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An examination of a concept of image in presidential campaigning: the Humphrey-Nixon compaign of 1968

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An examination of a concept of image in presidential campaigning: the Humphrey-Nixon compaign of 1968

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Content AN EXAMINATION OF A CONCEPT OF IMAGE
IN PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGNING:
THE HUMPHREY-NIXON CAMPAIGN OF 1968
by
Gary Dallas Keele
A Dissertation Presented to the
FACULTY OF THE GRADUATE SCHOOL
UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA
In. Partial Fulfillment of the
Requirements for the Degree
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
(Speech Communication)
February 1977
UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA
THE GRADUATE SCHOOL
UNIVERSITY PARK
LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA 90007
This dissertation, written by
.................. Gar¥ .. Dalla.s ... Keele ............................ .
under the direction of M.s._. ___ Dissertation Com-
mittee, and app1·oved by all its members, has
been presented to and accepted by The Graduate
School, in partial fulfillment of requirements of
the degree of
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
Dean
DISSERTATION COMMITTEE
._. IAJ~ .. /< . .. 9,~-···---- ···--··---·-- -----·--
Chairman
. ·--- -·- _1~~·~··---··-··-
········'?:::·,..···l ····ffl:!:7-........................... .
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Chapter
I . INTRODUCTION
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
II. VOTER IMAGES IN 1968
• • • • • • • • • • • • • •
III.
IV.
HUBERT HUMPHREY'S COMMUNICATED IMAGE IN 1968
RICHARD M. NIXON'S COMMUNICATED IMAGE IN 1968
• •
•
V. CONCLUSION: THE TESTING OF AN IMAGE
CONCEPTUALIZATION OF VOTING BEHAVIOR
• • • • •
APPENDIXES ••••••
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
SELECTIVE BIBLIOGRAPHY.
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
Page
1
48
68
110
145
178
222
..
1.1.
CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Every four y~ars, Americans elect a
king--but not only a king, also a high priest
and a prophet. It does not matter that we
are a practical and sophisticated people, no
longer (we think) influenced bys mbols,
myths, or rituals. To what our president
represents, we react with passion.
1
The most significant rhetorical phenomenon occurring in
the United States is the quadrennial election of the presi
dent. The nature, magnitude, and importance of the event
clearly warrant such a judgment. The campaign for president
is directed at more individuals than any other single
rhetorical effort. The 1976 presidential campaign will
attempt to reach more than one hundred forty million people,
about two-thirds of whom legally will be able to vote.
Approximately eighty million voters from Alaska to Florida
will cast their votes on Tuesday in November.
2
Millions of
dollars will be spent, untold millions of man-hours will be
expended by volunteer and paid professional staffs, and the
media will be filled with news items reporting the process
and advertisements attempting to influence it.
Popular election of a presidGnt is perhaps the most
1
significant recurrent event in the reaffirmation of the
American political system. Choosing between or among alter
native candidates helps to solidify the belief that individ
ual citizens participate in the political decision-making
process. As such, presidential campaigns provide a signifi
cant symbolic -reassurance contributing to the stability of
democratic regimes.
3
By voting, an individual legitimizes
the political system.
4
The campaign process tends also to
legitimize the existing political system as it emphasizes
choice and participation. While some individuals may choose
not to vote as a means of expressing their lack of confi
dence in the system, the idea that they could participate if
they desired tends to reinforce the belief that ultimate
control of the American political system rests with the
citizenry. While voting for a particular presidential can
didate may not directly influence public policy and few
individuals obtain that which tney desire even if their
candidate wins, indirectly elections may limit the kinds of
activ.fty in which a president may engage.
5
The ability of a
president to gain the cooperation of others in leadership
positions may depend on how favorable those "others" per
ceive the president's standing to be with the public.
6
An
election is a prime indicator of this public assessment.
The nature of political campaign clearly is rhetori
cal. Nimmo defined any campaign as "the activities of a
individual or group ... designed to manipulate the behav
ior of a wider number of people ... to his advantage."
7
2
A political campaign meets that definition well as Stephen
Shadegg observed: "The purpose of a political campaign can
be summed up in one sentence--to address a persuasive
request to every registered voter to support your candidate
at the polls."
8
The campaign for President, then, is a per
suasive appeal of magnitude and significance that warrants
rhetorical study.
Because Presidential political campaigns are rhetorical
events of considerable consequence, the Speech Communication
Association has commissioned a review of each presidential
campaign since 1948.
9
The Speech Communication Association
Research Board has tried to stimulate "more searching study
of political campaigns.
1110
Judith Trent's recent review of
speech communication research in political communication
indicates there is a strong interest in campaign communica
tion: "Between 1967 and 1973, fifty-four articles dealing
with some aspect of the 1960 through 1972 election campaigns
were published in seven national and regional speech commun
ication journals.
1111
Justifi~ation of the Study and
Review of the Literature
Even though a political campaign is a rhetorical phe
nomenon, communication generally has been ignored as a
variable in the study of election results and voter behav
ior. Steven Chaffee, in his recent review of research
concerned with the diffusion of political information,
3
concluded that in most research, "communication processes
are either assumed as a given, or treated as a source of
error."
12
The general view, according to Chaffee, is that
"while communication in general is manifestly essential to
the political process, communication variable~ did not gov
ern the course of the particular change."
13
David Swanson
came to similar conclusions in his review of campaign com
munication research:
... these studies tend to be self-consciously not
communication oriented. They study election outcomes
and attempted correlations between voting choices,
demographic characteristics, attitudes, or experiences,
but have not directly attacked the problem of determin
ing to what extent, if at all, persuasive campaign com
munication enters this process as a variable which may
influence the final result. Consequently, there is a
paucity of the impact of campaign communication per se
and many of our ''insights" into this genre of influence
are second-hand deductions based on ersatz evidence.
14
Studies of campaign communication in the discipline of
speech communication have not been highly productive. As
early as 1960, the Speech Association of America urged its
ITTernbers to search for ways in which they could contribute to
the study of campaign communication.
15
Nine years later,
James H. McBath and Walter R. Fisher concluded little pro
gress had been made.
16
In a 1972 review of political cam
paign communication research in speech communication, Swan
son found that the research focused only on selected
speechts of candidates, standards of judgment were confused
and ambiguous, many studies were merely descriptive, and
judgments concerning the importance of campaign persuasion
4
were intuitive and questionable.
17
Trent also was highly
critical because she discovered (1) little or no attention
given to voters as receivers, (2) that effect of the commun-
ication as a standard of judgment had been ignored or
asserted, and (3) communication variables other than
speeches had been ignored.
18
When presidential campaign communication is considered
as a variable, it often is examined only for the policy
positions articulated by the candidate.
19
There exist
essentially two explanations of how presidential candidates
select their policy stands. The first, "responsible party"
conceptualization, sees the candidates taking clear and
distinct posit'ons on issues which they explain carefully to
voters. The voters then select the candidate offering the
most attractive policy alternatives.
20
Spatial theories
argue that candidates assume the policy stands that will be
most popular among voters. If public opinion is essentially
unimodal and consistent over all salient issues, candidates
will likely assume the same issue position. Spatial the
ories are of two varieties, public opinion theories and
party cleavage theories. The public opinion theories ignore
party differences and assume that candidates seek out the
midpoint of public opinion. Party cleavage views recognize
the importance of public opinion, but modify public opinion
views by recognizing that a candidate's positions are
influenced by his own beliefs and motivations, by the
5
beliefs of those who are responsible for the candidate's
nomination, and by the necessity of securing financing and
motivated staff members for the campaign.
21
The problem with these explanations from a communica
tion perspective is that they deal with how a candidate
selects policy stands rather than how voters make their vot-
ing decisions. Essential to these explanations are several
key assumptions, among them being that candidates may
accurately determine voters' policy opinions, that voters
perceive accurately candidates' policy stands, that candi
dates have wide latitude in the selection of policy stands,
and voters' policy preferences can easily be determined.
These assumptions are questionable. For example, Hubert
Humphrey in 19£8, because of his position as Vice-President
and his defense of Lyndon Johnson's domestic policies, could
not assume a policy on Vietnam markedly different from
Johnson's, nor could he be highly critical of the manner in
which Vietnam policy had been conducted. In the New Hamp
shire primary of 1968, three of five McCarthy supporters
were critical of Johnson's Vietnam policy because it was not
sufficiently hawkish.
22
Clearly, McCarthy was not an advo
cate of a more hawkish Vietnam policy. Voters' familiarity
with policy stands is generally low, many are unable to
identify the stands taken by candidates, and few have real
opinions on specific stands.
23
Even granting these assump
tions, however, the spatial theories seem not to have strong
6
explanatory power. In 1968, candidates took a number of
positions which were in disagreement with the majority of
public opinion.
24
Partisan identifiers in the 1968 campaign
differed only on about half of the policy issues, but the
candidates did not differ on many of these.
25
When these
findings are joined with the fact that candidates spend lit
tle time articulating definite policy stands,
26
these ex
planations do not seem to offer a very fruitful approach to
assessing campaign communication.
The concept of party -iden ification has gained a
prominent position in explanations of voting behavior.
27
According to Richard W. Boyd, "Party identification is a
cognitive anchor for our political attitudes. The member of
a party is prone to look with approval upon his own party's
conduct and to be suspicious of the conduct of the other."
28
However, while gross percentages of party identification
remain relatively stable,
29
the degree to which people vote
according to their partisanship varies substantially. In
July, 1968, the Gallup Poll reported that 27 per cent iden
tified themselves as Republicans, 27 per cent as Indepen
dents, and 46 per cent as Democrats.
30
Yet final election
results not more than three months later 9ave Republican
Nixon 43.33 per cent of the vote, Democrat Humphrey 42.62
per cent, and Independent Wallace and others 14.05 per
cent.
31
In the 1972 election, the Democratic party was
still predominant, yet McGovern experienced a crushing
7
defeat. In 1952 and 1956 the Republican candidate, Eisen
hower, won by substantial margins. Kennedy, a Democrat, won
narrowly in 1960, and Johnson, a Democrat, won by a land
slide in 1964. Gerald Pomper's research correlating the
percentage ~f the vote a particular party received with that
which the party received in the four previous elections
indicates many fluctuations during the period 1932-1964 with
several of the elections having a correlation coefficient of
below .50.
32
The problem may be that the best method of measuring
partisan constancy and change, that of securing information
on the same individuals over an extended period of time, is
not available. Thus, gross percentages may obscure exten
sive internal shifting and the relative strength of the
partisan attachment.
33
Pomper estimates that about 22 per
cent of the voters have changed their political party in
their lifetime, about one-half of the voters have supported
the opposition candidate at least once in a presidential
election, and that in any given presidential election, about
30 per cent of the voters will be switching parties or will
be previous non-voters.
34
These figures are consistent with those reported by
V. o. Key, Jr., in his classic study of the 1940-1960 elec
tioi,S. Key estimated that one-eighth to one-fifth of the
voters in a given election are "switchers" from the party
they supported in the previous election. In addition, the
8
"standpatters" may be switchers at some future election. In
a given election, 15 to 20 per cent of those voting may be
classified as new voters because they have not voted previ
ously or did not vote in the previous election.
35
Dreyer's
study of the 1960 election indicates "that some degree of
partisan shift was registered by over 40 per cent of.
• •
respondents, with changes in partisan direction being regis
tered just as frequently as changes in partisan inten
sity."36
Sociological correlates of voters influence their par
tisan identification. Factors such as religion, geograph
ical location, social class, and ethnicity do not determine
an individual's vote. But such factors exert an influence
on the party identification the individual holds, which in
turn becomes an anchor from which voting decisions are made.
For example, since the New Deal period, the poor, Blacks,
union members, Catholics and Jews, Southerners, and urban
dwellers tend to identify themselves as Democrats. The non
poor, Caucasians, nonunion families, Protestants, and subur
ban and rural dwellers usually identify themselves as
Republicans.
37
While such groupings may break down as a
means of predicting the vote of a given individual,
38
they
are helpful in predicting in gross terms how large sociolog
ical groups may vote.
Party identification and sociological background of
voters have not been used in isolation to predict voting
9
behavior. Instead, they have been used as a basis from
which explanations are made as to why deviations occur.
Deviating from voting one's partisan identification is
thought to be caused by the intensity of intervening vari-
ables. A variable may be defined as "a set of empirically
observable behaviors which vary, which have different
values."
39
The common variables are attitudes toward the
"issues" and toward the candidates. These changes are
brought about by the events, circumstances, and candidates
unique to a given election. Thus, short-term forces affect
these variables and may intervene between the partisan
identification of the voter and his vote choice to determine
the distribution of the vote in a given election.'+
0
This
indicates that rather than an individual's party affiliation
determining his or her vote, a voter supports the candidate
of his party and/or continues his party affiliation only as
long as the candidate and/or the party is perceived by the
voter to best represent whatever image the voter possesses
of what a presidential candidate should be. As Arthur Brod
beck put it, "the voting studies show that the political
party and group one belongs to or identifies with is
perceived as sharing one's values, sometimes mistakenly.
The individual refrains from identification with political
parties who do not seem to share his value system."
41
The general strength of accounting for voting behavior
in terms of partisan identification modified in the short-
10
term by intervening variables cannot be denied. The
approach, however, has two limitations from a communication
viewpoint. First, the approach tends to ignore why these
variables changed and record only the nature and strength of
these variables.
42
The events and candidates which are
thought to influence these voter variables are time bound in
that they are unique to a particular election. Certainly
some circumstances, such as the state of the economy and
whether the nation is at peace, are recurring in nature.
But even these circumstances have characteristics unique to
the given election. The Tet offensive of early 1968 and the
assassinations of Martin Luther King, Jr., and Robert
Kennedy are examples of events that must have influenced
voters, yet, hopefully, were unique to that election. Sec
ond, accounting for voter behavior in this manner usually
tends to ignore the nature of communication as an influence
on the variables affecting the voting decision. An approach
would be helpful which would account for voting behavior by
incorporating the role of communication, the influence of
circumstances without detailing the specific nature of these
circumstances, and which considers the role of communica
tion.
Few of the electorate in a Presidential campaign engage
in detailed analysis to determine the candidates' policy
stands. Neither do they weigh carefully in a deliberate
manner the merits and demerits of those policy stands they
11
do discover. Most voters are not well-informed about polit
ical matters.
43
The many voters who are not well-informed
about the candidates' stands nor particularly motivated to
become so respond better to ambiguous cues on which they may
focus their own interests, fears, and hopes. For example,
in 1968 "many Republican doves thought Nixon favored imme
diate withdrawal from Vietnam; many Republican hawks thought
he wanted complete victory."
44
While McCarthy's opposition
to the Johnson administration policies in Vietnam usually is
credited for his excellent showing in the New Hampshire
primary in 1968, the Gallup Polls of that period showed that
Americans did not wish to stop the bombing (by 51 to 40 per
cent). The Harris polls indicated 54 per cent favored the
current war policy, and by 44 to 36 per ·cent, Americans sup
ported invading North Vietnam.
45
Instead of a reasonably
well-informed electorate, Edelman insists that "For most men
most of the time politics is a series of pictures in the
mind, placed there by television news, newspapers, magazines
and discussions. The pictures create a moving panorama tak
ing place in a world the mass public never quite touches,
yet one its members come to fear or cheer, often with
passion and sometimes with action."
46
An. explanation of voting behavior is plausible that is
based upon the belief that in a presidential campaign the
voter responds favorably to or votes for that candidate who
conveys an "image" of the world that most closely corre-
12
spends to that image held by the voter. A voter compares
the image of a candidate to his or her own image not by a
detailed analysis of policy stands, but through the symbolic
information received. The candidate, through his or her
communication, projects an image of the world and our role
within it which the voter compares to his or her own image.
Of course, one's party identification, job or profession,
and social background and surroundings contribute to the
composite image the voter holds. McBath and Fisher describe
the campaign communication process as
more a matter of communicating values than logical
information ...• Political persuasion operates more
on the basis of "images," "signs of consubstantiality,"
than the presentation of facts or arguments or even
direct emotional appeals. The attempt is to show the
candidate as possessing a view of the world which cor responds with that of the potential voters.
47
Novak sees the campaign for president as a process culminat
ing in an act in which "Each citizen is called on to examine
his own symbolic world and to place its weight behind the
symbolic world of one of the candidates (or to abstain) ."
48
This view is consistent also with Nimmo's perceptual view of
the role of campaign persuasion, with ego-involvement
explanations of attitude change, and with the concepts of
Kenneth Burke and Kenneth Boulding.
49
Boulding defined image as the "subjective knowledge"
50
of an individual. The image is an individual synthesis of a
person's location in space, time, personal relationships,
and intimations and emotions.
51
To this list, one could add
13
culture, history, and institutions.
52
To Boulding, image is
a superior term to knowledge because the latter "has an
implication of validity, or truth,"
53
While "validity and
truth" may be components of one's image, one's cognitions
may include belief, attitudes, and perceptions: simply the
judgments one makes about his individual existence and the
relationships among these judgments. The image has various
dimensiotls according to Boulding. Important for our pur
poses are what Boulding calls the relational dimension, "the
picture of the universe around him as a system of regulari
ties," the value dinension, "the ordering on the scale of
better or worse of the various parts of the whole image,"
and the affectional or emotional dimension "by which various
items in the rest of the image are imbued with feeling or
affect.n
54
Images thus include one's belief, one's con
cerns, and one's concept of good and bad, right and wrong.
They are a mixture of opinions, attitudes, values, and
beliefs. According to Fisher, "Images are composites of
empirical and nonempirical knowledge; they are dynamic and
vary in clarity, stability, and strength."
55
The important
conclusion of this conceptualization is "that behavior
depends on the image."
56
One's actions, or responses, are
determined by the image held. A communicator's discourse
conveys the image he or she holds, and thus recommends a
course of action the auditor should take. When John Kennedy
said in 1961, "Let every nation know, whether it wishes us
14
well or ill, that we shall pay any price, bear any burden,
meet any hardship, support any friend, oppose any foe in
order to assure the survival and success of liberty," he was
conveying an image of what he believed our role in the world
should be and appealed to Americans to share that view with
him.
5 7
Nimmo views campaign persuasion to function from a per-
ceptual base. Campaign communication conveys an image to
the voter of the candidate acting in a manner consistent
with the voters' image of how a candidate should act. For
Nimmo, "this might mean altering the perceptions of a loyal
Republican so that he sees in the Democratic candidate the
qualities he has learned to associate with being an effec
tive leader, thus giving him the rationale for voting for
the opposition despite his long-term predisposition."
5
e If
the campaign is successful, "the audience learns the mes
sages and modes of behavior acceptable to the persuader
without being converted."
5
'
This construct is similar to explanations of attitude
change determined by the level of ego-involvement. Such
views of the process of attitude change hold that an indi
vidual with low ego involvement in his or her attitude
toward the stimulus will likely assimilate as acceptable
views more discrepant from his preferred position than will
individuals with high involvement.
60
The individual does
not regard the message as discrepant, but perceives it as
15
close to his or her own position. If the message is per
ceived as discrepant, then it likely will be "contrasted" to
or, in other words, perceived as more remote from the pre
ferred position by the receiver, and thus rejected.
61
As
the level of involvement declines, the range of acceptable
positions increases and the range of unacceptable positions
declines. As the level of involvement increases, the range
of acceptable positions declines and the range of unaccept
able positions increases. The assimilation and contrast
phenomena, then, may be viewed as function of the image the
receiver possesses and the importance of the particular
components in the image formulation.
While discussion of an image of an image may seem
confusing, it should not. If one's image determines behav
ior, then a choice between candidates is made on what we
expect the candidates' future behavior to be. The candi
date's communication, as interpreted through the frame of
reference of voters' images, conveys the candidate's image.
The degree . of similarity perceived by the voter thus deter
mines the voting decision. This is analogous to Kelly and
Mirer's "Voter's Decision Rule" which they found to be
highly predictive of voting behavior. According to their
"rule," the voter sums his likes and dislikes of each candi
date and party and votes for the candidate with the most net
favorable items. If there is no such candidate, the voter
casts the ballot consistent with his or her partisan identi
fication.82 Farrell argues that the "first and most general
16
function [of political communication] is to define the
boundaries of the political system and to process and dis
seminate information and images about its objectives, envir
onments, resources, and cornponents."
63
To the extent that
voter images correspond to those conveyed, the political
actors are confirmed in their exercise of power. But
because different citizens possess different and changing
images, political actors must communicate in a manner to
satisfy these disparate images. Thus, the candidate
attempts through the communication of an acceptable image
to legitimize his or her candidacy and justify how the
political system will function if the candidacy is success
ful.
The strength of this conceptualization of voting behav
ior is that it incorporates partisan identification and
sociological background into the formation of the voter's
image. In similar fashion, the effect of any intervening
events or circumstances, even those unique to a given cam
paign, should be reflected in the image held by the voters
at a given point in time.
Statement of the Problem
and the Approach
This study examines the concept of image in determining
voter behavior in presidential campaigns. Such an examina
tion necessarily involvec the following prerequisites:
(1) the selection of at least one presidential campaign as a
17
test case, (2) the selection of the means by which
voters' images for that campaign may be determined, (3) a
means by which the image conveyed by the candidates may be
determined, and (4) a comparison of the two images.
The presidential campaign of 1968 is the test case.
The argument should be that the 1968 campaign is typical of
modern presidential campaigns. Unfortunately, the unusu1l
circumstances of each campaign make it unproductive to argue
that view. Any campaign is atypical. The candidacy of a
national hero to run against an initially little known
Illinois governor suggests that 1952 was not typical. The
choice between the same candidates after Stevenson had
experienced a sound defeat in 1952 and the increased use of
the media as a campaign tool serve to place in serious ques-
tion whether 1956 was a typical campaign. The selection by
the Democrats in 1960 of a relatively unfamiliar, young,
Roman Catholic senator from Massachusetts who spoke with a
New England accent to run against an incumbent Vice-Presi
dent was unprecedented. That the candidates engaged in
nationally televised debates for the first time strengthened
the unusual aspects of the 1960 campaign. In 1964, the
nation, still shocked by the assassination of Kennedy, was
asked to choose between a Texan and an extremely conserva
tive senator who had managed to gain control of his party's
nominating machinery. The campaign of 1972 was marked by
the candidacy of a little-known senator from South Dakota
18
who had risen to prominence via a long primary campaign and
substantial changes in the rules by which delegates to the
Democratic convention were selected. In addition, his
selected running mate was discovered to have a history of
mental illness and he had to be dropped from the ticket.
The 1976 election is without parallel in that it offers for
the first time in modern campaigning a major party candidate
from the deep South to oppose an incumbent who was an
appointed Vice President and was elevated to the presidency
during a period of national trauma which culminated in the
first resignation by a seated President.
The campaign of 1968 also was wrought with extraordin
ary circumstances. The nation was bitterly divided because
of the war in Vietnam. An incumbent President, believed to
seek reelection, withdrew from the race after a weak showing
in the New Hampshire primary. The assassinations of Martin
Luther King, Jr., and Robert Kennedy within a two-month
period shocked the nation. Riots and campus disturbances
were commonplace. A third party candidate made the most
serious challenge any third party candidate had made since
1912. Therefore, the 1968 campaign is selected because it
was like the campaigns in its basic constituents, including
a number of unusual events. The tools of campaigning used
in 1968, were essentially the same tools available to candi dates today.
64
In addition, campaign materials which allow
the analysis were obtainable.
19
This study will rely on available public opinion polls
as the basis for constructing the image held by voters in
1968. The polls examined will not be confined to the spe
cific campaign period. Because as much data as possible is
desirable, polling data approximately from mid-1967 to eariy
1969 will be used. For those questions to which responses
may have changed significantly during the period, such as
Vietnam, only the most recent will be used. The polls
employed are the American Institute of Public Opinion
(Gallup), Louis Harris and Associates, the Survey Research
Center, and the Opinion Research Corporation of Princeton,
New Jersey. The data, as presented in Appendix A, is organ-
ized under the following categories: (a) Vietnam, (b) other
areas of foreign policy, (c) economic affairs, (d) law and
order, (e) ra.ce relations, (f) the role of government, and
(g) miscellaneous concerns.
65
Public polling information offers a satisfactory method
to establish the images held by voters in 1968. Polling
procedures are now so refined that if the sample is appro-
priately drawn, according to Nimmo, "it is possible to
reduce the range of sampling errors so that in ninety-nine
cases out of a hundred the results of a survey of 1,000
properly selected adults will be within 4 per cent of
accuracy."
66
In 1968, the final Gallup and Harris surveys
reported Nixon's strength to be 43 and 41 per cent respec tively. The official returns gave Nixon 43.5 per cent.
20
This means that Gallup's percentage error was only .5 points
and the per cent of error was only slightly more than one
per cent. Harris' percentage error was 2.5 points and the
per cent of error was approximately 6 per cent.
67
Mendel
sohn and Crespi attest to the accuracy of the Gallup Poll:
"In the eight elections from 1954 through 1968, the average
error was reduced to 1.4 percentage points. Moreover, dur-
ing these last eight elections the largest deviation was 2.8
percentage points, which is less than the average error in
the previous nine elections."
68
However, the polling data used in this study are dif
ferent from those which simply request the voter to make a
preferential choice between two or among three candidates.
The method of selecting the sample is the same as for the
presidential preference surveys; consequently,. no problem is
presented by those techniques. But criticisms cf the pro-
cess have taken two forms. Some argue that the polling
technique may stimulate responses in individuals who do not
know about the question area and/or have not formulated an
image about it in their minds.
69
However, if that is true,
one might expect a random nature to the responses. Yet a
review of the polling data in sections A through G of
Appendix A indicates a high similarity of responses from
different pollsters. It seems safe to say that whatever the
polls are tapping, all seem to be tapping the same thing.
The polling data in sections A through Gare not designed
21
to indicate the saliency of these concerns to the voter.
Only the data in section Hare used to indicate saliency.
This also is a generalized criticism applicable not only to
responses to polling questions, but to any method that
attempts to extract and codify in some manner the inner
workings of one's cognitive structure. An attitude test
might be said, in similar fashion, to "create" attitudes in
the respondents, yet attitude studies . abound. However
imperfect, the approach seems the best available. Boulding
concluded that polling was a helpful approach to learning
about images:
One can admit all the deficiencies in the method, and
at the same time one has to confess that there is an
important residue of results. The problem of eliciting
information about images by the simple device of
recording answers to questions is by no means
insoluble. We do not necessarily have to take these
answers at face value. There are difficult and subtle
problems of interpretation .... Nevertheless ...
the results are impressive.
70
Finally, if polls did not provide valuable and accurate
information, they would not be so widely used.
71
..
A second criticism is that the respondents may not be
voters. As many eligible adults do not vote, the population
of voters and that of citizens is not the same. Voters,
however, are part of the population of citizens. To the
extent the sample is typical of citizens, it could be said
to be typical of voters. That is not quite accurate because
certain citizens have greater or lesser propensities to
vote. Generally, a higher percentage of Republicans vote
22
than Democrats.
72
This implies only that the image of
voters probably is slightly more conservative than the image
held by those responding in the data. For ease of discus
sion, we will refer, until Chapter V, to the responses as if
they were that of the voters.
The method used in this study to determine the image
conveyed by the candidates in 1968 relies heavily on the
views of Kenneth Burke. Key to Burke's view of the role of
language is his definition of man:
Man is
the symbol-using (Symbol-making, symbol-misusing)
animal
inventor of the negative (or moralized by the
negative)
separated from his natural condition by instruments of
his own making
goaded by the spirit of hierarchy (or moved by the
sense of order)
and rotten with perfection.
73
Burke argues that the essence of man, that which distin
guishes him from other species or things, is his ability to
use lancjuage. That ability allowed man not only to function
in a state of "motion" as do inanimate objects and other
species, but also to engage in evaluation, to take action
through symbols, to say no to events, or as he says,
Action involves character which involves choice-
and the form of choice attains its perfection in the
distinction between Yes and No (shall and shall -not,
will and will -not). Though the concept of sheer
motion is non-ethical, action implies the ethical, the
human personality.
74
Man progresses from the attainment of only those physical
items necessary for his survival only through the means of
23
conceptualizing symbolically. The use of symbols
.
1S
res~onsible for the establishment of organization and
status, for the existence of social hierarchy. Implicit to
the nature of any symbol system, to Burke, is the principle
of perfection and as man is essentially a symbol-using
being, he is guided by that principle.
75
The selection of particular symbols of a language to
express thought is, according to Burke, "a reflection of
reality, by its very nature as a terminology it must be a
selection of reality; and to this extent it must function
also as a deflection of reality."
76
The choice of symbols,
then, is an indication of how a user views the world. To
Burke, "The motivation out of which he [the actor-rhetor-
candidate] writes is synonymous with the structural way in
which he puts events and values together when he writes.
11 7 7
• • •
Thus, situations are perceived and communicated
about with particular vocabularies and these terminologies
indicate what we see as desirable or undesirable. The
perception of a situation reveals one's motivation in a
situation and the symbols one uses indicate one's motivation
through the vocabulary that one employs. An examination of
the vocabulary of the candidates should help us determine
their motives. If we can determine the candidate's motives,
we should discover the manner in which that candidate per
ceives the world, or the image held by that candidate.
Simply put, the way a person uses language discloses the
24
image he possesses of that world. According to C. Wright
Mills, "Language is taken by others as an indicator of
future actions."
78
Burke observed "the work of every writer contains a set
of implicit equations. He uses 'association clusters.' And
you may, by examining his work, find 'what goes with what'
in these clusters ... and however consciously he may go
about such work, there is a kind of generalization about
these interrelations that he could not have been conscious
of, since the generalization could be made by the kind of
inspection that is possible only after the completion of the
work."
79
Commenting on this approach, Bernard Brock con
cluded, "the critic may verify the hypotheses he constructs
by making a reasoned case for the consistencies of the parts
and the whole, that is, for the manner in which the terms
fit the apparent situation. In his work there is no substi
tute for intelligence and effort, both made sensitive by
wide experience.
1180
Burke recognizes his approach is open
to the criticism that it is intuitive, inductive, and even
idiosyncratic, but argues that even if he could deduce pro
cedures to analyze a work inductively, the charge would
revert to the critic was too derivative or mechanical.
81
Burke's explanation and defense of his approach is worthy to
note for it applies to this study:
I Do not contend that the mode of analysis here
proposed is automatically free of subjective interpre
tations. I do contend that an undiscussable dictionary
is avoided (as were one to have a set of absolute mean-
25
ings for every kind of symbol, and to simply "trans
late" a book from its exoteric idiom into the corre
sponding esoteric one). To know what "shoe, or house,
or bridge" means, you don't begin with a symbolist
dictionary already written in advance. You must, by
inductive inspection of a given work, discover the
particular contexts in which the shoe, house or bridge
occurs. You cannot, in advance, know in what equa
tional structure it will have membership.
By inspection of the work, you propose your
description of this equational structure. Your propo
sitions are open to discussion, as you offer your
evidence for them ....
82
In order to keep the subjective interpretations to a
minimum, we shall attempt to employ the methodology used by
Ivie in his study of presidential motives for war.
83
Rely
ing on concepts developed by Burke, Ivie developed a method
ology in which the researcher first discovers how the
communicator defines a situation.
84
Ivie concluded that a
president defines a war situation either as an ideal, a
crisis, a cause of a crisis, or a solution for a crisis.
85
The definitions to be discovered in this study will not be
similar to these, but the process of determining those
definitions will be similar in that we will locate "recur
ring patterns." Second, we will attempt to determine which
of the concepts of Burke's pentad seems to dominate in the
definition: act, scene, agent, agency, or purpose.
86
Third, we will attempt to locate "significant clusters of
god-terms and devil-terms."
87
However, Ivie's methodology is incomplete for this
study because it is limited to a single genre of communica
tion, presidential war speeches, given once by different
26
individuals. Thus, he attempted to discover a vocabulary of
motives that functions in a given genre, rather than a
vocabulary for a single communicator in a variety of commun
ication settings that a political campaign represents. This
study will seek to discover a vocabulary of motives for a
particular candidate applicable to an entire campaign based
on Fisher's conceptualization of the role of motives in
communication.
88
He argues that four motives are recurrent
in rhetorical discourse: "affirmation, concerned with giv
ing birth to an image; reaffirmation, concerned with revi
talizing an image; purification, concerned with correcting
an image; and subversion, concerned with undermining an
image."
89
These four motives will be assumed to exhaust all
possibilities; that all responses to a situation may be
classified as one of these four. Fisher notes that more
than one motive may exist at any given rhetorical moment,
but one will most likely dominate.
90
The intent is to pre
sent a portrayal of the images communicated by Humphrey and
Nixon.
Content analysis of the candidates' communication was
rejected as the methodology for this study because it would
have demanded the establishment of categories of language
usage which would illustrate directly the image portrayed by
the candidates. As Holsti explains, "a datum about communi
cation content is meaningless until it is related to at
least one other datum. The link between these is repre-
27
sented by some form of theory."
91
At this stage, a means to
explain the connection between the relative frequency or
lack of frequency of certain language characteristics as
determined by the categories chosen and the image portrayed
by the candidates is not available. While content analysis
might provide a degree of precision not available with the
methodology used in this study, it also may neglect the
broader view. For example, a candidate's failure to mention
frequently any particular concern of the voters could not
justifiably be interpreted to mean the candidate did not
view the concern to be important. Most assuredly, Nixon and
Humphrey were well aware of the importance of Vietnam to
their campaigns. Yet even without a frequency score, it is
fair to say that the candidates mentioned Vietnam substan
tially less frequently than a number of other voter con
cerns simply because there was little to be said that would
differentiate the candidates without risking the loss of the
support of a considerable segment of the electorate.
While it may have been possible to submit the texts of
the candidates' communications to a panel of experts or
judges to determine i.f their analysis might lead to similar
judgments as those to be made in this study, the pragmatics
of the situation did not justify the investment of such
effort. The texts consist of thousands of pages, often dif
ficult to read. The approach used in the study is rela
tively straightforward and should keep purely subjective
28
interpretations at a minimum. Thus, exposing the resource
material to a panel of experts probably would not produce
substantially different judgments. In addition, such
experts would have required both an understanding of the
methodology employed and relatively extensive knowledge of
the 1968 campaign.
The image held by voters in the campaign will be devel
oped by an analysis of polling results. The campaign com-
munication of Hubert Humphrey and Richard Nixon in 1968 will
be examined to determine the vocabulary of motives employed
and the image conveyed. The image conveyed by each candi
date will be compared with that held by the voters as deter
mined by an analysis of public opinion data. If this con
ceptualization of voting behavior is accurate, the candidate
whose conveyed image most closely approximated that of the
voters would have won the election. This approach does not
allow quantification, but the degree of similarity between
the images can be reasonably determined and compared to the
final election outcome. However, even if the winning candi
date's image corresponded more closely to the image held by
voters, that does not necessarily substantiate the view.
Such results could occur by chance. While that is not
likely, it is possible. We may only reject the view if the
results do not correspond with the election results. If
the results do correspond with election results, the study
will serve as support for the view and warrant additional
29
consideration.
Limitations to the Study
The primary research material for this study will be
156 texts of the major statements, speeches, press releases,
radio broadcasts, interviews and citizen discussion televi
sion panel shows of candidate Nixon and 120 texts of similar
materials of candidate Humphrey during the 1968 campaign.
92
The necessity of holding the study within a manageable
scope dictates limitations. First, the study will examine
the communications of candidates after the conclusion of the
nominating conventions. Certainly, events that occurred
before the final campaign period influenced directly the
choice of some voters. As we discussed previously the
primary and convention period was marked by the Tet offen
sive, Johnson's decision not to seek reelection, Martin
Luther King, Jr.'s, and Robert Kennedy's assassinations,
urban riots, and continuing dissent against the war culmin
ating in violent confrontation on the streets of Chicago
during the Democratic convention. The question is not if
these events influenced voters, but in what way did these
events affect the analysis proposed for this study. We will
attempt to answer that in several ways.
The 1968 election had a higher percentage of voters
making their voting decision during the post-convention
period than any previous election since World War II. It
was the only election in which more than 40 per cent of the
30
voters decided who they would vote for during the campaign.
No claims are made for a causal connection between the
events prior to and during the convention and the large
percentage deciding during the campaign. But it should be
noted that the events did not seem to resul~ in early
decisions by voters. The events may have caused traditional
Democratic voters to delay their decisions until the cam
paign period. Forty-two per cent of those who eventually
chose to vote for the Democratic candidate made their deci
sion during the campaign. In presidential elections from
1948-1968, this was the highest percentage of Democratic
voters to decide so late, except for the 1960 election when
44 per cent decided during the campaign. If we eliminate
the influence of Wallace voters by dividing equally between
candidates Nixon and Humphrey the voters for Wallace who
made their decision during the campaign, the percentage of
those who made their decision to vote for Humphrey during
the campaign increases to 46 per cent. That figure exceeds
even that of the 1960 campaign. In addition to explaining
the possible effects of the events prior to the campaign,
the large number of late-deciding Democrats may also account
for Humphrey coming- from a serious deficit to making the
election extremely close. The late decision-making by so
many voters in 1968 makes more reasonable the examination
only of the communication of the actual campaign.
93
Second, to the extent these events influenced the image
31
held by voters, and undoubtedly they did, that influence
should be reflected in the polling data. An examination of
the polling data employed indicates that 11 of the 13 items
concerning Vietnam were obtained after the Tet offensive and
Johnson's withdrawal, about half of the items concerning law
and order were obtained after the convention riots and after
