University of Southern California Dissertations and Theses

Psychopathology of fanaticism: A case study in the fanaticism of the Islamic Iranian revolution

(USC Thesis Other)

Psychopathology of fanaticism: A case study in the fanaticism of the Islamic Iranian revolution

PDF

Download a page range

Download transcript

Copy asset link

Request this asset

Transcript (if available)

Content PSYCHOPATHOLOGY OF FANATICISM:
A CASE STUDY IN THE
FANATICISM OF THE ISLAMIC IRANIAN REVOLUTION
by
Shapoor Masood Kadjar
A Dissertation Presented to the
FACULTY OF THE GRADUATE SCHOOL
UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA
In Partial Fulfillment of the
Requirements for the Degree
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
(Education)
December 1981
UMI Number: DP24779
All rights reserved
INFORMATION TO ALL USERS
The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted.
In the unlikely event that the author did not send a complete manuscript
and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed,
a note will indicate the deletion.
Dissertation Publishing
UMI DP24779
Published by ProQuest LLC (2014). Copyright in the Dissertation held by the Author.
Microform Edition © ProQuest LLC.
All rights reserved. This work is protected against
unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code
ProQuest LLC.
789 East Eisenhower Parkway
P.O. Box 1346
Ann Arbor, Ml 48106- 1346
UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA
THE GRADUATE SCHOOL
UNIVERSITY PARK
LOS ANGELES. CALIFORNIA 90007
This dissertation, written by
.I^AbjAJL.
under the direction of h..f.& 1 Dissertation Com
mittee, and approved by all its members, has
been presented to and accepted by The Graduate
School, in partial fulfillment of requirements of
the degree of
D O C T O R O F P H IL O S O P H Y
.........
Dean
D ate Decembe r 9
DISSERTATION COMMITTEE
Chairman
Sduc
Ph.5,
Ei
' * (
k\\
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Completion of this dissertation would not have
been possible without Tony Balinger's help and Dr. Gordon
Blount's editorial expertise.
I am indebted to Professors Schrader and Lashkari
for their constructive guidance toward completion of
this paper. My chairman, Dr. Ofman, inspired me to
start and finish this project.
Finally, it was my family, particularly Irene,
who put up with me in those lonely and perilous moments,
assuring me that I was capable of completing this task.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS........ . ii
Chapter
I INTRODUCTION............................... 1
Background to the Problem..................... 1
Statement of the Problem *....... ,....... 2
Research Hypothesis .....................2
Rationale and Significance....................3
Scope and Delimitations of the Study......... 3
Methodology..................................... 5
II REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE.......................7
The Current View of Fanaticism........ 8
Previous Work on Fanaticism. ......... 8
Prejudice vs. Fanaticism...... ...15
The Behavioral Components of Fanaticism..... 17
Absolute Truth. ..... ,19
Simplistic and Rigidly-Held Beliefs......... 24
Destruction of the Self........ ...27
Totalitarianism. ..........................37
Definitional Criteria and the
Method of Analysis......................-...39
III AN INVESTIGATION INTO THE
FANATICISM OF MOHAMMAD. __.......___..._____42
A Psychological Profile of Mohammad. . . . . . . . . .43
Mohammad and Absolute Truth..................60
Mohammad and Simplistic and
Rigidly^Held Beliefs...... 65
Mohammad and Destruction of the Self........ 71
Mohammad and Totalitarianism................. 73
iii
Chapter Page
IV AN INVESTIGATION INTO THE FANATACISM
OF ISLAMIC REVOLUTIONARY GOVERNMENT
OR IRAN.............. ........... 78
Islamic Iran and Absolute Truth..............80
Islamic Iran and Simplistic and
Rigidly-Held Beliefs........................84
Islamic Iran and Destruction
of the Self..................................88
Islamic Iran and Totalitarianism.............92
V CONCLUS IONS.............................. ......96
The Research Hypothesis.......................96
Recommendations....... 97
REFERENCES............................................... 101
APPENDIX: A COMPARISON OF EMIL KRAEPELIN'S
DESCRIPTIONS OF SCHIZOPHRENIC PATIENTS
AND DESCRIPTIONS OF MOHAMMAD AS MADE
BY MOSLEM SCHOLARS............. Ill
iv
CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Background to the Problem
Insufficient work has been done on the psychology
of fanaticism. Whether researcher, educator, philosopher,
politician, psychologist--one is left to one1 s own devices
in attempting to synthesize and codify what information,
theoretical and empirical, is extant. Furthermore, there
is a scarcity of contemporary case studies employing a
systematic analysis by such criterion measures.
Studies (Hoffer, 1951; Perkinson, 1977; Rudin, 1969)
have shown fanaticism to be a universal malady born of dis
content and destitution, one that feeds upon a belief in
the power of absolute truth and which finally matures as a
result of self-sacrifice and the united action of the group.
This malady may plague any people, at any time, and in any
geographical location; for its basic ingredient, its prime
tenet, is the mere unwavering belief that its followers are
in complete possession of the absolute truth, and that they,
and only they, possess this truth. This absolutism
patently has psychological implications for both theoreti
cian and practitioner. "Every extreme attitude," as Hoffer
1
2
(1954) noted, "is a flight from the self" (p. 4), and it is
the self that comes into view in psychotherapy. Any
further understanding of the self can only assist us as
educators, counselors, and patients.
Fanaticism, by virtue of contemporary technologies
and politics, is no longer provincial. Man is not faced
with only nationalism, but internationalism. A case in
point is Newsweek1s evaluation of the impact of Libya's
ruler Muammar Kaddafi: "Whatever volcanoes erupt inside
his mind, the world will receive the reverberations"
(Newsweek, July 1981, p. 46).
Statement of the Problem
Published writings on the subject of fanaticism
lack synthesis and codification as well as the application
of such operational frameworks to major contemporary
events.
The problem is, then, to 1) explicate and outline
the psychological and behavioral components of fanaticism
and subsequently to 2) systematically apply and analyze
this operational construct in the context of Iran, as a
case study in fanaticism.
Research Hypothesis
The research hypothesis is, therefore, that a
synthesis of the current concept of fanaticism, when
3
operationally defined and systematically applied, will
demonstrate that the Islamic political movement is, both
historically and contemporarily, fanatical.
Rationale and Significance
If from the research into the writings of major con
tributors to the theoretical and empirical work on fanati
cism a synthesis and codification of the concept could be
derived, such a clarification would have valuable implica
tions for both educator and therapist. The implications of
such understanding would lend itself to coming to grips
with fanatical structure as inauthentic behavior by the
patient, as well as assist the therapist in understanding
his own possible inclinations toward fanaticism as an
aspect of counter-transference. From a philosophical per
spective, such understanding would provide a platform to
counter— like the educator who fights ignorance and mis
understanding— the betrayal of the individual to the
interests of the group.
Scope and Delimitations of the Study
Fundamentally, this study has a theoretical orienta
tion as opposed to a practical or applied one, and is
exploratory in seeking to define the relationship between
Fanaticism and Islam.
4
It is important to set the delimitations of this
study to guard against broad definitions and applications
of its conclusions. The primary delimitation of this study
is that it does not purport to offer an exclusive nor final
solution to the problem as outlined, partially because an
experimental study is not possible. At bottom, it is a
descriptive study, but has characteristics of the logical
referential discourse (Hansen, 1961; Kinneavy, 1971).
After reviewing the literature and synthesizing the basic
conceptual understanding of fanaticism, the author has
applied that construct to a particular culture. As system
atic as that application may be, it is by its very nature
fraught with difficulty and prone to error as the data is
often difficult to obtain and interpret.
One limitation of this study was the inability of
the author to make use of objective test data. Several
instruments (for example, Adorno's Fascism Scale, Rokeach's
Dogmatism and Opinionation Scales, the Minnesota Multi-
phasic Personality Inventory) are capable of producing
relevant data referable to the criterion measures of fana-
ticisnu However.; due to the absence of cooperation by the
subjects of this study, such data was impossible to obtain.
The entire political environment was so charged and hostile
that the data by necessity was limited to two forms:
observed behavior and published primary source material,
including books., newspapers, periodicals, and radio and
television broadcasts emanating from the Islamic Revolution
ary Government.
The clinician observes in his laboratory, his con
sulting office. The author had the opportunity of first
hand experience during the years of 1978-1980; for two and
one-half years he examined, synthesized, and codified the
published work on the subject of the psychology of fanati
cism and then applied and analyzed contemporary Iran in
terms of those criteria. The results of that research
comprise the essential structure of this dissertation.
The author has made every attempt to remove personal
bias from the proper and professional accumulation and
evaluation of information. If the methodology of investi
gation is sound and the data appropriately handled, the
conclusions will carry import in spite of and beyond the
personal attitudes of the researchers.
Methodology
The inadequacy of the work on the psychology of
fanaticism has led this author to investigate the writings
on fanaticism toward the goal of synthesis and clarifica
tion; this objective constitutes the scope of Chapter II
in which the literature is reviewed and operational defini
tions set forth. Chapters III and IV are the results of
the application of this conceptual criteria to the Prophet
Mohammad as the prototype of the fanatical personality in
Islamic culture (Chapter III) and to the Iranian-Islamic
movement today (Chapter IV). Chapter V consists of the
author’s conclusions and recommendations.
CHAPTER II
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE
This chapter was designed to review the literature
relevant to the concept of fanaticism. The review was
approached with two objectives in mind: to synthesize and
codify the concept of fanaticism by comparing and contrast
ing the way in which various contemporary writers view it,
and to provide an operational framework from which histori
cal and contemporary Iran can be analyzed.
In the first section of this chapter, the author has
attempted to codify the current view of fanaticism. The
key contributions to the understanding of fanaticism were
briefly presented. In some cases the works cited character
ized fanaticism as a description of behavior, and in other
cases as an explanation of behavior. Etiology of behavior
is a difficult, complex, and sometimes inconsistent issue,
lacking consensus, and though helpful in understanding the
personality of the fanatic, is not required in behaviorally
defining its presence. Section two sets forth the defini
tional criteria to be employed in performing the descriptiv
analysis of both historical and contemporary Iran, and the
manner in which that analysis was performed.
7
8
The Current View of Fanaticism
In the main, the literature concerning fanaticism
was scant, and what had been done lacked systematic and
comprehensive treatment. Rudin's Fanaticism (196 9) is
perhaps the most comprehensive writing on the subject.
Fanaticism was. seen by Rudin as a universal problem, as a
problem of our time, and finally as a psychological problem.
In the psychological realm, fanaticism was divided into
attitude and pathology. Attitude can best be described as
the position taken— a meld of philosophy and politics—
where Rudin's concern was one of intensity; in pathology
the concern was with etiology.
When the concept of fanaticism is elucidated, it
will become apparent that there is substantial agreement to
the behavioral components of fanaticism, while there are
divergent opinions as to the etiology of such behaviors.
Consensus is not required as to psychodynamic processes
involved in the development of the fanatic as this research
is concerned with the behavior of such fanatics. While not
necessary, theoretical perspectives are included to permit
understanding of the fanatic process and to provide, where
possible, a logically cohesive explication.
Previous Work on Fanaticism
Psychological study of fanaticism has its roots in
the writings of Freud (1920) and Jung (1956), but received
9
its greatest attention in the studies of "authoritarianism"
(Rokeach, 1960; Adelson, 1953; Adorno, 1950), and "prejud-
dice" (Allport, 1946, 1954, 1967; Adorno, 1950). It is the
author's opinion that such studies provide a rich depository
of theory and research, but fall short in generating a
workable criterion framework which could be readily applied
in a number of settings. Moreover, fanaticism appears to
be capable of clear definition while remaining heuristic in
scope. Conceptually, fanaticism extends beyond the notions
of authoritarianism and prejudice; it appears that both
can be understood under the definition of fanaticism.
The Freudian approach to prejudice is best illus
trated by a classic study on the anti-semitic personality
(Adorno, 1950) . This model, also called the "Berkeley
Study," has been the model for countless studies to deter
mine the makeup of the authoritarian personality.
The first part of the Berkeley Study involved a
survey of 2,000 white, non-Jewish Californians who belonged
to organizations. Three multiple-choice questionnaires
were distributed. The first questionnaire was designed to
measure anti-semitism.(A-S Scale). The second question
naire measured a general dislike of all people who were
different from the white middle^class norm (ethnocentrism,
or E Scale). Scores on the A-S Scale were highly corre
lated (.80) with those of the E Scale. People who didn't
10
like Jews didn’t discriminate; they didn’t like anybody or
anything that was different from themselves.
Having established these correlations, the research
ers next sought to determine how the personalities of pre
judiced people differed from those of people who were not
prejudiced. Because anti-semitism had been so strongly
related to fascism in Hitler’s Germany (Becker, 1977), they
hypothesized that people who were anti-semitic would be
high in their potential for fascism. Accordingly, they
devised what they called the "implicit anti-democratic
trends" or potentiality for fascism (F Scale).
On the basis of Freudian theory, they defined the
potential fascist as manifesting the following character-v
istics:
1. The fascist would rigidly adhere to all con
ventional values, especially those involving authority and
traditional morality.
2. Any deviation from the conventional way would
be strongly punished.
3. The fascist would be preoccupied with power and
toughness in human relations, and manifest destructive,
cynical attitudes about human beings.
4. The fascist would project his unconscious,
emotional impulses outward into the world and resist
serious introspection (Adorno, 1950, p. 255-257).
11
In summary, the authoritarian personality is highly
conventional, obsessed with power, subservient to authority
and nonanalytical.
Jung (1971) notes the early advent of fanaticism
when he describes "Tertullian," a fanatic who lived in the
2nd Century A. D., as a classic example of introversion
sacrificing intellect to the inner soul. Jung (1971)
asserts that introverted thinking leads to fanaticism,
because the more the goal is situated outside the person,
the more strongly the secondary functions are forced into
the unconscious, and the more strongly they will oppose
the control of intellect, leading to the undermining of
conscious goals.
In another paper, Jung (1970) proposed that modern
man has become estranged from his instincts, and this
separation from instincts leads to conflicts between the
conscious and the unconscious, spirit and nature, faith and
knowledge. As a result of this rift between faith and
knowledge within the individual psyche, most men suppress
one or the other in order to establish a conscious, though
artificial harmony, creating on the one hand fanatical
alliance to political ideology and on the other, .blind
adherence to the literal interpretation of religious
mythology. Jung (1972) sees the religious fanatic as a
mentally unbalanced person, suffering from an imbalance
12
between the conscious and the unconscious and struggling
against the contents of his own unconscious.
A broad approach to the problem of the determinants
of prejudice is seen in a number of related studies of
personality and character structure. Investigators such
as Fromm (1941), Maslow (1943), Ackerman and Jahoda (1950),
and Bettelheim and Janowitz (1950) have studied the role
of social attitudes in the economy of the total individual.
Hartley (1946), Allport and Kramer (1946), and Gough (1951)
have demonstrated a large number of personality factors
and related attitudes that distinguish individuals high in
prejudice from those who are generally unprejudiced.
Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswik, Levinson, and Sanford (1950)
presented a theory of the development of prejudice (sug
gestive and supportive of the author1s four criterion
measures of fanaticism) explicated under The Behavioral
Components of Fanaticism:
1. Parents are characterized by rigid discipline
and conditional affection; i.e., dependent upon approved
behavior on the part of the child.
2. Family structure is based on a hierarchical
position, and inter-family relationships are based on the
clearly defined roles of dominance and submission.
3. When forced to ostensible submission to parental
authority, the child develops hostility and aggression
13
which are poorly channelized. The displacement of a
repressed antagonism toward out-groups.
4. Fear and dependency seem to discourage the
ethnocentric child from conscious criticism of the parents.
Rigid repression of hostility against parents may be
accompanied by an occasional breaking through of drives in
a.crude and unsocialized form.
5. The negative feelings against the parents have
to be excluded from consciousness, and may be considered
as contributing to the general lack of insight, rigidity of
defenses, and narrowness of the ego so characteristic of
the fanatic. Since the unprejudiced child as a rule does
not seem to have to submit to stern authority, he does not
exhibit an affinity for strong authority, nor does he need
to assert his strength against those who are weaker. The
"anti-weakness" attitude characteristic of the prejudiced
child seems to be directly related to the fearful submis
sion to authority.
6. Parents of prejudiced subjects not only seemed
to have been rigid disciplinarians, they also tended toward
preoccupation with problems of status, communicating to
their children a set of rigid and externalized rules.
Concern about status may well be assumed to be the
basis of such a rigid and externalized set of values. That
which is socially accepted and that which is helpful in
climbing the social ladder is considered good; that which
14
deviates, that which is different, and that which is
socially inferior is considered bad.
Rokeach (1960) postulated that the authoritarian
personality can be tested by obtaining a high score on
dogmatism and opinionation scales. He employed the Adorno
et al. (1950) scales of ethnocentrism and F Scales. As
was previously stated, the "Berkeley Study," which embraces
these scales, was devised to test the prejudice in a
narrow-broad sense; and .the F Scale was devised to see how
the personality of prejudiced people differed from that of
non-prejudiced people. In essence, Rokeach (1960) stated,
these findings provide the strongest
evidence we have been able to obtain
thus far indicating that the dogmatism
and opinionation scales are measuring
"something” relatively independent of
ideological content; we infer this
"something" to be general authoritari
anism and general intolerance, (p. 117)
By failing to account for fanaticism, Rokeach (1960) has
failed to reach complete definitional criteria for
authoritarianism.
The problem in operationalizing authoritarianism is
the problem inherent in attempting to describe the charac
teristics of an idea, an abstraction. A concept can only
be known in a scientific sense, a replicable sense, by its
behavioral- manifestations. The state of mind that is
authoritarianism reveals itself in prejudicial behavior.
It is incorrect to assume, however, that prejudicial
15
behavior comprises all that is authoritarian and that those
two terms, for all intents and purposes, are interchange
able.
A close review of the literature points to two
behavioral manifestations of authoritarianism: one is pre
judice, the other is fanaticism. There has not been an
adequate attempt to describe fanaticism in operational
terms and hence little systematic research by case study
has been performed. The concept was nascent but needed
