions did not significantly discriminant among individuals with low, moderate, and high levels of ecological awareness. Limitations of the Questionnaire One of the findings of this investigation was that a number of respondents did not complete the questionnaires. This circumstance occurred not on the EES instrument but rather on the environmental dilemmas. There are several possibilities for this outcome. One is that as a part of the informed consent it was required by the university to state in the consent information that the respondents were not obligated to complete the questionnaire-that they could stop at any time. Several respondents who did not complete the dilemma section wrote things like “I didn’t see any relevance to these questions for me so I did as the consent said I could.” Others wrote that “it took too long to do,” and that he/she were willing to do the Likert scale items of the EES but not the dilemmas. These responses were predominantly from males. Others wrote responses that were not codable because they became upset with the dilemmas themselves. That is to say several of the questionnaires had items like “kill the damn environmentalists they are screwing up everything.” It is also interesting to note that the scores on the environmental awareness component of the EES scale had lower scores for these individuals (i.e., for those who did not complete the questionnaires) both on the attitude and Ill behavior scales. The meanings o f the above results are discussed at length in the Discussion section which follows. 112 Chapter V Summary, Discussion, Conclusions, and Recommendations Summary The main purpose of this investigation was to discern whether or not moral development from the human to human perspective could be further extended to a morality that involves the environment. It addition, this investigation sought to determine whether or not this extension of moral reasoning toward and including the environment signifies a shift in the predominant paradigm o f moral development. To determine whether an extension o f moral development to the environment was feasible, a broad methodology was adopted. First, Flood’s (1992) Relative Presence Inventory (FRPI) was utilized to discern the types and level o f moral development (i.e., Kohlberg’s, 1981 justice or Gilligan’s, 1982 care perspective) present in a sample population. Second, the development o f an Enviro-Ethical Scale with the subscales of Ecological Awareness and Ecological Behaviors was developed by this author (and utilized in this study) to determine how these differing types of moral development are related to attitudes and behaviors involving the environment. In addition, a literature review that illuminated moral constructs from a multi-disciplanarian context was compiled to 113 provide a baseline for understanding moral development and its sequelae. The literature review also served to support further the emergence and existence of a theory o f moral development that has as an integral component a enviro-ethical core (which represents a shift in the predominant cognitive developmental moral paradigm). Throughout the introduction section of this investigation references were made to point out that there has been sufficient evidence to demonstrate that human beings have altered the environment significantly, and in some cases irreparably (Berger, 1986; Carson, 1962; Hawken, 1993) within a relatively short period o f time. Also, without further assessment and intervention, the ultimate outcomes of these environment-altering behaviors could have serious and permanent effects not only on future generations but also on present ones (Hawken, 1993; VanDerVeer and Pierce, 1994). Further, these environmental facts have been known since the time of Leopold’s 1949 work, but only now is this state o f the environment becoming known and accepted by the general populace (Hawken, 1993). It was argued in this investigation that part of the reason for the seriousness of the state of the environment is that factors of an “anthropocentric” moral paradigm (the predominant paradigm) function to restrict moral or self development and behaviors associated with development. In turn limited moral 114 development functions to limit awareness of environmental problems and responses to these problems while the process continues in a cyclical fashion. And, because o f the limitations on the personality constructs of development, limited and inadequate sets o f coping behaviors are utilized to deal with problematic and now crisis situations in regards to the environment. Discussion In this section, review of the hypotheses and their subsequent meanings are discussed. The limitations are considered at the end o