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A study of hypocrisy: A comparison of French and American variations of treatment in selected dramas

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A study of hypocrisy: A comparison of French and American variations of treatment in selected dramas

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Content A STUDY OF HYPOCRISY: A COMPARISON OF FRENCH AND AMERICAN VARIATIONS OF TREATMENT IN SELECTED DRAMAS by Raleigh Carson Robinette A Thesis Presented to the FACULTY OF THE GRADUATE SCHOOL UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA In Partial Fulfillment of the , Requirements for the Degree MASTER OF ARTS (Comparative Literature) January 1962 UMI Number: EP55091 All rights reserved INFORMATION TO ALL USERS The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted. In the unlikely event that the author did not send a complete manuscript and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed, a note will indicate the deletion. Published by ProQuest LLC (2014). Copyright in the Dissertation held by the Author. Dissertation Ptofcilish in g UMI EP55091 Microform Edition © ProQuest LLC. All rights reserved. This work is protected against unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code ProQuest LLC. 789 East Eisenhower Parkway P.O. Box 1346 Ann Arbor, Ml 48106-1346 UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA G RADUATE SCHO OL U N IV E R S IT Y PARK LOS A N G ELES 7, C A L IF O R N IA ) |37</ ^ 60 '65 R 656 j o ' f 1 This thesis, written by RaXiaigh..CamQa..RQbineJLte.. ... under the direction of h%fk...—Thesis Committee, and approved by all its members, has been pre sented to and accepted by the Dean of the Graduate School, in partial fulfillm ent of re quirements fo r the degree of c| R/iis............... . . . ... Dean Date...... J IS CQMMITTE Chairman TABLE OF CONTENTS i 1 Chapter Page i I. INTRODUCTION . . ........ . . . . . .......... 1 II. REVIEW OF LITERARY AND SCIENTIFIC ATTITUDES . . 26 III. COMPARISON OF DRAMATIC TREATMENT IN SOCIAL PLAYS .................... 52 Emile Augier's Le Mariage d'Olvmpe........ 52 George Kelly's Craig's Wife ......... 65 IV. COMPARISON OF DRAMATIC TREATMENT IN PLAYS OF RELIGIOUS HYPOCRISY........... 89 Hatcher Hughes* Hell-Bent fer Heaven ....... 89 Moliere's Tartuffe ...................... 99 V. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS..................... 119 BIBLIOGRAPHY.................................... 124 ii CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION i ( i - ■ ! Of the many writers who have referred to hypocrisy, or who have made use of it in various ways, none shows more clearly than Moliere that the existence and depiction of this vice in plays can serve as a warning that moral re adjustments are needed. He was not the originator of hypocrisy as a literary theme. He had many predecessors,1 ,but none of the others had ever so clearly delineated the jharmful effects of hypocrisy. Much of the excitement and opposition to his play, Tartuffe. can logically be ex plained on this basis. Morally, it seemed wrong to Moliere to have an outsider involved in intimate family affairs. The practice was particularly dangerous when such a spirit- ual overseer was a hypocrite as was Tartuffe. The warning was sounded. Powerful individuals interested in fostering the existing religious supervisors disagreed and attempted to block Moliere*s warning by preventing a public hearing ^See Daniel Momet, Histoire Generale de la Littera- ture Francaise (Paris, 1939), pp. 131-132. 1 of the play.^ A struggle ensued. Moliere was finally victorious. A similar warning of the need for moral readjustment can he seen in each of the three other plays which consti tute a part of this thesis. This is one of the reasons for their selection. Hatcher Hughes* Hell-Bent fer Heaven (1924), Pulitzer award comedy which deals like Tartuffe with religious hypocrisy, depicts the devastating and near- tragic consequences of its practice on an unsophisticated mountain family of North Carolina. Craig's Wife (1925), another Pulitzer award play by George Kelly, is a clear ! warning that a marriage based on hypocrisy can only end in i dismal failure and unhappiness. An equally clear warning !is sounded by Emile Augier's play Le Mariage d'Olympe (1855) against hastily contracted marriages with women of questionable character. Courtesans, Emile Augier says, do not make good wives. A duck always misses his mire. There will always be "homesickness for the mud. These warnings are no doubt a part of the recognized purpose of comedy.^ In so far as the general aspects ^See John Palmer, Moliere (New York, 1930), p. 343. ^A striking phrase used by Emile Augier. See Camille and Other Plays, edited with an introduction to the well- made play f e y Stephen S. Stanton (New York, 1957), p. 170. ^See T. W. Craik, "Some Aspects of Satire in Wycher ley's Plays," English Studies. 41:168, June 1960. of hypocrisy are concerned, it can be noted that many play wrights have ably depicted this vice. In France, Charles iSorel, Scarron, Urbain Chevreau, Eugene Scribe, Henri |Becque, Jules Remains, Marcel Pagnol, Jean Anouilh, Jean Giraudoux, Henri de Montherlant, and Marcel Ayrne, for ! example. In America, Clyde Fitch, Rodgers and Hart, George S. Kaufman and Marc Connelly, Arthur Miller, Ten nessee Williams, Lillian Heilman, and William Saroyan are noteworthy. Countless tragedies depict elements of hy pocrisy, or show characters practicing certain degrees of i idissimulation. The plays which do not contain some hypo- i critical character, depict, or refer to some element of hypocrisy are the exception. No stronger proof of its significance as a dramatic tool is to be found. Proof that the portrayal of hypocrisy in comedy can offer a clear warning of a need for moral readjustment can obviously best be found in juxtaposition of personal experience with dramatic representations. Such juxtaposition can, of course, make it clear that the truth is essential to an effective, unfettered life. Underlying the choice of hypocrisy as a topic, in fact, is the assumption that the truth is important in understanding and solving problems of all types. Dis simulation is a denial of the truth, whether practiced deliberately or unconsciously. Mild degrees may often be harmless enough, but in more severe forms hypocrisy often leads to complications and frustrations. It is this the dramatist would have us recognize. It is this that both sociologist and psychologist can confirm, often see ing hypocrisy result from the discrepancy between asserted ideals and actual practice, with the practice often being controlled by custom and social pressure to a point where hypocrisy seems inevitable in some instances. Such an instance is the rationale of equality to which, as a nation, we have been committed, but which, in actual prac tice, we do not carry out very well. Hence, the warning for moral readjustment, and hence, the reason why it may apply on a personal or community basis. On either level, 'the dramatic depiction of hypocrisy can serve as a warning. Failure to heed the warning can often result in a deepening of the trouble at either the personal or community level with resultant unhappiness, for, as Ibsen says, ''Everyone shares the responsibility and guilt of the society to which he or she belongs.'*** Nora's failure, for example, to heed -'Benjamin Ginsburg in an article titled **Hypoerisy as a Pathological Symptom,* * International Journal of Ethics. 32:163, January 1922, states: "For the trained sociologist, the appearance of hypocrisy is in itself a sufficient warning of the need of a moral readjustment. But for the general public, hypocrisy passes unnoticed until it pro vokes an explosion of fanaticism which finally focuses the moral issue before the community.” £ J. N. Lauvik and M. Morrison, Letters of Hendrick [sicl Ibsen (New York, 1905), Letter 142. the warnings about her marriage in A Doll’s House only resulted in a worsening of the pretense which characterized her marriage. Hypocrisy is the quicksand of human relationships. It is important to understand all we can about its nature. Drama offers a rich, rewarding field in which to seek ; understanding. This thesis is a part of such a search. Its purpose is to present a comparison of French and Ameri can dramatic treatment of hypocrisy, utilizing the plays already named. These particular plays have been chosen for the pur pose of being able to deal with the two major types of hypocrisy, religious and social. Since Moliere1s Tartuffe is the universally recognized French masterpiece of reli gious hypocrisy, its choice requires no explanation. Hell- Bent fer Heaven, by Hatcher Hughes, seems to me to be the best of the American plays with a similar theme. It was, therefore, chosen for that reason, and because, like Moliere*s play, it, too, sounds a warning. In considering the complex area of social hypocrisy, it was decided that marriage, from both the personal and community level, is the most important social relationship utilized by drama tists. The problem, then, was to discover which of the many French and American plays dealing with hypocritical relationships in marriage represents the best for both countries in terms of a well-developed theme, and which, at the same time, clearly constitutes a warning of the need Iof a moral readjustment. I I It is believed that Emile Augier in Le Marriage d * Olympe does this best for France, while George Kelly in Craig’s Wife represents the best for America. Thus, the principle of selection was based on the idea of choosing the two best plays for each country in the two principal areas of hypocrisy, religious and social, with the stipula tion that the theme clearly constitute a warning that moral readjustments are needed and that historical, sociological, and psychological data can be marshalled in each instance in support of the truth of the dramatist’s contention. Since plays depict human behavior, and, to an extent, evaluate behavior, it is evident that drama (particularly drama that deals with hypocrisy) is closely related to philosophy, sociology, psychology, psychiatry, and psycho analysis. In other words, any consideration of hypocrisy actually is extremely complicated. Something of the breadth and complexity of the subject will be presented in Chapter II. This chapter demonstrates the confirmation of dramatic contentions which is possible through an examina tion of the findings from other studies. Following this review, consideration is given to the selected plays of religious hypocrisy (Chapter III), and to the two social 7 plays which deal with social hypocrisy (Chapter IV). Chap ter V presents the summary and conclusions. It is not possible, of course, to deal with all of the literary, philosophical, or psychological works involved, as this would be too extensive and too technical. The following list of types of hypocrisy is indicative of the ! scope and complexity of the problem. ^ The first eight types, with many possible variations, generally constitute conscious hypocrisy. The last six types, also with many possible variations, are usually unconscious. 1. The politician or public servant who, truly motivated by greed, or a desire for power, pre tends to be conscientious, and filled with a desire to serve his fellow man, his city, state, or country. 2. The religious hypocrite who really has no true faith or piety, but pretends to be very pious in order to gain riches, promotions, power, a sexual conquest, or some other object incompatible with his pious expressions. 3. The grave, learned professional person who has recourse to Latin, or similar devices, to cover ^The classification is my own. It is based on the reading of plays and novels in which hypocrites appear, and on an examination of essays and texts connected with the subject. ignorance. He may refer to impressive past accomplishments in languages or mathematics in pretending to a dignity, and to an erudition he knows he does not really possess. The military hypocrite with whom strategic errors become "difficult campaigns” or working under "adverse conditions,” and in whom alcoholism can become "gastroenteritis." The lawyer hypocrite who often presents a bold "front,” who wears expensive suits and conveys the false impression that there are more clients than can possibly be handled. His "justice” is often seen as an acquittal. The executive and salesman hypocrite who resembles the lawyer but is often less suave. He, too, is likely to wear expensive suits, or sometimes imitations of expensive suits. His jewelry is likely to be noticeable, as will his latest car. He will make frequent references to important people he pretends to know, and generally will refer to impressive "deals” and large sums of money well calculated to nonplus the nai’ ve. The important-family hypocrite who pretends to have very important ancestors; is the descendant of important, distinguished people. Sometimes he has been known to purchase portraits in order to have "ancestors" to show off to friends. 8. The Everyman hypocrite who is the person who says, "I*m so glad you could come," "Sorry to hear you*re ill," "So glad to have seen you,” etc. He is the person of the courteous reply, "The little white lie” whose hypocrisy is generally regarded as harmless, or even as desirable. 9. The Oedipus wish hypocrite (as in the case of Hamlet), or similar types. Sometimes exists in men who rationalize their failure to fall in love and marry by saying they "have to support Mother." 10. The Euripidean-Clytemnestra or Electra person with whom there is a possibility of an Electra father- fixation complex; of a hatred for a mother, partly because the mother has committed an act similar to that of Clytemnestra’s when she joined Aegisthus. Whatever action she takes against the mother can be rationalized as duty to the father. Clytem- nestra*s desire for and acceptance of a lover during her husband’s absence, can also be rationalized in various ways. 11. The doctor hypocrite who is scientific. He is not a business man. He is a humanitarian. To the penniless man he says, "The operation would not 10 do you any good.” To the rich man, suffering from the same condition, but with the prospect of a fat fee, he says, ’ ’ The operation might help.’ 1 12. The frustration hypocrite who needs a scapegoat. His unhappiness and frustration are blamed on some O innocent bystander. 13. The malingerer who pretends to be ill to escape some unpleasant situation. Sometimes he pretends to be less ill than he is for the same reason. He may practice dissimulation or asimulation. According to psychiatrists, the practice may be a symptom of a serious mental disease. 14. The humble hypocrite who pretends modesty, humility, and who is self-effacing. He comforts himself unconsciously for lack of power, recogni tion, etc. Technically, his behavior is called ’ ’ deferential submissive behavior.” These examples make it clear that many instances of hypocrisy can be connected with Freud’s contention that man wants to be loved, with Adler’s that he wants to be Q Norman R. F. Maier, Frustration, The Study of Be havior Without a Goal (New York, 1949), p. 101, cites Hovland and Sears who ’ ’ found that the number of lynchings of Negroes in the South was negatively correlated with the price of cotton. Frustration caused by low cotton prices is regarded as the instigator of aggression and the Negro becomes the innocent bystander who is attacked.” 11 significant, or with Jung's that he wants security. "No one," however, says Sherman, "has as yet been able to classify the emotions into a logical system."^ He lists anger, love, joy, sorrow, depression, elation, anxiety. i Earlier, Watson had indicated the same difficulty when he said, "Hard and fast definitions are not possible in the psychology of emotion."^® He himself lists fear, rage, and i love as basic. Regardless of how they are classified, how- lever, it is obvious that hypocrisy has its origins in these primary emotions. Examine, say, Jung's idea that man wants security most of all. This will no doubt account for many instances of hypocrisy. A man pretends, for example, to be a good friend in order to get a business contract for goods and services, or he pretends to possess whatever virtues and talents seem necessary to win a promotion for the sake of more money. In all of these possibilities it may be the money that is wanted. Money apparently makes him feel secure. Why any given person has an excessive need for security constitutes a difficult question to answer and may involve some conditions in which, according to some, ^See Mandel Sherman, Basic Problems of Behavior (New York, 1941), p. 15. ^John B. Watson, Psychology from the Standpoint of a Behaviorist (Philadelphia, 1919), p. 195. he is quite powerless to behave in any other way 12 11 Although this viewpoint is vigorously presented by a | 1 o formidable array of scholars, it is not unchallenged. i |Hintz, for example, states: For the fact is that scientifically and empirically we are at the present moment far from having a complete knowledge of the meaning and dimensions of human charac ter structure or, most significantly, of the complexity of the forces that create, modify, or alter this struc- j ture or, most significantly, of the degree to which the human organism contains within itself the autonomous power to alter, to originate, to create, and thus to overcome previous conditioning. It has yet to be demonstrated empirically and scientifically, that acts of will, choices and new conditioning forces may not radically alter character structure itself.13 i i | To this Hook adds that "we are responsible, whether jwe admit it or not, for what it is in our power to do; and most of the time we can*t be sure what it is in our power John Hospers, "What Means This Freedom?” in Deter minism and Freedom in the Age of Modern Science (New York, 1958), p. 114, stated: "He may fight with all the strength of which he is capable, but it is not enough. And we, who are rational enough at least to exonerate a man in a situ ation of 'overpowering impulse* when we recognize it to be one, do not even recognize this as an example of it; and so, in addition to being swept away in the flood that child hood conditions rendered inevitable, he must also endure our lectures, our criticisms, and our moral excoriation." 12 See also Paul Edwards, "Hard and Soft Determinism," in Determinism and Freedom in the Age of Modern Science, ■ p . J o T . 1 ! 13 Howard W. Hintz, "Some Further Reflections on Moral Responsibility," in Determinism and Freedom in the Age of Modem Science, p. X f f i T . “ to do until we attempt it.”^ Further indications o£ the nature, scope, and com plexity of hypocrisy would be superfluous for the present, iIt seems clear that it has been universally recognized l as a species of vice. Its generic opposite of course is virtue. There is some question, however, as to whether what constitutes vice and virtue has been universally agreed upon. Greeks and Romans, for example, were tucider no obligation either to believe or say that all men are created equal. For them, therefore, there was no question ! of hypocrisy when they behaved differently toward aristo crat, freedman, or slave. Our sociological literature, ihowever, indicates that while we say t ( one man is as good « 1 C as another, that, in actual practice, we do not behave as though this were true. Such a situation leads to a discrepancy between avowed ideals, codes of morality, and actual practice which leaves both the individual and the community open to the charge of hypocrisy. We often con tinue to act like the Greek or Roman aristocrat without his moral milieu. ■^Sidney Hook, "Necessity, Indeterminism, and Senti mentalism," in Determinism ana Freedom in the Age of Modem Science, p. 17. Lloyd Warner, Democracy in Jonesville (New York, 1949), pp. 33, 293. Numerous other examples could be utilized to indicate the changing nature of morality, of virtue, of vice, and, specifically, of hypocrisy. It is doubtful, however, if anything in literature— epics, dramas, novels, or scholarly sociological, anthropological, or psychological works— could show any real change in, say, courage and its opposite, cowardice. People of all times have recognized courage as a virtue. True, the fashions in courage may alter slightly, but it is still courage for all that. It may be appropriate, therefore, to ask if some of the changes may not be more apparent than real. It is the rather constant, unchanging elements such as courage which give rise to a belief in the "universals" of literature. From this point of view, what are the universal, relatively unchanging elements of hypocrisy? If courage is accepted as being universally admired, then its opposite, cowardice, must be universally despised, or at least criticized as undesirable and classified as a vice. If this is accepted as true, what happens in terms of hypocrisy? Knowing cowardice to be despised, what if, despite this--and remembering Schopenhauer*s epigram that ”a man can do what he wills to do, but he cannot determine what he wills”--a man is fearful and behaves cowardly under certain circumstances? Would he not, then, attempt to hide his fear? If he pretends to possess a courage he does not 15 feel and knows that he does not feel, he is being hypo critical. It would then constitute what Sadler calls an attempt to conceal weakness.