University of Southern California Dissertations and Theses

The Muslim World and its efforts in Pan-Islamism

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The Muslim World and its efforts in Pan-Islamism

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Content THE MUSLIM WORLD AND ITS EFFORTS IN PAN-ISLAMISM by Abdulla Mohamed Sindi A Dissertation Presented to the FACULTY OF THE GRADUATE SCHOOL UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY (International Relations) June 1978 Copyright Abdulla Mohamed ') 1..?" Ji 1978 UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA THE GRADUATE SCHOOL UNIVERSITY PARK LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA 90007 This dissertation, written by under the direction of h"f§ ___ _ Dissertation Com- mittee, and ai>Pro'ved by all £ts members, has beell presented to a1Zd accepted by The Graduate School, in partial fulfillment of requirenients of the degree of DOCTOR OF HILOSOPHY Dean -: Ir, 7,0 • ---- - j 1 __ ___ c •. •• • • • • •• • • - - DEDICATION .rhis dissertation is dedicated to the three most important persons in my life whom I have b ~~n blessed to have. First, to my mother, Sa'deyya Shaf'ei, who has always believed in me and without whose love my life would have been unbearable. Second, to my brother Fouad, who at a young age took care of me and the rest of the family when our father died, who opened the way for me to pursue my education, and who had the original idea for this dissertation. To him, I am deeply indebted. Third, to my wife, Maria, whose love, devotion, patience, and under standing have been exceptional. ii PREFACE The writing of this dissertation was a ver y diffi cult task, not only because of the lack of materials on Pan-Islamism but also because of the lack of cooperation from the World Muslim Congress (WMC) and the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC). The Pan-Islamic movement has been almost ignored by the Western press and scholars. Although the former secretary-general of the OIC had supplied leading news papers in the West with information on the organization, 1 none of it ever appeared. What little information is available on Pan-Islamism has appeared merely in the form of a few lines, sometimes couched in terms of ridicule, 1 Interview by Impact with Tunku Abdul-Rahman Putra, secretary-general of the OIC: "Two Months After the Islamic Conference: Psychological Warfare, the One Which Is More Serious," Impact International Fortnightly (London) 2, No. 2 (1972): 8. Hereafter cited as "Psychological Warfare." iii in the New York Times and the Los Angeles Times. 2 Only three Muslim periodicals were found to be of some help. The first is The Islamic Review and Arab Affairs, which used to be published in Walking, England, but went out of publication in 1973 at a time when the contemporary movement of Pan-Islamism was just beginning to make headway. The second journal is Impact International Fortnightly, published in London. The third and most important publication is Pakistan Horizon, a scholarly journal issued by the Pakistan Institute of International Affairs in Karachi. This lack of materials was coupled with the less than-cooperative attitude of the officials at both the WMC in Karachi and the OIC in Jeddah. When I wrote to the officials of the WMC last year asking them to supp l y me with information on the congress for my dissertation, 2 See, for example, the coverage on the second Islamic summit meeting by Bernard Weinraub, "Reporter's Notebook: Islamic Pageantry," New York Times, February 27, 1974, Part I, p. 2. iv I received an encouraging reply, but the promised infor mation never arrived. A copy of their letter appears in Appendix A of this dissertation. The case was similar with the officials of the OIC. Although I personally visited the organization's headquarters in Jeddah and asked officials there to pro vide me with information on the Islamic conferences, they denied me most of the important materials, such as the verbatia t~anscripts of these conferences, on the ground that they were not to be publicly disclosed. In addition, they have consistently ignored the letters I wrote to them after my return to the United States. A copy of one of my letters appears in Appendix B. Only the World Muslim League (WML) in Mecca had been cooperative long before I started writing the dissertation, and I thank its officials for their help. A copy of their letter (in Arabic) appears in Appendix C. To conclude on a more positive note, I wish to express my sincere appreciation to Dr. Willard Beling and Dr. Rodger Swearingen for their advice and guidance V throughout my doctoral program at the University of Southern California. I am also grateful to King Abdul-Aziz University in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, for providing me with a full scholarship to continue my graduate work in the United States. Some of the material in Chapter II is based on many fruitful discussions with Dr. Willard A. Beling, my committee chairman. vi TABLE OF CONTENTS DEDICATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . PREFACE . . . . . . . . . . . . LIST OF }'f.APS . . . . . LI ST OF TABLES . . . . . . . . . . INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . PART I. THE MUSLIM · woRLD Chapter I . THE CONCEPT OF THE U1-1MAH AND ISLAMIC II. OPPOSITION TO NATIONALISM . . . Islamic Conception of Community The Impact of the West Islamic Opposition to Nationalism The Quran The Hadith Other supportive arguments ARABS VS. NON-ARABS IN THE ISLAMIC ill1MAH: AN HISTORICAL ACCOUNT . . vii Page ii . . . . . . . . . 1.1. )_ . . . . . . . . Xl..l. . . . . . . . . . Xl.1..1.. 1 8 28 Chapter III. Origin of the Arabs and Their Pre-Islamic Background The Arabs After Islam The Umayyad Dynasty The Abbasid Dynasty The Ottoman Empire Disintegration of the urnmah and the rise of Arab nationalism The Arabs After the Ottoman Empire Arabism and Islamism in the Contemporary World THE CONTEMPORARY MUSLIM WORLD: A SUBSYSTEt.fIC VIEW . . . . . . . . A Brief Review of the Literature Application of a Model Geographical proximity Social and cultural homogeneity Political interdependence (sharing membership in international organizations) Political attitudes or external behavior Economic interdependence Russett's Model and the Muslim World viii Page 60 Chapter Page PART II. PAN-ISLAMISr• 1 IV. THE PAN-ISLAMIC ti0VEMENT . ~ . . . . . . . . . Definition and Nineteenth-Century Background Al-Afghani's movement Abdul-Hamid's movement The Decline of Pan-Islamism The Revival of Pan-Islamism The World Muslim Congress: An Historical Survey The first congress (Mecca: June 7- July 5, 1926) The second congress (Jer11salem: December 6-16, 1931) The third congress (Karachi: February 18-19, 1949) The fourth congress (Karachi: February 9-11, 1951) The fifth congress (Baghdad: June 1962) The sixth congress (11ogadishu: December 26 , 1964-January 2, 1965) The seventh congress (Amman: September 1967) The World ?fuslim Congress in Perspective ix 100 Chapter V. VI. SAUDI ARABIA AND PAN-ISLAf1ISM Saudi Arabia's Position in the Muslim World Saudi Arabia in Inter-Arab Politics (Phase One: The Arab Cold 'V"ar) The \-Jorld t- 1us lim League Saudi Arabia in Inter-Arab Politics (Phase Two: The Arab "Hot" War) King Faisal's Call for Pan-Islamic Solidarity King Faisal's Efforts Attain Their Fruition DEVELOPING AND INSTITUTIONALIZING CONTEMPORARY PAN-ISLAMISM: COOPERATION Ai.~D CONFLICT AMONG ISLAMIC STATES ... A Survey of the Islamic Conference: 1969-1976 The Rabat summit conference (September 22-25, 1969) The first foreign ministers' conference (Jeddah: t1arch 23-25, 1970) The second foreign ministers' conference (Karachi: December 26-28, 1970) The third foreign ministers' conference (Jeddah: February 29- March 4, 1972) X Page 138 167 Chapter The fourth foreign ministers' conference (Benghazi: March 24-26, 1973) The Lahore summit conference (February 22-24, 1974) The fifth foreign ministers' conference (Kuala . Lumpur: June 21-25, 1974) The sixth foreign ministers' conference (Jeddah: July 12-15, 1975) The seventh foreign ministers' conference (Istanbul: t1ay 12-15, 1976) The OIC in Perspective Page VII. SillfMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS . 242 APPENDIXES Summary and Conclusions Recommendations Appei1dix A: Letter to Author from \·Jorld :Mus 1 im Congress . . . . . . 250 Appendix B: Author's Letter to the Organization of the Islamic Conference . . . 252 Appendix C: BIBLIOGRA.PHY Letter in Arabic to Author from the War ld t1us lim League . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xi 254 256 LIST OF MAPS 11ap Page 1. The Abbasid Dynasty at Its Largest Extent . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44 2. The Muslim World • C e • • • • • • • • • e • e 70 xii LIST OF TABLES Table Page 1. The Muslim Countries and Their Population . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2. Muslim Countries' Oil Production and Reserves . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3. Muslim Countries' Proven Reserves of Natural Gas ..... xiii 72 235 237 INTRODUCTION One of the major factors in the politics of the Middle East is Islam. Islam's political influence can be observed in domestic as well as in international affairs. The geographic span of the Islamic faith is formidable, encompassing almost all of Africa north of the Equator and extending eastward to Indonesia; it is even more impressive when viewed in comparison with that of other religious faiths, for Islam embraces more different races than any other religion. The bond that in theory links these nations in such societies as Malaysia, Pakistan, the Arab world, and the African countries is the concept of Muslim brotherhood. In practice, it is a concept that often shatters when it collides with national and political aspirations; but there are some issues, such as the Arab Israeli conflict, on which the Islamic states are gradu ally consolidating their attitudes and policies. 1 The purpose of this dissertation is twofold. The first major objective, treated in Part I, is an examination of some of the foundations of politics in the Muslim world, such as the ideological and historical foundations of Islam and the ecological and social structure of the region. The second and most important objective, treated in Part II, is to trace and analyze the historical evolu tion of Pan-Islamism and the contemporary achievements of the movement in bringing the Islamic states to a new understanding and cooperation. The justification for such a dissertation is derived from the importance of the Muslim world in inter national affairs. The region occupies a major portion of the Third World, and is today probably the most vola tile part of the world in which competition and confron tation of the superpowers have reached a frighteningly high level. The Arab-Israeli conflict, which constantly threatens world peace, and the world energy crisis have turned a spotlight on the Muslim world, and the newly recognized financial and political strength of the Muslim oil-producing nations has projected the region as a potentially powerful force to be reckoned with. Eleven 2 of the 13 members of the Organization of Petroleum Export ing Countries (OPEC) are Islamic countries and these domi nate the oil cartel's output and reserves. The Muslim world controls not only two-thirds of the world's proven oil reserves but also 58 percent of the non-Communist 1 world's proven natural gas reserves. Another justification for the undertaking of this study is the lack of materials on Pan-Islamism. It is hoped that this dissertation may help remedy this defi- ciency. Part I of the dissertation is divided into three chapters. Chapter I deals with the ideological founda tions of the Muslim world, with special emphasis on the idea of nationalism and the concept of the ummah ("the Islamic nation") as expressed in the Quran. It deals with such questions as: What does this concept mean? How did it influence the formation of the classical Muslim state, which included all Muslims irrespective of race or language? What effects did the development of modern nationalism have on the Muslim world and its ideological 1 See Tables 2 and 3 in Chapter VI for statistics on oil and gas production and reserves. 3 foundations? The chapter also explains why the development of modern Muslim nationalism is considered a violation of Islamic theology. Chapter II deals with the second aspect of the regions's political foundations, namely, its history. For centuries, and in fact up to Worlc War I, the Huslim world was united in one state, headed by a caliph. The chapter traces the historical evolution of this classical Muslim state and deals with such topics as how various conflicts between Arab and non-Arab Muslims resulted in breaking the unity of the ummah several times until it was finally dissolved at the turn of the century. The chapter also deals with such questions as: What effects did this historical conflict have on the present rela tions of the Muslim states? and What is the relationship between the exclusive doctrine of Pan-Arabism and the inclusive one of Pan-Islamism? Chapter III is an attempt to treat the contem porary Muslim world as a subsystem of the international political system. After a review of some of the litera ture written on the subject, Bruce M. Russett's model of subsystems is applied to the Muslim world. The use of 4 Russett's model is justified on the ground that it defines subsystems by multiple criteria that facilitate its appli cation. In addition, Russett's approach is interdisci plinary, i.e., it explains political aspects by depending heavily on social and economic variables. Thus through the application of this subsystem model, the chapter also deals with the ecological, religious, and social structures that comprise the third aspect of the Muslim world's political foundations. Part II of the dissertation, also comprising three chapters, is a study of Pan-Islamism, emphasizing only th l political ~pproach rather than the religious. The history of this movement is divided into three distinct periods. The first development of this movement began in the middle of the nineteenth century and collapsed at the turn of the century; the second was initiated in the 1920s and faded away during the 1960s; and the third is the contemporary movement that was launched in the late 1960s. Chapter IV, which continu•P S che discussion begun in Chapter II, is an atte1npt to trace and analyze the first two stages in the development of Pan-Islamism. 5 It deals with such questions as: What is Pan-Islamism? How did the movement start? Who started it, and why? What were the successes and failures of the first two stages? Why did they collapse? Chapter Vis devoted to Saudi Arabia and its 6 efforts to foster the contemporary movement of Pan-Islamism. The chapter is an attempt to reconstruct recent events in the Middle East and provide an explanation of how inter-Arab politics during the 1950s and 1960s led Saudi Arabia to launch an appeal for Islamic solidarity. Ques tions such as: Why did the late King Faisal start his Pan-Islamic campaign? and What efforts has Saudi Arabia made to sustain the movement? are also dealt with in this chapter. Chapter VI traces the development of contemporary Pan-Islamism from its inception to the present and exam ines the cooperation and conflicts among the Islamic states generated in their attempts to provide institu tional bases for the movement of Pan-Islamism. Chapter VII concludes the dissertation with a summary and assessment of Pan-Islamism. P A R T I THE MUSLir1 WORLD 7 CHAPTER I THE CONCEPT OF THE UMMAH AND ISLAMIC OPPOSITION TO NATIONALISM Islamic Conception of Community Nationalism is a political doctrine invented in Europe at the beginning of the last century. It holds that human beings are naturally divided into national groups, each with its own distinctive characteristics, and that the only legitimate government for each group 1 is a national self-government. According to this doc- trine, language, culture, race, and sometimes religion constitute different aspects of the same primordial entity, h . 2 t e nation. In addition, Western nationalism is secular, 1 Elie Kedourie, Nationalism (London~ Hutchinson, 1960), p. 9. 2 Ibid., p. 73. 8 maintaining a more or less strict separation of church and state. As a result of this nationalist doctrine, people in the West define their loyalty and identity in terms of nationality. Until recently this was not the case in the Muslim world. Language, culture, and race were all secondary in importance to belief in Islam, which was the sole legitimate basis for membership in the connnunity. This was so because, as D. S. r1argouliouth rightly holds, 3 Islam is considered a religion and a nationality at the same time. Even today a traditional Muslim's first loyalty is to his faith; his family or local group and his ruler come second and third respectively. 4 For traditional Muslims, a pre- or non-Islamic heritage was not a matter for pride or loyalty. Within 3 cited in Leonard Binder, The Ideological Revo lution in the Middle East (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1964), p. 51 (hereafter cited as Binder, The Ideo logical Revolution). Quotations from the Quran later in this chapter will reveal that Islam is also a nation ality. 4 G. E. von Grunebaum, Modern Islam: for Cultural Identity (Berkeley: Uni-;.,.ersity nia Press, 1962), p. 210 (hereafter cited as baum, Modern Islam). The Search of Califor von Grune- 9 10 the traditional Muslim st~te, all Muslims, regardless of race, culture, or language, were considered equal-at least theoretically. Non-Muslims did not enjoy first class citizenship, even though they might be of the same race and speak the same language as their 11uslim neigh bors, and paganism and polytheism were strictly prohibited . However, under the millet system, which has prevailed until recently in most of the Muslim world, Christians and Jews-ahl al-Kitab ("People of the Book") or ah1=_ al-Dhirnma ("Protected People")--were allowed to practice their - own religions freely in quasi-autonomous religious communities provided that they paid two forms of taxa tion, j izya ("poll tax") and kharaj ("land tax"), in exchange for the protection that they received from the 5 state. Islam is not only a religion and a nationality, but also a sociopolitical system in which church and 5 willard A. Beling, "Mobilization of Human Re sources in Developing Nations: Algeria, Tunisia and Egypt,~• in Dev loping Nations: Quest for a Model , ed . Willard A. Beling and George 0. Totten (New York: Van Nostrand Reinhold, 1970), pp. 185-87 (hereafter cited as Beling, "Mobilization of Human Resources"). 6 state are one. Such a system results in the establish- ment of an independent community with its own government, laws, and institutions. Islam, as Kenneth Cragg holds, founded just scch a state. 7 Accordingly, secularism is a violation of Islamic theology. Islam rej cts the idea of a sovereign state in the sense that it has the moral right to generate its own laws. 8 The word "Islam" itself means a complete surrender to and unconditional accept ance of God's authority. The Quran, which according to Muslims i~ the very word of God, is the only constitution of the Muslim state, and contains laws on all matters pertaining to human life. In other words, for Islam sovereignty rests with God alone. The Quran says: 6 wilfred C. Smith, Islam in Modern History (Princeton, N. J. : Princeton University Press, 19 5 7) , p. 18 (hereafter cited as Smith, Islam in Modern His tory). 7 Kenneth Cragg, The Call of the Minaret (New York: Oxford University Press, 1964), pp. 159-60. in The tion, York: 8 Manzooruddin Ahmed, "The Classical Muslim State," Contemporary }'l~.ddle East: Trauition and Innova ed. Benjamin Rivlin and Joseph S. Szyliowicz (New Random House, 1965), p. 99. 11 " . . . the Command is for none but God . Also: "Behold, thy Lord said to the angels: I will create a vicegerent [caliph] on earth . . . "lO And: "If any do 1 il to judge by [the light of] what God hath revealed, they are [no better than] Unbelievers . . . "ll The Impact of the West During the nineteenth and early twentieth cen tur·.es the traditional : Muslim societies crumbled unde.r the impact of European control and influence. While Wester influence seriously weakened traditional Muslim values, it did not supplant them. Only the educated classes of the 11uslim world have accepted modern nation alism with its secular notions, while loyalty to Islam 9 Abdullah Yusuf Ali, The Holy Qur-an: Text, Translation, and Commentary, 2 vols. (Lahore: Sheik Muhammad Ashraf [1938]), I:564, XII:40 (hereafter cited as Ali, The Holy Qur-an). In this system of citation, which will be followed in all future references to the Quran, the first number indicates the volume, the second the page, the third the chapter, and the fourth the verse. lOibid., I:24, II:30. lllbid., I:257, V:47. 12 has remained the main source of unity and identity for the majority of the people. Although Muslim nationalists have exploited Islamic loyalty in mobilizing the masses to reject foreign domination and achieve self-rule and self-identity, they have promoted economic and sociopolitical reforms that have put them in direct confrontation with the ulama (religious authorities). This confrontation, which is most acute in traditional Islamic states, has produced sharp political and ideological differences between the two groups, and time and again the nationalists have strengthened their power at the expense of the ulama. However, the question of separation of church and state has for all practical purposes been settled in the Muslim world. Under the pressure of modernization and industrialization, the influence of the ulama as the community's lawgivers has sharply declined, resulting in 12 a de facto separation of church and state. After World ,.Jar II, every 11uslim state, except perhaps Saudi Arabia, 12 Morroe Berger, The Arab World Today (New York: Doubleday, 1964), p. 322 (hereafter cited as Berger, The Arab World Today). 13 with the help of Western political experts or Western educated citizens, established a new constitution, in place of the Quran, to regulate its administrative, criminal, and civil codes. This, however, does not mean that the Muslim states have abandoned Islam altogether. Nothing could be further from the truth. The modern Muslim world has accepted those aspects of nationalism it considers rele vant to the rehabilitation of Islamic society, and re jected those aspects that would interfere with the prac tical tasks of that rehabilitation. Wilfred Smith argues that nationalism for Muslims everywhere is a Muslim nationalism. No Muslim society has yet substituted nationalism for Islam; Turkey is perhaps closest to having 13 done so. Today the Muslim world has become divided into many political entities; each has developed its own national fervor and become indifferent to, if not sus picious of, its Muslim neighbors. The development of these Muslim national movements, be they Arab, Turkish, 13 smith, Islam in Modern History, p. 80. 14 or Persian, has violated Islamic theology. Examples from the Quran, the Hadith (Prophet Mohammad's sayings), and other sources will demonstrate conclusively that Islam and nationalism are diametrically opposed to each other. Islamic Opposition to Nationalism The Quran The Quran , as the recorded word of God, is the preeminent source of Islamic teachings. From the Quran it is clear that the Islamic concept of community is based on the belief that all human beings are the children of Adam, and therefore constitute a single community. Differences in race, language, or culture, according to Islam, should not stand as barriers between man and man. The Quran says: 0 mankind! We created you from a single (pair) of a male and a female, and made you into nations and tribes, that ye may know each other (not that ye may despise each other). Verily the most hon oured of you in the sight of God is (he whc is) the most righteous of you ... 14 14 Ali, The Holy Qur-an, II:1407, XLIX:13 15 This incidentally means that Islam is a universal message, addressed to mankind in its entirety, and not to the Arabs alone. The Quran, referring to Mohammad, says: "We have not sent thee but as a universal (Messenger) to men, giving them glad tidings, and warning them (against sin) . This universal community is then divided by the Quran into two groups . Those who have accepted Islam constitute the "good" corrnnunity, and those who have not constitute the "bad" community. The first corrnnunity is known as al-Unnnah al-Islamiyyah ("the I slamic nation") or al-Umn1ah al-Mohammadiyyah ("the nation of Mohammad"). The Quran refers to this corrnnunity as follows: "Ye are the best of Peoples, evolved for mankind, enjoying what is right, forbidding what is wrong, and believing in God ... 1116 This Islamic umrnah, according to the Quran, is one world, one nation, and one people. God tells the Muslims in the Quran: "And verily this Brotherhood [ummah] of yours is a single Brotherhood [urrrrnah], and I lSibid., II:1142-43, XXXIV:28. 16 Ibid., I:151, III:110. 16 am your Lord, the Cherisher: therefore fear me (and no 17 other) . " The urnmah, which constitutes one of the key sociopolitical concepts in the Quran, refers to a social contract. Terms such as ahd ("covenant") and mithag ("compact") occur frequently in the Quran, and terms such as bay'a ("oath of allegiance") and aqd ("contract") are often used in the writings of 1-1uslim scholars. The bay'a is a form of contract by which the individual 11uslim accepts the obligation to obey God and his Prophet :Mohammad. When the individual :Muslim accepts the Quran and the traditions of the Prophet, he automatically 18 becomes a member of the umrnah. This Islamic ummah is known as Dar-al-Islam ("the abode of Islam") or Dar-al-Salam ("the abode of peace"). The rest of the world is referred to as Dar al-Harb ("the abode of war"), which is also known as 17 Ibid., II:883, XXIII:52. 18 Manzooruddin Ahmed, "Umrnah: versal Corrnnunity," Is1amic Studies 14, (hereafter cited as Ahmed, "Ummah"). The Idea of a Uni No. 1 (1975): 27-28 17 19 Dar-al-Sulh ("the abode of peace by treaty"). In addition to exhorting the r,1uslims to unity in the Quran, God also tells them to protect each other: "The Believers, men and women, are protectors of one another "20 They are told that they should also be willing to sacrifice themselves for each other: ... but give them preference over themselves, even though poverty was their (own lot). And those saved from the covetousness of their own souls, -they are the ones that achieve pros perity.21 18 As a corollary to its exhortation to unity and brotherhood, the Quran warns the Muslims not to be divided into na- tions: And hold fast, all together, by the Rope which God (stretches out for you), and be not divided among yourselves; and remember with gratitude God's favour on you; for ye were enemies and he joined your hearts in love, so that by His Grace, ye became brethren; and ye were on the brink of the 19 Elie Salem, "Nationalism and Islam," The Muslim World 52, No. 10 (1962): 279 (hereafter cited as Salem, "Nationalism and Islam"). 20 Ali, The Holy Qur-an, I:461, IX:71. 21 Ibid., II:1524, LIX:9. 22 Pit of Fire, and He saved you from it ... 11oreover, 1 · 1uslims are ordered to avoid suspicion and spying on each other, traits that are typical features of modern nationalism: 0 ye who believe! Avoid suspicion (as pos sible): for suspicion in most cases is a sin : and spy not on each other, nor speak ill of each other behind their backs. Would any of you like to eat the flesh of his dead brother? Nay, ye would abhor · 23 1. t . . . The Quran also says: " . . and fall into no 19 disputes, lest ye lose heart and your power depart However, if conflict arises between Muslims, the Quran "24 is quick to say: "The Believers are but a single Brother hood: so make peace and reconciliation between your two (contending) brothers . Despite these unequivocal divine commands, the modern Islamic community of believers has become divided 22 rbid., I:149, III:103. 23 rbid., II:1406, XLIX:12. 24 rbid., I:426-27, VIII:46. 25 rbid., !I:1405, XLIX:10. into many nations. The Quran refers to this division in the umrnah as follows: But people have cut off their affair (of unity), between them, into sects: each party rejoices in that which is with itself. But leave them in their confused ignorance for a time.26 The Hadith The second most important source of Islamic teachings is the Hadith ("Prophet Mohammad's Sayings"). From the Hadith it is clear that Mohammad preached equal- ity among Muslims. He said: An Arab has no superiority over a non-Arab, nor a non-Arab over an Arab; neither does a white man possess any superiority over a black one, nor a black man over a white one, except in point of righteousness ·.27 The Prophet also said: "God has removed from you the arrogance of jahiliyyah (pre-Islamic tribalism) and its pride of ancestry. Human beings are from Adam, 26 Ibid., II:884, XXIII:53-54. 27 Muhammad Muslehuddin, "Two Needs of Islamic World: 1. A Commonwealth of Islamic Countries, 2. A Muslim World Bank," The Islamic Review and World Affairs 58, No. 12 (1970): 25. 20 28 and Adam was from clay." The Hadith shows that Prophet Mohammad strongly argued for the unity of the ummah and warned against division among the : Muslims. Elie Salem 29 provides the following sayings of the Prophet on this point. Moham mad, he says, called upon the members of the ummah to be like the stones of a wall, the one supporting the other, and exhorted them to support and love each other. The Prophet said: "No one is a true believer unless he wishes for his brother (co-religious) what he wishes for himself." According to Salem, Mohammad asked for the death of anyone who sought to create disorder and division in the ummah. The Prophet is also reported to have said that the Muslim who dissociates himself from the ummah will die not as a Muslim but as a pagan. Moreover, the Prophet even rejected patriotism. When a man asked him, "What is patriotism?" he replied, "That thou assist thy people in spite of their wrong- 28 zafar Ishaq Ansari, "Contemporary Islam and Nationalism: A Case Study of Egypt,u Die Welt des Islams 7, Nos. 1-4 (1961): 30 (hereafter cited as Ansari, "Con temporary Islam and Nationalism"). 29 salem, "Nationalism and Islam," p. 279. 21 doing." 30 Other supportive arguments In addition to the Quran and the Hadith, several Western scholars have written about the incompatibility of Islam and nationalism. Von Grunebaum holds that Islam and nationalism are allies only in their opposition to foreign intruders, but everywhere else they compete for the supreme loyalty of the individual and the coIIIlllunity. 31 Leonard Binder says that "Nationalism is the 32 antithesis of Islam for it sets up the nation as a god." This is known as shirk ("setting up partners with God"), which is an unforgivable sin in Islam. The Quran says: God forgiveth not that partners should be set up with Him; but He forgiveth anything else, to 30 Bayard Dodge, "The Significance of Religion in Arab Nationalism," in Islam and International Relations ~ ed. J. Harris Proctor (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1965) , p. 96. 31 von Grunebaum, Modern Islam, p. 246. 32 Leonard Binder, Religion and Politics in Paki stan (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1961), p. 93. 22 whom He pleaseth; to set up partners with God is to devise a sin most heinous indeed.33 However, no Western scholar puts the point so eloquently as H. A. R. Gibb: The nationalist solution is ... clearly opposed to the Islamic principle. No matter how sincerely nationalists may profess their devotion to the doctrines and ethical teachings of Islam, they are committed to setting up a second prin ciple alongside it; and there is no way to avoid the resulting division and conflict of duties except by separating the spheres of church and state. Muslim nationalists may plead that they hold the second principle to be subordinate to the first; but experience-even in Muslim coun tries-has shown that the appetite of the modern national state is not easily satisfied short of the total allegiance of its population. And the conflict of aims is fundamental: Islam, like all higher religions, seeks the interests and welfare of individual men and women irrespective of race and nation, while nationalism, of necessity, sacri fices the individual to the supposed interests of the collectivity.34 In addition to Western scholars, several Arab theologians have written on the subject. Among these are some prominent Egyptians from al-Ikhwan al-Muslimeen 33 Ali, The Holy Qur-an, I:195, IV:48. 34 H. A. R. Gibb, Modern Trends in Islam (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1947), p. 115. 23 ("the Muslim Brethren") who lost their political power during the 1950s under President Jamal Abdul Nasser, the champion of modern Arab nationalisrr.. 11uhamrnad al-Ghazali argues that Arab nationalism is not just a direct viola tion of Islamic theology, but in fact a reversion to pre-Islamic Arab tribalism. 35 On the other hand, Hasan al-Banna, the founder of the Ikhwan, explains the ultimate goal of the Muslim Brethren thus: \.Je want the integration of all parts of our Islamic fatherland which have been cut off from one another due to the machinations of Western powers and their imperialistic greed and avarice. In this respect we want to make it clear that we cannot accept this artificial political fragmen tation of our fatherland.36 In addition to the lfuslim Brethren, several non Arab Muslim scholars have stressed Pan-Islamic ideology and opposed national ism. Sayyid Abulala }1audoodi argues that when nationalism enters the heart and mind of a 24 35 Mohammad al-Ghazali, Haqiqat al-Qawmiyya al Arabiyy~ [The Truth About Arab Nationalism] (Cairo: Makta but Dar Al-Uroubah, n.d.), p. 160. 36 As quoted in Ansari, "Contemporary Islam and Nationalism," p. 13. ·Muslim from one direction, Islam leaves them from another direction. Any t1uslim who has pledged him self to the devil of nationalism has been divorced by the angels of Islam.37 Muhammad Asad, on the other hand, condemns nationalism as opposed to the "fundamental Islamic principle of the equality of all men" and states that Islamic unity should "be of an ideological nature, transcending all considera tions of race and origin: a brotherhood of people bound together by nothing but their consciousness of a cormnon faith and a common moral outlook." 38 Explaining how the nationalistic concept of the separation of church and state had emerged in the Christ ian state, and why this separation is a violation of Islamic teachings, Moharmnad Iqbal writes: Primitive Christianity was founded, not as a poli tical or civil unit, but as a monastic order in a profane world, having nothing to do with civil affairs, and obeying the Roman authority practically 37 As quoted in Rupert Emerson, From Empire to Nation: The Rise to Self-Assertion of Asian and African Peoples, 2nd ed. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1967), p. 154. 38 As quoted in Erwin I. J. Rosenthal, Islam in the Modern National State (Cambridge, :Mass.: Harvard Univer sity Press, 1965), p. 129. 25 in all matters. The result of this was that when the State became Christian, State and Church con fronted each other as distinct powers with inter minable boundary disputes between them. Such a thing could never happen in Islam; for Islam was from the very beginning a c"vil society, having received from the Quran a set of simple legal prin ciples which, like the twelve tables of the Romans, carried, as experience subsequently proved, great potentialities of expansion and development by interpretation. The Nationalist theory of state, therefore, is misleading inasmuch as it suggests a dualism which does not exist in Islam.39 26 Another non-Arab Muslim scholar, Anwar G. Chejne, not only argues that Islam and nationalism are incompatible but looks upon ... Turkish nationalism with its revival of ancient Turkish traditions, pan-Arabism with its insistence on linguistic unity and Iranian nation alism with its glorification of pre-Islamic past as reactionary movements. Nationalistics have always existed and will continue to exist but nationalism is a modern reactionary movement which has destroyed all respect for ethical and moral values and created divisions among humanity.40 In conclusion, it is clear from the information presented in this chapter that Islam and nationalism 39 Mohammad Iqbal, The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam (London: Oxford University Press, 1934), p. 148. 40 Anwar G. Chejne, "Some Aspects of Islamic Nationalism," The Islamic Literature 8, No. 8 (1956): 11. 27 represent two radically different political philosophies that are ideologically incompatible. Islam is opposed to nationalism not only because it is secular but also because it creates division in the ummah. CHAPTER II ARABS VS. NON-ARABS IN THE ISLAMIC UMMAH: AN HISTORICAL ACCOUNT The classical Muslim state, which had the holy Ouran as its constitution and which included all : Muslims " irrespective of race, culture, or language, was troubled by occasional conflicts between Arab and non-Arab Muslims. Contrary to the Islamic theory of equality, Muslims did not treat each other as equals. In the early stage of Islam, the Arabs subjected non-Arab Muslims to economic and social injustices. In the more recent stages of this classical :Muslim state, the reverse was true when the Arabs themselves suffered under the oppressive rule of the Ottoman Turks. This rivalry between Arab and non Arab Muslims contributed to the dissolution of the politi cal unity of the Muslim world several times until it was 28 finally ended at the turn of the present century. This historical conflict between these two groups, which has its roots in the pre-Islamic Arab culture, continues to affect the present relationships between the Islamic states. Origin of the Arabs and Their Pre-Islamic Backgroun~ The ethnic group known as the Arabs originated in the Arabian Peninsula and derives from two separate lines of descent. The first and older line was the Qahtanite, or descendants of Qahtan, whose son Yarub gave his name to the people and the country. From this line came the Yemenites, or South Arabians, who are known as al-Arab al-Aribah ("the Arabian Arabs"). The second and younger line was the Ismailite, or descendants of Ismail (or Ishmael), son of Abraham by Hagar. The people of Mecca and its environs are descended from this line and are known as al-Arab al-Mustaribah ("the Arabized Arabs"). With the emergence of Islam in the seventh century, this line became the most important family among 29 1 the Arabs. Pre-Islamic Arabia (jahilyyah) was not a political entity. In the first place, the vast desert prevented the formation of a central political authority. The Arab tribes were scattered across the desert, dependent on camels and horses for transportation, and, if not settled in oases, spent most of their time in search of food and water. The constant struggle for survival precluded the development of such abstractions as political unification; indeed, the various tribes frequently attacked each other for ghana'im ("loot"), and of necessity the arts of fight- ing and horsemanship flourished. In the second place, the Arab nomads took intense pride in their individualism and refused, even until recently-though not during the time of Mohammad-to bow to any political authority except their tribal leaders, with whom they had ties of kinship. Although pre-Islamic Arabia was not a political entity, it nonetheless had a uniform cultural structure 1 Hazem Zaki Nuseibeh, The Ideas of Arab Nation alism (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1956), pp. 9-10 (hereafter cited as Nuseibeh, The Ideas of Arab Nationalism). 30 based on the Arab language, pagan religious beliefs, nomadic life, and social habits. Among the sccial norms were courage, hospitality, revenge, belief in supersti tions, fortune-telling, poetry contests, drinking, gamb ling, and the enjoyment of women. ,~omen were considered inferior to men and many female infants were buried alive immediately after birth for fear that they might bring shame to their fathers if permitted to grow up. The political organization of the tribe was regu lated by customs and traditions, and upward mobility in this structure was virtually impossible. The shaykh was 31 the head of the tribe and usually came fron1 a noble family , Ancestral heritage was considered of great importance. Pride in pure Arab ancestry was very strong, and persons with ancestors of black, servile, or non-Arab origin were .d d. f . 2 consi ere in erior. The country was sparsely populated with scattered villages and occasionally a larger town, some of which, such as Mecca and Medina, were centers of trade and 2 Reuben Levy, The Social Structure of Islam, 3rd ed. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1965), pp. 53- 54 (hereafter cited as Levy, The Social Structure of Islam). business. However, outside these larger centers that provided interaction with foreigners, pre-Islamic Arabia was for the most part isolated from the rest of the world. It was within this cultural milieu that the Prophet Mohammad was born in Mecca in A.D. 570. The Arabs After Islam Islam came to the Arabs in A.D. 610 when the mantle of prophethood fell on Moharrnnad. It drastically changed the entire sociopolitical structure of the Arab nomadic life. Arab loyalties shifted from their tribes to the new religion of Islam, which united the Arabs as a nation for the first time in their history. It also brought to them the first organized state to which the entire population owed its total allegiance . 3 However, as already mentioned in Chapter I, the unifying factor was religion and not nationality. As long as Islam was confined to the Arabian Peninsula, Islamic loyalty and Arab loyalty were synonymous, but when Islam spread to 3 Nuseibeh, The Ideas of Arab Nationalism, pp. 20- 21. 32 33 other areas a conflict developed between the two loyalties, as will be revealed shortly. From its inception and for a long time thereafter, the Arabs were the mainstay of Islam, and they were aware and proud of their historical mission to spread their faith among the infidels. The second caliph, Umar, who succeeded Abu-Bakr, referred to the Arabs as the essence of Islam, and assigned to them a position of dominance in the affairs of the state. 4 As Islam expanded into the surrounding areas, many non-Arabs espoused it, and for the first time in their history the Arabs faced the problem of having to live as equals, according to their new faith, with non Arab Muslims. Although Islam greatly improved Arab out look and behavior toward non-Arabs, pre-Islamic Arab prejudice and feelings of racial superiority did not disappear altogether, even under the influence of the divine command. Contrary to the Islamic principle of equality among all l·Iuslims, the Arabs maintained a super ior attitude toward their non-Arab fellow Muslims, whom they referred to simply as ajam ("dumb") beca 1 ..Lse they 4 Ibid., pp. 24-25. did not speak Arabic. The Arabs, incidentally, still use the tern1 today, usually in reference to the Persians, but without much of its old derogatory connotation. 34 Non-Arab t1uslims, who included the Persians, Iraqis, Egyptians, Berbers, and others, were known as the mawali 5 ("clients"). These could not become Muslims unless they were sponsored by Arabs. In addition, they were excluded from the material benefits of Islam such as the salaries and pensions from the diwan, the office estab lished by Caliph Umar for the purpose of distributing revenues of the conquests among Arab warriors. 6 On the other hand, Christian Arabs received preferential treat ment over other non-Arab Christians. For example, the Arab tribe of Banu Taghlib of Iraq, which remained Chris tian, was exempted from paying the poll tax to which all Christians and Jews were liable, and paid only double the 7 amount of the zakah ("alms"). 5 Its singular is mawla. 6 Bernard Lewis, The Arabs in History, 4th ed. (London: Hutchinson Universal Library, 1966), p. 58 (hereafter cited as Lewis, The Arabs in History). 7 Nuseibeh, The Ideas of Arab Nationalism, p. 26. The Umayyad Dynasty With the death of Uthman, the third caliph, Ali, Prophet Mohammad's cousin and son-in-law, was chosen as the new caliph. However, shortly thereafter a coup d'etat by Mu'awiya, a member of the Umayyad Arab family and the governor of Syria, succeeded in establishing the first dynasty in Islam. Thus he permanently ended a young Islamic tradition of democratically choosing the head of the state. Mu'awiya also moved the capital city from Medina to Damascus. However, during the entire period of the Umayyad Dynasty (A.D. 661-750), the Arab followers of Ali in Iraq and Medina and its environs refused to accept the Umayyad ruling class as legitimate and argued that the caliphate should go to the descendants of Prophet t1ohannnad . The social injustices suffered by the mawali increased under the Umayyad Dynasty, during which the power to govern was entirely in Arab hands. Political, military, economic, and social policies were all geared to the maintenance of Arab supremacy. In the conquered lands Arabs formed an exclusive military class, living 35 in luxurious camps supported by public funds, 8 while the mawali were kept racially and socially segregated from the Arabs. For example, a marriage between an Arab t, 1uslim woman and a mawla was considered a m~salliance. 9 t1ore- over, in the cities 0f the conquered lands, Arabs would not be seen walking on the street with the mawali, and on 10 festive occasions the last seats were assigned to them. However, the main grievance of the mawali was economic. As landowners and peasants they paid a higher tax than their Arab Muslim counterparts, who paid only the ushr ("tithe") . 11 Although they were permitted to enter the army and fight alongside the Arabs in Islamic con quests, they received lower pay and less booty than the Arab soldiers. 12 Also, while Arab t1us lims paid only the alms, the mawali were forced to pay both the land tax and the poll tax, to which only Christians and Jews were -s 25. Ibid. , p. 9L . The Arabs . History, 70. ew1.s, l.Il p. 10 The Social Structure of Islam, 59. Levy, p. llL . ew1.s, The Arabs in History, p. 68. 12 Ibid. , p. 70. 36 37 liable. When the mawali of Iraq rebelled at having to pay the poll tax, Hajjaj, the ruthless governor of Iraq, called them barbarians, drove them out of the towns in which they had settled, kiiled some of them, and confined the ·11 13 rest to vi ages. Another group of mawali that suffered under Arab discrimination were the blacks, against whom some of the pre-Islamic Arab prejudice continued. Like its Semitic predecessors, Judaism and Christianity, Islam did not abolish slavery, but rather ameliorated its conditions. Although according to Islam, only non-Muslim prisoners of war were subject to slavery, it was illegal to enslave 14 an Arab, and in most cases no liberty was promised to slaves who adopted Islam. 15 Non-Muslim blacks were often imported from Africa as slaves, a practice that existed until recently in some Arab countries, and that sometimes actually included black Muslims. A black, whether slave or free, was 13 Levy, The Social Structure of Islam, p. 58. 14 Nuseibeh, The Ideas of Arab Nationalism, p. 25. lSPhilip K. Hitti, The Arabs: A Short History, 5th ed. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1968), p. 76. referred to simply as abd ("slave"), a term still popu larly used today by most Arabs in reference to all blacks, including black Muslims. Slavery was not limited to blacks, however, and many non-Muslim whites from Persia, Turkey, and elsewhere in Asia were sold as slaves. For example, white Turkish slaves were often bought by Arab princes as personal bodyguards. 16 As Islamic conquests rapidly engulfed other neighboring territories, the mawali increased in number until they outnumbered the Arabs themselves, thus pro ducing an intolerable situation in which the ,-1hole struc ture of the Umayyad Dynasty was predicated on the sub mission of a large majority of socially inferior taxpayers to a ruling Arab elite minority. To overcome this unjust discrimination, the mawali strongly pressed for practical application of the theoretical equality of all Muslims expressed in the Quran and the Hadith, and even forged several new hadiths to suit their own purposes. To facilitate their accept ance and assimilation by Arab society, ~ost of the mawali changed their names to Arab names, adopted Arabic as 16 Levy, The Social Structure of Islam, p. 74. 38 their language and even fabricated Arab genealogies for 17 themselves. Thus during the last years of the Umayyad Dynasty there began a process of Arabization that did not end until some centuries later when the entire area 39 north of the Arabian Peninsula and North Africa was totally Arabized to for1n what is known today as the Arab world. This process of Arabization was facilitated by the fact that the Quran and the Hadith were both in Arabic, which was also the official language of the state and litera- ture. While the mawali of Iraq, Egypt, and North Africa found it expedient to become totally Arabized, the Per sians, who had developed a great civilization long before the coming of Islam, were proud of their cultural heri tage and refused to be Arabized. Their only concession to the dominant social group was their adoption of the Arabic script and study of the Arabic language--so successfully, indeed, that some Persians distinguished themselves in the field of Arabic grammar and literature. In addition to Arabization, the mawali's second 17 Ib1.·d., 60 61 pp. - . and perhaps most important salvation during the Umayyad Dynasty was found in a religious expression called the Shi'a. Shi'ism was begun as a political movement by those Arab Muslims in Iraq who claimed that the caliphate was the exclusive property of the descendants of Ali, Prophet Mohammad's cousin and son-in-law. The Shi'ite Arabs appealed successfully to the mawali, since both 18 groups felt themselves oppressed by the Umayyads. With the support of the mawali, Shi'ism gradually became a religious opposition to the state and the Umayyad ruling class. Later on, and in fact up to the present time, Shi'ism as an Islamic religious sect came to be identi fied largely with the Persians, while the majority of the Arabized mawali remained within the orthodox Islamic doctrine, ahl al-Sunna. However, it should be mentioned here that the difference between ahl al-Sunna and Shi'ism is slight-less marked, in fact, than that between Catholicism and Protestantism in Christianity. The mounting opposition of the Shi'ite followers of Ali and the discontented mawali, coupled with the 18L . ewis, The Arabs in History, p. 71. 40 internal decay of the regime, finally brought about the downfall of the Umayyad Dynasty. With the collapse of the Umayyads, the truly Arab period in the history of Islam in the Middle East ca.me to an end. However, very soon thereafter the remnants of the Umayyad family estab lished in the Iberian Peninsula ("Andalusia") a new Arab dynasty that lasted over 700 years. The Abbasid Dynasty The successors to the Umayyads, descendants of al-Abbas, an uncle of the Prophet }1ohamrnad, established their Abbasid Dynasty in the new capital, Baghdad. Under their rule (A.D. 750-1258), Islamic civilization experi enced its golden age. Industry, art, music, literature, architecture, and commerce flourished with immense vital ity as Arabs and non-Arabs consolidated their efforts to produce the most advanced civilization in the world during that era-a civilization that was based entirely on Arabic culture and tradition. Under the Abbasids, the sociopolitical status of the mawali was greatly improved. They were accepted as full members of the society and were relieved of most of 41 the economic disadvantages that they suffered under the Umayyads. Furthermore, they participated in government and played an important role in all the affairs of the empire. Many Turks and Persians held key positions in the army and competed with the Arabs for recognition and favors from the caliphs. For example, the members of the Barmak family of Persia, who had helped the Abbasids to come to power, were rewarded by several positions in h b . 19 t e ca inet. Under the reign of Harun al-Rashid, during whose time the empire reached its peak, Ja'far al-Barmaki was perhaps the second most powerful man in the government. However, Ja'far and the rest of the Barmaks were later accused of treason against Caliph Harun, and were all executed. Although Arab supremacy was sharply reduced, it did not disappear altogether. Beside the caliphate, most of the highest positions in the government were held by Arabs, and Arabic was still the official language of the state and culture. Consequently, the mawali, and especially the Persians, started a movement known as 19 rbid., p. 94. 42 al-Shuubiyah ("non-Arabs"). The movement went beyond the Islamic spirit of equality of all Muslims; in a pendulum swing of reaction, it assumed the offensive by asserting the superiority of non-Arabs to Arabs. The heated debate engendered by this controversial stance was quickly raised to higher philosophical levels by some of the leading scholars on both sides. 20 Friction between Arab and non-Arab Muslims con- tinued and took many forms. After the death of Caliph Harun, an open conflict developed between his two sons Amin and 11a 'moon in which Amin relied on the Arabs for help while }1a'moon called on the Persians. The resultant national conflict ended in a victory for Ma'moon and his Persian supporters, who took advantage of the situation . h. 1· . 1 . - . h A b 21 to increase t eir po itica power vis-a-vis t e ra s. Because of the vastness of the Abbasid Dynasty (see Map 1 below) and the totally inadequate means of communication available to them, it was impossible for the caliphs to maintain effective military control over 20 Nuseibeh, The Ideas of Arab Nationalism, p. 26. 21L . ewis, The Arabs in History, pp. 94-96. 43 ... ..... .. · . ... ... • . . . .... ... . . ·~ ' Hll~ ~ !yff t, MAPl 0 The Abbasid Dynasty at Its Greatest Extent 500 MILES 1000 .p,. .p,. the entire empire. As a result of this geographic isola tion of many areas of the empire, the friction between Arab and non-Arab Muslims, and the insignificant political stature of the later Abbasid caliphs, local dynasties began to arise and grow in power until the empire com pletely disintegrated. Many Turkish and Persian generals and governors were able to establish local rules not only in their own territories, but even within the Arabized lands; Egypt fell to a coalition of Turkish slaves who revolted against their army officers and succeeded in establishing the Mamluk ("slave") Dynasty. With the downfall of the Abbasid Dynasty, the Islamic urrnnah fell into permanent disunity. Never again would all the parts of the urnrnah be united under one central political authority. Also, with the eclipse of the Abbasids, the Arabs lost all their political and cultural hegemony and were reduced to the status of a subject people. They were not to become the masters of their own fate again until the middle of the twentieth century, when they gained independence from the European colonial powers. 45 The Ottoman Empire From the fifteenth to the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, all the Arab lands, with the exception of Morocco and some parts of the Arabian Peninsula, were 46 under the control of the Ottoman Turks. In addition to these two parts of the Arab world, this new political unity of the umrnah also excluded Persia and the t1uslim lands east of it. The Persians asserted their cultural inde pendence by refusing to subject themselves once again to foreigners, especially Turks from ahl al-Sunna ("the orthodox Muslim doctrine"), and politically separated themselves permanently from the ummah. In addition to the Arab lands, the Ottoman Empire included several parts of southeastern Europe. Constan tinople (now Istanbul) had been adopted as the capital city by the Turkish sultans/caliphs, who ruled with an iron hand . Arabs and non-Arabs alike suffered miserably from excessive taxation and an insanely oppressive rule. Arabic had lost its status as official language and Arab participation in government was insignificant. By an ironic twist of fate, the Arabs now writhed under the same injustices that they themselves had inflicted on non-Arab Muslims during the Umayyad Dynasty. Baghdad, Damascus, and Cairo, which had once been centers of culture and civilization, receded into backwardness. Under the corruption and oppression of the Ottoman regime, the Arabs sank deep in ignorance and isolation from the intellectual and economic progress enjoyed by post Renaissance Europe. Disintegration of the ummah and the rise of Arab nationalism Following the centuries of decadence under Turk ish oppression and misgovernment that resulted in the dissolution of the political unity of the Islamic ummah, Arab elites began to express their dissent and frustra tion in two forms. One was religious, calling for renewal of allegiance to the tenets of Islam. The other 22 was political, calling for an Arab nationalist movement. 22 George Antonius, The Arab Awakening: The Story of the Arab National Movement (Philadelphia: J.B. Lip pincott, 1939), p. 15 (hereafter cited as Antonius, The Arab Awakening). 47 Both expressions of revolt were the result of Western influence in the area, which was begun by the Napoleonic invasion of Egypt in 1979 and continued by missionaries, teachers, traders, archeologists, and others. The religious revival was initiated by Muslim Arab elites. A1nong the leading figures of this movement who exerted great influence on the Arab people was Abdul Rahman Al-Kawakibi of Syria (1849-1902). His writings were banned soon after publication throughout the Ottoman Empire, and he fled to Egypt, T.vhich was then under the autonomous rule of Mohammad Ali. Al-Kawakibi believed that the glory of the Islamic unnnah would never be achieved by any group of t1us lims except the Arabs themselves. He advocated the transfer of the caliphate to an Arab from among the descendants of Prophet Mohammad and the establishment of Mecca as the capital city. Al-Kawakibi 's ideas were best expressed in his two most important works, which were both attacks on the Ottoman regime: Taba'i al-Istibdad (The Nature of Despotism) and Umm al-Qura (The Mother of Cities- 23 another name for ~1ecca). In Unnn al-Qura, he listed 26 23 Abdullah Kannoun Al-Hasni, "Abdul Rahman Al Kawakibi," The Islamic Review 37, No. 5 (1949): 30. 48 reasons why the Arabs of the Arabian Peninsula were the most qualified of all Muslims to rule the Islamic ummah. Among his reasons were: that the Prophet was an Arab from the Arabian Peninsula, which contains Mecca and i1edina; that the Arabs of the Peninsula were the most knowledgeable of all Muslims in the principles of Islam and the traditions of Prophet :Mohammad; and that Arabic was the language of the Quran and the Hadith and was more familiar to all Muslims in the world than any other 24 language. The works of Al-Kawakibi and others like him received wide support among all Arabs, especially from the Sharif Hussein of r1ecca, a descendant of Prophet Mohammad. The book Umm al-Qura is still very popular today, particularly in Saudi Arabia. This country, with its fantastic wealth derived from its oil industry, has been the champion of the Islamic cause for the last two decades. This does not mean, however, that the Saudi leaders are interested in reestablishing the outdated 24 Abdul Rahman Al-Kawakibi, Umm al-Qura [The Mother of Cities] (Aleppo: Al-Mut'ba'ah al-As-riyyah, 1959), pp. 218-22. 49 caliphate; rather, they are working to reestablish the glory and solidarity of the Islamic ummah within a con temporary milieu. The role of Saudi Arabia in the evo lution of Pan-Islamism will be discussed in detail in Chapter V. While the religious approach was advocated only by Muslim Arabs, the nationalist solution was proposed primarily by Christian Arabs, who were least affected by the idea of Muslim unity. The seeds of Arab nationalism were planted in Greater Syria in 1847 "with the founda- tion in Beirut of a modest literary movement under Ameri- 25 can patronage." Syrians, and especially Maronite Christians, supported American and European schools, and this exposure to Western intellectual life resulted in the adoption of Western sociopolitical concepts, particu larly nationalism. The idea of creating a sovereign, independent nation-state based on a common language, culture, and traditions began slowly to dissolve Arab ties with the Muslim, but non-Arab, Ottoman Empire. 26 25 Antonius, The Arab Awakening, p. 13. 26 Richard H. De Kmejian, "Political Thought," in The 1·1iddle East: Its Governments and Politics, ed. Abid A. Al-Marayati (Belmont, Calif.: Duxbury Press, 1972), p. 108 . 50 The process culminated during the 1870s in the birth of the Arab national movement within an atmosphere of in tellectual ferment generated by a revival of interest in classical Arabic and the study of Arabic history and 1 . 27 iterature. This seed of Arab nationalism managed to maintain a pattern of slow growth in spite of Ottoman efforts to destroy it. The Turkish regime, threatened by the con tinued efforts of Arab nationalists, responded to this perceived danger with an attempt to suppress Arab national organizations. Far from succeeding, their efforts re sulted only in the increased alienation of their Arabic speaking subjects and led the Arab nationalists to arti culate their goals in terms of complete liberation from Ottoman rule. In 1913, an Arab Congress was officially convened in Paris by the Decentralization Party of Young Arabs to discuss Arab freedom, sociopolitical reforms, 28 and the renewed use of the Arabic language. 27 For an extensive and well-documented account of the rise of Arab nationalism, which is beyond the scope of this chapter, see Antonius, The Arab Awakening. 28 Francesco Gabrieli, The Arab Revival (New York: Random House, 1961), pp. 35-36. 51 The Turks themselves were not immune to the grow ing influence of Western political ideas. In 1908, the Young · Turks seized power in Istanbul, instituted several liberal sociopolitical reforms, and established a new constitution and parliament. However, since their reforms were geared toward the replacement of Islam by Turkism as the basis of the Ottoman Empire, their program of Turki fication inevitably produced adverse Arab reaction, espe- . 11 · S . 29 cia yin yria. Meanwhile, the political impotence and internal decay of the Ottoman Empire, "the sick man of Europe," made it possible for the European colonial powers to extend and strengthen their influence in the area. Britain, France, and Italy succeeded during the nine teenth and early trventieth centuries in colonizing several Arab portions of the Ottoman Empire, and in 1916 the Brit ish hastened the destruction of the empire by encouraging Sharif Hussein of Mecca, who dreamed of an Arab empire under his rule, to organize an Arab revolt in the Hijaz to break away from his Turkish suzerains. Also, during 29 Lewis, The Arabs in History, p. 174. 52 World War I, led on by British promises of independence after the war, the Arabs fought alongside the European Christian forces against Muslim Turkey. The result of all these events was the destruction of the Ottoman Empire and the end of any semblance of political unity within the Islamic ummah. Turkish hatred of the Arabs was exacerbated during World War I; the Arabs were reviled by the Turks as traitors for their collaboration with the British. Shortly after the war, under the revolutionary leadership of Mustafa _ Kemal "Atatiirk," Turkey embarked on a sweeping program of Westernization and de-Arabizaticn. The country was declared a republic, the institution of the caliphate was officially abolished, Arabic scripts were replaced by a Latin script, and a Western mode of life was adopted for the people and the state. The Arabs After the Ottoman Empire The Arabs' decision to defy Islamic teachings and break away from the rest of the ummah in their pursuit of nationalistic ambitions did not bring its expected rewards. The Arabs were severely disenchanted after 53 World War I by the failure of the British to carry out their promise of Arab independence, and shattered by the partition of Arab lands to form new states under the colonization of Western powers, which continued through the 1950s. Greater Syria, for example, was divided between Britain and France into Syria, Lebanon, Palestine, and Transjordan (now Jordan). The severest blow, however, was dealt by the British goverment through its Balfour Declaration of 1917, 30 which promised European Jews a homeland in Palestine. As a result, Western Jews forcibly occupied Palestine and changed its name to Israel in 1948. In addition, events between the two world wars were damaging to Pan-Arab nationalism. Local Arab nation alist movements developed independently of each other in opposition to their respective colonial enemies and began to compete with Pan-Arabism, to which the Arab League owes its creation in 1945. However, with Israel planted in the heart of the Arab world and perceived by all Arabs as a threat, Arab nationalism managed to sustain its power 3 °For the text of the Balfour Declaration, see George Lenczowski, The Middle East in World Affairs, 2nd ed. (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1957), pp. 80-81. 54 and influence among the Arab masses. After achieving freedom from European control, the Arabs began to work for unity and isolated themselves from the rest of the Muslim world . However, as a result of sharp ideological divisions between the so-called conservative and radical regimes, efforts to achieve unity did not materialize in anything beyond the short lived union between Egypt and Syria. Inter-Arab politics during the late 1950s and 1960s were especially marked by psychological warfare and political propaganda, with Nasser's Egypt setting the tone at the center of the Arab 31 s taee. Arabism and Islamism in the Contemporary World The development of Arab nationalism, however, 31 This will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter V. Also, for an excellent discussion on inter Arab politics see J':.1alcolm H. Kerr, The Arab Cold War 1958- 1970: Gamal Abd Al-Nassir and His Rivals, 3rd ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1971) (hereafter cited as Kerr, The Arab Cold \var) , and George Lenczowski, "The Arab Cold War," in The Middle East: Quest for an American Policy, ed. Willard A. Beling (Albany, N.Y.: State Uni versity of New York Press, 1973), pp. 55-72 (hereafter cited as Lenczowski, "The Arab Cold War"). 55 did not mean a departure from the tenets of Islam. As already mentioned in Chapter I, nationalism for Muslims everywhere is a Muslim nationalism. And since being an Arab means being a Muslim, 32 Arab nationalism means Muslim-Arab nationalism. Today , Pan-Arabism represents a distinct religio-nationalist phenomenon within Islam. 33 However, the close association between Arabism and Islam poses obvious problems both in the Arab world and in the wider :Muslim world. Although opposed by non-Arab Muslims and denied by Arab nationalists, Arab Islamic elitism expresses itself today throughout the Muslim world as it did during the time of the Umayyads and the Abbasids. Willard A. Beling holds that: Within the international political framework of the contemporary period, Pan-Arabism represents the elite wing of Pan-Islamism, and al-unnna al- ' arabiya (the "Arab Nationn) has for all intents and purposes within the new religio-nationalist framework replaced the classical al-umma al-islamiya 32 Berger, The Arab World Today, p. 312. 33 willard A. Beling, "Arabism: An Ecological Variable in the Politics of the !1iddle East," in The Middle East: Quest for an American Policy, ed. Willard A. Beling (Albany, N.Y.: State University of New York Press, 1973), p. 34 (hereafter cited as Beling, "Arabism: An Ecological Variable"). 56 (the "Islamic Congregation") 4 whi.ch embraced all Moslems regardless of race.3 Although Pan-Arabism is closely associated with Islam, it is different from Pan-Islamism and in many ways d t ·t 35 oppose o 1 . Pan-Arabism, as a nationalist doctrine, opposes all foreign intrusions in the Arab world regard- 1 f h h h M 1 . 36 Th 1 d ess o wet er t ey are us 1m or not. ea rea y mentioned historical animosities between Arab and non Arab Muslims can also explain the present antipathies between them. For example, at the Pan-African Cultural Congress that Arab Algeria had sponsored in July 1969, irrepressible Arabism asserted itself against negritude, an orientation that was strongly resisted by black African d 1 . 37 e egations. In addition, while all Arab states refuse to recognize Israel, Turkey and Iran maintain relations 34 Beling, "Mobilization of Human Resources," p. 185. 35 This point will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter V. 36 Beling, "Arabisrn: An Ecological Variable," pp. 35-38. 3 7 Ibid. , p. 39. 57 with it and the latter supplies it with oil. Also, Turkey and Iran have associated themselves with the Western defense system, ,-1hich the Arabs had rejected. 