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The origins of American involvement in Vietnam: a thematic content analysis of the Pentagon Papers

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Content THE ORIGINS OF AMERICAN INVOLVEMENT IN VIETNAM:
A THEMATIC CONTE T ANALYSIS OF THE PENTAGON PAPERS
by
David Joel ndrus
A Dissertation Presented to the
FACULTY OF THE GRADUATE SCHOOL
UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA
In Partial Fulfillment of the
Requirements for the Degree
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
(International Relations)
October 1975
Co yright by David Joel Andrus 1975
UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA
THE GRADUATE SCHOOL
UNIVERSITY PARK
LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA 90007
This dissertation, written by
·-------------------Da v_id __ Joe 1 __ Andrus ______________________ _
under the direction of h_J_~-- Dissertation Com
mittee, and approved by all its members, has
been presented to and accepted by The Graduate
School, in partial fulfillment of requirements of
the degree of
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
Dean
Date ____ _)_ ( :J.: .. _____ J~--------------
Chapter
I •
II.
TABLE OF CONT TS
Introduction ••••••••••••••••••••..••••
Reliability of the Mc amara Study
as a Source of Analytic data
Purpose of In uiry
Content Analysis and Data Collection
Procedures
Analytic Aoproach
Organization of Paper
The Ellsberg-Gelb Hypotheses:
A Point of Departure ••••••••••••••••••
The Ellsberg-Gelb Decision odel
Recapitulation of the Ellsberg-Gelb
ropositions
1
17
III. Thematic Coding and Information
Retrieval Techniques.................. 36
Bibliographic Elements
Thematic Codification
Purpose Codes
11
Chapter
IV.
v.
VI.
VII.
Illustration of the Codin
Technique
Information Retrieval Techniques
Methodolo ical and Modeling
Considerations ......................... .
Quantitative Techniques
Qualitative Techni ues
Stage Settin s: The oosevelt
Administrations ••••••••••••.•••••.•••••
Document Analysis for 1940-1945
Concluding Comments
The First Truman A ministration •••.••••
nalytic Commentary
Document Analysis for 1945-1948
The Second Truman Administration
• • • • • • •
Analytic Commentary
Document Analysis for 1949-1952
Page
59
102
153
VIII. Conclusions •••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 270
The ole of Bureaucratic Rivalry
iii
•
hapter
APP NDIXES
A.
B.
c.
The R le of Constraints on
Information Flow
The Role of Images and uman
Perceptions
Images and the Vietna Conflict
Inter-image Discrepancies
Concluding Comments
Selected Thematic Ele ents ••.••••••.•••
Thematic Categories •.••••••.•••...•••••
Purpose Codes ••••••.•.••••••••••••.••••
Pae
283
299
302
BIBLIOGRAPHY . • • . • • • • • • • • • • • • • . • • . • • • • • • • . • • • • • • • • 305
lV
Table
1.
2.
3
LIST OF TABLES
Determination of Individual and Group
Influence on Policy Formulation: 1945-
1948 (Level of U.S. Involvement in
Vietnam) .••.••••••••••••••.•••••••.•••••
Determination of Group Influence on
Policy Formulation: 1949-1952 (Level of
us. Involvement in Vietnam) •••••••••••••
Determination of Group Influence on
Policy Formulation: 1949-1952 (Level of
U.S. Penetration Into French and GVN
Internal Affairs) •••••••••••••••••••••••
V
Page
111
172
178
Figure
l
LIST OF ILLUST ATIONS
llsberg Fever Chart ••••.••••••••••••••
2 Level of Optimism and the Policy
Page
30
Process (1942-1967) •••••••••••••••••••• 70
3 Markov Measure of Policy Process
(1944-1948) • • . • • • • . • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 110
4 Level of Optimism and the Policy
Process (1944-1948) •••••••••.•••••••••• 118
5 Level of Optimism and the Policy
Process (1948-1952) •••••••.••.•.••••••• 190
Vl
CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
The study of foreign policy formulation and
international politics is limited, to a great extent, by
the quality and quantity of information available to the
public. And, unfortunately, as Kenneth Boulding contends,
"In the international system, ••• secrecy is paramount and
1
veracity is subordinated to the national interest."
This element of secrecy, and the corresponding dearth of
foreign policy documents, is particularly apparent in
studies of contemporary international events. For
instance, Ernest R. May, in in his book, "Lessons" of the
Past, argues that "After the first year of the Korean War,
2
most history of American foreign poli~y is obscure."
Those studies which have been conducted, he maintains,
including the very detailed analyses of the Cuban missile
• • II t
cr1s1s, ••• res on interview data, almost
3
unsupported by contemporary documents."
wholly
The one exception to this rule is American foreign
policy formulation related to Vietnam. Because Secretary
of Defense Robert McNamara commissioned a task force to
compile a documentary history of American foreign policy
1
2
decisions relating to Vietnam, and, because Daniel
Ellsberg, who worked on the task force, chose to release
the study to the public, we now have access to documents
with which " ••• the reasoning behind American policy toward
4
Vietnam ••• can be provisionally reconstructed.
RELIABILITY OF THE MCNAMARA STUDY
AS A SOURCE OF ANALYTIC DATA
Despite the fact that the study produced by the
McNamara Task Force comprises forty-three volumes
containing thirty-seven studies and fifteen sets of
documents, it is, like most collections of documents,
5
incomplete. Undoubtedly, the written communications of
some key officials are under-represented in the documents,
while those of others are over-represented. Furthermore,
much of the policy-making process involved verbal rather
than written communications between the decision makers.
These considerations have led some to argue that the
McNamara study, popularly known as Pentagon Papers, does
not contain adequate data to serve as the focus for
research on the American role in Vietnam. The validity of
this argument, however, would appear to depend upon the
level of analysis employed in the research. If the
documents are used as the only source of data for a
detailed analysis of a particular policy debate or
3
specific individual's role in the olicy process, the
Pentagon Papers would probably prove to be inadequate as
the sole source of information. On the other hand, these
documents do provide the necessary data to support a more
general level of analysis and permit inference about the
overall policy process as it related to Vietnam.
The primary criticism of the Pentagon Papers falls
upon the analytic commentary that accompanies the
documents. For instance, George McT. Kahin contends that,
"The narrative
unbalanced
scholarship."
that:
and
6
and analyses
occasionally
.
1n some
rest
sections are
on faulty
Yet, H. Bradford Westerfield argues
Under the circumstances no one should be
surprised to find that the quality of the Papers
is uneven and that although there is, for the
most part, an apparent striving for objectivity,
it is of course objectivity within the range
that I would identify as the 'Establishment
dove' perspectives of that period
(1967-1968) •••• Obvious inherent constraints at
the Pentagon meant that fundamental revisionism
would have to come later from outside, if at
all, using the Pentagon studies (especially the
documents) as partial raw material.?
Despite his reservations about the quality of the
analytical studies, Kahin maintains that the McNamara
Study:
••• provides such a mass of significant data as
to insure its enduring usefulness to anyone with
a serious interest in the United States' long
4
involvement in Indochina. This enormous
collection of documents and commentary
undoubtedly deepens our understanding of the
political premises and strategic objectives that
have underlain the Indochina, and especially the
Vietnam, policies of four American
administrations. And, on a military level at
least, these papers marshal a large body of
important documentation and analysis bearing on
discussions and decisions within the several
administrations concerning u.s. efforts to
achieve these objectives.B
Similarly, Westerfield contends
probably have to wait many years for
that, "We shall
, ,
a Pentagon Papers
of the Nixon era, to learn how we got out [of Vietnam], in
detail comparable to what the Papers tell us of how we got
9
in." Westerfield concludes, however, that " ••• for
admonition about the future, knowing how we got in is our
10
priority need •••• "
PURPOSE OF INQUIRY
It is specifically to the question of how we got into
Vietnam that we turn our attention in this particular
inquiry. The study employs a series of hypotheses
developed by Daniel Ellsberg and Leslie Gelb as its point
of departure. Utilizing the documents of the Pentagon
Papers as the basis for their arguments, both of these
men, working independently, derived similar sets of
hypotheses which attempt to explain the underiyinq reasons
for American involvement in Vietnam. Using the Pentagon
5
Papers to test their propositions, this study analyzes the
foreign policy decision-process, over time, in terms of a
succession of system-states. By focussing on the process
of change which occurred from state to state, an attempt
is made to explain why and how the United States became
increasingly embroiled in the Vietnam conflict.
Since the hypotheses which provide the point of
departure for our inquiry were derived by members of the
McNamara Task Force, the narrative and analyses included
in the Pentagon Papers were purposely excluded from our
examination to avoid contaminating our findings. Thus,
the research performed for this study was limited solely
to the actual government documents to determine what light
they shed on American involvement 1n Vietnam and to what
extent they support the Ellsberg-Gelb hypotheses.
CONTENT ANALYSIS AND DATA COLLECTION
PROCEDURES
The documents contained in the Pentagon Papers were
subjected to a thematic content analysis. Techniques were
developed to extract and code the thematic elements
contained in each document. These elements, along with
the bibliographic data for each document, were then placed
on a computerized data base to permit rapid and selective
information retrieval and analysis.
Content analysis
approach to the study
6
is in a sense a very traditional
of the international system. It
focusses upon documents or other verbal material in order
to explain or further illustrate historical situations.
The difference between contemporary and traditional
methods of carrying through such research is primarily the
use of the computer, which provides a greatly enhanced
capability of storing, retrieving, and, at least
potentially, analyzing such materials.
The advent of the computer gave a great push forward
to content analysis, but the problems of pre-analysis" -
that is, the selection and preparation of documentary
material for storage, retrieval, and analysis -- had
already been worked on before computerized content
analysis procedures really became available. Experimental
social psychology, and its offshoot in international
studies, simulation, generated great quantities of verbal
material. Psychologists from Robert Bales to Timothy
Leary, as well as scholars in linguistics, communications,
and so on, had wrestled with the problems of sorting and
coding verbal materials. Not the least of those interested
in content analysis were the library scientists, and, of
course, it was in their area that the first major step,
the Harvard General Inquirer,
content analysis.
This was immediately
was taken
picked up
in computerized
by the first
7
researchers working on content analysis of textual
materials, the Stanford group working under Robert North.
Their substantive interest also happened to be conflict
the study of war, escalations, and resolution and
bargain in key concerns of international relations
research. There was a burst of research done by the
Stanford group in the 1960's, notably of the period
leading up to the First World war, the belief system of
John Foster Dulles, and the escalation
11
,
between Castros
Cuba and the United States. Ultimately, this effort
fragmented and slowed down, for reasons which are still
not widely understood.
Some problem areas can be identified, however~
First, there is the ''data trap," which can be seen in many
other empirical contexts, that forces the analyst away
from the questions which originally motivated him, and
moves him into the largely bureaucratic business of
information processing and data management. Second, a
related philosophic belief 1n atheoretical data analysis
often becomes dominant. This 1s the idea that patterns
will "emerge" from "raw facts" without the need for
abstract theorization. Technically, this becomes a search
for computer programs which are "pattern recognizers" on a
grand scale. Third, description rather than inference
becomes the dominant statistical mode, and even here it is
believed, albeit inaccurately, that the theoretical
8
demands of descriptive statistics are minimal or
non-existant. And, finally, the emphasis in textual
processing has been on the ~ord, with the computerized
dictionary as the core of the computerized process. This
often leads into familiar dictionary arguments about the
confusion of
12
nuance.
meanings and the loss of contextual
These problems may or may not ex plain the histories
of various content analytical projects, but they are
certainly very real problems in the contemporary use (or
non-use) of content analysis after the burst of the
Renewed interest in content analysis has come
from a number of sources, two of which are particularly
salient: first, researchers in linguistics have come up
with what might roughly be called "cognitive mapping," in
which terms can be located spatially with reference to
each other, and where precedent and consequent word
"paths" can be traced. This is not the approach taken in
this study, but it is nonetheless equally important and
valid.
A second approach puts the emphasis in content
analysis upon thematic blocs, rather than words, in both
the data preparation and the data analysis stage. This
latter approach, as adopted in the present study, utilizes
the thematic bloc to: (a) get past the log jam of problems
mentioned above; (b) maintain theoretical control and the
9
original substantive interest~ and, (c) produce results
which are relevant to the understanding of decision-making
in the international system. This is the challenge, in
any case, which any empirical approach to the study of
decision-making must face and to which this inquiry
attempts to respond.
Using the content analytic techniques developed for
this study, the thematic elements in each document were
identified and tagged with numeric codes. This coded
information was then entered on a computer data base where
it could easily be retrieved and analyzed in a variety of
ways. A series of computer programs were written to
perform both specific and generalized retrieval functions.
In this way it was possible to display the verbal thematic
contents of entire documents, composite information from a
series of documents, and/or selected statistical data
generated by an examination of any or all segments of the
data base. This ability to flexibly extract and structure
the coded data served to facilitate the qualitative
analysis of the documents' manifest contents. Moreover, it
provided a means by which the foreign policy
decision-making process, as revealed by the documents,
could be analyzed through the use of dynamic mathematical
models.
10
ANALYTIC APPROACH
The study of foreign policy decision-making entails
an analysis of the process of change which occurs across
time. The state of any system of behavior
--
decision-making or otherwise -- at a particular point in
time is determined by its dynamic variables. The changes
in these variables, and, hence, the state of the system,
between time 1 and time 2 yield a discrete-time process.
By focussing on the process of change which occurred in
the evolving states of American involvement in Vietnam, it
is possible to explain why and how the United States
became increasingly embroiled in the Vietnam conflict.
The explanation and prediction of change in
time-dependent variables requires the formulation of a
dynamic analytic model. In the present study this
requirement was met through the use of a stochastic model.
Moreover, because Ellsberg's central hypothesis asserts
that a change in system-state (the level of u.s.
escalation in Vietnam) between time 1 and time 2 was
dependent only upon the state of the system at time 1, it
suggested the use of a particular type of stochastic model
13
known as a Markov chain. Other factors inherent in
the data further suggested the use of a specific Markov
model known as an absorbing Markov chain.
11
The Markov model was used to examine the decision
processes that occurred through the various system-states
that evolved between 1945 and 1952. Two specific
decision-processes, the level of U.S. involvement in
support of armed conflict in Vietnam and the level of U.S.
involvement in the governmental affairs of the Republic of
Vietnam, were analyzed by this technique. In essence, the
model examines the decision processes by analyzing changes
in system-states from year to year and then provides an
actual measure of the escalation process rather than just
an estimate of the amount of escalation.
The measurement~ derived from the Markov chains,
combined with measures of the actual amount of escalation,
policy recommendations, arguments for greater or less
involvement, and assessments of the progress and state of
affairs in Vietnam, as well as other categories of
quantitative data, were further analyzed with step-wise
multiple regression and computer qraphic techniques. For
example, analyses were performed to determine which
individuals and groups accounted for the greatest amount
of variance in the decision process in any given year or
administration; which arguments or factors accounted for
the greatest amount of variance in the decision process in
any given administration and for the over-all period of
the study: and which arguments or factors accounted for
the variations in recommendations submitted for policy
12
consideration.
The purpose of these statistical methods is to
simplify the complexities of political reality which
surrounded the formulation of foreign policy. While
simplification provides insights which would otherwise
remain obscure, it also implies a loss of information
which can only be examined through an analysis of the
actual documents. Therefore, a qualitative analysis of
the documents~ manifest contents was performed to gain
further insight into the meaning of the data.
With these research techniques, this study attempts
to examine the general problems of foreign policy behavior
addressed by the Ellsberg and Gelb hypotheses, such as:
l. The relationship between domestic political
considerations and foreign policy formulation.
2. The role of ideological issues in the
process of policy formulation.
3. The role of Congress, the bureaucracy, and a
free press in the process of policy formulation.
4. The long-run viability of an integrated
foreign policy as opposed to a pragmatic and
reactive approach to international affairs.
13
ORGANIZATION OF THE PAPER
In terms of the content and structure of this paper,
the reader will find a discussion of the Ellsberg-Gelb
hypotheses, which served as the basis of inquiry, in
Chapter II. This is followed, in Chapter III, by a review
of the thematic coding and information retrieval
techniques, and, in Chapter IV, by an examination of the
statistical methods employed in the research.
The actual findings of the research are contained in
Chapters V through VII. Chapter V examines the Roosevelt
years, Chapter VI the first Truman Administration, and
Chapter VII the second Truman Administration. Since no
decisions leading to American involvement in Vietnam were
made during the Roosevelt Administrations, it was not
possible to perform a Markov analysis of this particular
period. Therefore, the documents for the Roosevelt era
are examined solely in terms of traditional historical
analysis.
The structure of Chapters VI and VII, which relate to
the Truman Administrations, consists of an examination of
the policy process followed by an historical analysis of
the circumstances surrounding the decision process of each
Administration. And, finally, Chapter VIII concludes with
14
reflections on the nature of the decision-making process
that led to American involvement in Vietnam.
15
NOTES
1 Kenneth Boulding, "The Learning and
Reality-Testing Process in the International System," in
~ma2! and Realit~ in. Wor!d Politics, ed. by John c.
Farrell and Asa P. smith (New York: Columbia University
Press, 1967), p.10.
2 Ernest R. May, "Lessons" of the Past, (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1973), p.87.
3 Ibid.
4 Ibid., p. 88.
5 Two separate editions of the McNamara Study were
used as source material for this study: The Senator Gravel
Edition: The Pentagon Papers (5 vols.; Boston: Beacon
Press, 1971); and, u.s. Department of Defense, United
States-Vietnam Relations: 1945-1967 (12 vols.; Washington,
B.c.: Government Pr1nt1ng Office, 1971).
6 George McT. Kahin, "The Pentagon Papers: A
Critical Evaluation," American Political Science Review
LXIX (June, 1975), 675.
7 H. Bradford Westerfield, "What use
versions of the Pentagon Papers," American
Science Review LXIX (June, 1975), 688.
8 Kahin, "The Pentagon Papers: A
Evaluation," 675.
Are Three
Political
Critical
9 Westerfield, "What use Are Three versions of the
Pentagon Papers," 685.
10 Ibid.
11 For a review of the Stanford groups work see:
Robert c. North, et al., ~9ntent Analysis:! ~andbook with
~pplications f9~ the ~tudy or. International Cr1s1s
(Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern Un1vers1ty Press, 1963);
and, Oli Holsti, Content Analysis for the Social Sciences
and Humanities, (Reading: Massachusetts: Addison-Wesley,
1969).
12 For a brief discussion of the problems encountered
by the Stanford group with word and thematic content
16
analysis, see: Dina A. Zinnes, "The expression and
Perception of Hostility in Prewar Crises: 1914," in
Quantitative International Politics, ed. by J. David
Singer (New York: The Free Press, 1968), pp. 90-99.
13 Daniel Ellsberg, P~rs on the War (new york:
Simon and Schuster, 1972) ,-pp:-I'l9-=T20. Gelospropositions
can be found in: Leslie H. Gelb, "Vietnam: The System
Worked," Foreig~ Policy (summer, 1971), 140-167.
CHAPTER II
THE ELLSBERG-GELB HYPOTHESES:
THE POINT OF DEPARTURE
In 1967, Secretary of Defense Roberts. McNamara
established a Task Force for the purpose of compiling a
history of United States' post-war involvement in Vietnam.
Since the product of their labors was never intended for
public consumption, the members of the Task Force were
given access to C.I.A. and State Department documents as
well as the files of the Office of Secretary of Defense.
They were not given access to White House files, however,
and they were prohibited from interviewing any of the
people who led the country through this involvement. "The
result," according to Leslie Gelb, Chairman of the Task
Force, "was not so much a documentary history, as a
history based solely on documents -- checked and rechecked
1
with ant-like diligence."
The final report of this Task Force, popularly known
as the Pentagon Papers, does not contain every official
document generated with reference to United States
involvement in Vietnam. Nonetheless, it does contain a
formidable body of inter- and intra-governmental letters,
telegrams, memoranda, reports, and policy-papers which,
together, weave a picture of United States involvement
which heretofore was either unknown or generally assumed
17
18
but unsubstantiated.
The Pentagon Papers were released to members of
Congress in the fall of 1969 by Daniel Ellsberg, a member
of the McNamara Task Force. In his book,
Papers on the ~ar, Ellsberg discusses: (a) the role that
he and others were playing within the Government: (b) the
effect that compiling and reading the Pentagon Papers had
upon his personal beliefs about the American role in
Vietnam: and, (c) his purpose in exposing the once secret
documents to the public. To read the Pentagon Papers, he
maintains, 1s to discover the illegitimacy of United
States actions in Vietnam, the fallacy of the Government's
rationale for continued American involvement, and the
manipulation of events and public opinion engaged in by
each succeeding Administration in Washington. Ellsberg
claims that these documents explode the popular "quagmire
theory" of how the United States came to be ever more
deeply involved in Vietnam. Moreover, he argues that:
Along with their implications of the
illegitimacy of our policy and thus the urgency
of changing it, the Pentagon Papers revealed to
me that the President was part of the problem.
This was clearly a matter of his role, not his
personality or party. The concentration of power
within the Executive branch since world War
II ••• had focused nearly all responsibility for
'failure' upon one man, the President: and at
the same time it gave him enormous capability to
avert or postpone or conceal such personal
failure by means of force or fraud.2
19
The Quagmire Theory
Proponents of the quagmire theory viewed the
evolution of United States policy in Vietnam in metaphoric
terms: a person stumbling unwittingly into quicksand and
then, with each effort at extraction, sinking deeper and
deeper into the bog. This widely shared view had its
origin in Lucien Bodard's book, The Quicksand War, which
chronicled
3
Vietnam.
the post-war experience of France
David Halberstam's account of the Kennedy
.
1n
Administration's commitment in
4
Vietnam, entitled The
Making of ~Quagmire, added to this imagery, but it was
Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. who gave the quagmire concept a
precise definition. It was, he argued, a policy of "one
more step," with that next step designed to bring American
efforts in Vietnam to a successful conclusion. But,
somehow that next step always fell short of producing the
envisaged success and another step was always required.
And thus, he says:
••• the policy of 'one more step' lured the
United States deeper and deeper into the morass.
In retrospect, Vietnam is a triumph of the
politics of inadvertence. We have achieved our
present entanglement, not after due and
deliberate consideration, but through a series
of small decisions. It is not only idle but
unfair to seek out guilty men •••• Each step in
the deepening of the American commitment was
reasonably regarded at the time as the last that
would be necessary. Yet, in retrospect,
step led only to the next, until we
ourselves entrapped in that nightmare
American strategists, a land war in Asia.5
20
each
find
of
Ellsberg contends that the documents which comprise
the Pentagon Papers serve to debunk the "quagmire myth"
and present instead a model of American foreign policy
which he entitles "the stalemate machine." In general
terms his argument maintains that, because of prevailing
domestic and international pressures, each succeeding
administration was guided by two basic but contradictory
rules. On one hand, each administration wanted to avoid
the stigma of being held responsible for a Communist
takeover of Vietnam and, yet, each felt compelled to avoid
embroiling American military forces in an Asian land war.
As a result, he argues, each President took only those
steps which they deemed to be the absolute minimum of what
was necessary to forestall defeat and therefore ended up
6
by perpetuating an ever-escalating stalemate.
Ellsberg's conclusions largely coincide with those of
Leslie Gelb. After working with the McNamara Task Force,
Gelb arrived at a similar assertion about American
involvement in Vietnam: "Our Presidents and most of those
who influenced their decisions did not stumble step by
step into Vietnam unaware of the quagmire. u.s.
involvement did not stem from a failure to foresee
21
7
consequences." Instead, he maintains that our
Presidents fully realized Vietnam was a morass and that
the chances for the United States to attain a military
victory were slim if not non-existent. In Gelb's words:
Given international compulsions to 'keep our
word' and 'save face,' domestic prohibitions
against 'losing,' and their personal stakes, our
leaders did 'what was necessary,' did it about
the way they wanted, were prepared to pay the
costs, and plowed on with a mixture of hope and
doom. They 'saw' no acceptable alternative.8
THE ELLSBERG-GELB DECISION MODEL -
Ellsberg and Gelb contend that throughout American
involvement in Vietnam, the determination and execution of
United States foreign policy exhibits a marked continuity.
With regard to the determination of foreign policy there
. n h
1S ••• t e sameness of b~reaucratic debate, in substance,
tone, and agency position, and of its relation to
Presidential choice, at decision points throughout the
9
twenty year period." Presidential choices and policy
execution, on the other hand, were restricted by the
primary rule that it was vital not to lose Vietnam totally
to Communist control.
The first proposition of the Ellsberg-Gelb model
states that the importance of Vietnam was not based upon
22
strategic or economic factors but rather on domestic
political considerations and the international
repercussions that the loss of Vietnam would have for
United States cold war policy. From the standpoint of
domestic considerations, letting Vietnam go Communist was
seen as:
-opening the floodgates to domestic criticism
and attack for being 'soft on Communism' or just
plain soft;
-dissipating Presidential influence by having
to answer these charges;
-alienating conservative leadership in the
Congress and thereby endangering the President's
legislative program;
-jeopardizing election
President and his party;
prospects
-undercutting domestic support
'responsible' u.s. world role; and
-enlarging the prospects for
reaction--the nightmare of
garrison state.10
a
a
Moreover, the prospect of losing Vietnam
for the
for a
right-wing
McCarthyite
was also
considered to carry with it the potential of a direct
political and psychological defeat for United States cold
war foreign policy. For instance, it would be seen as a
defeat for the policy of containment and the strategy of
countering what came to be known in the 1960's as wars of
national liberation, as well as leading to a weakening of
11
American will and credibility.
W hile rule 1 of the Ellsberg-Gelb model holds that
Vietnam must be ke pt from falling under Communist control,
a second rule maintains that U.S. decision makers tried to
23
avoid committing American ground forces to a land war in
Asia unless it was necessary to satisfy Rule 1. Ellsberg
argues that, especially after the Korean War, domestic
considerations and pressures applied to rule 2 in much the
12
same manner as they did to rule 1. Therefore he
suggests an expanded rule 2 to encompass a set responses
to the threat of a Communist military victory. These
responses are listed in an order which reflects their
domestic political acceptability. According to Ellsberg,
unless they deemed it absolutely essential to satisfy rule
1, each President felt compelled to avoid taking action
to:
(a) Bomb South Vietnam or Laos;
(b) Bomb North Vietnam;
(c) Commit U.S. combat troops to Vietnam;
(d) Commit U.S. combat troops to Laos or Cambodia;
(e) Institute wartime domestic controls;
(f) Destroy Hanoi or Haiphong or the dike system, or
mine Haiphong harbor.
(g) Mobilize reserves;
(h) Assume full, overt administrative authority and
military command in South Vietnam;
(i) Invade North Vietnam;
13
(j) Use nuclear weapons;
Each succeeding escalatory action in this list would only
be taken if it was absolutely necessary to avert the loss
24
of Vietnam.
The restrictions of rule 2 give rise to a second
proposition that military victory in Vietnam was n,tver a
goal of United States foreign policy. Instead, each
President undertook only what he believed to be the
minimal steps necessary to avert a Communist military
victory. But, once the threshold of escalation was pushed
upward to permit a formerly restricted action, the scope
and extent of that action could "be greatly expanded in
14
pursuit of ultimate 'success'." This leads to an
interesting corollary proposition that efforts at
de-escalation were subject to limitations similar to those
of escalation. Once a decision to escalate to the next
step had been made and was believed to have successfully
forestalled a Communist victory, a retrograde or
de-escalatory step would be considered inconsistent with
established policy goals and be inhibited by domestic
political considerations.
With rule l requiring decision makers to avoid losing
Vietnam and rule 2 restricting the means at their disposal
(as well as their decision flexibility or latitude) to
satisfy rule 1, the model predicts "'discrepancies'
between predictions, recommendations,
15
and long-term
. "
aims •••• The inherent conflict between these two
rules, when applied to the policy formulation process,
resulted in policy choices which had a distinct short-term
25
bias and which:
(a) ere considered by those involved in the
decision process to be inadequate to either win
the war or avert long-term defeat.
(b) Were oriented predominantly toward military
rather than political means and ends.
(c) Required the
right-wing,
United States
authoritarian,
to support a
pro-American
Vietnamese regime which had a narrow base of
political support.
(d) Restricted the United States to the role of
advising and supporting other governments which
functioned as American surrogates by assuming
16
the responsibility for fighting the war.
The orientation of policy toward short-term
expedients was designed to minimize domestic apprehension
and opposition to American involvement in Vietnam.
Offering military aid, the use of advisors, and the
conduct of covert operations in support of a government
which was willing to wage the actual war for the United
States, served to satisfy this orientation, but at a cost.
For instance, analysts concurred that the best hope for
stability in Vietnam rested upon long-term political
reforms and a broadening of the political base of French
colonial rule and, later, the Saigon regime. Achievement
of these goals was thwarted by two factors. First,
26
because the United States was relying on another nation to
carry out its policy, the American government felt
compelled to avoid straining the relationship by pressing
for reforms or other particular actions. Thus the United
States' powers of bargaining and influence were
constrained.
A second factor militating against the desires to
broaden the base of the French colonial and Saigon regimes
was the specte r of short-run governmental instability
which could lead to a quick Communist takeover and, hence,
a violation of rule 1. Accordingly, the United States
opted to support a right-wing, militarized, and
authoritarian regime because it allowed greater American
control over the actions of the regime and offered the
greatest amount of stability on a short-run basis.
According to Ellsberg and Gelb, the use of another
government as an agent to implement American foreign
policy served to compound the inconsistency between rules
one and two, and led to a game of illusion and rhetoric.
Although the Presidents were restricted by domestic
considerations from sending u.s. forces to help the French
and, later, the Government of Vietnam, they were forced to
give the impression of unreserved American support. To
convince our ally "--in lieu of sending U.S. troops
imrnediately--that we would do 'whatever necessary' to
support them, the Administration had to say so publicly,
27
and to assert that major u.s. interests were at stake~
likewise, to warn Hanoi's leaders and deter them from
17
increasing pressure."
Rhetoric and deception were also required within the
American political system. To retain Congressional and
public support, and to insure that Congressional
appropriations
forthcoming,
for
each
military aid continued
administration resorted
to be
to news
management, cover-up, and falsification. The rhetoric
became self-fulfilling. By conveying the image that a
non-Communist Vietnam was vital to American interests, it
became increasingly incumbent upon the Government to
insure that Vietnam did not fall into Communist hands.
But, according to Gelb, the meaning of this rhetoric was
interpreted differently by the various actors involved.
The Communists believed •that their actions would be met
by counteraction." The American people believed that the
President would prevent Vietnam from falling, albeit
"without the anticipation of sacrificing American lives."
To the Congress, the Administration's insistance that
Vietnam was vital to American interests served to increase
Presidential responsibility for insuring that it did not
fall to the Communists, while it also increased
Congressional support for Presidential policy and
diminished criticism. To the American diplomat it conveyed
the message of continued u.s. support to our allies. And,
28
to the American military, "it was a promise that u.s.
forces would be used, if necessary and to the degree
18
necessary, to defend Vietnam."
According to Ellsberg and Gelb, the basis of the
rhetoric, Vietnam's vital importance to u.s. interests,
was never subjected to serious examination by American
decision-makers. Therefore, by treating rhetoric as fact,
it became a basic tenet of belief and Vietnam assumed
increasing importance as a test case of American
credibility both internally and internationally.
The final proposition of the Ellsberg-Gelb model
states that Presidential decisions to permit major
escalations of American involvement occurred only during
crisis periods when the loss of Vietnam to the Communists
seemed imminent. Ellsberg has postulated a two-phase A/B
cycle of American expectations which underlay this pattern
of u.s. decision-making. According to his hypothesis,
optimistic American ex ectations about the eventual
periods when success of their efforts grew during
Vietnamese insurgent activities were less visible and the
"enemy" appeared to be inactive. This optimism, which
~
represents the B-phase of the cycle, would reach a peak
just prior to a major Viet Cong offensive, when their
overt activities declined markedly. On the other hand,
the A-phase of the cycle represent periods of pessimistic
expectations about the future success of American efforts
29
in Vietnam. The A-phases were precipitated by crisis
periods such as Dien Bien Phu or the Tet offensive.
According to this hypothesis, decisions to escalate
the nature of United States involvement were only made
during the A-phases of the cycle. American policy was
reactive in nature. After the decision to escalate was
made, there would be an alteration in mood and expectation
from extreme pessimism to growing elation and optimism.
Ellsberg also argues that the Vietnamese Communists:
••• had a characteristic response to a new
U.S./GVN [Government of Vietnam] strategy or to
an escalation which further encouraged our shift
to unbounded optimism. After suffering initial
setbacks they would lie low for an extended
period, gather data, analyze experience,
develop, test, and adapt new strategies, and
then plan and prepare carefully before launching
them.19
Thus, a-phases of optimism flowed from the escalatory
decisions made during the pessimism of the A-phases and
were supported by a relatively passive reaction of the
Viet Cong to the escalation. Graphically depicted, the
cycle resulting from the alternating A and B phases
produce the "fever chart" contained in Figure I. Ellsberg
argues that this decision pattern constitutes a refutation
of the quagmire theory. For, "If major escalating
decisions -- enlarging the nature of our involvement, not
merely the scale -- had actually been made during the
a-phase, that would conform to the quagmire model. This
20
has never been the case."
L
E
V
E
L
0
F
0
p
T
I
M
I
s
M
"OPTIMISM"
16
14
FRENCH
DEFEATS
12
10~
I
~
I
I
8
6
4
2
DIENf!IENPHU
FIGURE l
ELLSBERG FEVER CHART
l""'rtC'DDT T' T' J'-
KENNEDY'S
PROGRAM
DIEM
COUP
JOHNSON'S
PROGRAM
TET
I \.
NIXON'S
PROGRAM
0,-r----t---r----t--t---t--+--t--+--i--t---+--+---ir---+---+--+--t---~--+--+--+-----..--
LATE 1950
Source:
APRIL 1954
1958 N'OVEMBER 1963 FEBRUARY 1968
Daniel Ellsberg, Papers on the War, Touchstone Books (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1972),
Figure 1, p. 121.
?
w
CS)
31
RECAPITULATION OF THE
ELLSBERG-GELB PROPOSITIONS
In subsequent chapters the Ellsberg-Gelb hypotheses
will be considered in the context of each Administration.
To facilitate examination of these somewhat involved
propositions, it is useful to restate them in a more
concise form. Subsequent references to these hypotheses
will be made
.
1n terms of the number or number-letter
combination assigned to them as follows:
1. The importance of Vietnam to the United States
rested upon domestic political considerations and the
effectiveness of United States cold war policy.
2. Presidential decisions on u.s. involvement in
Vietnam were guided by two basic rules:
a) Do not allow Vietnam to fall to the
Communists by military force.
b) Do not commit u.s. military forces to an
Asian land war.
3. If a military response was required to save
Vietnam from falling to the Communists, the
escalation would be constrained by domestic political
considerations to the approximate sequence of events
contained in the following list:
32
a) Bomb South Vietnam or Laos;
b) Bomb North Vietnam;
c) Commit u.s. combat troops to Vietnam;
d) Commit U.S. combat troops to Laos or
Cambodia;
e) Institute wartime domestic controls:
f) Destroy Hanoi or Haiphong or the dike system,
or mine Haiphong harbor;
g) Mobilize reserve forces;
h) Assume full, overt administrative authority
and military command in South Vietnam:
i) Invade North Vietnam;
j) Use nuclear weapons;
Each succeeding escalatory action in this list would
only be taken if it was absolutely necessary to avert
a loss of Vietnam.
4. To satisfy rule 2a, given the restriction of rule
2b, it was necessary to:
a) Resort to short-term policy considerations
rather long-term actions to insure that
Vietnam did not fall under Communist control
during the immediate future.
b) Use other governments to function as agents
of policy implementation by having them
assume the responsibility for military action
in Vietnam.
33
c) Adopt the role of offering military aid and
advisors, and conducting covert operations in
support of the government which was willing
to conduct the war for the United States.
d) Support the establishment of a right-wing,
authoritarian, pro-American regime
necessity, would have a narrow
base.
which, of
political
e) Avoid liberalizing and broadening the
political base of the Vietnamese regime to
minimize the possibility of political
instability within Vietnam.
s. The conflicting nature of rules 2a and 2b
produced discrepancies between the predictions,
recommendations, and long-term
policy in Vietnam.
aims of American
6. Military victory in Vietnam was never a policy
goal of the United States. Instead, each President
undertook only those steps which were considered to
be the minimal necessary actions to keep Vietnam from
falling into Communist hands.
7. The conflicting nature of rules 2a and 2b gave
United States policy a distinct bias toward
short term expedients.
gave rise to:
The short-term expedients
a) A recognition that American actions were
34
inadequate to avert long-term defeat.
b) Programs which were primarily military rather
than political in orientation.
c) Restrictions on the United States' control
and influence over its allies.
d) The use of information management, deception,
and unsupported rhetoric both domestically
and internationally.
8. Presidential decisions to escalate American
involvement were reactive 1n nature and made only
during crisis periods when the loss of Vietnam to the
Communists appeareo imminent.
35
NOTES
l Memo from Leslie H. Gelb to Robert s. McNamara,
January 15, 1969, in, Vietnam Relations, 1, p. ix.
2 Ellsberg, Papers on ~he var, pp. 34-35.
1n the original.)
(Emphasis
3 Lucien Bodard, The Quicksand war: Prelude to
Vietnam, (Boston: Little, Brown, 1967).
4 David Halberstam, rrhe Making of a Quagmi~, (New
York: Random House, 1965).
5 Arthur Schlesinger, Jr.,
Vietnam and American Democracy,
Houghton Mifflin, 1967), pp.31=32.
'I'he Bitter
1941-1966,
6 Ellsberg, Papers on the war, p. 100 ff.
7 'elb, "Vietnam: The System Worked," 140.
8 Ibid.
9 Ellsberg, Papers~ the War, p. 100.
10 Ge 1 b , " '1
1
he Sys t em W or k e d , " 1 4 3 •
11 Ibid., 142
Heritage:
(Boston:
12 Cf. Ellsberg, Papers on the War, pp. 102-105; and,
Gelb, "The System Workeo," 144-148:
13 Ellsberg, Papers on the ~~ar, p. 105.
--
14 Ibid • , p. 106.
15 Ibid. , p. 107.
--
16 Ibid. , pp.108-109.
---
17 Ibid. , p. 110
18 Gelb, "The System orked,
"
145-146.
19 Ellsberg, Papers on the Wa£, pp. 119-120.
20 Ibid., p. 121 •
•
CHAPTER III
THEMATIC CODING AND INFORMATION RETRIEVAL
TECHNIQUES
As was noted earlier, the purpose of this study is to
employ the Pentagon Papers as a means to analyze the
process of formulating and implementing American foreign
policy related to Vietnam. To obtain all of the official
documents which are currently available to the public, it
lS necessary to use two se arate editions of the Pentagon
1
Papers. One 1S the Gravel edition which contains all
documents entered into the record of the Senate
Subcommittee on Buildings and Grounds by Senator Mike
Gravel (D-Alaska), as well as 110 additional documents
from the period of the Johnson Administration which were
not included in the McNamara Task Force study. The second
is the declassified version of the Pentagon Papers
released by the Defense Department and published by the
2
Government Printing Office. While the Defense
Department version contains many pre-1960 documents
missing from the Gravel edition, officials of the Defense
Department have deleted individual words and sentences, as
well as entire pages. To obtain a com9lete set of
available documents, it is necessary to merge the two
36
37
3
editions.
The Pentagon Papers comprise more than 7000 pages of
information. Over 4~00 of these pages consist of analytic
co mm en tar y m .ad e by the Task Force member s w hi 1 e the
approximately 30~0 remaining pages comprise the actual
documents. As with any study of a large volume of
documents, the researcher approaching the Pentagon Papers
1s immediately confronted with the problem of how to
structure and assimilate a massive amount of data. In the
present study this task was accomplished by thematically
coding the contents of each document and entering the
coded data on to a computerized data base. A rapid and
flexible information search and retrieval system was
devised to extract and analyze the document information in
a variety of ways.
and
What follows 1s an explanation
the research approach employed
of the coding process
1n this study. The
coding techniques include the extraction, coding, and
subsequent recording of the following document
information:
(a) Bibliographic elements;
(b) Thematic elements;
(c) Purpose elements.
38
BIBLIOGRAPHIC ELEMENTS
The first step in coding each document is to identify
its various bibliographic elements for the computer data
base. Specifically, these identifying elements consisted
of:
(a) the date the document was originated;
(b) A code to indicate whether the document was
taken from the Gravel or Defense Department
edition of the Pentagon Papers, as well as the
volume and page number of its location within
the particular edition;
(c) Source and target codes which identify the
specific individual(s) who originated and
received the document and also the governmental
organization or functional group to which they
were assigned.
To illustrate this, consider a memorandum originated
by John Foster Dulles and sent to Charles E. Wilson. This
document would be assigned respective source and target
codes which not only identified these two particular
individuals but, also, that the document originated within
the State Department and was sent to the Defense
Department. In this way it was possible to extract and
analyze the documents generated by, or sent to, either a
39
particular person or a general organization. If a document
had only an organization name as its source or target, it
was categorized and coded accordingly. Documents prepared
by two organizations, or receiving general distribution,
were also assigned unique identifying codes.
THEMATIC CODIFICATION
Once the biblioqraphic information has been
identified for entry on the data base the next step is to
thematically code the textual content of the document. The
technique of thematic coding employed in this study
