The tyrant and the migrant: the bonds between Syracusan hegemony and mobility from Dionysius I to Agathocles

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Content THE TYRANT AND THE MIGRANT: THE BONDS BETWEEN SYRACUSAN HEGEMONY AND MOBILITY Copyright 2013 FROM DIONYSIUS I TO AGATHOCLES by JASON RICHARD HARRIS A Dissertation Presented to the FACULTY OF THE USC GRADUATE SCHOOL UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY (CLASSICS) December 2013 Jason Richard Harris DEDICATION To my parents, Joseph and Rosemary Harris "Hear the instruction of thy father, and forsake not the law of thy mother: For they shall be an ornament of grace unto thy head, and chains about thy neck." (Proverbs 1: 8-9) ll ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS The writing of a dissertation is a long and arduous process, and without the support of the following people and institutions, I never would have reached the finish line. First, I would like to giVe great thanks to my committee. My supervisor, Claudia Moatti, has been with me from the inception of the dissertation. In addition to her astounding knowledge of antiquity, she has also tolerated my inadequacies as a scholar with great kindness and grace. As I traveled along the path to the end of this project, I fell many times into the abyss of ignorance. Without fail, she pulled me out and sent me off in the right direction. For her wisdom and her guidance, I will always be grateful. Other members of the committee also have helped a great deal during the course of this project. William Thalmann improved the dissertation immensely with his incredible grasp of Greek literature and his eye for detail. With his extensive knowledge of tyranny and political history, Vincent Farenga provided an amazing amount of helpful suggestions as I revised the final draft. James Collins kindly assisted me during the prospectus and dissertation with his knowledge of philosophy and intellectual communities in the ancient world. Jason Glenn, as outside member, helped me a great deal to think of the wider historical implications for the project. Thomas Habinek also helped me to see the bigger picture regarding this project, especially during the prospectus stage. Ill Several other scholars played a key role m this project. I am extremely grateful to Clemente Marconi for his advice on the prospectus and for his kind hospitality when I visited the site of Selinunte. In addition to educational support during my years at the ASCSA, Margie Miles piqued my interest in Sicily and suggested that I make the island of Sicily the topic of my dissertation. Spencer Pope was of great help regarding the current state of archaeology in Sicily, and I greatly enjoyed co-organizing an AIA panel on Sicily with him earlier this year. Graham Oliver and Ekaterina Nechaeva offered their expertise on mobility as I hashed out my own ideas on the subject. Several institutions offered me generous support during the writing of the dissertation. The American School of Classical Studies at Athens generously provided me with the Eugene Vanderpool Fellowship, during which time I was able to start the project and to finish a large amount of the primary research. The American Academy in Rome offered me the Oscar Broneer Traveling Fellowship, so that I could finish my research and could travel to pertinent archaeological sites in Sicily. The University of Southern California provided me with an International Travel Grant to do research in Sicily, while a Dissertation Completion Fellowship allowed me to focus on finishing the project in a timely manner. During my four years overseas, many people opened their homes to me as I was traveling. Giouli Vompiri was the epitome of hospitality whenever I needed a place to stay during the hot summer months in Athens. In Sicily, the Di Stefano family allowed me to stay at their home in Tre Fontane when I needed to explore the western part of the island. Francesco Lucerna did the same when I needed to travel IV in the center of the island, while Leigh Lieberman and Alex Walthall were perfect hosts and congenial companions during my stay at Morgantina. Gianluca Savarino generously took time out of his busy dissertation writing schedule to act as my tour guide over the western half of the island. Jeff Gross, with whom I especially enjoy sharing the highs and lows of the writing process, also opened his home to me m Paris while I put the finishing touches on the draft. As the dissertation work has continued over the last four years, I slowly felt my sanity slipping away. If not for my friends in Los Angeles, I may have completely lost my mind. Christine Shaw and Nicole Giannella tolerated me when I was at my most neurotic and always found a way to make me smile. Other USC comrades, Afrodite Manthati-Angelopoulou and Paul Salay, distracted me from my craziness by being coffee and lunch buddies. My dear friend, Joe Nolan, was always available to calm me down when I was stressed. Dimitris Anagnostou and Christina Sekeris, my Greek family upstairs, were a constant source of support. Becket Cook, Renee Noseff, and Olivier Riquelme also made life in Los Angeles enjoyable through their positive attitudes in the face of my own dour attitude. My three years in Athens were enriched by my many friends there. Partners in-crime David Scahill and Sara Franck were always willing to make a trip to the coffee shop or Syntagma to de-stress. Ryan Boehm and Meghan Keen proved excellent companions during our Regular Member year at the School. Noah Kaye likewise was an excellent companion in our mutual appreciation of ancient history and Modern Greek. I am also grateful for the friendship of Sherry Fox, Sarah v Madole, Hiiseyin Oztiirk, Robert Pitt, and Molly Richardson, who took time out of their busy schedules to humor my requests for coffee or meals. At the AAR, I would like to thank my amici (Craig Martin, Brad Bouley, Tarrah Hartley Bouley, Sean Lally, Marina Nicollier, Sean Friar, and Claire Brazeau) for their kindness and their willingness to drink Aperol spritzes on the roof of the Academy. I would also like to thank old friends from Oxford, Elina Christophorou, Stefano Fazzari, and Benedetta Mattina, for providing support over the many years, even when we are continents apart. Finally, I would like especially to express my love and gratitude to my parents, Joseph and Rosemary Harris. They have sacrificed a great deal, so that I would not want for anything. In addition, they not only encouraged my education from a young age but also continued to support me through the many years of my doctorate. It is to them that I dedicate this work. VI TABLE OF CONTENTS Dedication Acknowledgements Abstract Introduction I. Chronology of the dissertation II. Resources on tyranny and politics III. Resources on mobility IV. Overview of the dissertation Chapter 1 -On the outside looking in: the tyrant and his relationship to the polis Part I: The tyrant as outsider A. The pre-tyrant tyrant: myths of Dionysius I B. Dionysius, the monster in isolation C. Dionysius the barbarian D. The foreign genealogy of Dionysius II E. The birth of Agathocles Part II: The tyrant as exile A. The first exile of Dionysius the Younger: Locri Epizephyrii B. The second exile of Dionysius the Younger: Corinth C. The pre-tyrannical life of Agathocles: Agathocles in exile Chapter 2- Moving in, moving up: the hegemony of the tyrant and his status as the protector of the polis Part I: The tyrant as the center of his city A. From Sicily to Persia: the identity ofDionysius's predecessor B. Dionysius the ideal Syracusan: the early years of his reign C. Dionysius the savior of the Greeks: the later years of his reign D. Agathocles as basjJeus: the ideal leader in a Hellenistic world 11 iii X 1 4 13 20 35 44 44 49 56 64 73 78 86 87 95 100 llO 110 111 118 128 136 Vll Part II: Identity, politics, and mass migrations under Dionysius I A. The early years: forced population transfers under the Deinomenids B. Expelling the enemy: Dionysius and the Carthaginians C. Intra-Greek rivalry: Dionysius and the Ionian cities D. Barbarian rewards: Dionysius, the Sicels, and the Campanians Chapter 3 - Here today, gone tomorrow: the (non-)cohesion of the 'court' of the tyrant Part I: The logistics of the court process A. Divisions B. Traveling and departing C. Lodging and payment Part II: The scholarly world of the court A. Scholarly output at the court B. The tyrant as scholar Chapter 4 - Counselors and confidantes: the political influence of the court Part I: The court and internal politics A. The eyes and ears of the tyrant: the court in Syracuse B. A meeting of the minds: the Hiero of Xenophon C. The Dionysii vs. the philoi. court/tyrant relations D. Close but too close: the fates of Leptines and Philistus Part II: The court and external politics A. An exercise in political futility: Athenian intellectuals/the Dionysii B. Success without interaction: the case of Isocrates C. The fight against tyranny: the Academy vs. the Dionysii D. The panhellenic tyrant: Dionysius I at Delphi and Olympia Chapter 5 -Friends or foes? Formal relations between the tyrant and the Greek poleis Part I: International relations and envoys: an overview Part II: Intra-island relations between Sicilian tyrants and poleis: a vertical relationship Part III: Relations with Greek poleisoverseas 145 148 152 159 166 175 178 178 185 195 205 205 215 227 227 230 240 245 247 258 259 268 275 285 298 299 308 310 Vlll A. The tyrant as diplomat: Dionysius between Athens and Sparta 310 B. The Dionysii, Magna Graecia, and marriage 336 C. Agathocles and the Hellenistic kingdoms 356 Chapter 6 -Barbarians or benefactors? The relationship between the tyrant 366 and non-Greek peoples Part I: Carthage Part II: Peoples of Italy Part III: Adriatic colonization Conclusion Bibliography Appendix: the sources Part I: Literary sources A. Fragmentary historians B. Diodorus Siculus C. Xenophon D. Justin E. Lysias F. Isocrates G. Plato Part II: Epigraphical sources Part III: Archaeological sources Part IV: Numismatic sources 367 379 391 406 415 461 463 463 466 470 474 477 480 483 486 493 499 IX ABSTRACT This dissertation analyzes the symbiotic relationship between the tyrants of fourth-century BC Syracuse and migrants displaced under their command. I argue that these tyrants (Dionysius I, Dionysius II, and Agathocles) were able to gain and to maintain their power for many years mainly due to a comprehensive program of mobility. These migrants were the backbone of a new empire, as these tyrants incorporated numerous Greek city-states and non-Greek peoples into their rule, not only in Sicily but also overseas in southern Italy and the Adriatic Sea. The first part of the dissertation focuses on the figure of the tyrant himself in literary sources, specifically the portrayal of the tyrant as an outsider. Because of this identification, the tyrant portrayed himself as the ideal citizen, by finding other groups whom he identifies as 'extra-foreign' (e.g. the Carthaginians). Because the tyrant lacked a formal support system among the citizenry of Syracuse, he spread his empire through the integration of migrant groups. The second section of the dissertation analyzes one type of small-scale migration for his political aims, namely his court of advisors. The section outlines the processes of court membership and then discusses the intellectual function of the court, which converted Syracuse into a scholarly center. This section finally discusses the political aspect of the court, by studying the internal politics between the tyrant and his court, together with political alliances fostered by the court across the Mediterranean. This section also evaluates the successes and many failures of the court, the latter of which were due to the inability of the tyrant to integrate these men either socially or politically. X The third and final portion of the dissertation details the use of envoys and other official ties (e.g. marriages) to create international networks of power between Syracuse and other key cities. This section also analyzes the alliances between the tyrants and other Greek and non-Greek cities (e.g. Sparta, Athens, and Carthage) and other empires (e.g. the Ptolemaic Empire) and demonstrates how tyrants balanced good relations with powerful cities both to diminish foreign threats to their rule and to increase their empire. XI INTRODUCTION "All usual tyrannies have been entirely of short duration." (Aristotle Pojjtjcs 5.1315b). This dissertation was founded on one question. If Aristotle and other ancient authors focus on the instability of tyranny by noting that many tyrannies had a very brief duration, how did the reigns of three fourth-century Syracusan tyrants (Dionysius the Elder, Dionysius the Younger, and Agathocles) last for many years? Although Aristotle provides a few exceptions to this rule directly before the quote noted above, by referencing several families of Greek tyrants, 1 the question of the durable tyranny nevertheless raises some questions. By its very nature, at least as represented in ancient sources, tyranny should be ephemeral. One man ruling unconstitutionally against an entire city certainly seems to be a losing formula. In answering the question concerning the length of these tyrants' reigns, as a consequence, I will analyze how a tyranny functioned. Theoretical texts in Aristotle, Plato, and Polybius often describe tyranny merely within the evolution of governmental forms, while other texts provide the expected actions of a traditional tyrant. 2 This project will juxtapose these theoretical texts with historical narratives to determine the actual practice of tyranny in Sicily. We know very well, for 1 For example, the Cypselids of Corinth and the Peisistratids of Athens. The Deinomenids of Syracuse are also mentioned by Aristotle, although he notes that their dynastic rule was not of long duration (~n7 0' aVO' afrr1] 7rot.,t.2t OdfLEWEv). 2 Most notably, the Hjero of Xenophon. 1 example, how Athenian democracy functioned, due to copwus testimony found in literature and epigraphy. In addition, tyranny in mainland Greece has been the focus of much modern scholarship and mainly is depicted as symptomatic of the archaic and early Classical periods. Because of the Athena-centric nature of many literary and historical sources, the history of Syracuse and the remainder of Greek Sicily are not as well-studied. Although Syracuse was one of the wealthiest and most populous cities in the Mediterranean and was a major player in the political and military affairs of Greece and Italy during the Classical period, the modus operandi of their political systems is not as clear as other Greek poJejs. Therefore, in Syracuse and other cities of Sicily, how did tyranny prosper in reality, in opposition to its theoretical foundations in literature? Upon studying the history of Sicily, two characteristics immediately become apparent: the proliferation of tyranny as a political system and the abundance of migration in various forms. 3 Tyranny was most prevalent in Syracuse, first with the Deinomenids and then with the tyrants discussed in this project, but also was found in poJejs across the island from the sixth to the third centuries. Concurrently, various forms of migration were widespread throughout the island during this time. From movement of mercenary soldiers and political exiles to the destruction and transfer of large populations, thousands of people were moving on, off, and over Sicily simultaneously. Sicily has been known primarily as a locus of colonization for mainland Greeks during the Archaic and Early Classical periods, and the study of migration in the ancient Greek world has been often limited to colonization or the 3 A typology of this migration will be discussed below on page 20. 2 Athenian metic. While previous works have described movements of people as a by product of other historical events (e.g. wars, etc.), this project also will look at the opposite: important historical events as a by-product of movement. Thus, soldiers move before wars can be fought. Ambassadors and traders had to migrate before they could establish political and economic relationships between cities. Mobilitl continued and even increased after the Athenian Expedition into the Hellenistic period. Indeed, this mobility as an impetus for important historical events especially was prevalent in a post-Peloponnesian War world filled with social and political upheaval. From these observations, a main focus of analysis for the project was formed: did mobility, in its various forms, encourage the prevalence of tyranny as a political alternative on the island of Sicily? Thus, the goal of this project is to provide a comprehensive study of the relationship between the tyrants of Syracuse and human mobility in Sicily from the rule of Dionysius I to Agathocles (approximately 405-289 BC). Were the many forms of mobility the way through which these tyrants gained power and spread their hegemony? Furthermore, was the dependence of tyrants on mobility symptomatic of tyranny as a whole or merely of these Syracusan tyrants of the fourth century? This particular location and time period are the perfect case study for analyzing the symbiotic links between tyranny and mobility. Although each Greek pojjs demonstrated the integration of migrants into the city infrastructure (as did the earlier tyrants of Syracuse and Athens, with its regulation of metics), the leaders of Syracuse discussed in this project are an excellent example 4 This term and its many forms will be discussed directly below. 3 of power politics through mobility. Their reliance on migrants led to a scale of human mobility rarely seen in the ancient world, with a comprehensive plan by tyrants that included people of all classes and ethnic groups. I. Chronology of the Dissertation A brief chronology of Sicilian history under the tyrants will follow, which will focus on events dealing directly with mobility and will emphasize the unity of this period. In regard to the relationship between tyranny and mobility, Sicily was the perfect locus for the analysis of these concepts. As a meeting point for various ethnic groups, including Greek colonists (who were further divided into Dorian and Ionian cities), Carthaginians, and pre-Greek peoples, Sicily had unprecedented opportunities for interaction between different ethnic groups and their political systems. After the island had been inhabited by non-Greek peoples (e.g. the Elymi, the Sicani, and the Siculi), the Greeks began to colonize the island in quick succession during the eighth century. Naxos, Syracuse, Megara Hyblaea, and Zancle soon became major sites of habitation, 5 while the Phoenicians began to place strategic economic posts on the western coast of the island. 6 After pnmary colonization continued during the next two centuries/ the first tyrannies began to appear, an evolution that culminated with the ascent of Gelon to rule in Gela, located 5 Naxos was founded in 734 BC, Syracuse in 733, Megara Hyblaea in 728, and Zancle (which would later beoome Messana) sometime between 730 and 720. 6 Motya was founded in the eighth oentury BC on the extreme western tip of the island. Carthage traditionally was founded in 814 by the Phoenicians ( FGrH 566 F60). 7 For example, one of the largest colonies, Acragas, was founded soon after 600 BC by a joint effort of Rhodes and Gela. 4 on the southern coast of the island. 8 After several years as tyrant in Gela, Gel on was invited by the exiled aristocracy of Syracuse to seize power in their city. 9 Having taken over the rule of Syracuse, he bolstered his rule with programs of migration, including the transfer of the inhabitants of Gela, Camarina, and Megara Hyblaea to Syracuse and the grant of citizenship to ten thousand mercenaries. 10 His most famous achievement would come several years later, when he would defeat the Carthaginians at the Battle of Himera. 11 After the death of Gelon in 4 78, his brother Hieron took over after having been given rule over Gela for several years. In addition to maintaining rule over his territory in Sicily, he also became involved in the affairs of Magna Graecia and won a victory against the Etruscans at Cumae. 12 He also participated in population transfers, by founding the colony of Aetna in 4 75 for his mercenary soldiers 13 and creating a scholarly court, visited by Simonides, Pindar, Bacchylides, and Aeschylus. With the death of Hieron in 466 and the short rule of his brother Thrasybulus, the Deinomenid dynasty was overthrown and a democracy established. The next major event in Syracuse would occur fifty years later, with the invasion of the island by the 8 Gelon began to rule in 491 BC after the death of Hippocrates. 9 Herodotus 7.154 described the interaction between Gelon and the gamoroj, the Syracusan aristocracy who had gone into exile at Casmenae (Hdt. 7.155). 1 ° For the transfer of other citizens to Syracuse, see Hdt. 7.156 and Thuc. 6.5.3. For the grant of citizenship, see Diad. Sic. 11.72.3. 11 For the Battle of Himera, see Hdt. 7.165-67 and Diad. Sic. 11.20-26. 12 For the victory at Cumae, see Diad. Sic. 11.51 and Pind. Pyth. 1.71-75. As regards his intervention in Magna Graecia, he protected the citizens of Locri against the tyrant Anaxilaus of Rhegium. 13 Diad. Sic. 11.49. 5 Athenians. Encouraged by Alcibiades under the pretense of aiding their allies, the Segestans, the Athenians attempted to take control of the island to gain an economic advantage in the Peloponnesian War. 14 With the defeat of the Athenian forces in 413 in the harbor of Syracuse with help from the Spartans, Syracuse ascended to the position of supremacy on the island. 15 At this time, Hermocrates became a key character in Syracusan politics. Having famously exhorted the Sicilians at the conference of Gela in 424, 16 he was a general and adviser against the Athenians during the expedition. After doing poorly as admiral in the Battle of Cyzicus in 412, he was sent into exile and spent time with the PersiansY He then attempted to return in 408 but was killed while attempting to seize power. 18 His followers, including the future tyrant Dionysius I, were murdered or went into exile. While this project specifically will begin with the accession of Dionysius I in 405, two important events that occurred several years prior set the stage for later events and define the period of this dissertation. First, after the failure of the Athenian expedition, a democratic revolution occurred in Syracuse in 412. While a large portion of Syracuse's history had been defined previously by tyrants, this battle between tyranny and democracy (mostly won by tyranny) would define the actions of 14 For the roots of the Athenian Expedition, see Thuc. 6.8-26. 15 Thuc. 7.69-87 recounts the defeat of the Athenians and the aftermath, where the defeated Athenians were sent off into the quarries of Syracuse and the Athenian generals executed. 16 For the speech of Hermocrates, see Thuc. 4.58-65. He also worked to create an alliance of cities against Athens, as discussed in Thuc. 6.32-34. 17 For the Battle of Cyzicus, see Thuc. 8.85. 18 For the return and death of Hermocrates, see Diad. Sic. 13.75. 6 many tyrants. 19 The history of mobility in Syracuse and much of Sicily revolved around the battle between different political systems, as many immigrants (especially soldiers) were a byproduct of the fight for the tyrant to stay in power. The second major event occurred in 410, with the battle between Segesta and Selinus over their territories. 20 Segesta's invitation to Carthage for help opened the door for a Carthaginian presence in Sicily that would continue for two centuries. Although Carthaginians had, for the most part, stayed out of Sicily since their defeat in 480, their renewed interest in the island caused much Greek and Carthaginian mobility over the coming years and was a major influence in the policies of the tyrants. It was into this environment that Dionysius I took power. Unlike previous leaders, this tyrant came from a lowly background as a scribe, and his actions upon taking leadership would reflect his dependency on immigrants. 21 After being elected to the board of generals, he immediately recalled those who had been previously exiled under the democrats. 22 His first official campaign was to aid Gela in 405 with the help of mercenaries under the direction of the general Dexippus of Sparta. Having been named strategos autokrat6r in 405 23 and having reassigned land in Syracuse to many foreign mercenaries and other followers who were not citizens, 24 Dionysius turned his gaze to other cities in Sicily. With the Carthaginians threatening, Dionysius used protection as a pretense to send the inhabitants of Gela 19 Arist. Pol. 5.1304a. 20 Diad. Sic. 13.56. 21 Dem. 20.161. 22 Diad. Sic. 13.91. 23 Pl. Ep. 8.353a-b. 24 Diad. Sic. 14. 7. 7 and Camarina first to Syracuse and then (along with the displaced inhabitants of Acragas) to Leontini. 25 Having survived a revolt in Syracuse with the help of Campanian mercenaries (another group of migrants who would play a major role in Sicilian history), 26 the tyrant again turned to condensing his power in Syracuse. After attacking Naxos and Catane and sending their former inhabitants into slavery, he moved the Sicels to Naxos and the Campanians to Catane, along with forcing the inhabitants of Leontini to move to Syracuse. 27 In 400/399, he also tried his hand at creating new settlements, found a new colony of Adranum at the foot of Mount Aetna. 28 Later in his reign, having strengthened his power in Syracuse, he turned to his enemy Carthage. As Carthage several years earlier had gained a foothold in Sicily through a treaty, which gave them power throughout much of the western part of the island, Dionysius brought in more soldiers (issuing large amounts of coinage to pay them) and kicked out the Carthaginians who had taken up residence in Syracuse and other cities in the eastern part of the island. 29 After some success in taking cities held by Carthage in the west (e.g. Motya) and an unsuccessful attack on Syracuse by the Carthaginians in 395, Dionysius began to focus on spreading his power internationally. Beginning in 390, the tyrant turned his attention to southern 25 Diad. Sic. 13.108-13. 26 Diad. Sic. 14. 7. 27 Diad. Sic. 14.14-16. 28 Diad. Sic. 14.37.5. 29 Diad. Sic. 14.41-46. 8 Italy, attacking Rhegium and Croton from Locri. Several years later, he destroyed Hipponium and Caulonia, moving their populations to Syracuse. 30 In the following decades, Dionysius attempted to spread his influence even further abroad, not only militarily but also culturally. Afraid of being seen as of lowly status with no culture, Dionysius gathered poets and scholars from the far reaches of the Mediterranean in order to make Syracuse a major cultural center. He invited intellectuals, such as Plato, to Syracuse 31 and also tried to become a poet himself. Unfortunately, his early attempts were less than successful, as his embassy to Olympia in 388 (or 384) was an abject failure. 32 He was slightly more successful politically during this time, as he expanded into the Adriatic. Whether his actions were part of a larger plan for conquering the Ionian Sea, Epirus, and Delphi, 33 he did affect the politics of the region, both by making an alliance with the Molossians in Epirus to return the exiled King Alcetas to the throne and by founding colonies in the Adriatic, including Adria at the mouth of the Po. 34 Furthermore, he increased his influence in central Italy by aiding the Gauls in their raids of the Etruscans and even created an alliance with them. 35 Toward the end of Dionysius I's reign, he turned his attention to relations with other major powers in the Mediterranean. While having made an earlier alliance with Athens in 394/3, 36 Athens renewed their relationship 30 Diad. Sic. 14.103-7. 31 For this earlier visit of Plato, see Diad. Sic. 15.6-7. 32 Diad. Sic. 14.109. 33 Diad. Sic. 15.13-14 for this view. 34 FGrH115 F128c. 35 Just. Epft. 20.5.4. 36 JGII 2 18 and Dem. 20.19-20. 9 with Dionysius several decades later, providing him with many citizen rights. 37 Late in his reign, Dionysius also supported Sparta, sending ships to their aid in 372, 369, and 368. 38 In regards to Carthage, he broke a previous agreement with that city defining the mutual boundary as the river Halycus in order to invade western Sicily unsuccessfully in 368. After having made a truce, 39 he died in 367, reportedly from over-celebrating in response to his victory in the Lenaea. 40 It was left to his son and successor, Dionysius II, to make peace with Carthage the following year. 41 The rule of this tyrant was far less glorious than that of his father, as the tyrant possessed little strength in leadership, a deficiency that caused political wrangling between various leaders. Although his uncle Dian would attempt to educate his nephew by bringing back Plato, Plato merely would suffer the indignity of being detained against his will and then unceremoniously sent away. 42 Dian himself would be sent off into exile, only to return in 357 with a small band of Greek mercenaries and fellow exiles. 43 After being received by the Carthaginian governor of Heracleia Minoa, 44 he seized power in Syracuse for a brief period before going off to Leontini when not elected to the board of generals. 45 When Dionysius II 37 JGII 2 103, 105, and 223. 38 Xen. Hell. 6.2 and Diad. Sic. 15.45-4 7. 39 Diad. Sic. 15.73. 40 Diad. Sic. 15.74. 41 Diad. Sic. 15.73. 42 Pl. Ep. 8.328b-30c and 337e-38a, along with Plut. Vlt. Djon 9-17. 43 Plut. Vlt. Djon 24ff. 44 Diad. Sic. 16.9-11. 45 Diad. Sic. 16.16-17. 10 threatened in 355, Dian returned with his mercenanes, only to then battle over leadership with a former ally, Heraclides. 46 With the mediation of two Spartans who had been sent to Syracuse, Pharax and Gaesylus, the two leading men held joint power long enough to be named thearodokoj at Epidaurus. 47 After the death of Heraclides (likely under the command of Dian), Dian himself was murdered in 354 at the hands of an Athenian immigrant, Callippus. 48 With Syracuse in disarray after the death of Dian, several men held power for a short time, and even Dionysius II came out of exile in Locri Epizephyrii after the death of his wife and daughters in 346. In order to rectify the political situation, Syracuse went to Corinth to seek aid. Corinth sent Timoleon, a man of some rank who had previously killed his brother after the latter attempted to become tyrant. 49 After coming over with a small force, 50 Tim olean wrangled with Hicetas and Dionysius, eventually wresting Syracuse from their control in 344/3 and sends Dionysius II into exile. 51 While he was successful politically during his rule, he still faced problems with the Carthaginians, defeating them at the battle of Crimisus in 341. He later defeated their forces and those of Mamercus the Oscan, which resulted in the boundary of the Greek/Carthaginian border at the river Halycus (again). 52 46 Diad. Sic. 16.18-20 and Plut. Vlt. Dian 41-52. 47 JGIV:95, lines 39-40. 48 Plut. Vlt. Dian 53-57. 49 For different versions of the murder of Timoleon's brother, see Plut. Vlt. Tim. 4-5 and Diad. Sic. 16.65. 50 See the fragmentary Timoleon Monument (SEG11.126a). 51 Plut. Vlt. Tim. 13-21 and Diad. Sic. 16.68-70 provide differing accounts of how Timoleon took over Syracuse. 52 Plut. Vlt.Tim. 34 and Diad. Sic. 16.81-82. 11 Under the leadership of Timoleon, Syracuse appears to have instituted some type of democracy, although Timoleon still had the position of strategos autokrat6r. 53 The most important action during his rule was the re-patriation of former citizens across many cities in Sicily. Bringing in tens of thousands of settlers from other parts of the island, as well as from southern Italy, Greece, and the Aegean, he rebuilt much of the Sicilian countryside. 54 As seen in the archaeological and numismatic record of the island, Timoleon bucked the trend of most other leaders by spreading out settlers away from Syracuse (although in one case, he did move the inhabitants of Leontini to Syracuse). 55 After the death of Timoleon, sources remam quiet until the accesswn of Agathocles in 317. 56 The son of a potter who migrated from Thermae to Syracuse c.343, Agathocles lived his earlier years as a vagrant, serving as a mercenary and being exiled twice. Under the pretense of aiding democracy, he invaded Syracuse in 317, killing 4,000 citizens and turning 6,000 into exiles. 5 7 These exiles attempted to convince Acrotatus, son of King Cleomenes of Sparta to come and rectify the situation, but he was of no use. 5 8 After several years of conquering Sicilian cities, Agathocles turned his sights to Carthage and invaded in 310, defeating them. He also convinced Ophellas, a regent of Ptolemy, to come with colonists from Athens but 53 Plut. Vlt. Tjm. 22-24. 54 Plut. Vlt. Tjm. 22-24 and Diad. Sic. 16.82-83. 55 Diad. Sic. 16.82. 7. 56 Diad. Sic. 19.2ff. 57 Diad. Sic. 19.6-8. 58 Diad. Sic.19.70-71. 12 then treacherously killed Ophellas. 59 Although being defeated by the Carthaginians in 307 and forced back to Italy, Agathocles still held enough power on the island to rename himself king in 304. 60 He was then able to extend his rule throughout southern Italy and the Adriatic, as far as to Corcyra in 298. His rule as king also saw an alliance with Ptolemy I before he died in 289. The period after his death saw the growth of Carthaginian power on the island, the arrival of Pyrrhus, and the attempt of later Sicilian leaders to maintain power. This period of political upheaval on the island ultimately would allow Rome to become the major power on the island. II. Resources on tyranny and politics Because this project focuses more on the ways through which tyrants and tyranny functioned, it will not discuss the definition of tyranny and the tyrant. Modern scholarship has debated these definitions and already has created a solid profile of this form of government (e.g. the terminology of the tyrant or the identity of the tyrant to determine who could be a tyrant in antiquity). 61 These treatises on tyranny as a whole provide a framework by which one can analyze the political and cultural background of tyrants' accession and rule, 62 can determine the different criteria that formed the tyrant, and can understanding the different ways in which tyrants ruled. 63 These overall treatises on tyranny help to situate the actions of the tyrants of Syracuse within the wider framework of the practice as a whole, in order 59 Diad. Sic. 20.42 60 Diad. Sic. 20.54. 61 0' Neill1986, Parker 1998, Ferrill1978, Scanlon 1987, and Lewis 2009. 62 Andrewes 1956, Berve 1967, Masse 1969, and Parker 1998. 63 McG!ew 1993. 13 to determine the umqueness or conformity to specific 'rules' of tyranny. Furthermore, many common characteristics of the tyrant are directly pertinent to the study of tyranny and immigration. As will be discussed further in the first two chapters of the dissertation, the tyrant was represented in literature and history as an outsider to the pojjs, both politically and geographically. 5 4 In order to combat this, they often portrayed themselves as the middle ground between various factions in the city, in order to become the protector of the pojjs. 65 Modern scholarship also discusses more specifically the conditions of social and political upheaval which allowed tyrants to take power, namely the stasjs through which the tyrant used mobility and instability as he attempted to maintain power. 66 Such struggles were common, as the tyrant, who was often portrayed as a break from the pojjs or as completely antithetical, fought against it (even though the tyrant perpetuated the practices of the pojjs). 67 Tyrants also often participated in other common activities, such as the taking of foreign wives. 68 Through marriages and other actions, they often fought against and collaborated with the aristocracies of their own and other poJejs, thereby allowing access to other networks of power across the Mediterranean. 69 Modern scholarship, however, often only tangentially mentions mobility as a symptom of tyranny. At their foundation, tyrants across the Greek world from all periods shared in common characteristics that affected the way in 64 Vernant 1982, Squilloni 1990, Gray 1996, and Raux 2001. 65 Fabbrini 2002 and Luccioni 1958. 66 Berger 1992 and Lewis 2009. 67 Lanza 1977 and Rauflaab 2003. 68 Gernet 1968 and Schmitt-Pantel1979. 69 Gernet 1968, Sanchez de Ia Torre 1999, and Collin-Bouffier 2010. 14 which they ruled, ways which often were dependent on the movement of peoples. Yet, while the foundation of Greek tyranny was the same, the phenomenon of Syracusan tyranny was produced from different factors than other tyrannies. Thus, even though all tyrannies are referred to with this term, tyranny was not a static political form but was constantly changing and adapting during different times and in different places. For example, an evolution of tyranny between its early years and the fourth century certainly occurred. 7 ° Concurrently running with this evolution of tyranny was the 'cycle' of governments, an ever-changing transition across the Greek world demonstrated both m theory and history from monarchy/tyranny to aristocracy/oligarchy to democracyfochlocracy. 71 During the fifth and fourth centuries within Syracuse, the pojjs itself suffered great changes in government, from the Deinomenids of the earlier fifth century followed by sixty years of democracy followed by the ascent of the tyrants. 72 This constant change often pitted one regime against the other, such as the struggles between democratic government and Dionysius I or Agathocles. 73 Even within the rule of one tyrant (e.g. Agathocles), the tyrant could choose to transform his rule from military tyrant to monarch, thereby catalyzing the evolution of tyranny to another form (although this transformation to basile us often was in name only). 74 Returning to the evolution of 70 Masse 1969, Sanchez de Ia Torre 1999, Lewis 2000: 97-98. 71 For these anakyklosejs, see Poly b. 6.5, Arist. Pol. 5.1316, Pl. Resp. 8.544-45, and Hdt. 3.80-82. See also Canfora 1993: 20-23 and Barcelo 1993: 169-75. 72 For changes in Syracusan government, see Asmonti 2008 and Robinson 2000. 73 Berger 1992. 74 Diad. Sic. 20.54.1. For discussion, see Lewis 2009: 107-10. 15 tyranny, several modern works argue rightly that tyrants ruling during the time period of this project were different from earlier tyrants, since these tyrants based their rule mainly on their success on the military. 75 Because of their status as military tyrants, they were forced to manipulate public opinion and to legitimize themselves as earlier tyrants, who had a far better pedigree. 76 In other words, earlier tyrants (who were wealthier), including the Syracusan Deinomenids, were far different from the working-class Dionysius I and Agathocles. 77 In addition to the chronological changes under tyranny, the geographical parameters of this political form also changed. Although tyrannies were concentrated in specific areas (e.g. in the far eastern and western parts of the Mediterranean), they were spread out around the Greek world. Did geographical location have an effect on the way that tyrannies functioned, especially regarding their dependence on mobility? Within Sicily, the 'empires' of the tyrants grew over time to massive tracts of land under their control both on the island and overseas by the fourth century. Could one call this land unified, a status that affected not only the hegemony of the tyrant but also the way in which people under their control were able to travel and to integrate? Moving on to the figures of the Syracusan tyrants, modern scholarship, including sources on Sicily during the late Classical and Hellenistic periods, has provided general discussion on their lives, as well as commentary on their deeds as part of a larger narrative concerning the history of the island. 78 Various volumes 75 Arist. Pol. 5.1310-11. 76 Lewis 2000. 77 Masse 1963. 78 Gabba and Vallet 1980, Goldsberry 1973, Meister 1967, and Consolo Lang her 1997. 16 focus individually on the exploits of Dionysius I, Dionysius II, and Agathocles 79 and discuss political or cultural trends of the reigns of each leader by focusing on the literary tradition of these leaders. While such volumes are useful for comparing various historical accounts to determine the accuracy of their rule, most identify sources of mobility only in passing and do not analyze these instances of mobility as part of a scheme to maintain rule. In a sense, each of these tyrants discussed in the dissertation was unique, with their own origins, accession to power, and way of ruling. Each tyrant created his own image and his own path to success, while concurrently drawing on the examples of his forbearers in tyranny, such as Dionysius did with his predecessor Gelon. 80 These tyrants consciously sought to imitate earlier tyrants or alternatively attempted to portray themselves as a different type of leader, such as Agathocles, who first appeared as a 'democratic' ruler. 81 Other leaders around the tyrant, most notably Dian and Timoleon, were often the antithesis of the tyrant while still participating in similar actions (including the movement of people). This project goes further by seeking to define the true process of tyranny for these tyrants and to compare this process with the theoretical representation of tyranny. 82 This theory, depicted briefly in the works of Polybius, Plato, and Aristotle and more thoroughly set out in the Hjero of Xenophon, 83 do not fully explicate the 79 See Sanders 1987, Sordi 1992, Stroheker 1969, and Caven 1990 for Dionysius I. See Mucciolo 1999 for Dionysius II. See Bonacasa, Braccesi, and De Mira 2001 for the Dionysii. See Lehmler 2005 and Consolo Lang her 2000 for Agathocles. 80 Lewis 2000. 81 R.osivach 1988. 82 For the difference between theory and practice, see McG!ew 1993. 83 For the Hjero of Xenophon, see especially Strauss 1963. 17 process of tyranny. By 'process of tyranny', I explicitly mean the ways through which each individual tyranny came to power and continued to thrive. I do not mean to say that the process of all tyrannies was one single stationary process available to and used by all tyrants, i.e. a standard definition to which modern historians have recourse. Thus, I use 'process' to mean a series of actions undertaken by the tyrant to accede to leadership and to maintain hegemony. This 'process' was not necessarily understood as such by ancient authors or by the tyrants themselves. Certainly literary sources understood the common actions of tyrants, and many tyrants seemed to consciously follow the most successful deeds of their predecessors (e.g. bodyguards and foreign wives). Yet, as will be seen in this work, tyrannies often differed in the ways they came into being, due to the social background of the tyrant and the historical environment in which he lived. Furthermore, the ways through which the tyrant grew and maintained his power base varied based on the same social and historical criteria. Thus, each tyrant was creative in the fashioning of his rule, with the process not only differing between tyrants but also differing between the theoretical treatment of the tyrant in ancient literature and the actual events of the tyranny. Many of these theoretical and historical deeds of the tyrant, such as the divisions of land and marriages, can be compared. 84 Even with these divergences between different tyrannies, certain characteristics seem to be common in the process of tyranny. One such characteristic is the dependence of tyranny on various forms of mobility, especially by Sicilian tyrants, although this mobility was used to varying degrees and in different forms. Thus, this project will evaluate the differences 84 Asheri 1977. 18 between theory and practice, as well as more fully define the process of tyranny, through the lens of the relationship between tyranny and mobility. Moving on to the links between the tyrants of Syracuse and migrants, such a relationship has been discussed to a smaller degree prior to this project. As examples, two brief articles in particular provide a foundation for the analysis of the tyrant migrant relationship, since these articles argue for the use of migrants by tyrants to maintain power. The first article argues for this relationship by researching its representation in literary sources and in the archaeological record. 85 The author notes that high degrees of mobility are directly related to tyranny (as opposed to democracy) and to the history of Sicily (as opposed to other areas of the Mediterranean). This piece, however, focuses only on the movement of cities and large population transfers and not the many other ways that tyrants use mobility to maintain power. The second article briefly describes the use of foreign soldiers by the tyrants. 86 The author argues that the tyrant relied on outsiders (e.g. mercenaries and craftsmen), because he himself was not a traditional man of the pojjs (i.e. leaders, such as Agathocles, were not originally from Syracuse). In addition, tyrants made Syracuse a center of immigration, not only by inviting these men, but also other migrants who would legitimize the leadership of the tyrant (e.g. poets and scholars). Each of these articles focuses on a different aspect of the tyrant's relationship with mobility, the former with large population transfers and the latter with mercenary soldiers. While both of these articles are very useful for this project, both articles only provide an introduction to this topic. Thus, while this project agrees with the 85 Lomas 2006. 86 Krasilnikoff 19 9 5. 19 basic argument of these articles, it will giVe a more complete picture of the relationship between tyrants and mobility, rather than spending only a few pages on one single aspect. This project ultimately positions itself among earlier scholarship by providing information about the true process of ruling for a tyrant. Rather than merely discussing the theoretical basis of tyranny, this project evaluates those positions to determine if theory translated into reality. Rather than detailing the chronological procession of the tyrant's actions (the effect), this project analyzes the reasons behind these actions (causes). Thus, by studying the importance of mobility, this project will add to the study of tyranny by determining the vehicle through which tyranny functioned. In addition, by studying these three tyrants of Syracuse, the study will compare their specific rule with the rule of other tyrants across the Greek world. Such research will evaluate if all tyrannies were fundamentally the same or if the way that the tyrant 'performed' his tyranny was wholly dependent on the time period and the geographical location. III. Resources on mobility Throughout this project, the term 'mobility' will be used quite frequently. To what does the term refer? Although recent scholarship has focused on different types of mobility (e.g. the mobility of goods or of ideas), this dissertation will focus almost exclusively on the mobility of people. Even within this division, mobility of people still covers a wide range of movement, a range which will be developed and analyzed in the following chapters. For example, mobility of people can be divided further into small-scale (e.g. foreign wives and the court) and large-scale (movement of entire cities). It can be voluntary (e.g. the court and mercenary soldiers) or involuntary 20 (e.g. political exiles). It can be long-term (forced population transfers) or short-term (ambassadors). One may believe that allowing the term 'mobility' to cover so many terms equally without any hierarchy dilutes the term. 87 Yet a major premise of this project is that the tyrants of Syracuse used all of these forms of mobility to maximize their power. Each of these discrete types formed a part of a larger program of mobility. One also may argue that 'mobility' should not include more conventional activities that require movement (especially envoys or wife exchange). Far from being some form of pseudo-mobility, I argue that these types of 'conventional' pojjs activities are equally crucial to 'mobility' as any other form. Indeed, traditional forms of movement in the ancient world, such as diplomacy, created further mobility. For example, diplomatic links between cities would encourage the movement of soldiers, scholars, and traders between these poJejs. The ability of tyrants to combine these 'conventional' forms of movement with other forms of mobility was a contributing factor in the success of their regimes. As the world has become more globalized, scholars of ancient history have begun to reflect more on the degree to which the world of antiquity was connected. The former idea of the ancient Greek world as a face-to-face society (i.e. where people rarely moved and where the number of personal contacts was extremely small and regulated) has yielded to the concepts of connectedness and movement. 88 Former ideas of mobility focused on short distance travel and little knowledge of far-away 87 I also will use the term 'migrant' to refer to people who participate in mobility. While 'migrant' often has the connotation of voluntary migration, I prefer to use migrant interchangeably for all types of people participating in mobility. 88 For questioning of face-to-face societies, see Bresson 2005. For discussion of globalization, see "Mediterraneanization" in Malkin 2005. 21 locations. 89 According to this belief, the average Greek from Syracuse never would travel or move a great distance during his or her life, forced by economic and transportation barriers to remain constantly close to home. The works of Fernand Braude! and other proponents of the longue duree, however, attempted to create a history of the entire Mediterranean by finding common elements through the history of the area, one of which was the tendency of people to travel and to move. 90 The recent advent of books, such as The Gorruptjng Sea, again shifted focus to higher degrees of mobility and travel, along with wider spheres of knowledge and movement. 91 The rich analysis provided in this work rightly puts the focus on immigration and other forms of mobility (e.g. small-scale trade and transhumance) as a major catalyst for change over time in the Mediterranean. Concepts such as microregions are particularly useful for the study of Sicily, a geographical diverse island, as well as the effect of this movement between micro regions or between pojjs and hinterland as an important factor in social and political change (although the discussion of specific political change is not a focus in The Gorruptjng Sea). Indeed, the geographical uniqueness of Sicily as a locus of great ethnic and geographical diversity and corresponding political instability (especially stemming from Sicily as a destination of widespread colonization from many Greek cities) has been discussed. 92 Such scholarship is a useful start for understanding wider trends in mobility but is not necessarily useful for understanding why certain historical events occur, 89 Morris 2007. 90 Braudel2001, Braude! eta!. 1986, and Braudell985. 91 Harden and Puroell 2000. 92 Lomas 2006, Constantakopoulou 2005, and Constantakopoulou 2007. 22 especially in Sicily during late Classical and Hellenistic times. While processes of mobility always existed in Sicily (e.g. for geological or geographical reasons), such theories cannot adequately explain why mobility increased so much under the tyrants of the fourth century. This historical and political uniqueness is a driving factor of this project, because the particular position of Sicily in the fourth century greatly impacted the increase of mobility relative to other time periods or geographical areas. The focus of these books on "interactions" (rather than specific historical events) or "centers of processes" (rather than political structures) allows the linking of a wide range of historical periods and geographical areas while concurrently rejecting absolute conclusions. 93 These wide-sweeping narratives, however, often dismiss the importance of historical events, such as the movements of groups or cities due to political upheaval. 94 Some scholars rightly reject this lack of focus on state formation and political structures, such as the pojjs, or on organized long-distance trade as disregarding the impetus for historical change. 95 This dissertation will follow this argument, in that seemingly minor events, such as the movement of a town, affected long-term historical trends in the Mediterranean. Indeed, the specific political actions of various tyrants during these centuries not only created a great deal of mobility within the island of Sicily and throughout the entire Mediterranean but also effect larger trends in history. The works listed above are excellent for contextualizing the importance of mobility as a whole but often do not provide 93 Vlassopoulos 2007. 94 Woolf 2005. 95 Driessen 19 9 9, Peters 2003 and Shaw 2001. 23 specific historical examples to back up their claims. More recent work also has studied the phenomenon of networks in the Greek world, especially the island of Sicily with its multidirectional networks between the island and its mother-cities of mainland Greece. 96 These various levels of connectivity brought together not only locations in Sicily but also wide-ranging spaces across the Mediterranean. 97 Social Network Analysis has been adapted in recent years to address the connectivity of the ancient Greek world. With its discussion of nodes, links, and hubs acting together to create a highly connected world, Social Network Analysis has provided an interesting way to view the Greek Mediterranean as a more cohesive whole, although difficulties in demography often hamper efforts to use the application fully. 98 Yet, even with the connected nature of the Greek Mediterranean acting as a vector for goods and people, traditional structures, such as the pojjs, acted as a way to control or even to prevent certain types of mobility, including trade. 99 Certainly, the pojjs was not the only lens through which one can analyze certain processes in the Greek world, especially mobility. 100 Yet the poJjs remains an important starting point from which to study both tyranny and mobility. This project will focus on the pojjs and its plasticity from its Aristotelian base to its various forms in Sicily and Southern Italy, by using the effects of mobility and tyranny on its form as a way to research this malleability. Most importantly, the traditional ideal of the 'fixity' of the 96 See, for example, Malkin 2005b. 97 For these various levels of connectivity, see Bresson 2005. 98 See Collar 2009 and Rutherford 2009 for applications of Social Network Analysis. 99 For the relationship between the state and trade, see Bissa 2009. 10 ° For anon-pojjsoutlook, see Vlassopoulos 2007 and 2009. 24 Greek pojjs and its desire to combat movement and migration (as represented in literature) was vastly different from the reality that Greeks experienced. 101 This stability of the pojjs was portrayed positively throughout the Greek world, just as institutional instability and movement were seen as great threats to the city. One only needs to look at the example of Athenian autochthony to know how geographical and political stability were valued. As will be demonstrated in the second chapter, even the tyrants of Syracuse espoused this stability in order to convince the citizenry of their ability to rule. Yet this stability was valued exactly because the true history of most Greek city-states was so unstable. Perhaps with exception to the political system of Sparta, most poJejs in the Greek world were under constant change. Nearly all cities in Sicily (even Syracuse) experienced political revolution every few decades. Even though mobility was looked down upon, in reality, all cities saw that mobility (e.g. trade) was a necessary evil. Even Plato, in his Laws, included migrants in the scheme of his ideal city. The system of me tics in Athens and other cities also shows how Greek cities struck an uneasy balance between foreigners and the city. More than any other state, the tyrants of Syracuse understood that mixing old elements and new elements in a city allowed it to expand (as with the amalgamation of former citizens and new settlers under Gelon and Dionysius I). Large-scale movement of entire cities under the tyrants of Sicily was another way through which to study the evolution and growth of the pojjs in Sicily. 102 As with Alexander the Great, however, much of this amalgamation was due to the spread of tyrannical power beyond the city, i.e. the creation of a larger empire. 101 For fixity of the pojjs, see Puroell 2004. 102 Demand 1990 and Mackil2004. 25 As the power of Syracuse spread throughout the eastern half of Sicily and much of southern Italy, new ethnicities (e.g. Sicel and Oscan) and political systems were incorporated into this empire. This incorporation affected both the poJjs of Syracuse and transformed these other cities as they joined a larger entity. Recent scholarship has focused on the phenomenon of mobility and asks important questions about its nature. Although mostly not about mobility in Sicily, 103 these studies provide a good theoretical base from which to think about relations between mobility and the state. Certainly, it is dangerous to create assumptions or arguments on one time period or location based on information from a different time or place. The whole premise of this project is the unique relationship between mobility and tyranny because of specific geographical and chronological circumstances. Diachronic studies of mobility concerning a wide range of locations, however, do provide fodder for thought 104 by discussing different types of mobility (e.g. voluntary mobility vs. forced mobility due to conquest) 105 and also the parameters of mobility. 106 These studies also evaluate different factors for movement and the process of mobility, including the methods of traveling and the problems that 103 Although Seibert 1982-1983. 104 Moatti 2004, Moatti and Kaiser 2007, Moatti, Kaiser, and Pebarthe 2009, Sordi 1994, Sordi 2005, and Angeli Bertinelli and Donati 2006. 105 For example, Noy 2000: 53-55 mentions four types of migration: local (movement to geographically contiguous region because of work, land, or marriage), circular (people return to place of origin after well-defined interval for work or for accumulating capital), chain (people at new location help and encourage migrants from same place of origin), and career (where people migrate for job opportunities) 106 Yasur-Landau 2010: 12-13 notes number of people involved, duration of interaction, cultural distanoe between different groups, segment of population involved, balance of power between cultures, and level of pluralism and tolerance between interacting societies. 26 migrants might face (e.g. how to travel to new locations, where to stay after arriving, and finding work). 107 Although these works mostly do not mention Sicily, they provide a theoretic background and parallels for understanding the state's role in mobility. This role especially appears in the control of migrants, as the governing body (i.e. tyrants) attempted to either block or (more often) to encourage the 108 movement of peoples. As with tyranny, the representation of the process of mobility in literature was vastly different from reality. Many works of literature, from the Poroj of Xenophon to the Repubjjc of Plato, discussed the importance of mobility to society. 109 Other ancient works discuss the view (often negative) and treatment of migrants in the Greek world. 110 This process of mobility ends with the integration or non-integration of immigrants, which was often affected by the perception of the foreigner. For example, from source material, how can one tell migrants from citizens and how did they identify themselves in the face of others' opinions? Did differences between Greek cities (e.g. dialects, political systems) affect the representation and acceptance of Greeks from other cities? 111 For example, while Greek literary sources often portray Campanians as lesser in culture than Greeks, what do other forms of source material say about their ability to participate in city 107 See chapter 6 of Noy 2000. 108 For the control of migrants, in addition to works listed in note 104, see Moatti 2000 and 2006. 109 See Gauthier 1976 and Pierart 2008. 11 ° For discussion, see McKechnie 1989. 111 Hall1997. 27 l ·r ? 112 W I II d . hi! . . . h . 'd . ? 113 He. ere peop e a owe to mtegrate w e mamtammg t e1r own 1 ent1ty. Rather than showing how immigrants passively were used by the state, immigrants directly benefited from relationships with cities and leading political figures (e.g. the tyrants of Syracuse) and also affected the state. 114 This project thus will look at mobility and its relationship with the state as a combination of legal and non-legal processes. As mentioned before, the importance of this project is not only the focus on the close and necessary dependence of tyranny on mobility but also the amazing breadth of the mobility that occurred. A wide array of groups and individuals came of their own volition or were forced to move. How then did this mobility appear in the record? By its very nature, movement would seem difficult to detect, and indeed it has been argued that tracing individual mobility in the ancient world is difficult due to the lack of documents. 115 Movement of groups appears more frequently in the ancient sources, although assessing the scope of this larger-scale mobility is difficult due to lack of demographics. 116 The evidence of mobility is most explicitly contained in literary sources, especially ancient historians, who detail various types of migration that will be listed below. As discussed further in the Appendix, however, these sources often suffer from biases from their authors, which can distort facts. Evidence of mobility from other sources, however, provides corroborating evidence. 112 Sironen 1995. 113 Selden 19 9 8. 114 Mitchell1997. 115 Osborne 1991 notes that the lone exception to this rule is Athens, with its deme registers and larger number of gravestones. 116 For the demography of mobility, see Scheidel 2004 and 2005. 28 For example, in the epigraphic record, inscriptions often attest to shifts in dialects. This evidence is seen especially in the eastern part of Sicily, where the gradual Doricization of inscriptions over the fifth century demonstrates the spread of Syracuse and its power through this area. 117 The best type of non-literary evidence for mobility is in the archaeological record. Until the latter half of the twentieth century, scholars had to rely almost solely on literary records to determine the history of Sicily. Recent excavations, however, have brought new information to light. Although determining mobility through biological or burial evidence can be difficult, 118 various sites across the island of Sicily show evidence of the mobility under the tyrants discussed in historical sources. 119 Within Syracuse, excavations have continued to demonstrate the spread of the city after the mass immigration of new citizens under Gelon and Dionysius I. 120 Proof of movement in the center of the island, especially through the creation of military garrisons (or phrourja) under the later tyrants of Syracuse, also appears in the archaeological record. 121 Certain sites on the island (e.g. Selinunte) and other small settlements likewise show the corresponding movement of Carthaginians during the fourth century. 122 In order to understand the many types of migrants and their (non- )acceptance into society, recent scholarship has focused on the many types of people 117 Willi 2008. 118 Beck 1995-1996 and Shepherd 2005. 119 For various other examples, see De Vito 1996 and 2002, Lentini 2002, Bacci and Tigano 1999, and Bitto 2001. 12 ° For further discussion, see Mertens 2006. 121 Franco 2008. 122 For examples, see Anello 1986. 29 who participated in voluntary mobility. Actors and guilds of artists, aided by increased numbers of festivals and laws enacted by various poJejs, traveled all over the Greek world. 123 Artisans and craftsmen, who were looked down upon by much of society, nevertheless were a large group of migrants and were important for the projects of the tyrants. 124 Poets and scholars flocked to the courts at the request of the tyrants, 125 although their reception and view by other was not always so positive. Traders were outsiders who were not trusted by the cities to which they traveled and h ld r h · d · · h h · f h · 126 Wh"] w o cou penorm t e1r ut1es w1t out t e sanctwn o t e c1ty. 1 e recent scholarship has focused on the contact traders made going in and out of open ports, 127 it has also stressed the strong connections created between cities due to trading. The foundation for relationships between cities, such as Athens and Syracuse, although strengthened through the influence of tyrants, was aided by merchants, 128 who also could be integrated into the city. 129 Perhaps the largest group that was mobile in Sicily during this period was that of mercenaries. Constantly called upon by the tyrants, mercenaries (like traders) were often represented as I f . 1so F I. d . . ·a I unsavory e ements o soc1ety. rom 1terary an numismatiC ev1 ence, arge 123 Ceccarelli 2004 and LeGuen-Pollet 2001. 124 Feyel 2006. 125 Stylianou 1998. 126 McKechnie 1989. Harden and Purcell2000 also mention cabotage. 127 Bresson 2000, Bresson and Rouillard 1993, Reger 2003, and Johnston 1993-1994 for traders in Sicily. 128 Fantasia 1993 and Oliver 2007. 129 Reed 2003. 130 Bettalli 1995. 30 numbers of mercenaries from various ethnic groups formed a powerful contingent. 131 Scholars rightly have begun to stress the strong relations between mercenaries and the state, 132 often resulting in some form of integration. Such forms of integration discussed by scholars include taking part in political decisions or the bestowal of citizenship. 133 The state often also provided them with more permanent housing in garrisons (phrourja) near poJejs, allowing for communication between citizens of these cities and the mercenaries. 134 By analyzing the effects of these groups together under the tyrants, however, we can begin to gain a complete picture of mobility in Syracuse and other parts of Sicily. Furthermore, the discussion of these groups combined provides a true picture of the degree of dependence tyrants had on migrants. Within this dissertation, other smaller types of mobility will be highlighted. Tyrants and other Greek states had an intricate system of foreign relations which helped in the process of mobility or often included migrants themselves (e.g. treaties and international arbitration common during the late Classical and Hellenistic . d ) 135 peno s . Such links allowed for scholars to travel from other Greek cities to Syracuse (e.g. Plato from Athens) to become members of the tyrannical court. Decrees between cities, such as Athens and Syracuse, also record relations that aid in 131 Krasilnikoff 1996. 132 Tagliamonte 1994 and Millino 2001. 133 Masse 1997. 134 Chaniotis 2002, Ma 2002, and Treziny 1999. 135 Jehne 1994, Riemer 2005, and Ager 1996. 31 economic and political ties between cities. 136 Recent literature also discusses the use of mobile diplomats and ambassadors, along with the institution of proxenja, in order to maintain relations between poJejs. 137 Various governments allowed the removal of taxes, bestowal of land grants, and grants of citizenship, encouraging foreigners to travel to other cities and to be integrated into their host city. 138 Other systems in the pojjs regulated the movement of goods and people, such as customs and archives. 139 This project situates these pojjs institutions into the context of tyranny, in order to understand if and how these leaders employed pre-existing Greek institutions to augment their own rule. Also existing were important relations between the tyrants and other Greek states, links which resulted in increased mobility. 140 The rule of tyrants often was helped by such alliances, which allowed these leaders extra troops or protection against attacks. 141 Such relationships could be with Greek cities on Sicily that were independent of and not cooperative with Syracuse such as Messina. 142 Further ties were fostered between the tyrants and southern Italy, which often proved useful as a source of resources or as a refuge for exile, as in the case of Dionysius II. 143 Relations between Syracuse and Greek cities on the mainland, mostly under Dionysius I are 136 Hagemajer Allen 2003. 137 Angeli Bertinelli and Donati 2001 and Walbank 1978 for general studies on diplomacy. See Pere-Nogues 2009 under Dionysius I. 138 Niku 2007 and Henry 1983. 139 Purcell 2005 for customs. Descat 2002 for archives. 140 Herman 1987, Marek 1984, Lucke 2000 and Low 2007. 141 Hofer 2002. 142 Zambon 2008. 143 Lomas 1993 and Cassia and Musti 1991. See D'Angelo 2001 for Locri. 32 recorded in literature and epigraphy, while alliances with Athens' enemy Sparta additionally are analyzed. 144 Political alliances also were established between the tyrants and Greeks farther abroad, such as between Syracuse and Egypt or Syracuse and Macedonia. 145 Just as important are links that tyrants created with non-Greek peoples. In regards to this project, these links are crucial in understanding the comprehensive program of mobility that tyrants used to maintain their power. These alliances prove that traditional concepts of Greek vs. barbarian are not always reflected in actual politics. 146 These groups, such as the Sicels, could be smaller and close-by yet necessary for keeping affairs near Syracuse stable. 