Administrative reform in Sudan: A human resource perspective

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Content ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM IN SUDAN: A HUMAN RESOURCE PERSPECTIVE by Ahmed Ibrahim Abusin A Dissertation Presented to the FACULTY OF THE GRADUATE SCHOOL UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY (Public Administration) January 1977 UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA THE GRADUATE SCHOOL UNIVERSITY PARK LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA 90007 This dissertation, written by ·---------Ahmed _Ibrahim Abus in-----------------------------------· under the direction of his _____ Dissertation Com- mittee, and approved by all its members, has been presented to and accepted by The Graduate School, in partial fulfillment of requirenients of the degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY ················~~~ ............... .. . . -+ - ~- _ J_J ____ _ DISSERTATION COMMITTEE - Chairman p ' 77 Al b .. TABLE OF CONTENTS Page LIST OF TABLES • • • • • • • • . • • • . V LIST OF FIGURES . . • • • • . • • . • • • • Vl.l. ACKNOWLEDGMENTS . . . • . • • • • • . . • • • Vl.l.l. Chapter I. INTRODUCTION • • . • . • • • • • • 1 Objectives of the Study • • • • • • 5 Scope of the Study • • • • • • • • 12 Definition of Administrative Reform • . 14 Significance of the Study . . • • • • 20 Methodology and Data Collection . . • • 22 Organization of the Study . • • . • • 24 II. ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM: GOALS, OBJECTIVES, AND STRATEGIES • • • • • . • • • 27 Background 27 ' • • • • • • . • • . • Administrative Reform and Development Administration • • • • • • • . • 30 Definitions of Administrative Reform • • 34 Goals and Objectives • • • • • • • 39 Variables • • . • • • • • • • • 48 Strategies for Reform • • • • • • • 73 A Matrix of Optimum Reform Strategy • • 108 ii III. THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF SUDAN. • • Introduction ..... The Sudan Political History Sudan's ~ajor Administrative in Retrospect .... The Role of the Institute of • • • • • • Reform . . . Public Administration in Administrative Reforms ...... . • Lessons of Experience • • • IV. MANPOWER PLANNING: CONCEPTS AND OPERATIONAL POLICIES .... Introduction ..... . Part I: Manpower Problems and Remedial Actions .... Directions for Remedial Action Part II: Manpower Procurement • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • V. HUMAN RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT: ADMINISTRATIVE • • • • • • • • • TRAINING AND UTILIZATION. • • • • • • Introduction ....... . The Status of Training .... . Training in Developing Countries Training--A Critical Factor of Development in Sudan ..... Administrative Training in the Sudan A Critical Review ..... . Training for Development: A New Perspective ..... . Executive Development Programs Personnel Utilization ... The Brain Drain in the Sudan. • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • EPILOGUE. BIBLIOGRAPHY • • • • • • • • • • • • • Page 124 I 124 159 180 198 I 202 I 220 220 231 275 288 310 310 311 315 319 323 336 343 353 356 368 375 Page . I APPENDIXES • • • • • . . . . • • . • • 387 A. Questionnaire • • • • • • • . • 388 B. An Agenda for Administrative Reform: A Sunnnary • • • • • • • . . • 393 I iv LIST OF TABLES Table 1. Characteristics of Coercive and Normative Strategies_ ........ . 2. Estimated Population of Major Towns • 3. The 1973 Population Census of the Sudan "Preliminary Results" ..... • 4. Sudan Foreign Trade in Principal Connnodi- 5. 6. ties, 1969-70 ........ . Sudan Active Population, 1956, and Gross Domestic Product, 1966-68, by Economic Sector . . . . . . . . . . Sudan Trade with Principal Foreign Countries, 1969- 70 . . . . • • • 7. Sudan Annual Budgets, 1899-1970 • • • • • • 8. Population Census in 1960 . . . . . . 9. Population in 1970 and 1980. • • • • 10. Economically Active Population in 1970 and 19 80 . . . . . . . . . . . • 11. Occupational Distribution of Labor Force 12. Employment of Economically Active Population Page 105 . 129 131 144 146 152 165 236 237 239 243 by Sector and Location. . . . . . . 245 V 1 I Table 13. Registered Urban Unemployment in Northern Sudan . . . . . . . . . . . 14. Literacy Estimates in 1966 • • • • • 15. 16. 17. Summary of Education (Public and Private) Numbers and Percentages at All Levels-- 1967 -68 . . . . . . . . . . Numbers of Students in the Final Form (Final Class) in Higher Secondary Schools, 1963-73 ..... . Students Registered in University and Higher Education, 1969-73 ... • • 18. Distribution of Post .,.Secondary Students Among Various Fields of Study in 1967-68 . . . . . . . . . . 19. 20. 21. Numbers of Classified Posts in the Central Government, 1957-68 . • • Classified Public Service Categories by Number of Posts and Annual Costs .. Sudanese Employed Outside the Sudan in 19 71 . . . . . . . . . . . • • • • • Page 251 257 : 260 262 264 267 269 303 361 vi LIST OF FIGURES Figure Page 1. Matrix of Optimum Strategy in Administrative Reform ............. 111 vii ACKNOWLEDGMENTS This study, "Administrative Reform in Sudan: A Human Resource Perspective," is an honest endeavor on my part to help my country in solving some of the critical administrative and personnel impediments which stand in the way of progress and prosperity. My concern a.bout human resources started with my joining the Institut of Public Administration in 1960 as a lecturer in public administration, and continued to grow as an important idea and area of research. My research attempts were eventually crowned in 1973 when the Minister of Public Service and Administrative Reform--who is a practitioner and a professional public administrator both nationally and internationally~-agreed to send me for doctoral studies at the University of Southern California. I am very much indebted to him. I have done my study and research in a beautiful and sunny part of Southern California. The institution of my study, the School of Public Administration, University of Southern California, was no less grand and inspiring vi-ii than its surroundings. The period of my study--September 1973 to February 1976--was one of the happiest times of my life. I was particularly fortunate to listen to and dis- I cuss issues of public administration theory, organiza tional behavior, development administration and personnel administration with outstanding men in these fields, such as Dwight Waldo, Gerald E. Caiden, Robert Berkov, Alberto Gurreiro Ramos, David Mars, Alexander W. McEachern, John Kirlin, Gilbert B. Siegel, John D. Gerletti, and John R. Schmidhauser. Professors John D. Gerletti, David Mars, Alexander W. McEachern, Gilbert B. Siegel and John R. Schmidhauser have ki.ndly accepted to serve in my doctoral guidance committee, while Professors Siegel, Gerletti and Schmidhauser formed my dissertation committee which guided me through the final process. I would like to extend to them all my gratitude and thankfulness for their unfailing I guidance and support. In my capacity as an international student, I was a member of the family of the International Public Administration Center under the directorship of Professor John D. Gerletti, assisted by Mrs. Mary Ono and Mr. John Barber. They have worked through their socializing and recreational programs to make my stay at USC a happy and joyful one. To them go my family's and my thanks. I would like also to extend my thanks to my colleagues with whom I have closely studied and prepared for the qualifying examinations and the other processes. Owing to shortage of space I will only single out the names of Abdullah Sanusi of Malaysia, Mohamed Abdel Al of Egypt, Mohamed Khan of ijangladesh, Isa Hashim of Nigeria, Miss Beverly Hawkins, Van Johnson, Jeff Eustace, and Rick Culley of the United States . Their friendliness, help and encouragement were most invaluable. Finally, my deep thanks go to Mrs. Jean Imamura who took pains in typing the final draft of the disserta tion. X DEDICATION To my parents who brought me up to achieve this end, but did not wait to see it. To my elder brothers, Abdillah Abusin and Mohamed Abusin, who inculcated in me since my childhood the desire and perseverance to learn and seek knowledge at all times. To my wife, Fatima Abusin, whose unfailing encouragement, assistance and love were an inspiration to me. To my sons, Ibrahim, Abdalla, Abuagla, and Khalid, and to my daughter, Hind, with a heartful wish that they may be in their future life men and women of will and determination to acquire knowledge for the service of their nation and countrymen. xi CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION I The center stage in all developing countries of I the world has been occupied by economic and social modern- ization, and to a lesser extent, by political reform. Administrative reform, as such, has received only secondary attention. The relatively low priority accorded to it is illustrated by two familiar facts: the lack of integration in most countries between development plans, on the one hand, and administrative reform activity, on the other. The term "administrative reform.," is a late arrival. Five year developmental plans and similar documents do mention the need to strengthen the administrative system to under take new tasks, but the main thrust of administrative reform programs has often not been integrated with plan ning, and has mostly come long after · the launching of early economic and social development schemes. The fact of the matter is that administrative reform lacks "appeal" as compared with programs in the economic., social, and political fields. 1 I I Difficulties encountered in implementing plans and generally in performing expanding governmental functions have created of late a growing awareness of the need for purposive action for administrative improvement. Such improvement has to take place constantly to keep national administrative capabilities connnensurate with the changing needs and requirements of developing countries. In many African countries the movement to introduce I administrative reforms arises out of the fact that the period of post-independence transition is at its end in the late sixties, and that the evolving responsibilities of government in the seventies require more effective executive instruments than could be had through normal civil services inherited from the colonial past. A close investigation of the whole system is now taking place in a number of countries and policies for administrative reform are being considered which are aimed at restructuring the machinery of government and human resources to make them more effective for the political, economic, and social changes. As administrative systems change slowly and in a conservatively incremental manner, natural response and adaptation are inadequate in meeting the challenges of 2 development. Something faster and more radical is needed, namely, organized programs of administrative reform in the major developmental sectors. The administrative impact on development is universally recognized. During the past two decades several countries whose administrative capacity must be judged high by any criterion have instigated comprehensive reviews of their machinery of government, public enterprises and private sector performance, and announced plans for structural overhaul and rapid expansion of management education and training.1 This comment was made in reference to Lord Fulton's Com mission which has made an overall study of the British Civil Service system in the period, 1966-1968. An impres s·ve number of new states, obsessed with the problems of survival, instability, and societal poverty, have already attempted radical administrative reforms or brought in foreign experts to advise on achieving a substantial improvement in administrati· ve performance. International bodies have been pressed to provide assistance and aid in sectoral and administrative reform projects and have responded within their limited means. As a result of this 1 Gerald E. Caiden, "Development, Administrative Capacity and Administrative Reform," International Review of Adniinistr·ative s • cienc·es 39, no. 4 (1973) :327. 3 awareness, assistance with enlarging administrative capacity and improving administrative reform programs has been made a priority of the Second United Nations Develop ment Decade. The challenge and the task of the 1970s is to devise and install administrative systems that can actually accelerate development and better enable develop ing countries to make effective use of their resources. The high priority attached to these efforts is endorsed by the UN Secretary General, giving special attentions to: (a) Formulation of basic requirements for improving the development administration of individual countries and of groups of countries with similar characteristic (b) Analysis and formulation of strategies and methods for making administrative reform and improvement a continuous and successful process (c) Preparation of guidelines and assistance as requested in the establishment of effective central administrative reform and management improvement offices (d) Focusing reform efforts on creating capabilities of achieving developmental goals and on better management of development efforts2 2 united Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Public Administration Division, Public Administra tion in the Secortd United N~tions Developmertt Dec~de, Report of the Second Meeting of Experts, 16-26 January 1971 (New York: United Nations, 1971), pp. 11-12. (ST/TA0/7/57) 4 I Scholars of public administration seem to agree that there is no comprehensive study of the subject of administrative reform in any of the major textbooks. "If it is mentioned at all, what is written is not much more 3 than extended footnotes or hurried afterthoughts." When more specialized studies use the words "administrative reform" in the title, they are usually general histories or case studies in administrative dynamics. The few writings devoted solely to administrative reform are frag mentary and embryonic. They are mainly concerned with descriptive and analytically narrow, if not unique, circum stances from which little of a general nature can be deducted. Nevertheless, they constitute a growing body of literature to which can be added general studies of reform, social change; acculturation and group politics which can be applied to the subject. There are certain generalizations upon which many writers agree. These generalizations deal with the 3 Gerald E. Caiden, "Administrative Reform," Inter- !!!!tional Re. view of· Adminis•tr·ative s ·ct· enc·es 39, no. 4 (1968):347. 5 independent and dependent variables of administrative reform which would contribute through their interaction to the success or failure of reform activities in any locale. These generalizations have been formulated on the basis of observations of case studies of administrative reform in many countries. Hopefully, these variables would be con solidated in the future for the development of an adminis trative reform theory. The variables are essentially (a) reform agents--political, bureaucratic, and societal; (b) environmental factors; (c) the timing of reform as it influences the stage of development of each particular country. This study on administrative reform in Sudan takes these variables as a point of departure and aims at study ing and evaluating their interaction in the social milieu of Sudan and hopes to come out eventually with a hypotheti cal contribution as to the appropriate strategy of reform that is most conducive to reform in the country and in countries that have similar characteristics. Reform, as an application of new ideas and innova tion, invariably involves new values and modes of behavior, and these, once introduced into organizations, must be protected and fostered until they become accepted by those 6 affected by it. Thus, reform is not accomplished merely by introduction of some schemes or a public law. Rather, it is a process, a complex one, in which many factors (variables) interact and the effect of which appears only over a period of time. The real evaluation of reform shoul be through judging its ultimate achievement, which is fostering desired changes in methods and behavior. This study will identify at least three variables that condition and adapt the strategies adopted in reform. Those vari ables are political leadership and political support, environmental support and the time factor. The strategy of reform is dependent on how these factors interact; and ideal reform only takes place when the leadership, con sidering environment and time elements, selects the appropriate strategy to effect the desired change. 1. Political leadership. The many demonstrated failures of administrative reform in Sudan have dramaticall shown the importance of political leadership. Strong and sustained support of political leaders is an essential condition for the success of any reform strategv. Once political leadership commits its~lf to reform, changes become likely. However, political support should go all the way from initiation of reform, influence of resource 7 allocation and selection of sectors of reform to the encouragement for attainment of desired goals. While political leadership figures importantly in administrative reform, bureaucratic leadership is equally essential for reform success. It is the view of the writer that bureaucracy in developing countries is a focal force and it behooves reformers to ensure its cooperation in any reform, lest resistance to reform becomes likely. 2. The social · en· v-ir· onnien t. Since reform implies !change it is expected to antagonize some elements of society. This entails that members and subgroups of society and organizations and clientele be informed and made familiar with the purpose and content of the reform, and their participation, and therefore support, be engen- 1 dered, lest resistence might frustrate the best of reforms. I So many reforms that are politically supported have crumbled for lack of societal support, particularly when societal leadership is deliberately alienated by the government. A reform strategy that is more likely to succeed is the one that engenders social participation and cooperation. 3. Time a· n-a· · e· c· onorny. Closely related to the task of securing a favorable political environment is the timing 8 I of administrative reform. The essence of reform timing is the estimation of the readiness of the internal and exter nal environments of reform. Some observers have noted that a change of political leadership through evolution or 1 . ld .d . · 1 · f f 4 revo ution cou provi ea critica impetus or re orm. However, this might help the initiation of reform but it does not ensure its success. More crucial is the economic stage of development in the country. Poverty and poor economic conditions are not conducive to reform. Reform is expensive and is, therefore, only successful in relative prosperity where political leadership has sufficient resources to enable it to mobilize human resources and effect institution building for the purpose of reform. Under conditions of poverty, corruption and nepotism could be important impediments to any reform whether structural or behavioral. The first objective of this study is to elaborate on the interaction of reform variables and to come out with 4 Leigh Grosenick and Fredrick C. Mosher, "Adminis trative Reform: Goals, Strategies, Instruments and Tech nique, " in UN, · 'Inter· r · e· g• i · otia1 s · emit1a· r · ori · Maj · or· Admin·ts·tr a - tive Refo· rms ·in Dev· elop· i11g· · c-oun·tr·fes (ESA, PA/Meeting 1/17 / 1971), p. 16. 9 a conceptualization of a reform strategy. The strategies of reform available so far have been expressed in terms of sets of polar approaches, such as micro-macro, adaptive innovative, comprehensive-incremental or selective, structural-behavioral, etc. Such polar sets are never encountered in their pure forms in day-to-day life, and as such they are of little utility to researchers. 5 To avoid being trapped in this polarization dilerrnna, this study shall pose two reform strategies that have direct bearing ' on the role of political and bureaucratic leadership in reform, and will attempt to test their validity and utilit. The two reform strategies selected are what the writer has termed coercive strategy and normative strategy. While the former one is characterized by one-sided goal setting and is resorted to and preferred by authoritarian one-party systems, the latter relies on legitimate direction and on the manipulation of people and bureaucracy, since it is envisioned as resting on free and spontaneous participation. Both strategies are likely to effectuate reform, but the 5 Arne F. Leemans, "Aspects of Administrative Change and Reform,'' in -Studie• s ·in• International Devel'o'pment and · Economics (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, D. C. Heath & Co., 1972), pp. 125-26. 10 normative strategy is apt to get more far-reaching and stable results. The second objective of this study focuses on human resources perspective, and attempts to define priorities in the substantive administrative reforms that are highly needed for Sudan's development. The recent stress on the significance of human resources in United Nations litera ture and in academia is striking and phenomenal. The Secretary General of the United Nations, in an appeal for increased funds for UNICEF, once wrote: The development of human resources should get precedence over national resources ... it is in many ways ironic that we are ready to invest large sums of money in development of natural resources of a purely physical character, while there is far less readiness to invest in those people who are both the procurers and beneficiaries of economic growth.6 This study will dwell upon the problem of human I resources planning and utilization as a prerequisite for any development in Sudan, and will work to demonstrate that one of the important constraints of administrative reform is the lack of integrating administrative reform, particu larly in the field of manpower planning and development, 6 Percia Campbell, "United Nations Report: Develop ment and Utilization of Human Resources," Interna• tional Development Review 10, no. 3 (September 1968):35. 11 with socioeconomic development. Another equally important constraint is the lack of professionalism in administration and the wrong conception that everybody can "muddle through" in this area without gaining any special adminis trative skill. The third objective of the study is a by-product of the previous two objectives, namely, by describing and I analyzing the process of administrative reform and suggest ing strategies and systematic approaches of reform, on the I one hand, and focusing on substantive priorities of develop- mental reform, the study should eventually contribute to the growing literature of development and administrative reform in developing countries, and thus add to the biblio graphical resources of public administration in Sudan. Scope of the Study Although Sudan claims, a ong with other developing countries, to have a local government system which is supposed to exercise a fair amount of autonomy in the administration of local affairs, there is still much to be desired. Most, if not all, local government employees are centrally employed and all local government units follow the same conditions of service and bound by the same rules 12 I and regulations that are applicable to the central g- overn ment in Khartoum. Due to insufficient financial resources at the local levels, the central government is the main supplier of local finances for local projects and it is the central government that allocates money for the differ ent items and development projects of the local governments. For that reason, this study treats the Sudan as one iden tity, and it concerns itself with the central government civil service. Another dimension of government in Sudan is the new regional government system which was granted to the ethni cally different southern region of the country after the 1972 Addis Ababa agreement between the Sudan Central Government and the southern rebels. The regional government enjoys local autonomy in the southern region and has its own cabinet, legislature, and civil service. However, the political set-up is new and is still totally dependent on central government financing. As such it has not manifested 1 any differences in its civil service system to justify a I special treatment in the study. This is particularly so in all administrative reform efforts which still emanate from the central government and equally affect the southern regional government. What applies to the central government 13 I civil service applies to the civil service in the regional government. The study is limited to the period since the political independence of the country in 1956, as there were no substantial administrative reforms witnessed during the colonial period. Def·ini'tion of Admirtts·tra·tive Reform Administrative reform is a directed action or a directed and deliberate change which involves innocation of some kind. It i.s supposed to improvise on the tradition and practice of public administration, and it is assumed that there is something good about it. The motive behind it is that administrative deficiencies cannot be cured by automatic self-adjustment, and that the accumulating sufferings arising out of the speed of change, particularly in developing countries of the twentieth century, demand !redress through imposed alternatives in administrative activities, and as such there have to be continuous efforts I Ito update such activities to meet the challenging and changing circumstances. Caiden, who is considered a pioneer in the field, defines reform as "the artificial inducement of administra- 14 1 tive transformation against resistance."6 He asserts that it is part of societal reform and that it has to be dis tinguished from normal administrative changes. This point is well taken by Dror who emphasizes the fact that reform concerns itself with comprehensiveness and innovativeness, rather than with minor procedural details of the day-to-day d . . . . 7 a ministrative action . Another characteristic of administrative reform is that it concerns itself with the implementation of substan- tive reforms . Thus, an agricultural reform or a conscious change in modes of life from an agrarian to an industrial being is a substantive developmental reform and is not an administrative reform; but all processes that work to chang goals or alter the mix of resources according to priorities or transform attitudes and behavior, or speed decisions, or change organizational structures and procedures are the flesh and blood of administrative reform. Another important characteristic of administrative 6 Gerald Caiden, Admini• stra• tive Refo'rm (Chicago: Aldin Publishing Co., 1969), p. 65. 7 Yehezkel Dror, "Strategies for Administrative Reform," De\relo· pme· n·t arid · ch· a11ge 22 (1970- 71): 19-35. 15 reform is its pervasiveness and persistence. There is always a time lag between the requirements of development and change and the administrative apparatus that carries such developmental changes. For that reason the need for administrative reform will disappear only when perfection is achieved. Administrative reform concerns itself with organi zational structure as well as behavioral improvements and I change. However, most of administrative reform activities that have taken place in the past have been criticized for their neglect of the new area of behavior and attitude. Siegel emphasizes this neglect when he speaks of institu tion building as a guiding framework for planning and analysis of formal organization capable of implanting social change without compromising viability. 8 Organiza- 1 tional development scholars relate administrative reform Ito the concept of organizational development which is a process whereby organizational weaknesses are diagnosed land changes are initiated that are expected to lead to 8 Gilbert B. Siegel, "Making Major Administrative Reform Acceptable and Operational," in UN, · In·te· r · r · e· g• ional Seminar· · on· A'dmin·is• tr· a• tive· Re· fo· rm:s· in• · ne· vel· o• pirtg Gountr·ies (No. E/F/S. 72, 11-H.7) (1971), pp. 129-30. 16 improvement in performance. This study will analyze all these definitions in Chapter II at length. But whatever definition it adopts does not change the fact that administrative reform is a relatively new field which begs the question of a standard ized theory. Suffice to mention here that administrative reform comprises organizational restructuring and behavi oral improvements and strives ultimately to effect effi ciency in administration, the need for which never seems to end. Administrative reform is beset by many philosophi cal controversies. On one hand, there lies the contextual theory of development which asserts tha.t development is a function of each country's history, culture, social insti tutions, human and natural resources, and political system. Likewise, since administrative reform is part and parcel of development, it must decidedly emanate from the local needs which are different in each country. On the other hand, there are those who claim universality_ of reform typologies and who advocate applicability of western models of development and reform. On another dimension, there are the proponents of ecology who adopt a deterministic approach of reform. Fred 17 I W. Riggs' writings are a striking example of this school.9 Those scholars point to the reconditioning that modern structures undergo as soon as they are grafted into a society with different values and mores. They regard the administrative system as one of interdependent subsystems in a total more inclusive social system, and that the bureaucratic subsystem monopoly of essential skills and modern technology results in its overshadowing of other social sectors. They cast doubt, therefore, on the need for, and the effectiveness of 1 management improvements in the civil services of new states, and call, instead, for 10 a more balanced reform and improvement of all subsystems. In contrast to this approach, there is the pragmatic approach which considers civil services of developing countries as the vanguards of modernization and the actual agents of change in their societies; and as such they I deserve greater attention I of administrative reform. The !writer is of this opinion. The controversy on administrative reform covers the area of strategies and priorities that developing countries 9 F. W. Riggs, Admin• is tr· a•ti• ort in Develop·ing· · coun tries (The Theory of Prismatic Society) (Boston: Houghton :t-'lif flin, 1964) . lOibid. 18 I should adopt for faster action to bring about the desired change. Different strategies are often put in polar terms: macro versus micro strategies, structural versus behavi oral, coercive versus normative, institutional versus ad hoc commissions. The answer to the question as to where to start, what comes first in importance, what sector to begin with which will have direct impacts of reform on other sectors, etc., is a totally subjective one, since reformers in different countries are of different back- grounds and they invariably take sides about reform processes and cannot afford to be indifferent or objective. However, everybody supports reform in general but nobody agrees on the particulars. All students of administrative theory agree on the objectives of reform which are effi- l ciency and practical optimization. One last point deals with the evaluation of admin istrative reform. Reform is not desired for itself; it is only a function of ultimate ends. Reform in itself is not always good, desirable and successful. Whether it is or not depends on the nature of the reform, its context and evaluation of events and situations before and after implementation. Judgment must be suspended until the end result is reached. Only then can we say whether it is a 19 I I success or failure. This very fact about reform evaluation works against any preconceived theory of reform, and rejects completely the notion that a certain reform fashion or principle which catches on and spreads rapidly through administrative teaching is always operational and workable. A striking example of such a fashion is the principle of the "Ombudsman" which gained at one time popularity and acceptability in academia and which later faded . . Significan·ce o· f the· Study Sudan is passing through a critical period of development. There is a plethora of economic and social projects being undertaken nowadays. A six-year economic and social plan is underway. Economic planners take administrative capacity of the country for granted and they hardly stop to ponder on the administrative and human needs of such projects. Administrative reform is still relegated to a secondary place in comparison to economic and social reforms which boost the political support of governments much more than the unappealing administrative reforms. Economic planners need to be made aware that development does depend on people, and that the quality and performance of development cannot be better than the incumbent person nel shouldering the responsibility of developing the 20 country. Administrative reform should go hand in hand with other aspects of development, and it is this for · which this study is significant. More specifically, the study works to create an atmosphere of awareness of human resources needs and development in order to meet the challenges of development. In corollary to the acute needs in skilled human resources, this study will consider what should be done to stop the currently peaking phenomenon of "brain-drain." /All neighboring countries are launching development pro grams of extensive latitude and they are in great need of skilled and semi-skilled labor. With the rising inflation in Sudan, labor is fleeing the country by the hundreds of thousands to seek better living and higher wages in oil producing countries. Such conditions work to aggravate the already soaring problem of manpower in Sudan. Specifically, the study aspires to delineate a prescribed future of administrative reform as well as instrumental theories concerned with the strategies and 1 priorities of reform. A recent development in Sudan is the creation of a central ministry for public service and administrative reform. The writer, being a member of that ministry and having worked before its creation on questions 21 of reform, hopes to help guide the direction of future reform efforts. The ministry has institutionalized reform but its attempts have been mostly limited to the area of micro civil service reforms. The study will delineate some important areas for macro and substantive administrative reforms. Lastly, the study is significant in helping to generate and engender indigenous research efforts in the areas of administrative reform. Methodolo'gy and Data · c-olle· c·tfon Administrative reform is a new field of study in the milieu of public administration. It gained considerabl attention only recently when the United Nations launched its first and second decades of development. This action has triggered the awareness for reform in both developed and developing countries. Through United Nations support, scholars of development have started to think and write about concepts of administrative reform, convene conferences to that effect and publish findings for the benefit of all United Nations member-countries. The study will review IUN publications exhaustively in this area, as well as all relevant literature in the field of development in general 22 1 I and administrative reform in particular. Consideration of case studies of reform in developing countries is another source of data. Official documents on reform, and intensive depth interviews with key persons dealing with reform movement in Sudan have been invaluable sources of data collection in this study. The writer, however, has first-hand infor mation about reform in Sudan as he was involved in adminis- trative reform efforts and has witnessed closely and participated in person on ad hoc commissions of reform and has attended, as a representative of the Sudan govern ment, some regional and interregional seminars on major administrative reforms. The methodology adopted in the study is a blend of descriptive and analytical study of what has been done and theoretical conceptualization of what should normatively be done in the future. The discussion of the variables and strategies of reform which determine the success or failure of reform efforts will lead the writer to suggest guidelines for future reform movements. The fact that studies of administrative reform are still embryonic and the field has not been able yet to reach a medium-range theory of reform constitutes a great 23 handicap to this study. However, the research will be pioneering--to be improved upon by future generations of Sudan theoreticians and administrative practitioners. The study consists of six chapters. Chapter I introduced the research problem, its objectives, purpose, significance, scope, methodology and organization. Chapter II deals with the concept of administrative reform, its definition, controlling variables, strategies, and how variables interact to bring about a contextual theoretical framework of reform strategy in Sudan and in developing countries with characteristics similar to Sudan. IA research design for the evaluation of reform strategies I will be offered in conclusion with the purpose of estab- I lishing the best normative strategy that may be adopted for future reform efforts. Chapter III looks historically and critically on I the Sudan past experience of administrative reforms, and will discuss the role of bureaucracy as an agent of change. The following two chapters take a normative direc tion, and concern themselves with substantive areas of administrative reform which appeal to the writer as the most important areas of macro reform in Sudan. Chapter IV 24 discusses the issue of manpower planning and utilization. Chapter V discusses the issue of training and executive development. Both chapters emphasize the importance of the often neglected area of the human resource perspective of reform so that Sudan manpower can be planned, utilized, conserved, and developed, and thus transformed from tradi tional manpower of a regulative administration to a more developmental, dynamic administration. Chapter VI is an epilogue of the research. The general theme of the organization of the study runs as follows: 1. Identify factors and variables that are both conducive and inimical to the success of reform efforts, and evolve, eventually, guidelines, if not a primary theory, for the formulation and effective implementation of administrative reform programs 2. Analyze national efforts for major reforms designed in the past to accelerate economic and social development and to suggest crucial new normative areas of reform 3. Develop criteria for the appraisal of administrative reform efforts In a nutshell, the study has two objectives: a theoretical one of contributing to the theory of reform, 25 and an operational objective which is concerned with normative administrative reforms of high priority. 26 CHAPTER II ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM: GOALS, OBJECTIVES, AND STRATEGIES Background 7 Administrative capabilities have been frequently singled out as one of the most important elements in the success or failure of national development measures and programs for economic and social progress. Difficulties encountered in implementing plans and generally in per forming governmental functions have created a growing awareness of the need for purposive action of administra tive improvement. Such action has to take place constantly to keep national administrative capabilities cormnensurate with the changing needs of the developing countries through the use of new administrative and managerial approaches and techniques, and the removal of administrative short comings of various kinds. In many African countries the movement to introduce administrative reforms arises out of the fact that the period of post-independence transition is at its end and 27 that the evolving responsibilities of governments require more effective executive instruments and manpower than could be had through normal civil services inherited from the colonial past. A close investigation of the whole system is now taking place in a number of countries, and policies for reform are being considered which are aimed at restructuring the machinery of government and human I resources to make them more effective for the political, economic, and social changes of those countries. Princi pally speaking, administrative reform is needed where administrative change is insufficient to keep an ad.minis- ! tration abreast of developments, or when the administration is obviously failing to meet the demands of the day or of the future, particularly in an era of high public aspira tions and expectations which is prevaleat in developing countries. The principal objectives for such a policy of reform are manifold: Firstly, accelerated economic and social development requires more efficient mobilization of resources--financial, natural, and human. This requires that advantage should be taken, but rather consciously and carefully, of the knowledge accumulated in the more advanced states of the world in the disciplines required 28 I for development, including the results of the tremendous progress made in science and technology. Secondly, all states in Africa have the problem of integration of people of different ethnic and tribal groups, geographical regions and religions. A primary task of all governments has therefore been to stimulate the development process which in time could result in a gr ving sense of real nationhood and existence of a united nation. Thirdly, and in corollary to the second objective, it is being increas ingly recognized that planned and balanced change, whether political, economic or social, should have as a principal objective, bringing development to the grass roots level in the rural sectors and not just in urban centers. Fourthly, a great deal of attention needs to be given to human resource development and reorientation policies so that government employees, on whose shoulders development depends, could be transformed from traditionalists, who were only suitable for a limited and regulative form of administration, to a more developmental, dynamic and inno vative one. 29 Adminis• trative Refo· rm and Development Adniinis tr· a·tion Since administrative reform is supposed to be an effective tool for the promotion of political, economic and social development, it is considered as an important component of the field of development administration. Development administration, as a new discipline in the arena of public administration, started after the prolifer ation of newly independent states that did not have any previous strong administrative tradition and which had to rely to some extent on international administrative assist ance. The new discipline is concerned in the main with deliberate acceleration of growth processes, modernization and action programs in developing countries, with attention to normative prescriptions and value judgments of thinkers and writers from developed societies. Caiden asserts that as yet, the scope of the discipline has been con fined largely to the administrative aspects--widely defined--of political development--economic develop ment--and social development of the newly emerging nations.1 However, most development goals ,discussed by proponents of 1 Gerald E. Caiden, "Development Administration and Administrative Reform," International Social Science Journal 21, no. 1 (1969):10. 30 1 the new discipline are culture-bound, and laden wi • :h normative values specific to a particular point in history (i.e., the present) and geared predominantly to western institutional and functional patterns of limited applic ability elsewhere. The political topics tackled by development administration were those such as diffusion of power, democratization, spread of civil rights, pluralism, etc., the economic topics covered industrialization, urbanization entrepreneurship, application of mechanical technology, full employment, etc.; social problems dis cussed were social mobility, equal opportunity, encourage- ment of liberal arts and humanities, etc. The ~riticism lodged against the discipline is that it concerned itself rather with shadows of development and put undue emphasis on the infrastructure of development rather than the sub stance which developing countries aspire to achieve. The discontent of this approach led dissidents to seek new meanings to development which are apt to be of more benefit to developing countries. More recently, development has been defined as a normative term which means the realiza tion of the potential of human personality. Development should, therefore, concern itself with the total social structure of any particular country, and a given set of 31 I social criteria that has to be fulfilled, i.e., redistribu tion of income to achieve equality, reduction of unemploy ment among the poor categories of a country and the elimination of the ugly face of poverty which is rampant throughout all developing countries. Only then, can we 2 speak of achieving development. With the change in the approach of development administration toward discussing more substantive problems of development rather than culture-bound determinants, objectives of administrative reform have been undergoing many changes. The past approach to development was !deterministic in the sense that it outlined certain modes I of behavior and specified certain political, economic, and social changes without which no developing country can develop and progress. This assumption emanates from the predetermined myth that the modernized countries are better administered than developing countries, and further, that !if the latter would adopt the administrative patterns of the former, the gap between them could be reduced. The justification for such a belief is based on all the observed 2 Dudley Seers, "The Meaning of Development," International Development Review 11 (December 1969):2-6. 32 I administrative failings of poor or developing countries. The shortcomings of this approach are obvious. Caiden believes that such failings are not a monopoly of develop ing countries. Secondly, there is a tendency to judge administration in developing countries not by the standards that actually prevail in the richer ones, but according to idealistic standards which fail to consider adequately differences in tasks, the relative instability of adminis trative foundations and the ecology of administration. Thirdly, developing countries are faced at one and the same time with so many administrative problems--lack of sufficiently experienced administrators, overhaul of the administrative system bequeathed by the colonial powers, distrust of administrators who embraced the colonial cultur and behaved just like them, etc.--that would tax the capability of the most able administration anywhere. 3 Enduring solutions to such problems would definitely require some kind of continuous administrative reform program which is by necessity different from any program experienced by any developed country. At present, the most pressing need for administra tive reform is felt in the newly ind~pendent developing 33 I I countries in order to increase administrative capacity for development. It is thus an essential ingredient of devel opment in any country, much more so in developing ones. Improvements in administrative capacity may involve the removal of environmental obstacles, structural alterations and changing individual and group attitudes and perform ances, taking into account the specific extra-administrativ variables and cost-benefit measures as well as administra tive ones. As such, administrative reform can be con sidered, just like development, as a normative behavior rooted in values, belief, and culture. Its universality is shown by the fact that every country--developed or developing--came to believe that administration does matter, and that its reform is wanted, needed and sought after continuously, first, as a means to achieve certain ends (e.g., improvement in performance), and second, as a contribution toward the improvement of the quality of life for every individual--in the society, which is the ultimate end of administration at large. Definitions of Administrative Reform All definitions of administrative reform have in connnon the fact that reform is a directed action or a 34 directed change; that it involves innovation of some kind and that it deals with comprehensive rather than minor changes in organizations. Caiden, who is considered e pioneer in the field, defines administrative reform as "the artificial inducement of administrative transformation against resistance." 4 It is artificial because it is man-made, deliberate and planned. It is induced because it involves persuasion, argument, and the ultimate threat of sanction. It has I moral connotation since it is undertaken in the belief that the end results will always be better than the status quo and so worth the effort to overcome resistance. Caiden !asserts that it is part of societal reform, but he dis tinguishes it from administrative change, which is a self adjusting "organizational response to fluctuating condi tions," claiming that the need for reform arises from change because of the malfunctioning of the natural proc- 5 esses of administrative change. Another way to distin- l guish between the two is 4 Gerald E. Caiden, Administrative Reform (Chicago: Aldin Publishing Co., 1969), p. 65. 5 Ibid., pp. 57-58, 65. 35 to confine the use of the term 'administrative reform' for those reforms in the living consti tution for the implementation of other kinds of reform. They could include attempts to (a) change purposes and goals, (b) alter the mix of resources, (c) transform attitudes and methods, (d) improve relationships and standards, (e) speed decisions, (f) alter patterns of authority and communication, and (g) achieve a higher level of efficiency.6 Dror speaks of "directed change of the main features of an administrative system," but he limits the concept of administrative reform to major changes of high comprehensiveness and innovativeness . 7 The advantage of this qualification is that it allows the study of reform . f 8 to concentrate on maJor re orms. Hahn-Been Lee stresses the point of innovation in his definition of administrative reform : .. . reform is viewed as a generic process per meating all phases of administration; it is con ceived as the crucial capacity that is required for the introduction of creativity into adminis- 6 Gerald E. Caiden, The Dynamics· of Public Adminis- tration (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1971), p. 124. 7 Yehezkel Dror, "Strategies for Administrative Reform," Development and Change 2, no. 2 (1970-71):19-35. 8 Arne F. Leemans, "Aspects of Administrative Change and Reform," in Studies in International Developmen· t and Economics, ed. Kenneth Rothwell (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, D. C. Heath & Co., 1972), p. 119. 36 trative units at whatever level for conscious pur suit of developmental goals.9 For the benefit of a United Nations conference that was held in 1971, major administrative reforms were defined as specially designed efforts to induce fundamental changes in the public administration systems through system-wide reforms or at least through measures for improvement of one or more of its key elements such as administrative structures, per sonnel, and processes.10 By definition, programs of major reform are distinct from normal and continuing administration and management improvement activities in terms of their scope, mode and implications, for the institutions that carry out such major reforms. This definition is criticized for its neglect of an area that gained importance recently: the area of behavior and attitudes of employees who implement the administrative reforms, and of attitudes prevalent in the I environment of reform which could expedite or impede the 9 Hahn-Been Lee, "An Application of Innovation Theory to the Strategy of Administrative Reform in Develop ing Countries," Policy s • ciences 1, no. · 2 (1970): 178. lOA mimeographed aid-memoir on UN, Interregional Seminar on Majo• r Admin• istra• tive Refo· rms in Developing Countries, 25 October-2 November 1971. 37 I movement of reform. Proponents of this view believe that reform of structures and organization alone, without attempt to reform attitudes and behavior, does not change societies very much and is ineffective. Writers concerned with institution building see many things in common between administrative reform and institution building. Siegel asserts that the idea of institution building originally was developed as a guiding framework for planning and analysis of formal organizations capable of im planting social change without compromising viabil ity. Thus, from the perspective of institution building, the perfecting of organizations that command the environments in which they are situated is the means to such ends as administrative reform and administrative development.11 Brodie relates administrative reform to the concept of "organizational development" which is a process whereby organizational weaknesses are diagnosed and changes are initiated that are expected to lead to improvement in per formance and in the capa.city of the organization to adapt and develop. He claims that the concept is wider than administrative reform as previously defined, in the sense 11 Gilbert B. Siegel, "Making Major Administrative 1Reform Acceptable and Operational," in UN, Interregional Seminar on Major Administrative Reforms in• Deve·loping I Countries, vol. 3 (New York, 1972) (Sales No. E/F/S/72/II/ H.7), pp. 129-30. 38 that organizational development puts its impact upon the enterprise as a whole as well as on its individual parts. It concentrates on the behavior and development of individuals, especially as these effect inter personal and intergroup relations. The definition thus broadens to include the cultivation of a cli mate of values, attitudes and managerial style in the enterprise that will lead to more effective performance and organizational resilience.12 In contrast to Dror's definition of adrn.inistrative reform which emphasizes comprehensiveness of reform, the organi zational development experts actually limit its meaning to micro organizational adaptations and changes, thus neglect ing the macro aspects of reform. Goals and Objectives The setting of objectives of reform is of primary importance as in any public policy or decision-making process. This is essentially so as it reflects directly on the determination of reform strategies later. Administrative reform programs are rarely designed with a single purpose in mind. Reform is a multigoal 12 M. B. Brodie, "Organizational Reform and Develop I ment," in UN, Interregional· Seminar· on Majo• r Administrative Reforms in Develo· p• ing co· untr·ies, vol. 2 (New York, 1972) (Sales No. E/F/S.72.II.H.6), p. 154. 39 oriented endeavor. Traditionally, reform has been equated with efforts to increase efficiency or effectiveness to achieve national objectives. The focus of reform at that stage was on the mechanics of administration, such as financial and budgetary procedures, personnel practices, organizational structures, and organization and methods; the static forms of reform, so to speak. The United Nations' first development decade--1960-1970, which called for action to lessen the gap between developed and develop ing countries--witnessed so many programs of reform, the nature of which could safely be termed static. About mid-point of the decade, it became evident that there 1 existed a persistent gap between development goals, on the lone hand, and actual performance results, on the other. When the realities of performance failed to correspond with the announced targets, an examination of the causes responsible for such a failure was urgently called for. !The failings have been shown to be due to the fact that "not too many of the (UN) projects in public administration were directly linked with development planning." 13 A new 13 chi Yuen Wu, "Public Administration for National Development,"· Internation·al Soc• ial sc• i • ence · Journ· a1 21, no. 1 (1969):124. 40 -------------------------------- approach was adopted by the United Nations where efforts were made to treat administrative capability as a factor central to the capability for development and growth, and to remind both the economists and the public administrators of the crucial role of government administration and reform acticn in economic and social development. What seems to have emerged from the experience of the 1960s is the neces sity for a new approach which gives administrative planning its proper place in all economic and social development plans. The isolation of administrative reform programs from public policy, national planning, and functional 1 reform programs has lessened their impact. The emphasis of reform on the administrative tech niques per se was well taken by Hahn-Been Lee, when he stated that improved method as a goal (of reform) is patently technique-oriented, but in administration technique is not a value in itself. It becomes valuable only when the larger goal towards which it is the means is seriously sought. Thus, in the absence of a well-formulated and accepted program of government goals, mere improvement of administrative methods and techniques might backfire in the form of more autocratic control of the populace by the bureauc racy.14 · · 14 Hahn-Been Lee, "Bureaucratic Models and Adminis- trative Reform," in The· Man· agetnent o· f Ch· an· ge in Government, 41 r, r------·------------------------------ I The recent trend and shift in goals of administra tive reform was toward the substance of government activi ties rather than on procedures and forms. The focus is shifted from form to substance, from economy and efficiency to goal effectiveness, and from bureaucratic merit to popular welfare. Goals of reform have now stressed the determination of broad public policies concerning develop ment. Problems of planning, progrannning, and determination of economic priorities as well as social programs of education, health, recreation, etc. have come to the front. The center stage in all developing countries has been occupied by economic and social modernization and, to a lesser extent, by political reform. Administrative reform as such has received only secondary attention. The relative_y low priority accorded to it was partly due to its intangibility when compared to operational and sub stantive economic and social reforms. The consequence of this situation was reflected in the lack of integration in lmost countries between development plans on the one hand, and administrative reforms activity on the other. Often development plans were adopted with little consideration ed. Arne E. Leemans (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1976), p. 116. l:-2 as to the ways in which they would be implemented; the prevailing assumption was that plans made would somehow be implemented. The administration variable has been missing from development planning, and the conventional dichotomy between 'planning' and administration has often excluded the possibility of incorporating the reality of administra tive capability in the plan itself. The statement, frequently made to the effect that the plan was good but the implementation was poor, is only indicative of the I extent to which economic and social planning has been divorced from administrative planning. The new line of thought is giving more consideration to the administration of development at the initial stages of planning and for mulation of operational program. In Pakistan, for example, the chairmanship of the Administrative Reorganization Com mittee was entrusted to the chairman of the Planning Com- I mission who was concurrently engaged in the preparation of the country's Second Four-Year Plan for social and economic development. This presented the committee with an invalu able opportunity to link firmly its recommendations on administrative arrangements with the imperatives of 43 development.15 This is a clear indication that the concep tion of administrative reform that has started at the micro level has been enlarged recently to cover more comprehen sive development programs at the macro level. Administrative reform is a long-range and continuin undertaking. The question to be posed at this juncture is to what extent it could be planned and implemented. Issues to be answered at the start of reform planning are such as: Who should be entrusted with reform tasks? How to involve society leaders in the conceptualization and thinking process? What are the sort of resources necessary for launching reform? From which quarters could opposition to reform be expected? Such planning would provide the basis for determining the terms of reference for a major program of reform. Attempts to answer these questions would be made as the study delves into the discussion of reform planning, reform variables and strategies. Reform is a long process; it does not arise by chance. All writings in the field agree to the fact that 15 G. Ahmed, "Role of Commissions and Connnittees in Administrative Reform," in UN, · rn·terre· glon· a1 Semin· a· r O!!, Maj • or Admirtistra·tive· · Re· forms· iri · nevelop• in: g· · c-o· ur1r·tr·fes, vol. 3 (New York, 1973), p. 125. 