University of Southern California Dissertations and Theses

A study of United States support of civic action in Colombia.

(USC Thesis Other)

A study of United States support of civic action in Colombia.

PDF

Download

Open document

Flip pages

Download a page range

Download transcript

Copy asset link

Request this asset

Transcript (if available)

Content A STUDY OF UNITED STATES SUPPORT OF CIVIC ACTION IN COLOMBIA by John H. Doney, Jr. A Thesis Presented to the FACULTY OF THE GRADUATE SCHOOL UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree Master of Foreign Service June 1966 UMI Number: EP58355 All rights reserved INFORMATION TO ALL USERS The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted. In the unlikely event that the author did not send a complete manuscript and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed, a note will indicate the deletion. Dissertation Publishing UMI EP58355 Published by ProQuest LLC (2014). Copyright in the Dissertation held by the Author. Microform Edition © ProQuest LLC. All rights reserved. This work is protected against unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code ProQuest LLC. 789 East Eisenhower Parkway P.O. Box 1346 Ann Arbor, Ml 48106- 1346 U N IV E R S IT Y O F S O U T H E R N C A L IF O R N IA T H E G R A D U A T E S C H O O L U N IV E R S IT Y PA R K LO S A N G E L E S 7 , C A L IF O R N IA This thesis, written by ...........JjQhnwHi.XLftnfiyjL.Jj.,............ under the direction of hi.$.....Thesis Committee, and approved by a ll its members, has been pre sented to and accepted by the Dean of The Graduate School, in p a rtia l fu lfillm e n t of the requirements fo r the degree of MASTER OF FOREIGN SERVICE Dean Date J.im.e.,...! .9.6.6. THESIS COMMITTJEE M culU l 4 ? l - hdi PREFACE During the past three years the writer has been serving in Colombia as a member of a public safety team of the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) engaged as advisors to the National Police of Colom bia and the Administrative Department of Security (DAS). This period was concurrent with the development of United 'States support of civic action in Colombia. It afforded an excellent opportunity for observation of civic action by one (Who is not currently engaged in the program, but who is keenly and professionally interested in it because of its relationship to the internal security and political stabil ity of Colombia. An early observation was that the specific objectives of each civic action project in community devel opment, literacy, health, rural communications, and public relations, are important to the country's development, but are often distinct from the attainment of internal security and political stability. ii Resulting from this period of observation was an (urge to conduct active research and attempt to make a ten- I tative evaluation of the civic action program in Colombia to which the United States has thus far committed well over j $3,000,000 in the hope of making a substantial contribution toward internal security and political stability. So far as can be determined, there has been no pre vious study evaluating the effectiveness of the United States support of civic action in Colombia. This evaluation ;is considered tentative because by no means all of the evi dence is available. Future studies in greater depth will icertainly be done, with contributions by psychologists, anthropologists, and community development specialists. iThis study is a personal one. Its conclusions are entirely personal and do not represent the position of the United States Government or USAID. Only unclassified sources have been utilized. iii TABLE OF CONTENTS Page PREFACE................ .............................. ii LIST OF M A P S ......................................... v Chapter I. THE PROBLEM OF ALIENATED RURAL POPULATIONS IN UNDERDEVELOPED COUNTRIES ................. 1 II. THE BASIS FOR UNITED STATES SUPPORT OF CIVIC ACTION IN COLOMBIA................ . 13 III. CIVIC ACTION AND R O A D S ................ 36 IV. CIVIC ACTION IN EDUCATION AND TRAINING . . . 44 V. CIVIC ACTION IN HEALTH AND SANITATION .... 57 VI. CIVIC ACTION IN COMMUNICATIONS ............. 67 VII. THE OUTLOOK FOR UNITED STATES SUPPORTED CIVIC ACTION IN COLOMBIA.................. 74 BIBLIOGRAPHY ........................................ 83 i iv LIST OF MAPS Map Page I. Road Projects.............................. 40 II. Education and Training Projects........... 49 III. Health and Sanitation Projects ............... 64 IV. Communications Projects ........................ 71 v CHAPTER I THE PROBLEM OF ALIENATED RURAL POPULATIONS IN UNDERDEVELOPED COUNTRIES A significant development in the world Communist movement has been its failure to bring about the revolution of the proletariat in advanced nations, and its relative success in underdeveloped and rural societies. This is the l i .exact opposite of the revolutionary theory expounded by Uarx, who predicted that the proletarian revolution would take place in advanced capitalistic countries. The first successful Communist revolution in Russia did much to establish in the minds of the revolutionary leaders the pre-eminent role of the proletariat as espoused by Marx. To them the proletariat, defined as "the class which is engaged in the production of material values in large-scale capitalistic industrial enterprises,"^ was the ^Nikolay Lenin, "Tasks of Political Education De partments" (1921), Selected Works (New York: International Publishers, 1943), IX, 261. 1 key element among the masses which must be won over and organized. Other groups, the peasants and small producers, could only be revolutionary when they "desert their own 2 standpoint to place themselves at that of the proletariat." The development of the revolution in Russia, made possible to a great extent by the collapse of the Eastern Front in World War II, seemed to bear out most of Marx's theories i regarding the proletariat. Lenin's and Stalin's distrust of the peasants was expressed in many ways and culminated in the ruthless elimination of the landed peasants in order to carry out the organization of the collective farms. Even 'with regard to the Chinese revolution Stalin, as late as i jl928, stated: "These tasks can be fulfilled only by a vie- I ■torious rebellion of the broad masses of the peasantry marching under the leadership and under the hegemony of the 3 revolutionary Chinese proletariat." Obviously Stalm did not think the revolution could be built in a country which did not have a proletariat. Subsequent history has shown ^Nikolay Lenin, "The Aims of the Revolution," print-j ed in Rabochv Put (Workers' Path), October 22-23, 1917. | .'Selected Works. VI, 240. I ^Joseph Stalin, Marxism and the National and Coloni-i al Questions (New York: International Publishers, 1935), p.J 235. 3 that there is another category among the masses of the worlc. which is more receptive to the Communist revolution than is the proletariat. Eugene Staley in his book The Future of Underdevel oped Countries has clearly shown that the successful Commu nist revolutions have occurred in underdeveloped territor ies , with the obvious exception of Czechoslovakia, where immediate outside pressures were decisive. He presents a convincing argument that Communist hopes for the future lie mainly in underdeveloped countries through defection of rural populations, and that this tendency of rural popula- j 1 .tions to defect from their established governments is the I greatest problem to be faced in limiting Communist expan- 4 sion. There is a striking difference between the theoreti cal and practical expressions of the Russian revolutionaries i and those of the Red Chinese leadership. Mao Tse-Tung estimated the Chinese proletariat at about 2,000,000 in dustrial workers. While he called them "the leading force ^Joseph Stalin, Marxism and the National and Colo nial Questions (New York: International Publishers, 1935), Ip. 235. 4(New York: Harper and Bros., 1954), Part II. I 4 i |in the revolutionary movement" he obviously realized that i ithe group was much too small to lead the revolution, and he ,even developed the term "rural proletariat" to describe I 5 [farm laborers. His writings are full of praise for the peasant associations which terrorized the rural populations and forced them to pay tribute in support of the revolution. In many areas they overthrew the landlords and their police 6 and established their own armed forces. Out of this ex perience grew the conviction that in underdeveloped coun- itires the "rural proletariat," which is really a self- icontradictory term, could form the vanguard of the revolu tion if properly organized and indoctrinated by well-trained guerrilla units. The discovery through the Chinese experience that i I jthe dissatisfied rural masses in the underdeveloped coun- i tries were better candidates for the revolution than the relatively prosperous proletariat in the industrialized countries brought about a profound change in the practices of the revolution, and required important doctrinal changes as well. Guerrilla warfare became the instrument for i i c ! Mao Tse-Tung, Selected Works of Mao Tse-Tuna (Pe king: Foreign Language Press, 1964), I, 18. ! 6Ibid.. p. 40. J 5 organizing the revolution of the downtrodden rural masses, and great successes were experienced where the masses were truly downtrodden. Much of the doctrine published by the newer Communist leaders concerns the conduct of guerrilla warfare in rural areas and the primary step of winning over the rural population. This requirement is recognized by . i guerrilla and counter-guerrilla experts alike. It explains how a revolution can succeed in an underdeveloped country if the rural population has become alienated from its cen tral government. Mao Tse-Tung considered the first step in resisting the Japanese through guerrilla warfare was to "raise up and i 7 organize the people." "Che" Guevara makes an interesting distinction be- i jtween guerrilla fighters and common bandit gangs. He says these gangs may have all the qualities of a guerrilla army except the support of the people. Inevitably, he says, they are captured or exterminated by public forces, whereas guerrilla fighters with their base of support in the masses ^Mao Tse-Tung, La Guerra de Guerrillas (Buenos Aires: Editorial Huemul, 1963), p. 65. All translations from Spanish by John Doney. 6 are true social reformers and are protected by the people.^ Roger Trinquier, in his authoritative book on guer rilla warfare, states: We have . . . seen how indispensable the support of the population is to the guerrilla. It is possible for him to exist only when people give him their un qualified support. He cannot live among a populace he has not previously organized and subjected to his will, because it is from it that he must draw his sus- . Q tenance and protection. David Galula states in his book, Counterinsurgency Warfarer Theory and Practice, that the insurgent will win a revolutionary war if he "manages to dissociate the popula tion from the counterinsurgent, to control it physically, to get its active support. . . ,"^ Since the first objective of the Communist guerrilla i movements is to win over the rural populations of under developed countries, it is a matter of urgent concern in international relations to know why the rural populations in some of these countries are susceptible to this approach. A useful study related to this problem was conducted by the ®"Che" Guevara, La Guerra de Guerrillas (Caracas: Instituto Ezequiel Zamora, 1960), p. 16. ! ^Modern Warfare, A French View of Counterinsurgency (New York: Praeger, 1964), p. 63. •^(New York: Praeger, 1964), p. 8. Center of International Studies at Princeton University and published under the title The Politics of the Developing Areas.^ The conclusions reached after this study of the political systems in five major underdeveloped areas of the world are of value in determining why some of the rural populations do not identify themselves closely with their own central governments, and therefore become alienated and receptive to the appeals of Communism. The above study concluded that in spite of the different characteristics and cultural patterns in the five i underdeveloped regions there are common properties resulting ifrom the wide gap existing between the traditional masses, which are still overwhelmingly rural and mostly illiterate, land the Westernized elite, which usually controls the cen tral structure of government. Moreover, the political pro cesses of change taking place largely in the urban centers I I jdo not usually contribute to the integration of the rural 'masses into the national structure. In fact they often in tensify inter-group tensions. When these factors are com- i bined with a subsistence standard of living and cultural "^Gabriel A. Almond and James S. Coleman (Prince dom Princeton University Press, 1960), pp. 535-537. and geographical isolation in rural areas, the alienation of the rural population is often a well-developed phenomenon. When alienation of a rural population occurs, even in a limited area, the conditions exist under which an in surgent force can gain at least a foothold, and once this process begins it is very difficult to reverse. The regular security forces, the police and the army, are the natural enemies of the revolutionary guerrilla forces once they have won over the population and estab lished their base. In some areas the police and military forces have been regarded for a long time as enemies of the •rural people because of their past conduct and because they 'have been regarded as serving the oligarchy or foreign in terests. In such cases the guerrilla forces have a ready made situation which is much to their advantage. In Latin America the role of the military developed after the colo nial period into one of predatory self-interest and only 'during this century has professionalism been introduced. In more recent years political enlightenment and social con sciousness have appeared in the military group. This de velopment is traced by Edwin Lieuwen in his article, "The Changing Role of the Military in Latin America." He points put that because of the developing social crisis in Latin 9 America the military has assumed a key role, whether from motives of legitimate duty to preserve-order, of political 12 opportunism, or of idealism. In carrying out their role in rural areas, the first task faced by the military or police forces is to secure the support of the people, who may have already been actively or passively alienated. A program for doing this, including any activity not of a purely military character, is called civic action. Because the alienation of rural populations in I underdeveloped countries has become a vehicle for Communist expansion, and because civic action is one alleged means of overcoming this alienation, the United States, through its foreign assistance program and through its military assist- I I ance program, has become materially involved in a number of civic action programs. The present study is an attempt to evaluate the United States-supported civic action program in one country, Colombia, where alienation of rural populations has reached ! ■substantial proportions for many years and where the inter national Communist conspiracy is attempting to develop an i ^Journal of Inter-American Studies. Ill, No. 4 (October, 1961), 559. 