^ He lists several in the 1 following manner. We try to conceal our weaknesses by a. Masquerading— wearing a mask. b. Putting our best foot forward. c. Philanthropy and other altruistic performances. d. Joining groups— clubs, societies, and associations. e. Diverse sicknesses and even insanity. f. Suicide. Man wants to be loved, or perhaps another way of say ing the same thing is that he is afraid of not being loved, or of being despised; so he pretends to a courage he does not feel, or he pretends to possess other virtues which are actually not present. Thus, any of these ways in which we try to conceal our weaknesses may possibly result in conscious or unconscious hypocrisy. Essentially it results from efforts to satisfy basic drives or wants: the desire for new experience, for security, for response, and for recognition.^ Failure to find satisfaction may result in dissimulation, or in conflict, which, in turn, will lead to further hypocrisy. As there are conflicts of varying 1 f i William S. Sadler, Modem Psychiatry (St. Louis, 1945), p. 142. 17 Millard Spencer Everett, Ideals of Life (New York, 1954), pp. 38, 65-66. complexity and depth it also follows that there are various degrees of hypocrisy. This fact seems to have been under ! consideration in the scathing portrayal and denunciation in Matt., xxiii: "Woe to you scribes and Pharisees, hypo crites; because you tithe mint, and anise, and cummin, and have left the weightier things of the law; judgment, and mercy, and faith* These things you ought to have done, and i - not to leave those undone. Blind guides who strain out a I I |gnat, and swallow a camel" (w. 23, 24). In short, any pretension to qualities not actually ■ possessed, any assumption of a false appearance of virtue or religion, any pretense of having goodness where it is actually lacking constitutes hypocrisy. It is believed jthat it may be the most detestable and detested of all vices when consciously practiced for a narrow, selfish aim. While it is recognized that some aims in this sense are more despicable than others, it is also the contention of this thesis that rationalizations*1 ® are equally degrading, 18 A. G. Tansley, The New Psychology and Its Relation to Life (New York, 1925), p. 1&2, defines rationalization as "the production of a ‘reason* for, as distinct from the true cause or motive of, an act or conation. The complex responsible for the act or conation is not recognized by the mind as a legitimate ground of action, either because it is an unconscious complex and therefore cannot be recog nized at all, or because, though the mind may be conscious or half conscious of its existence, there is conflict with some other important complex, which is felt to have a prior equally to be avoided. They are so regarded by the play wrights with whom this study is concerned, and by other dramatists. Unconscious hypocrisy is even more frequently and increasingly encountered in both drama and personal experience than is the conscious variety. The increase in dramatic representations is probably due to the growth and expansion of psychological, psychiatric, and psycho analytical studies. Dramatic warnings of the need for moral readjustment are concerned with both types as is this study. Dramatists have concerned themselves since very early times with warnings of the need for moral readjustment. That sociologists and psychologists share their concern has already been indicated. A more detailed consideration and review of some of the writings related to hypocrisy makes claim in determining conduct. A ground in harmony with this last complex is then unconsciously sought.'* He also states (p. 119): "The acts resulting from a complex which is not in harmony with the mind as a whole, and of which one is ashamed, are generally rationalized. that is to say, some reason is given for the acts which has nothing to do with their true cause, but which is intended to satisfy the mind, or some outside enquirer, that the acts are justified. This type of rationalization is called a defense reaction. Defense reactions, like hypocrisy, are often *the homagewhich vice pays to virtue,* that is to say, they are a concession to morality, to the moral code of the herd, and as such are due to herd instinct; or they may be a defense against the higher ethical self of the individual. Examples of defense reactions are of everyday occurrence, and it is quite a mistake to suppose that they represent conscious hypocrisy.” 18 this clear. It is evident that sociologists and psycholo gists share the belief that the dramatist’s concern with .hypocrisy should be encouraged. Flugel says, It is pretty generally agreed that the problem of rebuilding our tottering society upon a sounder basis is to some extent a moral problem, in the sense that its solution depends upon an appeal to the moral im pulses of man. *9 Dramatists of course make a strong appeal to moral im pulses. In a sense, a playwright like Moliere was a moral critic who appealed strongly and effectively to such im pulses. Is such moral criticism justified? Many present- day writers think it is. Richard Brandt has this to say: Moral criticism, like legal sanctions, is a device for social control that is justified--at any rate, among other things,— by its good effects. . . .We must remem ber that, if we are to advocate moral criticism as a means of social control for the sake of the general wel fare, we must specify the conditions necessary for the application of moral criticism. If moral criticism is to be effective it must be sincere, and if it is to be sincere the critic must be so constructed that he genuinely disapproves of the behavior or character trait he is criticising; the capacity to be unfavorably excited toward persons who misbehave must be built i n .20 The sincerity Brandt calls for is a necessary, in dispensable element of the successful play. Obviously he was not thinking in terms of plays specifically, but where 19 J. C. Flugel, Man, Morals, and Society. A Psycho- Analytical Study (New York, 1945), p. 9. on Richard Brandt, "Determinism and the Justifiability of Moral Blame," in Determinism and Freedom in the Age of Modem Science (New York, 1958), p. 139. 19 could any more powerful instrument for social control be found? Emotional identification carries an influence and a power that no mere amount of talking, or recitation of facts can ever achieve. Even if there is no such thing as free-will, as is maintained by the psychoanalysts and many others,^1 and even if some elements of the current moral criticisms and disapprovals of some dramatists may be in error, the actual and potential power of the dramatist when functioning at a high level cannot be disputed. The work of Eugene 0*Neill, of Arthur Miller, and of many other playwrights shows clearly enough that dramatists do respond to the findings of modern research. The more complete and accurate the research findings are, the stronger will be the impact on dramatists, for, through research, the dramatist*s own observations, intuitions, and insights can find the confirmation and support sometimes needed. His warnings should then sound clear and sharp. The warnings of needed moral readjustment and moral criticism, are not, however, the only ways in which drama may serve society. There is another possible way. It lies in the therapeutic value of drama. Reference has already 21 See John Hospers, "Free-Will and Psychoanalysis," in Readings in Ethical Theory (New York, 1952), p. 560. 20 been made to the fact that psychoanalysis and drama have much in common. For one thing, both have a close con nection with moral concepts. Other connections can be seen by a brief review of the essential facts connected with psychoanalysis. It began as a means of treating certain individuals and of trying to alleviate certain mental or nervous conditions with the psychotherapeutic method, the object being "to make the unconscious conscious, to render the patient aware of certain thoughts, memories, emotions, and desires which had been, or had become, inaccessible to consciousness” (Flugel, p. 28). i It was found that this process of increasing the scope of the patient*s awareness of the contents of his own mind had itself a therapeutic effect; it was as though the mere fact of the inaccessibility to consciousness of certain psychic contents was intimately connected with the occurrence of the mental trouble that had led the patient to the doctor. It was therefore inferred that ! the increase in awareness of the contents of one*s own mind was (at any rate under certain circumstances) desirable. Flugel also points out that as a means of treatment the method is the direct opposite of certain traditional measures: the one, for example, in which the patient is % urged to put aside his troubles, or to forget them by means of occupational therapy, and where, sometimes with hypno tism, efforts are made to persuade the patient that his 22 Flugel, pp. 28-29. troubles (since they have no organic basis) really do not exist; that he is really very well, etc. ’ ’ The method also differs,” says Flugel, ”from those straightforward ccrasnon- isense procedures in which the patient is told to pull him self together and to exercise his will."23 [The method] shows rather (as has often been pointed out) a certain resemblance, on the one hand to the insti tution of confession, which bids the penitent review the immoral thoughts and actions of his past, and on the other hand to the various precepts and procedures which emphasize the advantage of fully expressing one's emotion— from Aristotle's theory of tragedy as a pro cess of purging or catharsis through the intense arousal of pity and terror to such homely injunctions as *Get it off your chest, man* or 'Have a good cry, dearie.'2^ In this same way, it follows, then, that drama is use ful to society. A Tartuffe seeing his hypocritical ill ness portrayed would gain an awareness of the illness and thus receive the benefit of a "treatment” in the theatre or through the reading of a play. There are certain objec tions to this possibility which should be pointed out, however. It is possible that the Tartuffes might be so ill that they would be unable to see that the portrayal de picted elements common to their own lives. Even those who suffer from milder "cases” of hypocrisy might not profit therapeutically from seeing the symptoms displayed. 23Flugel, p. 28. 2^Flugel, p. 29. Failure might be due to what Jung called a "defense re** action" which is a type of rationalization cited by ^Tansley: i ... Jung tells of the Alpine climber whose libido is inadequate to enable him to overcome some obstacle in his path, though his physical powers are in fact ade quate to the task. If his mind is adapted to reality he recognizes both facts, and confesses that he "funks" the obstacle. Otherwise he takes the easy path of rational ization and declares the ascent to be physically impos sible. He refuses to recognize the failure of his will to make the ascent, the baffling of his conation by fear, because he is ashamed of it. and prefers to attribute the failure to physical factors over which he has no control* Very likely he grossly exaggerates the actual physical difficulties. Here we have a case of regression in a generalized form— the infantile habit of blaming i the wrong thing when an obstacle is encountered, because i the mind cannot or will not recognize the true cause of ! the failure. Such a mind is incompletely adapted to j reality. . . • And we are not slow to charge with dis honesty a man who resorts habitually to false defenses of such a nature. This is a fair charge if the man is really conscious or even half conscious of the true cause of failure, but it can hardly be sustained if. as is often the case, he is unconscious of it.25 The theatre could hardly hope to accomplish what some times requires determined, prolonged medical treatment. It does seem reasonable to believe, however, that the "half conscious." or those whose minds are partially adapted to reality, could profit from the theatre therapy, or from the reading of plays and other literary works. Since hy pocrisy, by all accounts, is so widespread, surely it could ^Tansley, pp. 182-183 23 be reduced among the "normal" practitioners. Surely the garden variety of hypocrites who are considered fairly well adapted to reality, could see themselves when their actor "double” shows how they look. Surely there is less hypocrisy in town after a play like Tartuffe has been presented. But how can such possible changes be measured? How much can conduct be changed by dramatic portrayals? How much can the "root of the unrest*' be changed by insight based on careful dramatic representations and the study of these in various courses of literature? While it would seem certain that the theatre plays an important part, it would be difficult indeed to know the exact dimensions of the influence exerted. As was previously remarked, a consideration of hy pocrisy leads one toward very complex questions. A few other relevant questions are as follows: 1. Do Americans agree on what constitutes virtue? 2. Is a conscious, systematic effort made through educational processes to implement particular ideas of virtue? 3. Should dramatists be concerned with moral appeals? 4. If more playwrights utilized the psychoanalytic concepts of behavior, would the level of "self- understanding" for hypocrites and those showing evidence of other vices be raised? 24 5. If greater understanding resulted, would this have a tendency to cure those afflicted with hypocrisy? 6. Assuming hypocrisy to be an individual expression of a collective illness, brought about by a dis crepancy between ideals and practices in a com munity, could greater knowledge of its true nature cause reactions which would militate toward bringing about changes in the underlying causa tive conditions? 7. In America where the ideal of education for all exists, is there danger that our government, our educators, and teachers will, because of resist ance to education, suffer from a lack of faith similar to that of the Romans who went on ob serving mere ceremonials and forms after real faith was dead? If this happens, and if there is too much discrepancy between ideals and practice, will this result in a sweeping hypocrisy affect ing the granting of diplomas, degrees, and edu cational processes in general? Will there be more rationalizations to justify economy and to avoid spending money for remedial reading, etc.? Perhaps further review of some of the writings con nected with hypocrisy will help to provide answers to these questions. There can be little doubt, at any rate, that hypocrisy is broad, complex, and dangerous to both |spiritual and social well being. Many philosophers, |sociologists, and psychologists have said so, and continue t to say so. The purpose, limitations, scope, and general conten tions of this thesis have been indicated. Some of the characteristics, complexities, and possibilities of con firmation of dramatic contentions concerning hypocrisy have also been reviewed. Further illustrations of the com- iplexity of the subject and the concern of dramatists and other writers with hypocrisy will be seen in Chapter II. CHAPTER II REVIEW OF LITERARY AND SCIENTIFIC ATTITUDES There can be no doubt that, as Warnock and Anderson I state, "Western civilization was born with the Greeks."^6 i jit is then appropriate that this examination should begin with that civilization. In beginning, one thinks immedi ately of the Age of the Tyrants and of those rulers who conceived of using propaganda, who collected and used writers to aid in their projects. Certainly it is reason- able to believe that certain degrees of hypocrisy, con scious or unconscious, could be found to have been present in these efforts. One remembers, too, the "guest-friend" 1 of the Greek Heroic Age. Any stranger must be sent off better than he was when he came. A Greek could not turn anyone away, nor could he ask questions until the guest had eaten. Once having eaten, however, the guest was obliged to tell the truth in response to questions, while the host was obligated to give a parting gift. Despite this custom, Odysseus, as shown in the Odyssey did not always tell ^^See Robert Warnock and George K. Anderson, The World in Literature (New York, 1950), I, 85. 26 27 the truth. Since an epic hero embodies national character istics, and since Odysseus was often underhanded and sly, here is an indication that elements of his character which would fit into a definition of hypocrisy were, neverthe less, accepted and admired by the Greeks. Obviously the Greeks failed to recognize certain acts as being what we would call hypocritical, and yet in Book IX of the Iliad Achilles makes it quite clear that he is fully aware of hypocrisy, and that he despises the hypocritical person: Achilles answered: "Odysseus, noble son of Laertes, I should give you formal notice plainly and in all fixity of purpose that there be no more of this cajoling, from whatsoever quarter it may come. Him do I hate even as the gates of hell who says one thing while he hides another in his heart."27 Later Achilles also accuses Phoenix of dissimulation, remarking: "I say further— and lay my saying to your heart— vex me no more with this weeping and lamentation, all in the cause of the son of Atreus. Love him so well, and you may lose the love I bear you." (p. 141) Odysseus, however, does not share this distaste for hypocrisy and dissimulation. When Penelope berates the suitors for not giving presents and for eating meals at someone else's expense, Homer says: Odysseus was delighted at this speech. He liked to see her extorting tribute from her lovers and bewitching 27 Homer, The Iliad, translated by W. H. D. Rouse (New York, 1942), p. 134. 28 them by her coquetry, while all the time her heart was set on quite a different c o u r s e .28 It can be noted in the Odyssey also that Hermes eats before answering Calypso*s questions. "The goddess now put some ambrosia on a table, drew it beside him, and mixed him1 a cup of red nectar. When he had dined and refreshed him self, he answered Calypso’s questions" (pp. 90-91). It is quite evident in Calypso’s conversation that she is ad hering to custom. It is quite evident, too, in the frank and truthful answers of Hermes after having eaten that he, too, is following the dictates of social law. It is in teresting to note that this law is the same for both gods and men. In this instance, Hermes does not provide a dis honorable example which might partially explain human hypocrisy. Deceit is fundamental to hypocrisy, and lying and im personation are necessary corollaries. That the gods did not always provide the virtuous example of Hermes may be noted in the Amphyitryon myth. This and similar examples may possibly account for the apparent acceptance of Odysseus’ lying, for certainly there is deceit in Jupiter’s assumption of the character and appearance of Alcmene’s husband for the purpose of making love to her. There are 28 Homer, The Odyssey, translated by E. V. Rieu (Baltimore, 1958), p. 283. 29 abundant examples of such dissimulation, and of gods im personating human beings. Impersonation is called "the fundamental ingredient of drama" by Warnock and Anderson (p. 99). Can it also be the embryo of what we call hy pocrisy? To the very early Greeks it may not have had such a coloration, but by the time of Euripides, it would seem that actions similar to those of Clytemnestra, Electra, and Hippolytus were seen as having been partially motivated by rationalizations, or what we would often call unconscious 29 hypocrisy. Indeed, it may be possible that the earlier, seemingly uncritical acceptance by the Greeks of actions by both gods and men which seem to us evil and hypocritical, was the prime raison d’etre of the plays of Euripides as O A is suggested by Moses Hadas. u Some idea of how much reason Professor Hadas has for thinking as he does, can be readily seen in the following lines from Electra: Electra But after you have heard me, Mother, will you hurt me? Clytemnestra No. I shall humor your mood. 29 Tansley, p. 182. in ■^See Euripides, Electra, translated with an intro duction by Moses Hadas (New York, 1950), p. vi. 30 Electra Then I will speak, and my preface will be this: I wish you had a better heart, my mother. Your beauty deserves praise, yours and Helen*s, two true sisters, both wantons, both unworthy of Castor. She was kidnaped and lost her virtue gladly. Then you de stroyed the bravest man of Hellas; and you hold out the pretense that you killed your husband for the sake of your child! People do not know you as well as I. Why, even before your daughter's sacrifice had been determined, when your husband had but newly left home, you were already training the golden clusters of your hair before a mirror. Any woman that cultivates her beauty when her husband is far from home you can write down as a wanton. There is no need for her to display a face made fair unless she is look ing for some mischief. You were the only Hellene woman, I know you were, who was happy when the Trojan side prospered, and when they were getting the worse of it your eyes were all clouded. You did not want Agamemnon to come back from Troy. And yet it was so easy for you to be chaste. You had a husband who was at least as good as Aegisthus; Hellas chose him to be her general. After your sister Helen had done what she did, you had a chance to win great glory. Evil deeds afford precept and example to the good. ... (p. 33) Clytemnestra My girl, it has always been your nature to love your father. So it goes; some are fond of their male parent, others love their mothers more than their fathers. I pardon you. Indeed, I am not so very happy about the things I have done, my child. (p. 33) Without becoming involved in a possible "Electra complex” interpretation, or other possibly controversial 31 points about Euripides, it seems evident that, as trans lated, when Electra speaks of Helen as having lost her virtue ^gladly* * and of Clytemnestra' s "pretense,” Euripides understood well enough what we generally mean by the term hypocrisy. Other Greeks and Romans did also. Witness the remarks of Aeschylus in Agamemnon. Richmond Lattimore gives this interesting passage as follows: For many among men are they who set high the show of honor, yet break justice. If one be unhappy, all else are fain to grieve with him: yet the teeth of sorrow come nowise near to the heart’s edge. And in joy likewise they show joy’s semblance, and torture the face to the false smile. Yet the good shepherd, who knows his flock, the eyes of men cannot lie to him, that with water of feigned _ love seem to smile from the true heart. Fraenkel obtains somewhat different results in trans lation, but both passages show clearly enough that Aeschylus was fully aware of the essential characteristics of the hypocrite: &Ye» paaiXeo, TpotaG it'toAtitopQ’ , ‘ ATpernC Y®ve@^ov» nS>G oe upooEiatm; atSc^ae oe(3t££o 7&5 pfjQ'tiitepapaC ti&'dxoxanfaC xaipdv xapiToGi rcoXXot 61 ppoTcSv 'cd 6©xetv el vat xpoartoooi Sixtjv icapa^dvTeo* t& i SoGTCpaYOOVTi t ' fento'tevaxet v 79° xgU tic ^hroTp.oC* S r ) Y t J , ' c t 31 Aeschylus, Oresteia, translated by Richmond Latti more (Chicago, 1953), p. 59. 