44 it has identifiable beginnings, and progress can be followed through a series of stages until reform reaches its fruition or is discarded or postponed or amended. Caiden refers to four stages in the process of reform: (a) The awareness of the need in view of the rela tive administrative inadequacies experienced by developing countries. A point is reached when people are no longer prepared to accept the status quo, particularly when they are under stress or in danger of their lives. (b) Formulation of goals and objectives, strategy and tactics. In this stage, relevant knowledge and creativ~ thought has to be articulated and proposals formulated with I an air of practicability and feasibility. Imitation is not enough in this stage. Creativity and originality are a must since situations and problems differ from one place to another. Reform agents may be intuitive individuals, groups or political leaders. The formulation connotes the idea of prior preparation, that administrative reform is organized, engineered, and planned beforehand. (c) Implementation. Here no catalogue of ways and means can help the potential reformer carry through his specific reforms. A climate conducive to reform must exist, and the introduction of a reform needs a sense of timing 45 and staging. The selection of techniques and strategies, to be discussed later, for implementing reform is crucial. (d) Evaluation. The end result of administrative reform must be some kind of permanent transformation for the better of the society in terms of the objectives of the reformers. Costs and expenditures can help as tools of evaluation, feedback from beneficiaries and clientele is another way and all other observable signs of improvement lor failure can be used to evaluate reform. However, reforms take a long time before they reach maturation and 1 d h 1 1 . d 1 . 16 en t emse ves to eva uation an ana ysis. These four stages of the process of reform are I sheer normative guidelines which can help the reformer, but I they are by no means standardized principles which gain acceptability at all times. Different writers tackled some of these stages of reform process, but most seem to put greater emphasis on reform evaluation as it is the essence and ultimate end of any reform. Backoff gives these criteria of evaluating reform results: the quantity and quality of reform activity, the effectiveness as related to the objectives of reform and the perceived relative 16 caiden, Dynamics· · of Public Administration, pp. 351-353. 46 advantage of the consequences of the reform plan. 7 Reform, as an application of new ideas and innova tion, invariably involves new values and modes of behavior, and these once introduced into organizations, must be protected and fostered until they become accepted by those affected by them. Thus, an administrative reform is not accomplished merely by introduction of some scheme borrowed from somewhere. Rather, it is a process, a complex one, in which many factors (variables) interact and the effect of which appears only over a certain period of time. One can identify at least three variables that condition the strategies of reform in any country. These are political leadership, environment, and timing. The strategy of reform is dependent on how these variables interact; and reform only takes place when the leadership, considering environment and timing, selects the appropriate strategy to effect it. 17 For a detailed treatment, see Robert Backoff, "Operationalizing Administrative Reform for Improved Governmental Performance,"' Adrrii'n·fs·tr· a·ti'oi1 · an:d s · o· c·te·ty 6 no. 1 (May 1974):90-94. 47 I 1. Po1itic· a1 and Administra• tive· Lea.der·ship The many demonstrated failures of administrative reform in various developing countries have dramatically shown the importance of political leadership. Strong and sustained support of political leaders is an essential condition for the success of any major reform. Dr. Mosher states that assuming political stability, it must also be recog nized that while incremental and often very minor changes in subsector policies and process may occur at random throughout the system under reform efforts that have little or no support from top political positions, politically unsupported reform leads to conflict and the dissipation of resources and per sonnel energies.18 Once political lea~ership commits itself to reform, including political and economic capital, change becomes likely. Political support should go all the way from initiation of reform, influencing of resource allocation, selecting of sectors of reform that are most needy of reform to the encouragement of reform for the attainment of desired goals and improvements in the government system 18L. h e1.g trative Reform: niques, " in UN, · Grosenick and Fredrick C. Mosher, "Adminis Goals, Strategies, Instruments and Tech 'Int· e· r · r · e· g·io1tal· · seminar, vo 1 . 2, p. 18 . 48 .___ _______________________________ ._ and the sustaining of such fulfilled goals. When this point is reached, the attention of top political leadership can be shifted to other .se~tors in need of reform. Case studies of successful reforms, though small in number, can be cited to indicate that they have only been realized through continuous and serious support from politicians. The experience of Pakistan is a case in point. While two attempts for administrative reform made by two American consultants in 1953 and 1955 (Professor Egger from the University of Virginia in 1953 and Mr. Bern hard Gladieux in 1955), on request of the Pakistan's Prime Minister of the day, failed because of civil service I antagonism. The picture changed innnediately after Presiden Ayub Khan assumed power in 1958 and declared a martial law in Pakistan. He adopted administrative reform as his method to bring about change. In the second five-year economic plan 1961-64, an assertion was made by the planning cormnission that a factor in the shortcomings encountered I during the first five-year plan 1957-60 period was adminis trative in nature. As the second plan was drafted and published, the martial law government set a number of study connnissions to examine different functional areas. There were connnissions on landownership, education, finance, 49 police, law, food and agriculture, medical services, prices, and a new constitution. Reports subsequently were rendered on these topics. An Administrative Reorganization Committee of Career Civil Servants was established as a part of the general reform drive. A number of structural and procedural changes, which the committee considered unprecedented, was proposed in its 1961 report and accepted by the government, and was implemented throughout 1 the period 1961-64. 19 In Sudan, a comprehensive Public Service Law was passed by the government in 1973 for the first time since independence. In the past, the public service was working on fragmented laws and on rules and regulations that had not the strength of law. One of the most conspicuous characteristics of the 1973 law was the admission of women employees into the pensionable service of the government. This could only be achieved through the seriousness and drive of the minister of Public Service and Administrative !Reform. 19 Albert Gorvi.ne, "Administrative Reform: Function of Political and Economic Change," in Adttiin• is• tra·tive· · pr·ob lems in · Pa· kis·tan, ed. Guthrie S. Birkhead (Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University Press, 1966), pp. 185-211. 50 Conversely, when reform lacks the political support, it is always doomed to failt~re. The administra tive reform in Venezuela is a case in point. Based on recommendations of a United Nations consultant, a reform study commission composed of prestigious persons (Public Administration Commission) was established to recommend broad reforms of the Venezuela national government, organi zation and civil service. The Executive Secretary of the Public Administration Commission decided to employ three consulting firms from the United States to conduct the commission's studies because he perceived that adequate indigenous resources were not available. The commission was gradually downgraded, with the Executive Secretary assuming real authority. In the process, normative link ages with the government body were severed. The doctrine of proposed personnel system reforms called for a total break with past practice. Such practice, in particular, was associated with a spoils system which had as its objective assurance of personal loyalty. Merit principles were to be applied and all jobs were to be placed under classification and pay plans to be controlled by a central personnel agency. Lack of normative linkage with the Congress caused a failure of passage of the personnel law. 51 The same problem was encountered when the President was prevailed upon to promulgate the law by executive order. The order eventually emerged as a watered-down version, much delayed and reluctantly issued. Ultimately, govern ment agencies interpreted the order as representing some thing less than complete legitimation, the net effect of h . h k 1· 20 w ic was wea comp iance. One of the major obstacles of reform in developing countries has been and still is the political instability and turbulence which characterize all countries of the Third World. Most significant reforms require many years to become fully effective and to come to fruition. It is, therefore, essential that there be some degree of stability and continuity of leadership during the reform period. But paradoxically enough, experience has shown that military governments have shown more positive and unmatched capacity of supporting and implementing administrative I reform than multiparty systems of governments. Groves 20 Gilbert B. Siegel, "Making Major Administrative Reform Acceptable and Operational," in UN, · 'Inte·rreg·ion· a1 Seminar, vol 3, pp. 137-38. Also see Roderick T. Groves, "Administrative Reform and the Politics of Reform: The Case of Venezuela," Public· Adminis·tr· a• tive Review 27 (December 1967):436-45. 52 argues that military regimes ofteri take power after a divisive and turbulent political period in order to restore order and national harmony. Their justification for their own entry into politics is to end politics and they usually begin by outlawing the most vigorous and conspicu ous of the pre-military political institutions. As they work for the stabilization of their regime and appeal for public and bureaucratic support, they tend to support and implement administrative reform projects among other substantive and operational development projects . 21 Such was the case of Pakistan with the military regime of Ayub Khan and in Sudan with the military regime of Numeiri in 1969. The attitudes of political parties and party dominated governments toward administrative reform have I been supportive. The Congress Party of India is an exam- I 22 ple. Others have not been so enthusiastic as in the 21 Roderick T. Groves, "Administrative Reform and I Political Development," in Leemans, Man· agemen· t ·of Change, pp. 105-7. 22 Ralph Braibanti, "Reflections on Bureaucratic Reform in India," in Admini· s·trati'on at1d E· c· on· omi'c· · nevelop ment in 'In.dia, ed. Braibanti and Joseph Spengler (Durham: Duke University Press, 1963), pp. 9-10. 53 I case of the Unnna. government in Sudan under the leadership of Prime Minister M.A. Mahgoub which superseded the government of Mr. El Sadig El Mahdi in 1967. The situation seems to depend on the character and attitudes of the incumbent government and more so of the prime minister himself. Most typical have been party governments which have supported reform movements at the inquiring connnis sions stage but went very slow at the implementation stage. This is especially so if the implementation stage, which costs money, effort and the results of which are unpredict able or uncertain, came shortly before election time. Groves sees other very sound reasons which inhibit party governments from supporting administrative reform. I First, parties generally look to political patronage to maintain their unity and expand their appeal, and this brings them in conflict with administrative reform efforts that emphasize merit. Secondly, reformist political parties are likely to be far more concerned with substan tive reforms (land reform, public housing, health and sanitation programs, ~ducation, etc.) that will impress their followers and the mass public than administrative reforms. However, this reason militates against adminis trative reform in both military and political party regimes; 54 I I yet military r~gimes, once well-established, do not fear public antagonism as much as political parties. Thirdly, political parties tend to be very sensitive about incurring the opposition of political influentials and pressure groups much more than military regimes, and would therefore think twice before introducing administrative reform that might antagonize major professional or labor organiza- . 23 t1.ons. While political leadership figured importantly in administrative reform, senior administrators were essential elements of reform leadership. Conflicting views portray I government bureaucracy in developing countries. "Some feel that it is the raft on which society is kept afloat 24 and saved from political and economic collapse." Others attack it as dull, clumsy, ill-organized, self-centered, and inimical to change and modernization. Hahn-Been Lee cites an example from Senegal where after independence top civil servants with limited basic education and narrow gauge experience rose to leading posts through seniority 23 Groves, "Administrative Reform and Political Development," pp. 107-8. 24 Hahn-Been Lee, "Application of Innovative Theory," p. 184. 55 I I and were, therefore, suspicious of young educated civil servants, reluctant to reform and opposed to change. "They h . . d . "25 sun innovations an improvements. While these two extreme situations prevail in some developing countries, the truth about civil service, or bureaucracy, lies some where between the two extremes. The situation is gradually changing in favor of the optimistic view. In most coun tries of the third world, civil services have most of the educated elite who influence political decisions on reform and implement the programs of development and change. Indeed, many reforms have originated from leading civil servants, and many reform connnissions have been constituted j of intellectuals holding middle management and senior positions in bureaucracy. This is particularly true in developing countries which had well established civil service systems such as Pakistan, India, Ghana, Nigeria, and Sudan. Undoubtedly, some of the criticism of bureauc racy's unsatisfactory contribution to development is unfair. Often the need for reform appears to stem from dissatisfaction with the poor performance of bureaucracy. I Sometimes failure of any reform movement is attributed to 25 Ibid. 56 the reluctance, antagonism, and inefficiency demonstrated by bureaucracy. It might be reasonable to question, how ever, whether poor performance and deficiency in achieving reform is in fact due to bureaucracy and whether bureauc racy is not being used as a scapegoat for other ills of society and unrealistic policies of politicians. The notion that human beings, whether civil servants or others, are naturally reluctant to change has been widely ques tioned. Brodie states that resistance to change is a much overworked cliche . There is no evidence to show that there is an inherent universal trait that can be so described. In some cases there are a number of reasons why people are right and sensible to resist change. If reasons behind change are not understood and shared, individuals and working groups will cer tainly have the feeling that they are pawns in the situation, and no one likes that.26 Indeed, if people are not involved in the planning of change, they are not likely to be supportive of it. An example of this situation took place in Pakistan in the years 1953 and 1955 when reform reports written by two American consultants were recommending drastic changes in 26 M. B. Brodie, "Organizational Reform and Develop I men t, " in UN, · Int· e· r ·re· g·fonal s · emitiar, vo 1. 2 , pp . 15 6-6 7 . 57 I I the leadership of the Pakistani Civil Service which was made up of generalists. The reports recommended high technical posts from fields of engineering, agriculture, and medicine be transferred to the Secretariat System of Pakistan which was operated by generalists in the same pattern as Britain. The reports greatly antagonized the Civil Service of Pakistan (CSP) . Gorvine states that the two reports did not fail for lack of insight into the Pakistan administrative system. Rather, it was due to the fact that they were unable to "maintain sufficient contact . h h d . . . 1 · "27 wit tea ministrative e ite. Another factor that enhances the important role of bureaucracy in developing societies is the fact that it is a stable organ of society in relation to the instability of many political regimes. This is particularly true of African countries which witness frequent changes in govern ments through coup d'etat. In corollary to this kind of situation politicians are normally young, inexperienced in politics and by necessity dependent on senior civil servants for technical and political advice. This is exemplified by the fact that most of the political ministers in African 27G . orvine, "Administrative Reform," pp. 188-89. 58 regimes are drawn from universities and middle echelons of civil services. In Sudan, research of the Institute of Public Administration revealed the fact that 60 percent of the political ministers during the two military regimes (one in the period 1958-64; the present one assumed power in May 1969) were drawn from civil service and universi ties. It also has been shown that the average life of a government in the period 1956-58 (the years of independ ence) was only eleven months. In the interim periods between the fall of a government and the taking over by another one, the Senior Civil Service assumes the political 28 leadership of the country. Groves states that in the abstract bureaucracy seems to be a rather unlikely place to look for power because the close association of bureaucracy with governing authority ought to make it highly vulnerable to ruptures in the political order, a common place in developing nations. Indeed, this has been the case in Latin America where each downfall of regime has brought a considerable or total collapse in the position of the bureaucracy as well. But in nations where change has been rather gradual and elite controlled, 28 R . t · f epor o Sudan Civil Service vol. 1, pp. 62-64. (in Arabic), Khartoum, Sudan (May 1968), 59 such as Thailand, or where the bureaucracy has obtained extraordinary prestige through past asso ciation with a highly successful colonial order, such as India, Malaya or Pakistan, the bureaucracy is a political factor to be reckoned with.29 While Groves' analysis seems to be true in totality, it is lacking in some details. This is so because Western bureaucracies have had a long tradition which regularized their behavior in connection with the political government in office and fostered the dichotomy which confined bureaucracy to being a mere tool concerned with execution while leaving the area of decision making to politicians. That is why Groves assumes in the abstract not to look for leadership in bureaucracies. However, it is the opinion of the writer that bureaucracies in developed nations are legal-rational and monocratic in nature, as has been defined by Weber, while bureaucracies of developing coun tries defy this definition. In actual fact, the bureauc racy and the political systems in developing nations can be visualized as two interacting subunits submerged in the social, cultural, and economic environment. This inter action takes place at the individual level, group level and 29 Groves, "Administrative Reform and Political Development," p. 109. 60 ------------------------------------ I I with the toal bureaucracy. Allusion has been given to the relative inexperience of politicians in African countries when compared with bureaucrats, and to the fact that most politicians have emerged from the civil service. These two facts interplay in developing nations to make the interaction between the political and bureaucratic leader ship very close indeed. The informal cultural attitudes that characterize Sudan, for example, demonstrate the fact that individual bureaucrats as well as groups have the opportunity to confer with political ministers and convey to them their ideas and suggestions in political change and administrative refonn and therefore have very great input on the political decision making. Thus, bureaucracy in such an informal situation defies all western Weberian definitions, and makes the most of theoretical typologies · irrelevant to bureaucracies of developing nations. One further point which determines the impact and leadership role of bureaucracy is the fact already alluded to, of the air of professionalism which is required by any successful administrative reform. Despite the meagerness of professionalism throughout developing nations, bureauc racies are the places where professionalism required for reform is found. However, there is always the possibility 61 that such bureaucratic professionalism might be used to foster and sponsor administrative reform activities that are carefully circumscribed and oriented so as to pose little threat to the bureaucracy's power and conditions. Braibanti has rightfully noted that most of the reform studies done in Ceylon and Malaya were directed toward salary and service structuring questions, issues unlikely 30 to change the basic character of the bureaucracy. One point of qualification is important here when we speak of the relative bureaucratic professionalism for the purpose of administrative reform. There is much to be I desired to bring about professionalism for reform. The sad fact is that there is still an acute shortage of cap- abilities and skills both among those who would plan and engineer the reform and among those who would implement it correctly and follow it appropriately. Adedeji asserts that most of the leading civil service administrators are the product of Africanization and the heirs to the colonial legacy, are generalists and amateurish in their approach 30 Ralph Braibanti, "The Higher Bureaucracy of Pakistan," in As·tan Bur· e· at1c·ra·t • ic· sy·s·tems· · Emerge·nt from the Bri• tish Tmperta· 1 T· r ·adition, ed . Braibanti (Durham: Duke University Press, 1966), pp. 661-66. 62 to administrative reform, and that there is a feeling among these senior administrators that one can still muddle through, and that the generalist administrator is still as 31 valuable today as he was in. the past. This lack of professionalism is one of the great impediments to adminis trative reform in developing nations. As Lord Fulton's report on the reorganization of the British Civil Service has emphasized the importance of professionalism for Britain,s administration, it goes without saying that African ex-colonies would be in a greater need for it. 32 Professionalism in the report is defined as coming from both sustained experience and fundamental knowledge which enables the man to move with ease among its concepts. Developing countries are in acute need of the latter pro fessionalism that would only come about through vigorous training. Training institutions which are supposed to help in preparing cadres of reform ·planners and implemen ters have been a later development in African states in the early sixties as a UN endeavor in technical assistance 31 Adebayo Adedeji, "Formulating Administration Reform Strategies in Africa," in UN; 'Interre• gional· s · eminar, vol 2, p. 70. 32 united Kingdom, Fulton Report Connnittee, The Civil Service, vol. 1 (1968). 63 to developing nations. Those institutions which scored any success were able to make their impact felt only very recently. Another impediment which accentuated the acute manpower shortage in some African countries is the brain drain of skills and professions to developed and developing nations who offer better careers and financial inducements much greater than national governments could afford. To recapitulate, it is an undisputed fact that both political and administrative leaderships rank very high among the controlling variables which determine the effec tiveness of administrative reform in developing countries. It is the opinion of the writer that bureaucratic leadership is as important as political. While no administrative reform can be planned or achieved without political initia tion and support, little can be done if the bureaucratic leadership is irresponsive or resistant to the reform. On this hypothesis, the writer will build his strategic theory of reform for Sudan, later in this chapter. 2. The Enviro· nment The political and social environment is no less important than political and bureaucratic leadership as a determining variable for the success of administrative 64 reform. Reform implies change and the implementation of reform is therefore bound to emphasize some administrative elements and de-emphasize or abolish other elements, whether these are programs or organizational structures and arrangements or personnel mobilization and allocation. Reform leaders must, therefore, make efforts to secure the support of the political and social substructures: congres or parliament, local leaders, urban population, trade unions, professional associations, and other pressure groups. The implementation of any administrative reform I requires that members and subgroups of organizations and the clientele be informed and made familiar with the purpos~ 1 and content of the reform, lest resistance might frustrate any program. Indeed, the development of awareness of the need and urgency for change might entail educating the public through mass media about the rationale of reform with the purpose of engendering public interest and support, 1 thus giving the reform programs legitimacy and accept ability. Grosenick and Mosher assert that historically, at least from the time of the Pharoahs, administrative reform has been dictated from the top, often on the recommendation of trusted advisors. Recently, social scientists have 65 I urged that administrative change should or must be the product of shared and participative processes. The latter argument is based either (or both) on behavioral grounds- that the behavior of persons cannot be effectively changed unless they share in the decision making which occasions their change--or on normative grounds--that in a democratic society which respects the identity and sanctity of the individual, each should have a voice in determinations on actions that will affect his behavior , his rewards and his . 33 sanctions. The issue applies to the participation of persons potentially affected in the planning and implementation of administrative change. It applies also to the extent of !participation of employees in the civil service and to that I of the citizenry in general, the clientele innnediately affected; interest groups which may be concerned and persons and groups which have relations with public agen cies and are directly concerned with public agencies' performance in the fields concerning administrative reform- such as contractors, businessmen, and private companies 33 Grosenick and Mosher, "Administrative Reform," in UN, Ihte·rre• gion:a1· Semiriar, vol. 2, p. 17. 66 I and enterprises. The relative ease with which political and social support can be secured is also related to the nature and scope of the reform. If it is a major program affecting wide interests and connnunities, political support will be harder to secure, though crucial it may be; whereas if the reform is of technical nature at the micro level of a few agencies, reformers would have an easier time since the people mostly affected would be few and within the elite who are more ready to comprehend technical matters and go along with them. Very few case studies have been cited in the literature dealing with the importance of the societal . bl . f 34 T h h . h . varia e in re orm. o sow ow important t e environ- ment is, one would cite a recent Sudan experience in the field of local government. In 1951 the local government system of Sudan was installed and it worked quite satis- factorily for the main reason that it gave the localities autonomy and financial power to levy taxes and effect their own local developmental programs. The main feature of the 34 see Grosenick and Mosher, p. 18; and Hahn-Been Lee, "The Role of Leadership in Administrative Reform," in UN, · In te· r · r · e· g·i ·on· a1· s · emitiar, vo 1. 2, pp . 8 8-90 . 67 system was that localities were considered legal bodies eligible to sue and to be sued, and therefore, free, to some extent, from central government surveillance and control. The local politics, a continuation of national politics, prevailed. After the military regime assumed power in 1969, it abolished all multiparty politics both nationally and locally, and for political expediency rather than efficiency, it dissolved all local government councils which were controlled by party politicians. To further the grip of the new regime the autonomy of the local government councils was drastically reduced, and power was shifted from the localities to the headquarters of the nine provinces of Sudan. Each province was put under a cormnissioner who was a representative of the centra government at Khartoum, and the localities were eventually reduced from local autonomous entities to mere agents of the provinces. A new local government act was enacted to that effect in 1971. 35 Neither at the stage of planning nor at the implementation were local leaders and major I societal groups involved. By the same token, administrativ officers of the ministry of the local government did not 35 Sudan, Local Government Act, 1971, p. 2. 68 participate in the proceedings. Indeed, the act was accompanied by personnel reallocations which gave little attention to the merit system in promotions and power distribution. The criterion of promotion and transfer ability was political allegiance and expediency. Some of the leading bureaucrats who expressed critical views on the reform were either purged or relegated to insignifi cant positions. Younger officials who demonstrated willing ness and support for the reform assumed leading positions. That action was evidently a gross underestimation of the local political leaders' influence on local people. The implementation of the act led to a lot of controversy; local government officials were quite unhappy about being ignored in the process of planning and change, local leaders were alienated and antagonized and thus became apathetic and disinterested in the functions of local government councils at best, and resistant and overtly opposed to it at worst. Performance of the local councils was adversely affected and this was reflected in the poor connnunity services rendered and the poor tax collection resulting in big financial deficits by the end of 1972, the year of implementing the law. The government tried hard to build up a new leadership in local government which 69 would adhere to the teachings and ideologies of the one party system. The new leadership was young and inexperi enced and did not capture the respect of the local commu nities. In 1975, the Sudan Parliament passed a resolution, which the government endorsed, to appoint a national com mission to review the local government system and to present its reconu:nendations for the improvement of the deficient system. The reviewing commission adopted a strategy which emphasized the full participation and co operation of local societal leaders through deep and long interviews in order to get their true opinions on the present system and how they would conceptualize a workable reform for the future of local government. 3. Timing The timing of the initiation of reform is the third important variable that goes hand in hand with political leadership support and environmental factors already discussed. The essence of reform timing is the estimation of the readiness of internal and external environments of reform. Some observers have noted that natural catastrophies and political crises such as wars and revolutions could 70 provide the critical impetus for administrative reform.36 Others have suggested that major reform is most likely shortly after the inauguration of new top-level political leadership. 37 In fact, it is connnon for aspiring new leaders, whether or not seeking power through evolutionary or democratic or revolutionary means, to promise major administrative reform. While this approach could be quite acceptable in many African countries which witnessed revolutionary changes in governments such as Sudan, Ghana, or Nigeria ~ a proper strategy of reform should always seek to stabilize itself through institutionalization and to plan for administrative reform whenever needed. It would be wasteful to wait for a change of government to effect reform. In this writer's view, the initiation of the frequent five-, seven-, or ten-year economic and social plan would be a more laudable approach for major administrative reforms. Pakistan, for example, found it feasible and expedient to start adminis trative reform at the start of the second economic five- 36 Hahn-Been Lee, "An Application of Innovative Theory," p. 184. 37 G · k d h 16 rosenic an Mos er, p. . 71 year plan of 1961-64. Manpower availability can be considered as one feature of the time variable. Together with it go all other resources--economic, financial, etc. The limitations of such resources hamper a great deal of aspirations of reform. Most developing countries operate within an economy of scarcity, and invariably every reform costs money. The allocation of meager resources to reform projects and the determination of priorities often make overall reform an impossibility. Equally crucial is the stage of development of the particular country launching reform. Poverty and adverse economic conditions are not conducive to reform; reform requires a minimum degree of lpropserity which enables government to mobilize human and !physical resources to a higher standard of efficiency and competence. Under conditions of deprivation and destitu tion, corruption, nepotism, and favoritism bloom and grow, thus impeding reform. Developing countries, hence, work against many odds, and this explains why so many adminis trative reform projects fail or remain at the planning stage until leadership, considering environmental variables 38 G:orvine, "Administrative Reform," in Birkhead, Administrative Problems in Pakistan, p. 440. 72 and time, selects the best strategy of reform. The next part will logically deal with such strategies. Strategies for Reform The writer agrees with Dror's definition of the concept of strategy as: A defined series of master policies or "mega policies." Strategies establish the framework of guidelines and the boundaries of policy space within which operational and detailed policies are to be established and decisions are to be made. Strategies for administrative reform must therefore deal with issues such as overall goals of adminis trative reform; the boundaries of administrative reform, preferences in respect to time, risk accept ability; choice between more incremental or more innovative reform, ... and the range of feasible reform instruments.39 The significance of this definition is that it is pervasive and encompassing, unlike other definitions which consider a strategy as one or another dimension. The strategic dimensions are frequently expressed in terms of 40 a set of polar approaches, for analytical clarity, such as macro-micro, adaptive-innovative, comprehensive selective or incremental, structural-behavioral polar sets, 39 nror, "Strategies for Administrative Reform," in Leemans, Management of Change in Government, p. 126. 40 Leemans, "Aspects of Administrative Change," in Rothwell, Studies in International Development, pp. 125- 26. 73 I and so forth. Seldom are strategies encountered in these pure forms in day-to-day activities of reform. More often a reform strategy embodies features and characteristics of micro and macro reform, incremental and comprehensive, structural and behavioral as these approaches interact with each other and are therefore inseparable. No reform plan that neglects structure and emphasizes behavior or vice versa would be practicable; likewise a strategy that starts as incremental may eventually and through time become comprehensive, or a strategy that attempts to be compre hensive is always selective as it cannot possibly cover every sector of life at one and the same time, even in the most developed nations which can afford all needed variables such as personnel, institutions, and technical know-how. This writer is of the opinion that a feasible strategy should always be a continuum of both behavioral and struc- tural, micro and macro, adaptive and innovative aspects of reform, and success of such a pervasive strategy is guaran teed only if due consideration to time factor, societal I environment, personnel, and financial and economic condi tions of a country is given. Dror asserts that the prefer able mix of administrative reform strategies is in the main a function of the concrete circumstances of each particular 74 reform situation: special local needs, availability of different resources, historic traditions and indigenous 41 political culture. All writers on administrative reform agree on these unique variables which make impossible the existence of universal optimal administrative reform strategies. Abelardo Samonte, in his review .of the book, Administrative Reforms in Asia, writes that the patterns exhibited by the experiences of Asian reformers are as varied as the cultural backgrounds of the people of Asia; so varied in fact as not to permit any valid comparison of goals, orientations, scope, nature and source of reform, and that "the choice of what pattern to follow is still 1 1 d . d b h 1 f h . . 1142 arge y etermine y t e aw o t e situation. Nevertheless, the concept of reform strategy can be of much applied usefulness as a framework for adminis trative reform policymaking in any particular country. An attempt to discuss such strategies will be made below, followed by a discussion of the 'normative strategy' of 41 Dror, "Strategies of Administrative Reform," p. 12 7. 42 Mario M. Nieves, "Asian Experiences in Adminis trative Reform':' (a review of Hahn-Been Lee and Abelardo Samonte (eds.), Administrative Reforms in As·ia) , Ph·ilippine Journal · of Public Admittistration 15, no. 1 (1971): 96. 75 reform which the writer sees as a continuum of different single polar strategies. Comprehensive versus Selective Strategy It is assumed, in general, that the steps involved in administrative reform which are logically sequential, though many of them may or must be carried out simul taneously, are as follows: 1. Research and analysis of the current situation of political, economic and social conditions prevailing 2. Analysis and discussion leading to consensus on goals of reform 3. Forecasting and availability of resources 4. Development of alternative places of reform 5. Analysis of plans, their costs and benefits 6. Decision to proceed on feasible plan 7. Implementation of plan adopted 8. Continuing feedback on consequences and modification of plan After the phase of conceptualization, a strategy would be developed. One of the most often debated issues regarding strategies is the relative merit of two alterna tives in the choice of scope and pace of reform, i.e., comprehensive reform versus selective reform, alternately 76 termed macro versus micro reform strategy. On some occasions, particularly after attainment of independence or a revolution or even an evolutionary change in. government, the incumbent government could adopt a comprehensive reform covering all fields of public administration, including machinery of government, civil service, budget system and financial administration, plan ning, public enterprises and special authorities, local government, etc. Usually the chosen instrument for plan ning and implementation of reform would be a central managerial agency which controlled finance or personnel, or an ad hoc or statutory connnission or task force created especially by the high authorities in government. The reform project might be applied across-the-board throughout the government. Support from the political leadership is 1 vital for such a reform as one distinct characteristic of such reform is that it is better suited to catch the imagination and popular support of the public which revolu tionary governments need badly at the early stages of their reign. Comprehensive reform approach is often criticized as impractical because it consumes a lot of time and requires managerial capabilities which are lacing in most developing countries. It also requires the support and 77 1 continuity of leadership, and since conditions are not always stable in developing countries, the continuity of political leadership is highly questionable. Too often a comprehensive reform is regarded as having been accom plished as soon as it is introduced through such means as the promulgation of a new act or a reorganization scheme. Needless to say, this is a fallacy, a fallacy regarding 43 reform as an output rather than a process. A bitter experience that took place in Sudan is illustrative of some of the issues discussed above . In 1966, a zealous and young prime minister convened a national connnission to make an overall reorganization of the administrative system. It took the commission two years to finish the across-the-board comprehensive report. By the time it submitted its final report, a change in government took place and the prime minister was then the leader of the opposition, and the comprehensive report languished unattended in government archives. Neverthe- less, it served later as important background material for selective reforms. Case studies of reform from different developing countries show preference for incremental or 43 Hahn-Been Lee, "An Application of Innovative Theory," p. 186. 78 selective reform over comprehensive reform. The 1966 Indian Administrative Reform Commission with very wi· -ie terms of reference, embracing administration at the center as well as in the states is a striking example of macro reform. A prominent politician was appointed chairman. The position of importance given to the conunission by its wide charter and the prestige of its chairman reflected the desire of the country as a whole that a respectable person should attack the entire problem of public adminis tration and do something substantial about it . Mukarji asserts that this expectation was not fulfilled, as the distinguished politician was caught up in political development, and after functioning as chairman for a little I over a year, left the commission for a more important 44 political post. The voluminous report of the commission I came out after four and a half years when the government terminated this experience in macro reform. It was not surprising that the exercise ended in a good deal of dis enchantment with the whote notion of effecting administra tive reform through a comprehensive commission. India 44 N. K. Mukarji, "Formulation of Administrative Reform Strategies," in UN, Interregional Seminar, vol. 2, p. 51. 79 I seemed to work better with micro reform activities as best seen in the work of its Department of Administrative Reforms which was set up in 1964 as a permanent branch of the central government to mount micro reforms which were more controlled and dealt with specific areas of adminis tration. The Pakistani Administrative Reorganization Committee of 1958-60 which dealt with the structure and functions of the entire central government met with better luch than its counterpart, despite the fact that its jurisdiction was no less extensive than the Indian 1966 Commission. G. Ahmed of Pakistan asserts that not all reconnnendations made by it have been accepted by the government, nor were they expected to be. But some of the rejections were the result of bureaucratic pressure and resistance. He believes that the relative success of the I I Pakistani comprehensive reform was due to the presentation device successfully adopted by the Administrative Reorgani- I I zation Connnittee. Instead of waiting to submit a volumi- nous report at the end of its deliberations, the committee furnished its recommendations piece-meal to the government for consideration as soon as its proposals with respect to an agency or a general organizational issue were ready. Over fifty such reports, succinctly drafted, were presented 80 to the government which was thus able to make timely d . . h . ' d . 45 ecisions on t e connnittee s recommen ations. One can safely infer from Pakistan's experience that the compre hensive reform started by the committee in question has in fact been staggered into parts and phases, thus being transformed to incremental reform in the end; and probably this was the influencing factor that led to the relative success of such comprehensive strategy. Adedeji asserts that despite the fact that many areas of African administrations call for reform simul taneously, the undertaking of comprehensive reform in all areas under such conditions of acute shortages in adminis trative capability will lead to nothing but chaos, 46 and since experiences in other developing countries have hardly shown any success of the global approach to administrative reform, African countries need to avoid this approach and concentrate, instead, on a series of medium-term programs. According to selective strategy, an administrative 45 G. Ahmed, "Role of Commissions and Committees in Administrative Reform,'' in UN, Interregional Seminar, vol. 3, p. 125. 46 Adedeji, "Formulating Administration Reform Strategies," in UN. Interr·egional Seminar, vol. 2, p. 71. 81 I reform is always a single step but it should tackle a key sector which would have its multiplier effect on other sectors of the administrative system. The selective strategy is more predictable since i _ sees reform in st~ges and as sequential chains. For that matter, a central agency which would plan and follow up reform through com petent well-trained professional reformers is a prerequi site of such strategy. In some developing countries such as India, Iran, Indonesia, Egypt, and Sudan, a central ministry for administrative reform has already been set up. In other countries the central personnel agency or the Ministry of Finance assumes the leadership role in reform. The advantages of administrative reform of the selective approach lies in its micro character. Specific areas of administration can be intensively studied and concrete, feasible recommendations developed; the success ful implantation of a new idea in one or two situations becomes a persuasive argument for its wider adoption; and the capabilities in administrative reform will not be unduly taxed. However, these advantages should not blind us to the limitations of the micro approach. There is always the danger that its activities would degenerate to simple reorganizations and organization and management 82 consultative work, thus defeating the whole purpose of a directed and contrived reform that should leave its impact on the entire government apparatus. Avoiding the dangers of this limitation would depend on the calibre, experience, and training of the leaders and staff of the central reform agency. Structural versus Behavior· a1 Strategy The tide of behavioralism later became so strong that it almost expunged structualism from theory building. jrhe structural approach of reform still prevails, but is often criticized as being static and inclined toward organizational dogma and bureaucratic rigidity. It concern itself with structures and institution building to the neglect of the human element in administration and the setting up of a working environment that would be conducive to individual initiative and creativeness. However, structuralists are increasingly realizing that change and reform will have but limited impact if effort is not undertaken to influence the behavior of members and groups of organizations and the political society at large. Developing countries have concentrated so far on the structural approach of reform as a macro activity to update the whole antiquated machinery of government much 83 more than on attitudinal reform. This tendency is under standable since problems of behavioral change are not as discernible as structural problems, and since few reformers in those countries have any reliable professional knowledge and skill to effect any behavioral program with confidence and certainty. Behavioral scientists believe that no major changes can take place unless members of the organization as well as those affected by its services or those influencing it change th~ir behavior and attitudes. This is particularly so in the world of today where turbulence and rapid change call for organic-adaptive organizations to meet the chal lenge of development and growth. Cohen asserts that rapidly changing complex tasks requiring skilled personnel are best accomplished by organizations that are more organic and adaptive, and he defines organic-adaptive organizations as being characterized by widely-shared influence, a de-emphasis on hierarchy, collaboration between experts working on projects, shifting leadership determined by expertise rather than by position, awareness and acceptance of informal relationships and great 84 • flexibility and adaptiveness.47 Reform must begin, then, with a diagnosis that matches organizational pattern to task demands. Thompson has argued that the focus for administration of development needs to be on adaptation in the rapidly changing environ ments currently existing. He maintains that the objectives of administration for development should be an innovative atmosphere, operationalizing and wide searching of planning goals, combining of planning with action, creating a cosmopolitan atmosphere where organizations respond to feedback from other organizations, diffusion of influence, increasing toleration of interdependence, and avoidance of b h 1 . . .. d. 48 ureaupat o ogy, i.e., excessive rigi ity. The behavioral approach emphasizes an incremental reform strategy, and believes that reform is more appro priate if individually fitted to the particular goals and tasks of the units concerned. 49 This will entail that 47 Allan P. Cohen, "Human Dimensions of A0ministra- l tive Reform: Towards More Differentiated Strategies for Change," in Leemans, Management of Change, p. 166. 48 victor A. Thompson, "Administrative Objectives for Development Administration," American· Science Quarterly = 9, no. 1 (1969):91-108. 49 Cohen, p. 169. 85 organizations be considered to be more than their goals, rules, and organization charts, and that a network of informal relationships affects the operations of every organization or unit. Such informal relationships deter mine the behavior of individual members and in time create values and norms of behavior for the whole organization. The reformer needs, then, to know these informal groups and to understnad how the reform proposals would affect or influence them, and how they would react to his pro posals. As needs and motivations differ from one group to another and from one organization to the other, the reformer would have to differentiate between individuals and groups and organization in terms of assessing the needs predominating at the time of each specific case. A reform is likely to succeed if it addresses these different needs in different ways. The difficulty in the behavioral approach is that it takes time and effort and intuition sometimes to iden tify the needs of different organizational members and to devise ways and means to satisfy them before any change reform will be effectuated. Leemans advocates a particular reform strategy of mixed structural behavior character. This suggests the 86 creation of new organizational units, possibly outside the existing organizational framework. Such units will not only be relatively free of the ills of existing organiza tions and their behavior, but their organizational form and the personnel assigned to them will tend to make them d . d . . 50 ynamic an innovative. Once such a unit exists, it can become both a model and a pressure group for further 51 changes. Many developing countries have adopted this strategy by creating numerous organizational units such as special purpose organizations, special authorities, public corporations, etc. This building of new institutions is only half the solution. Much more has to be done with respect to the attitudes in regular government organizations, as well as political and societal institutions, as all of these inter act and influence each other. The corruption and bribery that is common in some government units cannot be attrib uted to the corrupt behavior of employees alone. Bribery is a two-way traffic, and unless there is somebody who 50 Leemans, "Aspects of Administrative Change," pp. 126-27. 51 Cohen, p. 180. 87 bribes there would be no one who receives it. For that matter, a behavioral strategy should not only restrict itself to intra-organizational groups and individuals, but should attempt to improve the attitudes of politicians, societal leaders, and the public at large. This can take the form of more education and political orientation at the public service level as well as at political and societal levels. The change in attitudes and behavior is required at all levels with the purpose of making people in develop ing societies more receptive and responsive to the idea of reform. Behavioral reforms can take the form of development programs for government officials, political I orientation for politicians, members of parliaments and the public with the view to develop in each member of society a sense or mission in their roles and a spirit of public trust and dedication to their jobs. This is evi dently a long-range reform strategy that should be started, fostered, and guarded by the central institution of reform. Institutionalization as a· Strategy Many administrative reforms in developing countries have not been effective for lack of adequate institutional support. Until recently, very few countries had establishe 88 1 , permanent mechanisms for reform. Ad hoc commissions of reform have frequently been used by governments, but they were not kept under close and continuous surveillance, with the result that such commissions dragged along for years, and when it was time to hand in their reports it was difficult to fix a responsible agency for implementa tion and follow-up. It has been felt necessary, therefore, to establish a machinery inside the government on a perma nent basis not only to watch the programs of implementation of a commission's accepted reconnnendations, but also to point out from time to time what areas and new administra tive deficiencies have arisen requiring reform, to plan for the reform, implement it, and follow it to its fina l fruitive stages. In Iran, the State Organization for Administration and Employment under a Minister of State performs such responsibilities. In Indonesia, a Minister of State for Administrative Reforms acts as a coordinator, using as his instrument a permanent agency, namely the National Insti tute of Administration. In India a permanent Department of Administrative Reforms functions as a unit within the 89 I Ministry of Home Affairs for this purpose.52 In Africa there is a growing awareness of the need to provide adequate institutional support for administra tive reform measures. The Mills-0doi Reform Commission of 1967 recommended the establishment of the Department of Government Machinery to oversee the implementation of reform measures in Ghana. According to the Third-Year Plan of Ethiopia, a high level administrative reform com- mittee is to be set up as a standing body to supervise and bear the responsibility for the implementation of all 53 approved administrative and organizational changes. In Sudan a central ministry for public service and administra tive reform was created in 1972 to plan and execute administrative reform, and other activities. Institutionalized reform has many advantages over noninstitutionalized reform . It is continual and part of the system, and therefore, not viewed as an outside attack. It is less likely to be disruptive, pursuing incrementalism 52 G. Ahmed, "Role of Commissions and Committees," p. 126. 53 Adedeji, "Formulating Administrative Reform Strategies," pp. 70-71. 