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Attitudes toward achieving peace : a measure of "peace through strength" and "peace through cooperation" and the relationship of these attitudes with affective, coping, personality, and gender co...

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Content ATTITUDES TOW ARD ACHIEVING PEACE: A M EASURE OF PEACE TH R O U G H STRENGTH" AND "PEACE TH R O U G H COOPERATION" AND TH E RELATIONSHIPS OF THESE ATTITUDES W ITH AFFECTIVE, COPING, PERSONALITY, AND G EN D ER CORRELATES by Melissa Jean Johnson A Dissertation Presented to the FACULTY OF THE GRADUATE SCHOOL UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY (Education-Counseling Psychology) August 1990 U M I Number: DP25341 All rights reserved INFORMATION TO ALL USERS The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted. In the unlikely event that the author did not send a complete manuscript and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed, a note will indicate the deletion. Published by ProQuest LLC (2014). Copyright in the Dissertation held by the Author. Dissertation Publishing UMI DP25341 Microform Edition © ProQuest LLC. All rights reserved. This work is protected against unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code ProQuest LLC. 789 East Eisenhower Parkway P.O. Box 1346 Ann Arbor, Ml 48106 -1346 UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA THE GRADUATE SCHOOL UNIVERSITY PARK LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA 90089-4015 This dissertation, w ritten by M e lis s a Jean Johnson under the direction of h&x D issertation Committee; and approved by all its members, has been presented to and accepted by The Graduate School, in partial fulfillm ent of re quirements for the degree of D O C TO R OF PHILOSOPH Y Dean of Graduate Studies Date I? .? .? . DISSERTATION COMMITTEE Chairperson ACKNOWLEDGMENTS This research, in numerous ways, has been a cooperative effort. First, I would like to acknowledge the contributions of my committee. Michael Newcomb, the chair of my committee, was tireless in his support, encouragement, j and guidance. His scientific and editorial expertise have been invaluable. Our shared commitment to peace research has added meaning to this endeavor, j Michael Messner has been a wise guide as I’ ve struggled with the tensions | inherent in gender research. Always encouraging, he’s taught me new ways of ! thinking. Milt Wolpin, whom I met through the USC Peace Center during my first year of graduate school, has always been supportive with his advice and his i j humor. Frank Fox has provided me with many opportunities for intellectual and j pedagogical development. His faith in me throughout my graduate school ! experience has helped make this process pleasurable. Laurie Mintz has been an ■ important role model. H er advice on this research and her support of my professional growth will always be remembered. I would also like to acknowledge the faculty and students who supported this research by their participation, particularly Chip Blacker, Charlie Powell, Professor Nielson, Tony Wolf, Charles Benjamin, Ken Herman, and their I 1 students. I am indebted to my former students in SWMS, as well as to the members of USC Students for Peace and Justice for their participation. I am grateful to Ken H erm an who inspired my data-inputting "party," assisted with the early statistical analyses, and kept reminding me that I could "do it"; to Gary Ellis, who creatively and patiently produced the Tables and Figures, enduring brown-outs and lost data; to my grandmother, Mary Edmiston, and Dr. Burton Edmiston, who believed in me throughout this process; and to Inanna and Shashy, my four-legged companions, who remind me constantly of life’s fragileness and beauty. This dissertation is dedicated to my parents, Joseph Johnson and Mary-Jane Johnson. They taught me an appreciation of diversity and a love of learning. In particular, my father’s tales of esteemed friends in other regions of the world informed my developmental years with a sense of connectedness. I’ve been inspired by my m other’s compassion and her capacity to understand the other’s frame of reference, dramatized in her work as a bilingual educator in East Los Angeles. I only wish she were here to celebrate this accomplishment with me. Finally, I thank my husband, Philip Krumal, who has endured this process with humor, love, and support. H e’s believed in this research, sometimes more than I. His support has been pervasive. As intellectual colleague, he has spent endless hours listening to rough drafts and theoretical quandaries and providing fresh perspectives. As intimate partner, he has comforted, listened, and emotionally struggled with me through the ups and downs of this experience. As housemate, he has done more than his share to hold our "private" and "public" lives together. I am grateful for his endless love, which has been an important foundation for this work. TABLE OF CONTENTS ACK NOW LEDG M ENTS.............. LIST O F TABLES AND FIG U R E P R E F A C E .......................................... CHAPTER i j I. STATEM ENT OF TH E PR O B L EM ............................ I Theoretical Assumptions And Background 1 Statem ent Of The Problem I Purpose Of The Study | Assumptions 1 Hypotheses j Delimitations I Definitions Of Terms II. REVIEW OF TH E L ITE R A T U R E ............................... J Research Findings Related to Pro-defense and j Anti-nuclear Activism j Research Findings Related to Peace Attitudes i Activism And Peace Attitudes within the Paradigm | of Personality or Psychodynamic Theory | Activism and Peace Attitudes within the Paradigm of ' Coping Theory : Activism and Peace Attitudes within the Paradigm of Feminist Theory I Conclusions l III. RESEARCH M ETH O D O LO G Y ................................... ! Subject Sample | Instrumentation | Procedures 1 Dependent Variables Independent Variables : Statistical Analyses IV. RESULTS 134 Development of the Peace Attitude Scale (PAS) Peace Attitudes and Activist Group Membership Peace Attitudes and the Relationship with Affective, Coping, Personality, and Gender Dimensions Activist Behavior and the Relationship with Affective, Coping, Personality, and G ender Dimensions V. SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND Summary Results of the Tested Hypotheses Theoretical Conclusions, Implications, and Recommendations Research Conclusions, Implications, and Recommendations Policy Conclusions, Implications, and Recommendations RECOM M ENDATIONS 193 REFEREN CES 236 APPENDIX 253 Cover Letter and Questionnaire v LIST OF TABLES AND FIGURE TABLE 1. Sample D escription.......................................................................... 104 2. Four-way Classification Scheme for the Personal Attributes Questionnaire (PAS) ............................................ 114 3. Distribution D ata for Scales and Subscales................................. 128 4. Definitions of Scales and Subscales, Including Number of Items, Range, and Reliability (Ordered as in Questionnaire) .. 129 5. Entire and Abbreviated Items of the Peace Attitude S cale................................... 136 6. Categorical and M ean Responses to the 28 PAS Item s 138 7. G ender Differences on the Peace Attitude Scale Item s.............................................................. 140 8. Racial and Ethnic Differences on the Peace Attitude Scale Item s.............................................................. 142 9. Political Party Differences on the Peace Attitude Scale Item s.............................................................. 144 10. Principal Components Factor Analysis Results of Peace Attitude Scale..................................................................... 146 11. Brief Definitions of Scales: Peace Through Strength, Peace Through Cooperation, and Beliefs About Survival 148 12. Distribution and Reliability D ata for the Peace Attitude S cale......................................................................... 150 13. Racial and Ethnic Differences on the Peace Attitude S cale......................................................................... 152 14. Religion Differences on the Peace Attitude S cale......................................................................... 152 15. Political Party Differences on the Peace Attitude S cale......................................................................... 153 vi 16. Liberal/Conservative Differences on the Peace Attitude S cale......................................................................... 153 17. G ender Differences on the Peace Attitude Scale......................... 155 18. The Relationship between Peace Attitude and Sex Role T raits........................................................................... 155 19. Intercorrelations of Sex Role Traits with Nuclear Threat Responses............................................................... 156 20. Analysis of Variance: The Relationship among Peace Attitudes and Levels of Activist Behavior......................... 158 21. Correlation Coefficients for: Affective and Personality Variables with Peace Attitudes: Total Sam ple........................... 160 22. Correlation Coefficients for: Affective and Personality Variables with Peace Attitudes: Pro-defense Sam ple............... 161 23. Correlation Coefficients for: Affective, Coping, Personality, and G ender Variables with Peace Attitudes: A nti-nuclear........................................................................................ 163 24. Correlation Coefficients for: Affective, Coping, Personality, and G ender Variables with Peace Attitudes: Non-activist Sample........................................................................... 164 25. Intercorrelations of Coping Styles with Nuclear Threat Responses............................................................................... 166 26. Predicting Peace Through Strength: Simultaneous and Step-wise Tegressions Using the Total Sample and W omen and M en Separately (Activist Behaviors Included) 168 27. Predicting Peace Through Strength: Simultaneous and Step-wise Regressions Using the Total Sample and W omen and Men Separately (Activist Behaviors O m itted) 170 28. Predicting Peace Through Cooperation: Simultaneous and Step-wise Regressions Using the Total Sample and W omen and M en Separately (Activist Behaviors Included) 172 29. Predicting Peace Through Cooperation: Simultaneous and Step-wise Regressions Using the Total Sample and W omen and M en Separately (Activist Behaviors O m itted) 173 30. Frequencies and Raw Percentages of Activists and Non-activists on Demographic V ariables..................................... 175 vii 31. Frequencies and Percentages of Sex Role Traits in Activist Groups................................................................................... 177 32. Two-way Analysis of Variance: Main and Interaction Effects of G ender and Activist Stance on the D ependent V ariables........................................................................ 179 33. Analysis of Variance: Effects of the Dependent Variables on Activist Stance............................................................................... 181 34. Activist Group M ean Differences: Controlling for Peace Through Strength and Peace Through C ooperation 185 35. Predicting Pro-defense Activism: Simultaneous and Step-wise Regressions Using the Total Sample and W omen and Men Separately............................................................ 190 36. Predicting Anti-nuclear Activism: Simultaneous and Step-wise Regressions Using the Total Sample and W omen and Men Separately............................ 192 FIG U R E 1. Confirmatory factor analysis results of the Peace Attitude Scale......................................................................... 148 PREFACE It is my view that all research is subjective to the extent that our "world views" or "frames of reference" influence the constructs we choose to study, the questions we choose to ask, and the m anner in which we seek our answers. Given 1 this perspective, I, as a researcher, consider it im portant to point out to the reader the nature of my subjective window. As I began this study, I considered myself to have a "peace through cooperation" orientation toward issues of war, peace, and relationships between nations. It is an attitude I still maintain, perhaps somewhat more humbly. As I became immersed in the literature, i j particularly in the writings of Sowell (1987) and May (1982), I realized that my ! orientation toward the world is largely, though not solely, that of the j unconstrained vision. My "intuitive sense" is that we as a species have I potentialities far beyond those that we presently express. These potentialities j include the ability to resolve conflict rationally without the use of violence. But, | as May (1980) so poignantly points out, the flip side of this optimism is often j ■ despair, despair regarding our potentialities for evil and self-destruction, j In a conversation between Carl Rogers and M artin Buber (May, 1982), ; Rogers once stated, "Man [sic] is basically good." Buber responded, "Man [sic] is : basically good— and evil." It is our beliefs about human nature, goodness, and evil, that is the essence of this research. It is my noble, though meager, attem pt j to explore these fundamental beliefs and how they relate to our ideas and actions regarding war and peace in this era of nuclear weapons. W hen I began this research, the East-W est tensions of the Reagan era seemed unmitigated. As I finalize this research, walls that divide have collapsed j j and Bush and Gorbachev have concluded yet another Summit. Given this I j climate, some may question the usefulness and relevance of this research on peace attitudes. "Have we not arrived?" they ask. My answer is emphatically, "No!" Framing issues of conflict and peace in East-W est relations is a distortion of the world, as well as, of conflict, peace and justice. Tensions between the East and W est are reduced, but not because of any change in our consciousness or capacity to cooperate or non-violently resolve conflict with those who are f j I different from us. Tensions are reduced because we now see our "enemy" as i more like us, and thus more tolerable. Injustice and war persist-in the Middle ! East, in Central America, in South Africa. Countries strive to emulate the U.S., i | in part by obtaining the capacity for nuclear development while hum an needs go } I j unmet. i I While I have stated my personal orientation, I want to stress that my j purpose has been to explore and examine views about peace and not to substantiate which is superior to another. Specifically, I am concerned with identifying two specific attitudes toward peace, their relationship to activist behavior, and their association with certain afffective, coping, personality, and j gender variables. Perhaps in this time of potential transition it is more important i than ever to understand peace attitudes. x CHAPTER I STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM With the advent of the nuclear age, we have come to know quite well the horrors inherent in nuclear development— from the nightmare and devastation at Nagasaki and Hiroshima to the massive sarcophagus created by the Chernobyl disaster. The threat of nuclear annihilation has increased as the nuclear stockpiles of the United States and Soviet Union have m ushroomed from three nuclear weapons in 1945 to over 50,000 today. In the face of this build-up, many have argued that the nuclear arms race is an absurd endeavor that ultimately will lead to self-destruction (Caldicott, 1986; Schell, 1982). Others have argued that precisely because of the arms race and policy of deterrence, the planet has been spared the tragedy of another world war during the past 45 years. Adherents of this position argue that the security and preservation of our nation depend on such a military build-up (Weinberger, 1985). Alongside this growing and often heated political and ideological debate exists the theoretical and research concerns of the social scientist seeking to understand the sociological, psychological, and behavioral effects of living in this era of military development and nuclear weapons. Some of the questions researchers have attem pted to address include: 1. How do people cope psychologically with the threat of nuclear war? 1 2. W hat attitudes and personality correlates are associated with these coping styles? 3 W hat behavioral responses are associated with specific coping styles and attitudes? A small body of literature is emerging on how people cope with or respond to the threat of nuclear war (De Rivera, 1984; Lifton, 1982; Lifton & Falk, 1982; Yankelovich & Doble, 1984). A review of this literature indicates that much, though not all, of it has been exploratory and atheoretical in nature (Diamond & Bachman, 1986). The theoretical perspectives have commonly been based on clinical work and naturalistic observations and have evolved somewhat independently of more established psychological and political theories (Diamond & Bachman, 1986). Attitudes about peace and the behavioral response of activism have been studied in this context. There are, however, three existing paradigms into which some of the research can be placed: (a) general coping theory (De Rivera, 1984; Diamond & Bachman, 1986; Janis, 1985; Maddux & Rogers, 1983; Yankelovich & Doble, 1984); (b) psychodynamic or personality theory (Adorno, Frendel-Brunswik, Levinson, & Sanford, 1950; Budner, 1962; Christie & Geis, 1970; Fromm, 1941; Lifton & Falk, 1982; Mack, 1984; Rokeach, 1960); and (c) feminist theory (Chodorow, 1978; Connell, 1987; Di Leonardo, 1985; Easlea, 1987; Elshtain, 1982; Enloe, 1984; Ruddick, 1984; Williams, 198.9). Each of these theories, independently and together, provide additional depth into how people respond psychologically and behaviorally to the threat of nuclear war. O f particular interest is how individual attitudes toward peace translate into behavioral responses such as activism (Fiske, 1987; Tyler & McGraw, 1983). Political science and social psychology research has shown that generally people 2 j are not politically active (Milbrath, 1981; Nie & Verba, 1975). Those who have | chosen to take an activist stance on certain issues and perceive themselves as | social change agents have provided important information on the antecedents of ! activist behavior. Research specific to activism in relation to the nuclear threat is | still in the exploratory stages (Fiske, 1987; Tyler & McGraw, 1983). Activism in response to this issue is of particular interest not only due to the limited num ber i i of individuals involved but also because it may be necessary to insure the survival of the human species (Fiske, 1987; Lifton & Falk, 1982). Research within each paradigm has given some attention, directly or i | indirectly, to the role of attitudes about peace and related activist behaviors, j Diamond and Bachman (1986) consolidated the general empirical findings on i i nuclear threat responses into the larger framework of coping theory. They | identified activism and its related pro-defense or anti-nuclear attitudes as a form j of coping. From a psychodynamic perspective, activism, either pro-defense or anti-nuclear, is a function of the individual’s personality or social character. 1 Social character, as defined by Fromm (1941), is less specific than individual character and is comprised of an "essential nucleus" of traits that characterize i | members of a specific group. G ender theory contributes an analysis of structures, ; institutions, and inner dynamics that attempts to understand potential differences ^ and similarities between women and m en on issues of war and peace (Chodorow, I j 1978; Connell, 1987; Ruddick, 1984). j Much of this research has assumed, and only sometimes tested, the relationship between individuals’ attitudes about peace and their activist stance. | One of the problems has been psychometric; in order to examine this relationship | j one must measure both activism and peace attitudes. While a reliable and valid measure of activism has been developed (W erner & Roy, 1985), an equally psychometrically sound measure of peace attitudes was not found. Therefore, the first concern of this dissertation was to define, identify, and operationalize the I two prevalent peace attitudes of "peace through strength" and "peace through cooperation" utilizing an instrument developed for this study. An underlying assumption is,that peace attitudes are embedded in the larger ideological context of one’s view, conscious or unconscious, of hum an nature. The instrument was designed to tap the peace attitudes within the context of a dichotomous view of hum an nature. While normative data on this instrument, the Peace Attitude Scale (PAS), was obtained through surveying a cross-section of college students, of particular interest were individuals who had chosen to engage in some form of I j activist behavior related to their peace attitude. As previously noted, hypotheses exist regarding the relationship between peace attitudes, activism, and personality, as well as between peace attitude, activism, and coping and affective 1 states, including nuclear anxiety and spontaneous concern about nuclear war. In | addition, hypotheses exist regarding the variable of gender. These relationships | were studied by examining the associations between "peace through strength" and "peace through cooperation" and activism and various affective, coping, i I personality, and gender variables including nuclear threat salience, nuclear I anxiety, general and nuclear locus of control, general coping, intolerance of ambiguity, Machiavellianism, dogmatism, gender, and sex role traits. The findings may be of value in understanding more thoroughly how individuals cope ! ; with the threat of nuclear war and of the antecedents of activist behavior. 4 Theoretical Assumptions And Background In studying the ways in which people cope with the nuclear threat, it is necessary to look not only at general coping theory (Diamond & Bachman, 1986) t | but to consider contemporary psychoanalytic theory, with its revised gender and sociological formulations, and political science theory as well. All of these i combine to provide an essential framework to understand how people cope. j | Some of the most influential work in the area of coping with the nuclear * | threat has emerged from the psychodynamic tradition. Mack (1984) considered i ! coping within the psychological concept of resistance, consider the possibility of a nuclear holocaust, we pull away, wanting urgently to consider less painful matters. O ur minds and hearts cannot grasp the meaning of a million Hiroshimas or the possible deaths of hundreds of millions, if not billions, of human beings, so we turn away in a kind of benumbed horror and address ourselves to | problems of a more m anageable scale, (p. 263) i j Lifton and Falk (1982) described this response as "psychic numbing," a term j developed from Lifton’s extensive interviews with Hiroshima survivors. Psychic | numbing is a process that embodies a num ber of classical psychoanalytic defense ■ mechanisms, including repression, suppression, isolation, denial, undoing, ■ reaction formation, and projection. At its core is the repression of feelings i | toward the multiple implications of nuclear annihilation. Lifton (1982) argued i ! that, while essentially all individuals experience some level of psychic numbing, ! people vary in the extent to which they employ psychic numbing as a defense or ! coping strategy. i Lifton’s theory regarding psychic numbing has some support from i | quantitative research using the Nuclear Anxiety Questionnaire (NAQ) : (Newcomb, 1986). Newcomb hypothesized a factor of Nuclear Denial comprised 5 of items assessing a lack of worry about nuclear war and beliefs about survivability. A factor analysis of the NAQ confirmed the Nuclear Denial factor j which is congruent conceptually with the phenom enon of psychic numbing. The i Nuclear Denial factor correlated positively with the factor of nuclear support i (favoring nuclear weapons and technology), and negatively with the factors of j fear for the future and nuclear concern (fear and apprehension of nuclear uses). Newcomb suggested that these results indicate that those who advocate nuclear proliferation also minimize and/or deny the possible disastrous results of such i ! actions. j Interestingly, studies with the NAQ have indicated that women and men i differ in their degree of psychic numbing or denial, with women scoring lower on ■ denial and higher on nuclear anxiety in general (Newcomb, 1986). Psychic | numbing or denial is not the only area where gender differences are reported. For example, other studies have found that m en support war more readily than women (Droba, 1931; Droba & Quackenbush, 1942; Greenstein, 1961) and that j ; m en are less concerned about nuclear issues than women (Schwebel & Schwebel, 1981). A more recent study (Newcomb, 1988a) has examined the relationship of sex role orientation to nuclear anxiety and found that the more masculine-typed were also more supportive of nuclear proliferation and denied the threat of nuclear war. Paralleling these gender differences the more feminine-typed were i ' frightened and concerned about nuclear proliferation, were more fearful for the ! future, and denied less. While most studies suggest that there are differences in the ways m en and women, or feminine and masculine oriented individuals, respond to the issue of war, this difference has not always been consistent (Zur, 1 Morrison, & Zaretsky, 1985). 6 The feminist reformulations of psychoanalytic theory (Chodorow, 1978) provide a framework in which to understand possible gender differences regarding nuclear attitudes. Chodorow combined psychoanalytic object-relations : theory and sociological considerations to explain the psychological difference | between m en and women. M en are characterized as more positionally oriented, | more detached from their feelings, and more concerned with the boundaries i between individuals and between men and women. Chodorow attributes this to i | the boys’ oedipal experience with their mothers and their need (and the m others’ ! need) to experience the boy children as separate. Women, on the other hand, are I characterized as having more fluid boundaries and a more relational orientation i I to their world. W omen are more concerned with the inter-relatedness of human i beings. Chodorow attributes this to girls’ pre-oedipal and oedipal experiences j with their mothers, which remains semi-symbiotic. Little girls do not see j themselves as separate from others, as do little boys. W omen fear isolation; m en fear intimacy (Pollack & Gilligan, 1982). Applying this theory of psychic I structuring to the concern of war and nuclear war, it can be hypothesized that m en and women experience different feelings, beliefs, and anxieties. While Chodorow (1978) emphasized inner dynamics, Connell (1987) analyzed the interplay of structures and institutions in constructing the femininities and masculinities of our time and place. H e argued that "femininities and masculinities are not essences" as scalar psychological science suggests, but "are ways of living certain relationships" (p. 179). These "ways" are complex, characterized by the global subordination of women with ethnic, generational, and class-related patterns. 7 Psychodynamic theory provides a framework to conceptualize some of the specific aspects of coping with the nuclear threat such as psychic numbing and \ gender differences. M ore broadly, it offers hypotheses and guides research ; regarding how personality structure, or social character, predicts attitudes toward i i peace (Adorno et al., 1950; Fromm, 1941; Levinson, 1957). For example, j empirical research on the personality variables of authoritarianism (Adorno et j i al., 1950), intolerance of ambiguity (Budner, 1962), and Machiavellianism (Christi & Geis, 1970) suggest that a conservative ideological orientation is related to more of each of these traits. While there are some theoretical and i methodological problems with this research, lower levels of intolerance of ambiguity, authoritarianism, and Machiavellianism may be related to a liberal orientation. I G eneral coping theory takes a cognitive orientation and provides an additional framework to understand responses to the threat of nuclear war. Diamond and Bachman (1986) reviewed a num ber of partial taxonomies that 1 described various reactions to the nuclear threat (De Rivera, 1984; Yankelovich & Doble, 1984) and attem pted to reconcile these with general theories of coping. The two general theories they found most applicable to nuclear threat coping were Rogers' protection motivation theory (Maddux & Rogers, 1983; Rogers & Mewborn, 1976) and Janis and M ann’s (1977) conflict theory. Based on these 1 comparisons, Diamond and Bachman delineated seven different strategies people utilize to cope with the nuclear threat. The description of each strategy included ; beliefs, attitudes, and affect associated with the coping styles. No studies were i found which examines the associations between general coping style and nuclear threat coping style. However, such a relationship poses some interesting i 8 possibilities for exploratory study. While identified but not elaborated on by | Diam ond and Bachman, each style of nuclear threat coping reflected an ideology i j or attitude about peace— what it is and how it might be achieved an d /o r I j maintained. The seven coping styles which are described in detail in Chapter 2 are: (a) failure to cope; (b) survivalism; (c) tension-reduction activism; (d) deterrence activism; (e) fatalism; (f) deference to authority; and (g) non- i 1 imminent problem. Two peace attitudes-the "peace through strength" and the i I "peace through cooperation" orientations-can be associated clearly with four of I ^ i the seven coping styles delineated. i | In the United States, the two peace attitudes of "peace through strength" j and "peace through cooperation" seem to be the most prevalent (Kimmel, 1985). | These two peace attitudes reflect the prevailing concern that nuclear war must be I avoided. At the same time, they reflect differences regarding how nuclear war should be avoided. Individuals who hold different peace attitudes appear to have fundamentally different beliefs about human nature and visions of the world | (Friedman, 1984; Kimmel, 1985; Lifton, 1982; Sowell, 1987). Sowell (1987) described these visions or beliefs about hum an nature as "pre-analytic cognitive acts." They are what individuals sense or feel, intuitively, before any systematic reasoning is constructed. Sowell (1987) admitted that a strict dualistic division of world views is somewhat simplistic. Yet, while there are actually "innumerable combinations and permutations," most world views can be classified into two ! general schema, which can both be traced through the centuries in political, ' economic, philosophical, and psychological theories. These are the "constrained" ; and the "unconstrained" visions. The constrained view sees hum an beings as i ! "tragically limited creatures whose selfish and dangerous impulses can be 9 ' contained only by social contrivances which themselves produce unhappy side effects" (p. 35). This view has been represented in history by such individuals as Adam Smith, Edmund Burke, and Thomas Hobbes. The unconstrained view sees the "potentialities of human nature as extending far beyond what is currently i manifested" (p. 35). This view has been represented in history by the work of I W illiam Godwin, Antoine-Nicolas Condorcet, and Jean-Jacques Rousseau, j From this instinctive sense of the world, or view of hum an nature, political ideology emerges. The characteristics that distinguish the two peace attitudes of "peace through strength" and "peace through cooperation" can be summarized I ^ within the context of these world views. Each view of hum an nature reflects i | differing beliefs and values related to: (a) the basic relationships between | nations (particularly between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R.), (b) definitions of and i the nature of conflict, (c) purposes of government and nuclear weapons, and | (d) definitions of security and peace. For the purpose of illustration, the "peace through strength" and the "peace through cooperation" orientations are explored ; within the context of the U.S.-Soviet relations of the 1980s. Given the emerging t , East-W est political climate or political and military situations in other countries, i it might well be appropriate to couch these concepts in terms of other i 1 "adversaries" or "enemies." i Peace Through Strength In recent history, the political context for this position can be traced from i J the Nixon era through Reagan’s administration. The U.S.-Soviet detente of the i 1 Nixon-Brezhnev era atrophied under the Ford and Carter administrations. The relationship between the two superpowers deteriorated further with the Soviet i 10 j occupation of Afghanistan in 1979 and the U.S. election of Ronald Reagan in I 1980 (MccGwire, 1988). During the Reagan era, the Soviets were perceived as engaging in an aggressive nuclear arms build-up, resulting in a substantial Soviet | advantage over the U.S. in conventional (non-nuclear) weapons and an at least I equal nuclear force capability (W einberger, 1985; Woolsey, 1984). The build-up was perceived by the Reagan administration as motivated by the relentless i ■ determ ination of the Soviets to destroy the U.S. and, ultimately, to gain world dom ination (Frank & Rivard, 1986). Those who interpreted the Soviet buildup i as a potential threat to the U.S. generally supported the defense policy of : deterrence. "Deterrence is a situation in which neither party destroys the other's I j means of threat, but each has the capability to damage the other if the peace is * broken" (Boulding, 1988, p. 161). This policy holds that the Soviet warfighting j doctrine reflects an offensive orientation evidenced through direct invasion ' ■ (Afghanistan) and by proxy (Poland, Angola, Vietnam, Nicaragua). The two J : goals of this policy, according to W einberger (1985), are: "to deter aggression and coercion against the U nited States and its allies, friends, and vital interests," and "Should deterrence fail, to seek the earliest term ination of conflict on terms 1 | favorable to the United States ...." In this context, "favorable" refers to winning any war in which the U.S. is involved. Despite current shifts in U.S.-Soviet tensions, the policy of deterrence is still favored by many politicians, analysts, and i others. Underlying this political orientation is a view of the world and hum an ! 1 nature distinctly different from that held by those adhering to the "peace through cooperation" view. Kimmel (1985) wrote from his "peace through cooperation" | bias and summarizes the world view of "peace through strength" as perceiving the 11 ! relationship between nations as basically competitive. Those who believe in i peace through strength m aintain a certain ethnocentrism about the United States and perceive other nations dualistically, as either allies or opponents. The conflict model utilized by this group is one of "win-lose" which provides support for military competition and the arms race. The purpose of the government, as seen by this group, is to engage in peacekeeping through the use of deterrence, with nuclear weapons development and deployment playing an im portant role in ] this process. Hard-line proponents of deterrence view compromise between i | nations in the process of arms control as a negative political move, given the I 1 deeply ingrained differences between the two societies in ideological principles and values. Security is based on the power of military force and, if needed, violence. Peace is defined as a neutral, passive phenom enon-the absence of conflict. i Sowell (1987) provided perhaps a more compassionate or unbiased explanation of the "peace through strength" world view advocates based on constrained vision. While both constrained and unconstrained visionaries prefer ! articulated reason to force, they differ on the extent of efficacy of articulated j reason. The constrained vision sees articulated reason in regards to war as I limited, since war is taken for granted as inherent in hum an nature and requiring i control or containment by social institutions. W ar is viewed as a perfectly j rational act by those who anticipate to gain from it. If war is to be avoided by a ! peace-seeking nation, the actions necessary to contain it must include: (a) raise , the cost of war to potential aggressors by military preparedness and military l alliances, (b) arouse the public to awareness of dangers and threat, (c) prom ote patriotism and a willingness to fight, (d) rely on your adversaries’ awareness of 12 your military power more than on verbal communication, (e) negotiate only within the context of deterrent strength and avoid concessions or blackmail, and (f) rely more on the good sense and fortitude of the public at large than on moralists and intellectuals who are "more readily swayed by words and fashions" (Sowell, 1987). Understanding Peace Through Cooperation While the "peace through strength" supporters interpreted Soviet military buildup as offensive, supporters of the "peace through cooperation" position viewed it as the Soviets’ attem pt to protect their borders. Completely exposed on j its west border, the U.S.S.R. has been violated with repeated invasions j throughout history: from the Teutonic Knights in the thirteenth century to H itler and the G erm an army in the twentieth century (Treadgold, 1990). Subsequently, i | the policies of Soviet leaders were motivated by fear. In addition to this differing interpretation of Soviet politics and militaristic behavior, adherents to the "peace i j through cooperation" position are politically concerned that the policy of nuclear ' deterrence results in an inherently "unstable and unsustainable" nuclear balance (Krauthammer, 1984). Given this instability, there is concern that the policy of i deterrence will eventually break down, resulting in full-scale nuclear war and 1 probably annihilation of all of life on the planet. I i | As with the "peace through strength" position, the "peace through [ cooperation" stance is em bedded in a distinct world view and view of hum an I nature. According to Kimmel (1985), those who have adopted the "peace i through cooperation" stance ideologically view the relationships betw een nations j as having the potential for cooperative co-existence. They stress the need for cooperation, empathy, and improved communication between nations and view the conflicts between nations as stemming largely from a lack of these efforts. | The conflict model utilized is therefore one of "win-win," in which compromises : can be reached which benefit all the nations concerned. The role of government | in peacekeeping is seen as facilitating this process by engaging in negotiation and j compromise with other nations. Compromise is seen as a positive component of I 1 coexistence. These negotiations and compromises deal with arms reduction, as well as other aspects of the relationship between nations. Security is increased by an improvement in communication, the prom otion of trust, and the correction of | social and/or cultural misperceptions between nations. Peace is viewed as an active phenom enon in which institutions facilitate communication, empathy, and cooperation among individuals and nations. This world view is em bedded in a | conceptualization of hum an nature as potentially g ood-a Lockean (Allport, ! j 1968) or Rousseaunean (Friedman, 1984) position. ! Kimmel’s (1985) description is similar to Sowell’s (1987) unconstrained j vision, in which war is seen as contrary to hum an nature and caused by ! institutions. W ar is explained as a "failure of understanding, whether caused by 1 lack of forethought, lack of communication, or emotions overriding judgments" j i (p. 143). The steps necessary to maintain peace, for those with an unconstrained i ! vision, include (a) more influence for the intellectually or morally advanced I j portions of the population, (b) better communications betw een potential I enemies, (c) reduction of militant rhetoric, (d) a restraint on arm am ent I ! production or military alliances, (e) a de-emphasis of nationalism or patriotism, and (f) negotiating outstanding differences with potential adversaries as a means ' of reducing possible causes of war (Sowell, 1987). i 14 Given the current warming trend in the cold war rhetoric, the dramatic transitions in Eastern Europe, and improved U.S.-Soviet relations symbolized by the signing of the I.N.F. Treaty and the Bush-Gorbachev Summits, there may ultimately emerge some major variations to these two currently prevalent peace attitudes. For example, a relatively new peace attitude, described as the "peace through communication" attitude (Allison, Carnesale, & Nye, 1985) includes aspects of both the "peace through strength" and the "peace through cooperation" < positions. Referred to as the "owl" position, its tenets include the enhancem ent of crisis stability, reduction of the probability and impact of nuclear-related accidents due to mechanical problems or hum an or computer error, the development of procedures for term ination of war should one occur, the i j prevention and m anagem ent of crises, the strengthening of nonproliferation j efforts, and the limitation of misperceptions. Given the embeddedness of the ; constrained and unconstrained views in history and current society, however, one i j wonders about the possibility of a significant shift to an altogether distinct and i new position. At this time, at least, "peace through strength" and "peace through cooperation" rem ain the most prevalent peace attitudes and, as such, were of primary concern in this study, i The adoption of a peace attitude can be conceptualized as an internal j coping strategy. The process of moving from one’s internal coping style 1 (adoption of peace attitude) to an external expression of one’s peace attitude (in ■ the form of activism) is a phenom enon only beginning to be understood (Fiske, i 1987). Based on the two peace attitudes described, activism as an external coping strategy may take one of at least two forms: (a) tension-reduction activism, which i ' is ideologically congruent with the "peace through cooperation" position, and 15 (b) deterrence activism, which is ideologically congruent with the "peace through strength" position. While activist behavior has been examined in a num ber of research studies, I the results of Tyler and McGraw (1983) are some of the most widely quoted in the area of activism related to the nuclear threat. Their exploratory study of peace activists and survivalists indicated that the perception of efficacy is a key variable that distinguishes activists from non-activists. Efficacy related to j judgments of preventability was of particular importance for the peace activists and efficacy related to judgments of survivability was of particular importance to survivalist behavior. Unfortunately, other than the Tyler and McGraw (1983) study, most research has focused only on anti-nuclear or peace activist behavior and has provided little if any information on the behavioral antecedents of pro defense activist behavior. While some research results have been contradictory, studies of activists, | either pro-defense or anti-nuclear or both, have resulted in the following findings, j Personal and nuclear internal locus of control are higher in activists (Erdahl & ; Rounds, 1986; Tyler & McGraw, 1983). The salience of the nuclear threat is i higher for individuals engaged in peace activism than in those who are not, ! including those engaged in pro-defense activism (Hamilton, 1987). Nuclear anxiety, though not nuclear despair, tends to be higher for those who are peace activists than for those who are not (Diamond & Bachman, 1986). Given the exploratory nature of most of the nuclear threat coping research, 1 as well as some of the inconsistent findings, many researchers stress the | importance of further study of individual responses-internal and external— to the threat of nuclear war. Fiske (1987) has described the importance of obtaining a i ; 16 m ore thorough understanding of people’s reactions to nuclear war and of correlating these reactions with beliefs, feelings, and actions on both similar and dissimilar concerns. Mayton (1987a) has called for further study of value systems of persons who are politically active on behalf of pro-freeze and pro-strength i policies, in order to verify and extend the existing research. Newcomb (1988a) has noted the need for further research to evaluate individual characteristics that t j may account more accurately for the individual’s experience of nuclear anxiety. To support this additional research, Mayton (1986) has argued for the use of m easures which have established reliability, validity, appropriate factor structures, and are used in the context of theoretical orientations that are more than simply intuitive. Statement Of The Problem Research is needed to understand further the ways in which individuals respond to the threat of nuclear annihilation. One frequently identified i ! component of a response is an individual’s adoption of a specific attitude toward 1 peace. Research is needed to develop a scale that will effectively m easure the j attitudes of "peace through strength" and "peace through cooperation." In addition, research is needed to investigate the relationship of these two peace attitudes and activist behavior with certain affective, coping, personality, and t gender correlates. Specifically, the correlates studied include: nuclear threat i J salience, nuclear anxiety, general coping, general and nuclear locus of control, j intolerance of ambiguity, Machiavellianism, dogmatism, and gender. 17 Purpose Of The Study Since an integral component of one’s style of coping with the threat of nuclear war is one’s attitude toward peace, the primary purpose of this study was j to: (a) identify and define the dimensions that characterize peace attitudes, j (b) construct a reliable and valid measure based on this definition (the Peace Attitude Scale, PAS), and (c) confirm the hypothesized factors of "peace through strength" and "peace through cooperation" as measured by the scale. In addition to the development of the PAS, the purpose of this study was to investigate the correlational relationship between peace attitudes as assessed by this measure and student activism with other affective, coping, personality, and gender correlates including nuclear threat salience, nuclear anxiety, general coping style, ! general and nuclear locus of control, intolerance of ambiguity, Machiavellianism, | dogmatism, gender, and sex role traits. In summary, the purpose of this study was to address the following questions: j 1. Can individuals’ "peace through strength" and "peace through cooperation" attitudes be reliably and validly assessed through the use of the ! Peace Attitudes Scale? 2. Is a "peace through strength" attitude associated with pro-defense behavior? Is a "peace through cooperation" attitude associated with anti-nuclear behavior? 3. Do peace attitudes ("peace through strength" or "peace through i | cooperation") vary according to the following affective, coping, personality, and ! gender variables: nuclear threat salience, nuclear anxiety, general and nuclear j locus of control, general coping style, intolerance of ambiguity, I j Machiavellianism, dogmatism, gender, and sex role traits? I ; 4. Does taking an activist stance (pro-defense or anti-nuclear) also relate to the following affective, coping, personality, and gender variables: nuclear j threat salience, nuclear anxiety, general coping style, general and nuclear locus of i ! control, intolerance of ambiguity, Machiavellianism, dogmatism, gender, and sex J * role traits? I 5. Which affective, coping, personality, and gender dimensions studied best predict peace attitude and activist behavior? i 6. Which combination of affective, coping, personality, and gender dimensions studied are the best predictors of peace attitude and activist behavior? i ! i j Assumptions 1 This research was based on the following assumptions: 1. People have attitudes about peace. 2. Peace attitudes are em bedded in beliefs, conscious or unconscious, j about hum an nature. 3. Peace attitudes are associated with some psychological dimension. ; 4. Self-report responses to objective, Likert-type questions can provide i j information on peace attitudes. I t I Hypotheses j Based on the previously noted findings and research questions, this study attem pted to test the following hypotheses: 1. The Peace Attitude Scale is comprised of at least two factors: the Peace Through Strength factor and the Peace Through Cooperation factor. 2. The Peace Through Strength factor is positively associated with individuals engaged in deterrence or pro-defense activism. 3. The Peace Through Cooperation factor is positively associated with individuals engaged in tension-reduction or peace activism. 4. The Peace Through Strength factor is positively associated with individuals who are self-selected Republicans and who report being more conservative than liberal. \ 5. The Peace Through Cooperation factor is positively associated with j individuals who are self-selected Dem ocrats and who identify themselves as more I liberal than conservative. 6. Nuclear threat salience is associated with anti-nuclear activism and is i less associated with pro-defense activism. 7. Nuclear threat salience is positively associated with support for Peace Through Cooperation and negatively associated with Peace Through Strength. 1 8. Nuclear anxiety is positively associated with anti-nuclear activists but not I with pro-defense activists. j 9. Nuclear anxiety is positively associated with adherence to Peace Through i Cooperation but not with adherence to Peace Through Strength. 10. Personal and nuclear loci of control are positively associated with both pro-defense and anti-nuclear activists. ( 11. Powerful others and chance nuclear loci of control are positively ■ associated with the non-activist population. 20 12. W omen or feminine/androgynous typed individuals support Peace Through Cooperation more than Peace Through Strength. 13. M en or masculine typed individuals support Peace Through Strength m ore than Peace Through Cooperation. 14. Anti-nuclear activists score lower than pro-defense activists on intolerance of ambiguity and Machiavellian personality measures. 15. Those adhering to Peace Through Cooperation score lower on intolerance of ambiguity and Machiavellian personality measures, than Peace Through Strength adherents. | 16. Pro-defense and anti-nuclear activists score higher on dogmatism I | personality measures than the non-activist population. 17. G eneral coping style is associated with a particular nuclear threat coping style. Given the dearth of research, this is considered exploratory and no specific prediction is m ade at this time. Delimitations | The following delimitations applied to this study: j 1. In terms of age and current life pursuit, this study was delimited to : undergraduate students between the ages 17 and 32, attending college. , 2. This study was delimited geographically to students attending colleges I and universities in Southern California and Kansas. I 3. In assessing peace attitudes, this research was delimited to the study of the orientations of "peace through strength" and "peace through cooperation." i There may be additional peace attitude orientations such as the "peace through 21 communication" position (Allison et al., 1985) that the research design and data- i collecting procedures were not designed to assess. i i i 1 Definitions Of Terms The following terms are used throughout this dissertation and are central to understanding the present investigation: peace through strength— An attitude toward peace which perceives military strength and the notion of deterrence as imperative in preventing nuclear war. peace through cooperation— An attitude toward peace which is concerned with | cooperative co-existence between nations coupled with nuclear I disarmament. i I activism— This study was concerned with activism in relation to the nuclear threat. As such, activism is defined as a behavioral response to the nuclear j arms race which is bipolar in nature (actions either oriented toward j supporting expansion of nuclear preparedness or toward reducing our 1 nuclear arsenals) and varying in level of magnitude or intensity (W erner & Roy, 1985). ! nuclear threat salience-Nuclear threat salience refers to the conspicuousness of the nuclear threat in feelings, thoughts, and actions. It does not precipitate attitude change, but concretizes and brings the nuclear issue into awareness (Fiske, 1985). ; nuclear anxiety-Nuclear anxiety refers to the pervasive and insidious worry that j may perm eate many areas of a person’s life due to the threat of nuclear 22 atrocity. It is operationalized with four latent factors of nuclear concern, nuclear support, fear of the future, and nuclear denial (Newcomb, 1986). internal nuclear locus of control— Since locus of control may vary across j situations, Erdahl and Rounds (1986) developed a tripartite model for locus of control in relation to nuclear issues. Internal nuclear locus of control identifies a sense of personal control over issues related to the nuclear threat. powerful others nuclear locus of control— This external dimension is concerned | with beliefs that nuclear issues are in the hands of powerful others, j chance nuclear locus of control— This external dimension focuses on the role of 1 chance and fate in determining nuclear issues and, potentially, nuclear i annihilation. i I internal and external locus of control— R otter (1966) defined internality and j externality as perceptions of contingency relationships betw een an ' individual’s own behavior and the events which follow that behavior. In our I culture, a person who perceives a reinforcem ent as not contingent on his or her action usually attributes this to: (a) luck, chance, fate; (b) powerful I f others; or (c) unpredictability. This is labeled a belief in external control. On the other hand, if the individual perceives the event as contingent upon his or her own behavior or characteristics, then the belief is labeled internal control. intolerance of ambiguity— Intolerance of ambiguity is defined as "the tendency to perceive (i.e., interpret) ambiguous situations as sources of threat" (Budner, 1962, p. 29). 