32 o 6 6 lv fetp ’ fpcap x p o a ix v e tT a i x a l g«YXa i pooai v dp.oioxpexeT C dY^Xao'ca itp6a<*yjca pia£op,evoi - * « • - * - * * ; : * * • » * Sa*riC 6* &YaQ&<a itpopaTOYV&p-csv, 795 odx So ti X a 9 e iv Sp.p.a'ua (pconrdc^ T& eoxouvT’ eflcppovoC fex-diavofaC ddapet aai vet (piXoTV'ti . 32 Translation: [Now tell me, King, sacker of Troy, offspring of Atreus, how shall I address thee? How shall I pay homage, neither overshooting nor falling short of the mark of graceful behavior? Many in this world prize more the appearance of reality, after passing the bounds of justice: anyone is ready to echo the groans of him who is in distress-- but the sting of grief in no wise reaches to his heart; and resembling in aspect men who share another*s joy, forcing their unsmiling countenances (they . . .) [sic]. But if anyone is a good judge of a flock, he cannot be deceived by the look in a man’s eyes which, while feign ing to come from a loyal mind, blandishes with a watery friendship.]33 The concern of Socrates over the matter of piety, or virtue, is also well known, as is the concern of Plato with matters of morality. In the latter*s Republic, for example, he has Glaucon state that people would do right OO Aeschylus, Agamemnon, edited and translated by Eduard Fraenkel (Oxford, 1950), p. 137. J Translation by Eduard Fraenkel. only because of their fear of being detected and of being punished for transgressions. To indicate the fact that men and women are naturally immoral he tells the story of Gyges r and his ring which illustrates what they would do, he says, if they could be invisible.^ The invisibility of Gyges is akin to hypocrisy. By ihiding behind a mask, by pretending to possess a virtue not i jactually possessed, a cloak of invisibility is thrown over both personality and actions. They are not seen for what they really are, and, therefore, to an extent they are not seen at all. A part of one becomes invisible. According to Glaucon* s statement ". . . wherever any one thinks that he can safely be unjust, there he is unjust” (p. 359E). 1 |Although hypocrisy does not offer complete protection, it does confer a degree of safety through invisibility when successfully practiced, and, therefore, comes within the scope of the argument. What is the result? According to Glaucon, it would follow that everyone would be aware that he himself might be victimized, and, therefore, would help set up laws which would make it difficult for anyone to seek advantages through his ability to be invisible. He would be bound to praise and support these necessary laws, a y J Plato, Republic, translated by Benjamin Jowett, 2 vols. (New York, 1921), I, 359B. 34 but he would not really believe they constituted the most desirable course. Glaucon says: 1 This they affirm to be the origin and nature of jus- ; tice;--it is a mean or compromise, between the best of all, which is to do injustice and not be punished, and worse [sic 3 of all, which is to suffer injustice with out the power of retaliation; and justice, being at a middle point between the two, is tolerated not as a good, but as the lesser evil, and honored by reason of the inability of men to do injustice. For no man who is worthy to be called a man would ever submit to such an agreement if he were able to resist; he would be mad if he did. Such is the received account, Socrates, of the nature and origin of justice. (pp. 358C, 359B) If Glaucon is right in his argument, and if human nature is really of such a shabby quality, then does it not follow, since hypocrisy is of the nature of the fearful power which necessitates compromise, that being hypo critical is a basic aspect of being human? For if one does not really believe that a certain action is truly best, but is forced to say, through compromise, that it is, then one is automatically hypocritical. This viewpoint, however, does not by any means repre sent Plato's final word on the subject. It is a viewpoint, ihowever, followed by Hobbes in his Leviathan and Of Human Nature, and which has persisted in various forms through out history. It has met some contradictions, notably those of Shaftesbury, Frances Hutcheson, David Hume, Bishop Joseph Butler, and Adam Smith.33 But, regardless of 35Everett, pp. 533-589. 35 contradictions, there has been much cynicism and pessimism in historical, sociological, and psychological studies which treat of morality. Frequently morality is portrayed as a species of self-interest, a means of maintaining political control, or as a trick utilized by ruling groups to promote self interests. In such actual or imaginary situations hypocrisy would inevitably exist. Many are the commentators who suggest that history, from early Greece down to the present, has been characterized by constant self-deception to the extent of suggesting that hypocrisy is almost a necessary condition for the existence of civi lization. Here is a typical comment of that nature: Even in the free air of ancient Greece there were humbugs--sophists and self-deceivers. It was in Greece that Diogenes set out with his lamp to look for an honest man. We may be sure that he had no difficulty in discovering humbugs and hypocrites, and it has been suggested that, if he had been looking for a humbug, all he would have had to do was to peer into a mirror. For there is often a good deal of humbug in the enemy of humbug. We deceive ourselves most when we think that we are the only people who do not deceive themselves. As for the Romans, they seem to have practiced hy pocrisy with the same skill as other successful peoples. They persuaded themselves that other nations submitted to them, not through fear, but through love. Often, no doubt, they had to crush some tribe because it was a menace to them, but every great empire has to protect itself. That is how it becomes great. If only a nation is strong enough, it finds that it is menaced on all sides and has every excuse for overrunning more and more of its neighbors. And in overrunning them it has never a moment*s doubt that it is doing good. If this 36 is self-deception, then I think that history is largely a history of self-deception.36 There is a suggestion here that there would be less hypocrisy in the free air of Greece. There are others who suggest that early societies were free of hypocrisy pre cisely because they did not have this free air. The argument runs like this: Hypocrisy came with freedom. The members of primitive societies had a strong desire to con form, with the social organization everywhere being charac terized by a resulting uniformity, shown by the universal existence of a chiefship, the establishment of chiefly authority by war, the appearance and rise everywhere of the medicine-man and the priest. All acts of the members of primitive societies were tribal, for all the acts of the tribe involved them in their consequences. They could not bear any divergence from the observed rituals. According to this argument, it was the freedom of the Greeks and the Romans which made it possible for the hypocrite to exist; by the time of the last two centuries of the Republic, affectation and lack of reality were very noticeable. To this, Lucian and Seneca, Statius and Velleius bear witness. And Cicero, Seneca, Panaetius, Polybius, Quintus Scaevola, and Varro are said to have regarded religion as the device or Y. Y., "Humbug,” New Statesman and Nation. 18:952-953, December 30, 1939. 37 of statesmen to control the masses through mystery and terror. It had become impossible for these men to believe in the old faith, yet the people had to continue to take part in a gross materialistic worship. According to Gibbon, all religions were regarded by the people as equally true, by the philosopher as equally false, and by the statesman as equally useful. Cicero quotes a dictum of a Pontifex Maximus that there was one religion of the poet, another of the philosopher, and another of the statesman.37 The Stoics and the thinkers advocated a “double truth.” There was one truth for the intellectual classes and a different, separate truth for the lower classes. iThis condition reached its apex with expedit igitur falli in religione civitatem. (It is expedient for the state to be deceived in matters of religion.) Thus a situation prevailed in which the educated no longer believed in the old gods, but in which the vast majority of the people still retained their faith. For reasons of expediency the educated, however, continued to practice the rituals. This led to widespread separation of :belief and practice on the part of the educated with devas tating moral effects. It is further argued that it is the discrepancy be tween actual laws and customs, between thought and action ^^Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics (New York, 1915), VII, 63. 38 which is the basic cause of the various forms of hypocrisy. The history of the Pharisees mentioned in Christ*s Sermon on the Mount is used in support of the contention. It was [Ezra, it is maintained, who pointed out the danger of too * ! close an association with other peoples and other faiths. And it was the Torah which formed the nucleus of Ezra's reformation. By following the Torah strictly in prescribed conduct, in what was an honest attempt to do right, the strict Jew was soon converted into the Pharisee, “the sepa rate one." Eventually the rules of the Halakhah concerning conduct became so strict and so all-encompassing that they "imposed upon the many what only a few could obey, and the 1 result was hypocrisy."38 j j A similar process has involved many Christians. The unknown author of Aucassin and Nicolete suggests consider able discrepancy between Christian ideals and actual con duct. In Paradise what have I to win? Therein I seek not to enter, but only to have Nicolete, my sweet lady that I love so well. For into Paradise go none but such folk As I shall tell thee now: thither go these same old priests, and halt old men and maimed, who all day and night cower continually before the altars, and in the crypts; and such folk as wear old amices and clouted frocks, and naked folk and shoeless, and covered with sores, perishing of hunger and thirst, and of cold, and of little ease. These be they that go into Para dise; with them have I naught to make. But into hell ^Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics. VII, 64. would I fain go; for into Hell fare the goodly clerks, and goodly knights that fall in tourneys and great wars, and stout men at arms, and all men noble. With these would I liefly go. And thither pass the sweet ladies and courteous that have two lovers, or three, and their lords also thereto. Thither goes the gold, and the silver, and cloth of vair, and cloth of gris, and harpers, and makers, and the prince of this world. With these I would gladly go, let me but have with me Nicolete, my sweetest lady.39 In addition to Rabelais and Moliere, Balzac, La Bruyere, Rousseau, and many other French writers bear wit ness to the fact that, as Larousse expresses it, "Les pharisiens, que le Christ appelait des sepulcres blanchis ne sont pas seulement dans la synagogue.No, on the contrary. They have been widespread indeed. Larousse states: Des les premiers temps du christianisme, les faux devSts apparaissent. II y en a parmi les fideles, il £ en a parmi les pontifes et les docteurs. Au moyen- Sge, ils remplissent les couvents. Aussi que de satires, que de portraits hardis de l'hypoerisie! Qu'est-ce que Renard, le heros de si nombreux romans traduits en toutes les^langues, sinon le personnifica- tion de ce vice deteste? Qu*est-ce sur tout que Fatax- Semblant dans le Roman de la Rose, sinon le veritable axeul de Tartuffe? Si I'habit ne faix pas l'armite, avait dit Rutebeuf a propos de son Pharisien, la robe ne fait pas le moine dit Jean de Meung en introduisant sur la scene Dame Contrainte-Abstinence et Faux-Semblant. Deja Guillaume de Lorris nous avait montre 1*image de Papelardie sur les raurs du chateau de Deduyt: OQ ^Warnock and Anderson, II, 139. ^Pierre Larousse, Grand Dictionnaire Uhiversel (Paris, 1865), IX, 513. 40 En sa main un psautier tenoit, Et sachez que moult pensoit De faire a Dieu prieres feinctes Et d*appeler et saints et sainctes, Et si avait vestu la haire. Les apparences sont belles! Voyez le fond: Elle semble saincte creature, Mais sous le ciel n'a male aventure Qu*elle ne pense dans son coeur.^-l Translation: [From the beginning of Christianity, false worship pers appear. There are some of them among churchgoers, there are some among pontifs and doctors. In the Middle Ages, convents were full of them. Thus, how many sa tires, how many daring paintings of hypocrisy! What is Renard, the hero of so many novels, translated into all languages, if not the personification of this hated vice? Above all, what is * ’ False-Seeming” in the Roman de la Rose, if not the actual ancestor of Tartuffe? If the clothes do not make the hermit, Rutebeuf had said about his Pharisien, the robe does not make the monk, says Jean de Meung when introducing Dame Constrained-Abstinence and False-Seeming. Guillaume de Lorris had already shown us the picture of Papelardie on the walls of the Castle of Deduyt: In her hand she was holding a psalter And you must know that she thought greatly Of addressing to God simulated prayers And of calling upon all saints And she had put on a hair-shirt. The appearances are beautiful! Let*s look at the real facts. She looks like a saintly creature, But under the sky there is no evil adventure That she does not think of in her heart.]^2 ^Grand Dictionnaire Universel, IX, 513-514. ^Translation mine. During the Reformation, French students at the Sor- bonne also had some things to say about hypocrisy in the i form of satirical farces, part of a prevailing tradition to attack the bad monks and the bad priests. One of their productions, presented at the Sorbonne (1524) was called Maladie de Chretierme. A woman heroine representing Christianity is very sick. Hypocrisy and Sin are the two doctors. They prescribe idleness and fashion as the cure. Luckily the good doctor arrives in time! His name is Inspiration. He has a bouillon of four tongues (the Gospels), and tells of a magic white wine which can be purchased.^ The object was to get people to read the Scriptures, but the farce promptly brought against the student actors the wrath of the Sorbonne officials, who, while they did not advocate the same kind of Catholicism as that of the Pope at Rome, were busy, nevertheless, condemning the books of Rabelais and others representing Reformation-connected thought, and certainly wanted no part of student subtleties! Rabelais' thundering ”1 will cause thy holy gospel to be purely, simply and entirely preached, so that the abuses of a rabble of hypocrites and false prophets, who by human ^See L. Petit de Julleville, Repertoire du Theatre Comique en France au Moyen-Age (Paris, 1886), pp. 79-81. 42 constitutions, and depraved inventions have poisoned all |the world, shall be quite exterminated from about me"^ ! ' Iis also a landmark. j Perhaps hypocrisy is, as suggested above, a necessary (adjunct to civilization. There are those who imply, too, j ! that it is almost part of the normal individual anatomy and( physiology. Listen to an observer of London, 1824: ! For my own part, if I was obliged to commit my j reputation by hazarding an opinion upon so ticklish a ■ point, I should prefer seizing upon that most prominent feature in the human character, deceit, and would de fine the species as being, par excellence, the "hypo critical animal." For whatever may be advanced to the contrary, in the way of certain odious comparisons, to ( the disadvantage of hyenas and crocodiles, it should ! never be forgotten that in these cases "the lion is not | the painter." If the parties concerned could speak for themselves, it is pretty certain that no hyena would j | have the face to vie with Louis XVIII when making his i famous speech upon peace, which opened the Spanish War; and the arrantest crocodile would decline weeping with a genuine widow of Ephesus. Every peculiar condition of society has its favorite sin, which it clothes in likeness of its conterminate virtue. The merchant*s avarice is parsimony, the par son* s gluttony is hospitality, the great man's corrup tion is loyalty, and his hatred to the people is his zeal for the king's prerogative. All this is nothing; but your genuine hypocrite, the more he is inclined to sin, and the more he indulges his inclination, the louder and more confidently he declaims against it. . . . So curiously, indeed, are the most sacred and solemn objects mixed up with lackadaisical common-places, . . . that not to be a hypocrite is to lack common decency; and to call "things by their right names" is to unsettle the world's repose. The imagined necessity for the gravity ^Fran^ois Rabelais, Pantagruel, translated by Sir Thomas Urquhart (London, 1897), II, 196. of the learned professions, has gone a great ways towards generalizing the practice of hypocrisy. . . This commentator, who signs himself simply as ”M," maintains that the tendency to wear a mask, and to behave in a hypocritical manner, helps to establish order in society. /He argues that the dupes enjoy being dupes, that deceit makes love more enjoyable, and that the whole process of courtship is one great scene of ’ ’ mutual hy pocrisy."^ He speaks further of the simulated zeal and well-affected sympathy with which lawyers protest to God that their client’s case is justice itselfI He insists with Moliere that there is "rien de plus ridicule" than the external forms of the process by which a physician brings the fashionable cure of a fashionable disease to its final ;stages. But the climax of all pleasures derivable from { i deception, he believes, are those which accompany a general election where there is an unsurpassed false show of con strained equality and simulated friendship. He concludes as follows: • > I speak not of the comfort and advantage which derives from that organized system of hypocrisy, more despotic than the laws of Medes and Persians, which passes current in the world under the name of polite ness; because every one knows and feels its value, and ^"Hypocrisy” (indexed as Colburn), The New Monthly Magazine and Literary Journal, 2:301-304, 1824. ^"Hypocrisy, ” The New Monthly Magazine, p. 302. 44 is but too well pleased to possess a good excuse for hiding unpleasant truths, the avowal of which might involve the relater in a duel or a lawsuit. "Chi non sa fingere, non sa vivere," says the Italian proverb, a text upon which Nic [sic] Macchiavel has written an elaborate commentary; but by far a better one is to be found in the grave faces of politi cal wights, who, while they are exerting all their energies to propagate despotism and raise their own fortunes, turn up their eyes at the bare mention of this same Macchiavelli's name; and with a Pharisaical demureness of the whole outward man, denounce him and his writings as anti-Christian and anti-social, merely for saying, what they themselves are doing every day and hour of their lives. The triumph of opinion over the sword, has made political hypocrisy more than ever necessary in the safe conduct of a state.^ Present-day observers are not lacking to call atten tion to some of our own political hypocrisies. A good example can be seen in the article entitled "How an Elec tion Was Bought and Sold” in which the author describes the crude hypocrisy indulged in by some of the would-be politi cal campaign workers whose enthusiasm and devotion to the "right" candidate vanished when the expected financial remuneration was not immediately forthcoming.