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A historical study of the concept of the individual and society in educational philosophy

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A historical study of the concept of the individual and society in educational philosophy

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Content A HISTORICAL STUDY OF THE CONCEPT OF THE INDIVIDUAL AND SOCIETY IN EDUCATIONAL PHILOSOPHY A Dissertation Presented to the Faculty of the Graduate School The University of Southern California In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree Doctor of Philosophy by C» Grant Burton June 195*+ UMI Number: DP24021 All rights reserved INFORMATION TO ALL USERS The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted. In the unlikely event that the author did not send a complete manuscript and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed, a note will indicate the deletion. Dissertation Rubl sh*ng UMI DP24021 Published by ProQuest LLC (2014). Copyright in the Dissertation held by the Author. Microform Edition © ProQuest LLC. All rights reserved. This work is protected against unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code ProQuest' ProQuest LLC. 789 East Eisenhower Parkway P.O. Box 1346 Ann Arbor, Ml 48106- 1346 P h . D E d '5>t 8 9 7 ^ This dissertation, w ritten by N C . . . . grant. . burton under the direction o fh l& G u id a n c e C om m ittee, and approved by a ll its members, has been p re sented to and accepted by the F a cu lty o f the Graduate School, in p a rtia l fu lfillm e n t o f re quirements fo r the degree of D O C T O R O F P H I L O S O P H Y Dean 195k. Committee on Studies TABLE OF CONTENTS CHAPTER PAGE I. THE PROBLEM................................. 1 Statement and importance of the problem . . ♦ 2 Statement of the problem................ 2 Importance of the problem............... 3 The historical approach • •••••••••• ? Importance of historical approach to the problem ..................... 7 The need for philosophical interpretation ♦ 10 Definition of major terms used. ....... 11 ! i Scope of the investigation. ••••••••• 12; e i Historical limitations. •••••••••• 12 i Philosophical limitations............. • 13 j Interpretative limitations. .............. lb Source materials and methods of procedure • • lb Source materials. ••••••••••••• lb Methods of procedure. .••...••••• 16 Organization of the dissertation. ........ 1? Summary iSj II. TENTATIVE DEFINITIONS OF THE CONCEPTS TO BE ; INVESTIGATED AND PHILOSOPHICAL AND EDUCA- . 1 TIONAL PROBLEMS DIRECTIVE TO THE STUDY. . . . 20 t iv CHAPTER PACE Tentative definitions of the concepts to be investigated • • • • ......... 20 Difficulty of adequate definition. ..... 20 Normative and descriptive definition .... 22 Realistic and Nominalistic definition. . . . 2^ Individualism and socialism. .......... 27 Is there any middle ground? •••••••• 30 Summary. • •• •...........•••••••• 3** Philosophical and educational problems directive to the study 35 Philosophical problems • ••••••...• 36 Educational problems........... 36 Summary. •••••••• ............ •••• 38 III. THE EARLY HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE PROBLEM . kO The relationship of individual and society among primitive peoples. •••••••••• *+1 The individual and society in early civiliza tion ......... *+5 The role of the individual in oriental civilization .•••••.»•• ............ * t 8 The individual and society in Jewish educa tional thought • •• •................ CHAPTER PAGE The individual and society in early Greece • • 53 Spartan educational philosophy.............. 55 Early Athenian educational philosophy. . . . 56 Summary. 59 j i IV. CONCEPTS OF THE INDIVIDUAL AND SOCIETY AMONG | THE LATER GREENS AND ROMANS....................6l The individualism of the later Athenians . . . 61 Socrates and the individual....................66 Plato and the individual and society.......... 69 Aristotle and the individual and society . . . 82 The individual and society in the Hellenistic and Roman periods. ••••••••••••• 92 The Hellenistic era....................... 92 The early Roman period ................ 95 The later Roman period .................... 96 Summary........... 100 V. CONCEPTS OF THE INDIVIDUAL AND SOCIETY FROM EARLY CHRISTIANITY TO THE REFORMATION......... 103 The teachings of Jesus pertaining to individ ual and society as seen in early Christianity...............................106 Changes in Christian concepts after Christ . . 113 • CHAPTER PAGE Concepts of individual and society during the early Middle Ages......................116 I Concepts of the individual and society in the later Middle Ages........... • • • . . 119 Realism and Nominalism. • • • ............ 119 The work of St. Thomas Aquinas.............. 122 William of Ockham 126 Concepts of the individual and society during the Renaissance and the Reformation • • • • 129 The Renaissance ......... 131 The Reformation ••••••••• .......... 135 Summary ......... 137 VI. THE CONTRIBUTIONS OF JOHN LOCKE AND JEAN JACQUES ROUSSEAU TO CONCEPTS OF THE INDIVIDUAL AND SOCIETY......... 1^1 Locke's contributions ••••••••.••• 1**6 The contributions of Rousseau .......... l6l Summary ........... 175 VII. THE RELATIONSHIP OF THE INDIVIDUAL AND SOCIETY IN THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF JOHANN HEINRICH PESTALOZZI AND FRIEDRICH FROEBEL.............. 178 The work of Pestalozzi........................179 CHAPTER PAGE I The work of Froebel • ••••••••••••• 192 VIII. THE INDIVIDUAL AND SOCIETY IN THE PHILOSOPHY , OF JOHN DEWEY.............................20? IX. MODERN DEVELOPMENTS IN EDUCATIONAL PHILOSOPHY . . 232 t Traditionalism, scientific determinism, and experiment all sm in relation to the individual ! 1 i and society • •••••••••••••••. 233' i Idealism in education 23**j Realism and scientific determinism. • • • • • 238 Experiment all sm after Dewey............... 2*+2 i Harold Rugg and the uGreat TechnologyM .... 2^^ George S. Counts and the rebuilding of society. 2*+9 J Theodore Brameld and Reconstruetionism. .... 258, s“ “ y * 1 X. PHILOSOPHICAL IMPLICATIONS...................... 2?5j XI. SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS .... 297 Summary 297 I Statement of the problem. ••.••••••• 297 i Importance of the problem •••••••••• 298: Importance of historical and philosophical ! analysis................................. 298, Methods of procedure and source materials • • 299* CHAPTER PAGE Terminology ....................... • . 300 Early historical background of the problem. 301 The Early Greeks. ••••••••••••. 301 The Later Greeks# ••••••••••••• 302 The Hellenistic and Roman Era »•••••• 303 Early Christianity..........................303 The Early Middle Ages ••••••••••• 30b The Later Middle Ages ••••••••••• 30^ The Renaissance and the Reformation • • • • 305 Locke and Rousseau. .••••••••••• 306 Pestalozzi and Froebel. •••• ........... 306 . John Dewey. •••••••••.•••••• 307 Modern developments •••••• ........... 309 Conclusions 310 Recommendations ••••••••••••••• 313 BIBLIOGRAPHY............................... 316 CHAPTER I THE PROBLEM In the modern world there Is no greater problem than the problem of the relationship of the Individual and society* Like other great problems, this one has Its roots far back In the past* In the history of human thought, numerous positions concerning the Individual and society have been taken, with numerous consequences In action* Especially interested in the relation of man to men have been the leaders of education* Educational philosophers have, practically without exception, recognized the exist ence of this problem in their philosophies of education* Historical and philosophical analysis appears neces sary to an adequate understanding of the problem of man and society, whether we consider history to be the evolution of man as a social being, or the differentiation of the Indi vidual from the group* As one author has expressed it: Only in the light of their origin and growth can the numerous educational problems of the present be viewed sympathetically and without bias by the n teacher, the school administrator, or the public* 1 E. W. Knight, Education In the United States (Boston: Ginn and Company, 193 **), P* 3°* I. STATEMENT AND IMPORTANCE OP THE PROBIEM I Statement of the problem* The purpose of this study! i was to establish) by means of historical research and j philosophical analysis, the following with relation to j educational philosophy: I ! 1* The basic concepts held by outstanding educa- , tional philosophers concerning the individual j and society* | i 2* The way to a defensible present-day philosophy | of the Individual and society* j 3* Some means suited to the implementation of those j concepts found desirable for practical applica tion* In other words, the purpose of this study was to answer the following questions concerning the concepts of the individ ual and society in educational philosophy: 1* How may these concepts be defined tentatively? 2* When do these concepts first appear in educa- < tional thinking? j 3* What concepts were held by the Greeks? j km How did these concepts appear in Roman educa- | i tional philosophy? 5* What were their manifestations in medieval times? and the Reformation? I 7* What do they mean in the work of Locke? 8, How are they an essential part of the philosophy, of Rousseau? j i i 9# What concepts were developed by Pestalozzi? ' 10* What concepts were presented by Froebel? ! i i 11* How are these concepts a focal point in the writings of John Dewey? 12. What are the concepts of the individual and society which have been most recently expressed by educational philosophers, such for example as Counts, Rugg, and Brameld? 13* How may a defensible present-day philosophy of the individual and society be constructed? What ideas from the past may be saved, and what may not? I1 * - * How may such a philosophy be implemented? 1 I importance of the problem. The problem of the J individual and society is central to human activity. No j philosophy is fundamental that does not reflect upon man’s | relation to his fellow men. No history is accurate which does not report trends toward individualism or socialism, ; No education is effective which does not weigh the_ I individual and his social group. Even a cursory glance at , the world of hooks reveals an awareness of this problem on the part of numerous writers representing various fields of j < learning. A typical statement is that of Stella Henderson. J She writes, “Basic to all else is the problem of the recon-j i dilation of individual* liberty with the demands of social i / justice.1 * In important philosopher declares: Every social theory which has deserved the name of theory may be said to have been an attempt to solve the problem of order and freedom or at least to define the relation between these two necessities of social life.3 i The historian's point of view is expressed by Sir John Adams* a well-known British historian. He says of the problem in discussing the development of theories of educations ! | In point of fact the first appearance of educa tional theory consists mainly in a discussion of this very matter of the relation between the state and the individual. ^ Specifically, the problem is important for the following reasons: (1) The relationship of the Individual o Stella Henderson, Introduction to Philosophy of Education (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, m?), p. 16C. 3 Warner Fite, Individualism (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1916), p. 271 ** k John Adams. The Evolution of Educational Theory (London: Macmillan and Company, Limited, 1912), p. 135. land society forms a basis for all national ideologies in resolve either to a difference in emphasis upon the two I i phases of man's nature, the individual and the social, or , to different approaches to the reconciliation of these fac tors. A better knowledge of the individual and society is • i therefore essential to any international understanding, to { any lasting peace. Raoul de Roussy de Sales, a French political journalist, stresses the international importance and at once the difficulty of reaching an adequate solution: Can our conception of civilization, which rests j finally on the principle of individual freedom, be | reconciled with our knowledge that both war and want - can be eliminated only through collective discipline?^ (2) The determination of a satisfactory relation of Individ- i ual and society is of great concern to our nation in the strengthening and development of American ideals, in the evaluation and application of traditional beliefs. There is considerable confusion in American thinking today concerning the desirable spheres of the individual and society, and possible ways of bringing into agreement apparently con- j flicting social and individual interests. (3) Modern edu cators are deeply concerned with the responsibility of the world today. The basic differences in modern ideologies! Making of Tomorrow §1 education to the individual and to society* Learning is not only a psychological process, hut also a social process. John ..&*. Brubacher, an outstanding modern educator, points up the dilemma as follows: i Take any school or classroom as a society, what is the initial assumption which the teacher should con* struct? Should he make the atomistic one that here are so many discrete individuals; that here is a class, school* or society only Insofar as these indi viduals voluntarily will or contract? Or should he assume that these children have a composite character which antedates their gathering at school, because society is not a contract but an organism or a tran- s cendent idea? How far is the individual or society to be the measure of things, the yardstick of educational pro cedures?® Another educational philosopher who notes the importance of the problem to education is Elmer Harrison Wilds* In his history of education he declares: Our study of the history of educational thought will be unified and illuminated if the various theo ries of education are considered in relation to this problem of harmonizing individual development with social demands and needs— the conflict between individ ual progress and social stability*' ^ J ohn S* Brubacher* Modern Philosophies of Educa tion (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc* ,~l939), p. 12^. ? Elmer Harrison Wilds, Foundations of Modern Educa tion (New York: Farrar and Rinehart, 19^2), p* 37« Wilds indeed feels the meed for more frequent approach to j i educational problems through a consideration of the individ ual and societal elements therein* (*t) The current con- j fusion as to what should be the relationship of the | individual and society makes meaningful for the world of today the thoughts of great men of other eras when men struggled with this same problem* II. THE HISTORICAL APPROACH flapftgtanqs o£ historical approach problem. Of all methods, the one most appropriate to the problem of the | individual and society is that of historical and philosophic cal analysis* The problem itself is as old as man; its written account is as old as history* Consequently, it is well for us to view the past before looking to the future* As a matter of fact, Henri Bergson has said of the impor tance of the pasts “Practically we perceive only the past, the pure present being the invisible progress of the past 8 gnawing into the future*1 1 William James spoke of the present moment as “the darkest in the whole series*1 1 He , believed that nothing can be known of the present until it Henri Bergson, Matter and Memory« translated by N. M. Paul (London: George Allen and Unwin, Ltd., 1912;, p. 19^. : ^ Q ; is “dead and gone#117 j Apart from the concept of the ephemeral nature of the present, there are other reasons for historical treat- j ment of this problem# The past is continuous with the | i present just as the depth is continuous with the surface# j i Ulich speaks of the “surface and the depth of civiliza- ) tion,w seeing history1 s function as getting at the latter# William Ernest Hocking concurs: Human history# as men try with growing consciousness to direct their living, acquires by degrees an experi mental character $ and even though we mortals learn from experience with extreme slowness, history is something : better than a wish-wash of experimental gropings which j establish nothing! History in it s texture is change $ ' but.because of this, it reveals what permanent.11 Only by knowing the achievements of the past as a basis for our own efforts can an interminable infancy in human relations be avoided# Only by taking advantage of the social experience of those who have preceded him can i man escape a tedious repetition without accumulation# A denial of the importance of the historical principle is to ^ William James, Principles of Psychology (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1923)> I, p« 3^1* - 1® Robert Ulich, editor, Three Thousand Years of 1 Educational Wisdom (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard !University Press, 19^8), p# v# i ^ William Ernest Hocking, The Lasting Elements of Individualism (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1937)7 Ip# xl. -------, ---------------------------- --------- 9; deny the transmission of culture, to deny the possibility ! I of human progress* in historical study such as this one j can supply data for a frontal attack on educational prob- 1 lerns. Educational practices of today are not the result of ; any one period, but are a development from all periods. 12 Every age has its effect, whether beneficial or not. It is generally recognized that historical study and evalua tion must be a continuous process. History is never written! Monee and for all.1 1 The past must be constantly reinter preted, revalued. The very changing nature of the present, bringing first one problem and then another into focus, determines what aspects of the past may be most important to the present at any given moment. In this way the contribu tions of past ages may be screened and those which are undesirable cast away. Good, Barr, and Scates help to define the purpose of an historical study such as the present one. They say it is: • • • to suggest through the survey of these events fruitful generalizations from past experiences that may act as controls for behavior in the present or 12 Wilds, ©£. cit., p. 5. ^3 Carter V. Good, A. S. Barr, and D. E. Scates, The Methodology of Educational Research (New York: Appleton- Century-Crofts, Inc., 1935)P* _23£*______________ _____ | H. G. Good says the purpose of the historical approach to j education is to answer three different types of questions, j Tk those of "evolution, resemblance, and value.1 1 Educational i historians are more interested in aspects which yield ; | generalisations than in unique elements. This study was j i designed, therefore, to show, if possible, trends in think ing concerning the individual and society, to make compari sons when practicable, and to provide a useful evaluation in conclusion. aaag £££ Philosophical interpretation. A special effort has been made to provide philosophical interpretation in this study; for without interpretation, historical fact is useless* It does not furnish of Itself "ready-made con cepts." The data do not "fall of their own weight into i 15 I thought patterns." ' One could study changes in educational i practices without great benefit, unless he also interprets what great men have thought education should be or should achieve• ^ H. G* Good, "The Possibilities of Historical I Research." Journal of Educational Research* XXIX (October, j |1935), 1^8-551 | i 15 I y Edward H. Heisner, "The History of Education as a Source of Fundamental Assumptions in Education," Educational ^dministration and Supervision. XIV (September, 1928),378-j 11 Some writers go so far In their emphasis upon the need for Interpretation of history as to state that what actually happened In history Is not so Important as what man thinks happened* Typical of those holding this posi tion is historian Elmer Harrison Wilds* He states: ! What Aristotle, Quintilllan. Luther, and Pestalozzi thought about education is of rar less importance than what they make us think about education* It matters little what Plato said to the Greek people or what Rousseau said to the French people; it matters a great deal what they have to say to us today*1® Certainly as much can be learned from the aspirations and i ideals of a people as from their actual educational system* And, whether men stress the theoretical or the practical, j whether they concur with Wilds1 view or not, they can agree that the historical approach must stand or fall on the basis of aid to present and future* It is sincerely hoped that this study through its historical and philosophical approach will contribute to a future, but definite, solu tion of the indlvldual-society problem* III* DEFINITION OF MAJOR TERMS USED Only a general statement of policy with respect to definition of terms is given here for two reasons* First, ^ Wilds, op* cit*, p* 3* 12 it was considered necessary to devote an entire chapter, Chapter 1X1, to tentative definition of the concepts to he i i investigated* Secondly, it is hoped that in some cases j definitions will he apparent from subject matter or will he pitfalls of presupposition may he avoided* Too, since many j of the terms concerning the individual and society are used ; i in different ways (that is, normative and descriptive, Nominallstic or Realistic) it will he impossible to estab lish pre-set definitions in every case* Generally normative definitions will he used, and an effort will he made to j point out departure from this procedure and the implications of such departure* Historical limitattons, it was not intended that this study should attempt to constitute itself as a sys tematic investigation of the individual and society problem in all of manfs past experience* Desirable as it would he to look at history as a whole to see whether there would not emerge, a more meaningful pattern from the whole than from selected parts, such a task is beyond the scope of this study* It is well nigh beyond any one man* It was the ambition of Lord Acton to write a history of 1 1 the capable of on-the-spot treatment In this way some of the IV* SCOPE GF THE INVESTIGATION | ' ‘ 13 I 1 deliverance of man from the power of man*1— his concept of the individual and society. He decided not to attempt such a task, concluding that he would be indeed attempting to J i write all of history. j i In keeping with Lord Acton9s wisdom, this study will | select a limited objective in the hope of reaching that much, if no more* William Ernest Hocking justifies this selective approach: Likewise we may treat history as our servant not as our master, dipping into it here and there where we find it useful, but making no point of retracing in detail the history of our idea.1? In an effort to keep history as the servant, this ! study was purposely limited to educational philosophy: the j outstanding historical periods and the outstanding men of a period. Such limitation is Implied by any historical approach through the very principle of ‘ ‘ historical selectiv ity,” which decrees that some elements of history be remembered and others forgotten. i Philosophical limitations. Bealizlng that subjectiv-j ity is inescapable, the. author of this study made every j effort not to expound any one philosophy, but rather to i ! highlight areas of agreement, to determine what concepts are ^ Hocking, 0£. cit., p. 3* I generally accepted* Such a procedure is mandatory if the historical approach is to justify itself in determining patterns which will he of help to present-day education* i Interpretative limitations* The emphasis of this investigation was, wherever possible, upon primary sources in an effort to limit semantic error* The portions of the ! study concerned with evaluation are of necessity subjective, but at least subjectivity twice or thrice removed has been avoided* V. SOURCE MATERIALS AND METHODS OF PROCEDURE j Source materials* The source materials for this j ♦ investigation were limited mainly to books and periodicals* ! A careful research of all available sources did not reveal important investigations similar or parallel to this one* The typical studies of the individual philosophers con sidered in this investigation have not been listed* WrltteJ primarily from the general point of view, they do not bear directly on the problem of this study* i Roughly speaking the sources available fell into i i ! eight different types: (1) histories of education, (2) books and articles on research methodology, (3) philoso phy of education books, (*f) works on individualism, i (5) works on society, (6) educational sociology books,____| 15 i (7) studies of history, and (8) original works by great i educational philosophers. These source materials have been i listed in detail in the bibliography at the close of this study. ; i As has been previously mentioned, an effort has been j made in assembling the central information of this invest!- ! gation to use primary sources as much as possible. The main chapters, particularly, have been written from research I of the actual works of the educational philosophers con sidered. Use of secondary sources therein has been largely i confined to supporting statements and discussion. In the I presentation of historical background and early manifesta tions of the problem of the individual and society, it has been impossible to depend wholly upon primary sources. Though most writers admit the existence of educational 'theory in early ages, they agree as to a lack of primary sources defining it. Sir John Adams explains this point as followss The earliest recorded systematic discussion of edu cational theory dates from the fifth century B.C. But the discussion among the educators of this period that we find recorded, is so advanced in thought and so : finished in form that it necessarily implies much pre-Tg vious though unrecorded consideration of these matters. , i Since early discussions of theory are not existent or not i- — ......— i _Adamsf op. cit.y p. 135.____________________________ I available, deduction of this theory must be made from his- ; \ tories of the educational practices and procedures of early I times if knowledge concerning original sources of ideas is to be gained. When it has been necessary to rely upon his- i - I tories of education, an attempt has been made to use I specific ones devoted to restricted periods rather than i the more general ones. Methods of procedure. This study has followed the procedure described by Good, Barr, and Bcates, who write: Three major processes are involved in historical method: (1) collection of data • • • criticism of data collected . • » presentation of the facts in readable form, involving problems of organization, composition, exposition, and interpretation. 1° The source materials previously described were studied carefully and critically analyzed. An effort was made to present the findings of this critical analysis in coherent i and insightful discussion. Personal bias has been held to 1 a minimum; however, some may be implied by the very process of philosophical interpretation involved in arrangement and presentation of material. Nevertheless such interpretation is necessary to present a comprehensive and comprehensible report of the information resulting from a study of the i Good, Barr, and Scates. op. cit.T p. 2 * f r . VI* ORGANIZATION OF THE DISSERTATION TMs investigation is composed of eleven chapters* i Chapter I introduces f l The Problem,1 1 presenting such aspects i i as importance, definitions, scope, materials, procedures, and organization* Chapter II presents “Tentative Defini- i t tions of the Concepts to be Investigated and Philosophical and Educational Problems Directive to the Study*1 1 Chapters III to IX will consider historical movements and trends in educational philosophy as they bear on the problem of the individual and society* In general, they were organized around either great historical epochs in educational j philosophy or great educational philosophers* These chap- I tars include Chapter III, “The Early Historical Background of the Problem1 * 5 Chapter IV, “Concepts of the Individual and Society among the later Greeks and Romans1 1 5 Chapter V, “Concepts of the Individual and Society from Early Christianity to the Reformation1 1 5 Chapter VI, “The Con tributions of John Locke and Jean Jacques Rousseau to Con cepts of the Individual and Society“5 Chapter VII, “The Relationship of the Individual and Society in the Theory and Practice of Johann Heinrich Pestalozzl and Friedrich Froebel“; Chapter VIII, “The Individual and Society in the 1 Philosophy of John Dewey” 5 and Chapter IX, “Modern Develop- ments in Educational Philosophy * “ Concluding chapters____ consist of Chapter X, “Philosophical Interpretations,1 1 and < Chapter XI, “Summary, Conclusions, and Recommendations« “ j i These final chapters will seek to point out “where we | arrive#1 1 j • i | vii. swmrx ! i This chapter presented, first of all, the problem in its various aspects# Discussed were the statement of the problem and the importance of the problem# Specific ques tions were listed which this study has sought to answer# Direct quotations were given showing the importance which i outstanding writers and educators place upon the problem# Also presented were the importance of the historical I * t approach to present education and the need for philosophi cal interpretation in the solution of such educational problems as this# A general policy on definition was estab lished# The scope of the investigation was delineated with particular emphasis upon historical and philosophical limi tations# Source materials were classified, and methods of procedure were established to cover collectionT criticism and interpretation, and presentation of material# Finally,j the organization of the dissertation was outlined by chap- I ' : w I Chapter II idll consider definitions of the concepts to be Investigated and philosophical and educational prob lems directive to the study. CHAPTER II TENTATIVE DEFINITIONS OF THE CONCEPTS TO BE INVESTIGATED ! I AND PHILOSOPHICAL AND EDUCATIONAL PROBLEMS i DIRECTIVE TO THE STUDY i This chapter will seek to clarify the historical i i approach of this investigation by means of a discussion of j typical concepts in our thinking about the individual and society, which it is expected will be found in some form or other in writings of great educational philosophers and i historians* It will also present a list of philosophical and educational problems directive to the study* i i i i I. TENTATIVE DEFINITIONS OF THE CONCEPTS TO BE INVESTIGATED Difficulty of adequate definition* In discussing even tentative definitions of concepts relative to the individual and society, the author of this study was well aware of* the problem of reaching any area of agreement* Indeed it is submitted that much of the historical dis agreement as to the relative place of the individual or society is due to differences in semantics* Although this j fact does not lessen the problem, it should be pointed out i that how individual and society are defined Is directly I related to the Importance granted them* Be the one defined as orlor or post to the other* the dependency is there. I Because of the difficulty of definition in this , area* philosophers* sociologists* and historians have fur- j i ther complicated matters by reliance upon analogy* much of ! it figurative* Particularly has this statement been true of efforts to define society* Herbert Spencer and Oswald Spengler wrote of societies as social organisms* Hobbes in a frontispiece pictured society as a “human body social* * * constructed of atoms which are individual human beings* G* D* H* Cole criticises such definitions as follows: Again and again social theorists* instead of finding and steadily employing a method and a terminology proper to their subject* have attempted to express the facts and values of society in terms of some other theory of science. On the analogy of the physical sciences they have striven to analyse and explain society as mechanism, on the analogy of biology they have insisted in regarding it as an organism* on the analogy of mental science or philosophy they have per sisted in treating it as a person* sometimes on the religious analogy they have come near to confusing it with a God.1 Toynbee has also noticed and deplored the trend toward analogy* He writes: The inclination to introduce such analogies is merely an example of the myth-making or fictional infirmity of historical minds* * • • It is suffi ciently evident that the representation of a society ‘ 1 G* D. H. Cole* Social Theory (Philadelphia: Fredrick A* Stokes, 1920;* p . 13* _ 22 as a personality or organism offers us no adequate j expression of the society's relation to its individ ual members*2 To a lesser extent* the same process has functioned in i defining the individual and his province* Since, however, j i it is considerably more difficult to compare the individual ’ to other entitles, the term has generally been defined more j simply than that of society, I normative and descriptive definition. In defining the terms and the concepts of the individual and society, it ! should be noted that such definitions are characteristically^ either normative or descriptive* They may, for example, ; i emphasize the common type, the standard, the model, or the pattern in defining; or may stress the unique, the dissimi lar, the divergent, the novel* If a man tends to stress the former, he finds himself concerned primarily with the class; if he emphasizes the latter, he finds himself drawn in Interest to the particular* In this sense then, there are at least two different concepts of the individual and at least two different concepts of society* The individual may be viewed as a 1 1 social atom or 2 Arnold J• Toynbee, £ Study of History* Abridgment of Volumes I-VI, by B* G* Somervell TNew York: Oxford Uni- ; versity Press, 1951), p* 211* I 23l 3 I numerical unit in the mass.1 1 As such, he loses his par- 1 ticular identity, for as one perceives that the mass is made up of thousands of such individuals and as he becomes more aware of similitude than disparity, he soon finds him- self paying more attention to the whole than to the parts. The parts have ere long actually become boring because of ; their apparent sameness, and the individual is truly lost i in the mass. He is important only as he is a part of the h whole. Conversely, “the uniqueness of people as persons*1 may be accented. In highlighting the diversity of individ uals, attention is drawn to the cart to the extent that some individuals soon begin to question whether the whole has any reality at all. In a similar way, society may be conceived either as an a priori entity or as a resultant. If the normative approach is stressed, the first view applies. Smoothing off all the divergences of small or particular societies leaves a Society with the capital S. If, however, the heterogeneity and multiplicity of societies is stressed, one reaches the point of reducing society to the world or 3 Everett B. Martin, The Conflict of the Individual and the Mass in the Modern World (Hew Yorks Henry Holt and Co., 1932), p. 33• ** Loc. cit. worlds of the individual* John Dewey has pointed out the J descriptive and normalistic aspects of the term society. He 5 ! says: ! The terms society, community, are thus ambiguous. They have both a eulogistic or normative sense, and a descriptive sense; a meaning jure and a meaning de facto. In social philosophy the former connotation is almost always uppermost* Society is conceived of j as one by its very nature* The qualities which accom- ; pany this unity, praiseworthy community of purpose and welfare, loyalty to public ends, mutuality of sympathy are emphasized. But when we look at the facts which the term denotes, instead of confining our attention to its intrinsic connotation, we find^not unity, but a plurality of societies, good and bad.5 The normative and descriptive approaches to defini tion cited by Dewey above have both been utilized in the history of the problem of the individual and society with consequent difference in emphasis upon one or the other apparent aspects of the problem. It is believed, therefore, that some of the different views held by educational philosophers are due to these different concepts. A con sideration of normative and descriptive methods of defini tion leads directly to Realistic and Nominalistic methods— with the same or similar differences in application. j Realistic and Nominalistie definition. Paralleling ^ John Dewey, Democracy and Education. An Introduc tion to the Philosophy of Education (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1916 (April, 19^7) > P* 95* normative and descriptive definition, are the Realistic ( and Nominalistic approaches (in the mediaeval sense)* In i fact, the latter are merely particularly pointed applica tions of the former, characterised by the two well-known ! mediaeval schools of philosophy* As might be expected, ' these schools take definite positions with respect to individual-society concepts* i The Realists have been concerned with the problem of universal^judgments* In order to establish universal truths, they present a solution based upon Ma universal i pattern for every class of things, and particular individ- J uals of any class are but imperfect copies of the type*1 1 j Eby and Arrowood say further of Realism: The type alone is completely real; particulars only approximate reality; the type is the highest reality in its group, and the nearer^particular individuals or objects appj^oximat9^i^|^^^^^'be-^|her‘ 1each is* i Particulars are known liyHQEe senses, but the types or universals are known by thought.® In contrast, the Nominalists insist that the particu lar or individual object alone is real* Nhereas the Realists regard particulars as accidents or non-essentials, the Nominalists hold that 1 1 there is no substance which forms i the real essence of objects or persons; the qualities of an' i • ^ Frederick Eby and Charles F* Arrowood, The History and Philosophy of Education Ancient and Medieval (New York: Prentice-Hall, Inc*, 19^6), pp*74i-?2. I individual are the individual.Consequently, to the Nominalist universals are names only, not substance. These two philosophies contrast one view wherein things exist because of an underlying substance of which they are manifestations and another wherein things exist in their own right. Whether an educational philosopher sees the individual and society from one or the other of these positions makes considerable difference in his concepts of them. Toynbee describes two sueh different views: One is that the individual is a reality which is capable of existing and of being apprehended by itself and that a society is nothing but an aggregate of atomic individuals. The other is that the reality is a perfect and intelligible whole, while the individual is simply a part of this whole which cannot exist or be conceived as existing in any other capacity or setting.** Certainly this description is one of the Realistic versus the Nominalistic approach. These two approaches, when applied to concepts of the individual and society are fre quently referred to as the concepts of individualism and socialism (socialization, not political socialism). A proper understanding of the individual-society problem would seem to demand an examination of these two positions. 7 Ibia-, p. 7^2. ® Toynbee, op. cit.. p. 209. Individualism and socialism# Individualism as we I know it today indeed grew out of the Nominalistie revolt against Aristotelian classification— identicalness of mem* 9 i hers* 1 1 Class names do not give reality,1 1 says the Nomi- | nalist as he asserts individualism as the reality of the individual* Fite contrasts the two conceptss Individualism is the name applied to the theories which emphasize the demands of freedom; while socialism* in its broadest sense, stands first of all for organi zation and unity.10 Neither concept has all the advantages or disadvan tages* Both may he pictured in favorable or unfavorable terms* Individualism may be described as desirable freedom j i or undesirable lawlessness* Socialism may be described as j efficient organization or repressive tyranny* Ralph Barton : Perry loudly sings the praises of individualism through exaltation of the individuals Individualism designates the finality of that con crete and unique being which counts for one in the population; which is referred to by a proper name or personal pronoun; which springs from parents of opposite sexes; which moves about with an erect posture on the surface of the planet; which has a specific locus in place and time, and therefore a peculiar and unrepeat able experience; which has its own specific variation of certain generic capacities, such as sense, emotion, 9 Martin, op* cit., p* 9. ^ Warner Fite, Individualism (New York: Longmans, Green and Company, 1911), p. 2y¥* and thought; and which is uniquely qualified for cer tain peculiar relationships, such as communication, j friendship, and romantic love.11 | Homer, however, satirizes the idea of individualism as he * i i i i describes the Cyclops. He says of them: Among this people no assemblies meet; they have no stable laws. They live on the tops of lofty hills in hollow caves; each gives the law to his own wife and children and cares for no one else.12 i t Another poet, Tennyson, justifies socialism as a natural order of things. In speaking of nature he writes: So careful of the type she seems So careless of the single life. Fite in describing socialism utilizes the analogy which Cole and Toynbee deplore, but emphasizes the Healistic back ground of the concept. He writes in his book, Individual ism: . . . society is an organism, of which the life of the individual is a temporary function. Society, in other words, is the concrete reality of which the individual is a mere abstraction.1^ He shows how ethics, logic, history, economics, and sociol ogy, as well as psychology favor the importance of the 11 Ralph B. Perry, Shall Not Perish from the Barth (New York: Vanguard Press, 19W ) , pp. 32-33* 12 Homer, Odyssey, translated by George H. Palmer (New Yorks Houghton Mifflin Company, 1921), Book IX, p. 127* ^3 Fite, op. cit.. pp. j society which goes with socialism. He says that morality i is social^ that truth is the 1 1 opinion of the race”; that | i the individual is an episode in a movement, I The concepts of individualism and socialism are | inescapable in any consideration of the problem of this study. The concepts may frequently be expressed in slightly j different terms, however, Universalism. socialization or cantralization are frequently used to describe the stressing of society, Whitehead refers to the same sort of idea by using the terms individual absoluteness and individual rela tivity instead of individualism and socialism. He writes: One of the most general philosophic notions to be j used in the analysis of civilized activities is to con sider the effect on social life due to the variations j of emphasis between Individual Absoluteness and Individ-! ual Belativity, Here 'absoluteness' means the notion | of release from essential dependence on other members of the community in respect to modes of activity, while 'relativity' means the converse fact of essential relatedness. In one of their particularizations these ideas appear in the antagonism between notions of free dom and of social organization. In another they appear in the relative importance to be ascribed to the wel fare of the state and to the welfare of its individual members. The character of each epoch as to its social institutions, its jurisprudence, its notion of ideal ends within the range of practicability, depends largely upon those various patches of activity within which one j or the other of these notions, individual absoluteness!* ‘ or individual relativity, is dominant for that epoch.; l^t* Alfred North Whitehead, Adventures of Ideas (New York: Macmillan, 1933), PP• 5^-55* Is there any middle ground? It soon becomes obvious that between the normal!Stic and descriptive approaches, I I between individualism and socialism there ought to be some j sort of middle ground* Must it be assumed with the j apparent traditional dichotomy that the individual and j society are forever irreconcilable? Some writers have made ! just that assumption* For example, Benjamin Kidd writes: The interests of the social organism and those of the individuals comprising it at any particular time are actually antagonistic! they can never be recon ciled; they are inherently and essentially irrecon cilable. Also Fite mentions in his discussion the tendency to an either-or position: • • • nearly all thought about the subj ect [of the individual and society] has rested upon a presupposi- ! tion which would make the problem theoretically insoluble— the assumption* namely, of a fundamental contradiction between individual freedom and social order*1® Indeed, when one looks at the situation, the inter ests of man and society do seem to clash at nearly all points* However, to grant that they are not capable of reconciliation except for a compromise consisting of a | 17 «preference for one end or the otherH would seem to deny ^ Benjamin Kidd, Social Evolution (New York: Macmillan, 189^), p. 85* 16 Fite, op. elt.. p. 27h. 3i; the rather obvious fact of man's social nature on the one i hand, and his uniqueness on the other* To discuss the j i Individual and society as separate seems to "put asunder 18 what In nature seems Inextricably united.1 1 Sir John Adams 1 writes: We can think of the individual and the state sep arately [Adams uses state as synonymous with society ! throughout his work], but this is only an ordinary case of abstraction. We cannot think of the human individual as a complete independent unit. An essen tial part of his very nature is his relation to his fellows in a society. In the case of a hermit, we do not get rid of the social relation, we merely confine ourselves to its negative aspect. The term hermit in fact rather emphasises the social aspect by calling special attention to its negation. j It may be significant that Whitehead utilizes the : word individual as an adjective to modify absoluteness and relativity when he writes of the ideas of individualism and socialism. He and Adams would certainly agree that the individual and society cannot be separated because of the essentialness of the individual to both* However, how can the individual avoid losing his identity in society? 1 Toynbee has what he feels is a solution. While he agrees ^ John S. Brubacher, Modern Philosophies of Educa tion (Hew York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1939)* p. 132. 19 7 Sir John Adams, The Evolution of Educational Theory (London: Macmillan and Co., Limited, 1912) , pp. 132- 20 that society is the “field of action,“ he points out that , 21 the “source of all action0 is in the individuals which I i constitute it. Me is not satisfied with either the concept that the individual belongs to society or the concept that society belongs to the individual* Professor Toynbee says j confidently: | i The truth seems to be that a human society is, in itself, a system of relationships between human beings who are not only individuals but are also social animals in the sense that they could not exist at all without being in this relationship to one another* A society, we may say, is a product of the relations between individuals, and these relations of theirs arise from the coincidence of their individual fields ■ of action* This coincidence combines the individual j fields into a common ground, and this common ground is j what we call a society.22 j Toynbee is clearly still somewhat in the descriptive or j i Nominalistic camp here, but one gets a glimpse of possible middle ground* His statement has modified the impact of individualism by tempering it with a social viewpoint. It encourages a further search for possible resolution. Perhaps man has traditionally looked at matters per taining to the individual and society from too close a standpoint* KLdd spoke of interests being antagonistic “at Toynbee, op. cit.. p. 211. 21 Ibid., p. 209. 22 Ibid., p. 211. any particular time •1 1 1 1 At any particular time*1 may mean that in the broader scope there can be reconciliation. Adams says the apparent opposition between the two entities Toynbee, from whom the figure of speech seems to have been drawn, would agree. Anyway, it would appear that if Malways there has been conflict between the individual and I sufficient time pondering his relationship to the 1 1 herd” or its relationship to him. He has taken too short a view of immediate and perhaps selfish consequences to see the possi bilities of a more inclusive one. A Basic Plan for Catholic Curriculum Construction. Cronin is calling for a type of more inclusive views The argument has been put forward that neither the individual nor society is the true criterion of the educative process. The former is defective in that it generally sets up the well-being of the pupil as an objective of education rather than letting it accrue as a result. The latter fails because social utili tarianism must finally measure educational procedures may be only t # a beat in the rhythm of progress.1 1 Probably ! 2h as Martin says, the individual has not spent At this point the religious educators make themselvesj heard. Brubacher summarizes the position of J. T. Cronin in in terms of the kind of individuals it nourishes* The ; only escape from this impasse is to inquire as to man's; ultimate end* This, of course, is to be found in God* ! Both the individual and society are capable of only ; partial perfection while God, of course, is the source | of all perfection.4 2 ® j Whether we agree or not that it is God who furnishes the "middle ground" in the individual-society problem, we can see that the only satisfactory solution to the problem | is to find such a middle position, not a mere leaning to one side or the other, not a compromise, but a genuine syn thesis which will recognise the main values of both without damage to either* | Summary* In short, definition, especially definition of the concepts concerned is central to the problem of the individual and society* Consideration of these concepts has revealed that the descriptive approach and the Nominalistic philosophy lead, on the one hand, to the concept of individ ualism. defined as the theory emphasizing the freedom of the individual* On the other hand, the normative approach and the Realistic philosophy of semantics lead to socialism, defined as the theory emphasizing the organization of society. i It is as simple as that. Simplicity ceases to operate when the attempt is made to locate any middle ground* There are; Brubacher, op* cit., pp. 137-33. indications, however, that such exists, that it may he 1 possible to construct a synthesis favorable to both indivld-j ual .and society* | i In light of the above, it is expected that an his torical and philosophical analysis of the problem of this 1 study will reveal currents moving mankind from one concept to the other, with some over-all improvement in the position of the individual* Great educational philosophers will no doubt prove to have been sensitive to and instigative of these currents* It is hoped that educational philosophy in general has been and will be keenly aware of the problem and its magnitude* It is believed investigation will show j that outstanding philosophers in the field of education havej been concerned with finding a synthesis and have contributed to possibilities of such* Ifaat the schools of the past were actually like may not give an answer, but what out standing thinkers thought their schools ought to be like should help one to get a better perspective as he searches for the synthesis. 