90 I I and concerned with its continuing normative linkages and relations. On the other hand, its existing continuous relationship with other organizations might blunt its effectiveness unless it is vested with strong political support from the government. For this reason, some advo cate that there is need for appointment of a cabinet minister to be in charge of administrative reform and to ensure implementation of programs. Without top level political support, the reform agency may not be taken seriously by operating units, irrespective of the quality of its work. Permanent reform units have to be careful to keep enthusiasm and high spirit and interest in reform, lest it switches in time from macro reforms to technical operations of limited utility and significance. Its competence would, therefore, depend to a large extent on its ability to attract and retain creative talents as centers of adminis- trative leadership. This requires congenial reform-minded individuals, open to new ideas, ready to articulate and push reforms, exposed to varied organizational experiences, and rewarded for continuous innovation. Reformers of such reform agencies should possess unique qualities such "as passion for human development, propensity to organize, 91 spirit of experimentation, and a relativist outlook."54 This entails that the reform agency should provide an innovative atmosphere--stimulus and incentive to produce, sympathetic leadership willing to back staff efforts, an open, accessible, encouraging management, free flow of information, decentralized decision making; in short, it should be a center of excellence to be followed by all organic-adaptive organizations responsible for develop mental change within the country. Upon such qualities will depend the success of the reform institution. Western Technology and Technical Aid as a Strategy For most major administrative reforms in developing countries, the problem of external support and assistance, the kind of assistance to be accepted and the suitable aim of introducing assistance are crucial questions to ponder. The administrative reform program must be con sistent with the overall development program. Just as the administrative system of a country must not lag behind its socioeconomic development, so also is it important that it 54 Gerald Caiden, "Implementation--The Achilles Heel of Administrative Reform," in Leemans, Management of Change, p. 155. 92 I I not be too sophisticated for the economy. Countries must beware of reformists who are so obsessed with some of the modern management technologies that they are determined to superimpose them upon poor countries. Premature computeri zation and hasty introduction of the Planning, Programming, Budgeting System (PPBS) into the administrative system can do more harm than good as the experience of some countries have shown. Countries that have rushed to comprehensive development planning when their data base is very shaky, and their administrative capability unable to cope have found to their dismay that some of the new techniques are not automatically applicable in developing countries. Unfortunately, too little systematic data are available to evaluate or predict the long-range effects of external assistance and Western technology. All one can say as advice to developing countries is to be careful and to take time in introducing external assistance and in using Western science and technology. Fred W. Riggs takes a strong stand on the timing of the introduction of Western practices and institutions. He mentions that chief supporters of technical assistance and foreign aid in the West, particularly the United States, became increasingly disillusioned upon discovering that 93 practices and institutions which had apparently worked so well in the West failed to achieve their hoped-for results in the non-West. Riggs concludes that one of the fundamental reasons why public adminis tration works so badly in many of the new and developing countries is neither because they have refused to adopt Western institutions nor because they have inappropriately borrowed them, but rather because underlying ecological factors have made it very difficult for these institutions to perform effectively.55 More specifically, he believes the failure of constitutive systems (i.e., political systems) to work well means that the balance of power has swung decisively in favor of bureaucracies in most of the non-Western countries.56 He asserts that although much of the work of administrative reformers is devoted to efforts to change the structure and practices of public bureaucracies, this effort is largely doomed to failure. The most important means to improve administrative performance is surely to improve the effectiveness of the operation of constitutive systems. So long as administrative reformers refuse to think 55 Fred W. Riggs, "The Myth of Alternatives: Under- lying Assumptions About Administrative Development," in Rothwell, Studies in rn·terna tional Developme· n t, p. 133 and pp. 145-46. See also Riggs, Admittis·trative· Refo· rm and Politic• a1 Resp· on· s·ivetl'e·ss, A Theo· ry ·of Dyn· amic Bala· ncing (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1970). 56 Riggs, "The Myth of Alternatives," p. 133. 94 seriously about the performance of constitutive systems, limiting their span of attention to bureaucratic structure and practices, they will continue to be ineffectual and frustrated in their efforts. 57 Riggs' viewpoint was met with great criticism. Ralph Braibanti expressed the view that it is beyond the capability of an aid-giving nation to directly and deliberately accelerate politiciza tion (in developing countries) and that administra tive reform must proceed irrespective of the matura tion of the political process.58 Riggs' sweeping view that the improvement of administrative performance is totally dependent on the improvement and development of political systems in developing countries is deterministic and does not conform with reality. Indeed, a good deal of technical and administrative cap abilities developed in the West are transferable to I developing countries, not in toto, but selectively and with adaptation. There is no point in waiting until political systems in developing countries are as developed as bureaucratic systems before introducing Western technology 5 7 Ibid. , p . 145 . 58 Ralph Braibanti, "Administrative Reform in the Context of Political Growth," in ·Frontie·rs ·of Development Administration, ed. Fred W. Riggs~(_D_u_r __ fi_a_m_: __ D_u_k_e_U ___ n_i_' v ___ e_r_s~i ty Press, 1971), p. 229. 95 I and practices. Administrative reform is "ipso facto desirable and should be carried out whenever possible at 59 the most rapid feasible rate." Theorization on Administrative Reform Strategy Administrative reform, by its very nature, is sporadic, and its initiation is dependent on many vari ables: political, environmental, and the developmental stage of any country. For that reason, there has not yet developed any sufficient theoretical basis on which to judge when administrative reform is desirable or vitally necessary. The rate of societal change and modernization is different in different countries and therefore the need for administrative reform and the timing of reform varies in those countries. It is difficult to generalize and theorize. Developing countries have witnessed administrative reforms, some of which were successes; others which were partial failures. Reform proposals never totally fail. change the world with their appearance. They A new 59 Ferrel Heady, "Bureaucracies in Developing Coun- tries," in Riggs, · ·Fron·tfe· r · s · o· f · nevelopmertt Administr· atio!!_, p. 463. 96 source of intelligence comes into being which may form the basis of a future change program.60 Unfortunately, there are no built-in appraisal agencies which might assess with certainty and objectivity the results accruing for different reforms. One of the prob lems of appraisal is that results of reform take place during a period of time which varies in length depending on the nature and scope of reform, the managerial facili ties which are responsible for the implementation and the economic situations . Some reforms that did not prove feasible at a certain period might prove successful at a point in the future. Case studies of reform in developing countries have shown the truth of this point. A position classification system failed in the Philippines at times when the technical and administrative capabilities to implement it were not available. Later it was installed and it worked satisfactorily. Allusion has already been made to the state of the art of administrative reform theorization. There is still no comprehensive study of the subject and where specialized studies use the words "adminis trative reform" in the title, they are usually 60 caiden, · Admin:ts·tr·ative· Refo· rm, p. 208. 97 1 general histories or case studies in administra tive dynamics ... they are mainly descriptive and analytical of narrow, if not unique, circum stances from which little of a general nature can be deduced.61 However, the prerequisites of a theory of adminis trative refotm already exist. There are some generaliza tions which can be expressed and which possess a high degree of probability capable of verification. What works against these generalizations and constructs is the in complete existing evidence. The development of a general descriptive theory of reform is difficult in view of the great dissimilarities of environmental and political factors of countries. This makes a breakthrough in theory more difficult since a descriptive theory forms an indis- pensable basis for the development of normative theories; i.e., those theories concerned with a perspective future state of affairs dealing with questions of "how" and "when" reform ought to happen. The area of administrative strategies, in the writer's view, can serve as a conceptual framework for behavioral study of actual administrative reforms. Althoug 61C "d ai en, "Administrative Reform," p. 347. 98 I a preferable mix of reform strategies is in the main a function of the concrete circumstances of each particular reform situation, a few constructs concerning reform strategies may be of universal validity, and may work as a framework of administrative reform policymaking. Reform strategies have been considered and expressed by scholars in terms of sets of polar approaches for analytical clarities, such as previously discussed comprehensive-selective strategies, behavioral- structural, etc. The writer's view is that such polar sets are not encountered in their pure forms, and reform strategies are often a mix of the two polar extremes. To avoid being trapped in this polarization dilennna, the writer presents a design which looks into strategy dimensions as a continuum of all strategies dis cussed earlier to come up with a normative strategy of practical utility for developing countries. The design I poses two reform strategies that have been used at differen times in Sudan to effect administrative reform, and indi cates how empirical research should be directed to test the validity and usefulness of each strategy. The constructs of the hypothesis of the strategy can be stated as follows: 99 Administrative reform is more likely to be accepted and stands good chances of success if a) Continuous political support is ensured b) It is entrusted to a proper bureaucratic institution which is improved, motivated and supported to plan and effect reform c) Reform is based on critical evaluation, participation and cooperation of politicians, bureaucratic organiza tions and environmental leadership d) Both structural and behavioral aspects of reform are considered Coercive Str·ategy ver·sus Normative s ·tr· a:tegy One of the two strategies adopted in some adminis trative reforms is referred to here as the coercive strategy. Although the term 'coercive' carries a negative connotation, the coercive strategy has some advantages over the normative one. The coercive strategy is characterized by one sided, goal-getting and unbalanced power relationship. It is a strategy usually resorted to by the political system during its "honeymoon months" or "years" which follow the establishment of the regime through revolutions or 100 I I coup d'etats. It is mainly used to effect rapid and drastic changes which are supposed to capture the public's imagination and thus achieve legitimacy of and popular support to the new regime. Because of the expedient intention of the political regime in effecting rapi<l changes, the coercive strategy often neglects, consciously or unconsciously, to consider the internal organizational situations and the environmental factors, and would thus fail to engender participation of local leaders, and bureaucratic and pluralistic elements in the process of reform. The coercive strategy would prefer to use ad hoc commissions or small political and professional func tionaries to plan and institute reform strategies. It has the undisputable advantage of the continuous political support which works, at least in the early stages of reform, toward passing reform laws and following their implementation rather carefully and meticulously to safe guard against any possible sabotage or resistance incited by political adversaries and subversive elements in the society. For that particular caution against any opposi tion, the coercive strategy rests, in some cases, upon the application or the threat of application of physical sanc tions to resisters, such as deprivation of privileges, 101 insecurity of tenure, purging from civil service positions, restriction of movement, arrest, or political alienation to some political leaders. These coercive actions might help in the beginning to foster the implementation of reforms, but will eventually hamper the proper functioning of administrative reforms when counteraction takes place, and thus retard the complete efficacy and success of such reforms. However, if the political party in power is able, in due time, to mobilize the public and attain its coopera tion and good will, it will be in a better position to ensure the effectiveness of reforms. One of the disadvan tages of such a coercive method is that it will alienate some of the honest members of the intelligentsia of society and encourage the opportunists and self-centered individuals to take advantage of the situation and seek favors from the political government, and on the other hand, give the political leadership an untrue picture about their popularity and legitimacy among the society at large. The normative strategy, on the other hand, relies on legitimate direction and on the manipulation of people and bureaucracies since it is envisioned as resting on free and spontaneous participation, involvement and 102 cooperation, change of bureaucratic attitudes, public relations education, and training both for the public and bureaucratic members. If reform planning and implementa tion is institutionalized, the important role of bureauc racy as an agent of innovation and change is likely to be encorsed and more utilized than in cases of coercive strategies. Attitudinal reforms of civil servants through training and inculcation of service-orientation values, improvement of conditions of service and actual participa tion in formulation of reform policies are more likely to I take place than in coercive strategies. However, the normative strategy of reform is likely to fail if bureaucracy uses its creativity and authority solely as a means of enhancing its economic, political and social standing, and if it places self aggrandizement over other societal goals and has too much l aQtonomy. One other disadvantage of institutionalization is the probability of political rulers becoming too dependent on conservative forces of bureaucracy who do not acconnnodate new or different ideas and innovations generate from within the public organizations or engendered through public participation. Another demerit lies in the fact that other public agencies might get jealous of the central 103 institution entrusted with normative reform and might consequently blunt and jeopardize reform efforts unless, of course, the central institution is vested with very strong political authority over other agencies. Table 1 gives a sunnnary of the hypothetical cases for coercive and normative strategies which are subjects for future empirical testing. 1. Under conditions of strong political support, voluntary environmental support and favorable economic conditions, both strategies work well to effect administra tive reform. However, the normative strategy seems to get the upper hand due to the relaxed atmosphere prevalent both inside bureaucratic organizations and the external environ ment. 2. Under conditions of strong political support unaccompanied by bureaucratic cooperation, or environmental participation while economic conditions prevail, the I coercive strategy could achieve administrative reform, but such reform will be entrapped by hostile forces of both bureaucracy and society which might be fatal if the politi cal government did nothing to neutralize opposing public opinion and failed to mobilize it to its support. 3. Under conditions of poor political support, 104 TABLE 1 CHARACTERISTICS OF COERCIVE AND NORMATIVE STRATEGIES Criterion Coercive Strategy Normative Strategy A. Nature 1. Comprehensive or 1 . Incremental-- incremental, out- attacks key areas stretch personnel first--critical resources, political analysis and study expediency 2. Political initiation 2. Mainly bureaucratic of reform from above, initiation of reform loyal functionaries through institution- influential, no sub- alized bodies, co- stantial bureaucratic operation of participation bureaucracy through participation 3. Mainly structural 3. Can be both struc- reform, no time for tural and behavioral behavioral reform, sufficient time for indoctrination of training and in- loyal adherents doctrination 4. Administrative reform 4. Administrative treated as minor part reform treated as a of transformation of value in itself. social order, more Professional per- attention given to sonnel dedicated substantive reform to reform B. Political 1. Political support 1. Political support Leadership ensured and con- not certain, more (political and tinuous; bureau- bureaucratic bureaucratic) cratic support not support certain 105 Criterion C. External Societal Environment D. Economic Conditions TABLE 1 (Continued) Coercive Strategy 2. Bureaucratic partici pation weak due to purging and coercion 3. Political leadership neutralizes jealousies and ensures coopera tion by coercion and cowing into obedience 1. Societal participa tion sacrificed for political expediency 2. Alienation of resisting societal elements, support may be engendered later 1. Less expensive if reform incremental; more expensive if comprehensive 2. Success likely in prosperity 3. Corruption variable works in poor eco nomic conditions- due to coercion and coming into obedience Normative Strategy 2. Bureaucratic par ticipation great, high morale 3. Bureaucratic jealousies expected. More manipulation than force is the norm 1. Societal support ensured through participation in planning and imple mentation stages 2. No alienation expected, public relations ensures public involvement 1. Less expensive if reform incremental; comprehensive reform not feasible 2. Success likely in prosperity 3. Corruption less likely because reform not feasible in unfavorable times 106 Criterion TABLE 1 (Continued) Coercive Strategy 4. Reform laws promul gated, but do not guarantee success as counteraction may later start Normative Strategy 4. Reform laws not feasible--no reform expected favorable environment and bureaucracy, incrementalism might be the proper strategy to be adopted. 4. Under conditions of poor or nonexisting politi cal support and poor economic conditions, neither of the two strategies would be able to achieve any administrative reform, however supportive and favorable are the bureaucracy and external environment. However, micro reforms could continue through normative strategy. 107 I I A Matrix of Optimum Reform Strategy Hahn-Been Lee identified three broad categories of variables in reform: (1) the nature of reform, (2) reform . agents, and (3) the environment. Nature of reform relates to objects--content, complexity, and level applied--and the scope of projects. Reform agents can be defined by characteristics of references, and internal structure of the reform and related organizations. Key environmental variables are the political structure, especially the relationship of reform agents to political leadership; and timing of reforms, which includes general social and polit ical conditions, as well as the stage of economic develop ment. Lee considers that these variables yield strategies which may be visualized in simplified form on a two-by-two I • 62 matrix. Lee's matrix, though heuristic and very much simplified, was employed by scholars with some modification to determine optimum reform strategies in developing 62 Hahn-Been Lee, "An Application of Innovative Theory," pp. 177-80. 108 I nations. 63 Based on Lee's matrix, an adapted one of optimum reform strategy can be developed to suit the conditions of Sudan. Two main variables are emphasized on the matrix, namely, the independent variable of reform leadership and the variable of environment which encompasses (1) bureau cratic capacity and competence; (2) time and economic prosperity; and (3) societal participation. The reform leadership in Sudan is essentially made up of political leadership which may be at times strong, normative, and stable, and at times unstable and therefore weak and coercive. The corresponding reform strategies that have been explained above in Table 1 are the normative strategy which is basically incremental, and coercive strategy which is basically comprehensive. All factors work to make the first move realistic and likely to happen, and the second less likely to happen because of the factors detailed in the table which are the political instability, the hurriedness of reform and the lack of continuous 63 see Djunaidi Hadisumarto and Gilbert S. Siegel, "The Optimum Strategy Matrix and Indonesian Administrative Reforms," in Leemans, · Man:ag· etnent · o· f Ch· an· ge, pp. 252-71. 109 follow-up by the leadership. Figure 1 attempts to portray the possible alterna tives of reform strategy as determined and influenced by the different variables. Basically, there are six propositions which are conducive to a reform strategy. Boxes 1, 2 and 3 are cases where a combination of all favorable conditions is likely to result in the best incremental reform strategy. In Sudan, these favorable conditions of political leadership and environmental receptivity took place on two occasions. They are currently being felt since the present revolu tionary regime gained relative political stability and the economic conditions are moving slowly toward improvement and a specific ministry of administrative reform was established in 1971 to institutionalize administrative reform. It was also felt in the past during Abboud's regime in the period 1958-64, at which time Sudan witnessed its best economic prosperity. Boxes 4, 5 and 6 indicate a combination of rela tively stable and strong political leadership and unfavor able environmental variables. In this case no particular reform strategy alternative is feasible. The deciding factor is the unfavorable economic climate which impedes 110 l Bureaucratic Time and Societal Capacity and Economy Participation Factors Competence Favorable Favorable Favorable Reform Leadership Un- Un- Un- favorable favorable favorable Normative and stable political leadership Strong but unstable and/or coercive leadership ( 1) NS (7) cs ( 10) N (2) NS (8) cs ( 5) N ( 11 ) N (3) NS (9) cs I Note: NS= Normative strategy (incremental-institutionalized participative) (6) N ( 12) N CS= Coercive strategy (comprehensive, but lacks follow up and continuity) N = No strategy alternative FIGURE 1. MATRIX OF OPTIMUM STRATEGY IN ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM 111 I! II any substantial administrative reform. In such a situation, the political leadership concern will automatically shift from administrative reform to more substantive economic reforms which might help alleviate the economic pressures of the people. Boxes 7, 8 and 9 represent a situation where environmental variables are favorable, and political leadership though strong is unstable and at times demon strates coercive attitudes. This is usually the case immediately after a military coup or an armed revolution assumes power. For reasons of legitimacy and acceptability, political leadership affects rapid changes in administra tion. Chances are that such changes are comprehensive in nature and are meant to catch the imagination of the people. Such changes and reform might work well at the initial stages, but they flounder later due to the instabil ity of the regime and its concern with establishing itself. A similar situation took place when Sading El Mahdi assumed the responsibility of Prime Minister in 1967, though not through armed revolution. He innnediately launched a major administrative reform plan, and convened national conm1issions to review the organization of govern ment structure and civil service, but though environmental 112 I conditions were relatively favorable, his instability in office drastically affected the comprehensiveness of his administrative reforms. Boxes 10, 11 and 12 are cases where political leadership is strong, but unstable and/or coercive in nature, while all environmental factors are unfavorable. In this case, all reformative attempts will be shattered for lack of societal participation and poor economic con- ditions. Here, the political leadership will be involved in fighting adverse opposition forces and alienating them. As a result, it does not have the time nor the capacity to effect administrative reform. No particular reform strat egy is perceived. In Sudan, a similar situation happened in the early years of the present regime in 1969-71 when the government, though strong and coercive, experienced upheavals and political instability internally and at the societal level. It was concerned with mere survival rather than any other thing. Two examples of administLative reform, one more prone toward the coercive strategy and the other toward normative strategy, will be evaluated to see how successful they were. In the two cases, we assume the variables of political support and economic conditions as constant, with 113 I I the societal and bureaucratic variables in operation. This assumption is based on the hypothesis that political support and economic condition variables are absolutely crucial and decisive for any reform approach to reach fruition. The local government system of Sudan was estab lished in 1951 and has worked ever since satisfactorily for the main reason that it gave the localities a fair amount of autonomy and financial powers to levy taxes and decide upon their own local developmental changes. The local councils and municipalities were considered legal bodies free to sue and be sued and also free from the tight scrutiny and surveillance of the central government in Khartoum. The local government officers--analogous to the city managers in the United States--worked in close rela tionship with the local elected members and enjoyed a limited administrative freedom of action, yet they worked in an advisory capacity with the elected council at the stage of policy formulation but were fully responsible to the local council for the proper and rational execution of the policy laid down by the council. The local politics in municipalities and rural councils were a continuation of the national politics. Shortly after the present 114 1 military regime assumed power in 1969 and abolished multi party politics, both nationally and locally, it dissolved all local government councils which were controlled by party politicians. To further the control of the new regime over the country, the autonomy of the local councils has been drastically reduced and power shifted to the headquarters of the nine provinces of Sudan. Each province was put under a commissioner whowasa representative of the central government at Khartoum, and the local councils were relegated to mere agents of the provincial commis sioner. The city managers were made directly responsible to the commissioner for the conduct and administration of the local councils until new local politicians oriented toward a one-party system and loyal to the existing politi- cal system assumed power in local councils. The People's Local Government Act was passed in 1971 to that effect. Due to political expediency and search for legiti macy, the law was planned and promulgated with little or only pseudo participation from the local popul~tion and the local government bureaucracy. The local leaders, who were by necessity affiliated to national parties, were not involved in the process of change, and thus mostly were alienated and turned into hostile enemies or at best into 115 I individuals apathetical and disinterested in the functions of local government. The local government bureaucracy was not sufficiently manipulated and did not participate fully in the process of change. Some of the leading bureaucrats who showed resistance or expressed views conflicting with the view of the government were either purged or relegated to insignificant positions and were replaced by younger officials who demonstrated willingness, commitment, and enthusiasm to go along with the new policy. The connnis sioners under the new act were given power to effect eco nomic development, education, public health, public works, agriculture, animal resource development, and community development uithin the province. Each commissioner was assisted by an executive council representative of the functional public organizations such as health, education, irrigation, etc., and local outstanding personalities representative of labor unions and other social groups. The writer is of the opinion that such strategy employed in the local government administrative change was a coercive strategy which resulted in the failure of the reform. This can be tested on three levels: from the perspective of (a) political leaders and functionaries (formulators of reform), (b) bureaucratic officials 116 I I (dispersers of reform objectives), and (c) clientele groups who are recipients of the services rendered by the prov inces and the local councils. The criterion for evaluation of success is the satisfaction of the three elements of society with the output of the act, i.e., the administra tion and services delivered. Evidently, the indicators for the satisfaction vary from one group to another. (i) Formulator' · s satisfaction . How to evaluate reform f rom the viewpoint of politicians? Should it be measured by reform con~r ibution to the ultimate objectives? Should they be contented with nothing less than full realization of original objectives of reform? Or only partial fulfillment and improvement on status quo? What time limit should be allowed if results are not immediately forthcoming? Rarely does evidence allow research to attempt answers to such methodological problems. However, since the primary goals of the local government's new act 1 are political enlightenment, people's mobilization, economi and social development, and consolidation of national unity in accordance with the regime's socialist revolution, the politicians' satisfaction should be measured by their assessment of (a) the degree to which the reform rendered 117 services for the benefit of the citizens; (b) the degree to which the reform achieved the promotion of new ideas and the combatting of defunct political parties, sectarianism, racialism, and tribalism; (c) the promotion of public participation and cooperation; and (d) their opinion on employees' efficiency, performance, productivity, and moral satisfaction. (ii) Deliverers' satisfaction. The deliverers of reform are the local government officials who were responsible for implementing the new Local Government Act to the best of their abilities. Variance in their atti tudes toward the act could be distinctly found since some were committed to the act and the political system, and were raised to higher responsible administrative positions; some were alienated because they did not believe the change was for the better, nor were they participating in the process of change itself; and others who had no political sense and were indifferent to either the new or the old Local Government Acts continued as usual to function as executors and deliverers of services. The indicators of their satisfaction or otherwise may be specified as follows. a) Were their administrative abilities and professional 118 skills more tapped and utilized under the new Local Government Act or before? b) Did they feel that they participated in the process of reform planning adequately or not; and does it make any difference to them if they participate in the planning process or not; and can they express their views more freely now than before the new Local Govern ment Act was promulgated? c) Under the new Local Government Act, are job satisfac tion, motivation, and upward mobility based on merit or on political commitment; and what is the comparison with the old Local Government Act? Are they free to complain and do they get the chance to be heard and given fair treatment now; how does it compare with before the new act? d) Has the standard of services delivered to the public improved or deteriorated; and is this an outcome of changed power relationships between the local councils and the headquarters of the provinces? How do they think the public has reacted to this change in power relationships? e) Were chances for further training better after or befor the act? 11 (iii) Re• cipients' sa·tisfaction. The major indi cator of public satisfaction is the standard of delivery of services. a) What is the degree of satisfaction with educational, health, roads, water services, etc., rendered under the new act as compared with the standard and quality of services before the act? b) Were they involved in the planning process of change, and did the participation make any difference to them? c) Is their attitude toward the present government related to the quality of services received? How does the present level of tax collection compare with the previous one? d) What is the overall degree of political satisfaction with the present Local Government Act, and do they feel it is a better system than the previous local govern ment system? The other example of administrative reform took place in 1973 after the first public service law went into effect in July of the same year. In the past, the Sudan public service was working on fragmented laws and some rules and regulations which did not have the strength of the law, and which were amended from year to year to the 120 extent that people in the service lost track of the current regulations in operation. For the first time, the Minister of Public Service and Administrative Reform, using his ministry as the central institution of reform, convened ad hoc corrnnissions which were representative of bureaucracy professionals, labor unions, politicians, the private sector, and the public at large in a national conference to arrive at a comprehensive plan for a public service law. Such a law was passed eventually by the President. The law laid down the foundation for the rights and obligations of the public servants, defined recruitment, selection I and promotion systems, grievances resolution system, and I defined the appellate authorities. The law also has, for the first time, granted women the right of pensionable . 64 service. Although this administrative reform mainly con cerned the personnel working in public service, and was of a technical nature, and was therefore mainly the manufac ture of the elite groups of the society who comprehend technical matters better, the public participated in the proceedings of the conference. The Women's Union was 64 Sudan, Public• Ser\tic• e Law (Khartoum: Government Printing Press, 1973), p. 10. 21 1 equally interested and participated fully in the conference The techniques followed and the involvement of most interested sectors of the society in the planning stage of the law is considered to be a normative strategy. More than two years have passed since the adoption of the law. The testing of the degree of its success of reform can be done through the same indicators of satisfaction which were proposed for testing the Local Government Act of 1971. Since the public service act of 1973 was aimed at improving the efficiency of the public service for the purpose of enabling it to implement the economic and social developmental projects, its success can be measured accord ing to the following criteria: 1. The quality of services rendered by bureaucracy, and whether the public felt any improvement in the attitudeJ and performance of public servants 2. The testimony of politicians, particularly ministers, as to whether bureaucratic performance improved or not 3. The opinion of local government officers as to whether they feel they had more job satisfaction now that rights and obligations have been defined, and merit system reinstated in the service. Their opinions should reflect the degree of their satisfaction now 122 and before the promulgation of the law. Such a design to establish the case for or against the normative strategy can be validated through the ques tionnaire method which will elicit the opinions of the three sectors of society: the public at large who are affected by the services delivered, the politicians who were involved in the planning of reform, and the bureau crats who are both beneficiaries and implementers of !reform. A sample of the questionnaire is attached as Appendix A. 123 CHAPTER III THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF SUDAN Introduction This chapter is mainly a factual one to introduce the Sudan to the reader. However, the last four major parts of the chapter include some analysis of the important I issues discussed. The chapter begins by giving a brief description of the location, size, topography, climate ethnology, culture and ancient history of the country. This is followed by a brief description of the Sudan economy as it stands today and some views on its future trends. Follow ing this is a description of the Sudan political history to help in understanding the next and main part of the chapter, which discusses the evolution and growth of the civil service before and after independence and its chang ing role for development. The chapter concludes with a discussion cf the major administrative reforms that have taken and are taking place and shows where the Sudan should forge ahead in the reform movement. This last part of the 12 chapter is a prelude to Chapters IV and V which discuss more specifically two areas of reform which the writer deems important for the Sudan future development and progress. Location, Size and Extent Lying between 23 degrees and 3 degrees north and 22 degrees and 39 degrees east, the Sudan covers an area of 967,500 square miles (about 2,505,823 square kilometers), roughly a tenth of the continent of Africa and a third of the continental United States of America. It is the largest African country, followed closely by the Congo (905,378 square miles) and Algeria (919,590 square miles). Located in the northeastern part of Africa, the Sudan shares a connnon border with Libya and the Arab Republic of Egypt to the north; Ethiopia to the East; Kenya, Uganda and Zaire to the south; and the Central African and Chad Republics to the west. Because of its location and its traditional links to both Africa and the Arab World, the Sudan forms a natural bridge, geographically, economically and cul turally, between the people of the continent and the Middle East. Its close ties to both give it a unique and increasingly important role in world affairs. 125 Topography and Climate The greater part of the Sudan is a vast plain traversed by the northward flowing Nile River and its tribut~ries. Widely separated mountain chains and many hilly areas reach a maximum altitude of 7,000 feet. The Red Sea Hills on the east, the Marra Mountains on the west, the Ethiopian massif to the east and the Lake plateau of Central Africa to the south are the principal mountain ranges of the country. East and west of the river almost as far south as the latitude of Khartoum--the capital town--the country is largely "desert," though not altogether deserted. West of Halfa Reach, it is true, there is hardly anything to support life, but people cluster in small elongated villages along the banks of the Nile, and life is very busy and brisk in towns like Atbara, Berber and Shendi. To the south of this belt lies the great central zone of the Sudan, comprising the provinces of Darfur, Kordofan, the Blue Nile, Khartoum and Kassala. This is the most important grazing zone where large tribes live, with common characteristics but great divergencies in modes of life: rearing cattle, sheep, camels and goats. It is also the zone of urban settlement and economic and trade activities. 126 Distinct from these zones--a remarkable distinction in race, language and mode of life--is the clay plain making up most of three southern provinces (now divided into six provinces since 1973) of the Sudan and lying south of latitude 12 degrees north. There is a vast swampland at the center, but most of the lands are cultiva ble and have sufficient rainfall. In the northern desert and along the Red Sea Coast, dry heat exceeding 100 degrees Fahrenheit prevails most of the year; in the central and southern belts, dry and wet seasons are separated by transitional periods. Rainfall varies from almost none in the extreme north (Halfa area) to 60 inches annually in the humid tropical south. Climatic hazards--strong winds in the northern deserts and rain flooding in the central belt--often interfere with railroad traffic. The Sudan is one of the hottest coun tries in Africa in the period of March through June. Population, Ethnology, History Population. The census of January 17, 1956 reported a population of 10,262,536, with an approximate 127 number of 10 persons per square mile.1 The estimate of the population in July 1959 was 11,390,000. Less than 10 per cent of the population lives in urban centers, the largest of which are Khartoum (93,103), the political and economic capital; Omdurman (113,551), the country's largest city facing Khartoum on the western bank of the Nile; El Obeid (52,372); Port Sudan (47,862), the principal seaport of the country; Wad Medani (48,000), the capital of the Gezira area; and Atbara (37,000), the headquarters of Sudan Railways. The estimated population of major towns in 1967-70 I showed a marked increase in the three-town capital owing to the proliferation of industrial factories and companies which attracted skilled and unskilled labor from the different provinces of the country, mainly from the three southern provinces, and Darfur and Kordofan provinces of western Sudan. Table 2 shows these increases. In 1973, a new population census was carried out and the preliminary results showed an unexpectedly low 1 Karol S. Krotki, 21 Facts About the Sudanese (First population census of Sudan, 1955-56) (Salzburg, Austria: R. Kiesel, 1958), chaps. 2 & 4. 128 Town Khartoum (capital) Omdurman Khartoum North Port Sudan Kassala Wad Medani Al Obeid Atbara Gedaref Al Fasher TABLE 2 ESTIMATED POPULATION OF MAJOR TOWNS 1955-56 (000) 93.1 113.6 39.1 47.6 40.6 47.7 53.4 36.3 17.5 26.2 Source: Adapted from Sudan, Ministry of Planning, Economic Survey, 1969 (Khartoum, 1970), p. 176. 1966-70 (000) 246.9 245.5 118.2 105.9 85.8 73.3 67.5 54.5 60.6 48.5 129 increase of only 4,640,358 people when compared to the population census of 1956. The 1973 population census showed a marked decrease of population in the two provinces of Equatoria and Bahr el Ghazal of southern Sudan which were the fields of mutiny and bloodshed before 1964, when a large percentage of the population had to migrate to neighboring African countries or move to the northern provinces seeking employment. Table 3 shows the prelimi nary results of the 1973 population census. Khartoum province witnessed a doubling of population in 1973. Birth rates ranged from a low of about 41 per 1,000 in Khartoum province to reported rates of 69 and 84 per 1,000 in Upper Nile and Bahr el Ghazal provinces. The crude death rate for all ages was higher in the three southern provinces which probably reflected poor diet, unhealthful climate and little medical care. Reported annual death rates per 1,000 persons ranged from 27.60 to 32.6 in the south compared with an average of 14 in the north and 18.5 for the entire country. Reported infant mortality rates were also highest in the south. Rates ranged from about 67 per 1,000 live births in the northern 130 All ages Less than 1 1 - 4 5 - 9 10 - 14 15 - 19 20 - 24 25 - 29 30 - 34 35 - 39 40 - 44 45 - 49 50 - 54 55 - 59 60 - 64 65 - 69 70 - 74 75 - 79 80 - 84 85 & Over Not stated Actual Total (73/74) Actual Total (55/56) a Red Sea 100.00 2.18 12.56 16.69 10.49 7.80 7.39 8.83 7.38 7.06 5.42 3.85 3.22 1.72 1.82 0.86 1. 30 0.48 0.66 0.27 0.01 465,043 -- B. El Gazal 100.00 3.19 15.48 17.68 10.01 8.84 8.43 9.67 7.04 6.79 4.16 3.31 1.93 1.07 0.97 0.46 0.41 0.18 0.14 0.09 0.08 1,396,913 991,022 TABLE 3 THE 1973 POPULATION CENSUS OF THE SUDAN "PRELIMINARY RESULTS" Percentage distribution of population by province for both sexes Blue Nile Darfur Equatoria Kassala Khartoum Kordofan 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 3.12 2.32 3.13 2.84 3.18 3.05 16.15 14.97 13.04 15.06 13.15 15.86 18.15 19.38 15.07 17.85 14.82 19.48 12.07 9.85 9.97 11.01 11.19 10.70 8.35 7.41 8. 95 7.90 10.60 6.91 6. 65 5.81 7.38 6. 79 10.25 5.66 7.54 8.65 9.37 8. 57 9.83 7.85 5.80 8.33 6.89 6.52 6.37 5.76 5.90 6.87 7.52 6.20 5.96 6.55 4.19 4.99 4.78 4.52 3.95 4.48 2.96 3.57 4.78 3.20 3.00 3.64 2.67 3.08 2.91 2.85 2.38 2.99 1.38 1.43 1.98 1.44 1.35 1.66 1.68 2.18 1.57 1.64 1.42 1.98 0.89 0.96 1.09 0.96 0.81 1.04 1.05 1.40 0. 60 1.24 0.80 0.99 0.41 0.50 0.37 0.48 0.33 0.44 0.38 0.69 0.20 0.45 0.28 0.40 0.30 0.54 0.39 0.34 0.25 0.31 0.06 0.06 0.01 0.12 0.07 0.21 3,812,991 2,181,161 755,750 1,123,387 1,168,169 2,202,346 2,069,646 1,328,765 903,505 941,639 504,923 1,761,968 Source: Sudan, Department of Statistics, Population Census, 1973 (Khartoum, 1973). Northern 100.00 2,92 13.81 16.75 14.04 9.58 5.91 6.37 4.96 5.54 4.11 3.28 2.88 1.13 2.18 1.20 2.15 0.95 0.92 0.72 0.01 998,883 873,059 aRed Sea Province which previously was part of Kassala Province became a separate province in 1972. Upper Nile 100.00 2.40 15.65 16.89 9.27 9.17 8. 15 10.29 6.56 7.15 4.06 3.95 2.23 1.48 1.01 0.65 0.48 0.27 0.14 0.20 0.01 798,251 888,611 Total 100.00 2.90 15.05 17.62 10.96 8.38 7. 00 8.55 6.20 6.44 4.40 3.42 2.70 1.47 1.68 0.90 1.03 0.21 0.41 0.36 0.77 14,902,894 10,262,536 131 I provinces to 144 in the Upper Nile province.2 Ethnology. The political history of the Sudan since 1899 will be discussed in detail in the following part. However, at the risk of overburdening and unbalanc ing this introduction, it is relevant to take a brief look at the early history and ethnology of the Sudanese people until 1899. The wealth of the Nile Valley has made the Sudan, from earliest times, peculiarly liable to invasion; hence, the original stocks have been overlaid by successive waves I of immigrants and ". . . the country is now a Babel of ' 3 numerous races and tongues." The principal incursions have been those of black races from the south and west, and of Arabs from the east and north. These have inter married with, and frequently been absorbed by, the aborigi- nal population; the result being a mixture of races which makes distinction unusually difficult. Speaking generally, 2 Harold D. Nelson et al., Area Handbook of the Democratic Republic of Sudan (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1973), pp. 64-67. 3 Great Britain, Foreign Office, An· gto·-Egyptian Sudan (London: H.M. Stationery Office, 1920), p. 14. 132 the desert zone in the north is now peopled by nomadic Hamites and Arabs on its eastern part and by the Nubian villagers along the Nile; the central region by Arabs, Nubas and Negroids; the tropical belt south of the twelfth parallel by Negroes. The change of type, however, is gradual. 1. The Hamites or Bejas are a group of nomad tribes of the Hadendoa, Bisharin and Bani Amer of the Red Sea hills, who speak their own Hamitic and Semitic lan guages. 2. The "Arabs" are the latest comers among the great races of the Sudan. It is important to note, how ever, that the name "Arab" by no means indicates a tribe of pure or even preponderantly Arabian blood since the innnigrants have intermixed everywhere with the original populations, giving birth to people of brown skins in most of northern Sudan. The principal tribes are Kababish, Hamar, Hawazma, Kawahla, Messeria, Habbaniya, Taaisha, Beni Helba, Rizeigat, etc., in Kordofan and Darfur; Hassania, Shukriya, Rufa'a El Hoy, etc., in the Blue Nile and Kassala provinces, resident Ga'alyin and Shaigiya, etc., in the northern province, to mention only a few. The common language of the whole of northern Sudan is Arabic, 133 I of which there are considerable local dialect variations. 3. The Nubas were probably the chief aboriginal inhabitants of northern and central Sudan. After the Arab invasion, the majority of the Nile Nubas were absorbed into the conquering tribes, but isolated groups survived, chiefly on the Nile banks between Halfa and Dabba towns. They have their own dialect but they speak Arabic too. 4. The Negroids appear to be largely represented in Darfur and Upper Nile provinces. The so-called "Black Arabs" of Darfur, such as the Fur, Zaghawa and Bedaiat, are probably Negroids, being the result of perpetual marriages of the Arabs with the black races.4 5. The Negroes of the Sudan, mostly found south of the twelfth parallel, consist of a bewildering number of distinct peoples, greatly varying in size, character, color and language. It is to be noted that southern Sudan was preserved from external influences in the early days by climatic and geographical difficulties. The Negroes may be classified into three categories: (1) Sudanic- these are various clusters of tribes west of the White Nile, including the Azande tribe and Moru-Madi; (2) Nilotic 4 rbid., p. 16. 134 • Negroes--these are the peoples of the river and swamps- Dinka and Shilluk--Acoli and Nuer; (3) Nila-Hamitic people of the southern Nile Valley--the Bau and Latuka. English (among the educated) and a very rudimentary Arabic (among the public) serve as lingua franca. There is at present great attention given by the government to the teaching of Arabic language in the south. Many of these tribes have somewhat close affinities with tribes to be found in Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda and Congo, since the international boundary is nowhere based on ethnic groups. 5 Early history to 1500. From the beginning, the rulers of Egypt have always regarded "Nubia"--the very northern part of the Sudan--with both greed and anxiety. Only rarely did they actually subdue any part of it. The Romans of the Empire, as masters of Egypt, found two peoples inhabiting northern Sudan, the Blemmyes (ancestors of the Beja Hamite folk of today), and the Nobatae (repre sented today by the Nubians or the Barabra of Halfa and Dongola regions. They enlisted the second group in their I services. Eventually in 545 B.C., a powerful Nubian 4 Republic of the Sudan, tion, Sudan Almanac (Khartoum: 1961), pp. 82-83. Central Office of Informa Government Printing Press, 135 kingdom, Christian in religion, with its capital at Old Dongola, was established. 6 The Nubians divided in the tenth century into the two independent states of Makarra, with the capital at Dongola, and Alwa with its capital at I Soba on the Blue Nile fourteen miles south of Khartoum, and preserved their Christianity and their independence, even against Arab pressure for upwards of a thousand years. Not until 1500 could the Arabs achieve the final conquest of Nubia, absorbing the native inhabitants and banishing Christianity from the land. Meanwhile, the Blemmyes-Beja tribes, never Christianized, embraced Islam with fervor and became largely intermixed with the Arabs. The history of Turks, Funj and Furs (1500-1820). In 1517, Selim, Sultan of Turkey, took Cairo and soon con quered and ruled all the land south as far as the third cataract in Sudan (Dongola). South of this, two powerful native kingdoms practically divided the Sudan between them. The Funj kingdom, a true Negro power created in 1505 by Omara Dunkus, subdued the area from the third cataract to Fazogli and from the White Nile to Suakin in the Red Sea 6 Great Britain, Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, pp. 24-31. 136 I I I Coast. Its capital was Sennar. In 1748, it conquered Kordofan and reached its peak in 1724-62. In 1789, the Funj kingdom was destroyed by the savage tribe of the Hameg. To the west lay the kingdom of the Furs, for long years a rival with the Funj in the struggle for Kordofan province. These Furs descended from the aboridinal Negroid Dagu people of Darfur province. The Sultanate remained unbroken for four hundred years and in 1916 Ali Dinar, the last Sultan, rose against the Anglo-Egyptian government and was defeated. With his death, the Sultanate came to an end. By the end of the eighteenth century, the whole of Sudan, except for Darfur, was in anarchy and confusion. The Funj kingdom was no more than a loose con federation of decentralized tribes. Eventually, the fail ure to build up a centralized administration and the weakness of the royal house itself brought about the dis integration of the Funj kingdom. The end of the eighteenth century saw one after another of the local chieftains throwing off his allegiance to Sennar. By 1820, the authority of the Funj scarcely extended north of Khartoum. 7 7 Sudan Almanac, pp. 80-81. 137 Anne· xation by Egypt and exploitation period (1820- 1881). In 1820, Mohammed Ali, the Turkish Pasha of Egypt, sent two military expeditions south into the Sudan captur ing Sennar and El Obeid in the following year. The · con quest was initiated for obtaining gold and black recruits for the Egyptian army. Thus began a period of Turko- iEgyptian rule which lasted until 1885. A new capital was I I founded at Khartoum, and the country divided into provinces I and districts with Turks or Egyptians in charge. The reign of Khedive of Egypt, Ismail (1863-79), saw a number of changes. With the aim of creating a large Egyptian empire, Darfur and the southern provinces of the Sudan as far south as the Great Lakes were conquered. He employed European explorers and administrators like Sir Samuel Baker and Colonel Gordon. Under Gordon's adminis tration a concerted attempt to abolish the slave trade was made and met with success. But little was done to develop the resources of the country. Generally speaking, the Turko-Egyptian government, although it marked the first steps toward the making of a "modern" Sudan, did not meet with success. The officials appointed there lacked public spirit, were a burden on the country, unpopular and cor rupted. 138 The Mahdia and the reconquest (1881-1899). In 1881, a religious charismatic leader, having been pro claimed the "Mahdi" (the expected Guide or Messiah of Islam), initiated a revolt against the government. 8 The rebellion, which was a movement for both religious and political reform, was widely successful, and culminated in the capture of Khartoum, where General Gordon was killed in 1885. On the advice of the British who had occupied Egypt in 1882, the Turko-Egyptian government was withdrawn from the Sudan, and although the Mahdi died in the same year, the Sudan under his successor, the Khalifa Abdullahi, remained independent until 1898. Various reasons, includ ing the British fear of the establishment of French influ ence over the Upper Nile and the revenge for the brutal killing of General Gordon, led to the reconquest of the Sudan. This was carried out by an Anglo-Egyptian force under Kitchener between 1896 and 1898, culminating in the I battle of Omdurman. The Khalifa Abdullahi escaped but he died fighting in 1899. Following the reconquest, the Sudan I was procalimed a condominium in 1899 under joint British and Egyptian administrations and became known until 8 Ibid. , p. 81. 139 independence in 1956, as the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan. The Culture of the· Stidan The first steps toward a modern Sudan were started by the Turko-Egyptian rule in 1820. This era together with the glories and disasters of the Mahdist revolution and the renewed experience of alien rule under the Anglo-Egyptian I condominium welded the Sudanese people together and stimu lated the development of Sudanese nationalism. On New Year's day of 1956, the Sudan emerged into independent statehood. Three factors predominate in modern Sudanese history. The first is the indigenous tradition which is itself the product of the intermingling of Arab Muslims with Africans. The fusion began over a thousand years ago and is still continuing in the very southern part of the Sudan. The two other factors are the influence of Egypt and that of Britain. Egyptian rule on the Sudan ended with the Mahdist revolution; Britain's administration with the coming of independence, but modern Sudan is politically, culturally and materially, very largely the heir of these earlier refines. The Arabic-speaking Muslim tribes of northern Sudan were by no means primitive savages when Mohammed Ali Pasha 14 brought them under his rule. Dr. P. M. Holt, a British historian, who worked in the Sudan for a long time as a history teacher, writes: True, with the decline of the Funj power, the tribe or the clan was the largest effective politi cal unit: true also that the towns were little more than agglomerations of villages on sites favourable to the exchange of merchandise: nevertheless, these tribal connnunities of cultivators and herdsmen possessed a vigorous if rudimentary culture and produced a small literate elite who were in touch with the civilization of the great Islamic world.9 The characteristic figures of traditional Sudanese culture were the poets and the fakis (learned men who taught the Koran by rote to the children and who were of wide repute in Islamic jurisprudence). They used to read legal texts also and teach them to adults in mosques and in their houses. The native poets, too, had an influential status in the connnunity. During the Turko-Egyptian rule, Sudanese students were sent by the government to Al Azhar College in Cairo where they studied Islamic law and came back to teach in schools. Egyptian teachers were hired by the government to conduct courses in religion and the Arabic 9 P. M. Holt, A Modern History of the Sudan (London: Weidenfeld & Nicholson, 1961), pp. 191-92. 