the most serious Black urban riots had ceased. Twelve of
the fourteen items concerning race relations also were
obtained after the major Black disturbances had ceased.
94
Third, the large roster of Democratic candidates
opposed to the administration with which Humphrey was asso
ciated, along with McCarthy's failure to endorse Humphrey,
may have made it difficult to rally party regulars to work
for the campaign.
95
The events at the Democratic convention
also may have discouraged normal financial contributions.
96
However, the evidence indicates that McCarthy's candidacy
and the riots at the convention did not cost Humphrey sub
stantial votes. Of 15 issues analyzed by Boyd, the item
dealing with mass demonstrations ranked fifteenth in its
relationship to defection of votes from what might have been
expected.
97
Robinson found (1) no significant shift away
from Humphrey as a result of the violence in Chicago, and
(2) the bulk of McCarthy supporters, even the minority who
judged the use of force by the police to have been
excessive, voted for Humphrey.
98
There may have been some
failure to vote among McCarthy supporters , but the amount
32
was limited.
99
To argue that these votes may have cost
Humphrey the election is to assume the votes would have gone
to Humphrey if McCarthy had not been a factor. Some
probably would have, but the number must remain pure
conjecture.
The second major limitation of the study is that only
the communication of Humphrey and Nixon will be considered.
The communications of Wallace, Muskie, Agnew, and LeMay were
not analyzed for two reasons. First, sufficient primary
data to extend the analysis to these candidates were not
available. Second, their candidacies did not seem to
influence greatly the final outcome of the election.
Despite the publicity afforded Wallace and his relative
success as a third-party candidate, his net effect seems
only to have been to reduce the margin of Nixon's victory.
Scammon and Wattenberg support that conclusion:
Lou Harris in his polling .found that Richard Nixon
would have won a two-way election going away, while the
University of Michigan Research Center also suggests
that Nixon's lead over Humphrey might have been larger
had Wallace not been on the ballot, but that the lead
would perhaps not have been as massive as Harris sug
gests. One or two writers have indicated their belief
that Humphrey would have won with Wallace out. This
latter view to the authors seems to be based more upon
generalized voter profession of Democratic or Republi
can preferences than upon the specific circumstances of
the 1968 election. That Alabama or Mississippi voters
--although nominally Democratic--wuuld have gone to
Humphrey if Wallace had not run in 1968 seems to us
very unlikely. After all, these voters went massively
for Goldwater in 1964.
100
Weisberg and Rusk, in their analysis of survey research
center data, found that nine per cent of the total elector-
33
ate preferred Wallace first and Nixon second, while only
three per cent of the electorate preferred Wallace with
Humphrey second.
101
These data indicate that if Wallace had
not been in the race, Nixon's margin would have increased by
six per cent. In each category of White Democrats, White
Independents, and White Republicans, a greater number of
those voting for Wallace preferred Nixon as their second
choice than preferred Humphrey.
102
The strength of
Wallace's support outside the South was among male, White,
unskilled workers. The consideration becomes whether, if
Wallace had not been in the race, Humphrey would have gained
sufficient votes among those in the North to offset the
gains Nixon would have made in the South. As White Demo
crats voting for Wallace preferred Nixon as a second choice
by a margin of eight to five, it is doubtful that the dif
ference would have been sufficient to alter the election,
even if we allow for most of these voters residing in the
South. Scammon and Wattenberg estimate about six of ten
Wallace supporters in the North preferred Nixon to Humphrey
as their second choice.
103
Vice-presidential candidates will not be considered
because the elective choice primarily is between presiden
tial candidates, and because the vice-presidential candi
dates do not appear to have altered the basic outcome of the
election. The most that can be said is that perhaps
Muskie's presence on the Democratic ticket narrowed the
34
margin of Humphrey's defeat.
10
~ LeMay did not become a
candidate until late in the campaign. If LeMay's candidacy
had any influence on the campaign, it was negative probably
because of his statements indicating a propensity to use
nuclear weapons in Vietnam.
The third major limitation is that we are not going to
consider directly the impact of the media on the campaign.
The methodology used in this study indirectly considers mass
media campaigning. What candidates said in the campaign
either must have been reported directly in the media, or
what they said was consistent with the thrust of their media
campaigning. In addition, some of the primary mat8rial
includes texts of television and radio broadcasts.
News coverage during the 1968 campaign was relatively
even-handed. Graber's studies of press coverage of the
campaign indicate the coverage was quite uniform, that more
than half of the items reported in the press were supplied
by the campaigns, and that the newspapers exerted little
opinion leadership.
105
The potential effect of broadcast campaigning is a more
difficult issue to determine. Obviously, candidates use the
broadcast media extensively to campaign. McGinnis' report
of Nixon's 1968 campaign indicates how heavily Nixon relied
on television and the extent to which those broadcasts were
designed to reflect a changed image of Nixon.
106
To note
that Nixon won the election and used television extensively,
35
however, does not establish a causal connection. There are
examples from the 1968 campaign that question the effective
ness of relying on television campaigning. Muskie was able
to use television less frequently than Agnew, yet was more
popular. Milton Shapp, who relied heavily on television
campaigning, lost in Pennsylvania, a state carried by
Humphrey, to the Republican Shafer.
107
There seems to be a threshhold effect functioning in
television campaigning. If candidates are able to secure
sufficient exposure to assure familiarity by the voters with
the candidates and their image, then additional television
exposure does not seem to be highly effective. In his study
of the effect of broadcast campaigning, Jacobson considered
the variables of expenditures on broadcast campaigning,
incumbency, and the popular strength of the candidate's
party. He concluded that broadcast campaigning did have an
effect on lesser offices and in primary campaigns, but that
it did not seem to have an effect on presidential races
because the candidates were already sufficiently well
known.
108
Sears and Whitney have placed the familiarity of
the public with the major party presidential candidates at
above 90 per cent.
109
While Nixon did outspend Humphrey for
television advertising to the tune of $10.5 million to $9
million,
110
these amounts would seem adequate to assure both
candidates an adequate level of exposure.
Finally, the methodology of determining voter images
36
does not allow for direct assessment of the images voters
held concerning personal attributes of the candidates.
Thus, the methodology does not tap voter images of charac
teristics a president should possess such as appearance or
personality. The methodology essentially derives voter
images of what we called "issues." The term issue is used
here not to refer only to specific policy stands, but rather
to encompass a broad range of voter concerns about the
present state of the nation, goals toward which the country
should be moving, and the success or failure of past
actions. All concerns not directly related to personal
attributes of the candidates become part of the image hel d
by voters. The image, then, refers to the perceptions held
by voters about facts, about values, and about policies.
Images about personal attributes of candidates held by
voters are considered indirectly in that the images of the
candidates will be directly influenced by voters' percep-
tions of the image conveyed by the candidates on "issues" as
defined broadly above. For example, a candidate's intelli
gence probably will be judged to be higher by the voter if
the voter perceives the candidate to be supporting what the
voter perceives to be the "smart" action to support. The
candidate probably will be viewed as more trustworthy by the
voter if the voter perceives the candidate to be similar to
the voter in his view of the nation because then the voter
could "trust" the candidate to take the appropriate course
of action.
37
Conclusion
Presidential campaigns are probably the most signifi
cant rhetorical phenomena in which we participate. Yet
studies of political campaigns and voter behavior tend to
ignore campaign communication as an important intervening
variable between voter partisan identification and voting
decisions. This study tests a conceptualization of voting
behavior based on voters comparing images they hold with
images conveyed by the candidate. The hypothesis is that
voters vote for the candidate they perceive possessing an
image most similar to theirs. The concept will be examined
by analyzing in Chapter II relevant polling data to deter
mine the images held by voters in 1968. In Chapters III and
IV the image conveyed by candidates Humphrey and Nixon
respectively will be depicted. Chapter V will be devoted
to a comparison of voter and candidate images, the test of
the conceptualization, and comments about the nature of
. .
campaigning.
38
FOOTNOTES
1
Michael Novak, Choosing Our King (New York: Mac
Millan Publishing Co., 1974), p. 3.
2
These figures are generally known and accepted.
These particular figures are based on information found in
U.S. Bureau of the Census (Washington, D.C., Statistical
Abstract of the United States: 1973; 94th ed.) The esti
mated voting population in 1968 was 120.285 million and in
1972, 139.643 million, p. 379. Voter registration totalled
92,696 million in 1972, p. 383. 73.212 million votes cast
for president in 1968, and 77,719 million did the same in
1972.
2
Dan Nimmo, The Political Persuaders (Englewood
Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1970), pp. 5-6.
4
Murray Edelman, "The Politics of Persuasion," Choos
ing the President, ed. James David Barber, The American
Assembly, Columbia University (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey:
Prentice-Hall, 1974), p. 150.
5
Edelman, p. 150.
6
Fred I. Greenstein, "What the President Means to
Americans," Choosing the President, p. 122.
7
Nimrno, p. 10.
eStephen Shadegg, How to Win an Election: The Art of
Political Victory (New York: Taplinger Publishing Co.,
1964), p. 126.
9
For the reviews of the two most recent campaigns,
see The Quarterly Journal of Speech, 59 (April, 1973), and
55 (April, 1969).
10
cited in David L. Swanson, "Political Information,
Influence, and Judgment in the 1972 Presidential Campaign,"
The Quarterly Journal of Speech, 59 (April, 1973), 130.
11
Judith s. Trent, "Synthesis of Methodologies Used in
Studying Political Communication," Central States Speech
Journal, 26 (Winter, 1975), 287ff.
39
12
Steven H. Chaffee, "The Diffusion of Political
Information," Political Communication: Issues and Strate
gies for Research, ed. Steven H. Chaffee (Beverly Hills:
Sage Publications, 1975), p. 85.
13
Chaffee, p. 87.
14
David L. Swanson, "The New Politics Meets the Old
Rhetoric: New Directions in Campaign Communication
Research," The Quarterly Journal of Speech, 58 (February,
1972), 36-3 •
15
"Presidential Campaign 1960, A Symposium, Part II:
Contest for the Presidency," Quarterly Journal of Speech, 46
(1960), 355.
16
James H. McBath and Walter R. Fisher, "Persuasion in
Presidential Campaign Communication," Quarterly Journal of
Speech, 55 (February, 1969), 17.
17
Swanson, "The New Politics Meets the Old Rhetoric:
New Directions in Campaign Communication Research," pp. 34-
35.
1 8
Trent, p. 297.
19
Benjamin I. Page, "Presidential Campaigning: The
Rhetoric of Electoral Competition," Unpublished Ph.D. dis
sertation, Stanford University, 1973.
20
Evron M. Kirkpatrick, "Toward a More Responsible
Two-Party System: Political Science, Policy Science, or
Pseudo-Science?" American Political Science Review, 65
(December, 1971), 965-990.
21
This description of spatial theories necessarily is
greatly simplified. For excellent discussions of the views,
see Page, Chapter II, and William H. Riker and Peter C.
Ordeshook, An Introduction to Positive Political Theory
(Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1973), Chap
ters 11 and 12. The basic works developing these views are:
Harold Hotelling, "Stability in Competition," Economic Jour
nal, 39 (March, 1929); A. P. Lerner and H. W. Singer, "Some
Notes on Duopoly and Spatial Competition," Journal of
Political Economy, 45 (April, 1937); Anthony Downs, An Eco
nomic Theory of Democracy (New York: Harper and Row, 1967);
Arthur Smithies, "Optimum Location in Spatial Competition,"
Journal of Political Economy, 49 (June, 1941); and Otto A.
Davis, Melvin J. Henich, and Peter C. Ordeshook, "An Exposi
tory Development of a Mathematical Model of the Electoral
Process," American Political Science Review, 64 (June,
1970).
40
22
Richard M. Scammon and Ben J. Wattenberg, The Real
Majority (New York: Coward-Mccann! 1970), p. 91.
23
Angus Campbell, Phillip E. Converse, Warren E.
Miller, and Donald B. Stokes, The American Voter (New York:
John Wiley and Sons, 1960), Chapter 8.
2 4
Page, p. 7 9 •
2
~Page, pp. 121-122.
26
Page, p. 185.
27
For example, see Angus Campbell, Gerald Gurin, and
Warren E. Miller, The Voter Decides (Evanston: Row, Peter
son and Company, 1952); Campbell, Converse, Miller, and
Stokes, The American Voter; Angus Campbell, Phillip E. Con
verse, Warren E. Miller, and Donald E. Stokes, Elections and
the Political Order (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1966).
2
eRichard W. Boyd, "Presidential Elections: An
Explanation of Voting Defection," The American Political
Science Review, 63 (June, 1969), 509.
2
'Phillip Converse, "The Concept of a Normal Vote,"
Elections and the Political Order, Campbell, et al., p. 13.
10
scammon and Wattenberg, p. 73.
21
Research Division, Republican National Committee,
The 1968 Elections (Washington, D.C.: 1969), p. 23.
i
2
Gerald M. Pamper, Elections in America (New York:
Dodd, Mead, and Co.,
3
::iEdward C. Dreyer, "Change and Stability in Party
Identifications," Journal of Politics, 35 (August, 1973),
715.
34
Pomper, pp. 84-85.
25
V. o. Key, Jr., The Responsible Electorate (Cam
bridge: Harvard University Press, 1966), pp. 18-21.
36
Dreyer, p. 717.
i
7
Robert Axelrod, "Where the Votes Come From: An
Analysis of Electoral Coalitions, 1952-1968," The American
Political Science Review, 66 (March, 1972), 13. Axelrod
notes that the emergence of the Republican party in the
South may alter this grouping. The nomination of Jimmy
Carter by the Democrats in 1976 should act to clarify the
situation.
41
..
3 8
Pomper, p. 81.
39
David C. Leege and Wayne L. Francis, Political
Research (New York: Basic Books, 1974), p. 53.
4
GFor example, see Ph·ilip E. Converse, Warren E.
Miller, Jerrold G. Rusk, and Arthur C. Wolfe, "Continuity a
and Change in American Politics: Parties and Issues in the
1968 Election," The American Political Science Review, 63
(December, 1969), 1083-1105.
41
Arthur J. Brodbeck, "The Problem of Irrationality
and Neuroticism Underlying Political Choice," American
Voting Behavior, Ed. by Eugene Burdick and Arthur J. Brod
beck (Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1959), p. 130.
42
An example of this approach is Richard W. Boyd,
"Popular Control of Public Policy: A Normal Vote Analysis
of the 1968 Election," The American Political Science
Review, 66 (June, 1972), 429-458.
43
V. o. Key, Jr., Public Opinion and American Democ
racy (New York: Knopf, 1961), Chapter four; Campbell, et
al., The American Voter, p. 174.
44
Benjamin I. Page and Richard A. Brody, "Policy
Voting and the Electoral Process: The Vietnam War Issue,"
American Political Science Review, 66 (1972), 1088.
45
Scammon and Wattenberg, p. 28.
46
Murray Edelman, The Symbolic Uses of Politics
(Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1964) , p. 5.
47
McBath and Fisher, p. 18.
48
Novak, p. 15.
4 9
Please refer to Nimmo, pp. 180-193; Carolyn W.
Sherif, Muzafer Sherif, and Roger E. Nebergall, Attitude and
Attitude Change (Philadelphia: W. B. Saunders Company,
1965); Kenneth Burke, Philosophy of Literary Form (New York:
Vintage Books, 1957), A Grammar of Motives and A Rhetoric of
Motives (Cleveland: World Publishing Company, 1962), and
Language as Symbolic Action (Berkeley: University of Cali
fornia Press, 1968); Kenneth E. Boulding, The Image (Ann
Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1968).
50
Boulding, p. 6.
51
Boulding, pp. 3-5.
42
52
Boulding does not specifically mention these, but
they clearly are implied throughout The Image.
53
Boulding, p. 5.
54
Boulding, pp. 47-48.
55
Walter R. Fisher, "A Motive View of Communication,
"The Quarterly Journal of Speech, 56 (April, 1970), 131.
56
Boulding, p. 5. See also Fisher, 131.
57
John Kennedy, Inaugural Address, January 20, 1961.
Text is widely reprinted.
58
Nimmo, p. 181.
5 9
N1' mmo, p 181
• •
60
sherif, Sherif, and Nebergall, pp. 11-17.
61
See o. J. Harvey and Jeanne Rutherford, "Gradual and
Absolute Approaches to Attitude Change," Sociometry, 21
(1958), 61-68; C. I. Howland, o. J. Harvey, and M. Sherif,
"Assimilation and Contrast Effects in Reactions to Communi
cation and Attitude Change," Journal of Abnormal and Social
Psychology, 45 (1957), 244-252.
62
Stanley Kelly, Jr., and Thad W. Mirer, "The Simple
Act of Voting," American Political Science Review, 69 (June,
1974), 574.
63
Thomas B. Farrell, "Political Communication: Its
Investigation and Praxis," Western Speech, 40 (Spring,
1976), 96. See also Jurgen Habermas, Legitimation Crisis
(Boston: Beacon Press, 1975).
64
This is not to deny that the Richard Nixon campaign
of 1968 probably was the first to structure the entire cam
paign around television appearances. The campaign strategy
was to offer Nixon in highly structured simulated interview
situations specifically designed to portray Nixon as
thoughtful, competent, and offering a "new" perspective on
the problems of the nation. We are saying only that those
means of communication were open to all candidates, and
still are. Please refer to our discussion later in this
chapter dealing with the effects of the media on voting
behavior, and to Joel McGinnis, The Selling of the Presi
dent: 1968 (New York: Trident Press, 1969).
65
As we are trying to discover voter images rather
than assuming them on an a priori basis, the selection of
43
these categories must be arbitrary. However, the selection
of these categories is relatively unimportant, for they
constitute only a means of presenting data. The analytical
interpretation derived from the data is the important con-
sideration. This breakdown used is similar to that employed
by others. In discussing mass responses to political sym
bols, Edelman used the areas of the status of minority
groups, economic activities, and willingness to compromise
differences with other countries. See Edelman, The Symbolic
Uses of Politics, p. 175. Scammon and Wattenberg isolate
three areas of concern: economics, social concerns, and
foreign policy. Within social concerns, they place crime,
race relations, and social values. See The Real Majority,
pp. 40-43. Graber used analogous categories in her study of
the press coverage of the 1968 campaign: international
politics, economic policy, domestic politics, and social
problems. See Doris A. Graber, "Press Coverage Patterns of
Campaign News: the 1968 Presidential Race," Journalism
Quarterly (Autumn, 1970), 503.
66
. 96 t d f . 1 t 1 d
Nimmo, p. . Ins ea o using comp e e y ran om
samples, cluster sampling is used which means the same size
must be increased to 1500 to gain the sample accuracy,
Nimmo, p. 97. This is about the size used by Gallup.
67
Harold Mendelsohn and Irving Crespi, Polls, Televi
sion, and the New Politics (Scranton, Pa.: Chandler Pub
lishing Company, 1970), p. 67.
beMendelsohn and Crespi, p. 73.
6
'Leo Bogart, "No Opinion, Don't Know, and Maybe, No
Answer," Public Opinion Quarterly, 31 (Fall, 1967), 337; Leo
Bogart, Silent Politics: Polls and the Awareness of Public
Opinion (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1972), pp. 17-18,
198; Richard E. Vatz, "Public Opinion and Presidential
Ethos," Journal of the Western Speech Communication Associa
tion (40 (Summer, 1976), 196-206; Leege and Francis recog
nize the problem, but do not see it as insurmountable or as
negating the method. For an excellent defense of the poll
ing technique, see George Gallup, The Sophisticated Poll
Watcher's Guide (Princeton: Princeton Opinion Press, 1972).
70
Boulding, pp. 157-158.
71
See Page, "Presidential Campaigning: The Rhetoric
of Electoral Competition," and G. Ray Funkhouser, "The
Issues of the Sixties: An Exploratory Study in the Dynamics
of Public Opinion," Public Opinion Quarterly, 37 (Spring,
1973), 62-75. For an in-depth discussion of how widely
polls are used, see Mendelsohn and Crespi, pp. · 12-15.
44
72
Campbell, Gurin, and Miller, The Voter Decides,
p. 101.
73
Kenneth Burke, Language as Sy.mbolic Action (Berke
ley: University of California Press, 1968), p. 16.
74
Burke, Language as Symbolic Action, p. ll.
75
This admittedly is a very sketchy description of
Burke's views. Please refer to Burke, Language as Symbolic
Action, pp. 3-24.
76
Burke, Language as Symbolic Action, p. 45.
77
Burke, The Philosophy of Literary Form, p. 18.
78
C. Wright Mills, "Situated Actions and Vocabularies
of Motives," Power, Politics, and Peo le: The Collected
Essays of C. Wrig t Mi s, e. Irving L. Horowitz New York:
Oxford University Press, 1963), p. 439.
79
Burke, Philosophy of Literary Form, p. 18.
80
Bernard L. Brock, "Rhetorical Criticism: A Burkean
Approach," Methods of Rhetorical Criticism: A Twentieth
Century Perspective, ed. Bernard L. Brock and Robert L.
Scott (New York: Harper and Row, 1972), p. 319.
81
Burke, The Philosophy of Literary Form, p. 50.
82
Burke, The Philosophy of Literary Form, p. 75.
83
Robert L. Ivie, "Presidential Motives for War," The
Quarterly Journal of Speech, 38 (October, 1974), 337-345.
84
Ivie, p. 339.
85
Ivie, p. 339.
86
Ibid. Burke defines these elements of his pentad as
act, what was done; scene, when or where it was done; agent,
who did it; agency; how he did it; and why, purpose. See A
Grammar of Motives and A Rhetoric of Motives, p. vii.
87
Ivie, p. 339. This is actually Ivie's fifth step.
We have omitted his third step of locating principal forms
of substantiation because it is not applicable to this
study. Such a step is helpful only to the comparison of
several rhetorical efforts rather than the development of th
the image portrayed by a single candidate in a campaign.
Also see Richard M. Weaver, The Ethics of Rhetoric (Chicago:
Henry Regnery Company, 1953), pp. 212-228.
45
8 8
Wal ter R. Fisher, "A Motive View of Communication,"
Quarterly Journal of Speech, 56 (April, 1970), 132.
89
Fisher, "A Motive View of Communication," p. 139.
9
°Fisher, "A Motive View of Communication," p. 139.
91
0le R. Holsti, Content Analysis for the Social Sci-
ences and the Humanities (Reading, Massachusetts: Addison
Wesley Publishing Co., 1969), p. 5.
92
Benjamin I. Page of the University of Chicago sup
plied the copies of the texts which he received from the
national committees of the two major parties.
93
William H. Flanigan and Nancy H. Zingale, Political
Behavior of the American Electorate (Boston: Allyn and
Bacon, 1975), p. 160. The authors only present information
drawn from the Survey Research Center. We are responsible
for the interpretations.
94
Refer to Appendix A. We are making the judgment
that Black disturbanc e s essentially ended with the disturb
ances immediatel y after King's death.
95
Converse, Miller , Rusk, and Wolfe, 1095.
9 6
John P. Robinson, "Public Reaction to Political
Protest: Chicago 1968," Public Opinion Quarterly, 34
(Spring, 1970), 9.
97
Richard W. Boyd, "Popular Control of Public Policy:
A Normal Vote Analysis of the 1968 Election," p. 436.
98
Robinson, p. 8.
99
Converse, Miller, Rusk, and Wolfe, p. 1094.
10O
scammon and Wattenberg, p. 182.
1O1
Herbert F. Weisberg and Jerrold G. Rusk, "Dimensions
of Candidate Evaluation," The American Political Science
Review, 64 (December, 1970), 1171.
1O2
Weisberg and Rusk, p. 1171.
1O3
scammon and Wattenberg, p. 183.
1O4
see McBath and Fisher, p. 22, for an analysis of the
role of the vice-presidential candidates in the election. A
Harris survey showed Muskie to be 17 percentage points more
popular than Agnew; cited in Scammon and Wattenberg, p. 205.
46
See also Weisberg and Rusk, p. 1169. They report the mean
of Muskie scores on the "thermometer test" used by the
Survey Research Center exceeded Agnew's by 11 points.
105
Doris Graber, "Press Coverage Patterns of Campaign
News: the 1968 Presidential Race," Journalism Quarterly
(Autumn, 1970), p. 511, and "The Press as Opinion Resource
During the 1968 Presidential Campaign," Public Opinion
Quarterly, 35 (Spring, 1971), 177-181.
106
Joe McGinniss, The Selling of the President, 1968.
107
scammon and Wattenberg, p. 205.
108
Gary c. Jacobson, "The Impact of Broadcast Campaign
ing on Electoral Outcomes," Journal of Politics, 37 (August,
1975), 774-775.
109
oavid o. Sears and Richard Whitney, "Political Per
suasion," Handbook of Communication, ed. by Ithiel de Sola
Pool, Frederick W. Frey, Wilbur Schramm, Nathan Macoby,
Edwin B. Parker (Chicago: Rand McNally Publishing, 1973),
p. 2 58.
110
Mendelsohn and Crespi, p. 286.
47
CHAPTER II
VOTER IMAGES IN 1968
At the start of a campaign, we do not know
where the feelings and judgments of Americans
be. What do they think is just and fair? Are
they content or ready for major change? Do they
feel included or excluded? What are their
grievances, resentments, hopes, needs? Do they
want to be inspired or merely left alone?
1
This chapter details the image held by voters during
the campaign of 1968. This shall be accomplished by an
analysis of polling data from surveys taken approximately
from mid-1967 to early 1969. Such a spread of time is
necessary to gain as much data about as wide a range of
concerns as possible. The polls employed are the American
Institute of Public Opinion {Gallup), Louis Harris and Asso
ciates, the Survey Research Center, and the Opinion Research
Corporation of Princeton, New Jersey. The polling data are
presented in Appendix A, organized under the headings
{A) Vietnam, (B) other areas of foreign policy, (C) economic
affairs, {D) law and order, (E) race relations, {F) the role
of government, and {G) miscellaneous concerns. The plan is
to first profile the image of the voters in each of these
areas with reference to specific items in Appendix A, and
48
second, to provide a synthesizing analysis to draw together
the components of the image.
Vietnam and Other Areas
of Foreign Policy
Vietnam and other areas of foreign policy will be
considered together because they are closely related. An
understanding of voter concerns about Vietnam can better be
gained by placing those concerns within the general context
of foreign policy. The image held by voters in 1968 was
that the United States should not withdraw from the arena of
foreign affairs, but that the nature of the United States'
participation in international politics should undergo
substantial change. That claim generally applies to the
United States' involvement in Vietnam, but no consistent
view emerges as to how voters believed the change could be
accomplished. Voters appear to have made distinctions
between Vietnam and other areas of foreign policy only in
terms of the latitude of choices that were available in
Vietnam. The voters appear to have separated in their
images what the United States could do in Vietnam, given its
direct and extensive involvement, and what the nation should
do in other areas of foreign policy where no such overt com-
mitment had taken place.
By an overwhelming majority, Americans believed the
United States must be involved in the problems of the rest
of the world (Item B-2. If the don't knows, no answers, and
49
no opinions were distributed in the ratio as those who
responded, the margin is approximately three to one).
2
That
conclusion is sustained by much of the other data. In
response to what the United States should do if another war
similar to Vietnam should break out, most Americans clearly
believed the United States should assist the "attacked"
country in some manner (Item B-1). The voters also gen
erally supported foreign aid, particularly if it was to be
used directly for the improvement of the quality of life of
the residents of a foreign nation (Items B- 4, B-7). Yet
voters did not desire increases in expenditures for foreign
aid. Most desired foreign aid to remain at its present
level or decrease (Item B-6). This probably reflects a
desire to keep federal expenditures at a minimum and/or an
impression that aid dollars were not always wisely spent.
Voters desired the United States to work out its prob
lems with Communist nations (Items B- 8 and B-9), yet still
wished the nation to maintain a posture of defensive
strength in opposition to the Communists (Items B-11 and B-
13). Support for programs that could be perceived as poten
tially reducing tensions between the United States and the
U.S.S.R. varied. Item B-10 indicates Americans were seri
ously divided on whether the United States should trade with
Communists, although many had not crystalized their view.
They disapproved of actions to increase our troops in
Europe and were divided about how belligerent we should
50
become over the Soviet Union's invasion of Czechoslovakia
(Items B-12 and B-14). Any military reaction by the United
States, they believed, should be in conjunction with other
countries (Item B-11). Voters believed that the United
States should attempt to work with other nations to solve
international problems; this is evidenced by the strong sup
port given to our continued membership and activity in the
United Nations (Items B-18 and B-19). Opposition even to
Communist China's admission to the United Nations was minor
and not viewed as important (Item B-17).
The opinion that the United States should not become
directly involved in the affairs of other countries is best
illustrated in the responses given to questions concerning
Cuba and the Middle East (Items B-15 and B-20 through B-29).
Voters did not perceive Cuba having a Communist government
as justification for our intervention. Israel was perceived
as having certain rights and her military efforts generally
were suppurted (Items B-20 and B-24 through B-27). Yet
voters did not support direct United States' assistance in
terms of men or material even if war broke out in the Middle
East. The reactions to analogous questions concerning Arab
rights were similar, and even more negative toward sending
men or material if war broke out (Items B-22 and B-23).
Voters also had a similar image concerning the appro
priate role for the United States in the Vietnam War. They
would have liked to see the United Nations assume responsi-
51
bility for the conflict (Item A-1). They wished the South
Vietnamese to assume more of the burden (Item A-7), and
strongly supported a neutralist government in Vietnam (Item
A-10), but many were highly suspicious of any Communist par
ticipation in such a government (Items A-8 and A-9). The
important image component to note about Vietnam, however, is
that goals other than those being pursued by the Johnson
administration were desired by the American people (Items
A-1 and A-7, and A-10 mentioned previously), and there were
great differences over which specific action should be
followed in the war (Items A-2, A-4, A-5, A-6, and A-11
indicate that great division existed). Where the polling
choices offered were polar in nature, such as Item A-9,
opinion was almost equally divided. When a variety of
policy alternatives was offered, no single alternative was
preferred by anything approaching a majority. Only on the
question of intensifying the war by using nuclear weapons
were images held highly similar: negative.
Americans were not isolationists. They saw a suppor-
tive role for the United States through aid to achieve a
better life for others. They wished to negotiate with the
Soviet Union, although they were cautious of direct dealings
with them. Self-determination of peoples was highly
regarded, but voters believed the United States should not
take sides in terms of direct military aid with weapons or
troops. If military action was warranted, it should be
52
undertaken in conjunction with other nations. This general
ization of voters' foreign policy images seems applicable
also to Vietnam, but on this issue voters were faced with
the immediacy of an actual conflict. On what to do to
achieve the desired goals, Americans were divided.
While the polling data indicate differences in opinions
about what the United States should do in Vietnam, they do
not reflect the deep malaise the war had created in this
country. Neither do they reflect that the war was at the
root of prolonged and violent demonstrations by the young
from 1967 through the 1968 campaign. That voters were about
equally divided over whether the United States ought to step
up or decrease its military effort in the war (Item B-12),
does not adequately express the depth of the division. The
division was deeper than the emerging national consensus
that an original mistake had been made in sending United
States' military troops to fight in the war. The war caused
people to question seriously whether they were being
deceived by their own government, and whether the government
possessed the capacity to govern.
3
Theodore White expressed
it well when he concluded the war was "staining the vast
majority with that morbid, unhappy mood which lasted until
election night," and that the war initiated a "sense of
helplessness in American life which no candidate could
cure."
4
Later in this chapter the saliency of Vietnam and
other foreign policy concerns in voters' images will be
53
considered, but it is important to recognize at this junc
ture that the war in Vietnam wounded the American people as
no other concern and caused us to wonder about our national
purpose.
Economic Affairs
While the data on economic affairs are minimal, some
components of voters' image emerge clearly. First, there is
evidence of a strong belief in the work ethic. An examina
tion of Items C-1, C-6, C-7, C-8, and C-11 supports this
conclusion. An overwhelming majority desired public assist
ance to not increase or even to be reduced. While this
might indicate only a desire for a reduction of government
expenditures, this data combined with the other data justify
the broader claim. Item C-8 indicates opposition to the
concept of a guaranteed annual income, but when the concept
is altered to gauge responses to a guaranteed job (Item C-6)
providing an income equal to that suggested for the guaran-
teed income, people overwhelmingly approved the concept.
Results on Item C-7 differ somewhat from those of Item C-6
but together they show support for individual effort and
some support for a guaranteed job. The lower support fig
ures in Item C-7 may partially be accounted for by the form
of the initial question which asked about jobs and standard
of living.
Some worries about inflation also existed. While these
data do not indicate well how serious inflation was thought
54
to be, a clue may be gained from Item C-9. One would expect
these items to be so interrelated that the percentage of
favorable responses would be approximately equal. Yet those
satisfied with their income numbered appreciably fewer than
those satisfied with their work and housing. Inflation was
a sufficient irritant to cause approximately half the voters
to favor a freeze of wages and prices (Item C-4). Also
tight money which would make personal finances more strin
gent, was opposed, but a reduction in federal spending is
strongly supported. Reductions in federal spending influ
ence personal finances for most only indirectly. Reductions
in federal spending, however, also are perceived as lowering
tax burdens. Increased taxes generally are unpopular and
particularly so during inflationary times. Item C-5 shows a
distaste for increased taxes, but the degree to which it
reflects a concern about inflation cannot be determined from
these data.
The economic image of the 1968 voter consisted of a
firm belief in the work ethic, a concern over inflation, and
a desire for a reduction in federal spending.
Law and Order
Data in this area indicate voters in 1968 held highly
similar images. These items reflect deep concern over what
we have chosen to call law and order. Items D-11 and D-12
are particularly illuminating. Eighty-one per cent of those
surveyed believed that law and order had broken down.
55
Eighty-four per cent believed the President can be very
influential in preserving law and order. On the surface the
data may seem to conflict with the responses given in Item
D-13 which indicate the maintenance of law and order is a
local problem. But the apparent conflict may easily be
resolved. The President may be perceived as influential in
establishing the tone, the climate, the general policy deal
ing with law and order concerns, and these are implemented
and enforced at the local level. Viewed in this context,
the responses are consistent. Fear was deeply ingrained.
Fifty per cent of women were afraid to walk their neighbor
hoods alone at night (Item D-5). While men were not nearly
so frightened to walk their neighborhoods, their perceptions
must be considered because half of the men in America had
wives or female friends afraid to walk alone at night.
The courts were perceived as encouraging the decline in
law and order. They were seen as having encouraged viola
tion of the law (Item D-10) probably by not being suffi
ciently harsh with criminals (Item D-7). More conservative
judges were desired as appointees to the Supreme Court (Item
D-9), perhaps because it was believed such judges would
reach decisions making it easier to deal more harshly with
criminals. Yet views of the court had not changed drastic
ally from 1963 to 1967; those giving the Supreme Court a
good or excellent rating were about equal to those giving
the court a fair or poor rating (Item D-18).
56
Other data indicate a concern over the status of law
and order and a desire to deal with violations more harshly.
There was overwhelming support for more strict obscenity
laws (Item D-14). Voters believed demonstrators who pre-
vented Marine Corps recruiters and recruiters for companies
making napalm from appearing on college campuses should be
drafted (Item D-4). Citizens believed student disorders
needed to be dealt with more strongly (Item D-15). Even
shooting of looters on sight during race riots, apparently
without trial, was supported by most (Item D-8). Only 19
per cent of the population thought too much violence had
been used by the police in response to the demonstrations
during the Democratic convention (Item D-19).
Other items of data appear less significant. Gun
registration and police permission to purchase guns were
supported (Items D-1 and D-2). Prohibition of guns, how
ever, probably was not popular. We may infer this from the
hesitancy to restrict guns even to those under 18 (Item
D-3). Harsher penalties for driving under the influence of
alcohol were not supported.
The law and order component of 1968 voters' images is
clear. Belief in obeyi~g the law was crumbling. The Presi
dent and the courts were perceived as capable of doing
something about this attitude, but had not. The key to
returning to an orderly society was thought to be that those
in positions of authority had to deal with unlawful behavior
57
more harshly. Some behavior, such as trading in literature
thought to be obscene, or engaging in student demonstra
tions, even though legal and protected by the first amend
ment, was seen as criminal and a majority of voters wanted
it prosecuted.
Concerns about law and order related directly to Viet
nam and to race relations. The Vietnam war had sparked
violent demonstrations in the streets and on the campuses.
More important, the demonstrations had made vivid the under
lying cultural change that was seriously questioning previ
ously accepted standards of behavior.
5
The relationship of
law and order to race relations will be discussed in the
consideration of voter images of race relations.
Race Relations
Two characteristics of 1968 voters' image of the rela
tionships between Blacks and Whites stand out: (1) Blacks
should be treated as equal citizens, but they had not been,
and (2) Extreme care needed to be exercised in the rate at
which Blacks achieved equality. The first characteristic is
supported by the last two responses in Item E-2, and Item
E-1, and somewhat by Item E-3. Yet there is a strong per
ception that problems of the Blacks are not the appropriate
concern of the federal government (Items E-4 and E-5). The
effort to move Blacks to a position of equal citizenship had
moved too rapidly (third response of Item E-2 and Items E-8
and E-9). Item E- 7 is particularly important, because it
58
indicates that belief became increasingly widespread during
the campaign. Item E-9 indicates more than a rejection of a
specific proposal; it implies a belief that injustices could
not immediately be corrected. Some citizens continued to
believe that Blacks were not the equal of Whites and were
responsible for their own condition ( ):tern E-2). Whether
this was viewed as genetically induced or created by soci
etal conditions cannot be determined nor need it be for the
policy implied is the same: slow down on civil rights
programs.
There is a corollary to be drawn from these beliefs
which link conceptions of race relations to those of law
and order. There is a clear implication that voters per
ceived either that Blacks caused crime or the rapid acceler
ation of civil rights programs had precipitated a breakdown
of the previous social order.
These perceptions arose from two kinds of events and
circumstances that reached serious proportions during the
campaign of 1968. The summer of 1967 had been a period of
extensive racial violence all across the country. By the
end of that summer, 164 riots had taken 83 lives.
6
The
demands for freedom and integration had become militant, and
the goal was "Black Power." Racial violence flared early in
1968 and culminated in the violence that occurred across the
country following Martin Luther King's assassination in
April. Equally important to the linkage of law and order
59
concerns with race relations is that much violent crime
occurs in the ghettoes of our cities. Blacks were and are
the principal residents of these ghettoes. The result is
that not only are Blacks often the primary victims of vio
lent crime, but those who reside near the ghettoes, predom
inantly poor and working-class Whites, are also the victims.
Thus, many Whites came to fear the Blacks.
7
The perception
of a breakdown in law and order may have been a reaction to
societal changes. In the process, the concerns about law
and order developed serious racial overtones.
The Role of Government
Voters in 1968 generally approved of the federal gov
ernment playing a supporting role in helping those in the
society facing problems beyond their individual control such
as ghettoes, medical health facilities, medical bills for
the aged, etc. (see Items F-4, F-5, F-6, F-10, F-13, F-14,
F-21, and F-22). Items F-3, F-7, F-9, F-16, F-18, and F-19
provide ~dditional support to the generalization. But as
much as possible, voters desired that assistance to be in
the form of funding with the actual programs to be carried
out at the local level (Items F-15 and F-17). Education
particularly was seen as a matter of local concern (Item
F-7). Voters seemed to approve of the federal government
supporting financially a wide range of activity, yet were
cynical of the federal government's ability or willingness
to administer programs effectively. The data do not suggest
60
overwhelmingly that the federal government was viewed as too
strong (Item F-1), but Item F-2 indicates relative to other
large "power" elements, the federal government easily was
the most feared.
While voters favored continuing and even increasing
certain social programs, they were unwilling to finance
those programs. Items C-3 and C-5 indicate a desire to
reduce federal spending and strong opposition to increased
taxes. Two not mutually exclusive explanations of the
apparent paradox are possible. Voters may not associate
directly expanded federal programs and increased taxation.
They may approve of programs on one hand from which they
perceive direct help, and, on the other hand, desire an
overall reduction in the level of federal spending. Voters
may also have perceived a waste of money and/or inefficiency
in federal programs and/or desired a realignment of existing
spending priorities.
Miscellaneous Concerns
Judgments examined in this category deal generally with
the right of employees to unionize and strike, the simpli
fication of the process by which we choose a president, the
space program, the openness of government, the equity of
the draft, and prayer in schools.
The right of private industry employees to unionize
was not questioned. Even farmers were thought to benefit
from unionization (Item G-12). Voters seemed to approve
61
even of public employees being unionized (Items G-10 and
G-11). But support of the right to strike given to private
employees (Items G-3, G-5, and G-6) was not extended to
public employees (Items G-1, G-2, G-7, and G-9). Public
employees, because they provide vital services to all, were
expected to forego the right to strike. This belief applied
also to defense workers who, although employed privately,
were seen as working in the direct public interest (Item
G-4). While most may have agreed that all should be
afforded the same rights and privileges, the voters balked
when the realization of those rights and privileges posed
potential hardships for them.
Voters heavily supported elimination of the electoral
college and a national primary for the selection of presi
dential candidates (Items G-15 and G-16). They approved of
the 18-year-old vote and campaign spending limitations
(Items G-18 and G-19). Congressmen were expected to divulge
their financial status (Items G-23 and G-24) and not accept
campaign contributions for work connected with legislation
(Item G-22).
The selective service system generally was supported
(Item G-29), but modifications to make it more equitable
were desired, including alternative service (Item G-30) or
the elimination of some deferments (Item G-33). Deferment
until completion of college was viewed as reasonable (Items
G-31 and G-32).
62
The space program was a concern exhibiting polarity
among voters. Almost equal numbers supported landing a man
on the moon as opposed the endeavor. Those desiring to
expand or maintain at the present level the space program
were almost matched by those believing it should be cut back
(Items G-20 and G-21).
Finally, respondents overwhelmingly favored allowing
prayers in the public schools (Item G-37). However, for a
considerable portion of the voters the concern probably was
of low saliency as 22 per cent didn't know, gave no answer,
or expressed no interest in the question.
Synthesis and Conclusion
The problem in bringing these disparate elements to
gether to form an image is that a judgment of the importance
to the ·voters of these individual components is necessary.
From polling data previously discussed, one could mistak
ingly conclude, for example, that image components of the
space program were equally salient with those of the Vietnam
War. Obviously, that is not the case. Even if percentages
of voters supporting various federal programs were approxi
mately equal, this does not imply the programs were of equal
saliency. While such could be the case, obviously it does