resembles to some extent the conventional process of
abstracting a book or journal article. The contents of
each document were reduced to its central ideas or themes.
Each theme in the document was then compared with themes
already extracted from previous documents. If a
particular theme had not been encountered in an earlier
document, it was added to a list of distinct themes, and
assigned a unique numeric code. The com uter record for
the document was then tagged with this number. If a theme
had already occurred in an earlier coded document, the
existing numeric code for that theme was added to the
document record.
To illustrate
contained the theme:
this method, assume a document
"The U.S. will send Special Forces
40
units to South Vietnam." The first time this theme was
encountered it was add d to the list of distinct themes
and assigned the numeric code number 452. Then, each time
this theme was encountered in subsequent documents, the
numeric code of 452 continued to be used to tag the
document record. These numeric codes were assigned to
themes without regard to order. Then, after all of the
documents were coded, the original arbitrarily numbered
themes were recoded by the computer. In this way the
original codes could be changed to regroup the themes into
general conceptual categories.
This coding method is relatively unstructured in the
sense that the researcher does not approach the documents
with a pre-defined set of themes and corresponding numeric
codes. That is, in contrast to other methods of content
analysis, the coded information extracted from the
documents is not limited to a list of concepts that was
defined before the coding process began. Instead, each
document is allowed to yield its own themes and the
original author's own words are entered directly, or in
paraphrased form, on to the computer data base. The final
set of codes should embody all salient information
contained in the documents. Out of the 516 documents
4
coded, 570 distinct themes were identified.
It was practically impossible to assign the numeric
theme codes on the basis of any pre-defined numbering
41
scheme which groups them by general conceptual categories.
This problem is quite simply overcome by letting the
computer renumber the arbitrarily assigned thematic codes
in such a way that the themes are regrouped under the
desired general conceptual categories. To illustrate the
renumbering technique and the development of general
categories, consider the following two themes:
ORIGINAL
NUMERIC
code THEMATIC CONTENTS
538 Congress expresses doubts about the advisibility
of continued U.S. involvement in Vietnam.
452 The U.S. will send Special Forces Units into
South Vietnam.
In both cases the themes relate to American involvement in
Vietnam but each are different in terms of the primary
concern expressed by the context. In the renumbering
process, the numeric code for the first theme was changed
from 538 to 542. This served to assign it to a range of
numbers which defined a general concept category entitled
"Domestic Considerations." Similarly, the numeric code of
the second theme was changed to 171 which placed it in a
general concept category called "Level of u.s.
Involvement." This grouping procedure, which resulted in
42
thirty-one general categories, was strictly nominal in the
sense that it did not change the original uniqueness of
the thematic codes, while allowing the codes to be more
5
coherently organized.
PURPOSE CODES
Every thematic element contained in a document was
also assigned a Purpose Code to characterize the author's
intention 1n using the theme. For instance, a State
Department memorandum might "recommend" that the U.S.
extend military aid to South Vietnam; a subsequent memo
by the President might order the "irnolementation of a
L
decision" to extend u.s. military aid to South Vietnam;
and, at yet another point in time, a National Security
Action Memorandum could order the "suspension of the
previous decision" to extend military aid to South
Vietnam. In each case the theme remains "the extension of
u.s. military aid to South Vietnam," but the intentions or
purpose of the respective authors are entirely different.
In the first case the purpose was a recommendation; in
the second it was the im plementation of a policy decision;
and, in the third it was the suspension of a previous
decision.
All together, twenty-seven different purpose codes
6
were utilized in this study. Their function is
43
three-fold. They standardize the coding of the purpose
aspect of the raw thematic block and facilitate the
handling of the thematic aspect from a practical
standpoint, while inhibiting the proliferation of thematic
codes. More importantly, they give equivalent emphasis to
the extraction of contextual intentions from the
documents. Later, in the analysis of the coded data, it
is very easy to select a a specific theme or group of
themes, and retrieve those instances in which the themes
appear 1n the context of recommendations, or any of the
other twenty-six purpose categories. Finally, as in the
case of the thematic codes, the purpose codes were
organized into a structure which permitted easy
consolidation into a variety of more generalized purpose
categories. For example, it is possible to retrieve
specific documents on the basis of whether they contain
purpose codes which represented advocacy or negation of a
theme or set themes.
ILLUSTRATION OF THE CODING TECHNIQUE
As with any method of content analysis, the approach
used in this study requires the researcher to become
thoroughly familiar with the contents of the entire body
of documents before beginning the coding operation. Once
44
the documents have been read for familiarity, the actual
codin rocess moves quickly and does not re u1re an
extensive investment of manhours . Moreover , it can easily
be performed by one in ividual. For example, the document
coding for this study was erformed by one person and took
a combined total of approximately eighty hours or ten ~an
ays. To minimize errors caused by fatigue, the analysts
should limit the coding sessions to one hour intervals
with sufficient rest time in between each session.
The followin telegram sent by the State Depart ent
to Henry Cabot Lodge, Ambassador to the Government of
South Vietnam, serves to illustrate the codinq process.
The contents of the telegram, which is dated August 29,
1963, relate to the American Government's position with
regard to the impending coup against the Diem-Nhu regime
and the desire, on the part of U.S. officials, to remove
Ngo Dinh Nhu and his wife from a position of power:
1. Hi hest level meeting noon today reviewed
your [telegra number] 375 and reaffirmed basic
course. Specific decisions follow:
2. In response to your recommendation, General
{
Harkins is hereby authorized to repeat to such
[V1etriame'se] Generals as yau 1nd1cate the
messag~ previously transmT!te £Y CAS officers.
{
He should stress that the USG supports the
movement to eliminate the Nuhs from the
government-;-butthat before arriving at specific
understandings with the [Vietna ese] Generals ,
General Harkins must know who are involved,
resources available to them and overall lan for
{
cou p . The USG will suoport a coup which has
good chance of succeeding but plans no direct
involvement of US armed forces . Harkins should
45
{
state that he is prepared to establish liaison
with the cou planners and to review plans , but
will not eng'age directly in JQint coup plannin •
{
3~ Question of last approac~ to Diem [to induce
him to remove the Nhus from power] remains
undecided and separate personal message from
Secretary to you evelops our concern and asks
your comment.
[
4. On movement of US forces , we do not expect to
make any announcement or leak -at present and
believe tna~ any later-decisionto publicize
such movements should be closely connected to
developing events on your side . We cannot of
course prevent unauthorized disclosures or
speculation, but we will in any event knock down
any reports of evacuation .
{
5. You are hereby authorized to announce
suspension of aid through Diem government at a
time and unaer conditions of your choice .-In
deciding upon the use of thisauthority , you
should consider importance of timing and
--r
managing announcement so as to minimize
appearance -of collusion- wITh [Vietnamese]
Generals and- also to minimize danger of
unpredictable and isruptive reaction by
existing government. e also assume that you
will not in fact use this authority unless you
think it is essential, and we see it as possible
that Harkins' approach and increasinq process of
cooperation may provide assurance Generals
desire. Our own view is that it will be best to
hold this authority for use in close conjunction
with coup, and not for present encouraqement of
Generals, but decision is yours.7
To insure accuracy, the coder should read each
document at least two times immediately prior to codin
it. The first reading 1s used to attain a qeneral
understanding of its contents. Dur in subsequent
readings, as each thematic element is identified, it
should (as illustrated above) be underlined an have its
associated numerical code entered on the margin of the
ocument. To derive the associated numerical co e, each
46
identified theme should be compared with a list of themes
extracted from previously coded documents. When comparing
the identified thematic elements in a document to this
list of previously coded themes, the analyst should be
aware that a thematic element can be identical to a
previously coded theme and yet be expressed in different
words. If there is conceptual correspondence between an
existing theme on the list and a thematic element in a
document, regardless of whether they are expressed 1n
different words, the document is ta ged with the existing
thematic code. However, if a thematic element has not
previously been encountered, or expresses even a slightly
different concept from any existing theme, it should be
tagged with a new numeric code and its verbal content
added to the list of existing themes.
After each thematic element in a document has been
identified and tagged with the proper numeric code, the
analyst must then determine the author's intention or
purpose in using the theme and assign it with the proper
purpose code. When all thematic elements in a document
have been identified and tagged with the proper theme and
purpose codes, the resultant set of codes and their
related
abstract
verbal descriptions
of the document's
should provide an accurate
relevant contents. The
extracted codes from the telegram above produce the
following abstract:
47
1. THEMATIC CODE: 140 - (The U.S. Government will
let it be known that it would support a coup
against the existing South Vietnamese regime.)
PURPOSE CODE: 5 (Implement a decision or
formulate policy.)
2. THEMATIC CODE: 127 (The U.S. Government
supports the movement to eliminate the Nhus from
the Government of South Vietnam.)
PURPOSE CODE: 5 (Implement a decision or
formulate policy.)
3. THEMATIC CODE: 123 - (The U.S. Government will
support a coup which has a good chance of
succeeding but plans no direct involvement of
u.s. armed forces.)
PURPOSE CODE: 5 (Implement a decision or
formulate policy.)
4. THEMATIC CODE: 125 - (The U.S. Government will
establish liaison with coup
plans, but will not engage
coup planning.)
planners and review
directly in joint
PURPOSE CODE: 5 (Implement a decision or
formulate policy.)
5. THEMATIC CODE: 126 - (The U.S. Government will
pressure Diem into removing the Nhus from any
position of influence in order to forestall a
possible coup.)
PURPOSE CODE:
action.)
4 -
(Consider for
48
possible
6. THEMATIC CODE: 144 - (Initate a withdrawal of
u.s. forces from Vietnam.)
PURPOSE CODE: 1 - (Action will not be taken.)
7. THEMATIC CODE: ~39 - (The U.S. Government will
stop giving military and economic aid to the
Government of South Vietnam.)
PURPOSE CODE: 13 - (Prepare to take action.)
8. THEMATIC CODE: 286 - (Overt American support of
a coup against the South Vietnamese regime could
create adverse propaganda for the u.s. and
weaken American influence among the less
developed nations.)
PURPOSE CODE: 2 - (Factor for consideration.)
In some instances, as with thematic codes 140, 126,
and 286 in the example telegram, the thematic element is
implicitly rather than explicitly stated. In these three
cases, the implied or partially stated themes in the
telegram are explicitly stated in earlier documents and
can only be detected and understood if the coder has
followed the chronological development of the issues. For
instance, in paragraph 3, the implied meaning of a "last
approach to Diem" relates to a consideration, expressed in
earlier documents, of forestalling a coup by pressing a
reluctant Diem into removing the Nhus, who were considered
the primary cause
government.
of political unrest, from
49
his
The occurrence of implicit or partially stated themes
related to a particular issue, generally tends to increase
in frequency as the issue is repeatedly discussed in a
series of documents. The more familiar the correspondents
become with the various arguments related to an issue, the
more they tend toward brevity in their writing. This
tendency points out the need to code the documents in the
chronological sequence 1n which they were written.
Moreover, it indicates the need for caution when the
documents are split into groups and coded by separate
individuals. If more than one erson is used to perform
the actual coding, it is important that the documents not
be split up and distributed on an arbitrary basis.
Instead, each individual should receive and code a
chronological set of documents that encompass al! papers
related to one or more policy debates. In this way the
chance for a coder to miss any implicitly stated themes is
minimized.
In addition to tagging the thematic contents of the
document, the analyst must also assign codes to the
originator and recipient of the document. Once again, if
a person or organization appears for the first time as the
source or target of a document, a code must be established
to identify the particular party. As mentioned above, the
50
source/target codes were established in a manner that not
only indicates a particular person but also the
organization to which they were assigned. Referring to
our sample telegram, the author was identified only as the
the State Department. In this case, and in all other
documents with the State Department as the author, the
assigned source code was 004. The leftmost digit
(thousands position) indicates the general organization to
which the author or recipient was assigned. The next two
digits (units and hundreds positions) indicate the
specific person who authored or recieved the document. In
this case the leftmost zero identifies the State
Department as the general organization while the 04
signifies that no specific person was identified as author
of the telegram.
On the other hand, the recipient or target of the
telegram was Henry Cabot Lodge. The first time Lodge was
encountered as either author or recipient of a document he
was tagged with the next available source/target code,
which was 022. Once again, the zero in code 022 indicates
that Lodge was assigned to the State Department while the
22 specifically identifies Lodge himself. In this way it
is possible to retain a consistent identifier for a person
who is assigned to more than one organization at different
points in time. For example, if Lodge had, at a later
time, been reassigned to the Defense Department, only the
51
left most digit would be changed. In this case his
source/target code would have appeared as 122: the 1
indicating Defense Department while the 22 would continue
to be used to identify Henry Cabot Lodge.
The fully coded abstract should accurately express
the entire content of the original document. To validate
8
the coding process, the abstracts are compared to the
original documents to insure that:
1. All themes in a document have been detected and
coded;
2. All thematic elements included in the abstract
accurately represent the corresponding themes in the
original document;
3. The purpose code assigned to each thematic
element accurately characterizes the author's
intention in using the theme;
4. The source/target codes have been accurately
assigned.
Preferably, the person who validates the coding
process should be one who is familiar with the contents of
the documents but who did not actually code the abstracts
which are being validated. Once the coded data for each
document has been verified for accuracy it is entered on a
computer data base. The actual entries consist of
variable length records comprised of two parts: a
bibliographic segment and a textual segment. To illustrate
52
the content of the data base entries we will again use the
foregoing telegram as an example. The bibliographic
segment for this document would contain:
8,082963,2,02,0736,004,022. Reading from left to right we
find that:
(a) The first digit, 8, indicates the number of
thematic elements contained
document.
in this particular
(b) The number 082963 represents the date the
document was originated (August 29,1963).
(c) The digit 2 indicates the document can be found
in the Gravel edition. (A code of 1 was used to
identify the Defense Department Edition.)
(d) The number 02 represents the volume number in
which the document can be found.
(e) 0736 is the page number on which the document
can be found.
(f) The numbers 004 and 022 respectively represent
the source and target codes.
The textual segment is comprised of the one or more
sets of thematic and purpose codes extracted from the
document. In the case of our sample telegram, this
segment consisted of eight sets of codes and was entered
on the data base as: 140, 5, 127, 5, 123, 5, 125, 5, 126,
4, 144, 1, 039, 13, 286, 2. In each case the thematic code
is immediately followed by its associated purpose code.
53
Thus, we find thematic code 140 followed by its purpose
code of 5, and so forth.
Only the numeric codes are entered on the data base.
This serves to simplify both the initial data capture
operation (by key punching or on-line data entry) and
facilitates the ease with which subsequent data retrieval
operations can be performed. The verbal descriptors for
each thematic, purpose, and source/target code are entered
only once and on a separate data base. Thus, even thou~h
a particular code may appear hundreds of times in the
documents, the verbal description of the code needs to be
entered only one time on the descriptor data base. Then,
if a verbal translation of any or all numeric codes is
required, the computer can access the list of descriptors
and copy the text associated with each code every time it
needs to be translated.
INFORMATION RETRIEVAL TECHNIQUES
Once the coded document information was entered on
the computer data base, it could easily be retrieved and
analyzed in a variety of ways. A series of computer
program s were written to perform both s ecific and
generalized information retrieval functions. The search
and retrieval functions are structured by whether a
54
particular query or search instruction includes any or all
of the following variables as determininq factors: date
of document
code, and
instructions
origination, source code, target
purpose code. If desired,
can specify any or all of the
search and retrieval conditions:
code, theme
the query
following
(a) That only those documents which contain a
particular date, are dated subsequent
to a specified date, or fall within
dates, be included in the search.
or prior
a range of
(b) That only those documents containing
specified source and/or target codes be included
in the search. Document selection can be made
on the basis of either particular individuals
and/or general organizations.
(c) That only those documents containing one or
more specified theme codes be included in the
search. While the instructions can require that
either any or all of the specified codes be
present for selection to occur, they can further
require that selection occur only if another
code or set of codes is or is not present within
the document.
(d) That only those documents containing a
specified purpose code or range of purpose codes
be included in the search.
55
For example, a particular query could retrieve all
documents generated by Dean Acheson and sent to President
Truman during 1950, which "recommended" that the U.S. give
economic and military aid to French forces in Indo-China.
The query could be altered by omitting the source code as
a determining factor. In this case, all documents
generated during 1950, which contained the specified
recommendation and were sent to President Truman, would be
retrieved, regardless of their source. The results of the
search could be further altered by merely addinq,
changing, and/or omitting the specified parameters. In
this way the information retrieval and analysis programs
can be employed to display verbal records with full themes
and specified purposes for an entire document, composite
information from a series of documents, as well as
frequency counts generated by a selective search.
''Decision tracing" was developed as a particularly
useful display technique. Decision tracing begins by
locating ·each decision in the document data base. As a
decision-point is detected, both a retrospective and
prospective search is performed on the specified policy
issue. (A policy issue would be specified in terms of a
particular combination of themes and purposes which formed
the parameters of the search.) The retrospective search
traces backward from the decision-point and indicates when
and by whom the issue was first raised, what parties
56
recommended or opposed the issue, and what supporting
arguments were employed by the advocates and opponents of
the issue. The prospective search traces the policy
forward from the decision-point and indicates its effects
and ultimate disposition.
These retrieval techniques facilitate the
item-by-item analysis performed on the docu ents. Because
of the ease with which arguements and recommendations
could be retrieved and analyzed, direct examination of the
actual documents related to a specific policy debate or
time period became more tractable. For instance, before
analyzing the actual documents related to a particular
time period, the retrieval programs can be used to reveal
the salient issues, who supported or opposed them, and the
basis for their argumentation. At the same time, if an
individual or group changed position (e.g., moved from a
position of advocacy to opposition) during a particular
policy debate, or maintained contradictory positions
within a specific debate or across different debates, this
could easily be detected. In essence, the retrieval
techniques provide synoptic information on who said what,
when, and to whom. This information then serves as a guide
through the myriad of details contained in the actual
documents.
Similarly, the thematic
possible to apply quantitative
coding scheme made it
techniques to the contents
57
of the Pentagon Papers. Thematic coding moves beyond the
analysis of word frequencies to an examination of the
stream of consciousness, as it were, of the participants
in the decision-making process. The structure of the
thematic and purpose codes permit us to identify, among
other things, arguments (pro and con) , intelligence
assessments, recommendations, and decisions. The
cognitive elements which comprised the input to the
decision process could therefore be placed in arrays,
defined by both time and space, where they could be
statistically analyzed 1n relation to the decisions that
were actually made. It is to a discussion of these
statistical techniques that we now turn our attention.
58
NO'rES
1 The Senator Gravel Edition: The Pentagon Papers,
(Hereafter referred to as Gravel Edition), --rs ·vo1s7;
Boston: Beacon Press, 1971).
2 U.S. Department of Defense. United States-Vietnam
Relations: 1945-1967, (Hereafter referred to as Vietnam
Relations), (12 vols.; Washington, D.C.: Government
Ponting Off ice , l 9 7 l ) •
3 Not all documents assembled by the McNamara Task
Force have been released to either Congress or the public.
The index to the Defense Department edition lists a
section entitled "History of Contacts," with sub-headings
of "1965-1966," "Polish Track," "Moscow-London Track,"
and, "1967-1968." Next to each of these sub-headings,
which apparently contain documents pertaining to American
efforts to bring about negotiations, the government has
stated,"(This material not printed.)"
4 A partial listing of the 570 original codes 1s
contained in APPENDIX A.
5 APPENDIX 8 contains a complete list of the
general categories used 1n this study.
6 APPENDIX C contains a complete listing of the
purpose code descriptions.
7 Gravel Edition, I I, pp. 736-737.
8 Because only one person coded the entire set of
documents for this study, inter-coder reliability
coefficients are not reported here. To insure accuracy in
the coding process, (which can be fully replicated),
reliability checks were made by recomparing the coded
abstracts to the original documents.
CHAPTER IV
METHODOLOGICAL AND MODELING CONSIDERATIONS
MODELING CONSIDERATIONS
Processes of foreign policy formulation constitute a
systematic series of actions occurring over time and
oriented toward foreign policy goals. The elements of
change and time which define "process" require the
formulation of a dynamic analytical model to explain and
predict changes 1n time-dependent variables. And,
following the prescription of Hubert Blalock, "Dynamic
models virtually require mathematical formulation in order
1
to imply definitive predictions."
The variables which describe the behavior of a
dynamic system consist of parametric variables, which are
time-invariant throughout the duration of the system
analysis, and dynamic variables, which are time-varying
throughout the period of analysis. The state of a system
at any point in time is determined by its dynamic
variables. The changes in these dynamic variables, and,
hence, the state of the system, between time land time 2
yield a discrete-time process which is called a transition
rule.
If it were possible to predict the effect of any
59
60
change in a system with certainty, the system would be
closed and deterministic. Its transition rules, which
2
Gustav Bergmann calls "process laws,'' can be combined
with knowledge of any particular state of events to give
rise to knowledge of a preceding or subsequent state. For
instance, given that X causes!, if the value of Xis
altered, the value of Y would always vary in a prescribed
manner. In terms of an analytic model, Bergmann's process
laws are analogous to mathematical functions in which the
relationship between! and Y can be described through an
equation, where, by knowing the value of X, we can
perfectly predict the value of Y.
As Bergmann notes, however, process laws are only
applicable · to a closed system where there is no alteration
of its properties; a system of perfect knowledge. The
processes of foreign policy formulation, however, do not
occur in a closed system and are not deterministic. Like
all social systems, these processes are subject to the
vicissitudes of human behavior and thus we lack perfect
knowledge of the relationship among the variables. But
even limited understanding of the relationship between
variables does not preclude us from analyzing and
explaining foreign policy processes. This assertion is
predicated upon what Robert Dubin terms the paradoxes of
precision and power.
Dubin considers the precision paradox to be " ••• one
61
of the important reasons why there is both a distinctive
technology of applied social science and a distinctive
contribution of it to the corpus of the behavioral
3
sciences." The essence of this paradox is that high
precision predictions are possible to achieve without any
knowledge of the relationship between predictive indices
and predicted outcome. On the other hand, he outlines the
substance of the power paradox as follows:
A theoretical model that focuses on the analysis
of processes of interaction may contribute
significantly to understanding. This
understanding may be achieved by limiting the
system being analyzed, by simplifying its
variables and/or the laws of interaction among
them, and by focusing on broad relationships
among variables. Understanding of processes,
when achieved, does not necessarily provide the
basis for accuracy of pred1ct1on about the
reality being modeled by the theoretical
system.4
Since highly accurate predictions can be made without
an understanding of the processes producing the predicted
outcome, and because a high degree of understanding is
neither always necessary nor sufficent for accuracy in
prediction, process laws, which constitute the explanatory
link between process and outcome, may not only be
unnecessary but also impossible to attain. This
uncertainty inherent in our analytical model can be
accommodated by substituting probability distributions for
mathematical variables. Mathematical models based on
62
probability, or "stochastic models," enable us to account
for the relative freedom of choice available to foreign
5
policy decision-makers.
Generally speaking, we cannot predict, with any
certainty, the effect that international events, policy
debates, or other factors, have upon the decision-making
process. This element of uncertainty is inherent in
foreign policy analysis because: (1) the policy-making
system is not fully specified insofar as it is difficult,
if not impossible, to identify every variable which
influences the making of a decision: and, (2) by virtue of
the freedom of choice available to the decision makers, we
are confronted with the uncertainty which characterizes
much of human behavior. A probabilistic or stochastic
model, however, allows us to analyze policy behavior
despite its indeterminacy, by permitting us to predict the
6
expected outcomes of the decision-process.
This ability to analyze an indeterminate system stems
not only from the probablistic techniques of the
stochastic model, but also from the paradox of precision
and power identified by Dubin. While the analytic system
must have an isomorphous relationship to the concrete
system it models, the power paradox permits us to achieve
a high degree of understanding of the decision process
even though the system may not be fully specified.
Moreover, the precision paradox allows us to achieve
63
relatively accurate predictions without full knowledge of
the relationship between foreign policy determinants and
foreign policy outcomes.
QUANTITATIVE TECHNIQUES
The Ellsberg-Gelb model contains the postulate that
major changes in u.s. policy toward Vietnam occurred only
as a direct reaction to crises which threatened the lose
of Vietnam to the Communists. In other words, as depicted
by the Ellsberg fever chart of the A and B phases of
escalation, the evolution of the escalatory process was
not dependent upon the historical antecedents of American
involvement in Vietnam. Instead, a change in system-state
(level of escalation) between time 1 and time 2 was only
dependent upon the state of the system at time 1. This
proposition suggests that the policy process be analyzed
by a particular type of stochastic model known as a Markov
chain. A stochastic process possesses the Markov property
and 1s a Markov chain if:
••• the transition from the present state to the
next state does not depend on the path by which
the system arrived at the present state. This
assumption is exploited in the setting-up stage
of the model by envisioning an arbitrary time at
which the transition takes lace, picking up the
system at its present state, and disregardinq
system behavior prior to the contemporary
state.?
64
Two aspects of America's Vietnam olicy were analyzed
through the use of Markov chains:
1. Decision-making pertaining to the level of U.S.
involvement in support of armed conflict in Vietnam.
2. The level of U.S. involvement (penetration) in
the governmental affairs of the Republic of (So uth)
Vietnam.
These two dimensions are among the thirty-one general
thematic categories into which the individual themes can
be grouped. In the Markov analyses, the thematic elements
combined under these two specific categories were sorted
into continua ranging from the lowest to the highest
points of involvement. For instance, the continuum
pertaining to the level of U.S. involvement in support of
the armed conflict begins with the theme, "do not commit
to any form of involvement," and ends with the theme,
"employ nuclear weapons against China." Similarly , the
penetration continuum begins with the theme, "the U.S.
opposes the use of puppet governments or monarchies as a
weapon against Communism ," and ends with "The U.S. will
control the Government of
. ,
Vietnam s policy-making and
implementation."
It should be emphasized that the thematic elements
which make up the two continua consist of specific
recommendations as well as actual policy decisions
65
contained in the documents of the Pentagon Papers. In
this way the length of the two continua was determined not
by the highest level of escalation ever made within the
time-period of the study but, rather, by the highest level
of escalation ever recommended by members of the
overnment. The sorted thematic elements, which represent
recommendations and decisions for greater escalation,
comprise the possible states of escalation throu h which
the system could have evolved. However, only the actual
decisions were included in the f'nal Markov analyses.
The type of 1arkov model employed in this study 1s
called an absorbing Markov chain. In definitional terms,
an absorbin Markov process must have th~ pro erties of at
least one absorbing state an it must be possible for the
system to move from any of the non-absorbing, or
transient, states to an absorbing state 1n one or more
steps. As its name implies, however, once the system moves
into an absorbing state it remains there and cannot move
8
back to a transient state. By virtue of the fact that
the model allows the system to move from any transient
state to the absorbing state 1n one step, the precise
ordering of the themes along the two continua used in this
study 1s not a restrictive assumption 1n the Markov
analysis.
Rather, the crucial assumption required for the use
of absorbing chains is the nature of the end-states of the
two continua. In the
U.S. involvement 1n
category relate
support of armed
66
to the level of
conflict, the
end-state is ''Employ nuclear wea ons a ainst China." It
has been assumed as this state would be absorbing insofar
that once a policy-decision of this nature is made, the
United States could no loner reduce its involvement to a
lower transient level such as restricting its involvement
to bombing missions over South Vietnam.
In the category related to the level of U.S.
penetration of the governmental affairs of South Vietnam,
the end-state is, "the U.S. will control the Government of
Vietnam's olicy-making and implementation." In this case
the assumption was made that once the United States took
over complete political control 1n South Vietnam, the
Government of Vietnam would cease to exist as a viable
entity. And, once this governmental structure had been
swept aside, the preceeding system states would no longer
exist as possible points to which the system could return.
That 1s, by completely usurping the sovereignty of the
GVr, the United States would have destroyed the very
structure which would have to reassume political rule if
the U.S. subsequently decided to revert to an earlier
system-state involving only indirect political control.
This system-state would therefore become absorbing and
preclude any retrograde movement to a lesser transient
state of involvement.
67
In effect, absorbing chains are used to measure
unstable systems. To analyze the movement of the decision
process through the various system-states of involvement,
the actual decisions were separated by year, with 1942
serving as the initial condition of the system. The model
then analyzes the decision process by examining the
changes in system-states from year to year. Through an
analysis of the transition which occurs 1n the
system-state between one year and the next, the model
calculates the expected number of years until the system
reaches the absorbing or stable state. The separate
calculations for each year, when taken collectively, give
a deduced trajectory depicting the direction and speed of
the decision process through time. The ratio of the
estimated time for absorption from one year to the same
estimate for the subsequent year, yields a measure of how
fast the rate of escalation was changing. This ratio
provides a measure of the escalation process which can be
used, in conjunction with estimates of the escalatory
level and the amount of escalation, to analyze the
9
decision process.
The measures derived from the Markov chains, along
with measures of the frequency and source of policy
recommendations, arguments for greater or less involvement
in Vietnam, assessments of the progress and state of
affairs 1n Vietnam, as well as other categories of
68
quantitative ata derived from the document data base,
were analyzed using the techni ue of step-wise multiple
.
regression. Step-wise regression locates and ranks
independent predictor variables in the order in which they
account for the variation of a dependent or criterion
variable, based on their reduction of the sum of the
squares. For a predictor variable to be selected and
entered into the regression equation it must oass a test
of significance known as the F test. This determines
whether the variance of the dependent variable associated
with the introduction of the new predictor is attributable
to real effects, chance, or uncontrolled effects.
Similarly, at each step, the predictor variables already
included in the
.
regression equation are tested for
significance. If any previously included variable no
longer passes the F test of significance, it is deleted
from the equation. The selection process is completed
when the F levels of the remaining unselected predictors
are not of sufficient significance to be included in the
10
regression.
Employing a significance-level test of .01 for
selecting predictor variables and .005 for deleting
previously selected predictors, analyses were performed to
determine:
1. What individuals and government bureaus
accounted for the greatest amount of variance in the
69
decision process
.
1n any
.
q1ven year or
administration;
2. hat arguments or factors accounted for the
greatest amount of variation 1n the decision process
in a given administration and for the over-all
period under analysis;
3. And, what arquments or factors accounted for the
variation 1n recommendations submitted for policy
consideration.
Although this study only examines the period from
1940 to 1952, it
.
lS a oint of departure for a larger
project which has as its goal the analysis of American
11
involvement 1n Vietnam up to 1968. While the
statistics derived for the period after 1952 have not been
thoroughly analyzed, they can serve as a brief
illustration of the quantitative methods discussed above.
For instance, the rah contained in Fiqure 2 juxtaposes
measures of the level of optimism and the decision-making
process and represents an empirical measure corresponding
to Ellsberg's hypothesized fever chart. The measure of
the decision-making process was obtained from the Markov
model while the level of optimism consists of frequency
measurements obtained from thematic elements which express
a positive or optimistic assessment of the state of
affairs and/or progress of American efforts in Vietnam.
The periods along the bottom of the graph, which run from
L L
E E
V V
E E
L L
0 0
F F
0 p
p 0
T L
I I
M C
I y
s
M p
R
0
C
l E
s
s
I
2
3201
I
280
240
200
160
120
80
40
2
A
FIGURE 2
LEVEL OF OPTIMISM AND THE POLICY PROCESS
LEVEL OF
loPTIMISM
0
I I ,< ,-= Y: ..._, T I F I T I F 1--,,1 f" I I t ~ I I t""" I "f~~~e~ss
l 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 2 23 24 25 26
...J
::S>
71
l to 26, correspond to the years 1942 to 1967. Line l on
the graph epicts fluctuations in the level of optimis
expressed by officials in the American Government, while
line 2 represents a measure of the rate of change
exhibited by the decision-making process with respect to
escalation.
As can readily be seen from the graph, the A and B
patterns of escalation hypothesized by Ellsberg do indeed
exist, particularly up to 1952. That is, periods of
qualitative change in the level of American involvement
often occur only during low points of optimism. However,
there are , arked instances (particularly in 1953, 1963,
1965, and 1966) where qualitative chanqes occur either
when optimism is on the upswing or actually at a peak.
This breakdown 1n Ellsberg's hypothesis is also reflected
1n the results of a regression analysis designed to
indicate the factors which accounted for the greatest
amount of variation in the decision-making process for the
entire 26 year period. In this particular analysis,
frequency measures derived from concept categories 5
through 31 (see Appendix B) were used as independent
predictor variables. Accordingly, the step-wise
regression selected and ranked the following variables as
the most significant predictors of the decision-making
process:
assessments of the state
72
of (a) Optimistic
affairs and/or
Vietnam.
progress of American efforts
.
1n
(b) Arguments to increase U. S. involvement 1n
Vietnam based upon the desirability of supporting
the South Vietnamese regime.
(c) Arguments to
Vietnam based upon
.
increase U.S. involvement
.
1n
international political and
strategic considerations.
The fact that the regression analysis selected
optimistic rather than pessimistic assessments as the most
significant predictor of the rate of change in the
escalatory process serves to further illustrate the
breakdown of Ellsberg's hypothesis. But these measures
fail to reveal the conditions under which the hypothesis
either holds up or breaks down. To get at the answers to
these questions, r gression analyses were performed on a
year by year and administration by administration basis.
Even here, however, statistical analysis does not provide
us with the insights necessary to explain the
decision-making process .
QUALITATIVE TECHNIQUES
The purpose of statistical methods is to simplify the
complexities of the political reality surroundin American
73
involvement in Vietnam. This process of simplification
provides insights into reality which would otherwise
12
remain obscured by the complexity of events. On the
other hand, the simplification inherent in statistical
analysis also implies a loss of information which can only
be examined through qualitative (as o posed to
quantitative) analysis of the documents. Qualitative
techniques encompass the more traditional analysis of the
documents' manifest contents and allow the analyst to
" ••• compare in most minute detail what statesmen have said
with what they have actually done -- and determine what
13
perceptions have shaped their decisions."
As Oli Holsti contends, quantitative and qualitative
methods of content analysis should be used to supplement
each other. "It 1s by moving back and forth between these
approaches," he argues, ''that the investigator is most
14
likely to gain insight into the meaning of his data."
Following this prescription, qualitative analysis of the
documents' manifest contents, aided by the information
retrieval techniques discussed in Chapter III, have also
been employed in the present study. The results of the
qualitative analysis are presented in the form of an
historical reconstruction of salient events 1n each
administration. This reconstruction 1s predicated on all
documents contained in the Pentagon Papers. And, for the
sake of convenience, the contents of these documents have,
74
1n part, been presented in paraphrased form. However ,
where paraphrasing has been employed, the text of the
historical analysis continues to reflect the language of
the actual documents.
With the exception of the Roosevelt years, each
administration 1s first examined through the techniques
provided by the Markov models and regression analysis and
then through a detailed historical analysis of the actual
document contents. The combined results of these two
approaches will hopefully allow us to test the
Ellsberg-Gelb hypotheses and gain insight into the
decision-making process . Because the Roosevelt
Administrations, which are examined in the next Chapter,
entailed only limited decision-making with regard to
Vietnam, qualitative techniques provide the only possible
means of analysis. And, although Roosevelt 's decisions
related to Vietnam are limited in number and scope, an
historical analysis of this early period is necessary if
one 1s to trace the evolution and crystallization of the
policy behavior which led to American involvement.
75
OTES
1 Hubert M . Blalock, Jr., Theory Construction: From
Verbal to Mathematical Formulations (Englewood Cliffs:
Prentice-Hall , 1969) ,p.26.
2 Gustav Bergmann , Philosophy of Science (Madison:
The University of Wisconsin Press , 1957), pp. 9lff.
3 Robert Dubin, Theory Building (New York: The Free
Press, 1969), p. 18.
4 Ib~. , p.23.
text.)
(Emphasis contained in the original
5 D.J. Bartholomew , Stochastic Models
Processes (2nd ed.; London: John Wiley
1973) ,p.3.
for Social
and Sons,
6 For a related discussion of the use of stochastic
models in the analysis of foreign policy decisions see:
warren R. Phillips, Patrick T . Callahan, and Robert C.
Crain, "Simulated Foreign Policy Exchanges: The Rationale
Underlying a Theory of Foreign Policy Interaction,"
International Interactio~, I (October, 1974), 240-243.
7 Thomas J. Fararo,
Introduction to Fundamentals
Sons , 1973) , p .244.
Mathematical
(New York:
Sociology:
John Wiley
An
and
8 Donald P. Gaver and Gerald L. Thom son,
Programming and Probability Models in Operations Research
(Monterey, California: Brooks/Cole Publishing Company,
1973), p . 417ff .
9 For a detailed explanation of the mathematical
theory of Markov chains and their application, the reader
is referred to: Bartholomew, Stochastic Models for Social
Processes, passim; Fararo , Mathematical Sociology, chaps.
8,10 ,1 2-16; and, Gaver and Thompson , Programming
Probability Models in Operations Besearch, chaps. 9,13. -
1~ The step-wise regressions in this study were
performed using the Biomedical computer programs developed
by the Department of Biomathematics, School of Medicine,
at the University of California , Los Angeles . The reader
is referred to: BMD: Biomedical Computer Programs, w.J.
Dixon, ed., (Berkeley: University of California Press,
76
1973), pp. 305-30.
11 The decision to limit this issertation to the
analysis of the 1940-1952 time period was based on two
factors. First, this period is of substantive interest
because few, if any, contemporary studies have been
performed on the events leading up to and including the
initial direct involvement of the United States in the
Vietnam conflict. The vast majority of existing studies
on American involvement focus, instead, upon the Kennedy,
Johnson, and Nixon Administrations. On the other hand, the
study was also restricted to this time period for the more
pragmatic reasons of limited time an financial resources.
It is estimated that the final study, encom assinq the
years 1940 to 1968, will approach 800 pages in length and
require an additional year to complete.
12 Oli R. Holsti, Content Analysis for the Social
Sciences and Humanities, p. 11.
13 Oli R. Holsti, Robert C. North, and Richard A.
Brody, "perception and Action in the 1914 Crisis," in
Quantitative International Politics, ed. by J. David
Singer (New York: The Free Press, 1968), p. 124.
14 Holsti, Content Analysis for the Social Sciences
and Humanities, p. 11.
CHAPTE
S1
1
AG SETTING::;:
THE ROOSEV LT ADMINISTRATIONS
James Rosenau has described foreign policy as
" ••• authoritative actions which governments take -- or are
committed to take in order either to preserve the
desirable aspects of the international environment or
alter its undesirable aspects." In addition to bein
"necessarily calculated and goal oriented," he says that
foreign policy behavior "results when officials recognize
that action (or inaction)
1
is needed to enhance or
forestall chan es abroad." During the Roosevelt years,
and throughout the course of American involvement
.
1n
Vietnam , the foreign policy behavior of the American
Government was oriented toward either altering or
preserving the nature of the political regime which
overned Vietnam.
It is im ortant to study the foreign policy goals and
behavior of the Roosevelt Administrations toward Vietnam,
and Inda-China as a whole, because they serve as the nexus