1 II. PHILOSOPHICAL AND EDUCATIONAL PROBLEMS DIRECTIVE TG THE STUDY ; In light of the foregoing discussion, various I 1 philosophical and educational sub-problems which it is felt 36 are directive to this study have been listed for conven ience as follows: !• Is society a real, a pre-existent entity, or is i it nominalistic? 2. Is society monistic or pluralistic? Is it i Society or a collection of societies? 3# In the matter of the individual, does the self precede the educative process, or does it emerge from it? b* Is the individual a creature of will or of intellect? 5« Is the individual above society, or society above the individual? Can the two be separated meta physically? 6, Are the concepts of society and the individual irreconcilable? Educational problems. 1* Should the relation of the state to education be 1 that of complete control, partial control, or no j i control? j i 2. Should education be public or private? i 3* How far should the state go in education? b» Should the standards of society or the standards of the parents be followed? 5* What should be the relationship between the good Individual and the good citizen? i 6* Should Instruction be Individualized and indi- i vldual centered, or should It be Initiated by j the teacher at society’s direction? ! ?• Should the goal of education be Individual suc cess or social service? 8* Should education be primarily concerned with the conservation of values dear to society, or with ! the Innovation of values appealing to the Individual* j 9* Should the church enter Into education? If so, to what extent? 10* Should education be concerned with fear of exces sive Individualism or with fear of individual ism’s being crushed? 11* Should education help to perpetuate a class society? 12* Can education help to establish a synthesis j i between society and the individual? The educational problems, It will be noticed, arise i by interpretation from the philosophical problems* 411 of the philosophical problems involve the combination of descriptive approach, Nominalism, and individualism and the combination of normalistic approach, Realism, and socialism. As worded, most of them imply the traditionally conceived dichotomy* The educational problems are problems which have been, and will continue to be, central in educational philosophy because of their dependence upon basic philo- , sophical problems* The two lists of problems are useful as a guide in the examination of specific works in the history of educa tional philosophy* When an educational philosopher takes a position with respect to any one problem, he is taking a definite position with respect to the major problem of the Individual and society* III. SUMMARY In Part I of this chapter the traditionally conceived dichotomies of descriptive approach versusnormative approach was discussed— Nominalism versus Realism, and f \ individualism versus socialism* It has shown how these concepts all resolve to two points of view at the extremes of the individual-society problem* It has considered the 1 J possibility of a middle ground, a synthesis, which will be more than a veering toward one extreme or the other or a I 39! compromise between them. Part IX of the chapter presented two lists of sab- I problems or problems contingent to the major problem of i this study. These problems, it was pointed out, arise from j the concepts of the individual and society discussed in ! Part I. They are directive to a study such as this one. I The next chapter, Chapter III, MThe Early Historical Background of the Problem,* * begins the chapters which seek to point out major movements with respect to the problem as they occurred in the field of educational philosophy. Chapter III will consider primitive and ancient peoples, including the early Creeks. i CHAPTER III THE EARLY HISTORICAL BACKGROUND Educational practices in use today are not the | products of any one period of history. Every stage of man*s development has made its contribution in some measure and in some value. It is to be expected, then, that the problem of the individual and society as it is found in the present century will have roots that extend back to the beginning of recorded history and beyond. For man has been a social creature as far back as we know of him. And as a social creature, he encountered, from the first, problems in his relationship to society. Admittedly he was, initially, rarely aware of the exact nature of the problems. Nor did he spend time analyzing the forces at work in his life; however, both the problems and the forces were there. As Sir John Adams expresses its At the earliest stages both the individual and the social forces work more or less unconsciously. There is no deliberate effort on the part of the individual to assert his Individuality, nor on the part of society to subordinate that individuality to public interests. Yet each tendency is vigorously at work all the time. By the mere fact of living in a society the individual is moulded to the needs of that society. There may be no systematic attempt to curb individuality, but that curbing necessarily goes on. No doubt the individual reacts upon society and does his best to modify its to that extent the process of reaction between the I j individual, and the state may be said to make up organic I education.1 If man's reaction to his society was at first com- i pletely unpremeditated) it soon ceased to be so* Long ;before recorded history began, definite concepts were estab-j i lished, and conscious action was taken to support them. j Primitive man, as we know him from the study of his remains ! * i and from the observation of races and people who are still in primitive state, early assumed conscious direction in matters of education and social structuring. i I. THE RELATIONSHIP OF INDIVIDUAL AND SOCIETY j AMONG PRIMITIVE PEOPLES i I I Security has been said to have been the basic aim of o primitive education. In order to achieve security, con formity was stressed as a second aim. When man first united in family, clan, and tribal units, he found that the demands of individual and group safety required Individual and group' conformance, first to the smaller groups and then to larger groups. Danger from wild animals and the elements early ^ Sir John Adams, The Evolution of Educational Theory1 (London: Macmillan and Company, Ltd., 1912),pp. 128-129. | 2 Elmer H. Wilds, Foundations of Modern Education (New York: Farrar and Rinehart, 19*+2) , pp. 18-20. demonstrated the value of mass, as opposed to individual, j iaction* Group consciousness was the natural outcome* Shy 1 i and Arrowood stress this point in their comprehensive his tory of educations Primitive people have been able to survive under the hard conditions of their lives only by subordi nating the interests of the individual to the inter ests of the group* Primitive education strives to secure the continued existence of the group princi pally by restricting the activities of its members. • • • Primitive education today and always lays its emphasis upon the control of the learner by his elders, who force him into the mold of the existing social order.3 Such educational historians as Wild, Monroe, Hart, Butts, and Brubacher agree with thip analysis that primitive man firstsensedandthenlater consciously realizedthat each individual must be required to follow the folkways of the group* Conduct was therefore highly uniform and well- regulated* As Butts points out, very definite patterns were soon established* He writes: Quite explicit rules were formulated concerning the ; important activities of life: the duties of children toward their parents; the relations between the sexes; attitudes toward property; loyalty to the elders and leaders; division of the spoils of the hunt; the duties of warfare both as to victor and vanquished; taboos against certain kinds of food; the accepted interpreta tion of natural phenomena; and participation in 3 Frederick Eby and Charles Flinn Arrowood. The His- tory and Philosophy of Education. Ancient and Medieval (New York: Prentice Hall, Inc•, 19^2), p* 6• If religious rites and ceremonies. As might naturally be expected, the emphasis upon mass | |action was very effective in creating esprit de corps. j 1 I which was probably the chief bond in primitive society. i Any tendencies in the young toward individualism were | f quickly suppressed. Government was controlled by the elders, medicine men, and priests. These men also con trolled the puberty rites, and were therefore in a doubly strong position to enforce group uniformity. Each adoles cent was a separate problem to be dealt with, but the tribal fathers never questioned their traditional actions. The I youth of the tribe came into the tribe wholeheartedly and j without reservations of any kind or they were cast out com pletely. In primitive cultures the family was a relatively simple institution. It confined itself to only the most fundamental of functions: reproduction and nurture, shelter 5 and protection. The basic social unit was the tribe, and the individual took his meaning in society from his rela- j tionship to the members of his tribe. In general a sort of ^ B* Freeman Butts, A Cultural History of Education (Hew York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 19W) > PP. 10- 1 11. ^ Eby and Arrowood, op. cit., p. H-3. “communistic equality1 3 existed, but it was not an equality ! tor the sake of the individual* It was an equality for the ; i I good of the homogeneous unit. j i From the foregoing it can be seen that education and • educational philosophy among primitive peoples was (and j still is wherever primitive groups remain) extremely conser vative* As Brubacher expresses it, the purpose of such edu cation has always been t f to conserve and perpetuate the 6 funded capital of social experience*, f Obviously there were no individual aims of education apart from those of the group* The perpetuation of the group was at once the group aim and the individual aim* Nothing else was permitted* With primitive peoples society, therefore, very early assumed the upper hand, or as Adams says, seemed 3 1 to be eon- 7 spicuously the senior partner3 1 to the individual. Only vaguely was the importance of the individual felt* Man did not think of himself apart from society, and it was thou sands of years before the concept of individuality arose to question social authority. 6 I John &• Brubacher, The History of the Problems of Education (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 19^7) , pp. 1-2* I ij-5 I II. THE INDIVIDUAL AND SOCIETY j IN EARLY CIVILIZATIONS I i i In his book The Dawn of Conscience. Breasted refers | to the Nile Valley* as the t f earliest social arena where we j may observe man victoriously emerging from an age-long struggle with nature T and entering this new arena of social forces | to begin the baffling struggle of mankind with him- i S I self.** Certainly in Egypt one may observe definite develop- ments in the r e l a W o n of lndivldual and society* whereas ia primitive groups government had been a function of the / tribal elders, it had been taken over by despots and the priesthood in ancient civilizations. When men settled down 1 i I in the river valleys, more social organization appeared, and culture became more complex. Well-defined institutions emerged. Strong central governments were achieved. To a certain extent, the uniformity and the equality of every individual in light of the group aim, which had existed among primitive peoples, had disappeared. In comparing and contrasting Egypt and the other ancient civilizations with primitive tribes, Eby and Arrowood state? Society was sharply divided into distinct classes or castes. Mass action less rarely appeared. There 1 ® James H. Breasted, The Dawn of Conscience (New Yorks Charles Scribner’s Sons, 193^1), pp. 11-12.___ i was still some sense of social unity, some esprit de corps. but it had changed in character. The common feeling of social unity now found expression in family life, in class consciousness, in the worshipQof a par ticular deity, and in special organizations.* i The family, not the tribe, was the fundamental unit j i of society in the ancient civilizations. It had taken the place of the tribe in religion and in education of children. I Breasted sees the emphasis upon the family as very important in the development of Individual consciousness. Feeling { that moral discernment arises in the home, he writes: Here began also reflective contemplation of human nature: the wise man and the fool were contrasted, traits good and bad were balanced against each other, and a world of new values was emerging. In such an age the consciousness of personality was born, and human society became an arena consciously new, where new forces and new weapons clashed. It was in this age of the earliest recognition of character that the first individuals emerged, rising above the nameless masses submerged in the immemorial ages of the remoter past Many authorities agree with Breasted that family control of education has always been a powerful force for individuali zation. Paradoxically enough it appears to have taken the creation of a complex society to afford the individual adequate opportunity for the contemplation of his nature 9 Eby and Arrowood, op. cit., pp. Breasted, op. cit. T pp. 139-1*K>* h7 and for the development of individual consciousness. While : I I men were in the homogeneous unity of primitive society, | i they never seemed to question the atomistic nature of their | t relationship to society. Or perhaps it was that those who \ questioned openly never survived* i In addition to the improvement in the position of i the individual which resulted from the shift of basic social unit from tribe to family, there is further indication of improvement in the fact that women in Egypt held a rela tively high position in that culture* The status of women has always been indication within a civilization of the worth of the individual* i But if there were foregleams of a recognition of individuality in Egypt, that was all there were* As social institutions increased in diversity and complexity, class inequalities and distinctions arose to vitiate any over-all improvement for individuals* In fact it may be questioned whether the individual basically had retained as much real equality as he had held in primitive societies, wherein all individuals were equal before the tribe* So, too, Egyptian education, though more complex than primitive education, was just as traditional and conservative because of the emphasis upon religion and religious motives* In most ways, aims J j of education were the same, conserving and perpetuating j i ; "the funded capital of social experience.1 1 The method of | ! cementing the individual to his social culture placed more i stress on written tradition, however* III. THE BOLE OF THE INDIVIDUAL IN 1 ORIENTAL CIVILIZATIONS It is extremely doubtful that the oriental civilisa tions, except possibly Persia, had any perceptible influ- i ence upon the Western World in the development of concepts I concerning the individual and society. Generally speaking, oriental civilizations, China, India, for example, sup pressed individuality. The individual was told what he must think and believe* Emphasis was upon the past and the con servation of existing ideals and standards. Stability j rather than progress was the aim. Man was taught to 1 1 recoil from any outward act that would bespeak a self-centered volition.1 1 Obedience to parents and ancestors perpetuated a static social order, a fixed system. On the other hand, 12 Persia might have "proved the first type of Aryan progress." - j Butts, o^# cit* , p. 23. I 12 Samuel G. Williams, The History of Ancient Educa- i i t ion (Syracuse, New York: C. W. Bardeen, Publisher, 1903), lp*_31*______________________________________________________ I f I The Persians had a feeling for freedom, although they 1 stressed a rigid physical and military education of the j young men to insure perpetuation of the state. At about ! the age of six, boys were considered to belong to the state j and were required to commence a long term of public train* ! 13 1 ing. There was, however, considerable exercise of indi- i vidual freedom, certainly more than in any other oriental civilization. The Persians were unable to perpetuate their civilization, though, and so had no marked influence. One must turn to the Greeks to see any possible Persian influ- i ence. Perhaps any consideration of oriental civilizations j is best dismissed with the statement that ancient oriental 1 i educational philosophy provides an extreme example of empha-i sis upon the society aspect rather than upon the individual, and appears to have had little influence on Western think ing* IV. THE INDIVIDUAL AND SOCIETY IN JEWISH EDUCATIONAL THOUGHT Hebrew education is sometimes regarded as showing a middle position between occidental and oriental atti- j ik 1 tudes. Although the individual had to bow to authority, ( ^ P. P. Graves, Education before the Middle Ages (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1909) 9 p* 11* ___ jjL Wilds r-on.-cit.-r-p.-60.-------- — 501 J i • it was the authority, not of state, ancestor, or caste, hut j of deity, A new element had entered into educational I philosophy, in that all were considered to be 1 1 equal before God.1 1 The Jews held children as gifts from God. The t Hebrew Psalmist declared: ■ I Lo, children are a heritage of the Lord: and the j fruit of the womb is his reward. As arrows are in the hand of a mighty man, so are the children of youth. ^ Happy is the man thai hath his quiver full of them. 7 Such a view could not help strengthening a sense of indi viduality. Although Eby and Arrowood say that Hebrew edu cation began with the social and not with the individual, they note certain strains of a growing concern with the individual: The Hebrews were the first people to create a ! national ethos or ideal of character, and to form a national system of education. Every man, woman, and child was obliged to learn the fundamentals of the law. They were the first people to practice democracy, though it was in the form of a theocracy. National education aimed at the cultivation of individual char acter to the end that everyone might serve the Lord. Israel was inherently democratic, a people without cultural discriminations, the source of modern equal!- tarianism.1® ; The earliest record of organized social life in i Hebrew literature is found in Genesis, Cain constructed U Psalms 127*3-^- Eby and Arrowood, op. cit., pp. 132-133. 17 a fortified city for his entire family and followers. ' j i For a long time, however, the majority of the Jewish people i were nomadic. Hot until Moses had led the Hebrews from Egypt and had raised them from slavery through his social I teachings, did there become a Hebrew nation. Moses has been called by Biblical scholars "the first man in human 18 history who had a well-developed social consciousness." luring Hoses' period, established societies wherein there was attention to the individual and his rights were com pletely unknown. Yet Moses had become convinced that in 19 the sight of God all men were equal* To free his people from the bonds of slavery he developed an educational pro- 20 gram based upon the Great Commandments. He taught the social ideals during the years of wandering which were to be the foundation of Hebrew society. During all his teaching Moses had a special awareness of the need for a harmonious relationship between society and the individuals who composed it. He felt that ^ Genesis, **:17* 18 Hartwig Dierks, The Social Teachings of Moses and of Renresentative Prophets (St. Louis, Missouri: Concordia Publishing House, 19*+0), p. 25>» ^ Exodus, 3:7-8. 20 Ibid.. 29-31. individual righteousness must he achieved and maintained* His concern for the individual was expressed in his rebuking i of his people for their fadish worship of Baal* He sus pected group pressure and mass action, except as they arose from the relation of righteous individuals to their God Jehovah* Other great Jewish leaders also directed their atten- i tion to the individual and society* Amos defined the spirit of neighborliness* He was the first Hebrew prophet to stress the universality of mankind through his teachings that Jehovah was concerned with the welfare of other 21 ! peoples, not just Jews* Hosea emphasized inner motives j po 1 and denounced hypocrisy in society* Jeremiah followed j Hoseats doctrines, frequently using his examples and figures of speech* Isaiah scourged both the sins of the individual and of society* He demanded a fair share of the necessities of life for all men*^ Ezekiel established the doctrine of individual responsibility* He pointed out that every man is responsible to God for his own actions. “The soul that pL. sinneth, it shall die,” said the prophet* This individual L_ _ _ _ 01 I Amos, 9*7* I i aa Hosea, 6:6m ^ Isaiah, 5;8-10* ______aIf Ezekiel, l8s*».______________________ ____________ accountability, taken with the doctrines of the older j Hebrew prophets, has spread what Joseph A. Leighton has | i termed Mthe twin concepts of moral individuality and com- j munity1 1 in Western thought• All the Hebrew prophets, by highlighting the moral responsibility of the individual, have made a case for the worth of the individual* If he is to be responsible for his actions, if he is to act in a community, he deserves the worth which will make him a worthy actor* V* THE INDIVIDUAL AND SOCIETY IN EARLY GREECE Historians universally agree that Greek civilization represented a definite advance over the cultures preceding it* Certainly the Athenian Greeks made definite progress in the matter of harmonizing individual interests with social welfare* In Greek life there were a number of fac tors which made for social unification; there were also a number which encouraged individuality. Eby and Arrowood identify the former as: a common language, a common litera ture, the Greek religion, Spartan education, and the Olympian games* The latter they identify as the geographi cal.terrain, Greek initiative and spontaneity, emphasis on ! 25 Joseph A. Leighton, The Individual ^nd the Social i Order (New York: D* Appleton and Company, 1930), p* individualism in Athenian education, the intellectual basis of life, the individual nature of gymnastie contests and local worship* Inasmuch as there was no actual Greek nationality (the Greek states were too differing for real nationality), j it is impossible to present a unified picture of Greek edu- j cation or educational philosophy* One can only look at Sparta and Athens, in many respects the two opposite poles* However, the very separation of the population into the city states is generally regarded as having had much to do with the growth of freedom and independence that we associ ate with Greece* The small political units and the differ ences of interest in the many centers of eivic life cer tainly contributed to an idea of liberty which has greatly influenced all of Western civilization* Both Athens and Sparta were totalitarian states and so exercised complete jurisdiction over individuals, but there were sharp differences between the two* In Sparta the soldier was above the citizen; in Athens the citizen dominated the soldier* In Sparta the individual and his family were sacrificed to the interests of the state; in Athens there was an inherent love of individual liberty Eby and Arrowood, oj>. cit., pp* 195-197* - - 551 which required a better balance between discipline and ! 27 ! freedom, public responsibilities and personal interests. | Though the Athenian Greek philosophy has by far overshadowed the Spartan, both should be considered if only for the emphasis of the contrast. Spartan educational philosophy. Although there was probably no direct influence at all, Spartan educational aims were almost as conservative as those of the oriental civilizations. Like more primitive peoples, the Spartans sought to perpetuate their folkways. The state was the i only educational agency. The Spartan Individual was under j i state education for his entire life. liyovLrgns9 who founded i the Spartan state, according to Plutarch did not trust the family and consequently sought in every way to limit its influence. In so doing he tremendously weakened the insti tution which has done much to ereate awareness of the individual and his worth. There was no attempt in Sparta to develop the various capacities of the individual apart from his usefulness to the state in war. Dobson speaks of "Sparta which of all nations known to history paid least 2 8 attention to the individual as such.« Spartan education, . ' 1 — — ......... 1 1 27 Ibid., p. 19>+. 2° J. P. Dobson, Ancient Edneation and Its Meaning to ITs_(New-York:—Longmans r-Greene -and-Co.-t-l9TSy. p.- - 3 - - - — J being solely for the training of citizens to serve their j I country, especially in war, meant the suppression of | i individuality to accomplish its purpose. In describing the i operation of Spartan education, Freeman says: The 1 packs1 of the Spartan boys, like the English public schools, formed miniature states, to whose cor- I porate interests and honour each boy learned to make his own wishes subservient• It was expected that each boy would continue to make himself subservient to Sparta. i Early Athenian educational philosophy. In Athenian education there was at all times more of individualism than i in either Spartan or Homan education. As Wilds writes, "Here for the first time we see education conceived of as a progressive adjustment with recognition of the desirability of the development of individual personality." However, though education was left to the individual and the family, it was supervised by the state. The early Athenian wanted the development of most aspects of the individual; but he also wanted this individuality to contribute to public wel- i fare. A complete fruition of individual capabilities was sought; nevertheless, the individual took his importance Kenneth J. Freeman, Schools of Hellas (London: Macmillan and Company, Limited, 1922), p. 32. I _______j^-Wilds ._op._cit. T _p. -7-9.----------------------- and standing from his membership in the state rather than | from his individuality. His education bore direct refer- I ence to citizenship and its duties. Individual worth, but j still the worth of the individual to society, was the basic | aim of education. Pericles declared, **¥0 alone regard a J man who takes no interest in public affairs not as a harm less, but as a useless character.Bo much was this thought the pattern in early Athens that Williams declares, 1 1 The idea of the independent worth of the individual man seems never to have been fully conceived by the Greek mind. • • Certainly individual worth was viewed as worth for social and political ends. One finds continual thought of | | group welfare. j Even as far back as Homer, the aim of individual excellence was mentioned as "Fair and goodness" in the per fection of both mind and body. Archilochus, too, expressed the individual^ pride in his rights. In his fables the animals always appeal to their "rights" during their quarrels and difficulties in what is generally considered 31 Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War, translated by Benjamin Jowett (London: Oxford Clarendon Press, 1900), I, 129* 32 Williams, op. cit., pp. 96-97* to b© a eomie satire on society of men. The early Greek j i poets thought of the individual as a member of a city state ! i and showed him against a social background. They saw ! individuality and personality closely tied to the worlds of j nature and human society. Though feelings expressed were I personal, the Athenian poets appear to have recognized a social standard, a universal law which applied even when * * exploring the new world of individuality.M Generally Athenian education by custom became rela tively uniform. Though as society differed somewhat from one generation to another, so there were some slight differ ences in the ideas of what constituted worth. Davidson 1 points out the fact that old Athenian education was defin itely social and directive in the following passage: The old education had depended for its effect upon training and habit, and only to a very small degree upon moral choice. Its purpose was to produce men who should worthily subserve an end which they neither set up nor.chose— viz., the stability and well-being of the state.^*7 Werner Jaeger, Paideia: The Ideals of Greek Cul ture (New York: Oxford University Press, 19**5T, P* 116# ^ Ibid., p. 8^. 35 Thomas Davidson, The Education of the Greek People (New York: D. Appleton and Company, 1894), pp. 113- \Uh. 59" Aristophanes gave a similar picture of the education of the early Greeks. He deplored the passing of the old educa- the basis of any attention to the individual, rather than personal gain or pleasure, as did some of his contemporaries in later Athens. An investigation of educational philosophy and educa tional practices from primitive peoples down to the Spartans and Early Athenians indicates a growing awareness of both i society and the individual* Primitive man restricted the individual for what he felt was the good of society. Conse quently, although each man was equal before society, there was no regard for individuality as such. In Egypt and the early river valley civilizations, the supplanting of the tribe by the family as the basic social unit and the improved position of women in society indicate a slow awak ening to the principles of individual worth. The Jewish people through their theology and national ethos also gave greater recognition to concepts of the individual. By He favored the Early Athenian duty to the state as VI. SUMMARY ^ Aristophanes, 1 1 Clouds,1 1 The Complete Greek Drama edited by Whitney J. Gates and Eugene GfNeill, Jr. (New York: Random House, 1938), II, p. 579• seeing children as Mgifts from God,1 1 they had a foundation : 1 for individuality; however, the patriarchal organization of | the family and the formalism of Hebrew society acted to ! suppress the individual considerably. The Hebrew prophets j Jeremiah, Hosea, Amos, Isaiah, and EzeldLel were outstanding in th.tr »ool«l Insight* Th«r » Ho. <* l»«vl«- j ual responsibility to society as well as stressed social j justice for the individual. Among the Greeks the Spartans evidenced no liberal tendencies. Spartan society dominated the individual in every way* It was the Athenian Greeks who for the first time in recorded history established an j education which did not consciously or unconsciously straight jacket the individual. In Athens it was felt not j i only that individuality was compatible with society, but also that it contributed to social stability. The welfare i of society was regarded as the justification for development of individual capacities. Hot until the later Athenians was personal pleasure or gain regarded as a basis for individualism. Chapter If will discuss the relationship of the individual and society among the later Athenians and the : I Homans with special emphasis upon the philosophy, educa tional and otherwise, of Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle. CHAPTER IV | i ! CONCEPTS OF THE INDIVIDUAL AND SOCIETY ! I AMONG THE LATER GREENS AND ROMANS I I It is necessary to divide any consideration of edu- 1 cation among the Athenian Greeks into two periods* Hot only did the thinking of the great Greek philosophers, i Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle, constitute an educational philosophy distinct from that of early Athens In many respects, but the teachings of the Sophists and the | i individualism they engendered overthrew the basis of duty to the state as opposed to personal pleasure set up by the | earlier Hellenes* The Homans, of course, though they were j later influenced tremendously by the Greeks, during their early period had their own characteristic philosophy of education* I. THE IN0XVIDUALISM OF THE LATER ATHENIANS The later Athenian Greeks were much less inclined than their forebearers to accept social custom and author ity without close scrutiny* The whole period was one of critical examination of ancestral ideas and traditions* Protagoras had stated for the Sophists, f t Man is the measure' of all things, of those that are that they are, of those j 62 1 ! that are not that they are not•" This sentence is gener- i ally interpreted with man in the individualistic sense* It is not actually known from Protagoras1 statement whether he intended such a meaning, or whether he used man for the i species or collectively for the social group. Protagoras ! i himself was certainly not an exponent of extreme individual-j ism, politically or morally, as is shown by the myth of the i history of civilization which he tells in the dialogue Plato named after him* In the myth he points out that there must be justice and morality in any society, that evil treatment 1 will disperse a society* It is undoubtedly true, however, j that Protagoras looked upon justice and morality as not being absolutes* And his statement concerning "man as the i measure of all things" has been a bulwark of relativity, regardless of the meaning of the word man* In the later Athenian period the followers of Protagoras brought a new emphasis to the individual* Aleidamas of Elaea, for example, declared, "God left all 2 men free, nature has made no man a slave*" Lyeophron 1 Plato* "Protagoras," Dialogues * 322, translated by Benjamin Joweti, Vol. I (New Yorks Charles Scribner^ Sons, 1907), p. 122. 2 Eduard Zeller, Outlines of the History of Greek Philosophy (13 th ed*; Londons Rout ledge" and Kegan Paul, Limited, 1931) > p* 89* stated that all men are equal regardless of their ancestors He also stated, probably for the first time, the social con-j tract theory: “The law is a contract, by which right is ! mutually guaranteed; but it cannot educate its citizens to 3 be moral and just*1 1 All this emphasis upon the individual ; i shook the foundations of Greek society* The Sophists believed the individual has the capacity to recognize and know social good* This recognition of the right of the individual to free thought then opened the way to self determination and moral freedom* The moral nature of the individual was thought earlier to have arisen from his re la- i tion to his fellows within the family and the state* Now social institutions were no longer viewed as ends in them selves* The family and other institutions were valued as they made possible a better life, and came to be regarded as made for man, not man for them* Han was “not the slave, but the lord of institutions*” Instead of being tied completely to his citizenship, he was in a position to lay “claim to a K world in which the citizen had no part• “ The educational approach of many of the Sophists was ^ Zeller, loc* cit* k Thomas Davidson, The Education of the Greek People (New York: D. Appleton and Company, 1912), pp* 12*+-126* -------------------------------------------------------------------------- so individualistic and relative that their teaching seemed to many Athenians as openly immoral. To the traditionalist J a group which advocated individual decision as to conduct and service to society, which advocated individual reaction to social traditions and customs, could not be tolerated. ! i Sophism was a first effort toward individual determination, j and as such was unrefined and open to excesses* Some of the Sophists went to the extreme, in the trend toward individualism, of denying any objective social good at all; and falling back on personal pleasure and gain, they were direetly responsible for a decline of patriotism 1 and personal morality. To this extent, self interest and personal advancement became the goals of Sophist education. The young men of Athens took as their aim ^individual excellence for individual success. The older objective of social service and public usefulness^, was changed to one of selfish and rugged individualism,1 1 says Wilds in his his tory of education. Right and wrong became subjective matters, dependent upon the thinking of the individual. Spontaneous action was cherished, and human desires were exalted. It should be noted, however, lest one should think i that self-seeking individualism was completely unopposed and i 1 ______________ I ' " 11 ! i 5 Elmer H. Wilds, Foundations of Modern Education I |(New Yorks Farrar and Rinehart , 19^2) , p. 93._____ 1 1 " ”65! unchecked^ that there were two opposite tendencies at work at the time* The unbridled Sophist individualism was opposed by a disciplined socialism as expounded by Pythagoras and his followers. In speaking of these two i forces, Davidson says: If the latter Sophists left men a congeries of atoms, held together by no force at all, the former j bound them into an iron system by external force, depriving them of that autonomy which is the very condition of moral life, and which it was Socrates special mission to bring to light and champion.® The Pythagoreans indeed emphasized the organization of society. They looked upon men as the property of the 7 gods. Brotherhood was the working basis of the order, but ; there was no unqualified equality among men. In their social order there were different levels according to merit, 8 an idea which was termed "proportional equality." The later Pythagorean!sm influenced Plato, and through him, the Western World. Such was the pattern in Athens when the great educa tional philosophers arose, Socrates (**69-399 B.C.), Plato (**27-3**7 B.C.), and Aristotle (386-322 B.C.). On the one ^ Davidson, op. cit., p. 109* ^ Plato, "Phaedo," 62; "Laws" X. 902, Dialogues, translated by Benjamin Jowett, I, p. 3o8, and IV, p. Wf. 8 Zeller, pp. pit., p. 3*f. 66' hand, there was the aggressive individualism of the Sophists with its excesses; on the other, the repressive socialism of, the Pythagoreans* Realizing that the old aims of education i were not adequate for new conditions, these philosophers presented their own ideas for the improvement of society and' to that extent offered somewhat of a middle course. Their I i efforts did not counteract the selfish individualism engen dered by the Sophists, nor did they improve the morality of Athens, but their works have been of immense historical significance. They must be considered carefully to under stand the influence which their thinking had upon Western thought• | i II. SOCRATES AND THE INDIVIDUAL Socrates, along with Plato and Aristotle, taught universal concepts as superceding and transcending individ ual! sms. Of that much history is sure. It is not sure, however, just where Socrates leaves off and Plato begins. Since the former left no writings of his own and is known chiefly from Plato’s Dialogues and Zenophon’s Memorabiliar one can never be sure whether Socrates or Plato, or Socrates! or Zenophon is speaking. However, certain points of view were directly attributed to Socrates by Aristotle. It also seems reasonable to assume that certain views were held by him which constituted points along the way to the developed philosophy of his pupil Plato* i In general It can be said of Socrates, apart from | Plato, that he did not contribute to the excesses of the j Individualism or the narrowness of the socialism of his day*' While seeing the importance of the individual, Socrates j Insisted upon a common measure to take the place of the Individual one attributed to Protagoras* This common measure he found in the universal reason of man* Warbeke emphasizes this point* He says of Socrates: \ Along with Protagoras he was an easy mark for politicians who recognized individualism as the root of anarchy* But however persistently he maintained that man can act morally only in so far as he attains insight, and warmly as he commended open-mindedness on every subject, he was far from being a Protagorean Sophist or a Skeptic* On the contrary he was convinced that collective efforts of thinking, and especially by what he called dialectic, men progressively reach more complete knowledge* • • • he maintained that truth must be sought by coordinated effort as a community purpose*9 There is no extant discussion by Socrates of individ ual versus collective action* It is doubtful that he thought; in terms of such a dichotomy* It seems rather that he woulc, have thought it unnecessary to champion either* His idea was to get his fellows to think about the ethical and moral ^ John M* Warbeke, The Searching Hind of Greece (New York: F* S* Crofts and Company, 1931) > pp* 13^-136* . . 6gl i [ problems of individuals and society. For instance, he j attacked the idea of being content with tradition without j i first carefully examining it5 he urged the starting of | 1 thinking from experience* In this study no evidence was I 1 found to indicate that Socrates supported any of the politi-! 1 cal theories of his time* His role was rather that of a critic of society* Socrates says of himself in Plato*s For if you kill me you will not easily find a suc cessor to me, who, if I may use such a ludicrous figure of speech, am a sort of gadfly, given to the State by God; and the State is a great and noble steed who is tardy in his motions owing to his very size, and requires to be stirred into life* I am that gadfly which God has attached to the State, and all day long and in all places am always fastening upon you, arous ing and persuading and reproaching you*1® Socrates is speaking to the men of Athens who put him to death* He wanted them to know themselves, to think and know their own minds, for he felt that self-knowledge is necessary to social action* In his rebellion against unthinking acceptance of social dictum, Socrates struck out continually against mass-mindedness* He criticized all who were unable to stand against their fellows* For instance, 11 ' he so rebuked Callicles in the "Georgias*1 1 | ________________________ 1 Plato, "Apology,1 1 DialoguesT 30, translated by | Benjamin Jowett , pp* 328-329* I 11 • Plato, "Georgias,1 1 Dialoguesf Wl, translated by | I Benjamin Jowett, III, p* 70* __ ___________ i But Socrates was ever vary of the unchecked individ- ; ual* He had insisted that state duties called for 1 1 special knowledge, expert training, and good standing in the to city*1 1 In so doing he was, despite his purported faith i in democracy, calling for aristocratic leaders* It is j entirely possible that this view alienated democratic lead- | ers of his day and that Socrates was opposed by liberals and conservatives alike• It is interesting to note that although Socrates as we know him, particularly from Plato, opposed unrestrained individualism, his primary place in history is due, not to any particular ideas espoused, but to his striking example of an individual who. refused to bow to a narrow concept of society* Socrates was for all mankind the epitome of the brave human spirit which can never be submerged in the mass* III. PLAT© AND THE INDIVIDUAL AND SOCIETY Plato had observed Socrates1 fight against the uncontrolled individualism of the Sophists* He had wit nessed the way in which excess of Individualism had weakened public virtue and morality in Athens* In addition, he had been Influenced by the Pythagoreans and the Spartans' Warbeke, op* clt., p* 136. as well as by the Eleatle philosophers* Consequently, when I he set about to create the pattern for a perfect state, It was only natural that his thinking should require order in the relationship of individuals to replace the lack of order i he saw about him in the chaotic Athenian politics. | Like Socrates Plato believed in the existence of a 13 rational order, 1 1 a pattern laid up in heaven* “ ^ This pattern he set forth for society in the “Republic,1 1 written during his maturity* Later in his old age he wrote the “Laws,” which repudiated some of his former ideas as not being practical* In “Laws” one readss “Any change but the lif change of the bad is the most dangerous of all things•« j Plato apparently became very conservative in his old age* It is to the “Republic,** therefore, that one generally turns for those ideas of Plato which have left the greatest mark upon mankind* The ideal state of the “Republic*1 requires an aris tocracy to rule and guide the way for those not so gifted* Plato had definitely decided that free men fell into a philosophic class, a military class, or an industrial class* ! ^ Plato, “Republic,” Dialogues * 592, translated by ‘ Benjamin Jowett, II, p* ^23* I Ik- I Plato, “Laws,” Dialogues * 797* translated by Benjamin Jowett, IV, p* 315* 71 In the first group he placed the directing power, the soldiers being their agents, and the wealth producers, the 15 servants of both* x This arrangement is in keeping with ideas Plato had earlier expressed* Elsewhere, in the “Gorgias,1 * Socrates established that “one wise man may often be superior to ten thousand fools*1 1 Calllcles admitted that it is natural right 1 1 that the better and wiser should rule and have more than the inferior.“ In his orientation, Plato was focused upon society* As Warbeke states: Politics he conceives to be the science and art of expanding individual self-realization to include that of society* Hence the constant dependence of every projected arrangement upon the question: What is human good? The discussion of justice passes easily and naturally from excellence of individual character to what in law or government fosters it. 17 Plato*s aim of education was not only the happiness of the 18 individual, but the good of society. In the "Republic” Plato pictures society as having resulted from the inter dependence and needs of men: 15 Ibid*, 580-581, translated by Benjamin Jowett, II, pp. ^0<pfl2. ^ Plato, “Gorgias,“ Dialogues * ^90, translated by Benjamin Jowett, III, p. 78* ^ Warbeke, op* cit*, pp. 218-219* 1® Plato, • ‘ Republic,** Dialoguesf oassim* i 72} A State, I said, arises, as I conceive, out of the needs of mankind; no one is self-sufficing, hut all of us have many wants* Gan any other origin of a State be imagined* * * * then, as we have many wants, and many persons are needed to supply them, one takes a helper for one purpose and another for another; and when these helpers and partners are gathered together in one habitation, the body of inhabitants is termed a state* “ Plato is here using state as synonymous with society and is expressing the social contract theory expressed earlier by Lycophron* In their concepts the Greeks generally made no distinction between ideas of state and society* Plato was no exception* An interesting point made by Plato is that societies may be held together on more than one basis, as a matter of fact upon one or more of many possibilities* Temperance requires that whatever the basis is, it must be accepted 20 and respected throughout the society* This idea may be a source of the views of John Dewey as he stresses a multi plicity of societies* However, Plato was thinking norma- tively, rather than descriptively as was Dewey* It should be noted that in * Laws1 1 Plato gives a Ibid* t 3^9) translated by Benjamin Jowett, II 20 Ibid*y **32, translated by Benjamin Jowett, II, P. 257. source of society different from human need, that is, from the family and the tribe.21 It is probable that Plato recognized some of the pitfalls in theories as to social origin and so gave the two different accounts. In any case it is important to realize that he made a distinction between origin and purpose. Though the origin of society may have been for the preservation of life, the purpose of it was conceived by him as the good life* In this concept he found the way to bring the individual and society together more securely, more organically, than just by origin alone. The good of society and the happiness of the individual are to be achieved by team work. In the “Republic" an important key to Plato*s philosophy of the individual and society is found in the analogy of the “just" state and the just individual. The state is the individual written larges I will tell you, I replied; justice, which is the subject of our inquiry, is, as you know, sometimes spoken of as a virtue of an individual, and sometimes as the virtue of a State. . . . And is not a state larger than an individual. . . . then in the larger the quantity of justice will be larger and more easily discernible. I propose therefore that we inquire into the nature of justice and Injustice as appearing in the State first, and secondly in the individual, 21 Plato, "Laws,1 1 Dialogues. 677-68©, translated by Benjamin Jowett, 17, pp. 205-210. preceding from the greater to the lesser and comparing I them.22 ' i Throughout the '•Republic** the analogy is maintained. Plato saw wisdom, bravery, and justice all as qualities present in 2^ l both the state and the individual* J As one reads along in i I the “Republic** he begins to think of the state as having an i 2* + i objective reality all its own, of being 3 priori. Society it appears, was for Plato definitely Society with a capital S. Plato was, from the very start, not bothered by any feeling of the isolation of the individual. It was per fectly natural to him apparently to base his theory of the state and society upon the nature of man without losing the social emphasis. In his analogy Plato makes the individual and society organic. The state as a macranthropos and the individual as 25 & micronolis are interdependent, making it impossible to study one without the other. Everything found in the Plato, “Republic,1 1 Dialoguesy 368, translated by Benjamin Jowett, II, p. 190. ^ Ibid.. **21, translated by Benjamin Jowett, II, | pp. 267-268. 21 f In this study & priori is used in the sense of logically prior, not prior in time. 2*5 I ' These terms are obviously not Plato*s own, but those of Alexandre Kbyre. They fit perfectly, however, Plato1s concept. individual may be found in the state in larger quantity. This study found no evidence that Plato conceived of i the individual and society as opposed to each other* Like j the Greeks generally before the advent of the extreme J i Sophists, he saw no real conflict of aims and interests. The Greek states were close-knit units, and the concept of ; an individual outside their jurisdiction was unthinkable to Plato. He just naturally saw the improvement of individual life as a concomitant with improvement of government* He could not see the former without the latter. Ebenstein points out the feeling of unity Plato had for the society and the individuals of his time* He declares, ’ ’ Plato never j i starts out with the hypothesis of a homo politicus. and ! abstract ’political man* unrelated to the richness and com- 26 plexity of individual selves or of society as a whole.” He sees both entities, as is evidenced by his strong dis approval of teaching of children without reference to their 27 individual interests and capacities* But he was not so much thinking of catering to the individuality of the child j for the child’s sake as for the sake of society* Plato was I r f 420 William Ebenstein, Editor, Great Political Think- j ers (Hew York: Rinehart and Company, Inc., 1951) 9 p. 2* ^ Plato, ’ ’ Republic,” Dialogues, 536-538, translated by Benjamin Jowett, II, pp. 3 6 3 - 3 6 7 . “ 76] i deeply influenced by Spartan education, so that, while he t advocated in the "Republic” education of the individual in j different fields of learning, he set up a life of labor for ! i individuals in his state based upon their maximum contribu- | tion to the State’s well-bein^ This stress upon attention i to duty is certainly reminiscent of Spartan education. | i In the "Republic” Plato defined justice as "doing • 29 i one's own business.” The justice of society requires that ! each person should do his own work, that is, each part should efficiently perform its function to ensure harmony 1 in society, just as a harmony of the components making up | i the individual are required for individual justice. ] Winspear sees in the concept of justice the fundamental problem separating the idealists like Plato and the 1 Sophists. He writes: It was as they answered the problem 'lAlhat is justice?1 that thinkers found themselves in one camp or another. To the idealists, concerned as they were to defend inequality and the rule of the few, as just, justice became an eternal principle, a transcendent authority, a divine self, speaking through semidivine teachers and prophets. To the Sophists, concerned to defend the right of democrats to overthrow the rule of the favored J. F. Dobson, Ancient Education and Its Meaning I to Us (New York: Longmans, Green and Company, 1932) , pp. 4-5. J piato, "Republic • " Dialogues T *4-33, translated by j Benjamin Jowett, II, p. 253. 