147 Other groups, h h C I . I . . . d b d 148 sue as t e e ts, were more cruc1a 1n ga1n1ng resources an power a roa . Politics between the two superpowers of Sicily, with the changing Carthaginian presence on the island, also provide fodder for thought. 149 During the fourth and third century, the boundaries of the Carthaginian sphere of influence ( epiluateja) decreased and increased in relation to the power of the tyrants, 150 just as Syracusan presence in Africa increased, especially under Agathocles. 151 Part of the tyrant's program of extending his power included the founding of colonies, especially in the Adriatic. Most colonization and founding of new cities outside of Sicily occurred 144 Anello 1996 and Culasso Gastaldi 2002 for Athens. Giuliani 1994 for Sparta. 145 For Egypt, Santagati 1996 and Bonacasa 1993. 146 Pere-Nogues 2006 and Anello 1990-1991. 147 Occhipinti 2006. 148 Sinatra 1996. 149 Consolo Langher 1996b and Tine 2000-2001. 150 Bondi and Vallozza 2005 and Tusa 1990-1991. 151 Consolo Langher 1992, Fantar 1993-1994, and Raffone 2004. 33 under Dionysius I. 152 Scholars have debated the expanswn of this colonization, especially whether or not the tyrants had a plan for widespread founding of cities or whether these colonies were isolated outposts founded for economic reasons. 153 All of these various forms of mobility, while often derivative of the standard institutions of the Greek pojjs, nevertheless were adapted by the tyrant to build his own empire. This project will not argue that the mobility fostered by the tyrants in Sicily was particularly innovative. Mercenaries, traders, artisans, exiles, and other types of migrants were part of the Greek world for centuries before the Dionysii and Agathocles came to rule. These tyrants thus did not invent new types of mobility. Yet, they increased the degree of pre-existing mobility on the island through large- scale movement of mercenaries and population transfers. Furthermore, they combined many types of migration at one time to help them maintain their rule. As mentioned above, however, this mobility was being used for a different purpose. Rather than merely helping a pojjs to maintain its hegemony, these processes of mobility under the tyrant were used to create an empire. Athens and Sparta had briefly experimented with empire building in the fifth and fourth centuries. The empires of Dionysius I and Agathocles (and Dionysius II to a lesser degree) had more in common, however, with the empire of Alexander the Great. These empires were able to incorporate many different cities and ethnic groups, an action that radically transformed the political and social landscape. This transformation was completed through these various types of mobility encouraged by the tyrant. This project focuses on the importance of these migrants by not seeing the migrant merely as a 152 Except for Agathocles (see Landucci Gattinoni 1999). 153 Woodhead 1970, Braocesi 1989, and Graham 1964. 34 victim or as an unimportant consequence of rule. Rather, the symbiotic nature of the relationship between tyrant and migrant is perhaps here stronger than in any other time period or geographical location. Furthermore, the discussion in this dissertation and the larger project hopefully will lead to questions concerning the role of the migrant in other political systems and poJejs around the Greek world. IV. Overview of the Dissertation We will now turn briefly to the discussion of the methodology of this project, followed by a brief overview of the dissertation chapters. The chronological limits of the project are approximately 405 BC (the accession of Dionysius I to power) to 289 BC (the death of Agathocles). These dates, encompassing the entire reigns of three tyrants, were chosen due to the fact that all three shared common characteristics, especially in regards to mobility, and provide a good view of tyranny and political history during the transition between the Classical period and the rise of Hellenistic kingdoms. The three decades before the rule of Agathocles (approximately 350-320) will not be discussed, however, since these years were characterized by the disappearance of tyrannies across Sicily under the aegis of the Corinthian leader Timoleon, whose rule (although sharing certain characteristics with Sicilian tyrants) was fundamentally different. Periods in Syracusan history before Dionysius I also will be discussed, namely the reigns of the earlier tyrants of the Syracusan Deinomenid dynasty and the short period of rule by Hermocrates, the predecessor of Dionysius I. The rule of these men had many parallels to those of the Dionysii and Agathocles, similarities that will provide opportunity for fruitful discussion concerning the continuity or rupture of political practices. In addition, other tyrannies across the Greek world (e.g. those of Cypselus and Peisistratus) will be 35 analyzed for comparative material, especially in regard to the use of mobility in their rule. Geographically, the project will mainly cover the eastern half of Sicily, by focusing heavily on Syracuse and selected other Greek polejs of this region. Neighboring non-Greek settlements and settlements on the western half of the island (mostly under Carthaginian rule during this period) will appear when historically relevant. In addition, this project will focus on crucial overseas Greek cities in Italy and Greece, especially in regard to their political relations with the tyrants. I found it necessary to limit myself to these parameters due both to the amount of ancient evidence and of modern scholarship. As will be discussed in the Appendix, a large amount of literary and archaeological evidence (as well as epigraphy and numismatics) remains for this period in Sicily. In addition, although until recently Sicily had not been a focus of non-Italian scholarship, the entry for Syracuse in La Bjbjjografia Topografica della Golonjzzazjone greca jn Ita}ja contains 200 pages of ancient references and 200 pages of modern bibliography on this pojjs alone. 154 Extending the dissertation beyond these chronological and geographical parameters would have made the project far too difficult. Even with these limitations, I experienced two problems. The first was the balance between providing an overall narrative of the multifaceted relationship between tyranny and mobility and deeply analyzing certain aspects of this relationship. In this dissertation, I privileged the overview, so that I can argue for the great degree of this symbiotic relationship between the processes of tyranny and mobility. While I could have more deeply analyzed, for example, the relationship between the Dionysii and Plato or 154 The entry on Syracuse is found in the nineteenth volume of the BTCGl 36 between Plato and the Pythagoreans, large articles already have been written on these subjects. I thus have woven existing scholarship into the larger analysis of the relationship between tyranny and mobility. The second related problem was the degree of analysis in certain sections of the dissertation, such as the mass migrations under Dionysius I in the second chapter and colonization in the Adriatic in the sixth chapter. While I wished to introduce these phenomena into the dissertation, I was not able to deepen the discussion of the topic (although it will be expanded during the continuation of the project). As this dissertation progressed, I also realized that a great deal of discussion on the status of the migrant and the ways in which the migrant was integrated legally into Sicily (e.g. citizenship, land grants) would have to be left for later research. Finally, I decided to limit the amount of analysis on large-scale migration. Although four processes of large-scale migration (mercenaries, political exiles, movement of cities, and colonization) were key aspects of the rule of the tyrant, full discussion of these topics (especially mercenary soldiers) was not possible in this dissertation. Thus, I limited myself to the evaluation of small scale migration, with occasional forays into large-scale migration when particularly relevant. A brief discussion of the evidence for this project will be discussed below, but a substantial appendix at the end of this dissertation evaluates the various types of evidence and their biases. Here we note that no one type of evidence has purposely been suppressed. Literary sources will appear most often in the project, since it provides the most evidence concerning both the lives of the tyrants and the appearance of various groups of migrants. Unfortunately, a large amount of evidence disproportionately derives from one author (Diodorus Siculus), a Sicilian historian 37 who wrote a universal history. Diodorus composed his history through the research of earlier historians (Timaeus, Duris, Callias, Theopompus) who were contemporaries of the Syracusan tyrants but who only remain in fragments. Other historians, including Herodotus and Thucydides, have provided comparative material for earlier periods. Another group of historians, who wrote in Greek (e.g. Xenophon and Polybius) or Latin (Justin), also offer crucial information on a limited number of topics. Many of these historians (especially the fragmentary historians who serve as a basis for later authors) suffer from personal bias that may have affected their depiction of history. In order to limit the damage caused by bias, I have attempted to consult other types of literary evidence to confirm the information found in these authors. Source material for these tyrants also exists in other genres of Greek literature. For example, the rhetors Lysias and Isocrates make (positive or negative) references to Dionysius I in their discussion of contemporary political affairs. The biographer Plutarch makes mention of the Dionysii in his biographies of Dian and Timoleon. Philosophical discussions in the works of Xenophon, Polybius, and Aristotle provide analysis with which one can compare the theoretical background of tyranny with its historical practice. The letters of Plato provide an insight into court life and the personality of the Dionysii. Although none of these works offers the reader a comprehensive overview of the relationship between tyrants and migrants, one is able to piece together a more complete picture of the political and social history of Sicily during the fourth century through them. Other types of evidence also provide corroboration with these literary sources. Because literary evidence is often riddled with biases and inconsistencies, these different forms of testimony help to distinguish fact from fantasy. Epigraphic 38 evidence is one such form. Although the epigraphic record in Syracuse and Sicily is woefully inadequate, and no Syracusan inscriptions remain that record the deeds of the tyrant, several important Athenian inscriptions confirm the importance of the Dionysii in mainland Greek affairs. Numismatic evidence gives record of the continued existence or sudden disappearance of a pojjs, especially important when the tyrants participated in large-scale movement of population. Coinage also testifies to changes in population, especially through imagery which may identify new settlers (e.g. mercenaries). Archaeological evidence also helps to verify literary passages by reflecting changes in habitation, especially the foundation or destruction of a site. Furthermore, the transformation of the material assemblage found at a site suggests new populations, especially useful when this transformation can be securely dated. While the record from one type of evidence is often defective, the combination of literary evidence with these other forms often helps to fill in historical gaps. The dissertation is divided into three main parts of two chapters each. The first part of the dissertation (chapters l and 2) analyzes the figure of the tyrant himself. In ancient literary sources, the tyrant most often is pictured as an outsider. Is this depiction true? By looking at the early history of the Dionysii and Agathocles, we will determine in the first chapter just how the tyrant was an outsider (whether merely an outsider politically or a true migrant from elsewhere). This chapter then will evaluate the different types of threats that came from his identification as outsider. Was it merely a tapas of literature with little political effect, or did the 'foreignness' of the tyrant harm his political aspirations? The importance of this chapter is grounded in the argument that this relationship of tyranny and mobility stemmed from the foreign identity of the tyrant. Because the tyrant often was 39 rejected at first by his own citizens, he was forced to turn to non-citizens for help. The second chapter will reflect upon the opposite process, which was used by the tyrant to combat his foreignness: the 'centrification' of the tyrant. In order to convince the citizenry of his pojjs that he was not a threat, how might the tyrant gain their trust (at least long enough to seize power)? The tyrant thus attempted to portray himself as an ideal citizen, by opposing himself to an already existing enemy or to one created by him, who he concurrently portrayed as a threat to his citizens. This chapter will look at the various periods during the reign of the tyrant when he was able to portray himself as the protector of the pojjs, in order to repulse threats to his hegemony. By focusing on the 'danger' posed by other elements, he was able to distract the populace from his own non-constitutional actions. In addition, the chapter will address particularly successful processes of mobility, such as large-scale forced population transfers, that were based in this ideology of the tyrant as protector of the city. These first two chapters will determine the reasoning behind the relationship between tyranny and mobility. It is not merely enough to begin with the analysis of the different types of mobility without first discussing why these tyrannies in Sicily had such a high dependence on mobility, in opposition to other Greek political systems and poJejs. The second part of the dissertation moves from the figure of the tyrant himself to those who were in close proximity to the tyrant. Chapters 3 and 4 will evaluate one small-scale process of mobility during the rule of the Dionysii: the court. As noted above, except for the discussion of mass migrations in the first chapter and colonization in the sixth chapter, this project in its current form will not address large-scale processes of mobility (including movement of mercenaries and political 40 exiles) and will focus on small-scale mobility, which nevertheless had wider political and social implications. The court was one way through which the tyrant invited influential intellectual scholars and political advisors to Syracuse. In return, these men influenced the rule of the tyrant both politically and intellectually, as cultural capital brought by the court transformed into political capital for the ruler. In addition, the inclusion of native Syracusans in the court also will allow for the comparison of the treatment of citizens and the treatment of non-citizens within the same environment. The chapter will analyze the ways in which the court arrived and departed, where they were lodged, and how they were paid. This section on logistics will also determine if the court was a true institution or was merely a loosely tied group of men connected to the tyrant. The second part of the third chapter will evaluate the intellectual atmosphere of the court and how the court interacted with the tyrant intellectually. This chapter will also look at the ways in which tyrants took part in the scholarly world, whether through drama or philosophy. The second chapter of this section will research the political effects of the court. Members of the tyrannical court were influential citizens in their home city who both could create links with their poJejs and could advise the tyrants on their best course of action. Did the Dionysii use their court to the best of their ability? This chapter will analyze the various key relationships in the court and the successes or failures of these relationships. When the links between the court and the tyrant broke down, what were the reasons for these problems? Because the relationship between tyrants and members of their inner circle did not produce the best results, such short-comings demonstrate that all forms of mobility were not equally beneficial. They also help to address the limits of mobility (e.g. through the lack of integration of migrants), 41 while still affirming the possibility of political advantage through the process of the court. The last third of the dissertation (chapters 5 and 6) analyzes vanous categories of international relations and alliances that the tyrants fostered throughout the Mediterranean. The section has been divided into two chapters: the first dealing with Greek alliances and the second with non-Greek alliances. What were the processes of mobility open to the tyrant in order to open lines of communication between him and other cities? The first chapter will look at those individuals, such as envoys and wives of the tyrants, who were part of the diplomatic process. The fifth chapter addresses the relationship of the tyrants with individual cities (e.g. Sparta and Athens), in order to understand how the tyrant balanced relations between poJejsthat were hostile to one another. In addition, the chapter will address a wide geographical area of alliances, from Italy to Egypt. The sixth chapter will address relations between the tyrants and 'barbarian' cities (e.g. Carthage). Were these relations fundamentally different from relations with Greek cities? This chapter will further detail the political and military benefits that the tyrants received from contact with these non-Greek groups. By looking at the use of strategic alliances and marnages, I wish to show how the tyrant himself was a sort of diplomat, balancing relations between important Greek cities to ensure that his rule was not threatened. I then will compare these types of non-Greek relations to their alliances with Greek cities to determine if they were fundamentally different. The transfer of wives and envoys is quite important, because at their core, this process was based on the movement of only one or a few individuals. Yet this process of migration gave rise to further migration, whether through the transfer of troops or 42 colonization, to give a few examples. As the project progresses geographically from the city of Syracuse to the larger Greek world, these two chapters help to answer the question of how the tyrants not only maintained their power but also spread it successfully throughout the remainder of Sicily and southern Italy. 43 CHAPTER 1 -ON THE OUTSIDE LOOKING IN: THE TYRANT AND HIS RELATIONSHIP TO THE POLIS Part I: The tyrant as outsider When studying the relationship between the tyrant and mobility, one first must understand the impetus behind the creation of such a relationship. As this chapter will argue, the status of the tyrant within his own city was a crucial catalyst for the symbiotic relationship between tyrant and migrant. Was the tyrant considered as the center of his city and the rightful ruler? Although earlier tyrants, such as the Athenian Peisistratus and the Syracusans Gelon and Hieron, were represented positively as excellent leaders of their city, the fourth-century tyrants of Syracuse were not generally portrayed in these terms. How did this relationship between tyrant and migrant change when the tyrant himself was portrayed as an outsider, just like those who entered and exited the city under his command? The parameters of this discussion will revolve around two themes: the portrayal of the tyrant merely as a foreigner/barbarian (i.e. without any mobility suggested) and the tyrant as an actual migrant (i.e. as a mobile figure himself). In some ways, the result of both statuses is the same. Both the foreigner and the migrant are outsiders, traditionally without access to political and economic rights offered to true citizens. These two themes are intertwined in the case of the Syracusan tyrants, although each tyrant is portrayed in different ways. For example, within literary and epigraphical sources, Dionysius I is not portrayed as a migrant per se but rather merely as a barbarian. This environment of foreignness, however, increases under his son and is transformed into geographical mobility, specifically his exiles later in life. 44 Status as an outsider and a migrant evolves further under Agathocles, who is not a Syracusan citizen at birth and who migrates to Syracuse later in life. Within the following two chapters, my evaluation of the tyrant's identity will follow a rather structural approach. The schema for my analysis will use vanous oppositions, including inside/outside and center/periphery, which have strong geographical connotations. This focus on geography is not fortuitous, since the other process discussed in this project, mobility, involves the change from one physical space to another. Likewise, other oppositions discussed in this chapter, including Greek/barbarian and citizen/foreigner also reflect upon the interplay between tyrant and migrant. Yet this terminology did not always demarcate true geographical zones but rather various conceptions in Greek thought. For example, even though the tyrant may have physically been present in his pojjs, he may have been seen as an outsider politically or socially. In addition, there are no defined boundaries between these oppositions, i.e. an exact spot where one opposition ends and another begins. Depending on chronological and/or geographical differences, tyrants were never, for example, 100% Greek and 0% barbarian. Tyrants were always navigating these oppositions, in order to foster the identity that would ensure the stability of his power and the growth of his empire. Before beginning my analysis, a few important notes are in order. First, when researching the lives of the tyrants, it becomes readily apparent that much of the information is skewed by both positive and negative propaganda. Attempts by ancient authors to portray the tyrant in a different light make it difficult to 45 ascertain the truth. 155 Such bias, however, still proves useful to modern scholars. Many positive or negative biases found in later authors (e.g. Diodorus Siculus, Plutarch, and Justin) derive from earlier authors contemporary with the rule of the tyrants. The biases between contemporary authors and later authors are not created equal. Rather than Diodorus or Justin merely narrating historical events of which they know nothing, they referred to these earlier historians and often transferred to their own work the biases of these earlier authors, who had direct experience with the tyrants in question. Concerning positive propaganda from the historian Philistus, a close friend of Dionysius I and Dionysius II, one may question the need to promulgate such falsely positive information regarding the tyrant, information that may be false. The need for this propaganda reflects the need for the tyrant to be praised and his rule legitimized. It demonstrates the insecurity of the rule of the tyrant and his reliance on positive representation, whether true or false, to support his rule. On the other hand, negative propaganda often derives from authors, such as Philoxenus and Timaeus, who directly or indirectly suffered under the tyrant. These men, who experienced mistreatment and exile under Dionysius I and Agathocles respectively, had a reason to portray the tyrant in a particularly negative fashion. Most importantly for this study, their treatment was likewise experienced by thousands of citizens and non-citizens during the reigns of these tyrants. Thus, their own feelings about the ruler also likely were felt by many of their other victims. This anger against the tyrant, which was encapsulated in these negative biases against the tyrant, on a larger scale would have threatened the stability of the tyrant's rule. 155 These biases and the general problems of dealing with particular authors and other types of material will be discussed in more detail in the Appendix of this dissertation. 46 Thus, biases in the sources do not nullify the usefulness of these narratives but often lead to valid conclusions about the status of the tyrant among his contemporaries. This issue of bias leads to a second problem: the inability to create a truly historical narrative of the tyrant. It is impossible to completely separate a historically accurate description of the tyrant and his representation in the sources, in order to to establish a historical narrative of each tyrant. Although the 'historical truth' is not entirely recoverable, throughout the first two chapters, I attempt to navigate between these two levels of historical fact and tropes, noting wherever possible information that is likely anecdotal and information that appears to be historically accurate, by using corroborating evidence for the latter to establish its veracity. Yet some of the information concerning the life of the tyrant (e.g. the dream of the mother of Dionysius I foretelling his great leadership or the exposure and salvation of the child Agathocles) obviously seem to be obvious tropes that conform to the mythology of the tyrant rather than fact. Although these topoj often speak against the historical veracity of the tyrant, I contend that even fanciful storytelling adds to the dialogue regarding the actions of the tyrant in the larger social and political milieu of Syracuse and of Sicily. How did these tropes, which dwell firmly in the mythological world, interact with the historical world in a way which we can understand? In other words, how do these topoj allow us to say anything about the historical relationship between mobility and tyranny that I will disucss in this project? In the Greek world, the world of literature and myth interacted with reality on a daily basis, whether in religion, legal matters, or other aspects of the pojjs. Thus, the literary representation of the tyrant (i.e. the trope) was already present and known at the time of these tyrants. 47 From the stories of tyrants included in the history of Herodotus to the representation of the tyrant in Athenian tragedy, the Greek world already had a strong tradition of tyrants (even though the terminology was not always consistent). Greek cities around the Mediterranean (including Sicily) had already experienced rule from men who single-handedly ruled the pojjs. From these earlier experiences of tyrannical rule were born these topoi The fourth-century tyrants discussed in this project interacted with these tropes, by not only reacting to this mythology but also adding to it. While the Dionysii and Agathocles were far more interested in political and military affairs, their representation to their public was nevertheless a crucial factor in the acceptance of their rule. One more note. The following two chapters are not a discussion of the 'psychology' of being a tyrant. I do not try to determine merely what the tyrant believed about himself or his subjects, since travelling inside the mind of the tyrant is impossible. When looking at the creation of an image for a tyrant, however, I will analyze the reasons for the creation of this image and will determine the reactions to such an image, both by the tyrants and by his subjects. Thus, these chapters ultimately are not interested in what the tyrant thought but what he did. Any references to that which the tyrant 'desired' or that which the tyrant 'hoped to do', for example, are predicated by actual political causes and effects. I do, however, discuss frequently the image of the tyrant. By 'image', I mean the ways in which the tyrant was seen that caused his acceptance or rejection. The image was not static but changed over time during the reign of the tyrant and changed from city to city. The tyrant himself had a great role in the projection of his image, first from his deeds and second from positive propaganda (from authors such as Philistus). While later 48 authors also had a role in creating this image of the tyrant, insofar as it has been preserved for modern scholarship, these later authors mimicked the opinions of earlier authors contemporary with the tyrants of this project. Just as with a 'true historical' narrative of the tyrant's life and rule, the 'true' image of the tyrant cannot be fully ascertained (and also because there was not only one image of the tyrant shared by all people in all places). The following two chapters will attempt to focus on several elements of this image (e.g. the tyrant as barbarian or as the protector of the pojjs) that had very specific political ramifications for the tyrant during his rule. A. The pre-tyrant tyrant: myths ofDionysius I Several anecdotes concerning the early life of Dionysius have survived, with each story analyzing the path of the tyrant to power, not only along the geographical spectrum from Syracuse to the larger Greek world, but also from Greek to outsider. How do these various identities interact, and does Dionysius lose his Syracusan identity as he attempts to promulgate a larger pan-Sicilian (and later pan-hellenic) identity? Each narrative also contains an element of mobility, which mirrors the instability of the tyrant's own status within his empire. As noted above, although these stories have many elements of propaganda and of fiction, they mirror the multitude of identities present in Sicily in the late fifth century and show awareness on the part of pro- and anti-Dionysian writers that issues of image could positively or negatively affect his ability to rule. In order to become any type of leader, acceptance by the larger community (i.e. the citizen body) is crucial, even if the leader later radically transforms his image after becoming tyrant. In reality, little is known about Dionysius I before he became tyrant. It seems that he was a scribe who was a follower of Hermocrates, but nothing else historical 49 remains from his early pre-tyrant years. The more propagandistic narrative of the early life of Dionysius, however, is far more complete. We look first at the birth of the tyrant. The first myth of the birth of Dionysius narrates how the mother of Dionysius, while pregnant, had a dream that she gave birth to a satyr. She then went to the Galeotae, native Sicel interpreters of dreams, who prophesied that she would give birth to a leader who would be eminent in Greece and who would rule for a long time (Cic. Djv. 1.20.39). 156 Djonysjj mater, ejus quj Syracosjorum tyrannus fujt, ut scrjptum apud Phjjjstum est, et doctum homjnem et diljgentem et aequalem temporum j]Jorum, cum praegnans hunc jpsum Djonysjum alva contjneret, somnjavjt se peperjsse Satyrjscum. hujc jnterpretes portentorum, quj Gal eo tee tum jn Sjd}ja nomjnabantur, responderunt, ut ajt Phjjjstus, eum, quem j]Ja peperjsset, clarjssjmum Graedae djuturna cum fortuna fore. Now, Philistus, who was a learned and diligent man and a contemporary of the times of which he writes, gives us the following story of the mother of Dionysius, the tyrant of Syracuse. While she was with child and was carrying this same Dionysius in her womb, she dreamed that she had given birth to an infant satyr. When she told this dream to the interpreters of portents, who in Sicily were called 'Galeotae', they replied, so Philistus relates, that she would bring forth a son who would be very eminent in Greece and would enjoy a long and prosperous career . 157 156 Val. Max. 1.7 ext.7 also provides the same account, albeit with less details. 157 All Eglish translations have been excerpted from the Loeb editions of their respective authors. 50 Within the dream narrative, a tapas in Greek literature which provided divine sanction for the birth of a great leader, various identities are attributed to Dionysius. Dionysius is called the future tyrant of the Syracusans, yet the non-Greek Galeotae, located outside of Syracuse near Mount Aetna, 158 interpret the dream. Even if they were an obvious choice to translate her dream, due to their known ability as seers, it is nevertheless interesting that only this non-Greek group was able to correctly identify the tyrant. In addition, Dionysius is also described as one who will be most famous not merely in Sicily but in Greece. This birth myth shows the interplay of various geographical and ethnic identities which will be reflected later in his reign in the links of Dionysius with Greek and non-Greek peoples both on the island and across the Mediterranean, especially because the status and greatness of the tyrant was determined by a non-Greek non-Syracusan community of seers. 159 Thus, this part of the myth simultaneously reflects the future empire of Dionysius as including the island of Sicily (including native peoples) and the larger Mediterranean while drawing away the focus of Dionysius' s beginnings in Syracuse. Furthermore, the comparison of Dionysius to a satyr confirms the confusion of identities in the personality of Dionysius, since satyrs had conflicting roles in Greek mythology. They 158 The Galeotae were seers who lived in Sicel territory and were linked mythically to Hyperborean Apollo and to the Celts. For the description of Hybla Gereatis, the home of the Galeotae, see Pausanias 5.23.6, who notes that Philistus described their inhabitants as the interpreters of omens and dreams. For the links of the Galeotae with the Celts and Apollo, see the entry for the Galeotae in the Ethnjca of Stephan us Byzantinus (as contained in the recent 2006 edition by Billerbeck). For a description of the Galeotae, see Catturini 1987: 15-17. For modern discussion of the myth, see Sammartano 2010: 165-67 and Sordi 1990a: 167-68. 159 The inclusion of the Galeotae, with their links to Sicels and Celts, reflects the special relations of Dionysius with Sicel communities and Celtic mercenaries. See Chapter 2, pages 166-70 and Chapter 6, pages 387-390 .. 51 were both assistants of Zeus in establishing his universal rule (the obvious connotation for the pro-Dionysian Philistus) and, more commonly, primitive beings who were slaves to their desires. 160 Thus, at the same time, this image of Dionysius as a satyr argues (depending on the bias for or against the tyrant) either for a stable far-reaching rule by a just ruler or for an empire ruled with barbarity by a leader who is ruled by his own desires. This mythical anecdote confuses the status of Dionysius as a Syracusan, by combining Syracusan, Sicel, and non-human elements into one mish-mash of identities. The second story, which took place immediately before the beginning of Dionysius's reign, tells how the mane of Dionysius's horse suddenly was covered with a swarm of bees (Cic. Djv.l.33.73 (~ FGrH556 F58)). 161 Facta conjectura etjam jn Djonysjo est paulo ante quam regnare coepjt; quj, cum per agrum Leontjnum jter fadens, equum pse demjsjsset jn flumen, submersus equus voragjnjbus non exstjtjt; quem cum maxjma contentjone non potujsset extrahere, djscessjt, ut ajt Phjjjstus, aegre ferens. cum autem a}jquantum progressus esset, subjto exaudjvjthjnnjtum respexjtque et equum alacrem laetus aspexjt, cujus jn juba exam en apjum consederat. quod ostentum habujt hanc vjm, ut Djonysjus pauds post djebus regnare coeperjt. Still another instance of conjectural divination occurred in the case of Dionysius, a little while before he began to reign. He was travelling through the district of Leontini, and led his horse down into a river. 160 Sammartano 2010: 168-70. 161 The main souroes for this story are Cic. Djv. 1.33.73 (~ FGrH 556 F58) and Ael. VH 12.46. Pliny HN8.64 has an abbreviated version of the events. The version of Aelian states that the swarm of bees covered the hand of Dionysius when he was about to mount the horse. 52 The horse was engulfed in a whirlpool and disappeared. Dionysius did his utmost to extricate him in vain and, so Philistus writes, went away greatly troubled. When he had gone on a short distance he heard a whinny, looked back and, to his joy, saw his horse eagerly following and with a swarm of bees in its mane. The sequel of this portent was that Dionysius began to reign within a few days. Cicero notes that this portent occurred in the area of Leontinoi (per agrum Leontjnum), 162 while Aelian states that, after receiving this vision, Dionysius went to the Galeotae again for the translation of this portent. 163 In a positive sense, a divine portent again legitimates his reign, especially with the inclusion of bees in the myth, which suggests that Dionysius would be the peaceful leader over a unified empire. 164 The presence of Leontinoi in the tale, a city of Chalcidian heritage, foretold the incorporation of both Dorian and Chalcidian cities into his new empire. On the other hand, at the beginning of his rule, Leontinoi was an outpost of the Syracusans, which was full of exiles and foreigners at that time. 165 Because Dionysius was stationed at Leontinoi at the beginning of his rule and used Leontinoi (instead of Syracusan citizens) to seize power, his empire (as represented by the bees) was still a mix of 162 Leontinoi played a role in Dionysius's seizing of power, since he there put into action his plan to take over Syracuse in 406 BC. 163 The passage of Aelian notably states that the Galeotae said that the portent was a sign of monarchy ( 5n TaLrra fLOvapxLav 07]1\,ol). 164 Bees were often used to portray a harmonious society. For full discussion of the imagery in this passage, see Sammartano 2010: 176-83. 165 D. d s· 13 95 3 c " " · '' ' "' ' ' - " ' ' - · ' "' '' lO . lC. . . aVT1] 0 1] 7r01'vl8 TOTE 'f'povpwv 1]V 'TWV L.VpaiCOOLWV, 7rl'v1]pE'; V7rapxov 't'vryaoWV ml f€vwv &.vepoYTrwv). Ostensibly, many of the <j>voyaoE, would have been those who fled Syracuse several years before due to the tumult after the death of Hermocrates. The identity of the f€voL is not discussed here. For further discussion of this fact in light of this portent, see Sammartano 2010: 184-87. 53 ethnic identities, in addition to political and social outsiders. Furthermore, the location of this portent affirming the identity of Dionysius as tyrant outside of the borders of Syracuse (not constitutionally within its borders) also calls into question his status as a Syracusan. The final episode, found in Valerius Maxim us, describes the vision of a woman from the town of Himera before Dionysius became tyrant. In the vision, having ascended to the dwellings of the gods, she saw a blond and freckled figure bound in iron chains and cast down at the feet of Jupiter, a figure who was identified as Dionysius I, the dire fate of Sicily and Italy who would bring destruction upon them when freed. 166 As with the first two examples, this story contains ambiguous elements that confuse the identity of the tyrant. As with the other two myths, Dionysius has divine sanction for his rule, since he dwelt among the gods before he was sent to Sicily. His identification as the alast6r of Sicily and Italy demarcates the power of Dionysius and his future empire. 167 The provenance of the woman from Him era recalls the Battle of Him era, the site of the famous battle in 480 BC between the Carthaginians and Greeks. The inclusion of Himeran would recall the heroic 166 Val. Max. 1. 7 ext.6 (praeuaJentem ujrum flauj colorjs) Jen#gjnosj orjs) ferrejs catenjs ujnctum; Joujs sojjo pedjbusque subjectum ... j]Jum Sjcjjjae atque Jtafjae djrum esse fatum solutumque ujncujjs muftjs urbjbus exjtjo futurum). The scholium to Aeschines De falsa legatjone 10 (~ FGrH 566 F29) contains a similar account. See also Tert. De anjm. 46. The version which follows Timaeus then goes on to say that the woman, after identifying Dionysius as this dire fate when he entered the walls of Himera, was murdered shortly after Dionysius gained power. See also Orlando 2007: 280-83, especially for the role of such a tale in the pro-Dionysian propaganda of Philistus. 167 The term is found in the fragment of Timaeus preserved in the scholium of Aeschines. For the description of Dionysius as alastor, see Lewis 2000: 100-1. For further discussion of Dionysius in this role, especially its transition from a positive to a negative portrayal, see Orlando 2007: 284-86. 54 deeds of Gelon at the battle and would suggest that Dionysius would save the Greek world from the advance of the Carthaginians, as he would attempt with his attack on Him era in 39 7 BC. 168 On the other hand, 169 Dionysius comes off poorly in the story (e.g. in chains at the feet of Zeus, his identification as the 'dire fate' of Sicily and Italy, and his treatment of the woman, who would be murdered). In addition, although originally the symbol of the Greek fight against the barbarian, the city of Himera had changed and had become a community of mixed peoples under the control of the Carthaginians by the time of Dionysius. As with the appearance of the Galeotae in the other tales, the interpretation of the identity of Dionysius by a non- Syracusan woman and the revelation of this identity outside of Syracuse at Himera suggests a more complicated ethnic and political picture. Furthermore, the vision constantly changes geographic location, from the hall of the gods back down to earth, from Sicily and Italy to Greece. While such a vision verifies the future power of the tyrant and his burgeoning empire, the various locations in the myth (none of which include the city of Syracuse) also decenters him from any one identity, especially his identity as Syracusan. These three myths encapsulate the struggle that Dionysius had throughout his reign, as he attempted both to secure the center of rule in Syracuse from threats and to create a larger political entity beyond his home pojjs. 168 For the liberation of Himera by Dionysius during the sack of Motya, see Diad. Sic. 14.47.6, where Dionysius is said to have sent for (p.ETE7n!p.'f'aTo) the inhabitants of Himera. For the Carthaginian context of this myth, see Sordi 1984: 534-36, Sordi 1989: 67-70, and Sordi 1990: 161-62. 169 The inclusion of this story in the fragments of Timaeus is the first hint, sinoe Timaeus sought to portray tyranny under the Dionysii in a particularly bad light. For the use of such myths in Timaeus, see de Sanctis 1958: 50-52. 55 B. Dionysius the monster in isolation Other authors, however, moved to the opposite side of the spectrum by portraying Dionysius as a complete social and political outsider. An identification of the tyrant in the guise of an outsider occurs in a drama about Dionysius, the Cyclops or Galateja of Philoxenus. 170 Although little of the play remains, several points concerning the plot are known, 171 the most important of which notes that Philoxenus modeled his Cyclops on Dionysius, the nymph Galateia on the flute-player Galateia, and Odysseus on the poet himself. 172 Several non-Greek identities are at play here, including Galateia, whose presence reflected the relations of Dionysius with non- Greek peoples. 173 Furthermore, this identification of Dionysius as Polyphemus has 170 Philoxenus also will be discussed further in chapter 3, pages 192, 196-97 and Chapter 4, pages 209-11 and 217. See the entry on Philoxenus in the Suda, the scholium to Aelius Aristides 46.309, Diad. Sic. 15.6, and Lucian Ind. 15. See Anello 1984: 17-19 and 46-47, as well as Muccioli 2004: 124-26, who has basic information on the play. Although much of this information may be apocryphal, it appears that Philoxenus, who had previously been the court poet of Dionysius, wrote this drama after his escape from the stone quarries, to which he had been sent by the tyrant for not praising his poetry. An alternate reason of his oonsignment to forced labor, however, centers on the poet's romantic advances toward Galateia, a relationship which angered the tyrant and caused Philoxenus's exile. For the treatment of Phil oxen us and Galateia, for example, see Ath. 13.598e. 171 The date of oomposition and performance has a terminus ante quem of 388, since the Plutus of Aristophanes, which mentions the drama, dates from 388. For the plot of the drama, see the scholium to Plut. 290, the scholium to Theoc. I d. 6.1 (~ FGrH 76 F58), and Natalis Comes Myth. 9.8. Mucci ali 2004: 132-34 also discusses these fragments. Interestingly enough, there is the possibility that the Cyclops of Euripides (first performed in 408) was reperformed in Sicily, as noted by Allan 2001: 71-72. 112 Ath 1 6 C , , A , K, , , , , ~~ ., '"' r , , , , "'' . . e 'TOV fLEV L.J..WVVUWV VICI'vW'lra V7rOOT1]UafLEVO';, 'T1]V 0 aVI'v1]Tpwa al'va'TELaV, EaV'fOV 0 'Oovuu€a). 173 Galateia was linked to the Celts and to the Illyrians, two groups with whom Dionysius would also foster relations. According to the entry Galateia in the Etymologjcum Magnum, the three children of Polyphemus and Galateia were Keltos, Illyrios, and Galas. See Muccioli 2004 for 56 several ramifications. The depiction of Polyphemus as a lyre-playing temple-building Cyclops in the Cyclops or Galateja certainly is a less negative and barbaric portrayal than the Polyphemus of the Odyssey, the poet nevertheless ridicules the unsuccessful attempts by Dionysius at making music and at wooing Galateia, which thereby diminishes the image of Dionysius as a powerful leader . 174 Even though not all facets of the figure of the Cyclops were negative, especially with his relations to the island of Sicily, 175 the connotations of Polyphemus and his previous references in literature (especially the Odyssey) show Dionysius as an outcast creature who lived a primitive and isolated life. Like Polyphemus, Dionysius treated his visitors to his realm poorly (as will be explored further in the third chapter on the court). Just as Polyphemus had attempted to eat Odysseus, so too did Dionysius mistreat his guest Philoxenus. Just as Polyphemus had forced his guests to flee his island, so too did Dionysius turn his own citizens into migrants through his program of forced migration and sending of former citizens into exile. With his hatred and mistrust of others, especially displayed through the Cyclops' (and Dionysius' s) rejection of Greek ideas of guest- friendship, the Dionysian Cyclops was also the antithesis of the Greek pojjs and was the epitome of physjs (nature) not nomos (law). 176 This negative connotation reflects further discussion of these ramifications. 174 Anello 1984: 48-51 notes that, although this Polyphemus was artistic and did not eat humans, he still showed affinities to the barbarians. 175 His relations to Sicily were used previously during the reign of Hieron to glorify the tyrant's rule. Such Sicilian connections were stressed by poets during his reign, such as the Aetnaeae, which was commissioned for the founding of the new oolony by Hieron. Aeschylus wrote another tragedy based on the myths of the local Palici. For the use of these plays as propaganda, see Anello 1984: 35-39. 176 For the image of the tyrant as a representative of physjs and as the opposite of the pojjs, see 57 badly on Dionysius, who is represented as someone who did not integrate socially or politically into his city. This isolation was a trope in the life of the tyrant, which showed him gradually becoming paranoid and forced to use spies or cronies to watch for threats to his rule. 177 Although tyrants traditionally had difficulty gaining trust with other types of states, 178 the least amount of trust existed between the tyrant and his own citizens. Theoretically, when the city lost its sense of community through tyranny, through the loss of its civic space and institutions, 179 nothing was sacred to the tyrant, not even members of his own family. 180 The tyrant thus was depicted as isolating himself and constantly on guard against his own community. 181 Within the Hjero of Xenophon, a philosophical treatise written in the fourth century BC that represents an imaginary dialogue between the poet Simonides and the tyrant Hieron in the 4 70s, an overarching theme was the estrangement between the tyrant and his citizens. 182 The more 'carefree' existence of a private citizen was contrasted with the Nagle 2006: 140-44 and Sanders 1987: 15-19. 177 Fades 1991: 581-82 describes this evolution in further detail. For the use of cronies and spies among tyrants, see Polyb. 16.37.1 and Levy 1996:47. 178 The mistrust between tyranny and other forms of government with constitutional ends (e.g. the Athenian democracy) was a common trope in the literature of Demosthenes and !socrates. See Leopold 1981 for further discussion, especially 228-29. 179 For the loss of community in a tyranny, see Boesche 1993: 15-17. 180 Th 6851('~'~' I ,, ,, ' \' I ·~' ,, "t ..+.' ·~·' ~" UC. . . avopL UE Tvpavvcp 1] 'lrDI'vEL apx1JV EXOVUTJ OVUEV al\,oryov OTL sVfL't'Epov OVU OUCEWV OTL p.~ 7rwT6v). Note that this passage also combines the figure of the tyrant with the city which also can act in tyrannical ways (in this case, Athens). 181 This view is expressed by Plato in a dialogue between Socrates and Glaucon in Resp. 8.567b-c. Socrates goes further by saying that the tyrant was compelled to do away with his closest friends, who were the most comfortable with him. 182 See also, for example, Sevieri 2004: 282-83. 58 constant anxiety of the tyrant, caused by his status as an unacceptable element in the city (Xen. Hjer. 2.8-9). eV8Vc; ryGp 'Toic; f-LEV lOu/yrau;, av tL0 i; 7r6tv~c; aln·Wv KowOv 7r6lvef-LOV 7rolvef-Lf;, "f:: rt '' p ll I e \: \ ,+, p I I , \ EsECr'TW 07rD~ av JVOVI'vWV'Ta~ 7rOpEVECY a~ fLTJOEV -yOJVOVf-LEVOV') fLTJ 'TU; aV'TOV') ' I " ' l I " ' I 9 \: I \ "l l av'To~ 'TE ryovv W'lri\MYfLEVO~ owv'Ta~ avary~<r;v ewa~ o~aryew Ka~ a,~,,~,ovr:; ' l ,..}, I ' \ I e " \:\ ' \ '\: " '\ \ O'lrl'vO-yopov<:; ae~ CYVfl/Trep~aryeu aL e7reura oe o~ fLEV WWJ'Ta~, eav Ka~ I I ' l I 'l l ' 9 ' \: I '"8 V ~ (Frpa'Tevwv'Ta~ 7rov eu; 7rOI'vEfL~av, a''"" ovv e7rewav rye El\.. wuw oucaoe, ' ,.+, /l ,.+,I r " 9 r \: \ I ' \: \ ' \ r " au 'Ya,~,e~av u -y~CYW r;rtovv'Ta~ ewa~, o~ oe 'Tvpavvo~ e7rewav eu; 'TTJV eav'Tcvv /l , ,.+,I I ' l I l I " " 'lrOI'vW a-y~KWV'Ta~, 'TO'TE EV 'lrl'vEUPTOU::; 'lrDI'vEfLWU:; UYaCYW OV'TE'). To begin with, as long as their state is not engaged in a war in which all take part, private citizens are free to go wherever they choose without fear of being killed. But all despots move everywhere as in an enemy's country. At any rate they think they are bound to wear arms continually themselves, and to take an armed escort about with them at all times. Secondly, in the event of an expedition against an enemy's country, private citizens at least think themselves safe as soon as they have come home. But when despots reach their own city, they know that they are now among more enemies than ever. Within this passage, words like 7rav7"axfl and de£ demonstrate that the tyrant never could escape this negative atmosphere of distrust. Other phrases, such as el<; 'r~V Eav'TiDv 7r6tvw and efa-w 'Tijc; olK£a'), demarcate the inner and outer boundaries of the dwelling and the city of the tyrant, even within which his status as an outsider threatens his safety. Did such a rejection of Dionysius I happen in his own life, or was this depiction as a paranoid ruler due only to the bitterness of a mistreated poet? 59 Various stories from the narrative of Dionysius I display the translation of the lack of trust of a tyrant due to rejection by his community into his rejection of closeness even from his most intimated friends and relatives. Although many of these stories, at first glance, appear to be anecdotal, they likely reflect the uneasy existence around the tyrant. For example, Dionysius was depicted as frightened at the prospect of being shaved with a razor or having his hair cut, 183 and he apparently also had shut himself away in his own personal prison. 184 A second anecdote states that the tyrant had so alienated himself from his own family that he would not sleep with his wives without searching them and surrounded his bed with a ditch and a bridge. 185 Furthermore, the hatred for Dionysius by his family surfaces when his sister Theste states that she rather would have gone into exile with her husband, since she would rather be known as the wife of Polyxenus the exile than the sister of Dionysius the tyrant. 186 His closest advisors, ironically known as the phjJoj of the tyrant, were often a source of concern and distrust for Dionysius I, who depended on their help but also feared the very influence he provided them. Thus, these literary sources portray 183 Plut. Vlt. Djon 9.2-4 argues that even the family members of the tyrant needed to be searched before entering the presenoe of the tyrant. Cic. Tusc. 5.58 states that only Dionysius's daughters were allowed to shave their father. See also Sanders 1987: 27 and 87-88. 184 Cic. Tusc. 5.58 (jta propter jnjustam domjnatus cupjdjtatem jn carcerem quod am modo jpse se jncJuserat). 185 Cic. Tusc. 5.59. The language in this passage likens the figure of the tyrant to a city that is constantly under siege. 186 After the flight of his brother-in-law Polyxenus into exile, he called his sister in in and blamed her for not telling of her husband's flight. See Plut. Vlt. Djon 21.4-5 (aicic' ov 7rpo€cyvwv hEl Kai\,W'; ElxE fLOL fLCi"'A) .. ,ov ITol-vvgEvov yuvaL~<,a cfE{xyovro') f) uoV TvpavvoLwro') d0Et.,cp1}v t.iryEa-8w), where the two participles of being a tyrant and being an exile are juxtaposed, with the status of the exile far better than the status of the tyrant. !soc. 16.25-26 also notes that the relatives of the Peisistratids preferred to go into exile rather than to be ruled under a tyranny. 60 him as cautious of his friends (since he knew they would rather rule as a tyrant than be ruled by a tyrant 187 ) and as destitute of friends who were trustworthy. 188 Although these types of stories reek of anecdotal evidence, this fear had some historical veracity, as shown by the various ways that he treated many members of his family and his court. 189 Thus, even though the fear and isolation of the tyrant may have been exaggerated in order to conform to a literary trope, yet the effects of some type of strained relations between the tyrant and his associates does appear in the historical record. For example, Dionysius employed of a corps of bodyguards to separate himself from the citizen body, a common theme in literature 190 and a practice imitated by tyrants across the Greek world, including those of Athens and Corinth. 191 In 405 BC, Dionysius I would begin his tyranny by collecting a 187 Plut. Vlt. Djon 9.4 (tAFfE OE ToVc; cpLt.,ov') cpvt.,dTTEu8aL voVv ~xovrac; ElOW'> KaL (3ov!.,oplvovc; piiicicov TvpavvEiv f} TvpavvEwBaL). The terminology in this passage (e.g. (3ovlcofLa' and the two infinitives) shows the agency of the tyrant/his friends as those who able to consciously act in the manner of a tyrant. 188 PI E 7 332 (' ' -'' ' '' ' ' ' 'e ' ' ' ' ' ~ -''' ' . p. . c V'lfO uo't'W'> 7rUYTEVWV ovoEVL, fJ-0118 EUW 7]: 7rEV1]'> ryap 1JV avopwv 't'LI'vWV leaL 7WYTwv). Chapter 4 will discuss this topic more fully, especially the fractious relationship between the two groups. As will be seen on pages 95~100, in the case of Dionysius II, his life in Corinth will be characterized not only by being 7rEVrJ' avopwv <j>iicwv but also acting as destitute of money and culture. 189 This treatment, such as the exile and death of many members of his court after the Olympic Games of 388, will be discussed in Chapter 3, pages 190~94 and Chapter 4, pages 295~97. 190 Lack of trust and bodyguards go hand in hand, as mentioned by Aristotle in Po15.13lla 9~14. Likewise, in Xen. Hjer. 10.3, Hiero is told by Simonides that the best way to control the citizen body and to protect from attack is by frightening them with a bodyguard ( Tov' fLEV ovv TowLnovc; fliit.) .. nv av uwcppovU;oL 6 d7r0 TWv Oopv¢6pwv cp6(3oc;). Later in this section, as well as in 5.3, he notes that the bodyguard preferably consists of foreign mercenaries (as also noted by Aristotle, who juxtaposes the bodyguard of foreign mercenaries with a king's bodyguard of citizens). 191 Perhaps the most famous example of the bodyguard of a tyrant is that of the Athenian 61 bodyguard at Leontinoi, an act that imitated Peisistratus, even to the extent of inflicting false wounds in order to procure the bodyguards (Diad. Sic. 13.95.5-6). ,, "'' , , ,.... , 'e 'e e, , A , ,, , , , afLa o r;[Lepq 'TOV 'lrl\/1] avo;; a pouy ev'Toc; eu;; eov'Twovc;, 7rO''""a npo<:; 'TTJV 'Tijc; e7r~f3oii.Jj') {nr68euw 7r~eavo!vory0ua') l7reUYE 'ToVc; 5xtvovc; OoVva~ ,.+, /l ' " " " 'f:: I <\ '' " l I \: \ -yv,~,aKa<:; av'Ttp 'TCVV (Frpa'TWYTWV esaKouwv<:;, ave; av 7rpoa~prrra~. '"eryera~ oe ,.... "t , A , , , rr , , 'Ae - 'TOV'TO 7rpasa~ 'TOV i..l.WVVCYWV a7rGfL~fLOVfLEVOV EUYUFrpa'TOV 'TOV r;vawv: Ka~ ryGp EKeiv6v cpacrw Eav'TOv Ka'Ta'TpavfLa'T£uav'Ta 7rpoetv8e'iv elc; 'T0v '•'''r.!r.!<' '~'-..h•'•P- ,_ EKKI\/TjULaV OJ') E'lr~t-JEJVOVI'vEVfLEVOV, Ka~ O~a 'TOV'TO -yVI'vaKTJV /'vat-JEW 7rapa 'TCVV 7rofvurWv, f; xpr;ucff-LEVOV 'T0v 'Tvpavvt8a 7repurre7rouijaBaL Ka~ 'T6'Te !1wvVuw') 'Tf; 7rapa7ril./r;u£q fLTJXavf; 'To 7rlvij8o<;;; ega7ra'T0CYa') Ev0prye~ 'Ta 'Tij') 'Tvpavv£0o<;;;. And at day-break, when the common people were gathered in Leontini, he delivered a long plausible speech to further his design and persuaded the populace to give him a guard of six hundred soldiers whom he should select. It is said that Dionysius did this in imitation of Peisistratus the Athenian. Since he, we are told, after wounding himself, appeared before the assembly alleging that he had been the victim of a plot, and because of this he received a guard at the hands of the citizens, by means of which he established the tyranny. And at this time Dionysius, having deceived the multitude by a similar device, put into effect the structure of his tyranny. Peisistratus, who achieved his tyranny by having a bodyguard voted to him. The best portrayal of these events is Hdt. 1.59.4-6. Note, however, that this guard of Peisistratus was composed not of foreigners but of chosen citizens ('rOw duTWv Kwral,.iga'; livOpa';). Timoleon, the tyrant killer, first realized the danger of his brother Timophanes and his aspirations to tyranny when the latter was traveling through the city of Corinth protected by bodyguards, as noted in Diad. Sic. 16.65.3-4. 62 Thus, while the bodyguard was a common part of this tyrannical trope, it makes sense historically. Certainly, the use of mercenaries, especially in a bodyguard, would vouchsafe the political and military power of the tyrant, in the same way that the lictors accompanying Roman magistrates with their fasces embodied the power of these officials. At the same time, however, this use of a bodyguard also would stress the status of the tyrant as an outsider, in that he was unable to entrust his personal safety to the citizen body and needed to be protected from them. 192 The fact that many of these bodyguards who protected him were non-Greek mercenaries from Campania only heightened this separation between the tyrant and the true citizen body of the pojjs. This ideological separation from the demos was reflected physically by this swath of men, who keep the tyrant at a distance from his own city. Several of these tales of social separation, including the depiction of Dionysius as Polyphemus, certainly seem to be fanciful exaggerations. Even within these depictions, however, is a kernel of truth that causes us to reflect upon the status of Dionysius. Dionysius certainly did need to separate himself from his citizens on occasion, as witnessed by their attempts to revolt and to threaten his rule. There thus is a sense that Dionysius was at times an outsider in his own city Syracuse, an outside-ness that appeared in these myths. One might argue that these depictions of the tyrant are mere topoj and can not be taken as historical fact. Yet the conflicting identities presented in these myths reflected political and social conflicts faced by the tyrant. While some of the 192 Pl. Resp. 8.567d-568d discusses the dependence of the tyrant on a group of protectors from outside of the city (or slaves that he has enfranchised), as reflected by his reaction to the citizens of his pojjs. See Raux 2001: 158-59 and Squilloni 1990: 114-15. 63 information concerning the life of the tyrant may be exaggerations, the threats to Dionysius were real. He spent the first several years of his rule facing internal threats, including a revolt by the Syracusans that almost cost him his life. Intrigue and danger were part of the life of the monarch or tyrant across the Greek and non- Greek world. These threats were magnified in a tyrannical regime, where the basis of the rule of the tyrant was only based on demonstrations of power and persuasion. Indeed, as will be discussed in the section below, these negative topoj of the tyrant began to be formed in the late fifth and early fourth centuries. Might not the dangers in the life of Dionysius I be factual and contributions to these topoj found in later authors, rather than reflecting an already-existing stereotype? Even in the light of possible exaggerations, the historical narrative of political struggle in Sicily during the fifth and fourth century provides a background for the image of a tyrant who struggled to integrate into his city. C. Dionysius the barbarian The above examples demonstrate that Dionysius was depicted as an outsider from his own city. What was his status in the larger Greek world? Were there instances when Dionysius was also represented as an outsider in regard to his wider identity as a Greek? In addition to his political policies, Dionysius also cultivated cultural capital in order to be perceived as an enlightened leader, namely with his attempt to be a dramatic poet. 193 In addition to the increase in his presence at pan- hellenic sanctuaries Uust as his predecessors had done before him), 194 Dionysius also 193 For the development of cultural capital by the creation of a oourt, see chapters 3 and 4. 194 For dedications by Hieron and Gelon, see Diad. Sic. 11.26.7, Paus. 6.19.7, and Pind. Pyth. 1. 73-80, as well as ML 27 and 29. Harrell 2006: 126-32 discusses these passages further, 64 demonstrated his knowledge of Greek culture by creating dramatic works presented at festivals, such as the Olympic Games and the Athenian Lenaea. 195 Although only scattered fragments of these plays remain, 196 a few general themes are apparent. His tragedies both seem to show Sicilian superiority by following Aeschylus and Euripides in setting his plays on the island 197 and to represent his just rule as achieved through nomos rather than physjs. 198 By composing these plays and presenting them at panhellenic festivals, Dionysius was participating in a rich past shared by Greeks around the Mediterranean and was arguing for his status as a type of super-Greek, who combined not only political prowess but artistic ability. In promoting his Greek heritage, however, he was not particularly successful, most notably with his dismal failure at the Olympic Games of 388. The story states that, after Dionysius had sent professional rhapsodes to read his verses and to win glory for the tyrant, 199 the spectators soon recognized the poor quality of his compositions, ridiculed him, and even started a small riot by overturning his tents in disgust. 200 while Sartori 1966: 34-36 discusses the donations of Dionysius I in particular. 195 The most famous presentation of his tragedies was his victory in 367 at the Lenaea, as mentioned in Them. Or. 9.126c and Tzetz. ChjJ. 5.178-81. 196 For collected fragments of Dionysius, see Snell TrGF76 F1-13. See also Suda o 1178 and Diad. Sic. 15.73.5-74.4, as well as Ceocarelli 2004: 125-28 and Grossardt 2005: 225-26. 197 Dionysius was even reported to have the memorabilia of Aeschylus and Euripides. See Todisco 2002: 65 for further discussion. 198 Sanders 1987: 2-5. 199 Th t t ' ,,, ,, ' • ,,, ' ' ' ' ' ' ' t ' A ' e passageS a eS E7rEf£'f E OE ICaL pa'f CfJUOV') TOV') 1CpaTLOTOV') ... 'lrOI/T]UWOLV EVUOsOV 'TOV L.J..WVVUWV. For the full text, see Diad. Sic. 14.109 and 15.7.2. See also Chapter 4, pages 292-95. 200 D. d s· 14 109 2 r.. ' '' - • e - ' ' - ' ' '' ' lO , lC. , , \r'E'Ta OE TaVTa ava EWpOVV'TE') 'T1}V ICaiCLaV 'TWV 'lrOI/T}fLa'TWV, UlHfEf\,(J)V 'TOV A I \ I ' \ ~ " \ "\ ~ ~ 'Y \ \ ) N t th t L.J..WVVUWV ICaL K,a'Tfr'fWWOK,OV E'lrL TOUOVTOV, WUTE TWa') 'TOI\,fL1]0a/, ot..ap7ra~::,EW Ta') OK/T]Va') . 0 e a the poor quality of Dionysius's verses was equaled by the poor performanoe of his chariots (14.109.4). 65 Although he did not completely despair of his reputation, 201 the depiction of Dionysius as a cultured and educated ruler was questioned. Even if his military and political sovereignty at home was not immediately threatened by this travesty, 202 he did suffer damage to his image as a leader, especially from poJejs he wished to court (notably Athens, which seemed to distance itself from Dionysius after this incident). This disaster also allowed for his status as a Greek to be questioned. Such a public relations disaster was the perfect opportunity for the rhetor Lysias to take his stand against the tyrant. Having urged the organizers of the event not to admit the representatives of a tyranny he termed most impious, 203 he then delivered his Olympian Oration, in which he called the Greeks to action against the oppressors of Greece, namely King Artaxerxes of Persia and Dionysius (Lys. 33.3-5). 204 l l \ \: \ /l ' \ I ' I I \ " , 7rO''""ar:; oe 7ro,~,eu:; V7rO 'Tvpavvwv ava(Fra'TOV') ryeryevr;fLevar:;. Ka~ 'Tav'Ta e~ \ \: ' ' e I ' I r " \ \ \: 1 \ /l fLEV 0~ au EVE~av E7raCYX,OfLEV ... opWf-LEV ryap 'TOV') KWOVVOV') Ka~ fLEryai\DV') ' 'e ' ' ' e "'' ,, , ' ' ' ,.... Ka~ 7rav'Taxo ev 7rep~eCY'TTJKO'Ta<:;: e7rUY'Tau e oe o'T~ r; fLEV apxr; 'Tcvv Kpa'ToVv'TWV 'Tij') 8atv(Lr'Tr;r:;, 'TWv oe XPTJf-La'T(J)V f3aaiA,eV') 'TafL£a'), 'Ta oe 'TWv 'E' • ' ' - ~ - e ~ ' - ~' • • ' ' ' ' 1\d\/TjVWV CYWfLa'Ta 'TCVV oa7raVaCY a~ OVVafLEVWV, VaV') OE 7r01\d'va') fLEV aV'TO') ' '' ' ~· . ' - "' ' ' KEK'TTJ'Ta~, 7ro''""ar:; o o 'Tvpavvo<:; 'TTJ'l ..: .. M<e,...,~a<:;. 201 His flatterers later would tell him that the negative reaction of the crowd was due to the envy of his genius, as noted in Diad. Sic. 14.109.6. Damage oontrol needed to be done, sinoe the word of his failure apparently had been spread through the city by sailors returning from the Games (Diad. Sic. 14.109.5). 202 Dionysius himself did not leave Syracuse to participate. Diad. Sic. 14.109.2 notes that Dionysius sent his brother Thearides as the head of the delegation. 203 Diad. Sic. 14.109.3 (Tov' €f auE{3EUTILTrJ' TVpavvi!lo,). 204 Lysias's distatste for Dionysius reflected the ebb of Athenian-Syracusan relations (Lysias identified with both cities, sinoe his family was originally from Syracuse and was a resident alien in Athens) and also his own personal grudge against tyrannical rule. Under the rule of the Thirty Tyrants, his own brother, Polemarchus, had been murdered. 66 Since many parts are held subject by the foreigner, and many of her cities ravaged by despots ... For we see both the gravity of our dangers and their imminence on every side. You are aware that empire is for those who command the sea, that the King has control of the money, that the Greeks are in thrall to those who are able to spend it, that our master possesses many ships, and that the despot of Sicily has many also. In his salvos against Dionysius, he consistently groups the tyrant with the Persian king, when he notes that Greece was held under the power of the barbarian and that many Greek cities were destroyed by despots. Unlike Gelon, who dedicated spoils at Olympia after defeating the hated barbarian enemy, 205 Dionysius is compared side- by-side with the Persian king, when Lysias complains that both the Persians and Dionysius control the seas through their many ships. Within this negative description of the Syracusan tyrant and the Persian king, Lysias seems to argue that these two men are preventing the Greeks from owning the land and the sea (namely the Mediterranean) that is rightly theirs. 206 Thus, by grouping Dionysius with the Persian, who grasped at what was not his, Lysias called into question the legitimacy of Dionysius's rule, especially because he goes against Greek mores by acting as a 205 Gelon dedicated the spoils of the Carthaginians at Olympia to demonstrate the vast difference between the Greek and the barbarian other. For description of the dedication, see Paus. 6.19.7, as well as 6.9.4-5 for an earlier appearance of Gelon at Olympia. For discussion, see Mari 2006: 45-46 and 64. See also Chapter 4, page 291. 206 See especially Lys. 33.5, where Lysias states that rule is for him that owns the sea (f) p.cv d.px~ TOw KpaToLwrwv Tij'; 8at..,dTT1J'>), and 33.6, where he argues that the foreigner has often attempted to seize what is not theirs ('ri}'; d)\)\nTpLa'> E7rlBVfLOLwra') ). 67 despot. 207 When Dionysius attempts to portray himself as the protector of the Greeks against the barbarians, Lysias argues the opposite, namely that Dionysius acts in the same way as the barbarian from whom the Greeks must protect themselves. 208 Lysias hated Dionysius and tyranny in general, and his opinion mattered, both as a well- respected Athenian orator and as someone with Syracusan heritage. 209 Although Lysias stops short in claiming that Dionysius was a barbarian, his paralleling of the actions of the Persian King and the Syracusan Tyrant is a powerful rhetorical act. Even if Dionysius was a Greek, by threatening the sovereignty of other Greeks, he did not act as a good Greek. The identity of Dionysius as someone who acted outside of these proper Greek social and political boundaries would have political ramifications after 388. 