explication and clarification.
The single psychological study on fanaticism falls
short of the needed explication and synthesis. In that
study Rudin (1969) described fanaticism in two dimensions:
one of affect or intensity, and one of etiology or psycho
pathology. Though providing insight, such a framework is
insufficient as a criterion measure. What is required is
a comparative analysis between prejudice and fanaticism
toward creation of an operational definition.
Prejudice vs. Fanaticism
Significant differences, sometimes subtler-other
times marked, exist between the notion of the prejudiced
man (as developed in the literature by Allport, Rokeach,
Adorno, and others) and the fanatic. Those differences
can be understood in a graphic display (see Table 1).
16
TABLE 1
The Prejudiced Man
The Prejudiced Man
has an object to his
prejudice
relatively less intensity
of feeling
prejudice can exist without
fanaticism
( -\
does not require suppression
of individuality in that he
(a) does not have to defer
to a leader
(b) does not have to belong
to a group
prejudice uses classes or
"generic" classifications;
e.g., Catholics are not pre
judiced against other
Catholics
the prejudice differentiates
and requires an object for
that prejudice; e.g., as
Sartre (1946) noted, the anti-
Semite required the Jew
the prejudice is confined to
each class, limited by the
parameters of each class
reflective
different view of self: the
prejudiced man underestimates
the nature and extent of his
prejudice (Allport & Kramer,
1946)
awareness proceeds from
unconscious to conscious______
vs. the Fanatic
The Fanatic
exhibits a generalized de
structive modality wherein
the object for destruction
changes
relatively more intensity
of feeling
fanaticism subsumes prejudice
all fanatics are prejudiced
suppression of individuality
by
(a) requiring deference to
a leader
(b) requiring membership in
a group
the fanatic group is consti
tuted of members whose idea
structures are congruent;
one Muslim may be prejudiced
against other Muslims who
"think differently"
the fanatic is undiffer
entiated, the driving force
is the idea/with fluidity as
to the object for destruction
the fanatic's prejudice is
disjunctive; everything not
"him" is hated; believes "one
is either with him or againsij:
him"
reflexive
the fanatic overestimates his
depth of fanaticism and
strives for a public display
of the depth of his feeling
and commitment (Hoffer, 1951
conscious to unconscious
17
The last idea contrasted in Table 1 needs some
explication. The prejudiced man has repressed his pre
judice and that prejudice, through encounter, education,
and psychotherapy, can be brought into conscious awareness;
the prejudiced man can move from repression to introspection
This is not so with the fanatic. Fearing a loss and
diminution of the self, the fanatic rescues his ego esteem
by hooking himself to a group. As the ultimate goals
cannot be reached, the group sets its sights on minor
ones; as each minor goal is met and destroyed, the object
for destruction changes. Eventually this destruction
turns inward toward members or factions of the group.
When this happens, a loss of group belongingness occurs
and weakens the fanatic1s ego-syntonic feelings. The
feelings of inferiority are projected onto others and
suppressed by the fanatic. Hence, his movement is always
away from being more conscious to being less conscious
as disturbing feelings are repressed.
The Behavioral Components of Fanaticism
Research into the possible fanaticism of any person,
group, or political movement requires the enunciation of
18
behavioral criteria that capture the conceptual understand
ing of the fanatical process. When applying these defi
nitional criteria in analysis of this author's intended
research, i.e., an analysis of historical and contemporary
Iran, one ought to be able to stipulate what characteristic
of behavior his subjects would be manifesting.
There is some misconception by those who necessarily
connect fanaticism with religiously-based fanaticism. It
is true that, etymologically, fanaticism is derived from
the Latin word "fanum," which means the sacred, the bene
ficial, the salvific, the temple, the consecrated place
(Rudin, 1969). The term "fanaticus" is found in Latin
literature and means "to be put into a raging enthusiasm
by DietiT (p. 12). In Germany after the 18th century, the
term appears? fanatics are seen as "raging fighters for
religious principles" (p. 13). Association is not the
mother of necessity, however, and fanatics are not neces
sarily religious nor are devoutly religious people fanatics
Historically, the fanatic has employed his religious
beliefs within his fanatical process to achieve his politi
cal ends. It is widely known that the subject of this
research, the Islamic movement,; is not a requisite, however
of fanaticism, but a criterion.
A review of the literature and synthesis of the
ideas presented reveals four primary behavior components
of fanaticism. These components are:
19
1. absolute truth
2. simplistic and rigidly-held beliefs
3. destruction of the self
4. totalitarianism.
Absolute Truth
Those who have sought to identify the sources of the
twentieth century totalitarianism have typically found the
culprit in one or another particular ideology or system of
belief, such as the planned economy of communism, the racial
superiority of Marxism, and so on. Traditionally, the
remedy for these "bad*' doctrines has been the substitution
of reinstatement of a "good" or "humanistic" ideology— a
system of beliefs which, its supporters avow, is certain to
promote a resurgence of human dignity and satisfaction.
But as Karl Popper (1963) argues, the deepest threat
to freedom lies not in one especially beknighted doctrine
or shade of opinion but in the intractable, unshakeable
belief in "any" system as the sure, certain provider of
utopia on earth. The bad guys, says>Pcpper (1963), are any
people who claim to have the absolute answer. After David
Hume (174 0) , the concept of absolute epistemological
certainty became indefensible--if we see a thousand or even
a million swans that are white, does this guarantee that the
next swan we chance upon must perforce be white? No, say
Hume and Popper. Indeed, the "probability" of the swan
20
being white cannot .even.he..-considered greater , since
probability itself assumes an unprovable connection between
the past and future (Russel, 1957) . In coming upon a
"black swan," we will be provided with a certain knowledge
that all swans are not white. Man is best served, then,
by a search not for confirmations but for contradictions or
negating instances. The most useful theories are those
most amenable to testing or "falsification. " Knowledge
progresses when theories are negated, when they survive a
search for contradictions. Man becomes fanatic when he
creates unbending beliefs and unquestionable dogmas
(Perkinson, 1971). Dogma,in general, inhibits the growth
of knowledge; in the political sphere it emasculates life
itself, stifles creativity, and smothers those very forces
of spontaneity and debate that would tend to be correcting
influences. Thus, Plato's logically irrefutable philoso
pher-state, Aristotle's absolute laws of science and world,
Hegel's "inevitable" dialectic of history, and Marx's
perhaps well-meant but pandemic economic theory play into
the hands of fanatics.
Sartre (1956) stated, "To be human means to reach
toward being God" (p. 566). This is "useless passion,"
however, since man can never be God. If we believe Sartre's
declaration that "man can not be God" is true, we are con
fronted by the history of man wherein he continually
attempts to attain perfection. Man, as in the image of
21
his God, is a creator. Man creates abstract theories and
man creates laws and works of art. Man creates a world,
a universe, that he inhabits. But unlike God, man is
fallible, imperfect, unfinished. What God has made is
perfect, complete, and what man has made is imperfect,
incomplete, inadequate. Man1s knowledge is not the perfect
truth, his behavior is not absolutely good, his societies
not the best possible. Man is not omniscient, nor omni
potent. What man creates is always improvable.
Thus man is always able to incline, continually,
toward perfection. That he actually does so is manifest
both in the fact we human beings try to overcome or elim
inate the contradictions contained in our ideas, and in
the fact we try to overcome or eliminate the adverse con
sequences of our behavior. When we eliminate the contra
dictions in our knowledge, we diminish our error. We move
closer to truth. When we eliminate the adverse conse*-
quences of our behavior by modifying that behavior, we
improve our behavior (Skinner, 1974). We move closer to
God.
Giambattista Vico (1839) observed that man is a
wfinite being able to know and to will, who tends toward
the infinite'.'" Charles Darwin supplied a theory that
explains how man does tend toward the infinite. According
to Darwin's theory of Natural Selection (1909), the
environment criticizes^— via liquidation of the organism—
22
those offspring that are inadequate. Those that survive
grow and create new offspring which are subject to the same
critical selectivity of the environment. In this way the
species evolve, according to Darwin (1909). So it is with
what man creates-'-man's society, his knowledge. Both
evolve and grow as a result of "criticism"— the elimination
of what is inadequate in the society, the elimination of
contradictions, the elimination of what is adverse.
Whereas God creates exnihilo— out of nothing— man creates
continually through the reconstruction or modification of
what he has previously created. And he reconstructs in
order to overcome or eliminate the inadequacies revealed
by criticism. Thus, criticism is the spring of human
creativity, human growth.
Man stops growing when he ceases being critical,
when he ignores or refuses to admit that what he has
created— his knowledge, his social arrangements, his
religion— contain contradictions and adverse consequences.
Man can ignore his condition of fallibility and declare
that his knowledge is true, that his actions are good.
He can claim to be God. At this point he becomes a fanatic.
A fanatic is dogmatic. He insists that his theories, his
ideology, his solutions are the correct ones. A fanatic
is an obstructionist. He ignores (or cannot perceive)
arguments, facts, or consequences that refute his solution.
Finally, a fanatic is authoritarian. When he has power,
23
he tries to impose his answers on others. Dogmatism/
obstructionism, and authoritarianism are all out of keeping
with the human condition of critical judgment. By holding
to the concept that they are in the possession of absolute
truth and that they have no room for improvement, fanatics
stop tending toward perfection and growth.
Psychoanalysis has described in many ways the manner
in which fanaticism operates in the human psyche. Analysis
tends to focus on an individual's overcompensation on
internal doubts accompanied by a false sense of external
certainty (Jung, 1972) . According to Jung (1972), the
absolute in fanaticism works as a compensation for one's
insecurity. "Fanaticism is a brother of doubt" (Rudin,
196 9, p. 9). In order for the fanatic to hold on to the
tenet of his absolute truth, he must then destroy the
present for the hope of the elusive, future (Hoffer, 1951;
Rudin, 196 9). This type of fanatical mentation creates a
language with an excessive usage of the words "must" and
"ought" (Watzlawick, 1977) , the language of absolute
truth. The fanatic uses words such as "should" and "ought"
so he can free himself from what it is that is "possible"
to what it is that is "desirable" (Ayandegan, 1979).
Therefore, it can be concluded that a fanatic, in order to
achieve his unattainable goals, destroys the existing order
and hopes that good will arise spontaneously. Setting the
24
world on fire becomes an act of revolutionary love for
mankind.
Simplistic and Rigidly-Held Beliefs
Mead (1977) examined fanaticism in an anthropologi
cal context as a continuing possibility in any culture with
a choice between old and new ways of behavior. Mead
provides examples from her field studies and concludes that
the conditions and state of fanaticism recur with the same
manifestations—-a closed mind/ a refusal to entertain
counter arguments, a willingness to destroy those who
threaten the fanatically^held belief, an attraction for
disturbed individuals, and an increase in strength as the
belief becomes more untenable. It is suggested by Mead
(1977) that fanaticism is a psychological mechanism that
recurs with different degrees of intensity at every level
of social organization, depending on whether the time is
ripe. It is suggested that a major problem lies in trans
forming the fanatic back into a temperate human being.
Taylor (1977), in a case study about the Weathermen,
points out the influence of environment in the creation of
the fanatic. He also points out that the environment
would not be so effective if not for individuals* single-
mindedness, and closed^mindedness.
Becker (1977) describes the middle-class West German
youths who perpetrated terrorist activities between 1968
25
and 1972, and provides an analysis of terrorism based upon
biographical data of the leaders of the Baader-Meinhof
gang. Meinhof, Ensslin, and Baader are found to exhibit a
fanaticism and willingness to kill similar to that of the
previous generation under Hitler’s rule. Similarities are
noted between the German terrorists and those of other
countries, all of whom manifested fanatic intensities and
absolute disregard for the present.
Paul Watzlawick (1977) writes about how power tends
to corrupt people, and how fanatics pursue perfection to
gain power. Watzlawick (1977) argues that his pursuit of
perfection makes the fanatic justified to commit the worst
atrocities and,as the writer states, "and the most inhuman
repression that has blighted the history of mankind,
especially from the Inquisition into the very present"
(p. 13). The author argues that the logic of the fanatic
is deceptively simple: "Destroy the existing order and the
good will arise spontaneously" (p. 13). This is how
"setting the world on fire" (p. 13) can be viewed as an act
of revolutionary love for mankind. Since the fanatic is
the ambassador of future perfection, wanting nothing for
himself and everything for mankind, the end justifies any
means. Watzlawick (1977) points out that the modern time
has left behind "the Aristotelian dichotomies and with
them the unreasolvable paradoxes of an all-or-nothing view
26
of reality" (p. 13). The fanatic is behind the intellec
tual time and in the language of psychoanalysis, in a
repressed state.
William T. Daly (1977) states that the distinguish
ing characteristic of the fanatic is his highly simplified
and rigidly held view of social reality. He casts aside
the complex and unintegrated beliefs about causality which
others use to make rough sense out of their world, in favor
of a tendency to see the cause of all problems in a single
force for evil and the solutions for those problems in a
single force for good. He rejects the complex and uninte
grated values which serve others as guidelines for moral
behavior, in favor of a tendency to view as moral any
behavior which delays or endangers that victory. Finally,
he views with contempt the willingness of others to act
without explicit reference to their basic beliefs and
values. He sees it as weakness to act in accordance with
different and often contradictory sets of guidelines in
different areas of life, and insists that all bbhavior
conforms strictly and explicitly to his highly simplified
set of beliefs and values.
The single-minded purposefulness, while being con
ceptually narrow and closed to contradictory information,
defines the second basic characteristic of the fanatic.
Recall that one of the characteristics distinguishing the
merely prejudiced man from the fanatic is the tendency of
27
the fanatic to describe his entire world in a disjunctive
fashion. This dichotomous thinking, that people-events-
ideas are either good or bad, is the argumentative founda
tion for the fanatic's utilization of any means at hand
to obtain his end. This is not to imply that all fanatics
are terrorists, but that all fanatics would seem to be
intensely rigid in their beliefs and antipathetic to those
who think conversely.
Destruction of the Self
Sirice development of the ego occurs in the distinc
tion between the self and the outside world (Freud, 1923),
the quality and the fabric of the outside world is con
tingent upon the degree of freedom exercised by the
parents and the quality of the interaction of parents with
their outside world. In the authoritarian environment the
self has been relegated to the side and the well-being of
the dictator or the state is in focus; consequently, the
self loses its ego-syntonic state. This flight from the
self is much more apparent in a theocratic society, whereby
the rules of religion are adhered to strictly.
The Oxford Dictionary (1933) defines religion as
"recognition on the part of man of some higher unseen power
as having control of his destiny and as being entitled to
obedience, reverence, and worship" (Fromm, 1950, p. 34).
As Fromm (1950) points out, the word "entitled" is
28
significant because the reason for worship and obedience
lies not in the love for the deity or in the moral quali
ties of the God, but "in the fact that it has control, that
is, has power over man" (p. 34). As in any authoritarian
concept, obedience is virtue and disobedience vice. Since
the power of God is unlimited, man begins to feel helpless
and insignificant in relation to God, and "submission to a
powerful authority is one of the avenues by which man
escapes from his feeling of aloneness and limitation"
(p. 49). When man surrenders himself, he loses his sense
of independence and integrity, freedom and authenticity,
but he gains the protection of the group and the support
of the theocratic state. However, man still feels the
helplessness before the forces of nature and God
(Koran, 1953). Men feel separated and their disunited
existence creates an unbearable prison, leading to anxiety,
guilt, and shame (Fromm, 1956). This emotional prison and
the feeling of separation goes back to the time when the
infant is born and leaves the security of the womb, i.e.,
"the situation in which he still was part of nature, he is
still symbolically attached to the mother" (p. 18). The
more complete the separation, the greater is the need to
replace the original biological roots by new affective
roots. Yet the need to return to the state of absolute
bliss remains (Fromm, 1973).
29
Therefore, man has a choice: he can persist in his
craving to regress, and pay for it by symbiotic dependence
on mother (soil, nation, religion), or he can progress and
find new roots in the world through his own efforts, by
experiencing the brotherhood of man and freeing himself
from the power of the past. Man can either love others,
which requires the presence of independence and productive
ness, or he can relate to others symbiotically, i.e., by
becoming fanatical, by becoming part of them or by making
them part of himself. In this symbiotic relationship, he
strives either to control others (sadism) or be controlled
by them (masochism) (Fromm, 19 73) .
In the book titled Fanaticism (1969), Josef Rudin
states that "of all the forms of sadistic, masochistic, and
sadistic-masochistic reaction, the subtle, camouflaged
forms, especially in the realm of religious-moral education r
are the most difficult to diagnose" (p. 144). Since both
sadism and masochism are hidden and often unconscious
sources of deviate pleasure, they are carefully avoided
and devalued by the fanatic. Nevertheless, they may
emerge in roundabout ways. One of the ways man attempts
to overcome his feelings of shame and guilt is to reject
himself and attach himself to a more noble and larger
cause. Rudin (1969) described this process of rejecting
one's selfhood for the good of mankind and insisting that
answers to complex problems are at the disposal of the
30
person as "a disturbance of affect" (p. 141), a desperate
attempt to break out of an infantile situation into an
object world. A fanatic, by being a fanatic, loses the
distinguishing molecular properties of his own identity.
He forgets who he is. Loss of self results in massive
short-circuiting of ego energies. The fanatic, in order
to charge his depleted ego, has to wire himself to the
group and, by this act, gets a pseudo-ego charge, but
loses the "affective" properties of his identity (Rudin,
(1969).
In order to contribute to the continuation of group
hegemony and hence continuation of pseudo-self-respect,
the individual members are encouraged to sacrifice their
wasted selves so the group can have the legitimacy
required for its ideals and concepts (Fromm, 19 73). Any
body who disagrees with the group ideal becomes an enemy
of each individual member of the group, and violence takes
over. This group hegemony transforms fantasy to reality
since reality for the individual fanatic is nothing more
than the general consensus of the group, and it matters
not if its conviction cannot be tested by reason or criti
cal examination (Fromm, 1973).
Religious group fanaticism performs this important
function— it enhances the solidarity and cohesion of the
group and makes manipulation of individuals easier by
appealing to the narcissistic prejudices of the individual
31
(Hoffer, 1951; Rudin, 1969). Further, it satisfies the
ego of its members, particularly those who have few
reasons for feeling proud or worthy.
Obviously there is a positive correlation between
the degree of group narcissism and the lack of real satis