23 tolerance of am biguity-Tolerance of ambiguity is defined as "the tendency to perceive ambiguous situations as desirable" (Budner, 1962, p. 29). M achiavellianism -M achiavellianism refers to how one generally deals with people, particularly in the arena of m anipulation and one’s beliefs regarding the extent to which others can be m anipulated in interpersonal interactions (Christie & Geis, 1970). j dogmatism— The concept of dogmatism attem pts to define individual differences in openness or closedness of belief systems. According to Rokeach (1960), open and closed mindedness are on a continuum, on which low ideological dogmatism is congruent with open mindedness. The extent to which a person’s belief system is open is "the extent to which the person can receive, evaluate, and act on relevant information received from the outside on its own intrinsic merits, unencum bered by irrelevant factors in the situation arising from within the person or from the outside" (p.57). general coping style— G eneral coping style is defined as any goal-directed i | sequence of cognitive operations for the purpose of adapting to internal/external demands or challenges (Heppner, 1986). Specifically, avoidant and active styles are considered in this study (Folkm an & Lazarus, i 1980). gender— This term is distinct from the ubiquitous term, "sex," in analyses of differences and similarities betw een women and men. W hile "sex" is the biological classification of male or female, "gender" is a socially constructed phenom enon (Unger, 1979). The term "gender" was selected for use in this l study in order to emphasize that differences or similarities betw een male and female subjects are not attributable to any biological or genetic i j 24 explanatory schema. One measure, though obviously limited in usefulness, is | the dichotomous categorization of male and female. ' sex role traits-While frequently sex role identity is concerned with global self- i concepts of masculinity and femininity, this study confined itself to socially constructed, stereotyped, and self-reported instrum ental (masculine) and expressive (feminine) personality traits (Spence & Helmreich, 1978; Spence, Helmreich, & Stapp, 1974). i i 25 CH A PTER II REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE The purpose of this chapter is to survey previous research that addresses questions posed in Chapter 1. Specifically, this review concerns the following questions: 1. Can "peace through strength" and "peace through cooperation" attitudes be reliably and validly assessed through the use of the Peace A ttitude Scale? 2. Is a "peace through strength" attitude associated with pro-defense behavior? Is a "peace through cooperation" attitude associated with anti-nuclear behavior? 3. D o peace attitudes ("peace through strength" or "peace through cooperation") vary according to the following affective, coping, personality, and gender variables: nuclear threat salience, nuclear anxiety, general and nuclear locus of control, general coping style, intolerance-tolerance of ambiguity, Machiavellianism, dogmatism, gender, and sex-role trait? 4. Does activist behavior (pro-defense or anti-nuclear) also relate to the following affective, coping, personality, and gender variables: nuclear threat salience, nuclear anxiety, general and nuclear locus of control, general coping style, intolerance of ambiguity, Machiavellianism, dogmatism, gender, and sex- role trait? 26 5. Which of the affective, coping, personality, and gender dimensions under I < study best predict peace attitude and activist behavior? | 6. Which combination of the affective, coping, personality, and gender dimensions under study are the best predictors of peace attitude and activist behavior? The chapter is organized to review first the research on the dependent I variables of pro-defense and anti-nuclear activism and peace attitudes. Because | the affective variables of nuclear threat salience and nuclear anxiety have been i i associated with direction and intensity of activism and peace attitudes, the ! findings of this research were reported within the discussion of the dependent 1 variables. The two dependent variables of activism and peace attitudes have j been previously examined within the theoretical boundaries of several paradigms: i | (a) personality or psychodynamic theory, (b) coping theory, and (c) feminist ! j theory. Therefore, a review of the theoretical and research literature in these I areas on the dependent variables of activism and peace attitudes was supplied. i Based on the literature review of these three paradigms, the independent variables for use in this study were identified. Finally, possible relationships betw een the independent variables, including the affective variables of salience i and anxiety, and the dependent variables of activism and peace attitudes were ; examined. i i Research Findings Related to Pro-defense and Anti-nuclear Activism , Pro-defense and anti-nuclear activism can be viewed within the larger ' fram ework of political participation. Political science and political socialization theory and research have long sought to understand the question, "what forces ; 27 j lead one individual to be active while another is not?" (Nie & Verba, 1975). Broadly defined, political participation is comprised of those actions of private citizens by which they seek to influence or to support government and politics I (Milbrath, 1981). Participation can be conceptualized in unidimensional and multi- j dimensional terms. M ilbrath (1981) illustrated the unidimensional nature of i ! participation with the analogy of roles played at a Rom an gladiatorial contest. ! "Apathetics" are persons withdrawn from the political process and who do not j even watch the show. "Spectators" are persons minimally involved in politics, who j "cheer, clap, and finally vote to decide who has won the battle." The "gladiators" | are the active combatants. And yet, this unidimensional conceptualization is i I inadequate to describe the multiple ways in which individuals do participate. i | Cross-national studies (V erba & Nie, 1972) have identified a num ber of basic i I modes in which people participate. The modes include voting, party and j | campaign work, community activism, contacting officials, protesting, and , communicating (e.g., writing letters, engaging in political discussions). While : there are positive correlations between the activities of individuals across different modes, the correlations between activities within the same mode are much higher. Participation does not, as was earlier thought, form a G uttm an | scale implying unidimensionality. As revealed by the factor analysis of Nie and V erba (1975), those who engage in relatively infrequent or difficult acts of participation do not automatically engage in easier or more frequent acts. ! Different modes of participation are preferred by citizens who have different attitudes toward politics (Milbrath, 1981). Voting is the only mode of political activity that a large part of the citizenry engages in (Nie & Verba, 1975). Beyond that, only 11% of the population can be considered "complete actives": individuals engaged in all modes of political participation at least once in their lives (V erba & Nie, 1972). Inactives do not participate at all politically and comprise approximately 22% of the population (V erba & Nie, 1972). W hat are the characteristics of that small percentage of the population who are "complete actives?" They tend to be male (e.g., the voting rate, while narrowing, is about 10% lower for women), middle-aged (rather than young or old), relatively wealthy, well-educated, probably part of the dom inant ethnic, religious, or racial group, psychologically involved in politics, willing to take sides in political conflicts, civic minded, and have a high level of political efficacy (Milbrath, 1981; Nie & Verba, 1975). The characteristics of activists as identified by political scientists are not Unlike the characteristics revealed in the research on anti-nuclear and other peace activists (Fiske, 1987; Taylor & McGraw, 1983). Unfortunately, there is far less research on pro-defense activists, although some of the characteristics seem to associate with those identified by political scientists. The following review looks more specifically at some of these characteristics. Demographics Because gender-related variables were of particular interest in this study, gender theory and research are reserved for a separate section later in this chapter. The demographic variables of socioeconomic position and political party association are discussed here. Findings by Tyler and McGraw (1983) supported the notion that activists, in . | this case peace activists, were more likely to be educated and well-off. However, j these findings have not been consistently supported (Fiske, Pratto, & Pavelchak, i 1983; M ilburn & W atanabe, 1985). In terms of peace activists, but not pro defense activists, research findings indicated that their political orientation is liberal or D em ocrat (Tyler & McGraw, 1983; W erner & Roy, 1985). The | political orientation of pro-defense activists is more conservative and Republican I . (W erner & Roy, 1985), but less research has been done on this group. Am erican t | liberals and conservatives had misperceptions of the Soviet U nion during the I j 1980s, which represented the divergent ideologies of both parties (Bialer, 1985). j No research was found that suggested whether or not peace activists or pro- i defense activists were largely members of the dom inant ethnic, racial, or religious group although conflicting findings regarding the religiosity of peace activists j have been reported (Mayton, 1987a). | I j Civic M indedness j The concept of civic mindedness is similar to Tyler and McGraw’s (1983) i | concept of the attribution of moral responsibility. The freeze movement i ' maintains a recurrent them e that the threat of nuclear war transcends political boundaries and is primarily a moral issue. One example of this dictum to fulfill i | m oral obligations by opposing the nuclear arms race is found in the pastoral ; letter of the National Conference of Catholic Bishops (Ostling, 1982). Tyler and ‘ McGraw (1983) predicted that attributions of moral responsibility would i l distinguish peace activists (participants in the freeze movement) from pro- ■ defense activists (survivalists). This hypothesis that the freeze activists would ! i ! 30 J report a greater sense of moral responsibility than the individually oriented I survivalists was supported. However, it should be noted that the pro-defense i j group studied, the survivalists, comprised a very small percentage of those who might consider themselves pro-defense activists. Davis and Taylor (1987) examined civic mindedness in two other pro defense groups: (a) active duty soldiers, and (b) veterans. The study was carried l out through the University of Kentucky at Fort Knox and included only subjects i with long-term military careers. Some research has suggested that exposure to authoritarian structures may disrupt development of democratic political ! participation skills (Almond & Verba, 1965; Elden, 1981). The results of the ; Fort Knox study, however, refuted those findings, showing that active-duty i soldiers acquired civic orientations needed for political participation, just as i ! civilians did. By contrast, veterans were less politically active, less interested in j politics, less tolerant, and less knowledgeable than civilians or active duty ' soldiers. The researchers proposed that veterans’ marginal status was determ inant of limited civic mindedness. Admittedly, the life experience of form er career soldiers differs from those of other marginalized groups, such as the young, the poor, racial minorities, and women. However, civilian readjustm ent can involve economic, political, and psychological costs for long term soldiers, impacting on civic mindedness. A broader cross section of the pro-defense population rem ains to be studied in regards to m oral responsibility and civic mindedness. 31 j Political Efficacy j Political efficacy is discussed m ore thoroughly later in this chapter within the context of research and theory on the independent variable of locus of control. At this point, however, the results of two studies should be noted which have provided support for the notion that activists tend to have higher levels of political efficacy. j Bolton (1972) found that the "absence of feelings of powerlessness" characterized individuals engaged in varying degrees of peace activist behavior (from conventional to radical). Based on the work of Seeman (1959), he delineated five types of alienation: powerlessness, meaninglessness, ! normlessness, isolation, and self-estrangement. Scales were developed to ] m easure each of these dimensions. Powerlessness was defined as "the expectancy | or probability held by the individual that his [sic] own behavior cannot determ ine | the occurrence of the outcomes, or reinforcem ents he [sic] seeks" (Seeman, I 1959). This dimension of alienation distinguished both conventional and radical j peace activists from the general population, by the absence of feelings of j powerlessness. These results are congruent with the political participation | literature that states that feelings of personal and political efficacy are ! characteristic of activists. i | Tyler and McGraw (1983) studied some psychological antecedents to | behavioral responses to the nuclear threat and found efficacy was a key variable. * The individuals studied were not randomly selected, but were associated with ! groups known to have responded behaviorally— nuclear freeze activists and ! survivalists. Respondents w ere compared to a general public sample. W hile this j study was exploratory in nature and the conclusions must be considered with I : 32 caution due to the nature of the samples and the cross-sectional nature of the data, it is a frequently cited study. It is of particular interest in relationship to the present research because of its attem pt to examine the behavioral antecedents of * both the peace and pro-defense activist. Because of this focus, the design and the ' ! * ! findings of the study are presented in some detail here. j The independent variables studied were: judgments of risk, efficacy i ] judgments, attributions of causality and moral responsibility, and general political orientations. The authors hypothesized that demographic variables such as j education, income, and political orientation might explain differences in behavioral responses. They also hypothesized that higher estim ated personal risk or vulnerability would lead to engaging in some form of protective behavior, I either by attem pting to prevent or survive nuclear war. Based on the political science research on the importance of political efficacy in participation and the work of R otter (1966) on personal efficacy and locus of control, they hypothesized that those taking protective action, of whatever form, would have some feeling that their actions would be efficacious. Three causal sources of 1 nuclear war were identified as: (a) chance or accidents, (b) the government, and | (c) the public. It was hypothesized that those taking action would attribute i I causation of nuclear war to controllable rather than uncontrollable causes. j i ' ; Controllable was defined as attributions of causality to the public and to the government, which citizens can influence via political action. U ncontrollable t i causes were attributed to chance. The final hypothesis involved attribution of ' j m oral responsibility and was discussed earlier in this chapter. i | To summarize their findings, the two modes of behavioral response i ! (survival and prevention) were not mutually exclusive. However, while there was i I 33 some overlap, one response predom inates over the other. In addition, those who felt that nuclear war was survivable (survivalists) did not feel it was preventable, and visa versa. While perceived risk influenced prevention behavior, it did not influence survival behavior. Demographic variables did not predict behaviors, although the results indicated that liberals and Dem ocrats were more likely to attem pt to prevent nuclear war, while the pattern was the opposite for survivalists. In addition, those with high income and education were m ore likely I to engage in preventative behaviors. A step-wise regression indicated that | efficacy judgments and attributions enhanced the ability to predict behaviors far ! j beyond perceived risk and demographic variables. Tyler and McGraw (1983) concluded that perception of efficacy was the key ; variable. For the survivalists, it was efficacy for survival behavior, and for the j freeze activists, it was efficacy related to the preventability of nuclear war. | Studies by Hamilton, Knox, Keilin, and Chavez (1985) and M ilburn and I W atanabe (1985) also support the notion that a strong sense of political efficacy is characteristic of peace activists. O ther than the Tyler and M cGraw (1983) study, no studies were found that examined the political efficacy of the pro defense activist. i i "High Psychological Involvement" ! While Nie and V erba (1975) and M ilbrath (1981) did not define "high | psychological involvement," several variables of interest in this research seem to indicate levels of psychological involvement. The two variables are the salience j of the nuclear threat and nuclear anxiety. A body of research has developed ' which has examined each of these variables. i i ' 34 Nuclear threat salience. According to Fiske and Taylor (1984), salience focuses attention on issue-relevant feelings, thoughts, and actions. It does not precipitate attitude change, but concretizes and brings into awareness previously abstract issues. It may result in behavioral responses which are m ore extreme or intense, but which are consistent with previously held thoughts and beliefs (Fiske, 1985). ! Several studies and reviews have explored what makes the nuclear issue ! i m ore salient. The m edia increases salience (Kinder & Sears, 1985). This includes such films as T h e D a y A f t e r (Schofield & Pavelchak, 1985). The efforts of numerous peace groups, including writing letters to the editors of newspapers, i i j writing articles for various publications, arranging public speakers, forums, and demonstrations dealing with the nuclear threat and which are covered by the ! media, are designed in part to keep the nuclear issue salient for the general j public (Mayton, 1987b). In their study of antinuclear retired military officers, Frank and Rivard (1986) postulated that lack of nuclear threat salience may be facilitated for naval I ; personnel because nuclear planning or weapons are not part of their job i 1 i responsibility. However, no empirical studies were found which investigated the i j factors that diminished salience. i M ayton (1987b) argued that the most effective way of assessing nuclear salience involves utilizing nonreactive, indirect techniques. Escalona (1965) used j an indirect response form at to assess elem entary age respondents’ nuclear I concern by posing the question, what would the world be like in 10 years? While 70% of the children m entioned nuclear war an d /o r destruction, her m ethod must ! be considered somewhat reactive, since she focused the children’s attention on "the world" (Mayton, 1987b). Elder (1965) also employed an indirect assessment m ethod in his study of college freshm an in the Pacific Northwest when he asked them to complete two sentences, "My greatest fear regarding the future is . . . I and "I worry about... Only 7.6% of the sample expressed spontaneously a concern about nuclear war in response to these incom plete sentences. i Mayton (1987b) located no studies from the 1970s that assessed spontaneous concern. However, there has been a re-em ergence of interest in j studying the phenom enon of spontaneous concern in the 1980s. In their | I t replication of the Elder study, Mayton and D elam eter (1986) noted a significant j increase in concern since the 1960s with 18.1% of the 127 respondents in 1982 1 j expressing concern spontaneously. In addition, they noted that m en and women ' ! : I did not differ significantly in their concern about nuclear war, but liberal arts majors m entioned m ore concern than professional studies majors and undeclared students. ^ W hen 186 undergraduate students in the Pacific Northwest were given I several questionnaires, including the SCANTS (10 incomplete sentences rather , than two: five sentences beginning with "I worry about.. . ." and five sentences | | beginning with "My greatest fear about the future is .. .."), 50% reported concern i j about nuclear war (Mayton, 1986). Multiple regression analyses showed that two variables, sex and self-reported religiosity, entered the equation with significant regression weights, but accounted for only 6.7% of the variance in spontaneous | concern. Males expressed m ore spontaneous concern than females and Mayton j (1986) noted the results as countering the findings that males are m ore hawkish ' than females (Lewis, 1975) and that females worried m ore and reported being j j m ore anxious about nuclear war than males (Newcomb, 1986). H e provided two i 36 explanations for this difference: (a) these college women had a lower estim ate of the power of the world’s nuclear arsenal and a lower estim ate of the likelihood of nuclear war related somehow to their uniquely female moral orientations; or (b) college females are just as concerned as college males, but that other concerns are simply more salient and more numerous for their nuclear concerns to be expressed. In addition, Mayton (1986) noted that college women, when asked directly about nuclear war concerns, reported a higher level of concern. Mayton (1986) questioned w hether the finding on sex differences may have been an artifact of direct versus indirect questioning. j j In a correlational study (Mayton, 1987b), ten significant relationships were identified betw een the SCANTS and direct measures of nuclear anxiety, worry, depression, concern, and anger. Respondents expressing spontaneous concern ! were more likely to have higher levels of worry, anxiety, concern, depression, fear j ! of the future, and anger about the threat of nuclear war. Respondents expressing j spontaneous concern were also less likely to score high on nuclear denial as it is I m easured by the Nuclear Anxiety Questionnaire (NAQ). In addition, nuclear threat salience was not associated with several measures of m ental health or | general anxiety, but was m oderately associated with holding the value of a world 1 at peace (Mayton, 1987b). While the above studies provided information on the variable of nuclear threat salience within the general population and in association with other variables, they did not address specifically the extent of nuclear threat salience ; within activist populations. Two studies assessed nuclear salience within activist I populations. Utilizing the SCANTS and the W erner and Roy Activism Scale, j H am ilton (1987) found no correlation with pro-nuclear activism, but a significant, I 37 though small, correlation with antinuclear activism. In other words, college students reporting spontaneous concern were slightly m ore likely to self-report antinuclear activist behaviors. The second study, by Fiske et al. (1983), examined the images of nuclear war of anti-nuclear activists and the general population. They concluded that anti-nuclear activists experienced the threat of nuclear annihilation as chronically salient. They reported frequently thinking about the issue and experienced detailed and concrete images of nuclear war— personal, hum an images of dism em bered bodies, people screaming, buildings burning, barren landscapes. The memory of a nuclear atomic test kept the nuclear threat salient for one retired anti-nuclear military officer, There is nothing that you can read, nothing that you can see in pictures, even m otion pictures, which prepares you for what it is. 110-kilotons, which we now consider a moderately small bomb, ! nineteen miles away is just like the end of the earth. An enormous j pulse of heat and incredible light. Even with your back to it, the i light almost seems to infuse your skull from outside. And then the ! blast like no other blast because it persists— it pulses a couple of | seconds long. And then finally this enormous fire ball, and then the glowing cloud going up in the stratosphere in this wicked purple light. (Frank & Rivard, 1986, p. 41) i O ther studies have substantiated these findings on salience and activism (Hamilton, Chavez, & Keilin, 1986; M ilburn & W atanabe, 1985; Pavelchak & i . Schofield, 1985). These uniquely salient concrete images may motivate anti- | nuclear activity (Fiske, 1987). This m atter of salience may be perceived as : related to the general activist characteristic of "high psychological involvement." i ' Nuclear anxiety. Researchers have long expressed the theoretical notion ! that the threat of nuclear annihilation is a pervasive and subtly harmful worry, I ubiquitous in many areas of a person’s life (Lifton, 1982; Mack, 1982). Studies of 38 youth (Escalona, 1965; Schwebel, 1982) have suggested that children and teenagers experience distress, fear, dread, helplessness, tension, nightmares, anxiety, and, for some, denial in relationship to the threat of nuclear war. A review of U.S. national pollings from 1945 to 1982 found an increase in disenchantm ent with the arms race, as well as an increase in personal fears of nuclear war within the general public (Kramer, Kalick, & Milburn, 1983). Clinicians have begun to report an increase in the num ber of clients coming in for treatm ent complaining of anxiety related to the threat of nuclear war (Nelson, 1985). This general concern has been referred to as nuclear anxiety. However, until recently there have been no psychometrically sound attitude and affect assessment instruments for use in determining the extent and dimensions of nuclear anxiety. While several instruments have been developed (Hamilton, 1987), the most widely used appears to be the Nuclear Anxiety Q uestionnaire developed by Newcomb (1986). W ith the development of the 15-item NAQ (Newcomb, 1986), additional empirical data have been collected clarifying and confirming various components of the phenom enon of nuclear anxiety. The items of the NAQ represent a second-order construct of nuclear anxiety which is reflected in four latent factors: (a) nuclear concern, (b) nuclear support, (c) fear for the future, and (d) nuclear denial. While most of the research with the NAQ has focused on the general population, some of it has considered the activist population specifically. The results of both are presented here. Newcomb (1986) hypothesized that nuclear anxiety, as m easured by the NAQ, would correlate positively with the separately assessed factors of depression, powerlessness, and general drug use. H e also hypothesized that nuclear anxiety would correlate negatively with purpose in life and life satisfaction. H e tested these hypotheses with a correlational study of 722 young j i adults. In comparing the demographic data on this sample with national surveys 1 j of young adults and other samples of young adults, Newcomb’s sample did not i appear significantly different regarding life activity or living arrangem ents (Newcomb, 1986). The primary sample difference was in the disproportionate | num ber of females (71%). The correlational study provided the following ; associations with nuclear anxiety, supporting the hypotheses: Less purpose in life j i (.07), less life satisfaction (-.18), m ore powerlessness (.18), m ore depression j : (.15), and m ore drug use (.24). An analysis of male and female responses ! revealed a few gender differences in the above correlations. W omen, for ! j i ; example, had higher associations betw een nuclear anxiety and purpose in life and : j life satisfaction. M en had a greater association betw een nuclear anxiety and drug , use. While no causal relationship can be determined, this may indicate that women tend to respond to external threats by experiencing a devaluation of life, j j while m en respond by turning more to drugs (Newcomb, 1986). A nother interesting finding in this study was the relationship between the nuclear denial factor and its positive correlations with nuclear support (support for nuclear j weapons and technology) and its negative association with nuclear concern and fear for the future. Newcomb (1986) suggested that these findings support the i ! notion that those who advocate and favor nuclear proliferation also tend to I ! minimize and deny the potentially catastrophic results. i I Newcomb (1988a) examined the relationship betw een nuclear anxiety and a , num ber of background, personality, and social support correlates with the same i 739 respondents. Background variables, which included age, sex, m arital status, i i 40 num ber of children, high school graduation, income, and months worked during the past year, yielded few significant relationships. The largest background difference was on sex of the respondent, with women reporting significantly more | i i fear for the future, less nuclear denial, less nuclear support, and more nuclear j concern than the men. Personality correlates indicated that those who were m ore I concerned were m ore liberal, less law obedient, m ore vulnerable, less objective, I and less self-acceptant. Liberalism was the strongest correlate with nuclear : i anxiety of the personality variables studied. Those who denied experiencing ! nuclear anxiety were more conservative, traditional, and supported nuclear ! I proliferation. In addition, the sex-role correlates were congruent with the ! findings on gender differences. Those who were masculine-typed were also more \ supportive of nuclear proliferation, while those who were feminine-typed denied 1 less, had m ore fear for the future, and were more concerned about nuclear i proliferation. In terms of social support, those who were less concerned felt m ore ' j supported in almost all areas of life. Those with higher nuclear anxiety felt less | support from their social networks. Newcomb concluded that this may indicate | that to confront personally the threat of nuclear war, one must allow feelings of discomfort and vulnerability-the very responses that denial or psychic numbing I are intended to minimize. Despite these associations, most background, 1 ! personality, and social support variables only had low to m oderate predictability. Newcomb (1988a) concluded that further research was needed to consider ! alternative individual characteristics that may m ore accurately account for j experiences of nuclear anxiety. 1 In an additional study, Newcomb (1988b) used the same population of young adults to examine the associations betw een nuclear anxiety and seven i 4 1 ■ general life areas, including drug problems, psychosomatic complaints, relationship problems, em otional distress, work problems, health problems, and family problems. In this study, social conformity and social resources were controlled to guard against spurious or confounding effects. The results indicated that nuclear anxiety was m oderately associated with em otional distress and psychosomatic complaints, modestly associated with subjective perceptions of family and health problems, and did not seem to interfere with intimacy, : satisfaction with work, or the ability to handle drugs. Newcomb concluded that while nuclear anxiety had some modest relationship to emotional distress, it did not play a prom inent or debilitating role in the psychic life of the young adults studied. I In examining the relationship betw een nuclear anxiety (using the NAQ) and i nuclear threat salience (using the SCANTS), H am ilton (1987) noted a significant relationship (.37, which is significant at the .001 level). | The one study with the most direct implications for the relationship j betw een activist behavior and nuclear anxiety was conducted by H erm an (1987) j on 216 southern California university students. In an experimental study of I attitudes and reactions to a nuclear war fear arousal exercise, he found that those i J who were committed to a preventive nuclear war strategy expressed greater I concern, greater nuclear anxiety, and employed less nuclear denial than those i ' subjects who were uncomm itted to a preventive strategy. H e also found, i I consistent with Newcomb’s (1986) findings, that there were significant gender ; differences in nuclear anxiety with women expressing more concern, m ore fear I for the future, and m ore chance of death by nuclear war. 42 To summarize, nuclear anxiety has long been hypothesized as a factor that can negatively affect the psychological well-being of individuals in our society. However, due to the prevalence of nuclear denial or psychic numbing, as well as the absence of objective measures, it has been difficult to assess empirically the j extent of the negative effect. Studies utilizing the NAQ have supported many of the theoretical assumptions, including speculation about the phenom enon of j psychic numbing. The study of the affective variable of nuclear anxiety is j fundam ental in the study of how people cope with the "existential absurdity" ' (Lifton, 1982) posed by the threat of nuclear war. It is, as well, fundam ental in the study of activist behavior, although no studies were found that directly : I I assessed that relationship. j i Based on this research, what is already known about the pro-defense and i anti-nuclear activist? First of all, few studies have explored the antecedents of 1 pro-defense activity. The one study that looked at one segment of the pro- . ] defense population was by Tyler and M cGraw (1983), which examined the antecedents of survivalist behavior. The survivalist, however, is only a small l J segment of the pro-defense population and, as Fiske (1987) pointed out, further i I study is needed to understand other types of pro-defense activists. Certain S hypotheses can be form ulated about the pro-defense activist based on the i I political participation literature and the characteristics of those who are active in ! general. However, these characteristics have not yet been empirically studied in i | relation to the pro-defense activist. In addition to further research on the pro-defense activist, many studies on ! anti-nuclear activists were exploratory in nature and further research is needed to . | support or disconfirm the results. To make sound contributions to the I L 4 3 understanding of activism, psychometrically sound m easures are needed (Mayton, 1986). W erner and Roy (1985) pointed out the methodological problem s in studies by Fiske et al. (1983) and Tyler and McGraw (1983) which did not utilize psychometrically sound m easures of activism. W erner and Roy (1985) claim that their instrum ent will enhance further research on activists by assessing both the direction of a respondent’s activism (either supporting nuclear preparedness or supporting disarm am ent) and the m agnitude or intensity of the activist behavior. Given these limitations, the studies reviewed indicated that the following characteristics distinguish anti-nuclear activists: (a) chronic salience of the | nuclear threat (Fiske et al., 1983; Ham ilton et al., 1986; M ilburn & W atanabe, | 1985; Pavelchak & Schofield, 1985); (b) a strong sense of political efficacy ; | ! (Bolton, 1972; Ham ilton et al., 1987; M ilburn & W atanabe, 1985; Tyler & i McGraw, 1983); (c) the belief that nuclear war is preventable, but not survivable j i | (Tyler & McGraw, 1983); (d) more likely to be liberals and Dem ocrats (Tyler & J j | McGraw, 1983; W erner & Roy, 1985); and (e) more likely to be educated and j well-off (Tyler & McGraw, 1983), although not all researchers have obtained 1 results supportive of these last two characteristics (Fiske et al., 1983; M ilburn & j W atanabe, 1985). i I ! i Research Findings Related to Peace Attitudes While an attitude toward peace is a necessary component of anti-nuclear j and pro-defense activism, because of its significance to this study, the variable of [ peace attitude is addressed in this separate section. One assumption of this study ! # i I is that attitudes toward peace are em bedded in views of hum an nature, what it 1 means to be human, and the nature of good and evil. If positions on war and 44 peace are perceived as part of a moral code, then Lippm an’s (1965) comments are apt: At the core of every moral code there is a picture of hum an nature, a m ap of the universe, and a version of history. To hum an nature (of the sort conceived), in a universe (of a kind imagined), after a history (so understood), the rules of the code apply, (p.80) Sowell (1987) delineated two fundamentally different positions on hum an nature— the constrained and the unconstrained. The constrained is the H obbesian perspective of hum an beings as essentially limited and evil, while the unconstrained is the Rouseaunean perspective of hum an beings as essentially I good with greater potential. These views are manifested globally, in our i individual and collective lives. In our mythological history, Friedm an (1984) pointed out that they are represented by Prom etheus and by Job. In current I political science they are represented by the realist school (e.g., M organthau) and I | the world society school (e.g., Burton). In psychology they are represented in the j orientations of Freud on the one hand, and the self-actualizing humanists on the i ! other. In our personal political orientations and in our governm ents’ foreign I policy, they are represented by the peace through strength and the peace through j cooperation positions. j Over the years some have attem pted to m easure empirically peace ! attitudes, sometimes indirectly in the context of views of hum an nature, but most often apart from any definite theoretical position. This discussion addresses the ! findings of these peace attitude studies and the strengths and weaknesses of the ! m easures used. The reason for the latter concern was to determ ine w hether a j psychometrically sound and useful peace attitude m easure already existed. 1 In the period betw een W orld W ar I and W orld W ar II, D roba (1931) I i i developed a militarism and pacifism scale to identify a particular attitude or 45 predisposition to act with reference to the issue of war versus peace. The 44- statem ent scale m easured differences in opinions related to peace and war. In : the analysis of data from University of Chicago students ( n = 300, n = 400), one ; i finding was of particular interest. W omen were m ore pacifistic, on the average, ! than men. Problems with the scale included lack of psychometric data (other | than reported reliabilities of .83 and .90), its lengthiness, and the fact that it m easured opinion, rather than any other underlying constructs such as the view of [ hum an nature. No other studies were found that utilized this scale. Probably the | ! ! greatest weakness of the scale, however, involved its atheoretical basis. j Following W orld W ar II, several additional scales em erged to assess j internationalism and worldmindedness. Levinson’s (1957) scale of nationalism ■ i and internationalism was based on the theory of the authoritarian personality. ' I The prem ise of this research was that "every foreign policy orientation, whatever i i j its degree of rationality and constructiveness, has, to an appreciable extent, a ! psychological foundation in the personalities of its adherents" (p. 37). In other ! words, a foreign policy orientation is em bedded in an ideological position that : represents the personality structure with all its irrationalities. For the purpose of j his study, Levinson defined nationalism as a facet of a larger ethnocentric (or authoritarian) orientation. It is characterized by a rigid distinction betw een in groups and out-groups, with the Am erican nation in this case being the in-group. ! As such, the Am erican nation was glorified and idealized. O ther nations were seen as inferior and threatening. This view also included a belief in the ! inevitability of war, "given the nature of hum an beings." | I Internationalism , on the other hand, was defined as an ideology concerned 1 with minimizing the barriers betw een nations, prom oting a full exchange of ideas, , 46 commodities, and cultural ways. Military activity is either avoided entirely or, m ore often, is accepted only as a last resort following all other means of negotiating a conflict settlement. Based on correlational studies utilizing the IN (internationalism - j nationalism) scale, other m easures of authoritarianism (e.g., the E or ethnocentric scale developed by the Berkeley Group), and other m easures of foreign policy views, Levinson found that Republicans had a significantly higher (m ore nationalistic) m ean IN score than the Dem ocrats or Independents studied. M ore fundamentalists or conservative religious orientations also had higher nationalism scores. Levinson concluded that personal authoritarianism constitutes an im portant inner source (although by no means the only source) of the disposition toward nationalism and related ideologies. While Levinson’s scale was soundly em bedded in personality theory and considered many world view components similar to those of concern in this study, j there are several fundam ental problems with the scale. First, many items are dated and not relevant to foreign policy issues today. Second, the scale has been criticized as biased against the Right or conservative viewpoint. | Sampson and Smith (1957) discussed the concept of world-mindedness, in ; many ways similar to Levinson’s notion of internationalism. W orldmindedness 1 | refers to a fram e of reference or world view separate from knowledge about or I interest in international relations. W orldm inded individuals take a world-view of the problem s of humanity and see their reference group as humankind, rather than American, English, or Chinese. The worldmindedness scale is comprised of ! 32 items, representing the following dimensions: religion, immigration, j government, economics, patriotism, race, education, and war. The correlation of i i 4 7 this scale with the E (ethnocentrism ) scale was -.71, indicating a negative i association betw een worldmindedness and ethnocentrism. While the researchers argued against the psychodynamic underpinnings of the Berkeley G roup’s research on authoritarianism , they found that worldmindedness and authoritarianism were closely (and inversely) related. In assessing this scale, the items are obviously less dated and m ore universal than those on the IN scale. Theoretically, despite the authors’ objections, the worldmindedness scale appears based in personality theory, rather than specifically in formulations regarding hum an nature. The scale assesses positions on a range of issues (eight), rather than a specific focus on peace attitudes. Lutzker (1960) attem pted to predict cooperative behavior using E scale items that assessed internationalism and isolationism. A fter identifying high internationalist and isolationist subjects, he used an experimental design with i j zero sum and non-zero sum games to test his hypothesis that internationalism ! implies friendly and cooperative attitudes toward other nations also applies to i f individuals. The results supported the hypothesis that internationalists, in the ^ interpersonal gaming situation, differed from isolationists in at least two im portant ways: (a) internationalists were more cooperative; and | (b) internationalists were m ore reluctant to abandon efforts at cooperation. W hile these results are of interest, methodological criticism has been made against the game approach (M artin & Larsen, 1976). These criticisms question • w hether it is game behavior, attitudes, or situational predictors that are being j measured. i In attem pting to overcome the methodological problem s of the gaming ; design, M artin and Larsen (1976) developed a pencil-and-paper Likert-type 4 8 m easure to assess cooperation and competition. A factor analysis of their 28- item scale revealed five areas: aggressive orientation, fascist tendencies, work ethic orientation, power orientation, and independence orientation. High competitiveness was correlated significantly with scores on the Machiavellianism m easure (Mach IV). Items on the competitive-cooperative scale are more personal, and so, while this m easure may effectively assess general cooperative- competitive attitudes (reported reliabilities were .70 and .82), it is difficult to generalize the findings to attitudes about cooperation and competitiveness among nations. Mayton (1987a) argued that only two items were needed to assess peace attitudes. H e reviewed and synthesized findings based on two items of the Rokeach Value Survey which he identified as the world at peace item and the j national security item. H e also noted that the world at peace value was | congruent with Kimmel’s "peace through cooperation" attitude and that the [ national security value was congruent with the "peace through strength" attitude. I ; Results of his analysis revealed the following associations: (a) females rated world peace as m ore im portant than males; (b) religious groups m aintained a i ! high value of a world at peace; (c) Dem ocrats and Independents rated world | peace their first priority, while Republicans rated it their second; (d) world peace : was m ore or less valued equally for all age groups except for a sharp drop for late | adolescents in college; (e) a high value of world peace was associated with low * authoritarianism ; and (f) a high value of world peace was associated with lower ^ masculinity. I While these results are congruent with other studies on peace attitudes and | political ideology, the items tap only values and not the broader underlying 49 framework of views on hum an nature. Also, the brevity of the m easure (two items), limits its ability to tap sufficiently the complexities of views of peace based on differing visions of hum an nature. The two items were presented as mutually I exclusive. This dichotomous conceptualization does not account for the view that j i national security is enhanced by a world at peace. > i To summarize, researchers have attem pted to empirically study attitudes about peace for many years. Limitations of the existing scales, either 1 i methodological or theoretical, prevented their effective use in this study. These j i limitations, however, provided the impetus for the development of the Peace 1 | A ttitude Scale used in this dissertation. ] i j i i Activism and Peace Attitudes within the | Paradigm of Personality or Psychodynamic Theory i As discussed in Chapter 1, some of the most influential work in the area of 1 coping with the nuclear threat is based in the psychodynamic tradition. Lifton’s ! (1982; Lifton & Falk, 1982) concept of psychic numbing is certainly characteristic of this perspective. Psychic numbing, or denial (a factor of nuclear anxiety as 1 m easured by the NAQ), is a hypothetical process to avoid experiencing feelings or emotions regarding potential nuclear annihilation. It is related to the psychodynamic process of resistance, repression, and a num ber of other defense | mechanisms (Lifton, 1982). At least two other psychological conceptualizations have em erged from that same psychodynamic tradition: "psychologic" (W hite, ! ! 1965) and "mirror imaging" (Bronfenbrenner, 1961). These phenom ena occur in | individuals and groups of people, such as nations or social movements (Bandura, ! 1982). I i I ( 50 "Psychologic" is similar to the defense mechanism of splitting, in which an artificial dichotomy is created betw een all-good and all-bad forces to prevent pervasive anxiety and fear of destruction (Blanck & Blanck, 1974). In term s of U.S.-Soviet relations, the Am erican public sees the U nited States as all-good and the Soviet U nion as all-bad. "Mirror imaging" refers to the phenom enon in which opposing countries m aintain the same misperceptions regarding each other (Frank, 1967). These three phenom ena— psychic numbing, psychologic, and m irror im aging-represent attem pts within the psychodynamic tradition to explain both individual and group responses to the nuclear threat. A nother body of literature from the psychodynamic and personality tradition on responses to the nuclear threat is the work on "social character." According to From m (1941), the social character is a collection of traits that ^ capture one’s way of being in the world as shared with others. This social character underlies shared ideological and political orientation. This concept implies the need to simultaneously change personality and social structure. Some i of the specific traits examined in "social character" research include: i (a) dogmatism, which includes an authoritarian outlook on life; (b) intolerance of i I ambiguity; and (c) Machiavellianism. Each is discussed below, with its < contributions to understanding activism and peace attitudes. i | Dogmatism j The theoretical conceptualization of dogmatism was developed by Rokeach | (1956, 1960) as an outgrowth of the authoritarian personality research. In order 1 to fully appreciate the dogmatism construct, it is necessary to examine this i history. The theoretical roots of authoritarianism and dogmatism can be traced i ! 51 to the work of Erich From m (1941) and Wilheim Reich (1960). The work of From m is the focus here. Utilizing both Marx’s theory of the irrationality of m odern capitalist society and Freud’s theory of irrationality resulting from sexual repression in the hum an soul, From m developed a theory about "the hum an basis of fascism" (Forbes, 1985). This hum an basis is em bedded in the social character of authoritarianism . Its historic roots can be traced to the period of the R eform ation and the development of capitalism. These historic developments, : i according to Fromm, m arked the beginning of the individuating of W estern ' civilization, allowing the individual to break away from the pre-individualistic bonds of society, which provided both limitations and security. The freedom birthed in this era, however, was not simply positive freedom or "freedom to" fully i experience one’s intellectual, emotional, and sensual potentialities, but negative ; j i freedom or "freedom from" as well. "Freedom from" m eant severing the j previous security and definition provided by a tightly defined social structure. It ‘ < i m eant confronting the existential isolation which bred anxiety and powerlessness. , | From m identified two general modes of responding to this seemingly intolerable : I sense of isolation: (a) develop new dependencies and submissions, such as i i conformity to accepted patterns or submission to new forms of authority; or i (b) full realization of positive freedom experienced through love and productive work. The latter path involved joining again with hum an beings, nature, and < i ones’ self, without giving up the independence and integrity of the individual self. The form er path involved overcoming isolation by reducing the gap betw een the j I ■ I self and the world, by surrendering one’s individuality and integrity. Em bedded I ! within the personality of these individuals is a deep seated respect and longing for i i i established authority, necessary to compensate for the aloneness of freedom ; the tendency to give up the independence of the self and fuse with som eone or i something external to acquire the strength lacking internally. The world is * f viewed dualistically— split betw een those with power and those without; those who i i are superior and those who are inferior. Distinct forms of this mechanism of escape include submission and dom ination or masochistic and sadistic strivings, j with the objective of getting rid of the self and losing the burden of freedom. | These are the roots of the authoritarian personality. ! Empirical support for this theory of the authoritarian or potentially fascist i personality has been provided in the classic work of the Berkeley Public Opinion Study Group, also known as the Berkeley Group, comprised of Adorno, Frenkel- ! 1 i Brunswik, Levinson, and Sanford (1950). They hypothesized that the "political, i economic, and social convictions of an individual often form a broad and ! i : coherent pattern, as if bound together by a ‘m entality’ or ‘spirit,’ and that this 1 i I pattern is an expression of deep lying trends in his [sic] personality." They argued j j ' ; that the theory of ethnocentrism, with its psychological aspects of group relations, i , offers a starting point for understanding the mentality or spirit of the authoritarian. Ethnocentrism is a term introduced to m ean provincialism or - cultural narrowness, the tendency of the individual to be ethnically centered and \ | to engage in a rigid acceptance of those who are culturally alike and a rejection ! of those who are culturally different. It is an ideological system pertaining to ■ I groups and group relations in which distinctions are m ade betw een in-groups I | (those groups with which the individual identifies) and out-groups (those with which the individual does not share a sense of belonging and which is regarded as j i i antithetical to the in-group). The outgroup, while usually objectively weaker, is ; not always perceived as such but is seen as a power-seeking threat. | 53 Ethnocentrism is based on a pervasive and rigid in-group/out-group distinction that involves stereotyped negative imagery and hostile attitudes toward the outgroup, with conflicts unresolvable except through a dominant-submissive relationship with the superior in-group dominating. The in-group and the out group are sociopsychological concepts rather than purely sociological. Qualitative analyses by historians, literary persons, and political analysts have indicated that fascist social movements have shown consistent tendencies to oppose a variety of minority groups. To test their hypotheses about ethnocentrism, a research design was developed that involved creating new objective measures, using existing projective measures, and intensive interviewing. The scales developed included t ! the A-S (Anti-Semitism) scale, the E (Ethnocentrism ) scale, the PEC (Politico- I Econom ic Conservatism) scale, and the F (Fascism) scale. These measures, at j various stages of development, were administered to a variety of subjects , ( n = 2,099), all within California, and largely middle class and college educated. j i Reliabilities and validities were established for each of the scales and their i : respective subscales. They found that a key concept to understanding authoritarianism was I ethnocentrism . One distinction betw een the ethnocentric and nonethnocentric I | groups was pseudo-patriotism . Pseudo-patriotism was distinguished from patriotism ("love of one’s country") in that it was a "blind attachm ent to certain national cultural values, uncritical conformity with the prevailing group ways, and ! rejection of other nations as outgroups" (Adorno et al., 1950, p. 107). This need | for an out-group which was both inferior and threatening prevented identification ; with humanity as a whole. It takes the political form of nationalism and a ! 