f hypothesis four. H ypothesis 1 stated that the level o f ecological awareness and care orientation would be significant predictors of environmentally ethical behaviors. It was found that gender was a significant predictor of ecological awareness and enviro-ethical behaviors, and that there were also gender differences that were significant in the orientation (care vs. justice) that one used to solve moral dilemmas. However, moral orientation (i.e., care vs. justice) was not a significant predictor o f either of the enviro- ethical behavioral scales. These results could suggest several things. They could mean (a) that the instrument designed to measure moral orientation needs further refinements in scoring protocols to increase the reliability and validity of its score, (b) that a more diverse sample could have responded differently and could have changed outcomes and 115 ultimately significance, (c) that there were mediating variable(s), such as locus of control, or some other attributional element, present but not tested which affected the attitude and behavioral component especially in women’s responses (d) that women’s moral reasoning processes were undergoing changes that reflected a shift in the predominant moral paradigm,1 (a position that Gilligan (1982) and Flood (1992) would support), and (e) that the element o f religious moral reasoning needs to be further elaborated in both Kolhberg’s (1981) and Gilligan’s (1977, 1982,) and Gilligan et al. (1992) theories; as this type of responding was present in the dilemmas, and as coding o f this type of response was ambiguous and could have confounded the results. H vnothesis 2 stated that there would be a significant difference between males and females on levels of either ecological awareness or environmentally ethical behaviors. This hypothesis was supported. Further it was evidenced that females scored significantly higher than males on ecological awareness and subsequently on self- reports o f enviro-ethical behaviors. The basis for this prediction was the literature review. There is evidence that there are social role expectations of women that reinforce their having to have or develop a certain facility with relationships, both through the use of empathy, and with 1 Gilligan ct al. (1992), Flood (1992) and Langdalc (1983) have noted that women use both care and justice responses more than do men. Flood (1992) related that she believed this to be representative of an integration process for women, and that it may be reflected in her results. as Lyon’s (1982) described it, “being the other.” As a result of this social role expectation coupled with the results of other research, (especially Flood’s, 1992) it was hypothesized that it would be easier for women to assume the role of the environment, the ecosystem, or o f an animal. Flood, (1992), Gilligan, et al. (1988), Langdale,(1983), and Lyons, (1982) have stated that this role-taking ability coupled with observations of damage or hurt to the “other” also creates an imperative for action in those women and men who have been socialized in the aforementioned fashion. The impetus for action in a conflict situation between two parties becomes the alleviation of the suffering of the “other” in Gilligan’s (1982) terms, or as an incentive to seek some form o f inclusive solutions to the problem. H vnothesis 3 stated that there would be no difference by background/ demographic variables on either ecological awareness or environmentally ethical behaviors. This hypothesis logically led to five specific predictions: Prediction 1. There would be no difference by marital status on either ecological awareness or environmentally ethical behaviors. This prediction was supported for no significant differences were found between the three groups o f single, married and remarried. It was hypothesized that the majority of a person’s moral development occurs before the age that a person would marry. Moreover, although moral 117 development can change throughout the life span, Lyons’ (1982) and Langdales’s’ (1983) research showed that these changes were more integrative of other forms o f moral development rather than radically different from the existing form of moral development within the individual. Prediction 2. There would be no difference by ethnicity on either ecological awareness or environmentally ethical behaviors. Because the preponderance of respondents was Caucasian, comparisons on this dimension were somewhat limited. However, the differences of increased environmental awareness approached significance with Caucasian populations. This outcome has not been the case throughout the environmental literature. Indigents and minority populations are often represented as