141 language in the Sudan. Primary schools were established in places like Khartoum, Berber and Dongola. The impact of western ideas and western education upon the Sudanese did not come until the establishment of the condominium at the start of this century. The founding and history of the Gordon Memorial College and other educational institutes had a great impact upon Sudanese modern thinking. This subject, however, will be discussed in more detail later. IThe Sudan Economy The modern economy of the Sudan is based largely upon irrigated cotton growing which is government con trolled. The traditional economy is based upon independent jherding and sunnner rainfall cultivation of drought resistant food grains. One axis of population density and maximum economic activity follows the Nile River in a north-south direction; another lies along the railway from least to west through the center of the country. Where the two meet is the hub of productive and connnercial activity, in the Gezira area and the three towns that con stitute the capital of the Sudan (Khartoum, Khartoum North, and Omdurman). 142 I In 1972, it was estimated that roughly one-fourth of the population lived in the modern sector and three fourths were in the traditional sector. More than 85 per cent of the population derived its livelihood from primary activity--herding or cultivating. The diversification of the productive structure had barely begun in the 1960s- some three or four years after political independence. Cotton still provided between 60 and 70 percent of mer chandise exports and largely determined the level of economic activity, money income and fiscal revenues. Other agricultural exports (gum arabic, sesame, groundnuts [peanuts]) were on the increase but depended largely on varying climatic conditions from year to year (see Table 4). Mineral extraction is still negligible, and industry is in the embryonic stage, employing about 6 percent of the active population and providing about 13 percent of gross domestic product (GDP). About 8 percent of the economi cally active population is engaged in tertiary activity such as cormnerce and services. Whereas most of the active population is engaged in herding and cultivation as the primary economic activity, only about 38 percent of total domestic product is thought to be derived from agriculture. This is largely the result of the low average productivity 143 TABLE 4 SUDAN, FOREIGN TRADE IN PRINCIPAL COMMODITIES, 1969-70 (Value in millions of Sudanese pounds)a Value Commodity Quantityb 1969 1970 Exports Cotton fiber Gum arabic Sesame Groundnuts (peanuts) Cattle and sheep Hides and skins Cottonseed Oilcakes Other products Imports Foodstuffs Total Beverages and tobacco Crude materials and fuels Chemicals and related products Textiles Machinery and equipment Transport equipment and parts Other manufactures Total 172 47 113 82 234 7 65 n.r. • • • • 51.8 63.7 8.6 9.1 7.1 6.5 5.0 5.5 2.7 n.r. 1.9 1.7 2.8 3.1 3.0 5.6 3.3 8.7 86.2 103.9 7.6 12.0 5.2 8.9 7.9 5.6 8.2 9.9 15.4 12.5 9.3 14.5 13.1 13.8 22.6 22.9 89.3 100.1 Source: Adapted from L'Economie des Pays Arabes [Beirut] 14 (July 1971):36/162 al Sudanese pound equals US $2.87. bCattle and sheep in thousands; others in thousands of metric tons. n.r. = not reported. • • • • = not applicable. 144 1 I I per man-hour in agriculture, the low value of most sub sistence production coupled with poor administrative efficiency. Manufacturing had shown rapid growth during the 1960s, while agriculture was relatively stagnant. Industry had expanded from so low a base, however, that its share of economic activity was still slight--estimated as 6 percent. Table 5 shows the active population (1956) and the GDP in 1966-68, by economic sector. As in many developing countries, the statistics on the origin of GDP were derived from approximate esti- mates and were somewhat unreliable, particularly for measuring trends over time. These calculations have to be taken with great caution, particularly in commerce and finance which may have been inflated by the inclusion of the profits of public entities, such as the sugar monopoly, which in fact were a form of indirect taxes. A notable characteristic of the Sudan economy is the dominant and growing role of government in economic activity. This is due to the historical fact that the Sudan during its second colonization in 1898 had little but agriculture to attract foreign investors. Because of this, private business never developed significantly, and because of the dearth of indigenous private savings, the 145 TABLE 5 SUDAN, ACTIVE POPULATION (1956) AND GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT (1966-68), BY ECONOMIC SECTOR Sector of Economic Activity Percentage of Active Population 1956 Agriculture, forestry, and fishing 85.6 Manufacturing 5.0 } Mining n.a. Electricity n.a. Construction 0.6 Commerce 2.1 } Finance n.a. Transport and communication 0.6 Government services} Services, other 4.6 Inadequately described 1.3 Total 100.oc Gross Domestic Producta (in millions of Sudanese pounds)b 1966 1967 1968 173.0 190.2 199.9 38.5 42.0 43.8 16.6 16.3 16.7 23.9 21.7 24.3 104.8 113.7 127.0 31.8 31.4 33.8 {40.6 46.3 51.5 27.8 28.2 30.0 • • • • •••• • • • • 456.9c 489.9c 527.0 (in .% of total) 1968 37.9 8.3 3.2 4.6 24.1 6.4 9.8 5.7 • • • • 100.0 Source: Harold Nelson, Area Handbook of the Democratic Republic of Sudan, 1973. a At factor cost. b 1 Sudanese pound equals US $2.87. C Does not total because of rounding. n.a. = not available. = not applicable . • • • • 146 fgovernment had always been the prime mover in agricultural investment, primarily in irrigation schemes. The colonial government maintained close contact over the development of agriculture and ended the partici pation of foreign capital in the Gezira scheme in 1950. 10 From the colony's beginning, postal and connnunication services have been state owned. In transportation, the absence of a road system has resulted in virtually no com petition from private business with the state-owned rail ways and steamer services . The Sudan Railways, with an annual budget now over Sf30 million, is a state corporation that owns and manages railways, steamers and the Nile, hotels and Port Sudan harbor. The largest pre-independence economic project was the Gezira scheme which began opera tions in 1925. By 1967 three-quarters of a million farmers and their families, as well as many casual laborers from other parts of the country, derived their livelihood directly from the scheme. 11 The scheme produces about lOArthur Gaitskell, Gezira: A Story of Development in the Sudan (London: Faber, 1959), chaps. 3-5. 11 sudan, Ministry of Information and the Gezira Board, The Gezira · B ·oard·: · What It is• and How It Works, 1966-67 (Khartoum: Ministry of Information, August 1967), p. 81. 147 70 percent of the Sudan's cotton, besides dura, wheat and groundnuts. In 1959, the government established a number of factories, including two sugar factories, a cardboard factory, a tannery and two fruit and vegetable canning plants under a special corporate body called the Industrial Development Corporation. By 1969, the IDC had invested over Sf30 million in industrial projects. In 1971, another similar corporation was established to invest on two other sugar factories, a cement factory, two textile factories with a capital investment of over SflOO million. Since mid-1969, the government has been corrnnitted to socialism, and since the inauguration of the nationali- zation policy in mid-1970, it has taken over all corrnnercial banks as well as the medium-sized and large firms that dominated the modern sector of manufacturing and trade. Foreign trade became government directed. It was estimated that by 1972 the public sector was accounting for about 12 55 percent of gross output. Under these circumstances the role of public finance and planning has taken an added importance. The lack of appreciable real economic growth from 1965 through 12 Nelson et al., Area Handbook, p. 222. 148 I ' I 1971 (the period of October 1964 Revolution and political upheavals and instability) was attributed to the relatively low level of public investment (after completion of the major irrigation projects of the early 1960s--Roseiras and Khashm el Girba Dams). The relatively depressed cotton earnings of the mid-1960s, among other factors, led to a decline in private investment as well. The public sector was unable to muster enough investment financing to match foreign assistance received for the Ten-Year Plan of !Economic Development, 1961-62/1970-71, and the plan had to be virtually abandoned after the first five years. Some of its proposed agricultural projects were later included in the Five-Year Plan of 1970-71/1974-75. In the meantime, current government expenditure on military and other requirements was mounting. The strength of military forces had increased from 5,000 men in 1956 to nearly 50,000 in early 1972. This increase was due to heavy fighting between the central government forces and the southern Sudan rebel forces. A settlement achieved through negotiations was signed in Addis Ababa in March 28, 1972, which gave southern Sudan a semi-autonomous regional government and put an end to fighting. Consumption outstripped savings at an alarming 149 I rate, and the government was obliged to borrow heavily from the banking system; its borrowing amounted to over Sf317 million in April 1976. 13 The rising rate of infla tion cancelled out most or all of the nominal yearly growth in GDP of about 5 percent a year between 1960 and 1969; and since the population was growing at about 3 percent a year, the purchasing power of per capita income had actually declined. In 1969, per capita income was estimated at about S£36, the equivalent of about US $103 (one Sudanese pound equals US $2.87). 14 Inflation and mounting consumption had also put pressure on the balance of external payments and, despite improved cotton exports from 1969 through 1971, there was a continuing shortage of foreign exchange for the imports needed for development. The burden of foreign debt was considerably increased by the early 1970s. Thus, the country is in a precarious financial position, and it appears that implementation of the five-year development plan would depend heavily on connnitments of foreign 13 sahafa Daily Newspaper (Proceedings of the People's Council in discussing the annual budget of 1976-77, dated June 16, 1976). 14 Nelson et al. , Are· a Handbook, p. 223. 150 I assistance on favorable terms. In moving to diversify its markets and sources of assistance after 1969, the present Nimeiri government has made the country's trade somewhat over-reliant on bilateral barter arrangements with the connnunist countries. Official dissatisfaction with these arrangements was reportedly mounting even before the abortive connnunist coup of July 1971 resulted in the elimination from government of the faction most strongly in favor of close ties with the Soviet bloc countries. The government is now seeking to obtain more favorable terms for trade and for aid with no strings attached. It also intends to expand trade with 1 western Europe, the wealthier Arab countries, China, and the United States (see Table 6). The potential for greatly increased production through adequate investment was judged basically good, given the requisite political and financial stability. The economic potential of the southern region had as yet scarcely been tapped, and the central rainlands, where the bulk of proposed investment was to take place, were also thought to promise a favorable return. Two developments that tended to improve the country's credit worthiness as an applicant for international loans were the termination 151 I TABLE 6 SUDAN, TRADE WITH PRINCIPAL FOREIGN COUNTRIES, 1969-70 (in millions of Sudanese pounds)a Country Imports Exports Cotton 1969 1970 1969 1970 1969 Soviet Union 4.5 8.6 3.9 16.3 2.5 Italy 4.5 2.0 11.2 10.7 7.8 Federal Republic of Germanyb 5.9 7.8 10.1 10.6 5.6 India 8.9 13.3 10.5 10.3 10.5 Japan 7.6 5.9 7.4 9.3 4.1 People's Republic of China 5.0 4.2 6.4 6.2 4.6 United Kingdom 17.8 20.1 5.8 6.2 4.2 United States 2.7 3.1 2.9 3.8 0.3 Other countries 32.4 35.1 28.0 30.5 12.2 Total 89.3 100.1 86.2 103.9 51.8 Communist countries C 12.6 18.3 15.4 25.6 11.5 EECd and United Kingdom 36.9 36.9 33.8 35.4 19.2 Fiber Ex. 1970 16.3 7.0 3.8 9.3 4.6 5.4 3.9 0.5 12.9 63.7 24.3 17.0 Source: Adapted from L'Economie des Pays Arabes [Beirut] 14 (July 1971):36/162. a 1 Sudanese pound equals US $2.87. b West Germany cBulgaria, Hungary, and the German Democratic Republid (East Germany) were not reported in source for imports; Bulgaria and Hungary were not reported for exports. Yugoslavia is not included. d European Economic Community. 152 I of the war with the southern rebels in March 1972 and the achievement of increased yields and stability of output in cotton growing. The peace settlement was the first step toward creating conditions that might permit some stabili zation of public finances and a possible diversion of expenditures from military and current needs to development needs. Inefficiency in State Enterprises In general, the state's economic activities have not done well. Although the state's agricultural schemes have been comparatively successful, their profits have been negligible compared to the huge capital outlays on them. Of course, their total benefit to the state cannot, and should not, be measured in terms of profit alone. But more could be gained from these schemes by making the tenants do more of the work. Hundreds of the Gezira Board scheme inspectors do much that the tenant should be doing for themselves, while the state supplies laborers and pays their railway fares to come to work as seasonal labor in the scheme. Many of the tenants have ample time to get involved in trading as a source of additional income. Discipline is very much lacking in these government schemes. 153 The railway with its rolling stock and equipment badly maintained usually loses money in spite of its mono polistic position. The railways authorities disclosed in 1967 that by November of that year they had lost over S£80,000. 15 Its 1968-69 budget of over Sf20 million I . envisaged a surplus of only S£35,000, a return of less than 0.2 percent. The inadequate transport facilities provided by the Sudan Railways Corporation have seriously affected the economy since exports are not transported to Port Sudan seaport in time for shipping. The state factories under the management of the Industrial Development Corporation have lost money at a high rate due to the absence of proper pre-establishment market studies, slowness in execution of projects and non coordination of production and marketing. An investigation of these factories in 1969 indicated that all of them have been running at a loss with the exception of one sugar factory. The loss of the IDC in that year has been esti mated as S£6 million. The ambitious economic role undertaken by the state has caused its poor performance to have even greater impact 15 Mor• ning News, November 19, 196 7. 154 upon the economic and political life of the country. Finding it impossible to meet daily expenses out of revenue, successive governments started borrowing from the Bank of Sudan--Sf23.6 million by the end of July 1969--which meant simply printing more money. The borrowing is considered to have multiplied to hundreds of millions in the 19703. With foreign investment unattracted and local private enterprise hampered through nationalization and political instability, the state ventured into more and more economic activities which nearly exhausted the country's convertible foreign reserves and led to increased borrowing from abroad. The Sudan's foreign reserves fell from S£53.2 mil lion in December 1961 to Sf17 million as of July 31, 1969, and its official foreign debts which stood at S£76.1 mil lion as of June 30, 1968 continued their post-1964 increase reaching S£110.5 million by the end of 1970. 16 Repayments in 1968 of aid received under official loans amounted to Sf3.1 million which constitutes more than 35 percent of 16 Sudan, Ministry of Finance and Economics, Review of the Economy: A Supplement to the 1967-68 Budget (Khartoum: Ministry of Finance and Economics, 1967), p. 47; Barclays Bank Overseas · Re\riew (September 1969), p. 42. 155 i the receipts from foreign aid. The burden of foreign debts is expected to increase sharply after 1970 as foreign aid decreases while repayments increases. Such a growing burden of foreign debt is bound to worsen the economic situation of the Sudan and so increase political discontent as imports become dearer and rarer, and there are no ade quate substitutes from home production. This state of affairs has led economists and political scientists to believe that the state ventures in more industrial and connnercial fields should be checked, land more opportunities and encouragement should be given I to private enterprises, both local and foreign, to invest in the Sudan's economy. Since the state's ventures in these fields have so far been very unsuccessful, and since there is little likelihood that the discipline and effi- ciency necessary to make them more successful will be achieved in the near future, it seems that the road to a satisfactory rate of economic development and a stable political system is through the promotion of private enter prise. Local enterprise is limited by the paucity of local I capital and experience. But the state might help in I organizing large limited liability companies with private public capital, allowing their complete independence to 156 1 operate with the discipline and efficiency of private business. In addition to organizing and developing local business talent, the Sudan needs considerable private investment from abroad. It is true that there are serious difficulties in avoiding the corrupt and exploitative aspects of foreign investment, but the ability to secure foreign economic help while maintaining a significant measure of political and economic self-determination should 17 be possible for any reasonably competent government. What has aggravated the poor economic conditions of the state's industrial and agricultural enterprises is the fact that many highly qualified and able people have been employed, but underused, in the routine-ridden public sector where there is little incentive for effort and improvement. Indeed, state employment for many people is only a form of "outdoor relief"; they are contributing far less to the economy than they would under more incentive- oriented employment. Under a 1966-67 policy of eliminating unemployment, thousands of graduates and secondary school l sudan: nal of 17 oluwadre Aguda, "The State and the Economy in the From a Political Scientist's Point of View," Jour Developing Ar· e·as, no. 7 (April 1973), pp. 431-48. 157 I leavers have been taken into state employment although they are not needed. Professional graduates, such as engineers and architects, have little opportunity outside government employment because of the meager, atomized nature of the private sector. Because of the civil service caution and laissez-faire attitude toward its staff, however, such professionals cannot gain the degree of competence and skill which they would if their income depended on satisfy ing clients. The desire to use the political power of the state to control the economy and thereby improve the living standards of the citizens is in principle laudable. What is in serious doubt is whether extensive economic and non governing activities by the state are the most effective ways of promoting the people's welfare under present cir cumstances in the Sudan. The government has assumed such a wide range of functions that, unless the implementing organs are better coordinated and made much more efficient, progress will be greatly retarded. Indiscriminatory employment in public enterprises will only lead to ineffi ciency and lack of discipline, the result of which would be a complete lack of respect by the public for the state owned enterprises, a lack of confidence in government 158 ability to improve the people's economic conditions, and eventually a lack of confidence in the political authority of the state. The state's involvement in too many nongoverning processes can only impede general progress and increase political discontent. Every effort should be made to obtain the people's maximum contribution to development by leaving to them a great deal of initiative and incentive. Expansion of state activities, except those that are man datory, should only occur where reasonably efficient state organs already exist or can be established to carry out the new functions. Thus, a great deal of reform in organiza tion and manpower utilization within the government's economic activities is called for. The Sudan Political History The Condominium Agreement of 1899 Lord Cromer, the British Consul-General in Egypt, pointed out to his government in November 1898 the need for innnediately defining the future political and administra tive status of the Sudan, particularly in view of the Frenc 159 I arrival at Fashoda.18 Since Britain had no desire to I annex the Sudan and an unrestricted restoration of the pre Mahdist-Turko-Egyptian rule and sovereignty was not prac ticable under the circumstances, Lord Cromer proposed the compromise of a dual Anglo-Egyptian administration, a condominium. The Anglo-Egyptian Agreement was - signed in Cairo on the nineteenth of January 1899. In Article I of the Agreement, the territories to be comprised in the new Anglo-Egyptian Sudan were defined as: firstly, those never evacuated by Egyptian troops; secondly, those which had been temporarily lost to Egypt in the period 1882-98; and thirdly, those which may hereafter be reconquered by the two governments acting in concert; allusion here is to Darfur province, which was annexed to the Sudan in 1916. The most important provisions are in Articles III 19 and IV of the Agreement. They created the post of the Governor-General of the Sudan, an officer who was to be 18 A small French force arrived at Fashoda on the Nile near Malakal on July 10, 1898 and hoisted the French flag. After a short Anglo-French crisis, the French force was withdrawn in December 1898. 19 cecil H. A. Bennett, ed., · The Laws of th· e Sudan (London: Haycock Press, Ltd., 1935), I, Subtitle 2, 7-10. 160 I ---------- appointed by Egyptian decree on the recommendation of the United Kingdom government. He was vested with the supreme military and civil command of the country, and empowered to legislate by proclamation in all matters for the govern ment of the Sudan. He was to inform both Egyptian and United Kingdom governments of all such proclamations. The agreement had the effect of separating the administration of the Sudan from that of Egypt by stipulating that no Egyptian legislation was to apply to the Sudan unless specifically promulgated in t he Governor-General's procla- 1 I mations. The Condominium Agreement was not, however, a constitution for the Sudan: it was simply an instrument giving formal recognition to the existing situation on the morrow of the reconquest. The name is very misleading--the agreement did not in any real sense create a true condo minium, a conjoint soveriegnty over the Sudan, but merely gave a nominal recognition to the historical claims of Egypt, while reserving almost complete autonomy to the Governor-General who was normally a Britisher nominated by the United Kingdom government. The conclusion of the agreement gave an international legal sanction to the new form of the government. There remained the formidable task 161 of creating, operating and developing all the administra tive, judicial, financial, social and economical functions and services of a modern state. An immense task confronted Lord Kitchener, the first Governor-General, in October 1898. The thirteen years of the Mahdist rule had destroyed the former Turko Egyptian administrative system. The Khalifa's rule had been strong but despotic. The population, through battle, I famine and pestilence had dwindled from eight and one-half I to three and one-half million. Tribes were broken up, the land passed out of cultivation, and a general state of lawlessness prevailed. Trade with the world outside was almost stagnant. Kitchener outlined his policy in the following few , decades in the 1899 annual report as follows: The necessary laws and regulations will be care fully considered and issued as required, but it is not mainly to the framing and publishing of laws that we must look for the improvement and the good government of the country. The task before us ... is to acquire the confidence of the people, to develop their resources and to raise them to a higher leve1.20 20 British Information Service, · The Sudan 1'899·-1953 (London: Trade Union, 1953), p. 23. 162 duction The years since 1898 hav; seen the gradual intro- 7 of European material culture and institutions, the I latter usually on the British model. For convenience, the political development of the country during the Condominium may be divided into three periods. 1898-1928. This period witnessed a very active administration in which the country was divided into four teen provinces (later reduced to twelve and finally to nine), each in the charge of a senior British officer called the governor, assisted by other British officers as inspectors. Under them, in charge of districts, were Egyptian junior officers. During the early years, while the country was still under military administration, the brunt of administrative responsibility in the provinces fell upon British officers of the Egyptian army. Military officers were, however, gradually replaced by civilians, carefully recruited from the British colleges. After the First World War, few Sudanese were admitted in the provin cial administration. The period passed peacefully and internal security was maintained. Economic development had started since 1899 and the government's budget witnessed perpetual development along the years. In the early years and until 1912, the budget deficit was met by the Egyptian treasury in Cairo. Figures for the Sudan annual budgets demonstrate the development (Table 7). Within this period, the British administration of the Sudan, subject to maintenance of proper supervision, aimed at leaving local administration as far as possible in the hands of the local Sudanese authorities. Tribal Sheikhs who had been dispossessed and stripped of power during the Mahdia were reappointed and generally encouraged to re-establish their authority. Southern chiefs were recognized as representatives of their people, too, and both northern and southern local administrations were given legal recognition through ordinances in 1922 and 1932, respectively. Another interesting development in this period was the establishment of Gordon Memorial College as a primary school in 1901, and which became the center for Sudanese higher education and sophistication. 1938-51. With the foundation of the Graduates' General Congress at the beginning of this period, there appeared an indigenous political movement among educated Sudanese. It is worth mentioning, however, that as early as 1924 the spirit of nationalism had manifested itself l ____________________ 164 TABLE 7 SUDAN ANNUAL BUDGETS, 1899-1920 Year Revenue(£) Expenditure (f) 1899 124,500 228,000 1900 240,000 598,000 1903 462,000 618,000 1906 804,000 831,000 1909 1,040,200 1,153,200 1912 1,758,500 1,658,500 1914 1,544,000 1,533,000 1917 2,195,355 1,901,941 1920 4,932,000 3,552,000 Source: Abstracted from J. S. R. Duncan, The Sudan (London: William Blackwood, 1952), p. 105. 165 in some form. During this period, the "Sudnaization" of the central government was initiated and by 1944 Sudanese were sitting in Province Councils, and an Advisory Council for northern Sudan, with Sudanese members, was founded as a first serious measure toward familiarizing Sudanese with self-government. At about this time, the Graduates' Con gress split into two parties, one favoring union with Egypt, and the other demanding complete independence for the Sudan. In 1948, and as a second measure to cope with the Sudanese rising opposition to British foreign rule, a partly elected and partly nominated Legislative Assembly, with limited legislative powers, was set up. It practiced, in general, the functions of a parliament and it was given some leeway in domestic matters, although the Governor General always retained vetoing power over its resolutions. The party advocating a union with Egypt boycotted the elections of the Assembly. 1951-52. This period witnessed a rapid movement in the direction of self-government. Abortive negotiations , over the Sudan took place between Great Britain and Egypt in 1950. Alarmed by the Egyptian announcement in the same year of its intention of abrogating the 1936 agreement and of demanding a unification of the Nile Valley under the --------- - - - -- ------------ ------ Egyptian Crown, the Legislative Assembly passed a motion demanding from the Condominium the declaration of self government in the Sudan. In March 1951, in response to another motion of the Assembly, the Governor-General appointed an Anglo-Sudanese Constitutional Amendment Com mission to recommend the next steps in the advance to self-government. The commission drafted a new constitution which formed the basis of the Self-Government Statute, I I enacted by the Legislative Assembly on April 23, 1952. This provided for a Council of Ministers, composed entirely 1 of Sudanese, and responsible to a bicameral Parliament. The new Constitution was for an unspecified transitional period, after which the Sudanese would exercise the right of self-determination. To obtain Egyptian consent to this statute, after repeated failure of negotiations in the previous years, seemed impossible when, in July 1952, the unpredictable happened. The coup d'etat of the Egyptian army deposed King Faruq and shattered the old structure of Egyptian politics. With the departure of Farug, the provocative Egyptian assertion of sovereignty over the Sudan ceased. The Egyptian junta, under General Neguib ' 1 who is half Sudanese by birth and educated partly in the · Sudan, I I was more considerate to the needs of the Sudanese, 1------------------------------ 167 and it was its intention to proceed to fulfill the Sudanese demand expressed in their Legislative Assembly. So it came about that in the autumn and winter of 1952-53, under standings were reached between the Egyptians and the Sudanese advocating complete independence. In October 1952, the British government had accepted the draft of the Self-Government Statute, passed earlier by the Legislative Assembly. On November 2, the Egyptian government proposed some amendments to the statute and eventually the Anglo Egyptian Agreement of February 12, 1953 was signed. Self-Government and Self-Determination 1953-55 The Agreement provided that a three-year period of self-government under international supervision was to begin innnediately and end with a decision by the Sudanese people on the future of their country. The Governor-General's roles under the Self Government Statute were to be exercised with the concur rence of an international connnission consisting of two Sudanese, one Briton, one Egyptian, and one Pakistani. An elaborate scheme for the termination of this transitional period was laid down in the Agreement, but this was not followed in practice. The first step to be carried out .__ _____________________________ _ 1681 -------- was the election of a parliament, and the Agreement set up an International Electoral Commission which conducted the first parliamentary elections in November and December of 1953, and the Sudanese Parliament held its first meeting on New Year's Day, 1954. The transitional period lasted for only two years, culminating in the declaration of independence of the Sudan1 , on January 1, 1956. Meanwhile, the government administra tion went smoothly except for two minor eruptions, one in the north on March 1, 1954 and the other in the south in August 1955, due to political implications and rapid changes in administration. The Parliamentary Regime 1956-58 A new republic was born in January 1956. The political history of the parliamentary period after independence was a development of that of the preceding years. Thus, as Dr. P. M. Holt put it, New Year's Day, 1956, marks only in a formal and conventional sense a ·new era in Sudanese history. The real line of demarcation must be placed either earlier, on the "appointed day" of 9 January 1954, when the essential transfer of power from British to Sudanese hands took place; or later, on 17 Novem ber 1958, when the Army coup d'etet ended the brief 169 period of parliamentary government.21 Ismail el Azhari, the first national Prime Minis ter, continued to dominate the Parliament after independ ence, but certain political eruptions affected his popu larity. Parliamentary life from 1954 to 1958 was charac terized by factionalism rather than party politics, and its debased quality was to be used as a justifi cation of their action by the soldiers who ended it.22 The two main opposition parties were pressing for a coali tion government, so that they could be associated with the achievement of independence, but that did not take place until February 2, 1956. On July 5, Azhari lost the con fidence of the Parliament and Abdallah Khalil was elected as Prime Minister through a coalition of the two opposition parties. The new government remained in office until the new elections took place in February-March 1958. General instability, party corruption and an economic crisis in 1958 contributed to the army's assuming power on November 17, 1958. After the new Parliament assembled in March 1958, 21 Holt, A Modern His• tory· o· f the ·sudan, p. 171. 22 rbid., p. 172. 170 I the Prime Minister found it imperative to form a two- party cabinet. He entered into a conflict with the Liberal Party, the political group which included the majority of southern deputies. Southerners were antagonized by Abdallah Khalil's policy, since he refused to include theiL I nominees in his cabinet. The government was also threat ened with losing the parliamentary majority in the second meeting of the new house, which was scheduled on November 17, 1958. During the parliamentary regime, the economic and social development continued with great strides. The government during the period was aware of the problems and difficulties and took great measures of economic value. To mention only a few: a great increase was planned in the amount of irrigated land in the Gezira Scheme, known as the Managil extension. Another major development was the extension of the railway system with a line branching off from the existing line in Kordofan province and running southwestwards to Nyala in Darfur. Also, an economic and technical aid agreement was concluded on March 31, 1958 with the United States which contributed greatly to the relief of the economic crisis in the same year due to the poor cotton crop and its falling price in the world ._ ______________________ 11u markets. The civil service remained stable and slightly affected with politics and upon it lay the shouldering and solving of the developmental programs. The Military Government, 1958-64 On the dawn of November 17, 1958, a bloodless , coup d'etat took place and power passed to the connnander- 1 in chief, General Ibrahim Abboud. Many factors contributed to the army assuming power at that time. At the background of the problem lies the fact that parliamentary democracy was an alien form of govern ment which had been transplanted very superficially shortly ! 1 before independence. Political parties were factional and the mass of the people were swayed in elections by broad I general issues. There was no majority party throughout the , parliamentary period in the House of Representatives, and consequently, coalition governments came and went at short I intervals. The problems of the three southern provinces were beyond the solution of a weak central government which was always preoccupied in seeking a majority in the House. The public grew cynical, impatient and indifferent with these political maneuvers. All of this complex political situation which ' developed against a background of economic crisis in cotton 172 production accelerated the public need for some political reform. The army movement in the Sudan had its parallels in other Middle Eastern states such as Egypt. It has always been true that Egyptian political conditions had their parallel, though independent, counterparts in the Sudan. On November 17, General Abboud made a broadcast in which he spoke of the "state of degeneration, chaos and instability of the country," which he ascribed solely to the "bitter political strife between parties trying to 23 secure personal gain by any ways and means." The dissatisfaction with the political parties because of their inability to give the country an effective and good government and the deteriorating economic condi tions contributed to the public support of the military take-over. Although political observers believed that the Abboud regime had made significant changes in the fields of agriculture, such as the establishment of Kashm el Girba 23 Broadcast by General Ibrahim Abboud, President of the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces, Prime Minister and Minister of Defence, November 17, 1958. 173 - --------- Agricultural Scheme, the building of the Roseires Dam, and in the fields of industry, such as the building of Geneid and Kashm el Girba sugar factories, the fruit canning factories at Kariema and Wau, the cement factory in Rabak, the textile factory in Khartoum, it was unable to give the country the political stability that it needed. The regime witnessed two abortive coup d'etats against it, and it was faced with great opposition from the political parties, students' unions of Khartoum University and other institutions as well as Workers' Trade U nions which were always a stronghold of the Communist party. This political opposition to the regime coupled with evident corruption and nepotism that characterized the military rulers, invariably led to a nation-wide opposition of the regime. Its policy in solving the southern Sudan problem through suppression by military force aggravated conditions in the south, and drained the economy by diverting most of the country's financial resources to military equipment and personnel rather than development. The October Revolution, 19.64·- ·69 The resentment and opposition which had been grow ing since 1959 inevitably led to a confrontation between the regime and the political parties, Federation of Trade j _______________________ 174 - ----------- Unions and university students. This confrontation took place on October 21, 1964, when the police opened fire on a peaceful meeting of students at the University of Khartoum while they were discussing the southern problem. One student was killed and nine others were injured. The following day, during the public funeral of the student, speeches were made denouncing the policy of the regime. The staff of the University of Khartoum resigned in protest! I I against what had happened and called for the end of the military regime. A nation-wide political strike was organized and declared on October 26, 1964. Young army officers who han shown discontent in the past were not behind the military ruling junta, and in fact refused to obey orders to fire on demonstrations in Khartoum. General Abboud had no alternative but to declare his decision to dismiss the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces and the Council of Ministers and to announce his agreement to form a transitional government which would make the necessary arrangements for a return to democratic life and civilian government . The transitional government formed in October 1964 1 included representatives from all political parties and professional groups who took part in the leadership and L_ ______________________ 175J 1 l organization of the revolution against the military regime. The three big traditional political parties of the country were dissatisfied with their share and insignifi- cant role in the October transitional government, and from the start formed a strong front to depose that government and make new arrangements for a better representative government. Parliamentary elections were held in April 1965 and a coalition government between the two big par ties, the National Unionist party and the Umma party was formed. The exclusion of the third big party--the People's I Democratic party--and the two small parties, the Communists and the Muslim Brothers, from government led to a struggle for power, and the country fell again into instability, indicated by the continuous fall and rise of coalition governments in the period between 1965 and 1969. The October era had one bright side of bringing together the different factions of the southern rebels to a national conference with northern political parties to try and solve 1 the southern question. Although no agreement was reached before the present revolutionary government came into power, those attempts paved the way for a final settlement. Besides the effort concerning so.uthern Sudan, the October Revolution worked to bring back the rule of the traditional 176 ----------- parties and a pattern of unstable governments resembling those of the period of 1954-59. The parliamentary regimes of the period 1965-69 were thus characterized by chaos, intrigues and lack of purpose. The successive governments representing the traditional parties and groups failed to carry out any economic or social development of any sort, and the period was one of impotence and economic stagna- . 24 t1.on. May Revolution, 1969 It was against this background that what was called the 'Free Officers' of the army, led by Colonel Gaafar Nimeiri (the present president of the country), took power on May 25, 1969, through a peaceful coup d'etat. They like many educated Sudanese were impatient with the bickering and corruption of politicians, the deteriorating economic situation and the growing problem of the South. But underlying all this was a conviction among the officers that a socialist path was the only alternative.25 The early years of this givernment were years of 1 instability and change. It dissolved all political parties, I I I 24 For a comprehensive political survey of the I period 1964-69, see M. O. Beshir ,· Revo·lutiot1 and N · a·tional- · ism in the Sudan (New York: Harper & Row Publishers, Barnes & Noble Div., 1974), pp. 202-28. 25 Ibid., p. 226. 177 '--------------------------------- thus alienating them. The University Students' Union had also declared opposition to the regime and is still opposed at the present time. The instability reached its peak in July 1971, when I a Communist countercoup was carried out by the three dis missed members of the Revolutionary Corrnnand Council. Nimeiri was out of power and was imprisoned for four days after which forces supporting him countered the Corrnnunist instigated coup and reinstated him in office. The follow ing years witnessed the complete eradication of the Commu nist influence in Nimeiri's regime and opened the way for a serious effort by the government to see development foster and prosper in the country. This effort was par tially successful as so many inhibiting factors militated against economic prosperity and progress. One of the great achievements of this regime is • the promulgation of Addis Ababa Agreement in 1972 which brought settlement of the southern question and granted a f d 1 h h f h Sudan. 26 Th" e era status tote sout ern part o t e is act put an end to the long bloody struggle between the central government and southern rebels and diverted funds 2611 Because of northern sensitivity, however, the phrase used was 'regional autonomy,'" Nelson, p. 190. 178 that used to be constrned in the military struggle to economic and social purposes. The government is seriously struggling to achieve economic development, and the newly stated policy is to 1 encourage the private sector of the economy through private investments in industry and agriculture, both from inter national as well as national sources. The economic success and failure of this policy will be discussed later. Another achievement which is greatly commended is the creation of a central ministry for public service and administrative reform entrusted with the major role of administrative reform for the whole country. More time and space will be given to this aspect of development later in the research. One of the controversial achievements of the regime is the new local government setup which was brought about through the passing of the People's Rule Act of 1971, which put all provinces under a political appointee who is the representative of the central government, thus changing the career bureaucratic nature of the job, and which reduced local government rural and town councils into mere agents of the province, while they were previously autono mous and enjoying legal status. The number of such .__ _______________________ 1 _79~ I councils increased from 86 before the Act to 5,123 after the Act. At present there is a great controversy as to whether the new local government system is an achievement I or not, and whether it is functioning at all. The govern- 1 I ment has constituted a national committee to review the act and performance of the system and reports its findings to the People's Legislative Council. The committee's report is under review now, but its findings have called for urgent and drastic changes in the system (see Chapter II for more details). Sudan's Major Administrative Reforms in Retrospect Administrative reforms are fundamental changes in the administrative machinery of a country. In developing countries, major reforms are especially designed to serve two main purposes: (a) to introduce new developments and innovations to meet the needs of a changing society; and (b) to improve the efficiency and running of the adminis trative machinery already in existence. Both objectives of administrative reform can be served either through periodic attempts by ad hoc organi zations, or through continuous working of a permanent organization of reform. The former of the two objectives, 180 however, may be better achieved through ad hoc national commissions appointed by the political government of the day to carry out a comprehensive overall investigation of the government machinery and eventually suggest reconunen- 1 dations for reform. The latter objective is best achieved through the established agencies particularly geared to initiating reforms in the civil service machinery as a permanent process. Experience has shown that the adminis trative reform measures that emerge out of normal attempts and activities of permanent institutions are more accept able to civil service leaders and are, therefore, more effective in bringing about improvement and change. In developing countries, the need and interest in administrative reforms began to be felt only recently. In most cases, the need was felt only after political independence; particularly when the new governments were faced with the tremendous task of social and economic development. As they proceeded with the task of socio economic development, it was realized that not much can be achieved in this field without improving the administrative I machinery of the government. The inherited administrative systems, in most cases, were only suitable for a limited and regulative form of government. The demand for socio- 181 -------------------- economic development necessitated a quantitative expansion and a qualitative transformation of the functions and processes of government and administration. Sudan Experience In the Sudan, major administrative reforms have taken place at very remote intervals. Since its independ ence in 1956 and until the May 1969 Revolution took place, the Sudan witnessed only two or three major administrative reforms. That was mainly due to the unfavorable political climate that prevailed during this period. Party politi cians were lacking the proper conception of the role of administrative reform and were busy in party politics rather than in serious consideration of development proj ects and the proper administrative apparatus necessary to implement them. Likewise civil service leaders were equally apathetic, dull and status-quo minded. It is undoubtedly true that reform needs leadership, and it is only when the political government in power initiates major reform policies that bureaucracy moves to assure its positive role in planning the reform and implementing it. Bureaucracy in the Sudan is ill-fitted to initiate major administrative reforms for reasons of character conflicts, empire-building attitudes and lack of coordinating civil L_ __________________ l82 bodies at the top bureaucratic levels. Other scholars believe that the major obstacles to reform have been the lack of imagination and apprecia tion of the problem of management in its proper perspective and magnitude, and the limited sources available to the institutions appointed to this task. In formulating the country's plans and programs, priority is often given to material production and construction work to the complete neglect of the question of administrative improvement, a situation which often leads to failure of plans and programs. It is to be noted that the major administrative reforms that took place in the Sudan before 1969 fall into two main areas--relationship between central and local governments, and internal organization and personnel policies and practices of the bureaucracy. However, in both areas the reforms were neither extensive nor satis- factory by any criterion. In the field of intergovernmental relations, an Organization Commission was appointed in 1959 to consider the interrelations between local and central governments and to advise on the proper provincial setup of government in the nine provinces of the Sudan with the purpose of L ________________________ l83 decentralizing more central powers to the local government councils and provincial headquarters. On the recommendation of this Organization Com mission's report, the Provincial Administration Act of 1960 was passed by the government. The Act reduced con siderably the powers of the provincial commissioner, the central government representative, and his powers were diffused between an elected provincial legislative council and a provincial executive council made up of provincial heads of departments, i.e., representatives of central ministries like education, irrigation, works, etc., pre sided over by the provincial connnissioner. As a result, a group leadership was replacing the individual leadership assumed previously by the provincial commissioner; but problems soon arose because the Act did not give the com missioner any powers of coordination, and as a result the representatives of central ministries at the provincial level were not obliged to consult with the commissioner, and thus became rather independent in their execution of duty. The Act also failed to decentralize sufficient financial powers to provincial and local government coun cils, and as a result failed to se.rve its main purposes; that of decentralizing authority and actio·1 to the local connnunities. In 1972, a new local government act called the Public Rule Act was passed. This Act will be discussed later. In the area of reorganization of civil service and updating of personnel policies and practices, two attempts 1 of major administrative reforms have been made. Back in December 1957, two years after the achievement of political independence, the government felt the need for a revision of the terms of service of the government officials and employees. A corrnnission for this purpose was appointed, known as Franklins' Terms of Service Corrnnission, with the following terms of reference: (a) to consider principles which should govern pay and other conditions of service; (b) to consider whether any changes are desirable in the scales of pay and superannuation in view of the rising cost of living; and (c) to make reconnnendations on the organization, structure and relationship between the various components of the civil service machine and the grading of responsibilities within units of the service and, in doing so, to bear in mind the functions and responsibilities of these units. The Franklins' Connnission submitted a comprehensive report in May 1959 to the Minister of Finance and 185 Economics. r t pu~ great emphasi~ ~n -the first two terms- ] of reference and touched only lightly on the reorganization of ministries and departments but recommended the creation of a special organization commission. The reforms recom mended by the commission were quite sound and appropriate, but unfortunately only a very small portion of the report was implemented. The portion implemented was the proposed salary scale for superscale posts, i.e., posts of under secretaries, directors, their deputies and assistants. The main reasons for nonimplementation were the unfavorable financial conditions of 1958 which resulted from a poor rainy season and a poor cotton production which is the main cash crop of the country. The pressure put on by the government employees' trade unions for the revision of salary scales in view of the rising cost of living, and the fact that the previous report of 1959 was not considered by the government, com pelled the government to appoint two terms of service commissions in August 1965, one to consider the terms of service of officials and the other of government employees. The following terms of reference were stated in the letter of appointment: (a) to consider the principles which should govern the conditions of service and emoluments of 186 ------- - -----, the civil service; (b) to review the present terms of service and to see that they are commensurate with the duties and responsibilities of the incumbents and with the cost of living; (c) to re-evaluate the posts of the civil service after conducting a comparative study of the duties and responsibilities of different posts in government units ;j (d) to review the present personnel establishments of government units at all levels and to see whether they cope with the duties and responsibilities entrusted to these units, and to cut redundant posts, if any, and to suggest increase, upscaling or downscaling of posts if deemed fit; (e) to review the relationship between the structure of emoluments of existing classes of civil servants and between categories withiD these classes; and (f) to see whether any changes are desirable in existing superannua tion schemes. The commissions submitted their reconnnendations to the Minister of Finance and Economics in September 1968 on the following subjects: principles of remuneration, women's pay and other conditions of service, discipline, 1 cost of living, staff complements and grading, establish ments of ministries and departments, structure of the service, salary levels, allowances, leaves and pensions. 187 ---- serious attention was paid to these recommendations except in the area of salary scales for officials and employees which were improved only to satisfy the urgent needs of the officials. The remainder of the reconrrnenda tions are yet to be considered for implementation. The attention of relevant government authorities has been frequently drawn to the need for implementing the other recommendations, some of which are meant to update obsolete rules and regulations that govern the civil service since the early thirties of this century. In the area of organizational reforms of the government machinery, the need was felt for an attempt to consider the civil service departmental setup with the aim of reorganizing governmental units and defining relations between them so that they can be in a position to cope with the expanding peoples' needs for socioeconomic development and growth. Since independence in 1956, no attempt of such nature was made. We have referred previously to the Reorganization Commission of 1959 but that was mainly con cerned with the study of the local government system and the definition of relations between central and local governments. In August 1966, a young and zealous Prime Minister 188 1 ------------------- who believed in reform and introduction of young blood and new ideas into the civil service appointed an organization commission whose members were distinguished, capable and 1 young, and were entrusted with the following terms of reference: (1) to evaluate the organizational structure of the civil service, the interrelations between different units and the effectiveness of these units; and (2) to recommend steps for reform with the aim of increasing efficiency, fostering good organization, and ensuring proper methods of coordination and cooperation between government ministries and departments. The enthusiastic Prime Minister fixed two weeks as the deadline for the commission to submit to him its proposals and on request of the commission the period was extended to one month. As one could imagine, the corrnnis sion could only submit its report to the Prime Minister two years later, in May 1968. By then the young Prime Minister who initially appointed the commission was no longer in office; he had by then become the leader of the opposition in the Constituent Assembly. The commission report was submitted to the Prime Minister of the day in May 1968 but since he was not essentially the initiator of the reform, he gave no attention to it. The report was 189 ------------------ - - - ------- quite extensive and a great effort was put into it. For this reason, the Institute of Public Administration thought of focusing light on it in one of its annual conferences in February 1969. The conference thoroughly studied the I report, updated it and compiled feasible reconnnendations ! of administrative reform for the government to implement. Soon after, the May 1969 military revolution assumed power in the Sudan and committed itself to radical change and administrative reform. The experience of major administrative reforms before the May 1969 revolution was bitter. Most attempts were abortive and frustrated by lack of implementation. 1 The hard fact is that administrative reform does not receive high priority in national development strategies. In the Sudan, this deplorable state of affairs may be attributed to two reasons: (1) There is political insta- bility of governments and consequent short term of office of any senior political reformer. The average life of national governments in Sudan in the period between 1954 and 1968 was found by the Organization Commission of 1966 to be eleven months. Consequently, the turnover of minis ters was found to be very high. The majority of the ministers came to assume office for the first time and only L ___ ~ ________________ 190 f for a period of eleven months on the average. (2) One can not but conclude that the Sudan bureaucracy lacks initia tive for change and improvement. Administrative leaders in the bureaucracy are busy in routine dealings and unfortunately do not have time to think about systematic reforms. They were also affected by the rapid political changes in government and by economic development urgency and seem to have produced very little impact on the politi cal leaders who have worked with them. On the other hand, because they are busy in routine matters, they have no time to develop either themselves through training and educa tion, or their subordinates through delegating to them a part of their responsibility and authority. Thus, a vicious circle, somewhat like the following is in opera tion: Busy in routine + No time to develop themselves+ No time to develop subordinates through delegating work; + therefore more burden over them;+ and therefore no time to think of reform and change because busy in routine handling. Administrative Reforms A ·fte· r the May 1969 Revoluti'on With the advent of the Military Revolution of May 191 I 1969, a more favorable political envi~onme~t was estab- lished. The revolutionary government was committed to ' radical and effective social change in all aspects and I jwalks of life. Although no clearly defined program of administrative reform was promulgated and announced, nearly every ministry or department underwent some sort of reform and change. At the start, a near-complete change in the bureau cratic leadership took place. That was effected t~rough a large-scale purging policy aiming at removing from office bureaucrats who were affiliated with dissolved political parties, who were charged with inefficiency, and those who were not committed to socialistic changes in government. Adruinistratively speaking, this extensive purging of senior 1 executives is considered to be a major administrative reform, though students of Public Administration in the Sudan consider it a major setback to the development of the ! I country as it deprived the country of some of its most able and competent career civil servants. Another area of major administrative reform was the organization of governmental agencies. The government ,was vigorously committed to the system of establishing investigation commissions to study and advise individual \.