from which the eventual direct American involvement
.
1n
Vietnam arose. However , because Roosevelt sought to
pursue his policy oals rimarily through a course of
inaction rather than action, the explicit olicy decisions
77
78
which are necessary to erform Markov and re ression
analyses do not exist. Therefore, our exa ination of the
period between 1940 and 1945 will, of necessity, be
limited to a qualitative analysis of the document
contents.
Roosevelt's original interest in Inda-China came
about in 1940 and was spurred by
,
Japans desire to
establish military bases within this French colony. At
first, American officials relied upon efforts to persuade
the French Government to resist Japanese encroach ents.
Jhen this failed and Japan assumed a protectorate of all
French Inda-China, the United States attem ted to use
diplomacy and economic sanctions, rather than direct
military confrontation,
withdrawal from the area.
to bring about a Japanese
The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor brou ht these
efforts to an abrupt end, and Roosevelt turned his
attention to considerations of the post-War disposition of
Indo-China. Publicly, officials in W ashington spoke of
supporting the ultimate restoration of French sovereignty
over its former colonial possessions. Privately, however,
Roosevelt was insistent upon preventing the
reestablishment of French colonial rule in Inda-China.
Instead, he sou ht some means of assuring the political
independence of the Inda-Chinese. The method he employed
to achieve this alteration of the international
79
environment was policy inaction with res ect to the desire
of France to partici at in the liberation of In a-China
from Japanese control.
1he pursuit of this policy by inaction served to
temporarily forestall French desi ns to restore its
colonial rule in Indo-China. ut, at the same time, the
lack of a clearly defined body of action-oriented policy
also enerated confusion within the American and Allied
overnments. Post- War lanning efforts for Southeast Asia
became stymied an friction arose between the United
States an those Allied governments which were also
colonial owers. In the midst of this rowing confusion
and animosity, Charles de Gaulle
.
raise the specter of
war-torn France being made even weaker through the loss of
its colony in Indo-China. To this ima e of a teetering
French economy on the verge of collapse, de Gaulle added
the possibility of a Communist takeover and the absorbtion
of France into the Soviet sphere of influence.
The imagery of a Communist takeover in France struck
a responsive chord among American officials who saw France
as the key to ultimate European economic recovery and
political stability. They , in turn, began to use their
influence to initiate an about-face in the orientation of
American policy with regard to Indo-China. This ovement
eventually led to indirect American support of the
restoration of French colonial rule 1n Southeast Asia.
80
And, from this point on, the image of an international
Communist conspiracy in Europe and Asia was effectively
used by the French to prod the United States into
increasing its involvement in the Vietnamese conflict. To
examine this evolution of American policy in greater
detail we will proceed to an analysis of the document
contents for the years 1940 to 1945.
DOCUMENT ANALYSIS FOR 1940-1945
Prior to World War II, Vietnam was part of
Indo-China, a French colony, and of little political or
strategic significance to the United States. By mid-1940 ,
however, two series of events combined to alter the
structure and balance of power within the international
system and, 1n turn, to increase U.S. interest 1n
Indo-China. First, American concern had become acutely
aroused by the rapid and aggressive expansion of Japanese
control and influence over China and the Southeast area of
the Pacific. Then, in May and June of 1940, Hitler's army
invaded and occupied most of France. The unoccupied
portion of France was governed from the provisional
capital of Vichy by the authoritarian regime of Marshal
Henri Petain, who had been a leading advocate of French
2
accomodation with Hitler. A key result of this change
in regime and circumstances was that the French colonial
81
empire came into the hands of a weak and discredited
government committed to collaboration with Germany who was
the Axis alliance partner of Japan.
When France surrendered to Hitler, Japan began to
exert pressure on the Vichy Government to allow Japanese
ground and air forces to be stationed 1n Indo-China. To
President Roosevelt, already alarmed at the rapid spread
of Japanese military strength in China and across the
Pacific, the prospect of a Japanese military occupation of
Inda-China represented a significant destabilization of
the status quo of the Pacific, and a direct threat to
3
American strategic and economic interests.
Faced with the probability that France would succumb
to Japanese threats and accede to their demands, Roosevelt
began to place counter-pressure on the Vichy Government.
The French responded by insisting that they could continue
to resist Japan only if they were supported by a direct
commitment of American military forces. But, feeling
compelled to avoid committing the United States to a
potential armed confrontation with Japan, Roosevelt
unsuccessfully attempted to sway the French with vague and
ambiguous statements of support. On August 6, 1940, the
U.S. State Department informed the French Ambassador that
" ••• we have been and are doing everything possible within
the framework of our established policies to keep the
4
situation in the Far East stabilized •••• " In response,
82
the Ambassador concluded that his government had no
alternative but to comply with Japanese demands, because
he interpreted:
••• the phrase 'within the framework of our
established policies', when associated with the
apparent reluctance of the American Government
to consider the use of military force in the Far
East at this particular time, to mean the United
States would not use military force in support
of any position which miqht be taken to resist
the Japanese attempted aggression on
Indochina.5
The French assessment proved to be accurate. For
al though the Roosevelt Administration had become
increasingly concerned with the course of events, there
was no serious consideration of committing U.S. forces
even when the Japanese Army poured into Indo-China a year
later. The American Government limited its efforts to
economic pressure and diplomatic suasion to convince Japan
that it was not threatened by
consequently,
Inda-China.
had no need for
The United States
any nation,
military bases
and,
.
10
continued with these
tactics even after the Japanese invasion was an
accomplished fact. According to a memo by Sumner Welles,
Roosevelt met with the Japanese Ambassador on July 24,
1941 to protest Japan's military occupation of Inda-China
and, without consulting the French, offered to turn
Inda-China into a neutralized country, similar to
83
Switzerland, in return for the complete withdrawal of all
Japanese troops. The offer carried with it a guarantee
"that Japan would be afforded the fullest and freest
opportunity of assuring herself of the source of food
supplies and other raw materials in Indochina which she
6
was seeking to secure." FUrthermore he stated,
"
••• none
of the powers concerned [China, Great Britain, the
Netherlands, The United States, and Japan] would undertake
any military act of aggression against Indochina and would
remain in control of the territory and would not be
confronted with attempts to dislodge them on the part of
de Gaullist or Free French agents or forces."
offer was not, however, accepted by the Japanese.
7
Tnis
The following day Japan announced that it had assumed
a protectorate of all French Inda-China. President
Roosevelt countered this move by: (a) receiving the armed
forces of the Philippines into the United States army; (b)
appointing General Douglas MacArthur as commander of all
army forces
.
1n the Far East; and, ( C) freezing all
Japanese financial assets in the United States. However,
right up to the very eve of American entry into World War
II, Roosevelt continued to seek some way to persuade Japan
to remove its troops from Inda-China without directly
threatening the use of American military forces. On
December 6, 1941, he sent a message to Emperor Hirohito
deploring the continued influx of Japanese troops into the
84
French colony and asked him to withdraw before open
8
hostilities occurred. Then, on the morning of December
7, 1941, Japan resolved America's policy dilemma in
Southeast Asia by attacking Pearl Harbor. In doing so,
however, they thrust the American Government into a new
policy dilemma: whether the French should be allowed to
reclaim Inda-China as a colony once the war had ended.
Throughout the course of World War II President
Roosevelt and the State Department privately and publicly
reassured the French that one of the primary allied war
aims was the restoration of all pre-war territories to the
French Empire. For instance, on November 2, 1942,
Presidential Assistant Robert D. Murphy wrote to French
General Henri Giraud:
Referring to the declaration made on
several occasions by President Roosevelt, and
the obligations already undertaken by the
American Government as well as by the British
Government, I am able to assure you that the
restoration of France to full independence, in
all the greatness and vastness which it
possessed before the war in Europe as well as
overseas, is one of the war aims of the United
Nations.
It is thoroughly understood that French
sovereignty will be re-established as soon as
possible throughout all the territory,
metropolitan and colonial, over which flew the
French flag in 1939.
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
••• the American
.
1n any way 1n
within the
authorities will not intervene
those affairs which are solely
province of the national
85
administration or which have to do with the
exercise of French sovereignty.9
Despite the American Government's official commitment
to the restoration of the French Empire , the documents
indicate that Roosevelt himself became increasingly
attracted to the concept o national self determination
and independence for all colonial peoples . The
contradiction between the President's
.
growing personal
views and the officially stated position of the Government
can be seen not only in the idealistic principles of
self-determination which he successfully sought to have
included 1n the Atlantic Charter . but also in his
correspondence with Stalin. In contrast to the foregoing
communique to General Giraud, Roosevelt agreed with Stalin
that no allied blood should be shed in restoring
Indo-China to French colonial rule. In the President's
op1n1on, "after 100 years of French rule 1n Indo-China,
the inhabitants were worse off
10
than they had been
before ." He therefore proposed, and Stalin agreed,
that Indo-China should be
trusteeship while
11
independence.
the
laced under an international
people were prepared for
Two months later, 1n January 1944, Roosevelt
expressed the same opinion of French colonial rule and the
trusteeship proposal to
. . ,
Br1ta1n s Lord Halifax. In
86
contrast to Stalin, the British received the proposal with
consternation because of the implications it contained for
the future of their own colonial possessions. However,
the President's trusteeship scheme appears to have been
designed primarily for application to Indo-China. In a
memo to Secretary of State Cordell Hull, Roosevelt
concluded that the English and Dutch, as colonial powers:
••• have never liked the idea of trusteeship
because it is, in some instances, aimed at
future independence. This is true in the case
of Indo-China.
Each case must, of course, stand on its own
feet, but the case of Indo-China is perfectly
clear. France has milked it for one hundred
years. The eople of Indo-China are entitled to
something better than that.12
President Roosevelt's increasingly steadfast desire
to prevent France from reestablishing its control over
Indo-China, when combined with his failure to be candid
with the French regarding his position, led to confusion
within both the American and Allied governments. The
confusion and its debilitating effect on policy
formulation became increasingly manifest as the tide of
war turned in favor of the Allies and planning for the
post-war period became more and more imperative.
In October 1943, the Washington Delegation of the
French Committee of National Liberation heard that the
allies were planning the liberation of Indo-China and that
the Chinese were slated to play
.
a maJor role in
87
the
operation. To preclude any Chinese claim to their former
colony, the Committee informed the State Department of its
wish to have French forces participate in the liberation
and argued that, because the Chinese and Annamites were
"hereditary enemies," the Chinese should be excluded from
13
the operation. Assistant Secretary of State, Adolf
Berle, Jr., told the Committee that their request was
primarily a military matter to be considered by the Chiefs
of Staff but he privately noted later that it also
presented a significant political problem. "This brings
us," he said, "squarely up to the problem of whether, in
the Far East, we are re-establishing the western colonial
empires or whether we are letting the East liberate itself
14
if it can do so."
Because of the political considerations inherent in
the French request, Berle felt that the entire matter
should be forwarded to President Roosevelt for a policy
decision. In presenting the matter to Under Secretary of
State Stettinius, Berle expressed the opinion that France
would probably use its arguments against Chinese
participation when the French Committee placed its request
before the Pacific War Council. Berle argued that:
The French would push this view in the
Pacific War Council. This would probably be
supported by the British and the Dutch. This
88
would present us, for all practical purposes,
with the task of reconquering Inda-China almost
single-handed (Since the British interest stops
with Burma) for the sole purpose of returning
Inda-China to France. France is unlikely to be
able to maintain herself in control of, or
protect, that province for a good while; so that
we should have the added job of policing and
protecting it against the Chinese as well as the
Japanese in the interest of the French Colonial
Empire.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ~ . . .
Frankly, I doubt if we could defend before the
Congress a very considerable expenditure of
American lives for the sole purpose of keeping
Inda-China in French, as against Chinese or
Inda-Chinese, hands •••• 15
Berle was not alone 1n his arguments against
permitting French re-entry into Inda-China. The State
Department's Division of Far Eastern Affairs contended
that "the Annamites, by and large have for the Chinese a
feeling of friendliness and cultural affinity." Moreover,
they argued: "It is our belief that the Annamites are
fundamentally capable of self-government and it should be
the objective of any post-war administration to train
Annamites to resume the responsibilities of
16
self-government."
When the French request was finally presented to
President Roosevelt, along with the State
,
Departments
recommendations, he not only turned it down but also
refused to acknowledge and resolve the essentially
political problems it raised. It is here that we find the
89
first open manifestation of Roosevelt's decision to use
tactics of "inaction" to forestall the restoration of
Indo-China to the French colonial empire. In responding to
the Secretary of State, Roosevelt said:
In regard to the use of Chinese troo s
against Annam, I agree with the State Department
that the French presentation of the case is not
sufficiently valid to take any action.
The whole matter should be left to the
discretion of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and to
the Commanding Officers in the area. This is
essentially a military problem.17
The President's decision to place the matter in the
hands of the military only transferred the problem to the
War Department. When the military asked the State
Department for political guidance so they could proceed
with civil affairs planning for Indo-China, they found
they did not have the discretionary power that Roosevelt
had indicated. Frustrated by the growing bureaucratic
confusion caused by Roosevelt's "non-policy" on
In o-China, Under Secretary Stettinius informed the
President of their request and stated that a number of
important decisions were dependent upon the role to be
played by the French in the liberation of Indo-China.
Therefore, he continued:
Subject to your approval, the State
90
Department will proceed on the assumption that
French armed forces will be employed to at least
some extent in the military operations, and that
in the a ministration of Indo-China it will be
desirable to employ French nationals who have an
intimate knowledge of the country and its
problems. We would assume further that the use
of French forces or civilians would be without
prejudice to the uestion of the ultimate status
of French Inda-China and would be related solely
to problems connected with and flowin from
possible military operations.18
Roosevelt responded b writing across the face of
Stettinius' memo: "No French help in Indochina __ country on
lg
trusteeship."
The President's approach to persistent French
re uests for participation in the liberation of Inda-China
had the merit of avoiding a direct confrontation with the
French and, in turn, a disruption of Allied unity. By
avoiding the formulation of an action-oriented policy
toward Inda-China, it would appear that he anticipated the
problem of French participation to be resolved by the
rapid advance of American and ritish forces across the
Pacific. Once the liberation of Inda-China had become an
accomplished fact, the question of French participation
would have become a moot point. Of even greater
importance was the fact that this course of events would
have deprived the French of an opportunity to reestablish
its colonial rule in Southeast Asia. Contrary to plan,
however, Roosevelt's non-policy position not onl had
disruptive effects within the American Government, it also
91
served to destabilize relations within the Allied camp.
In a reported conversation between British Ambassador Lord
Halifax and
remarked:
Secretary of State Hull, Lord Halifax
••• that information had come to him from his
Foreign Office that in a conversation with the
Turks, Egyptians and perhaps others during his
recent trip to the Near East, the President
spoke rather definitely about what purported to
be his views to the effect that Indochina should
be taken away from the French and put under
trusteeship •••• The Ambassador said that of
course he had heard the President make remarks
like this during the past year or more but that
the question of whether the President's
utterences represent final conclusions becomes
important in view of the fact that it would soon
get back to the French •••• 20
Throughout 1944 and early 1945 the French and the
British pressed the American Government for its formal
position on such questions as French participation 1n
liberating Inda-China, the subsequent administration of
that country after its liberation, and the possibility of
supplying military aid to the French resistance forces
fighting the Japanese from within Inda-China. Roosevelt
tied the hands of the Office of Strategic Services, the
State Department, his Theater Commander, and others, by
refusing to let them collaborate with the French. But, at
the same time, he refused to state formally the policy of
his Administration to the Allies. Stettinius informed the
92
President that " ••• the British are obviously perturbed
21
about the situation." And, a perplexed Charles de
Gaulle presented the following situation to the American
Ambassador to France on March 13, 1945:
We have received word that our troops still
fighting in Indochina have appealed for aid to
your military authorities in China and the
British military authorities in Burma. We have
received word that they replied that under
instructions no aid could be sent •
••• This worries me a great deal for obvious
reasons and it comes at a particularly
inopportune time. As I told Mr. Hopkins
[Special Assistant to President Roosevelt] we do
not understand your policy. What are you
driving at? Do you want us to become, for
example, one of the federated states under
Russian aegis? The Russians are advancing apace
as you well know. When Germany falls they will
be upon us. If the public here comes to realize
that you are against us in Indochina there will
be terrific disappointment and nobody knows to
what that will lead. We do not want to become
Communist; we do not want to fall into the
Russian orbit, but I hope you do not push us
into it.22
With de Gaulle's message in hand, Edward Stettinius,
who was now
unofficial
Secretary of State and
leader of Roosevelt's loyal
seemingly the
opposition,
attempted to get the President to approve publicly the
grant of assistance to French resistance fighters 1n
23
Indo-China. on March 17, 1945, William D. Leahy, a
Roosevelt aide, informed Stettinius that the President
deemed the action to be "inadvisable at the present
93
24
. "
time •••• But, on March 19, approximately a month
before President Roosevelt's death, there was ' a reversal
of position. The State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee
instructed General Chennault to
25
provide aid to the
French and Secretary Stettinius informed the French
Government that:
1n appreciation of the importance and urgency
which the French Provisional Government attaches
to this question, immediate steps are being
taken to ascertain whether any further
assistance can be given from the China Theater
to the resistance groups within Indo-China
without jeopardizing the over-all war efforts in
other areas.26
With this decision the United States began the
process of ever-greater direct involvement in Indo-China.
Here, too, 1s the first of many French references to the
imminent danger of Soviet hegemony
.
1n Europe. It is also
the French the first
successfully
of many instances in which
used the unsubstantiated threat of
international Communist subversion as an effective lever
to move the United States into a position of more directly
supporting French forces in Indo-China. As such, de
Gaulle's message, and the American response, represent one
of the earliest manifestations of a process that would
also eventually lead to the cold war.
After the decision to give aid to French forces 1n
94
Indo-China, pressures for clarification of United States
policy, both from within the American Government and from
its Allies, increased sharply. France grew more and more
suspicious of United States intentions with regard to the
future disposition of Indo-China and pressed repeatedly
for French partici ation in the liberation of Southeast
Asia. The British supported French demands and moved to
include France in the Southeast Asian Command, under the
direction of Lord Mountbatten, for pur oses of planning
and active participation
27
Indo-China.
.
1n
The British subse uently
the liberation of
requested American
concurrence with the proposal to include France in the
liberation of Indo-China. oosevelt, however, refused to
consider the matter, even though members of his
Administration considered Indo-China policy to be "a
matter of lively military interest," and the lack of
policy "a
military."
28
source of serious embarrassment to the
The President insisted that the future
disposition of Indo-China was a matter for post-war
planning and prohibited the military and members of the
Executive branch from discussing the matter. This
resulted 1n the establishment of American policy through
default. As one member of the State-War-Navy Coordinating
Committee noted, France,
" b
• • • y using a technique of
submitting a series of questions to various agencies of
95
the United States Government and by obtaining even
negative or non-committal responses thereto has been in
29
effect writing American policy on Indo-China."
Although the United States decided to give military
aid to French resistance groups within Indo-China, policy
confusion continued an Allied relations were further
jeopardized by subsequent developments
.
1n American
military plans. The United States had decided not to
conduct any major military operations oriented toward the
direct liberation of Indo-China. Instead, all American
efforts and resources were to be concentrated on defeating
30
Japan in its own homeland. This decline 1n Southeast
Asia's strategic importance gives reason to Roosevelt's
lack of concern for plans to liberate Indo-China. At the
same time, it could only serve to increase his perception
of this plan, which was militarily unnecessary, as being a
cover for the reestablishment of French colonial rule.
Therefore, the development of American military plans
served to reinforce Roosevelt's policy of inaction which,
in turn, increased the level of suspicion and distrust in
Franco-American relations. Thus, as President Truman
assumed the reins of power, he inherited a situation of
increasing confusion within his own government, as well as
growing Allied dissension, arising from the neglect of
96
Inda-China policy.
CONCLUDING COMMENTS
Even in these early days we find that the features of
American foreign policy behavior with respect to
Indo-China tend to conform with the main hypotheses of the
Ellsberg-Gelb model. Prior to the out-break of war
.
1n
1941, these features consisted of the domestic pressures
which inhibited Poosevelt from committing American
31
military forces to armed conflict with Japan, the
subsequent necessity to utilize a third party (France) as
surrogate to attain policy goals, and the need to
encourage and placate this surrogate with vague and
ambiguous statements of support that would not and could
not be carried out because of domestic pressures.
Similarly, the lack of any clearly defined policy
vis-a-vis Inda-China during the war-years, and the failure
of the United States to be candid in the representation of
its policy to its Allies, were also to become permanent
features of American involvement in Vietnam. Here, too,
we find in de Gaulle's warning to the United States about
the expansionist Communist m~nace, the point of departure
for the cold war and the policy of containment. In sum,
then, the emerging issues and the patterns of policy
97
formulation and execution exhibited under Roosevelt,
although germinal, tend to conform to the underlying
propositions of the Ellsberg-Gelb model.
Of even greater significa nc e 1s the fact that during
the Roosevelt era, concern over who would govern
Indo-China became a firmly established issue in American
foreign policy . Before America's entry into World War II,
the goal of United States policy was to prevent Japanese
control of Indo-China, while during the war the policy
goal, albeit informally stated, was to prevent the
reestablishment of French colonial rule. While the focus
shifted from Japan to the French, the issue remained the
same.
By the end of the Roosevelt Administrations it 1s
possible to discern a movement within the United States
government which would eventually lead to direct American
support of French colonial rule in Indo-China. Throughout
the latter part of Wor ld War II and into the early
post-war years, the American military establishment
generally considered Indo-China to be of minimal strategic
32
interest to the United States. The attempts by
Secretary Stettinius and others to have Roosevelt grant
military assistance to the French appear, therefore, to
have been motivated by a desire to improve deteriorating
Franco-American relations more than anything else.
Whether Roosevelt would have continued to resist these
98
pressures had his health held out is a matter of
speculation.
grant military
hat 1s certain is that the decision to
aid to french resistance
.
grou s 1n
Inda-China was the first of many steps that led the United
States down the road to the eventual morass of the 1960's.
This pressure to formulate American policy in support
of a French re-entry into Indo-China came primarily from
the Division of European Affairs in the State Department,
James C. Dunn, Edward Stettinius, James Forrestal, and
others who had a decidedly pro-French bias. Moreover, as
a group, they were 1n gen~ral agreement that the Soviet
Union was attemptin to en ineer a Communist takeover in
33
France and the rest of Europe. The only group within
the American Government which steadfastly argued against
the resumption of French colonial rule in Indo-China was
the state
, . . .
Departments D1v1s1on of Far Eastern Affairs.
Thus, de Gaulle found receptive and influential supporters
within the American Government through whom he could sway
u.s. policy toward a more pro-French view. And, as the
following analysis of the first Truman Administration will
reveal, the policy recommendations of the Division of
European Affairs became the prevailing force 1n the
decision-making process.
Why,
James
6.
1 James N.
hat, How,"
• Rosenau
99
NOTES
Rosenau, "Comparing Foreign Policies:
in Comparing Foreign Policies ed. by
(New York: Sage-Publications, 1974), p.
2 F. Roy Wills, France, Germany
1945-1967 (London: Oxford University
1-2.
and the New Europe:
Press, 1968), pp.
3 See, Vietnam Relations, 7, section V.B.l, p. 1:
and, Roberta ohlstetter, Pearl Harbor: Warning and
Decision (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1962), pp.
88-99ff. (Wohlstetter's research was conducted in a manner
similar to the present study insofar as she analyzed 39
volumes of Congressional hearing transcripts in an effort
to examine American policy behavior prior to the Japanese
attack on Pearl Harbor. However, contrary to this study,
ohlstetter focussed primarily upon testimony rather than
government documents.)
4 Vietnam Relations, 7, section V.B.l, p. 1.
5 Ibid., p. 2.
6 Ibid., p. 10.
7 Ibid., p. 9.
8. Ibid., pp. 14-15. (For a more detailed
examination of these diplomatic maneuvers, the freezing of
Japanese assets, and the receiving of Philippine forces
into the United States Army see: Wohlstetter, Pearl
Harbor, pp. 99-100ff. and pp. 233-246.)
9 Vietnam Relations, 7, section V.B.l,, p. 16.
10 Ibid., p. 24.
11 It has been suggested that Roosevelt's views were
based more on a desire to punish the French Government for
collaborating with the Axis powers than any idealistic
concern for self-determination. (Cf. Vietnam Relations,
1, section I.A, pp. 12-13.) - -
•
100
12 Vietnam Relations, 7, section V.B.l, p. 30.
13 lb id. , pp. 17-18.
14 Ibid, p. 19.
15 Ibid. , pp. 19-20.
16 Ibid. , p. 21.
17 lb id. , pp. 21-22.
18 Ibid. , p. 31.
19 Ibid. , p. 33.
20 lb id. , pp. 32-33.
21 Ibid. , p. 43.
22 Ibid. , p. 65
23 Ibid., pp. 66-67
24 lb id. , p. 68
25 lb id. , pp. 70-71
26 lb id. , p. 72
27 lb id. , pp. 34-44.
28 Ibid. , p. 1.
29 Ibid.
30 Ibid. , p. 13.
31 While the existence of domestic pressures is not
explicitly mentioned in the documents contained in the
Pentagon Papers, they can be ascertained from the numerous
studies of American politics and foreign policy which
focus on the pre-War years. See, for instance, Dexter
Perkins, The Evaluation of American I9reign Polici {2nd
ed.; London: Oxford University Press, 1966), chaps.
VII-VIII.
3 2 Cf. lb id. , p.
section I.A, pp. 15-16.
45; and, Vietnam Relations,
-
1,
101
33 See, for instance, Harry s. Truman, Years of
Decision (2 vols.; Garden City, New York: Doubleday,
1955), passim: Charles E, Bohlen, Witness to Histor~:
1929-1969 (New York: W .. W. Norton, 1973), passim; an ,
Walter Millis, ed., The Forrestal Diaries (New York:
Viking Press, 1951), £ass1m.
CHAPTER VI
THE FIRST TRUAN AD INISTRATION
The first Truman Administration constituted a
transition period in which the United States formulated
the policies of the post-war era. In a sense, it
represents a pre-choice phase in the policy process which
led to direct United States involvement in Vietnam. In
this respect, the transition period is marked by two
distinct trends which corresponded to perceptions of the
emerging post-war international political system. Some
officials of the American Government, particularly in the
State Department's Division of Far Eastern Affairs,
continued to argue for Roosevelt's goal of supporting
Inda-Chinese aspirations for self-government. At the same
time, because of increasing perceptions of threat from an
international Communist movement, support was also given
to continued French presence in Inda-China. Despite the
fact that these two recommendations were mutually
exclusive in nature, they both became foreign policy goals
which were pursued simultaneously by the United States.
The conflict inherent between these two qoals imbued the
decision-making process with an inconsistency which, at
time, bordered on institutional schizophrenia. The
perception of Communist
.
expansion became the
.
primary
102
103
obsession of the Truman Administration, however, and the
emerging cold war became the dominant guideline in the
formulation of United States policy for the next two
decades.
ANALYTICAL COMMENTARY
In May of 1945, the United States moved away from a
position of effectively blocking the reestablishment of
French control over Indo-China, to a position of indirect
support for the restoration of French colonial rule. The
primary basis for this change was the emerging perception
of threatened Soviet dominance of Europe. In the face of
this threat, the maintenance of unity among the Western
Allies and the restoration of European political,
economic, and military strength was fast becoming the
paramount interest of American foreign policy. In
particular, restoration of the stability and strength of
France was considered a vital factor in the containment of
communism. But, at the same time, the Administration's
desire to avoid alienating the growing nationalist
movements in Asia conflicted with, and prevented support
of, the restoration of Indo-China to France. The American
Government therefore opted for a position of "neutrality"
and proclaimed that it neither supported nor opposed
104
reestablishment of French control over its former colony.
It is at this point that the ambivalence created by these
two conflicting policy goals began to manifest itself in
American policy behavior. In all cases, however, the
stability of Franco-American relations and the containment
of Soviet influence remained the dominant policy.
For instance, in January, 1946, out of concern for
unity among the Western Alllies, the United States
violated its policy of neutrality by agreeing to a British
request to transfer Lend-Lease military equipment to
French Forces 1n Indo-China. This was followed, in April
of 1946, by American approval of the replacement of
Chinese occupation forces in North Vietnam with French
troops. This,
.
1n essence, meant approval of the
reestablishment of French civil administration throughout
Indo-China.
On one hand, the United States directly assisted the
restoration of French colonial rule. And, yet, on the
other, they blamed French colonial policy for the growing
instability 1n Southeast Asia. The United States became
particularly concerned when open warfare erupted between
the French and Vietnamese in December of 1946. Seemingly
ignoring the fact that it had directly assisted the French
10 regaining control in Inda-China, the Truman
Administration considered the French deception of the
Vietnamese and their continued colonial policy to be the
105
primary cause for the conflict.
Out of fear that continued warfare would turn all of
Asia against the Western powers, the United States pressed
France to negotiate a settlement with the Vietnamese and
grant them their independence. At the same time, the
United States determined that continued French presence in
Indo-China was necessary to offset perceived, but
unsubstantiated, Soviet influence over the Viet Minh.
Almost without fail, the reports which gave rise to the
specter of Communist influence were French in origin.
Despite the obvious bias in these reports and the fact
that American intelligence units could detect no evidence
of Soviet influence, American support 1n the conflict
gradually fell to the side of France. The Truman
Administration had decided that it preferred continued
colonial rule to a Communist regime.
With the passage of time, the Administration saw the
United States' interests as being tied directly to those
of its European Allies and considered the Western
democratic system to be on the defensive in the face of
international Communist expansion. To attain its policy
goal of containing the spread of communism, the United
States concluded that France could not relinquish total
control over Vietnam without having all of Indo-China fall
under Communist control.
Truman considered France to have the primary
106
responsibility for stabilizing the situation in Vietnam
but opposed the use of French puppet governments as a
weapon against communism. Moreover, he persisted in his
refusal to openly assist France out of fear that the
Americans would be labeled imperialist aggressors by the
Communists. But, as the end of the first Truman
Administration approached, the policy of supporting
Indo-Chinese self-determination had become so distorted
that it was merely a facade to maintain American prestige
and influence 1n Asia and further the policy of
containment. The Administration's efforts and interests
in Vietnam were oriented primarily toward the attainment
of its policy goals in Europe. Indo-China had become an
American pawn in the cold war with the Soviet Union.
For instance, the United States opposed any major
French military offensive against the Viet Minh not out of
any interest in Inda-Chinese independence but because it
would place a further strain on an already weakened French
economy. More importantly, increased French military
action in Vietnam was seen as potentially jeopardizing the
Administration's efforts to obtain Congressional funding
for European redevelopment. Similarly, in an effort to end
this military and economic drain on France, the United
States attempted to pressure France into accepting a
negotiated settlement with the Vietnamese and the
establishment of a non-Communist government in Vietnam. As
107
an inducement, the United States offered to support
publicly French policy in Indo-China. This represented
the first serious consideration of openly dropping the
American policy of "neutrality."
Thus, by September, 1948, the United States formally
established the elimination of Communist influence
.
1n
- Indu-China ~nd the fostering of a closer association
between Indo-China and the West (particularly with France)
as long-term policy objectives. It was concluded,
however, that: (1) France was fighting a losing struggle
in Vietnam; (2) that Comm nist control of the country had
increased; (3) that any Vietnamese government would be
unlikely to succeed if it excluded Ho Chi Minh; and, (4)
that U.S. influence in Southeast Asia had suffered a
set-back as a result of French policy in Indo-China, but
the United States had an immediate interest in supporting
France for the furtherance of u.s. aims in Europe.
It was in this policy statement that the foreign
policy goals with respect to Indo-China became
crystallized. Because the number of policy decisions made
between 1945 and 1948 were limited in both number and
scope, the results of the statistical techniques applied
to this Administration can be looked upon as giving us a
firm grasp upon the obvious. Nonetheless, a review of
these findings serves to clearly identify the source and
nature of the input into the decision-making process and
108
lends support to the results obtained from the subsequent
qualitative analysis.
STATISTICAL INFERENCE
AND THE LEVEL OF U.S. INVOLVEMENT IN VIETNAM
A major shift in the policy position of the United
States occurred quickly after President Roosevelt's death.
The transition from a osition of blocking the restoration
of French control over Indo-China to a policy of indirect
support of French efforts was based upon the perceived
threat of Soviet domination of all of Europe and the
consequent necessity of rebuilding Europe to prevent it
from falling under Communist rule. Once the transition
occurred, no new policy positions were formulated for the
balance of the administration.
As noted above, the policy process of this
Administration can be viewed as a pre-choice phase. By
wrapping itself in the cloak of "neutrality," the United
States avoided the necessity of openly adopting a policy
position on the issue of Vietnam. Instead, Truman
concentrated on the reconstruction of Europe, which was by
far the most important policy goal of his Administration.
The policy goals related to Vietnam remained relatively
undefined until they became firmly established in the
first formal policy statement on Indo-China, which was
109
issued in September, 1948. This course of events, as
measured by the Markov model, is depicted by the graph of
the policy process contained in Figure 3. The upward
movement of the policy process in 1945 represents the
substantive change in policy which occurred after Truman
assumed the Presidency. The process then declines until
1948, when American goals in Indo-China began to
crystallize and were formulated into the first United
States policy statement on Indo-China.
The increased policy activity during 1945 involved a
substantive change in the nature or state of u.s.
involvement in Indo-China. In contrast, the more dramatic
increase in 1948 involved a formal crystallization of the
substantive change which occurred in 1945 rather than
another substantive change in the state of the system.
American support of France remained just as tacit and
indirect at the end of 1948 as it was in 1945.
Furthermore, fear of Communist
.
expansion remained the
underlying basis of American policy for the entire
Administration. What the graph in Figure 3 depicts then
is a rapid substantive change in Indo-China policy
immediately after Roosevelt's death, followed by a
subsequent crystallization of this change in the specific
goals contained in the 1948 policy statement.
The measurements of actor influence obtained through
regression analysis, and contained in Table 1, lend
L
E
V
E
L
0
F
p
0
L
I
C
y
p
R
0
C
E
s
s
FIGURE 3
MARKOV MEASURE OF POLICY PROCESS
1601
140
120
H,0
I
801
60~
40
20
1
I
: 1 , 1 ~
19 45 1946 1947
} POLICY PROCESS
1948
.....,
.....,
~
TABLE 1
DETERMINATION OF INDIVIDUAL & GROUP I NFLUE N CE ON
POLICY FORMULATION: 1945-1948
(LEVEL OF U.S. INVOLVE M EN T IN VI ETN AM)
--------------------------~------· -------------------------------------------- ------
EASUREMENT DESCRIPTION
I. MEASUREMENTS OF INFLUENCE
ON A YEAR BY YEAR BASIS:
II. MEASUREMENTS OF INFLUENCE FOR
ENTIRE ADMINISTRATION
YEAR
1945-
AGGREGATE GROUPS WITH
STATISTICALLY SIGNIFICANT
INFLUENCE ON POLICY
(a) State Department
(Stettinius)
(b) Division of European
Affairs
1946- nil
1947- nil
1948- nil
State Department
(Stettinius)
I-'
....,
I-'
112
further support to the relative stability of the processes
of policy formulation. During the 1945 transition period
we find the efforts of Secretary of State Stettinius and
the State Department's Division of European Affairs to
have had the greatest amount of statistically significant
influence on policy formulation. This quite clearly
conforms with the results of our direct examination of the
documents. The policy recommendations in support of
stronger Franco-American relations, submitted in early
1945 by the Division of European Affairs, comprised the
major portion of the policy position actually adopted by
the Government.
On the other hand, the regression analysis was unable
to select any individuals or groups as statistically
significant
1946-1948.
predictors of policy during the years
Since this particular analysis involves a
regression of each individual's policy recommendations
against policy formulation, this tends to support the
conclusion that no substantive change in policy occurred
after 1945.
selected as
And, finally, Secretary Stettinius was
the only individual with statistically
significant influence on decision-making for the entire
time-span of the Administration, even though he resigned
on July 2, 1945. This finding lends even further support
to our contention that 1946-1948 represents a period of
113
quiescence in policy formulation.
The results obtained from other regression analyses
also tend to support observations obtained from direct
analysis of the documents. With respect to the underlying
basis for the Administration's Indo-China policy, we find
that:
(1) Increasing concern over the deteriorating
and unstable political conditions in Vietnam was
the only significant predictor of policy
recommendations selected by the regression
analysis.
(2) The actual change in the policy process was
predicted by two statistically significant
factors:
a) Concern over growing Soviet influence
1n both Europe and Vietnam which
combined into the emerging policy of
containing the spread of communism.
b) And, domestic considerations pertaining
to Congressional support for, and
funding of, the European Recovery Plan.
(3) Finally, the level and direction of policy
change also was predicted by only two
statistically significant factors:
I
114
a) Support for the role of France 1n
Indo-China;
b) And, once again, concern over growing
Soviet influence and the containment of
communism.
The findings of our statistical analyses conform with
those revealed by direct examination of the documents.
They indicate that any sympathetic concern for Vietnamese
self-determination which may have existed within the
Administration was quickly subordinated to American policy
goals in Europe and the desire to prevent the expansion of
communism. While overtly operating as a neutral with
respect to Vietnam, support for France and French policy
within Vietnam was a primary feature of American foreign
policy. In this case, a decision of "not to decide," was,
1n effect, a decision which served to support French
actions 1n Vietnam. The American pressure which was
exerted upon France to liberalize its policies
.
1n
Indo-China was motivated by a concern that the continued
drain on depleted resources would
jeopardize European security. And, although the United
States pressed for Vietnamese self-government, they were
speaking of a non-Communist government closely tied to,
and patterned after, the Western democracies. If such a
government could not be attained, then Administration
officials believed it would be better to lend support to
115
continued French colonial rule.
THE ELLSBERG-GELB HYPOTHESES
The lack of direct U.S. involvement in Vietnam during
the period of 1945 through 1948 precludes a complete test
of the Ellsberg-Gelb propositions. The results of our
analysis, however, generally coincide with the model's
predictions. using the summarized list of propositions
contained 1n Chapter 1 as our guideline, we find that the
evidence supports the contention (Proposition-1) that
Vietnam's importance to the United States rested upon
domestic political considerations and, particularly, the
effective implementation of American cold war policies.
Concern that French military efforts against the Viet Minh
would jeopardize public and Congressional support for the
European Recovery Program made the struggle in Vietnam
assume increasing importance to the United States.
By the end of 1948 the American Government feared
that Vietnam itself was falling under the sway of Soviet
influence. Therefore, prevention of Communist domination
in Vietnam (Propostition-2a) became a major long-term goal
of U.S. foreign policy. Moreover, fear of losing Vietnam
brought the U.S. to the point of considering open support
of French actions in Vietnam. While there was no specific
mention of avoiding a commitment to support France in its
116
Asian land war (Proposition-2b), American officials were
under orders to avoid committing the United States to any
form of direct involvement. Any attempt to achieve a
military victory over the Vietnamese was considered to
involve a long and bitter struggle with little hope of
ultimate success (Proposition-2b). In light of this
assessment, and, because of the aforementioned American
domestic political considerations, the Government went so
far as to seek assurance from France that it would not
embark upon a major military campaign in Vietnam.
Instead of resorting to direct U.S. involvement, the
Administration sought to achieve its policy goals
.
1n
Vietnam through the efforts of the French Government
( Pro po s i t ion- 3 a) • Continued French presence in Vietnam