not follow that it necessarily must be the case.
Fortunately, we need not guess about this. Gallup sur
veyed respondents for the saliency of these various
components.
8
Item H-1 indicates that after the Tet
63
offensive the Vietnam war was the primary concern. By March
of 1969, people identified Vietnam as the most serious prob
lem by a margin of more than two to one over the second most
serious problem of crime and lawlessness (Item H-2). An
indication of which programs voters wanted to keep or
increase and those they wished to cut also provide some idea
of saliency (Item H-3). The most popular programs in order
of preference were those dealing with crime, education, and
poverty. The least popular were the space program, financ
ing the war, and welfare.
9
These survey results do not
record race relations because "programs" for race relations
essentially did not exist. What existed were laws and
judicial decisions. This particular polling question was
unable to tap the relative saliency to the voters of these
concerns. But, as we indicated earlier, voters perceived a
strong correlation between Blacks and efforts undertaken to
improve their role in the society, and increased crime and
social disorders. Thus, this data could be interpreted as
supporting strongly the belief that law and order, or main
tenance of the existing social order, was more important to
voters than programs designed to promote "civil rights" or
"social justice."
It would be wrong, however, to conclude that only
voters' images of national problems influence voting behav
ior. Obviously, voters were involved deeply in the individ
ual concerns about their own personal lives. That image may
64
be as instrumental in determining voter behavior as those
dealing with the nation. To reason otherwise is to assume
an altruistic voter willing to sacrifice his own self
interests for those of the country. One year before the
election, Gallup asked, "What do you consider to be the most
urgent problem facing you and your family today?" The
responses were illuminating. Financial concerns dominated
overwhelmingly (Item H-4). Concerns about paying the bills,
buying the groceries, and paying for schooling were impor
tant. Probably that is not unique, but that such concerns
are common does not deny their importance in a voter's
image. Although previous data indicate there was general
satisfaction with housing, work, and income, people still
were very much concerned with the practical, everyday
aspects of their lives.
Life was not perceived by the voters of 1968 as improv
ing. There was a widespread malaise among voters in 1968.
The cause could not be assigned to particular programs or
actions. But that it existed cannot be denied (Items H-5
through H-8). Voters did not believe the quality of life
was improving in terms of morals, honesty, happiness, or
peace of mind. The most optimistic report was in terms of
happiness and even then only one of four Americans perceived
improvement. For each of the concerns, those perceiving a
worsening situation greatly outnumbered those seeing
improvement. The country was perceived as heading in the
65
wrong direction. The extension of that observation is that
the direction of the nation needed to be reversed. The
President becomes the obvious person on whom such a burden
is placed and to whom such a challenge is given.
Voters in 1968 were troubled by a war in Vietnam they
had difficulty understanding, and which did not seem any
closer to conclusions. Suspicion of direct United States
involvement in other nations with men and material was ram
pant. Inflation was eroding the ability of citizens to
maintain existing life styles, while riots, dissenters, and
increased demands by Blacks were threatening the value
structure on which that life style was based. Government
had grown more pervasive, but it had not seemed to improve
its ability to solve problems. Something was wrong in
America, and it needed to be put right somehow. In Chapter
V we will return to these voter images to determine how well
the image conveyed by Humphrey and Nixon corresponded with
them.
66
FOOTNOTES
1
Michael Novak, Choosing Our King (New York: MacMillan
Publishing Co., 1974), p. 25.
2
The references in the text are to specific items in
Appendix A. Rather than footnote each reference, we have
included the reference in the text.
3
Theodore H. White, The Making of the President 1968
(New York: Atheneum Publishers, 1969), pp. 5, 13.
4
White, pp. 13, 30.
5
An excellent discussion of citizen perceptions of l aw
and order appears in White, pp. 188-199.
6
White, p. 202.
7
Whi te, p. 19 3.
8
Such Gallup survey findings have been previously used
for longitudinal studies of voter concerns. See G. Ray
Funkhouser, "The Issues of the Sixties: An Exploratory
Study in Dynamics of Public Opinion," Public Opinion
Quarterly, 37 (Spring, 1973), 62-75.
9
These questions were asked in February, 1968. Consid
ering the events that occurred between then and the elec
tion, images about the war and law and order probably
increased in saliency.
67
CHAPTER III
HUBERT HUMPHREY'S COMMUNICATED IMAGE IN 1968
I set out to show the American people that
they are better than they sometimes think they are
••. more fair and less prejudiced ..• more
thoughtful and less emotional .• & more courageous
and less fearful than some politicians think.
1
This study hypothesizes that voters make their candi
date choice by comparing their image of the world with the
image conveyed by the candidate. The candidate who conveys
an image that corresponds most closely to that held by the
voter receives the vote. The test of that conceptualization
was begun in the previous chapter where the image held by
voters in 1968 was delineated. In this chapter the image
conveyed by Hubert Humphrey in 1968 through his campaign
communication will be profiled by analyzing the texts of
his major communication efforts. The image will be derived
from determining Humphrey's vocabulary of motives. Mills
concluded that
A motive tends to be one which is to the actor and to
the other members of a situation an unquestioned answer
to questions concerning social and lingual conduct.
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
The words which in a type situation will fulfill this
function are circumscribed by the vocabulary of motives
68
acceptable for such situations. Motives are accepted
justifications for present, future, or past programs or
acts.
2
The vocabulary of motives will be developed by the methodol
ogy outlined in Chapter I: Humphrey's definition of the
situation will be determined; his communication will be
examined to discover which of the parts of Burke's pentad
dominated his communication; third, we will attempt to
locate Humphrey's God and devil terms; finally, we will
determine which of the four motives isolated by Fisher seems
best to essentialize Humphrey's communication.
Humphrey's Definition
An essential problem Humphrey fac e d in the campaign of
1968 was as Vice-President he was closely associated with
Lyndon Johnson. He was identified with leadership that had
intensified the United States' involvement in an increas
ingly unpopular war, and with policies that had been unsuc
cessful in bringing that conflict to a satisfactory conclu
sion. Humphrey was unable to disclaim completely that
leadership and those policies because to have done so might
negatively have affected the peace negotiations in progress,
may have further fractionalized an already divided party,
and would have denied Humphrey the association with Johnson
he so strongly desired on economic affairs and a wide range
of domestic concerns. In addition, Humphrey felt the neces
sity as Vice-President to adhere to administration policy,
and he was also bound to Johnson by feelings of close
69
friendship.
3
Humphrey's overriding definition of the situation in
1968 was that the United States needed a "New Day" and that
he could provide it. While he did not specfically use that
terminology in reference to all areas of public concern,
that definition clearly was implied throughout his communi
cation. The definition recognized the existing frustration
as well as serving as an attempt to disassociate Humphrey
from unpopular leadership. Hubert Humphrey's undesirable
position of being so closely associated with Johnson
accounts for why, in a campaign year in which the issue of
United States' involvement in Vietnam is credited with
unseating an incumbent President, Humphrey communicated
relatively infrequently about the issue. Even during his
acceptance speech Humphrey gave Vietnam scant attention,
although the streets of Chicago had been the scene of vio
lent confrontations between the police and demonstrators
opposed to our Vietnam policy. In his acceptance speech,
Humphrey said the first reality facing the nation was "the
necessity for peace in Vietnam." He promised to "do every
thing within my power to aid the negotiations and to bring a
prompt end to this war."
4
He claimed "the policies of
tomorrow need not be limited by the policies of yesterday"
5
and that he would "apply that lesson to the search for peace
in Vietnam.
• • •
" 6
These references did not occur until
pages four and five of a nine-page speech. Substantially
70
less than 10 per cent of the speech made any reference to
the war in Vietnam. His definition had not yet clearly
emerged, but the foundation for it was established.
In Wilmington, Delaware, almost two weeks later, Viet
nam received further mention. Humphrey urged the country to
have the "fortitude to see through a long, demanding negoti
ation in Paris which may finally bring peace to Southeast
Asia."
7
Humphrey urged three other general foreign policy
actions in this speech; his remarks about Vietnam came last.
Almost two weeks later, on the twenty-third of September,
Humphrey again mentioned Vietnam. He declared, "I run on
the Platform of my Party. That Platform points the way to
peace in Vietnam and a negotiated political settlement."
8
He indicated that the platform pointed toward "reduction of
American combat forces as the South Vietnamese are able to
carry a greater share of their own burden ... to free
elections open to all who will abide by the peaceful
processes."
9
His first priority would be "to honorably end
that war."
10
Humphrey assigned top priority to ending the
war several times in the campaign: in Minneapolis on Sep
tember 24,
11
in Sacramento on September 25,
12
in San Fran
cisco the next day,
13
in Salt Lake City on September 30,
14
in a position paper released in late October,
15
and iL Los
Angeles on October 24.
16
Yet on each of these occasions,
with the lone exception being his national television
address from Salt Lake City on September 30, Humphrey passed
71
over Vietnam quickly, mentioning the war and its end only as
one action among many necessary to attain peace.
Hubert Humphrey's address to the nation on September
30, 1968 warrants careful attention because it was his major
statement on the issue and fundamental to establishing his
definition of a "New Day." After this speech Humphrey's
popularity consistently climbed until the final election
results were very close. During the remainder of the cam
paign he continued to embrace the position outlined in the
September 30 address and declined to go beyond it. For
example, on CBS's "Face the Nation," in response to a
question raised about whether a bombing halt should occur
immediately, Humphrey said, "I have stated my case very
clearly, as best I could, in Salt Lake, and I do not believe
that it will be helpful to you or to me, to the American
people, or to the cause of peace for me to try to elaborate
upon it."
17
The September 30 address was instrumental in Humphrey's
strategy to disassociate hims~lf from Johnson's war poli
cies. In the address, Humphrey indicated that Vietnam poli
cies were those of Johnson and the candidate would support
them as a loyal Vice President: "President Johnson will
continue--until January 20, 1969--to make the decisions in
Vietnam. The voice at the negotiating table must be his. I
shall not compete with that voice. I shall cooperate and
help."
18
At the same time, however, Humphrey stressed that
72
a change in leadership was only 112 days away and the new
administration would need to "make a complete reassessment
of the situation in Vietnam .••. "
19
He repeated the
phrase from his acceptance speech that "the policies of
tomorrow need not be limited by the policies of yester-
day.
1120
He offered a three-step proposal: (1) a cessation
of the bombing of North Vietnam "as an acceptable risk for
peace ••. " if there was evidence of willingness to restore
the demilitarized zone;
21
(2) a move toward a "de-Americani
zation of the war"
22
by establishing a "specific timetable
by which American forces could be systematically reduced
while South Vietnamese forces took over more and more of the
burden";
23
and (3) "an immediate cease fire--with United
Nations or other international supervision and supervised
withdrawal of all foreign forces from South Vietnam."
24
The
policy advocated was not markedly different from that being
pursued. Bombing already had been curtailed; Humphrey's
proposal was to eliminate the bombing if an indication of a
willingness to reestablish the demilitarized zone were
forthcoming. De-Americanization always had been hoped for
and Humphrey saw it only as a possibility during the next
year. An immediate ceasefire with international supervision
long had been desired. The problem was how to achieve
agreement on the nature of the ceasefire and its supervi
sion. But as Johnson's vice-president, Humphrey needed to
indicate he had independent plans for achieving peace, that
73
he was not tied to the policies that had divided the coun
try, and that his was a new initiative or the birth of his
"New Day. "
In his effort to emphasize the "New Day" Humphrey
stressed other foreign policy initiatives apart from Vietnam
his administration would undertake. He urged ratification
of the nuclear non-proliferation treaty. This treaty was
designed to prevent the spread of nuclear technology to non
nuclear nations; it had been approved by the Soviet Union,
many other nations, and the President of the United States.
However, the treaty had not been ratified by the United
States' Senate. Humphrey saw the treaty as a new opportun
ity for peace, a new step toward limiting the number of
countries possessing nuclear weapons, and a new opportunity
to make significant advances in arms control.
In his acceptance speech, Humphrey had referred to the
negotiated treaty as progress toward halting the arms race.
Ratification of the treaty was urged as a necessary step to
turn back the arms race and build bridges to others.
25
Later in Washington, D. c., Humphrey urged prompt ratifica
tion as a "sound step toward a more peaceful world, a step
we can take without jeopardy that would reduce the danger
of nuclear war."
26
Before the Zionist Organization of
America on the eighteenth of September, he called for rati
fication of the treaty because it would "help determine
whether we will build a world safe for our children or
74
whether we will live in a world of danger and terror."
27
He
saw delay in ratifying the treaty as potentially "killing
this treaty for ever,"
28
and "the end of •.. efforts to
hold back the flood of nuclear destructive power to nations
around the globe."
29
Humphrey urged ratification of the
treaty in highly similar fashion throughout the campaign.
30
Vice President Humphrey's support of the nuclear non
proliferation treaty was also a means by which he attempted
to distinguish himself from Nixon. He constantly character
ized Nixon as supporting the treaty, but opposing ratifica-
tion. To Humphrey, the result of such a stand was to risk
war. Typical of his depiction of Nixon's position were his
remarks about the treaty on September 18, 1968:
To delay ratification for partisan political rea
sons could set in motion a tragic chain reaction of
doubt and rejection among nations who might otherwise
agree to this treaty.
Why is ratification so crucial?
Five nations now have nuclear weapons.
itself is dangerous.
That
.
in
The cause of world peace and our own security
would only be jeopardized by dozens of nations having
the weapons which could plunge us all into World War
III.
On this, as on most issues, Mr. Nixon has been
evasive--he has refused to face the issue squarely.
He says he is for the treaty, but against ratify
ing it now.
He says he is for the treaty, but he has reserva
tions about it.
He says he is for the treaty, but he will not
encourage the Senate to ratify it.
75
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
I don't think we can afford to play political
games with anything so serious as the spread of nuclear
weapons.
On this issue there is no safety in equivocation--
only an invitation to disaster.
31
Virtually every time Humphrey mentioned the treaty, Nixon
was criticized for his stand. At times the criticism was a
part of a long list of questions demanding to know where
Nixon stood.
Other foreign policy concerns rarely were discussed,
and when they were, Humphrey consistently linked them to
previously explicated goals as part of the "New Day." For
example, when he discussed the invasion of Czechoslovakia by
Soviet troops, Humphrey argued that the invasion should not
stop ratification of the nuclear non-proliferation treaty
nor prevent continued talks to limit the arms race. The
problems of the Middle East were addressed substantially
only once during the campaign and that was in his appearance
before the Zionist Organization of America. In the speech
Humphrey supported the existence of Israel with secure
boundaries and free navigation of all waters including the
Suez Canal and the Gulf of Aqaba, favored active United
States' efforts to bring about a settlement, and favored
continued United States' military assistance to Israel,
including phantom jets. However, he used even this appear
ance to call for ratification of the non-proliferation
treaty.
3 2
76
Economic prosperity was not viewed as something "new"
by Humphrey, but he envisioned the level of prosperity
iJ.nproving. What was "new" we1:e the social problems that
could be solved as a result of the new level of prosperity.
The "New Day" would be reflected in the quality of American
lives by the increased opportunities and fewer problems sus
tained economic prosperity would bring. He argued for
expanded federal programs to assist citizens in need. Among
the federal programs to be initiated or expanded were the
following:
(1) Increased financial support for local police.
(2) Increased funding to provide more judges and
courts.
(3) Increased federal support of penal institutions.
(4) A Marshall Plan for the Cities.
(5) A Federally subsidized National Urban Development
Bank.
(6) Expansion of Federal Home Administration Lending.
(7) Increased Federal aid to education.
(8) Increased Social Security benefits by fifty per
cent.
(9) Extension of federally financed medical care to
children.
(10) Guarantee of an opportunity for higher education.
(11) Liberalized eligibility for food stamps.
(12) Improved Veterans' benefits.
(13) Expanded medicare coverage.
(14) Federally subsidized research to modernize con
struction techniques.
(15) Increased Job training.
33
While these might be perceived as increasing inflationary
-
pressures, Humphrey implied that his "New Day" of peace in
Vietnam and concommitant economic growth at home could allow
these goals to be achieved without undue inflationary
pressure.
Even in the area of law and order, Humphrey's defini-
77
tion as that of a "New Day" is applicable. His "New Day"
would eliminate the causes of crime and improve the nation's
ability to deal with crime when it did occur. To Humphrey,
if negative societal conditions could be eliminated or
reduced, then the symptom, crime, would be eliminated or
reduced. Humphrey's remarks before the American Legion in
New Orleans in September offer a good illustration of his
.
view: "In the long run, we can only cut crime by getting at
its causes: slums, unemployment, rundown schools and
houses. This is where crime begins, and that is where it
must end."
34
To deal with the disease of poverty that he
saw as breeding crime, Humphrey offered a broad range of
social programs, ranging from improving the economy to
encouraging rat control, from education to housing.
To improve law enforcement capabilities, Humphrey con
sistently offered three areas where the federal government
could offer support: (1) financial aid to local police,
(2) increased funding for the courts to rel'eve understaff
ing, and (3) financial assistance to penal institutions to
encourage rehabilitation. Federal support for local police
was necessary, Humphrey believed, because:
We find that we have neglected and overlooked and
shortchanged our policemen for decades.
Our police forces are undermanned--and the men are
underpaid and often undertrained.
We give these brave men one of the most important
jobs in our society. Then we pay them on the average
of two-thirds of what is necessary to support a family
in moderate circumstances.
78
We make them the agents of social order, and
rightly demand that they behave lawfully in the face of
extreme provocation from lawbreakers.
But we rarely give them the kind of quality
training they know they need to do their jobs effec
tively.
We don't give them modern technical equipment.
We even tie them up with clerical work unconnected
with the business of preventing crime, deterring and
detecting crime.
We don't adequately train them in community
relations.
35
Federal help for the courts was necessary to allow the
judicial system to perform its function:
Let's face the fact. Where our courts fail, they
do so primarily for one reason: They are understaffed,
overworked, and overcrowded.
The solution is to give the courts the tools to do
their job. And I intend to do just that.
The Federal government will support training and
recruitment of court personnel, and we will make the
criminal justice process in the District of Columbia a
model for the nation.
36
Federal assistance to prisons was necessary to allow them to
accomplish their purpose of rehabilitation:
As President, I would propose that the Federal
Government provide assistance to our state and local
correctional institutions--while also doing a better,
more effective job in Federal penitentiaries.
We can and we will rehabilitate those offenders
who can be returned to society to live productive lives
free from crime and we will protect the public from
those we cannot cure.
37
The "New Day" which Humphrey envis·oned would allow the
nation to focus upon both the causes of crime and the after-
effects of crime. But to do so would demand increased
79
levels of funding, which were possible only if the war ended
and economic growth continued.
Humphrey's "New Day" included continued progress toward
equality for minority groups in our society and a unified
society free of prejudice. An often-repeated statement in
his campaign was, "Shall we--as a nation--move forward
toward one society of opportunity and justice, or shall we
abandon this commitment out of fear and prejudice and move
instead toward a fractured and separated society--Black
against White; rich against poor; comfortable against left
out?"
38
Humphrey linked problems of inequality to other
areas of concern: to crime and disorder, because we could
not have people hating other races and thus engaging in
rioting and civil disorders; to economic prosperity because
only prosperity could allow all Americans regardless of race
to participate fully in the society; and to international
peace because peace would allow us to focus our energies on
domestic concerns such as race.
The idea of a unified society was a pivotal part of
Humphrey's "New Day." Before the B'nai B'rith, Humphrey
declared, "It is my belief that the modern movement for
human rights in America is one continuous struggle--that it
is still going on--and that for us to survive as a free
nation, it must continue."
39
In that same address, he said
"I believe that those who still have less than the rest of
us [equal opportunity] have shown remarkable patience and
80
good will in resisting the call of extremism. Of course,
the movement for equal rights must now change. The old
objective was to use the law to strike down legal barriers.
The new objective is to build real equality •... This new
objective is harder. At the same time .•• it has become
much more urgent.
1140
In a position paper on education,
Humphrey declared, "Desegregation is not o~ly the law of the
land, but it must also be an accomplished fact."
41
"20
years ago, I called for equal opportunity; and I call for it
now."
42
Humphrey's call for a unified society was unequi
vocal: "Now is the time for everyone who cares to Join
hands in this country--to stand up against racism--to stand
up against suspicion and hate--to stand up against those who
want to stop this country's journey into the future."
43
For
him, the nature of the choice was vivid: "Which way:
Apartheid or democracy? Separation or community? A society
of ordered liberty or a society of fear and repression?"
44
The recurring theme throughout Humphrey's communication
was that his election would bring a "New Day" to American
society. The components of the "New Day" included increased
opportunities for education, better housing resulting in
better neighborhoods, continued hopes for a better future,
improved social security and medical care for the elderly,
the reduction or elimination of poverty, expansion of mass
transit, improvement of the cities, and the protection of
the environment. Humphrey consistently tied the attainment
81
of these goals and programs to the maintenance of prosperity.
The "New Day" depended on keeping that which the old had
provided, economic p·rosperity, and on moving forward to
improve the quality of life for all Americans. In calling
for a "New Day," Humphrey symbolically was disassociating
himself from the old administration by attempting to indi-
cate that under his leadership, the continued economic pros
perity would allow us to afford substantial improvements.
Just as Roosevelt had offered the "New Deal" and Kennedy,
"The New Frontier," Humphrey would break with the old to
lead us to a "New Day."
The Application of the Pentad
The pentad of Burke is a means of describing how sym
bolic communication functions. The elements of Burke's
pentad are the act which stresses what was done, the scene
which stresses when or where the act was done, the agent
which emphasizes who did it, the agency or how it was done,
and the purpose, or why it was done.
45
The particular ele
ment stressed by a communicator indicates the motive operat
ing, or the verbal justification for action. In determining
the dominant elements of the pentad functioning in Humph
rey's communication, the nature of his justification of his
candidacy should emerge.
No single element of the pentad totally dominated
Humphrey's communication in the campaign of 1968. The ele
ments stressed varied with the topic area he discussed.
82
His communication about law and order stressed a scene/
agency ratio. An agency/agent ratio dominated his
discussion of other domestic concerns.
A scene/act ratio dominated Humphrey's discussion of
Vietnam. The nature of the conflict determined the range of
acts that were possible to bring the war to an end. Unilat
eral withdrawal was rejected by Humphrey because it would
"jeopardize the independence of South Vietnam and the safety
of other Southeast Asian nations ... [and] would make
meaningless the sacrifices we have already made."
46
Escala
tion also was rejected because it would make meaningless the
sacrifices the nation had made.
47
The nature of the situa-
tion had justified the United States' initial involvement
under Eisenhower. The war also was responsible for John
son's "courageous" act of withdrawal.
48
His call for a
cessation of the bombing of North Vietnam, de-Americaniza
tion of the war, and a cease-fire under international super
vision depended for its success on whether the war scene was
such that the steps were justified.
While the September 30 speech to the nation on Vietnam
probably was Humphrey's most famous foreign policy statement
and his call for ratification of the nuclear non-prolifera
tion treaty was his most repeated position, Humphrey's
remarks in Columbus, Ohio, on September 21 entitled "A
Strategy for Peace," and his speech in San Francisco on
September 26 before the Commonwealth Club constituted his
83
most complete statement on the entire range of foreign
policy concerns. Both statements indicate Humphrey's
perception that the international situation, the scene,
demanded that certain acts be taken. On the subject of the
arms race, he said:
After two years of concentrated effort, the United
States has succeeded in persuading the Soviet Union to
join in discussions placing limitations on both offen
sive and defensive nuclear missiles .... we will seek
to avoid a situation in which we and the Soviets would
be forced to devote more and more of badly needed
resources to the strategic arms race.
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
Further accumulation on both sides borders on
insanity. It is not needed to deter; it does not pro
vide more protection; it does not ensure greater
destructive capability.
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
Are we not intelligent enough, wise enough, to
come to a realistic agreement with the Soviet Union, a
properly safeguarded agreement to limit and then to
work toward reduction of our offensive and defensive
strategic nuclear forces? I believe that we are. And
the entire world will benefit from our wisdom.
But again we do not have much time. Now is the
time to move.
49
The nature of the international situation also demanded
to reassessment of our foreign policy:
The lesson of Vietnam is not that we should turn
our backs on Southeast Asia--or on other nations or
peoples in less familiar parts of the world neighbor
hood.
The lesson is, rather, that we should most care
fully assess our national interests--carefully define
our goals and priorities, that we should formulate
policies which will form new American guidelines.
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
Not only should we continue to encourage regional
84
cooperation ... but we should also avoid, where
possible, unilateral involvement, either militarily or
economically--where multilateral means are available.
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
The United States cannot play the role of global
gendarme. The American people don't want it, and the
rest of the world won't accept it.
50
These are only excerpts from his two most well-devel
oped statements concerning foreign policy issues other than
Vietnam. But such developed positions clearly were the
exception. Humphrey rarely discussed foreign policy,
undoubtedly because to have done so would have strengthened
his association with Johnson. He did stress the nuclear
non-proliferation treaty because it allowed him a vehicle to
call for peace. But even his urging of ratification was
justified on the grounds that the international scene
demanded a reduction of tensions and fewer chances for
nuclear war.
A scene/agency ratio dominated Humphrey's discussion of
law and order. The scene consisted of elements which
fostered crime; the primary means to alter the scene was for
the federal government to initiate programs and provide
funding for programs designed to eliminate the causes of
crime and to improve the law enforcement system to better
deal with crime. In his nationwide television address of
mid-October, Humphrey said: "Anyone who tells this country
--as Mr. Nixon has--that poverty and crime have little or no
relationship, is fooling you and himself. Now, all of us
know that poverty, despair, alienation have throughout
85
history been the breeding ground for crime."s1 His stress
on the scene tacitly denied that agents, or individuals,
primarily were responsible for crime, particularly the
agents of the court:
•.. we hear in some quarters today that they
[the courts] are causes of crime--that they condone it.
Courts are an easy target for anyone who wants to
find an easy scapegoat to explain inaction.
Our courts are ethical and devoted to justice.
52
During the campaign, Humphrey formed a task force to
make recommendations of policy dealing with crime and
related concerns. One conclusion of the task force report
was that "Irresponsible criticism of court decisions is a
public disservice. This only diverts attention from the
real problem of crime and justice, and undermines efforts to
deal responsibly with crime."
53
The task force noted in its
detailed report that "The High Court's decisions, it is
claimed, are a principal cause of the crime rise, the fail
ure of criminal justice, and alleged moral laxity. Whether
these views be sincere or whether they represent political
irresponsibility, it is our belief that they are just plain
wrong."
54
The task force report also contained substantial
evidence to support its conclusion. Humphrey continued to
endorse the conclusion of the report concerning the courts,
but chose not to offer or discuss in the campaign the data
which the task force presented as evidence for its conclu
sion. Consistent with his general support of the courts and
86
the decisions they had made, Humphrey supported the nomina
tion of Justice Abe Fortas to become the new Chief Justice.
Fortas was considered closely aligned with the liberal
majority of the Warren Court.
Even when Humphrey expressed concern over the high
recidivism rate among convicted felons, he found the failure
of the penal institutions to be at fault. Again, Humphrey
blamed a part of the scene and not individual agents:
When 75 per cent of all people arrested prove to
be repeaters, these institutions are not providing ade
quate correction.
Too often our prisons provide only custody, not
rehabilitation.
They are not institutions designed to help as many
prisoners as possible and to protect society against
the rest--not institutions to provide work and educa
tion--but merely schools for crime.
This must be stopped.
55
The means or the agency altering the scene was the fed
eral government. Humphrey urged a large number of varied
social welfare programs to improve the conditions he saw as
breeding crime while at the same time urging the federal
government to provide financial support for the police, the
courts, and the prison system. As the entire nation was to
blame for allowing the conditions to exist that fostered
crime, so too the nation through the federal government had
to assume the responsibility for changing those conditions.
An agency/agent ratio dominated Humphrey's communica
tion concerning other domestic areas. In regard to the
87
economy, Humphrey saw it to be the responsibility of the
federal government to maintain prosperity and encourage
growth:
The government must use fiscal and monetary poli
cies to keep our growth steady and sustainable.
It must help to break bottlenecks and strengthen
free markets.
It must review all its programs with price
stability in mind.
It must improve productivity and efficiency
through training and mobility of workers and stimulate
more investment and modernization by business.
And it must work with business and labor toward
greater wage-price stability.
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
I believe that much more can be done with active
business and labor participation in voluntary and
cooperate efforts to fight inflation.
56
The only agents who would employ the appropriate agency, the
federal government, to assure prosperity and growth were
Humphrey and the Democrats. Humphrey attempted to portray
himself and the Democrats as the agents of prosperity and
growth as contrasted with Richard Nixon and the Republicans
as the agents of recession and unemployment. This theme was
established early, remained consistent throughout the cam
paign, and as the campaign reached its closing stages,
became the paramount campaign message. Selections from
Humphrey's first major statement on the economy after being
nominated illustrate well the thrust of the theme:
We have had 90 consecutive months of economic
expansion with no recessions since early 1961. This
contrasts with three recessions in the 1953-1960
88
period. In fact, under the eight years of Republican
leadership from 1953 through 1960, the United States
suffered three of its four recessions in the 22 years
since World War II.
The gain in real family income has been 32 per
cent under the Kennedy-Johnson and Johnson-Humphrey
Administrations, compared with 9 per cent in the
earlier period.
Unemployment rose 2 million from 1953 to 1960 and
has dropped 2 million since 1961 .
. . . people throughout the world are impressed by
the American economic miracle of the 1960s.
By making jobs for middle-class Americans secure;
prosperity has enabled us to launch a major effort on
the long ignored problems of job opportunities for the
disadvantaged.
The average American family of our time can live
as well in 1968 and still have enough left to buy a new
car out of its 1968 income ... or pay for a year in
college without dipping into savings and without
borrowing.
The Republicans gave us rising prices with unem
ployment and stagnation.
The Democrats have given us roughly the same price
rise with enormous growth in employment; in family
income and in the economy generally.
57
As the campaign progressed, so did the effort to tie
the economic record of the 1950s directly to Nixon. In
Pittsburgh in mid-September, Humphrey called for an examina
tion of the Nixon Republican record. He recalled that pay
checks increased more than three times faster during the
Democratic years than during the recession-ridden Republican
50s when Mr. Nixon was part of the Administration.
58
To
Humphrey, unemployment had risen during the Republican-Nixon
years and prosperity would disappear under Nixon-Republi-
89
cans.
59
In Cleveland, the Republicans, who always were
referred to as Nixon-Republicans, became Nixon-Agnew Repub
licans responsible for three recessions in eight years.
60
Humphrey strove to link Nixon and even Agnew with past slug
gish economic performance, but he did not even mention
Eisenhower in connection with those activities and policies.
The record of the '50s became a Nixon-Republican record and
not an Eisenhower record.
At the same time, Humphrey attempted to associate him
self with the general economic prosperity by attributing
that prosperity to Democratic policies and implying he had a
role in their formulation. In Sacramento he said, "I
believe in the Kennedy-Johnson-Humphrey economic policies of
the 1960s which raised personal income--after taxes--and
after cost of living increases--three times faster than dur
ing the Republican-Nixon years."
61
He referred to the '60s
as "the Kennedy-Johnson-Humphrey years" in Portland.
62
The
theme ran consistently throughout the campaign. The Nixon
Republicans were responsible for the sluggish economic per
formance of the '50s and that performance would be repeated
if Nixon was elected. The Democrats, meaning the triumvir
ate of Kennedy, Johnson, and Humphrey, had brought prosper
ity. Humphrey's election was necessary for continuation of
that prosperity.
In race relations, Humphrey symbolized continual
progress toward equality for minority groups and that the
federal government would work actively to assure that
progress. In addition to statements already cited, Humph-
90
rey, in Boston, supported the 1954 Supreme Court decision
(Brown vs. Board of Education) and the Civil Rights Act of
1964 and said "these policies are essential in building a
just and free America."
63
Freedom of choice regardless of
race was the foundation of both his housing and his urban
crisis positions.
When Humphrey discussed a variety of miscellaneous
concerns, he usually did so along with suggesting the appro
priate role the federal government should take in helping
ameliorate these concerns. For Humphrey, that role always
was a much expanded one for the federal government through
financing, study, or the creation of the proper incentives
for others to deal with these concerns.
Education, urban problems, and housing are examples of
the areas in which Humphrey recommended federal programs he
desired to hasten the dawning of his "New Day." Improvement
in the quality of education and improvement in the access to
that education were recurring themes throughout the cam
paign. The themes demonstrated both confidence in educa
tional institutions and the process of education as a vital
step in improving the quality of individual lives. Humphrey
declared early in the campaign that "Americans want to know
that their children will have the chance for a full educa
tion--and it is in our national interest that they do. I
believe it is time to assure every American four years of
college or advanced vocational training--according to his
91
ability to learn and not his ability to pay."
64
On
October 6, Humphrey issued a statement detailing his recom
mendations on education and the role of the federal govern
ment in achieving them:
1. Strengthen Federal support for all education ....
2. Extend the opportunity for preschool education to
every child.
3. Mount a massive and comprehensive effort to bring
equality of education opportunity to the poor or
handicapped child.
4. Help move to creative, year-round education.
5. Achieve desegregation not only in law but in fact.
6. Expand substantially our teacher training programs.
7. Triple the number of students in vocational educa
tion and improve greatly the quality of opportuni
ties available in it.
8. Guarantee to every young American full opportunity
for higher education limited onl y by the ability
to learn.
9. Mount a vigorous nationwide attack on illiteracy
through anecpanded Adult Basic Education program
and go beyond basic adult education with an Adult
Opportunity Act to help adult Americans continue
their education.
65
In Cincinnati on October 11, he repeated these plans and
goals and added to them the concept of open schools, open to
all, open to a variety of curriculum particularly public
service, and open all year round.
66
The role of the federal
government to Humphrey was not to control, but to expand
financial aid and incentives, and opportunities.
Humphrey communicated similar goals and programs in
regard to urban problems and housing. Again, Humphrey
advocated an expanded federal role. The highlights of his
detailed position paper on urban affairs, issue d September
17, included:
92
1. National definition of fundamental social, economic
and democratic objectives for the shaping of the
environment of the future.
2. Creation of a National Domestic Policy Council to
oversee the reorganization of the federal bureau
cracy to make it more responsive to the planning
and the development needs of the country.
3. A Marshall Plan for the Cities, based on self-help,
local initiative, coordinated planning and private
and public capital.
4. A federally subsidized National Urban Development
Bank to mobilize large amounts of private capital
for urban development.
67
The foundation of the position, as Humphrey put it, was "to
provide the choice of a satisfactory living environment for
all persons--regardless of race, ancestry, or place of
residence."
68
His position on housing expressed the same
philosophy: "The choice of housing type or location must
not be restricted by race, color or religion."
69
Humphrey
desired also to increase "the flow of housing capital," "to
acquire reserves of land for future public uses including
housing," "to make decent housing available to every Ameri
can family through various forms of assistance," "to modern
ize housing construction through federally assisted
research," and to simplify the administration of housing
programs.
7
° For Humphrey, the federal government was an
instrument that could do more, should do more, and would do
more.
In other areas of potential concern, Humphrey's commun
ication was highly similar. Humphrey developed or supported
programs designed to give the federal government an integral
role in the solution of social problems. The existing role
93
of the federal government was viewed as insufficient and
relatively inactive. The federal government, to Humphrey,
should facilitate social change by establishing goals, pro
viding financing, and providing incentives. Clearly, to
Humphrey, the government was an agency capable of much good,
and Humphrey and the Democrats would be the only agents to
employ it properly.
God- and Devil-Terms
Richard Weaver defines a God-term as an "Expression
about which all other expressions are ranked •... "
71
A
God-term, then is one that is at the peak of a hierarchy,
all others being subordinate to it and flowing from it. In
similar fashion, a devil-term is a term of repulsion. The
God-terms become terms of reverence such as progress inef-
ficient. Devil-terms are used to name those items that
should be rejected, such as un-American or prejudice. A
determination of Humphrey's God- and devil-terms will pro
vide an indication of the sense of the value ordering of
Humphrey.
There was a difference in the God- and devil-terms
Humphrey used in discussing domestic policy and those he
used in foreign policy. His God-terms in both areas of
discussion flow directly from his definition of the situa
tion as requiring a "New Day." In foreign policy the God
term was "New." His Vietnam initiatives were offered as new
94
and his urging of the ratification of the nuclear non
proliferation treaty was called a new opportunity for peace.
The "newness" of the approaches seemed almost more important
than the goals the approaches were designed to achieve. For
"New" to have been the God-term for Humphrey in foreign
policy is understandable. It reflects again the necessity
Humphrey felt to disassociate himself from Johnson in the
area of foreign policy. However, what was "New" for Humph
rey in Vietnam were not different grounds for a settlement,
but new approaches to achieve the old desired settlement.
Risk and de-Americanization became the new approaches. Uni
lateral withdrawal and escalation remained devil-terms.
In domestic policy, the God-term for Humphrey was pro
gress. In economics, progress would be obtained even if
some inflation had to be tolerated. Humphrey's position on
the economy was clear: (1) even allowing for inflation,
tremendous economic gains had been achieved under Democrats,
(2) viewed in perspective, inflation was not serious, and
(3) we ought to stress economic progress and search for ways
of controlling inflation.
Humphrey attempted to illustrate that economic progress
had been substantial even after inflation had been consid
ered. He compared real incomes during the eight Democratic
years as opposed to the previous Republican years. Specif
ically, he stressed the 32 per cent gain during the '60s as
compared to the 9 per cent gain experienced from 1952 to
95
1960. Accompanying that comparison usually came a listing
of the tangible benefits one could obtain with the addi
tional income, usually a new car or a year of college edu
cation.
The effort to put inflation into perspective followed
a similar strategy of comparing Democratic price performance
of the sixties with Republican price performance of the
fifties. For example, Humphrey said in Portland:
Contrary to Republican scare stories, there is no
major difference in our price record for the past seven
and a half years than in the preceding eight Republican
years.
Wholesale prices rose more under the Republicans--
9 per cent--as against only seven and a half per cent
in the Kennedy-Johnson-Humphrey years. Our most com
prehensive price index, the "GNP deflater," rose 17 per
cent during the eight Republican years and only 16 per
cent under the Democrats.
72
In a position paper released in mid-October, Humphrey
noted that "Even with the impact of the war, we had no
greater price rise between 1961 and 1968 than the Republi
cans had from 1953 to 1960."
73
In an interview, Humphrey
claimed "that Republicans gave us rising prices with unem
ployment and stagnation while we Democrats have given
roughly the same price rise with enormous growth in employ
ment, in family incomes, and in the economy generally."
7
'+