____ ___ _ 192 -------------------- -~ ministers on the reoganization of their ministries and their subordinate departments with the aim of attaining efficiency and progress in the outmoded systems, and of improving the p r formance of personnel. The Institute of Public Administration played a great role in the work of these corrnnissions as most of the IPA staff members were working as members and rapporteurs of many of them. The work of these investigating commissions related mainly to the working of the economically productive units of govern ment, such as Sudan Railways, Sudan Airways Corporation, and the Industrial Development Corporation which is responsible for all governmental industrial enterprises. Another area where major administrative reform was felt was the nationalized and confiscated indust~ial and commercial enterprises. The government nationalized in May 1970 more than seventy commercial, financial, and industrial firms that were previously privately own. Six sectors of public corporations were created, each headed by a board of directors responsible to a specific minister. The ministers concerned, Ministers of Treasury and Plan ning, Industry, Agriculture and Connnerce, Supply and Foreign Trade, were to form a coordinating body called the Supreme Authority for Public Sector Corporations under the 1931 chairmanship of the President. The sectors were divided as follows: 1. The Public Corporation for Industrial Production 2. The Public Corporation for Agricultural Production 3. The Public Corporation for Transportation 4. The Public Corporation for Banking 5. The Public Corporation for Catering and Tourism 6. The Public Corporation for Connnerce Under each public corporation, there is a number of productive firms and ~rading houses, each of which is administered by a board of directors presided over by the general manager of the firm. Although the reorganization of these corporate bodies was a recent endeavor, it has not proved successful. This is indicated by the fact that most--if not all--of nationalized companies have been running at a loss. The next reform worthy of mention here is the revision of the local government system in the Sudan. The old system of local government concerned itself mainly with the administration of social services peculiar to and typical of a primitive society. These were essentially rudimentary education and public health, organization of local markets and provision of water wells and the like. 194 The new reformed local government system has been given the irrrrnense and noble task of taking an active part in engendering political and social changes in the Sudanese society. The new local government system, as explained by the new Public Rule Act of 1971, is conceived as a style of government adopted by the central state. Its main features can be summarized in the following: a) Devolution of more powers of the central government to local government agencies at the regional levels enabl ing the local government organs at the provinces and local councils to take active part in economic and social development of their communities b) Mobilization and involvement of the local communities througb the creation of village development councils and representation in provincial and local councils, in policymaking and planning of economic and social development schemes and in the administration of such schemes c) Creation of regional and provincial administration as independent budgetary units with quasi-legislative and executive powers deconcentrated from all central government departments 195 1 , d) Implementation of local schemes through local finance and self-help Th P .. 1 C . . 27 . d . h e rovincia onnnissioner is now veste wit powers sufficient to make him the coordinator and sole government agent held accountable to the central government for the proper administration and security. As a result, he will be more powerful than the career administrator who was there before. The new local government system has been criticized in many aspects, and it has been under review by a national connnission constituted by the People's Legislative Council. The main shortcomings singled out by the connnission which are in need of reform are (1) too much power is concentrated in the hands of the Provincial Com missioner to the detriment of local councils' incentive and local initiative and loss of their past legal personal ity; and (2) local councils have unnecessarily multiplied in numbers and levels. A few months after the Military Revolution of May 27 The Sudan is divided into 18 administrative regions, each called a province, headed by a commissioner who is usually a career civil servant. A radical change in the way of his appointment to office is envisaged in the new Act, as he will be a political appointee from now on. ___________________________ 196 ji969 the government created the Central Bureau of Public Control as a controlling and reformative agency, and assigned its management a member of the Revolution Connnand Council, the Supreme Constitutional power in the Sudan I before the recent presidential elections. The bureau was vested with sufficient power to effect control over all government departments, public corporations and agencies of the private sector as well. Its functions were mainly: a) To check on the conduct and behavior of administration in government units and to reveal any shortcomings hindering proper execution and application of adminis trative laws and regulations b) To check on the performance and conduct of civil servants and to investigate cases of maladministration, abuse of power, injustice, red tape, inefficiency, and to suggest corrective measures necessary to rectify the situation c) To receive complaints raised by citizens against corrupt civil servants or against any abuse or misuse of power, and to suggest the corrective measures necessary The role of the bureau in administrative reforms 197J ! has not been quite satisfactory. It was involved from the start in extending the government's control over the nationalized and confiscated industries and connnercial firms. This urgent task consumed most of its time and effort, and it had little time to investigate and put right cases of maladministration and abuse of power. It suffered from an acute shortage of properly trained staff. , Eventually, it was dissolved when cases of corruption and financial embezzlements were cited against it. The Role of the Institute of Public Administration in Administrative Reforms The Institute of Public Administration was created in 1960 as a joint undertaking between the UN and the Sudan government. It was entrusted with three main functions: (a) conducting training programs aiming at improving the performance and efficiency of civil servants at all levels; (b) conducting consultative services in problems of admin- istration and organization and civil service practices, and suggesting corrective measures for the improvement of methods and techniques of office management; and (c) con ducting research in administration and related fields to benefit civil servants and bureaucratic leaders in con ceptualizing problems of administration, and extracting 198 and adopting new methods and techniques in their day-to-da;l I work. The role of the institute in administrative reform can best be seen in its participation in the majority of investigation and reorganization commissions appointed by individual ministers, or the Council of Ministers in session. The institute feeds these connnissions with experts of public administration to work as commission members, and by providing up-to-date background material in the subject under discussion. The system of effecting administrative reform through the Institute of Public Administration has advan tages as well as disadvantages. Since the studies and recommendations are made by outsiders, they are likely to be more objective or unbiased in favor of one service unit or the other. Moreover, the personnel conducting the studies, being specialists in the academic discipline of public administration, can look at the problems from a wider angle and in relation to the total administrative system, and can apply their professional knowledge in finding solutions. This is likely to produce more rational solutions in the long run than those produced by adminis- trators. On the other hand, being outsiders, the members 1991 of the staff of the Institute of Public Administration may not be able to identify the problems and causes which can I only be felt and identified by those working in an organi zation for a long time. Another limitation of the approach is that it depends on the initiative of individual minis tries and departments, and such initiatives are rare. Moreover, the recommendations of the consulting team are I not as much binding on the ministries as the recommenda- tions of a commission or an inner superholding agency. Another type of administrative reform effected by the Institute of Public Administration is the training programs held for different levels of administrators. Through induction and introduction of new ideas and inno vations in the field of public administration and manage ment, course participants begin to change their attitudes and may adopt some ideas and implement them. But again, this is definitely a slow process of reform. The third attempt of the Institute of Public Administration in administrative reform is the annual Round ' Table conferences which tackle specific problem areas, and I where senior civil servants, ministers, private sector executives and university professors are invited to take part in the discussions. Since the inception of the 200 institute, nine conferences have been held to deal with the topics: 1. "Techniques of Development Planning," 1959, for one day 2. "Sudan Manpower Needs," 1960, for one day 3. "Public Administration and Economic Development," 1961, for five days 4. "Perspectives in Public Administration in Sudan," 1962, for seven days 5. "Administrative Improvements for Development in the Sudan," 1963, for five days 6. "Training for Civil Service in Sudan," 1964, for five days 7. "Civil Service in a Changing Society," 1966, for five days 8. "Major Problems of Municipalities," 1967, for five days 9. "Administrative Reform Conference," 1969, for seven days These conferences have had as their aim the increase of knowledge and technical competence of senior , officers, the integration of their thinking, and the pro- vision of new and balanced perspectives in the ope~·ation of administrative agencies. L _____ _ As can be seen, the conference ! 20!.J I themes have covered a wide range of subjects designed to inspire scar~h fur p~of~ssional and technical knowledge, stimulate curiosity and motivate conceptual thinking. The exchange of different views by different personnel from i the private sector and university scholars helps the administrators in adopting attitudes and ideas and in implementing change and reforms in their departments. However successful the conferences are, the fact remains that implementation of new ideas, thoughts, and techniques is again a matter of discretion of the top officials. Lessons of Experience The above survey shows that administrative reform had always been of secondary importance in the strategy of national development in the Sudan. The reforms that took place were of an ad hoc and intermittent nature, and depended mostly upon the spontaneous initiative ·of some politician or politicians at a particular point in time. Administrative leaders of the Sudanese bureaucracy failed to initiate and were rather passive to reform, and rather parochial in their outlook; mainly concerned with the prob lems of their own individual organization or ministry to the neglect of others. As a result, questions of coordi- 202 nation between ministries suffered. Most efforts of reform were short-lived and were concerned mainly with two aspects: the reorganization of governmental apparatus and personnel policies and prac- 1 tices. There was hardly any comprehensive well-organized plan for government reform. This was due to the fact that there was no central organ or agency assigned such impor tant activity as reform. Most attempts toward administra tive reform did not find, therefore, favorable support and adequate attention at the implementation stage, with the result that only parts of any report were implemented and the rest either shelved or lost in the bureaucratic process. Politicians may become very much interested in administrative reform at the start of reform, but once a reform commission is appointed or its recommendations are adopted, there does not seem to be a proper follow-up at the implementation stage. This is partly due to the high turnover of ministers and the continuing political insta bility of the country, and partly to the lack of conception as to the importance of administrative reform among the bureaucratic leaders; but it is most decidedly due to the fact that no central agency with sufficient power was 203 r 1 available to coordinate, implement and follow up reforms. The Creation of a Minis• try· for Reform In order that administrative reform may start and sustain strength and vigor toward successful results, a spearhead with sufficient capabilities and perseverance and power is a necessary prerequisite. This could only be achieved with the advent of the Ministry of Public Service and Administrative Reform which was established in October 1971 and classified as a "key" ministry on equal footing with the Ministries of Defense, Foreign Affairs, and Interior. The ministry was charged with the pivotal role of: i) determining objectives and jurisdictions of ministries, departments and public corporations; ii) formulating the rules and norms of public service; iii) developing and implementing national training schemes; iv) supervising institutions for administrative and management training and research; and v) steering and servicing government-wide adminis trative reforms.28 The structure of the ministry is noticeably broader than corresponding ministries or agencies of reform in the 28 sudan, Ministry of Public Service and Administra tive Reform, A Programme for Administrative Reform: ~ Report of a United Nations Mission (Khartoum, December 1972), p. 4. 204 r . 7 1 developing countries. It encompasses the Department of Public Service (the personnel agency), the Pensions and Post-Service Benefits Department, the Department of Labor, I the Institute of Public Service, the Center for Management Development and Productivity (an ILO-UNDP special fund assisted project), Directorate of Training (for planning and coordinating of training on the national scale), and Directorate of Administrative Reform (for planning and implementing administrative reform programs). Thus, four distinct yet interrelated functions constitute the role of the ministry: administrative reform programs, training, manpower planning, and personnel policies and practices. Although the ministry was created as recently as October 1971, its impact in creating a groundwork for administrative reform is markedly observable, and its influence in government process and administrative change has been considerable. The reform activities of the ministry since its inception in 1971 have been very impressive. They fall under three categories: training, personnel management, and reorganization of government departments, and they are briefly highlighted in the following paragraphs. 205 According to Presidential Decree Number 6, deter mining the jurisdictions and functions of different minis tries, the Ministry of Public Service and Administrative Reform is charged with the responsibility of supervising administrative and vocational training institutions and planning, and i1nplen1entation of national training schemes. By virtue of its encompassing both the Civil Service Department and Labor Department, the ministry's mandate extends to the labor force in t he national and regional public services of the Sudan, and the potential advantages of such integration of functions which are ultimately man power development and utilization remain to be realized. However, the ministry is off to a good start in programming for training and development of manpower on a national scale. To start with, a training department has been established with a view to act as the technical arm of the ministry in planning, organizing and coordinating training programs in all agencies of state as well as supervising and upgrading such programs. The department has initiated action on a survey of training needs and of training institutions with a view to provide an initial information base for the formulation of a national training program. The challenge facing the department is to organize in- service intradepartmental training units with the aim of enlarging their training coverage to more than the present 30 percent coverage of departmental employees. Compli mentary to this challenge is the planning and administra tion of government scholarship program for abroad training of civil servants in such professions and skills that are urgent and relevant to the economic and social development plan of the country. On the side of national training institutions, the ministry is aware of the need for organ izing and reactivating the functions and programs of such institutions to work in close relationship with the manpower requirements of the national development plan. Thus, the ministry has already started to reorganize governing boards of institutions such as the Institute of Public Administration, the Center for Management Develop ment and Productivity, and the Academy of Local Government. ' With this apparent multiplicity of administrative training institutions, a visible institutional gap remains, that is, the training of senior executives in the public sector, both in the ministerial political level and the top bureaucratic levels. The ministry, therefore, has started plans for building and establishing an Administrative Academy for the training of senior level personnel, 1 compatible with their level of responsibility and seniority. On the side of vocational training, which is partly, the responsibility of the Department of Labor and partly the individual ministries and departments, there is need for a national program to coordinate such activities and to cut down on the present overlapping and wastage of resources. I By and large, the problems that stand out in the field of training and development are essentially, the need , to organize training on a national scale, the need to undertake a greater effort of institution building with a view to counter proliferation of institutions, artd the need to educate trainers to develop and improve the capabilities of the training centers and institutions. The reform efforts in the field of personnel policies and practices that the new ministry has achieved are far-reaching and pervasive. The personnel rules and regulations governing selection, promotions, leaves, allowances, discipline, and other terms of service of government public service have been outmoded and deficient for a long time. Some of them date back to 1934 and 1936 and were still applicable in 1971. The ministry, using 208 r the Institute of Public Administration as a steering , secretariat and rapporteur, took to revise and update I I , public service laws and regulations. The result was a new public service law passed in 1973, a new discipline ordi nance passed in 1976, and new public service regulations governing promotions, allowances, secondment, and the like. A new Selection Corrnnission was created in 1974 and was assigned the central role of the selection and appointment of university graduates into public service. The ministry also established two important statutory commissions in 1972, one for deciding on civil service appeals, and the other as a public service advisory council to look into major issues of personnel reform and advise the Minister of Public Service in that respect. Both corrnnissions have been satisfactorily functioning and have gained the popular acceptance of government employees. The ministry has rightly addressed itself to the problem of the terms of service for public service as well as public corporations. A United Nations Commission was invited in 1973 to study and advise the government on administrative reforms in the field of personnel manage ment, and specifically to advise on a new grading system for all posts of public service and to suggest an outline 209 1 for a new structure of salary scales; to investigate the present public service personnel classification in areas of recruitment policies, selection and promotion proce dures, and recommend measures leading toward general improvements; to review prevailing personnel budgetary procedures and suggest desirable improvements; and as appropriate, make or endorse recommendations on any other reforms which the commission may consider relevant to the general improvements of administrative practices in the Sudan. The commission's report was submitted in December 1973 to the Minister of Public Service and Administrative Reform. The ministry is in the process of implementing some of the recommendations submitted, but the most impor tant outcome of the report so far has been a salary raise between 15 to 25 percent for employees across the board. Other recommendations that the ministry is contemplating are a job classification plan and the creation of organi zation and methods units for administrative improvements throughout the government departments. A special committee to review and advise government on terms of service of public corporations was convened by the Minister of Public Service and Administrative Reform 210 ! in 1972. The committee's report is already under review , by the government. Insofar as the reorganizational aspects of reform are concerned, the Ministry of Public Service and Adminis trative Reform has created a Directorate for Administrative Reform. It is still in its embryonic stage and its role and functions have yet to be spelled out in specific operational terms. So far the department has started some organization and management work within some government departments, but its staffing, work program, and approach are yet to be adequately thought of and resolved. In a critical remark about the Directorate of Administrative Reform, a United Nations Mission which was requested to outline an administrative reform program for the Sudan remarked that administrative reform should be a programmed process; the scope of supporting services should be enlarged beyond the limits of the conventional organization and management approach; the active participation and the positive involvement of all ministries and other establish ments in continuing programming for their administrative improvement should be elicited; and the organization of the supporting services should be made to filtrate through 211 r-- . - I the whole machinery of government.29 I I Reform Program for ·the· Future At the request of the Sudan government, a United Nations Mission arrived in November 1972 to help the newly established Ministry of Public Service and Adminis trative Reform map out administrative reform strategies and programs in three areas: surveying the personnel system of the country, formulating national training and development programs and helping the ministry in streng thening and revitalizing training institutions, and helping the ministry to develop its organizational cap abilities for steering and implementing a major adminis- 30 trative reform program. The mission was an advance study party for an international commission to be convened in the last quarter of 1973 to review the mission's report and advise the Sudan government on the reform program. The mission's report was submitted after four weeks and it contained a broad ' framework for an administrative reform program and strategy The international commission that came later concerned 29 A Programme for Administrative Reform, p. 20. 30 rbid., p. 1. 212 I itself mainly with personnel problems as it had no suffi cient time to delve on other parts of the reform program. The objectives of the broad framework of adminis trative reform were as follows: a) Building up the capability of the new ministry to initiate, steer and support a government-wide adminis trative improvement process b) Restructuring and modernizing present personnel systems and practices in the civil service and the public sector corporations c) Developing a national training and development program and sustaining the required institutional support d) Introducing new procedures for planning administrative improvements and building up the network of supporting management services units in the ministries, public sector corporations, and local government organs e) Tapping technical assistance resources required for moving simultaneously along these four fronts 31 A sunnnary of the specific recommendations pertain ing to the major components of the proposed program is presented in Appendix B of this study. 31 rbid., p. 6. 213 - The most important and far-reaching recommendations which the government has adopted and is in the process of I 1 implementing today are mainly general recommendations: (1) to strengthen the capability of the new Ministry of Public Service and Administrative Reform by recruiting and vigorously training a core of reformers to shoulder and steer the planning and implementation of reform plans on a national level; (2) the initiation and implementation of a position classification system in the public service to replace the present class system which is divided into superscales, administration and professional, subprofes sional or technical and clerical classes, accompanied in later years by a number of separate occupational groups or cadres for medical doctors, agriculturists and veteri narians and other lower groups; (3) the strengthening of the present training institutions at the national levels through slightly changing their approaches and points of emphasis, together with the initiation of a new Academy of , Administrative Sciences for the training and development of top executives and politicians; and (4) the establish ment of management services units in every ministry and major corporation with the purpose of helping the executive 1 leadership in these ministries to plan for administrative r- - I reform to be part and parcel of the development planning l I process, and to relieve the top leadership of the task of I 1 personnel and management work, staffing problems, budget- ing problems, and data processing and information systems. It can be rightly stated that the mission's report constitutes a basic framework for a major administrative reform program in the Sudan. This is the first time in the history of the country that an effort has been made to articulate and put forward for discussion a planned program, of action. Tribute should be given to the minister of the new Ministry of Public Service and Administrative Reform, as he is a professional public administrationist by educa tion and a man of both national and international practical experience in management and training. However, the mission's report has some major proposals which are not in this writer's view feasible at this point in time and development of the Sudan, as well as some other proposals which are broad and operationally undefined. The proposal for planning and implementing a unified job classification system for the whole country 1 was met with sound opposition in the view that it needs a lot of time and skills to prepare and implement--something that the country does not possess right now. Other l ~ factors work in disfavor of a postclassification system. I The International Commission that was invited later in 1973 to review the mission's report mentioned that such a system is most suitable to evaluate and classify different occupational groups in a single organization which reflect the relative importance attached to such occupations, but it is doubtful to devise it to deal equitably across a number of organizations of different occupations and skills for a whole country. The commission mentioned the fact that although the United States federal government has been using a unified job-oriented classification system for a long time, in recent years it came to have serious doubts about their system as they became increasingly conscious of the need to "manipulate the structure to suit their recruitment needs in relation to particular occupational groups. 1132 Added to these reasons is the fact that the present Sudan unified man-oriented classification is simple to use, and makes it easier to transfer persons from one occupational group to another as necessitated by the shortage in professional and administrative posts for development purposes. I believe, however, that a post- 32 Report of the International Commission, p. 5. 216 classification system can be adequately used in public corporations which are specialized agencies for the manu facture of a specified product or which render mostly one specified service, such as the water and electricity corporation or the textile and sugar factories of the government. One area which I found very lacking in the !Il 4 -.::: - ...... ..., sion's report was the area of manpower planning and utili zation. All it mentioned was that a clear distinction should be made between manpower planning in the sense of assessing the plan's requirements of different manpower categories which can only be derived from the development projects envisioned, and manpower development which is more of devising action measures for the training and development of needed categories, and that it is in the latter rather than the former domain that the Ministry of Public Service and Administrative Reform could shoulder a 1 ·b·1· 33 centra responsi i ity. This statement is correct as far as it goes, but it reduces the responsibility of the new ministry to one of micro-reform, while the present manpower planning 33 Report of the UN Mission, sec. C, p. 3. 217 I -situation of the country calls fo; more. As the country is heading toward a major economic and social development indicated by its five-year plan ending this year and a six-year plan starting next year, there would be a great need for technical and professional personnel. The sad fact is that our education system until today is geared toward graduating students with a general certificate of education which does not qualify them to hold any technical or skilled job in the proliferating industrial and agri cultural projects of the government. We keep repeating that this is a colonial heritage of Britain and we blame that, but twenty years have passed since we gained our political independence. There is, therefore, a dire need to review our educational system and build it on a new philosophy compatible with our development stage. Furthermore, our educational system and institu tions have to work hand in hand with the consumers of their product, in the different ministries, departments, public corporations and the private sector, so as to get a feed back as to the consumers' needs and requirements. Coordi nation of such needs and the best way of fulfilling them is a major reformation aspect in the field of manpower planning. 218 I Lastly, there have to exist favorable recruitment and selection policies and encouraging terms of service for technical and skilled personnel to join and remain in the government service. Among such encouraging terms of service is a planned and articulated policy of training and development for the different levels of government personnel. The Ministry of Public Service and Administra tive Reform has therefore a crucial and central role in manpower planning and development. This writer conceives of this role as vital for development, and for this par ticular reason, manpower planning is singled out as the main topic of the fourth chapter, and manpower development the topic of the fifth chapter. 219 CHAPTER IV MANPOWER PLANNING: CONCEPTS AND OPERATIONAL POLICIES Introduction This chapter endeavors to tackle the subject of manpower planning as one of the major administrative reforms seriously needed in the economic and social devel opment of the country. Part I starts with conceptual definitions of terms such as manpower, manpower policy, manpower planning, human resource development, education and training. It delves at length on the problems of man power planning and employment problems which face the Sudan as a consequence of the nonexistence of manpower planning policies and action. The problems discussed in this part cover both skilled and unskilled labor forces as well as population growth patterns, such as high population rate of growth, young age of population, underutilization of women labor force · , etc., which have direct impact upon ' the provision of employable labor force sufficient in L 220 quantity for national development requirements. The I quality of the supply of labor force by different educa- 1 tional institutions is discussed at great length. In conclusion, reconnnendations in the direction of remedial ' and reformative action involving, among others, the insti tution building required for manpower planning, are delineated. Part II deals specifically with manpower procure- ment. The Human Factor in National Development In the final analysis, the wealth of a country is based upon its power to develop and to effectively utilize • the innate capacities of its people. The economic and social development of nations is ultimately the result of human effort. It takes skilled human agents to discover and exploit natural resources, to mobilize capital, to develop technology, to produce goods and to render serv ices. Indeed, if a country is unable to develop its human resources, it cannot build anything else, whether it be a modern political system, a sense of national unity or a prosperous economy. This chapter purports to define manpower planning and human resource development and their relationship to economic and social growth in a developing 221_, country like the Sudan. The importance of the human factor in national development is certainly not a new idea. Adam Smith con . sidered a man's talents to be part of his fortune as well ' as that of the society to which he belonged. A growing number of today's economists subscribe to a theory that human resources are a form of capital, a produced means of production, and the product of investment. Modern books ! on economic growth and the increasing number of plans for economic development seem to stress the importance of man power planning, which encompasses education, training and the creation of skills. Yet, despite the almost universal acceptance of this notion, there has been little systematic ' analysis of the alternate means and possible strategies of human capital formation in both the plans and the books on economic development. If this is the case in developed nations, then the developing countries are in a worse situation insofar as the analysis of procedures and processes of integrating education and manpower planning with programming for general economic and nocial develop ment is concerned. This is so because many problems of planning and human resource development are unique to every country that experiences them and that, in the final 222 -- ----------- ----J r anaiysis, -are totally depe~den~ on the -i~cal situation which is an outcome of so many complex and interrelated social, economic and cultural factors. The undeniable fact remains that an analysis of alternative policies of human resource development is an indispensable part of any good economic development plan. All planners recognize the importance of training and education in development, but most fail to incorporate a systematic analysis of human development in the plans they : propose. Some have argued that human factors cannot be quantified as easily as other economic factors, and hence should be excluded from rigorous analytical treatment. This seems to be a misconception. It is possible to quantify many of the human resource variables, and there is no valid reason why this cannot be done, despite the fact that it may pose great difficulties in developing countries which lack in statistical information and avail ability of reliable data. Conceptual Definitions Terms such as manpower, manpower policy, manpower planning, human resource development, education, and training have been used repeatedly, when the topic of manpower planning is tackled, but without being defined. 223 J - For precision, it is desirable that these terms be specifically defined. Manpower. The word manpower is equivalent to the term labor when labor is understood to be a factor of production in the basic framework of analysis used by economists. 1 In this broad sense, manpower can also be understood to mean generically "personnel" or "employees." Looking at it in still another manner, manpower can mean the total quantitative and qualitative human assets of people in a society. In this sense, the word is inter preted to mean the power of man, both in terms of the size of the population and the talents and educational levels in that population. Manpower policy. Manpower policy is concerned with the development and use of human labor as an economic resource and as a source of individual and family income. Because national manpower policy overlaps national employ ment and educational policies, a clear definition is difficult. Therefore, we can probably more usefully define 1 Thomas H. Patten, Jr., Manpower Planning and the Development of Human Resources (New York: Wiley-Inter science, 1971), p. 11. 224 - - - - - national manpower policy in terms of its goals and the tools with which it pursues these goals. The goals of manpower policy may be identified as follows: first, employment opportunities for all persons who want them; second, the provision of education and training capable of fully developing each individual's productive potential; third, the matching of men and jobs. Manpower policy defined in this context includes the demand side of the national economy as well as the supply side which concerns 1 the development of skills and the matching of individuals with jobs. To the extent it is concerned with the welfare of workers, it inevitably becomes involved in income dis tribution and wage and incentive issues. In sunnnary, manpower policy may be regarded as as a kind of three-legged national stool, with one leg each for job creation, manpower education and training, and the matching of men and jobs.2 Once jobs are designed in any organization and openings are authorized, it can be said that jobs are created. Man power education and training come into play when thought is given to required worker behavior--which is the task of manpower development. Then, through recruitment, selec- tion and placement policies and procedures, the matching of 2 Ibid., p. 12. 225 i men and jobs takes place. Manpower policy thus defined is I ~ a task of the whole nation or of the national government rather than a task of an industrial organization or an individual department. Therefore, given the purpose of industrial organizations to provide goods and services at a profit, it is difficult to conceive that they would view as their central mission such objectives as supplying or providing jobs for people who cannot compete effectively in the labor market. Manpower planning. Planning is a process of thinking ahead, a method for anticipating difficulties and seeking through reasoned action based upon foreknowledge, to guide the course of events toward desired goals. By this means, planning approaches the future with the aid of I systematic analysis in order to minimize surprise and uncertainty and to eliminate mistakes and waste. 3 At the level of economy, manpower applies the processes of plan ning in general to the preparation and employment of people for productive purposes. Manpower planning may thus be viewed as a tool of manpower policy. 3 Richard A. Lester, Manpower Planning in a Free Society (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1966), p. 4. 226 1 - It is possible to define manpower planning from a narrow point of view or from a broad one. First, it may be viewed in the narrow sense of replacement planning as that term is normally used in the conduct of industrial relations activities in organizations. From this stand point, manpower planning encompasses the analysis of labor turnover, identifying approaches to the planning of careers 1 for employees, developing models for planning recruitment and the promotion of employees, and analyzing the relation ship between pay policies and recruitment. A second way of viewing manpower planning is to consider it tantamount to personnel planning which ranges over all activities of the department and includes recruit ment, selection, placement, training, education, wage and salary administration, safety, labor relations, and the like. This definition is obviously broader than viewing manpower planning as programming the staffing of the organ- ization. A third meaning of manpower planning applies to manpower and employment policy at the level of economy. In this framework, "manpower" is regarded as the quantita tive and qualitative measurement of a nation's labor force, and "planning" is regarded as establishing objectives and 227 1 r programs to develop human resources in line with different national goals. Very often the focus of this type of man power planning is primarily on educated manpower and its role in the development of an underdeveloped country. In addition to that, the focus may also be on the most poorly educated or illiterate manpower and what is required in terms of education, training, health improvement, etc., to bring them into the mainstream of society. In this con text, manpower planning becomes involved with demography, the population composition in terms of educational levels, age and sex ratios, the skill mix, and present and future gross national product. This chapter will address itself to this broad meaning of manpower planning in the Sudan. Patten sees the goal of manpower planning as follows: The ultimate goal of manpower planning should be to ensure that each organization has the right number of people and the right kind of people at the right places at the right time doing things for which they are economically most useful.4 This is not an easy task for a developing country to achieve. It entails analyzing supply and demand of skills required by development and changing societal values and educational systems so that the supply of such skills 4 Patten, Manpower Planning, p. 20. 228 ' conform as nearly as possible to the demands and require ments of economic and social development. Human res·our·ces development. Stripped of subtle ties, both manpower and human resources refer to and mean people. Human resources could be equated with "labor" in the sense of a factor of production, or simply population. Human resources are considered to develop in many different ways. One is by formal education, beginning with primary or first-level education continuing through various forms of secondary education and then culminating in higher education, including colleges, universities, and technical institutes. Second, human resources are devel oped on the job through systematic or informal training programs in employing institutions; in adult education programs; and through membership in various political, social, religious, and other groups. A third way is through self-development, as persons seek to acquire greater knowledge, skills, or capacities through prepara tion on their own initiative, such as taking formal or correspondence courses, reading, or learning from others in informal contacts. Motivation for self-development varies from one society to another. 229 Education. Education is concerned with teaching the members of society how they are expected to behave in a variety of situations. It is thus a broad concept that is related to the development of and changes in human behavior. Among young people, education involves trans mitting skills, beliefs, attitudes, and other aspects of behavior which they have not previously acquired. Among older age groups, education involves substituting new ideas, beliefs, and skills for previously acquired ones. It is assumed that societies and organizations are perpetu ated through education, the passing on of the cultural heritage. Each society passes its culture on, with some changes, to successive generations, largely through social interaction. In the broadest sense, education is synony mous with socialization itself. Training. Training encompasses activities ranging from the learning of a simple motor skill up to the acquisition of complex technical knowledge, and learning elaborate administrative skills. Training in industry has a definite purpose. It refers to the efforts that are made to facilitate the process of learning and which result in on-the-job behavior required of a member of an organization. The learned behavior should contribute to 230 I r--- 1 the organization's objectives. Training is, therefore, an end in itself, but a means to an end; it is a tool I not which assists in the production of goods and services. In I I this way an organization can justify the cost of training because it contributes to the effective development and utilization of the human resources in an enterprise and ultimately to the achievement of organizational goals. The issue of training will be dealt with in the following chapter. This lengthy discussion of definitions has been designed to identify the meanings of these terms for the benefit of the nonspecialist. This was felt desirable as terms and words tend to have different connotations in the changing field of social science. Such definitions have to be carefully stated if understanding is to be achieved when such terms are encountered in this chapter. Part I: Manpower Problems and Remedial Actions The functions performed by the administrative structure within the total social system of a developing country usually undergo fundamental changes after political 1 independence. The development of the Sudan from a depend ent colonial territory to an independent state in 1956 has 23l_j I brought about a significant transformation in the nature of the state and the scope of its activities. Though the usual and traditional functions of the state, such as I maintenance of law and order, administration of justice, defense and internal security, and collection of revenue, have continued to be important, greater emphasis has now been put on the economic and social functions of the state relating to national development in its various aspects. Economic development and social betterment have become matters of national priority. As slow progress in economic 1 and social development has characterized the colonial era, the successive governmental development plans, such as the five-year plan of 1957-62, the ten year plan of 1961-71, and the latest five-year plan of 1970-75, have attempted to offset the slow start by emphasizing increased economic development and improved social services and social welfare in such fields as industry, agriculture, irrigation, trans port and communication, health, education, community development, etc. With the expansion in the scope and scale of governmental functions, the public service of the Sudan has been brought to the very center of the stage in the process of change and development, and has been called upon 232 j1=o- bear additional and fresh resPon;ibilities :-New - indus trial undertakings, increased social services, and extended international commitments have contributed to a steady , growth in the scope and variety of public functions. I I The increase in governmental functions in the post- independence era has raised some rather vexing issues. Important among these is the problem created by the criti cal shortage of higher management and technical personnel possessing requisite qualifications and experience. Independence and the accompanying change in the scope and quality of the states' activity created significant man power problems of both quantitative and qualitative dimen sions. The scarcity of personnel having the requisite skills has become a prime factor limiting the capacity and capability of the total social system to realize its aspirations and goals. The Sudan today is facing a great challenge of formulating a strategy of manpower planning and staff development capable of building skills and knowledge required for economic, social, cultural and political growth, and of providing avenues of participation in the creation of a better society. The underlying assumption lies in the fact that, as one among many developing 233 1 r countries, the Sudan has embarked upon large and challeng ing socioeconomic development programs in the face of a 1 critical shortage in personnel. The sad fact is that the aspect of manpower planning and development has been neglected in most of the developmental plans and this has resulted in great delays and frustrations of such plans. A careful analysis of the social problems facing manpower planning, both from the supply and demand aspects, is the objective of this chapter. Manpower Problems Population Growth and Labor Force The Sudan, with an area of 2.6 million square kilometers, is the largest country in Africa, while the density of its population at 6 per kilometer is one of the lowest in the continent. The country has enormous poten tialities for expansion of agricultural and industrial development, and it may appear that the growth of popula tion should present no serious problem either in the short term or in the distant future. Nevertheless, certain features of the population and its growth pattern are matters of serious concern to manpower planners. The population in 1955-56 was estimated at 234 j j io.26 million, and preliminary results of 1973 census put it at 14.9 million. Table 8, which gives comparative I I population structure of the Sudan and other parts of Africa in 1960, shows that the population is almost evenly divided between males and females, the former having a slight edge (50.6 percent) over the latter. It is also apparent from the table that more than 44 percent of the total population was estimated to be below the age of 15 years, and that about 20.7 percent is above 65 years. This is to say that though Africa as a whole has a relatively young population (43 percent of total population being below the age of 15 years), the population of the Sudan is younger than the African standard. This suggests that at least 44 percent of the population is not considered to be in the labor force. This should be a matter of great con cern to planners. Table 9 shows that the Sudanese population of working age (15-64 years) in 1970 was projected to be 52.2 percent of the total as compared to 53.4 percent for Africa as a whole. The rapid rate of growth of the population which is responsible for the young age structure of the population is expected to rise from the present level of 2.97 percent per annum to 3.4 pereent per annum during the I 235 1 N w °' Region and Country Africa Western Africa Eastern Africa Middle Africa Northern Africa Southern Africa Sudan Total (000) 269,577 79,500 77,089 29,402 65,392 18,164 11,770 TABLE 8 POPULATION IN 1960 Distribution by Age Group 0-14 15-64 65+ 43.2 53.9 2.9 44.2 53.4 2.4 43.3 53.8 2.9 41.7 55.2 3.1 43.4 53.5 3.1 39.8 56.2 4.0 44.3 53.0 2.7 Annual Rate Percentage of Growth of Females 1950-60 % 2.18 50.2 2.16 49.8 2.12 50.7 1.70 51.4 2.44 49.6 2.38 50.0 2.64 49.4 Source: International Labor Review 104, no. 3 (September 1971):197. N l.v ....... ca » C: ~ 0 .µ ,--- .,.. C: res o C"> :::, .µ 0 QJ 0 00 ex: u I- ........ Africa 344,484 Western Africa 101,271 Eastern Africa 97,882 Middle Africa 35,892 Northern Africa 86,606 Southern Africa 22,832 Sudan 15,779 TABLE 9 POPULATION IN 1970 and 1980 1970 ~ QJ C: c:::t .µ 0\0 n:, ..c:: •r- I ex: .µ .µ LO 30 (/) n:, r-f ,-- 0 r-,... QJ ,-- res ~ I ,-- ...J - :::, (/) :::, ~ 0 4- n:, c:x:: 0 0.. QJ C: \0 0 E I- 0 0 C"> c:4-m QJ 00 0.. c:x:: c:x:: 0...-t ~ u. 1-- 53.4 2.48 50.2 456,721 53.2 2.45 49.9 133,406 53.4 2.42 50.6 128,757 55.1 2.01 51.3 45,785 52.3 2.85 49.6 119,385 54.7 2.41 50.0 29,386 52.2 2.97 49.5 21,946 ~ C: c:::t 0 \0 •r- I .µ LO n:, r-f ,-- :::, (/) 0.. QJ 0 C"> 0.. c:x:: 52.4 52.3 52.5 53.6 51.6 54.3 51.0 Source: International Labor Review 104, no. 3 (September 1971):200. 1980 QJ .µ n:, ..c:: ex: .µ 30 (/) ,-- 0 CO QJ n:, ~ I 4- ,-- :::, ~ 0 0 res C: r-,... E C: 4- CJ) ~ QJ c:x:: 0 ....... u. 2.86 50.2 2.79 50.1 2.78 50.6 2.46 51.0 3.26 49.5 2.56 50.1 3.35 49.5 ---- present decade. This rate of growth is also one of the highest that prevails in underdeveloped countries. The I manpower planner who is particularly interested in the present and future size of the labor force, its growth rates and other social factors which determine labor force participation of various groups must be concerned with the policies which should limit population growth. A reduction I in the birth rates will not innnediately lead to a reduction ! in the labor force, but it would do so in the future, and would probably increase the country's propensity to save and to invest in more direct productive activities. Another interesting piece of statistical informa tion concerns the economically active population of the Sudan in 1970 and 1980. Table 10 shows the estimates of the active population in 1970 and 1980. It suggests the crude activity ratio of the population (i.e., the propor tion of economically active persons to the total popula tion) for the Sudan in 1970 to be 32 percent--which is far below the African average of 38.5 percent. This ratio is expected to drop to 31 percent for the Sudan in 1980 while 5 the African average will drop to 36 percent. This low 5 The activity rate of the population is expected 238 ---------------------- - - TABLE 10 ECONOMICALLY ACTIVE POPULATION IN 1970 and 1980 1970 1980 I > .,... V) V) .µ QJ QJ QJ QJ -0 u .µ .-- .µ .-- C cl: QJ co .r::::.. co co .r::::.. co co .µ e::::: .µ E >, e::::: .µ E >, QJ co 30 QJ QJ .µ 30 QJ C S- -0 e::::: ...- 0 ,-..... LJ... -0 .,... ...- 0 CC lJ.. 0 .µ ...-- ::, CO S... I .--- ::, > CO S... I .,... C co 0 s- >, ::, (.!:, 0 4- co 0 s- .,... QJ ::, (.!:, 0 4- C') ::, .µ 0 u .µ C ~ 0 .µ 0 u .µ .µ C ,-..... 0 QJ 0 00 .,... C 4- O"I 00 u co C 4- O"I e::::: u I- .......... ~ cl: 0 .-t ~ I- .......... ~ cl: e::::: cl: 0 .-t ~ Africa 132,479 38.5 1.99 31.1 165,379 36.2 2.24 30.7 Western Africa 43· ,450 42.9 1.96 38.9 53.613 40.2 2.12 38.7 Eastern Africa 41.975 42.9 2.06 35.1 52,688 40.9 2.30 34.8 Middle Africa 15,257 42.5 1.55 37.9 18,114 39.6 1.73 36.9 Northern Africa 23,601 27.3 2.26 7.1 30,969 25.9 2.75 7.4 Southern Africa 8,197 35.9 1.85 26.5 9,994 34.0 2.0 27.4 Sudan 5,065 32.1 2.68 10.3 6,767 30.8 2.93 11.1 - Source: International Labor Review 104, no. 3 (September 1971):202. N w \0 ----- - ---- ----- ----- -- crude activity rate of the population of the country is explained by the low participation of women in economic activity--a characteristic feature of Moslem countries. The female activity rate for Northern Africa demonstrates the same feature of the Sudan's low female rate of par ticipation since the North African countries are predomi nantly Moslem too. As a consequence of the decline in the activity ratio, the dependency ratio in relation to the economically active population is expected to rise sharply during the decade 1970-80. Such dependent population is largely made up of young people who are not part of the labor force. 1his fact, in addition to the dependency of women who are not in the active labor force, will raise serious problems in the country's endeavor to accelerate economic develop ment. As a consequence of the relatively young population, a large part of the country's resources will have to be diverted from investment in productive activity to to drop "due mainly to the expectation that fewer people under the age of 15 and over the age of 60 will participate in economically productive activity. This tendency can be attributed to the combined effects of a policy of universal 1 education--compulsory for an extended period of time--and changes in the technical process of production, and there fore, in the structure of demand for labor." Patten, Man power Planning, p. 3. 240 ---- - consumption--for the provision of facilities for the young population. Also, in view of the high population rate of growth, the net annual addition to the labor force--i.e., the persons who have attained the working age and for whom jobs are to be provided--is estimated to be 181,000. In the context of the rate at which the Sudan economy has been developing at present, it is a tremendous job to create job opportunities for such a large number of persons. 