was deemed necessary to offset Soviet influence and
stabilize the country. At the same time, a stable
non-Communist regime in Vietnam was believed to be a
second necessary ingredient for policy success. Because
Ho Chi Minh was allegedly an agent of international
communism and under direct Soviet control, the United
States withheld support from his Democratic Republic of
·Vietnam. Even though Ho was considered to be the most
popular and capable political figure in Inda-China and the
key to any hope for internal political stability, the
United States sought the establishment of a government,
(Proposition-3c), that would be closely aligned with the
117
west and "patterned upon our conception of a democratic
1
state •••• •
The pattern of policy formulation and the escalation
of American involvement appears to have been in reaction
to a Communist threat and conforms to Ellsberg's
hypothesized fever chart (Proposition-7). Figure 4
juxtaposes the Markov-defined policy process against the
level of official optimism over events in Vietnam. As
Ellsberg predicted, policy escalation occurred when
optimism was low, and, in reaction to a perceived threat
to u.s. interests. At the beginning of 1945 the policy
process was low and optimism, in a relative sense, was
high. During 1945, the level of optimism declined as the
threat of Soviet dominance in Europe grew. This gave rise
to a concurrent increase in the policy process to counter
the Soviet threat. In this instance, indirect American
support of French efforts to consolidate their hold over
Indo-China was seen to be one way of preserving Allied
unity and preventing the spread of Soviet control over
Europe. By 1946, policy activity declined while optimism
began to rise. But, then, as the perceived threat of
Communist influence in Vietnam
corresponding decline in optimism.
increased we find a
This gave rise to
another surge in the policy process during 1948 when the
policy position of the United States was crystallized in a
formal policy statement.
L L
E E
V V
E E
L L
0 0
F F
0 p
p 0
T L
I I
M C
I y
s
M p
R
0
C
l E
s
s
I
2
FIGURE 4
LEVEL OF OPTIMISM AND THC POLICY PROCESS
160
140
120 I
I
I
100~
2 POLICY PROCESS
.
I
I
80_1
6"
40
20
I
------ ..- 2 ..:::~~~ l _ ~ ~ LEVEL OF
0 T OPTIMISM
I I
19 44 1945 1946 1947 1948
....,
....,
(X)
119
It is interesting to note that while fear of growing
soviet influence became a touchstone for American policy
considerations in Indo-China, this perception was totally
unsupported by any evidence, even at the end of the
Administration. Almost without fail, the reports which
gave rise to the specter of Communist influence were
French in origin. For instance, General de Gaulle raised
the threat of communism when seeking American support for
2
French resistance groups in Inda-China. At later point
in time, Assistant Secretary of State Dunn based his
concern over Soviet dominance in Europe on a conversation
held with the French Minister of Foreign Affairs. Dunn
expressed his concern in the form of a policy
recommendation to support the French re-occupation of
Inda-China. In turn, this recommendation was ultimately
3
translated into a policy decision. From this point on,
the documents are dotted with references to the growing
threat of communism, which were directly or indirectly
attributed to French sources. Yet, there is only one
mention in the documents of the possibility that "French
concern over Comrnunist[s] may
divert ••• [American]
4
Indochina."
attention
well be
from French
devised to
policy
.
1n
120
DOCUMENT ANALYSIS FOR 1945-1948
Immediately after President Roosevelt's death the
State and War Departments began an all-out effort to have
President Truman fill the policy void with respect to
Inda-China. Policy recommendations and supporting
argumentations were solicited from various divisions of
the State Department and an immediate recommendation was
made to inform France of American military plans for
5
southeast Asia. On April 20, 1945, the Secretary of
State acted upon this request and informed French
Ambassador Bonnet that existing war plans for the defeat
of Japan would not permit the diversion of American
resources for military operations in Inda-China and, under
the circumstances, the United States could see no useful
purpose 1n concluding a Franco-Allied military agreement
for that purpose. The State-war-Navy Coordinating
Committee then set about drawing together various
recommendations and opinions in an effort to formulate an
overall policy proposal on Inda-China.
The State Department's Division of European Affairs,
for instance, considered the growing French suspicion of
u.s. intentions with regard to Inda-China, and the
resultant deterioration of Franco-American relations, to
be of primary concern.
121
Success of the United States
proposal to place Indo-China under an international
trusteeship, they contended, was solely dependent upon the
voluntary action of France, and General de Gaulle had made
it clear that it would remain part of the French Union.
Nor could the United States rely upon the support of its
allies, who were also colonial powers, to assist
.
1n
pressuring France into accepting the trusteeship pro osal.
But, the most important consideration, they argued, was
that, "Such action would ••• run counter to established
American policy of aiding France to regain her strength in
order that she may be better fitted to share
responsibility 1n maintaining the peace of Europe and the
6
world." The Euro pean Division therefore recommended
that:
1. The Government of the United States should not
oppose the restoration of Inda-China to France,
regardless of whether or not a program of
international accountability was established.
2. The United States should use its influence to
have France liberalize its economic policy and
permit greater Indo-Chinese participation in their
government.
3. Offers of French military assistance in the
Pacific be considered on the basis of their military
merits and not rejected because they might assist
122
France in regaining control over Indo-China.
4. United States military aid to French resistance
groups in Indo-China be continued -- but without any
specific commitments with regard to the amount or
7
kind of aid to be extended.
The State Department's Division of Far Eastern
Affairs concurred with the European
. . . ,
D1v1s1on s
recommendation of not opposing the restoration of
Indo-China to the French Union. Their concurrence,
however, was predicated upon different assumptions and
qualified by additional recommendations. The Far Eastern
Division considered "the increasingly profound interest of
the United States 1n the future of Southeast Asia," rather
than the quality of Franco-American relations, to be the
necessary underpinning
8
for any American policy on
Indo-China. A French announcement of plans for a more
liberal policy in Indo-China was seen by them as an
attempt to under-cut the anti-French, independence
sentiment prevalent among the Indo-Chinese and a direct
result of French uncertai~ty with respect to the position
of the United States on the future of Indo-China. It was
their considered opinion that, once France regained
control of the colony, they did not actually intend to
grant self-rule to the Inda-Chinese.
To prevent France from reneging on its promised
liberalization, the Far Eastern Division recommended that
123
the United States continue to keep the French in the dark
with respect to American intentions for the future of
Inda-China. In what has proved to be a prophetic
statement, they contended:
If really liberal policies toward Indo-China are
not adopted by the French -- policies which
recognize the paramount interest of the native
peoples and guarantee within the foreseeable
future a genuine opportunity for true,
autonomous self-government -- there will be
substantial bloodshed and unrest for many years,
threatening the economic and social progress and
the peace and stability of Southeast
Asia.9
By failing to recognize and assist trends toward
self-government within Asia, the probability of the
Indo-Chinese adopting an ideology that was antithetical to
American interests, and for all Asia to turn against the
10
West, was considered to be very real. Therefore, in
exchange for United States acquiescence in the restoration
of Inda-China to the French Union, the Far Eastern
Division recommended that France be required to give
"adequate" assurances of: (1) a national government run
for and by the Indo-Chinese: (2) the cessation of any
discrimination against the peoples of Inda-China; and, (3)
the establishment of complete economic and commercial
11
equality for Inda-China, within the French Union.
Moreover, they believed that further aid should not be
extended to French resistence groups because it would be
124
politically undesirable for the United States "to lend
military aid or be associated with the reestablishment of
12
French control over Indo-China."
Although there was general agreement within the
American Government that a more liberalized French
colonial policy was highly desirable, the observations and
recommendations of the Far Eastern Division were, for the
most part, quickly rejected in favor of those put forth by
the European Division. On April 23, 1945, Assistant
Secretary of State Dunn st'ated that, in his opinion, it
would be better to let U.S. policy continue to drift than
base it upon the propositions of the Far Eastern Division.
Rather than drive France further away from the United
States by interfering in her colonial affairs, he argued
that we should draw ever closer to the French and British.
,
Dunn s arguments were based upon his perception of a
Russian threat to the independence of Europe. This
concern is witnessed in the conclusion of a message sent
to Under Secretary of State Grew:
Mr. Dunn emphasized his belief that now is the
time for us to cooperate wholeheartedly with
France. In this connection he referred to his
recent conversation with [French Minister of
Foreign Affairs] Bidault in which the latter
stressed his fears for western civilization as a
result of the dominance of Russia in
Europe.13
The compromise version which resulted from these two
125
policy proposals, although containing certain
considerations presented by the Far Eastern Division,
primarily represented the pro-French views of the European
Division. Used as a basis for subsequent discussions with
the French, the compromise version expressed American
concern over the threat to peace and stability in
Southeast Asia posed by a resumption of French colonial
rule. But, rather than asking France for "adequate
assurances" of its intention to permit self-government in
Indo-China, it sought only "a positive indication of their
14
intentions." rn this compromise we find the acceptance
of two recommendations, one of which is the antithesis of
the other. The conflict inherent
.
1n a policy of
supporting the resumption of French colonial rule, but
with the proviso that they would grant self-rule to the
Indo-Chinese, ensured the generation of ambivalence which
would come to mark American foreign policy.
On May 8, 1945, at the United Nations Conference in
San Francisco, Secretary of State Stettinius sought to
further reassure France by informing Bidault that, while
elements of American public opinion condemmed former
French policies in Indo-China, the United States
Government did not question French sovereignty over the
Indo-Chinese. Stettinius noted that, "Bidault seemed
relieved and has no doubt cabled Paris that he received
15
renewed assurances of our recognition over that area."
126
In the mean time, while the State Department was
setting about mending fences between France and the United
States, the Joint Chiefs of Staff had decided that the use
of French forces in the Pacific would be of little or no
value to the war effort. Pressed by the State Department
to give serious consideration to the employment of French
troops, the Chiefs of Staff laid down provisions involving
training and deployment which would preclude their use
until the spring of 1946. General MacArthur further
stipulated that he would use the French troops in the main
effort against Japan's homeland and made no mention of
16
their use in Indo-China.
ith increasing pressure from France and Great
Britain, the question of using French forces in the
Pacific was finally resolved by a bit of subterfuge in the
form of a joint agreement between President Truman and
Winston Churchill. On July 24, 1945, less than a month
before the end of the war, a British proposal to
reallocate the areas under American and British military
command was formally approved. The southern portion of
Inda-China, which encompasses what became South Vietnam,
was transferred to Admiral Mountbatten's control under the
Southeast Asia Command. Out of deference to Chiang
Kai-shek, however, the northern portion of Indo-China was
retained within the China Command. It was further agreed
that the use of French forces would be determined by, and
127
be under the direct control of, the commander in chief of
17
the Command accepting their use. With this agreement
in hand the British allowed French troops to enter
Indo-China and reestablish their civil administration
within southern Indo-China while Chinese forces occupied
the north.
ALLIED OCCUPATION OF INDO-CHINA AND THE REESTABLISHMENT OF
FRENCH CONTROL
On August 22, 1945, the Office of Strategic Services
informed the State Department that the French, unable to
re-establish their control of Indo-China with a powerful
show of arms, were attempting to negotiate their re-entry
with the Indo-China Central Liberation Committee. The
Indo-Chinese leadership, however, were purportedly
purchasing arms from the Japanese army to use against the
French or Chinese, if either nation attem ted to occupy
Indo-China. In addition they were requesting that their
country be made an American protectorate. In a statement
issued on August 15, 1945, the Liberation Committee
announced:
Should the French attempt to return to
Indo-China with the intention of governing the
country, and to act once more as oppressors, the
Indo-Chinese are prepared to fight to the end
against any such reoccupation. On the other
hand, if they came as friends to establish
128
commerce, industry and without aspirations to
governmental rule, they would be welcomed the
same as any other foreign power. The Central
Committee wishes to make known to the United
States Government that the Indo-Chinese people
first of all desire the independence of
Indo-China, and are hoping that the United
States, as a champion of democracy, will assist
her in securing this independence in the
following manner: ( 1) Prohibiting, or not
assisting the French to enter Indo-China; (2)
keeping the Chinese under control, in order that
looting and pillaging will be kept to a minimum;
(3) sending technical advisors to assist the
Indo-Chinese to exploit the resources of the
land; and (4) developing the industries that
Indo-China is capable of supporting.
In conclusion, the Inda-Chinese would like to be
placed in the same status as the Philippines for
an undetermined period.18
As with subsequent requests from Ho Chi Minh for American
support and protection, the documents give no indication
that his messages were even acknowledged, let alone
entertained for possible American action.
On August 19, 1945, Emperor Bao Dai, who was the
titular head of the Japanese puppet Government, abdicated
and fled the country. The National Li beration Committee
quickly proclaimed a provisional government with Ho Chi
Minh as president. By September 9th, Ho declared
independence for the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (ORV).
This was followed by the entry of British troops into
Saigon and Chinese forces into Hanoi. But, whereas the
Chinese accepted and worked with Ho Chi Minh and the ORV,
the British refused to do so. Instead, they permitted the
129
French to overthrow the ORV government within the South
and replace it with French civil administration.
Throughout the ensuing months Ho Chi Minh appealed to
Great Britain, the Soviet Union, China, and, 1n
particular, the United States, to assist him in securing
19
his nation's independence.
The United States opted for what has been termed as a
position of neutrality. In a telegram dated October 5,
1945, Acting Secretary of State Dean Acheson informed
State Department personnel in China of the following
policy:
[The] u.s. has no thought of opposing the
reestablishment of French control in Indochina
and no official statement by u.s. Government has
questioned even by implication French
sovereignty over Indochina. However, it is not
the policy of this Government to assist the
French to reestablish their control over
Indochina by force and the willingness of the
u.s. to see French control reestablished assumes
that French claim to have the support of the
population of Indochina is borne out by future
events.20
The British took a contrary position to that of the
United States and continued to assist France in regaining
its control of Indo-China. In a Franco-British agreement
concluded 1n mid-October, it was stipulated that the
French Civil Administration would exercise complete civil
authority within the British occupied zone of Indo-China.
Furthermore, the agreement stated that British troops
130
would be withdrawn from Indo-China as soon as terms of the
Japanese surrender were enforced and all Allied prisoners
21
of war were repatriated.
With the conclusion of the Franco-British agreement,
the armed conflict between Vietnamese and French forces,
which had begun on September 23, when the French overthrew
the DRV, intensified. De Gaulle used the prevailing
violence and disorder as an excuse for not issuing a
policy statement proclaiming French
22
to
institute self-government in Vietnam.
intentions
The British, 1n
an effort to assist France in quelling the violence and
restoring order, requested permission from the United
States to turn control of Lend-Lease military equipment
over to French forces in Vietnam. Upon forwarding the
request to Truman, Dean Acheson noted that:
The French, and no doubt the British also, will
be very upset if we refuse to permit this
transfer. However, in the light of our recently
adopted policy we may be subjecting ourselves to
criticism if we permit this transfer for the
purposes stated, i.e., maintenance of
order.23
In turn, the President agreed to the transfer on the
grounds that it would be impracticable for the United
States to remove the equipment from Vietnam. Out of
interest for greater unity with its western allies, Truman
decided to suspend American neutrality temporarily at the
131
expense of the Viet nationalists.
Throughout the latter part of 1945 and early 1946, Ho
Chi Minh continued his one-sided correspondence with
President Truman, pleading for United States recognition
of
. ,
Vietnam s independence and asking for American
intervention, on the grounds of the Atlantic Charter and
the Charter of the United Nations, to stop the bloodshed
in Vietnam. While the French claimed that they were
earnestly pursuing negotiations with the Viet Minh, the
Vietnamese claimed that the "[o]nly contacts which French
authorities have had with (the] Viet Minh ••• have been
undertaken solely to stop bloodshed and it would be
24
inexact to speak of real negotiations."
To assess the situation in Vietnam more accurately
and determine if the French were indeed trying to
negotiate, Secretary of State Byrnes sent observers to
Hanoi. The general consensus among these American
officials was that, although France did not actually plan
to grant independence to Vietnam, the French were
sincerely pursuing a conciliatory policy. On the other
hand, they felt the Vietnamese were prepared to engage in
full-scale warfare if French proposals proved to be
25
insufficient or went unfulfilled.
On February 28, 1946, France and China negotiated the
withdrawal of all Chinese occupational forces from
Northern Inda-China, thus completing the reestablishment
132
26
of French control over the entire colony. This was
followed on March 6, by an agreement between France and
the Democratic Republic of Vietnam which contained the
following terms:
1. The French Government recognizes the
Vietnamese Republic as a Free State having its
own Government, its own Parliament, its own Army
and its own Finances, forming part of the
Indochinese Federation and of the French Union.
In that which concerns the reunitin of the
three 'Annamite Regions' [Cochinchina, Annam,
Tonkin] the French Government pledges itself to
ratify the decisions taken by the populations
consulted by referendum.
2. The Vietnamese Government
ready to welcome amicably the
conforming to international
relieves Chinese Troops ••••
declares itself
French Army when,
agreements, it
3. The stipulations formulated above will
immediately enter into force. • •• the High
Contracting parties will take all measures
necessary to stop hostilities in the field ••• and
to create the favorable atmosphere necessary to
the immediate opening of friendly and sincere
negotiations. These negotiations will deal
particularly with:
a. diplomatic relations of
Foreign States
Viet-nam with
;
b. the future law of Indochina
c. French interests economic and
cultural, in Viet-nam.~7
Ho Chi Minh's acceptance of the March 6 accord ended
his attempt to internationalize the Vietnamese struggle
for independence. The withdrawal of Chinese forces from
North Vietnam during April, 1946, brought Allied
133
occupation of Indo-China to an end and reestablished the
control of France over its colony. Although the United
States expressed concern about the sincerity of French
intentions to liberalize its colonial policies, as well as
the possible Communist affiliations of Ho and the Viet
28
Minh, American officials did not directly oppose or
assist the efforts of either party. On the surface, the
United Sates policy of "neutrality" was applied equally
to all concerned, although, in actuality, this aided the
French in regaining control of Inda-China.
FRENCH-VIETNAMESE NEGOTIATIONS
The March 6 accords called for the French and
Vietnamese to begin immediate negotiations to define the
details of independence for the Democratic Republic of
Vietnam. The first conference was convened on April 19,
1946, at Dalat in Cochinchina. By May the negotiations
broke down because of French insistance that Cochinchina,
which comprised much of what became South Vietnam,
constitute an independent entity within the French Union
rather than be assimilated into the ORV. Since
Cochinchina contained the important mercantile cities of
Saigon and Cholon and was among the richest provinces
within Indo-China, the Viet Minh considered its
incorporation into the DRV to be a matter of life or death
134
for the new State of Vietnam. Therefore, when the French
announced the formation of an independent Cochinchina on
June 1, 1946, renewed guerrilla warfare was touched off
29
within South Vietnam.
A second conference was convened by the French and
Viet Minh at Fountainebleau on July 6, but was scuttled by
French maneuvers aimed at undercutting the viability of
the DRV. On August 1, the French convened a second Dalat
conference, concurrent with the negotiations taking place
at Fountainebleau, but excluded Ho Chi Minh and other DRV
fficials. Ostensibly, the
Conference, which included
purpose of the
representatives
Dalat
from
Cochinchina, Annam, Laos, and Cambodia, was to establish
the framework of the Inda-Chinese Federation within the
French Union. But, to the U.S. State Department, the
deliberate exclusion of the DRV led to the inescapable
conclusion "that the French are endeavoring to whittle
down Viet Nam and to settle the future form of
organization of Indo-China with those who may be expected
30
to be amenable to French influence." The general
opinion of the American Consul in Hanoi was that, with the
DRV faced with either submission to France or open
resistance, an open break between France and the DRV was
imminent. He concluded that " ••• although the French could
quickly over-run the country, they could not -- as they
themselves admit -- pacify it except through a long and
135
bitter military operation."
Concurrent with American concern over the potential
outbreak of warfare between France and the ORV, the United
States also expressed increasing apprehension about
.
growing Communist influence in Vietnam.
Washington stated that its intelligence
Al though
reports of
Communist influence were of "uncertain reliability," the
Saigon Consul was requested to be increasingly alert to
indications of collaboration between the DRV and Communist
32
elements. In an appeal for United States intervention
in Vietnam, Ho Chi Minh took
.
to point out that he pains
was not a Communist. But, any reassurance conveyed by his
statement was soon nullified by a French communique
expressing concern over increased Communist activities
33
within Inda-China.
American pessimism over deteriorating conditions in
Vietnam was temporarily dispelled by a Franco-DRV modus
vivendi signed on September 14, 1946.
French and Ho Chi Minh agreed to
Once again the
negotiate their
differences but this attempt at reconciliation also proved
to be short-lived. The documents do not indicate the
degree of sincerity with which the French approached the
modus vivendi, but throughout the following weeks the
number of violent clashes between French and Vietnamese
forces increased. The French seized control of the local
government in Haiphong and Langson in North Vietnam and,
contrary to the March 6 accord, began
136
landing
reinforcements at Tourane. Then, on November 29, 1946, a
"high French Foreign Ministry official" informed the
American Ambassador to France that the French were quite
concerned over developments in Indo-China and they now had
"positive proof that Ho Chi Minh is in direct contact with
Moscow and is receiving advice and instructions from the
34
Soviets."
While the American Consul in Saigon reported that his
"contacts" confirmed the development of a Communist
infra-structure, the Vice Consul at Hanoi informed the
Secretary of State that the French had known of
,
Hos
Communist affiliations since the 1930's and that he found
it "peculiar" that they should only now become concerned.
Since France suspected Ho of operating under Soviet
instructions for more than a year, the Vice Consul argued:
It is further peculiar that French concern
should be brought to [the] Dept's attention at
very moment when [the] French apparently are
beginning to (apparent omission) program in
Tonkin and when [the] French may be preparing to
force [theJ Vietnam Govt to collaborate on
French terms or to establish [a] puppet govt in
its place.
French concern over Communist[s] may well be
devised to divert [the] Dept's attention from
French policy in Indochina.35
Despite the fact that constant French concern over Soviet
influence in Inda-China was recognized by ome Americans
137
as a diversionary tactic, the French ploy was sucessful.
The seed that Ho was possibly an agent of Moscow had been
planted and the United States took no actions to prevent
France from suppressing the Viet Minh.
However, in an effort to forestall full-scale war,
Under Secretary of State Dean Acheson directed both the
American Ambassador in France and the Consul in Saigon to
discuss the deteriorating situation in Vietnam with both
of the respective parties. But, in his instructions,
Acheson reminded the Saigon Consul of "Ho's clear record
as [an] agent [of] international communism," and informed
him that, to the State Department, the least desirable
outcome "would be
Communist-dominated,
[ the] establishment
Moscow-oriented state
[of a]
[ in]
Indo-China •••• " The Consul was further instructed to tell
Ho that any tendency toward intransigence and violence
would imperil the interest and sympathy held by the
American people for the Vietnamese. Above all, the Consul
was to avoid giving any impression that the U.S.
Government was making a formal intervention into the
36
conflict.
The prevailing opinion within the American Government
was that an all-out military offensive to reconquer
Vietnam was beyond the military capability of France and
would not be supported by French public opinion.
Therefore, it was believed that France would base its
138
policy upon the March 6 accords and the recent modus
vivendi and resort to military operations only if forced
to do so. At the same time, a small Communist group was
considered to be in control of the ORV and manipulating
nationalist sentiments among the Vietnamese to the point
where they might turn against all white people. And,
whereas the honesty of both French and Vietnamese
officials was deemed open to question with respect to
recent incidents in Vietnam, the State Department had come
to consider French influence to be a vital antidote to
Soviet influence and a means of protecting Southeast Asia
37
from future Chinese imperialism.
On December 19, 1946, full-scale warfare broke out
between French and ORV forces and all contact between the
two governments broke down. The immediate reaction of the
United States was to shy away from any appearence of
interfering in the conflict to avoid embarrassing and
irritating the French and to deprive the Communists of the
ability to label the intervention as "foreign
imperialism." By the same token, the u.s. wanted to keep
the conflict from being presented before the United
Nations Security Council. Being of the opinion that French
presence in Indo -China was necessary to offset growing
Soviet influence over the Viet Minh, American officials
were concerned that the United Nations might press for an
Indo-China trusteeship and the eviction of the French from
139
the colony. This, in turn, would resent the United
States with a set of undesirable alternatives. If the
United States used its veto power to prevent U.N.
intervention, it would be publicly denying its professed
support of self-determination for all colonial peoples and
consequently undermine its influence among the Asian
nations. On the other hand, if the United States was
forced to support the expulsion of France from Indo-China,
it would, according to prevailing opinion, be turning
Inda-China over to Communist rule. In assessing the
situation, John Vincent, Director of the Office of Far
Eastern Affairs, informed Acheson that:
Although the French in Indochina have made
far-reaching paper-concessions to the Vietnamese
desire for autonomy, French actions have been
directed toward whittling down the powers and
the territorial extent of the Vietnam 'free
state'. This process the Vietnamese have
continued to resist. At the same time, the
French themselves admit that they lack the
military strength to reconquer the country. In
brief, with inadequate forces, with public
opinion sharply at odds, with a government
rendered largely ineffective through internal
divisions, the French have tried to accomplish
in Indochina what a strong and united Britain
has found it unwise to attempt in Burma. Given
the present elements in the situation, guerilla
warfare may continue indefinately38
On December 24, 1946, Acheson conveyed American
concern over the outbreak of hostilities in Vietnam to
French Ambassador Bonnet. Expressing his worry that the
140
situation would be brought before the U.N., Acheson
pressed Bonnet for clarification
39
of French military
intentions. hile informing France of American
readiness to assist in resolving the conflict, the State
Department refused to openly violate its policy of
neutrality. For instance, when, on January 8, 1947, the
French asked to purchase surplus U.S. military supplies,
the State Department turned down the request on the
grounds that the French intended to use the weapons in
40
Indo-China. sut this policy of neutrality, combined
with the increasing perception of a threatened Communist
take-over in Vietnam, was placing the United States on the
proverbial horns of a dilemma. Truman was finding it
increasingly difficult to pursue the dual policy of
supporting both continued French presence in Indo-China
and the principle of Inda-Chinese independence.
When by February no resolution to the conflict seemed
1n sight, George Marshall, who was then Secretary of
State, became increasingly concerned. While reassuring
the French Government of continued American recognition of
French sovereignty in Vietnam, Marshall ointed out to the
French their lack of understanding of the Vietnamese
desire for self-government and the diminishing support
within the world for their "outmoded colonial outlook and
methods." But, at the same time, he indicated that the
United States did not desire to see colonial rule
141
supplanted by a Communist
.
regime. Reminding the French
that the United States could not indefinitlv keep the
conflict from coming before the U.N. and would find it
difficult not to support an international investigation,
41
the Secretary urged France to find a solution quickly.
In May the conflict was still unresolved and Marshall
had arrived at the point where he considered the United
States to be ''in the same boat" as the French, British,
and Dutch, with respect to Southeast Asia. "We cannot
conceive [of] setbacks to [the] long-range interests [of]
France," he contended, "which would not also be setbacks
[of] our own." He believed any relaxation of European
controls over Southeast Asia would plunge these new
nations into violence and disarray which, in turn, would
lead to greater anti-Western sentiments and permit a
Communist take-over throughout Asia. Arguing that the
Western democratic system was on the defensive in nearly
all emerging nations, Marshall felt that French presence
in Vietnam was necessary to stabilize the situation but he
urged France to liberalize its policy and stop playing
42
into the hands of the Communists.
Admitting that he had no solution of his own for the
Vietnam problem and that he was reluctant to interject the
United States into the conflict, Secretary Marshall was
nonetheless concerned that the French would launch a
large-scale military offensive against the Viet Minh. The
142
primary reason for Marshall's concern, at this point, was
the potentially adverse effects that a major French
military campaign could have upon American domestic
support for his European recovery program. "It is
obvious," he said ''that such an offensive ••• would have [al
serious effect on public opinion ••• which would be
reflected in a Congress which will be called upon to
consider extensive financial aid for western European
43
nations, including France."
At the root of Marshall's concern were the massive
European military and economic assistance projects
launched by President Truman during 1947. The importance
of these programs to United States foreign policy was
expressed by the Harriman Committee on Foreign Aid:
The interest of the United States in
Europe ••• cannot be measured simply in economic
terms. It is also strategic -and political. We
all know that we are faced in the world today
with two conflicting ideologies ••• our position
in the world has been based for at least a
century on the existence in Europe of a number
of strong states committed by tradition and
inclination to the democratic
concept •••• 44
Because of the sizable role played by the French
Communist Party 1n the politics of France, the United
States considered the preservation of French democracy to
be a keystone in its European Recovery Plan and its policy
to contain the spread of communism. Thus, by the end of
143
1947, the Truman Administration was more interested in
insuring the success of its European policy than with the
nationalistic aspirations of the Vietnamese. oreover,
the Soviet Union was seen to be using the guerilla warfare
in Vietnam as a means of diverting large numbers of French
troops from European defense and to produce a concurrent
drain on the French economy to inhibit its post-war
45
recovery.
W ith growing military stren th in Vietnam, the
French, for their part, were becoming increasingly
reluctant to make concessions to Ho Chi Minh and sought to
46
reduce the ORV to a position of impotence. As one
means of attaining this oal, they moved to restore former
emperor Bao Dai as head of the Vietnam Government. On
June 5, 1948, in what is known the Ha Long Bay Agreement,
the French Government a reed to recognize Vietnamese
independence within the French Union. Bao Dai was willing
to assume responsibility for leading the new government,
but only if the agreement was ratified by the French
Assembly. The Assembly, however, was reluctant to grant
its ratification and began dragging its feet on the
matter. To keep the plan alive while they continued their
negotiations with Bao Dai, the Government of France formed
a provisional government of Vietnam, headed by Gene.ral
Nguyen Van Xuan.
The United States, convinced that the French could
144
not militarily defeat the Viet Minh and fearful that
prolonged conflict would both weaken France and jeopardize
all estern relations with Asia, sought to insure that the
new government
Marshall:
took root. According to Secretary
••• continuation of [the] parade of puppets such
as France has produced over [the] past two years
will strengthen [the] hand of Ho Chi Minh and
may well insure eventual emergence of [a] state
probably dominated by Communists and almost
certainly oriented toward Moscow. It is to
avoid such [an] eventuality that we consider it
of highest importance that [the] present
so-called central [Vietnam] government, or in
fact any non-Communist government, be given
every chance to succeed by granting it such
concessions as will attract [the] greatest
possible number of non-Communist
elements.47
Here we see the first indications of inconsistency in
American policy behavior caused by the antithetical
policies of supporting French colonialism as a buttress
against communism while at the same time pursuing a policy
goal of supporting national self-determination. The
Truman Administration's obsession with containing the
spread of communism had distorted the very meaning of
self-determination. The United States was now willing to
support any Vietnamese regime, even a facade erected by
the French, as long as it was non-Communist. And, since
the United States had accepted unsupported French
allegations that the Viet Minh were controlled by Moscow,
145
this meant the United States opposed the only viable and
truly nationalist movement in Indo-China. Any overnment
would be acceptable as long as it was non-Communist and
carried the trappings of democracy.
The American Embassy in Paris was instructed to
inform the French Government that the United States was
convinced that the Assembly must quickly and unequivocably
grant Vietnam its independence or lose all of Indo-China.
To achieve French compliance the Embassy was instructed on
July 14, 1948, to "apply such persuasion and/or pressure
as 1s best calculated [to] produce [the] desired result."
As an inducement, the United States offered to seriously
consider extending public approval to French actions in
Vietnam, once the French Assembly unequivocally approved
independence. Consideration of this action amounted to a
maJor break with the previous American policy of
"neutrality" and signified the first serious thought of
48
direct American involvement in Vietnam.
By September of 1948, however, the provisional
government of Vietnam remained a facade for French puppets
and a source of continuing consternation to the United
States. On September 27th, the American Government issued
its first formal policy statement on Inda-China and
attempted to place this concern in perspective. Because
it succinctly encapsulates the evolution of the policy
process which transpired
.
1n the first Truman
146
Administration, the essential features of the text have
been included below:
The immediate objective of U.S. policy in
Indochina is to assist in a solution of the
present impasse which will be mutually
satisfactory to the French and the Vietnamese
peoples, which will result in the termination of
the present hostilities, and which will be
within the framework of U.S. security.
Our long-term objectives are: (1) to
eliminate so far as possible Communist influence
in Indochina and to see installed a
self-governing nationalist state which will be
friendly to the U.S. and which, commensurate
with the capacity of the peoples involved, will
be patterned upon our conception of a democratic
state as opposed to the totalitarian state which
would evolve inevitably from Communist
domination; (2) to foster the association of the
peoples of Indochina with the western powers ••• ;
(3) to raise the standard of living so that the
peoples of Indochina will be less receptive to
totalitarian influences ••• ; (4) to prevent undue
Chinese penetration and subsequent influence in
Indochina ••••
To attain our immediate objective, we
should continue to press France to accomodate
the basic aspirations of the Vietnamese •••• We
have recognized French sovereignty over
Indochina but have maintained that such
recognition does not imply any commitment on our
part to assist France to exert its authority
over the Indochinese peoples •
••• since early in 1947, the French have
employed about 115,000 troops in Indochina, with
little result, since the countryside except in
Laos and Cambodia remains under firm control of
the Ho Chi Minh government. A series of
French-established puppet governments have
tended to enhance the prestige of Ho's
government and to call into question, on the
part of the Vietnamese, the sincerity of French
intentions to accord an independent status to
Vietnam.
147
••• This hatred of the Vietnamese people
toward the French is keeping alive anti-western
feeling among oriental peoples, to the advantage
of the USSR and the detriment of the u.s.
We have not urged the French to negotiate
with Ho Chi Minh, even though he probably is now
supported by a considerable majority of the
Vietnamese people, because of his record as a
Communist and the Communist background of many
of the influential figures 1n and about his
government.
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
An increasing Soviet interest in Indochina,
as demonstrated by a step-up in radio
broadcasts, was evidence in the first half of
1948. The line taken by these broadcasts has
been constantly to discredit the United States
by attempting to identify it with 'imperialistic
France.· There continues to be no known
communication between the USSR and Vietnam,
although evidence is accumulating that a radio
liaison may have been established through the
Tass agency in Shanghai.
The objectives of U.S. policy towards
Indochina have not been realized •••• France, is
fighting a desperate and apparently losing
struggle in Vietnam. The economic drain of this
warfare on French recovery (from World War II],
while difficult to estimate, is unquestionably
large •
••• Our greatest difficulty in talking with
the French ••• has been our inability to suggest
any practicable solution of the Indochina
problem, as we are all too well aware of the
unpleasant fact that Communist Ho Chi Minh is
the strongest and perhaps the ablest figure in
Indochina and that any suggested solution which
excludes him is an expedient of uncertain
outcome •••• The above considerations are further
complicated by the fact that we have an
immediate interest in maintaining in power a
friendly French government, to assist in the
furtherance of our aims in Europe. This
immediate and vital interest has in consequence
taken precedence over active steps looking
toward the realization of our objectives in
148
Indochina.49
The contradictions inherent in this policy position
flowed primarily from a erceived Soviet threat in both
Europe and Vietnam. And, yet, the evidence of Soviet
linkage to Vietnam was admitted to e nonexistant. As
1948 drew to a close the American Government became
increasingly convinced that Moscow was the guiding force
behind the Viet Minh but its intelligence agencies were
never able to obtain evidence to support this assumption.
In commenting upon a State Department circular entitled,
"Pattern of Soviet Policy in Far East and Southeast Asia,"
the Saigon Consul, George Abbot, argued that " ••• Communist
control has been concealed and identified with Nationalism
so successfully as to confuse and delude public opinion in
50
France and the United States •••• " The con·fusion and
delusion, however, seems not to have been limited to the
public alone. Although he contended that Soviet influence
was operative 1n Vietnam, Abbot noted that, "No evidence
has yet turned up that Ho Chi Mir.his receiving current
directives from Moscow, China, or the Soviet Legation in
51
Bankok." Moreover, he could find no clear explanation
for the lack of anti-Amer .canism, which was considered to
be the hallmark of most Communist parties, among the Viet
Minh. Nor, could he directly account for the "apparent
quiescence" of the Communist elements within
. ,
Vietnam s
149
sizable Chinese colony. Nonetheless, the perception of
Soviet influence was treated as an established fact by the
decision makers within the American Government.
Despite, or perhaps because of, this growing fear of
Soviet influence, the first Truman ~dministration drew to
a close by withdrawing its proffered support of the
French-imposed provisional government of Vietnam. On
January 17, 1949, the State Department cabled its Paris
Embassy that "we cannot at this time irretrevably [sic]
commit [the) u.s. to (the] support of [a] native govt
which by failing [to] develop appeal among Vietnamese
might become virtually (a] puppet govt, separated from
[the) people and existing only by [the] presence [of]
52
French military forces."
therefore, to make no
The Ambassador was ordered,
commitments until and unless
instructed by the State Department.
150
NOTES
1 Vietnam Relations, 8 , section V.B.2a, p. 144
(italics mine) •
2 Vietnam Relations, 7 , section V.B.l, p. 65.
3 Vietnam Relations, 8, section V.B.2a, p. 18.
4 lb id. , p. 84.
5 lb id. , pp. 1-2.
6 lb id. , p. 7.
7 lb id. , pp. 7-8
8 Ibid., pp. 9ff.
9 Ibid. , p. 14.
10 Ibid., p. 11.
11 Ibid., p. 16.
-
12 lb id. , p . 12.
13 Ibid., p . 18.
14 Cf. Ibid. , pp . 11, 23.
15 Ibid. , p. 27
16 Ibid. , pp. 33-36.
17 Ibid. , pp. 37-43.
18 lb id. , p. 47.
19 Vietnam Relations, 1, section l.C, pp. C69-Cl04.
20 Vietnam Relations, 8 , section V.B. 23, p. 49.
21 Ibid.
22 Ibid. , p. 50.
23 lb id. , p. 52.
151
24 Vietnam Relations, 1, section I.C, p. C75.
25 Vietnam ~elations, 8, section V.B. 2a, pp. 53-61.
26 Ibid., p. 62.
27 Vietnam Relations, 1, section I.A, pp. A25-A26.
28 Cf. Ibid., pp. 46, 57;
section I.A, p. A30.(To allay
Communist ties, Ho Chi Minh
Communist Party on November 11,
and , Vietnam Relations, 1,
any susp1cions about his
dissolved the Indochinese
1945.)
29 Vietnam Relations, 8 , section V.B. 2a, pp. 64-76.
30 lb id. , p. 76
31 lb id. , p. 77
32 lb id. , p. 79
--
33 lb id. , pp. 79-80.
34 Ibid. , p. 83.
35 Ibid., p. 84. (Omission noted in original text and
1s not result of Defense Department censorship.)
36 lb id. , pp. 85-86.
37 lb id. , pp. 86-89
38 lb id. , p. 91.
--
39 Ibid. , pp. 93-94.
40 Ibid. , p. 97.
41 lb id. , pp. 98-99.
42 lb id. , pp. 100-102.
--
43 lb id. , p. 102.
44 Vietnam Relations , 1 , section I.A, p. A52.
45 Vietnam Relations, 8 , section V.B.2a, pp. 127-128.
46 Ibid. , pp. 104-111.
152
47 Ibid. , p. 132.
48 Ibid. , pp. 134-135.
49 Ibid. , pp. 144-149.
50 Ibid. , p. 150.
51 lb id. , p. 151.
52 Ibid. , p. 152.
-
CHAPTER VII
THE SECOND TRUMAN ADMINISTRATION
The second Truman Administration is a period during
which policies formulated 1n September of 1948 were
expanded and solidified. In particular, the United States
Government made two distinct policy decisions which
expanded both the nature and level of American involvement
in Vietnam. The U.S. extended de JU~e recognition to the
Government of Vietnam, led by Emperor Bao Dai, and then
initiated extensive military and economic aid programs for
Inda-China. As with the major policy shift which occurred
in 1945, these decisions were also made in reaction to a
perceived, but basically unsubstantiated, threat involving
an imminent takeover ·of Inda-China by Communist forces.
But, whereas the threat in 1945 was seen to lie in Soviet
efforts to direct and dominate the Viet Minh, the threat
perception in 1949 was linked to the possibility of a
Chinese Communist invasion of Inda-China in support of Ho
Chi Minh.
ANALYTIC COMMENTARY
Between 1949 and 1952 this fear of overt intervention
by the Chinese brought about a gradual but perceptible
153
154
change 1n the focus of U.S. foreign policy. The
predominance of Europe in the over-all scheme of American
policy began to diminish and, by 1952, the most urgent and
immediate threat to American political and strategic
interests was seen to emanate from Asia. The policy