Always the identical tactic was used when he discussed
inflation. He asked voters to examine the entire Democratic
period, not just the immediate past period, and to compare
the Democratic pric~ performance to that of the Republican
96
years. The Democrats, according to Humphrey, did as well
on price stability without sacrificing employment, economic
growth, and prosperity. The choice was clearly implied:
Did voters wish to sacrifice economic prosperity to control
inflation or did they wish to continue prosperity and work
on controlling inflation?
The third aspect of Humphrey's strategy on inflation
was to stress economic progress as preferable to restrictive
measures to control inflation. This approach contrasted the
prosperity of the Democrats with the policies followed by
Republicans which contracted the economy. For example,
Humphrey said, "We will have full employment and economic
growth .... But we need not--and we will not--sacrifice
prosperity on the alter of out-dated Republican econom
ics."75 The ordering was clear. Progress, his key God
term, allowed for prosperity and full employment to follow.
These were much more important to Humphrey than controlling
inflation. Inflation was a devil-term, but not nearly so
objectionable as unemployment and stagnation.
Progress also was the God-term in other areas of
domestic concern. Humphrey urged progress in eliminating
the societal conditions that cause crime, and in improving
the ability of existing institutions and agencies to deal
with crime: Such progress would allow liberty and justice
also, concepts equally important to Humphrey as obedience to
the law and order in the society. In his nationwide televi-
97
sion address on crime, Humphrey said:
We have laws--and when I am President they will
be enforced.
We need order--and when I am President we will
have order.
But we also need individual liberty and justice,
and when I am President we will have liberty and jus
tice, too.
Any one who seriously believes that order can
exist without liberty and justice is tragically--even
dangerously--misguided.
76
Instead of "Law and Order," the report of Humphrey's task
force on the issue was called "Order and Justice." Humphrey
stressed justice rather than harsh enforcement of the law or
unduly long sentences for crimes. While he recognized the
problem of order brought about by increases in crime, he
identified the essential nature of that problem not to be
the laws, which he generally found adequate, but in the pro
vision of justice. Crime, to Humphrey, did not come about
because people lacked a sense of right or wrong, or because
they felt they would not be punished if caught. Crime
resulted primarily from societal conditions that needed to
be solved. In the meantime, Humphrey believed we needed to
improve our ability to provide enlightened law enforcement,
speedy and fair justice in the courts, and rehabilitation
for the convicted. To Humphrey, in 1968,
•.. civil peace is made up, in two equal parts, of
order and justice.
The two go together.
You can't separate them. And those who say you
98
can, would mislead you.
People mus~ obey the law. And the law must be
enforced.
At the same time, people must feel that the soci
ety law in which they live offers them justice in the
true sense.
So we have to keep moving on both fronts. We
can't let down on either.
77
In discussing the need for progress, Humphrey linked
race relations and law and order. Without social justice,
civil order could not be expected. The nation, as Humphrey
saw it, needed to move more rapidly toward social justice,
to providing a society of equal rights and opportunities to
all. The federal government had to be an active force to
provide the impetus and programs to assure that progress.
The Primary Motive
The final task in determining Humphrey's vocabulary of
motives is to determine which of the four motives character-
ized by Fisher best describes Humphrey's 1968 campaign com
munication. No single motive applies equally well to each
of the communications used as primary material in this
study. Instead, the 1968 campaign was considered a single
rhetorical act, and the motive most applicable to the entire
campaign was sought. Humphrey's communication in the 1968
campaign can best be viewed as a rhetoric of reaffirmation.
However, that portion of Humphrey's discourse dealing with
Vietnam strongly reflects a rhetoric of purification.
Purification of the image he had for voters in 1968 was a
99
necessary prerequisite to Humphrey pursuing a rhetoric of
reaffirmation. As discussed earlier in this chapter, Humph
rey was associated closely with Lyndon Johnson, an unpopular
president usually held responsible for an increasingly
unpopular war. The strategy of disassociation, limited to
Vietnam, was embodied in Humphrey's September 30 address.
The key element was that as President, Humphrey would
accept new risks to achieve peace including cessation of the
bombing of North Vietnam, Humphrey attempted to purify his
image as an extension of Lyndon Johnson by indicating his
policies would not necessarily be those of Johnson and by
proposing a specific step at least moderately different from
that which had been pursued.
To the degree that his efforts at purification were
successful, Humphrey was in a position to offer a rhetoric
of reaffirmation on remaining voter concerns. But the key
to his campaign call for a "New Day" depended on a rela
tively early end to the war in Vietnam. A "New Day" in this
nation was not likely until that conflict was resolved.
Humphrey could not be perceived by voters as offering much
hope for ending the war or bringing about a "New Day" until
his image was purified.
Fisher identifies as a possible archetypal pattern to
rhetorics of reaffirmation a "Christian life-renewal
theme."
78
Such a theme is more easily discernible in a
single rhetorical discourse than in a rhetorical campaign
100
consisting of many individual efforts. However, a semblance
of the theme emerges in Humphrey's communication. His reaf
firmation essentially offers a "New Day" to the American
people. This "New Day," or rebirth, will come about after
the end, or death, of the Vietnam war. The rebirth to
Humphrey, would allow continued economic prosperity. The
rebirth would gradually eliminate the social causes of most
crime and allow the criminal justice system to function more
efficiently. The rebirth would extend equal citizenship to
all without posing a threat to any. The federal government
was the agency to help achieve these goals. Thus, Humphrey
was reaffirming the importance and existence of prosperity.
He reaffirmed the belief that most citizens were law-abiding
unless circumstances forced them to be something else.
Humphrey reaffirmed that all citizens, regardless of race,
are entitled to equal opportunity. And he reaffirmed that
the basic function of government is to improve the quality
of life for individual members of the society.
Vocabulary of Motives
Motives are verbal justifications for acts. Mills pro
vides examples of such vocabularies. He offers that "under
the aegis of religious institutions, men use vocabularies of
moral motives: they call acts and programs 'good' and 'bad'
and impute these qualities to the soul."
79
Other groups
rely on a hedonistic language. For many, pleasure and pain
101
are accepted motives.
80
In determining the vocabulary of
motives of a presidential campaign, a political vocabulary
of motives is required. That vocabulary is a synthesis of
the previous analysis.
Humphrey's vocabulary of motives stressed the capabil
ity of the federal government as the agency able to solve
society's problems. His communication emphasized the mate
rial well-being of the individual. If some individuals were
unable to attain a satisfactory level of material well
being, then that was a problem for the society. If jobs
were not available, then the society had failed to create
sufficient jobs. If crime was rampant, then the society had
not eliminated the causes of crime. If race relations were
strained, it was because the society had failed to incorpo
rate all equally into the society without threatening
others. If the fault is the society's, then the solution to
the problem must rest with the collective arm of the soci
ety. The federal government, as Humphrey saw it, had a
responsibility to improve the life of its citizens. Pro
gress was measured by the problems that could be solved. In
domestic affairs, Humphrey employed a vocabulary of motives
consistent with a traditional liberal philosophy of govern-
-
ment. The function of government, to Humphrey, was to
improve the quality of life of its citizens.
In foreign affairs, Humphrey's vocabulary of motives
was one of peace. He desired peace in Vietnam, not victory.
102
Peace was more important than supremacy. Reduced military
action in Vietnam was justified in terms of peace. Discus
sion and agreements with the Soviets was justified in terms
of peace. Instead of principle, or victory, or protection
of interests, foreign policy actions were justified in terms
of peace. Even the disapproval of immediate withdrawal from
Vietnam, which clearly would have ended the fighting, was
justified on the grounds of long-term peace.
In Chapter V, the image developed by Humphrey in the
campaign of 1968 will be compared with Nixon's to determine
which candidate's image corresponded most with the image
held by voters in 1968.
103
FOOTNOTES
1
Hubert Humphrey, Remarks at Youngstown, Ohio, Novem
ber 2, 1968, text supplied by the Democratic National Com-
mittee, p. 4.
2
C. Wright Mills, "Situated Actions and Vocabularies
of Notices," Power, Politics, and People: The Collected
Essays of C. Wright Mills, ed. Irving L. Horowitz (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1963), p. 6.
3
Theodore H. White, The Making of the President 1968
(New York: Atheneum Publishers, 1969), pp. 270-271.
4
The Acceptance Speech of Hubert H. Humphrey, p. 5.
5
The Acceptance Speech of Hubert H. Humphrey, p. 5.
6
The Acceptance Speech ot Hubert H. Humphrey, p. 5.
7
Wilmington, Delaware, September 12, 1968, text sup-
plied by the Democratic National Committee, p. 1.
8
Wilmington, Delaware, p. ~-
9Wilmington, Delaware, p. 3. Ellipses are in original
text.
10
rbid., Wilmington, Delaware, p. 3.
11
Remarks to the A.F.L.-C.I.O. state convention, Min
neapolis, Minnesota, September 24, 1968, text supplied by
the Democratic National Committee, p. 1.
12
Remarks to the A.F.L.-C.I.O. state convention, Sacra
mento, California, September 25, 1968, text supplied by the
Democratic National Committee, p. 2.
13
Remarks to the Commonwealth Club, San Francisco,
California, September 26, 1968, text supplied by the Demo
cratic National Committee, p. 8.
14
Address to the Nation on NBC-TV, Salt Lake City, Sep
tember 30, 1968, text supplied by the Democratic National
Committee, p. 1.
104
..
15
Position Paper on Youth, date uncertain, but probably
October 24, 1968, text supplied by the Democratic National
Committee, p. 2.
16
Remarks to the Southern California Clergy, October
24, 1968, text supplied by Democratic National Committee,
p. 1.
17
CBS News, Face the Nation, 1968, Volume 11 (New York:
Holt Information Systems, 1972), p. 305.
1 8
Address to the Nation on NBC-TV, September 30, 1968,
p. 2.
1 9
Address to the Nation on NBC-TV, September 30, 1968,
p. 2.
2 0
Address to the Nation on NBC-TV, September 30, 1968,
p. 2.
21
Address to the Nation on NBC-TV, September 30, 1968,
p. 5.
22
Address to the Nation on NBC-TV, September 30, 1968,
p. 5.
23
Address to the Nation on NBC-TV, September 30, 1968,
p. 5.
2 4
Address to the Nation on NBC-TV, September 30, 1968,
p. 6 •
25
Wilmington, Delaware, September 12, 1968, p. 1. The
occasion was the dedication of a bridge which probably
explains the metaphor.
26
Statement by Hubert Humphrey, Washington, D.C., Sep
tember 15, 1968, text provided by the Democratic National
Committee, p. 1.
27
Statement before the Zionist Organization of America,
Washington, D.C., September 18, 1968, text provided by the
Democratic National Committee, p. 2 •
28
Statement on the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty,
Washington, D.C., September 18, 1968, p. 2.
29
Statement on the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty,
p. 2.
105
3
°For example, in Boston, September 19, Louisville,
September 20, in Columbus, Ohio, September 21, in Minneapo
lis, September 24, in Sacramento, September 25, in San
Francisco, September 26, his address to the nation televised
from Salt Lake on September 30, and in Los Angeles on Octo
ber 24. Texts of remarks provided by Democratic National
Committee.
31
Statement on the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty,
September 18, 1968, pp. 1-2.
32
Statement before the Zionist Organization of America,
PP. 1-2.
33
These programs were advocated at various times during
the campaign and are part of the public record.
34
Remarks before the American Legion, New Orleans, Sep
tember 11, 1968, text supplied by the Democratic National
Conu'"lli t tee, p. 3.
35
Remarks before the American Legion, p. 3.
36
Remarks before the American Legion, p. 4.
37
Remarks before the American Legion, p. 4.
38
Remarks before the B'nai B'rith, Washington, D.C.,
September 8, 1968, text supplied by the Democratic National
Committee, p. 1. This exact phrase or one highly similar
was used also in Pittsburgh, September 14, in Springfield,
Illinois, September 20, in Louisville the same day, and in a
position paper issued on youth on October 24.
39
Remarks before the B'nai B'rith, p. 3.
40
Remarks before the B'nai B'rith, p. 3.
41
"A New Day: Toward Excellent Education for All
America," released in Washington, D.C., October 6, text sup
plied by the Democratic National Committee, p. 10.
42
"A New Day: Toward Excellent Education for All
America," p. 10.
43
Remarks at Harlingen, Texas, October 23, 1968, text
supplied by the Democratic National Committee, p. 2.
44
Remarks before the B'nai B'rith, p. 6.
45
Kenneth Burke, A Grammar of Motives and a Rhetoric of
Motives (Cleveland: World Publishing Company, 1961), p.
Vl.l. •
106
4 6
Address to the Nation on NBC-TV, September 30, 1968,
p. 4.
47
Address to the Nation on NBC-TV, September 30, 1968,
p. 4 .
48
Address to the Nation on NBC-TV, September 30, 1968,
p. 2.
49
"A Strategy for Peace," Columbus, Ohio, September 21,
1960, text supplied by the Democratic National Committee,
pp. 4-5.
5011
A New Strategy for Peace," San Francisco, Califor
nia, September 26, 1968, text supplied by the Democratic
National Committee, pp. 2-4.
51
"Law and Order," television address, October 14,
1968, text supplied by the Democratic National Committee,
p. 5.
52
Remarks before the American Legion, p. 3.
53
"Summary of the Report of the Vice President's Task
Force on Order and Justice," released September 16, 1968,
text supplied by the Democratic National Committee. Humph
rey endorsed the report in a news release from the Committee
dated the same, p. 1.
54
"Order and Justice Task Force," released September
16, 1968, text supplied by the Democratic National Commit
tee, p. 20.
55
Remarks before the American Legion, p. 4.
56
Remarks to the Economic Club, Detroit, Michigan,
October 17, 1968, p. 7. This identical position also was
outlined in his "Position Paper on Economic Policy," Octo
ber 14, 1968.
57
Economic Statement, issued in Washington, D.C. and
Waverly, Minnesota, text supplied by the Democratic National
Committee, pp. 1-4.
58
Remarks in Pittsburgh, Pa., September 14, 1968, text
supplied by the Democratic National Committee, p. 2.
59
Remarks in Pittsburgh, Pa., p. 3.
60
Remarks at a Democratic Steer Roast, Cleveland, Ohio,
September 22, 1968, text supplied by the Democratic National
Committee, p. 3.
107
61
Remarks at the State A.F.L.-C.I.O. convention, p. 1.
62
Remarks at the Portland City Club, Portland, Oregon,
September 27, 1968, text supplied by the Democratic National
Committee, p. 5.
63
Remarks to a Downtown Rally, Boston, Massachusetts,
September 19, 1968, p. 3.
64
Remarks at a Democratic Steer Roast, p. 2, and
Remarks to the Minnesota State A.F.L.-C.I.O. convention,
p. 3.
65
News Release, Democratic National Committee, Washing
ton, D.C., October 6, 1968, pp. 1-2.
66
Remarks to the National Newspaper Association, Cin
cinnati, Ohio, October 11, 1968, pp. 3-4.
67
News Release, Rochester, New York, September 17,
1968, text supplied by the Democratic National Committee,
p. 1.
68
"Position Paper on Urban Crisis," Rochester, New
York, September 17, 1968, text supplied by the Democratic
National Committee, p. 1.
69
"Housing the American Family," position paper
released probably on October 25, 1968, text supplied by the
Democratic National Committee, p. 1.
7011
Housing the American Family," pp. 1-2.
71
Richard Weaver, The Ethics of Rhetoric (Chicago:
Henry Regnery Company, 1953), p. 212.
72
Remarks at the Portland City Club, Portland, Oregon,
September 27, 1968, text supplied by the Democratic National
Committee, p. 5.
73
"Position Paper on Economic Policy: A Program to
Control Inflation," released October 14, 1968, text supplied
by the Democratic National Committee, p. 2.
74
"Where They Stand: Humphrey and Nixon Answer MW's
Questions," Merchandising Week, October 14, 1968, p. 22.
75
Youngstown, Ohio, November 2, 1968, p. 3.
7611
Law and Order," p. 5.
108
7 7
Ibid . , p. 6 .
7 8
Fisher, "A Motive View of Communication," p. 134.
7 9 •
Mi 11 s , p • 4 51 .
80
Ibid.
109
CHAPTER IV
RICHARD M. NIXON'S COMMUNICATED IMAGE IN 1968
Our country today is a nation of wealth, of
power, and of paradox. We find our people affluent
and afflicted, free and yet frustrated. Government
is larger and more powerful than ever, and less
effective. The people are more affluent than ever,
and seem less fulfilled. We daily exceed the wild-
est dreams of our ancestors in productivity, wealth
and power. Yet we feel an undermining current of
despair, as if the dreams were better than their
achievement or as if the cause of fulfilling our
material dreams, we failed the American dream.
1
This chapter delineates the image Richard Nixon pro
jected during the 1968 campaign. As in the previous chap
ter, Nixon's vocabulary of motives shall be constructed by
determining his "definition" of the situation, by discov
ering which of the elements of Burke's pentad dominated his
communication, by locating his God and devil terms, and by
determining the basic rhetorical motive underlying his
communications.
Nixon's Definition:
A definition is sought of how Nixon perceived the
United States and what he felt was necessary for the future.
While Humphrey perceived the need for and offered a "New
Day," Nixon perceived a serious lack of leadership existing
110
and offered as his essentializing definition, "New Leader
ship." This was not a campaign slogan, nor did Nixon use
such terminology when he discussed each area of public con
cern, but the thrust of his campaign clearly was one in
which he claimed the quality of leadership was dismal, that
new leadership was necessary, and that he could provide that
leadership.
His call for new leadership began with Vietnam as
almost everything did in the campaign of 1968. Nixon main
tained throughout the campaign that neither he nor any other
candidate should make suggestions concerning what policy
should be followed in order to encourage a negotiated set
tlement. Nixon believed "that President Johnson should have
absolute freedom of action to negotiate what he finds is the
proper kind of settlement. And, under the circumstances, no
one on the outside should say that he should agree to this
or that. That would mean that the enemy would wait for the
presidential candidate to be elected rather than negotiate
with the President we've got."
2
In following this strategy,
Nixon was not being vague in his failure to offer specific
policy alternatives. From his perspective, he could do
nothing else in the best interests of the country. In a
national radio address a week before the election, he said:
..• one of the most persistent pieces of advice I
have gotten has been to spell out in detail the steps
by which I would move toward peace in Vietnam, and the
precise terms on which I would settle.
From the standpoint of a political campaign, this
111
could be very useful. But from the standpoint of the
national interest, it could be disastrous.
Consider what could happen if a candidate for the
Presidency detailed in advance--for the information of
the enemy as well as of the American people--the steps
he intended to follow.
Immediately, every one of those steps that
involved actions by the u. s. would become unavailable
for bargaining purposes. The candidate would be trad
ing for votes what our negotiators could otherwise
trade for lives.
3
His failure to make specific recommendations about
United States' policy in Vietnam was more than a campaign
strategy. On October 16, Nixon, along with Humphrey and
Wallace, had been informed of secret negotiations under way
in Paris, and had been asked by Johnson to drop Vietnam from
public debate. Apparently Nixon did so except for general
remarks.~
Nixon attempted to identify himself with efforts to
gain peace. He planned to do nothing during the campaign
that would weaken or delay our chances for a negotiated set
tlement and peace. But Nixon needed also to disassociate
himself from the conduct of a war that so seriously had
divided the country. He could not do that by questioning
the efficacy of the United States' initial involvement or by
defining the war in a particular way, such as a civil war or
a war of aggression. Such a definite stand probably would
have alienated as many voters as it may have pleased.
Rather than question individual strategic or tactical deci
sions, Nixon instead discussed the war and United States'
112
involvement from a broad perspective. He questioned why the
most powerful nation in the world had not been able to bring
the war to satisfactory conclusion. He summarized his
criticisms by claiming "that never has so much military and
economic and diplomatic power been used so ineffectively as
by this administration in conducting the war in Vietnam."
5
Nixon claimed "we should turn to new leadership and I think
a new economic, diplomatic and military policy can bring a
negotiated end to the war on an honorable basis."
6
Often
implied was that the situation was analogous to Korea where
new leadership under the Eisenhower administration, had
ended the Korean War, and that would be the case again.
Having defined the situation as one requiring new lead
ership, Nixon asked the American voters to make a choice.
He maintained the choice was not between specific policy
alternatives, but between symbolic alternatives. The voter
had to decide, according to Nixon, "whether the war can bet
ter be ended by an Administration hobbled by a legacy of
past failure, or by a new Administration neither defending
the old mistakes nor bound by the old record."
7
Nixon attempted to symbolically represent change, to
symbolize an end to the frustration over the war that had
divided the country. Because he too desired an end to the
war, he would not discuss specific steps to be taken. His
election would bring new leadership with the opportunity
for a new approach, and a change of policy.
113
Unlike Hubert Humphrey, Richard Nixon emphasized for
eign policy concerns. His perception of the world was not a
pleasant one. To Nixon, the international position of the
United States had continually declined during the eight
years of Democrats in the White House. Nixon had a favorite
way of putting it:
Look clear around this great wide world of ours.
Go home tonight, put a map of the world up on the wall.
Stand back ten paces, five paces, throw darts at it.
I do not think you will be able to hit a place in
the world where we aren't worse off than we were eight
years ago when our administration left Washington, D.C.
whether it's in Latin America, whether it's in Europe,
whether it's in Asia. We find that American foreign
policy has not met the challenge of our times. It no
longer speaks to our times, and so we need a new
policy.
8
The deterioration in the United States' position, according
to Nixon, occurred because the United States had lost its
ability to lead. United States' leadership was questioned
because of the nation's inability to function well domes
tically. Nixon linked domestic and foreign affairs as
symptomatic of the same problem--a lack of leadership.
Because the nation was troubled domestically by inflation,
crime, and disorder, other nations seriously questioned the
ability of the United States to lead the world. This theme
ran through Nixon's entire campaign. Typical of the manner
in which he developed the theme, was his response to a ques
tion during a citizen interview format program from Dallas:
When a nation can't manage its own economy, and
our dollar has lost confidence around the world, as you
know that was a situation in the spring months, when we
114
have an unprecedented basic lawlessness in this country
and a lack of respect for law, the inevitable effect of
that, in Europe and in Asia and in other countries, is
to look at the United States of America and think that
something has gone wrong. They lose respect for us.
9
Rather than attack Humphrey or the Johnson administra-
tion about a specific foreign policy action, or criticize
the quality of United States' relations with a specific
nation, Nixon chose to examine the role of the United States
in the world from a broad perspective. Viewed from that
perspective, the United States no longer was in the position
of leadership in which it had been eight years previously.
Nixon attempted to demonstrate that the lack of leader
ship in international affairs was a natural consequence of
that same leadership's failure to handle domestic issues
properly. This was true particularly in economic policy.
Leadership, according to Nixon, that could not keep the
domestic economy healthy had lost any basis for respect and
leadership internationally. Because the leadership could
not set domestic priorities and relied on the federal gov
ernment to solve all problems, inflation had resulted. As a
result, Nixon thought international investors had lost
confidence in the dollar, and, unwilling to hold dollars,
were turning them in for our gold.
10
He viewed this as
symptomatic of the lack of respect for and confidence in
United States' leadership that was negatively influencing
the nation's position internationally.
The working man in America not only had been forgotten
115
by the current leadership, according to Nixon, but he had
also been sacrificed by that leadership's emphasis on solv
ing the problems of others. In a time "when the national
focus is concentrated upon the unemployed, the impoverished
and the dispossessed, the working Americans have become the
forgotten Americans."
11
As Nixon saw it, "Government in
recent years has broken faith with the American workingman;
it has violated the terms of its unwritten contract with the
American people."
12
Inflation, caused by an administration
of which Humphrey was a key member, and whose economic
policies Humphrey defended, was the obvious evil. The work
ingman and the retired workingman, according to Nixon, were
being sacrificed by "the glaring mismanagement of fiscal and
monetary affairs by this administration."
13
Nixon's view of the economy differed significantly from
Humphrey's, partially because of the nature of the evidence
he chose to stress. While Humphrey emphasized the entire
eight years Democrats had controlled the White House, Nixon
constantly focused attention on the leadership of the past
four years when Humphrey had been Vice President: "Since
the last election, the average American worker has lost more
than $1,000 in his income through inflation, more than $200
in his cash savings, more than $1,000 in the value of the
insurance policy he purchased for his family."
14
As Nixon
wished the electorate to perceive the problem, "the average
American workingman has been on a federal treadmill. Every
116
pay raise he has won has been wiped out by rising prices and
rising taxes."
15
Nixon asserted often that in spite of wage
increases, the real income of the average factory worker had
actually declined sixty-three cents a week in the past three
years.
16
Nixon thought the present leadership had failed to set
appropriate priorities: "The difficulty with U.S. policies
... is that we have been scatter-gunning, shot-gunning .
. . . We need to rifle-shot. We need to go in quite
directly to those areas that have the highest priorities and
we need to tap out those where the priorities should be
low."
17
Nixon believed that his new leadership would deal
effectively with the situation: "The problem is difficult,
but I think that if I have the opportunity I will know how
to cut and where to cut in a way that will put first things
first."
18
Leadership had failed most in dealing with law and
order. Existing leadership had been helpless while crime
skyrocketed; new leadership, according to Nixon, would
restore freedom from fear. The nation had been better,
according to Nixon, "when there was respect for legitimate
authority on American campuses and respect for the rule of
law in American hearts."
19
For Nixon it was the darkest
"night of the spirit" through which the nation had ever
passed.
20
The problem of law and order was designated by
Nixon as his top domestic priority.
21
117
During the campaign, Nixon emphasized the rapid
increase in the amount of crime and indicated the worst
crime situation in the country was in Washington, D. C.,
where responsibility for law enforcement solely was that of
the executive branch. Riots in over three hundred cities
in the last four years had taken two hundred lives. Seven
thousand had been injured. Under the Democrats, twelve
thousand had been killed in violent crimes, two hundred
thousand hospitalized, and over one hundred billion dollars
had been lost. Crimes of violence had almost doubled.
22
Nixon characterized Washington, D. C. as the "Crime Capi
to l ";23 there crimes of violence had almost tripled, up 175
per cent during the Democratic administrations. In Washing
ton, scrip was used on buses, churches were closing immedi
ately after services, felonies were occurring at the rate of
one per every 16 people, and "a violent mob burned down
great sections of America's capitol--something that hasn't
been done to Washington, D.C. since British troops left 145
years ago."
24
The problems of law and order were largely a function
of the quality of national leadership. According to Nixon,
"The Presidency changes the attitude toward respect of law
and the priorities."
25
Nixon believed the President could
establish through the Attorney General an entirely new
attitude toward law and order.
26
The existing administra
tion "has stood helplessly by as crime has increased ten
118
times as fast as population; new leadership is going to
restore freedom from fear in this nation."
27
Nixon criticized the quality of leadership for separat
ing Blacks from the rest of the society by doing things for
them rather than encouraging Blacks to do things for them
selves. While affirming that "it is essential that we pro
vide for the Negro what he does not have today,"
28
Nixon
indicated that present programs were "oriented too much to
doing things for the Negro, making him feel inferior, making
him in effect, part of a colony within a class apart. And
what we have to do is orient our programs more toward help
ing the Negro do things for himself so he can stand with
pride with others, as part of the main street of America,
with the piece of the action."
29
Nixon discussed directly the role of the President in
the affairs of the nation. Nixon thought the President was
important symbolically in that citizens needed to identify
not with each piece of legislation proposed or with each
appointment made, but with the kind of society the President
represents and envisions. Nixon recognized that "Only the
President can hold out a vision of the future and rally the
people behind it.
1130
The task of the President, as Nixon
saw it, was "to lead, not to administer .•. "
32
He
intended "to marshall the moral authority of that office to
the fullest, to set priorities, to point out where the needs
are, to encourage and reward citizen efforts to meet those
119
needs."
33
The President must be ''the spokesman for the real
sentiment and purpose of the country."
34
Nixon believed the
President's "mind and attention must be left clear to deal
with those problems where only he can provide the leader-
h
, n3S
sip . ...
The Application of the Pentad
A natural extension of Nixon's definition of the situa
tion as one requiring new l eadership is that the agent,
rather than any other element of the pentad, should be per
ceived as dominating the situation. Leadership is a human
quality and thus must reflect an emphasis on agent, or who
did it or who should do it. Throughout the campaign, Nix-
on's communication, unlike that of Humphrey's, stressed the
importance of the agent.
The problems of Vietnam existed, according to Nixon,
not because of an inappropriate purpose or because incorrect
policies (acts) had been undertaken. Neither had it been
necessarily wrong to commit troops (agency) to fight in
Vietnam, nor was the nature of the war (scene) such that it
prevented an acceptable solution. The problems of the war
arose because the agents had erred in their handling of the
war. Nixon described the conduct of the war as
a sad chronicle of misjudgments--misjudgments of the
requirements of guerilla war, misjudgments of the ene
my's stamina and will, misjudgments of how to use
America's power effectively.
It is a history of a lack of candor at home and a
lack of leadership abroad.
120
Effective American leadership would have united
the free world in support of South Vietnam's struggle.
It would have isolated Hanoi, not Washington. This
kind of leadership would have been worth whole divi
sions of troops.
Greater candor at home would have spared our
nation much of the bitterness and division that the war
has brought.
36
Nixon questioned not the motives of the Johnson administra
tion, but its ability.
As peace talks were under way during the campaign and
Johnson specifically requested the Vietnam debate to be
removed from the campaign so as not to damage secret nego-
tiations under way, all Nixon could do was describe gener
ally the nature of a settlement that would be acceptable to
him and should be acceptable to the country. The nature of
settlement was quite similar to that which the Johnson
administration had been attempting to achieve. But Nixon
discussed the parameters of the settlement as if they could
be determined by him, rather than by the nature of the war.
Nixon would not impose a coalition government on the South
Vietnamese, for that could be interpreted as a victory for
aggression and a defeat for the United States. Any govern
ment chosen by free elections would be satisfactory, and all
elements could participate in those elections if they first
agreed not to employ the use of force.
37
Whatever settle
ment was to be reached need not involve conquering North
Vietnam, but the settlement could not be one which might
easily be interpreted as an American defeat. For that
121
reason, an honorable end could not be achieved by a precip
itate withdrawal of American troops. Any settlement of the
war, Nixon insisted, should reduce the chances of war and
increase the chances for peace in the future.
38
The key is
not whether these recommendations represented new policies;
but that Nixon indicated their chances for success depended
on the agents attempting to implement them.
Because Nixon stressed the agents of the Democratic
administration had acted incorrectly, the problems in inter
national relations were many. Peace was not closer in the
Middle East because the United States had not kept pace with
the Soviet Union's introduction of sophisticated weapons to
the area, and because the hunger and misery of the Arab
world had not been eradicated.
39
Castro was continuing to
export violence and revolution because the United States had
"talked tough and walked on eggshells";
40
as a result
efforts "to boycott his regime •.• met with minimal suc
cess ••• western nations have all but ignored our leader
ship in this."
41
To Nixon, N.A.T.O. was weakened and its
future was uncertain.
42
In Latin America, the Alliance for
Progress was in trouble: "Economic and social development
has not kept pace with demands, and democratic progress has
been only halting. The already ominous gulf between North
and South America continues to widen at an alarming pace."
43
The United States, according to Nixon, was not keeping up
with the Soviet Union in terms of military preparedness.
122
The Soviet Union already had surpassed the United States in
naval power.
44
The United States' overall military superi
ority, important in discouraging Soviet expansion, had van
ished. Without such military superiority, the negotiating
position of the United States was weakened.
45
A Nixon
administration would "restore our objective of clear-cut
military superiority--meaning by this the aggregate that
constitutes real superiority rather than competition weapon
by weapon."
46
In stressing agent, Nixon personalized the foreign
policy of the United States. "I am going to re-examine our
posture all around the world. Our posture in terms of our
commitments around the world. That's why I said earlier
that the United States, in terms of foreign aid, and in
terms of loans and otherwise simply can't assume the burden
that it's presently assuming in helping other nations."
47
Nixon indicated that he would directly influence the foreign
policy of other nations: "It's time that other nations
in the free world assumed more of their share of the burden
of defending Freedom around the world, and we will have that
kind of a foreign policy."
48
He called for an increased
role in aid and defense by the free countries of Asia, for
the Europeans to increase their aid to the underdeveloped
countries,
49
and for other nations generally to increase
their act.ivity: "Economically, diplomatically, militarily,
the time has come to insist that others must assume the
123
responsibilities which are rightfully theirs. We must do
our full share. But the free world can no more afford to
base its security and prosperity on a system of permanent
welfarism abroad than the progress of our own people can be
based on permanent welfarism here at home."
51
Because a new
administration would offer new leadership, the United States
would be able to influence others to share the burdens. In
return, the United States would work more closely with them
in the formulation and execution of policy. For example,
Nixon expressed concern over Europe's views concerning the
nuclear non-proliferation treaty. While he approved the
nature of the treaty, he questioned the timing of signing it
while Soviet troops occupied Czechoslovakia.
51
Nixon stressed the agent in domestic economic affairs
also. The individual, rather than the government, should
determine spending priorities. He declared "It is time we
left more of the people's money in the people's hands--to
spend as they see fit and not as a big government spender
sees fit."
52
Less federal spending and fewer federal taxes
were his goals. He urged a balanced budget, if not every
year, at least over a term of years.
53
Nixon hoped to
accomplish the goals in three ways. First, clear priorities
would be established. High priority areas to Nixon included
benefit programs for the elderly and aid to education.
54
A
second way government spending was to be reduced was by
increasing government efficiency. Nixon put it succinctly:
124
"I think we need more economy in government and less govern
ment in the economy."
55
The key to controlling inflation
was sound fiscal management, appropriate tax and credit
policies, and prudent use of government funds.
56
He was
convinced his administration could "keep the economy going
at a high rate without the inflation which this administra
tion has brought."
57
Third, Nixon indicated he would get
people off the welfare roles and onto payrolls. Typical of
his statements on this issue were his comments made in a
national radio broadcast on October 21:
Let's remember that there appear to be at least
two forces at work in the mind of the man concerned
about the security of his job and his job rights. One
is to protect what he has, which is human enough; and
the other is to resent the fellow who he believes is
taking a free ride on the taxes that he, the worker,
pays.
As we increase the number of jobs in the next
administration, and end the fear of job displacement,
we will turn that natural resentment into a construc
tive channel. Those truly in need of welfare will
receive welfare; the man in need of a job will get off
welfare and get on a job .
58
Nixon saw this being accomplished by an expanded economy
that would provide more jobs, and by incentives to private
industry to retrain and hire more people.
59
When Nixon discussed law and order, his emphases on the
individual emerged clearly. Contrary to Humphrey, Nixon
believed crime was not caused primarily by social condi
tions:
•.• Mr. Humphrey has exaggerated and overemphasized
poverty in this country as a cause of crime. Cer
tainly, conditions of poverty are the traditional
125
breeding ground of criminals--and we should not dimin
ish our efforts to eliminate those conditions.
But contrary to what this Administration believes
and preaches, the war on poverty is not a war on crime
and it is no substitute for a war on crime.
Poverty cannot explain the dangerously accelerat
ing use of drugs among the teenagers of affluent Amer
ica. Poverty cannot explain the rising growth of
crimes and violence and larceny among the youth of
suburban America. Poverty cannot explain the 187%
increase in daytime burglaries in this country in the
last seven years.
In every year since World War II the Gross Nation
al Product of this country has expanded and personal
incomes have risen. Yet, in the last eight years,
while the GNP has continued to expand and while
millions of Americans--because of that economic growth
--have crossed the poverty line into the affluent
society--major crimes have almost doubled in America.
60
Individuals, according to Nixon, were responsible for their
own acts. To have argued that the scene was primarily
responsible, as Humphrey did, was to argue that the society
was responsible.
While Nixon claimed some agents were responsible for
crime, other agents had made it more difficult to deal with
crime. Nixon did not attack the Supreme Court directly as
an institution, or an "agency" by which law, order, and
justice were maintained, but instead attacked the errors
that had been made by this particular court, or in other
words, the present agents of the court. The court errone
ously had made decisions which made the task of enforcing
the law more difficult. While he was careful not to attack
the motivation of the court, Nixon was clear in indicating
it had erred. In so doing, the "peace forces," according to
126
Nixon, had been weakened. If necessary, Nixon would recom
mend legislation to correct the imbalance he perceived.
Only in that manner did he believe citizens could be assured
that the hands of the police would not be tied in dealing
with criminals.
The most important aspect of Nixon's communication
concerning race relations during the 1968 campaign was that
it almost was non-existent. Nixon did not speak of uniting
Blacks and Whites, nor did he offer a single government pro
gram designed to improve the quality of life of the Blacks
or other minorities. The nearest he came to recommending
such a program was to suggest that incentives should be
given to private industry to help train the poor and the
Blacks so they might enter the job market. That approach,
however, would be instituted only once the working man had
more job security from an expanding economy.
61
This sugges
tion was not aimed specifically at minority groups, but at
all who were ill-prepared to enter the job market. Nixon
did not condemn any existing programs designed to aid the
minorities, but neither did he praise them or urge their
expansion and improvement. Essentially, Nixon conveyed an
attitude of hands off, that Blacks and other minorities
would be the beneficiaries of no special legislation or
programs not offered to the entire population. The emphasis
was on individuals, no matter what their race, being respon
sible for their own welfare.
127
Nixon desired the agency, federal government, to change
from an active force in encouraging school integration to a
secondary role as the enforcer of existing laws. On several
occasions, Nixon opposed the withholding of federal funds
from local school districts in order to encourage racial
balance in the schools.
62
Nixon distinguished between overt
segregation and racial imbalance and saw a different role
for the federal government in each situation:
In the first there is a deliberate policy of keep
ing the races from mixing in the schools; negroes are
just not allowed into some white schools, for example.
But "racial imbalance" is used to describe a situation
where the schools are open to all races, but where-
usually because of residence--it turns out that one
race or another predominates in a given school. What I
am against is using the threat of withdrawing federal
funds to force a local school board to balance its
schools racially, by busing children all over a city,
for instance. If the local school board thinks busing
is best, that's up to them. But federal money--or the
threat of its withdrawal--should not be used to force
them. On the other hand, in the case of a deliberate
policy of segregation, the executure is clearly obliged
by Congress and the courts to withdraw federal funds.
Of course, I would execute that law in order to end
overt segregation.
63
The thrust of Nixon's position was that as opportunities
improved for all, so would they for Blacks. Such a view is
consistent with an emphasis on agent. An active, aggressive
role for the federal government in promoting improved race
relations was not envisioned by Nixon. Nor does it appear
that Nixon saw Blacks as having unique problems that differ
entiated them from the rest of the society. To have done so
would have emphasized scene as the controlling element.
Nixon emphasized the worth and the importance of the
128
individual. To Nixon, "We live in a nation where men with
vision, energy and determination can bring about vast
changes."
64
He believed the greatest untapped resources in
the nation were "the energies and the spirit of the American
people themselves."
65
Nixon perceived that these citizens
were prepared to start exercising that spirit: " •.. there
is a spirit in the air ••• across this land today the for
gotten Americans, the silent, quiet Americans, are waking up
and speaking up."
66
These "forgotten Americans," according
to Nixon, were speaking up so they could play a larger role
in determining the nature of their own lives. As Nixon
said, "I believe that the American spirit is reappearing now
to demand the return of that personal freedom."
67
To Nixon,
"the crucial question our history now poses for us is not so
much what services are to be provided, but rather who should
make the decisions. Should the decision be made and the
priorities be set by the citizens and their elected local
officials, or by the government in Washington and its
appointed bureaucrats?"
68
When government action was necessary, functions were to
be turned over to state and local governments. The federal
government would enter only when a need existed that could
not be solved in other ways. Local control was important to
Nixon. In education, with as much responsibility as
possible being delegated to the local level, bloc grants
were to be used. To deal with pollution, regional policies,
129
to be coordinated with federal policies, were recommended.
Revenue sharing was advocated, "For we do not believe that a
man sitting in an office in Washington knows more about the
needs of the people than our governors and our mayors and
our local leaders."
69
Federal income tax credits for taxes
paid at the state and local level were suggested to enable
"state and local governments to increasingly finance their
own activities."
7
;