10 insurgency base. Civic action can be characterized by stating its most important objective, the winning over of alienated rural populations to the established government authority. A more formal definition of civic action may be found in the Army's Manual on Civil Affairs Operations, which is quoted as follows: Civic action, an aspect of Civil Affairs, is any function performed by military forces in cooperation with civil authorities, agencies or groups through the use of military manpower and material resources 1 for the socio-economic well-being and improvement of the civil community with a goal of building or rein- | forcing mutual respect and fellowship between civil ! and military communities.13 Another definition of civic action appears in USAID jManual Order No. 1018.3 as follows: Civic action is the use of existing indigenous military forces to contribute to economic and social development through projects useful to local popula tions. Assistance should stress the training of military personnel in the purpose of civic action programs and in proper attitudes and behavior con sistent with good military-civilian relations.^ j A significant policy statement regarding civic S. Army Manual FM 41-10, p. 83. Special Programs and Policies— Civic Action" :(August 1, 1962). 11 action is contained in a Department of Defense Directive as follows: Military Assistance Programs should, where fea sible, encourage the use of indigenous military and paramilitary forces in underdeveloped countries in the construction of public works and other activities helpful to economic development, provided that such participation does not significantly detract from the capabilities of the forces to perform essential mili tary missions. This writer takes exception, in one respect, to the above formal definitions of civic action which limit civic action to a function performed by military forces, and will have more to say on this point later. In other respects, however, the above definitions seem adequate. The following chapter will relate something of the recent background of civic action in Colombia and the United i States' decision to participate in the support of certain projects. Other chapters will examine each project support ed by the United States sufficiently to show its scope and purposes. Finally an attempt will be made to evaluate each project and the program as a..whole for their contribution •^DQD Policy and Responsibilities Relating to the Military Assistance Program. Department of Defense Direc tive 5132.3 (Washington, D. C.: 29 February 1960). 12 towards winning the support of alienated populations in the rural areas of Colombia. CHAPTER II THE BASIS FOR UNITED STATES SUPPORT OF CIVIC ACTION IN COLOMBIA The first attempts to select civic action projects for the Colombian military services which would merit United States funding led to considerable confusion and a prolifer ation of proposals. In Colombia, as in most Latin American countries, the military services receive a large portion of the national budget, estimated at between 20 and 25 per cent.'*' They have a highly trained officer elite and exert an important, sometimes decisive, influence on political affairs. They already receive, as of 1966, about two-thirds of every United States foreign assistance dollar to Colom bia . The Colombian military services also engage in numerous activities not bearing directly upon their military 1Lieuwen, "The Changing Role of the Military in Latin America," loc. cit.. p. 567. 13 14 capabilities or duties. Military personnel are utilized in agriculture and livestock production to help support their battalions. The Army builds roads and bridges on contract. The Navy owns the Colombian tanker fleet, which is a highly profitable enterprise. In this manner the ser vices add greatly to their true operating budget. Some activities are a combination of training and public service, such as the airline operated by the Colombian Air Force, Servicio de Aeronavecracion a los Territorios Nacionales (SATENA), reaching into areas not serviced otherwise. i It is possible to fit all of the above civilian- type activities of the Colombian military services into the usual definitions of civic action, for all of them involve the use of military personnel and facilities in activities i >\7hich are useful to the community in some way. Under such circumstances, however, the formal definitions of civic i action are inadequate in determining which projects should ■receive United States funding for the purpose of carrying (out United States objectives. Many proposals were based more upon a desire to find useful work for the military than to carry out an urgent civic action mission. In April, 1962, after many discussions of civic action between the Colombian Minister of War and members of 15 the United States Army Mission in Colombia, a plan was sub mitted for civic action programs which were considered suitable for United States support. This plan included projects for penetration and farm-to-market roads, airport construction, community development, various health and sanitation projects, primary education, vocational educa tion, air transportation and a three-pronged project for the Llanos area of Colombia consisting of road development, education and information, and air transportation. The proposed activities were to take place in virtually every region of Colombia whether there was an insurgency threat or not. Such a variety of proposals covering practically the entire geographical area of Colombia and a whole spec trum of social activity reflected that most of those who planned the proposals were not keeping in view the primary i interest of the United States to limit Communist expansion, if possible, through civic action. Apparently there was no clear statement outlining the conditions under which the United States was willing to support civic action, although these conditions are clearly implied by the mission of the armed forces to protect the internal security of the country in areas where it is threatened. Such a threat clearly 'existed in certain well-defined areas where the rural popu lation had become alienated from the central government in Bogota. A policy was needed to determine which projects were consistent with United States objectives. The needed policy was developed by the United States Country Team in Colombia between April and September of 1962 and resulted in what was called an "Impact" program stressing civic action projects in the areas where internal jsecurity was seriously threatened. However, some uncer tainties remained, and a United States Army Civic Action Mobile Training Team was requested to come to Colombia to study the various proposals included in the "Impact" pro gram. The projects which survived and were developed out of jthe survey by the Mobile Training Team established clearly the trend of United States policy toward civic action in Colombia. The idea of an "Impact" program with special em phasis upon internal security was firmly established, and ! jhas remained foremost since that time. Civic action became, so far as the United States was concerned, a part of the counter-insurgency effort. Some of the projects which were dropped as civic | i action projects were able to survive in other programs. The* airline operated by the Colombian Air Force, SATENA, is now well established with equipment furnished under the Military Assistance Program and by USAID. A vocational training program for the Armed Forces was worked out in collaboration with the industry tax supported Servicio Nacional de Apren- dizaie (SENA), a national vocational institute and one of the more successful national institutions with facilities throughout the country. Airport construction continues to receive support from other foreign aid funds. A number of projects which were worthwhile in them selves were dropped or carried on at a reduced scale by the 1 Colombian services. The obvious conclusion is that these i projects were not found to be closely enough identified with i the idea of "Impact" against counterinsurgency. Examples are the rat control project for north coast cities proposed as a Navy civic action project, and several of the original educational and medical assistance proposals. The Mobile Training Team (MTT) gave top priority in its survey to road construction in violence areas or in areas recently pacified. It recommended reorganization of Colombian Army Engineer Battalions and the introduction of new training methods for operators of heavy equipment to be provided under Military Assistance Program (MAP). The pro vision of materials and fuels from USAID funds was also 18 i jrecommended. The civic action road construction and main- jtenance projects, including the Tolima Highway, have devel- i joped into by far the most expensive part of civic action in jColombia. The roadbuilding projects will be discussed in the following chapter. The MTT recommended an initial project for twelve Medical Field Dispensaries, eight of them to be located in violence areas where no medical facilities existed. Equip ment was to be provided from MAP funds and expendable medi cal supplies by USAID. Another approved project in the 1 jfield of health arid sanitation was a well-drilling project with equipment provided from MAP funds and soft goods sup- I Iport from USAID funds. The communications proposals resolved into two major projects, the Llanos-Amazonas communications net, which 'eventually was taken out of the Civic Action Program for i ^reasons to be discussed? and the rural early warning, or Finca Nets, a project which has remained a major civic ac tion effort. i The MTT recommended a literacy education project i i ifor the armed forces, since approximately 5 0 per cent of I the 18,000 recruits who enter the armed forces each year i are illiterate. An intensive literacy and citizenship 19 training course was recommended during basic training, with the requirement that each trainee should teach at least one 2 other person to read and write. An important point with regard to United States support of civic action in Colombia is lack of experience under the conditions existing in Colombia and some of the other underdeveloped countries. Thus the available doctrine is not necessarily valid for these countries. A Review of Civil Affairs Doctrine prepared by The Civil Affairs Direc torate of the Department of the Army in 1964 establishes | important precedents in the conduct of civil affairs, in- i eluding civic action, under military auspices. Most of this experience was derived from World War II and subsequent operations involving direct military and civil intervention under a military command. According to this study, the doctrine developed out of civil affairs experience in World War II and subsequently is of limited application because of two characteristics not present in most areas of opera tions today. First, "... much of the accumulation of o Information regarding the MTT survey obtained through informal personal interviews with Mr. Frank Open- chowski, Assistant Program Officer, USAID, August 10, 11, and 12, 1964, Bogota, Colombia. The official report of the survey is classified. 20 j c i v i l a f f a i r s d o c t r i n e has b een b a se d on e x p e r ie n c e w it h a I |specific type of advanced country and a sophisticated military-political situation."^ Second, the role of the commander as a "kind of supreme authority" has "... [changed to the point where it involves participation in the i conduct of civil affairs operations in sovereign states to (Which o f f i c i a l r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s o f t h e P r e s i d e n t a re a c c r e d - 4 ited." In view of these differences, the study continues, "It would be imprudent to assume that this doctrine can be applied without modification to the types of situations in ■underdeveloped countries which arise from U. S. involvement 5 in contemporary international conflicts." The lack of experience with military-civil affairs [in underdeveloped but completely sovereign countries has I caused much difficulty in the selection of civic action projects for United States support. The idea of "Impact" upon areas of actual or threatened insurgency as developed by the MTT in Colombia seems to furnish an excellent guide line for selection of projects for Colombia, and is probably I I ^Deputy Chief of Staff for Military Operations, Department of the Army (Washington, D. C.: 1964), p. 2. i 4Ibid.. p. 3. 5Ibid.. p. 4. 21 valid for all of Latin America where military assistance since 1960 has been oriented toward the strengthening of internal security capabilities against Castro-Communist 6 activities and against internal disruption. While current policy does include the possibility of supporting civic action for long-term social and economic development, the funding limitations seem to dictate a preference for "Impact" projects to meet the most urgent internal security require- Lents. It will be shown in this study, however, that in spite of the intended preference for "Impact" projects the i projects themselves have departed radically from this principle. In some cases they have become radically sep- l arated, geographically or administratively, from the areas pf actual or threatened insurgency. I Civic action programs which have a strong impact in certain areas of Colombia are closely related to Colombia's critical economic needs. The casual visitor to Colombia receives the impression of a thriving urban society with five cities of over half a million population, a capital city of over a million and a half, a variety of industrial ^David E. Bell, Proposed Mutual Defense and Assis tance Programs. FY 1964. Summary Presentation to the Con gress (Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office, April, '1963), p. 60. 22 enterprises, and almost every kind of natural resource. Nevertheless Colombia is still basically an agricultural country which is only beginning to emerge from almost com plete dependence upon one crop, coffee, for foreign ex change. Moreover, in spite of its agricultural base, Colom bia produces very few food products in sufficient quantity for export and still imports important quantities of food- i stuffs. In addition to coffee, the principal export, the only foods exported in notable quantities are bananas, sugar, and shrimp, and about 80 per cent of the wheat con- ' 7 isumed in Colombia is imported. Economists agree that i agricultural expansion must continue to be a major goal of Colombia's development in spite of difficult terrain and i the limited fertility of the land. Under these conditions the alienation of large rural areas is a critical factor in ithe national economy. i i Except for Communist subversion, the prospects for ■rural stability in Colombia would be rather bright. Before Il959, however, this statement could not have been made be- jcause of the phenomenon called la violencia. which was in ^Ernesto Camacho Leyva, Factores Colombianos (9th ed.; Bogota: Instituto Colombiano de Opinion Publica, 1964), pp. 289-292. 