decisions made under this Administration, were formulated
1n an atmosphere clouded by the belief that Chinese
Communist forces were about to overtly assist Ho Chi Minh
in his battle against the French. Concern over the
possibility of Chinese aggression occurred in phases which
covariantly corresponded with decisions to increase
American involvement in Inda-China.
THE ROLE OF COMMUNIST CHINA IN THE FORMULATION OF
UNITED STATES POLICY
Throughout 1948 and during the early part of 1949,
the United States, for a variety of reasons, expressed a
reluctance to become openly committed to a French proposal
to install former Emperor Bao Dai as head of a new
Vietnamese government. First, the French were believed to
be militarily incapable of defeating the Viet Minh. Their
forces were ill-equipped, lacked leadership, and could not
enlist the requisite support of the Vietnamese - which was
believed necessary to defeat Ho Chi Minh. Furthermore,
France refused to grant the new Bao Dai regime the
155
concessions attendent to independence and deemed necessary
to ensure its internal support and stability. Therefore,
Secretary of State Acheson determined that the United
States should not rush to the support of the Bao Dai
agreements for fear of beinq accused of abetting a
colonial puppet government and
"own remaining prestige" in Asia.
thereby losing
. ,
A:ner1ca s
Mao Tse-tung's crushing defeat of Chain Kai-shek's
Nationalist Army, however, served to diminish the
reluctance of the United States to support the so-called
Bao Dai solution. As the Chinese Communist Army swept
across China and toward the border of Indo-China, a fear
that they would join forces with Ho Chi Minh began to
mount very rapidly. As the State Department put it, "the
Southward movement of Chinese Communist armies toward the
northern frontier of Indochina introduces a new element
that transforms an already serious situation into an
l
emergency." This led to the conclusion that there was
no alternative to avoiding a Communist government
.
1n
Vietnam except to support the Bao Dai solution. At the
same time there was growing concern that neither the
French forces in Inda-China nor the governments of
Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia (also known as the Associated
States) could
Consequently,
survive without
the American
outside
Government
assistance.
undertook
consideration of extending recognition and aid to the Bao
156
Dai regime. Fear of a Chinese invasion, therefore, caused
the United States to cast off its reluctance to support
the French and Bao Dai and brought about a reversal of
American policy.
During the early months of 1950, as ao Tse-tung
consolidated his control over the China mainland, evidence
gathered by American intelligence units indicated that no
overt Chinese military intervention in Indo-China appeared
1n the offing. This diminished concern over possible
Chinese aggression 1s reflected 1n the policy statement
entitled NSC48. Although Communist control of China had
altered the international oolitical system, the maJor
threat to American interests in Asia was still seen to
emanate from the Soviet Union rather than China or any
coalition of Communist groups in Asia. The primary
strategic interests and objectives of U.S. policy
continued to be oriented toward Europe. This is manifest
in the basic concept of American strategy which, in the
event of war with the USSR, called for a strategic
offensive in the West and a strategic defense 1n the East.
This did not mean that the United States had no
strategic or political interests in Asia. The loss of
China to the Communists was believed to have resulted in a
serious alteration of the balance of power, since it
provided the Soviet Union with a vehicle for pursuing its
policy of aggrandizement within Asia. This, in turn, set
157
off a re-evaluation of the importance of Asia, and, in
particular, Southeast Asia, to American interests and
eventually led to a decline in the concentration of u.s.
policy on European considerations.
The fall of China to the Communists, and their
threatened take-over of Indo-China, gave rise to what was
later termed the "domino theory." Japan emerged as the
keystone in the American policy of containment within
Asia. The perceived need to satisfy Japan's requirements
for industrial raw materials and food imports imbued
Indo-China with a new element of importance -- its role as
a supplier of raw materials to the ·ndustrialized West and
a concurrent need to deny these materials to the
Communists.
Similarly, the desirability of maintaining relations
with China was expressed in terms of providin Japan with
a necessary trade outlet for its industrial products and
the United States with vital strategic materials. The
policy of a monolithic Communist bloc had not yet emerged
and trade relations with Cnina were considered to be a
means of preventing increased Chinese dependence on the
Soviet Union, while promoting a pro-Western aliqnment of
the Peking regime.
With the threat of Chinese aggression at an ebb, the
United tates had embarked upon a pragmatic policy of
economic suasion and accommodation with the Chinese
158
Communist regime. After suffering years of foreign
exploitation, it was believed that any attempt by the
United States to foment the overthrow of Mao Tse-tung
would be rejected by the Chinese people as another example
of foreign interference and ,
benefit of the communists.
consequently, redound to the
Likewise, any effort to
blockade China would also lead to failure because it would
not be supported by other estern nations. The American
Government therefore adopted a policy of non-interference
with the Peking government and minimal direct support for
the Chinese Nationalist regime on Formosa.
Between the date of February 16, 1950, when France
formally requested U.S. aid for its military efforts in
Indo-China, and May 1,1950, when the decision to grant aid
was actually made, the threat of overt Chinese aggression
was considered to be minimal. Despite this fact, the
State Department, Defense Department, and Joint Chiefs of
Staff continued to recommend that the United States extend
aid to France and the Associated States. However, they now
based their recommendations on the fact that the internal
threat to Vietnam had become increasingly grave . France
was talking about cutting its losses and withdrawing from
Inda-China. The Viet Minh had driven the French away from
the northern border of Vietnam and were on the verge of
driving them out of Tonkin
French officials, Chinese
Province. And, according to
aid to Ho Chi Minh was
159
a gravating the deteriorating situation, swinging the
military balance in favor of the Viet Minh. Therefore, in
addition to granting military aid to France, the Joint
Chiefs also recommended that the United States conduct
covert operations in Southeast Asia and reverse its olicy
by extendin recognition to ationalist China's de facto
blockade of the Chinese mainland.
The onset of the Korean conflict in June, 1950, led
to further involvement of the U.S. in Vietnam through the
establishment of a Military Assistance Advisory Group
[MAAG] in Saigon and approval of increased aid to France
and Vietnam. Concerned that the Soviets would attempt to
divert American attention and resources away from Korea by
instigating a military confrontation in Europe, the United
States began to search for some means of relieving the
French of their military involvement in Indo-China so they
could bolster their commitment to NATO and European
defense. This resulted 1n a suggestion to establish and
train an independent Viet Army which could assume
responsibility for military action in Vietnam and permit
France to withdraw its forces to Europe. However, this
early attempt at what President ixon much later labeled
"Vietnamization," was viewed by the French as an American
effort to undercut their position 1n Indo-China and a
further strain was placed upon Franco-American relations.
Throughout the year of 1950, the possibility of a
160
Chinese invasion of Indo-China was considered to be
remote. American decision makers, therefore, continued to
view the deteriorating military position in Vietnam to
flow primarily from the perpetuation of French colonial
policy and the lack of indigenous support for continued
French presence 1n Vietnam. Although additional American
aid was approved for French forces, the United States
resolutely refused to relieve France of the responsibility
for keeping Indo-Cnina out of Communist hands. As long as
the French persisted in their colonial policy , the United
States avoided committing ground forces to the defense of
Vietnam. And, because American strategic
were believed to be stretched so thin, the
capabilities
Joint Chiefs
recommended that, even in the event of an overt Chinese
attack, the United States should not permit itself to
become engaged in a general war but, instead, should work
in concert with its allies to do everything to contain the
Chinese, short of employing U.S . forces.
By M ay of 1951, the entry of Chinese forces into the
Korean conflict served once again to increase the
perceived threat of a Chinese invasion of Indo-China and
altered the U.S. Government's conception of its security
interests. While American decision makers still believed
the fundamental threat of communism emanated from Moscow ,
the concept of a monolithic Communist bloc, com rised of
China and the Soviet Union, had now emerged. The greatest
161
immediate threat to American security was now seen to lie
in Asia rather than Europe. The United States dropped the
pragmatic and non-interventionist policy toward China that
was promulgated in the National Security Council policy
paper entitled NSC48/l . The new policy contained in
NSC48/4 sou ht to: (a) deny Formosa to the Chinese
Communists and strengthen its defensive capabilities: (b)
foster and support anti-Communist Chinese elements for
resistance in China to the Peking regime: and, (c)
develop contingency plans for the use of U.S. naval and
air forces to both blockade China and take military action
against selected targets within China.
A year later, in June of 1952, the Joint Chiefs
believed that the dan er of
Indo-China had markedly increased.
a Chinese invasion
.
1n
Apparently the United
States was now considered to be militarily capable of
conducting a maJor war, since they argued that any new
policy statement should contain provisions to give the
military the freedom to conduct offensive strikes directly
against China. Although the British and French opposed
any consideration of a military offensive aimed at China,
the Joint Chiefs argued that this was the only plan which
promised military success. Accordingly, they recommended
that: (a) the U.S. should not defend Inda-China with
ground forces but, instead, should relegate this role to
the French and British: (b) the U.S. should not
• •
162
participate 1n any combined military command for the
defense of Indo-C ina but, instead, should lead military
operations against Cnina with support from France and
Britain; (c) any alliances with France and Britain which
would encumber American military action a ainst China
should be reassessed with an implied recommendation that
they be scuttled; and, (d) 1n the event that France and
Britain refused to
against China, the
unilateral action.
support a
United
United
States
States
should
offensive
consider
Certain members of the National Security Council felt
that the Joint Chief's proposal not only carried too great
a risk for the United States but also failed to address
the real threat to Vietnam. In their op1n1on, the reater
danger in Indo-China consisted of internal subversion
rather than overt Chinese intervention. While there was a
recommendation that the new policy statement, NSC124 ,
should face up to the problems of internal subversion and
possible French withdrawal from Indo-China, the Joint
Chiefs, with the support of Secretary of State Acheson,
appear to have won the day. NSC124, as a approved by
President Truman, did not actually change U.S. policy
toward Indo-China or define what would or should be done
if France withdrew. It did, however, lean toward support
of the Joint Chief's recommendations for direct offensive
action against China, including consideration of
163
unilateral action on the part of the United States.
Beyond a directive that American covert operations in
Southeast Asia should be strengthened, NSC124 contained no
specific policy statements which coped with the steady
deterioration of the French military position in Vietnam
or possible French wi thdrawal from Inda-China. Policy
prescriptions for countering Chinese aggression were much
more specific than those related to the internal struggle
between the French and Viet Minh. And, yet, NSC124 states
that:
The anger of an overt military attack against
Southeast Asia is inherent in the existence of a
hostile and aggressive Communist China, but such
an attack is less probable than continued
communist efforts to achieve domination through
subversion. The primary threat to Southeast Asia
accordin ly arises from the possibility that the
situation in Indochina may deteriorate as a
result of the inability of the governments of
France and of the Associated States to continue
to oppose the Viet Minh rebellion, the military
strength of which is being steadily increased by
virtue of aid furnished by the Chinese
Communists and its allies.2
The formulation of American olicy on the basis of a
perceived threat of external aggression, regardless of
whether the perception is based in reality or not,
.
lS
readily understandable. Thus, consideration of overt
Chinese Communist intervention during late 1949 and early
1950, 1n conjunction with the deteriorating French
military position vis a vis the Viet Minh, would a pear to
164
account for the change in American policy leadinq to
recognition of the Bao Dai regime and the granting of aid
to France and the Associated States. However, as 1n the
case of NSC124, when the policy process focusses upon a
threat of external a gress1on which the olicy-makers
consider unlikely to occur, while ignoring policy problems
considered to be of critical importance, the explanation
is less readily apparent. An understanding of this policy
behavior would appear to reside in the political milieu
which existed throughout the administration.
POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS AND THE FORMULATIO
OF U.S. POLICY
Early 1n 1949 it was reco nized that no military
solution could resolve the conflict between the French and
3
Viet Minh. Similarly, Acheson believed that no amount
of American military or economic aid could save the Bao
Dai regime unless it could ain the full support of its
people by demonstrating its independence from France and
strong leadership in the face of the problems confronting
4
the country. The only hope for stability 1n
Indo-China, it was contended, resided in the willinqness
of France to grant the Vietnamese full in ependence and,
1n doing so, bring to an end the string of delays,
ambiguous agreements, and puppet governments. At the same
165
time, the United States expected France to continue its
war against the Viet Minh and protect Indo-China from
Chinese aggression until the Bao Dai regime gained the
strength an capabilities necessary to resist internal and
external aggression.
In essence the United States was askin France to
give up the economic benefits which they accrued from
Indo-China by granting their colony complete inde endence.
And, yet, France was to continue to expend its human and
material resources in an effort to retain Inda-China's
food products and raw materials for Japan, the United
States, and the rest of the non-Co munist nations, while
denying them to the Soviet Union and China. Whenever
France threatened to cut its losses by abandoning
Inda-China the United States responded by granting ever
increasing amounts of military and economic aid. At the
same time, however, they attempte to pressure France into
granting further
nationalists.
political concessions to the Viet
At all times the United States made it clear that
France shouldered the primary responsibility for defending
Vietnam from a Communist take over. No United States
forces would be committed to the defense of Indo-China.
From a military point of view, the Joint Chiefs believed
that American involvement in a ground war in Indo-China
would result in wholly defensive military action which
166
would " ••• at best be indecisive and would probably extend
5
over an indefinite period." On the other hand, the
State Department was against any American military
involvement as long as the French refused to grant
independence to Vietnam. From a political standpoint this
would have placed the United States in the untenable
position of supporting the continued existance of a
colonial regime with American military might. Moreover,
the Defense Department was of the
. .
op1n1on that once
American troops were committed to Indo-China the French
would "shake off responsibilities and show even less
initiative ••• " in defeating the Viet Minh and granting the
6
Vietnamese their independence.
Continued French control over Indo-China also
prompted the United States to keep the Franco-Viet Minh
conflict from being brought up before the United Nations.
Secretary of State Acheson believed that once the issue
was raised before the U.N., the Asian members would insist
on scrutinizin the entire Indo-China situation, including
the French "role toward both the Associated States and
7
Viet Minh, with unforeseeable but hazardous results."
He was afraid that if the Vietnamese conflict was brought
before the U.N. the United States would lose what little
control and influence it had over the course of events in
Inda-China. On the other hand, the Joint Chiefs of Staff
had their own reasons for keepin the Vietnam conflict out
167
of the United Nations. If the U.N. elected to send forces
into Indo-China, the United States would be morally
obligated to contribute its forces to fight in Vietnam
under U.N. auspices. Since the Joint Chiefs were already
opposed to the use of American forces 1n Vietnam, they
surely did not want to find themselves committed to wage
an unwanted war through the United Nations. In their
argument they noted that:
Inasmuch as the United States-sponsored
resolution, 'uniting for Peace', has been
adopted by the General Assembly of the United
Nations, and should a si uation develop 1n
Indochina in a manner similar to that in Korea
in which United Nations forces were required,
the United States would then probably be morally
obligated to contribute its armed forces
designated for service on behalf of the United
Nations. It is, therefore, in the interests of
the United States to take such action in
Indochina as would forestall the need for the
General Assembly to invoke the provisions of the
resolution, 'uniting for Peace' .s
The "Uniting for Peace" resolution was a procedure
devised by the United States, and "passed under strong
American pressure and over vehement Soviet opposition,"
which allowed the U.N. General Assembly to consider peace
and security issues that nor ally fell under the purview
of the Security Council. It was a vehicle devised soon
after the beginning of the Korean conflict by the United
States for the purpose of circumventing the Security
Council and, hence, the Soviet
. ,
Unions veto power. It is
1 1
1
I,
I,
'
168
interesting, therefore, to note the Joint Chiefs# concern
that the United States might find itself a victim of its
own invention. Without the "Uniting for Peace"
resolution, the Vietnam issue would presumably have gone
before the Security Council where the U.S. could have
controlled the course of events through the use of its own
veto power. But , with the existence of this new
resolution, The Joint Chiefs believed the issue would most
likely have ended up before the General Assembly and
9
beyond the absolute control of the United States.
By ruling out both U.N. action and direct U.S.
military involvement 1n Vietnam, the only means available
for the United States to pursue its policy goals
.
1n
Indo-China were its powers of persuasion and the ability
to recind its aid programs. Since any attempt to withhold
U.S. aid would ultimately lead to a French withdrawal from
Indo-China and the collapse of the Associated States, the
use of this power would prove to be counter-productive. On
the other hand, the American power of persuasion was found
to also be of limited utility. By March of 1950, the State
Department had concluded that the exertion of any further
American pressure to grant political
concessions to the Viet nationalists, would lead to a
rupture of Franco-American relations and possible French
withdrawal from Indo-China. This led to friction between
the Defense Department, which argued that greater pressure
169
should be brought to bear on the French, and the State
Department, which flatly refused to pursue the
recommendation. It also led the United States to back
away from the political solution which it considered to be
so necessary for peace and stability in Indo-China.
The United States Government saw itself confronted
with the following situation: (a) continued American
pressure for greater concessions to the cause of
Vietnamese independence carried the potential of a French
withdrawal from indo-China; (b) It was not in the United
States' interests to defend Vietnam from the Communists
through the use of American troops; {c) without continued
French military presence in Inda-China, all of Southeast
Asia would fall under Communist domination; and, {d) if
Southeast Asia fell to the Communists this, in turn, would
soon lead to the capitulation of other Asian nations.
Given this line of reasoning, the American decision makers
thought it to be in the interest of the United States to
reduce their demands for Vietnamese independence.
Therefore, even though the United States considered French
political concessions a necessary condition for long-range
peace and stability in Southeast Asia, the Truman
Administration found it necessary to sacrifice this goal
for the short-term stability promised by continued French
military presence.
By backing down from its support of Vietnamese
170
independence and abandoning the search for any potential
political solutions to the Vietnamese conflict, the only
avenue of recourse left to the United States was military
action. But, again, given the fact that the u.s. refused
to become militarily involved in the defense of
Indo-China, the only course of military action considered
acceptable was direct offensive action against possible
external aggression. And, since "[t]he danger of an overt
military attack against Southeast Asia ••• was inherent in
the existence of a hostile and aggressive Communist
10
Ch
. ..
1na ••• , the focus of NSC124 on deterring Chinese
aggression, rather than the political problems of
Indo-China, becomes more understandable. The countering
of Chinese aggression was the only problem confronting the
United States which lent itself to a relatively clear and
uncomplicated solution. Furthermore, it was the only
action permitted under the policy constraints laid down by
American decision makers.
STATISTICAL INFERENCE
AND THE LEVEL OF U.S. INVOLVEMENT IN VIETNAM
This trend toward increasing reliance upon military
rather than political solutions for the Vietnamese
conflict is reflected in measurements of actor influence
on policy decisions which were obtained by regression
171
analysis. Referring to the year-by-year measurements
contained 1n Table 2, we find thRt the Defense Department
enters the picture in 1950 and immediately becomes,
statistically, the most significant group within that
year. They also exerted the preponderant influence on
policy formulation during 1952 when NSC124 was approved.
On the other hand, except for the year 1949, the State
Department either ranks third
.
or, 1n the case of 1951,
does not appear at all.
When we turn to the measurements of actor influence
obtained for the over-all period of the Administration,
they at first appear to be at odds with both the
year-by-year measurements and our contention that the
Government had turned increasingly toward military rather
than political solutions. The influence of the State
Department on policy formulation was greater than that of
the Defense Department. It will be noticed, however,
that, statistically, the most siqnificant group for the
entire period of the Administration was the cluster of
joint State/Defense Department committees. This would
indicate that there was a fair degree of consonance
between the policy proposals made by the two departments.
And, indeed, this observation 1s supported by our
examination of the document contents which revealed that
Secretary of State Acheson gave general support to the
military proposals of the Joint Chiefs and the Defense
TABLE 2
DETERMINATION OF GROUP INFLUENCE ON
POLICY FORMULATION: 1949-1952
(LEVEL OF U.S. INVOLVEMENT IN VIETNAM)
,EASUREMENT DESCRIPTION YEAR
I. MEASUREMENTS OF INFLUENCE 1949-
ON A YEAR BY YEAR BASIS:
1950-
1951-
1952-
II. MEASUREMENTS OF INFLUENCE FOR
ENTIRE ADMINISTRATION ------
------
----
----
----
- ·-
AGGREGATE GROUPS WITH
STATISTICALLY SIGNIFICANT
INFLUENCE ON POLICY
(a) State Department
( a) Defense Department
( b) Joint State/Defense Dept .
Committees
(c) State Department
(a) Joint Chiefs of Staff
National Security Council
(a) Defense Department
(b) National Security Council
(C) State Department
(d) Joint Chiefs of Staff
-
(a) Joint State/Defense Dept .
Committees
( b) State Department
(c) National Security Council
(d) Joint Chiefs of Staff
(e) Defense Department
~
~
N
173
Department, while expressing growing reluctance to press
France for greater political concessions.
Thus the State
,
Departments support of military
proposals, in conjunction with their continued influence
on political policy, would tend to explain the
predominance of their policy influence for the entire span
of the Administration. At the same time it adds further
support to the observed shift from political to military
solutions for the containment of communism in Southeast
Asia.
The results obtained from other regression analyses
also tend to support observations obtained through direct
analysis of the documents:
(1) Two factors were selected as statistically
significant predictors of policy recommendations made
during the Administration. Listed in order of their
importance, these factors, which constitute the
underlying reasons for the recommendations, consisted
of:
(a) Fear of a global war with the Soviet Union
and China.
NSC124, the
(Right up until the formulation of
main concern of the American
Government was that inadvertance or ill-informed
policy would lead to a qlobal war before U.S.
military capabilities were built-up to the point
where they were able
action.)
174
to sustain a global
(b) a strong belief 1n Vietnam's strategic and
economic importance to the Unite States. (By
1949 the United States had come to the
conclusion that Indo-China was of major economic
importance to Japan, the non-Communist nations
of Asia, and the United States. These economic
considerations, when combined with the strategic
importance assigned to Southeast Asia in terms
of the emerging domino theory, led the United
States to believe that Communist domination of
Southeast Asia would critically end nger United
States security interests. This belief led the
Government to consider it necessary to engage in
internal propa anda designed to convince the
American people of "the importance of Southeast
Asia to the security of the United States so
that they ••• [miqht] be prepared for any of the
courses of
11
124] •••• " )
action proposed [in SC
(2) The actual policy decisions were predicted by
two statistically significant factors. Listed
.
1n
order of their importance, these factors, which
served as the underpinning for the actual decision
175
making, consisted of:
(a) A belief that U.S. actions in Vietnam
should never compromise American integrity and
prestige. (This factor was the underlying
reason for the initial decision to withhold o.s.
support for the Bao Dai solution and was
expressed 1n terms of avoiding any appearance of
endorsing
continued
either
French
a puppet
colonial
qovernment
rule.
or
When
deteriorating conditions within Inda-China, and
the threat of a Chinese invasion, led the United
States to believe that the Communists were in a
position to take over Vietnam, the American
Government decided to extend recognition and aid
to Bao Dai but not become directly involved as
long as the French retained their control over
the country. Here again, fear of being accused
ot supporting colonialism was one of the main
arguments supporting a decision not to commit
U.S. forces to the defense of Indo-China and to
insure that France retained full responsibility
for carrying out the struggle against the Viet
Minh.)
(b) A strong belief in Vietnam's strategic and
economic importance to the United States. (It is
interesting to note that, in
decision making, Vietnam's
176
the case of actual
economic and
strategic importance is ranked second. This
again conforms to our analysis of the actual
documents. while decisions to expand American
involvement were actually based upon this
consideration, it was of secondary im ortance to
the guidin rule that the United States should
not compromise its
involvement in the
prestige through unwarranted
Vietnam conflict. It was
American officals believed that only when
Vietnam was in imminent danger of falling to the
Communists that its strategic and economic
importance became the overriding issue.)
STATISTICAL INFERENCE AND THE LEVEL OF U.S.
PENETRATION IN FRANCO-VIETNAMESE AFFAIRS
In this Administration we detect the first attempts
by the United States to become involved in the internal
affairs of
attempts
the French and Vietnamese governments. These
that they actually were so
constituted a high
limited,
level of
however,
attempted influence rather
than penetration of internal affairs. In summary form
they can be identified as follows: (a) an attempt to exert
American control over the formulation and implementation
177
of the political and military policies of France and the
GV by controlling the distribution of U.S. aid; (b)
efforts to secure the establishment of a Vietnamese army;
(c) efforts to attain land reform and changes in Vietnam's
economic infra-structure; (d) attempts to bring about
reforms in the leadership of the GVN, with particular
reference to Bao Dai; and, (e) the conclusion of a
bilateral aid agreement with the GVN in an effort to
circumvent French
12
Inda-China.
control over U.S. actions
.
1n
Table 3 contains the results of regression analysis
measurements
penetration.
of actor influence on the level of
As can readily be seen, statistically
significant measurements of actor influence on policies
involving penetration of French and GVN internal affairs
occurred only in 1950 and 1951. And, as with our actor
measurements pertaining to decisions on u.s. involvement
1n the Vietnamese conflict, (Table 2), the Defense
Department appears to have held a significant amount of
influence relative to other governmental groups. This
finding parallels the results of our analysis of the
document contents, which revealed the desire of the
Defense Department to: (1) place tighter controls on the
distribution of aid because, 1n their judgement, the
French were generally unable to carry out effective
leadership and military planning; and, (2) have France
TABLE 3
DETERMINATION OF GROUP INFLUENCE ON
POLICY FORMULATION: 1949-1952
(LEVEL OF U.S. PENETRATION INTO FRENCH AND GVN INTERNAL AFFAIRS)
EASUREMENT DESCRIPTION
I. MEASUREMENTS OF INFLUENCE
ON A YEAR BY YEAR BASIS:
YEAR
1949-
AGGREGATE GROUPS WITH
STATISTICALLY SIGNIFICANT
INFLUENCE ON POLICY
nil
195in- (a) Joint State/Defense Department
Committees
II. MEASUREMENTS OF INFLUENCE FOR
ENTIRE ADMINISTRATION
1951-
1952-
(b) Defense Department
nil
(a) Defense Department
(b) National Security Council
(a) National Security Council
(b) State Depa r tment
(c) Defense Department
(d) Joint Chiefs of Staff
.....
-.J
CX)
179
grant political concessions to the Viet Nationalists and
generally bring about internal reforms 1n the civil
administration of Indo-China. The State Department, on the
other hand, was opposed to any increase in American
efforts to exert greater influence over the internal
affairs of France and Vietnam.
Regression analyses were performed to determine the
reasoning behind recommendations for greater American
control over the internal affairs of France and Vietnam.
These tests resulted in the selection of the following two
predictors: (1) a desire to insure the qreatest amount of
success for French military actions in Indo-China; and,
(2) a decision to lend support to the Bao Dai regime in
its negotiations with the French. On the other hand,
analyses designed to determine the arguments which
actually supported the decision making process selected a
different set of predictors. The rationale behind the
actual decision making appears to have been: (1) support
of the Bao Dai regime as the only viable alternative to a
Communist government in Vietnam; and, (2) concern that if
Indo-China fell to the Communists, the other nations would
also fall (belief in the domino theory).
The predictors selected in both of these statistical
analyses conform with those revealed by direct examination
of the documents. Whereas the United States would not
assume direct responsibility for the defense
180
of
Indo-China, it insisted upon the authority to direct the
course of events. Moreover, while the Americans did not
want France to withdraw from Indo-China, they believed it
to be in the political, (both domestic and international),
and strategic interests of the United States to eliminate
all remnants of French colonial rule. Political, social,
and economic reform within Vietnam was deemed necessary to
enlist the support of the Vietnamese people, as well as
other Asian nations, for the new Bao Dai government.
THE ELLSBERG-GELB HYPOTHESES
When comparing the results of our analysis with the
Ellsberg-Gelb hypotheses we
.
again find a substantial
degree of conformity between our findings and their
predictions. Referring once again to the summarized list
of propositions contained in Chapter I, we find with
respect to:
Proposition l- Both our detailed examination of
the actual documents and the regression analyses
support the proposition that Vietnam's importance to
the United States rested upon the effectiveness of
U.S. cold war policy. Vietnam was considered to be
vitally important, strategically and economically, to
181
the overall effectiveness of the policy to contain
.
communism 1n Asia. On the other hand, the
corresponding proposition that Vietnam's importance
to the U.S. was also predicated upon domestic
Eolitical considerations is not explicitly supported
by either our examination of the documents or our
statistical analyses. We find explicit concern over
two domestic political considerations:
a)
b)
One area of concern was that the
"Employment of U.S. forces in a de facto
war [against China] without a formal
declaration would raise questions which
would make it desirable to consult with key
menbers of both parties 1n Congress 1n
order to obtain their prior concurrence in
the courses of action contem lated [in
13
NSC124]."
The second area
concern focused
of domestic political
upon the perceived
unwillingness of the American public to
support U.S. military involvement ln
Vietnam on the grounds that we would become
bogged down in another Korean-type venture.
Thus, the National Security Council (NSC)
believed that an effective information
campaign should be launched to convince the
182
public of Vietnam~s economic and strategic
importance to the United States.
The evidence, therefore, would tend to indicate
that the origin of American involvement was
predicated solely upon cold war strategic and
political economic interests. Domestic
considerations, on the other hand, were viewed as a
stumbling block to greater involvement and
represented an obstacle that that the Government felt
compelled to overcome through internal propaganda.
Instead of being a reason for expanding or
maintaining American involvement, domestic
considerations served as a constraint by inhibiting
the commitment of American forces to
. ,
Vietnam s
defense.
Propositio~2- The documents
Truman Administration clearly and
of the second
consistently
support the proposition that policy decisions on U.S.
involvement in Vietnam were guided by the two basic
but conflicting rules (2a and 2b) of preventing
Vietnam from falling to the Communists by military
force while, at the same time, not committing U.S.
forces to an Asian land war. The inconsistency
inherent 1n these two rules 1s manifest in each of
the NSC policy statements and particularly in the
debate leading up to, and the policy contained 1n,
183
NSC124.
Proposition 3- The evidence conta·ned 1n the
documents, while not overwhelming, tends to support
the contentions of Proposition three. The U.S.
Government consistently refused to commit American
ground forces to defend Vietnam and expressed concern
over the lack of public support for another ground
war in Asia. However, American policy, as stated in
NSC124, did ermit the use of U.S. air and naval
support in the event that Inda-China was threatened
with a Communist military victory.
The fact that u.s. decision makers considered it
permissible to engage in air and naval actions aimed
directly against China but felt compelled to avoid
committing U.S. ground forces, indicates the
existence of some form of explicit or implicit
constraints on the escalatory steps that could be
taken. But, by virtue of the fact that our evidence
is limited to a four year period which does not
encompass actual U.S. military involvement in
Vietnam, we are unable to thoroughly test Proposition
three.
Proposition 4- To satisfy rule 2a (prevent
Vietnam from falling to the Communists) given the
restrictions of rule 2b (not committing u.s. military
forces to an Asian land war) we find:
184
a) The U.S. did indeed resort to short-term
policy considerations to prevent Vietnam
from falling under Communist control.
Long-term political solutions were
considered the only viable means of
reducing the threat of a Communist takeover
in Vietnam. But, as the French military
position in Indo-China deteriorated and the
perceived threat of a Chinese invasion
loomed ever larger, the U.S. turned away
from political resolution of the conflict
out of fear that it would provoke a French
withdrawal from Indo-China.
b) As predicted, the U.S. did resort to the
use of other governments (France and the
GVN) as a ents for implementing American
policy, by having them, as opposed to the
U.S., assume responsibility for military
action in Vietnam.
c) As predicted, the U.S. adopted the role of
offering military aid and the conduct of
covert operations in support of its client
regimes.
d) As predicted, the U.S.
objections to the Bao
appeared necessary to
did give up its
Dai regime when it
do so in order to
e)
185
prevent the Communists from assuming
control in Vietnam. And, although the
American Government did press France to
grant political concessions which would
widen the GVN's political base of support,
these efforts diminished with the passage
of time.
As predicted, and in conjunction with
Proposition 4d, the decrease in American
efforts to bring about a liberal and
independent Vietnamese regime was directly
related to a rowing concern that these
efforts would further destabilize the
situation in Vietnam and possibily result
in a French withdrawal.
Proposition 5- Between 1949 and 1952, the
conflicting nature of rules 2a and 2b did indeed
produce discrepancies between the predictions,
recommendations, and long-term aims of American
policy in Vietnam. George Abbott and others in the
State Department considered it to be a truism that
there was no military solution for the conflict in
Indo-China.
negotiations
The continuation of Franco-Vietnamese
leading to self-government were
considered the only viable approach to conflict
amount of resolution. Acheson argued that no
186
American military or conomic aid could save the Bao
Dai regime unless it could gain the full support of
its own people, as well as the support of neighboring
Asian nations • Therefore, as long as the Bao Dai
.
regime bore signs puppet of being a French
government, the United States believed it would be
inimical to American restige and foreign policy
goals to extend recognition and assistance to the
GVN.
As the threat of a Communist victory increased,
however, the U.S. saw no alternative to avoiding the
establishment of a Communist government except to
support the nominally independent Bao Dai regime.
Because of American reluctance to intervene
militarily, this led to the extension of American
military aid and a decrease 1n attempts to press
France for Vietnamese independence for fear that
these efforts would miscarry. Because of the
self-imposed restriction against American military
intervention, the Truman Administration was forced to
embark upon a course of action which they predicted
would fail in the long-run, but was deemed necessary
to avert the immediate loss of Vietnam.
Proposition 6- As hypothesized, a military
victory in Vietnam was never a stated policy goal of
the United States. Indeed, most American political
187
and military leaders believed that a military victory
was impossible to attain. Instead, the policy
objectives of the United States were to prevent overt
intervention of an aggressive Chinese Communist
regime by
the same
position
promising American retaliation,
time, bolstering the French
1n Vietnam with U.S. aid.
Proposition 6 contends, President Truman
only those steps which were considered
while, at
military
And, as
undertook
to be the
minimal actions necessary to
falling into Communist hands.
keep Vietnam from
Proposition 7-
nature of rules 2a
As predicted,
and 2b did give
the conflicting
U.S. policy a
distinct short-term bias. In
proposition we find that:
a) American actions were
insufficient to avert a
relation to this
recognized to be
defeat in the long
run. Despite this recognition, American
officials saw no alternative to the course
of action selected, if a short-term defeat
1n Vietnam was to be avoided.
b) As predicted, the bias t Jward short-term
expedients led to programs which were
primarily military rather than political in
nature.
c) As predicted, United States control and
188
influence over the policy and ctions of
its client regimes were limited to a
significant extent. Although attempts were
made to use U.S. aid as a means for
attaining this control, they failed because
France threatened to withdraw and, the
United States would not allow itself to
step in and fill the military void that a
French pull-out would leave (rule 2b).
d) As predicted, the American Government foun
it necessary to resort to national and
international propoganda and information
management to enlist support for its policy
goals in Indo-China. Efforts were
undertaken to persuade both the American
-
public and the non-Communist allies of the
United States that Bao Dai was not a
colonial puppet and that it was in their
interests to sup ort the containment of
communism
.
1n Indo-China. Failing this,
they were told, one nation after another
would fall under Communist domination.
In part, even the u.s. recommendation
to create an independent Vietnamese army
was a propaganda move supporting the
fiction that the Bao Dai regime was really
189
independent. From the beginning it was
planned that this army would be created in
name only and its personnel would remain
under the control of
Command.
the French High
Proposition 8- Once again, as in the first
Truman Administration,
formulation and the
the pattern
escalation of
of policy
American
involvement in Vietnam appears to have been in
reaction to the threat of a Communist takeover and
conforms to the hypothesized Ellsberg fever chart.
Referring to Figure 5, we see that the level of the
policy process (line 2) always moves inversely
.
10
relation to the level of optimism with regard to the
course of events in Vietnam (line 1). The graph
reflects the plummeting level of optimism between
1949 and 1950 which led to the decision to recognize
the Bao Dai regime and grant military and economic
assistance to Indo-China. After this initial decision
the policy process swings gradually upward,
reflecting subsequent decisions to speed-up the
implementation of the aid program, to increase the
amount of aid, and to engage in covert actions. At
the same time, we find a corresponding increase in
the level of optimism resulting from the perceived
effects of the aid program and the decline
.
10
L L
E E.
V
i, t.:
L L
0 u
t ' l'
(j t'
i' 0
1 ' L
I I
1 C
I f
s
M f>
k
u
C
1 I:.
5
s
I
16~
1411
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11'.l
~rn~
6 kl
~
-- ~~
IJ
1'148
1\~
-
---·
✓---
-✓---
.,
_.,.--
fIGU~E 5
LEVEL OF OP1IMISM AND THE ~OL!CY PROCESS
l
lLEVEL OF
OPTI M ISM
-"" --~ ---- --
- - __,___ CY
\ .,_ - _____ , PUI,I
'\ 0 ......__~ 2 ------ - ----1 .
~ - ---r------- l~~
PROCESS
~-----
1':14~
1~51
....,
\.0
~
191
official concern over overt Chinese intervention.
And finally, by tracing the level of optimism
and the policy process throu h 1952, the graph
clearly depicts the environment in which SC124 was
formulated and the impact of its policy statements.
As noted above, the probability of a Chinese invasion
was, at that time, viewed to be remote and the
primary threat to Vietnam's security was considered
to be internal subversion. This perception is
reflected 1n the continue rise in optimism, albeit
that the level is much lower than in 1949. At the
same time, the level of decision making activity had
dropped off sharply. This reflects the failure of
NSC124 to address itself to any new policy decisions
with respect to Indo-China, the continued decision
not to become militarily involved in Vietnam, and the
basic orientation of this policy statement toward the
formulation of contingency plans against a Chinese
invasion.
In _ conclusion, then, President Truman's decisions to
escalate u.s. involvement in Vietnam ended on the same
note that they had egun. Between 1945 and 1948,
unsubstantiated reports of Soviet efforts to manipulate a
Communist takeover 1n Vietnam led the United States to
tacitly support French efforts to suppress the Viet Minh.
192
In 1950, a perceived but equally unsubstantiated threat of
overt Chinese intervention led Truman to commit the United
States to the support of a French puppet government in
Vietnam, to extend substantial military and economic aid,
and to engage 1n covert operations in Indo-China. The
direct commitment of U.S. military forces in defense of
Vietnam was, however, an escalatory threshold which he was
unwilling to cross. This constraint served to color both
the nature and outcome of the policy process. And, it
created a marked disparity between actual assessments and
recommendations, and the resultant policy decisions.
Moreover, in both Administrations, the French
successfully played u on American fears to enlist U.S.
support. From 1945 through 1948 the French Government
constantly raised the specter of Soviet influence in
Inda-China in order to provoke an American commitment.
Then, from 1949 through 1952, they used both the fear of a
Chinese invasion and the possibility of a French
withdrawal to achieve the same results. The Joint Chiefs
appear to have been aware of French attempts at what they
14
called "psychological warfare" on the United States.
As a result, France was unsuccessful in provoking a
commitment of American forces to the defense of Vietnam.
However, they were successful in using this ploy to obtain
the original commitment of American military and economic
aid as well as subsequent increases in the level of these
I
1 ,
It
193
aid programs.
This leads one to wonder how the American Government
could be duped into making decisions which ran counter to
both the evidence at hand and its professed policy goal of
avoiding embarassing entanglement in the Vietnam conflict.
It can be argued that any postmortem examination of a
decision making situation
.
carries with it unfair
advantages of hindsight. One is not confronted with the
need to make decisions in the heat of the battle, as it
were. Nor are there the unknown elements and outcomes
that existed then. For instance, the National Security
Council did not know whether Mao Tse-tung planned to let
his troops continue their advance into Inda-China once
they had secured their control of the Chinese mainland.
Similarly, the NSC could not tell if China's entry into
the Korean conflict would be followed by a diversionary
invasion of Inda-China. Consequently, decisions to
escalate American involvement in Inda-China at those