the initiators o f enviro-ethical behaviors. Examples of this perception include the first protests on record against environmental racism. These protests, which were in Houston Texas, were instituted by blacks in that city (Bullard, 1994). Also, Native Americans in Montana, the Cheyenne, have fought successfully to protect their reservation from the coal strip mining process that has damaged much of Montana’s ecosystems (Small, 1994); a process that Berger (1986) has described as a doing irreparable damage to the environment. Prediction 3. There would be no relationship between increasing number of children and either increased ecological awareness or increased environmentally ethical behaviors. This hypothesis was not supported. The results showed that a significant inverse relationship existed, (i.e., that with increasing numbers o f children present in the home, levels of environmental awareness and levels of enviro-ethical behaviors decreased significantly). This finding was surprising because to date the environmental literature seemed to be split regarding the effect o f children and ecological awareness. That is to say, a preponderance o f the environmental literature focuses on the carrying capacity o f the planet (i.e., the maximum population of the earth before ecological systems break down) as a central concept, and that increasing numbers of children could be indicative of a lack of ecological awareness of the onset. However, because of the pressure of many cultural and religious beliefs, it may hold that people have hierarchical processes at work. That certain religious beliefs where increased family size is encouraged 119 (Catholics, Muslims and others) may take precedence over other forms of awareness such as the damage to the planet as a result o f overpopulation. Further, with research such as Gambone’s, (1993) that indicates with increased opportunity for role-taking and with increased opportunity o f diversity of roles being modeled (items provided in larger families) the likelihood of increasing one’s level of moral development increases as well. Prediction 4. There would be no relationship between educational attainment and ecological awareness. This hypothesis was likewise not supported. It was found that education was significantly correlated with ecological awareness and accounted for 8 % o f the variance. It was hypothesized that because of the problems mentioned in the introduction (i.e. problems with accurate dissemination of information concerning the environment and the fact that ecology is a highly specialized area of study) increases in education would not necessarily translate into increases in Ecological Awareness. It is apparent that this problem is not the case. It is possible that the milieu associated with 120 higher education does expose an individual to ecological information in other ways that are not discipline specific. Prediction 5. There would be no relationship between reported annual income and either ecological awareness or environmentally ethical behaviors. This prediction was also not supported. It was found that a significant inverse correlation existed. Namely, that with increases in income decreases in environmental household recycling behaviors were reported. The testing of this hypothesis was based in part on the EES scale item number 26 which states / would be inclined to be environmentally aware if I had more income. The results o f the pilot study o f thirty subjects revealed almost invariably that this item was scored low by the respondents. However this item, as the demographics section illustrates, indicated that the relationship of income to enviro- ethical behaviors needed further clarification. Apparently with increasing income a decrease in enviro-ethical behaviors is manifested. This result would make sense if those who recycled did so for money as many indigents do. However, many o f the people at the recycling centers received little or no compensation for the materials they recycled. Difficulties with the recycling process could also be a factor. 