54 ] cynicism about world government and perm anent peace. Ethnocentric or | i authoritarian individuals scored higher on pseudo-patriotism. A uthoritarianism ! was also correlated with high conservativism and low ethnocentrism was i i associated with liberalism. In addition, the research revealed nine traits which | distinguished the authoritarian personality or the ethnocentric from the ; nonethnocentric subjects of the study: (a) rigid, middle-class conventionalism; ; | (b) authoritarian submission; (c) authoritarian aggression; (d) opposition to the I subjective, the imaginative, the tender-m inded; (e) superstition and stereotypy; ; (f) preoccupation with dominance-submission, strong-weak, leader-follower dimensions; (g) destructiveness and cynicism; (h) the projection outwards of unconscious em otional impulses; and (i) exaggerated concern with sexual issues (Adorno et al., 1950, p. 228). i D espite these findings, critics have revealed fundam ental defects in the j theory and methodology. The sample has been criticized as biased due to the use of middle class, frequently college-educated subjects. In his classic criticism, j Edward Shils (1954), m ade several im portant points. The m em bers of the i | Berkeley G roup (a) did not integrate the sociological perspective into their work i i ! by acknowledging the im portance of conformity to social norm s as often adaptive , i 1 j and not always compulsive; and (b) were quite sensitive to the pathology of the j ] extrem e Right, but were blind to the same pathology of the Left. Shils, writing in i l i the context of the 1950s, argued that Russian communism could be j conceptualized as the authoritarian left, that Bolshevism and fascism are i fundamentally similar in that they both dem onstrate hostility toward civil ! liberties, antipathy for parliam entary institutions, individualism, private i I enterprise. They both view the political world as a struggle betw een morally irreconcilable forces. Shils argued that the left was not necessarily healthier and less neurotic than the Right. R othm an and Lichter (1982) supported Shils’ argum ent in their work R o o t s o f R a d i c a l i s m , which presented an unflattering criticism of the New Left as the "inverted authoritarian" personality. Forbes (1985) provided both methodological and philosophical critiques of the research of the Berkeley G roup following his study of nationalism among Canadian high school juniors and seniors. Based on his survey of 1,825 students in three provinces, he concluded that there was no general factor of ethnocentrism and that people had different reactions to different ethnic and national groups. High ethnocentrism was sometimes, although not always, associated with high authoritarianism as m easured by the F scale. H e contended that authoritarianism as m easured by the F scale had m ore to do, in fact, with conventionalism and conformism than with ego weakness and psychopathology. Philosophically he argued that the dualistic conceptualization of individuals as ethnocentrically authoritarian verging on psychopathological or tolerant, liberated, strong-minded, and freedom loving democrats reflected a belief that the democratic type is the highest attainable ideal. However, it reflects an ethnocentrism regarding the superiority of democracy above all other forms of government. It also reflects a superior regard for m odern science over and above ancient science and such works as Plato’s R e p u b l i c in which he attem pts to address political and psychological types (Bloom, 1968). Rokeach (1956, 1960) recognized these limits of the authoritarian personality construct and m easure when he began investigating ideological dogmatism. H e argued that it was not so much what one believed but how one believed that determ ined ideological structure. Rokeach viewed dogmatism on a 56 continuum — not of rightist and leftist ideas but of open and closed thinking. H e : described the structure of ideological dogmatism as characterized by: (a) closed j ways of thinking associated with an ideology; (b) an authoritarian outlook on life; i I (c) rejection of those with opposing belief systems; and (d) a qualified acceptance of those with similar beliefs. j R okeach (1960) studied leftist and rightist political and religious groups, j i using the dogmatism and authoritarianism measures, to determ ine the levels of . i both constructs. The English college student population comprised i Conservatives, Liberals, A ttleeite Laborites, Bevanite Laborites, and I Communists. The political orientations coincide from right to left as listed i ( ; above. Of particular interest were the extreme left Communist group members. They scored low on the authoritarian F scale, indicating low levels of ethnocentrism and high levels of tolerance toward ethnic and racial groups. However, based on the dogmatism scale, they were the most intolerant of the five 1 groups toward those who disagreed with their views. t The preceding general discussion of authoritarianism and dogmatism raises i 1 questions relevant to the study of activists and of peace attitudes. Studies ; com pleted in this area that are specific to peace attitudes support the notion that | peace activists or individuals with a peace-through-cooperation orientation may i be less ethnocentric. For example, world-mindedness may well be the inverse of | ! the authoritarian personality structure (Sampson & Smith, 1957; Smith & Rosen, j 1958). As noted earlier, the highly world-minded individual favors a world view j of humanity and has as his or her reference group all of hum ankind rather than , Americans, Germ ans, or Chinese. Levinson’s (1957) work on the authoritarian ! I personality and foreign policy, as discussed earlier, distinguished betw een what 57 j he term ed nationalism from internationalism — ideological frames of reference that impact on attitudes toward foreign policy and peace. These studies do not, ! however, answer w hether or not world-minded, cooperative-oriented individuals are any less dogmatic than their nationalistic, com petition-oriented counterparts. In summary, the concept of dogmatism remains complex and somewhat controversial. It is an im portant variable for this study, in that it may help characterize specific types of peace attitudes and activist orientations. Because no studies were found that specifically examined the dogmatic psychological system and activist behavior, this is an area for exploratory research. i ! Intolerance O f Ambiguity ! The research on intolerance of ambiguity as a personality variable suggests it is a construct worth examining in relation to sociopolitical ideologies and j behaviors. The concept of intolerance of ambiguity was first developed by i Frenkel-Brunswik (1948, 1949) and was subsequently integrated into the ! psychoanalytic theory of the authoritarian personality (Adorno et al., 1950). In that context, intolerance of ambiguity was associated with prejudice and m ental I l , rigidity, while tolerance of ambiguity was related to m ental flexibility (Tatzel, i ■ 1980). j ! Intolerance of ambiguity was later studied apart from authoritarian personality theory (Budner, 1962). Budner (1962) defined intolerance of ambiguity as "the tendency to perceive (i.e., interpret) ambiguous situations as ! sources of threat" (p. 29). Tolerance of ambiguity was defined as "the tendency to i perceive ambiguous situations as desirable" (p. 29). Budner (1962) defined an ambiguous situation as one which lacked structure or categorizing potential, that 1 i 58 was novel, complex, or insoluble. H e identified several possible responses to threat including phenomenological denial, phenomenological submission, operative denial, and operative submission. By doing so, he implicated intolerance of ambiguity as a coping mechanism. The adaptation schema delineated by Budner (1962) contained four basic elements: (a) hierarchy of values and goals; (b)resources or levers to m anipulate the environment; j (c) conception of reality, in terms of the im m ediate situation, ways to contend with it, assets, and liabilities; and (d) general coping mechanisms or techniques for handling demands. Based on these elements, Budner (1962) categorized intolerance-tolerance of ambiguity as an aspect of coping behavior. Budner (1962) developed a 16-item scale of intolerance of ambiguity. Using 17 different samples, Budner (1962) perform ed correlational analyses that examine: (a) socially relevant beliefs and behaviors; and (b) personality and personal value systems, including authoritarianism , attitudes toward parents, and i Machiavellianism. i j The study of socially relevant variables yielded the following results: 1. Intolerance of ambiguity was significantly correlated .32 with j conventionality, .25 with cautiousness, .27 with being ordinary j 2. Belief in a divine power, attendant at religious services, and dogmatism i about religious beliefs were positively associated with intolerance of ambiguity 3. Restricting exposure to conflicting value systems by favoring censorship j was also related to intolerance of ambiguity. 1 | Based on the theory of authoritarianism , intolerance of ambiguity was predicted to be positively related to authoritarianism . A negative association betw een the Mach and ambiguity scales was also anticipated, because of the i I 59 conflict betw een conventional morality and the tough-minded approach stressed by Machiavelli. The results supported the authoritarianism hypothesis but, because of the relatively low correlation of .32, Budner (1962) suggested that intolerance of ambiguity and authoritarianism were separate, complex, and overlapping constructs, rather than different ways to m easure the same construct. The correlation with the Mach scale was negative, although the results were not as significant or conclusive. Additional studies have indicated that intolerance of ambiguity may be related to world view. For example, R otter and O ’Connell (1982) studied the sex-role orientation of college students and found that male and female androgenous and cross-sex typed subjects were m ore tolerant of ambiguity than conventionally sex-typed subjects. The Sidanius study (1978) related intolerance of ambiguity to sociopolitical world view. Sidanius did not conceptualize intolerance of ambiguity as a separate construct from authoritarianism , as did Budner (1962), but as a m anifestation of authoritarianism . His research questions included: 1. Is intolerance of ambiguity related to sociopolitical ideology? 2. W hich dimensions of intolerance of ambiguity are related to which dimensions of sociopolitical ideology? 3. Can empirical support be found for the context hypothesis in contrast to authoritarian personality theory and the extremism hypothesis? His subject sample included 195 Stockholm high school students to whom were adm inistered Budner’s Intolerance of Ambiguity scale and the S4 Conservatism scale with its five factors of racism, politicoeconomic conservatism, religion, sexual repression, and authoritarian aggression. 60 [ Based on scatterplot analyses, the results were interpreted by Sidanius (1978) to support authoritarian personality theory. H e found a reliable and linear relationship betw een racism and intolerance of ambiguity (r = .28, p < .01). There was a positive correlation betw een general conservatism (total S4 score) and general tolerance of ambiguity (total Budner score) (r = .27, p < .05). In addition, some support for the context hypothesis was found based on curvilinear relationships between: (a) general conservatism and general i i intolerance of ambiguity; (b) general conservatism and need for certainty and j uniformity; (c) racism and need for the familiar; and (d) political party l preference and need for security. No studies were found that directly assessed intolerance of ambiguity in anti-nuclear or pro-defense activists, or in relation to peace attitudes. However, I the studies noted above provided some data on the broader context of ; sociopolitical ideology, coping, and world view. i 1 M achiavellianism ! A third personality variable with implications for sociopolitical ideology and ! < _ | behavior is that of Machiavellianism. Machiavelli published T h e P r i n c e in 1532 i ! and since then his name has been equated with the use of deceit, guile, and i opportunism in interpersonal relationships. Christie and Geis (1970) defined M achiavellianism as a general strategy for dealing with people, in particular the extent others are seen as m anipulatable in interpersonal situations. Following I ! their review of 38 studies, Christie and Geis (1970) found no significant i I 1 relationship betw een Machiavellianism and political ideology or preference. 1 They concluded that: 61 High Machs m anipulate more, win more, are persuaded less, persuade others more, and otherwise differ significantly from low Machs as predicted in situations in which subjects interact face to face with others, when the situation provides latitude for improvisation and the subject must initiate responses as he [sic] can or will, and in situations in which affective involvement with details irrelevant to winning distracts low Machs. (p. 312) Behavior that distinguishes high and low Machs falls on a continuum from cool detachm ent (high M achiavellian) to high involvement with people (low Machiavellian). I The descriptions of the M achiavellian personality were based on research utilizing the Mach scales. The most widely used are Mach IV and Mach V, i | although other versions of the scales exist (Vleeming, 1979). Items for the scales ■ were drawn from the writings of Machiavelli { T h e P r i n c e and T h e D i s c o u r s e s ), and thus the name. In his 1979 review, Vleeming categorized the research on M achiavellianism j since 1970. Vleeming found that only 8 of the 34 studies fit into the Christie and J Geis behavioral param eters of manipulation, persuasiveness, and persuasibility. j Vleeming placed the rem aining studies in a miscellaneous category. Two studies categorized under persuasibility are of particular interest here. These studies i indirectly bear upon compliance or attitude change, because they concern activism and conservativism which Vleeming considered as two opposites. The . study by Cryns and Finn (1973) suggested that active participation by liberal ! individuals was associated with low authoritarianism , low Machiavellian ■ tendencies, low dogmatism, and high anomie. These findings were congruent j with those of Gold, Friedm an, and Christie (1971) who found that "students who had been politically active prior to coming to college scored higher than the rest i | of the group on New Left Philosophy, Revolutionary Tactics, and M achiavellian 62 Cynicism, but scored lower on M achiavellian Tactics and Traditional Moralism" (p. 26). These later two characteristics coincide with traditional M achiavellian tendencies and authoritarianism . Vleeming (1979) concluded on the basis of these studies that individuals high on persuasibility tend to be activists (of a liberal or Left orientation), and therefore low on Machiavellianism. The above studies provide a fram ework for hypothesizing relationships j betw een M achiavellianism and activism. It is hypothesized that peace activists | j will score low on Machiavellianism. However, no research was found which 7 i i addressed the activism of those of a Right orientation. Further research in this ! area is needed. In summary, psychodynamic theory provides a paradigm with which to understand m ore thoroughly the psychological and behavioral responses to the threat of nuclear war. First, certain dynamic processes can be applied 1 i j individually and collectively, resulting in such concepts as "psychic numbing" , (Lifton, 1982), "psychologic" (W hite, 1965), and "mirror imaging" ^ (Bronfenbrenner, 1961). These concepts may be related to world view, nuclear | threat salience, and nuclear anxiety. As such, they may be associated with peace i attitudes and type of activism. I j Second, psychodynamic theory provides the basis for research on "social j character." This research suggests that personality or specific traits may be the source of sociopolitical ideologies. The traits focused on in this review included i * i authoritarianism , intolerance of ambiguity, and Machiavellianism. W hile no I ! research was found that specifically addressed these traits in relation to both pro- : defense and anti-nuclear activism, some studies were found which suggested that low authoritarianism (as m easured by world-mindedness and internationalism ) ; 63 may be associated with a peace attitude congruent with "peace through cooperation." Studies were also found which suggested that low M achiavellianism characterized of liberal activists, but not conservative activists (Cryns & Finn, 1973; Gold, Friedm an, & Christie, 1971), and that tolerance of ambiguity was associated with a less authoritarian world view (Sidanius, 1978). F urther research is needed to specifically address the relationship of these three personality variables with peace attitudes and pro-defense and anti-nuclear activist behavior. Activism and Peace Attitudes within the Paradigm of Coping Theory W hile most nuclear threat research has not been conducted within the paradigm of coping theory, a reconciliation of research findings and coping theory provides im portant information on nuclear threat responses. Diam ond l j and Bachm an (1986) attem pted such a reconciliation by examining Rogers’ ' protection motivation theory (Maddux & Rogers, 1983; Rogers & Mewborn, I 1976) and Janis and M ann’s (1977) conflict theory. While conflict theory provides a framework to conceptualize a variety of nuclear threat coping styles, protection motivation theory provides a framework from which to explore the variables of efficacy and locus of control as components of general coping with the nuclear threat. General Coping Theory In applying general coping theory to the nuclear threat, Diam ond and Bachm an (1986) noted several problem s stemming from the nuclear threat itself. First, the threat of nuclear annihilation is a stressor that is unlike any other. It 64 has a disastrous scope, threatening not only the individual but the entire civilization with possible extinction. It carries with it the potentiality for ending all birth (Caldicott, 1986; Schell, 1982). In addition, it is an unpredictable stressor. A nuclear attack may occur next year, next week, this afternoon, or not at all. It is prospective in nature, rather than retrospective. It is not a stressor em anating from some past tragedy, the loss of a loved one for example, but of a tragedy waiting to happen--by decision or by accident (Diam ond & Bachman, 1986). Second, the threat of nuclear annihilation is also unusual in that it requires collective action to both propose and negotiate m ethods for averting it (Diam ond & Bachman, 1986). Given these characteristics, the stressor of the threat of nuclear war obviously differs from other acute stressors that are less global in their threat (e.g., flood, famine, genocide), are retrospective (e.g., the loss of a loved one, incest), or are relatively well defined (e.g., cancer, surgery). The nuclear threat does not fit neatly into the category of "chronic" stress, given that chronic stress has often been operationalized as a com bination of m inor life stresses. Keeping in mind the uniqueness of the threat, Diam ond and Bachm an (1986) reviewed existing taxonomies based on three studies and, from these, delineated seven coping styles utilized in this era of the nuclear arms race. The first study was by Tyler and M cGraw (1983) which was discussed at length earlier in this chapter. The second study was by Yankelovich and D oble (1983) which described four different orientations towards the nuclear threat: (a) the threat minimizers, who believe that nuclear war will never take place and therefore feel secure supporting an aggressive foreign policy; (b) the conciliators, who view the threat of nuclear war as an urgent problem and support initiatives for reducing 65 that threat; (c) the live-and-let-live group who are basically suspicious of the Soviets, but prefer some sort of peaceful coexistence to a belligerent relationship; and (d) the religious-oriented group, who fear nuclear war but also fear the "evil" Soviets and thus lend their support to the experts favoring policies of military strength. The third study was conducted by D e Rivera (1984) and involved extensive interviews with a large num ber of subjects. H e identified five strategies for coping with the nuclear threat including: (a) support of deterrence; (b) support of tension-reduction; (c) deferral to authority; (d) the adoption of a fatalistic attitude towards the nuclear threat; and (e) acceptance of the nuclear threat as an im portant but not imm inent problem . By integrating these taxonomies, seven coping mechanisms were established and are described below. M ethod 0: Failure to cope. Individuals who fall into this category view the threat of nuclear annihilation as real and imminent, but are unable to "live with" the threat. Nuclear despair is a likely characteristic of these individuals. They have little sense of personal or collective efficacy to overcome their expectation or move to a m ore emotionally effective coping response. None of the three studies found this to be a predom inant attitude. M ethod 1: Survivalism. Survivalists believe that nuclear war is likely but survivable. These beliefs, coupled with their sense of personal efficacy, allows them to prepare for survival. They m aintain conservative foreign policy attitudes, but selfdom participate in the formal political system. 66 Method 2: Tension-reduction activism. Individuals in this group see | j nuclear war as preventable, but not survivable if it occurs. They have a strong . I sense of personal efficacy and see personal action as necessary to prevent nuclear | i war. It is also likely that they have high political efficacy and experience little ; 1 nuclear despair. j i | j Method 3: Deterrence activism. D eterrence activists are individuals who minimize the dangers of nuclear war and have confidence in U.S. military strength as an effective means of deterring Soviet attack. These individuals are characterized by conservatism, low feelings of despair, and support for existing ; political institutions. i Method 4: Fatalism. These individuals have resigned themselves to the : idea that nuclear war is likely. It is an attitude that Lifton (1982) referred to as "waiting for the bomb." While they are resigned, they are not despairing; this ; inevitability does not seem to bother them much. This style is m arked by low j political participation or support, low expectations of future success, and limited I confidence in future plans. This style may lead to "hedonistic" acting out. i J i | Method 5: Deferral to authority. Individuals who use this m ode of coping I think little about nuclear war. They are characterized by low concern, low j ! despair, little participation in the political process, and little personal or political ► i , efficacy. This group copes by placing their faith in the "experts" and higher authority, such as government officials or even God, to prevent war. i ! 67 Method 6: Non-imminent problem. This group sees that nuclear war is j likely, but only in the far future. As a result, they experience m oderately high j levels of concern but low efficacy and despair. j p Integrating these coping m ethods with the five m odes of conflict theory and | decision-making focus led to the categorical parallels described below (Diam ond & Bachman, 1986; Janis, 1985): i I 1. Unconflicted inertia. Unconflicted inertia is adopted when one, faced with a threat, decides that the threat will not continue, if the present actions are | i continued. In the case of the nuclear threat, one must believe that there is no 7 » i i i risk of a nuclear war given the current governm ental policies. This coping J t ! response is congruent with M ethod 5, deferring to authority. I i 2. Unconflicted change. This strategy is adopted when one decides that the \ threat will continue if current action is m aintained, but the risk can be completely 1 | elim inated if im m ediate action is taken. Diam ond and Bachm an (1986) i i ; described M ethod 1, the attitude of the survivalists, as congruent with this m ode of coping. Survivalists act to completely elim inate the nuclear threat to themselves. 3. Hypervigilance. This response is utilized when one decides that even if an effective response is possible, there is insufficient time to work it out rationally. The results are often panic and acceptance of the first quasi- satisfactory solution. Hypervigilance in response to the nuclear threat is rem iniscent of M ethod 0, failure to cope. 68 4. Vigilant decision-making. Vigilant decision-making occurs when a i ! solution seems possible and there is sufficient time for an effective response. This could entail a preference for deterrence, tension-reduction, or a i combination of the two. 5. Defensive avoidance. This strategy is utilized when the decision m aker determ ines that a solution is not possible. The individual may then procrastinate, ; i buckpass, or reluctantly choose the best of several bad alternatives. Following . this latter choice, one may attem pt to justify this decision by selective appraisal, j i i rationalization, and denial. Most nuclear threat coping mechanisms fall under ! the category of defense avoidance. Procrastination coincides with M ethod 6, the ; | i | non-im m inent problem. Buckpassing is reflected in M ethod 5, deferring to the | i 1 experts. And those who choose "the lesser of two evils" may align themselves 1 1 with the deterrence or tension-reduction positions to reduce their anxiety. , D iam ond and Bachm an (1986) were careful to stress that not all who j endorse deterrence or tension-reduction activism do so only to pacify themselves. ; Those who do may be considered "bogus activists," while "true activists" are those who reached their policy decision on the basis of vigilant inform ation processing. This integration of responses to the nuclear threat with the conflict m odel i ! of coping theory provides a unique framework to conceptualize activist responses [ and peace attitudes. For example, M ethods 2, 3, 5, and 6 all agree that nuclear war should be avoided. The disagreem ent involves how it should be avoided - | w hether by strength or by cooperation. As discussed earlier, this disagreem ent may result from two different world views and views of hum an nature. I 69 A possible lim itation of D iam ond and Bachm an’s coping m odel is the implication that these responses are mutually exclusive. However, the following interview comm ent by a retired admiral suggested that, under some circumstances, M ethod 3: D eterrence activism may combine with M ethod 6: i Non-im m inent problem . "Among commanders, lieutenant com m anders and j captains, we said ‘T here’s never going to be a nuclear w ar’" (Frank & Rivard, I 1986, p. 48). A nother recurring characteristic of the various coping styles is the role of i efficacy. A later conceptualization of the protection m otivation theory (Maddux 1 | & Rogers, 1983) emphasized beliefs about one’s ability to produce an effective i coping response. This concurs with the research on activism which identified i efficacy as a distinguishing characteristic of the activist population. Given that efficacy, or locus of control, is frequently implicated in both the general coping i | literature and the nuclear threat coping literature, this research is now discussed. ; Efficacy and Locus of Control I Perceived control of events is considered a motivational variable (Stipek & i j Weisz, 1981). Perceived control has been identified as a key variable ! characterizing activists in general (M ilbrath, 1981; Nie & Verba, 1975), as well as ; peace activists and some groups of pro-defense activists (Tyler & McGraw, 1983). | Perceived control can be conceptualized within various perspectives. W ithin the ! cognitive coping paradigm, protection motivation theory provides a framework to understand the relationship betw een perceived control (or efficacy) and activism. W ithin the paradigm of social learning theory, locus of control is further 70 I ------------------------------------------------------------------- ------------------------------------------------------- explicated. Perceived control, in general and in relation to nuclear threat activism, is discussed here within the context of both paradigms. Efficacy. According to Solomon (1983), perceived self-efficacy refers to subjective judgments of how well one can execute a course of action, handle a situation, learn a new skill, and the like. In explaining the role of self-efficacy in coping, Bandura (1982) pointed out that, i i Judgm ents of self-efficacy . . . determ ine how much effort people will j expend and how long they will persist in the face of obstacles or , aversive experiences. W hen beset with difficulties people who ! entertain serious self-doubts about their capabilities slacken their j | efforts or give up altogether, whereas those who have a strong sense | of efficacy exert greater effort to m aster the challenge, (p. 123) ' j Rogers’ (1975; M ewborn & Rogers, 1979) "protection motivation model" ; | utilized the construct of efficacy to explain individuals’ m otivation to protect | j I I themselves against perceived danger. The model delineated three message and t j " \ j three cognitive components. The message variables include: (a) degree of j noxiousness of the danger; (b) likelihood that the danger will occur given no i ; intervention; and (c) perceived effectiveness of the given coping response. The three cognitive variables are: (a) perceived severity of the danger; (b) expectancy i ! of exposure to the danger; and (c) degree of faith in the espoused coping response. Research on these variables suggested that the perceived effectiveness . i of the coping response was most im portant to responding; the noxiousness and likelihood of the event were secondaiy. These findings are congruent with the ! 1 work of Leventhal (1970) who argued that a coping response perceived to be ineffective would leave the individual vulnerable to the real danger and facilitate i i using such defense-avoidance reactions as denial. These findings regarding ; general coping responses parallel the theory proposed by D iam ond and Bachm an I 71 (1986). Those who believe that they can effectively respond align themselves : with positions of deterrence or tension-reduction as part of vigilant decision making. Those who do not believe that they can effectively respond or do not believe there is time for an effective response either fail to cope or utilize defense avoidance mechanisms. i i Locus of control. The locus of control construct was popularized by R otter J i (1966) and is defined as a generalized expectancy for internal or external control of reinforcem ents. Internal control is the belief that an event or outcom e is ; contingent on one’s own behavior or on relatively perm anent characteristics such | as ability. External control is the belief that an event is caused by factors beyond , one’s control such as luck, chance, or powerful others. According to R otter’s theory, internal and external locus of control are considered fairly stable ; i characteristics of the individual, with only slight variability according to j situations. Locus of control is considered one com ponent of general coping and problem-solving styles. For example, H eppner (1986) developed a scale to assess three factors underlying the generally accepted stages of the problem-solving or coping process. Five stages were delineated by H eppner as comm on to most models of problem solving: general orientation, problem definition, generation of alternatives, decision making, and evaluation. The three factors that H eppner argued underlie these general processes include problem-solving confidence, approach-avoidance style, and personal control. H eppner found a positive correlation betw een personal control and locus of control. However, other 72 correlational data on his problem-solving inventory suggest that it is m ore than simply a locus of control measure. Correlational analyses have indicated that internal locus of control is | positively associated with such variables as academ ic achievement (Stipek & Weisz, 1981). However, because these were correlational, cross-sectional data, it cannot be determ ined w hether internal locus of control causes such achievements as academic success or visa versa. Keeping these cautions in mind, some research has addressed specifically locus of control in relation to activist behavior. G ore and R otter (1963) found that locus of control was correlated with i I I ! social action in their study of students at a southern Negro college during the I early civil rights movement. Individuals with greater internal locus of control i : were m ore likely to commit themselves verbally to personal involvement in social action. A n extension of the G ore and R otter study was conducted by Strickland I (1965). She examined the relationship betw een locus of control and actual activist behavior, rather than simply verbal comm itm ent to activist behavior. I ' Results of her study supported the notion that activity in civil rights dem onstrations was significantly associated with m ore internal control. N uclear threat activism, either pro-defense or anti-nuclear, may be I I associated with internal locus of control. Tyler and M cGraw (1983) did not distinguish betw een efficacy and locus of control. They identified efficacy, as m easured by the R otter internal-external scale, as a key variable that characterized both survivalists and peace activists. E rdahl and Rounds (1986) identified a problem with using a personal internal-external scale to understand responses to the nuclear threat. They argued that locus of control may vary across situations, particularly with a 73 situation like the threat of nuclear war. They hypothesized that high personal j i 1 internal control would not necessarily be related to a sense of personal control in | i relation to the nuclear threat. Personal control over the threat of nuclear war is i qualitatively different from and may be independent of beliefs of control over daily life experiences. To assess this possibility, they developed the Nuclear Locus of Control scale: one dimension for internal locus of control, and m ultiple | dimensions for external locus of control. Their theoretical framework was based on the work of Levenson (1973, 1981) who argued for a tripartite m odel of locus of control: (a) internal or system, (b) external based on fate or chance, and (c) external based on powerful others. This delineation seem ed especially ] applicable to the study of locus of control over the nuclear threat. Their findings i : 1 supported their hypotheses. High internals on the personal level did not 1 necessarily score high on internality related to the nuclear threat. L ater findings 1 | by Rounds and Erdahl (1988) supported the notion that beliefs about influencing i j systems or institutions can be independent of beliefs about events within direct t experience. Using the Nuclear Activism Scale (W erner & Roy, 1985), 475 ■ graduate and undergraduate students at 11 universities and colleges in New York ; and M innesota were categorized as pro-defense, anti-nuclear, or non-activist. ! There was a strong positive correlation betw een internal nuclear locus of control and anti-nuclear behavior and intentions. There was not a significant relationship betw een internal control and pro-defense activism. i i To summarize, the paradigms and research of general coping theory, as well ; i ; as the specific variable of locus of control and efficacy, enhance form ulations , regarding responses to the nuclear threat. According to Diam ond and Bachm an | (1986), utilizing Janis and M ann’s (1977) conflict model, a wide range of hum an I 74 responses, including deterrence and tension-reduction activism, can be delineated. Protection motivation theory provides a fram ework to study efficacy as it relates to the nuclear threat. Social learning theory, with its focus on locus of control and efficacy, has stimulated research on social action, in general, and | nuclear threat activism, specifically. No studies were found that examined directly the relationship betw een general coping style and nuclear threat coping ^ i style. In addition, few studies were found that examined locus of control within | i the pro-defense population, beyond the survivalist group studied by Tyler and McGraw (1983) and the college students studied by Rounds and Erdahl (1988). i i Activism and Peace Attitudes within the Paradigm of Feminist Theory The relationship betw een gender and war is complex. Some theorists have | i ! ignored the relationship betw een gender and war, scarcely recognizing the sexual ’ i : j division of hum an populations and potential gender differences in attitudes, j affect, and behavior (Di Leonardo, 1985; Hare-M ustin, & M arecek, 1988). i I O thers acknowledged possible differences in attitudes, beliefs, and feelings about j war and the nuclear threat stemming from gender socialization (e.g., Arkin & Dobrofsky, 1978; Easlea, 1983, 1987; H am ilton et al., 1987) or gender-specific psychic developm ent (e.g., Kaufman, 1987; Williams, 1989). Some theorists claimed these differences arise from women’s innately peaceful and nurturing nature (e.g., Daly, 1973, 1978; McAllister, 1982; Ruddick, 1984; Spretnak, 1982). W om en’s peace efforts have included the W om en’s Peace Party founded by 1 Jane Addam s in 1915 (Addams, 1907; Bussy & Tims, 1980) and the compelling : story of W om en’s Strike for Peace in the early 1960s (Swerdlow, 1982). Today, i j W AND (W om en Advocating Nuclear Disarm am ent), M END (M others : 75 Em bracing N uclear Disarm am ent; see M ehan & Wills, 1988), and the G reenham Com mon Peace Encam pm ent evidence wom en’s efforts to secure nuclear i disarm am ent and peace. i The view that women are typically m ore peaceable, less aggressive and i violent, and more opposed to warfare than m en has been challenged by some on experiential and ideological grounds. Elshtain (1982) cautioned against the idealized notion of woman as Beautiful Soul, a term coined by Hegel to refer to good, pure, self-sacrificing, pacific individuals of rarefied sensibilities. She j argued that such a depiction of women is ultim ately an im potent image or m odel | for political change in the nuclear age. Nor does it square with wom en’s role in the second line of defense, keeping the "home fires burning, the farms and i J factories producing, the bandages, blankets, and food stuffs flowing and the dead ! j mourned" (Elshtain, 1982, p. 343). Similarly, Z ur et al. (1985; Z ur & \ Glendinning, 1987; Z ur & M orrison, 1989) pointed to wom en’s support of warmaking as Rosie the Riveters, Florence Nightingales, "worried mothers, j proud sweethearts, and acclaimed widows" (1987, p. 112). Steihm (1982) ( described the potent role of the "protected" in the wartime practices of the "protector." Di Leonardo (1985) cited wom en’s increased military participation, including "heroic" efforts in Third W orld guerrilla armies where the "Woman | W arrior" is an im portant symbol. Many feminists encourage wom en to learn I m artial arts skills to counter m en’s pernicious violence against wom en (Ruether, 1985). A comprehensive and accurate analysis of the relationship betw een j gender and war must encompass and account for this range of evidence, i This review focuses on: (a) existing research and (b) current psychological, i | political, sociological, and m oral theories on gender and war. The emphasis on 76 theory attem pts to provide a broader, m ore accurate fram ework from which to J i understand the results of existing research. Specifically, three theories are j examined within the frame of feminist inquiry: (a) sex role theory; (b) feminist i psychoanalytic theory; and (c) a feminist ethic of care. i I C urrent psychological research has suggested that wom en support peace to j a greater extent than men. These studies centered on gender differences (or lack j of differences) in em otional and cognitive responses to conventional and nuclear j war. Masculinity has been a popular construct with which to understand the ; greater incidence of male, rather than female, aggression, conflict, and violence j (Arkin & Dobrofsky, 1978; Easlea, 1983, 1987; Enloe, 1984; Kaufman, 1987). ! These traditional masculine characteristics are expressed in war and, m ore 1 i ; specifically, in nuclear development and deployment. Notions of masculinity and j femininity may indeed be im portant in theorizing about gender differences in i nuclear threat response. Different theories, however, provide varied • I conceptualizations of masculinity and femininity, each suggesting unique research ' i ; considerations. In psychological research, sex role socialization theory is : advanced as the standard explanation for these differences. Although popular with feminist scholars in the 1970s, sex role explanations have been highly i criticized in current feminist discourse as too static and rigid, typically neglecting gender difference in power relations, and the interaction of internal dynamics with the external pressures of socialization agencies (Connell, 1987; Eisenstein, , I 1983; Williams, 1989). j D espite new and general acceptance of feminist psychoanalysis as superior | to sex role theory (Connell, 1987; Williams, 1989), it has received lim ited J f ! attention as a potential alternative for informing research on gender differences : i 77 I ! in nuclear threat response. Fem inist psychoanalytic theory is examined as a 1 creative alternative to the ubiquitous use of sex role theory to explain differences j I in nuclear threat response. Sex role theory and feminist psychoanalysis m aintain i I I ! different notions of masculinity and femininity. Sex role theory views masculine and fem inine traits as the result of social learning while feminist psychoanalysis | describes masculinity and femininity as structured in the personality through ' unconscious developmental processes. W hile reductionistic versions of feminist ( i 1 psychoanalysis are subject to similar pitfalls as sex role theory, an integration of i . i | feminist psychoanalysis with a theory of social and power structures has been | i | proposed (Craib, 1987; Messner, 1990). : 1 , \ 1 Fem inist moral theory, represented by the work of Carol Gilligan (1982, | i I i | 1987), is also examined here for its utility and limits. Gilligan contended that | women and m en m aintain different perspectives toward nurturance, morality, j and justice. M en’s m oral standpoint is generalized, abstract, and concerned with ! reason and universality. It is an "ethic of justice." W om en’s m oral standpoint is i : concrete, contextual, and em bedded in notions of care and interdependence. It is ; an "ethic of care." i i ; R esearch into these differing constructions of self and morality has revealed j I that the two m oral ethics are not divided strictly by gender. In one study, Gilligan | (1982) found that 75% of the women used predom inantly the ethic of care and j 25% used predom inantly the ethic of justice. O f the m en in her study, 79% used ( predom inantly the ethic of justice and 14% used predom inantly the ethic of care. : j D espite this, Gilligan’s theory has been widely understood as providing a category : of gender difference. 78 Gilligan’s work has been a controversial voice among feminist theorists. Some feminists welcomed this representation of wom en’s caring morality, seeing it as a "positive orientation to behavior" (Epstein, 1988, p. 77). O thers objected to the dualism and stereotyped notions perpetuated by Gilligan’s care/justice dichotomy (Epstein, 1988). Despite this controversy, or perhaps because of it, her work dem ands examination, particularly of its implications regarding gender, war, and peace. Both Sara Ruddick (1984, 1987) and Jean Bethke Elshtain (1982) applied the m oral standpoint of care or, "maternal preservation love" (Ruddick, 1984), to issues of war and peace in the nuclear age. j From the outset, it is im portant to identify a potential lim itation of these psychological and moral theories. This lim itation is the emphasis on and I i I exaggeration of gender difference (H are-M ustin & M arecek, 1988). The j conceptualization of gender difference is an im m ediate bias and restriction, since : I it focuses on and suggests characteristics that distinguish individuals or groups. However, using social science research on gender differences as an example, the i characteristics typically found to differentiate groups "usually do not distinguish | | m ost of the m em bers of one group from most of the mem bers of the comparison i I group" (Jacklin, 1981, p. 266). Researchers who adhere strictly to difference j theories, such as sex role, feminist psychoanalysis, or the care/justice delineation | | in m oral standpoints, may overlook, minimize, or disregard im portant and I i j m eaningful similarities betw een women and m en in responses to the nuclear I threat. This lim itation is considered in the evaluation of these theories. ! i 1 i ! The utility and limits of traditional sex role, feminist psychoanalytic, and j feminist m oral theory to explain the relationship betw een gender and the threat ! of nuclear war are considered in regard to the following questions. 79 1. Does the theoretical fram ework explain differences and similarities betw een females and males and betw een feminine and m asculine-oriented individuals in responses to the nuclear threat? j 2. Does the theoretical framework elucidate "within group", as well as, j "between group" differences (such as differences among wom en of different classes, ethnicities, races, ages, and cultures) in responses to the nuclear threat? 3. D oes the explanatory schema account for apparent contradictions in gendered behavior in relation to the nuclear threat? i j 4. W hat criteria should guide further theory developm ent? | Answers to these salient questions may further the developm ent of a solid ! theoretical base to guide research on sex-related differences and similarities to I j i : the nuclear threat. Given that much of the existing nuclear threat research in j ! psychology has been atheoretical (Diam ond & Bachman, 1986), these theoretical j j considerations are an im portant next step in advancing the social science research ' i < i i | paradigm of these issues. i i Research Findings i | N ot all studies that examined psychological responses to the threat of . | nuclear war looked for gender differences, although many did include sex (the j biological categories of fem ale and m ale) as a variable. Some of these studies j i | have not found significant differences (Doctor, Goldenring, & Powell, 1987; 1 ! Feshback, Kandel, & Haist, 1985; Jensen, 1987; Z ur et al., 1985), while others ( have found differences in women's and m en's attitudes, beliefs, and values ! regarding nuclear war. For example, women have been found to be m ore ' pacifistic (Droba, 1931) and value a world at peace m ore than m en (Mayton, ! 80 1987a). O n die other hand, m en have been found to be m ore hawkish (Lewis, \ 1975) and m ore accepting of war (Putney & M iddleton, 1962), and to support an j increase in nuclear weapons m ore than do women (H am ilton et al., 1987). ! Psychologically, wom en reported less denial, less nuclear support, m ore fear for ! i the future, and greater nuclear concern than m en (Herm an, 1987; Newcomb, 1986). W om en have reported greater anticipation of death by nuclear annihilation than m en (Herm an, 1987). Nuclear anxiety of wom en was j associated m ore with lowered purpose in life and life satisfaction, while nuclear j anxiety of m en was more highly associated with drug use (Newcomb, 1986). j i . . i A few studies have investigated gender, defined as socially constructed j phenom enon (Basow, 1986; Unger, 1979; Williams, 1989), using m easures of sex role. Jensen (1987) found little support for masculinity as a m ediating variable in nuclear war attitudes. Newcomb (1988a) found that m asculine-oriented j individuals showed greater nuclear support, while fem inine-oriented individuals j indicated less nuclear support, greater nuclear concern, and greater fear for the 1 I future. ! Few studies were found that investigated the relationship betw een m oral i reasoning and attitudes about war and peace (e.g., Z ur et al., 1985). This may be | l I i due, in part, to difficulties in measuring m oral constructs. These difficulties have i ! not precluded theoretical postulations (e.g., Elshtain, 1982, 1985; Ruddick, 1984; ■ I ; R uether, 1985; Steihm, 1982). I I Sex Role Theoiy ! i I Sex role socialization theory was frequently chosen as the explanatory I fram e from which to interpret both sex and gender differences in nuclear threat 81 ) research. Role theory is an approach to social structure concerned with "stereotyped interpersonal expectations" (Connell, 1987). Talcott Parsons (1942, j 1956) and other sociologists developed role theory during the 1950s to explain \ internalization of roles, including the acquisition of sex role behavior and j attitudes, through the mechanisms of learning. Agencies of primary socialization, i such as the family, school, media, and peer groups, facilitate developm ent of | I gender appropriate traits. For instance, properly socialized boys should exhibit j instrum ental and achievem ent-oriented traits adapted to m eet the needs of the i | occupational world, while properly socialized girls should learn expressive and caregiving skills to facilitate domestic and child-rearing duties. Early critics of role theory cited the limited and restrictive depiction of norm ative fem ale and male traits implied in the theory (Chesler, 1972; Friedan, 1963; Millett, 1970). Introduction of the androgyny concept helped reduce J problem s of sex role stereotyping. The notion of androgyny considered both i m asculine and feminine traits im portant and adaptive to particular situations. These traits were not viewed as end points on a single dimension (m eaning m ore ! of one implies less of another). Rather, they were perceived as separate ! j dimensions (meaning the level on one dimension is independent of the level on i i j the other dimension). Sandra Bern (1974, 1981a, 1981b), for example, developed i I the Bern Sex Role Inventory (BSRI) to "blend traits allocated m asculine and i ! fem inine into a series of traits that were both crucial to the m ental health of any [ individual, m ale or female" (Eisenstein, 1983, p. 60). A second widely used I i m easure of masculinity, femininity, and androgyny is the Personal A ttributes j Q uestionnaire (PAQ), developed by Spence, Helmreich, and Stapp (1974). 