6 This is an additional problem facing manpower planners of the country. The Employment_ Situation of Unskilled Manpower The collection of statistics showing the occupa tional distribution of the labor force in the Sudan economy is particularly difficult. This is largely due to the imperfect specialization of the economically active popu lation. People often pursue several occupations on a regular or seasonal basis. The low levels of skills accompanied by illiteracy make it possible for people to 6 See "Background to the Request of the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Sudan to the Inter national Labor Organization for a Comprehensive Employment Strategy Mission within the Framework of the World Employ ment Program" (Me1t1orandum, December 1971, Department of Labor, Khartoum). I ----------- -------. try their hands at different types of productive activity. This introduces a large element of fluidity in the occupa tional structure. However, it is true that relatively few men have subsidiary occupations besides their principal ones. But with women it is different. They often have two substantial occupations, household duties and work in cultivation, but they may also work at handicrafts at home. This raises a problem in deciding which of the several occupations pursued by the person is the principal one and which is the subsidiary. The above limitations aside, Table 11 reveals the predominance of agricultural and pastoral activities of the population. More than 85 percent are engaged in agriculture and stock-raising occu pations. It also shows that the Sudan labor force is overwhelmingly male since out of the total labor force of 4,843,000, about 3,492,000 are male and only 1,351,000 are female. The concentration of the female's work is found l in agriculture, especially in the subsistence economies of southern and western Sudan, where the woman is economically much more active than in the middle eastern and northern , parts of the country. Other female occupations besides ' household duties and agriculture are in textile manufac- I I • tur1.ng, cottage industry, nursing, teaching, and clerical I I ( ______________________________ _ 242 N ~ w Industrial Group 1. Pastoral and agricultural activities 2. Manufacturing 3. Construction 4. Commerce 5. Transport 6. Services 7. Unclassified TABLE 11 OCCUPATIONAL DISTRIBUTION OF LABOR FORCE (in 000 persons) Males All Ages 3,044 63 31 92 31 177 54 Females All Ages 1,111 176 • • • • • 8 • • • • • 46 10 Total Both Sexes 4,155 239 31 100 31 223 64 Percentage of the Labor Force 85.76 4.97 .64 2.06 .64 4.61 1.32 Source: Sudan, Ministry of Finance and Economics, The Ten Years of Economic and Social Development 1961-62--1970-71, as quoted in Economic Survey (1971), p. 12. work. The limitations created by the scarcity in mineral resources and their remoteness from the conrrnercial centers have influenced the tempo of the development of industrial work in the Sudan. The complete absence of natural resources of power has made it difficult to establish any kind of heavy industry in the country. Consequently, there is a marked expansion in light industry and especially industries for processing agricultural products such as cotton gi nning, textile manufacturing, oil pressing, con fectionaries, and sugar industry . The public utility industries and services are mostly government monopolies. Thus, the railways, ports, roads, electricity, and trans port industries are run and maintained by the government. Other minor services such as engineering and maintenance workshops, and some manufacturing industries, are privately owned and constitute the bulk of the small unit establish- ments. Table 12, more recent than Table 11, shows the percentage employment of economically active population by sector and location. It is clear from this table that over 80 percent of the labor force was employed in primary production (i.e., agriculture, animal husbandry, forestry, 244 ) 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. TABLE 12 EMPLOYMENT OF ECONOMICALLY ACTIVE POPULATION BY SECTOR AND LOCATION Sector Urban Animal Husbandry 0.38 Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing 6.03 Industry 3.89 Handicrafts 6.60 Building & Construction 3.28 Transport & Co111Tiunication 6.91 Commerce & Trade 11.83 Other Governmental Services 29.39 Other Private Services 24.12 Seeking work for the first time 7.56 Total 100.00 Semi urban 0.97 30.19 2.09 6.46 3.33 4.33 12.41 19.32 15.02 5.87 100.00 Rural 4.77 79.98 0.33 2.93 1.10 0.80 1.63 2.03 5.30 1.17 100.00 All Areas 3.96 67.45 0.89 3.62 1.54 1.78 3.66 6.56 8.24 2.29 100.00 Source: "Background to the Request of the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Sudan to the International Labor Organiza tion for a Comprehensive Employment Strategy Mission within the I Framework of the Wor 1 d Emp 1 oyment Program" (Memorandum, December 1971), I p. 5. 245 I andf isheri~s) mainly in rural areas. It can als~ be I noted that industry (which incidentally contributed about 8 percent of the GDP in 1968) 7 only provided employment for less than 1 percent of the labor force. Apart from being very small, it would appear that the industrial sector has been capital-intensive. This seems to be highly undesirable in a country like the Sudan where unemployment of unskilled labor is rising fast. One would hazard the viewpoint that if a large number of persons are to be employed in this sector, a different strategy with regard to industrial employment and technology has to be thought of both by government and the private sector involved in industry. Industrial employment is expected to enlarge as the present economic policy of the Sudan government cuts down on governmental investment for the production of goods which the private sector can handle more efficiently. This new policy has been indicated by the serious attempts of the government to encourage foreign investment from Arab 7 Mohamed El Murtada Mustafa, "Manpower and Employ ment Problems in the Sudan" (a Paper presented at a study course on Active Labor Policy Development, organized by the 1 International Institute for Labour Studies, Geneva, March 1972), p. 6. L __________ _ 246J ------ - ----------------------. countries, Western European countries and the United States. This new policy is expected to increase the growth of economy and lead to more industrial employment in the not very far future. A point of caution is relevan here. Modern sectors of the economy in many developing countries are penetrated by a rich hegemonic economy represented by multinational corporations. A relatively slow growth of employment in these sectors has been noticed and it was a direct product of that penetration simply because the prime mover of the rich economy is a project rather than employment creation. Although accel erated economy growth rates have accompanied the domination of multinational corporations, the uneven nature of development has been accentuated; i.e., capital-intensive activities have expanded and labor-intensive activities were neglected. Capital-intensive industries developed income-growth concepts but neglected the social criteria of development (which are essentially income distribution, employment creation, education, health, nutrition, etc.), and it directed manpower planning more toeard the problems of special skills than employment creation and promotion. I The Sudan planners have to be aware of falling into the same trap, and should, therefore, encourage those industrie 247j that are labor intensive so that opportunities for creat] ing more employment to absorb the present soaring unemploy ment in the unskilled categories of labor can be enlarged. As things stand at present, however, most of the manpower of the Sudan will have to continue to seek employment in the primary sector of the economy during the coming decade--a fact which will accentuate the phenomenon of underemployment in the rural areas as well as accelerate the already rising rate of exodus of young people from the rural areas into the urban centers unless the government seriously adopts development plans which will occupy and retain the labor force in the rural areas of the Sudan. Urban Unemployment Problem Increasing unemployment in urban areas is probably the most serious and intractable problem facing the developing nations. Unemployment rates as high as 15 per cent of the labor force in the modern sectors are not uncommon. The reasons for this may be attributed to the following. 1. The relatively high wages in the modern sectors act as a magnet drawing persons away from the rural agri cultural areas. In many developing countries, the earnings differential between the modern and traditional sectors is 248 1 in the neighborhood of 8 to 1.8 2. The primary education attained by rural youth raises their aspirations and encourages them to escape from the traditional agricultural sector. 3. Jobless drifters from rural areas to urban areas can be fed and housed for considerable periods by their relatives who already have employment in urban centers. 4. Added to the above reasons is the fact that labor force is rapidly swelling as a result of the ever increasing rate of population growth. Information and statistics on unemployment in the Sudan is either incomplete or unavailable. But as a rule of the thumb, the rate of increase in the labor force in the modern sector will exceed the rate of increase in population growth. On the other hand, the rate of increase in new employment opportunities is rather limited owing to the fact that the growth in economy is terribly low. At the very best, new jobs are created at a rate only half 8 walter Galenson, ed., L~bor in Developirtg Econom- 1 ics (Berkeley: University of California Press, Institute of Industrial Relations, 1962), p. 299. ----------------------- 249 j that of the increase in national income.9 The only statistical indicator of urban unemploy ment could be obtained from figures for unemployed persons registered at the employment exchange centers which exist only in eighteen towns and only in the six provinces of northern Sudan. The other three provinces of southern Sudan do not have such centers. Despite the unreliability of the registrations of unemployed persons in these centers, which is due to the fact that registration is voluntary and that there is no way of deleting the names of those who consequently find employment, Table 13 gives an idea of the situation. Table 13 reveals that both the registration of unemployed persons and the number of persons who remained unemployed on the register at the end of each year increased by 63 percent during the four years from 1967-68 to 1970-71. Though the number of placements increased by 80 percent during the same period, the percentage of total registered persons, however, declined from about 9 Khogali Mubarak, "Administrative Problems Con , fronting Manpower Planners" (a Paper presented at the Thirteenth Inter-African Public Administration Seminar "Managing Unemployment in Africa," Khartoum, December l 1974). p. 16. ___ _ on 250 Year 1967-68 1968-69 1969-70 1970-71 TABLE 13 REGISTERED URBAN UNEMPLOYMENT IN NORTHERN SUDAN No. of Persons No. of Persons No. of Persons Registered Placed in Remaining 35,800 45,382 58,442 58,198 Jobs Unemployed 3,881 6,887 4,081 6,030 31,919 38,495 54,361 52,168 Source: ILO Report to the Sudan Government on National Employment Strategy, p. 6. 11 percent in 1967-68 to about 10 percent in 1970-71. The reports of manpower officers of the Department of Labor in urban centers have constantly pointed out that the people are moving from rural areas into towns and that opportunities are not increasing significantly to meet the I move. The population of Khartoum area alone is believed 251 --- - - ----- - ------ to have increased from about 450,000 in 1955 to about 800,000 in 1970. 10 The number of those seeking employment in urban I centers is likely to accelerate. Consequently, unless a I policy of intensive utilization of the rural labor force is pursued, the urban unemployment is going to pose very serious problems in the near future. There are signs, however, that show the government awareness of this problem ! which is demonstrated by the fact that most development plans of the five-year economic and social plan of 1970-75 are more directed toward rural agricultural areas than urban centers. The reform and modernization of the agri cultural sector seems to be the correct policy for checking the flow of manpower into urban centers. Rural Underemployment and Seasonal Shortages of the Agricultural Labor Force While the problem of unemployment of unskilled persons and, as we shall see later on, the unemployment of some categories of educated persons characterizes the urban 1 areas, the problem of the rural agricultural areas is lOILO Report to the Sudan Government on National Employment Strategy, p. 7. 252 ------ -- - -------------------. mainly underemployment coupled with the attendant problem of the exodus of young people from the rural primary sector. Economists speak of underemployment whenever it is possible to remove some of the agricultural labor force from agricultural activity without causing any reduction I to total agricultural production. The Sudan, being a , country of wide agricultural possibilities, abundant fer ' I tile lands, low density of population and sufficient water I 1 resources, though not well distributed, should not have an acute problem of rural underemployment. But the factors causing it are more cultural than economical. Earlier efforts to develop the Sudan were frustrated by the unwillingness of the local population to accept wage employment whether on temporary or permanent basis. The attraction of higher wages was not regarded as sufficient enough to compensate for the loss of personal freedom and the harsh employment discipline and the social inferiority which stigmatizes the menial employment. This is particu larly so in northern and central Sudan. In these parts of the country, it is an existentialist tradition that owning land is a prerequisite to independence, integrity and , social citizenship. But to perform manual labor or to be hired by somebody and become a wage earner is humiliating 253 and violates the concept of social freedom. This led to a great deal of underemployment although the situation is greatly changing now as more and more people are seeking I seasonal employment in the agricultural sector. Side by side with general underemployment in the rural areas, the Sudan is experiencing a problem of serious shortages of labor during harvest seasons in several areas where large-scale agricultural projects have been imple mented by the government. In the Gezira scheme (which is the main cotton production scheme of the government), about 462,260 workers were needed for picking cotton in 1969-70. 11 Yet only 230,371 were available in the area. The rest of the workers had to be imported from Kordofan and Darfur Provinces of western Sudan and from outside the Sudan, especially from Chad. In fact, one of the basic problems which confronts all large-scale agricultural schemes, such as sugar plantations which are existing or in the stage of development, is the nonavailability of a stable local agri cultural labor force. 11 M. 0. Beshir, "Educational Policy and Employment Problems in the Sudan" (a mimeographed Paper presented at the Inter-African Seminar on Managing Unemployment in Africa, Khartoum, December 1974), p. 55. 254 I ------- ------- - --- This paradoxical situation of simultaneous exist ence of chronic labor shortage in the commercialized agricultural sector and the existence of underemployment in the rural areas is partly explained by the seasonal nature of employment in agricultural production on one ,hand, as well as the various social and cultural factors I I already alluded to and by the exodus of youthful labor to the urban areas, on the other, thus accentuating the unemployment problem in cities and the shortages of labor in rural agricultural areas. An intensive policy of rural development which keeps the rural population away from cities as well as political campaigns to mobilize people and encourage them to rid themselves of the harmful cul tural traditions and beliefs is the only viable solution for the manpower planning policy. So far, we have briefly surveyed the general man power and employment situation of unskilled labor in the Sudan. We shall now turn to the manpower and employment problems of skilled labor. Skilled Manpower and Employment Problems The problems pertaining to the educated and skilled manpower of the Sudan constitute some of the most formidabl ,ones to the manpower planner. The common features of such problems can be summarized as follows. a) While there is an acute shortage of persons educated in scientific and technical fields, there is an I overproduction of school leavers and university graduates I of general education, the latter having no relevance to the requirements of national development. Consequently, the Sudan is faced with an increasing rate of unemployment. b) There is a complete lack of coordination between the activities of the educational system and the manpower demands of the national development. c) The educational and employment policies have become matters of real concern now, and they call for an urgent revision in the light of the requirements of eco nomic and social development. In order to appreciate the intensity of the prob lem, we shall at first present a brief survey of the edu cational characteristics of the population. Although the inhabitants of the Sudan, especially in the north, have a long history of literacy, both the rate of literacy of the population and the educational attainment of the adult population leave much to be desired. From Table 14, it is apparent that the rate of literacy for the adult population (15 years and over) in 256 N VI -...J Age Over 15 years Over 25 years Male TABLE 14 LITERACY ESTIMATES IN 1966 (in 000) Population Literacy % Female Population Literacy % 3,639 919 25 3,497 128 3 2,436 554 22 2,393 44 1 Both Sexes Population Literacy % 7,136 1,047 14 4,829 597 12 Source: Sudan, Ministry of Education, Educational Statistics, Academic Year: 1966-67. - ------ 1966 was 14 percent, which means that the illiteracy rate of the adult population was 86 percent as compared to the world average of 39 percent around 1966. As is true of many African countries, the high rate of illiteracy is partly explained by the colonial education I policy which accorded a low priority to education expansion 1 and improvement. The education policy was mainly directed at training a small number of indigenous personnel in certain skills to serve as junior administrative officers, teachers, and clerks. Such policy has had an adverse effect on the development and growth of the government public service which is the main employer of skilled man power in the Sudan. First, the narrowness of the educational apex at the higher levels of education had meant an output woefully inadequate in relation to the demands for qualified and highly trained personnel. It was only in the late thirties that a limited program for educating high manpower in the fields of agriculture, engineering, medicine, administra tion, teaching, and justice was launched. This too-late educational program had successfully produced a handful of administrators and professionals and a rather large number of clerks filling junior posts and performing routine 258 1 - functions. This situation resulted in a service that was overstaffed at lower levels, and understaffed at top levels. Second, the heavy emphasis put on the literacy and humanistic content of the curricula rather than on tech nical and vocational subjects resulted in a critical shortage in the technical and professional personnel cadres--the backbone of all professional and technical departments engaged in the initiation and implementation of socioeconomic development programs . Third, with the attainment of independence and the desire to build a new and progressive social order, reform in education became an urgent necessity. The education has been enlarged quantitatively and qualitatively, but it continued to maintain some of the negative features that adversely affected the quality, such as the emphasis on general liberal education at the expense of the voca tional and technical ones. Another negative feature of the educational system is the uneven distribution of school children among the various levels of education. Table 15 shows the numbers and percentages of pupils at all levels of education in 1967-68. It is apparent from the table that 75 percent of 259 TABLE 15 SUMMARY OF EDUCATION (PUBLIC AND PRIVATE) NUMBERS AND PERCENTAGES AT ALL LEVELS--1967-68 Level A 11 1 eve 1 s Kindergarten Elementary & primary I (4-5 years of schooling) Primary (8-10 years of schooling) Secondary (10-12 years of schooling) University and higher education No. of Pupils 656,984 9,950 493,556 109,070 33,855 10,553 % of Every Level to Grand Total 100 1.5 75.1 16.6 5.2 1.6 Source: Sudan, Ministry of Education, Educational Statistics, 1967-68. 260 ----- the school children had not completed eight years of schooling; about 92 percent had not completed ten years 1 (i.e., a total of 75.1 percent+ 16.6 percent), and only 1.6 percent were receiving university and other post- I secondary levels of education. The imbalance in the distribution between the academic general education and technical and vocational education can be depicted from Table 16. The figures show that out of 16,147 students in the final classes in the higher secondary schools in 1973-74, 15,297 (about 95 per cent) were in academic higher secondary schools. The rest, which amounts to only 850 (5 percent), were in commercial and technical schools. The number of graduates from post secondary technical and vocational institutes is shown to be 685 in 1968-69. 12 University and higher education had undergone similar expansion, although not in the same dimension. In 1955-56 (the year of independence), the only university in the country was the university college of Khartoum, with its faculties of Agriculture, Arts, Science, Medicine, Law, Engineering and Veterinary Science. The most significant 12 sudan, Ministry of Education, Educational Statis tics, 1968-69, p. 36. 261 N °' N TABLE 16 NUMBER OF STUDENTS IN FINAL FORM (FINAL CLASS) IN HIGHER SECONDARY SCHOOLS, 1963-73 Male Students >, Female Students >, >,-+-> ,-- >, -+-> s.. •,- ttS ,-- >, s.. .,- u u C ttS C •,- ttS s.. u u C ttS C •,- Vl •,- OJ Vl ttS Vl C :::S Vl U Vl u ttS •,- V' •,- OJ Vl ttS Vl C :::S Vl E ,-- E -+-> ,-- •r- ,-- OE,-- s.. r- •,- -c, E ,-- E -+-> ,-- •,- ,-- o E ,-- OJ •O OJ ttS 0 -+-> 0 •,- E o OJ 0 C C OJ •O OJ ttS 0 -+-> 0 •,- E o r- s.. -c, -+-> 0 -c, > 0 C. 0 Vl O 0 ~ _g ..c: 0 -c, -+-> 0 -c, > 0 C. 0 Vl O 0 ttS ttS ttS > ..c: ttS •,- ..c: >, ..c: Vl U ..C: u u ttS >..C: ttS •,- ..c: >, ..c: Vl U ..C: -+-> OJ U O U u s.. u O'>U •,- u 0 U OJ OJ U OU u s.. u O'>U •,- u 0 >- c:::( (.!:, V) c:::( c.. V) LLJ V) ::::E ca V) u V) I- V) . c::x:: (.!:, V) c:::( c.. V) LLJ V) ::::E ca V) I- 1963-64 1,558 187 1,119 229 89 99 259 189 75 97 3,904 1964-65 1,818 273 9,820 261 120 68 425 212 70 102 4.169 1965-66 2,050 259 1,215 216 111 97 522 218 167 192 5,147 1966-67 2,743 343 1,166 274 160 142 708 89 133 180 5,938 1967-68 3,137 473 1,189 221 187 115 863 129 141 177 6,632 1968-69 3,167 495 1,202 214 200 115 891 135 186 140 6,735 1969-70 3,781 627 1,068 330 206 130 1,092 200 266 81 7,781 1970-71 5,349 800 904 400 214 148 1,092 259 243 350 9,780 1971-72 5,235 1,232 1,000 177 200 419 1,180 600 291 305 10,648 1972-73 6,446 2,100 1,012 190 260 558 1,425 700 333 210 13,238 1973-74 8,058 2,400 1,050 200 280 570 2,159 850 350 230 16,147 Source: Sudan, Ministry of Education (December 1974), quoted from Beshir, "Educational Policy and Employment Problems in Sudan, 11 p. 29. --- - -- - 1 additions to this was the establishment of the Faculty of Economic and Social Studies in 1958, a Faculty of Pharmacy in 1958, Departments of Geology and Architecture in 1958, Departments of Political Science and Business Administra- l tion in 1963, a Department of Electrical Engineering in 11963, a Department of Chemical Engineering in 1964, and I ' Departments of French and Anthropology in 1964. The Khartoum branch of Cairo University was estab- I . lished in 1958 as an evening degree-granting university with faculties of Arts, Commerce, and Law. The Islamic University was established in 1965 when specializations in Arabic and Islamic Studies, and like the Khartoum branch of Cairo University, it has no science based specialization. In addition to these, a number of nonuniversity, but post-secondary institutions were created after independ ence, the main of which is the Khartoum Technical Institute in 1957. Table 17 illustrates the growth in university and higher education in the last four years. It is to be noted that the number of students enrolled in university and higher institutions rose from 11,437 in 1969-70 to 19,901 in 1973-74. Of these, there were 16,490 in the three 263 N °' +:' TABLE 17 STUDENTS REGISTERED IN UNIVERSITY AND HIGHER EDUCATION, 1969-73 Institute 1969-70 1970-71 1971-72 1972-73 1973-74 University of Khartoum 4,043 4,641 5,189 5,856 6,400 Khartoum Branch of Cairo University 5,098 6,848 8,127 7,828 9,482 Islamic University 549 535 638 503 609 Higher Teachers Training Institute 405 444 493 509 511 Khartoum Technical Institute 654 754 234 150 139 Higher Instutute for Survey • • • • • • 73 71 103 Higher Institute for Technical Teachers • • • • • • 48 78 115 Higher Institute for Commerce 172 153 169 188 228 Higher Institute for Physical Training 34 54 117 150 102 Khartoum School for Fine Arts 130 160 107 157 115 Ahfad University College 29 62 92 111 143 High Institute for Textile Technicians • • • • • • 20 53 64 Secretariat School 30 45 64 81 76 Institute for Laboratory Technicians • • • ••• 26 17 39 Shambat Agriculture Institute 130 196 276 352 • • • High Nursing College 69 78 63 65 71 Institute for Engineering Technicians • • • • • • 53 114 105 Public Health College 77 44 57 34 40 "' °' l.n TABLE 17 (Continued) Institute 1969-70 1970-71 1971-72 1972-73 1973-74 Institute for Survey Technicians • • • • • • 29 43 57 Institute for X-Ray & Radiology Technicians • • • • • • • • • 56 66 Forestry College • • • 13 • • • 18 29 Institute for Drama & Music 17 42 100 114 126 11,437 15,072 15,911 166,24 19,901 Source: Admissions Office, University of Khartoum, quoted from Beshir, p. 33. universities of Khartoum, Khartoum branch of Cairo Uni versity and the Islamic University. It is also to be noted that while 70 percent of I the students enrolled in the University of Khartoum were I reading for science and mathematics-based degrees (which is approximately about 4,480), all those enrolled in the other two universities were reading for nonscience and non- 13 professional degrees. The sad fact is that neither the Khartoum branch of Cairo University nor the Islamic Uni versity contribute in a positive way to the solution of the problem of shortage of qualified manpower required by national development. On the contrary, both contribute to the problem of overproduction of graduates in liberal arts and humanities. The continuation of both universities in their present form present a dilermna which the education policy and manpower policy will have to face sooner or later, and the sooner the better. A more detailed picture of post-secondary education according to the fields of study is shown in Table 18. The imbalance of distribution of students at a higher level of education among the various fields of study is demonstrated in the fact that 50 percent of the students study social sciences (i.e., Economics and Law), 22 percent 266 I I TABLE 18 DISTRIBUTION OF POST-SECONDARY STUDENTS AMONG VARIOUS FIELDS OF STUDY IN 1967-68 Field of Study Total Percentage Total 7,795 100 Economics and Social Studies 2,720 34.69 Arts 1,251 16 . 38 Law 1,211 15.41 Natural Sciences 995 12.59 Medicine 438 6.00 Teachers' Training 408 5.18 Engineering and Architecture 346 4.34 Agriculture 275 3.41 Veterinary Science 151 2.00 Source: Sudan, Ministry of Education, Educational Statistics, 1967-68. 267 f tudy ~ducation and arts, and that only 16 percent study technical sciences (engineering, medicine, agriculture, and veterinary sciences), and 13 percent natural science. Although the statistics concerning the University of Khartoum alone show that 70 percent are studying for science-mathematics degrees in 1974, the total picture of post-secondary studies as shown in Table 18 is far from being satisfactory. The imbalance in education should be a matter of serious concern to the manpower planning policies in the near future. Implications of the Present Education Policy The crisis in higher education today in the Sudan is that the limited educational resources are being directed into the fields which are not a priority in rela tion to economic development. Limitations in the science/ mathematics studies and higher technical studies on the one hand, and the uncontrolled expansion in the liberal studies on the other, constitute the basic problem of surpluses and shortages of skills of the national development. As education in the post-independence period expanded at all levels, employment in the publis service also expanded. Table 19 shows this expansion in government 268 - - ----- - ---- employment (excluding the army, police, prisons, and unclassified labor). The table shows posts which are referred to as classified categories, i.e., those posts that are pensionable and permanent. They constitute the three categories of the public service, viz., the adminis trative and professional, the subprofessional and technical and the clerical. Year 1957-58 1958-59 1959-60 1960-61 1961-62 1962-63 TABLE 19 NUMBER OF CLASSIFIED POSTS IN THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT, 1957-68 Number Year Number 16,964 1963-64 25,042 18,389 1964-65 27,608 19,103 1965-66 31,282 19,622 1966-67 33,556 21,398 1967-68 35,070 22,874 Source: Sudan, Ministry of Finance, 1967-68 (Establishment Department). L___ _ ______________ 269 The numbers of those employed in the police and prison services increased from 9,148 in 1957-58 to 12,000 in 1962-63, and from 15,763 in 1955-56, to 17,320 in 1967- 168, respectively. The Personnel budget (Chapter I in the Central Government Budget) increased from Sf6,489,137 in 1 1955-56 to Sfl0,128 in 1956-57, to Sf15,038 in 1967-68. 14 Some remarks are relevant here. 1. An important feature of the employment practice is the predominance of male employees. Out of 30,070 classified posts in 1967-68, only 3,723 were occupied by women ; the majority being employed as teachers in the Ministry of Education. 2. In spite of this large expansion in employment, a substantial number of classified posts remained vacant, mainly for the lack of qualified candidates. There were, for example, 2,923 vacancies in July 1968. Although we do not specifically know the qualifications required to fill these posts, it can be assumed that most of them needed professionally or technically qualified persons who are not available. The largest numbers of vacancies existed in the Ministry of Education (732), the Ministry of Health (402), 14B h. es 1.r, "Educational Policy," p. 33. 270 - -- - Economics and Finance (294), Communications (196), and Agriculture (1,677) . 15 3. While vacancies existed because of shortages in qualified personnel in certain technical fields, the government in 1966 set out to employ school leavers and university graduates in the central government budget with out really having the need for them. The movement was political and social in nature as it was meant to relieve the unemployment problem among graduates of Arts and Human ities, and junior and high secondary school leavers who started to cause unrest to the government through demon strations and riots. The distribution of those employed against a special "unemployment fund" amounting to Sfl44,040 in 1968 was as follows: Students completing intermediate school (junior secondary) ......... . • • 2,934 Students completing up to 3 years in secondary school ........ . . . . . 116 Students completing university and Islamic institutions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 780 Students completing high secondary school Total 15 Ibid., p. 37. • 4,528 8,367 271 --------- - - None of those school leavers and university gradu ates were sought by employers--whether it was the govern ment or the private sector of the economy. They were con- I sidered unsuitable to fill the vacancies existing, and the rate of economic growth of the economy and its absorptive capacity was too low to provide new opportunities of employment. The overproduction of university graduates in certain areas such as Law and Arts, and the overproduction of academic secondary school leavers has led to the un employment of such forces on whom the education system has already invested a great deal of money. The problem of the unemployable educated people, besides being politically a factor leading to unrest and instability, is economically a big waste. African countries, and it would seem all underdeveloped countries, pay dearly, and in most cases much more than advanced countries, for the school of their children. 16 In the Sudan, the annual educational cost of each elementary school pupil was estimated as 34 percent of the GNP per capita; that of an academic secondary 16 see UNESCO, s·tatistical Yearbook, 1967 and 1968 (Paris), and y·earb· o· o· k· · o· f · Nati'or1a· 1 Ac·co· un·ts Sta·tfs·tfcs, 1967 (UN Publication, Sales No. E69. XVII 6). 272 ..J I student 110 percent; that of- at echnical or trade secondary student 400.8 percent; and that of a university student 3,257 percent of GNP per capita. 17 The GNP per capita in 1 1966 was estimated as Sf35 (the Sudanese pound is equiva lent to 2.85 American dollars). The cost in Sudanese pound per pupil at different levels of education is as follows: Elementary school pupil ...... Sf12.0 per year Academic secondary pupil . . . . . 38.5 per year Technical and trade secondary student .......... . University of Khartoum student • • . . 140.3 per year 140.0 per year 1 8 4. According to a study made of the Sudan require ments and resources of higher level manpower conducted by the Ministry of Labor, the major categories in which a shortage was acute are as follows: a) University-level graduates in Engineering, Agriculture, Forestry, Veterinary Sciences, Science and Mathematics teachers, Statisticians, Technical Secondary school teachers, financial managers and pure scientists b) Technicians in Engineering, Agriculture, Veterinary Science, laboratory workers, accountants, typists, and 18 Mustafa, "Manpower and Employment Problems," p. 22. 273 J communications workers In conclusion, the educational system of the Sudan is characterized by various serious imbalances: a) A low participation of the female population in education 1 b) Low proportions of students at the higher levels of the educational ladder I Low proportions of students in the technical-scientific ! fields, especially at the secondary school level d) An overproduction of higher education students in the fields of arts and humanities, and an acute shortage of them in the scientific and technical fields All these factors limit the potentialities of the country's manpower, delay the economic and social growth and create unemployment which has started to lead to unrest, discontent and political instability. The remedy lies in taking serious steps in the way of a manpower planning policy which aims at articulating the educational policy of the country with the urgent requirements of 1 development and progress. Since education is one and at 1the same time a human right, a consumer goods, a means of raising productivity and an instrument of change, its I planning and organizing cannot be left to the educationist 274 ' alone. Prospective employers, chief among which is the government, economists, politicians, parents and even school attendants themselves, under the guidance of the manpower planner should participate fruitfully with the ' educationist and contribute to the process of policy con ceptualization, manpower planning and manpower management. Directions for Remedial Action Creation of a Central Organization for Manpower Planning The set of problems discussed in this chapter should help to delineate the appropriate organizational machinery for the purpose of assessing manpower needs and the formulation of manpower policies and programs for effective manpower development on a continuing basis. In most developing countries, there is little experience in the establishment of governmental machinery concerned mainly with manpower planning. There are a number of countries who started to establish manpower planning boards, e.g., Nigeria, Ghana, with different degrees of success. In the Sudan, several attempts were made to create at one time a ministry of planning, and at some time a planning board of a national composition assisted by a I 275 J !planning secretariat under the auspices of the Ministry of Finance and Economics. All past attempts were complete failures as they have lacked the proper political support, the professional and technical expertise in manpower plan ning and the proper authority linkage between manpower consuming departments and manpower supplying sources. There was no coordination between the requirements or different economic and social development plans and the educational institutions supplying manpower. Over and above that, there was almost a complete neglect of the scientific estimations of manpower needs of the different ministries involved in different developmental plans. There is now an urgent need for the creation of a central organization for manpower planning to be endowed with sufficient political support and entrusted with sufficient authority for manpower planning. It is highly recorrnnended that it should be placed under the auspices of the presidential office. Within the central government machinery, the Ministries of Education, Public Service and Administrative Reform (encompassing the Department of Labor and training institutions), Finance and Economics, and the Khartoum University have obviously major roles to play in the determination of manpower policy and planning. Other ,~inistries are vitally concerned with th~- problem of skill-generation in order to effect developmental plans. They are more or less consumers of manpower and have a I major role to play in the formulation of manpower demand. !These are the Ministries of Agriculture, Irrigation, Public I Health, Local Government, Industry and Social Affairs. In addition to these central government bodies, private employers' organizations, and trade unions are also con cerned with manpower problems in general. The active par ticipation of all these organs of society is urgently required for any successful short- and long-range manpower policy and implementation. The central machinery for manpower planning should I be entrusted with the following functions: 1. The coordination of the activities of all central and regional bodies requiring and producing manpower 2. Encouraging forward planning on the part of each ministry within its particular area of interest 3. Assuming full responsibility for human resources assessments on a continuing basis 4. Constructing and periodically revising a master plan or strategy 5. Promoting and reviewing the implementation of the 277 I I strategy which has been adopted by the political government Wherever the planning machinery is placed, the most important question is whether it works. The answer to this I question lies in the seriousness of the decision makers to see to it that what has been decided upon is meticulously implemented and carried out. It is of vital importance that the organizational machinery be staffed with highly qualified personnel, mainly engineers, statisticians, economists, anthropolo gists, sociologists, and pedagogical experts. Lastly, every society develops a cultural pattern of its own which is related to its work. This includes a technological system, a sociological system, and an ideo logical system. It is fruitless to focus any analysis of economic and social development only on the technological system. The interpersonal relations of a society, the beliefs, traditions and attitudes toward change and reform are extremely important for the success of any development process. The successful execution of a plan depends to a considerable degree upon the voluntary support of all the 1 people who are in any way affected by the changes the plan is designed to bring about. The set of values of the 21s I I society have to be carefully considered and wisely manipu lated and transformed to effect necessary changes in an 1 educational system that has been functioning for nearly half a century with little or no change at all. I Reform of the Structure of Incentives In most developing countries, it is incorrect to assume that relative earnings and status reflect the actual value of the contribution of individuals to development. Pay and status are often more related to tradition, colo nial heritage, scarcity in the labor market and political pressures than to productivity. Certain occupations crucial to development are poorly paid and hence given low prestige and encouragement. Others are overpaid relative to the need for them. The administrator's class gets preference over technician and artisan occupations. White collar jobs are also relatively overpaid. Such preference has a consequence: the vertical exodus from technical groups to administrative classes for reasons of prestige and high income. In the Sudan, this has been the case since the early days of the colonial regime. As a result, parents I have always tried to seek white-collar government employ- ment for their offsprings, and this entailed that the 279 pupils are sent to academic schools rather than technical and vocational schools. The consequence was an almost complete desertion of technical education in the Sudan; thus, the present woeful shortage of artisans and tech nicians for developmental projects. If meaningful and ,harmonized development of manpower is to be fostered, the salary and incentives structure should be revised in a way which pays better attention to an adequate distribution among the various occupations in relation to national development needs and priorities. It is pleasing to observe new developments in this direction in the Sudan, where the central ministry of public service and administrative reform has rightly taken measures late in 1974 to influence and modify the incen tives patterns for the subprofessional and technical class of the public service. Major changes in the wage and salary structure have been effected to equate the status and position of artisans and technicians with their counter parts in the administrative and other classes of the public service. These major changes would certainly have a direct impact on technical school leavers and would encourage newcomers of the school age to join the technical education that has been suffering unduly for a long time. 280 - - - ----------------, Changes in the Educa·tional Sys·tem The major weaknesses in the education of the pres ent and future labor force mentioned in this chapter indicate the need for far-reaching reforms in the aims, structure, content, and methods of teaching and learning. First, in the context of the growing level of unemployment and rural underemployment, the most important aim of education is clearly to awaken and increase the awareness of the people to the underlying causes of their poverty, and to the means by which the quality of their lives may be transformed. The contemporary reliance upon full-time schooling systems caters for a small percentage of the population. The mass impact rE!quired calls for a system of continuing lifelong education. This implies the establishment of a network of educational facilities and programs which will provide learning opportunities and vocational adult education for all ages. Second, in order for education to serve as a means of acquiring intellectual and manual skills, and the knowl edge and attitudes which will enable men and women to be actively employed as producers of goods and services, pre vocational and vocational education and training ought to 1 be given greater emphasis than heretofore in the curricula L _______ _ 281 of educational institutions. For the great majority of learners, the programs should be related to rural occupa tions and activities. Third, a movement is needed on the direction of de-emphasizing the value of prolonged academic education leading to certification and nonexistent white-collar jobs, and in its place, substituting a more practical technical and vocational education relevant to the requirements of the socioeconomic development of the day. Fourth, to safeguard against outdated parental and societal values thwarting the new realistic and practical employment-opportunity-oriented education and training, it will be necessary to make the dissemination of occupational information and vocational guidance an integral part of school curricula and adult educational programs directed to the out-of-school population. It is pleasing to note that since 1970 an educa tional policy with far-reaching effects on the system of education was initiated. The main features of the new policy were as follows: 1. The expansion of education at all levels, particularly at the primary level, which involved also the extension of the primary course of education from four years to 282 I -------------------------- six years, and the introduction in the additional two years of some subjects of direct relevance to develop ment such as agricultural education · 2. The diversification of the secondary school, i.e., the promotion of technical, agricultural, and commercial secondary schools 3. The division of the academic high secondary school into two sections: scientific and literary sections, the latter preparing students to join universities and the former preparing the other part of students to join higher technical institutions, or equipping them with some preliminary vocational skills that will facilitate their employment in productive jobs 4. The replacement of the old educational ladder which continued for more than fifty years by a new ladder of six years of primary education and three years of general secondary and three years of higher secondary schooling The most striking feature of the new policy is the promotion of technical education with a view of making as a first step no less than 50 percent of the high secondary schools follow technical courses including agriculture, connnerce, and teachers' education. Because of the high 283 costs involved, the shortage of qualified technical teachers, the provision of technical workshops and labora tories, and the traditional attitudes toward technical education, this objective still remains to be fulfilled. No target date was specified for the achievement of the 50 percent conversion of schools to technical education. The situation in universities and higher education institutions came under government review. Yet, it was difficult to achieve changes or reforms in this area at a very acceptable rate for a variety of reasons; some are cultural, some are political and others financial. The University of Khartoum, among the three universities of the Sudan, is the only one that took cognizance of the impor tance of emphasizing technical and scientific education as opposed to education in humanities. As things stand today, 70 percent of its student intake goes to "science" colleges. However, a thorough and long-range plan of "scientifica tion" is still lacking, and much more is still left to be desired. The critical problem that calls for urgent political action is the annual output of the Islamic University and Khartoum branch of Cairo University which becomes a liability rather than an asset, and which may cause serious political and social troubles if left growing I 284 1 l and unemployed indefinitely. The Role of the Ministry of Public Service and Administrative Reform in Manpower Planning By virtue of its encompassing under its purview the civil service department, labor department, and in- lservice training institutions and abroad training, the ministry has many potential advantages to use in manpower planning and development. It is in this field of manpower planning that administrative reform could be closely tied with economic and social development plans and reach fruition. Two distinct aspects of manpower planning can be differentiated, though they are closely linked and comple mentary to each other. The first aspect is manpower in the sense of assessing the economic and social plans requirements of different manpower categories, and seeing to it that they are supplied by schools, institutions and vocational centers. The other aspect is manpower develop ment and retention in which the ministry has a central and crucial role to play. In the first aspect of manpower needs assessment and satisfaction, the Ministry of Public Service and Administrative Reform has an important coordinating role 285 --- - - --- --- to play, as well as an operational role insofar as the supply of vocational manpower is concerned. To start with, there is a great need that the changed philosophy of education from a liberal and general one to a scientific one reoriented toward satisfying the technical personnel needs of development be vigorously pursued and rigorously followed up. In this respect, the ministry in cooperation with the Ministry of Education has to influence the political decision to expedite and support the new educational philosophy previously referred to. Side by side with this, the Department of Planning, which is part of the Ministry of Finance, Economics and Planning, has to work with the Ministry of Public Service and Administrative Reform to see to it that plans and programs of manpower needs assessment of economic projects carried out by the different sectoral ministries and local government are made ahead of time and that ways and means of supplying such needs in due time are decided upon and seriously implemented. There is a great need for the creation of a manpower committee as one of the statutory committees of the Department of Planning in which the Ministry of Public Service should adequately be represented.I The Department of Labor should be more positive in helping I I 286 I .___ _____________________________ _ 1t~provide statistics of unskilled labor availabl~- fo~ economic projects which are underway as well as future projects. It can also plan the intake in its vocational centers to connnensurate with such assessed needs of skilled I ·manpower. The central role of the Ministry of Public Service Administrative Reform in manpower development and retention 1 need not be overemphasized. This involves the effective utilization of in-service institutions, the proper planning of administration of abroad education and courses to bridge the gap in the short technical and professional personnel and the retraining of present unemployable personnel so that they may be readily absorbable in future economic plans and projects. Together with this, the ministry has to adopt a progressive and dynamic personnel policy which aims at retaining in the service and utilizing fully the technical and professional personnel already developed. This can be done through pursuing of a policy which guaran tees security of tenure and other motivational aspects of employment. This policy, if pursued vigorously, will tend to reduce the brain drain that the country is facing today. 287 Part TI. Manpower Procurement Recruitment and Selection ,Recruitment System The word "recruitment" within the context of per- lsonnel administration has a special meaning which is frequently misunderstood. When people speak about recruit ment, they take the word to refer to the whole process of selection and placement. Technically speaking, and in its simplest definition, it may be "the process through which suitable candidates are induced to compete for appointments to the public service." 19 Stahl believes that the goal of recruiting activities is the production of an adequate number of qualified applicants for employment. Recruitment ends with an abplication; the examining process begins with one.2 Recruiting agencies in advanced countries give great attention to the process of recruitment so that the ablest manpower in the labor market will be attracted to apply. Recruiting efforts usually take the form of 19 sid Panush, "Positive Recruitment Pays," Public Personnel Review 19, no. 1 (January 1958):11. 20 0. Glenn Stahl, Public Personnel Administration 6th ed. (New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1971), p. 111. 288 announcements of vacant positions in papers, television and radio, or announcements in brochures, handouts and attrac tive-looking bulletins which give a brief summary of the :agency's personnel policy, opportunities of career advancement and other privileges and fringe benefits. The public services in the United States are obliged to adopt ' such practices and to reach out for competent candidates because of the strong competition of the private industrial sector and its ability to attract the best young talents found in the labor market. The Sudan public service, being the biggest employer in the country, does not face the problem of positive recruitment yet. This is attributed to many reasons: the fact that conditions of service are more attractive in the public sector, the relatively high prestige of the public service and the status enjoyed by civil servants, and the lack of hard competition of the private industrial sector which is still limited and weak owing to the current low growth of the economy. The picture is expected to change if private industry is allowed to develop on its own ini tiative without much interference by the government. The government adopted and executed a nationalization policy of the major private industries early in 1970 which was a 289 complete failure and a major setback for the economy. It has recently changed this policy by returning some of the nationalized industries to their previous owners--a move ment which was meant to revitalize the private sector. !Only then would the private economy become a competitor to the public sector in attracting the best talents of the I I educational institutions. Looking at the recruitment system of the public service, we readily see its similarity to the British system. This is not surprising since the Sudan was a British colony for more than fifty years. Consequently, the British personnel system was transplanted to the coun try with the necessary adjustments and adaptations. The basic element in the policy is the recruitment of young persons after they complete the designated stages in the educational system to fill positions in the bottom rungs of certain career ladders of the service. In Britain "specifically, there are four main service-wide classes: the administrative class, the executive class, the clerical class and the clerical-assistant class." 21 The plan was 21 Felix A. Nigro, Public Personnel Administr·ation (New York: Henry Holt Co., 1958), p. 135. I slightly changed in the Sudan, and we have now three main categories: the administrative and professional class which embodies the senior administrative and professional jobs usually filled by university graduates, the sub professional and technical class, and includes employees ,with high secondary school certificates or post-secondary but nonuniversity education; and the clerical class which performs the manipulative work of the service and employs secondary school leavers, typists, junior bookkeepers, storekeepers, and similar junior clerks. The Sudan public service is a true career service, where recruits enter at an early age and, if they prove their capacity, are progressively moved up the promotional line until they reach the top posts. The fact that the Sudan adopts the "rank-in-person" system, as distinct from the "position classification" system, means that the appointment of a person is to a "service" and not to a single post. A service consists of a group of public servants, all of whom are available to fill and have open to them a group of posts usually hierarchically arranged in order of responsibility and emoluments.22 22 uN, Recruitment and Selection in the Public Serv ice of Developing Countries (New York, 1968), pp. 10-11. 291 The difference from the recruitment point of view between rank-in-person system and post-classification ystem, is I that when recruitment is made to a post, there is specific matching of the professional qualification of the aspirant against the requirements of the particular post. When recruitment is made to a "service," the aspirant has to be matched not only with a post to be immediately occupied, but also with the capacities, professional and personal, required for a career in that service. As such, the prin ciple of "fitting the man to the job" which is the basis for selection procedures in post-classification systems is unsatisfactory; and a more behavioral approach of selection which looks into the effects of the organization over the aspirants and the reciprocal effects of the candidate over the organization is called for in the rank-in-person 23 personnel systems. The question of whether to continue with the rank in-person classification system or to revert to a job oriented classification one was raised on several occasions of personnel reform in the Sudan; the latest occasion being 23 Everett G. Dillman, "A Behavioral Science Approach to Personnel Selection," in Human Res· ource Manage ment in Public Organizations, ed. Gilbert B. Siegel (Los Angeles: University Publishers, 1973), p. 312. I a report to the Sudan government by an international commission under the auspices of the United Nations on December 1973. The commission recommended the continuation jof the "rank-in-person" system of classification for the following reasons: 1. It is simple--qualifications provide a tried and reliable basis for assessing the calibre of the person who can measure up to the different job levels; and a single salary grid covering all occupations and listing the salaries attached to each of the different levels is simpler and more easily understood than a system in which the different occupations have their own, and sometimes different, classification structures and pay levels 2. It is more equitable inasmuch as it makes it possible to pay the same amount for jobs requir ing people of equal calibre 3. A man-oriented system makes it easier to trans fer people from one occupational group to another--something that is highly desirable in the Sudan where some governmental agencies may be in shortage of special administrative and professional capabilities available in other agencies 4. A post-classification system leads to jealousies and to leapfrogging between the different occu pational groups of the service 5. The latter system has to be based on an elaborate system of evaluation which could make heavy demands on trained, and often scarce, manpower, which in Sudan could be more profitably deployed in the simpler task of the rank classification, and ensuring that the numbers and levels of staff are brought into line with service require ments24 24 sudan, Ministry of Public Service and Administra- 293 Select·ion Based · on Me·rit Many countries nowadays accept that the general principle governing selection should be that, where there are more applicants than posts, appointment should go to the most meritorious. This principle is now frequently jstated in constitutions or public service laws. Section ; 12 0£ the Sudan Public Service Act of 1973 provides that I I ,"selection for public posts shall be through free competi- , 25 tion in accordance with the merit system." Public servants in any modern state are essential for the planning and implementation of developmental pro grams; and the quality of a public service depends, to a large extent, on the caliber of individuals recruited to it. While in-service training, proper career management and executive development can help later on to develop further the potential of the raw material, it is my belief that the recruitment and selection process is the corner stone which determines the quality of the service. As ,tive Reform, Personnel: Administrative and Related Reforms (Report of an International Connnission, Khartoum, December 1 1973), p. 5. I 25 sudan, Public Service Law (Khartoum, 1973), Section 12, p. 4. 