77! few, justice was a historical arrangement relative to the growth of society that produced it and claiming no i greater validity than the sanction of custom and social I agreem@nt.3U It can certainly he argued that the whole purpose of the "Republic* 1 is to refute Thrasymachus1 claim that justice is tice was subject to change and not an a priori principle. So were the institutions of society merely arrangements. At the end of Book IV Adeimantus and Glaucon admit that Socrates has made his point concerning justice and the duties of the individual. But the question remains, how can Plato be sure of having each individual perform the duties he is best qualified to do for the state? His pro gram seems much more beneficial to society than to the individual man, despite his assurance following the Allegory of the Cave that the most happiness is to be found in the just state. One of the great weaknesses in the "Republic" is that it does not tell how the ideal is to be achieved from the status quo. Plato gives a partial solution to the problem in this famous passage: I said: Until, then, philosophers are kings, or the kings and princes of this world have the spirit and power of philosophy, and political greatness and wisdom merely the benefit of those in power. To the Sophists jus- Alban Winspear, The Genesis of Plato's Thought (New York: The Dryden Press, 19^0), pp. 77-78. meet in one, and those commoner natures who follow either to the exclusion of the other are compelled to stand aside, cities will never cease from ill— no, nor the human race, as I believe— and then only will this our state have a possibility of life and behold the ; light of day. . . .31 A similar expression is made in “Apologia Pro Vita Suas i Epistle VII.” In both statements Plato again affirms his j doctrine of rule by an aristocracy of intelligence. His ' I i solution, if apparent, is hardly real. It would seem to lack appeal to the individual to insure its installation in human affairs. The real problem would be to get the first generation in order to produce the second. While Plato's individuals are passing a laborious existence, 1 1 Assuring the greatest happiness to the greatest number,*1 it is to be wondered whether they would not have some thoughts as to whether they might not profit more from exercising their latent individualism. As H. R. Murphy points out, the education set forth in Books III and IV might develop citizens “eager to confer benefits on each other. 2 The mine and your division of properties might 31 Plato, “Republic,“ Dialogues. **73, translated by Benjamin Jowett, II, p. 301. 32 Murphy, Interpretation of Plato's Republic (Londons Oxford Clarendon Press, 1951), pp. 15-16. 79 have been wiped out, as required 33 However, some men seem by nature impelled to focus upon their individuality rather I | than upon their social propensities* It is doubted that j these would find the “Republic” to their liking* Modern j consensus is that there was too much regimentation in j Plato*s ideal, too many seeds of asceticism* j Even in the later “Laws'® Plato still strongly pre- sents the whole as superior to the part* He wrote* And one of these portions of the universe is thine own, stubborn man, which, however little, has the whole in view; ana you do not seem to be aware that this and every other creation is for the sake of the | whole, and in order that the life of the whole may be | blessed; and that you are created for the sake. of the whole, and not the whole for the sake of you*34 j Shorey1 s translation reads “unhappy man” in place of “stubborn man*" Such a reading would seem to make the older Plato sound somewhat cynical and less hopeful for the happy individual and the good of society* Certainly the passage shows a marked influence of Pythagoras and is more akin to him than to Socrates, who has been left out of the “Laws1 * completely* Such writing has caused men like Davidson to state that Plato passed finally to the extreme of ! " Plato, “Republic,” Dialoguesf **63, translated by Benjamin Jowett, II, p« 289* ^ Plato, “Laws ,” Dialogues * 903, translated by Benjamin Jowett, IV, pp* 415-416. 35 1 socialism. Whether one agrees or not, all must concede that even in the “Republic" Plato1 s restrictions upon the j i poets and other artists indicates that he was hardly con- j i cerned with the individual as such. The provision for the | i transfer of individuals from one social class to another was made primarily for the benefit of society. It is also suspected that the equality Plato demanded for women was based upon a manpower ideal rather than one of personality. For Plato hardly seems to have been a crusader for individ ual rights, women1s or otherwise. Certainly he apparently j never thought of the slaves in Greek society as individuals with rights. Nor did he grant the claim of the home or family* Instead, he opposed them* When Plato refused to accept the family, he dis counted one of the great sources of individuality* His reason for distrust of family training was apparently the defeat of Athens by Sparta. In any case, he is regarded as one of history's strongest supporters of state education* Along with Aristotle and Xenophon he was probably responsi ble for the later instituted ephebic military training* Eby and Arrowood state: 35 Davidson, op* cit. y p. l1^* j i piato, "Republic,1 1 DialoguesT ^23 > translated by j iBenjamin Jowett, II, p. 2hy. _ I The writing of the Republic grew out of the idea _ that education is the primary function of the state. • • • to Plato more than to any other man, we owe the doctrine of state control of education. 3 7 In his support of state control of education Plato gave con*! crete evidence of dealing with some of the educational problems arising from his answers to the philosophical problems listed in Chapter III* In this area it is felt that the Influence of Plato will be observed in more recent educational philosophers who have supported state education. Plato has been severely criticized for the views expressed in the “Republic.1 1 It is claimed that not only i does he lack consideration and affection for the common i man^ but that his system is 1 1 founded on truths accessible to only a small and exceptionally gifted portion of man- oo kind*1 1 Indeed a more valid objection to Plato1 s theories is that while he advocated stability and uniformity, his exclusion of the great mass of mankind, the workers, from having any part in the direction of society and the state, would prevent the development of the common interests and like-mindedness so necessary to any solution of the i individual-society problem* It should also be noted that 37 Frederick Eby and Charles F* Arrowood,' The Devel opment of Modern Education (New York: Prentiee-Hall, Inc*, 195377 pp# 3^- 360. 3 8 __________Davidson,_op*_cit,*.,_pp*_-138-139.------------------ I ------------------------------------------------------ 82] his authorization of the use of the medicinal lie by society 39 hut not by the individual has been a major philosophical support to the totalitarian dictatorships in their disre gard of the individual through their use of lies to effect a dubious public good. Plato might deplore the unintended ; \ • support his idea has given, but the damage has been done. | i Platofs doctrine presents at least three ideas of j timeless significance for education: the importance of not / separating the intellectual and the moral in the education of the individual; the necessity of thorough education and training for the leaders of society; and the requirement of ] i i education as the most essential function of the State. His j feeling that there is no real quarrel between society and > the individual with adequate education and insight is cru cial to any synthesis. His insistence upon the rational approach of philosophy is unassailable to most thinkers. i IV. ARISTOTLE AND THE INDIVIDUAL AND SOCIETY More than any other man, perhaps, Aristotle has influenced the concepts of Western thought. An incredible number of works, between four hundred and one thousand, have! i ibeen attributed to him. His reputation is based, however, i ____________ ' ' 1 39 Plato, “Republic •, f Dialogues. 382, translated by Benjamin Jowett, II, p. 20o. 1 ■ ____ ___ _ '' " ' .... ' '* 831 on those, few which have survived, the most revealing of j which were apparently written during the thirteen year ! period of his teaching at the Lyceum# It is primarily to I this period one must turn to consider the concepts of the ! i i individual and society which he held* j Like Plato Aristotle saw no real conflict between the • ' i individual and the state Cstate meant the same as society to the Athenian Greek)# In the “Politicsr t he wrote: “Since the end of individuals and of states is the same, the end of the best man and the best constitution must also be the *♦0 ] same.” Aristotle felt that the state progressed as individuals progressed, yet he did not recognize the individual as an end in himself, nor did he desire the development of the individual for the sake of the individual In his “Politics1 1 he wrote: Neither must we suppose that any one of the citizens belongs to himself, for they all belong to the state, and are each of them a part of the state, and the care^ of each part is inseparable from the care of the whole. ; Despite this social emphasis Aristotle realized that it is ridiculous to speak of the happiness of the whole of society! Aristotle, “Politics,” Poetics. VII, 133*4*, trans lated by Benjamin Jowett (New York: The Modern Library, j 19*4-3), P. 311. ifl Ibid#, VIII, 1337, translated by Benjamin Jowett, pp# 320-321# apart from the happiness of its individual members* As | Davidson points outs He maintains that man and the state do not stand to | each other in the relation of end and means, but are essentially correlates* • • • It is through the state ! that man is man*^ In setting up the structure of his philosophy, i Aristotle envisioned social philosophy as arising from j ethics* In this sense his "Politics" complements the "Ethics*" Like Plato he attempted to ground his concepts of society in the nature of man* Man as he saw him was essentially a social being* Consequently, when Aristotle said at the conclusion of "Ethics," "to this let us now pro to eeed," he was turning his attention to communities and societies* These he saw as arising naturally from the needs' of mens Mien several villages are united in a single complete community, large enough to be nearly or quite self- sufficing, the state comes into existence, originating in the bare needs of life, and continuing in existence for the sake of a good life* And therefore, if the earlier forms of society are natural, so is the state, for it is the end of them, and the nature of a thing is its end* • « • Hence it is evident that the state is a ^ Davidson, op* cit*, p* 155* **3 Aristotle, Hichomachean Ethics. X, 1181, trans lated by D* P. Chase (New York: E* P* Dutton and Company, Inc*, 193*0, P* 262. r ' ' 8 ' 5 i i I creation of nature^ and that man is by nature a political animal *^ Aristotle’s idea here was close to that of Plato; however, , Aristotle stressed the natural character of the origin of ! the state, whereas by picturing man as consciously taking helpers, Plato had a social contract origin to meet men’s i needs rather than a purely natural one* Both however I insisted that a differentiation should be made between source and purpose, and gave the good life as that purpose* Aristotle strongly believed the state to take preced ence over both the individual and the family* He said: i I Further, the state is by nature clearly prior to the * family and to the individual, since the whole is of necessity prior to the part. • • • the proof that the state is a creation of nature and prior to the individ ual is that the individual, when isolated, is not self- sufficing; and^therefore he is like a part in relation to the whole. ? Indeed he saw any man who was independent of society as a ”beast or a god*” Though he gave the state precedence over the family, Aristotle had no mistrust of the family as did Plato* He saw it as a natural and smooth-fitting unit of society, its Aristotle, "Politics,” Poetics. I, 1252-53, translated by Benjamin Jowett, pp. 53-51 *. Ibid.. I, 1253, translated by Benjamin Jowett, p. 55. function feeing to take care of the everyday needs of the h6 individual. Such a conception of the family was defin itely more favorable to individuality than Plato's. ' j like Plato, Aristotle felt the need for the individ uals in a society to have some things in common, but not all things* He objected strenuously to the communism of wives and children in the “Republic*( i Society, to him, was a plurality* In effect he criticized Plato for making society a unison rather than a harmony* In “Politics" he said: Is it not obvious that a state may at length attain j such a degree of unity as to be no longer a state?— since the nature of a state is to be a plurality, and in tending to greater unity, from being a state, it I becomes a family, and from being a family, an individ- j ual; for the family may be said to be more than the | state, and the individual than the family* So that we ! ought not to attain this greatest unity even if we % „ could, for it would be the destruction of the state. ' Aristotle felt that sufficiency and uniformity were not compatible, that the more sufficient a state is, the less uniform it will be* Undoubtedly Aristotle had not been quite fair to Plato in this criticism. The latter did provide for differ ent classes in his ideal state and demanded communism only Ibid* * I, 12?2, translated by Benjamin Jowett, p. 53. ^ Ibid*, II, 1261, translated by Benjamin Jowett, p. 81. for the highest order. It is certainly more realistic, however, to realize, as Aristotle did, that there are many : i different classes and types of individuals and that as long I i as there are individual differences the possessive pronoun i will be evident in human relations. tinuum, had a more definite feeling for completeness of life for the individual than did Plato. As Dobson says: The main difference between Aristotle and his predecessors in theory lies in his greater considers- j tion for the individual. The end of education for j each man is to learn how to employ leisure in the > best possible way, and the best way is to live the highest life possible for man. . . . this is a manrs j highest duty to himself, so that social efficiency highest human aim.TO Aristotle made the aim of education the same for the state and for man in general— happiness. The happiness of all citizens was the highest possible good to him. Aristotle considered education as a function of the state. In Book VII of "Politics" he said: his attention above all to the education of youth; for though extremely important, is not the only, or the Vi-4 aef ViMm.n aim *rO In order to achieve this aim of universal happiness None will doubt that the legislator should direct ^ Dobson, op. cit., p. 79* 881 the neglect of education does harm to the constitution* The citizen should he molded to suit the form of gov ernment under which he lives* For each government has a peculiar character which originally formed and which I continues to preserve ,it*“ j i Later in the same chapter he added: And since the whole city has one end, it is manifest that education should be one and the same for all, and that it should be public, and not private— not as at i present, when every one looks after his own children separately, and gives them separate instruction of the sort which he thinks best ; the training in things whic^are of common interest should be the same for Aristotle is here supporting a common core of education, not a uniformity of education to be given by the state, for he had already criticized Plato for making his state too j uniform* The state education idea came naturally to Aristotle, just as it had done to Plato* Hocking points out i the firm hold the Athenian state had upon the thinking of its citizens when he says of the state: The associations which are now its chief rivals were without prominence in the Greek world* There was no church; occupational groups were few and small; artisanry, commerce, and manual labor were devoid of corporate pride* There was nothing in the domestic Greek, the industrial Greek, the religious Greek, to rebel against the assumption that the political Greek Aristotle, "Polities," Poetics. VIII, 1336, trans-; lated by Benjamin j’ owett, p. 32©* hoc* cit* 51 ' was the acme of human nature* j The state was all-important in Greek civilization because j i of its all-inclusiveness. When Aristotle gave the state the primary purpose of providing for the highest good, he j was of necessity excluding nothing from its functions. In j this way it becomes the highest community. Such a point of j view is difficult for moderns to accept. They will fre- j quently accept the doctrine of Plato and Aristotle that the society is an organism. They will frequently agree that modern states must be communities of both law and fellow ship; but they are generally loathe to grant unique and pri-; 52 mary importance to any institution as such. It is interesting to note that Aristotle recognized i three different types of government: royalty, aristocracy, and constitutional government. These he saw perverted into tyranny, oligarchy, and democracy when government is bad. He wrote in Book III of the “Politics”: For tyranny is a kind of monarchy which has in view the interest of the monarch only; oligarchy has in view the interest of the wealthy; democracy, of the needy: none of them the common good of all. 53 _______________________________________________________________________________ i ^ W. E. Hocking, Man and the State (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1926), p. 173• j ^ Ebenstein, op. cit.« p. 68. J ^ Plato, “Politics,” PoeticsT 1279, translated by ! Benjamin Jowett, p. 139. Aristotle said the solution of the problem of who should govern lies in a polity, a constitution which gives the largest voice to the middle class. That class should be i stronger, he said, than either of the others for the preven-j tion of extremes.As a matter of fact, Aristotle inclined 7 i toward denying citizenship to the lower class of people. j i He defined a citizen as , f he who has the power to take part in the deliberative or judicial administration of any 55 state.1 1 This is a concept of “active citizenship1 1 which would deny itself to the lower class. Aristotle said that it is no more absurd to deny citizenship to the lower classes than to slaves. Laborers and mechanics he classic fied as servants of the state in the same sense that slaves are the servants of individuals.^ This is a variety of the analogy of ends and means. As Bbenstein points out in kis Great Political Thinkers s Aristotle was unaware of the idea, expressed in religious terms by the Jewish-Christian teaching in antiquity, and in philosophical terms by Immanuel Kant in modern times, that every man is, by virtue of being ^ Ibid.. 1295 > translated by Benjamin Jowett, pp. 191-19^ ^ IMd., 1275> translated by Benjamin Jowett, p. 127. ^ Ibid., 1273, translated by Benjamin Jowett, pp. 13^-135. " human, an end in himself, and must not be reduced to ; a means*57 j Further proof of Ebenstein* s statement may be found in Aristotle's treatment of the subject of slavery* Though his ideas were not severe for his age, he, like Plato, did not think of slaves as individuals with rights* In f , Polities, , he termed the slave a "living instrument1 1 and said, "For that some should rule and others be ruled is a thing not only necessary, but expedient; from the hour of their birth, some are marked out for subjection, others for 58 rule.** Indeed he justified slavery as natural at great i length, seeing its foundations in psychology, economics, J i and biology* I Such is the picture of Aristotle in relation to the ! individual and society* He was a great organizer by nature, organizing almost unconsciously the materials of the individual and the social worlds into an organic concept* He may not have been the first to express such an organic view of society, but he was the first to express it clearly and definitely* While emphasizing the social aspects of life, he managed to retain, because of the excellence of 5? Ebenstein, op. cit., p* 72* Aristotle, "Politics,1 1 Poetics* 125*+9 translated by Benjamin Jowett, pp* 57-58* 921 f I his organizing powers, more feeling and consideration for j i the individual than did Plato and the others* The concepts ; i he furthered did not block the individualism of the Sophists of his day or their instrumentalist view of society; how- i ever, his concept of a society above the individual, taking its purpose from those individuals of which it is composed, ! has served as a leavening influence in human thought* V* THE INDIVIDUAL AND SOCIETY IN THE HELLENIST IG AND HOMAN PERIODS .. ( ! The Hellenistic era* Plato and Aristotle had taught j i the supremacy of the Creeks both as to social and individual capacities* Upon the defeat and subjugation of the city- states it appeared that a wider outlook was necessary* "What was needed,1 * says Ebenstein, "was a philosophy of man as an individual in relation to himself and the world at *39 large* He points out that the Creek individual "was rarely faced with fundamental challenges affecting him as a person, and • • • he was seldom drawn into a collectivity so large as to make his individuality disappear alto- 60 gether*" When the comfortable relationship to the 59 Ebenstein, op* cit*, p* 136* 60 Loc. cit. j ' ~ 9 3 ! ( city-state was removed , the individual was forced at once ' i to fall back upon his individuality and to develop a new | concept of universality* Without the concepts of the j Hebrew prophets and Christianity to turn to, the early j i Hellenes found such a doctrine in Stoicism. Three hundred | years before Christ, Zeno had stated the equality of all j men. The nominalism of the Stoics, providing as it did for “highly generalized1 1 individual concepts was not always logically impeccable, but it did provide for more inward individuality and at the same time outward universality. The universal spirit dwelt in all things; therefore all were brothers. Marcus Aurelius, the Roman emperor, a latter Stoic pointed out his world citizenship: “Everything har- i monizes with me, which is harmonious to thee, 0 Universe. Nothing for me is too early nor too late which is in due 61 time for thee.“ Joseph A. Leighton summarizes the con tribution of Stoic thought to concepts of the individual and society as follows: Through the emphasis on the power of reason and self-control to make a man independent of circumstances, and on the universal presence of the divine spark in man, the Stoic philosophers deepened and universalized Marcus Aurelius, “Meditations,“ IV, 23j The Stoic and Epicurean Philosophers, edited by Whitney J. Oates (New York: Random House, ±9kO), p. 511* -------------------------------------------------------------------------" 9® the principle of personality. Rational individuality is elevated to the position of supreme value and power. . . . For the first time in Western thought the univer sal nature of rational and ethical Individuality or personality is explicitly recognized.®2 j i Many of the Stoic principles fitted in very neatly with the doctrines of Christianity when the two were brought together in^the latter Hellenic and Roman Eras. j The Epicureans made little contribution to the ! individual-society problem. They sacrificed family, com munity, and state to simple satisfactions and painless- ness.1 1 The only way the Epicureans had open to society was through a social contract idea upon recognition of the advantages which come from establishing communities. They i actually held aloof from public life as much as possible. Plutarch, as Eby and Arrowood point out, was "the 611- chief writer on education for many centuries•** He was largely interested in the leisure class and apparently never considered the individuals relationship to his society. His attention to the individual was confined to discussions of the importance of good habits and the development of human faculties. 62 Joseph A. Leighton, The Individual and the Social Order (New York: D. Appleton and Co., 1926) , pp. Warbeke, op* cit.. p. ** 08. ^ _______^L.Eby_and_Arr.owoodop.._ cit*.f-p*—508.-------------- " 95 i The Early Roman period* In the early period of Roman history educational ideals and aims were purely Roman* The i i t Roman as such has never been noted for his reflective | thought, but for his powers of organization and transmis- ( i sion* It is only natural, then, to find no concerted j i philosophical works upon which to base a discussion of this j period* One must look directly to Roman life, as historians i have pictured it, to see the relation of individual and society. Early Roman life was actually not too far removed from that of primitive societies in social outlook. Wilds points out this fact in his history of education: *?The aim | of early Roman education was to repress the freedom of the individual in the interest of the state, to make a nation of brave warriors and of dutiful citizens.1 ^ The major differ ence between primitive and early Roman life was the role of the family in the latter. The authority exercised by the head of the family (patria potestas) was second only to the power of the state* It was absolute over all the mem bers, the power of life and death, thus the strength of the Roman family throughout history and particularly during early Roman history. The family performed all of the Wilds, 02. cit., p. 121. primary functions such as the rearing of children, but also ; performed others: “Work, worship, moral standards, public duties, personal rights, social status, and history all , 66 i centered about the family." j The emphasis upon the family by the Homans provided i one of the most important of their contributions to Western t i social thought. As has been noted, the strength of the family institution has been essential to the development of an awareness of individuality and a consciousness of the 'possible roles of the individual in society. The later Homan period. In the later period of Homan history the influence of the Greeks was paramount in i the field of reflective thought. As Dobson has said, "From i about 100 B. C. onwards, roughly, for two centuries, we find 67 Roman education running closely on Greek lines •" So evident was the Greek influence that it is easy to forget that there were a few Roman educational philosophers. Of these Cicero and Quintilian are notable. Cicero's political and philosophical works show markedly the influence of both Aristotle and Plato, 66 Eby and Arrowood, op. cit., p. 527# Dobson, o|>. cit., p. 10**. ...----------------------------------------------- particularly the latter. For one of the most important of j these works was titled "Republic and Laws,” an indication j that it lacked the originality of its models. There are j some notable differences, however, between Cicero^ thoughts and those of his predecessors. It has been noted that both! ! Plato and Aristotle held highly nationalistic views. j Aristotle had felt that the Greeks were superior to other peoples and were actually entitled to hold them as slaves. In contrast, Cicero spoke of one commonwealth of which both gods and men are members. He also said: And so, however we may define a man, a single definition will apply to all. This is a sufficient proof that there is no difference in kind between man and man. . . . In fact, there is no human being of any race who, if he finds a guide cannot attain to virtue. This is certainly a concept of the equality of all mankind, something Cicero definitely added to the ideas he took from Plato and Aristotle. Cicero also spoke of the natural tendency for love of fellow men in “On Moral Duties*1: Mature with the aid of reason likewise binds man to man, unites them by the bond of language and of Z Q I Cicero, “The Republic and the Laws,** Great Politic cal Thinkers. edited by William Ebenstein (New York: Rinehart and Company, 1951), p* 13** ♦ I " 98: i social life, inspires them with a strong love of j offspring, and impels them to multiply the occasions ) of meeting and consorting with their fellows.69 j Obviously he viewed society as a natural development rather | than an artificial creation. Ebenstein in his book Great ! ' Political Thinkers sees the idea of love in Cicero as pointing "forward, toward Christianity, rather than back* ; ward, to Plato and Aristotle. He points out that "the sentiments and instincts of man are, for Plato and Aristotle* no more than the raw materials out of which creative reason 71 molds social and political institutions.1 * For Cicero love: | might also be a measure whereby institutions of society j could be judged. In this way the individual and his worth became more important. Since Cicero was widely read after his death, his contribution to the concept of the unity of 1 mankind is undeniable. Like those of Cicero, Quintilian's writings were very popular, particularly during the Renaissance period. His primary interest was in literary education; his sole contribution to concepts of the individual and society seem to be in his emphasis upon the ethical nature of the j ^ Cicero, "On Moral Duties,** Basic Works. edited by Moses Hadas (New York: Random House, 1951), p. 9# Ebenstein, ££• cit., p. 12b* ?1 Loc._cit.________________________________________ individual orator,'72 and upon public as opposed to private 1 education* In the latter area, he commented upon one of the problems which arise out of differing concepts of the j nature of the individual and society* Quintilian felt that ! i public education was undeniably superior to private eduea- j tion in the home *?3 j After Quintilian, it is evident that increased state control followed increased state support of education* The Emperor Julian insisted that appointments to public teach ing positions be approved by him. Christians were prevented from holding these positions* Valentinian revoked Julian’s decree, but he along with Valens and Theodosius continued to exercise close control over education*^ Although the Romans added relatively little of importance to the concepts of the Greeks relative to the individual and society, they contributed much to Western thought by way of their tolerance* Despite the close con trol held over education by some of the later emperors, the ^2 Quintilian, Institutes of Oratory, translated by John Selby Watson (Londons Henry G* Bohn, lo56), II, p* 391* 73 Ibid.. I, p. 18. 7 Eby and Arrowood, op. cit., p. 563; William Boyd, The History of Western Education (Londons Adams and Charles : Black, 1950), p* S7* lOOj i Homan period generally must be acclaimed for the freedom of 1 r thought and religion permitted to the individual. I VI. SUMMARY j In later Athens the Sophists, beginning with the i ! i moderate individualism of Protagoras, overemphasized the V individual apart from his social context* The introduction of relativism into ethics and politics, the denying of any objective social good, was responsible for a decline in moral and social responsibility* The Sophists, however, despite their crudeness and excesses, were making the first j real effort toward individual determination* I The individualism of the Sophists was opposed in Athens by the disciplined socialism of the Pythagoreans and by Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle* The great Greek trium virate of philosophy sought to establish a common measure to take the place of the individual one attributed to Protagoras* Socrates strove to get his contemporaries to think critically about individual and social problems* As Plato presented him, he was definitely opposed to the unchecked individual* However, his personal example of i individual courage and his refusal to accept without ques- i tion a society thrust upon him have been an inspiration to J individualists throughout history. J Plato wanted a rational order* He set forth two j such orders in the “Republic” and the “Laws,” the former of , which is generally accepted as the more challenging philo- j i sophically. Society for Plato was Society with a capital S.' Though he expressed a variation of the contract theory for its origin, he made its purpose, the good life, & priori* He made man and society organic as contrasted with the instrumental view of society held by the Sophists. For Plato the individual was the raw material of the just state. His repudiation of the family struck a blow against individ-j uality. His support of state education made him one of the outstanding advocates of public as opposed to private con trol. I i Aristotle had more feeling for the individual than did Plato, but his emphasis, too, was upon society. Through the greatness of his powers of organization he effected a j better organic harmony of man and his society than his predecessors. He considered education a state function and presented, like Plato, a completely nationalistic approach i to social philosophy. < In the Hellenistic era there were few contributions j ! to individual-society concepts apart from the Stoic emphasis! i j upon the brotherhood of all men. The early Romans are | notable for their emphasis upon family life. The later j I -102 I Romans were content to follow the Greeks# Only one of the i Roman educational philosophers stands out from his hack* ground# Cicero, though he followed Plato and Aristotle in much of what he wrote, gave renewed strength to the concept i ' of the equality of mankind earlier expressed by the Stoic, j Zeno. He stressed the importance of brotherly love, and ini i so doing forshadowed the impact of Christianity upon Western culture. Chapter V will continue discussion of the historical [ background of the individual-society problem in educational philosophy, covering the period from early Christianity to * the Reformation# 1 CHAPTER V | i CONCEPTS OF THE INDIVIDUAL AND SOCIETY FROM I l EARLY CHRISTIANITY TO THE REFORMATION | i Stoicism had widened the Greek concepts of the individual and society from nationalistic ones to principles of universality* - In so doing, it had prepared the way for Christianity, a force which was to dominate the thinking of the Western world for many centuries* In its beginning, Christianity was essentially a personal religion which held new hope before the Individual man* Arising from its roots i in the Hebrew ethos, it found a world literally waiting for it. To get close to God the man who followed Greek philos ophy needed rationality* With Christianity, he needed only i to open his being to God* Greek philosophy appealed to the elite, Christianity to all individuals* Christianity thus did much to counteract the aristocratic principle of Greek philosophy through its exaltation of the common man* When the Greek City-states collapsed and the Hebrews lost their independence, man's intimate relationship to the j state had been lost* As Eby and Arrowood point out, the j . . • t greatest need of the ancients was a method to increase the scope of the individuality engendered in such a way as to "balance the desires and needs of the individual with the « — f iwelfare of society as a whole.1 1 They write: j i The human spirit cannot he permanently content * within circumscribed bounds of any civic op social i institution or conventional patterns. By virtue of his power to conceive the universal, manfs thought and action became potentially infinite. Loyalty to the ■ group is a vital educational force in the more primi- i tive stage of society, but as man's experience | broadens, he becomes conscious of an imperative mission i to a larger whole. Differences of race, class, nation- j ality and creed may divide men on the lower levels of , life, but all such divisive factors must be subordi nated in the moral universe. Jesus revealed the Kingdom of God or of Heaven, as the most comprehensive form of human society.2 j Whether one sees religion as divine or man made, there is no denying the appeal of Jesus' teachings to the individual, i no escaping the social force of the Christianity which won j the Western world in his name. Most historians feel that the influences of i Christianity, particularly the teachings of Jesus himself, were of great importance in harmonizing the individual and society. All do not agree, however; Gibbon had linked religion with barbarism in his account of the decline and fall. Frazer takes up his idea, favoring Greek and Roman Influence: Frederick Eby and Charles F. Arrowood, The Develop ment of Modern Education (New York: Prentiee-Hall, Inc., j 19^5), pp. 202-£83. i ( 2 Ibid., p. 582. 10? Greek and Homan society was built on the conception ; of the subordination of the individual to the community . of the citizen to the state; it set the safety of the ; commonwealth, as the supreme aim of conduct, above the i safety of the individual whether in this world or a | world to come. • • • All this was changed by the spread of Oriental religions which inculcated the communion of j the soul with God and its eternal salvation as the only objects worth living for, objects in comparison with which the prosperity and even the existence of the state sank into insignificance. . . . A general disintegra tion of the body politic set in. The ties of the state and the family were loosened: the structure of society tended to resolve itself into its individual elements | and thereby to relapse into barbarism. In their anxiety to save their own souls and the souls of others, they were content to leave the material world, which they identified with the principle of evil to perish around them.3 There are elements of truth in Frazer’s attack. Too often j the Christians were content to excuse this world in favor ofj the next. However, there are several erroneous premises evident here which should be pointed out. First of all, Frazer does not seem to consider the fact that Christianity j came to incorporate much Greek and Homan philosophy. Secondly, it is assumed that harmony between the ideas of saving the soul and serving one’s fellows does not exist, when actually the two in the teachings of Jesus are inseparable. Thirdly, Frazer has implied that Christianity i destroyed Greece and Rome. In this view he does not have 3 Sir J. G. Frazer, The Golden Bough (London: The Macmillan Company, 191*0 , I, pp. 300-301. the support of* accepted history today* Toynbee points out I i that Greece had fallen and that the seeds of destruction j i were already sown in Home before Christianity arrived on j the scene*** As may be seen from the Frazer statement, Christianity, perhaps unfortunately, has not meant the same • thing to all men* It has undergone during the centuries ( many developments and modifications* It is impossible in this investigation even to attempt to present all of these* j i Only the major currents and changes, and then only as they affect the relationship of individual and society, can be considered* This chapter will discuss the problem of the individual and society from Early Christianity to the Reformation, considering not only some concepts arising from and allied to Christianity, but also some of those which diverge from it. I. THE TEACHINGS OF JESUS PERTAINING TO INDIVIDUAL AND SOCIETY AS SEEN IN EARLY CHRISTIANITY Jesus Christ presented what is merely a basic frame- ! work for the tremendous structure of Christian theology and philosophy* In spite of the transcendent being he is k Arnold J. Toynbee, Christianity and Civlliy.atinn (Wallingford, Penn*: Pendle Hill, 19**?) , pp* l*»-lf>* believed to have possessed, he led according to the Gospels : a relatively normal life, being far from an ascetic.^ Unlike f 1 John the Baptist, he made no attempt to withdraw himself j i from society* He remained in it as an example of how it 6 might be good and yet be the normal life for man* i I Central to all of Christ’s teaching was the father- j son concept of relationship to God* Boots of the social concept are found in the Old Testament* For example, in Isaiah one finds: ”His name shall be • • • the everlasting 7 Father.*1 In Psalms is written: f l Like as a father pitieth 8 | his children so the Lord pitieth them that fear him*1 1 The question is asked in Malachi: ’ ’ Have we not all one father? hath not one God created us? why do we deal * i treacherously every man against his brother by profaning 9 the covenant of our fathers?” Yet the father idea in the Old Testament was incidental to the idea of God as a pro vider of law* Jesus’ idea of the Father was that he is loving and understanding, not stern and forbidding* The 5 Matthew 11:19* ^ John 17:1?5 Matthew 5*1*+* ^ Isaiah 9s6. 8 Psalms 103s13* 9 Malachi 2:10. fatherhood of God also meant the brotherhood of man* Together these two aspects of the one concept brought a new dignity to the human individual, whatever his social status j apart from Christianity. The love of the Father brought him into the unity provided by the father-son concept, not i his own intellect as had been the case with the Greek. As a matter of fact, the intellect availed nothing without humility. The differences among men according to the early Christian view were not nearly so important as their essen tial relatedness. Christ rather emphasized the humble qual ities which even the lowest have in common. In the Sermon i on the Mount he saids Blessed are the poor in spirits for theirs is the kingdom of heaven. ' Blessed are they that mourns for they shall be comforted. Blessed are the meeks for they shall inherit the earth. Blessed are they which do hunger and thirst after righteousness: for they shall be filled.10 Though Christ stressed the brotherhood of men, he did not claim men to be equal mentally or physically. The parable of the talents proves that he recognized how men 11 differ in their abilities and aptitudes. To him they were entitled to equal consideration from each other. His Matthew 5s3-6. 11 Matthew 25:1^0. concept of equality of Individuals was equality in God*s sight; it was a recognition of the absolute value of j in itself * It gained a value infinitely greater than that ' j of any material object* Christ admonished his followers j their souls. In Matthew he said: j Lay not up for yourselves treasures upon earth, where moth and rust doth corrupt, and where thieves break through and steals But lay up for yourselves treasures in heaven, where neither moth nor rust doth corrupt, and where thieves do not break through nor steal*12 Later he added, 1 1 But seek ye first the kingdom of God, and ; ■ i his righteousness; and all these things shall be added unto If Christianity developed an individualism of its own because of the emphasis upon the worth of the individual soul and the steps which must be taken to guard it, it was a completely different one from that of Sophist Greece. Jesus stressed continually the principle of self-realization through ministering to the wants of others: “Inasmuch as ye have done it unto one of the least of these my brethren, ye individuals* In Christianity the human soul became an end not to let material things interfere with the salvation of ^ Matthew 6:19-20. 13 Ibid-- 6*33. have done it unto me.” But it shall not be so among you: but whosoever will be great among you, let him be your minister; And whosoever will be chief among you, let him be your servant: Even as the Son of man came not to be ministered unto, but to minister, and to give his life a ransom for many.1? i Love or charity was a keynote of early Christianity, Jesus said, "By this shall all men know that ye are my 16 disciples if ye have love one to another," Paul poeti- , cally summed up charity as a basic relationship between individuals: Though I speak with the tongues of men and of angels, and have not charity, I am become as sounding brass, or ! a tinkling cymbal. And though I have the gift of prophecy, and understand all mysteries, and all knowl edge; and though I have all faith, so that I could remove mountains, and have not charity, I am nothing. And though I bestow all my goods to feed the poor, and though I give my body to be burned, and have not char ity, it profiteth me nothing. Charity suffereth long, and is kind; charity envieth not; charity vaunteth not itself, is not puffed up; rejoiceth not in iniquity, but rejoiceth in the truth; beareth all things, ! believeth all things, hopeth all things, endureth all things.1? Christianity with its basic principle of love sets 1 an exceedingly high standard for the individual to maintain,; llf Ibid.. 25:**0. Ibid.. 20: 16 John 33:35. I Corinthians 13:1-^, 6-7. i n ! i i In so doing, it has directly affected society* Hash calls } attention to a widespread effect of Jesus' personal example: Ho man of our breed and culture can possibly look upon his own life with the self-satisfaction natural to the Greek and Homan* For, thanks to Christianity, j it has become almost an instinct with us to measure ourselves not by ourselves, and not by our neighbors, | but by God, by the infinite good.10 j Thus it can be seen that early Christianity was at once within itself deeply personal and deeply social* Leighton points up this fact* He also indicates addition of some thing new to Jesus' teachings: The individual must freely accept the exalted and j exacting ideal* He must be ready to subject all his j natural impulses, to give up all worldly values and interests, to forsake if necessary his possessions and even his family, and to seek above all else inner purity of motive ana aim, absolute integrity of pur- i pose, complete spiritual freedom, to the end that he may become perfect as God is perfect* On the other hand, this personal ideal finds expression in this service of his fellows, in a life of complete good will, fellowship, cooperation, forgiveness, and for bearance* The individual must be ready not only to forget himself, but to sacrifice himself, if necessary for the cause of the Kingdom.1' The Pagan Morld, particularly through the Stoics, hac, moved in the direction of universal brotherhood* Even before Christianity certain distinct improvements had been 1 Q H* 3* Hash, Genesis of the Social Conscience (Hew York: The Macmillan Company ,~lS97) > pp. 136-137* * * * 9 Joseph A* Leighton, The Individual and the Social Order (Hew York: D. Appleton and Company, 1926) , p. 71* 112' 20 made In human relations; however, because the time was | I ripe and because its message was clearcut, early j Christianity made greater progress* Some of its historians , attribute practically all social reform to its teachings. For instance, Leeky praises most highly the soeial impact of early Christianity: | i The high conception that has been formed of the sanctity of human life, the protection of infancy, the elevation and final emancipation of the slave classes, the suppression of barbarous games, the creation of a vast and multifarious education of the imagination by a Christian type, constitute together a movement of philanthropy which has never been paralleled or approached in the pagan world. i Perhaps this praise is somewhat premature. In any case, it embodies the potentialities of the doctrines taught by Jesus. If all of the early promises of the movement have not been fulfilled, it at least has given mankind a splendid example of his inherent possibilities for establishing com pletely harmonious relationship between the individual and his fellows in society. 20 W* E. H. Lecky, A History of European Morals from Augustus to Charlemagne (lew York: B. Appleton and Com pany, 1929), passim. 21 Ibid.. II, p. 1*3. i i j i II. CHANGES IN CHRISTIAN CONCEPTS AFTER CHRIST ; i For many years following Jesus, Christian church members lived almost in daily expectation of the institu tion of the Kingdom of God upon earth* This fact had encouraged Christians to take little part in government and / social institutions other than their own* little attempt i had been made to harmonize Christ's teachings with current philosophy5 few if any concessions had been made to living with the Homan Empire* In time, however, Christianity, through its absorption of many different elements was expanded not only to include a social philosophy but also 1 i to harmonize with certain basic tenets of Greek philosophy and Roman bureaucracy* St* Paul in Chapter 12 of I Corinthians pointed out the individual differences among men; and using the analogy of the body, clearly established for Christianity the organic concept of society* He wrote as follows: That there should be no schism in the body; but that the members should have the same care one for another. And whether one member suffer, all the members suffer with it; or one member be honoured, all the i members rejoice with it* > How ye are the body of Christ, and members in j p a r t i c u l a r . I 22 I Corinthians 12:25-27• I ' ii¥l I i fhls Is the organic concept akin to that of Plato and i Aristotle. It foreshadowed a definite tread in Christianity to accept wherever possible Greek scholarship. ! ! Despite the opposition of such men as Tatian and Tertullian, such other men as Justin the Martyr and Clement of Alexandria began the wedding of Pagan philosophy and j Christianity. The conflict represented by these church men j has been repeated at regular intervals throughout history, but the trend has always been toward amalgamation, even though occasionally there has been evidence of conflict. Saint Augustine is known widely as one of the early church fathers in whom ancient thought met smoothly with j Christianity. i Joseph Leighton identifies two distinct additions to Christian concepts of the individual ass (1) 1 1 the growing dominance of the dualistic asceticism with its withdrawal from the world into the monastic life” and (2) "the over- 2 1* emphasis of mystic and magical union with the Godhead.” 1 These changes he attributes to strains of Neo-Platonism and I 25 Stoicism. They are not inherent in Jesus. j 1 ________________ i 23 Robert Nlich, History of Educational Thought (New York: American Book Company, 19^*5) > PP* 77-80. 2k- Leighton, op. cit., p. 82. _______25 Ibid., p. 78*________________ : All scholars have not approved of the new elements added to Christianity* Eby and Arrowood, for example, feel that the change from the simple doctrines of Jesus to the complex Christian theology was an unhappy one for the Thus it came about that the new movement for the higher evolution of emotional and ethical life, which promised to bring goodwill, democracy, and universal brotherhood among men, was diverted by the rationaliz ing spirit of Greek philosophy and the organizing genius of Roman bureaucracy* The high ethical idealism and pure altruism of Hebrew prophecy and Christianity were so buried under credal formalism and hierarchial regimentation that they have not gone far in altering man's natural disposition.2® There is much truth in this statement; yet it should be pointed out that a syncretic Western culture was being formed, and it was inevitable that no pure strains would be preserved. In justice to Christianity as modified by Greek concept of the community of mankind during the Middle Ages of history* Ulich emphasizes the tremendous socializing !power of Christianity: It was Christianity and its organizations which in the period of the migration of the nations and in the following centuries tamed hordes of warriors, comforted people in their suffering and set up spiritual standards individual and society thought, it should be pointed out that, with all its changes^ and corruptions, the Church afforded still the most clearcut ! ' ............................. ' ' l l g I in a world of b r u t a l i t y . | I III. CONCEPTS OF INDIVIDUAL AND SOCIETY 1 i DURING THE EARLY MIDDLE AGES Christianity had begun with great hopes for a rebirth of society through recognition of each individual1 s duty to every other individual. Partly through absorption of con cepts inherently foreign to the teaching of Jesus and partly through the formalization of the Church which occurred with application of the Roman penchant for organization, thj i freshness of individuality that characterized early Christianity was lost. As Jesus* earthly mission receded into history and the church became ever larger and more inclusive, formal creeds and rituals, hierarchies and regi mens began to channel the individual and his efforts. In education liberal training of individual powers gave way to pO instruction for church leadership. The Middle Ages found the individual pretty well restricted by the group. As Graves points out: The watchword was authority and the conformity of the individual to the model set. .... Assimilation and repressedon are thus the key to the Middle Ages, and until the bondage to authority, convention, and Ulich, op. cit., p. 86. Eby and Arrowood, op. cit.. p. 626. 