23 some ways unique to Colombia. A familiarity with the back ground of la violencia helps to explain why rural Colombia has been an attractive field for Communist subversion for many years. ! The historians of the violence usually begin with an account of the overwhelming political victory of the Liberal Party in 1930, which was followed by a wave of extreme political and physical recriminations against the Conservatives, particularly in the Departments of Santander and Boyaca. The bitterness which resulted from this con flict between the Liberal and Conservative Parties has only recently been somewhat ameliorated by the implementation of the National Front arrangement. The intervening years mark an epoch of barbarity seldom equalled among people of a single nation. There are a number of documented studies and chronicles recording the grisly details of the atroci ties committed during the violence, by the Police and the Army against the rural populace, and by various bandit gangs claiming one political affiliation against those claiming another political affiliation. One such study, La Violencia i 'en Colombia, contains many eyewitness accounts and attempts 24 g a sociological analysis of the violence. A book by Jorge Enrique Gutierrez analyzes the role of the Colombian judi- 9 cial system in the violence. Both writers, the first from the sociological point of view and the second from the legal standpoint, agree that a basic cause of the violence was oppression and abuse and a complete failure of the judicial process characteristic of the highly centralized government in Bogota as applied in its relations with the rural popula tions. The military, including the Army and the Police, was the principal instrument of this government oppression in 'the past. In other words, the Army was actually the instru- i ment which caused the alienation of rural peoples, leaving little opportunity for civic action programs. Since 1959, however, a more enlightened governmental i system has taken effect as a result of the National Front ^agreement between the Liberal and Conservative parties. A jwe11-publicized feature of this agreement is the alternation in national administration by the two parties every four I : ’ : j ^Mons. German Guzman Campos, Orlando Fals Borda, and Eduardo Umana Luna, La Violencia en Colombia. Estudio de un Proceso Social (2nd ed.; Bogota: Ediciones Tercer Mundo, 1962), Tomo I. ^Violencia y Justicia (Bogota: Ediciones Tercer Mundo, 1962). years, meaning that the two parties agreed on a Liberal candidate for 1959 and alternated in subsequent administra tions every four years. A much more important feature of the agreement, however, was the "millimetric" division of political patronage which has given a solid basis to the pacification effort and has even brought the beginnings of a civil service. It has enabled the military forces, in cluding the Police, to engage in altruistic endeavors in rural areas rather than in purely coercive efforts to sub- Jdue rural populations as in the past. In his final state ment in La Violencia en Colombia Mons. Guzman recognizes the 'concern of the first National Front under President Alberto | |Lleras Camargo to bring peace to the rural areas, and the I ^'effort of the Armed Forces to again be an honorable in strument at the service of the Republic."^ The civic ac tion programs of the Armed Forces during the Lleras adminis tration and during the administration of Dr. Guillermo Leon Valencia give considerable evidence of this effort. The National Front arrangement, moreover, has been a useful mechanism to settle some outstanding party differences, such as the fight over patronage, and has been the vehicle for i j ^Guzman, o p. cit.. pp. 423-424. Translation by John Doney. 26 some of the needed reforms benefiting the rural areas. As a result of the improved atmosphere under the National Front government a number of criminal bandits, who formerly operated under the auspices of highly-placed lead ers of one or the other of the political parties and claimed the loyalty of large rural groups, have been run to earth. These include such well-known figures as the for midable "Sangre Negra," his lieutenant, "Punto Rojo," the long-sought "Desquite," and the Conservative bandit Efrain Gonzalez, whose exploits at one time assumed heroic dimen sions in the minds of the rural population of the Department of Santander. Gonzalez was trapped and killed by the Army in Bogota with very little repercussion, although he still claimed protection on the ministerial level. This writer has had an opportunity during 1964-1965 to observe directly the improved situation in two important i rural areas, the Llanos Orientales or Eastern Plains Region, constituting about one-third of the geographical area of Colombia, and the Department of Huila where the Army has been engaged in operations against the Communist-oriented jbandit leaders Mario Marulanda, alias "Tiro Fijo," Ciro pastano, Oscar Reyes and associated bandit groups in the regions of Marquetalia, Rio Chiquito, El Pato, and 27 Guayabero. Concerning the Llanos. the wave of violence which caused so much human tragedy and destroyed the promising cattle business for many years has been well documented in La Violencia en Colombia. On page 68 of this book is an account of the thesis of Major Eduardo Roman, who claimed that the Llanos could be pacified without retaliatory vio lence, and of how he went unarmed into the Llanos to re- 11 claim the land of his relatives at Las Gaviotas. This same officer, now a retired Lieutenant Colonel, presently heads the Rural Security Service of the Administrative De partment of Security in the Llanos Orientales. a force of # 240 rural agents which had its beginnings in 19 54 as a private vigilante organization under Colonel Roman in the Municipality of El Yooal. Because of the early successes of the Rurales in protecting the ranchers, the organization expanded and received official recognition and support from the National Front Government of President Alberto Lleras Camargo. The important point to be brought out here is that the Rural Security Service menbership includes about twenty leaders, designated as fundadores. who are former guerrilla i I " 1 1 ^ i ! Guzman, o p. cit. 28 fighters of Liberal persuasion. Today they lead one of the most dependable rural agencies in support of the National Front under a Conservative President, whose favorite pastime* is hunting ducks with them in the Llanos. This organization has the full support of the Llaneros and has made it pos sible for the military and police to re-enter the Llanos peaceably. As a result of the new era of stability in that region, the cattle population of the Llanos has risen to about 4,000,000 head, with an early potential of about 12,000,000. Where the land is suitable for agriculture, 'the production of cotton, palm nuts, and minor crops is in- 12 creasing. There is no doubt that the rural population of i the Llanos has been won over to the National Front govern ment . The situation in the Department of Huila is not nearly so far advanced as in the Llanos. For over a year the Army has been engaged in operations against Communist- trained and -oriented bandits who still dominate some mountainous areas and make forays against ranchers and small towns, and who terrorize and collect tribute from the | views and observation during field trips with Colonel Roman, January 25-26 and April 13-16, 1964; March 25-31 and May 26-30, 1965, in the Llanos Orientales. rural people. Several hundred refugees are now residing in the town of Neiva as a result of their refusal to bend to the will of the bandits. These people testify that the majority of the people in the Communist-dominated areas are I only awaiting assurances of permanent government protection | in order to cooperate with pacification. What they fear is that the government forces will withdraw, as in the past, leaving them helpless victims of the vengeful guerrillas. While much remains to be done in Huila, the attitude of the rural population seems to be receptive to pacification by the government. In this kind of situation civic action 13 would seem to promise good results. For the reasons given above— the placating of party rivalries, the new interest of the government in rural prob lems, the new role of the Armed Forces, and the cooperation of formerly hostile elements of the indigenous population— it was stated previously in this chapter that except for Communist subversion the prospects for rural stability in Colombia would be rather bright. The fact is that the ■^Interviews and field trips with Lieutenant Colonel i(R) Enrique Millan, Chief of the Neiva Field Office, Admin istrative Department of Security, July 25-26, 1964, and September 21-22, 1965, at Neiva, and June 26, 1965, at Girardot. 30 Communist Party and organizations of the Communist revolu tionary line have a long record of perpetuating rural vio lence and guerrilla warfare in Colombia. Alonso Moncada in his book Un Aspecto de la Vio lencia extensively documents the role played by internation al Communism in Colombia. He cites chapter and verse of Communist philosophy on violence, the long record of support by the Communist press in Colombia of the "heroes of resis tance," Communist guerrilla schools maintained in Colombia, Communist front organizations active in guerrilla support, Communist complicity with criminal bandits, and the estab lishment of the so-called "Independent Republics" of Marque- talia, Sumapaz, Guayabero, Ariari, and Riochiquito. He relates in considerable detail the career of Juan de la Cruz Varela, the Communist chieftain of the "Independent Repub lic" of Sumapaz. He documents 233 assaults by Varela and his gang involving one or more murders. Varela had the distinction of being elected to the Colombian House of Representatives in 196 0 on the ticket headed by the Liberal Dr. Alfonso Lopez Michelson, who now heads the "soft line" of the Movimiento Revolucionario Liberal (MRL), a splinter of the Liberal Party which has remained aloof from the 'National Front. Juan de la Cruz Varela, in spite of 31 numerous charges against him, continues to walk the streets of Bogota unmolested, and the authorities are unable to enter the Sumapaz region to investigate the charges. Dr. Moncada does not ignore the other causes of the violence. He states: I do not . . . maintain that the sin is entirely of the Communist Party, though it is not among the least guilty, and at the present time it can be said that it bears the chief responsibility that the atrocious phenomenon persists.^ Since the above statement was made in 1963, the truth of it has become impressively obvious. All of the i remaining guerrilla leaders are of the Communist line, draw ing comfort and sustenance from the urban Communist organi zations, and many of them receiving training in guerrilla j i warfare in the Soviet Union, Communist China, and Cuba. i iTrainees returning from those areas often bring funds with which to finance insurgency campaigns and terrorism. Some of the Communist guerrillas are remnants of former criminal bandit groups eliminated in the government's campaigns in Tolima or elsewhere. Oscar Reyes, currently operating in jEl Pato under the Communist banner, was formerly an extor i 1 _____ - ... : 14Alonso Moncada Abello, Un Aspecto de la Violencia ((Bogota: Promotora Colombiana de Ediciones y Revistas jLtda., 1963), p. 53. Translated by John Doney. 32 tioner and kidnaper in the Intendencia of Caqueta. Remnants of the "Sangre Negra" gang in Tolima reportedly have joined Juan de la Cruz Varela in Sumapaz. The current rallying point for Communist subversion in Colombia is the Castro- Communist supported Eiercito de Liberacion Nacional (ELN), which is a counterpart organization to the Fuerzas Armadas de Liberacion Nacional (FALN) of Venezuela, but has not yet reached the same level of organization or effectiveness as the FALN. They have succeeded in carrying out attacks on two towns which they sacked and held in terror for several i hours. These towns were Simacota in Santander and Inza in Huila.^ i In view of the direct involvement of the inter national Communist conspiracy in the rural problems of Colombia, the United States has an interest in any program which might effectively assist some aspect of the counter insurgency effort. This is the basis of United States sup port of civic action in Colombia and it explains the need for programs having "impact" in specific areas, rather than a general effort as was originally proposed. The urgency of the problem of alienated rural populations certainly j 15interviews with Lieutenant Colonel (R) Enrique Millan, September 21-22, 1965. 33 justifies this policy and would seem to demand even greater emphasis until such time as the Communist enclaves are elim inated and the "Independent Republics" are incorporated into national life. Only then will there be a possibility of normal development in the rural areas. At the same time it is important to understand that civic action programs, no matter how well conceived and executed, cannot accomplish the objective alone. They can only contribute materially to a well-coordinated effort by all of the internal security forces in Colombia, and this I leffort should be closely followed by the administration of I lother government services. Furthermore, the term "internal security forces" should include the civilian police agencies as well as the military. It is they who must give the people security on a continuing basis after the Army leaves. In this context it is interesting to note that one of the most successful counterinsurgency efforts to date, by the British in Malaya, was a police-oriented effort under a civil government in which the Army took an important but 16 subsidiary role. The possibility of civic action projects for the police should not be discounted. ^ Review of Civil Affairs Doctrine, pp. 4-5. 