points in time are understandable. But, once the dust had
settled and, by their own admission, the probability of
external aggression was considered remote, how can the
continued escalation of American involvement be accounted
for? Why did decision makers call for political solutions
and a limited American role, on one hand, while, on the
other, they made decisions that ran counter to their own
recommendations? In order to explain this evident
194
disparity in the decision making process, a closer review
of the document contents this administration for
.
15
necessary.
DOCUMENT ANALYSIS FOR 1949-1952
------------------
As Truman's second Administration began in January of
1949, the Government of France was still trying to obtain
parlimentary approval for its so called "Bao Dai solution"
in Vietnam. The Bao Dai solution sought to install the
former emperor as head of a French designed, unified,
Vietnamese state which would be bound to the French Union.
According to this plan, the Bao Dai regime would replace
the provisional Vietnamese government and be granted
minimal autonomy. The emperor's leadership, with the
support of the newly granted French concessions to
Vietnamese nationalism, was suppose to draw the
non-Communist supporters of Ho Chi Minh away from the Viet
Minh and, 1n turn, weaken Ho's power and prestige among
15
the people.
Interestingly enough, there was a reluctance on the
part of all parties concerned to pursue the Bao Dai
solution. While the Ha Long Bay Agreement of June 5, 1948
solemnly recognized the establishment of an independent
Vietnam, it did not relinquish French control over
. ,
Vietnam s army or the conduct of its foreign affairs.
I~
~ I
1,
Moreover, specifics surrounding the transfer
195
of
governmental controls were not defined in the agreement
but were to be the subject of future negotiations. In view
of these qualifications and the undefined terms of the
agreement, Bao Dai was reluctant to head the new
Vietnamese government unless the French granted him the
authority and concessions necessary to "gain the support
of sufficient Nationalist elements to insure stability for
16
his new government." In particular, he insisted that
Cochinchina be relinquished as a French colony and
17
incorporated into the new country of Vietnam.
French colonialists and conservatives were also
dissatisfied with the Bao Dai solution and began an
all-out campaign against the Ha Long Bay agreement. They
considered it the first step in losing the entire French
colonial empire. As a result of this dissatisfaction , the
French Assembly became sharply divided on the issue of
Vietnamese independence. On the other hand, the French
Government, already confronted with other serious domestic
and international issues, was reluctant to push the
18
Assembly for approval. Bao Dai recognized the growing
instability and weakness of the French Government and
became even more insistent upon Assembly approval of
Vietnamese independence before he would assume the role of
19
head-of-state.
The United States, for its part, wanted the new
II
I'
196
Vietnamese government to be established and take root, but
it too was reluctant to express support for the plan until
the French Assembly ratified the agreement and the Bao Dai
regime proved to be stable. In a telegram to the American
Consul in Saigon, dated May 2, 1949, Acheson stated that
the State Department:
••• desires you [to] guard carefully against any
action which might be seized upon as premature
endorsement or de facto recognition by [the] US
of Bao Dai or any regime he may establish.
FR[ANCE is] giving evidence of pessimism re
[theJ viability [of the] Bao Dai solution and
[the] Dept desires [to] retain as much freedom
of action re I[ND0-1 C[HINA] as possible without
1n any manner giving [the] impression we oppose
or wish to hinder [the] ex-Emperor.20
THE UNITED STATES AND THE BAO DAI SOLUTION
Despite this reluctance to throw American support
behind the Bao Dai solution, the unexpected swiftness and
ease with which Mao Tse-tung and the Chinese Communists
were crushing Chiang Kai-shek's army within China made the
United States increasingly anxious to see the French
expedite the establishment of the new Vietnamese regime.
Out of fear that Vietnam would fall under Communist
control, the United States felt compelled to support the
imposition of a French created regime with questionable
popular support. In a telegram to the Secretary of State,
197
the American Consul General 1n Saigon, George Abbott,
conten ed that " ••• the rapid progress of the Chinese
Communists casts a lengthening shadow over Indochina, and
every day of delay increases the difficulty of Bao Dai
21
achieving his objectives."
American concern was predicated upon an increasingly
pessimistic assessment of the French military position in
Vietnam and a growing concern that Chinese Communist
force~ would assist Ho Chi Minh by direct intervention in
Vietnam. Thus, the movement of American policy behavior
toward increasing support for a political solution to the
Vietnam conflict was not motivated by a desire for
Vietnamese self- etermination. It was sparked by a belief
that the French were militarily incapable of suppressing
the Viet Minh and that continued conflict would only
provide the Chinese Communists with an excuse to intervene
in support of Ho Chi Minh. In a memorandum prepared for
the New Delhi Foreign Service Conference held in February,
1949, George Abbott presented the following argument:
The truism that 'there is no military solution'
for Indochina is more pertinent now than ever,
with 100 , 000 French troops ••• [being] hardly more
than adequate to hold the present very limited
areas of control. In this stalemate, large
scale Chinese Communist intervention or the
complete breakdown of present
[Franco-Vietnamese] political negotiations
leading to self-government would have a serious ,
if not disastrous, effect on the present French
military position.22
I
198
The morale and discipline of French combat units were
seen to be 1n sharp decline and widespread French
atrocities were reported by both American and British
sources within Vietnam. The French Government and its
military leadership 1n Vietnam displayed a prevailing lack
of confidence and a sense of hopelessness over the
deteriorating military situation. It became more and more
difficult to get the best officers to seek combat duty.
The high rate of pay and the chance for rapid professional
advancement were considered to be the only reasons that
massive resignations
23
and desertions were being
averted.
The Viet M inh forces, on the other hand, were
considered to be displaying no signs of decline in their
ability to resist the French, nor did they exhibit any
decline 1n morale. In contrast to the French forces, the
Viet Minh displayed vigor and cohesiveness and were
spurred on, in part, "by French indecision and bad faith,
24
and the terrorism of French troops." Moreover, it was
reported that, al though operating under adverse
conditions, the Viet Minh were adeauately administering
the large areas under their control and were able to "form
a source of supplies and of fresh troops that ••• [were]
25
only limited 1n numbers by the arms available." The
sources of their assistance were considered
199
to be
indigenous and the American Consul in Saigon re orted
that,"Although there are rumors of a Chinese Communist
treaty with Ho Chi Minh, and of a Chinese Communist
general and his staff in Northern Tonkin, there is little
evidence, as yet, that the Chinese are of any considerable
26
help in the resistance."
Once again American decision makers refused to be
dissuaded by the lack of any evidence that the Communists
intended to intervene. In view of what he termed as a
deteriorating situation, Dean Acheson informed the Saigon
Consul, on May 10, 1949, that there appeared to be no
alternative except to support the Bao Dai experiment. He
stated that, " ••• at the proper time and under the proper
circumstances," the United States would extend recognition
to the Bao Dai Government and that the State Department
was considering the possibility of also extending military
and economic aid to France and Vietnam. According to
Acheson, diplomatic recognition and extension of American
aid would be contingent upon:
1. F'r ance clearly
concessions to
offerin
make the
"all
Baodai
necessary
solution
attractive to [Vietnamese] nationalists" and
avoiding any appearance of settin up a puppet
regime.
2. That the Bao Dai Government demonstrate the
,,
200
capacity to conduct its affairs in a manner
designed to achieve maximum popular support.
3. That Bao Dai not attempt to include Communist
27
figures within his government.
Despite the compulsion to counter the threat of
Communist expansion into Inda-China, the United States was
reluctant to cast caution to the wind by openly supporting
a French puppet regime. American officials again found
themselves caught between the conflicting policies of
supporting French goals in Indo-China to contain the
spread of communism while, at the same time, supporting
the establishment of a popular government in Vietnam.
Like a classic case of Kurt Lewin's avoidance-avoidance
28
conflict, American policy behavior was marked by a
vacillation between the two goals. For instance, as the
decision makers moved closer toward the support of French
policies, they found them increasingly repelling and
tended to retreat 1n the opposite direction and vice
versa.
Thus, on May 20th, Acheson expressed growing
pessimism about the ultimate acceptance of the Bao Dai
regime by the Vietnamese people. In particular, he
considered French insistence on retaining control over
Vietnam's army and the conduct of its foreign affairs to
be the chief stumbling block. When the independence
movement became too strong to be defeated, he believed,
201
France would have to accept the terms of the nationalists
if it hoped to preserve any influence in Southeast Asia.
"However," he concluded, the " ••• Dept [is] oersuaded
[that) FR[ANCE) is unlikely [to] make further concessions
[at] this time and that any US efforts {to] press them
29
[to) do so w[ou]ld probably miscarry. " Therefore, the
Administration placed its hopes on France fulfilling its
obligations " ••• with such generosity and expedition that
[an] impressively constructive atmosphere will be
created ••• " and lead the Viet nationalists to accept the
30
Bao Dai solution. But, fearing that the French were
offering the Vietnamese too little too late, Acheson
maintained that the United States would not be willing to
rush "into the breach to support [the] Bao Dai agreements
at [the] cost [of]
31
its own remaining prestige [in)
Asia."
The American Government believed the only real hope
for preventing Vietnam from falling under Communist
control to be a sincere offer from France which granted
the Vietnamese full independence. Yet, as predicted by
the Ellsberg-Gelb model , the State Department saw itself
as being powerless to persuade or coerce France into
granting the required concessions. Moreover, Acheson
considered the recent fall of China to show that no amount
of American military or economic aid could save a
government unless it could gain the full support of its
202
people by granting a political voice to all major groups
32
and by demonstrating real leadership. To impress this
fact upon the French, the American Ambassador, David
Bruce, was instructed on June 6, 1949 to inform the French
Government that, in the State Department's estimation, the
Vietnamese were unlikely to accept the present terms of
the Bao Dai solution or " ••• anything less than equality
33
with other peoples." The French were also told that
the United States considered the paramount question to be
whether Vietnam "is
34
to be saved from Communist
control." This question assumed particular importance
since "the southward movement of Chinese Communist armies
toward the northern frontier of Indochina introduces a new
element that transforms an already serious situation into
35
an emergency." Therefore, the message concluded, the
decision of the United States to intervene and extend the
necessary support and assistance that France would
require, would be governed by the extent to which France
complied with the nationalist demands in Vietnam.
ESTABLISHMENT OF THE BAO DAI REGIME
On June 14, 1949, while the United States began a
serious examination of its policy options and objectives
in Asia, a new Vietnamese state was established under Bao
. ,
Da1 s leadership. However, the agreement between the
203
French Government and Bao Dai still had not been ratified
by the French Assembly. The United States, therefore,
maintained its ''wait and see" attitude to determine if
French concessions were sincere and the Bao Dai regime was
viable. The State Department did, however, set out to
generate an aura of legitmacy around the Bao Dai reqime by
trying to persuade the Asian nations to support the new
Vietnamese government. The rationale behind this move was
spelled out in a telegram sent by Acheson to the American
Consul in Saigon almost a month before the new Vietnamese
state was launched:
Best hope [for success of the Bao Dai regime]
might lie 1n [an] active demonstration of
interest in and support of Baodai solution by
other non-Commie Asian govts. Appeal [of] such
[a] solution to (the] Vietnam nationalists
w[ouJld presumably be far greater if it appeared
sponsored by free Asian nations animated by [an]
interest [in the] self-determination [of] Asian
peoples and their own self-preservation in [the]
face [of an] immed[iate] Commie rnenac rather
than if it had appearance [of a] gambit
engineered by FR[ANCE], US and UK as part [of
the] strategy of west-East conflict.36
In instructing the American Embassy in Rangoon to
seek Burmese support for Bao Dai, Acting Secretary of
State ebb, on June 20, 1949, gave voice to one of the
clearest early references to what was later known as the
"domino theory." He suggested that the Ambassador explain
to the Government of Burma the " ••• importance to Asia of
204
[the] success of [the] Bao Dai regime which might thereby
create [the] bulwark against COMMIE control [of] Vietnam.
If COMMIES gain control [of Vietnam, then all of] I[NDO]
C[HINA], THAI[LAND] and [the] rest [of] SEA [Southeast
Asia] will be imperile ." Webb further stated, however,
that if France should renege on its promises or the new
Vietnamese government should fail, the U.S. would "refrain
from supporting [the] Bao Dai solution and it would be
clear as to why [the] US [was] unable [to] prevent COMMIE
37
control [of] Vietnam." Thus, the American Government
was leaving its options open to save face and avoid
discrediting its policy of containment in the eyes of the
world.
By November of 1949, the French Assembly still had
not ratified the agreement with Bao Dai. This delay in
ratification and the success of the Chinese Communists
against Chiang Kai-shek's forces had deeply alarmed
officials of the United Kin dom. Similar to their efforts
to engage American support for the restoration of French
colonial rule in 1945, the British were now attempting to
persuade the U.S. to recognize the French imposed Bao Dai
regime. At a conference held in Singapore they resented
the following recommendations to the United States:
1. A failure of the Bao Dai experiment would
inavitably [sic] result in a complete French
withdrawal from Indo-China; therefore u.s. and
Commonwealth Governments should join the UK in
205
assisting the French in support of Bao Dai.
2. In view of the urgency of the situation
Western nations cannot afford to await prior
sponsorship of Bao Dai by the Asiatic nations.
It is therefore recommended that after the
transfer of sovereignty to Vietnam on January 1
(1950] the UK support the new regime.
3. Following action is recommended:
a. The French should be asked to clarify
the legal status of Vietnam.
b . De 1ure recognition is not possible
until: •• the] agreement is ratified. It is
therefore recommended that de facto
recognition of Vietnam be ranted on the
transfer of sovereignty ••••
c. The French should be encouraged to
expedite the ratification ••••
4. It is hoped that Secretary of State Acheson
will issue a public statement with regard to
Indo-China similar to that made with regard to
Hon Kong on May 18th when he stated that in the
event of an attack on Hong Kong the United
States will fulfill its duties under the Charter
of the United Nations.38
AMERICAN POLICY POSITION WITH RESPECT TO ASIA
On June 10, 1949, there 1s the first documentary
reference to Defense Department involvement 1n the
post-war Inda-China problem. On this date the Secretary of
Defense, Louis Johnson, wrote a memorandum to the
Executive Secretary of the National Security Council. In
it he expressed his growing concern over the course of
206
events 1n Asia: "The advance of communism in large areas
o the world and particularly the successes of communism
1n China seriously affect the future security of the
United States." Since a major objective of u.s. policy
was "to contain communism in order to reduce its threat to
our security," Johnson requested the staff of the National
Security Council to begin:
••• a study of the current situation in Asia to
re-examine and correlate current policies and to
appraise the commitments and risks involved in
the various courses of action political,
economic, and military which might be
undertaken in support of the broad objective and
recommend for the consideration of the National
Security Council an appropriate plan of action
outlining specific o jectives to be
achieved.39
The British recommendations, coupled with Secretary
of Defense Johnson's reouest and the fast-changing
situation 1n Southeast Asia , led the National Security
Council (NSC) to approve a reassessment of United States
policy in Asia. This resulted 1n a olicy paper entitled
C48/l, which spelled out the position of the United
40
States with respect to Asia, and the specific policy
decisions adopted by President Truman and the members of
41
the Council, which were contained in SC48/2.
Asia was seen to possess significant potential
political , economic, and military power. Therefore the
NSC viewed any possible domination of this area "by a
207
nation or coalition of nations capable of ex loiting the
region for self-aggrandizement ••• [as a threat to] the
42
security of Asia and the United States." This threat
was not seen to be emanating from Co munist China or any
regional coalition of Asian Communist parties, but,
rather, from the Soviet Union. "The United States
position with respect to Asia," is one of "competition
together with friendly countries a ainst the USSR for
influence on the form and direction of the Asiatic
43
revolutions." Therefore, it was conclu ed that, "For
the forseeable future ••• our immediate objective must be to
contain and where feasible to reduce the power and
44
influence of the USSR in Asia ••• "
NSC48 also served to affirm and strengthen the basis
for the emerg1n domino theory. "The olitical offensive
of the Kremlin or its proteges," it was contended, "also
tends to gather additional momentum as each new success
45
increases the vulnerability of the next tarqet." In
particular, much concern was expressed about the
vulnerability of Japan and the grave consequences that
would result if this "keystone" of the Pacific should fall
under Communist control. "If Japan, the principal
component of a Far Eastern war-making complex, were added
to the Stalinist bloc," it was argued, "the Soviet base
could become a source of strength capable of shifting the
balance of world power to the disadvantage of the United
208
46
States."
Although the American occupation of Japan was seen to
have basically altered the political structure of the
country and moved it toward democratic institutions,
traditional Japanese social patterns, which were
considered to be antithetical to democracy, remained
strong within the society. The NSC looked back on the
pre-war rise of right-wing Japanese militarists to a
position of political power and determined that, "The
of these oatterns to demonstrated
totalitarian
susceptibility
exploitation is enhanced by
.
economic
maladjustment which may grow more serious as a result of
population increases and of obstacles to the expansion of
47
trade."
The threat of a Communist takeover in Japan was
considered to be quite serious. This threat was increased
by the purported inclination of the Japanese toward
totalitarianism because of the social patterns inherent in
their culture. And, even if this inclination led to
another right-wing government instead of Communist
domination, it was contended that compelling political and
economic factors would move Japan toward accommodation
with the "Soviet orbit." The reasons given in support of
this argument were: (a) the close proximity of Communist
countries to a weak and disarmed Japan; and, (b) "the
potential of Communist China [to serve] as a source of raw
209
48
materials vital to Japan and a market for its goods . "
But , the primary focus of American concern appeared to
center on economic factors, as is witnessed by the
following statement:
While scrupulously avoidin assumption of
responsibility for raising Asiatic living
standards , it is to the U.S. interest to promote
the ability of these countries to maintain , on a
self-supporting basis, the economic conditions
requisite to political stability. Japan can
only maintain its present living standard on a
self-supporting basis if it is able to secure a
reater proportion of its needed food and raw
material (principally cotton) imports from the
Asiatic area, in which its natural ma kets lie,
rather than from the U.S., in which its export
market is small. In view of the desirability of
avoiding preponderant dependence on Chinese
sources ••• this will require a considerable
increase in Southern Asiatic food and raw
material exports.
The Indian problem is somewhat analogous:
he sizeable post-war In ian dollar deficit may
be traced largely to this country's
unprecedented dollar food imports ••••
It is thus difficult to foresee a time at
which Japan and India will be self-supporting in
the a sence of greatly increased food production
and some increased cotton production in Southern
and Southeast Asia, One major prerequisite to
such an increase is the restoration of political
stability in the-food exporting countries of
Burma and Inao-China . 49
Thus, a new dimension had been added to
. ,
Americas
policy of keeping Vietnam out of Communist hands
In a-China was needed as a source of raw materials and a
market for the products of Japanese industry. This need,
210
1n turn, was predicated upon the assumption that, without
non-Communist trading partners, Japan would, of necessity,
50
be drawn into the Soviet bloc. Moreover, if Japan
should fall under Communist control, it was assumed that
the military balance in the Pacific would be so altered
that the rest of Asia would also fall:
The industrial plant of Japan would be the
richest prize in the Far East for the USSR. For
Japan and major Asian raw-material producing
areas, together with the necessary
transportation lines, to be controlled by the
Soviet Union would add measurably to the
war-making potential of the USSR.SI
The NSC also considered Inda-China to be of major
economic importance to the United States. "Asia,
particularly South and Southeast Asia," they stated, "are
among the principal sources of United States imports of
several basic commodities which could contribute greatly
to United States security for stockpiling purposes and
would be of great assistance in time of war if they
52
remained available to us." Contrary to Marxist
arguments, direct American economic interests do not
appear to be the sole motivating force behind United
States involvement 1n Indo-China, but they did play a
sizable role. American purchases of strategic materials
were viewed as a means of providing the Asian nations with
an important source of dollars to promote economic
211
development and stability. Moreover, u.s. exports to
Asia, at that _particular time, were deemed to be of less
importance than imports, and these imports of strategic
raw materials from Southeast Asia could, if necessary, be
53
obtained from other sources. But, the Truman
Administration did feel that American exports to Asia were
by no means insignificant and they "could grow 1n
importance to the
54
stability of our own domestic
economy." "In brief," they concluded, "the economic
advantage derived by the United States from our trade with
non-Communist Asia 1s considerable and there 1s little
55
doubt of the wisdom of its development."
The Administration felt it was now clear that the
Kremlin was mounting a concerted effort to gain control
over Southeast Asia to acquire its resources and, in doing
so, deny them to United States. But, of equal importance
to the economic considerations were the potential
political repercussions that the loss of Inda-China would
have for America's cold war policy:
The extension of communist authority in China
represents a grievous political defeat for us;
if Southeast Asia also is swept by communism we
shall have suffered a major political rout the
repercussions of which will be felt throughout
the rest of the world, especially in the Middle
East and in a then critically exposed
Australia.56
Despite the strategic importance of Asia, the Joint
212
Chiefs of Staff, with .. "a tional Security
,
concurrence, argued that the United States
Council
primary
strategic interests and war objectives lay in Europe
rather than Asia. As 1n the first Truman Administration,
Europe was seen as the main target of Soviet expansion and
it therefore occupied the central position in American
foreign policy and strategic planning. Accordingly:
••• the current basic concept of strategy in the
event of war with the USSR is to conduct a
strategic offense in the 'est' and a strategic
defense in the 'East' •••• As a primary matter in
the event of war, it is essential that a
successful strategic defense in the 'East' be
assumed with a minimum expenditure of military
manpower and material in order that the major
effort may be expended in the 'west' .57
Although the NSC assumed that si nificant soviet
influence was being exerted upon the Chinese Communists,
and that this influence would "grow more firm," the
concept of a monolithic Communist bloc does not appear to
have become fully developed by the end of 1949. The
Soviet Union, itself, rather than China or a Sino-Soviet
alliance, appears to have represente the main threat to
American security interests. While the United States did
not feel that it or any other estern nation could
"greatly weaken Chinese communist control of China in the
58
foreseeable future," it was believed that they could
possibly create friction between Moscow and Peking and
213
pull China closer to the West. Indeed, the
. .
op1n1on was
expressed that any overt attempt by the United States to
interfere in Chinese affairs, either on the mainland or in
Formosa, would undoubtedly redound to the benefit of the
Communists. American intervention on the China mainland
would end up by "rallyin all of the anti-foreign
59
sentiment in China to their [the Communist] side." On
the other hand, any u.s. effort to occupy Formosa would be
labeled as imperialism and "seriously affect the moral
position of the U.S. before the bar of world opinion ••• at
a time when the U.S. is seeking to expose Soviet
60
imperialist designs on other nations."
The policy of the United States with respect to all
of Asia, in the assessment of President Truman and the
rest of the National Security Council, was to be pragmatic
in nature with a distinct economic bias. The fundamental
threat of communism emanated from Moscow rather than
China, Vietnam or any other Asian nation. And, the Asian
nations were considered to be mutually interdependent in
the fight to contain the spread of Soviet hegemony. If
one nation fell, the others would soon follow. In this
respect, maintenance of
,
Japans pro-western
was considered the key to Asian security.
orientation
Japan needed
both Indo-China and mainland China as a source of raw
materials and an outlet for its industrial goods if it was
to survive. Thus, the NSC decided to press France to
I
I
214
insure the independence of Vietnam and to foster trade
with China in an effort to thwart Soviet desi ns on Asia.
In their words:
The USSR is the primary target of those U.S.
economic policies designed to contain or turn
back Soviet-Communist imperialism, and not China
or any of the Soviet satellites considered as
individual countries. It would, therefore, be
inappropriate to apply to the willing or
unwilling partners of the USSR punitive or
restrictive economic measures which are not
being applied to the USSR itself •••• It should
also be our objective to prevent Chinese
Communists from obtaining supplies of goods of
direct military utility which might be used to
threaten directly the security interests of the
western powers in Asia. It is not, however,
either necessary or advisable to restrict trade
with China in goods which are destined for
normal civilian uses within China •••• three
,
reasons exist for this position: (1) Japans
economy cannot possibly by restored to a
self-sustaining basis without a considerable
volume of trade with China, the burden of Japan
on the United States economy cannot be removed
unless Japan's economy is restored to a
self-sustaining basis and u.s. interference with
natural Japanese trade relations would produce
profound Japanese hostility; (2) permitting
trade with Communist China in qoods destined for
normal civilian use will enable us to obtain
quantities of important commo ities needed by
the U.S •••• and permit China to choose between
a Soviet and a western orientation in their
foreign economic relations; and (3) restriction
of trade ••• would be ineffective and impractical
in view of the existance of alternative sources
of supply 1n other countries which will not
cooperate in exoort controls affecting normal
trade with China.61
In terms of the evolution of United States foreign
policy with respect to Vietnam in _ particular, and Asia in
215
general, the position paper entitled NSC48 represents a
clarification of the policy considerations underlying
American involvement in Asia rather than a major chanqe in
the level of involvement. The actual major policy
d cisions flowing from NSC48 consisted of:
(1) Being prepared to meet threats of direct or
indirect Communist aggression in Asia by
extending "political, economic, and military
assistance and advice where clearly needed to
supplement the resistance of the other
governments in and out of the area which are
more directly concerned."
(2) Developing "cooperative measures through
multilateral and bilateral agreements to combat
Communist internal subversion."
(3) Encouraging the economic recovery and
development of Asia through: ( a} "Vigorous
prosecution of the Point IV program ••• "; (b)
"Execution of a stockpiling program for
strategic materials ••• "; (c) "Encouragement of
private United States investment ••• and support
of the early extension of credits by the
International Bank and the Export-Import
Bank ••• " ; And , (d) encourage increased trade
among the Asiatic countries. "This would
include, for example, further efforts to secure
216
the benefits of most-favored-nation treatment
for Japan."
(4) Exploitin any rift between the Soviet Union and
the Chinese Communists. "Where appropriate,
covert as well as overt means should be utilized
to achieve these objectives."
(5) Employing diplomatic and economic means to deny
Formosa to the Chinese Communists. But, "the
strategic importance of Formosa does not justify
overt military action ••• so long as the present
disparity between our military strength and our
global obligations exists."
(6) Employing American influence to resolve the
colonial-nationalist conflict by satisfying the
fun amental demands of the
" h. 1
••• w 1 eat the same time minimizin
nationalists
the strain
on the colonial powers who are our Western
allies."
attention
The NSC decided that, "Particular
should be
.
given to the problem of
Indo-China and action should be taken to bring
home to the French the urgency of removing the
arriers to the obtaining by Bao Dai or other
non-Communist nationalist leaders of the support
of a substantial pro ortion of the Vietnamese."
(7) Finding means by which members of the British
Commonwealth and other non-Communist nations
217
could be induced to collaborate with the United
States in Asia.
(8) And, engag 1ng 1n domestic and foreign
information rograms with respect to the United
,
States policies 1n Asia, to "gain maximum
62
support both at home and abroad."
In the eventuality of war with the Soviet Union,
American policy, as defined in NSC48 , sought to minimize
the necessity of extensive U.S . military involvement in
Asia. While the United States was willing to negotiate
bilateral defense treaties to protect Asia from Communist
expansion, the long-range goal was to establish a
collective security arrangement for Asia that was similar
to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Realizing the
time-consuming difficulties that had to be overcome before
an Asian version of NATO could become a reality, the
American Government sought to fill the security gap by
both enlisting the assistance of its Western Allies and
through the negotiation
agreements. As
.
1n Europe,
of multilateral
however, the
defense
immediate
objective of U.S. policy was to develop, through military
and economic aid, "sufficient military power in selected
non-Communist nations of Asia to
security and
63
prevent further
maintain internal
encroachment by
communism." And, by ordering preparations to be made
to extend economic and military aid to all governments
resisting Communist aggression in Asia,
218
the NSC had
paved the way for assisting France in its war with Ho Chi
Minh.
AMERICAN MILITARY ASSISTA CE TO FRANCE AD INDO-CHINA
By January of 1950 the Chinese Communist Army had
successfully marched across China to Vietnam's northern
border and the French were in the rocess of transferring
the internal administration of Vietnam to Bao Dai. In a
review of conditions within Vietnam, a State Department
telegram, dated January 20, 1950, expressed hoe that Bao
Dai would succeed in undermining Ho Chi Minh's leadership
but noted that " ••• marked opposition has been encountered
which demonstrates at least that Bao Dai's popular support
65
has not yet widened." The Department was particularly
disturbed by an increase in Viet Minh military activity
and speculated that it could "be evidence of increasing
strength reinforced by hopes of CHI[NESE] COM IE support,
66
direct or indirect." This speculation, they admitted,
was not supported by any
Department had:
evidence since the State
••• as yet no knowledge of negotiations between
Ho and Mao groups although radio intercept of
[a] New China News Agency release of Jan 17
indicates that Ho has messaged the 'GOVTS of the
world' that the 'GOVT of the Democratic Republic
of Vietnam is the only legal GOVT of the Vietnam
219
people' and is ready to establish DIPL[OMATIC]
relations with any GOVT which W[OU]LD be willin
to cooperate with her on the basis of equality
and mutual respect of national sovereignty and
territory so as to defend world eace and
democracy. Ho's radio [is] makinq similar
f
· 6 7
pro ess1ons •••
In light ot this assessment the United States sought to
urge France to rant further concessions to the Vietnamese
nationalists and undertook consideration of when and how
to extend merican recognition of the Bao Dai regime.
By mid-January the pace of events involving
Inda-China accelerated rapidly. On January 18, 1950, the
Chinese Communists reco nized Ho Chi Minh's Democratic
Republic of Vietnam as the legal government of Vietnam.
This was followed, after long and acrimonious debate
within the French Assembly, by ratification of the Bao Dai
solution. On January 29th, the French Government formally
established Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia as independent
states within the French Union. Then, on January 30th,
the Soviet Union countered this move and joined China in
officially recognizing Ho Chi Minh's government.
On February 2nd, Dean Acheson responded to this
flurry of events and the threat of Communist influence in
Southeast Asia by recommending to President Truman that
the United States extend its recognition to the three new
Indo-China States. Truman approved the recommendation on
February 3rd, and, soon thereafter, on February 16, 1950,
the French Government requested long-term
220
military
assistance from the United States for the prosecution of
68
the war against Ho Chi Minh. Playing once again upon
the Truman Administration's obsession with Communist
expansion, the French Government informed the American
Ambassador 1n Paris of the "extreme gravity" of the
situation in Vietnam and of their expectation that, at a
m1n1mum, Communist China would furnish "increased"
military aid to Ho Chi Minh. The French then added the
proverbial "frosting
Ambassador:
on the cake" by telling the
••• that the effort in Indochina was such a drain
on France that a long-term program of assistance
was necessary and it was only from the United
States that it could come. Otherwise ••• it was
likely that France might be forced to reconsider
her entire policy with the possible view to
cuttino her loses and withdrawing from
- 6 9 -
Indochina ••••
Confronted with the loss of China to the Communists
and the presence of Communist Chinese forces along
Vietnam's border, the United States responded to the
possibility of a French withdrawal from Indo-China by
sending an economic survey mission, headed by Robert A.
Griffin, to Southeast Asia. The purpose of the mission was
to determine the types and dollar amount of aid needed to
70
support the French. But all members of the
Administration did not share the expectation that aid was
221
the solution to Vietnam's security. A member of a team of
State Department officials sent to Asia for the purpose of
enlisting Asiatic support for the new Inda-Chinese states
cautioned Secretary of State Acheson against making a firm
decision to grant the economic and military aid. In this
regard, he argued:
It is transparently clear that Asiatic neighbors
of Indochina consider Bao Dai a French creation
and a French puppet; despite current and
anticipated actions of support by [the] U.S. and
western powers they [are] prepared [to] sell his
regime short ••••
We should realize that ECA [Economic Cooperation
Administration) and military aid from [the]
u.s., just as recognition by [the] u.s., do not
constitute the 'missing components' [for the
eventual success of the Bao Dai regime]. Whi le
absence of ECA and military aid, just as lack
(of] recognition, would prove disadvantageous ,
under present circumstances they are not of
primary importance and will not constitute
decisive factors ••••
'Missing component' is further action
French which would place Vietnam
category of independent states.
by [the]
in [the]
Accordingly, Griffin mission should receive very
precise and careful instructions prior to
departure and it would be my recommendation that
no ECA or military aid be committed to French
Indochina unless France gives requisite public
undertakings re further steps leading to [an
independent] status •••• 71
It was argued further that the French analogy which
compared the situation in Vietnam to the Communist threat
72
in Greece was a "dangerous delusion." The perception
222
of the Asian nations falling like so many dominos before
the onslaught of Communist aggression could not be
dispelled, however. On February 27, 1950, the National
Security Council stated in SC64, that there was "already
evidence" of the movement of arms from China into Vietnam.
Arguin that the French could not successfully contain the
Viet Minh
that:
'fhe
if China
,
came to Hos aid, the NSC concluded
It is important to United States security
interests that all practicable measures be taken
to prevent further co munist expansion 1n
Southeast Asia. Indochina is a key area of
Southeast Asia and is under immediate threat.
he neighboring countries of Thailand and Burma
could be expected to fall under Communist
domination if Indochina were controlled by a
Communist-dominated government. The balance of
Southeast Asia would then be in grave
hazard.73
ational Security Council, through NSC64,
instructed both the State and Defense Department, "as a
matter of priority ," to prepare "a program of all
practicable measures designed to protect United States
74
security interests in Indochina." While the State
Department's responsibility was limited to the economic
survey mission headed by Robert Griffin, the Defense
Department was assigned the task of determining military
needs in Inda-China. In an effort to influence the speed
and direction with which the Defense Department moved on
223
its recommendations, Dean Rusk, who was then a Deputy
Under Secretary of State, wrote a memo to General James
Burns of the Office of the Secretary of Defense. Rusk
attempted to impress upon Burns the urgency and gravity
with which the State Department viewed the situation in
Vietnam. Stating that his Department considered
Indo-China to be "the most strategically important area of
Asia," Rusk pressed for speedy Defense
action by arguing that, "It 1s
.
now, 1n the
Southeast
Department
opinion of the [State] Department, a matter of the
greatest urgency that the Department of Defense assess the
strategic aspects of the situation and consider, from the
military point of view, how the United States can best
contribute to the prevention
75
encroachment in that area."
of further Communist
hile the Defense Department pondered the military
situation in Indo-China, the Griffin mission began its
long and tedious task of ascertainin the economic aid
requirements. This job was made more difficult by a
growing squabble between the French and Vietnamese
regarding the mechanics of distributing American military
aid. While Griffin anticipated no difficulty 1n
developing the Cambodian and Laotian aid programs, because
of the cooperation between these governments and France,
he expressed concern that the "controversy on military aid
which 1s budding [between the French and Vietnamese]
,\.
224
without any help from the mission could jeopardize [the]
76
success of the economic program."
In a telegram to the Secretary of State dated March
16, 195~, Griffin reported that, while the situation in
Vietnam was not serious enough to prompt defeatism, it did
justify the need for effective American aid in order to
strengthen the Bao Dai Government and halt the Viet Minh .
Arguing that Bao Dai was not a French puppet , Griffin
reported that economic aid would brinq the non-Communist
supporters of Ho Chi Minh to transfer their allegiance to
the Bao Dai regime. This could be accomplished, he
believed, by administering the aid through the Bao Dai
Government and thus "increasing its appearance of
independence, its local and international prestige , [and]
its ability to conduct useful works for
77
[the] common people."
[the] benefit of
Griffin contended there was no immediate danger of a
Chinese Communist invasion of Indo-China. But, because
military intelligence had reported that "limited but
potentially increased" Chinese material aid was being sent
to Ho Chi inh, he advised speedy approval and delivery of
American aid. To this end, it was recommended that an aid
agreement
Realizing
be concluded with
that the French
each separate state.
would oppose such an
arrangement, Griffin based his recommendation on the need
to both give the appearance that Bao Dai was not a French
225
puppet and undercut the Vietnamese argument that French
control of u.s. aid was tantamount to continued French
control over Vietnamese affairs. Moreover, the desire of
France to administer the aid proqram was so strong that
Griffin expressed concern as to whether the U.S. would be
able to exercise even a minimum of control over its own
78
aid program.
Acheson instructed Griffin to avoid exacerbating the
79
friction between the French and Vietnamese. In
addition, on May 29th, he instructed the Paris Embassy to
ask France to make clear to the non-Communist nations its
intention to support the independence of Vietnam. Acheson
stressed that the American Ambassador should make it clear
that the United States was not ar u1ng for increased
French concessions to the Vietnamese nationalists.
Instead, the purpose of the American request was to dispel
the prevailin _ opinion that Bao Dai was a French puppet,
and thereby gain increased international support for
American and French actions in Inda-China. Acheson then
stated that the State Department strongly believed the
transfer of the Palace of Government to ao Dai, with
"suitable attendent ceremonies," to be the "most important
80
single propaganda move possible now."
The United States found itself caught 1n a bind. The
French refused to grant any real olitical or economic
authority to Bao Dai and sought to preclude any Vietnamese
226
or American control over the distribution of U.S. aid.
The United states, on the other hand, sought to appease
Vietnamese nationalists and enlist the support of other
Asian nations for the Bao Dai regime. But , fearing that
any hint of American pressure would disrupt
Franco-American relations and the ultimate attainment of
U.S. policy goals in Indo-China, the Truman Administration
elected to romote a facade of Vietnamese inde endence
throu h the instrument of propa anda and , ulti ately, to
appease French concern over u.s. interference.
Consequently, on April 9, 1950 , Acheson instructed Griffin
that U. S . aid should not be iven directly to Vietnam
because it could precipitate a
. .
cr1s1s by inducing the
Vietnamese with "hyper-confidence" and furnish an occasion
81
for a Viet Minh demonstration .
In the meantime , on A ril 10, 1950, the Joint Chiefs
of Staff, 1n response to the request from the National
Security Council an Dean Rusk's memo, sent the Secretary
of Defense its recommendations for U.S. military
assistance in Vietnam. The Joint Chiefs concluded that
Southeast Asia was of "critical" strategic importance to
the United States because it was a major source of
strategic materials required for the U.S. stock pile
rojects and "a vital segment in the line of containment
of communism stretching from Japan southward and around
82
the Indian Peninsula." In their opinion, the fall of
227
Indochina would undoubtedly lead to the fall of other
83
states in outheast Asia and throughout the Pacific.
In addition to denying the United States a base from which
it could conduct operations nee ssary to contain
comrnun1sm, the fall of Inda-China would:
••• alleviate considerably the food problem of
China and would make available to the USSR
important strate ic materials . In this
connection, Soviet control of all the majo r
components of Asia's war otential might become
a decisive factor affecting the balance of power
between the United States and the USSR. 'A
Soviet position of dominance over Asia, Western
Euro e, or both , would constitute a major threat
to United States security'; and ••• (a] Soviet
position of dominance over the Far East would
also threaten the United States position in
Ja an since that country could thereby be denied
its Asian markets , sources of food an other raw
rnaterials .84
The Joint Chiefs then noted that it appeared obvious
from recent intelliqence reports that the situation 1n
southeast Asia had deteriorated and, "without United
States assistance," they arqued, "this deterioration will
85
be accelerated." But , while they considered the
military situation to be rave, as things then stood, they
expressed additional concern that American pressure on
France to grant greater inde endence to Vietnam might lead
to a French withdrawal from Inda-China. "It must be
appreciated," they contended, " ••• that French armed forces
of approximately 140,000 men are in the field and that if
228
these were to be withdrawn this year because of political
considerations, the Bao Dai
.
re 1me robably could not
86
survive even with United States aid." Thus, they
the rapidly su ested that
deterioratin
the need
situation
.
1n
to stabilize
Indochina should be given
immediate priority over political considerations involving
Vietnamese independence. In other words, the
nationalistic aspirations of the Vietnamese would be
sacrificed , if necessary, to keep the French forces
Inda-China.
.
1n
In consideration of the "pressing urgency" with which
they viewed the military situation in Inda-China, th
Joint Chiefs recommended a speedy allocation of funds for
military aid . "Precise determination of the amounts