117 29 I Institution was broken, progress was impossible. i Between the collapse of the Roman empire and the movement of Scholasticism there was little written on the I subject of education, especially things which might be con- j strued as educational philosophy. There was undoubtedly too much conformance to pattern for such to be considered ! necessary. Apparently those writers who did venture forth j considered themselves to be interpreters and organizers of earlier creators. Augustine and Boethius stand out in the i early middle ages as the major transmitters of Greek thought. The former definitely leaned toward Platonism, though he somewhat modified Plato's concepts with his Christianity (or vice versa). Instead of seeing the peace which a good state brings as an end in itself, he made it a means of approach to God. Boethius sought to harmonize Platonism and Aristotelianism, but leaned definitely toward the latter and so foreshadowed the coming of the Scholasticsj Of the great social and political developments between the seventh and eleventh centuries, three should be mentioned as affecting the individual and society directly. These were the extension of the Catholic Church to all of Western Europe; the social, political, and economic . ^ Frank P. Graves, Education before the Middle Ages (New Yorks The Macmillan Company, 1909) ? p. 3*____ _____ ___ 30 organization termed feudalism; and the Crusades. Whereas j the result of the Crusades was to widen the experience of ! men and thus expose them to the relatedness of their { i fellows, affording opportunity for concepts of universality^ the end results of the feudalism and Catholicism of the early Middle Ages seem to have militated against individ- ! uality. The former, stressing class and rank, perpetuated a repressive social system that denied most individuals the opportunity of making their utmost contribution* The latter, overlapping with secular authority, was equally conserva- 1 tive. It is true that feudalism and the church provided { ) some protection of the individual and also a social stabil ity. The feudal system was not without emphasis upon cour- j tesy and chivalry, rights and responsibilities; however, this emphasis was not effective until the later period of the middle ages brought to bear the influence of the Cluny monks, the later Cisterbians, the Franciscans, and the 31 Dominicans. And while there was charity in the Church, there was only a limited amount of social concern. i McGiffert says in speaking of Medieval Christianity* O A ! Eby and Arrowood, op. cit., p. 667• ^ Radoslav A. Tsanoff, The Great Philosophers (Mew Yorks Harper and Brothers, 1953)> pp. 176-177. Charity there might be in plenty and even philan thropy, but to think of so transforming the world as to make charity and philanthropy unnecessary was impossible* In this connection Christ1 s words, tThe poor ye have always with you,* were sadly abused as an explicit prophecy of a necessary and permanent social situation*^2 IV. CONCEPTS OF THE INDIVIDUAL AND SOCIETY IN .THE LATER MIDDLE AGES Realism and Nominalism. The primary method of scholars and educators of the Middle Ages after 1200 was the dialepjfcIc. .method• Loftie, especiall3^fQrmal~logicr held the center of^ the stage. The name Scholasticism has been given to the movement-which respited^from-scholar*s atten tion to authority and primary use of deductive reasoning. Early Scholastics opened up a philosophical problem which is central to any discussion of the individual and society, that is, the problem of the realityof particularand uni versal ideas. Here, under different names, was a form of the age old problem of absolute truth versus^relative truth. Here was a problem which impinged upon the two major his torical concepts of society, the organic and the instrumen- i tal. x I ^ Arthur Cushman McGiffert, The Rise of Modern Religious Ideas (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1925), p. 256. The Realists, those who held that universal ideas have a reality . pfLtheir own at „ first _predominated over the j Nominalists , those who held that universals are merely names. Realism hadjbeengiyen great impetus in the Middle Ages by Augustine. During his time, philosophy meant \ Realism. His beliefs were that universals "subsist apart from the world of particular colours and shapes and 3*4- sounds.1 1 This extreme Realism had come down from Plato \ through Neo-Platonists. A moderate Realism had also been derived from Aristotle’s form-matter concept. This type of Realism acknowledged reality in both the individual and the universal. It was another way of stating the organic con- " ^ cept of the individual and society without denying an instrumental value to society. In one form or another, Realism was dominant in the Middle Ages 5 its ramifications were particularly evident in medieval society: Garre calls attention to this facts Corporations were prior to individuals, as the universal was prior to its particulars. Dominating all activities there was the pervasive and unifying reality of the Church. And numerous institutions, the Papacy, the great monastic orders, the ecclesias tical schools, the universities, the towns, the ^ ££• ante, pp. 24—26. ^ Meyrick H. Carre, Realists and Nominalists (London: Oxford University Press, 194*6), p. 36. 121”! guilds, the manors, and many other corporate personal!-i ties expressed the medieval confidence in Realist prin- | ciples*35 - j But there were those who questioned the priority of institutions over the individuals therein, who took an instrumental view of the individual and society* These i nominalists termed universals as mere names, acknowledging individuals alone to have reality* Roscellinus and William of Ockham were characteristic of this group, as Averroes and William of Ghampeaux were characteristic of extreme Realists, and Albert us Magnus and St* Thomas Aquinas, of moderate Realists* At its extremes ; Realism~denied human freedom and ... * ~ ' f individuality. At its extremes Nominalism denied order and 36 ‘ purpose to the universe. Abelard saw the need for moderating Realism, of grounding reality in the nature of \ individuals* He sought a middle path nbetween a Realism that severed-bhe uni^rsal^and Jhejarticular^ and a 37 Nominalism which abolished meaning•t f It took Saint Thomas Aquinas to give full expression to moderate Realism, however. ^ Ibid.. pp. 37-38. 36 Leighton, op. cit., p. 92* Jf Carre, pp. cit* r p* 63. 122' The work of St. Thomas Aquinas. In any consideration ! of culture In the Middle Ages, St. Thomas Aquinas is a | principal figure. His contribution to Western social and i educational philosophy was a harmonious and fertile combina-, i tion of the concepts of Aristotle and Christianity. In a general sense, he attempted to reconcile the absolute approach of the latter with the golden mean of the former. - - i He attempted also to reconcile the rational with the revela- tional. It is. true that in constructing his unity, he left out a few parts. The combination is not perfect; sometimes " ! St. Thomas was forced to choose concepts from one system, | i other times from the other. The result, however, provided a! much more happy union than the earlier one of Christianity and Plato. It provided a better basis for working out har- t monious relationships between the individual and society. Aquinas was a moderate Realist. To accept Aristotle i he had to accepttheform-matter concept, but in the matter of individual and society, he leaned somewhat more toward the individual than did Aristotle. The Greek philosopher had presented an organic view of society. Aquinas* view, despite his Realism, was more instrumental. Though he would call society an organism from the point of view of form (since he believed that large units are made up of an j j organized hierarchy), he saw it as an instrument from the point of view of purpose. In his essay 1 1 On Princely i Government ,1 1 he wrote: I Man then needs guidance for attaining his ends. . . . It becomes clear-that man is naturally a social and political animal, destined more than all other animals to live in community. . . . One man alone would not be able to furnish himself with all that is ! necessary, for no one man*s resources are adequate to j the fullness of human life.38 4 i Having thus established society as the natural order for men, Aquinas added, "So in addition to the motives of interest proper to each individual there must be some prin- 39 ciple productive of the good of the many.1 1 From this statement he proceeded to the conclusion: 1 1 It is clear thatj a king is one who rules the people of a city or a province j L.0 1 for their common good.1 1 Later he wrote the key statement:; "The final object of human association can be no different *fl from that of the individual man*1 1 De WUlf declares this principle of the state existing for the good of the citizen to be a clearcut statement by Saint Thomas of the guiding 1+2 principle in Scholastic social philosophy. Mien Aquinas i ________________________________________________________________________________ I 3^ A. P* D'Entreves, Editor, Aquinas: Selected Politi-I cal Writings (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 19hB), p* 3* ! 39 Ibid*, p. 5* ! i 1+0 Ibid., p. 9. Ibid.. p. 75- i ' lf2 Maurice De Wulf, Philosophy and Civilization in | !the Middle.Ages (Princeton: Princeton University Press, i 11922)-,_p._221.------------------------------------------- — l established that not only was virtuous living the end or 1*3 ■ the individual, but Mpossession of God,1 1 he was able, by | i means of his strategem of making society an instrument of j God, to resolve the problem of authority and make the j i states and their rulers instruments of God* Aquinas could j not accept society as a final end in itself, as an ultimate j i purpose. It must be directed toward the higher end* I definite values in the individual, but when he spoke of the final object of society being the same as the final object of the individual, he was not giving recognition to immedi ate individual, objectives, which may be transitory and unworthy* To Aquinas the existence of the state for the individual was not a matter of providing for individual license. He very carefully distinguished common welfare and individual interests The common welfare of the city and the individual welfare of one person are distinguished not only by a quantitative but also by a formal differences for the common welfare is different in nature from that of the individual, just as the^nature of the part is different from that of the whole.w This principle he also applied to his concept of the nature L.0 J William Ebenstein, editor, Great Political Think ers (New York: Rinehart and Company, Inc., 19f>l) , p* 217* ^ D’Entreves, op* cit.T p. 165* 125 i of laws | Since every part bears the same relation to its whole as the imperfect to the perfect, and since one man is a part of that perfect whole which is the j community, it follows that the law must have as its * ^ ! proper object the well-being of the whole community.^? ; In actual application, St, Thomas Aquinas, like | Aristotle, was conscious of natural inequalities among men* i In referring to this matter, he said, “For men of outstand ing intelligence naturally take command, while those who are less intelligent but of more robust physique seem 1*6 1 intended by nature to act as servants.1 1 This is not the doctrine of Christ, but a derivative of Greek philosophy. It is a continuance of the idea of a natural aristocracy, | which the Greek tradition in the Middle Ages continued to ! i i support, despite the basis of Christianity. It has been pointed out that Saint Thomas modified the heroic stand of Jesus by an application of the mean of Aristotle. In at least one instance, he not only changed one of Christrs concepts, but fell short of Aristotle in so doing. Reference is made to the early Christian concept of love for one*s fellow men. In this matter Saint Thomas took | the commandment for man to love his neighbor as himself, and ^ IMS* > P* in* ^ Ibid., p. 101. I 126 placed his emphasis upon the latter half of the injunction, putting love of self above love of neighbors. ' Similarly t in the matter of loving one's enemies, he advocated loving ; i them for the sake of God but was half-hearted in urging that the individual love them for his own sake. 1 l In the final analysis, though he was favorable to thej i individual, Aquinas, like Aristotle focused upon society and God more sharply in the ascending order of that hierarchy. His philosophy is an ingenious effort to combine the general i and the particular, to establish a reality for both. To an extent, it is an effort to harmonize the instrumental f approach with the organic. William of Ockham. The work of William of Ockham is notable for his revival of Nominalism. Until Ockham, Realism had dominated its opponent. Ockham himself admitted W Realism to be the prevalent mode of philosophy in his day. He attacked it unhesitatingly, however, claiming that universals are merely terms that have no existence in real ity. As such he called them signs representing many L7 ' Anton C. Pegis, editor, Basic Writings of Saint Thomas Aquinas (New York: Random House, 19^5) , cassim. k-8 Carre, op. cit.f p. 107* 127 individual objects* In The Seven Quodlibeta he declared, j 1*9 ' ! l But everything outside the soul is individual." This j concept makes experience direct* Nothing stands between experience and the object of experience* For Ockham, then, I i it was possible to comprehend the individual object directly* This view was in opposition to Saint Thomas* i idea that only universals yield knowledge, that all one can know of the individual object is what can be abstracted from it* like all Nominalism, Ockham's attacks corporations i and institutions as ends in themselves* Such have no j i priority over individuals, no reality apart from the j j individuals who compose them* Such a view shook Scholastic i cism (with its emphasis upon institutions) to its very foundations* It placed an emphasis upon individuality which heralded the awakening of interest in the individual so marked in the Renaissance* It naturally forwarded the instrumental concept of the relationship of individual and society. In his book Ockham Studies and Selections, Stephen Tornay quotes from Ockham's Dialogue, as translated by him, the following ideas relative to society: ^ Richard McKeon, editor and translator, f , The Seven Quodlibeta," Selections from Medieval Philosophers (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1930), II, p. 361. j 128 I All men were created equal as to what concerns the sustentation of the body, the procreation of children, the contracting of matrimony or observing virginity ! and such others*50 | Tornay says that Ockham held that in the state of nature j 51 f , nian is not obliged to obey man but God alone*1 1 He j points out that Ockham felt that it was necessary for man to establish the state by a ^general compact of human 52 society*” In espousing the contract theory of society, William of Ockham had picked up an idea first advanced by the Sophists. Plato had mentioned it in the Republicf but had not developed its implications* This idea of Ockham*s 53 is prophetic of Rousseau's Social Contract. j j Thus Ockham foreshadowed by his emphasis upon the i individual, as contrasted with the corporate body, the ! writings of the great educational philosopher Rousseau. In his work are found, as well, the seeds of the Wominalist theories so evident in later British Philosophy, particu- 9* larly in the educational philosophy of John Locke. It is Stephen Chak Tornay, Ockham Studies and Selections (La Salle, Illinoiss The Open Court Publishing Company, 1938), p* 80. 51 Loc* cit. 52 Ibid., pp. 80-81. j | 53 ££• post, p. 167. ! 51 * 1 I ££. j 2£Si, p. 159. : in his theorizing in the field of pure philosophy that i i i Ockham's greatest importance lay. He actually made only i slight organized application of his principles in specific j philosophies, but he alerted thinkers who followed him to | i the tremendous problem inherent in the Realism-Nominalism | i controversy—-a problem which recurs in one form or another at regular intervals in the history of Western thought. V. CONCEPTS OF THE INDIVIDUAL AND SOCIETY DURING THE RENAISSANCE AND THE REFORMATION The Renaissance and Reformation are generally thought * of as overlapping and coexistant historical periods during which the emphasis of Western thought shifted from authori tarianism to rationalism, from the corporation to the individual, from the religious to the secular. There is truth in this set of opposites despite the fact that the Renaissance and Reformation developments were already ger minating during the Middle Ages. This study has already pointed out that the latter medieval attitude stressed not only the institutions of society, but also the value and personal significance of the individual. The Realism- Nominalism controversy has been noted as proof of the fact i that medieval scholars were deeply concerned with estab- i i i lishment of harmony between the individual and society and j so were anxious to give proper recognition to each aspect* Such late Medieval writers as Dante and Marsilio of i Padua were actually preparing the way for the Renaissance i Reformation age* Dante's separation of theology and i philosophy as equal and independent in his Be Monarchia is | i a link to the growing Renaissance idea of the subordination j i of theology to philosophy. Even more than Danta, Marsilio ! had sought to break some of the traditional bonds of his period. He established the principle that the ruler governs by the will of the people and stressed method of government above object of government in The Defender of Peace* But though there were in the Middle Ages many fore- j runners of Renaissance and Reformation ideas, though there ! i were many liberal aspects of the systems of the Scholastics,1 though there were men like Ockham, the general tone of Christianity as the basis of medieval life had become ultra conservative* This fact was evident in both Church and State. Hierarchies had been built up to harmonize Christianity and the secular world. Both Church and State had become so traditional!zed and institutionalized that i I the "Revival of Learning" which ushered in the Renaissance | seemed like a sudden and fresh awakening to principles of j individuality. F. J. C. Hearnshaw stresses the impact of the Renaissance and Reformation as follows: 131 Mediaeval Christendom had been, in theory if not in i fact, a unitary commonwealth under the dual authority | of Pope and Emperor, each representing one aspect of ! the Bivine Majesty wherein ultimate sovereignty resided* Within that commonwealth the interests and activities of the individual were subordinated to the good of the Christian community as a whole* • • • The Benaissance | saw the establishment of the secular state as the pri mary political unit; the Reformation saw the emergence of the individual as his own philosopher and priest.?? It was inevitable that two such basic movements, themselves1 the result of earlier Greek and medieval thinking, should produce profound changes in later political and social theory. The Benaissance* The Benaissance has been described as “the attainment of self-conscious freedom by the human 56 spirit manifested in the European race.1 1 Certainly men of the period continually emphasized human dignity. Their oratory and literature exalted man. Typical of expressions glorifying man was that of Pico della Mirandola: The nature allotted to all other creatures, within laws appointed by ourselves, restrains them. Thou, restrained by no narrow bonds, according to thy own free will, in whose power I have placed thee, shalt define thy nature for thyself. . . . Nor have we made thee either heavenly or earthly, mortal or 55 j. p. c. Hearnshaw, editor, The Social and Politi cal Ideas of Some Great Thinkers of the Renaissance and the Reformation (Hew York: Barnes and Noble, 19^-9) > p. 30. 5^ J. A. Symonds, Benaissance in Italy (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1883) , I, I*. 132 I . ! immortal, to the end that thou, being, as it were, thy I own free maker and natural molder, shouldst fashion thyself in what form may like thee best. Thou shalt have power to decline unto the lower or brute creatures,; or to be reborn unto the higher or divine, according to ! the sentence of thy intellect.57 ( i In Benaissance education the individual was given special attention in the new humanist schools. | Vittorino da Feltre harmonized individual worth and develop ment with Christian society in his school at Mantua. Leone Battista Alberti elevated the family over the state as the social institution to guard individual welfare. Petrus Paulus Vergerius and others recognized and estab- 58 lished individual differences as an educational principle, j The awareness of human power so evident during the Renaissance period resulted in production of many Utopias. Notable among those of that period or immediately following are More1 s Utopia. Bacon*s New Atlantis, and Harrington’s Oceana. Each of these sought to establish man’s way to perfection, primarily through exercise of his own powers, rather than through divine grace. Each envisioned a per fect society of human beings who could become godlike through their inherent potentialities. i ____________________ j 5? ibid., I, 1*9. i ^ W. H. Woodward, Vittorino da Feltre and Other | Hnmaniat Educators (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,i 1905), p. 109. Giordano Bruno, perhaps the outstanding philosopher I l of the Renaissance, had established new concepts of univer-! sality of God and his influence. He spoke of Mone matter, I one power, one space. . . . God and Hatare everywhere J 59 equally#*1 This was a philosophy of infinite perfectibil- • ity. Its optimism concerning man and his possibilities found many echoes in Renaissance thinking. In keeping with this concept, Jean Bodin defined sovereignty so as to interpose no church authority between God and the develop- 60 ing national states. He did not clearly establish sover- I eignty in the people, however, although his concept was a ! 1 move in that direction. The man who most clearly placed it in the people was Hugo Grotius. During the Renaissance he sought to establish some sort of law which might govern individuals and societies as well. He was unwilling to derive this law from God, but did so from man’s social nature. In establishing law as arising from the basic character of man, he was harking back to implications of the Stoic concepts of universality of man. i 59 I J. I. McIntyre, Giordano Bruno (Londons Macmillan; Company, 1903), p. 181 * - . 60 Ebenstein, op. cit., p. 327. ! 13 V; I As Tsanoff has pointed out, every school or Greek j philosophy had its adherents and its opponents during the j 61 i Renaissance, In this respect Humanism was truly a revival i of classical learning and philosophy. The factor which | i differentiates the Renaissance from other periods was pri marily the cited special emphasis upon human potentiality j ! which gave rise to Utopias, new ideas of education, and new concepts of law. Men with widely differing backgrounds alike contributed to the force of the movement. It is per haps the fact that Renaissance thinking had no common back ground, no systematic structure, which proved its ultimate I weakness and its final undoing. Initially the emphasis of the Renaissance upon the individual was most beneficial. It freed men from many undesirable fetters. But like the stress placed upon the individual by the Sophists, it went to extremes. The fine balance which must be maintained between the societal and the individual aspects of man was not established. Eby and Arrowood, at the end of a chapter in which they refer to the Renaissance along with Fifth Century Greece and early V Christianity as scaling 1 1 the highest peak of creative 62 genius,*1 deplore the fact that the age degenerated even ^ Tsanoff, on. cit.. p. 233* 62 _ Eby_and_Arrowood ,_op._cit ._,_p._-837_.___________________ __ 135! I as it developed: i The Renaissance was marked by an exaggerated I individualism* The theory of education did not fail to emphasize the social aspects of life* Worthy citizenship, home membership, and social intercourse were strongly presented. But the social education of the time was incapable of overcoming the spirit^of the age that was predominantly individualistic.^ The Reformation* The Reformation, overlapping as it did with the Renaissance, affords both contrasts and com parisons with the latter* 1 1 lake the Renaissance it was a movement of resistance to discredited authority and a demand 6b for direct self-expression of man’s spiritThe Reform ers, however, were strenuously opposed to what they con- I i sidered a shallow concern with this world displayed by men j of the Renaissance* There was a considerable degree of the doctrine of human depravity in the Reformation idea of equality of man that made it different from the Renaissance idea* There was a feeling that too much glorification of the human individual could be only at God’s expense* All men were equal in the sense of needing God and his grace* In that light worldly rank was of little consequence* The final result of such doctrines was much the same, though, as 63 ibid.. p. 939; j 6h i Tsanoff, on* cit*. p* _237*_______________________ 1 136| i those of the Benaissance to which they were related— -the \ inference of a democratic social order. Emphasis upon the individual showed itself in i Reformation thought to be an effort to make religion a per sonal matter, to make more intimate the individual*s rela tionship to his God. It tended to remove the corporate i church as a social institution from the essential unity. I Both Galvin and Luther placed the individual layman as close to God as the priests of the Church. In so doing they reaffirmed Jesus* doctrine of the essential equality of every individual, the right of every man to be next to God. j Both Luther and Galvin stressed the inability of man j to effect his own salvation. In this belief they differed from Melanchthon and Erasmus who, perhaps because of their I classical backgrounds, insisted upon the importance of j human free will* In the sense that it sought a return to the early Christian faith, the Reformation was the religious aspect of the Renaissance* However, the movement became allied with various other social forces of the time. While being i j very radical in his religious views as to the rights of the | i individual, Luther was very conservative politically and 1 ! _ | opposed social revolution. Calvin, on the other hand, admitted “the right of resistance to tyrannical rulers, 137 provided that resistance was in the hands of magistrates and themselves in the Huguenot massacre in France. Following pseudonym of Stephen Junius Brutus. It stressed the ideas • of contract in society and the trusteeship of rulers as j well as the idea of resistance to tyranny. This document | exerted considerable influence upon Locke and Rousseau through its championing the principle of individual consent and therefore must be regarded as a definite contribution I of the Reformation to concepts of the individual and society Early Christianity, especially the teaching of Jesus, was based upon the absolute equality of individuals and the concept of brotherly love. The doctrine of man as a son of God made all men brothers before God and enjoined them to act as brothers. Relatively soon the simple teachings of Christ were augmented by Greek philosophy through the syn theses of the apologists who fused the pagan and Christian j into the medieval man. Augustine had favored Plato in his , the unsuccessful efforts of the Huguenots, the pamphlet r l A Defense of Liberty against Tyrants” was published under the ~ i 3 8 i I system; St* Thomas Aquinas found in Aristotle the way to j 1 intellectual!ze the Christian concepts. | In the early Middle Ages little was written which j 1 may be classified as educational philosophy. Feudalism and j 1 the beginnings of many corporate social institutions arose, j A few seeds of the Realist-Nominalist philosophical contro-{ 1 versy are found during this period* In general the age was ; one of conformance to authority by the individual. In the later Middle Ages came the great scholastic movement so typified by the work of Saint Thomas. In many ways it stressed the value and significance of the individ- j ual, but always as a part in a definite hierarchy. The Christian Church had become extremely corporate in nature and extremely conservative. Because of the inherent limi tations of the period and because the movement was too formal and too tied to interpretation of the past rather than creation, Scholasticism made only nominal contribution to understanding the nature of the individual and society* Saint Thomas Aquinas and others made an amalgamation of Aristotle, Christianity, and Stoicism which served as a working foundation for later periods. An examination of j Aquinas’ work shows a close attention to Aristotle, at the | I expense of the original simplicity of Christianity. Aquinas j leaned somewhat more toward the individual than Aristotle, j 139 however. He kept an organic view of society, while at the same time making society an instrument of God for bringing I i man into his grace. The Realism versus nominalism controversy, which , became quite prominent in the later Middle Ages, involved the very philosophical basis of many current problems related i to the individual and society. The proponents of each view were primarily concerned with a formal and often hair splitting disputation of the matter, and consequently over looked possibilities for direct application of their con cepts to ^social conditions about them. The controversy has | i established, nevertheless, a rather extensive philosophicalj basis for the semantic problem at the root of much disagree ment and misunderstanding concerning the relative roles of individual and society. The Renaissance and Reformation were extremely important to the development of both individual and society. These movements are inseparable, so closely are they inter woven. Both emphasized the individual, the former generally glorifying him, the latter frequently concentrating upon his innate depravity and sinfulness. Fortunately each, taken in retrospect, was antidotal of the ill effects of the other. Together they revived the Greek and early Christian concepts of individual worth and advanced a recognition of the rights of the individual not to be submerged in soeiety The power of individual reason was stressed by the Renaissance, the importance of the individual conscience by the Reformation# The excessive individualism which j developed during the Renaissance was distasteful to the Reformers because of its worldly implications# Their reac tion counteracted personal freedom with personal responsi bility# In the Renaissance and the Reformation many ideas were advanced which had tremendous influence upon John Locke and Jean Jacques Rousseau, notably the ideas of social contract and trusteeship# Chapter VI will discuss the concepts of the individ ual and society which were presented by the writings, par ticularly the educational philosophy, of Locke and Rousseau# CHAPTER VI THE CONTRIBUTIONS OF JOHN LOCKE AND JEAN JACQUES ROUSSEAU TO CONCEPTS OF THE INDIVIDUAL AND SOCIETY In the preceding chapter, this study considered the evolution of concepts relative to the individual and society during the period from early Christianity to the i Reformat ion. The present chapter will discuss such con cepts in the work of John Locke and Jean Jacques Rousseau. In addition it will point out some of the specific back ground to their thinking as evidenced in the writings of such men as Francis Bacon, Thomas Hobbes, Bene Descartes, Johann Comenius, and John Milton. Among post-Ref oxmation philosophers who are interest ing because of philosophical comparisons with or contrasts to the educational philosophies of Locke and Rousseau, Bacon stands out as a forerunner of seventeenth century emphasis upon man's social nature. In his New Atlantis and other writings he had highlighted man in social context. Bacon recognized the individual's obligation to society as ( that of the part to the whole. Despite individual interests,1 • I each man in Bacon's concept must give way to the larger j interests of society. Bacon was violently opposed to the ; i formal deductive logic of Aristotle's method as outlined In| the Organon* however, and his support of Induction and I i scientific experiment for many centuries gave him a plaee in history which rightly belongs to Locke, because of his i more systematic philosophy* One of Bacon's major contributions to social thought! was his concept of the Idols* He referred to the Idols of the Tribe, Idols of the Cave, Idols of the Market Place, and Idols of the Theater* All of these are false notions in men's minds* The Idols of the Tribe arise from human nature and from the race* As Bacon said, they are "aeeord- j ♦ i ing to the measure of the individual and not according to the measure of the universe*" The Idols of the Cave are ! the false notions arising from the individual himself, his peculiar background and special prejudices* The Idols of the Market Place are the semantic difficulties which block understanding* The last set of idols are Idols of the Theater* These are the dogmas of philosophical systems* Bacon Insisted that all classes of false notions "must be renounced and put away with a fixed and solemn determination 1 Francis Bacon, "Novum Organum*" Modern Classical Philosophers* edited by Beniamin Rand (New Yorks Houghton Mifflin Company, 192*0, pp. 31-32* m-3 2 before entrance into the 'kingdom of man#1" In this manner he foreshadowed Locke, who spoke out against dogmas and empty words in human relations* He also opened the way for Rousseau's censure of the society of his day as a cor ruptingof inherently good individuals# Thomas Hobbes was a definite background influence for both Locke and Rousseau, though his primary ideas differ considerably from the doctrines of either# He differed from Locke in that the latter has inspired not absolutism but democracy# Hobbes * materialism was nominal- istlc, though, and so related to Locke's opposition to the doctrine . of innate ideas# Both men started with nature, yet Hobbes was definitely pessimistic as compared to Locke# Too, Hobbes was not specifically concerned with a theory of knowledge as was Locke# Rousseau afforded similar like nesses and differences# His man was a natural one, but the nature in which he lived was not the jungle in which Hobbes' man fought with tooth and claw for his existence# In his Leviathan Hobbes set individuals in conflict with each other# Seeing them as equal, he also saw them 3 desiring the same things and therefore against each other# 2 Ibid., p. b7* . Thomas Hobbes, "Leviathan," The English Phlloso- phers from Bacon to Miil? edited by Rdwin A# Burtt _CNew_Yorks— The.Modern Library, 1939),-pp* 159-160#------ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Xlflf His concept of government was absolutist or at least the effect of his doctrine has been to strengthen the position of absolute states. Actually Hobbes1 society did not com- j i pletely submerge the individual* He retained the right to j fight society which endangered his life* How Hobbes9 savage! man rises to make a social contract is a questionable point j i in his doctrine* It is this contractual source of society 1 which separates his absolutism from modern totalitarianism, | b however, according to Ebenstein* Rene Descartes was hailed as a great influence not only by Locke, but also by Rousseau* Locke declared that Descartes9 writing was the first to turn his interests to philosophy* Rousseau expressed similar enthusiasm. Actually, however, their emphasis upon experience attacked the rationalism of Descartes* He apparently had little interest in social problems* The concern for social prob lems expressed by Locke and Rousseau make it clear that, although their interests may have begun with Descartes, they are hardly disciples* The sense realism of Johann Comenius9 psychology was more definitely reflected by Locke and Rousseau* All three started with and emphasized nature* Comenius radiated ** William Ebenstein, editor, Great Political Thinkers (New Yorks Rinehart and Company, Inc., 1951), p* jb2. mystic piety and brotherhood of man* He advocated education t for everyone regardless of social status* Before Rousseau, I he “intimated that the school system should he adapted to the child rather than the child to the system*1 1 But he saw too the fact that education is the means of improving j ( society through improving individuals* Universal public | ! education was his dream* Though Comenius* direct influence was limited, he certainly contributed to the ideas of Locke, Rousseau, and others, and so exercised tremendous final effect* John Milton, the last named thinker who stands in the background of Locke and Rousseau, characterised the ! seventeenth century trend of movement from the later j Renaissance humanism to sense realism* He favored a broader humanism in education, opposing narrow Ciceronianism* In this trend he anticipated Locke9 s rejection of narrow humanistic education* In social philosophy he recognized that government in his day had lost the divine sanction which had forced all men to follow it* He saw each individual as having both rights and duties as a social being, but he attempted to set up inner compulsion in place , s of Three Centuries Frank P* Graves, Great : : The Macmillan Compa _ of the outer compulsion to social effort which had lost its ! force. I. LOCKE'S CONTRIBUTIONS John Locke cannot be claimed by the field of educa tion alone; his stature as a major philosopher of the English language is far too great. It should be noted, however, that Locke is by right of his definite concern with problems of education correctly termed an educational philosopher of considerable rank. As an educational i philosopher, Locke was deeply aware of the problem of rais- i ing men from the state of nature to the state of society. I i Basically this is the problem of education, whether it be I education in the family, in the school, or in society at large* Locke's great Influence is not due to radical out look. As a matter of fact, the general tone of his work is one of toleration and peaceful compromise. Locke was impressed by the Reasonableness of Christianity, as his selection of that title for a work indicates. He felt that the Christianity of Jesus without the dogma of the Church provided a peaceful atmosphere. Consequently he continually searched for a reasonable basis apon ahich all might agree I in the solution of educational and social problems. His ideas about nature, man, and society were keyed to human needs in practice. By his refusal to proceed from axioms I i and first principles (but rather from experience) he shook loose many of the fetters of the past; however, his calm ness of judgment, his moderation, and his willingness to reserve judgment prevented the alarm which generally greets| change in patterns of thought. The works of Locke with which this study is primar ily concerned are his Essay Concerning Human Understanding. Some Thoughts Concerning Educationf Conduct of the Under standing T and two Treatises of Government. The first of these works presented his theory of knowledge. It is a frontal attack upon the doctrine of innate ideas. In the second work Locke presented his concept of the education of a gentleman. The ideas expressed therein differ somewhat from those of the third work, which more nearly coincides with Lockef s basic philosophy as expressed in Essay Concern ing flwman Understanding» In the Two Treatises of Govern ment Locke established himself as a fountainhead of liberal- . . i ity in social philosophy. A consideration of the works i mentioned proves Locke to be a fruitful intellect in the | evolution of concepts relative to the relationship of the individual and society. I Any discussion of Locke's social ideas must start, naturally enough, from his basic philosophical position. This foundation becomes clear after an examination of the Bssay Concerning Human Understanding. This study has already mentioned the influence of William of Ockham upon ! Locke and other British thinkers. In the Essay Locke ! .... i revealed his nominalist background. In the first of the four books he attacked the doctrine of Innate ideas as follows: For, first, it is evident, that all children and idiots have not the least apprehension of thought of them: and the want of that is enough to destroy the universal assent, which must needs be the necessary concomitant of all innate truths: it seems to me near a contradiction to say, that there are truths i implanted on the soul which it perceives or under stands not; imprinting, if it signify anything, being nothing else but the making certain truths to be per ceived* No proposition can be said to be in the mind which it never yet knew, which it was never yet con scious of.® By ruling out first principles and axioms, Locke left only relativity. He confirmed this fact by pointing out in Chapter III that all men do not recognise such moral principles as faith and justice and further that moral prim- ciples cannot be Innate since they need proof. He 6 John Locke, jyi Essay Concerning ffuman Und erst f i nd- j ing. edited by A. S. Pringle-Pat t is on (Oxford: The Claren- | don Press, 192*f) , p. 18. ! ^ Ibid., pp. 2S*r&9. explained the reason for belief in innate principles in concluding Book I by sayings I When men have found some general propositions that j could not be doubted of as soon as understood, it was, I I know, a short and easy way to conclude them innate* ! This being once received, it eased the lazy from the j pains of search, and stopped the inquiry of the doubtgul concerning all that was once styled Innate In Book XI of An Essay concerning Human Understanding Locke stated that all ideas come from experience* Here was expressed his tabula rasa concent of the mindvs being like a sheet of white paper, “void of all characters, without 9 any ideas*1 1 The knowledge men obtain, he said, comes from 10 either of two sources s sensation and reflection* Leibniz saw in the specification of reflection as one source an admission of the principle of innateness* However, Locke took such care in Book I to refute innate ideas that the assumption of Leibniz seems unjustified even though one should believe that Locke admits a certain amount of j activity in the understanding* In the process of combining | ! and relating ideas he implied that there are certain inherent powers of the mind* 1 1 " ■ •mmmmmmrnm 1 1 1 ■ ' | " ' " J . . . . 8 IfeM-, p." ‘ n. ^ f p. ^2. I I 10 Ibid.. pp. k3-kh. This repudiation of innate ideas and the tabula j theory have definite implications for concepts of the i individual* If the mind at birth is as a blank sheet of j i paper, ready for the imprint of experience and education, j all are equal in the sight of society* The religious doc* I i i trine of original sin in the individual is thereby repudi ated, for he and his nature are easily changed. In Book III of the Essay Locke followed Ockham in the emphasis on the particular, the individual, as opposed to the general, the corporate body* His concept of words as the signs of ideas established the majority of them as general terms instead of names for particular things* But he stressed the reality of particulars, stating that c , the genus, or more comprehensive, is but a partial conception of what is in the species, and the species but a partial 11 idea of what is to be found in each individual* ' * This doctrine reverses the emphasis of the Realists* It pre paredthe way for Kant9 s refusal to see the individual serve as the means to society. In Book IV of The Essay concerning Human J^dgrstgnd* i ing Locke confirmed the reality of knowledge only “where 12 ideas agree with things•” This point is an important 11 Ibid., p. 250. ______ 12 Ibid. . p. 287._____________________________________ - foundation for a social and political philosophy. It 1 I challenges theory without practice* It repudiates lip ser- j i vice* In the final analysis It demands that social benefits; be real In meeting the needs of Individuals* It Is a prin- ; j clple which condemned the otherworldllness and social I Impracticability frequently evident In Medieval Christian society* It has also condemned Locke's own failure later ! i to provide for adequate mass education* In his theory of education for the gentleman Locke, as might be expected, Is definitely concerned with the i individual educand* This point of view certainly was in | i keeping with the English tutorial system in which he j dabbled, but it was also consistent with his basic philoso- { phy as presented In the Essay* His system in short aimed 15 at a sound body and a sound mind, ^ the harmony of the I physical and mental in the individual* He opposed body 1^ punishment as a source of unsocial conduct, feeling that desirable social conduct must be willed by the individual and can never be forced from him* In Some Thoughts concern ing Education the effectiveness of desire for social status | ^3 John Locke, “Some Thoughts Concerning Education,H Locke Selections * edited by Sterling P* Lamprecht (New Yorks Charles Scribner's Sons, 1923), p* 3* lh Ibijfl., p. 5. was established* As Frederick Mayer says, Locke “almost 15 ^ anticipated Rousseau1 1 in his emphasis upon social status | and recognition of human integrity* Thus he respected the individual, and in educational philosophy worked for his liberation from any unnecessary bonds* 1 Locke Vs stress upon formation of good habits has frequently been overemphasized to the point that some 1 authors, particularly the older ones, have referred to 16 LockLan education as “Education as discipline.“ Similarly there are those who take Locke's statement that if gentle* men are “once set right, they will quickly bring all the 17 rest into order*1 ' as contradictory evidence of oligarchy and absolutism* They also point out that his “Proposals for the Bringing Up of the Children of Paupers“ set up a 18 cruel workhouse type of education for poor children* Unfortunately there is no complete defense against this showing of clay feet, except to point out that such inter pretation whether justified or not in fact are not . . i 3*5 Frederick Mayer, & History of Modern Philosophy (New Yorks American Book Company, 1951), p* -19**-# ^ Graves, op* pit., p. 52* j ^ Robert Ulich, History of Educational Thought ! (New Yorks American Book Company, 19^5), pp* 20k-20$* 18 Ibid.. p. 205. ' j consistent with Locke's general philosophy. It Is felt that those who refer to education as discipline are making I a piecemeal application. The charges of oligarchy and absolutism can be answered by calling attention to the fact; that Locke was actually an environmentalist to the extent of declaring "that the difference to be found In the manners and abilities of men Is owing more to their educa- 19 tlon than to anything else.” In this light the reference to 1 1 all the rest” can be mitigated by the opinion that Locke apart from his unfortunate choice of words was merely recognizing the need for some discipline and for good lead* ers which all earthly democracies manifest. The lapse Into workhouse education Is harder to reconcile, however, Locke here apparently forsook his own basic position for the unenlightened view of his age and deserves castigation for . . . 1 such lapse. If he was guilty, as It appears, his own philosophy would convict him for failure to apply to prac tical application that which good theory dictated, just as it convicts all unenlightened practice. Certainly it seems that the kindest thing which can be said of his Proposals i is that they fell far short of what one might expect from a great liberal and practical thinker, despite the fact that they offered some improvement over the status quo. ; i involving as it did delinquency frequently encountered | among poor children of the eighteenth century. j i It is more pleasant to the student of Locke to leavej his proposals for mass education and go on to his Two j Treatises of Government. These have many concepts of ; • ■ > i importance to the individual and society, and consequently for education, despite the political emphasis of the title. It has already been pointed out in the introduction to this chapter that Locke, as well as Hobbes, begins his thinking with nature. "The State of Nature" is his first sub-title, j i In the discussion which follows he revealed that, whereas Hobbes saw the state of nature as one of savage competi- i tion, he saw nature as almost an ideal state, very little different from the state of society. As a matter of fact he envisioned the rights of men as natural rights. He wrotes . . . we must consider, what state all men are naturally in, and that is, a state of perfect freedom to order their actions. and dispose of their posses sions and persons, as they think fit, within the j bounds of the law of nature, without asking leave, or depending upon the will of any other man.2® on John Locke, "Two Treatises of Government," Great Political Thinkers, edited by William Ebenstein (New Yorks Rinehart and Company, Incorporated, 1951)* p. 371* - 155 fills Is an Idyllic state prophetic of Rousseau's f l noble savage" doctrine* In it Locke found an equality of men by j nature* i In order to protect each individual's rights and insure his liberty (Locke was careful to distinguish between! i liberty and license and rule out the latter), he turned to natural law, which he said everyone administerss And that all men may be restrained from invading others rights, and from doing hurt to one another, and the law of nature be observed, which willeth the peace and preservation of all mankind, the execution of the law of nature is, in that state put into every man's hands, whereby every one has a right to punish i the transgressors of that law to such a degree as may | hinder its violation* i Locke did not make clear how the subjective element is i removed from the process of executing the law of nature or how justice rather than brutality is accomplished except to say that severity of punishment will be only to the extent necessary to discourage transgression* Then he turned to say that since "self-love will make man partial to them selves and their,friendss and on the other side, ill nature. passion and revenge will carry them too far in punishing 22 1 others,1 1 civil government is established to avoid the Ibid*, p. 372. 