34 In addition to the basic requirement that civic action projects should have an impact upon the internal security problem in order to qualify for United States sup port, there are other considerations and problems to be met. One of the first difficulties that has been encountered in all of the proposed projects is that the Colombian military does not really have the capability to perform the desired functions even when the funds are provided. This results in the utilization of a large portion of the funds in reaching the desired capability before the project can begin. It also leads to the problem of getting other gov ernment agencies to assist in the project, and sometimes causes resentment by civilian authorities when they are not credited publicly with their part in military civic action. The problem of capability will be discussed in con junction with the specific projects and will also figure in the conclusions of this study. It is appropriate, however, to bring into focus at this point the question of just how much investment should be made in giving the military a capability for civic action in any specific endeavor. It has been shown that the Colombian military is already deeply i involved in many non-military activities. Some of the civic action proposals would increase this involvement still 35 further at the expense of the civilian agencies interested in the activity. If the military does not have the capa bility for the proposed activity and cannot acquire it without a heavy United States investment, the question arises as to whether or not this is the way to do it. Some of the projects could probably be implemented by USAID through the designated civilian agencies leaving the mili tary to perform its primary role of providing security. The civilian branch of the government in this way would also acquire the badly-needed better image in the minds of the rural population it serves, and would be permanently estab lished in its proper function in the community. Obviously the problem cannot be solved in terms of generalities, but the question of civilian priority should be considered in connection with each specific project. CHAPTER III CIVIC ACTION AND ROADS Within the context of the Civic Action Program in Colombia there is one indisputable fact about roads. They are expensive. Of the total of $1,940,000 committed through the 1966 fiscal year by USAID for the Civic Action Program, $1,305,000 is for roads, or about 67 per cent of the United States contribution, not counting either the heavy and mis cellaneous equipment furnished under the Military Assistance Program or the Colombian contribution. In view of the large proportion of the available civic action money devoted to road construction and maintenance, it seems wise to deter mine so far as possible the importance of roads in dealing with insurgents and guerrillas, as distinct from the im portance of roads in economic and social development. The Mobile Training Team which surveyed Colombia for purposes of United States support of civic action gave top priority to road projects in violence areas. But they 36 37 I |found that in order to prepare for the project they had in i mind they would have to reorganize the Colombian Army Engi neer Battalions and introduce new training methods in the Army Engineer School, including an "on-the-job" type of training program for heavy equipment operators, in addition to arranging for the necessary equipment and some skilled personnel from the Ministry of Public Works. In other words, the Colombian Army did not have the capability to undertake the proposed civic action project. Undoubtedly the reorganization of the Engineer Battalions was good in the interest of modernization in i jorder that they might better fulfill their mission. Fur thermore, the construction of roads where contractors or public works teams cannot function is a logical mission for these battalions. Their use for roadbuilding certainly fits the usual definition of civic action. The question to be examined here is whether the furnishing of USAID funding for "soft goods," that is, the materials and fuels needed to employ the modernized engineering battalions in their I mission, is effective civic action in the sense of combat ting insurgency by winning over alienated rural populations in critical areas. The United States-supported civic action road 38 projects are incorporated in two project agreements with the Colombian Minister of War under the titles "Tolima Highway" and "Road Improvement and Maintenance," signed in February, 1963. Map No. I shows the locations of the roads under construction or improvement and the progress to date. The Tolima Highway has been a Colombian Army con struction project for a number of years. It envisions two two-lane, all-weather, gravel highways, one from east to west and one from north to south in the Department of To lima. It involves ninety-eight miles of construction be- I tween Ataco in Tolima and Palmira in the Department of iValle; the north-south portion runs from Chaparral to El Carmen— a total of 17 3 miles, of which seventy-two miles are now finished. Completion is scheduled for 1967. The area serviced by this highway has been one of the principal violence areas in Colombia for many years, but the Army and the National Police have regained control and put down the worst of the bandits in this area during the last two years. The Road Improvement and Maintenance Project in volves reconditioning and rehabilitation of 127 kilometers of roads in the Departments of Santander, Caldas, and Valle. Most of these roads have fallen into a state of disuse MAP NO. I ROAD PROJECTS 7 78° 77 76' 75° 74° 73' 7'L 71' 70 69°1 68' 57' 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 C> d 0 0 0 0 LI1 B '-" CIVIC ACTION 12.' 12° ft]J'TICO MAP No. I CONVENCIONES f ~ Capital de la Republi ca ,,( }>- Ca pital de Deparlamenla - lntendencia- Comisaria • 11' .. ~ 11° .. Po b lac iones ferrocarriles 0 Carreteras t ft ;J Limit• Internacional -t-++++++ (j Limite Deparlamental -·-·-·- 10' 0 Violence Areas - - - - ID' Tolima Highway Roa a Construction and Maintenance go 1500000 -1500.00 g• 8' VENEZUELA 8' ! 7° 7• <:::) R A u c ~ J ......... B' ~ ~ ~ •PORE ~ B 0 Y A CA 5• 5• rooo.ooo + \J !000.000 40 ~ 4• \) (, 1'\' T A oUribe J' I 30 2· ' z o "'- . .__ A u sP~E. ';\T - --- .1 ...... " ' c A Q u A \ l i" j' MAPA BRA5i\L 10 ' DE LA REPUBLICA DE A M A z COLOMBIA ~ 2· z · . . . . . . INSTITUTO GEOGRAFICO DE COLOMBIA ' AGUSTIN CODAZZI 30 30 . ESCALA ,:5. 000000 ZOOK . ' . 50 50 lOO . 4' 4• 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 d 0 d 0 0 0 e ~ ~ 1.0 7<J' 78' 77 76' 75' 74' 73' n: 71' 70" 59• 68° 57' Al Oes!e de Greenwich !Z 0 • H because of the violence. As a means of combatting violence roadbuilding seems to have definite limitations which have almost been reached in the present program. Without denying the need for roads in the process of development, their necessity for purposes of pacification must be seriously questioned, and it can readily be shown that they do not of themselves bring law and order. The Road Improvement and Maintenance Project, which is really a road rehabilitation project, is itself an admission that roads can quickly be come useless if the government authorities lose control of a region. The many highway robberies and killings by groups iOf guerrillas of up to over 100 in number which have oc curred during the last two years also testify that roads do jnot of themselves inhibit guerrilla activity. i While it is true that the Department of Tolima has been mostly pacified during the past three years, it would i be a mistake to say that the civic action road project was decisive or even instrumental in the process. The hunting Jdown and killing of "Sangre Negra" and other important ban dits in Tolima through intensive military and law enforce- jment efforts, accompanied by the politically pacifying jeffects of the National Front agreement, were the decisive (factors in Tolima as elsewhere. The Tolima Highway is a 42 j useful road, but it is still under construction as a USAID |financed civic action project consuming most of the avail able civic action funds while the current counterinsurgency activity is taking place in other regions. Nowhere in the literature of counterinsurgency is the necessity of roadbuilding mentioned. The prime neces sity of winning the loyalty and cooperation of rural popu lations cannot possibly wait for multimillion-dollar pro jects in every rural area. Once the "Modern War,1 1 as Roger Trinquier calls this problem,"*" is won, the feasibility of roads and how to finance them can be decided. I \ It will be recalled from the previous chapter that Ithe original civic action proposals for Colombia included iroad construction in the Llanos Orientales. where roads are i relatively cheap to build, and an ambitious project in the Sumapaz region, where they would be very expensive. In the Llanos the peace has been maintained for several years now by a small force of indigenous rural agents under the Ad ministrative Department of Security (DAS), who do not need 2 modern roads. The Sumapaz highway proposal was found to ■^Trinquier, o p . cit. . Chap. II. ^The Servicio de Secruridad Rural de Los Llanos Orientales. DAS. 43 require several million dollars of support as a civic action project, and would undoubtedly contribute much less to the pacification of the region than would the elimination of Juan de la Cruz Varela and a few of his henchmen. In summary, roadbuilding as a civic action activity is extremely expensive for the number of people affected in the rural areas; it is static rather than mobile, requiring large expenditures and money and personnel long after the need for civic action has passed; and finally, roads are not necessary in combatting insurgency. Obviously most of the remaining Communist enclaves and violence areas will have to be brought under control without multimillion-doliar highway projects because neither the time nor the funds are available. Civic action will play an important role in these final actions, but some of the other projects seem to have a much better potential for the money expended than roadbuilding. It is hoped that some of the suggestions at the end of this study will prove useful. CHAPTER IV CIVIC ACTION IN EDUCATION AND TRAINING The amount of United States support of civic action projects to date in education and training has been rela tively small. A one-time contribution of $24,000 for the Armed Forces Literacy Program in 1963 was used to purchase iequipment, materials, and books for the purpose of assist ing an internal program to raise the literacy rate of con scripts . In fiscal year 1965, a Rural School Construction Program will provide thirty primary schools in the rural violence areas where no schools presently exist. This pro gram will be financed by a grant of $1,400,000 Colombian pesos from the 1964 United States Program Loan to Colombia. In fiscal year 1966, a similar grant of $800,000 Colombian pesos is programmed for youth camps. It is worthwhile to discuss the background of each of these projects. The Colombian Army Literacy Program may at first consideration seem to be an internal matter not directly 44 45 related to civic action. Its chief concern is raising the literacy rate of Army recruits from a starting level of less than 50 per cent to third-grade minimum level for all. This is a modest objective, but requires a great deal of effort in its accomplishment. Along with literacy, an attempt is made to instill good citizenship, patriotism, and respect for constitutional government. According to Colonel Alejo Sanchez O'Donoghue, Chief of the Civic Action Section, Colombian Army, it is important to understand something about the background of the Colom bian Army recruit in order to understand the importance of the Literacy Program in civic action. As mentioned before, more than half of the men are illiterate at the time of conscription. Most of the remainder are of a low level of literacy and are unskilled. A large majority of them come from rural areas where they have witnessed many aspects of the violence and have been victimized by it or have parti cipated in it. Their attitudes toward the Army and the government have been formed not by teachers and school books, but by chaos and neglect and often by atrocious treatment at the hands of government representatives during ! the violence. In some areas of Colombia the aftermath of the violence left a bitterness towards the military and the 46 police which was a factor in the people's alienation from the government.^ As a case in point, in the Llanos Qrientales. the eastern plains of Colombia composing about one-third of the country's geographical area, the government began a campaign in 1949 to put down the guerrillas operating in the region, some of whom had much support among the people. The Army and the police permitted themselves to indulge in such ex cesses during the following four years that their image in 2 that region has never recovered. In June of 1953, after the assumption of power by General Gustavo Rojas Pinilla, the government granted an amnesty, at which time the guer rillas of the Llanos agreed to turn in their arms and lead a peaceful life on condition that the military forces with draw. During the following years, as related previously, through the formation of a group of indigenous peace offi cers, the Rural Security Service, that region avoided the second wave of violence which overtook other regions. Both the Army and the police are again present in the Llanos. but they tread very lightly now and their image is gradually ■'■Interview with Colonel Sanchez, Bogota, November 3, 1964. O / ^Guzman, La Violencia en Colombia, pp. 66-81. 47 jimproving. | The Colombian Army recruit, because of his back- I Iground, presents an excellent opportunity for the Army to jestablish contact with the rural community. The literacy i program is bringing about cultural improvement and better attitudes, which are bound to have an effect upon the re cruits' home communities when they return. Considering the magnitude of this opportunity to influence the rural violence areas through the Army re cruits, the present literacy program is a small beginning, but it- shows great promise. The $24,000 United States grant' for literacy training was used to purchase electronic teaching equipment, books, and modern literacy teaching materials for a program to bring 12,000 recruits annually i up to the third-grade reading and arithmetic level, followed by a second phase of reading room study for future improve ment. Basic equipment was furnished for ten military re cruit training centers and fifty-eight battalion reading rooms. A third phase of this program contemplates obliga tion of each soldier to teach a member of his family or community after his return to civilian life. During the last quarter of 196 3, the equipment was installed at the sites shown on Map No. II; instructors were prepared and M A P NO. II EDUCATION AND TRAINING PROJECTS 7 78° 77 76° 75° a 0 a 0 0 lf) 2· 1IC0 ::ci ft Jf 1" }- 0 0 c £)JI 74° 73' 7'L 71' 0 0 0 d 0 e 70' 69' ~~~~~~~o~~ 8 0 0 fD CIVIC ACTION MAP No. II CONVENCJONES Capital de la Republica C apital de O epartamenlo - lnlendencia-Comisaria Poblaciones ferrocarriles Carretera~ Limile Internacional Limite Deparlamental D' Violence Areas r-~~~~t--~~~~~~~-t-~-+.~--4~~~~~~.t.-----.L-:.-~~--1-t"--~~~~~ 9° 1500000 a· 7° <::::;:) ~ ............ 5• ~ .......... "t::..J ~ 5•• !000.000 + ~ 40 ~ \) c, ~'\' 3• 2' T A oUribe c A u ~T Literacy Centers Youth Camp Facility Rural Schools VENEZUELA ' • R A U C A •PORE BO YA CA A U sP~E ./ 12.' • 11· .... ++++++ ___ ... 10' ·l50000 9• 8' 50 !D00.000 4• 3' 2.' _4,,---~+------___.:~ ......... -----+/ _ ___ ~::_~~------4-___.::i:_ _____ ~,,,,.,,q___.::__::~=~---1500000 0° BRAS\L 1· MAPA 10 DE LA REPUBLICA DE A M A z 0 COLOMBIA ~ 2· 2· ' + ' + + ' INST\TUTO GEOGRAFICO DE COLOMBIA AGUSTIN CODAZZI 30 3• ES GALA i;5.000000 50 5 0 100 ZOOK . 4' 67° Al Oes te de G reenwich 0 0 0 0 0 0 c:i 0 0 0 8 LO 79" 78' 77 7f) 75' 7'1' 73' n· 71' 70" 69' 68° 1....--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------z 0 • 50 the first groups of recruits began training. The most re cent estimate is that the literacy level of the recruits has now been raised to approximately 80 per cent through this program, a level much higher than that of the popula tion as a whole. While the degree of success of the program in each location depends upon the enthusiasm of each indi vidual commander, the reports from Military Assistance Group (MAG) officers in the field indicate that the program is 3 very well received by recruits and officers alike. The Rural School Construction Program will require 'considerable cooperation with the Ministry of Education and i I departmental agencies. School buildings will be constructed ! i by the Army, using local labor when available, on sites j !located mainly along the routes of the Civic Action Road i Projects. The Army will operate the schools until such time as the proper civilian agencies can take over. This program is a continuation and expansion of a 'similar program of the Colombian Army already in effect, in which fifteen schools are completed and fourteen more are junder construction. The problem of rural schools in o Interview and map overlay: Mr. Frank Openchowski, Assistant Program Officer, USAID, Bogota, March 8, 1965. 