required for military aid , special covert operations, and
concomitant economic and psychological proqrams
.
1n
Southeast Asia," they said , "cannot be made at this
time •••• " But , it was their considered opinion that, "In
the light of the world situation ••• it would appear that
military aid programs and other measures will be necessary
1n Southeast Asia at least
87
II
year ••••
durin the next fiscal
In their recommendation, the Joint Chiefs called for
a "much more forceful and ositive position" on Indo-China
88
than the one put forth by the State Deoartment.
Hather than re eating the uncon itional and uncontrolled
229
military aid pro ram that was conducted in China, which
was ineffective and wasteful, they recommended a carefully
controlled aid program that would be fully integrated with
concurrent political and economic programs. Specifically,
they sought the establishment of an ~merican ilitary aid
group in Indo-China which would: (a) screen all requests
for military equipment to ensure that the reposed
military operations were both feasible and satisfactorily
coordinated; ( b) ensure full coordination of military
plans and activities between the French and Vietnamese
forces; and, (c) actually supervise the distribution of
aid to those forces. "It should be understood [by the
French and Vietnamese]," they said, "that military aid
will only be considered 1n connection with such
coordinated operational plans as are approved by the
representative of the Department of Defense on duty in the
89
recipient country."
In conjunction with the military aid program the
Joint Chiefs also recommende an increase in "show the
flag" visits by the u.s. to the Southeast Asian states, a
recognition of the de facto blockade of mainland China by
the Chinese Nationalists, a program of special covert
operations 1n Southeast Asia, and a long-term program to
provide Japan with a secure source of food and strategic
90
raw materials from the non-Communist areas of Asia.
In this way, they maintained, the United States could
230
.
assume a position of "positive and proper leadership among
the Western Powers," with re ard to matters 1n Southeast
Asia and "retrieve the losses resulting from previous
mistakes on the part o the British and the French, as
91
well as to preclude such mistakes in the future •••• "
THE U.S. ENTERS THE VIETNAMESE CONFLICT:
APP OVAL OF AID TO INDO-CHINA
On May 1, 1950, President Truman approved an
allocation of ten million dollars in military aid for
Inda-China. Soon there after the Griffin mission
recommended the extension of a "modest" 60 million 1n
economic assistance. On May 11, 1950, the American
Government formally announced its intention to establish
economic aid missions in Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos to
assist in coordinating and implementing various economic
aid programs. Then, a little over one month later, on
June 27, 1950, Truman announced his decision to send U.S.
forces into Korea to stop the North Korean invasion across
the 38th parallel . At the same time, he reported that he
had asked the ationalist Chinese to stop all air and sea
operations against mainland China and had ordered an
acceleration in the delivery of military aid to the French
in Inda-China. Of equal significance, and in accordance
with the Joint Chiefs' recommendation, Truman ordered the
231
dispatch of a military mission to Indo-China to provide
"close working relations" with the French and Vietnamese
92
forces. This latter decision brought about the
establishment of the first American military unit within
Inda-China, in the form of a Military Assistance Advisory
Group [MAA]. Moreover, it represented a move toward the
Joint Chiefs' recommendation to have the distribution of
American aid controlled by members of the Defense
Department.
The outbreak of the Korean conflict gave rise to
American concern that the Communists would engage
.
1n
diversionary tactics elsewhere in the world. Particular
concern was expressed that the Soviet Union might engage
in military ventures within Europe and that the Chinese
Communists were preparing to invade Indo-China in support
of Ho Chi ~inh. Because the French forces were considered
the only viable unit capable of containing the Chinese,
the state Department undertook consideration of increasing
direct aid to France at the expense of its aid programs
for the Associated States [Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos].
The need to contain Chinese Communism was deemed to be of
greater importance than supportin the independence of the
Associated States. But, according to Dean Acheson, until
the threat of a Chinese invasion of Inda-China appeared
imminent, the State Department would "continue [to] give
[ the] strongest support possible to [the] ASSOC[IATED]
'J
232
States in order [that the] development of independent and
stable GOVTS shall not be impeded and their position
strengthened in [the] eyes [of] INTERNAT[ION]AL public
93
opinion."
At the same time, the State Department wanted to
build strong, capable native military forces within
Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos. More effective use of native
troops, they believed, would permit France to recall its
military units from Inda-China to bolster European
defenses. It was made quite clear, however, that U.S.
military aid, and American support of a Viet army, would
continue to be a "supplement and not replace direct
94
FR[ENCH] efforts in [Inda-China]
• • • •
II
A similar theme of limited but greater indirect U.S.
involvement was developed and recommended by the Joint
Chiefs of Staff in July of 1950. In a review of the
National Security Council policy paper entitled NSC73,
they recommended:
If the Chinese Communists provide overt military
assistance to Southeast Asian Communist
elements, the United States should prevail upon
the British to reverse their proffers of
recognition to Communist China and to provide
such military assistance as is practicable to
assist the Burmese and/or the French 1n
resisting Chinese Communist aggression. In
addition:
military assistance 1s
Viet Minh forces of
United States should
a. If overt
provided the
Inda-China, the
increase its MDAP [Mutual Defense
233
Assistance Program] Assistance to the
French and urge the French to continue an
active defense, with the United States
givin consideration to the provision of
air and naval assistance.
b. The United States should ask the
United Nations to call u on member
nations to make forces available to
resist the Chinese agqression.95
But, while the recommendation called for greater American
involvement, the Joint Chiefs argued that the U.S. should
only " ••• be prepared to rovide military assistance short
of actual participation of u.s. Armed Forces at this
time." Moreover , it was concluded that, 1n the event the
employment of U.S. forces in Southeast Asia was actually
necessary, American involvement would be restricted to
Indo-China. Burma, Thailand , and Malaya were considered to
96
be areas of "British responsibility."
POLICY E-EVALUATION AND RECOMME DATIONS AT MID-1950
On July 14, 195~, the staff organization of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff concluded that while the situation
.
1n
Southeast Asia remained '' potentially explosive," the
French military position had continued to improve and "no
unusual Chinese Communist or Vietminh activities have
97
occurred since the Korean invasion." In contrast, on
August 7, 1950, the State Department's survey mission in
234
Saigon reported a decline in French military capabilities
and recommended an increase in U.S. military, economic,
and political assistance. According to their assessment:
The military situation confronting the French in
Indochina is internal against the Viet Minh and
impending external a ainst Co mmunist China. The
French forces after a pproximately 5 years of
warfare ar e stalemated against Ho Chi M inh and
a ppear to have lost [a] considerable amount of
offensive spirit. This failure to restore
internal security is attributed by [the] French
to [the] lack of cooperation of noncommunist
people and [the] deep seated hatred and distrust
of French which exists among (a] large part of
the population. Military action alone cannot
solve this internal security problem. A
political solution which includes concessions on
the part of France and definite plans possibly
backed by [the] U.S. or the UN for eventual
independence if [sic] Vietnam Cambodia and Laos
1s a necessary compliment to military action.
The overall assistance ••• reguested up to this
time 1s considered inadequate to fully
consummate u.s. broad objectives in Indochina
and assistance will have to be provided to
French Indochina on an increased scale to resist
th h t f C
· 98
e encroac men o om mun1sm ••••
Acheson responded to this assessment by expressing
concern over the growing political and military
deterioration 1n Inda-China. Citing the increasing signs
of military collaboration between the Viet Minh and
Chinese Communists, and, the continued threat of a Chinese
invasion, Acheson informed the Saigon Legation and Paris
Embassy that the U.S. must take prompt and dramatic action
to: (a) enlist all factions of Vietnamese political
thought in support of France and Bao Dai: (b) repudiate
235
the Vietnamese claim that the French were not sincere in
their support of
. ,
Vietnam s independence; ( C) avoid
jeopardizing the already inadequate French military
position in Inda-China; and (d) avoid further depletion
of Western European military potential , and, hopefully,
improve it by releasing French troops from Inda-China. In
this respect, they were informed, the United States, at a
forthcoming foreign ministers conference,
.
was going to
recommend the formation of a Vietnamese national army.
France would be pressed to make a joint declaration, with
Bao Dai, of the establishment of the Vietnamese army
pursuant to the Accords of March 8 , 1949. However, the
plan called for Bao Dai to immediately declare a state of
national emergency and place the new army under the
command of the French High Command. Realizing that the
plan would be criticized as a meaningless gesture , Acheson
argued that, at a minimum , it would "legally establish a
Viet Army presumably with distinctive insignia and to
this extent represent a step forward. We believe [the]
need for action [is] so great," he said, "[that] we must
give consideration [to) every possible action within
99
practical limitations."
Acheson was supported in his recommendation by the
Southeast Asia Policy Committee. In a draft statement of
U.S. pol icy
Secretaries
on Indo-China which was sent
of State and Defense, the
to the
committee
236
recommended that the United States support the formation
of national armies within Inda-China. To the members of
the committee, the formation of these armies appeared to
be "the most effective method by which the U.S. can, at
present, stren then the security of Indochina and add to
i t s s tab i 1 i z a t ion • " 'l'o at ta in th i s o a 1 , they r e co mm ended
that:
••• if ne otiations are conducted with
representatives of the French Government, U.S.
represen atives [should] secure French
acceptance of the following conditions which
shall attach to the extension of U.S. assistance
in the formation of national armies in
Indochina: (1) French Union forces would not be
with rawn from Indochina until such Associated
States armies were fully trained and ready to
act effectively in replacement; (2) France
would not decrease its outlay for Indochina
below the 1950 rate durin the period of the
Arner ican military aid re uested; ( 3) the
national armies rojects would have the approval
of the three Associated States governments; (4)
the High Commissioner for Indochina, the French
Command, and the three Associated States would
maintain full consultive relations with the
[American] Legation and MAAG during the period
of the formation of the armies.100
The committee then went on to recommend that the
United States not commit any of its armed forces to the
defense of Indo-China as lon as France persisted in
retaining its colonial administration. In addition, they
argued that: (a) increases in ilitary aid should be tied
to operational plans approved by the United States; (b)
the United States should use its influence to insure that
237
France carried out , "in letter and spirit," the March 8
Accords and the conventions of December 30, 1949, which
provided for self-government; and, (c) the U.S. should
favor the withdrawal of French forces from Indo-China once
the new national
101
national defense.
.
armies assumed responsibility for
In response to the committee, the Defense Department
indicated that, contrary to the the opinion of the State
Department, it believed the draft statement of policy was
too weak from the political side. Large scale American
aid, they believed, should only be given on the condition
that France would agree to "vigorous political measures
and reforms in Indochina." But, above all, they argued:
We must avoid at all costs, the commitment
of U.S. armed forces, even 1n a token or small
scale fashion, for combat operations. Such a
commitment would lead France to shake off
responsibilities and show even less initiative
in Indochina. There are too many undone things
to even consider such a commitment at this
stage . And, even as a last resort , there would
be serious objections to such a commitment from
the u.s. point of view. U. S. officials must be
on guard against French attempts to pressure or
panic us into some sort of commitment . Failing
to get a satisfactory statement from the U. S . ,
the French , over the next few months , may try a
little psychological warfare on us . They may
speak hopelessly of a coming Dunkirk . They may
intimate the necessity to come to an
understanding with the Chinese Communists. They
may threaten to throw the problem into the
United Nations, either in a political or a
military way. The best defense against such
tactics will be to make France pull themselves
up by their own efforts.102
238
Thus, whereas the Defense Department argued that
greater pressure should be brought to bear upon France to
grant more political concessions to the Vietnamese and
generally set its own house in order, the State Department
flatly refused to concur. The Defense Department
concluded, therefore, that ''we must resolve the problem of
influencing the French to take a number of steps
.
1n
Indochina, on the one hand, without assuming the
responsibility for the success or failure of the overall
103
program to streng then Indochina's security." The
Defense
,
Departments insistance upon a "hard-hitting"
American policy on economic and political concessions to
the Vietnamese, re presents a complete about-face from the
''hands-off" position advocated by the Joint Chiefs during
the month of April. It would appear, therefore, that the
American Government was having difficulties in attaining a
consensus on policy recommendations for the political
solutions which were considered so essential to the
resolution of the Vietnam conflict.
On October 17, 1950, a joint State-Defense Department
meeting was held to review recent talks held with French
officials, to analyze the views of the Saigon Legation
with regard to the situation in Indo-China, and to review
the proposed NSC policy statement on Indo-China. At this
239
meeting there was general concurrence that, whereas France
had agreed to collaborate with U.S. authorities in Saigon
on matters of distributing U.S. aid, the French did not
give the formation of a Vietnamese army a very high
priority . France had requested an increase in aid to
support its 1951 budget of 600 million for Inda-China,
but indicated that this budget did not permit them to
equip the new Viet army. Thus, they had asked the U.S. to
assume responsibility for its pay and maintenance. The
American officials refused to comply with this request but
did work out details for increased u.s. aid to French
forces in Vietnam. A formal announcement of the decision
to increase American aid to France was made later the same
104
day . At the time the increase 1n aid was
granted , it was the considered opinion of American
officials that, while the French did not plan to withdraw
totally from Inda-China, there was evidence that they
planned to withdraw from Tonkin Province in the North of
Vietnam. And, whereas there was no evidence that France
intended to make a deal with the Chinese Communists, it
was generally believed that they were contemplating taking
the Inda-China problem to the United Nations .
Concurrently, it was noted ''that French reports from
Saigon, particularly from High Commissioner Pegnon, have
begun to emphasize the prese nce of large numbers of
'Chinese
,
Troops on the Vietnamese side of the
,,
'
240
l '15
frontier."
American aval Intelligence, however, reported there
was no evidence of any significant build-up in Chinese
forces along the Viet border or within southern China.
But, the four year old military stalemate had been broken,
they contended, by a large Viet Minh offensive in Tonkin.
The success of the Viet Minh operations threatened the
entire French position within northern Indo-China and
displayed an unexpected strength on the part of Ho Chi
Minh's forces. Conversely, the
" ••• revealed serious weakness [sic]
offensive also
in French manpower,
106
leadership, and intelligence operations." In many
cases French forces capitulated without resistance and the
High Command failed to effect the necessary tactical
withdrawals, resulting in the unnecessary loss of
equipment and men. This led to the conclusion that, based
on its present equipment and manpower, France was not
capable of conducting an offensive within Tonkin.
Furthermore, it was contended that, while the present
level of U.S. aid would increase French military
capabilities, it would not serve to counterbalance the
probable increase in Viet Minh capabilities, especially as
107
additional supply routes to China were opened.
American concern and irritation over the course of
events in Vietnam were not limited solely to the French,
but also extended to Bao Dai. The Emperor spent most of
I'
11
241
his time on the French Riviera rather than in Saigon
attending to affairs of state. On October 18, 1950, as
the Viet Minh mounted their offensive in the Nor th, Bao
Dai decided to return to Vietnam after an extended stay in
France. Secretary of State Acheson instructed the American
Legation in Saigon to use this opportunity to inform the
Emperor that his leadership was a crucial element in the
effort to defeat the Viet Minh . And , 1n an attempt to
pressure Bao Dai into actually taking hold of the reins of
government , Acheson instructed the legation to tactfully
suggest the possible cessation of American aid. In this
regard he suggested the Emperor be told:
••• any further display [of] procrastination in
facing realities in the form [of] prolonged
periods of seclusion at Dalat or otherwise
W(OU]LD confirm impressions of those not as
convinced of [the] Emperor's seriousness of
purpose as [the State] DEPT and LEG[ATION] are
and raise questions of the wisdom of continuing
to support a Vietnamese GOVT which proves itself
incapable of exercising the autonomy acquired by
it at such a high price.108
The American threat to withdraw its support was, of
course, without foundation as long as the United States
maintained a desire to contain the Chinese Communists and
defeat Ho Chi Minh . And, since the United States refused
to commit itself to the direct attainment of this goal, it
had no real source of influence over either France or the
Bao Dai Government. This dilemma is highli hted in a
242
memorandum sent by the Southeast Asia Policy Committee to
the Secretary of Defense, which stresses what actions
should be taken by France but cautions against pushing
them to the
Indo-China:
point where they would withdraw from
Political Steps
With our eye on the main objective in
Western Europe and our policy against
colonialism, and for nationalism (except where
our worthwhile allies would be unduly weakened)
our ends could best be served by bringing about
on the part of the French:
A. Definite announcement by
French of a decision on their part
phase out their political government
Indochina ••••
the
to
.
1n
B. Building up the prestige and
strength of the troops of the Associated
States and giving them greater autonomy.
c. Giving greater governmental
powers to the States, within the framework
of the French Union.
It is, of course, most important that the
French do not quit cold and leave a political
vacuum behind them.
U.S. MILITARY INTERVENTION
The case of the French military in
Inda-China is not believed to be hopeless. We
should therefore avoid military intervention, at
least for the present. Instead, we should do
what we think is to their best interests and
ours in the long run; that is, rely mainly on
the political stemps [sic] noted and give
increased military aid, aimed primarily at
enabling the Associated States to protect
themselves against the encroachment of
communism.109
243
The Truman Administration also felt constrained by
force of circumstance from pursuing its Indo-China policy
via the United Nations. In a telegram to the American
delegation at the United Nations , dated Novembe r 22, 1950,
Acheson stated that the State Department did not favor the
use of a U.N. Peace Observation Commission (POC) 1n
Indo-China. Because of the colonial relationship between
France and the Associated States , he believed that the
Asian members of the United Nations would insist on an
investigation of the whole Inda-Chinese situation rather
than limitin the issue to the establishment of a POC.
Thus, he concluded:
••• we see no benefit in [a] FR[ENCH] appeal to
[the] UN without (a] FR[ENCH] declaration of
intent to grant eventual independence to I[NDO-]
C[HINA] •••• Without such a declaration by
FR[ANCE] , we believe any attempt to secure UN
aid, including [the] use of [a] POC, W[OU]LD
lead to UN insistence on scrutinizing [the]
entire I[NDO-] C[HINA] situation and [the]
FR[ENCH] role toward the Associated States and
Viet Minh , with unforeseeable but hazardous
results. Attempt to use [a] POC is not worth
the risks we see inherent in [ a] UN
consideration of the I[NDO-] C[HINA] situation
at the rnoment.110
•
THE THREAT OF CHINESE INTERVENTION AND
U.S. POLICY RECOMMEND TIO S FOR 1951
244
As the year 1950 drew to a close, the Administration
was attempting to size up the fast moving pace of events
in Indo-China and formulate a coherent policy statement
that would encompass its position on such matters as
continued U.S. aid, the role of the United Nations 1n
Indo-China, and U.S. support for France. A November 28th
memorandum prepared by the joint chiefs of staff and sent
to the members of the ational Security Council serves to
effectively pull together and summarize the revailin
considerations and recommen ations. In general, the Joint
Chiefs believed" •• that the fu ndamental causes of the
deterioriation in the Indochinese security situation lie
in the lack of will and determination on the part of the
indigenous people of Indochina to join wholeheartedly with
the French in resisting communism." Without the popular
support of the peo le, they concluded, the French could
not achieve a favorable long-range military settlement.
Therefore, to keep Indo-China from falling to the
Communists, they recommended that the U.S. "take action,
as a matter of urgency, by all means racticable short of
the actual employment of United States military
245
f
"
orces •••• But, as long as the French persisted in their
colonial rule of In o-China, " ••• the United States should
continue to insure that the primary responsibility for the
restoration of peace and security in Indochina rests with
the French." Then, operating under these guidelines, they
argued that the u.s should make the distribution of its
aid contingent upon receiving assurances from France that:
(a) A program providin for the eventual
self-government of Indochina ••• will be developed
and initiated at once ••••
(b) National a mies of the Associated States of
Indochina will be orqanized as a matter of
urgency •••
(c) ••• France will dispatch sufficient
additional armed forces to Indochina to insure
that the restoration of peace and internal
security of that country will be accomplished •••
(d) France will chan e its political and
military conce ts in In ochina to:
1. Eliminate its policy of colonialism.
ii. Provide proper
Associated States.
tutelage to the
iii. Insure that
command structure,
interference, is
effective and
operations.111
a suitable military
unhampered by political
established to conduct
appropriate military
To insure that France actually fulfilled these
requirements for continued U.S. aid, it was suggested that
a means of checkin on French compliance be developed.
France was to be denied the colonial control which
246
constituted the very reason for her presence in Inda-China
and yet was to be dissuaded from pulling out of Southeast
Asia or taking the Vietnam problem to the U.N. for
resolution. On the other hand, France was expected to
continue to wage the war and permit the United States to
approve its military plans , while the United States , as a
matter of policy, assumed no responsibility for events in
Inda-China and refused to commit American forces to its
defense. According to the Joint Chiefs:
In the event of overt attack by organized
Chinese Communist forces, the United States
should not permit itself to become engaged in a
general war with Communist China but should, in
concert with the United Kingdom, support France
and the Associated States by all means short of
the actual emoloyment of United States military
112 "" -
forces ••••
This did not mean that the United States had ceased
to view Indo-China as being strategically important. It
merely meant that U.S. policy objectives in Southeast Asia
had to be attained by other nations, and, through other
means than direct military involvement by the United
States . According to the Joint Chiefs, "United States
security interests demand that this government, by all
means short of the actual employment of United States
military forces, seek to prevent the further spread of
communism in Southeast Asia generally and, in particular,
113
in French Indochina." It was their opinion, however,
247
that American military intervention against the Viet Minh
would probably lead to a general war with China, which, in
all likelihood, would be a prelude to a global war
involving the Soviet Union. And, it was believed the
·estern powers had insufficient forces to conduct a war on
both the mainland of Asia and in Europe at the same
114
time.
With these recommendations in hand, the National
Security Council began the new year of 1951 by attempting
to assemble the new policy position of the United States
with regard to Indo-China. On M ay 17, 1951, their new
policy statement, SC48/4, was approved by President
ruman. The policies contained 1n NSC48/4 superseded
prior statements of policy on Asia contained in NSC48/2,
N SC 13, NSC,22, NSC34, N SC37, and NSC81. This new
statement of policy continued the evolution and hardening
of cold war concepts and growing indications that Japan
was considered to be of central importance to American
security interests in Asia.
The concept of a monolithic Communist bloc, dominated
by the Kremlin, had become fully developed. And while the
greatest immediate threat to American security was now
seen to come from Asia rather than Europe, the fundamental
threat of Communism was still believed to emanate from
Moscow rather than China, Vietnam, or any other Asian
nation. As the NSC noted, "Current Soviet tactics appear
248
to concentrate on bringin the mainland of Eastern Asia
and eventually Japan and the other principal off-shore
islands 1n the Western Pacific under Soviet control,
primarily through Soviet exploitation of the resources of
115
Communist China."
In line with the arguments of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, the NSC stated that the United States should avoid
precipitating a general war with the Soviet Onion,
" ••• particularly during the current build-up
nf
.... -
the
military and supporting strength of the United States and
its allies to a level of military readiness adequate to
support United States foreign policy, to deter further
Soviet aggression, and to form the basis for fighting a
global war should this prove unavoidable." Until it
overcame its military weakness, the NSC contended that the
o.s. "should seek the firm establishment and effective
application of the principle of collective security and
should, except in those instances when on balance the need
for unilateral action outweighs other considerations, act
116
1n and through the United Nations •••• "
As expressed 1n the olicy statement of 1949,
entitled ~SC48/2, the long-range objectives of the United
States continued to be the elimination of Soviet power and
influence 1n Asia and the denial of Asian material
resources to the Communist bloc. To attain these ends,
the immediate objectives of the U.S. included: (a) the
249
detachment of China as an "effective ally" of the Soviet
Union; (b) maintenance of the "off-shore defense line"
which iiicluded Japan, Ryukyus, the Philippines, Australia,
and New Zealand; (c) assistance to help Japan develop
self-reliance and the capabilities necessary to maintain
internal security and resist external aggression; and, (d)
attempts to "Deny Formosa to any Chinese regime aligned
with er dominated by the USSR and [to] expedite the
strengthening
117
Formosa."
of the defensive capabilities of
The Truman Administration's reaction to the entry of
Communist Chinese forces into the Korean conflict can be
seen throughout NSC 48/4. Whereas previous U.S. policy
had sought to avoid any commitment to the defense of
forrnosa or interference with the Communist regime on
mainland China, American policy now took an about-face.
In this respect, the NSC stated that:
While continuing to recognize the National
Government as the legal government of China, the
United States, with respect to Communist China,
should now:
a. Continue strong efforts to deflate
Chinese Communist political and military
strength and prestige by inflicting heavy
losses on Chinese forces in Korea through
the present U.S. operation.
b. Expand and intensify, by all available
means, efforts to develop non-communist
leadership and to influence the leaders and
people in China to oppose the present
Peiping · regime and to seek its
'he
250
reorientation or replacement.
c. Foster and support anti-communist
Chinese elements both outside and within
China with a view to developing and
expanding resistance in China to the
Peiping regime's control, particularly in
South China.
d. Stimulate differences between the
Peiping and Moscow regimes and create
cleavages within the Peiping regime itself
by every practicable means.
e. Continue United States economic
restrictions against China, continue to
oppose seating Communist China in the UN,
intensify efforts to persuade other nations
to adopt similar positions, and foster the
imposition of United Nations political and
economic sanctions as related to
developments in Korea.
f. In order to prepare for Chinese
aggression outside of Korea ••• expedite the
development of plans for the following
courses of action, if such action should
later be deemed necessary:
specter
( 1) Imposing a blockade of the China
coast by naval and air forces.
(2) Military action
targets held by
outside Korea.
against selected
Communist China
(3) Participation def nsively or
offensively of the Chinese Nationalist
forces, and the necessary operational
assistance to make them effective.118
of Chinese Communist aggression,
especially 1n Inda-China, and concern with how to counter
this threat, became absorbing issues for the next few
years. With regard to Japan, the threat was considered
I
251
sufficient to warrant casting off any previous American
fears of re-arming Japan. The reestablishment of Japanese
military forces was considered to be a matter of critical
urgency.
continue
119
its
But, in Indo-China, the NSC decided to
policy of increasing the military
effectiveness of French forces "without relieving the
French authorities of their basic
responsibilities or committing United States
military
armed
forces." Similarly, the policies of encouraging autonomy
for the Associated States and the promotion of
international support for these new regimes were to also
be continued. In effect, American involvement in Vietnam
was not to be raised beyond the level of giving aid and
120
advice. The domino theory still held sway but
"Increased anti-communist manpower [for Inda-China] must
come from
121
Vietnam."
the Associated States, principally
In an effort to dampen domestic criticism that the
United States was supporting colonialism in Indo-China~
the State Department presented U.S. involvement to the
American public in terms of preserving Southeast Asia from
Communism so the people there could ultimately exercise
sovereignty. To increase the aura of Indo-Chinese
independence, the United States invited Vietnam, Cambodia,
and Laos to participate in the signing of the Japanese
Peace Treaty. Then, on September 7, 1951, the United
252
States entered into a bilateral economic cooperation
agreement with Vietnam.
In this agreement, the Vietnamese agreed to allow an
American technical and economic mission to enter their
122
country to administer the agreement. This, of
course, served to upset Franco-American relations. General
Jean de Lattre de Tassigny, the French High Commissioner
in Indo-China, argued that the American ol icy of
condemning the French as colonialists, combined with its
insistance on treating Vietnam as an independent and
mature state, would ultimately be counter-productive for
all parties concerned. He contended that the "missionary
zeal" of Americans,
.
10 pushing
fanning the
for
fires of
Vietnamese
extreme independence, "[was]
nationalism." Moreover, he maintained that, "French
traditionalism is vital here [in Inda-China]. You cannot,
you must not destroy it. No one can simply make a new
nation overnight by giving out economic aid and arms
123
alone."
THE THREAT OF CHINESE INTERVENTION AND
U.S. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS FOR 1952
Displeasure with the effects of U.S. aid on Viet
nationalism did not, however, inhibit France from seeking
an American commitment to intervene militarily in
253
Inda-China in the event of a seemingly imminent Chinese
. .
1nvas1on. To this end, on December 22, 1951, France
requested immediate conversations with the U.S. and Great
Britain concerning possible concerted military action.
Being cognizant of American desires to keep the Vietnam
conflict out of the United Nations, France, in an apparent
effort to promote an American military commitment,
delivered the U.S. an aide-mernoire on a proposal to appeal
to the U.N. if Chinese Communists overtly intervened.
This prompted tripartite military discussions between the
U.S., Britain, and France, in which General Omar Bradley,
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, agreed to recommend
to his government " ••• the transmittal of a declaration to
Red China that aggression against ••• [Southeast Asia would]
bring certain retaliation from the three powers, not
124
necessarily limited to the area of aggression."
This series of events provoked a study by the
National Security Council to determine the policy of the
United States and the courses of action to be taken in the
event of Chinese Communist aggression 1n Inda-China. A
draft of the new policy statement, (NSC 124), which was
circulated for discussion and amendment, proposed a joint
warning by the U.S. and other Western powers that Chinese
aggression against Indo-China would be met by a possible
retaliation against China itself:
254
If it is thus determined that Chinese
Communist forces (including volunteers) have
overtly intervened in the conflict in Indochina,
or are overtly participating to such an extent
as to jeopardize retention of the Tonkin delta
by the French forces, the United States should
support the French to the qreatest extent
possible, preferably under the auspices of the
UN. It is by no means certain that an
appropriate UN resolution could be obtained.
Favorable action in the UN would depend upon a
change in the attitu e of those governments
which view the present regime in Indochina as a
continuation of French colonialism ••••
Even if it is not possible to obtain a UN
resolution in such a case, the United States
should seek the maximum possible international
support for and participation in any collective
action in support of France and the Associated
States. he United States should take
appropriate military action against Communist
China as part of a UN collective action or in
conjunction with France and the United Kingdom
and other friendly governments. However, in the
absence of such support, it is highly unlikely
that the United States would act
·1 11 125
uni atera y ••••
In this draft statement, the staff of the SC
recognized that military action against China would run
the risk of a general Asian war, reduce U.S. global
military capabilities, and "arouse public opposition to
, , It
another Korea •••• They argued, however, that an
effective information
.
campaign could serve to enlist
public support for the " ••• use of u.s. forces in Indochina
regardless of sentiment against 'another Korea' •••• "
And, they concluded by stating that:
The military action contemplated herein
255
would constitute , 1n effect , a war against
Communist China which would be limited only as
to its objectives , but would not be subject to
any geographic limitations. Employment of U. S .
forces in a de facto war without a formal
declaration woula raise questions which would
make it desirable to consult with key members of
both parties in Congress in order to obtain
their prior concurrence in the courses of action
contemplated.126
The Joint Chiefs of Staff expressed serious doubts
about the military considerations contained in the draft
statement. First, they pointed out that the chances of
ga1n1ng British or French support in any military action
against China were very s 1 irn. Referring to recent
conversations they had with the Chiefs of Staff of both
the United Kingdom and France, they argued that the
British and French would " ••• oppose taking military action
against Communist China as a nation, even 1n the face of
aggression." Moreover, both of these countries were
considered to "think almost exclusively 1n terms of
defense, at least as far as Europe and Southeast Asia are
concerned ... Therefore the Joint Chiefs were of the
opinion that both the United Kingdom and France would
oppose any concept of action against China with the
exception of defensive land battles limited to Inda-China ,
127
Burma, or Thailand.
The Joint Chiefs argued that defensive tactics would ,
at best, prove to be indecisive and could result in a war
256
that dragged on indefinitely. Any military measures
designed to prevent the Chinese from seizing control of
Southeast Asia, they contended, should, from the outset,
be planned so as to offer a "reasonable chance of
success." And, in their opinion, the only tactic which
offered this chance was direct military action against
China itself, rather than a defensive action limited only
to Indo-China. without the freedom to undertake direct
action against China, the Joint Chiefs stated they could
not endorse the policies contained 1n NSC124.
words:
In their
The Joint Chiefs of Staff, from the
military point of view, must, 1n any event
oppose acceptance of all of the military
commitments devolving from NSC124 without a
clear understanding that the United States must
be accorded freedom of action and, if possible,
support in the undertaking of appropriate
military action to include action against
Communist China itself. Failing such freedom of
action, the United States should accept the
possibility of loss of at least Indochina,
Thailand, and Burma. • •• the Joint Chiefs of
Staff reaffirm their position that United States
ground forces should not be committed in French
Indochina, Thailand, or Burma and for the
defense of those countries. Further, they
strongly oppose the United States joining a
combined military command for the defense of
those countries.128
While admitting chat their were risks attached to
their proposed military action against China, the Joint
Chiefs argued that these risks "should not necessarily be
an overriding deterrent to United States action." In
257
support of this contention they referred to SC48/5 which
"points out, the risk of global war 'should not preclude
undertaking calculated risks against specific areas in the
over-all interests of the United States.'" Among the
risks they believed the United States should run, was the
possibility of a rupture in U.S. relations with France and
Britain, inclu ing the possible severence of any alliances
with these countries. If, 1n the event of Chinese
ag ression 1n Southeast Asia, the British and French
refused to offer either political or military support to
direct American military action a ainst China, the Joint
Chiefs believed the United States should: (a) assess the
effect and risk of unilateral American action on its
European relations an al 1 iances; and, (b) assess the
validity and desirabiltiy of retaining these alliances.
And, as a continuation of this line of reasoning, they
strongly recommended "the inclusion 1n any National
policy statement with res ect to Security Council
Southeast Asia [a] stipulation that the United States
Government will consider taking
unilaterally, if necessary, aqainst
129
Communist China."
military action,
the nation of
Unless France and Britain were willing to support a
military offensive against China, the Joint Chiefs did not
want to Join any combined military co rnand with these
nations for the joint defense of Southeast Asia.
258
Moreover, they maintained that as long as France persisted
in its opposition to a direct offensive against China, the
French should not be relieved of its responsibility in
Inda-China. Instead:
••• while French Indochina, Thailand , and/or
Burma are being defended by other friendly
n3tions, the role of the United States 1n
support of such defense should be primarily
military action against Communist China itself.
This latter action should, of course, involve
military support from the British and French ••• ,
but should remain under the control of the
United States.130
Taken back by the Joint Chiefs' recommendations, the
NSC decided that the military implications of entering a
war against China should be studied in more detail and
explained to the Council and President Truman. The NSC
then sent the draft statement back to its staff for
modification , after expressing the view that it
concentrated far too much on the action to be taken in the
event of Chinese aggression when, in their opinion:
••• by far the greater danger is that Southeast
Asia will fall to subversive tactics: that in
the absence of overt a gression it is probable
that before long France will be unable or
unwilling to continue to carry the burdens of
civil war: that the paper proposes no courses of
action to meet these contingencies which are
commensurate with the burdens and risks which it
proposes we assume to deal with the lesser risk
of aggression ••••
This is a major
policy . If nothing
deficiency in the proposed
is done beyond what is now
259
being done to prevent Communist subversion 1n
this area, there is grave doubt as to the wisdom
of assuming very grave risks of qeneral war in
an attempt to save the area from further overt
aggression.131
While the United State Government continued its
policy debate on NSC 124, the French, at a tripartite
meeting held in May, 1952, discussed their deepening
financial difficulties stemming from the Vietnam war and
raised the question of whether the strategic importance of
Southeast Asia justified continued French and American
effort. In attempt to brinq French doubts to an end by
relieving their financial burden, the State De artment
informed France, on June 17th, that an appropriation would
be prepared to provide an additional 150 million dollars
132
for the 1953 fiscal year.
On the same day, Secretary of State Acheson pressed
the British for some kind of tentative aggreernent on an
Allied position vis-a-vis potential Chinese aggression.
Arguing that a joint warning to China would be
counter-productive if the Western Allies were not prepared
to back it up, Acheson informed the British that he, too,
believed it
11
••• was futile and a mistake to defend
Indochina in Indochina." He concluded that their only
hope was to chanqe the Chinese mind. To accomplish this,
he argued, "We could strike where it hurts China or we
133
could set up a blockade against trade."
260
The policy statement, NSC124/l, was finally approved
on June 25, 1952. And, even though the British and French
would not commit themselves to any contingency plans for
an offensive strike against China the resultant
compromise contained in the policy statement was primarily
a victory for the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The NSC
concurred that if Southeast Asia were to fall to Communist
control as a result of overt or covert Chinese aggression,
it would give rise to critical psychological, political,
and economic consequences that would lead other countries
1n the area to subsequent submission to, or alignment
with, communism. This, in turn, would purportedly impose
such economic and political pressure on Japan that it too
would eventually seek accommodation with communism. Thus,
the NSC considered it to be "imperative that an overt
attack on Southeast Asia by the Chinese Communists be
134
vigorously opposed."
In addition to continuing its program of aid for
Indo-China, the NSC adopted the following courses of
action:
1. Obtain agreement with other nations for a
joint warning to China regarding the consequences of
Chinese aggression against Southeast Asia.
issuance of this warning, however, was
The
to be
contingent upon obtaining prior agreement from France
and the U.K. with the courses of action contained in
261
SC 124/1.
2. Obtain agreement from the U.K. and France
that, in principle, a naval blockade of China should
be included in the minimum courses of action.
3. Increase covert operations that were
"designed to assist in the achievement of U.S.
objectives in Southeast Asia."
4. Inform the American people of Southeast
Asia's strategic importance to the United States and
prepare them for the possible implementation of any
of the courses of action contained in NSC 124/1.
5. "Continue to assure the French that we are
cognizant of the sacrifices entailed for France in
carrying out her effort 1n Indochina and that,
without overlooking the princi le that France has the
primary responsibility in Indochina, we well
recommend to the Congress appropriate military,
economic an financial aid •••• "
6. By cultivating friendly and increasingly
cooperative relations with France and the Associated
States, attempt to maintain, if not increase, the
degree of American influence over their policies and
actions, with the intention of "directing the course
of events toward the objectives we seek."
7. Ensure that France did not pull out of
Inda-China.
8. Press for
Associated States.
greater autonomy or
262
the
9. "Intensify efforts to develop the armies of
the Associated States •••• "
1~. If France should decide to withdraw from
Vietnam or press for a
either directly by the
sharing of responsibility,
U.S. or through the United
ations, the U.S. would
withdrawal and consult with
" ••• oppose
the French
a French
and British
concerning further measures to be taken to safeguard
the area from communist domination."
11. In the event that Chinese Communist forces,
including volunteers, overtly intervened 1n
Inda-China or jeopardized the retention of the
critical Tonkin Delta through covert actions, the
United States should:
(a). Support France or the Associated States in
requesting immediate U.N. action.
{b). Whether : or not U.N. action was
carry out in union with France and
Kingdom:
obtained,
the United
(1) "A
itself
resolute
to which
defense of Indochina
the United States would
provide such air and naval assistance as
might be practicable."
(2) "Interdiction of Chinese Communist
communication lines including
China."
those
263
.
1n
12. The United States would provide the major
portion of the air and naval support while France and
the Associated States would be responsible for
providing the ground forces necessary for the defense
of Inda-China.
13. And, "In the event the concurrence of the
United Kingdom and France to expand military action
against Communist China is not obtained, the United