1 i 82 Using sex role theory, m en’s greater support of war can be viewed as | stemming from their social training to be competitive and aggressive. Such traits are consistent with a "peace through strength" approach to control war and ! hostility betw een nations. This W eltanschauung, or world view, assumes that | individuals and nations are inherently competitive and conflict is conceptualized as only a w in/lose situation (Kimmel, 1985). Conversely, wom en are socialized to dem onstrate caring and tender traits which are m ore congruent with the "peace through cooperation" W eltanschauung. Proponents of this world view I value empathy, cooperation, and win/win resolutions (Kimmel, 1985). This | socialization occurs as the individual interacts with primary and secondary ! i | socialization agencies. For example, secondary socialization takes place as adults I ; interact with social institutions, such as the military. In 1970, the President’s j Commission noted that Am erican society was comprised 23.7 million veterans I | and nearly half of the employed male population had served an average of 27 : months of active duty. The military occupies a unique position in the J socialization of 17 to 20-year-old recruits in the transition from adolescence to i adulthood. | i 1 I In recent years, sex role theory has been readily applied to investigations of ! cognitive and em otional reactions to the threat of nuclear war. For instance, | I ! [ H am ilton et al. (1987) used sex role theory to explain differences they found in | which men, com pared to women, reported (a) a stronger desire to survive a i | nuclear war; (b) greater support for increased nuclear weapons; and (c) greater ! endorsem ent of deterrence. Newcomb (1986, 1988a) found differences betw een | wom en and m en and betw een feminine and masculine individuals and implicated 83 sex role and related "macho" tendencies in m en’s greater nuclear denial and : greater nuclear support as possible explanations. j Theorists concerned with masculinity and military developm ent expect and j i concur with such results. Enloe (1984) argued that the military is "society’s ; i bastion of m ale identity" (p. 15) and that military com bat validates masculinity by j expressing control, dom ination, and conquest. Easlea (1987) blam ed socialized | I masculinity as a major driving force behind current nuclear weapons j ! development, stockpiling, and deployment. H e identified the competitive and aggressive behavior institutionalized and rew arded in the scientific world of ; nuclear developm ent and the military as contributing factors in his argum ent. ' T he traditional masculine ideology of conquering nature, rather than respectfully interacting with "her," pervades this paradigm. Sexual, birth, and paternity imagery are not uncommon, as illustrated by reference to the first fission bom b as "a baby boy if a successful explosion, a baby girl if a failure" (p. 207). Theorists and researchers alike confirmed associations betw een socialized masculinity and military support and nuclear development. T here are clear advantages in contem porary sex role theory to shape hypotheses and interpret findings in nuclear threat research. First, it shifts , explanations of gender difference from biology to learning and social expectations. Second, it provides avenues for reform: change expectations of "agencies of socialization" such as the family, m edia, peer groups, and schools, and perhaps reduce propensities towards war and aggression. Jensen (1987) 1 suggested, for example, that young boys be encouraged to develop tender, nurturing traits. Such practices may reduce the competitive aspects of the 84 ; traditional masculine role and thereby curtail nuclear support and ultim ately the threat of nuclear war. D espite its virtues, sex role theory suffers from several serious theoretical ■ shortcomings. First, a persistent core concept identifies and may reify some traits | as masculine (m ale) and others as feminine (female) (Eisenstein, 1983). i i Contributing to this biological dichotomy is the practice of explaining gender differences with sex role theory. Connell (1987) pointed out the excessive confusion betw een sex and sex role in literally hundreds of sex difference studies. | N uclear threat research is no exception. Recognizing this, researchers have ] begun to include sex role m easures such as the BSRI and the PAQ to investigate , the association of masculinity, femininity, and androgyny with responses to the i ! nuclear threat (e.g., Jensen, 1987; Newcomb, 1988a). This corrective practice | i does not satisfy critics who view sex role explanations as theoretically flawed. i | Second, sex role theory focuses on "behavioral conformity to static sex roles i rather than on the processes whereby individuals actively construct definitions of m asculine and feminine" (Williams, 1989, p. 12). In other words, sex role theory I provides an explanatory schema for acquiring behaviors that correspond with sex role stereotypes. Behaviors inconsistent with these stereotypes, such as feminine fem ale m arines (Williams, 1989), simply cannot be explained. N or can sex role theory account for social struggle and social contradiction, such as conflict betw een socialization agencies (Connell, 1987). One example of conflict betw een socialization agencies or traditional expectations is illustrated by the military . recruitm ent slogan, "some of the best soldiers wear lipstick" (Enloe, 1984). ! Finally, sex role theory has been rigorously criticized for inadequate i attention to economic, political, and domestic inequality of power in gender i 85 relations and sex differences (Connell, 1987). Miller (1976) claimed that many so-called "feminine" ("expressive") characteristics arise from wom en’s subordination to m en and m en’s dom ination of women. W hen power variations betw een m en and wom en are considered, the notion of "sex role" appears ironic and inappropriate. Having recognized the im portance of differential power dynamics in race and class structure, it would be inconceivable to refer to "race roles" or "class roles" (Connell, 1987). As Raymond (1979) deftly n o te d ,". .. the language of androgyny, is the language of dom inance and servitude combined. O ne would not put m aster and slave language or imagery together to define a free person" (p. 161). In her analysis of feminism and peace, R uether (1985) characterized wom en as "not so much peacem akers as they are repressed into passive ‘kept wom en’" (p. 71). Sex role theory does not elucidate the potentially complex relationship among wom en’s subordination, feminine traits, and w om en’s concern for peace and nuclear disarmament. Unfortunately, the theory allows many researchers to believe that "there is no power relationship here at all" (Connell, 1987, p. 51) and largely ignore power variations in traditional gender role expectations and behavior. To summarize, sex role theory has guided most nuclear threat research on sex/gender difference. W hile differences betw een women and m en or betw een fem inine and m asculine-oriented individuals may indeed exist, role phenom enon may be an insufficient and ultimately damaging explanation of these patterns. Sex role theory neglects the interaction of internal dynamics with social expectations in shaping the behavior, attitudes, and world views which underlie responses to the nuclear threat. Sex role theory disregards the role of power. Because of the emphasis on behavioral conformity to static sex roles, it does not 86 explain similarities betw een m en and women nor within group differences on j issues of war, peace, and the nuclear threat. I Fem inist Psychoanalysis ; Fem inist psychoanalysis retains the useful constructs of "masculinities" and j "femininities," while effectively embracing the complexities, diversity, and | | ' apparent contradictions inherent in hum an development, activity, and relations i (Connell, 1987; Messner, 1990; Williams, 1989). Chodorow (1978) has been j influential in the developm ent of feminist psychoanalytic thinking. H er work | combined psychoanalytic and sociological insights to explain the construction of j gender and the perceived psychological differences betw een m en and women. i H er version of hum an developm ent identified pre-oedipal attachm ent to the ! m other as the central or critical process in fem ale identity development. Because t of this significant relationship with the m other, fem inine identity is birthed and i j emerges from connection, unity, and relation. As a result of this experience, ! w om en’s sense of self is based in their capacity for empathy. Fem inine 1 personality is motivated toward the retention and continuity of external ! relationships. i 1 1 Com pared to little girls, little boys’ pre-oedipal period is shorter and less j intense. This is due to both the m others’ and the boy’s recognition that they are j indeed different and separate from each other in fundam ental ways. Chodorow j I (1978) wrote, "A boy, in order to feel himself adequately masculine, must ■ ] ; distinguish and differentiate himself from others in a way that a girl need , I : | not— m ust categorize himself as som eone apart. M oreover, he defines masculinity j negatively as that which is not feminine" (p. 174). Boys develop a positionally ! oriented sense of self rather than the relational sense of self typical of girls. This j i positional self for the boys is birthed in separation and isolation and the denial | I I | i i and repression of early fem inine attachm ents. R elational needs of m en tend to be m ore repressed as they are m ore concerned with the boundaries and i distinctions that separate individuals or m en and women, rather than the I processes that connect and join them together in a relationship. j Applying this theory of psychic structuring to concern about nuclear war, it can be hypothesized that women and m en may experience different feelings, ; beliefs, and anxieties in response to this threat. W om en’s and m en’s different ; psychic structures may predispose them to fundamentally different world views and, as a result, to fundamentally different views about war and peace. Fem inist t 1 psychoanalysis suggests that women m aintain a m ore global world view, are m ore j ' cooperative, and are m ore attuned to issues of interconnectedness. In short, i wom en are characterized, theoretically at least, by qualities that align them m ore j with the "peace through cooperation," rather than with the "peace through strength," orientation. O n the other hand, m en’s positional psychic structure suggests a "peace through strength" stance. Kaufman (1987) warned that if m asculine identity is structured in the psyche in this fashion, it is "terrifyingly fragile" (p. 13). Violence against women, other men, and the self may all be used in attem pts to com pensate for and bolster this fragile m asculine identity. Kaufm an (1987) recognized that each of these three forms of violence is ! ' expressed in the practice of war. D innerstein (1977) asserted that this psychic i j j structure is the root of the m alaise that threatens hum an survival. W hen this , theory of gender difference is applied to concern about war and peace, it i . , ! 88 accurately reflects much of the current data on gender differences in attitudes and responses. If looked at too narrowly, however, several problem s emerge. First, the use of feminist psychoanalysis is seen by some theorists as problem atic since it may reify categorical differences betw een women and m en (e.g., Gilligan, 1982; Rubin, 1983). The unitary depiction of the m other (or adult wom an in general) as nurturing, caring, and em pathic has unfortunately provided the m aterial of a new essentialism (Di Leonardo, 1985; Eisenstein, 1983; Segal, 1988). This glorified caricature of wom an encourages a false universalism, ; another rigid stereotype which reduces women to a lim ited set of characteristics | and which disregards im portant differences among women, such as differences in i class, race, and ethnicity (Eisenstein, 1983). It is a representation disturbingly I close to the ideologically problem atic and similarly restricted Beautiful Soul (Elshtain, 1982). j Second, it leaves wom en vulnerable to the counter argum ent that they are not entirely or always peaceable and unselfish beings (Di Leonardo, 1985). Further, it fails to explain the experience and actions of Third W orld women who repudiate nonviolence in liberation efforts. Finally, it leaves no room for i peaceable men, because m en are perceived as inevitably, if not inherently, ; violent. i I O n a m ore general level, one assum ption of this theory is that psychology is j the cause of all differences. This is worrisome since it ignores the relationship j betw een psychology and structured inequality. Like sex role theory, this , form ulation of gender difference leaves unexplored the relationship among , w om en’s lesser power, gender difference in personality, and desires for peace. 89 This reductionistic approach is a regrettable lim itation of feminist psychoanalysis. An alternative is a social constructivist theory of gender which effectively integrates a feminist psychoanalytic form ulation of gender difference | in personality developm ent and m oral agency with a theory of social and power structure (Connell, 1987; Flax, 1983; Harding, 1981; Harstock, 1983; Messner, 1990; Williams, 1989). i I I The Ethic O f Care i i I The work of Carol Gilligan (1982, 1987) provides a bridge betw een j psychological and m oral theory. In particular, Gilligan’s feminist scholarship undercuts traditional and current assumptions underlying m oral theory. As a ! developm ental psychologist, Gilligan took issue with Kohlberg’s cognitive- i developm ental m odel of m oral reasoning. Kohlberg’s stage theory adheres to j K antian tradition (Baier, 1987; Tronto, 1987) and is concerned with sets of ■ "moral principles rationally chosen after consideration of competing principles" j i (Tronto, p. 657). This m oral point of view is im partial, universalizable, and ' focused on describing what is right (Frankena, 1973). The central them e of Gilligan’s work attem pted to dispute supposed 1 findings that wom en’s m oral reasoning is less developed than m en’s on Kohlberg’s scale. Gilligan referred to Chodorow (1978) and argued that wom en’s j different concept of the self and focus of identity (relational rather than i | positional) results in an experience of m oral developm ent different from m en’s as described by Kohlberg. Two m oral tracks emerged: an "ethic of care" which rests j on an understanding of contexts, relationships, caring, and interdependence; and I I i I 90 an "ethic of justice" which rests on objectivity, rationality, and universal rules and principles of fairness (Ford & Lowry, 1986; Lyons, 1983; Pratt & Royer, 1982). Benhabib (1987) elaborated these two m oral positions, focusing on the role of the generalized and concrete other. Notions of the "generalized other" j requires viewing individuals as rational beings entitled to universal rights and duties. This standpoint is congruent with Kohlberg’s "ethic of justice" and predom inates contem porary universalist m oral theory and m oral psychology. The standpoint of the concrete does not require abstracting from individuality ! and concrete identity. This standpoint is governed by the view that each and I every individual has a "concrete history, identity, and affective-emotional constitution .... W e seek to com prehend the needs of the other, his or her motivations, what he or she searches for and desires" (p. 164). According to Benhabib (1987), the "generalized other" is a necessary but insufficient condition i j from which to define the m oral standpoint. | The distinction betw een "justice morality" and "care morality" provides a i I fram e for considering gender differences in the construction of m oral positions i j on war and peace. First, the "ethic of care" contains elem ents of m aternal I i j nurturance. Ruddick (1984, 1987) uses m aternal images to explain com m itm ent I and to m otivate others in peace efforts. Identifying herself as a feminist and a pacifist, Ruddick (1984) described women as having a unique capacity for pacifism based on their social role as mothers. She claimed that (a) women have distinctive interests in and capacities for peacem aking; (b) these interests and capacities are connected with m aternity; and (c) although women’s peacem aking ! has hitherto been confined to m aternal life, women have "more influence every j ; day" in making the world safe for future generations. According to Ruddick (1984), the historical association betw een wom en and peace is based in m aternal practice. "Out of m aternal practice a distinctive kind of thinking arises that is i incom patible with military strategy but consonant with pacifist com m itm ent to j j non-violence" (1984, p. 233). She appealed to wom en’s m aternal nature with its j preservation love, pacifist attitudes toward conflict, concrete rather than abstract thinking, and m aternal sexuality. These traits largely explain the difference betw een wom en and m en on issues of war and peace. (Ruddick attem pts to deal j with social contradictions by referring to pacifist men, such as Ghandi, W ilfred j i i Owen, A ndre Trocm e, and Randall Jarrell, as "maternal men." Unfortunately, i j she did not distinguish betw een m en’s public politics, e.g., pacifism, and aspects ; of hegemonic masculinity in m en’s personal relationships, e.g., sexism.) Ruddick I j (1984, 1987) prescribed m aternal thinking as a m oral orientation and advocates that m aternal traits, combined with feminist politics, could be a powerful force in j securing a peaceable world. Elshtain (1982, 1985) concurred, proposing , "m aternal thinking" as an alternative to the prevalent archetypes of the Beautiful ! Soul and Just W arrior. ; Second, wom en may support war less because of a concrete and contextual 1 m oral position whereas m en may support war m ore because of an abstract and generalized morality. For example, Ruddick (1984) associated abstract and I generalized thinking with dispositions that simplify and dissociate. This style of thinking is connected to warfare and may explain support for violent enterprises. The protagonist in R em arque’s (1975) A l l Q u i e t o n t h e W e s t e r n F r o n t illustrated the potency of abstract thinking in warfare. The protagonist speared an "enemy" French soldier who has sought refuge in the trench beside him. W hen the Frenchm an died after several agonizing hours, R em arque’s hero spoke to the i i : 92 m an he had killed, "Comrade, I did not want to kill you .... But you were only an idea to me before, an abstraction that lived in my mind and called forth its appropriate response. It was that abstraction I stabbed" (p. 195). Idolization of the abstract, juxtaposed with disdain for the concrete, contains devastating possibilities in the nuclear age. W hen annihilation of the faceless "enemy" is accomplished by turning a key and pressing a button, abstract hatreds have less ! I ! j opportunity to "rub against concrete friction" (Elshtain, 1985, p. 50). Ruddick j I ! j presented m aternal thinking as descriptive and prescriptive. It describes why I wom en may support peace m ore than m en do. In addition, it advocates the . concrete and contextual in m oral formulations about war and peace. i I Third, the "ethic of care" suggests provocative research questions. Contrary j to Ruddick and Elshtain, Z ur and his colleagues (1985, 1989) used Gilligan’s I (1982) work to question the assertion that m en are m ore likely to support war i j than women. H e argued that women and m en equally support war but endorse j different justifications of war. W omen, because of a "care morality," endorsed i I justifications that relate to empathy for children and oppressed people. Men, ; because of a justice orientation, justified war by abstract or rational criteria. To summarize, the justice/care m oral dichotomy explains gender difference 1 in responses to war and peace by (a) associating m aternal nurturance with | pacifism; (b) connecting abstract, general thinking to warfare; and (c) expanding i i | possible justifications for war. D espite these contributions, the justice/care | m oral distinction is an insufficient theory from which to hypothesize wom en’s and i m en’s m oral positions on war and peace. The limitations are m ethodological and t ! philosophical. It is im portant that considerable debate has centered on problem s of m ethod and Gilligan’s scholarship. For example, Gilligan’s central argum ent was that wom en’s m oral reasoning is not less developed than m en’s, as indicated by research utilizing Kohlberg’s scale; wom en’s m oral reasoning is, however, different. Yet, when W alker (1984) reviewed 61 studies using Kohlberg’s scale, he found no trend in m ales scoring higher than females. In other words, as G reene and Maccoby (1986) asserted, Gilligan has attacked a "straw man." Gilligan’s theory is strictly one of difference. H er m ethod and interpretations were designed to support this them e. Problematically, her study on m oral reasoning about a classic dilem m a utilized a very small sample: 8 boys and 8 girls. Gilligan interpreted the girls’ responses as m ore caring, the boys as m ore concerned with what was "right." Interestingly, Epstein (1988) observed the same protocols and came to different conclusions, raising questions about reliability. In the abortion-decision study, 29 pregnant women participated. Clearly, no comparison group of m en could be provided. Thus, speculation on possible differences here was inappropriate. D espite this, Gilligan m ade difference interpretations expressing stereotyped views of wom en’s and m en’s altruism. Similarities betw een women and men, as well as differences among wom en and among men, cannot be contained in her overly simplistic m oral dichotomy. From the standpoint of m oral theory, this focus on gender difference results in an inadequate philosophical position. Advocates of a wom en’s m orality have alm ost always viewed it as a necessary corrective, potentially improving the morality of the whole society. Certainly Ruddick’s m aternal thinking illustrated w om en’s morality as corrective in an aggressive, w ar-torn world. Yet, this functionalist argum ent is doom ed because it "ignores the fact that privileged m en are the adjudicators of what is useful, of what is im portant, and therefore, of what stands most in need of correction" (Tronto, 1987, p. 656). Like earlier sex role theories, Gilligan ignored social origins and reduced all difference to static gender categories. She provided her readers with no inform ation on her subjects (no social background— race, class, religion) or personal detail (education, employment, age, interests, politics) except for their sex. G ranted, Gilligan (1982) stated in her introduction that m oral orientations "arise in a social context where factors of social status and power combine with reproductive biology." Unfortunately, this is an observation she did not develop. Ruddick (1984), considering m oral orientations about peace, also alluded to social context. In fact, she used social context to explain why some women, or m others, do not choose a pacifist stance. First, for women confined in domestic life, war offers real education, new training, job experience, economic power, ! travel, and a sense of communal life. Second, women who love peace may do so because of their dread of war’s aggression. W eapons of protection, supported by ; the governm ent’s war policies, may relieve that sense of horrible vulnerability, j Third, even peace-loving women, if undereducated and economically dependent, ! may allow m en at hom e and in politics to decide for them the best way to deal ! , with the danger of threatened aggression. These hypotheses raise some ■ interesting questions about the relationship betw een secondary social status and j ' I attitudes about war and peace. Yet, Ruddick avoided developing this im portant i ; thread in her theory of m aternal thinking. O thers researchers (Arkin & Dobrofsky, 1978; Coles, 1977; Stack, 1986) I have questioned the relationship betw een social context and the shaping or re- ' 95 ; shaping of m oral standpoints. Arkin and Dobrofsky (1978) rem inded us that m onolithic military structure and experience in battle may shape m oral positions. For example, basic training and the military community create a masculine ; archetype in part by providing an environm ent w here "emotions and character are controlled a n d /o r positioned by rank, authority, cooperation and competition, aggressiveness, and self-reliance" (p. 166). M ilitary community can never provide for mutually personal, intim ate, warm, supportive, and interactive prim ary group relations. This illustrates the crucial role of patriarchal , institutions in shaping m oral orientations. i O ther researchers (Coles, 1977; Stack, 1986) have argued that perhaps a j "caring" morality would be better identified with subordination or minority status than with gender. Carol Stack (1986) studied black migrants returning to the 1 rural South. She reported that these poor black wom en and m en converge in ; relations with others and in their "vocabulary of rights, morality, and the social good" (p. 323). R obert Coles (1977) provided circumstantial evidence from 1 interviews with Indian, Chicano, and Eskimo children. These children were critical of Anglos for their inattention to proper m oral concerns and for their lack of care for others and for the earth. N either the role of institutions nor of social conditions of secondary status ! were examined by Gilligan. Y et such an investigation is essential to a | comprehensive description of m oral reasoning related to war and peace. It is also necessary to consider social context and culture if the "ethic of care" is to be i a legitim ate prescriptive m oral standpoint. How can an ethic of care avoid the i charge of relativism, of embodying different m oral positions in different societies i and at different times (Tronto, 1987)? As a contextual m oral theory, the milder form of "soft relativism" may best apply. The only way a "care morality" could entirely avoid the charge of relativism would be to suggest a universal caring relationship (e.g., parent and child). This, however, is obviously problem atic for feminist scholars because it posits a narrow and conservative definition of "caregiver." The attem pts by Ruddick (1984, 1987) and Elshtain (1982, 1985) to identify an alternative m odel for pacifism based on care and m aternal nurturance are noble. Yet, like the "ethic of care," m othering literature provides an exaggerated focus on difference betw een women and men. It perpetuates the ideology of the "good" woman, disqualified from the world of male economic and political dominance. Tronto (1987) pointed to its conservative quality, preserving existing social relations without asking if the relationships are "good, healthy, and worthy of preservation" (p. 660). Interestingly, m aternal imagery has a long history within the feminist m ovement. Using it to distinguish themselves as morally superior, nineteenth and twentieth century wom en struggled to enter the public world as m oral reform ers. Second-wave feminist scholars have shown how this ideological strategy provided short-term gains, but that, over time, it was also a strategy used by male supremacists to push women back into the hom e (Di Leonardo, 1985). It has often been the process of breaking the identification of wom en with m aternity that has em powered wom en (Ruddick, 1984). From this perspective, Di Leonardo (1985) protested the feminist use, w hether biological or social, of the m other image: innately peaceful and morally superior to men. In "demobilizing" the m oral m other, she pointed to ideological problem s with the image. First, to use the m oral m other image to mobilize new peace activists does 97 not challenge the traditional social order for these activists. It does not encourage them to becom e feminists nor does it raise feminist consciousness. Second, it glorifies the heterosexual, reproductive woman, and implicitly devalues the lives of childless women and lesbians. Third, it leaves no room for men, who are perceived as innately violent, to join the feminist antim ilitarism movement. Finally, it leaves wom en vulnerable to the counterargum ent that they are not entirely peaceable and unselfish beings. It ignores that wom en or m others do not care for all equally but care m ore for those emotionally, physically, and culturally close. Given these problems, it is difficult to m aintain a distinction betw een feminist "concepts of peace-oriented m aternal thought and the culturally ubiquitous sexist, homophobic, and sentimentalizing constrictions of m otherhood" (Di Leonardo, 1985, p. 613). In sum, the "ethic of care" has serious shortcomings. It is inadequate to explain the gender/w ar relationship because it reduces all difference to simplistic, static gender categories, ignoring the role of institutions and secondary social status. It exaggerates gender difference, idealizing the m aternal without challenging the traditional social order. It ignores similarities among wom en and men, as well as, differences within groups of wom en and within groups of men. As an alternative (rather than supplem ental) m oral theory of pacifism, it does not fully address the place of caring in society and m oral life. Sum m ary A variety of studies have revealed differences betw een women and men. However, only one study was found that attem pted to integrate the concept of masculine and fem inine traits with responses to the threat of nuclear war. W hile 98 Newcomb's (1988a) study is one example of an integration betw een psycho- ; dynamic and sociological feminist theory with nuclear response research, no studies were found which specifically addressed masculine and fem inine traits in relation to peace attitudes or in relation to pro-defense or anti-nuclear activism. Currently, sex role theory dom inates as the explanatory schem a in psychological | nuclear threat research. However, when scrutinized in the light of current i ^ | feminist discourse, sex role theory has serious shortcomings. i | Sex role theory, feminist psychoanalysis, and fem inist m oral theory are all i | both useful and lim ited in explaining the gender differences and similarities on j the issues of war, peace, and the nuclear threat. The preceding analysis suggests ! that a viable theory must integrate a form ulation of gender difference in ■ personality and m oral developm ent with a theory of social and power structure i | (Connell, 1987; Flax, 1983; Harding, 1981; Harstock, 1983; M essner, 1990; I Williams, 1989). i Conclusions Coping with the threat of nuclear war is a complex psychological and behavioral phenom enon. The developm ent of a peace attitude and a com m itm ent to pro-defense or anti-nuclear activism may be com ponents of coping (D iam ond & Bachman, 1986). The literature reviewed has suggested that peace attitude and true activist behavior may evolve from protection m otivation and personal and political efficacy (Erdahl & Rounds, 1986; Maddux & Rogers, 1983; Tyler & McGraw, 1983). Or, vigilant inform ation processing may be the basis of peace attitude and activist behavior (D iam ond & Bachman, 1986). A dditional argum ents have been m ade suggesting that attitudes and activism are 99 em bedded in one’s personality-m anifested in the traits of dogmatism (Rokeach, 1956, 1960), intolerance of ambiguity (Budner,1962; Sidanius, 1978), an d /o r M achiavellianism (Christie & Geis, 1970; Gold et al., 1971; Vleeming, 1979). Given the gender differences frequently cited by researchers, feminist analyses provided social, economic, and psychological attributions, not only for differences [ betw een the genders, but for differences betw een those with masculine and j 1 : fem inine traits as well. : i W hile studies were found that examined com ponents of these theories with t | m ultiple variables, no studies were found that examined all of these variables in I j relation to each other. A comprehensive study to examine the intricate ] relationships of these variables is needed to provide greater understanding of attitudes and activism in this era compromised by the potential for nuclear ■ annihilation. 100 I C H A PTER III i i l RESEARCH M ETHODOLOGY i I i r J Based on the literature review of the previous chapter, it is evident that the i ' psychological m eans for coping with the threat of nuclear war is a very complex j issue. A clear appreciation of the particular coping styles involved in activist I behaviors and their respective peace attitudes is far from complete. In addition, i j the affective, coping, personality, and gender correlates associated with activist i behavior and peace attitudes need further exploration. This descriptive and exploratory study, therefore, attem pts to answer the following questions: 1. Can peace through strength and peace through cooperation attitudes be reliably and validly assessed through the use of the Peace A ttitude Scale? 2. Is a peace through strength attitude associated with pro-defense behavior? Is a peace through cooperation attitude associated with anti-nuclear behavior? 3. D o peace attitudes ("peace through strength" or "peace through cooperation") vary according to the following affective, coping, personality and gender dimensions: nuclear salience, nuclear anxiety, general and nuclear locus of control, general coping style, intolerance of ambiguity, dogmatism, M achiavellianism, gender, and sex role trait? 4. Does taking an activist stance (pro-defense or anti-nuclear) also relate to the following affective, coping, personality, and gender variables: nuclear 101 salience, nuclear anxiety, general and nuclear locus of control, general coping style, intolerance of ambiguity, dogmatism, M achiavellianism, gender, and sex ' role trait? 5. W hich affective, coping, personality, and gender variables under study j best predict peace attitude and activist behavior? i i 6. W hich com bination of affective, coping, personality, and gender | dimensions under study are the best predictors of peace attitude and activist j ! stance? M ore specifically, this study was designed to: (a) identify and define two j dimensions that characterize predom inate attitudes toward peace, (b) construct a ! reliable and valid m easure of these attitudes based on the definition, (c) test for i ' the hypothesized factors, Peace Through Strength and Peace Through | Cooperation, in the m easure, (d) examine the correlational relationship betw een I peace attitudes as assessed by the PAS and types of activism, and (e) evaluate the i : degree of association betw een the PAS and affective, coping, personality, and gender variables, which include salience of the nuclear threat, nuclear anxiety, general and nuclear locus of control, general coping style, intolerance of ambiguity, dogmatism, Machiavellianism, gender, and sex role trait. These objectives were studied through the use of cross-sectional data obtained through , ■ survey procedures. i This chapter reviews the m ethodological issues relevant to the study. It is ■ organized to present the research design including descriptions of the subject populations, the scales employed, the procedures used, and the statistical analysis perform ed. 102 Subject Sam ple i The data for this study were obtained from several samples: j 1. students at the University of Southern California ( n = 133); j 2. students at California State University, Fullerton ( n = 93); and j 3. students at Bethel College, in N orth Newton, Kansas ( n = 25). j These three samples included students from three groups based on | behavioral associations: i 1. students with a pro-defense orientation and referred to in this study as i "pro-defense activists" (RO TC students and student m em bers of such campus I organizations as Young Am ericans for Freedom and Young Republicans; ' n = 23); 2. students with an anti-nuclear orientation and referred to in this study as "anti-nuclear activists" (students involved in campus peace organizations, Young Dem ocrats, or enrolled in the University certificate program in Peace and Conflict Studies; n = 31); and I 3. non-activist students comprising the research control group (students enrolled in undergraduate general education, psychology, international relations, and political science courses; n = 197). These students may be active in student or community organizations, but not ones directly related to peace or defense issues. Dem ographic data on the total sample and the three groups, including sex, , age, race and ethnicity, college major, religious orientation, income, political : party m em bership, and liberal/conservative self-rating are provided in Table 1. 103 Table 1 Sample Description Demographic Tote) Pro-Defense Anti-Nuclear Non- Variables Sample Activists Activists Activists ( n=251) 100* (n=23) *2*" (n=31) 12.4* (n=197) 78.5* CA Male 107 42.6 18 78.3 14 45.2 75 38.1 Female 144 57.4 5 21.7 17 54.8 122 61.9 G E R A N G E Range 17-32 18-24 18-31 17-32 Ms 20 19 21 19 TH N IC ITY African American 13 5.2 2 8.7 0 0.0 11 5.6 American Indian 11 4.4 0 0.0 0 0.0 11 5.6 Asian 37 14.7 2 8.7 1 3.2 34 17.3 Caucasian 167 66.5 15 65.2 27 87.1 125 63.5 Hispanic 18 7 2 4 17.4 2 6.5 12 6.1 Otter 5 2.0 0 0.0 1 3.2 4 2.0 Y E A R IN C O L L E G E Freshperson 111 44.2 4 17.4 4 12.9 103 52.3 Sophmore 46 18.3 4 17.4 7 22.6 35 17.8 Junior 47 18.7 4 17.4 8 25.8 35 17.8 Senior 47 18.7 1 1 47.8 12 38.7 24 12.2 C O L L E G E M A JO R Social Science 111 44.2 12 52.2 17 54.8 82 41 6 Liberal Arts 36 14.3 4 17.4 23 29.0 9 11.7 Science 24 9.6 2 8.7 2 6.5 230 10.2 Business/Law 58 23.1 4 17.4 2 6.5 52 26.4 Otter 22 8.8 1 4.3 1 3.2 20 10.2 R E LIG IO N Agnostic 8 3.2 0 0.0 2 6.5 6 3.0 Catholic 89 35.5 11 47.8 4 12 9 74 37.6 Eastern 8 3.2 0 0.0 2 6.5 6 3.0 Jewish 7 2.8 0 0.0 J 3.2 6 3.0 Protestant 93 37.1 11 47.8 9 29.0 73 37.1 None 24 9.6 .1 4.3 6 19.4 17 8.6 Other 22 8.8 0 0.0 7 22.6 15 7.6 104 T able 1, co ntinued Demographic Total Pro-Defense Anti-Nuclear Non- Variables Sample Activists Activists Activists (n=251) 100* (n=23) 9.2* <n=31) 12.4* (n=197) 78.5* IN C O M E 00-20K 24 9.6 3 13.0 6 19.4 15 7.6 20-40K 50 20.0 5 21.7 8 25.8 37 18.7 40-60K 51 20.4 6 26.0 4 13.0 41 20.8 60-80K 33 13.2 3 13.0 2 6.5 28 14.2 80-100K 19 7.6 1 4.3 , 3 9.7 15 7.6 100K+ 74 29.5 5 21.7 8 25.8 61 31.0 PO LITIC A L PA R T Y Democratic 77 30.7 4 17.4 20 64.5 53 26.9 Republican 123 49.0 15 65.2 1 3.2 107 54.3 Other 51 20.3 4 17.4 10 32.2 37 18.8 LIBER A L/C O N SERV A TIV E SELF - R A T IN G Very Conservative 7 3.2 3 2.5 0 0.0 4 13.0 Conservative 50 19.9 8 34.8 0 0.0 42 21.3 Moderate 125 49.4 9 39.1 8 25.8 109 54.8 Liberal 52 20.7 3 13.0 14 45.2 35 17.8 Very Liberal 16 6.8 0 0.0 9 29.0 7 3.6 105 T here were m ore wom en ( n = 144) than m en ( n = 107) in the entire | sample. The only group with less wom en than m en was the pro-defense activist group. These differences were considered in the statistical analyses. Anti-nuclear activists in this study tended to be older and further along in ! I academ ic years than other groups. Social science majors com prised the largest - academ ic m ajor category for all samples. A fter social science, the second largest : m ajor category for anti-nuclear activists was liberal arts. Pro-defense activists | were equally distributed betw een liberal arts and business/law program s, and : non-activists tended to be business/law majors. The largest percentage of subjects in all groups identified them selves as Caucasian. Asian Am ericans were the next largest ethnic group in the non- | activist population. Hispanics were the next largest ethnic group in the pro- j defense and anti-nuclear activist populations. The anti-nuclear activist group was I | the least ethnically diverse. i M ost subjects were either Catholic or Protestant in religious affiliation, except in the anti-nuclear activist group w here there was greater diversity in religious affiliation. Thirty-one percent of the non-activist population cam e from families that earned over $100,000 per year. Income level for the pro-defense and anti-nuclear activist groups was curvilinear, with an equal percentage of families earning: (a) betw een $20,000 and $40,000, and (b) over $100,000. The sample was predom inately Republican (49%), with D em ocrats comprising 31% of the total population. Alm ost half (49.4%) of the subjects identified themselves as politically m oderate. Conservative and very conservative self-ratings comprised 23% of the sample, while liberal and very liberal self- I ratings comprised 28% of the sample. The pro-defense activist population was largely R epublican and identified themselves as "very conservative" to ; "moderate," with 13% self-identified as "liberal," The anti-nuclear activists I | showed less variance in their self-ratings, with 25% "moderate" and the i rem ainder "liberal" and "very liberal." It should be em phasized that this sample was not random and the inform ation above is simply descriptive of this particular sample. G eneralizations beyond the demographic composition of these groups cannot be j m ade. i l ! Instrumentation ! i A survey booklet which comprised eleven m easures (213 item s) used in this i i ' ! study (see Appendix A) was adm inistered to all subjects. Subjects were inform ed I that com pletion of the survey would take approximately 45 minutes. They were , instructed to com plete it in one sitting. A com plete description of the m easures used in the survey, as well as the conditions under which they were used, is provided below. The m easures are presented in the order of adm inistration. i | ! Cover Statement The cover statem ent m et the ethical standards required by the H um an Subjects Com m ittee in providing a description of the study and clarifying ; subjects’ rights. The statem ent provided as brief a m ention of war and peace issues as possible. This brevity and ambiguity was necessary to m aintain the reliability of the sentence completion contained in the SCANTS, described j below. 107 Spontaneous Concern about the Nuclear Threat (SCANTS) The salience of the nuclear threat was found to be an im portant variable in people’s coping response (Mayton, 1987b). M easurem ent of salience, however, is difficult, in that it must be nonreactive and indirect, as opposed to the m ore reactive m ethods used traditionally to assess attitudes in social psychology. The content of most questions places the issue of nuclear war in people’s minds so that direct questioning is not appropriate. M ayton’s (1987b) SCANTS was designed to assess the respondent’s level of nuclear threat salience indirectly through single probes or incom plete sentences. M ore specifically, respondents w ere asked to identify those things which worried them m ost and their most prevalent fears regarding the future. Respondents were asked to com plete each of ten items leaving none blank. No examples were provided. The SCANTS was scored by reviewing the responses for m ention of nuclear war, nuclear destruction, atom ic bombs, or other related term. Those m entioning nuclear war or a related term were categorized as a 2, identifying them as spontaneously concerned. Those not m entioning nuclear war were assigned a value of 1. Some responses may be what M ayton referred to as borderline responses, those that are ambiguous in their referral to nuclear war. The conservative rule of thum b he suggested was not to include these as indicators of concern (Mayton, 1987b). W ith a minimal explanation of the purpose of SCANTS, interrater reliability in classifying responses has been around 89%, with the 11% differences alm ost always dealing with the borderline issues previously noted. W hen raters have been m ore thoroughly briefed as to the purpose and different responses, the 108 interrater agreem ent has consistently been calculated at 97% or above (Mayton, 1987b). In considering the reliability of the SCANTS, the unique nature of nuclear threat concern should be kept in mind. For example, some individuals may view the nuclear threat as chronically salient or nonsalient, while others may find it salient at certain times but not at others. Despite this possibility for inconsistency, H am ilton’s (1987) test-retest adm inistration of the SCANTS to 133 college students resulted in 80.5% rem aining consistently concerned or consistently unconcerned. These data appear quite reliable for this type of assessment. C riterion validity of the SCANTS is supported by relationships betw een it and other m easures of concern and worry about the nuclear threat (Ham ilton, 1987; Mayton, 1987b). Predictive validity was supported by the fact that the scores differentiate betw een groups of individuals who reported worrying often about nuclear war and those who reported not worrying often (Mayton, 1987b). Intolerance Of Ambiguity B udner (1962) defined intolerance of ambiguity as "the tendency to perceive (i.e., interpret) ambiguous situations as sources of threat" and tolerance of ambiguity as "the tendency to perceive ambiguous situations as desirable." An ambiguous situation is defined as one which cannot be adequately structured or categorized due to novelty, complexity, or insolubility. Responses to threat include repression and denial, anxiety and discomfort, destructive and avoidant behavior. 109 Intolerance of ambiguity refers to evaluations m ade rather than overt i j behaviors perform ed. Thus, the assum ption underlying the developm ent of the scale was that attitudes and values tap the construct m ore directly than inferences i from observed or "real-life" behavior. i To develop the scale, 33 items reflecting three types of ambiguous situations and four kinds of threat responses were selected. T en positively 1 worded items and eight negatively worded items m et the significance criterion. i I Two of the positive items were dropped to yield a balanced 16-item scale. W hile j | the scale was originally developed for responses on a 7-point Likert scale, a 5- i ! point Likert scale was used in order to be consistent with the other Likert scale m easures used in this study, i The reliability com puted using Cronbach’s alpha form ula was I approxim ately .49. While this was rather low, Budner argued that it seem ed I acceptable given that (a) the m ore common split-half coefficients w ere not used, i (b) the scale is free from artifacts such as acquiescence and social desirability which, because they are consistent, tend to maximize reliability estim ates, and ■ (c) the concept itself is complex and probably multidim ensional. In a separate < I study of adult college students, Tatzel (1980) determ ined a test-retest reliability j of .73. In the present study, the reliability alpha was .49. This is a low reliability ! for research purposes. However, it is consistent with the reliability reported by | B udner (1962). i To establish criterion validity, Budner (1962) com pared his scale to other ! m easures of intolerance of ambiguity, including the Coulter scale (Eysenck, 1954), the W alk scale (O ’Connor, 1952), and the Princeton scale (Saunders, i l | 1955). In general, the intercorrelations were high enough to suggest that they | tapped a com m on construct, presum ably intolerance of ambiguity. The Budner scale exhibited the highest average correlation although its difference with the W alk scale was negligible (Budner, 1962). The Budner scale has some advantages over the authoritarian (F) scale | because the items of the Budner scale are of a politically neutral nature and j because the scale is balanced against acquiescence response bias (Sidanius, ! 1978). i j Personal Attributes Questionnaire (PAQ) D uring the feminist climate of the 1970s, behavioral scientists began to i i question many of the long-standing assumptions underlying previous theoretical I j and em pirical approaches to studying women and men. O ne of those j assumptions concerned the dimensions of masculinity and femininity. ! Historically, masculinity and femininity were seen as bipolar: end points on a | single continuum. This conceptualization was often used to reinforce traditional stereotypes of and role expectations for wom en and men. Objections were raised to the m odel and some advocated abandonm ent of this bipolar m odel in favor of | a dualistic or androgenous m odel (Bern, 1974; Carlson, 1971; Constantinople, ! 1973). From this new theoretical conceptualization, both the PA Q (Spence, Helm reich, & Stapp, 1974, 1975) and the Bern Sex Role Inventory (Bern, 1974) : were developed. i I In using the PAQ, it is im portant to distinguish betw een global concepts of j , masculinity and femininity and m ore empirically limited sets of m asculine and i fem inine attributes. Based on their review of the empirical research relating the i ’ PA Q with other gender-related phenom ena, such as role expectations, global I 111 m asculine and fem inine self-concept, preference for sex-typed activities, and responsiveness to sex role demands, Spence and H elm reich (1981) argued that the PA Q is not a sex-role m easure, but rather a trait m easure of socially desirable instrum ental and expressive characteristics. They stated, in fact, that the instrum ent has no face validity and, at best, only minimal construct validity as a sex-role m easure. As a m ore narrowly defined trait m easure of self-reported instrum ental and expressive capacity, it may have implications for the study of some socially significant behaviors (Spence & H elm reich, 1980). PA Q results m ust be interpreted cautiously, emphasizing that this is simply a self-report m easure of stereotyped masculine and feminine traits, not a global m easure of sex role. It must also be stressed that the PAQ, as a m easure of potential gender difference, neglects the interaction of internal dynamics with social expectations in shaping the behavior, attitudes, and world views which may underlie responses to the nuclear threat. The PAQ was used with these cautions in mind. The full version of the PA Q (55 bipolar item s) was developed from a pool of over 130 items assem bled largely by Rosenkrantz, Vogel, Bee, Broverm an, and Broverm an (1968) in their "sex-role stereotype" study. These items were identified by college students as characteristics that differentiated m en from women. The 55 items selected for the PA Q were those which both sexes reported as stereotypic characteristics distinguishing m en from wom en and on which m en and wom en tended to report themselves as differing. The results yielded three scales: Masculine (M), Fem inine (F), and M asculine-Fem inine (M- F). The items in the M asculine scale are characterized as self-assertive, instrum ental capacities, while items on the Fem inine scale are interpersonally oriented, expressive capacities. The M -F scale contains items that can be 112 j classified as instrum ental, expressive, or as a com bination of both. The part- j whole correlation suggested that the M -F items are m ore related to each other i i ; than to either the M or F scales. In addition, the M -F scale appears to provide ; inform ation not available from the M and F scores alone and refutes the bipolar j interpretation of masculine and feminine as essential opposites. As a result, | Spence and H elm reich (1978) chose not to reassign these items to the M or F i 1 scales. | The PA Q was adm inistered by asking respondents to rate them selves on j each of the bipolar items on a 5-point scale. Separate scores were then i | determ ined for each individual on the three scales. : The approach adopted by Spence and Helm reich (1978) for both I ! description and prediction purposes was to perform m edian splits on the M and F | scales on their total sample of combined females and males. In this study, two * types of scores were generated for each subject. For m ost analyses, the simple ! PA Q F (feminine), PAQM (masculine), and PA Q M F (m asculine-fem inine) scores were used. In several analyses, a four-way classification system was used. ; To compute the latter, the m edian F score of 32 and the m edian M score of 29 i ■ were used. The individuals were then classified by m eans of a 2 by 2 table based ! on their position above or below the m edian on the two scales. The four-way classification scheme is illustrated in Table 2. | The short form of the PA Q is most widely used today, including in many of j Spence and H elm reich’s (1978) studies. The short form was developed by ; selecting eight items from each scale based primarily on the m agnitude of the part-whole correlation betw een the full PA Q and the short form with correlations ' of .93, .93, and .91 for M, F, and M-F respectively. D espite the brevity, the short 113 T able 2 Four-way Classification Scheme for the Personal A ttributes Q uestionnaire (PA Q ) M ASCULINE Above Median (2 9 ) Below Median (29) Above Median (3 2 ) Androgenous Feminine (n=77) (n=58) (3 0 .7 )* (2 3 .1 )* FEMININE Below Median (3 2 ) Masculine Undifferentiated (n=77) (n=39) (3 0 .7 )* (1 5 .5 )* form appears reliable. Cronbach alphas w ere com puted on the total sam ple used in this study. The reliability of each scale was lower than that reported by Spence and H elm reich, but were considered adequate for research purposes. The alphas w ere .78, .81, and .69 for M, F, and M -F respectively. Spence and H elm reich (1978) considered social desirability as an initial threat to the PA Q ’s validity. Scores might be contam inated by respondents’ attem pts to select socially desirable answers. Spence et al. (1975) explored the relationship betw een social desirability using the M arlowe-Crown Social Desirability scale (Crowne & Marlowe, 1961). The correlation betw een the Social Desirability scale and the three PA Q scales ranged from .08 to .36. Spence and H elm reich (1978) concluded that individual differences in the PA Q scales’ scores are not seriously distorted by this type of response bias. A nother possible threat to the instrum ent’s validity is intelligence, since brighter individuals might m ore easily acquire socially desirable characteristics or might be m ore adept at presenting themselves in a favorable light. Spence and H elm reich (1978) used the Scholastic A ptitude Test V erbal and Q uantitative | scores and examined the relationship betw een these scores and the three PAQ j j scales in a sam ple of approxim ately 500 college students. These scores proved to i be essentially independent, the correlations ranging from .02 with M to -.12 with F. I I j j Rotter Internality-Externality Scale R otter (1966) defined internality-externality as perception of contingency | relationships betw een one’s own behavior and the events which follow that i j behavior. In our culture, a person who perceives a reinforcem ent as not contingent on his or her action usually attributes this to (a) luck, chance, fate, (b) the control of powerful others, or (c) unpredictability. This is labeled as a i belief in external control. O n the other hand, if the individual perceives the i I ] event as contingent upon his or her own behavior or characteristics, then the I belief is labeled internal control. i In a sam ple of 400 college students, R otter (1966) obtained an internal i consistency coefficient (Kuder-Richardson) of .70. H e also com puted test-retest i reliability coefficients for 60 college students with a value of .72. The time 115 betw een tests was 1 month. Cronbach’s alpha was com puted as .75 for the total sam ple ( n = 251) in this study. ; D iscrim inant validity was established in comparisons of R o tter’s Externality I j m easure with: (a) the M arlowe-Crowne Social Desirability scale (R otter, 1966); (b) Edw ard’s Social Desirability scales (Berzins, Ross, & Cohen, 1970); and j (c) m easures of intelligence (Rotter, 1966). The ranges of correlations reported ■ were -.07 to -.35, -.23 to -.70, and .03 to -.22, respectively. i I The full-form version of the scale consists of 23 items, one internal item i 7 I paired with one external item, and 6 filler items. This forced-choice form at was ! scored by giving 1 point to each endorsem ent of an external statem ent. Scores i j ranged from 0 (most internal) to 23 (most external). This study used the 23 items | only, deleting the filler items. ! ! Peace A ttitude Scale (PAS) The PAS was developed to tap the two peace attitudes most prevalent in ; current literature: Peace Through Strength and Peace Through Cooperation. Twenty-eight face valid items were constructed based on the review of the literature and then randomly ordered. W hile efforts were m ade to write items ■ that could be considered universal and were not dependent on any particular , political climate, one of the peace attitude items did refer to U.S.