51 Colombia is of such magnitude that this particular project can only be of significance if it has a special impact in violence areas. In order to do this it must involve the continual opening up of new schools in violence areas and the rapid takeover of the schools by civilian agencies. Otherwise, the capability of the Colombian Army to supply personnel for the schools will soon be used up, and the project will become static. If the Army can open thirty rural schools a year in violence areas and civilian agencies can rapidly assume their obligation to operate the schools, i the project can have a major impact. Furthermore, these rural schools can become important centers of community action if the right leaders come along. There seems to be no reason for tying the Rural School Construction Project ! to the Road Construction Project. A rural school can con ceivably have more of a civic action impact than a road at ja fraction of the cost, and in areas where roads do not reach. The key factor in the success of civic action school building will undoubtedly be the degree of support received from the Ministry of Education. The Military Assistance Group has been instrumental in bringing about a considerable improvement in such support. The Youth Camps sponsored by the Army beginning in 52 1964 were assisted by an initial grant of $3,000 (dollars) from United States funds. Four pilot camps were established at selected military installations. In fiscal year 1966, $80,000 pesos have been programmed for expansion of these camps. Under the original plan still in effect, the Youth Camps are voluntary. They offer a three-week program of indoctrination and training to the twelve- to fifteen-year- old group. The required subjects include history, hygiene, civics, patriotic songs, citizenship responsibility, and I sports. The pilot camps are located at Tunja, Armenia, Palmira, and Neiva. Although still in its earliest stage of development, the Youth Camp Program is probably the most hopeful of all the civic action ideas today for its poten tial impact and for its possibilities of community partici pation. In spite of the many problems being encountered, the Youth Camp Program has been received with great enthu siasm by all senior Colombian Army officers who feel that this activity can contribute greatly to lessening the vio lence and winning the support of the rural population. Mr. Frank Openchowski, Assistant Program Officer- Operations, USAID, Bogota, visited three of the four pilot camps in July of 1964. Because of the apparently great 53 potential value of this project, Mr. Openchowski's report is quoted at length: Camp Located in the Tunia Area This camp was under the direct supervision of the First Brigade Headquarters and was located in Tunja city proper. Participants attending this camp were selected from various political and climatic regions of the Brigade area, and of the 54 originally enrolled, seven requested permission to return home before the completion of the course because of nostalgia and in ability to adjust to the climate and group living. The camp was located in a primary school building, some of the classrooms having been converted into dor mitories and others being used as classrooms. Messing facilities were provided in the quarters and the Bri- i gade athletic facilities were made available to the camp participants. Instruction was provided by offi- | cer personnel detailed by the Brigade and not by pro fessional instructors. Activities included a visit to i the governor's office, National Police local Head quarters, the fire department, the Bishop's residence, Tunja University, and some historical and industrial sites located within the Brigade jurisdiction. Local reaction to this activity was favorable and support in the form of donated bus transportation, free lunches during visits, etc., was supplied. There was no evi dence of any publicity given this activity locally. USIS support in the form of projectors and films was supplied at the request of the Brigade and two Peace Corps volunteers gave team sport instructions. This camp appeared to be well organized and the supervision was good. The geographic location, al though centrally located in the Brigade area, is cli matically undesirable in that many of the boys come from low altitude regions and appeared to be affected by the cold. Should other camps be conducted in this area it will be necessary to supply additional cloth ing. Members of the first group were issued ponchos in addition to the normal clothing allowance and sweaters would have proved useful. The Brigade Com- i mander stated that the ration allowance was not ade- L _ quate and also suggested that _length_o.f__the_s_tay_co.uld_ 54 be extended from two to three weeks. Camp Located in the Armenia Area . This camp was under the supervision of the sixth brigade and under the control of the "27 Rifles" In fantry Battalion. The camp was located at the finca "Dinamarca" which is situated approximately eight miles outside of Calarca. The participants were housed in a run down finca residence and classroom facilities were set up under a canvas shelter. Inflatable air mattresses substituted for beds and the "swimming pool" consisted of a large stock watering tank. The educa tional Staff was composed of military personnel, with non-commissioned officers belonging to company "Harpon" which specializes in civic action activities forming the bulk of the instructors. There were fifty parti cipants, and they were all selected from the area of the battalion jurisdiction. Two of the participants were the younger brothers of known bandits. The group visited Armenia and Calarca as well as industrial and historical sights, the Battalion "Cisneres" camp, etc. Local support consisted of the donation of the camp site, 40 liters of milk a day, and a calf and a pig which were presented to the two outstanding students at the end of the course. Local publicity was given in the Diario del Ouindio. a local newspaper published in Armenia. Some USIS film support-was given the camp. The physical facilities encountered here were the poorest of the three camps visited. The Battalion Commander stated that the ration allowance was inade quate and that more USIS support would be requested if additional camps were conducted. The Brigade plans to rotate the location of future camps between the various battalions. Camp Located in the Palmira Area This camp was under the supervision of the Third Brigade located in Cali and under the control of the Third Engr. Battalion (Codazzi), located in Palmira. The fifty participants, all from the battalion area of responsibility, were housed in barracks located in the battalion compound. Sleeping quarters and messing facilities were shared with the unit troops and the 55 NCO swimming pool was used for water sports. The edu cational staff was not limited to battalion personnel and instruction on farming, animal husbandry, poultry raising, basic veterinary medicine, etc., was given at the local educational institutions. Activities in cluded visits to model farms, sugar mills, industrial sites, a local college and the battalion civic action road construction sites. Local support was excellent with full participation by civilian and religious in stitutions. Publicity was coordinated by the Brigade Public Relations Officer and was disseminated through out Valle. USIS movies were supplied by the center in Cali. The Battalion Commander stated that the ration allowance was inadequate. Future plans call for ro tating camps between various brigade battalions. The excellent facilities available were due primarily to the outside income derived by the Battalion "Codazzi" from road contracts with the Ministry of Public Works. Youth camps have now been sponsored by sixteen Army brigades and enthusiasm still runs high. Mr. Openchowski recommends that United States support of Youth Camps be coordinated with all government and civilian agencies, that better logistic support be given the camps, that better publicity be realized, that more United States military and civilian officials visit the camps, and that local business and social groups in each area be encouraged to give their wholehearted support to make the camps a success. It is noted that one brigade commander recommended a longer course of training in the camps, but the general trend has been to 56 4 put a large number through a short course. In summing up this chapter on civic action in edu cation and training, two outstanding points should be men tioned: first, this field of civic action seems to have a high potential impact in violence areas for the amount of money spent. Second, the amount of United States support, especially from grant funds, has been a very small portion of the civic action funds to date. These two points will be significant in the final recommendations of this study. ^Mr. Frank Openchowski, March 8, 1965. CHAPTER V CIVIC ACTION IN HEALTH AND SANITATION In some remote areas of Colombia the Armed Forces are the only agencies representing the Government which have any medical facilities or medical personnel. In a few cases these facilities are quite adequate and are able to offer the local populations substantial medical assistance, but in most instances the facilities are small, or supplies are inadequate, or medical advice is lacking. As of this writing the Navy hospital at Leticia on the Amazon River, a rather good small hospital, has no doctor. In the majority of remote areas there was little or no medical attention at all until the introduction of the Field Dispensaries under the Civic Action Program. The Colombian Armed Forces, in spite of their limit ed medical facilities, have made a practice of providing medical services to civilians wherever possible, and in recent years have introduced a monthly Civic Action Field 57 58 Day in rural towns near the battalions at which time mili tary personnel offer services ranging from haircuts and shoe repairs to medical and dental consultations. However, the lack of competent medical personnel in the Army to carry out even these simple field day assignments has caused the necessity of soliciting outside personnel, such as univer sity students, to help in the effort. The resulting situa tion, in which certain civilians donate a great deal of time and effort to a worthy project but the Military Civic Action Program gets all the credit, has led to considerable re- jsentment by some of the civilians, and in this sense is counterproductive. An interesting example of this resent ment is shown by the following item from the "University jPage" of El Tiempo. Colombia's largest daily newspaper: I Military Civic Action Nothing is more plausible than the interest of some of our fellow students to participate in commu nity development activities. Nevertheless, this in terest should not obscure a clear vision concerning the methods of accomplishing this labor. The campaigns of military civic action promoted by the Colombian Army are one of the methods which the university students should carefully observe. In summary this kind of program goes as follows. Ten university students and 15 0 soldiers arrive one Sunday at some town. The university students— stu dents of medicine, engineering, veterinary medicine, nursing, agronomy, dentistry— spend the whole day attending the campesinos. a labor very beneficial for 59 the community. The soldiers, meanwhile, lay down a pair of tarpaulins and give haircuts to a number of campesinos. At the end the Army forms squads, sings hymns and takes the final curtain call, in which the stellar part consists of cries of "Viva the Army." The campesino. because of appearances, receives the feeling that all the benefits are owing to the Armed Forces, which is not good for the Army and much less so for the students. There are other methods through which we students work for the fatherland, and strictly as students, leaving to the Army the labors that correspond to its nature and constitutional function. The above example is neither fair to the Army nor necessarily typical of student attitudes toward participa tion in Civic Action Field Days. It does show clearly that the Army will either have to handle them alone, or give credit where credit is due if it desires to make civic ac tion a community project. Otherwise a certain amount of opposition and disinterest can be expected. Proposals for Civic Action Field Dispensaries en countered somewhat the same difficulties as the road pro jects and the Civic Action Field Days. The desirability of the dispensaries in rural areas where little or no medical service was available was obvious, but the Colombian mili tary services had very little capability for establishing ■^Enrique Santos Calderon and Daniel Samper Pizano (Bogota), April 21, 1965, p. 8. Translated by John Doney. 60 additional medical services. As a result, the equipment for this civic action project was furnished under United States Military Assistance, valued at about $17,000 (dol lars) for each dispensary; the supplies were furnished and continue to be furnished by USAID in the amount of $157,000 (dollars) for fiscal year 1965 plus $1,080,000 in Colombian pesos from the 1964 Program Loan fund. The buildings were provided by local or other government agencies, and the staffing was made possible only in cooperation with the jMinistry of Health. Insofar as the obligation of the Minis- jtry of War under the effective USAID Program Agreement is concerned, it is provided that "the activity will be super vised by the Ministry of War ..." and The Chief Surgeon agrees to assume the maintenance of the dispensaries as well as the assignment of a full time nurse or orderly to each dispensary either from the Armed Forces resources and personnel, or through the local community. Where no civilian doctor is available to staff a Field Dispensary, the Chief Sur geon agrees to assign a military doctor until a civil ian doctor can be provided.^ Clearly the Ministry of War's contribution under this agree ment is held to an absolute minimum, although the entire project is publicized as "Military Civic Action." p Program Agreement, Civic Action, between USAID and Colombian Minister of War (Bogota, May, 1965). 