Programs that could be handled by private industry
should be handled there, in Nixon's view, with the federal
government offering incentives and acting only as a cata-
lyst. "We will enlist that great e ngine of private ente r -
prise, in training the unemployed, in building the housing,
in rebuilding the cities of America. That~s the way to do
it and that's the area in which we will move."
71
Two exam
ples illustrate Nixon's view. First, he recommended ending
the Job Corps:
I think we ought to get rid of the Job Corps pro
gram and substitute for it a program that we in the
House, the Republicans in the House, and I supported it
also, called the Human Investment Act in which we will
provide a tax credit to private industry to train the
unemployed for jobs that really exist in the industries
... in which they are trained. I think that gives
you an indication of the approaches that I would
make.
7 2
Second, while expressing concern for the necessity of high
standards of health care and making good health care avail
able to all, Nixon wished to keep the federal role to a
minimum: "I would prefer that, where feasible, there be
less rather than more federal involvement in the health care
130
area, with as much responsibility as possible being dele
gated to state and local groups who are the closest to the
problems.''
73
In a response to a question concerning the
role of government in medicine, Nixon said, "It should serve
as a catalyst and supplement private efforts only as
needed."
74
Nixon believed increased voluntary effort would be
helpful because "As government has strained to do more, our
people have felt constrained to do less."
75
Nixon noted,
however, that the voluntary way would not work unless the
government was committed to it. If government was not com
mitted, the result would be "a bureaucratic attitude that
either ignores voluntary efforts or tries to subordinate
them to federal programs."
76
As President, Nixon would
"expect federal departments concerned with social problems
all to be actively dedicated to the stimulation of new
voluntary efforts ... It's time for the federal establish
ment to winnow out its own programs, and determine those for
which primary reliance can be placed on voluntary efforts.
Then it must encourage voluntary organizations to move in
and take over."
77
God- and Devil-Terms
Burke suggests that the emphasis upon the agent in
one's motive represents the functioning of a philosophy of
idealism.
78
Such a ' philosophy is called idealistic by Burke
for it implies that individuals are capable of creating and
131
modifying the world in which they live.7
9
Given that
orientation, we should expect "God" and "devil" terms in
Nixon's communication which reflect a view of the individual
ultimately responsible for his or her own well-being.
In both foreign policy and domestic policy, the God
terms were those that describe positive human attributes.
Leadership and strength were the God-terms most applicable
to Nixon's communication about foreign policy. A President
with qualities of leadership would be able to take new steps
to end the war, to use the strength of the United States to
gain meaningful negotiations. The devil-terms were the
opposite of these. Inability to lead and weakness were
negative human attributes that Nixon used as devil-terms.
While Humphrey stressed achieving a framework in which the
nations of the world could work together, Nixon stressed
achieving a position where the United States was preeminent.
Only then could the United States negotiate with others
favorably from a position of strength. Negotiation from a
position of strength would allow the United States to
determine its own future in international affairs, rather
than being subjected to the will of other nations.
The overriding God-term for Nixon in domestic affairs
was personal freedom. Personal freedom was to be achieved
by increasing the range of decisions about which the indi
vidual would have control. Key to Nixon was whether deci
sions were to "be made and the priorities be set by the
132
citizens and their elected local officials, or the govern
ment in Washington and its appointed bureaucrat?"
80
Under
personal freedom at the apex of his God-terms concerning
domestic policy, Nixon placed lesser positive terms as they
applied to each area of concern. Fewer taxes and less fed
eral spending would promote more personal freedom as the
individual would have greater determination over the expen
diture of his funds. The restoration of order and respect
for the law would make the individual more free from domes
tic violence, and thus able to exercise his personal freedom
more fully. Many social problems could be solved, according
to Nixon, by relying on "volunteerism," the exercise of
personal freedom. Blacks could better exercise their per
sonal freedom, according to Nixon, if they were encouraged
to achieve for themselves, rather than being encouraged to
rely on government programs to accomplish equality for them.
Even integration would be more favorably received if it came
as a result of personal freedom (individual choice) r2ther
than being imposed. To Nixon, the federal government should
have entered into integration problems only when the chosen
actions of some interfered with the personal freedom of
others, such as when segregation was sanctified by local
laws and decisions. A God-term of personal freedom is
totally consistent with Nixon's stress on the individual,
the agent in Burke's term, as the primary and best determi
nant of political and social well being.
133
Increased federal spending, higher taxes, more federal
programs, more crime, permissive attitudes toward lawless
ness, and government acting in the sphere of private enter
prise all were devil-terms to Nixon because they restricted
personal freedom. Such actions tend also to increase the
importance of the means (agency) by which problems are
solved, rather than who (agent) solves them. To accept
Nixon's devil-terms as other than devil-terms would diminish
the importance of the individual, and imply that the quality
of leadership (an agent function) was not extremely impor
tant. To have done that would have been to deny the essence
of Nixon's campaign.
The Primary Motive
Fisher argues "that motives are names which essential
ize the interrelations of communicator, communication,
audience(s), time, and place."
81
Our final task, then in
building Nixon's vocabulary of motives, is to essentialize
those interrelationships into a predominant motive.
The very nature of a political campaign demands that
the challenging candidate, or the candidate representing the
challenging party when the incumbent is not a candidate,
employ a rhetoric of subversion. A rhetoric of subversion
.
functions when "a communicator attempts to weaken or destroy
an ideology,"
82
and "invariably is an attempt to undermind
the credibility of some person, idea, or institution."
83
The challenging candidate must attribute to the incumbent
134
candidate or the candidate of the incumbent party, some
failures either in the sense of not acting, not acting cor
rectly, acting inadequately, or a combination of these. The
challenger must undermine the image of the incumbent candi
date and/or party or there is no justification for the
challenger's election. The question is whether or not that
motive necessarily must dominate the campaign. Fisher
recognizes there exists a "relationship between affirmative
and subversive rhetorics: to affirm an image is, in effect,
to subvert an old one; to subvert an old one is, in effect,
to affirm a new one."
61
However, a relationship may also
exist between a rhetoric of reaffirmation and a rhetoric of
subversion, depending on how the communicator perceives the
situation. As a challenging political candidate attempts to
subvert an existing candidate or party, he may do so not
only by affirming new images, but by reaffirming existing
images and indicating the incumbent candidate or party is
not consubstantial with those images. One might contend
that the challenger in that situation is only purifying the
image of the incumbent candidate or party. However, subver-
sion seems to better describe the motive which is function
ing. To purify an image is to modify it in a positive
sense, to make it clean, but to subvert an image is to
modify it in a negative sense, to make it unclean.
The motive predominant in Nixon's campaign rhetoric of
1968 was one of reaffirmation. He reaffirmed that a strong
135
.
United States with good leadership would have handled the
Vietnam situation easily, and would have been able to exert
a strong positive influence in international affairs. Nixon
reaffirmed that inflation was unnecessary and stemmed from
an emphasis on government programs. He attempted to reaf
firm that we were a nation that respected the law and func-
tioned under it. But most of all, he reaffirmed a belief
the worth of the individual. To reaffirm these values,
Nixon had to subvert Humphrey and the Democrat Party by
indicating not that they were evil, but that they were
unable to provide quality leadership. The existing leader
ship, as Nixon saw it, lacked the ability to make the
beliefs he reaffirmed paramount again; only new leadership
with Nixon as President could accomplish that.
The Vocabulary of Motives
The preceding analysis has indicated how Nixon defined
the situation, which of the elements inherent in any situa-
tion seemed, from Nixon's perception, to dominate, the ulti
mate terms he used, and the basic motive dominating his
campaign. A synthesis of these concepts provides Nixon's
vocabulary of motives, or the verbal means by which he
sought to justify his election to the presidency.
Nixon's definition of the situation in 1968 was that
new leadership was needed, both domestically and interna-
tionally. This was not a campaign slogan for Nixon or
another call for a simple change of political leadership,
136
although he desired that also. His definition of "New lead
ership" was a humanizing of the problems and concerns of the
nation in 1968. Nixon did not, as no candidate can, ignore
the demands for economic prosperity and peace. But he
placed these and all other concerns in terms of individual
freedom and responsibility. Individuals, and not programs
or institutions were the objects of praise and blame. The
international position of the United States had declined, in
his view, not because of a changing world scene, but because
of the quality of leadership provided by the agents given
the responsibility of managing foreign policy. Domestic
ally, these same individuals had failed because they were
unconcerned about allowing the individual maximum latitude
in his or her decision-making. Too much reliance had been
placed on solving problems for the individual, rather than
encouraging the individual to solve them on an individual
basis. Freedom of choice, freedom from fear, freedom from
government domination were clear themes throughout his com
munication. Along with freedom, individuals had to assume
responsibility. Thus, individuals, and not society, were
responsible for crime and lawlessness, and for allowing it
to continue. Nixon's vocabulary of motives was one which
viewed positively those actions which emphasized the indi
vidual, and viewed negatively those which diminished in any
way the importance of the individual.
In the next chapter, we will compare Nixon's image with
137
that of Humphrey to determine which candidate's image
best corresponded with that held by voters in 1968.
138
FOOTNOTES
1
Richard M. Nixon, "To Make a Dollar Worth a Dollar,"
a radio address over the CBS radio network, October 23,
1968, text supplied by the Republican National Committee,
p. 1. Many of the texts of Nixon remarks are Western Union
copies relayed to the campaign headquarters. As such, they
contain frequent typographical errors. When quoted, we have
taken the liberty of correcting these errors without so not
ing the error. We should advise the reader also that at the
bottom of some texts of Nixon remarks, the following phrase
appears: "Note: Since Mr. Nixon is speaking without text,
these remarks may be changed in delivery but he stands by
them as stated here."
2
CBS News, Face the Nation, 196 8, Volume II (Holt
Information Systems: New York, 1972), p. 317. Nixon made
similar statements at a press conference in Anaheim, Septem
ber 17, text provided by Republican National Committee,
pp. 4 and 15, in an address at the Mormon Tabernacle in Salt
Lake City, September 18, text provided by Republican
National Committee, pp. 10 and 11, and in an address on the
CBS radio network, October 27, 1968, text provided by the
Republican National Committee, p. 8.
3
CBS radio network address, October 27, p. 5.
4
Theodore H. White, The Making of the President 1968
(New York: Atheneum Publishers, 1969), pp. 387-388. Our
analysis of Nixon's communication indicates also this was
true.
5
Address at the Mormon Tabernacle, p. 11. Essentially
the same words were used in Comment, the weekly radio news
program of the Republican National Committee, text provided
by the Republican National Committee, October 7, 1968, p. 2.
6
Television interview on WAVE-T.V., Louisville, Ken
tucky, September 26, 1968, text supplied by the Republican
National Committee, p. 7.
7
CBS radio network address, October 27, 1968, p. 8.
139
8
For example, see the address at the Mormon Taber
nacle, p. 10. Similar wording could be found in his Comment
remarks of October 7, pp. 1-2 and in a statement issued in
Buffalo, New York, October 7, 1968, p. 1.
9
"Nixon Format Television Interview," KLRD-TV, Dallas,
Texas, October 11, 1968, p. 9.
1
°For example, see remarks at Denver, Colorado, Septem
ber 25, 1968, text supplied by the Republican National Com
mittee, p. 1, or "If Nixon Is President," U.S. News and
World Report, October 7, 1968, p. 43.
11
Labor Day Message, September 1, 1968, text provided
by the Republican National Committee, p. 1.
12
Labor Day Message, p. 2.
13
"The Case for Removal of Foreign Investment Restric
tions," Statement Issued October 3, 1968, text supplied by
the Republican National Committee, p. 1.
14
Labor Day Message, p. 2.
15
"The Workers' Treadmill," Milwaukee, Wisconsin, Sep
tember 23, 1968, text supplied by the Republican National
Committee, p. 1.
16
For example, see a statement released in New York
City, October 8, 1968, text supplied the Republican National
Committee, p. 1.
17
Press Conference in Anaheim, p. 17. See a very simi-
lar statement in "Nixon Format Television Interview," p. 2.
18
Anaheim Press Conference, p. 17.
19
Remarks at Denver, Colorado, p. 2.
20
Remarks in Albany, New York, October 28, 1968, text
supplied by the Republican National Committee, p. 1.
21
"If Nixon Is President," p. 43.
22
These statistics all come from Nixon. For examples
of them in his communication, please refer to remarks at a
Milwaukee rally, p. 8, remarks in Denver, Colorado, pp. 1-2,
a statement issued in Buffalo, N.Y., p. 2, and a statement
in Battle Creek, Michigan, p. 1.
23
Remarks at a Milwaukee Rally, p. 8.
140 ·
24
Remarks at Denver, Colorado, p. 2, and quoted. For
other material, see those remarks and for example, a state
ment at Chattanooga, Tennessee, text supplied by the Repub
lican National Committee, September 27, 1968, p. 1.
25
Television interview on WAVE-T.V., p. 9.
26
Press conference in Anaheim, p. 10.
27
Statement in Kansas City, Missouri, October 16, 1968,
text supplied by the Republican National Committee, p. 2.
28
Press conference in Anaheim, p. 7.
29
Press conference in Anaheim, p. 7.
3011
The Nature of the Presidency," Radio Broadcast over
CBS and NBC, September 19, 1968, text supplied by the Repub
lican National Committee, p. 1.
31
"The Nature of the Presidency," p. 5.
32
"The Nature of the Presidency," p. 4.
33
"The Voluntary Way," Radio broadcast over ABC, Octo
ber 6, 1968, text supplied by the Republican National Com
mittee, p. 7.
34
"The Nature of the Presidency," p. 3. Nixon offers
this as a quotation from Woodrow Wilson, source unknown.
3
s.'If Nixon Is President, " p. 4 9 .
36
CBS radio network address, October 27, 1968, pp. 2-3.
37
For example, see television interview on KOMO-T.V.,
Seattle, Washington, September 24, 1968, text supplied by
the Republican National Committee, pp. 2-3.
38
For example, see "Nixon Format Television Interview,"
KLRD-T.V., Dallas, Texas, October 11, 1968. Text supplied
by Republican National Committee, p. 13.
3
'Statement to the B'Nai B'rith Convention, Washington,
D.C., September 8, 1968, text supplied by the Republican
National Committee, p. 1.
40
statement released October 12, 1968, Miami, Ohio,
p. 2.
141
41
"The Time to Save N.A.T.O.," CBS Radio broadcast,
Detroit, Michigan, October 13, 1968, text supplied by the
Republican National Committee, p. 2.
42
"The Time to Save N.A.T.O.," p. 2.
43
Statement in Miami, Florida, October 14, 1968, text
supplied by the Republican National Committee, p. 1.
44
Statement in Norfolk, Virginia, October 2, 1968, text
supplied by the Republican National Committee.
45
This theme is common throughout the campaign. The
most complete statement of these views was in a statement
issued in Battle Creek, Michigan, October 23, 1968, text
supplied by the Republican National Committee, and in
"Security Gap," a radio address over the CBS network,
October 24, 1968, text supplied by the Republican National
Committee.
4 6
"Security Gap, " p. 7.
47
Television interview on KOMO-T.V., p. 15.
48
Mormon Tabernacle Address, p. 12. See also remarks
at a Milwaukee Rally, September 23, 1968, text supplied by
Republican National Committee, p. 7.
49
For example, see Television interview on KOMO-T.V.,
pp. 4-6.
5011
To Keep the Peace," CBS Radio Address, October 19,
1968, text supplied by the Republican National Committee,
pp. 3-4.
51
Press Conference in Anaheim, p. 2.
52
Remarks at Minneapolis, Minnesota, October 8, 1968,
text supplied by the Republican National Committee, pp. 1-2.
53
"If Nixon Is President," p. 44.
54
"Nixon Format Television Interview," p. 2. See also
"A Statement in the Problems of the Aging," issued in Key
Biscayne, Florida, September 29, 1968, text supplied by the
Republican National Committee, pp. 29-31; statement released
in Miami, Florida, October 16, 1968, text supplied by the
Republican National Committee, p. 2; "The Enduring Genera
tion," CBS radio network address, October 21, 1968, text
supplied by the Republican National Committee, p. 1.
55
"Nixon Format Television Interview," p. 15.
142
.
56
For example, see "A Statement on the Problems of
Aging," p. 5; "What Inflation Does to Farmers," statement
Minneapolis, Minnesota, October 8, 1968, text supplied by
the Republican National Committee, p. 3; "If Nixon Is
President," p. 44.
in
57
"If Nixon Is President," p. 44.
58
"An Open Door for American Labor," CBS radio broad
cast, October 21, 1968, text supplied by the Republican
National Committee, p. 5.
59
Representative of his remarks on these subjects were
those in Ibid., pp. 5 and 7.
61
Statement issued September 13, 1968, text provided by
Republican National Committee, pp. 1-2.
61
"An Open Door for American Labor," pp. 3-4.
62
For example, see Ibid., p. 11; "Nixon Format Televi
sion Interview," p. 10; "Nixon Replies," The New Republic,
October 26, 1968, p. 15.
6 3
"Nixon Replies, " p. 15.
64
Statement in Oklahoma City, September 17, 1968, text
supplied by the Republican National Committee, p. 3.
65
"The Voluntary Way," p. 1.
66
Mormon Tabernacle Address, p. 7.
67
Address at William and Mary College, Williamsburg,
Virginia, October 2, 1968, text supplied by the Republican
National Committee, p. 3.
68
"Where Government Should Be," Radio Address over CBS,
October 25, 1968, text supplied by the Republican National
Committee, p. 3.
69
"Where Government Should Be,
II
p. 6.
7
Q"Where
Government Should Be,
II
p. 7.
71
Mormon Tabernacle Address, p. 16.
72
Interview on WAVE-T.V., p. 14.
73
"Where Do They Stand on Health?" Medical World News,
October 4, 1968, p. 57.
143
74
"How Nixon Views the Medical Scene," Medical Econom-
ics, October 14, 1968, p. 27.
75
"The Voluntary Way," p. 2.
76
"The Voluntary Way," p. 5.
77
"The Voluntary Way," p. 6.
78
Kenneth Burke, A Grammar of Motives and A Rhetoric of
Motives (Cleveland: World Publishing Company, 1962),
p. 171.
79
Burke, A Grammar of Motives and A Rhetoric of
Motives, see pp. 171-226 for Burke's extended discussion.
8011
where Government Should Be," p. 3.
81
Walter R. Fisher, "A Motive View of Communication,"
Quarterly Journal of Speech, 56 (1970), 132.
82
Fisher, "A Motive View of Communication," p. 137.
8 3
Fisher, "A Motive View of Communication," p. 138.
84
Fisher, "A Motive View of Communication," p. 138.
144
CHAPTER V
CONCLUSION: THE TESTING OF AN IMAGE
CONCEPTUALIZATION OF VOTING BEHAVIOR
The President is an elected politician. He
gets elected, in reality, as best he can. Like
any other politician in a democracy, he is sup
ported by people who think he will uphold their
interests. And there is nothing shocking about
this. But the President is not only an elected
politician. He is also magic. He is the monarch,
emblem, and protector of national unity, defender
of the American faith. And so the gap opens again
between the rhetoric and the reality. It is not
enough that he should be a decent, honorable,
sensible man who has succeeded, as Disraeli said
when he became Prime Minister, "in climbing to the
top of the greasy pole." He must be the divinely
ordained leader. But the ordination of Richard M.
Nixon was not divine. It was .•. extremely
human.
1
This study has been guided by the observation that a
political campaign for the Presidency is a significant
rhetorical event. However, explanations of voting behavior
usually ignore the communication of the candidates as a
significant intervening variable influencing voter behavior.
Explanations of voting behavior rely heavily upon vqters'
partisan identification, largely influenced by sociological
background, and maintain that voters defect from that
partisanship because of short-term forces. Because the
145
short-term forces of any election are unique to that elec
tion, such an explanation, although sound, is limited in
that any explanation of voting behavior is bound by the
unique circumstances of the given election. Instead, we
offered an image conceptualization in this study. We argued
that each individual holds an image of the world, and it is
that image which determines his or her behavior, including
candidate choice. Candidates for President also project
images of the world, primarily through their communication
during the campaign. The voter, according to this concep
tualization, makes the voting decision based on which candi
date's image most closely adheres to the image he holds.
The potential strength of this conceptualization is that the
concepts of voter partisanship and the influence of short-
term forces are incorporated into the image held by voters
and the image conveyed by Presidential candidates.
The methodology for examining this conceptualization
involved using public polling survey information about the
electorate in order to construct the images held by voters
in 1968. Next, texts of the major statements, press
releases, position papers, and interviews of Humphrey and
Nixon made after the nominating conventions were examined to
determine the image projected by the candidates. A vocabu
lary of motives was developed for each candidate by utiliz
ing concepts developed by Ivie and Fisher. First, each
candidate's definition of the situation developed an
146
essentializing definition of how he perceived the world in
relation to the campaign and what his role as President
would be. Next the elements of Burke's pentad which seemed
dominant in the candidate's image were identified. Finally,
the primary motive of each candidate's campaign was indi
cated. Humphrey offered as his definition, a "New Day."
His definition stressed in domestic policy the agency, or
the means, by which his "New Day" was to be accomplished.
But in international affairs and in law and order, Humphrey
saw the scene as defining the nature of the action to be
taken. Humphrey's campaign functioned with a motive of
purification in regard to Vietnam, and with a motive of
reaffirmation for other concerns of the campaign. Nixon's
definition was one of "New Leadership." He viewed the
situation to have resulted from a lack of leadership, and to
alter conditions, new leadership was demanded. Nixon's
definition stressed the individual agent as responsible for
altering the situation. Finally, Nixon used a motive of
reaffirmation, although a motive of subversion also was
apparent.
In this chapter, we plan to compare voter images with
the images conveyed by the candidates. That comparison will
explore the worth of the conceptualization. To the degree
the comparison of images corresponds with the final vote
tallies, this conceptualization of campaign communication
is viable. The comparison will review voter images in each
147
of the areas and the candidates' communicated images.
Observations about the potential worth of the model will be
made.
Vietnam
That the American voter was frustrated by the war in
•
Vietnam would be a gross understatement. The war had
divided the nation, brought the downfall of an incumbent
President, and was responsible for some of the most virulent
and widespread dissent the nation had known. That Americans
desired an end to United States' involvement cannot be
denied. Though voters were unified on a strong desire to
end the war, they were far from agreement on what consti
tuted an acceptable end to the war, or how the end should be
achieved. Most voters did not desire Communist participa
tion in a new Vietnam government to be forced by negotia
tions.2 Most did not want Communist participation in a new
South Vietnam government even if such participation were
achieved through legitimate elections. Voters did not hold
a particularly "dovish" image of desired actions in Vietnam.
While voters did not demand an all-out military victory,
almost two-thirds believed as late as June of 1968 that the
United States should continue or extend the bombing of North
Vietnam. Even a bombing halt with clearly stipulated condi
tions was preferred only by a slim majority. Among those
with an opinion, most believed our troop levels in Vietnam
were satisfactory or should be increased.
148
Humphrey initially could not help but symbolize the
frustration over the war and the Johnson Administration's
failure to bring it to satisfactory conclusion. As the
Vice-President of that administration, much of that frustra-
tion had to be focused upon him. For that reason, Humphrey
needed to disassociate himself from that policy. The
attempt of Humphrey, then, to purify his image on Vietnam
was an absolute necessity. That Humphrey made significant
gains following his speech in which he attempted to separate
himself from Johnson does not indicate necessarily that
Humphrey's Vietnam "position" was preferred to Nixon's, but
only that he too needed to symbolize a "newness" in order
for voters to seriously consider his candidacy. The high
percentage of Democrats who delayed making their voting
decision until the campaign period provides some indication
they were waiting for such a move. Humphrey's "New Day" had
to dawn with an end to Vietnam. He needed to indicate that
his election would constitute a change capable of bringing
the conflict to an end.
Nixon was in no position to capitalize on the Vietnam
issue. To have condemned United States' involvement would
have alienated significant numbers of voters. To have sug
gested specific policy changes may have been interpreted as
undermining the negotiations then under way, particularly
if it had become known that he specifically had been
requested in mid-October not to continue the Vietnam debate.
149
Nixon could not advocate a more bellicose policy because
such a policy surely would have alienated voters who did not
relish yet another escalation. Such a policy would have
been inconsistent with Nixon's belief that this was a period
for negotiation rather than confrontation. More belligerent
action may have strained relations with European and other
allies already less than enamored with our Vietnam policy.
Yet other policy alternatives, short of unilateral with
drawal, were not available. Consistent with his entire cam
paign, Nixon emphasized the need for new leadership, stress
ing the failure not of policies, but of men.
Data presented in Chapter II indicate that Vietnam was
a highly salient issue for voters. The examination of the
candidates' communication indicates that policy recommenda
tions were few and highly similar; goals to be accomplished
in the war were identical, and the range of acceptable
solutions was virtually the same. Voters perceived the
candidates in much the same way. Gallup polls conducted
.
in
September, 1968, before Humphrey's Salt Lake City address,
indicated that 45 per cent considered Humphrey a hawk, 30
per cent considered him a dove, and 25 per cent expressed no
opinion. The percentages were exactly the same for Nixon.
3
To the degree that voters distinguished between the candi
dates on the issue of Vietnam, the image projected by Nixon
should have more closely matched that held by voters essen
tially because his administration necessarily would repre-
150
sent new leadership. His stress upon the agent and the lack
of leadership allowed voters to identify with Nixon no mat
ter what specific policy they preferred. In August of 1968,
54 per cent to 27 per cent of those surveyed thought Nixon
could do a better job of dealing with the Vietnam war.
4
By
early October, after the September 30 speech, 44 per cent
thought Nixon could best handle the war, 25 per cent thought
Humphrey, and 19 per cent saw no difference.
5
The data are
not totally comparable for the September survey did not
allow a "no difference'' response, but they generally indi
cate an improved public perception of Humphrey, relative to
Nixon, on the war. Humphrey was able to establish for some
voters that his election would also provide new leadership.
However, these figures support our conclusion that voters
saw little difference in the images communicated by the
candidates on Vietnam.
Foreign Policy
The image held by voters of the appropriate role of the
United States in international affairs other than Vietnam
was not that the United States should withdraw or become
less interested in foreign matters, but that the nature of
its involvement should change. No longer should the United
States engage in unilateral action, but instead should
encourage self-determination for other nations, and engage
in military action only in concert with allies. Voters
thought the United States should offer only that foreign aid
151
which was designed to improve the quality of life of the
residents of the recipient nations. Voters believed also
that the United States and the Soviet Union should attempt
to resolve their differences, but the United States must
remain strong and not too eager to trust the Communists.
These concerns reflect a skepticism about our international
role had developed from the Vietnam experience. While no
foreign policy issue other than Vietnam was given as a
response to any survey question designed to elicit the most
important concerns of voters, these views suggest the depth
of the disenchantment over Vietnam.
Bec a u s e Humphr ey needed t o e s t abl ish an ima ge separate
from Johnson's in foreign policy, he chose to stress con
cerns other than Vietnam. Ratification of the nuclear non
proliferation treaty was strongly urged by Humphrey. The
key to international peace, as Humphrey saw it, was to limit
the arms race. He saw the non-proliferation treaty as a
first step in t hat direction. Humphrey desired all military
intervention and aid to be handled unilaterally. Humphrey's
"New Day" called for international peace and goodwill. Pre
venting more nations from obtaining nuclear weapons and
beginning strategic arms limitation talks were the agencies
by which to achieve that "New Day" in international affairs.
Humphrey was reaffirming a desire for peace, and the belief
that nations could live together in harmony.
Nixon's image differed from Humphrey's in several sig-
152
nificant ways. He conveyed concern about our position in
the world, indicating it had declined because of poor lead
ership. Nixon wished to delay ratification of the nuclear
non-proliferation treaty because of the Soviet Union's
invasion of Czechoslovakia. He urged a strengthened defense
posture for the nation. Like Humphrey, he was willing to
negotiate with the Soviet Union, but wished to do so from a
position of strength. Nixon called for new leadership by
subverting the quality of present leadership and by reaf
firming the desirability of a strong international position
for the United States. His position on ratification of the
nuc l ear non-proliferation treaty and his call for a streng-
thened defense posture indicated a basic distrust of the
Soviet Union.
Voter images of foreign affairs were so dominated by
Vietnam that other concerns were of low saliency. Voters
were suspicious of Communist regimes and increasing foreign
aid. They did desire negotiations with Communists to settle
differences, but wished these to move slowly. Voters con-
demned the invasion of Czechoslovakia by the Soviets, but
were unwilling for the United States to adopt a "get tough"
position because of it. Nixon's desire to re-evaluate for
eign aid, to delay ratification of the nuclear non-prolif
eration treaty, and to maintain defense parity probably was
closer to voters' images than the image communicated by
Humphrey. The image corresponded to the voters' desire to
153
avoid military confrontation. The Vietnam war had made the
voter cautious about international involvement.
Economic Affairs
Economics was one of four areas in which the candidates
communicated substantially different images. The others
were law and order, race relations, and the role of govern
ment. To Humphrey, recent economic experience had been
slowed only momentarily by inflation. But inflation could
be handled, especially if the war ended. His concern was
for prosperity as opposed to recession; for jobs as opposed
to unemployment; and for bringing all citizens into the eco
nomic mainstream as opposed to tolerating poverty. To
Humphrey, the way to assure these goals was to expand the
federal government's role in economic affairs.
Nixon consistently branded inflation an evil which was
destroying the economic foundation of this country. Accord
ing to him not even those who had received pay increases
were able to keep up with inflation. Real income had
declined and that was unforgiveable. Nixon promised to cut
inflation, without creating unemployment and/or economic
contraction. His emphasis was on expanding the role of pri
vate enterprise through tax incentives and prudent fiscal
and monetary policies.
9
The voter ima~e of economic matters was confused and
inconsistent, perhaps confirming that the average citizen
lacks a good understanding of economic matters. The high
154
cost of living obviously was of substantial concern to the
voters. Most wanted to deal with it by reducing federal
spending. Although concerned about inflation and desiring a
reduction in federal spending, voters still supported many
social welfare programs at existing or expanded levels.
Several explanations of this apparent paradox are possible.
First, a large portion of those expressing concern over
inflation were not those advocating retention or expansion
of federal programs. This explanation is possible only to a
degree. For example, it is impossible for the approximately
three-fourths of the voters who desired reduced federal
spending to be distinct from the three-fourths of the popu
lation who supported retraining programs. Second, many may
not have related expanded programs with increased government
expenditures and resulting inflationary pressure. Most
likely, however, the seeming paradox represented a set of
priorities functioning. Many government programs designed
to help individuals were desired and preferred over other
kinds of federal expenditures. There may also have existed
a belief that waste and inefficiency were commonplace. Such
a belief is consistent with the strong belief in the work
ethic we noted in Chapter II; someone must have been getting
something for nothing and that needed to be corrected.
It appears that Nixon's image of economic affairs more
closely matched the image held by most voters in 1968, but
the voters with images more like Humphrey's were almost
155
equal in number. Voters had to choose between concerns
about inflation and concerns about prosperity.
Nixon was able to subvert Humphrey's image in economic
concerns because of the increasing rate of inflation. The
individual social welfare programs supported by Humphrey
generally were popular, but some of the voters may have
perceived him as increasing federal spending. Nixon, too,
supported highly popular social welfare programs such as
Medicare, aid to education, and increased social security
benefits. At the same time, he continually called for
reduced federal spending without suggesting where the reduc
tions would occur. While supporting universally popular
programs, Nixon did not risk alienating any class of voters
by suggesting theirs was one of the programs to receive
reduced funding.
Nixon also identified more strongly with the work
ethic. His stress on individual agents primarily being
responsible for their own well-being countered directly
Humphrey's "New Day" which called for an expansion of fed
eral social welfare programs. While Nixon stressed the
problems of the individual no longer being in a position to
make his own economic decisions, Humphrey stressed the fed
eral government as the appropriate agency for solving many
financially related problems. Nixon constantly promised to
take people off the welfare rolls and to put them on the
payrolls. He recommended job retraining programs be
156
eliminated and turned over to private enterprise; again, the
theme was to take people off the government role and put
them on the payroll. Nixon's image most closely matched the
image held by those relatively financially secure and not in
danger of losing their jobs. Humphrey's image best matched
those most dependent on government jobs and/or programs, and
thus more likely to suffer if reductions in funding took
place, mainly the poor and the Black.
This analysis is supported also by a Gallup Poll taken
in mid-October, 1968. Voters were almost equally divided
about which party they believed would do the best job of
keeping the country prosperous; 34 per cent Republican, 37
per cent Democratic, and 29 per cent saw no difference or
expressed no opinion. As the income level of the respon
dents increased, so did the percentage preferring Republi
cans.6 As to which party would do the best job of keeping
prices down, 40 per cent preferred the Republicans, 24 per
cent preferred the Democrats, and 36 per cent perceived no
difference or expressed no opinion. Only those in the
$3,000 to $5,000 income range thought the Democrats could do
a better job of holding prices down and then only by the
narrow margin of two per cent.
7
Law and Order
In no other area of voter concern did Humphrey
symbolize an image so different from that held by the gen-
eral voter. In no other area did Nixon symboliz~
.
aJ.. image
157
so similar to that held by the vast majority of 1968 voters.
The overwhelming majority of voters believed there had been
a breakdown in law and order. Humphrey perceived the
rapidly increasing rate of crime to be caused by societal
conditions. Nixon believed the cause was a decline in
respect for the law. Nixon and the majority of voters
shared the image that the President was important in pre-
serving law and order; Humphrey viewed law and order primar
ily as a local concern. Nixon and the majority of voters
thought the courts had erred in some of their decisions
concerning the rights of criminal defendants; Humphrey sug
gested the problem of the courts was one of understaffing.
The voters desired conservatives be appointed to the Supreme
Court; Nixon urged a strict constructionist; Humphrey urged
the confirmation of Abe Fortas as Chief Justice. Humphrey
implied crime could be solved by spending more money; Nixon
said we needed an entirely new attitude.
Humphrey's "New Day" demanded the conditions that
foster crime be eliminated. That approach involved large
expenditures of monies at a time when the voter feared
inflation and desired reduced government spending. More
important, Humphrey's image indicated rather than the indi
vidual (agent) being responsible for crime and capable of
solving it, the society (scene) was responsible and the fed
eral government by the expenditure of funds (agency) could
solve it. Nixon's image was the opposite, and so was that
158
held by the voter. The important observation is not only
did Humphrey communicate an image about law and order dif
ferent from that of Nixon and the image held by voters; but
that concerns of law and order were highly salient to
voters. After Vietnam, crime and lawlessness was viewed as
the number one problem facing the nation.
Race Relations
The majority of voters approved of equal rights for
Black citizens, but thought the nation had moved too rapidly
toward that goal and that the movement needed to be
slowed.
10
Nixon's projected image corresponded well to such
images. Blacks were equal citizens to all others, but the
federal government under Nixon's leadership would take no
active steps to assure that equality by increasing opportun
ities for Blacks. Nixon's plans to turn federal job train
ing programs over to private enterprise on the grounds that
private enterprise would provide better training for the
Black poor probably communicated more about his faith in a
capitalistic society than it did about his concerns for
Blacks. Such an attitude displayed Nixon's emphasis on
individual responsibility. Even the weapon of withholding
federal funds from school districts engaging in segregation
would be employed in a Nixon administration only if the
segregation was overt and not a result of residential pat
terns. Blacks, Nixon believed, should progress as the rest
of the society progressed and receive no special programs.
159
Humphrey, however, was the candidate for equality now
for Blacks and all others in the society. To Humphrey, the
nation needed to move beyond striking down legal barriers to
creating real equality. Humphrey symbolized activism by the
federal government to improve the condition of minorities.
These views aligned his image closely with that held by
Blacks, other minorities, and the economically disadvant
aged. But such an image did not match well the image of the
majority of voters. Most voters were not racists, although
that attitude certainly existed among some voters. But
voters believed racial progress had been achieved so rapidly
that in the process the basic fabric of the society had been
torn. Immediate efforts to assist Blacks were perceived as
promoting social upheaval. Some perceived the efforts to be
successful only at the expense of Whites.
The Role of Government and Other
Miscellaneous Concerns
Humphrey supported an increased role for the federal
government as the direct solution of social problems; Nixon
symbolized a decreased role for the federal government in
which it acted as a catalyst and provider of incentives for
individual effort. This distinction reaches to the core of
the difference in the candidates' images. Humphrey's "New
Day" was designed to solve social problems by a more active
role for the federal government. How (agency) was the most
important consideration to him. Humphrey reaffirmed the
160
traditional liberal philosophy that the federal government
should be an active force in solving social problems. Nixon
reaffirmed the importance of the individual (agent) and the
freedom he should possess.
The voters' image about the role of government do not
emerge clearly from the data. Voters generally supported
existing social programs, but believed, by a slight plural
ity, that the government had grown too strong and powerful.
They saw the federal government also as potentially threat
ening. Voters generally wished control of programs to
revert to the state and local level. While voters favored
maintaining or expanding many existing programs, they
desired also a restructuring of priorities. A clear indica
tion of the nature of the new priorities, however does not
emerge from the data. Humphrey's call for expansion of pro
grams designed to help directly individuals in need probably
was appealing to many. Nixon's call for a decreased role
for the federal government probably also struck responsive
chores. The voters were divided, and neither candidate's
image seems to have matched that of an overwhelming majority
of voters.
The Testing of the Conceptualization
If this image conceptualization of presidential cam
paigning is viable, then the candidate whose image most
closely matched that of the electorate should have won the
election. Moreover, the degree to which a given candidate's
161
image exceeded the other candidate's in matching voters'
images roughly should approximate the margin of victory.
The communicated image of Humphrey and Nixon was highly
similar concerning Vietnam. Given that, Vietnam should not
have played an instrumental role in determining voting
decisions. Theodore White, and Rosenburg, Verba, and Con
verse have agreed that Vietnam probably played little of a
role in deciding the election.e However, such conclusions
may seriously underestimate the importance of Vietnam to the
election. In spite of Humphrey's strategy to disassociate
himself from Johnson on Vietnam, he was not successful. An
analysis of candidate ratings provided by the Survey
Research Center indicates the highest intercorrelation among
the ratings for any two individuals who were potential can
didates in 1968 was between Humphrey and Johnson, higher
than any correlation between any candidate and his vice-
presidential running mate.' Humphrey and Johnson were
highly assimilated in the public image. In spite of Humph
rey's efforts to disassociate himself from Johnson, particu
larly in his September 30 address, he was not successful.
Perhaps part of his failure was because on other concerns,
primarily those dealing with economics, Humphrey tried to
associate himself with Johnson. If we are accurate in
claiming the primary reason for Johnson's low popularity was
the war in Vietnam, then that war also was costly to
Humphrey.
10
Boyd's analysis of the degree of defection from a
162
"Normal" expected vote over a range of issues tends to con
firm that the war cost Humphrey votes. Following a normal
vote analysis, Humphrey should have received 58 per cent of
the vote of those desiring to pull the soldiers out of Viet
nam, 58 per cent of the vote of those who wished to keep the
soldiers there, and 55 per cent of those who wished to
undertake a more hawkish stand. He received only 46 per
cent, 50 per cent, and 31 per cent, respectively. Normal
vote analysis is predicated on two candidate electoral
competitions, so it might be possible that Humphrey's lower
than expected vote totals represented only a drain to
Wallace supporters. But that was not the case. From each
of the same category of supporters, Nixon received more
votes than a normal vote analysis would predict. Thus,
Humphrey experienced a loss of votes on Vietnam to both
Wallace and Nixon. Our development of the images communi
cated by Nixon and Humphrey suggests that while there was
little to distinguish between them, Nixon's probably matched
more closely that held by voters. However, the analysis in
no way reflects the serious loss for which a normal vote
analysis accounts.
Our analysis indicates that on the next most salient
issues of law and order, and race relations, Nixon's image
was much closer to that held by voters. Thus, these con
cerns should have lowered Humphrey's vote. This analysis is
confirmed by others. Boyd, a gain using a normal vote
163
analysis, found that in the 15 items he analyzed, urban
unrest ranked second, belief in segregation ranked fourth,
and the speed with which civil rights was moving ranked
sixth in the magnitude of their relationship to defections
from the vote a normal vote analysis would predict for
Hurnphrey.
1 2