294 such, the selection process should endeavor to serve two main purposes: (a) to ensure that selection is based on merit, and that no suspicion of a spoils system, favoritism or nepotism, is being operated in any way, particularly in a country of different ethnic groups like the Sudan; and (b) that the selection process should not only be fair and equitable, but should be accepted by the public at large as fair and just. The first purpose can be served through the adop tion of a central recruitment system which safeguards against all irregularities and adopts satisfactory selec tion methods which give equal opportunity for every individual to compete. The second purpose can be served through the actual participation of society in the selec tion process, and through making such a process an open one subject to scrutiny and democratic control. In the Sudan until lately, these considerations had not assumed much significance as the availability of candidates possessing the prescribed qualifications did not generally exceed the number of vacancies. It has been shown before that some 2,923 unfilled vacancies appeared in the July 1968 central budget due to the fact that they are professional and technical jobs which do not have 295 qualified personnel available to fill them. But the employment situation in the country has been gradually undergoing changes. The availability of higher secondary ' school graduates and university graduates (other than from I certain professional colleges) seems to have reached a stage where it has already exceeded the requirements of I the public service. Thus, in this changed context, the two purposes spelled out for a proper recruitment policy have become relevant. Even where the overall shortages in technical capabilities still continue to exist in the service, I feel that the process of selection on merit can be used with advantage for the purpose of the right assign ment of candidates to the various employing units. More over, it seems that the present acceptance of the univer sity diplomas and school certificates as substitutes for other special qualities which may be required for selection purposes is generally a misconception. Merit rating achieved by academic examinations of schools may not necessarily be identical with the merit rating that should be given on selection processes, particularly for general posts that require administrative qualities and those that require specific professional capabilities. A personnel scholar, at one time, criticized this practice when he 296 I I observed that in the Middle Eastern countries, "degrees take the place of examinations and education credentials h d d f . . b. 1 · .. 26 are t e common stan ar or measuring suita i ity. Moreover, the commitment to a selection process based on lmerit and its practice is something desirable in itself for the purpose of establishing the tradition of merit I I selection and its acceptability as a matter of principle and practice in the minds of both job aspirants and society at large. One detrimental practice to the principle of merit that has been adopted by the government is the indiscrimi nate and unnecessary employment by the public service of school leavers ot different levels. One is happy to note the provision in the ne· w public service regulations of 1973 that appointments shall only be made to fill vacant posts and no new posts shall be created except when the state of work necessitates such creation. Thus rightly the government does not intend to utilize recruitment to 1 thc public services as a means of relieving the educated unemployed as it used to do in 1967 and 1968. This ! _____ _ 26 Ferrel Heady, "Personnel Administration in the Middle East," Public Personnel Review 10, no. 1 (January '1959):30. ' 297 orientation in the government's recruitment policy is highly connnended as it was felt that the continued absorp tion of all school graduates into the government service jwill not only negate the principle of selection on merit, but will also fail to provide enough incentive to the students to develop their optimum capacities. Redundancy in the public service in the past few years has not only lowered the efficiency all around by affecting the morale of good performers, but actually lowered the per capita productivity, and increased the overall cost of administra tion (which the Sudan can ill-afford at the moment). This chapter has already emphasized in part I the need for co ordinating the educational system with the national require ments based on social and economic planning. The important consequence of such an approach would be to shift manpower from the areas of redundant skills to areas of shortages. This policy might be a long-term one, but until it gives fruition by cutting down the availability of unnecessary skills, the present unemployable manpower should have no room in the public service. Rather, they should be shifted Ito developmental projects in the present five-year plan of 1970-75, or alternatively retrained through crash programs in those vocations and technical skills that are in demand today. Administration of Sele·ction Traditionally and until today, selection to the Sudan public service has been the responsibility of the independent departments among which the functions were I divided. Selection was regarded generally as a "line" :function to be carried out by hierarchic superiors of ' persons to be selected. As early as the 1940s and 1950s 'when the University of Khartoum was the only mainstream of I recruitment of young graduates for the administrative and professional class of the public service, the university authorities used to contact the different departments shortly before the graduation commencement to ascertain the number and types of vacancies they had available in their budgets. The university then advertised these vacancies to the finalist students to enable them to fill applica tions according to their own personal choices. The place ment of the students was then carried out by a departmental board representing all departments assembled under the auspices of the Ministry of Interior to interview the students and to locate them, bearing the student's choice · in mind and trying to respond to it as nearly as possible. I :In ceratin fields where shortages were acute, such as - - ------- engineering, the board gave more consideration to the acute needs of departments rather than the student's choice. As the number of students gradually multiplied, each department was left to select on its own terms. The I central personnel agency, situated under the Ministry of Finance and Economics has the role of ensuring that such departments are selecting candidates according to the number of vacant posts at their disposal, but it seldom interferes with the authority or methods of selection adopted by the individual ministries and departments. With other public service classes--the subprofessional and technical and clerical classes--the labor department was assuming the responsibility of providing names of recruits to individual departments for interviewing and selection. The Sudan did not witness, like other developing countries, the formation of a strong central personnel agency or a public service connnission which is solely responsible for central recruitment throughout the public service. Its role in the Sudan has always been limited to the provision of budgetary facilities and the creation of necessary posts required by departments. As far back as 1962, the writer has suggested that the central personnel agency should assume the full func- l - -------- tion of central selection of employees, particularly at the administrative and professional levels, on behalf of individual ministries and departments of the public service for reasons of fairness, equity and equal opportunity. 27 This had not been carried out until 1973 when it was reconnnended by an International Connnission to the Ministry of Public Service. 28 The commission reconnnended that at the apex of public service there should be a Public I Service Recruitment Board located within the Ministry of Public Service and Administrative Reform (the central per sonnel agency of the public service. The functions of the board as suggested were: a) To advise on the framing of the recruitment regulations 1 for the various public services in accordance with the terms of the broad policy laid down by the government b) To undertake actual recruitment to posts in the admin istrative and professional class. Its jurisdiction is limited for the time being to the recruitment of university graduates to the above class 1 in the Public 27 A. I. Abusin, "The Development of Civil Service Republic of Sudan" (Master's thesis, Institute of Administration, Khartoum, 1962), p. 124. 28 Sudan, Report of International Commission, p. 20. 301 ----- To allocate such selected candidates to the various government units The r~cruitment authority to the subprofessional and technical class was left to the individual ministries and departments, with the central personnel agency assuming ! overall budgetary control while the authority for selection and appointment to the clerical class seems to be com pletely delegated to the individual units concerned. The creation of such a central recruitment board is definitely a progressive step in the direction of cen tralizing the recruitment function, but it leaves much to be desired. It is of utmost importance that the authority for recruiting employees in the subprofessional and tech nical class--the backbone of the public service--should also be assumed by the newly created recruitment board. Table 20 shows the relative magnitude of the subprofes sional and technical class in the public service (the third item in the table). There are several advantages that may accrue from a centralized recruitment procedure and a centralized recruitment board, such as: 1. It is easier to place one central agency in a position where it can resist pressures toward favoritism 1. 2. 3. 4. TABLE 20 CLASSIFIED PUBLIC SERVICE CATEGORIES BY NUMBER OF POSTS AND ANNUAL COSTS Class Categories Superscales (Assistant Directors up to Under- secretary) Administrative & Professional Class Subprofessional of Techincal Class Clerical Class Total 1955-56 No. of Basic Posts Annual Pay 151 ts 226,766 2,019 1,464,655 8,845 2,390,383 3,136 780,463 14,151 5,062,267 1972-73 No. of Posts 743 11,686 37,596 5,611 55,636 Basic Annual Pay fSl,024,545 9,006,930 6,565,532 1,801,881 18,398,888 Source: Sudan, Ministry of Public Service and Administrative Reform, A Programme for Administrative Reform (A report by UN Mission) (Khartoum, December 1972), p. 2. 303 f r patronage (e.g., by giving it a high autonomous status and a high level of political support) than it is to place a number of departmental agencies in that position. 2. A central recruitment agency may be in a better position to permit desirable representation of interest groups and the private sector. To obtain societal legiti macy the central recruitment board had as one of its members a high ranking official, representative of the industrial sector of the Sudan. 3. Such a central agency has a better chance of acquiring specialized expertise in recruitment and selection techniques which may not be matched by departmental agencies. 4. A central agency may, by securing compatibility of standards in all departments, be able to prevent some departments from falling behind others in the general quality of their staff. 5. When there is an overall shortage of qualified recruits, a central recruitment agency by coordinating demands and rationing the supply can prevent a disorganized interdepartmental competition for staff. 6. When the assistance of outside agencies (such as universities and similar institutions) is necessary for 304 ------- conducting selection tests, this may be better organized through a single central agency. 7. Finally, a central recruitment agency may be in a better position to attract and place more suitably qualified Sudanese nationals studying abroad or those employed in the private sector laterally at levels in the service not necessarily the most bottom ones. Methods and Tools of Selection The public service of the Sudan did not so far develop any comprehensive system of competitive selection which would be considered satisfactory by Western standards. Although provisions for merit as the basis of choice may have been set in the personnel laws and regulations, the individual ministries and departments concerned are usually free to apply the merit criterion as it sees fit. Principally speaking, a healthy program of selection should include the following ingredients: (1) the evalua tion of the past record of all applicants in order to project future behavior in the new post or career; (2) the evaluation of the training, education, and certificates attained by candidates; (3) the written competitive tests of different types to measure mental and personality quali- 1ties and traits as well as other professional, technical, 305 and administrative capabilities of contesters; (4) the conducting of the interview which is one of the most widely used techniques in selection; and (5) the usage of the !probationary period as the best device of checking on the validity and reliability of the previously mentioned selection techniques. As has been mentioned e2rlier, the public service has not yet felt the need to employ such competitive tech niques of selection as the numbers of professionally and administratively capable applicants to public employment fell woefully short of the demand. Recently the picture began to change as more and more graduates were seeking employment in numbers that are much more than the public vacancies that are available. Within the last ten years, competitive examinations found their way as a method of selection in different departments but strictly on individual basis . Yet, as a recognized service-wide policy, the competitive selection has not been adopted. There is much hope that the new Central Recruitment Connnission will be capable in due time of developing, standardizing, and validating selection techniques, and ensuring their applicability by different departments for selection of those categories of employees L ________ _ 306 1 .. I that fall under their personnel jurisdictions. Although it is not appropriate to delve in detail into the applicability to Sudan of different types of testing and interviewing that are connnonly used in Western developed countries, some points seem to be worthy of mention here. There is a common tendency everywhere in the world of personnel administration to overuse and, therefore, misuse the interview as a selection device. There is a connnon misconception that the interview can be used as the only means of selection. There is a great deal of research that proves the employment interview to be a deficient tool of selection if it is used by itself. In view of the fact that the reliability and validity of the employment inter view have not been ascertained beyond doubt, researchers have come to the conclusion that it can only evaluate certain personality traits which are observable during the interview, and that so many other personality traits and qualities as well as other qualifications necessary for the success in job performance could only be properly evaluated through testing means other than the interview. Such other means are essentially the personality tests, aptitude tests, performance tests, demonstration tests, 307 j l and the like. 2 9 As such, the employment interview should , be carefully contrived to examine certain personality I traits leaving other qualities and characteristics to be , evaluated through other tests. The interview, therefore, I should be considered as complementary and supplementary to written tests and other selection devices. The other point to be mentioned deals with the standardization and validation of written tests. The developing countries, and the Sudan is not an exception, have not yet developed the appropriate expertise knowledge nor do they have the adequate financial resources to standardize and validate tests before using them. The types of tests that are now in usage tend to be academically oriented and their job relatedness is not yet ascertained. However, the area of test validation and standardization is a complex and an expensive one; yet it is a necessary endeavor, nevertheless, if the Sudan service is genuinely serious about developing meritorious selection procedures 29 For an elaborate discussion of the utility of the interview, see the writer's paper, "The Selection Interview: Revisited" (a Paper presented to Professor Siegel in PA 616 in which the writer surveyed the research literature on the selection interview and the research findings on the validity and reliability of the selection interview). L __ 308 I that are worthy of the name. The sooner it launches such an endeavor the better for the joint benefit of the public service and the prospective manpower that seeks public emp laymen t. 309 CHAPTER V HUMAN RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT: ADMINISTRATIVE TRAINING AND UTILIZATION Introduction This chapter is complimentary to the previous one insofar as manpower development is concerned. The previous chapter emphasized the point of manpower planning as an important first step in any reform of manpower development. The object of such manpower planning was to assess the needs of the public sector as well as the private sector for trained manpower, the types of training required to meet the various requirements of the state, the ability of ' educational and training institutions to produce the various types and levels of training needed, and an esti mate of future requirements for trained manpower in terms of development. Under such a plan, the development of manpower would be fitted into the overall economic and social development plan as an essential component of it. There is a close organic relationship between economic and social 310J development planning and manpower development planning. The administrative reform movement should always work to see that staff development plans work in close relationship with the requirements of the national development plan. 1 rn the previous chapter, the emphasis was more on educa tional planning so that schools, technical institutions ' and universities would produce qualified manpower in the fields of specializations that are relevant to the national development projects. In this chapter, the emphasis is shifted to staff training plans which would bridge the gap left behind by educational institutions and would instill into government officers new knowledge, behavior and attitudes required by the changing nature of development through the years. Administrative training, in particular, is seen as ranking high in the priorities of administrative reform activities. It is of importance because the country has a compelling need to ensure that the available manpower is used to the best advantage, and there must be as little waste as is humanly possible. The Status of Training Today, an observant person engaged anywhere in the 311 E rld of work can~ ee that training is widely accepted as a necessary function of managing government machinery. The relentless press of technology, the inexorable fact of I change, the ceaseless clamor of social and economic prob lems combine tc make the adaptability and continuing preparation of the work force at least as important as its initial acquisition and motivation. Yet, the concept of formalized training as a natural and continuing activity is one that has seen its main development in the 1930s. Today, training is held in high regard in business and government, both as a means of achieving more successful operations and at the same time, of giving individual opportunities for more satisfying personal achievement. It has been suggested that the organization man of the future may spend 50 percent or more of his life in some kind of formal education or training just to keep abreast of his ·b·1· . l responsi i ities. Stahl asserts that there can be little doubt that training as an inte gral part of management is here to stay. The era of lack of receptivity is over. Each year over one- 1 Kenneth T. Buyers, "The Choice to Grow or Decline," in Employee Training and Development in the Public Service, ed. K4 T. Buyers (Chicago: Public Personnel Association, 1970), p. 5. 312 - - - ------------------- third (that is around one million persons) of the federal work force takes part in some facet of in service developmental activity sponsored and paid for by the national government.2 American industry alone spends on the order of 1$3 billion on formal training programs each year. Invest lment in skills acquired through systematic training now accounts for over half of the expenditure on all formal education in the United States. About $600 million are 3 spent on management development programs alone. George Odiorne has suggested that training in the United States has acquired an added dimension since the period of the sixties. The economic and political situations of the country have created problems for management. Unemployment levels above 4 percent were unacceptable and politically explosive. Civil rights movement turned from passive to active means. Riots in cities were attributed to unemploy ment and poverty in the ghettos. The cause of poverty and unemployment was related to lack of skills required by the American industry. The solution adopted to solve all this 2 o. Glenn Stahl, Public Personnel Administration, 6th ed. (New York: Harper & Row, 1971), p. 219. 3 Rolf P. Lynton and Udai Pareak, Training for ,Development (Homewood, Ill.: Dorsey Press, 1967), p. vii. 313 ' was training. Management development 4 bec _ o _ m _e;; wa - y - of solving economic and social problems. In Britain there was no pressure from the society to develop a structured orientation in training. Training in the British career service assumed its present general form only recently. The impact of science and technology has made it more and more felt in government, and an under standing and appreciation of economics and of scientific and other technical problems is becoming as important to the senior civil servant as a knowledge of political science. To keep up with these changes in thinking there has been a gradual revolution in the training of civil servants, who as recently as the period between the two world wars, learned mainly by experience on the job. The first break with traditional attitudes came toward the end of 1942, when the House of Commons debated on the report on "Organization and Control of the Civil Service." This led to the formation of a committee headed by Lord Assheton. The Assheton Report of 1944 emphasized two training requirements: (1) the need for civil servants to develop the right attitude to the public, and (2) the need 4 George S. Odiorne, Training by Obj~ctives (London: Collier-Macmillan, Ltd., 1970), p. v. 314 I for good management and sound organization.5 --Centraliz~ training for young recruits into the administrative class was instituted immediately after the Second World War and 1 consisted of a three-week course at the Center of Adminis- trative Studies in London. The orientation given to trainees developed a better appreciation of the relation ships between ministers and parliament, and between minis ters and their departments, and also a better understanding of the problem of coordination between ministries. The next major shake-up in the training function was in 1968 when the Civil Service Staff College was established as a result of the recommendations of the Fulton Connnittee. There is now more emphasis on specialized training in specific areas of administration. Training in Developing Countries It has been remarked that with respect to training in the public service, the usual distinction between the so-called underdeveloped and advanced countries tends to lose much of its significance. On this issue, the United 5 Fred Tickner, Training in Modern Sosiety (New York: Graduate School of Public Affairs, State University of New York at Albany, 1966), p. 56. 315 I Nations handbook on training has stated that comprehensive training programs in the public service are so new that countries of differing stages of economic development find themselves, so to speak, in the same boat, which is to be guided towards a goal of improving the quality of the public service. The history of training on the grand scale in the public service goes back hardly more than a quarter of a century.6 However, developing countries found themselves 7 lagging behind in this aspect of personnel development. A host of reasons caused this state of affairs: the fact that they are newly emerging nations whose innnediate con cern was for political identity more than anything else, the fact that political elites were mostly political activists and were less appreciative of the art and science I of administration, and the lack of the administrative structure and apparatus to carry out a planned training program. Such was the scene in the 1950s and early 1960s when technical assistance was rendered to these countries through the auspices of the United Nations, bilateral aid, Agency of International Development (AID), or foundations 6 united Nations, Handbook of Training in Public Service (New York: Un Publications, 1966), pp. vi-vii. such as the Ford Foundations, the Fulbright Foundation, ~r 1 the German Foundation for Developing Countries. The 195Os was the period when large scale efforts to export public !administration from some countries of Europe and the United I States into Asia, Latin America, and Africa took place. As William J. Siffin has remarked: Nineteen fifty-five, it was a recent year, but a year in a time of faith--faith in the developmental power of administrative tools devised in the West. It was a sanguine year in a time of hope--hope that public administration could lead countries to modern ization . 7 The public administration of the United States was a fairly representative specimen of what was being exported to and imported by many developing countries. During the 195Os there was a serious effort at applying the classical "principles" approach to address the requirements of development. Many public administration experts were engaged, mainly through the United Nations, in building institutes of public administration in the countries of the Third World. Here public administration technicians and experts emphasized the tool-oriented administration and sought to transfer the administrative techniques to improve 7 william J. Siffin, "Two Decades of Public Adminis tration," SICA, Occasional Papers, American Society for Public Administration, October 1974, p. 3. 317 --- - -- -------, the machinery of government to serve modernization. The tools--especially the tools of personnel adminis tration and budgetary and financial administration- were among the prime products of American public administration.8 Between 1952 and 1963, the United Nations, the Ford Founda tion, and the United States government helped to establish some 70 public administration institutes in developing countries which were the chief conveyors of administrative tools into those countries. Such an orientation in training did not afford the study of policymaking and administrative policies, and it simply did not fit the politics-administrative-economic realities of most of the developing countries. This was perhaps the main reason why such institutes failed to bring about an effective change in developing countries and it was not until complete reorientation and change of direc tion was effected in these institutes that they started to function as an important tool of development. As socioeconomic functions loumed large in public sector operations, there was an urgent need to develop skilled and high-talent manpower to cope with the problems of socioeconomic planning and implementation. At this 8 rbid., p. 7. 318 --- -- - juncture, developing countries are in need of a departure from the old orientation of instrumental training to training for development as a new orientation which links training with the actual need of development. Training--A Critical Factor Qf Development in Sudan If developed countries have recently felt the need for updating their civil services to meet the challenges of the twentieth century, it goes without saying that develop ing countries have a more challenging task of reorienting and transforming their civil services, in structure and objectives, from rudimentary services into ones which are in resonance with the highly nationalistic independent states. This is a very difficult adjustment to bring about even under the most favorable staffing conditions. In the circumstances in which there is a heavy loss of experienced staff, as was the case in all newly independent countries, the task becomes much more difficult to manage. Further more, the period immediately after political independence is accompanied by an accelerated pace of economic and social development and expanded provision of government services in response to the people's expectation that independence means greater economic well-being for all. 319 ' Sudan's case is not an exception.--Th; need for qualified and well-trained administrative staff in the Sudan rests upon the following assumptions. 1. The formulation and implementation of national development plans and programs are facets of administrative 1 I actions as well as political initiative. Allusion has been made in previous chapters to the equal importance of administrative leadership, within the Sudan public service, in the development process, as compared to the political leadership and support. This is particularly true of the Sudan's unstable political setup when taking into considera tion the fact that there are times when effective political direction staggers and lapses. Under such circumstances, administrative leadership provides an effective means of 9 maintaining the element of continuity in government. 2. In a country engaged in increased socioeconomic activities, and where socialist governments assume, rightly or wrongly, most of such developmental activities, the administrative staff performs very significant functions. 9 sudan has been characterized with many political changes and coup d'etats where civil service leadership is called upon to assume interim leadership before things settle down. Vivid examples took place after termination of military regimes in 1964 and 1971. 320 Hence, the creation and maintenance of administrative capabilities and competences becomes an increasingly deter mining factor in the success of development and progress. Indeed the success of administration becomes a function of training and staff development in such a case. 3. The changed political status of the Sudan from a dependency to an independent country creates significant manpower problems of great quantitative and qualitative dimensions. The exodus of foreign personnel after the achievement of independence created an acute shortage of well-qualified and trained indigenous administrators. In certain ministries and departments, e.g., the Ministry of Interior, an acute shortage in members of Sudanese adminis tration was felt at the time of "Sudanization" as early as 1955. This led to rapid promotion of young national administrators, who lacked experience and training, to assume senior administrative posts. Another factor aggravating the state of affairs is the fact that politi cians were lagging behind in administrative abilities and executive leadership as they had been political activists much more than actual planners and policymakers. This resulted in a situation where civil service leadership was entrusted with the actual promulgation of policies and 321 planning together with execution and implementation of such policies. Thus, the scarcity of personnel possessing the I requisite skills and competence, coupled with the qualita tive lack of administrative skills had become a prime factor limiting the capacity and capability of the total social system to realize its aspirations and goals until today. Under such circumstances, effective training and staff development becomes a crucial necessity. 4. The requirement of these skills grows very much faster in the socioeconomic development process facing the Sudan today, where projects and programs embarked upon are varied and multifarious. 5. A very new but readily felt factor is the brain-drain that the Sudan is witnessing today. Particu larly at the top and middle levels of administrative cadres the country is facing an exodus of administrators and pro fessionals to neighboring countries at a rate that has never been experienced before. Factors leading to this are twofold: that neighboring countries are offering better facilities and salaries on the one hand, and the infla tionary conditions of the Sudan coupled with frequent purging of top government officials resulting in disenchant ment, disappointment, low morale and frustration, on the 322 I ----- ---- other, which ultimately speeded up the brain-drain. More will be said about this issue when we deal with problems of retention and motivation of personnel. Under such cir cumstances, the training factor is highly needed to put right the imbalance in administrative skills that the country is rapidly losing nowadays. Administrative Training in the Sudan A Critical Review Pre-Service Training The Sudan administration in the first two decades of this century was dominated by British and Egyptian army officers. Gradually recruitment of civilian administrators from both colonizing countries took place. Recruits were usually selected from among young university graduates who were sent to the Sudan after a one-year study of Arabic language. After a few months of service, they were required to pass another examination in Arabic and two years later, a third in law. In the meantime, the Sudanese played a modest part in the administration--mainly as junior clerks and account- ! ants. But the deterioration of Anglo-Egyptian relations which followed the outbreak of the Egyptian revolution of 1919 resulted in the gradual displacement of the Egyptians 323J I by the Sudanese. This trend, started in 1919, became par ticularly powerful after 1924 when Egyptian civilian and army personnel were evicted en masse from the Sudan. A special course for the training of Sudanese junior district officers (submamurs) was introduced in 1919. This marked the first step toward pre-service administrative training in the Sudan. Spurred by the continued Anglo-Egyptian dispute on the one hand, and the accelerated pace of Sudan's progress toward self-government and self-determination, on the other, Sudanization once again gathered momentum during the late thirties and early forties and proceeded to take place at an unprecedented speed in the postwar period. Thus, while the Sudanization Connnittee of 1946 reconnnended that by 1962, 62.2 percent of the established posts in the civil service should be Sudanized, the rapid rate of the coun try's constitutional development resulted in almost com plete Sudanization of the civil servants by the eve of independence in 1955. In order to meet the training requirement of the I country in the innnediate postwar period, measures have been 1 taken to develop the Gordon Memorial College,which had been I ,recognized by the University of London in 1945, into a 324 j degree-giving university college in 1951. Within the University College, a department of public administration, !which formed part of the Faculty of Law, had been created in order to undertake the training of would-be senior administrators in the Minis~ries of Interior and Local Government. Graduates of the Faculty of Arts and Faculty of Science who were recruited as junior administrative officers in these two ministries spent three months in the department during which they received introductory lectures by members of the Faculty of Law and senior members of the civil service. The next six months were spent in the field where recruits worked as administrative cadets under senior administrative officers in the districts and pro vincial headquarters. After completion of their field training, they went back to the University College for a further three-month period of lectures which culminated in examinations after which successful candidates were given . f. . d . . . 10 certi icates in a ministration. The curriculum covered a wide range of subjects including accounting, rural economy, police organization, lON. Angus and R. Niehoff, Rec·onnaissance Survey Report Concerning an 'Ins• titute of Publi• c Admirtistra• tion in Sudan (UN Report No. TAO/SUD/31 1960), p. 17. 325 and ~a;; heavily biased toward legal studies, particularlyl criminal law, criminal procedure, civil procedure, tort and contract, to the almost complete exclusion of other social sciences. The limitations and shortcomings of the legalis tic law and order oriented approach of the one-year course became increasingly obvious during the post-independence period which witnessed the expansion of government activi ties and responsibilities, particularly in the socio economic development of the country. This resulted not only i n the expansion and reorientation of the civil service, but also in the creation of numerous new ministries and government units requiring new types of administrative ability. In the circumstances, the course of the Faculty of Law could hardly be regarded as suitable for providing training in public administration. The needs of the new situation had to be met by other means. Training courses abroad, though very popular among members of the middle and senior grades of the civil service, could not be exclusively relied upon. Apart from the expense involved, they were naturally not tailored to suit the particular needs of Sudanese personnel. It was, therefore, decided that training centers be established locally. Accordingly, a Faculty of Economic and Social 326 I I Studies was established at the University of Khartoum in 1968, and two years later, an Institute of Public Adminis tration was launched as a joint undertaking in technical cooperation between the Sudan government and the United N . 11 1 ations. At the University of Khartoum, a Department of Political Science was created within the Faculty of Economic and Social Studies in 1960, to undertake the teaching of public administration, not only because it is an integral part of the discipline of social science, but also because of its usefulness in training students who would eventually assume the administrative responsibilities in the civil service departments after graduation. The subjects of Principles and Techniques of Public Administration and Comparative Public Administration are taught to under graduates. In addition, two one-year postgraduate diplomas I were introduced in 1966--one in international relations, the other in public administration--and the old training in public administration at the Faculty of Law was termi nated. 11 Muddathir Abdel-Rahim, "Trends in the University Teaching and Research in Public Administration in Sudan," Sudan Journal of Administra• tion and Deve:lQPment 6 (1970): 37 327 The new diploma of public -;dministratio~-~nlike 7 the old certificate, is social science oriented and includes papers on problems of development in new states and social !problems of modern Africa, comparative public administra- ' tion, principles and techniques of public administration, I problems of administration in Sudan and developing coun- tries, office management, and organization and Sudan laws. I The diploma is essentially an academic rather than a vocational course, and the teaching is done through lectures, reading assignments and seminars. Although it is categorized as a pre-service training in public administra tion, the civil service officers with normally three or more years of practical experience after university gradua tion are constantly encouraged to join the diploma course. When they do so, they are supposed to relate their studies and research papers to the actual experience they have had in the field. This course of study has had a considerable impact on the civil service of Sudan. The annual intake of diplomas in public administration and international relations is normally between 30 ro 40 students, and it will hopefully increase as more qualified teaching staff join the Department of Political Science which has only three full-time staff members at present. 328 ------ - In-Service Administrative· Train• ing The aim of in-service training programs, as dis tinguished from that of the formal educational system discussed in the previous chapter, is more specific, and I the programs are normally designed to fit a recipient either to perform his existing duties more effectively and adequately or to prepare and enable him to perform a job f d "ff d "b·1· 12 o i erent an greater responsi i ity. To use such a definition, however, is not to suggest a hard and fast distinction between the two processes of educat ion and training, with respect to their role in governmental staff development. Both learning processes ought to be basic and permanent features of the staff development programs. Harbison suggests that the accumulation of human capital may start with the formal education, but it does not end there. It is continuous lifetime process, and the knowledge and skills acquired during employment are often as valu able as those earned at school.13 Indeed, in order to produce the necessary skills, a country's formal educational process must be supplemented 12 A. L. Adu, The Civil Service in New African States (New York: Praeger, 1965), p. 50. 13 Freder"ck Harbison et al., Education, Manpower and Economic Growth (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1964), p. 17. 329 by training programs that will enhance job readiness and adapt employees to new programs, conditions and needs that are necessary to sustain the development of society. In I this sense, the concept of training may be understood as a process concerned with ends as well as means. Its concern with ends relates to the values and attitudes it seeks to connnunicate to public servants to sustain the country's development. As a means it seeks to provide the skills and knowledge that civil servants will need in order to achieve better administrative performance. A United Nations experts team of two has been invited by the Sudan government to assess the needs for in-service training in the country. The team has found that a serious imbalance exists between the needs to be met and the adequacy of the administrative machinery to carry them out. This imbalance constitutes a major obstacle to national development, and to meet even a part of its growing responsibilities, the Sudan must develop the administrative capacity to implement its programs. As a result of the team's report, the Institute of Public Administration was established in 1960 as a joint under taking between the government and the United Nations. Since its inception, the IPA has become the main ...__ _______________________ 330 J center for administrative training, res~~rch in - administra- 1 tive problems and consultative services to the different . ministries and departments. The new IPA programs were directed mainly toward the middle grades and supervisory grades of the civil service. It had developed, by this time, specialized departments in the fields of personnel administration, local government administration, financial admini8- tration, development administration, and a research department. The IPA training programs have been a great success insofar as middle management training, supervisory training, and induction training are concerned. However, they have often been criticized on several counts: Being of rather short duration, unevenly developed and utilized by government departments, often ad hoc in character, deficient in systematic planning and supervised execution, lacking assistance from staff specialists, directed exclusively towards the lower ranks of the civil service, and usually not consti tuting part of an integrated program leading to a diploma or a degree.14 Some of these criticisms are quite sound, but it is of great importance for future reformative efforts to diagnose 14 Mutasim Al-Beshir, "Administration and Develop ment: A Study of the Role of the Civil Service in the Sudan" (Ph.D dissertation, UCLA, Los Angeles, 1967), pp. 115-16. r ~ he reasons why in-service training was not~ complete success. 1. Training is an area of reform which reflects the importance of the leadership factor in reform. It is a function of leadership before it becomes a function of the administrative apparatus within the civil service. In Sudan's case, training has never been a priority in the eyes of political and bureaucratic leaders. They have only paid lip service to its importance. When financial support and diligent follow-up was required so that govern ment departments may take it as a serious component of development, it was not obtained. This has been reflected in the fact that financial allocations were not suffi ciently provided to qualify IPA staff members or to get necessary training equipment or institutional buildings. Ministries and departments, particularly at the start of the IPA, were not cooperative, and it was felt that those who were available for training were officers who could be dispensed with, not officers who could develop and benefit from training. As a result, the IPA intake of trainees came from low or middle class categories, and it was not effective in reaching senior cadres of executives. ex-director of the IPA put it, As the I 332 1 One of the main obstacles to training senior administrators is that of prestige. Senior adminis trators in Sudan, especially those holding top posi tions such as undersecretaries and directors have high social standing. The idea of going through training or development programs is in most cases unacceptable and generally receive much direct and indirect resistance. The fact that most of the lecturers and instructors in public administration are younger than their students does not improve matters. In addition, senior administrators have difficulty in obtaining release from their work to participate in training programs. This hampers the organization of courses and is a matter of great concern.15 In addition to that, the IPA has been oscillating between the Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Planning, and eventually the Ministry of Public Service and Administra tive Reform. Under this lack of a stable organizational control, the IPA had suffered greatly in institutional stability and staff morale. Had the IPA found continuous political guidance and organizational stability its overall 1 impact on the civil service would have been much more felt than it is now. A direct result of lack of leadership continuity was that there had been a considerable loss of staff to other public agencies and corporations who offered 15 Quoted in UN Mission, A ~rogramme for Administra tive Reform (Khartoum, Ministry of Public Service and Administrative Reform, 1972), p. 18. 333 r etter terms of -service than the iPA, and-that there is now "evidence of a staff morale problem that needs innne diate correction before its efforts can be redirected. 1116 2. Like many institutes in developing countries, the emphasis of management courses at the start was on the inculcation of effective administrative mechanisms. These were the days where POSDCORB, span of control, unity of connnand, line and staff issues were concepts deemed impor tant per seas both scientific management and human rela tions schools of thought and practice were in vogue. Such an orientation in training did not afford the study of policymaking and administrative politics, and it simply did not fit the politico-administrative-economic realities of the developing countries--thus, the passive attitude of civil service toward administrative training. However, by the mid-1960s, as indigenous staff members assumed IPA leadership, there was a growing realization that the key to development is not so much the general improvement of the techniques of public administration for efficiency purposes as it is the fostering of indigenous economic and social growth through effective domestic policies, and that 16 Ibid., p. 17. 334 I training should not work in a vacuum but should rather work hand-in-hand and in complete harmony with the practical needs of development. That was reflected in the shift of in-service training courses to more operational substantive ones such as project management, development administra- tion, and economic and social problems. Closely concerned with in-service administration training is the Academy of Local Government, established by the Ministry of Local Government with a view to meet the training needs of Local Government staff--administra- 1 tive, accounting, and clerical. The academy is only four years old and is still seeking resources upon which to build itself. Its impact is not yet felt. The Management Development and Productivity Center is another institution conducting in-service management training with emphasis toward management of public corpora tions and the industrial private sector. It was estab lished in 1964 as a joint project between the Sudan govern ment and the ILO. The center is embarking on its second phase with a well-conceived program for developing the national counterparts so that its viability and effective ness could be ensured when the ILO experts phase out as UNDP assistance terminates in 1976. 335 J Middle Management Trairting There is a growing awareness that administrative !in-service training of the past should be adjusted; in 'other words, instrumental public administration should be I promoted in the face of progrannnatic demands into training for development. Training for development is one of the most important reformative activities for the future. It should include, rather emphasize, courses of instruction in the substantive areas of development. There is an imperative need to revise or replace "the principles of public administration" orientation made obsolete by the necessities of development. What may be good for developed countries may not be applicable or relevant to less developed nations. Siffin writes: The public administration training and education strategies exported to and usually continued in the institutes and institutions of developing countries seldom address the most important needs of develop mental administration .... The public administra tion institutes should not remain locked into a past that we have learned has limited relevance to the most important needs.17 17 s·ff. i in, "Two Decades of Public Administration," p. 26. 336 J I Administrative training gained new impetus irrnne- diately after the creation of the Ministry of Public Service and Administrative Reform in 1971. According to the Presidential Decree Number 6, determining the juris dictions and functions of different ministries, the ministry is charged, among others, with the responsibility for supervising administrative and vocational training institutions, and planning and implementing of national training schemes. Thus, the way was paved for an inte grated approach to training and manpower development. The ministry invited in 1972 a UN mission to devise a program for administrative reform which included specific recom mendations on training and staff development, viz., a) A National Training Act should be promulgated setting up a machinery for formulation national training programs, clarifying responsibilities of government units in training their staff, regulating budgetary appropria tions for training and the administration of in-service and intradepartmental training centers and programs. b) Under the proposed act, a National Training Council to be set up under the auspices of the ministry with representation of other focal ministries (particularly the Ministries of Education and Planning and the University ---- - -- - of Khartoum) . .The terms of reference of the proposed council should include: (i) the formulation of a national training program as an integral part of administrative reform plan; (ii) follow-up on implementation of the pro- !gram; (iii) devising necessary measures for consolidating I land upgrading existing training institutions; (iv) develop- I ing special national schemes for improved utilization of manpower; and (v) proposing measures for filling any insti tutional gaps. The mission has given the IPA a special attention in its report. The report asserts that a program for the revitalization, reorientation and reorganization of the IPA should be considered an integral part of the proposed administrative reform (already outlined in Chapter III). The work program of the IPA should be derivative of the administrative reform program and closely geared to its requirements. Indeed, the report called for the usage of the administrative reform projects as an instrument for training at the institute, thus linking the IPA programs with practical, problem-solving, result-oriented group-work I 1 of development at large. The report has emphasized the 1 already discussed notion that the training activities and contents should go hand-in-hand with development plans of 338 the day. Similarly, the methodology, techniques and approach used in training have to undergo rigorous change land improvement. The chalk and talk method heavily used today should give way to a combination of theoretical training with a practical approach based on case material, team work, project-oriented seminars. A participative approach to training with the trainees actually working instead of passively listening is the order of the day. The mission envisages a drastic change in direction and orientation of the training activities of the IPA. It has to be the right arm of the Ministry of Public Service and Administrative Reform insofar as preparing a reservoir of trained team leadership which should actually carry forward the reform activities assumed by the ministry. This, in the mission's view, should be the primary function of the IPA. The residual training role of it will necessi tate a most radical and fruitful change of direction; viz.,the IPA should not indulge in formal nor theoretical class work. Instead, it would be expected to produce training materials and specific curricula content needed to train ministry and state corporation staffs to implement corrective and improvement measures which are officially authorized by the ministry. In this context, the IPA is 339 ' I,' ---- --··- --- I seen as a center for the training of trainers who come from sectional or sectoral training centers whose agencies are directly affected by the anticipated reforms which the mission proposed. To successfully convert the IPA into a useful ! I fulcrum between project performance and successful instal and to ensure adequate progress and continuity in I 1 . ations I providing this linkage, there are several other policy changes which are necessary. The first of these is to shift the recruitment of specialists who are to provide training leadership in the direction of successful practi tioners or consultants of demonstrated ability in the functional and program fields. Continuing emphasis upon academic experience and credentiality would render the IPA susceptible to tendencies to return to canned courses of more detached academic concerns. The second of these is to take care of salary conditions, promotional possibili ties, and other motivational aspects of the staff members of the IPA in order to ensure cooperation and efficient utilization of its staff members. In the writer's view, such terms of service should not be less than those enjoyed by the academic staff of the University of Khartoum, since qualifications and nature of job are very similar. Only 340 ,...__ _______________________________ _ - through this can we check the continuing exodus of IPA staff members to agencies that offer better conditions and promotional opportunities. To sum up, the mission envisages the m.ain functions I of the IPA as follows: a) Direct participation in administrative refonn projects embarked upon the mother ministry, the Ministry of Public Service and Administrative Reform b) Limited training functions focused on specialized courses other institutions and training centers cannot provide c) Preparation of training material and developing trainees for other institut·ons, particularly training centers of the different government departments d) Major responsibility in pre-service training programs for newly recruited university graduates The institute will have to develop staff competence in special management fields of importance for its role in I the administrative reform program, as budgeting and accounting; qualitative methods--cost accounting; project analysis--project management; systems analysis--work pro cedure and work study; personnel management; training methodology and techniques; procurement and supply manage- 341 ---------------- -- ment; data processing; and office management and tech niques. In the writer's view, the proposals of the mission concerning the reorientation of the IPA's training activi ties are well taken. However, certain reservations are I posited. Firstly, the IPA reform proposals are far and very ambitious. To change the role of the I h. · reac 1.ng IPA into a training center for trainers of other centers is quite acceptable. But in the foreseeable future, this •is not possible simply because organizational training is I I not yet developed in the Sudan, as opposed to institutional I training in public administration. The IPA will have to continue as a training center for middle management and entrance grades of the civil service for a considerable period of time. The institutional training does have its own merits, however. In a country where there is little tradi tion in executive development, there is need to identify physically a place for such a venture and to inculcate the 1 feeling of importance that should be attached to it. Secondly, the institutional training brings togethe I • :senior and middle-level administrators from different government units to discuss and exchange ideas on subjects 1...