faction an individual feels with himself. An easier life
situation and a better concept of the self make one less
attracted to the fanatical group. Those who are hungry
in material and cultural areas, those who are lower in the
social strata, have a tendency to be attracted more to the
group fanaticism. A life of unmitigated boredom is the
fertile ground for group fanaticism (Hoffer, 1951).
Fostering group fanaticism is very inexpensive compared to
the social expenses required to raise the standard of
living. Members of the fanatical group are extremely
sensitive and ready to react with rage to any wound or
insult, real or imaginary, inflicted upon their group
(Fromm, 197 3). There is very little doubt that the image
of their group is all-important when fanatics are in con
flict with another group, and the narcissistic image of
their group will be raised to the highest level, while the
devaluation of the opposing group sinks to the lowest
(Fromm, 197 3). While sinister and devilish qualities are
ascribed to the other group, one's own group is kind and
humane (Fromm, 19 73).
32
In the nucleus, of such a group the object is not
the individual any more, but the group as a holistic form.
The individual is fully aware of this arrangement and fully
supports and maintains this position. To declare that his
country is the best in the world or his religion the most
wonderful does not sound strange or crazy to the individual
(Fromm, 1973). As a matter of fact, it is accepted as a
sign of patriotism, faith and loyalty. Since this notion
is shared by the whole group it becomes realistic and takes
on an aura of rational value.
In the moral sphere the collective point of view
leads to the idea of "collective guilt." Men are made
responsible for something they are not actually responsible
for. In judging, or, as the case may be, condemning men
in this manner, the person who judges evades the responsi
bility for his judgement. As soon as someone acts as if he
were a mere part of the whole, and as if only this whole
counts, he can enjoy the sensation of throwing off some of
the burden of his responsibility. This tendency to flee
from responsibility is the motif of all collectivism
(fanaticism) (Frankl, 19 66). In this type of environment,
everybody looks for his own interest, and the responsibility
to the others is diminished. The true community, i.e.,
the community of responsible persons, vanishes in this
atmosphere of collective preaching or teaching.
33
But when man escapes into the masses, he loses his
most intrinsic quality: responsibility. When man does not
exercise his freedom and his responsibility from the exis
tential point of view, we consider him inauthentic (Sartre,
194 8). Since authenticity consists of having a true and
lucid consciousness of the situation and assuming the
responsibilities and risks that it involves in pride or
humiliation (Sartre, 1948) , so fanaticism can be existen-
tially defined as an in-authentic act, as an act more in
service of death than life.
The fanatic, by denouncing himself and attaching
himself to the group, creates a schizoid world, and in
order to survive, has to plunge himself more and more into
the subterranean world of the unconscious. The dichotomy
that exists for the fanatic is no. different than what
Alfred Adler (1907) refers to as the neurotic. The neurotic
lives in a fictitious world that is structured around pairs
of opposing concepts. The main one of these is the opposi
tion between the deep-seated feeling of inferiority and
the subject*s exalted personality feeling. One of the ways
that the fanatic can tolerate the obliteration of the self
is through terror.
Terror crushes the autonomy of self-
respect, while faith obtains it, more
or less voluntary surrender. In both
cases the result of the elimination
of individual autonomy is automatism,
both faith and terror reduce the human
34
entity to a formula that can be
manipulated at will. (Hoffer,
1954, p. 27)
Another means, of dealing with, the anxiety of the
separated and wasted self is through repression. Repres
sion is one of the several defense mechanisms which the
ego may employ against an instinctual drive which is the
source of anxiety. Thus the occasion or motive for repres
sion is anxiety aroused by a derivation of an instinctual
drive. The target of repression is ordinarily a libidinal
drive, but it is possible that repression may also be
employed on occasion against an aggressive or destructive
drive (Freud, 1930), and it certainly may be so employed
against a super-ego demand (Freud, 19 2 3). The mechanism
of repression consists in the establishment of a counter-
cathexis by the ego. Repression is thus possible only
after a substantial degree of ego development has taken
place. Later, repression is, by and large, repetitions or
consequences of the infantile ones. The adult ego
represses something only to the extent that, and only in
those areas where, it is still infantile as a consequence
of infantile repressions or other similar, infantile
defenses. With these exceptions it can deal with instinc
tual demands and with external stimuli in other ways;
e.g., in the case of the former by judgemental repudiation,
in the case of the latter by adaptive behavior of some
kind.
35
The "effects;" of repression are twofold. In the
first place, the drive and its derivatives are excluded
from the ego and are consigned to the id, which means that
as long as the repression is maintained, the repressed
drive has no access to consciousness, produces no emotional
consequences, and does not give rise to any motor activity
aimed at gratification of the drive. However, the
repressed drive persists in the id and exerts a persistent
pressure in the direction of emergence into consciousness
and of gratification. Consequently, there is a tendency
for derivatives of the repressed drive to intrude into the
function of the ego and to reach consciousness, which may
generally be described as compromise formations (Waelder,
1930). Through clinical experience, psychologists know
that the process of becoming aware of the important
impulses that were repressed creates an earthquake-like
sense of bewilderment and confusion. Not all people are
willing to risk this adventure, least of all the fanatic,
who profits from being blind (.Fromm, 19 73) . Finally, it
is important to note that there is a direct correlation
between the intensity of a fanatic's behavior and the degree
of his. projection (Rudin, 1969) .
In summary, what has been explicated is as follows:
1. Ego develops via identification through the
non-ego (environment).
36
2. Quality of environment affects the degree of
ego-syntonic state.
3. Authoritarian environment through theocratic
state creates in man a sense of helplessness.
4. Helplessness leads to guilt, shame and anxiety.
5. To overcome the feelings of guilt, shame and
anxiety, the individual attaches himself to the group.
6. In order for the group to survive in its degree
of intensity, the individual is asked to sacrifice his
selfhood.
7. Group narcissism is one means of encouraging
the individual to sacrifice himself.
8. To sacrifice himself and forget responsibility
and guilt, the member must push from conscious toward
unconscious.
9. To tolerate the brain-chatter of the conscious-
unconscious dialogue, the individual must repress.
The fanatic can be understood, therefore, as suffer
ing from massive psychological inferiority. His feelings
of inferiority and helplessness before the forces of the
world, and perhaps before the force of God, are buffered
by the symbiotic connection to the group. This belonging
ness exacts, a terrific psychological price from the
individual, however, requiring that he give up his
individuality and conform to the group. Any diversity of
idea threatens alienation from the group and must be
37
repressed. Group pressure, which occurs through cultural
programming, propaganda, structuring, and monitoring of
the members* activities, suppresses and even destroys the
self. Individuality is sacrificed for the group. Indi
viduation and differentiation of the self is not permitted.
The self is homogenized into a kind of group personality.
Totalitarianism
The notion of totalitarianism is the idea that the
understanding and beliefs presented by the group are suffi
cient to answer all questions that arise in the course of
human events regarding the nature of government, individual
responsibility, spiritual life, physical needs and economic
behavior. In short, it is a "total" explanation which
functions for the good of all members. Consequently,
individual differences are disallowed and all imperatives
must be obeyed.
The totalitarian state, for example, might assume
the right (bestowed upon itself because of its inherent
goodness and ability to serve the total needs of its group
members) to dictate public morality, fashions of dress,
appropriate entertainments of body and mind, and the manner
and form in which it will receive any "criticism." The
justification for such apparent intrusions into the seem
ingly private aspects of man emanates from the position
that the individual is subservient to the group, and that
38
the totalitarian group provides answers to all needs and
therefore there can be no grounds for complaint.
Totalitarianism is a logical and necessary extension
of the other tenets of the fanatical personality. The
belief in absolute truth, a dichotomous view toward events
into either good or evil, and the suppression of the
individual in favor of the group would seem to require and
plead for the extension of this position to an all-
inclusive, a totalitarian one.
Moreover, totalitarianism is required to control the
possibility of individuals liberating themselves from the
constraints placed upon them by the group, which would unde^:
mine the power of the group and the power of its members
(who continue to find their role in it ego-syntonic)
(Marcuse, 1955).
An aspect of the fanatic's process is the necessity
that his dialectic is the law of totalization. The reality
of the fanatical movement is woven out of the actions of
countless individuals, true, but they are not individuals
acting as individuals. It has been the purpose of the
fanatic's dogma to exterminate the individual subjectivity
(recall destruction of the self) and create a situation
wherein there has been within the individual an interior!za-
tion of the exterior (the dogma) and the person believes
there has been an exteriorization of his inferiority, i.e.,
what is happening is precisely what he wants if he could
39
but have it his way (see Laing & Cooper, 1964, p. 93-106).
What is concluded, then, is a totalitarianism of body and
spirit to which the group member gives himself like the
young child gives himself to his parents.
Definitional Criteria and the Method of Analysis
To this point the author has attempted to develop
four definitional criteria for the determination of the
presence of the fanatical process, while providing some
theoretical insight into the psychological etiology of this
behavior. Those four constructs will now be applied in the
testing of the research hypothesis, that an operational
definition of fanaticism, when systematically applied to
the Islamic political movement, in both its historical and
contemporary aspects, will demonstrate that it is fanatical
Such a systematic application will occur in the following
manner.
Historical Iran will be analyzed in terms of
Mohammad, as known through his teachings, as the prototype
of the fanatic personality in the Islamic culture. Both
primary (the Koran) and secondary sources (historical
writings by renowned scholars) will be analyzed to deter
mine the presence or absence of the following:
1. That Mohammad professes to be in possession of
knowledge of the absolute truth and that only he and his
followers possess, that truth (absolute truth) ;
40
2. That Mohammad will describe the philosophical
issues in dichotomous terms, with no ground for relativism,
that divergent opinions are not to be tolerated, and those
who disagree are enemies (simplistic and rigidly-held
beliefs);
3. That Mohammad will establish group primacy over
the individual, there will be a suppression of individual
thought and feeling, the creation of a group attitude which
requires conformity, and severe punishment meted out for
deviation (destruction of the self);
4. That Mohammad will present a totalitarian view,
that his beliefs are able to provide answers to all ques
tions arising in the areas of physical, spiritual, economic,
and political conduct, and that such imperatives must be
obeyed ( , tota'iitari anism) .
If these conditions are found to exist, then it can
be concluded that Islamic Iran, as represented by Mohammad,
was fanatical. The result of this inquiry comprises
Chapter III.
In Chapter IV, the definitional criteria will be
applied to contemporary Iran as represented by the Islamic
Revolutionary Government. Here the author will rely on
his first-hand observations and published primary source
materials emanating from the Government. If the definition
al criteria are met, it can be concluded that contemporary
41
Iran, as represented by the Islamic Revolutionary Govern
ment, is fanatical.
The results of these two inquiries will be reported
and discussed in Chapter V, along with the significance of
these findings and the implications to treatment of the
fanatical personality, as well as recommendations regarding
further research.
CHAPTER III;
AN INVESTIGATION INTO
THE FANATICISM OF MOHAMMAD
The purpose of this chapter is; to elucidate
Mohammadfs philosophy and behavior and analyze his; behavior
according to the four criterion measures of fanaticism. It
has. been hypothesized that such an analysis would demonstrate
that the Islamic political movement, in its historical
sense, with Mohammad as the prototype of Islamic fanaticism
and in its contemporary sense, with the Islamic Revolution
ary Government, is fanatical. An inquiry into the primary
source, The Koran, and secondary sources (historical writ
ings by renowned scholars) would reveal the presence or
absence of the four criterion measures.
This chapter will begin with a psychological profil^
of Mohammad. As the theological and political formulations
of Islam have their roots in the personality structure of
their prophet, such a review would not only provide insight
into the nature of Islamic thought but also provide a
logical connection and theoretical consistency to the rela
tionship between Mohammad, his teachings, and the present
day Iranian Islamic movement. It is possible, of course,
42
43
for followers to alter--for better or worse— the theoretical
teachings of their leader; however, more often there is a
logical congruence between the two. Therefore, the
criterion measures characteristic of historical Islam
should reveal themselves in the personality of Mohammad,
as well as his teachings.
A Psychological Profile of Mohammad
When Amru, a follower of Mohammad and a military
commander, captured Alexandria, the capital of Egypt, he
was confronted with a priceless library. Philoponus, the
learned custodian of the treasure, pleaded with Amru
against its destruction. Gmar, the Khalif, was finally
informed, and when asked to rule on the matter, declaimed:
"If these writings of the Greeks agree with the book of
God (Koran), they are useless and need not be preserved.
If they disagree they are pernicious and ought to be
destroyed" (Wollaston, 1905). Wollaston (1905), who
reports the incident, writes,
So the incomparable collection which
reflected the glory of the Ptolemies
was used to light the fires of the
baths of the city, and for six months
the smouldering ashes of 700,000
volumes bore witness to the withering
influence of bigotry and fanaticism.
(p. 106)
It was with unyielding certainty, then, that Mohammad and
the religious book he penned "as the Apostle of God, the
44
final messenger" (Zwemer, 1946, p. 6), declared himself
the knower of the absolute truth.
The references in the Koran as to the omniscience
and omnipotence of God (Allah) and the infallibility of
the writings (Koran) proliferate throughout the writings.
These teachings comprise "the path of thy Lord, a straight
path. We have detailed Our revelation for a people who
take heed" (Koran, Surah 6, v. 127). These revelations
from Allah came to Mohammad (see Surah 7, v. 2), and they
were not to be questioned.
It is not for the faithful, men or
women, to make their own choice in
a thing when Allah and his Messenger
have decided the matter . . . Mohammad
is the father of no man among you. He
is the Messenger of Allah and the seal
of the prophets. (Koran, Surah 33,
v. 36-40)
The emergence of the Koran, the work of Allah, was describee,
(by itself) as a "miracle" (Rodinson, 1971, p. 92), so
prized that if a follower wanted to obtain the book, he
would go to Mohammad and obtain permission to copy the
original (Margoliouth, 1914, p. 7). An aura of power and
miracle hung over Mohammad, and "when he was talking as the
Messenger of God he was infallible, dogmatic, and his
followers listened without any question" (Margoliouth.,
1914, p. 70).
In the early years of Islam it had not been so. In
his. early years Mohammad was much less dogmatic, less
45
hardlined in his. teachings., teachings which were in keeping
with the customs: of the Arabs: a concern for the poor and
needy, admonitions against intolerance and extremes,
teachings which were fundamentally apolitical. But this
was to change.
Mohammad was a very insecure man. His psychological
history had been quite painful. He had a difficult and
rejecting childhood. He lost all the significant people
in his life: gestating in his mother's womb, his father
died; his mother died when he was six years old; he lost
his grandfather; he had no brothers or sisters. He lived
a lifetime of solitude. Mohammad the child and Mohammad
the restless young man became Mohammad the Prophet. Owing
to a certain personal, religious and sociological appropri
ateness, his message met with an enthusiastic response
from a group of disciples who then became a community, a
sect. Such a community most probably met some of Mohammad'';
deep-seated needs for belongingness, for family (Rodinson,
1971).
Historians (Wollaston, 1905; Rahnama, 1941,
Pickthall, 1953) suggest that Mohammad's childhood was
fraught with events and influenced by people that immedi
ately set him apart from his Arab community. These people
and events created a kind of psychological "rejection" from
infancy on into his adult years.
46
Mohammad's father died before he was born, and as
a result, his mother, Amene, was a whiny, crying, sour,
hypochondriac, constantly preoccupied with death (Rahnama,
1941). From the time of his birth, until her death six
years later, Amene taught her son that life held no joy;
tears, morbidity, and the anticipation of death were the
most important things in life. This negative, pessimistic
personality of Mohammad's mother had the potential to
adversely affect the normal development of the personality
of her child.
Paykel (1974) found that stress can cause with
drawal, regression, and eventual disorientation. He postu
lated that these conditions are particularly acute in the
pregnant woman. Hetzel (1956) and Rosen (1955) discovered,
in a number of studies on stress in pregnant women, that
there are some links between life stress and complications
of pregnancy. Studies by McDonald (1965, 1968) concurred
with Hetzel's (1956) and Rosen's (1955) studies; he found
that the factor of the mother's emotional state was a
powerfully relevant dimension in the child's well being.
Stott (19 70) wrote that psychological stress during preg
nancy, including matrimonial trouble, injury, illness, death
of a husband or child, have been linked to mental retarda
tion and congenital malfunctions in the offspring. The
infant born under stressful conditions is likely to be more
vulnerable (Ferreira, 1965; Kelly, 19 62, McDonald, 19 68).
47
The characteristics associated with fear and emotional
arousal that are produced by an excess of adrenal hormones
may interfere with the newborn's ability to relax, attend
to stimuli, and shut off abundant stimuli. It might also
be assumed that if mothers who have experienced prolonged
stress have not adapted to the stress by the time the new
child is born, it is likely that the new demands of parent
ing will serve to increase the stressful state. Maternal
fetal tension will be perpetuated in the early weeks and
months of mother-infant interaction after birth. In light
of the above-mentioned studies, it would be safe to assume
that Amene's extreme anxiety and stress were, in some
measure, transmitted to the child Mohammad.
Qurayshite custom dictated that the infants of
wealthy parents be given to the nomadic clans to rear. With
the nomadic life, the children would be filled with the pure
air of the desert and draw strength from the hearty life of
the Bedouins (Wollaston, 1905; Rahnama, 1941; Rodinson,
1971). The city Arabs also felt that this was the best
means for them to maintain contact with their nomadic
counterparts. This was no small consideration in light of
the fact that a foster-brotherhood was regarded as a power
ful bond between two men. Another important factor was the
purely economic one; nomadic families were extremely
dependent on the income derived for caring for those wealthy
children. But shortly after Mohammad's birth, when the
48
Banu Sad tribe came to Mecca to take the newborn infants,
they refused Mohammad, knowing he had no living father; a
child without a father was unwanted, even if his grand
father was a wealthy and powerful member of the tribe.
Rahnama (19 41) attributed this rejection to the fact that
a fatherless household could not properly compensate them