22 IMS* , P. 37^. . - ^ 6, confusion of nature* This idea seems rather strange, as Locke himself | admits; it acts, however, to preserve to mankind a right of ! judgment over the community# He may ask himself at any j time whether or not government justifies its existence as j i an improvement upon the state of nature* It appears from I this idea that society is contracted for on the basis of j its ability to safeguard the rights of the individual* Locke definitely put social contract on the basis of individual assent and retained, as one might expect from t his Nominalist position, the source of social power in the individual* “For truth and keeping of faith,” he said, 1 1 belongs to men as men, and not as members of society* This idea distinguishes Locke's social contract from those of his predecessors* In his, rights are retained by the individuals and are not possessed by both the people and the community* In sharp contrast to Aristotle and Plato, Locke challenged the power of one man to hold another in a state of slavery or the power of one man to place himself in slavery to another* He defined a "state of war,” and dis tinguished it from the state of nature, with which he 23 Ibid., p. 375. 157 2b i apparently felt Hobbes confused the latter. He said that | i a man who seeks a slave places himself in a state of war 1 with his object. It is specifically to avoid war that the individual in Locke's concept places himself in society. At this point it is well to mention the fact that | Locke , as seen by Ebenstein, draws a "sharp distinction j between state and society*Of the two, society is the more inclusive and more lasting entity. It includes the state but is not limited to the state. Plato, Aristotle, and other early thinkers had made no distinction. State and society were to them synonymous. The destruction of ! one was the destruction of the other. Locke's idea has many interesting implications. It establishes society as a higher allegiance than government. It makes possible the changing of the latter without ill effect to the former. Law of the state loses some of its power in that there may be a higher one, that of society. One of the most interesting ideas expressed in the Two Treatises is the function of society as a protector of i the property of the individual* The individual's property, according to Locke, starts with his own person. He wrote: 2h Ibid., pp. 375-377. 25 Ibid.. p. 369. i$8] I i Though the earth and all inferior creatures be common to all men« yet every man has a property in his own person * This nobody has any right to but himself* The labour of his body and the work of his hands, we may say, are properly his. Whatsoever, then, he removes out of the state that nature hath provided and left it in, he hath mixed his labor j with it, and joined to it something.that is his own, j and thereby makes it his property.2® ! Thus the individual has in himself the foundation of I property. In the natural state he has the power to pre- i serve his property, to protect it against all others. When society is formed by compact, Locke said, individuals turn over the protection of their property to the community, j which he pointed out cannot exist where it does not protect j property. Locke detailed the function of society as I follows: i And thus all private judgment of every particular member being excluded, the community comes to be umpire, by settled standing rules; indifferent, and the same to all parties* • • *2? | Later he added: Wherever therefore any number of men are so united into one society as to quit every one his executive power of the law of nature, and to resign it to the public there and there only is a political or civil society. ° 26 ibid., pp. 377-378. 27 Ibid., p. 381. 28 Ibid., p. 382. ; j - 15£ I It is obvious that Locke visualized the protection of i property as the chief purpose of forming a society# It is : I for this protection that individuals turn over to society i many of their powers. Theoretically it might seem that men in society have j fewer rights than men in a state of nature, since they have j surrendered many of them; however, in actuality the man in society is far better off because of the security he has gained. His rights are more effectively exercised. Conse quently Locke saw societies as a distinct improvement upon natural states. i In reading Locke's "Two Treatises of Government” one • notices that there is a recognition of more than one society*! When Locke did use society rather than £ society or socie ties he was using the word in a normative sense. Society for him was not Society with a capital as it was for Plato. Since particular things had sharp reality in his system, he spoke of particular societies. Locke's doctrine of society placed the legislature of any society in the key position. The moment it betrays i the trust placed in it by the individual members, it for feits its trusteeship. By this concept Locke gave the i i people the right to rebel against rulers and government, but one must keep in mind his separation of the state and society* The changing of governments must be by organized j process of the society above them* Locke was not giving j i license to mob type rebellion* He said: To conclude, the power that every individual gave the society when he entered into it, can never revert to the individuals again, as long as the society lasts, but will always remain in the community; because without this there can be no community, no commonwealth, which is contrary to the original agreement • • • *2' ! Similarly he stated that when a society provides a ruler or legislative body with power, such power does not revert directly to the society until the period for which it was i given elapses or until the ruler or legislative body betrays its trust. In this fashion Locke prepared the way for the American Revolution, but more important still, by establishing the right to rebel immediately upon mis management , he established an actual deterrent to rebellion* Those in power, under this concept, are forced by the immanent threat of rebellion to safeguard the rights and property of their individual constituents* Prior to Locke, writers who advocated the individual’s right to rebel against discredited authority were on the defensive* Locke i took the offensive in his doctrine, and reversing the 29 Ibid., p. 391. 161 positions, pat the corporate body on Its metal> I k ( Thus Locke managed to be a forward looking thinker j | without actually getting the name of a radical* He cham pioned the Individual throughout his philosophy, but he also carefully pointed out the Individual's need of society; i and the necessity for one individual to harmonize his j rights with the rights of other individuals to the end that in society all individuals might enjoy the greatest possible advantage* He freed the individual from the tyranny of governments but his doctrine impels f < bloodless revolution" as a social rather than anti-social step* The society of i all individuals must act to safeguard the rights of each individual* ! i j II. THE CONTRIBOTIONS OF ROUSSEAU Whereas Locke did not believe man to be naturally good f Rousseau did* This difference in outlook had definite implications for their respective philosophies* Locke had, from the first, recognized the need for society* On the ! other hand, Rousseau's early writings, particularly, deplored the faults of society, which he felt actually corrupted the natural goodness of the individual* It is i * ! this theme which opens Emile: or & Treatise on Education: j i Everything is good as it comes from the hands of the Author of Nature; but everything degenerates in i 162 the hands of man* He forces one country to nourish the productions of another; one tree to bear the fruits of another* He mingles and confounds the ell-' mates, the elements, the seasons; he mutilates his dog, his horse, and his slave; he overturns everything, disfigures everything; he loves deformity, monsters; he will have nothing as Nature made It, not even man; like a saddle horse, man must be trained for man*s service— he must be made oyer according to his fancy like a tree In his garden.^1 Close Inspection of Rousseau's position here reveals that, first of all, It Is hardly consistent within Itself, and secondly that It Is not consistent with some of Rousseau's own writings* How can the individual, born good, when he joins his fellows In a society, lose that goodness? Rousseau did not explain; nor actually did he wish to do away with society* It would appear that his place In the history of Western thought is largely that of emotionalized challenge rather than that of logical organization* He who would find interior consistency in Rousseau will be disappointed, for the prophet of nature has made his Impact upon the civilization he challenged with what are essentially only half truths, and his inconsistencies are infinite* He swung from freedom to authority, from pessimism to 3^ Jean Jacques Rousseau, Emile, translated by William H* Payne (International Education Series; New York: D* Appleton and Company, 1909), p* 1* optimism, from toleration to repression* A systematic exposition of Rousseau’s position is therefore extremely difficult• Strangely enough, the inconsistencies in Rousseau’s ' philosophy of the individual and society are not as dis appointing to readers as Locke's rare lapses. The former radiated such quixotic brilliance, such enthusiastic vigor that his readers forget his logical deficiencies. The latter radiated such calm deliberation, such unbiased wis dom that his readers are startled when they come upon his imperfections* Both men, and both approaches to the solu- | tion of human problems, have their place. It is hard to say which has had the greater influence in men’s affairs. Intentional or otherwise, Rousseau’s exaggeration was needed to secure attention in the society in which he found himself• Locke, it must be remembered, lived for years in liberal Holland before returning to a liberal England. Rousseau came from an absolutist France. The techniques of the two men which finally brought them to world prominence were those most appropriate to getting them an initial hearing within their respective environ- Rousseau literally sprang into prominence when his first work, commonly referred to as Discourse on the Arts ments. and Sciences T appeared* In answering the question Has the I progress of J&a sciences a M arts contributed t£ corrupt ££! i to purify morals? Rousseau began his contrasting of the noble man of nature with the artificiality of society which ; i corrupts him* In his second discourse, Upon the Origin of Inequalities gmong; Mankind. Rousseau again voiced his dis trust of society* He wrote: Such was, or may well have been, the origin of society and law, which bound new fetters on the poor* and gave new powers to the rich; which irretrievably destroyed natural liberty, eternally fixed the law of property and inequality, converted clever usurpation into unalterable right, and for the advantage of a few ambitious individuals, sub jected all mankind to perpetual labor slavery and wretchedness*^^ i Locke had seen law as existing ia nature. Societies j merely took over the enforcing of it* Rousseau, in con trast, saw laws as concomitants of societies to protect property* In the natural state he identified compassion as “a natural feeling, which, by moderating the violence of love of self in each individual, contributes to the preser- 33 vatlon of the whole species*1 1 It would seem that Rousseau used the word compassion in much the same sense 32 Remain Holland, editor, The Living Thoughts of Rousseau (New York: Longmans, Green and Company, 193977 pTM. 33 IfeM*, P. 39. 165 j i in which Lockeused law* j i Whereas Locke felt that the protection of property | i was a natural and justifiable act, for which in truth societies are formed, Rousseau in the Discourses abhorred j the entire business* He spoke out as follows: The first man who, having enclosed a piece of ground bethought himself of saying This is mine* ; and found people simple enough to believe him, was the real founder of civil society* From how many crimes* wars and murders, from how many horrors and misfortunes might not any one have saved mankind, by pulling up the stakes, or filling up the ditch, and crying to his fellows, ’Beware of listening to this imposter; you are undone if you once forget that the fruits of the earth belong to us all, and the earth itself to nobody* •31 * - It is well known that, later, Rousseau accepted the social i i contract theory of the origin of society* The difference in the above idea and that of social compact as desirable is indicative either of contradiction or of growth* In the two discourses the theme of return to nature is complete and unrestrained* In Rousseau*s later works, although the idea was still prominent, sometimes contradictorily so, this stand was modified* Julie (or The Hew Heloise), for example, urged simple, natural living, in so far as insti tutions of society permit* Rousseau gave obviously more recognition to society in this work* At one point he j iSSj wrote, "Justice and the fitness of things require that | everyone should be disposed of in a manner the most advan- | tageous to himself and to s o c i e t y . "35 Like all of his writings, Julie shows the constant j conflict in Rousseau between the individual and society. He said in one parti I am convinced it is not good for man to be alone. Human minds must be united to exert their greatest strength, and the united force of friendly souls, like that of the collateral bars of an artificial magnet, is incomparably greater than the sum of their separate forces.3o In another place he dropped the vision of individuals in fruitful harmony to stress the harsh reality of individuals in conflicts As everyone considers his own particular interest, and none of them that of the publie, and as the Interests of individuals are always opposed, there is amongst them a perpetual clashing of parties and cabals, a continual ebb and flow of prepossessions and contrary opinions.37 Perhaps the contradictlon rests as much in man as in Hous seau. Certainly one must admit that he demonstrates both social and antisocial natures. Rousseau was obviously keenly aware of both tendencies, undoubtedly felt both of Ibid., p. 126. 36 Ibid., p. 129. 37 Ibid., p. 131. .J them himself. In The Social Contract and Emile are Bousseaufs great efforts to spread his ideas. In the former the emphasis is political; in the latter, educational; however, ■ i both are closely related and no more inconsistent with each other than within themselves. Both texts were written in ✓ the same year. Since is best understood in the light I of The Social Contract r this study will consider the political work before turning attention to the educational application of retournez & la nature. The Social Contract begins with Rousseau1s ever recurring lament for the state of the individual. “Man is ! Born free,*1 he wrote, 1 1 And yet we see him everywhere in 38 chains.1 1 This time, however, society received better treatment: “But the social order is a sacred right which 39 serves for the basis of all others.1 1 In Chapter I he declared his purpose as that of discovering the conventions upon which society is founded. Rousseau established the family as a natural society which is the model for political societies. It is 38 ^ Jean Jacques Rousseau, The Social Contract. edited by Charles Frankel (New York: Hafmer Publishing Company, \ 19^-7), P. 5. j 39 Loc. cit. < 168 I I I interesting to see that he mentioned the love between mem- | i bers of the family as the only difference* There are those ; ko who feel that Pestalozzi strengthened a weakness in Rousseau when he declared that only through love can society if 1 i be reborn* Certainly Rousseaufs societies are short on | love* j In setting up the social compact among individuals, Rousseau pointed out that, since no man has any authority over any other man by right of nature, any authority which is exercised must be by convention* He declared: ’Where shall we find a form of association which will defend and protect with the whole common force the person and the property of each associate, and by which every person, while uniting himself with i all, shall obey only himself and remain as free as before?9 Such is the fundamental problem of which the Social Contract gives the solution.4* 2 The individual in Rousseau's system contracts with no other individual, but with the whole society* He stated further: If* therefore, we exclude from social compact all that is not essential, we shall find it reduced to the following terms: Each of us places in common his person and all his power under the supreme direc tion of the general will; and as one body we all receive each member as an indivisible part of the whole.^ j ^ Cf • post f p. 186* ^ Ulich, History of Educational Thought * p. 221* Rousseau, The Social Contract* pp. 1**-15* Ibid.t p. 15. It should be noticed that The Social Contract reversed Rousseau's opposition to the Idea of property as expressed In the Discourses* One of the Important concepts Introduced by Rousseau is that of volonte de tous and volonte generale. The “will . . . V . ■ „ ^ . . I of all” is merely a sum of individual wills; it is not reliable* The “general will” is more than a sum of Individ-! ual wills, being concerned with the welfare of society as a unit as well as with the parts. It is generally felt that this concept (which Rousseau adopted apparently to get a mystical transformation from the individuals in conflict to the individuals in harmony— a problem which concerned him Mt in Julie ) constituted a revival of the organic theory of society which Plato and Aristotle followed as a means of explaining the relationship between individual and society. For Rousseau the concept also served as a way of getting to the idea of the difference between freedom of the individual I in the natural state and the actually greater moral equality and freedom resulting from true social organization. Sbenstein hails the Rousseau of The Social Contract as the Cf• p. l66. Ebenstein, op. cit., p. ^16. Rousseau, The Social ContractT p. 22. first modern to attempt a synthesis between the work of j Aristotle and Plato, which 1 1 emphasized good government at j > . i the expense of self-government” and the work of Locke and j others, who were Mconcerned principally with self- | b? \ government•1 1 The general will was Rousseau’s means of | i getting a voluntary subordination by the individual of his j individual interests to the general interest in the mystical realization that freedom to follow individual Interests is only an illusion and that the only real freedom to enjoy anything is found with a good society* At the end of Book I Rousseau declared: I shall conclude this chapter and book with a remark which must serve for the basis of the whole social sys tem: it is that, instead of destroying the natural equality of mankind, the fundamental compact substi tutes, on the contrary, a moral and legal equality for that physical inequality which nature placed among men, and that* let men be ever so unequal in strength or in genius1 *0they are all equalized by convention and legal right.4** This statement is a far cry from the Rousseau of the Dis courses, but it must be realized that he was here charac terizing the good society and not such artificial and repressive ones as the France of his own day provided* Since The Social Contract is a utopia which discusses Ebenstein* op* cit*f pp* 17-^18* 1*8 Rousseau, The Social Contract T p* 22* primarily the ideal society, one is not to© surprised that j * < in Emile Rousseau9s criticism of contemporary societies I , I should cause him to remove Emile from actual society while | * ] educating him for a place in ideal society* Emile is being educated for a reborn society, and not for Rousseau9s own* In The Social Contract one finds: "The body politic, as ' well as the human body, begins to die from its birth, and | ko bears within itself the causes of its destruction*1 9 y Con* * sequently, the withdrawal of Emile was sanctioned on the basis that a society cannot renew or revitalize itself* ✓ This doctrine as implied in Emile is a distinct weakness in Rousseau9 s concepts, for he never made clear how the mysti cal rebirth of society occurs when the new citizens are i educated apart from reality* Rousseau justified his ignor ing of the social background: In the social sphere, where all have their destined places, each should be educated for his own* If an individual who has been trained for his place withdraws from it, he is no longer good for anything*™ Later he said of his pupil, "Regardless of the vocation of « his parents, nature summons him to the duties of human life* To live is the trade I wish to teach him*1 1 ^ Just how this ........................................................ i Ibid., p. 79. 50 ' « ! ^ Rousseau, Emile* p* 8* | ^ Loo* cit* I aim Is achieved in vacuum is not clear* Ulich has suggested / that the Emile is not to be taken literally in this regard* He declares of Rousseaus “All he needed was an artistic means of explaining to a corrupt society what might be achieved if nature were allowed to take the place of artificiality in education. The emphasis upon nature as a preparation for the individual to take his place in society would indeed be paradoxical* were it not for the fact that Rousseau recog nised in addition* both men and things as educational 53 sources • Since nature is the one teacher over which man has no control, he directed that things and men as teachers should fit in with nature* As an example of this nature orientation* Rousseau advocated that the individual be taught only the natural consequences of his acts until he * reached an age wherein he could grasp the social and moral consequences of them* He saw the age between twelve and fifteen as that in which the powers of the individual are greater than his natural desires* This surplus power is to be used for education by men and things: social educa- Ulich* History of Educational Thought T p« 217* ^ Rousseau* finale* p. 2* All in all, the education advocated in Emile is j i individualistic, that is, the education for men* In the ; last book of the work Rousseau sought to outline a suitable * education for Emilefs model mate Sophie* As contrasted i with the education of the man, the education for the woman i is repressive and completely subjected to the interests of | the other sex: Thus the whole education of women ought to be rela tive to men* To please them, to be useful to them, to make themselves loved and honored by them, to educate them when young, to care for them when grown, to counsel them, to console them, and to make life agree able and sweet to them— these are the duties of women at all times, and what should be taught them from their infancy. Tliis doctrine is characteristically European in outlook* Individuality has there traditionally meant male Individ- * uality* Tn any Individuality is to be suppressed in the woman* One of the most serious educational criticisms directed against Rousseau, in addition to that of repres sing women, arises from his dividing the individual's development into definite periods essentially unrelated to i each other* This arrangement violates the integrity of the individual* Modern psychology denies the watertight compartments implied by Rousseau. However, though some of , Rousseau's specific ideas were in error, he recognised his fallability and recommended thorough study of human nature, j ✓ i In his preface to Smilg he wrote; This is the study upon which I am most intent, to the end that, though my method may be chimerical and ! false, profit may be derived from my observations. I may have a very poor conception of what ought to be done, but I think X have a correct view of the subject on which we are to operate. Begin, then, by studying your pupils more thoroughly* for it is very certain i that you do not know them.?* Thus, Rousseau himself gives the key to his final evalua tion. He is not to be read for a logical system or for ' ! specific answers to specific problems. He was a man of ; emotions who opened up new vistas for human thought. He j posed many problems without adequately answering them, but j he did make other men see those problems in a clearer light. His attempts in The Social Contract to get a harmonious organic relationship between individual and society in the final analysis fell back upon mysticism; his educational prescription for the individual of the new society in failed to grapple with reality. Yet his emphasis upon the worth of the individual man once more, as other such emphases had in past periods, awakened the individual to 55 Ibid.. p. xlii. the ever present danger of his individualityf s being lost in the mas s• It brought attention to the need for a continuous! and delicate balancing of individual and social interests* ! i III. SUMMARY ! Chapter VI has concerned itself primarily with two great educational theorists, John Locke and Jean Jacques Rousseau* In the presentation of the works of these men, it has noted the background influence of Francis Bacon, with his concept of the Idols as false notions which cloud the minds of men and prevent harmonious social relationships . f between individuals* The chapter has also referred to the Leviathan of Thomas Hobbes as a source of fruitful compari sons and contrasts in relation to Locke and Rousseau* All three men started with the state of nature; however, Locke and Rousseau were optimistic in their desire for the improvement of society, and unlike the pessimistic Hobbes, have inspired democracy and liberal education* The challenge to both Locke and Rousseau of the philosophy of Descartes was mentioned* He inspired both i men to turn to the study of their fellows* The sense real ism and the brotherly love of Comenius was cited as a possi ble influence* John Milton, it was established, had antici- \ pated Locke9s rejection of the narrow and confining humanism* Milton clearly saw that the loss of divine sane- ! i i tion of governments meant that eaeh individual must dis charge his social obligations through inner desire rather than outward compulsion* ; i Basically Locke and Rousseau learned toward the | I individual) but both were concerned with the establishment j of proper social relations for his greater good* Both men started with the state of nature, Locke viewing it with natural law already established and Rousseau idealizing it at the expense of the artificial and absolutist society of i his native France* In Locke is characterized the intellec tual and systematic approach, presented with a spirit of toleration and compromise if necessary* In Rousseau is i epitomized the emotional challenge, thrown down without regard to internal consistency and without thought of equivocation* The Englishman by nature, if not by race, strove always for practicality and logical application* The Frenchman was more concerned in awakening his fellows to a problem through a striking presentation of it than he was in presenting a workable solution* j i Locke and Rousseau, both, declared that all men are bom equal* Locke did not believe all men are good by i nature as did Rousseau, but his tabula rasa theory and j repudiation of innate ideas left all men equally dependent upon society and education* Locke saw society arising to i » act as a disinterested judge and a protector of the rights j i and property of individuals* Bousseau at first rejected 1 the idea of property as the source of much human suffering and misery, but in The Social Contract came to recognize the necessity for social compact* He even established the I concept of the general will as a method of bringing the j individual into society or societies which are organie and indivisible* He again proved his dependence upon feeling and the mystical as compared to Locke* j Thus two men, basically different in personality, j made stirring cases for the integrity of the individual and ; set up systems of society in which the watchword was the good of the greatest number of individuals without losing sight of each member’s separate identity and interests* Chapter VII will discuss both the theoretical and i practical gifts to education, and thereby to society, made by two great educational practitioners, Johann Heinrich Pestalozzi and Friedrich Froebel* These men took the theories of Locke and Bousseau and made them working prin ciples in education* THE RELATIONSHIP OF THE INDIVIDUAL AND SOCIETY IN THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF JOHANN HEINRICH PESTALOZZI Perhaps one of the greatest indications that the work of Locke and Rousseau did not directly support license and excessive individualism is found in the fact that Pestalozzl and Froebel, and others of their generally acknowledged followers in practical application have stressed the social context* It was not the individual apart from society or in vacuum with which their concern lay, hut with the individual as a contributing social unit* i Locke and Rousseau had deeply influenced Benjamin Franklin and Thomas Jefferson in America, and Basedow and others in Europe* The efforts of Franklin and Jefferson bore fruit, not only in the field of government, but also in education* They were responsible for establishment of public libraries and for much of the impetus given to liberal public education in this country* They were as different basically as Locke and Rousseau; Franklin looked at education from the strictly utilitarian point of view, theless both emphasized the dignity of the individual* In and Jefferson favored a classical foundation* They never his history of education Ulich has declared: I • • • there are two types of personality without I which no society ©f free and self reliant people can j thrive* One is represented by Benjamin Franklin, the proud * industrious, and thrifty man with a trained and i experienced common sense; and the other type is repre sented by Thomas Jefferson, the highly cultured, yet democratically minded, natural aristocrat* • • • v Basedow was probably the first educator to put prim- j ciples of Bousseau and Locke into practice in European edu cation* His Philanthropinum at Dessau favorably influenced such great thinkers as Kant* It introduced many new ideas i which were extensions of Rousseauism* These ideas were worked out in more detail later by Pestalozzi and Froebel* It is to these two men one must turn to see the most fruit- ' ful practical application of the concepts of the great theorists* Their importance stems at once from their | i enlightened practice and from their influence upon John Dewey and other important modern educational philosophers* This chapter will consider their gifts to society* I. THE WORK OF PESTALOZZI Rousseaufs doctrine resulted in some wild experiments in education, many of them having unhappy results* Undoubt-j edly the most notable follower of Rouseauism was j Robert Ulich, History of Educational Thought I (Hew York: American Book Company, 19^5), p* 257* Johann Heinrich Pestalozzi. It is felt that any considers- \ tion of concepts of the individual and society in educa- j tional philosophy must consider the theory and practice of ' i Pestalozzi because of his profitable adaptation of the j i high-flown and often unreal principles of Bousseau to actual educational situations. Both theorists and practitioners j are required to perpetuate an ideal* But Pestalozzi was no chain-step follower. Though he definitely started from the basic position of his predecessor, he supplemented him con siderably and contributed many ideas of his own. Not only i in education, but also in the fields of philosophy, politics^ j iand sociology, Pestalozzi wrote many small works. His current fame as an educator (though he was in many respects a failure in his own time) has kept most persons from thinking of him in any other setting. Unfortunately many of Pestalozzi•s writings not directly connected with educa tion are unavailable in America for this reason. Pestalozzi showed his dependence upon Rousseau in his earliest work. In his Father1 s Journal he recorded the education of his son a la Smile. His first published work, The Evening Hour of & Hermit* a collection of aphorisms, also reflected Bousseau. In these, however, Pestalozzi J demonstrated his greater concern with actual social prob- ! j | : jlems. Basic to his later comments concerning the I individual and society is his Idea expressed therein that ; man must first learn to know himself. He wrote* ! Why does man seek truth without method and scope? Why does he not search for the necessities of his nature that he may build upon them the enjoyment and happiness of his life? Why does he not seek such truth as gives him peace and enjoyment, which makes him content) which develops his strength) brightens his days and brings blessings upon his years? t Man, driven by his needs can find the road to 1 this truth nowhere but in his own nature.2 Later he added: f , Lack of knowledge of your own nature, o man, curbs your wisdom still more than all external restrictions forced upon you. There is a difference, though, in Pestalozzi1 s approach from that of Bousseau, however much Rousseau may have influenced him. Pestalozzi did not actually respect the natural man out of social context. To him realizing man1 s nature really meant getting to the essential social character of man, which has full opportunity to develop i only through association with other men. A. Pinloche has interpreted this idea as follows* Man left to himself is naturally idle, ignorant, improvident, thoughtless, careless, credulous, timid, ^ Heinrich Pestalozzi, “The Evening Hour of a Hermit,* Three Thousand Years of Educational Wisdom, edited by j Robert Ulich (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 19**8), I p..> 81. 3 Ibid. f b. _____________________________________ and fall of unbounded desires. And the dangers whieh I his weakness encounters, and the obstacles placed in j the way of his desires, make him also tortuous, cun- ’ ning, crafty, suspicions, violent, bold, revengeful, and cruel. That is man such as he would inevitably become if he were abandoned to himself and deprived of culture; he would steal as readily as he would eat, and he would kill as readily as sleep.^ Instead of looking to physical nature as did Bousseau, Pestalozzi turned to the home to develop the individual. Education, begun in the home, not in isola tion from every social institution, is his theme. As Misawa has pointed out of Bousseau and Pestalozzi: In the eyes of both, the course of Nature was divine and inviolable. But while Bousseau sought Nature*s work in the wilderness, Pestalozzi saw it in the home life. It is not physical nature, but a well-ordered home that can become the true cradle and workshop of human nature Misawa is only partially correct in his interpretation. Actually Pestalozzi, when he spoke of nature, was often not referring to physical nature at all. He saw about him an irresponsible nature which was not in keeping with the loving nature posited by Christianity. He would not admit that the apparently blind, disinterested nature which the naturalists acknowledge solely was the only one affecting j ^ A* Pinloche, Pestalozzi and the Foundation of the Modern Elementary School (New York: Charles Scribner * s Sons, 1901), p. 121. ^ Tadasu Misawa, Modern Educators and Their Ideals (New York: D. Appleton and Company, 1909) / p. 12^. man* In Hov Gertrude Teaches Her Children he differen- 1 tiated two forces as follows: Nature, on whom the inevitable laws of the exist ence and consequences of the accidental are based, seems only devoted to the whole, and is careless of the individual that she is affecting externally* On this side she is blind; and being blind, she is not the Nature that comes, or can come into harmony with t the seeing, spiritual, moral nature of men* * * * Men will only become man through his inner and spirit ual life* * * * Mere physical nature leads him not hither.® i Here is mysticism to re-enforce philosophy. Pestalozzi felt free to fall back upon emotion whenever the intellect failed to satisfy* His love for his fellows was so great that he yearned with all his being for the cosmos which his t emotions desired but which his intellect could not prove* j i In Pestalozzi1 s system all human powers are the 7 natural endowment of every individual. Consequently he favored universal education, the development of all men without constraint so that human nature may be at its high est* He declared: The higher purpose of education is to prepare the individual to make free and self-reliant use of all the faculties with which the Creator has endowed him, and so to direct these faculties, that they may perfect Heinrich Pestalozzi, How Gertrude Teaches Her Children (London: George Allen and Unwin, Ltd., 189**), ip* 160. 7 Pestalozzi, Letters on Early Education (Syracuse, New York: C. ¥• Bardeen, Publisher, 189&) , p» 16._________ all human life; each individual* in his proper place* should he able to act as the instrument of the omnipo tent* all-knowing Power that has called him into | being*9 j Opposed to philanthropy* Pestalozzi felt that each individ-! ual must be prepared to stand on his own merits* If he ! loses self-respect* he is unable to help himself; therefore i the worth of each individual is continually emphasized* He said: My countryJ My country! The value to the state of your citizens is no whit greater than their value to themselves* Any faith in the civic value of a citizen who sets no individual value on himself is a dream from which you will some day awake in terror. Any country* but especially a free country* is socially in good health only because of the moral* spiritualgand civic virtues of the individuals that make it up.' } This view is typical of Pestalozzi * s placing of the individ ual over society* He pointed out that states and societies are merely individuals employing their powers together* Consequently he felt that governments and societies have no claim to precedence over individuals* As a matter of fact* he saw society as lacking the desirable instincts of the man himself* It is more apt to err than the individual. He declared: 8 Heinrich Pestalozzi, The Education of M (New York: Philosophical Library * 1951) * P* 31* ^ Ibid* * pp* Mankind in the mass has no virtues; only the ! individual has them* The state as such has none; it merely has the power to use the virtues of its individ ual members*10 Obviously Pestalozzi did not believe in social reform which attempts to start with society in general, as many j varieties of such reform do* He insisted that all worth- i j while reforms must start with the individual* He warned: Those who wish to make the community virtuous and strong* before virtue and strength are developed in the individual may frequently lead the State into wrong action, because they try to fix the external forms of virtue and strength upon men without making sure that the essence of the thing is theirs*11 It is apparent, then, that Pestalozzi saw the true j educator and the social reformer as essentially one* How ever there is no actual foreshadowing of the reconstruction i advocates— Hugg, Counts, and Brameld— and their overweaning ; desire to remake society* Pestalozzi never forced the individual in any way, but only prepared for his unhindered development* Roger BeGuimps has stated of Pestalozzi: In his speeches, in his explanations of his views, and especially in his fables, he is constantly compar ing the education of man, even from the intellectual and moral point of view, to the development and growth of a plant* * • • He even states it once in these words: 9Man, formed from the dust of the earth, grows 10 Ibid., p. kb. 11 J• A* Green, Life and Work of Pestalozzi (London: lUniversity Tutorial Press, Ltd*, 1913), pp*141-1^2* 12 and ripens like a plant rooted In the soli* This Is Pestalozzivs organic theory of development. All aspects of the individual must be developed in harmony. ! The physical, the Intellectual, and the spiritual must j receive equal attention. Only that which affects the totalj i individual is educational* Pestalozzi insisted of education and the individual: 1 1 It must reach his hand and his heart as well as his head. . . . To consider any one capacity exclusively is to undermine and destroy manvs native equilibrium., # ^ In reading Pestalozzi many are initially puzzled as to how he can account for direct influence upon the individr ual, when he insists that growth of the child comes spon taneously from within. How then is it possible to get from the child anything but that which has been enfolded into his nature? Pestalozzi mystically attempts to answer this l1 * criticism with his principle of love* To Bousseau he ! adds this new element, with which he seeks to raise his 12 Roger BeGuimps, Pestalozzi: His life and Work. ; translated by j. Russell (Hew York: Appleton, 1895), p* 123*f ^ Pestalozzi, f , The Swan Song,*1 Pestalozzi»s Educa tional Writings. edited by J. A* Green (London: Edward Arnold, 1916), pp. 268-269* i k 1 Pestalozzi, Letters on Early Education, p. 171j i Pestalozzi, The Education of Man. p. 33* 187 naturalism above materialism. It is through love in the home that the mother educates her children, changing them from primitive to moral beings. It is love which creates a harmony of the individual in society. Here is the Christian concept of love so effective in early Christianity. It is ! the mystical teaching of Jesus forgotten for so long in the formality of religion. If there is love, there will be justice; if there is justice, there will be freedom, 1!> reasoned Pestalozzi. ^ His concept was of active, not passive, love. This point he made clears Love is made up not of words and fancies, but of j man’s ability to carry the world’s burdens, to lessen j its miseries, and to soften its distress. The God of | Love made love a part of the order of things on earth, ; and the man who is at odds with his role in the world, will likewise be at odds with the love of God and of his neighbors. Love that is without force and effect is no love at all.1® Since the God of Love enfolded the nature of the child, it is mainly necessary that there be an unhindered unfolding of the individual. It is unnecessary to forcibly mold the individual to outside desires. Should one feel that this idea is in conflict with Pestalozzi’s statement that primitive man left to himself is weak and subject to 15 Herman Krusi, Pestalozzi: His Lifef Work. §nd Influence (New Yorks Van Antwerp, Bragg and Company, 1875) > p. 113. 16 Pestalozzi, The Education of Man. p. 91. evil, he would point out that only In moral society does the love principle function to raise the individual from savagery• Eby and Arrowood explain the process beginning with home education by which Pestalozzi felt man becomes man: From this close relation to the mother, the infant derives a sense of dependence; and out of this, in response to her care, emerges a feeling of love for the mother* Her protection in time of danger produces a feeling of trust and gratitude. The firmness of the mother in her ministrations stimulates an attitude of patience and obedience. Such is the genesis of the fundamental emotions which make the child human and personal. From these original virtues, love, trust, gratitude, patience, and obedience, develop the higher aspects or the moral, social, and religious life.17 Consequently education is a matter of transfer. The love originally developed for the mother must be transferred to man and to God. For this reason Pestalozzi urged that "the first instruction of the child should never be the business of the, head or of the reason; it should always be the busi~ 18 ness of the senses, of the heart. of the mother.w It will be noted that the love principle in Pestalozzi's work does not actually obviate the need for I direct influence. As Eby and Arrowood noted, he expected Frederick Eby and Charles F. Arrowood. Develo Pestalozzi, How Gertrude Teaches Her Children. obedience, which always implies some molding. The mother finds it necessary to be firm on occasion. Actually Pestalozzi could not get away from the need for compromise. i His philosophy strengthens the case for freedom of the j \ individual, but he was forced to acknowledge that freedom must be balanced with responsibility, lest the freedom of one individual begin to interfere with the freedom of others. The child can be given freedom as he learns how to use that freedom socially and morally* Blind physical nature must not be the guide of the individual, but the mystical nature i of man's kinship to God. In getting the individual from the primitive state to the moral state of relation to God, Pestalozzi viewed the state of society as merely an intermediate level. Conse quently he recognized three types of laws animal law, 19 social law, and moral law. The social law is but a modi fication of animal law and in no manner a moral law. It is obvious that Pestalozzi, having a nominalist bent at least in viewing society, was thinking primarily of the corrupt society of his day. Instead of viewing progress in terms of improving society, he spoke of achieving a state of moral i freedom. The difference is merely one of terminology; he j ^ Krusi, op* cit., p. 108. I I cannot be considered anti-social merely because he was aware of the fallibility of specific societies, even though j he declared: “The social compact is nothing more than a truce, entered into by the animal propensities of all i parties, which would otherwise be at constant war with each 20 other*1 1 Pestalozzi had a utopian view of social better ment which he chose to call moral* Others have used such s phrases as unlimited community, Godlike society, or higher J life* and have meant pretty much the same thing. The word society to Pestalozzi simply had too many unfortunate con notations for him to use it to describe a state of harmony ! with God. | Arising from his idea of the three levels or states was PestalozziY s doctrine of Culture— -Epochs of Recapitula tion. This concept has been discarded generally in educa tion; however, taken in general rather than in specific terms, it has considerable truth. He contended that each individual has within himself the primitive man, the social t man, and the moral man and must pass through the two prior states in achieving the perfection of morality. Regardless of the relative progression of other men or the community generally, an individual will at any one time be in a ! 20 ibid., p. 107. 19lj particular state as refleets his own development. Conse- j I queatly some individuals are moral in a primitive community j * 21 or a social one* Pestalozzi himself had achieved the moral state in a state of mere society* By his example of the selfless i individual he proved all his doetrines in practice* He advocated love, and he loved the children of his schools above his own fortune* In his Inquiries into tfoe Course of Nature in the Development of Mankind he wrote, after point ing out how thousands of men pass their lives in a primitive state: i But one man I know who strove for more; he was filled with an urge for purity and with a faith in mankind such as few mortals know; his heart was made for friendship, love, and loyalty* But he was not made for this world; there was in it no niche for him. And the world, finding him a misfit, did not ask whether he was one through his own fault, or through the fault of others* It crushed him with its iron hammer, as masons who break up a stone to fill the gaps between their 1 bricks* Even so, this lonely man believed in man kind more than in himself, and after untold suffer ing he learned what few mortals will ever be per mitted to learn*22 Approached with the spirit of a Pestalozzi, the j problems of the individual and society disappear* No wonder! 21 Ulich, History of Educational Thought, p* 269. 22 Ibid., p. 270. 192 i i his tomb is marked: j i Savior of the poor at Neuhof, at Stanz the father of orphans, at Burgdorf and Munchenbuchsee founder of j the popular school, at Yverdun the educator of humanity$ man Christian, and citizen* All for others, nothing for himself* Peace to his ashes*23 i i II. THE WORK OF FROEBEL i The educational principles of Pestalozzi were fur- ! i ther developed by two great thinkers of the nineteenth cen tury, Johann Friedrich Herbart and Friedrich Wilhelm Froebel. The former was primarily concerned with the methods of the teacher and specifically with the psychology of education, j Consequently his work is not of particular interest to this j study. The latter, being greatly interested in the edu- j i cand's development and being by nature of his approach a profound educational philosopher, is of considerable importance. Like his predecessor Pestalozzi, he radiated the Rousseau emphasis upon nature, but in so doing he also contributed some new concepts of the individual and society to educational philosophy. He was probably the most origi- i nal of Pestalozzi’s successors. In his autobiography Froebel professed his allegiance to his predecessor. "The watchword of teaching and of i education was at this time the name of Pestalozzi,*1 he wrote* “It soon became evident to me that Pestalozzi was Ok to be the watchword of my life also*1 1 Later he added the i following after a visit to Yverdon: The powerful, indefinable, stirring and uplifting effect produced by Pestalozzi when he spoke, set one*s soul on fire for a higher nobler life, although he had i not made clear or sure the exact way towards it, nor ! indicated the means whereby to attain it* Thus did the power and manysidedness of the educational effort make up for deficiency in unity and comprehensiveness; and the love, the warmth, the stir of the whole, the human kindness and benevolence of it replaced the want of dearness, depth* thoroughness, extent, perseverance, and steadiness*2* Not only is Froebel*s evaluation of Pestalozzi*s philosophy and practice revealing of his subject, but also | of himself* His dissatisfaction with Pestalozzi points up | I his preoccupation with, and penchant for, unity and organ* ism* Having been influenced considerably by the German idealists Fichte and Hegel as well as by the realistic Km Dm F* Krause, Froebel was convinced that everywhere is organization, plan, purpose, and relationship* He chanted, “All is unity, all rests in unity, all springs from unity, strives for and leads up to unity, and returns to unity i I - . ■ — I — . . . ■ I I I 1 . 1 1 1 1 . . . . . . . 1 I Friedrich Froebel, “Autobiography,“ Three Thousand Years of rediaeational Wisdom, edited by Robert UUeh j (Cambridge, Massachuse11ss Harvard University Press, 19^7) > P* 535. ! 26 1 at last.” Applying the unity concept to society and the individual he declared further: j Life in its great as well as in its small aspects, in humanity and the human race as well as in the individual (even though the individual man often wil- j fully mars his own existence)— life, in the present, j the past, and the future, has always appeared to me as I a great undivided whole, in which one thing is i explained, is justified, is conditioned and urged for ward by the other.2/ Here is a strong avowal of belief in the organic eoneept of the relationship of the individual and society, noted throughout this investigation as one of the two general positions taken by social philosophers. j Krause had developed a variation on the form-matter ! 28 concept of Aristotle which he referred to as Gliedganzes. As Eby and Arrowood note, Froebel incorporated this doe- 29 trine into his system. Its use enabled him to assert that every particular has a dual aspect. It has its own unity at the same time it forms a part of the unity of a larger whole. Froebel applied his theme to everything in sight, God, nature, the universe, mankind, the individual, < 26 Ibid.. p. 5fc3. 27 ibid., p. 528. 28 Part-whole. i 2^ Eby and Arrowood, Development of Modern Education. p. 799. education, the curriculum. He coined such expressions as | all-sided connectedness to explain his extravagant unifiea- I tions. The key concept to his crusade, however, was his 1 positing of eternal law in all things and making all things 1 1 in and through God.