-Soviet 1 relations. R espondents were asked to check one of five responses for each item of the Likert-type scale, ranging from "strongly disagree" to "strongly agree," I including an option for "I don’t know." W hile there may be some lim itations to respondents’ self-report, these lim itations are inherent in survey research in ! general and in all the tools utilized in this study. i i 116 | Some inform ation on the Peace A ttitude Scale is provided here. However, j because the developm ent of the scale was a substantive part of this research, it is | described at length in C hapter 4. Factor analysis. The existence of two general factors were hypothesized, resulting in two unipolar scales: Peace Through Strength and Peace Through : Cooperation. W hile two distinct factors were predicted, it should be noted that i they w ere not predicted to be mutually exclusive. In addition to the large general factors, it was anticipated that another, m ore modest, factor might em erge related to survivability. To test for the hypothesized factors, both a principal ! com ponents analysis and a confirmatory factor analysis were used. i 1 Estimates of reliability. The means, variances, and reliabilities of the PAS ! for all samples w ere calculated. The range of scores was computed. A n estim ate of internal consistency using Cronbach’s alpha was com puted for each of the two factors and the total inventory based on responses from the entire sam ple I ( n = 251). Estimates of validity. To ensure the content validity of the scale in term s of 1 the peace attitude definitions given earlier, two substantive criteria for items i i were used. A n item had to tap the characteristics of one of the two peace I I attitudes being studied: Peace Through Strength and Peace Through i - Cooperation. Second, it had to refer to the impact of that attitude on 1 (a) conceptualizations of conflict and peace, (b) the purpose of weapons, (c) the i role of governm ent, or (d) the definition of security. 117 If a scale can be used to m ake meaningful distinctions betw een groups, then j it is considered to have predictive validity. Therefore, to the extent that the PAS successfully distinguished betw een the pro-defense and anti-nuclear activist groups, the scale had predictive validity. Final version of the PAS. Items not adequately reliable or valid in relation to the factors being studied were omitted. i Nuclear Locus O f Control (NLOC) The NLOC scale was developed to assess beliefs about w hether nuclear war and nuclear policy decisions are, or can be, influenced by oneself, powerful others, or chance. This tripartite m odel of locus of control was based on the work of Levenson (1973, 1981), in which he argued that while internal locus of control is unidim ensional, external locus of control is m ultidim ensional, consisting of ! beliefs in fate, chance, and that other powerful people are in control. Based on . this, Levenson developed the I, P, and C scales which m easure internal, powerful others, and chance locus of control respectively. E rdahl and Rounds (1986) - viewed this separation in the external control dom ain as particularly appropriate , to the study of nuclear issues. A n initial pool of 72 items was developed to assess the three beliefs regarding control of the nuclear threat. Factor analytic ■ procedures resulted in two equivalent 6-item forms for each scale. A 6-point ; Likert-type form at, ranging from "strongly disagree" to "strongly agree," was I adapted to a 5-point scale for consistency in this study. It should be noted that the Internal Nuclear Locus of Control (INLOC) items were reversed in this study. As a result, a low internal score indicates high internality. ' 118 Following a principal axis factor analysis, the resulting factors were extracted and rotated to a varimax criterion. A three-factor solution was selected based on C attell’s scree test. E rdahl and Rounds (1986) com puted and found good internal consistency with Cronbach’s alpha for internal locus of control (.87), external control by powerful others (.76), and external control by chance (.85). In the present study, Cronbach’s alpha revealed a similar reliability on internal locus of control (.87). Reliabilities for external control by powerful others (.70) and external control by chance (.78) were somewhat lower but still good for research purposes. Test- retest coefficients for 4 weeks were .85 (internal), .86 (powerful others), and .78 (chance). Correlations with Levenson’s IPC scales showed the expected pattern except in term s of generalized internal locus of control, suggesting that beliefs of influence on m ediating factors, such as political processes, are independent of beliefs of influence over one’s personal world. W ays O f Coping T he Ways of Coping Checklist is a 66-item checklist developed by Folkm an and Lazarus (1980) to assess a wide range of thoughts and actions that people use to deal with stressful events. The Checklist is comprised of eight scales, five empirically constructed scales via factor analysis and three rationally constructed scales via theory. C ronbach’s alpha was reported for each empirically created scale as follows: Problem -focused Coping (.88); Wishful Thinking (.86); D etachm ent (.74); Seeking Social Support (.82); and Focusing on the Positive (.70). The 119 alphas for the rationally created scales were as follows: Self-blame (.76); Tension-reduction (.59); and Keeping to Self (.65). For the purpose of this study, the two highest loading items from each scale were used. W ith only two items per scale, the alphas calculated from this sam ple w ere generally low, ranging from .22 to .74. It was decided that a Principal Com ponents factor analysis, using an oblique rotation, might reveal a m ore concise and reliable factor structure for use in this study. A two-factor structure I i was the most interpretable with Wishful Thinking, D etachm ent, Self-blame, i Tension-reduction, and Keeping to Self loading on Factor 1 and Problem -focused Coping, Seeking Social Support, and Focusing on the Positive loading on Factor 2. Factor 1 reflected Avoidant coping styles and Factor 2 reflected Active coping efforts. In this sample ( n = 251), the alphas were com puted at .58 and .42 for | avoidant coping and active coping respectively. i ! M achiavellianism This m easure was designed to tap a person’s general strategy for dealing , with people, especially the degree to which one feels other people can be j m anipulated in interpersonal situations. The 20-item M ach IV scale (Christie & i | Geis, 1970) was developed from an original 71 items drawn from the writings of ! M achiavelli ( T h e P r i n c e and T h e D i s c o u r s e s ) . The items were conceived as falling j into three areas: (a) the nature of interpersonal tactics, (b) views of hum an nature, and (c) abstract or generalized; morality. A n item analysis indicated that the items about hum an nature were most highly related to the overall M ach score and items about m orality were least highly related. W hile two scales were i : developed (the M ach IV and the Mach V), the M ach IV was selected as i f : 120 advantageous for use in this study. The Mach V was undesirable due to the m ethodological problem of low reliability associated with the forced choice form at (Vleeming, 1979), a phenom enon referred to as ipsativity by Cattell (Hicks, 1970). The final M ach IV scale does not have this problem due to its Likert-type form at. It is comprised of the ten items that were related most highly in the M achiavellian direction and the ten items m ost highly related to the opposite direction. R espondents indicated their responses in a standard 6- category Likert form at (with strongly agree being rated 7, no answer rated 4, and strongly disagree rated 1). This was converted to a consistent 5-point Likert scale for this study. Psychometric data on the M achiavellian m easure has continued accumulating since the initial review of 38 studies by Christie and Geis (1970). For example, Christie and Geis (1970) reported an average split-half reliability score, obtained from various samples, of .79. According to Vleem ing’s review of 34 studies done betw een 1970 and 1979, similar reliabilities have been obtained by other researchers. Oksenberg (1971) reported a split-half reliability for m en of .75 and for wom en of .39. Starr (1975) reported a split-half reliability for m en and wom en of .70. In the present study, Cronbach’s alpha was also com puted as .70. A num ber of validity studies have been done. To sum m arize them , while not all hypotheses were confirmed, in 12 or 13 instances in which face-to-face contact, latitude for improvisation, and irrelevant affect w ere all judged present, the high Machs won m ore, were persuaded less, persuaded others m ore, or behaved as predicted significantly com pared to low Machs . . . in seven of the nine cases in which two of the variables were present, high Machs did better. (Robinson & Shaver, 1973) 121 I W hile reliabilities were good and research has generally supported the ' M achiavellian concept, one lim itation of the scale should be considered: the | situational factors which may effect M achiavellian behavior. In other words, the j level of M achiavellian interpersonal strategies employed by an individual may vary across different situations (Christie & Geis, 1970; Vleeming, 1979). Dogm atism ^ F or the purpose of this study, a shortened version of the R okeach (1956) j Dogm atism scale was used. The original Dogm atism scale attem pted to tap the I key dimensions of closed-mindedness: (a) closed ways of thinking associated with | an ideology; (b) an authoritarian outlook on life; (c) an intolerance toward ! individuals with opposing belief systems; and (d) a tolerance of those with similar i ' beliefs (Rokeach, 1960). The Dogm atism scale is preferred over the j j A uthoritarian F scale because it attem pts to m easure ideological dogm atism as a structure of beliefs, rather than focusing on the rightest content of authoritarian beliefs m easured by the F scale. R okeach’s 40-item Dogm atism scale (Form E) had adequate reliability for j research purposes. Split-half reliabilities for British college students ( n = 80) ! and British workers ( n = 60) were .81 and .78, respectively. Troldahl and Powell 1 (1965) designed a 20-item short dogmatism scale from the 40-item version. This ] I shorter scale is m ore easily included in survey studies. The reliability of the 20- . item scale was assessed by correlating it with the 40-item version. In a sam ple of I 227 Boston suburbanites, the correlation was .95. In a sam ple of 84 Lansing i ! adults, the correlation was .94 (Troldahl & Powell, 1965). C ronbach’s alpha was com puted as .73 for the 20-item version with the 251 college students in this i ! 122 study. The 20-item version, like the 40-item scale, was scored on a Likert-type scale. i i ! i Brief Measure of Activism Regarding the Nuclear Arms Race W erner and Roy (1985) described activism regarding the nuclear arms race as behavior aim ed at changing norms, laws, or others’ opinions on this topic, i Their scale is an attem pt to assess nuclear activism in term s of both direction of activism (supporting expansion of nuclear preparedness or supporting reduction : of our nuclear arsenals) and intensity of activism. T heir norm ative data were collected from five groups expected to vary in the direction and intensity of their i behavioral response to the nuclear arms race (peace activists, n - 51; religious teachers, n - 51; graduate students in psychology, n = 45; Republican Party i m em bers, n = 42; workers in defense industries, n = 38). i | The initial questionnaire consisted of 58 items pertaining to 29 behaviors ! adapted from a m easure of activism regarding the abortion issue. For each of the | 29 behaviors, one statem ent was w ritten that represented the pro-nuclear position and one was w ritten that represented the anti-nuclear position. In the j questionnaire, ’ 'anti-nuclear weapons" was used to m ean favoring a policy of i i | freezing, reducing, or eliminating nuclear weapons by the U nited States while ; "pro-nuclear weapons" was used to m ean "favoring a policy of developing, I j stockpiling, and deploying nuclear weapons by the U nited States." Respondents I ■ w ere asked to read each item and identify how often they had perform ed a \ specific behavior during the past 4 years. The item -analytic procedures employed were aim ed at developm ent of a bipolar scale, m easuring both the direction and intensity of reported activist i i 123 j behavior. Scale sums and item -total correlations were com puted for a full scale f i based on all 58 items. Item s selected for the final scales were done so on the basis of three criteria: non-zero variance, positive item -scale correlation with the ; full scale, and positive item-scale correlation with the appropriate unipolar scale. The 50 items m eeting these criteria had a coefficient alpha reliability of .95. j Alphas for the anti-nuclear and pro-nuclear unipolar scales were .96 and .85 : respectively. For the intensity of activism scale, alpha was .90. A 14-item short form, developed as the final form of the scale, had high and statistically significant correlations with the full-scale version of each scale. The 14-item version was used in this study. Cronbach’s alpha indicated i j ' good reliability for research purposes with the anti-nuclear and pro-nuclear ' unipolar scales com puted as .86 and .78, respectively. The total activism score I | reliability was .80. ! To establish scale validity, it was hypothesized that the five groups sam pled ■ would rank from most "anti-nuclear" to most "pro-nuclear" in behavior in the order noted above. Based on one-way ANOVAs and the Kruskal-W allis analysis of variance, significant differences betw een groups were found in the predicted i | direction. The authors argued in favor of the scale’s brevity for an internally consistent, efficacious survey tool for distinguishing groups on their orientation j 1 toward this issue. ; N uclear Anxiety Q uestionnaire (NAQ) i ' Fifteen items were composed to assess individuals’ attitudes, beliefs, and ! em otional reactions toward nuclear war, nuclear weapons, and nuclear power 1 plants and m ake up the NAQ, The initial norm ative data for the scale were obtained from a sample of 722 young adults who had grown up in the nuclear age. Each respondent identified his or her position on a 5-point Likert-type scale, with responses ranging from "strongly disagree" to "strongly agree," and providing a response option for "I don’t know." Newcomb’s (1986) maximum-likelihood confirm atory factor analysis indicated that the NAQ items reflected four latent constructs: nuclear concern, nuclear support, fear for the future, and nuclear denial. Additionally, nuclear anxiety was identified as a second-order construct which had positive loadings for nuclear concern and fear of the future, and negative loadings for nuclear support and nuclear denial. H am ilton (1987) reported a test-retest reliability for the NAQ of .82. Newcomb (1989) reported test-retest reliabilities for the NAQ on two samples. The 1986 sam ple was comprised of 49 upper division U C LA students. The 1987 sam ple was comprised of 87 upper division U CLA students. T he test-retest reliabilities were .88 and .83, respectively. In the present study, Cronbach’s alpha was com puted on the NAQ and four subscales. A lpha was .81 for the total N uclear Anxiety scale, and .73, .60, .42, and .54 for the subscales nuclear concern, nuclear support, nuclear denial, and fear for the future, respectively. All reliabilities, except for nuclear denial, were above .50 and considered to be adequate for research purposes. C riterion validity, established by examining the correlations with other m easures of nuclear anxiety, was at an acceptable level. T he correlation of the NAQ with the Knox-Ham ilton nuclear anxiety m easure was reported as .66. The correlation with the Speilberger nuclear anxiety scale was reported as .57 (H am ilton, 1987). 125 Dem ographic Page Every subject received a brief biographical inform ation questionnaire including an open ended question about the subject’s age, followed by forced choice, mutually exclusive, alternatives to questions concerning the subject’s sex, academ ic major, religious affiliation, socioeconomic background, and political affiliation. Procedures Subjects were self-selected on the basis of their involvement in one of the targeted organizations, program s, or classes. Potential volunteers learned of the study through announcem ents at their meetings and in their classes, or as a result of personal contact by phone with the researcher. Subjects were instructed to com plete the survey in one sitting and to return it to the head of the organization, program , or class. It was then picked up by the researcher. Potential subjects contacted by phone were provided a return envelope in which to send the com pleted anonymous questionnaire to the researcher. Dependent V ariables The four dependent variables which were the concern of this study w ere the individuals’ nuclear threat coping style. They were: (a) activist behavior, either pro-nuclear or anti-nuclear as determ ined by organizational affiliation or as m easured by the Brief M easure of Activism R elated to the N uclear T hreat (W erner & Roy, 1985) and (b) peace attitude, either Peace Through C ooperation or Peace Through Strength as m easured by the PAS developed in this study. 126 Further understanding of these dependent variables and of their relationship with each other was attem pted through exam ination of their relationship with the following independent variables. Independent Variables The independent variables can be categorized as affective, coping, personality, or gender variables. O f specific interest are salience of the nuclear threat, nuclear anxiety, general and nuclear locus of control, active and avoidant coping, intolerance of ambiguity, M achiavellianism, dogmatism, gender, and sex role traits. Table 3 provides a further summary of this study’s dependent and independent variables, as assessed by the scales and subscales, including items per scale, score ranges, and reliabilities as com puted for this study. Most reliabilities, calculated using Cronbach’s alpha, are adequate for research purposes. D istribution inform ation is provided on each of the scales and subscales in Table 4. The distribution data indicated that there was an adequate am ount of variance and good range on most scales. The sam ple was normally distributed as indicated by skewness and kurtosis levels ranging from + 1.00 to -1.00. The pro defense variable was modestly non-norm al but should not effect analysis. Statistical Analysis T here were three m ajor statistical com ponents in the analysis of the obtained data: 127 Table 3 D istribution D ata for Scales and Subscales ! Variables 1 Range Ms Variance Skewness Kurtosis A FFEC TIV E Nuclear threat salience 1 to 2 1.23 0.18 1.31 -0.29 Nuclear anxiety 27 to 73 50.13 73.28 -0.04 -0.04 Nuclear denial 4to 16 10.04 6.84 -0.01 -0.43 Nuclear support 6 to 20 13.44 7.30 0.06 0.07 Nuclear concern 8 to 25 17.92 14.93 -0.20 -0.45 Fear for the future 2 to 9 5.23 2.85 -0.08 -0.82 CO PIN G Activism -14to21 3.85 43.22 0.20 0.33 Pro-defense activism Oto 14 1 94 10.46 2.00 3.28 Anti-nuclear activism Oto21 5.79 29.23 0.90 0.05 Internal nuclear locus of control 6 to 30 19.26 24 68 -0.12 -0.76 Powerful others nuclear locus of control 6 to 30 19.93 13.16 -0.50 1.11 Chance nuclear locus of control 6 to 27 12.92 16.47 -0.54 0.46 External locus of control 1 to 22 10.75 17.93 0.13 -0.44 Active coping 12to40 31.78 22.42 -0.70 1.05 Avoidant coping 6 to 27 14.55 19.30 0.38 -0.08 PER SO N A L ITY Intolerance of ambiguity 27 to 55 40.50 32.00 -0.10 -0.45 Dogmatism 29 to 81 52.60 65.40 0.22 0.86 Machiavellianism 33 to 80 57.39 62.10 0.32 0.52 G E N D E R Feminine traits (PAQF) 12 to 40 31.78 22.42 -0.70 1.05 Masculine traits ( PAQM ) 15 to 40 29.49 2 4 9 9 -0.36 -0.03 Masculine/Feminine traits ( PAQM F) 16 to 38 27 68 17.44 -0.08 -0.23 j i 128 Table 4 Definitions of Scales and Subscales including N um ber of Items, R ange and Reliability (ordered as in Q uestionnaire) Number Scale of items Range Alpha Ways of Coping ( Folkman & Lazurus, 1980) Assesses thoughts and actions used to deal with stressful events. Active Coping ( includes: Problem-focused coping; Seeking social support; Focusing on the positive) 6 3 to 18 42 Avoidant Coping ( includes: Wishful thinking; Detachment; Self-blame; Tension-reduction; Keeping to self) 10 6 to 27 .58 Machiavellianism (M ACH IV)(Christie&0eis, 1968) Measures interpersonal style, particularly manipulative tendencies. 20 33 to 80 .70 Dogmatism (Rokeach, 1956) Assesses closed and open-mindedness 20 29 to 81 .73 Brief Measure of Activism Regarding the Nucleer Arms Race (Werner and Roy, 1985) identifies individuals engaged in behaviors aimed at changing norms, laws, or others' opinions in support of expanding or reducing nuclear arsenals. Scale: Pro-nuclear Activism 7 OtoM .78 Scale: Anti-nuclear Activism 7 0to21 .86 Scale: Total Activism (acontinuum, with pro-nuclear activism scores at one end and anti-nuclear activism scores at the other. 14 -1 4 to 21 .80 Nucleer Anxiety (NAQ) (Newcomb, 1986) Assesses attitudes, beliefs, and emotional reactions toward nudes' war, nuclear weapons, and nuclear power plants. Scale: Nuclear Anxiety 15 27 to 73 81 Scale: Nuclear Denial 4 4to 16 .42 5cale Nuclear Support 4 6 to 20 .60 Scale Nuclear Concern 5 8 to 25 .73 Scale Fear far the Future 2 2to9 .54 129 T ab le 4, continued Number Scale of items Range Alpha Spontaneous Concern about the Nucleer Threat (SCANTS) (Mayton, 1987) Estimates level of nuclear threat salience indirectly through incomplete sentences 6 1 to 2 Intolerance of Ambiguity (Budner, 1962) Measures the tendency to perceive ambiguous situations as either threatening or desireeble 16 27 to 55 49 Personal Attributes Questionnaire ( PA Q) (Spense& Helmreich, 1978) Uses self-report of "masculine" and “feminine" sex role traits to generate two sets of scores: (1)a fourway classification scheme identifies each subject as androgenous, masculine, feminine, or undifferentiated, and (2) computes a feminine (PAQF), masculine (PAQM), and feminine/masculine (PAQMF) score for each subject Scale: Masculine (PAQM) 8 15 to 40 78 Scale: Feminine (PAQF) 8 12 to 40 .81 Scale: Feminine/Masculine (PAQMF) 8 16 to 38 .69 External Locus of Control (Rotter, 1966) Assesses perception of the relationship between behavior and outcome. 23 1 to 22 .75 Peace Attitude Scale Designed to tap beliefs, attitudes, and conceptualizations of peace, conflict, the purpose of weapons, the role of government, and the definition of national security from "constrained” and “unconstrained" perspectives on human nature 28 TB D TBD Nuclear Locus of Control ( Erdahl & Rounds, 1985; Rounds & Erdahl, 1988) Tripartite measure of beliefs about who determines nuclear war and nuclear policy. internal Nuclear Locus of Control ( IN L O C ) 6 6 to 30 87 Powerful Others Nuclear Locus of Control (PNLOC) 6 6 to 30 70 Chance Nuclear Locus of Control (CN LO C) 6 6 to 27 78 j 1. To address the first concern of this study, that of developing a Peace A ttitude Scale, the following statistical procedures were employed on the norm ative data collected on the PAS: a. Dem ographic differences in m ean responses on the PAS items were calculated using one-way A N O V A and point-biserial correlation procedures. b. The factor structure was obtained by first employing a principal com ponents analysis, proceeded by a confirmatory factor analysis. I c. Means, variances, and reliabilities (using Cronbach’s alpha) were | calculated on the scales. j | d. C ontent and predictive validity were established according to the ! procedures described in the instrum ent section. i i e. Response differences based on dem ographic differences, including i i gender, race and ethnicity, religion, political party, and liberal-conservative self- j ratings, were investigated using point biserial correlations and one-way analyses ! of variance. I 2. To examine the differences betw een peace attitude groups (Peace Through Strength and Peace Through C ooperation), several statistical procedures, both m ultivariate and univariate, w ere utilized: a. T he Pearson product-m om ent intercorrelations coefficients were com puted, correlating the two scales of the PAS with each of the other 21 scales and subscales used in this study. Four m atrices w ere generated using the total sample; the pro-defense activist population; the anti-nuclear activist population; and the non-activist population. b. M ultiple regression analyses were used to predict which scale or scales uniquely predicted peace attitudes. Both step-wise and sim ultaneous 131 analyses were perform ed on each peace attitude scale, using the total sample; fem ale subjects; and m ale subjects. These procedures generated prediction m odels for each of the dependent variables and allowed investigation of different m odels based on gender. These analyses were then repeated with the behavioral variables of pro-defense and anti-nuclear activism om itted. This generated equation m odels which used only affective, coping, personality, and gender variables to account for variance. 3. To investigate the differences among activist groups (pro-defense activists, anti-nuclear activists, and non-activists), several statistical procedures w ere used: a. A one-way analysis of variance was perform ed to determ ine the relationship of the peace attitudes (Peace Through Strength and Peace Through Cooperation) with activist behavior as determ ined by organizational affiliation. b. A cross-tabulation procedure was used to examine the differences am ong activist groups. c. The predom inance of m en over wom en in the pro-defense activist group was revealed by the cross-tabulation procedure. It was therefore decided that a two way analysis of variance should be perform ed to determ ine that potential differences were related to activist group m em bership, and not simply a confound due to sex. d. Because the variables being studied were probably correlated and not unique contributors to the dependent variables, a m ultivariate analysis of variance was employed to assess activist group differences on affective, coping, personality, and gender variables. 132 ( e. One-way analysis of variance was used as a post hoc test to locate the effects of each dependent m easure on the three levels of activist behavior. f. Because of the potential for spurious results in the preceding analyses, m ultivariate analysis of covariance was used to examine the relationship among activist stance and the dependent variables while controlling for peace attitude. g. Analysis of covariance was used as a post hoc test. h. Step-wise and sim ultaneous m ultiple regression analyses w ere used to j j determ ine which variables best predicted activist stance for women, men, and the j com bined sample, as m easured by the W erner and Roy (1985) Activism Scale. i j All of the statistics utilized in this research were com puted using the j Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS) program (Nie, Hull, Jenkins, , Steinbrenner, & Brent, 1975). A n IBM ACM VS system was used to run all the i I com puter programs. 133 ! C H A PT ER IV ! I RESULTS i j The purposes of this study were to: (a) identify and define the dimensions i j that characterize peace attitudes; (b) construct a reliable and valid m easure | based on this definition (the Peace A ttitude Scale, PAS); (c) confirm the hypothesized factors of Peace Through Strength and Peace Through C ooperation i as m easured by the scale; and (d) investigate the relationship betw een peace ! attitudes as assessed by this m easure and student activism with other affective, I i coping, personality, and gender correlates including nuclear threat salience, nuclear anxiety, locus of control, general coping style, intolerance of ambiguity, i dogmatism, Machiavellianism, gender, and sex role trait. In this chapter, results I of the statistical analyses are described. The developm ent of the Peace A ttitude Scale is reported, including factor analysis, reliability and validity tests, and correlational results. The relationship betw een peace attitude and activist behavior is examined. Finally, peace attitudes and activist stance are investigated for their relationship with affective, coping, personality, and gender-related dimensions, including which variables best predict peace attitude. Development of the Peace A ttitude Scale (PAS) T he Peace A ttitude Scale was developed to tap the two peace attitudes m ost prevalent in current literature: Peace Through Strength and Peace Through 134 Cooperation. Twenty-eight face valid items were constructed based on the review of the literature. The entire item and its abbreviated counterpart are presented in Table 5. The abbreviated version is used in all subsequent tables. The responses of all 251 participants to the 28 items are presented in Table 6. For presentation purposes, the "disagree" and "strongly disagree" categories w ere combined, and the "agree" and "strongly agree" categories were combined. The m ean response was given with a significance level if it varies from zero (a noncom m ittal "don’t know" response). Positive m ean values indicate agreem ent with the item and negative values indicate disagreement. All except three items deviated significantly from zero. The items which did not deviate significantly from zero included: (a) the definition of peace as the absence of conflict; (b) the , key function of governm ent as peacekeeping through deterrence; and (c) the necessity of a strong m ilitary due to com petition for goods, power, and prestige. Even though the m ean response differed significantly from zero in the negative direction, the largest "don’t know" response (*c69Erc = 78) related to the usefulness ol the Star W ars D efense system. The m ajority of subjects felt that they would feel safer and m ore secure if there was a reduction in nuclear arms; that peace can be achieved and supported with negotiated compromise, cooperation, communication, and trust; and that nuclear w ar was not survivable nor worth surviving. M ost respondents disagreed with the notion that long-standing world peace can best be attained, and nuclear war avoided, by military strength. However, most subjects also agreed that in order for the U nited States to m aintain its position of power, it m ust m aintain itself as a powerful military strength. 135 Table 5 E ntire and A bbreviated Item s of the Peace A ttitude Scale 1. Having a targe arsenal of nuclear weapons helps to assure US. security. 2. I vould feel more secure if the US. had a greater supply of nucleer veapons. 3. In the nuclear age, a key function of the federal government is peacekeeping through negotiation. 4. I vould fecal more secure if the US. and the Soviet Union reduced their nuclear arsenals. 5. Competition is the basis for most international conflicts. 6 . Peace is the absence of active conflict. 7. National security is i mproved when communication and trust are promoted between all nations. 8 . It is possible for international conflicts to be resolved in a way that benefits all nations involved. 9. Long-standing world peace can best be reached through non-military means and cooperation between nations. 10. Nuclear war is preventable through the process of negotiated arms reduction agreements between nations. 11. It is possi ble to survive a large scale nuclear war if one is adequately prepared. 12. It is important to develop nuclear veapons to deter nuclear war. 13. In the nuclear age, a key function of the federal government is peacekeeping through deterrence (maintaining a strong military). 14. Since many conflicts between nations result from competition for goods, power, and prestige, it is necessary to mai ntain a strong military. Nuclear arsenals increase security Security with nuclear arms Government role is negotiation Arms reduction increases security Competition is basis of conflict Peace is absence of conflict Security with communication Mutually beneficial resolution Non- military cooperation Negotiations prevent nuclear war Nuclear war is survivable Nuclear arms deter nuclear war Government role is deterrence Arms needed for competition 136 j Table 5, continued 15. Peace can only be achieved when the unjust ‘ conditions that promotes war (such as ! racial and religious oppression, hunger, and poverty) are overcome. 1 16. Cooperation between nations can be achieved with consistent efforts. 17. Compromises between nations are an important and positive aspect of arms negotiation. 18. Long-standing world peace can best be j attained by maintaining strong military ! forces. | 19. In the event of a large scale nuclear war 1 I think few people, if any, will survive. | 20. Nuclear war is best prevented by | maintaining a strong military power. 21. Negotiated compromises between nations can contri bute to world peace. 22. The world will be safer when the nuclear j arsenals of all countries are reduced. 23. Peace requires the development of | programs and i nstitutions to facilitate j communication and cooperation among | individuals and nations. ' 24. Misunderstandings related to cultural j and/or social backgrounds are an impoertant part of most international conflicts. 25. The Star Wars Strategic Defense I nitiative is an excellent example of how to maintain and promote world peace and security. 26. While survivability may be possi ble i n a large scale nuclear war, it would not be worth it. 27. For the U.S. to maintain its position as a great notion it is important for the US. to maintain itself as a powerful military strength. 28. The greater the power of a nation's military force the more secure that nation is. Conflict due to unjust conditions Cooperation achieved with effort Compromise important Peace through military strength Few survive Arms prevent nuclear war Negotiated compromises Reduce arms for safety Programs/Cooperation Cultural /Social misunderstandings SD I Not worth surviving Arms important to great nation Military power needed for security 137 Table 6 Categorical and M ean Responses to 28 PAS Item s ( n = 251) Disagree or Don't Know Agree or Ms s Abbreviated Item Strongly Strongly Disagree Agree 1 Nuclear arsenals increase security 116 32 103 -0.19 * 2 Security with nucleer arms 190 32 29 -0.99 *** 3 Government role is negotiation 9 19 223 1.25 *«* 4 Arms reduction increases security 35 29 187 0.97 *** 5 Competition is basis of conflict 2 1 19 2 1 1 1 .0 0 *** 6 Peace is absence of conflict 96 47 108 0 . 0 2 7 Security with communication 7 16 228 1.26 *** 8 Mutually beneficial resolution 40 52 159 0.62 *** 9 Non-military cooperation 16 39 196 1.05 »** 1 0 Negotiations prevent nuclear war 40 39 172 0.69 *** 11 Nuclear war Is survivable 177 51 23 _1 oi *** 1 2 Nuclear arms deter nuclear war 158 41 52 -0.69 **» 13 Government role is deterrence 92 51 108 0 .0 1 14 Arms needed for competition 82 51 118 0 . 1 2 15 Conflict due to unjust conditions 47 29 175 0.70 *** 16 Cooperation achieved with effort 16 28 207 0.96 *** 17 Compromise important 7 19 225 1 .1 2 »** 18 Peace through military strength 146 58 47 -0.52 *** 19 Few survive 2 1 26 204 1.13 *** 2 0 Arms prevent nuclear war 138 54 59 -0.47 *** 2 1 Negotiated compromises 6 17 228 1 .1 0 *** 2 2 Reduce arms for safety 46 36 169 0 . 6 8 *** 23 Programs/Cooperation 6 2 2 223 1.19 **• 24 Cultural/Social misunderstandings 29 37 185 0.80 *** 25 SO I 124 78 49 -0.46 *** 26 Not worth surviving 37 42 172 0.84 *** 27 Arms important to great nation 73 42 136 0.30 *** 28 Military power needed for security 108 34 109 -0.18 ** 9 Deviates from zero or a “don't know' noncommittal position * Significant at .05 level ** Significant at .01 level *** Significant at .00 1 level 138 j Dem ographic C om parisons on the Peace A ttitude Item i | Analyses w ere perform ed to investigate possible differences related to i dem ographic variables, including gender, income, academ ic m ajor, religion, and i political party. The average responses for w om en and m en separately on the 28 PAS items and test of differences betw een them are presented in Table 7. O ver half of the | item s (15 out of 28) significantly differentiated betw een the sexes. In general, i I w om en disagreed with the notions that security is assured by large nuclear ' arsenals and that nuclear weapons deter nuclear war. W om en reported significantly m ore support for: (a) non-military, cooperative efforts towards | peace; (b) negotiated arm s agreem ents, including compromises, to prevent j I nuclear war; and (c) program s and institutions to facilitate com m unication and | cooperation among individuals and nations. W om en believed, significantly m ore | ■ so than m en, that: (a) international conflicts can be resolved in mutually beneficial ways; (b) cooperation can be achieved with consistent efforts; and ' (c) the world will be safer with reduced nuclear arsenals. i ! M en expressed significantly m ore support for the im portance of U.S. military power to m aintain its position as a great nation. M en positively endorsed | the notions that a key function of governm ent is peacekeeping through deterrence and that a strong military is necessary because of the com petition for < ■ goods, power, and prestige. M en supported peace efforts such as cooperation, compromise, communication, and negotiated arm s agreem ents to reduce nuclear arsenals. However, m en’s support of these items was significantly less than w om en’s endorsem ent. These findings are congruent with the notion that wom en t i ! 139 Table 7 G ender D ifferences on the Peace A ttitude Scale Item s ri3« Abbreviated Item Male Subjects (n=75) Female Subjects (n « 1 2 2 ) Point- biserial r( 251) 1 Nuclear arsenals increase security 0.14 -0.43 - 0 . 2 2 2 Security with nuclear arms -0.80 -1.13 -0.15 • • 3 Government role is negotiation 1.26 1.26 0 . 0 0 4 Arms reduction increases security 0.87 1.04 0.08 5 Competition is basis of conflict 0.92 1.06 0.09 6 Peace is absence of conflict -0.08 0 . 1 0 0.08 7 Security with communication 1 .2 1 1.31 0.07 8 Mutually beneficial resolution 0.45 0.76 0.15 ** 9 Non-military cooperation 0.90 1.16 0.15 «« 1 0 Negotiations prevent nuclear war 0.53 0.82 0.15 • • 11 Nuclear war is survivable 0.94 1.06 0.05 1 2 Nuclear arms deter nuclear war -0.44 - 0 . 8 8 -0.18 *« 13 Government role is deterrence 0 .2 1 -0.13 -0.14 » 14 Arms needed for competition 0.32 -0.03 -0.15 • • 15 Conflict due to unjust conditions 0.65 0.74 0.04 16 Cooperation achieved with effort 0.83 1.07 0.16 • • 17 Compromise important 1 .0 0 1 .2 1 0.15 * • 18 Peace through military strength -0.42 -0.60 0.08 19 Few survive 1 .0 2 1 .2 2 0 . 1 0 2 0 Arms prevent nuclear war -0.29 -0.60 -0.14 • 2 1 Negotiated compromises 0.96 1 .2 1 0 . 2 0 «** 2 2 Reduce arms for safety 0.52 0.80 0.13 • 23 Programs/Cooperation 1.06 1.29 0.16 •* 24 Cultural/Social misunderstandings 0.75 0.85 0.06 25 SO I -0.42 -0.49 -0.03 26 Nat worth surviving 0.77 0.89 0.05 27 Arms important to great ration 0.49 0.16 -0.14 » 28 Military power needed for security -0.04 - 0 . 1 0 -0.03 a Deviates from zero or a 'don’t know' noncommittal position * Significant at .05 level ** Significant a* .01 level *** Significant et .001 level 140 I are m ore associated with Peace Through Cooperation and m en are m ore i | associated with Peace Through Strength. ) j One-way analyses of variance were used to investigate additional ! dem ographic differences, including race and ethnic differences, religion, academ ic m ajor, income, and political party. The Scheff£ procedure was used to locate significant differences. No significant differences were found for income f or academ ic m ajor and the breakdowns are thus not presented. Protestants gave I significantly less endorsem ent than the "other" religious category to the belief that i ! national security is im proved when com m unication and trust are prom oted i betw een nations. However, there were no other significant differences betw een , the seven religious groups on each of the PAS items. The only racial or ethnic group that negatively endorsed the notion that nuclear war is survivable was the A m erican Indian. The A m erican Indian group reported feeling significantly less secure than Caucasians with a greater supply of i i nuclear weapons. A m ore thorough description of these findings is presented in j Table 8. Although some of these findings were significant, caution m ust be used in interpreting these results due to the unequal and low num ber of subjects in ( m ost cells. Caution must also be used because these variables are considered for : their unique relationship to the PAS items, rather than for their potentially interactive relationship. As hypothesized, the one-way ANOVAs indicated that there were a num ber of significantly different responses on the PAS items by D em ocrats and ! Republicans. W hile D em ocrats tended to support Peace Through Cooperation 1 items, Republicans tended to support Peace Through Strength items. D em ocrats 1 negatively endorsed items related to nuclear weapons build up, nuclear security, ■ 141 I _ Table 8 Racial and Ethnic Differences on the Peace A ttitude Scale Item s Abbreviated Item Afr A m (n-13) Amer Ind (n « 1 1 ) Asian (n-37) Ms 3 Caucasian (n-167) Hispanic (n«18) Other (n«5) F value 1 Nuclear arsenals increase security 0.62 0.09 -0.24 -0.33 0.39 0 . 2 0 2.45 2 Security with nuclear arms -0.31 -0.09 a -0.76 -1 .1 9 a -0.89 0 . 0 0 5.83 *** 3 Government role is negotiation 0.85 0 . 0 2 1.24 1.32 1.17 1.80 2 .4 0 * 4 Arms reduction increases security 0.62 0.45 1 .0 0 1.03 0.77 1.40 1 .1 0 5 Competition is basis of conflict 0.62 0.73 1.08 1.03 1 .0 0 1 .0 0 0.89 6 Peace is absence of conflict 0.46 0.36 0.70 a -0 .2 0 o 0.33 -0.60 5.61 *** 7 Security with communication 0.69 0.73 1.43 1.30 1.17 1.80 4.26 *** 8 Mutually beneficial resolution 0.62 0.73 0.49 0.63 0.67 1 .2 0 0.45 9 Non-military cooperation 0.85 0.55 1.05 1.08 1.06 1.60 1.27 1 0 Negotiations prevent nuclear war -0.15 ab 0.45 0.78 0.77 a 0.33 1.60 b 4.08 ** 11 Nuclear war is survivable 1.00 a -0.55 abc 1.03 b 1.14c 0.72 1 .0 0 5.70 *** 1 2 Nuclear arms deter nuclear war -0.23 -0.27 -0.54 -0.80 -0.67 -0.40 1.09 13 Government rote is deterrence 0.15 0.72 -0.05 -0.06 0 . 2 2 0 .2 0 1.08 14 Arms needed for competition 0.31 0.81 0 . 2 2 0 . 0 0 0.50 0 . 0 0 1.80 15 Conflict due to unjust conditions 0.69 0.09 0.78 0.69 0.89 1.0 0 0.93 16 Cooperation achieved with effort 0.69 0.45 0.84 1 .0 2 1 .1 1 1.60 2 .6 2 * 17 Compromise important 1.15 0.73 1.08 1.13 1.17 1.80 1.97 18 Peace through military strength -0.23 0.36 -0.35 -0.64 -0.44 -0.80 2.56 * 19 Few survive 1 .0 0 1.18 1 .0 0 1.17 1.17 1 .0 0 0.23 2 0 Arms prevent nuclear war -0.08 0.18 -0.35 -0.56 -0.44 -0.60 1.45 2 1 Negotiated compromises 0.92 0.91 1 .0 0 1.13 1.17 1.60 1.46 2 2 Reduce arms for safety 0.15 -0.09 0 . 6 8 0.81 0 . 2 2 1 .2 0 3.47 ** 23 Programs/Cooperation 0.92 0.91 1.14 1.25 0.94 1.60 1.92 24 Cultural/Social misunderstandings 0.69 0.09 0.73 0 . 8 6 0 . 8 8 1 .2 0 1.91 25 SO I -0.62 0.09 -0.35 -0.55 - 0 .1 1 -0.40 1.23 26 Not worth surviving 0.31 0.82 0.73 0.89 1 .1 1 0.40 1.07 27 Arms important to great nation 0.69 0.91 0.08 0.25 0.61 0 . 0 0 1.49 28 Military power needed for security 0.38 0.36 - 0 .1 1 -0.13 0 . 0 0 -0.40 0.89 Deviates from zero or a "don't know" noncommittal position Significant at .05 level Significant at .01 level Significant at .001 level Similar letters denote significant difference i i i 142 nuclear deterrence, the necessity of a strong military for com petition, long standing world peace via a strong military or a Star W ars D efense system. R epublicans significantly and positively endorsed these same items. T able 9 provides a m ore thorough description of these significant differences. I I i Factor Analysis I The 28 items of the PAS were examined in both exploratory and i confirm atory factor analyses. i Principal components analysis. Several principal com ponents analyses w ere perform ed using oblique factor rotations. The initial analysis suggested i high factorability by m eeting the following rules of thumb: (a) the correlation i ' m atrix included correlations greater than .30; (b) the Kaiser-M eyer-Olkin ! M easure was .90, greater than the desired .50; (c) B artlett’s test of sphericity (2595.4289) had a significance of p < .0000; and (d) the anti-im age covariance m atrix had low correlations. T hree oblique analyses were perform ed, extracting two, three, and finally i four factors, to determ ine the m ost appropriate num ber of factors to represent 1 i the data. The two-factor oblique rotation converged in seven iterations and j resulted in a factor structure that corresponded alm ost precisely with the f hypothesized Peace Through Strength (PTS) and Peace Through C ooperation i j (PTC) factors. The two eigenvalues greater than one accounted for 38.0% of the I variance. The eigenvalue for Factor 1 (PTS) was 7.96 and accounted for 28.4% * of the variance. The eigenvalue for Factor 2 (PTC) was 2.67 and accounted for ! 9.5% of the variance. The -.40 correlation betw een Factor 1 and Factor 2 143 Table 9 Political Party Differences on the Peace A ttitude Scale Item s ms» Abbreviated Item Democrat (n*77) Republican C n=123) Other (n-51) F values 1 Nuclear arsenals increase security -0.58 a Olio -0.31 7.78 *** 2 Security with nuclear arms -1.27 a -0.77 a -1.08 5.94 ** 3 Oovernment role is negotiation 1.14 1.28 1.37 1.59 4 Arms reduction increases security 1 .2 2 0.87 0.82 2.96 5 Competition is basis of conflict 0 . 8 8 1.03 1 .1 0 1.19 6 Peace is absence of conflict -0.16 0.23 - 0 . 2 0 4.05* 7 Security with communication 1.34 1.14 a 1.45 a 4.13* 8 Mutually beneficial resolution 0.70 0.56 0.69 0.51 9 Non-military cooperation 1.30 b 0.80 ab 1.27 a 10.36 *** 1 0 Negotiations prevent nuclear war 0.79 0.54 0.92 3.38* 11 Nuclear war is survivable 1.18 0.90 1 .0 0 1.57 1 2 Nuclear arms deter nuclear war -1.05 a -0.42 a -0.78 7.08 *** 13 Oovernment rote is deterrence -0.38 a 0.34 ab - 0 . 2 0 b 9.98 *** 14 Arms needed for competition -0 36 a 0.53 ab -0.14 b 18.93 *** 15 Conflict due to unjust conditions 1 .0 0 a 0.54 a 0.65 4.58* 16 Cooperation achieved with effort 1 .0 0 0.87 1 .0 0 2.72 17 Compromise important 1.29 a 0.98 a 1.24 6.52 ** 18 Peace throu$i military strength - 0 . 8 6 a -0.26 a -0.65 8.63 *** 19 Few survive 1 .1 2 1.13 1.16 0 . 0 2 2 0 Arms prevent nuclear war -0.78 a -0.24 a -0.55 6.17 ** 2 1 Negotiated compromises 1 .2 1 1 .0 2 1.14 2.25 2 2 Reduce arms for safety 0.90 a 0.48 a 0.84 4.67 * 23 Programs/Cooperation 1.34 a 1.07 a 1.24 3.74* 24 Cultural/Social misunderstandings 0.92 0.67 0.96 3.02 25 SO I -1.04 ab -0.07 be -0.53 ac 20.42 *** 26 Not worth surviving 0.99 0.72 0.90 1.48 27 Arms important to great nation -0.25 a 0.67 a 0 . 2 2 16.06 *** 28 Military power needed for security -0.40 a 0 .1 9 a - 0 . 2 2 6.78 ** a Deviates from zero or a "don't know" noncommittal position * Significant at .05 level ** Significant at .01 level *** Significant at .001 level Similar letters denote significant difference 144 indicates that the factors, Peace Through Strength and Peace Through C ooperation, were not perfectly independent but were also not the same. The three-factor model, while som ewhat less interpretable, generated Peace Through Strength, Peace Through Cooperation, and Beliefs A bout Survival factors. The four factor solution was the least interpretable. O n the basis of these analyses, the two-factor m odel was chosen to reflect the data because it suggested the cleanest factor solution. The factor loadings are shown in Table 10. These findings support Hypothesis 1: The Peace A ttitude Scale is com prised of at least two factors: the Peace Through Strength factor and the Peace Through Cooperation factor. A t this point in the analyses, it was decided to delete item PAS5 (com petition is the basis for m ost international conflicts). It had a very low loading (.24). In addition, it did not theoretically fit within the peace attitude m odel as designed. The three items related to Beliefs A bout Survival also had very low factor loadings. They were taken out of the PAS and set up as a separate scale. The literature indicated that there may be a correlation betw een peace attitude and beliefs about survival (Tyler & McGraw, 1983). However, there is no indication that beliefs about surviving nuclear war and beliefs about achieving peace fall within the same construct. C onfirm atory factor analysis. A confirm atory factor m odel was used to test the items on the two factors found in the principal com ponents analyses. The determ inant (.54) was not very small relative to the m agnitude of the standardized variances in the correlation matrix to be analyzed. This indicated that one or m ore variables need not be deleted due to near perfect linear Table 10 Principal Com ponents Factor Analysis Results of the Peace A ttitude Scale (oblique rotation) i | Abbreviated Item Factor 1 Factor 2 Peace through Strength Peace through Cooperation 2 0 Arms prevent nuclear war 0.82 -0.32 14 Arms needBd for competition 0.82 -0.28 27 Arms important to great nation 0.80 -0.34 18 Peace through military strength 0.78 -0.37 13 Government role is deterrence 0.78 -0.19 1 2 Nuclear arms deter nuclear war 0.78 -0.39 1 Nuclear arsenals increase security 0.72 -0.34 28 Military power needed for security 0.72 -0.13 25 SO I 0 . 6 6 -0.35 2 Security with nuclear arms 0 6 4 -0.43 6 Peace is absence of conflict 0.30 -0.14 7 Security with communication -0.23 0.69 9 Non-military cooperation -0.48 0 . 6 8 23 P rogram s/Cooperation -0.35 0 . 6 8 16 Cooperation achieved with effort -0.26 0.67 2 1 Negotiated compromises -0.24 0.63 17 Compromise important -0.25 0.62 2 2 Reduce arms for ssfety -0.41 0.59 24 Cultural/Social misunderstandings -0.15 0.51 15 Conflict due to unjust conditions -0.16 0.49 4 Arms reduction increases security -0.42 0.44 11 * Nuclear war is survivable -0.36 0.43 1 0 Negotiations prevent nuclear war -0.26 0.41 3 Government role is negotiation 0 . 0 0 0.38 8 Mutually beneficial resolution - 0 .1 1 0.32 26 Not worth surviving -0.23 0.24 19 Few survive -0.13 0.24 5 Competition is basis of conflict -0.13 0.24 Correlation between F 1 and F2 is -.40 * Item was reverse coded in scale creation i I i 146 relationships and that the m aximum-likelihood m ethod can be used. Im portantly, I the factor intercorrelation was not higher than .90. See Figure 1. j T he total coefficient of determ ination was .91, indicating that the m easurem ent m odel is good. O ne hopes to achieve a nonsignificant chi-square to confirm the fit of the m odel (Joreskog & Sorbom, 1981; Long, 1983). However, a nonsignificant chi-square was not obtained, perhaps because of the num ber of j variables (24) in relation to the num ber of subjects ( n = 251). W hen the chi- ! square does not reflect an adequate fit, other criteria can be used (Joreskog & i j Sorbom, 1981; Long, 1983). For example, chi-square should be no m ore than two ! times the degrees of freedom . This m odel m et that criterion with a chi-square of ' 444.55 and 251 degrees of freedom . A second criterion suggests the goodness of I [ fit index be greater than .9. The goodness-of-fit index obtained was .87, I indicating a m oderately good fit. W hile the goodness-of-fit index was less than ; the desired .9, it m ust be rem em bered that the sam ple is small. As desired, all i ^ t values of factor loadings were significant at the p < .001 level. 1 The standardized solution included two items with small loadings (below 1 .30): PAS6 on the PTS factor (Peace is the absence of active conflict) and PAS3 i on the PTC factor (A key function of governm ent is peacekeeping through negotiation). Although small, these were significant loadings. The correlation : betw een the PTS and PTC factors (-.6) was somewhat greater than in the PC I | model. This increase was expected w hen moving to a cleaner two-factor model. | The overall CFA model, shown in Figure 1, is similar w hen com pared to the PC | m odel and supported the hypothesis that the Peace A ttitude Scale com prised two factors, Peace Through Strength and Peace Through Cooperation. i t i ! 147 Nuclear arsenals | 59 Increase security Security with nuclear arms Peace Is absence of conflict Nuclear arms deter nuclear war Government role Is deterrence Arms needed for competition Peace through m ili tary strength Arms prevent nuclear war SO I Arms Important to great nation Military power needed for security 2 .59 6 .27 12 .76 13 .74 14 .80 16 .77 20 .81 25 •62, 27 .79 , 28 .66, Peaoe Through Strength Peace Through Cooperation .45 4 .63 7 .30 8 .72 9 .39 10 „,.40 15 >61 16 v 58 17 s!58 21 ^ 5 7 £22 S , 65 23 \ 43 24 Government role Is negotiation Arms reduction increases security Security with com munication Mutually beneficial resolution Non-military coop eration Negotiations prevent nuclear war Conflict duetounj ust conditions Cooperation achieved with effort Compromise Impor tant Negotiated compro mises safety Programs/Coopera tion Cultural/Social mis understandings 00 Figure 1. Confirmatory factor analysis results of the Peace Attitude Scale. The maximum-likelihood m odel indicates that PAS20 (N uclear war is best prevented by m aintaining a strong military) is the m ost reliable indicator of Factor 1 (PTS) and PAS9 (Long-standing world peace can best be reached through non-m ilitary m eans and cooperation betw een nations) is the m ost reliable indicator of Factor 2 (PTC). Definitions, Distribution Data and Reliability of the Peace Attitude Scales B rief definitions of both scales confirm ed in the CFA m odel and the survivability factor suggested in the PC A are presented in Table 11. The distribution data for the two peace attitude and one survival beliefs scales are shown in Table 12. The kurtosis, variance, and skewness estim ates indicated reasonably norm al distributions. A low score on the PTS and PTC indicated low support for that particular position on peace; while high scores on these two scales w ere evidence of support. A low score on the beliefs about survival scale indicated a belief that survival is possible, while a high score indicated a belief that survival is neither possible nor desirable. Cronbach’s alpha was com puted to determ ine the internal consistency reliabilities of the Peace Through Strength and the Peace Through C ooperation scales of the PAS, as well as, the Belief A bout Survival scale. As shown in Table 12, the alphas for the peace attitude scales were relatively high and adequate for research purposes. The Beliefs A bout Survival scale is less reliable, with an alpha of .53. 149 Table 11 Brief Definitions of Scales: Peace Through Strength, Peace Through Cooperation, and Beliefs about Survival Scale Definition Peace through Strength Eleven items designed to measure views about peace, conflict, the purpose of nuclear weapons, the role of government, and the definition of national security from a "constrained" vision of human nature. Peace Through Cooperation Thirteen items designed to measure views about peace, conflict, the purpose of nuclear weapons, the role of government, and the definition of national security from an "unconstrained" vision of human nature. Beliefs About Survival Three items to assess beliefs about the survivability of nuclear war. Low scores indicate survival beliefs; High scores indicate belief that nuclear war is not survivable, nor worth surviving. Table 12 D istribution and Reliability D ata for the Peace A ttitude Scales Scale Number of items Range Ms Variance Skewness Kurtosis Alpha Peace Through Strength 1 1 -2.00 to 1.64 -0.27 0 . 