for a child's care. However, it happened that a Banu Sad
tribeswoman named Halime was among the women looking for
children to care for. When the selection process had ended,
she found that there was no infant available to supplement
her family's income. At the last moment, she reluctantly
decided to take the infant Mohammad, thinking that the
scanty income he was likely to bring was better than no
income at all.
Understanding Halime's background is important.
Before Mohammad's birth she had been friends with Fatima
Khathamie, a wealthy Meccan woman. Fatima had always been
very generous with Halime, insuring that Halime's family
was always well cared for. Rahnama (19 41) recounted that
Fatima had been hopelessly in love with Mohammad's father
and wanted desperately to marry him, but he had been
promised by his father to Amene and eventually married her.
When Fatima heard of Abdolah's (Mohammad's father) death,
she is said to have lost her mind from grief. Rahnama (1941)
asserted that immediately after Abdolah's death, Fatima
disappeared from Mecca, and her wealth was dispersed.
49
Halime's loss of her benefactor precipitated deep emotional
grudges against Mohammad's family. Halime had not only
lost a steady source of income, she had lost a friend. The
picture is not a pleasant one. Mohammad was born to a
woman who was described as anxious, hysterical, and morbid.
He was then adopted by a woman who, for personal, economic,
and social reasons, did not really wish to care for him.
Neither of these women would seem to present good prospects
as an acceptant, loving mother. It will be discussed later
how a third woman, Khadije, was instrumental in creating
psychosexual pressure oh Mohammad.
Ross (1952), Schlosberg (1954), and Spitz (1946)
postulated that if a mother is happy, loving, and under
standing , the child will tend to feel secure, comfortable,
friendly, and trusting. If she is impatient, hostile, and/
or erratic, the child will probably take longer, if at all,
to trust in others or in himself. Rejection from "signifi
cant others" was part of Mohammad's life from the beginning
Refusal on the part of Banu Sad women to take Mohammad is
initially perplexing, in light of the fact that Mohammad's
grandfather, Abdul Mutalib, was a wealthy and generous man,
and considered to be the spiritual chief and foremost
statesman of Mecca (Rahnama, 1941; Rodinson, 1971).
Obviously, the grandfather had let it be known that he was
not going to help his son's widow. Erickson (.1950) states
that a commitment on the part of the adults is. most
50
important in the psychological development of the child.
This commitment can best be made when adults value the
contributions that the child can make to their lives and to
his own. It is apparent that during his early childhood,
no one in Mohammad1s sphere valued him, and therefore, there:
was no commitment to him as a person. Allport (1961) and
Rogers (1939) both assert that a child (18 months to four
years) begins to be sensitive to the first social components
of self-concept. It is not surprising, then that at about
the age of four, Mohammad began to show outward signs of
"difficult behavior" (Rahnama, 19 41, p. 119). One day,
while shepherding, he pretended to be mortally wounded,
telling his foster-brother that someone was intent upon
killing him. The foster-brother ran to the camp for help,
and when Halime and her husband Haress ran to his aid,
rather than a dead or wounded child, they found Mohammad
serenely sitting on a rock gazing dreamily into the sky
(Rahnama, 19 41).
Haress, it is said, had many times wanted to send
the child back to his mother because of similar behavior.
This last incident prompted them to take him to see a Kahin,
a seer-fortune teller. The Kahin*s assessment of Mohammad* s ;
behavior must have been extremely disturbing, for the Kahin
was reported to have said, "0, children of Arabia, be afraid
of what may happen to you. Kill this child, he will make a
mockery of our gods" (Rahnama, 1941, p. 122). It is not
51
known what transpired between the Kahin and Mohammad, but
Rahnama (1941) cited an example that showed Mohammad as
being contemptuous of the authority of the old gods. He is
reported to have torn a religious artifact from his neck,
declaring that he had somebody to protect him and had no
need for sacred objects.
After his sojourn with the Banu Sad tribe, Mohammad
returned home, but his reunion with his mother was short
lived. She died when he was six, as the two of them were
returning from a pilgrimage to his father’s grave.
Mohammad was taken to live with his wealthy grandfather.
Rahnama (1941) and Wollaston (1905) describe the grand
father, Abdul Mutalib, as a devout and dogmatically reli
gious man who had at one time been willing to sacrifice
(as. the Biblical Abraham) his favorite son, Mohammad's
father, Abdolah, to fulfill a holy covenant.
In Mohammad’s relationship with his grandfather,
one can see the situational formulations of the classical
analytic concept of the love-hate dependency syndrome.
Mohammad must have been cognizant of Abdul Mutalib's
attitude toward his son, Mohammad's father. Such an atti
tude could have only engendered dislike and fear, but
Mohammad also knew that he had no one now except his grand
father, on whom he was totally dependent. Moreover, it is
probable that he loved the elderly man, his; only source of
psychological nourishment. As statesman and spiritual______
52
leader of Mecca, Abdul Mutalib had a special seat and a
powerful position in the holy house of Kaaba. Mohammad
was friendless and spent his time accompanying his grand
father and associating with adults. He defied Arab tradi
tion by going withhhis grandfather to the council meetings,
where children were not allowed. Irreverently he would
occasionally sit in Abdul Mutalib*s place; when others
protested, the grandfather is reported to have said, "Let
him sit there, he is aware of the greatness of his future"
(Rahnama, 1941, p. 132). The young, insecure and impres
sionable Mohammad must have been affected by these pro
nouncements. While loving his grandfather, he deeply
feared him, and it is plausible that this fear was projected
onto Mohammad* s God and to Islam, a religion based foremost):
on fear. When his grandfather died, Mohammad was left in
a precarious position, both emotionally and socially.
To the superstitious Arab, Mohammad was a bad omen;
wherever he went, death would follow. He had no father,
his grandfather *s early lack of attention had left the
child and his mother economic and social outcasts. His
behavioral problems had forced the Banu Sad woman, Halime
-^who had never wanted him in the first place-^to return
him in disgrace to his mother. His mother was an anxious,
nervous woman, preoccupied with the death of her husband
to the exclusion of the welfare of her son. Then she too
died, leaving him motherless. Finally, the grandfather,
53
who originally neglected him, and later indulged him to
the point of fostering an isolated narcissism, died,
abandoning Mohammad. It is not certain how a particular
child will react under these circumstances, but it has been
suggested that this type of constant stress situation will
produce compensation, reaction formation, delayed maturity,
and/or passive dependency. Hartshorne, May, and Shuttle-
worth (1930). postulated that a child who feels accepted by
Iiis, parents and peers does not usually have a compulsive
need to gain attention and is less likely to use, with any
persistence, such attention-seeking devices as stealing,
bragging, fighting, lying, etc.
Poole (1882) described the adult Mohammad as
follows:
His laugh was rarely more than a
smile, perfumes, however, he loved
passionately, being most sensitive
to smell. His constitution was
extremely delicate. He was nervously
afraid of bodily pain; he would sob
and roar under it. he was delighted
in telling little stories— fairy tales
and the like. He romped with children
and played with their toys. (p. 16)
This childlike behavior of the adult Mohammad, Poole wrote,
was the result of the traumatic experiences of his early
life. How traumatic these early experiences were we will
never know, but perhaps one may judge by the Koran and
Islam that sprang from Mohammad's mind and conduct.
54
At its simplest, the moral develop
ment of the child may be described
in terms of the process by which the
child acquires the values esteemed
by his community, how he acquires a
sense of right and wrong in terms of
those values, and how he learns to
regulate his personal desires and
compulsions so that, when a situa^-
tional conflict arises, he does what
he ought to do rather than what he
wants to do. (Ammin, 1957, p. 77)
Mohammad as an adult displayed all the opposite signs of
those Ammin (1957) uses to define morality. He never
showed any respect for the values that were esteemed by
his community. His sense of right and wrong was diametric
ally different from the value system of his community, and
all through his life he did what he wanted to do rather
than what ought to be done. As Rodinson (1971) states,
"all his life we find him thinking before making a decision
conducting his public and private business efficiently,
knowing when to bide his time and when to retreat, and
capable of taking the necessary action to ensure the
success of his plans" (p. 53). And yet, beneath this
surface was a temperament which was nervous, passionate,
restless, feverish, filled with an impatient yearning
which burned for the impossible. As Rodinson (19 71) points
out, "this was so intense as to lead to nervous crises of
a definitely pathological kind" (p. 53),
It was also at the beginning of his adulthood that
he began his habit of taking long journeys through the
55
mountains of Mecca, sometimes for as long as a month, and
it was this solitude that prompted Wollaston (1905) to
write, "Always pensive, he had of late become even more
thoughtful and retiring" (p. 39). He spent practically all
his time in contemplation and in silence. But, instead
of "stilling his anxiety," solitude and meditation created
more images which "perplexed" and "agitated his soul"
(Wollaston, 1905, p. 39). At this period Khadije, now his
wife, plays an important role in Mohammad's life and in
shaping his thoughts and his future prophethood. Since
Khadije was almost twenty years older than he, it is
unlikely that he felt for her "the physical passion which
was later to procure him, in his old age, the young and
lovely women of his future harem" (Rodinson, 1971, p. 51).
But he always had a great respect for her, firm affection,
and gratitude which never wavered. Rodinson (1971)
recounts that a psychoanalyst has suggested that the
"frustrations of an orphan, deprived of his mother1s
warmth at an early age, may have strengthened his attach
ment to an older woman" (p. 51). Every indication from
history suggests that before his prophethood, Mohammad was
well respected and was held in high regard by his con
temporaries. He was even given the nickname "Amin, the
trustworthy1 . 1 (Rahnama, 1941, p. 200). Yet, he was not
satisfied with his humdrum existence; he had an underlying
restlessness; he wanted something more. His fundamental
56.
psychology in every detail will always be a mystery; but,
while laying no claim to any impossible and almost certainly
misleading analysis and taking into account the trends of
human behavior pointed out for us by Freud, it is possible
to make some observations on which to build some kind of
psychological hypothesis.
Mohammad had, as the phrase goes, everything to
make him happy, and yet he was not happy. Through the
passages of muddled history of his life, one can make
certain assumptions regarding his discontent. One of the
things that affected him most was the fact that he had no
male heirs. With Arabs, as with the Semitic people in
general, this, was a source of shame. These men were called
Abtar--the mutilated. Mohammad the Abtar, in the early
days, of his prophecy, heard a voice from heaven declaiming
these vengeful lines: "Yes; we have given you abundance
so pray your lord and sacrifice. It is your enemy who is
the Abtar" (Koran, Surah 108, v. 3). So Khadije's inability
to give him male heirs provided additional reasons for his
dissatisfaction with her. Additionally, Mohammad saw the
wealthy Qurayshites using and abusing the pleasure of love.
As. has. been said by Rabbi Nathan, "Nowhere in the world
was. there such a propensity towards fornication as among
the Arabs." (Rodinson, 1971, p. 55). Mohammad silently
suffered the fact that each, man, merchants and travelers
especially, was, allowed by custom to take wives for a________
57
limited period. Polygamy waa per Haps: less: widespread than
has been suggested, but divorce was simple and frequent.
Young and beautiful slave girls were easily bought
(Rodinson, 19 71).
But Mohammad was, wedded to Khadije and to her alone.
It is possible that their marriage contract involved an
obligation on his part to take no second wife, and the
wealthy Kadije was in a position to make demands. But as a
man known for his belief in fairness' and moderation,
Mohammad was bound to the mother of his female children by
ties much stronger than any written undertaking. Even so,
knowing what we know of his amorous proclivities later in
life, we can imagine that there were plenty of times when
he, in the gospel phrase, which would probably have
astounded him, committed adultery in his heart. He must
have thrust away temptation many times, perhaps even with
deceptive ease. But whether they appeared easy or hard,
we know now what these victories may have cost him and
what a sense of frustration they may have left behind.
Mohammad by now must have considered himself, no
doubt, an exceptional person. From a very early age, he
saw few of the people around him take any interest in the
religious, moral and intellectual questions which occupied
him. This must have gained him the reputation of an
inoffensive idealist, quite unfitted to cope with practical
matters,. Rodinson (1971) points out that the troubles of
5 8
a man mocked for his. lack of male heirs, the frustration of
a highly sexed man whose own moral conscience prevented
him from realizing his desires, the suppressed fury of a
man fundamentally sure of himself but treated with contempt
by practical politicians— all these things were capable of
creating a personality thirsting to turn the tables in each
particular, but still keeping strictly within the normal
bounds of the society in which he lived. "There was some
thing in Mohammad which made him overstep those bounds"
(p. 56).
This kind of case history we find in the wards of
psychiatric hospitals. There is a definite pathological
element in his makeup. Perhaps the stories about the angels
who came and took him and opened his heart while he was
pasturing flocks belonging to his nurse's family, mentioned
before, actually developed from accounts of some kind of
seizure (Bodinson, 19 71). This story may be a complete
fabrication. It may be, too, that as we mentioned before,
as a child Mohammad was experiencing schizophrenic attacks.
Many of the syndromes mentioned by Emil Kraepelin in his
book Dementia Praecox and Paraphrenia (1919), regarding
schizophrenia apply to Mohammad. (See Appendix for further
comparisons..)
In all societies and among all races, individuals
are found who, because of something in their constitution
or their personal history, find it difficult or even________
59
impossible to adjust to the roles which society expects of
them. In some cases their behavior brings them into
violent conflict with their environment; others succeed in
making some kind of adjustment, especially since many
societies have allotted exceptional roles to these
exceptional people. This often takes the form of making
those with a particular kind of abnormality responsible for
contracts with the supernatural world, the world of gods
and spirits.
Some of these individuals possess exceptional gifts.
They see things which others do not see, hear things which
others do not hear. A feeling they cannot explain makes
them utter words and gestures which are quite outside the
normal behavior patterns of ordinary people. All this is
naturally put down to their contact with another world— the
world of powers which, while they cannot normally be seen
or heard can perform what, to the common run of mortals, is
impossible. Some of these extraordinary beings are, of
course, very far from normal; while in others the strange
ness and abnormality manifests itself only rarely, in
particular circumstances; in the course of everyday life
they behave just like everyone else. There are some whose
inferior mental capacities are not enhanced by their
special peculiarities; others, on the contrary, possess
complex and powerful personalities with a capacity for rich
60
and original thought. Pre-Islamic Arabia had its own share
of such men (Rodinson, 1971).
In all events, it is now generally understood and
admitted that certain individuals can sincerely believe
that they are the recipients of visual, auditory and mental
messages from the beyond; and also that their sincerity is
no proof that their messages really come from where they
are claimed to have come (Rodinson, 19 71). It is the
concept of the unconscious which has enabled us to under
stand tliese things. As Rodinson states, "we find these
ecstasies and sensory phenomena in a very similar form
among persons suffering from recognized mental conditions
such as hysteria, schizophrenia and uncontrolled verbal
ization" (p. 77).
Although the evidence is suggestive, it is by no
means conclusive that Mohammad was seriously emotionally
disturbed. It appears incontrovertible however, that his
character shaped the nature of Islam. Within his person
ality can be seen the forces required to generate a
political theology, incorporating the ideas of absolute
truth, simplistic and rigidly held beliefs, destruction of
the self, and totalitarianism.
Mohammad and Absolute Truth
The word Islam is derived from the Koran and means
submission to God (Wallbank, Taylor and Bail, 1965). From
61
the beginning, Mohammad insisted upon an uncompromising
monotheism and further insisted that he, Mohammad, was the
only means by which, one could reach God. Therefore, the
most important declaration of faith a Muslin made (and
still makes) is. that Allah is. the only God and that
Mohammad is that God's only messenger. Mohammad's
prophecy began from the time he received his first
revelation. These revelations were memorized and/or
recorded, and comprise the sacred scripture of Islam, the
Koran. As Wallbank et al. (1965) wrote, "it would be
difficult to exaggerate the important role the Koran plays
in the daily life and attitude of Islamic peoples. For the
pious Muslim, it is the holy of holies" (p. 251). Funk and
Wagnall's Standard Reference Encyclopedia (Vol. 17, 195 9)
stated that Muslims consider the Koran to be above criticism,
that it is not to be proved but should be used as the
standard of merit. It is a book that is. "authoritative
and dogmatic" (p. 14 3). Mohammad himself stated "this is
the scripture whereof there is no doubt" (Koran, Surah 2,
v. 1) .
Whether the Koran can be considered inspirational
or dogmatic, there is no doubt that it reveals, in minute
detail, the psychology of its author. Andrae (1935) wrote:
The Koran itself is a source of
immeasurable value for the under
standing of Mohammad’s inner life,
of the motives which prompted his
message, and of the arguments and
62
objections, which his contrymen
raised against his preaching. A
first hand source... that enables
us to trace a soul which wrestles
with its fate and with naive candor
reveals its aims...as well as its
faults and accomplishments, its
weaknesses and courage, (p. 114)
Therefore, it is from the Koran, and the interpretations of
the Koran as written by Ali (1975), Arnold (1913),
McDonald (1965), Margoliouth (1905), Pickthall (1953),
Tritton (1947), and Swemer (1946) that we can see that
Islam was indeed the answer to Mohammad's own Psychological
needs.
When Mohammad moved to Medina, questions regarding
the credibility of his religion began to arise and his
authority was put to a test. Additionally, some of
Mohammad's personal desires (such as wanting to marry the
wife of his adopted son, the inclusion of the concept of
forbidden months into the religious custom, his interest
in holy wars, as well as the threat of creating schisms in
the Arabian brotherhood by Mohammad's teachings) aroused
serious objection to his power and infallibility. He
found himself in a position which compelled him, even if
he had not been so inclined, to fight for power. Arnold
(1913) notes this change.
It has been frequently asserted by
European writers, that from the date
of Mohammad's migration to Medina,
and from the altered circumstances
of his life there, the prophet
appears in an entirely new character.
63
He is no longer the preacher, the
warner, the apostle of god to men,
whom he would persuade of the truth
of the religion revealed to him, but
now he appears rather as the unscru
pulous bigot, using all means at his
disposal of force and statecraft to
assert himself and his opinions.
(p. 34)
It should be remembered that the Koran was not
written over a brief period but, in fact, over several
years, from about 609 A.D. to 632 A.D. In the later
writings Mohammad would redefine and strengthen his power
and position, legitimizing certain relationships (as in the
case of marrying the wife of his adopted son) and certain
policies and goals (Rodinson, 1971, p. 206-207).
Mohammad found himself the leader of the party in
Medina, and his struggle for power was successful. Little
by little the party, partly religious and partly political,