61 Moreover, the policy of planning civic action for impact in the violence areas seems to have been discarded with reference to field dispensaries. Instead the locations were selected to "... provide basic medical care for ap proximately 425,000 inhabitants of areas which at the in ception of this project had inadequate medical facilities 3 or none at all; . . ." At the present time there are nine teen fixed field dispensaries in operation in nine different Departments and National Territories. In addition, there are two floating dispensaries on the Magdalena and Putumayo Rivers, and one flying dispensary for the Llanos Orientales and the Amazonas regions. In effect, the Ministry of War has replaced the Ministry of Health as the government health service agency in some very extensive areas of the country. The latest Program Agreement provides that the Ministry of Health will take over these field dispensaries not later than December, 1969, but it does not explain why the Minis try of Health cannot assume control of most of them immedi ately, since the actual participation and support of the Ministry of War is minimal. The circumstances seem to ^Program Agreement, Field Dispensaries (c/A). be tween USAID and Colombian Minister of War (Bogota, February 11, 1964), p. 3. 62 indicate that most of these dispensaries, not counting the floating and flying ones, could be taken over at an early date by the Ministry of Health, assuming the same kind of USAID support that has been furnished to date. The loca tions of the Field Dispensaries, as shown on Map No. Ill, are nearly all outside of the present areas of violence or Communist control. If the above is true, that the Ministry of Health could rapidly take over the Field Dispensaries now in the 'hands of the Army, then the possibility is presented that the Army could embark upon an impact program involving the setting up of field dispensaries in the remaining violence areas of Colombia where, for security reasons, no other government agency could do the job, and where the Army could truly be a spearhead in establishing medical services. There is no doubt that such civic action activity would help to win the support of alienated rural populations. In the field of sanitation, the Colombian Army has a civic action project which, although it required a sub stantial amount of United States and civilian assistance to place in operation, has all of the characteristics of a practical military civic action project where impact upon ^iolence areas is desired. This refers to the Colombian HEALTH AND SANITATION PROJECTS 12.' 11' 10' go 1500000 30 r 60 50 1000.000 40 3• 1' J' 2' 3• 7 78° 77 76' 75° 74° 73' n· 71' 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 d 0 0 lf) e 70° 69°1 0 0 0 0 0 l{) CI IC ACTION MAP No. III CONVENCIQN[S C apital de la Republica C apital de Departamenlo- lntendencia-Comisaria Foblaciones Ferrocarri le.s Carref era5 Limite Internacional Limite Departamental 68' • ++++-+++ ---- Violence Areas r-~~~-r-~~~~~~~-J-----,~~-+~~---+~~~1-~~~-A'-~~----\::--~~ Water Systems W' /;) ~ ~\ ~ ~ ~ ~ + \j ~ \) (; ~": I I c A MAPA DE LA REPUBLICA DE COLOMBIA INSTITUTO GEOGRAFICO DE COLOMBIA 0 0 0 ci 0 l{) 50 78' AGUSTIN CODAZZI ESCALA 1:5.000000 50 100 ZOOK.. 77 76' 75' Q •P ORE BO YA CA '-. A u ~T A A M A z 0 0 0 0 d 0 e 74' 7 3' n: u 71° Medical Dispensary Floating Dispensary Flying Dispensary VENEZUELA sP~E BRASIL 70" ' ' . ; ; 69° 68° 57° 12.· 11· 10• ·1 500.000 g· B' ! 7" I 5• 1000.000 4' 3' 2· r 10 2· 4' 6 7° A.I Oes+a de Greenwich 1..----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------...... z 0 • H H H 65 Army's Civic Action Well Drilling Project, which is approx imately equal in size and production to the similar project operated by the Ministry of Health, but is utilized in vio lence or borderline areas where the civilian teams cannot go. The Ministry of Health and Army projects are considered capable of drilling about fifty wells each per year, but have not yet reached that rate. The locations of wells drilled by the Army teams are noted on Map No. III. In a manner similar to other United States-supported civic action projects, the well drilling project received i trom the Military Assistance Program two drilling rigs along i 1 with the necessary vehicles and heavy equipment and tools !for two well-drilling teams. A Mobile Training Team was brought in to train Colombian Army personnel in the opera tion. USAID committed $223,000 (dollars) through fiscal year 1965 in grant funds, and $709,000 Colombian pesos from jthe 1964 Program Loan for spare parts, materials, drill points, well casing, chlorinators, and filters. The Colom bian Army furnishes Army personnel as operators, arranges for locally contributed labor, and agrees to provide period ic inspection of the completed potable water systems. The i project provides not only for well-drilling, but also for i the construction and rehabilitation of water systems and 66 equipment in rural areas. Thirteen of these systems have been completed. During fiscal year 1965, plans called for twenty-four more wells and thirty more water systems to be constructed or improved in the Departments of Boyaca and Tolima in recently pacified areas. The well drilling project is the kind of civic ac tion activity which can have an immediate impact upon the development of a community. It is a visible and constant symbol of community improvement and stability. It cannot fail to interest every member of a community, and a certain proportion will accept such a project as evidence of the 1 government's concern with community welfare. This one pro ject could provide the beginning for community development in many newly pacified rural towns. i i CHAPTER VI CIVIC ACTION IN COMMUNICATIONS Five years' experience in technical assistance pro grams of the United States has taught this writer that the second thing desired by any agency of an under-developed country seeking help is an up-to-date radio communications isystem, including the latest gadgets— the first thing is vehicles. There seems to be little doubt that vehicles and xadios have a secure place in every technical assistance program. Communications needs in remote areas of Colombia were approached in two different ways under the civic action program to meet two different problems. The Ministry of Government had planned for some time a "National Territories Communications Net" for better control of the far-flung domain under that Ministry's jurisdiction-— "National Terri tories" including those remote regions not yet incorporated into Departments. However, lack of funds for the necessary 67 68 Single Sideband (SSB) type radio stations and for technical and operating personnel had blocked these plans indefinite ly , although some radio links had been installed. The initial Civic Action Communications Project proposed by the Military Assistance Group and approved by USAID in February, 196 3, provided USAID funding in the amount of $132,000 (dollars) for the purchase of twenty- eight SSB stations. The Minister of War agreed to assist in the transportation, installation, and operation of this equipment at sites selected by the Minister of Government. Meanwhile, a new USAID program was established in Colombia beginning in January, 196 3, under the Office of Public Safety, to provide technical assistance and some [commodities for improvement of the National Police of Co lombia, a dependency of the Minister of War, and the Admin istrative Department of Security (DAS), a dependency of the President of Colombia. The Office of Public Safety was faced with the problem of augmenting and modernizing nation al communications networks for both of these agencies. After a preliminary survey and meetings with MAG officials and interested agencies, an agreement was reached to support one national users' net to be administered by the Minister Jof Government, but providing service equally to the National 69 Police, DAS, the Customs Department, and to private individ uals in remote areas when other services were not available. Public Safety funds were sufficient to add a number of new stations to the net, to provide radio teletype equipment for the most heavily-used links in the net, and to bring a communications engineer with one assistant to plan and im plement the work. When completed, this nationwide SSB net will easily handle all national traffic for the agencies concerned from a national communications center in Bogota. As can readily be seen, this Ministry of Government net be- i jcame much more than a civic action project after 1963, but assistance from both the Colombian Army and Air Force, and Lrom MAG officers is still an important element in the suc- 'cess of the project. Map No. IV shows the Ministry of Gov ernment Net as it functions at this time. The second civic action approach to the problem of communications in remote areas is the early warning or civil defense net, which came to be called the "finca net." This was a plan worked out by Colombian Air Force Lieutenant Colonel Hernando Nieto and was already out of the planning stage when the first Civic Action Mobile Training Team visited Colombia in 1962. Colonel Nieto, working at the combined staff level, envisioned a citizens' band communi- M A P NO. IV COMMUNICATIONS PROJECTS 7 78° 77 76° 75° 740 73• 7?: 7l 0 70° 69°1 68° 57° 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 d 0 0 0 0 "' 2 "' CI IC ACTION 12° 12.0 fi-JJfICO MAP No. IV CONVENCIONES 1' i ' Capilal de la Republica ~ Ca pital de Deparhmento-lntendencia-Comisaria • 11· Foblac iones 110 ferrocarri!es 0 Carretera:s. t ft iJ Limite Internacional ... ++++++ {) Limit. Depar!amental -·-·-·- 10° 0 Violence Area --- 100 at. Territories Net Main Net Sub Nets go 1 500000 ·1 500000 go • • • •••• . . . '• .. . . ' .... . .... .. . • • • VENEZUELA .. ao Bo ! 7° 7" ~ c::::i A ~ J 'I-..\ .R Oa4a;Jla.re 50 ~ ~ ~ a PORE ~ B 0 Y A C A 5• 50 1000000 + ~ f000.000 40 I~ 40 Cl(,~'\' T A gUribo I 30 30 BRASlL 1· MAPA t 0 DE LA REPUBLICA DE A M A z COLOMBIA ~ zo z· ' ' . . ' INSTlTUTO GEOGRAFlCO DE COLOMBIA ' ' AGUSTIN CODAZZI 30 3• ES CALA J: 5.000000 50 50 100 ZOOK. 40 40 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 d 0 0 s "' 7g• 78° 77 76° 75· 74° 73° 72.' 71° 70" 69° 68° 67° Al Oeste de Greenwich ~ z 0 • H < 72 cations network of at least 100 radio transceivers in each battalion area located at farms and small settlements. This net was intended for early warning in case of attack, for intelligence collection, and for the conduct of normal busi ness. Through Colonel Nieto's leadership the radio trans ceivers were purchased by the civilian population in a num ber of areas threatened by violence. Technical assistance was given by Armed Forces personnel for installation and maintenance. Colonel Nieto's recent death in an automobile |accident is a grave loss to this program. However, progress has been sufficient to establish the finca nets as a perma nent part of the Civic Action Program. Under the 1965 USAID Program Agreement with the Minister of War, $500,000 pesos from the 1964 Program Loan will be made available for con- i trol and relay stations to increase the operational capa bilities of three of the ten finca nets now in operation with approximately 1,000 stations, and to permit the nation al police and military units to enter the nets. This will enable them to receive whatever internal security intelli gence comes over the system and to be on call when help is needed. In attempting to expand the system farther into more remote areas, two problems can be foreseen: in many rural 73 areas there will be no civilians who are able to purchase equipment, and some of these poor areas are among the most important security-wise. The second problem will be the difficulty of getting help promptly even when the radio is available. Experience to date with the operation of the finca nets indicates that maintenance problems and breakdowns are held within reasonable limits, about 5 per cent quarterly, and that the civilians are satisfied and enthusiastic with the results. i In the two civic action projects in communications which are described above, both of which are vitally impor tant in different ways, the second has a much greater poten tial for impact in violence areas than the first. The finca nets provide a way for the military and police forces to be in direct contact with the people, permitting them to participate in their own defense, and at the same time to detect unsympathetic elements when they appear. CHAPTER VII THE OUTLOOK FOR UNITED STATES SUPPORT OF CIVIC ACTION IN COLOMBIA Civic action is one field of technical assistance activity in which USAID can influence the military services significantly. It can be a means of determining what capa bilities for action the Colombian military forces will have, and what direction they will take. This influence can be a means of directing these forces into a multitude of ineffec tive civilian sidelines, or it can help them to save Colom bia from alien domination by fulfilling their internal security mission along with the other security agencies. Civic action in Colombia should have a special task, not just the promotion of any useful activity that seems con venient, but a well-coordinated group of activities which supplement each other in the areas of grave danger. Fortu nately, after considerable experimentation, this seems to be the policy which has been decided upon, and it is hoped 74 75 that more projects will be devised to implement this policy. In discussing the outlook for civic action in Colom bia, however, there is no avoiding the fact that the road projects are scheduled to take an even bigger bite of funds in fiscal years 1966 and 1967. It is perhaps useless to speculate about how much could be accomplished with the same amount of money in other civic action projects, because the United States is definitely committed to the completion of the Tolima Highway. However, it is most unlikely that United States funds will be available for other multi- i million-dollar civic action roads into the other violence areas and Communist enclaves. This means that pacification in these areas will have to be accomplished by other means. Roads will be built eventually after pacification takes place and when it is economically feasible. In connection with the Civic Action Field Dispen saries it was stated previously that these facilities, when introduced by the Army, might have more impact if installed in newly pacified areas and then rapidly turned over to the Ministry of Health. The same possibility exists with the Well Drilling Project and the Finca Nets, as well as in school construction. This idea could be carried a step further by organizing a community development service under 76 civic action to consult with a community regarding its total needs and the means of meeting these needs. This idea seems to have merit, because it is evident that United States funds for civic action will be limited and that most of these funds will be gobbled up by road construction. Therefore, in the final analysis, it will be necessary for the people of each pacified community to find their own answers to community needs. Even if they are able to obtain a civic action water system, school, dispensary, or communi cations system, they will still be faced with many problems and will have scarce resources. In this kind of situation, which can be expected to recur time and time again until I ithe violence is gone, the services of a community develop ment worker would be an invaluable aid to the community in solving specific problems. The different civic action pro jects could be worked into a complete plan for community development in which the people could participate every step of the way. If the community development worker had access to some limited