210 By having his reputation tarnished at Olympia, a gathering ground for the most influential men of the Greek world, Dionysius risked losing valuable alliances or gaining enemies. Thus, the significance of the identification of the tyrant as such was not limited merely to literature but translated into true threats to his rule. While tyrants were compared negatively with other groups in the fifth century (e.g. with oligarchy 211 ), the identification of the tyrant with the barbarian as 207 This feeling is especially expressed by the next clause, which states that the ancestors of the fourth century Greeks expelled the tyrants ('roVe; OE Tvpdvvov') EgEt.,duavTEc;). 208 Prag 2010: 61-63. 209 See the entry on Lysias in the Appendix. 210 See chapter 5, page 325. 211 Elites were often referred to with adjectives such as xapin,. The noble wife of Dionysius I, Aristomache, was described as from a noble family, and the noble wife of Agathocles, Damas, was said also to be noble. See Collin-Bouffier 2010: 293-97 for a more complete description of the terminology. 68 a trope in Greek literature began comprehensively in the fourth century. 212 Tyrannical rule was seen as acceptable only among barbarian peoples, because the tyrant attempted to subvert the pojjs, the quintessential institution of all Greeks. 213 In addition, the tyrant was the last step in the degeneration of the state, when the bounds of propriety have been passed, after which point the tyrant not only becomes a barbarian but sub-human. 214 As the ultimate threat to the Greek city-state, the tyrant eventually would become a poetic tapas for everything antithetical to the pojjs. 215 Throughout the literary record, discussion of the tyrant was often tied to the identity of the pojjs. Beginning mainly with Plato, and continuing with Aristotle and Polybius, the tyrant was included as a natural part of the cycle of governments, by being represented as a symbol of the degeneration of the state. As will be discussed further in the third chapter, this depiction was strongly influenced by Plato's own experiences with the Dionysii and their failure to become the philosopher-king that he desired. Even though tyranny was an integral part of cycle of governments, it nevertheless was one that should be avoided at all costs. Thus, the tyrant was likened to the barbarian (who could not take part in the life of the pojjs), because the tyrant was an obstacle in the formation of the pojjs. As philosophical discussion of the pojjs increased in the fourth century, Plato and other authors had contemporary examples 212 Much of this attack likely derived from the large number of political exiles, including poets, who were created during this time period (especially in the case of Dionysius 1). For this reasoning, see Sartori 1966: 18-20. 213 Arist. Pol. 3.1285a 18-24. This passage also is discussed in Boesche 1993: 6-7. 214 This argument is made by Farenga 1981: 6-8, who notes how the Repubjjc of Plato argues that, under the tyrant, the traditional roles of ruler and ruled or citizen and metic are turned upside-down (8.556b-d). 215 Lanza 1977: 191-93. 69 of tyranny from which they could create their opinions. Thus, even if the figure of the tyrant was occasionally exaggerated by these authors, such distortion and manipulation of the tyrant reflected uneasiness with tyranny, especially in relationship to the pojjs. While some authors (including Xenophon and Isocrates) saw tyranny as a possible solution to the problems of Greece, Plato had first-hand experience with the fate of the pojjs under Dionysius I, with the gradual disappearance of the independent pojjs in Sicily. Lysias also refers to the threat to the pojjsin his Olympic Oration, when he suggested the Dionysius I, like the Persian king, had control over the seas. Therefore, just like the barbarian, Dionysius I was attempting to create a larger empire, thereby subjugating the pojjs to his larger political desires. This 'barbarity' of Dionysius I appeared in the historical record when he followed the practices of other tyrants by taxing free citizens, in order to build public works, an act that made his own citizens like resident aliens. 216 This improper behavior turned frequently to sacrilege, as when he pilfered the temples of Syracuse and sold the offerings to finance his campaigns, 217 or when he despoiled the golden clothing of the statue of Zeus and ordered that the golden locks from the statue of 216 Arist. Pojjt. 5.1313b 21-26 gives a list of tyrants and also notes that taxation prevents the citizens from being wealthy and maintaining a guard (unlike the tyrant). See also Kallet 2003: 122-26 and Gallant 1989: 409-11, the latter of whom places this taxation into the context of changes in the Hellenistic period. 217 Polyaenus, Strat. 5.2.19 notes that the temple of Asclepius was plundered, with the offerings sold in the marketplaoe. Dionysius 'escaped' the sacrilege by ordering those who purchased the offerings to bring them back to the temple. See Scarpa Bonazza Buora 1984: 62-65 for discussion of tyrannical sacrilege under Dionysius I, such as his possible theft from a large amount of gold from the Temple of Zeus at Olympia (Cic. Nat. D. 3.83-84). 70 Apollo be shorn off. 218 This barbaric behavior would be repeated in Italy as well, when Dionysius went in 384 to Pyrgi in Etruria and sacked the temples of Apollo and Leucothea for money and offerings. 219 Such actions seemed especially barbaric, since the pillage of temples was rare among non-Greek peoples, who normally had respect even for foreign gods? 20 Although these deeds of the tyrant fit well with his standard image, the fabrication of these episodes is not likely, especially since the sources provide the reasoning for such behavior, namely that Dionysius needed funds to pay his mercenaries and for other military expenses. Because of this behavior, rule under Dionysius the Elder was represented as worse than under the barbarian Carthaginians. For example, in a speech preserved in Diodorus Siculus which supposedly occurred during a Syracusan assembly, Theodorus notes that the Carthaginians at least would allow Syracuse to maintain its ancestral laws, while Dionysius plundered temples, seized the wealth of citizens, killed citizens, and paid slaves to enslave their masters (Diad. Sic. 14.65.2). 221 218 Ael. VH 1.20 (~~:aL TO llryat.pn OE TaLi 'A7r6t.) .. ,wvor;; 7rEpl£uV"'l\,7Ju-Ev, ~xov KaL alnO XPvuoV'> (3oOTpUxovr;;, K£t.,dJuar;; d7ro1CElpaL Twa ainoV'>)· Palmer 1992: 86-89 notes that the Athenians began to suspect Alcibiades of seeking to be tyrant after he committed a similar sacrilege, with the mutilation of the Herms. 219 Ael. VH1.20. This passage also notes that Dionysius was present for this sacrilege, toasting to the Benevolent Deity, as was the custom at a symposium. 220 Several apparent exceptions included the pillage of sanctuaries by the Phoenicians at Selinunte in 409 (Diad. Sic. 13.57.4-5), the defacement of the temples at Acragas by Himilcon in 405 (Diad. Sic. 13.108.2), and the plunder of the temples of Demeter and Kore by Himilcon at Syracuse in 396 (Diad. Sic. 14.63.1). The attack on the temple of Demeter and Kore at Syracuse is notable, since Diodorus argues that such sacrilege caused the plague and subsequent defeat (14.70.4). See Giovannini 2007: 198-99 and Vanotti 1989:35-36 and 40. 221 See also Scarpa Bonazza Buora 1984: 21-23. 71 Kapx71ooviou; ' 'CO ' npo Cr'T a'T"'T OfLEVOV, I "'' A I " p I ' I "' I K ~' VUCTJCYaV'Ta<:; OE i..l.WVVCYWV EX,EW JVapv'Tepov EKEWWV OECY'lrO'TTJV. apX,TJOOVW~ fLf.v rycip, 1div 7ro!l.i.fLqJ Kpa70m:vu~, ¢6pov c'DpuYf-Lf.vov fvaj36v'TE') olJI< !iv i;fLCi'l ' /l " I I \: " \ /l ? \: \ \ \ r \ EKWI'vVCYaV 'TOU:; 7ra'Tpwu:; VOfLOU:; OWU<EW 'TTJV 'lrDI'vW: OV'TO') OE 'Ta fLEV ~epa uvtv0ua'), 'ToVc; oe 'TWv lOWJ'Tc'Dv 7rfvo-lrrovc; &fLa 'Ta'i<;;; 'TWv KEK'TTJfLEvwv "-frvxaic; '"',, , , , e ~ , , , , ~ , ~ , , a-yEI'vOf-LEVO'), 'TOV') OU(E'Ta') fLUY OOO'TE~ Ka'Ta 'TTJ') 'TCVV OECY'lrD'TWV OOVI'vE~ac;: \ \ p I \ \ " /l r l I \: I " ' ' ' I Ka~ 'Ta CYVfLJVawov'Ta KWTa 'Ta<:; 'TCVV 7ro,~,ewv a,~,wueu; oewa, 'TaV'T ev e~pr;vv For if conquered, we will have to obey the commands of the Carthaginians, and if conquerors, to have in Dionysius a harsher master than they would be. For even if the Carthaginians defeated us in war, they would only impose a fixed tribute and would not prevent us from governing the city in accordance with our ancient laws. This man has plundered our temples, has taken the property of private citizens together with the lives of their owners, and pays a wage to servants to secure the enslavement of their masters. Such horrors with the storming of cities are perpetrated by him in time of peace, yet he promises to put an end to the war with the Carthaginians. The qualification of Dionysius I in this passage as a {3ap{nepo<; Oe<nr67"7!<; m companson to a state traditionally seen as a barbarian enemy only serves to emphasize status outside of the Greek norm. Although the veracity of this speech is not certain, such sentiments would have been felt by the citizenry who lived through political and social upheaval. This example, combined with the others analyzed above, portray the identity of Dionysius not merely as a Syracusan but as a combination of many Greek and barbarian elements. Unlike most Greeks, whose identity primarily was tied to their pojjs, Syracuse hardly plays any role in the identity of Dionysius. 72 Although his identification with the wider Greek world reflects his future empire in Sicily and overseas, his status as an outsider would not serve him well when he attempted to establish his rule early in his reign. As the next chapter will discuss, Dionysius was forced to combat these suspicions by the citizenry of Syracuse by promulgating his status as the ideal Syracusan and ideal Greek. D. The foreign genealogy of Dionysius II The transition from Dionysius the Elder to Dionysius the Younger after the death of the former in 367 BC provided an opportunity to firmly establish a dynasty based in Syracuse. 222 The rule of Dionysius II, however, was an abject failure, since he did not maintain the military and political successes of his father, due to political discord created by his inability to rule. Regardless of the new look of his (non- )empire, ancient texts still focus on the struggle over image by Dionysius II and his treatment as an outsider. These problems were indeed shared by his entire family, 223 who were portrayed as following their father in improper non-Greek behavior. 224 222 Various sources discuss the desire for Dionysius I to hand over the reins of his rule over to Dionysius II. For the dynasty of Dionysius I, see Isoc. 6.44-45 (Ev Tals ainals Tlp.als KaL ovvaUTEia"), as well as Diad. Sic. 16.5.4 and 20.78.3. For further discussion, see Sordi 1989: 70-73. The noun ovvauTEia did not necessarily mean 'dynasty' in the modern sense (often merely a synonym for power or even empire), but the fact that Dionysius was portrayed as handing over the same power and territory to his son stress that the Dionysii were meant to be an actual dynasty. For the marriage and dynasty, see also Chapter 5, pages 341-44. 223 Dionysius II was born likely in 398, the first son of Doris. His younger brother Hermocritus appears in an Athenian inscription of 369/8, reoeiving honors with him. See JG II 2 103 lines, 20-21 (Tov' vEi' Tov' [Ll,]ovv[uiov Llw] I [vv]uw[v] ml 'Epp.6KpLTov). In addition, he had two step-brothers, Hipparinus and Nysaeus, from his father's marriage to Aristomache. For a description of the family of Dionysius II, see Di Fede 1949: 31-36. 224 Note that the Syracusans as a whole were not spared from negative depictions. The depiction of Syracusans is of a people living their so-called "good life" (icEcy6fLEVO' ai'i (3io, Evilaip.wv), a debauched lifestyle without virtue and with much gluttony (Tpa7rE/;wv 7rlc~prJ,), as noted in Pl. 73 Issues with alcoholic tendencies, gluttony, and tastes in expensiVe clothing (all of which were considered signs of a transformation from a good monarchy to an evil tyranny and of barbarians) were included in the depiction of the family of Dionysius I. 225 Hipparinus (the half-brother of Dionysius II) and Apollocrates (the son of Dionysius II) were addicted to alcohol, 226 and another half-brother of Dionysius II, Nysaeus, participated in much unseemly behavior, including gluttony, wine guzzling, and the abuse of women and boys. 227 Dionysius II especially was singled out for his social ineptitude, represented in sources as dwarfed and deformed in character due to his lack of education. 228 Such deficiencies in character reportedly stemmed from his childhood, during which time he was not trained in the proper way to rule. 229 Having been withdrawn from proper social relations, his childhood at least followed the Ep. 7.326b. Plato notes that such behavior would have predisposed the Syracusans to nurturing a tyrannical regime. See Luccioni 1958: 76-78 for analysis of this passage. 225 Such behavior followed the ideas of Polybius (6.7.7), who, while describing the transformation from monarch to tyrant, states that this transformation took place when leaders allowed their desires to overflow (nSTE 01] Tals E7rlBvfLLat.s E7r6fLEVOL Cna T7JV 7rEpwvu!av) and when they thought that it was necessary to distinguish themselves from their subjects with special dress, as well as in the presentation and preparation of a wide array of foodstuffs ( €faicicov' p.cv cuei]w, 0 ,, (3 ~ ~ J! \ r I ~ r I >f;l"\ "\ ~\ \ 1"\ \ \ \ V'lfEI'va OV UEW EXEW TOV') 1J10VfLEVOV') 'TWV V'lrO'Ta'TTOfLEVWV, Esai'vi'vOV') OE ICaL 'lrOUClJ>va') Ta') 7rEpL 'T1]V "'' , ' ' ' ' ) TPO't'1JV a7rol'vavuEl8 ICaL 7rapaaK£vac; . 226 For the antics of Hipparinus and Apollocrates (whom Athenaeus incorrectly calls Apollocrates, the son of Dionysius the Elder), see Ath. 10.435e-436b (~ Theopomp. FGrH115 Fl85-186). 227 Ath. 10.436a-b (~ Theopomp. FGrH 115 Fl87). See also earlier in this section of Athenaeus (~Theopomp. FGrH115 Fl88). 228 Plut. Vlt. Djon 10.1 (CJi.a!.,E!.,wf31JfLEvwv d7rat.lJEvu-Lqt KaL avvTETPlfJpivov TO 1}8o'>)· 229 Plut. Vlt. Djon 9.2 states that his father kept him locked away and withdrawn from social I t • (>A, I I "\ J! ~ ' > I r "\ I r I \ > I I ) re a lOllS E'f'povpEL IW'TaiCI\£LU'TOV OLICOL, UL Ep1JfLWV OfliJx,La') ETEpac; IWL a'lrElpLCf 7rparyfLWTWV • Instead of acting as a leader in training, he was more interested in life as a craftsman and made wagons, lampstands, or wooden tables and chairs (rltJ.ilgw Ka'i 1-..,vxvLa'; Ka'i OLcppov'; gu/-..,[vov'; Ka'i Tpa7rE~a'; TEICTaw6fLEVOv). 74 traditional social mores of his father, who, as seen above, apparently was withdrawn from his friends and family. Dionysius II also was represented as a slave to alcohol, who went on drinking binges of as much as ninety days, so blind from his drinking habit that his cronies pretended that they could not see to downplay his addiction. 230 Were some of these reports exaggerated, part of political propaganda which served to undermine the rule of the tyrant? Even so, such views suggest further reasons for the inability of this family to rule (especially because earlier tyrants, such as Gelon, were not scolded for such behavior). These deficiencies of character represented characteristics of non-Greeks, especially tendencies to covet luxury and to drink excessive amounts of alcohol. At least with his father, positive elements in his myths forecasted the political greatness of the tyrant. For Dionysius the Younger, however, no such positive story seems to have existed. In addition to his behavior, Dionysius II also was unacceptable to Syracusan citizens due to his genealogy. While two of Dionysius I's children were fully Syracusan through their mother Aristomache, Dionysius II and his brother Hermocritus were only half-Syracusan, since their mother was from Locri Epizephyrii in southern Italy. The tyrant with one parent external to the network of citizens was another common tapas of Greek literature. 231 The tyrant often 230 "' th t f h. d · k. 1· c ' ' e· ·· · ' · ' · ' e· ' ' ' rOf e S ory 0 IS fin mg mges aVTOV EU OTL E'lrL 1JfLEpa'; EVEV1]1COV'Ta fLE VEW, OW IWL rlt43icvw7r6TEpov 'fEVEuea, TOS 6'fE"), see Ath. 10.435e c~ Arist. Constjtutjon of the Syracusans F605.1). For Dionysius II's alcoholism, also see Ath. 10.435d (~ Theopomp. FGrH115 F283a) and Plut. Vlt. Djon 9.4. For the story with his flatterers, see Ath. 10.435e (~ Theophr. F548). For the Djonysokolakes, see also Ath. 6.249e-f, along with Chapter 3, pages 182-83 and Chapter 4, pages 230-32. See also Pl. Resp. 9.571b-57ld and Luocioni 1958: 84-88 for the reliance of tyrants on food and aloohol. 231 Vernant 1982:34-35. 75 represented a mixture of half pojjs and half foreign city, 232 although the proclamation of this mixed lineage occasionally was a deliberate choice on his part. 233 Indeed, the first great Greek tyrant, Cypselus, was the product of a mixed . 234 marnage, a narrative which showed how the introduction of a foreign spouse broke a closed system of endogamy and created disruptive tyranny. 235 The bigamous marriage of Dionysius I to Doris and Andromache stressed the juxtaposition between the legitimate Syracusan wife and the foreign wife, from whom Dionysius II would issue. The version of the marriage in Diodorus Siculus, although indicating the foreignness of Doris, depicts the marriage more positively, as a marriage between the leader of the Syracusans and the daughter of another illustrious citizen, in much the same vein as aristocratic marriages between elites of different poJejs. 236 In this case, Dionysius I appeared to follow standard pojjspractice 232 For further discussion, see Catenacci 1996: 121-26. 233 Tyrants often professed ethnic origins fully or partially different from those of their citizens. Peisistratus, for example, claimed his lineage from the house of Pylos and Neleus, whose posterity later came to Athens to rule ( E6vTE<; OE Ka'i o[rroL rlvE~<,a8Ev ITVA.,w[ TE ICa'i N1]!-..£WaL ... oi 7rplnEpov E7r1}t.,v0e;; E6vTE'> EryEvovcro 'A817valwv (3am_)·de;;), as noted in Hdt. 5.65.3. Peisistratus's choioe of Messenian heritage over Athenian autochthony may stem from the problem of tyrants to prove why they should rule over their fellow kinsmen and citizens. See Hall 2010: 26-27, who demonstrates that democratic Athens wished to prevent such amalgamation, which was often prevalent in the aristocratic marriages of the time between different cities. 234 In the narrative, the Bacchiad Labda is married off to a foreign man. As Hdt. 5.92 relates the tale, Corinth was onoe ruled by the aristocratic Baochiadae, who practiced endogamy. One of the women of the family, Labda, was born crippled and was spurned by all the men in the family. She then was married off to Eetion of Petra, who by lineage was a Lapith ( mvTrJV Ba~exmOEwv ryGp oVOEls ij8EA.,E ryijfLaL, faxE'- 'HETLwv 6 'ExE~epdTEoc;, Cn]fLov 0Ev EWv E/(, ITE7p1J'>, r!nap Ta rlvEK,a8EV Aa7rL81]'> TE ~CaL KawEL01]'>). 235 Gernet 1968:349-50 and Vernant 1982: 26-27. 236 He notes that Locri Epizephyii was not the desired source for Dionysius I's foreign wife, especially since he wished to create political links through a marriage with Rhegium. Having 76 by contracting such a marriage. The more salacious narrative of Plutarch, however, focuses on the bigamous status of the marriage and notes that Dionysius married both women at once on the very same day. 237 Plutarch also downplays the status of Doris by describing her merely as Doris of the Locrians, but he describes Aristomache as the daughter of a leading Syracusan and as a native of the city. 238 Even if the tyrant appears to have shown no preference, Plutarch notes the desire of the citizens of Syracuse for Dionysius to show preference to the native-born Aristomache over his foreign wife. 239 Doris would provide the son who would succeed Dionysius, and by giving birth to the first son of Dionysius I, Doris made up for the fact that she was a not Syracusan (Plut. Vlt. Dian 3.3). f:: I J l l \ J I I r " I \ ,p I " sEV7J<:;: a,~,,~,a EKEWV npo7epq V7r7JpX,E 'TEKOVCYV 'TOV 7rpECYJVEVOV'Ta 'TTJ'l !1wvvu£ov ryeveCi') vLOv aln·f; f3or;8e'iv 7rp0<;;; 'TQ ryf.vo'), i; OE 'ApuY'TOflJlX,r; l \ I " I " A I I \: ty \ \ ' 'lrOI'vVV XPOVOV a7raU:; CYVVCf:JKE~ 'Tt{J i..l.WVVCYU{J KaU7rep CY'lrOVOa':,OV'T~ 7rEp~ 'TTJV EK been rebuffed by that city, he sent ambassadors to Locri. The citizens voted to approve the marriage and gave over Doris, the daughter of their most prestigious citizen (EtLvr}uTevev 6 A I A 1<;: \ ,_...., I e I ' > ~ \ I J! > <;: f: I Ll.WVVUW') L.J..Wpwa 'T1}V i::!.EVETOV vryaTepa, Ka'T EK£WOV 'TOV X_POVOV OV'TO') EVUOsOTaTOV 'TWV 7roicLTwv), as described in Diad. Sic. 14.44.6. See also Chapter 5, pages 345-49. 237 PI t TT"t n· 3 1 3 c "e ' '' - " ' ' '' · ' ' ' "' ' u . v 1 , 'lOfl • - au 18 aryeraL ova yuvau<,ac; af.J.£L ... 1\,eyeraL o 1JfLEPCf fLEV afL't'OTepac; rlryaryEu8at- fLlij). This narrative also references the suicide of Dionysius the Elder's first wife, as well as the machinations of Doris' mother to prevent the pregnancy of the native-born Aristomache. 238 The description of these women is found in Plut. VIt. Djon 3.2 ('rfw 0Ev E/(, Ao~<,pWv 6vo0a b.wpLOa \ ~\ J I ) ... 'T1}V UE E7rLXWPWV , 239 The passage notes that he showed no preference for either of the women (TOv OE tiA.)\DV X_P6vov fuov vEfMJv EavTOv OwTEI\,ELv EK,aTEpqt ). He also dined with them together and slept with them in turn (~<,owfj 0Ev El8LufLEvwv 0EL7rVELv fLET' ainoV, 1rapa vV~<,Ta OE Ev fLEpEL uvvava7ravopivwv). Plutarch also notes the desire of the Syracusans for the Syracusan wife (~<,a[ToL TWv "i.vpa~<,ovu-Lwv E(3oVt.,ETO TO 7rt.,ij8o'; T7JV ErtEvij 7ri\,Eov ~XEW Tij'; gEv1J';). See Plut VIt. Djon 3 for these passages. 77 Yet the people of Syracuse wished that their countrywoman should be honored above the stranger. But Doris had the good fortune to become a mother first, and by presenting Dionysius with his eldest son, she atoned for her foreign birth. Aristomache, on the contrary, was for a long time a barren wife, although Dionysius was desirous to have children by her. In any case, he accused the mother of his Locrian wife of giving Aristomache drugs to prevent conception and put her to death. Here one senses the inferiority of Doris on display, when she attempts to prove her worth to the Syracusans and to Dionysius by bearing the future tyrant. In this narrative, Dionysius II is not portrayed as the offspring of two illustrious parents but rather as from the tyrant and his foreign wife. Her status as an immigrant was partially transferred onto her son, and his own status as half-Locrian would compromise his status as a worthy successor to the tyranny. E. The birth of Agathocles After the reign of Dionysius II and the guardianship of Timoleon over the island, in the little-known period between the death of Timoleon and the accession of Agathocles to power, a general peace to some degree was established in the volatile political world of the island. 240 After many tyrannies across the island were 240 Much of this peace was due to the victory of Timoleon over the Carthaginians at the Battle of Crimisus c.340 BC, along with the subsequent treaty between the two parties, which set the border between the Greek and Carthaginians again at the Halycus River. For the battle at the Crimisus River, see Diad. Sic. 16.78-81 and Plutarch Tjm. 27-29. For the general peace on the island after the intervention of Timoleon, see Diad. Sic. 16.82-83 and Plut. Vlt. Tjm. 35. 78 extirpated, many cities of Sicily were re-peopled, and the eastern part of Sicily saw great economic growth. 241 Within this political environment, Agathocles seized power. In this chapter, the image of the tyrant as an outsider has moved across the spectrum from more social and political (e.g. Dionysius I) to more literal. Agathocles is the culmination of this of this evolution, since Agathocles, by all accounts, was a true outsider to Syracuse, whose constant mobility and status as a migrant during his early years was stressed in the sources. The most complete source for the birth and childhood of Agathocles is found in Diodorus Siculus. 242 To sum up the story briefly, Agathocles was born the son of Carcinus of Rhegium, who had moved to Thermae and married a woman of the area. Having heard troubling news in a dream, Carcinus learned from the oracle of Delphi that his son would cause great trouble to the Carthaginians and all of Sicily. He then exposed the child, only to have his wife give the child over to her brother to be brought up in his home. After Carcinus learned that his child had survived, fearing the Carthaginians, he moved the family to Syracuse, where father and son would work as potters. Of course, as seen with the birth myth of Dionysius I, many of these details are reminiscent of a tyrannical trope: in this case, the vision in a dream, the use of a medium to determine the identity of the child, and abandonment. Much information in this narrative stresses the identification of Agathocles as an outsider, including the very identity of his father Carcinus, who was an exile from his native city of 241 The bibliography for ancient sources and the campaigns of Timoleon is vast. See the lives of Tjmoleon by Plutarch and Nepos, as well as Talbert 19 7 4 for a good overview. 242 The entire passage discussed here is Diodorus Siculus 19.2.1-7. 79 Rhegium (which seems more historically accurate). 243 Although the text unfortunately does not explain when or how Carcinus became an exile of Rhegium (the sack of the city under Dionysius the Elder in 38 7 is a feasible cause) or how long he had been living at Thermae before the birth of Agathocles, 244 Carcinus himself certainly was a migrant, first from Rhegium to Thermae and later from Thermae to Syracuse. Because Agathocles was born into this immigrant family, his status as a migrant began from his very birth into a geographically unstable environment. Even the identity of Thermae, the city in which Carcinus settled after his exile from Rhegium, was complex. Although the history of the area around Himera at this time . f . 245 h . h' . I . 'd . f 246 F' 1s con us1ng, t e vanous 1stonca narratives prov1 e two certa1n acts. ust, Thermae itself was a city of transplants, migrants who had been moved to their 243 D. d s· 19 2 1 (K ~ ' 'P ~ "' ' ' ' ~ '' ) lO . lC. . . apiCWO'; 0 1}rywor;; 't'vryar;; ryEVOfLEVO'; EIC 'T1]'; 'lra'Tpwor;; . 244 Diodorus earlier recounts in 14.111~112 that Rhegium was sacked and destroyed in 387, with all inhabitants sold into slavery who were unable to pay the one mina in ransom. The city was later refounded during the time of Dionysius II and was given its independence again by Leptines and Callippus in 351. See Strabo 6.1.6 for Rhegium's refounding under Dionysius II (who apparently called in Phoebia), as well as Diad. Sic. 16.45.9 for the granting of independence. 245 It is difficult to determine which cities still existed. Diodorus, for example, in 11.49, states that Himera was never again inhabited after its destruction by the Carthaginians in 405. He later states in 13.114.1, however, that the Himerans were allowed to re~inhabit their town under the terms of the treaty of 405. Himera also appears later in 19.71.7 as reverting back to territory of the Carthaginians in the 314 BC treaty between Agathocles and the Carthaginians. 246 Two similar historical narratives recount the founding of Thermae. The first notes that Thermae was founded by the remnants of Himeran citizens who remained after the destruction of their city in 405 (Hjmera deleta quos dvjs beJJj calamjtas rehquos fecerat, jj se Thermjs conlocarant jn jsdem agrj finjbus neque lange ab oppjdo antjquo), as described in Cic. Verr. 2.2.86. The other tradition, found in Diad. Sic. 13.79.8, states that the Carthaginians founded this settlement in 407 BC from their own citizens and from the Libyans before the end of the war. 80 present location only one generation before the arrival of Carcinus. Second, Thermae at this time was firmly in the sphere of Carthaginian influence. 247 Thus, Agathocles was born to an immigrant father in a city of migrants which had a highly non-Greek character. As if this story were not sufficiently geographically unstable, there appear Carthaginian envoys, who were traveling to Delphi and who were instructed to learn about the birth of Agathocles. 248 The narrative up to this point seems mildly historically accurate, but this part of Agathocles' birth-myth is perhaps the most mythical (for why would Carthaginian envoys would care about the worries and insomnia of a poor potter?). As with the birth story of Dionysius I, this detail plays a role in the propagandistic fashioning of the figure of the tyrant by lending some credence to his rule. Such a tale could be construed as the demonstration of divine favor on the tyrant through these theoroj to Delphi, 249 and the mention of Delphi and its status as a pan-hellenic sanctuary surely helps to portray Agathocles as a pan- hellenic ruler and savior of Sicily and Greece from the Carthaginians, as noted later in the oracle. 25 ° Certainly, the presence of the Carthaginians would reflect the crucial role that Carthage would come to play in his political and military ventures 247 Diod. Sic. 19.2.1 (TETarypiv1}r;; Tijr;; 1r6f.£wr;; TaVn}'; V1rO Kapx1JOov!ovr;;). 248 Diod. Sic. 19.2.2 (t8wK£V Evro!.,Gs Kapx1JOovLots Tw-L 8Ewpols rlvaryopivols Elr;; llEt.,cpoV'>)· 249 This claim was likely put forward by the pro-Agathoclean historians Antander and Callias, as argued by Simonetti Agostinetti 2008: 153-54. The historian Antander (FGrH 565) would naturally be favorable to Agathocles, since he was his brother. Callias was said to have been bribed by Agathocles to praise his virtue and piety ( avaic1]<j>eEl, cyap !nr' 'AcyaeoKicEOV' ml owpwv fLEcyaicwv a7rOil6fLEVO,), as noted in Diad. Sic. 21.17.4. 250 Diod. Sic. 19.2.3 (j.Leyd!.,wv riTVX1JfLChwv 6 ryEvv1}8Eis afno') ~rrraL Kapx1JOovLots) and Consolo Langher 1990a: 139-40. By adding Delphi, this propaganda could give religious sanction to the actions of the tyrant, as argued by Catenacci 1996: 50-51. 81 upon his accession to power. Since propaganda concerning the tyrant always was a double-edged sword, the oracle also raised questions concerning his identity, especially when the oracle included all of Sicily as a victim of his actions. 251 As with the Galeotae, the presence of Carthaginian envoys stressed an extra layer of ethnic diversity, since non-Greeks again played a major role in the process of identification for the tyrant. They also remind the reader that the area of Agathocles' birth was not Greek. These theoroj, who were mobile figures themselves, and the oracle of Delphi, the omphalos of the Greek world far from Sicily and a religious center for all Greeks and foreigners, de-center the narrative 252 by including vastly disparate cities of the Greek world, 253 including Rhegium, Himera, Carthage, and Delphi. Most surprisingly, the city in which Agathocles will rule, Syracuse, expressly appears nowhere in the narrative. Thus, this part of the birth story not only reinforces the multiple identities in relationship throughout Sicily at this time but also highlights the multiple identities of Agathocles. As with the multiple identities of Dionysius I, the inclusion of these disparate geographical locations will foreshadow his own empire, which would stretch across the Adriatic and the Mediterranean to the African continent. After the birth of Agathocles, the tale notes that Carcinus exposed his son in public in order to kill him, although Agathocles' mother eventually was able to spirit her child away to the house of her brother, where Agathocles spent his childhood. 254 251 Diad. Sic. 19.2.3 (ml 7rrLUTJ "2.LKEic~). 252 For example, Croesus of Lydia (Hdt. 1.53-55). 253 For discussion of reinforoement through geographical distance, see Catenacci 1996: 63-64. 254 Diod. Sic. 19.2.4 (EgE81]K£ TO 7rat-0Lov CnJfLOULqt ... "'A,d8pqt TO 7rat-Ofov dvdl\,ero ... npO'; OE TDv dOEt.,cpOv 82 Such a scene is a mythical trope of kings and tyrants, 255 most famously reminiscent of the Corinthian tyrant Cypselus, who also spent his early life away from his community, only to return as tyrant and to punish his city for their rejection of him. 256 Both the childhood of Cypselus and of Agathocles focus on this period as one of displacement, where each future tyrant would spend his childhood without a pojjs and without a unified family. The stories of these two tyrants also contain elements of an eventual return with troops gained during their time in exile, followed by cruel vengeance upon the citizens of their pojjs. Thus, even if such a detail in the narrative was mythical, it does highlight the contentious relationship each tyrant has with his own pojjs. This mythical imagery of the avenger would appear as historical fact, as will be discussed below, when Agathocles would be required to attack his own city of Syracuse and his own fellow citizens to sieze power. In the final episode in the Jugendgeschjchte of Agathocles, after accepting the boy as his own, Carcinus moved Agathocles and his mother to Syracuse. 257 In this episode, various traditions of Agathocles' early life diverge, because the age at which he moved to Syracuse is disputed. 258 Regardless of these variants, Agathocles 'Hpa~~:t.,Ef.fn]V ~<,aTa8EfLfV1J). 255 Such stories abound, including the childhood of King Cyrus of Persia and Lycophron, the son of Periander and future Corinthian tyrant. Hdt. 1.112 recounts how Cyrus was sent out in the country to be raised by shepherds. Lycophron's exile to Corcyra appears in Hdt. 3.52-53. For further discussion on the separation of tyrants from society in their childhood, see Gray 1996: 367-70. 256 For the story of Cypselus, see Hdt. 5.92. Note that the marriage of Carcinus and the mother of Agathocles mirrored the marriage of Labda and Eetion, with each spouse from a different city. For the return of Cypselus, see Vernant 1982: 26-27 and Drews 1972: 133-34. 257 Diod. Sic. 19.2. 7 {jLETc[JK/T]UEV El'; "i.vpa1CoVuua'; 7ravoLKm'; ). 258 Diodorus notes earlier in this passage that Carcinus moved to Syracuse when Agathocles was 83 eventually migrated to his future base of power, where he and his father would be given Syracusan citizenship 259 (likely accurate according to the description of new laws put into practice by Timoleon). 260 It is only at this point that Agathocles finally becomes a member of the Syracusan citizen body, having spent most of his young life as an outsider, both geographically and politically. In addition to the narrative of Diodorus, other narratives of Agathocles' youth also remain. Multiple traditions exist side-by-side, both in historians closer to the time of the tyrants (e.g. Timaeus and other fragmentary Hellenistic historians) and later historians (e.g. Diodorus, Polybius, and Justin), who preserve the views of these earlier writers. 261 These narratives all reinforce the social mobility of Agathocles from poor artisan and migrant to powerful tyrant by means of the sad tale of a poor seven years old, although this age is extrapolated from the narrative, since the transfer is reported directly after the aoceptance of seven-year-old Agathocles by Carcinus. Polyb. 12.15.6 (~ Timaeus FGrH 566 Fl24b) states that Agathocles came to Syracuse around the age of eighteen (7rEpL ~T1J T7JV i}"'A,udav 01CTWICa£0EICa ryeyovWr;;). It is more likely that Agathocles arrived later in life around age of eighteen, when Diodorus later states that the future tyrant was enrolled as a citizen after the battle of Crimisus. Because the battle of the Crimisus is dated to 343/2, Agathocles likely would have been too young at age seven to be enrolled on the citizen lists, if the birth of Agathocles in 350/49 is to be accepted. For the discussion of the various threads, see Cavallaro 1971: 43-45 and Simonetti Agostinetti 2008: 156-57. 259 Diod. Sic. 19.2.8 (6 OE Kap~~:Lvo') 0er' 'Arya8o~<,/..iovc; 7ro"'l\,t/rorypa¢1J8Els ~CaL 0era TaLrra Qt.,[ryov (3uhuac; xp6vov ETE"'J\,EVT1]UEV). 260 D. d s· 19 2 8 ( e· ·• '' ' T '' ' ' K 'e ' ' ' ' - K - 10 . IC. . . ICa ov o7J X_Povov LfLOI\,Ewv fLEV o opw we; VLIC1JUac; T1JV E'lrL TqJ P1JfLLUUCfJ fLdX1JV ToVc; Kapx1JOovf.ovc; fLerEOwK£ Tijc; Ev "'i.vpa1CoVuaat.s 7ro/-..,urELac; 1riiaL ToLe; (3ovl.,opivols). 261 For example, among the Hellenistic historians of Agathocles, the Samian Duris seems to have had great influence on the extant narratives. Duris had personal connections with Sicily, since his father Kaios was born in Sicily (perhaps Heracleia) while the Samians were in exile between 366/5 and 322/l. For the provenance of Kaios, see Paus. 6.13.5 (~ FGrH76 T4) and Consolo Langher 1990b: 50-51 and 66. Within his history, his biographies focused on great men who came from nothing and later became famous. For further discussion, see Consolo Langher 1991: 158-59 and 181-83. 84 potter, who spent years far from the city in a world external to the network of · · 262 0 h I . J . h h . f c1t1zens. ne sue examp e appears m ustm, w ose s orter narratiVe o Agathocles' youth focuses on this transition, by describing the tyrant as one who grew to greatness, even though he had the lowest and most humble origin. 263 The narrative of Justin, however, is more negative, with no dream sequence adding divine flavor to Agathocles' childhood. 264 Although this narrative has a less geographically rich narrative, 265 Justin also notes that the father of Agathocles was a potter, that he moved to Syracuse, and that he was given citizenship while he was a young man. 266 Justin notes that Agathocles moved to Syracuse and received citizenship at a much older age (likely around eighteen), thus identifying him as a migrant and non- Syracusan for a much longer period of time. Furthermore, after receiVmg citizenship, Justin notes that Agathocles had no property to lose, 267 a fact which suggests that Agathocles received little honors or land after moving to Syracuse. 262 For supernatural births, see Catenacci 1996: 56-63. For stories of poverty at the tyrant's birth, see Cavallaro 1971:45-47 and Catenacci 1996: 115-20, who argues that such a depiction may have been part of aristocratic propaganda. For the early life of the tyrant outside of the city, see Vernant 1982:33-34. 263 Just. Epjt, 22.1.1 (Agathocles, Sjcjjjae tyrannus, quj magnjtudjnj prjorjs Djonysjj successjt, ad regnj maJestatem ex humjfj et sordjdo genere peruenjt). 264 See Galli 1982 for the negative traditions of Agathocles, especially his low status as a potter, as noted in Diad. Sic. 19.1 and Just. Epjt, 22.1. Polyb. 15.35.4-5 notes that Agathocles came from a position as one of the people (OrJfLOTLK~). 265 For example, the birthplace of Agathocles is merely listed as Sicily ( jn Sjcjjja ... natus) in Just. Epjt, 22.1.2. 266 For the description of the potter (patre figulo), see Just. Epjt, 22.1.2. For the grant of citizenship (Syracusas concessjsset adsdtusque jn dujtatem jnter jncolas esset), see Just. Epjt, 22.1.6. With the inclusion of the term jncolae in this detail, it appears that Carcinus and Agathocles had lived in Syracuse for some time before receiving citizenship. 267 Just. Epjt, 22.1.7 (nee jn fortunjs quod amjtteret). Other negative parts of Justin's narrative 85 Because of various biases in these accounts, 268 many facts are not secure, and the first two decades of his life before his move to Syracuse shrouded in murky darkness. Most important to this chapter, however, are the facts which exist across all traditions: a) Agathocles was not a native Syracusan by birth and b) Agathocles was an immigrant to that city sometime during his youth. Although the exaggerations of this status often speak more to the prejudices of historians, the image of this tyrant as a migrant was a consistent historical part of his tradition. In a sense, we see a progression from Dionysius I (who was only a political outsider) to Dionysius II (who was half-outsider through his foreign mother) to Agathocles (who was fully an outsider to Syracuse both socially and geographically). Although the lives and accession to tyranny of each tyrant was different, each narrative confirms that the tyrant fought his own battle to be accepted as a viable leader of his pojjs. The example of Agathocles gleaned from his early years shows how far he especially had to go to become tyrant. Part II: The tyrant as exile After turning from the early years of the tyrants, we now will look at another type of mobility that often occurred during the life of the tyrant: exile. Many tyrants were victims of this process of migration in this way, after expulsion from their own city. The second half of this chapter will analyze several instances of exile before and after the reigns of Dionysius II and Agathocles. How did this form of mobility affect the image of the tyrant? How did it affect the way in which he ruled? These examples will be discussed in the following section. 268 See especially the relationship between Timaeus and Agathocles, as discussed in the section on fragmentary historians in the Appendix. 86 demonstrate how the tyrant continued in his ways even outside of his original city, as he constantly searched for an opportunity to impose his tyrannical rule. His time in exile did not teach him how to integrate himself into a new environment and to stop being an outsider but rather encouraged him further to increase his tyrannical traits to a heightened degree. A. The first exile of Dionysius the Younger: Locri Epizephyrii The first decade of the rule of Dionysius II was relatively uneventful (at least according to the sources), but his rule would be shattered by the hostile military campaign led by his exiled uncle Dion, 269 after Dian returned with military forces to take over Syracuse in the absence of Dionysius. 270 After many mercenaries and the remainder of Syracuse had gone over to the side of Dian and his forces and after several military defeats, Dionysius II attempted to sue for peace. Having been unable to persuade Dian to the terms of surrender 271 and fearing for his life, Dionysius went off into exile secretly to Italy with his possessions and royal paraphernalia loaded on h . 272 H f' h I . Rh . d h L . 273 a s 1p. e ust per aps spent severa years m egmm an t en went to ocn. 269 Dian was exiled one year after Dionyius II took power. The exile was due to the growing influence of Dian in Syracuse. See Plut. Vlt. Djon 14.3, where Dionysius II apparently intercepts a letter between Dian and the Carthaginians oonoerning peace talks. Whether this letter was faked by the sycophants in the oourt of Dionysius who were frightened of the influence of Plato and Dian is up for debate. 270 Dionysius was sojourning in Italy with a large troop of soldiers at the time of Dian's campaign and had to sail back to Syracuse. See Diad. Sic. 16.10.2. 271 Dion attempted to conciliate Dionysius the Younger and the Syracusans, who were seeking the dissolution of the tyranny, by seeking immunity for the tyrant, as noted in Plut. Vlt. Djon 30.1 and Diad. Sic. 16.17. Diad. Sic. 16.17.1 and Plut. Vlt. Djon 37.1 discuss Dionysius II's maintenance of a mercenary army (Diodorus) and his property (both Diodorus and Plutarch). 272 D. d s· 16 17 2 c · ' " · e' ' ' ' ~ ' f3 ' ' ' '' e 10 . IC. . . aV'rO'> o EV EfLEVO'> Ta XP1JtJ-aTa ICaL 1raaav T1JV aaLI'vUC'TJV ICaTaaK£V1]V El'va EV h7ricEvua' ml mTi]pEv El, T~v 'haiciav). See also Plut. Vlt. Djon 37.2 and Just. Epjt. 21.2.8. 87 The tyrant in exile was another common trope in Greek history, evidenced most notably by the two exiles of the Athenian tyrant Peisistratus. 274 Furthermore, the exile of a Syracusan tyrant to Locri had occurred even earlier than Dionysius II, with Thrasybulus, the last tyrant of the Deinomenids. 275 Locri Epizephyrii was a strategic location 276 and a safe place for Dionysius from enemies, especially since other groups polemical to Syracuse were wandering around southern Italy at that time. 277 The choice of Locri was most convenient due to familial connections from his mother's 273 It may be that Dionysius spent approximately four years in Rhegium before arriving at Locri for six years. 274 Shortly after Peisistratus became tyrant in Athens, Hdt. 1.60.1 describes how he was eventually driven into exile by several political factions (!;_era OE oV 7rot.,t.,'Ov X_P6vov nJJvTO ¢poV1]aavTE'; oZ TE TaLi Meya~eA.,Eo<; OTautiinaL Ka'i oL TaLi Av~<,oVpryov EgE!-..,aVvova-L fLW). Having returned by means of false support by the goddess Athena, Peisistratus took power again and married the daughter of the powerful Athenian Megacles. Having angered Megacles, the tyrant was then forced to flee in exile to Eretria, where he lived with his sons for ten years r .. e' ~, , rr , , , . , , ~ . , , , . ~ , , , \)""a WV UE 0 EUJLU'Tpa'TO<; Ta 'lrOLEVfLEVa E'lf EWVTCfJ a7ral'vl'vaUO"E'rD EIC 'T1}'; XWP1J<; TO 7rapa7raV, d7r/)(,6fLEVO<; OE €<; 'EpETpwv Ef3ov!.,dJETO lip.a ToLaL 7rat-u0 before holding power for a third and final time, as described by Hdt. 1.61.2. The chronology of Peisistratus's exiles is a subject of debate. Arist. Ath. Pol. 14.4 states that Peisistratus first colonized Rhaikelos in the Thermaic Gulf, then went to Pangaios, and finally ended his travels in Eretria. Herodotus, however, only notes Eretria. See Adcock 1924 and Hind 1974, along with Weil1960: 112-14. 275 Thrasybulus was overthrown in 465 BC. Having suffered defeat with his mercenaries, he was able to negotiate a truce with the Syracusans and to retire to Locri (0LE7rpEu{3dJuwro npO<; ToVc; "'i.vpaKoa-Lov';, Ka'i avv8EfLEVO'; Ta 1rpO'; aVToV'; V7r6a7rov0o'; d7rij"'A.BEV El'; Ao1Cpo{8). See Diod. Sic. 11.68.5. 276 Dionysius likely was thinking in military terms of the future when he possibly would take rule again and was searching for a location for a series of permanent forts in the area. See Strabo 6.1.10 and Plin. HN3.10.95. 277 For the strategic choioe of Locri, see Meloni 1951: 149-52. For enemies in Italy, see Diad. Sic. 16.15.1-2 (the Bruttians) and Strabo 6.1.4-5. For a general overview of Dionysius's power struggle at Locri, see di Fede 1949: 126-29. 88 side and ties to the aristocracy. 278 Thus, as a location of exile, Locri might have acted as a most un-exilic place, a home away from home for Dionysius II. The history of Locri echoes the life of Dionysius II, since the protagonists of its foundation story were also unwanted exiles. 279 The original story of Locri's colonization states that the first colonists were descendants of slaves and fugitives, after the slaves of Ozoli in Locris seized the citizens' wives during war and then fled with them to the new city after their husbands returned from the First Messenian 280 . 281 War. Although a more honorable story ex1sted (and although the story of the Locrians was much disputed in antiquity), 282 the inhabitants of Locri and their seedy past were representative of the negative view of migrants. Dionysius II was the perfect figure to continue the scandalous history of the city, although the status of 278 Ath 12 541d c 'e' ' · - ' , ' ' ' · ' · - ' ' ' A ') • • 7rapEI'v WV OVOaV avnp fJ/T]Tp07r01'vW L.J..Wpl8 ryap 1] fL1]T1Jp aU'roV TO ryEVo<:; 1]V OK,Pl8 • See also Plut. Vlt. Djon 3.3. 279 See Arist. F54 7 Rose. 28 ° For further discussion, see Van Compernolle 1976: 339-40, 342-43, and 34 7. 281 Timaeus, however, puts forward this more honorable story of the colonization of Locri, by supposing that the colonists were free men rather than slaves. The account of Timaeus conoerning the oolonization is found in Polyb. 12.5-6. In order to support his claim, Timaeus mentions that the inhabitants of Locri showed him an inscription of the treaty ('roVe; OE 1rpiinov 0Ev E7rllJELKvVEw aVTip avv81}K,ac; Ertpd7rTovc;) that he saw in the fourth century BC, as well as testimony from Echecrates, whose father was an ambassador of Dionysius I. For mention of the inscription, see Polyb. 12.9.3. For the testimony of Echekrates, see Polyb. 12.10.7 -9. See also Van Compernolle 1976:340-41, DeSanctis 1958: 54-64, and Chaniotis 1988: 244. 282 Polybius (12.10.6) was not impressed with these claims of the Locrians and noted that Timaeus omitted many facts about his sources and therefore consciously told a complete falsehood ( 6 OE 7rdvra TaLrra 7rapa"'J\,E"'J\,ot-7rW'; Oij"'J\,6'; Eun uvvEt-OW'; aVTip KaT a 7rp68Euw E'}rEVUfLEvcp ). Polybius uses as proof in 12.5.6-8 slave genealogy laws of inheritanoe through the mother's side, since the women of the first Locri were the lawful inhabitants of that city. He also argues in 12.6 that these slaves pretended to be descendants, by accustoming themselves over time to the role of lawful inhabitants. 89 Dionysius II after he arrived at Locri is not known exactly. 283 Did he attempt to live as a citizen among the Locrians or to take over as tyrant? One narrative notes that Dionysius was accepted at first by the Locrians, although this description would suggest that the Locrians did not expect Dionysius to rule over them but to act as a private citizen. 284 From the literary and epigraphic evidence, 285 Dionysius likely did not hold power at Locri at first, although, having been driven away from his previous seat of power in disgrace, Dionysius would have desired some semblance of . 286 Af h . d L . h r h b h . f prest1ge. ter e arnve at ocn, t erewre, e egan anot er campmgn o outrageous behavior against their community, after he seized the citadel of the town as if he were the rightful leader and ruled over Locri for six years. 287 283 A full list of sources of the exile of Dionysius II, as well as a brief summary, is provided by D'Angelo 2002: 179-83 and 2001: 19-24. 284 Ghezzi 2004: 340-41 discusses the different threads regarding the role of Dionysius II at Locri. Plut. Vlt. Tjm. 1.4 argues that the tyrant followed the laws of Locri as a lowly exile, but the remaining sources discussed below argue that he attempted to be tyrant. 285 Just. Epjt. 21.2.9 ( exul a Locrensjbus sodjs accept us). The question of Locri's government at this time is questionable. Thirty-nine tablets found at Locri do mention Ev T(w uvvrtJ.,vEWfL (3am.:> .. ki, but this position does not seem to be a king as such. For the definitive version of the inscriptions, see Costabile 1992. Even if, as some suggest, this position was not a Locrian but a foreign leader tied to the Locrians through a syntefeja with some type of military function (as noted, for example, in Van Compernolle 1987: 103-4 and 109, along with D'Angelo 2001: 12- 13), the dating of the archive would suggest Agathocles, or more likely, Pyrrhus. For general dating discussion, see de Franciscis 1961: 28-30, who notes that the tablets suggest a more democratic government. D'Angelo 2001: 17-18 suggests that perhaps the democracy and tyranny could have worked together, with comparanda in Diad. Sic. 14.45.2 and 15.74.5 (the coexistence of an assembly and tyranny). 286 See Meloni 1951: 158-161. 287 Just. Epjt. 21.2.9 (velut jure regnaret, arcem occupant sojjtamque sjbj sae0tjam exercet) and 21.3.9 (per annos sex regnasset) respectively. It seems that Dionysius II may have stopped off at Rhegium for up to four years before ruling over the Locrians, but nothing substantial of this period is mentioned in the sources. 90 Amongst the sources which discussed this exile in Locri, two groups have formed. The more sympathetic group focuses on Dionysius as the alast6r of the Locrians, the conquering leader of a wide empire, as well as on the fate of the tyrant's family and children under the cruel Locrians, whose eventual murder at the hands of the Locrians is referred to as anosjon. 288 In the narratives of the more judgmental group, Dionysius is shown raping, pillaging, and murdering, actions that juxtapose the righteousness of the local Locrians with the all-conquering exiled tyrant. 289 Justin depicts this depravity in two episodes, the first occurring after Dionysius took rule of the citadel, when he seized and violated the wives of the leading men, polluted the virgins of the town, banished or murdered the leading men, and confiscated their property (Just. Epjt. 21.2.9-10) Exul a Locrensjbus sodjs acceptus, uelut jure regnaret, arcem occupat so}jtamque sjbj saeujtjam exercet. Gonjuges prjndpum ad stuprum rapj jubebat, ujrgjnes ante nuptjas abducebat stupratasque prods reddebat, locupletjssjmos quosque aut dujtate pellebat aut ocddj jmperabat bonaque eorum jnuadebat. Being received, in his exile, by his allies the Locrians, he took possession of the citadel as if he were their rightful sovereign, and exercised his usual outrages upon them. He ordered the wives of the principal men to be seized and violated. He took away maidens on the point of marriage, polluted them, and then restored them to their 288 For the reference to aJast8r, see Ath. 12.54lc. For the reference to the Locrians as dv6awv, see Ath. 12.541e. See also D'Angelo 2002: 183-85. 289 Clearchus (as represented in Athenaeus), Aelian, and Strabo form the former group, but Justin (who follows Theopompus more closely) is firmly in the latter. See D'Angelo 2002: 179-83. 91 betrothed husbands. As for the wealthiest men, he either banished them or put them to death, and confiscated their property. The confiscation of property would have enriched the tyrant and would have allowed him to procure extra goods and mercenaries. The murder or banishment of the leading citizens would have lessened the threat of internal political competition. As with his father, he also may have seen an opportunity to exploit class conflict, by pleasing the demos through the defeat of the oligarchy. 290 Regarding his treatment of the women, the idea of the tyrant breaking up the citizen body with forced marriages, thereby debasing the citizen body, is a tapas of the tyrant found in various other narratives. 291 As a tapas, it may be that Justin exaggerates this event in Locri, but such exploits were not impossible, especially when such actions are undertaken for political or military purposes. In any case, as told, this episode demonstrates that the tyrant did not lose his tyrannical traits when he steps beyond the boundaries of his city, but that these traits were magnified. His desire for power (or his allegiance) was not tied to one city, but he sought to establish his tyranny wherever he could. In a second episode narrated by Justin, when the Locrians were losing ground to the neighboring Lucanians, Dionysius II apparently advised them to send all of their wives and daughters to the temple of Aphrodite and to choose from among them one hundred to appease the goddess through sacred prostitution. This suggestion of the tyrant, however, was merely a ruse for rape and pillage, since he 290 See also the pretense of an assembly ( cantjanem) called by Dionysius in Just. Epjt. 21.3.3. 291 Such an action is reminiscent of the original tale of the founding of Locri Epizephyrii, with the violation of the wives of the citizen males by slaves. For this tapas, see Schmitt-Pantell979: 227-29. 92 then went into the temple, stole the jewelry and clothing of the women, and tortured some of them to discover the wealth of their husbands (Just. Epjt. 21.3.6-8). Probata consiljo, quo et superstjtjonj et pudjdtjae wrgmum consulebatur, certatjm omnes femjnae jnpensjus exornatae jn templum Venerjs conuenjunt, quas omnes Djonysjus jnmjssjs mj]jtjbus spo}jat ornamentaque matronarum jn praedam suam uertjt. Quarundam ujros djtjores jnterfidt, quasdam ad prodendas ujrorum pecunjas torquet. This proposal, by which regard was shown both to their superstitious observances and to the honor of their virgins, being received with approbation, all of the women, in most expensive dresses, assembled in the temple of Venus. Dionysius, sending in his soldiers, took off their finery, and made the ornaments of the matrons a spoil for himself. The husbands of some of them too, who were of the wealthier class, he put to death. Others he tortured to make them discover their husbands' wealth. Although certain parts of this story seem historically suspect, 292 these passages reflect the moralizing tradition concerning Dionysius the Younger, which focused on his barbaric hubrjs and greed. Furthermore, the sexual perversions of Dionysius II represented in these narratives appear elsewhere, narratives that told how he would sleep with betrothed women before their marriage and how he would force young Locrian maidens to dance naked. 293 Such texts emphasize the innocence of the 292 Earlier in the chapter, while discussing the relationship between the Locrians, Justin wrongly mentions Leophron as tyrant of Rhegium. Furthermore, there is no historical or archaeological evidence to suggest that sacred prostitution was a common practice of the Locrians at this time. See also Van Compernolle 1976: 370-73 and 375-77. 293 Ath. 12.54ld (5'; ryE 7rpoey&p.EL 0Ev 7rapEUil2vv El'; TO OwfLchwv TGs VVfLo/O(I'ro"'l\,7]8ELaa'; ... \ ~\ \ ' I e' > I > I"\ e ' ' ) D f th uvvaryarywv oE Ta'> wpawc; 1rap EVovc; ... ICaiCEwac; EK£1'vEVUE 1JPEVEW ryvfLvac; . ror ur er 93 Locrian citizens and demonstrate that, even separated from his citizens, the exiled Dionysius still was unable to act in a lawful manner. This behavior of the tyrant resulted not only in his rejection but also the rejection of his family. After Dionysius II, having ruled over the Locrians for six years, left for Syracuse, 294 the Locrians seized the wife and children of the tyrant. Although Dionysius, with the help of the Tarantines, tried to release his family (both by ransom and by force), the Locrians would have their revenge on the tyrant, by murdering them and throwing them into the sea after terrible suffering. 295 The Locrians first returned the favor to Dionysius for the violation of their married women and maidens that occurred in the temple of Aphrodite, by blotting out the existence of the tyrant's family. 296 Even if the calling down of curses and the cannibalism of the Locrians do not speak well about their own behavior, it appears that their action was a reaction to the impiety of Dionysius and his own barbaric behavior. Thus, the exile of Dionysius II in Locri confirms his status as one who ultimately was not accepted the city of his exile. Furthermore, we see that the family of the tyrant loses their lives due to his loss of humanity while in exile, a loss of humanity that will be described further in the next section. discussion of the moralizing tradition of Dionysius, see Ghezzi 2004: 341-46. 294 Dionysius II either decided on his own terms to regain control of Syracuse or was forced out by an angry populace and oligarchy.For the reasons of Dionysius's departure, see Meloni 1951: 163-66. 295 For the main narrative of their death, see Ath. 12.541d-e. Plut. Prae. ger. rejp. 821d, Plut. Vlt. Tjm. 13.5, Strabo 6.1.8, and Ael. VH 9.8 all discuss the deaths of Dionysius's wife and children. For general discussion of these events, see Ghezzi 2004: 357-60. 296 One of Dionysius II's sons, however, had escaped with him to Syracuse. 94 B. The second exile of Dionysius the Younger: Corinth After his ten years in exile and the death of his uncle Dian, Dionysius II seized power again in Syracuse, 297 by hiring mercenaries and driving out the then-tyrant Nisaeus. 298 Although he was able to hold power, at least tenuously, for several years, he would not be able to live out the end of his life as tyrant, just as his father had. The Syracusans, having grown tired of the constant changes in leadership amongst the tyrants, 299 sent ambassadors to Corinth to ask for their help. 300 To rectify the situation, the Corinthians sent Timoleon, who arrived with a fleet in 344 and defeated Dionysius II. The tyrant was sent first to the Corinthian garrison at Catane 301 and then to Corinth as an exile for the second time. 302 Within this narrative, several common themes appear, including the hostile relationship between 297 The dating of these events is a bit murky in the souroes, Nep. Tjm. 2.1 states that Dionysius II became master of Syracuse after Dian had been killed (jnterjm Djone Syracusjs jnterfedt Djonysjus rursus Syracusarum potjtus est), although it seems that Dionysius did not come back for another several years after the death of Dian. 298 Plut. llit. Tjm, 1.2 (LlwvVcnoc; ~TEL 0EK.dnp gEvov') uvvaryaryWv Ka'i TDv nhE Kpwrovvra Twv " , N - , " , , , ,, f3 , , ,, , e , , , " , -l L.VpaiCOOLWV VUaWV EsEI'vaUa'), aVEI'va ETa 7rparyfLWTa 7ral'vW ICaL ICa EUI'T1]1CEL TVpaVVO') Es apX1J'> . 299 Diad. Sic. 16.65.1 notes that the Syracusans were forced to be slaves under various tyrannies ('rvpavvLaL 7ro/-..,/-..,als Ka'i 7rOLIC[!-..,ws Oovt..,d-'EW rlvary~<,a~6fLEVOl). Plutarch Vit. Tjm, 1.1-2 states similarly that Syracuse was constantly changing tyrants (f) o€ 7r6ic" 6./cicov €f 6./cicov fLETa(3df.)\nvaa uvvEXW'> ·nJpavvov) and was overrun by barbarians, who gladly tolerated such frequent changes of government (pq-Olwr;; 7rpoaLEfJivwv TG.s flETa(3ot.2tr;; TOw OvvauTEliVv). 300 This city was chosen both due to kinship (oLa T~v rmcycycvEtav) and because they were considered lovers of freedom and haters of tyrants ( o/l)\£"'J\,dJ8Epov ICa'i fLWOTVpavvov), as noted in Plutarch Vlt. Tjm. 2.1. See also Diad. Sic. 16.65.1-2. Note, however, that the text of Plutarch also discusses the intervention of Corinth not only due to tyranny but also to the problems suffered by the Sicilians under the threat of the Carthaginians. 301 Diad. Sic. 16.70.1. 302 For the passages, see Diad. Sic. 16.70, Plut. Vlt. Tjm. 14, and Nep. Tjm. 2. Westlake 1952: 27- 28 also provides a brief summary. 95 Timoleon and tyrants 303 and the status of Corinth as an excellent location to exile tyrants. 304 Timoleon sent Dionysius II into exile to Corinth, so that the Corinthians would have proof of his victory over tyranny. On his part, Dionysius also would serve as an example of the sad life of a tyrant. 305 It certainly seems the more political and less psychological argument seems more likely, 306 but the psychological treatment of Dionysius II also fits well with the status of the tyrant as social outsider. Three sources (Diodorus Siculus, Plutarch, and Cornelius Nepos) each describe the exile of Dionysius II, although each represents the tyrant in a different 303 Regarding Timoleon and his relationship with tyrants, Dionysius II was one of a series of tyrants (although the most powerful and famous) whom Timoleon deposed and sent into exile. Plut. Vlt. Tjm. 24.1 notes that Timoleon determined to set other Sicilian cities free and to root out all tyrannies from the island ((3ovA,6fLEVor;; 6 Ti.p .. ot.,Ewv Ka'i TG.s (f)l..).,"ar;; 7r6"'A£l8 tA£v8EpWuaL Ka'i 7ravcrd7raaLv EKKCnjraL Tijr;; "'i.ucE/-..,[ar;; TG.s Tvpavv[Qar;;). Nicodemus of Centuripe and Apolloniades of Agyrium were ousted as tyrants of their cities (Diad. Sic. 16.82.4). Furthermore, the main adversary of Dionysius II for control of Syracuse, Hicetas, was eventually compelled to go into exile as a private person at Leontini ((3wTEVuEw lOufYT1JV Ev AwvcrLvols). See Plutarch Vit. Tjm, 24.1, which also notes that Leptines was sent off to Corinth. Diad. Sic. 16.82.4 notes, however, that Hi aetas eventually became a rabble-rouser again and was put to death by Timoleon. 304 After his defeat at the hands of the Sicilian cities in 450 BC, the leader of the Sicel revolt, Ducetius, was exiled for life to Corinth by the assembly of the Syracusans, who also provided for his support ('rOv b.ovKEnov EgE7rEfL'}rav Elr;; T1}v K6pw8ov, Ka'i EvcraV8a 7rpo(rrdgavTEr;; 1caTaf3wVv T1]V L1Cav1}v aVTip xop1ryLav uvva'lfE(PTEL/-..,av), as stated by Diod. Sic. 11.92.4. It appears, however, the Duoetius would return from Corinth to Sicily to found his own oolony at Kale Akte, in the area of Messina, either in 446 BC or 440 BC. See, for example, Diad. Sic. 12.29. Leptines, tyrant of Apollonia and Engyum during the time of Timoleon, also was sent off to Corinth. 305 Diodorus notes that Timoleon wanted to give tangible evidence of his program against the tyrants (EvOELK,VVfLEVor;; Tols ''Ef,.),._,1JUL TG.s TOw ~<,aTa7ro"')....,EfL1]8EvTwv Tvpdvvwv EK,7rTWo-Et-r;;). On the other hand, Plutarch suggests that Timoleon wished to have the Sicilian tyrants in his own city, so that the citizens could observe them living the pathetic life of an exile (mlcov fryovfLEVo' Ev Tfj fL1JTpo7r6"')....,EL ToUr;; Tijr;; "'i.t-K,E"')....,fn.s Tvpdvvovr;; V1rO TOw 'E"')....,"')....,1}vwv d7ro8EwpEW-8at- cpvryaOt-K,Wr;; ~<,a'i Ta'lfEww' l;wvw,). See Diad. Sic. 16.72.5 and Plut. Vlt. Tjm. 24.2 respectively. 306 For further discussion, see Westlake 1952: 38-39. 96 light and shows how biases of historiographers distort history. Nepos is the most kind to the tyrant, since he writes that Timoleon sent Dionysius II to Corinth safely due to the Dionysii's former support of the Corinthians and due to Timoleon's desire to remember their kindness. 307 Nepos notes that Timoleon showed clemency to make his victory more noble and to show from what great heights Dionysius II had fallen, 308 while Dionysius II was portrayed positively as an ally of the Corinthians. This story, however, seems a bit strange, for if Dionysius was such a kind ally to the Corinthians, why would Timoleon see him as a threat who needed to be shipped off to Greece? Plutarch and Diodorus, on the other hand, focus on the change of Dionysius the Younger's fortunes in a more negative fashion. The former notes that the tyrant left for Corinth as a private person in humble garb, a scene of wretchedness juxtaposed with the greatest of all tyrannies in which he was born and raised. 309 The latter presents the exile in a much harsher light, by noting that he lost a tyranny formerly considered as bound in steel through his cowardice and wretchedness. 310 Even when all sources agree that he was not left to suffer the vengeance of his citizens and that he was allowed to leave with some personal possessions, 311 each of 307 Nep. Tjm. 2.1-2 (tutoque ut Corjnthum pervenjret effect, quod utrorumque Djonysjorum opjbus Corjnthjj saepe adjutj fuerant; cujus benjgnjtatjs memorja volebat exstare). 308 Nep. Tjm. 2 ( eamque praeclaram vjctorjam ducebat ... quem ex quanta regno ad quam fortunam detujjsset). 309 PI t TT"t m· 13 4 ( ' - " ' ' ' , "-e ' e ' ' ' "' ' , U , V 1 , 11m. , TOTE 7rpUYTOV WUJJ'T1}'; ICaL Ta'lrEWO'; O't' El8 ... ryEVV1] El8 fLEV ICaL Tpa't'El8 EV Tvpavv[QL Tfj 1rauWv E7rt-¢avEuT&/rv Ka'i fLeyL(rrv). 310 Diod. Sic. 16.70.2 (OL' dvavOpLav KaL Ta7rEw6nrra '}rvxiJc; n}v TE 7rEplf3Cnrrov Tvpavv£0a KaL 0E0EfLEV1]V, We; ~¢auav, aoaf.Lavn). 311 See also Westlake 1952:27-28. 97 the sources presents the exile of Dionysius II in a pathetic light as loss of prestige and rna terial wealth. The life in exile of Dionysius II at Corinth also provides an opportunity for ancient authors to moralize the downfall of the tyrant, 312 by providing either sympathetic or disparaging reaction to the metabole and the tyche of Dionysius II. 313 The image provided by Plutarch was the most sympathetic to the tyrant, by showing his suffering with some degree of nobility and with some redeeming personality traits. 314 When Dionysius II arrived in Corinth, he became a great curiosity to the citizens, some of whom sympathized with him due to his reversal of fortune. 315 Dionysius II was represented as enlightened, 316 but he was still reviled by some. 317 In addition, he did not show complete rehabilitation from his former ways, since he loitered about the town, got drunk, argued with prostitutes, and made a living as a 312 For general discussion of the tyrant's time at Corinth, see Porph. Pyth. 59 and lamb!. VP 233. Val. Max. 6.9 discusses the change in Dionysius's fortune in comparison with other Greek and Roman leaders. See also Di Fede 1949: 143-46. 313 For further discussion, see Orsi 1994: 55-57. 314 Masse 2006: 193-94. 315 Plut. Vlt. Tjm, 14.1 ( oi TE npO'; T7}v fLE'raf3ol\,7}v TpeTr6fLEVOL KaL UVfL7ra8oVvTE'; ). 316 Plut. VIt. Tjm, 15.2 (iJ7r0 IT!-vdnvvo<; dxpEt.,i]a-8aL, TVX1J<; p_eraf3ot.3w oiJnv cpEpovTE'>)· He also is depicted as having a sense of humor when others were insulting him, as seen in the episode with the man who shook out his robe after meeting Dionysius in Plut. Vlt. Tjm. 15.3. He is portrayed as a joker (cpVaH p~8VfLOV fwra Ka'i cfxl\,aK.6t..,arprov), who acted in such a manner to amuse himself ( 7rot..,A3w ri{3EI\,TEpLav E7rl})ELK,VVfLEVOV Ev Tip oxot.,d~Ew)' as noted in Plut. VIt. Tjm, 14.3. 317 Upon meeting the tyrant, Diogenes of Sinope finds the presence of Dionysius amongst his friends as detestable and calls Dionysius a slave ('rowLnov dv0pd7ro0ov C/Jv), as described in Plut. Vlt. Tjm. 15.5. 98 mus1c teacher to song girls. 318 Other authors focused on his exile in Corinth as a punishment for his earlier behavior, rather than a mere change in fortune. While remaining rather laconic on this part of Dionysius II's life, Diodorus mentioned that he was punished for his braggart behavior. 319 Aelian also presented this exile as a recompense for Dionysius's behavior, by comparing his former riches and power to his later life as a fool in the barber shops of Corinth, where he lived in penury and suffered a horrible end. 320 Justin shows the depths of this recompense, by detailing his degradation into the very lowest condition of life, since he walks about in rags and covered in dirt. 321 This passage also notes that Dionysius acted this way because he believed that, by being laughed at and by being a subject of scorn rather than fear, he would be safe. 322 In this way, Dionysius actually hid his tyrannical tendencies, rather than attempting to reform them. Of course, it is difficult to know what to believe in these stories, smce this information 1s unable to be verified m any historical way. One sees here a I > \ ~ "\ I \ ~ "\ y1 > I ~ >A,' r! > y I K£1CpafLEVOV a7rO 'TWV IW7r1}f'vEUJ)V IWL UW'lrl'v1}1C'TL~::,OfLEVOV EV fJBICfJ T0/8 a't' wpa'; EpryasOfLEVOl8 ryvvaLo1s, TG.s OE fLOVOovpryoV'; Ev Tals cfJOals 0~.15dmwvra, Ka'i 7rEp'i 8EaTp/..K,Wv Cfap.ivrwv EpL~Ew u7rov0d~ovra npO'; EK£Lva'; KaL 7rEpL fLE"'J\,ov'; rlpfLov[a'; ). Ael. VH9.8 notes that Dionysius became a priest of Cybele who played the drums. 