had grown. Within five years respect had been earned;
Allah was the Supreme Ruler, Mohammad was the messenger.
He now had the absolute and final statements within the
Koran to sanction his authority and to free him from being
accountable.
Through it all, perhaps Mohammad was unaware of
the deeper nature of his motives, as well as of where all
this was leading him. He remained a deeply religious man,
but a man who could construct his religion to serve his
personal ends. Convinced that he was in direct communica
tion with God and in possession of the absolute truth, he
64
solidified his Arab followers into a powerful political
body, a body destined, however, by nature and by origin, to
become totalitarian.
Samuel Zwemer (194 6) states that "Mohammad called
himself the apostle of God, the final messenger in the long
line of apostles and prophets" (p. 26). In Zwemer*s view,
Mohammad, after his flight to Medina, began to associate
his own name with that of deity in a way not used by him in
the earlier revelations. It was the nature and psychologi
cal composition of Mohammad to assume that he knew what was
best for his followers. According to the Koran, the
sentiment of God worship is ingrained in human nature
(Husain, 1958). If a man is inclined to turn away from it,
it is but a lapse on his part, and it is necessary to
redirect his attention. "Man's very existence is witness
against himself, however, he may seek excuses" (Koran,
Surah 75, v. 14 & 15). This concept of false superiority
has permeated all aspects of Muslim life. As Philip Ashby
(196 3) points out, the tension between Islamic thought and
its neighbors is not unlike the strain which is inherent
in Islam itself. "It is produced by the juxtaposition of
that which is divine and therefore superior, with the
obviously inferior quality of that which is human" (p. 124) .
Given the Muslim conception of God and man, it follows that
what is produced by the mind of man cannot be considered
ultimately of absolute significance. As the writer has
65
pointed out in the first part of this chapter, Muslims have
a strong predilection toward absolutism. Whatever is not
absolute is insignificant, and hence inferior.
Mohammad and Simplistic and Rigidly-Held Beliefs
Muslims believe the Koran contains all the teach
ings that Mohammad articulated in his life as a prophet,
and as such is complete. However, the evolution of the
Koran, both in its literary form and theological complete
ness, raises serious questions which seem to dilute, if not
contradict, this notion. Margoliouth (1914) states that
the greater part of the Koran was delivered orally. The
repertory of material, as is the case with most preachers,
was "meager." Mohammad was acquainted with only a few
stories, and the doctrines which he had to communicate were,
during a long period, "exceedingly simple" (p. 26). Even
Muslim scholars agree on the simplistic manner in which the
Koran deals with complicated problems. Husain (19 58) writes;,
"the Koran's approach in this matter is not dialectical, it
does not propound metaphysical theses and frame logical
arguments for them so as to compel an adversary to sub
mission. It addresses itself always to man's natural
instinct" (p. 46).
The above statement, ironically, is correct,
however, not in the sense that the author wants to convey
his point. Rather, the Koran merely deals with complicated
66
issues in a simplistic manner. Tritton (1947) states,
"Mohammad was a preacher, not a theologian and none would
have been more surprised than he at some of the meanings
which were read into his words" (p. 7). Margoliouth (1914)
writes that "when the prophet died, he left twenty thousand
companions who had not done more than glance at the Koran,
and only a few who knew how to read and write and knew the
whole of the Koran by heart - two of them being doubtful
cases" (p. 6). As Margoliouth continues, any companion of
the prophet who knew a long Surah (chapter) by heart, was
counted as a marvel. It is reported by Margoliouth that
the first written text of the Koran done by Omar (the seconc
Khalife) was burned by Othman (the third Khalife), and the
next written Koran was not done until 150 years after
Mohammad*s migration from Mecca to Medina. The oral,
rather than written, form of development of the Koran may
have fit Mohammad *s style, but created difficulties. The
stories were simplistic and repetitious. In the trans
mission to others, parts were forgotten and meanings
changed. The oral form was also incapable of providing the
depth and completeness needed to contend in an orderly
manner with the theological and political issues of the
time.
It is significant how God, as described in the
Koran, resembles Mohammad. In order to sooth his psycho-
logical wound and compensate for the humiliation that he
67
went through at the hand of the Qurayshites, Mohammad
created a God and appointed himself as the only apostle of
that God. Mohammad, at the beginning of his prophethood,
acted like a preacher; but then, when he migrated to
Medina, he became an absolute ruler like his God. Arnold
(1913) states,
From the date of Mohammad's migration
to Medina, and from the altered cir
cumstances of his life there, the
prophet appears in an entirely new
character. He is no longer the
preacher, the warner, the apostle
of God to men, whom he would persuade
of the truth of the religious revealed
to him, but now he appears rather as
the unscrupulous bigot, using all
means as his disposal of force and
statecraft to assert himself and his
opinions, (p. 34)
Referring to this same issue, McDonald (19 65) concurs with
Arnold (1913), that "like his grandfather, Mohammad later
ruled like an absolute monarch, a prophet of God, in his
own right" (p. 8). McDonald (1965), in another passage,
continues that he "sat in the gate of his house and judged
people, he had no need of a code, for his own will was
enough, he followed the customary law of the town when it
suited him and when he judged that it was best" (p. 69).
Since Mohammad was illiterate and a preacher rather
than a theologian, he did not deal systematically with
recurring theological-political problems, "such as conflict
ing claims of heirs, or questions of divorce. He was
ignorant of the great Roman laws" (McDonald, 1965, p. 70).
68
So the legislative part of the Koran grew out of such scraps
set down out of heaven to meet the needs of the squables
and questions of the townfolk of Al Medina. As McDonald
(1965) points out, "the system was one of pure opportunism"
(p. 294). McDonald (1965) points out that "A revelation
proved too wide or too narrow, or left out some important
possibility. Then there came another revelation to supple
ment or correct, or even to set the first quite aside.
Mohammad had no scruples about progressive revelation as
applied to himself" (p. 295). Thus, through these
interpretive acts, many flat contradictions have come into
the Koran.
In the deliberate darkness that has surrounded
Mohammad's life we can see some sparks which lead us closer
to the true Mohammad. Algred Guillaume (1966) states,
Abu Huraira said, "the prophet of
God came out to us while we were
writting Hadith, and said 'what is
this that you are writting?' We
said, 'Hadith which we hear from
thee.* Said he, 'A book other than
the book of GodJ Do you not know
that nothing but the writting of
books beside the book of God led
astray the people that were before
you?' We said, 'Are we to relate
Hadith of you, oh prophet of God?'
He replied, 'Only relate Hadith of
me, there is no objection. But he
who intentionally speaks falsely
on my authority will find a place
in hell." (p. 16)
This appears to mean that those who disagree are enemies.
There is no question that Mohammad was weary of educated
69
people, he did not want to be challenged by them and the
few times that the Jews challenged him, the result was
total massacre of the entire Jewish tribe (Wollaston, 1905).
It is the same type of thinking that caused Mohammad to be
very scornful of poets (Koran, Surah , v. 6 9). Poets,
in the Jahliya period, were men of immense prestige. They
were the wise men, the thinkers and the historians of the
tribe. The emergence of a poet in a tribal family was
celebrated with dance and song. As Seale (1978) points
out "Koran was scornful of poets because Mohammad could not
tolerate anybody as a source of competition with his work"
(p. 14).
But as we peer closely into the life of Mohammad,
we become aware that his dislike for poets was not only
that they disagreed with him but also because they were
educated and hence knowledgeable of the stories mentioned
in the Koran.
Mohammad, as we can see through the pages of history,
was a man determined to prove his point. He had created a
role for himself and as is often the case, his opponents
seem to have seen more clearly than he himself what lay
beneath his surface modesty. He accepted with humility the
modest role of herald which the Lord assigned to him. But
it is not difficult to discern the legitimate pride under
lying the humility which he honestly endeavored to acquire,
and as Rodinson (1971) points out "intelligent politicians
70
could readily understand how the ,logic of his position was
inevitably bound to push him, in spite of himself, to
supreme power" (p. 105). How could a man to whom God spoke
directly ever submit to the decision of any council? How
could the dictates of the supreme being be subjected to
discussion by the aristocracy of Mecca? Rodison (1971)
explains, "In a society which drew no clear line between
the sacred and the profane, it was quite obvious that the
logical outcome would be a situation in which God would
dictate his commands personally through Mohammad, in the
sphere of internal and external affairs, as well as on
strictly religious matters" (p. 10 5). The belief that God
was on his side made Mohammad intolerant of other people’s
views and in order to elevate God's words above mortals he
had to resort to the absurd language of absolute and
dichotomous nature. Being the preacher that he was, he
had to bring God down from his ascent and communicate his
point in a simplistic and rigid manner. As stated in the
Koran, "Invoke the name of your Lord of east and west.
There is no God but he, take him for your protector." The
message is explicit and simple. There is only one God. No
other being may be associated with him as an object of
worship because all other beings of whatever kind are far
below him. Margoliouth (1914) states, "Blind obedience to
71
the orders of prophet by the individual Muslim was a
helper in leading to fanaticism" (p. 46).
Mohammad and Destruction of the Self
Research has demonstrated that Mohammad was not an
ordinary person. Circumstances of his life created a kind
of psychological havoc that, in order to survive, he had
to create an environment diametric to the uncaring and
unloving environment to which he was exposed as a child.
Mohammad had to surround himself with a group that would
worship him and make him an object of their devotion. The
conscious-unconscious dependency in the group required the
destruction and annihilation of the individual. Since the
group, and not the individual, was the source of nourishment
and ego satisfaction, Mohammad employed the fear of God to
destroy any attempt toward individuality.
Hence, today one can observe in the Islamic commu
nity that a Muslim loses the distinguishing molecular
properties of his own identity (Rodin, 19 69) . This loss
of self results in massive short-circuiting of ego energies.
The Muslim, in order to charge his depleted ego, has to
connect himself to the group, and through this process he
gains a psuedo-ego-charge which results in the loss of
affective properties of his identity (Hoffer, 1951). As
is apparent in such a system, the object of reverence is
not individuality but the group as a holistic form.
72
In order for the individual to be able to con
tribute to the continuation of pseudo-ego-respect, he is
encouraged to sacrifice his wasted self; thereby, the group
can have the legitimacy required for its ideals and con
cepts. Anyone who disagrees with the group ideal becomes
an enemy to each individual member since disagreement
threatens their ego-nourishment process. Violence takes
over. In this kind of environment fantasy is transformed
into reality. Since reality for the individual member is
nothing more than the general consensus of the group, it
matters not if their conviction cannot be tested by reason
or critical examination. Islam as a religion performs the
fantasy-reality transformation to enhance the solidarity
and cohesion of the group and makes manipulation of
individuals easier by appealing to the concept of conformity
and herdishness (Ahmed, 1957). In the preaching of Islam,
the individual self disappears to a large extent and the
aim is to belong to the herd, to be like everyone else,
with no feelings or thoughts that make the person different
(Fromm, 1973). One is encouraged to conform in custom,
dress, ideas, so to be saved; saved from the frightening
experience of aloneness.
By reminding his followers of the day of the judg
ment and everlasting fire (Koran, Surah 7, v. 4-5; Surah 2,
v. 39), Mohammad created an atmosphere of fear unknown in
Arabia. Tritton (194 7) talks about the fear, "the fear of
73
God and the possibility of eternal fire lay heavy on the
Muslims" (p. 7). When describing devout Muslims, Tritton
(1947) says, "one always looked as if he were coming back
from the funeral of his best friend. The thought of death
leaves the believer no joy, his .knowledge of Godfs laws
leaves him no friend" (p.. 12) .
Islam made life so fearful to its followers that
going to the arm of death was a blessing. Abu Musa, a
highly respected Muslim ascetic, once said, "I prefer to
have my nostrils filled with the smell of a corpse rather
than with the scent of a woman" (p. 12). Tritton (1947)
continues: "These men had the judgment so continuously
before them that when fire was mentioned a man's limbs
started out of their sockets and another fainted when he
saw a head peering out of an oven" (p. 12).
It can be seen, therefore, that Mohammad establishe
the group preeminent over the individual. Group conformity
was maintained by threats of dire retribution. One could
not be a devout Muslim and retain one's individuality;
Mohammad required the destruction of the self.
Mohammad and Totalitarianism
One can read in the Koran that every person "has a
goal toward which he turneth,so vie with one another in
good works. Wheresoever ye may be, Allah will bring you
all together. Loi Allah is able to do all things" (Koran,
74
Surah 2, v. 148). In another passage of the Koran, one is
instructed that "unto Allah [belongeth] whatever is in the
heavens and whatsoever is in the earth; Allah is able to
do all things" (Koran, Surah 2, v. 285). Islam is not a
mere religion, or a theistic philosophy, but as Ahmad (1957)
writes, "it is a complete way of life, an ideology which
provides guidance for every field of human activity" (p. 42)
Muslim scholars truly believe that all there is to
know is contained in the teaching of Islam. Syed Anvar Ali
(1975), in making reference to the belief that Islam has
the answer to all man *s questions, states that, "only the
revealed religion (Islam) is the real guide" (p. 184). He
expounds on the belief that the real purpose of life is
only "Ibaadt" (worship) which consists of total submission
to the will of Allah, and only the pleasure of Allah is the
purpose, as well as the standard, of morality. Syed Anvar
Ali (1975) states, "The ultimate goal of all activities for
a believer is only the pleasure of his Lord" (p. 184). The
Koran (Surah 2, v. 207) orders the believer to sell his
soul for the pleasure of Allah, and declares that all his
prayer, sacrifice, life, and death are for Allah alone
(Koran, Surah 6, v. 162); therefore, whatever good he does,
it is for Allah's pleasure only (Koran, Surah 4, v. 114).
Islam presents itself as an all-embracing system—
a social order, a polity, an economic ideology-~in short,
"a complete code of life" (Ahmad, 1957, p. 42).
75
One reason behind such an emphasis on Allah as an
all-powerful and all^-knowledgeable being is the fact that
Mohammad, according to Pickthall (1953), was a member of the
Hunafa Society, a secret group that felt disgust at the
idolatry of their countrymen. They longed for the religion
of the Hebrew Abraham, and looked upon themselves as having
a sense of the "upright" because they held the way of truth,
Rodinson (1971) concurs: "He is said to have belonged to
a brotherhood which practiced its own special rites at
Meccan ceremonies and observed additional taboos" (p. 4 9).
Recall that Mohammad experienced tremendous humili
ation by his city kinfolks. Rodinson (1971) states, "He
saw few of the people around him take any interest in the
religious, moral and intellectual questions which occupied
him" (p. 55). He was mocked, considered an inoffensive
idealist, and not taken very seriously. In retaliation,
Mohammad created a God and a sect where he, exclusively,
was its chosen messenger. Rodinson (1971) described this
God as all^-knowing and all-powerful. One should turn to
him; other so-called gods had no power, and Fate, that
first metaphysical incarnation of the laws of nature to
which Meccan ideology clung, was subject to the Deity.
God gratified those whom he would, and humbled and raised
men at will. At the end of time he would deal out reward
and punishment according to his own lights, which were
beyond human understanding, to those who had pleased or
76
displeased him. These things would be decided at the Last
Judgment, which already figured in Mohammad’s first revela
tion and which emerged as a basic dogma, putting the new
community in direct opposition to the dominant religious
beliefs of its society.
In.nrder to justify itself in the face of a power
ful and aggressive opposition— an opposition on the alert
for every weakness, an opposition based first and foremost
on the conservatism of the people and quick to make
extensive use of the argument of loyalty to the ancestral
faith and to denounce Mohammad as an ambitious trouble
maker— the new faith had to create a tradition for itself
which would also explain away its difficulties, diffi
culties which, it might be thought, supernatural assistance
would surely have avoided. To this end, the "Voice,"
profiting from all that Mohammad was learning, and all
that he already knew, told the story of the prophets of
the past. This revelation was later to be called "the
seven narration" or "mathani" (Rodinson, 1971, p. 121),
employing the same Aramaic word which was used by the Jews
to signify the Repetition, the preeminent Oral Tradition
(mishnah in Hebrew, mathnitha in Aramaic). In the preface
of the "Mohammad-Bin-Khvedshah-Bin Mahmud," the editor,
Arbuthnot (18 91), referring to the all-engulfing aspect of
Islam, states,
77
It is both possible and probable
that when Mohammad first began his
career as a reformer, preacher and
apostle, he was buoyed up with the
hope that he might bring both the
Jews and Christians into his fold.
On this account he introduced into
his Quran so many of the persons
mentioned both in the Old and New
Testament, along with many details
obtained from Rabbinical and
Christian sources. (p. 11)
Even the casual reader of history will notice the import
ance and force of this totalitarian view when it came, to
reveal itself in the religious wars of conquest.
CHAPTER IV
AN INVESTIGATION INTO THE FANATICISM
OF THE ISLAMIC REVOLUTIONARY GOVERNMENT OF IRAN
The purpose of this chapter is to analyze the
present political behavior of the Islamic Revolutionary
Government of Iran according to the four criterion measures
of fanaticism. Recall that it has been hypothesized that
such an analysis would demonstrate that the contemporary
Islamic political movement, that is, the Iranian-Islamic
Revolutionary Government, is fanatical.
The analysis of the religio-political beliefs and
behavior of a government is somewhat more problematic than
the analysis of one man. Somewhat like a corporation, a
government is not a consistent group of men, for the world
has seen the assassination of several important Iranian
political figures in the Revolutionary Government in recent
weeks, yet the government and its philosophy proceed in
the exercise of its powers. It is not a simple matter,
therefore, to analyze and evaluate the behavior of the
government. It is Khomeini, but not only Khomeini. It is
published government communications; it is the state^-
78
79
controlled communications systems; it is the laws of the
Parliament; it is the concensus— behavior and myth--of its
followers.
It would seem the analysis of only observable
behavior would prove an insufficient process in the study
of a government like that of Iran. Anthropology suggests
that myth and fable may assist in the endeavor. The
shadows of history may be less obvious, but more revealing,
than the deeds of a nation (Rahnama, 1941) . Under analysis
one can see that the myths and fables of Iran have remained
constant over the centuries, while historical forms— differ
ent names and variations of ideology— have come and gone.
For more than 2,000 years, Iran has primarily been ruled
by dictatorships (Malcolm, 186 7). Whether they were called
King, King of Kings, Light of Arya, or Protector of the
Weak, in nearly every instance the nation was in the grip
of autocracy, theocracy or monarchy.
There is an old Persian story that the people one
day asked Molla (Molla Nasredine) where they could find
the center of the earth. Molla pointed to where his
donkey was standing and said, "There." They replied, "How
do you know?" He answered, "If you do not believe it, go