^ Another example similar to the questions raised by M*s reference to the "gravity of the learned professions" of a contemporary nature but which probably also has appli cability to the London of 1824, to the Rome of the Caesars, 47 "Hypocrisy," The New Monthly Magazine, p. 303. ^Harper's Magazine. 221:33-38, October 1960. or the Athens of Pericles, concerns the naval and military life of our time, and of recent wars, the accuracy of which could be verified by many veterans. As all veterans will testify, the various branches of the Armed Forces of the United States have, like all organizations, their share of excessive drinking on occasion, with the consequent "hang over" which often results in an inability or "incapacity for the proper performance of duty." If the rank is suf ficiently high, however, this "alcoholism" or hangover is often referred to less crudely. It becomes, instead, "gastroenteritis." A similar device has often been noted in connection with venereal disease. Gonorrhea among service men is normally diagnosed as "gonococcus infection of the urethra," and of course is usually associated with illicit sexual intercourse. Through the magic and gravity of rank, however, it can become "non-specific urethritis,” in which case, of course, the bacterial invaders, through the mysteries of hypocrisy, become more respectable because less "specifically" known. The preceding examples, comments, and quotations make it obvious that hypocrisy is a complex, many-sided subject. This review has also served as a reminder of some of the more self-evident and well-known aspects of hypocrisy. We have seen that hypocrisy was present in various forms in early Greek society, that Homer dealt with it, that Socrates and Plato were concerned with related aspects, and that Aeschylus and Euripides also gave it attention. Apparently Euripides understood what we call rationaliza tions or unconscious hypocrisy, and, like many dramatists since, sounded his own warning against its practice. The pessimistic view stated by Glaucon in Plato's Republic, we have seen, was followed by Hobbes and many subsequent writers in various fields. The Romans, too, we have noted, had their difficulties with the discrepancies between avowed beliefs and actual practices, as did the people of the Middle Ages, the Reformation, and the people of subse quent periods down to our own time. Some observers have suggested that hypocrisy is almost a necessary, or at least an inevitable, adjunct to civilization. That it is present in every era, including our own, cannot be denied. Per haps more attention is given it than ever before through modern philosophical, sociological, and psychological studies of its related aspects. Those who study and write on morals, for example, and who propose changes, cannot of course avoid dealing with hypocrisy. Virtue and truth cannot be fully understood without reference to their imitators and to their pretenders. Changes cannot be intelligently proposed without understanding that ’ ’ error 47 and falsehood are hostile to rational systematization.”49 Kurt Baier, Richard B. Brandt, Sir David W. Ross, J. C. Flugel, John Hospers, Paul Edwards, William S. Sadler, Norman R. F. Maier, Mandel Sherman, Millard Spencer Everett, and Marcus George Singer are but a few of those who have concerned themselves with problems relating to hypocrisy. Changing ideas and new directions are often encountered in their work. Ginsberg, for example, writing in the Inter national Journal of Ethics, calls attention to the fact that the traditional school of ethics spent a great deal of its time denouncing the hypocrite. Carlyle, he says, represented the opinion of his time when he characterized hypocrisy as the bane of morals in his essay on Burns. The modern view is more humane and more scientific. ^ ^G. L. Duprat, Morals: A Treatise on the Psycho- Sociological Bases of Ethics (New York, 1903), pp.143, 330-331. He adds: "Truth is one of the ends of social activity, because it brings the thoughts into agreement and leads to the stable communion of minds. It is also one of the loftiest ends of individual mental activity, because it alone furnishes a solid basis of well-coordinated action, and of action that leads to success. Without the posses sion of truth the best intentions are in vain. . . . For the individual to be almost without difficulty or effort courageous, clever, wise, and temperate, his environment must be forever holding them up to his admiration, and must teach him nothing but aversion from vices such as bru tality, theft, vengeance, hypocrisy, immodesty, intemper ance, selfishness, etc.1 * 50«The modem view,” says Ginsberg (see p. 4 of this thesis), "which sees in morals not a set of divinely- revealed truths, but a series of painfully acquired and ever-evolving rules more or less in accord with the changing conditions of human existence, cannot be so hard 48 Ginsberg argues that the presence of hypocrisy in a com munity is indicative of the fact that the moral code is in compatible with the precise needs of the collectivity, and that, although the material of which morals are made has a tendency to change, the injunction and requirement of obe dience remains constant, giving rise to the erroneous popu lar belief that the moral code is eternal. The obligation of sincerity and of faithfulness to the plighted word, he says, is implicit in all moral codes, and yet truth-telling is always the last to be completely obeyed because of the fact that it depends upon the perfect adjustment of the rest of the moral code with the needs of the social organ ism. "Such a condition," Ginsberg insists, "has never yet Cl been realized in the history of human society. . . on the hypocrite. . . . The modern view from sentiment can not avoid condemnation of hypocrisy as a vice, and yet when it is engaged in studying morals, it finds in this in sincerity an invaluable scientific aid ..." (p. 160). "The history of the Middle Ages records multiple instances of the ineffective and disastrous attempt to combat hypoc risy by the strict application of the Christian moral code. No matter how well-intentioned the efforts of reformers, the attack on social symptoms cannot remove the root of the unrest" (p. 165). 51 Ginsberg adds (p. 162) that "the preachers who apologize for the supposed failure of Christianity with the argument that the doctrines of Jesus have never been really tried out are guilty of casuistry: no impartial historian has ever gainsaid the relative success of Christianity both as a religion and as a code of morals during the last two thousand years. But the admitted presence of large numbers of hypocrites who have contented themselves with an ex ternal observance of their professed religion furnishes an indisputable indication that the success of the Christian Gospel has never been complete.” 49 Ginsberg's views appear to be typical of those of numerous social scientists and various scholars and writers who have concerned themselves with hypocrisy and its i related elements. For that reason, his beliefs are pur sued a little further. If the success of the Christian Gospel has not been complete, he is quick to point out that the moral systems of philosophers have not been any more successful. He sees these things as examples of the fact that moral evolution proceeds at a very slow pace, pointing out that the seventeenth century's contradictions which caused trouble to the conscience of the time are, for the most part, still present and still unsolved, with even an additional complication added, for says he, "We have super imposed the belief in democracy, which, unfortunately, has served only to drive the educated man's contempt of the mob below the surface." The present "Freedom Rider" campaign and desegregation controversy would, no doubt, be applicable to his argument, as would certain other current practices. By California state law all high schqol students are required to give the pledge of allegiance to the flag. This is the general % practice, too, at lower grades throughout the country. The pledge, of course, is concluded with the words "with liberty and justice for all." Democratic beliefs are also sponsored in home and church, and yet it is well known 50 that these ideals are often in conflict with actual prac tices. Are the people involved conscious of hypocrisy? Says Ginsberg: Whenever a society is immoral, that is, whenever it i finds itself forced by the complexities of the situ- j ation to violate its adopted code of morals, it is of necessity hypocritical. . . . Every child is taught to profess verbally sentiments which he does not share in reality, and which he sees no one about him sharing. He is taught to hold the lie in horror, but it is practiced in this very teaching, and he is given the taste and habit of using it as well: strange school of moralityI . . . The power of the individual upon the collectivity is in most cases infinitesimal: he cannot change the social conventions into which he is born. He cannot choose whether to be a hypocrite or not.52 In sentences such as that of Ginsberg above which states, "He cannot choose whether to be a hypocrite or not," there is an interesting connection between older dramatists and present-day philosophers, sociologists, and psycholo gists. One is reminded of the concept of Fate in Greek drama. One remembers, too, that Euripides seems to have understood the modern concept of rationalizations, and that modern psychoanalysts tell us "that it is the unconscious that determines what the conscious action shall be."^3 Hamlet*s delay in killing his uncle is explained through an Oedipus wish. Numerous other such parallels could be "^Ginsberg, p. 165. ^Hospers, "Free Will in Psychoanalysis," in Readings in Ethical Theory, pp. 563-564. 51 pointed out. A brief review, such as has just been made in the above chapter, in which both literary and essentially I scientific writings are examined, always leads to some | I I jinteresting speculations. An obvious thought for literary I i ' : students would be that a literary genius knew truths long ago which are only now being confirmed by scientific methods. One wonders, however, how many dramas and other literary works were influential in their time but which were not the works of genius, and which were essentially psychologically false in content. It is reasonable to believe, I think, that both j ' I |literature and science can be enriched by a mutual examin- j F j Nation of findings. Scientists can help dramatists and others eliminate error and falsehood; past experience tells us that scientists can find in literature an inspiration and a guide to further discoveries. Each is essential to the other. CHAPTER III COMPARISON OF DRAMATIC TREATMENT IN SOCIAL PLAYS They cover a dunghill with a piece of tapestry when a procession goes by. — Miguel de Cervantes Emile Augier*s Le Mariage d'Olvmpe Stephen S. Stanton calls Le Mariage d’Olvmpe (1855), Olympe’s Marriage "one of the most vigorous adaptations of the well-made play to social drama,” and Augierfs "best exhibition of the characteristics of the piece bien faite.''5^ "The social play (piece a these) has been,” he says, "a staple of European and American drama since 1850, but it could not have existed without the formula of the well-made play."-'” ' Hypocrisy is not essential to this formula but is a frequent ingredient. It is, however, the chief and essential ingredient of Olympe* s Marriage. For a setting, Augier uses Pilnitz, a fashionable spa of the time near Dresden, Germany. The early action, • ^Camille and Other Plays, p. xxxvi. ~ * ~ *Camille and Other Plays, p. viii. 52 represented as occurring in 1854, occurs here; the remain der of the play takes place in Vienna. The Marquis and Marquise de Puygiron are here with their grand-daughter ! Genevieve de Wurzen. The play begins in a conversation room. The Marquis is questioning Baron de Montrichard about a notorious Parisian courtesan, Olympe Taverny, whose death is reported in the papers. Baudel de Beausej our, another gentleman present, pretends to have known her. Montrichard enlightens the Marquis concerning "luxuriously C £ L and frequently kept" (p. 167) women like Olympe, shocking jthe Marquis by explaining that many are marrying into the ibest families. After the Marquis’s departure, Beausejour who is rich but lacks entree into society because of his lack of family background, proposes to "buy a wound" for 50,000 francs from Montrichard, the best swordsman in : Paris; that is, Montrichard is to allow himself to be wounded in exchange for the money. The aristocrat agrees to the duel, with the plan of afterwards sponsoring Baudel in society. "I’ll take that wound from you," says Montri chard, "but— gratis, you understand?" Baudel thinks, "That will cost more— but I don’t mind." 56 All references to Le Mariage d*Olympe are from Camille and Other Plays, edited by Stephen S. Stanton. The translation is by Barret H. Clark. 54 As Baudel goes out Montrichard says to himself, "There’s a queer typeI I’ll make something of him: first a friend— very attached— with a string to his paw— ! This duel is exactly what I needed to set me going once again" (P. 174). ' He goes to the door and meets Olympe Taverny! She is now Pauline, Countess de Puygiron, and by marriage now the Marquis’s niece, who finally admits confidentially that she is Olympe; that her "death" is a convenient trick. They pledge mutual aid. If anyone persists in recognizing her ihe will have to confront the formidable duelist Montri- | ; 1 i jchard. Olympe, in turn, will help further his suit of the ! I ; ! Marquis * s grand-daughter Genevieve de Wurzen. Montrichard warns Pauline that "the career of an honest woman is a fearful undertaking!" Pauline retorts, "It can’t compare with ours! If you only knew how much energy it required to ruin a man!" Henri, the Cotint de Puygiron, appears, as does the Marquis and Marquise. Pauline has arranged this "acciden tal" meeting, and succeeds by representing herself as the daughter of a Vendeen in endearing herself to the Marquis and Marquise who welcome her as a daughter and forgive their nephew Henri for marrying secretly. In Vienna (Act II) Pauline proceeds with her plan of invading society. It is not, however, what she expected. 55 She learns that Genevieve keeps a diary; that she is in love with a married man. This man, Pauline later learns, is her own husband. Meanwhile, Baudel, sponsored by Montrichard, is making his way in society. To become the countess's lover would really make him a man of fashion, he thinks. With that end in view, he arrives with an ex pensive necklace which he succeeds in getting Pauline to accept. She passes it off as ’ ‘ paste" to her family. Later Henri reveals that he has learned that she is Olympe Taverny but insists upon remaining together, to keep up appearances. Pauline's mother Irma arrives. She agrees to leave the following morning for payment of 5,000 francs from Henri. The Marquis and Marquise welcome Irma graciously and hospitably. They leave for a party. Pauline remains with her mother. It is a gay reunion. Montrichard arrives. Adolphe, an impersonator, comes offering theatre tickets. He, too, is made a guest. All the candles are lighted; champagne flows. Adolphe is drunk. He cries about his poor children. Pauline offers him money. When he refuses, she gives him the pearl out of the necklace Baudel had given her. Act III opens with Montrichard's call on Pauline. He has been at Homburg for a week of gambling and has suc ceeded in breaking the bank. He has funds now. He is no 56 longer interested in marriage for the present. Pauline tells him that she has sent Baudel ahead to Nice with some j"precious possessions” (p. 211) to wait for her there. i t jShe plans to join him later following the showdown with the !Puygirons. Adolphe arrives, tells the Marquis and Marquise about the party and the pearl. ”1 can hardly believe,” he says, ”that Mme. la comtesse intended to make me so valuable a present.” Henri arrives, also learns that the pearl is jreal; that so, too, no doubt, is the necklace of diamonds. : Henri accuses Pauline of receiving the necklace from M. de |Beausejour, and reveals that she is Olympe Taverny. The ! Marquis is thunderstruck. Henri feels obligated to duel ; with Beausejour and leaves for that purpose, not knowing ! that Baudel is no longer in Vienna. Pauline then reveals that she is in possession of Genevieve’s diary, reads some compromising extracts about Genevieve’s love for Henri, and refuses to write to Paris for it where she has sent it for safekeeping. The Marquis offers her half a million francs for it. She refuses. The Marquis shoots her as she tries to leave, saying ”God is my judge.” There is both conscious and unconscious hypocrisy in the play. Sometimes both are combined in the same person, but, for the most part, they are separated. In general, Olympe is a frank hypocrite. She does not indulge much 57 in rationalizations. There is a suggestion of a slight, degree of unconscious hypocrisy on two occasions only: once when she refuses the offer of half a million francs |for the grand-daughter's diary which she has stolen. The ' Marquis asks her to send for the diary. Pauline Nothing is simpler. But, really, if I give up my only weapon, what guarantee shall I have? Marquis My word as a gentleman. ! Pauline ! t ! Good; between people of honor a given word is i enough. Well, I give you my word that I shall not misuse my precious treasure. What would j be the good for me? Marquis The pleasure of revenge. You must hate us, for you realize how we despise you. (p. 224) While there is nothing to show that she hates the Marquis's family, it is possible that, unknown to her, part of her motivation may have been to humiliate them, as a result of her resentment. The Marquis's words sug gest the possibility. She tells herself, however, that this is "strictly business." It is, therefore, an in stance of possible rationalization, and, as such, 58 _ _ unconscious hypocrisy. ' The other instance is more defi nite. Montrichard asks Pauline, after he recognizes her as Olympe, if she loves Henri. She replies, "That is not the question. I strew his path with flowers— artificial, perhaps, but they are prettier and more lasting than real ones" (p. 177). This is surely unconscious hypocrisy. It shows that Pauline feels conscious of an obligation to Henri. Having tricked him in his innocence, she evidently tells herself that it is not so bad, after all, to have done so, for she makes him happy. She shows no need of such a rationalization, however, when she is contemplating an "affair" with Beausejour. Montrichard Poor Baudel! Be a good girl, now, Countess, and donTt ruin the boy! Pauline He will get just what he deserves, he, the prince of fools! (p. 211) There is evidence of unconscious hypocrisy on the part of grand-daughter Genevieve in connection with the diary, 57 The French, however, does not give the impression of unconscious hypocrisy. In the Michel Levy Freres Paris edition of 1855, Pauline says, "Vous me suppliez! . . . Moi, que vous fouliez aux pieds tout a l*heure.--N*attendez de moi ni pitie ni merci!— Votre nom, je le vendrai, je le mettrai a l'encan, et fussiez-vous assez riche pour couvrir l'enchere, vous ne l'auriez pas! C*est ma vengeance! Allons! place a la comtesse de Puygiron!" (p. 106). 59 and her love for Henri. Olympe and Montrichard comment on this, and, in doing so, reveal a theme of the play. Montrichard How did this hopeless love take root? Pauline It’s not hopeless--that’s the nicest part of the business. She's taken it into her head that I’m a consumptive, that I haven't more than six months to live. I don’t know where she got that idea! . . . And she’s waiting for my death with angelic serenity. That’s the way with these angels! Dealers in morality! Good Lord, we're better than they! Don’t you think so? Montrichard I i Well, between the person who sets a trap and the one who allows himself to be caught there’s hardly a hair’s difference. . . . (pp. 212, 213) Henri well illustrates Montrichard*s idea as a theme. Olympe is the major conscious hypocrite, but is she worse than Henri? He fools both himself and others. Something of how easily he does this can be seen shortly after Olympe had managed to bring Henri face to face with the Marquis. Because his marriage was new, because he was enjoying having a beautiful woman all to himself, and, more, because he wanted her without any possible interference from his family, he had, for the purpose, an appropriate attitude toward society. Compare this attitude with his feeling later when he has tired of Pauline, and has ’ ’ discovered” 60 Genevieve. In the first instance, when the Marquis says they had expected to see him just before the death of 1 Henri*s father, his answer is a hypocritical one. Says he: i I ”I was very, very lonely and I thought of you, but import- i ' - i jant business affairs— ” And the truth of the matter was that he had been traveling about, alone with Pauline. When the Marquis and Marquise discover that he has married with out even telling them, let alone consulting them, the answer, evidently because he had thought they would not approve of Pauline, is hypocritical once more. Henri ' | . ! I You are mistaken, Monsieur: I respect what deserves respect. But the prejudices and ab surd conventions, the hypocrisy and tyranny of society— nothing could prevent my despising them as they deserve to be despised! ; This is the same man who, in the second instance, jafter discovering that Pauline is the notorious Olympe Taverny, and after having discovered Genevieve, has an en tirely different attitude. Henri You may well regret all the wasted hours, after what I have just found out. The society our family moves in is not exactly what you had ex pected, I know, and your disappointment has opened my eyes. You feel that this is not quite your place--you feel ill at ease, out of your natural element; you cannot forgive the real society ladies for the superiority of their manners and their breeding--. (Pauline is about i to speak.) I can see how bitter you are from j | every word you speak. You cannot understand ; 61 the true worth or the essential goodness of this family. You are bored, and as out of place as an unrepentant sinner in church— Pauline (Sharply) That will do! You don*t love me, in other words. There is only one thing to do: separate on friendly terms. Henri Separate? Never. Pauline Are you doing me the honor to want my company? Henri You bear my name, Madame, and I shall not allow it to be dragged in the gutter. (A pause en sues.) Now let us quietly accept the result of our act. We are bound together: let us walk side by side, and try not to hate each other. Pauline You will find that difficult. Henri Never fear; if I cannot forget how you became Countess de Puygiron, I shall never lose sight of the fact that you are she. Now, I have already shown you too much of what I feel-- this explanation is at an end. Let us do our best to keep up appearances. (pp. 198, 199) This change is too strong to simply pass for the character portrait of a ”na£ve, slightly obtuse hero.”