121 Perhaps research into this variable in conjunction with housing that has curbside recycling would assist with understanding this variable. Hypothesis 4 stated that there would be a significant positive correlation between age and both ecological awareness and environmentally ethical behaviors. The results indicated no significant differences existed between age groups on ecological awareness or behaviors. In some of the research conducted by Gilligan et al. (1988), Lyons (1982,) Langdale (1983), and Flood (1992) it was noted that there appeared to be some developmental shifts that took place for women in their mid to late twenties. This shifting orientation from predominantly care, to care and justice responses in the mid to late twenties seemed to be a movement toward more o f an “integration” of justice and care orientations. This shift also seemed to be fairly stable throughout the remainder of the life cycle. Because of these findings by Gilligan et al (1988), it was hypothesized by this investigator that the same type of responses would be present with the women sampled in this study. It was hypothesized that the manifestation of this developmental shift in facility of moral orientation would appear as differences between age groups on the levels of their ecological awareness and enviro-ethical behaviors. 122 Limitations The limitations and counterarguments are presented in the following section. Discussion of the instruments used, the sample population, other potentially confounding variables such as changes in women’s use of moral reasoning processes, and the importance of religion are also evaluated. InstrumentCs- ) Some problems with the scoring methodology were present in this study. Training the scorers/raters was a difficult and time-consuming task. Raters not only had to understand the basics of complicated moral theories, but also had to achieve acceptable inter-rater reliabilities across dilemmas. Inter-rater reliabilities of this type consisted of the numbers of considerations per question and the type of considerations per question. This type of methodology (i.e., scoring o f open-ended questions from moral dilemmas) creates other problems, as well. For example, did the dilemmas presented to the respondents create “pulls” toward certain types of moral responses? Certainly that movement limits certain types o f moral response is the case with the Heinz dilemma as seen in Table 6. The structure of this dilemma (as mentioned previously in the methodology section) created a response set that made care responses less likely. Flood (1992) and Langdale (1983) discussed this possibility at length in their 123 investigation, and suggested that the dilemmas be modified to be less likely to create “pulls” in either direction . Results for both this study (and for those o f Flood’s, 1992 study) illustrated that more justice responses were used in the response sets to the Heinz dilemma, with 75.6 % using “justice” responses in this study compared to 24.4.% who used “care”. The remaining dilemmas in the study were more balanced with the numbers o f care and justice responses. Gilligan et al. (1992) would argue that nothing less than utilizing case interviews can measure her constructs reliably, and that even the case interview type o f data gathering and analyses misses significant information. (Gilligan has since begun to utilize more naturalistic observations and team approaches for data gathering for this very reason). There is another concern regarding the scoring of dilemmas-that is, the concern about evaluating moral orientations out o f context. This concern may have some relevance if contributions posed by some linguists are accurate. As Tannen (1991) pointed out, even though the language o f different respondents may be the same in response to some questions in the moral dilemmas, the intended meanings may vary greatly depending upon the gender of the respondent. This variation is due to the ‘“‘frame” and “context” in which the different genders operate.. In cases interviews, the scorer may be aware o f the sex of the respondent and may therefore be able to pick up on contextual cues. In the dilemma scoring procedure 124 the raters score blind to the gender o f the respondent. This procedure therefore, inhibits the reception o f many gender related contextual cues. Sampling One source o f a problem in the sampling could be that a wider range of ethnicities is needed in order to obtain a more representative sampling for purposes of testing the generalizability of the theories. The sample in this study came from a predominantly white population in a region that is known for its conservatism. Flood’s (1992) study also had limited generalizability because her sample was o f high school students in Northern California. A broader based sample may have changed the results such that the analyses might have achieved significance. Other Variables It is also possible, that other variables not studied in this investigation mediated the results concerning significance o f moral orientation and enviro- ethical behaviors. Variables such as locus of control and perhaps even some o f the tenets o f Gilligan’s (1982) theoiy are also applicable. That is, in the environmental dilemmas, a person who is “care” oriented is likely to choose a response that favors the people in the dilemma because o f an awareness o f