States should consider taking unilateral
135
action."
Immediately after the approval of NSC124/l , the
United States once again attempted to obtain British and
French support
136
for direct military action against
China. The documents do not indicate whether these
efforts met with any success, but the upward movement of
American involvement in Vietnam did not seem to become
impared. On December 5, 1952, the French requested that
the U.S. send mechanics to Vietnam to assist 1n
maintaining their aircraft. On December 22, Acheson
informed The American Embassies in Saigon and Paris that
approval had been granted for the assignment of 25 to 30
137
U.S . Air Force mechanics to Vietnam. With this final
act, Truman turned the Indo-China problem over to the
Republican party and a new Administration.
264
OTES
1 Vietnam Relations, 8 , section V.B.2a,
•
209.
2 lb id. , p. 524 (italics mine).
3 Ibid • , pp. 178, 180-181.
4 Ibid. , p. 198.
5 Ibid • , p. 489.
6 Ibid. , p . 369.
--
7 Ibid. , pp . 395-396.
8 Ibid. , p. 403.
9 John G. Stoessin er, The United Nations
Superpowers (New York: andom House , 1970), • 17.
and the
10 Vietnam Relations , 8 , section V.B.2a, p . 524.
11 Ibid., p . 527.
12 See , for instance, Ibid., pp . 528-530.
13 Ibid • , p . 476.
14 lb id. , p . 369.
--
15 Vietnam Relations, 8, section V.B.2a, pp. 162-163.
16 lb id. , p .171.
17 Ibid. , p . 155.
18 Ibid. , p. 172.
19 lb id. , p . 171.
20 lb id. , p. 153.
21 lb id. , p . 154.
22 Ibid. , p. 178.
23 Ibid. ,
•
18
•
24 Ibid., p. 181.
25 Ibid.
26 Ibid.
27 Ibid., pp. 190-192.
265
28 Kurt Lewin, A Dynamic Theory of Personality (New
York: McGraw-Hill, 1935) chap: 3.
29 lb id. , p. 194.
3 Ibid.
31 Ibid.
~
32 lb id. , p. 198.
33 lb id. , p. 207.
34 lb id. , p. 2k18.
35 lb id. , p. 209.
--
36 Ibid. , p. 191.
37 lb id. , p. 220.
38 Ibid. , pp. 223-224.
39 Ibid. , p. 218.
40 lb id. , pp. 225-264.
41 Ibid., pp. 265-272.
42 Ibid. , p. 227.
43 lb id. , p. 226.
44 Ibid. , p. 227.
45 Ibid. , p. 239.
46 Ibid.
47 Ibid. , p. 240 (italics mine).
266
48 lb id. , p . 240.
49 Ibid. , pp . 258-259 (italics mine ) •
5'1 Ibi d ., pp . 261-262.
51 Ibid., p . 255.
52 lb id. , p . 261.
53 Ibid • , p . 256 .
54 l b i d . , p . 261 .
55 Ibid.
56 Ibid. , p . 24
•
57 Ibid. ,
•
256 •
58 lb id. , p . 244 .
--
59 Ibid.
60 Ibid.
61 Ibid. , pp . 262-263 .
62 Ibid. , pp . 265-272.
63 Ibid., p . 266 .
64 Ibid. , p . 261 .
--
65 Vietnam Relations , 1 , section I.A, p . A59.
66 Ibid.
67 Ibid.
68 Vietnam Relations, 8 , section V.B.2a, pp. 276-279.
-
69 Vietnam Relations, 1 , section I.A, pp . A35-A36.
70 Vietnam Relations, 8, section V.B.2a, pp. 286-287.
71 Ibid. , pp . 280-281.
72 Ibid.
73 Ibid. , p 285.
267
74 Ibid.
75 Ibid. , p . 288.
76 Ibid.,
•
2 0 •
77 Ibid., p . 292.
78 lb id. , pp . 298-299.
79 Ibid. , p . 289 .
80 Ibid., p . 302.
--
81 Ibid.,
•
306 .
--
82 lb id. , p . 308.
83 Ibid., p . 309 .
84 Ibid.
85 Ibid. , p . 310.
86 lb id. , pp . 311-312 .
87 lb id. , p . 310 .
88 Ibid. , p . 318.
9 Ibid. , p . 311.
90 Ibid. , pp . 312-313.
91 Ibid., p . 318.
92 lb i d . , pp . 336-337.
93 Ibid. , p . 339.
94 Ibid., p . 338.
95 Ibid. , p . 341.
96 Ibid. , p . 342.
97 Ibid.
98 Ibid. , p . 343.
•
268
99 Ibid. , pp. 345-346.
1 0 Ibid. , p . 350.
101 Ibid • , pp. 351-368.
102 Ibid. , p . 369.
103 lb i d . , p . 370.
l '14 lb id. , pp . 371-379.
1 5 Ibid., p . 375.
106 Ibid. , p . 382 .
--
1 ~7 Ibid. , pp . 383-384
108 Ibid • , p . 390
109 Ibid. , pp . 391-3 92
1 Ibid. , pp . 395-396 .
111 Ibid. , pp . 40 -402.
112 lb id. , p . 402 (italics mine) .
113 lb id. , p . 403 .
114 lb id. , p . 414.
115 Ibid.,
•
426 •
116 lb id. , p . 427.
117 Ibid. , p . 429.
118 lb id. , pp . 431-432.
119 Ibid. , pp . 434-435.
120 lb id. , pp . 435-436.
121 lb id. , p . 443.
122 lb id. , pp . 447-451.
123 Vietnam elations, 1, section II.A, p . Al8. (It
269
should be noted that the Defense Department chose to omit
most documents relating to discussions of French
displeasure with American policy toward the Associated
States. These documents are also not available in the
Gravel edition.)
124 Vietnam Relations, 8, section V.B.2a, p. 466.
125 lb id. , p . 475.
126 Ibid., p . 476.
127 Ibid. , pp . 488-489.
128 Ibid. , p . 489.
129 Ibid. , p. 490.
130 Ibid., p. 492.
131 Ibid. , pp . 504-505.
-
132 lb id. , p . 517.
--
133 Ibid. , p. 516.
--
134 Ibid. , p. 523.
135 Ibid. , pp. 526-534.
136 Gravel Edition, 1 , p . 390.
- -
137 Vietnam Relations , 8 , V.B.2a, pp . 538-540.
-
CHAPTER VIII
CONCLUSIONS
Among the most striking features arising from this
study 1s the marked disparity between the belief, on the
part of American officials, in what course of policy
action should be followed and the policy decisions they
actually made. Throughout the eight years of
,
Truman s
Presidency the documents indicate a recognition and
acceptance of: (a) the need for France to effect a
political settlement by granting independence to Vietnam;
(b) the futility of military action against the Viet
Minh;
dangers
(c) the advisability of avoiding the political
inherent 1n supporting French efforts 1n
Indo-China as long as they insisted on perpetuating
colonial rule; and ( d) the inability of American aid to
bring stability to the GVN and peace to Vietnam unless the
Vietnamese Government attained a broad base of popular
support. These assessments were supported by American
decisions-makers and even appeared in the policy
statements they issued. And, yet, the policy decisions
that were made, for the most part, ran completely counter
to these arguments and recommendations.
270
271
THE ROLE OF BUREAUCRATIC RIVALRY
In an examination of the relationship between
bureaucratic politics and the formulation of foreign
policy, Morton Halperin notes that, "A natural assumption
is that governments -- including that of the United States
-- tailor
their national security decisions to what
.
lS
happening abroad or what they hope to achieve abroad."
But, he argues,
1
"The truth lS apparently more
complicated." While we could not agree more with this
observation, we are still left with the question of where
the truth actually lies. Why did the United States
initiate policies which, in the opinion of the decision
akers, were inimical to American interests and had little
or no hope for success?
According to Halperin, the deci~ions and actions of a
government are not only determined by important domestic
and international events but, also, by "the interplay
among executive and legislative organizations, public and
2
private interests, and, of course, personalities."
Roberta Wohlstetter, in her comprehensive study of
American decision-making immediately prior to the Japanese
attack on Pearl Harbor, has also identified bureaucratic
3
rivalry as a distorting factor in the decision process.
272
In support of this argument, we have already seen the
bureaucratic interplay between the Division of European
Affairs and the Division of Far Eastern Affairs which led
to indirect
Indo-China and
American support of French
the predominant bias of
efforts in
the State
Department toward European affairs. We have also seen the
successful attempt by the Joint Chiefs to orient the
national security decisions of NSC124 away from a defense
of Indo-China and toward plans for a strategic offensive
against China. While both of these cases suggest that
bureaucratic politics and personal predilections account
for part of the decision making behavior, they in no way
account for the overall contradiction between policy
prescriptions and policy decisions.
THE ROLE OF CONSTRAINTS ON INFORMATION FLOW
Halperin and Wohlstetter also suggest that
constraints on information and arguments can also account
4
for ambiguity in the decision making process. The flow
of pertinent information through an organization to its
decision makers can be impeded for a variety of reasons or
even overlooked because of "noise" caused by competing,
and, less important information. Throughout the period
under analysis in this study, the perceived Soviet threat
to Europe, the Communist take over in China, and the
273
Korean conflict all served to: (a) increase international
tension: (b) generate competing information: (c) add to
the clatter of useless information: and, (d) generally
numb the perceptions of American decision-makers. But
these factors also fail to fully account for the erratic
policy behavior of American officials. Our study did not
indicate the existence of any major impediment to the flow
of information within the Government and the decision
makers appear to have been fully aware of the intelligence
reports and impressions of officials stationed abroad.
They received these reports and quoted them in National
Security Council policy statements, but they still made
decisions which ran counter to the facts and assessments
they contained.
THE ROLE OF IMAGES AND HUMAN PERCEPTIONS
Finally, Wohlstetter contends that erratic policy
behavior can be attributed
5
to "conditions of human
~rception," while Halperin argues that "Participants
[in the decision-making process] shape arguments in terms
of shared images of the society and the government even if
they do not believe that those images are an accurate
6
reflection of the world." According to Halperin:
Participants will have considerable difficulty
getting the ordinary administrator or politician
274
to believe facts that qo against the shared
images of reality which are common to the
organization. Officials react as all
individuals do to evidence which goes against
strongly held beliefs. They either ignore the
evidence or reinterpret it so as to change what
it seems to mean.7
The problems arising from human perceptions and
widely shared images would appear to offer us some insight
into American policy behavior with respect to Vietnam.
This insight, however, flows from the concept of shared
images itself rather than their impact on the flow of
information, as suggested by Halperin. Snared images, when
acting as a constraint on the flow of information, would
result
.
1n a policy which was consistent with the
decision-makers' perceptions of reality. All in-coming
information would be rejected or distorted until it
supported their preconceived images of reality. As a
result, their policy decisions would correspond with these
images even though they might be in contradiction with
reality itself. In the case of Vietnam, however, the
problem was not that participants had difficulty in
persuading
contradicted
decision-makers to
shared images.
accept
The
facts which
decision-makers
themselves accepted facts and arguments which ran counter
to the decisions they made. Therefore, the inconsistent
policy behavior does not appear to have been caused solely
by a disparity between shared imaqes and reality itself.
'
275
Rather, the inconsistency seems to have also resulted from
a lack of congruity between the images which actually
composed the decision makers' "belief system."
An individual's belief system subsumes, among other
things,
'
images of national and regional political
8
systems. AS Oli Holsti maintains, this system of images
can be "thought of as a set of lenses through which
information concerning the physical and social environment
is received. It orients the individual to his
environment, defining it for him and identifying its
salient characteristics." Moreover, regional and national
images, like the total belief system, also serve as
" ••• models that order for the observer what would
9
otherwise be an unmanageable amount of information."
Holsti, Halperin, and others argue that inconsistent
policy behavior results from a lack of congruity between
the content of these images and what is commonly perceived
as reality. However, this exclusive concentration upon
the existencE of disparity between image and reality leads
us to ignore the possible lack of symmetry or congruence
between the images which compose the belief system itself.
And, in the case of American policy behavior in Vietnam,
the contradictions between policy prescriptions and policy
decisions appear to have arisen from the co-existence of
two incongruous but commonly held images as well as a
disparity between image and reality.
276
IMAGES AND THE VIETNAM CONFLICT
According to the prevailing regional image, the
instability in Vietnam was cast in terms of an internal
conflict arising from continued French colonial policy.
This image elicited recommendations to restrict u.s.
involvement to the use of diplomatic pressure aimed at
bringing about political concessions to Vietnamese
aspirations for self-determination. At the same time, a
second, and concurrently shared, perception of reality
involved all of the cold war imagery of an international
Communist conspiracy. The instability
.
1n Vietnam,
according to this global image, was believed to have been
aided and abetted by the Soviet Union and Chinese
Communists. And, although intelligence reports indicated
that there was no "hard" evidence to substantiate a direct
link between Ho Chi Minh and Moscow or Peking, the power
of this second image, when evoked, was strong enough to
overwhelm all facts and reasoning to the contrary. It 1s
in this second and more strongly held global image that we
find a marked disparity between perceived and objective
reality.
Because a global image would be more widely shared
and more strongly reinforced than a regional image, it
277
would also tend to be dominant in relation to the regional
image. This concept of strong and weak images corresponds
to Holsti's contention that: "All discrepant information
does not create an equal pressure to reduce dissonance.
Attitudes about central values will be more resistant to
change because of an introduction of discrepant
information than those at the periphery of the belief
10
system."
The regional image of Vietnam was much more
peripheral to the belief system of the Truman
Administration than was the global image of an
international Communist conspiracy. Consequently, this
would explain why there was little pressure to reduce the
discrepancies which arose in American policy behavior when
the goals related to Vietnamese independence came into
conflict with the goal of containing communism.
Whereas policy arguments and recommendations were put
forth in the context of the regional image, the basis for
action was the global cold war image. The United States
recognized the Vietnam conflict to be an internal war
against colonial rule and therefore did not want to become
involved for fear of being accused of keeping a colonial
regime in power. But, whenever the French military
position in Vietnam appeared to be collapsing or the
French threatened to withdraw, the cold war image became
predominant and the prohibition against intervention was
278
quickly pushed aside. Because of the perceived
competition between the Communist and non-Communist
worlds, if France withdrew from Vietnam, it was presumed
the Soviet Union would quickly move in to fill the void.
Existing evidence did not support this assumption -- it
was merely accepted as a given fact of the cold war. Thus,
-
the origins of American involvement 1n Vietnam appeared to
have rested upon a distortion and displacement of reality
in Indo-China, caused by a dominant global image of the
East-West conflict.
INTER-IMAGE DISCREPANCIES
On the other hand, the discrepancy between policy
prescriptions and policy decisions arose more from a
conflict between this regional and global image than from
a conflict between image and reality. These conflicting
images resulted in policy behavior which is analogous to
paranoid schizophrenia in an individual. The threat of an
international Communist conspiracy, which served as the
underpinning for the cold war imagery, was never seriously
questioned nor subjected to a reasoned debate. As a
result, the basis of the threat remained vague and was
accepted without the support of any elaborate
rationalizations. And, like a paranoid schizophrenic, the
policy behavior exhibited marked shifts from one image of
279
reality to another without any apparent justification or
11
systematized rationale. This behavior is manifest in
the contradictory considerations, recommendations, and
decisions which appear in many of the policy statements on
Indo-China.
that the foreign policy This is
decision-makers
not to say
in the Truman Administrations were
suffering from schizophrenia. Instead, the intention is
to argue, by way of analogy, that the existence of
inconsistent images of reality
12
resulted 10 an
"organizational 'mental illness'" which partially
explains the contradictory and reactive nature of the
decision process between 1945 and 1952. Periods of
pessimism with regard to the course of events
.
1n
Indo-China served to elicit cold war images of widespread
Communist subversion. The evocation of these images
resulted in quantum jumps in decision making activities,
and, despite all arguments to the contrary, led to
increases in both the level and nature of American
involvement.
This relationship between image elicitation and
actual decision makin provides us with a further
explanation of the fever chart depiction of the decision
process as hypothesized by Ellsberg.
contradictions which existed between
Moreover, the
the global and
regional images serve as an explanatory link between
280
Ellsberg's two conflicting rules of policy behavior. The
global image gave rise to the desire to avoid a Communist
victory in Vietnam, while the regional image constituted
the underpinning of an opposing desire to avoid committing
American forces to the defense of Vietnam.
CONCLUDING COMMENTS
In general, the United States did not stumble blindly
into the quagmire. Nor, from the very beginning, did the
Government hold out any real hope for long-run success of
its policy. Thus, in the final analysis, it would appear
that the Ellsberg-Gelb hypotheses provide a reasonably
accurate basis for explaining policy behavior with respect
to the o~ig!~ of American involvement in Vietnam. But,
precisely because our analysis was limited to the short
span of time encompassing the origins of American
involvement, we cannot determine if their hypotheses
accurately predict policy behavior for the entire period
of American involvement. As mentioned in the introduction,
a test of the Ellsberg-Gelb model for the period of 1953
through 1968 1s currently being made and will be the
subject of an additional and forthcoming study.
It must also be borne in mind that this study was
based solely on the documents contained in the Pentagon
Papers, which in no way reveal the entire historical
281
m i 1 i e u s u r r o u n d i n g t he se forui r e i 9 n
p olicy decisions.
Therefore the validity ol any
conclusions or
generalizations which might b dJ drawn from the analysis
must also be limited by the de~ r e ,1 1 ree of accuracy with which
the Pentagon Papers recount t~d• i .. decisiori making process.
On the other hat;1d, the validit~o!lo of any historical analysis
is limited by the amount of in!o r1 10:ormation available. And,
as of this writi g, the Pentago~~ -1 • Papers represent the most
comprehensive body of informat! o i l:. ion re lated to American
involvement 1n Vietnam that is trn currently available to the
public.
282
NOTES
l Morton H. Halperin, Bureaucratic Politics and
!Oreig~ ~o!icy (washington, D.C7: Tfie Brookings Institute,
1974), p. 1x.
2 Ibid.
3 \v oh 1 stet t e r , Pe a r 1 Har bo !. , pp • 3 9 2 - 3 9 6 •
4 Cf.
Policy, pp.
392-396.
Halperin, Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign
139-155; and, Wohlstetter, Pearl Harbor, pp.
5 Wohlstetter, Pearl Harbor, p. 397.
6 Halperin,
Policy, p. 153.
Bureaucratic Politics
7 Ibid., p. 151.
8 Ibid. , pp. 11-13.
----
and Foreig!!_
9 Oli R. Holsti, "Cognitive Dynamics and Images of
the Enemy," in Image and Reality in World Politics, ed. by
John c. Farrel! and Asa P. SmTth (New york: Columbia
University Press, 1967), p. 18.
10 Ibid., p. 21.
11 Kenneth Boulding has argued that the international
system, and the policy behavior which defines it, is
" ••• by far the most pathological ••• segment of the total
social system •••• " ( "The Learning and Reality-Testing
Process in the International System," p. 5.)
12 Ibid., p. 10 •
•
APPENDIX A
SELECTED THEMATIC ELEMENTS
283
284
001 DO NOT COMMIT TO A Y FORM OF INVOLVEMENT
002 THE U.S. ILL NEITHER OPPOSE OR SUPPORT THE
RE-ESTABLISH~E T OF FrtENCH CONT OL OVER INDO-CHINA
005 PROMOTE COMMERCE BETWEEN SOUTHEAST ASIAN COUNTRIES &
FREE WORLD WITH PARTICULAR REFERENCE TO JAPA
0~6 U.S. SHOULD DEFER TO ASIATIC LEADERSHIP IN RESOLVING
EVENTS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA
007 SUPPORT BROAD-BASED, INDE E DENT, VIETNAMESE
GOVERNMENT REGARDLESS OF ITS POLITICAL ORIENTATION
009 OPPOSE REESTABLISHMENT OF FRECH CONTROL
010 SUPPORT A BROAD-BASED,
VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT
NONCOMMUNIST, INDEPENDENT
~11 SUPPORT AN INDO-CHINESE TRUSTEESHIP UNDER THE UN
015 THE U.S. CONSIDERS THE RETENTION OF DIEM AS GVN
LEADER AS A MATTER TO BE DECIDED BY THE COUP LEADERS
016 THE U.S. OPPOSES THE USE OF PUPPET GOVERNMENTS OR
MO A CHIES AS A WEAPON AGAINST COMMUNISM
018 THE U.S. WILL NOT LEND ITS SUPPORT TO A BO DAI
GOVERNMENT
019 THE U.S. SUPPORTS BAO DAI GOVERNMENT AS THE ONLY
VIABLE ALTERNATIVE TO A COMMUNIST GOVERNMENT IN
VIETNAM
020 THE U.S. SUPPORTS THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A VIETNAMESE
GOVERNMENT U DER THE LEADERSHIP OF BAO DAI
~21 THE U.S. EXPRESSES CONTINUING
GOVERNMENT OF SOUTH VIETNAM
SUPPORT TO THE
022 THE U.S. WILL CONTINUE TO SUPPORT THE PRESENT GVN
LEADERSHIP UNTIL A GENERALLY ACCEPTABLE ALTERNATIVE
LEADERSHIP APPEARS ON THE SCENE
023 FRANCE MUST MOVE FASTER IN MAKING VIETNAM TRULY
INDEPENDENT
027 THE U.S. WILL SUPPLY FRENCH RESISTANCE GROUPS IN
IN 0-CHINA WITH MILITARY AID
285
035 THE U.S. WILL URGE FRANCE TO INCREASE ITS FIGHTING
AND TECHNICAL FORC SIN VIETNA
036 AID SHOULD BE CONTINGENT UPON FRENCH EFFORTS TO
ESTABLISH A TRUELY POPULAR VIETNAMESE GOVER MENT
037 THE U.S. REQUIRES FRENCH SUPPORT FOR THE PROPOSED
EUROPEAN DEFENSE COMMUNITY IN RETURN FOR U.S. AID
039 THE U.S. WILL STOP GIVING MILITARY AND ECONOMIC AID
TO THE GOVER MENT OF SOUTH VIETNAM
042 FRANCE MUST WITHDRAW FROM VIETNAM BEFORE THE U.S.
WILL DIRECTLY ASSIST THE GOVERNMENT OF VIETNAM
045 THE U.S. WILL ENTER INTO A MILITARY AND ECONOMIC
ASSISTANCE AGREEMENT WITH THE GVN
049 OPPOSE A CEASEFIRE PRIOR TO THE COMMENCEMENT OF
NEGOTIATIONS
050 OPPOSE A CEASE-FIRE PRIOR TO AN ALLIED VICTORY
052 THE U.S. WILL WITHDRAW ITS REPRESENTATIVES FROM THE
GENEVA CONFERENCE
054 U.S. OPPOSES A SOUTH VIETNAMESE NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT
WITH NORTH VIETNAM
055 U.S. OPPOSES A FRENCH NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT ITH VIET
MINH
057 U.S. SHOULD GUIDE THE COURSE OF ANY NEGOTIATIONS
058 THE U.S. INSISTS THAT ANY NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT IN
VIETNAM MUST ALLOW THE U.S. TO CONTINUE ITS AID AND
TRAINING PROGRAMS FOR SOUTH VIETNAM
062 OPPOSE FREE ELECTIONS IN VIETNAM
063 OPPOSE PARTITION OF VIETNAM
065 OPT FOR REGIONAL MILITARY ACTION RATHER THAN UN
ACTION BECAUSE THE U WOULD NOT SEEK A MILITARY
VICTORY IN VIETNAM
069 U.S. WILL NOT INTRODUCE GROUND FORCES IN SOUTH
VIETNAM
073 U.S. ILL NOT INTERVENE MILITARILY UNLESS FRANCE
MEETS PREREQUISITES: GRANT INDEPENDENCE TO VIETNAM,
TRAIN VIETNAMESE
MILITARY PLAN
TROOPS, IM LEMENT
286
AGGRESSIVE
074 U.S. WILL NOT INTERVENE MILITARILY UNLESS INVITED BY
VIETNAMESE
075 THE U.S. WILL SEND AIR FORCE MECHANICS TO VIETNAM TO
MAINTAI FRENCH/GV AIRCRAFT
078 THE U.S. WILL TRAIN SOUTH VIETNAMESE POLICE TO COMBAT
LOCAL INSURGENCY
079 THE U.S. WILL TRAIN GVN FORC S TO AGE UNCONVENTIONAL
RATHER THAN CONVENTIAL WARFARE
080 THE U.S. WILL ASK THE ICC
PERMISSIBLE MILITARY PERSON
U.S. TRAINERS CA REPLACE
FORCES
TO RAISE THE LEVEL OF
EL IN VIETNAM SO THAT
THE WITHDRAWING FRENCH
081 THE U.S. WILL INCREASE THE SIZE OF ITS MAAG UNITS
!THIN VIETNAM
082 ENGAGE IN INTERNATIO AL PROPAGANDA & PSYCHOLOGICAL
PROGRAMS TO PROMOTE SUPPORT FOR U.S. POLICIES IN
SOUTHEAST ASIA
083 ENGAGE IN INTERNAL (WITHIN THE USA) PROPAGANDA TO
COUNTER PUBLIC AND CONGRESSIONAL OPPOSITION TO U.S.
ACTIONS IN VIETNAM
084 THE u.s_ ILL IMPROVE SOUTH VIETNAM AIR FIELDS TO
SUPPORT JET FIGHTERS, BUT DO SOU DER THE GUISE OF
MAKING COMMERCIAL AVIATION IMPROVEMENTS
085 PERMIT U.S. MILITARY ADVISORS
SUPPORT GVN MILITARY MISSIONS
TO ACCOMPANY AND
086 THE U.S. AIR FORCE WILL FLY {ECONNAISSANCE AND
AIR-GROUND SUPPORT MISSIONS
0d 8 THE U.S. WILL ESTABLISH A SPECIAL COUNTER-INSURGENCY
GROUP ITHI THE U.S. GOVERNMENT TO ORIENT THE
TRAINNING AND ACTIVITIES OF ALL GOVERNMENTAL AGENCIES
TOWARD COUNTER-INSURGENCY ACTIVITIES
089 THE U.S. WILL INTRODUCE ARMED FORCES INTO SOUTH
VIETNAM TO BOOST GVN MORALE AND BOLSTER U.S. PRESTIGE
IN SOUTHEAST ASIA
090 THE U.S. WILL INTRODUCE U.S. FORCES INTO VIETNAM TO
ACT AS A
INTERVENTION
DETERENT TO SINO-SOVIET
287
MILITARY
091 THE U.S. WILL INTRODUCE FORCES INTO VIETNAM TO ASSCME
A STATIC DEFENSE ROLE SO THE GVN FORCES CAN CONDUCT
MORE MOBILE OPERATIONS
092 U.S. TROOPS WILL CONDUCT COMBAT OPERATIONS IN SOUTH
VIETNAM FOR PURPOSES OF SELF-DEFENSE AND SECURITY OF
THEIR BASES OR OTHER LIMITED OPERATIONS
093 THE SENIOR U.S. MILITARY OFFICER IN SOUTH VIETNAM
WILL HAVE EQUAL RANK WITH THE AMBASSADOR AND HAVE
DIRECT RESPONSIBILITY FOR ALL U.S. MILITARY
OPERATIONS
094 PLAN FOR THE USE OF U.S. GROUND TROOPS BUT DO NOT
DISCLOSE THE PLAN TO THE AMERICAN PUBLIC
097 U.S. SHOULD TAKE ACTION TO INSURE GREATER CONTROL
OVER THE DECISION-MAKING ACTIVITIES OF ITS ALLIES
098 U.S. SHOULD HAV CONTROL OVER DISTRIBUTION AND USE OF
MILITARY & ECONOMIC AID
099 U.S. SHOULD USE AID AS MEANS OF GAINING INFLUENCE
OVER POLICY FORMULATION & IMPLEMENTATION
101 THE U.S ~ WILL EXPAND THE ROLE OF ITS SUPPORT
PERSONNEL IN VIETNAM TO ENCO PASS A POSITION OF
LIMITED PARTNERSHIP IN THE WAR EFFORT
102 INITIATE JOINT US-GVN PLANNING FOR MILITARY ACTION
AGAINST ORV
103 THE U.S. WILL BECOME THE MAJOR MILITARY
DECISION-MAKER IN SOUTH VIETNAM
105 THE U.S. WILL INITIATE OPERATIONS BY GVN FORCES . TO
CLEAR SAIGON AND THE SURROUNDING AREA OF VIET CONG
FORCES
108 THE U.S. ILL PROMOTE A STRATEGIC VILLAGE-HAMLET
PROGRAM FOR THE RELOCATION OF THE SOUTH VIETNAM RURAL
POPULATION
110 THE U.S. WILL HAVE THE GVN INCREASE THE SIZE OF ITS
MILITARY FORCES
111 THE U.S. WILL REORGANIZE THE STRUCTURE AND ACTIVITIES
OF THE GVN MILITARY FORCES
113 THE U.S. ILL PERMIT GV
THE LAOTIAN PANHANDLE AS
FRUSTRATION OF THE GVN AND
ATTACK NORTH VIETNAM
288
AIR AND LAND STRIKES INTO
A MEANS OF RELIEVING
DIVERTING THEIR DESIRE TO
114 THE U.S. WILL ALLOW SOUTH VIETNAMESE TROOPS TO ENGAGE
IN CROSS-BORDER OPERATIONS INTO ' AOS AND CAMBODIA
115 THE U.S. WILL HAVE THE GVN
OPERATIONS AGAINST NORTH VIETNAM
IMPLEMENT COVERT
116 THE U.S. WILL HAVE GVN MILITARY FORCES STRIKE NORTH
VIETNAM WITH COVERT SUPPORT FROM U.S. FORCES
120 THE U.S. DEMANDS REFORMS IN THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE
GOVERNMENT
122 U.S. TO Er GAGE IN PROPAGANDA !THIN SOUTH VIETNAM TO
GIVE THE GVN THE APPEARENCE OF A DEMOCRACY WITH A
CONCERN FOR PUBLIC WELFARE
123 THE U.S. GOVER MENT WILL SUPPORT A COUP WHICH HAS A
GOOD CHANCE OF SUCCEDING BUT PLANS NO DIRECT
INVOLVEMENT OF U.S. ARMED FORCES
124 THE U.S. WILL PROVIDE THE COUP LEADERS WITH INTERIM
SUPPORT DURING ANY PERIOD OF GOVERNMENTAL BREAK-DOWN
CAUSED BY A COUP
127 THE U.S. SUPPORTS THE OVEMENT TO ELIMINATE THE NHUS
FROM THE GOVERNMENT OF SOUTH VIETNAM
128 THE U.S. WILL MANIPULATE THE PLACEMENT AND
APPOINTMENT OF HIGH-LEVEL GVN OFFICIALS
129 THE U.S.
POLITICAL
OPPOSITIO
POLITICAL
WILL TAKE MEASURES TO PENETRATE THE
PARTIES, GOVERNMENT ARMED SERVICES, AND
GROUPS IN SOUTH VIETNAM FOR PURPOSES OF
CONTROL
130 THE U.S. WILL TAKE STEPS TO
VIETNAMESE OPPOSITION TO THE GVN
NEUTRALIZE SOUTH
133 THE U.S. WILL HAVE THE GVN FORMULATE ECONOMIC
POLICIES DESIRED BY THE U.S.
134 THE U.S. WILL HAVE THE GVN PROMOTE AGRARIAN REFORM IN
SOUTH VIETNAM
135 SET UP AND PLACE IN OPERATION A
INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
289
GVN CENTRAL
137 THE U.S. WILL ENCOURAGE THE GVN TO PLACE GREATER
CONTROLS ON THE MASS MEDIA
138 THE U.S. WILL PLACE U.S. PERSONNEL IN ADMINISTRATIVE
POSITIONS WITHIN THE GOVERNME T OF SOUTH VIETNAM
139 THE U.S. WILL CONSIDER REPLACING EXISTING GVN LEADERS
TO INSURE ACHIEVEMENT OF U.S. OBJECTIVES IN VIETNAM
140 THE U.S. GOVERNMENT ILL LET IT BE KNOWN THAT IT
WOULD SUPPORT A COUP AGAINST THE EXISTING SOUTH
VIETNAMESE REGIME
142 THE U.S. WILL USE THE VIETNAM WAR AS A rABORATORY AND
PROVING GROUND FOR MILITARY RESEARCH ANO DEVELOPMENT
143 THE U.S. WILL USE DEFOLIANTS IN VIETNAM
145 THE U.S. WILL OFFER TO WITHDRAW ITS TROOPS FROM
VIETNAM AND ESTABLISH TRADE BET EEN NORTH AND SOUTH
VIETNAM IN EXCHA GE FOR A CESSATION OF VIET CONG AND
ORV HOSTILITIES
146 THE U.S. WILL OFFER TO STOP BOMBING NORTH VIETNAM IN
EXCHANGE FOR THE ORV'S WITHDRA AL FROM SOUTH VIETNAM
AND A CESSATION OF INFILTRATION FROM THE NORTH
152 HE U.S. WILL MAKE A PAUSE IN THE BOMBING
VIETNAM BEFORE IT BEGINS GREATER ESCALATION
HANOI A CHANCE TO NEGOTIATE AND GIVE
GOVERNMENT A CHANCE TO GAIN PUBLIC SUPPORT
OF NORTH
TO GIVE
THE U.S.
15~ U.S. SHOULD ACT TO INSURE THAT ANY ATTEMPT TO
NEGOTIATE WITH NORTH VIETNAM FAILS
155 THE U.S. ILL ENGAGE IN NAVAL PATROLS IN THE GULF OF
TONKIN
157 ACCEPT A LASTING COMMITTMENT TO DEFEND & ECONOMICALLY
SUPPORT THE SOUTHEAST ASIAN STATES AS A TRADEOFF FOR
THEIR SUPPORT OF U.S. ACTION IN VIETNAM
158 THE U.S. ILL PERMIT U.S. CIVILIANS TO FLY U.S.
AIRCRAFT O COMBAT MISSIONS IN VIETNAM
159 THE U.S. WILL ESTABLISH AND OCCUPY U.S. MILITARY
BASES IN SOUTH VIETNAM
290
160 U.S. WILL PROVIDE AIR & SEA SUPPORT IN SOUTH VIETNAM
161 THE U.S. WILL DEPLOY ADDITIONAL AIR POWER TO SOUTH
VIETNAM
162 THE U.S. WILL INTRODUCE MISSILE UNITS INTO SOUTH
VIETNAM
163 RESTRAIN FROM ESCALATING U.S. INVOLVEMENm IN VIETNAM
UNTIL AFTER THE U.S. NATIONAL ELECTIONb HAVE BEEN
HELD
164 CONTRIVE CIRCUMSTANCES TO SUPPORT U.S. ESCALATION OF
THE WAR IN THE EYES OF THE WORLD
165 TAKE ACTION TO SPEED UP THE WAR'S ESCALATION BUT GIVE
THE APPEARANCE TO BOTH CONGRESS AND PUBLIC ALIKE THAT
ACTIONS ARE GRADUAL AND THERE HAS BEEN NO CHANGE IN
U.S. POLICY
168 U.S. WILL ENGAGE IN COVERT OPERATIONS (PSYCHOLOGICAL,
PROPOGANDA, AND PARAMILITARY)
169 THE U.S. WILL PLACE ITS ARMED FORCES ON A WAR-TIME
FOOTING AND INCREASE ITS RESERVE FORCES
171 THE U.S. WILL SEND SPECIAL FORCES UNITS INTO SOUTH
VIETNAM
172 U.S. WILL DIRECTLY INTERVENE WITH GROUND FORCES ON A
UNILATERAL BASIS
174 THE U.S. WILL INSTALL AN ELECTRONIC AND MILITARY
BARRIER AT THE 17TH PARALLEL TO PREVENT INFILTRATION
FROM NORTH VIETNAM
178 THE U.S. WILL USE THE U.S. AIR FORCE TO CONDUCT AIR
STRIKES IN SOUTH VIETNAM
179 THE U.S. WILL USE NAPALM BOMBS UNLESS THEY BECOME A
POLITICALLY UNACCEPTABLE WEAPON
181 THE U.S. WILL MAKE AIR STRIKES INTO THE LAOTIAN
PANHANDLE
183 THE U.S. WILL MOUNT AN AGGRESSIVE DRIVE TO DEFEAT AND
EVICT THE VIET CONG AND DRV FORCES FROM SOUTH VIETNAM
184 CONSIDER THE USE OF THAI AIR BASES FOR U.S. AIR
STRIKES IN VIETNAM
291
185 THE U.S. WILL ENGAGE IN CROSS-BORDER OPERATIONS INTO
LAOS & CAMBODIA
186 THE U.S. ILL USE A ':!'RADE EMBARGO AND FINANCIAL
CONTROLS AGAINST THE ORV
187 'rHE U •• WILL BLOCKADE T.-IE NORTH VIETNAMESE PORTS
188 •rHE U.S. NAVY WILL SHEL~ THE NOR'I'H VIETNAMESE COAST
AND PORTS
189 THE U.S. WILL MINE THE NCJRTH VIETNAMESE HARBORS
19 0 THE U.S. COVERT AI RFORC
VIETNAM
(FARMGATE) WILL BOMB NORTH
191 THE U.S. WILL PROVOKE ~ NOR'I1H VIETNAMESE MILITARY
ATTACK ON U.S. FORCES TO PROV I DE A REASON FOR BOMBING
NORTH VIETNAM
195 THE U.S. WILL USE A BCOMBING PAUSE FOR PROPAGANDA
VALUE
198 THE U.S. ILL END THE BOMBING PAUSE AND RESUME
BOMBING ORTH VIETNAM
201 THE U.S. ILL ESCALATE THE LEVEL AND IN'rENSITY OF
BOMBING IN NORTH VIETNAM
204 U.S. WILL INSTITUTE A :POLICY OF SUSTAINED REPRISAL
AGAINST NORTH VIETNAM
205 THE U.S. WILL GIVE NORTH VIETNAM SIGNALS THAT U.S. IS
PREPARED TO EMPLOY I ~CREASING FORCE TO OBTAIN
AMERICAN OBJEC'rIVES IN V IETNAM
208 THE U.S. WILL EX'rEND THE TOUR OF DUTY OF ITS TROOPS
209 THE U.S. WILL ACTIVATE !-TS RESERVE FORCES
210 THE u.s. WILL SEND GROUN..D TROOPS IN·ro LAOS
211 THE U.S. WILL SEND GROUN:D TROOPS INTO CAMBODIA
212 'rHE U.S. WILL SEND GROON D TROOPS IN·ro NORTH VIETNAM
213 THE U.S.
ILL BOMB IN THE URBAN AREAS OF NORTH
VIETNAM
214 EMPLOY NUCLEAR WEAPONS I N V. N.
292
215 U.S. WILL TAKE INDIRECT ACTION A3AINST COMMU IST
CHINA
216 U.S. WILL TAKE COVERT ACTION AGAINST COMMUNIST CHINA
217 U.S. WILL BLOCKADE THE Cf INA MAINLAND
218 U.S. WILL TAKE DIRECT MILITA Y
COMMUNIST CHINA
219 EMPLOY NUCLEAR WEAPONS AGAIN~T CHINA
ACTIOJ AGAINST
262 DETERMINE HOW THE U.S. CAN EXTRICATE ITSELF F OM
VIETNAM WHILE MAINTAINING AS GOOD AN IMAGE AS
POSSIBLE IN U.S., ALLIED, AND ENEMY EYES
263 EXPRESS CONCERN OVER HOW TO EXTRICATE THE U.Sa FROM
SOUTH VIETNAM IF THE GVN COLLAPSES AND STILL RETAIN
U.S. PRIDE AND PRE TIGE
264 U.S. HUMILIATION RATHER THAN VICTORY IS THE MOST
LIKELY OUTCOME OF ESCALATION IN VIETNAM
265 THE U.S. CANNOT BE SURE THAT ATTACKING NORTH VIET AM
WILL PRODUCE THE DESIRED RESULTS
266 A STRICTLY MILITARY VICTORY
POSSIBLE
IN VIETNAM IS NOT
267 U.S. POLICY
INEFFECTIVE
IN SOUTH VIETNAM IS DRIFTING AND
271 DEPLOYMENT OF U.S. GROUND TROOPS TO SOUTH VIETNAM
WOULD INCREASE U.S. COMMITMENT WITHOUT CONTRIBUTING
MUCH TO THE ACTUAL OUTCOME OF THE WAR
272 THE SUCCESS OF U.S. POLICY IN SOUTHEAST ASIA IS
DEPENDENT UPON POLITICAL RATHER THAN MILITARY
SOLUTIONS
275 U.S. BOMBING OF NORTH VIETNAM HAS HAD NO MEASURABLE
DIRECT EFFECT UPON HANOI'S ABILITY TO MOUNT AND
SUPPORT MILITARY OPERATIONS IN THE SOUTH
279 THE U.S. HAS NOT PERSUADED ITS ALLIES THAT THE WAR IN
VIETNAM IS ESSENTIAL TO THE DEFENSE OF THEIR FREEDOM
281 U.S. ACTIONS IN VIETNAM ARE DESTROYING THE VIETNAMESE
PEOPLE AND THEIR CUL'rU E
286 OVERT AMERICA SUPPORT OF A COUP AGAINST THE SOUTH
I
293
VIETNAMESE REGIME COULD CREATE ADVERSE PROPAGANDA FOR
THE U.S. AND WEAKEN U.S. INFLUENCE AMONG OTHER LESS
DEVELOPED NATIONS
287 THE U.S. IS CONCERNED THAT ITS IMAGE AND INTERESTS
MAY BE ADVERSELY AFFECTED BY THE REPRESSIVE CONDUCT
OF THE GVN
299 IF AN ELECTION WERE HELD IN VIETNAM THE VIET CONG
WOULD WIN
306 FRANCE MUST DECIDE TO INTERNATIONALIZE THE WAR IN
VIETNAM BEFORE THE U.S. WILL INTERVENE MILITARILY
309 THE ONLY DEMONSTRABLE ACHIEVEMENT OF U.S. ACTIONS IN
VIETNAM IS THE LARGE NUMBER OF ENEMY KILLED IN ACTION
BY LARGE MILITARY OPERATIONS
312 U.S. ESCALATION OF THE WAR WILL RESULT
SUBSTANTIAL LOSE OF AMERICAN LIVES
315 U.S. BOMBING OF NORTH VIETNAM WILL NOT DIRECTLY OR
INDIRECTLY PURSUADE NORTH VIETNAM TO NEGOTIATE
316 U.S. AIR ATTACKS ON INDUSTRIAL TARGETS WILL NOT BE
EFFECTIVE BECAUSE NORTH VIETNAM IS PREDOMINANTLY A
RURAL SOCIETY
317 U.S. AIR ST IKES ON ORTHERN POPULATION CENTERS RISK
A COU TER-PRODUCTIVE WAVE OF REVULSION WITHIN THE
U.S. AND ABROAD, AS WELL AS A GENERAL ASIA WAR
318 AN INCREASE IN THE NUMBER OF U.S. TROOPS IN VIETNAM
WILL NOT REDUCE THE LEVEL OF VIET CONG VIOLENCE
319 AN INCREASE IN THE NUMBER OF U.S. TROOPS IN VIETNAM
WILL NOT REDUCE THE NUMBER OF ENEMY TROOPS TO THE
POINT WHERE THEIR CAMPAIGN WILL FAIL
320 THE U.S. SHOULD
TROOPS IN VIETNAM
GOVERNMENT INTO
INVOLVEMENT
PLACE A LIMIT ON THE NUMBER OF U.S.
SO THE MILITARY DOES NOT LOCK THE
A TRAP OF UNENDING AND DEEPER
321 INCREASES IN THE LEVEL OF U.S. FORCES IN VIETNAM
COULD RESULT IN PRESSURE FROM THE MILITARY TO INVA~E
LAOS, CAMBODIA AND NORTH VIETNAM
327 THE FAILURE OF THE UNITED STATES TO INTERVENE
MILITARILY IN VIETNAM MAY DESTROY FRENCH SUPPORT FOR
THE PROPOSED EUROPEAN DEFENSE COMMUNITY
294
332 U.S. IS OtLY ATION ITH THE WEALTH & POWER NECESSARY
TO PROTECT ORLD FREEDOM
333 SOUTHEAST ASIA IS OF ECONOMIC IMPORTANCE 'I'O JAPAN
334 SOU'rHEAST ASIA IS OF ECONOMIC IMPORTANCE TO WEST
335 SOUTHEAST ASIA IS OF STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE TO WEST
337 THE U.S. SUFFERED A MAJOR BLOW TO ITS PRESTIGE
BECAUSE OF COMMU IST SUCCESSES AT THE GENEVA
CONFERENCE
340 U.S. MUST STOP COMMUNIST AGGRESSIO IN ASIA BEFORE IT
DEVELOPS INTO GENERAL ARFARE
345 THE BEST LEGAL JUSTIFICATION FOR SENDING U.S. FORCES
INTO VIETNAM IS 'COLLECTIVE SELF-DEFENSE,' WHICH IS
NOT PROHIBITED BY THE GENEVA ACCORDS
348 USE OF NUCLEAR EAPO SWILL NOT REDUCE THE NUMBER OF
AMERICAN GROUND FORCES REQUIRED FOR VICTORY
353 WHILE AN OVERALL PLAN FOR THE CONDUCT OF THE WAR AND
THE FUTURE PEACE IS IMPORTANT, IMMEDIATE EMPHASIS
MUST BE PLACED ON SMALLER, SPECIFIC, AND MORE RE OILY
ACCOMPLISHED OPERATIONS
361 A MILITARY VICTORY IN VIETNAM IS NECESSARY TO GIVE
CREDENCE TO U.S. POLICY OF CONTAINMENT
362 MORAL AND POLITICAL INVOLVEMENT NECESSITATE THAT U.S.
NOT WITHDRAW FROM VIETNAM
363 FAILURE BY THE U.S. TO ESCALATE THE WAR WILL ONLY
SERVE TO LENGTHEN THE DURATION OF THE WAR AND RISK AN
ENEMY VICTORY
364 CONSIDER THE ECONOMIC AND HUMAN LOSES IN VIETNAM TO
BE A CHEAP PRICE TO PAY IN RELATION TO THE SPECTER OF
A DEFEAT FOR THE U.S.
366 U.S. REPUTATION IS THE PRIMARY STAKE IN THE VIETNAM
CONFLICT
367 INTERNATIONAL NEGOTIATIONS OVER LAOS THREATEN THE
ABILITY OF THE U.S. TO CONTINUE ITS MILITARY ROLE IN
VIE'I'NAM
295
369 IF THE U.S. GEOGRAPHICALLY RESTRICTS ITS MILITARY
ACTIONS TO SOUTH VIETNAM IT CANNOT ACHIEVE VICTORY
37~ THE MILITARY SITUATION IN
INCREASINGLY GRAVE
LAOS IS
373 THE LACK
UNDERMINED
CONFIDENCE
DEFENSE
OF DECISIVE U.S. ACTION IN
THE PRESTIGE OF THE U.S.
OF OUR ALLIES IN OUR COMMITMENT
BECOMING
LAOS HAS
AND THE
TO THEIR
374 EXPANSION OF THE WAR BEYOND THE SOUTH IS NECESSARY TO
BOLSTER SOUTH VIETNAMESE MORALE
377 A MILITARY VICTORY IS ONLY ACCEPTABLE SOLUTION IN
VIETNAM
380 MORE U.S. TROOPS ARE NEEDED IN VIETNAM TO STOP
INFILTRATION AND DEFEAT THE ENEMY
383 THE TONKIN RESOLUTION IS SO BROAD THAT THE
ADMINISTRATION DOES NOT NEED ADDITIONAL CONGRESSIONAL
APPROVAL FOR FURTHER ESCALATION OF U.S. INVOLVEMENT
IN VIETNAM
385 A BOMBING PAUSE WOULD DEMORALIZE THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE
388 A PAUSE AND SUBSEQUENT RESUMPTION OF BOMBING WILL
INCREASE THE PSYCHOLOGICAL STRAIN ON THE NORTH
VIETNAMESE
391 THE U.S. WILL USE NORTH VIETNAMESE INFILTRATION AS
THE PRIMARY PUBLIC REASON FOR EXPANDING THE WAR
393 U.S. BOMBING OF NORTH VIETNAM IS NECESSARY TO BRING
ABOUT NEGOTIATIONS
398 THE U.S. BOMBING PROGRAM SHOULD BE STRUCTURED TO
ENGENDER FEAR AMONG THE NORTH VIETNAMESE OF FUTURE
DESTRUCTION FROM THE AIR STRIKES
399 U.S. PLANS FOR ESCALATING THE WAR ALLOW MAXIMUM U.S.
CONTROL OVER THE COURSE OF EVENTS
400 USSR WILL NOT PROVOKE DIVERSIONARY INCIDENTS IF U.S.
ESCALATES WAR AGAINST THE ORV
401 CHINA WILL NOT PROVOKE INCIDENTS IF U.S. ESCALATES
THE WAR AGAINST THE DRV
403 IF THE U.S. TAKES MILITARY ACTION AGAINST NORTH
296
VIETNAM THEY WILL BE HITTING AND UNDERMINING THE
LOGISTICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL SOURCE OF VIET CONG
SUPPORT
404 TAKE MILITARY ACTIO AGAINST THE NORTH TO DESTROY
THEIR WILL AND CAPABILITY TO SUPPORT THE VIET CONG
405 IF U.S. MILITARY ACTION AGAINST NORTH VIETNAM DOES
NOT QUICKLY BRING THE WAR TO AN END, SOUTH VIETNAMESE
MORALE WILL PLUMMET AND THEY WILL MOVE TOWARD
EGOTIATION WITH THE GVN
406 TAKE MILITARY ACTION AGAINST NVN AS A SUBSTITUTE FOR
STRENGTHENING THE GOVERNMENT OF SOUTH VIETNAM
412 THOSE NORTH VIETNAMESE CIVILIANS WHO WOULD BE
ENDANGERED BY U.S. BOMBING OF URSA AREAS ARE
DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY ENGAGED IN THE SUPPORT OF THE
AR
413 U.S. POLICY IN VIETNAM IS PENALIZED BECAUSE IT MUST
DEAL WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF A PLURALISTIC SOCIETY
AND CANNOT PRESENT A UNITED FRONT
414 TO ACHEIVE VICTORY IN VIETNAM THE U.S. MUST PUT ASIDE
MANY OF THE SELF-IMPOSED RESTRICTIONS ON ITS LEVEL OF
INVOLVEMENT IN VIETNAM
437 THE VIETNAMESE FEAR MASSIVE DESTRUCTION OF THEIR LAND
IF U.S. INTERVENES
442 THE U.S. CONSIDERS THE GNV LEADER TO BE AN OBSTACLE
TO THE SUCCESS OF U.S. POLICY IN VIETNAM
444 IF THE GVN
U.S. AND
EFFICIENT,
COMMUNISTS
DOES NOT BECOME MORE COOPERATIVE WITH THE
MAKE ITS GOVER MENT STRONGER AND MORE
SOUTH VIETNAM WILL BE LOST TO THE
448 THE GVN LEADERSHIP REJECTS U.S. DEMANDS FOR
LIBERALIZATION AND REFORM OF THEIR GOVERNMENT
450 THERE IS AN INCREASE IN ANTI-AMERICAN AND NEUTRALIST
FEELINGS AMONG THE GVN OFFICIALS
451 THERE IS AN INCREASE IN ANTI-AMERICAN AND EUTRALIST
FEELINGS AMONG THE VIETNAMESE PEOPLE
452 THE GVN FEELS THAT THE U.S. IS LOOKING FOR A WAY OUT
OF ITS INVOLVEMENT IN VIETNAM
297
5 4 COMMU IST SUCCESSES IN VIETNAM AD AT THE GENEVA
CONFERENCE THREATEN U.S. SECURITY INTERESTS
505 THE LEVEL OF VIET CONG VIOLENCE IS ON THE INCREASE
508 INFILTRATION FROM THE NORTH INTO SOUTH VIET A IS
INCREASING
510 THE NU~BER OF ENEMY TROOPS USING LAOS AND CAMBODIA AS
A SANCTUARY IS INCREASING
511 NORTH VIETNAM IS INCREASING THE LEVEL OF ITS FORCES
IN SOUTH VIETNAM, LAOS, AND CAMBODIA
512 THE WAR IN VIETNAM IS A TEST CASE AGAINST COMMUNIST
EXPANSION
532 THE VIETNAM WAR WILL DIVIDE AD SAP THE STRENGTH AND
VITALITY OF THE U.S. JUST AS IT DID TO FRANCE
533 THE U.S. GOVERNMENT
BELIEVING THE WAR IS
ATTEMPT TO WITHDRAW
UNTENABLE
HAS MISLED THE U.S. PUBLIC INTO
GOING . ELL AND THIS MAKES A Y
FROM SOUTH VIETNAM EVEN MORE
534 THE U.S. PUBLIC WOULD NOT UNDERSTAND A SUDDEN U.S.
DECISION TO PULL OUT OF VIETNAM AD WOULD REACT
ADVERSELY
535 RE-EDUCATION OF THE U.S. PUBL 1C ON THE REAL SITUATION
IN VIETNAM WOULD BE REQUIRED TO PERMIT A U.S.
~vITHDRAWAL
537 THE U.S. PUBLIC WILL SUPPORT SUSTAINED AMERICAN
MILITARY INVOLVEMENT IN VIETNAM
538 THE AR IN VIETNAM IS UNPOPULAR AND IS ERODING U.S.
PRESTIGE AT HOME AND ABROAD
542 CONGRESS EXP ESSES DOUBTS ABOUT THE ADVISIBILITY OF
CONTINUED U.S. INVOLVEMENT IN VIETNAM
543 THE U.S. DEFENSE DEPARTMENT DISAGREES WITH THE STATE
DEPARTMENT'S POSITION ON AMERICAN POLICY IN VIETNAM,
AS ELL AS THEIR ASSESSMENT OF CONDITIONS IN VIET AM
547 THE AMERICAN PU LIC WANTS THE ESCALATION OF U.S.
INVOLVEMENT IN VIETNAM TO STOP AND THE WAR ENDED
548 CONCERN THAT THE U.S. CONGRESS ILL END MERICAN
ACTIONS IN SOUTH VIETNAM BECAUSE OF THE INSTABILITY
298
AND REPRESSIVE ATURE OF THE GVN
550 PREPARE AMERICAN PUBLIC FO GREATER MILITARY &
ECONOMIC INVOLVEMEN'f IN VIETNAM THROUGH INTERNAL
PROPAGANDA
551 U.S. MUST BE PREPARED FO A LONG-TERM WAR & A
LONG-TE MAID COMMIT ET
553 CONSIDER THE AMERICAN PRESS TO BE DISTORTING THE TRUE
PICTURE OF CONDITIONd IN VIETNAM
555 ALLIES WOULD GENE ALLY NOT SUPPORT INCREASED MILITARY
ACTION BY U.S.
556 ALLIES WOULD REJECT U.S. USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS
558 BRITAI ILL NOT ENTER INTO JOINT MILITARY ACTION BUT
WILL ENGAGE IN SECRET TALKS ON SCOPE OF U.S. PLANS
562 THE SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIO S GENERALLY DO NOT FAVOR
CLOSER ILITARY TIES ITH THE U.S. AND THE WEST
APPENDIX B
THE ATIC CATEGORIES
299
I
300
1 Recommendations to increase the level of U.S.
olvement
.
the Vietnam conflict. l 1n
2 Recommendations to decrease the level of u.s.
involvement 10 the Vietnam conflict.
3 Recommendations to increase the level of u.s.
penetration into Vietnam
,
internal affairs. s
4 Recommendations to decrease the level of u.s.
involvement into Vietnam
,
internal affairs. s
5 Optimistic assessments of the state of affairs within
Vietnam.
6 Pessimistic assessments of the state of affairs
within Vietnam.
7 Arguments supporting greater U.S. involvement 1n the
Vietnam conflict.
8 Arguments supporting a decrease 1n U.S. involvement
in the Vietnam conflict.
9 Arguments to increase U.S. involvement in Vietnam
based upon considerations of American credibility and
prestige.
10 Arguments to decrease U.S. involvement in Vietnam
based upon considerations of American credibility and
prestige.
11 Arguments to increase U.S. involvement in Vietnam
based upon the desirability of supporting the South
Vietnamese regime.
12 Arguments to decrease U.S. involvement in Vietnam
based upon the bad character i stics and nature of the
Vietnamese regime.
13 Arguments to increase U.S. involvement in Vietnam
based upon American domestic considerations.
14 Arguments to decrease U.S. involvement in Vietnam
based upon American domestic considerations.
15 Ar uments to increase U.S. involvement in Vietnam
based upon considerations of th domino theory.
16 Arguments to increase U.S. involvement in Vietnam
301
based upon international political and strategic
considerations.
17 Arguments to decrease U.S. involvement in Vietnam
based upon international political and strategic
considerations.
18 Arguments to increase u.s. involvement in Vietnam
based upon Vietnam's strategic and economic
i m po r tan c e to the Uni t ed state s •
19 Argu! !k .. nts to decrease u .s. involvement in Vietnam
based upon the lack of strategic and economic
importance of Vietnam to the United States.
20 Arguments for negotiations with the Viet Cong and
North Vietnam.
21 Arguments a ainst ne otiations with the Viet Cong and
· or th Vie t n am •
22 Arguments for international solutions to the Vietnam
conflict.
23 Arguments against international solutions to the
Vietnam conflict.
24 Arguments for U.S. militar y
Soviet Union and/or China.
invo 1 vemen t with the
25 Arguments against U.S. military involvement with the
Soviet Union and/or China.
26
27
28
Short- and lon -term American
considerations.
plan 1ng efforts
Considerations involving French and GVN roles
responsibilities in the Vietna conflict.
and
and
Considerations i nvolving the American
responsibilities i n the Vietnam conflict.
role and
29 Negative assessments of French policy and activities
in Vietnam.
30 Positive assessments of French policy and activities
in Vietnam.
31 Considerations of European recovery and defense as
related to American pol icy in Vietnam.
APPENDIX C
-
PURPOSE CODES
302
,1
.I
303
1. Action will not be taken.
2. Factor for consideration.
3. Recommended action.
4. Form a contingency plan.
5.
6.
Consider for possible action.
Implement a decision or policy.
7. Decision to increment a previous decision.
8. Decision to speed-up the implementation of a previous
decision.
9. Decision to slow down
previous decision.
the ~mplementation of a
10. Statement of established policy.
11. Suspend policy for further study and consideration.
12. Policy implementation is producing desired results.
13. Prepare to take action.
14. Progress of policy implementation is slow or not
producing the desired resultr •
15. Recommend that action not be taken.
16. Recommend the establishment of contingency plans.
17. Recommend that policy decision be implemented.
18. Recommend incrementing a previous decision.
19. Recommend speeding-up the
previous decision.
implementation of a
20. Recommend slowing down the
previous decision.
implementation of a
21. Form contingency plans for incrementing a previous
decision.
22. Consider incrementing a previous decision.
304
23. Recommend decision be taken but keep decision from
the American public.
24. Implement a decision or establish policy but keep the
decision or policy from the American public.
25. Not a factor for consideration.
26. Not a recommended action.
27. Do not form a contingency plan.
28. Will not consider for possible action.
29. Previous decision will not be incremented.
30. Recommend that the policy be suspended for further
study and consideration.
31. Recommend that preparation for action be undertaken.
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305
306
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1940
1959
1963-
DAVID JO L ANDRU
Born in ayrc, Pennsylvania
Graduated from High cho I, Waverly , New York
A istant Vice President, Security Pacific National
Bank, Lo An eles, alif rnia
196 7 A.A., Pasadena ity ollcge, Pasadena, alifornia
1969 B.A., California State University, Los Angeles
1969-75 raduatc Student University of Southern alifornia,
Los Angeles
1972 A.M., Univ rsity of Southern California

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Asset Metadata

Creator Andrus, David Joel (author)

Core Title The origins of American involvement in Vietnam: a thematic content analysis of the Pentagon Papers

School School of International Relations

Degree Doctor of Philosophy

Degree Program International Relations

Degree Conferral Date 1976

Publication Date 10/20/1975

Defense Date 10/20/1975

Publisher University of Southern California (original), University of Southern California. Libraries (digital)

Tag OAI-PMH Harvest

Format theses (aat)

Language English

Contributor Electronically uploaded by the author (provenance)

Permanent Link (DOI) https://doi.org/10.25549/usctheses-oUC25305

Unique identifier UC25305

Identifier Ph.D. I '76 A576 (call number),etd-AndrusDavi-1975.pdf (filename)

Legacy Identifier etd-AndrusDavi-1975

Document Type Dissertation

Format theses (aat)

Rights Andrus, David Joel

Internet Media Type application/pdf

Type texts

Source 20230120-usctheses-microfilm-box5 (batch), University of Southern California (contributing entity), University of Southern California Dissertations and Theses (collection)

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Repository Name University of Southern California Digital Library

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