*1 This belief he claimed is not to be | that he was neither pantheist nor mystic. Yet in «The j Education of Man1 1 he proved himself to be both to the satis faction of most readers. Affirming his belief in unity, he defined the source of it as follows: This unity is God. All things have come from the Divine Unity, from God, and have their origin in the Divine Unity, in God alone. God is the sole source of all things.3U Obviously Froebel was a confirmed if not confessed mystic in his approach to metaphysics. His criticism of Pestalozzi1s lack of logical organization is especially interesting in the light of his own tendency to fall back upon emotions. Certainly he is more systematic than the earlier reformer, but hardly more unemotional. Froebel naturally enough interpreted education in the light of unity and universal organism. His definition of | the process is strikingly similar to Pestalozzi1s. He 30 Froebel, “The Education of Man,1 1 Three Thousand Years of Educational Wisdom, edited by Robert Ulieh (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 19^7)> P« understood as pantheism. He insisted upon technical grounds 196; I wrote; ! i I Education consists in leading man* as a thinkingf | intelligent being * growing into self-consciousness * to & Pure and unsullied* conscious and free representation i of the inner l^w of Divine Unityt and in teaching him ; ways and means thereto* 3 ^ " j Froebel is obviously riding his own particular hobby to the I i exclusion of much else, with the result that his definition! i of how “man becomes man1 1 is primarily a restatement of his metaphysics* i i Just as Pestalozzi had difficulty in exact explana tion of how to reconcile unhindered unfolding of the individual with the direct influence implied by “leading,1 1 so Froebel found consistency in the matter impossible* He j fluctuated between the two poles* It was this dualistic j tendency of the organic concept of individual and society j 32 which John Dewey later criticized* Froebel approached the matter generally with the suggestion that “education in instruction and training, originally and in its first prin ciples, should necessarily be passivef following (only guarding and protecting), not prescriptivef categorical* 33 interfering* “ His emphasis on unity and the priority of 31 Ibid*, p* 551; ££♦ ante, pp* 183-18M*. Cf• post, pp. 216-217* 33 Froebel, “The Education of Man,1 1 p* 55^* the larger whole whole was always present, however, to pre vent giving the Individual his head completely* He hoped i that direct Influence, when needed, could he exercised In such a way as to leave undamaged the individuality of the learner* First, he pointed out that “prescriptive educa tion*1 is out of order before the “advent of self- j consciousness*l,J Secondly, he advocated placing the individual in situations and environments which reveal to him his conduct*1 as in a mirror, easily and promptly reveal ing to him its effects and consequences, readily disclosing j ' • I * , I to him and others his true condition* **~^ He expected that each individual as he therefore becomes conscious of him self will mold himself and obviate the necessity of exterior force* Consequently, Froebel used the term self-activity along with self-determination* Pestalozzi had claimed that the things which are educational are the things which affect the whole individual the things in which the whole individual actively engages* Froebel*s self-activity obviously was intended to encompass ' ! 36 jthe whole individual also, for he had made a much more 35 loc* cit* oA 1 ^ James L. Hughes, Froebel*s Educational Laws for All Teachers (New York: D« Appleton and Company, 1907), p* w. ; conscious effort at organic structure* Actually self- j activity is redundant except as it excludes group activity* I Froebel with his mania for unity undoubtedly did not wish i to rule out concerted action* Perhaps he would have endorsed a Jamesian concept of a hierarchy of selves* Such i would be a means of defending the self-activity concept, i anyway* j The reader of Froebel's work will note that, although the word individual occurs with regularity, there are few references to society. The word unity seemed more than enough apparently to Froebel to symbolize the community* i In fact, he would undoubtedly point out, as did Pestalozzi, j that the state of society is but a lower degree, a rela- ] i tively imperfect state in the hierarchy of unities which are at once a grand unity* Though Froebel's individual is conscious of separateness, he is mystically aware of the greater whole to which he belongs* He veritably aches to 37 identify himself with larger units* Like most mystic doctrines, Froebel's becomes somewhat confusing in its being all things at once to everyone* Resembling Klein's 1 bottle of topological renown, its inside and outside are ........... ii wmm I ^ S* S* F* Fletcher and J* Welt on, editors, j Froebel's Chief Writings on Education (Londons Edward Arnold and Company, 1912), p* 7* one* He insisted: For man, as such, gifted with divine, earthly, and ; human attributes, should be viewed and treated as related to God, to nature, and to humanity; as compre hending within unity (God), diversity (nature), & M individuality (humanity!. well &s also t£g present. pqst f and future *^° Such an approach is invulnerable at least to its author* i It is the sort of thing which if accepted completely must i i be taken primarily on faith and feeling* But men like Froebel and Pestalozzi were convinced that emotion may even be more important than intellect in the solution of prob lems* Had not Pestalozzi pointed up the fact that reason ing does less for the poor than feeling* | The foregoing quotation implies another similarity to Pestalozzi* Froebel, too, held the Culture Epoch or Recapitulation Theory* His reference to Mdivine, earthly, and human attributes1 1 indicates that just as Pestalozzi recognized the primitive, social, and moral aspects of every man’s nature, so he accepted an evolutionary develop ment that each individual must pass through* At some points in his writings Froebel kept his Culture-Epoch ideas in general terms* For instance, in one of his letters he established three stages of individual development seen not | only in particular men but in the race* These he termed Froebel, “The Education of Man,1 1 p_*_561 stages of unconsciousness or mere instinct, vague feeling or progress toward the third stage ©f conscious intelli- geace. Such an idea appears quite defensible* However, elsewhere Froebel announced: MIndeed, each successive generation and each successive individual human being, inasmuch as he would understand the past and present, must pass through all preceding phases of human development and ko culture* ♦ • *t t This statement is much more specific than any of Pestalozzi fs on the same subject and is conse quently more open to attack* Today it seems preposterous to claim that each individual must pass through the development of the race* If each generation merely builds upon the past, it will be doing well without any repetition* Nowhere in Froebel, despite his interest in childhood, is there the same stress upon the role of the mother and the role of mother love as in Pestalozzi* Froebel lacked the supreme confidence in mother teaching so often expressed by his predecessor* He advocated distinct educational training lfl for mothers, refusing to recognize an intuitive educational 3^ Smilie Michaelis and H* Kealty Moore, editors, iFroebe^s Letters on the Kindergarten (Syracuse, New Yorks C* W* Bardeen, Publisher, 1896), p* 300* 1+0 Loc» eit* hi Arnold H* Heinemann, editor, Froebel Letters (Boston: Lee and Shepard, Publishers, 1393) , p* ~20lj capacity Inherent In mother love# He also felt that the 1 mother, at least partially, should turn her child over to j society for education after it reaches three years of age* Hence the kindergarten! Froebel apparently feared that too , much emphasis upon the home as an educational agency might actually result in removal of the individual from society# , i He believed that education must be continuous and compre- j hensive to the extent of being synonymous with living in kO society# Naturally enough, the “morning circle1 1 of the kindergarten and the social play \diich he evolved for chil dren of all ages were designed to provide social harmony, j affirming his belief that only through association with his fellows can the individual grow and develop# i Thus Froebel attempted at ©nee to provide for individuation and socialization in education# Such an attempt was self-mandatory for him in light of his search for unity in diversity# Hegel and Fichte had set forth the concept of synthesis through resolution of thesis and antithesis# Froebel attempted to adapt the dialectical procedure to the final resolution of man’s social problems* 1+2 Josephine Jarvis, translator, Friedrich Froebel*s j Education by Development (New York? D« Appleton and Company} 1B99) ,n, 163. 1 in. Bmmsm - ■ ■ i Of the many followers of Locke and Rousseau, two | i stand out in the field of education* Pestalozzi, first, i and, then, Froebel through their philosophy and practice of j education demonstrated to the world that a large measure of ! Individual freedom may he reconciled with social responsi bility. Both men were inclined toward the mystical, emo tional, rather than intellectual approach. Pestalozzi made no great pretense of logical organization; he rested his case primarily upon the principle of love and personal ! I i example. Froebel, attempting to establish a defensible ! philosophical position after the fact of Hegel, Fichte, and Krause, expanded Pestalozzi1s ideas of organic development | of the individual in society into a doctrine of universal unity. Turgid writing on the part of Froebel prevents his definite classification as a pantheist; however, the lucid areas of his composition demonstrate his increasing reliance upon God as the source of all units and unities. He appeared to feel that mere mention of the name solves all problems. Whereas Pestalozzi advocated the home above all else ; \ in education of the individual and named mother love as the greatest socializing force, Froebel wanted the individual 2031 delivered over to civil society for his education at least 1 or a part-time basis from the age of three* Both men saw i ! I edacatlon as the process of unfolding the nature of each | Individual* Since God had done the initial enfolding, it i i did not seriously occur to them that there could he any unsocial tendencies exhibited if the unfolding were j unhindered* However both men, apart from their concept of < i growth, recognized the need for some social pressure* Though they tried to escape the need for molding of the individual by society, they were not entirely successful in logical terms in solving the problem of freedom and respon- j sibility* Pestalozzi1s love principle provided a more | appealing approach than Froebel*s semantic balderdash* j i Love has more meaning than all-sided connectedness * In justice to Pestalozzi and Froebel, it should be pointed out that their emotional response to Bousseau has had actually greater effect in the establishment of social ized education for all individuals than the more intellec- i tual approach of men like Herbart* Of the two emotionalists, Pestalozzi placed greater emphasis upon the worth of the individual* Froebel started with Bousseau*s premises, but \ hi. lor unity « M lor hi. t. .aln««lu vision of the individual as the part and society as the < whole* It is to John Dewey who made valiant efforts to j reduce the FroebeUan dualism arising from the organic con- j cept of the individual and society one must turn to see the j i possibilities of a synthesis which sought to avoid meta physical separation of the terms* Chapter VIII will discuss the Dewey concepts of the individual and society as epistemologically divisible but metaphysically inseparable* 1 1 ■ 1 CHAPTER VIII j f | THE INDIVIDUAL AND SOCIETY IN THE i i PHILOSOPHY OP JOHN DEWEY { I In the preceding chapter this investigation pre sented concepts of the individual and society evident in the writings and practices of Pestalozzi and Froebel* As j educational practitioners of heroic proportions who applied ! j the ideals of Bousseau, they, and such other educators as Comenius, Batke, and Herbert, were the direct educational ancestors of John Dewey, with whom the present ehapter is i primarily concerned* But Dewey's writings were not limited ' i to education* Because of his wide interests in all the sciences, social and otherwise, he showed definite influ ences coming from Locke, Rousseau, Kant, Darwin, Spencer, Huxley, Bentham, Mill and Hegel* Naturally it is difficult to distinguish direct j influences from Locke and Bousseau from those acting through! 1 Pestalozzi and Froebel* It is certain, however, that Dewey | i displayed elements of the empiricism of Locke as well as of the concern for the individual so ardently preached by Bousseau* Kant had advoeated treating the individual | always as an end and never as a means* Dewey followed this j dictum and added to it* He had partaken of the biological j emphasis of Darwin, Spencer, and Huxley, He had also sam- j i pled the utilitarianism of Bentham and Mill, But Dewey ! aimed at a defensible synthesis in his pragmatism, and while i he kept his eye upon the individual, he never lost sight of his social obligations. Although Dewey would not agree with Hegel's state- j ment "The welfare of a state has claims to recognition ! I totally different from those of the welfare of the individ ual,1 ^ it was Hegel's work which first attracted him to philosophy, Hegel's influence upon Dewey was similar to that of Descartes upon Locke and Rousseau, The pupils in each case were not content with the master's basic position, but were greatly stimulated by him, j The main influences upon Dewey's social philosophy were Charles Peirce and William James, From them came his method and basic philosophical position. This study in establishing a modicum of background for the understanding of Dewey must make some specific reference in this chapter to his Immediate predecessors in pragmatism, for Dewey's exact relation to Peirce and James is not widely understood. Modern research has indicated that James' interpretation of , ^ G, W, F, Hegel, "Philosophy of Law," Great Politi cal Thinkers f edited by William Hbenstein (New York: Rinehart and Company, 1951), p* 5&9* Peirce was faulty, that he Misread Peircefs Realism into 2 Nominalism. It is not the purpose of this study to dwell | upon the details of the shift, but it should be pointed out I that Peirce viewed his 1 1 pragmatic! smt f primarily as a method; i for recognizing and testing meaning that is to be dis covered, not created. Peirce declared? J In order to ascertain the meaning of an intellectual! conception one should consider what practical conse quences might conceivably result by necessity from the truth of that conception; and the sum of these conse quences will constitute the entire meaning of the conception. 3 i i On the surface this paragraph sounds like an extract from ! * i i any pragmatic philosophy, but its real meaning depends upon j i interpretation of the words practical consequences. For I Peirce these words did not mean practical consequences for the individual alone. Truth to him was never relative to individuals. It was always a social or public matter. Its demonstration in practical consequences will then become more valid as it proves itself useful to more and more individuals, and finally to all society. As a logical extension of this principle, Peirce in 2 James Feibleman, j|n Introduction to Peirce * s Philosophy (New York: Harper and Brothers, 19**6)y passim. I 3 Charles Hartshome and Paul Weiss, editors, Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce (Cambridge, Massachusetts:Harvard University Press, 1931-1935J> V, j par. 9. ; his writings displayed an Important soeial concept, that of the unlimited community % which has not attracted the atten tion which is its due* In it he revealed that c l praetieal j i consequences1 1 for him are far from the mundane or the mere | opportune* He viewed goals which would require many genera-! tions of work to achieve* In describing the unlimited com-* j munity Feibleman says, Peirce next goes on to show that it is illogical for the individual to identify his interests with any limited thing* All persons die, and all limited social groups must sooner or later come to an end even though they survive the individual* Logicality, Peirce then concludes, leads us to this: that we cannot be logical and yet put our trust in any affair of a limited nature * . • Peirce noted ! three kinds of motives for human action: love of self, of a limited class having common interests and feelings with one's self, and love of mankind* But love, which is logical, must be directed from the self through the limited class toward mankind and even beyond to the whole universe* • In short it must embrace an unlimited community*^ Reference has been made to this social concept of Peirce, because it is necessary to apply some of his limitations to pragmatism in order to prevent certain of Dewey's follow ers from running away with the method to mere practicality and expediency* Dewey knew the work of Peirce as well as that of James, and his own instrumentalism should therefore ’ ** James Feibleman, The Revival of Realism (Chapel Hill, N* C*: The University of North Carolina Press, 19l *6)* pp. il-if2. _____ _____ be interpreted somewhat in terms of the former as well as in terms of the latter, as has been customary for many iyears. i i Although he misunderstood Peirce, James made definite contributions to Dewey* He also made direct con tributions to the social philosophy of his day* Throughout i his work is found an emphasis upon the finality of individ ual in his concept of the self. James recognized different types of selves and placed them in order* He wrote: A tolerably unanimous opinion ranges the different selves of which a man may b e 1 seized and possessed,1 and the consequent different orders of his self regard,| an hierarchical scale* with the bodily Self at the , bottom, the spiritual Self at top* and the extra cor- juo^aal gafesrial ssls&s. sazigM social s^iveg, between*? I James saw the subordination of the lower selves to the higher selves as growth, pointing out that recognition of the aspects of the lower selves in others causes a man to become dissatisfied with his own lower selves* In this concept a man may have many selves, especially social selves* James said that there are as many different social selves with respect to one individual as there are other 6 individuals who recognize him* j -------------------- I t c I 7 Horace M* Kallen, editor, The Philosophy of William James (Hew Yorks The Modern Library, 1925) , p* 1^9* 6 , P. 128. j James spoke of all experience as being either “Self11: ©r “not selfThe pronoun i, he demonstrated refers as j 8 definitely to position as here and this * Reality is the j \ individual on the spot, acting or ready to act. In cense- j quence of this view James decided: ! i The mutations of societies, then, from generation ; to generation, are in the main due directly or indizectjy to the acts or the examples of individuals whose genius | was so adapted to the receptivities of the moment, or I whose accidental position of authority was so critical | that they became ferments, initiators of movements, setters of precedent or fashion, centers of corruption, or destroyers of other persons, whose gifts, had they had free play would have led society in another direc tion. ° j Thus the individual is the key to soeial change. Though j James established the fact that society determines what contribution may be accepted (or rejected) at any one time, he made it clear that it cannot determine what the contri bution will be. He declared: Thus social evolution is a resultant of the inter action of two wholly distinct factors, the individual, deriving his peculiar gifts from the play of physiologi cal and infra-social forces, but bearing all the power of initiative and origination in his hands; and, second, the social environment, with its power^of adopting or rejecting both him and his gifts.10 7 Ibid.. p. 1»H. 8 Ibid., p. 157. 9 Ibid.. pp. 235-236. 10 Ibid., pp. 2*H-21 f2. 211; i I James' doctrine placed particular emphasis upon the impor tance of the individual himself, and also upon the differ- | i ence between individuals* This latter fact was demonstrated! i by his insistence upon the identification and preparation of i superior individuals* In short, James stressed the sacredness of individ- i uality. The social institution is secondary to the individ uals, whose lives are "leveled up in their common inner meaning* But with all his emphasis upon the individual, he yet recognized the fact that the highest development of the individual lies in his achieving of his highest social and spiritual potentialities* Dewey was even more conscious of man's social nature i and his social problems than was James, in spite of the many charges his intellectual opponents have brought against him* He was keenly aware of man's social shortcomings* In The Quest for Certainty he stated, "Our knowledge of human affairs on this earth is inexact and unorganized as compared ! with some things which we know about bodies distant many, 12 many, light years*" 11 Itoid*, p* 3^9* ! i 1 O | J ohn Dewey, The Quest for Certainty a £ Study of t I the Relation of Knowledge and Action (New York: Minton, Balch and Company, 1929), p* 216* 212 As a matter of fact, Dewey's philosophy might he ; termed a social philosophy, for the traditional concerns of philosophy, epistemology and metaphysics are frequently j subordinated to the social interest. Dewey himself estab lished the social motif in all his work by pointing out the i social origin and function of philosophy. He denied the traditional concept of philosophy. In speaking of the usual philosophical approach he said: Philosophy has arrogated to itself the office of demonstrating the existence of a transcendent, absolute or inner reality and of revealing to man the nature and features of this ultimate and higher reality. It has therefore claimed that it was in possession of a higher organ of knowledge than is employed by positive science : and ordinary practical experience, and that it is marked by a superior dignity and importance— a claim which is undeniable if philosophy leads man to proof and intui tion of a Reality beyond that open to day-by-day life and the special sciences.1^ This statement is all tongue-in-cheek and far from his own belief that "philosophy originated not out of intellectual lif. material, but out of social and emotional material." Dewey, in other words, felt that philosophy, arising from social interaction, must clarify men's thoughts with respect to their social problems and clashes. Philosophy, like all * * ■ 3 John Dewey, Reconstruction in Philosophy j (Hew York: Henry Holt and Company, 1920), p. 23* j llf Ibid., p. 25. ! # _ t "2131 i other forms of human endeavor, must be practical* In writ ing of "The Development of American Pragmatism,1 1 Dewey | i declared: | Pragmatism, thus, presents itself as an extension of historical empiricism with this fundamental differ ence, that it does not insist upon antecedent phenomena but upon consequent phenomena; not upon the precedents but upon the possibilities of action, and this change j in point of view is most revolutionary in its conse quences.*^ Hence the concept ©f philosophy as a social instrument* Eby and Arrowood attribute the importance which Dewey placed upon social life to three influences in his thinking* They point out first of all his interest in Hegelian philosophy with its organic concept of society* Next they mention his work in history and anthropology at. Johns Hopkins University* Finally they refer to his research of the Industrial Revolution and his observation 16 of rugged individualism in America* Dewey concurred with Aristotle that man is a social animal* He disagreed with Rousseau that an individual can develop apart from a social environment* But Dewey's approach to the relationship of individual and society **•5 John Dewey, "The Development of American Pragma- j ; tism," Twentieth Century Philosophy* edited by Dagobert B* Runes (New York: Philosophical Library, 19^3)> P* *+62. 16 Frederick Eby and Charles F* Arrowood, Development of Modern Education (New York: Prentice-Hall, lyfrS) , P* 8?iU| eschews the traditional approach just as his concept of the ! nature of philosophy repudiates the traditionally conceivedj function# In Reconstruction in Philosophy he wrote: j Society is composed of individuals: this obvious and basic fact no philosophy, whatever its preten- I sions to novelty, can question or alter* Hence these three alternatives: Society must exist for , the sake of individuals; or individuals must have j their ends and ways of living set for them by \ society; or else society and individuals are corre lative, organic, to one another* society requiring the service and subordination or individuals and at the same time existing to serve them# Beyond these three views, none seems to be logically conceivable* ' In the following pages Dewey stated that the organic con cept seems desirable from the point of view of avoiding i extreme individualism on one hand and extreme socialism on ; the other* He pointed out that since society is composed i of individuals, it would appear to be only natural that the , individuals and the organization which holds them together should be equally regarded* But he refused to aceept any one of the three arrangements* He stated: We plunge to the heart of the matter, by asserting that these various theories suffer from a common defect* They are all committed to the logic of general notions under which specific situations are to be brought* What we want light upon is this or that group of individuals, this or that concrete human being, this or that special institution or social arrangement•1® ■ ^ Dewey, Reconstruction jji Philosophy, p# 187 18 tmh ~ 1 aa 215! / It Is doubtful that, in the final analysis, any f philosopher can actually avoid a choice between organic and instrumental concepts of society; he will find it impossible i to escape from appearing to be an advocate of the instru- j mental concept at one time and of the organic at another* ! Dewey, however, attempted to sidestep the area of contro versy and again put emphasis upon the concrete, the practi cal, as the true concern of philosophy* In both Reconstruction in Philosophy and in Experi ence and Nature Dewey refused to accept the contract theory of society as Ha record of fact,1 1 though he did accept it ; 19 i as “a symptom of the direction of human desire*1 1 In his j rejection he carefully avoided committing himself to any j alternative theory* It would seem then that Dewey was not greatly concerned with the metaphysics of the individual and society, but primarily with their immediate manifesta tions* Society and individual are involved in a process* No real clash ean occur lidien no attempt is made to separate these concepts or to place one above the other* It is interesting to note that Dewey by this approach saved him- j self the necessity of any argument* There exist for him 19 ^ John Dewey, Experience and Nature (Chicago: The Open Court Publishing Company, 192©;, pp* 217-218; Dewey, Reconstruction in Philosophy* p. Mf. only the specific relations between the specific individual! i and the various societies of which he is a member* Such a view is extremely convenient, though not always satisfac- | tory* It is open to the charge of atomism, and it prevents ; the philosopher and the social scientist from making any i valid generalizations* It does, however, tend to emphasize; i need for specific reforms, because as Dewey explains, the i general term cannot with its glamor cover up the specific defects of any society* Specific conflicts cannot be 20 minimized as with the organic concept* Dewey went on in Reconstruction in Philosophy to i > ! castigate the organic concept of society for its glossing over of specific troubles* He declared: In theory, the particulars are all neatly disposed of; they come under their appropriate heading and category* • • • But in empirical fact they remain as perplexing, confused and unorganized as they were before* So they are dealt with not by even an endeavor at scientific method but by blind rule of thumb, cita tion of precedents, considerations of immediate advan tage, smooth things over, use of coercive force and clash of personal ambitions * “ This criticism is certainly justified* Too often social theory has been only that, and not a guiding principle* The' failure of the social doctrine of medieval Christianity to 20 Dewey, Reconstruction in Philosophy, pp* 190-191* 21 Ibid., p. 192. be active in alleviating social problems would seem to con- 1 cept. Since the very philosophical basis of James' and Dewey's pragmatism denied separately subsisting universals, Dewey did not in Reconstruction in Philosophy criticize at ; i length the concept of Society with a capital JJ, except to deny its existence and point out that there are infinite siderable detail the individualistic thought of eighteenth and nineteenth century England and France. He refused to and that all else— that is, universals are derived. He pointed out that this view, in addition to slighting social associations, is falsely conceived. He wrote: the real difficulty is that the individual is regarded as something given, something already there. Consequently, he can only be something to be catered to, something whose pleasures are to be magnified and possessions multiplied. . . . Now it is true that social arrangements, laws, institutions are made for man, rather than that man is made for them; that they are means and agencies of human welfare and progress. But they are not means for obtaining something for individuals, not even happiness. They are means of creating individuals•23 firm Dewey's position. Dewey's attack was not limited to the organic con- accept as stated the notion that individuals alone are real < 22 Ibid., p. 200 23 Ibid., pp. 193-19^. 218; Dewey has subscribed here to a variety of instrumental con- j cepts of the relationship of, as he would say, Individuals I to societies* But he has made it clear that the instrument j is not for fulfilling the desires ©f a static, prefabricated type of individual* In the interaction between men and their societies individuality is created* This doctrine appears elsewhere in Dewey*s works, noticeably in Freedom ok OG> and Culture, Experience and Education, ^ and Experience 26 and nature* In the last named book he speaks of mind as emerging, from social communication* Extending his eoneept of the creation of individual* ity, Dewey decided: 1 Society is the process of associating in such ways I that experiences, ideas, emotions, values are trans mitted and made common* To this active process, both the individual and the institutionally organised may truly be said to be subordinate* The individual is subordinate because except in and through communication of experience from and to others, he remains dumb, merely sentient, a brute animal* Only in association with fellows does he become a conscious centre of experience. Organization, which is what traditional theory has generally meant by the term Society or State, is also subordinate because it becomes static, rigid, institutionalized whenever it is not employed to ^ John Dewey, Freedom and Culture (New York: G* P* Putnam*s Sons, 1939) , pp. 10*f-105* John Dewey, Experience and Education (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1950) , p. 5V. * Dewey* Experience and Nature* p* 169. 219 facilitate and enrich the contacts of human beings ! with one another.** \ i Here is a masterpiece of semantics, a rare bit of verbal footwork. It is well that Dewey was an avowed creator or syntheses, for after leaning toward an instrumental concepti of the relationship of the individual and society, here he ; is not far from espousing an organic one. True enough he I was speaking about function rather than structure. It is also true that he subordinated both the individual and society to the process which is their interaction, but none- i theless Dewey seems to have had his cake and eaten it too. i Perhaps here is the proof of his thesis that one should not generalize concepts of society and individual and then I separate them. It would appear that if one does not, he can have the respective advantages of both instrument and organism without the disadvantages. He can take active part on behalf of the individual, as Dewey did in 28 Individualism— Old and New. without damage to society; he can limit individuality in the interests of other individ uals without taking sides. Since society is not an entity, just a name for individuals in the process of creating 27 Dewey, Reconstruction in Philosophy. p. 207. oft John Dewey, Individualism— Old and New (New Yorks ' Minton, Balch and Company, 1930) , p. 51* 1 themselves and each other, the quarrel Is solved by remov- j Ing one of the traditional opponents from the ring* Is It j any wonder that many traditional philosophers have been furious at Deweyfs refusal to pick up traditional meta physics I However, when Dewey relied upon techniques instead i of concepts, he was actually expressing a concept; so his j i opponents have not been entirely without ammunition* It is only that they would prefer to meet him at close range on the old familiar battleground* Whether ohe agrees with Dewey or not in his refusal to invade metaphysics, he has to admit the tempting nature i of the doctrine of the creation of individuals* It hands to the school and society the means to rebuild the world* j No longer are educators dealing with insulated individuals I who, being a priori * are unchanging* When the developing individual is being reached, he is being modified* But notice, everything depends upon the ability to reach the nascent individual* Should one be about to criticize Dewey for a concept of the individuality which HisM and Mis not,1 1 he should note the philosophers statement in Individualism — Qld and New* Here he defined his term more fully# Individuality is at first spontaneous and unshaped; it is a potentiality, a capacity of development* Even so, it is a unique manner of acting in and with a world of objects and persons* It is not something complete in itself, like a closet in a house or a secret drawer in a desk, filled with treasures that are waiting to he ; bestowed on the world* Since individuality is a dis tinctive way of feeling the impacts of the world and 1 of showing a preferential bias in response to these I impacts, it develops into shape and form only through interaction with actual conditions; it is no more ‘ complete in itself than is a painter's tube of paint | without relation to a canvas#29 j Though the figurative analogy here is bad (since apart from completeness the tube of paint has a fixed initial reality whieh Dewey did not grant to the individual who is in a process of becoming), Dewey's concept has been clarified by the later book* Holding such a view of the evolution of individual- ! ity, Dewey obviously had to emphasize education, especially : that type of education which he believed makes men* This point of view Dewey had doubtless absorbed from Kant, who in his treatise Pedagogics had defined education as the process by which man becomes man* Because of Dewey's close linkage of education and philosophy, there is no point to the argument sometimes heard as to whether he is primarily a philosopher or an educator* One can be both, as he is both* Starting from the viewpoint, earlier noted in this chapter, that philoso- i phy has a social origin and function, he identified i 29 Ibid-, PP- 168-169. education as the means of keeping philosophy practical by | | putting it into force. j Philosophic thinking has for its differentia the fact that the uncertainties with which it deals are found in widespread social conditions and aims, con sisting in a conflict of organized interests and institutional claims. Since the only way of bring- : ing about a harmonious readjustment of the opposed tendencies is through a modification of emotional and intellectual disposition, philosophy is at once an explicit formulation of the various interests of life and a propounding of points of view and methods through which a better balance of interests may be effected. . . . we reach a justification of the statement that philosophy is the theory of education as a deliberately conducted practice.30 Democracy and Education is only one of the Dewey i works, therefore, to center around education. It is notable* 1 however, for the eloquent yet clear presentation of the socio-educational philosophy in its expanded form. Beeon- struction in Philosophy gives the outline 5 Democracy and Education fills in the picture. As might be expected, it begins with the usual motif. Education, Dewey wrote., is 31 the continuous means of social group renewal. Though it operates primarily for the development of the immature mem bers of the group, it is a concomitant of growth. Dewey also recognized the fact that social life is contiguous with 3° John Dewey, Democracy and Education (New Yorks The Macmillan Company, 19lo) , p. 3o7* ^ Ibid., p. 12. 223! communication and that communication is essential to learn**1 irng. r , In final account, then,” he added, , ! not only does social life demand teaching and learning for its own per manence, but the very process of living together educates, j In other words, social relations are circular. Every individual is in a constant relation to other individuals as learner or teacher. Dewey noted further that as socie ties become more and more complex, there is greater need for formal teaching and learning. Thus arises the school as a social organ. It has four main functions in relation ship to social environment. It simplifies, eliminates, 33 balances, and coordinates various elements as necessary. problem of education, Dewey declared: The basic control resides in the nature of the situations in which the young take part. In social situations the young have to refer their way of acting to what others are doing and make it fit in. This directs their action to a common result, and gives an understanding common to the participants. For all mean the same thing, even when performing different acts. This common understanding of the means and ends of action is the essence of social control. . . . To achieve this internal control through identity of interest and understanding is the business of education.^ In speaking of social control, which he sees as a Ibid., p. 7» 33 Ibid.f p. 2^. 3** Ibid. t pp. " 22*? In this concept elders and juniors are interdependent. j ) Society is dependent upon the individual as well, for in j determining the activities of the individual, it determines | its own future. Dewey viewed dependence as a social i strength and not as a weakness# Without a need for other individuals, no single individual can grow, according to 1 him. He saw personal independence as a danger to society because of its tendency to 1 1 decrease the social capacity of an individual#1 1 He said of independence and the individual: In making him [the individual] more self-reliant, it may make him more self-sufficient; it may lead to aloofness and indifference# It often makes an individual so insensitive in his relations to others as to develop an illusion of being really able to | stand and act alone— an unnamed form of insanity which is responsible for a large part of the remedi able suffering of the wo rid. 3? This passage would be Dewey's answer to those who have taken his pragmatism and claimed for it an exaggerated individualism. Chapters V and VI of Democracy and Education discuss various theories of education with which Dewey compares and contrasts his own. He treats education as preparation, as unfolding, as formal discipline, as formation, as recapitu lation, and as reconstruction. All of these concepts are Ibid.T p. 52. rejected as ways of perpetuating society, except his own, j the last named. Of Froebel, a prime advocate of unfolding, I as Chapter VII of this study has noted, he wrote: Froebelfs recognition of the significance of the native capacities of children, his loving attention to them, and his influence in inducing others to study them, represent perhaps the most effective single force in modern educational theory in effect ing widespread acknowledgment of the idea of growth. But his formulation of the notion of development and his organization of devices for promoting it were badly hampered by the fact that he conceived develop ment to be the unfolding of a ready-made latent prin ciple. He failed to see that growing is growth, developing is development, and consequently placed the emphasis upon the completed product.^® This rejection just naturally follows from Dewey*s idea of creation of individuals as the social process. Similarly Dewey attacked the formal discipline theory of education which he saw stemming from Locke. He felt that its dualism separates subject matter from activ ity and therefore that it results in an emphasis upon narrow skills rather than upon harmonious development of the whole individual.^ He charged the formation theory of Herbert with an undesirable result— overlooking the active and specific aspects of individuals— pointing out that it emphasizes method at the expense of attitude in the og 1 learner. The recapitulation theory, arising from j t Rousseau's return to nature doctrine, he likewise rejected, declaring it to he false biologically. He stressed the importance of short-circuiting growth to make it possible i to retain a social heritage without each individual's hav- ^9 ing to repeat the evolution of it. x j At the same time Bewey criticized the educational application made of his predecessors as being one sided, he did not completely reject them. He probably felt his own indebtedness too much, though he did repudiate the particu lar emphasis in each case. In his own concept, that is, j education as reconstruction of experience, he placed the importance upon the continuous re-evaluation of experience necessary to the direction of later experience. The result and the process are to be singly identified, not separated. Dewey refused to accept a dualism between means and ends just as definitely as he did between change and stability, mind and matter, object and subject, individ ual and society. One is not to think of either society or individual as a means to the end of the other. He is 38 Ibid.T P. 83. 39 ibid., p. 8?. 1+0 Ibid.. pp. 89-91. (which at once creates individuals and perpetuates socie ties) . Dewey1 s doe trine that ends and means are a unity eon-j stituted the foundation of his democratic theories of educa-j tion and consequently of society. He consistently refused I in his defense of democracy the idea that any hut demo cratic methods may be used to achieve democratic goals. "If,” he said, 1 1 there is one conclusion to which human experience unmistakably points it is that democratic ends bl I demand democratic methods for their realization.* Later An American democracy can serve the world only as it demonstrates in the conduct of its own life the efficacy of plural, partial, and experimental methods in securing an ever-increasing release of the powers of human nature, in service of a freedom which is co-operative and a cooperation which is voluntary.^2 An important point made by Dewey in Democracy and Education is that societies which are factional and dis organized do not permit the development of consistent, integrated individuals. He saw no need for lack of unity in social organization, despite his recognition of the he added to this idea, concluding: k - i x Dewey, Freedom Ibid.. p. 176. Culture f p. 175* uniqueness of individuals* , f Soeial organization,1 1 he (Dewey consequently criticized Plato for failing to recog nize the uniqueness of individuals, as is demonstrated, by his having put them into a few sharply separated classes*) In democratic education every human being's potential must be achieved; all members must also have equal chance to developed at the same time provision is made for individ uality* Dewey saw no difficulty either in the fact of increasing numbers of individuals* He provided for this inevitability as follows: The extension in space of the number of individuals who participate in an interest so that each has to refer his own action to that of others to give point and direction to his own, is equivalent to the break ing down of those barriers of class, race, and national territory which kept men from perceiving the full import of their activity. This doctrine culminates in a wider social aim— international share experiences kb In this way values in common are Henry Holt and Company, 1932), pp. 408-H09. k - 5 Dewey, Democracy and Educationt p. 101 Dewey, Democracy and Education* p* 105* John Dewey and J* H* Tufts« Ethics (New York: In short, Dewey set up two main criteria for xaeasur- • ing the worth of a society and its education* The first of j these pertains to the number and variety of interests which ; are shared; the second, to the fullness and freedom of the j interaction. Consequently his revolt against any type of education which removes subject matter from social context! Consequently his ease for an international democratic society! Though he recognized the existence of many separate societies based upon minor interests of the moment, he yet did not deny the possibility and the desir ability of a world society* In this sense he followed j * + 6 | Peirce in his concept of the unlimited community* James | had put his characteristic emphasis upon the individual in his doctrine of the many selves* But his idea is not essentially incompatible, either, to Dewey*s and Peirce’s concepts* For as individuals progress to higher selves, so are limited societies progressing toward the unlimited one* Dewey even used terminology similar to that of Peirce* In The Public and Its Problems he referred to **the great k8 community,1 1 but he distinguished it from f , The Great 1+6 Cf. ante, pp. 207-208 Cf. ante, p. 209. W Henry Holt John Dewey, The Public and Its Problems (Hew York: ; and Company, 1927), p* Ih-3* Society1 1 to remind everyone that his philosophy had not ; suddenly become Idealism. Dewey, in his practicalism, just refused to keep his eye upon the ideal society. He would rather keep it upon the progress made day by day toward i improved but still limited communities without being con cerned with the metaphysical problem of whether or not an j unlimited one in the universal sense will ever be reached. Thus Dewey's instrumentalist variety of pragmatism, upon inspection, has revealed itself to be an extremely unified philosophical system involving education, politics, j ethics, and aesthetics, all of which are merely facets of the whole. It eschews metaphysics in favor of practicalism i and particularism. If one retains the .emphasis placed by the originator upon the social aspects of human nature, undue individualism cannot result. Dewey obversely saw the problem not of controlling individual freedom but of achieving individual freedom. Perhaps this latter eoncept was a residue in him of the absolute idealism of Hegel. i Individuals are free (and yet paradoxically social) to the extent of the number and the variety and the fullness of their interactions with their fellows. i Chapter IX will discuss modern concepts of the J individual and society in educational philosophy, paying. speeial attention to the idealistic, realistic, and prag matie positions and to such well known figures as Rugg, Counts, and Brameld* CHAPTER IX j MODERN DEVELOPMENTS IN EDUCATIONAL PHILOSOPHY j i i The preceding chapter of this investigation, Chapter VIII, dealt with the work of John Dewey, finding it to be aj I carefully concerted socio-educational philosophy* To Dewey education and philosophy were synonymous, or at least prac tical philosophy and education were but different aspects of the same thing* Because of his profound interest in educational philosophy, Dewey has had tremendous influence upon modern educational specialists and consequently upon i i their ideas as to the relationship of the individual and , society. As is generally the case with great figures in any field of endeavor, Dewey has both enthusiastic follow ers and determined opponents* In modern educational philosophy his pragmatism has been opposed by both of the two other major schools of thought, idealism and realism* So indoctrinated with Dewey have his followers been that they have held their own remarkably well, aided of course until just recently by the presence on the American scene i of their high priest, Dewey himself* But long before the end of his active, personal j influence, Dewey's followers began to Impose their own 1 interpretations to the extent that some have definitely 2331 \ ] departed from the original doctrine of socialized individ- i ualism. This trend of coarse has served to step up the j attacks of the opposition tooth upon Dewey1 s followers and upon Dewey himself* Chapter IX will consider modern developments in the ■ i evolution of concepts concerning the individual and society.; It will point out the continuing influence of Dewey and his followers and the opposition accruing to them. Special attention will toe given to the work of three recent educa tional philosophers, Harold Rugg, George S. Counts, and Theodore Brameld because of their great emphasis upon the social aspects of education* I. TRADITIONALISM, SCIENTIFIC DETERMINISM, AND EXPERIMENT ALISM IN RELATION TO THE INDIVIDUAL AND SOCIETY An examination of recent educational philosophy dis closes such a number of modern educators, each with his own approach to social problems, that it will toe impossible for this study to consider more than the three previously men tioned in any detail* It was felt, however, that a survey of trends with identification of certain individuals with i I certain viewpoints will toe of value. i 23^: Idealism in education# Idealism in education had j been the basic American tradition, as well as the European* j In his book Holders of the American Mind* Norman Woe If el i characterizes this fact, saying, “There is a tendency to i accept the essential religious, philosophic, ethical, social^ and economic formulations of the past as only slightly inadequate today— a few adjustments and the chaos of today 1 will turn to the order of yesterday*M In social philoso phy the idealist tends to exalt social institutions and universal principles* For example, William T* Harris, an outstanding idealist in American education, had stated: Each of these cardinal institutions [family, school, vocation* state, church] exercises on the members of society its peculiar education* It forms his mind through action and reaction**2 Note the difference in Harris1 and Dewey’s points of view* The emphasis here is upon the corporate body, not the individual* Kandel has expressed the idea held by many educa tional idealists of the & priori nature of society in rela tion to the individual: 1 Norman Woelfel, Holders of the American Mind (New York: Columbia University Press, 1933) > p* 221* I p William T* Harris, Psychologic Foundations of Education (New York: D. Appleton Century Company, lS^1 *), i p. 2o¥. , Society is, in fact, prior to the individual, and the school is an agency for promoting stability and adapting the individual to the environment in which he lives* . • • society establishes schools to pro vide a firm basis for itself and to sustain the common interest* • • • Society changes first and the 1 schools follow.3 This concept is that of formation* one which Dewey rejected. i But Dewey*s rejection has obviously not destroyed it. j i Ross L. Finney supports the traditional view when he states* **Individual experience is too short and fragmentary to k render a verdict* * . . It is the long run that counts.