the 125 perceived damage to those people, (despite the acceptance of the environment as an entity able to sustain damage). This view of a woman’s changing her responses because of social learning processes such as in the situation previously described has some merit if Chodorow’s (1978) theoiy is correct. Choderow described issues of boundary diffusion and societal reinforcers that perpetuate women’s subordinate positions through the modeling of people in the workforce and through the process of women’s identification with the “mothering” process. A result o f this kind of modeling and reinforcement process is that responses by women to environmental problems may, because they in some way create problems for others, create relationship problems for the women themselves. For example, a response that occurred frequently in the dilemmas took the following form: I know that logging the old growth forest till it is gone is not “right” but the damage to the families and the kids is so high too. In this case even though I would wish it were different I would have to choose people over the owls. This response would be coded as a justice response given the existing scoring criteria. However, it clearly reflects a struggle with knowing what a more “enviro- ethical” response would be. Nonetheless, because of the conflict for the people involved (i.e., the loss of jobs, having to relocate, retraining in a new industry, 126 economic hardship) , the respondent chose a more justice-oriented response despite what appeared to be an awareness o f the need for a different response.2 Changes in Moral Paradigm as a Possible Confound Flood (1992) Gilligan et al. (1992) Langdale(1983) and Lyons (1982) have all noted that women tend to use more o f a repertoire o f orientations in their responses to moral dilemmas than do men. That is, women will use “justice and care” responses more frequently than men; men tend to use predominantly the justice response, though not exclusively. Flood (1992) indicated that this could be representative o f the shifting of wom en’s moral development to a more “holistic” moral development and that this signifies not only a change in the predominant moral paradigm but a change that is integrative in nature. Religion In the research literature, there is evidence that Kohlberg’s (1981) seventh stage is illustrative o f his wanting to include religious principles (Petrovich, 1985) as representing higher order stage development. A variety o f possible meanings is then created in terms o f Kohlbergian moral development. The relevance of religious responses in terms o f Gilligan’s theory (1981) is even less clear. 2 Sometimes the two areas of concern come together. There is evidence where women in India, the “Chipko” have reformed major governmental policy through their activism, (i.e., by standing in front of heavy duty foresting equipment or by hugging or chaining themselves to the trees to protect forests). They have done these behaviors because of an awareness that without the trees their lands would flood. And, if the lands flood, their families and especially their children’s lives would then be endangered. Furthermore, their fears would become a reality (i.e., they would lose their home - the forest). 127 Religious-based responses posed some interesting problems insofar as scoring of the dilemmas was concerned. It became clear to the raters and this investigator that the meanings of religious-oriented responses were highly variable and may have introduced some error of measurement. The ranges o f response were on a continuum from fanatical (almost paranoid) to well thought-out discourses on the meaning of religious morality and its heuristic value for any moral dilemma. In the previously mentioned examples possible confounds to the relationship between moral orientation and ecological awareness and enviro- ethical behaviors were noted. Conclusions The results of this investigation yielded information that adds to the body of research regarding moral development/orientation and enviro-ethics. A new instrument developed by this author, the Enviro-Ethics Scale demonstrated sufficient reliability such that it can be used to determine the amount of ecological awareness and self reported enviro-ethical behavior present in a sample population. The Flood Relative Presence of Care Inventory was also verified in this investigation as a reliable instrument for evaluation o f moral orientation (i.e., Kohlberg’s (1981) “justice” or Gilligan’s (1977, 1982) “care” perspectives). 