319 Diodorus only mentions that the tyrant spent the rest of his life in poverty (mTE(3iwuEv a7ropoVf1£VO' EV Kopiver) in 16. 70.2, although he does qualify this as the punishment described above ( 7rapd0EII'ffLa TOL') K,avxwpivols acpp6vw') E7r'i Tals ElnvxLw.s). 320 A I VH6 12 (' e~ e '' ' ~ ' ' ' ~ ' ' ' ' ' (3' e . . anmca 1]0" aL UE EV T0/8 ICOVpEWl8 ICaL ryEI'vW'T07rOl£W ... EV 'lrEVLCf fLVpllf owrywv ... WV Owvr A.iVv dA,ryE wlnwrov). 321 Just. Epjt. 21.5.2-7 (jn sordjdjssjmum ujtae genus descendjt ... pannosus et squahdus jncedere). 322 Just. Epjt. 21.5 (jbj humjfhma quaeque tutjssjma exjstjmans ... rjsum hbentjus praebere quam captare ... omnjaque jsta facere; ut contemnendus magjs quam metuendus ujderetur). 99 fundamental change in image, from a former leader of Syracuse to an object of scorn. Furthermore, in Corinth, he reflected the fictional depiction of his father as the Cyclops, who behaved primitively with no real social relations. In a way, he has lost all meaningful interaction and only lived in the sense of existing biologically, not within any community. Within these narratives, as the tyrant continues to lose his humanity in exile, an interesting question of agency appears. Does such behavior by the tyrant mean that his identification and actions as an outsider are universal regardless of whether he is inside or outside of his city? Perhaps his removal from his city means that his inherent outsider-ness is amplified. When sources speak of the change in fortune for Dionysius II, they focus on a loss of material goods and political power, not a change in his image. Exile indeed seems not to change the tyrant but to encourage him in his tyrannical ways, as the natural challenges and opposition to tyranny often were not present beyond the gates of the city. The two periods of exile in the life of Agathocles will provide a perfect example. C. The pre-tyrannical life of Agathocles: Agathocles in exile If the life of Agathocles had followed a more stable trajectory after becoming a citizen, the future tyrant would have settled down in Syracuse. The status of him and his father as artisans (a most mobile profession), however, would be a defining characteristic in his early life and even during his time as tyrant. Such pride in his profession would be used against him, such as when besieging his own city of Syracuse, Agathocles was denigrated by his fellow citizens, who apparently addressed him as 'potter' (di Kepap..eD). 323 Although authors favorable to Agathocles use his 323 Diad. Sic. 20.63.5 and Plut. Reg. et jmp. apophth. 176e. 100 former career as an artisan to show how miraculous Agathocles' transformation into tyrant of Syracuse was, 324 other authors in the ancient world viewed such a profession negatively, by noting that artisans could not exercise political rights or be full citizens. 325 Having arrived at Syracuse as a youth, Agathocles did not follow the profession of a 'good citizen' (e.g. farming) but rather clung to his mobile roots. Agathocles displayed a dual identity after he became tyrant, 326 and his former status appeared suspect especially in times of crisis, when his leadership skills were 327 attacked. Agathocles was not content to remain a potter, and the next years of his life saw him become a mercenary, during which time he bounced back and forth between cities on Sicily and the mainland of Italy. 328 Although accounts of various authors differ, it seems that Agathocles had impressed Damas, a wealthy Syracusan who 324 Most notably in Polyb. 12.15.6-7, the historian notes that Agathocles must have had some great and admirable qualities (jLErya n ryeyovEvaL XP'iJfLa Ka'i 8av0duwv) in order to become a leader from humble beginnings. Polyb. 15.35 echoes this focus on the transformation of Agathocles. See also Consolo Lang her 1990a: 137-38 and 141, as well as 1990b: 51-52. 325 The most famous example is Arist. Pol. 3.1277b, which provides this description of the banausoj. For further discussion of the status of the artisan in this context, see Vilatte 1995: 115-16. 326 Likewise, Athenaeus recounts how Agathocles would show off golden vessels to his friends as a reminder of his know-how in such matters (7rEp'i 'lrTropf.as 'Arya8o~<,t.,Ea cjnw'i TDv TVpavvov €1C7rWfLWTa xpvaii E7rWEucvLwra TOL'; ETaLpolS cpdaK£W, Eg Jw E1CEp&p .. EVUE IW'TEUICEVaiCEvaL TaLna). See Ath. 11.466a-b (~ FGrH183 F2) and Cavallaro 1971:35-36 and 39-41. 327 Simonetti Agostinetti 2008: 157-59 discusses this tension between Agathocles as leader and Agathocles as potter and notes that issues of status arose when he struggled to quell a revolt in Africa and to pay his soldiers. For example, Diad. Sic. 20.34.5 describes how Agathocles eschewed royal garb in fran of his soldiers. Diad. Sic. 20.63.4 notes his pride in his former life as a potter, as it showed his true ambition and drive to go from a most lowly position to the highest. 328 For a general description, see McKechnie 1989:43-44. 101 helped Agathocles as he worked his way through the ranks of the military and who eventually provided him with the position of chiliarch. 329 Although he would go on to marry the widow of Damas, he soon would leave Syracuse and begin his life on the move. After taking part in a campaign with the Italian city of Croton in 317 BC, 330 he was driven out and forced to take refuge in Tarentum, where he would enroll in their mercenary core. 331 After being suspected of fomenting revolution there, he gathered other exiles together and went to Rhegium. 332 Thus, in rapid succession, within the space of a few lines of historical narrative, Agathocles moved from Croton to Tarentum, then to Rhegium, and finally back to Syracuse. 333 Although this narrative may have been exaggerated by a source hostile to Agathocles, the life of a mercenary, even one in charge of many troops, was a highly mobile existence, as he traveled from city to city in search of a paycheck. We see here not only frequent movement but rejection and expulsion by the inhabitants of Tarentum, an act which highlights his inability to integrate into a community. In addition, his mobility during this period is reflected in his cohorts, with whom he went to Rhegium: other exiles and outcasts who were not wanted. 329 Diad. Sic. 19.3.1 notes that Damas had fallen in love with Agathocles and had provided him with everything he needed (including property). Note that Just. Epjt. 22.1.12 refers to Damas as Damascon. 330 Diad. Sic. 19.3.4 notes the participation of Agathocles on behalf of Croton. m D. d s· 19 4 1 c , f3' e ' ~ K ~ ,, • ' '"' ' • lO . lC. . . K,a'Tal\,afL, aVEU aL 'T1]V 'TWV poHJJVLa'TWV 'ffQ{\,W E7rLXElp7]Ua'; EsE'lfEUE ICaL fLE'T Qt.,[rywv El'; TdpavTa 0i£u-W81J. Tax8Els OE 1rapa TaL'; TapavrLvot.s Ev Tfj TWv fLW-8o¢6pwv TdgEl). 332 D. d s· 19 4 3 c · · ,,,, "'e ~ ' ' · ' e' ' ' ~ ' lO . lC. . . El8 V'lfO 'f WV 1}1'v E ICaWO'TOfLEW. UW7rEp a'ffO{\,V El8 ICaL TaVT1}') 'T1]'; OTpaTEW8 'e , , , 'I , , ..+, , "' , 'P , , , '(3 'e l UVV1] powE TOV') ICa'Ta 'T1]V Tal'vWV 't'Wfaoac; IWL 1]ryWOl8 7fQ{\,EfLOVfLEVOl8 ... E 01] 1]UEV . 333 For a brief discussion of his time abroad in Italy, see Vattuone 2005b: 297 ~98. 102 Although Agathocles is portrayed as a brilliant soldier with superhuman skills, 334 but he alternately is described as a common soldier who was engaged in piracy against the Syracusans. 335 In addition, Agathocles appears as a renegade, unacceptable to the political establishment of Syracuse at that time, for which reason he became a mercenary. For example, the narrative of his early career also identifies him as a political exile. Syracuse had become an oligarchy, 336 to which Agathocles was linked through his marriage with the widow of Damas. 337 Agathocles soon would find himself at odds with two of its most influential men, Heracleides and So stratus. Due to their influence, Agathocles was forced to remain in Italy after his first 334 Examples include his ability to wear great amounts of armor, his daring in the field in his battles with Croton, and his later escape from Acestoridas, whose context will be discussed below on page 105. See also Consolo Lang her 1976:388-394. 335 Just. Epjt. 22.1.7 (gregarjam mjfjtjam sortjtus) and 22.1.14 (pjratjcam adversus patrjam exercujt) respectively. Note that Justin oompletely passes over Agathocles' exploits in Italy. For further discussion of this omission, see Galli 1982: 157-158. Justin also differs from Diodorus (who notes that Agathocles married into money), when he states in 22.1.6 that he had little property to lose (nee jn fortunjs quod amjtteret) and in 22.1.14 that he was suddenly made rich (ex jnope repente djves factus esset). 336 After the political reforms of Timoleon in 338, an oligarchic council of 600 men was to lead the city (although whether it was a constitutional Senate or an ad hoc group of leaders is up for debate). For general discussion, see Rizzo 1968-1969: 379-82. This more elite group, whose presence in Syracuse had been suggested several decades before by Plato, as noted in Ep. 7.337b-c (50 of the best citizens) and 8.356c (35 nomophylakes). Such a system was the ideal state of political expression in the eyes of Timaeus. See Consolo Langher 1990a: 170-73 for Timaeus's hatred of monarchical and tyrannical rule in both Sicily and pro-Maoedonian Athens and for his dislike of philo-Macedonians, such as Aristotle and Theophrastus. 337 For the evolution in the fourth century BC of elites and their vocabulary, especially in regards to Aristomache and the widow of Damas, see Collin-Bouffier 2010: 293-97. 103 campaign in Croton and to ply his trade as a mercenary, and he only returned to Syracuse after the expulsion of this faction. 338 Upon return from his first exile, Agathocles attempted to quell the city's fears by asserting himself politically in Syracuse in a new way, since his years of exile as a mercenary for other cities eroded his identity as a Syracusan and perhaps had taken away some of his political rights. 339 Agathocles' tactic, namely taking the side of the democracy against the recently exiled party of the oligarchy, allowed Agathocles to become a tyran popuJajre, who seemingly saved the demos from the continued advances of the oligarchy. 340 Aiding him in his fight against the oligarchy was the decision of the oligarchic exiles to seek aid from the Carthaginians, 341 through which action Agathocles could again revive anti-Carthaginian sentiment as a means to gain and to maintain power, just as Dionysius I had done before him (as will be discussed further in the following chapter). Agathocles' attempt to win over the crowd with his 'democratic' ways, however, was put to an end by Acestoridas, a Corinthian general who had been elected general at Syracuse. After Agathocles made an attempt to become tyrant for the first time, he was expelled from the city by 338 Diod. Sic. 19.4.3 (brEura Tij'; Ev "i.vpaKoVuuat.s OvvaOTELa'; ICaTa""A.,v8ELu1]'; Ka'i Twv 7rEp'i TDv "i.WmpaTov ¢vry6vcrwv ICaTij"'ABEV El'; T7JV 7racrpLOa). 339 For the loss of community and rights by exiles, see Montiglio 2005: 35-37. 34 ° For the account of Agathocles' battle against the troops of Sostratus and the exiled oligarchy, see Diad. Sic. 19.4.3-7. For the attempts of Agathocles to be seen as a champion of the common man and a tyran popufajre, see Masse 1969: 169-70 and 175-77, along with Consolo Langher 1976:404-6. 341 Diod. Sic. 19.4.3 (u-VfLfHLXOJJvnvv OE TWv Kapx1JOovLwv TOL'> 7rEpL TDv "i.dxrrpaTov cpvryduw). Relations between the Syracusans and Carthaginians, however, may have improved at this time. For a brief discussion of Carthaginian-Greek relations in the later fourth century BC, see Anello 1990: 212. 104 the general and narrowly escaped with his life. 342 Ironically, the Corinthian Acestoridas was brought in to protect the Syracusans from the political advances of the Syracusan Agathocles, 343 an event that demonstrated how the pojjs needed to seek outside help to save itself from its own leader, before Agathocles could deprive the pojjs of its rights and enslave his citizens. 344 Since the tyrant often did not get support from inside the city through the broad base of the citizen body, he needed to k h . . . d . 345 attac t e c1t1zenry m or er to se1ze power. After being defeated, Agathocles then went into exile for a second time, an exile attested in both epigraphic and literary sources. 346 Agathocles may have also participated in piracy during this interlude of exile, 347 but he almost certainly went 342 Diod. Sic. 19.5.1-3 (OOga'> E7rt8Ea-8at- TvpavvLCn Cna T7JV u-VvEuw EgEcpvryE TDv KLvOvvov) and Justin 20.1.16. 343 For the figure of Aoestoridas, see Manni 1966: 148-51 and Vattuone 2005b: 304-5. Acestoridas also was brought in to deal with the Carthaginian threat, and the Syracusans did negotiate peace with them (Diad. Sic. 19.5.4). The inhabitants of Acragas likewise later would call in Acrotatus from Sparta to protect them from Agathocles (Diad. Sic. 19.70.1-71.1 ). 344 For an early example of a tyrant destroying his citizen body, see the example of the Corinthians Cypselus and Periander in Hdt. 5.92, with discussion in Gray 1996: 376-77. 345 For example, oertain members of the oligarchy and much of the demos originally accepted the rule of Dionysius I and supported him. See Sanders 1987: 23-24. 346 The Marmor Parium notes that Agathocles took leadership as strategos autokrator (nvL o' ainWL I ~TEL ToVTwL Ka'i 'Arya8o~<,l.,ijv "'i.vpa I IC6aLoL EL'A-ovro €7r'i TOw EpvfLd'T(JJV I TWv Ev "'i.u<£1-..,LaL ainoKpaTopa mpa I Trry6v) and then later as tyrant (ml 'AcyaeoKici], :Sv I paKovu I u[ w ]v cTVpavvwuEv). The first passage (B15) is dated to 319/8, during the rule of the archon Apollodorus, while the second passage (B17) is dated to 316/5, during the rule of the archon Demokleides. This document put the two periods into distinct focus. Diodorus mentions Agathocles as a strategos (Diad. Sic. 19.5.5), but he generally mixes the two periods together. See Jacoby 1904: 127-128. 347 Just. Epjt. 22.1.14-16 argues that Agathocles participated in piracy (pjratjcam aduersus patrjam exercujt), although this may stem from his zeal to portray Agathocles in a negative light. 105 to Morgantina, 348 where he took up residency and was giVen a position of leadership. 349 This proximity to Syracuse allowed him to gather new forces at his disposal, with which he could assault Syracuse once again. 350 While major accounts of the fall of Syracuse (those of Diodorus and Justin) differ significantly, 351 both paint the same relatively positive image of Carthage (i.e. who attempted to conciliate the Syracusans and Agathocles). For example, Hamilcar was the keeper of the peace in these negotiations, since he settled conflicts in 314 (between Agathocles, Messana, Acragas, and Gela) and then helped again in 311, when Agathocles was besieging Syracuse. 352 On the other hand, the image of Agathocles is wholly negative (i.e. the citizen who wars against his own city), since Agathocles was the destroyer of the peace between the Carthaginians and the Syracusans. 353 348 Diad. Sic. 19.6.2 states that he filled the ranks of his supporters from that city (mni!cEfEv El, 't ' ', M ' ) TasEl8 TOV') T EIC opryaVTW1]'> , 349 Just. Epjt. 22.2.1 (a Murgantjnjs, apud quos exulabat, odjo Syracusanorum prjmo praetor, max dux creatur). 35 ° Karlsson 1992: 17 notes how this time in the interior would prove to Agathocles how important military power was in other cities, since he would then place garrisons in Kephaloidion (Diad. Sic. 20.56.3), Centuripe (Diad. Sic. 19.109.3) in 312, Gela (Diad. Sic. 19.107.5) in 311, and Herbessus (Diad. Sic. 20.31.5) by 309. 351 For differences in the stories, see Pearson 1987: 234-36. Diodorus does not mention the Carthaginians as having a role during the siege (i.e. he says that they were used only for peace talks), while Justin focuses on the strong dependence on Hamilcar and Carthaginian troops during the attack (i.e. that Agathocles was in cahoots with them). For explication of the relationship between Hamilcar and Agathocles, see Polyaenus, Strat. 5.3. 7 and Just. Epjt. 22.2, as well as Dolce 1960: 156-61 and Magnetto 1997: 39-42. 352 For negotiations with Messana, Acragas, and Gela, see Diad. Sic. 19.65.5 and 19.71.6-7. Ager 1996:5 5-57 discusses the official role ofHamilcar in more detail. 353 Diad. Sic. 19.5.4 discusses the peace between the Carthaginians and Syracusans. Just. Epjt. 22.4 notes the oonciliation attempts between Agathocles and the Syracusans occurred with the help of Carthage. 106 Once agam, Agathocles became worse than a non-Greek. 354 Because the citizens requested the help of foreigners (who were normally seen as a threat to the interests of the pojjs) for protection from Agathocles, they declared through this that rule under the Carthaginians would be preferable to that of Agathocles. A barbarian state (e.g. Carthage) was at least a state which operated under a system of laws and treaties. Thus, the tyrant becomes not just an outsider to his own pojjs but even to civilization itself. In regard to Agathocles, this sentiment is captured best by Justin, who notes an ironic reversal of sides between the often-hostile Carthaginians and the supposedly Syracusan-loving Agathocles. Syracuse was defended by an enemy with the love of a citizen, while being attacked by a citizen with the hatred of an enemy (Just. Epjt. 22.2.2-4). In eo bello et urbem Leontjnorum capjt et patrjam suam Syracusas obsjdere coepjt, ad cujus auxjljum Hamil car, dux Poenorum, jnploratus deposjtjs hostjljbus odjjs praesjdja miljtum mjttjt. Ita uno eadem que tempore Syracusae et ab haste dujlj amore defensae et a due hostjlj odjo jnpugnatae sunt. He [ Agathocles J both took the city of the Leon tines, and proceeded to besiege his native city, Syracuse, after which Hamilcar, general of the Carthaginians, being entreated to aid it, laid aside his hatred as an enemy, and sent a body of troops thither. Thus, at one and the same time, Syracuse was both defended by an enemy with the love of a citizen, and attacked by a citizen with the hatred of an enemy. 354 As seen in the cases of other tyrants, they often participated in barbarian behavior or even asked for the help of barbarians. For example, before the arrival of Timoleon on the island in 344 BC, Hi aetas requested the help of the Carthaginians to grasp control of economic interests on the island. See Westlake 1949: 71-72 for further information. 107 A prime example of Agathocles' barbarity is found in the vow taken by Agathocles before his ultimate attack in front of the citizens of Syracuse and the Carthaginians, when the citizens of Syracuse forced Agathocles to swear in the temple of Demeter that he would do no harm to the democracy. 355 In an alternate account, when the Carthaginians were brokering a peace between the tyrant and the Syracusans, Agathocles swore a vow, pledging his loyalty to peace with the Carthaginians, perhaps also in the temple of Demeter. 356 Regardless of the account, both show the blasphemy of Agathocles, when he disregards the vow to Demeter, whose religious and ideological significance as the protectress of Syracuse 357 and its sovereignty is well attested in texts 358 and coinage. 359 Agathocles broke his promise to the 355 D·ds· 1954(' ·e ,e~ ·' ''' e· · '~,, ·' ·· lO . lC. . . E'lrEUI 1] IW'TEI'v EW El8 'T1]V 'lra'Tpwa IWL 7rapax El8 El8 TO 'T1]'; L.J..1}fJ/T]TpO'; LEpov V'lfO TOw 7ro/-..,urWv t'!JfLOUE fL1]0Ev Evavruv8fwaa-8at- Tfj CnJfLOICpaTLqt ). 356 Just. Epjt. 22.2.8 (tunc Hamjfcarj exposjtjs jnsjgnjbus Cererjs tactjsque jn obsequja Poenorum jurat). As regards the temple of Demeter, several editions of the text prefer cerejs to modify jgnjs, wax candles used in the swearing ceremony. Other editors prefer jgnjbus Cererjs, which focuses on the importance of the goddess in Syracuse, as well as another passage (in Juv. 14) that discusses the goddess and the act of touching, as in the passage of Justin. 357 See especially Diad. Sic. 14.63.1~2, where Himilcon's plunder of her temple caused a plague and the subsequent protection of the city from Carthaginian attack. 358 Various leaders used the cult of Demeter and Kore to further their political aims. The voyage of Timoleon to Sicily was said to have been acoompanied on the ship (named the 'Demeter and Kore') by a priestess of Demeter, while a vision of the goddess' torch during the expedition was declared as auspicious (Plut. Vlt. Tjm. 8.1~2 and Diad. Sic. 16.66.4~5). Agathocles himself would later sacrifioe to the two goddesses on the shores of Cape Bon at the outset of his African expedition in 310 in order to persuade his troops (Diad. Sic. 20.7.1). See White 1964: 266~68 for discussion of the goddess as propaganda. 359 For example, Caccamo Caltabiano 2010: 281~82 notes the silver tetradrachms minted at the time of Agathocles' expedition to Africa with the name AfAEJAKAEIO:SjAfAEJAKAEO:S and the image of Persephone with the legend KOPA. See also Chapter 2, pages 144~45 for the evolution of coinage under Agathocles. 108 Syracusans by attacking them and his promise to the Carthaginians, with whom he would go to war. 360 In this case, the Carthaginians appeared more pious, ready to hold their vow sacred, in order to maintain peace. Agathocles therefore was worse than those traditionally seen as the barbarian, since he trampled on the sovereignty of the Greek pojjs and on the sacredness of the gods for his personal power gain. This attack on sovereignty resulted in the subsequent destruction of Syracuse with the slaughter and exile of thousands of innocent citizens. 361 The question remaining from this chapter may be: "What are the negative ramifications for such a portrayal of the tyrant?" As noted at the very beginning of this chapter, such questions regarding the status of the tyrant that created problems for him and, as will be discussed in the next chapter, distrust that led to lack of support from the citizen body. This lack of support led to the necessity for the tyrant to rely on migrants (themselves social and political outsiders to Syracuse) for the majority of his rule. Was he able to convince the citizens at all that he was a capable ruler? How then was he even able to gain rule? As the next chapter will argue, these tyrants employed several different processes designed to move themselves to the center of the city, rather than to remain on the outskirts of the city socially and politically. 360 He also would attack other cities, including Messana in 315. For further discussion of the breaking of the vow, see Consolo Langher 1980:318-20. 361 Diad. Sic. 19.8.1 puts the number of those slain at 4,000, with another 6,000 exiled. 109 CHAPTER 2- MOVING IN, MOVING UP: THE HEGEMONY OF THE TYRANT AND HIS STATUS AS THE PROTECTOR OF THE POLIS Part I: The tyrant as the center of his city As discussed in the previous chapter, the representation of the Syracusan tyrant was complex and often changed position along the spectrum from Syracusan citizen to barbarian. Furthermore, while this shifting representation was partly a reflection of both contemporary and later authors, such concerns regarding the identity of the tyrant and his rightful place as ruler had political repercussions that threatened his sovereignty. As will be argued in this chapter, in order to combat such threats and to establish his rule, the tyrant used both ideological and political strategies, which often centered on migration. Within this chapter (as with the previous chapter), I will use the terms 'ideological' and 'political' quite frequently. While the qualifying terms may seem somewhat vague, I will attempt to explicate the difference, as pertains to this project. By 'ideological', I mean the figurative way in which both the tyrant and his citizens perceive his rule. Often, the tyrant and his subjects had competing ideologies concerning his proper rule. While I certainly cannot travel inside the mind of the tyrant, literary sources strongly suggest that the tyrant consciously wished to portray himself in a certain way and to create a certain ideology of legitimacy around him, as to convince his subjects of his credentials to rule. Thus, even this ideological vision of the tyrant was not merely symbolic. He did not merely wish to assuage the vanity of the tyrant but rather to protect his rule and to provide him with the permission to enlarge his empire. These ideological strategies served as the basis from which the tyrant could implement more tangible 110 political strategies, strategies which allowed the tyrant to transfer from a more symbolic agent (e.g. the protector of the people) to a historical agent (e.g. the sole holder of hegemony in Syracuse). For example, as we will see, Dionysius gained power by disparaging the Syracusan generals by saying that they did not have the interests of the citizens in mind. Dionysius thus was ideologically establishing himself as a proper citizen, in opposition to the evil generals (even though this ideological representation of the generals may have been historically inaccurate). By establishing this ideology, Dionysius could then continue with his political strategies, including the recall of exiles. Thus, the first part of this chapter will analyze the way in which the tyrant placed himself at the center of the pojjs and his growing empire ideologically, by identifying groups more 'outside' than himself. This 'centrification' of the tyrant allowed him to take on the role of ideal protector from these groups for the Syracusans. The second half of the chapter will detail a more concrete political strategy through which the tyrant successfully established his empire: forced transfers of population. Through these transfers, the tyrant radically changed the composition of many poJejs across city and undermined the former values of the city while asserting his own power. A. From Sicily to Persia: the identity of Dionysius's predecessor In order to understand the identity of Dionysius the Elder within the city, as he attempted to situate himself on the spectrum between other and Syracusan citizen, we must contextualize the political environment of Syracuse immediately before Dionysius came to power. From where did Dionysius the Elder come and how did he become a leader of the Syracusans? The first and sudden appearance of 111 Dionysius 362 in the history of Syracuse occurs in the narrative of the death of the Syracusan leader Hermocrates. When discussing the supporters ( <TVflinpanov're<;) of Hermocrates, Diodorus states that among their number was Dionysius, the future tyrant of Syracuse. 363 This Hermocrates, who also spent much of his life negotiating an ambiguous image between Syracusan and migrant, would serve as a model for the rule of Dionysius and the struggle between citizen and outsider. Hermocrates first made an appearance at the conference of Gela of 424, where he encouraged the Sicilians (:Zuceicu)j'Ca') to put aside all differences and to join together for the common cause of Sicily against the advances of Athens. 364 By asserting that the inhabitants of Sicily were neighbors dwelling on a single island surrounded by the sea and called by the same name (Thuc. 4.64.3-4). 365 X ' ~' - t - '~' t' ' " 't ' - a,~,Kwea 'TCVV s vr-r;evwv, 'TO oe s Vfl/Trav ryeurovar:; ov'Ta<:; Ka~ s vvoucov<:; fL~ar:; I \ I \ " <\ l I ~ l I \ \:\ xwpa<:; Ka~ 7rEp~ppV'TOV Ka~ OVOfLa EV KEKI\/TjfLEVOV') £ .. MCE11.UV'Ta') ••• 'TOV') OE 362 Few facts are known about the early life of Dionysius, only that he held a minor position in Syracuse as a cypap.p.a'rev<;. See Dem. Lept. 161, as well as Diad. Sic. 14.66.5 and Polyaenus, Strat. 5.2.2 (who states that Dionysius acted as scribe specifically to the generals of Syracuse). Diad. Sic. 13.96.4 states that Dionysius became a tyrant from his earlier life as a scribe and ordinary private citizen (EK rypafLfliLTEwr;; KaL TaLi Tvx6vcror;; lOuinov), i.e. one who had no political expenence. 363 For this episode, see Diod. Sic. 13.75.8-9 (dJv 1jv KaL b.wvVawr;; 6 0era TaLrra TWv "i.vpaKou-Lwv Tvpavv~ua<; ). Diodorus claims that Dionysius was wounded in the battle but was declared dead, so as not to suffer the wrath of the Syracusans. See also Chapter 4, pages 232-33. 364 The speech of Hermocrates is found in Thucydides 4.59-64. See also Thucydides 6.33 and 6.79. 365 See also Dominguez 2006: 322-23 and Harrison 2000: 86-88 for discussion for his definition of Sicilian. This statement is problematic, especially since the non-Greek Sicilians were also said to call themselves ~LKeicLwmL See Diad. Sic. 5.6.6 and Hall 2004: 49 and 121-23, where the latter notes that Sicilian consciousness was based not on common identity but geographical proximity. 112 , , , ,.+, ,, , •e , , e , , , ,, ,.+, ,.... , , e " al\d'vO't'VI>vOV') E7TEI'v OV'Ta') a poo~ a~e~, TJV CYW't'POVWf-LEV, afLVVOVfLE a, EUTrep , e· , , ro. , t , ~ , t , ~, Ka~ Ka EKa(PTOV') t-JI'va7r'TOfLEVO~ S VfL7raV'TE') KWOVVEVOf-LEV: S VfLf-LaX,OV') OE ,~, , , , , t' e '"''"' ,, , ovoe7ro'Te 'TO ,~,ourrov e7rasOfLE a ovoe o~a''""aK'Ta<::;. There is no disgrace in connections giVmg way to one another, a Dorian to a Dorian, or a Chalcidian to his brethren. Above and beyond this we are neighbors, live in the same country, are girt by the same sea, and go by the same name of Sicilians ... but the foreign invader, if we are wise, will always find us united against him, since the hurt of one is the danger of all. We shall never, in future, invite into the island either allies or mediators. Hermocrates not only created a common Sicilian identity among Greeks but also portrayed himself as a leader who united the poJejs of the island (as Dionysius I would later do with his empire). 366 In this instance, Hermocrates directed the creation of the definition of insider/outsider and asserted himself as a prime example of this Sicilian identity. Later, due to his opposition to the ruling government of Syracuse after the Sicilian Expedition, 367 he and his followers (known as phjJm) were accused of not 366 Cusumano 2009: 50-51 argues that Hermocrates refers specifically to the uniting of Dorian and Ionian cities, creating a pseudoethnicity and a suprapolitical entity. Malkin 2007: 183-84 argues that the Sicilians had multiple identities. For ethnic hierarchy under Dionysius, see also Chapter 5, pages 308-10. 367 Expressly a democracy during the last quarter of the fifth century, Syracuse swung even more toward extreme democracy after the reforms of Diodes in 412. Known mainly for oondemning the Athenian generals, Demosthenes and Nicias, to death (Diad. Sic. 13.19.4), Diodes had placed Syracuse under a democracy from 412 to 408, between the Athenian Expedition and the rise of Hermocrates, when the latter was exiled (Diad. Sic. 13.63.1). Diodes apparently placed term limits on magistrates and gathered a group of men to create a new law code. 113 following the laws of Syracuse and not respecting the jsotes of other citizens. 368 Having been exiled after the Battle of Cyzicus in 410 BC, he befriended and likely fought for the Persian satrap Pharnabazus, 369 who provided him money for ships and for mercenaries. Having been rebuffed once by the Syracusans during an attempted return to his native city, he formulated a new plan, which centered on gaining the trust of even the most democratic of Syracusans. He first rebuilt part of Selinus, destroyed by the Carthaginians in 409, and was victorious in battles in the area of Motya and Panormus, Carthaginian strongholds on the western part of the island. 370 Proceeding to Himera and collecting the bones of the Syracusan dead from the famous battle of 480, Hermocrates had the bones conveyed at great cost to Syracuse (Diad. Sic. 13.75.2). 'E I "'' ' ~ I ' l p' ' ' ' " I pf-LoKpa'TTJ'l o o 4VpaKouw<:; ava,~,af-Jwv 'TOV<:; f-LE'T av'Tov (Frpa'Tevov'Ta<:; 'IpApav 'e . ._, , 7raperax r;uav o~ 4VpaKouw~, 368 For the criticism of the behavior of his men in regard to the other citizens, see Thucydides 6.38.5 ca~-v~-va 01] p/ij fLE'ra 7rol.,f.IVv laoVOfLEl.o-8at-; KaL 'lriV'; Q[,cawv ToVc; ainoVc; p/ij TWv ainWv d.fwvuea,;). Thucydides, however, generally presents Hermocrates in a positive light, as argued by Westlake 1958-1959: 266-67. The same article of Westlake (249-51) discusses their behavior in light of attempting to form a type of quasi-oligarchy. 369 Diad. Sic. 13.63.2 (</"lciav txwv 7rpo' iPapvri(3al;ov Tov nvv IIEpuwv uaTpa7rrJV). It appears that Pharnabazus gave him a large enough sum of money to build five triremes and hire one thousand soldiers upon his return to Sicily. See also Xenophon Hellenjca 1.1.31, along with Vanotti 2005: 270-72 and Pearson 1987: 154-55. Xenophon mentions Hermocrates as part of a mission to Susa with his brother Proxenus (1.3.13). For the banishment of Hermocrates, see Xen. Hell. 1.1.27. 37 ° For general narrative of Hermocrates during the period of his return to Sicily, including the rebuilding of Selin us and the ravaging of the territories of Motya and Panormus, see Diad. Sic. 13.63.3-6. 114 I''' I'''\\~! KEKOCYfLTJfLEVar:;, E7r~ 'TOV'TCVV 7rapeKOf-LUYEV av'Ta E'lr~ 'TTJV 4VpaKOVCYaV. Hermocrates, the Syracusan, having taken his soldiers, set out from Selinus. On arriving at Himera, he pitched camp in the suburbs of the city, which lay in ruins. Finding out the place where the Syracusans had made their stand, he collected the bones of the dead and, putting them upon wagons which he had constructedand embellished at great cost, he conveyed them to Syracuse. He then attempted to gain control of the city with several thousand troops but was killed in the attempt. 371 After his death, we learn that most of the philoj were killed or exiled, although Dionysius escaped this fate. 372 Within these deeds of Hermocrates, we see another process that would come to define the reign of his follower: empire-building. On the level of the pojjs, we see his attempt to repatriate the bones of the heroes from the Battle of Himera to Syracuse. Although the passage is not clear, it seems likely that Hermocrates would have placed the bones in a heroiin. The act of creating a heroiin was common in the Greek world, especially to advance one's political goals, as seen in the cases of Cimon of Athens with the bones of Theseus and Cleisthenes of Sikyon with the bones of Melanippus. 373 By creating this civic space in the center of Syracuse, where all 371 For the narrative, see Diad. Sic. 13.63 and 13.75. 372 Diod. Sic. 13.75.8 ('roVe; OE d7r0 Tijc; tuiX1Jc; Owuw8Evrac; fLE8urrdvTec; Elc; KpLuw ¢vryfj KaTeOL!ca~ov). 373 For the repatriation of Theseus's bones under Cimon, see Plut. Vlt. Cjm. 8. For the deeds of Cleisthenes of Sicyon, see Hdt. 5.67. Lichas of Sparta also repatriated the bones of Orestes (Hdt. 1.67), although the reasoning behind this repatriation was in response to an oracle, in order to capture Tegea. 115 Syracusans could share in the history and identity of their heroes, Hermocrates was redefining Syracuse. As will be seen below, Dionysius would reconfigure the identity of Syracuse much more drastically in the early years of his reign, by the import and grant of citizenship to large numbers of new inhabitants. In addition, the repatriation of the heroes' bones was an opportunity for Hermocrates to repatriate himself to Syracuse, the pojjs from which he had been exiled. The refashioning of Syracusan identity would be equaled by his own change in identity, from exile to leader of Syracuse. Although Hermocrates' focus on Syracuse demonstrated his need for a base for his rule, other actions prove that his intentions were to create a larger political entity. The most obvious of these intentions was his speech at the Congress of Gela in 424. Granted, Hermocrates did not have the requisite power at that time to take over power, but his creation of a Sicilian identity against a common enemy clearly showed that Hermocrates was able to think above the level of the pojjs. Of course, Dionysius I would later echo these sentiments when he would attempt to consolidate his own growing empire against the Carthaginians. Hermocrates also showed an empire focused mindset after he was exiled in 410, when he sought help from the Persian satrap Pharnabazus. By taking part in the campaigns of the satrap and becoming hisphilos, Hermocrates made an important alliance that paid off in the form of soldiers and ships. Hermocrates did not see himself as merely a local dynast but as a leader who could unite Sicily and could link Sicily with other parts of the Mediterranean. The narrative of Hermocrates demonstrates several themes of Greek ideology replicated in the reign of Dionysius I. The earlier actions of Hermocrates represent 116 him as the protector of the Syracusans and Sicilian identity, especially through his speech at Gela, where he attempted to unify the island. Later in his career, however, he would become a migrant, unable to enter Syracusan territory due to his status as an exile. 374 Furthermore, he became dependent on the resources of a non-Sicilian, non-Greek leader (i.e. the Persian Pharnabazus) and then used the resources of this 'barbarian' to fight against his own city. Having lost the support of the Syracusan government at that time, he needed to convince the citizens of his good intentions in order to gain their political support. In the face of his setbacks, the transportation of the bones of the war heroes from Him era to Syracuse attempted to offset his negative behavior and to re-center himself as the protector of all things Sicilian against the outsider, 375 by recalling the success at Him era of the earlier tyrant Gelon. 376 This especially is apparent in his first actions upon returning to Sicily, namely at Selinus, as attempted to undo the destruction of the barbarian Carthaginians. His revenge upon the Carthaginians at Motya and Panormus likewise allowed him to become a type of protector figure. Furthermore, he represented himself as a true Syracusan by placing the bones of the heroes in their rightful place within the city. Here, we see 374 D. d s· 13 75 3 c " ' ' " - " ' ' ' ' ' ' e ' "' '' · ' - lO . lC. . . aU'ro') fLEV OVV E'lrL 'TWV opwv ICa'TEfLEWE OW TO ICWI'vVEU aL TOV') 't'vryaoac; V'lfO 'TWV v6fMJv avvdvat.) notes this fact when Hermocrates was preparing to enter Syracuse with the bones of those fallen at the Battle of Himera. 375 See also his reestablishment of Selin us in Diad. Sic. 13.63.5. 376 Such actions show a protection against 'foreign' elements, such as Athens and Carthage. See Vanotti 2003b: 194-95 for his desire to show pfetas to the Syracusans and to perform an Jmftatfo Gelonfs. Barcelo 1994: 5-6 notes that Hermocrates had earlier viewed Carthage more positively and suggests that the Sicilians should seek aid from Carthage against Athens during the Sicilian expedition. By his later years, however, Carthage had become closer to Athens as attested by a treaty of alliance (IG 1 3 123), which likely caused Persia to fund his expedition back to Sicily to fight against Carthaginian-Athenian expansion. See Vanotti 2005: 272-75 for further discussion. 117 the combination of ideological attempts by Hermocrates to gain political supremacy, as he struggled during the last few years of his life between his life as an outsider and his desire to be the leader of the Syracusans. Most importantly, the narrative of Hermocrates shows the beginnings of an attempt to create an empire built on common identity and collaboration between vanous powers across the Mediterranean. These actions of Hermocrates and this struggle to create an empire would later come to define the rule of Dionysius. B. Dionysius the ideal Syracusan: the early years of his reign As argued by several ancient writers, Dionysius was an unstable leader with multiple identities, many of which reflect an otherness antithetical to any loyalty to Syracuse as its leader. On the other hand, Dionysius and his followers depicted the tyrant as a source of stability, to whom the citizens of Syracuse, as well as the greater Greek populace, could turn in times of trouble. Although this tendency does not reflect a direct contemporary response to these writers by the tyrant (since these anti-Dionysian works were mainly written in the generation following Dionysius and later), these efforts do show knowledge on the part of Dionysius that his political rule could be threatened by negative opinions. In order to seize and to solidify power at the very beginning of his reign, he first needed to establish himself within the city as a proper citizen. By creating a group of 'bad' citizens within Syracuse, who did not have the well-being of the city in mind, he could present himself as the 'good' citizen and the protector of the pojjs. While the definition of a 'good' citizen is a complicated discussion, concern with the civic life of the pojjs was one criterion. 377 In this 377 For example, Lysias (12.20) notes that his family acted better than most citizens by providing funding for dramas and for special levies. 118 instance, the definition of a 'good' citizen was contingent upon preservmg the hegemony of Syracuse in the face of Carthage. The conflict between the Carthaginians and the Sicilian Greeks in the last decade of the fifth century created a breach within Syracuse and provided the perfect opportunity for Dionysius to become tyrant, especially by identifying a group within the city who threatened its sovereignty. After a defeat of the Greeks at Acragas, some of its inhabitants fled to Syracuse, 378 where Dionysius claimed at an assembly of the Syracusans that their generals betrayed the Greeks to the Carthaginians. 379 Dionysius, appearing in the theater of Syracuse during a play, stated that the men in charge of the public affairs within the city were more dangerous than the enemy and argued that he himself was fighting on the behalf of the citizens (Diad. Sic. 13.92.1) 380 uvv0paf-L6V'T(J)V oe 'TWv CJxtvwv br' aln·Ov Ka~ 7rvv8avof-Lc!.vwv 7rep~ 'T(J)V Kapxr;Oov£wv, dryvoe'iv a-lrroVc; lcpTJ, o~6'T~ 'TWv e:gweev 7rOfvE[LWJ'TEpov<;;; " \ "<:;: " " " ? ' \ l" I E)(.OVCn 'TOV') EVOOV 'TCVV KOWWV 7rp0E(PTW'Ta<:;, OU:; 0~ fLEV 'lrOI'vUTa~ 7TUT'TEVOV'TE') ' ty ' \ r:;:\ \: ,.+, " \ \: I \ I ' I e eop'Ta~.:,ovuw, av'To~ oe o~a-yopovv'Te<:; 'Ta UTJfWULa 'TOV') (Frpa'TUV'Ta<:; afL~CY ave; I \" l I ' P>' I \' \ 7rE7rDUTJKaCY~, Ka~ 'TCVV 'lrOI'vEfLWJV aVV7rEpJVI1./l]'TOV') 7rOWVfLEVWV 'Ta') eu; 'TOV /l \ \ l l I J \ ~ I \ \: I " 'lrOI'vEfLOV 7rapam<EVa') Ka~ fLEI'vl'vOV'T(J)V E'lr~ 4VpaKOVCYa') 'TTJV OVVafLW aryew, ' '~· • ' ' ..h '~ 'TOV'TCVV OVO TJV'TWOVV 7rDWVV'Ta~ -ypOV'TWa. 378 Diad. Sic. 13.91.1-2. Anello 2006: 9-13 describes this episode, as well as the later events at Gela, as creating an atmosphere of fear and anomja, through which Dionysius could seize rule. 379 Diod. Sic. 13.91.3 (mpanyyWv Kanry6p1JUEV W<; 7rpoCn06vcrwv Ta 7rpdryfLaTa Tols Kapx1JOovLot_s). 380 Diad. Sic. 13.92.2 notes that, by arguing that the generals were working with the enemy, Dionysius could strip them of their power and could seize the leadership of Syracuse for himself ( r ~ I > ~ \ \ "\ I r! \ 1"\ > J!"\ y > I \ W<; ULa7rEfL7rOfLEVWV aVTWV 7rpO<; TOV<; 'lrOI\,EfLWV<;. OVTW ryap fLaf\,lfiT 1}1\,'lrL~::,EV EICEWWV fLEV 7rEpwLp1}u-Eu8aL T7JV Egovu-Lav, EavT(jJ OE 06vcp 7rEpurr1}u-Ew T7}v u-TpaT1}ryLav). For the theatricality and manipulation of public opinion by tyrants, see Lewis 2000: 98-99. 119 When the populace rushed in throngs to him and were questioning him about the Carthaginians, he told them that they were unaware that they had more dangerous enemies than their foreign foes: the men within the city in charge of the public interests. These men the citizens trusted while they held public festivals, but these very men, while plundering the public funds, had let the soldiers go unpaid. Furthermore, although the enemy was making their preparations for the war on a scale which could not be surpassed and were about to lead their forces upon Syracuse, the generals were giving these matters no concern whatsoever. Whether this episode actually occurred in reality (and I see no reason why it could not have), the theatrical setting of this proclamation reflected the refashioning of Dionysius's persona as the concerned Syracusan. Within this narrative are two themes prevalent throughout the career of Dionysius I: the threat of the Carthaginians and the instability of the Syracusan political system. 381 The accession of Dionysius I occurred at the precise moment when the city was most uncertain of its own political identity (in this case, when the city was torn between democracy and the leadership of the generals). 382 By breaking the social fabric and traditional 381 For more general discussion of the power base of Dionysius, see Masse 1962: 16-18. 382 According to philosophical treatises on tyranny, a tyrant can take power, even while an outsider, when the demos has completely collapsed and when the high level of liberty in the city has reached a point where anarchy threatens to take over. See especially Pl. Resp. 8.562c-63a and Polyb. 6.9.8-10. As Sanchez de Ia Torre 1999: 176-79 notes, the Syracusan tyrants were able to take power, sinoe they held the means to quell internal problems, at a time when the citizens were unable to take care of their own affairs. As the city was turned upside-down and as the laws and households fall apart due to an excess of freedom, the tyrant was able to take power. For further discussion, see Luccioni 1958: 78-79 and Raux 2001: 149-50. 120 political system of the pojjs, 383 Dionysius created a period of stasjs, which he would promulgate throughout his reign. 384 As will be seen below, Dionysius did so by pitting old citizens against new citizens, the elite against the lower classes, and · · · r · 385 Wh'l S ld h b bl c1t1zens agamst wre1gners. 1 e a strong yracuse wou ave een a e to rebuff the attempts of the tyrant to seize power, 386 the stasjs first created by the threat of Carthage and promulgated during the rule of Dionysius rendered the city too weak. The political history of Syracuse (as well as Sicill 87 ) is rife with regime changes during the fifth century, which fragmented the city into various groups (e.g. elites, demos, and army). By undermining the generals and the democracy, Dionysius established his own regime by convincing the citizens that he formed the middle ground between these groups, a mediator with the interests of the city in mind. 388 383 For the opposition of the tyrant and the organization of the pojjs, see Squilloni 1990: 108-11. Lanza 1977: 163-65 and Schmitt-Pantel1979: 219-20 discuss the rending of the pojjs under the tyrant. 384 See, for example, Leopold 1981: 242-43. 385 For the various types of opposition, see Berger 1992: 65-66. 386 This threat of tyranny helped to draw the polis together, most often among democratic cities, in their quest to keep the city from falling into tyranny. Raaflaub 2003: 59-60 and 82-84 note how the threat of tyranny was the glue by which the democratic city held together. 387 Such a role was especially useful in fifth-century Sicily, where the pofjswas not stable, with no established social order and with tensions between various Greek and non-Greek entities, as noted in Thucydides 6.17.2 (tJxt.,ols TE ryGp gvf.L!.LE[K,crols 7ro"'J\,vavOpoVuw aL 7r6""A,El8 KaL fJqtOLar;; ~xovu-L TWv 7ro"'l\,t/rWv TGs fLeraf3ot.,Gs KaL E7rWox&s ). Although this description occurs within the biased oontext of Alcibiades' argument for the invasion of Sicily by the Athenians, historical events during the fifth oentury oertainly verify his opinion to a large degree. Note also the term f1£W{3oic~, a term often used to mean changes in political regimes. See Aucello 1961: 433-38 for the debate between Nicias and Alcibiades over the unity and power of Syracuse, as well as the opinion of Thucydides regarding the Syracusans. 388 For the tyrant as middle ground, see Fabbrini 2002: 265-67. For the case of Dionysius pitting the accusations of the Acragantines against the generals in order to seize power, see Lintott 121 Dionysius, however, while appearing to be amenable to the desires of each group, was playing these groups off of one another in order to gain control himself. 389 Although he was the source of stasjs, Dionysius represented himself as the paradigm of a true Syracusan and as the protector of the pojjs ( npo<T'Ca'r'T/'i 'rov O~fLov 390 ). Many major leaders across the Greek world wished to present themselves in this light, in order to gain power. While this term could refer to any popular leader, this practice of referring to oneself as such also was followed by earlier tyrants. 391 Dionysius I was said to have followed in their lead, especially regarding their policies against the elite of the city, who were therefore portrayed as damaging the city through their unfair . d 392 econom1c a vantages. Two examples from Dionysius's policies outside of Syracuse in his early career demonstrate this process. First, before his rule in Syracuse, when Dionysius I 1982: 195-97. Aristotle later notes in Pol 5.1303a the tensions between various political systems that occurred in Syracuse after the fall of the Deinomenids. See also Berger 1992: 57- 61. 389 Luccioni 1958: 80-81. 390 Although Dionysius is not expressly referred to by this title in these passages, the characteristics he represented are similar. Authors of the fourth century had reoognized a dual role of the prostates, the first as a protector of the peace amongst the Greeks and between Greeks and non-Greeks. Bouchet 2008: 364-67 provides various passages of Xenophon, !socrates, and Demosthenes. The second of these roles of the prostates is as holder of great power, with political and military supremacy. Cities (or rulers) could use this power to harm others. See the example of Athens and the Deli an League in Xen. Vect. 5. 391 S p · · d . A . R 1 5 1305 ( ' - '' " ' ' ee eiSltratus, as note In fiSt. 0, . a 7rp0(I'fa'TaL TOV U1]fLOV, OTE 'lrQ"'J\,EfL/..K,OL ryEVOWTO, Tvpavv[QL E7rt-TL8EvTo). For general discussion of the tyrant with roots in this position (€/(, 7rpoumTIKi)<; pi/;rJ<;), see Pl. Resp. 8.565d. See also Boucher 2008: 367-70. 392 The common factor between these tyrants (especially Peisistratus and Dionysius) was their attack on the wealthier citizens of the pojjs. Arist. Pol. 1305a mentions that Dionysius positioned himself against Daphnaeus and other wealthy citizens. 122 commanded troops in 406/5 at Gela against the Carthaginians, he benefited from the stasjs there between the elites and demos. Because Dionysius condemned the wealthiest citizens to death and confiscated their possessions for redistribution, the grateful Geloans believed him to be their liberator and responsible for their freedom. 393 Second, in 403, after persuading a citizen of Enna, Aeimnestus, to seize power as tyrant, Dionysius then encouraged the Enneans to revolt against the new tyrant and even contributed troops to the cause. He then handed Aeimnestus over to the Enneans for punishment and thus refashioned himself into a paragon of justice, in whom others cities could place their trust. 394 In both cases, Dionysius appears as a protector of pojjs freedom, who ostensibly protected the democracy and interests of the citizens, even while he gained the trust of the populace only to advance his future . f 395 mms o conquest. As seen before, within Syracuse, Dionysius gained the trust of the demos by disposing of the 'treacherous' generals and the elites. 396 By distancing himself from the military and economic elite, the tyrant was able to build a wider base of power 393 D. d s· 13 93 2 3 (' ' ~ '' ~ r' ' ' ' ' ~ ' ~ '' e ' ) lO . lC. . . - V'lfO TOV U1]fLOV 'TWV El'v9_JWV W') aurW') aVTOl8 ryeyEV1]fLEVO') 'T1]'> EA£V Epwc; and Berger 1992: 25. 394 Diod. Sic. 14.14.6-8 (We; (3ovA,6fLEVO'> 7rpoTpE'}raa-8aL TGs lf'A).,"ac; 7r6""A,El8 ainip 7rlDTEVEw). Dionysius decided to hatch his plan against Aeimnestus when the latter would not allow him to enter the city. 395 For the duplicity of the tyrant, see Lewis 2000: 104. 396 Dionysius was able to separate himself from the aristocracy more easily. From all accounts, Dionysius was not a member of the upper class. He was referred to by Demosthenes as EvOc; oypap.p.an!w, and V7i7JpE7rJ,, as noted in Lept. 161. Diad. Sic. 14.66.5 and Polyaenus, Strat. 5.2.2 also confirm this, as discussed in note 1 of this chapter. See Collin~Bouffier 2010: 299~ 303 for further discussion of Dionysius's relationship with the elites of the city and his non~ elite status. 123 d . f 397 D' . h with the support of the demos, navy, an m antry. wnysms t en sought the goodwill of these Syracusans by providing new benefits, which completely rearranged the political and social landscape of the city and allowed Dionysius to establish a 'new and improved' Syracuse, with himself at the very center. He first gave or reinstated citizenship for some already present in the city (Diad. Sic. 14.7.4- 5). " \:\ I \ \ ' I 'f:: l I '\: I " ,.+,'l \ 'TTJ') OE xwpa<:; 'TTJV fLEV apUFTTJV EsEI'vOfLEVO') eowpr;ua'TO 'TOU;; 'TE 'YU'vOU:; Ka~ " , ,.+,, r I I \ \:' "l l , I ' ' " f:: I \ 'TOU; E't' T;r'fEfLOV~ar:; 'TE'Ta'lfLEVOU:;, 'TTJV 0 a1\d\/TjV Ef-LEpUYEV E'lr UTTJ') sEVq_J 'TE Ka~ 7rofv£'Tv, CYVflJTrep~tvaj3Wv 'Tip 'TWv 7rofvurWv 6v6fLa'T~ 'ToVc; T;tvev8epwfLEvov') OoVI\,ovc;, abc; EK&tve~ VE07rofv£'Ta'). OdOwKe oe Ka~ 'TaS olKfns 'Toic; CJxtvou:; • ' - ' - N ' ' ~' - "'r. ' - e "' ' 'lr11./TjV 'TCVV EV 'TV r;mp: 'TaV'Ta') oe 'TOU; -yu'vOU:; Ka~ 'TOU; fLUY 0-yopou:; ·~ ' eowp71(J'a7'0. As for the territory of Syracuse, he picked out the best of it and distributed it in gifts to his friends as well as to higher officers, and divided the rest of it in equal portions both to aliens and to citizens, including under the name of citizens the manumitted slaves whom he designated as New Citizens. He also distributed the dwellings among the common people, except those on the island, which he gave to his friends and the mercenaries. The first group was the neopoJjtaj, who were made of several groups, 398 mostly Syracusan slaves freed by the tyrant on several occasions. 399 The number is not 397 Lintott 1982: 200-3. 398 Grace 1974: 357-58 notes that there were very few instances of the word neopojjtahn the sources. Most of these references have a slightly derogatory sense, as if they were not as good as 'proper' citizens. An early group under the Sicilian tyrants appeared in the historical record directly before the Battle of Himera in 480, when Gelon aocepted them into citizenship. See Sinatra 1992: 354-60 for their effect on social relations in Syracuse. 124 exactly known, but in at least one instance, Diodorus states that Dionysius freed at least enough slaves to man sixty ships. 400 In any case, their new status provided wide support for the tyrant and further undermined the power of the traditional political parties of Syracuse. To these new citizens (and to others) were given redistributed land in 405 401 (as well as houses and perhaps wives 402 ), an event which radically transformed the geography of the city and created a new Syracuse. 403 Interestingly enough, the passage of Diodorus notes that the land was distributed in equal portions to the xenoj and the citizens, which now included the neopo}jtai In this case, it appears that Dionysius not only treated the old and new citizens equally but also the foreigners in his service (most likely mercenary soldiers). This constant turmoil created by Dionysius I within the boundaries of Syracuse at the very beginning of his reign would ensure that no one group would be able to gather enough power while he cemented his role. 404 Furthermore, Dionysius would increase this turmoil (and his 399 For example, Diad. Sic. 14.7.4, 14.58.1, and 14.96.3. 400 Diad. Sic. 14.58.1 (hric~pwuEv €f ainwv vav' €f~Kovm). 401 D. d s· 14 7 3 c ' '' ''' · ' · · ' "' ' ' f3' ~ ~ lO • lC. • • 'T1]V 0 al'vl'v1}V EfLEplliEV E'lr UI1]'; sEVCfJ TE IWL 'lrQ/-..,1/T'[}, 01JfJ/lrEpl)l"a WV 'T9_J 'TWV 7ro/-..,urWv Ov6fLaTL ToVc; ii'A£v8Epwpivovc; OoVA.,ovc;, aD'> EK.dt..B VE07ro/-..,[Tac;). Although this section also discusses land grants to xenoj, the land grants regarding non~Syracusans will be discussed in Chapter 2, pages 163~ 73. 402 Diad. Sic. 14.7.4. Chapter 66.5 of the same book notes that Dionysius gave w1ves of the aristocracy and exiles to slaves, although no particular instance is mentioned. This fact may be a fabrication of Timaeus to make the tyrant look more evil. 403 For further discussion of the early land grants of Dionysius I, see Asheri 1977: 23~25. For the expansion of the city under Dionysius, see De Mira 2001: 363~365. Such placations of the citizenry with redistribution were seen as a common tactic of tyrants, as noted by Pl. Resp. 8.566e ('rVpavv6c; o/1JUW ElvaL V7rlDXVELTaL TE 7rot.,t.2t KaL lBLqt KaL CnJfLOULqt ... ryijv OdvEi.f.LE Cn]fLcp TE KaL TOL'> 7rEpL EavTOv KaL niiuw). See also Luccioni 1958: 82-84. 404 For similar actions under the Deinomenids, see Luraghi 1994: 368~ 73. 125 power) through the process of mobility, by transporting former Syracusan exiles into his territory. 405 At an early assembly, the tyrant pushed for the return of Syracusan exiles, when he argued that the army of the city would be strengthened against the Carthaginians. His ulterior motive, which seems to be in line with other actions, was to win the exiles to himself and to establish the tyranny by murdering their enemies d ·a· h · h f. a 406 an prov1 mgt em w1t con 1scate property. These two groups, slaves and exiles, although political and geographic outsiders prior to their acceptance to the citizen body, formed the core of a new Syracuse, a Syracuse with Dionysius firmly at the center. One may wonder, however, how such actions were successful, since the introduction of new citizens and exiles would cause indignation from the former established citizen body, an anger which would threaten the rule of the tyrant. Within the relation between the image of the tyrant and his political power, however, there existed an equation. As political and military strength increased, the importance of the tyrant's identity as outsider decreased, because he would be able to quash any rebellion caused by discontent or lack of trust. There thus came a point when the importance of the identity of the tyrant grew increasingly irrelevant, when the strength from his actions overcame the negative repercussions from his negative image. By gaining the support of these neopo}jtaj and political exiles and creating further division in the body politic of Syracuse, Dionysius was able to quash any resistance that would have arisen from 405 Such a process is duly noted in the aforementioned passage of the Republic (8.566e), when the philosopher states that the tyrant must come to terms with his exiled enemies ( 7rpo' Tov' lfw Ex8poV'; TaL'> 0Ev K,aTaf.) .. ,aryfj). 406 Diod. Sic. 13.92.7 (i}fLE"'J\,"'J\,ov ryGp i/8Ew'> ChjrEu8at- TWv Ex8pWv cp6vov'>, CnJfLd-'UEl8 TWv oVmiVv, EavTols d/rro~<,a8EuTaplva Ta X.P''lfLwra.) 126 those who saw him as an outsider or a threat. In addition, the rearrangement of the traditional citizenry would have weakened traditional politics. Other poJejs had seen this redistribution of citizenry, albeit in a slightly different form. For example, Cleisthenes' redistribution into ten new tribes comes to mind. 407 By dividing up the population into ten new tribes (which themselves were composites from different areas of Attica), he was able to prevent one group from taking precedence. In a similar way, Dionysius wished to blunt the power of the ruling class by reconstituting the makeup of Syracuse. While the tyrant first needed to gain some semblance of support from the citizen body to get his foot in the political door, he was only able to thrust the door completely open by integrating these new more amenable populations into his growing empire. Within the first few years of the rule of Dionysius I, the tyrant enacted a plan of establishing his rule in several stages. His first step was to take advantage of the stasjs caused by the Carthaginians to question the authority of the Syracusan generals and the leading political party. If he merely stopped at this point, however, his authority likely would have quickly eroded, after the breach he created in the Syracusan political system closed again. Instead, by bringing in migrants and providing rights to the neopoJjtaj, he was able to keep the breach open and to place himself in the center of the Syracusan political system. While he may have been a scribe or a rabble-rouser to many of the established Syracusan citizens, he was a leader and an evergete who provided political rights and land to thousands of these 407 The redistribution is discussed in Hdt. 5.67. 127 new citizens. These two stages combined helped him not only to seize power but also to maintain his power through the support of other outsiders he legitimized. C. Dionysius the savior of the Greeks: the later years of his reign The view of Dionysius as the savior of the Greek pojjs and Greek culture gained momentum outside of Sicily later in his reign, when hostility to non-Greek enemies (e.g the Persians) increased in the early fourth century. 408 The military and political power of Dionysius I (and later of Agathocles), who protected the island of Sicily from the advance of the enemy, 409 made him a prime target for the plans of these writers. Earlier actions of the tyrant discussed above were necessary to establish the rule of the leader at Syracuse. Yet, as the Dionysii and Agathocles continued to rule, their hegemony spread beyond the level of the poJjs to a larger empire overseas. Just as the tyrant sought to portray himself as the prostates tau demou within his city to establish his leadership within, the ability to appear as soter to the Greek race was one way to convince the larger Greek world of the legitimacy of their empires. Again, the Dionysii and Agathocles followed their Sicilian predecessors, including the Deinomenid Gelon, whose victory over the Carthaginians at Himera vaulted him to the s6ter of the western Mediterranean. Other leaders, through their wisdom and decision making, positioned themselves at the heads of nascent empires, such as the Athenian Themistocles during the Persian Wars or Alcibiades during the Sicilian Expedition. In the fractious political upheaval of the 408 Although the tyrant himself still risked being labeled as more barbarian than Greek, the high level of stasjs within and between Greek cities in the fourth century necessitated a strong leader and legitimized the role of king or (even) tyrant. See Hartog 2001: 84-87 and 97-98. 409 See also Fabbrini 2002: 24 7-49. His unsuccessful relations with Olympia will be discussed in Chapter 4, pages 291-95. 128 fourth century, which had seriously damaged the power of mainland Greece, the tyrants of Syracuse again could step into this role as panhellenic s6ter. The panhellenic ideals of Plato and Isocrates reflected the need of the mainland Greeks for a savior, who could lead the Greeks in their battles against the barbarians and who could save them from internal discord. 410 This role of Dionysius as savior of the Greeks (following in the footsteps of his Deinomenid predecessors Gelon and Hieron) was encouraged by his later actions at panhellenic sanctuaries, particularly Delphi, where he sent statues 411 and took a part in the rebuilding of the temple of Apollo. 412 He also (perhaps) took part in two separate panhellenic conferences of 371 and 368 at Delphi 413 and arranged peace among the Greeks of the mainland. 414 These actions show Dionysius's desires to become involved in larger Greek issues and to become a protector to the traditional leaders of the Greek world, 41 ° For a general overview of these issues, see Merante 1972-1973:85-89. 411 He also honored the sanctuary of Delphi by sending statues in 374/3 BC, as described by Diad. Sic. 16.57.2-3 (b.wvvu!ov TaLi "i.vpaKou-Lwv Ovvdu-Tov 7rEfL']ravToc; Elc; 'O"'A,vfL7rLav KaL llEt.,cpoV'> iuyal.p.am EK xpvuov ml cl.i<j>avTo' OEOrJfJ.WVP'YrJfJ.EVa). The dating of this action is provided by reference to earlier actions in the text. For general discussion, see Giuliani 1994: 163-65. 412 The temple had burned or had been damaged in an earthquake in the winter of 373j2. For the text and discussion of the inscription of 363 BC recounting the donations for the repairs, see Tad 140. The aforementioned Athenian inscription honoring Dionysius also mentions his role in the rebuilding of the Delphian sanctuary in JGII 2 103, lines 9-10 ([T?j'] o[lK]oilop.[ia' T]l [au VE ]w ). 413 Xen. Hell. 6.4.2 and 7.1.27 respectively. Neither passage is clear as to the presenoe of Dionysius at the conference, although the context would suggest that his representatives at least were present. 414 According to an inscription of the Athenian haul§ honoring Dionysius and his sons, Dionysius took part in arranging a general peace amongst the warring Greek states (i'JorJe[ ovuw T?jL] I [!'Jau]LI.iw, El[p~]vrJL), as noted in IG 11 2 103, lines 23-24. The inscription is also included with commentary in the collection of Tad 133. See also Jehne 1994: 43 and 80, Ryder 1965: 134, and Cole 1981: 217-19. 129 Athens and Sparta. By this time, he had transcended his status as merely a tyrant of Syracuse and his identity as a Syracusan, by acting now as an example of a true leader of the Greeks. As evidence of this collaboration between mainland Greece and Syracuse were three Athenian inscriptions, which honored Dionysius I and his family. 415 Although the inscriptions will be discussed further in the fifth chapter, the terminology used within the body of the text to describe the tyrant is relevant to discussion here. Most interestingly, the inscriptions refer to him as the archon of S . '1 d 416 1c1 y an not as a tyrant. A brief discussion about the use of the term 'tyrant' is useful here. Although the term was tied to the softness and luxurious lifestyle of non-Greek monarchs until the literature of the fifth century BC, 417 tyrannos began to refer to Greek leaders from the time of Herodotus. The difference between the negative portrayal of the tyrannos and the most positive view of the basileus at that time had not still been demarcated fully. 418 This confusion occurred especially with Sicilian tyrants. 415 JG II 2 18 (dating from 393/2), JG II 2 103 (dating from 369/7), and JG II 2 105 (dating from 368/7). These inscriptions will be discussed further in Chapter 5, pages 325-32. 416 The best attestation in the inscriptions is line 7 of JGII 2 18, where &px[o]vT[a] is preserved. 417 As regards the terminology of Tvppavo,, the word is thought to have foreign origins in Lydia. See the first attested use in Archilochus Fl9 (oiJ fLOL Ta fl)ryEw TaLi 7ro"'J\,vX_PUuov fLE;..,EL I aVO' EDvE , y~, • ~~ • , 1 e ~ , ,, ~~ . . , '"' 1 , , e , , 'TrW fLE s1JI'vO';, avo aryawfLaL EWV Eprya, fLeya/\,1]<:; o auK. EpEw Tvpavvwor;; a1rmrpo EV ryap EUTW (xpea~cp.wv cp.wv) and Xenophanes F3 ( a(3pouvva' OE p.ae6vTE' avw<j>EicEa' 7rapa Avowv I 6<j>pa TvpavvL1}r;; 1}uav livEv UTWfEpijr;;). For further discussion, see BarcelO 1993: 83-92 and O'Neill 1986:27-28, who also discuss its use in Greek tragedy. 418 In his 128 uses of tymnnos, Herodotus is fairly consistent in defining the tyrant negatively as a despotic ruler who enslaves Greeks and abuses his power, although Herodotus occasionally refers to the same leader as both tyrannos and basjfeus. For an example of eastern kings as tyrants, see the discussion of Otanes in Herodotus 3.80-82. Aristotle also refers to barbarian kings as having tyrannical qualities in Pol 3.1285a and 4.1295a. For discussion of these passages, see Ferrill1978: 391-94. 130 Herodotus tended to use basjJeus to refer to the tyrants, 419 although Pindar was not so consistent. 420 While Herodotus seems to understand the negative connotation of the term 'tyrant' (and avoided offending the leader by addressing him as such), later writers, such as Thucydides, demarcate the division between kings and tyrants more clearly. When Thucydides refers to the tyrants of Sicily, for example, he always 421 refers to them as tyrants. By the fourth century BC, the term tyrannos had gained a negative connotation, an evolution which led to other more positive terms for the ruler, such as 'dynast.' 422 The Athenians would have avoided using this negative term for Dionysius at this time due to its connotations. It seems that Dionysius himself (as well as other leaders, such as Dian and Agathocles) held the post of strategos autokrat6r. 423 The use of 'arch6Ii in the inscriptions to refer to Dionysius, at first 419 As regards the tyrants of Sicily, Herodotus refers to them several times as basjfeus, especially in direct address, when the historiographer relates a conversation between a tyrant and others. See, for example, the reference to Gelon as basjfeusin 7.161.1 and Ferrill1978: 388-91. 420 Parker 1998: 153-54 notes that Find. Pyth. 2 and 3 vacillate between tyrannos, basjfeus, and prytanjs. Several oenturies later, Polybius also would turn back to a more fluid progression of monarchy and tyranny. While earlier authors (e.g. Plato and Aristotle) had mapped their own progression of political systems, Poly b. 6.4.8 noted the ease with which, for example, tyranny could move to monarchy {j.LETa(3at.) .. ,oVu1Jr;; OE TaVT1Jr;; Elr;; Ta UVfL¢vij K.aK.d, t.,Eryw 0' Elr;; TvpavvLOa). See also Walbank 1995: 206-10 and Levy 1996: 4 7-48. 421 Perhaps part of this change in perception was due to a fundamental change in the nature of tyrants around this time to military leaders. For the use of tyrant, see Thuc. 1.14.2, 6.4.2, and 6.94.1, who refers even to the Deinomenids with this title. Other authors also refer to tyrants as such, even if they attempt to portray them in a more positive light (e.g. Xenophon in his Hjeroor !socrates in his Archjdamus). See Parker 1998: 164-66. 