11oreover, Iran and its Arab neighbors are not on the best of terms with each other. For one thing, Arab Muslims (Sunnis) regard Persians (Shi'ites) as second-class Muslims. For another, the Arabs view with suspicion Iran's military buildup, and resent its ambitions in the Gulf (e.g., Iran occupied several Arab islands and had claims to Bahrain). Even the name of the Gulf has been a source of friction between the Iranians, who call it the "Persian Gulf," and their Arab neighbors, who call it the "Arabian Gulf." Today, nationalism represents the overriding sen- 38 timent among educated Arabs. However, nationalism com- 58 bined \vith the historical Arab xenophobia toward all things foreign has resulted in an Arab world that is plagued by confusion and conflict . . Despite this, the Arab world is perhaps experiencing today its modern era of renaissance. The 1970s have witnessed a resurgence in the Arab world. The newly recognized financial and political power of 38 Berger, The Arab World Today, p. 10. the Arabs, their achievement during the 1973 war with Israel (although limited), their successful oil embargo, the rapprochement between their radical and conservative regimes, and the development of contemporary Pan-Islamism under Arab leadership have all made it possible for the Arabs to regain their confidence and self-respect. 59 CHAPTER III TIIE CONTEMPORARY MUSLIM WORLD: A SUBSYSTE11IC VIEW Chapters I and II have thrown some light on the ideological and historical backgrounds of the contemporary Muslim world. Although these two factors constitute the cultural heritage shared by the Muslim states, they are not sufficiett in themselves to identify the contemporary 1 Muslim world as a region or subsystem of the international global system. Obviously, more relevant criteria are needed for an adequate identification of the region. However, it should be emphasized here that it is difficult 1 For the purpose of this chapter the terms "region" and "subsystem" are used interchangeably. 60 to identify a region, 2 and it is even more difficult to put the concept to really productive use. The use of different criteria and different definitions will usually result in the delineation of different regions, and ana lysts do not normally agree as to what the appropriate 3 criteria are. Before considering which criteria, if any, are competent to establish the existence of an Islamic sub system, it will be advantageous at this point to review some of the literature on the subject. A Brief Review of the Literature Few studies have been done on the treatment of the Muslim world as a region or subsystem. Since the early 1950s several social scientists have tried to arrive at a satisfactory definition of a subsystem for the Muslim 61 2 Roderic H. Davison illustrated this point so well in his article, "Where Is the Middle East?" Foreign Affairs 38, No. 4 (1960): 665-75. 3 Bruce M. Russett, International Regions and the International System: A Study in Political Ecology (Chi cago: Rand McNally, 1967), p. 2 (hereafter cited as Russett, International Regions and the International Sys tem). 62 world. However, very few political scientists have par ticipated in these studies, and thus the concept of region used in them is primarily geographical in nature. Also, since the approaches used in these studies are traditional, their application of the term "subsystem" is less rigorous than would be required by general systems theory in Inter national Relations, which would demand that a variety of operations be carried out to establish the existence of a subsystem. Consequently, only four of these studies are found to be worthy of mention. One of the earliest studies was written in 1952 by Raphael Patai, 4 an anthropologist whose main field of specialization is the Middle East. Patai accurately identified the religious, anthropological, and ecologi cal similarities-which will be discussed later in this chapter-that tend to give unity to the :Muslim world. Thus, his Middle East includes everything from Africa north of Latitude 12° N to Pakistan in the east, and to Turkey in the north. 4 Raphael Patai, "The Middle East as a Culture Area," The Middle East Journal 6, No. 1 (1952): 1-21 (hereafter cited as Patai, "The Middle East as a Culture Area"). A study published in 1957 by Leonard Binder, 5 a political scientist and specialist on the Middle East, argued that Islam as a political ideology could provide a preliminary criterion for delineating the Middle Eastern region: Elsewhere religion tends to reinforce nation alism. The opposition of fundamentalist and tra ditional Islam to nationalism gives a distinctive character to potential alterations or transforma tions of existing political institutions, whether they are traditional or borrowed from the west.6 Accordingly, Binder used the existence of a religious alternative to nationalism and, to a lesser extent, the brief colonial experience as the two most important cri teria by which to delimit the Middle East in terms of the study of comparative government. Although the kind of Islamic state that may arise as an alternative to nationalism remained largely undefined by Binder, he nonetheless listed some of its features. These include, among others: The declaration of the sovereignty of God 5 Leonard Binder, "Prolegomena to the Comparative Study of Middle East Governments," American Political Science Review 51, No. 3 (1957): 651-68. 6 Ibid., p. 652. 63 as the foundation of the legitimacy of its government, the Quran and the traditions of Prophet Mohammad as the laws of the state, and the exclusive eligibility of Mus lims for policy-making positions. 7 The following year Binder produced another study on the subject. 8 To his two previous criteria for de limiting the J ,1iddle East, he now added another: ... the most important characteristic setting apart the Middle East as a subordinate interna tional system is the ideological context of its politics, both domestic and external. On this basis the Middle East proper stretches from Libya to Iran, with fringe areas including Afghanistan, Pakistan, and the Maghrib, and a core area in cluding the Arab states and Israel.9 Among the special features of the Middle Eastern international system listed by Binder are : the common heritage of the Ottoman legal system, the overlapping of 7 Ib id , , p . 6 6 2 . 8 Leonard Binder, "The Middle East as a Subordinate International System," in The Ideological Revolution in the Middle East, ed. Leonard Binder (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1964), pp. 254-78. This article had appeared earlier in World Politics 10, No. 4 (1958): 408-29. 9 Ib id . , p . 2 6 3 . 64 domestic and foreign politics, the political and consti tutional instability, the relative equality of all actors, the paradoxical inadequacy of the diplomatic process, and, except for Israel, the use of Pan-Arabism and Pan Islamism as political symbols. Binder admitted that these characteristics are far from providing a manageable group of systematic rules. His hope, however, was that they would serve to illustrate the distinctive nature of the 10 Middle Eastern system. In addition to Patai the anthropologist and Binder the political scientist, several geographers have recognized the Muslim world both as a distinctive geo- graphic region and as a cultural unit. Among the lead- ing figures in this field . Harm J. De Blij, who in 1971 1.S produced a scholarly wor 1 ~ geographic regions. 11 In on this study De Blij identified 10 international geographic regions, including the : Muslim world. However, he excluded Pakistan and some Muslim African cotmtries south of the Sahara from this region. De Blij recognized that this l O lb 1.· d . , 2 -- 5 p . / . 65 11 Harm J. De Blij, Geography: Regions and Concepts (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1971). region is known by several names: "the Middle East " ' "the dry world," "the Arab world," and "the Muslim world," but since he found none of these designations to be satis factorily inclusive, he opted for a purely geographical term for the region- "North Africa and Southwest Asia." His criteria for delimiting the region are based on geo graphical , cultural, religious, linguistic, historical, 12 and cultural landscape elements. It should be noted here that although there are other studies on the region, most of them have a narrower scope of the Middle East and therefore are excluded from h . . 13 tis review. Application of a t1odel One who chose to study international regions 12 Ibid. , Chap. 10, "North Africa and Southwest Asia , " pp. 373-422. These elements will be mentioned later in this chapter. 13 The most important of these are two studies by 1 · 1ichael Brecher. The first is "International Relations 66 and Asian Studies: The Subordinate State System of South ern As i a , " Wo r 1 d Po 1 i tics 15 , No . 1 ( 19 6 3) : 213 - 3 5 , ill which he compared and contrasted it with the Middle Eastern subordinate state system. The second is "The Middle East Subordinate System and Its Impact on Israel's Foreign Policy," ~nternational Studies Quarterly 13, No. 2 (1969): 117-39. through quantitative analysis is Bruce M. Russett, who in 1967 produced an important work on international political . 14 regions. Russett argued that although there is no agreement on what constitutes the characteristics of an international subsystem, most analysts agree on three criteria: geographical contiguity, interaction, and per ception of belonging to a distinctive cornmunity. 15 He, however, delineated international regions by the following f . . . 16 ive criteria: 1. Social and cultural homogeneity (i.e., simi larity with respect to several kinds of internal attri butes) . 2. Similar political attitudes or external behavior (i.e., voting positions in the United Nations). 3. Political interdependence (i.e., common mem bership in international organizations). 4. Economic interdependence (i.e., intraregional trade as a proportion of the nation's national income). 14 Russett, International Regions and the Inter- national System. 15 Ibid., p. 7. 16 Ibid . , p . 11 . 67 5. Geographical proximity. Using this model and relying on data based on the 1962-63 and earlier world configurations, Russett iden tified six international political regions, of which the last two are only clusters because they do not meet all five criteria. These are: Communist Eastern Europe, Latin America, Western Europe, Non-Communist Asia, the Arab World, and Black Africa. 17 Russett admitted that 18 his approach is not solely a general systems approach, and that his groupings are equivalent to geographers' 19 regional types. However, his definition of region by multiple criteria has provided grounds for its application here. Without going into the complex area of data gathering, which is beyond the scope of this chapter, an attempt will be made here to apply, by a traditional analytical method, each criterion of Russett's model to 17 The Arab World meets all of the criteria except United Nations voting patterns (ibid., pp. 193-94). 18 Ibid., p. 7. 19 rbid., p. 12. 68 the contemporary Muslim world. Also, to facilitate their application, Russett's five criteria are arranged in a different order. Geographical proximity In his discussion of regional delineation Russett considered territorial contiguity to be a necessary if not sufficient condition for the identification of a region. 20 He added that for each major aggregate there is a limited number of states that form the core of the 21 system. The Muslim world forms a solid belt of states that encompasses everything from all of Africa north of Latitude 5° N--with the exception of Ghana and Liberia to Pakistan in the east and to Turkey in the north, with fringe areas including Bangladesh, Malaysia, Indonesia, Maldives, Comoros Islands, and Tanzania, and a core area including all 19 Arab states (see Map 2 below). Excluded from this consideration are the Muslim republics of Soviet 20 rbid., p. 158. 21 Ibid., p. 182. 69 ... A - ... ~ ' LE◄ LIBElllA~ I TOGO EQUATOR Atlantic Ocean lZZJ ARAB ST A TES kfJt:I NON -ARAB ST A TES COMORO ISLANDS / EQUATOR .. • MALDIVES ~. : ·· -:: .. BANGLADESH ·• ... Indian Ocean MAP 2 The Muslim World (k,u.,._s a ~ ~ ~ f.__,-,..,.. _- .. - ···.· ... INDONESlA" .,,..,,_ ~ ~ .. ~, .,___ ~11- ~ 0 Central Asia, the Chinese Muslim province of Sinkiang, and Albania, whose destinies are inseparable from the Communist world; and Kashmir, an autonomous part of India. Within this region there are 46 independent Muslim states with a total population of over 680 million. More than 50 percent of the population of each country is composed of Muslims (see Table 1 below). Except for six African states (Benin, Central African Empire, Ethiopia, Ivory Coast, Tanzania, and Togo), which have not participated in efforts of Pan-Islamism and are not members of the OIC (which will be discussed in Chapter VI), all of them identify themselves as Muslim and perceive themselves as belonging to this distinctive Muslim community. Social and cultural homogeneity In discussing social and cultural homogeneity, Russett pointed out that similarity, rather than identity, of nations in the region is often sufficient to warrant their inclusion in a cultural area. He added that this concept is multidimensional rather than unidimensional, that is, the similarity should be evidenced in more than 71 72 TABLE 1 THE MUSLIM COUNTRIES AND THEIR POPULATIONS Country Afghanis tan Algeria Bahrain Bangladesh Benin•k (formerly Dahomey) Cameroon Central African Empire* (formerly Central African Republic) Chad Comoros Islands Egypt Ethiopia;', Gambia Guinea Guinea-Bissau Indonesia Iran Population (1973 Estimates) 17,900,000 15,700,000 222,000 75,000,000 2,909,240 6,116,690 1,640,000 3,999,000 290,000 35,900,000 26,598,000 384,193 4,259,000 810,000 131,712,500 32,214,836 Percentage of Muslims 99 98 99 85 60 55 55 85 95 93 65 85 95 70 95 98 Country Iraq Ivory Coast-;'~ Jordan Kuwait Lebanon Libya Malaysia Maldives Mali :Mauritania Morocco Niger Nigeria Oman Pakistan People's Yemen Qatar Saudi Arabia TABLE 1--Continued Population (1973 Estimates) 10,164,350 4,515,005 2,555,940 916,200 3,020,800 2,177,700 11,392,400 125,000 5,391,500 1,260,400 16,995,000 4,354,480 79,758,959 750,000 64,892,000 1,516,000 170,000 8,174,920 73 Percentage of Muslims 95 55 95 100 57 100 52 100 90 100 99 91 75 100 97 95 100 100 Country Senegal Sierra Leone Somalia Sudan Syria T . I anzan1.a -;~ Togo·k Tunisia Turkey United Arab Emirates Upper Volta Yemen Total TABLE 1--Continued Population (1973 Estimates) 4,020,000 2,768,585 3,950,000 16,910,600 6,890,000 14,380,000 2,120,000 5,520,800 38,000,000 320,000 5,514,120 6,070,000 680,190,218 Percentage of :t--Iuslims 95 65 100 85 87 65 55 95 99 100 56 99 SOURCE: World Muslim Gazetteer, 1975, 2nd ed. (Karachi: Umma Publishing House, 1975), pp. 977-79 (hereafter cited as World }1uslim Gazetteer). *States that are not members of the OIC. 74 a single set of cultural traits. 22 There are many social and cultural characteristics that are apparent throughout the Muslim world. The most important of these is, of course, the Islamic faith, which, according to von Grtmebaum, represents "the only political value and decidedly the only value that gives the civitas Islamica its raison d'etre." 23 Islam per meates the entire scope of life and holds the ultimate sway over feeling, thinking, and action. It is, as Raphael Patai correctly argued, "a psychological factor of first-class magnitude, lending unfailing spiritual sustenance to all true believers, that is to the over whelming majority of the population." 24 Since Islam is an all-encompassing religion, as already explained in Chapter I, it has had a great influ ence on Muslim culture and tradition. In his excellent 22 Russett, International Regions and the Inter national System, p. 14. 23 von Grunebaum, 1'1odern Is lam, p. 48. 24 Raphael Patai, "Religion in Middle Eastern, Far Eastern, and Wes tern Culture, n South~1es tern Journal of Anthrop~logy 10, No. 3 (1954): 237. 75 25 study, W. 11ontgomery Watt emphasized the integrative capacity of Islam in the political and intellectual lives, as well as in the mores and psyches, of Muslims. Islam is a religion, but it is no less a connnunity whose reli gious ties regulate for each member individually and for all members together the rules and conditions of life. The Shari'ah ("Islamic law"), which has remained static and immutable over the centuries, has promoted uniformity throughout the l1uslim world, not only in the official religious practices, but also in the major institutions of the family and inheritance. This uniformity is not confined to the core area of the region or to the areas that once were parts of the political unity of the urnmah; it is also evident in the peripheral areas where the tendency to increase the application of the Shari'ah has 26 been great. Nor is the influence of Islam limited to Muslims. Non-Muslims who live in the Muslim world are 25 w. Montgomery Watt, Islam and the Integration 76 of Society (Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 1961) . 26 rbid., p. 207. On this point see also J. Spencer Trimingham, The Influence of Islam upon Africa (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1968), pp. 98-99. raised in an Islamic cultural milieu, and they cannot or do not wish to be totally cut off from the Islamic com- 27 munity they live in, identify with, and feel a part of. As already mentioned in Chapter I, nationalism has no deep roots in the Muslim world, especially among the less educated peoples who constitute the overwhelming majority of the population. Hence, there exists among Musl i ms throughout the Muslim world a social and psycho logical attachment to Islam and to the Muslim community. Von Grunebaurn writes: The Muslim community is at the same time the r1uslim commonwealth. The umma is a body politic as well as the body of true believers; it may not have been activated as a unified political org. ani zation for many a century, yet it remains the only true "nation" in ·which a Muslim has membership, a supernational entity without an organization, whose distribution among a number of states is, in the last analysis, accidental and irrelevant.28 In addition to Islam and its manifold socio cultural contributions, the Muslim world is unified by 27 M. Jamil Hanafi, Islam and the Transformation of Culture (New York: Asia Publishing, 1974), p. 17. 28 von Grunebaum, }1odern Islam, p. 48. 77 h . 1 .b R h 1 P · 29 ·d d many ot er interna attri utes. ap ae atai provi e a comprehensive discussion of all social and cultural similarities that characterize the t1uslim world as a distinct cultural unit. Although 25 years have passed since he wrote this work, most of what he said is still valid throughout the Muslim world, and much of the follow ing discussion is based on Patai's findings. It should be stated here that these social and cultural character istics are general, overall features that apply best to the core area, although they exist with some variation from one subregion to another. With the exception of the fringe areas, the Muslim world consists largely of desert and arid lands. The majority of the population is engaged in agriculture and government services, and heavy industrialization is prac tically nonexistent. High rates of illiteracy are common throughout the region, especially among women, and pre college education is dominated by religious indoctrina tion. Free elections and Western-style democracy are nonexistent. Social classes are numerous and distinct. 29 Patai, "The Middle East as a Culture Area." 78 Religious authorities, sharifs and saiyids ("religious nobilities"), have a respected place in the society. The family unit, headed by the father, is the focal point of Muslim culture. Upon the death of the father, the oldest son, regardless of his wishes, becomes the head of the family with all its responsibilities and honors. The family is usually large, patriarchal, and patrilineal. The relationship between men and women is governed by a rigid code of ethical ideals and double standard sex mores in which emphasis is placed on female "purity" and chastity, both premarital and postmarital. The Muslim world is pervaded by a variety of well known superstitions, such as the feared evil eye of "bad" people and the belief in such demons as jinns, ghouls, afrits, spirits, and other beings, which are believed to be constantly interfering with the lives of the people. The worship of spots marked by stones or trees, which are believed to be the tombs of saints, to acquire baraka ("holiness") is also a common practice. Arabic, the language of the Quran, is widely understood beyond the core area and its scripts are used in many non-Arab states including Iran, Afghanistan, 79 Pakistan, and 1'1alaysia. Also, Arab names are corrnnonly used beyond the Arab region. And the veil, a traditional article of clothing for Muslim women, is still worn in villages all over the Muslim world. Finally, as De Blij pointed out, the region has its distinct cultural landscapes. Muslim mosques, mina rets, bazaars, streets, architecture, and roads combine to produce an intangible atmosphere of smells, sounds, and sights that are unique to the region. Political interdependence (sharing membership in international organizations) Russett stated that nations usually share cormnon formal bonds in the shape of intergovernmental organiza- 30 tions that are created for a variety of purposes. Since Part II of this dissertation is devoted to Pan-Islamism and its efforts to establish international organizations in the Muslim world, it is sufficient here to mention the names of the various t- 1us lim organizations a.ri.d their functions. 3 o I · 1 R . d th I t Russett, nternationa egions an e n er- national System, p. 94. 80 The Muslim states share common memberships in different intergovernmental and nongovernmental inter national organizations, all of which have one primary goal: to promote cooperation and understanding in all fields and to strengthen common bonds among all Muslim states. The oldest of these organizations is Mo'tamar al-Alam al-Islami or World Muslim Congress (WMC), which was founded in 1926 in Mecca and has maintained its head quarters in Karachi since 1949. The WMC has been active ever since its creation in promoting political, economic, cultural, and social cooperation among all }1uslims. 31 Another important organization is Rabetat al-Alam al Islami or ,~orld 11uslim League (WML), which was created in 1962 with headquarters in Mecca to promote Islamic soli darity, with an emphasis on disseminating Islamic values and eliminating all ideologies that are inconsistent with Is lam in all :Muslim countries . 32 Although the WMC and WML are nongovernmental, 31 world Muslim Gazetteer, pp. 647-48. 32 world Muslim League, Rabetat Al-Alam Al-Islami: An Introduction (Mecca: World Muslim League, n.d.), p. 2 (hereafter cited as WML, Rabetat: An Introduction). 81 they nonetheless have fostered cooperation among the Muslim states and helped to pave the way for the creation of several intergovernmental organizations in the Muslim world. The first and most important of these is an inter national political organization called the Organization of the Islamic Conference or OIC, which was founded in 82 1969 in the wake of the burning of al-Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem under Israeli occupation. The burning of this third holiest shrine in Islam sent a wave of shock through out the Muslim world and resulted in the world's first Islamic summit conference in Rabat in 1969. A general secretariat for the OIC was established in 1970 in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. This organization, which holds its annual sessions at the foreign ministers' level, was established for several purposes: . to consolidate cooperation among merrher states in the economic, social, cultural, scien tific and other vital fields of activities, and to carry out consultations amonj member states in international organizations. 3 33 General Secretariat of the Organization of the Islamic Conference, Mithag Al-Motamar Al-Islami [Charter of the Islamic Conference] (Jeddah: General Secretariat of the OIC [1972]), p. 3 (hereafter cited as General Sec retariat, Charter of the Islamic Conference). My transla tion from Arabic. 83 Following the 1973 Arab-Israeli war and the successful oil embargo, the ore held a second Islamic summit meeting in Lahore, Pakistan in 1974 to further strengthen solidarity and cooperation among the Islamic states. As of 1976, this organization has 43 members. These include all the states listed in Table 1 above (with the exception of the six African states), the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), Gabon (45 percent Muslim) , 34 and Uganda (40 percent Muslim) . 35 Ever since its establishment, the ore has been active in the creation of several new independent inter governmental organizations to perform various functions for the Islamic countries. The first of these is the International Islamic News Agency (IINA), established in 1972 with headquarters in Jeddah. Among its various objectives and functions is "to collect and distribute . f . f . I 1 · · " 36 in ormation o interest to s amic countries. The 34 world Muslim Gazetteer, p. 983. 35 Ibid. , p. 9 84. 36 rnternational Islamic News Agency, "General Assembly of IINA Held in Kuala Lumpur August 16-17, 1972: Statute of International Islamic News Agency" (unpublished report, Jeddah, 1972), p. 1. 84 second is the Islamic Development Bank, established in 1974 with headquarters in Jeddah. The purpose of this bank is to "foster economic development and social progress of member countries and Muslim communities individually as well as jointly in accordance with the principles of the Shari'ah (Islamic Law) . 1137 The last is the Islamic Broadcasting Organization, established in 1975 with head quarters in Jeddah. The objectives of this organization include, among others, the spreading of the Islamic call (da'wa) and the promotion of Islamic causes around the world. 38 Efforts are now being made by the OIC to establish the following: an Islamic institution for science; a statistical, economic, and social research center for the Islamic countries; and a center for history, art, and 37 Islamic Development Bank, Al-Bunk Al-Islami Littanrnyah: Ittifagyiat At-ta'seese [Islamic Development Bank: Articles of Agreement] (Jeddah: Islamic Develop ment Bank [1974]), p. 6 (hereafter cited as Islamic Development Bank, Articles of Agreement). ~1y translation from Arabic. 38 secretariat General de l'Organisation de la Conference Islamique, "Projet de reglement de l'organisa tion des radiodiffusions des etats islamiques" (unpublished report, Jeddah, 1975), p. 1 (hereafter cited as Secretariat General, "Projet des radiodiffusions"). Islamic culture in Istanbui. 39 Political attitudes or external behavior In discussing the similarity of political atti tudes, Russett pointed out that his primary objective and one admittedly very difficult to achieve-was to determine the similarity of people's attitudes, especially the political attitudes. 40 Hence, he relied on roll-call votes in the United Nations General Assembly as the best available tool to measure the political attitudes or external behavior of nations. 41 Russett concentrated on five superissues considered before the eighteenth session of the United Nations General Assembly in 1963: the Cold 39 General Secretariat of the Organization of the Islamic Conference, "Joint Communique of the Seventh Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers Held in Istanbul, Republic of Turkey from 13-16 Jamad Al-Awwal, 1396 H. (12-15th May, 1976)" (unpublished report, Jeddah, 1976), p. 1 (hereafter cited aa General Secretariat, "Joint Communique of the Seventh Islamic Conference 0 ). 40 Russett, International Regions and the Inter national System, p. 59. As explained earlier, the over whelming majority of :Muslims owe their first allegiance to Islam, and there exists among them a psychological attach ment to the world community of Islam. 41 Ibid., p. 60. 85 War, intervention in Africa, supranationalism, Palestine, d lf d . . 42 an se - etermination. Although there is no study available dealing specifically with Muslim states' voting behavior in the United Nations General Assembly, there are nonetheless some studies that have proved to be very helpful. The most important of these are two studies that focus on the voting behavior of the developing nations in the United Nations General Assembly. In the first study, David Kay 43 examined the role of the Afro-Asian nations (the majority of which are Muslim) that were not original members of the United Nations. These include all Muslim states except Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Syria, and Turkey, and there can hardly be any doubt as to how these nations would vote on the same issues confronting the Afro-Asian states. Kay indicated that these new member nations have a connnon core of characteristics that vitally affect their 42 Ib~d., 64 65 ~ pp . - . 43 navid A. Kay, The New Nations in the United Nations: 1960-1967 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1970) (hereafter cited as Kay, The New Nations). 86 participation in the political process of the United Nations. They are nonwhite, underdeveloped, opposed to imperialism and racism, and in favor of equal rights, 44 self-determination, and economic aid and development. Kay added that because of their position as a majority in the General Assembly, they have substantially altered the nature of the United Nations political process to their own advantage. Thanks to the new nations, the major issues of East-West confrontation in the United Nations have been replaced by different issues of North- South, 45 Developed-Underdeveloped nature. }1ehrunnisa Ali, 46 on the other hand, studied the voting behavior of the Third World (Afro-Asian and Latin American states) on five important issues considered by the twenty-ninth session of the United Nations General Assembly in 1974, at which time the :Muslim states con stituted 60 percent of the Afro-Asian bloc and 45 percent 44 Kay, The New Nations, pp. 181-82. 45 rbid., p. 182. 87 46 Mehrunnisa Ali, "The Third World and Some Politi cal Problems in the UN General Assembly," Pakistan Horizon 28, No. 1 (1975): 30-52 (hereafter cited as Ali, "The Third World"). 47 of the larger Third World bloc in the General Assembly. The five issues rwere: Palestine, South Africa, economic rights of the developing nations, Korea, and Cambodia. 48 Ali found the Third World nations to be unified in their alignment on the first three issues, but unable to take a joint stand on the last two because of different indi- 49 vidual interests and concerns. The Muslim states may not always vote alike on every single issue, as is obviously the case in every other group or bloc, but they share similar political attitudes on the major issues that are of great concern to them. These include: the right of the Palestinians and their struggle; Israeli annexation and Judaization of Arab lands, especially Jerusalem; and the problems of Eritrea, Kashmir, Turkish Cypriots , and Filipino ~1us lims . In addition to these "Muslim issues," there are other issues, such as human rights, imperialism, self determination, racism, development, the right to their 47 calculated by the author from Ali's list (ibid., pp. 49-52). 48 rbid. , p. 35. 49 lb id. , p. 44. 88 natural resources, and the need for a new international economic order, that are of concern to them as well as to the larger Third World. Most of the resolutions that the Muslim states have voted for in the United Nations General Assembly had been previously approved by them at the annual foreign ministers' session of the OIC, which is usually held a 89 few months before the yearly session of the United Nations. The second Islamic summit meeting committed all OIC member states to adopt a joint stand on all issues in the United Nations General Assembly and other inter- . 1 b d. 5 0 nat1.ona o 1.es. Also, the fifth Islamic foreign min- isters' conference in Kuala Lumpur committed all member states to support each other's candidacies for election to international posts at the United Nations and other international organizations. 51 In addition, the sixth 50 General Secretariat of the Organization of the Islamic Conference, Mage'mo'ut Gararat Wa Bayanat Motamarat Munazzamut Al-Motamar Al-Islami Min Ar-Rabat Ela Kuala Lumpur [Declarations and Resolutions of the Conferences of the Organization of the Islamic Conference from Rabat to Kuala Lumpur] (Jeddah: General Secretariat of the OIC [1974]), p. 49 (hereafter cited as General Secretariat, Declarations and Resolutions). 51 Ib 1.· d . , 10 9 11 pp. - . Islamic conference of foreign ministers in 1975 passed a unanimous resolution committing all member states to support the efforts of the developing nations at the United Nations General Assembly to institute a new inter- . 1 . d 52 nationa economic or er. Furthermore, the seventh Islamic conference of foreign ministers in Istanbul passed a unanimous resolution calling on France to comply with the United Nations resolution of December 11, 1975, which all member states of the OIC had already supported, to grant immediate and unconditional independence to the 53 Somalic Coast. On the other hand, the Muslim states voted in 1974 for three important resolutions in the United Nations 90 52 secretariat General de l'Organisation de la Conference Islamique, "Resolutions economiques adoptees par la sixieme conference islamique des ministres des affairs ~trangeres tenue a Djeddah du 3 au 6 rajab, 1395 H. (12-15 juillet 1975") (unpublished report, Jeddah, 1975), p. 10 (hereafter cited as Secretariat General, "Resolutions ~conomiques adoptees par la sixieme conference"). 53 General Secretariat of the Organization of the Islamic Conference, "Political Resolutions Adopted by the Seventh Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers Held in Istanbul, Republic of Turkey from 13-16 Jamad Al-Awwal, 1396 H. (12-15 May, 1976)" (unpublished report, Jeddah, 1976), p. 16 (hereafter cited as General Secretariat, "Political Resolutions Adopted by the Seventh Islamic Conference"). General Assembly in support of the PLO. The three reso lutions, which were approved by the United Nations General Assembly, involved: inviting the PLO to participate in the United Nations debates on the Palestine question, granting the PLO observer status in the General Assembly, and confirming the right of the Palestinians to self- d . . 54 eterm1.nat1.on. In addition, the Muslim states voted f th . . h f h d 1 · · 55 d or e economic rig ts o t e eve oping countries an 56 the ouster of South Africa from the General Assembly. Also in the same year in Paris they voted for two UNESCO resolutions condemning Israel, cutting off aid to it, and barring it from full membership in UNESCo. 57 During the thirtieth session of the United Nations General Assembly in 1975, the Muslim states voted for several anti-Israeli and pro-Palestinian resolutions, the most famous of which was a resolution condemning Zionism as a form of racial discrimination. The resolution passed 54 Ali, "The Third World," pp. 35-39. 55 Ibid., p. 46. 56 Ibi·d., 40 41 pp. - . 5 7 Ibid. , p. 36. 91 by a vote of 72-35, with 32 abstentions. 58 Equating Zionism with racism was first advocated by the first Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers in 1970. 