-------------------------------- 342 1 ----- - - related to problems of economic and social development. Participants would be much more exposed to new ideas and thoughts and would learn much more, than in their own 1organizational environment, about problems of development. Thirdly, in a country where middle and top execu tives are in scarcity and are shiftable from one govern ment unit to another according to personnel needs, it will be expected that they would get a broader perspective of administrative problems, planning problems, and policy making problems in an institutional setting than in an organizational setting. This argument does not preclude the setting up of regional training centers or organizational centers to carry out such training functions in a country which is vast and far-flung such as the Sudan. Institutional train ing is here then to remain and the IPA has to shoulder both functions of training of trainers as well as training of middle-grade executives. Executive Development Programs It is now recognized in all developed countries that staff training in administration for high level responsibilities is vital if those who are charged with the 343 I func~ions of in the whole formulating high policy and advising ministers range of matters which fall within their 1 portfolios are to be prepared for their assignments. The proper assessment of all the factors of national and inter i national significance and also fo the advice of experts I I is important if the right policies are to be recommended for action. Development administration is now a major responsibility charged to all senior administrators in ministries, departments, and in the field. It has been recognized, therefore, that administrative staff training (alternatively called executive development programs) is essential in cases where people are likely to be appointed to top policy formulating and advising positions in govern- I I ment and business. Thus, institutions such as the Administrative College at Henley in Britain, the Federal Executive Institute in the United States, and their equivalents in Europe have been established. In developing countries the need is further accentuated by the fact that persons appointed to high level positions such as permanent secretaries of ministries and heads of major departments and public corporations would not have had the lengthy experience of officers similarly placed in developed countries. Moreover, they 344 ------------------------- assume office in situations of great political dynamism and ferment when ability to work in consonance with the situation, while maintaining a sound policy and balanced approach, is an asset of great value. In such circum stances, it is very important that such executives be given I the high level staff training required. In a few instances, ! such as in India, Pakistan, East Africa and Ghana, staff I colleges have now been established. One of the main 1 obstacles to providing such colleges is that governments 1 are so pressed for high level personnel and supply is so desperately short, that officers cannot be spared for courses lasting more t~1an a few weeks. In the Sudan, executive development programs are not yet fully established. With the exception of some partial effort on the part of the IPA manifested in an annual top management seminar of four days and intermittent annual conferences built around certain topical themes 1 dealing with economic and social development, top manage ment in the different sectors of national administration remains unexposed to any rigorous management development !programs. Existing institutions, such as the IPA, Univer lsity of Khartoum, and the Management and _ Productivity Center, do not seem to have mustered the capability and 345 the image to attract executive leaders to their programs and break through an ostensible barrier of resistance to training. In addition, top executives have difficulty in obtaining release from their work to participate in train ing programs. Hence, a visible institutional gap exists insofar as their development is concerned, and that was a matter of great concern to the Sudan government. A policy statement issued by the Central Committee of the Sudanese Socialist Union (the topmost political organ) bearing the title "On Building the Modern State," issued in 1971, envisaged a national training program for the public service made up of two components: (1) streng thening and consolidating pre-service and in-service training programs, and (2) the establishment of an Academy of Administrative Sciences to contribute to the development of higher administrative cadres in the Sudan and neighbor ing countries. Repeatedly, the Minister of Public Service and Administrative Reform has spelled out the concept of the contemplated academy as a multipurpose, multifaceted institution catering to the postexperience leadership training needs of the different national administrative sectors and including the private sector. 346J -- --- Certain factors have been mentioned to show the importance of the establishment of the academy. 1. Ever since the accelerated policy of the Sudanization of the administrative machinery, senior administrators have been left on their own to swim or sink. Reaching the top through accelerated and automatic promo tion to fill senior posts vacated by the British, middle grade executives had to learn management by doing it. 2. As the world has witnessed a drastic change and an awareness of the need to change administration and update it to cope with developmental needs, the Sudan civil service could not afford to be impervious to this universal trend. The climate of national reconciliation between the north and the south following the Addis Ababa Agreement which led to the creation of a regional government in the southern provinces of the Sudan was one of the direct reasons for serious thought that the academy would be the right place for the training of young administrators who assumed leadership posts in the south. 3. In the same vein, the academy could bring together politicians and senior administrators, the civil ians and the military and the top professionals, from different fields and sectors of the administration. It 347 was felt that a communication gap planners and sectoral ministries, exists between economicl and between professional groups hobbled by their own variety of tribalism, and that this gap could place a formidable roadblock in the way of 1 nation building. The academy sought to work toward bring ing more connnon understanding between different groups. I 4. In a real sense, the need for such an institu- tion in the Sudan setting goes beyond the recognition that development administration is getting to be more of a science than a craft; that effective leaders are mostly made not born; and that continuing education is the only insurance against professional obsolescence. Nor is the separation of management from technological skills main tainable any more. It is no longer possible to think of these two sides of government work as being inseparable compartments. The generalist managers need to be 'pro fessionalized'--i.e., to be equipped with professional management skills and a working knowledge of the sectors in which they operate, and how the interaction of politi cal, social, and cultural aspects of development operates. Similarly, the specialists need to be equipped to an appropriate degree for management. At a certain point in their career, they need to develop as professional 348 1 1 generalists rounded out for bigger roles, including the effective usage and managing of specialist teams working under them. The target population of the projected institution is operationally defined as the superscales and their equivalents in rank, status and role, in the public cor- porations, regional and local governments, the private sector and military officers. Political leaders who work as ministers and leading figures in the political party- the Sudanese Socialist Union--are to be encouraged to participate in the academy's programs. While there is no accurate census of this top management cadre, it is roughly estimated as constituting the top 5 percent of the work force of the organized modern sector of the Sudan economy, and this is no less than 10,000. As such, the establish ment of the academy should entail no duplication or overlap with the existing training institutions, nor should it in any way weaken them or cut down on their respective missions. The objective of the academy is to support the administrative reform and development program already launched by the Ministry of Public Service by providing (1) training and development of leaders and higher staff I _________ 349 1 in management fields of special importance, (2) management research activities needed in connection with administra- tive reform planning and programming, and (3) advisory services to the Minister of Public Service and Administra tive Reform on policies and main issues for the administra tive reform plan. The UN Mission which considered the Sudan govern ment proposal of the academy recommended that it be estab lished as soon as possible. The mission conceived of it as: An integrated development administration insti tution which through a variety of training offerings would be supporting a nation-wide administrative reform program, supplementing that 'action training' directly geared to job and organizational performance. The Academy would undertake an action research pro gram geared to identification of training needs of its target population, developing appropriate train ing material and suggesting changes that could re inforce the impact of its training and development effort. In the same vein, it should provide selec tive advisory services that could further the end of the program.18 The mission has reconnnended that its special fields of interest should include (a) development administration, 18 Sudan, Ministry of Public Service and Administra- tive Reform, The su·dane· s· e Aca· demy for Adminis tr· a ti ve Science (Khartoum, 1972), pp. 8-9. l _____ _ 350 r (b) ----- administrative reform, (c) public enterprise management modern management techniques, (d) financial management budgeting, (e) development planning-programming, I and land I 1 project analysis and management, (f) local government and I regional government and connnunity development, and (g) sectoral programs. Apart from the training effort, the academy should undertake pilot investigations into the relative effec tiveness of different leadership training techniques, planning techniques, and project analysis and management. It should also be a clearing house of information on the training needs and career pattern of top managers in different sectors. Likewise, its advisory services should be concerned with the present administrative reform plan and how it should be staged and implemented, and it should give priority to policy analysis, advisory services, improve ments on current laws and regulations, and other motiva tional aspects of government service. One important aspect is that such institutions have to be born strong and impressive from an early start. The academy would be viable and effective to the extent that it projects an image of competence, hard-headed 351 I realism, rnlevance, and prestige. This entails that its -------- -7 staffing pattern should reflect these requirements from the beginning. It cannot do with less than top trainers and consultants and experienced men in management training I 1 and research with an established reputation and demon- strated competence. Thus, a small core team made up of Sudanese and expatriates of high quality in training and research should constitute the resident teaching staff. It should be supplemented by an adequate fund for short term consultants to be brought in from abroad on the occasion of specific assignments. Furthermore, the staff core should be supplemented on a part-time basis by senior practitioners from the civil service and private sector who are of demonstrated competence in their fields of speciality and profession. These would be of particular importance in the sectoral training seminars conducted by the academy. It goes without saying that the academy, in order to attract some of the best talents in the labor market, has to have full financial support and should be permitted the highest possible degree of operational autonomy. Its internal organization should be designed around a pool of trainers--consultants, representing the whole spectrum of ---- - --- - ----- ---- disciplines and expertise, operating through three func- tional centers--training, research and consultancy on a project basis, with these projects staffed by inter- ldisciplinary, multifunctional teams drawn from the three I centers. The keenness and interest of the government in the academy has been demonstrated through the serious attempts of the Ministry of Public Service and Administrative Reform to seek international and bilateral funds for the construction of a residential academy. How successful these attempts would be is a matter of time. Although the academy was expected to start working in 1973, it was recognized that things do not go as fast as the government would wish. But until the academy becomes a reality, the executive development program of the Sudan senior public service cannot get a serious start. Personnel Utilization This chapter should not be concluded without some mention of the question of personnel utilizati.on which should be closely related to and follow human resource development. The capital, both human and financial, which the Sudan can put in its efforts toward increased exploitation of its human and natural resources is definitely limited in the short run. These serious resource bottlenecks I restrict the possible rate of expansion. Furthermore, in the long run, such capital for develop1nent can only be increased to the extent that earlier development efforts have been productively oriented and wisely managed to produce their maximum benefits. In general, this implies close attention to planning and the elimination of waste as much as possible. Manpower planning should not only restrict its domain to the supply of manpower needs but should see to it that such supply is effectively utilized. Thus, for example, an increase in the provision of medical doctors in relation to population should be accompanied by a com patible provision of auxiliary and supporting personnel and equipment such as nurses, health centers and medical equipments. There would be little point in exerting great efforts to achieve such a target of producing additional doctors without exerting similar effort to produce support- 1ing staff and physical facilities. This has often been the case in the Sudan where an emphasis has been put on producing specialist doctors in large numbers only to be I --- --------------------, employed in Khartoum due to the fact that rural hospitals do not possess the adequate number of qualified nurses nor the necessary medical equipment which facilitate the work of the specialists. As a result Khartoum hospitals are overstaffed and more people are bringing their sick from I remote areas, while doctors in rural hospitals are under- 1utilized. This is another way of saying that a compre- 1 lhensive planning of manpower development has to be kept I closely in line with the planning of the different compo nents of health development in the Sudan . Another feature of manpower utilization concerns those trained personnel who are sent abroad to specialize in certain scarce skills but, on their return, are posted in totally different areas of specialty, or alternatively to administrative jobs where promotional opportunities are much greater than in specialized areas. Evidently the solution for such anomalies lies in the proper planning of incentives, promotional prospects and other conditions of service which take into consideration the relative degree :of importance of different professions. Another implication of manpower utilization lies iin the general tendency in most of the Sudan public service I ,agencies to retain at the top the power to make decisions 355 which should be and could be made more competently at subordinate levels. This results from many reasons which discourage senior officials from delegating sufficient power to their subordinates. The implication of such a situation is the serious underemployment of middle managers who are young, enthusiastic and bright, and who conse quently get frustrated and discontented with the simple types of jobs they undertake at present which do not challenge or tap fully their intellectual and professional capacities. A heavy responsibility in relation to manpower utilization, therefore, rests on senior executives and administrators to ensure that the public service does not lose its youthful recruits through failure to employ their talents and potentials to the greatest extent. One notices a great emigration movement to neighboring countries like Libya, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and the Gulf Emirates by young trained Sudanese professionals who have left the public service for reasons of job dissatisfaction. This point requires some discussion at length. The brain drain has been cited by the Minister of Economics and Planning as a serious problem which threatens 356 the economic and social development of Sudan.19 It deprives the country of its qualified administrative and professional cadres, its youthful mid-career officials and its skilled manpower forces, and it has therefore to be dealt with as a part of an integrated approach to human resource policy, development and utilization. It is a I ,problem that pervades all strata of the public service as lwell as the private industrial sector of the economy. Its seriousness has been exemplified by a strange phenomenon reflected in the Sudan daily papers which carry every morning warnings from the different government departments and public corporations addressed to employees in name 1 that if they do not report to work within a specific I period of time, they will be subject to disciplinary action I in absentia and will lose their jobs. The bitter fact is that such employees have already left the country to seek employment in the neighboring countries. The Sudan Council of Ministers has discussed the brain drain problem in its session of August 15, 1976, and convened a ministerial 19 B"h . M" . f Mamoun i eiry, inister o ning, "Presentation of 1976/77 Annual :Legislative Council,"·-El· · s-ah·afa· · na• ily Economics and Plan Budget to the People' Newsp· a· p·er, Khartoum, 1 June 16, 1976, Issue no. 52064, p. i. L-______________________ 35J icommitt~~ to investigate the problem at length, and to d d b . 20 , I reconnnen ways an means to com at it. The brain drain is a universal phenomenon. It is recognized world-wide that the flow of talent from poor to rich countries is a symptom of a rigid world system in which economic, technological, social and political con- ditions are operating to widen the gap between the poor and the rich countries. It stems from the contrasting conditions which prevail in both the rich and the poor nations. The pulling forces of economic and technological prosperity push the high-talented manpower from where it is desperately needed to affluent countries where they contribute to further affluence and development. Qualified personnel from poor countries who study abroad are exposed to a psychological war in which they are directly or indirectly convinced that they are returning to fight a losing battle of development in their respective countries, ' and they might as well elect to stay in developed coun tries where they get more material reward for their work. Talents inside the poor countries are pushed out by a multiple of local and international forces. 20 sah·afa Daily N · ewsp·aper, Khartoum, Issue no. August 20, 1976, p. 1. 5330, I 358J ----- - The "brain drainers" represent critical skills badly needed in developing countries, namely engineers, physicians, scientists, and technicians of different kinds. The seriousness of the brain drain lies in the fact that developing countries are losing personnel in whom a great investment has been made. In addition to that, the poor countries are not benefiting from the earnings of "drainers." Even greater is the loss of their contribution to the development of their countries. Although the brain drain is partly attributed to the international conditions existing today, the unfavor able conditions in the developing countries may be blamed as well. Political instability is singled out as the major variable encouraging the brain drain. In the Sudan, it has been estimated that 30 percent of its high cadres of pro fessional and administrative personnel has been lost to Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Nigeria, and the United Nations in the period 1969-75 through political purging and coercion. It has been estimated that over 200 Sudanese qualified d 1 d k . h h . 1 f B .. Zl me ica actors war int e ospita so ritain. 21 These statistics have to be taken with reserva tion since they do not depend on scientific empirical research. But based on Sudanese soci~l behavior, where I 359 I J Economic factors are cited as the second important factor leading to the brain drain. This is particularly noticeable among the classes of skilled labor of techni cians, fitters, carpenters, machinists, machine operators and drivers who expect to gain four times their local salaries in neighboring Arab countries. The economic I factor has also a bearing on the fact that unemployment I I among school leavers and university graduates in liberal arts is constantly rising, and it became imperative for ; such young gene.i::ations to seek employment outside the Sudan While government may encourage such unemployable categories to migrate to neighboring countries, it has to seek ways and means of retraining those categories who are highly needed for the development of the country. Table 21 gives an idea of the dimensions of the brain drain problem, but it is by no means a dependable or reliable picture since it does not include statistics of the sizable number of professional Sudanese working in the United Kingdom. Remedies for the Brain· Drain Because of increasing interdependence among today's nations, the Sudan cannot isolate itself and seal off its , everybody knows the whereabouts of everybody else, the , estimates probably are not far from the truth. 360 vJ °' t--J ,-- V) s::: n:s ..c •r- s::: 0 0 '-:> -0 •r- >, Q) V) • S- >, V) s::: .µ o a, E s::: ,-- 4- -0 :::s C..Oc::( 0 E s... u LLJ a. ~ Saudia Arabia 41 Libya 5 Kuwait 6 United Emarates States 25 Bahrin 1 Qatar 5 Yemen 1 Jordan • • • Lebanon • • • Iraq • • • Syria • • • Nigeria Somalie Central Africa United States TABLE 21 SUDANESE EMPLOYED OUTSIDE THE SUDAN IN 1971 s::: •r- ~ I ~ .µ • V) s::: -0 -0 s::: Q) ,-- n:s Q) Q) •r- 4- ~ n:s .µ -0 ,-- V) >, E o ,-- u s::: Q) S- ,-- S- V) ~ 0 -0 S- n:s •r- :::s ,-- :::s •r- :::s S- ,-- S- ,-- n:s 0.. s::: S- 0 V) ,-- 0 ~o Q) n:s n:s c....c..c O a, u..c •r- ..c V) ..c .c: .µ E E :::s :::s •r- ,-- u o ~ n:s s::: n:s .µ 0 Q) LLJ (/') V) V) u c::( '-:> V) -l :::J-l 0 t- 0:::: 174 1,399 52 1,666 30 4,552 964 5,551 (As in 1974} 48 235 4 293 1 95 13 134 (As in 1974) • • • 153 • • • 154 1 70 7 83 77 C ••• • • • 78 • • • 29 • • • 29 2 27 ••• 29 • • • 14 • • • 14 (As in 1970) • • • 13 (As in 1970) 40 40 (As in 1970) 77 77 (As in 1970) 39 39 (As in 1970) 20 20 (As in 1970) TABLE 21 (Continued) r- C: co C: •,- C: .,.. "' I ca ~ 0 • • V, C: -0 -0 .,.. C: -0 C: QJ r- co QJ >, QJ V, .,.. QJ •,- <+- ... co~ -0 r- V, ~ >, v, E >, E o r- u c:: QJ r- V, ~ ~ 0 QJ-0 V, 0 -0 ~ CO •,- :::::, v, r- ~ .,.. ~ ~ r- ~ C: r- <+- ex: ..0 r- CO 0. C: ~ 0 ..0 r- 0 ~o QJ co co :::::, 0. 0 0 0...0..00QJUO •,- ..0 V, ..0 .c ~ E 0 E ~ ca r-:, E :::::, :::::, •,- r- u r-:, ~ co C: co ~ 0 QJ u LLJ 0.. LLJ V) V) V, u ex: V) _J ::::, _J 0 .,_ a: Uganda 8 8 (As in 1970) Chad 506 506 (As in 1970) International Organization 22 22 (As in 1970) Source: M. 0. Beshir, "Educational Policy and Employment Problems in the Sudan," p. 57 Note: The table does not include statistics of a considerable number of Sudanese employed in the United Kingdom. borders from international influences. As such there are no easy solutions for the problem. Some countries, such as I Egypt, tried the restrictive measures of preventing the !emigration of professionals, but the policies failed and 1were eventually abolished. ~he Sudan laws stipulate that I I each official who has been sent abroad for further training and education must return and work for four times the period he spent outside. Failure to do so will result in fines equivalent to the costs incurred in educating the official. But the application of such a clause was weak and it eventually became a dead letter. In the face of failure of restrictive measures, nothing less than a long-range preventive policy is called for. This policy should be an integral part of the admin istrative reform project of the country, and it is incum bent on the Ministry of Public Service and Administrative Reform to initiate it. Remedies of the situation can be both long-term and short-term. They are in essence what the administra tive reform strategy is all about. The long-term policy can be seen in the following recommendations. 1. That a thorough and comprehensive reform should take place in the educational system of the country so that 363 its outcome is compatible with the developmental needs of the country. By doing so the currently increasing numbers of unemployable school leavers would be cut down to a !minimum. The formal educational process must be supple- I 1 mented by training programs that will enhance job readi- ness. 2. That the educational philosophy should incul cate in students the virtues of nationhood and love and sacrifice for one's home and country at large, so that young generations will grow to stay at home and work with self-denial to develop their countrymen. 3. That the government should strive hard to effect economic growth so that greater emp_ loyment oppor tunities are available than at present. The government should also allow the private industrial sector to grow and prosper on its own without much control or interference. Short-term strategic policies should work to effect the following conditions. 1. Government political leadership should refrain from indiscriminate purging of professionals and adminis ltrators who would love to stay at home to serve their !people and nation. Political purging has led to the loss of very important categories of men of demonstrated 364 1 I - - -- - abilities and competence. The sad fact is that the government has recognized of late the mistake of purging, and has tried to call back some of those men from abroad. 1 The majority of them have chosen to stay where they are. 2. The government has to adopt personnel rules 1 and regulations which motivate young generations in the middle-management of the civil service to put to -work their utmost ability and professional knowledge. This can be ,effected through a guided policy of delegation which has been discussed earlier. 3. The government has to accept the brain drain as a fact of life, and accordingly should work to regulate it. At present, personnel who elect to leave the country on their own are crossed off the roster of the civil service, thus losing their rights in pensionable service and other facilities. This is a severe and cruel punish ment in the writer's view. Rather than resorting to this, it is reconnnended that any government official who migrates for a temporary period of time should be granted the per mission to do so on condition that he comes back to his post after the termination of the leave of absence. By so doing, the government will leave the door open for the qualified talents to make a safe return to their work after 365 I -------- - the temporary absence. Since they are not going to lose their continuity in service, or be penalized for their absence, they will be tempted to come back after a while land contribute their newly gained experience to the devel opment process of their country. This policy is particu larly suitable for Sudanese migrants because experience has shown that, due to the intricate and very close social ties of the Sudanese community, migrants like to return to their home country at a certain point in their life. ,The social ties with the home country, the extended family I and the like tend to cause migrants to return. As a result, the Sudanese are different from other nationals who migrate and settle down in the recipient countries for the rest of their lives. 4. The government should work to ensure that personnel utilization policy is strictly obeyed. This requires that the right person be posted in the right job. So often professionals choose to go into administrative jobs because they pay more. A personnel policy endowed with appropriate incentives for professionals to stay where 1 they are most needed may work to solve problems of person nel utilization. 5. Budgetary constraints impinge on manpower 366 - ----- development programs and manpower utilization too. The Sudan, like so many African countries, is in the position I of being unable to employ all of the highly qualified . !manpower, not because they are not needed, but because there is no money to pay them. Now, given the increasing I occurrence of budgetary constraints on policies of public employment, there should be a growing pressure to ensure that new personnel budget expenditures are directly pro ductive or at least conducive to the yielding of additional streams of income whicl will provide a surplus for further , investment. Human resource development efforts and public employment creation schemes must in future have significant multiplying effects leading directly to effective produc tive employment that generates increased economic and social output, savings, investment, and further employment. To say it in dirrerent terms, the creation of additional unnecessary and unproductive white-collar jobs will lead to progressive underemployment, consumption, and less investment on productive manpower and development. 367 EPILOGUE In the preceding chapters, an attempt has been made 1 I to reveal the Sudanese experience in administrative reform. Reference has been made to the Sudan history and culture and to the sociopolitical environment in order to place the reform in its proper perspective and provide for a clear understanding of its proportion and significance, as well as its limitations and shortcomings. This study delineated a prescribed future of administrative reform and suggested instrumental theories concerning the strategies that the government can take to plan and effect administrative change. The title of the study, "Administrative Reform: A Human Resource Perspective," defines its scope and limita tions. Administrative reform is defined in the study as a major directed action to effect deliberate change which involves innovations that improve on the practice of development administration with the purpose of upgrading efficiency and effectiveness. Developing countries often plan and allocate 368 1 material resources and funds for economic and social development, but tend to overlook the human side of the enterprise or alternatively take administrative aspects needed in the process of development for granted. Politi cians, economists, and sociologists are inclined to believe that once economic and social programs are planned and I :financial resources allocated, they will somehow be imple- 1 1mented. Most short- and long-term development plans, therefore, lose sight of the administrative variable--the human resource planning, training and motivating--and as a I result, plans fail or at best do not wdrk on schedule. The study has attempted to point out the importance of human resource planning and procurement so that development projects can be provided with the appropriate skills and administrative capabilities. Chapter IV of the study treated this aspect and presented concrete proposals con- 1cerning the creation of national awareness for the human resource forecast and planning. The creation of appropriat 1 manpower planning institutions, and the deliberate revision I ' of the country's educational system at the levels of both 1 general and higher education have also been proposed so that our schools and universities can produce personnel .. who possess skills commensurate with development needs. 369 -·------------------- ---------------- -------------------- I In Chapter V, the study discussed aspects of human resource development and placed emphasis on two issues: pre-entry and in-service training of personnel, and motiva tion of staff so that they may elect to stay at home to serve the needs of development. The question of motivation is particularly important at this juncture of Sudan's development when the country is facing a soaring brain drain problem. The organizational location of the agency which is , charged with the responsibility for planning and executing administrative reform, and the legal base from which it is to operate also call for particular attention. It is •significant to note that none of the several unsuccessful 1 attempts at reform that preceded the creation of the Ministry of Public Service and Administrative Reform was led by a specific organization or vested with any form of !legal authority. In each case the attempt was sponsored by a particular prime minister who assigned to an individ ual or to a small commission the task of developing a reform program. The authority behind the operation was 1 therefore of a personal nature and insufficient to carry I , those proposals. Also lacking organizational identity and supporting staff, they were not in a position to contend L ____ _ 370 !with shifting political pressures and instability in I government. As a result, the past administrative reform experience was not a very bright one. It was not until the ministry was created in 1971 that any progress in reform was felt. This was due to the political support I that the ministry had and to the relative stability of government which enabled the ministry to plan and control the execution of reform. The ministry is still in its formative stage and it is working hard to build an efficient team of reformers and to cultivate in other government agencies the right atmosphere to recognize the need for this reform. So far, the ministry's attempts, by neces sity, were limited to the area of micro reform, and are mainly concentrated on revision of outmoded personnel laws, and the building of administrative service units in major government departments. This study has outlined a clear future of action for the ministry in the area of macro reforms which should tackle major areas of development that will have multiple effects on other development areas. I Judging from the experience of other countries in administrative reform, it is safe to assert that reform is contextual, subjective, and value laden. Such character istics made it difficult so far to conceptualize reform in L------------------------------ 371 I -- ----- a basic theory of any universal applicability. However, certain generalizations, formulated on the basis of obser vations of case studies of reform had sufficient agreement in the academia to warrant them acceptability and adoption. These generalizations concern the independent variables that influence the path of reform, and strategies that help achieve it. In order to be able to shoulder its responsibility for macro administrative reform, the Sudan has to ponder on ' strategies of reform. Strategies have been defined as master policies to establish the framework of guidelines and the boundaries of policy space within which operational and detailed policies are to be established and decisions are to be made. Strategies for administrative reform must therefore deal with issues such as overall goals of administrative reform, the boundaries of administrative reform, preferences in respect to time, risk acceptability, choice between more incremental or more innovative and comprehensive reform and the range of feasible reform instruments. An extensive discussion of reform strategies was the concern of Chapter II. It is here that a prefer ence was given to what the writer termed "normative strategy" of reform which is characterized by normative- 372 1 r~e ~ s. incrementalism, and political and societal partici pation. The chapter dealt equally with the political and I environmental controlling variables of administrative reform in developing countries, and judging from the success or failure of such case studies, the chapter con eluded with a theoretical conceptualization that political support, time and economy, administrative capability and societal participation are the crucial determinants of the success or failure of any administrative reform and that the appropriate strategy of reform is an outcome of such variables. A matrix to explain the interaction of such variables was provided in Chapter II. The political support has been singled out as the most important among other variables, and that continuous political support of reform can only be achieved in a time of relative political stability. This tends to be a difficult balance in the present turbulent time in which all developing countries are living. Chapter III is entitled "The Political Economy of Sudan." Its first part is mainly a factual statement meant to introduce the Sudan to the reader, while its second part is a review of reform literature in the country and an analytical survey of past reform attempts, their lphil;soPhy and methodology, and an account of the factors that led to reform failures. It is a background chapter which is important in paving the way for the following chapters. i In conclusion, this study is meant to highlight the importance of administrative reform in general, and in human resources in particular. It is a sincere endeavor to help the country move steadily in the difficult path of development and prosperity. 374 BIBLIOGRAPHY 375 J BIBLIOGRAPHY Books Adedeji, Adebayo. "Formulating Administrative Reform Strategies in Africa." In UN, · Interregional Seminar on Majo• r Administrative Re·forms in Develop- I ing Countr·ies. Vol. II. New York, 1973. Adu, Amighadai L. New York: The Civil Service in New African States. Praeger, 1965. Ahmed, G. 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Edited by Kenneth Rothwell. Lexington, Mass.: D. C. Heath, 1972. 378 I _j Lester, Richard A. Manpower Planning in a Free Society. Princeton: University Press, 1966. Lynton, Rolf P., and Pareak, Udai. Training for Develop ment. Homewood, Ill.: Dorsey Press, 1967. Martin, Percy E. The Sudan in Evolution. London: Constable & Co., 1921. Mukarji, N. K. "Formulation of Administrative Reform Strategies." In UN, Interregional Seminar on Major Administrative· Reforms in Developing Countries. Vol. II. New York, 1973. Nigro, Felix A. Public Per·sonnel Administration. New York: Henry Holt Co., 1958. ---- , and Nigro, Lloyd G. Modern Public Administra- tion. New York: Harper & Row, 1973. Odiorne, George S. Training by Objectives. London: Collier-Macmillan, Ltd., 1970. Patten, Thomas H., Jr. Manpower Planning and the Develop ment of Human Resources. New York: Wiley-Inter science, a Division of John Wiley & Sons, 1971. Pigors, Paul; Myers, Charles A.; and Malm, F. T. Management of Human Resources: Readings in Personnel Administration. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1973. Riggs, Fred W. Administration in Developing Countries. • ---- The Theory of Prismatic Society. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1964. Administrative Reform and Political Responsive ness, A Theory of Dynamic Balancing. Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1970. "The Myth of Alternatives: Underlying Assump tions About Adu1inistrative Development." In Studies in International Development and Econom ics. Edited by Kenneth Rothwell. Lexington, Mass.: D. C. Heath, 1972. 379 Siegel, Gilbert B., ed. Human Resource Management in Public Organizations: A Systems Approach. Los Angeles: University Publishers, 1973. Stahl, 0. Glenn. Public Personnel Administration. New York: Harper & Row, 1971. • The Personnel Job of Government Managers . Chicago: Public Personnel Association, 1971. Tickner, Fred. Training in Modern Society. New York: State University of New York at Albany, Graduate School of Public Affairs, 1966. Articles Abdel Rahim, Madhathir. "Trends in the University Teaching and Research in Public Administration in Sudan." Sudan Journal of Administration and Development 6 (1970) :32-42. Aguda, Oluwadare. "The State and the Economy in the Sudan: • From a Political Scientist Point of View." Journal of Developing Areas, no. (April 1973), pp. 431-48. "The Sudan Civil Service, 1964-1971." Quarterly Journal of Administration, no. 6 (April 1972), pp. 333-47. Backoff, Robert. "Operationalizing Administrative Reform for Improved Governmental Performance." Adminis tration and Society 6, no. 1 (1974):90-94. Caiden, Gerald E. "Administrative Reform." International Review of Administrative Sciences 24, no. 4 (1968) i 347. • "Development Administration and Administrative Reform." International Social Science Journal 21, no. 1 (1969):10. 3801 - - - - -------, Caiden, Gerald E. "Development, Administrative Capacity and Administrative Reform." International Review of Admirtis·trative Sciences 39, no. 4 (1973): 327. Campbell, Percia. "United Nations Report: Development and Utilization of Human Resources." Inter national Dev~lopment Re~iew 10, no. 4 (1968) :35. Currie, Sir James. "The Educational Experiment in the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, 1900-1933." Journal of the I African Society 34 (London, 1935):49. Dror, Yehezkel. "Strategies for Administrative Reform." Development and Change 2, no. 2 (1970-71):19-35. Groves, Roderick T. "Administrative Reform and the Politics of Reform: The Case of Venezuela." Public Administration Review 27 (December 1967): 436-45. Heady, Ferrel. "Personnel Administration in the Middle East." Public Personnel Review 20, no. 1 (January 1959):30-35. Holt, P. M. "Sudanese Nationalism and Self-Determination." Middle East Journal 10, no. 4 (1956) :369. ILO. International Labor Review 104, no. 3 (September 1971):entire issue. Lee, Hahn-Been. "An Application of Innovation Theory to the Strategy of Administrative Reform in Develop ing Countries." Policy Sciences 1, no. 2 (1970): 178-84. Nieves, Mario M. "Asian Experiences in Administrative Reform." Philippine Journal of Public Adminis tration 15, no. 1 (1971):96. Panush, Sid. "Positive Recruitment Pays." Public Per sonnel Review 19, no. 1 (January 1958) :10-16. Robertson, Sir James. "Some Problems on the Path to Self-Government." Public Administration 39 (Winter 1961):329-21. 381 Seers, Dudley. "The Meaning of Development." Inter nation· a1 · nev· elopment Review, December 1969, pp. 2-6. Siffin, William .J. "Two Decades of Public Administration." SICA Occasional Papers (American Society for Public Administration), October 1974, n.p. Thompson, Victor A. "Administrative Objectives for Development Administration." American Sicence Quarterly 9, no. 1 (1969) :91-108. Wu, Chi Yuen. "Public Administration for National Development." International Social Science Journal 21, no. 1 (1969):124. Government Documents Angus, Norman C., and Neihoff, Richard 0. Reconnaissance Survey and Report Concerning an Institute of Public Administration for the Sudan . New York: United Nations, 1960. British Information Service. The Sudan 1899-1953. London: Trade Union, 1953. Great Britain. Foreign Office. Anglo-Egyptian Sudan. London: H. M. Stationery Office, 1920. • Foreign Office. Self-Determination in the Sudan. London: H. M. Stationery Office, 1956. Nelson, Harold D. et al. Area Handbook of the Democratic Republic of Sud~. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1973. Sahafa Daily Newspaper. Issue No. 5264. Khartoum, June 16, 1976. Sudan. Public Service Law. Khartoum, 1973. 382 I Sudan. Connnission for Reorganization of the Sudan Civil Service. Report of the Commission for· Reorgani zation of the Sudan Civil Service Vol. I. • • • • • • • (in Arabic) Khartoum, 1968. Department of Labor. "Background to the Reques1i of the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Sudan to the ILO for a Comprehensive Employ ment Strategy Mission within the Framework of the World Employment Program." Khartoum, December 1971. (Mimeo) Institute of Public Administration. Adminis trative Improvement for Development in the Sudan. Proceedings of the Fifth Round Table Conference, January 1963, Khartoum, 1963. Institute of Public Administration. The Civil Service in a Changing Society. Proceedings of the Seventh Round Table Conference, February 1966, 1 Khartoum, 1966. Institute of Public Administration. Perspective of Public Administration in the Sudan. Proceed ings of the Fourth Round Table Conference, March 1962, Khartoum, 1962. Institute of Public Administration. Public Administration and Economic Development. Proceedings of the Third Round Table Conference, March 1961, Khartoum, 1961. Institute of Public Administration. Sudan Journal of Administration and Development. Vols. 1-8 (1965-73):entire issue. Institute of Public Administration. Training for Public Service in the Sudan. Proceedings of the Sixth Round Table Conference, March 19f4, Khartoum, 1964. Ministry of Education. Educational Statistics, Academic Year 1966-67. Khartoum, 1967. L __ 383 ' ::_J Sudan. Ministry of Education. Educational s·tatistics, Khartoum, 1968. • • • • • • • • Ac·ademic Year· 1967-68. Ministry of Education. Educational Statistics, Academic Year 1968-69. Khartoum, 1969. Ministry of Finance and Economics. Review of the Economy: A Su2plement to the 1967-68 Budget. Khartoum, 1967. Ministry of Finance and Economics. Sudanese Economist, no. 126, December 1968. Ministry of Information and the Gezira Board . The Gezira Board: What It is and How It Works, 1966-67. Khartoum, Ministry of Information, 1967. Ministry of Planning . Economic Survey, 1969. Khartoum, 1970. Ministry of Public Service and Administrative Reform. Personnel: Administrative and Related Reforms. Report of an International Collllllission, Khartoum, December 1973. Ministry of Public Reform. A Progralllllle A Report of a United 1972. Service and Administrative for Administrative Reform. Nations Mission, Khartoum, Ministry of Public Service and Administrative Reform. The Sudanese Academy for Administrative Science. Khartoum, 1972. Sudan Almanac. Khartoum, Government Printing Press, 1961. United Nations. A Handbo· ok of Public Administration. • New York: UN Seles No . 61-11-H-2, 1961. Bureau of Economic Affairs. Structure and Growth of Selected African Economics. New York: Sales No. 58-11-C.4., 1958. 384 United Nations. Department of Economic and So~ial Affairs. Population Growth and Manpower • in ·the Sudan. Population Studies no. 37. New York, Sales no. 64-13-5, 1964. ____ . Handbook of Training in ~he Pub.lie Service. New York: UN Publication, 1968. . Pub1ic Administration in the s· econd United ---- Nations Development Dec~de. Report of the Second Meeting of Experts, 16-26 January 1971, Public Administration Division, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, New York: United Nations, 1971. ST/TA0/7/57 . . Recruitment and Selection in the Public Service ---- of Developing Countries. New York: UN Publica- tion no. ST/TAO/M/42, 1969 . ---- . Report of the Eastern African. Part 8. Cooperation in Human Resources. New York: UN, 1970. UNESCO. Statistical Year Book, 1967 and 1968. Paris: UN, 1967-1968 . ---- . Yearbook of National Accounts Statistics, 1967. New York: UN Publication, Sales No. E-69-17.6. United States. AID. Study Committee on Manpower Needs and Educational Capabilities in Africa. Sudan: Study of Manpower Needs, Educational Capabilities and Overseas Study. Report no. 4 (July 30, 1965). Unpublished Material Abusin, Ahmed I. "The Development of Civil Service in the Republic of Sudan." MPA thesis, New York Univer sity, 1962. 385 ------ Al-Beshir, Mutasim. "Administration and Development: A Study of the Role of Civil Service in the Sudan." Ph.D dissertation, UCLA, Los Angeles, 1967. Beshir, M. 0. "Educational Policy and Employmeni" .Problems in the Sudan." Paper presented in the Inter African Seminar on Managing Unemployment in Africs, Khartoum, December 1974. Mubarak, Khogali. "Administrative Problems Confronting Manpower Planners." Paper presented at the Thirteenth Inter-African Public Administrative Seminar on Managing Unemployment in Africa, Khartoum, December 1974. Mustafa, Mohamed El Murtada. "Manpower and Employment Problems in the Sudan." Paper presented at the International Study Course on Active Labor Policy Development, International Institute of Labor Studies, Geneva, March 1972. 386 APPENDIXES 387 APPENDIX A 1. A Sample of the Questionnaire Administered to Evaluate the Success of the L.G. Act of 1971 Respond to each question by encircling on this sheet the number that best expresses your opinion. 1. Politician's Satisfaction a) Did the law assist in achieving better services to citizens? b) Did the law assist in promoting new political awareness and outlooks in the citizens? c) Did the law engender public parti cipation and cooperation with the government? d) Did it have an impact on employees' performance and productivity? e) Compared to the past L.G. Act, how do you rate it? f) Are you satisfied with the overall achievements of the law? 2. Deliverers' Satisfaction a) i. How far have your administrative and professional skills been tapped under the new L.G. Act? ii. How far have they been tapped under the past L.G. law? :,.. ;.) H HO 0 ~~ 0 ~ 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 .. 1 2 H "Cl >-."Cl •r-l 0 $-1 0 ~ 0 Q) 0 ~ c., ::> c., 3 4 5 3 4 5 3 4 5 2 4 5 3 4 5 3 4 5 - 3 4 5 3 4 5 388 b) i. · How far did the bureaucracy participate in the planning process of the new L.G . Act? ii. How do you rate your participation in the changes that took place in the past law? c) i. How do you rate your job satisfaction under the present L.G. Act? ii. How do you rate your job satisfaction under t he past law? d) i. What do you think of the promotional system in local go ernment under this Act? ii. What do you think of t he promotional system under the past law? e) i. How do you rate your satisfaction with local councils losing their autonomy and being agents to the Cotmnissioner? ii. How do you rate your satisfaction with the autonomy given to local councils under the past L.G. Act? f) i. How far is delivery of local services been improved under the new Act? ii. How far ~as the delivery of service satisfactory uuder the past law? >-H H H 0 0 Q) 0 0 ::>~ ~ 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 · 2 1 2 1 2 H "O >-,-O -~ 0 HO Cl:! 1 8 Q) 0 µ.,. ::> c., 3 4 5 3 4 5 3 4 5 3 4 5 3 4 5 3 4 5 3 4 5 3 4 5 3 4 5 3 4 5 389 3. Recipients' Satisfaction a) i. What is the degree of your satisfaction with delivery of service under the new L.G. Act? ii. What is the degree of your satisfaction with service delivery under the past law? b) i. How far was public involvement in the planning process that preceded the passing of the law? ii. How far was public involvement in the changes that took place in the past L.G. Act? c) i. How do you feel about the performance of local employees under tqe new Act? ii. How do you feel about their performance under the past law? d) i. Is the increase in the tax the public pays justified by the services rendered under the new Act? ii. Was the level of tax the public paid justified by the local services rendered under the past Act? ' >, )..I )..I )..I 0 0 (1) 0 0 > P-4 P-4 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 )..I "O >,-o .... 0 )..I 0 co 0 Cl) 0 µ,. c., > c., ' 3 I 4 5 I I 3 4 5 3 4 5 3 4 5 3 4 5 3 4 5 3 4 5 3 4 5 I 390 2. Respond to each question by encircling on this sheet the number that best expresses your opinion. 1. Politicians' Satisfaction a) Did the law assist in achieving better services to citizens? b) Did it have an i mpact on employees' performance and productivity? c) Did the public participate satis factorily in the planning process of the law? d) Did the bureaucracy participate satisfactorily in the planning process? e) Did the law have impact on the employees' job satisfaction? £) Did women's performance improve under the law which granted the same denied r'ghts in the past? 2. Deliverers' Satisfaction a) How fa.r did the bureaucracy parti cipate in the planning process of the law? b) How do you rate your job satisfaction under the present law? c) How do you rate the promotion system under this law as compared to promotion under the L.G. Act? >-, H H H 0 0 (1) 0 0 :>P-t P-t 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 H -0 ::,...-o '1"'1 0 HO co 0 (1) 0 i:z.. c., :>c., 3 4 5 3 4 5 3 4 5 3 4 5 3 4 5 3 4 5 3 4 5 3 4 5 3 4 5 d) How do you think of the impact of this law over the employees' performance and productivity? e) To what degree do you think the law was needed by the public servants? 3. Recepients' Satisfaction a) How far was the public involvement in the planning process that preceded the enactment of the law? b) How far do you feel the law affected the public service performance and productivity? c) How far do you feel an improvement in the efficiency of the public service under the new law? d) What is the overall evaluation, by the public, of the Public Service Law? >, H H 0 Q) 0 >~ 1 1 1 1 1 1 . H H 0 "M 0 C'd ~ ~ 2 3 2 3 2 3 2 3 2 3 2 3 '"O >,'"O 0 HO 0 Q) 0 c., > c., 4 5 4 5 4 5 4 15 I I i I I 4 : s I i 4 15 I I I I I I I I 392 APPENDIX B AN AGENDA FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM: A SUMMARY The Agenda for Administrative Reform 1 over the two to three years to come would include the following programs and projects. A. An Organization Development Programme for the Ministry of Public Service and Administrative Reform A-1. Building up the capabilities of the New Direc torates A-2. Reorientation of the established department A-3. Upgrading the quality of progessional staff of different categories through study tours, senior staff, and training and development programmes professionals A-4. Building the top-team of the ministry and developing integrated work programmes A-5. Effecting certain organizational changes: re defining jurisdictions of the different units, establishing a special machinery for personnel 1 sudan, Ministry of Public Service and Administra _l tive Reform, A Programme for Administrative Reform (Report of a UN Missfon, Khartoum, 1972). 393 management of the public sector corporations, reconstituting the Board of IPA, establishing a vocational training board, modernizing the records and filing systems of the Civil Service Department and the Pension Administration A-6. Streamlining relationships with the Treasury, Planning, Education, Local Governments and other Sectoral Ministries B. Effecting the Personnel Management Reforms B-1. Undertaking a comprehensive classification and pay study. B-2. Training a network of personnel professionals for the installation of a new classification and .pay system B-3. Coaching and backstopping the installation work and facilitating the transition to an operational phase B-4. Extending decentralization of personnel management functions, along the lines of the experiment undertaken in the Ministry of Education, to selected ministries, corporations, and local government units B-5. Conversion of central personnel files in the Departments of Civil Service a.nd Pension to a card system, laying a basic foundation for future EDP application B-6. Updating and codification of personnel rules, regulations and circulars B-7. Improvement of budget format and practices and streamlining w ·ork relations between the ministry and the treasury B-8. Upgrading the quality of personnel officers within the ministry and other agencies and providing a series of development programmes in modern tech niques of personnel management 394 B-9. Helping the local government ministry ~mprove 7 personnel practices in line with the new organi zational setting in this sector B-10. Helping public sector corporations resolve pending personnel problems and bring to a closure the present transitional phase B-11. Helping the ministry install a small but equipped machinery for personnel management in the public sector corporations B-12. Helping the Department of Labour in the forma tion of a comprehensive labour standards enforcement service, restructuring its field network, improving labour market and employment accounting and accelerating the expansion of vocational training C. Training and Development Progrannnes C-1. Establishment of the Academy (Staff College) of Top Management as a joint project between the ministry and the University of Khartoum, with administrative affiliation with the minister. The academy should become fully operational by the end of the Administrative Reform Progrannne period. In the interim period the academy should amount to a series of AR-oriented two week residential programme addressed to under secretaries and their equivalent in the other sectors, and closely involving the ministers C-2. The academy should, in this interim period, provide the expertise needed by the ministry to carry out the proposed reforms in training and development programmes outlined in section C-XI above, namely: --The establishment of a National Training Council under a new National Training Act 395 --The development of a national scheme for the effective absorption of university graduates into public service --The development of a national scheme for the redeployment of manpower in the public service --Introducing the proposed methodology and procedures for formulating the national training plan --Training trainers and training supervisors and developing a national network of trainers --Help consolidate, strengthen, reorient and develop the staff capabilities of existing training institutions in public administration and management development --Pooling the resources needed to mount a series of advanced training in modern management techniques for the network of management services officers required for the AR programmes C-3. The orga~ization of vocational training on a national scale, including the setting up of a Vocational Training Board and developing a progrannne for the accelerated training of voca tional trainers needed to feed the decentralized vocational training units C-4. Developing a system for financing national training that ensures sharing the ~osts of training by its users on a sustained basis including budgeting arrangements for this purpose D. Programming Administrative Reform and Developing Supporting Services D-1. Introducing the planning procedures proposed in section C-XII above (paragraphs 116-18) D-2. Developing the network of management services units and training their staffs (paragraphs 119- 21) D-3. Developing a central pool of management specialists and AR-programming officers within 396 the ministry under the AR directorate (paragraphs 112-25) D-4. Reviewing the proposed bill of Administrative Control and Inspection and the formation of a Management Audit Bureau, reporting directly to the Minister, well-staffed with management auditors trained in modern management auditing techniques 397

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Creator Abusin, Ahmed Ibrahim (author)

Core Title Administrative reform in Sudan: A human resource perspective

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School School of Public Administration

Degree Doctor of Philosophy

Degree Program Public Administration

Degree Conferral Date 1977

Publication Date 01/13/1977

Defense Date 01/13/1977

Publisher University of Southern California (original), University of Southern California. Libraries (digital)

Tag Civil service -- Sudan,OAI-PMH Harvest,Sudan -- Politics and government

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Language English

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