- * ® The abrupt switch, combined with Pauline * s remark about CO J See Camille and Other Plays, p. xxxiv. "dealers in morality” argues for a deliberate attempt on Augier*s part to make Henri an unconscious hypocrite opposed to his wife's preeminence in the conscious sphere. Remember, too, that this is the same man who had referred previously, under different circumstances, to the "absurd conventions, the hypocrisy and tyranny of society.” What could be more absurd than what he proposes to Pauline? 1 Since the Marquis and not Henri is the true pro tagonist, however, this unconscious hypocrisy on the part of Henri could easily escape attention. The Marquis and the Marquise are represented as such good people that it : appears Henri’s "reform” has occurred naturally under this good influence. This would not, however, equate well with his previous behavior, nor is it reasonable to believe that Augier would have believed it indicative of true reformed behavior. The truth is that Henri is not reformed. He is as hypocritical as ever. It seems true that, as Montrichard said, "between the person who sets a trap and the one who allows himself to be caught there's hardly a hair's difference.” In short, in view of the unconscious hypocrisy displayed by Henri, this would not seem to be a play which condemns the courtesan's behavior any more than it does Henri's. There are other portraits of hypocrisy shown in the jplay. One of the best is that of Adolphe, the actor who 63 had been given the pearl in the carousal scene in which Pauline "lets her hair down." Adolphe is the "honest man” who cannot believe that the Countess had meant to give him such an expensive gift. Actually, being afraid of the police, or of an accusation of theft by the Marquis*s family, he returns under the guise of being the honest man who would not take advantage of a mistake. From the standpoint of humor, the hypocrisy lends itself beautifully to delightful dramatic irony. When Pauline’s winnings in conservative Viennese society are referred to as enormous, there is such a situation, be cause, of course, audiences know that she has gambled away ; fortunes. i Pauline I j Enormously? A hundred francs at the outside. i | Marquis i I That’s good, at a franc a point. But I have an idea you don’t care for gambling? Pauline's hypocrisy and her double-meaning answer be come more amusing because we know that gambling is one of the things she does enjoy. Pauline I don’t, M. le Marquis, I don’t--(To herself) at a franc a point. (p. 186) Another example stems from the erroneous belief of Genevieve that what is stodgy Viennese society from 64 Pauline*s viewpoint is really too sophisticated for her. Genevieve ; Pauline is so serious that I think she*s bored by all this frivolous society. ! Marquise i Yes, and she seemed, beforehand, to expect a wonderful time! Pauline £ imagined it was going to be something far different from this! Marquis You are too serious for your years, my dear niece. i Pauline Perhaps. Marquise ! But society is not altogether a matter of frivolity. If you are bored with young | people, why don*t you talk with the older ! ones? You could certainly find something worth while to talk about with them? Pauline Madame, I am ashamed to confess that the topics of conversation in society do not appeal to me: I am a barbarian. I*ve lived too long in our primitive Brittany. Marquis We shall civilize you, my dear child. . . . , Another amusing example is derived from Baudel*s |flirtation with Pauline. He tells her that she is more beautiful than Olympe, not realizing that he is talking to that notorious woman. Since the audience knows, it is I amusing. Pauline . . . But you*re not at all gallant toward the woman you once loved— you did once love Olympe, didn’t you? ' Baudel Not in the least, but she was wild about meI With the exception of the Marquis and the Marquise every character in the play shows some degree of hypocrisy. At times it helps to further the action. At other times, I i 'it adds wit, and amusement based on dramatic irony. In I iterms of a thesis, the best possibility is that Olympe is not really much different from Henri. Hypocrisy has no respect for rank nor position. This is equally true in the American play, Craig1s Wife, which for the purpose of being able to compare a French and an American play dealing with social hypocrisy of a specified type, now requires attention. George Kelly’s Craig's Wife Produced by Rosalie Stewart at the Morosco Theatre, New York, October 12, 1925, Craig's Wife received the Pulitzer award for 1925-1926. Unlike the previous Pulitzer award play, Hell-Bent fer Heaven. George Kelly’s play does not deal with religious hypocrisy, nor with unconscious hypocrisy. The hypocrisy represented, like that of Olympe, i is of the conscious variety. When accused of this, how ever, Mrs. Craig makes a denial, simply one more strand of her dissimulation. ’ ’ But I wonder that, with all your wis dom,” her husband Craig says, ”it never occurred to you that one cannot play a dishonest game indefinitely” (p. 378).-*^ When his wife insisted that she had not been dishonest, Craig’s answer was, ’ ’ Possibly not, according to your standards, but I think you have. And I think you know you have. And that’s the rock that you and I are splitting on, Harriet. If this affair at Passmore’s hadn’t revealed you, something else would: so my going may as well be to-day as to-morrow. Good-bye, Harriet.” With these words the ”dupe” who now sees clearly, leaves his wife after two years of marriage. His eyes have been opened in one night, for all of the action of the play takes place between five-thirty in the evening and nine o’clock the following morning. Mrs. Craig’s sister is seriously ill in Albany, New York. She is there when the play opens, but the servants are not relaxed. ”It ’ud be just like the lady to walk in on us, Mrs. Harold,” observes Maizie, ”. . . If she gets an idea up there that there’s -^All references are from George Kelly, Craig’s Wife in A New Edition of the Pulitzer Plays, edited by Kathryn Coe and William H. Cordell (New York, 1935). 67 a pin out of place around here,— she'll take the first train out of Albany. . . . Oh, there's plenty like her— I've worked for three of them; you'd think their houses were God Almighty" (p. 323). Their fears are not unjustified, for cold, calcu lating, selfish Mrs. Craig does return early. There is, after all, she says, nothing to be done. "Your mother's been through this very same thing many times before," she tells her worried niece who has returned with her. "Listen, Ethel dear, I've seen your mother at least a dozen ; times at what I was perfectly sure was the point of death, and she's always come around all right" (p. 324). j When Ethel regrets not having told her mother about her engagement to Professor Fredericks, and expresses the idea that her mother would be less worried and concerned jabout her future if she had only told her, Mrs. Craig can not understand why Ethel's mother should be concerned about the future. "You're only nineteen. . . . Why does a person need anybody, dear, if he has money enough to get along on?" She advises caution and talks against marriage with a poor professor. In her own case, she says, she had no private fortune. "So the only road to independence for me, that I could see," she tells Ethel (p. 326),’ was through the man I married ... it isn't financial independence [that I speak of particularly. I knew that would come-- as a result of another kind of independence; and that is the independence of authority--over the man I married. , . . . I married to be independent.” And when Ethel asks if she meant independent of her husband too, she replies: Independent of everybody. I lived with a stepmother, Ethel, for nearly twelve years, and with your mother after she married for over five; I know what it is to be on some one else's floor. And I married to be on my own-- in every sense of the word. I haven*t entirely achieved the condition yet— but I know it can be done. (She turns and glances up the stairs and out through the portieres, to assure her self that no one is listening.) (p. 326) Ethel I don’t understand what you mean, exactly, Aunt Harriet. Mrs. Craig I mean that I’ m simply exacting my share of a bargain. Mr. Craig wanted a wife and a home; and he has them. And he can be perfectly sure of them, because the wife that he got happens to be one of the kind that regards her husband and home as more or less ultimate conditions. And my share of the bargain was the security and protection that those conditions imply. And I have them. But, unlike Mr. Craig, I can’t be absolutely sure of them; because I know that, to a very great extent, they are at the mercy of the mood of a man. (She smiles knowingly.) And I suppose I’ m too practical minded to accept that as a sufficient guaran tee of their permanence. So I must secure their permanence for myself. (pp. 326-327) She continues to explain the basis of her hypocrisy, and, in doing so, is showing that it is conscious. Ethel How? 69 Mrs. Craig By securing into my own hands the control of the man upon which they are founded. . . . Haven’t you ever made Mr. Fredericks do some thing you wanted him to do? Ethel Yes, but I always told him that I wanted him to do it. Mrs. Craig But there are certain things that men can't be told, Ethel; they don’t understand them; particularly romantic men; and Mr. Craig is in veterately idealistic. Ethel But supposing he were to find out sometime? Mrs. Craig Find out what? Ethel What you’ve just been telling me--that you wanted to control him. Mrs. Craig One never comprehends, dear, what it is not in one’s nature to comprehend. And even if it were possible, what about it? It’s such an absolutely unprovable thing; that is, I mean to say, it isn’t a thing that one does or says, specifically; it’s a matter of— inter pretation. (She is amused.) And that’s where women have such a tremendous advantage over men; so few men are capable of interpreting them. But, they can always interpret them selves, if they’re so disposed. And if the interpretation is for the instruction of a romantic husband, a woman can always keep it safely within the exigencies of the moment. (p. 327) 70 When Ethel states that she does not think this is quite honest she is expressing the essential fact: that it represents a hypocritical practice. During Mrs. Craig’s absence in Albany, Miss Austen, Mr. Craig’s aunt who lives with them, had received a visit from Mrs. Frazier, a widow from across the street. The widow brought some roses and had remained to help Miss Austen with a dress pattern. Mrs, Craig is upset when she returns and finds the roses in the living room because the petals might get on the furniture or on the floor, and is very angry when she learns that Mrs. Frazier is upstairs visiting with the aunt. She also learns that Mr. Birkmire had called during her absence, and that he had tried since to reach her husband, Walter Craig. On the first call, Mr. Birkmire had left a telephone number where he could be reached. Later, she learns, her husband had left a number for Mr. Birkmire. Mrs. Craig has to know all these de tails, and then calls the number which had been left in an attempt to get the operator to give her the address. Walter returns, is cross-examined but is unaware that all this is more than a wifely interest. He is warned against the widow who is still upstairs. Mrs. Frazier comes down with Mr. Craig’s aunt. She is a warm, kindly person who describes herself as a "one-man woman,” unable to consider remarriage following the accidental death of her husband 71 ten years previously. She parts on very friendly terms with Miss Austen and Mr. Craig. Although Mrs. Frazier is evidently the only neighbor who has been in the house at all, Mrs. Craig, being careful to see that her husband Walter is out of earshot, tells Miss Austen, "Well, from :the looks of things, if I'd stayed away much longer, X should have probably come back to find my house a thorough fare for the entire neighborhood." She then insists in a very disagreeable way that Mrs. Frazier has been trying for a long time, like other neighbors, to get inside the house, to satisfy vulgar curiosity. "Let them tend to their houses and they111 have plenty to do: instead of wasting their time with a lot of silly roses," says Mrs. Craig. Auntie Austen expresses the belief that Mrs. Frazier probably has no idea what the house looks like, says that "a good neighbor is a very good thing sometimes" (p. 327), and explains that Mrs. Frazier had simply brought some roses over and that she had then asked her to help with a dress pattern. When Mrs. Craig says, "I want you to know that I resent intensely your having brought Mrs. Frazier in here" (p. 337), the reply shows that Miss Austen regards her as a hypocrite. Miss Austen (turning away) Oh, be honest about it, at least, Harriet! Mrs. Craig What do you mean? Miss Austen Why particularize on Mrs. Frazier? Mrs. Craig Because I don't want her here. Miss Austen You don't want anybody here. Mrs. Craig I don't want her. (She strikes the table with her knuckles.) Miss Austen (looking directly at her) You don't want your husband--(Mrs. Craig starts slightly and then stands rigid) only that he's necessary to the upkeep here. But if you could see how that could be managed without him, his position wouldn't be as secure as the position of one of those pil lows there. (She indicates the pillows on the seat of the stairway.) (p. 337) Mr. Craig comes downstairs and hears something of the disagreement. Miss Austen has already informed Mrs. Craig that she feels it is her duty to tell Walter before she leaves that he is being victimized and that she wants Mrs. Craig there when she tells him. Mrs. Craig tells Walter that she objected to Mrs. Frazier being there. Miss Austen replies, Harriet is chiefly provoked, Walter, be cause she has allowed herself to be tempted off form for a moment. She would much prefer 73 to have excluded Mrs. Frazier by the usual method--that has been employed in the exclu sion of every other man and woman that has ever visited here. But since she's blundered, she must attempt to justify herself now by arraigning Mrs. Frazier as everything from a vulgarian to a busybody— and even to insinu ating that her visit here this afternoon was inspired by an interest in you. (p. 339) Miss Austen then explains to an unbelieving nephew that "nobody could like Harriet . . . she doesn’t want them to" (p. 340) and when Walter objects, saying that he does, his aunt tells him that he is blinded by "a pretty face." Craig Well, what has Harriet done? Miss Austen She’s left you practically friendless for one thing; because the visits of your friends imply an importance to you that is at variance with her plan: so she’s made it perfectly clear to them, by a thousand little gestures, that they are not welcome in her house. Be cause this is her house, you know, Walter; it isn't yours— don't make any mistake about that. This house is what Harriet married— she didn’t marry you. You simply went with the house--as a more or less regrettable necessity. And you must not obtrude; for she wants the house all to herself. So she has set about reducing you to as negligible a factor as possible in the scheme of things here. (p. 341) She gives Walter further data which expand the details of the procedure involved in her technique of hypocrisy which Mrs. Craig had mentioned to her niece. When Walter says that Harriet could never turn him against his friends, his aunt replies: Walter— they can make men believe that the mothers that nursed them--are their arch ene mies. (She comes forward suddenly and rests her left hand on the table.) That's why If m warning you. For you're fighting for the life of your manhood, Walter; and I cannot in conscience leave this house without at least turning on the light here, and letting you see what it is that you're fighting against. ... (p. 342) It is not possible to turn on the light, however. Walter cannot believe what his aunt is saying. The night before Harriet's return, he had played cards at the Pass more's. Birkmire who was supposed to have gone with him had telephoned that he could not go because of the arrival of his father. And now, according to the papers, both Mr. and Mrs. Passmore were dead. It was this tragedy which was destined to expose Harriet. Birkmire came to the Craig residence nervous and excited. "What about it, Walt?" he asked. Craig About what? Birkmire About Fergus and his wife. You were out there last night, weren't you? Craig Sure. That's where I talked to you from. Birkmire Well, my God, what happened out there, Walter? 