59 In 1976 the :Muslim states voted for a General Assembly resolution endorsing a plan to establish a Pales tinian homeland in the Israeli-occupied West Bank and the Gaza Strip. This resolution passed by a vote of 90-16, with 30 abstentions. 60 And in the same year in Nairobi they voted for two UNESCO resolutions condemning Israeli cultural and educational violations in occupied Arab territories and the continuing Israeli archeological ex cavation in Jerusalem. 61 Furthermore, the Islamic states formed a consultative group to enhance the coordination 58 "United Nations," 1976 Britannica Book of the Year (Chicago: Encyclopaedia Britannica, 1976), p. 689. 59 General Secretariat, Declarations and Resolu tions, p. 18. 60 "u.N. Assembly Backs Palestinian State," Los Angeles Times, November 25, 1976, Part I, p. 8. The Islamic states had already passed a similar unanimous resolution in their 1975 foreign ministers' conference in Jeddah. 61 "UNESCO Ends Controversial Nairobi Session," Los Angeles Times, December 1, 1976, Part I, p. 26. 92 of their positions and protection of their interests at the world Third Conference of the Law of the Sea held in New York City in 1976. 62 Finally, to solidify their grouping as a bloc in the United Nations General Assembly, the Muslim states in 1975 appliPd for an observer status for their OIC at the United Nations, 63 which ,~as later granted. Although Russett did not explicitly require that the states of a particular region form a bloc in the United Nations Gen eral Assembly, it is fairly clear from the OIC resolutions and from Kay's and Ali's studies that the Muslim states form a sub-bloc within the Afro-Asian bloc in the General Assembly. Economic interdependence Russett's last criterion for a subsystem is trade 62 General Secretariat, "Joint Communique of the Seventh Islamic Conference," p. 14. 63 secretariat General de l'Organisation de la Conference Islamique, "Resolutions politiques adoptees par la sixieme conference islamique des ministres des affairs etrangeres tenue a Djeddah du 3 au 6 rajab, 1395 H. (12-15 juillet 1975)" (unpublished report, Jeddah, 1975), p. 37 (hereafter cited as Secr~tariat General, "Resolutions politiques adoptees par la sixieme conference"). 93 relations. To focus on clustering as a function of eco nomic interdependence, he looked at virtually all possible pairs of states in the international system of 1963 and measured their interdependence on the basis of a ratio between trade (exports plus imports) and gross domestic product. He computed the economic interdependence of every country with each of its trading partners by divid ing the sum of their exports to each other by the gross 64 domestic product of each. Data on intraregional trade as a proportion of the Muslim states' national income are simply not avail able. Nor are there any available statistics on intra regional foreign aid, investment, receipts from tourism, or shipping that would reveal some aspects of economic interdependence. It must be admitted here that the development of such statistical data is beyond the scope of this chapter, and without such data it is impossible to determine whether the Muslim world meets this last criterion. Available information on economic interaction and 64 Russett, International Regions and the Inter national System, pp. 127-28. 94 cooperation among Muslim countries is limited and does not reveal much. In addition to the already mentioned Islamic Development Bank, which was established in 1974, the Muslim states established in the same year, within the ore, an Islamic Solidarity Fund to finance various proj- . h I 1 . . 65 ects int e s amic countries. However, data on the performance of the bank and the fund are not yet avail able. In addition to these two economic institutions, the Lahore summit meeting established a eonnnittee of Representatives and Experts to promote cooperation in the economic field among the Muslim nations. 66 Also, the Department of Economic Affairs of the General Secretariat of the ore concerns itself with preparing proposals on economic cooperation and technical assistance among member states to be considered at the annual sessions of the ore. The economic resolutions of the fifth, sixth, and seventh Islamic conferences of foreign ministers have also com mitted the Islamic countries to promote mutual trade, investment, technical cooperation, and joint ventures in 65 General Secretariat, Declarations and Resolu tions, p. 105. 66 rb id. , p. 94. 95 the industrial field. However, the effects of these reso lutions remain to be seen. Russett's Model and the Muslim World From the above discussion, it is clear that had it not been for the various efforts of Pan-Islamism that began in 1969, the Muslim world would not have qualified for the application of Russett's subsystem model. The establishment of the OIC has not only promoted political and economic cooperation among the Islamic states, but also resulted in the creation of several intergovernmental organizations with a variety of functions. This does not mean that the Muslim world has become united. In fact, it is no more united than Latin America or non-Connnunist Asia, both of which were identified by Russett as sub systems. The application of Russett's model to the Muslim world in this chapter reveals that the first three cri teria-territorial contiguity, relative cultural homo geneity, and common membership in international organi zations-are met without difficulty. The fourth cri terion, however-United Nations voting patterns-is less 96 than adequately met because no direct information is available on the voting behavior of Muslim states in the United Nations General Assembly. And because of the lack of data for the last criterion-economic interdependence no judgment can be made. According to Russett, if one or two criteria are not met, the aggregate cannot be con sidered a subsystem or "all-purpose" region, and should 67 be viewed only as a cluster. Hence, it is the conclu- sion of this chapter that the contemporary :Muslim world constitutes, according to Russett's model, a cluster of countries within the global political system. However, as already explained at the beginning of this chapter, most analysts agree that the three most important criteria for the identification of a subsystem are interaction, perception of belonging to a distinctive community, and geographical contiguity, and that this last criterion, in Russett's view, represents a necessary if not sufficient condition for the identification of a region. Then, on the basis of the information supplied in this chapter, the : Muslim world meets these three 67 Russett, International Regions and the Inter national System, p. 182. 97 criteria and thus would be identified as a subsystem. Although Russett's model was applied here by traditional methods, the use of quantitative analysis probably would have produced similar results; in the case of the last two criteria-United Nations voting patterns and trade relations-even better findings might have resulted from quantitative analysis. The difficulty of making an unambiguous identi fication of the Muslim world reveals the need for further research in the field of international relations on the concept of subsystem as it relates to this group of nations. 98 P A R T I I PAN-ISLAMISi'1 99 CHAPTER IV THE PAN-ISLAMIC MOVE?1ENT Definition and Nineteenth Century Background Pan-Islamism is of two kinds, religious and political. In its religious aspect, as the reaffirmation of the applicability of Islamic law to all matters per taining to human life, it opposes the rise of seculari zation in Muslim countries. On the political side, it is the reassertion of the political unity of the Muslim world. Thus its goal is to promote unity among the Islamic states in order to reestablish a single t1uslim . 1 community. The history of Pan-Islamism dates back to the 1 Berger, The Arab World Today, p. 317. 100 101 second half of the nineteenth century, when the t1uslim world was plagued by religious and social decadence and by political divisions resulting from the rise of nation alism and the penetration of European colonial powers into h O d . 2 t e ttoman omains. Pan-Islamism launched its efforts to save the ?1uslim world from disintegration in two simul taneous movements. While the first movement combined politics and religion, the second was purely political. Al-Afghani's movement The founder and inspiration of Pan-Islamism was the great reformer, Jamal al-Din al-Afghani (1839-1897). Al-Afghani's Pan-Islamic movement was both religious and political. On the religious side, he appealed for the purification of Islamic belief and practice, the moderni zation and extension of education, and the raising of intellectual standards. On the political side, he called for Islamic unity far beyond the Ottoman frontiers and urged resistance to the European colonial powers. However, 2 For some of the arguments concerning the specific origins of Pan-Islamism, see Dwight E. Lee, "The Origins of Pan-Islamism," American Historical Review 47, No. 1 (1942): 278-87. because of foreign domination and the rising forces of nationalism throughout the Muslim world, al-Afghani failed in his call for Islamic unity. His campaigns th oughout the Muslim world nevertheless stirred Muslim nationalist feeling and contributed to both the Arabi uprising in Egypt and the Persian revolution. And his influence continued to be manifested in the more recent popular movements that combined political programs with Islamic fundamentalism, such as the "Muslim Brethren" 3 movement in Egypt. Abdul-Hamid's movement The second Pan-Islamic movement was launched by 102 the Ottoman Sultan Abdul-Hamid II (1876-1909) as a response to such European movements as Pan-Germanism and Pan Slavism. He looked upon the Pan-Islamic movement as a way to mobilize opinion all over the Muslim world in support of the faltering Ottoman state and to provide it with the alliances that it needed in its time of 3 H. A. R. Gibb, Mohannnedanism: An Historical Survey, 2nd ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1971), p. 120 (hereafter cited as Gibb, Mohannnedanism). 103 4 weakness. Abdul-Hamid used Pan-Islamism as a political instrument to fight both the encroachment of European colonial po-wers and the rise of Arab nationalism. How ever, he failed on both counts, not only because of Euro pean force, but also because his primary aim was to exploit the Pan-Islamic sentiment for purely Turkish purposes. 5 The Decline of Pan-Islamism In 1908 the spirit and cause of Pan-Islamism suffered a setback when a secular revolt against Abdul Hamid brought to power a nationalist movement that stressed Turkish rather than Islamic sentiment and tradition. The new regime continued to suppress Arab nationalism in the name of Ottoman national unity rather than in the inter ests of Pan-Islamism. Furthermore, the dreams of Pan-Islarnists were 4 Bernard Lewis, "The Return of Islam," Commentary 61, No. 1 (1976): 45. 5 T. Cuyler Young, "Pan-Islamism in the Modern World: Solidarity and Conflict Among Muslim Countries," in Islam and International Relations, ed. J. Harris Proctor (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1965), pp. 194-95 (here after cited as Young, "Pan-Islarnisrn in the Modern World"). 104 shattered by the harsh reality of World War I. In 1914, the Ottoman caliph, who ·was siding with the Central Powers, called upon all Muslims-including the Arabs-to join him in a jihad ("holy war") against the "infidel" British, French, and Russians. Not only did the Muslims of Africa and Asia fail to respond to his call; the Arabs-seduced by British promises of independence-sided with Britain against the Turkish forces. Finally, the Pan-Islamic movement, which was already severely weakened, received its death blow in 1924 when the Turkish revolutionary leader, Mustafa Kemal, shocked the Muslim world by abolishing the office of the caliphate. By this action, he destroyed the institutional basis of Pan-Islamic ideology. Kemal rejected the demand o± the Muslim world that he himself assume the position of caliph. His reply to the Muslim world was that the caliphate had degenerated into an ineffective institution and that the Muslim countries should first become inde pendent, then form a league of Muslim states the head of which might be called caliph. 6 As a result of Kemal's actions religious authorities from all over the Muslim 6 world Muslim Gazetteer, p. 846. world gathered in Cairo in 1926 at the invitation of the University Mosque of al-Azhar to discuss the perplexing issue of the caliphate. After a week of deliberation the congress declared that the caliphate was incapable of realization because of the prevailing divisions in the Muslim world. 7 The Revival of Pan-Islamism The entire pattern and atmosphere of Pan-Islamism changed drastically with the abolition of the caliphate and the establishment of a secular state in Turkey, to gether with the concomitant self-absorption of Arab nationalism. After the collapse of the Ottoman Empire the Muslim world was in a shambles. Most of the Muslim world was colonized, and each Muslim country was involved in its own internal problems. Preoccupation with the struggle against colonialism and the rising forces of nationalism throughout the Muslim world made Pan-Islamism 105 7 see Arnold J. Toynbee, "The Caliphate Congress (Mu'tamaru'l-Khilafah) Held in Cairo on the 13th-19th May, 1926," in Arnold J. Toynbee, "The Islamic World Since the Peace Settlement," Survey of International Affairs 1, 1925 (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1927): 81-91. 106 inconceivable. Attempts to reactivate Pan-Islamism or to express Islamic unity on political or other levels failed, and the unity of the Muslim world became only a dream. Thus Pan-Islamism existed only as a sentiment of cohesion. It was not cohesion itself, or any political or institu tional expression of it; Islam had finally lost the strug gle to nationalism. The revival of the Pan-Islamic movement was spora dic and confused, and had little to do with any hope of unified or widespread political power or organization. Rather, Pan-Islamists were generally concerned with the religious and cultural rehabilitation of the total com munity of Islam. Their efforts to display Muslim soli darity on a popular level resulted in the creation of the Mo'tamar al-Alam al-Islami or World Muslim Congress (WMC), a nongovernmental body. From 1926, when it was first convened, to 1967 the WMC held seven congresses in different parts of the Muslim world to dis uss a variety of issues unrelated to political unity. Each congress was an independent entity and was not officially attended except perhaps by the host country. The World Muslim Congress: An Historical Survey The first congress (Mecca: June 7-July 5, 1926) 8 The first meeting of the W11C was arranged by King Abdul-Aziz Ibn Saud, who wished to use the congress as an opportunity to gain the support of the rest of the Muslim world for his conquest of the Hijaz and its holy cities, Mecca and t1edina. In his invitation to the con gress, Ibn Saud declared that the objectives of the con gress were to promote the well-being of the Hijaz and its citizens and the security of pilgrims, and to fulfill his previous undertakings to refer the destiny of Mecca and 11edina to the decision of the entire : Muslim world. Thus, Ibn Saud implicitly excluded from the agenda the question of the caliphate, which had been discussed three weeks earlier in Cairo. His invitations to the congress were sent to the goven1ments of four independent Islamic 8 For more details on this congress see Arnold J. 107 Toynbee, "The Proclamation of Sultan 'Abdu'l-Aziz B. Sa'ud as King of the Hijaz and the Islamic Congress at Mecca (1926)," in ibid., pp. 308-19, from which the following information is derived. 108 countries: Afghanistan, Yemen, Persia, and Turkey; to one Islamic leader-Amir Abdul-Karim of Morocco--who was independent de facto but not de jure; to another Islamic leader- the Bey of Tunis--who was under the protectorate of the French government; to two Muslim official bodies the Central Religious Directorate for the Muslims of Central Asia and the Supreme Muslim Council of Palestine; to five private Muslim associations-two in the Dutch East Indies and three in British India; and to three religious dignitaries-two in Damascus and one in Algiers. The congress, however, was opened with 60 dele gates. Except for Ibn Saud's delegation and the dele gation representing the Muslims of the Soviet Union, all these delegates attended without official status. The Turkish government, which had accepted Ibn Saud's invitation, had delayed in sending its delegation and the other governments had not replied to the invitation. Turkey, Egypt, Afghanistan, and Yemen joined the congress after the first week of its deliberations. Only Persia refused to attend. In his inaugural address, which was read out for him by Shaykh Hafiz Wahbah, Ibn Saud showed statesmanship by imposing only one limitation upon the freedom of discussion, which was that the congress should confine its attention to the affairs of the Hijaz and not concern itself with international issues or with questions between Muslim peoples outside the Hijaz and their respective governments. However, Ibn Saud trans gressed his own ruling by causing a resolution to be moved regarding the status of "Aqabah and Ma'an"-two places on the borders between the lii.jaz and Transjordan that, a year earlier, had been expressly claimed by the British government in its capacity as a mandatory power over Transjordan. The resolution, which was proposed by the Syro-Egyptian Sayyid 11uhammad Rashid Rida and sec onded by the Indian Khalifat Committee delegation, asserted that historically "Aqabah and Ma' an" were inalienable parts of the Hijaz and that their annexation to Transjordan-a country under the mandate of a non Muslim power--constituted a direct violation of Prophet Mohammad's dying injunctions. The resolution committed the congress to protest the annexation and asked Ibn Saud to do everything in his power to restore the two places to their previous status. Although the resolution 109 was carried, it was noteworthy that the Afghan and Turk ish delegations abstained from the discussion, while the Egyptian official delegation not only refused to join in this resolution on the ground that it was outside the scope of the agenda, but also withdrew from the room when the question was being discussed. While the Indian Khalifat Connnittee delegation stood by Ibn Saud on this international issue, it dis agreed with him on several religious issues, such as its insistence that a fixed tariff be introduced for charges payable by pilgrims, and that the local government should be accountable to the Muslim world for the revenues it derived from the pilgrim traffic. But Ibn Saud defeated all efforts by other delegations to interfere in the internal affairs of his country. However~ religious and political controversies were not the main features of the congress. The dele gations spent most of their time, attention, and energy in promoting the material well-being of the pilgrims by discussing noncontroversial, factual details of public administration. While it was recognized that the public security measures established in the Hijaz by Ibn Saud 110 111 were effective, there was much dissatisfaction with hygienic conditions. A Palestinian delegate drew an unfavorable comparison between the indifference toward the health and convenience of Muslim pilgrims in the Hijaz and the care taken of Christian pilgrims at Jeru salem . The congress thereupon adopted a series of reso lutions, moved by one of the official Egyptian delegates, aimed at making comprehensive provisions for the pilgrimsr welfare. The governments and the Muslim communities of the countries from which pilgrims came were urged to found permanent hospitals in the Hijaz and to send medi cal missions every year during the pilgrimage. Detailed proposals were made for the organization, during the pilgrimage period, of first-aid patrols; for the opening of dispensaries; for the building of sanitary slaughter houses and latrines; and for the improvement of the water supply. The congress showed that the enlightened, realistic humanitarianism of the educated Muslims had gained an influence over its members by adopting an antislavery resolution moved by the leading representative of the Association of Indian Ulama. A commission was appointed to inquire into slavery and the slave trade in the Hijaz and to present to Ibn Saud's government its proposals for their suppression, insofar as they were in conflict with Islamic law. Although the congress took a keen interest in its own organization and procedures by adopting Arabic as its official language, and decided that each delegation should employ as its spokesman the best Arabist among its 1nembers, the Indian Khalifat Committee delegation ignored the motion and repeatedly addressed the rest of the delegates in Urdu and English. The congress constituted itself as a permanent organizat~on, called the World Muslim Congress, which was to assemble annually at Mecca and to extend its -scope from the holy places and the pilgrimage to Muslim 112 issues in general. The Muslim world was mapped out into areas that were to be entitled to separate representation. A draft committee was also appointed, and the official delegations from Turkey, Afghanistan, Egypt, and Yemen were asked to present their suggestions to this com mittee. Before adjourning, the congress appointed a provisional standing committee and arranged for the subsequent election of a permanent standing connnittee of six members that was composed of a Turkish railway engineer, an Egyptian architect, an Indian financier, a Syro-Palestinian educator, and two other experts in hygiene and law 'tvho were to be the connnon representatives of the Hijaz and Najd. However, the Egyptian, Afghan, and Turkish official delegations announced that the appointment of this committee was beyond the scope of their instructions. The Yemeni and Egyptian delegates also declared that they did not regard themselves as bound by the terms of Ibn Saud's message to the congress, in which he had set forth his line of conduct in politi cal and religious matters. Nonetheless, the Mecca congress had proved to be a success by producing the first signs of unity within a tiuslim world recovering from internal disintegration and colonial rule. From Ibn Saud's point of view, the congress had achieved its purpose by giving explicit and implicit recognition for his Hijaz conquest from many Muslim states, and by producing an amicable modus vivendi with the Islamic world. 113 The second congress (Jerusalem: December 6-16, 1931)9 The connnittee that had been formed five years earlier by the : Mecca congress to make it a permanent body was never called into existence, partly through the reluctance of the Muslim governments to commit themselves to membership in a permanent organization of this sort, and partly because Ibn Saud himself did not reap the advantages he had hoped for from the holding of the first congress. The field was thus opened for a new initiative, and the opportunity was seized by al-Hajj :Mohammad Amin 1 H · d f .lO f J 1 d "d f a - usayni, gran mu ti o erusa em an presi ent o the Supreme Muslim Council of Palestine, acting in con cert with Mr . Shawkat Ali, the leader of the Indian Khalifat Committee. The beginning of their collaboration went back to the Arab outbreak in Palestine in August 1929 when concern throughout the Muslim world found 9 For more details on the congress see H. A. R. 114 Gibb, "The Islamic Congress at Jerusalem in December 1931," Survey of International Affairs (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1934), pp. 99-109, from which the following material is taken. lOR 1 · . 1 d e igious ea er. practical expression in the widespread support given to the Arab rights in Palestine against the Zionist intru sion. The actual decision to convene the congress was made earlier in the year, at a moment when Muslim feeling was running high over the situation in Palestine follow ing the British prime minister's letter of February 13, 1931, to the Zionist leader Chaim Weizmann concerning the establishment of a Jewish homeland in Palestine. At a meeting of the Supreme Muslim Council held in July 1931, Hajj Mohammad A. al-Husayni was authorized to send out invitations to the congress, the purpose of which was declared to be the investigation of the actual situation of Islam and the measures to be taken in de fense of its interests. The invitations, which were sent in October, were marked by two new features of some significance. In addition to the invitations sent to the rulers of Muslim countries, to different political and religious bodies (including the Indian Khalifat Committee and the ,-1afdist party in Egypt), and to promi nent individuals, invitations were issued to all Muslim associations that had sprung up throughout the Arab world during the 1920s, and also to the Shi'ite ulama of Iraq 115 and Syria. This invitation to the Shi'ah to participate in the congress was a striking innovation, inasmuch as it was the first outward manifestation of a new spirit of cooperation- born in part of common adversity- among all ?1uslims. However, the announcement of the congress and the issuing of invitations invoked a mixed reaction. The ambiguous phrasing of Mr. Shawkat Ali's public declara tion gave rise to speculation as to the exact purposes for which the congress had been convened, and a rumor was circulated that it was intended to reopen the question of the caliphate and to nominate the Turkish former caliph Abdul-Majid Efendi for the position of caliph. This rumor was met with strong opposition, and although 116 it was explicitly denied by the organizers of the congress themselves, it remained a stumbling block in their way. Nor did the exact definition of the matters to be laid before the congress succeed in allaying the fears of the opposition forces. On the one hand, the al-Azhar ulama were strongly averse to the project of establishing an Islamic university in Jerusalem. On the other hand, a vocal section of modernist opinion in Cairo declared 117 that the congress was reactionary and in conflict with the modern evolution toward national states. These expressions were naturally echoed in Turkey, where the minister of foreign affairs declared in the Great National Assembly that Turkey would have nothing to do with the congress, as such undertakings were of no value to any Muslim country, and would instead distract the Islamic nations from pursuing the true path of political and economic progress. He added that any external or internal policy that used Islam as a political weapon would be vigorously opposed by the Turkish government. The other Muslim governments obviously also had some reservations, for they hesitated to respond to the invitation and made various inquiries from their repre sentatives and the authorities in Palestine. As the Mandatory Government had not been officially consulted before the convening of the congress, Hajj Mohammad A. al Husayni was summoned before the British high commissioner to define the objectives of the congress, and was warned that the British government would not allow the conven ing of a congress at which questions might be raised affecting the external or internal affairs of friendly 118 powers. Of all the Arab rulers, the Imam of Yemen was the only one to respond promptly in a favorable manner. But when the congress assembled on December 6, not only Iraq, Transjordan, and Egypt participated, but also a representative sent by Ibn Saud on his own behalf. The various Islamic associations also participated almost without exception, and the Shi'ite groups (except that of India) sent their representatives. Other delegates came from Tunisia, Nigeria, Algeria, Persia, Morocco, Libya, Indonesia, Ceylon, India, Chinese Turkistan, the Caucasus, Yugoslavia, and the Urals. Despite the earlier warning of the British gov ernment, the congress not only expressed itself strongly on the Zionist question, but also protested vigorously against British, French, and Italian colonization of t1uslim countries and the antireligious policy of the Russian government. This attack on European colonialism resulted in the expulsion of the outspoken Egypt::..an representative, Abdul-Rahman Bey Azzam, from Palestine. Eight connnittees were formed to study and report on matters relating to: the statutes of the congress, its propaganda and publications, finance and organization, Islamic culture and the proposed Islamic university in Jerusalem, the Hijaz railway, the holy places of Pales tine, propagation and guidance of Islamic teachings, and other proposals laid before the congress. These reports were subsequently discussed in general meetings, and were all approved without exception. The main recommen dations adopted by the congress, however, related to its own constitution, which contained 17 articles, and the establishment of an Islamic university in Jerusalem. The constitution defined the objectives of the congress as: cultivation of the spirit of cooperation among Mus lims, protection of Muslim interests and holy places, defense of Muslims against activities of Christian mis sions, furthering the establishment of Islamic and Arabic universities and scientific institutions, and other re lated Muslim causes. It was also decided that the con gress would meet every two years in Jerusalem. Further re~olutions provided for the opening of a central bureau of publicity with local branches to propagate the principles of the congress by means of publications and various meetings; the formation of local committees to collect special and annual donations and 119 contributions; the preparation of an Arabic dictionary; the protection of the holy places in Palestine by boy cotting Zionist goods and creating agricultural associa tions to purchase and exploit Palestinian lands; and the creation of an association for the improvement of Islamic religious instruction and spiritual direction to combat Christian missionary inroads and the spread of atheism. Finally, the congress passed a vote of thanks to the Christians of Palestine and Transjordan for their sym pathy toward the congress and sent a special message of greeting to the Orthodox Conference at Jaffa, declaring that the cause of the Orthodox Arab Christians was re garded as part of the common Arab cause. Although all the resolutions were approved, few were implemented because of Zionist pressure and the international economic depression. And although the delegates adopted statutes to make the WMC a permanent body in Jerusalem, it never met there again, and showed little sign of activity in the years thereafter. The third congress (Karachi: February 18-19, 1949) In the 18 years following the Jerusalem congress, 120 the Muslim world underwent radical changes. World War II came and ended with world-wide repercussions. The begin ning of the Cold War with its attendant Communist threat made some t1uslim countries, e.g., Iran and Turkey, look for Western help to defend themselves. In addition, Palestine was taken over by European Jews, the Arab countries decided to manage their international affairs apart from the rest of the Muslim world by forming the Arab League, and Pakistan was created as an independent state for Indian Muslims. Since Pakistan was created in the name of Islam, it has always been more interested in the Pan-Islamic movement than most Muslim countries. Within a year and a half of its creation Pakistan played host to the third meeting of the WMC, which was organized under the aus pices of Jama'at al-Ukhuwwat al-Islamiyya (League of Islamic Brotherhood). Unofficial delegates from all over the Muslim world attended the congress to discuss and find solutions to the deteriorating situation of the Muslim world. Al-Hajj Mohammad Amin al-Husayni of Pales tine expressed the grievances of all Muslims around the world regarding the situation in his country, and asked 121 for general Muslim support against the Zionist forces. He added that the creation of a foreign state in the most vital part of the Muslim world was designed to place it under constant threat of force at the will of the 11 major powers. 122 Although this meeting of the WMC lasted only two days, it actually succeeded in adopting statutes that made the WMC a permanent international body to be convoked at regular intervals in different parts of the Muslim world. The delegates also unanimously approved the establishment of a permanent headquarters and secretariat for the WMC . K h. 12 1.n arac 1.. The fourth congress (Karachi: February 9-11, 1951) Two years after its establishment as a permanent b d h WMC . . K h. 13 o y, t e met again 1.n arac 1.. This time it was 11 "The Fifth World Muslim Conference," The Islamic Review 37, No. 5 (1949): 32-33. 12 world Muslim Gazetteer, pp. 647-48. 13 see "World Muslim Conference," The Islamic Review 39, No. 6 (1951): 24-36, from which the following material is drawn. 123 officially inaugurated by the first prime minister of Pakistan, Liaquat Ali Khan, and was attended by some leading personalities of the Muslim world, e.g., Habib Bourguiba, president of Tunisia since 1957; Aden Abdulla Osman, who later became president of Somalia; and a number of distinguished religious authorities. At this meeting, the delegates defined the objects and aims of the WMC as linking the Muslims of the world socially and cultur ally, inculcating in them the true spirit of Islamic brotherhood, removing the barriers of racial nationalism, and bringing up the rising generation of Muslims along Islamic lines. Thirty-one Muslim and non-Muslim countries were represented by their Muslim delegations. In his address to the delegates, the Pakistani minister of commerce and education stressed the importance of Muslim unity and cooperation in all fields, and argued that the educa tional programs in all Muslim countries should emphasize the concept of Muslim brotherhood and solidarity. Al-Hajj Mohammad Amin al-Husayni was unanimously elected first president of the WMC. He explained the importance of general Muslim support to the Palestinian cause and warned the Muslim world of Zionist plans to expand the Jewish claims to }1edina and Khaiber in Saudi Arabia. The congress spent most of its time devising effective ways to promote the ideals of l1uslim brother hood and unity . It also sponsored a number of projects in the fields of commerce, education, and social welfare as a means of bringing l'1us lims closer together. In contrast to previous sessions of the WMC, 124 this time there was a special women's session inaugurated by Mrs. Begum Liaqat Ali Khan, wife of Pakistan's prime minister. She discussed the role of Muslim women in promoting the solidarity of the Muslim world. The wife of the Iranian minister of education, 11rs. Sa' ida Jazairi, also addressed the women's sessicn and spoke of Islamic values and their importance in bringing up Muslim chil dren to follow the Islamic way of life. The conference also held a cultural exhibition, depicting the glory, intellectual growth, and scientific achievements of Muslims from the time of Prophet Mohammad to the modern era. The fifth congress (Baghdad: June 1962) Once again 11 years passed with little sign of activity, and general enthusiasm for Pan-Islamism was at 125 a low point. Conflicts among Muslim countries increased as each jealously defended its independence and sover eignty. To save the Pan-Islamic movement from further deterioration, al-Hajj Mohammad Amin al-Husayni, president of the WMC, campaigned for the convening of a conference, and Iraq agreed to host the meeting. 