6 8 - 0 . 1 2 -0.56 0.90 Peace Through Cooperation 13 - 1 .0 0 to 2 .0 0 0.96 0.23 -0.41 0.94 0.80 Beliefs About Survival 3 -1.67 to 2.00 0.99 0.60 -0.58 0 . 0 0 0.53 Demographic Differences on the Peace Attitude Scales Differences on the PAS scales based on dem ographic characteristics were tested. T he average responses differentiated by race and ethnicity, religion, political party, and liberal-conservative self-rating are shown in T able 13, 14, 15, and 16. One-way analyses of variance, with a significance level of .05, w ere used to test for differences among m eans (Glass & Hopkins, 1984). It should be noted that this is a particularly conservative statistical tool and may not indicate the location of significant differences. T here were no significant differences on the peace attitude and survival scales in relation to income, religion, and academ ic m ajor. Significant differences were found on Peace Through C ooperation among some ethnic groups. However, these results should be interpreted with caution due to the unequal and low num ber of subjects in several cells. The m ost interpretable differences were betw een R epublicans and D em ocrats and betw een conservatives and liberals on the peace attitude scales. As hypothesized, D em ocrats provided m ore negative endorsem ent of Peace Through Strength than Republicans, while positively endorsing Peace Through C ooperation m ore than Republicans. Self-identified conservatives supported Peace Through Strength, while self identified liberals did not. Liberals and conservatives both supported Peace Through C ooperation, but liberals supported it significantly m ore. Liberal were significantly m ore convinced that they would not survive, nor w ant to survive, a nuclear holocaust than m oderates or conservatives. These results supported Hypothesis 4: Peace Through Strength is positively associated with individuals who are self-selected Republicans and who identify them selves as m ore conservative than liberal and Hypothesis 5: Peace Through Table 13 Racial and Ethnic D ifferences on the Peace A ttitude Scales MS 9 Scale Afr A m (n»13) Amer Ind ( n=1 1 ) Asian (n*37) Caucasian Hispanic (n=167) (n=18) Other F value (n=5) PeaceThrough Strength 0 . 1 0 0.32 -0.16 -0.38 -0.05 -0.25 2.82 * Peace Through Cooperation 0 . 6 6 b 0.52 a 0.94 1 .0 0 0 . 8 8 1.49 ab 4.72*** Beliefs About Survival 0.77 0.5 0.92 1.06 1 .0 0 0.80 1.58 I ------------------ | | a * i « Deviates from zero or a ’don't know" noncommittal position Significant at OS level Significant at .01 level Significant at .001 level Similar letters denote significant difference Table 14 Religion D ifferences on the Peace A ttitude Scales MS 9 Scale Agnostic (n=8 ) Catholic (n=89) Eastern (n=8 ) Jewish (n=7) Protestant (n=93) None (n=24) Other (n=2 2 ) F value Peace Through Strength -0.63 -0.15 - 0 5 6 -0.51 - 0 . 2 0 -0.37 -0.60 1.63 Peace Through Cooperation 0.96 0.96 1.31 0.92 0 . 8 6 1.03 1.16 2.13 Beliefs About Survival 1 .2 1 1 .0 0 1 .2 1 1 .0 0 0.95 0 . 8 8 1.08 0.36 9 Deviates from zeroor a “don't know’ noncommittal position * Significant at .05 level ** Significant at .01 level *** Significant at .0 0 1 level Similar letters denote significant difference 152 Table 15 Political Party Differences on the Peace A ttitude Scales Ms» Scale Democrat (n«77) Republican (n-123) Other (n * 5 l) F values Peace Through Strength -0.64 a 0.03 ab -0.40 b 19.42*** Peace Through Cooperation 1.09 a 0.83 ab 1.06 b 3 7 4 Beliefs About Survival 1 .1 0 0.92 1 .0 2 1.30 8 Deviates from zero or a "don't know" noncommittal position * Significant at .05 level ** Significant at .01 level *** Significant at .001 level Similar letters denote significant difference I Table 16 L iberal/C onservative Differences on the Peace A ttitude Scales Scale Conservative ( n=57) Ms9 Moderate (n=125) Liberal (n=6 8 ) F values Peace Through Strength 0.23 be -0.24 ac -0.76 ab 28.37 *** Peace Through Cooperation 0.75 a 0.91 b 1.23 ab 18.66 *** Beliefs About Survival 0.81 a 0.93 b 1.26 ab 6.48 ** 9 Deviates from zero or a "don't know'noncommittal position * Significant at .05 level ** Significant at .01 level *** Significant at .001 level Similar letters denote significant difference 153 C ooperation is positively associated with individuals who are self-selected D em ocrats and who identify themselves as m ore liberal than conservative. It should be noted that both conservatives and liberals, Republicans and D em ocrats, supported a peace through cooperation orientation to conflict resolution. They differed, however, in the degree of this support. T he average responses for wom en and m en separately on the two peace attitudes and survivability scales and the test of differences betw een them are presented in Table 17. The positive point-biserial correlation suggested that w om en endorse Peace Through C ooperation m ore than men. Both m en and w om en negatively endorsed Peace Through Strength, although m en’s negative endorsem ent was significantly less than w om en’s. T here was no significant difference betw een m en’s and w om en’s beliefs about surviving nuclear war. It has been suggested that sex-role trait may be a better indicator of gender differences than biological sex (Basow, 1986; Unger, 1979). A one-way analysis of variance was perform ed to assess the relationship betw een sex-role trait and the peace attitude scales. As Table 18 illustrates, all four sex trait groups (androgenous, masculine, feminine, and undifferentiated) supported a peace through cooperation orientation. However, "masculine" individuals supported Peace Through C ooperation significantly less than "feminine" individuals. W hile all four groups negatively endorsed a peace through strength position, high fem inine trait individuals reported significantly less support for Peace Through Strength than did high m asculine trait individuals. These findings largely support Hypothesis 12: W om en or fem inine/ androgenous typed individuals support Peace Through C ooperation m ore than Peace Through Strength and Hypothesis 13: M en or m asculine-typed individuals Table 17 G ender Differences on the Peace A ttitude Scales Ms 9 Scale Male Subjects (n=75) Female Subjects (n * 1 2 2 ) Point- biserial r{ 251) Peace Through Strength - 0 . 1 2 -0.38 -0.15 ** Peace Through Cooperation 0.85 1.04 0 . 2 0 *** Beliefs About Survival 0.91 1.05 0.09 9 Deviates from aero or a 'don't know' noncommittal position * Significant at .05 level * * Significant at .01 level *** Significant at .00 llevel T able 18 T he R elationship Betw een Peace A ttitude and Sex R ole Traits ____________________________Ms9__________________ Scales Androgenous Masculine Feminine Undifferentiated F value Traits Traits Traits (n=77) (n=77) (n=58) (n=39) Peace Through Strength -0.29 -0.05 a -0.45 a -0.38 3 .1 2 * Peace Through Cooperation 1.04 0.83 a 1.07 a 0.88 4.16** 9 Deviates from zero or a 'don't know' noncommittal position * Significant at .05 level ** Significant at .01 level *** Significant at .001 level Similar letters ctenate significant difference 155 support Peace Through Strength m ore than Peace Through Cooperation. It | should be noted that, in this study, androgenous individuals do not significantly | differ in their peace attitudes. ] The relationship betw een sex-role trait and other nuclear threat responses were investigated using Pearson correlation coefficients. T able 19 shows that 1 anti-nuclear activism was significantly and negatively associated with m asculine ; traits and significantly and positively associated with fem inine traits. T here was a significant relationship betw een fem inine traits and the perception that nuclear issues are in the hands of powerful others. M asculine traits w ere significantly i I correlated with the belief that nuclear w ar is survivable. i J Table 19 ! Intercorrelations of Sex Role T raits with , N uclear T hreat Responses Variables Feminine Traits Masculine Traits A FFEC TIV E Nuclear threat salience 0.06 0.34 Nuclear anxiety 0.18 -0.03 Nuclear denial - 0 .2 1 - 0 . 1 0 Nuclear support -0.06 0 . 1 0 Nuclear concern 0 . 1 2 0.05 Fear far the future 0.17 0.09 C O PIN G Beliefs about survival 0 . 1 0 -0 .1 4 * Activism 0.14 -0 .4 4 * Pro-defense activism 0.17 0.33 Anti-nuclear activism 0.43 * -0 .4 0 * Internal nuclear locus of control 0 . 1 2 0 . 0 0 Powerful others nuclear locus of control O.SS ** 0.05 Chance nuclear locus of control 0.28 -0.27 * Significant at OS level ** Significant at .01 level *** Significant at .001 level 156 j Peace Attitudes and Activist Group Membership | One-way analyses of variance w ere perform ed to determ ine the relationship j of Peace Through Strength and Peace Through C ooperation with activist i behavior as determ ined by organizational affiliation. T hree tests for hom ogeneity of variances were used. For the PTS scale, C ochran’s C was .3784 with p - .431 approximately; for the PTC scale, it was .3929 with p = .246 approximately. Bartlett-Box F for the PTS scale was .377 with p = .686; for the I PTC scale it was .839 w ith p = .433. The M aximum V ariance/M inim um J I V ariance was 1.220 for the PTS scale and 1.435 for the PTC scale. T ogether ! these tests suggested that the populations m et the assum ption for equality of variances. The conservative Scheffe m ultiple com parison test was used to com pare the means. This was a very strict test of the hypotheses. As illustrated in Table 20, | pro-defense activists positively endorsed Peace Through Strength, while non- ' activists and anti-nuclear activists negatively endorsed Peace Through Cooperation. Pro-defense activists differed significantly from both non-activists and anti-nuclear activists in their support for Peace Through Strength. In addition, anti-nuclear activists differed significantly from both pro-defense activists and non-activists in their lack of peace through strength support. These findings corresponded with Hypothesis 2: The Peace Through Strength factor is positively associated with individuals engaged in deterrence or pro-defense activism. The one-way m ean comparisons of the Peace Through C ooperation scale by organization affiliation indicated that, even though all three organizational groups supported a cooperative orientation, anti-nuclear activists reported 157 Table 20 Analysis of V ariance The Relationship among Peace A ttitudes and Levels of Activist Stance ______________ riss___________ Scales Pro-Defense Anti-Nuclear Nan- F value Activists Activists Activists (n -2 3 ) (n-31) (n-197) Peace Through Strength 0.48 be -1.26ato - 0 . 2 0 ac 44.52*** Peace Throuji Cooperation 0 .7 1 a 1.40 ab 0.92 b 19.55*** 9 Deviates from zero or a "don't know" noncommittal position * Significant at .05 level ** Significant at .01 level *** Significant at .001 level Similar letters denote significant difference significantly greater support than did the pro-defense or non-activist groups. This corresponded with Hypothesis 3: The Peace Through C ooperation factor is positively associated with individuals engaged in tension-reduction or anti- nuclear activism. T he one-way com parison tests also indicated good predictive validity for the PAS, with the two peace attitude scales distinguishing betw een activist groups. 158 Peace Attitudes and the Relationship with Affective, Coping, Personality, and Gender Dimensions i j | T he relationships of the peace attitude scales with the affective, coping, i personality, and gender dimensions w ere investigated with correlations and several m ultiple regression analyses. Correlational Relationships: Peace Attitudes with Affective, Coping, Personality, and Gender Dimensions Four correlation m atrices were generated to examine the relationship of I peace attitudes with affective and personality dimensions. The m atrices used: ! (a) the total sample, (b) the pro-defense activist population, (c) the anti-nuclear j activist population, and (d) the non-activist population. The findings are reported in Tables 21, 22, 23, and 24, respectively. ] Using the total sample, there w ere significant correlations betw een the I peace attitude scales and alm ost all other variables in the hypothesized i i directions. Peace Through C ooperation was significantly and positively correlated with spontaneous nuclear concern, internal nuclear locus of control, anti-nuclear activism, nuclear concern, nuclear anxiety, identification with fem inine traits, active coping skills, and the belief that nuclear w ar is not ■ survivable. The Peace Through C ooperation scale was significantly and ; negatively correlated with intolerance of ambiguity, endorsem ent of the role of f i | chance in nuclear issues, Machiavellianism, dogmatism, pro-defense activism, | nuclear denial, nuclear support, fear for the future, and a peace through strength position. T he Peace Through Strength scale was significantly and positively correlated with intolerance of ambiguity, endorsem ent of powerful others and the ! 159 Table 21 C orrelation Coefficients for: Affective and Personality V ariables with Peace Attitudes: T otal Sam ple n = 251 Variables Peace Through Peace Through Strength Cooperation A FFEC TIV E Nuclear threat salience Nuclear anxiety Nuclear denial Nuclear support Nuclear concern Fear for the future C O PIN G Peace through strength Peace through cooperation Beliefs about survival Activism Pro-defense activism Anti-nuclear activism Internal nuclear locus of control Powerful others nuclear locus of control Chance nuclear locus of control External locus of control Active coping Avoidant coping PER SO N A L ITY Intolerance of ambiguity Dogmatism Machiavellianism G E N D E R Feminine traits (PAQF) Masculine traits ( PA QM ) Masculine/Feminine traits (PAQMF) -0.09 0 . 1? * * -0.48 *** 0.50 *** 0.44 *** -0.35 *** 0.50 *** -0.44 *** -0.34 *** 0.45 *** 0.46 ** -0.16 ** 1 .0 0 -0.48 *** -0.48 *** 1 .0 0 -0.32 *** 0.32 *** -0.70 *** 0 . 4 9 »»« 0.50 *** -0.36 *** -0.54 *** 0.38 *** 0.30 *** - 0 .2 1 *** 0 . 2 0 *** -0.06 0.23 *** -0.24 *** 0.07 -0.14 ** -0.23 *** 0.27 *** 0.04 0.09 0.33 *** -0.1 9 * * * 0.33 *** - 0 . 2 2 *** 0.18 ** -0.30 *** - 0 . 1 2 * 0.30 *** 0.17 ** -0.08 0.15 ** -0.23 *** * Significant at .05 level ** Significant at .01 level *** Significant at .001 level 160 Table 22 C orrelation Coefficients for: Affective and Personality Variables with Peace A ttitudes Pro-D efense Sample n = 23 Variables Peace Through Strength Peace Through Cooperation A FFECTIV E Nuclear threat salience Nuclear anxiety Nuclear denial Nuclear support Nuclear concern Fear for the future C O PIN G Peace through strength Peace through cooperation Beliefs about survival Activism Pro-defense activism Anti-nuclear activism Internal nuclear locus of control Powerful others nuclear locus of control Chance nuclear locus of control External locus of control Active coping Avoidant coping PERSO N A LITY Intolerance of ambiguity Dogmatism Machiavellianism G EN D ER Feminine traits (PAQF) Masculine traits (PAQM) Masculine/Feminine traits (PAQMF) - 0.11 ■0.72 *** 0 .54* 0.53 ** -0.62 *** 0.47 ** 1.00 -0.45 -0.41 * -0.71 *** 0.55 * -0.64 ** ■0.02 0.04 0.36 * 0.26 0.09 0.31 •0.05 0.56 0.31 -0.08 0.37 0.14 ■0.13** 0.49 ** -0.23 -0.46 * 0.41 * ■0.40 * -0.45 * 1.00 0.12 0.68 * * * -0.58 ** 0.55 ** -0.13 * 0.11 -0.07 -0.32 0.22 - 0.22 0.12 ■0.41 * -0.56 ** 0.18 ■0.06 ■0.31 * Significant at .05 level ** Significant at .01 level ***■ Significant at .00 1 level 161 j role of chance in nuclear issues, Machiavellianism, dogmatism, pro-defense I activism, nuclear denial, nuclear support, fear for the future, and identification j with m asculine traits. The Peace Through Strength scale was significantly and j negatively correlated with anti-nuclear activism, nuclear concern, nuclear anxiety, | fem inine traits, active coping styles, peace through cooperation attitudes, and the j belief that nuclear w ar is not survivable. | These findings supported a num ber of the research hypotheses regarding , the relationship betw een peace attitudes and personality and affective variables, | including Hypothesis 7: N uclear threat salience is positively associated with Peace Through C ooperation and negatively associated with Peace Through ( i Strength; Hypothesis 9: Nuclear anxiety is positively associated with adherence I ! to Peace Through C ooperation but not with an adherence to Peace Through | Strength; and Hypothesis 15: Those adhering to Peace Through C ooperation i ; score lower on intolerance of ambiguity and M achiavellian personality m easures, than adherents to Peace Through Strength. T he correlations in the pro-defense and anti-nuclear populations, shown in Tables 22 and 23, generally paralleled those noted above. T here w ere fewer significant correlations in each of these populations, but the trends rem ained in the hypothesized directions. Peace attitude and alm ost all affective, coping, personality, and gender dimensions correlated significantly in the hypothesized direction in the non activist population, as shown in T able 24. According to this analysis, the non activist with cooperative beliefs reported spontaneous nuclear concern, nuclear anxiety, along with low levels of nuclear support and denial, beliefs that nuclear w ar is not survivable, active and avoidant coping, low dogmatism and 162 Table 23 C orrelation Coefficients for: Affective, Coping, Personality, and G ender V ariables with Peace A ttitudes: A nti-N uclear Sample n - 31 Variables A FFEC TIV E Nuclear threat salience Nuclear anxiety Nuclear dBnial Nuclear support Nuclear concern C O PIN G Peace through strength Peace through cooperation Beliefs about survival Activism Pro-defense activism Anti-nuclear activism Fear for the future Internal nuclear locus of control Powerful others nuclear locus of control Chance nuclear locus of control External locus of control Active coping Avoidant coping PE R SO N A LITY Intolerance of ambiguity Dogmatism Machiavellianism G E N D E R Feminine traits (PAQF) Masculine traits (PAQM) Masculine/Feminine traits (PAQMF) Peace Through Peace Through Strength Cooperation 0 . 1 0 0 .3 4 * - 0 .1 1 0.36 * 0.13 -0.03 0.42 ** -0.28 0.09 0.31 * 1 .0 0 0 . 0 2 0 .0 1 1 .0 0 - 0 .2 1 0.39 * -0.33 * 0.23 0.55 *** -0.26 -0.05 0.09 0 .2 1 -0.07 0.44 ** -0.35 * 0 . 1 0 - 0 .2 1 0.39 * -0.23 0.06 -0.26 -0.31 * 0.08 0.18 0.08 0.44 ** -0.26 0.26 - 0 . 1 0 0.13 - 0 . 2 0 -0.06 0.44 0 . 0 0 0 .0 1 0.09 -0.18 * Significant at .05 level ** Significant at .01 level *** Significant at .001 level 163 Table 24 C orrelation Coefficients for: Affective, Coping, Personality, and G ender V ariables with Peace A ttitudes: Non-Activist Sam ple n = 197 Variables Peace Through Strength Peace Through Cooperation A FFEC TIY E Nuclear threat salience -0.09 0.17** Nuclear anxiety -0.41 ** 0.45 *** Nuclear denial 0.42 *** -0.34 *** Nuclear support 0.41 *** -0.37 *** Nuclear concern 0.30 *** 0.42 *** Fear for the future 0.08 - 0 . 1 0 CO PIN G Peace through strength 1 .0 0 -0.41 *** Peace through cooperation -0.41 *** 1 .0 0 Beliefs about survival 0.28 *** 0.30 *** Activism -0.58 *** 0.34 *** Pro-defense activism 0.46 *** -0.30 *** Anti-nuclear activism -0.39 *** 0 .2 1 ** Internal nuclear locus of control 0.23 *** - 0 .1 1 Powerful others nuclear locus of control 0.13* 0.04 Chance nuclear locus of control 0.19** -0.25 *** External locus of control 0.03 -0.08 Active coping -0.18 ** 0.24 *** Avoidant coping 0 . 0 0 0.13 * PERSO N A LITY Intolerance of ambiguity 0 .2 1 ** -0.08 Dognatism 0 .2 1 ** - 0 . 1 2 * Machiavellianism 0.17** -0.28 *** G EN D ER Feminine traits (PAQF) -0 .1 9 * * 0.34 *** Masculine traits (PAflM) 0 . 1 0 -0.04 Masculine/Feminine traits ( PAQM F) 0.15* -0.24 *** * Significant at .05 level ** Significant et .01 level *** Significant et 001 level 164 ! M achiavellianism, fem inine traits, and a negative endorsem ent of Peace Through j Strength. I i The non-activist with deterrence beliefs reported little nuclear anxiety, but i some nuclear concern, along with nuclear support and denial, low internal j control regarding nuclear issues, the belief that nuclear war is not survivable and I is in the hands of powerful others, high intolerance of ambiguity, dogmatism, and J M achiavellianism, and low fem inine traits. Non-activists who endorsed Peace I Through Strength had a negative relationship with active coping and Peace i Through Cooperation. I Correlational Relationships: General Coping Styles ; and Nuclear Threat Responses The total sam ple m atrix revealed some additional correlational relationships that are of interest in this study. Hypothesis 17: G eneral coping | j style is associated with a particular nuclear threat coping style was designed to facilitate exploration of the relationship betw een general coping style and responses to the nuclear threat. The findings are reported in Table 25. Active coping was positively and significantly associated with anti-nuclear activism, nuclear anxiety, nuclear concern, Peace Through Cooperation, and endorsem ent of the belief that nuclear war is not survivable. Active coping was negatively and significantly associated with pro-defense activism, nuclear support, fear for the future, and Peace Through Strength. The avoidant coping style was significantly associated with only two nuclear threat response m easures. Avoidant coping was positively related to the endorsem ent of powerful others and chance in the arena of nuclear issues. 165 Table 25 Intercorrelations of Coping Styles with Nuclear Threat Responses Variables Active doping Avoictant Coping A FFEC TIV E Nuclear threat salience 0.01 -0.01 Nuclear wixiety 0.24 *** 0.07 Nuclear denial -0.07 0.04 Nuclear support -0.26 *** -0.03 Nuclear concern 0.19 *** 0.07 Fear for the future -0.11 * 0.09 C O PIN G Peace through strength -0 .2 3 * * * 0.04 Peace through cooperation 0.27 *** 0.09 Beliefs about survival 0.11 * 0.09 Activism 0.30 *** 0.04 Pro-defense activism -0 .1 6 * * 0.04 Anti-nudes' activism 0.27 *** 0.07 Internal nuclear locus of control -0.06 0.04 Powerful others nuclear locus of control -0.31 0.2 1 *** Chance nuclear locus of control -0.10 0.20*** * Significant at .05 level ** Significant at .01 level *** Significant at. 001 level Predicting Peace Through Strength B oth step-wise and sim ultaneous m ultiple regression analyses were perform ed on the total sam ple to determ ine which variables best predicted Peace Through Strength. Step-wise and sim ultaneous analyses were perform ed on m ale and fem ale populations separately to determ ine if the regression models were the sam e or different based on gender. In addition, regression analyses were conducted om itting pro-defense and anti-nuclear activist variables from the equation to allow affective, coping, personality, and gender variables to em erge as predictors of peace attitude. The sim ultaneous m ultiple regression procedures specifically controlled for all other variables as each was added to the equation. Because all independent variables w ere added to the equation, the R square for significant variables was sm aller (Pedhauzer, 1973). To control for sex in the m ultiple regression analyses of the entire sample { n = 251), sex was entered into the equation first and accounted for 2% of the variance ( p < .05 level). The negative beta indicated that m en had a higher level of PTS support than women. Table 26 shows pro-defense activism was the best predictor of Peace Through Strength w hen the total sam ple was considered. Together, high pro defense activism, low anti-nuclear activism, and low nuclear anxiety were the best predictors of a peace through strength orientation. Next, m ultiple regression analyses were perform ed on Peace Through Strength using m en and wom en separately. Relying on models created solely on the total sam ple may generate beta bias by minimizing gender differences (H are- M ustin & M arecek, 1988). This procedure attem pted to determ ine if different m odels w ere appropriate for wom en and men. As illustrated in Table 26, 167 Table 26 Predicting Peace Through Strength: Simultaneous and Step-wise Regressions Using the Total Sample and Women and Men Separately (Activist Behaviors Included) Total Females Males (n=251) (n=144) (n=107) variables Simult. Stepwise Corr. Simult. Stepwise Oorr. Simult. Stepwise Corr. Huclear threat salience .0 0 -.09 .06 - . 1 2 -.07 -.0 8 nuclear anxiety -.1 8 * * -.18 *** -.48 *** -.16 * - .1 4 * -.3 4 *** -.17 * -.23 ** .59 *** Pno-defense activism ,37 *** .37 *** .50 *** .36 *** .37 *** .46 *** .36 *** .38 *** .54 *** Anti-nuclear activism -.3 4 *** -.36 *** -.5 4 *** -.33 *** - 34 *** - 4 9 *** -.40 *** -.39 *** - 62 *** Internal nuclear locus of control .08 .30 *** .09 .1 6 * .38 *** - . 0 1 .25 *» Powerful others nucleer locus of control .08 .11 ** .2 0 ** .08 .1 4 * .25 *** .06 ,14 Chance nuclear locus of control .07 .23 *** .11 .32 *** .01 . 1 2 Brier nal locus of control - . 0 1 .07 -.03 .04 .03 .19 * Active oop tng - . 0 2 -.2 4 *** .01 - . 1 2 -.08 -.3 6 *** Avoidant coping .01 .04 -.03 .03 .07 07 Intolerance of ambiguity .11 * .1 4 * * .33 *** .07 .30 *** .1 6 * 2 1 «** .39 *** Dogmatism .08 .1 0 * .33 *** .09 .30 *** .07 .36 *** flacbtevelllantsm -.04 .1 8 * * .0 0 .13 -.0 7 . 2 0 ** FBmlnlne traits (PAQF) . 0 0 - . 1 2 * .04 -.0 4 - . 0 2 - . 1 2 tlascultne traits (PAQM) .05 .17 ** .04 .05 -.07 . 2 2 ** (fender .03 -.15 **- Multiple Regression Summary Index F 19.80 *** 52.93 *** 8 . 8 6 *** 26.09 *** 13.73*** 50.42 *** R .75 .75 .71 .70 .83 .81 Rsq .58 .57 .51 .49 .69 . 6 6 * Sign If leant at .05 level ** Sign Meant at .01 level *** Significant at .001 level OS 00 sim ultaneous and step-wise prediction equations for fem ales included the sam e variables as those in the total sample equation: (a) pro-defense activism; (b) anti-nuclear activism; and (c) nuclear anxiety. Included in the step-wise but not in the sim ultaneous equations were: (a) low perceptions of internal control in nuclear issues and (b) the perception that chance determ ines nuclear issues. I M ales differed from fem ales in that they did not share these perceptions; instead, i I intolerance of ambiguity was the final best predictor. I j These analyses indicated that activist behavior (both pro-defense and anti- j nuclear) was an im portant predictor of peace attitude. However, a prim ary | concern of this research was the relationship of affective, coping, personality, and | gender variables with peace attitude. Based on this, it was decided to com pute | prediction equations for peace attitude, omitting activist behavior as a dependent i j variable, allowing additional affective, coping, personality, and gender variables i to significantly account for variance. t The results of the step-wise and sim ultaneous m ultiple regression analyses ; for the total, fem ale, and m ale samples with activism om itted are depicted in Table 27. Low nuclear anxiety was the most significant predictor of Peace Through Strength for the total, female, and m ale samples. The prediction equation for the total sample com bined males and females, thus explaining why , the am ount of variance for the total sam ple fell betw een the betas obtained for I j fem ales and males. For this reason, special attention was given to the equations generated for fem ales and males. Low nuclear anxiety and low perceptions of personal influence on nuclear issues w ere the best predictors of Peace Through Strength for women. Dogm atism was also significant w hen the step-wise m odel was used. Table 27 Predicting Peace Through Strength: Simultaneous and Step-wise Regressions Using the Total Sample and Women and Men Separately (Activist Behaviors Omitted) Total Females Males (n -2 5 1 ) ( n = » 144) (n -1 0 7 ) Variables Simult. Stepwise Oorr. Simult. Stepwise Corr. Simult. Stepwise Oorr Nuclear threat salience .04 -.09 .0 0 - . 1 1 .06 -.0 8 Nuclear anxiety -.39 *** _ 4 3 »»» _ 48 *** - 28 ** -.31 *** _ 3 4 -.46 *** _ 5 4 «»» -.5 9 »** Internal nuclear locus of control .15 * .18 *** .30 *** .21 * 29 *** ,38 **** .06 .25 »* Powerful others nuclear locus of oontrol .06 .2 0 *** .1 2 .25 *** -.06 .14 Chance nuclear locus of control .05 .23 *** .15 .32 *** - . 0 2 .1 2 External tocus of control - . 0 1 .07 - . 1 2 .04 .1 2 .19 » Active coping -.09 -.24 *** - . 0 2 - . 1 2 -.17 -.36 *** Avoidant coping .01 .04 . 0 0 .03 .05 .07 Intolerance of ambiguity .1 7 * * .1 7 * * .33 **» .09 .30 *** .2 3 * * .24 ** .39 *** Dogmatism .16 ** 21 *** .33 *** .1 2 .2 0 * .30 *** .1 9 * .2 2 ** .36 *** Machiavellianism .01 .1 8 * * .01 .13 .01 . 2 0 ** Feminine traits (PAQF) .0 0 - . 1 2 * .00 -.0 4 .04 - . 1 2 Masculine traits ( PAQM ) .11 .1 7 * * .06 .05 .1 8 * .22 ** Gender .0 0 -.1 5 * * Multiple Regression Summary Index F 11.46 *** 38.27 *** 4.60 *** 17.47*** 8.83 *** 32.94 **» R .64 .62 .56 .52 .74 .70 Rsa .40 .38 .32 .27 .55 .49 * Significant at .05 level ** Significant at .01 level *»* Significant at .0 0 1 level I ---------------y.-------------i ; M ales differed from fem ales in that intolerance of ambiguity was the 1 second best predictor while dogmatism also accounted for a significant am ount of . variance. ; Predicting Peace Through C ooperation i 4 Sim ultaneous and step-wise regressions on Peace Through C ooperation j w ere perform ed using the total sam ple { n = 251). Entering sex first accounted j for 4% of the variance. ! The final results of the sim ultaneous and step-wise regression on Peace j Through C ooperation are shown in Table 28. The best predictor of Peace j Through C ooperation for wom en and m en was nuclear anxiety. Otherwise, 1 gender regressions generated different models for Peace Through Cooperation. The best predictors for wom en were: (a) high nuclear anxiety; (b) low . M achiavellianism; (c) anti-nuclear activism; and (d) avoidant coping. For men, i the best predictors were: (a) high nuclear anxiety; (b) low pro-defense activism; (c) not endorsing the notion that chance determ ines nuclear issues; and (d) the belief that nuclear issues are in the hands of powerful others. The step-wise equation indicated two additional significant contributors: (a) low external, or ] high internal personal locus of control and (b) high internal locus of control on | nuclear issues. i i i T he prediction m odels illustrated in Table 29 were generated when pro- * | defense and anti-nuclear activist behaviors were not included in the prediction 1 equation. For females, the best predictors were: (a) nuclear anxiety; (b) low M achiavellianism; (c) avoidant coping; and with the step-wise analyses, (d) high i i internal locus of control on nuclear issues. For males, the best predictors were: 171 Table 28 Predicting Peace Through Cooperation: Simultaneous and Step-wise Regressions Using the Total Sample and Women and Men Separately (Activist Behaviors Included) Total Females Males (n = 2 5 l) (n=144) (n -1 0 7 ) Variables Simult. Stepwise Oorr. Simult. Stepwise Corr. Simult. Stepwise Oorr. H ue tear threat salience .04 .17 ** - .0 1 . 2 0 ** . 1 0 .17 * Hucleer anxiety .29 *** .31 *»* 50 *** .35 *** .32 *** .43 *** .31 ** .40 *** .51 *** Pro-defense activism - 2 0 *** . 2 0 *** -.36 *** -.06 - . 1 1 -.3 2 *** _ 30 ««* _ 4 5 « •* AH 1- nuclear activism .1 4 * .18 *» .38 *** .1 7 * .2 3 * * .40 *** .09 .38 ** Internal nuclear locus of control -.08 . 21 *** -.03 . 26 *** -.17 -.1 9 * - 2 2 ** Powerful others nuclear locus of oontrol .06 .06 -.08 -.17 * .26 ** .31 *** .07 Chance nuclear locus of oontrol - .1 1 -.1 7 * * . 24 *** .07 - .1 7 * . 28 ** -.3 0 *** _ 28 *** External lxus of control -.09 -.1 4 * -.03 - .1 5 * -.1 3 - .1 9 * _ 2 2 ** Active coping - .0 1 27 *** .03 . 2 2 ** - . 0 1 .28 *** Avoidant coping .1 3 * .1 2 * .09 . 2 0 ** .1 6 * .16 * .01 - . 0 2 intolerance of ambiguity -.05 . 1 9 **» -.06 - 1 9** .0 0 - . 2 0 * Dogmatism -.05 - . 2 2 *** -.06 -.1 9 * * -.0 3 - .2 4 * * Machiavellianism - . 1 0 -!30 *** -.26 ** -.31 *** -.3 3 *** .06 - . 2 2 ** Feminine trails (PAQF) .11 .30 *** .03 . 2 0 ** .14 2 g * •* Masculine traits ( PAQM ) .06 -.08 .09 - . 0 1 .08 -!03 (tender . 0 2 . 2 0 *** Multiple Regression Summary Index F 10.73*** 25.98 *»* 5.44 *** 19.18 *** 7.44 *** 18.48 *** R .65 .62 .62 .60 .74 .73 Rsq .42 .39 .39 .36 .55 .53 * Significant at .05 level ** Significant at .01 level *** Significant at .001 level Table 29 Predicting Peace Through Cooperation: Simultaneous and Step-wise Regressions Using the Total Sample and Women and Men Separately (Activist Behaviors Omitted) Total Females Males (n=251) ( n* 144) (n = 107) Variables Simult. Stepwise Corr. Simult. Stepwise Oorr. Simult. Steowlse Corr. Nuclear threat salience .0 2 .17 ** .03 . 2 0 ** .03 .17 * Nuctear anxiety .39 *** .41 *** .50 *** .40 *** .40 *** .43 *** .46 *** .54 *** .51 *** Internal nuclear locus of oontrol - . 1 1 -.13 ** - . 2 1 *** -.09 -.1 5 * . 26 *** -.15 - . 2 0 ** Powerful others nuclear locus of control .07 -.06 -.09 -.1 7 * .30 ** .29 *** 07 Chance nuclear locus of oontrol - . 1 0 -.17 ** - 24 **# 08 - .1 7 * -.2 4 ** _ 2 7 **» -.28 *** External locus of control -.09 -.1 4 * .0 0 - .1 5 * -.19 - 2 ? ** - . 2 2 ** Active coping . 0 2 ,27 *** ,05 .2 2 ** .01 .28 *** Avoidant ooplng .1 2 * .11 * .09 . 2 0 ** .1 7 * .1 6 * .0 0 - . 0 2 Intolerance of ambiguity -.08 . 19 **» -.08 -.1 9 * * -.0 4 - 2 0 ** Dogmatism -.09 - . 2 2 *** -.07 -.1 9 ** - . 1 1 -.2 4 ** Machiavellian Ism - . 1 2 -.1 3 * -.30 *** -.27 ** -.31 *** . 3 3 **# . 0 2 - . 2 2 * Feminine traits (PAQF) .11 .1 2 * .30 *** .03 .2 0 ** .14 .29 *** Mascul Ine traits ( PAQM ) .03 -.08 .09 - . 0 1 .0 2 - 0 3 Gender .04 . 2 0 *** Multiple Regression Summary Index F 10.42 *** 22.61 *** 5.80 *** 17.37 *** 6.51 *** 19.30 *** R .62 .60 .61 .58 .69 .66 Rsq .38 .36 .37 .33 .48 .43 * Significant at .05 level ** Significant at .01 level *** Significant at .0 0 1 level | (a) nuclear anxiety; (b) nuclear issues in the hands of powerful others; (c) lack of belief in the role of chance; and, with the step-wise procedure, (d) high personal locus of control. These findings added further support to Hypothesis 9: N uclear anxiety is | positively associated with adherence to Peace Through C ooperation but not with ] j adherence to Peace Through Strength. N uclear anxiety is the best predictor of . Peace Through Cooperation, as well as positively associated with it. Activist Behavior and the Relationship with ! Affective, Coping, Personality, and Gender Dimensions i ; Demographic Differences Cross-tabulations were used to determ ine the frequencies and percentages. Table 30 shows the roughly equivalent num ber of wom en ( n = 17) and m en 1 ( n = 14) in the anti-nuclear activist group, but the predom inance of m en ( n = 18) ' over wom en { n - 5) in the pro-defense group. This unequal distribution of m en . and w om en could confound findings in the analyses of differences among activist groups. To ascertain that observed differences were related to group m em bership and not simply a confound due to sex, additional two-way analyses i i ; of variance w ere perform ed. | Before preceding to the two-way ANOVA, Table 31 was generated to | assess the distribution of masculine, feminine, androgenous, and undifferentiated I types in each activist group. Congruent with the gender distribution, m ost pro defense activists w ere m asculine typed. Unexpectedly, anti-nuclear activists were . also com prised largely of masculine-typed individuals, followed by androgenous, - undifferentiated, and then feminine. 174 Table 30 Frequencies and Percentages of Activists and Non-activists on Dem ographic V ariables Demographic Pro-Defense Anti-Nuclear Non- Yarlables Activists Activists Activists (n-23) 9.2* (n-31) 12.4* (n-197) 78.5* SE X Male 18 16.8 14 13.1 75 70.1 Female 5 3.5 17 1 1 .8 1 2 2 84.7 G E R A N G E Range 18-24 18-31 17-32 Ms 19 2 1 19 T H N IC 1T Y African American 2 15.4 0 0 .0 11 84.6 American Indian 0 0 .0 0 0 .0 11 1 0 0 . 0 Asian 2 5.4 1 2.7 34 91.9 Caucasian 15 9.0 27 16.2 125 74.9 Hispanic 4 2 2 .2 2 1 1 .1 1 2 66.7 Other 0 0 .0 1 2 0 . 0 4 80.0 Y E A R IN C O L L E G E Freshperson 4 3.6 4 3.6 103 92.8 Sophmore 4 8.7 7 15.2 35 76.1 Junior 4 8.5 8 17.0 35 74.5 Senior 11 23.4 1 2 25.5 24 51.1 C O L L E G E M AJOR Social Science 1 2 1 0 .8 17 15.3 82 73.9 Liberal Arts 4 1 1 .1 23 25.0 9 63.9 Science 2 8.3 2 8.3 230 83.3 Business/Law 4 6.9 2 3.4 52 89.7 Other 1 4.5 1 4.5 2 0 90.9 R ELIG IO N Agnostic 0 0 .0 2 25.0 6 75.0 Catholic 11 12.4 4 4.5 74 83.1 Eastern 0 0 .0 2 25.0 6 85.0 Jewish 0 0 .0 1 14.3 6 85.7 Protestant 11 1 1 .8 9 9.7 73 78.5 None 1 4.2 6 25.0 17 70.8 Other 0 0 .0 7 31.8 15 6 8 . 2 175 Table 30, continued Demographic Pro-Defense Anti-Nuclear M on- Variables Activists Activists Activists (n-23) 9.2* (n-31) 12.4* (n-197) 78.5* IN C O M E 0 0 - 2 0 K 3 12.5 6 25.0 15 62.5 20-40K 5 1 0 .0 8 16.0 37 74.0 40-60K 6 1 1 .8 4 7.8 41 8 0 4 60-80K 3 9.0 2 6 .1 28 84.8 80-100IC 1 5.3 3 15.8 15 78.9 1 0 0 K* 5 6 . 8 8 1 0 .8 61 82.4 PO LITIC A L PA R TY Democratic 4 5.2 2 0 26.0 53 6 8 . 8 Republican 15 1 2 .2 1 0 .8 107 87.0 Other 4 7.8 1 0 19.6 37 72.5 LIBER A L/C O N SERV A TIV E SELF - R A TIN G Very Conservative 3 42.9 0 0 . 0 4 57.1 Conservative 8 16.0 0 0 .0 42 84.0 Moderate 9 7.3 8 6.5 109 86.3 Liberal 3 5.8 14 26.9 35 67.3 Very Liberal 0 0 . 0 9 56.3 7 43.8 176 Table 31 Frequencies and Percentages of Sex Role Traits in Activist Groups Pro-defense Anti-nuclear Activist Activist Non-activist _________ (n=23)________ ________ (n « 3 l)_________________ (n=197)_____ Row Column Row Column Row Column Sex Role Trait________ Frea Percentage Percentage Frea Percentage PeroentaoB Frea. Percentage Peroentaas Androgenous 7 9.1 30.4 7 9.1 2 2 . 6 63 81.8 3 2 0 Masculine 13 16.9 56.5 1 0 13.0 32.3 54 70.1 27.4 Feminine 1 1.7 4.3 6 10.3 19.4 51 87.9 25.9 Undifferentiated 2 5.1 8.7 8 20.5 25.8 29 74.4 14 7 Chi Square 13.72* * Significant at .05 level i T he results of the two-way A N O V A are now described. Table 32 | sum m arizes the m ain and interaction effects of all variables by sex and activist , behavior. All tests for interactions w ere non-significant except for one variable; belief that chance dictates nuclear issues had a significant interaction betw een i activist behavior and sex. T here were significant m ain effects by activist behavior on nuclear anxiety, nuclear denial, nuclear support, nuclear concern, fear for the j i j future, Peace Through Strength, Peace Through Cooperation, survival beliefs, i | total activism, pro-defense activism, anti-nuclear activism, internal nuclear locus | of control, powerful others nuclear locus of control, intolerance of ambiguity, and i , dogmatism. There were significant m ain effects by sex on total activism, pro- I j defense activism, Peace Through Cooperation, active coping, Machiavellianism, : fem inine traits, and masculine traits. G iven these results, it can be concluded that the significant differences j betw een group m em bers were not simply a confound of sex, except som ewhat in / the case of chance nuclear locus of control. This finding allowed for further investigation of hypotheses regarding differences among activist and non-activist I i groups on all other variables. Results pertaining to chance nuclear locus of control were the only ones that need to be interpreted with caution due to the interaction effect of sex and activist behavior. Affective, Coping, Personality, and Gender Dimensions of Activist Behavior ! M ultivariate analyses of variance were employed to study group differences on affective, coping, personality, and gender variables. T hree m ultivariate tests of significance were used to test the null hypothesis of the equality of m ean ! vectors of two or three organizational groups. Pillais, H otelling’s t , and Wilk 178 T able 32 Two-way Analysis of V ariance: M ain and Interaction Effects of G ender and Activist Stance on the D ependent M easures _________________ F Values_______________ Dependent Variables Main Effect Main Effect interaction Gender Activism A FFEC TIV E Nuclear threat salience 0.06 0.73 1.20 Nuclear anxiety 2.96 10.91 *** 1.68 Nuclear dBnial 0.00 7 4 0 *** 2.25 Nuclear support 2.29 11.86 *** 0.68 Nuclear concern 3.04 5.11 ** 1.12 Fear for the future 1.92 2.70 0.40 C O PIN G Peace through strength 0.15 41.70 *** 0.76 . Peace through cooperation 5.28 17.81 *** 0.21 Beliefs about survival 0.17 4.26 * 2.79 Activism 4.33 * 55.01 *** 1.05 Pro-defense activism 7.44** 4.58* 0.17 Anti-nuclear activism 0.47 66.79 *** 1 87 Internal nuclear locus of control 0.18 10.65 *** 1.59 Powerful others nuclear locus of control 0.13 5.54 ** 1.94 Chance nuclear locus of control 0.34 4.32* 3.16 External nuclear locus of control 2.40 2.00 0.21 Active coping 11.37 *** 2.57 2.54 Avoidant coping 0.56 0 .1 1 0.24 PER SO N A L ITY Intolerance of ambiguity 0.52 15.98 *** 0.14 Dogmatism 0.05 9.38 *** 0.90 Machiavellianism 7.16** 1.23 0.88 G EN D ER Feminine traits (PAQF) 18.69 *** 1.22 0.94 Masculine traits (PAQM) 2.86 2.64 0.79 Masculine/Feminine traits (PAQMF) 31.14*** 0.28 1.05 * Significant at .05 level ** Skprificantat.01 level *** Significant at . 001 level 179 Wilks lam bda all indicated significant differences betw een m ean vectors ( p < .000 in each test). The significant results of the omnibus F-tests allowed for ! j post hoc exam inations using one-way ANOVAs. i Before proceeding to the post hoc test, the univariate F- tests com puted in | the M A N O V A procedure should be noted. These indicated that the differences may be due to the following variables: intolerance of ambiguity, external locus of control, Peace Through Strength and Peace Through Cooperation, nuclear locus of control, active coping, dogmatism, nuclear anxiety, and m asculine traits. ; However, these results m ust be used with caution because significance levels : were not adjusted for several comparisons being m ade at the sam e tim e. Also, i this procedure ignores the intercorrelations among dependent variables. One-way analyses of variance w ere used as post hoc tests to isolate the I effects of each dependent m easure on three activist behavior groups. These I j findings are reported in Table 33. The univariate ANOVAs indicated that j significant differences betw een the anti-nuclear activist group and the two other groups on m ost measures. The anti-nuclear activists had significantly greater tolerance of ambiguity, internal nuclear locus of control, anti-nuclear active | behavior, intensity of activism, nuclear anxiety, and nuclear concern. The anti- i nuclear activists scored significantly lower on dogmatism, nuclear denial, and j nuclear support than either the pro-defense activists or the non-activist | population. This group also was significantly m ore internal than the non-activist population, but not m ore than the pro-defense activist population. T here was not a significant difference in subjects’ salience scores. However, the trend was in the hypothesized direction. A nti-nuclear activists reported spontaneous concern 180 T able 33 Analysis of Variance: Effects of the D ependent V ariables on Activist Stance Ms Variables Pro-Defense Activists (n=23) Anti-Nuclear Activists (n=31) Non- Activists (n=197) F value A FFEC TIV E Nuclear threat salience 1.26 1.32 1 .2 1 1.07 Nuclear anxiety 45.17 ab 55.68 be 49.84 ac 11.35 * Nuclear denial 10.52 b 8.52 ab 1 0 .2 2 a 6.38 «* Nuclear support 1 2 .13 be 8.61 ab 1 0 .6 8 ac 13.32 **« Nuclear concern 15.96 a 19.68 ab 17.88 b 6.47 #* Fear for the future 5.61 5.26 5.77 2 .2 1 CO PIN G Activism -1.43 ab 13.29 be 2.98 ac 60.79 ««« Pro-defense activism 4.39 ab 1.06 a 1.78 b 8.44 ** Anti-nuclear activism 2.96 a 14.35 ab 4.77 b 71.20 « M » * Internal nuclear locus of control 18.78 a 15.58 ab 19.89 b 11.07 <*** Powerful others nuclear locus of control 20.39 b 17.94 ab 20.19 a 5.56 * Chance nuclear locus of control 11.69 11.42 a 13.29 a 4.10 * External nuclear locus of control 9.57 9.38 a 1 1 .10a 3.24 * Active coping 10.35 a 12.32 a 11.08 3.61 * Avoidant coping 14.04 14.74 14.57 0.18 PER SO N A LITY Intolerance of ambiguity 41.74 a b 35.42 a 41 16 b 16.13 *«• Dognatism 54.26 b 47.00 ab 53.28 a 9.19 *«* Machiavellianism 56.30 55.90 57.64 0.65 G E N D E R Feminine traits (PAQF) 31.04 30.81 32.02 1.19 Masculine traits (PAQM) 32.04 ab 28.52 a 29.34 b 3.76 * Masculine/Feminine traits (PAQMF) 25.22 a 23.16 22.27 a 3.94 * Significant at .05 level Significant at .01 level Significant at .001 level Similar letters denote significant difference 181 about nuclear war m ore than did the pro-defense activists. The non-activist group had the lowest level of spontaneous concern. The pro-defense activist population was m ore dogm atic than the non activist population and significantly m ore dogmatic than the anti-nuclear activist population. This group reported significantly less nuclear anxiety than the other two groups, as well as significantly greater nuclear support and nuclear denial. Pro-defense activists reported significantly higher levels of m asculine traits and engaged in significantly m ore pro-defense active behaviors. They endorsed nuclear issues as in the hands of powerful others. The non-activist group, m ore than either activist group, held that nuclear issues are a m atter of chance. These results supported Hypothesis 6: N uclear threat salience is highly associated with anti-nuclear activists and is less significant in pro-defense activists and Hypothesis 8: Nuclear anxiety is positively associated with anti-nuclear activists but not with pro-defense activists. The results of the univariate A N O V A partially supported Hypothesis 10: Personal and nuclear locus of control is positively associated with both pro defense and anti-nuclear activists and Hypothesis 11: Powerful others and chance nuclear loci of control are positively associated with the non-activist population. Both activist groups had similar levels of high internal locus of control, especially when com pared to the non-activist group. As hypothesized, anti-nuclear activists had high internal nuclear locus of control. However, pro defense activists had significantly lower efficacy on nuclear issues than anti- nuclear activists. Pro-defense activists differed from non-activists on the 182 dim ension of externality. Pro-defense activists endorsed the role of powerful others on nuclear issues, while non-activists attributed m ore to chance and fate. Hypothesis 14: A nti-nuclear activists will score lower on intolerance of ambiguity and M achiavellian personality m easures, than pro-defense activists was partially supported by the univariate ANOVAs. A nti-nuclear activists scored lower on intolerance of ambiguity m easures, indicating greater tolerance of ambiguity. However, there were no significant differences among any of the three groups on levels of M achiavellianism. Hypothesis 16 was also only partially confirmed. It was hypothesized that pro-defense and anti-nuclear activists will score higher on dogm atism personality m easures than the non-activist population. However, anti-nuclear activists achieved the lowest m ean score, indicating a significantly lower level of dogm atism than either the non-activists or pro-defense activists. It is possible that the preceding M A NOV A and A N O V A results are spurious due to the role of peace attitudes. Therefore, a m ultivariate analysis of covariance was employed to examine activist behavior, while controlling for Peace Through Strength and Peace Through Cooperation. This statistical procedure answers w hether there still significant differences among groups in the best linear com bination of dependent m eans when adjustm ents have been m ade for the covariates of peace attitudes (Norusis, 1985). Next, analyses of covariance w ere used as post hoc tests to locate the findings of the M ANCOVA. The m ultivariate results for the interaction effect w ere highly significant. The Pillais, Hotellings t , and Wilks lam bda tests all were significant ( p < .000). As anticipated, fewer variables were significantly related to activist behavior when peace attitudes were controlled. However, six variables (intolerance of 183 ambiguity, internal nuclear locus of control, chance nuclear locus of control, activism, and fem inine and m asculine traits) rem ained significant when I controlling for peace attitudes, as shown in Table 34. Significant differences betw een activist groups were lost on externality, m asculine traits, powerful others nuclear locus of control, dogmatism, and nuclear anxiety. The t values indicated the contribution of the covariates, PTS and PTC. ! Peace Through Strength contributed significantly to the differences related to: ! | intolerance of ambiguity, internal nuclear locus of control, powerful others J nuclear locus of control, chance nuclear locus of control, dogmatism, activism, I nuclear anxiety, and beliefs in survival. Peace Through C ooperation contributed ' significantly to nuclear threat salience, chance nuclear locus of control, active i | coping, Machiavellianism, activism, nuclear anxiety, fem inine traits, and beliefs ! about survival. Predicting Pro-defense Activist Behavior Step-wise and sim ultaneous m ultiple regression analyses were perform ed, , regressing all independent variables on to pro-defense activism as m easured by the W erner and Roy (1985) activism scale. This pro-defense categorization i 1 differed from that used in the rest of this research w here activism was determ ined , via organization affiliation. This alternative categorization provides a slightly j different perspective of an activism that is confirmed by self-report and not i inferred from group m em bership. M ultiple regression analyses w ere used. \ As depicted in Table 35, the best predictor of pro-defense behavior was i Peace Through Strength. In fact, for females, Peace Through Strength was the ! only significant predictor. For males, Peace Through Strength was accom panied Table 34 Activist Group Mean Differences: Controlling for Peace Through Strength and Peace Through Cooperation M A N O O V A Variables and Activist Groups Observed Standard Adjusted PTS PTC F value Ms Deviation Ms t value t value A FFECTIV E Nuclear threat salience Pro-defense Activist Anti-nuclear Activist Non-activist Nuclear anxiety Pro-defense Activist Anti-nuclear Activist Non-activist Nuclear denial Pro-defense Activist Anti-nuclear Activist Non-activist Nuclear support Pro-defenseActlvlst Antl-nucleer Activist Non-activist Nuclear concern Pro-defenseActlvlst Anti-nuclear Activist Non-activist (n=23) 1.26 0.45 1.31 (n = 3 l) 1.32 0.48 1.26 (n=197) 1.21 0.41 1 .2 2 (n=23) 45.1? 8.95 49.70 (n = 3 l) 55.68 7.98 50.16 ( n=197) 49.84 8.18 50.83 (n=23) 10.52 3.01 9.26 (n = 3 l) 8.52 2.55 10.03 ( n=197) 1 0 . 2 2 2.50 9.97 (n -2 3 ) 12.13 3.15 10.74 (n = 3 l) 8.61 2.69 10.29 (n=197) 1 0 . 6 8 2.49 10.39 (n=23) 15.96 3.46 17.50 ( n * 3 l) 19.68 3.65 17.76 (n=197) 17.8? 3.84 18.24 -0 .1 6 2 .3 2 * 0.52 -4 .8 2 * * * 5 .7 1 * * * 0.34 5.29 *** -2.85 ** 0.9 5 .4 2 * * * -4 .1 1 * * * 0.24 -2 .3 9 * 5.71 »»* 0.67 Table 34, continued Variables and Activist Groups G EN DER Feminine traits (PAGF) Pro-defenseActlvlst (n=23) Anti-nuclear Activist (n=31) Non-activist (n = i9 7 ) Masculine traits (PAGM) Pro-defense Activist (n=23) Anti-nuclear Activist (n = 3 l) Non-activist ( n= 197) Masculine/Feminine traits (PAQMF) Pro-defenseActlvlst (n=23) Antl-nuclear Activist (n » 3 l) Non-activist (n®197) * Significant at .05 level ** Significant at .01 level *** Significant at .001 level MANOOVA Observed Standard Adjusted PTS PTC F value Ms Deviation Ms t value t value -0.70 5.03 *** 5.35 31.04 4.50 32.32 30.81 5.24 29.18 32.02 4.68 32.37 1.71 0.15 1.86 32.04 5.34 31.42 28.52 4.00 29.24 29.34 4.89 29.24 1.02 -3 .2 3 * * * 4.98 25.22 5.66 24.13 22.16 4.29 24.52 22.27 4.88 2 2 . 0 0 «* Table 34, continued Varlables and Actlv 1st Groups Avoidant ooplng Pro-defenseActlvlst (n=23) Anti-nuclear Activist (n » 3 l) Non-activist (n=l 97) PERSO N ALITY I ntolerance of ambiguity Pro-defenseActlvlst (n=23) Anti-nuclear Activist ( n=31) Non-act Ivlst (n = l97) Dogmatism Pro-defenseActlvlst (n“ 23) Anti-nuclear Activist (n = 3 l) Non-activist (1 9 7 ) Machiavellianism Pro-defenseActlvlst (n*23) Antl-nuclear Activist (n = 3 l) Non-activist (n=197) MANCOVA Observed Standard Adjusted PTS PTC F value Ms Deviation Ms t value t value 1.53 1.77 0.29 14.04 5.59 13.88 14.74 4.84 14.88 14.57 4.18 14.60 3 .1 4 * * 0.04 6.38 41.74 5.96 40.47 35.42 5.05 36.89 41.16 5.31 40.95 3 .3 9 * * * -0 91 1.92 54.26 8 . 0 0 51.93 47.00 8.52 49.75 53.28 7.70 52.86 1.20 -4 ,1 0 * * * 1 57.30 9.57 55.17 55.90 7.80 58.57 57.64 7.70 57.10 «• Table 34, continued MANOOVA Variables and Actlv 1st Groups Observed Standard Adjusted PTS PTC Ms Deviation Ms t value t value Internal nuclear locus of oontrol Pro-defense Activist (n»23) Anti-nuclear Activist (n * 3 l) Non-activist (n=197) 18.78 15.58 19.90 5.20 4.60 4.76 17.45 17.15 19.66 3 .1 2 * * -0.91 Powerful others nuclear locus of control Pro-defenseActlvlst (n«23) Antl-nucleer Activist (n«*3l) Non-activist (n=197) 20.39 17.94 20.19 3.73 4.38 3.40 19.97 18.40 20.14 2 .1 4 * 1.04 Chance nuclear locus of control Pro-defenseActlvlst (n“ 23) Anti-nuclear Activist ( na 3 1) Non-activist (n* 197) 11.70 11.42 13,29 4.81 4.02 3.91 10.49 1 2 .8 8 13.04 2.51 * -2.50 External locus of oontrol Pro-defense Activist (n=23) Anti-nuclear Activist (n = 3 l) Non-activist (n=197) 9.57 9.39 1 1 . 1 0 4.10 4.18 4.24 9.21 9,85 1 1 . 0 0 0.07 -1.73 Active coping Pro-defense Actlv 1st (n°23) Anti-nuclear Activist (n » 3 l) Non-activist (n -1 9 7 ) 10.35 12.32 11.09 2.50 2.44 2.93 11.05 11.46 11.25 -1.60 2.83 F value 5.27 ** 2,57 4.16 ** 2.59 0.12 Table 34, continued Variables and Activist Oroups Fear for the future Pro-defense Activist (n«23) Antl-nucleor Activist (n = 3 l) Non-activist (n=197) COPING Beliefs about Survival Pro-defense Activist (n=23) Anti-nuclear Activist (n = 3 l) Non-activist (n=197) Activism Pro-defense Activist (n=23) Anti-nuclear Activist (n » 3 l) Non-activist (n= 197) Pro-dsfense activism Pro-defense Activist (n=23) Antl-nucleer Activist (n a 31) Non-activist (n=»!97) Anti-nuclear activism Pro-defenseActlv 1st (n*»23) Anti-nuclear Activist (n= 31) Non-activist ( n - 197) MANCOVA Observed Standard A djusted PTS PTC F value Ms Deviation Ms t value t value 1.45 -1.36 0.95 5.61 1.44 5.39 5.26 1.13 5.53 5.77 1.28 5.72 -3 .2 4 *** 3.27 *** 1.09 0.96 0.90 1.25 1.33 0.67 0.98 0.94 0.77 1.00 -9 .0 5 * * * 3.2 6 * * * 15.41*** -1.43 6.46 2.31 13.29 5.21 8.85 2.98 5.31 3.68 6 .9 8 * * * -2 .9 8 * * 6 .4 4 * * 4.39 4.07 2.54 1.06 2 . 