422 Diad. Sic. 13.112.1-4 and 16.57.2-3 refer to Dionysius I in this way. 423 This position represented not just a strat§gos over an army but also seemed to have greater political powers above and beyond (such as control over the Assembly and the honors accorded to a hero). The position, however, was an elected position, as noted especially in the case of 131 glance, may be slightly strange, especially because the temporary one-year reign of the Athenian archon and the lifetime dictatorship of Dionysius I were vastly different in scope. 424 Were the Athenians attempting to make Dionysius feel as one of them by using this title? The most sensible choice seems to be that Dionysius I actually referred to himself as an archon, especially in light of comparative material on the other side of the Mediterranean. 425 For example, Demosthenes suggests that Leucon, the tyrant of Bosporus, had the title of archon, even though he elsewhere is referred as having the powers of a tyrant. 426 In this sense, the title given to Dionysius in the inscription was not particularly striking, since it was a common term for tyrants in Athens and perhaps was the official name that Dionysius used to refer to himself. 427 The geographical terminology in the title of Dionysius, however, is more interesting. The Athenians referred to him as the leader of Sicily (apxwv), not as the leader of Syracuse (*apxwv 'rwv :ZvpaKov<Twv). Because these inscriptions were honorary and sought further aid from the tyrant, the choice may partially have come from a desire to qualify the rule of Dionysius as legitimate over Sicily as a whole. 428 Dian (Diad. Sic. 16.20.6 and Plut. Vlt. Dian 48.2). 424 Nevertheless, the honors given to the tyrant by the Athenians, including political rights and integration into the social fabric of Athens, would be conducive to this new nomenclature. 425 Vanotti 2003a: 4 7-51 also oontains oomparative examples with kings and tyrants of the Bosporus. 426 Leuoon ruled from 389 to 349. See Aeschin. 3.171 and Din. 1.43 for references to him as a tyrant. 427 For example, an inscription from Nymphaion refers to Leucon as archon. See SEG 48.1027 and Tokhtasev 2006 for the inscription and analysis. 428 Line 7 of JG II 2 18, line 19 of JG II 2 103, and line 8 of JG II 2 105 all refer to Dionysius as head of Sicily. For discussion of Dionysius's title as archon, see Vanotti 2003a: 4 7-51, Sartori 1966: 58-60, and Lewis 2009: 9-10. 132 By the time of the first inscription and certainly by the end of his reign, Dionysius held most of the eastern half of the island (although the Carthaginians held much of the western half during this time). By designating Dionysius as tyrant of Sicily, within the positive context of this honorary inscription, Athens depicted him as the unifier of the island under his reign. In these inscriptions, he was represented as the ruler who was able to hold rule securely, no mere tyrant with a precarious hold on power but a rightful ruler who represented his city and the island in an official capacity. This v1ew 1s confirmed by literary sources dated to the end of Dionysius's reign. Later sources refer to the power of Dionysius and his identification as a larger potentate of Europe. 429 The Athenian Isocrates also saw the rule of Dionysius in larger terms and directly engaged the tyrant in his desire to seek a solution to the problems ailing the Greek world in the fourth century BC. Mainland Greece was a political mess, ripped apart by conflicts between Athens, Sparta, and the growing power of Thebes, while the ever-looming power of Persia also threatened Greece. With his successful wars and diplomatic forays, 430 Dionysius was the perfect target for the panhellenic program of Isocrates. Because the democratic system of the 429 Diodorus occasionally refers to the larger sphere of Dionysian influence (2.5.6-7, 16.5.4, 16.9.1-2, and 20.78.3). In 16.5.4 and 16.9.1, he refers to the rule of Dionysius as fLE'fiUTrJV Ovva(rrdav TOw Kwra T1JV EVpW7r1JV. Much of this depiction derives from the pro-Dionysian Philistus. See Sordi 1986: 85-88 for the conoeption of Europe regarding the rule of Dionysius. 430 As will be discussed in chapters 5 and 6 more thoroughly, during the first decades of the fourth century, Dionysius had gained control of the majority of Sicily, had gained a foothold in Italy through his links with the Locrians and Gauls, had begun to increase his foothold in the northern Adriatic, and had sucoessfully negotiated diplomatic relations with both Sparta and Athens. 133 Athenians was unable to heal the social and econom1c woes of Greece, perhaps tyranny (if approached in the correct way) could provide the strength needed to improve the health of the Greek world. 431 Earlier works of Isocrates portrayed Dionysius as one who destroyed and enslaved (especially as he was represented in the vision of the woman from Himera). 432 His later works would portray Dionysius as a possible savior for the Greeks due to his power. 433 In addition, because of his ability to fend off foreign enemies, such as the Carthaginians, Dionysius would become the perfect candidate to protect the Greeks. 434 Because Dionysius was progressing in his evolution from sinner to hero, Isocrates argued that Dionysius had saved Sicily from the very troubles plaguing Greece, namely devastation by war and constant besieging by foreign enemies, and had made Syracuse the greatest of all Greek cities. The best example of Isocrates' later feelings toward the tyrant is found in his Letter to Djonysjus, partially extant and likely written around 368, 435 where he referred to the 431 Franco 1993. 432 See !soc. Pane g. 169, where the orator laments the state of a destroyed Italy and enslaved Sicily ('h-a!-vla plv dvduTaTO'> ryEryovE, "i.LK£1\,[a OE ~~:aTa0E0oVI\,unw) under the tyrant. This work, however, was written around 380, at the nadir of Athenian-Syracusan relations. 433 For Dionysius's increase in power, see Isoc. 5.65, which notes that Dionysius took power in Syracuse and in eastern Sicily, even though he came from a low position. !socrates, however, does not portray this rule entirely positively, as he notes that the tyrant was driven by an illogical and crazy desire for monarchy ( hnBvfLfwar;; fLOvapxWs rit.,Orywr;; KaL fLavu<,Wr;;). 434 Passages of his Archjdamus and phjjjp praise the tyrant for his ability to conquer neighboring territories and to defeat the Carthaginians. For Dionysius's valor in face of the Carthaginian threat, see !soc. 6.44-45. The orator also notes in 3.23 how Dionysius faced internal and external threats successfully. For an overview of Isocratean relations with Dionysius, see Mathieu 1966: 101-4. 435 Chapter 1 states that !socrates wrote the letter in his old age, and chapter 8 states that the Spartans were no longer in power. As the Spartans were defeated at Leuctra in 371, the letter must date after this year. For further discussion of the letter, see chapter 4, pages 271-7 4. 134 tyrant as the possible salvation of the Greeks and described him as the foremost of the race and the holder of the greatest power. In the epistle, Isocrates asked Dionysius to work on behalf of Greece, by arguing that now was the best opportunity to act (Isoc. Djonysjus 7). 436 el !LEv o:Uv f-L~if 'TW~ 7Wv 7r6!vewv el(rr;r-;oVf-Lr;v, 7rp0<;;; 'roVe; f.~<e£vr;'l 7rpoe(FrW'Ta<;;; 'roVe; tv6ryov') !iv f.7rowVf-Lr;v: f.7re~00 0' lnrEp 'Tijc; 7Wv !EI\,I\,0vwv mJYrr;p£a" , P•' , "·'~, ~·e' ·' 7rapemcevauf-La~ CYVfLt..JOv,~,evew, npo<:; 'TW av oucaw'Tepov o~a,~,ex eur;v r; \ \ I " I \ I " f:;:l npo<:; 'TOV 7rptJYTEVOV'Ta 'TOV ryeVOV') Ka~ fLE'lUY'TTJV EX,OV'Ta OVVafLW; If I were offering advice to some particular state, I should address its leading men, but since I have determined to give counsel looking to the salvation of all Hellenes, to whom could I more appropriately address myself than to him who is the foremost of our race and the possessor of the greatest power? While such kind words for the tyrant were no doubt exaggerated by the desperation of Isocrates and his own personal agenda, the fact that Isocrates believed that Dionysius was a viable option, to such a degree that he lauded his deeds to other leaders, demonstrated a willingness to collaborate with Dionysius. In Isocrates' portrayal, there existed no ambiguities of identity for the tyrant and no questions of his loyalty to his city. Rather than creating stasjswithin the citizen body, Dionysius was seen as the provider of peace and stability, a stability that he could transport from Sicily to the remainder of the Greek world. Dionysius was thus transformed into the 436 !socrates also stresses in chapter 9 the tyrant's wider role in repa~rmg the mainland, by repeating soon after that he spoke on behalf of Greeoe (!nrcp TE Ti], 'Eicicaoo, icccyEw). 135 quintessential Greek leader, the savwr of the entire land. His attempts at taking advantage of political upheaval in mainland Greece, especially in the aftermath of the Battle of Leuctra, by taking part in panhellenic matters increased his prestige overseas. As witnessed by his honors under the Athenians (and perhaps the 'victory' of his plays in the Lenaea of 367), Dionysius had successfully established his empire in the West and had gained the trust of the mainland Greeks. By the sending of envoys to strategic sites in Greece, certainly a less substantial form of mobility than forced population transfers (although mobility nonetheless), he showed sensitivity to the negative opinions of tyranny in many Greek poJejs by participating in traditional pojjs politics through the use of diplomacy. While Dionysius gradually persuaded the mainland Greeks of his good intentions, he also thus was able to establish the legitimacy of his empire among even the Greeks of mainland Greece. D. Aga thocles as basile us. the ideal leader in a Hellenistic world In the time between the rule of Dionysius I and the rule of Agathocles, such ideological and political attempts to represent the tyrant as a proper citizen of the pojjs have not been preserved, especially since they were not necessary under the rule of Dionysius II. There was no need for ideological birth myths for Dionysius the Younger, as there had been with his father, since the provenance of the son of the tyrant was plainly known. Because Dionysius II had been groomed to take over leadership from his father, there was no need to create an agenda to gain power. Because Syracuse had been handed over to him relatively smoothly, he did not need to create stasjswithin the citizen body and seems to have been content in keeping the policies of his father. The weak rule of Dionysius II, however, would have been helped by an effort on the part of the tyrant to show himself as a worthy leader. His two 136 defeats, at the hands of Dian and of Timoleon, were partially brought on by his inability not only to command his forces properly but also by a lack of support within the citizen body. Even though dissension within the ranks could be combatted by military and political might, these two conquerors were aided by their representation as destroyers of tyranny, not only from within the citizen body but also from abroad. 437 In this case, Dian and Timoleon were able to demonstrate that they had the best interests of the citizen in mind, rather than Dionysius II, who relegated to the status of outsider/threat once again. In one sense, to refer to the major theme of this project, the failure of Dionysius II was due to his inability to command migrants (e.g. mercenaries) better than his adversaries. The narrative of his reign was far less replete with the type of mobility demonstrated by his father or by Agathocles. In another sense, to refer to the creation of an empire, the failure of Dionysius II reflects a more common tapas found in Greek literature, the failure of the leader's son. With the exception of a few sons (e.g. Alexander the Great), most sons of tyrants and monarchs were mere shells of their fathers. Even the most famous tyrannies in the Greek world (e.g. Periander and Peisistratus) saw a weakening of power as the family of the tyrant attempted to create a dynasty. 438 In addition, the earlier Sicilian tyrants saw a discontinuation of power under Thrasybulus and Thrasydaeus. 439 Aristotle himself noted this inability 437 Chapter 4 (especially the section regarding Athenian intellectuals and the Dionysii on pages 275-85) discusses the role of the Academy in Athens in the oonquering of Syracuse by Dian, with the ideological support garnered within the Academy. 438 For the tyranny of Lycophron, the son of Periander, see Hdt. 3.50-53. 439 As noted in Pol. 5.1315b, Thrasybulus (the brother of Hieron) was able to rule only for ten months before being overthrown. Thrasydaeus, the son of Theron of Acragas, likewise had a 137 of tyranny to create dynasties. 440 Part of this inability was due to the ad hoc nature of a tyranny. The tyrannies of Dionysius I and Agathocles, example, were born from specific political and social conditions that allowed them to seek power. Furthermore, because these tyrannies were created ex nihilo, with no constitution or recourse to laws, the only reference for the sons of tyrants was the rule of their fathers. If they were unable to maintain the support held by their father or to create support (as Dian and Timoleon were able to do with the recruitment of large numbers of soldiers), their rule would become fragile (as occurred during the reign of Dionysius II). Agathocles thus would have to create his rule from scratch. The beginning of the reign of Agathocles was unlike that of Dionysius I, without this ideological 'centering' among the populace as the proper citizen. It is true that Agathocles did oppose himself to the oligarchy in order to appear as a supporter of democracy, 441 but most of his persuasion was completed through military power and not through ideological mythology. While Dionysius rose to the tyranny from the rank of scribes, the experience of Agathocles as a mercenary soldier played a larger role in his political agenda (or lack of one). 442 Having established his rule more securely, he also short reign and was expelled from the city after a defeat at the hands of the Syracusans (Diad. Sic. 11.53). 440 Arist. Pol. 5.1315b notes the many dynasties of tyrannical families and highlights the difficulty that each had remaining in power for a long period of time. 441 See Chapter 1, pages 104-5. 442 Polybius describes him not as a violent tyrant (as the first phase of his rule as tyrant was due to political upheaval, only to be replaced with a mild rule, as noted in 9.23.2), but as a great military leader and administrator of the state, as in 12.15. Diodorus provides a similar assessment of Agathocles in 19.9.6-7, by noting that he kept careful watch over the finances 138 would participate in the ideological fashioning of his status later in his rule. In order to complete his evolution from renegade soldier to ideal leader, Agathocles would attempt to transform himself ideologically from tyrannos to basjJeus. His official position after taking leadership in Syracuse during his early years is not securely known. During the fourth century and into the reign of Agathocles, it appears that the Assembly still existed to some degree 443 and that several magistracies were still in place. 444 Agathocles had previously held a strat§gja in the army, and had been appointed chiliarch first at Syracuse (under his patron Damas) and later at Croton. During his first years, the powers of Agathocles as strategos autokrat6r likely included overseeing various civil powers, the recruitment of mercenaries, and the enfranchisement of new citizens. 445 Within the narrative of Agathocles' life, as he traversed from city to city, we see a trajectory that included many types ofleadership positions. Such a trajectory again proves that each tyrant created his own path to power, as the Deinomenids, the Dionysii, and Agathocles each came from a different social standing and geographical location to take power. Certainly, the trajectory of and military spending of the city, as well as proper rule over the his growing empire. See also Consolo Lang her 2005b. 443 The Assembly appears in Diad. Sic. 20.4.6, Diad. Sic. 20.63.2-3 (the imperfect of the verb in this passage suggests that the assembly happened more frequently), Polyaenus, Strat. 5.3.6, and P Oxy. 24.2300, as listed in Goldsberry 1973: 64-67, who speaks of the balance between the Syracusans and Agathocles. 444 Goldsberry 1973: 580-88 lists the magistracies that may still have been in existence under Agathocles, including the amphjpolos of Olympian Zeus, who was likely chosen by election between the three Dorian tribes (see Diad. Sic. 16.70.6) and the pojjanomos (Pl. Ep. 13.363c). 445 The enfranchisement of new citizens, which undid some of the processes put into place by Timoleon, was not popular with the citizens. Many issues arose between the Syracusans and other parties who had access to rights, including mercenaries (Diad. Sic. 21.18.1). For discussion of the background of these passages, see Goldsberry 1973:48-49. 139 Agathocles was influenced by the world of the fourth century. Agathocles gained power from a military background as a mercenary, not for a position of wealth, as many earlier tyrants had. This life as a mercenary was a new trademark of the fourth century, after the Dionysii (and even Timoleon) had risen to greatness on the backs of mercenaries. Finally, a mercenary who had worked his way up seized power (with a little help from a member of the Syracusan elite). Nevertheless, with such a tempestuous past, it was a good idea for Agathocles to recall an earlier era of Syracusan tyrants (namely the Deinomenids) by providing himself with the title of king. As noted above, whether Gelon and Hieron ever had been called king is uncertain, although it seems a distinct possibility. 446 In addition, new monarchs were popping up into existence in the territories divided from the empire of Alexander the Great. After Agathocles had earlier attempted to show himself as a bastion of democracy and failed, his next attempt to change his image included a portrayal of himself as a gentler monarch. 44 7 While he was described in several sources as a great leader, many within Syracuse and his army were not so pleased with his rule, especially since he had altered the civil body of Syracuse. He had suffered protracted battles with a large group of exiles and had also survived a mutiny of mercenaries that nearly cost him his life, when he fled from the shores of Africa back to Sicily. 448 By changing his title, the tyrant could refashion himself (at 446 Diad. Sic. 11.38 and 11.66, as well as Find. Pyth. 2 and 3. 447 For Agathocles change to kingship, see Polyb. 12.15.7 ((3arnlcEv' 7rpouacyopw6p.Evo') and 15.35.4 ((3aurlcEi' (mau7J' ~U<Eicia, vop.wecvTE,). Note that the latter passage also identifies Dionysius I as basjfeus, although he likely never named himself as such. 448 See Diad. Sic. 20.69.3, Diad. Sic. 20. 70.4, and Just. Epjt. 22.8.13-14. 140 least superficially) through his self-declaration as basjJeus, as Agathocles did sometime between 307 and 304 BC (Diad. Sic. 20.54.1). 449 'Acya8oK:i>./fic; cyap 7rv86fLEVOc; mvc; 7rpoe'P7!fLEVOVc; Ovvaa-,-ac; av[lp'T/fLEVOVc; /l,a07!fLa K:a' VOfLi!;wv fL~H OVVafLECT' fL~'CE XWP!f fL~'CE mZc; 7rpaxeeza-, < ' e I ' \ ' I p l 1 \ \: If:;: \ , 1'vEU7TECY a~ 'TOV'TCVV eaV'TOV aVT;r'fOpevue f-JaUL/'vEa. Ka~ o~aUTJfLa fLEV OVK , , ',.+,, , , , '..+. <, , , , 'e EKpwev exew: E-yope~ ryap a~e~ CY'TE'Yavov, OV Ka'Ta 'TTJV E'lr~ ECYW 'TTJ') If:;: " r I I ' ' le ' 'Tvpavvwo<:; eK 'TWO') ~epwuvvr;<:; 7repu<E~f-LEVO<:; ovK a7re e'To 7rep~ 'TTJ'l ~ ' ' ,.. ' ovva(Fre~a<:; arywv~~:,OfLEVO'). When Agathocles heard that the leaders whom we have just mentioned had assumed the diadem, since he thought that neither in power nor in territory nor in deeds was he inferior to them, he called himself king. He decided not to take a diadem, since he habitually wore a chaplet, which was his at the time when he seized the tyranny because of some priesthood and which he did not give up while he was struggling to gain the supreme power. His new status could ground him both geographically and ideologically, a status vastly different than his early life and career, where he played the role of tyrant- migrant, constantly on the move as mercenary or exile due to political and/or military reasons. The accession to kingship could provide stability and legitimacy that other positions ( e,g strategos autokrat6r) could not, a course of action taken by various rulers around the Greek world 450 and perhaps even in Sicily. 451 449 The date of Agathocles' declaration of kingship is disputed. Within the oontext of Diodorus's narrative, the date would be 307/6 BC. Historical context, however, would show that the declaration could not have taken place until 304 BC, which is the generally accepted date for his change in title. For further discussion and passages of Agathocles where he is called 'king,' see Van Compernolle 1987: 106-7. 450 See the clear precedents with the Ptolemies in Egypt and the Diodochi in Macedonia. Unlike 141 Of course, this change in name was in name only, because Agathocles continued acting as he had before the name change. 452 Agathocles, although preferring to call himself king, apparently eschewed the diadem and a bodyguard in order to maintain the image that he was not a tyrant or king, 453 although he seems to have appeared in the form of royalty at least once. 454 He still wore the same type of wreath ("dcpavo<;) worn during his tyranny, an action which demonstrated continuity with his previous position. 455 While he attempted to change his image, vestiges of the former identity apparently remained. Although the passage in Diodorus is not detailed concerning the process of the change to monarchy, since it merely focused on his simple proclamation as king, the passage continues by saying that Agathocles then attempted to show himself worthy by attacking the city of Agathocles, however, the Diadochi took over the kingship of Macedonia as part of the previous establishment, either as members of the Macedonian royalty or as hetairoj of the family. See Simonetti Agostinetti 2008: 154-55 and Chapter 5, pages 358-59. 451 It even seems that Dionysius I may have taken this step prior, if he represented himself as king and took the royal diadem, chariot, and clothing, although such a representation may stem from negative propaganda. As Sanders 1987: 7-9 details, several fragmentary authors (Batis FGrH268 F4, Theopomp. FGrH115 F187, and Duris FGrH76 F14), as well as Dio Chrys. Or. 37.21, all note the status of Dionysius as king. 452 Masse 1969: 173-74. Agathocles also, even before becoming king, apparently wore royal robes of purple and only threw them aside when he wished to seem as one of the common people (inro8EfLEVO'; T7}v 7rop¢Vpav KaL fLE'ra!.,a(3Wv lBUJJnK7JV KaL Ta7rEw7w Ea-8ijTa). See Diod. 20.34.3-5 for his behavior with his army, along with Simonetti Agostinetti 2008: 157-59. 453 Diad. Sic. 20.54.1 and 19.9.7. Note also that he did not seem to wear royal dress anymore. 454 Diad. Sic. 21.4 notes that he escorted his daughter with royal pomp. Sic. 455 Diad. Sic. 20.54.1, which also notes that he may have oontinued to wear the wreath due to his baldness. See also Lewis 2009: 107-10 for further discussion on the evolution of Agathocles from tyrant to king. 142 Utica, located near Carthage. 456 From the context of Diodorus's account, it would appear that Agathocles was in Africa when he declared himself as king. While Diodorus perhaps did not mean to place this event in Africa, he still places Agathocles' declaration within the context of his battles there. This episode reinforces the same image of Agathocles as basing his power on military might and as a geographically displaced leader. One may find it ironic that the tyrant, who had spent so long in his attempt to gain power over Syracuse, was hundreds of miles away across the sea when he declared himself king. Yet by this time, as with his tyrannical predecessors, Agathocles had advanced his empire beyond the borders of Syracuse and even of Sicily, after he had invaded northern Africa. By naming himself king in Africa, he was reflecting the change in his new empire by changing his title to match that of other empire-rulers across the Greek Mediterranean. Even more than other tyrants who had come before, Agathocles had recent precedents both for empire and for kingship, as the early Hellenistic world had seen the creation of the Ptolemaic and Seleucid empires only two decades before. This declaration thus seems to earmark a clear case of peer polity interaction. 457 In the chapter preceding his declaration as king, Diodorus notes that the leaders who inherited the empire of Alexander all began to call themselves king and to wear the diadem in quick . 458 SUCC8SS10ll. 456 Diad. Sic. 20.54.2. 457 See especially Ma 2003 for such interactions in the Hellenistic period. 458 Diad. Sic. 20.53.2-4 lists Antigonus, Demetrius, Ptolemy, Seleucus, Lysimachus, and Cassander as those who began to call themselves basjfeus. 143 In this sense, through this declaration, Agathocles attempted to make his burgeoning empire more unified by this declaration. His title as basjJeus refers, however, to what geographical or political entity? Is he meant to be King of Syracuse, Sicily, or some greater area? When one turns to numismatic evidence to find this answer and charts the evolution of the coinage of Syracuse under Agathocles, a pattern of geographic dislocation also emerges. In the first stage of coin minting from 317/6 to 310, all Syracusan issues under Agathocles were struck with the legend ~TP AKO~IDN, without the name of the tyrant. In coins of the subsequent period, from 310 to 306, two series of silver tetradrachms begin to show changes, when the first issue contained the legend Ar AGOKAEO~ on the reverse and the legend ~TPAKO~IDN on the obverse, while the second issue has only Ar AGOKAEO~ without the name of the Syracusans. 459 Although a few examples of the bronze coinage at this time still maintain the legend ~TP AKO~IDN, 460 the Syracusans mostly had been disassociated from the rule of Agathocles by the removal of the legend. The third period of coins between 305 and 289, after he had declared himself king, were struck only with the legend ArAGOKAEO~ BA~IAED~, with ~TP AKO~IDN gradually disappearing. 461 Thus, Agathocles saw himself as the 459 For the full discussion of the evolution of Agathocles' cams m regard to the internationalization of imagery, see Zambon 2006:81-83 and Buda 1969-1970: 193-212. The second issue also has a monogram (AN), which suggests that Agathocles' brother held minting rights while Agathocles was in Africa. Of course, part of this evolution oomes from the gradual takeover by Agathocles of the Syracusans' ability to mint ooins. 460 This would seem to suggest that some body of Syracusan citizens maintained the ability to com. 461 Goldsberry 1973: 64-67 notes that the silver issues of the period (perhaps dating post-304) contained the legend :STPAKO:SIDN. 144 embodiment of the city, when he began to supplant the identity of the Syracusans. Furthermore, as the empire of Agathocles expanded, Syracuse would be incorporated into a larger entity, one where the identity of the pojjs would be subjugated to the greater identity of Agathocles' new overseas empire. Thus, the later years saw his empire form, as Agathocles continued to expand beyond the walls of Syracuse. For example, while Dionysius waited for the Carthaginians to come to him to do battle, Agathocles went into their own territory to attack them and increase his territory in Africa. This evolution makes sense on a political and ideological level, especially since Agathocles began to see himself as sovereign over an area much larger than Syracuse. Just as Dionysius I had succeeded at the end of his reign, Agathocles had successfully asserted his power overseas. Agathocles also followed the successful trajectory of Dionysius I from negotiating his image within the city of Syracuse to negotiating his image in the larger Greek world. Having succeeded in Africa, Agathocles moved on to bigger and better things and turned his sights to Italy, Corcyra, and connections with other kings across the Greek world. As will be discussed later, these relations with new kings (e.g. the Ptolemies) were also a main reason for this change in title. Agathocles wished to be seen as an equal to these men in order to gain their support, since the position of a simple archon or strategos simply would not do. As the creator of a new empire, Agathocles found a new title that matched his aspirations to rival the larger empires of the Greek East. Part II: Identity, Politics, and Mass Migrations under Dionysius I As noted above, Dionysius I was able to gain power in Syracuse at the beginning of his rule by a combination of ideological and political moves. We then 145 looked at the ideological view of the tyrant at the end of his reign. How though did he seize hegemony over the remainder of Sicily? This section will look at a very specific type of process involving mobility that increased the political power of the tyrant and the size of his empire: forced mass migration. Despite these early machinations by Dionysius I, the tyrant soon would see his rule rejected, because his role as leader was not accepted by all citizens. During the first years of his rule, he continuously experienced threats to his power. This threat culminated in the revolt of 404, during which Dionysius would have lost power if not for the help of Campanian mercenaries. 462 Thus, he needed to forcefully establish his rule by quelling threats from other poJejs near Syracuse. These forced movements of large numbers of people undoubtedly helped the tyrant tremendously in maintaining power for thirty-eight years, both by quashing insurrection among enemy cities and by expanding his new empire. 463 This use of mobility for political and military gains, as will be seen, was especially successful through the replacement of these populations with mercenary soldiers in many instances. 464 These forced population transfers allowed Dionysius to make Syracuse the political center of a Sicilian empire unified under his rule, although this hegemony came at the expense of the poJejs in the remainder of the island. 465 While much of this forced migration was driven by political expediency, as 462 For the revolt and his rescue by the Campanians, see Diad. Sic. 14.8-9. 463 For the use of mobility to repress insurrection, see Masse 1969: 106-13. Scheidel 2004: 21-24 looks at the effects of population transfer on the acoeleration of state formation, although he focuses on Romanization. 464 See, for example, Pere-Nogues 2004: 150-52 for the use of mercenary settlements. 465 Such was the complaint by Plutarch, who characterized such movements of people as a symptom of tyranny ( Vlt. Tjm. 1.1). 146 will be seen below, the way through which the tyrant 'sold' these migrations to his citizens was ideological, grounded in traditional prejudice and historical animosity between various poJejs. This is not to say that the use of forced migration was a process only used by Dionysius I, since Syracusan tyrants before him 466 and other empires in the Greek and non-Greek world also employed such processes to control their peoples. 467 Within Syracuse, however, these processes provide a particularly useful way to understand how tyranny functioned and expanded, especially in regard to its relationship with other political systems, including democracy. 468 As we have seen before, the tyrants of Syracuse created political instability through the amalgamation of various ethnic groups and social classes. 469 While Sicily itself was a complex combination of various political entities and ethnicities, such diversity was encompassed within the city of Syracuse itself, with its variegated demos of old and new citizens. 470 The fact that Dionysius enacted most of these forced migrations during the first decade of his rule further eroded the previous identity of the immigrants and thus allowed the tyrant to assign them a new one as a member of his new empire. 471 Through this new identity, 466 The exoellent article of Lomas 2006: 104-6 notes that, while mass migrations were common under tyranny, the process was far more intricate than merely a topos of tyranny. 467 For other political systems dependent on mass migration, including Hellenistic kingdoms, Athens, and the Persian Empire, see Cohen 1983: 63-68. See also Lomas 2006: 106-8, who notes that these processes were often more common at the edges of the Greek world. 468 Lomas 2006: 101-4 discusses how democracy attempted to reverse the migrations completed under the Deinomenids and Dionysius. 469 For the relationship between displaced migrants and the pofjs, see Lomas 2006: 108-10. 47 ° For the comparison of the Syracusan and Athenian demos, see Christian 1975: 67-68. 471 Harden and Purcell 2000: 275-78 discuss the duration of time needed to create a culture of 14 7 Dionysius refashioned his own status as the stable leader of unstable poJejs across Sicily. By importing groups that were on the fringe of these cities, he moved himself to the center of the city, rather than the demos. By doing so, he attempted to portray himself as a type of evergete, who reestablished the cities under his power anew. 472 A. The early years: forced population transfers under the Deinomenids As mentioned above, Dionysius I was not the first tyrant of Syracuse to use mass migrations to his benefit. The Deinomenids, notably Gelon and his successor Hieron, used the process of metojk§sjs to strengthen their political and military position. After the democracy in Syracuse fell to Gelon in 485, the tyrant spent the next three years transferring large populations, beginning with Gela, the city whence he came to Syracuse. 473 Benefiting from the prior stasjs between the inhabitants of Gela and the expelled gamoroj, he transferred half of the population of Gela to Syracuse. 474 Later in 484, he would transfer the entire population of enrootedness. They later argue (382-84) that it generally was impossible to identify the population of a city and note that much of the population was constantly on the move. This mobility divided the city into a sedentary core and mobile groups. They also argue that anachoresjs was part of the Greek mentality and that every Greek was conscious of this movement. 472 For kings and tyrants as evergetes, especially during the Hellenistic period, see Gauthier 1985: 7-13. 473 Having descended from an illustrious family in Gela, he was under the service of Hippocrates, tyrant of Gela, who promoted him to a high army position. He eventually took over rule in Gela after the death of Hippocrates and ruled there for several years before taking advantage of the political situation in Syracuse to seize power there. See Herodotus 7.153-55 for the full narrative. 474 The various accounts of movement under Gelon are preserved in Hdt. 7.156, Thuc. 6.5, Polyaenus, Strat. 1.27.3, and Strabo 10.1.15, along with the schofjum to Find. OJ. 5.19 (~ FGrH556 F15 and FGrH566 F16a-b). Summaries of movements under Gelon are provided by Luraghi 1994: 281-91, Maggi 1976: 100-14, and Demand 1990: 46-50. Luraghi 1994 also 148 C . S d d h' I . . h' 4 75 H ld I amarma to yracuse an grante 1s new sett ers c1t1zens 1p. e wou a so transfer part of the population of Megara Hyblaea to Syracuse, although this transfer was limited to the elite of the city, with the remaining inhabitants sold into slavery. Finally, he brought 10,000 mercenaries of various extractions from southern Italy and Greece into the city and gradually integrated them into the political fabric of the city. 476 The effects on Syracuse were seen geographically, since the size of the city was expanded and infrastructure was created to deal with thousands of new citizens. 477 An equally great transformation was seen in the social structure of the city, when various social classes (from elites to mercenaries) from various cities across the island and overseas were mixed together in a period of several years. These notes that little information is provided conoermng any legal or juridical processes, the absence of which portrays these events more as the brutal transport of large population. 475 A question remains regarding the status of Camarina after the transfer of population, especially regarding the destruction of the city. Cordano 1992: 5-6 makes the argument that the language of Herodotus 7.156 suggests that a remnant of the population remained and that the city was not destroyed. This would make sense in light of the repopulation of the city in 461 after the fall of the tyranny, when the former inhabitants quickly gained back their Camarinean identity, as seen in the famous tesserae of citizenship from the Temple of Athena. 476 For the transfer, see Diod. Sic. 11.72.3. The various provenances of these mercenaries during the reigns of Gelon and Hieron are provided by literary evidence and epigraphic evidenoe, in the form of dedications at panhellenic sanctuaries. For literary evidence, see Find. OJ. 6.6 for Hagesias of Syracuse, formerly of Arcadia. Paus. 5.27.1 makes mention of a Phormis of Maenalus, who fought under Gelon and Hieron and made a dedication as a Syracusan at Olympia. Other dedications are made by Astylus, formerly of Croton (Moretti Olympjonjkai 186-87, 196-98, and 219), and by Praxiteles, formerly of Man tinea (IVO 266). See Demand 1990:48-49 for further discussion. 477 Mertens 2006: 310-15 discusses the archaeological evidence, including platejaj, stenopoj, and jnsulae in new areas of the city. Not only do necropoleis around the outskirts of the city show the needed increase to deal with the burials of new inhabitants, but areas of habitation near these burial grounds also show the degree to which the city had expanded. Traces of aqueducts built around the Epipolae to bring water to the enlarged city also testify to this transformation. 149 groups did not merely inhabit the same space, but also took part in the social life of the city, especially since they were added to the citizenship lists. 478 Did such transfers of population make the core of this new city stronger, because these citizens owed their status to the tyrant? Did these movements change Syracuse into a new center of Doric power? On the other hand, did this mass mobility create weakness in the social fabric, by not allowing one group to gain enough power to overthrow the 479 tyrant? In a sense, through these mass migrations, Gelon gained strength politically and ideologically. Politically, he was able to undermine the former political culture of Syracuse and to create new bases of support by introducing new populations. Ideologically, even though he had previously been a tyrant of another city who had migrated to Syracuse, 480 by bringing in these new populations and substantially altering the composition of the city, he made himself the center of this new city he had created. The successor to Gelon, Hieron, continued these processes of mass migration but in a slightly different manner. While Gelon focused on the transfer of populations jnto Syracuse, Hieron was more interested in transferring populations between non-Syracusan cities. The main episode of population transfer under Hieron occurred in 4 76, when the tyrant removed the inhabitants of Naxos and Catane to Leontinoi, likely to control these populations more easily by moving them closer to 478 For the changes to the citizenship lists, see Millino 2001: 144-46. 479 Luraghi 1994: 368-73 argues for this point, by noting the stasjs between new and old citizens across various cities in Sicily in Diod. Sic. 11. 76. 480 Did such dependenoe on these new citizens foroe the tyrant himself outside of the social network of the city, as Luraghi 1994: 370 argues? It certainly did not help Gelon that he himself was not Syracusan but had previously held rule in Gela. 150 Syracuse. 481 New inhabitants from the Peloponnese and Syracuse were placed in Naxos and the land redistributed, while a more regular plan for the city, almost entirely different from the previous layout, was created. 482 The more famous colonization occurred at Catane, where the former inhabitants were replaced by 5,000 mercenaries from Syracuse 483 and 5,000 Peloponnesians, most of whom were mercenaries who likely had previously helped the tyrant. 484 Little is known about this new settlement (known as Aetna), although it seems that they were given Dorian laws following those of Syracuse. 485 In addition, the inhabitants were referred to as jdjoj oMetores, a term which signifies their status not only as settlers but as settlers belonging to Hieron. 486 In this sense, Aetna not only was a military center but also a testimony to the status of Hieron as patron and hero. Again, we see the combination of politics and identity at work in the creation of Aetna, whose foundation not only provided the tyrant with a necessary base for his soldiers but also allowed him to take 481 Diad. Sic. 11.49.1-2 and Strabo 6.2.3. For a general overview, see Demand 1990: 50-52, who argues that Hieron favored mercenary soldiers at the expense of citizens. 482 For redistribution of land in general in this area at this time, see Asheri 1966: 39-40. DiVita 1996: 293-94 notes the regular jnsulae and the rigid scheme of roads running northjsouth and eastjwest. For the new layout of Naxos and its fate after the repopulation, see Mertens 2006: 343-48. 483 A schojjum to Find. Pyth. 1.120b notes, however, that the 'Syracusan' mercenaries actually were a mix from Gela, Megara, and Syracuse. For this note, see Millino 2001: 151-53 and Raffone 2004: 68-71. 484 For an overview of the provenance of the soldiers, see Luraghi 1994: 335-38. Hieron also placed mercenaries at Gela (Diad. Sic. 11.76.4). 485 See Find. Pyth. 1.61-65, where Findar notes that Hieron founded the city with god-founded freedom according to the laws of Hyllus (Tip 1r6t.,w KElvav 8w00dnp aVv D\£v8EpLqt I 'TA),jlJo'; (J"'rd8pn'; 'IEpwv Ev v6fLOl8 ~ICTUiu') and that the new inhabitants lived as Dorians (pivEw TEep.oU:nv ... !lwp1Ei'). 486 This argument is made by Sinatra 1992: 349-51, who also refers to Find. Pyth. 1.32. 151 on the role of the founder of a colony whose new citizens would owe their political rights to the tyrant. These mass migrations were one precedent established by the Deinomenids that would be followed by Dionysius I. These population transfers were one way through which Gelon, himself a transplant from Gela, and Hieron gathered support after taking power. Their benefactions to the new migrants would translate into political loyalty for the tyrants. In this way, the subsequent mass migrations were not an innovation by Dionysius I. Dionysius, however, would repeat these migrations, especially those of Hieron, who sought to expand his power beyond Syracuse. Dionysius would increase the number and the scope of these mass migrations, not only to anchor his hegemony in Syracuse, but also to create his empire in eastern Sicily and Magna Graecia. II. Expelling the enemy: Dionysius and the Carthaginians The mass migrations under Dionysius I did not occur in a haphazard way. In order to increase his political power, the basis of his population transfers was ideological, namely mobility that corresponded to a traditional ethnic hierarchy. These ethnic groups can be divided into those treated kindly and those treated negatively under these transfers. The former group included the Sicels, Campanian mercenaries, and cities of Dorian heritage, while the latter group included Greek cities of Ionian heritage and the Carthaginians. As we will see below, the spectrum was not organized on a strict Greek-barbarian divide. Thus, while Dionysius claimed to protect Hellenism against the advance of the barbarian, he simultaneously treated many barbarians better than Greek cities. If we again analyze these transfers as part of the creation of an empire, the reason for this non-division of Greek and barbarian 152 becomes clearer. Within Greek empires, the status of non-Greeks was often fluid and did not follow the traditional schema of Greek supremacy over the barbarian. One only needs to think of the new preference of Persian customs by Alexander the Great, one that compromised his standing with his Macedonian leadership. 487 While Dionysius did not seem to follow any 'barbarian' customs, he often allied himself with non-Greek groups to fight against Greek adversaries. Dionysius performed these mass migrations by means of a simple equation: ideological usefulness + political expediency. The main purpose of these migrations was to increase power and to decrease opposition, while he still employed ideological reasoning (i.e. by dredging up former hostility from the Peloponnesian War) for some means of justification for his decisions. While the standard opinion states that the tyrant cared little for the opinion of others and did what he wanted, these population transfers show an abuse of power mixed with sensitivity to public opinion, even if that opinion only served to ease the completion of his political plans. Among the groups who suffered under these forced transfers were the Carthaginians. Because the rule of Dionysius was threatened by both external and internal forces during the first decade of his rule, a new tactic would have to be implemented to find a scapegoat, a group that could be represented as more of an outsider and as more of a threat to Syracuse than himself. He found this threat with the advance of the Carthaginians. Carthage had been seen as the quintessential barbaric enemy from the beginning of the fifth century, 488 a view also confirmed 487 For the adoption of proskym§sjs by Alexander the Great, see Arr. Anab. 4.10. 488 Prag 2010: 64-65 notes the typical barbarity of Carthaginian sailors in Diad. Sic. 19.103.4-5 (cutting off the hands of Athenian merchants) and child sacrifice in Diad. Sic. 20.14. 153 later in Roman writers. 489 Due to earlier battles with the Greeks and other reasons, 490 the 'threat' of the barbarian among the Greeks on the island of Sicily lasted well down into the Roman occupation of the island. 491 While the Carthaginians were portrayed as the 492 enemy, the relationship between the Greeks and the Carthaginians often was not as fractious as the sources suggest. Carthage was given administration over various Greek cities on the island 493 and was often called upon by various Greek poJejs in time of need. 494 Even the great symbol of the Carthaginian forces at the Battle of Him era, Hamilcar, was half-Syracusan through his mother. 495 489 Bonnet 2005: 140-41 discusses the biases against the Carthaginians stemming not only from their own lack of literature but also the effects of the Punic Wars on later scholarship. 49 ° For example, Hall 2002: 186-87 argues that the large number of foreigners living in major centers actually perpetuated Greek/barbarian stereotypes. 491 For example, Plato ( Ep. 8.353a) worries about the barbarization of the island ( T6e' 8TE Kivovvo' EryEvero ~axaTor;; "i.u<£"'J\,£c,t Tfj TWv 'E!-v!-v1}vwv V1rO Kapx1JOovLwv dvduTaTov l)""A,7Jv EK{3apf3apw8El.o-av cyEvcuea,). The opening to the Tjmoleon of Plutarch (1.2) bewails the fate of Sicily, with barbarians and mercenaries overrunning the island ( aL OE 7r"'A.£ln-TaL 7r6"'A£l8 V1rO (3apf3dpwv wc;riowv ml UTpanWTWV d.p.wewv WTEixovTo). Merante 1972-1973: 85-89 notes that this continued worry about the Carthaginians was due to panhellenization efforts by authors such as !socrates. With the attack of the Carthaginians on Sicilian lands (Diad. Sic. 19.110,20.29- 30, and 20.38-39), Agathocles also would bring back the Carthaginian threat as an jnstrumentum regnj, as argued by Anello 1990: 212. 492 The wholly negative view of Carthage, however, mainly was based on propaganda disseminated by Syracuse, especially as other Greek cities had much better relations with the African power. See Pere-Nogues 2006: 60-61. 493 Barcelo 1994: 6-7 notes that the Carthaginians were g1ven administrative oontrol over Leontinoi and Messana (Diad. Sic. 13.114.1). In the religious sphere, note the presence of Carthaginian theoroj traveling through Sicily to Delphi in the birth tale of Agathocles (19.2.3) 494 Galvagno 2005 argues that, while Carthage was seen as the aggressor, the city often reacted defensively, as in the case of the Battle of Himera, which only started when Carthage came to help an allied Greek city. For their political strategy, see Chapter 6, pages 373-75. 495 Herodotus 7.166. 154 In addition, as will be seen below, communities of Greeks and Carthaginians mixed, such as in the cohabitation of Phoenicians and Greeks in Syracuse and Motya. 496 In addition, a Greek colony likely thrived at Carthage itself. 497 Nevertheless, the Syracusan tyrants of the fifth century began the tradition of portraying the Carthaginians as the 'barbarian' enemy, no doubt due to their position opposite Carthage in 480. 498 Even though the status of the Carthaginians would improve over the fifth century (due mainly to their economic usefulness), Sicilian leaders still could create the Carthaginian threat anew. The predecessor of Dionysius, Hermocrates, also focused on Carthage as an enemy, even while Syracuse and Carthage were communicating through envoys. 499 Although the Carthaginians had been a military foe at the beginning of Dionysius's reign, he had since made peace with them. 500 Nevertheless, since Dionysius I continued to face opposition in 496 Greeks often visited the main temple in Motya (Diad. Sic. 14.53.2) and many Greeks fought on the side of the Carthaginians at the battle there in 397 (Diad. Sic. 14.53.4), as discussed by Anello 1990: 199-200. For a general overview of these types of closer relations, see Merante 1972-1973: 91-92. 497 For the presence of a small Greek oolony at Carthage, see Diad. Sic. 14.77.5 and Fan tar 1998: 11-12, who includes relevant inscriptions from the CJSem. In addition, for discussion of the relationship between Carthage and the cult of Demeter and Kore, see Diad. Sic. 15.77.4-5, along with Fan tar 1993-1994: 214-15 and 1998: 17-18. 498 For example, the Persae of Aeschylus was shown at Syracuse, while the battles between the Greeks and Persians at Salamis and Plataea were juxtaposed with the battles between the Greeks and Carthaginians at Himera and Cuma in Find. Pyth. 1. 71-81. For further discussion, see Raocuia 2008: 183-86. 499 Anello 2008: 84-87 notes the examples of the ambassadors sent by the Syracusans to Carthage in 407 (Diad. Sic. 13.79.8) and the envoy sent to Acragas by Carthage to head off conflict (Diad. Sic. 13.85.2). 50 ° For the peace treaty, see Diad. Sic. 13.114. The terms of the treaty are repeated again at Diad. Sic. 14.7.1. 155 his early years, the perceived 'threat' of Carthage would provide the perfect ruse for h . . d I'd 501 Th . f I h f 1m to se1ze an to canso 1 ate power. e creatwn o externa t reats was o ten the only way to create unity within a fragmented community, 502 as well as an excellent way for a tyrant to represent himself as the protector of the people, just as Gelon had done after Himera in 480. 503 For example, Dionysius used the threat of the Carthaginians at the beginning of his reign to force the inhabitants of Gela and Camarina to move to Syracuse. 504 As mentioned earlier in this chapter, Dionysius also claimed that the generals of Syracuse were in collaboration with the Carthaginian enemy, in order to seize power. Although relations between Syracuse and Carthage had become more stable over the last years of the fifth century, in 398 BC, under the encouragement of 501 In the same passage of the Repubjjc (8.566e), this tactic of creating a constant enemy is identified as typical of a tyrant (npiinov 0Ev 7rot.,EfLovr;; nvGs dEL ICWEZ). See also Arist. Pol. 5 1313b ( JI ~\ \ "\ \ r I r! ~ \ J! "\ I 'i' \ r I > I , EUTL OE ICaL 'ffQf\,EfLO'lrOW'; 0 TVpaVVO';, 07r(J)'; 01} auxoi\,OL TE WOL ICaL 1J1EfLOVO'; EV X_PELCf CnaTE/-..,Wuw 6vTE'>). 502 Sicily was a larger example of this fragmentation, as demonstrated especially in the famous speech at the Congress of Gela in 424 of Dionysius's predecessor, Hermocrates, who focuses on the identification of the Sicilians as one people in the face of Athenian invasion. For Hermocrates' speech, see Thuc. 3.59-64. For the unity from outside threat, see Westlake 1952: 56-57. 503 Gelon took advantage of this threat in battles with the Carthaginians to be proclaimed the protector of the Hellenic spirit. Various authors depict Gelon as the savior of the Greeks over Hamil car at Himera in 480 BC, while Hamil car is depicted as a barbarian king in the vein of Xerxes. See especially Herodotus 7.165-66. While Gelon was proclaimed as savior across the Greek world (Polyaenus, Strat. 1.27.1 and Diad. Sic. 11.26.5-6), the sources seem to gloss over the fact that the original cause of the battle was infighting between two local Greek tyrants. See Harrell2006: 123-25 and Pearson 1987: 139-40 and 179-80. 504 Diad. Sic. 13.111.3-6 records this pathetic incident, where the inhabitants were forced to leave quickly. The impetus for their quick departure was the fear that they would befall the same fate as the Acragantines. 156 Dionysius, the Syracusans attacked the Carthaginians within the city of Syracuse. While such treatment of Carthaginians settlements was part of a pattern demonstrated under Dionysius I between 406 and 396, 505 this episode was particularly notable, since it occurred in Syracuse itself. Under the direction of the tyrant, the Syracusans seized the property of the Carthaginians and then plundered their homes and the ships of the Carthaginian merchants in the harbor (Diad. Sic. 14.46.1 ). 506 \ \:\ \ J l I " A I \ 'f:: I <:;:I r ~ I fLE'Ta OE 'TTJV EKKI\/fjULaV, 'TOV i..l.WVVCYWV 'TTJV EsOVCY~aV OOV'TO'), 0~ 4VpaKOCYW~ ' lh ' I "' I ' ,, I ' " K ~ ' r-a '±'owuw<:a XP'T/P..ar-a o'7!P7ra(J"av. ovK o"''lo' cyap r-wv apx71oov""v " J " ~ I '\: \ " I ll \ \:\ \ " Cf:JKOVV EV 'TaU:; 4VpaKOVCYau:; aopa<:; E)(OV'TE') K'TTJCYEU:;, 'lrOI'vl'vO~ oe Ka~ 'TCVV EfL7r6pwv elxov Ev 'Tip lv~fLev~ 'TGs vaVc; ryefLoVua') cpop'T£wv, & 7r&v'Ta o~ecp6pr;uav o[ ~vpaK6CYWL After the meeting of the assembly, the Syracusans, with the perm1sswn of Dionysius, plundered the property of the Phoenicians. Since no small number of Carthaginians had their homes in Syracuse and rich possessions, and many also of their merchants had vessels in the harbor loaded with goods, all of which the Syracusans plundered. The presence of the Carthaginian 'enemy' in this passage is striking. Not only did Syracuse trade extensively with the Carthaginians, but the passage stresses that 505 For example, Himera was disbanded and split between settlements at Termini Imerese and Cefalu, while Soluntum was destroyed in 397, with the inhabitants moving to Monte Catalfano. Vassallo 2008: 196-98 has a description of settlement patterns during this time and the later fourth century in the north-central part of the island. 506 Whitaker 1978: 67-68 notes the presence of both 'Carthaginian' and 'Phoenician' fleets. While Carthage was the main political player, other Punic strongholds, such as Panormus, were allied cities. 157 many Carthaginians within the city of Syracuse possessed property and homes within the city, as marked by the phrase aopcu; /C'C~(J"W;. 507 The passage notes that the Syracusans did feel some animosity towards the Carthaginians, mainly because the previous hostilities created the opportunity for Dionysius to take over. 508 Yet while the Syracusans felt some animosity to the Carthaginians, as seen in their reaction, this hostility seems to have been caused by the negative view created by the tyrant, especially in view of the fact that these Carthaginians were integrated economically and socially to some degree into the fabric of the city. Why did their status within the city change so quickly? Their foreignness was an easy target for Dionysius, who needed to create the 'barbarian threat' in order to be seen as the protector of Syracuse in the face of internal danger. The Syracusans agreed to drive out the Carthaginians because they wanted to please the tyrant, so that he would treat them more humanely. 509 Thus, Dionysius also could take advantage of the hostilities to appear as a more gentle and humane leader, as he apparently had begun to do. 510 Within this one action, the status of the Carthaginian displayed its great fluidity, as in a matter of days, the Carthaginian turned from economic ally to unwanted interloper. Dionysius did not cast out the Carthaginians because they were 'barbarians' but because they were specifically Carthaginian, a group that had caused trouble for the Greeks before and could again. In this way, Dionysius took 507 For the referenoe to a!lpas /C'C~UE"' see Merante 1972-1973: 97-98. 508 Diad. Sic. 14.45.5. The cruelty of the Carthaginians is also noted in Diad. Sic. 14.46.2 and 14.46.3. 509 Diod. Sic. 14.45.5 (~7rEtxa OE KaLTOv b.wvVuwv 1n"'J\,av8pw7rlnEpov EavTols if'A,cTrL~ov X_P1}aHI8w). 510 Diad. Sic. 14.45.1 makes the claim that he had stopped banishing or putting to death his subjects, which had been his prior habit. 158 advantage of the natural fear of this group to turn previous suspicion and fear away from himself as a cruel leader to suspicion of the Carthaginians who lived among the Syracusans. By providing the citizens a chance to please him and to receive material benefits from the plunder, he could take the focus from his own cruelty and could quell the hatred and fear of the populace by transferring those feelings to the Carthaginians. Such expulsions by Dionysius I in Syracuse and other Greek cities is an example of one type of mass migration, a uni-directional population transfer that pushed one group out of Syracuse. This instance demonstrated that, unlike the pojjs, which often had consistent identifications for the citizen and the metic, the status of citizen and foreigner alike in the empire of Dionysius I could change very quickly, a change that will be demonstrated numerous times below. C. Intra-Greek rivalry: Dionysius and the Ionian cities As part of his attempt to identify groups whom he could portray as the enemy, Dionysius I used rivalries between city-states in Sicily that had festered for several centuries. His predecessor Hermocrates previously drew attention to the Dorian vs. Ionian divide within the context of Athenian intervention in the island, as when he commanded the inhabitants of Dorian Camarina to express to the Ionian Athenians that they were not slaves but free Dorian citizens. 511 Dionysius later took advantage of the divisions between the Dorian and Ionian ethne, when he stressed the status of Syracuse as a Dorian city while he attacked surrounding Ionian cities. By the Ia te fifth century, eastern Sicily was a patchwork of primary colonies from Greek cities and secondary colonies founded by Sicilian cities, with the identity of each city an 511 Thuc. 6. 77.1. Willl950: 377-78 discusses the Ionian vs. Dorian ethnediscourse at this time. 159 important part of its social and political fabric. For example, the emphasis on the nomjma of each city as belonging to a particular ethnoswas an important part of the narrative of a city's founding. 512 Certain characteristics of a colony, however, were subject to change, including its dialect. 513 This change in dialect was a direct result of population transfers, as when Himera and Messana gradually became Doricized (as noted through coin legends) through the movement of settlers from Doric cities in the mid-fifth century, or when Catane was given Doric-speaking settlers after they were moved to Aetna. 514 During the fifth century, in addition to the disappearance of traditional languages (e.g. Sicel and Elymian), inscriptions show that the Doric kojn§ began to spread over the island, specifically the so-called Doric mitior of Syracuse. 515 It is within this context of competing ethnic identities that the population transfers of Greeks under Dionysius I occurred. If Dionysius was going to create an empire in eastern Sicily, he would not only have to contend with different ethnic groups but competing Greek identities as well. Although Dionysius 512 For a discussion of nomjma, see Ostwald 1986: 83 and Malkin 2011: 195. Thuc. 6.4.3-4 discusses the nomjma of Gela as Dorian, from its mixed Cretan and Rhodian ancestry. These nomjma would be given to Acragas when Gela founded that city. Himera was founded by a combination of Doric Syracuse with Ionic settlers from the Chalcidice, resulting in Ionian nomjma, as told by Thuc. 6.5.1. For the discussion of nomjma, see Malkin 2005b: 66-68. 513 For example, Messana, Himera, Naxos, Leontini, and Catane all originally used the Ionic dialect. Syracuse, Acragas, Gela, Selinus, and Megara Hyblaea all used the Doric dialect. For discussion of these dialects, see Arena 1996: 191-200. 514 For the narrative of Catane and Aetna, see Diad. Sic. 11.49. Willi 2008: 48-49 discusses the examples from Naxos and Leontinoi. 515 Corinthian oolonies used Doric mitior, while Rhodian colonies (e.g. Gela) used Doric media. For an overview of the Doricization of the island, see Willi 2008: 45-4 7 and Korhonen 2004: 80- 81. This focus on Doric as a symbol of Sicily is seen later in the works of Theocritus, who has his characters speak in a Doric accent, as noted by Rizzo 1973:31-36. 160 understood the importance of population transfers to maintain power, he had a slight problem. After representing himself as the protector of Greeks against the advance of the Carthaginians when he took power in Syracuse, how could he reconcile this image to the subjection of fellow Greeks to his program of forced migration? 516 His reaction to the cities of Ionian extraction fell into two camps, milder and more severe. The fate of Leontinoi fell into the first group. The history of Leontinoi in the last quarter of the fifth century was quite messy. Beginning in 422, the elite of the city were incorporated into Syracuse, after they moved there and were given citizenship, while the ch6ra of Leontinoi likely was brought into the sphere of Syracusan political power. 517 In 406, with the approach of the Carthaginians, many inhabitants of other cities (Gela, Acragas, and Camarina) were transferred to Leontinoi, which now became a phrourjon (military garrison) against the threat of the Carthaginians. 518 Dionysius would gather his army here to take power against the Carthaginians, 519 and the city again would become free under the stipulations of the treaty of 405. 520 After the citizens of other cities moved back, the city saw the return of its elite the same year. Within this general atmosphere of mobility, the major transportation of the population of Leontinoi occurred in 403, when Dionysius 516 For the issue of Dionysius as protecting the Greeks, even as he subjected them to his mass migrations, see Anello 1984: 43-46. 517 See Thuc. 5.4.2, Xen. Hell. 2.3.5, and Diad. Sic. 12.54.7. Leontinoi is termed an ojk§t§rjon in Diad. Sic. 13.89 from this period onward. This earlier period of Syracusan relations is discussed by Maggi 1976: 206-10. 518 Diad. Sic. 13.95.3 and 13.113.4. 519 For the status of Leontinoi and its reflection of the new oommunity of citizens that would be created under Dionysius I, see Pere-Nogues 2009: 112-13. 52 ° For Leontinoi and the treaty, see Xen. Hell. 2.3.5 and Diad. Sic. 13.114.1. 161 I transferred the entire population to Syracuse. 521 While the city continued to exist in a limited form until 396, 522 most of the inhabitants were moved to the new areas of Syracuse created to hold these mass migrations. 523 The Leontinians agreed to migrate undoubtedly to avoid the fate of the inhabitants of Naxos and Catane, whose fate will be discussed below. Dionysius moved the inhabitants out of Leontinoi to increase the area of Syracusan influence by making a corridor through Leontinoi up the east coast. 524 Why he treated the inhabitants of Leontinoi more kindly than their counterparts in Naxos and Catane is not exactly known. It likely was due to the shared history between the two cities over the two previous decades, the former habitation of the elite in Syracuse, and the role of Leontinoi in the early years of Dionysius's reign. In this sense, even though Leontinoi was a city of Ionian extraction, it shared a common history with Syracuse for several decades and was not a full enemy of Syracuse, as Naxos and Catane were. Dionysius thus could assuage the resentment of the Leontinians and could quell the threat of revolt by providing them with a new home in Syracuse, while still maintaining his image as protector of the island against both hostile Carthaginians and Greeks. 521 Diad. Sic. 14.15.4. 522 For the continued existence of Leontinoi, see Diad. Sic. 14.58.1 and 14. 78.2. The city would be resettled with meroenaries in 396, although it may have been that the population was mixed with former inhabitants. See Berger 1991: 138-39. 523 For example, Gelon and Dionysius had built up several areas of Syracuse near Ortygia (see Diad. Sic. 14.9.5 for the reference to Neapolis). He moved the new inhabitants of the city there, as noted in Plato Ep. 7.349d. See De Mira 2001: 362-63. For other general plans for the housing of new inhabitants, see chapter 4 of Rizzo 2000. 524 For the reasons behind the transfer of the Leontinians, as well as the background of the city at this time, see Maggi 1976: 206-10 and 238-41. 162 The Ionian cities of Naxos and Catane, however, did not fare so well, smce their inhabitants were displaced by Dionysius, not to Syracuse but to an unknown future. These population transfers were slightly different from the examples listed above. Within the mass migrations under Dionysius, two separate processes of movement occurred. The first was uni-directional, when a location merely saw the displacement of inhabitants from or the transfer of new settlers to a location. The creation of the Sicel site of Adranum, the transfer of people to Syracuse from Leontinoi, and the expulsion of Carthaginians from Syracuse are several examples of this process. 525 The second type of process was bi-directional, when one group was pushed out of a location and a second group brought in. The events at Naxos and Catane are two such examples of the latter process. In 403, Dionysius attacked both Ionian cities, defeated them, and sold many of the inhabitants into slavery. He then moved new transplants to the two conquered cities: the Sicels into Naxos and Campanian mercenaries into Catane (Diad. Sic. 14.15.2-3). fLE'Ta oe 'Taih·a IIpoKI\,i]c; 0 'TWv Nag£wv d¢rr;oVfLEVO') f.7raryryetv~wv fLEryEee~ e \ If:;: \ If:;: " A I <\ \ \: \ ' \: \ " 7rEUY eu;; 7rapeowKe 'TTJV 7ra'Tpwa 'Tt{J i..l.Wvvuup: oc; 'Ta<:; owpea<:; a7rooov<:; 'Tt{J ' 'TOV') ' xapurap..evoc; 'f:: \: f:;:l \ \ \ I ',.+." " I \: I es r;vopwrroo~ua'To, Ka~ 'Ta<:; fLEV K'TTJCYeu:; e-yr;Ke 'Tau; (Frpa'TWJ'Tau:; o~ap7raua~, ' "'' I ' ' ' I I , II' I "'' ' 'Ta oe 'Te~xr; Ka~ 'Ta<; ouaa<:; Ka'TeCYKa 'I' ev. 7rapwrrlvr;auv<:; oe Ka~ 'Tau; Ka'Tava£ou:; ' 'TOV') ' ' ' aVX.JLal'vUJ'TOV') ' EV 525 Another example of a center created for a new population was the city of Tyndaris, which held former inhabitants from Messenia. The city, founded in 396/5, was dependent on Syracuse at least until the time of Agathocles. Walls of various periods remain, and the city was built on a Hippodamian plan with jnsulae of equal size. For discussion of the site, see Barreca 1957. The planning of the site is discussed in DiVita 1996:296-99. 163 EOwp0ua'To, 'TO~') oe KafL7ravols 'T0v 7r6tvw 'T(J)V Ka'Tava£wv olKTJ'T0pwv f!OwKev. Afterwards, Procles, the commander of the Naxians, after being won over by great promises, delivered over his native city to Dionysius, who, after paying the promised gifts to the traitor and granting him his kinsmen, sold the inhabitants into slavery, turned their property over to the soldiers to plunder, and razed the walls and the dwellings. He also meted out a similar treatment to the Catanians, selling the captives he took as booty in Syracuse. The territory of the Naxians he gave as a present to the neighboring Siceli and granted to the Campanians the city of the Catanians as their dwelling-place. This movement is attested not only in Diodorus but also in archaeological and numismatic records. The layout and location of Naxos was changed from its former orientation, and the city minted new coins. 526 Furthermore, the new coinage of C b · · 1 · 527 w· h h atane ore w1tness to 1ts mercenary popu atwn. 1t t ese movements, we see that Dionysius did not just change the location of people under his rule but also their status, in this case from free to slave. Such an action was common under empires, as seen by the treatment of the inhabitants of Melos under the Athenian Empire during the Peloponnesian War. 528 Ironically, it was the relationship between Athens and NaxosjCatane during the Peloponnesian War, especially during the Athenian 526 For example, Naxos moved away from the harbor and its archaic center. See Lomas 2006: 110- 12 for the changes in city planning under Dionysius I. 527 Issues of coins dating after 403 have the image of the butting bull on the reverse, a oommon image which reflected the presence of mercenaries, who were stationed at Catane until most of them were moved to Aetna in 396 (Diad. Sic. 14.58.2). See Pope 2009: 133-34 for discussion of this numismatic evidence. 528 For the commenoement of hostilities against Melos, see Thuc. 5.114. 