14 The arrangements for the fifth congress were made by a reception committee of citizens, of which the Mayor of Baghdad, Mr. Abdul-Majid Hassan, was the chair man. The conference was attended by delegations from 32 t1uslim nations and 11uslim minorities living in non Muslim countries. For example, there were delegates from the Soviet Union, the United States, and Germany. With the exception of Egypt and Kuwait, whose relations with Iraq had soured, most of the major Muslim countries were 14F . f . or more in orrnation on Haleem, "The Baghdad World Muslim Horizon 15, No. 3 (1962): 169-76, material is taken. this congress see A. B. A. Conference," Pakistan from which the following represented at the gathering. Although a number of prominent Indian t- 1uslims were invited to attend, none of them accepted the invitation. The delegation from Pakistan included t1r. Inamulla Khan; Hakin Hasan Qarshi, president of the Lahore branch of the WMC; Maulvi Abdul Khair Muslim; and Mr. M. Jawed. All officials attending came as individuals and none was authorized to speak in the name of his government. The conference, which met in the town hall of Baghdad, lasted for a week. In the plenary session and in the political commission, which was the largest of the corrnnissions, all speeches were simultaneously trans lated into three languages-Arabic, English, and French. The inaugural address was delivered by the Iraqi presi dent, Abdul-Karim Qassem, who expressed hope that the conference would come up with meaningful and constructive programs to achieve the solidarity of the Muslim world. The conference was then divided into four com missions--political, socioeconomic, religiocultural, and the organization-cum-commission--whose resolutions were placed before the plenary corrnnission for approval. All controversies among Muslim countries were carefully 126 avoided, including Iraq's claim to Kuwait. Rather, the time was spent on issues that concerned the Muslim world as a whole. For example, Palestine, Kashmir, Eritrea, and West Irian were thoroughly discussed and resolutions on them were unanimously approved. 127 A great deal of emphasis was pla~ed on the Pales tinian problem. The congress appealed to all Muslim countries not to recognize Israel, either de jure or de facto, not to have any dealings with it, and to strengthen the economic boycott against it. The delegates unani mously denounced Israel as a foreign power thrust into the heart of the Muslim world, a power whose designs of expansion represented a threat to the peace of the Middle East. On the questions of Kashmir and the Indian Mus lims, resolutions were sponsored and supported not only by the anti-Indian Pakistani delegation but by other delegations as well. The conference took the stand that all peoples had the right of self-determination. The delegates called upon the United Nations to take steps to implement its own resolutions on Kashmir. On the question of Indian Muslims, the conference condemned the atrocities reportedly perpetrated on Indian Muslims from time to time, and called upon the Indian government to protect the lives and property of its 11uslim citizens and to guarantee their right to practice their religion and to develop their culture. On the question of West Irian, the delegates took the stand that by history, tradition, and close relation ship with Indonesia, West Irian was a part of Indonesia, and that the government of the Netherlands should relin quish its hold on it. The delegates also gave their sup port to the scheme of Malaysia, which was explained to them by the Malaya delegation headed by a member of par liament, Lugman :Musa. 128 In addition, the conference condemned the handing over of Eritrea to Ethiopia by the United Nations, while the Ethiopian delegation complained of the treatment meted out to the Muslims of that country by its non-Muslim leaders. Finally, the congress adopted a constitution for the Wl·fC, without which the congress so far had been nothing more than a religious club. The congress also passed a general resolution calling upon all Muslim countries to 129 resolve their mutual misunderstandings through negotia tion, mediation, or arbitration. To bring t-1uslims of the world closer together, the congress advocated the exchange of students, professors, artists, and writers, and ex pressed the need for an international Muslim news agency and Islamic cultural centers around the world. To promote unity in the political field, the congress authorized its newly created executive council to appoint a commission to examine the possibility of a Muslim commonwealth. Although the fifth conference of the WMC was one of the most active meetings, its resolutions, like earlier ini tiatives, amounted to nought. The sixth congress (Mogadishu: December 26, 1964-January 2, 1965) Th h 1 . f . . h · 15 f e WMC c ose Soma ia or its sixt session or two reasons. First, the congress wished to demonstrate the support of the entire Muslim world for Somalia's 15F . f . h. or more in ormation on tis congress see In'amullah Khan, "The Mo'tamar Al-Alam Al-Islami: A Brief Description of Its Sixth Conference Held at Mogadishu," The Islamic Review 53, No. 6 (1965): 27-29, from which the following material is drawn . territorial claims to predominantly Somaii areas of nei8hboring countries, especially Ethiopia and Kenya. Second, Somalia was the only Muslim country in the entire continent of Africa that had a 100 percent Muslim popu lation. Thirty-three countries from Africa, Asia, and Europe were represented at the gathering. It was offi cially opened by President Abdulla Aden Osman of Somalia, who declared that the time had come for a Muslim summit 16 conference. The major concern of the delegates was the abolition of colonialism in all its forms and the promotion of self-determination and religious freedom. Specifically, the conference gave unanimous support to the freedom and unification movement of all Somali lands, and for the first time in its history declared its unanimous solidarity with the Muslims of Eastern and Western Turkistan in their demand for self-determination and religious freedom. The delegates also expressed 130 their full support of the self-determination efforts of Indian Muslims, Kashmir, Eritrea, and the Turkish Cypriots. 16 In' amullah Khan, "Though ts on a :Mus lin1 Summit Conference," The Islamic Review 54, No. 4 (1966): 4. In the field of international politics, the congress once again called upon all Muslim governments to work together to establish a comrnonweal th of Muslim countries, and suggested that to achieve this goal, the 1'1uslim governments should start building up ever-widening areas of understanding and cooperation among themselves in different fields. The congress also announced that 131 it did not subscribe to the theory that there were only two blocs-the capitalist and Communist worlds-but rather asserted that the Muslim world was a distinct area of the globe that should be independent of these two groups. In the economic and social fields, the delegates recognized the urgent need for the establishment of a t-1uslim common market, and called upon t- 1uslim countries to expand their commercial relations with each other. In addition, the congress repeated its earlier plea to all t1uslim countries to pool their resources and build up an effective world Muslim news agency to establish a good communication system and to save the Muslim world from outside propaganda. Finally, in the religious and educational fields, the conference declared that education throughout the ~1uslim world should be Islamicized at all levels, and recommended the establishment of an Islamic university in 11ogadishu to serve the whole of East Africa. The seventh congress (Annnan: September 196 7) 132 The 1967 Arab-Israeli war was one of the most violent and tragic wars in the history of the Muslim world. The Israeli army swiftly captured not only the Gaza Strip, the Sinai, and the Golan Heights, but also the West Bank with its holy city, Bait al-1-iagdis (Jerusalem), which contains al-Aqsa Mosque, the third holiest shrine in Islam. The entire Muslim world reeled under the shock of these defeats. Within three months of the war, the WMC met for the last time in an extraordinary session in Annnan, the nearest city to Jerusalem, to devise ways of recapturing the holy city and liberating the occupied lands. King Hussein of Jordan inaugurated the congress and took personal interests in its deliberations. The delegates pledged support for the struggle against Israel and called upon all :Muslim governments to oppose the Israeli aggression and to liberate the Muslim holy places f Z . . l 17 rom ionist contra . The World Muslim Congress in Perspective Since the WMC was created as a nongovernmental body, it was not intended to play a dynamic role in the Pan-Islamic movement; yet it remained for a long time the only expression of that movement. All efforts to elevate it to an intergovernmental level or to replace it with 133 a more active organization failed. Soon after indepen dence, Pakistan tried to form a bloc of Muslim nations, but did not succeed even in convening an intergovernmental conference. In 1954 Pakistan played host to an inter national }~slim Economic Conference, but no successor or permanent structure developed. In December 1957-January 1958 Pakistan was host to a second International Islamic Colloquium, but again no integrative results were achieved because of rivalry from other Muslim countries, especially Syria and Egypt, which tried to prevent Pakistan from 18 securing any political advantage from the conference. 198-99. 17 world :Muslim Gazetteer, p. 389. 18 Young, "Pan-Islamism in the Modern World," pp. It was also thought for a while during the 1950s when most Muslim states gained independence that the WMC might be replaced by a much more viable organization, 134 but this prospect was short-lived. In 1954, during the pilgrimage period at Mecca, the leaders of Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Pakistan organized an intergovernmental Islamic Congress with headquarters in Cairo and Anwar Sadat, the current Egyptian president, as its secretary-general. This congress was designed to be a nonpolitical institu tion holding its annual session in Mecca during the ·1 . . d 19 pi grimage perio . However, because of political dif- ferences among its three founding countries and the com petition between Egypt and Pakistan for the intellectual leadership of the Muslim world, the congress made little headway and soon after became moribund when both Pakistan and Saudi Arabia withdrew from it. Nevertheless, the congress continued to exist in Cairo for a few more years, but only as a political instrument in the hands of the 19 t1ahmud Brelvi, "The Islamic Congress (Al- Mo' tamar Al-Islami), Cairo: A Brief Survey of Its Work," The Islamic Revie'tv 43, No. 10 (1955): 13. For the congress charter see "The Proposed Annual Islamic Congress at :Mecca: The Text of Its Draft Charter," The Islamic Review 42, No. 11 (1954): 26-27. Egyptian government to acquire control of the coordinates of religious Pan-Islamism formerly in the hands of the Muslim Brethren. 20 Up to the 1960s, the WHC had stood as the only symbol of Pan-Islamism; after this decade, however, it 135 was supplanted by the OIC and gradually receded in impor tance. During its existence, it had always suffer !d from lack of effectiveness as a result of political differences among Muslim countries and the patent efforts of Pakistan and Egypt to control its policies and operations for national ends. Consequently, the WMC played only a minor role in the development of Pan-Islamism. Despite its relative impotence, however, it promoted the idea of Muslim solidarity and succeeded in suggesting new approaches to the Pan-Islamic movement, such as an international Islamic news agency, an Islamic development bank, and the convening of an Islamic summit conference. The WMC also paved the road for the establishment of the WML and the ore. 20 Anouar Abdel-Malik, Egypt: Military Society, trans. Charles Lam Markmann (New York: Vintage Books, 1968), p. 199. To expand its onerations, the WMC in 1963 established in Karachi a Center for Cultural, Economic and International Studies. 21 The secretariat of the WMC is still operative in Karachi and has branches and affiliates in 52 countries and a number of correspon dents in different parts of the world. It now special izes in studying :Muslim problems around the world, published various books and pamphlets, and through its weekly magazine The Muslim World tries to inform world public opinion about }1uslim issues. Since 1965, the WMC has enjoyed a consultative status with the United Nations. Its current president is Dr. r1aruf al-Dawalibi, h f . . . f s . 22 t e ormer prime minister o yria. The Amman congress of 1967 was the group's last conference, and it is doubtful that the wt-1C will meet again. Since 1969 the 1--fuslim world has embarked on a new and more effective Pan-Islamic movement by creating the OIC, which will be discussed in detail in Chapter VI of this dissertation. As a preface to this discussion, 21 world r1uslim Gazetteer, p. 970. 22 Ibid. , p. 648. 136 Chapter V will examine the circumstances that led to this new effort toward Pan-Islamism and the role of Saudi Arabia in the genesis of the new organization. 137 CHAPTER V SAUDI ARABIA AND PAN-ISLAf1ISM Saudi Arabia's Position in the r1us lim liorld Saudi Arabia enjoys a tmique position in the Arab and Muslim worlds, for it is the birthplace of both the Arabs and Islarn and contains t- 1ecca and t 1 ledina, the two holiest cities of Islam. It is also the only modern ·Mus lim country that has established the holy Quran along with the Islamic Shari'ah as its constitution. Its national flag, which bears the famous Islamic statement of faith: "There is no god but God, Mohammad is the Messenger of God," also symbolizes the country's position as the repre sentative of Islam. Moreover, Saudi Arabia is the only Muslim state that can rightly claim to be the offspring of the first 138 139 modern Islamic revival movement, called Wahhabism. During the middle of the eighteenth century ~1ohammad Ibn Abdul Wahhab launched in central Arabia, with the support of the House of Saud, a reformist campaign for the purifi cation of Islamic beliefs and practices, and against tomb and saint-worship. And the movement's influence still lives on in Saudi Arabia today. Although not national istic, the Wahhabi movement was the first modern reasser tion of the Arab claim to supremacy in Muslim affairs, 1 and to its inspiration are traceable, directly or indi rectly, practically all the great modern reformist move ments of Islam such as the Senusi movement in Libya, the Pan-Islamic movement of Jamal al-Din al-Afghani, and the B b . . p . 2 a i movement in ersia. In addition to the above distinctions, Saudi Arabia possesses the largest known oil reserves in the world, and is the leading producer of OPEC , producing 30 percent of its total output. The enormous wealth from oil has made the country one of the greatest financial 1 Gibb, Mohammedanism, p. 115. 2 Nuseibeh, The Ideas of Arab Nationalism, p. 41. 140 powers of the modern world. Consequently, Saudi Arabia has at its disposal potentially powerful ideological and financial weapons with which to carry the torch of Pan Islamism and respond to the appeal of secular Arab radi calism. Conscious of its position in Arab and Muslim affairs, Saudi Arabia's primary concern in its foreign policy has always been Islam. This has made the country strongly anti-Communist, an orientation that has been reinforced by Saudi Arabia's awareness of the threat posed by communism to its immense wealth derived from the oil industry. Saudi Arabia in Inter-Arab Politics (Phase One: The Arab Cold War) Following the nationalization of the Suez Canal in 1956 and the subsequent Israeli-British-French attack on Egypt, Gamal Abdul Nasser emerged as the unchallenged hero of Arab nationalism. In less than two years, Egypt and Syria joined together to form the United Arab Repub lic (UAR) under his leadership. With the establishment of the UAR, the radical notions of nationalism and revo lutionary socialism of the Pan-Arab movement acquired new significance. Revolutionary Arab nationalists expected and even encouraged Arab masses in other Arab countries to rise against their leaders and join the UAR, and soon Lebanon was engulfed in a bloody civil war between the opponents and proponents of the UAR. Arab opponents of Nasser and the UAR were labeled "reactionaries" and "agents of imperialism," and several unsuccessful plots were organized by the UAR to overthrow the various monar chies in the Arab world. 3 To protect himself, Imam Ahmed of Yemen quickly merged his country with the UAR to form a federation. The two Hashimite monarchies of Jordan and Iraq also joined to form a federation of their own, but shortly thereafter the federation came to an end when a group of Iraqi army officers, led by Abdul-Karim Qassem, overthrew the monarchy in Baghdad. However, it later turned out that Qassem had plans of his own and refused either to join the UAR or to accept Nasser's leadership of the Arab revolutionary camp. While other Arab monarchies decided to protect 3 Lenczowski, "The Arab Cold War," p. 60. 141 themselves in federations, Saudi Arabia sought to disrupt the Egyptian-Syrian union. It was reported that King Saud had offered Abdul Hamid al-Sarraj, the chief of Syrian Army Intelligence, two million British pounds and the presidency of Syria if he would assassinate Nasser and frustrate the union. 4 This allegation made Saudi Arabia and the other Arab monarchies the targets of a long and vitriolic propaganda campaign in the press and radio of the UAR. However, by the end of 1961 a group of Syrian army officers, dissatisfied with Nasser's socialist measures, broke the union with Egypt. Frustrated by the "secessionists" in Syria, Nasser decided to expose the traditional monarchy in Yemen by dropping his federation with Imam Ahmad, and withdrew behind the barricades of socialist reconstruction at home. Nevertheless, his dreams for a Pan-Arab union did not end. Nasserists and radical Arab nationalists believed that the quest for 142 Arab unity required the prior overthrow of Arab monarchies 4 A. R. Kelidar, "The Arabian Peninsula and Power Poli tics," in The Arabian Peninsula: and Politics, ed. Derek Hopwood (Totowa, N.J.: and Littlefield, 1972), p. 154. in Arab Society Rowman 143 and conservative regimes. Pan-Arab nationalists simply did not believe in peaceful coexistence insofar as inter Arab politics were concerned, seeking instead to propa gate revolution and assist it wherever it took place in the Arab world. Revolution to them was not a mere matter of domestic affairs; it had acquired a Pan-Arab dimension. Consequently, Arab monarchies and conservative regimes, led by Saudi Arabia, were put on the defensive and felt threatened by Nasser's radicalism and claim to the leader ship of the Arab world. The World Muslim League To combat Nasser's secular Arab nationalism and revolutionary socialism, Saudi Arabia was forced to rely on Islam as a counterideology. In May 1962, the govern ment of Saudi Arabia sponsored an international Islamic conference in Mecca to devise ways of fighting secularism and radicalism in the Arab world. Religious authorities and distinguished personalities from all over the Muslim world attended the gathering. After four days of deliber ations, the conference formed an international organiza- tion known as Rabetat al-Alam al-Islami, or World Muslim League (WML), \vith its permanent secretariat in Mecca. 144 The conference also declared that "Those who disavow Islam and distort its call under the guise of nationalism are actually the most bitter enemies of the Arabs, whose glories are entwined with the glories of Islam. 115 The WML, however, was not intended to be either a political or a governmental organization. Rather, it is a religious organization composed of Arab and non-Arab Muslim scholars, intellectuals, and sociologists, whose aims are the furtherance of Muslim cooperation and unity, the dissemination of Islamic values, and the elimination of all ideologies and habits inconsistent with Islam. Although the WML is a religious organization and much less politicized than the Wt1C in Karachi, it has always dealt with Muslim political questions such as the Pales tinian problem, the Filipino Muslims, the Turkish Cypriots, and Eritrea, and has called upon Muslim governments to extend support to their causes. In addition, the WML has taken upon itself the 511 Islam Against . Nationalism," The Economist (Lon don) 203 (June 2, 1962): 903. task of coordinating the efforts of Islamic organizations around the world. From time to time it calls a general conference for these organizations to discuss various measures for the defense and propagation of Islam, and the protection of the Muslim world from alien cultures and ideologies. The second of such conferences, which was held in 1974 at the WML headquarters in Mecca, was one of the largest Islamic gatherings in modern times, with 140 Muslim organizations and institutions from all over the world represented at the meeting. To maximize efforts and avoid duplication, the conference established a permauent body within the WML called the Supreme Coordinating Committee of World Islamic O~ganizations, which was composed of three representatives from Asia, three from Africa, one each from Europe, North America, Latin America, and Australia, and one from each organi- . 6 zation. 145 6 Khurshid Ahmed, "Mecca Conference of World Muslim Organizations: Seeking Unity at the Grass-roots," Impact International Fortnightly (London) 4, No. 9 (1974): 8. Also, "Resolutions and Recommendations of the World Con ference of Islamic Organizations," Impact International Fortnightly (London) 4, No. 10 (1974): 8-9. For the first of such conferences see "First Conference of World Islamic Organizations Held at Mecca," The Islamic Review and Arab Affairs 56, Nos. 11-12 (1968): 28-30. 146 Although the WML enjoys the blessing and financial support of the Saudi Arabian government, it is a nonpar tisan, nonsectarian organization whose decisions &re dependent solely on its Constituent Council, which con sists of 50 notable personalities representing Islamic . h . . . 7 movements int eir respective countries. The WML was admitted as a member of the nongovernmental body of the United Nations, and has branches and affiliates all over the world. Through its scholarships, financial support to Muslim causes and Islamic centers around the world, annual international seminars at Mecca during the pil grimage, and various publications and periodicals both in Arabic and English, 8 the WML has become one of the most dynamic and authoritative religious organizations in the Muslim world. However, the WML has dealt with only one aspect of Pan-Islamism, namely, the war against secularism, socialism, and nationalism. The other aspect of Pan Islamism, i.e., the promotion of political unity among 7 world Muslim League, Rabetat: An Introduction, p. 2. 8 rbid., pp. 13-20. Islamic states and the formation of an international Muslim political organization, was left to later Saudi efforts, which also stemmed from inter-Arab politics and the Saudi-Egyptian rivalry for the leadership of the Arab world. Saudi Arabia in Inter-Arab Politics (Phase Two: The Arab "Hot" War) No sooner had the WML been established than another inter-Arab crisis developed. In September 1962, Imam Ahmad of Yemen died, to be succeeded by his son Imam al-Badr. A week later, a group of Yemeni army offi cers led by Colonel Abdullah al-Sallal seized the radio station in San'a and announced that the new imam had been 147 executed. Egypt, along with all Arab countries except Saudi Arabia and Jordan, recognized the new regime. Shortly thereafter, however, it was revealed that Imam al-Badr had not been executed, but was actively organizing tribal support to stage a countercoup . Nasser seized on the revolution in Yemen as an opportunity to break out of his year-long isolation in the wake of Syria's seces sion from the UAR, and regain the initiative in Arab affairs through a display of revolutionary leadership. To support the new republican regime in Yemen, he first dispatched military advisors, then small numbers of troops, then large numbers of troops. Nasser 'tvas not interested in Yemen per se, but rather in the entire Arabian Peninsula with its large oil deposits. Yemen to 9 him was only a foothold. Unable to cope with Nasser's radicalism and war fare closer to home, King Saud was forced to give way to his younger brother, Crown Prince Faisal. Faisal began by breaking off diplomatic relations with Egypt and, together with King Hussein of Jordan, began to supply the royalist forces in Yemen. To discourage Saudi Arabia from aiding the royalists, Egyptian planes began a series of bombardments against several Saudi villages on the Yemeni borders that resulted in the death of several civilians. Faisal responded by announcing a general mobilization of the Saudi armed forces and charged Egypt and the Yemeni Republic with continuing air and sea 148 9 11iles Copeland, _Th_e_G_a_m_e_o_f_N_a_t_i_on_s_: __ Th_e_A_m_o_r_a_l ity of Power Politics (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1969), p. 266. aggression. 10 The conflict between Saudi Arabia and Egypt escalated, and soon Yemen became an international battleground. In addition to the revolution in Yemen, the year 1963 witnessed a great boost to the radical Arab hopes when the revolutionary Ba'th Party seized power both in 149 Iraq and in Syria, giving rise to prospects of a new and larger united Arab republic. Consequently, Saudi Arabia and Jordan felt surrounded by revolutionary regimes in Iraq, Syria, Egypt, and Yemen. The Cairo negotiations for a new UAR were inconclusive, however, for although Nasser welcomed the overthrow of Qassem and the "secessionists" in Syria, he was not so willing to work with the Ba'thists this time. Although several Arab and international efforts were made to negotiate a solution to the Yemeni conflict, all eventually came to nought. Early in 1964 the first Arab summit meeting was convened in Cairo to discuss means of preventing Israel from diverting the Jordan River. Saudi Arabia seized on the occasion to propose a lO"Saudi Arabia," The 11iddle East Journal 17, Nos. 1-2 (1963): 132-33. Pan-Arab solution to the conflict in Yemen and a formula for the withdrawal of Egyptian troops from that country. However, the surmnit meeting failed to provide a solution for the conflict in Yemen. At the second Arab surmnit meeting in Alexandria later in the year, Crown Prince Faisal and President Nasser agreed to bring the Yemeni republicans and royalists together on neutral ground at the town of Erkwit in the Sudan. But the Erkwit confer ence also failed to provide a settlement. 150 In November 1964 Faisal replaced Saud as king and continued his efforts to find a solution to the Saudi Egyptian conflict in Yemen. In August of the following year, Faisal played host to Nasser in Jeddah and the two leaders agreed to a new formula for ending their conflict in Yemen. As a result of their meeting, the Yemeni royalists and republicans met once again in the town of Haradh in northern Yemen. Nevertheless, the Haradh con ference, like all earlier initiatives, amounted to nothing. There were too many irreconcilable differences, both between Saudi Arabia and Egypt and between the Yemeni royalists and republicans themselves. In addition, Yemen represented a testing ground for influence in the Arab world between the forces of revolutionism under the leadership of Egypt and the forces of conservatism under Saudi Arabia. 11 King Faisal's Call for Pan-Islamic Solidarity 151 King Faisal's frustration over his inability to resolve the conflict in Yemen, together with the radical Arab camp's political propaganda and psychological warfare against Arab monarchies and conservative regimes, led him to adopt a counterstrategy in the form of an appeal for Pan-Islamic solidarity. As a ruler of Prophet Mohammad's native land and a custodian of the two holiest shrines of Islam, Faisal not only felt a special responsibility to ensure the solidarity of all Islamic states, but also looked upon Islam as a strong counterweight to radical Arab nationalism and revolutionary socialism. Faisal realized that the v~Il.,-despite its wide successes in Pan-Islamic reformism--was only a religious organization, and that he needed to complete the circle of Pan-Islamism 11 For a specific study dealing with the conflict in Yemen see Edgar O'Ballance, The War in the Yemen (Hamden, Conn.: Archon Books, 1971). 152 by seekin 6 intergovernme . tal cooperation among the Islamic states, not only to bring them closer together for mutual goals, but also to stem the tide of Soviet influence and radicalism in the Arab world. King Faisal's Pan-Islamic initiative took the form of a political speech in which he outlined his new strategy. At an international Islamic conference spon sored in 11ecca by the WML following the pilgrimage of 1965, Faisal declared to the assembled delegations: Brothers, on this memorable day which, we hope, shall, by God's might and will, be the spring-board for an Islamic revival, I would like to discuss the policy of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. . We are one ·with our ~1uslim brothers in all parts of the world. And we try with all our power to unite them, bring them closer and make them do away with any disagreements or influences that might mar their relations. We fully support the call for an Islamic summit conferencel2 to enable all Muslim powers to examine and discuss matters of mutual interest and benefit. 13 To emphasize the significance of his Pan-Islamic 12 As mentioned earlier, in the sixth session of the WMC in Mogadishu President Osman of Somalia called for an Islamic summit conference. l3.World Muslim League, Rabe tat: An Introduction, p. 7. 153 call, Faisal began a series of state visits to 1'1uslim countries in which he appealed for Pan-Islamic unity. Between December 1965 and September 1966 he visited nine Muslim countries in Asia and Africa to promote the Pan Islamic alliance. Although Faisal professed his intention to include in his projected grouping such revolutionary Arab regimes as Egypt, Syria, Iraq, and Algeria, his visits were primarily to conservative countries. Except for Mali and Guinea, which maintained good relations with Egypt, the rest of the Islamic countries that Faisal visited had, in one form or another, rejected Nasser's radicalism. Faisal began with a one-week visit to the shah of Iran; a month later he spent another week with King Hussein I of Jordan, and then visited the Sudan, Pakistan, Turkey, l\,f G . M 1 . d T . . 14 norocco, 7uinea, a i, an unisia. During his state visit to Pakistan, Faisal spoke of Islam as a bond unit ing all Muslims and called for cooperation among all Islamic states to meet the challenge posed by alien radical ideologies: 14 For Faisal's state visits and speeches see King dom of Saudi Arabia, Ministry of Information, Faisal Speaks, Book XII (Jeddah: Ministry of Information [1968]), pp. 36-112 (hereafter cited as Ministry of Information, Faisal Speaks). It is in these moments, when Islam is facing many undercurrents that are pulling 11oslems left and right, east and west, that we need time for more co-operation and closer ties to enable us to face all the problems and difficulties that obstruct our way as an Islamic nation, believing in God, His Prophet and His Laws.15 King Faisal's call for Pan-Islamic solidarity was favorably received in all the countries he visited, since he was recognized as the representative of Islam and a guardian of its holiest cities. Even before Faisal ended his tour, his appeal began to show some results. The first Islamic country to follow Faisal's lead was, some what unexpectedly though not surprisingly, Somalia, which he had not visited. In August 1966, its President Osman visited Faisal in Riyadh and repeated his earlier call for an Islamic summit conference. 16 But since other Islamic leaders did not follow up on Faisal's and Osman's call, nothing was achieved. More support for Faisal's Pan-Islamic solidarity came two years later when the 15 Ibid., p. 52. 16 n. C. Watt, "The Postponement of the Arab Sum mit," The vlorld Today 22, No. 9 (1966) : 364. 154 shah of Iran made a state visit to Saudi Arabia. 17 But again there was no response from the rest of the Muslim world. And although three Muslim leaders-King Hussein of Jordan, King Hasan II of Morocco, and President Ayoub Khan of Pakistan-strongly endorsed Faisal's Pan-Islamic alliance, still nothing came of the matter. King Faisal's call for an Islamic alliance was perceived by Cairo and Damascus as a threat to Arab nationalism and an attempt to reconstitute a regional defense pact-similar to the old Eisenhower Doctrine alignment or the Baghdad Pact-in order to organize the Middle East in a pro-Western alliance. Nasser reviled Faisal as a traitor to the Arab cause, and argued that 155 the Islamic alliance was an American-British conspiracy aimed at dividing the Arab world and undermining Arab hopes for unity. Faisal repeatedly defended himself against Nasser's charges that the United States and Brit ain were using him. In his reply to President Khan's speech of welcome at Karachi airport in April 1966, Faisal used the occasion to exonerate himself and his Pan-Islamic 17 Robert R. Sullivan, "Saudi Arabia in International Politics," The Review of Politics 32, No. 4 (1970): 440. call: We have been accused, I am sorry to say, by certain Moslems, of trying to establish pacts, treaties, or certain privileged relationships with non-Moslem powers or foreign countries beyond those agreements approved by international councils. I would like to assure you that we have no such in tentions and our only aim is to promote Islam, support the religion of God and bring all Moslems closer together to enable them to discuss between themselves the affairs of their religion and life. 18 156 Syria, on the other hand, condemned Faisal as a reactionary whose call for Islamic unity was not sincere but was rather designed as a campaign against Arab nation alists for purely personal ends. To counter Faisal's proposed Islamic alliance, Syria called for an emergency 19 conference in Damascus of the revolutionary Arab states. However, since this was one of several Syrian attempts to take away from Egypt the leadership of the Arab revo lutionary camp, little was achieved by the Syrian call. F~isal defended himself against the Syrian charges during his state visit to Turkey in August 1966 when he said: 18 :t-1inistry of Information, Faisal Sneaks, pp. 53-54. 