6 8 3.27 1.79 3.09 1.44 -5 .1 1 * * * 1.53 31.65 *** 2.96 3.70 4.84 14.35 4.90 1 2 . 1 2 4.77 4.30 5.11 Table 35 Predicting Pro-defense Activism: Simultaneous and Step-wise Regressions Using the Total Sample and Women and Men Separately Total Females Males (n = 2 5 l) (n>°144) C n= 107) Variables Simult. Stepwise Corr. Simult. Stepwise Corr. Simult. Stepwise Corr. Nuclear threat salience . 1 2 * .05 .06 .01 .16 .07 Nuclear anxiety -.04 -.3 4 *** .01 - . 1 2 .0 2 -.35 *** Peace through strength .43 *** 4 4 »»* .50 *** 51 «»« .46 *** .46 *** .44 *** .45 *** .54 *** Peeoe through cooperation -.13 -.1 3 * -.36 *** .06 - . 1 1 -.3 5 ** -.2 6 ** - 4 5 ««« Internal nuclear locus of control -.13 -.1 4 * - . 0 1 -.05 . 1 0 - . 2 1 * - .1 8 * - . 0 1 Powerful others nuclear locus of control - . 0 2 .0 2 - . 0 2 .08 .06 - . 0 1 Chance nuclear locus of control -.07 .10 .1 2 .21 ** - .2 2 * .01 External locus of control .01 -.05 -.07 -.0 4 . 0 2 04 Active coping .0 2 -.16 ** .03 -.03 .09 - . 2 0 ** Avoidant oop ing .07 .04 .11 . 1 2 . 0 0 .06 Intolerance of ambiguity -.03 .09 -.0 4 . 1 0 -.0 4 .11 Dogmatism .06 19 *** -.04 . 1 2 .09 .23 ** Machiavellianism .01 .18 ** -.0 4 . 0 2 .08 .2 0 ** feminine traits (PAQF) -.08 .23 *** - . 1 2 - . 1 0 -.05 -.16 » Masculine traits (PAGM) .03 .19 ** - . 0 1 - . 0 2 .06 .1 9 * Gender _ 2 0 **» _ 24 »** _ 3 4 *»» Multiple Regression Summary Index F 8.85 *** 32.89 *** 2.30 *** 3 7.17*** 4.55 *** 19.47 *** R .61 .59 .51 .46 .65 .60 ftsa .38 .35 .26 .21 .43 .36 * Significant at .05 level ** Significant at .01 level *** Significant at .0 0 1 level j by low Peace Through Cooperation, high internal locus of control, and low i i beliefs in chance as the determ inants of nuclear issues. t i Predicting Anti-nuclear Activism As depicted in Table 36, anti-nuclear behavior was best predicted by low adherence to Peace Through Strength. Following low Peace Through Strength, significant contributors to wom en’s anti-nuclear behavior w ere high spontaneous i ! concern, high internal locus of control on nuclear issues, and on the step-wise ; regression, nuclear anxiety. , Following low Peace Through Strength, significant contributors to m en’s ; anti-nuclear behavior w ere high internal nuclear locus of control, high nuclear i ! anxiety, belief in powerful others, active coping, and low Machiavellianism. 191 Table 36 Predicting Anti-nuclear Activism: Simultaneous and Step-wise Regressions Using the Total Sample and Women and Men Separately Total Females Males (n = 2 5 !) (n*144) (n -1 0 7 ) Variables Simult. Stepwise Corr. Simult. Stepwise Corr. Simult. Stepwise Oorr. Nuclear threat salience .05 .16 ** .2 4 * * 24 * •» .3 4 * * * -.1 4 -.1 5 * -.0 6 Nuclear anxiety . 2 0 ** .25 *** .43 *** .14 !»7* .39 *** .2 8 * * .25 ** .55 *•* Peace through strength -.33 *** -.35 »** -.5 4 *** - 30 *** -.33 *** - 4 9 »«* -.3 3 ** -.3 9 *** -.6 2 *** Peeoe through cooperation .06 .38 *** .09 .40 *** -.05 38 *** Internal nuclear locus of oontrol - . 2 1 *** _ 1g »»« -.36 *** -.2 3 * * - .2 1 ** -.3 5 *** -.2 8 *** -.30 *** -.3 6 *** Powerful others nuclear locus of oontrol .08 - . 1 0 -.0 4 -.1 7 * .2 4 * * .1 9 * * .0 0 Chance nuclear locus of oontrol .05 -.08 .16 -.0 9 -.08 -.0 8 External locus of control .03 -.09 .08 -.03 -.0 8 -.15 Active coping .15 * .14 ** 27 .1 2 . 2 0 ** .1 8 * .2 0 * .40 *** Avoidant coping .05 .07 .01 .04 .09 .11 Intolerance of ambiguity -.06 -.26 *** -.06 -.2 5 *** -.0 3 -.23 ** Dogmatism -.03 _ 2 0 *** - .0 1 -.1 9 * * -.0 6 - . 2 2 ** Machlavel llanlsm -.08 -.1 7 * * -.0 4 - .1 4 * -.11 - 2 2 *» Feminine traits ( PAOF) - . 1 0 .05 -.03 .07 - .2 1 * -.1 6 * .05 Masculine traits (PAQM) -.05 -.1 3 * - . 0 2 -.0 8 - . 1 0 - . 2 1 ** Gender -.1 4 * * -.15 ** - . 0 2 Multiple Regression Summary Index F 11.31 *** 33.65 *** 6.53 *** 21.41 *** 8 .7 5 * * * 17.76 *** R .6 6 .64 . 6 6 .62 .77 .75 Rsa .44 .41 .43 .38 .59 * Significant at ,05 level ** Significant at .01 level *** Sign If leant at .001 level CH A PTER V SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOM M ENDATIONS | Based on the results reported in Chapter 4, this chapter is organized to j provide: (a) a summary of the study; (b) results of the tested hypotheses; and 1 I (c) a discussion of theoretical, research, and policy conclusions, implications, and j recom m endations. i ! Summary | The intent of this study was to examine how people cope with the threat of j nuclear war. M ore specifically, this study was designed to explore peace attitudes and related activist behaviors in association with affective, coping, personality, I and gender correlates. D iam ond and Bachm an (1986) suggested that the adoption of a peace i attitude is an integral part of coping with the threat of nuclear annihilation. In ! addition, these attitudes may be em bedded in fundam ental beliefs about hum an i , nature (Kimmel, 1985; Sowell, 1987) and hum an relations (Eisler, 1987). Sowell (1987) delineated two visions of hum an nature: (a) the R ousseaunean I unconstrained vision and (b) the H obbesian constrained vision. Eisler (1987) , proposed two models of hum an relations, dom inator and partnership. The ! prevalent "peace through strength" orientation parallels the constrained view and I i 193 dom inator m odel while "peace through cooperation" coincides with the : unconstrained view and partnership model. i j Engaging in activist behavior in support of one’s peace attitude can be I ! conceptualized as an external coping strategy and may take one of two forms: ! (a) tension-reduction or anti-nuclear activism, and (b) deterrence or pro-defense I ' activism (D iam ond & Bachman, 1986). These findings guided this research on i peace attitudes and activism. A review of the literature revealed the existence of num erous peace | attitude m easures (D roba, 1931; Levinson, 1957; Lutzker, 1960; M artin & Larsen, | 1976; Sam pson & Smith, 1957). However, psychometric and theoretical i | lim itations precluded their use in this study. As a result, a m ajor com ponent of ; this investigation involved: (a) identifying and defining two dimensions that characterize the predom inate A m erican peace attitudes, (b) constructing reliable and valid m easures of these attitudes, (c) testing for the hypothesized factors of ! Peace Through Strength and Peace Through C ooperation in the m easure, and (d) examining the correlational relationship betw een peace attitudes as m easured by the newly developed Peace A ttitude Scale and types of activism. T he second com ponent of this investigation involved the relationship of peace attitudes and of activist behavior with affective, coping, personality, and gender variables. T hree theoretical schem a established the relevant variables: (a) coping theory, (b) psychodynamic theory, and (c) gender theory. Applying coping theory to nuclear threat responses revealed that the following variables may be associated with peace attitudes a n d /o r activist behaviors: (a) general or personal locus of control, (b) nuclear locus of control 194 (attributions of internal, powerful others, and chance), and (c) general coping styles. j A recurring characteristic of various coping styles is the role of efficacy t (M addux & Rogers, 1983). Findings regarding personal efficacy or locus of ! control and activism have been inconsistent. G ore and R otter (1963) and | Strickland (1965) found that personal locus of control correlated with social i | action. Rounds and Erdahl (1988), on the other hand, found that beliefs about i affecting events within direct experience were independent of beliefs about ! influencing systems or institutions through action. A better predictor of activism appeared to be the tripartite m easure, N uclear Locus of Control. The personal i and nuclear locus of control m easures were therefore included in this study. The j relationship betw een general coping styles such as Avoidant and Active (Folkm an & Lazarus, 1980) and responses to the nuclear crisis also required | further exploratory analysis. Several relevant variables were suggested in relation to "social character" as * defined by From m (1941). The social character is a collection of traits that capture shared personality and shared ways of relating to the world. It underlies , ideological and political orientations. O ut of this psychodynamic tradition, the I 1 Berkeley group attem pted to quantify social character with the m easure of | authoritarianism . Subsequent research evolved three related quantifiable constructs: (a) intolerance of ambiguity (Budner, 1962); (b) M achiavellianism , (Christie & Geis, 1970); and (c) dogmatism (Rokeach, 1960). A review of the t literature suggested that intolerance of ambiguity and M achiavellianism may be ^ higher in conservative pro-defense activists than in liberal anti-nuclear activists 195 (Budner, 1962; Sidanius, 1978). However, dogmatism may be higher in both activist groups than in non-activist groups (Rokeach, 1960). In addition, spontaneous concern about the nuclear threat and nuclear anxiety em erged as relevant variables in studying peace attitudes and actions. W hile neither of these affective constructs have been placed within a theoretical fram e, they can be conceptualized within the fram e of psychodynamic theory. High spontaneous nuclear concern, as well as high nuclear anxiety, suggest an awareness of potential nuclear disaster and a lack of repression, suppression, undoing, or splitting. The m ost reliable m easures of salience and nuclear anxiety w ere developed by M ayton (1987b) and Newcomb (1986, 1988a, 1988b, 1989), respectively. Fem inist theory provided an analysis of inner dynamics and power structures that interplay to generate differences in w om en’s and m en’s experience and, subsequently, their attitudes, beliefs, and behaviors. Connell (1987) argued that it is impossible to understand the sources of these differences through empiricist science. However, quantifiable techniques may be used to dem onstrate possible differences, setting the stage for further research into the roots of these differences both within and betw een groups of wom en and men. G ender was investigated in this study by examining differences and similarities betw een w om en and men, as well as, betw een self-reported "feminine" and "masculine" types. The present study required participants to com plete a survey questionnaire com prised of the m easures m entioned above (200 items), as well as, 13 biographical questions. College student participants fell into one of three groups: 196 (a) pro-defense activists ( n = 23), (b) anti-nuclear activists ( n = 31), and (c) non activists ( n = 197). The data obtained were used to assess the factorability, reliability, and validity of the Peace A ttitude Scale and to examine the relationships among peace attitude, peace activism, and affective, coping, personality, and gender variables. To generate the Peace A ttitude Scale, a principal com ponents factor analysis was used, followed by a confirm atory factor analysis. The rem ainder of ! the analyses utilized correlations, m ultivariate and univariate analysis of variance i | and covariance, and m ultiple regression analyses. i i Results of the Tested Hypotheses i M ost of the hypotheses w ere supported by this investigation. This section 1 presents a discussion regarding the findings associated with each hypothesis. | Hypothesis 1: The Peace Attitude Scale is comprised of at least two factors: the Peace Through Strength factor and the Peace Through Cooperation factor. ■ T he original 28 PAS items were generated from a review of the literature j on peace attitudes and beliefs about hum an nature, focusing on the contributions ! of Sowell (1987) and Kimmel (1985). The items were designed to tap peace . through strength and peace through cooperation orientations. Two, three, and four-factor models were produced by an oblique principal 1 com ponents factor analysis. The m ost interpretable was the two-factor m odel i which supported Hypothesis 1. The subsequent confirm atory factor analysis was I I sim ilar when com pared to the principal com ponents model. Reliabilities for the 197 two factors, Peace Through Strength and Peace Through C ooperation, were .90 and .80, respectively, indicating very good reliability for research purposes. I T he best indicator of Peace Through Strength was: "Nuclear w ar is best i ! prevented by m aintaining a strong military." In fact, the four highest loadings on i Peace Through Strength assert the im portance of a strong military, but not of ! nuclear arms, in preventing nuclear war. Frank and Rivard (1986) distinguished i I betw een anti-nuclearists and anti-militarists in a study of peace attitudes in ; retired m ilitary admirals. Anti-nuclearists opposed nuclear weapons but l supported a strong military, while anti-militarists had reservations and inner I conflict concerning the militaristic world-view in general. Tzanos (1988), a i | nuclear engineer, further illustrated the anti-nuclearist stance w hen he argued for ! nuclear disarm am ent and the establishm ent of deterrence at the conventional i : arm s level. The Peace A ttitude Scale was not designed to distinguish anti- | nuclearists from pro-nuclearists. However, it is im portant to note that the four best indicators of Peace Through Strength are pro-military, w ithout being pro- nuclear. The fifth highest loading, "It is im portant to develop nuclear w eapons to deter nuclear war," asserted a pro-nuclearist preventive stance. As speculated, adherents to a "peace through strength" ideology considered i ! the prevention of nuclear war of m ajor im portance. However, the m eans for preventing nuclear war via a strong m ilitary was distinctly different from the peace through cooperation orientation. The three highest loadings on Peace , Through C ooperation required the developm ent of program s and institutions to : facilitate com m unication and cooperation, non-military and cooperative efforts, as well as, com m unication and trust betw een all nations. 198 I For theoretical and em pirical reasons, the three item s that assessed beliefs about | survival were rem oved from the PAS and set up as a separate scale. They had ; low factor loadings on both the principal and confirm atory factor analyses. In t 1 addition, the literature suggested a possible correlation betw een peace attitude and beliefs about survival (Tyler & McGraw, 1983). But there was no indication i that survival beliefs and peace beliefs fall within the same construct. ! i Hypothesis 2: The Peace Through Strength factor is positively associated with i | individuals engaged in deterrence or pro-defense activism. t | Hypothesis 3: The Peace Through Cooperation factor is positively associated ► with individuals engaged in tension-reduction or anti-nuclear activism. ' R esearchers have often assum ed a positive relationship betw een these i k ' peace attitudes and activist behaviors (e.g., Tyler & M cGraw, 1983; W erner & ! Roy, 1985). However, there have been no psychometrically sound instrum ents to support these assumptions. In this study, a one-way analysis of variance was perform ed using Peace Through Strength and Peace Through C ooperation from the reliable PAS. Pro-defense activists differed significantly from anti-nuclear activists and non-activists, being the only group that positively supported Peace Through Strength. In addition, Peace Through Strength was the best predictor of pro-defense behavior for males and fem ales separately, as well as, for the total sample. A nti-nuclear behavior was best predicted by negative endorsem ent of Peace Through Strength. Interestingly, Peace Through C ooperation did not significantly predict anti-nuclear activism, although negative endorsem ent of Peace Through C ooperation was the second best predictor of m ales’ pro-defense behavior. Peace Through C ooperation was positively supported by all three 199 I groups, although anti-nuclear activists indicated significantly greater support, j These findings suggest that beliefs about cooperation held by pro-defense and | anti-nuclear activists is a m atter of degree and not as dichotom ous as originally supposed. It appears that both pro-defense and anti-nuclear activist groups value i non-m ilitary cooperative efforts such as negotiation, developm ent of program s and institutions to facilitate com m unication and cooperation, and resolution of the unjust conditions that prom ote war. The difference appears to be in the i | weight given these efforts when considered alongside m ilitary options. T here are several limits to these significant findings which m ust be emphasized. First, this research was not designed to determ ine the causal i relationship betw een attitude and activism. For example, D iam ond and ' Bachm an (1986) identified two types of activists: (a) true activists, and (b) bogus i ' activists. A true activist is characterized by vigilant decision m aking in which , beliefs, attitudes, and actions are thoroughly considered. The true activist may use a particular peace attitude, com bined with other antecedents, as the impetus j for activist behavior. O n the other hand, the bogus activist engages in activist behavior due to defensive avoidance mechanisms or hypervigilance. The bogus activist acts out of panic to reduce anxiety. In the example of the true activist, a particular peace attitude theoretically precedes the behavior. F or the bogus activist, the peace attitude may be subsequently adopted to justify activist behavior. A non-linear interplay betw een peace attitudes and activist stance is also possible. Second, the positive relationship betw een peace attitude and activism does not capture potential conflict and contradiction in hum an experience. Many of the scientists who developed nuclear weapons experienced such concern about 200 the destabilizing and destructive capabilities that they becam e leading supporters of arms control (Blacker & Duffy, 1984). Several high ranking m ilitary leaders expressed opposition to nuclear weapons after retirem ent, including G eneral O m ar Bradley, President Dwight D. Eisenhower, G eneral Douglas M acA rthur, A dm iral Hym an Rickover, and Field M arshall Lord M ountbatten (Frank & Rivard, 1986). Interviews with antim ilitarist retired military leaders indicated inner conflict and psychological distress. O ne said, "I felt like I was dying em otionally inside"; another, "I felt so bad about the future it was tearing m e up inside"; the third, "You felt yourself breaking down— sort of enjoying your job but knowing the whole thing’s wrong" (Frank & Rivard, 1986, p. 27). O ne questionnaire was returned to this researcher with a note attached. This R O T C cadet reported his plans for "getting out [of ROTC] next year and walking away from my scholarship." H e described his R O T C com m itm ent as a strain on academ ic aspirations. In addition, he believed he would not enjoy military life. It is impossible to know precisely what he m eant by this last statem ent. However, there appeared to be a conflict betw een military life and the values and aspirations held by this college student. The findings of this study indicated a positive relationship betw een peace attitude and activism. However, as these anecdotes illustrate, there may be subtleties in this relationship which are not accounted for in the research. Finally, there may be differences in expressed beliefs about peace and cooperation w hen com pared to actual choices and behaviors when threatened. Peace researchers point to num erous historical examples w here valued peace was consciously sacrificed for forcibly achieving other goals and asserting other values (Nikitin, 1988). 201 j Hypothesis 4: The Peace Through Strength factor is positively associated with I individuals who are self-selected Republicans and identify themselves as i more conservative than liberal. Hypothesis 5: The Peace Through Cooperation factor is positively associated with individuals who are self-selected Democrats and who identify themselves as more liberal than conservative. W erner and Roy (1985) found that conservative a n d /o r Republican individuals w ere m ore likely to engage in pro-defense activism while liberal a n d /o r D em ocratic individuals were m ore likely to engage in anti-nuclear f activism. Using the Rokeach Value Survey, M ayton (1987a) found that j D em ocrats and Independents identified a "world at peace" as their first priority, 1 while Republicans reported it as their second priority, after "national security." i Im portantly, a "world at peace" was im portant to both political party groups. They differed, however, in the priority to which they gave peace and national security issues. This dichotomy betw een political parties on issues of war and peace is a relatively recent phenom enon, according to Burns (1984), who observed the j historic presence of a peace, or at least internationalist, part of the Republican I j party, represented by W endell Wilkie, Dwight Eisenhower, and Nelson ; Rockefeller. However, with the "Reaganization" of the Republican party the I ! internationalist position has been almost completely obliterated. I These findings corresponded with the results of this study. T here was a | positive relationship betw een Peace Through Strength and Republican a n d /o r conservative orientation and a negative relationship betw een Peace Through i Strength and D em ocratic a n d /o r liberal orientation. Both political parties 202 : supported Peace Through C ooperation although liberals and D em ocrats i | supported Peace Through C ooperation significantly m ore so than Republicans I and conservatives. As previously noted, the Peace A ttitude Scale is lim ited in m easuring this relationship because it does not capture potential conflict and conciliatory efforts. F or example, the freeze m ovem ent m aintained a recurrent them e that the threat of nuclear w ar transcends political boundaries and is prim arily a m oral issue (Ostling, 1982). Republicans who adhere to this m oral dictum may support ' disarm am ent and reject efforts in military build up. In this study, a second | R O T C cadet was a m em ber of the D em ocratic party, although not active in | Young D em ocrats. Because his activist behavior was oriented along pro-defense lines he was categorized as a pro-defense activist. However, this categorization | may not adequately reflect his beliefs about peace, war, and hum an nature. \ I Hypothesis 6: Nuclear threat salience is highly associated with anti-nuclear ; activism and is less significantly associated with pro-defense activism. t Salience of the nuclear threat suggests high psychological involvem ent with 1 the potential of nuclear war. Salience does not change previously held beliefs. It i 1 does, however, concretize and bring into awareness previously abstract issues, and may result in m ore extrem e or intense behavioral responses (Fiske, 1985). A N O V A procedures indicated no significant differences am ong activist and non activist groups in spontaneous concern about the nuclear threat. However, there was a trend in the hypothesized direction. A nti-nuclear activists reported the m ost concern, followed by pro-defense activists, and then non-activists. In addition, salience was significantly predictive of anti-nuclear activism for both 203 wom en and men. These results give partial support to previous findings which showed significant differences betw een anti-nuclear or peace activists and non activists in concrete, vivid images of nuclear disaster (Fiske et al., 1983; H am ilton et al., 1986; Pavelchak & Schofield, 1985; M ilburn & W atanabe, 1985). T here was not a significant difference betw een activist groups on the variable of salience. Salience was a somewhat good predictor of anti-nuclear activist behavior, but not of pro-defense. These largely non-significant results may be an artifact of the time in history w hen the data was collected. K inder and Sears (1985) found that the m edia increased salience by covering events that raised awareness of potential nuclear disaster. This included films like T h e E a y A f t e r (Schofield & Pavelchak, 1985) and coverage of anti-nuclear dem onstrations, speakers, and other events (Mayton, 1987b). No studies w ere found which exam ined factors that might diminish conscious fears and fantasies of nuclear annihilation. It is possible to speculate that news of successful arms treaties and negotiations, along with the vast changes reported from E astern Europe, may reduce spontaneous concern and may explain these non-significant results. If spontaneous concern about the planetary nuclear crisis is indeed on the decrease, then there are distressing implications. Melville (1988) insisted that com prehension of the catastrophic nature of the nuclear revolution was essential for "a transition toward the new paradigm of thought needed for survival" (p. 183). O ther researchers have suggested that, prior to em pow erm ent and the ability to act for survival, there must be individual and collective confrontation of nuclear reality inevitably accom panied by despair, anxiety, and spontaneous concern (G reenw ald & Zeitlin, 1987; Macy, 1983). 204 Hypothesis 7: Nuclear threat salience is positively associated with a high level of support for Peace Through Cooperation and negatively associated with | i ' Peace Through Strength. j j As anticipated, there was a negative relationship betw een Peace Through | Strength and spontaneous concern about nuclear war and a positive relationship i betw een a Peace Through Cooperation and spontaneous concern about nuclear I . . . 1 war. However, spontaneous concern was predictive of neither peace attitude. No causal relationship can be determ ined. Yet, the inner world of Peace i Through C ooperation supporters seems to contain m ore conscious images of i nuclear annihilation. This may be a consequence or a determ inant of their , cooperative world view. i j i | Hypothesis 8: Nuclear anxiety is positively associated with anti-nuclear activists j but not with pro-defense activists. G eneral concern about the threat of nuclear war has been m easured ! empirically by the NAQ (Newcomb, 1986). The NAQ items reflect four latent j constructs: (a) nuclear concern, (b) nuclear support, (c) fear for the future, and i j (d) nuclear denial, as well as the second-order construct of nuclear anxiety. Only ! one study was found that had direct implications for the relationship betw een i ; nuclear anxiety and activism. In an experim ental study of attitudes and reactions ! to a nuclear w ar fear arousal exercise, H erm an (1987) found that those who were com m itted to a preventive nuclear war strategy expressed greater nuclear anxiety * and concern and employed less denial than those subjects who were uncom m itted to a preventive strategy. 205 The results of this study were partially congruent with H erm an’s (1987) results. A nti-nuclear activists had the highest nuclear anxiety, the lowest denial, and the least nuclear support of the three activist groups. A n assum ption of this study was that pro-defense activists also m aintained a preventive war strategy. Yet, they reported the lowest nuclear anxiety and concern, and the highest denial and nuclear support of the three groups. In addition, high nuclear anxiety was a significant predictor of anti-nuclear behavior for the total sam ple and for men. It accounted for only a small, although significant, am ount of variance for women. The following discussion focuses on the implications of two findings: (a) the relationship betw een psychological distress, nuclear anxiety, and activism, and (b) nuclear anxiety and bogus activist behavior, Newcomb (1986) found in a study of 739 young adults that higher levels of nuclear anxiety were associated with less purpose in life, less life satisfaction, m ore depression, m ore powerlessness, and m ore drug use. Newcomb’s findings suggested that the threat of nuclear war with its potential to generate nuclear anxiety, could negatively affect psychological well-being. O ther than powerlessness, this study did not m easure the variables studied by Newcomb (1986). Interestingly, the anti- nuclear activists in this study had the highest level of anxiety and reported a sense of em pow erm ent and the belief that their actions could m ake a difference in personal and nuclear issues. Im plied in activist behavior is a sense of purpose in life which also contradicts Newcomb’s findings that high anxiety is associated with less purpose in life. Newcomb’s population was comprised primarily, if not solely, of non-activists. According to G reenw ald and Z eitlin (1987), those who have had their numbing interrupted with worry, fear, and anxiety, and who do not take some kind of action are most at risk for fatalistic apathy. It is possible to speculate that one distinction betw een activists and non-activists is how they cope with, process, and tolerate the "existential absurdity" (Lifton, 1982) of the nuclear threat. For some, the anxiety seems an im pedim ent; for others, an im petus to act. Second, true activists when com pared to bogus activists may have different experiences with nuclear anxiety. D iam ond and Bachm an (1986) described bogus activists as individuals who: (a) determ ine that a solution is not possible and reluctantly choose the best of several bad alternatives, aligning themselves with an activist position to reduce their anxiety; or (b) decide that even if an effective response is possible, there is insufficient time to work it out rationally. Panic results and the first quasi-satisfactory solution is chosen. Thus, the higher level of nuclear anxiety reported by some anti-nuclear or pro-defense activists may stem from a failure to cope and may facilitate desperate activist behavior. Hypotheses 9: Nuclear anxiety is positively associated with adherence to Peace Through Cooperation but not with an adherence to Peace Through Strength. The relationship betw een nuclear anxiety and peace attitudes parallels the relationship betw een nuclear anxiety and activist behavior. A N O V A procedures indicated that Peace Through Strength was negatively correlated with nuclear anxiety, nuclear concern, and fear for the future, and positively correlated with nuclear support and nuclear denial. Peace Through C ooperation was positively associated with nuclear anxiety and nuclear concern, and negatively associated with nuclear denial and nuclear support. N uclear anxiety was the best predictor of Peace Through C ooperation for wom en and m en separately and together, according to step-wise and sim ultaneous m ultiple regression procedures. Low 207 , nuclear anxiety was the best predictor of Peace Through Strength for the total ! sample, as well as, for wom en and m en separately. t Com bined with the findings on nuclear salience and peace attitude, it appears that cooperation adherents think m ore about nuclear war and experience I I greater anxiety and concern in relation to these thoughts. A dherents to the ! I strength m odel think about nuclear war less which is congruent with reported i ! denial or psychic numbing (Lifton, 1982; Newcomb, 1986). i Hypothesis 10: Personal and nuclear loci of control are positively associated i with both pro-defense and anti-nuclear activists. ! Hypothesis 11: Powerful others and chance nuclear loci of control are positively associated with the non-activist population. i The perceived control of events is considered a m otivational variable (Stipek & Weisz, 1981). This has been born out in research on peace activists, i which identified a strong sense of political efficacy is an key variable (H am ilton et al., 1987; M ilburn & W atanabe, 1985; Tyler & M cGraw, 1983). The findings of this study differed som ewhat from Tyler and M cGraw (1983), whose step-wise j m ultiple regression indicated efficacy judgm ents and attributions were the best i ! predictors for both anti-nuclear and pro-defense activists (survivalists). Anti- i nuclear and pro-defense activists reported similar beliefs about personal efficacy. ! However, anti-nuclear activists reported significantly stronger beliefs that their own behavior could influence nuclear issues. Congruent with this, internal 1 nuclear locus of control significantly predicted w om en’s and m en’s anti-nuclear behavior. Beliefs in powerful others com bined with personal or nuclear-related efficacy as significant predictors of m en’s cooperative attitudes and anti-nuclear I 208 L . . _ . behavior. Pro-defense activists did not significantly differ from non-activists; 7 both believed there was little they could do to influence nuclear issues. O n the external dimensions, pro-defense activists endorsed the role of powerful others while non-activists endorsed chance. In addition, low chance attributions were a significant predictor of m ale pro-defense behavior. These latter findings deserve consideration. First, it is surprising that cooperative and anti-nuclear active males were highly efficacious, while also viewing powerful others as determ ining nuclear issues. However, according to anti-nuclearist Caldicott (1984), the Iron Triangle of powerful others does indeed dom inate nuclear decision-making. The three sides of this triangle work in tandem and include: (a) the Pentagon and related agencies such as the N ational A eronautics and Space A dm inistration and the N uclear W eapons Branch of the D epartm ent of Energy; (b) the key comm ittees of Congress, including H ouse and Senate A rm ed Services committees, as well as m em bers of Congress from districts and states with concentrated defense industries; and (c) private industry, such as corporations, research institutes, defense-related trade unions, and laboratories. Cooperative and anti-nuclear activist m ales seem to recognize this complex of power, yet m aintain a sense of their own power to influence the system. Second, absolute, autom atic obedience to the hierarchical chain of com m and is required for military success (Davis & Taylor, 1987; Frank & Rivard, 1986). Low efficacy on nuclear issues, deferral to powerful others, and the belief that chance does not determ ine nuclear outcomes characterized pro-defense " activists in this study. Many of the pro-defense subjects in this study were in an R O T C program . This authoritarian structure may partially explain the pro defense view that powerful others "influence the increase or decrease in the num ber of US nuclear weapons" (Erdahl & Rounds, 1985). It may also explain the low chance attribution; pro-defense activists may feel that nuclear issues are "safely" in the hands of powerful others. The deferral to authority by deterrence activists suggests that D iam ond and Bachm an’s (1986) coping strategies are not mutually exclusive coping styles, but m ethods which overlap. In this case, there seems to be an interplay betw een M ethod 3: D eterrence activism and M ethod 5: D eferral to authority. Finally, as discussed earlier, this research was not designed to determ ine causality. For non-activists, the belief that nuclear issues reside with chance may preclude activist efforts. O n the other hand, the need to justify nonactive behavior may result in adopting the belief that nuclear issues are determ ined by fate and chance. This study also investigated the relationship betw een peace attitudes and nuclear locus of control. A dherents to a peace through strength ideology significantly endorsed the role of chance and powerful others, but not their own efforts, in determ ining nuclear issues. Low internal control in relation to the nuclear threat was a small, although significant, predictor of Peace Through Strength for women. Alternately, Peace Through C ooperation adherents reported a significantly strong sense of personal em pow erm ent regarding the nuclear threat and perceived powerful others and chance as less influential in determ ining nuclear events. This strong sense of personal efficacy was a small but significant determ inant of variance for wom en’s peace through cooperation attitudes. ; Hypothesis 12: Women and feminine/androgenous typed individuals support Peace Through Cooperation more than the Peace Through Strength. Hypothesis 13: Men or masculine typed individuals support Peace Through I Strength more than Peace Through Cooperation. i ; In examining responses to the threat of nuclear war, not all studies have i ' looked for gender differences. O f those that have included gender, some have not found differences either betw een m en and w om en or betw een masculine and ; fem inine oriented individuals. However, a num ber of studies have exam ined and j found differences betw een wom en and m en and betw een masculine and ! feminine, in attitudes about war, peace, and taking action to m ake a difference. Some of these differences are sum m arized below: 1. W om en differ from m en in their voting behavior. U ntil recently, : m ore m en voted than wom en (Klein, 1984; M ilbrath, 1981; Nie & Verba, 1975). i | 2. W om en engage in less general activist behavior than m en (M ilbrath, ' 1981; Nie & Verba, 1975). ; 3. In term s of war and peace issues, w om en support war less, support military spending less, oppose military intervention more, and provide greater i j support for peace and equity issues than m en (Boulding, 1984). W om en are j m ore pacifistic (D roba, 1931) while m en are m ore hawkish (Lewis, 1975). i ! W om en value a world at peace m ore than m en (Mayton, 1987b). i ! 4. W om en respond psychologically differently than m en to the threat of j nuclear war. They reported less denial, less nuclear support, m ore fear for the i | future, and greater nuclear concern (H erm an, 1987; Newcomb, 1986). W om en reported greater anticipation of death by nuclear annihilation than m en (H erm an, 1987). Nuclear anxiety of wom en was associated m ore with lowered : 211 I ___________ purpose in life and life satisfaction, while nuclear anxiety of m en was m ore highly associated with drug use (Newcomb, 1986). 5. These different psychological responses extend beyond gender to masculine and fem inine orientations. M asculine-oriented individuals showed greater nuclear support, while fem inine-oriented individuals indicated less nuclear support, greater nuclear concern, and greater fear for the future (Newcomb, 1988a). As discussed in C hapter 2, there are m ethodological and theoretical problem s in many of these gender difference studies. D espite this, the results of this study supported the hypotheses of some gender differences on issues of war, peace, and the nuclear threat. However, sex bias in psychological research can tend toward one of two poles: alpha bias, the exaggeration or emphasis of difference; and beta bias, the tendency to minimize or ignore difference (H are- M ustin & M arecek, 1988). E ither tendency can occur at any point in the research process (Denm ark, Russo, Frieze, & Sechzer, 1988; Fausto-Sterling, 1985). The following discussion applies feminist guidelines for non-sexist research to this study. First, gender stereotypes may bias the developm ent of research questions (D enm ark et al., 1988). A stereotypic them e in nuclear threat research is that m en are m ore aggressive and violent while wom en are m ore peaceable (Johnson, 1989). This study was designed, in part, to examine this stereotype by considering both differences and similarities in wom en’s and m en’s nuclear positions. Second, to avoid sexism in sam ple selection, Johnson (1989) em phasized consideration of the interaction of race, ethnicity, class, religion, education, college major, and similar variables with gender in nuclear threat research. Specific guidelines by feminist researchers included: (a) select participants from diverse cultural, ethnic, racial, and class groups (D enm ark et al., 1988; Fine, \ i 1985; Lerm an, 1986); (b) specify the sex and race of everyone involved in the research (D enm ark et al., 1988); (c) select appropriate com parison groups (D enm ark et al., 1988); and (d) control for or vary sex, race, age, or occupation of j persons involved in the research (D enm ark et al., 1988). As a result, this researcher attem pted to thoroughly describe the population that participated in j this study. U nfortunately, there was not adequate economic, ethnic, or religious { diversity to allow a statistical analysis of the relationship of these variables with gender. A preponderance of nuclear threat studies used only college students to i ; examine the gender-war relationship (Johnson, 1989). Jacklin (1981) argued that ! sex-related differences found in college populations, or in other sam ples of white, , upper middle-class, educated individuals, may not generalize to the population at large. The college students in this research w ere primarily Caucasian and j i affluent. The generalizability of the results of gender difference in this study is i thus limited. Third, statistical procedures can exaggerate or minimize difference. In this study, gender was considered using the following analyses: (a) tests of difference | on the 28 PAS items; (b) tests of difference on the PAS scales; (c) step-wise and I sim ultaneous m ultiple regression procedures on peace attitudes; and (d) step- i ! wise and sim ultaneous m ultiple regression procedures on activism. ' The average responses for wom en and m en separately on the 28 PAS items and the test of difference betw een them revealed that over half of the item s 1 significantly differentiated betw een genders. M en w ere m ore likely to: i I 213 , (a) support m ilitary pow er in m aintaining U.S. greatness; (b) view peacekeeping through deterrence as a key function of government; (c) value a strong military | because of com petition for goods, power, and prestige. W om en provided m ore support for: (a) non-military, cooperative efforts towards peace; (b) negotiated arm s agreem ents, including compromises, to prevent nuclear war; and (c) program s and institutions to facilitate com m unication and cooperation among individuals and nations. Both women and m en believed that: (a) international | conflicts can be resolved in mutually beneficial ways; (b) cooperation can be achieved with consistent efforts; and (c) the world will be safer with reduced nuclear arsenals. However, m en’s positive endorsem ent of these item s was i significantly less than wom en’s. j W om en’s and m en’s responses on the PAS scales showed that neither i 1 wom en nor m en supported Peace Through Strength, although m en’s responses indicated significantly less opposition to military efforts. Both wom en and m en supported Peace Through Cooperation, with women providing significantly more support than men. W om en m ore than m en believed that nuclear w ar is not survivable, nor w orth surviving. Beliefs about survival may be related to a defensive macho or om nipotent response (Frank, 1982; Schwebel & Schwebel, 1981). As Newcomb (1986) observed, m en are predom inantly the decision m akers on nuclear issues. Consequently, "one is confronted with the real possibility that machismo and denial behavior may dictate the fate of civilization and the world" (p. 915). W hen sex role traits were assessed, feminine-typed individuals provided the greatest support for Peace Through Cooperation. Although four sex trait groups opposed Peace Through Strength, the greatest opposition came from feminine- 214 | typed individuals. The least opposition was provided by masculine-typed i | individuals. The correlational relationships betw een sex role traits and all other ! nuclear threat responses indicated very few significant relationships. The only significant response for both masculine and fem inine-typed individuals was on the variable of anti-nuclear activism— a negative association for masculine-typed and a positive association for feminine-typed. T here was a significant correlation | of feminine-type with the belief that powerful others determ ine nuclear issues. j j M asculine-typed individuals did believe that nuclear war is survivable while fem inine-typed did not. The four-way classification scheme indicated that both activist groups were comprised largely of masculine-typed individuals. This was unexpected since the literature suggested a correlation betw een fem inine typing and anti-nuclear activism and cooperative orientation (Jensen, 1987; Newcomb, 1986). In order to ; m ake sense of these findings, the masculinity and femininity items used in this study w ere reviewed. The feminine type was characterized as very emotional, able to devote self completely to others, very gentle, very helpful, very kind, very aware of the feelings of others, very understanding of others, and very warm in relations with others. M asculine qualities w ere independence, active, i competitive, easily m akes decisions, self-confident, feelings of superiority, and the ability to stand up well under pressure. Many of these so-called masculine ; qualities intuitively characterize activist types, and may explain the ! r preponderance of masculine-typed individuals in both pro-defense and anti- i nuclear activist groups. Separate m ultiple regression analyses assessed w hether different equations predicted wom en’s and m en’s peace attitudes. Cooperative wom en were i 215 predicted by high nuclear anxiety, low m anipulative interpersonal tendencies, avoidant coping styles, and efficacy to influence nuclear issues. Cooperative m en w ere predicted by high nuclear anxiety, belief in powerful others’ control of nuclear issues, low chance attributions, and high personal internal control. Strength-oriented wom en were predicted by low nuclear anxiety, low internal nuclear locus of control, and closed-mindedness. Strength-oriented m en were predicted by low nuclear anxiety, low tolerance for ambiguity, closed-mindedness, and self-reported masculine traits. G ender sim ilarities and differences em erged from this analysis. Low nuclear anxiety similarly predicted w om en’s and m en’s Peace Through Strength, while high nuclear anxiety best predicted w om en’s and m en’s Peace Through Cooperation. However, the sets of variables which best predicted wom en’s and m en’s peace attitudes differed. D ifferent sets of variables also predicted w om en’s and m en’s activist behaviors. A nti-nuclear active wom en were best predicted by negative endorsem ent of Peace Through Strength, high spontaneous concern, efficacy on nuclear issues, and nuclear anxiety. A nti-nuclear active m en were best predicted by negative endorsem ent of Peace Through Strength, efficacy on nuclear issues, nuclear anxiety, the belief that nuclear issues are in the hands of powerful others, active coping, and low fem inine traits. Pro-defense active wom en were predicted by their peace through strength orientation; pro-defense active m en were predicted by their peace through strength attitude, as well as, low endorsem ent of Peace Through Cooperation, internal nuclear locus of control, and a lack of belief in the role of chance. These results suggested that different psychological and structural processes may construct w om en’s and m en’s peace attitudes. W om en’s responses to war 216 and peace are inevitably related to the experience of global subordination (Connell, 1987). For example, one predictor of strength-oriented wom en was low efficacy on nuclear issues. This may relate to letting others (male, strength- i 1 oriented, politicians) decide the best way to deal with the danger of threatened aggression (Ruddick, 1984). Some wom en who feel vulnerable or powerless may be relieved by the governm ent’s war policies and weapons of "protection." However, this research was not designed to provide an explanatory schem a for l ! these differences. Speculation is therefore difficult and problem atic in term s of j potential gender bias. ! Fourth, an exaggeration or m inim ization of difference often occurs at the I __ . level of analysis and interpretation. The very notion of difference is problem atic, : implying a characteristic that distinguishes betw een groups. Jacklin (1981) reported that sex differences usually do not distinguish m ost m em bers of one i group from m ost m em bers of the other. To rem ediate skewed portrayal, D enm ark et al. (1988) advocated consistent reporting of both sex differences and similarities. Avoiding alpha bias requires the uncom m on practice of reporting non-significant findings (D enm ark et al., 1988; Jacklin, 1981). In this investigation, the researcher attem pted to report both sim ilarities (non-significant differences) and differences in gender responses. For example, different sets of variables predicted wom en’s and m en’s peace attitudes, suggesting different structural and psychological processes may interplay to construct w om en’s and m en’s relationship to war. Equally im portant, wom en’s and m en’s Peace Through Strength and Peace Through C ooperation attitudes were best predicted by the sam e single variable: low nuclear anxiety for Peace Through Strength; high nuclear anxiety for Peace Through Cooperation. 217 j Finally, bias can occur in the explanatory schem ata provided. Often, j nuclear threat research provides no explanation of gender difference (or j similarity) or provides inadequate explanations without consideration of the theoretical limits and contradictions (Johnson & Newcomb, 1989). This research I provided an im portant description of gender and peace attitudes, as well as of ! gender and activism. However, this research did not attem pt an analysis of the structural m ilieu which generated these differences. N or was the study designed to examine contradictions and conflicts in gender experience, such as the ! fem inine fem ale m arine described by W illiams (1989). These concerns are taken i ■ up m ore fully in the section on Theoretical Conclusions, Implications, and | Recom m endations. I I Hypothesis 14: Anti-nuclear activists score lower then pro-defense activists on intolerance of ambiguity and Machiavellian personality measures. i i Hypothesis 15: Those adhering to Peace Through Cooperation score lower on intolerance of ambiguity and Machiavellian measures, than Peace Through Strength adherents. B udner (1962) defined intolerance of ambiguity as "the tendency to i 1 perceive ambiguous situations as sources of threat" (p. 29) rather than desirable. Sidanius (1978) related intolerance of ambiguity to sociopolitical world view, having found a positive correlation betw een intolerance of ambiguity and general conservatism. No studies were found that directly assessed the relationship ; betw een intolerance of ambiguity and activism or peace attitude. The results of this research supported Hypothesis 14 and Hypothesis 15. T here was a significant, positive relationship betw een intolerance of ambiguity i 218 and Peace Through Strength. Alternately, there was a significant, negative association betw een intolerance of ambiguity and Peace Through Cooperation. In both step-wise and sim ultaneous m ultiple regression analyses, intolerance of ambiguity significantly predicted Peace Through Strength for males. Pro-defense activists were significantly less tolerant of ambiguity than anti-nuclear or non activists. Intolerance of ambiguity was developed in relation to the authoritarian construct which has been criticized for its bias in m easuring Rightist, but not Leftist, pathology (Rokeach, 1960; Shils, 1954). This criticism, applied to B udner’s (1962) scale, may partially explain the findings described here. O ther explanations are possible as well. Deviation from existing paradigm s and fam iliar experience requires the ability to tolerate ambiguity, while pursuit of the known does not. Since the dom inant them e of hum an history has been the accum ulation and the use of arms, rather than their lim itation or reduction (Blacker & Duffy, 1984), adherents to strength need not tolerate ambiguity to the extent required of cooperation advocates. T here are num erous examples of psychological and sociopolitical ambiguity in relation to war and nuclear issues. Erikson (1985) described a m alignant psychological mechanism, pseudospeciation, as the false sense of unique, superior identity of one’s group over other groups (Erikson, 1985). Potentially threatening circumstances reinforce this mechanism, generating the need to annihilate the "other" or keep them "in their places" by recurrent warfare. Erikson insisted an undeveloped potential for peace lies in the resolution of pseudospeciation. Yet, it requires the ability to experience ambiguous situations and unfam iliar others as desirable, not threatening. 219 j Similarly, cultural transform ation theory proposed two m odels of society: f (a) the rigid, hierarchical dom inator configuration, and (b) the partnership i | configuration in which diversity within the species is not equated with either inferiority or superiority (Eisler, 1987). Partnership m odel societies, as evidenced by archeological data, tend to be m ore peaceful and less hierarchic and authoritarian. D om inator societies, in which m ale power is idealized and "masculinity" is equated with violence and dom inance, are the prevailing paradigm . According to Eisler (1987), transform ing civilization to a partnership i ■ m odel requires tolerating ambiguity on m ultiple levels and engaging in i : cooperative rather than fam iliar hierarchic efforts in global and interpersonal ! | experience. L I Concretely, Chase (1984) analyzed the dom inator stance of the U.S. in i relation to Central Am erica. R esolution of conflict in C entral Am erica, j according to Chase, requires that the U.S. abandon its historically fam iliar i i militaristic, dom inator role in favor of supportive diplom atic and economic , developm ent. 1 Finally, N ikitin (1988) described U.S.-Soviet security issues since W orld ; W ar II as largely defined by national security alone, without inclusion of economic, political, diplomatic, and ideological m eans of security. A n alternative approach to security is the notion of universal or collective, m utual security. , Planetary survival requires a shift in thinking and in international relations to the principles of universal security. Such a transition dem ands new attitudes toward political and ideological differences betw een powers and tolerance of different social models (Nikitin, 1988). 