and prove that it is not." This and othfer stories, passed
from family to family, decade to decade, reveals the
Iranian's attraction to the absolute.
80
Islamic Iran and Absolute Truth
One cannot find a single Iranian who has doubts
about his concepts or beliefs, argues Oriana Fallaci (1980)
and she appears to have made an accurate generalization.
An American diplomat living in Iran for a number of years
was telling a story of how he had quit asking for direction
in the streets simply because every pedestrian would tell
him the way and they would each lead in different direc
tions. No Iranian wanted to admit that he didn^ know.
The Iranian has always been enamoured with the absolute;
and, appropriately, his governments have come to be dictator
ships.
.The psychological cost of life under a dictatorship
whether its origin is foreign or domestic, political or
religious, is costly, especially when it leads to man's
abandonment of his personal freedom and integrity.
The loss of freedom makes man feel insignificant,
and in order to compensate for that feeling, he clings to
the outside power of absolute truth in the name of religion
(Abd-Al-Rahman, 1979a).
The dictator (whether it is Mohammad-Reza-Pahlavi
or Ruholah-Al-Musavi-Al-Khomeini) becomes the ultimate
source of authority while the individual, in comparison,
becomes helpless and insignificant. The loss of self
esteem would lead toward a collective sense of castration
anxiety (Fromm, 1973) and ultimately would lead toward
81
social and psychological impotency. This probably is a
good answer to Eric Hoffer's (1980) question in his
article, "Why the Shah Couldn't Modernize Islamic Iran."
Hoffer (1980) points out that Islam is a congenial religion
and does not demand its followers to prove themselves
through accomplishment. What Hoffer (1980) ironically
missed was the absence of the power of "procreation" in
Iranian society. The loss of the power of "procreation"
psychologically would lead the individual toward the con
cept of absolute truth. The individual Iranian, in order
to survive this ego-alien environment, has created a
hierarchical system of authority in the family, which
places the individual in the position of absolute pseudo
power at home as a mini’ -dictator (Arberry & Landau, 194 3) .
In his absence, the father, as the rightful head of the
family (Poole, 1882; Hendrix, 1979), delegates the power
to the next legitimate member of the family. Therefore,
it is not surprising to observe the lowest one on the
pecking order venting his frustration on a dog or a cat.
Of all the different sects of Islam, the Muslim
sect of present-day Iran, Shiism, is the most fundamental
ist and totalitarian (Dike, 1981; Keddie, 1980). Shiism
developed out of the claims of Ali's (Mohammad's nephew
and son-in-law) descendants (Arberry & Landau, 1943; Keddie -
1980; Funk & Wagnall, 1972) . Shi'ism began as a political
movement rather than a religious one (Arberry & Landau,
82
1943? Keddie, 1980), During the Safavi dynasty, Iran was
constantly engaged in war with the Sonni Ottoman empire
(Arberry & Landau, 1943; Keddie, 1980). In order to unite
the populace against the Sonni Turks, the Safavi kings
appealed to the religious dogmas of Iranians, making it
their duty to fight the Sonni Ottomans. The basic doctrine:
of Shi’ism is heavily dosed with absolutism. For example,
it is believed that:
1. Mohammad himself designated Ali as Iman
(spiritual leader)?
2. God preordained this?
3. Mohammad revealed secrets of divine knowledge
to Ali that were handed down from generation to generation,,
Because of these divine secrets, each Iman is infallible
and his decisions must be accepted as final and as
absolute truth?
4. Devotion to the Imam is a religious obligation,
superceded only by the belief in God, and Mohammad as the
messenger (Funk & Wagnall, 1972).
The followers are warned that "Islam is the God’s
religion, and Koran his words, and Mohammad’s and Ali's
words need no proof, since it comes directly from Allah
himself" (Ravasani, 1981, p. 7). Ravasani (1981) explains
that descendants of Ali (called Maasoom— "Innocence")
have no need of a vote of confidence by the populace? and,
83
as a matter of fact, it is the populace that must beg for
their attention and obey them blindly.
By studying the relationship between Iran and Alih;
family, much can be learned about the concept of absolute
truth and the destruction of the self, and how they are
operative in the Iranian psychological makeup. From their
defiant assertion that Ali is the first Imam and successor
to Mohammad (historically after Mohammad the successors
were: Abu-Bakr; Omar; Othman; and, finally, Ali), and only
Ali and his descendants are Maasoom, Iranians have created
a mythology of their own (love-hate), serving to accept
Islam as religion while maintaining Arabs as outsiders.
Iranians, both past and present, have never liked Arabs,
and have used derogatory words such as "alligator eater"
and "barbarian" to describe them. Part of the reason,
according to Mehdi Bahar (1965), was the unconscious
jealousy toward the free-spirited way of the Arab1s life.
Iranians, having been in bondage for thousands of years,
could not tolerate domination under backward but, nonethe
less, free people. The same unconscious love-hate syndrome
persists among Iranian Muslims toward the United States.
As Marvin Zonis (1980) argues, at the same time that
Muslim Iranian fanatics insist America leave them alone,
they simultaneously hold American diplomats hostage to
insure America's presence.
84
Notice that Iranians are protesting
the history of the alleged American
crimes in Iran. They seek to end all
forms of U.S. intervention in their
internal affairs. Yet what mechanism
have they chosen to accomplish this
policy? The very policy which will
guarantee America’s continued involve
ment in the internal affairs of
Iranian politics. If there is one
way to keep the United States in Iran,
it is for Iranians to keep holding
our diplomats., (Zonls, 1980, p. 11)
According to Abd-Al-Rahman (1979b) , Iranians
cannot tolerate the ambiguities of life? for Iranians,
everything has to be black or white, and the appeal of the
Muslim religion, especially to the descendants of Ali, was
based on the dictum that once they stated their position,
their words and deeds were absolute and resistant to
change. The absence of relativism in the words and deeds
of Imams will be discussed in the following section.
Islamic Iran and Simplistic and Rigidly-Held Beliefs
Islam had the power of peacefully
converting souls by the simplicity
of its theology, the clearness of
its dogma and principles, and the
rituals it demands. In contrast to
Christianity, which has been under
going continued transformation since
its origin, Islam has remained identi
cal with itself. (Ansari, unpublished,
p. 23)
In "Gharate Iran" (1979), the author argues that
a major source for the appeal of the people (Iranians) to
Islam was the simple but barbaric manner in which the
85
Arabs invaded Iran. As has been argued in previous sec
tions, the loss of "procreativity" psychologically would
lead to destructive tendencies (Fromm, 1973), either
active (sadism) or passive (masochism). According to
Surosh (1949), "Iranians held an unconscious sado-maso
chistic tendency toward Islam which was sublimated through
fanatical allegiance with that religion" (p. 11). Surosh
(194 9) continues that "The narrow-mindedness of fanaticism
was present from the beginning of Islam" (p. 12). This
type of fanaticism appealed to the Iranian mentality, sub
jugated by the tyranny of dictatorship. It was small
wonder that the majority of people calling themselves
"Mahdi" were Iranians (Mahdi was the twelfth Imam of the
Shi'ite religion, who supposedly disappeared in a well and
one day, like the Messiah, would return to bring the day
of judgment). Mutahari (1975), a personal friend of
Khomeini, who was assassinated at the beginning of the
Iranian revolution, asserts that "There is a good chemistry
between Islam and Iranians" (p. 26). He points out simply
and authoritatively that "Islam was genetically right for
Iranians!" (p. 27). Through 800 pages, he repeatedly
points out that a true Muslim has no use for dichotomous
and divergent points of view. He repeatedly attacks
Georgy Zidan, the great Egyptian historian and scholar,
because of his doubt about some historical conducts of
the prophet.
86
Whether one.reads Mutahari (19 75), Khomeini
Ansari (unpublished), Anvar Ali (1975), Haq (1960), or
Azmi (1968), one is left with the impression that there is
an "uncompromising adherence to a few basic principals"
(Keddie, 1980, p. 1). It is as David Hirst (1980) pointed
out, that in a
strange, archaic idiom, they have
a simple and non-dichotomous message,
"create great divine power in your
selves." This means that God will
strike fear into your enemies, no
matter how numerous they are. Thanks
be to God, Iranians have the power
of faith. If the faithful believer
kills, he goes to paradise, which is
better than here, and if he is killed,
he goes to paradise, which is better
than here., (p. 23)
Reading these numerous passages one cannot help but notice
that there is a narrowness of vision and rigidity of
thinking, a lack of the spirit of inquiry and questioning.
Few passages of the Islamic Iranian Constitution, regard
ing retribution, that recently was passed by the Islamic
Parliament, is a graphic example of simplistic and rigidly-
held beliefs placed into political operation:
A. Punishment for intercourse (with
other than wife)
1. Death sentence
Article 100 . . . intercourse in
following manners will lead to punish
ment by death:
a., intercourse with members of
one1s family will be punished
by death;
87
b. intercourse with stepmother
will be punished by death;
c. non-Muslim's intercourse with
a Muslim female will lead to
death of non-Muslim;
d. rape will cause rapist to be
punished by death.
Regarding above rules, there is no difference
between young or old, married or unmarried person.
2. Stoning:
Intercourse (with other than wife) in
the following ways will lead to stoning:
a . . . intercourse of a married man
with anybody else, be it adult
or teenager, will lead to stoning;
b . intercourse of a married woman
with any man will lead to her
stoning; (intercourse of a mar
ried woman with a boy not in
adulthood will lead to being
punished by whipping). If the
husband or wife of the inter
courser is not available, stoning
will not be done.
In regard to stoning, the following should
be applied:
Article III When a person had confessed
to intercourse to stoning, first Hakim-sharr
(the religious lawgiver-judge) will throw
the stone, then other people.
Article III — When a person has confessed
to Zana (intercourse with other than wife)
and been condemned to stoning, first the
religious lawgiver will throw the stone,
the the others. But if a person has been
proven guilty because of other witnesses,
then the witnesses throw the first stone,
then the religious lawgiver, and then the
others.
88
Article 114 — For men they must be put into
a hole, deep to their waist and for women
into a hole, deep to their chests, then the
stoning will begin.
Article 116 Stones used for stoning must
not be very large to kill the condemned
person by one or two stones. They also must
not be very small so the person cannot be
killed. It must be small and enough to last
a long time.
Article 117 The person condemned to stoning
must be washed (the same way that Muslims
wash their dead) and then must wear Kafan
(white cloth that Muslims cover their dead
with). (Iran News, May 31, 1981)
What is at issue here is not a moral decision as
to the religious or ethical appropriateness of the sanctions
imposed; it is an issue that strikes at a different level.
It is not, perhaps, relativism— though that could partially
grasp the idea-^-but rather individual responsibility and
equity. The absence of latitude and the severity of the
penalty— -the blind absoluteness— of the Iranian government's
position— can only be founded on a narrowness of belief and
understanding. When confounded by the inconsistencies and
inadequacies of his new teachings, Mohammad would provide
another "revelation"; today such complaints are labeled
treason and silenced by the swift arm of government power.
Islamic Iran and Destruction of the Self
Khomeini is a seventh-century man
crashing into the twentieth century
with the speed of a bullet-— a bullet
propelled by the forces of the past.
Who knows what that bullet will
89
shatter in the present or future?
(Mohammad Heikal, 1980, p. 1)
The 12th century Iranian poet and scholar, Saadi
states, "It is not accidental if a ruler is a'tyrant and
unjust, he is the personification of people's sins against
one another."
If Saadi's assessment is correct, then we must
accept that Khomeini is the sword of God, intent on cross
ing the horizontal course of logos, establishing its range
by its own derangement. In the language of Zia Mutahari
(1981), "Khomeini is the nexus of madness crying to be
brought out from the shadow of obscurity" (p. 5). No
matter what is said about Khomeini, the writer believes
that leadership in Iran is an Islamic-Iranian phenomenon,
and it must be understood in the light of the destruction
of the self. As Temko (1980) points out, "The unifying
element of a disparate band of militants is not subservient
to Moscow, not an intellectual fondness for Marx or Engels,
but a single-minded genuine devotion to Allah, and to a
mercurial Ayotollah, seen as his messenger on earth" (p. 4).
Islam, from its very beginning, encouraged "The
ritual of prayer, the ritual of fasting in the month of
'Ramazan,' the ritual of going to Mecca, all these rituals
were intended to destroy individuality and create a
cohesive group hegemony” (Hoffer, 1980). In the civic
life of the community, the influence of Islam is, if less
90
apparent, nevertheless, of considerable interest. Lambton
(194 3) described the individual in the Islamic world as
having no status, and only by virtue of belonging to some
corporation did he acquire a status. It is natural,
therefore, to find today the tendency for Iranian society
to organize itself into corporations and guilds, such as
Hezb-Ul'-Lah, the God's Corporation. Lambton (1943) stated
that the tendency was strong and persisted down to recent
times. The guild had no respect for the individual.
In the private life of the individual, the influenc
of Islam has not been fortunate. "There has been some
divergence between theory as expounded by the great Muslim
philosophers, such as Al-Ghazali, and actual practice"
(p. 172). Lambton (1943) asserts that two particular
doctrines in Islam had an unfortunate effect in lowering
the moral and psychological tone of individual Iranians.
1. The process of "Ta,wil," which consists of
deducing secondary meanings from literal statements,
either by a process of rationalization or allegorical
translation, has done little to give stability and firmness
to individual Iranian belief, while the moral dangers of
the doctrine of "Taquja," a dispensation from the require
ments of religion under compulsion or threat of injury,
are too obvious to require emphasis.
2. Process of temporary marriage or Siqa. This
institution is widespread in Iran, and has done much to
91
create a feeling of insecurity in family life, which has
acted unfavorably in the psychological composition of the
family (Lambton, 1943) ,
As an Iranian psychoanalyst stated, "The degree
of reverence for Khomeini is proportionally connected to
the degree of self insignificance, which leads toward
castration anxiety" (Tehrani, 1979). Rollo May (1969) sees
castration as "severing of the testicles, becoming a eunuch
(p. 177). The Iranian problem, from May’s (1969) point of
view, is the loss of the power to procreate. This writer
agrees; the loss of the power of procreativity resulting
from the destruction of the self has kept Iranians backward
No wonder Hoffer (1980) states, "In countries where Muslims
live side by side, whether as a majority or minority, with
members of other creeds, the Muslims remain as a rule back
ward while the non-Muslims usually display some facility
for modernization" (Hoffer, 1980, p. 8).
Hoffer (1980) points out that Islam has acted as
a tranquilizer, and Kermani (1950) concurs. "Islam is
the best medicine for the ills of the modern time" (Kermani
1950, p. 53). Whether this tranquilizer is going to help
the patient or not, only history will tell; but for now,
"anybody criticizing the clergy will be shot to death:
Khomeini" (Iran News, May 19, 1981, p. 1) .
92
Islamic Iran and Totalitarianism
In an article called "Coming to Terms with Funda
mental Islam," William Brown (1980) stated,
Within Islam, perceptions are differ
ent. A 'Muslim's identity is firmly
embedded in an immediate, intimate,
and real social setting. He is not
comfortable with our abstractions.
He is never mindful of the past— a
real phenomenon— and finds a reference
point in tradition. (p. 22)
Muslims have been promised by Mohammad that they
possess all the knowledge necessary to live in this world.
They have been given laws that are workable in the economic,
political, spiritual and social spheres. Within this type
of community, according to Brown (1980), they see the
world differently. They are more at ease with a single
community consensus (because of the destruction of the
self) predicated on the common pursuit of God's will.
In the West, according to Brown (1980), one uses
political abstractions, which includes pluralism— "the
weighing and intensity by which an individual supposedly
sorts through his political priorities and by which our
society accommodates specific wishes of determined
minorities" (p. 22). In Islamic Iran, pluralism is not
pursued. They see the factions which pluralism sanctions
as being destructive of community. They have been taught
that the Islamic law is infallible and complete.
93
The Iranian revolution was the result of the
clashes of the forces of the twentieth century with Islamic
teachings. Essentially/ by the act of revolution they
solved their modern dilemma. Jansen (1981) points out/
"What happens when the very strong/ but perhaps not wholly
irresistible/ forces of change run up against the immovable
object that is the Koran/ that final/ perfect/ unchanging
and unchangeable revelation?" (p. 22). Jansen (1981)
thinks that this dilemma presents no problem to Khomeini
and his followers because they would say, "To hell with
modernity: let the twentieth century adapt itself to Islam
and to the Koran—^literally, every single word of it"
(p. 22).
Islam in Iran, through the teachings of Khomeini,
is deceptively simple. Temko (1979) explained that Khomeini
is a holy man— a miracle worker with special appeal in a
country where six out of ten people cannot read. Khomeini
tells them what they should do and when they should die.
They do not fear death because the Koran has assured them,
"Do not imagine that those killed in God*s service are
dead. Rather, they are alive, nurtured in the presence
of their Lord" (Temko, 1979, p. 26). In the language of
an executed poet, "Islam has committed the greatest sin
against humanity by robbing death of its integrity and
awesomeness" (Golesorkhi, 196 9).
94
Through modern communication technology, non-
Muslims are, as Godsell (1979) stated, becoming better
acquainted with the "powerful appeal of Islam*s stark and
simple monotheism and of its rejection of the need for any
medium between God and man" (Temko, 1979, p. 18).
The simplicity and absoluteness is, in reality,,
deceptive, because underneath exists the adversity and
divisions. The war of Shi'ite Khomeini with Kordish Sonni
is the result of totalitarianism in Islamic Iran, The
Kords today want autonomy and change; Shi * ism denies change.
As Keddie (1980) pointed out, the Shi*ites want to "Fill
the earth with justice and equity as it is now filled with
inequity and oppression" (p. 13).
To Khomeini, change is brother of sin and tanta
mount to disloyalty and rebelliousness. The Islamic
Iranian government, seeing itself through the prism of
Islam as omnipotent and omniscient, has reached the point
of what Watts (1970) calls "monstrous." Because "absolute
omnipotence, when considered as perfect self-control, leads
to total paralysis, for control is a degree of inhibition,
and a system which is perfectly inhibited is completely
frozen" (p. 42). Billick (1981) points out that since the
revolution, the Islamic Revolutionary Government is so
incapable of dealing with everyday problems of life that
they resort to mass arrests and fill the jails. The Muslim
clergy is bent on forcing their views (totalitarianism) on
95
people and, if required, the liberals and the educated
must be destroyed. Khomeini encourages the populace to
follow the cleric's path. But as McGik (1980) points out,
"Iranian Muslims have been advised by the Koran to ask and
follow the words of the learned [Khomeini] to the letter.
Often, the West interprets this blind following as fanatica
(p. 19).
It would appear that is a sound interpretation.
1"
CHAPTER V
CONCLUSIONS
The purpose of this study has been twofold: (1) to
attempt to clarify and codify the current view on the
psychology of fanaticism; and (2) to present key contribu
tions to the understanding of fanaticism. through four
criterion measures comprising the operational definition.
In Chapters III and IV these measures were applied to
Mohammad and the Islamic Revolutionary Government in Iran
to determine if they could be characterized as fanatical.
The Research Hypothesis
On the basis of all four criterion measures, both
Mohammad and the Islamic Revolutionary Government in Iran
are fanatical. In both instances— indeed, throughout the
history of Iran, a fundamental belief in absolute truth