19 Abbas Kelidar, "The Struggle for Arab Unity," The World Today 23, No. 7 (1967): 297-98. . I will use this occasion to declare that we are not ambitious, that we do not seek gain and that we have no ulterior motives. The only thing we do want is that well-founded, brotherly rela tions should exist between the Islamic peoples to enable them to co-operate among themselves, solve their problems and build up their future on a solid foundation.20 Faisal frequently argued that he was promoting neither a pact nor an anti-Arab-nationalist campaign, declaring on several occasions that he was not opposed 157 to Arab unity, but rather regarded it as a first step toward the larger Muslim unity. Since Arabism is inalien ably associated with Islam and Arab nationalism represents a distinct Islamic nationalist phenomenon, 21 Faisal emphasized the religious and traditional elements in Arabism and was vehemently opposed to the radicalism, secularism, and revolutionism of the Pan-Arab movement conducted by the leftist Arab regimes. Faisal even declared that he wanted Nasser, as the head of a large Muslim country, to participate in his Pan-Islamic move ment, and defined his conception of Pan-Islamism as an 20 Ministry of Information, Faisal Speaks, pp. 72-73. 21 This point has already been explained in Chapter II by citing Professor Beling. 158 extension of the Arab surrnnit meetings to the wider Muslim 22 world. These declarations, however, were dismissed as rhetoric by Egypt, Syria, and the rest of the leftist Arab regimes, which increased their campaign of propaganda warfare against Faisal. This time, however, Faisal not only continued to defend his call- . when we call upon Moslems to come closer to gether for the sake of their own solidarity and co-operation, we do not harbour any evil intentions towards others, nor do we wish to become a source of danger, aggression or disturbance to others. We believe that if 11oslems achieve the principle of brotherhood, co-operation and progress, the resulting benefit will not be restricted to Moslems only but will extend to other nations as well.23 but even took the offensive: . . . what we . . . find strange and most unpala table is that there should be certain elements which are Moslem (or purport to be) actively hos tile to you and to us: elements which oppose the spread of Islam and the use of the Book of God and the Sunna [tradition] of His Prophet as arbiter, elements which even encourage in 11oslem lands and quarters the spread of beliefs, ideologies and trends of thought which are in conflict with the Moslem religion and the Shari'a. This is strange indeed. Well, we are ready to ... fight these 22 Kerr, The Arab Cold War, p. 110. 23 Ministry of Information, Faisal Speaks, p. 76. enemies of Islam--we will struggle as we struggled in the past.24 159 In addition to his local enemy- the radical Arab regimes - Faisal identified three foreign enemies of his Pan-Islamic movement: Zionism, communism, and imperial ism. He argued that these three doctrines are the most dangerous enemies faced by the Arab and }1uslim worlds, and stressed the importance of Arab leadership and responsi bility for the call to Pan-Islamic solidarity against them. 25 During his state visit to the Sudan in March 1966, Faisal said: We cannot and will not ignore the forces which oppose our efforts today. These are the evil forces of imperialism and the sinister forces of ... Zionism and the forces of Connnunism. As to imperial ism, it opposes our preaching of Islam because it knows that Islam is a religion of brotherhood. and a religion of equality. And imperialism aims to oppress other people and to rule them in wholly different \vays. As to the forces of Zionism, they know that co-operation between Moslems would put an end to the evil expansionist ideas of international Zionism 24 Ministry of Information, Faisal Speaks, p. 157. 25 Ahmad Asar, Mu' gezatun Fawg ar-Remal [A ~1iracle over the Sands], 2nd ed. (Beirut: Al-Matab'i Al-Ahliyah Al-Libnaniyah, 1966), p. 188. in Islamic and Arab countries . . . . . . . . . . As for the Communists, they are attacking us because the Islamic movement is going to destroy all that Communism stands for, in particular, dis belief in Almighty God, and destruction of humans as humans . 2 6 Thus Faisal presented three major aspects of his Pan-Islamic theory. The first aspect is a distinctive Islamic mission, which he defined as "our responsibility from birth, deriving from the faith to which our lives are devoted." The second is presented as a determinant of policy that would provide the necessary justification for combatting communism and for opposing socialism and revolutionism. The third aspect is the supranational foundation of a Pan-Islamic political organization that, in Faisal's words, would foster "Islamic cooperation that would win us 600 million Muslims" and that would also ' introduce a potent political force in the Arab struggle against Israel. 27 In short, King Faisal's Pan-Islamic alliance had three major international objectives: 26 Ministry of Information, Faisal Speaks, p. 35. 160 27 Hisham Sharabi, Palestine and Israel: The Lethal Dilemma (New York: Western Publishing Co., 1969), pp. 98- 99. intergovernmental cooperation among the Islamic states, elimination of Soviet influence and radicalism in the Arab world, and mobilization of the rest of the Muslim world behind the Arab struggle against Israel . During 1966, and until the 1967 Arab-Israeli war, the main dividing- line in the Arab world between the conservatives and revolutionaries had been between King Faisal's Pan-Islamic alliance and President Nasser's radical Arab nationalism. Prior to the June 1967 war the Arab states were in such disarray that it was hard to imagine an Arab victory over Israel. When the war broke out, the Israeli army swiftly captured not only 161 the Syrian Golan Heights and the Egyptian Sinai Peninsula, but also the rest of Palestine with its holy city Jeru salem. Three months after the crushing defeat, Arab leaders met in Khartoum to assess their situation. King Faisal seized this opportunity to end the conflict in Yemen by extracting from Nasser a pledge to withdraw Egyptian troops from that country. However, along with other oil-rich Arab states, Faisal also agreed to extend $140 million in aid to Egypt, Syria, and Jordan to help in the recovery of their war-torn economies. 152 With the Israeli occupation of Jerusalem and other Arab territories, King Faisal's notions of Pan-Islamic solidarity took on new and compelling significance. Faisal, who was a very religious man, was deeply disturbed by the loss of Jerusalem, and insisted that the holy city was not negotiable in any peace settlement with Israel. He declared on many occasions that his foremost dream was to live to see Jerusalem liberated from Zionist control and to pray in its holy shrine, al-Aqsa Mosque. Thus Faisal began to rally the Islamic states behind the Arab cause, a strategy that Nasser and other Arab leaders had failed to employ. Faisal presented the Palestinian prob lem to the wider Muslim world as a Muslim issue and called upon the Islamic states to support the Arabs for the liberation of Jerusalem. In one of his religiously oriented, highly emotional speeches, delivered in Mecca before the Muslim delegations assembled for the pilgrimage, Faisal said: Holy Jerusalem calls for you, Brothers! It is asking for your help, and beseeching you to save it from its misery and affliction. What are we wait ing for, and until when shall we wait while our sacred and treasured possessions are being dese crated in the ugliest manner? What is holding us back? Are we afraid of death? And is there a way of death better and more honourable than death in the course of a struggle to uphold the will of God? The ~ Muslims should feel angry and should rise like one man, disregarding all irrelevant questions of nationality or partnership. This is a 11uslim call, a call to jihad in the cause of God, in the cause of our religion and our beliefs and in defence of our sacred and treasured possessions. I pray to the Almighty that when my time comes to die, I die as a martyr in the cause of God. 2 8 King Faisal's Efforts Attain Their Fruition King Faisal's appeal for Pan-Islamic solidarity 163 was reinforced in August 1967 by the burning of the al-Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem under Israeli occupation. This fire, which destroyed part of the mosque, the first mosque of Islam and the place of the Dome of the Rock whence Prophet Mohannned is believed by Muslims to have ascended to Heaven, sent a wave of shock across the Islamic world. While other Muslim leaders were content to condemn Israel for the fire, Faisal, deeply disturbed by the incident, not only called for an Islamic summit conference to 2811 King Faysal of Su'udi Arabia Calls the 11uslims to Jihad to Save Palestine and the Holy Places on the Occasion of the Hajj (1388 A.H.)-28th February 1969," The Islamic Review and Arab Affairs 57, No. 2 (1969): 4. consider the situation and mobilized the Saudi armed forces, but also called upon all t1uslims to rise in a holy war against Israel. A month later, Faisal scored a major diplomatic victory when the world's first Islamic summit meeting (which will be discussed in the following chapter) was convened in Rabat at the prompt invitation 164 of King Hasan of Morocco in response to Faisal's call. Because of the tremendous symbolic and emotional signifi cance of Jerusalem in the eyes of the }1uslim world, even some opponents of King Faisal's Pan-Islamic alliance, such as Egypt, felt obliged to attend the conference. The gathering gave the conservative Muslim states in general, and Saudi Arabia in particular, an opportunity to expand their influence in the area. King Faisal's next step was to convene the first Islamic conference of foreign minis ters in Jeddah in March 1970. Although the Jeddah con ference was boycotted by Syria and Iraq, the gathering was attended by most Islamic countries. To give it a more lasting significance and assert its own leadership, Saudi Arabia secured the decision to establish an Islamic political organization with its permanent secretariat in Jeddah. The Egyptian delegation, which opposed the motion, 165 found itself outvoted by an overwhelming majority. The new Islamic organization (which will be dis cussed in the next chapter) came to be known as the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) and has since grown under the patronage of Saudi Arabia to be a much more viable organization than anything preceding it in the Muslim world. The organization has also spilled over to create other independent governmental organizations, all based in Saudi Arabia, with a variety of functions for the Muslim states. As a result of King Faisal's unflagging moral and financial support for these inter national Islamic organizations, Pan-Islamism under him has grown from a weak theoretical conception to become 29 the most volatile ideology in the modern Middle East. King Faisal's use of the oil industry as a poli tical weapon and his close relations with post-Nasser Egypt during the 1973 Arab-Israeli war have created an 30 unusual degree of unity among the Arabs. Faisal's 29 Kai Bird, "Faisal's Legacy: Religious Politics and the New Generation," Worldview 18, No. 9 (1975): 13. 30 Peter r1ans field, "The Arab Dimension: Renewed Self-Confidence," The Round Table 253 (January 1974): 19- 20. 166 strategy has not only helped Egypt move out of the radi cal Arab camp to become a moderate state but also ex tended Saudi Arabia's prestige and power far beyond the Middle East. Radical Arab leaders such as Mo'ammur Qaddafi of Libya were isolated, the the proposed 1973 federation of Egypt, Syria, and Libya became a dead issue. There is no doubt that King Faisal's death in 1975 was a great loss to the Pan-Islamic movement, for he was the unquestioned force behind the movement. How ever, the present Saudi leadership of King Khalid and Crown Prince Fahd has dedicated itself to follow Faisal's path and has continued to extend financial and political support to the Pan-Islamic movement. CHAPTER VI DEVELOPING AND INSTITUTIONALIZING CONTEMPORARY PAN-ISLAMISM: COOPERATION AND CONFLICT Al10NG ISLAMIC STATES A Survey of the Islamic Conference: 1969-1976 The Rabat summit conference (September 22-25, 1969) The burning of al-Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem in August 1969 under Israeli occupation impelled the Muslim leaders to meet in lfurocco at the invitation of King Hasan II. The remarkable thing about this summit meet ing is that it took place at all considering the then wide range of conflicts between the radical and conser vative Islamic states. Operating as it was against this background of 167 internecine conflict, the summit faced serious problems from the very beginning . In the first place, the call for the conference did not elicit a positive response from some Islamic states. Although the invitation to the summit meeting was extended to 35 states, only 25 1 attended; of these} only 10 were represented by their 168 heads of state. Cameroon, Ghana, Ivory Coast, Maldives, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Tanzania, and Upper Volta all declined the invitation and announced they had no desire to participate in the summit meeting, while Syria refused to attend on the ground that it had broken off diplomatic relations with Morocco. Iraq demanded as a condition of its attendance that the Islamic states maintaining diplo matic or economic relations with Israel should first sever these ties. Since seven Islamic states with close rela- 2 tions with Israel attended, Iraq refused to join the 1 These were Algeria, Iran, Jordan, Kuwait, :Mauri tania, Morocco, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, and Yemen ("Islamic Leaders Arrive in Morocco for Conference," New York Times, September 22, 1969, Part I, p. 13). 2 These were Chad, Guinea, Iran, Mali, Niger, Senegal, and Turkey (Dana Adams Schmidt, "Big 4 Action Urged at Islamic Parley," New York Times, September 26, 1969, Part I, p. 3). summit. On the other hand, Egypt sent a low-level dele gation headed by Anwar Sadat as a deputy for President Nasser, who was said to have been stricken by a virus. In the second place, the conference confronted three major problems that reflected the deep divisions among the participating states and rendered the sunnnit ineffective. The first problem emerged over the admis sion of the PLO to the sunnnit. While Iran and Turkey opposed the admission of the PLO even with an observer status, President Houari Boumedienne of Algeria insisted on its participation, arguing that the Algerian National Liberation Front had been admitted to the Bandung Con ference and the nonaligned conference in Cairo. 3 Thus the Moroccan government felt compelled to extend an invitation to Yasser Arafat, the PLO leader, to attend as an observer lest he denounce the sunnnit meeting. Although the problem of the admission of the PLO was soon resolved, still another one emerged from the lack of a formal agenda. While most of the conservative and moderate states favored an agenda limited to the 3 shameem Akhtar, "The Rabat Sunnnit Conference," Pakistan Horizon 22, No. 4 (1969): 336. 169 170 discussion of the burning of al-Aqsa Mosque and the future status of Jerusalem, the radical Arab states such as Algeria, Egypt, Libya, and the Sudan pressed for the inclusion of the whole question of Israeli occupation of Arab territories as well as the future of the Palestinian refugees. The problem of the agenda, however, was finally resolved as the moderate and conservative states yielded to the pressure of the radical Arab states and agreed that the summit meeting should take up the Middle East b 1 . . . 4 pro em in its entirety. The third problem-one that almost wrecked the conference-emerged over India's participation in the sumn1it. Although the six-state preparatory committee of the summit had rejected India's request to attend on the grounds that it was not a predominantly Muslim coun try, the participants at the plenary session, under pressure from the radical Arab states, decided to invite India because of its pro-Arab and anti-imperialist posi tions. Accordingly, the Moroccan government announced that an Indian delegation would arrive the following day 4 Ib id. , p . 3 3 7 . 171 and that until then the Indian ambassador to :Morocco, Mr. Gurbachan Singh, would represent his country at the summit meeting. However, President Yahya Khan of Pakistan, who had earlier agreed at King Faisal's request to allow the representatives of the Indian t- 1uslim community to participate in the sunnnit, questioned the credentials of Mr. Singh, a non-Muslim, to represent India's Muslim minority. The Pakistani president also insisted that any Indian delegation attending the surmnit must be man dated by India's Muslim community and not by the Indian government, which, according to Pakistan's charges, had always persecuted its :Mus 1 im minority. Khan argued that if India, with its 10 percent Muslim population, could attend the summit, there was no reasonable basis for excluding other countries with large Muslim minorities, such as the Soviet Union and China. In fact, by the same token, the Pakistanis argued, Israel could also make a case for a similar privilege. Hence, the Pakistani delegation stayed away from the conference and refused to attend the rest of the meetings until India was ex cluded from the summit. Since Turkey, Iran, and Jordan acknowledged the validity of these objections and stood behind Pakistan, the Indian delegation was politely asked to leave to prevent the summit meeting from ending in a f . 5 1.as co . After surviving these three initial crises, the summit found little to agree on. A resolution endorsed by the radical Arab states calling on all Islamic states to break off relations with Israel was opposed by Iran, Turkey, and the African states that maintained ties with Israel and saw no ideological or moral contradiction in dealing with that country. Despite the conflicting stands of the radical and conservative states, there were a few moments of solidar- ity. The shah of Iran, in spite of his opposition to breaking ties with Israel, supported the radical Arabs' 6 demand for a tough agenda and expressed his hope that the unprecedented summit meeting would not be the last. He also appealed for Muslim unity and strongly warned Israel that it faced a robust, unified Muslim world. 7 5 Ibid., pp. 338-39. 6 "Rabat Conference," 11uslimnews International (London) 8 (October 1969): 18. 7 "La Conf~rence islamique au sonnnet," Maghreb ,,. Etudes et Documents 36 (novembre-d~cembre 1969): 32. 172 The summit also provided an opportunity for Morocco and 1'1auri tania to resolve their conflict and normalize their 1 . 8 re at1.ons. After three days of deliberation, the summit conference issued its final declaration, which broadly expressed Muslim solidarity with the Arab cause and unanimously condemned the criminal act against al-Aqsa Mosque, called for the return of Jerusalem to Arab con trol, demanded the restoration of all Arab lands to their pre-1967 status, and in only broad terms declared the Islamic states' support of the Palestinian people. In addition, the conference affirmed the Islamic states' need to work together to promote cooperation and mutual assistance in all fields. However, the most important achievement of the conference was its decision to lay the foundations for further conferences when it decla~ed that the Islamic states' foreign ministers would meet the following year in Saudi Arabia to establish a perma nent Islamic organization. 9 8 Ibid., p. 34. Morocco had territorial conflicts with Mauritania. 173 9 General Secretariat, Declarations and Resolutions, pp. 10-14. The first foreign ministers' conference (Jeddah: March 23-25, 1970) In accordance with the decision of the Rabat summit meeting, 22 foreign ministers and high officials met in Jeddah to discuss a two-point agenda: examining the results of their common action at Rabat and consid ering the creation of a permanent Islamic organization that would foster political, economic, and cultural · 10 cooperation among the Islamic states. 174 Iraq and Syria continued their boycott and instead advocated armed struggle with Israel, and because of souring relations with the host country, the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen did not attend either. And although they had attended the Rabat summit meeting, Chad and Mali not only boycotted this meeting but even con tinued their relations with Israel. However, the PLO and the Arab League attended as observers and have con tinued to be so renresented ever since. ~ King Faisal opened the conference with a long, emotional speech on the Palestinian problem and Muslim lOibid., p. 17. rights in Jerusalem, and urged the delegates to come up with meaningful and constructive programs. Addressing the foreign rninis ters, Faisal said: ... I should like to draw attention to the fact that the eyes of the world are focused on this meeting of yours. Our Muslim brothers all over the world and their friends are awaiting from us decisions which would gladden their hearts and quieten their minds. They are hoping that the decisions you adopt and the actions you take will, with God's help, have consequences beneficial to all, and which would realise the aspirations of all. At the same time, the enemies of IsJam are viewing this conference with fear and exaspera tion. They want to frustrate all that you are engaged in, and to portray you as failures and recalcitrants. I pray to the Almighty that He may frustrate their mischief and banish their hopes.11 Nevertheless, the proposed creation of an organi zation generated heated debates between the radical and conservative states. Algeria, Egypt, Libya, and the Sudan feared that the organization would act in rivalry with the Arab League and that it would be dominated by conservative pro-Western states, some of which maintained 175 11 "Historic Speech by King Faysal of Su'udi Arabia Inaugurating the Conference of Foreign Ministers of Islamic Countries, Held at Jeddah on 15-17 11uharram 1390 A.H. (23-25 March 1970 C.E.) ," The Islamic Review and Arab Affairs 58, No. 3 (1970): 4. 176 relations with Israel. The Egyptian foreign minister also regarded the proposed organization as irrelevant to the Arab struggle and instead expressed his country's desire for actual material support from the Islamic states. On the other hand, while Iran supported the crea tion of the organization, Indonesia opposed the idea on the grounds that the United Nations and several Islamic bodies already provided for such organizational coopera tion. However, at Pakistan's urging the Indonesian dele gation agreed to the idea. 12 Although the resolution on the creation of the organization was opposed by the four radical Arab states, all other participants voted in favor of it with the exception of Turkey, which abstained on the plea that it was a secular state. The new organization was estab lished with temporary headquarters in Jeddah pending the liberation of Jerusalem. The foreign ministers also agreed to meet once a year to follow up on their common action and provide solid bases for Pan-Islamism. It was 12 Shameem Akhtar, "The Jeddah Conference," Pakistan Horizon 23, No. 2 (1970): 180-1 (hereafter cited as Akhtar, "The Jeddah Conference"). decided that their annual session be hosted in rotation by the member states; if no invitation was extended, the meeting would be held at the organization's headquarters 13 in Jeddah. The radical Arab states opposing the creation of the organization were also angered when the conference failed to support their plea for a strong resolution calling on all Islamic states to break relations with 14 Israel. The Sudanese foreign minister expressed his dismay at the delegates' refusal to take a hard-line attitude toward Israel and announced his country's with drawal from the conference. 15 Torn between the radical and conservative states, the conference once again came out in general terms in its joint communique in support of the Palestinian strug gle. However, the conference condemned Israel for its 177 13 General Secretariat, Declarations and Resolutions, p. 20. 14 nana Adams Schmidt, "Islamic Ministers Split as They End a Parley in Jidda," New York Times, March 27, 1970, Part I, p. 12. 15 Akhtar, "The Jeddah Conference," p. 182. 178 intransigence and refusal to comply with the United Nations resolutions calling for its withdrawal from Arab terri tories; denounced Zionism as a racial, aggressive, and expansionist movement; and declared that August 21 of every year (the anniversary of the burning of al-Aqsa Mosque) be a day of solidarity with the Palestinian 16 people. The second foreign ministers' conference (Karachi: December 26-28, 1970) Although this conference was designed to follow up the tasks left by the previous meeting and give sound practical shape to the objectives of the newly created organization, its time was wasted in heated debates on methods of financing the organization and on various pro posals and recommendations to provide new institutional bases for Pan-Islamism. Despite boycotts by Iraq, Syria, the Peoples' Democratic Republic of Yemen, and the Sudan, 24 Islamic 16 General Secretariat, Declarations and Resolutions, pp. 18-19. states attended the conference, including Chad and Mali, which had boycotted the previous one. The delegates adopted an agenda that included the Palestinian problem; Portuguese aggression against Guinea; organization and financing of the newly established body; and the promo tion of economic, social, and cultural cooperation among 17 member states. The assembled foreign ministers unanimously appointed Mr. Tunku Abdul-Rahman Putra, the former prime minister of Malaysia, to a two-year term as secretary- 1 f h . . 18 genera o t e organization. 179 The Pakistani president addressed the foreign ministers and declared that Islamic solidarity was "neither a new alignment nor a new bloc," but rather a new attempt on the part of the Islamic states to identify areas of 19 meaningful and constructive cooperation among them. 17 Ibid., pp. 23-24. 18 The secretary-general may be reappointed for another two-year term (ibid., pp. 22-23). 1911 Five Aims of the Conference: The Text of the Address of General Agha J , 1uhamrnad Yahya Khan, President of Pakistan, at the Opening Session of the Second Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers at Karachi, Pakistan on 25 December, 1970," The Islamic Review and Arab Affairs 58, No. 12 (1970): 8. 180 The various positions expressed by the delegates at the previous conference regarding the establishment of the organization were still maintained at this conference. Thus, despite the opposition of Algeria, Egypt, Libya, and the Sudan, the sum of $500,000 was promised by the f h mb h . . . Je ddah . 2 O rest o t e me er states tote organization in On the question of economic and cultural coopera tion, the foreign ministers examined a Pakistani proposal to establish an international Islamic bank for trade and development. Egypt was entrusted with the task of making a comprehensive study of the bank to be submitted to the secretary-general within six months. The conference also decided to convene two separate meetings of the member states' representatives and experts, the first in Tehran to study the creation of an international Islamic news agency, and the second in Rabat to study the establishment of Islamic cultural centers around the world. In addi tion, the secretary-general was asked to make a draft d f h f h . . 21 stu yo a carter or t e organization. 20 s. Amjad Ali, "World Muslims Meet in Pakistan," Pakistan 17 (December 1969-January 1970): 122. 21 General Secretariat, Declarations and Resolutions, pp. 26-~ 2 8. 181 Finally, in their diplomatic drive the foreign ministers expressed full support for the Palestinian struggle, condemned the Portuguese aggression against Guinea, and unanimously endorsed the United Nations Secur ity Council on that aggression. 22 The third foreign ministers' conference (Jeddah: February 29- 1·1arch 4, 19 72) This conference had originally been planned to meet in Kabul, Afghanistan, in 1971, but economic prob lems resulting from a severe drought suffered by that country forced a cancellation of the conference for that 23 year. However, the period was spent on four conferences of the member states' representatives and experts that were designed to follow up on the decisions made at the 22 Ibid., pp. 24-26. 23 These are: (1) the Conference on Islamic News Agency (Tehran, April 20-22, 1971), (2) the Conference on Islamic Cultural Centers (Rabat, June 1-3, 1971), (3) the Conference on Draft Charter (Jeddah, June 21-23, 1971), and (4) the Conference on Islamic Bank (Cairo, February 7-9, 1972) ("Islamic Conference-From Talk to Take-off," Impact International Fortnightly [London] 1, No. 22 [1972]: 5 [hereafter cited as "From Talk to Take-off"]). previous conference and submit various studies to be considered at the third foreign ministers' conference. 182 By this time it was clear that many member states were lagging in their financial contributions to the organization. The secretary-general expressed his dis satisfaction and pointed out that only a few Islamic states such as Saudi Arabia, Iran, Malaysia, and Pakistan had shown some enthusiasm and extended financial support to h . . 24 t e organization. The third conference of foreign ministers was attended by 30 Islamic states-the largest number of participating states to date. Four states-Bahrain, Oman, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates-attended for the first time following their newly acquired independence. Also attending for the first time were Syria, which had undergone a change in its leadership, and Sierra Leone. And while the Sudan, recovering from an unsuccessful Connnunist coup, moderated its political attitude and came to join the conference, Iraq and the Peoples' Democratic 24 "Islamic Unity: That Problem of Ego and Indif ference," Impact International Fortnightly (London) 1, No. 12 (1971): 4 (Tunku Abdul-Rahman Putra, secretary-general of the ore, speaking to Impact). Republic of Yemen continued their boycott. The Egyptian delegation was headed by Mr. Hasan Tuhamy, a Pan-Islamist and special advisor to President Sadat whose presence reflected Egypt's post-Nasser poli tical attitude of moderation. As a result, the number of the radical Arab states had decreased to only Algeria and Libya, and the latter-despite its radicalism--had become an advocate of Pan-Islamism. Thus the rivalry between the radical and conservative states was sharply reduced. On the political issues, the conference once 183 again devoted a great deal of time to the Middle East conflict. It condemned, in stronger language than ever before, the Judaization of Jerusalem and recommended the creation of a "Fund for Palestine" to be made up of donations from the peoples and governments of the member states for the support of the Palestinian struggle against 25 Israel. In addition, the conference voiced its concern over the reported persecutions of Filipino Muslims, 25 General Secretariat, Declarations and Resolutions, pp. 35-36. 184 expressed its solidarity with the African people's strug gle against racism and imperialism, and came out in sup port of the territorial integrity of Pakistan. The foreign ministers warned India that failure to abide by the United Nations resolutions regarding the situation in the Indian subcontinent could affect its relations with the I 1 . 26 s amic states. The conference also sent an official delegation, composed of some member states' representatives, to Paki stan and Bangladesh to bring about a reconciliation between them. However, the delegation was denied per mission to enter Bangladesh because there had been no prior recognition of the independence of Bangladesh by 27 the conference. The establishment of an international Islamic news agency, Islamic cultural centers around the world, and an international Islamic bank moved from proposal stage to project stage. The conference approved the project for the establishment of the International Islamic 26 rbid., p. 40. 27 "Psychological Warfare," p. 9. News Agency (IINA), for which Malaysia had advanced financial support. While both Iran and Somalia wanted the agency to be headquartered in their countries, it was finally located in Jeddah because of the symbolic impor tance of Saudi Arabia in the Muslim world . 28 Projects on Islamic cultural centers and the Islamic Development Bank were also approved, although both projects still needed extensive planning and development. However, the most tangible achievement of the conference was the adoption of a charter for the organi zation itself, without which the whole forum had so far been no more than a debating club. The adopted charter not only laid down the objectives and statutes of the organization, but also accorde<l it both purpose and iden tity of its own. 185 Oddly enough, the name of the organization was declared to be nothing more than the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC), and its objective was officially stated as the promotion of Islamic solidarity and coopera tion in all fields among the member states. It was 28 General Secretariat, Declarations and Resolutions, p. 37. 