government credits he could undoubt edly find many other innovations for the improvement of the community and many opportunities for winning the population over to the government. Since the above suggestion is intended to be taken 77 seriously, an attempt will be made to examine how the military services, in cooperation with other agencies, coulc carry out a plan for community development projects where a positive impact is needed. The plan would, of course, in clude the other civic action program activities already operating within the Civic Action Program. The Army at present is not capable of mounting a community development program, but has certain capabilities which would serve very well as a starting point. The other internal security services and civilian agencies of the government, if properly approached, could arrange to parti cipate; support from United States sources should be con tinued until internal security is assured. The kind of civic action program which is recommend ed here is an all-out effort, but concentrated on fewer targets than at present, with the objective of quickly wip ing out the remaining vestiges of La Violencia and at the same time defeating the much more virulent Communist insur gency. This program of civic action in community develop ment would require much better coordination and far finer skills than any of the civic action projects to date in I Colombia. It would require the elimination forever of the term "military civic action," because the military services 78 would be only one element in a spearhead of forces combined against the target. A better name for this campaign would be "National Civic Action for Community Development." Each of the national ministries would be represented and would be responsible to act within their proper spheres in the project. The military commander would be responsible for the physical protection of the civic action operation as long as needed, but would have no responsibility for the completion of any specific project, and would thus be ready as soon as the situation warranted to move on to the next community. The various projects, however, and the ministry representatives responsible for them, would remain to see the job through with the local people. The key man under the military commander would be a civil affairs officer who could be either military or civilian, but would have to be a bonafide community develop ment expert who would remain long after the military pro tective forces had moved on to the next target. His func tion would be the delicate one of developing the interest of the local population in their own welfare. The atmosphere would be ideal for the functioning of Peace Corps-type in dividuals, with all the excitement of a front-line action in a most worthy effort. 79 The selection of targets for the National Civic Action campaign would be extremely important, because it would not be worthwhile to expend much effort in fringe areas where government control can already be exerted. The National Civic Action effort would be aimed at the heart of each of the "independent republics," or at remote areas known to harbor substantial guerrilla forces. The campaign would not be characterized as a military campaign, but would be adequately protected from any possible attack. Under the Military Assistance Program the Colombian Army has been made capable of occupying and supplying remote positions by heli copter and air drop. One of the most urgent community problems which should be taken up at once by the civic action forces in I i any newly pacified areas is the problem of the police and how the people of the area can participate in their own protection once their confidence has been won. It has been found that many of the people in violence areas are desirous of government protection and services, but they know that when the Army moves into an area it will be moving out again and that in other areas they have failed to provide I any substantial permanent protection. Their fear of revenge from the guerrillas has often obscured any other considera- 80 tions. It has seemed strange in observing civic action operations in Colombia that approximately one-half of the internal security forces of the country consist of the National Police, the administrative Department of Security (DAS), and the uniformed Customs Guard; yet the Army seems to feel that the police have no reason to participate in civic action in the violence areas and no immediate concern with the Army's activities in these areas. The fact of the matter is that the most urgent civic action project in any newly pacified area is the formation of a permanent police I i iservice in which the people can have confidence. The ap proach to this problem must be flexible and adaptable de pending upon the political background of the area. The i police can only be effective if they have the support of the people. The people should, therefore, be consulted as to what kind of police organization they want. In many rural areas an indigenous police organization, such as the 'Rural Security Service, may be what they want. If so, the national government should be prepared to sponsor such an Jorganization. Otherwise it may be faced, after a year or two, with an illegal and autonomous system of autodefensa. jThe "National Campaign of Civic Action for Community 81 Development” suggested herein would be an ideal vehicle for the discussion of police problems with local populations. Any such effort should include representatives of the civil ian police agencies as principal participants. The Civic Action Program supported by the United States Military Assistance Program and USAID has made a positive contribution to the internal security and economic and social development of Colombia. Colombia is now one of the prime targets of Castro-Communism in Latin America. It is essential that civic action funds be used where they can best meet this threat and not be dissipated in broad schemes. Only by defeating the Communist insurgent threat can the remaining alienated rural populations of Colombia be integrated into national life. The suggested "National Civic Action Campaign for Community Development" would serve as a focusing mechanism for all agencies against the sub versive threat, and at the same time stress the service of the Armed Forces to the nation. B I B L I O G R A P H Y i BIBLIOGRAPHY Books Almond, Gabriel A., and Coleman, James S. The Politics of the Developing Areas. Princeton: Princeton Uni versity Press, 1960. American University. Special Operations Research Office. Casebook on Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare: 23 Summary Accounts. Washington, D. C.: December, 1962. Batten, T. R. Communities and Their Development. London: Oxford University Press, 1957. ________ . Training for Community Development. London: Oxford University Press, 1962. Braibanti, Ralph, and Spengler, J. J. (eds.). Tradition. Values, and Socio-Economic Development. Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press, 1961. Brand, Willem. The Struggle for a Higher Standard of Liv ing . Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1958. Brookings Institution. Development of the Emerging Coun tries: An Agenda for Research. Washington, D. C The Brookings Institution, 1962. Buchanan, N. S., and Ellis, H. S. Approaches to Economic Development. New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1955. Cairncross, A. K. Factors in Economic Development. New York: Praeger, 1962. 83 84 Camacho Leyva, Ernesto. Factores Colombianos. 9th ed. Bogota: Instituto Colombiano de Opinion Publica, 1964. Champassak, Sisouk Na. Storm Over Laos: A Contemporary History. New York: Praeger, 1961. Duke University. Commonwealth Studio Center. Tradition. Values, and Socio-Economic Development. Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press, 1961. Erasmus, Charles J. Man Takes Control. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1961. Foster, George M. Traditional Cultures and the Impact of Technological Change. New York: Harper and Bros., 1962. Frost, Raymond. The Backward Society. New York: St. Mar tin's Press, 1961. Griffith, William E. The Sino-Soviet Rift. Cambridge, Mass.: The Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press, 1964. Guzman Campos, German, Orlando Fals Borda, and Eduardo Umana buna. La Violencia en Colombia. Estudio de un Pro- ceso Social. 2nd ed. Bogota: Ediciones Tercer Mundo, 1962. Tomo I. Hall, Edward T. The Silent Language. New York: Doubleday, 1959. Hoffman, Paul G. World without Want. New York: Harper and Bros., 1962. Hoselitz, Bert F. Sociological Aspects of Economic Growth. Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1960. Jureidini, Paul A., and Others. Casebook on Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare: 23 Summary Accounts. Wash ington, D. C.: American University, Special Opera tions Research Office, 1962. 85 Katz, Saul M. , and McGowan, Frank. A Selected List of United States Readings on Development. Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1963. Kindleberger, Charles P. Economic Development. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1958. Krause, Walter. Economic Development; The Underdeveloped World and the American Interest. San Francisco: Wadsworth, 1961. Leibenstein, Harvey. Economic Backwardness and Economic Growth. New York: John Wiley, 1957. Mao Tse-Tung. Selected Works of Mao Tse-Tuncr. Vol. I. Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1964. Mead, Margaret. Cultural Patterns and Technical Change. UNESCO, 1953. i Medrano, Humberto. Sin Patria Pero Sin Amo. Miami; Ser vice Offset Printers, 1963. Millikan, Max F., and Blackmer, Donald. The Emerging Na tions . Boston: Little, Brown, 1961. Moncada Abello, Alonso. Un Aspecto de la Violencia. Bogota: Promotora Colombiana de Ediciones y Revis tas Ltda., 1963. Nieto Rojas, Jose Maria. La Batalla Contra el Comunismo en Colombia. Bogota: Empresa Nacional de Publicaci- ones, 1956. Pepelasis, Adamantios, Mears, Leon, and Adelman, Irma. Economic Development. New York: Harper and Bros., 1961. Poston, Richard W. Democracy Speaks Many Tongues. New York: Harper and Row, 1962. Quimbaya, Anteo. Cuestiones Colombianas: Ensavos de Inter- pretacion y Critica. Bogota: Ediciones Suramerica, 1958. 86 Ross, Murray G. Community Organization; Theory and Prin ciples . New Yorki Harper and Bros., 1955. Shannon, Lyle W. (ed.). Underdeveloped Areas. New York: Harper and Bros.., 1957. Spicer, E. H. Human Problems in Technological Change. New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1952. Staley, Eugene. "The Communist Path to Development," in The Future of Underdeveloped Countries. Part II. New York: Harper and Bros., 1954. Tanham, George K. Communist Revolutionary Warfare: The Vietminh in Indochina. New York: Praeger, 1962. Theobald, Robert. The Rich and the Poor. New York: Clarkson N. Potter, 196 0. jTrinquier, Roger. Modern Warfare: A French View of Counter-Insurqencv. New York: Praeger, 1964. Tse-Tung, Mao. La Guerra de Guerrillas, trans. Manuel Torino. 2nd ed. Buenos Aires: Editorial Huemul, 1963. Valeriano, Colonel Napoleon D., and Bohannan, Lieutenant Colonel Charles T. R. Counterauerrilla Operations: The Philippine Experience. New York: Praeger, 1962. Articles and Periodicals Cleveland, Harlan. "The Caricature of Foreign Aid," Depart ment of State Bulletin. 1963. 48. No. 1229 (14 January 1963), pp. 6 0-65. Dart, Francis E. "The Rub of Cultures," Foreign Affairs. January, 196 3, pp. 360-371. Ensminger, Douglas. "Community Development and Its Contri bution to National Development," Community Develop ment Review. VI (June, 1961), 10-16. 87 Francis, Michael J. "Military Aid to Latin America in the U. S. Congress," Journal of Inter-American Studies. VI (July, 1964), 389-404. Lieuwen, Edwin. "The Changing Role of the Military in Latin America," Journal of Inter-American Studies. Ill, No. 4 (October, 1961), 559-578. Lindsay, Frank A. "Unconventional Warfare," Foreign Af fairs. XL, No. 2 (1962), 264-274. Mead, Margaret. "The Underdeveloped and the Overdeveloped," Foreign Affairs. XLI, No. 1 (1962), 78-79. Perpetua, Antonio. "Community Development as a New Institu tion of Government," Community Development Review. VI (June, 1961), 17-33. Santos Calderon, Enrique, and Samper Pizano, Daniel. "Military Civic Action," El Tiempo (Bogota), April 21, 1965, p. 8. Public Documents Bell, David E. Proposed Mutual Defense and Assistance Pro grams . FY 1964. Summary Presentation to Congress. Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office, April, 1963. U. S. AID Manual Order No. 1018.3. Special Programs and Policies— Civic Action. August 1, 1962. | u . S. Congress. House. The Communist Conspiracy: Strategy' and Tactics of World Communism. 84th Congress, 2nd Session, H. Rept. 2243, 1956. U. S. Army Manual FM 41-10. Civil Affairs Operations. Paragraph 71b, p. 83. U. S. Department of Defense Directive 5132.3. POD Policy and Responsibilities Relating to the Military As sistance Program. February 29, 196 0. 88 Reports Colombian Military Forces. Orcranizacion de Cursos Juven iles . Directiva Permanente No. 1 de 1965. Bogota: April, 1965. ________ . Realizacion de Accion Civico-Militar. Bogota: Departamento E~5, 1964. Department of the Army. Review of Civil Affairs Doctrine. The Civil Affairs Directorate. Office, Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations. Washington, D. C.: 23 September, 1964. U. S. AID Airgram. Civic Action Funding. Bogota: U. S. Embassy, July 29, 1964. U. S. AID Memorandum. Tolima Highway— Report of Field Investigator, by J. Elmer Dunham. Bogota: U. S. ' Embassy, October 16, 1964. i j_______ . Visit to Youth Camps, by Frank Openchowski. ! Bogota: U. S. Embassy, July 13, 1964. ________ . Well Drilling, by C. Preston Blanks, Jr. Bogota: U. S. Embassy, September 3, 1964. Q. S. Army. Qperaciones Contra Fuerzas Irreaulares. trans. from FM 31-15 (May 31, 1961). Q. S. Military Project Summary. Literacy Education. Bogo ta: U. S. Military Assistance Group, May, 1963. _________. Road Maintenance and Construction. Bogota: U. S'. Military Assistance Group, May, 1963. _________. Tolima Highway. Bogota: U. S. Military Assist ance Group, May, 196 3. U. S. Military Report. Inspection of Civil Defense Net works . by Major Theodore B. Malinowski. Bogota: U. S. Military Assistance Group, April 26, 1965. 89 Navy Report. Civic Action Rodent Control Program, by U. S. Navy Medical Mobile Training Team. Colombia: March, 196 3. Other Sources Embassy. Personal interview with Frank Openchowski, Assistant Programs Officer— Operations. Bogota: August 10-12, 1964. Personal interview with Colonel Alejo Sanchez O'Donoghue, Chief, D-6 Section, Colombian Army. Bogota: November 3, 1964. Personal interview with Major Lawrence D. Shields,- U. S. Military Assistance Group. Bogota: November 10, 1964. Personal interviews and field trips with Lieuten ant Colonel (R) Eduardo Roman Bazurto. Chief, Rural Security Service, Administrative Department of Security. January 25-26 and April 13-16, 1964; March 25-31 and May 26-30, 1965, in the Llanos Ori- entales. Personal interviews and field trips with Lieuten ant Colonel (R) Enrique Millan Perdomo, Chief of the Neiva Field Office, Administrative Department of Security, July 25-26, 1964, and September 21-22, 1965, at Neiva; and June 26, 1965, at Girardot.