164 Expedition, that condemned these two poJejs to their fate. By enslaving free Greek citizens, Dionysius again was creating a new template for his empire. Those cities which were unwilling to accede to this new political landscape were dealt with severely. Dionysius was not necessarily creating a 'Dorian' empire (although his close connections with Sparta would suggest some sort of shared bond), but the genealogy of Naxos and Catane had marked them within the empire as outliers that could be rooted out if necessary. Just as Dionysius had quickly changed the status of the Carthaginians, the hegemony of these cities was destroyed in order to make way for new populations who were more amenable and useful for the maintenance and expansion of the empire, namely the Sicels and Campanians. From these events, two observations can be made. First, the existence of many people in eastern Sicily during this period was precarious. For example, the Naxians were either sold into slavery or managed to escape to Mylae, a town set up by Rhegium for the refugees. 529 When Messana captured the city, the Naxians again had to flee to various cities in Sicily. The Naxian exiles would only be gathered together again at Tauromenium by Andromachus, the father of Timaeus. 530 Second and more important to the discussion concerning identity, we see a dual process of migration, when one group hostile to the tyrant was pushed out in order to make room for other groups with whom the tyrant wished to ally himself. In this case, these non-Dorian cities were a target because of their unwillingness to become part 529 For the transportation of the Naxians to Mylae, see Diad. Sic. 14.87.1. After a battle at Messene, the Naxians were dispersed across the island, only to be brought together again by Andromachus. 53 ° For the foundation of Tauromenium by Andromachus, see Diad. 16.7.1. 165 of Dionysius's growing empire and their previous status as allies of the Athenians. The Naxians had accepted the Athenian fleet and had furnished them with supplies at the onset of the Athenian Expedition. 531 Indeed, the Naxians and Cataneans were the closest allies of Athens, having remained so with them even when other Sicilian cities had broken off relations. 532 Dionysius thus could achieve two goals with one action, namely the defeat of possible future adversaries and the support of possible allies (e.g. the Sicels and Campanians) through land grants. The identity of Naxos and Catane as non-Dorian cities who had aided the enemy of Syracuse (and indeed all of Sicily, who had been the target of the Athenians) created an ideological base on which the tyrant could more easily base his aggression. D. Barbarian rewards: Dionysius, the Sicels, and the Campanians Within the spectrum of treatment concerning various groups under Dionysius I, the non-Greek Sicels landed on the positive side. After gaining power in Syracuse, Dionysius turned his attention to the area around Mount Aetna and in the center of the island, both strongholds of the Sicels, as a possible area to expand his empire. Although the identity of the Sicels eventually disappeared, after their territory and people were incorporated into Greek settlements, 533 Sicel identity as a unified 531 See Diad. Sic. 13.4.3-4 and Thuc. 6.50.2-3. 532 Thuc. 7.57.11. 533 Micciche 2007: 428-30 discusses the gradual decline of the Sicels during the fourth century, as attested both through archaeology and historical sources. For example, after the reign of Dionysius I, the Sicels only appear again in 356 as allies in the retaking of Syracuse by Dian (Diad. Sic. 16.9.5) and then in 342, when oertain predominantly Sioel sites (e.g. Enna and Agyrium) joined the symmachja of Timoleon (Diad. Sic. 16.73.2). While several Sicel sites (for example, at Sabucina and Vassallaggi) show some numismatic evidence to the end of the fourth century, most Sicel sites are in decline well before then. 166 political force was still strong enough in the late fifth and early fourth centuries to warrant attention on the part of the tyrant. Although the center of the island, a stronghold of the Sicels, had been given relative autonomy in the treaty of 405, 534 Dionysius quickly broke the treaty and attacked Herbita, which managed to fight against the tyrant and to sign a treaty. 535 Within this chain of events, Dionysius attempted to reconcile his role as conqueror with that of a protector in order to hide his imperialistic intentions, as when he exiled the tyrant of Herb ita, Archonides, who then founded the city of Halaesa Archonidea. 536 By giving the inhabitants of Halaesa their 'autonomy' again, he could portray himself as the protector of Sicel sovereignty. 537 This process of image reconciliation was seen at Enna in 403/2, when Dionysius placed an aristocrat, Aeimnestos, in a position of leadership, only to remove him when Aeimnestos began to rebel against the tyrant. 538 By then deposing the rebel, Dionysius could appear as the trustworthy leader who saved the city from 534 For the terms of the treaty of 405 with Carthage, see Diad. Sic. 13.114.1, which states that the Sicels would live under their own laws. 535 For Dionysius's decision to war against the Sicels, see Diad. Sic. 14.7.5. For the treaty with Herbita, see Diad. Sic. 14.15.1. Franco 2008: 183-88 has an extensive summary of events. 536 Diad. Sic. 14.16.1 discusses the founding of Halaesa, with Archonides as its epjstates, and notes that it was formed from groups of mercenaries, the poor of Herbita, and a mixed group with Syracusan exiles ( ElxE ryap fLW-8o¢6pov'; TE 7r"'A,Elov'; KaL mJfLfLU<,crov tJx!.,ov ... 7ro"'J\,"'A,oL OE KaL TCDV a7r6pwv 'Ep(3Lwiwv). Diodorus also notes (14.16.4) that the Carthaginians may have helped in its founding. While the oenter shows continued Sicel influence with the cult of the god Adranus, the name shows Italic influenoe. For discussion, see Franco 2008: 183-88, as well as Oochipinti 2006: 72-73. 537 For the grant of autonomy, see Diad. Sic. 14.15.1 and 14.16.1. 538 Diad. Sic. 14.14.6-8. 167 stasjs, even when the political turmoil was caused by his own political . . . 539 part1e1patwn. While such episodes show the foresight of Dionysius as he expanded his empire beyond Syracuse even in the early years of his rule, other actions by the tyrant show stronger signs of empire building. Not only did Dionysius 'provide autonomy' for the inhabitants of these existing Sicel cities, but he also created new centers for them. The first example occurred in 403, when he attacked the city of Naxos, sold all of its inhabitants into slavery, and then gave the land to Sicel settlers. 540 The disposal of the former inhabitants did double duty for Dionysius, since it not only rooted out a locus of political hostility toward the tyrant but also rewarded the Sicels and won their favor. 541 The second more substantial action by Dionysius was the creation in 400 of a new Sicel center, Adranum, named after the Sicel deity. 542 Unfortunately, little is known about the founding, since the passage of Diodorus only mentions Adranum between two completely different narratives. 543 In 539 Diad. Sic. 14.14.6-8 notes that this action was taken to convince other cities to believe in his protection ( Wr;; (3ovA,6fLEVO<; 7rpoTpE'}raa-8aL TGs lf'A).,"ar;; 7r6""A,El8 ainip 7rlliTEVEw). For further discussion of the episode at Enna, see Miociche 2008: 124-25. 540 Diad. Sic. 14.15.2-3. The father of the historian Timaeus was one of the victims of this action. 541 Occhipinti 2006: 70-71 argues that these actions, as well as the episode at Enna, were ways for Dionyius to ingratiate himself with the Sioels at the expense of the cities of Chalicidian extraction. Dionysius also established a garrison of Sicel mercenaries after his defeat of Motya in 397, as attested in Diad. Sic. 14.53.5. 542 Adranum was built near the center of Mendocino, which was destroyed between 408 and 403. Because of a later cities built on top of the site, little has been found at the site, save for some Sioel artefacts that attest to its identification. 543 Diad. Sic. 14.37.4 merely states that Dionysius founded a city on the slopes of Mount Aetna and called it Adranum from the name of a temple ('roVTwv OE 7rpaTTOfJivwv b.wvVaLor;; 0Ev Ev Tfj "'i.ucE/-..,~ 1r6t.,w ~ICTWEV inr' ai.nOv TDv Tijr;; AfTV1J<; t..,Ocpov, Ka'i d7r6 Twor;; E7rupavoV'> LEpoV 168 one sense, Dionysius founded this site for political reasons, in order to combat the new influence of Halaesa Archonidea in the area, which transported many Greeks into the city after its founding. 544 Although little is known of the status of the city at this time, 545 the choice of Dionysius to name it after a Sicel deity shows a deliberate desire on the part of the tyrant to preserve Sicel identity. This attachment to Sicel identity ties directly to the desire of Dionysius to appear as the protector of Sicily. Although the Sicels were non-Greek, their status as an indigenous group tied to the land played a role in pro-Dionysian propaganda, as was seen most notably in the appearance of the Galeotae in the birth myths of the tyrants. 546 As noted in the first, while the presence of the Galeotae ultimately confused the status of Dionysius, the Galeotae, as the only ones able to interpret the future of the tyrant, established a mythical link to pre-Greek Sicily and the Sicels, a link that was strengthened by the political actions in the center of the island. The success of Dionysius's plan was limited, because the Sicels continued to be a contentious neighbor throughout the first two decades of his reign through their 7rpouJry6pEvuEv ai.n1w ''AOpavov). This single statement is placed in between the anabasjs of soldiers under Xenophon and political events of Maoedonia. 544 This argument is made in Cusumano 2009: 52-53. 545 The entry for Adranum in Puglisi 2009 notes that, like most of the cities in this area, the first substantial coinage extant dates from the rejuvenation of the area under Timoleon. Later coinage retains the symbolism of mercenaries located in the area (e.g. the bull). From the earliest years of the reign of Dionysius, mercenary settlements were common in the area, as with the establishment of a garrison with Campanian mercenaries at Agyrium (Diad. Sic. 14.9.2-3). 546 For the dream, see Cic. Djv. 1.20.39 (~ FGrH 556 F57). For the city of Hybla Gereatis, see Paus. 5.23.6. See also chapter 1, pages 50-52. 169 relationship with Athens. 547 Nevertheless, the Sicels were originally a possible source of support for Dionysius, both through their political influence in the center of the island and through their status as indigenous inhabitants of the island who could legitimize the reign of Dionysius as the protector of Sicily. In addition, the inclusion of these Sicel centers showed the multicultural nature of the empire of Dionysius. Although the prevwus episode against the Carthaginians showed otherwise, Dionysius was certainly willing to include other ethnic groups m his empue, especially ones who increased his credibility and provided support for him in the interior of the island. The other non-Greek group preferred by Dionysius was the contingent of Campanian mercenaries, whom Dionysius often relied upon throughout his reign. The most famous example was his use of mercenaries in quelling the revolt of the Syracusans against him in 404, which would begin a long period of reliance and mutual assistance between the Campanians and Dionysius. 548 As seen above in the example of the land grant of Catane to the Campanians, Dionysius included his mercenaries in the process of mass migration. In this instance, the reason was far 547 The Sioels had begun already to revolt again in 396, as attested in Diad. Sic. 14.58.1. An Athenian proxeny decree (IGI 3 228), dating from 385/4 (as known from the archon formula), is evidence of a relationship between the Athenians and the Sicel leaders Archonides and Damon. The Archonides in this inscription is likely the son of the Archonides who founded Halaesa Archonidea, while Damon likely was the leader of Centoripe who was at war with Dionysius in 396 (Diad. Sic. 14.78.7). Lines 9-14 establish that the inscription is a re establishment of proxeny that was given earlier between 435 and 415. The inscription likely was an attempt between Athens and the Sioels to maintain links, sinoe both were hostile to Dionysius at this time. For discussion of the inscription, see Walbank 1978: 354-58 and Culasso Gataldi 2002: 104. See also Chapter 5, pages 319-20 for Sicel-Athenian relations. 548 See Diad. Sic. 14.7-10 for the revolt. 170 more political than ideological. Dionysius needed to station his mercenaries relatively nearby, while also placing them strategically in the zone between areas of Syracusan and Carthaginian hegemony. Thus, the phrourja seen in the hinterlands and the already established location of Catane were ways to provide long-term housing for his mercenaries. 549 In addition, such land grants were a way for the tyrant to pay his mercenaries in lieu of money, especially for Dionysius I, whose large quantities of mercenaries surely exhausted his coffers. 550 Ideologically, the presence of Campanians was of no particular benefit to Dionysius I. At this point, however, it was not a hindrance either. The Campanians in Sicily were first given negative billing in the famous passage of Plato, where he feared that Oscan will supplant Greek as the main language on Sicily. 551 While the Campanians still maintained a strong identity for decades to come, 552 their more ambiguous identity at this time did not necessarily mean that they were an enemy to be feared or as the quintessential barbarian. Dionysius therefore did not need to treat them as he had treated the Carthaginians, since they were not a threat to the tyrant and were his agents of rule in many ways. Because of their intervention in Syracusan military matters from the beginning, they were the stable flag-bearers of Dionysius's new empire, in the same way that the Sicels represented an older Sicily. The possible 549 Ma 2002: 116-17 discusses the different types of housing for soldiers and their respective implications for the ruler. 55 ° For land grants as payment, see for example, Krasilnikoff 1995: 176-77. 551 Pl. Ep. 8.353e (dating from 352). Sironen 1995: 185-88 discusses this passage and the status of the Oscan language in Sicily, while he also mentions that Lydus, Mens. 1.13 and a scholium to Juv. 3.207 describe the low status of Oscan. 552 Zambon 2001: 249-52 mentions the coinage of Campanian cities, which showed Italian imagery and often had the legend KAMIIANDN. 171 geographical and linguistic links between the Campanians and the Sicels also may strengthen this comparison, although how much Dionysius knew of this is suspect (even though later authors were more convinced). 553 Thus, even though the presence of the Campanians in these mass migrations was mainly due to political and military necessity, their status as foreigners did not, at first, cause major issues. If any issues arose with their status, however, their military might overcame any negative reactions to their image. Furthermore, as with the Sicels, there was no apparent fluidity of their status (as seen with the Carthaginians). These two groups were always treated kindly by the tyrant, with no sudden policy changes making them the enemy. The reasons for this treatment were strategic, as the Sicels were necessary for the center of the island and the Campanians were militarily necessary for the increase of the empire. From this analysis of mass migrations, several important conclusions appear. Within these processes, Dionysius exploited existing identities even while creating new paradigms. He affirmed preexisting negative opinions of certain groups but adapted them slightly to his new system. The world of the Sjkejjotaj put forward in the speech of Hermocrates had disappeared, as Greek unity had been transformed into a hierarchy where certain Greek cities were treated more fairly than others, and where non-Greek peoples were treated better than many Greeks. On the other hand, just as Hermocrates had argued his case for political reasons, so too did Dionysius shape the identities of these various groups through his population transfers for 553 For the provenanoe of the Sioels and their arrival from Italy, see Thuc. 6.2.4-6, Serv. Aen. 7.795, Dian. Hal. Ant. Rom. 1.9.22, and Diad. Sic. 5.6.3-4. Varro, Ljng. 5.105 and 5.179 also note similarities between Latin and Sicel. 172 political gain. Instead of repelling the growing empire of Athens under the direction of Hermocrates, however, Dionysius sought to expand his own empire. Dionysius too was the shaper of identities, in that he decided who the insider and who the outsider were in his new world. This inside-ness and outside-ness were not limited to the sphere of ideology but were demonstrated physically and geographically through the processes of immigration and emigration undertaken in these mass migrations. Thus, to be an outsider often meant expulsion beyond the walls of the city, at a time when the tyrant was building on the foundations of the past his new world with him at the very center. Within this chapter, we have seen how the tyrants attempted to move themselves away from their status as political outsider to the center of the city by various means. The easiest way for the tyrant to gain the trust of the populace at the beginning of his rule and at moments when his rule was threatened was the creation of an outsider, an enemy from whom the tyrant could protect his pojjs. By finding this outsider (or later by introducing foreigners into the city), the tyrant attempted to convince his citizens that the 'threat' from another source was far greater than the threat to political stability that he brought to the pojjs. Furthermore, after the tyrant seized power, by providing benefactions either to his own city or to other cities around the Mediterranean, the tyrant consciously supplanted his former image as a nuisance with the image as a protector of all things Greek. As seen especially with Dionysius I, the tyrant could exploit this role to gain hegemony over larger areas, especially through the process of mass migrations in the guise of protection. Not only could he displace or enslave large populations who were hostile to his plans, but he also could replace them with groups more useful to his rule, such as mercenanes. 173 Thus, he was able to rule throughout Sicily and gained the resources he needed to expand his empire overseas. 174 CHAPTER 3- HERE TODAY, GONE TOMORROW: THE (NON-)COHESION OF THE DIONYSIAN COURT The next two chapters will analyze a mam source of migrants who were in close proximity to the tyrant: his court. Sicilian tyrants were not umque m demonstrating an interest in cultivating scholarly and political life, since various leaders across the Greek world encouraged movement of poets and scholars to their own courts. 554 These leaders understood that the import of talented men was an excellent way to convert cultural capital into political power, as these court members not only helped the tyrant to appear more cultured but also provided him with vital logistical advice by which he could rule. The Dionysii, major promoters of the court atmosphere, also benefited from their prime location in the center of the Mediterranean, since Sicily was a natural crossroads to which influential intellectuals could be attracted. 555 In the changing world of the early fourth century, 556 with their own hegemony under threat, the Dionysii (in theory) could harness their scholarly base in order to create political and cultural power. 557 This chapter will discuss the logistics of the court. What did this court look like? As the center of the process of 554 For the court as part of the foreign policy of the tyrant, see White 1955: 12-14, who focuses especially on Polycrates of Samos. Syracusans also showed up in the entourage of other leaders, such as Philistides, who was a thaumatopojos in the court of Alexander. See Ath. 1.20a and 12.538e, as well as Milanezi 2004: 191-93. 555 For Sicily as a scholarly locus, see R.ostagni 1957. 556 Krasilnikoff 1995: 179-80 discusses the court of Dionysius as creating a new type of world order created after the stasis and political decay after the Peloponnesian War. 557 Catenacci 1996: 232-39 identifies the tyrant in his role as the sjgnore della parola, who gathered scholars in order to oonfirm his status as leader and promulgator of Greekness. 175 mobility for many men from different poJejs, how did its members function, in relation to the tyrant, to the city of Syracuse, and to each other? 558 In looking at both the cultural and political aspects of the court, we will see that the court ultimately provided some benefit to the tyrants, but this benefit was limited by the behavior of the tyrant and the (lack of) structure in the court. The main cause for this limitation is found in the process of migration itself. Although the Dionysii were successful at bringing men to their court, they were not successful at integrating them properly politically and socially into Syracuse. As represented through the testimony of the sources, the court was over-mobile, since members often did not remain long enough to make an impact or were sent away by the tyrants due to personal enmity. Part of the temporary nature of the court was due to the identity of the members. This type of scholarly centrifugal force, where court members were often drawn into the court, only to be thrown out again quickly, not only prevented them from properly increasing the power of the tyrants but also damaged the image of the tyrants both contemporarily and in later sources. This lack of cohesiveness and structure also calls into question the terminology of the 'court' as such, since its stability as an institution was rarely visible in the sources. Unlike other migrants (e.g. the victims of mass migrations discussed in the previous chapter), court members often had free will to organize their time at the court. Except for Syracusans, all members participated in a temporary change of residence, whether their residence at the court lasted a few weeks or a few years. Furthermore, as mentioned in the introduction of the dissertation, 'migrant' is a 558 For the court of the tyrant defying a pojjs-centered approach due to the inclusion of men from various cities, see Vlassopoulos 2007: 102. 176 blanket term that can refer to either voluntary or involuntary mobility. In this case, their entrance into the court was completely voluntary (although, as we will see, their exit occasionally was coerced). In opposition to other migrants, who were dependent on the tyrant for rights and even their lives, the members of the court had greater freedom. Their relationship with the tyrant was far more equal, as they offered education or ldeos for the tyrant in exchange for monetary rewards. This freedom, often in the form of parrh§sja (free speech), was one fundamental way through which the court member threatened the authority of the tyrant, especially in political matters. As we will see in the following chapter, this more ambiguous status of the court member jeopardized their safety within the court. Before beginning with the logistics of the court, one obvious question comes to mind: why did tyrants see the need to create a court? By court, I mean this community of men who had regular personal contact with the tyrant, whether in a ludic, scholarly, or political context. What benefits did such an institution provide? As we have seen, the tyrant had ample access to military power and could easily establish his power through these means. Yet as we saw in the previous chapter, the tyrant gained and increased his power through many different channels, including ideological and political. In a more abstract sense, the maintenance of a court offered the opportunity for the tyrant to show himself as the bearer of Greek culture, not only in Syracuse but across the Greek world. More substantively, the tyrant's access to a large group of intelligent and influential men would provide him with proper advice concerning his rule over Syracuse and his growing empire. 177 Part I: The logistics of the court process A. Divisions The fourth century was a general time of mobility for scholars, as they moved around the Greek world to spread their ideas to various leaders. This tendency was especially apparent in the literary sources through the intervention of sophists, whose constant movement (especially for money) and willingness to bounce from city to city was depicted negatively in the sources. 559 Indeed, Diogenes the Cynic upbraided both Aristippus and Plato for their time spent at the court of the Dionysii and quipped that they would have not sold themselves intellectually if they would have been content with their lives. 560 Other scholars were lauded for the efforts to travel to various cities, as they attempted to positively affect the pojjs and its evolution. 561 Indeed, Plato himself traveled across the Mediterranean to Syracuse to experiment with his philosophical ideas on the citizenry of Syracuse, in order to persuade the Syracusans and their leader to cultivate a more fulfilling and less debauched lifestyle. 562 The philosopher, who famously traveled back and forth to 559 Montiglio 2005: 105-8 discusses the negative view of sophists due to their attachment to material goods. Montiglio 2000: 92-93 argues that sophists did not want to station themselves in one plaoe but to profit from society by gathering in strategic locations with the resources to support them. She cites various negative views by Plato, including Pl. Ti 19e and Pl. Soph. 224b, as evidence for a negative view of these men. 56 ° For example, Aristippus joked that Diogenes would not have needed to waste his time washing lettuce if he would have gone to the court of the Dionysii (Val. Max. 4.3 ext.4b). After this insult, Diogenes stated that Aristippus would not have needed to flatter Dionysius if he had contented himself with eating vegetables (sj tu jsta esse velles, non adularere Djonysjum). See Diog. Laert. 6.2.58 for a similar situation between Plato and Diogenes. 561 See Campbell 1984: 17-18, 20-22, and 57-58, who details the new role of scholars in the fourth century, as they attempted to influence the structure of these pofejs, 562 For the reasons for Plato to travel to Syracuse, both philosophical and political, see Isnardi 178 Sicily three times in order to collaborate with both Dionysius I and Dionysius II, eventually would regret his travels on the island and would depict himself as an Odysseus who was forced to wander around the Mediterranean in vain. 563 Traveling to the court of a tyrant, however, was popular long before the fourth century. The meeting between the foreign wise man and the tyrant was a common trope in literature from the very birth of tyranny. 564 For example, the Seven Sages were reported to have met at the court of the tyrant Cypselus in Corinth, 565 while the Corinthian tyrant Periander was reported to have invited a group of wise men to his own court. 566 Cleisthenes of Sicyon would provide precedent for the attraction of influential men to his court through the competition for the hand of his daughter. 567 The Deinomenids also had set a precedent within Syracuse by inviting various scholars to join them at the court. Aelian states that Hieron, after becoming ill, turned himself to scholarly pursuits and invited various scholars to his court. 568 The court of Hieron became a place for various poets, such as Pindar, Aeschylus, and Parente 1970: 104-9. 563 For the hatred of his wandering in Sicily, see Pl. Ep. 7.350d. The referenoe to Odysseus is found in Pl. Ep. 7.345d-e. 564 See Gray 1986, especially 119-21, where she cites Diad. Sic. 9.26 as a discussion of this trope. 565 D. L t 11 40 (' '' ' - ' ' "' ' K ,,,,, ' ' ' ' "' -) 10g. aer . . . OfLI.Jx,t.aV aU'T(JJV avaryeypa't'E 7rapa V'fEI'vC[), TJ IWL aU'fO') 't'1JOL 7rapaTVXEW. The author of this statement was Archetimus of Syracuse. Ephorus, on the other hand, stated that they met at the court of King Croesus ("E<j>opo' o€ 7rapa Kpofmp ). 566 D. L t 1 7 99 (' ' '' • - ' '' • ' ' ' " ' ' ) Th. I wg. aer . . . eywv oE VfLa'> a7rooEXOfLaL, we; LUTE aV'roL, on uafLOTLICWTwra . IS group a so apparently had convened at the Lydian court the year before ( 7rEV8ofLaL We; 1rEpvn EryEvero VpJVv •' ' ' ' A ,, , " ' ' ) al'vW 1rapa TOV vuov E<; L.apoEl8 . 567 Hdt. 6.126-32. 568 Ael. VH 4.15. Aelian oompares Hieron to Gelon, whom he characterizes as uncultured ( tl.p.ovuo' ). 179 Bacchylides, to possibly meet and to praise the tyrant. 569 Thus, the Dionysii had a successful precedent which they attempted to reproduce within their own courts, after they had seen how the presence of famous scholars at the court increased the renown of the tyrant as a powerful leader and patron. Within these earlier examples of courts, as well as the court of the Dionysii, we see the court as a more permanent alternative to the temporary gathering of influential scholars at panhellenic festivals every few years. Indeed, the position of Syracuse in the West, both as a center of political power and as a link between the eastern and western Mediterranean, allowed the pojjs to become a quasi-panhellenic site, with visitors from around the Mediterranean. Yet instead of gathering to share common Greek traditions at a sanctuary, the foci of this gathering at the court were the kleosofthe tyrant and the increase of his empire. It is not certain that the tyrant co-opted all theatrical and scholarly production in the city, however. Syracuse already had a thriving dramatic environment in the fifth century, as evidenced by Dionysius's entrance in the theater when he attempted to usurp power. Little is known about the types of festivals at Syracuse (we learn that the Festival of Pitchers was celebrated there due to a reference about the winning of a prize by Xenocrates) 570 or the degree to which the tyrant directed their celebration. Under the Dionysii, however, we do not see a heavy presence of the traditional type of poet 569 Pindar and Baochylides composed their Olympjan 1 and Ode 5 both in 4 76. They later composed their Pythjan 2 and Ode 3 respectively in 468. Aeschylus had been at Syracuse for the first time from 4 72 to 467. For various poets together at the court of the Deinomenids, see Svarlien 1990-1991: 103-5. 570 "' h. · d D. L 4 2 8 ex - -'' e' · '"' ' - ror t IS ep1so e, see wg. aert. . . pump OTE'f'avcp TLfL1J EVTa E7rau""cp 7ro/-..,v7rouws TOl8 Xovul 7rapa !3.wvvu&p), Ath. 10.437b, and Ael. VH2.41. 180 seen at the court (e.g. epinician and tragedic poets, such as Aeschylus and Pindar). As will be seen below, Dionysius I himself took on the role of court tragedian, by composing his own poetry that was performed at other panhellenic festivals. Scattered testimony of court members under the Dionysii remains in various literary sources. 571 The discussion in the following two chapters will focus on the Dionysii, rather than Agathocles. While Agathocles did not promote the scholarly court of his predecessors, he still maintained a group of men who gathered around him, 572 although the paucity of references does not allow fruitful discussion of the processes of Agathocles' court. As a former mercenary, Agathocles did not seem as interested to spend his resources on creating a court, since he established himself more by means of a strong military rather than attempting to make us of cultural capital. In addition, his less stationary lifestyle (e.g. his time around Carthage) would have made maintaining a court more difficult. As we turn to the court of the Dionysius, one major difficulty appears concerning the definition of its members. The system of the court during the early fourth century was not firmly established, with few official divisions. 573 Revolving around the tyrant was a mix of various professions 571 The most comprehensive list of intellectuals at the court of the Dionysii is found in Squillace 2012: 21-28. Other lists are found in Sanders 1987: 1-3, Sanders 1979-1980: 64-66, Todisco 2002:67-68, Di Fede 1949:79-80, and Orsi 1994: 52-55 (the latter two discuss Dionysius II). 572 Ath. 11.466a preserves a fragment from Caecilius of Caleacte, which describes how Agathocles displayed drinking cups that he had made to his companions ('AcyaeoKicca <jnwl TCJV Tvpavvov EK/TrWfLWTa xpvmi E7rWELICVLwra TOL'; ETaLpolS cpdaK£w). The friends here are described in different terms than earlier members of the court, as noted by Sordi 2008: 63-64. Polyaenus, Strat. 5.3.1 and Zaccara 2006: 172-77 also discuss the appearance of the friends of Agathocles. 573 Herman 1980-1981 discusses the evolution of the court as demonstrated in inscriptions and argues that the turning point from a more amorphous, generalized group to one with defined boundaries and positions occurred around 280 BC. After this period, more technical titles for 181 (bodyguards, intellectuals, physicians, etc.) who stayed at the court for different periods of time. 574 The most discussed groups around the tyrant were his phjJoj ('friends') and kolakes ('flatterers'). What was the function of each group, and were they separate groups in reality? For example, the large groups of flatterers around the Dionysii were mentioned several times in ancient sources, 575 where they were portrayed as acting ridiculously to preserve the honor of the tyrant, such as pretending to be blind to match the near-sightedness of Dionysius II. 576 They commonly appeared as drinking buddies who mimicked the poor behavior of the sons of Dionysius. 577 The most famous of these kolakesperhaps was Democles, who was an associate of Dionysius II, who frequently played the buffoon and destroyed an embassy of the tyrant on account of his ridiculous behavior. 578 Confusingly, however, poets and other scholars also were frequently shown in the context of drinking parties and sitting at a prized position near the tyrant, in order to gain his trust. 579 members of the court appear. 574 For the diversity of the court, see Herman 1997: 213-15. 575 Many of these references are oontained in Athenaeus, including 6.249e-f and 10.435d-e. For further debate on the definition of the Djonysokolakes (i.e. if they were mere flatterers or also a special term for actors), see Ceccarelli 2004: 116-19. For a general overview of the flatterers, see Ceccarelli 2004: 119-24. See also Chapter 4, pages 230-32. 576 Ath. 6.249e-f. 577 In one instanoe, Dionysius II was reported to have been drunk for ninety days to the point of blindness (Ath. 10.435d ~ Arist. Constjtutjon of the Syracusans F528 Rose). His flatterers again feigned blindness, so that the tyrant would not be embarrassed. Although the tale may be exaggerated, the behavior of the flatterers is not out of the question. Ath. 10.436a also notes that kolakes also hung around Apollocrates, another son of Dionysius I. 578 For the episode, see Ath. 6.250a-d. Another kolax by the name of Satyrus is mentioned under both Dionysii. Athenaeus only preserves his name from the works of Timaeus but says nothing else about him. 579 See also Xenophanes (page 200) and Aristippus (page 203). 182 For example, Dionysius I was especially fond of having the poet Philoxenus drink with him, 580 and even Plato made an appearance at these banquets. 581 Were these men counted among the kolakes, or were they considered as a more educated elite group? The same problematic arises with the definition of the philoi In most instances, as will be discussed in more detail next chapter, 582 the phjJoj seemed to have a more political role as advisors to the tyrant. 583 Many of the phjJoj, however, also had the negative tendencies of the kolakes and took advantage of their relationship with the tyrant rather than providing advice. Thus, the definition of the kolakes and phjJoj seems to have been fluid, although the terminology often reflects more the positive or negative bias of the author, rather than the specific duties of these groups (i.e. that kolakes were the negative manifestation of this group). Overall, however, the sources do not provide enough information to determine any official procedures or administration, as was seen later in the courts of the Seleucids or the Ptolemies. Before turning to greater discussion of the court of the Dionysii, it is useful to provide a very brief overview of these other later courts in the Mediterranean. For example, the courts of the Ptolemies and the Seleucids had a much greater level of administration. Because of the nature of the sources, we know much more about these courts and their divisions. For example, the later space of the court in 580 Ath. 1.6e-f (uvvEfLE8vE OE Tip cp~_) .. ,agEvcp i/8Ewr;; 6 b.wvVuw0. 581 Plato was present at a banquet which Dionysius II was holding for the youths of Locri Epizephyrii, as noted in Pl. Ep. 13.360a. Pl. also makes mention elsewhere (e.g. Pl. Ep. 7.326b-d) of the lavish banquets that both Dionysii gave. 582 Again see Chapter 4, pages 230-32. 583 For discussion of the role of the phjfoj, see especially Sordi 2008. 183 Ptolemaic Egypt was much more well-defined. Members of the court, which included both Greeks and Egyptians, had official titles, such as syngenejs (kinsman of the king), a level which seemed closest in several levels of interaction with the Ptolemaic King. 584 Although the hierarchy of the court grew even larger as the Hellenistic period progressed, earlier courts like those of the Dionysii, did not seem to be as well defined. While Alexander created his court from both the Macedonian Greeks and Persians, 585 most early courts seemed to consist of the Macedonian elites (i.e. wholly Greek, as with the Syracusan court). 586 Concerning terminology, Polybius, who had a quite negative view of the court due to their back-stabbing tendencies (which also will be discussed below in regard to the court of the Dionysii), only referred to the court members as 'those around the court' ( o[ 7rep~ 'T0v aVtv0v) or 'courtiers' ( o[ a!iAuw0, a rather amorphous term that reflected the same lack of terminology in the court of the Dionysii. The Ptolemaic and Seleucid courts seemed to expand into their larger and more artificial hierarchies later in the second (or perhaps third 587 ) century. The terminology of the court members expanded into various groups of syngenejs and philoj. 588 These earlier courts, however, seemed to be close-knit groups of friends around the king built through bonds of cfnt..ia (as with, for example, the 584 For a recent overview of the Ptolemaic court and its transformation, see Moyer 2011. Moyer also provides an overview of the Hellenistic courts in general and the evolution in modern scholarship of its understanding. 585 For the composition of the early oourt under Alexander, see Spawforth 2007. 586 For overiviews of the oourts of the Hellenistic Period, see Habicht 1958 and Herman 1997. For an overview of the Seleucid oourt, see Savalli-Lestrade 1998. 587 Dreyer 2011 argues that the growth of administration in the court of the Seleucids began earlier than previously thought. 588 See Dreyer 2011: 48-49 for further discussion of the hierarchy. 184 Dionysii and Plato or Archytas of Tarentum). The Hellenistic courts did seem more progressive in their size and consumption, in opposition to the court of the Dionysii, which did not seem to progress far beyond the palace. Furthermore, as noted above, as the empire of the Hellenistic kingdoms grew, the question of ethnicity in the court became more important, a problem not experienced in the court of Dionysii (except perhaps for the Campanian mercenaries who formed the bodyguard of the tyrant). At their core, however, later courts followed the same equation as the court of the Dionysii, namely that social connection between the court and the tyrant/king was based on exchange: monetary gain and perhaps renown for the court members in return for loyalty to the ruler. 589 These courts also were international, drawing in groups of poets and other scholars from around the Mediterranean. 590 At its core, the court of the Dionysii did not maintain the hierarchy or political reach that later courts had. Yet as we will see below, the tyrants of Syracuse still attempted to gain political and cultural capital from their court, even though the amorphous nature of the court prevented them from doing so. B. Traveling and departing We will now turn to the actual process of the court. When studying such a process of mobility, the various practicalities of immigrating and emigrating come into play. 591 How were scholars invited and how did they arrive at the court? 592 589 Moyer 2011: 18-19. 590 Dreyer 2011: 4 7 discusses this international identity at the court of Philip at Pella. 591 For further discussion on the practicality of movement, see chapter 6 of Noy 2000. 592 An interesting later parallel between a Syracusan traveling to the court of a monarch is that of Theocritus to Ptolemy II Philadelphus. Theocritus focuses on his Syracusan identity in Jd. 11 and Jd. 28. Hunter 1996: 118-19 argues that the arrival of the Syracusans Praxinoa and 185 Where did they stay, and how were they recompensed for their work? The first part of this process concerns how they arrived and departed. The earliest court members (kolakes and phjJm) obviously came from the closest circle of the tyrant in Syracuse. The reasons for later members to come to the court varied between different court members. From the geographical distribution of the members of the court, it does not seem that the tyrants chose their court based on any predilection for certain areas but rather based on their talents. 593 As will be discussed further below, a major draw to the court was the monetary benefits provided by the tyrant. It did not seem very likely for a scholar to merely show up at the court and to expect to become a member, as did Aeschines, who arrived at the court and was ignored by the tyrant at first. 594 One possible opening for men to become court members stemmed from political links between Syracuse and the scholar's home city. Philistion, the court doctor of Dionysius II (and perhaps Dionysius I), 595 hailed from Locri Epizephyrii (although he was alternately described as a Syracusan due to his time at the court). 596 The pre-existing links between Locri and Syracuse, strengthened by the marriage between Dionysius I and the Locrian Doris, would have created the Gorgo to the festival of Adonis in Idyll 15 reflects the arrival of Theocritus at the oourt of the Ptolemies. 593 Thus argues Le Bohec 1985 for the constitution of the court of the Macedonian kings. Le Bohec also notes the presence of a hierarchy in the Macedonian members, as seen in the titles 7rpwToL ¢ileaL and HphJfLEVOL ¢ileaL. Although the Dionysii did seem to have favorites among the court, there did not seem to be a formalized hierarchy. 594 See Plutarch De adul. 67d-e (AlaxLm}'; ... 7rt.,dxiar;; OE OEVpo 7ro""A,A3w 8dt.,aTTav, Wr;; uvryryEvotx6 aoL Cna cfxl\,ouocpLa'>, i]pit.,1]Tat.). 595 Pl. Ep. 2.314d-e. 596 For this denomination, see Diog. Laert. 8.8.86 and 8.8.89. 186 opportunity for Philistion to travel to the court. 597 In the same way, the possible appearance of Xenophon at the court of Dionysius I would have been fostered by the relations between Sparta (where Xenophon had been in exile) and Dionysius I. 598 The visit of the author, between 393 and 391, 599 was likely for mutual military benefit, since Xenophon (a strong military leader) could have aided Dionysius I during his third war with Carthage during this time and would have received help during his own forays with the Persians. 600 In spite of the military benefits afforded to Dionysius and Xenophon, the scholarly influence of the court was found in his Hellenjca, perhaps published under the nom de plume of Themistogenes the Syracusan. 601 Existing relationships with other members of the court, which could be based on mere friendships or philosophical connections, also provided a way for new 597 For the marriage between Dionysius and Doris, see Chapter 5, pages 346-49. Squillace 2012: 28-32 discusses the background of Philistion more closely and focuses on the relationship between Syracuse and Locri. 598 This Xenophon was certainly the famous author, as Ath. 10.427f describes him as the son of Gryllus. The visit of Xenophon to the court is found in Ath. 10.427f-428a. Athenaeus notes a passage of Theophrastus (~ Fll8 Wimmer), which Sordi 2004: 71 uses to argue that the presence of Xenophon at the court was reliably asserted. For the political relations between Sparta and the Dionysii, see chapter 5, notes 45-69. 599 Sordi 2004: 72-73 not only argues for the presence of Xenophon at the oourt but locates his time there during these years, sinoe Xenophon was with King Agesilaus before and after this date. 600 Sordi (jbjd.) argues for the help of Sparta in the third war with Carthage (Diad. Sic. 14.90 and 14.95). Sordi 1980a: 10-11 stresses the links between Xenophon and Syracuse with the inclusion of Syracusans under Xenophon. The most famous of these is Sosis, who joined Xenophon with 300 mercenaries (Xen. An. 1.2.9). 601 Xen. Hell. 3.1.2 (8Ef1HJTocycvEL T'f' "2.vpaKouir cy€cypa7rmL) and Plutarch De glor. Ath. 345e. 187 members to be recruited. 602 Although originally ignored, Aeschines eventually was admitted into the court, with the sources diverging on the scholar who introduced him to the tyrant. Diogenes Laertius argues that Plato paid no attention to Aeschines when he arrived, which resulted in Aristippus introducing the Athenian to Dionysius, 603 while Plutarch states that it was Plato who scolded Dionysius for allowing Aeschines to travel all the way to Sicily without receiving any attention from the tyrant. 604 Xenocrates of Chalcedon, having been a pupil of Plato from a young age, became a member of the court by traveling with Plato on his final journey to Sicily. 605 Plato also brought along Speusippus on his second trip to Syracuse for company 606 and sent over Polyxenus to Dionysius II, so that he might teach the tyrant. 607 As the power of the tyrant grew internationally, it seems rather rare that the tyrant would actually invite particular scholars to the court. Relations with former or current members of the court seemed to form the basis of these invitations. Thus, as the amount of mobility increased to the court, it encouraged further mobility through existing contacts. 602 For example, when Dian brought back Callippus and his brother from Athens, Pl. notes that their friendship stemmed from time spent together and not philosophy in Pl. Ep. 7.333e (auK EK cfxl\,ouocp!.as ryeyovlnE ¢[1\,w). 603 Diog. Laert. 2.7.61 604 De adul. 67d-e. Lys. 6.6-7 noted the failure of Aeschines at the court and derided him for his fawning behavior over the tyrant, as discussed by Tuplin 1985: 372-73. Lysias states that Dionysius alone did not fall for the flattery of Andocides and refers to the tyrant as the most intelligent of all rulers. His opinion of the tyrant, however, would change to the negative in the decade from 399 BC (when this speech was given) to 388 BC (when his Olympic Oration was presented). 605 D' L t 4 2 6 ( c ' ' 11' ' " ''' ' ' ' " ' ' ' - ~' ) 10g. aer . . . OVTO') EK VEOV t~vaTWVO') 1}KOVUEV, atu'va Kai E/8 L.,iKEI'viaV aVTCfJ UVVa'lrEU1}fL1}UEV . 606 Pl. Ep. 2.314e. 607 Pl. Ep. 2.314c ( 7rEpL OE ITol-vvgEvov E8aVfLauar;; 5n 7r€p:'fwp.L uo1). 188 One notable exception to this process, however, occurred with Plato, since he was invited to the court by the Dionysii themselves on all three occasions, through the exhortation of either Dian or the Pythagoreans. When Plato was summoned for the first time, he came at the behest of Dian, so that the rule of Dionysius I would not be affected negatively by the bad-intentioned counseling of others. 608 After the poor treatment of Plato at the hands of Dionysius I, it did not seem likely that the Athenian philosopher would ever set foot on Sicily again. After Dian went to Athens from 365 to 361 to live in exile, Plato again was persuaded to return, this time with Speusippus. 609 Although the special relationship between the two men and Plato's high esteem for Dian certainly played a part, 610 he also was persuaded to return by the tyrant and his friends, who sent along numerous letters that sought his intervention in the education of Dionysius II. 611 After his mistreatment by Dionysius II on the second trip, he then was persuaded to travel back for the third time by Archytas and the Pythagoreans, who sent the court member Archedemus and other friends to Athens to encourage his return. 612 On his part, Dionysius furnished the 608 Pl. Ep. 7.327d-e. Ael. VH 4.18 notes that the arrival of his seoond visit to Syracuse was with great pomp circumstance, with Dionysius II driving Plato to his palace. Also see Plut. Vlt. Djon 13.1 for this episode. 609 For the relations between Dion and Plato and their influence on the latter's visits to Syracuse, see Sonnabend 1996: 88-89. 610 Lewis 2000: 25-26 argues that Plato saw Dian as more different than most Syracusans, describing him as eumathes and also details the importanoe of Plato for the education of Dionysius II. 611 PI E 3 317 (" ' ' ' ' ' - ' ' '" "'e ) . p. . a-c ouaL TOTE E'lrUITOI'vaL 1rapa uov ICaL 1rap al'vl'vWV 1}1'v ov . 612 Plut. VIt. Djon 18.2-3 (oL 0' i¥7rEfJ:']rav 'ApxECnJfLOV 1rap' ain6v ... KaL cpLt.,ov') Oerwo!Jlvov<; TaLi IT!-vdnvvo<;). 189 trireme for the men and sent a long letter to the tyrant beseeching him to return. 613 In order to convince Plato, the Pythagoreans played to his love of philosophy and learning by telling him that Dionysius II had made great progress in his education. 614 Although the Dionysii played a major role in the invitation of Plato to the court, as with many other instances listed above, access to the court was through previous personal relations, a process which formed a type of scholarly chain linking the court members together. At certain times, however, the scholarly chain would break, with scholars banished from the court. The sources give few examples of scholars voluntarily leaving the court, although when they do, they portray the departure of scholars at the court as occurring at the whim of the tyrant. Diogenes the Cynic, for example, stated that Dionysius I treated his friends like purses and threw them out when they were empty. 615 Even if the arrival of the court members happened through the agency of other court members, the agency of departure often was wholly in the hands of the tyrant. For this reason, Plato wrote to Dionysius II that he should either make use of Philistion or should send him with Speusippus to Athens. 616 As Plato suggested, it was Dionysius who controlled the final mobility of his court members. It seems, however, that court members generally did not suffer the most severe 613 PI E 7 339 b (' , ' \ I ' I " ~ I J! ... II' ~\'A '"' ,, ' ~ I . p. . a- e1r EfLE TPUTJP1J pqurruwr]'; EVEICa T1J'; 7ropEw';, E7rEf£r EV oE PXEU1JfLOV, ov 1]ryEuro fLE TOw Ev "i.ucE/-..,[qt 7rEp'i 7rA.£UTrov 7roLEW-8at-, TOw 'ApxVTTJ OVrfeyovlnwv ¥va, Ka'i (it..,A.,ov') ryvwpLfLOV'> TWv Ev "i.u<£t..,£c,t ). 614 Jbjd. 615 D. L t 6 2 50 ( • e ' ' ' ' ' ' ~ ' '' ' " ) wg. aer . . . we; Vl'vaK.OlS, Tovc; fLEV 7rl'v1JPEl8 KP1JfLVWv, Tovc; oE K£VOV'> puwrwv . 616 PI E 2 314d (""' ' '' ' ' ' ' ~ "''' ~ ' '' u " ' ~ . p. . -e '±'lJ>vlDTUJJVL oE, EL fLEV aV'TO'> X_P'[}, u'f'oopa X_PW, EL oE owv TE, L./TTEVOL7r7r9_J XP1JOOV \ > I .,_I" , \ , ..+, 1 , 1 ) ICaL a'Tr07rEfL'f OV ... EL UV a'f'EL1]'> aU'TOV • 190 punishment: death. Within the re1gn of the Dionysii, few examples remam of execution under the tyrant, and these examples mainly occur at the beginning of their rule. 617 As for close associates of the tyrant, we see, for example, the story of Leon, the associate of Dionysius I, who was put to death for behaving suspiciously. 618 The poet Antiphon (not to be confused with the Athenian orator) was said to have been put to death, since he not only insulted the verses of Dionysius, 619 but also threatened the rule of the tyrant by stating that the best type of bronze was that which formed the statues of Harmodius and Aristogeiton, the tyrant-slayers. 620 The largest group purge under Dionysius I occurred after his embarrassment at the Olympic Games of 388, when he murdered a large number of his phjJoj due to suspicion of their plotting against him. 621 At this time, other philoj suffered a fate common to many members of the court: exile. Just as the rather anti-intellectual Agathocles was said to have driven out many poets during his reign, 622 the Dionysii consigned many of their former court members to this fate when they were unhappy with them. Exile was 617 At the beginning of his attempt to seize power, he put to death the elites of Gela (Diad. Sic. 13.93.2-3. He also ordered his most powerful opponents, Daphnaeus and Demarcus, put to death (Diad. Sic. 13.96.3). 618 Cic. Tusc. 5.60 has the more thorough narrative, although Ael. VH 13.34 also mentions this episode. 619 Philostr. V 82.15 (owpavicLI;E cyap Ta' Tau t,.wvvrnov Tpacyroia,) and Plut. X orat. 833b. 620 In addition to the above two passages, the story is also mentioned in Plut. De adul. 68a-b and Arist. Rh. 2.1385a. The later passage, the most thorough, also discusses the death scene in more detail. Importantly, the passage does mention others that were to be executed with him, perhaps indicating greater cruelty of the tyrant. 621 Diad. Sic. 15.7.3. 622 Ath. 15.699c quotes a passage of Alexander of Aetolia ( &,, 'AcyaeoKicEio' icauwL <j>pcvE' 1jlcauav lfw 7raTpioo,). 191 occasionally more temporary, as in the case of Philoxenus of Cythera. The poet was sent off to the quarries on the Epipolae, either for his relationship with Galateia, the flute girl of Dionysius I, 623 or for disparaging the poetry of the tyrant. 624 The two most famous philoj to be exiled, as will be discussed more thoroughly in the next chapter, were Philistus (the most trusted colleague of Dionysius I) and Leptines (the brother of the tyrant), who were both sent away for several years. 625 Because this practice was not uncommon, the phjJoj of Dian were afraid that they would suffer a similar fate after the exile of Dian by Dionysius II and were calmed down only after the tyrant gathered them and assured them of their safety. 626 Plato again has provided the most comprehensive narrative of departures from the court, not only because he was the most renowned member of the Dionysian court but also because he departed multiple times. As with Philoxenus, after offending Dionysius I, he was sent away from the court after his first visit. The story states that the tyrant sent him away from Syracuse under the supervision of Follis the Spartan, who then took him to Aegina. While waiting to be sold as a prisoner of 623 For the episode with Galateia, see Ath. 1.6f-7a, Ael. VH 12.44, and the scholium to Ar. Plut. 290. Anello 1984: 17-19 and 46-4 7 discusses the two different strands. Mucci ali 2004, especially 123-24, discusses the fate of Philoxenus within the larger discussion of his poetry and argues that the story of his trip to the quarries derives from Ephorus or Timaeus. 624 The episode of the insulting of Dionysius's poetry is told is various forms in Diad. Sic. 15.6.2- 5, Lucian Ind. 15, Plut. De Alex. fort. 334c, Plut. De tranq. Anjm. 4 71e, Cic. Att. 4.6.2, Amm. Marc. 15.5.37, Stab. 3.13.31, Tzetz. ChjJ. 5.160-68, and the entry on Philoxenus in the Sud a. 625 See chapter 4, pages 24 7-257. 626 Pl. Ep. 7.329c-d. There was also apparently a report at this time that Plato also had been put to death by Dionysi us II. 192 war, Anniceris the Cyrenaean ransomed him and sent him back to Athens (Plut. Vjt. ' " ' " "' ' a'lrDK'TEWa~ 'TOV avopa Ka'Ta {3i>.af3~(J"wBa, cyap ouoev, a!>.!>.' ~ ,, ' ~ ' ' ' ' IT '• ' ' A" "' ' ' ~ ' e oov,"oo;; ryevr;'TaL ow Ka~ '"eryera~ a,,,~~,u;; eu; ~rywav -yepwv a7rooou a~ IT , , , , , 'Ae , , , ,.... , , 1 " ,.+,, ,, , ,~,wrwva, 7rOI'vEfLOV npo<:; r;vawv<:; ov'Toc; av'Tou:; Ka~ 'I' r;-y~CYf-La'To<:; o7rw<:; o • '"e ' 'Ae ' ' A' ' ' ,,,r;-y eu:; r;vauvv ev ~rywv 7rurrpamcrrraL But Dionysius requested in private that Follis kill Plato on the voyage, if it were in any way possible. If not, he should in any case sell him into slavery, since he would not be harmed, but would be quite as happy, being a just man, even if he should become a slave. Follis, therefore, as we are told, carried Plato to Aegina and there sold him, for the Aeginetans were at war with the Athenians and had made a decree that any Athenian taken on the island should be put up for sale. This passage interestingly proves that the court was not completely devoid of political purpose. Plato, as an Athenian citizen, would be punished by the Spartan Follis, an act that not only reflected the savage nature of Dionysius but also the political animosity between the cities of Greece. Scholars of the court, as representatives of their own poJejs, thus could be used as pawns in the larger political squabbles of the period. This fate of Plato was used to demean the philosopher, evident when Diogenes the Cynic referred to him as a dog that was returned after being was sold. 628 His second visit (the first under Dionysius II) was slightly less 627 A complementary version is discussed in Diog. Laert. 3.1.19-20. 628 See Ael. VH 14.33 (oiJK, E7ravijABov EK£l.o-e 58ev Enpd81}v, &unep oL KVver;;). Elsewhere, Diogenes also had made fun of Plato for going to Syracuse. When Plato had invited friends to his house who had come back from Syracuse, Diogenes is said to have trampled on his carpets and stated that he was trampling on the vanity of Plato. See Diog. Laert. 6.2.25-26 for this episode. 193 caustic, when he agreed to sail to Athens and to return with Dian departing during Dionysius's war with the Lucanians. 629 His last departure from the court, however, was the most dramatic, when Archytas of Tarentum was required to send a ship with an embassy from his home city to convey Plato to Athens safely from the dangerous 630 atmosphere of Syracuse. Little information was recorded concerning how long each scholar stayed (i.e. if they merely stayed for a short time or for several years). Several men appear in the role of messenger, obviously spending time at the court but depicted in a more mobile role. Baccheius appears as a letter bearer between Plato and Dionysius I, and Archedemus traveled back and forth between Syracuse and Athens in Plato's absence, in order to answer their questions. 631 Leptines brought a statue of Apollo for Dionysius from Athens, and Plato suggests that Dionysius II give several gifts to the Athenian Terillus, who also was constantly traveling back and forth. 632 Other members of the court were sent out from the court at Syracuse temporarily. Polyarchus, known for his pleasurable lifestyle, was sent off to Archytas as Tarentum, 633 while Lysicleides left Syracuse for Athens in order to report the 629 Pl. Ep. 3.316e-317a. 630 Plut. Vlt. Djon 20 (wxv 7rEfL7rovrn 7rpw(3Eiav ml TpwK6vTopov) and Diog. Laert. 3.1.21-22. Archytas also wrote a letter to Dionysius II and reminded him of the latter's guarantee for the safety of the philosopher. 631 For Baccheius, see Pl. Ep. 1.3091-c. For Archedemus as messenger, see Pl. Ep. 2.313d-e. 632 For the episode with Leptines (likely a Pythagorean who murdered Callippus, the murderer of Dion) see Pl. Ep. 13.36la-b. For the appearance of Terillus, see Pl. Ep. 13.363c (tun o€ nvv aEl 7r"'A.B)V'T(JJV). 633 Ath. 12.545a, who quotes the Ljfe of Archytas by Aristoxenus. 194 dealings between Dionysius II and Plato. 634 Although several of these figures appear only within this context with little other information, the testimony of these shorter periods of travel demonstrates that the court was a mobile environment with messengers traveling frequently between Syracuse and other cities around the Mediterranean. As for the non-Syracusan members of the court who were not permanent residents of the pojjs, almost no information remains, except for a few general statements. For example, Polycritus of Mende apparently stayed in Syracuse with Dionysius II until he was expelled and survived there without the tyrant at least until the arrival of Dion. 635 A passage of Lucian argues that Plato actually only stayed for a few days each time he went to Sicily, because he was very bad at playing the flatterer to the tyrant. 636 Unfortunately, these passages do not shed light into the period of residency for the court. We do not know what the average time spent at the court was, nor do we know if protocol existed in order to coordinate the stays of various court members. The sources focus mainly on the arrival and departure of the court, which at least places the focus of the agency on the tyrant to determine the stay of the members of the court, rather than their passive ability to merely stay in Syracuse. C. Lodging and payment Where did the court stay? Were they housed close to the tyrant or in separate quarters? One thing seems certain: although the court congregated at the palace, the 634 Pl. Ep. 2.314e-315a notes that Lysicleides had not been spreading false rumors about the issues between the philosopher and the tyrant. 635 Diog. Laert. 2.7.63. 636 Lucian De paras. 34. 195 court did not live at the palace. This likely was due to the common fear that those closest to the tyrant, including his court, were the most dangerous threats to his rule. By limiting access of the tyrant to the court, he could ensure his safety to the highest degree. In fact, the special status of Plato with Dionysius II was confirmed by the f h PI II d . h' . h b . h d 637 act t at ato was a owe mto 1s presence w1t out emg searc e . Furthermore, the tyrant offered to Plato a special indication of his trust, so that Plato could enter and exit from the presence of the tyrant. 638 Although the other court members were invited into the presence of the tyrant at dinners and drinking parties, the tyrant would have kept the majority of the court away from him (especially concerning their housing 639 ). This fact is also confirmed by another passage, where Athenaeus states that Xenocrates would lay a wreath of flowers on the statue of Hermes whenever he left the palace after their get-togethers. 640 In addition to his possible temporary home in the quarries of the Epipolae while being punished by Dionysius I, 641 Philoxenus also received an allotment ofland in a Sicilian colony. 642 Although Philoxenus thus was more rooted in Sicily and was allowed to 637 A I V:H4 18 (' ' ~ I ' I \ ' \ \ ' I ) e . . W') EK£WOV fLOVOV El1Il£VaL npoc; aU'fOV fJ-1] EpEVVWVEVOV • 638 PJ t TT.t fl' 191('t' '' ' -A ' ' •' ''' '" c '' ' u . vi, 'lOfl . Esat.peroc; oE 1rapa TCfJ L.J..Wvvuup 7rl1I'Tl8, 1JV ovoEl8 al'vl'v0'> ELXEV, aot-EpEVV1JTOV aVTip 7r"'A./T]Ulfl,~Ew). Does this 7rUTns merely indicate the promise of the tyrant, or does this rather refer to some type of object (such as a document or other token) that allowed Plato to pass in and out? 639 One notable passage of Diogenes Laertius (2.8.75) discusses Simus, the Phrygian steward of Dionysius II, showing Aristippus various fancy houses (7roA.,vTEf.£ls ofx.:ovc; aVTip Ka'i 1-..,IBo(YrpdYTovc; ). Whether these were the houses in which the court members were housed is unable to be determined. 640 Ath. 10.4371 (ljYTrEp ElW8EL KaL ToVc; dv8woV'> th:drrroTE E7rLTlBEvaL UTEcfdvov') Eu1rEpac; > "\ "\ I r > I ) a'ffa{\,1\,auuofLEVOc; we; aV'rov . 641 Ael. VH12.44. 196 have a more active role in the court, 643 it seems that even Philoxenus also had his primary residence away from the palace. The narrative of Plato again provides the most evidence for the residence of the court members within Syracuse but outside of the palace and Ortygia, perhaps in the area of Achradina, where Dionysius I housed other immigrants he had moved into the city. 644 The sources note as an exception that, after Dionysius II began to become jealous of the relationship between Dian and Plato during the second trip of the latter, he moved the philosopher to the Acropolis, so that Plato could be closer to him. 645 Plato himself notes that he was housed in the garden next to the palace, as if he were a hostage of the tyrant. 646 The tyrant not only moved Plato there but also set a guard around him, so that he could not escape without special permission from him. 647 Although Philistus and other court members hostile to him used this proximity to accuse the philosopher of poisoning the mind of the tyrant, 648 his residence near the tyrant obviously does not appear in a positive context. His housing at the palace of Dionysius II rather was a situation specific to Plato and not to the \ J! "\ "\ \ > I J! ) ICaL ouwv 7rOI'vi'v1}V EV7ropwv EXOVTO'; • 643 See Muocioli 2004: 127-28. 644 De Mira 2001: 362-63 discusses the transfer of population under Dionysius I to the outer areas of Syracuse, including Achradina. 645 Plut. Vlt. Djon 16.1 (IT!-vdnvva OE b.wvVuw'; EV8V'> plv Elc; T7}v iucplnro"'J\,w fLerEuT1JUEv). 646 PI E 7 347 (' ' ' - ' - ' ' " ) . p. . a cpKovv ryap ... EV TqJ K/T]7r9_J TqJ 7rEpL T1JV oucwv . 647 Pl. Ep. 7.329e notes that Dionysius plaoed him there, so that he could not escape by land or by sea, since no trader or any official would allow his escape (ol!rr' dv ~fL7ropoc; ot!rrE TWv Ev Tals Tijc; xWpac; Eg60ol8 dpx6vrwv aVO' av de; 7rEpLEWEv fLE piwov €1C7rOpEv6fLEVOV). Later in the same text (34 7a), Plato mentions the special dispensation from Dionysius to leave ( 8eEv avo' li.v 6 evpwpo' ij8E"'A,Ev fLE acpELvaL p/ij 7rEfL¢8Elu1]') ainip TWO') EvTo"'J\,ijc; 7rapa b.wvvufov). 648 Pl. Ep. 3.315a. 197 court in general. In addition, as punishment, we learn that Plato was later moved out of his garden home in the palace and housed among the mercenaries on Ortygia. 649 During his final trip to Syracuse, Plato had been sent out of the citadel to be housed with Archedemus, another member who spent time at the court (Pl. Ep. 7.349c-d). '"'' \" ''l '.P>'A I 'TO UTJ fLE'Ta 'TOV'TO TJ '1ra1'va~ E7T1f-JOVI\/Tj i..l.WVVCYU{J 'ToV tL0 d7roOoVva~ 'Ta AI I "f:;: f:: "e l I " '' i..:>UVVO<; XP7!floa7"a EOOsEV ex pa<; "ocyov exew av • e • , npo<:; fLE 7r~ avov, Ka~ ' \ I,..}, ' \ evpwv 7rpo-yauw wc; 'Ta<:; " ' " I ' ryvvaucar:; ev 'Tt{J ICTJ7rtp, ev ? I J I CfJ KWTCf:JKOVV eryw, OEo~ 8Vua~ 8valav 'Twa oex~p..epov: tgw 0~ p..e 7rap' 'A f:;:l I \ I " PXEOTJf-Lt{J 7rpOCYE'Ta'T'TEV 'TOV xpovov 'TOV'TOV fLEWaL Now after this Dionysius decided that his previous plot of refusing to pay Dian's money would provide him with plausible grounds for a quarrel with me; and, as a first step, he sent me out of the citadel, inventing the excuse that the women had to perform a sacrifice of ten days' duration in the garden where I was lodging. Thus, during this period, he gave orders that I should stay outside with Archedemus. While the passage only notes that Plato went i!gw, it is obvious that Archedemus was not housed at the palace and perhaps not even on the island of Ortygia itself. In regard to Plato, we see an extreme instance of control for Plato, where his residence represented a space of control under the tyrant. Indeed, the pojjs of Syracuse was a controlled environment under the aegis of the tyrant, where populations were either allowed in or pushed away from its borders. As one drew closer to the center of power 649 Plut. Vlt. Djon 19.5 and Ep. 7.350a-b both state that Plato was later housed among the mercenaries on Ortygia (1/JKovv 01] TO 0era TOJ~no ~gw Tij'; iucp07r6A£w'; Ev TaL'; fLLa-8o¢6pot_s). This situation was especially precarious for Plato. The mercenaries were plotting to kill him, since he was attempting to reform the tyranny, a change which would have reduced the need for their service. See Masse 1997: 168-69 for further discussion of the uneasiness between Plato and the mercenaries. 198 (i.e. the palace of the tyrant on Ortygia), the control became greater, just like a black hole that grasps tightly onto certain elements and expels other elements far away. Dionysius thus attempted to possess Plato within the palace, but the rejection by Plato of Dionysius's political vision doomed Plato to eventual ejection from the realm of the tyrant. The next logistical issue for the tyrant was the funding for the court members. How were these men paid, since monetary compensation seemed to be the major reason for traveling to Syracuse? As the tyrant complains in the Hjero, court members expected to do very little for the tyrant but also to receive more money than they would receive from anyone else in a lifetime. 650 Within the context of this passage and in much of the remaining source material, it seems that the balance between the exchange of gifts at the court between the scholar and his patron had been skewed. Normally, a very strict formula had been established between leaders and scholars, i.e. poets would offer their own composition highlighting the kleos of the leader in exchange for the generosity of the ruler (as seen in the poems of Pindar and Bacchylides). In the Dionysii's case, there are few examples of this xenja-type relationship. This deficiency likely occurred due to the fact that boundaries within this tyrannical court were not clearly defined, a definition demonstrated by earlier courts. 650 X H" 1 13 ( " I "\ ~ ~ I " ' ' -~ I \ ' ~ 't ~ en. Jer. , OVTW Tl.fLLa 'lrWI'vEL'TaL T0/8 TVpaVV0/.8 WO'TE OL E'lrWEUCVVfLEVOL ICaL OTWVV asWVUL 7ro"'J\,"'J\,a7r"'J\,dm..a !.,a(36vTEr;; Ev Qt.,[rycp X_P6vcp d7nlvaL 1rapa TaLi Tvpdvvov f) 5ua Ev 1ravrL Tip (3Lcp 1rapa 7rdvrwv TWv (i)l.).,"wv dv8pdJ'lrwv K:riiwrat.). 199 To put it more crassly, poets across the Greek world apparently knew that trading one's poetry for money, for example, was one way to make a quick buck. 651 Therefore, Aeschines reportedly came to Dionysius II due to his poverty, so that he might receive some type of compensation from the tyrant. 