186 decided that the OIC be divided into three bodies. The first is the Conference of Kings and Heads of State, which is to be the supreme authority of the OIC and hold its sessions whenever the interest of the Muslim world war rants it. The second is the Conference of Foreign l1in- is ters, which is to hold its sessions annually and have the power to appoint the secretary-general. The third is the General Secretariat, which includes such organs and agencies as may be established under the aegis of the Oic. 29 Yet the charter was not adopted without diffi culty. Several states preferred a loose association and a few others faced the problem of reconciling their national secularism with outward Islamism. Indonesia, Lebanon, and Turkey pleaded constitutional inability to adhere fully to the charter and requested deletion of references to the Islamic religion and Islamic solidar ity. Indonesia, the largest Islamic country, argued that since the word "charter" was binding, it should 29 General Secretariat, Charter of the Islamic Conference, pp. 4-7. be changed to "joint statement." The Indonesian delega tion also felt that emphasis on Islam might provide leverage for the Islamic parties in its country. But at the same time, there was fear that refusal to associate Indonesia with the world Muslim community might provoke unfavorable domestic reactions. Consequently, Indonesia registered its reservation on the charter and declared that while it would continue to participate, it would 187 t f 1 bl . t d t . f · · 1 · b · 1 · 3 o no ee o iga e o meet its inancia responsi i ity. The Turkish delegation expressed a similar reser vation on the charter, and declared that while Turkey had no desire to pull out of the OIC, it needed more time to study and decide on possible areas of cooperation. Lebanon too expressed the same reservation on the charter and financial contributions, despite Iranian efforts to help it change its position. When the Lebanese delega tion pleaded constitutional inability to pay financial contributions to the OIC, the head of the Jordanian delegation countered by saying that while the Lebanese government begrudged a small contribution to the OIC, 30 "From Talk to Take-off," p. 5. it was apparently willing to spend a fortune on Beirut 31 night clubs. These expressions of reservations and lack of accord resulted in a proposal by Mauritania and some African states that those countries preferring to call themselves secular as opposed to Muslim should be ex cluded from the OIC. However, the charter was later modified to enable such states to participate as asso ciated members if they so desired. The fourth foreign ministers' conference (Benghazi: March 24- 26, 1973) Once again this conference was supposed to meet in Kabul, but it was convened instead in Libya at the urgent request of President Qaddafi to consider the plight of the Filipino Muslims. However, because several Islamic states had not been on good terms with Libya, they did not join the conference, an action that damp ened the spirits of the secretary-general. Despite persistent calls on all members to honor 31 Ibid. 188 their financial obligations, no positive response was elicited from most members. In his report to the foreign ministers, the secretary-general announced that the OIC was facing financial problems because of the lack of support from many member states and revealed that the receipts of the organization for 1972 represented only 58 percent of the subscriptions due to it. However, on a happier note, he reported that the OIC charter had been approved by the required majority of the members and thus would be registered with the United Nations. 32 Nonethe less, Indonesia, Lebanon, and Turkey continued to par ticipate without signing the charter. The Middle East problem and the question of the Filipino 11uslims occupied most of the attention of the delegates. The foreign ministers expressed their urgent concern over the "Zionist threat to the Red Sea Basin," and, without specifying any particulars, called upon all member states to work together to confront this perceived 189 32 "Another Year of Enforced Inactivity [Tunku Abdul-Rahman Putra reporting to the Fourth Islamic Confer ence of Foreign Ministers held in Benghazi, Libya, March 24-26, 1973] ," Impact International Fortnightly (London) 2, No. 22 (1973): 6 (hereafter cited as "Enforced Inactivity"). 33 danger. The conference also recognized the PLO as the only legitimate representative of the Palestinian people and decided to implement the reconnnendation adopted by the last conference by establishing the Fund for Pales- . 34 tine. On the problem of the Filipino Muslims, the foreign ministers demanded that the government of the Philippines protect its Muslim minority against suppres sion and violation of their human rights. The confer ence also recommended the establishment of a fund to alleviate some of the economic hardships suffered by the Filipino Muslims. As a final measure, the confer ence decided to send to the Philippines a delegation composed of the foreign ministers of Libya, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, and Somalia, to discuss with its government the conditions of :Muslims there. 35 In addition to the Middle East problem and the 190 33 General Secretariat, Declarations and Resolutions, pp. 67-68. 34 Ibid., pp. 62-63. 35 rbid., pp. 69-70. plight of the Filipino Muslims, the conference called upon the Indian government to release promptly all Paki stani prisoners of tvar, expressed its full support of the Eritrean people in their struggle for independence, and denounced the continued Portuguese colonial presence in Africa. In other fields, the conference noted with satis faction the progress achieved by the general assembly of IINA 36 and urged the member states to extend financial support to the agency. The conference also decided to establish a jihad fund to assist Islamic liberation movements around the world, finance Islamic centers and societies abroad, provide aid in the event of natural calamities, and build schools and hospitals for needy lv fuslims throughout theworld. 37 Furthermore, the con ference decided to establish new Islamic cultural centers in Africa and to call for a conference of the Islamic cultural centers of Europe-to which Saudi Arabia 191 36 Toe general assembJ ~ T of the IINA was held in Kuala Lumpur August 16-17, 1972, in Tvhich the participants had formally established the news agency. 37 General Secretariat, Declarations and Resolutions, p. 82. advanced 10,000 British pounds to defray the expenses 38 to be followed by similar conferences in other parts of the world. To strengthen the OIC secretariat, the conference created a permanent committee of economic experts to help the economic division of the organization achieve its goals. It also asked the secretary-general to pre pare and publish an annual reference book presenting statistics on current religious, cultural, and other conditions prevailing in the }1uslim world. 39 The secre tariat was also entrusted with the task of drawing up a report on the conditions of 11us lim minorities throughout the world with a view to devising ways to protect their 1 . . 1 d 1. . . h 4 o po itica an re igious rig ts. Finally, at the request of the depressed and disillusioned Tunku Abdul-Rahman Putra, who wished to retire from office at the expiration of his term, the 38 "Enforced Inactivity," p. 7. 192 39 General Secretariat, Declarations and Resolutions, p. 83. 40 rbid., p. 77. ministers unanimously approved the appointment of Mr. Hasan Tuhamy, an Egyptian, as the new secretary-general effective January 1, 1974. 41 The Lahore summit conference (February 22-24, 1974) 193 In sharp contrast to the first summit conference, which was an emotional reaction to the al-Aqsa Mosque fire, the second Islamic summit meeting was held under much more favorable circumstances. For one thing, the Pan-Islamic movement had achieved consolidation, expan sion, and acceptance since it was first launched at Rabat. For another, the international balance of power in the Middle East had shifted in favor of the Arabs. The Arab achievements of the October 1973 war, though limited, and the subsequent Arab oil embargo, together with the sharp increases in oil prices, had created an unprecedented degree of unity and confidence among the Arabs. Also, the newly recognized financial and political strength of the Muslim oil-producing 41 Ibid., p. 86. countries 42 had turned a spotlight on the Muslim world and forced the rest of the world to recognize it as a potentially powerful political force to be reckoned with. Some industrialized countries, such as France and Japan, that had previously maintained a neutral stand on the Arab-Israeli conflict were now, after having felt the pinch of the oil embargo, coming out openly in sup port of the Arabs. Moreover, the increasing number of states supporting the Arab cause had resulted in the diplomatic isolation of Israel. Most of the African states that had diplomatic relations with Israel broke them off during the war; those that did not break off then followed suit after the war. 43 However, there are still a few Islamic states that have relations with Israel, such as Turkey, which 42 Eleven of the 13 OPEC members are Muslim. More on this later. See statistics on Muslim countries' oil production later in this chapter. 43 Fifteen African states broke off ties with Israel; 10 of these are Muslim. These are: Cameroon, Central African Empire, Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Tanzania, and Upper Volta. The non-Muslim states include: Equatorial Guinea, Ghana, Kenya, Malagasy, and Zambia (Urnm al-Qura, Mecca, October 19 and 26 and November 2, 1973). 194 has diplomatic relations with it, and Iran, which main tains some economic ties with it. The latter country is a major oil producer and does not feel pressed to sever ties with Israel, as have the poor African states that need Arab political and economic support. Another positive development that had a direct bearing on the summit conference was the growing mood of understanding and reconciliation in the Muslim world. While Egypt had already improved its relations with Saudi Arabia before the October 1973 war, Iraq decided to end its border conflict with Iran and resume the diplomatic relations that had broken off in 1970. Qaddafi also decided to visit Egypt and Saudi Arabia and resolve his differences with their leaders that had arisen out of the conduct of the October war. In addition, Saudi Arabia and the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen normalized their relations, Syria and Jordan resumed diplomatic relations suspended in 1971, and Pakistan decided to recognize the independence of Bangladesh. 195 The latter attended the summit and Prime Minister Zul fikar Ali Bhutto of Pakistan appeared hand-in-hand with Shaikh Mujib-al-Rahman of Bangladesh during the conference. That the Islamic world this time was the focus of world attention was manifested by the many goodwill messages received from all over the world. Communist China, Cambodia, Canada, Ceylon, Belgium, Britain, North Korea, Togo, West Germany, Zambia, and the United Nations secretary-general sent messages, in one form or another, welcoming the summit meeting and expressing hopes for its success and contribution to world peace. 44 196 Convened at the initiative of the outgoing secretary-general, Tunku Abdul-Rahman Putra, with the support of Saudi Arabia, the summit aimed primarily at expressing :Muslim solidarity with the Arab struggle against Israel. The foreign ministers, who met before the heads of state, had limited the agenda to the Middle East con flict, carefully avoiding bilateral disputes between the 1 . . h f h . 45 Mus im states to insure t e success o t e summit. Pakistan seized on the occasion to host the sum mit as an opportunity to restore national pride and 44 1-1ehrunnisa Ali, "The Second Islamic Summit Con ference, 1974," Pakistan Horizon 27, No. 1 (1974): 31 (hereafter cited as Ali, "The Second Islamic Summit"). 45 Ibid., p. 34. self-respect in the wake of East Pakistan's secession and to tilt the balance of diplomatic power in the Indian subcontinent from New Delhi to Islamabad and drive the 46 beginning of a wedge between India and Bangladesh. 197 Called under these favorable circumstances, the summit conference was attended not only by the 30 invited states, but also by eight new members of the OIC. Bangla desh, Cameroon, Gambia, Guinea-Bissau, and Upper Volta were accepted as full members, as were Gabon and Uganda, 1 h h . h h d M 1· · · 47 h at oug neit er country a a us im maJority; owever, both were represented by their 11uslim heads of state. In addition, the PLO was elevated from its observer status to become a full-fledged member, and its leader, Yasser Arafat, was accorded the status of a head of state. Iraq attended for the first time but only as an observer. 46 vijay Saroop, "The Islamic Summit," The World Today 30, No. 4 (1974): 139. 47 Although the admission of non-11uslim states had stirred a controversy at the last sunnnit conference, this time none of the member states opposed the admission of either Gabon or Uganda, and the conference spokesman ex plained their admission as based on "the collective judge ment" of the members ("Islamic Summit: From Lahore to Brass Tacks," Impact International Fortnightly [London] 4, No. 5 (1974]: 4 [hereafter cited as "From Lahore to Brass Tacks"]) . Also attending the summit meeting as guests were delega tions from the Arab League, the ,me, and che WML, and these have continued to attend as guests ever since. At his own request, the patriarch of Antioch and all Orient also attended as a guest. The fact that this time there was no boycott or abstention and that the majority of states attending were represented at the head of state level showed the growing realization among the Islamic states of their new economic and political power and the need for cooperation among them. Out of the 38 participating states, 34 were represented at the head of state level, five at the head of government level, and seven by their foreign ministers. Among the absentees were King Hasan II of Morocco, King Hussein of Jordan, and the shah of Iran. 48 The summit conference produced a unanimous 48 According to the Iranian embassy in Pakistan, the shah did not attend because of the presence of only one of the heads of state, who was not mentioned by name (Ali, "The Second Islamic Summit," p. 34). While King 198 Hasan's absence was not explained, it seemed that King Hussein's absence was due to the presence of Yasser Arafat, toward whom the king felt personal animosity arising out of the 1970 Jordanian-Palestinian shootout. declaration on the 11iddle East. The delegates promised action in all fields against Israel, called for an imme diate and unconditional Israeli withdrawal from occupied Arab lands, attacked the United States and other Western countries for supporting Israel, opposed the internation alization of Jerusalem, demanded the restoration of the holy city to Arab control, and called upon all Islamic states to support the PLO in all ways possible and pro vide it with facilities by allowing it to establish ff . . h . . 49 o ices int eir countries. Expressing Islamic solidarity with the Arabs, Premier Bhutto declared that "the armies of Pakistan are the armies of Islam .. we shall enter Jerusalem as brothers-in-arms. 1150 However, when the sunnnit meet ing repeated its call for all member states still main taining ties with Israel to sever these ties, Iran and Turkey opposed the motion . It was reported, however, that the Turkish government might sever its relations 199 49 General Secretariat, Declarations and Resolutions, pp. 95-100. SO"Speaking with a United Muslim Voice," Far Eastern Economic Review 83, No. 9 (1974): 12. with Isra 1 if all Muslim states would recognize an in dependent Turkish Cypriot state. But to display soli darity with the rest of the Islamic states, Turkey agreed to contribute an undisclosed amount to the OIC, although l. ·t t . f ·t h t Sl was no a signatory o 1. scar er. Although the agenda was limited to the Middle East conflict, the non-oil-producing members managed to direct the discussion to a subject closer to their hearts-the soaring price of oil and its adverse impact on their national economies. Unanimity was easy enough to achieve when the Arab case against Israel was being discussed, but when the question of the oil embargo and oil prices was raised, a heated discussion ensued on how the oil-producing members could avoid inflicting eco nomic hardship on the poorer members. With the increase in world oil prices, the rivalry in the OIC between the radicals and conservatives receded and was replaced by a new division between the rich and the poor members, a division that has plagued the OIC ever since. This division has represented a 51 "Islamic Summit," Impact International Fort nightly (London) 4, No. 5 (1974): 2. 200 quid-pro-quo situation in which the African states were expected to rally themselves behind the Arab struggle against Israel in return for Arab money and support against colonialism and racism in Africa. At first, the oil producers tried to dodge the issue and let it be known that it was their business alone. But Premier Bhutto reminded his Muslim brothers that Islamic unity should be translated into concrete measures of cooperation between the producing members and those that had been suffering from the high price Of Ol. ·1. 52 Th Al . .d f h e gerian presi ent went a step urt er by calling for common action to help all poor nations; however, he justified the oil embargo and the rise in oil prices and argued that the oil problem was part of a broader issue, the issue of all raw materials. 53 Nonetheless, what the poor members desired most was some sort of relief or concessions from the oil- producing members. It was generally acknowledged that 52 "Give Us the Cash, Brothers," The Economist (London) 250 (l1arch 2, 1974) : 36. 53 Ali, "The Second Islamic Summit," p. 37. 201 the Third World states had been hit harder than the in dustrialized world by the increased oil prices, and on the basis of this recognition the poor members asked not only for cheaper oil but also for some share in invest ment and aid. Some delegates proposed that the oil producing members should set aside 15 percent of their 54 new income to help the poor members. Taking notice of the high oil price, President Qaddafi suggested that the oil-consuming nations be classified in four groups: the Muslim countries, the rest of the Third World, the industrialized countries "which offer us technology and arms," and the rest of the industrialized world. He then proposed a four-tier price system for crude oil that would hit the last group 55 the hardest. However, realizing that his suggestion might not be practical or acceptable, Qaddafi instead made a plea for an end to the oil embargo against the Third World nations. He added: The impact of the oil issue has become too strong for the states of the Third World and had 54 Ibid. , p. 3 7. 55 "From Lahore to Brass Tacks," p. 4. 202 affected their economies, particularly the African states, which stood by us and sacrificed some of their interests for our sake during the Ramadan war [the October 1973 war] _5 6 On the other hand, Iran announced that on the eve of the sunnnit conference it had contributed one billion dollars to the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund to alleviate the balance of payments of 203 the oil-consuming nations. President Idi Amin of Uganda then proposed that the sum should be deposited with the Islamic Development Bank instead. Endorsing his sug gestion, Yasser Arafat argued that a deposit with the \vorld Bank meant placing the money under Jewish control. 57 Realizing that the question of economic coopera tion and the plight of the poor members needed more careful study by economic experts, the summit formed an economic committee composed of the experts of five rich and three poor member states and instructed it to submit ·t 1 h f · · · ' f 58 is proposa sat t e next oreign ministers con erence. 56 Ibid. 5 7 Al; , "The S d I 1 . S . t " 38 L econ s amic ummi , p. . 58 General Secretariat, Declarations and Resolutions, pp. 93-94. 59 Also, as a supplement to the Islamic Development Bank, the summit established an Islamic Solidarity Fund to finance various projects in the Muslim world. 60 And to consolidate its support with the rest of the Third World, the summit promised a vigorous use of the oil weapon against South Africa, Rhodesia, and Portugal, and several Islamic states, including the host country, de- 61 cided to sever relations with Portugal. However, in its economic resolution the summit conference spoke only of what had been stressed by the delegates, . i . e . , the decision to support one another in their efforts to secure the mobilization of their natural resources, and to consolidate mutual economic cooperation. 62 Except for establishing a broad frame 204 59 The Preparatory Committee of the bank met in Jeddah on December 15, 1973, and signed a declaration of intent with regard to establishing the bank ("Islamic Development Bank," Impact International Fortnightly [London] 4, No. 10 [1974]: 6). 60 General Secretariat, Declarations and Resolutions, p. 105. 61 lb id . , p . 9 8 . 62 rbi"d., 101 2 pp. - . work for economic cooperation, the resolution made no mention of any concrete measures to achieve that goal. Not only did the sunnnit conference fail to provide any immediate relief to the poor members, it was unable to obtain any assurance from the oil-producing members that they would invest their surplus in the less affluent countries. In other matters, the sununit decided to establish two Islamic universities in Africa, one in Niger and the other in Uganda, for the improvement of educational pro- 63 grams and the propagation of Islam. In addition, the summit conference resolved that all member states should consult together to adopt a joint stand on international issues at the United Nations and other world bodies. 64 Although it was not intended that disputes among the Islamic states be brought up at the summit meeting, the Afghan envoy began discussing his country's terri torial disputes with the host country, only to be told 205 by Presidents Sadat and Boumedienne to confine his remarks 63 Ali, "The Second Islamic Summit," p. 36. 64 General Secretariat, Declarations and Resolutions, p. 94. 206 65 to matters on the agenda. It was agreed, however, that all bilateral disputes between the member states be solved peacefully through mediation and the good offices of the 66 Islamic states. The summit conference was hailed as a success by almost all of the member states and was well received by some in the outside world. For example, China's Premier Chou En-lai welcomed what he called the positive results of the summit, especially the increasingly important role of the Muslim states in the Third World's struggle against imperialism and exploitation imposed by a system f 1 . l . 67 o unequa economic re ations. The summit meeting was the largest and most impressive Islamic gathering in modern history. Out of 65 Ali, "The Second Islamic Summit," p. 35. It should be mentioned here that ever since its monarchy was overthrown in July 1973, Afghanistan had brought its old territorial claims against Pakistan. Also, Afghanistan, which had promised to host the fifth foreign ministers' conference, expressed its regrets at the summit that it would be unable to do so, and Malaysia agreed to host it instead. 66 Ibid., p. 39. 67 "Islamic Conference," Impact International Fort nightly (London) 4, No. 10 (1974): 2. it the Muslim states have emerged as a potentially united force and the Arabs as a unified group within that force, asserting their leadership in the Pan-Islamic movement not only by their domination of the OIC membership but also by their wealth. The fifth foreign ministers' conference (Kuala Lumpur: June 21-25, 1974) Although the OIC had made some progress up to this point, it was still marked by the loftiness of its rhetoric and the fuzziness of its actual program. The }1alays ian prime minister who opened this conference urged the delegates "to come out with concrete proposals that can be implemented" rather than "merely producing gran diose plans that look impressive on paper but that will 68 not get off the ground." 207 Despite his urging, this conference, like its predecessors, failed to adopt definite measures in either political or economic cooperation. The Economic Committee, established by the Lahore sunnnit conference, merely 68 Sydney H. Schanberg, "Islamic Parley Avoiding Conflict," New York Times, June 24, 1974, Part I, p. 3. 208 reported that it had identified a number of areas fot cooperation among the member states and that it needed more time to develop concrete proposals. Thus the foreign ministers decided that the committee would continue to function and meet twice a year or when requested by the 69 secretary-general. Also, the conference's resolutions on economic cooperation simply recommended joint ventures, bilateral economic cooperation, the creation of an Islamic Fund for Economic Adjustment to help the poor members suffering from high oil prices, the establishment of an economic and technical cooperation scheme to provide each other technical assistance, and the setting up of a preferential tariff system in consonance with the prin ciples of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) . 70 These economic resolutions provided nothing concrete, and most of the political resolutions were mere repetitions of previous resolutions. However, the fact-finding mission that had been sent to the 69 General Secretariat, Declarations and Resolutions, p. 150. 7 oib1.·d., 147 49 pp. - . Philippines by the Benghazi conference reported that that country had failed to produce a plan for the protection and assistance of its Muslim minority. In response to this information, the conference passed a unanimous reso lution condemning the government of the Philippines for its treatment of its Muslim citizens and called upon it to "desist from all measures which resulted in the kill- ing of Muslims . " The conference also demanded a political solution for the Filipino Muslims, decided that the fact-finding mission would remain operative to pur sue the matter with the Philippines government, and voted to establish a Filipino Muslim Welfare and Relief Agency to alleviate some of their economic hardships. 71 To solidify their joint stance and present them selves as a bloc in the United Nations and its special ized agencies, the member states unanimously supported the candidacies of the Algerian foreign minister to the chairmanship of the following General Assembly session, a former Lebanese minister of agriculture to the post of director-general of the Food and Agriculture 71 rbid., pp. 139-41. 209 Organization, and a Senegalese to the post of director general of UNESCo. 72 However, the most important achievement of the conference was the expansion and strengthening of the institutionalization process of Pan-Islamism. The IINA was provided with $2.5 million (contributed by five rich I Arab states: Kuwait, Libya, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates) to help finance the installa- 73 tion of its worldwide telecommunication system. The Islamic Solidarity Fund was put under the jurisdiction of the OIC secretariat and was expanded to incorporate the Jihad Fund established at the Benghazi conference, the financing of the two proposed Islamic universities in Africa, and the newly proposed Filipino 11uslim Welfare and Relief Agency. To enable it to carry out its expanded duties, the Islamic Solidarity Fund was provided with $26 million, 74 of which Saudi Arabia alone 72 rbi· d. , 109 11 pp. - . 210 73 "Islamic Foreign Ministers' Conference," The Journal of ~ · 1us lim World League, Mecca 1, No. 10 (1974): 60. 74 M. G. G. Pillai, "Razak: The Peace-Maker," Far Eastern Economic Review 85, No. 26 (1974): 13. 211 contributed $10.2 million. 75 However, the amount allotted to the fund generated various debates on how it should be spent. A Libyan proposal was rejected that would have given the amounts directly to Muslim minorities instead of going through their respective governments. In addition, the delegates reconnnended the estab lishment of an Islamic science foundation and referred the proposal to their respective governments for approv al.76 The conference decided against discussing the Islamic Development Bank, preferring instead to set up a special committee to complete its report on time for the Islamic finance ministers' conference to be held in Jeddah within two months. It was revealed, however, that 77 $1 billion was promised by the members to the bank. 75 "The Kuala Lumpur Conference," The Journal of Muslim World League, Mecca 1, No. 10 (1974): 53. 76 General Secretariat, Declarations and Resolutions, p. 151. 77 Abdul-Haleem Uwaiss, "Al Motamar al-Islami," Al-Wa'y Al-Islami 10, No. 114 (June 1974): 96, an inter view with Mr. Hasan Tuhamy, secretary-general of the OIC. The bank was formally established by the finance ministers on August 12, 1974. Saudi Arabia and Egypt had advanced $200,000 and $100,000 respectively for the establishment of its offices in Jeddah ("Preparatory Connnittee Approves Islamic Bank Charter," Impact International Fortnightly Furthermore, to solidify the OIC secretariat itself, the conference instituted a large body of rules and regulations covering everything from the internal rules of the secretariat, to its financial and personnel regulations, to the procedures of the conferences. The general secretariat was enlarged to contain the following eight main departments: 78 1. Office of the Secretary-General 2. Department of Economic Affairs 3. Department of Political Affairs 4. Department of Cultural and Social Affairs 5. Department of Administrative and Financial Affairs 6. Department of Legal Affairs 7. Department of Holy Jerusalem and the 212 [London] 4, No. 11 (1974]: 10). However, the bank started with only 750 million Islamic dinars (one I.D. equals one Special Drawing Right of the International Monetary Fund) (Islamic Development Bank, "Islamic Development Bank: Articles of Agreement," p. 7). 78 General Secretariat of the Organization of the Islamic Conference, Mage'mo'ut Nouzom Munazzamut Al Hotamar Al-Islami [Regulations of the Organization of the Islamic Conference] (Jeddah: General Secretariat of the OIC, 1974), pp. 62-67. Palestinian Cause 8. Department of Information Finally, the secretary-general proposed that the name of the OIC be changed to the Organization of Islamic Solidarity to express some degree of unity among the mem ber states. But to his dismay the motion was defeated 79 an event that reflected the members' apathy and fear of losing their political independence. The sixth foreign ministers' conference (Jeddah: July 12-15, 1975) 213 With this conference the number of the members rose to 43, thus making the OIC one of the world's largest political bodies. While Iraq and the Maldives were accepted as full members, Nigeria and the Comoro Islands joined as observers. The fact that Nigeria, the largest African country and a major oil producer, joined this late and only as an observer showed that, unlike the poor African states that joined earlier, it was not attracted 79 General Secretariat, Declarations and Resolutions, p. 138. by Arab money. King Khalid of Saudi Arabia opened the conference with an emotional speech on the loss of King Faisal whom the foreign ministers eulogized for his pioneering role in the Pan-Islamic movement-and urged the delegates to fulfill his brother's fondest dream of liberating Jerusalem and praying in al-Aqsa Mosque. Addressing the foreign ministers, Khalid said: The best way to honor his memory is for all of us to be determined to follow his lead and what he sought in the solidarity and unity of all Muslims, and to strive to achieve the greatness of the t1us lim nation. Above all is to fulfill his most ear nest hope: for us to pray, with God's Grace and Will in al-Aqsa Mosque, the first of the two Gib lahs80 and the third holiest shrine, with Jerusalem once again Arab, free, and dedicated to the service of God and His religion.Bl In response to this appeal to Faisal's memory, 214 80 In the early years of Islam, Muslims faced Jeru- salem when they prayed. 81 s - · G- - 1 d 1 '0 . . d 1 ecretariat enera e rganisation e a Conference Islamique, "Communique conjoint de la sixieme conference islamique des rninistres des affairs etrangeres tenue a Djeddah du 3 au 6 Rajab, 1395 H. (12-15 juillet 1975)" (unpublished report, Jeddah, 1975), pp. 2-3 (here after cited as Secretariat General, "Connnunique conjoint de la sixierne conference"). Author's translation from French. the main theme of the conference was that Jerusalem is an inalienable part of the Muslim world and that Israel should relinquish control over it. The de l egates set up 215 a permanent committee called the Jerusalem Committee, composed of nine members, including the PLO and the secretary-general, to conduct a global diplomatic campaign 82 to establish Muslim rights in Jerusalem. In addition, the conference unanimously called for the expulsion of Israel from the United Nations and other international bodies for violating the United Nations charter by its continued refusal to comply with the United Nations reso lutions calling for its withdrawai. 83 Finally, the con ference called for the establishment of an independent Palestinian homeland in the territories occupied by Israel. 84 Turkey and Iran, which in previous conferences had remained aloof from the Arab-Israeli conflicts, now 82 - . - - 1 " - 1 . 1 . . Secretariat Genera, Reso utions po itiques adoptees par la sixieme conference," p. 6. 83 Ibid., p. 19. 84 Ibid., p. 11. 216 began their drift toward the Arab position. This change of stance was the result of three factors: the growing Muslim bonds through the OIC, Israeli intransigence, and economic and political interests. Turkey has turned sharply toward the wealthy Arab states for economic and political support since the rise of oil prices and the 1974 Turkish invasion of Cyprus. Iran, en the other hand, has security interests in the Persian Gulf that depend on Arab cooperation. It is also a major oil producer with a vital economic interest in strengthening OPEC, which is dominated by Arab states. Nevertheless, neither of these two major Muslim states has decided to break relations with Israel, an action that has remained an embarrassment to the Muslim world in general and to the OIC in particular, which has constantly called upon its member states to stop de&ling with Israel. Turning their attention from the Middle East situation, the conference delegates listened "with inter est" and sympathy to the report by the l~ader of the Turkish Cypriot community on the efforts made by his people to protect their rights and preserve their 217 . d d 85 1.n epen ence. However, support for the Muslim Cypriots was limited because of the fact that a number of the member states were more sympathetic to Archbishop Makarios and his nonaligned and anti-imperialist image. The foreign ministers also debated the situation of the Filipino Muslims and repeated their demand for a political solution to their suffering. However, Presi dent Marcos, who has been dependent on Arab oil, sent a delegation to the conference, not to offer it an expla nation of the failures of the Jeddah negotiations, 86 or the continued conflict in the southern Philippines, but to ask it what it had done to implement its 1974 resolu tion to establish a Filipino Muslim Welfare and Relief Agency. This was enough to put the conference on the defensive, especially Libya, which has been an active supporter of Filipino Muslims. But Marcos quickly 85 secretariat General, "Communique conjoint de la sixieme conference," p. 10. 