Weisberg and Rusk found that al though those who
wished to deal with urban unrest by solving problems of
poverty and unemployment supported Humphrey, the margin was
not nearly so great as that afforded Nixon by those who
leaned toward using more force.
13
Given this analysis that Nixon's image more closely
matched that of the voters, and that Humphrey's "loss" on
Vietnam may have been greater than even our analysis sug
gests, a more substantial Nixon victory should have been
expected. In addition, as we illustrated in Chapter I, the
data may also reflect an image somewhat more liberal than
that need by actual voters because Republicans have a
greater propensity to vote than Democrats. Yet the election
was extremely close, with Nixon winning by less than one
half million votes. Were there circumstances, short of dis
carding the image conceptualization, that may have accounted
for the discrepancy? Several appear quite probable.
First was the candidacy of George Wallace. The infor
mation presented in the first chapter limits Wallace's
candidacy to the net effect of reducing the margin of
Nixon's victory. While an analysis of Wallace's communica-
164
tion has not been attempted, it is fair to state that
Wallace projected an image most similar to voters who would
have voted for Nixon if Wallace had not entered the race.
Second, an analysis of the communication of the vice-presi
dential candidates has not been attempted. Such an analysis
may have indicated Muskie's image more closely symbolized
the view of the world held by voters than did Agnew's. If
so, then the Muskie candidacy also would have narrowed the
final election margin. Certainly, Muskie was more highly
evaluated than was Agnew.
14
A third possibility is that the
ethos or credibility of Humphrey was stronger than Nixon's.
The possibility is not likely because one's image must
influence one's credibility, Nixon's image more closely
matched that held by voters. Nixon was thought to make a
better appearance on television,
15
to be less "wishy-washy"
than Humphrey,
16
to be more experienced in world affairs,
17
to be more sincere,
18
to be more likely to go down in his
tory as a great statesman,
19
and even to be more likeable.
20
The Wallace and Muskie candidacies offer the best explana
tion of the results short of rejecting the conceptual
ization.
This analysis indicates that a conceptualization of
voting behavior in which voters are thought to compare their
images with those conveyed by presidential candidates and
their vote for that candidate whose image best corresponds
to their own, has utility as an explanatory tool. The
165
study has shown that the view essentially does account for
the results of the 1968 election. The method's ability to
explain election results is even stronger than the examina
tion of the 1968 election illustrates if we modify our find
ings to allow for the candidacy of Wallace decreasing
Nixon's potential vote and Muskie's candidacy increasing
the Humphrey vote.
This view of voting behavior also strengthens the
view that campaign communication does have importance as
an influencing factor functioning between the partisan
identification of voters and their candidate selection.
Present methods are adequate in isolating which views held
by voters may have influenced them to defect, but these
methods do not account for how voters may have come to hold
these views. This study, relying on what the candidates
communicated, implies strongly that the views voters hold
of the candidates may be largely influenced by what
candidates say.
This approach to the study of campaign communication
rectifies many of the weaknesses Trent found in her review
of studies of campaign communication undertaken by
researches in the discipline of speech communication.
21
She concluded such studies gave only minimal attention to
the receivers of the communication and to the effect the
communication had upon the receivers. The voter, or at
166
least the potential voter, is integral in this approach.
The image held by the voter is the essential element of
the judgment made. Effect of the communication on voters
is considered directly in that the comparison of the images
determines how the communication of the candidates should
have been received by voters.
The approach has obvious limitations. Great precision
is not possible because the analysis does not lend itself
to quantification. Something analogous to a coefficient of
correlation between candidate and voter images is not
possible. If a majority of voters in a given election do
not possess distinct images, the approach may be difficult
to use.
Conceptualizing voting behavior as an act in which the
voter casts a vote for the candidate perceived as corre
sponding most closely to the image held by the voter poten
tially has applicability to elections other than those for
president. Whether an election is for the office of United
States Senator or Representative, or for a local office, or
even for a ballot proposition, a voter acts in correspon-
dence with the image. For example, whether to approve or
disapprove a measure calling for increased funding of local
schools will depend on the image held by the voter. That
image probably will integrate some or all of the following
considerations: Have the schools been effective? Will
increased funding improve the quality of education? Is
167
increased funding necessary to attract, retain, or provide
equity for school employees? How much will the increase
cost the individual taxpayer and can the taxpayer afford it?
What other measures are being proposed which increase or
decrease taxes? Which of these are more important and which
are likely to pass? In similar fashion, an election for a
city councilman demands of the voter a comparison of his
composite image of what a city councilman should represent
with the image conveyed by the candidates. The voters' com
posite image may include not only judgments about specific
actions that may have been proposed, but also a wide range
of judgments such as the desirability of the community as a
place to reside and raise a family, the cost of living in
the community, the role of the city government in providing
services, and the kind of services deemed to be needed or
desirable. The examples do not need to be belabored.
Voters act on the basis of how closely the image conveyed by
candidates or by propositions corresponds with the image
held by the voter.
Two important questions arise concerning the image as a
determining factor in voting behavior. First, how may the
nature of voter images be determined, and second, what is
the role of communication in altering these images? The
first question is important because a construct that cannot
be identified is of no use either as a means of explaining
behavior or as a means of planning campaign strategy and
168
behavior. The second question is important for if communi
cation plays no role or a very small role in altering images
held by voters, then much of the campaign process may be
useless, and the study of election behavior would not be a
productive area of research for communication scholars.
This study has employed public opinion polling data as
a means of determining voters' images in a presidential
election. Generally, such an approach was satisfactory,
although more frequent polling and the asking of additional
questions would have been an asset to further defining the
image. However, as the importance of the office declines,
such public polling data either declines in amount or ceases
to exist all together. Rarely, if ever, for example, can a
single poll be found measuring voter concerns over a broad
range of issues at the local level. Polls indicating voter
preferences for one candidate or another, or whether voters
plan to vote yes or no on a given ballot measure, might be
found. These polls, however, do not investigate voter
images, but indicate only at a given point in time what
judgment the voter has made as a result of the image held.
Private polls may be undertaken if sufficient funds exist to
allow the candidate or the supporters of given measure to
afford them. These polls often are deficient in scope and
methodology. While undoubtedly they are an asset in plan
ning campaign strategy, they often are not available to the
researcher attempting to explain voting behavior. What is
169
needed to make a concept of voting behavior based on image
valuable as an explanatory tool is a productive method of
determining voter image when polling data is not available.
Such an alternative method does not readily reveal it
self. Some suggestions are possible which entail broadening
the sources of information. If a small city ballot proposi
tion may be offered as an example, the scholar and/or the
strategy planner could interview citizens and local commun
ity leaders. Obviously, this could not be done in great
depth or a normal polling operation could be undertaken.
But community leaders may w~ll be in a position to be sensi
tive to the public mood. Attendance at meetings of local
organizations such as churches, political action groups, and
the city council may be illuminating. A careful review of
the local newspaper, including letters to the editor, and of
other community information sources may be helpful. An
exhaustive list of potential sources is not possible, but
only sufficient examples to indicate that other means are
available to assist in the determination of voter images.
The difficulty is that these alternative means demand care
ful interpretation, lack precision, and are not easily
employed. For a voter image conceptualization of voting
behavior to have wide utility, additional research should be
undertaken to refine a methodology of determining voter
.
images.
The second important question is how effective is com-
170
munication in altering voter images? No definitive answer
is possible, but some important considerations are. Images
may be altered only by stimuli that reach the image. Those
stimuli in an election campaign essentially are of two
types: events and circumstances that occur and arise, and
communication. All election campaigns reflect some altera
tion of the images of some voters. The amount of alteration
may be substantial or minor. Some campaigns may be sub
jected to the occurrence of major events that cannot help
but alter voter images in some way. An example is the
McGovern campaign of 1972 in which the discovery of Senator
Eagleton's past history of mental illness was an event of
such magnitude that it could not help but modify images.
Other campaigns may be relatively free of such occurrences,
yet substantial alteration of voter images occurs. It must
be recognized also that voter images may be so firm that
only the most earth-shaking stimuli could possibly alter
them. The judgment about the importance of campaign commun
ication, then, cannot be determined absolutely, but any
judgment made must be relative and considered in the context
of the campaign.
The assumption cannot be made that communication
necessarily acts as stimuli. Voters may be exposed very
little or not at all to the communication of the candidates
and supporters and detractors of particular measures. The
assumption of exposure is reasonable at the presidential
171
level because of the high level of coverage of the campaign
by the news media and because of the large amount of televi
sion time and newspaper space purchased to convey the candi
dates' messages. If the approach used in this study to
account for voting behavior is to be used in the study of
elections for lesser offices or for local ballot measures,
the researcher would need to ascertain that voters had
relatively high exposure to the communication of the cam
paign. Unless that high exposure can be demonstrated,
voters may only impose an image previously derived on the
candidates or the proposition, and not be aware of the image
conve y e d by communication during t he c ampaign.
The approach of this study, as mentioned previously in
Chapter I, has some basic similarities to Kelley and Miner's
"Voting Rule." Their "Rule" says simply that the voters
will cast their votes for the candidates for whom they per
ceive the greatest number of positive attributes in excess
of negative attributes. The strength of an image concep
tualization is that it integrates the various perceptions
held by the voter and allows for the saliency of the various
components of the image to be considered. In addition, the
approach of this study does not rely on the recall of the
individuals surveyed as does the "Rule." Kelley and Miner
asked respondents to list positive and negative attributes
of the candidates. That method provides no assurance that
the respondent is able to list all of the attributes he
172
perceives or that he can even verbalize them. In the
methodology of this study, the pollsters select the ques
tions and provide a range of responses for the individual to
select. Kelley and Miner also had their respondents list
positive and negative attributes after the election had
occurred. As they readily admit, the responses could have
been influenced by the actual vote the respondents cast.
This approach leaves unanswered a question that is of
interest to all concerned about voting behavior. How does
a voter come to hold the images he possesses? This approach
attempts to explain only that the voter acts on the basis of
the image held, and does not account for how the voter came
to hold that image.
If Nixon and Humphrey in 1968 were typical of candi
dates for the presidency, then this study indicates that
presidential candidates are relatively clear in their com
munication about their goals and objectives, that presiden
tial candidates rarely detail specifically the policies by
which they hope to achieve those goals and objectives, that
the communication of presidential candidates is highly
redundant, and that presidential candidates are very con
sistent in what they communicate.
Nixon and Humphrey rarely articulated specific policies
they planned to undertake if elected President. But
Humphrey did suggest he would be willing to take greater
risks to attain peace in Vietnam, that he would push for
173
greater strategic arms limitation agreements with the
Soviets. Humphrey clearly indicated prosperity and growth
were more important to him than inflation. To Humphrey, the
government needed to be more active in solving social prob
lems and particularly in creating equal opportunity for all
citizens. Nixon suggested the parameters acceptable to him
for a Vietnam solution and that the position of the United
States needed to improve in international affairs. Nixon
endorsed a decreased role for the federal government and a
greater emphasis on using private industry for solving
social problems. He implied that the individual should be
responsible for his own l i fe and actions. Nixo n made it
clear that civil rights progress could be slowed in his
administration.
Nixon and Humphrey discussed a narrow range of public
concerns and repeated often their views about these con
cerns. Because the range of concerns was narrow and because
the campaign was i ntensively covered by t he media, incon
sistencies by the candidates were minor or non-existent. No
instances were discovere d of a c andidate taking a position
on one occasion and a position substantially different on
other occasions. Candidates may articul ate goals inconsis
tent with other goals, but they are consistent in these
inconsistencies. For example, Nixon called often for
reduced expenditures in the space program, while at the same
time he called for an improved space program. One may be
174
justified in characterizing this kind of communication as
equivocation, but the candidates were consistent in such
statements.
Nixon and Humphrey also did not introduce new concerns
for any extended discussion during the campaign. They
responded to the Czechoslovakian invasion and the cessation
of bombing in Vietnam only in terms of positions they had
articulated extensively before.
V. o. Key suggested, "In the large the electorate be
haves about as rationally and responsibly as we should
expect, given the clarity of the alternatives presented to
it and the character of the information available to it."
22
If Nixon and Humphrey were typical of candidates for the
presidency, then candidates do seem to address themselves to
the concerns of the voters in a manner that should allow the
voters to make relatively clear distinctions between the
candidates. Voters do seem to vote for candidates whose
view of the world best corresponds to the view of the world
held by the voters. That would seem to be highly rational
and responsible behavior.
175
FOOTNOTES
1
Lewis Chester, Godfrey Hodgson, Bruce Page, An Ameri
can Melodrama: The Presidential Campaign of 1968 (New York:
Dell Publishing Company, 1969), p. 883.
2
Please refer to data and discussion offered in Chap
ter II under the heading, "Vietnam." Rather than refer the
reader each time to the appropriate section of the study
where these ideas previously were developed, we are in this
chapter summarizing information about voter images developed
in Chapter II, summarizing information about Humphrey's com
municated image developed in Chapter III, and Nixon's devel
oped in Chapter IV.
i
Gallup Opinion Index, October, 1968, pp. 18-19.
4
Gallup Opinion Index, September, 1968, p. 6. N'ne
teen per cent had no opinion.
5
Gallup Opinion Index, October, 1968, p. 23. Twelve
per cent had no opinion.
6
Gallup Opinion Index, November, 1968, p. 5.
7
Gallup Opinion Index, November, 1968, p. 6. This
represented a slight decline for Nixon and a slight improve
ment for Humphrey over the previous month, but nothing sub
stantial.
eTheodore H. White, The Making of the
(New York: Atheneum Publishers, 1969), p.
ton J. Rosenburg, Sidney Verba, and Philip
Vietnam and the Silent Majority (New York:
1970), p. 50.
President 1968
400, and Mil
E. Converse,
Harper and Row,
'Philip E. Converse, Warren E. Miller, Jerrold G.
Rusk, Arthur C. Wolfe, "Continuity and Change in American
Politics: Parties and Issues in the 1968 Election," The
American Political Science Review, 63 (December, 1969),
1090.
176
1 0
Richard W. Boyd, "Popular Control of Public Policy, A
Normal Vote Analysis of the 1968 Election," The American
Political Science Review, 66 (June, 1972), 440. Boyd con
tends the negative view of Johnson held by voters was the
leading issue of the 15 he examined in accounting for defec
tions from the expected Democratic vote.
11
Philip E. Converse, "The Concept of a Normal Vote,"
in Angus Campbell, Phillip E. Converse, Warren E. Miller,
and Donald E. Stokes, Elections and the Political Order (New
York: John Wiley, 1966), pp. 9-39; Boyd, pp. 429-434. Boyd
offers a simplified explanation of the rationale behind the
concept of the normal vote and the mathematical equation by
which it is computed .. A "normal" vote predicts a Democratic
victory. Thus, a defection from a normal vote does not
necessarily mean a Democratic loss.
1 2
Boyd, p. 4 3 5.
13
Herbert F. Weisberg and Jerrold G. Rusk, "Dimensions
of Candidate Evaluation," The American Political Science
Review, 64 (December, 1970), 1181.
14
There is some evidence that Muskie's candidacy was
more helpful to Humphrey than Agnew's was to Nixon. See
Scammon and Wattenberg, p. 205, and James McBath and Walter
Fisher, "Persuasion in Presidential Campaign Communication,"
The Quarterly Journal of Speech, 55 (February, 1969), 22.
See also Weisberg and Rusk, p. 1169. Muskie received a sub
stantially more positive rating than did Agnew.
liGallup Opinion Index, October, 1968, p. 14.
16
Scammon and Wattenberg, p. 170.
17
Gallup Opinion Index, October, 1968, p. 13.
1
eGallup Opinion Index, October, 1968, p. 15.
1
'Gallup Opinion Index, October, 1968, p. 12.
20
Gallup Opinion Index, October, 1968, p. 11.
21
Judith s. Trent, "A Synthesis of Methodologies Used
in Studying Political Communication," The Central States
Speech Journal, 26 (Winter, 1975), 297.
22
V. o. Key, Jr., The Responsible Electorate (Cam
bridge: Harvard University Press, 1966), p. 7.
177
A P P E N D I X E S
178
APPENDIX A
POLLING DATA
179
POLLING DATA
The survey data presented below cover a period approxi
mately from mid-196 7 to early 1969. The polls employed are
the American Institute of Public Opinion (Gallup), Louis
Harris and Associates, the Survey Research Center, Univer
sity of Michigan, and the Opinion Research Corporation of
Princeton, New Jersey. The data is organized under the fol-
lowing categories: (A) Vietnam, (B) other areas of foreign
policy, (C) economic affairs, (D) law and order, (E) race
relations, (F) the role of government, and (G) miscellaneous
concerns. The survey data are as follows:
A. Vietnam
1. "Turn the entire problem over to the United
Nations. Ask the U.N. to try to find a peace
solution. Both sides would agree in advance to
accept the decision--even if it calls for with
drawing U.S. troops. The U.N. would then police
the border between North and South Vietnam. Do
you favor or oppose this plan?"
Favor 6 0
Oppose 32
Don't know 8
(G.O.I., November 1967, p. 14.)
180
2. "We are now bombing North Vietnam, but we have
not sent troops into North Vietnam. Would you
favor or oppose extending the ground war into
North Vietnam?"
Favor
Oppose
No Opinion
39
44
17
(G.O.I., Dec. 1967, p. 5.)
3. "Some people say we should go all-out to win a
military victory in Vietnam, using atom bombs
and weapons. Do you agree or disagree with this
view?"
Agree
Disagree
No Opinion
27
65
8
(G.O.I., April 1968, p. 19.)
4. "Which do you believe--should we:"
Increase the bombing in North Vietnam 42
No change: do what we are doing now 22
Stop the bombing 19
Other 4
Don't know, No answer 13
(O.R.C., June 1968.)
5. "Which do you believe at U.S. troops in Vietnam
--we should:"
Send more troops 17
No change: things are about right 32
Reduce the number 13
Take All troops out 22
Other 4
No opinion or no answer 12
(O.R.C., June 1968.)
6. It has been suggested that the U.S. agree to
stop all the bombing of North Vietnam but with
the understanding that if after one or two
months the North Vietnamese DO NOT begin to
181
remove their soldiers from South Vietnam that
the U.S. would then decide whether to bomb all
of North Vietnam including cities. Would you
favor or oppose such a plan?"
Favor
Oppose
No opinion
48
39
13
(G.O.I., July 1968, p. 12.)
7. "Suppose that in the coming presidential cam
paign one candidate said that we should turn
over more of the fighting in Vietnam to the
South Vietnamese and that as of next January 1,
the U.S. would withdraw some of our troops.
Other things being equal, would you vote for
(or) against this candidate?"
Vote for 66
Vote against 18
Don't know 16
(G.O.I., August 1968, p. 17.)
8. "In the peace negotiations would you favor or
oppose our agreeing to give the Vietcong--the
communists--some minimum representation in the
South Vietnam government?"
Favor
Oppose
Not sure
(Harris, May 1968
26
52
22
Washington Post, June 3, 1968, p. Al3.)
9 .... a coalition government which resulted
after an election in which the communists were
voted representation.
Approve
Disapprove
Not sure
(Harris
38
43
19
Washington Post, August 19, 1968, p. A2.)
182
10 .... a neutralist government of South Vietnam
which is "neither pro-u.s. nor pro-Communist."
Approve
Disapprove
Not sure
(Harris
66
16
18
Washington Post, August 19, 1968, p. A2.)
11. "Suppose the Vietnam war is not over by the time
the next President takes office. If you had to
choose one of the following courses, which would
you favor his following in Vietnam? (1) Use
nuclear weapons and win the war once and for
all. (2) Pour in troops and bombs to win the
war with conventional weapons. (3) Keep mili
tary pressure on until the Communists make
peace. (4) Pull U.S. troops back to the cities
and let the South Vietnamese do more of the
fighting until the Communists make peace.
(5) Withdraw U.S. troops gradually but keep sup
plying the South Vietnamese militarily. (6) Get
out of Vietnam altogether."
Use nuclear weapons 8
Pour in troops and bombs 18
Keep pressure on 17
Pull back to cities 17
Withdraw gradually, continue aid 18
Get out altogether 13
Not sure 9
(Harris
Washington Post, October 7, 1968, p. A6.)
12. "People are called 'hawks' if they want to step
up our military effort in Vietnam. They are
called 'doves' if they want to reduce our mili
tary effort in Vietnam. How would you describe
yourself--as a 'hawk' or a 'dove?'"
December, 1967
January, 1968
February, 1968 (early)
February, 1968 (late)
March, 1968
April, 1968
(G.O.I., April, 1968, p. 20.)
Hawk Dove No opinion
52
56
61
58
41
41
35
28
23
26
42
41
13
16
16
16
17
18
183
13. "In view of the developments since we entered
the fighting in Vietnam do you think the U.S.
made a mistake sending troops to fight in Viet
nam?"
Yes No
48
44
46
42
41
40
35
37
No opinion
July, 1967
October, 1967
December, 1967
February, 1968 (early)
March, 1968
April, 1968
August, 1968
October, 1968
(G.O.I., October 1968, p. 24.)
B. Other Areas of Foreign Policy
41
46
45
46
49
48
53
54
11
10
9
12
10
12
12
9
1. "If another war similar to the Vietnam War were
to break out in some other part of the world,
which of these actions should the United States
take? 1. Send some weapons, but let them fight
their own war. 2. Send all weapons needed and
some military advisors. 3. Send advisors and
all weapons and pilots needed. 4. Send all
weapons and troops needed. 5. The U.S. should
do nothing."
Do nothing 26
Send weapons 32
Weapons and some advisors 15
Advisors, weapons, and pilots 5
All weapons and troops needed 11
Don't know, no answer 13
(O.P.C., June 1968.)
2. "The country would be better off if we just
stayed home and did not concern ourselves with
problems in other parts of the world."
Agree 20
Disagree 64
Don't know, depends, refused choice 3
No answer, no opinion 16
(S.R.C., October 1968, 16:23)
184
3. "Some
other
think
best
this
yes)
we:"
people say that we should give aid to
countries if they need help, while others
each country should make its own way as
it can. Have you been interested enough in
to favor one side over the other?" (if
"Which opinion is most like yours? Should
Give aid to other countries 40
Other, depends, both 19
Each country should make its
own way 28
Don't know 1
No answer, no interest 12
(S.R.C., October 1968, 5:29.)
4. "The United States should start a massive devel
opment program for countries of Asia to try to
stop Communism by dealing with the lack of suf
ficient food, housing, and education."
Strongly agree 13
Agree 41
Disagree 26
Strongly disagree 7
Don't know,
no answer 13
(O.R.C., June 1968)
5. "The United States should train and supply the
troops of friendly Asian countries before Com
munist guerilla activities become serious."
Strongly agree 11
Agree 44
Disagree 26
Strongly disagree 7
Don't know, no answer 13
(O.R.C., June 1968)
6. "President Johnson has proposed that Congress
set aside about $3.1 billion for aid to coun
tries in other parts of the world, or about 2
per cent of the total annual budget. Would you
like to see this amount increased or decreased?"
185
Increased 7
Keep the same 31
Decrease 50
No opinion 12
(G.O.I. June 1967, p. 11.)
7. "Are you in favor of the United States Govern
ment helping other nations who ask our aid in
their birth control programs?"
Yes, favor 70
No, oppose 22
No opinion 8
(G.O.I., September 1968, p. 25.)
8. " ... in the Atomic Age we still have to try to
work out a peace with Russia."
Yes 88
No 5
Not sure 7
(Harris,
Washington Post, September 2, 1968, p. A8.)
9. "Some people think it is all right for our gov
ernment to sit down and talk to the leaders of
the communist countries and try to settle our
differences, while others think we should refuse
to have anything to do with them. Have you been
interested enough in this to favor one side or
the other?" (if yes) "What do you think?
Should we:"
Try to discuss and settle differences 78
Other, depends, both 1
Refuse to have anything to do with the
leaders of communist countries 8
Don't know 1
No answer 0
No interest 12
(S.R.C., October 1968, 5:31.)
10. "Some people say that our farmers and business
men should be able to do business with communist
186
countries as long as the goods are not used for
military purposes; others say that our govern
ment should not allow Americans to trade with
communist countries. Have you been interested
enough in this to favor one side over the
other?" (if yes) "How do you feel? Should
farmers and businessmen be:"
Allowed to do business with
communist countries 31
Other, depends, both 4
Forbidden to do business with
communist countries
Don't know
No answer
No interest
(S.R.C., October 1968, 5:33)
38
3
0
24
11. (In context of the Czech crisis.) The United
States "should strengthen i t s defenses and
alliances, such as NATO, to be prepared to
resist aggression anywhere in the world."
Agree 65
Disagree 19
Not sure 16
(Harris, August 1968
Washington Post, September 2, 1968, p. A8)
12. U.S. should "demand that the Russians get out of
Czechoslovakia."
Yes 40
No 38
Not sure 12
(Harris
Washington Post, September 2, 1968, p. A8)
13. "The United States has troops in West Germany as
a result of the NATO treaty agreement with our
Western allies. In general, do you approve or
disapprove of keeping our troops in West
Germany?"
Approve 63
Disapprove 23
No opinion 14
187
(G.O.I., November 1968, p. 8.)
14. "It has been suggested that the U.S. send
100,000 troops to West Germany to remain there
until the Russians remove their troops from
Czechoslovakia. Do you favor or oppose this
proposal?"
Favor 29
Oppose 55
No opinion 15
(G.O.I., October 1968, p. 29.)
15. "How about the situation in Cuba? Do you happen
to remember whether its government is demo
cratic, communist, or something else?" (if com
munist) "Some people feel we must do something
to get the communist government out of Cuba;
others feel that it is up to the Cuban people to
handle their own affair. Have you been inter
ested enough in this to favor one side over the
other?" (if yes) "What is your feeling:
Should we get Communist government out of Cuba
or let the Cuban people handle their own
affairs?"
Get the communist government out 13
Let Cuban people handle their own
affairs 51
Other, depends, both 3
Don't know what to do 2
No answer 0
Cuba is a democracy 1
Cuba is something else 3
Don't know Cuban government 15
(S.R.C., October 1968, 5:43.)
16. "The United States is going to have to fight
Communist China sooner or later, so we might as
well fight before she develops a strong nuclear
force."
Strongly agree 12
Agree 22
Disagree 41
Strongly disagree 15
Don't know, no answer 11
(S.R.C., June 1968)
188
17. (If China known to be Communist and not a U.N.
member) "Do you think Communist China should be
admitted to the United Nations, or do you think
it should not?" (if should not be admitted)
"If Communist China were admitted to the United
Nations, should we stay in or get out?"
Communist China should be admitted to U.N. 23
No; if in, U.S. should stay 24
No; if in, don't know 3
No; if in, no answer on U.S. 0
No; if in, U.S. should get out 5
Don't know if China should be admitted 6
No answer if China should be admitted 0
Inappropriate 39
(S.R.C., October 1968, 5:42.)
18. "Do you think the United States should give up
its membership in the United Nations, or not?"
Yes 1 0
No 85
No opinion 5
(G.O.I., September 1967, p. 16.)
19. "How important do you think it is tha t we try to
make the United Nations a success--very impor
tant, fairly important, or not so important?"
Very important 79
Fairly important 10
Not so important 6
No opinion 5
(G.O.I., September 1967, p. 15.)
20. "Israel should be recognized as a state of the
Arab nations."
Agree
Disagree
Not sure
(Harris
82
3
15
Washington Post, July 10, 1967, p. Al7.)
189
21. "Israel should give full rights to Arabs who
live or used to live where Israel is now."
Agree 58
Disagree 14
Not sure 28
(Harris
Washington Post, July 10, ·1967, p. Al7.)
22. "If a full-scale war were to start (in the Mid
east), do you think that the U.S. should or
should not supply arms and material to the
Arabs?"
Should 3
Should not 79
No opinion 18
(G.O.I., August 1968, p. 23.)
23. (After questions on the Mideast) "If a full scale war were to start there, do you think the
U.S. should or should not send troops to help
the Arabs?"
Should 2
Should not 83
No opinion 15
(G.O.I., August 1968, p. 24.)
24. "Israel should be guaranteed the right to send
ships through the Gulf of Aqaba."
Agree 88
Disagree 1
Not sure 11
(Harris
Washington Post, July 10, 1967, p. Al7.)
25. "Israel should be given the right to use the
Suez Canal."
Agree 86
Disagree 1
Not sure 13
190
(Harris
Washington Post, July 10, 1967, p. Al7.)
26. "Israel should withdraw all its forces from Arab
territory before other issues can be settled."
Agree 21
Disagree 62
Not sure 17
(Harris
Washington Post, July 10, 1967, p. Al7.)
27. (Jerusalem should become an international city
open to all.)
Let Israel keep control 33
International city 33
Not sure 24
(Harris
Washington Post, October 9, 1967, p. A6.)
28. "If a full-scale war were to start (in the Mid
east), do you think the U.S. should or should
not supply arms and material to Israel?"
Should 24
Should not 59
No opinion 17
(G.O.I., August 1968, p. 21.)
29. "If a full-scale war were to start (in the mid
east), do you think the U.S. should or should
not send troops to help Israel?"
Should 9
Should not 77
No opinion 14
(G.O.I., August 1968, p. 22.)
191
c. Economic affairs
1 ••.• aid for welfare and relief payments •..
Expand 14
Keep as is 46
Cut back 31
Not sure 7
(Harris
Washington Post, April 3, 1967, p. A2)
2. (measures to curb inflation) reinstate tight
money • • .
Favor
Oppose
Not sure
(Harris
20
56
24
Washington Post, October 16, 1967, p. A2)
3. (measures to curb inflation) reduce federal
spending . . •
Favor
Oppose
Not sure
73
12
15
(Harris
Washington Post, October 16, 1967, p. A2)
4. "It has been suggested that prices and wages
(salaries) be frozen--that is kept at their
present level, as long as the war in Vietnam
lasts. Do you think this is a good idea or a
poor idea?"
Good idea 38
Poor idea 40
No opinion 12
(G.O.I., January 1968, p. 20.0
5. "President Johnson has asked Congress to pass a
bill that would increase personal income taxes.
If passed, it would mean that for every $100 now
paid in income taxes, there would be an
192
additional 10% surcharge, or $10. Would you
like to see Congress pass this bill or reject
it?"
Pass 14
Reject 79
No opinion 7
~.O.I., January 1968, p. 26.)
6. "Another proposalis to guarantee enough work so
that each family that has an employable wage
earner would be guaranteed enough work each week
to give him a wage of about $60 a week or $3200
a year. Would you favor or oppose such a plan?"
Favor 78
Oppose 18
No opinion 4
(G.O.I., July 1968, p. 24.)
7. "In general, some people feel that the govern
ment in Washington should see to it that every
person has a job and a good standard of living.
Others think the government should just let each
person get ahead on his own. Have you been
interested in this enough to favor one side over
the other?" ( if yes) "Do you think that the
government ••. "
See that all have jobs 31
Other, depends, both 11
Each get ahead on his own 47
Don't know 1
No answer 0
No interest 9
(S.R.C., October 1968.)
8. "as you may know, there is talk about giving
every family an income of at least $3200 a year,
which would be the amount for a family of four.
If the family earns less than this, the govern
ment would make up the difference. Would you
favor or oppose such a plan?"
193
Favor 36
Oppose 58
No opinion 6
(G.O.I., July 1968, p. 23.)
9. (Are you satisfied with •.. )
Yes
Work 88
Income 67
Housing 80
(Gallup, April, 1969, cited in Scammon and Watten
berg, p. 102.)
10. "Do you think poverty will ever be done away
with in this country?"
Yes 7
No 89
No opinion 4
(G.O.I., July 1967, p. 17.)
11. "In you opinion, which is more to blame if a
person is poor--lack of an effort on his own
part, or circumstances beyond his control?"
Lack of effort 42
Circumstances 19
Both 36
No opinion 3
(G.O.I., July 1967, p. 17.)
D. Law and Order
1. "Do you favor or oppose Federal laws which would
control the sales of guns, such as making all
persons register all gun purchases no matter
where they buy them?"
Favor 71
Oppose 23
Not sure 6
194
(Harris
Washington Post, April 23, 1967, p. A4.)
2. "Would you favor or oppose a law which would
require a person to obtain a police permit
before he or she could buy a gun?"
Favor 73
Oppose 24
No opinion 3
(G.O.I., September 1967, p. 17.)
3. "Which of these three plans would you prefer for
the use of guns by persons under the age of 18-
forbid their use completely, put strict restric
tions on their use, or continue as at present
with few regulations?"
Forbid 31
Restrictions 53
As now 14
No opinion 2
(G.O.I., September 1967, p. 18.)
4. "Do you feel that students who won't let the
Marine Corps or companies making napalm recruit
on campus should be drafted?"
Should be drafted 53
Should not be drafted 30
Not sure 17
(Harris
Washington Post, December 18, 1967, p. A2.)
5. "Is there any area around here--that is, within
a mile--where you would be afraid to walk alone
at night?"
National Men
Women
Yes 35 19
50
(Gallup, February, 1968, cited in Scammon and Wa.t
tenberg, p . 9 5 . )
195
6. "In three or four European countries, a person
who drives a car after having more than one
drink of alcoholic beverages is sent to jail.
Would you like to see such a law in this
country, or not?"
Yes 40
No 54
No opinion 6
(G.O.I., February 1968, p. 29.)
7. "In general, do you think the courts in this
area deal too harshly, or not harshly enough
with criminals?"
Too harshly 2
About right 19
Not harshly enough 63
No opinion 16
(G.O.I., February 1968, p. 29.)
8. "As you may know, a mayor of a large city has
ordered the police to shoot on sight anyone
found looting stores during race riots. How do
you feel about this--do you think this is the
best way to deal with this problem or do you
think there is a better way?"
Best way 54
There is a better way 41
No opinion 5
(G.O.I., July 1968, p. 17.)
9. "When new appointments are made by the President
to the Supreme Court, would you like to have
these people be people who are liberal or who
are conservative in their political views."
Liberal
Conservative
No opinion
30
51
19
(G.O.I., August 1968, p. 26.)
196
10. Violation of law and order has been encouraged
by the courts.
Agree 69
Disagree 28
Not sure 8
(Harris
Washington Post, September 9, 1968, p. A2.)
11. Law and order has broken down in this country.
Agree 81
Disagree 14
Not sure 5
(Harris, September, 1968, cited in Scammon and Wat
tenberg, p • 9 6 . )
12. A strong President can make a big differe nce in
directly preserving law and order.
Agree 84
Disagree 10
Not sure 6
(Harris, September 1968, cited in Scammon and Wat
tenberg, p . 9 6 . )
13. Keeping law and order is much more a local than
a Federal government problem.
Agree 73
Disagree 13
Not sure 9
(Harris
Washington Post, September 9, 1968, p. A2.)
14. " •.. would you like to see stricter state and
local laws dealing with such (obscene) litera
ture, or not?"
Yes 85
No 8
No opinion 7
(Gallup, late May 1969, cited in Scammon and Watten
berg, p. 74.)
197
15. "In general, would you like college administra
tions taking stronger stands on student disord
ers, or not?"
Yes 94
No 3
No opinion 3
(Gallup, Early June, 1969, cited in Scammon and Wat
tenberg , p • 7 4 • )
16. "How much respect do you have for the police in
your area--a great deal, some, or hardly any?"
Great deal 77
Some 17
Very little 4
Don't know 2
(G.O.I., September 1967, p. 19.)
17. "In general, what kind of rating would you give
the Supreme Court--excellent, good, fair, or
poor?"
Excellent
Good
Fair
Poor
1967
15
30
45
29
17
46
(G.O.I., August 1967, p. 15.)
1963
10
33
TT
26
15
41
18. "Would you be willing to work with local police
in a community anti-crime operation and report
on any suspicious activity in your neighbor
hood?"
Yes 87
No 13
(G.O.I., March 1968, p. 17.)
198
19. Did you happen to hear anything about what went
on between the police and the demonstrators in
Chicago at the Democratic convention? (IF YES)
Do you think the police used too much force, the
right amount of force, or not enough force with
the demonstrators?
Did not hear about what went on
Too much force
Right amount of force
Not enough force
Don't know
(S.R.C., post-election survey, 1968.)
E. Race Relations
12
19
32
25
12
1. (In order to solve the race problem and prevent
racial outbreaks) " ... setting up large-scale
federal work projects to give jobs to all the
unemployed."
Would be effective 56
Not very sure 13
Not very effective 31
(Harris
Washington Post, November 20, 1967, p. A2.)
2. (With which of the following statements do you
agree?) (addressed to Caucasians)
Blacks are inferior to Whites 24
Blacks have less native intel-
ligence than whites 44
Blacks have less ambition than
Whites 60
Blacks are asking for more than
they are ready for 67
Blacks are more violent than
Whites 42
Blacks breed crimes 33
Until there is justice for minorities,
there will not be law and order 63
America has discriminated against
Negroes for too long 58
(Harris, September, 1968, cited in Scammon and Wat
tenberg, pp. 97-99.)
199
3. "As you may know, Congress passed a bill that
says that Negroes should have the right to go to
any hotel or restaurant they can afford, just
like anybody else. Some people feel that this
is something the government in Washington should
support. Others feel that the government should
stay out of this matter. Have you been inter
ested enough in this to favor one side over the
other?" (If Yes) "Should the government ... "
Support the right to go wherever they afford 52
Other, depends, both 2
Stay out of this matter 33
Don't know 2
No answer 0
No interest 10
(S.R.C., October 1968, 5:11.)
4. "Some people feel that if Negroes are not get
ting fair treatment in jobs the government in
Washington should see to it that they do. Oth
ers feel that this is not the Federal govern
ment's business. Have you had enough interest
in this to favor one side over the other?'' (If
Yes) "how do you feel? Should the government
in Washington .•. "
See to fair treatment 38
Other, depends, both 6
Leave matters to state and local community 43
Don't know 2
No answer 1
No interest 11
(S.R.C., October 1968, 4:73.)
5. "Some people say that the government in Washing
ton should see to it that White and Negro chil
dren are allowed to go to the same schools.
Others claim this is not the government's busi
ness. Have you been concerned enough about this
question to favor one side over the other?" (If
Yes) "Do you think the government's in Washing
ton should ... "
See they go to same schools 38
Other, depends, both 7
Stay out of this area 44
200
Don't know
No answer
No interest
(S.R.C., October 1968, 4:76.)
2
1
9
6. "Do you favor or oppose open hous _·.ng laws?"
Favor 42
Oppose 37
No opinion 21
(G.O.I., October 1968, p. 32.)
7. Do you think the Administration is pushing inte
gration too fast, or not fast enough?"
early June April
Oct. 1968 1968 1968
Too fast
54
45 39
Not fast enough 17
20 21
About right
21 22 25
Don't know
8 13 15
(G.O.I., October 1968, p. 30; July 1968, p. 15; May
1968, p. 22. The term "Johnson" was inserted before
Administration in the April and June surveys.)
8. (Should) the
.
civil rights be
progress in
• • •
speeded up?
Yes
Blacks
72
Caucasians
28
(Harris, October 1968, cited in Scammon and Watten
berg, pp. 97-98.)
9. "A Negro organization is asking American
churches and synagogues to pay 500 mi :_lion
dollars to Negroes because of past injustices.
How do you feel about this--would you favor or
oppose this being done?"
Favor 4
Oppose 90
No opinion 6
201
(Gallup, late June, 1969, cited in Scammon and Wat
tenberg, p. 74.)
10. "In your opinion, how well do you think Negroes
ar~ being treated in this community--the same as
Whites are, not very well, or badly?"
May March July
1968 1968 1967
Same as Whites 10 67 72
Not very well 17 19 15
Badly 3 2 2
No opinion 10 12 11
(G.O.I., August, 1967, p. 13 and July, 1968, p. 19.)
11. "Do you think there is likely to be any serious
racial trouble in this community in the next six
months?"
Yes
No
No opinion
June
1968
19
75
6
(G.O.I., July 1968, p. 16.)
July
1967
13
78
9
12. "The conclusion of the President's Commission on
Civil Disorders was that our natior is moving
toward two societies, one Black. One White-
separate and unequal. Do you agree with this
conclusion, or not?"
Agree
Disagree
No opinion
May
1968
36
51
13
(G.O.I., July 1968, p. 18.)
March
1968
32
52
16
13. "Who do you think is more to blame for the
202
present conditions in which Negroes find them
selves--White people, or Negroes themselves?"
White people
Negroes
No opinion
May
1968
24
54
22
(G.O.I., July 1968, p. 20.)
March
1968
2 2
58
20
14. "Do you think most businesses in your area dis
criminate against Negroes in their hiring prac
tices, or not?"
Yes 21
No 65
No opinion 14
(G.O.I., July 19n8, p. 21.)
F. The Role of Government
1. "Some people are afraid the government in Wash
ington is getting too powerful for the good of
the country and the individual person. Others
feel that the government in Washington is not
getting too strong for the good of the country.
Have you been interested enough in this to favor
one side over the other?" (If yes) "What is
your feeling, do you think ... "
The government is too powerful
Other, depends both
Government has not gotten too
strong
Don't know
No answer
No interest
(S.R.C., October 1968, 4:56.)
40
3
30
2
0
24
2. "In your opinion, which of the following do you
think will be the beggest threat to the c~untry
in the future--big business, big labor, or big
government?"
203
Business 12
Labor 26
Government 46
Don't know 16
(G.O.I., September 1968), p. 20.)
3. "Do you favor or oppose a federal plan such as
Medicare for older people which would cover all
members of your family '?"
Favor 51
Oppose 39
Not sure 10
(Harris
Washington Post, January 23, 1967, p. A2.)
4 •
• •
. medicare for the aged ...
Expand 35
Keep as is 51
Cut back 8
Not sure 6
(Harris
Washington Post, April 3, 1967, p. A2.)
5.
• •
. aid to set up mental health clinics ...
Expand 47
Keep as is 39
Cut back 5
Not sure 9
(Harris
Washington Post, April 3, 1967, p. A2.)
6. "Some say the government in Washington ought to
help people get doctor and hospital care at low
cost; others say the government should not get
into this. Have you been interested enough in
this to favor one side over the other?" (If
yes) "What is your position? Should the gov
ernment in Washington ... "
Help at low cost 52
Other, depends, both 6
204
Stay out of this
Don't know
No answer
No interest
(S.R.C., October 1968, 4:53.)
27
2
0
14
7. ... the Head Start program.
Expand
Keep as is
Cut back
Not sure
(Harris
23
33
21
23
• •
Washington Post, April 3, 1967, p. A2.)
8. "Some people think the government in Washington
should help towns and cities provide education f
for grade and high school children; others think
this should be handled by the states and local
communities. Have you been interested enough in
this to favor one side over the other?" (If
yes) "Which are you in favor of ... "
Help from Washington 28
Other, depends, both 4
Handling at state and local level 48
Don't know 1
No answer 0
No interest 18
(S.R.C., October 1968, 4:54.)
9 .... federal scholarships for needy college
students . . .
Expand 47
Keep as is 38
Cut back 9
Not sure 6
(Harris
Washington Post, April 3, 1967, p. A2.)
10. A federal program to tear down ghettoes in the
cities.
205
Effective 57
Not very effective 32
Not sure 11
Harris
Washington Post, November 20, 1967, p. A2.)
11. "Besides providing for the military security of
the country, the Federal Government conducts a
number of programs in many different areas. I
want to run down some of these programs. For
each, tell me if you think it should be expanded
kept as is, or cut back". . . aid to cities • .
• • •
Expand
Keep as is
Cut back
Not sure
(Harris
15
43
26
16
Washington Post, April 3, 1967, p. A2.)
12. A federal program to exterminate rats in slums.
Effective 52
Not very effective 41
Not sure 7
(Harris
Washington Post, November 20, 1967, p. A2.)
13.
• •
• Federal housing for low income families
• • •
Expand
Keep as is
Cub back
Not sure
(Harris
25
48
19
8
Washington Post, April 3, 1967, p. A2.)
14. "As part of the anti-poverty program, the Fed
eral government is providing funds for retrain
~ng poorly educated people so they can get jobs.