652 When Dionysius II asked Aristippus why he came to the court, Aristippus expressly told him that he showed up for the money. 653 As seen from above, they almost certainly were given housing, but they also appeared frequently at the table of the tyrant, so perhaps their food and drink also was provided directly by the tyrant. Once the men arrived, however, it is not known if they received some type of stipend. Most discussion of compensation in the sources refers only to specific rewards or prizes. For example, when Xenocrates showed himself the most talented at drinking at the Feast of the Pitchers, Dionysius II awarded him a golden crown. 654 A more useful reward was bestowed when Helicon of Cyzicus accurately predicted a solar eclipse, for which feat Dionysius II rewarded him for his knowledge with a talent of silver. 655 Plato also may have been the recipient of monetary gifts, as a rumor was circulated against Plato that he had received eighty talents from the tyrant. 656 Plato seems to have insulted Dionysius II for his lack of generosity, saying that the money given to Plato when he 651 In Jd. 16, Theocritus wishes to offer Hieron II the same relationship that Hieron I had with Pindar, namely that the poet would sing the praises of the leader for money. See Hunter 1996: 83-90,96-97, and 103-6 for further discussion of this oontext. 652 Diog. Laert. 2.7.61. 653 Diog. Laert. 2.8. 77-80 (vVv OE XP7Jtninvv 0E6fLEVor;; 1rapa uE ij1oJJ ). 654 D h' . d D' L 4 2 8 Cx - "' ' e' , 'en ' - ror t IS ep1so e, see wg. aert. . . pump OTE'f'avcp TLfL1J EVTa E7rau""cp 7ro/-..,v7rouws TOl8 Xovul 7rapa !3.wvvu&p), Ath. 10.4371, and Ael. VH2.41. 655 Plut. Vlt. Djon 19.4 (8avfHLa-8Eis inrO TaLi Tvpdvvov OwpE(w D.,af3EV dpryupLov Tdl\,avTov). 656 Diog. Laert. 3.1.9 (1rapa b.wvvu-Lov !.,a(3Wv V1rEp Ta OryOof}lwvcra nll\,avra). 200 was driven away was not sufficient for his travels, 657 although other sources state that Plato disdained the large amounts of money offered to him. 658 From these passages, it seems that the court obviously was given some type of financial patronage from the tyrant, yet there is no evidence of standardization of the process. Again, the sources stress that the members of the court were more at the whim of the tyrant with no process of integration into a standard court environment. Such a lack again focuses on the shortcomings of the court as a steady stream of support for the tyrant. When a court member arrived, what type of community was present? Was the court a unitary organism or a more divided body? Among the sources, the common view of the court was as a den of intrigue, not only against the tyrant but also among its many members. Even among the scholarly members, who came to the court for 'higher' purposes than the flatterers, personal relations needed to be carefully navigated. One negative portrayal is seen in Polybius, who described the courts of kings and tyrants as full of back-stabbers who all positioned themselves for political and monetary gain. 659 In the Hjero, the tyrant argued that, even when the court was praising everything that the tyrant says, they actually were harboring evil thoughts against him. 660 Indeed, this fear was not just a literary trope but real fear. For 657 PI E 1 309 ( \ ~\ I \ "\ I " J!'>: ' ' "\ I J! \ '..+. '"' ' ~ I . p. . C TO UE X_PVUWV TO l'vafJ/lrpov, 07rEp EUWICa'; El8 a7rDU'TOI'v1]V ... OVTE ryap E'f'OUWV EK£WO , "' ' \ J! \ \ ,, "\ (3' "'' ) ry 1JV ucavov ovTE npo'; Tov a/\,1\,ov wv UVfL'f'Epov . 658 Plut. Vlt. Djon 19.1-2. Plutarch, as a member of the Academy, obviously would not wish to cheapen the philosophical exploits of Plato and argued against any monetary recompense for his services. 659 For example, Polyb. 5.26 discusses the courtiers of the king. Herman 1997: 205-11 argues that the court often devolved into anarchy, as each court member only looked out for himself. 660 X u· 1 14 15 (" ''- -'- " • - ' ' ' - - ' ) en. _uler. • - O'TaV EWTJ TIS Ua't'W'> OTL OL UUJJ'lrUWTE') OV'TOL 7raVTE') ICaiCa VOOVOL TCfJ Tvpavvcp • 201 example, in his letter to Dionysius I, the Athenian Isocrates explained to Dionysius that his presence at the court was a disadvantage, because the flatterers of the tyrant could speak badly of Isocrates and could discredit his advice. 661 Without a physical presence at the side of the tyrant, members of the court could suffer as the object of gossip and smear tactics. When relations were formed at the court, they often were based on pre- existing scholarly or philosophical connections. For example, among the different types of scholars depicted as working together were geometricians and astronomers. 662 The most notable philosophical association at the court of the Dionysii was that of the Pythagoreans. 663 In addition to the relations between Plato, Archytas, and the school at Tarentum, one may recall the story of Phintias and Damon, where the latter pledged to take the punishment for the former after Phintias was found guilty of plotting against Dionysius I. 664 Within this episode we see not only the fractious relations between the Dionysii and the Pythagoreans (of which there are other examples 665 ) but also the camaraderie between members in an environment that was politically and intellectually charged. Just as these friendly 661 I n· · 2 3 c · ' ' - ',,, ' - f3 e' ' · ) soc. 'lonysJus - a7roVTO'; ryap Tov rypa'f avera'; EP7JfLa Tov 01J 1JUOVTO'; EOTW . 662 Plut. Vlt. fljon 13.2 states that, after the arrival of Plato, the palace was filled with many geometricians ('rO TvpavvEWv, &r;; cpau-L, KovwvrOr;; V1rO 7rf./r]8ovr;; TOw ryEwfLerpoVvrwv ICaTELXEV). In his thirteenth letter (363d), Plato discusses a group of astronomers, also known as those who play the game of ball ( Tov' uvu<j>aLpurra' ). 663 For a listing of the Sicilians among the Pythagoreans, see lamb!. VP 267, as well as the commentary of Musti 1989: 34-39. 664 For one narrative, see Cic. Tusc. 5.22.63. 665 For example, Polyaenus, Strat. 5.2.22 discusses the poor relations between Dionysius I and the Pythagorean Euephenus of Paras. Zaocara 2008: 172-77 places this incident within a general discussion of the relations between tyrants and their oourt in the work of Polyaenus. 202 relations occasionally existed between the scholar and the family of the tyrant, 666 other personal relations existed, as between Plato and Xenocrates 667 or Carcinus and Aeschines. 668 The personal relationships among court members, however, devolved into cattiness, as each man vied with his colleagues for fame and money. 669 The tyrant often was at the center of this discord, by encouraging internal conflict, in order to lessen the possibility of a coherent group who could challenge his power. For example, Aristippus found himself as an object of hatred at the court for his fawning relationship with the tyrant. Described as closer to Dionysius than any other court member due to his ability to adapt himself to each situation in the court, 670 Aristippus was termed the kingly dog (f3arn/w<:ov dva), and both Diogenes and Plato looked down on his sleazy behavior. 671 Plato often was a lightning rod for conflict 666 Plato writes in Ep. 13.361a-b that he is sending along a sculpture to the wife of Dionysius II, because she took care of him when he was ill (5n fLOV E7rEfLE/-..,ELTo Ka'i VrywLvovcro'; Ka'i iw-8EVoVvro') agLw'> EfLoV TE KaL uoV). A more anecdotal story (Lucian, Menjp. 13) describes how, when Dionysius II had been condemned to death for his crimes upon the return of Dian, Aristippus arrived and argued for his release from the charges. 667 Diog. Laert. 4.2.11 preserves an episode, where after hearing that Dionysius had threatened to cut off the head of Plato, Xenocrates states that he would need to be beheaded first. 668 Diog. Laert. 2. 7.63 noted this connection. 669 See Vatai 1984: 78-80 for an overview. 670 Diog. Laert. 2.8.66 (OW KaL 1rapa b.wvvu-Lcp TWv (f'A).,"wv d/801dp.EL fLCil..) .. ,ov). Other anecdotes depict the volatile relationship between Aristippus and Dionysius. Diog. Laert. 2.8.78 describes an episode where Dionysius requested that Aristippus dance around the banquet in women's clothing. Diog. Laert. 2.8. 73 notes an instanoe when Dionysius made Aristippus sit in the seat of shame at the end of the table, after Aristippus refused to spout philosophy. Diog. Laert. 2. 7.67 states that, while Dionysius treated Aristippus well, he was subject to the negative whims of the tyrant, as when he spit on the scholar. 671 Diog. Laert. 2.7.68-69. Diog. Laert. 2.7.61 notes that Plato was not only on bad terms with Aristippus but also with Aeschines, due to the latter's relationship with the tyrant. 203 between his friends and other members of the court, 672 conflict that stemmed from the jealousy of Dionysius II concerning friends whom he thought were closer to the philosopher. For example, Dionysius was portrayed as complaining in his garden to Plato, Archedemus, and Aristocratus that Plato liked everyone else more than him. 673 This jealousy often resulted in negative behavior from the tyrant, as when Dionysius threatened Plato and his friends to not speak poorly about him. 674 Other scholars at the court took advantage of this unstable relationship to defame the philosopher, as Plato intimated when describing how Cratistolus and Polyxenus were accusing Plato at the Olympic Games of defaming the tyrant. 675 The party of Philistus, who was supportive of tyranny, was also openly hostile to Plato. Philistus had been encouraged to return for the express purpose of saving the tyranny, 676 while the pro-tyranny party believed that the doctrines of Plato were bewitching the tyrant and that Plato was attempting to overthrow the monarchy by himself. 677 Thus, the fractious atmosphere among the members, due mainly to the unstable environment under the tyrants, also encouraged court members to actively prevent the integration of other 672 Other scholars at the court also had philosophical differences with Plato. In opposition to Plato, who looked down on luxurious living, Polyxenus encouraged such a lifestyle, especially by Dionysius the Younger. Ath. 12.545a-546c describes Polyxenus's time as an envoy from the court of the tyrant to the court of Archytas at Tarentum, where he debated with the latter conoerning the importanoe of luxury for a leader. 673 Pl. Ep. 3.319a. 674 Pl. Ep. 2.310b. 675 Pl. Ep. 2.310c-d. Cratistolus is only mentioned here, and Polyxenus is mentioned elsewhere (2.314c-d and 13.360c) as a disciple of Bryson of Megara. The Olympic Games in question may have been those of 364 BC. 676 Plut. Vlt. Djon 11.4 and 12.1. 677 Plut. Vlt. Djon 14.1-2 (vvvL OE OL' EvO'; aocjxriToV Kwra"'A.,VovaL T1JV b.wvvuLov TvpavvLOa). 204 court members. Overall, this (albeit) brief look into the logistics of the court reflects the image of the court as a type of centrifuge, which attracted possible members into the world of the tyrants but which did not allow them to become established before being tossed away. The analysis of the court above leads to one question: was 'the court' really a court? I would argue that the court of the Dionysii was indeed a court but one in its infancy, without the institutional hallmarks of later court in the Hellenistic world. It also may be that the existence of the court waxed and waned at specific times during limited time periods (as seen when scholarly interest increased upon the arrival of Plato). It does not seem that the court was able to develop or flourish based on its own agency as an institution, as the tyrant had complete control over the members of the court regarding their housing, payment, and times of arrival or departure. Part II: The scholarly world of the court A. Scholarly output at the court If one scours the sources to find vestiges of scholarly life at the court, a striking conclusion appears: very little information remains which expressly confirms scholarly activity there. As noted above, a common image portrays court members arriving at the court but doing very little, even as they expected to receive large amounts of money. 678 Thus, they were represented less as intellectuals and more as flatterers. The usual backdrop for the appearance of various intellectuals during court activities did not include serious scholarly thought but merely drinking parties, where they often appeared more skilled at imbibing wine than creating a piece of 678 Xen. Hjer. 1.13. See also above (page 199). 205 scholarship. 679 Why did this dearth of information concerning their actual scholarly activities, especially when a large group of men with various abilities in different fields came to the court of the Dionysii from all parts the Greek world? Rather than explicating the scholarly activities of the court members, the texts focused more on their personal relationships with the tyrant and with each other. Why did the sources focus on personalities rather than scholarship? The main sources that mention the court (the Epjstles of Plato, the Djon of Plutarch, and Diogenes Laertius) were biographical works that seemed to prefer emotionally charged and gossip-ridden tales of the court to any analysis of its work. For example, Diogenes Laertius often would include a list of works for each scholar he discussed, but the background concerning these works (e.g. where and under which circumstances they were composed) often was not included in his biographies. These authors were not necessarily interested in detailing the logistics of the scholarly activities of the court, which were not exciting or were already known by their audience. Thus, the references that we can glean from their works are few and are general in nature. For example, Plutarch mentions that the interest for philosophy increased a great deal in the court after the arrival of Plato, and as a result, he states that the palace was filled with dust due to the going to-and-fro of the many geometricians there. 680 From this passage, we learn that philosophy and geometry were two subjects studied at the court and that there were quite a few scholars who 679 For the appearance of scholars at these drinking parties, especially of Dionysius II, see McKinlay 1939: 56-58. 680 Plut. Vit. Djon 13.2 ('rO TvpavvEwv, &r;; cpau-L, KovwvrOr;; {nrO 7rf./r]8ovr;; Twv ryEwfLerpoVvcrwv ICaTE'iXEV). 206 studied each subject. In addition, the court seemed quite mobile, with members commg in and out of the court frequently. Another passage notes a group of astronomers or geographers in the court with whom Plato had contact, whom he referred to as young men who dabbled in the affairs of the globe. 681 Through this passage, we can add astronomy to the list of subjects studied at the court and can confirm that such 'classes' consisted of more than just one or two scholars. Thus, at the very least, these passages confirm the presence of multiple scholars who were engaged in various fields. Unfortunately, the more basic information (number of scholars, their provenance, their names), were not deemed important enough for the authors to record and remain hidden to posterity. In addition, except for the Pythagoreans (and members of the Academy), we do not know which other competing schools of philosophy or science were present at the court. Evidence does remain for competing ideas regarding the rule of the Dionysii by pro-tyranny and anti-tyranny members of the court, such as when Philistus was recalled to lead the pro-tyranny group of court members against the possible influence of Plato. Yet formal philosophical distinctions between members have not been preserved. In spite of this testimony concerning groups of scholars at the court, there are few specific instances of scholarly output at the court. On the scientific side, one event has been recorded, namely when Helicon of Cyzicus accurately predicted an 681 Pl. Ep. 13.363d ('roVe; vEunEpovc; KaL ToVc; avucpwpuTrGs). While the term neoteroj often was used in the context of revolution, the letter writer here does not seem suggest any ideas of revolution. As he wishes that they be exhorted, perhaps he means that they should continue to pursue new ideas, but no political significance for this term seems evident here (although these men would have formed the basis for his own lessons on political change in Syracuse). 207 eclipse of the sun and was given a talent of silver as a reward from the tyrant. 682 On the literary side and philosophical side, with exception to Plato (who will be discussed below), extant testimony is scant. For example, in the context of his parasitic behavior, Lucian notes that Aristippus, as the court member in the highest favor of the tyrant, had the cooks of the tyrant come to him every day to provide bits of knowledge. 683 In typical fashion with information about the court, except for the frequency of this action, nothing is known about the content of this knowledge or its audience. Aeschines, who was introduced to the tyrant by Aristippus after his was spurned by Plato, received gifts from the tyrant after presenting him with several d . I 684 F d . f . . h A h' h d I d m ogues. rom preserve m ormatwn, 1t seems t at esc mes a a rea y composed these dialogues before his time at the court, as he read his works (including the MjJtjades), in order to become acquainted with Dionysius II. 685 Although Lucian states that Aeschines then stayed on at the court, 686 no further particulars are given about any literary output he may have produced there. In fact, no information remains concerning any literary or philosophical works produced at the court (except those of the Dionysii, as we will see below). Does this paucity occur because the focus at the court was not on the individuals of the court and their own scholarly production, since they were at the mercy of the tyrant, who would not want 682 Plut. Vlt. Djon 19.4 ('E!-vL~ewv 0 Kv~ucrwOc; de; TWv IT!-vdnvvoc; uvv1}8wv i-}1\,[ov 7rpoEL7rEV t¥~et.,EL']rw). 683 L D 33 (" \ ' ... II' \ ' I J! \ ~ ' A I " I UC. e paras. WO'TE TOV') 0 'f O'lfOWV') OU1]fLEpaL E7rEfL7rEV 7rapa TOVTOV 0 Ll.WVVUW') We; TL 7rap ainov p.aerJuop.cvov,). In the same vein, Diogenes Laertius notes (2.8.73) that Dionysius once asked Aristippus to enunciate a tenet of philosophy, but the scholarly refused and roused the anger of the tyrant. 684 Diog. Laert. 2.7.61. 685 Lucian De paras. 32. 686 Ih .d (' , , 'e , " , , ~ ' , l 1 , {\,QL'TrDV EICa 1]'TO EV L,LICE!'vLCf 7rapam:TWV L.J..WVVUU{J . 208 the court to take glory away from him? Perhaps, but the absence of evidence here does not seem to stem from evidence of absence but rather due to the nature of the sources, which preferred more exciting personal narrative than any scholarly output. As will be discussed in the next section concerning the tyrant as scholar, several members of the court (namely Philoxenus and Philistus) had extended intellectual interaction with the Dionysii. Although these authors also participated in the creation of their own literary works, they likely did not complete these works at the court. Yet their works are still relevant to this discussion, because these works certainly were affected by their experiences at the court. For example, perhaps the most famous work of Philoxenus, his Cyclops or Galateja, reflected his opinion of the tyrant after his mistreatment by the tyrant. It may be that Philoxenus wrote this work not at the court of Dionysius but after his return to Cythera, especially since the subject matter and negative portrayal of the tyrant obviously would not have been conducive to production at the court. 687 An alternate tradition does suggest that Philoxenus composed at least part of it while he was locked up in the quarries, 688 but this passage seems anecdotal and the location of the composition of the play cannot be confirmed. Regardless of the location of the composition, the experience of Philoxenus at the court and his relationship with the tyrant in this environment played a major role in the subject matter. The portrayal of Dionysius as the Cyclops, the symbol of brute strength, is especially poignant when one considers how 687 For the suggestion from the tradition that Philoxenus returned to Cythera to compose his work, see Muccioli 2004: 124-26. See also Natalis Comes Myth. 9.8 (~ Baochylides F59 Snell). 688 Ael. VH 12.44 states that he composed the poem in a famous cave and thus disregarded the punishment of Dionysius (0t..aTpL(3wv TDv KV~eA.,oJ7ra Elpryduwro TWv EavToV fLE!.,Wv TO K.dt..:t,,w-Tov, I >~\ e' \ > A I I \ ~ \ ) 7rap OVUEV EfLEVO'; 'T1}V EIC Ll.WVVUWV 'TllJ.-Wpt..aV ICaL ICa'TaU/..K,1}V , 209 Dionysius I apparently manhandled the poet, both in his condemnation to death and in his exile from the court. The inspiration for the creation of this work, therefore, did not stem positively from his acceptance and integration into the court but reflected a negative opinion from his treatment at the hands of Dionysius. Furthermore, the Cyclops as the symbol of physjs and not nomos was in direct contradiction to Dionysius's self-portrayal of himself in his own literary output as the epitome of nomos. 6 f§! By representing the tyrant as a Cyclops, a creature with no recourse to customs or laws and with no pojjs, Philoxenus called into question the very legitimacy of Dionysius's empire. Such a condemnation was especially damaging to the tyrant due to the timing of the composition for Philoxenus's poem around 388, at the same time as the debacle of Dionysius at the Olympic Games, the decline of positive relations with Athens, and the poor treatment of the court. In fact, the Cyclops or Galateja was parodied in the Plutus of Aristophanes, a legacy that proved how the work of Philoxenus (and perhaps another work of Philoxenus parodied by Plato 690 ) and his portrayal of Dionysius had wide reaching implications in Athens. In this sense, although the Cyclops may not have been composed at the court, it still successfully represented the type of negative relationship between the tyrant and the poet at this time. Through this work, the court of Dionysius would not have been 689 For the use of Philoxenus's poem as condemning Dionysius as the symbol of physjs and brute strength, see, for example, Sanders 1987: 15-19. For Dionysius's self-representation as the symbol of nomos, see Chapter 4, page 294. 690 Wilkins 2001:345-48 mentions that Plato, in his Ph;:wn, parodied another work of Philoxenus, the Dejpnon (as noted in Ath. 1.5b). Athenaeus notes that this Philoxenus was from Leucas, although it seems from other referenoes in Athenaeus that this is actually Philoxenus of Cythera. Modern scholars have argued about the presenoe of only Philoxenus or multiple Philoxeni, but Wilkins argues that the similarity in each of these Philoxeni in ancient commentators suggests that they are the same. 210 represented as a locus of scholarly output but as a place in which scholars were discouraged from intellectual interaction and creation by being subject to exile or death. The second author, Philistus, also took part in the general intellectual atmosphere of the court and used the events that occurred there as inspiration for his own work. We learn that Philistus had a scholarly influence on the Dionysii, although this influence seemed to be somewhat anti-philosophical (at least as much as philosophy would encourage regime change). As will be discussed in the following section, the court of the Dionysii was a locus for conflicting philosophical debates on leadership, while the (re-)appearance of Philistus at the court of Dionysius II was predicated by the desire of certain members of the court to have a counterpoint to Plato and to his philosophical influence. 691 Even if this passage suggests that Philistus attempted to suppress the scholarly atmosphere of the court, at least in regard to philosophy, he nevertheless participated in the dialogue of the court regarding the proper way to rule the Dionysian empire. Concerning his own literary output, Philistus was the creator of several well-known historical works, several of which pertained to the rule of Dionysius and to Sicily. 692 Unfortunately, the Suda and other sources that describe the works of Philistus do not note the locus of their composition. His Hjstorjes (of Sicily or of the Dionysii), were likely composed away 691 Plut. Vlt. Djon 11.1-2 (W<; rlvrLTaryfLa npO<; IT!-vdnvva KaL cfxl\,ouocp!.av EK£Lvov ¥govTE<;). 692 See also Chapter 4, pages 251-52. The entry on Philistus in the Sud a(~ FGrH 556 T1a and 1 b) notes that Philistus was the author of a work on the history of rhetoric, a history of Egypt, a history of Sicily, and a history of Dionysius among others (6<; 1rpiino<; 1caTa T7}v fnrropuc7w ' • ' ' ,,, ' t '' T' ' ' A' ' ' (3 (3' ' (3' " ' ' ' TEXV1JV LOTopwv eypa'f E. uvverasE oE EXV1JV P1JTOplK/T}V, lPfV7rTWK,a EV L l'vWl8 L , L.LICE!'vUca EV {3i.f3!-..,[ols w' ... ITEpL b.wvva-Lov TaLi Tvpdvvov {3i.f3!-..,[a a-T'). See also the testimonia of Philistus in FGrH, especially 556 Tll-26. 211 from the court, during the period of Philistus's exile. 693 Regardless of this geographical information, the court had a major influence on the works on Philistus, as the output of Philistus suggests some of his works were written in and affected by the court of Dionysius. The relationship between Philistus and the tyrant would have been accented most in his Hjstorjes of Sicily and of Dionysius, since these works would have included biographical information about the men closest to the tyrant. Indeed, Pausanias states that, in order to gain pardon and to return to Syracuse, Philistus repressed the most dastardly deeds of Dionysius in his history of him. 694 Here, within this statement, we see the editing of literature based on personal dynamics created within the court, dynamics that produced the exile of Philistus and provided him the opportunity for further literary creation in order to re-enter Syracuse. The scholar with the most influence at the court of the Dionysii was Plato. It does not seem that Plato composed any of his works at the court, 695 but this lack of output does not indicate his lack of contribution to the scholarly life of the court. Although his political influence, which will be discussed in the next chapter, was perhaps more marked, he also transported his philosophical ideas regarding the 69 3 While several passages agree that his Hjstorjes were written in exile, they disagree on the exact location. Plut. Vlt. Djon 11.4 states that he wrote them in northern Italy (Adria) specifically. Plut. De exjJ. 605c states that he wrote them in Epirus. The mostly likely explanation is that Plutarch is referring to different historical works, since Philistus wrote several. For the compilation of his history abroad, see Stylianou 1998: 179-80. 694 Paus. 1.13.9 ((hro!CpJJtaaBaL TOw b.wvva-Lov Ta dvouu{JTaTa). 695 The only work that expressly has any relation to his time at the court was his Epjstles, although not all of them dealt with Sicily (and since most of the letters were likely forgeries, as is discussed in the section on Plato in the Appendix). 212 direction of the Dionysian empire to the court. As seen from his interaction with the tyrants in various sources, he wished for the Dionysii to evolve as better rulers through their education as better men and philosophers. 696 In fact, his philosophical influence over the tyrants frightened other members of the court, especially the flatterers who thrived on tyranny. 697 Although the ability of Plato to spread his philosophy was limited both by the tyrants and by their court, 698 the scholarly education offered by Plato crucially affected the court during his sojourn and after his departure. Indeed, the request of Dian for Plato to travel to the court of Dionysius I for the first time was due to Dian's desire for Dionysius not to be turned away by the teachings of others concerning the best life. 699 In this instance, we not only see that various philosophical ideas already were present at the court before the arrival of Plato but also that the primary reason for Plato's visit was educational. The latter two visits of Plato also stemmed from his philosophical relations, especially with the Pythagoreans of Tarentum. 70 ° For example, when Archytas and other Pythagoreans were pleading with Plato to return to the court of Dionysius II, they requested his 696 For the plans of Plato to improve the Dionysii through philosophy, see Isnardi Parente 1970: 200-2. 697 See especially Pl. Ep. 7.330a-b and 333c. 698 Lewis 2000: 28-29 argues that the fear of Plato's philosophy forced him to provide primarily political advioe, as his philosophical teachings ooncerning his hatred of tyranny put him in danger. 699 Pl. Ep. 7.327d-e (npLv TWa'; [i/\,1\,ov') Evcrvx6vcra') b.wvvu-Lcp E1r' (i""A,Anv f3Lov alnOv TaLi {3EA/rLOTov 7rapaTpcym). 70 ° For the Pythagoreans as the motive for Plato's last two visits to Sicily, see Isnardi Parente 1970: 104-9. 213 return in order not to destroy the educational progress that they had made with the tyrant. 701 Although Plato himself (or other sources who describe his journey) says very little about his scholarly activities at the court, a few passages have remained. From his Epjstles, it seems that Plato wished to spread his philosophical ideas generally to the pojjs of Syracuse (although the people to whom Plato wished to influence seems limited to the educated class of citizens 702 ), especially in light of their profligate ways of living. 703 Although little is known of the ways through which Plato disseminated his knowledge, the literary evidence suggests Plato often held regular lessons at the court. Thus, Dian eventually convinced Dionysius I to come hear Plato during his leisure time, so that the philosopher could teach him. 704 During the lessons of Plato, an audience apparently was listening to the philosopher, an audience with whom the tyrant was angered due to their admiration of the speaker rather than himself. 705 Thus, this passage reflects a type of culture encouraged by the tyrants where discussion and renown was focused on him (rather than the creation of scholarly 701 Plut. VIt. Djon 18.2-3 (oL 0' i¥7rEfJ:']rav 'ApxECnJfLOV 1rap' ain6v ... KaL cpLt.,ov') Oerwo!Jlvovr;; TaLi II!-vdnuvor;;) and Pl. Ep. 7.339d (E7rwTol\,aL OE lf'A).,"aL EcpoLnvv 1rapd TE 'ApxLnov KaL TWv Ev Tapavn). 702 Pl. Ep. 2.314a states that philosophy should not be spread to the uneducated (di!ca(3ov pivToL I > I ~ > > e I > ~ I ) fJ-1] 'lrO'TE EIC'lrEUTJ TaVTa El8 av pw7rOV') a7raWEVTOV') • 703 Pl. Ep. 2.312a notes that he wished to have philosophy held in honor by the multitude of inhabitants (Zva fLOL Tlp.ijno cfxl\,ouocp!.a KaL 1rapa Tip 7rt.,1}8E1), which seems to be inconsistent with Plato's views on the indulgent Sicilians. See also Luccioni 1958: 76-78. 704 PI t TT.t D. 4 3 (, '' ' ' 't ' ' ' , ' , - II' ' ' u . v 1 ' 'JOfl • EOWOVoaUE ICaL ULE7rpasa'TO 'lrOI/T]UafLEVO') uxoi\,1}V aU'TOV EVTVXEW !'va'TWVL ICaL iuwVaw). 705 Plut. VIt. Djon 4.4 (iJx8er6 TE TOL'> 7rapoVuL 8avfLa(rrWr;; d7ro0EXDfLEvots TDv livOpa). Although these passages come from Plutarch, a much later author, his intimate knowledge of the Academy as a member concerning its way of education would lend credence to this statement. 214 output for the benefit and glory of the philosophers or poets themselves). Yet it also indicates some type of community that had been invited to hear the philosopher speak, thereby suggesting a desire among the associates of the tyrant to learn. Plato also was interested in fostering the education of the tyrants, not only with his own beliefs, but with the beliefs of other scholars, again mainly Pythagoreans. 706 For example, in one instance, Plato sent along copies of Pythagorean works to Dionysius, along with the scholar Helicon of Cyzicus. 707 Plato was also said to have directed Dian to acquire materials from the Pythagoreans, including three books written by Philolaus. 708 From these few instances, we can see that Plato was not merely seeking his own glory at the court of the tyrant but actually strove to educate the Dionysii (although his own reasons for doing so were also predicated on using the Dionysii as guinea pigs for his own philosophical and political experiments). B. The tyrant as scholar Within the sources, the largest consumer and creator of scholarly output was the tyrant. Since the court revolved around the tyrant, literary texts unsurprisingly focused on the figure of the tyrant as the center of scholarly creation. Just as Hiero 706 Diog. Laert. 8.4.79-81 oontains a transcription of correspondence between Plato and Archytas, wherein Archytas wrote that he was sending along certain works to Plato. Plato then responded by confirming that he had received the memoirs sent to him. While the exact text of the letter was likely not available to Diogenes, the close scholarly relationship between the two philosophers certainly would suggest such interaction to be true. 707 Pl. Ep. 13.360b-d. For Helicon, see above, pages 200 and 207. 708 Diog. Laert. 3.1.9 (b.LwvL E7rEuTEl)\£V El'; "i.ucE"'J\,[av Wvr}uaa-8at- Tp!a {3if3"'A,[a ITv8wyopual 1rapa Wi)..,oA.,dov fLVWv E~<,wr6v). Elsewhere in Diogenes Laertius, Plato's love for the work of Philolaus appears. Tradition states that Plato either bought a work of Philolaus for the outrageous sum of forty talents of silver or received the work as a gift from Philolaus for saving a disciple of his who had been thrown into prison by Dionysius. See Diog. Laert. 8. 7.84-85. 215 in his eponymous dialogue, the tyrant was shown as taking an interest in scholarly thought, rather than merely a cruel master with no cultural mores. The desire for the tyrant to also be a scholar, however, was problematic. Unlike earlier tyrants (e.g. Hieron), whose status was firmly as the patron, Dionysius I blurred the boundaries between poet and patron. As we have seen, the barrier between kolax and philos already was quite fuzzy at the court. As Dionysius crossed the boundary from the consumer of court culture to the creator of court culture, the identity of the court became even more muddled. As we saw in chapter l with the failure of Dionysius I at the Olympic Games of 388, success in empire building did not always translate to success in the agon of poetry. As we study the example of Dionysius I, we will see how successful the tyrant can be as he attempts to change roles from leader to scholar. In addition, the success of the tyrant as a scholar was mitigated by various factors, including his own inability to accept philosophical ideas that challenged his own status as tyrant. At the very least, he was shown as fostering an environment that not only accepted various scholars into his court but also as allowing limited opportunity for discussion, especially in regard to his own poetic creation. For example, Diodorus Siculus, when noting that Dionysius I turned to writing poetry after ceasing from warfare, stated that the tyrant imported many men to his court as instructors and correctors of his poetry. 709 Thus, the court also was a location for literary discussion, where poets not only could teach the tyrant but also could evaluate his work. This literary discussion, of course, focused on the tyrant and 709 D. a s· 15 6 1 (' ' ' ' '"' • ' ' " ~ '~ ' ' • lO . lC. . . OW ICaL 7rOL1]fLa'Ta rypa't'EW V7rEU'T1]0a'TO fLETa 7r01'vl'v1}'; U7r0VU1]';, ICaL TOV') EV TOLIT0/8 oogav ~xovrac; fLE'TE7rfp./TrE'TO ICa'i 7rpOTlp.iVv ainoVc; uvv01Irplf3E ICa'i T0JV 'lrOI/T}fLd'T(JJV E7rw-HLTa'> Ka'i Cnop8unG.s ElxEv). 216 created a space where the members of the court were employees of the tyrant, 'hired' by him to increase his scholarly standing. In fact, the aforementioned Philoxenus suffered his punishment under the tyrant in this very role. Plutarch states that Philoxenus was thrown into the quarries after he disparaged the whole tragedy of Dionysius when the tyrant had asked him to correct it. 710 When Philoxenus had returned to the court, he stated that he would rather go back to the quarries than to lie about the beauty of the verses of Dionysius. 711 Here one sees Philoxenus in the role of a judge or a teacher, who took an active role in the education of the tyrant in his literary endeavors. In this sense, Philoxenus was 'fired' for not following the rules of contract, since he did not help the tyrant in a constructive way that encouraged the tyrant in his literary exploits. Plato also was 'fired' in a similar manner and sent away, when he insulted Dionysius I. By insulting Dionysius and calling him ethically suspect, he was not adhering to the normal rules of the court, where the tyrant was simultaneously encouraged to become more prestigious and praised for his current power. The main appearance of Dionysius as participator in the creation of cultural capital was through dramatic composition. Dionysius's own interest in tragedy, however, was not born ex nilljJo but rather reflected Greek cultural developments in the western Mediterranean. Sicily itself had previously been portrayed in Greek literature as a locus of tragedy, Occidentalism stemming from its identification as 710 Plut. De Alex. fort. 334c (5n TparycpO!av alnoV Owp8WuaL ~~:EI\,Evu8Els EV8V'> d7r0 Tij'> dpXiJ'> l)""A,7Jv fLEXP' Ti], KopwviOo, 7rEpu'cypa'fEv). 711 Cic. Att. 4.6.2. 217 the home of the Cyclopes/ 12 dangerous volcanoes, and large amounts of wealth (in addition to the haunt of tyrants). 713 Furthermore, by the end of the fifth century, tragedy was not limited to Athens but had also gained hold in the West. Syracuse had a permanent theater at least by 440, Catane likely also had a theater in the fifth century, 714 and Plato discussed dramatic competitions already occurring in Sicily at the time of his visits. 715 Most famously, Aeschylus came twice to Sicily (472-467 and 458-456) and died at Gela. He had come into contact with the tyrant Hieron for whom he produced the Aetna in 4 76, and he then restaged the Persjans between 4 7l and 469. 716 With these plays, Aeschylus was not only able to honor Hieron as the founder of Aetna but also glorified Sicily through his references to native Sicel elements, a practice repeated by Dionysius I throughout his reign. 717 Furthermore, contact between tyrants and poets within Sicily resulted in the appearance of various tyrants in comedy. 718 The interaction between the Athenian Aeschylus and the 712 In addition to the obvious reference to the Cyclops in the play of Philoxenus, Allan 2001: 71- 72 argues that the Cyclops of Euripides (performed first in 408) was made for later performance in Syracuse or Catane (since the Cyclopes dwelt around Mount Etna). 713 For Sicily as the land of tyranny, see Thuc. 1.17-18. This topic of Occidentalism is discussed more thoroughly in Lanza 2007, especially 274-76. 714 Allan 2001: 68 argues that the rebuilding of the theater oocurred earlier, in 460. Morgan tina, Leontinoi, and perhaps Heraclea Minoa also had theaters built during the fourth century. For a brief discussion of the evolution of theaters in Sicily, see Csapo 2004: 56-57 and 66-67. 715 Pl. Leg. 2.659b-c. 716 For the production of the Aetnaeae, see the Vita Aeschylf 9.18 (for the founding of Aetna, see Diad. Sic. 11.49). For the restaging of the Persae, see the VitaAeschyfj]6 and the scholium to Ar. Ran. 1028. Contact between poets and the Deinomenids is discussed further in Todisoo 2002: 41-44. 717 For the relationship between the writings of Aeschylus and the deeds of Hieron, see Anello 1984: 35-39. 718 For example, the !sole of Epicharmus discusses both Hieron and Anaxilaus of Rhegium ( CGF 218 Deinomenids also likely resulted in the transfer of knowledge about the Sicilian world to Athens. 719 Increased contact between Athens and Syracuse from 393-388 resulted in the appearance of Sicily more frequently in Athenian comedy, especially when relations soured between Dionysius I and his court in 388. 720 Thus, tyrants become a minor subject early fifth century comedy, while Dionysius I became the object the object of ridicule in several comedies during his rule. 721 Dionysius I joined this tradition of poets in the West, along with numerous other tragedians and comedians that have survived merely in fragments. 722 He is somewhat unique, in that he was one of the few leaders in Sicily who did not merely act as a patron to the arts but who actually participated in the creative process himself. 723 Indeed, Dionysius seems to have realized that he was actively carrying on 108 F98 Austin). In addition, the comic poet Phormus apparently was the teacher of the sons of Gelon (see the entry on Phormos in the Suda). 719 Missiou 2007: 103-5 discusses the sojourns of Aeschylus in Sicily within the context of Athenian-Sicilian relations. Thuc. 6.21, however, would focus on the ignorance of the Athenians about Sicily in his explanation of the failure of the Sicilian Expedition. Plut. Vlt. Njc. 12.1-2 also discusses the underestimation of Sicilian power in the eyes of the Athenians. 720 Two comedies of Aristophanes, produced in 388 and 387 (the Al.oicouiKwv and the Kwmico' respectively), are based on Sicilian myths and reflect this interest in Sicily. F1 of the Al.oicouiKwv draws parallels with Pl. Grg. 518b, which mentions Sicilian cookery. For referenoes to Sicilian food, see Wilkins 2001: 314-17. For the discussion of the relationship between Syracuse and Athens circa 388, see Sanders 1987: 10-15. 721 Squillace 2012: 65-66 notes the mention of Hieron in the scholium to Ar. Nub. 971. He also notes the mention of Dionysius in Ar. Plut. 549-550. Dionysius also appeared in a comedic contest (Ephippus F16 Kassel-Austin) and had a comedy named after him (Eubulus F25 Kassel-Austin). 722 For a list of these various tragedians in the West, see Dearden 1999: 244-45 and Todisco 2002: 65. 723 A notable exception was Mamercus, the Campanian leader of Messana in the mid-fourth century, who apparently oomposed at least one epigram in Greek (Plut. Vlt. Tjm. 31.1). See Sironen 1995: 188 for discussion of Mamercus not only within a literary oontext but in a 219 this tradition, since he procured the wax tablets of Aeschylus and other memorabilia of Euripides, 724 the latter of which he apparently placed in the shrine to the Muses. 725 The tyrant seemed destined for literary 'renown' even from the moment when he seized rule, since Dionysius made his first attempt to persuade the Syracusans to discard the generals and to make himself leader in the theater of Syracuse, an action which would foreshadow his own interest in drama. 726 After his early years, which were filled with internal battles and external conflict with the Carthaginians, Dionysius I was able to turn to cultural exploits. As Aelian noted, Dionysius not only appreciated and praised various tragedies, but he also composed them. 727 Thus, rather than being a mere consumer of court poetry, he took on the role of a poet himself. Cicero also qualified the tyrant as an enthusiastic musician and tragic poet, although he argued that the actual talent of Dionysius in these fields was not relevant. 728 Indeed, Dionysius was not a particularly good poet, since his aforementioned participation in the Olympic Games of 388, apparently was a context of assimilation into the Greek cultural world. 724 For the wax tablets of Aeschylus, see Lucian Ind. 15 ('rO AlaxVt.,ov 1rvg£ov El'; 6 EK£Lvo'; ~rypa¢E uVv 7ro"'A,"'A,fj mrovOfj ICT1Jailp.EVo';). For the memorabilia of Euripides, see Hermippus Vita Eurfpfdfs 138. 725 Moretti 1963: 39-40 notes the same passage of the Vita Eurfpfdfs listed in the above note. JG XIV.l2 1.13) seems to discuss this LEpOv TOw MvaELwv as a place where a later kojnon of artists gathered. 726 Diad. Sic. 13.94.1. Lewis 2000: 98-99 argues for this theatricality and manipulation of public opinion by Dionysius I, noting not only the occasion in the theater but also the Himeran audienoe for his visit there (Val. Max. 1.7 ext.6). 727 A I V:H13 18 (' ' • - " '' ' '' ' ' '" ' ' ' ' ' ' e . . Ll.WVVOW') 0 'T1]'> L,U(£!'vW') TVpaVVO') Tparycpowv fLEV 1]U7ra~::,E'TO ICaL E'lrTJVEL ICaL OVV ICaL Op&p.acra EgeTr6v1JUE Tparyucd). Aelian adds as a side note that Dionysius did not compose comedies, as he had no humor. 728 Cic. Tusc. 5.22.63 (musjcorum vera perstudjosum ... poetam etjam tragjcum -quam bonum; nihil ad rem). 220 complete disaster. 729 Indeed, his deficiency as a poet likely caused jealousy of other court members, which led to their ill treatment. 730 By the end of his rule, in 367, he apparently was talented enough to win a victory at the Athenian Lenaea, 731 although this victory may have been influenced by the desire of Athens to ally itself with Syracuse during the messy post-Leuctra political environment. Upon analyzing the extant fragments of the Dionysian tragedies, one understands that his compositions had a specific political purpose to their creation. 732 From the titles that remain of the tragedies of Dionysius, he seems to have followed the normal repertoire of subjects for tragedies and entrenched himself in the cultural atmosphere of the time. Yet it seems that Dionysius was innovative in his representation of events in his tragedies, and his representation of traditional myths differed from other authors. 733 More importantly, these tragedies also provided the tyrant with a forum to portray his rule in a more positive light. Unlike Philoxenus, who portrayed Dionysius as the embodiment of physjs rather than nomos/ 34 the tragedies of Dionysius reversed this trend and focused on his rule 729 Diad. Sic. 14.109. See also Chapter 1, pages 66-68 and Chapter 4, pages 291-94. 730 Plut. De tranq. anjm. 4 71e-f states that Dionysius treated Plato and Philoxenus badly because they upstaged his talent. For the general insecurity of Dionysius I, see Lewis 2009: 58-59. 731 For the participation of Dionysius in the Lenaea, see Diad. Sic. 15.73.5-74.4 (~TGF 76 T1 Snell), Tzetz. ChjJ. 5.178-181 (~ TGF76 T3), Them. Or. 9.126c, and Ael. VH13.18. 732 For a general overview of the Dionysian tragedies, see Ceocarelli 2004: 125-28. The fragments are gathered in TGrF76 Snell. 733 Grossardt 2005: 225-26 notes that a fragment from the Hektoros Lytm (F2A) describes how Priam went to speak to Achilles on foot, in direct contradiction to the Homeric version of events. 734 See chapter 1, pages 56-58. 221 through justice. 735 These poems were thus a way to fight against the anti-Dionysian propaganda that was common in other areas of the Greek world, especially Athens. 736 While tragedy nearly always disparaged the image of the tyrant as a cruel leader with no recourse to laws or Greek customs, Dionysius used his tragedies to reverse that image, by creating a more positive representation of himself as an enlightened ruler who participated in Greek cultural activities. Unlike his father, Dionysius II did not create major literary works (or at least they have not survived). Even if literary sources often focused on the penchant of Dionysius II for drinking parties or for his desire to dabble in toys instead of politics/ 37 not all was lost on the tyrant. As with his father, Dionysius the Younger also participated in the scholarly world of the court, a court which he maintained in a similar fashion. His main interest in the court centered on the figure of Plato, with whom, as noted above, 738 he jealously guarded his relationship. Because he wished to please Plato, he attempted to follow his teachings/ 39 as well as the teachings of the Pythagoreans, including Archytas, who was sent to the court in the absence of Plato to combat others who were falsely educating the tyrant. 740 The sources even seem to suggest that Dionysius had shown some skill in his education. Plato states that, in 735 See especially TGF 76 F4-5 Snell. For further discussion of the role of the Dionysian tragedies, see Sanders 1987: 2-5. 736 See the scholium to Ar. Plut. 550, as well as Fll and F18A Snell. The scholium to Ar. Plut. 550 compares Thrasybulus of the Thirty Tyrants and Dionysius I. 737 For his drinking parties, see above, pages 182-83. For Dionysius II's seclusion in his early life, see Plut. Vlt. Djon 9.2. 738 For the personal relationship between Dionysius, Plato, and Dian, see Chapter 4, 265-68. 739 For example, Pl. Ep. 7.338 notes that Dionysius II was seized with desire to hear the teachings of Plato more thoroughly (58Ev lip.a plv El'; E7r1Bvpiav fJEL TaLi CnaKoVuaL EvapryEuTEpov). 740 Pl. Ep. 7.338c-e (7rapa1CoVufL&/rwv nvWv ~fLfLEOTOL TOw Kwra cfxA.,ouocpLav). 222 order to convince him to go back a third time, Dionysius and the Pythagoreans had sent a trireme, other scholars from Sicily, and a long letter with Archedemus to persuade Plato. As part of the letter, Archytas and other scholars in Tarentum pleaded with Plato to return, in order that Dionysius maintain the progress he had made in philosophy. 741 Furthermore, Plato seemingly praised Dionysius for his intellect and his ability in dialectic in comparison to other members of the court. 742 Dionysius II thus attempted to take part in a wider scholarly community both outside of and within the court. Although he did not produce plays at panhellenic festivals, he appears to maintained limited contact with the cultural world of Athens, as when he wished to have Plato find funds for a chorus at Athens. 743 In addition, Dionysius stayed in contact with Athenian intellectuals, including most notably Speusippus. It seems quite probable that he sent letters to the nephew of Plato, with whom he had a rather fractious relationship, due to the close relationship between Speusippus and Plato. 744 Both Athenaeus and Diogenes Laertius record letters sent to Speusippus, where the tyrant upbraided him for his love of pleasure, his love of money, and his love for the courtesan Lastheneia. 745 In this way, Dionysius used his 741 PI E 7 339 d c ~ '' · ~ ' , ' ' · ' , ' · e ' " ' ' . p. . a- oV'roL oE 1Jf.J.LV 1JrfEI\,ov 7raVTE'; Tov aV'rov 1\,oryov, we; avfLa(rrov ouov L.J.WVVUW'> E7rWE0w~~:W'> Ef1] npOc; cfxl\,ouocpLav). 742 Pl. Ep. 2.314c~314d describes how Plato sent Polyxenus to Dionysius in order to supplement his studies. In this oontext, he states that the tyrant is superior to other members of the court in argumentation (5n npOc; TO Omi\,EX8ijvaL KaL cpVau KaL Tfj fLE860cp TWv t.,Orywv 7r&p.7rol.,v OwcpEpEl8 alnWv). 743 Pl. Ep. 13.362a (€av n OETJ €p.E rlvaiciuKEW El, xoprr;iav). This passage is in the oontext of many tasks for Plato to complete while he was at Athens on behalf of Dionysius II. 744 See Chapter 4, pages 278~82. 745 Ath. 7.279e and 12.546d, along with Diog. Laert. 4.1.2. See McKinlay 1939: 53~54 and Sonnabend 1996: 62 for further discussion of this relationship. 223 philosophical education and his knowledge of proper behavior to demonstrate himself superior to the nephew of his teacher. Dionysius wished to demonstrate that he had become an expert on the subject of moderation and proper living. Unlike his father, who had been ridiculed for his relationship with the courtesan Galateia, Dionysius II turned the tables by questioning the intentions of a supposed intellectual. Within the court, he also attempted to assert his philosophical knowledge as learned through Plato. For example, Plato notes that Dionysius had attended the lectures of other scholars at the court and had compared them with the teachings of Plato. 746 This passage not only demonstrates the general scholarly atmosphere of the court, with many different scholars providing lectures, but also shows the interest of the tyrant in learning differing philosophical viewpoints. Furthermore, also after the departure of Plato, when fearing the bad publicity he might receive from Plato regarding the tyrant's treatment of the philosopher, Dionysius gathered another group of scholars. Rather than hearing their ideas, however, he appears to have desired to show off his own knowledge. Plutarch relates that he failed at providing a coherent description of the teachings of Plato, thus necessitating the return of the philosopher again. 747 Plato also writes that Dionysius had written his own unique 746 PI E 2 313 d (' ' ' (3 '" ' ' ' ' '' ' ' e ' ' ' . p. . c- E'lrEL ryap aaavL~::,El8 aV'ra a-vr·yrytiyvofLEVor;; TE ai'vi'vOl8 leaL 1rapa EWfLEVor;; 1rapa Ta TOw (i)l.).,"uw Ka'i ai.na 1Ca8' aind). Note that the verb here is (3auavL~Ew, which has the meaning 'to put to the test' but also 'to torture'. It does not seem from the oontext, however, that the letter writer is insulting the knowledge of Dionysius but rather is encouraging him in his close pursuits of philosophy. 747 Plut. Vlt. Djon 18.1-2 (iwary/(,d~ero ToLr;; ID..,dnvvo<; 7rapa1CoVap .. aaL IWICW<; xpijaBaL. ICa'i 7rdt..,w EK£Lvov E7r68El). 224 treatise from the ideas he had heard from Plato during his visit, although Plato was dubious about this claim (Pl. Ep. 7.34lb). 748 ll \ \ ' \ \ \ I J\: I \ r " " " 7r01\d'va ryap aV'TO') Ka~ 'Ta fLE'iUFra EWEVa~ 'TE Ka~ U<aVW') EX,EW 7rpOCYE7rO~EUTO \: \ \ r \ " "l l I r! \: \ \ J I ,.+, I o~a 'Ta<:; V7rO 'TCVV a,~,,~,wv 7rapaKoa<:;. vcrrepov oe Ka~ aKovw ryerypa't'eva~ J \ \ ? I " e' r r " I J\:\ " J " aV'TOV 7rep~ WV 'TO'TE TJKOVCYE, U"VV EV'Ta OJ') aV'TOV 'TEX,VTJV, OVOEV 'TCVV aV'TWV Cbv dKoVoc olOa OE oVOEv 'To-lrrwv. For he claimed that he himself knew many of the most important doctrines and was sufficiently informed due to the versions he had heard from his other teachers. I am even told that later on he himself wrote a treatise on the subjects in which I then instructed him, composing it as though it were something of his own invention and quite different from what he had heard. Yet of this, I know nothing. Although he was not always successful in his education (and eventually would lose the intellectual and political battle between pro-tyrannical elements and the Academy, led by his uncle Dian), Dionysius was neither anti-scholarly nor a passive recipient of knowledge from his court, but rather was a participant in the promulgation of ideas discussed there. As we have seen, the Dionysii attempted to foster a court environment during their rule. From the testimony of the sources, however, it does not appear that the court was particularly well-formed or consistent. There did not seem to be a formal court process, and the logistics of the court revolved around the whims of the tyrant. One popular function for the members of the court was as the creators of scholarly discussion, who were mainly focused on the education or encouragement of the tyrant 748 We do not know what the subject of the treatise was, although the letter writer suggests that Dionysius had adapted Plato's own teachings and then claimed that they were his own invention (ryeypa¢EvaL ai.nOv 1rep'i CLv TCne i]1wvue, uvv8Evra W<; alnoV TEXV1JV, oVOEv TOw ai.nWv CLv , ' ) aKOVOL . 225 as a scholar himself. Fundamentally, the court of Dionysius the Elder and of Dionysius the Younger had few differences. To a degree, the court of Dionysius I was more focused on praising the talents of the tyrant as poet, while that of Dionysius II committed itself more to philosophy. Both rulers, however, seemed unable to commit to fully integrating the court as an institution. Whether they had other more pressing concerns on their hands or they were afraid to hand over too much power to the members, the tyrants did not fully take advantage of this process of mobility. Although this lack of trust in the court did not have great implications in their scholarly pursuits, as will be discussed in the next chapter, their neglect of the court had wider political implications. 226 CHAPTER 4- COUNSELORS AND CONFIDANTES: THE POLITICAL INFLUENCE OF THE COURT Part I: The court and internal politics Although we have seen in the previous chapter that the court was a locus of intellectual creation, it did not only encourage poets, philosophers, and other scholars to congregate at the service of the tyrant for these purposes. The court also served a second major function, namely as a group of political advisors who provided counsel not only for internal politics (i.e. maintaining rule within Syracuse) but also for decisions regarding the growing empire of the tyrant around Sicily and farther abroad. Syracuse, especially during the reign of the Dionysii, thus became a center both of intellectual and political power, one that rivaled other major poJejs around the Greek world, most notably Athens. 749 This political role of the court became especially important, especially in light of the lack of true administration within the city under the capricious rule of the tyrant. Without a strong ekldesja or boule, the court took on many of these roles and allowed the tyrant to rule over an increasingly larger area. 750 As will be discussed below, members of his court would take control over various elements that formed the foundation of the empire, including the army, navy, and overseas governorships. We thus see competing micro-communities at play here in Syracuse, as the court takes over political responsibilities from traditional bodies of decision making. Yet, at the same time, this micro-community of the court 749 For the overlap of intellectual and political centers, as well as the evolution of each city (including Athens), see Engberg-Pedersen 1993: 285-92. 75 ° For this role of the court (in regards to kingdoms), see Herman 1997:200-1. 227 struggles in its own identity, in relation to the pojjs and to the empue of the Dionysii. Was the court a scholarly entity or a political entity? What role did it play in relation to the 'totalitarian' rule of the tyrant? How far was the reach of the court? In its most basic schema, the court can be conceived of a community in the shape of a pyramid, with the tyrant at the very top and the court spreading out in various levels below the tyrant (although divisions of this pyramid were somewhat amorphous in comparison to the more well-defined courts of the Ptolemies and Seleucids). Although the tyrant-court relationship was vertical (i.e. with the court positioned below the tyrant), this relationship also perhaps was the most horizontal and equal of the relationships between the tyrant and his subjects, as his advisors were the closest in proximity and were given the most responsibility. 751 Yet this proximity did not necessarily translate to safety for the court members, as more political responsibility also meant an increase in the threat of a possible coup and a corresponding increase in suspicion on the part of the tyrant. The changing identities of the court within and in relationship to the tyrant often created an unstable political environment that threatened to upset the standard hierarchy. These phjJoj of the tyrant, at first from Syracuse but later from other cities around the Greek world, would form an essential part of the narrative of the tyrant's reign, both as the creators of political policy and victims of the policies of the tyrant. These court members thus would direct various processes of mobility and would be victims of mobility themselves, as they moved to and from the community of the court (often away in exile). How strong, however, was the political function of the court? Were 751 Davies 2002: 5-8 discusses horizontal relationships with other tyrants and other more vertical relationships (e.g. with subjugated cities). See also Chapter 5, pages 308-310. 228 there processes or behaviors that limited its strength and usefulness to the tyrant? As will be discussed below, the usefulness of the court would be limited due to the over mobilization of the court. The tyrant was able to draw influential members to his court but often was unable to integrate them more fully into the city. This lack of integration threatened the stability of the tyrant's empire and even aided in causing the downfall of Dionysius II. Within the following chapter, we will discuss the influence of several important phjJoj, both Syracusan and non-Syracusan. Each of these men identified with various micro- and macro-communities in relation to the Dionysii. For example, the Syracusans Leptines and Philistus formed part of the closest micro-community with the tyrant as his closest advisors. Yet, as we will see, their differing views on the largest macro-community (the Dionysian empire) would bring them into conflict with the tyrant. Andocides and Aeschines, who were members of a different pojjs (i.e. Athens) would become part of the more general micro-community of the scholarly court. Their inability to integrate into the pojjs of Syracuse and their own weak political standing in their home city, however, ultimately would not help Dionysius in his quest to build relations between these two pojjs-communities. The relationship between Plato, Speusippus, and Archytas of Tarentum was even more complicated. Plato and Speusippus shared both familial and pojjs connections, while they both participated in a shared philosophical community with Archytas. At various times, sometimes simultaneously and sometimes not, they shared in the micro-communities of the scholarly court in Syracuse together with the tyrants. Finally, Isocrates is the most unique example of these scholars, since he seemingly shared no community at all with the tyrants through no personal contact. Yet, through his letter to Dionysius 229 I, he attempted to create an entirely new macro-community with the tyrant, a panhellenic macro-community that included Sicily and the remainder of the Greek world. In a sense, this relationship was the most successful, as Isocrates did not come into contact with these conflicting communities at the court. Thus, through his relationships with these various scholars, the Dionysii were required to balance many different communities, from the micro-communities of his court and various philosophical schools, to the larger macro-communities of the pojjs and his own empire. His inability to harmoniously integrate these competing communities into his own program of rule was the major limiting factor for the political usefulness of the court. A. The eyes and ears of the tyrant: the court in Syracuse The philoj of the tyrant played different roles in the life of the tyrant, which were not always political. The definition of the phjJos is a slippery one, as the status of the members of the court changed constantly. What was the relationship between the intellectuals and the phjJm? As discussed in the previous chapter, within the various tales of the court, it seems that the intellectuals within the court were included among the phjJoj. Thus, the intellectuals coming from abroad to Syracuse most likely were included as philoj, although apparently not all were intellectuals. As noted before, one group of these non-intellectuals (or at least scholars acting in a non-intellectual manner) who seemed to fraternize with the tyrants were the Djonysokolakes, or 'flatterers of Dionysius's, of whom there were reported to be a great number milling about at the residence of the tyrant. 752 Whether they were 752 See Ceccarelli 2004: 119-24, who notes that these flatterers were mentioned several times and discusses the great number of flatterers in Ath. 6.24 9 e-f. See also Chapter 3, pages 182-83. 230 merely fellow Syracusans or visitors to the court, 753 their main purpose, as suggested by various sources, was as drinking companions to the tyrants. At first glance, they served little purpose, other than to ensure that the excesses of the tyrant were not committed alone. 754 Yet, more prominent intellectual members of the court also took part in merry-making with the tyrant. 755 While these meetings with his flatterers generally were portrayed negatively as episodes of debauchery, it may very well be that many decisions under the Dionysii were made in such an environment. As this section demonstrates, the flatterers (much like the Assembly under Dionysius I) within the court may have acted as a sort of rubber stamp for the political decisions of the tyrant, decisions that were likely often made in this context. Within this dynamic, we again see competing micro-communities within the court: one focusing on ludic activities and the other focusing on political activities. Ideally, such communities could work together, as in the world of the symposium, where men would gather to share in feasting and in fruitful conversation. Indeed, we do see certain members of the court, including Plato and Xenophanes, participating in both activities. 756 Yet, as we will see below, the Dionysii were far more comfortable with the ludic associations of the symposium, where the tyrant was free to gather the 753 Ceccarelli 2004: 116-19 brings up the suggestions that they might have been actors. See also Arist. Rh. 1405a 23-25 and the commentary by Stephan us (Arist. Rh. 168). 754 For a description of the flatterers, see also Ath. 10.435d-e, which discusses the companions for Dionysius II's drinking binges. Apparently, during one ninety-day drinking binge when the tyrant drank himself blind, the flatterers played along with the drunken blindness of the tyrant. 755 See McKinlay 1939: 56-58, who mentions Xenophanes (Ael. VH 2.41 and Ath. 10.437b), Philoxenus (Ath. 1.6!), Antiphon (Plut. X orat. 833b), and Xenophon (Ath. 10.427!). 756 See chapter 3, page 183. 231 praise of his court members. The political aspect of the court, where members were given access to free speech and decision making, was not developed. By attempting to keep his court in the ludic sphere, the Dionysii could prevent access to the power that accompanied advising in political matters. Where did Dionysius find inspiration for this community? Such a raucous process of political decision-making with one's phjJoj also appeared under Hermocrates, the predecessor of Dionysius I. When Syracuse had returned to democracy in the aftermath of the Peloponnesian War, 757 the philoj of Hermocrates were depicted as a group of rabble-rousers, who neither followed the laws nor respected the democracy. 758 Together with his philoj, Hermocrates was accused of not respecting the jsotes of other citizens and as forming a type of oligarchy. 759 His philoj were the core of those under his command who attempted to take back Syracuse upon his return to Sicily and who fought against the citizens of Syracuse during this attempt. A large portion of the phjJojwere killed or exiled after the death of Hermocrates (although Dionysius himself escaped by feigning death after the battle) and would be recalled at the beginning of the reign of Dionysius I (Diad. Sic. 13.75.8-9). 760 , \:\ ~ I \ I ' I \ " r! l 9le ' ' 0~ OE 4VpaKOCYW~ 'TO ryeryEVTJfLEVOV aKOVCYaV'TE') U"VV 'TOU;; O'lrl'vOU:; TJI'v OV eu; 'TTJV , , e' <, , , , ,.... , 'e , ,.+, , , !E , aryopav, Ka r;v fLE'Ta 7ra,,,~,,ov 'lrl\/1] avo;; e7r~'Yavev'Te<:; 'TOV 'TE pf-LoKpwrr;v \ " I ' " \ l I ' I \ \:\ ' \ Ka~ 'TCVV CYVfl/7rpa'T'TOV'TWV aV'Tt{J 'TOV') 'lrl'vEUPTOV') a7rEK'TEWaV. 'TOV') oe a7rO 757 See Chapter 2, note 367 for Diodes. 758 Thuc. 6.38.5. For further discussion of the phjfoj of Hermocrates, see Sordi 2008: 153-57. 759 Westlake 1958-1959: 249-51. 76 ° For the recall of exiles, see Diad. Sic. 13.96.2. 232 \ ' " ll " I I ' l I ' \ " 'TWE') aV'TWV 'lrDI\d'vOU:; 7rEpU7TECYOV'TE') 7paVf-LaCYW OJ') 'TE'TEI'vEV'TTJKO'TE') V7r0 'TCVV 9 'A I ' \ " "~ I I TJV Ka~ i..l.WVVCYW') 0 fLE'Ta 'TaV'Ta 'TCVV 4VpaKOCYWJV 'TVpaVVTJCYa'). When the Syracusans heard what had happened, they gathered in the market-place under arms, and since they appeared accompanied by a great multitude, they slew both Hermocrates and most of his supporters. Those who had not been killed in the fighting were brought to trial and sentenced to exile. Consequently, some of those who had been severely wounded were reported by their relatives as having died, in order that they might not be given over to the wrath of the multitude. Among their number was also Dionysius, who later became tyrant of the Syracusans. It is here that Dionysius first appears in the historical narrative, specifically as a phil as of Hermocrates. When discussing the supporters ( <TVflinpanov're<;) of Hermocrates, Diodorus states that among their number was Dionysius, the future tyrant of Syracuse. 761 As noted in the first chapter, the policies of Dionysius were influenced a great deal by Hermocrates regarding his relationships with the court, although the identity of Dionysius's court was not as belligerent as the group of men . d H 762 serv1ng un er ermocrates. How was the court of the tyrant politically influential? Within the historical narrative, the court only appeared as a decision-making body on several occasions. Certain individuals occasionally made an appearance among the court in order to 761 See the last sentence of the quoted passage above (c1v iw Ka'i b.wvVaLo'; 6 0erCt TaLrra TOw "i.vpaKoa-Lwv TvpavVJ}aa';). 762 See the section on Hermocrates in chapter 2 (pages 111-18). 233 dispense advice and to aid the tyrant politically. In Syracuse, even before the Dionysii, Simonides was said to have mediated a truce between Hieron and Theron in 4 76/ 63 and Plato would act as political mediator when he traveled to Syracuse to reconcile the feuding Dian and Dionysius II. 764 Plato also would dispense much advice to Dionysius II regarding the direction of the tyrant's reign. Indeed, regarding the true function of Plato at the court, he did not come in the guise of a philosopher (although he did wish to convert the tyrant to the ideal philosopher- king) but as a politician. For example, when he counseled Dionysius the Younger to take a moderate course in life, he notes that his impetus for such a suggestion was the creation of an empire that was greater than his father's. 765 As part of his political agenda, he directed the tyrant to find friends who could rule various cities, in order to unify the island. 766 He also advised Dionysius to import fifty men from Athens and the Peloponnese to act as nomophylakes, in order to frame laws for the new state. 