was followed through ah ideology that was simplistic and
rigidly-held, and as such, promoted the destruction of the
self and paved the way for totalitarianism. If the criteri
on measures are sound, and it is this author's opinion that
they are, then there can be little reservation in the con
clusions reached.
96
97
The possible weakness in this research, as has
been noted earlier in Chapter I, was the limitation in the
nature of available data to be analyzed by the criterion
measures. This study was a descriptive study limited,
somewhat, by the nature of the data available: observed
behavior and published primary and secondary sources.
Naturally, it would have been a more powerful study had
circumstances permitted psychological testing of the sub
jects. It would seem that the very nature of the problem—
analysis of a person with the theoretical characteristics
of the fanatic-'— would preclude the availability of certain
data; such a person, by virtue of who he is, would not
cooperate in the collection of information. It is possible
therefore, that the study is as powerful as it could become
and all that could be suggested would be the replication
of such case studies aimed towards a deeper understanding
of the fanatical process.
Recommendations
In light of what has been concluded, what can be
recommended? The task facing the educator and therapist is
first, one of self-exploration. Only by an understanding
of the fanatical process and an introspection of himself
is the person less likely to unwittingly engage in damaging
counter^transference behavior with his patients. The
second task, as Mead (1977) puts it, is to assist the
98
fanatic in changing back into a temperate individual.
That process can be aided by the following:
1. The promotion of general education. Nearly all
studies about the concept of prejudice show that people
with large amounts of formal education tended to be less
prejudiced than people with little, or a narrow, education
(National Opinion Research Center, 1944; Samelson, 1945a,
1945b). Although it has been this author*s position that
there are seminal differences between the prejudiced person
and the fanatic, it is hypothesized that such an educational
process would be effective with the fanatic. This recom
mendation is made with reservation, however; and the con
firmation of this conclusion could easily be the subject
of further research.
2. The providing of subject information, informa
tion about what the fanatic holds to be bad or incongruent
with his beliefs. Most investigators have found that
individuals with a large amount of information about a
particular group tend to have more favorable attitudes
v .
towards that group than individuals with little information
(Watson, 1929; Reckless & Bringen, 1933; Murphy & Likert,
1938; Netter, 1946). Closson (1930), and Zeligg and
Hendrickson (1933) found a positive correlation between
the amount of information on the subject group and positive
attitudes towards them.
99
3. Increased open experience in non-academic
settings. Educational research also shows that in an open
and free setting (as opposed to a rigid and formalized
educational setting), people1s attitudes were more likely
to go through a positive change.
4. Increased intergroup contact. The most
dramatic changes in attitude as a result of intergroup
contact have been observed in situations in which two
different groups both lived and worked together in circum
stances requiring a high degree of mutual cooperation
(United States War Department, 194 7; Brophy, 1946; Deutsch
& Collins, 1951) . The structure of such experiences could
appreciably decrease the degree of fanaticism as well as
lower the likelihood of fanaticism evolving.
What can be recommended for the therapist? It
would appear that both individual and group psychotherapy
could be effective with the fanatical personality. Such
psychotherapy would appear most effective when: 1) the
focus is on individual feelings and experience; 2) the
therapist presents a description of human nature that
includes uncertainty, ambiguity, and personal responsibilit
3) there is an appreciation of, and permission to change,
feelings and philosophical positions; 4) there is a high
degree of self-disclosure and interaction (rather than
distance and isolation).
100
Such recommendations regarding education and psycho
therapy as an intervention against fanaticism might have
application on an international scale. Admittedly, the
task would be a difficult, though not impossible one.
REFERENCES
101
102
Abd Al-Rahman. The betrayal of Iran. Unpublished
manuscript, Iran, 1979:. (a)
Abd Al-Rahman. Zoozeh Komonist Dar Iran. Unpublished
manuscript, Iran, 1979. (b)
Ackerman, N. W., & Jahoda, M. Anti-Semitism and emotional
disorder. New York: Harper, 1950.
Adelson, J. A study of) minority group authoritarianism.
Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 1953,
48, 477-485.
Adler, A. Study of organ inferiority and psychical com
pensation. New York: Nervous and Mental Disease
Publishing Company, 1907.
Adorno, T. W. The authoritarian personality. New York:
Harper, 1950.
Ahman, K. Fanaticism, intolerance and Islam. Iraq:
Islamic Publication Ltd., 1957.
Ali, S. A. Islam the religion. Karachi: Syed Publication,
1957.
Allport, G. The nature of prejudice. Cambridge,
Massachusetts: Addison-Wesley, 1954.
Allport, G., & Kramer, B. Some roots of prejudice.
Journal of Psychology, 1946, 2_2, 9-39.
Allport, G. Pattern and growth in personality. New York:
Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1961.
Allport, G. Personal religious orientation and prejudice.
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1967,
5, 432-443.
Ammin, A. Family and child caring. Tehran, Iran:
Chapkhane, 1957.
Andrae, T. Mohammad, the man and his faith. London:
Barnes & Noble, 1935.
Ansari, M. The Quaranic foundation and structure of Muslim
Society. Unpublished manuscript, Industrial
Educational Foundation, Karachi.
J
103
Arberry, K., & Landau, V. Islam today. London: Faber &
Faber, 1943.
Arbuthnot, F. The Rauzat-Us-Safa of Mohammad-Bin-
Khavendshah-Bin Mahmud. London: Royal Asiatic
Society, 18 91.
Arnold, T. W. The preaching of Islam. New York: Charles
Scribner*s Sons, 1913.
Ashby, P. History and future of religious thought. New
Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1963.
Azmi, M. Studies in early Hadith literature. Beirut:
Al-Maktab a Islam, 1968.
Bahar, M. Mirase Estemar. Unpublished manuscript, 1965.
Becker, J. Hitler*s children. New York: J. B. Lippincott,
1977.
Bettelheim, B., & Janowitz, M. Dynamics of prejudice.
New York: Harper, 1950.
Billick, P. Savagery in the name of God. Time, July 6,
1981, 14-18.
Brophy, I. N. The luxury of anti-Negro prejudice. Public
Opinion Quarterly, 1946, 9 _, 456-466.
Brown, W. Coming to terms with fundamental Islam. The
Christian Science Quarterly, Friday, February 1,
1980, p. 22.
Campbell, J. The hero with a thousand faces. New York:
Pantheon Books,, 1949.
Closson, E. E. A study of the factor of information in
race prejudice. Unpublished Master *s Thesis,
Iowa State University, 1930.
Daly, W. T. Ideological fanaticism. Et Cetera, 1977,
■34 U) , 5-8.
Darwin, C. Origin of the species. Cambridge, England:
Cambridge University Press, 1909.
Deutsch, M., & Collins, M. Interracial housing: A psycho
logical evaluation of a social experiment. Minne
apolis, Minnesota: University of Minnesota Press,
1951.
104
Dike, B. ABC Night Line, 1981. ABC Television, October 8,
1981. Los Angeles, California.
Erikson, E. Childhood and society. New York: Norton,
1950.
Fallaci, 0. Interview with Imam Khomeini. Etelaat Daily
Newspaper, January 20, 1980. Tehran, Iran.
Ferreira, A. Emotional factors in prenatal environment.
Journal of Nervous and Mental Disease, 1965, 141(1)
108-118.
Frank!, V. The doctor and the soul. New York: Alfred A.
Knopf, 1966.
Freud, S. A general introduction to psychoanalysis.
Garden City, New York: Garden City Publishing
Company, 19 20.
Freud, S. The ego and the id. New York: The Norton
Library, 1923.
Freud, S. Civilization and its discontents. New York:
Norton, 1930.
Fromm, E. Escape from freedom. New York: Rinehart, 1941.
Fromm, E. Psychoanalysis and religion. New York: Bantam
Books, 1950.
Fromm, E. The art of loving. New York: Harper & Row,
1956.
Fromm, E. The anatomy of human destructiveness. New York:
Holt, Rinehart, & Winston, 1973.
Funk, K., & Wagnall, S. Standard reference encyclopedia.
Vol. 17. New York: Standard Reference Works
Publishing, 1959.
Gharate Iran. Unpublished political pamphlet, 1979.
Giambattista, V. Dell, unico principio e fine del dirito
universale. Prima versione di Nicola Corcia,
Ch. 10, 1839.
Godsell, G. Islam and Christendom: The fallout from their
second great encounter. The Christian Science
Monitor, Tuesday, December 18, 1979.
105
Golesorkhi, S. Speech during his trial in front of shah1s
tribunal, Tehran, Iran, 196 9.
Gough, H. G. Studies of social intolerance: Some psycho
logical correlates of anti-Semitism. Journal of
Social Psychology, 1951, 3_3, 237-246.
Guillaume, A. The traditions of Islam. Beirut: Khayats,
1966.
Hansen, H. Patterns of discovery. Cambridge, England:
Cambridge University Press, 1961.
Haq, M. A history Of early Islam. Karachi: Booksellers
and Stationers, 1960.
Hartley, E. L. Problems in prejudice. New York: King's
Crown Press, 1946,
Hartshorne, M., & Shuttleworth, S. Studies in the organ-
ization of character. New York: Macmillan,
1930.
Heikal, M. Quoted in Geoffrey Godsell's article, "1980's:
Ayatollah, Pope embody rise of religion." The
Christian Science Monitor, Wednesday, January 2,
1980.
Hendrix, K. Koran dictates Islamic treatment of women.
Los Angeles Times, Sunday, October 7, 1979.
Hetzel, K. Changes in urinary nitrogen and electrolyte
excretion during stressful life experiences and
their relation to thyroid function. Journal of
Psychosomatic Research, 1956, 1_, 177-185.
Hirst, D. War with Iraq: Last stand for Mullahs. The
Christian Science Monitor, Friday, September 26,
1980.
Hoffer, E. The true believer. New York: Harper & Row,
1951.
Hoffer, E. The passionate state of mind. New York: Harper
& Row, 1954.
Hoffer, E. Why the Shah couldn't modernize Islamic Iran.
Los Angeles Herald Examiner, January 6, 1980.
106
Hume, D. Treatise of human nature. Pamphlet hitherto
unknown. Originally written in 1740. Reprinted
with an introduction by J. M. Keynen and P. Sraffa,
Hamden, Connecticut.
Husain, A. The quintessence of Islam: A summary of the
commentary of Maulana Abol Kalam Azad on Al-Fateha,
the first chapter of Quran. London: Asia Publishing
House, 1958.
Iran News. May 19, 1981. Published in Los Angeles, an
Iranian weekly paper.
Iran News. May 31, 1981. Published in Los Angeles, an
Iranian weekly paper.
Jansen, G. Moslems and the modern world. The Economist,
January 3, 1981.
Jung, C. Two essays on analytical psychology. New York:
Meridian, 1956.
Jung, C. The undiscovered self. In C. Jung, Collected
Works. New York: Princeton University Press,
1970.
Jung, C. The problem of types in the history of classical
and medieval thought. In C. Jung, Collected Works.
New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1971.
Jung, C. On the importance of the unconscious in psycho
pathology. In C. Jung, Collected Works. New
Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1972.
Keddie, N. Khomeini's fundamentalism is as revolutionary
as his politics. Lbs Angeles Times, January 13,
1980 .
Kelly, G. A. The abstraction of human process. In G.
Nielson (Ed.), Proceedings of the 14th International
Congress of Applied Psychology. Vol. 2. 1962,
p. 220-229.
Kermani, N. History of Iranian awakening. Tehran, Iran:
Chapkhaneh Mazaheri, 1950.
Khomeini, R. Sayings of Ayatollah Khomeini. New York:
Bantam Books, 1979.
Kinneavy, J. A. A theory of discourse. Englewood Cliffs,
New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1971.
Koran. Edited by M. Pickthall. New York: Mentor Books,
1953.
Kraepelin, E. Dementia praecox and paraphrenia. New York:
Robert E. Kpleger, 1919.
Laing, R. D., & Cooper, D. Reason and violence. London:
Tavistock, 1964.
Lambton, A. Article on Iran from the book by. Arberry and
Landau, "Islam today." London: Faber and Faber,
1943.
Malcolm, J. History Of Iran. Vol. I. 1867. From a
handwritten, private collection, India.
Marcuse, H. Eros and civilization. Boston: Beacon Press,
1955.
Margoliouth, D. S. Mohammad and the rise of Islam. New
York: Putnam*s Sons, 1905.
Margoliouth, D. S. The early development of Mohammadonism.
London: Williams & Norgate, 1914.
Maslow, A. The authoritarian character structure. Journal
of Social Psychology, 1943, 1J3, 401-411.
May, R. Love and will. New York: W. W. Norton, 1969.
McDonald, D. Development of Muslim theology, jurisprudence
and constitutional theory. Beirut: Khayat, 1965.
McDonald, R. L. The role of emotional factors in obstetric
complications: A review. Psychosomatic Medicine,
1968, 30/(2) , 222-237.
McGik, T. Iran struggles under weight of its fundamentalis
clergy. The Christian Science Monitor, Tuesday,
August 19, 1980.
Mead, M. Fanaticism: The panhuman disorder. Et Cetera,
1977, 34 (1) , 35.
Murphy, G., & Likert, R. Public opinion and the individual.
New York: Harper, 1938.
108
Mutahari, M. Mutual assistance between Islam and Iran,
(Khadamate moteghabil Islam v. Iran.) Daftare
Nashre Farhange Islam, Tehran, 1975.
Nasredine, M. Once the mullah. New York: David McKay,
1967.
National Opinion Research Center. Handbook of social
psychology. Vol. 2. Edited by Gardner Lindsey.
Cambridge, Massachusetts: Addison-Wesley, 1954.
Netter, G. The relation between attitude and information
concerning Japanese .in"America. American Social
Review II, 1946, 177-191.
Oxford American Dictionary. Oxford, England: Oxford
University Press,, Ely House, 1933.
Paykel, E. The depressed woman. Chicago, Illinois:
University of Chicago Press, 1974.
Perkinson, H. The possibilities of error. New York:
David McKay, 19 71.
Perkinson, H. Fanaticism: Flight from fallibility. Et
Cetera, 1977, 34 (1), 18.
Pickthall, M. (Ed.) The glorious Koran. New York: Mentor
Books, 1953.
Poole, S. Selections from the Quran and Hadith. Lahore:
Sind Sagar Academy, 1882.
Popper, K. The open society and its enemies. New Jersey:
Princeton University Press, 1963.
Rahnama, Z. The prophet. Vol. 1 and 2. (In Farsi)
Tehran, Iran: Zavar Publishing, 1941.
Ravasani, S. Imam's role and democratic rules are contra
dictory. Iran Shahr Newspaper, Vol. 3, No. 28,
1981.
Reckless, W. C., & Bringen, H. L. Racial attitudes and
information about the Negro. Journal of Negro
Education, 1933, 2 _, 128-138.
Rodinson, M. Muhammad. New York: Pantheon Books, 1960.
Rokeach, M. The open and closed mind. New York: Basic
Books, 1960.
109
Rosen, V. H. The reconstruction of a traumatic childhood
event in a case of derealization. Journal of the
American Psychoanalytic Association, 1955, _3,
211-221.
Ross, N. Psychoanalytic child psychiatry. Annua1 Survey
of Psychoanalysis, 1952, _3, 202-289.
Rudin, J. Fanaticism. Indiana: University of Notre Dame
Press, 1969.
Russel, B. Why I am not a Christian. New York: Simon and
Schuster, 1957.,
Samelson, B. The patterning of attitudes and beliefs
regarding the American Negro: An analysis of public
opinion. Unpublished doctoral dissertation, *
Radcliffe College, 1945. (a)
Samelson, B. Does education diminish prejudice? Journal
Of Social Issues, 1945, _1(3), 11-13. (b)
Sartre, J. Anti-Semite and Jew. New York: Schoken, 1948.
Sartre, J. Being and nothingness. New York: Philosophi
cal Library, 1956.
Schlosberg, H. Three dimensions of emotion. Psychological
Review, 1954, 61, 81-88.
Seale, M. S. Qurart and Bible. London: Redwood Burn Ltd.,
1978.
Skinner, B. F. Beyond freedom and dignity. New York:
Free Press, 1974.
1
Spitz, R. Anaclitic depression: The psychoanalytic study
Of the child. New York: International University
Press, 1946.
Stott, D. H., & Marson, N. Inconsequence as a primary
type of behavior disturbance in children. British
Journal of Educational Psychology, 1970, 44,
10749.
Surosh, A. Claimant of Mahdiism. Tehran, Iran: Chapkhaneh
Mazaheri, 1949.
Taylor, H. The education of fanatics. Et Cetera, 1977,
34 (1), 78.
____________________________________________________________________________
110
Temko, N. The real Khomeini: Sword of Islam, doer of
dishes. The Christian Science Monitor, Wednesday,
December 26, 1979.
Temko, N. What makes militant Iranian students tick.
The Christian Science Monitor, Tuesday, May 20,
1980.
Tritton, A. S. Muslim theology. England: The Royal
Asiatic Society, 1947.
United States War Department, Information and Education
Division. Opinions about Negro infantry platoons
in white companies of seven divisions. In T. M.
Newcomb and E. L. Hartley (Eds.), Readings in
social psychology. New York: Holt, 1947.
Waelder, R. The principle of multiple function. Psycho
logical Quarterly, 1930, _5, 45-62.
Wallbank, T., Taylor, A., & Bail, K. Civilization past
and present. Chicago: Scott, Foresman, 196 5.
Watson, G. B. Orient and Occident: An opinion study.
Religious Education, 192 9, 2_4, 322^-328.
Watts, A. Nature, man and woman. New York: Random House,
1970.
Watzlawick, P. The pathologies of perfectionism. Et
Cetera, 1977, 34(1), 12.
Wollaston, A. N. The sword of Islam. London: John
Murray, 1905.
Zeligs, R., & Hendrickson, G. Racial attitudes of two
hundred sixth grade children. Social Research,
1933, 18, 26-36.
Zwemer, S. Heirs of the prophet. Chicago: Moody Bible
Institute of Chicago, 1946.
Zonis, M. Islam. The University of Chicago Magazine,
1980, 9, 41-43.
APPENDIX
A COMPARISON OF EMIL KRAEPELIN'S DESCRIPTIONS
OF SCHIZOPHRENIC PATIENTS AND DESCRIPTIONS OF MOHAMMAD
AS MADE BY MOSLEM SCHOLARS
111
112
A Comparison of Emil Kraepelin's Descriptions
of Schizophrenic Patients and Descriptions of Mohammad
as Made by Moslem Scholars
Kraepelin_______________________ Moslem Scholars______________
1. "Behavior of the pupil of 1. "Mohammad was famous for
the eye— there are frequently his great black restless
in the earlier stages of the eyes." (Poole, 1882, p. 16)
disease and in conditions of
excitement, conspicuously .
wide, because of an increase
caused by the morbid process
of that cortical excitement
which reduces the tone of the
sphincters. 1 1 (Kraepelin, 1919,
P. 77)
2. "Like his grandfather,
Mohammad ruled like an
absolute monarch, a prophet
of god in his own right. He
judged people and had no need
of a code, for his own will
was enough." (McDonald,
1965, p. 69)
"Mohammad called himself the
Apostle of God, the final
messenger in the long line of
prophets." (Zwemer, 1946,
p. 26)
"Eminently unpractical in all
common things of life, he was
gifted with mighty powers of
imagination." (Poole, 1882,
p. 19)
"He was possessed with a
strong religious idea, an
idea dominating his life, and
his aim was to impress that
idea on his people." (Poole,
1882, p. 19)
2. "On the other hand, we
meet also, but in smaller
range,with exalted ideas.
The patient feels that he
has a special call, is
something more than every
one else, has a proud
spirit, an enormous will
power, is sent from God."
(Kraepelin, 1919, p. 95)
113
Kraepelin_______________________ Moslem Scholars
3. "Many patients see,
especially in sleepless
nights, all possible
figures, effects of light,
or objects appear dis
torted. 1 1 (Kraepelin, 1919,
P. 194)
3. "He had of late become
even more thoughtful and
retiring. Contemplation and
reflection now engaged his .
whole mind. The continued
solitude through sleepless
nights instead of stilling
his anxiety, magnified into
sterner and more impressive
shapes the solemn realities
which perplexed and agitated
his soul." (Wollaston, 1905,
p. 39)
4. "Mood is mostly de
pressed. The patients feel
themselves tormented, in
wardly constrained,
hindered. They incline
often to painful self
observation, they are shy,
quiet, reserved. Behavior
usually accompanies the
loss of self-confidence
and independent energy,
which results from the
continuance of the morbid
residual." (Kraepelin,
1919, p. 195)
4. "It was during these
periods of imposed isolation
that Mohammad started to
lose weight and have more and
more unusual thinking."
(Rahnama, 1941, p. 228)
"He was very nervous, and
restless withal, often low-
spirited, downcast as to
heart and eyes. Yet he would
at times suddenly break
through these broodings,
become gay, talkative,
jocular, chiefly among his
own." (Poole, 1882, p. 17)
"By degrees his impulsive
and susceptible mind was
wrought up to the highest
pitch of excitement and he
would give vent to his agita
tion in wild and rhapsodical
language, the counterpart of
his inward struggles after
truth." (Wollaston, 1905,
p. 39)
5. "They must answer the
voices, must do what has
been commanded. On the
other hand, they hear
5. "At first he thought he
was possessed with a devil,
and the refuge of suicide
was often present to his mind.
(Poole, 1882, p. 18)
114
Kraepelin Moslem Scholars
voices from God saying
they are the chosen."
"The mood is morose, often
irritable, they shut them
selves up, indulge in
superior irony."
"The repetition of questions
addressed to them, queer ways
of expressing themselves,
singular clothing."
(Kraepelin, 1919, p. 196)
"When revelations came, he
believed he heard them
spoken by an angel from
heaven." (Poole, 1882,
p. 18)
"His temperament was nervous
and excitable from a child
up. It is said, he was sub
ject to cataleptic fits."
(Poole, 1882, p. 18)
"By temperament the holy
prophet was sad, sullen,
pensive. For hours he would
sit silent, enwrapped in his
thoughts and in his mantle,
oblivious to talk and murmur
around him." (Mozahar U1
Hag, 1960, p. 128)
"There is something so
tender and womanly and witha
so heroic about the man, who
never passed a group of
little ones without a smile
from his wonderful eyes and
kind words for them."
(Ansari, p. 14)