Do you think spending by the Federal Government
for this purpose should be kept at least on the
206
present level, or reduced, or ended altogether?"
Present level or increased 75
Reduced 13
Ended altogether 8
Don't know 11
(A.I.P.O., February 1967
Lloyd A. Free and Hadley Cantril, The Political
Beliefs of Americans: A Study of Public Opinion (New
York: Simon and Shuster, 1968), p. 12.)
15. "Under the Community Action program, the Federal
government makes grants to city governments and
private organizations so that they can carry on
local projects with the idea of combatting pov
erty. Do you think spending by the Federal gov
ernment for this purpose should be kept at least
at the present level, or reduced, or ended alto
gether?"
Present level or increased 54
Reduced 25
Ended altogether 10
Don't know 11
(A.I.P.O., February 1967
Lloyd A. Free and Hadley Cantril, The Political
Beliefs of Americans: A Stud of Public O inion (New
York: Simon and Shuster, 1968), p. 11.
16. Setting up massive summer camps
Effective 47
Not very effective 38
Not sur0 15
(Harris
Washington Post, November 20, 1967, p. A2.)
17. "It has been suggested that 3 per cent of the
money which Washington collects in Federal
income taxes be returned to the states and local
governments to be used by these states and local
governments as they see fit. Do you favor or
oppose this idea?"
207
Favor
Oppose
No opinion
72
17
11
(G.O.I., August 1967, p. 25.)
18 .
. . . the war on poverty
Expand
Keep as is
Cut back
Not sure
23
37
31
9
• • •
(Harris
Washington Post, April 3, 1967, p. A2.)
19.
• •
. aid to care for adequate commuter trains
• • •
Expand
Keep as is
Cut back
Not sure
(Harris
14
24
29
33
Washington Post, April 3, 1967, p. A2.)
20 .... subsidy payments for farmers ...
Expand
Keep as is
Cut back
Not sure
(Harris
12
34
37
17
Washington Post, April 3, 1967, p. A2.)
21.
... federal aid in highway building
Expand
Keep as is
Cut back
Not sure
(Harris
22
51
19
8
Washington Post, April 3, 1967, p. A2.)
• • •
•
208
22 •... program to curb air pollution ..•
Expand
Keep as is
Cut back
Not sure
(Harris
50
31
9
10
Washington Post, April 3, 1967, p. A2.)
G. Miscellaneous Concerns
1. "Do you favor or oppose the right of . . .
policf.!men to strike?"
Favor
Oppose
Not sure
(Harris
36
56
8
Washin g t on Post, October 2 3 , 1 967, p. A2.)
2. "Do you favor or oppose the right of ... fire
men to strike?"
Favor
Oppose
Not sure
(Harris
35
57
8
Washington Post, October 23, 1967, p. A2.)
3. "Do you favor or oppose the right of ..• rail
road workers to strike?"
Favor
Oppose
Not sure
(Harris
59
29
12
Washington Post, October 23, 1967, p. A2.)
209
4. "Do you favor or oppose the right of ••.
defense workers to strike?"
Favor
Not sure
Oppose
(Harris
34
55
11
Washington Post, October 23, 1967, p. A2.)
5. "Do you favor or oppose the right of ... auto
industry workers to strike?"
Favor
Oppose
Not sure
(Harris
64
26
10
Washington Post, October 23, 1967, p. A2.)
6. "Do you f avor or oppose the right of r ubbe r
indus t r y worke rs t o s t rike ?"
Favor
Oppose
Not sure
(Harris
64
22
14
Washington Post, October 23, 1967, p. A2.)
7. "Should public school teachers be permitted to
strike, or not?"
Should
Should not
No opinion
36
57
7
(G.O.I., April 1968, p. 24.)
8. "Should nurses be permitted to s ·crike or not?"
Should
Should not
No opinion
29
66
5
(G.O.I., April 1968, p. 25.)
210
9. "Should garbage men or sanitation men be per
mitted to strike, or not?"
Should
Should not
No opinion
43
51
6
(G.O.I., April 1968, p. 27.)
10. "Should publ ic school teachers be permitted to
joint unions, or not?"
Should
Should not
No opinion
59
34
7
(G.O.I., April 1968, p. 23.)
11. "Should nurses be permitted to join unions, or
not?"
Should
Should not
No opinion
58
34
8
(G.O.I., April 1968, p. 25.)
12. "Farmers of the nation are being advised to
start a nationwide union. How do you feel about
this--do you think they should or should not
establish a nationwide union?"
Should
Should not
No opinion
48
35
17
(G.O.I., April 1968, p. 26.)
13. "It has been suggested that no strike be per
mitted to go on for more than 21 days. If after
21 days the union and the employer cannot reach
agreement, the courts would appoint a committee
that would decide the issue and both be com
pelled to accept the terms. Would you favor or
oppose this idea?"
211
Favor
Oppose
No opinion
69
22
9
(G.O.I., February 1968, p. 27.)
14.
• •
. repeal of section 14B of the Taft Hartley
Act . . .
Favor
Oppose
Not sure
(Harris
17
39
44
Washington Post, March 28, 1967, p. A2.)
15. "Would you approve or disapprove of an amendment
of the Constitution which would do away with the
Electoral College and base the election of a
Pr eside nt on the total vote c ast throughout the
na t ion?"
Approve
Disapprove
No opinion
66
19
15
(A.I.P.O., June 1968
G.O.I., July 1968, p. 25. )
16. "It has been suggested that presidential candi
dates be chosen by the voters in a nationwide
primary election instead of by political party
conventions as at present. Would you favor or
oppose this?"
Favor
Oppose
No opinion
76
13
11
(Gallup release, September 22, 1968.)
17. "It has been suggested that the e ·lection of a
new President be in September an- the inaugura
tion in November in order to allow an incoming
President more time to prepare l~gislation for
the opening of Congress in early January. Do
you think this is a good idea or a poor one?"
212
Good idea
Poor idea
No opinion
62
19
19
(G.O.I., April 1968, p. 21.)
18. "Do you think persons 18, 19, and 20 years old
should be permitted to vote, or not?"
Yes
No
No opinion
66
31
3
(Gallup release, September 22, 1968.)
19. "Would you favor or oppose a law which would put
a limit on the total amount of money which can
be spent for or by a candidate in his campaign
for public office?"
Favor
Oppose
No opinion
67
25
8
(G.O.I., July 1968, p. 26.)
20. "Do you favor or oppose the space project
landing a man on the moon?"
Favor 43
Oppose 46
Not sure 11
(Harris
Washington Post, July 31, 1967, p. A2.)
21.
• •
. the space program
Expand
Keep as is
Cut back
Not sure
(Harris
13
38
42
7
• • •
Washington Post, April 3, 1967, p. A2.)
.
of aim
213
22. (Af":.er q estions about Senator Dodd) "Do you
favor or oppose a law which would not allow Con
gressmen to receive any campaign contributions
for personal work connected with legislation?"
Favor
Oppose
Not sure
(Harris
59
23
18
Washington Post, May 8, 1968, p. A2.)
23. (After questions on Senator Dodd) "Do you
favor or oppose a law which requires that all
members of the House of Representatives and the
U.S. Senate reveal their total personal income,
and its sources?"
Favor
Oppose
Not sure
(Harris
67
22
11
Washington Post, May 8, 1967, p. A2.)
24. "It has been proposed that members of the House
of Representatives and the Senate be required to
make public a record of their financial assets
and holdings every year. Do you favor or oppose
this proposal?"
Favor
Oppose
No opinion
69
20
11
(G.O.I., May 1967, p. 9.)
~
25. "At present when Congress passes a law to spend
money the President cannot approve the parts of
that law but must approve it in f~ll. Should
this be changed so that he can turn down some
parts of the law without turning down the entire
law?"
Should
Should not
No opinion
55
29
16
(G.O.I., April 1967, p. 20.)
214
26 •.•. program to curb water pollution ..•
Expand
Keep as is
Cut back
Not sure
(Harris
50
35
5
10
Washington Post, April 3, 1967, p. A2.)
27. "Would you be willing or unwilling to pay $15 a
year more in taxes to finance a federal program
to control air pollution?"
Willing
Unwilling
Not sure
(Harris
44
47
9
Washington Post, July 24, 1967, p. A2.)
28. "Most cities in Europe require electric and tel
ephone wires to be placed underground. Do you
think it would be a good idea or a poor idea to
require wir_s to be put underground in urban
areas in this country?"
Good idea
Poor idea
No opinion
80
12
8
(G.O.I., January 1968, p. 19.)
29. "As you know, young men 18 years old and over,
if physically qualified, are subject to the mil-
itary draft. In general, do you favor or oppose
the draft as it now works?"
Favor present system 53
Oppose system 36
Not sure 11
(Harris
Washington Post, May 13, 1968, p. A3.)
30 •.•. a system of universal service whereby
young men could choose between the military and
the Peace Corps or some other form of non-combat
215
public service.
Favor
Oppose
Not sure
(Harris
67
21
12
Washington Post, February 20, 1967, p. A2.)
31. "It has been suggested that the draft be changed
so that 19-year-old boys would be subject to a
draft by lottery--that is, ~ny 19-year-old can
be drafted, and, if qualified, would serve in
the armed forces. For those chosen it might
mean no deferment for college or any other rea
son. If you had to choose, would you favor the
present system or the lottery system for draft
ing 19-year-olds?"
Present draft 54
Lottery of 19s 31
Not sure 15
(Harris
Washington Post, May 13, 1967, p. A3.)
32. "Under the present draft law a college student
is deferred until he has finished college,
unless he is in the lower half of his class and
doesn't pass a special draft test. Do you think
this system of deciding whether college students
should be drafted is fair or not?"
Fair
Unfair
Not sure .
(Harris
38
48
14
Washington Post, February 20, 1967, p. A2.)
33 (the ending of deferments for graduate students)
Yes
No
Not sure
(Harris
50
34
16
Washington Post, May 13, 1968, p. A3.)
216
34.
• • •
volunteer enlistments
favor
oppose
Not sure
42
46
12
• • •
(Harris
Washington Post, February 20, 1967, p. A2.)
35. "It has been suggested that the base pay of
young men who go into the armed services be
increased to make their pay equal to the minimum
wage paid by business and industry. Would you
favor or oppose this plan."
Favor
Oppose
No opinion
80
17
3
(G.O.I., January 1968, p. 25.)
36. (Draft resisters should not be exempt from mili
tary service . )
If they feel the Vietnam war is morally
wrong, they should be exempt 25
No 65
(Harris
Washington Post, May 13, 1968, p. A3.)
37. "Some people think it is all right for the pub
lic schools to start each day with a prayer.
Others feel that religion does not belong in the
public schools but should be taken care of by
the family and the church. Have you been inter
ested enough in this to favor one side over the
other?" ( If yes) "Which do you think:
1. Schools should be allowed (to start) each
day with a prayer. 3. Pro-con, depends, both,
other. 5. Religion does not belong in the
schools."
Pro-prayer
Depends
Anti-prayer
Don't know
No answer
No interest
63
3
11
1
14
7
217
(S.R.C., October 1968, 14:53.)
Additional survey data is important to the construction
of the image held by voters in 1968. The additional data,
however, do not classify well under the categories listed
above. The data are useful to indicate the relative
saliency of the various concerns to the voters and to
provide an indication of the general mood of the electorate.
The data are presented below in a category that we name, for
lack of a better term, synthesizing data.
H. Synthesizing Data
1. (What is the most important problem facing the
nation?)
Feb .. 28, 1968
May 26, 1968
Aug. 4, 1968
Sept. 8, 1968
Oct . 3 0 , 19 6 8
March, 1969
Crime, civil rights, high cost of
living
Vietnam war, crime, and lawlessness
Vietnam war, crime and lawlessness,
race relations, high cost of living
Vietnam war, crime, civil rights,
high cost of living
Vietnam war, crime, race relations,
high cost of living
Vietnam war, crime and lawlessness,
race relations, high cost of living
(Various Gallup surveys summarized in Scammon and Wat
tenberg, p. 39.)
2. "What do you think is the most important problem
facing this country today?"
Vietnam war 40
Crime and lawlessness (including riots,
looting, juvenile delinquency) 17
218
Race relations
Inflation, high cost of living
College demonstrations
Poverty
Unrest in nation
Other problems
Don't know, no answer
16
9
4
3
3
16
2
(Gallup, March 1969, cited in Scammon and Wattenberg,
p. 227.)
3. "Which one of these government programs would you
most like to see kept or even increased, if yea had
to choose one?"
Anti-crime, law enforcement programs
Aid to education
Anti-poverty program
Medicaid
Anti-air and anti-water pollution
programs
Welfare and relief
Aid to cities
Subsidies to farmers
Financing Vietnam war
Build for highways
Space program
Q)
U)
rtl
Q)
H
0
s:::
H
H
0
~
Q)
Q)
~
22
19
17
9
8
8
3
4
4
2
2
.µ
U)
H
·.-4
µ.j
.µ
~
u
1
1
6
2
2
10
5
7
18
9
39
(Harris, February 1969, cited in Scammon and Wattenberg,
pp. 75-76.)
4. "What do you consider to be the most urgent problem
facing you and your family today?"
Financial: the high cost of living, taxes,
cost of education 60
219
No problems--everything's fine 16
Miscellaneous 10
Sickness, health problems 8
Vietnam: concern over relatives in Vietnam
or the possibility of his going 5
Racial problems: integrated neighborhoods,
riot 4
Employment problems: hard to find a
good job 3
Old age: proper housing and care 3
No opinion, no answer 2
(Gallup, November 1968, cited in Scammon and Wattenberg,
pp. 226-227.)
5. "Do you believe that life today is getting better or
worse in terms of morals?"
Better 8
Worse 78
No change 12
Don't know 2
(G.O.I., September, 1968, p. 28.)
6. "Do you believe that life today is getting better or
worse in terms of honesty?"
Better 13
Worse 61
No change 19
Don't know 7
(G.O.I., September 1968, p. 27.)
7. "Do you believe that life today is getting better or
worse in terms of happiness?"
Better 26
Worse 49
No change 18
Don't know 7
(Gallup, November, 1968, cited in Scammon and Watten
berg, p. 101.)
220
8. "Do you believe that life today is getting better or
worse in terms of peace of mind?"
Better 15
Worse 69
No change .LO
Don't know 6
(Gallup, November 1968, cited in Scammon and Wattenberg,
p. 101.)
221
S E L E C T I V E B I B L I O G R A P H Y
222
SELECTIVE BIBLIOGRAPHY
Books and Essays in Books
Abels, Jules. The Degeneration of Our Presidential Elec
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American Institute for Political Communication. The 1968
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Bogart, Leo. Silent Politics:
Public Opinion. New York:
Polls and the Awareness of
John Wiley and Sons, 1972.
Boulding, Kenneth E. The Image. Ann Arbor: The University
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Brodbeck, Arthur J. "The Problem of Irrationality and
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Voting Behavior. Edited by Eugene Burdick and
Arthur J. Brouoeck. Glencoe, Illinois: The Free
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Budd, Richard W.; Thorp, Robert K.; and Donohew, Lewis.
Content Analysis of Communications New York: Mac
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Burke, Kenneth. A Grammar of Motives and Rhetoric of
Motives. Cleveland: World Publishing Company, 1962.
Burke, Kenneth. Counter-Statement. Berkeley: University
of California Press, 1968.
Burke, Kenneth. Language as Symbolic Action. Berkeley:
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Burke, Kenneth~ Philosophy of Literary Form. New York:
Vintage Books, 1957.
Campbell, Angus; Converse, Phillip E.; Miller, Warren E.;
and Stokes, Donald E. Elections and the Political
Order. New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1966.
223
Campbell, Angus; Converse, Phillip E.; Miller, Warren E.;
and Stokes, Donald B. The American Voter. New York:
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Campbell, Angus; Gurin, Gerald; and Miller, Warren E. The
Voter Decides. Evanston~ Row, Peterson and Company,
1952.
Chaffee, Steven H. "The Diffusion of Political Informa
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Chester, Lewis; Hodgson, Godfrey; and Page, Bruce. An Amer
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Downs, Anthony. An Economic Theory of Democracy. New York:
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Edelman, Murray. The Symbolic Uses of Politics. Urbana:
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Flanigan, William H., and Zingale, Nancy. Political Behav
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Gallup, George. The Sophisticated Poll Watcher's Guide.
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Greenstein, Fred I. "What the President Means to Ameri
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Holsti, Ole R. Content Analysis for the Social Sciences and
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224
Lar_g, Kurt, and Lang, Gladys Engel. Politics and Televi
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Mendelsohn, Harold, and Crespi, Irving. Polls, Television,
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Attitudes and Public Opinion. New York:
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Political
David McKay,
Novak, Michael. Choosing Our King. New York: MacMillan
Publishing Company, 1974.
Pool, Ithiel de Sola. "T. V.: A New Dimension in Poli tics."
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Arthur J. Brodbeck. Glencoe, Illinois: The Free
Press, 1959.
Pamper, Gerald M. Elections in America. New York: Dodd,
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Ray, Joseph M., ed.
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The President: Rex, Princeps, Imper
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Research Division, Republican National Committee. The 1968
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to Positive Political Theory. Englewood Cliffs, New
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Rosenburg, Milton J.; Verba, Sidney; and Converse,
Phillip E. Vietnam and the Silent Majority. New York:
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Scammon, Richard M., and Wattenberg, Ben J. The Real Major
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225
Sears, David O., and Whitney, Richard. '' .. 'oli tical Persua
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Shadegg, Stephen. How to Win an Election: The Art of
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Sherif, Carolyn W.; Sherif, Muzafer; and Nebergall, Roger E.
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Saunders, 1965.
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the United States: 1973. Washington, D.C.: Govern
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Weaver, Richard M. The Ethics of Rhetoric. Chicago: Henry
Regnery Company, 1953.
White, Theodore H. The Making of the President 1968. New
York: Atheneum Publishers, 1969.
Periodicals
Axelrod, Robert. "Where the Votes Come From: An Analysis
of Electoral Coalitions, 1952-1968." American Polit
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Bogart, Leo.
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331-345.
"No Opinion, Don't Know, and Maybe, No
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Boyd, Richard W. "Presidential Elections: An Explanation
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226
Davis, Otto A.; Henich, Melvin J.; and Ordeshook, Peter C.
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Spatial Competition." Journal of Political Economy, 45
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the Electoral Process: the Vietnam War Issue." Ameri
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979-995.
Pamper, Gerald M. "From Confusion to Clarity: Issues and
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"Presidential Campaign 1960. A Symposium, Part II: Contest
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"Candidates Answer EN Education Questionnaire." Education
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Unpublished Materials
Democratic National Committee. "America Is Better than
Nixon or Wallace Believes, Humphrey Says." News
Release. Washington, D.C., October 16, 1968 .
. "American People Cannot Trust Either Nixon or
-----
Wallace, Vice President Humphrey Says." News Release.
Erie, Pa., October 7, 1968.
229
Democratic National Committee. "Build Bridges of Under-
standing at Home and Abroad, Vice President Urges."
News Release. Wilm~ngton, Delaware, September 12,
1968.
"Citizenship Day Message by Vice President Hubert H.
-----
Humphrey." News Release. September 16, 1968 .
. "Continue Tradition of Humane Democratic Govern-
-----
ment, Humphrey Says." News Release. Detroit, Michi-
gan, October 17, 1968 .
. "Democrats Provide Jobs, Training to Take People
--____,O,,_f..,,.....,,...f Welfare, and Help Them ~ielp Themselves, Vice Presi-
dent Humphrey Says." News Release. Portland, Oregon,
September 27, 1968 .
• "Democratic Ticket Has Earned People's Trust,
-----
Humpr ... rey Says." News Release. New York, New York,
October 30, 1968 .
• "G. o. P. Seeking Renewal of 'Permanent Patent
-----
on Recession,' Humphrey Says." News Release. Evans-
ville, Indiana, October 14, 1968 .
. "G. o. P. Sought to Buy Rather than Earn Trust of
-----
American People, Humphrey Says." News Release.
Youngstown, Ohio, November 2, 1968.
.
. "HHH Seeks Laws to Stop Disorder." News Release.
---w~a-s-hington, D. c., October 17, 1968 .
. "Humphrey Attacks Nixon's Secret Letter to Wall
--------
Street." News Release. New York, New York, October
10, 1968 .
• "Humphrey Cites Democratic Program for Progress,
---P,,_r_o-speri ty, Peace; Hi ts Nixon Issues Evasion." News
Release. Cleveland, Ohio, September 22, 1968 .
• "Humphrey Declares Economy Can Provide Jobs For
---A-1-1- Who Want Them." News Release. Harlingen, Texas,
October 23, 1968 .
-----
. "Humphrey Favors Rural Revitalization, National
Conservation and Land Policy." News Release. Peoria,
Illinois, November 1, 1968 .
. "Humphrey Issues Science-Technology Statement.
-----
Hits Political Gap Hunting of Nixon." News Release.
San Jose, California, October 25, 1968.
230
Democratic National Committee. "Humphrey Pledges Action to
Encourage Political Participation by Americans Abroad."
News Release. Washington, D.C., November 1, 1968 •
• "Humphrey Pledges End to Hunger and Malnutrition
-----
in America .. " News Release. Washington, D.C., Octo-
ber 16, 1968 •
• "Humphrey Pledges Strong Economy, Vigorous Secur-
-----
ities Regulation to Maintain Confidence in Invest-
ments." News Release. Washington, D.C., October 29,
1968 .
. "Humphrey Promises Educational Bill of Rights."
-----
News Release. Cincinnati, Ohio, October 11, 1968 .
• "Humphrey Proposes Specific, Straightforward Pro-
-----
gram to Combat Crime, Calls on Rivals to Talk Sense on
the Issue." News Release. Boston, Massachusetts,
October 9, 1968 .
• "Humphrey Seeks Improved Police Justice to Stop
-----
Riots, Crime." News Release. Washington, D .c., Sep-
tember 22, 1968 •
-----
• "Humphrey Seeks Improved Policy, Community Rela-
tions, Equal Justice to Eliminate Crime and Disorders."
News Release. Washington, D.C., September 16, 1968 .
-----
• "Humphrey Urges Reversal of Ruling Barring
Charles Evers from u. of Mississippi Speech." News
Release. Washington, D.C., October 2, 1968.
-----
• '°Humphrey
Politics, Backs
Moral Concern."
ber 31, 1968 •
Urges Young People to Participate in
a Democratic Party Based on Issues,
News Release. Newark, N.J., Octa-
. "Inflation Control Program Announced by Vice
-----
President Hubert H. Humphrey." News Release. Washing-
ton, D.C., October 14, 1968 •
• "Nation Cannot Afford Evasive President, Vice
-----
President Humphrey Says." News Release. Toledo, Ohio,
September 23, 1968.
•
News Release . Washington, D .c., September 5,
1968 .
• "Nixon Afraid to Debate, Humphrey Charges."
-----
News Release. Kansas City, Mo., Octob«=r 15, 1968.
231
Democratic National Committee. "Nixon Denies Americans
Added Security of Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty,
Vice President Humphrey Says." News Release. Louis
ville, Kentucky, September 20, 1968 .
. "Nixon Hides Negative Record Behind Saturation
-----
Advertising, Humphrey Says." News Release. New York,
New York, October 18, 1968 .
• "Nixon's Key Campaign Decisions Justify Public's
-----
Lack of Trust in Him, Humphrey Says." News Release.
Hartford, Connecticut, October 18, 1968 .
. "No Memberships in Discriminatory Groups, Vice
-----
President Humphrey Says." News Release. Washington,
D.C., October 4, 1968 .
. "Position Paper: G. I. and Veterans Rights."
----,,N~e-w-s Release. Washington, D.C., October 18, 1968 .
. "Silent, Evasive, Vacationing Nixon Takes Ameri
___ c_a_n_ People for Granted, Humphrey Says." News Release.
Scranton, Pa., October 7, 1968 .
. "Vice President Hubert H. Humphrey's Address to
---t~h~e- Nation on Vietnam and American Foreign Policy, Salt
Lake City, Utah--NBC-TV." News Release. September 30,
1968 .
. "Vice President Humphrey Backs Gun Control,
-----
Challenges Mr. Nixon to Reveal His Position." News
Release. Washington, D.C., September 14, 1965 .
. "Vice President Humphrey Challenges Nixon on Law
-----
and Order Stand." News Release. Stratford, Connecti-
cut, October 18, 1968 .
-----
. "Vice President Humphrey Challenges Nixon to
Debate; Hits 'Fence Straddling.'" News Release.
Springfield, Illinois, September 20, 1968 .
• "Vice President Humphrey Cites Economic Gains
-----
Under Kennedy-Johnson and Johnson-Humphrey Administra-
tions." News Release. Washington, D.C., September 7,
1968 .
• "Vice President Humphrey Defines New 'Strategy
-----
for Peace.'" News Release. Washington, D.C., Septem-
ber 26, 1968.
232
Democratic National Committee. "Vice President Humphrey
Details Crime Fighting Program." News Release. New
Orleans, La., September 11, 1968 .
. "Vice President Humphrey Offers Blueprint for
__ ___,O,.,_r_d_er and Justice." News Release. Washington, D .C.,
September 16, 1968.
---e:=---
. "Vice President Humphrey Outlines His 's"tra tegy
for Peace.'" News Release. Columbus, Ohio, Septem-
ber 21, 1968 .
-----
• "Vice President Humphrey Pledges Active, Open
Presidency to Meet Nation's Problems." News Release.
New York, New York, October 10, 1968 .
• "Vice President Humphrey Promises Price Stability
-----
with Prosperity--Not Enough Recessions." News Release.
Portland, Oregon, September 27, 1968 .
-----
. "Vice President Humphrey Promises to Fund Federal
Funds to Cities." News Releas e . Washingtonr D.C.,
October 5 , 1968 .
• "Vice President Humphrey Proposes Action to
-----
Rescue and Renew America's Rivers, Keep Shorelines Open
to All." News Release. The Dalles, Oregon, Septem
ber 28, 1968 .
• "Vice President Humphrey Proposes Nine-Point Plan
---o-f-Action for Excellence in Education. " News Release.
Washington, D.C., October 6, 1968 .
-----
• "Vice President Humphrey Proposes Program to Aid
0 lder Americans." News Release. Washington, D .C.,
September 25, 1968 •
-----
. "Vice President Humphrey Proposes Regular Summit
Meetings." News Release. Washington, D .c., October 8,
1968 .
-----
. "Vice President Humphrey Proposes 7-Point Program
to Strengthen American Family Life." News Release.
Toledo, Ohio, September 23, 1968 .
-----
• "Vice President Humphrey Proposes Specific
Actions on Urban Crisis." News Release. September 18,
1968 .
-----
• "Vice President Humphrey Proposes 10-Point Pro-
gram for Revitalization of Rural America." News
Release. Sioux Falls, S.D., September 19, 1968.
233
Democratic National Committee. "Vice President Humphrey
Says Mr. Nixon Is Evading Major Issues Before the Coun
try." News Release. W?shington, D.C., September 15,
1968 .
. "Vice President Humphrey Says 1968 Campaign Will
-----
Decide Whether the Extremists Succeed; Assails Nixon
and Wallace on Their 'Law and Order' Appeals." News
Release. Salt Lake City, Utah, September 30, 1968 •
• "Vice President Humphrey Says Nixon Is Same Man
--------
He Was in 1960." News Release. Boston, Massachusetts,
September 19, 1968 .
.. "Vice President Humphrey Says Nixon's Economic
-----
Policy Would Cause Recession." News Release. Detroit,
Michigan, October 17, 1968.
. "Vice President Hum·phrey Scores Labor Record of
-------
Wallace and Nixon." News Release. Minneapolis, Minne-
sota, September 24, 1968 .
. "Vice President Humphrey Scores Nixon Economic
-----
Policy." News Release. Detroit, Michigan, October 18,
1968 .
. "Vice President Humphrey Sees Revenue from Eco-
-----
nomic Growth Providing Funds for Social Needs." News
Release. Washington, D.C., September 16, 1968 .
. "Vice President Humphrey to Encourage 'Women-
-----
Power.'" News Release. South Gate, Michigan, Novem-
ber 1, 1968 .
. "Vice President Humphrey Urges Arms Aid to Israel
-----
Pending General Settlement in Middle East." News
Release. September 18, 1968 .
. "Vice President Humphrey Urges Rejection of
, ........ E-x-tremism." News Release. Charlotte, N. C., October
2, 1968 .
. "Vice President Steps Up Campaign With All-Out
__ ___,,A,....,t,._t,_ack on 'Racism. ' " News Release. Washington, D. C. ,
October 6, 1968 •
. "Vice President Warns of Threat to Economic Gains
-----
Under G. O .. ~ P. Rule." News Release. Bluefield, West
Virginia, October 3, 1968.
• "V. P. Humphrey Pledges End of 'Balance of
___ T_e_r-ror. ' " News Release. Los Angeles, California, .
October 24, 1968.
234
Democratic National Committee. "Youth:
Hubert H. Humphrey." News Release.
October 24, 1968 .
A Statement by
Washington, D.C.,
. "Wallace Policy Hits 'Little Man,' Vice President
-----
Humphrey Says." News Release. Jacksonville, Florida,
October 2, 1968.
Humphrey, Hubert H. Address to the National Newspaper Asso
ciation. Cincinnati, Ohio, Democratic National Comnit
tee, October 11, 1968 .
. "Crime Prevention and the Control of Firearms."
---,.,..--
Statement issued in Washington, D.C., Democratic
National Committee, September 13, 1968 .
. "The Democratic Record of Economic Growth and
-----
Prosperity." Statement made in Waverly, Minnesota,
Democratic National Committee, September 7, 1968 .
. "Fiscal Policy u.nd .Surtax." Statement made in
---~-
Washington, D.C., Democratic National Committee, Sep-
tember 16, 1968 .
------
. "Freedom from Hunger." Statement issued in Wash-
ington, D.C., Democratic National Committee, October
16, 1968 .
·----
. "Housing the American Family." Statement issued
October 25, 1968, Democratic National Committee [site
unknown] •
. "Law and Order." Television Address, Democratic
----..--
National Committee, October 12, 1968 .
-----
. Message to the American Political Science Associ-
ation. Washington, D.C., Democratic National Commit-
tee, September 5, 1968 .
. "A New Day for America." The Acceptance Speech.
----,c~h~i~'cago, Illinois, Democratic National Committeee,
August 29, 1968.
. "A New Day for Older Americans." Statement made
-----
in Los Angeles, California, Democratic National Commit-
tee, September 25, 1968 •
-----
. "A New Day for the American Family." Statement
made in Toledo, Ohio, Democratic National Committee,
September 23, 1968.
235
Humphrey, Hubert H. "A New Day: Toward Excellent Education
for All America." [Site unknown] Democratic National
Committee, Statement issued October 6, 1968 •
-----
. "An Open Letter to the Securities Dealers and
Brokers Receiving a Private Letter from Richard Nixon."
Washington, D.C., Democratic National Committee, Octo
ber 29, 1968 .
. "Position Paper: G. I. and Veterans Rights."
-----
Washington, D.C., Democratic National Committee, Octo-
ber 18, 1968 .
. "Position Paper on Economic Policy: A Program to
------
Control Inflation." Statement issued in Washington,
D.C., Democratic National Committee, October 14, 1968.
• "Position Paper on Youth." [Site unknown] Demo
___ c_r_a-tic National Committee, Statement issued· October 24,
1968 •
• Remarks at a Bridge Dedication. Wilmington,
----,.,.-
Delaware, Democratic National Convention, September 12,
1968 .
. Remarks at a Democratic Steer Roast. Columbus,
----,..--
Ohio, Democratic National Committee, September 22,
1968 .
. Remarks at a Downtown Rally. Peoria, Illinois,
Democratic National Committee, November 1, 1968 .
-----
. Remarks at a Noon Rally. Detroit, Michigan,
Democratic National Committee, October 17, 1968 •
. Remarks at a Retired Citizens' Luncheon.
-----,,,,--.,.-
Detroit, Michigan, Democratic National Committee,
October 17, 1968 •
. Remarks at Bluefield, West Virginia. Bluefield,
-----
West Virginia, Democratic National Committee, October
3, 1968 •
• Remarks at Constitution Plaza Rally. Hartford,
-----
Connecticut, Democratic National Committee, October 18,
1968 •
• Remarks at Fairleigh Dickinson University. New-
-----
ark, New Jersey, Democratic National Committee,
• Remarks at Jacksonville, Florida. Jacksonville,
-----
Florida, Democratic National Committee, October 2,
1968.
236
Humphrey, Hubert H. Remarks at Louisville, Kentucky.
Louisville, Kentucky, Democratic Natior al Corr~ai ttee,
September 20, 1968 •
. Remarks at Pittsburgh, Pa. Democratic National
-----
Committee, September 14, 1968 .
. Remarks at Salt Lake City. Salt Lake City, Utah,
Democratic National Committee, September 30, 1968 .
. Remarks at Sea Girt, New Jersey. Democratic
--------,--
Na tio na l Committee, September 13, 1968 .
. Remarks at South Gate, Michigan. South Gate,
---...--,_
Michigan, Democratic National Committee, November 1,
1968 .
. Remarks at Springfield, Illinois. Springfield,
-----,1~1-1-inois, Democratic National Committee, September 20,
1968 •
. Remarks at Youngstown Rally. Youngstown, Ohio,
-----
Democratic National Committee, November 2, 1968 .
. Remarks at the Avco Manufacturing Company.
-----.s-t~r-atford, Connecticut, Democratic National Committee,
October 18, 1968 .
. Remarks at the Dedication of a Bi-lingual Skills
---,,,---
Center. Harlingen, Texas, Democratic National Commit-
tee, October 23, 1968 .
. Remarks at the Dedication of the John Day Dam.
-----
The Dalles, Oregon, Democratic National Committee, Sep-
tember 28, 1968 .
. Remarks Before the B'nai B'rith. Washington,
-----
D.C., Democratic National Committee, September 8, 1968 •
. Remarks in Charlotte. Charlotte, North Caro- ___ ___,,,--..-_
lina, Democratic National Committee, October 2, 1968 .
. Remarks in Erie, Pa. Erie, Pa., Democratic
--------.,--
National Committee, October 7, 1968 .
• Remarks in Scranton. Scranton, Pa., Democratic
___ N_a_t-ional Committee, October 7, 1968 .
• Remarks in Toledo, Ohio. Toledo, Ohio, Demo-
-----
cratic National Committee, September 23, 1968.
237
Humphrey, Hubert H. "Remarks to a Downtown Rally." Boston,
Massachusetts, Democratic National Committee, Septem
ber 19, 1968 •
. Remarks to a Garment District Rally. New York,
-----
New York, Democratic National Committee, October 30,
1968 .
. Remarks to a Kansas City Rally. Kansas City,
-----
Mo., Democratic National Committee, October 15, 1968 .
. Remarks to a Portland Civic Center Rally. Port-
----,,,,----
land, Oregon, Democratic Nat.ional Committee, September
27, 1968 •
• Remarks to a St. Louis Rally. St. Louis, Mo.,
-----
Democratic National Committee, October 16, 1968 .
. Remarks to a Senior Citizens' Rally. Los Ange-
-----
les, California, Democratic National Committee, Septem-
ber 25, 1968 .
• Remarks to the AFL-CIO State Convention. Minne-
-----
apolis, Minnesota, Democratic National Committee, Sep-
tember 24, 1968 .
• Remarks to the American Legion. New Orleans,
-----
La., Democratic National Committee, September 11, 1968 .
. Remarks to the Apparel Industry Meeting. New
-------,
York, New York, Democratic National Committee, Octo-
ber 10, 1968 .
-----
• Remarks to the City Club. Portland, Oregon,
Democratic National Committee, September 27, 1968 .
. Remarks to the Commonwealth Club. San Francisco,
-------,,,....
California, Democratic National Committee, September
26, 1968 •
. Remarks to the Economic Club. Detroit, Michigan,
-----
Democratic National Committee, October 17, 1968 .
. Remarks to the International Brotherhood of Elec-
----..-
trical Workers. New York, New York, Democratic
National Committee, October 18, 1968 •
• Remarks to the National Association of Retail
-----
Druggists. Boston, Mass., Democratic National Commit-
tee, October 9, 1968.
238
Humphrey, Hubert H. Remarks to the Southern California
Clergy. Los Angeles, California, Democratic National
Committee, October 24, 1968 •
. Remarks to the State AFL-CIO Convention. Sacra-
-----
mento, California, Democratic National Committee, Sep-
tember 25, 1968 •
-----
• Remarks to the Vanderburgh County Annual Demo-
cratic Dinner. Evansville, Indiana, Democratic
National Committee, October 14, 1968 .
• Remarks to the Western States Water and Power
-----
Consumers Conference. Sioux Falls, South Dakota, Demo-
cratic National Committee, September 19, 1968 .
• "The Right to Health." [Site unknown] Democratic
-----
National Committee, Statement released October 18,
1968.
•
nia,
"Science to Serve a Nation." San Jose, Califor
Democratic National Committee, October 25, 1968.
• Statement made in Rochester, N. Y. Democratic
---N~a-t~ional Convention, September 17, 1968 .
-----
• Statement made in Washington, D. C. Democratic
National Committee, September 15, 1968 •
-----
• Statement made in Washington, D. C. Democratic
National Committee, September 18, 1968 •
-----
. "Statement of Vice President Hubert Humphrey on
the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty." Washington,
D. C., Democratic National Committee, September 18,
1968 •
• "A Strategy for Peace." Remarks in Columbus,
----,,--.,.-
Ohio, Democratic National Committee, September 21,
1968 .
• "Vice President Humphrey Asks Democrats to Unite
___ f __ o_r_ Continued Progress in America." Sea Girt, N. J.,
Democratic National Committee, September 12, 1968.
Nixon-Agnew Campaign Committee. Press Release~ New York,
New York, October 22, 1968.
"Nixon Format Television Show." KLRD-TV, Dallas, Texas.
October 11, 1968.
Nixon, Richard M. Address at the Morman Tabernacle. Salt
239
Lake City, Utah, Republican National Committee, Septem
ber 18, 1968.
Nixon, Richard M. Address at William and Mary College.
Williamsburg, Virginia, Republican National Committee,
October 2, 1968 •
. Address in Dallas, Texas. Republican National
-------
Committee, October 11, 1968 .
. "A Brighter Future for the American Indian."
-----
Statement delivered by Howard Baker. Omaha, Nebraska,
Republican National Committee, September 27, 1968 .
-----
., "The Case for Removal of Foreign Investment
Restrictions." [No site] Republican National Commit-
tee, Statement released October 3, 1968 .
. CBS Radio Network Address. Republican National
-----
Committee, October 27, 1968 •
• "Fair Play for the Cattle Industry." Statement
-----
made in Dallas, Texas, Republican National Committee,
October 11, 1968 •
. "Federal Personnel Policies in the Nixon Admini-
-----
stration." [No site] Republican National Committee,
Statement released October 4, 1968 .
• "For a Productive Alliance." Statement made in
-----
Miami, Florida, Republican National Committee, Octo-
ber 14, 1968 •
. "For Excellence, Freedom and Diversity." Address
-----
on the CBS Radio Network. Republican National Commit-
tee, October 20, 1968 .
• "For More Jobs, Less Need for Welfare." CBS
-----
Radio Address. Republican National Committee, Octo-
ber 28, 1968 •
• "For the Enduring Generation." CBS Radio Network
---~"""""
Address. Republican National Committee, October 22,
1968 •
• "The Great Generation." A Radio Address. Repub
---1-1-·c-an National Committee, October 16, 1968 .
• "Happy Birthday, General Eisenhower." Statement
----,,.--
by Richard M. Nixon. Republican National Committee,
October 14, 1968.
240
Nixon, Richard M. "The Illegal Grape Boycott." Statement
in San Francisco, California. Republican National Com
mittee, September 5, 1968 .
• "Labor Day Message." New York, Republican
-----
National Committee, September 1, 1968.
•
tion •
A Letter Sent to the American Vocational Associa
Republican National Committee, October 4, 1968.
• A Letter to Leaders of the Securities Industry.
-----
Republican National Committee, October 2, 1968.
. "A Mandate to Gain Ini tia ti ve." CBS Radio
-----,,,---,,,-
Address. Republican National Committee, October 30,
1968 .
• Message Sent to Key Individuals and Organizations
-----
of Retired and Reserve Military Personnel. Republican
National Committee, October 3, 1968.
. "The National Air Transport Policy in thE~ Nixon
___ A_d_m-inistration." [No site] Republican National Commit-
tee, Statement released October 3, 1968 •
. "The Nature of the Presidency." An Address on
-----
the NBC and CBS Radio Networks. Republican National
Committee, September 19, 1958 •
-----
. "Nixon Calls American Prison System Crime Univer-
sity, Proposes Job Training, Other Rehabilitation
Measures." [No site] Republican National Committee,
Statement issued October 10, 1968 .
• "Nixon Calls for Crackdown on Smut Peddlers."
-----
[No site] Republican National Committee, Statement
issued October 9, 1968 .
. "Nixon Calls for More People on Payrolls, Not
-----,-
Welfare, Opposes Unemployment Rise as Means to Curb
Inflation." Statement made in Columbus, Ohio. Repub
lican National Committee, October 16, 1968 •
. "Nixon for Social Security and Medicare and for
-----.-
Making Both Programs Effective." Statement made in
Allentown, Pa. Republican National Committee, Octo
ber 24, 1968 •
-----
• "Nixon Says 'Apostles of Anarchy' on Campuses
Pose Gravest Threat to Academic Freedom." Statement
made in El Paso, Texas. Republican National Committee,
November 2, 1968.
Nixon, Richard M. "Nixon Says Humphrey Is Guilty of False
hood on His Attitude Toward Mexican-Americans." State
ment made in San Antonio, Texas. Republican National
Committee, November 1, 1968 .
. "Nixon Says Some Supreme Court Decisions Have
-----
Weakened Peace Forces Against Crime, Would Restore
Balance." Statement made in London, Ohio. Republican
National Committee, October 22, 1968 .
-----
• "Nixon Says U. s. Must Be First in Space."
Statement made in Austin, Texas. Republican National
Committee, November 2, 1968 •
• "Non-Proliferation Treaty." [No site] Republican
-----
National Committee, Statement released September 11,
1968 .
• "An Open Door for American Labor." An Address on
-----
the CBS Radio Network. Republican National Committee,
October 21, 1968 .
• Press Conference in Anaheim, California. Repub-
-----
lican National Committee, September 17, 1968.
•
.
s1.n,
Remarks at a Milwaukee Rally. Milwaukee, Wiscon
Republican National Committee, September 23, 1968.
• Remarks in Denver, Colorado. Republican National
---~-
Committee, September 25, 1968 .
. Remarks in Erie, Pennsylvania. Republican
-----
National Committee, October 1, 1968 .
-----
. Remarks in Minneapolis, Minnesota. Republican
National Committee, October 8, 1968.
. Remarks in Sioux Falls. Sioux Jfalls, South
-----
Dakota, Republican National Committee, September 24,
1968 .
-----
• Remarks made in Florida. Republican National
Committee, September 30, 1968 .
• "The Research Gap: Crisis in American Science
----.,,,..
and Technology." [No site] Republican National Commit-
tee, Statement made October 5, 1968 .
. "The Role of the Securities Industry in the
·---
National Economy." Republican National Committee,
Statement issued October 2, 1968.
242
Nixon, Richard M. "The Security Gap. " CBS Radio Network
Address. Republican National Committee, October 24,
1968 .
. Statement at the Houston Space Center. Houston,
-----
Texas, Republican National Committee, September 6,
1968 .
. Statement by Richard Nixon. [No site] Republican
-----
National Committee, Released September 13, 1968 •
• Statement in Anaheim, California. Republican
-----
National Committee, September 16, 1968 .
• Statement in Oklahoma City. Oklahoma City, Okla-
-----
homa, Republican National Committee, September 7, 1968 .
• Statement in Williamsburg, Virginia. Republican
-----,,..,,,--.,--
National Committee, October 2, 1968 .
• Statement issued in Akron, Ohio. Republican
-----,,..,,,--.,-
Na ti o na l Committee, October 10, 1968 .
• Statement issued in Washington, D. C. Republican
-----
National Committee, October 25, 1968 .
. Statement made in Albany, New York. Republican
-----
National Committee, October 28, 1968 .
• Statement made in Boston, Massachusetts. Repub-
__ ____,,,__,...-
lican National Committee, October 18, 1968 .
. Statement made in Buffalo, New York. Republican
-----
National Committee, October 7, 1968 .
• Statement made in Chattanooga, Tennessee. Repub-
-----
lican National Committee, September 27, 1968 .
-----
. Statement made in Chicago, Illinois. Republican
National Committee, October 19, 1968 •
• Statement made in Greensboro, North Carolina.
-----
Republican National Committee, October 17, 1968 .
• Statement made in Johnstown, Pennsylvania.
-----
Republican National Committee, October 15, 1968 .
. Statement made in Knoxville, Tennessee,
-----
Republican National Committee, October 15, 1968 •
. Statement made in Lwonia, Michigan. Republican
- - ---
National Conu~ittee, October 29, 1968.
243
Nixon, Richard M. Statement made in Marion, Illinois.
Republican National Committee, October 29, 1968 .
. Statement made in Miami, Florida. Republican
-----
National Committee, September 30, 1968 •
. Statement made in Miami, Florida. Republican
-----
National Committee, Tuesday, October 15, 1968 .
. Statement made in New York, New York. Republican
-----
National Committee, October 23, 1968 .
. Statement made in Norfolk, Virginia. Republican
-----.,~..-
National Committee, October 2, 1968 .
. Statement made in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania.
-----
Republican National Committee, October 28, 1968 •
. Statement made ia Rochester, Minnesota. Republi-
-----
can National Committee, October 30, 1968 .
. Statement made in Rochester, New York. Republi-
-----
can National Committee, October 17, 1968 .
. Statement made in San Antonio, Texas. Republican
-----
National Committee, November 1, 1968 .
. "A Statement on the Problems of the Aging." Key
-----.,~-
Biscayne, Florida, Republican National Committee, Sep-
tember 29, 1968 .
-----
. Statement released by the Nixon For President
Committee. New York, September 9, 1968 .
. Statement released in Anaheim, California.
-----.,~-
Republican National Committee, September 17, 1968 .
. Statement released in New York, New York. Repub
---1-i-·c-an National Committee, September 10, 1968.
. Statement released October 3, 1968.
___ u_n_k-nown] Republican National Committee .
[site
-----
. Statement to a Mexican-American Meeting. Van
Nuys, California, Republican National Committee,
October 9, 1968 .
. Statement to the B'nai B'rith Convention. Wash-
-----
ington, D.C., Republican National Committee, Septem-
ber 8, 1968.
244
Nixon, Richard M. Statement to the Conference "To End
Hunger," Delivered by Charles E. Goodell. Washington,
D.C., Republican National Committee, October 16, 1968 .
. Statement to the Women For Nixon/Agnew Advisory
-----
Committee. Kansas City, Missouri, Republican National
Committee, October 16, 1968 .
. "A Strategy of Quality: Conservation in the
-----
Seventies." CBS Radio Address. Republican National
Committee, October 18, 1968 .
. Television Interview, KOMO-TV. Seattle, Washing-
-----
ton, Republican National Committee, September 24, 1968 .
. Television Interview, WAVE-TV. Louisville, Ken-
-----
tucky, Republican National Committee, September 26,
1968 .
. "The Time to Save Nation." An Address on the CBS
-----
Radio Network. Republican National Committee, Octo-
ber 13, 1968 .
. "To Keep the Peace." CBS Radio Address. Repub-
-----
lican National Committee, October 19, 1968 .
. "To Stop Polluting Our Cities." Republican
-----
National Committee, Statement is
11
ed October 13, 19£ c. , ,
. "Toward a Revitalized Merchant Marine." Republi-
-----
can National Committee, Statement released Septem-
ber 25, 1968 .
. "Towards Peace through Arms Control." CBS Radio
-----
Network Address. Republican National Committee, Octo-
ber 26, 1968 .
. "The Voluntary War." An address on the ABC Radio
-----
Network. Republican National Committee, October 6,
1968 .
. "What Inflation Does to Farmers." Statement in
-----,.---
Minneapolis, Minnesota. Republican National Committee,
October 8, 1968.
. "Where Government Should Be." CBS Radio Network
----...--=-
Address. Republican National Committee, October 25,
1968 .
. "Who Can You Trust?" Statement made in Lubbock,
____ T_e_x-as. Republican National Committee, November 1,
1968.
245
Nixon, Richard M., and Rockefeller, Nelson A. Joint State
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New York, New York, August 21, 1968.
Page, Benjamin I. "Presidential Campaigning: The Rhetoric
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Report to Vice President Hubert H. Humphrey of the Task
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Joseph A. Peckman, Chairman. Released September 30,
1968.
"60 Minutes--Nixon: Candidly Speaking." An Interview Con
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246