128 In addition, other relevant information (regarding variables that can predict group membership) was added because o f the significance o f the discriminant analysis. This analysis comprised attitudes, behaviors and demographic variables, but not moral orientation items. Recommendations This research has been highly focused on the ’’care” perspective o f moral development for a number o f reasons. First, the masculine-oriented “justice” perspective as put forth by Kohlberg (1981) has already been heavily researched and analyzed, and more is known about that perspective. In addition, its reliability and validity are well-established for its main construct o f “justice reasoning.” These properties have not been established for the “care” perspective. Another reason for this focus is that for women there is an emphasis both culturally and psychologically on relationships, and this relatedness is not reflected in the “justice” perspective o f moral development, but is in the “care perspective.” Even though a significant result was not demonstrated in this study regarding moral orientation and levels o f ecological awareness and enviro-ethical behaviors, further investigation may be fruitful in establishing the connections between moral development/orientation and enviro-ethics. Further research may show that because o f the emphasis within the female culture on relationships and their sustenance, the feminine morality or “care” perspective is more likely to include a relationship with the environment. Suggestions for future research would necessarily involve (a) a reexamination o f the relationships between moral orientation and enviro-ethics and (b) a search for other variables that may be involved with the process o f exhibiting those enviro-ethical behaviors. In addition, the inclusion of religious components needs to be further refined insofar as scoring protocols are concerned. It is this investigator’s hope that the information in this study will help develop some basis for understanding environmental problems, for determining and for ascertaining how they can be ameliorated in the future. 130 References Berger, J. J., (1986). Restoring the earth: How Americans are working to renew our damaged environment. New York: Alfred A. K nopf Brown, L.M., & Gilligan, C., (1992). Meeting at the crossroads: W om en’s p sychology and girls development. 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Dote t f i U U / Fitadpol Investigator; Frank Fox Ph.D. ' ttfa A * } a& S € 0 S & / m * » q ( &. Due s k t w Student Investigator Mario L. DotUdiftleder. Doctonl Candidal* WWEMnY Of fOt/ntEM C A tlTO W iU . WlVOUtfV FAW t tD» A N C O C *. CALtrOWUA 000IM 03I 138 Please write the number that corresponds to your choice in the box at the left of each category Sex □ Age □ (1) Male (1) 13-15, (2) 16-20 (3)21-25 (4) 26-30 (5)31-35 (6) 36-40 (7) 41-45 Marital Status □ (1) Single (2) Married (3) Divorced (2) Female (8) 46-50 (9) 51-55 (10)56-60 (11)61-65 (12) 66-70 (13) 71 & above (4) Remarried (5) Widowed Number of Children □ (1) None (2)1 (3 )2 (4)3 (5 )4 (6)5 (7) 6 OR MORE Years of education □ (1) junior high school (2) high school (3) Ass. Degree (4) Bachelors degree (5) Master's (6) Ph.D. (7) M.D (8) Other, technical or professional Ethnic Background □ (1) Caucasian (4) Asian (2) Black/African (3) Hispanic/Latino (7) Other Yearly Personal Income (5) Middle- Eastern (6) Native- American □ (1) under 20,000 (2) 20,000-30,000 (3) 31,000-40,000 (4) 41,000-50,0000 (5) 51,000-60,000 (6) 60,000-and above 139 Environmental Dilemmas Old Growth Forest There is a debate going on betw een som e lumber com panies, loggers, and townspeople who want to cut the old trees, and environmentalists who want to stop the cutting of old growth forests. If the loggers cut the old growth section of forest that they want to, then there is an increased danger that the rare spotted owl, as well a s other species, will becom e extinct. In addition, the ecosystem will be changed forever. If the loggers don't cut, then the lumber com panies, som e loggers, and som e towns will suffer economic hardship. Som e people may lose their jobs, and som e people may have to move away in order to survive. W hat should be done? Answer the following questions as completely and a s best you can Write on the back of this page if you need more space 1 WHAT is the conflict or conflicts) in this situation? Why is this a conflict? 2 HOW would you solve the problem? Are there any consequences or outcom es that you thought about when you m ade this decision? 