*1 In speaking of Dewey, Finney later declares: From a dozen points of view he overemphasizes the deliberative, conscious aspect of individual and social life, and in many ways slurs over the value of habit, drill, and compulsion* The inevitable result is to discount the importance of the social heritage and to pour oil on the already dangerous fire of contemporaneous individualism*? Finneyis not alone in this position* Woelfel places six American educational philosophers in the category of «stressing values inherent in American historic traditions.1 These men are, in addition to Finney, Bagley, Morrison, Cubberley, Briggs, and H* H* Horne (sometimes confused with 3 i# L* Kandel, Conflicting Theories of Education (Hew York: The Macmillan Company, 193$) , p. 79 f • If Ross L. Finney, 4 Sociological Philosophy of Education (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1928) , p. ^55* | 5 ibid.. p. 1*78. Ernest Horn, a pragmatist). To this group may be added j Hutchins and Adler* | i Herman Horne is frequently cited as representative ; i of the idealist position in contemporary educational j j philosophy* In 19^2 he was selected to present this view- j i point in the Forty-First Yearbook of the National Society j for the Study of Education* Therein Horne states: It is natural that a given society should make its schools in the image of itself* The schools do not first make society but society first makes the schools, and then the schools in turn help make society* The schools do not stand alone in the j making of society or in the education of the young* i All the forces and influences that exist, of which j the school is one, help make society, ana all of ! society helps educate the young*' j i Horne has the typical idealist’s concept of society as moving toward Society with a capital S* He says, "Socie ties put into their schools what those societies want to be 8 and to become." Though he recognizes a plurality of imperfect societies, these are all existent because they have not reached perfection* Whenever he speaks of a society, Horne speaks of an actual entity, disclosing that 6 Woelful, op. cit,, p. 50 f• ^ Herman H* Horne, "An Idealistic Philosophy of Edu- j cation," The Forty-First Yearbook of the National Society i for the Study of Education* Part I, Philosophies of Educa tion (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 19^2), p* I?1 ** 8 IbM., p. 175. his most real world is that of universals and concepts* As he himself declares r , the objective of living and learning is 9 ! to develop the natural man into the ideal man.1 4 There is j i an ideal social order , even though it has not yet been | i reached• | It is interesting to note that in all of Horne’s j i presentation of the idealist position there is scarcely a single use of the word individual but many references to society. Mankind and man in the universal sense are promi nent also. Despite the emphasis upon eternal verities, however, Horne recognizes that the improvement of society ; must come gradually, that it is not one easy step from the imperfect societies we have today to the ideal society. In this respect he is not too different from modern realists and pragmatists, except that they do not grant the precon ceived perfection at the end of the process. Dewey as this study noted was focused primarily upon the process. The idealist is focused upon the end. The realist is greatly concerned with the problem of getting the right method. The ways Horne delineates as those in which the school can improve society are (1) to 1 1 suggest lines of i i future social growth4 1 (2) to 4 1 educate for leadership and 9 Ibid.. p. 19^. - - 238. follQwership” (3) to “express appreciation for right social ! emphases and criticism of misplaced emphases8 1 (b) to ”assist inhandling social problems in a scientific way” and (5) to j 1 1 assist in tppnsmittinfl the established values of the 10 past,” It is doubtful that the realists and pragmatists i would have any great quarrel with these* The pragmatist would play down the fifth purpose and would point out that in one and three the values and verities implied are not to be & priori but will emerge from the process. The realist would especially approve of the fourth purpose. With slight '•''N changes of emphasis, all three schools might proceed with these purposes. Realism and scientific determinism. Realism has appeared in modern education as scientific determinism. As Wilds has stated, “The scientific movement in education has brought about a systematic qbiective.analysisof curricular materials in order to determine scientifically just what should be taught to satisfy the actual needs both of the 11 individual and of society.” The emphasis is upon method, not process. The realist, however, like the idealist is j Elmer H. Wilds, Foundations of Modern Education (New York: Farrar and Rinehart, 19^-2) , p. ^2o. -- 2391 I searching for pre-existent values and truths* For the j i realist "knowledge consists, first, in the prehension of pre-existent entities and, second, in the discovery of 12 their inter-relationships•" From the viewpoint of social philosophy, the realist is generally able to work harmoni- ously with the_idealist • The realist element is generally found, therefore, alignedidealists in the attack upon-pragmat ism • Snedden, Bobbitt, Judd, Charters, Terman, and Thorndike are frequently cited as the outstanding exponents of the realism approach to problems of the individual and society. These gentlemen have liked to think of themselves as "the middle-rof-the-roaders.They feel they have the solidity of the idealists with respect to definite ends and the flexibility of the pragmatists with respect to methods • They deplore the dogmatism of the idealists and the chaos of the pragmatists. When Judd says, 11. • • the individual must be taught to give up his personal ways of thinking based on.what his eyes see, and adopt the conclusions of 12 Frederick S. Breed, Education and the New Realism (New Yorkt The Macmillan Company, 1939), p* 207# ^3 john Wahlquist, The Philosophy of American Educa tion (New York: The Ronald Press Company, 19^*2) , p. 65. social experience, u lie is close to the idealists* Breed j is also close to them in declaring$ | The realist acfeepts scientific facts ai|d laws as a part of the relatively ^ch^^eairCfoUnSatldh upon which he builds his enterprises * He hpl&s that man kind ..'willJhave greater security ihja,society^organized ! on this ^principle than Jth* a u p o n the " ; prihciple_.that the. world is his oyster.^ But Breed too indicates the point at which realism and pragmatism touch* He says, Judgments of the whole must perforce be based on knowledge of parts* This fragmentary knowledge seems to be relative* as the pragmatist contends* To a large extent it is proved today and disproved tomorrow.1® ; I Generally the realists proceed as if this similarity were only incidental, however. They disapprove of any attempt of education to experiment in social realms* Having pre- ! pared individuals to make-intelligent"decisions as to social problems, the school.willstep aside. It will take orders from society, not attempt to construct Jits idea of an improved social order* Just as Horne has presented the idealist position in the Forty-First Yearbook, Breed has set forth the realist Charles H* Judd, The Psychology of Social Institu tions (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1927), p. 303* ; 1* > ! ^ Breed, op * cit•, p* 165* Ibid*, p* *+3« 2bl' ! doctrine* In his article he admits the dualisms inherent \ in modern realism, hut attempts to use them to an advantage : 17 in the 1 1 bipolar theory of education," again claiming a i middle-of-the-road position* It is interesting to note that Breed recognizes organism and environment, purpose and possibility, personal interest and external demand, freedom and authority, and the individual and society as "fundamen- 18 tal factors of adjustment*" He points out that the rela tionship between each pair is and not versus. but he does not explain just how the adjustment is accomplished* Dewey had refused to accept the idea of any separation* Breed would argue that in so doing Dewey ignored the demands of a | separate "self-existent social world," the morality of whicii makes definite demands upon "a morality sanctioned by the 19 natural propensities of the individual*" Consequently he refers to "the exaggerated individualistic emphasis o c i found in instrumentalism*" ^ Frederick S* Breed, "Education and the Realistic Outlook," Forty-First Yearbook jgf the National Society for the Study of Education* Part I, Philosophies of Education, p. 12?. 18 Ibid.. p. 127. ^ Loc. clt. 20 Ibid.T p. 126. Yet later Breed claims Both pragmatism and realism start from the same point. He writes, 1 1 In each the point j i of departure Is Individual freedom, Initiative, spontaneity, 21 interest,1 1 Obviously, with his middle position he feels / he can claim both respect for individual demands and for social demands as well. He concludes his treatment with a figurative analogy of a cart >requiring two wheels on which j to travel, but it must be pointed out that the bipolar theory, while naming a problem, while establishing the need for adjustments, does not solve the problem. It still C - remains as that of determining the amount of emphasis to be placed upon one entity or the other, the individual and society, Eynerimentalism after Dewey, Following Dewey there have been numerous developments in educational experimen tal! sm, some of which he has deplored. Nearly all of the pragmatist educators, have, like Dewey, stressed the social aspects of human nature* As Childs notes, "For the individ ual living in modern society the most significant part of op his environment is the social aspect,1 1 But there is much 21 Ibid., p. 131. 22 John L, Childs, Education and the Philosophy of Experiment all sm (New Yorks D. Applet on-Century Company, 11931) , P. S3* ________ ___ ___________________________ emphasis upon the development or personality as well* Hilpatriek says, "Education thus becomes primarily the con scious pursuit of personally felt purposes with ever more 23 « ' adequate self-direction as the goal." J Of course there are; limiting words such as more adequate in this statement; how ever such recognition of individual interest has fed many i streams of individualism, and has forced the traditional Deweyites such as Bode to reaffirm the social emphasis of pragmatism and to repudiate transient desires* He states, "It could hardly be an exaggeration to say that the purpose of sound education is to emancipate the pupil from denend- pk I ence on immediate interest*" One of the primary problems encountered by pragma tists in social and educational philosophy is that, once having rejected absolutes and eternal verities, they are frequently hard pressed by their opponents on the matter of getting value away from the discrete individual into a social setting* Naturally reference is made to the good of all* but too often there has been little or no attempt to t define just exactly what such a good may be in specific ^ William H* Kilpatrick, Remaking the Curriculum (New Yorks Newson and Company, 1936) , pp. 17-18. pk Boyd H* Bode, Progressive Education at the Cross roads (New York: Newson and Company, 1938)» P* 58. cases. In his representation of the pragmatist position in, the Forty-First Yearbook. Kilpatrick writes: ] t Three conceptions are here involved in successive logical sequence: (1) the highest conception we have, at the time, of the good life; (2) the highest adequacy of the proposed conduct (as against alternative pro posals} to bring this highest good life to all on the highest conceivable basis of justice; (3) the moral obligation to accept this most adequate available con duct as binding and so put it into operation.2- * Apart from the words at the time, this statement sounds like idealism per se. There is no anchor for highest conception: highest adequacy or highest good, and the idealist in light of other pragmatist doctrines is impelled to ask, “Whose?*1 This is particularly true when Kilpatrick says on the next page: However well or ill-made onefs system may be, each one does have his own system of values and they choose for him (if his habit of control over.his emotions permits) what course he will pursue.2® Is it any wonder that Kilpatrick’s interpretation of Dewey, on the one hand, has seemingly encouraged pragmatically inclined individualists to overemphasize the individual apart from society, and on the other, has served to invoke William H# Kilpatrick, “Philosophy of Education i from the Experimentalist Outlook,1 1 Forty-First Yearbook of the National Society for the Study of Education. Part I, Philosophies of Education, p. £o. 26 Ibid.. p. 51. the combined wrath of the traditionalists and the scien tific realists for what they regard as opportunism* Whenever a pragmatist voices the idea of reconstruct-' ing society, the idealists and realists are particularly alarmed* They are apprehensive of Bode, Childs, and Kilpatrick; but they feel that Rugg, Counts and Brameld , place not only society but also the individual in jeopardy. This chapter will continue with attention to the last three educators named. It is felt that their doctrines are especially challenging to modern education and whether con curred in or not, furnish a further basis for understanding the proper relationship between individual and society# II. HAROLD RUGG AND THE GREAT TECHNOLOGY In his book, Education and Social Progress. Charles H. Judd states: Inspired by the idea that the schools must con tribute in some way to social reform, certain radicals have gone so far as to advocate that teachers assume the role of leaders and direct the reorganization of the economic and political systems. These extremists have misconceived the function of the schools.2' I This statement at once characterizes the approach of such modern pragmatists as Harold Rugg and George S. Counts, and Charles H. Judd, Education and Social Progress (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 193^;> P* 2oo. the reaction of educational realists and idealists to their; proposals. Both Bugg and Counts are basically tied to i Dewey, but both go further than he in that they desire immediate and rather definite action to achieve their alms of improved societies. i On the flyleaf of The Great Technology, Bugg • s most important document for the student of the individual and society, is found the followings We stand at the crossroads to a new epochs in one direction lie various pathways to social chaos and the possible destruction of interdependent ways of living.28 | Bugg, the engineer, is seeking to reorder "Man-Man relation- ships1 * and r t Man-Thing relationshipsn at the same time. He turns to The Great Technology as the most attractive social alternative for the future. The individual, having been freed from the burdens of nature by increased productivity, can now study and apply scientific methods to the solution of his social problems. Consequently Bugg declares, f , Our task, therefore, is to launch a nation-wide campaign of adult education, to create swiftly a compact body of minor ity opinion for the scientific reconstruction of our social 28 Harold Bugg, The Great Technology (Hew York: The J ohn Day Company, 1933) • 29 order.1 1 Three ideas of revolutionary importance are credited by Rugg with having prepared the way for his technology: machine technology, corporate control, and individual free- 30 dom. He sees no conflict apparently in the operation of the last two ideas named, indicating that, like Dewey, he j does not establish the individual and society as separate entities with conflicting interests. Basic to Rugg1 s plan is "effective collective con- 31 trol of the economic system."*' He is initially rather vague as to just how this objective is to be achieved, except to say that it must be through adult education. He points out two fundamental problems of society: design and consent. These are involved, he says, in the design of an adequate social order and the consent of the governed to that order. In later setting up actual means to accomplish reorganization of society he calls for "regional clearing- 32 houses of public discussion," more leisure and creative opportunity for individuals. He scores lack of educational 29 Ibid.. p. 2b, 30 Ibid.. pp. 36-37. 31 Ibid., p. 181. 32 Ibid., p. 206. support financially and the turning to an education for i literacy rather than for living. This failure of education! he charges with responsibility for placing individuals in j artificial social classes. Bugg asks for a "National Coun-j 33 cil of Cultural Reconstruction" to survey community needs 1 \ and assets. Local councils would take up in each community i i the task of employing all not otherwise employed in soeial reconstruction, the cost to be paid by the Reconstruction Finance Corporation. This educational WPA, along with the reorganization of the schools to present a more pragmatic education, is Rugg*s direct attack. Education is "the surest guide1 1 to The Great Technology. The creative nature of the individual will be harmonized with American life through education. Educational leaders will work together with political and economic leaders to accomplish social reordering. A new philosophy of education and a new pro gram of educational worker training will cinch up the package. Considered in light of recent world events, Rugg1s proposals appear as rosy as many of the depression panaceas . j i In a new flush of intoxication with the glories of science and machine production, Rugg did not realize a fact which 33 ibid., p. 251 now seems incontrovertible: that technical developments do not improve man's social efficiency* He has the engineer's » faith in machinery and consequently seems to feel that the bigger the social machine, the greater the production of social benefits. Certain aspects of governmental bureauc racy would seem to deny his premise. It is not that Rugg's proposals are harmful5 quite the opposite. They are founded i on a genuine belief in democracy, a clear faith in the essential goodness of the individual, an optimism that all will be well if man only makes the effort. Perhaps Rugg is 1 right, but he seems for the moment to be a strange bed- | 1 fellow for the run-of-the-mill pragmatists. He is more akin to the "tender-minded" then the "tough-minded" as described by William James. But if a Rousseau may be an impractical dreamer, then maybe Rugg may be excused if his desire for a new social order has made him believe it is there just for the talcing by forum, committee, and the Reconstruction Finance Corporation. III. GEORGE S. COURTS AND THE REBUILDING OF SOCIETY Rugg is a mild rebuilder of society when contrasted with George S. Counts. The latter possesses none of the 1 easy optimism of the former; his approach is unmistakably more realistic. At the outset he declares: 2501 Any individual or group that would aspire to lead j society must be ready to pay the costs of leaderships ; to accept responsibility, to suffer calumny, to sur- l render security, to risk both reputation and fortune. • • • Society is never redeemed without effort, struggle, and sacrifice.3^* I When he looks at American education, Counts sees no forceful social program. Even Progressive Education, he says, "has elaborated no theory of social welfare, unless it be that of 35 i anarchy or extreme individualism. The class of people who send their children to Progressive schools want, he declares, to deal with life but keep it at arm's length. He wants the schools to seize on life at close quarters. i Counts is greatly concerned with one of the educa tional problems which derives from a philosophical problem. From the problem of the relationship of the individual to society he is attracted to the problem of "the nature and extent of the influence which the school should exercise 36 over the development of the child." He notes that opinions range from no moulding of the individual to com plete indoctrination of him. Very sensibly he points out that frequently our choice of freedom for the individual has 3^ George S. Counts, Bare the School Build a Hew j Social Order? (Hew York: The John Bay Company, 1932), p. ¥•; 35 Ibid.• P. 7. 36 Ibid., p. 10. been in preference to a heavy-handed restriction by society. This situation he feels is an unhappy one not allowing a satisfactory resolution of the problem. But he obviously is prepared to take one side if necessary against the other, i statings | On the other hand, I am prepared to defend the thesis that all education contains a large element of imposition, that in the very nature of the case this is inevitable, that the existence and evolution of society depend upon it, that it is consequently emi nently desirable, and that the frank acceptance of this fact by the educator is a major professional obligation.37 Counts justifies imposition upon the individual by estab- j lishing the idea that he does not possess freedom initiallyj rather that he gains freedom through the operation of society. The imposing upon and the liberation of the i individual are simultaneous. It is immediately obvious that Counts and Rousseau are quite different in some respects. The former denies the inherent goodness of the individual. He says: . . . on entering the world the individual is neither good nor bad; he is merely a bundle of potentialities | which may be developed in manifold directions. Guidance is, therefore, not to be found in child nature, but rather in the culture of the group and the purposes of living. There can be no good individual apart from some conception of the character of the good society; and the good society is not something that is given by 37 Ibid.. p. 12 ----------- nature; it must be fashioned by the hand and brain of j man* *3° Counts is likewise here in opposition to Froebel with his concept of education as an unfolding of the individualvs nature* Counts deplores any shrinking of the individual [ from society. He wants children left in an adult world as an impetus to their own adulthood* In this matter he agrees with Dewey. As one reads the quoted paragraph above, he notes, however, that in the concept of society there is not the same insistence, as with Dewey, that it is a description of the process of the individual's growing and developing. 1 There is more connotation of a fabricated entity with per haps even metaphysical separation from the individual* The recognizable pragmatic position is more evident in Counts' later book The Prospects of American Democracy* In this volume he holds throughout the instrumental view of the relationship of the individual and society. Evident also are the pragmatic insistence upon the tentative nature of what man calls truth and the importance of man doing for himself what must be done. Thus Counts builds his case for reconstruction by i land through the school* He sees no choice for the school I , 253: i I but to so act or to become “a handmaiden of autocratic j power, a defender of privilege, a conserver of fixed doc- trine, an instrument for sealing the eyes, stopping the | ears, stilling the tongue, and darkening the mind of each 39 generation.” But unlike many educational philosophers, Counts does not see the school as the only powerful eduea- i i tional agency. In fact he criticizes educators for exagger-i ating their own importance, particularly when they do not use whatever power they do have. He is not as much afraid that the school will dominate the individual in undesirable ways as he is that other more vigorous agencies and influ ences will beat the school to the opportunity. Particularly! 4 is he concerned with the development of an adequate society in the machine age. While Hugg is stimulated by the thoughts of technology, Counts is wary of the machine with out corresponding change in society. He states: The control of the machine requires a society which is dominated less by the ideal of individual advance ment and more by certain far-reaching purposes and plans for social construction.w When he speaks of society, though he makes special reference to America, Counts is actually thinking of a world I - * 39 George S. Counts, The Prospects of American 'Democracy (Hew York: The John Day Company, 1933) 9 p. 292. ^ Counts, Dare the Schools Build £ New Social Order. P • 27 • j society. He sees the fundamental aspects of democracy, not as the American form of government, hut as the f , moral ifl equality of men.M In society organized under such an ideal of democracy, the weak individual will he helped along hy making the strong individual carry the heavy burdens* Obviously Counts is here preparing a new economic founda tion for democracy. Later he confirms this facts 14If property rights are to he diffused in industrial society, natural resources and all important forms of capital will 1*2 have to he collectively owned.1 1 This point of view is expressed also in The Soviet Challenge to America.^ in his idea that the days of capitalism are numbered, Counts is prepared to do battle with the privileged classes, perhaps alltoo literally. For he declares: And according to the historical record, this process [surrender of privileges] has commonly been attended by bitter struggle and even bloodshed. • • • There is little evidence from the pages of American history to support us in the hope that we may adjust our difficul ties through the method of sweetness and light.w lfl Ibid. , p. **3 George S. Counts, The Soviet Challenge to America (New Yorks The John Bay Company, 1931) > passim. Counts, Bare the School Build & New Social Orderf 51* 255; Fortunately he feels that our ability to produce in America will aid the situation, in that it is foolish for individ- I uals to fight over property when it may be created freely j ] by cooperative effort• , As one reads Counts, a number of questions come to mind. Who will force the strong individual to carry the heavy burdens? Democratic society? Counts does not say that the strong individual would be encouraged to pick up the burdens 5 he says that they would be placed upon his **5 ! back. Such a procedure smacks of European dictatorship, j i which most Americans would hardly regard as democratic, j even in essence. Whenever such force is organized, there ! is always the possibility the power will get into the hands of specific individuals who will use collectivity as a mere cloak to hide the utmost of individual privilege. Though Counts dedicated The American Road to Culture to John Dewey, he and Dewey part company at the first men tion of placing burdens. Dewey would approve of an approach which would convince the individual it is actually in his best interest to pick up his fellow's problem, but he would not condone the element of force. Chapter VIII of this i study noted that Dewey in Freedom and Culture Mconsistently j ^ Ibid., p. 1*1. refused in his defense of democracy the idea that any hut democratic methods may he used to achieve democratic 1 *6 1 goals.” Undoubtedly Dewey was directing a portion of his j attack upon Counts himself* His repudiation may have heen the reason for the more evident allegiance to pragmatism in Counts* volume of 1939> The Prospects of American Democracy, than is found in his volume of 1932, Dare the School Build a New Social Order. Counts may have heen attempting to get hack in the graces of the master. But though he is more pragmatic in his approach in the latter volume, insisting upon the infinite perfectibil ity of society with moral equality of all men, he is just as insistent upon the need for a planned reconstruction at the i start. In fact there is even a note of gloom that it may be too late already. He is afraid that the American people may have f , missed their opportunity two generations ago when the aristocracy was relatively confined and feeble and the 1*7 forces of democracy were strong and confident.*1 Essentially the difference between Counts and other pragmatists like Dewey and Kilpatrick, as Wahlquist points out, is that whereas he demands a planned society, they are ££• ante, p. 227. ^ Counts, The Prospects of American Democracy. p. 25>1. - - 2 5 7 ( 1+8 1 content with a planning one* This view would explain the | curious fact, already noted in this chapter that whereas Dewey insisted upon the process, Counts seems to have in mind a particular entity* Consequently he has heen fre quently criticized as advocating a fixed frame of reference. A major trouble with Counts* doctrine is that it might ! result in merely a different set of social impositions upon the individual in the name of escape from individualism and escape from society dominated by aristocracy. There is, furthermore, a contradiction in the think ing of Counts. Primarily he professes a faith in the i ability of the average individual to think for himself. But he also feels it is necessary to tell him at the incep tion of his planned society what he should think in order { to get the system under way. Once Counts* system were in force, one might well wonder how susceptible it would be to change. Would it be regarded as a status quo to be indefinitely perpetuated as some European dictatorships have been regarded? Also if initiation requires force, can the system run by itself without regular applications of i such force? ! It would seem that approach by democratic process, j i !■ ■ ■ !■ ■ H U »■........ ■>■■■■..... IN II ■ ■ I ! 4 **8 John T. Wahlquist, The Philosophy of American Edu-I cation (New Yorks The Ronald Press Company, 19^2;, p. 323♦__| - 258 \ however slow and bumbling, would be preferable to Counts1 plans for the individual and society. XV. THEODORE BRAMELD AND RECONSTRUCT IONISM i Theodore Brameld has been selected for consideration in this study, not just because he is a modern critic of education, but rather because he is one contemporary critic who claims to present a consistent and constructive educa tional philosophy. Although he is the author of several other works on education, Brameld, a professor at New York University, ranks as an educational philosopher of note on the basis of his Ends and Means in Education and Patterns of Educational Philosophy. In these two texts is presented what he terms his 1 1 reconstructionist philosophy.1 1 Conse quently this investigation will concern itself primarily with these two sources. Brameld early establishes the fact that the changes required by re constructionism are not “subversive.“ He insists upon the “rootage1 1 of his philosophy in the old. He says: One of the ways in which reconstructionism has such rootage— in fact the most important way--is in its devotion to democracy. More than any other 1 inherited belief , we hold that democracy is the high est form of society and that the public school should ; • L j .q be one of its principal instrumentalities* It is well that he makes this statement of allegiance, for | he later speaks of collectivity as "one of the most crucial 50 features of the order evolving around us*1 1 Collectivity i has rather distasteful connotations for most Americans of | i this age* Brameld claims the schools of today are not meeting the needs of either society or the individual of which it is composed* He states: Most schools at whatever level proceed too blandly from the assumption that their purpose is to prepare young people for a way of life characterized by the virtues of independence, personal exertion, fair rewards for earnest individual effort* • • • Too few of them proeeed from the contrary assumption that the individualistic period of our history is waning --waning so rapidly that we can accurately say it has in many ways quite disappeared.51 Not only are the schools themselves failing to adjust to the present, declares Brameld, but also the three outstand ing philosophies of modern times are not grappling with the problem. Rather than use the customary terms idealismT realism* and pragmatism to identify these philosophies, ^ Theodore Brameld, Ends and Means in Education: A Mid-Century Appraisal (New York: Harper and Brothers, 19505V p- V. Loc. cit. 51 Ibid., p. 6. Brameld terms their educational applications "perennial- ism," "essentialism," and "progressivism." It is easy to see the basic referents, however# Eeconstruetionism, as here advocated, may not be as shocking to the educational world as the proposals of Rugg and Counts, previously discussed in this chapter* Let no one think Brameld is not hoping for changes every bit as definite though# He speaks of "the new order" and of "reconstructed democracy#"' He differs from such radical progressivists as Bugg and Counts. Whereas they feel, in the matter of means and ends, the latter will pretty well take care of themselves, he feels that the individual must Co be prepared for ends inherent in "common strength of aim." In Chapter II of Ends and Means in Education Brameld, after referring to the three basic contemporary positions in educational philosophy, apart from eclecticism, defines his position as follows: The fourth and final philosophy, reconstructionism, agrees up to a point with the perennialist: there is desperate need for clarity and certainty, for our civilization is beset with frustration and bewilder ment# It radically disagrees, however with perennial- ismfs solution. Instead of returning to the middle ages, it would attempt to build the widest possible ibid.."p. 7. ^ Ibid., p. 8. r 261 consensus about the supreme aims which should govern I mankind in the reconstruction of world culture. These • aims can be delineated through cooperative search: 1 indeed, the reconstructionist is convinced that already j there is a growing consensus or agreement about their most basic characteristics. The world of the future should be a world which the common man rules not merely in theory, but in fact. It should be a world in which the technological potentialities already clearly dis cernible are released for the creation of health, abundance, security for the great masses of every color, every creed, every nationality. It should be a world in which national sovereignty is utterly sub- , ordinated to international authority. In short, it I should be a world in which the dream of both ancient Christianity and modern democracy are fused with modern technology and art into a society under the control of the great majority of the people who are rightly the sovereign determiners of their own destiny.^* The influence of Rugg and Counts ‘ is obvious here. Rote the! i frequent reference to the word technology, so reminiscent ■ of Rugg. But is this a separate philosophy, a definite system; or is it another outcry of the cult of change? It would seem that Brameld is more interested in general pro posals defensible on the grounds of sociology than he is in working out a logically defensible system. As one reads Brameld * s works, he is inclined to feel that the appeal, like that of ancient Christianity, is primarily to the emo tions rather than to the intellect. Brameld reminds one of t some politicians. He is for everything good and against evil, without definitely committing himself as to just how Ibid.. pp. 15-16. these good things are to be identified and separated. Similarly, he is willing to accept the credits of other philosophies. He says, While repudiating nothing of the constructive achievements of progressivism, and while recognizing | also the importance both of essential knowledge and | clear rational analysis, this philosophy commits itself, first of all, to the renascence of modern , culture.55 .This obvious desire for eclectic support arises from the search for American rootage of Brameld1s proposals to secure socialization. He goes on to state that from change f l should emerge nothing less than control of the industrial system, of public services, and of cultural and natural 56 resources by and for the common people. In the desire for an economic rebirth, Brameld echoes Counts. As a matter of fact, there are not many ways in which Counts and Brameld actually differ except in the latter*s insistence on change as a separate philosophy. Counts is content to be a pragmatist and add the strong emphasis on reconstruction. Brameld starts with the idea that he is creating a new school of thought in demanding a new social i order. Strangely enough, the number of those who nowadays choose to call themselves "reeonstructionists" in the ; 55 ibid., p. 17. 56 log, cit. Brameld sense would seem to bear out his contention* The student of philosophy aslcs himself what there is in Brameld^ doctrine to justify itself as a separate philoso In trying to pin down Brameld to already existing philosophical systems, one notes his sharp criticism of Robert Hutchins for a philosophy which serves f , no social purpose of reform*1 with uno functional interaction1 1 between 57 school and society. Brameld terms Hutchins1 movement the Hew Reaction and points out that it is directly opposed to his own position. Dewey and progressive education fare much better at Brameld1s hands than the modern idealists. After considerable praise of progressivism, Brameld con cludes that it should be supplanted or supplemented by a philosophy 1 1 which, both in ends and means, is more solid and positive.XXJ It is obvious to his reader that he is here, at least, proposing merely a more virile brand of pragmatism than Dewey1s. His main objection to progres- sivism in Ends and Means in Education, he finally admits, is that it does not go far enough. Interestingly enough, Brameld comments on one 57 Ibid.. p. 26. 58 ibid., p. 37. 2 6 1 * weakness of progressi vism: 1 1 a tendency among some of its j devotees to gloss over the necessity of basic philosophic | 59 1 analysis.1 1 Such a comment is applicable to his own ideas.' f He is not sure whether reconstructionism is a supplement or j a change to progressivism. Such a fact seems indicative of lack of basic analysis on his own part, despite his claims to a more reasonable position than that of either absolu tism or positivism. A careful examination of Brameld1s latest volume, Patterns of Educational Philosophy, reveals actual addition ■ i to the philosophy of re constructionism (if it can be differ entiated from progres si vism) • Primarily intended as a textbook for educational philosophy, the new book is strictly a secondary source in those portions which deal rather extensively with the three basic contemporary educa tional positions. The first part of the book, especially, has material taken verbatim from Ends s^nd Means in Educa tion. some of which has already been discussed in this study. The portion of the book which is primarily of interest here, therefore, is that section which essays to I establish reconstructionism as a fourth basic position in i educational philosophy. The secondary material is I ^ Ibid., p. HO. appropriate only as it reveals Brameld himself, not his subjects. Since it is suspected that Brameld is but another variety of pragmatist, his comments on progressivism may be interpreted as possible background for his views. He is ! i frankly critical of the individualistic emphasis in Dewey1s j i followers. He grants Dewey1 s own social coneern, but he scores the movement for its failure to remove obstacles to 60 social growth. He points out the division of progressiv- ism into those calling for a planning society. He sees that the movement, by and large, is in favor of planning as j * i opposed to either hands-off individualism or planned society; consequently he feels that progress!vism needs 6l 1 1 reexamining, correcting, and supplementing.M He declares: Basic to our task is the diagnosis of two spheres of tension that, we believe, are chronic to this theory and program: one, the tension between means and ends; the other the tension between individuality and sociality.62 Following this statement, Brameld expresses his con viction that the two «spheres" can be utilized. He then 60 Theodore Brameld, Patterns of Educational Philosophy (Hew fork: World Book Company, 19 ?0) , pp. 197- 200. 61 Ibid., p. 206. Ibid., p. 207. _ . . 266, easts his vote for a planned democratic society. At this ! . i point one is reminded that Dewey would utterly refuse the idea that his philosophy and its legitimate offspring separate the individual and society. Did he not in Hecon- j struction in Philosophy and Democracy and Education stress 6H- the inseparability of the two? Is not his entire work a valiant attempt to synthesize the old dualisms? Dewey would also frown on the desire of Brameld for a planned society, just as he repudiated Rugg and Counts in that area; and he would state that a planned democratic society is a contradiction of terms. ! When he again introduces reconstructionism as the j alternative to the progressivism, perennialism, and essen- tialism he has just repudiated, Brameld makes such further profuse statements of indebtedness that one begins to wonder if perhaps he is not truly an eclectic rather than a radical progressive. Again, too, however, it is stated that the greatest indebtedness is to progressivism. So the second book of Brameld leaves his readers still suspecting the legitimacy of his claim to a separate philosophy. It is interesting to note that some of the most ! 63 Ibid.. p. 207. Qf. ante, pp. 218-219. distinctive ideas presented under reconstructionism are notj i proprietary with it# At one point Brameld cites Reinhold | ! Niebuhr's thesis that man is frequently moral while society i | is immoral# He states: ! ! This point is that, since the behavior of groups is by no means always of the same texture or refine- I ment as we find in individuals, any philosophy that I hopes to cope with the acute problems of our culture ' will fail unless it first diagnoses group behavior as objectively as possible and includes such diagnosis in its total view of reality#0* Brameld's specific adaptation of this doctrine to his recon- structionism is to declare that it holds that, if indivLd- 66 uals can act intelligently, so can groups# Niebuhr's idea would seem to repudiate the thought j of society as an organism# Brameld admits that the organic i theory of society is difficult to defend nowadays nfor the apparent reason, among others, that often its parts do not 67 hold together or cooperate•" But by the strategem of i claiming the organic concept as helpful for understanding society in various periods of history, he retains a great measure of social organism for reconstructionism# After referring to the totalitarian organic societies and i i —— " ■»■ '■ ■ ■ ■ •'• " ! n ■ i i 65 Brameld, Patterns of Edneational Philosophy, p. 66 Ibid.f p. ^25. I 67 Ibid., p. M-32. admitting the danger of some of them, he expresses the need for the organic principle in our age* Here is an interest-, ( ing juxtapositions Brameld criticizes progressivism earlier for inherent tension between individual and society and then I casts his lot with the organic concept, which Dewey noted I i ' in connection with his analysis of other philosophies, sets j i up a false dualism between man and society* Of course Brameld would deny that reconstructionism establishes any dualisms, though he speaks of group mind as well as individual mind* The fact that he never fully accepts the organic principle, though he toys with it, per-j mits him to say that the group mind ! t has no meaning as j i mysterious entity that exists, in and of itself, and with ! i characteristics totally different from those of individual 68 minds •T l The group mind though not different in kind from the individual mind is different in degree, Brameld writes. Brameld1 s strength is the strength of semantics* Without general words, without coined words, without common words with uncommon meanings, he would be lost* In the first place he eschews to talk about idealism, realism, and pragmatism* These are abstractions certainly, but only of a minor order, as compared to perennialism, essentialism, I mmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmr nm l I 68 Ibid., p. b66. and progressivism* The use of the latter series in his discussion permits him to assemble a patchwork pattern in ! reconstructionism which would be more obvious along side of j i I the traditional schools* Also he can gather up historical support for his position through this technique without facing the implications inherent in the true philosophical j i ! basis of the material upon which he rests his case* The general words, the coined words, the vague words in Brameld are obvious to any reader* One encounters constellation of forces * philosophic buttresses, human dynamics, utopian consensusf and numerous others* In Patterns of Educational Philosophy there is much use of descriptive or figurative analogy, which proves nothing. A key line, one which he chooses at least to italicize, follows; The guiding principle is that normatively the group mind &s ends and means is a culture that knows--in the most inclusive sense possible— both what it wants and how to gain its want s*ky What does Brameld mean? Is this idealism or pragmatism? Of course these questions are impossible to answer of any sentence out of context. Brameld himself is careful to i : . . . . < stick with his own terms. His restriction of idealism to perennialism and his word coinage enable him to be both idealist and pragmatist apparently as he chooses* At one I i i t ______ 69 Ibid., p. 1*69.____________________ ______________ point he calls for the practical approaches of the latter; j at another he falls back upon an idealistic belief in the | \ modern myth 1 1 to breathe into them the warmth of emotion and ; faith and beauty. ! Brameld1 s philosophy is always the best~by any j standards, he will tell one. Other philosophies either look to the past or the present; his looks to the future. j Other philosophies perpetuate; his rebuilds as well. Other j systems provide for either social or self-realization; his provides for both. Other philosophies are partial; his J 71 ! is concerned only with “defensible partiality.1 1 One wonders why such a happy combination was never achieved before. The truth of the matter is that Brameld resembles the God-intoxicated Nietzsche; he is intoxicated by the prospect of change. He seizes upon this flexible aspect of his extension of pragmatism and attributes all benefits to it. All that is needed for a better individual in a better society is the magic of the word reconstruction. In its benign light everything seems possible. If reconstruction ism has assets no other positions can lay claim to, chief among these would appear to be a vast self-confidence which * i ! 7° Loc. eit. 71 Ibid.. p. 558. 