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Asset Metadata

Creator Keele, Gary Dallas (author)

Core Title An examination of a concept of image in presidential campaigning: the Humphrey-Nixon compaign of 1968

School Annenberg School for Communication and Journalism

Degree Doctor of Philosophy

Degree Program Speech Communication

Degree Conferral Date 1977

Publication Date 02/01/1977

Defense Date 01/03/1977

Publisher University of Southern California (original), University of Southern California. Libraries (digital)

Tag Humphrey, Hubert H. (Hubert Horatio), 1911-1978,Nixon, Richard M (Richard Milhous), 1913-1994,OAI-PMH Harvest,Presidents -- United States -- Election -- 1968

Format theses (aat)

Language English

Contributor Electronically uploaded by the author (provenance)

Advisor Fisher, Walter R. (committee chair)

Permanent Link (DOI) https://doi.org/10.25549/usctheses-oUC25318

Unique identifier UC25318

Identifier PH.D. SP '77 K26 (call number),etd-KeeleGaryD-1977.pdf (filename)

Legacy Identifier etd-KeeleGaryD-1977

Document Type Dissertation

Format theses (aat)

Rights Keele, Gary Dallas

Internet Media Type application/pdf

Type texts

Source 20230120-usctheses-microfilm-box5 (batch), University of Southern California (contributing entity), University of Southern California Dissertations and Theses (collection)

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