220 These examples suggest that survival m andates a resolute and I unprecedented break with many historical, political, psychological, and ideological positions that evolved from pre-nuclear times (Melville, 1988). The ! prevalent Peace Through Strength m odel requires little tolerance of ambiguity, but offers little hope for survival. As the late G eneral O m ar Bradley once said, "We know m ore about war than we do about peace. W e know m ore about killing than we do about living" (Caldicott, 1984, p. 31). Cooperative, partnership, non m ilitary resolution of conflict requires a greater tolerance of ambiguity because i | there exist fewer blueprints or precedents. j According to Christie and Geis (1970), high M achiavellian individuals i "m anipulate more, win more, are persuaded less, persuade others more" (p. 312). i , They are detached rather than highly involved with others. No studies were i found which specifically exam ined activism (pro-defense or anti-nuclear) and i Machiavellianism. However, Cryns and Finn (1973) found that active political ( participation by liberals was associated with low authoritarianism , low 1 M achiavellian tendencies, and low dogmatism. Gold, Friedm an, and Christie (1971) found that college students with a history of political activism scored high on M achiavellian Cynicism, but lower on M achiavellian Tactics and Traditional Moralism. i | The results of this study partially supported these earlier findings. Peace | Through Strength individuals were significantly m ore M achiavellian in their ; relationships, while Peace Through C ooperation individuals seem ed significantly less detached and manipulative. Low M achiavellianism accounted for a significant am ount of variance for cooperative wom en in both sim ultaneous and i ! step-wise regressions. M achiavellianism was not a significant predictor of Peace ! 221 I Through Strength. No significant difference on M achiavellianism was found | betw een activist groups. N or did M achiavellianism em erge as a significant | predictor of activist behavior. M achiavellianism, like intolerance of ambiguity, was developed from the ! authoritarian m odel of personality and may share its Leftist bias (Shils, 1954; i j Rokeach, 1960). This may explain the significant correlation betw een high i Machs and Peace Through Strength. The non-significant finding on ! 1 M achiavellianism and activism may be explained by efforts of both activist groups i j to be persuasive and win others over to the valued ideological position. Both j attem pt to m anipulate the environm ent— with military force, deterrence policies, ! j or with dem onstrations, civil disobedience, and persuasive speakers. i i i 1 Hypothesis 16: Pro-defense and anti-nuclear activists score higher on I dogm atism personality m easures than the non-activist population. Dogm atism is a psychological system of closed thinking. The m easure developed by Rokeach (1960) purportedly is not biased in favor of the Left like earlier authoritarian measures. As a result, individuals on the Right or Left who ; hold strong, closed-minded positions should appear dogmatic on this scale. This ■ hypothesis was not born out in this research. ! Dogm atism was significantly associated with Peace Through Strength, as ! well as a significant predictor of Peace Through Strength for wom en and m en i ‘ separately and together in step-wise regressions. Dogm atism had a significant, ! negative association with Peace Through Cooperation. It was not a significant predictor of cooperative attitude. 222 | N either closed-mindedness nor open-m indedness significantly predicted | activist behavior, although anti-nuclear activists were significantly m ore open- ! m inded than pro-defense activists or non-activists. I These findings can be interpreted several ways. First, despite efforts by ! ■ Rokeach (1960) to create a non-biased m easure of dogmatism, he may not have j fully succeeded. O n the other hand, cooperative individuals who were active in , anti-nuclear efforts may indeed be less dogmatic and m ore open-m inded. ■ Certainly, open-m indedness is required for mutually beneficial resolution of conflicts, negotiation, compromise, cooperation, comm unication, and trust. j Hypothesis 17: General coping style is associated with a particular nuclear j threat coping style. ! The threat of nuclear war is a stressor like no other. It is an unpredictable, j final tragedy waiting to happen. It differs from many other stressors because collective, not individual, action is required to prevent its disastrous results. This research was concerned with ways of coping with this threat, investigating: (a) attributions of chance, powerful others, and the self in personal and nuclear issues; (b) peace attitudes; and (c) activist behaviors. In addition, two general coping styles were considered in this study: (a) Active and (b) Avoidant. Active coping comprised Problem-focused Coping, Seeking Social Support, and Focusing on the Positive. Avoidant coping com prised Wishful Thinking, D etachm ent, Self-blame, Tension-reduction, and Keeping to the Self. Avoidant Coping individuals viewed nuclear issues as in the hands of chance, fate, or powerful others. Active Coping individuals reported high nuclear anxiety, nuclear concern, fear for the future, believed that nuclear war is not survivable, 223 and supported cooperative peace efforts, but not military strength. This parallels the paradoxical finding that children who overtly worry most about nuclear war are often among the better adjusted (Goldenring & Doctor, 1985; G reenw ald & Zeitlin, 1987). A nti-nuclear activists tended to be Active Copers while pro-defense activists used m ore Avoidant Coping mechanisms. Strength-oriented non activists reported a negative relationship with Active Coping; cooperation- oriented non-activists used both Active and Avoidant Coping mechanisms. This tendency to cope with stress both actively and avoidantly may intensify decisional conflict. It may preclude the Problem-focused, Positive-focused stance used by anti-nuclear activists. Given the decisional conflict of cooperative non-activists illustrated by Active and Avoidant coping, the words of Janis’ (1985) are apt, Vital decisions often involve conflicting values, which m ake the decision m aker realize that any choice he or she makes will require sacrificing ideals. As a result, the decision m aker's anticipatory anxiety, shame, or guilt is increased, which adds to the level of stress. (p. 73) Theoretical Conclusions, Implications, and Recommendations The final three sections of this dissertation focus on theoretical, research, and policy implications and recom m endations to foster interpersonal and global cooperation. A t this juncture, it seems im portant to again rem ind the reader of this researcher’s cooperative view and to acknowledge that a strength-oriented researcher or reader would perhaps choose other recom m endations. The results of this research supported many of the existing findings on peace activism and extended the conceptualization of peace attitudes. A valuable description of cooperative and strength orientations was developed, 224 showing the tendency of cooperative individuals to experience spontaneous nuclear concern, high nuclear anxiety and concern, low nuclear denial and nuclear support. Coping styles included negative endorsem ent of Peace Through Strength, tension-reduction or anti-nuclear activism, beliefs that nuclear war is i not survivable, feelings of em pow erm ent on personal and nuclear issues, the j belief that chance does not determ ine nuclear outcomes, and Active coping. i ! Personality styles were generally tolerant of ambiguity, open-m inded, with low i I m anipulative tendencies in interpersonal relationships. Cooperative individuals | reported possessing "feminine" traits, such as w arm th and understanding in i | hum an relations, awareness of others’ feelings, and the tendency to be gentle, | kind, and helpful. ■ Strength-oriented individuals experienced low nuclear anxiety and concern, ! as well as, high denial and nuclear support. Coping styles were characterized by j negative endorsem ent of Peace Through Cooperation, pro-defense or deterrence activism, low efficacy on nuclear issues combined with beliefs that nuclear issues are controlled by powerful others and chance, and a negative relationship to Active coping. Personality styles tended to be dogmatic, m anipulative and persuasive, and intolerant of ambiguity. Strength-oriented individuals reported possessing "masculine" traits, such as independence, competitiveness, perseverance, confidence, and the tendency to be active, feel superior, and stand up well under pressure. These findings suggested three areas for further theoretical development: (a) the relationship betw een world view and peace attitude; (b) the nature of activism; and (c) the gender-war relationship. 225 This research seem ed to support the notion of an im portant relationship betw een world view, peace attitude, and activist stance. O f particular interest is how this world view, dem onstrated by peace attitude, may generalize to other arenas of life. For example, the threat to hum an survival comes from at least three directions: (a) the threat of nuclear annihilation; (b) the progressive destruction of the life support system; and (c) the hunger, hom elessness, and disease of half of the planet’s people (Macy, 1983). D o cooperative-oriented individuals m aintain a different relationship to the life support system than strength-oriented individuals? How do both orientations view the rights of nature, given that nuclear holocaust threatens not only hum an life, but all life, including the habitat itself (Nash, 1989)? How do both world views attem pt to psychologically and actively deal with hum an misery? How do adherents of both positions deal with interpersonal conflict in intim ate and other every day relationships? The research also raised theoretical questions about the intransigence of world views. A re these orientations static and inflexible, trapping hum an and global relations forever in a dichotom ous web? Or, are these orientations flexible, promising possibilities for change and transform ation? W hat are the factors, structural and personal, that construct these world views? In addition, there rem ain questions about the limits of the PAS and world view theory. The PAS was designed as a continuum with activists on the two end points and non-activists between. It is possible that the theoretical basis on which the PAS was developed oversimplified peace attitudes. As noted earlier, the m easure is not able to uncover conflicts and contradictions in hum an experience. N or does it distinguish betw een various peace through strength positions, such as 226 the anti-nuclearist and pro-nuclearist observed by Frank and Rivard (1986). The ■ m easure may oversimplify cooperation as well. Trust and m utual understanding | w ere em phasized in the Peace Through Cooperation items of the PAS. However, j Axelrod (1988) stressed that trust and understanding are not necessary for j cooperation; the only necessity is the expectation of sharing the future. How j m uch valuable data were lost by a limited, dichotomous categorization of peace ! attitude and world view? Even if this m odel effectively depicts the beliefs of I i mostly white and affluent college students at several universities and colleges in ; southern California and Kansas, does it adequately represent peace attitudes on a i | broader scale? Answers to these questions are necessary to enrich the world view i j theory proposed and generally supported by this research. ’ This research also raised theoretical questions about the nature of activism. ; Activists and non-activists who shared the same ideological orientation also i shared many affective, coping, personality, and gender-related correlates. W hat F factors interplay for some to becom e active change agents and others not? In addition, a broader definition of activism and social change agency may be required. C urrent m easures and categorizations (e.g., W erner & Roy, 1985) assess activism via participation in m ovem ent politics, pragm atic politics, and m ajor or third party politics (Burns, 1984), as well as, interpersonal political discussions. However, one questionnaire was returned to this researcher with a I ! note from a Buddhist student who viewed his spiritual practices as essential to i | global peacem aking. T here was also a trend in anti-nuclear and feminist literature toward spiritual and interpersonal peacem aking efforts which are not assessed by current empirical m easures (Macy, 1983; McAllister, 1982; Spretnak, ; 1982). W hat are the practices, political and personal, utilized by im plem enters of 227 change? How do activists, broadly defined, select particular actions for social change? ; Finally, a m ore comprehensive understanding of the roots of gender difference and similarity on issues of war and peace m ust be achieved. T here are lim itations in the m anner in which gender has been investigated in existing research on nuclear threat response. In term s of methodology, this study has attem pted to rectify some of these shortcomings by adhering to non-sexist i empiricist m ethods. In doing so, im portant descriptive data were obtained. In addition, this research pointed to the need for developm ent of an adequate theory of gender and war. The following discussion highlights the criteria which » this new theory m ust m eet. As discussed in C hapter 2, sex role theory, feminist psychoanalysis, and 1 fem inist m oral theory are useful and lim ited frameworks with which to study the gender and war relationship. G ender does seem to play a vital role in attitudes ! j and m oral positions about war, peace, and the nuclear threat. However, differences within gender groups must be considered along with the undeniably significant role of social institutions and power. A n adequate theory must integrate a form ulation of gender difference in personality and m oral t [ developm ent with social and power structure (Connell, 1987; Flax, 1983; H arding, 1981; Harstock, 1983; Messner, 1990; Williams, 1989). Craib (1987) described this integration as an ’ ’ elective affinity" in which institutions m ake use i of and perhaps confirm the "routine structure and processes of the m ale [and | female] personality" (Craib, 1987, p. 737). i M essner (1990) expanded on this notion using the m etaphor of a tapestry. j H e described gender identity as a thread which runs through the tapestry. As I f ! 228 1 individuals interact with social institutions, pieces of the tapestry are added. "Yet I | the thread itself is not fixed: it is woven, moved, stretched, re-woven, as new | pieces of the tapestry are added. G ender identity, rather than being viewed as a j "thing" which people "have," is thus conceptualized as a process of construction which develops, comes into crisis, and changes as a person interacts with the social world" (p. 419). In other words, wom en and m en respond to war and the nuclear threat in ways which reflect an interaction of their gender identity with a complex social world. For example, wom en’s concern for peace may interact with econom ic needs m et by "unskilled" electrical w eaponry assembly work. W ainwright (1983) illustrated how a tedious, low-paying job that helped pay the | rent becam e "complicity in a system to kill people, som ething about which many I l ; of the wom en had grave doubts, despite feelings of loyalty to ‘our boys’ fostered ! by the government" (Enloe, 1984, p. 198). This interaction may add a new piece to the tapestry of gender and its relationship to peace attitude. To understand gender differences m ore fully, it is im portant to consider the different social worlds which individuals experience, that are shaped in part by differences in class, race, and ethnicity. D ifferent "masculinities" and "femininities" and, perhaps, different world views, emerge in response to different social climates. W hile this theoretical notion has not been explored in relation to nuclear threat response, M essner (1990) illustrated its potential relevance in research on organized sports and the construction of masculinities. Likewise, W illiams (1989) identified this phenom enon in research on m ale nurses and fem ale m arines. As applied by M essner (in press) and W illiams (1989), an elective affinity betw een gender and social structure can account for differences within gender groups as well as similarities betw een gender groups. As Rosaldo (1980) clarifies, "gender is not a unitary fact determ ined everywhere by the same sorts of concerns, but instead, [is] the complex product of a variety of social i ! forces . . . Svomen’s status’ is itself not one but many things" (p. 401). A social i i constructivist theory provides for these "many things" by integrating vital psychoanalytic insights with interdisciplinary knowledge of social structure. Few, if any, researchers have utilized an "elective affinity" betw een social I ! structures and personality to explain gender related differences in relation to war, j | peace, and the nuclear threat. Such a theory may offer a powerful alternative to I ) ' the three theories reviewed in C hapter 2. The "elective affinity" of social | constructivism recognizes the interaction of internal dynamics with the external J pressures of socialization agencies. Agencies of socialization do teach m en about | aggression, competition, violence, and abstract thinking while encouraging I 4 wom en to be nurturing, tender, and concrete. But, boys and girls, m en and t i women, need not be passive recipients of these messages, but have unique i ' identities which interact with these structures. 1 E nloe’s (1984) association of masculinity with m ilitarism and E aslea’s (1987) description of the m asculine nature of nuclear weapons developm ent may be enriched by the m ore complex notion of masculinity offered by feminist psychoanalysis in the context of social constructivism. The findings of gender difference and similarity in this research also may be m ore accurately understood with this explanatory schema. Given this alternative conceptualization, new research questions and m ethods are suggested. Along with Peace Through Strength and Peace Through C ooperation as defined in this study, what other models of how the world works exist? How do these world views relate in part to wom en’s and m en’s psychic 230 developm ent? W hat is the relationship among wom en’s subordination, fem inine traits, and cooperative or strength-oriented world views? W hat is the relationship among m en’s dom inant position, masculine traits, and cooperative or strength-oriented positions on peace? W hat additional social, psychological, and m oral processes combine to form wom en’s and m en’s attitudes about peace, war, and the nuclear threat? W hat characterizes the different stories wom en and m en tell about their personal encounters with the nuclear threat? W hat are the commonalities, as well as the differences in hum an experience w hen faced with the threat of extinction? M ethods should include samples of diverse groups of w om en and of m en to understand varied relationships betw een gender and war. Sample diversity should include and extend beyond differences in class, race, and ethnicity to encom pass wom en and m en whose lives differentially intersect with militarism, such as official soldiers, military spouses, defense workers, peace activists, and survivalists. Interpretive, qualitative, and ethnographic m ethods may be most useful for this exploratory, theory-building research. Investigation of these questions and m ethods will contribute to a viable, tested, and integrated theory about gender and war--a theory which considers power and power relations and interweaves knowledge of social structure with personality form ation and m oral development. Research Conclusions, Implications, and Recommendations D espite the lim itations already discussed, the Peace A ttitude Scale is a prom ising m easure. It will enhance peace research because fewer assumptions will need to be m ade about peace attitudes. In addition, it provides a much- needed theoretical basis from which to study attitudes about war, peace and the nuclear threat. Some suggestions for future use are proposed here. The PAS is a useful tool with which to investigate peace attitudes in the larger population, and with other groups of anti-nuclear and pro-defense activists. O f particular interest will be the study of peace attitudes in diverse ethnic, race, class, and religious groups, as well as with individuals whose lives differentially intersect with militarism. W ith only slight modification, the PAS can be used in peace research in other regions of the world. U nderstanding peace attitudes outside our borders is essential to efforts in global conflict resolution. O ne provocative im plication of this research concerns the relationship betw een salience, nuclear anxiety, empowerm ent, and activism. H as the reduction of East-W est tensions resulted in less spontaneous nuclear concern? H as the nuclear threat becom e less salient? If confronting the potential for nuclear catastrophe is indeed a significant pre-condition for the transition toward the new thinking required for survival (Melville, 1988), what are the implications of diminished salience? W hat empowers? W hat provides the im petus to act? W hat are the consequences of potentially waning activism and reduced public involvement? History has illustrated the essential role of public involvement in successful arms control negotiations. Stim ulated by public involvement, SALT I was negotiated and ratified. W ith public complacency, we ended up with M IRVs and an unratified SALT II (Drell, 1988). Finally, the arms race is not driven by weapons alone but also by psychological processes (Frank & Melville, 1988). Arms control is only one discreet m echanism for limiting conflict. O ther mechanisms must be developed 232 (Blacker & Duffy, 1984). Contributions from psychology may play a vital role in helping to reduce global tensions, elim inate hostility, and develop confidence and trust betw een nations (Blacker & Duffy, 1984; Frank & Melville, 1988; Melville, 1988). Psychological research has already uncovered some of the im poverished psychological processes that im pede cooperative efforts and interfere with the sense of global interconnectedness. Enem y images disrupt communication, allow for dehum anization, and provide justification for the arm s race (Frank & Melville, 1988). Pseudospeciation provides a false sense of superior identity within small groups, generating the need to annihilate the "other" (Erikson, 1985). Psychological research suggests m ethods for understanding our potential enemies, including the "other-ness" in ourselves (Erikson, 1985). It provides a way to consider how other nations "in their own historical space and time, w hether by , evolution or revolution, prom oted a unification of a sense of identity of populations previously and hopelessly isolated from each other?" (Erikson, 1985, p. 216). Policy Conclusions, Im plications, and Recom m endations In considering policy conclusions, implications, and recom m endations, one is rem inded of the popular notion on posters and bum per stickers: "think globally; act locally." Some of the prescriptions discussed here are best im plem ented locally; others may require a larger context. First, the im portance of arms control must be stressed. "In reality, there are no experts on nuclear war" (Drell, 1988, p.223). The public must be inform ed and active in the form ulation of nuclear policy issues via public outreach, education, and on-going dialogue with public officials (Drell, 1988). Although 233 | arms control may appear technical and complex, the key ideas are rem arkably | com prehensible. W ell-thought-out opinions and com m on sense are often m ore j im portant than so-called arms control expertise (Blacker & Duffy, 1984). I | N ot only the outcom e but the process of negotiation is vital to reduced tensions. It seems that perhaps the very process of reaching agreem ent allows adversaries to better understand the other’s m otivations and actions. In working i 1 on shared problems, negotiation generates a spirit of cooperation (Blacker & I Duffy, 1984). I Psychologists can inform these efforts in global cooperation with principles i j of healthy hum an relations. For example, without blam e and without using i I sm aller countries as scapegoats, with less m utual belittling and greater efforts to i see through each other’s fram e of reference (G reenw ald & Zeitlin, 1988), arms control efforts may be m ore effective. E ducation of children and young adults both at school and within families may have significant implications for increasing cooperation and the sense of interconnectedness. Com mercial textbooks have rem ained largely silent on the nuclear arms issue. Yet, academ ic curriculum on the subject has been developed and published by concerned educators (Hemphill, 1985; Zars, Wilson, & Philips, 1985). These program s offer students the opportunity to explore their concerns and gain knowledge of alternatives to the nuclear arms race. For parents and educators, books may be particularly useful. G reenw ald and Zeitlin (1987) reviewed three in the context of their research on families and the nuclear threat: H e l p i n g Y o u n g C h i l d r e n U n d e r s t a n d P e a c e W a r a n d t h e N u c l e a r T h r e a t (Carlsson-Paige & Levin, 1985); W h a t S h a l l W e T e l l t h e C h i l d r e n : P a r e n t i n g i n t h e N u c l e a r A g e { P a r e n t i n g i n t h e N u c l e a r A g e , 1983): and T a l k i n g t o 234 j C h i l d r e n a b o u t N u c l e a r W a r (V an O rnum & V an Ornum , 1984). O ne of their ! | m ost striking conclusions was not the question of how to talk to children, but j what m eaning such talk had for adults (G reenw ald & Zeitlin, 1987). In part, it | m eant confronting feelings of helplessness about the ability to protect the young. Applications of psychological wisdom may foster interconnectedness and | cooperation. These may include: (a) evolving an international dialogue on | developm ental studies (Erikson, 1985); (b) collaborative research efforts such as the book, r e a k t h r o u g h , cooperatively w ritten by U.S. and Soviet scholars; (c) cultural exchanges, visits, and contacts (G reenw ald & Zeitlin, 1987); and (d) the use of new technologies for heightening awareness of the nuclear crisis and facilitating cooperation, including international telecom m unication by , satellite (spacebridges), international rapid mass travel, and exploration of outer I space (Eisler, 1987; Frank & Melville, 1988; G reenw ald & Zeitlin, 1987). E isler (1987), D innerstein (1976), and other feminist thinkers rem ind us, i however, that these transform ational efforts are lim ited to the extent that they ignore the necessary transform ation in the existing sex/gender system. 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A m e r i c a n J o u r n a l o f O r t h o p s y c h i a t r y . Zur, O., M orrison, A., & Zaretsky, E. (1985). M e n , w o m e n , a n d w a r : G e n d e r i d i f f e r e n c e s i n a t t i t u d e s t o w a r d w a r . Paper presented at the W estern Psychological Association Meeting, San Jose, California. i i 252 APPENDIX Cover L etter and Q uestionnaire SCHOOL OF EDUCATION DEPARTMENT OF COUNSELING - WPH 503 (213) 743-2380 (213) 743-8707 STUDENT ATTITUDE QUESTIONAIRE Introductory Letter The purpose of this study is to understand more about how college students feel about war and peace and about how these feelings and attitudes may be related to interpersonal, problem solving, and personality styles. If you decide to participate in this project, you will be asked to fill out a questionaire that contains questions about your attitudes, feelings, and levels of anxiety related to such topics as war and peace. You will also be asked questions about your interpersonal, problem solving and personality styles. The questionaire is to be completed in one sitting. This should take less than an hour to complete. There are obviously no right and wrong answers regarding attitudes and how you feel about certain topics. We would like you to please answer each qestion as honestly and carefully as you can. The effect of responding to these questions may cause some discomfort, to the extent that examining one's political beliefs, feelings and attitudes is uncomfortable. All information obtained during the study will remain strictly anonymous. You are not required to participate in this study. If you do agree to participate, you can still change your mind and withdraw from the study at any time. Your decision will in no way be held against you. The University Park Campus of the University of Southern California has a standing committee known as the University Park Institutional Review Board to which complaints or problems concerning any research project may, and should, be reported if they arise. The IRB telephone number is (213) 743-6781. If you wish to learn the results of this study, or have other pertinent questions about this research or procedures, you may contact Melissa Johnson c/o Dr. Michael Uewcomb, Department of Counseling Psychology, University of Southern California, WPH 500, Los Angeles, California, 90007. Phone number: (213)743- 8707 . Signature of Student Investigator: ■ '/SU 'jzxd, /?£! M.S. Signature of Faculty Supervisor: UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA UNIVERSITY PARK. LOS ANGELES.CAUFORNIA 90089 0031 254 STUDENT ATTITUDE QUESTIONAIRE Instructions: Throughout most of this questionaire you will be asked to indicate your agreement or disagreement with statements. However, in the first part of the questionaire we want you to finish some incomplete sentences. Please just write what comes to mind. 1. I worry about ____________________________________________________________ 2. I worry about 3. I worry about The next 3 sentences refer to the future. 4. One of my fears regarding the future is 5. One of my fears regarding the future is 6. One of my fears regarding the future is Thank you for completing the sentences. Please go on to page 2. 255 lease indicate your extent of agreement or disagreement with these statements 2 3 4 3 Strongly Disagree agree Know Dis- Don't Agree Strongly An expert who doesn't come up with a definite answer probably doesn't know too much. Agree 5 3- I would like to live in a foreign country for a while. 9. There is really no such thing as a problem that can't be solved. 10. People who fit their lives to a schedule probably miss most of the joy of living. 11. A good job is one where what is to be done and how it is to be done are always clear. 12. It is more fun to tackle a complicated problem than to solve a simple one. 13. In the long run it is possible to get more done by tackling small, simple problems rather than large and complicated ones. 14. Often the most interesting and stimulating people are those who don't mind being different and original. 15. What we are used to is always preferable to what is unfamiliar. 16. People who insist upon a yes or no answer just don't know how complicated things really are. 17. A person who leads an even, regular life in which few surprises or unexpected happenings arise, really has a lot to be grateful for. 18. Many of our most important decisions are based upon insufficient information. 1 9 . 21. I like parties where I know most of 1 the people more than ones where all or most of the people are complete strangers. Teachers or supervisors who hand out 1 vague assignments give a chance for one to show initiative and originality. The sooner we all acquire similar 1 values and ideals the better. 22. A good teacher is one who makes you wonder about your way of looking at things. 256 Instructions: Below is a listing of bipolar descriptions. Please circle the number that best describes the way you are most of the time. For example, on item 1, if you are not at all aggressive, you would circle 1; if you are very aggressive you would circle 5; if you aren't either, then circle 3. 23 . not at all aggressive 1 2 3 4 5 very aggressive 24 . not at all independent 1 2 3 4 5 very independent 25. not at all emotional 1 2 3 4 5 very emot ional 26. very submissive 1 2 3 4 5 very dominant 27. not at all excitable 1 2 3 4 5 very excitable in a major crisis 28. very passive 1 2 3 4 5 very active 29. not at all able to devote self completely to others 1 2 3 4 5 able to devote self com pletely to others 30. very rough 1 2 3 4 5 very gentle 31 . not at all helpful to others 1 2 3 4 5 very helpful to others 32. not at all competitive 1 2 3 4 5 very competitive 33. very home oriented 1 2 3 4 5 very worldly 34. not at all kind 1 2 3 4 5 very kind 35 . indifferent to others' 1 2 3 4 5 highly needful of others' approval 35. feelings not easily hurt 37.not at all aware of feelings of others 38. can make decisions easily 39. give up very easily 40. never cry 41. not at all self- confident 42. feel very inferior 43. not at all understanding of others 44 very cold in relations with others 45. very little need for secur i ty 46. go to pieces under pressure approval 4 5 feelings easily hurt 4 5 very aware of feelings of others 4 5 have difficulty making dec isions 4 5 never give up easily 4 5 cry very easily 4 5 very self-confident 4 5 feel very superior 4 5 very understanding of others 4 5 very warm in relations with others 4 5 very strong need for security 4 5 stand up well under pressure 257 Instructions: Each of the following items consists of a pair o'f alternatives labeled (a) or (b). Please select and circle the one statement of each pair (and only one) which you more strongly be 1 ieve to be the case. 47. a. Many of the unhappy things in people's lives are partly due to bad luck, b. People's misfortunes result from the mistakes they make. 48. a. One of the major reasons why we have wars is because people don't take enough interest in politics, b. There will always be wars, no matter how hard people try to prevent them 49. a. In the iong run people get the respect they deserve in this world. b. Unfortunately, an Individual's worth often passes unrecognized no matter how hard he tries. 50. a. The idea that teachers are unfair to students is nonsense. b. Most students don't realize the extent to which their grades are influenced by accidental happenings. 51. a. Without the right breaks one cannot be an effective leader. b. Capable people who fail to become leaders have not taken advantage of their opportunities. 52. a. No matter how hard you try some people just don't like you. b. People who can't get others to like them don't understand how to get along with others. 53.. a. I have often found that what is going to happen will happen. b. Trusting to fate has never turned out as well for me as making a decision to take a definite course of action. 34. a. In the case of the well prepared student there is rarely if ever such a thing as an unfair test. b. Many times exam questions tend to be so unrelated to course work that studying is really useless. 55. a. Becoming a success is a matter of hard work, luck has little or nothing to do with it. b. Getting a good job depends mainly on being in the right place at the right time. 56. a. The average citizen can have an influence in government decisions. b. This world is run by the few people in power, and there is not much the little guy can do about it. 57. a. When I make plans, I am almost certain that I can make them work. b. It is not always wise to plan too far ahead because many things turn cut to be a matter of good or bad fortune anyhow. 53. a. In my case getting what I want has little or nothing to do with xuc^. b. Many times we might just as well decide what to do by flipping a coin. 59. a. Who gets to be the boss often depends on who was lucky enough to be ir. the right place first. b. Getting people to do the right thing depends upon ability, luck has little or nothing to do with it. 50. a. As far as world affairs are concerned, most of us are the victims of forces we can neither understand, nor control. b. By taking an active part in political and social affairs the people can control world events. 258 5 1 , 62. 53. 54. 55. 6 6 . 57. 53 . 5 9 . a. Most people don’t realize the extent to which their lives are controlled by accidental happenings. b. There really is no such thing as "luclc". a. It is hard to know whether or not a person really likes you. b. How many friends you have depends on how nice a person you are. a. In the long run the bad things that happen to us are balanced by the good ones. b. Most misfortunes are the result of lack of ability, ignorance, laziness, or all three. a. With enough effort we can wipe out political corruption. b. It is difficult for people to have much control over the things politicians do in office. a. Sometimes I can't understand how teachers arrive at the grades they give. b. There is a direct connection between how hard I study and the grades I get. a. Many times I feel that I have little Influence over the things that happen to me. b. It is impossible for me to believe that chance or luck plays an important role in my life. a. People are lonely because they don't try to be friendly. b. There's not much use in trying too hard to please people, if they like you, they like you. a. What happens to me is my own doing. b. Sometimes I feel that I don't have enough control over the direction my life is taking. a. Most of the time I can't understand why politicians behave the way they do. b. In the long run the people are responsible for bad government on a national as well as on a local level. 7 r. str'actions: Please indicate your extent of agreement or disagreement with the following statements. 1 2 3 4 Strongly Dis- Don't Agree Disagree Agree Know TO. Having a large arsenal of nuclear 12 3 4 weapons helps to assure U.S. security. 71. I would feel more secure if the U.S. 1 2 3 4 had a greater supply of nuclear weapons. 72. In the nuclear age, a key function 1 2 3 4 of the federal government is peacekeeping through negotiation. T3. I would feel more secure if the U.S. 1 2 3 4 and the Soviet Union reduced their nuclear arsenals. 74. Competition is the basis for most 1 2 3 4 International conflicts. 75. Peace is the absence of active 1 2 3 4 conflict. 76. National security is improved when 1 2 3 4 communication and trust are promoted between all nations. 77. It is possible for international 1 2 3 4 conflicts to be resolved in a way that benefits all nations involved. 73. Long-standing world peace can best 12 3 4 be reached through non-military means and cooperation between nations. 79. Nuclear war is preventable through 1 2 3 4 the process of negotiated arms reduction agreements between nations. 30. It is possible to survive a large l 2 3 4 scale nuclear war if one is adequately prepared. 31. It is important to develop i 2 3 4 nuclear weapons to deter nuclear war. 32. In the nuclear age, a key function 1 2 3 4 of the federal government is peace keeping through deterrence (maintaining a strong military). 33. Since many conflicts between nations l 2 3 4 result from competition for goods, power, and prestige, it is necessary to maintain a strong military. 5 Strongly Agree 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 [ 260 1 2 3 4 5 Strongly Dis- Don't Agree Strongly Disagree Agree Know Agree 34. Peace can only be achieved when the unjust conditions that promote war (such as racial and religious oppression, hunger, poverty) are overcome. 35. Cooperation between nations can be achieved with consistent efforts. 86. Compromises between nations are an important and positive aspect of arms negotiations. 87. Long-standing world peace can best be attained by maintaining strong military forces. 38. Zn the event of a large scale nuclear war I think few people, if any, will survive. 89. Nuclear war is best prevented by maintaining a strong military. 90. Negotiated compromises between nations can contribute to world peace. 91. The world will be safer when the nuclear arsenals of all countries are reduced. 92. Peace requires the development of programs and institutions to facilitate communication and cooperation among individuals and nat ions. 33. Misunderstandings related to cultural and/or social backgrounds are an important part of most inter national conflicts. 94. The Star Wars Strategic Defense Initiative is an excellent example of how to maintain and promote world peace and security. 95. While survivability may be possible in a large scale nuclear war, it would not be worth it. 96. For the U.S. to maintain its position as a great nation it is important for the U.S. to maintain itself as a powerful military strength. 261 97. The greater the power of a nation's military force the more secure that nation is. 98. By active participation in the appropriate organizations, I can do a lot to reduce the chances of nuclear war. 99. This country is run by a few people in power and only they can influenci U.S. nuclear policy decisions. 100.It's chiefly a matter of fate, whether or not there will be a nuclear war. 101.Through political actions, I could influence the possiblity of a nuclear war occuring. 102.Powerful people in our society will influence the increase or decrease in the number of U.S. nuclear weapons. 103.The occurence of nuclear war in my life would simply be due to bad luck. 104.If I put my mind to it, I could have an influence on U.S. nuclear policy decisions. 105.Whether or not there is a nuclear war is completely determined by other powerful people. 106. Whether or not the number of U.S. nuclear weapons are increased or decreased is a matter of fate. 107.Whether or not there is a nuclear war depends somewhat on my own act ions. 103.Other powerful people determine U.S. nuclear policy decisions. 109.If I live the rest of my life and there isn't a nuclear war, it is because I am lucky. 110.1 feel that only a few powerful people have any important influence over whether or not there is a nuclear war. 1 2 3 4 5 trongly Dis- Don't Agree Strongly lsagree agree Know Agree 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 262 1 2 3 4 3 Strongly Ois- Don't Agree Strongly Disagree agree Know Agree 11.By efforts on my part, I can have an effect on U.S. policies involving the number and types of nuclear weapons. 12.It seems that the likelihood of nuclear war is greatly influenced by accidental happenings. 13.1 am somewhat responsible for the threat of nuclear war. 14.Other people influence increases or decreases in the number of U.S. nuclear weapons. 15.Chance will decide if there is a nuclear war or not. 263 Instructions: Below is a list of ways people cope with a wide variety of stressful life events. Please indicate how you generally deal with problems and stresses by circling the appropriate number for each strategy. 116.Criticized or lectured myself. 117.Went on as if nothing was happening. 118.1 tried to keep my feelings to myself. 119.Accepted sympathy and understanding from someone. 120.Tried to forget the whole thing. 121.Changed or grew as a person in a good way. 122.Reallzed I brought the problem on myself. 123.Got away from it for a while; tried to rest or take a vacation. 124.Tried to make myself feel better by eating, drinking, smoking, using drugs or medication. 125.Rediscovered what is important in life. 126.Avoided being with people in general. 127.Talked to someone about how I am feeling. 128.Stood my ground and fought for what I wanted. 129.Wished that I could change what was happening or how I felt. 130.Wished that the situation would go away or somehow be over with. 131.1 went over in my mind what I would say or do. Does not apply and/or not used 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 Used some what 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 Used quite a bit 2 . 2 2 2 2 2 Used a great deal 3 3 3 3 3 3 264 instructions: Please indicate your extent of agreement or Lisagreement with the following statements. 1 2 3 4 5 Strongly Dis- Don't Agree Strongly Disagree agree Know Agree 32.Never tell anyone the real reason 1 2 3 4 5 you did something unless it is useful to do so. 133.The best way to handle people is to tell them what they want to hear. 14.One should take action only when sure it is morally right. 135.Most people are basically good and kind. 136.It is safest to assume that all people have a vicious streak and it will come out when they are given a chance. 137.Honesty is the best policy in all cases. 138.There is no excuse for lying to someone else. 139.Generally speaking, people won't work hard unless they're forced to do so. 140.All in all, it is better to be humble and honest than to ,be important and dishonest. 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 141.When you ask someone to do some- 1 2 3 4 5 thing for you, it is best to give the real reasons for wanting it rather than giving reasons which carry more weight. .42.Most people who get ahead in the 1 2 3 4 5 world lead clean, moral lives. 143.Anyone who completely trusts anyone 1 2 3 4 5 is asking for trouble. 144.The biggest difference between most 1 2 3 4 5 criminals and other people is that the criminals are stupid enough to get caught. 145.Most men are brave. 1 2 3 4 146.It is wise to flatter important 1 2 3 4 people. 147.It is possible to be good in all 1 2 3 4 respects. 265 1 2 3 4 5 Strongly Dis- Don't Agree Strongly Disagree agree Know Agree 148.Barnum was wrong whan he said that there's a sucker born every minute. 149.It is hard to get ahead without cutting corners here and there. 150.People suffering from incurable diseases should have the choice of being put painlessly to death. 151.Most men forget more easily the death of their father than the loss of their property. 152.In this complicated world of ours the only way we can know what's going on is to rely on leaders or experts who can be trusted. 153.My blood boils whenever a person stubbornly refuses to admit he/she is wrong. 154.There are two kinds of people in this world: those who are for the truth and those who are against the truth. 155. Most people just don't know what's good for them. 156.Of all the different philosophies which exist in this world there is probably only one which is correct. 157.The highest form of government is a democracy and the highest form of democracy is a government run by those who are most intelligent. 158.The main thing in life is for a person to want to do something important. 159.I'd like it if I could find someone who would tell me how to solve my personal problems. 160.Most of the ideas which get printed nowadays aren't worth the paper they are printed on. 161.A person on their own is a helpless and miserable creature. 152. It is only when a person devotes themself to an ideal or cause that life becomes meaningful. 266 1 2 3 4 5 Strongly Dis- Don’t Agree Strongly Disagree agree Know Agree 163.Most people just don’t give a "damn” for others. 164.To compromise with our political opponents is dangerous because it usually leads to the betrayal of our own side. 165.lt is often desirable to reserve ! judgment about what's going on until ! one has had a chance to hear the j opinions of those one respects. ! t J 166.The present is all too often full of j unhappiness. It is only the future i that counts-. 167.The United States and Russia have just about nothing in common. 168.In a discussion I often find it necessary to repeat myself several times to make sure I am being under stood. 169. While I don't like to admit this even to myself, my secret ambition is to become a great person, like Einstein, or Beethoven, or Shakespeare. j 170.Even though freedom of speech for all groups is a worthwhile goal, it is unfortunately necessary to restrict the freedom of certain political groups. 171.It Is better to be a dead hero than to be a live coward. 267 Instructions: Each of the questions below describes an activity that relates to the issue of nuclear weapons. Read each item and then indicate if and how many times you performed that activity during the last four years. Please use the scale below. Write the number of your answer on the line in front of each item. 3 * Three or more times 2 * Two times 1 * One time 0 3 Never, or no times To shorten the items, the following "shorthand" terms are used: "Pro-nuclear weapons" means "favoring a United States policy of developing. stockpiling, and deploying nuclear weapons." "Anti-nuclear weapons" means "favoring a policy of freezing, reducing, or eliminating nuclear weapons by the United States." 172. Turning a conversation to the subject of nuclear weapons so you could present an "anti-nuclear weapons" point of view. 173. Turning a conversation to the subject of nuclear weapons so you could present a "pro-nuclear weapons" point of view. 174. In a conversation, saying that production by the U.S. of nuclear weapons should be decreased or stopped, when the subject was brought up. 175. In a conversation, saying that production by the U.S. of nuclear weapons should be maintained at its current level or expanded, when the subject was brought up. 176. Trying to convince a friend or acquaintance that production by the U.S. of nuclear weapons should be maintained at its current level or expanded. _177. Trying to convince a friend or acquaintance that production by the U.S. of nuclear weapons should be decreased or stopped. _178. Contributing money to an organization that attempts to change public opinion or laws in an "anti-nuclear weapons" direction. _179. Contributing money to an organization that attempts to change public opinion or laws in a "pro-nuclear weapons" direction. _180. Trying to convince a relative that the U.S. should freeze production and deployment of nuclear weapons. _l81. Trying to convince a relative that the U.S. should continue to produce and deploy nuclear weapons. _132. Signing an "anti-nuclear weapons" petition. _183. Signing a "pro-nuclear weapons" petition. _184. Attending a meeting of an organization or group that attempts to change public opinion or laws in a "pro-nuclear weapons" direction. _185. Attending a meeting of an organization or group that attempts to change public opinion or laws in an "anti-nuclear weapons" direction. 268 Instructions: Please indicate your extent of agreement or disagreement with tie following statements. 1 2 3 4 5 Strongly Dis- Don't Agree Strongly Disagree agree Xnow Agree ia6.Nuclear power plants are a safe means of energy production. 137.1 am quite concerned about how many countries have nuclear weapons. 138.1 would feel frightened if 1 lived within ten miles of a nuclear plant. 189.It is essential for our protection that my country produce as many nuclear weapons as possible. 190.Nuclear power plants are an efficient (cost effective) energy source. 191.1 imagine there will be a nuclear war in the next 10 years. 192.There is a strong link between nuclear power plants and nuclear weapons. 193.It is a good for other countries that the United States supplies them with nuclear power plants. 194.1 feel frightened when I think of all tlie nuclear weapons in the world. 195.1 imagine I would survive a nuclear war. 196.1 have never really worried about nuclear war. 197.Many people tend to overreact about the threat of nuclear war. 198. There are times' I have felt depressed thinking about the possibility of nuclear war. 199.The world feels like a very dan gerous place because of so many nuclear weapons. 200.1 have no hesitancy about raising a child with the threat of nuclear war. 269 ' -r.structicr.s: Please provide the following information. 201. Age:________ 202. S e x : Male ___ Female___ 203. Racial/ethnic background: Asian ___ 31ack_____________ ___ Caucasian ___ Hispanic ___ Native American ___ Other (specify) ____________ 204. Year in college: Freshperson ______ Sophmore____________ Junior_______________ Senior_______________ Graduate (specify degree in progress) _________________ 205. Academic ma jor : ___________ 206. Grade point average to date: ______________ 207. Years of education that you expect to complete: Some college but no degree (specify number of years) College graduate Graduate training: Masters Doctorate Other (specify) 208. What was your total fa subsidized by your parent; income. Otherwise, answe combined income if marri signifcant other): Below 10,000___ _______ 10,000-20.000 ______ 20.000-30,000________ 30.000-40,000________ 40.000-50,000________ 209. Religious affiliation: Catholic________________ Jewish____________ ______ Protestant_______ ______ Other (specify) _______ 210. Registered to vote: Yes ______ No ______ 211. Political affilation: Democrat ______ Independent ______ Republican ______ Other (specify) ______ i I i mily income last year? If you are student being s, please answer with respect to your parents' r in terms of your own househoId income (i.e., ed or cohabitating and sharing finances with 50.000-60,000 60.000-70,000 70.000-30,000 80.000-90,000 90.000-100,000 Over 100,000 270 * 212. Do you consider yourself: Very conservative ______ Conservative________________ ______ Moderate ______ Liberal ______ Very liberal _____ _ 213.With what organizations or special programs are you affiliated (i.e. social, political, religious, academic)? Some examples of organizations or special programs include fraternities/sororities, ROTC, Black Student Union, Students for Peace and Justice, Campus Crusade for Christ, and Young Republicans. Please identify your affiliation with these, or other. organizations or special *programs.

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Asset Metadata

Creator Johnson, Melissa Jean (author)

Core Title Attitudes toward achieving peace : a measure of "peace through strength" and "peace through cooperation" and the relationship of these attitudes with affective, coping, personality, and gender co...

Degree Doctor of Philosophy

Degree Program Education-Counseling Psychology

Publisher University of Southern California (original), University of Southern California. Libraries (digital)

Tag education, educational psychology,OAI-PMH Harvest

Language English

Contributor Digitized by ProQuest (provenance)

Permanent Link (DOI) https://doi.org/10.25549/usctheses-c26-536913

Unique identifier UC11245175

Identifier usctheses-c26-536913 (legacy record id)

Legacy Identifier DP25341.pdf

Dmrecord 536913

Document Type Dissertation

Rights Johnson, Melissa Jean

Type texts

Source University of Southern California (contributing entity), University of Southern California Dissertations and Theses (collection)

Access Conditions The author retains rights to his/her dissertation, thesis or other graduate work according to U.S. copyright law. Electronic access is being provided by the USC Libraries in agreement with the au...

Repository Name University of Southern California Digital Library

Repository Location USC Digital Library, University of Southern California, University Park Campus, Los Angeles, California 90089, USA