3 HOW do you know that this is the right thing to do? That is, W HY would you solve the problem this way? 140 The Hatton Canyon Dilemma The residents of the Monterey Peninsula have been debating for 44 years about a proposed highway project which would run through the Hatton Canyon. Opinions seem to be split fairly evenly. O pponents of the Freew ay have argued to preserve one of the last strands of native Monterey pine trees, som e natural wetlands, and a rare species of onion. In addition, they argue for the scenic open sp a ce In the canyon to be left as is. Proponents of the project say the Freew ay is needed in order to eliminate traffic snarls in the area, and that the canyon is the m ost logical place for the freeway. It is estim ated that the freeway a s proposed will relieve traffic congestion in the area for approximately the next 20 years W hat should be done? Answer the following questions a s completely and as best you can. W rite on the back of this page if you need more space. 1 WHAT is the conflict (or conflicts) in this situation? W hy is this a conflict? 2 HOW would you solve the problem? Are there any co n seq u en ces or outcom es that you thought about when you m ade this decision? 3 HO W do you know that this is the right thing to do? That is, W HY would you solve the problem this way? 141 Human Dilemmas The Heinz Dilemma In Europe, a woman w as near death from a special kind of cancer. There w as one drug that the doctors thought might save her. It was a form of radium that a druggist in the sam e town had recently discovered. The drug was expensive to make, but the druggist was charging 10 times what it cost him to make. He paid $200 for the radium and charges $2,000 for a small dose of the drug. The sick woman’s husband, Heinz, went to everyone he knew to borrow the money, but he could only get together about $1,000 which is half of what It costs. He told the druggist that his wife was dying, and asked him to sell It cheaper or let him pay later but the druggist said, "No I discovered the drug and I'm going to make money from it." W hat do you think Heinz should do? Answer the following questions as completely and as best you can. Write on the back of this page if you need more space. 1. WHAT is the conflict (or conflicts) in this situation? WHY is this a conflict for you? 2. HOW would you solve the problem? Are there any consequences or outcom es that you thought about when you m ade this decision? 3. HOW do you know that this is the right thing to do? That is, WHY would you solve the problem this way? 142 The Sara Dilemma Sara is a successful teacher in her late 20's who has always supported herself. She has led an independent life which has centered on her work and she has been offered a tenured position for the next year. Recently she has been involved in an intense love affair and now finds that she is pregnant. Initially pleased about the pregnancy, she now begins to consider it realistically. While she would like to have the baby, she feels that she would need a lot of support— both financially and emotionally. Her lover, who is married to another woman, has decided he will not help with the care of his child. W hat do you think Sara should do? Answer the following questions as completely and as best you can. Write on the back of this page if you need more space 1. WHAT is the conflict or (conflicts) in this situation? WHY is this a conflict? 2. HOW would you solve the problem? Are there any consequences or outcom es that you thought about when you m ade this decision? 3. HOW do you know that this is the right thing to do? That is, W HY would you solve the problem this way? 143 E E S C A L E Q uestions below utilize a six point L ikert scale ranging from (l)D lsagrcc Strongly (2)Dlsagree (3)WeakIy Disagree (4)W cakly A gree (5)Agrce (6) Strongly A gree ( I ) N ever (2) R arely (3) O nce In a while (4) Sometime* (5) Often (6) Always PLEASE CIRCLE THE ANSWER THAT BEST REFLECTS YOUR POSITION ON THESE ITEMS 1) I w ould pay m ore for a product if I knew that it w as truly environm entally sound (i.e. friendly)? (l)D lsag ree Strongly (2)l)isagrre (3)\Vealdy Disagree (4)W cakly A gree (5)Agrcc (6) S trongly Agree 2) I think that w e could get along with few er consum er goods. (l)l>lsagree Strongly (2)l>lsagree (3)W eakly Disagree (4)W eakiy A gree (S)Agree (6) Strongly Agree 3) W hen voting for a candidate his or her record on environm ental issues is im portant to me. (l)D isagree Strongly (2)I)isagree (3)W ealdy Disagree (4)W eakly A gree (S)Agree (6) Strongly Agree 4) Perpetrators o f environm ental crim e(s) should be punished to the fullest extent o f the law. (l)l)L*agrre Strongly (2)l)lsagree (3)W eakly Disagree (4)W eakly A gree (5)Agree (6) Strongly Agree 5) I have fantasies o f living in a rural rather than an urban environm ent. (l)D lsagree Strongly (2)Disagree (3)W eakly Disagree (4)W eakly A gree (S)Agree (6) Strongly A gree 144 6) W henever it is reasonable I vote for pro-environm ental issues. (l)D b ag re e Strongly (2)Dlsagree (3)W eakly D b ag rre (4)W eakly Agree (5)Agree (6) Strongly Agree 7) I believe that w e should reduce our dependence on fossil fuels. (l)D isagree Strongly (2)D bagree (3)W’ eakIy Disagree (4)W euldy A gree (5)Agree (6) Strongly A gree 8) T here is no need to w orry about environm ental issues, science will take care o f any problem s. (l)D U agree Strongly (2)D bagree (3)W eakly Disagree (4)W eakly A gree (5)Agree (6) Strongly Agree 9) I w ould support cooperatives like food co-ops if they w ere in my com m unity. (l)D tsagree Strongly (2)DUagrcc (3)W eakly D isagree (4) W eakly A gree (5)Agrec (6) Strongly Agree 10) I believe that m ost environm ental organizations are legitim ately concerned about change w ith respect to the environm ent. (l)D lsag rre Strongly (2)Disagree (3)WeakIy Disagree (-l)Wcakly A gree (5)Agrec (6) Strongly A gree 11) I support political activism w ith respect to environm ental issues. (l)D lsagree Strongly (2)Dlsagree (3)W cakly Disagree (4)W eakly A gree (5)Agree (6) Strongly A gree 12) I donate m oney to environm ental organizations. (l)D lsagree Strongly (2)Disagree (3)W eakly Disagree (-l)Weakly Agree (5)Agrec (6) Strongly Agree 13) I believe w e should research and develop alternative energy sources. (l)D isagrec Strongly (2)Dlsagree (3)W eakly Disagree (4)W eakly A gree (5)Agree (6) Strongly Agree 145 14) I drive a car that gets 30 or m ore m iles per gallon on the freeway. (I)D lsagree Strongly (2)Disagree (3)W>aldy Disagree (4)W taldyA gtT t (5)Agrce (6) Strongly Agree 15) I support the use o f birth control. (l)D isagree Strongly (2)Dlsagree (3)W eakly Disagree (4)W eakly Agree (5)Agree (6) Strongly Agree 16) U nder som e circum stances m ilitant o r violent protest and behaviors tow ard a perpetrator or perpetrators o f environm ental crim es is necessary. (l)D tsagree Strongly (2)Disagrcc (3)W'eakly Disagree (4)W eakly Agree (5)Agrcc (6) Strongly Agree 17) I avoid the purchase o f toxic cleaners w henever possible. (l)D lsagree Strongly (2)Dlsagrce (3)Weakly Disagree (4)WeakIy Agree (5)Agree (6) Strongly Agree 18) I drink purified water. (I)N ever (2)Rarely (3)Once In awhile (4)Somctlmes (5)Often (6)Ahvaya 19) I believe that the w orld is significantly overpopulated. (l)D U agree Strongly (2)Disagree (3)WeakJy Disagree (4)Weakly A gree (5)Agree (6) Strongly Agree 20) I use air or w ater filtration in my place o f residence. (l)D isagree Strongly (2)Disagree (3)Weakly Disagree (4)W eakly A gree (5)Agrec (6) Strongly Agree 21) I consider m yself less status conscious than my peers. (l)D U agree Strongly (2)Disagree (3)W eakly Disagree (4)W eakly Agree (5)Agree (6) Strongly Agree 146 72) I rideshare or carpool whenever possible. (I) Never (2) R arely (3) O nce In a while (4) Som etim es (5) Often (6) Always 23) I believe in vegetarianism though I may not practice it. (l)D lsagree Strongly (2)Dtsagree (3)W ealdy Disagree (4)WcakIy Agree (5)Agree (6) Strongly Agree 24) I pick up trash on the beach when I see it. (l)D lsagree Strongly {2)DUagree (3)We«kly Disagree (4)W rakly Agree (5)Agree (6) Strongly A grre 25) I support planned parenthood. (l)D lsagree Strongly (2)l)isagrec (3)Weakly Disagree (4)W takly Agree (5)Agree (6) Strongly Agree 26) I would be more inclined to be environmentally aware if I had more income. (I )D lsagrre Strongly (2)DUagree (3)Weakly Disagree (4)Weakly A gree (5)Agrce (6) Strongly Agree 27) I recycle goods whenever I can. (l)D isagree Strongly (2)l)lsagree (3)Weakly Disagree (4)W eakly Agree (5)Agree (6) Strongly Agree 28) I purchase recycled or reusable goods whenever possible. (l)D lsagree Strongly (2)I)lsagrec (3)Wealdy Disagree (4)Weakly Agree (5)Agree (6) Strongly Agree 29) I think I would recycle more if it were made easier for me to do. (l)D isagree Strongly (2)Disagree (3)Weakly Disagree (4)W eakly Agree (5)Agree (6) Strongly Agree 147 PLEASE NOTE The copyrighted materials utilized in the scoring o f the moral dilemmas have not been reproduced in this document. It is suggested that the author be contacted for the scoring criteria and for permission to use her instrument.
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Dollschnieder, Mario Leonard (author)
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Moral development and enviro-ethics: an examination of the theories of Kohlberg and Gilligan
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Doctor of Philosophy
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Education - Counseling Psychology
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University of Southern California
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Fox, Frank H. (
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), Marcoulides, George (
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