271" results in unbridled optimism. Perhaps its courage to attack all problems and situations is its greatest contri bution to the individual and society. V. SUMMARY J Chapter IX has treated modern educational concepts 1 of the individual and society. Idealism in education, upon examination, proved to favor universal principles and social institutions. Society comes before the individual in the thinking of most idealists* The concept of forma- i i tion rejected by Dewey is still prevalent in the writings of men like Finney, Bagley, Morrison, Cubberley, Briggs and Horne. The last named idealist, Herman Horne was found to be a typical representative of traditionalism in educa- ' tion. He holds that it is only right that schools should follow rather than lead society. The school only suggests how society should grow, only assists society in the hand ling of its problems. Modern realism or scientific determinism, as it has frequently been called, was found to emphasize methods in i i education. Realists, like idealists, are opposed to the relativism of pragmatism. Snedden, Bobbitt, Judd, j Charters, Terman, and Thorndike, as typical realists, pre- I I fer to be known as middle-of-the-roaders, feeling that they ; 272] avoid the faults of both idealism and pragmatism. Breed as | i an outstanding realist recognizes many dualisms in his i i 1 1 bipolar theory of education,1 1 He deplores excessive empha- i i sis upon the individual and also that upon society. In the former trend he sees pragmatism at work; in the latter, idealism. Pragmatism after Dewey shows a number of interesting developments. The old line Deweyites like Childs, Bode, and Kilpatrick stick pretty close to the master* It was found that some of Kilpatrick’s language selections are unhappy, but that basically the traditional pragmatists seek to temper the individualistic emphasis of their school with insistence upon a social setting for all values, Rugg, Counts, and Brameld were cited as modern pragmatists who want to remold society, Rugg’s emphasis is upon technology. It is his hobby horse, and he rides it continually, A pro duct of depression years, Rugg's proposals sound as out-of- date as the stock market crash. He did not realize that technology does not, as it advances, advance the man behind it. Consequently, his concrete plans are ineffectual and visionary. His faith in democracy and the individual are j genuine, however. Like Rousseau, he is a prophet, not an j executive, I i Counts proved to be a more practical, more vigorous 273n i rebuilder. He proposes imposition upon the individual in order to free him. In direct opposition to Dewey in this particular area, he approves of less than democratic means j i to achieve democratic results. He wants the strong to i carry the burdens of the weak, by force if necessary* Here is the planned society as differentiated from the planning ) society advocated by Kilpatrick and Dewey, The individual ! and society under Counts enjoy much the same relationship as they do in totalitarian cultures, Brameld, the third rebuilder, warily skirts the I areas where Counts has received criticism as being undemo- j t cratic and un-American. Though professing a philosophy of | i definite action, one deserving separate status, he proves j to be eclectic. His semantic ability enables him to juggle concepts endlessly, to give credit to all schools but to claim founding of a new school. His proposals are all defensible from the viewpoint of sociology. But he never makes clear just how he will avoid the impractical approach of Rugg on the one hand and the totalitarian leaning of Counts on the other. The prime asset of reconstructionism is not in its unique philosophy. It is a mixture which has 1 i been selected without too careful examination of impliea- ; tions of the sources. Its great value is in its self- confidence and optimism. Chapter X will consider further philosophical impli-j ! cations for education of the various concepts of the ! individual and society as presented in Chapters III to IX. j i It will attempt to relate philosophical bases and philo sophical problems to certain derived educational problems. It will consider the possibility of philosophical synthesis i and the achieving of a defensible middle position in educa tional philosophy with respect to individual and society. PHILOSOPHICAL IMPLICATIONS I The preceding chapter, Chapter IX, has presented an overview of modern educational philosophy as it relates to the matter of the individual and society, climaxing the j historical presentation in Chapters ill to IX of concepts j pertinent to the problem of this study. The present chapter will consider some of the philosophical implications arising from the preceding seven core chapters* The reader of this investigation will note that it has been necessary to include considerable philosophical interpretation and I analysis in the separate chapters at appropriate places* Thus many of the possible ramifications of the various con* cepts have already been stated or implied* However, whereas the primary purpose of the foregoing chapters has been to depict the evolution of concepts with appropriate on-the- spot analysis and comment, the major purpose of the present chapter is philosophical in nature* It will attempt to derive some meaning from the welter of concepts and varia tions, theses and antitheses* It will discuss how a , i i defensible present-day philosophy of the individual and society may be constructed and will indicate ideas from the l past which may be saved and ideas which may not for the ; ! education of the Individual in a democratic society* As was pointed out very early in this study, one of the great stumbling blocks to social harmony is the diffi culty man has in the communication of his ideas* Bacon and Locke* one will remember* were greatly concerned with the l semantic problem* In Chapter II and again in Chapter V, this investigation called attention to the Realism- Nominalism semantic controversy, pointing out how the difficulty of defining terms such as individual and society is primarily due to lack of philosophical agreement* Unfortunately, perhaps, the old controversy is still going Extreme Realism is maintained by numerous writers J who investigate the nature of Goodness or of Beauty, , who uphold the corporate character of the Church, or who press the claims of Nationality or Labor or the State, Nominalism is advocated, by others in the name of individuality and democracy. In the matter of the individual and society, philo sophical agreement and semantic clarification must be achieved simultaneously, for they are actually one problem. But let modern man be optimistic] Imperfect as language- meaning is, it is possible through it, as a matter of fact j is possible only through it, to work out man's problems* ; on* Carre points out this fact Meyrick H. Carre, Realists and Nominalists (Londons Oxford University Press, 19%) , p. 124. Consequently, with awareness of the need for exact langu- j i age, with a genuine desire to communicate and not to con- j fuse, the task of securing harmony between the Individual ' i and society, though a tremendous one, is capable of achieve ment* History bears eloquent witness of the power of human j thought and feeling courageously applied* Though to date | progress toward social harmony has been slow, there is much ' i hope for the future* Looking back upon the central chapters of this study, the researcher admits that history seems, thus far at least, i to be a see-saw, a jockeying back and forth between empha- j ses, first on the individual and then on society* There has been a continuous expansion and contraction of individual i l freedom, a continuous fluctuation in the amount of super vision and control exercised by society* It appears as though the polar tendencies of individualism and socialism are antidotal, each of the other* Certainly when one tendency has clearly dominated or has seemed to be getting out of hand, there has been a reaction in thought, philo- i f sophical, educational, political and sociological, which has started the pendulum swinging in the opposite direction* j Many have assumed that this pattern, being histori cally obvious, is both right and necessary* Historians j i especially are so inclined* Adams, for example, refers to j 278 the eoumteraetanee as a -heat ia the rhythm of progress."2 ; Sociologists frequently make the same assumption: The triumph of individualism would have been barbarism; the triumph of centralization would have stagnation; the contest of the two has produced civilization.3 s i Historically both writers are correct in their statements, j i but their rejoicing in the process is indicative of the aforementioned non seauitur assumption. It does not follow that satisfactory working relationships cannot be main tained on a more permanent basis. It is not inherently necessary that the pendulum swing from one side to the i other, though it is true that to date it has been in con- j stant motion. As one turns his attention from history in general to the history of educational philosophy in particular, he notices a similar tendency toward 1 1 either-or positions.M As this study has indicated, a number of educational philosophers have been spokesmen primarily for the freedom of the individual. They have seemed to feel that the societal aspects, because of the power of institutionaliza tion, will pretty well take care of themselves and that the 2 Sir John Adams, The Evolution of Educational Theory (London: Macmillan and Company, Ltd. , 1912), p. 131* ^ Herbert W. Conn, Social Heredity and Social Evolu tion (New York: Abingdon, 191*0 $ p. 195* 279j real danger is that the individual will become submerged in! the mass* But educational philosophies tending toward ! i individualism have been strongly opposed by other educa- | tional philosophies which have reflected primarily the institutional Interest of the teaching profession and the i need for socialization in human affairs* I i i It is readily apparent, then, from historical study ' i i of the relationship of the individual and society that nearly all concepts define this relationship as either organic or in&t^nmantfti. The holders of the organic view declare that society, being the whole, is the prime reality;, the individual, being but a part of the whole, is not to i be conceived apart from the whole* The individual has no meaning away from society* Those who take the instrumental view declare that the individual is the prime reality; society is only a group of individuals which are capable of existing by themselves and which have meaning apart from society* Plato and Aristotle presented the organic point of ! view; the Sophists were adept in their espousing of the instrumental* A few thinkers have attempted a synthesis to claim the virtues of both positions* Perhaps the most notable of the synthesizers was John Dewey* Tending to j 1 ; I ignore the metaphysical background of the problem, Dewey I concentrated upon the empirical approaches to its solution* j i He managed to find a middle ground which deserves addi- 1 ! tional investigation* Historical research indicates that a predilection j for organism and unity invariably results in favoring the J i corporate whole above the individual components* It is j ! also clear that a view of society merely as an instrument for enhancing the individual generally does not give suffi cient recognition to the reciprocal restraints which must be Imposed upon individuals if the greatest amount of j j freedom for the greatest number is to be achieved* Conse- j i quently, it is felt that the only defensible present-day i educational philosophy must base its claim upon its ability j to establish long term harmonious working relationships between the individual man and society* Brubacher in his Modern Philosophies of Education characterizes the typical, and for the most part unsatis factory current educational approach* He points out that a fundamental conflict between the individual and society is' frequently implied* An attempt is then made to effect harmony through f , sublimation of desires*1 1 Sometimes even force may be required to bring both together* Brubacher j says this fact gives one explanation of the dualisms of child and curriculum, pupil and teacher* He notes that truces for long periods are rare in this approach. Obversely, a defensible educational philosophy, finding it | necessary to establish long term or even permanent harmony, must at the start avoid any metaphysical separation of individual and society. i Therefore, organic views which, despite their claim to unity, involve treating the individual and society as separable phenomena prove unsatisfactory. But so do purely instrumental views which also seem to give society a meta physical reality and a capability of separation from the individual when they admit of social values which are not I individual values. The best approach for lasting harmony j i is to view the individual and society as merely two differ ent aspects of the same thing. This approach will avoid whole and partT object and instp^ment connotations meta physically. (It will actually not matter whether it be termed organic or instrumental in so far as the implications of these terms are restricted to purposet where they do not set up conflicts, as they do when they are applied to j structure.) The reality of individual and society must be ! i ■ i regarded as continuous. Separation would then have i ** John S. Brubacher, Modern Philosophies of Education (New Yorks McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1939), pp. 132- 133# ; i • 1 epistemological utility but, being only temporary, would not occasion the dualisms too difficult of reduction, once i they are established in the human mind* The problems oeca- I i sioned by such dualisms are exemplified by the work of | i Spencer and his followers. Spencer severed the social from the individual and never managed to reunite the two aspects j satisfactorily. Rousseau attempted to divorce the individ- ! ual from society but had to give up the project. But though the researcher feels that neither the strictly organic nor the strictly instrumental relationship i of the individual and society may be accepted, it is not | ! assumed that the advocates of either position have made no ! contribution to a possible middle position. Far from the i opposite appears trueI To a certain extent, all philosophy since the very first philosopher has been eclectic. Though to most philosophers the word eclectic has too many conno tations of patchwork, it must be admitted that philosophers get ideas directly from other philosophers without benefit of the thesis/antithesis approach of synthesis. Conse- i quently it is possible to save many ideas from the past with relatively little revision. In some cases only a somewhat I different setting or interpretation is needed to make the ideas of use in the construction of a philosophy defensible ! in the light of present-day conditions. ! i It is not surprising, therefore, to find that cen- j turies ago Aristotle and Plato made an outstanding contri bution to human thought when they recognized the social i nature of man and pointed out that even could man be visualized apart from society he would be something other than human. Aristotle declared that men fall into two j general classes, those who by the power of the intellect j can accept responsibility and govern themselves, and those who are unable to accept responsibility and therefore have to be governed externally. He called the first group free men and the second group slaves. In this idea there is considerable meaning for the modern world, for to the extent man develops and assumes internal direction, it is unneces- ! i sary for the application of external restrictions. Inter preted in this light, the highest form of individuality is not the unrestrained expression of savage instincts, the catering to the natural man which some people have read into Rousseau. Rather, as Warner Fite has so aptly stated, it is clear that: . . . the individual, so far as he is conscious of himself, is a free agent, capable of realizing ends of his own and no longer subject to Nature’s laws; secondly, that a society of conscious beings is so far ,a society of free beings, mutually free, capable of realizing mutually agreed upon ends, and no longer subject to the impersonal laws either of economics or 5 I of physical nature. j In short, it may be stated as an axiom of human life | that control is necessary to prevent utter chaos and the ! jungle of Hobbes. George Soule declares, 1 1 Somebody1 s j i liberty to do something must be denied if any action is to be taken. This truth applies to all rules and all social institutions, from a baseball league to a national political government.1 1 As examples to prove his point he cites some instances of the necessity for control in America. He notes that automobile drivers must be controlled by traffic lavs; that farmers must be restricted if adequate crops are | to be grown; that publishers must be controlled to prevent i immoral Influences upon the young; that speculators must j 6 be restricted in the interest of innocent investors. Such control is of two basic varieties, however: autocratic, which aligns itself with the external, and democratic, whicfcL aligns itself with the internal, with self-control and self- direction. Viewed in this light, life demands a choice between freedom and slavery. The process of achieving ^ Warner Fite, Individualism (New York: Longmans, Green and.Company, 1911), p. 130. 6 George Soule, 1 1 Change and the American Tradition,1 1 j Literature for Our Time, edited by Leonard S. Brown and j others (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 19^7) > p* 153* individuality becomes, if a man selects freedom, a matter of achieving maturity* In the words of Martin, the choice' n j man must make is between "maturity and infantilism*1 1 Physical, external force is the weaker type of social con- i trol as well as the degrading one* Internal control is I i strengthened to the extent it is exercised. It provides | the only satisfactory approach to freedom. From this prin ciple of internal control, one arrives logically at demo cratic government. Democracy is based upon the principle of liberty for all to the extent of responsibility. And only in democracy is there the possibility of harmonizing freedom and law. Stella Henderson has called this fact to the attention of I educators: I Individual liberty can be reconciled with social justice if (1) the individual will remember that he is free only when treating himself and others as ends; (2) the government--the servant of the people in a democracy— acts to promote the welfare of all. Extreme individualism is license, not freedom* Laissez faire results in the rule of the strong, not in freedom for all. Economic, as well as political, freedom must be 'freedom within the law.' We shall be freer if we restrict our freedom.® 7 Everett D. Martin, The Conflict of the Individual and the Mas s in the Modern World I New Yorks Henry Holt and i Co., 1932TTP* 199. j o Stella V* F* Henderson, Introduction to Philosophy! of Education (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, i T9W7:); p.'im._________________ * Those who have been used to the Metaphysical separa tion of individual and society, who have been in the habit of thinking in that false dichotomy of individual versus society may insist that paying attention to group welfare of necessity implies a lessened concern with the individual and vice versa. However, it must be realized that in order to provide for the betterment of all in a democracy, special attention must be given to individual excellence, for in a democracy decisions ultimately rest with the individual. Certainly, in this fashion only, can an actual democracy perpetuate itself. The moment the bulk of individuals fail or are unable to exercise their individuality vigorously and intelligently, a democracy ceases to be a democracy and becomes something else. Thus a democracy affords the utmost to the individual without playing down the social aspect of man's nature. This study called attention earlier to the almost complete lack of freedom and individuality in primitive cultures, where the natural man may be seen at his best, or i i worst, depending upon one's point of view. If one looks at primitive man without bias, he is forced to conclude thatj civilization is a dual process. Not only is socialization j involved, but also individuation. Dewey established the ; fact that not only do individuals make society, but also does society function in the making of individuals* Hocking has further elaborated upon this idea, pointing out the presence of the middle grounds If we refer to the plain facts of experience, we seem to see that individuals are products of social groups quite as much as social groups are products of individuals* • • • dependency seems to run both ; ways* • • • Aristotle and Locke are both right— , the state is prior to the individual, and the i individual is prior to the state: there is an alternating current or cycle in which neither can claim absolute priority.9 Such a doctrine is proved historically* Primitive men have no real individuality; they are as much alike as the proverbial peas in a pod. Only as the interactive process provides a more complex society are there concurrently more complex individuals* A primitive man is a primitive man, with little or no claim to differentiation* Today, however, 1 in our complex democratic society one can not even inclu sively term a fellow man as a farmer or a hardware merchant. In addition, he may be a Bepublican, a Mason, a graduate of Swarthmore College, a poet, an athlete, an agnostie--in short a unique, complex individual* Cooley sums up this rather paradoxical aspect of increasing individuation with increasing socialization in a democracy, sayings ^ William E. Hocking, The Lasting Elements of Individualism (New Havens Yale University Press, 1937) > pp. 4-5* In accordance with the ideal or ’equal opportunity,’ we try to facilitate special personal development in every possible way* holding that it not only does the j most for the Individual, but enables him to do the ' most for society. In this way modern society recog- j nizes and fosters individuality as the earlier epochs i . never thought of doing.10 ! i But let it be stressed again that the individuality whereof the researcher speaks is conscious individuality, and the society is conscious society* Mutual understanding is necessary for social harmony. Such understanding demands a subliming of individuality. Dr. Merritt M. Thompson, Professor Emeritus of the School of Education at The Univer sity of Southern California, for many years stressed this particular idea by means of an interesting graphic analogy* He pictured the propensities of human life as a diamond shape with man working up from 1 1 primitive individualism” (or what the author would term seeming individualism) at the bottom point of the diamond, through ’ ’predatory individ ualism,” to ”socialization” at the girth, and thence to ’ ’spiritual individualism” at the top point of the figure. He declared that man’s present state seems to be about that of predatory individualism in most aspects. j Certainly the individual most desired, in the w<— Charles H. Cooley, Social Process (Hew York: Scribner, i of Mash, is “mot the bare individual but the social individ ual* This concept, it has been noted, was in all proba bility first advanced by the Hebrew prophets, Jeremiah, j I Hosea, Amos, Isaiah, and Ezekiel. They urged individual j responsibility to society as well as stressed social jus- ! i tice for the individual* In Ancient Athens it was likewise felt, however vaguely, that individuality not only is com- j patible with society but also contributes to social stabil ity when men are made aware that only in socialization is there complete individuation* Socrates strove, therefore, to make his contemporaries think critically about individual and social problems, and he expanded the Sophist man as the “measure of all things1 1 from the self-centered man to the * ■ . i socially oriented man, thus counterbalancing the Sophist contributions to individual determination with contribu tions to individual responsibility. Strangely enough, it has been Rousseau who has made one of the outstanding additions to understandlng of the relationship between individuality and socialization, between the individual good and the good of all* Through j his earlier work, Rousseau is frequently cited as author!- | zation for license and the following of the natural impulse ! i . i i H. S. Nash, Genesis of the Social Conscience (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1897) , p. 1*>. to the exclusion of the social. In the Social Contract. though, he expressed the more mature idea that only through! participating and cooperating with his fellows can the j i individual achieve his greatest growth as an individual. j Rousseau stated: | i The passing from the state of nature to the civil ! state produces in man a very remarkable change, by ! substituting justice for instinct in his conduct, and giving to his actions a moral character which they lacked before. . . . Man, who had till then regarded none but himself, perceives that he must act on other principles, and learns to consult his reason before he listens to his inclinations. Although he is deprived in this new state of many advantages which he enjoyed from nature, he gains in return others so great, his faculties so unfold themselves by being exercised, his ideas are so extended, his sentiments so exalted, and his whole mind so enlarged and refined, that if, by abusing his new condition, he did not sometimes degrade it j even below that from which he emerged, he ought to ! bless continually the happy moment that snatched him forever from it. and transformed him from a circumscribed and stupid animal to an intelligent being and a man.*1^ Here is a point of view that, while strictly instrumental in origin, can be endorsed by any defensible present-day philosophy of the individual and society. Rousseau, in attempting to explain himself further, got mixed up in the problem of "the general will,1 1 and was never able to 12 Jean Jacques Rousseau, The Social Contract. edited by Charles Frankel (New York: Hafner Publishing Company, 19^7)> pp* 13-19. explain Just how the volonte gene rale develops or to make ( this particular doctrine logically consistent with his i basically instrumental approach. But disregarding the metaphysical corner into which Rousseau pointed himself, one can from his own empirical observations agree with the ] Frenchman's somewhat belated praise of social life* ' Rousseau finally came to a recognition of the inseparabil ity of individual and society5 thus his efforts to get the individual back into the social setting from which he had earlier tom him* One of the greatest champions of the individual obviously saw in the final analysis that man has both collective and distributive aspects* In all probabil ity he saw, too, the ultimate futility of attempting to establish either separate, non-contiguous organic or instru mental metaphysical foundations for social philosophy* As Dewey says, here is the individual and society; where do we go from here? Perhaps Pestalozzi had the right idea after all when he declared that feeling frequently does more than thinking in social matters* Actually his tory has proved that the emotional response of Pestalozzi ! 1 and Froebel to Rousseau has had greater effect than the intellectual response of such men as Herbart• And Stoicism seems to have made its greatest contribution through appeal! 1. ! I to the brotherhood of men rather than through any logical insights. The power of Christianity, especially the early ! variety stemming directly from Jesus, came from its strik ing message in simple terms which roused the feelings of I the most unerudite. Ignoring the metaphysical enigmas which! tempt and yet elude the scholar, Christianity rested its j i case for harmony of the individual with his society upon j the principle of love arising from the Fatherhood of God and the Brotherhood of Man. Certainly it seems mandatory that thought and feeling i not he separated in attempts to enhance man in his individ ual and social aspects. By nature, fortunately, man may be i roused not merely in his own behalf as a discrete individ ual, but through training and insight may be aroused in j i favor of his fellows, even apart from the knowledge that by helping them he is indirectly helping himself. Of course the utilitarian approach has the merit of being rather more positive. Note John Stuart Mill's reaction to the ideal of loving one's neighbor as himselfs 4s the means of making the nearest approach to this ideal, utility would enjoin, first, that laws and social arrangements should place happiness, or (as speaking practically it may be called) interest, of every individual as nearly as possible in harmony with the interest of the whole; and secondly, that education and opinion, which have so vast a power over human character, should so use that power as to estab lish in the mind of every individual an indissoluble i association between his own happiness and the practice ! of such modes of conduct, negative and positive, as j regard for the universal happiness prescribe; so that not only he may be unable to conceive the possibility of happiness to himself, consistently with conduct | opposed to the general good, but also that a direct impulse t© promote the general good may be in every individual one of the habitual motives of action, and i the sentiments connected therewith may fill in every j human being's sentient existence.1^ It appears, then, that there are two actual avenues to harmony of the individual and society, the religious or moral and the utilitarian. It also appears to be of not too much value to be constantly examining motives to deter* mine which of the avenues is in use at a given time. Suf fice it to know the goal and the general direction thereto. As Mill so clearly points out, the utilitarian may in time, ' i through habit alone if nothing else, become the moral; for the true utilitarian has conceded that freedom means the greatest amount of freedom for all. It must be remembered that refusal to agree to meta physical separation of individual and society in itself does not immediately solve all our social problems, for all too often there is a strange lag between thought and action, much more noticeable than between feeling and action (as implied earlier in this chapter) • Recognizing the insepar able nature of the individual and society merely sets the 23 John Stuart Mill * Utilitarianism. Everyman's Library Edition (New Yorks Duttonj 1910), P* 16. 29^ stage for solution. It prevents men from approaching social problems with the versus attitude; It prevents a hasty con- i elusion of the opposition of sociality and individuality j i before the “larger picture” is seen* The social system is i i likely to suppress individuality as long as it remains imperfect* It will remain imperfect as long as each individ ual has yet to achieve “spiritual individualism*1 1 The pro- i cess therefore may be a very long-term one* It is a process in which education can help, can even lead the way* But education, contrary to Rugg, Counts, and Brameld, cannot remake the social order* Nor should it be expected to* | Drastic change can be accomplished only through legislation to which the school may contribute only indirectly* However, education may be expected to bear a big part of the load* If both the utilitarian and moral aspects of man’s nature may be brought to bear upon social problems, then a great share of the solution of those problems rests with education* The job of the schools has always been regarded as that of developing social intelligence* At i times they have failed miserably* If education is to justify’ itself as a profession, it must assume the challenge of | teaching harmony between the utilitarian and moral, the ! I I individual and social aspects of human nature* Repudiation j \ I of the Individual/society dualism will provide a working j agreement* Admittedly the tasks ahead are not easy ones, i but they must be faced* In general terms Horne has sue*- einetly stated the role of education worthy of the name: But we need to recognize that education is the ' individualizing of society as well as the socializ ing of the individual* The individualizing of society makes leaders of society, as the socializing of the individual makes fit members of society* To adjust the individual to society is a stabilizing process, tending to preserve the ancient social | institutions; to adjust society to the efficient i leader is a process making for progress, tending to increase the social values* For education simply to adjust men to society would be indeed valuable conservation, but for education also to adjust society to the capable individual means progress *^ Perhaps it is a good omen for "the middle ground1 1 that such an avowed idealist as Home should join Dewey and Hocking in their concept of individuation and socialization as con current aspects of living* More specifically than Horne has indicated, modern education must examine its materials and its practices in the light of defensible democratic principles* The fullest development of the individual must be sought in order that i the lives of all individuals may be reciprocally enriched* Schools must continually reorganize and strengthen their I instruction to afford opportunities for growth in a social I * Ik , Herman H* Horne, Idealism in Education (New Yorks i The Macmillan Company, 1910), pp* 126^127• setting; they mast teach the doctrine of freedom and law or, better yet, freedom and self-control* In conjunction with the home and the church, schools must seek to teach the fact that love provides the smoothest working relation ships between men, and so has the greatest utility* Chapter XI will present a summary, the conclusions, and the recommendations of this study* SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, M l RECQMMBNIAIIONS | The preceding chapter has added to the philosophicalj interpretation it was possible to include in Chapters III j to IX in the coarse of presenting concepts of the individ ual and society in educational philosophy* This final ; chapter will set forth, in addition to a summary, the con clusions and recommendations which arise from this investi gation. Part I, the summary, will present in the usual < precis form the followings a statement of the problem, the! importance of the problem, the importance of historical and philosophical analysis to such problems, methods of pro cedure and source materials, and terminology. It will recapitulate the contributions of the various historical periods and of the selected great educational philosophers. Part II, conclusions, will delineate certain ideas deduced from the findings of the study. Part III, recommendations, will present the suggestions of the author for further research and action. I. SUMMARY i ] Statement of the problem. The original purpose of this study was to examine and evaluate concepts of the individual and society as they appear historically in edu cational philosophy, with the intention of establishing any j apparent need for, and possibility of achieving, synthesis j or middle ground for social action. It was hoped that cer- i tain conclusions and recommendations would arise from the investigation for present-day use in continuing efforts to j achieve individual and social harmony. Importance of the problem. The problem of the individual and society is fundamental to philosophy, to history, to education; as a matter of fact, it is central to human activity. Writers everywhere have stressed its : importance. The relationships between the individual and society form the bases for all ideologies in the world today. Achieving satisfactory social relations is one of the greatest concerns of our nation. Educators, particu larly, are challenged by responsibility to the individual and society. Hence the importance of studying the outstand ing ideas of great educational philosophers who have struggled with the same problem. ! Importance of historical and philosophical ; A study of the individual and society lends itself readily | i to historical and philosophical treatment• The social problems of man are as old as his history. Though 299 historical study will not provide ready-made patterns acceptable today, a knowledge of the past is essential for realistic thinking about the future* Identification of components of today's problems is facilitated by a knowledge of their origin and background* Analysis and interpreta tion of the concepts of great thinkers of the past will not : only enrich man's understanding of the present, but will also lessen the chance of his making the same errors over and over again* It is submitted that, since the educational practices of today are the product of not one but many / periods of history, only through an understanding of their geneses in educational philosophy can educators properly evaluate them* Method of procedure and source materials* Procedure in the preparation of this investigation has been the read ing, analyzing, and interpreting of sources* In preparing the manuscript, an effort was made to present the concepts involved in meaningful terms* Svery attempt has been made to correlate material, indicating fruitful relationships and logical developments* In some instances concepts were contrasted as well as compared* Effort was made to iden- ! tify influences, to detect common strains of ideas* It was necessary at times, particularly in matters of early history, to utilize secondary source material* By far the greater reliance has been upon primary works, however* They were i used whenever existent and available to the researcher* Careful search revealed no significant related investiga- ! tions* , j Terminology. In Chapter I a general policy was j established to use normative definitions whenever possible* This plan has been followed* No attempt was made to cen tralize definitions because of the fact that part of the problem is the unwillingness of all concerned to accept the same terminology when presenting ideas* So truly is ' i the semantic foundation involved, one can point out that social ideas and the words in which they are couched cannot be separated* Changing the words changes the meaning; giv ing the words different connotations changes the meaning also* Consequently, it was decided to follow the previously mentioned general policy and to point out, as I much as possible, any special or unusual definitions as the study progressed* In Chapter II considerable space was devoted to a discussion of tentative definitions of the concepts to be investigated* Central to the chapter is the > Nominalist-Realist controversy, which has distinct Implications for terminology* In many cases philosophical agreement must be reached before complete semantic clarifi cation is possible* t j Early historical background of the problem* In ! i primitive cultures the individual was restricted for what was felt to be the good of society* Though every individual was equal before society, there was little or no real j individuality. In the very early civilizations, including Egypt, the family evolved as the basic social unit* As the family rose above the tribe, the status of women also rose, and there was an accompanying tendency toward recognition of the worth of the individual* Among the Jewish people individuality was furthered. The Hebrew Prophets con tinually stressed individual responsibility as well as individual freedom and social justice. The early Greeks. Spartan society may be regarded as an outstanding example of complete subordination of individuality to sociality* The Athenian Greeks were the first people in history to recognize the principle that individuality contributes to social stability. Welfare of society was regarded as the justification for development | of individual capacities and for enjoyment of individual .... i liberty* Not until the later Athenians did emphasis on ! personal gain arise as a factor in the excessive ' The later Greeks. The individualism of Protagoras j - I had been of a mild variety, but his Sophist followers j i engendered a decline in public morality through their i i excesses. Sophism made definite contributions to Individ* ual determination, but for the most part overemphasized the individual away from his social context. Consequently, i Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle opposed the unchecked individualism of their day. Socrates devoted himself to increase of critical thinking concerning the individual and i society. His personal life has proved to be a great testi- ; monial to the principle of individual worth. Plato, the second of the Mgreat triumvirate1 1 deplored the irrational approach of many of the Sophists. Society for him was & priori to the individual, though he probably initiated the organic concept to explain their relationship (as against the instrumental concept of the Sophists) • A firm supporter of state education, Plato has been a great influ ence in the triumph of public control over private control of education. Aristotle gave greater recognition to the individual than did Plato, but he too gave relatively more j attention to society. His philosophy provides the outstand-f ing example to organic harmony of individual and social elements, though like all organic concepts It ended by favoring the whole above the components* Like Plato he made a nationalistic approach to education* i The Hellenistic and Homan Bra* The Stoic doctrine of brotherly love was a prime contribution of the Hellenis tic period* The social life of early Borne centered around the family, a social institution which encouraged individ uality* No unusual developments stemmed from Home during this time, however* Later Homans were satisfied to follow the lead of the Greeks, so that of their educational philosophers only one, Cicero, stands out* He foreshadowed i the impact of Christianity through his emphasis upon brotherly love and the equality of mankind* Early Christianity» The doctrines of Jesus, arising from a basis of the fatherhood of God and the brotherhood ! of man, maintained the absolute equality of individuals* Brotherly love and the Golden Hule had taken the place of the * * eye for an eye and tooth for a tooth1 1 relationship between individuals fostered by Mosaic Law* A new element, i that of love, was added to the Greek concept of individual ity* Christ taught a creed for the individual primarily, but it was one which brought no conflict between individ uals and consequently between man and his society* Before j long the Christian Apologists, Augustine and others, intro- i duced much from Pagan philosophy into Christianity, The | simple doctrines of Jesus, resting primarily upon feeling, were intellectualized, For the most part, the thought ! engendered did not make up for the brotherly love feeling lost to systematization. Asceticism and mysticism were j introduced, and much of the original spirit of Jesus* teachings was submerged beneath credal formalism. The Early Middle Ages, Undoubtedly rationalized Christianity played a great part in the civilizing of the barbarian world left after the fall of Rome, but the growth ! of the Catholic Church and the spreading of feudalism I ! generally seem to have acted in favor of a society which repressed individuality. The former was conservative and i inclined to overlook social inadequacy. The latter, being based upon class and rank, sought social stability above individual development. The Crusades were without doubt educative of universality5 they brought many men into wider contact with their fellows; but their addition to scientific 1 knowledge was obviously greater than their addition to social knowledge. The Later Middle Ages, Through the concentration of j 1 the Scholastics upon deductive logic there arose in the I Later Middle Ages the great controversy between Realism and Nominalism* Angus tine had seen the former and philosophy as synonymous* Aristotle had engendered further Realism * ■ i through the influence of his form-mat ter concept. In social matters Realism was evident in the Later Middle Ages in the I I domination of corporate entities* St* Thomas Aquinas, j i whose great contribution was further harmonious combination ; i I of Aristotle and the Christianity of Jesus, advanced moderate Realism* Like Aristotle he was favorable to * individuality, but he favored sociality whenever it appeared that a choice must be made* The great champion of Nominal ism was William of Ockham* He opposed the idea that cor porations exist for the sake of anything but the individuals who compose them* His emphasis upon individuality fore shadowed the Renaissance and Reformation emphasis upon the individual* He was in a way a forerunner of the doctrines of Locke and Rousseau* The Renaissance and the Reformation* It is impossi ble to separate these overlapping and coexistent movements* i Both stressed individuality, but whereas the spirit of the | Renaissance frequently resulted in exaggerated individual!sm[ i this trend in secular matters was countered by the Reforma- j ! tion emphasis upon individual responsibility* Like the , Jewish Prophets of old, the Reformation leaders, Luther and Calvin, linked individuality and conscience* In turn the 1 Renaissance glorification of man counteracted religious concentration upon human depravity and sinfulness* In j retrospect the two movements appear to have to have sub- J i limed each other* Certainly the influence of one without i the other would have been warping. j Locke and Rousseau. The great English and French ' champions of the individual manifested interesting points of likeness and difference* Both started from nature; both were concerned with proper social relationships; both believed that men are born equal* But here the similarity \ ends. Bach reflected the national temper and the political | I situation of his native land* Locke's approach was the i well-organized, rational one; Rousseau's, the emotional, rarely self-consistent* From the first, because of his Tabula Rasa theory, Locke saw all men as equally dependent upon each other and society* Rousseau initially withdrew his individual from the corrupt society typified by contem porary France, only to restore him, by way of soeial con tract, to a more ideal society* ! Pestalozzi and Froebel* Among those who responded to the messages of Locke and Rousseau were Pestalozzi and Froebel. Theirs was primarily the emotional response as i compared to that of Herbert* Pestalozzi was only super- i ficially concerned with organization and logical consist- j ency. Rousseau may have had a love for mankind, but Pestalozzi added something new to Rousseauist doctrine when ! j i he reaffirmed the principle of love preached by Christ* He j stressed the influence of home and mother in education, which he viewed as a process of unfolding the nature of each individual* Froebel was somewhat sceptical of the family in education and wanted the individual placed under the jurisdiction of civil society at an early age* i Pestalozzi placed greater emphasis upon the worth of the individual than did Froebel. The latter, being wrapped up j in unity and organic theories, was more inclined to focus on the whole .than its parts* Both men had difficulty in ’ meeting the problem of freedom and responsibility in logical! terms* Pestalozzi’s reliance upon love as a simple Christian approach seems of greater value as a solution than Froebel1s retreat to mystical semantics. John Dewey* Dewey’s social philosophy represents an i attempt to avoid the dualism he saw as inherent in organic 1 concepts of the individual and society* He also sought to avoid the view of the Sophists that society is merely an instrument for the furthering of individuality. In his i |synthesis he centended that there is no inherent conflict between society and the individual since both are but i different aspects of the same thing. He turned his back j upon traditional metaphysics, refusing to juggle what he saw as chimeras in favor of a more direct approach to social problems. He emphasized the process in which the individual and society are involved, not the entities, which he felt .have only epistemologieal separation. His doctrine of the creation of individuals by the school and society is in j direct contrast to the doctrine, held by Pestalozzi and Froebel, of the unfolding of individuals (into whom God has earlier enfolded their natures)• Though pragmatism I / historically has been frequently attacked as a source of exaggerated individualism, Dewey actually, if anything, overdid the social aspects. It is interesting to note that Pierce’s concept of "the unlimited community,1 1 James’ doc trine of "the higher selves," and Dewey’s principle of "the great community" approximate each other in the final analy sis, despite the fact that the philosophies of the three vary greatly. Dewey set up two main criteria for evaluating a society, the number and variety of interests which are shared, and the fullness and freedom of the interaction. t Individuals are, he said, free and yet paradoxically social i tto the extent and fullness of their social relations. 309; I Modern developments* An examination of modern | idealism reveals that soelal institutions and universal ; principles are regarded generally as being logically prior | to the individual by its adherents* Very definitely the j school follows, rather than leads, society* Modern realismj i proved to emphasize methods in education* The realist | openly embraces various dualisms, among them the individual and society, but optimistically holds that there is no real difficulty reconciling the two* Pragmatists following Dewey fall into two categories, those who seek to stay i close to the master by tempering the individualistic tenden-| i cies of pragmatism by continually emphasizing the social setting, and those extremists who have gone to either the i poles of individualism or socialism under the pragmatic banner* Eugg, Counts, and Brameld want to remold society* In the main they want to mold the individual at the same time* Eugg has not realized that growth scientifically is not always accompanied by growth socially* His emphasis on technology is out of date* Counts is a more vigorous re builder* He seems to approve of means not quite democra- tic as long as democratic results are the goal. His is the I planned society as opposed to the planning society advo cated by Dewey and his close followers* Brameld, though t t | claiming to have founded a new school of philosophy, is an eclectie who is more successful in sociology than in ; philosophy* His reconstructionism is of greatest value for its optimistic approach and for its recognition of the need for harmony of the individual and society* II. CONCLUSIONS In a sense the entirety of Chapter X is devoted to the conclusions of the author of this study. Chapters previous to Chapter X have either stated or implied certain conclusions also. However, it is felt desirable to restate here in summary form various conclusions which are con sidered to be of major import* Succinctly stated, these may be grouped as follows: j 1* There has been a continuous fluctuation in individual freedom and social control historically* When either the social or the individual aspect of man's nature has gained ascendancy, philosophers, educational and other wise, have taken up the task of securing a more even and harmonious relationship• 2* Educational philosophy, being a variety of social philosophy, has been deeply concerned with the individual ' and the society he moves in* Educators from the time of i Socrates to the present have been aware of the need for smooth integration of the individual and the social* 3ii 3. Two main views of the relationship between the | i individual and society have been held by philosophers* | i These are the organic with its consequent favoring of the | i whole (society) over the part (individual) and the instru mental with its inevitable choice of the end (individual) i over the means (society). Some attempt has been made with 1 considerable success, and with unlimited future possibili ties, to effect a synthesis between the two traditional viewpoints. Typical of these is the doctrine which, focus ing attention on the process and not upon the components of it, declares that socialization and individuation are i i simultaneous. i b. A philosopher’s concepts of the individual and | society are almost invariably closely related to his basic philosophy. Those who tend to stress stability and the i retention of values, emphasize society. Those who tend to stress change and the introduction of new values, emphasize the individual. 5. For the most part earlier educational philoso- i phers, while deeply conscious of man’s social nature have Men most militant when championing the individual. Those who have favored the individual have apparently felt that, I whereas the social aspect of man’s nature seems to hold its Sown, it is necessary to affirm constantly the principle of individuality to prevent the submerging of the Individual j in the mass* i 6* Modern educational philosophers, Dewey and those i t i following, have been imbued with the social setting and man's social responsibilities* Many pragmatists, anticipat ing charges of relativism and individualism, have exercised ; their individuality in a social arena to such an extent that they have frequently been charged with the social extreme instead of the individual one* 7* It is obvious in retrospect of philosophy that i the true route of progress falls between extremes* Individ-* i ual liberty must be tempered by individual responsibility* j i Someone's freedom must be limited if freedom is to be pro-* j vided for the greatest number* Liberty is reciprocal in democracy* The democratic form of government thereby offers the best hope for harmony of the individual and society* 8* Separation of the individual and society has i epistemological utility but there is no metaphysical reality; in separating the "collective” and 1 1 distributive” aspects of man's nature* Not only should one speak of individuals as belonging to society, but also of society as belonging to individuals* Individuals make a society, but also society makes individuals * The achievement of a form of social life jin which interests are “mutually interpenetrating1 1 (in the ! I words of John Dewey) would keep the individual and society j i I firmly together. Carried to the ultimate, this concept | # » i would open the way for an international society— that great | dream of Pierce, 1 1 the unlimited community.1 1 i 9. There has not been enough feeling expressed in most areas of social relationship. Thought points the way, but feeling is required for the execution. The principle of love, as presented in the simple teachings of Christ and as exemplified by him and such educators as Pestalozzi, resolves all problems. i 10. Educational institutions alone cannot “remake j i society1 1 or remake man either. The task of individuation/ | I socialization is one for all human institutions and agen- j * cies. It is for the individual in particular as well as for society in general. Education can teach children social responsibility. It can teach them social intelligence. Thus its responsibility is enormous, but it must have help from every segment of the community. III. BECOMMENDAT IONS i I The author of this investigation felt it appropriate to make a few specific recommendations apart from those inherent in the conclusions previously enumerated. Conse quently it is recommended that: 1. Further research be initiated into those areas i of the individual/society problem not the province of this i study, that is, the religious, ethical, sociological, and j political ramifications of the problem. ! i 2. Educational emphasis be given to the necessity j of achieving harmony between the individual and society by j preparing teachers so that they might approach the problem j consciously, aware of its complexity and its importance to ' their students. 3# Philosophers strive to reach agreement upon I basic social issues to the extent of providing a foundation i for meaningful terminology. J b. Citizens everywhere be made aware of the \ I inseparability of their individuality from their sociality by stress upon the democratic principle of freedom within the law. BIBLIOGRAPHY BIBLIOGRAPHY Adams, Sir John, The Evolution of Educational Theory. London: Macmillan and Company, Ltd*, 1912. Adamson, John E., The Theory of Education in Plato1 s Republic* London: S. Sonnenschain and Company, Ltd., 1 1903. Aristotle, Basic Works. Edited by Richard McEeon; Mew York: Random House, 19*+1« I ! _____ Nichomachean Ethics. Translated by D. P. Chase5 j New York: E. P. Button and Company, Inc., 1931 *. # ! ______, Poetics. Translated by Benjamin Jowett; Hew York: The Modern Library, 19^3• Bacon, Francis, “Novum;; Organum,1 1 Modern Classical Philosophers. Edited by Benjamin Rand; Hew York: Houghton Mifflin Company, 192%. Bergson, Henri, Matter and Memory. Translated by | H. M. Paul; London: George Allen and Unwin, Ltd., 1912. j Bode, Boyd H., Progressive Education at the Crossroads. 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Creator Burton, C. Grant (author)

Core Title A historical study of the concept of the individual and society in educational philosophy

Degree Doctor of Philosophy

Publisher University of Southern California (original), University of Southern California. Libraries (digital)

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Language English

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