75 Craig did not know what Birkmire was talking about. He had not seen the papers. Birkmire explained that all the newspapers were full of the story, and that a man was seen leaving the Passmore residence (maybe Craig) after midnight. Walter was on the point of calling police head quarters to let them know that he might be the man seen leaving. Birkmire stopped him, saying: Well, now, wait a minute, Walter, don't move too fast; you know a thing like this can take a thousand and one turns, and we don't want to make any false move. This kind of thing *ud be pie for the newspapers, you know and the fact that we were invited out there to play cards wouldn't read any too well. ... I think the wise move for us is just to hop out there and try to find out what's going on; and if they haven't found anything out yet, just get in touch with Police Head quarters and let them know where we're at. While Walter and Birkmire are gone, Mrs. Craig ex citedly discovers the story in the newspapers. During this time there is a long distance telephone call (Act II) from Mr. Fredericks who wants to talk to Ethel. Harriet sends the maid to make certain Ethel's door is closed; then she tells Mr. Fredericks that Ethel is asleep and cannot be disturbed. She hangs up with a curt "I'm sorry." At this moment two detectives arrive looking for Mr. Craig. "Yes, Ma'm, we're from Police Headquarters," one of them ex plains, "But, that doesn't need to alarm you, Mrs. Craig; there's no particular connection between that and our 76 visit here" (p. 351). When Mrs. Craig asks if they think Mr. Craig might be the man that was seen leaving the house, the detective replies: No, that circumstance is really not being considered; a house of that description might have had any number of visitors during the evening. Mrs. Craig That’s very true. Catelle But, we've had a report late this afternoon, Mrs. Craig, from the Lynnebrooke Telephone Exchange, where your line comes in, that there was a call made on your telephone here at five-twenty-seven this evening, asking for the address of the telephone number Levering three, one hundred; and that happens to be the number of the telephone at Mr. Passmore’s home. (P- 351) Mrs. Craig You mean that somebody called from here? (She indicates the telephone.) ... I can’t imagine who it would be that called. (p. 352) This is dissimulation again. Mrs. Craig had called when she was checking up on her husband. The investigation is discontinued when the detective calls headquarters and learns that there have been new developments and that he must return at once. He will get in touch with Mr. Craig if it is necessary, he says. Mr. Craig returns to find a worried, excited wife. "I thought probably you’d been 77 arrested or something," she tells Walter. And then she says, "The police are looking for you; you know that, don't you?" (p. 355). When Walter inquired what they would be looking for him for, she says, "Well, now, why do you sup pose they*re looking for you, Walter? . . . Doesn't it say in the paper there," she asks, "that you were seen leaving Passmore's at twelve o’clock last night?" (p. 355). Craig It doesn't say I was seen leaving there. When Craig asked her if the men from police head quarters had said they knew he was out at Passmore's, she replied: I don't remember what they said, exactly; I was too upset. But they wanted to know where you were, and, of course, I couldn't tell them; because you were here when I left the room, and then you suddenly disappeared. (Turning away to the right.) I was never placed in such a position in my life. I'm sure those men must have thought I was evading them. (Turning back to him again.) But I didn't know what to say to them--except that you'd probably taken a little walk around the neighborhood here; because I'd sent Maizie over to the garage to look for you as soon as I saw the paper, and she said both the cars were in there. (p. 356) All of this, too, is an elaborate act. She knew very well that the detectives were making a routine check, as they had said, on an unusual, associated incident, and only because she herself had called the dead man's number in an effort to discover the address, not realizing, of course, 78 that it was Passmore*s number. It was the number Mr. Craig had left with the servants the night before for Birkmire. She had been responsible for the investigation. She is horrified when she discovers that Craig and Birkmire have been to the dead man's house. "Do you want your name to be dragged into this thing?” she demanded. When Craig says that his name will be dragged into it anyway, she insists that it is wrong to give any information voluntarily. She says: . . . you don't have to go rushing out to meet a lot of scandalous publicity, either. I should think your own common sense would show you what it would mean to have your name even mentioned in a thing of this kind. (Turning away and down towards the center table.) Why, it 'ud be in every newspaper in the country. ... If you’ ve had nothing to do with this thing, what's the use of becoming involved? (p. 356) Craig What do you mean, if I've had nothing to do with it? (p. 356) When Craig says he is going to call Birkmire to see if he knows anything new, Mrs. Craig becomes panicky, tells him to stay away from the telephone, that the telephone is being watched, and that the operator could be listening in. Craig asks, "And do you think she has nothing to do but listen in on calls?” Mrs. Craig forgets herself for a moment, and says: "She listened in on this one, didn’t she?” When Craig asked her which one, she realizes what 79 she had said and covers up her slip, by saying, ”1 don't know which one she listened in on. But some one must have ! ■ I listened in on something or those men wouldn't have come jhere, would they?" (p. 358). When Craig insists on tele- |phoning, she seizes the telephone and says, "I will not i 'allow you to drag my name into a notorious scandal" (p. 358). [ When Craig persists, she explodes with, "If you speak over that telephone I'll leave this house! . . . And you iknow what construction *ud be put upon that, under the circumstances” (p. 358). She tells Craig that she is not I i interested in the degree of his guilt or innocence; that she is only interested "in the impression on the popular mind,— and the respect of the community we've got to live in" (p. 358). When Mr. Craig asks the housekeeper, Mrs. Harold, if she knew who could have called the Passmore's number, she replied, "I never even thought about it today until Mrs. Craig asked me for it when she came in this evening” (p. 359). Craig then realizes that his wife was the one who had made the call. He asks why she had not told the truth (p. 359). Craig You were playing safe; that was it, wasn't it? Mrs. Craig Exactly! 80 Craig Listen to me, Harriet. Why weren’t you at least honest with me in this thing, and not try to make it appear that I was responsible for the visit of those detectives? Mrs. Craig Because I knew exactly what you’d do if I told you* And that would mean an explanation of why I had called up; and the next thing would be an admission of the fact that you are the man the Police are looking for. (p. 360) Craig But it’s you those detectives are looking for. Mrs. Craig Oh, you needn’t try to turn it on me.’ They wouldn't be looking for either of us if you’d stayed at home last night, instead of being out card-playing with a lot of irregular people. Craig What was there irregular about Fergus Passmore? Mrs. Craig (turning to him, in a wrath) There must have been some irregularity, or this thing wouldn’t have happened. Everybody that kiew Fergus Passmore knew that he was insanely jealous of his wife; and then you have to go out visiting them. (She crosses below the table to the piano.) I felt in my bones up there in Albany that something *ud happen while I was away; that was the reason I didn't stay up there any longer than I absolutely had to. I knew as soon as ever my back was turned you’d be out with your friends again. (p. 360) 81 Craig . . . And what has your back being turned got to do with my visiting my friends? To make the point that she could have succeeded in keeping him away from friends, Mrs. Craig ends with a pointed question, MYou haven't been visiting them in the last eighteen months, have you? And they haven't been visiting you, either?" When Craig asks if she means that she has kept them out, Mrs. Craig looks him straight in the eyes and says: Well, if I did the end justified the means; you at least haven't been in the shadow of the j law in the last eighteen months. (p. 361) | When Craig remembers and remarks that his aunt had ! said that she had driven all his friends away from the house, she replies, "There are ways of getting rid of people without driving them away from the house" (p. 361). At this point Craig's eyes have been opened. He now realizes fully that she would like to be rid- of both friends and husband. He tells her: . . . But, don't make any mistake that I think you didn't want my friends here simply because they played cards; you wouldn't have wanted them if they’d come here to hold prayer meetings. You didn't want them because, as my aunt says, their visits implied an import ance to me that was at variance with your little campaign--the campaign that was to re duce me to one of those wife-ridden sheep that's afraid to buy a necktie for fear his wife might not approve of it. (p. 361) 82 Mrs. Craig tells him that he has had his share of ’ ’ this bargain," to which Craig replies that he had never regarded his marriage on that basis. Mrs. Craig asks, "Did ; you expect me to go into a thing as important as marriage j with my eyes shut?” Craig I wanted you to go into it honestly, as I went into it--fifty-fifty.--And you’ ve been playing safe right from the start. ... I see your game as clearly as my aunt sees it. . . . You’ ve been exploiting me, consistently, in your shifty little business of personal safety. And you’d throw me right now to the suspicion of implication in this double murder— to preserve that safety. (p. 362) i f | The morning paper (Act III) reveals that Fergus Pass- more had taken his own life and that of his wife. All of Harriet’s dissimulation, frenzy, and activity had been for nothing. But it had exposed her. Her husband tells her this when he says, "You made a remark here last night, Harriet, that completely illuminated me; and illuminated you . . . you said that a woman might lose her husband but not her home, if she knew how to secure it” (p. 368). He then tells Harriet that he must leave her. The expressman arrives for Miss Austen’s trunks. Mrs. Craig is concerned about possible damage to the floors and the walls, and then tells her niece, who is preparing to return to her mother, that "Mr. Craig’s aunt is sending some luggage away to be mended” (p. 370). Mr. Fredericks arrives; Ethel learns about his long distance call the t night before. Mr. Craig takes Ethel and Mr. Fredericks to the train. Later he is to join his aunt at the Ritz. Maizie was dis charged for putting a card on the ”sacred” mantel, and Mrs. Harold decides to accompany Miss Austen, first to the Ritz, and then on a world tour. Mrs. Craig is left alone. A telegraph boy arrives with a telegram informing her that her sister has just died. Mrs. Frazier arrives at this ! ; point with an armful of white roses for Miss Austen. I |Mrs. Craig receives her expressions of sympathy graciously. i As Mrs. Frazier leaves, Mrs. Craig is left forlornly alone, clutching the roses, ignoring the falling petals; ”her eyes wide and despairing" (p. 379) as the final curtain falls. The house is now all hers, for Craig has given it to her. But she is not rejoicing. Craig’s wife is a conscious hypocrite. The conclusion of the play, however, makes it quite clear that she is to be pitied. The mournful, solemn note, the despairing eyes can leave no doubt on this point. Even Craig, with what normally would be considered every right to be angry, realizes that his wife’s hypocrisy is the result of circum stances: hereditary and environmental forces over which she has had no control. He does not hate her. This is shown 84 when he says: "No, there isn't a thing in the world I don't forgive you for, Harriet. ..." Something of the inevitability, and inescapable quality of her hypocrisy, rooted in her past, her child hood, and in unpleasant experiences is seen in the follow- ; ing lines: And I wouldn't be the first woman that's lost her home, and her husband too, through letting the control of them get out of her hands. . . . I saw what happened to my own mother, and I made up my mind it 'ud never happen to me. She was one of those "I will follow thee, my husband" women--that believed everything my father told her; and all the time he was mortgaging her home over her head for another woman. And when she found it out, she did the only thing that women like her can do, and that was to die of a broken heart--within six months; and leave the door open for the other woman to come in as step mother over Estelle and me. And then get rid of us both as soon as Estelle was marriage able. (Turning to him suddenly.) But the house was never mortgaged over her head, I'll promise you that; for she saw to it that it was put in her name before even she took him; and she kept it there, too, right to the finish. (p. 362) Her hypocrisy is seen and understood by Craig's aunt who unsuccessfully tries to "turn the light on" before leaving. She, too, understood that Harriet was to be pitied for this affliction, but, like a woman who would want to protect her loved ones from a dangerous disease, regards it as something from which to flee. Craig, al though still a dupe at this point, has been armed with 85 knowledge of the process. Thus, when the Passmore affair frightens Harriet, it is easy for Craig to see the truth and to know he has been deceived. It is apparent that Augier's Le Mariage d * Olympe varies considerably in treatment from George Kelly's Craig's Wife. Both Olympe and Harriet are conscious of their hypocrisy, but they are, nevertheless, different. While Craig's wife is conscious of her hypocrisy, she can no more help practicing it than she can help constantly arranging the piano scarf because of her mania for neat ness. Her hypocrisy stems from childhood experiences over which she has no control. - Although Olympe*s hypocrisy is also conscious, it is |not presented as the result of unfortunate, uncontrollable j ' i past experiences. She enjoys her adventures. She pretends to love Henri, to be the daughter of a Vendeen, etc., for the sake of further adventures as the Countess de Puygiron. Excitement, not security, is her goal. Money is only im portant as an aid in furthering adventure and excitement. That is why it is possible for her to give Adolphe, a stranger, an expensive pearl. In considering variations in treatment between the French and American dramas dealt with in this thesis, this difference is of primary importance: it determines the denouement. Emile Augier did not visualize Olympe 86 Tavemy*s behavior as the uncontrollable product of unseen influences. Consequently, he has the Marquis shoot her. I Such a conclusion would be difficult in Harriet*s case. (it may be possible that George Kelly wanted to show Harriet! as being punished for her hypocrisy by being left alone at the final curtain, but it is, nevertheless, true that the reader or spectator feels pity for her. It is doubtful, though, that this could be said for Olympe Taverny. She is; l simply the wicked girl. Sympathy is with the Marquis who I is protecting his family against an unscrupulous adven turess. Another important variation in treatment comes from the fact that Augier uses Olympe*s hypocrisy to forward the1 action. Olympe, by representing herself to the Marquis as the daughter of a Vendeen, and by ingratiating herself, pushes the action forward nearer the climax. In other words, hypocrisy is a motivating force. In Craig*s Wife, the hypocrisy explains the denouement only. Craig leaves Harriet after he discovers her hypocrisy, but the discovery is brought about by the fact that Fergus Passmore had killed himself and his wife. Harriet*s exposure came, therefore, because this incident threatened her security and forced her into a more active hypocrisy, not because of any original hypocritical act of her own. The dramatic phase of her hypocrisy arose as a result of other action. It did not cause the action. The exposition indicated that she was practicing hypocrisy, through her own explanation of it to Ethel. i 1 Subsequently, it was again explained by Craig's aunt. This is different, too, from the treatment in Le Mariage d * Olympe. Olympe's hypocrisy is all more direct. At the moment her "death” is heard of we see her in the actual act of practicing it. George Kelly's Harriet, however, only tells about her hypocrisy. Her aunt also talks about it. It is only after the Passmore deaths that she begins to /'act" hypocrisy. The warning given by Craig's aunt is I istill another difference. No one warned the Marquis. He did not know of Olympe's hypocrisy until the actual scene a faire when Henri himself tells him his wife is the notorious Olympe Taverny. Her previous incognito position, insofar as the Marquis and the rest were concerned, had made possible much delightful irony, conspicuously absent from the American play. Both plays well illustrate the danger of hypocrisy to both the practitioner and the dupe. Pity is aroused for Craig's wife, even more than for the dupe, her husband Walter Craig. The creation of this pity, the fact the hypocrisy as depicted does not forward the action as it does in Augier's play, the greater use of exposition to explain the hypocrisy, and the warning given by Craig's 88 aunt of Harriet's hypocrisy, with a conspicuous lack of the witty dramatic irony of double meanings in the American play, constitute the chief variations of treatment in these two plays. CHAPTER IV i COMPARISON OF DRAMATIC TREATMENT IN PLAYS OF RELIGIOUS HYPOCRISY The devil can cite Scripture for his purpose. --William Shakespeare Hatcher Hughes* Hell-Bent fer Heaven In Hell-Bent fer Heaven, a Pulitzer prize-winning play of Hatcher Hughes for 1923-1924, there is a development of unconscious religious hypocrisy. Sid Hunt, a soldier hero of World War I returns to his mountain home in North Carolina to a warm welcome by his father Matt, his mother Meg, and his grandfather, old David Hunt. Andy Lowry, an old friend who has not been to war and who is now carrying the mail, comes by. Later Andy*s sister Jude arrives. Andy has been drinking moderately. He is encouraged to drink more by Rufe, who has been working in the Hunts’ family store during Sid's absence. Intent on marrying Jude himself, and wanting to eliminate his rival, Sid, Rufe prods Andy slyly with remarks about the feud fifty years earlier between Andy’s and Sid’s families, and succeeds, 89 with the help of the liquor, in enraging Andy. Sid returns from the store with pistol cartridges for Andy (Act II) which had originally been intended for target practice. The enraged Andy grimly refers to the feud. . . . When the Hunts an* the Lowries fought the last time the Hunts killed three more Lowries *n the Lowries killed Hunts! Do you call that ekal? . . . I*m a-goin* to kill , three more Hunts *n the Hunts killed Lowries!®0 When Jude returns to find Sid dancing for Andy before being shot, she rushes forward with a scream. This gives Sid a chance to disarm Andy. They are reconciled. Sid returns Andy's gun. Jude and Sid announce their intention of marrying, and so, perhaps, the feud will not be renewed after all, the Hunts think. The proposed marriage, how ever, causes Rufe successfully to renew his attempts to inflame Andy against Sid. He also succeeds in convincing Andy that Sid is really planning to kill him en route home. During an approaching storm, Andy, who insists upon going home, and Sid who wants to make arrangements for the mar riage with Jude's father, set out on horseback. A shot is heard not long afterwards, followed almost instantly by a second. Sid's horse returns with an empty saddle. David and Matt take their guns, go to investigate. Sid returns 60 All references to Hell-Bent fer Heaven are from Hatcher Hughes, Hell-Bent fer Heaven (New York, 1924). 91 while they are out and is seen only by Rufe. Sid leaves again to intercept David and Matt, planning to use the telephone at the dam. He realizes that Rufe has been responsible, but is not certain that Rufe's acts were in tentional. He rushes out. Rufe prays, concluding with, "If it's Your will that this blasphemer shall die, I've got a whole box o* dynamite out in the store, with a time fuse long enough so I can git back here afore it explodes. I can blow up the dam while he's under thar a-telephonin*, an* the waters o' Your wrath'll sweep over him like they did over Fharaoh an* his hosts in olden times!” Amid thunder and lightning, Rufe shouts, "I hear you, Lord! an’, like Joshua o' old, I go to do Your will!" Matt and David return (Act III) with Andy as a prisoner, still unaware of the fact that Sid is safe and that he has been home. Rufe denies having seen him. They bind Andy's hands and feet, and put him in the cellar. Andy threatens to expose Rufe, and Rufe is on the point of killing him with a shotgun after making certain that it is the Lord's will, when Sid returns to find Rufe alone again. Sid pretends to be a ghost, says he has orders to find out who murdered him. "It 'us Him— up yonder!" Rufe shouts. Hearing Andy in the cellar, Sid goes to compare notes. Matt, David, Meg, and Jude return. Rufe tells them he has seen Sid's ghost. David is skeptical. Andy and Sid 92 return. At his urging, Jude touches Sid experimentally; then throws her arms around him. Andy makes for Rufe who runs to Meg for protection. At Sid's insistence, Rufe explains that in planning Sid's death he was only an instrument. Meg and Jude recoil in horror; Matt reaches for his gun; Andy insists that it is his right, wants only to use his fists on the hypocrite. David advises that he be left to the Lord, calls attention to the rising flood. The house will soon be under water. They must leave by boat. Rufe asks from the cellar, "You ain't a-goin* to leave me here to drownd? I cain't swim, neither!" Coming out of the cellar, he prays to God; he ends by cursing God. He screams hysterically as the curtain falls. As can be noted from the plot outline above, Rufe represents an exaggerated type of hypocrisy, not often seen, and more likely to be associated, when observed, with definite neuroses or psychoses requiring hospitalization. There are elements, however, which can be observed in everyday life. The character displaying this unusual, exaggerated type of hypocrisy, Rufe, is the only hypocriti cal person in the play. All of the hypocrisy is concen trated on him, with the possible exception of Meg's hy pocrisy by implication which will be explained later. To add to this concentration, clues are given even in the stage directions, as in the following examples: 93 1. (Rufe appears at the top of the stairs, unobserved by the others. He is thirty, of medium height, with pale face and shifty, uncertain manner.) (p. 11) 2. (Rufe comes downstairs, smiling at David with an expression of great compassion and humility.) (p. 11) 3. (In an instant the faces of the men be come tense with amazement. Rufe is conscious of this, but continues with a show of innocence.) (p. 38) The development of Rufe as a hypocrite furthers theme, action, and characterization. Sid summarizes the effect on the theme when he says the Lord is "almighty tired of bein* the scapegoat fer folks that do all the meanness they can think of an* call it religion!