86 The secretary-general of the OIC had arranged for negotiations between the Moro National Liberation Front and the Philippines governn1ent. The two parties met in Jeddah from January 18 to 29, 1975, but the negotia tions ended in a deadlock ("The Philippines: Non-Talks in Jeddah: The Inside Story," Impact International Fort nightly [London] 5, No. 5 [1975]: 5). selected Lebanon's foreign minister to convey to the delegates on his behalf the message that the Philippines 87 government had decided in favor of Muslim autonomy. To affirm their grouping as a bloc within the United Nations system, the delegates once again passed a resolution supporting the candidacies of several member states to international posts at the thirtieth session of the United Nations. Although nine member states expressed reservations, the conference supported Libya and Pakistan for election to the Security Council, Afghanistan and Bangladesh for election to the Economic and Social Council, Bahrain as vice-president of the General Assembly, and a Kuwaiti as director of the newly established International Organization for Human Settle- 88 ments. Furthermore, the conference passed a resolution calling for cooperation and coordination between the OIC and the Arab League, the Organization of African Unity, and the nonaligned countries, in order to exchange views 218 87 "Islamic Conference: manship," Impact International 15 (1975): 7. Realities of Muslim States Fortnightly (London) 5, No. 88 s - · G- - 1 "R- 1 . 1 · . ecretariat enera , eso utions po 1t1ques adoptees par la sixieme conference," pp. 42-43. 219 and adopt a joint stand on all issues of common interest. 89 Taking into consideration the drastic develop ments in Portugal and its decision to end its colonial presence in Africa, the conference passed a resolution calling on the member states to resume normal relations with Lisbon. 90 And to confirm their support to each other against outside powers as expressed in the charter, the conference delegates unanimously supported Morocco's claims to the towns of Ceuta and Melilia and their coastal islands, and called upon Spain to relinquish its hold 91 over them. While most political resolutions were distin guished by unanimity, most economic resolutions reflected a lack of will on the part of the delegates to establish concrete economic bases for cooperation. The conference passed nine economic resolutions, most of which were marked by delays and further studiE~s. Although the delegates debated a Saudi Arabian draft for economic 89 rbid., pp. 34-3,. goibid., p. 30. 91 rbid., pp. 90-91. cooperation, no agreement was reached and the matter was referred to the economic committee for a detailed study to be submitted at the next conference. 92 The committee was also assigned the task of drawing up a plan for the establishment of an Islamic monetary area. 93 On the question of setting up an Islamic fund for economic adjustment, proposed by the last conference to alleviate economic burdens resulting from the high price of oil, the delegates simply decided to keep the matter under 94 continued review until an agreement was reached. 220 The lack of will, however, was primarily mani fested by the member states' slowness to honor their financial obligations. The conference urged all members to contribute to the Islamic Solidarity Fund, each accord ing to its capacity, in order to provide the fund with at 1 $50 ·11· bl · · · b" · 95 east mi ion to ena e it to attain its o Jectives. 92 s .... · G.... .... 1 "R.... 1 . .... . ecretariat enera , eso utions economiques adoptees par la sixieme conference," pp. 8-9. 93 Ibid., p. 3. 94 Ibid. , p. 7 . 95 Ibid., p. 14. The conference also appealed to all members to pay their annual subscriptions to IINA and provide it with an addi- tional sum of $6 million. 96 And to save the OIC secre- tariat itself from a financial collapse, the conference established a Financial Control Body • the secretariat in to ensure that all financial operations and accounting d . . d 9 7 recor s were ma1.nta1.ne . In the matter of institutionalizing Pan-Islamism, the foreign ministers received several studies on the establishment of the Islamic science foundation proposed by the last conference, but instead amended the name of the project to the Islamic States Scientific Consultative Council in its first phase and noted that it needed more d . 98 stu 1.es. In addition, the conference approved in 221 96 Ibid., p. 16. The second general assembly of the IINA, in which the participants had adopted the regu lations of the agency, was held in Jeddah from November 17 to 19, 1974 ("International Islamic News Agency," The Muslim World [Karachi] 12, No. 23 [1974]: 1). 97 secretariat General de l'Organisation de la Conference Islamique, 91 Resolutions financieres et adminis tratives adoptees par la sixierne conference islamique des rninistres des affairs etrangeres tenue a Djeddah du 3 au 6 Raj ab, 1395 H. ( 12-15 j uille t 19 7 5)" (unpublished report, Jeddah, 1975), p. 6. 98 s ~ · c- - 1 "R- 1 . - . ecr~tar1.at enera , eso ut1.ons econom1.ques adoptees par la sixieme conference islamique," p. 12. principle the creation of an Islamic broadcasting organi zation to be located in Jeddah. However, the actual decision to establish this new organization was made two days later in Jeddah by a conference of representatives of the Islamic states. Among its various objectives was to disseminate throughout the Muslim world an awareness of the political, economic, social, and educational prin- 99 ciples upon which Islamic solidarity is based. The seventh foreign ministers' conference (Istanbul: May 12-15, 1976) Turkey, which up to now had not been a full fledged member, announced that it had officially signed the OIC charter and accepted all obligations due to the organization. 100 In a further display of Muslim soli darity, Turkey announced that it had allowed the PLO to 99 secretariat General, "Projet des radiodiffu s ions , " p . 2 . 100 General Secretariat, "Joint Communique of the 222 Seventh Islamic Conference," p. 4. Indonesia and Lebanon, however, continued to participate in the OIC without signing its charter. ff . . A k 101 open an o ice in n ara. In this conference, Comoro Islands decided to end its observer status and joined as a full member, thus making Nigeria the only country with an observer status. Joining the guest list this time were the Muslim Youth Organization and the United Nations organization, whose secretary-general sent a message of goodwill ex pressing his hopes that the conference would contribute to international peace in the Middle East. 102 The conference was opened by the Turkish prime minister, who recalled Turkey's past pivotal role in the Islamic world and traced Istanbul's historical background as a center of Muslim culture and power for centuries. Then, referring to Turkey's present role in Cyprus, he called upon the member states to support his country's efforts to establish an independent Muslim connnunity in the island. The leader of the Cypriot Muslims also repeated his previous appeal to the delegates to 101 "Turkey," 1977 Britannica Book of the Year (Chicago: Encyclopaedia Britannica, 1977), p. 680. lOZGeneral Secretariat, "Joint Corrnnunique of the Seventh Islamic Conference," pp. 1-4. 223 recognize his community's right to self-determination. Thus this time Turkey succeeded in obtaining the member states' support for its Cyprus plans. The conference passed a resolution recognizing the "rights of the Turk ish Muslim community" to form an independent state in Cyprus, and decided that the representatives of the Muslim Cypriots should be invited to attend future ses sions of the Oic. 103 To display }fuslirn solidarity with a member state, the conference passed a unanimous resolution condemning France for its occupation of the island of Mayotte, declared that the island was an integral part of the state of Comoro Islands, and demanded that France with- d f . . d" l 104 raw rom it 1mme iate y. In addition, the conference repeated the Islamic states' pledge to support the PLO, this time adding the establishment of a Jerusalem Fund to counter Israel's Judaization of the holy city and sustain Palestinian 103 General Secretariat, "Political Resolutions Adopted by the Seventh Islamic Conference," pp. 39-40. l0 4 Ibi"d., 14 15 pp. - . 224 resistance against it. 105 And in supporting the African liberation movements, the conference this time went beyond moral and diplomatic support by requesting the secretary-general to establish direct contacts with the liberation movements in Namibia and Zimbabwe (Rhodesia) d 1 h . h h · . 1 d l0 6 an to supp y t em wit t eir materia nee s. Furthermore, the conference passed a unanimous resolution condemning Rhodesia's attack on 11ozambique, and denounced the "collusion" between Israel and the racist regimes in southern Africa "with the purpose of threatening the security and independence of African and Arab states." 107 In other matters, the conference called for the establishment of nuclear free zones in Africa, the :Middle East, and south Asia; condemned the Philippines govern ment for its continued oppression of its Muslim minority and failure to honor its promise to grant them political lOSG 1 S . ''J . C . - f h enera ecretariat, oint onnnunique o t e Seventh Islamic Conference," p. 7. 106 ceneral Secretariat, "Political Resolutions Adopted by the Seventh Islamic Conference," pp. 10-12. lO 7 Ibid . , p . 44 . 225 autonomy; and called upon all African states to provide a just solution to the Eritrean problern. Since bilateral disputes between the member states were avoided, agreement was easy enough on most political issues, but on economic matters the conference, like its predecessor, failed to adopt definite measures. The economic committee, which had held a conference in Istanbul a few days earler, reported to the conference that it was unable to develop concrete proposals because many member states had failed to supply it with the necessary data for its projects. Thereupon the confer ence decided that the committee would hold another con ference in Jeddah within three months to present its economic proposals, and urged the members to cooperate by providing the data necessary for the committee's 108 work. However, the committee's membership was in- creased to 18 and, despite the problems it was facing, 108 c~neral Secretariat of the Organization of the Islamic Conference, "Economic Resolutions Adopted by the Seventh Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers Hela in Istanbul, Republic of Turkey, from 13-16 Jamad Al-Awwal, 1396 H. (12-15 May, 1976)" (unpublished report, Jeddah, 1976), p. 8 (hereafter cited as General Secretariat, "Economic Resolutions Adopted by the Seventh Islamic Con ference") . 226 the conference assigned it new duties and renamed it the Islamic Commission of Economic, Cultural, and Social Aff . 109 airs. The conference approved a draft convention 110 on technical and trade cooperation, called upon the member states to help each other with labor and technical ex pertise, and decided that the leaders of the member states' chambers of commerce would meet the following year in Istanbul to devise ways and means for commercial and industrial cooperation. 111 To strengthen the institutional bases of Pan Islamism, the foreign ministers expressed their satisfac tion with the progress achieved by the Islamic Solidar ity Fund in collecting contributions from the member 112 states, allocating $1.5 million for the two Islamic l0 9 Ibid., p. 7. llOThis was not publicly disclosed. 111 Ibid. , p. 2. 227 112 since the last conference the fund had received additional sums: $5.5 million from Saudi Arabia, $4.5 million from Libya, and $2 million from the United Arab Emirates ("Islamic Solidarity Fund," Impact International Fortnightly [London] 5, No. 7 [1975]: 12). universities in Africa, granting Gabon $100,000, 113 and extending financial assistance to Guinea-Bissau to help 114 it build an Islamic center. In addition, the conference examined a report submitted by the director-general of IINA in which he explained the steps taken to build up the agency's telecommunication network, and asked for $14 million to help the agency achieve its goals. Thus once again the conference was compelled to urge all its members to honor 115 their financial obligations to the agency. The head of the general assembly of the newly created Islamic Broadcasting Organization, which had met a few days earlier in Istanbul to approve its annual budget, asked the conference for financial aid to n1eet 228 113 "Islamic Solidarity Fund," Impact International Fortnightly (London) 6, No. 3 (1976): 14. Although the purpose of the grant to Gabon was not explained, it seemed odd that Gabon, which had been a member of OPEC since June 1975, would be given financial aid. 114 General Secretariat, "Economic Resolutions Adopted by the Seventh Islamic Conference," p. 4. 115 Ibid., p. 12. Since the last conference Iran had advanced an additional $100,000 to the agency ("IINA Gets Iranian Support," Impact International Fortnightly [London] 5 , No . 19 [ 19 7 5] : 4) . h . . , d 116 t e organizations nee s. On the project of the Islamic States' Scientific Consultative Council, the delegates received a study prepared by the secretariat, but no action ·was taken and the matter was referred to 117 their respective governments for approval. The conference also approved the appointment of Dr. Ahmadu Gay, the president of the Economic and Social Council of Senegal and the former minister of education, 118 as the new secretary-general. The delegates also appointed three assistant secretaries-general from 119 Morocco, Pakistan, and Turkey. In reaffirming its keen desire to strengthen the secretariat, the conference expressed its dismay at some members' lagging in their financial donations, and emphasized that the 1976 budget represented only the 116 General Secretariat, "Economic Resolutions Adopted by the Seventh Islamic Conference," p. 13. 117 Ibid., p. 14. l l S G 1 S . '' J . C . - f th enera ecretariat, oint onrrnunique o e Seventh Islamic Conference," p. 4. 119Ib. d 1. • ' p . 20. 229 . . . d h . 120 minimum requirement ue tote secretariat. Nevertheless, to give the secretariat a much more important role and keep it independent of all members, including Saudi Arabia, the host country, the conference approved several rules and regulations governing privi leges and immunities for the secretariat and its per sonnel. It was decided that the secretariat, its staff, and the representatives of the members should enjoy in all the member states such legal privileges and immuni ties from prosecution as might be necessary for them . h. f . 121 to exercise t eir unctions. Finally, the conference decided to establish an Islamic historical, art, and cultural research center in Istanbul and welcomed Turkey's proposal to establish 120 General Secretariat of the Organization of the Islamic Conference, "Administrative and Financial Reso lutions Adopted by the Seventh Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers Held in Istanbul, Republic of Turkey, from 13-16 Jamad Al-Awwal, 1396 H. (12-15 11ay, 1976)" (unpublished report, Jeddah, 1976), pp. 3-4. 121 General Secretariat of the Organization of the Islamic Conference, "Agreement on Immunities and Privi leges for the Organization of the Islamic Conference Adopted by the Seventh Islamic Conference of Foreign :Ministers Held in Istanbul, Republic of Turkey from 13-16 Jamad Al-Awwal 1396 H. (12-15 May, 1976)" (unpublished report, Jeddah, 1976), p. 1. 230 a statistical, economic, and social research center for the Muslim world. 122 However, considering the slow prog ress achieved by the OIC, these proposals may be years in materializing. The ore in Perspective During its seven-year history the OIC has been plagued by many problems that have rendered it ineffec tive. Ever since its establishment the organization has faced financial problems arising from the lack of support from its member states. Except for a few dedicated states such as Saudi Arabia, the rest of the members show little enthusiasm for supporting the organization. This lack of support is manifested not only by failure to finance the OIC's activities, but also by the fact that only a few member states have been willing to host the annual session of the organization. As a result, Saudi Arabia not only carries most of the financial burden but also hosts the OIC and all of its specialized agencies . 122 General Secretariat, "Economic Resolutions Adopted by the Seventh Islamic Conference," p. 1. 231 Another problem faced by the OIC is the divisions between its members. In the early stages the division was between the radicals and conservatives, and although this schism has declined in importance, it has not dis appeared altogether. Also, more recently, another divi sion has emerged between the rich and poor member states as a result of the large increases in oil prices, a division that has not only had an adverse impact on the organization's performance, but also he l ped to crystal lize yet a third division, i.e., between the Arab and non-Arab member states. Since most of the ore oil-producing members are Arab, they have been put under pressure by the poorer members to provide them with economic aid and cheaper oil. But nothing concrete has yet been done to allevi ate their economic hardships, which have been augmented by the large increases in oil prices. In addition, non-Arab members are fearful of Arab domination of the ore, and in view of the histori cal Arab hegemony in Muslim affairs, their fear is well founded. Arab domination of the organization is mani fested not only by the large number of Arab states- 232 almost 50 percent of the ore membership-but also by the wealth of the Arab oil-producing members, who have been instrumental in preventing the financial collapse of the Ole. Yet this Arab wealth has attracted poor Muslim states to join the Ole. In return for Arab money and political support in the struggle against imperialism and racism in southern Africa, poor African states have broken their diplomatic relations with Israel and sup ported the Arab cause against it. This diplomatic iso lation of Israel has been one of the most important achievements of the ore. However, not all non-Arab states have joined the ore because of Arab money. Some joined because of their concern over the state of affairs in the t1uslim world and their romantic longing for an Islamic revival, while others could not afford to be seen lagging in a popular cause. On the other hand, some of the non-Arab oil-producing members, such as Indonesia and Nigeria, have joined the organization only half-heartedly; the former has not yet committed itself to the Ole charter, while the latter has joined only as an observer. 233 Although the OIC member states are a potentially powerful force in international affairs because of their predominance in the world's energy field, they have not yet pooled their efforts to mutually constructive ends. Only Arab oil-producing members have expressed their solidarity by the 1973 oil embargo, while the rest of the non-Arab producers have dissociated themselves from the embargo. Nevertheless, except for Venezuela and Ecuador, the rest of the OPEC members are Muslim, and they produce 92 percent of the cartel's output. In addi tion, the OIC members produce 51 percent of the current world production of oil, control two-thirds of the world's proven oil reserves (see Table 2 below), and control 58 percent of the non-Communist world's proven natural gas reserves (see Table 3 below) . 123 Despite this recognized financial and political strength of its members, the OIC has been plagued by financial problems and lack of performance in economic and political cooperation. Positive results such as 123 calculated by the author from "Worldwide Oil and Gas at a Glance," The Oil and Gas Journal 74, No. 52 (1976): 104-5. 234 235 TABLE 2 MUSLTM COUNTRIES' OIL PRODUCTION AND RESERVES Country Saudi Arabia (including the Neutral Zone) ·k Iran--,'( Iraq-;'( Kuwait (including the Neutral Zone)--,'( Nigeria-I, United Arab Emirates ·k Libya-/( Indonesia '1( Algeria..,~ Qatar..,'( Oman Egypt Gabon-/, Estimated Production (1,000 b/d) During 1976 8,795.0 5,875.0 2,070.0 2,045.0 2,020.0 1,945.0 1,900.0 1,500.0 950.0 485.0 365.0 325.0 220.0 Proven Reserves (1,000 bbl) January 1, 1977 113,150,000 63,000,000 34,000,000 70,550,000 19,500,000 31,200,000 25,500,000 10,500,000 6,800,000 5,700,000 5,800,000 1,950,000 2,125,000 Country Syria Malaysia Afghanistan Tunisia Turkey Bahrain Total World total % of Muslim TABLE 2-Continued Estimated Production (1,000 b/d) During 1976 175.0 155.0 150.0 77.0 67.0 58.0 29,177.0 57,210.5 51 -;'.·OPEC members. 236 Proven Reserves (1,000 bhl) January 1, 1977 2,200,000 2,430,000 85,000 2,700,000 390,000 290,000 397,870,000 598,990,320 66.42 TABLE 3 MUSLI11 COUNTRIES' PROVEN RESERVES OF NATURAL GAS (January 1, 1977) Country Iran Algeria Saudi Arabia (including the Neutral Zone) Nigeria Kuwait (including the Neutral Zone) Qatar Iraq Libya Indonesia United Arab Emirates Pakistan Malaysia Bangladesh Proven Reserves (In Trillions of Cubic Feet) 330,000 125,800 65,500 44,000 34,200 27,500 27,000 25,800 24,000 22,500 15,820 15,000 8,000 237 TABLE 3-Continued Country Tunisia Bahrain Egypt Afghanistan Gabon Oman Syria Total World total CT/ M 1 . lo US l.ID Total non-Communist CTI M 1 . lo US l.ffi Total Communist 238 Proven Reserves (In Trillions of Cubic Feet) 6,600 3,000 2,800 2,750 2,500 2,000 1,200 785,970 2,303,777 34.11 1,350,777 58.18 953,000 IINA, the Islamic Development Bank, the Islamic Solidar ity Fund, and the Islamic Broadcasting Organization were accomplished only after a long and painful process, and they are not yet fully developed. And while the ore has, to a limited extent, succeeded in solidifying the rest of the Third.World's stand with the 11uslimworld 239 on such questions as the need for a more equitable inter national economic order and the fight against imperial ism and racism, it has failed to make some of its members, such as Iran and Turkey, abandon their relations with its chief enemy, Israel. Beside the }fiddle East conflict, the racist regimes in southern Africa, and the plight of the Fili pino ~1us lims, which have been discussed in conference after conference, the ore members find little to agree on. The time and energy of each conference is wasted in heated debates and progress is delayed by further recom mendations for more detailed studies on each new project. Although the ore has achieved some progress in persuad ing the Islamic states for the first time in their modern history to work together for a connnon cause and solidify their attitudes and policies in the United Nations and other international bodies, it is, by its name, still largely an emotional expression of solidarity. All efforts to elevate the organization to a higher level 240 to express Muslim unity in the political and economic spheres have failed. All bilateral disputes between the member states have so far been avoided, 124 and concrete economic measures of cooperation have yet to be produced. Each member state independently follows its own national goals and is eager to preserve its complete sovereignty and independence. Nationalism has proved to be a stronger force than any other doctrine, even in the Muslim world. Although the OIC is nothing more than a loose association of Muslim states, it, along with its spe cialized agencies, remains the only expression of Pan Islamism. Outside of the OIC the Islamic states find themselves alone or in some subregional arrangements, such as the Arab League; the Regional Cooperation for Development, which includes Iran , Pakistan, and Turkey; 124 1 · · h h f . . . t ' f nits eig t oreign minis ers con erence in Libya in May 1977 (whose resolutions the author has been patiently and vainly waiting to rec ive), the OIC formed a permanent body to settle disputes between the member states by peaceful means ("The World," Los Angeles Times, May 23, 1977, Part I, p. 2). and the West African Economic Community. If the OIC is to be rendered more effective, it needs to be increasingly politicized so as to play a major role in settling disputes between its members. It must also assume a dynamic role in the economic sphere to provide the necessary means for the economic integra tion of the Muslim world. However, the organization cannot achieve its goals until the members themselves show more enthusiasm and support for it. Unless the Islamic states are clear about their objective realities as well as those of the world around them, and unless they strongly desire a positive role for the OIC, there will be little hope for the future of Pan-Islamism. To this extent, the Islamic nations should be thankful to the arsonist who, by setting fire to al-Aqsa Mosque, was also able to mobilize the least common denominator of solidarity in the Muslim world. 241 CHAPTER VII Silln· 1ARY, CONCLUSIONS , AND RECO11MENDATIONS Summary and Conclusions In the first part of this dissertation, it was established that Islam and nationalism represent two ideologies that are diametrically opposed to each other. Islam was shown to be not only a religion and a nation ality but also a sociopolitical system in which state and church are one. Hence, modern nationalism with its secular orientation is considered a violation of Islamic theology. In modern times and under the influence of West ern ideas, only educated i1uslim classes have accepted nationalism and secularism, while the less educated 242 classes, who constitute the overwhelming majority of the Muslim population, still identify themselves primarily as Muslim and owe their first and foremost allegiance to the religion of Islam. Since Islam is also a nationality, its adherents form the nation of Islam or the ummah. The classical Muslim state, which had the Quran as its constitution and was ruled by a caliph, included all Muslims irre spective of race, culture, or language. Contrary to the Islamic theory of equality, how ever, Muslims did not treat each other as equals. In the early stages of Islam the Arabs subjected non-Arab Muslims or mawali to severe economic and social injus tices. In the latter stages the reverse was true when the Arabs suffered under the oppressive rule of the Ottoman Turks. As a result of this historical conflict between Arab and non-Arab Muslims, the political unity of the ummah was dissolved several times until it was finally ended at the beginning of the present century when Arab nationalism succeeded in breaking Arab ties with Muslim Turkey. This historical conflict between the two groups 243 244 has also continued to affect their present relations. The antipathy between them is manifested primarily between the Arabs (Sunnis), who consider the Iranians (Shi'ite) as second-class Muslims; and by Turkey and Iran, which continue to maintain relations with Israel, much to the dismay of the Arabs. Thus, although contemporary Pan - Arabism represents a distinct religio-nationalist phenome non within Islam, it is different from Pan-Islamism and in many ways opposed to it. The dissertation has also established, through the application of Bruce Russett's model of subsystems, that the contemporary t1uslim world constitutes a cluster of nations within the international political system. The Muslim world is unified by religious, social, and cultural factors; and the Islamic states identify them selves as Muslim and perceive themselves as belonging to the world's ~1uslim community. In its second part, the dissertation has traced the historical evolution of Pan-Islamism from its in ception in the middle of the nineteenth century to the present. European encroachment on the Ottoman domains and the rising forces of nationalism throughout the Muslim world in the last century induced Jamal al-Din al-Afghani and the Ottoman Sultan Abdul-Hamid II to wage separate Pan-Islamic campaigns to bring all 1 ,1uslims together. Both, however, failed to achieve their goals because of the very factors that incited them to wage their cam paigns. After World War I and the destruction of the Ottoman Empire, Pan-Islamism was revived; however, it was a weak and sporadic movement that had little to do with any hope of unified or widespread political power. The movement was symbolized by the WMC, a nongovernmen tal body headquartered in Karachi since 1949. From 1926 to 1967 the WMC held seven congresses in different parts of the Muslim world, but each congress was an independent entity and was not officially attended ex cept perhaps by the hosting country. Inter-Arab politics during the 195Os and 196Os, which were marked by political propaganda and ideologi cal warfare between the radical and conservative regimes, forced Saudi Arabia to wage a campaign for Pan-Islamic solidarity as a counterweight to Nasser's secular Arab nationalism and revolutionary socialism. In this first 245 stage of this inter-Arab conflict, Saudi Arabia estab lished in 1962 the WML, a religious organization head quartered in Mecca, to combat all ideologies inconsistent with Islam in the Arab world. In the second stage of 246 this inter-Arab conflict, which produced the Saudi Egyptian embroilment in the civil war in Yemen, King Faisal of Saudi Arabia launched an appeal for a Pan Islamic alignment to counter Nasser's ambitions in the Arab world. Faisal's call was reinforced by the al -Aqsa Mosque fire in Jerusalem in 1969 under Israeli occupa tion, and produced the world's first Islamic summit conference. Faisal's next step was to convene the first Islamic foreign ministers' conference, in which he secured the decision to establish the Organization of the Islamic Conference, or OIC. The OIC, with the financial and political sup port of Saudi Arabia, has extended its activities and resulted in the creation of several Islamic organiza tions, all of which are headquartered in Saudi Arabia. These organizations include the International Islamic News Agency, the Islamic Development Bank, and the Islamic Broadcasting O ganization. In its short history of seven years the ore has held two summit meetings and seven foreign ministers' conferences, which have produced some degree of llllity among the Islamic states and brought them for the first time in their modern history to solidify their attitudes and policies in the United Nations and other inter national bodies. Because of the lack of financial and moral support from the member states, however, the ore has been nothing more than an emotional expression of unity among the Islamic states, and has been unable to achieve definite measures in the political and economic spheres. The Muslim world is still recovering from the traumatic era when Muslims were forcibly subjected to alien, infidel rule. While contemporary Pan-Islamism has a long way to go before it achieves its ultimate goal of llllity among the Islamic states, it is a solid manifestation of the strength of Islam as an important factor in international politics. Reconnnendations The inconclusive results obtained by the 247 application of Russett's model of subsystems to the contemporary Muslim world has revealed the need for further research in the international relations field on the concept of subsystem as it relates to the region. A scientific application of Russett's model requires that data be gathered on every single criterion and applied through quantitative analysis. Another recommendation suggested by this study is the acquisition of more information on Pan-Islamism. Since materials on the subject are very hard to obtain, the WMC and the OIC should provide future researchers with all important data, without ·which it would be very difficult to analyze, assess, and impartially evaluate future developments in Pan-Islamism. Further research is needed on the Muslim world to provide a comprehensive analysis of inter-Islamic politics, a task that was not intended to be within the scope of ·::his dissertation. Although this study has provided a detailed analysis of the Muslim world's ideo logical foundations and of Pan-Islamism, it has left the subject of inter-Islamic politics to be investigated by future researchers on the Muslim world. 248 A P P E N D I X E S 249 A P P E N D I X A LETTER TO AUTHOR FROM WORLD l-1USLI11 CONGRESS 250 ORLD U S LI r, ON GRESS • (In Consultative Status with the United Nations and having Observer's Status with the Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers.) :~,r ~ y~ <Sj-) rJ I ~(.JI HEADQUARTERS T E L EP H O N E S : 417665 - 414047 CABLE • •AH B AB'• KARACHI (PAKISTAN) p, 0, B . NO, 1 5030 KARACHl .. 2. (PAKISTAN) To nr . Abdulla M. Sindi , P.O. Box: 751 , Artesi a Calif. 9070 1 U. S .A. Dear brother Abdullah M . Sindi, June 15, 1976 Assalam-o-Alaikum ·Ha Rahmatullah a Barakatuh ! ~re acknov·ledge with thanks your letter re.:;ardin in ormation about J..ot ~ .r= '[ ~ - • t r-· f ~ C).I ,t t'. G -- II t ~ '- ~.,. I ~ G k ~ l- . . l ~ C!' f ~ >L >L >L l . ~- ' t:" ,.,.._ - >L"f r,:'.. .t t l r E 1: ~ L [ . (.. - 'i - 'f ""). 'i \ii . (i t. '- E:: t'i' r- t-\ -: •r - ·f. f'' L p ~ :: ,r- ~ ~-. - £ ~ ¥ 1 ~· ~ ... - I ./ ·t· E ,; ) ~ E \ - - t C· - " ' >L - "' l, - i.- -r..~ - ... 't= t: ~ ~- 'i: ,f- ...... t - - C: .t' ~ j: ~~ [ f' - ~; ~ :f . ~ o I 't . r .f r-:.. C> ~: -::: { ·E:. ~ 1. -~ ~. 1_ . '- 'f r, 't: t - -.... (, " - - -' -r- (: E . ~ 0 -t c. Sl ~• f . · .' i· sC- E ~ • [-: . '- . (i "4 - i 1:. I- ~ I - • C"° 't: ~• u ... .e ... 1. • 1- - :. ~- 1- r .f f: " ~ ~- L L ,f f n '-- 'f }- r - ... ·[ 11' ~ ft • 1" o_ .y "1A t. § · ~ "' r ~ . f;:. ~- ~ e: ~ .c- '[ e'. ~. > ~ ~ ~ [ ~ -t ~ r-:.. E ... p G S .,. t: c., .r - - r, -r. . r .:!. ~ -: F ~· ~ [, f f ~ l l ~~ J ~ f. \ c. f· '{_ -i_ i. r r. 7" ~ <r t:. , f" E r oL -~ i.: ... - Cr.. . !r, - '- ·C: ... - (~t t't~ - '--- - :~ :, . . . . . . . . :(_ : .. . . . =r : . . . . o h ~ t- 1 (1 Q· 1 E ·~ I ~ E ~ - - - - ~~ ~ -!; \t ~ .~ I g~~ ~ r~ ~ ~\~ ~5~ - •l\I\: ~ ~:· ~\ ~ ~ ' ~:~ . ~ ~ l ~:... ~ JG . • B I B L I O G R A P H Y 256 BIBLIOGRAPHY Primary Sources Books Ali, Abdullah Yusuf. The Holy Qur-an: Text, Translation and Commentary . 2 vols . Lahore : Sheik ~1uharnrnad Ashraf [1938]. "Turkey." 1977 Britannica Book of the Year. Chicago: Encyclopaedia Britannica, 1977. "United Nations." 1976 Britannica Book of the Year. Chicago: Encyclopaedia Britannica, 1976. World Muslim Gazetteer, 1975. 2nd ed. Karachi: Urmna Publishing House, 1975. Periodicals "Islamic Leaders Arrive in Morocco for Conference." New York Times, September 22, 1969, Part I, p. 13. Schanberg, Sydney H. "Islamic Parley Avoiding Conflict." 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Creator Sindi, Abdulla Mohamed (author)

Core Title The Muslim World and its efforts in Pan-Islamism

School School of International Relations

Degree Doctor of Philosophy

Degree Program International Relations

Degree Conferral Date 1978-06

Publication Date 03/13/1978

Defense Date 03/13/1978

Publisher University of Southern California (original), University of Southern California. Libraries (digital)

Tag OAI-PMH Harvest,Panislamism

Format theses (aat)

Language English

Contributor Electronically uploaded by the author (provenance)

Permanent Link (DOI) https://doi.org/10.25549/usctheses-oUC25329

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