Linked assets

University of Southern California Dissertations and Theses

Conceptually similar

PDF

Studies on the biology of zelleriella (protozoa, Opalinidae)

PDF

The Support Of Local Populations For The Forces Of Order And Legal Government In A Developing And Insurgent Area: Identification Of Some Problems And Relevant Factors

PDF

Towards The Development Of An International Regime For The Seabed Beyond The Limits Of National Jurisdiction: A Comparative Study Of Four Proposals. (Volumes I And Ii)

PDF

Water relationships of feral house mice, Mus musculus, Linnaeus, from a coastal salt-marsh habitat

PDF

Study of international intellectual cooperation

PDF

A study of vocational guidance in twenty non-state supported colleges and universities.

PDF

Realism in the fiction of Frances Burney

PDF

A survey of the present status of adult education in the United States.

PDF

The Cultural Institute In Mexico City As An Example Of United States Policy In Cultural Relations

PDF

A survey of ninth grade general science in Los Angeles County.

PDF

The teaching of vocational civics in the junior and senior high schools of the United States.

PDF

A philosophy of vocational education.

PDF

A study of curriculum development at the junior college level in relation to modern social and educational change

PDF

A study of the Los Angeles medical agencies providing care for certain classes of low income groups

PDF

The ecology of the mid-water Amphipoda in the waters over the Santa Catalina and the San Pedro Basins off the coast of southern California

PDF

The evolution of United States policy towards Indochina, 1950-1954.

PDF

Dye laser characterization of two films of baceriorhodopsin

PDF

A survey of the present educational situation in the Irish Free State

PDF

Anaerobic and aerobic carbohydrate breakdown pathways in Ascaris lumbricoides var. suum

PDF

Graduated Deterrence: The Use Of Nuclear Weapons In A Strategy Of Limited War

Asset Metadata

Creator Doney, John Harvey, Jr. (author)

Core Title A study of United States support of civic action in Colombia.

School Graduate School

Degree Master of Foreign Service

Degree Program Foreign Service

Degree Conferral Date 1966-06

Publisher University of Southern California (original), University of Southern California. Libraries (digital)

Tag Latin American studies,OAI-PMH Harvest,political science, international relations

Language English

Contributor Digitized by ProQuest (provenance)

Advisor Hadley, Paul E. (committee chair), Fertig, Norman R. (committee member), Hickman, Martin B. (committee member)

Permanent Link (DOI) https://doi.org/10.25549/usctheses-c30-97596

Unique identifier UC11221377

Identifier usctheses-c30-97596 (legacy record id)

Legacy Identifier EP58355.pdf

Dmrecord 97596

Document Type Thesis

Rights Doney, John Harvey, Jr.

Type texts

Source University of Southern California (contributing entity), University of Southern California Dissertations and Theses (collection)

Access Conditions The author retains rights to his/her dissertation, thesis or other graduate work according to U.S. copyright law. Electronic access is being provided by the USC Libraries in agreement with the au...

Repository Name University of Southern California Digital Library

Repository Location USC Digital Library, University of Southern California, University Park Campus, Los Angeles, California 90089, USA