Linked assets

University of Southern California Dissertations and Theses

Conceptually similar

PDF

Psychological androgyny: A study of its relationship to self-esteem, achievement motivation, age, and group membership in women religious and women college students

PDF

A study of public education in Iraq, with suggestions for its reorganization

PDF

The problem of secondary teacher recruitment and retention in Iran

PDF

Phenomenological case studies of bulimia

PDF

An experimental study of the longitudinal effects of a methadone treatment program on the personality structure of heroin addicts

PDF

A study of the role of relationships in the treatment of mildly mentally retarted, acting out adolescents

PDF

The war in El Salvador: The child as witness, participant, casualty, survivor, a phenomenological study

PDF

American students' perception of Islam and the Arab world

PDF

The good child as the unidentified patient in the family system: A study of childhood antecedents of adult alienation from self

PDF

The lonely profession: A study of the psychological rewards and negative aspects of the practice of psychotherapy

PDF

A study of the influence of attitude on the outcome of therapy in a captive population

PDF

The development of the existential model of depression in women

PDF

A study of the effects of group assertion training on anxiety, depression, self-concept and assertiveness in heroin addicts

PDF

Physiological, emotional, and self-reported indices of stress response for women in dual-career marriages

PDF

Change in sex-role orientation as a function of brief marital therapy

PDF

Quality of supervision and effectiveness of interns as a function of supervisor-intern psychotherapeutic orientations

PDF

The impact of adult and peer models on conforming to the values of others

PDF

Toward a humanistic-existential rehabilitation psychology: A study of the congruence of the principles of rehabilitation psychology with the tenets of the humanistic-existential approach in psychology

PDF

Attentiveness and awareness as a variable in psychopathology and therapy: The relationship between neurosis, anxiety and the ability to attend

PDF

The humanistic-existential approach to child therapy: A methodology for practice and research

Asset Metadata

Creator Kadjar, Shapoor Masood (author)

Core Title Psychopathology of fanaticism: A case study in the fanaticism of the Islamic Iranian revolution

Degree Doctor of Philosophy

Degree Program Education

Publisher University of Southern California (original), University of Southern California. Libraries (digital)

Tag Islamic Studies,Middle Eastern Studies,OAI-PMH Harvest,Psychology, clinical,psychology, social

Language English

Contributor Digitized by ProQuest (provenance)

Permanent Link (DOI) https://doi.org/10.25549/usctheses-c26-489734

Unique identifier UC11245990

Identifier usctheses-c26-489734 (legacy record id)

Legacy Identifier DP24779.pdf

Dmrecord 489734

Document Type Dissertation

Rights Kadjar, Shapoor Masood

Type texts

Source University of Southern California (contributing entity), University of Southern California Dissertations and Theses (collection)

Access Conditions The author retains rights to his/her dissertation, thesis or other graduate work according to U.S. copyright law. Electronic access is being provided by the USC Libraries in agreement with the au...

Repository Name University of Southern California Digital Library

Repository Location USC Digital Library, University of Southern California, University Park Campus, Los Angeles, California 90089, USA