** (p. 168). Under the guise of a well-wisher to Andy, he hypo critically fans Andy*s resentment over the outcome of the family feud fifty years previously, egging him on to kill Sid, which, of course, would leave Sidfs girl to him. Since Andy responds to his hypocritical prodding, this spurs the action forward. Later, his lying has the same effect. When, for example, he denies having seen Sid, Matt and David, thinking thait Sid has not returned, and that he may have been killed by Andy, begin a whole new campaign. In terms of characterization, Rufe serves to provide contrast, and thus to aid in portraying others, to provide specific examples of types of hypocritical rationalizations to which many people, if in less degree, are subject, and to add to the suspense, for one does not know whether his evil machinations will succeed or not. An example of the contrast used to aid in the charac terization of others can be seen in connection with Sid and Andy, and the juxtaposition of their attitude with that of Rufe toward military service. When Sid, just returned from the war, asks about Rufe's health, Rufe replies, "I cain't brag on myself much” (p. 12). Sid What's the trouble? You're lookin' all right. (p. 12) Rufe Yeah, I am, on the outside. The thing's in here (taps himself on the stomach), what ever it is. I tried to git in the army arter you left, but they wouldn't have me. (p. 13) David Fust I ever hyeard of it, Rufe. . . . What post did you go to git edzamined--if 'tain't no secret? Rufe I wasn't edzamined by no army doctor. I was a-goin* to be, but a man down at Pine- ville looked me over an* said it wusn't no use. David Was he a doctor? I Rufe i i I (Evasively) Not edzackly; but he had worked fer one an* knowed how to edzamine folks. (p. 13) David (Chuckles) Oh, I see! Like the man by playin’ the fiddle: he’d seed it done! Well, them army doctors wouldn’t ha’ been so per- tickler, jedgin* by some o’ the samples I seen that got by ’em. Rufe I hyeard they let the bars down toward the end. But I’d jist as soon stay out of a fight if I cain’t git in tell it’s over. Sid’s basically honest nature is shown by his reply at this moment when he says: ’ ’ That’s the best time to git in.” When David suggests that Rufe is a coward, and that he had known his grandfather who had knocked his front teeth out so he would not have to serve in the Confederate Army, Rufe rationalizes this by saying: ”He didn’t b’lieve in fightin' about niggers! He’d ha’ fit all right if he’d had as much to fight fer as Sid had!” (p. 15). The hypocrite excuses himself for not fighting and manages to cover his grandfather as well. In the light of Sid and Andy’s basically honest reactions Rufe’s character and hypocrisy are made all the darker. Andy's portrait of a basically honest person is furthered by the contrast. Andy, who, like Rufe, did not go to war, asks Sid, "I reckon you’re demed glad you went over?” (p. 31). 96 Sid I am now. But they ’us once er twice while I ’us thar I’d jist as soon ha’ been back. Andy You’re lucky. They hain't been no time I wusn’t sorry I didn't go. Sid What 'us the trouble? Wouldn’t they have you? Andy Have me, hell! They’d ha’ jumped at me! But Maw an’ Paw wheedled me into claimin' edzemption so’s I could help cut that patch o* timber up the river fer the gov’ ment. An* now I'm totin’ the mail. Sid Well, don’t be so down-hearted. Somebody's got to tote it. Andy But, dam' it all, I want a job that gives me more elbow room! Every time I look at that piddlin' mail sack an’ think o* what you've been through, I git so goddern mad at myself an* everybody else ’at I feel like startin’ a war o* my own right here in the mountains! (p. 32) In terms of various types of hypocrisy portrayed and represented by the character of Rufe, there is, first, that just cited, which could be called the ’ ’ draft-dodger” type. In addition, there is the hypocrisy of excessive humility, of hate disguised as kindness, profit on liquor, rational ized as ”if folks is bound they're a-goin’ to drink 97 the stuff, I s'pose 'tain't no more 'n right to help 'em git sompen good" (p. 50); and "I would kinder like to git back jist what I paid fer it.” Passion and desire for Judei is disguised as unselfishness, love "ordained from above” and as "spiritual marriage." In a scene in which Rufe awakens emotional religious ecstasy in Jude, he kisses her passionately and then lulling her back from her surprise into her former mood, tells her it was "jist a holy kiss," and insists, "'Tain't no harm fer the Lord's lambs to play together!" (p. 161). And, finally, murder itself is I rationalized as the will of God. Rufe in attempting to murder Sid and Andy is only the instrument of the Lord. I"I didn't do it, I tell you!" he shouts, "I 'us only His instrument!" Rufe It 'us Him up yonder! He done it! (He turns to the men.) I know you won't believe me, 0 ye o' little faith! But if it's the last word I ever utter on earth, He appeared to me in the storm an' I hyeard His voice! . . . It 'us while you 'us out a-lookin' fer Sid. He come in an' accused me o' aggin* Andy on to shoot him! He cussed and reviled an* took God's name in vain! . . . Then he went out to the dam to tele phone an* head off Matt! I knowed the blame 'us all a-goin' to fall on me, an* I knelt thar to pray! (Pointing.) Right thar in that very spot! (He looks around him and lowers his voice impressively.) An* all of a sudden God appeared to me in thunder an* lightnin'!-- 98 . . . An* He spoke to me in a still small voice, but loud aplenty fer me to hear! ; Jude (sways rhythmically) Halleluyah! Bless his name! Meg I What'd He say? Rufe (with a convulsive movement of the muscles of his face) "Gird up your loins," He says, "an* take ' that box o’ dynamite you got out thar in the { store an* go forth an’ blow up the dam while ! he's under thar a*telephonin*!" i When confronted with a shocked, unbelieving, and angered group, and while backing away from an enraged Meg who had exclaimed, "Then you did do it! You tried to mur der him!" Rufe said, "I know it seems quair now, Meg! But He works in a mysterious way! I 'us only--" Meg (makes a move toward him with clenched hands) Take him out o* here an* kill him! If you don't I'11-- David (stopping her) Now ca'm yourself, Meg! Rufe I didn't do it, I tell you! I 'us only His instrument! It is noteworthy that Meg, who has been the hypo crite's protector and dupe to an extent, presumably the most religious person in the play, is now ready to kill, 99 and it is "irreligious" David who cautions moderation. This is the "hypocrisy by implication" referred to earlier. Meg who was certain of her righteousness, has now, by virtue of her readiness to kill Rufe, cast doubt upon the sincerity and reality of her religion. In short, there is a sort of blasphemy, as David had suggested earlier, when referring to Rufe's presumption and certainty that the Lord was with him, in being too "righteous." If not actually hypocritical, then--Mr. Hughes is saying--it is a fault, perhaps even a sin. It is akin to the immoderation against which Cleante speaks in Tartuffe. Moliere's Tartuffe Moliere's celebrated play Tartuffe began its stormy career in 1664 at a private court performance. Persuasive arguments, revisions, and petitions to the king finally gained for Molikre the privilege of giving a public per formance in 1667. Robinet, one of the contemporary critics, describes the scene at which crowds fought for seats.61 The long delay and mental duel against the power ful secret organization, the Compagnie du Saint-Sacrement, seemed at last about to return dividends to the Sieur ^See John Palmer, Moliere (New York, 1930), p. 346. 100 de Moliere. The expectation was short-lived. The king was absent from Paris. The President du Parlement, Monsieur t de Lamoignon, who was a member of the secret society, took i • |advantage of the king’s absence to order the play closed after one performance. ”1 am persuaded,” he said, ’ ’ that your play is a fine and instructive piece of work, but it j is not fitting for comedians to instruct people in matters I [concerning Christian morality and religion; the theatre is : [no place for preaching the Gospel.”^2 Moliere*s reply to this, as Palmer indicates, is that, on the contrary, "the j theatre had its origins in religion, and it is still the principal end of comedy to correct the vices of men, who are more likely to be laughed than scolded out of their ; sins.”^ The opposition, however, was so powerful that, despite the king's friendship and revision of the play, Moliere's pleas were disregarded. In his second placet addressed to the king he says, En vain^je l'ai produite sous le titre de 1'Impos- teur, et deguise le personnage sous l’ajustement d'un homme du monde. J'ai eu beau lui donner un petit chapeau, de grands cheveus, un grand collet, une epee, et des dentelles sur tout 1’habit; mettre en plusieurs endroits des adoucissements, et retrancher avec soin tout ce que j’ai juge capable de foumir 1*ombre d'un ^Palmer, p. 343. ^Palmer, p. 349. 101 j pretexte aux celebres originaux du portrait que je j voulois [sic 1 faire; tout cela n*a de rien servi.®4 i The history of Molierefs fight against the Compagnie du Saint-Sacrement is in itself a revealing study of hy- jpocrisy. Palmer, previously mentioned, gives an interest- ing account of the background of this conflict. Moore^-* 66 and Lancaster also provide background material in English. Daniel Momet gives an interesting summary in French. Tartuffe was conceived as a three-act farce in which the laughs were chiefly at Orgon's expense. To understand the play as it now exists in five acts with its emphasis on morality and hypocrisy, some knowledge of the background circumstances is essential. Part of Mornet's discussion follows: ... d’autres ecrivains avaient, avant Moliere, attaque la fausse devotion et fait du devot hypocrite un portrait dont Moliere s*est souvenu, sdrement ou probablement: Ch. Sorel dans son Polyandre (1648), Scarron dans le Montufar de ses Hypocrites (1661), Urbain Chevreau dans L*Hypocrite de son Ecole du Sage (nouvelle edition, 1652). ^-The Second Placet of Moliere, quoted by Fernand Ledoux, ed., Le Tartuffe ou LfImposteur de Moliere (Paris, 1953), p. 44. ^-*W. G. Moore, Moliere, A New Criticism (Oxford, 1949). ^Henry Carrington Lancaster, A History of French Dramatic Literature (Baltimore, 1942), II, 620-634. 102 Les deux devotions.--II n'y avait pas, en 1669, de lutte entre les devots et les libertins, mais il y avait une lutte violente entre deux devotions; elle etait mSme si violente qu'elley allait 6tre, pendant j cent ans, la grande lutte qui ebranlera le pouvoir royal | et la religion m§me. ... Il existait, des 1627, une societe d'Smes pieuses, ”la compagnie du Saint-Sacrement, " societe secrete dont on a retrouve et etudie de nombreuses archives. Elle avait pris, des 1650, une extension extraordinaire. Elle agissait a Aix, a Marseille, a Caen, a Toulouse, dans presque toutes les grandes villes. En sous-main, elle contrdlait presque toutes les affaires publiques Ou mimes privees. Elle avait fonde et faisait vivre des associations tres genereuses, oeuvres de bienfaisance, visites aux prisonniers. Mais elle pretendait aussi bien, et surtout, etre une police implacable opposee a tous les vices publics et prives, le jeu, le blaspheme, I’heresie, la licence du Camaval [sic], les impietes des bateleurs; a 1*occasion, elle denonqait aux peres les fils debauches^ aux maris les femmes trop coquettes. Ainsi tendait a s’etablir en France une religion non pas i humaine et traitable, mais austere et impitoyable. . . . De Pidee^du fanatisme dangereux a celle du fanatisme interesse et hypocrite, il n*y avait qu'un pas, et nous avons bien des preuves qu'il fut franchi. La compagnie fut appelee communement la Cabale. II est de r , notoriete publique” (1’expression est du temps) que la cabale [sic] trouble des families et sfingere, comme Tartuffe, dans la vie privee. . . . Si JMoliere n*a pas voulu attaquer la Cabale, il a attaque tous ceux qui comprenaient comme elle la devotion. Et il les a attaques avec la complicite de 1*opinion. II a combattu— au moins dans la pensee des contemporains— non la religion, mais un abus reel, actuel, redoutable de la religion.6? Translation: [Other writers had attacked false devotion before Moliere and had made of the hypocritical person a por trait which Moliere certainly or probably remembered: Charles Sorel in his Polyandre (1648), Scarron in the Montufar of his Hypocrites (1661). Urbain Chevreau in 67Momet, II, 131-134. 103 the hypocrite of his Ecole du Sage (new edition 1652). The Two Devotions: In 1669, there was no conflict j between the "devots" and the "libertins" but there was ; a violent struggle between two devotions; it was even so violent that it was going to be, for a century, the big struggle that shook the royal power and religion itself. ... As early as 1627, there was a pious society: the Compagnie du Saint-Sacrement, a secret organization of which many files have been found and studied. By 1650 j it had achieved an extraordinary growth. It was active j in Aix, Marseille, Caen, Toulouse, in almost all large cities. Undercover, it controlled almost all public or ! even private affairs. It had founded and generously i helped associations, but it also, and above all, claimed j to be an implacable police, opposed to all public and private vice, gambling, blasphemy, heresy, carnival licentiousness, and the impieties of street acrobats. At times, it would denounce corrupt sons to their fathers, coquettish wives to their husbands. Thus a i religion, not human and tractable, but austere and piti less was trying to establish itself in France. . . . From the idea of dangerous fanaticism to that of interested and hypocritical fanaticism there was only one step, and we have many proofs that it was taken. I The company was commonly called "la Cabale." It is "common knowledge" (the expression was used at that period), that the "Cabale” disturbs families and inter feres, like Tartuffe, with private lives. ... If Moliere did not want to attack the Cabale, he has attacked all those who understood devotion the same way. He attacked them with the complicity of pub lic opinion. He fought (at least in the opinion of his contemporaries) not religion itself, but an actual and dangerous misuse of religion.]°° This background information strongly argues, then, that once again a playwright was involved with a warning con cerning need for a moral readjustment. It was urgent. The persistence with which Moliere pursued his efforts to obtain a hearing for the play seems to argue, too, that 68 Translation mine. he viewed it in this light. That Moliere thought of the Cabale as representing a dangerous misuse of religion is indicated in the very ! beginning of the play. It begins in the very first act I with a sharp discussion in Orgon's house. His mother, Madame Pernelle, is leaving. She departs in a flurry of .words which shows that she is annoyed by what she sees as the worldly life followed in the house against the advice of the "pious" Tartuffe whom she and her son both venerate. The cordial, almost worshipful welcome extended to Tartuffe i I is distasteful to Damis, Orgon’s son, and to Mariane, his daughter. Sharing their disgust is Orgon’s second wife Elmire, and her brother, Cleante, all of whom insist that Tartuffe is not truly pious, that he is only a hypocrite. Orgon will not listen. When he returns from the country, he shows little concern for his wife's health but is very solicitous about that of Tartuffe. To Cleante who advises moderation and points out that "there are pretenders to devotion as well as to courage” and that, while there is nothing finer than to be truly devout, nothing is more abominable than "the outside daubing of a pretended zeal,” Orgon only praises Tartuffe and ignores his brother-in- law' s opinion. Later (Act II) Orgon tells Mariane that, despite a previous promise to Valere, he wants her to marry Tartuffe. 105 This arouses keen indignation in Dorine, the maid and con fidante of Mariane, and throws Mariane into despair. Valere arrives and is suspicious of her attitude toward the proposed marriage with Tartuffe. They quarrel and are about to part when Dorine stops this nonsense, pointing out that they truly love one another. Elrnire sends for Tartuffe (Act III), and pleads with him to abandon the idea of marrying Mariane. This is the first time Tartuffe has had an opportunity to be alone with Elrnire. He tells her that he has been waiting for such a chance, that he loves her. She tells Tartuffe that she will guard his secret if he will not marry Mariane. Mean while, Damis has been hiding in a closet. When he hears Tartuffe making love to Elrnire, he regards this as a heaven-sent opportunity to expose Tartuffe*s perfidy and promptly denounces him to Orgon. The hypocrite agrees with Damis* denunciation, saying that it is true and admitting that he is only a miserable sinner, knowing as he does so that Orgon will interpret this as an acceptance of calumny, not from guilt, but from true piety and true humility. Orgon turns in fury against Damis, disowns him, sends him away and says that he is going to give all of his estate to Tartuffe. Tartuffe accepts, saying nla volonte du ciel soit faite en toute chose!” 106 To forestall the imminent marriage of Tartuffe (Act IV), Elrnire tells Orgon that she can show him proof of Tartuffe*s dissimulation. To prove this, Elrnire tells j [Tartuffe that she returns his love. He resumes his love- ! making but insists upon having immediate proof. To her pretended fears about her husband, Tartuffe says that Orgon is "a man to be led by the nose*1 (p. 202),^ and Says also, i ”1 have brought him up to the point of seeing everything, without believing anything*' (p. 202). When Tartuffe opens the door a little to see, at Elrnire*s bidding, if her husband might be near, Orgon comes out from under the table i ! where he has been hiding to confront Tartuffe angrily. When he tells him that he must leave, Tartuffe says, on the contrary, it is Orgon who must leave, for it is no longer Orgon*s house. Not only does Tartuffe have the donation of all Orgon*s assets (Act V), but he also has compromising papers left with Orgon by a friend who has fled the country. M. Loyal, the bailiff, arrives, orders the house vacated, but even then Madame Pemelle can scarcely believe it pos sible. Tartuffe himself arrives with an officer to put Orgon under arrest. The officer has orders from the king, ^All quotations from Le Tartuffe are from Moliere, Le Tartuffe. edited by Fernand Ledoux. (Translations mine.) however, to tell Orgon that he is exempt from the terms of his contract with Tartuffe, that the king remembers his former services, and forgives him for holding the papers jof the fugitive friend. His orders are, he says, to arrest Tartuffe. He leads the hypocrite away. Tartuffe, it will be noticed, does not appear until the third act. Therefore, none of the actual concept of hypocrisy derives from any action involving direct dis simulation up to this point. The picture of Tartuffe as a hypocrite is derived from the remarks of other charac ters. Damis, a frank, honest young man is against Tar tuffe. He must have good reasons. Even more telling are Dorine*s attitude and words. To Madame Pemelle’s admoni tion that things would be better for them all if they were governed by Tartuffe, Dorine says, ”11 passe pour un saint dans votre fantaisie: Tout son fait, croyez-moi, n*est rien qu* hypocrisie” (p. 54). Madame Pemelle* s unreasonable attitude lends greater credibility and trust to Damis * s and Dorine*s attitude. When Dorine adds that she would not like to trust herself with him, nor with his man Laurent without a good guaran tee, the portrait of hypocrisy receives an added stroke. A foreshadowing of later action connected with his sensual nature and desires is also accomplished. She adds to this later when she states that she believes Tartuffe to be 108 jealous of Elmire. This, she thinks, may be the reason he does not like the visits of which Madame Pemelle also complains. The first two acts paint two central portraits: one of Orgon as the credulous dupe of Tartuffe; the other of Tartuffe himself as the hypocrite. Dorine uses a double brush when Orgon returns after a two-day absence (Act I, scene IV) (pp. 68, 70). Dorine Madame eut, avant-hier, la fievre jusqu’au soir, Avec un xnal de t£te etrange a concevoir. Orgon i ; Et Tartuffe? j Dorine Tartuffe? il se porte a merveille, Gros et gras, le teint frais et la bouche vermeille. Orgon Le pauvre homme! Dorine Le soir elle eut un grand degout Et ne put au souper toucher a rien du tout, Tant sa douleur de tete etait encor cruelle. Orgon Et Tartuffe? Dorine II soujja, lui tout seul, devant elle, Et fort devotement il mangea deux perdrix Avec une moitie de gigot en hachis. 109 Orgon Le pauvre homme! Dorine La nuit se passa tout entiere Sans qufelle put fermer un moment la paupiere; Des chaleurs 11empechaient de pouvoir sommeiller, Et jusqu'au jour pres dfelle il nous fallut veiller. Orgon Et Tartuffe? Dorine Presse dfun sommeil agreable, II passa dans sa chambre au sortir de la table, Et dans son lit bien chaud il se mit tout soudain, Ou sans trouble il dormit jusques au lendemain. Orgon Le pauvre hommeJ Dorine A la fin, par nos raisons gagnee^ Elle se resolut a souffrir la saignee, Et le soulagement suivit tout aussitSt. Orgon Et Tartuffe? Dorine * Il reprit courage comme il faut, Et, contre tous les maux fortifiant son &me, Pour reparer le sang qu*avait perdu madame, But, a son dejeuner, quatre grands coups de vin. Orgon Le pauvre homme! Dorine Tous deux se portent bien enfin; Et je vais a madame annoncer par avance j La part que vous prenez a sa convalescense. I I As will be noted in this ironically humorous passage, Orgon is being portrayed as gullible. At the same time, with farcical repetition of words, Dorine is inserting in formation which exposes the character of Tartuffe as hypo- • I critical. We learn that he is a glutton who ate "very devoutly” two partridges and ’ ’ half a leg of mutton hashed,” and that he drank excessively "four large draughts of wine , at lunch. ” It is Dorine, too, who later reveals that iTartuffe boasts of his lineage, and that he had been poverty stricken before Orgon had given him a home. While we learn, then, particulars of his hypocrisy, we also see the effects on the family itself. In Act III we note that the interaction of Tartuffe*s hypocrisy and Orgon*s credulity has brought about a situ ation which calls for assistance from Elrnire. She evi dently knows, as Dorine had suspected, that Tartuffe loves her. She, therefore, appeals to him not to marry Mariane. This provides Tartuffe with his opportunity to make love to Elrnire. Damis overhears the shameful proposals; thinks he can unmask him. He denounces Tartuffe, but does not reckon on the depth of the credulousness of Orgon, nor upon the skill of the hypocrite. After outfacing his accuser, Ill Tartuffe, now even more revered, manages to assure himself of further opportunities to make love to his benefactor’s wife. And as though this were not enough, Orgon gives him jhis estate. Tartuffe Soit, n’en parIons plus. Mais je sais comme il faut en user la-dessus. L’ honneur est delicat, et 1*amitie m*engage A prevenir les bruits et les sujets d’ombrage: Je fuirai votre epouse et vous ne me verrez. . . . Orgon Non, en depit de tous, vous la frequenterez. ' Faire enrager le monde est ma plus grande joie, ' Et je veux qu’a toute heure avec elle on vous voie. Ce n’est pas tout encor: pour les mieux braver tous, Je ne veux pas avoir d’autre heritier que vous, Et je vais de ce pas, en fort bonne maniere, Vous faire de mon bien donation entiere. Un bon et franc ami, que pour gendre je prends, M’est bien plus cher que fils, que femme et que parents. N'accepterez-vous pas ce que je vous propose? Tartuffe La volonte du ciel soit faire en toute chose! (pp. 168-170) His indifference to Damis’ fate and his skillful neu tralization of ’ ’ exposure” reinforces the hypocritical por trait. The marriage with Mariane, however, is still the motivating force in Act IV. It is this again which causes Tartuffe’s enemies to prepare a trap for him. Elrnire herself demonstrates the efficacy of hypocritical tricks, for in order to unmask him she resorts to the same tech niques. It is only to keep people from talking that "my jhusband" wants us to be seen together, and so, therefore, I can be locked up with you here alone. How little do you know the heart of woman. Whatever reason we may find for i the passion that subdues us, we shall always be a little ,ashamed of admitting it. Since the word has "slipped me," would I have been so anxious to restrain Damis? Would I jhave listened so calmly to your original proposals and to the offer of your heart if I were not interested? And why I !do you think I am opposing the marriage? Do you realize i i ithat it was to keep from having to share you with Mariane? Reasoning in such patterns (pp. 192-194), Elrnire shows that she can play the hypocrite as well as Tartuffe. Her dis simulation, however, is not for a base motive, and, there fore, is not even thought of as being hypocrisy. Never theless, the technique is well demonstrated in her exposure speech, which also shows how reasonable hypocritical reasons can be. Tartuffe is not blinded by passion. The reasons Elrnire gave are all very probable, just the kind anyone can believe if he wants to. Tartuffe*s love made him want to, just as love for power may make a man believe that he wants it for the good he can do to others. When we ask ourselves how Orgon and his mother could be so gul lible, we should remember this demonstration of Elmire’s. 113 Orgon and his mother were credulous because they wished to j i ! believe in a certain type of religious faith and certain devoutness. In doing so they approach hypocrisy, too, in an effort to bend relationships, by r a t i o n a l i z a t i o n ,70 to fit what they wish to believe. All of this is part of the hypocrisy with which Moliere deals. Tartuffe, the master hypocrite, has no protection against the same weapon when it is used against him. He 1 is easily exposed by Elmire, but this only brings on a ' ’ ’ crisis," as Elmire called it. Orgon has given all of his estate to the impostor who, as a result of his ex posure, seeks to drive them out of the house. In the final ;act, however (Act V), Orgon is saved by a deus ex machina in the form of intervention by the king. Orgon's credulity had involved him so deeply that it is difficult to see how Moliere could have rescued him from his difficulties with out using a deus ex machina. Considering the long battle Moliere waged for the right to show the play, and consider ing the king's aid and friendship in that fight, it was an understandable conclusion to the play. Nous vivons sous un prince ennemi de la fraude, Un prince dont les yeux se font jour dans les coeurs, Et que ne peut tromper tout l’art des im- posteurs. (p. 244) 70see footnote number 18, p. 16, above. It is particularly interesting to note that Elmire apologizes to Tartuffe for the manner in which the ex- ' tremities of the situation had forced her to expose him, !• j and that Cleante urges Orgon to be tolerant toward Tar- ; tuffe. These two understand hypocrisy and human weakness I t - ^ iin general. Their lack of excess, their moderation, and I their tolerance stem from this understanding. Moliere is i J saying that to understand hypocrisy is to be less hypo critical. In comparing these two plays of religious hypocrisy one cannot avoid noting an interesting resemblance between I Meg and Orgon. Both protect the hypocrite. In doing so, both display a certain gullibility, with, of course, Orgon*s being much more highly developed than that of Meg. Both, however, are angry and ready to resort to violence when they learn they have been victimized. The religion they had so energetically professed, therefore, seems to have been based on rationalization and self-deception. Rufe himself is highly neurotic, but his motivations are clearly evident. This is not so with Tartuffe. He does not display any neurotic symptoms, nor are his motivations as clearly indicated as are those of Rufe. There can be little doubt that Rufe is compensating. He is striving for stature and respect. He expects affected humility and unconsciously hypocritical godliness to aid 115 him in the struggle. He is also physically attracted to Jude. This is rationalized as spiritual love and thus becomes unconscious hypocrisy. Tartuffe, however, although attracted to Elmire, does not display his motivations as i 1 clearly. His hypocrisy presumably antedated his interest ' in Elmire. It cannot be explained solely on this basis. ‘Being hypocritical with Tartuffe seems to be a profession. 1 I ( iHe does not need, therefore, to be provided with an ex- ;tenuating circumstance. He has long since ceased to believe in the moral platitudes and pious expressions which . 1 . , jcome automatically, through long years of practice, to his 1 I imind. With him it is just a trade. If anything, this I I ; 'makes his hypocrisy even more deadly, more devastating. I It seems a true part of his development, not a result of it. There are still other differences. In Hell-Bent fer Heaven. Rufe, the hypocrite, appears at once, and is the prime motivator of the action. The action arises from his hypocrisy which in turn is shown as stemming from his desire for Jude, whereas in Tartuffe the hypocrite does not even make his appearance until the third act. The first two acts, unlike Hell-Bent fer Heaven, are largely given over to a word portrait of Tartuffe, given by other charac ters, as Dorine, for example, and for developing the idea that Orgon has been made a dupe of this hypocrite, and 116 for showing the devastating effects on the family. In Hell-Bent fer Heaven there is no dupe at all in the sense of Moliere's Orgon. It is true that Andy, under the in fluence of liquor, is subject to hypocritical suggestions, and, to that extent, he, too, is a dupe, but in the sense of a person who strongly believes in the goodness and righteousness of the hypocrite, who maintains and supports him in the face of the more realistic estimates of the others, and who furthers the action, he is not present in Mr. Hughes' play. The closest to this would be Meg, but she does not appreciably affect the action of the play. Mr. Hughes* Rufe is not as intelligent as Tartuffe. His rationalizations are much more transparent. Rufe takes greater chances than Tartuffe. He wants the girl. He attempts to use his humility, his pretense of virtue as tools in his battle for her. He schemes to murder because this will clear the way to obtaining Jude, but this must be God's will. He believes this, that it really is God’s will. Tartuffe is conscious of his hypocrisy. He seeks to fool others, not himself. His success in fooling Orgon results in poignant irony. Even though we see Tar tuffe for only two acts, he is more convincing than Rufe. Although an uneducated mountain man, and as such not ex pected to be as facile as Tartuffe, one would expect less transparency in rationalizations. Rufe was too ill to make 117 as convincing a hypocrite as Tartuffe. Hypocrisy is not normally or usually the last resort of the mentally un balanced or the strongly neurotic, or even psychotic, as . Rufe suggests. Neither Mr. Hughes nor Mr. Kelly made use of the witty dramatic irony of double meanings so plentifully in evi dence in both Augier and Moliere. The creation of Orgon as a strong dupe automatically sets up an ideal situation for the development of irony, for along with Elmire, Damis, Cleante, and Dorine, the audience also knows that Orgon is being led by the nose. Consequently, his high regard for Tartuffe in the "et Tartuffe?" scene with Dorine, and the disparity between what the feeling should be toward a woman like Elmire and what it actually is creates lusty humor as well as irony. This is also true in Augier's play. The audience knows immediately that the Countess de Puygiron is Olympe Tavemy through her recognition by, and friendship with, Montrichard. Consequently, when the Marquis and his family talk of gambling and of Pauline's winning "enormously" when a hundred francs constitutes the "fortune" being discussed, the audience, knowing that Pauline is Olympe Tavemy, can find this very amusing. The arrival of Irma whom the Mar quis also accepted in good faith as a strict, respectable Vendeenne with whom he would talk Breton, creates another 118 such situation since the audience knows the truth about her, too. In both French plays other characters share the hy pocrisy. Montrichard, Baudel, Irma, Adolphe, Henri, and Genevieve, all have some share in it, along with Olympe. Only the Marquis and the Marquise are free of it. This contrast makes their characters far more impressive. In Tartuffe, there is presumably a sharing, too. Laurent, Tartuffe's "man,” would be presumed to be aware of his master's true character. And while presented as dupes, it seems that both Orgon and his mother are also unconscious hypocrites in their religion. It was this fact which made I t them easy dupes. Another major difference between the American and French plays dealt with in this thesis is that the American plays show a greater degree of black and white; that is, except for the possibility of Meg, no one else shares Rufe*s hypocrisy. It is all concentrated in him. Everyone else is honest as far as is shown. Only Harriet is a hypocrite, and only Rufe. As in the two social dramas previously compared, the cul de sac to which hypocrisy leads is again seen. CHAPTER V SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS Keep thy tongue from evil, and thy lips from speaking guile. --Psalms XXXIV, 13. Essentially these are the variations in treatment shown between the American and French plays studied: the American plays depict hypocrisy as the result of unfortu- j jnate, uncontrollable past experiences. This is not true of the French plays. Pity is aroused in the American plays but not in the French ones. There is a greater concentra tion of hypocrisy in the American plays; that is, in general other characters in the play do not tend to be hypocritical, too. The hypocrite stands alone. The other characters are honest. This is not the case in the French plays, in which the hypocrite has an ally or in which other characters also display hypocrisy. Finally, the American plays do not show dramatic irony with double meanings, a quality which is evident in the French plays. Some of these variations may be due simply to the time difference separating the plays; others, such as the 119 120 dramatic irony, are no doubt due to a greater emphasis on classical traditions in France. The two social plays are separated by 70 years; the two religious ones by 260 years. During the seventy years which separate Emile Augier from George Kelly, tremendous gains have been made in medicine, in all its allied sciences, and in sociological ; research, much of which has tended to emphasize the import- ance, power, and influence of both heredity and environ ment. Most educated people have come to accept the fact that man is the result of his heredity and environment, and that he has little control over what he is, or what he will become. The results of biological and sociological re search which have led to such a conclusion--and to atti tudes predicated upon this conclusion--have been made known on an extensive basis. It is only natural and reasonable therefore that playwrights like George Kelly and Hatcher Hughes should utilize this information, and be influenced by it when depicting characters like Harriet and Rufe. Their hypocrisy has been delineated so many thousands of times in the ’ ’ case histories" of psychiatrists and other professional workers under some other label, such as psycho neurosis, for example, in which the hypocrisy would be treated as a symptom of a deeper, more basic difficulty. A writer of seventy years ago, whether French or American, could not have been influenced in the same way. It may 121 be true, however, that a playwright of sufficient genius, such as Shakespeare, through rare insight may have antici pated certain scientific findings. Host playwrights could j } i inot hope to do so. | Even assuming that George Kelly did not see Harriet, for example, as a medical problem, rather than a moral one, :this would not prevent the audience from seeing her in that light. Nor would it prevent some of those changes which occur through interpretation by an actress. It seems ob vious enough, however, that George Kelly did see Harriet as; | 'the product of her heredity and environment. The lines in . . . j which she talks about her mother*s unfortunate experiences, j i > the bitterness of her own youth, the constant arranging of the scarf, and her mania for cleanliness and neatness all argue strongly that George Kelly was deliberately por traying a character (in the light of new psychological data) who acts as she does only because of certain un fortunate, uncontrollable past experiences. To believe otherwise would be tantamount to saying, I think, that much of the material in the play has no conscious purpose, and serves no purpose. George Kelly knew (as does the audience) that Harriet needs medical attention. No one can despise or hate her. One pities her despair and lone liness as the curtain falls. Such pity is only possible 122 when we know that she did not deliberately choose to be a hypocrite. — It is clear that hypocrisy is a complex manifestation of behavior. Philosophy, psychology, sociology, psycho analysis, and psychiatry can help us to understand this. Hypocrisy can arise in a mild form from a simple desire to be polite, to be courteous, or it may be a manifestation \ of a serious mental illness or maladjustment. It may exist, too, among very normal people when a moral code is not compatible with the "precise needs" of a community. ! Its existence and depiction in plays, as we have seen, can serve as a warning that moral readjustments are needed. It can take the form of unconscious rationalizations. The man! ' i iwho wants power talks about the "good" he can do for others. It can take the form of an Oedipus wish, as with Hamlet, or it may be a defense reaction. It may be simply an attempt to conceal a weakness; it may be the result of anger, of love, of passion, of a desire for sexual con quest, of a desire for security, or for recognition of some kind. It is definitely not simply a matter of consciously and freely deciding to put on a mask. The evidence indi cates that the hypocrite, like Harriet and Rufe, often has no choice in the matter. It is as though an unseen and undeniable giant standing ominously before a trembling midget were demanding that he don the mask. He has no choice. He must obey. There is reason to believe that literary or dramatic iportrayals of hypocrisy can have a therapeutic effect, and i ■ jthat they can aid in fostering the realization that happy, effective lives are inevitably based on truth; that hy pocrisy, on the contrary, is an open raft in an open sea which sooner or later, despite frantic efforts, will sink. All four plays dealt with specifically in this thesis show this. Innumerable other plays, both French and American, ring the same alarm, as does a rich and ever-increasing flood of scientific information. The alarm should be jheeded. Hypocrites are Fate’s Raft Riders in a perilous BIBLIOGRAPHY BIBLIOGRAPHY A. Primary Sources Aeschylus. Agamemnon. Oxford, 1950. Oresteia. Chicago, 1953. 1 - jAugier, Emile. Le Mariage d* Olympe. Michel Levy Freres i i edition. Paris, 1855. | i I | i jAyme, Marcel. Clerambard. New York, 1958. 1 I Beaumarchais, Pierre-Augustin Caron. The Barber of Seville. London, 1928. Cassidy, Frederick G., ed. Modem American Plays. New York, 1949. Coe, Kathryn, and William H. Cordell, eds. A New Edition ' of the Pulitzer Plays. New York, 1935. Cordell, Richard A., ed. Representative Modem Plays. New York, 1929. Euripides. Electra. New York, 1950. Giraudoux, Jean. Jean Giraudoux. Four Plays. Adapted and with an introduction by Maurice Valency. New York, 1960. Heilman, Lillian. Four Plays by Lillian Heilman. New York, 1942. Homer. 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New York, 1937. " Hospers, John. ”Free-Will and Psychoanalysis,” in Readings in Ethical Theory. New York, 1952. Joad, Cyril E. M. Common-Sense Ethics. New York, 1921. Lancaster, Henry Carrington. A History of French Dramatic Literature. Baltimore, 1942. i Larousse, Pierre, ed. Grand Dictionnaire Uhiversel. Vol. IX. Paris, 1865. Lynd, Albert. Quackery in the Public Schools. New York, 1953. Maier, Norman R. F., and H. Willard Reninger. A Psycho logical Approach to Literary Criticism. New York, 1933. Maier, Norman R. F. Frustration, the Study of Behavior Without a Goal. New York, 1949. Mornet, Daniel. Histoire Generale de la Litterature Francaise. Paris, 1939. " Niebuhr, Reinhold. Moral Man and Immoral Society. A Study of Ethics and Politics. New York, 1932. Palmer, John. Moliere. New York, 1930. Plato. Republic. Translated by Benjamin Jowett. 2 vols. New York, 1921. 131 Rabelais, Francois. Pantagruel. Translated by Sir Thomas Urquhart. Vol. 2. London, 1897. Sadler, William S. Mental Mischief and Emotional Con flicts. St. Louis, 1947. i | ______________ . Modem Psychiatry. St. Louis, 1945. Saintsbury, George. A Short History of French Literature. Oxford, 1945. Sherman, Mandel. Basic Problems of Behavior. New York, 1941.. I. i ! Singer, Marcus George. Generalization in Ethics. New I York, 1961. iTansley, A. G. The New Psychology and its Relation to Life. New York, 1925. |Turquet-Milnes, G. From Pascal to Proust. New York, 1926. Waite, Edward. The Doctrine and Literature of the Kabalah. j London, 1902. Warner, W. Lloyd. Democracy in Jonesville. New York, j 1949. i Warnock, Robert, and George K. Anderson. The World in Literature. New York, 1950. Watson, John B. Psychology from the Standpoint of a Behaviorist. Philadelphia, 1919. Wilbur, George B., and Warner Muensterberger, eds. Psycho analysis and Culture, Essays in Honor of Geza Roheim. New York, 1951. D. Secondary Sources: Periodicals Aiken, H. D. "Role of Conventions in Ethics," Journal of Philosophy, 49:173-177, March 13, 1952. Albrecht, M. C. "Does Literature Reflect Common Values?" American Sociological Review, 21:722-729, December 1956. 132 "An American Play," American Mercury. 6:504-505, December 1925. [Review of Craig*s WifeT] Anschutz, Grace. "Masks: Their Use by 0*Neill and Pirandello," Drama. April 1927. Arvin, N. "Theory of Literature," Partisan Review. 16:318-321, March 1949. Baillie, J. "Beware the Whitewash!" Christian Century. 68:1248-1249, October 31, 1951. Baylis, C. A. "Facts, Propositions, Exemplification and Truth," Mind, 57:228, October 1948. Beer, T. "Hypocrisy," American Mercury. 10:1-9, January 1927. Bertocci, P. A. "Moral Structure of the Person," Meta physical Review, 14:369-388, March 1961. Bondurant. Alexander L. "The Amphitryon of Plautus, Moliere*s Amphitryon and Amphitryon of Dryden," The Sewanee Review Quarterly, 33:455-468, 1925. Brandt, R. B. 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Creator Robinette, Raleigh Carson (author)

Core Title A study of hypocrisy: A comparison of French and American variations of treatment in selected dramas

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