767 In addition, a focus on the control of foreigners and other migrants played a maJor role in Plato's political program for Dionysius II. Mercenaries, for example, were an unwanted problem for Plato, as his perfect city would not need mercenaries, 763 Diodorus does not mention this bit of information. It is found in the scholium to Find. OJ. 2.29. For political and military alliances at this time, for example, see Diad. Sic. 11.48.6-7. See Piccirilli 1973: 7 4-79 for discussion of the mediation of Simonides. 764 Pl. Ep. 7.331d and Lewis 2000: 30. 765 Pl. Ep. 7.332e-333a. Lewis 2000: 28-29 notes this passage and argues for the use of political plans rather than philosophical plans by Plato. 766 Pl. Ep. 7.331e-332a and Isnardi Parente 1970: 200-2. Note that the Epjstles use the term phjfoj for these comrades. 767 PI E 7 337 (' e ' '' ' ' ' '' ' ' ' - e - ' ) S . p. . c apt- r-ov oE EWaL fLVpwvopcp 'lrDI'vEL 7rEVT1JICOVTa /..K,aVoL TOWVTOL ... EWaL VOfLOVr;; . ee also Lewis 2000: 32-33. 234 with protection from an army of citizens. 768 His focus on unwanted migrants was encapsulated in his Eighth Letter, in which he worried that the island would be flooded with Carthaginians and/or Campanians, who would blot out the Greek language and would turn Sicily into a province under foreign power. 769 While discouraging immigration from foreigners onto the island, within Sicily, Plato suggested large-scale movement of citizens, encouraging the tyrant to resettle the many poJejs that had been depopulated under the mass migrations of Dionysius I. He also encouraged the tyrant to deprive the non-Greeks of the lands and other rights given to them by Dionysius I by restoring former inhabitants to their ancestral homes (Pl. Ep. 8.357a-b). \ \ " ~ l I '' \ "l l " " ' \ " ' I Ka~ fLE'Ta 'Tav'Ta -'-M<e,...,~av av 'TTJV a'"'"r;v, eurrep eprya e7r~ vtp ery~ryvero, I \ \ p pI <\ " " ',.+, l I r! \ ' \ Ka'TtpKUYa, 'TOVo;; fLEV JVapJVapOV') TJV VVV EX,OVCYW a-yEI'vOf-LEVO'), OCYO~ fLTJ V7rep " " 'l e I \: l I \ \ If:;: \ \:' 'TTJ') KOWTJ') El'vEV ep~a<:;, O~E'lrDI'vEfLTJCYaV npo<:; 'TTJV 'TVpavvwa, 'TOV') 0 " e , , ,.... !E', ,.... , , , , , , , Efl/rrpou ev oucr;'Ta<:; 'TCVV ,,,~,,r;vucwv 'T07rWV eu;; 'Ta<:; apxa~a<:; Ka~ 7ra'Tptpa<:; After this, had my intentions been realized, I would have resettled the rest of Sicily by depriving the barbarians of the land they now hold, except for those who fought in defense of the common liberty against the tyranny, and by restoring the former occupiers of Greek lands to their ancient and ancestral homes. While this process of resettlement would be completed only later by the successor to Dionysius II, Timoleon, the advice of Plato to undertake such a large project clearly 768 For further discussion, see Vatai 1984: 76-77. 769 PI E 8 353 ( '' ' ' ' - 'E" - "' - " '' - "" ' '"0 - . P· . e uxeuov El8 EP1JfLWV 'T1]'; l'vi\/T]VlK/T}'; 'f'WV1]'; L,U(£1'vW 7raaa, '±'OWU(,(J)V 1] 'lrUCWV (3 ,_,' ''') fLETa al'vovua El8 Twa uvvauTet..av KaL Kpwro'; . 235 demonstrated his interest m the future of the tyrant and the island, not philosophically but through the implementation of strategies that would alter the political and social landscape of the tyrant's empire. Nevertheless, these instances of individuals in the court who made political statements rarely occurred, a paucity of decision-making which was repeated in regard to group decisions by the phjJoj. These men were occasionally shown as taking part in the programs of the tyrant, as in his large building program of 40 l, where he extended the walls of the Epipolae to protect against the invasion of the Carthaginians. Here, Diodorus specifically notes that the tyrant oversaw the work together with his friends. 77 ° Furthermore, during the Syracusan revolt of 404, Diodorus writes that Dionysius gathered his friends to give him counsel on the quashing of the revolt (Diad. Sic. 14.8.5). 771 "E' ' 9 ? " ,.+, ,, ' "'' " I ,.+, ' ' I 9 '"wpu:; fLEV ovv, eu; 'TCVV 'Yu"wv, wc; o evw~ -yauw, o 7rDUTJ'TO'J 7ra'Tr;p, eurrev '" "'I •' ' '..+.I ' ' I IT •'t "''' "' ' aV'Ttp, OW'T~ Ka11.DV EV'Ta-yWV E(PTW TJ 'TVpavvu:;: Oi>vVsEVO') OE 0 ICTJOE(PTTJ') ' ,-~,, ~- , ro' ' 't' " ' ' - K ~ ' a'7TE-y7JVWTO OEW l'vaf-JOV'Ta 'TOV Os V'Ta'TOV UTT'TrOV eu; 'TTJV 'TCVV apX,TJUOVUVV ' I ',.+. " ' ' K I I ' 'I '• e7ru<pwre~av a-y~7r7revua~ npo<:; 'Tovo;; afL7ravovr:;: 'TOV'TOV') ryap fLU,xwv ' l l I ,.+, l " r! " \ ~ l I I ih /l \:' ' \ a'TTEI'vEI'vOUlTE~ -yVI'vaiCTJ') EVEKa 'TCVV Ka'Ta £ .. MCEI'v~aV 'TO'lrWV: '±'U'vUT'TO') 0 0 fLE'Ta " ' ' I t' ' ' " IT l t' I 'TaV'Ta 'Ta') UFrop~a') CYVV'TasafLEVO'), aV'TEUTTWV 'Tt{J Oi>vVsEVq_J, 7rp0(TTJKEW ".+. , ',.+,' ,, e' , "'" , ,..., '<:;: ,,, , ,..., E-yTJCYEV OVK E't' U7T7rOV EOV'TO') EK'lrTJOaV EK 'TTJ') 'TVpaVVWO'), a1\d'va 'TOV /l 'l I ' I CYKEI'vOVo;; El'vKOfLEVOV EK7rU7r'TEW. Heloris, one of his friends, or, as some say, his adopted father, declared to him, "Tyranny is a fair winding-sheet." Polyxenus, his brother-in law, advised him to use his swiftest horse and ride off into the domain 770 D. a s· 14 s 6 c ' ' ' '' ' ~ -''' '' ' ' ' "' ~ ' ) lO . lC. . . IWL aV'rO') oe fLETa 'TWV 'f'LI'vWV 7rpOU1]Upeve Ta') 1]fLEpa'> O!'va') 'TOL') epryoL') . 771 Diod. Sic. 14.8.4 sets the scene (uvvf}ryarye ToV'> cpLt.,ov') (3ovl\,evmJfLEVO'> 1repL TOw Eveunfnwv). 236 of the Carthaginians to the Campanians, whom Himilcon had left behind to guard the districts of Sicily. Philistus, however, who composed his history after these events, declared in opposition to Polyxenus that it was not fitting to run from the tyranny on a galloping horse but to be cast out, dragged by the leg. Interestingly enough, Diodorus argues that the philoj were not the first choice for aid by the tyrant, since Dionysius sought out their advice only after he had been abandoned by his mercenaries. 772 When evaluating the response of his phjJoj, one can understand the greater reliance on his mercenaries than his friends. Rather than encouraging him or giving him political advice, Heloris told him that tyranny was a fine funeral shroud (i.e. that tyranny often results in the death of the tyrant), while P I ld h . f1 h C . 773 I h. . d o yxenus to 1m to ee away to t e ampamans. n one sense, t 1s ep1so e shows a type of parrh§sja, where the friends of Dionysius (who in this case also included family members) were allowed to speak freely. This freedom of speech, however, was rare and limited to this episode, since Dionysius was desperate for advice at this time due to the great danger threatening him at the very beginning of his rule. Through their freedom of speech, his closest advisors demonstrated through their opinions that they did not believe in the stability of his rule. Indeed, Dionysius only would survive with the help of his Campanian mercenaries, who were able to swoop in and defeat the Syracusans. This episode represents the competition between 772 Diod. Sic. 14.8.4 (iJ7r0 TWv fLW-8o¢6pwv Ery~<,acraf.£t-7r6fLEVOr;;). 773 Philistus was the only voice of reason in this instanoe, telling him not to give up rule but to face the revolt. Slightly different versions of the story are given by !socrates (6.44-45) and Aelian ( VH 4.8), who note that Dionysius was besieged by the Carthaginians, not the Syracusans, when he consulted his friends. The passage of !socrates also notes the desire of Dionysius to flee by sea. See Alfieri 2008: 98-100. 237 brains and brawn that often appeared in the narrative of the tyrant, as he struggled to find the right balance between ideological and intellectual strategems within his rule (as evidenced by his 'centrification' discussed in chapter two) and military forces. The phjJoj must have played a larger role in the administration of the burgeoning empire of Dionysius I, since large-scale projects and movements of thousands of people could not have been overseen by Dionysius alone. In addition, the many smaller cities of Dionysius's empire outside of Syracuse would have needed supervision once under the hegemony of the tyrant, to ensure that these poJejswould not revolt. They were rarely seen together, however, as a group who provided counsel, since nearly every action of Dionysius related by historians was undertaken only by his agency. Why was this so? Perhaps the fragmented nature of the opinions of the philoj without much substance, as seen above, was one reason that they did not appear more in the historical narrative. The narrative of Plutarch confirmed this evaluation, when he noted that the opinions of the philoj of Dionysius II likewise made them seem like children and slaves of tyranny, with their advice only gratifying the tyrant. 774 More obviously, the practice of tyranny itself did not encourage collaboration for political purposes, as noted by Aristotle/ 75 although both this passage of Aristotle and the aforementioned passage of Plutarch refer to a conference (rn'iA"Aocyoc;) for the friends of Dionysius II. Because the tyrant, for the most part, was seeking power and not friendship, his actions were based on personal 774 Plut. Vlt. Djon 6.4 ( 7raL0a'; ... OoVI\,ovc; Tijc; TvpavvLOoc; rlryEVvWc; KaL 7rEpup6(3wc; Ta 7rot.,t.2t npOc; xcfpw Tip fLE1pa1CUp UVfL{3ovf.,EfJOVTac;). 775 Arist. Pol. 5.1313a39-b6. 238 and not common interest. 776 The nature of tyranny thus also was a deterrent to political input by the phjJoj, as such input would make them privy to the plans and power source of the tyrant. By allowing the input of advisors and by providing them with access to his thoughts and plans, the tyrant was vulnerable to undermining and plotting by these men. The political function also was not optimized, since the institution of the court and its philoj was evolving during the first half of the fourth century and would not fully develop until the period of the Ptolemies and Seleucids. 777 After the rule of the Dionysii and their disbanding after the death of Philistus, the terminology for the phjJoj gradually begins to diversify. 778 It was only during this time that the function of these men transformed from a group appearing occasionally during a political struggle to a more permanent council responsible for military and political decisions. We see this evolution through several instances of court members whose careers spanned this evolution. One such example was Clean, 779 a member of the court of Dionysius II 780 who followed him into exile. He later would join Philip II and would appear in the guise of a sophjst§s of Alexander, taking part in the debate over the practice of proskyn§sjs. From these passages, one sees Clean morph from a 776 Mattaliano 2006: 51-56 makes this argument and also refers to the passages of Plutarch and Aristotle in the oontext of the u{i/-)cocyo,. The author also notes that the term uficicocyo' was found elsewhere in Sicily, notably in the tablets of Camarina, which suggests its function as some type of governing body. 777 Sordi 2008: 163-64. See also Chapter 3, pages 183-85. 778 Sordi notes, for example, that Plato used the term ETalpoL 779 For the life of Clean with Alexander, see Curt. 8.5.8 and Sordi 1983: 19-21. 780 Sordi 1983 suggests that he was likely a 7rpouacywcyiOrJ' mentioned in Plutarch Vlt. Djon 28.1 (~ FGrH566 F32). 239 member of the entourage of Dionysius II to a policy-maker under Alexander. Furthermore, the discussion in which Clean takes part regards the possible assimilation of Alexander and his philoj into foreign cultural traditions through the practice of proskyn§sjs, assimilation and integration of court members which the Dionysii did not fully address. Nevertheless, the inclusion of court members into such a discussion was not always positive for these men. Within the court of Alexander, Callisthenes held a prime position of power as the court historian (and the nephew of Alexander's former teacher, Aristotle). When Callisthenes took part in this debate over obeisance in 32 7 and scolded Alexander for his acceptance of this practice, Alexander took offense at this affront by Callisthenes and had him arrested. 781 In this instance, the belief that Callisthenes could speak freely to Alexander, due to his closeness with the leader, was his downfall. The paranoia of Alexander that arose from the willingness of these men to change policies of the growing empire, a brashness which suggested that (at least in the mind of Alexander) such men could threaten his own rule. The court member needed at all times to maintain the proper distance between himself and the leader. B. A meeting of the minds: the Hiero of Xenophon Thus, the court member needed to position himself carefully in the presence of the tyrant, lest his intentions be questioned. The lack of political dialogue at the court mainly stemmed from these fragile internal politics, concerning both the relationship between tyrant/court and relationships amongst its members. The most 781 For this episode, see Arr. Anab. 4.13 and Curt. 8.6. Cleitus the Black also suffered a similar fate a year earlier, when he was murdered after chiding the Alexander for not acting as the legitimate king of the Macedonians and for neglecting to give Philip II credit for building his empire. See Arr. Anab. 4.8-9 and Plut. Vlt. Alex. 50-51 for this episode. 240 well-known theoretical text discussing the relationship between the intellectual and the tyrant was the Hjero of Xenophon, which recorded a hypothetical meeting between the early fifth-century tyrant Hieron and the poet Simonides. 782 Such an interaction between poet and tyrant was created when the intellectual traveled to personally intervene, by attempting to offer advice or to influence the political system of his patron, as occurred historically between Hieron and Pindar. 783 Within the dialogue of Xenophon, Simonides acted the typical role of wise man by giving Hiero advice on a wide variety of subjects regarding the best way for him to retain his rule. In much of the dialogue, however, the roles of sage and uneducated tyrant are reversed, since Hiero is the primary communicator of ideas and proves the wiser in many passages. 784 From this theoretical dialogue, may one discover underlying themes which reflect the historical relationship between the court and the tyrants of Syracuse (especially since Xenophon perhaps traveled to the court)? 785 Most importantly, through his advice, Simonides acted the role of the new intellectual, who did not merely praise the tyrant as a poet but also took an active role in politics. 786 His knowledge of politics and the proper way to rule will not only result in 782 The meeting between these two men also was discussed in philosophical texts. For the meeting between Hiero and Simonides, see also Pl. Resp6.489b and Arist. Rh. 2.1391a. 783 Kojeve 1963: 172-73. The meeting between the wise man and the tyrant was a common theme in ancient literature, as seen in the examples of Plato/ the Dionysii or CroesusfSolon. See Diad. Sic. 9.26 and Gray 1986, especially 119-21. 784 Gray 1986: 115-17. Sevieri 2004: 278-79 notes that Simonides attempts to show himself as equal when offering advice, yet it is the tyrant who acts as primary communicator in their exchange of ideas. 785 For Xenophon at the court, see Chapter 3, page 187. 786 Gelenczey-Mihalcz 2000 notes the similarities with Xenophon's role in the oourt of Agesilaus. Simonides also apparently took part in arranging a peaoe between Hieron and Theron of 241 econom1c and political benefits to the tyrant but also in the happiness of his subjects. 787 Did this ability by members of the court to provide political advice, however, ultimately threaten the tyrant? The dialogue of Simonides and Hiero demonstrates a comfort with tyranny as a viable alternative to other political systems (as in the relationship between the Dionysii and their court) and not merely as a form of government that needed to be destroyed. Earlier poets (e.g. Pindar) had shown how the tyrant (in the guise of the basjJeus) could work for the good of his citizens. 788 In addition, other works of Xenophon, such as the Gyropaedja and the AgesjJaus, demonstrate that rule by one man could be successful. Several reasons for this new positive portrayal of tyranny were possible/ 89 especially since tyrannies of the fourth century (e.g. the Dionysii) were greatly impacting the politics of Greece. Nevertheless, while Hiero and Simonides generally respected one another, the possibility for distrust still hung over the dialogue, especially due to the knowledge of Simonides concerning the proper way to rule and his boldness in asserting such claims to the tyrant. While Simonides provided advice to Hiero and was at pains throughout the dialogue to assure Hiero that he wished only to help the tyrant, his status of advisor and wise man either could Acragas (FGrH566 F93). 787 See the concluding suggestions of Simonides, as detailed in chapter 11 of the Hjero. 788 Find. Pyth. 3.70-71 refers to Hieron as a king who is gentle to his citizens, who is not envious of others, and who is loved by friends (6<; "'i.vpaK6uuauJL vEfLEL (3am.:A.£U<; I 7rpab'> do-ToLe;, oV ¢8ovEwv rlrya8ols, gELvots OE 8avfLa(rrOc; 7rch1Jp). Of course, Pin dar himself was a type of gEvoc; to the oourt who also shared into this special relationship with the tyrant. 789 In addition to discussing the relationship between the Hjero and just rule, Aalders 1953: 211- 13 also argues that Xenophon clearly saw the state of affairs in fourth oentury Greece, as tyranny was on the increase and as the general atmosphere of Greek politics was at an impasse. 242 make him a viable alternative as ruler or prove useful in the hands of a rival of Hiero. 790 Thus, while the role of Simonides appears at first glance as a boon for Hieron, undercurrents of distrust are littered throughout the dialogue, especially when the two men expressed differing opinions on various subjects. This distrust of the court by the tyrant is a common theme of the dialogue, 791 as well as other literary sources. Political instability created by those closest to the tyrant was not a problem limited to the tyrants of Syracuse. Isocrates notes that several tyrants were murdered by members of their own family, 792 while Thucydides conversely notes that no relationship generally was sacred to the tyrant, not even family bonds. 793 Because of this breakdown in relations, the poet (or another type of intellectual) could act as a type of mediator between the tyrant and his people, if the intellectual could accent the benefits of the tyrant's rule through his educational and cultural programs. Because there was no reciprocal relationship between the tyrant and his subjects, due to their total estrangement, the intellectual, through his interaction with the tyrant, possibly could present the tyrant in a positive light to his subjects. 794 In reality, however, the tyrant distrusted his court, since these court 79 ° For further discussion on the distrust between Simonides and Hiero, see Strauss 1963:40-43. 791 See the murder of tyrants by their own family in Xen. Hjer. 3.7 -9. 792 !soc. 8.111-13 notes that the tyrant lives in fear and uncertainty due to his increasing empire. See Low 2007: 158-60 for the dangers of empire under the tyrant. 793 Thuc. 6.85.1 describes such bonds as olKEiov. For further discussion of the lack of trust between the tyrant and his family, see Tuplin 1985:356-57. 794 As with Pindar's praise of Hieron in Pyth. 1-3 and OJ. 1. For the ability of the intellectual to act as mediator in the face of estrangement between tyrant and subject, see Sevieri 2004: 282- 83. 243 members both had the wish for power and the access to this power. 795 The very proximity of the court members to the tyrant was one fear expressed by Hiero, upon stating that the tyrant must be most wary, not when he is out of his city, but when he was within the palace gates. 796 Hiero also noted that plots against his rule often were the work of those whom he considered closest to him. 797 Although Simonides exhorted Hieron to have faith in his closest friends, including his court, 798 Hieron identified the intellectuals as a dangerous group, because (like Simonides) they had the intelligence to formulate a plot. 799 In this way, the status of the scholar/advisor is ambiguous, an ambiguity that threatened the relationship between all court members and the tyrant. As described directly above, the loyalty of Callisthenes became suspect after Callisthenes directly challenged the policies of Alexander. Within the context of Syracuse, Pindar also struggled to find the proper balance between proffering glory to the tyrant and suggesting possibly controversial ideas. 800 Under the Dionysii, we will see this ambiguous status of the scholar best through the example of Plato. While Plato first would be respected by the tyrants, his questioning of the direction of the Dionysian 795 For both passages, see Arist. Pol. 5.13131 ('rvpavvucOv OE TO fLd"'A,urr' ri'lrLOTELv TaL'; ¢L"'J\,ots, Wr;; (3 "\ I \ I ~ I ~\ 1"\ I ) OVI\,OfLEVWV fLEV 7raV'f(J)V UVVafLEVWV UE fLaf\,lfi'Ta TOVTWV , 796 X u· 2 10 (' ~\ I ·~· ' ~\ J! ~ ' I ''e ' ' ~I ' I ., "\, en. _uler. . o oE Tvpavvo<; avo E'lrEwav ElliW T1J<; OLICW8 7rapEI'v V EV aiCwovvcp EUTW, a/\,1\, EvcraV8a 01] Ka'i p.,d!-..,urra cpvt..,aK.TEov oferaL Elvat.). 797 Xen. Hjer 1.38 (Ka'i ToLvvv aL E7rlf3ov!-..,a'i Eg oVOEvwv 7r/-..,EovE<; TOl8 Tvpdvvols Elu'w f) d7r0 TWv fLd"'A.,urra cjxt..£Lv ainoVc; 7rpomrot/T]Uapivwv). 798 Xen. Hjer11.14-15 and Sordi 1980a: 11-13. 799 X H" 5 1 ( I \ \ '~\ 1' ~ ·~ ~ \ ., I \ ..+, \ \ en. Jer. , rytPfVWUK,OVOL fLEV ryap OVUEV 1}'T'TOV 'TWV WUJJ'TWV TOV') ai\,K,/./).-OV') TE ICaL UO't'OV') ICaL ~ I \ ~\ A, I I I ) ULK.aWV') ... TOV') OE UO't'OV'), fJ-1] TL fL1JXaV1]UWV'TaL . 800 See, for example, the treatment of the exiled Demophilos in the ode to King Archesilaus of Cyrene (Pyth. 4.263-99). 244 empue soon would place him in the crosshairs of the tyrants' wrath. Just as Simonides wished to turn the focus away from the tyrant to the citizens of his pojjs, the policies of Plato which attempted to moderate the rule of the tyrant quickly turned the philosopher from friend to enemy. Even the closest and most respected advisor to the tyrant could quickly have his loyalty questioned. C. The Dionysii vs. the philoi. court/tyrant relations Such fear of one's closest associates appears frequently in the narrative of the Dionysii, especially the life of Dionysius the Elder, who (according to tradition) feared the approach of anyone. Tradition states that he was cautious of his friends, because he knew they would rather rule as a tyrant than be ruled by a tyrant. 801 Likewise, a passage of the Letters of Plato notes that Dionysius never felt safe, since he was destitute of friends who were trustworthy. 802 As will be discussed later in this chapter, the reign of the Dionysii was punctuated by occasional episodes of paranoia founded on distrust of his court, where the happiness and stability of the tyrant was compromised. 803 As evidenced in the Hjero, much of this distrust stemmed from the ambiguity of the relationship between advisor and tyrant. Pindar was one such example of the ambiguous advisor, as when he attempted to navigate between his positions as an aristocratic poet, a courtier who shows deference to the leader, and a 801 Plut. Vlt. Djon 9.4 (tAFfE OE ToVc; cpLt.,ov') cpvt.,dTTEu8aL voVv ~xovcrac; ElOW'> KaL (3ovl.,opivovc; piiicicov TvpavvEiv f} TvpavvEiuea,). See especially the neoessity for his daughters to shave him (Plut. Vlt. Djon 9.3 and Cic. Tusc. 5.20.58). See also Sanders 1987: 27, 87-88 for the fear of Dionysius I. See chapter 1, notes 100-104. 802 PI E 7 332 (' ' -'' ' '' ' ' ' 'e ' ' ' ' ' - -''' ' . p. . c V'lfO uo't'W'> 7rUYTEVWV ovoEVL, fJ-0118 EUW 7]: 7rEV1]'> ryap 1JV avopwv 't'LI'vWV leaL 'lrUITi.Vv). 803 For the happiness of the tyrant, see Sordi 1989:65-67, who notes Pl. Ep. 7.326b and 7.327b as proof of this false happiness among the Dionysii. 245 philos who provided advice to the tyrant. 804 This constant concern for the true position of the court members in the hierarchy of the tyrant, either as firmly under his rule or as a colleague, caused those closest to him to suffer his wrath when threatened. Tales of punishment inflicted by the tyrant on his court members are found throughout the reign of Dionysius I, tales which demonstrate the capriciousness of the tyrant, as well as his insecurity. 805 As discussed in the previous chapter, Philoxenus, the writer of dithyrambs from the island of Cythera, apparently was sent to the quarries for insulting the poetry of the tyrant, 806 while the poet Antiphon even may have been put to death. 807 Although several details of these stories appear embellished or apocryphal, such behavior was not necessarily an exaggeration, since the quarries had been a destination for punishment. 808 In addition, the sentence of execution appeared at other times, as when Dionysius put many to death at the very beginning of his rule. 809 As discussed in the previous chapter, the most notable victim 804 For this analysis of the relationship of Pin dar in OJ. 2 (to Theron of Acragas), see Stoneman 1984:43-45. 805 Lewis 2000: 58-59 links the poor treatment of intellectual and Dionysius's issues with insecurity 806 Diad. Sic. 15.6.2-5 discusses the arrival of Philoxenus to Syracuse. Many souroes discuss the treatment of Philoxenus at the hands of Dionysius I, especially regarding his reaction to the criticism by Philoxenus, including Lucian Ind. 15, Cic. Att.4.6.2, Ath. 1.6e, Plut. De Alex. fort. 334c, Plut. De tranq. anjm. 4 71e, and Ael. VH12.44 807 For the possible execution of Antiphon, see Arist. Rh. 2.1385a and Philostr. V 81.15. 808 See Thucydides 7.87 concerning the fate of the Athenian prisoners after the Sicilian Expedition. 809 For example, see his treatment of the wealthiest citizens of Gela in Diad. Sic. 13.93.2 or his condemnation to death of his two strongest opponents, Daphnaeus and Demarchus, at an assembly in Diad. Sic. 13.96.3. 246 of the wrath of both Dionysii was Plato, who, on his first trip to Sicily in 388 to counsel Dionysius I, apparently was sold into slavery by the tyrant after displeasing him. 810 His treatment did not improve on his second trip, when he was placed under house arrest, or on his final trip, when he again was held against his will and only saved by the intervention of his friends at Tarentum. 811 Such negative treatment was founded on the jealousy and resentment the Dionysii harbored against Plato. For example, Dionysius theY ounger continually sought the praise and close friendship of Plato, although the tyrant was unable to impress the philosopher, as his uncle Dian did. 812 Such dysfunctional relationships on the part of the Dionysii, especially in regards to Plato, demonstrate the instability of the 'community' created by the tyrants. The tyrants' obsession concerning their relationship with their court was not founded on the desire for mere companionship, but rather on their desire to exploit the court for personal glory. The reason for their punishment was the consistent failure to provide this affirmation and glory to the tyrant. D. Close but too close: the fates of Leptines and Philistus Most members of the court were traveling to Syracuse, i.e. citizens of other cities who were invited to the court. Two major figures of the court, however, experienced the opposite process of mobility, as native Syracusans who were sent away from the court. These two figures, Philistus and Leptines, were the most intimate of Dionysius's phjJoj but eventually were sent into exile after falling under 81 ° For this episode, see Diog. Laert. 3.1.18-21, Diad. Sic. 15.7, Plut. Vlt. Djon 5.1-3, and Nep. Djon 2.2. 811 For his second trip, see Pl. Ep. 7.329b-330b. For the third trip, see Pl. Ep. 7.350a-b. 812 PI E 7 330 c· ' ,, , - -,' ,, A' '(3 ,, ' ' "''' • - e ' "' ' . p. . a EaV'rov oE E7rawEw fLa/\,1\,ov 1J L.J..UJ)Va E ov"'ero fLE ICaL 'f'Li'vOV 1]ryEw aL uw'f'EpovHJJ'; piit.) .. nv f) 1 K£Lvov ). 24 7 the suspicion of the tyrant. As will be discussed below, the story of these two men represents the excess of mobility within the court. While they originally were staunch supporters of the Dionysii, Dionysius did not allow them to remain so. Their exile (although temporary) would severely damage the support network of the tyrant. As with his brother, Dionysius the Elder, the early life of Leptines is not known. After his brother took power, Leptines was considered an integral part of the household of the tyrant, as indicated by an Athenian inscription dating from 394/3. 813 When attempting to court the tyrant by providing him with praise and honors, the Athenians also included in this praise the two brothers of Dionysius, Leptines and Thearidas. 814 Whether or not these brothers were considered as possible successors to Dionysius, 815 the Athenians understood that, since they were attempting to gain favor with the tyrant, the inclusion of the brothers of the tyrant within the honors was important. 816 Historical sources provide a few brief hints concerning the strategic importance of Leptines. He first appears in 39 7 as the admiral of the forces of Dionysius and the commander of the siege works, as the tyrant attacked the Carthaginian stronghold of Motya on the extreme western coast 813 JG II 2 18. Only the first few lines of the inscription remain, so the honors provided by the Athenians are not known. The inscription will discussed further in Chapter 5, pages 323-25. 814 Lines 6-9 ( hraw.!uaT LlT[ 0 ]v[ vuwv TO I v :STK ]Eicia, &px[ 0 ]vT[ a l ml AerrTiVrJV To[v aOEic I ¢o ]v TOV Llwv[v]u[io m]l 8mpiOrJv To[v aOEic</>o I v] Tov Llwvvu[io]). Thearidas also would be an ambassador for Dionysius I, leading the failed delegation to Olympia in 388 (Diad. Sic. 14.109.2). 815 Sabattini 1989:32-35 suggests this possibility. 816 The inscription also includes Polyxenus, the KrJOEUT~' of Dionysius. The portion of the inscription after these names is not extant, so it is not known if even more names were listed. 248 of Sicily. 817 After the defeat of the Motyans, Leptines was left to guard against Carthaginian reprisals and to oversee the besieging of other cities, 818 although these actions were only partially successful. 819 He again was given control of a fleet in 390 and took part in a battle between an alliance of Italian Greeks and Lucanians, 820 where he was able to ransom many captives of the Italian Greeks and persuaded the two sides to reconcile. 821 Since he became renowned with the Greeks of Italy, he angered his tyrant brother, who wanted to use the tumultuous political situation to his advantage by swooping in and taking over control of the affairs in Magna Graecia. 822 Because of his intervention in Magna Graecia, Leptines was relieved of his command in favor of Thearidas, who became the favored brother for the next few years. These brief narratives offer several possible glimpses into the persona of Leptines: an obedient brother, a flawed commander, a figure more enlightened than his brother in regard to the treatment of others, and perhaps a rival to Dionysius I. If the loyalty and effectiveness of Leptines were somewhat questionable, Philistus seemed to be the steadfast follower personified. Best known as 817 Diod. Sic. 14.48.4 (}LETa OE TaV'ra E7rL plv Twv ~prywv Kwr€1-..,t/TrEv E7rw'T(l/T1]V Aewdv1JV TDv vaVapxov). 818 Diad. Sic. 14.53.5 notes that Leptines was given 120 ships with which he oould guard the straits. He also was ordered to besiege the western Sicilian cities of Segesta and Entella. 819 Diad. Sic. 14.55.2-3 states that Leptines was only able to sink some of the Carthaginian ships, allowing the remaining ships to arrive at Panormus and the Carthaginians to begin their march upon eastern Sicily and Syracuse. 820 Diad. Sic. 14.102.2 notes that Leptines was sent to aid the Lucanians and arrived with the fleet after the tide of the battle had turned against the Italian Greeks. 821 Diad. Sic. 14.102.3. 822 This reasoning is given in Diad. Sic. 14.102.3. 249 philotyrannos, 823 he was mentioned first as a spectator in the attack of Gylippus during the Athenian siege of Syracuse, 824 although he did not become a major historical figure until the reign of Dionysius. 825 When Dionysius made his famous accusation that the generals betrayed the Syracusans before seizing power in 405, Philistus paid the fine leveled on Dionysius by the archons and encouraged him to speak his mind. 826 Although why Philistus was so closely allied to the future tyrant is not exactly known, 827 he showed his loyalty to Dionysius against the prevailing political powers by disregarding the orders of the archons. One year later, when the Syracusans revolted from the rule of Dionysius while he was away fighting the Sicels, the tyrant was in a quandary regarding the future of his tyranny, so desperate that he only was thinking of ways in which to die gloriously. 828 While Dionysius's other philoj merely suggested ways for him to escape, 829 Philistus exhorted the tyrant to 823 See Plut. Vlt. Dian 36.2 (~ FGrH556 T23a). Nep. Dian 3.2 also makes the famous claim that Philistus loved the institution of tyranny more than the tyrant himself (hominem ami cum non magis tyranno quam tyrannid1). Also see the quotation of Philistus, when Dionysius I is facing a revolt of the Syracusans early in his reign, where he states that Dionysius should not abandon his tyranny (Diad. Sic. 14.8.5 ~ FGrH556 T4). 824 Plut. Vlt. Nic. 19.5. 825 For brief summaries of the actions of Philistus, see Pearson 1987: 19-22 and De Sanctis 19 58: 17-21. 826 The episode is recounted in Diad. Sic. 13.91.3-5 (~ FGrH556 T3). The archons reportedly had fined Dionysius for causing an uproar and for enoouraging the populace to judge the generals without due recourse to the laws. Philistus then stated that he would continue providing money for fines as long as Dionysius wished to speak. 827 The entry for Philistus in the Suda and Cic. De or. 2.13.57 both note that Philistus was a kinsman of Dionysius. 828 Diad. Sic. 14.8.4. 829 For example, Polyxenus (who would also be named in JG II 2 18) suggested that Dionysius flee to the Campanians. 250 fight back and not to relinquish his rule. Regardless of any ulterior motive behind his actions, Philistus had established himself as the right-hand man of Dionysius at the very outset of his rule. Philistus also demonstrated his support of the tyrant in his writings, since he not only was a philos of Dionysius but also an intellectual in his own right. 830 Although few fragments of his work remain, 831 the attempt of Philistus to vaunt the rule of Dionysius has been detected in the writings of later authors, specifically Diodorus. 832 Such pro-Dionysian bias does not necessarily confirm the inaccuracy of his Hjstorjes. As has been noted, 833 in ancient times, his strong approach to history was compared to that of Thucydides, while he was suggested as good history reading even by Cicero. 834 Through these Philistian passages, Dionysius's phjJos attempts to place his rule in a positive light by portraying him as the ideal tyrant. For example, Philistus represented the early years of Dionysius as an extensive attempt to unify the pojjs and to protect its citizens, including the tyrant's campaign to bring back exiles from Acragas in 406/5 and from Aetna in 404/3, as well as his massive public 830 See the claim in Diod. Sic. 14.8.5 (WLI-vw-To<; 0' 6 p_era TaLrra TGs hrrop[a<; uvvrag&p.Evo<;). 831 For a oollection of fragments, see FGrH556. 832 For example, as noted by Sanders 1988: 54-57, the passages on Sicily in Book 15 show that Diodorus followed Philistus in two chief ways. First, the book provides little information on the career of Dionysius from the 384 onward (e.g. only two chapters on the colonization of the Adriatic and four chapters on war with the Carthaginians), likely because the chief source of Diodorus in these matters, namely Philistus, was in exile during this period. Second, the book has a positive portrayal both of Leptines and Philistus, whom the other main source of Diodorus, Timaeus, despised. 833 Namely by Sanders 1981: 398-99. 834 Cic. Q Fr. 2.11.4. 251 works projects in 402/l and 399/8. 835 Philistus apparently also spread mythical propaganda, most notably through the tale of the accession of Dionysius to leadership through the story of the woman from Himera, a narrative that compared Dionysius to the earlier tyrant Gelon. 836 Although such pro-Dionysias bias was useful in persuading later historians of some positive aspects of the tyranny of Dionysius, whether his machinations during the rule of the tyrant had any immediate positive effects on contemporary politics is not known. Regardless of this ambiguity, of all members of the court, Philistus (and Leptines to a lesser degree) was the most influential and trusted member. In light of their importance, the exile of both friends in the 380s would demonstrate how little confidence Dionysius had in his court (or perhaps how paranoid he had become). The suspicion of the tyrant in his phjJoj, as will be discussed below, increased after his abject failure at the Olympic Games of 388, which shook all relationships with his court to the core. Leptines had already found displeasure in the eyes of the tyrant with his behavior in the battle between the Italian Greeks and the Lucanians in 390, and his more peaceful policies with Southern Italy (i.e. the creation of colonization and trade with these cities rather than of political stasjs resulting in a hostile takeover by Dionysius) demonstrated a fundamental disagreement with the tyrant regarding the direction his burgeoning 835 For the relocation of exiles from Acragas, see Diad. Sic. 13.92.4-7. For exiles from Aetna, see Diad. Sic. 14.9.6. The earlier public works are discussed in Diad. Sic. 14.18, while the later works are discussed in Diad. Sic. 14.41-43. For the use of these events as evidence of Philistus portraying Dionysius as a mild tyrant, see Sordi 1990a: 163-64. 836 For further discussion of this tale, see Chapter 1, pages 54-55. For further discussion of this episode as propaganda, see Sordi 1990a 161-62. 252 empire would take. 837 As seen by the example with Alexander and Callisthenes above, the eillingness of court members to direct the policy of the tyrant regarding the direction of the empire often resulted in disaster for the court member. In this case, between 386 and 384, Leptines would be sent into exile, although the reasons behind this decision are disputed. On his part, Diodorus only mentions that Leptines was one of many men sent into exile by the tyrant, 838 while Aeneas Tacticus states that the tyrant exiled Leptines under the pretense of sending him to Himera to gather troops. 839 The most likely impetus behind his exile is mentioned by Plutarch, who includes a rather salacious history for the relationships of Leptines and Philistus. 840 He suggests that the exile of Leptines was caused when he gave one of his daughters to Philistus in marriage without first telling Dionysius. 841 Such a move angered Dionysius, since it would have perhaps affected the dynastic succession under Dionysius (i.e. by creating a rival to Dionysius the Younger) and was understood by the tyrant as another attempt to destabilize his rule. 842 Because of his role in 837 For the discussion of the Italian policies of Leptines and the apparent agreement of Philistus with them, see Sanders 1987: 55-58. 838 Diod. Sic. 15.7.3 (oiJK, Qt.,[ryovr;; OE KaL EcpvrydOEvuEv ... Aewrlv1}r;; 6 d))Et.,¢0'>)· For an overview of the exile of Leptines, see Sabattini 1989: 29-31,46-47, and 50-51. 839 Aen. Tact. 10.21-22. Whitehead 1990 and Bettalli 1990: 245-46 mention this passage. This destination of Leptines was in direct contradiction with other sources. 840 Plut. Vlt. Djon 11.3 notes that Philistus perhaps was having illicit relations with the mother of Dionysius, while Leptines apparently had two daughters with a married woman. 841 Plut. Vlt. Djon 11.3 (~FGRH556 T5c). 842 For such suggestions, see also Sabattini 1989: 54-57. 253 accepting the hand of the daughter of Leptines in marriage, Philistus also was driven into exile by Dionysius. 843 The narratives of their exiles map out different courses for each exile geographically and also diverge according to source, especially in regard to Philistus. Diodorus Siculus, for example, notes that both men went first to Thurii, where they were received warmly by the Italian Greeks, 844 no doubt due to the kindness Leptines had shown to them several years earlier after their defeat by the Lucanians. Nothing is known of their sojourn at Thurii, but Diodorus then diverges from other sources by noting that they were reconciled to the tyrant and returned. The chronology is not known, but the verb confirms that both men eventually returned. 845 The return of Leptines during the reign of Dionysius the Elder is the most likely, as he was present as commander of Dionysius's troops at the Battle of Cranium in 375, when he died of battle wounds. 846 Both Diodorus and Plutarch also note that, when Leptines and Dionysius were reconciled, the tyrant gave Leptines his daughter Dicaeosyne in marriage. 847 Such a gesture by Dionysius perhaps demonstrated a sense of renewed trust in Leptines, especially since a marriage had caused a rift between the two men. 843 See, for example, Plut. VIt. Djon 11.4 ('rOv OE W[/,vlD-Tov Efr}!.,au-E "i.u<£"'J\,[a';). 844 Diod. Sic. 15. 7.4 (iJOTEpov OerJ8Evcro'; TaLi b.wvvuLov 0t-1]A,f.i1Pf1JUav, Ka'i IWTE!-..,8(wrE'; El'; TG.s "i.vpaKoVua'; El'; T1JV 7rpoihr&pgaaav dJVowv d7rolcaTEUTI1Hrwav). 845 Diodorus only notes that they returned (mTEI.B6vTE,), while the fact that they both took part in the reconciliation to Dionysius is indicated by the plural of the verbs lnrJ)cicacyrwav and d 'lrDIW'TEU'TIIBrwav. 846 For the narrative of the battle, see Diad. Sic. 15.17.1. For the later years of Leptines, see Sabattini 1989: 58-62. 847 Diad. Sic. 15.7.4 only notes that he gave his daughter, while Plut. Vlt. Djon 11 provides a story of the original marriage that caused the exile of the men. 254 It may have been a more strategic move on the part of the tyrant, however, since it perhaps was wiser to keep one's enemies closer. A phjJos no longer in the court, with an intimate knowledge of the plans and personality of the tyrant, was a danger to Dionysius. The move to Thurii and the continued alliance with the powerful Greeks of Magna Graecia, who were far more sympathetic to the plight of Leptines, also could have compromised political stability under the tyrant by involving him in further conflict away from home. Indeed, not long before, another member of the court, Heloris, 848 who had been exiled by Dionysius, became an enemy of Dionysius and led an opposing force (also of Italians) against the tyrant in 389 at the battle of the Eleporus River. 849 Dionysius thus would not have wanted to make another error by embittering another former court member made emigrant. Regardless of the motives behind the reconciliation, Leptines had been put in a position of power once again, an action that confirmed both his original importance and the dangers of putting stable members of the court into movement. When the phjJos was with the tyrant, his actions and movement could be controlled closely. As the phjJos traveled farther from the court, his ability to collaborate with rivals and to provide them information about the tyrant could compromise his own rule. Thus, the tyrant constantly negotiated and re-negotiated the personal distance, which often corresponded to physical distance. The situation with Philistus, however, was slightly more complicated. As noted above, Diodorus states that Philistus returned with Leptines after several 848 Diad. Sic. 14.104.3 notes the future of Heloris, who was surrounded by the soldiers of Dionysius and slain. 849 For the full narrative of the final battle of Heloris, see Diad. Sic. 14.104. 255 years, while all other sources concerning Philistus provide an alternate fate, namely that he did not return after the death of the tyrant. Although Diodorus refers to the tyrant inviting the two men back only as flwvvcno,, the tyrant in question cannot be Dionysius the Younger, because Leptines certainly returned (and more importantly died) during the reign of Dionysius the Elder. Perhaps the most likely explanation is that Diodorus conflated the two tyrants into one and that Philistus returned during the reign of Dionysius II. Ancient sources point to two paths for Philistus, the first to a long-term sojourn in the Po Valley in northern Italy and the second to residence in Epirus. 850 The geographical locations of the exile may indicate that Philistus served some purpose to Dionysius while abroad and that his exile was not merely . h I dd. . . . h. H. . 851 Phil. h k pums ment. n a 1t10n to wntmg 1s Jstones, 1stus may ave ta en on official duties on behalf of the tyrant, especially as, during this time, Dionysius took more interest in expanding his empire in the Adriatic. It has been suggested, for example, that his exile was taken under the guise of commanding Dionysius's new I . . h Ad . . 852 h h. . . E . 853 Th co ames m t e natlC or t at 1s t1me spent m puus was as governor. us, the assertion that further court mobility, i.e. the exiles of Leptines and Philistus, was completely harmful to the tyrant may be overstated in this case, since the exile of Philistus may have been useful in other ways to the tyrant. Nevertheless, it appears 85 ° For the Po Valley, see Plut. Vlt. Djon 11.4 and Nep. Djon 3. For Epirus, see Plut. De exjJ. 605c. See also Chapter 6, pages 396-401 for Dionysian colonization in the Adriatic. 851 Paus. 1.13.9 suggests that Philistus wrote the Hjstorjes, with their pro-Dionysian bent, to gain pardon from the tyrant. For further discussion of the composition of his Hjstorjes, see Stylianou 1998: 179-80. 852 For this suggestion, see Pearson 1987: 19-22. For a oomplete overview of oolonization under Dionysius I, see Figueira 2008: 498-502. 853 See Sanders 1987:44-45 and 55. 256 that colonization efforts in northern Italy and the Adriatic were never extensive and were far less important than stability at home. Indeed, Philistus was still seen as key to the survival of the tyranny in Syracuse, as evidenced after the death of Dionysius the Elder, when Dionysius the Younger recalled Philistus due to his fear of the increasing power of Plato and Dion. 854 Furthermore, after the death of Philistus, 855 Dionysius II fled into exile to Italy, a result that confirms the status of the phjJos as a main factor in holding the tyranny together. As we have seen throughout the first half of this chapter, ancient sources show that the atmosphere of the court as promoted under the Dionysii was far from stable. One may argue that such a depiction was due to negative bias on the part of anti-tyrannical or anti-intellectual authors. This analysis, however, was drawn from a wide array of sources, from more anti-Dionysian sources (e.g. Plato) and those more amenable to the tyrants and to tyranny (e.g. Diodorus Siculus), all of whom provide a consistent, if not terribly comprehensive, picture of court life. The fragility in the relationships at the court was caused by both sides. The motive of court members for being in the presence of the tyrant was not necessarily long-term support for his rule but rather for monetary gain. When members of the court, such as Plato and Philistus, did show an interest in supporting and directing the rule of the tyrant, Dionysius sabotaged their support by sending them away. Thus, the situation spiraled downward, when the tyrant, having alienated many by his deeds, yet fearing to be alone, created a court to guard against his precarious position. 854 See FGrH556 T5a, T17b, and Plut. De exjJ. 605c. 855 Upon the defeat of Dionysius II at the hands of Dian, Philistus committed suicide. For the narrative of his death, see Diad. Sic. 16.16.3-4, Plut. Vlt. Djon 35.3-4, and FGrH 70 F219. 257 Because of his constant paranoia, however, he drove these men away, a process which fulfilled his fear of losing his support network. Part II: The court and external politics While the court could provide valuable advice to the tyrant regarding his rule at home, its members also could increase the influence of the tyrant abroad through their personal connections. Although the intellectual members of the court originally arrived at the court due to their intellectual prowess, they were not disconnected politically from the larger Greek world. These men were politically active abroad and could use their own fame to create an audience for the actions of the tyrant in their home city. For example, the historiographer Xenophon (possibll 56 ) could have provided useful assistance in gathering troops (from his own experience as the head of mercenaries in the East) and could have further cemented strong relations between Dionysius I and the author's dear friend Agesilaus. 857 No matter which role these intellectuals played within the court (poet, philosopher, historian), each court member had the opportunity to further the political plans of the tyrant. 856 There is debate as to whether Xenophon ever was at the oourt of Dionysius I. While Xenophon was mentioned with Dionysius I only in more anecdotal texts (e.g. Ath. 10.427f-428a ~ Theophr. Fll8 Wimmer), he could have been present for at least a short time. The most likely time period for his presence would have been between 393 and 391, which coincided with the third war of Dionysius I with Carthage. The publication of the Anabasjs with the pen name Themistogenes of Syracuse (Hell. 3.1.2 and Plut. De glor Ath. 345e) also lends some credence to this idea. See Sordi 2004: 71-73 for further discussion, as well as Chapter 3, page 187. 857 After his exile from Athens after the Battle of Coroneia, Xenophon spent many years in the Peloponnese under the protection of the Spartans. His admiration for Agesilaus II is seen best in his work of the same name, which was likely written after the death of the Spartan king in 360. 258 A. An exercise in political futility: Athenian intellectuals and the Dionysii Two Athenian intellectuals certainly were members of the court of the Dionysii, although their influence in creating relations between the tyrant and Athens apparently was not substantial. Why not? The narrative of their time at the court focuses not on the benefits these scholars could provide to the tyrant, but rather the benefits which the scholars could receive from their time at the court. For most members of the court, the impetus of becoming a philos was not due to any desire to advance the political regime of the tyrant but rather to gain financially from their time with the tyrant. The first Athenian intellectual, Andocides, likely arrived in Syracuse at the court of Dionysius I early in the reign of the tyrant. 858 The political influence of Andocides, at least regarding relations between Syracuse and Athens, was likely minimal for two reasons. The first reason concerns the status of Andocides at Athens. Although he eventually became an important ambassador to the Spartans, at the time of his visit to Dionysius I (and for several years afterwards), he was persona non grata at Athens, an identity that limited any political sway he might have in his home city. 859 The second reason stems from the length of time that he spent at Syracuse at the side of the tyrant. Since the visit of Andocides to the court of Dionysius was only one of many to various kings and leaders across the Greek world, the amount of time during his eight-year exile he spent in Syracuse 858 Andocides was an exile from Athens between 410 and 402, during which period he visited Dionysius I. Thus, Andocides was at Syracuse sometime between 405 and 402. 859 Andoc. De red. 7 and Thuc. 6.60 discuss Andocides role in the mutilation of the Herms. Andocides' De pace was written as part of an embassy to the Spartans in 3 91 BC. 259 would have been short. 860 In addition, Lysias noted that Andocides was not able establish himself as a trusted advisor in Syracuse, since he was unable to fool the tyrant through his attempted friendship. 861 While this passage confirms that Andocides was skillful at creating connections across the Greek world through his ability to persuade various other leaders, historical sources show no close relationship between him and the tyrant. This relationship limits the likelihood that Dionysius would benefit politically at Athens (if anyone would have cared to listen to Andocides after he returned from exile). The second intellectual, the orator Aeschines, 862 also attempted to cash in on the economic and political power of the tyrant. The dire economic straits of the rhetor are said to have forced him to seek patronage at the court of Dionysius I. Having been presented to Dionysius by Aristippus, he then received gifts for dialogues he had written before returning to Athens. 863 From the extant sources, this seems to be the limit of interaction between the two parties. Within this narrative, one sees the benefit for Aeschines (namely that he received a monetary handout from Dionysius in his time of need) but no political reciprocation. When Aeschines returned, for example, the narrative of Diogenes Laertius only notes that Aeschines continued to write and does not note any further references to Sicily or to Dionysius. While one might extrapolate that Dionysius received some benefits from these visits 860 Lys. 6.6 notes that Sicily was only one stop among others, which included Italy, the Peloponnese, Thessaly, the Hellespont, Ionia, and Cyprus. 861 L 6 7 ('' ' ~ ' 'A ' ,, , •t 'e • , ' ' ' ) ys. , 0') fLOVO') 'TWV a-uryryEVOfLEVWV VUOICWTJ OVK. Esa7ra'T1} 1} V'lf avopoc; TOWVTOV , 862 Note that this Aeschines (also known as Aeschines of Sphettus or Aeschines Socraticus) 1s different than the more famous Aeschines, the enemy of Demosthenes. 863 See Diog. Laert. 2.61 for the aocount of Aristippus visiting the oourt. 260 (perhaps personal glory), little evidence remams that the political standing of Dionysius abroad was improved. Although the sources speak of few political benefits to the tyrant, these visits by well-regarded citizens of Athens may have improved the opinion abroad of Dionysius I as a competent ruler. After political relations between Dionysius and mainland Greece had been limited to Sparta for the first decade of the tyrant's rule, an inscription dating from 393 between Syracuse and Athens providing honors to Dionysius shows a remarkable change in diplomacy. 864 While this inscription postdates the visits of these scholars by several years, visits by Andocides and Aeschines would have allowed Dionysius to advertise his political and economic power to other cities, such as Athens. Even though these men were not at the height of popularity, their notoriety in the city suggests that the populace would have known that the court of Dionysius was a location at which prominent men (and therefore their poJejs) could seek support. The degree to which these visits were responsible for the strengthening of relations in the 390s, however, is only a conjecture, as the inscriptions give no indication of any mediators (i.e. that either Andocides or Aeschines had nominated the tyrant) in the granting of honors. Indeed, as will be discussed in the following chapter, honors for Dionysius and his sons likely were predicated on the desire of an alliance between Syracuse, Cyprus, and Athens. Perhaps relations between these two intellectuals and Dionysius would have made the tyrant more familiar to the Athenians, who had previously been wary of Syracuse after the Sicilian Expedition. Nevertheless, the extant sources focus on the economic 864 JG II 2 18. See the following chapter (pages 323-33) for a more oomplete discussion of Athenian inscriptions mentioning the tyrant. 261 gifts provided to Andocides and Aeschines at the court of Dionysius, rather than any political benefits for the tyrant. One may ask if the paucity of source material about their visits or the particular genre in which the evidence is preserved obscures a stronger relationship and influence on the part of the Athenians. Absence of evidence certainly does not indicate evidence of absence. This type of limited exchange between intellectuals and the tyrant (i.e. literary works for gifts), however, was a theme repeated often and was a common part of the court process. The most famous example of an Athenian intellectual at the court of the Dionysii was, of course, Plato. During his three trips to Sicily, Plato played several roles: an intellectual educating the family of the tyrant, a therapist counseling the tyrant on his personality, a philosopher seeking a location to test his ideals, and (most importantly for this section) a politician advising the Dionysii on the direction of their rule. These various roles were not exclusive, yet the last had the most effect on the international relations of the tyrant. Plato's status as a prominent Athenian citizen would have provided legitimacy to the political plans of Dionysius I and Dionysius II, especially useful for an alliance of the Dionysii with Athens. During the first voyage of Plato, around 388, 865 he came to Syracuse and was tutor to Dionysius's brother-in-law Dian, a visit beneficial both for Plato and for Dionysius I. Plato could use the tyranny of Syracuse to experiment with the ideals of the Academy in molding his perfect philosopher-king. Dionysius I could use this relationship with an influential Athenian to renew his relationship with Athens, 865 Questions of the chronology of the birth and death of Plato have his birth anywhere from 430 to 427, although a date of 428 seems the most accurate. Plato went to Sicily for the first time when he was about forty (Pl. Ep. 7.324a). 262 which warmed in 393 but quickly grew cold. 866 This first stay at the court demonstrates the failed dynamics between the tyrant and philosopher. Because Plato was not willing to merely placate the tyrant and was not politically useful to Dionysius I in creating an alliance with Athens, 867 the first meeting between these two men was far from successful. Much of the failure of Plato was not in his control, after the failure of Dionysius I at Olympia in 388 had not endeared him to mainland Greece. The main reason for this failure, of course, was because Plato was not interested in helping the Dionysii make connections abroad but rather wished to reform their rule at home, by converting them into mild rulers and repairing the tumultuous political and social atmosphere of Sicily. 868 During his sojourn with Dionysius I, Plato and the tyrant quickly grew frustrated with another, due to the fundamental differences in the reasons for their interaction. As noted above, Plato's inability to praise the rule of the tyrant by questioning its validity quickly turned his status ambiguous. Thus, the first journey of Plato ended in failure, with the philosopher sent off in disgrace. During his second and third trips, the political plans of Plato revolved around two major goals which went hand-in-hand: repopulating the abandoned poJejs of Sicily and driving the foreign influence of the Carthaginians and Campanians out of 866 For the reasons for the visit of Plato, see Sonnabend 1996: 42-46. The links between Syracuse, Athens, and Sparta will be discussed in the following chapter concerning international relations. For the problems arising between Athens and Syracuse in the early 380s, see Sanders 1987: 10-15. 867 For this assessment, see Sanders 1979: 214-16. 868 The plans for the Dionysii, especially for Dionysius the Younger, were political and not merely philosophical. See Pl. Ep. 7.332e-333a and Lewis 2000: 28-29. 263 the island. As with Dionysius I, the advice of Plato was not focused on increasing the reputation of the tyrant abroad but rather on the improvement of Sicily. Thus, the repopulation of the island did not involve external political forces, since the migrants who would form the inhabitants of these revived cities were not transplants from other parts of the Mediterranean, but rather Sicilians who previously had been forcibly moved by Dionysius the Elder. 869 This repopulation was meant to fight against the apparent 'barbarization' of the island that was taking place during the fourth century, a theme found in the works of Plato and Isocrates. 870 Plato claimed that, if Dionysius II followed his directions, he would multiply the empire of his father many times and would be able to enslave the Carthaginians. This position of authority would be in contrast to the position of Dionysius I, who paid tribute to the barbarians. 871 Plato here condemns the normal process of politics practiced by son and father, namely the constant movement of foreign peoples at the expense of the original citizens. Ironically, in order to spread his empire, Dionysius II must first turn back the clock and must turn inward to Sicily to centralize and strengthen his citizen base there, rather than attempting through constant military intervention and hostile diplomacy to spread his empire overseas. Within this new plan of Plato, however, was included one suggestion that did require the intervention of and contact with other cities. In his Seventh Letter, he notes that new laws should be put 869 Pl. Ep. 7.332c and Weil1960: 399. 870 See Di Fede 1949: 55-57 for this plan. This barbarization theme appears especially in Epjstle 8 of Plato. Merante 1972-1973 discusses the use of this barbarization in the panhellenic plans of Plato and !socrates. 871 Pl. Ep. 7.332e-333a (aU OuTr"'J\,au-Lav T7}v 7raTpc[Jav dpx7w piwov 7rOUJ]aoL, 7ro"'J\,"'J\,a7r"'J\,au!av OE 6vrw'; ... d!-v!-v' oVx &u7rEp vVv ToVvavrLov 6 7racr7}p alnoV ¢6pov EHLgaTo cpEpEw TOL'> (3apf3dpot_s). 264 in place for Syracuse by a group of men of Greek origin gathered for this purpose. 872 The influx of these men, a temporary quasi-court for political purposes, would also strengthen the empire of Dionysius by giving it true legal infrastructure. Even if certain political institutions (e.g. the Assembly) were existent, these wise men drawn from all parts of the Greek world, would help to refashion the empire of Dionysius. In this case, however, international politics would be used to temper the tyranny in Syracuse, rather than to encourage the tyranny and its empire to grow. Nevertheless, the Dionysii did see some usefulness for Plato closer to home, mainly due to his ties to the politically powerful Pythagoreans in Tarentum, an alliance which could aid their plans for military expansion in Magna Graecia. Such political usefulness is one explanation for the wooing of Plato by Dionysius I by means of lavish gifts and sumptuous transportation to Sicily. 873 Tarentum had already begun to establish itself as an important pojjs in Magna Graecia during the first decades of the fourth century, as well as a center of philosophy and science. 874 Most of this development was due to one individual, the polymath Archytas of Tarentum, whose links with the Pythagoreans made Tarentum a philosophical center. Members of the Pythagoreans thus became part of the court of the Dionysii and made an impact on their tyranny, although this influence was short lived. 875 872 Pl. Ep. 7.337b-d. See also Lewis 2000: 26-27 and 32-33 for discussion of this idea. 873 See the personal trireme sent to pick him up for his third visit to Syracuse in Pl. Ep. 7.339a. 874 For example, Zopyrus of Tarentum (or perhaps Heracleia), the inventor of war-engines, may have been attracted to Syracuse by Dionysius I in his large-scale employment of artisans (Diad. Sic. 14.41-43). See also Vlassopoulos 2007: 101 for discussion of this example. 875 The most famous example was the presence of the Pythagoreans Phintias and Damon at the court of Dionysius II. See Cic. Tusc. 5.63 and Polyaenus, Strat. 5.2.22. In addition, the list of Pythagoreans in the lamb!. VPlists several Sicilians, of whom three are Syracusans. See Musti 265 Plato originally had come into contact with Archytas on his first voyage to Sicily and Italy in 388, 876 and, although there is a question of the relationship between these two philosophers, 877 there certainly was a guest-friendship between the two, likely established on the first visit of Plato to Magna Graecia. 878 Through his guest-friendship with Plato, Archytas arrived at the court of Dionysius II and enacted an alliance with the tyrant in 367. 879 Plato thus helped to create further court relations by encouraging the intervention of other members from around the Mediterranean, an act which he repeated several times. 880 After the departure of Plato, the Pythagoreans, especially Archytas himself, seem to have continued the education of Dionysius the Younger concerning the proper way of ruling. Through the persuasion of Archytas, who stated that Dionysius II was making good progress in becoming a successful ruler (information which would prove to be wrong in the eyes of Plato 881 ), Plato was convinced to make his third voyage to Sicily in 361. Dionysius further convinced Plato by sending a trireme for a comfortable voyage along with some members of the court who would persuade Plato of the progress of the tyrant: Archedemus, an associate of Archytas, and several 1989:34-39 for Pythagoreans in Sicily. 876 Pl. Ep. 7.3261-d, as well as Diog. Laert. 3.6. 877 Cic. Rep. 1.10.16 notes that Plato switched his allegiance to Archytas after the death of Cicero, while Dem. 61.46 notes the Archytas was the student of Plato. 878 Pl. Ep. 7.339e and 7.350a. 879 PI E 7 338 d ('A ' ' ' ' ' ·"' ' e · ' ' ' · ' " ' ' . p. . c- PXVT1J'; TE 1rapa L.J..Wvvuwv npw a'f'I.KBI at--eyw ryap npw a7rl£VaL sEVt..av leaL "''' 'A I \ ~ ' T' \A I I ' I"\ ) 'f'LI'vWV PXVTTJ ICaL TOl8 EV apavn ICaL L.J..Wvvuup 7rOt/T]Ua'; a7rE7rl'vEOV . 880 See Pl. Ep. 7.339a-b and 350a, along with Sonnabend 1996: 20-22 for further discussion. 881 Pl. Ep. 7.340b. 266 other Sicilians with whom Plato had fellowship. 882 Within this entire narrative, while there undoubtedly was extended contact between the tyrant and Archytas, a politically powerful member of southern Italy, this contact again was not used to increase the power of Dionysius II abroad, but rather to focus on the education of the tyrant within Syracuse. Unfortunately, the guest-friendships between the three protagonists would not prevent disaster in this last episode, since Plato would need to escape through the machinations of Archytas and other Tarentines, who was required to send an official embassy to Dionysius requesting the return of the philosopher. 883 Within this narrative, one again sees the political importance of Plato and Archytas in the escape of Plato from the court, when several prominent Taren tines sent an embassy from the city and a thirty-oared ship to Syracuse. 884 This political intervention, nevertheless, would not be to the benefit of Dionysius II, when he continued to focus on increasing his tyrannical rule and fighting against the instruction of Plato and Archytas. Why did this relationship between the tyrant and these philosophers ultimately fail? One answer may be found again in the identity of the competing micro-communities at the court. In this case, Dionysius found himself against members of the same philosophical school, namely the Pythagoreans. As we discovered in the previous 882 PI E 7 339 b ('A '' - 'A ' ' " ' '" ' - ' . p. . a- PXEU1JfLOV ... Twv PXVTTJ avryryeyovoTwv Eva, leaL ai'vi'vOV'> ryvwpi.fLOV'> Twv EV ~LKEic£,;<). Plut. Vlt. Djon 18.2-3 notes that the expedition was not only made due to the enthusiasm of Archytas but also because Dionysius was threatening the safety of Dian, if Plato did not come back. 883 Pl. Ep. 7.350a-b. ' ' ) TpwK,ovTopov . 267 chapter, vanous philosophical schools were present at the court. While these philosophical connections were a natural consequence of court composition, the tyrant needed to ensure that one school did not grow too strong. Indeed, Aristotle claimed that tyrants prevented schools and other organizations from forming. 885 The political detente of the Pythagoreans ultimately may have been too much of a threat to Dionysius, who would have wished to prevent this school from overly affecting his own rule. This last episode would irrevocably break links between these influential members and would pit the tyrant against his uncle Dian. Thus, not only the internal politics of the court broke down, but also any chance for Dionysius II to gain additional support abroad. Such inability on the part of Dionysius II to foster links thereby sabotaged his attempts to stabilize his rule. As we will see below, the more successful community-building attempts of his uncle Dian were a major factor in the downfall of the tyrant. B. Success without interaction: !socrates The most successful example of an Athenian scholar communicating with Dionysius appears through the example of Isocrates, although ironically, the interaction was long-distance and involved no in-person contact. The most substantial bit of evidence regarding this relationship is found in Isocrates' Letter to Djonysjus, which was composed at the very end of the tyrant's reign. The opening of the letter indicates that Isocrates was never present at the court, since he assured the tyrant that he would have met with Dionysius in person if he could have sailed to 885 Arist. Pol. 5.1313b 268 Syracuse, although he could not due to his old age. 886 Regardless of the distance, through this letter, I socrates offered himself as an ally of the tyrant, a sort of quasi- phil as who could provide advice and could increase his prestige among the Athenians and other Greeks. Of course, Isocrates also was using the tyrant to advance his own goals of panhellenic collaboration against the barbarian enemy who threatened fourth-century Greece. The letter is also remarkable as the culmination of an evolution regarding the feelings of Isocrates toward Dionysius from extremely negative to positive, progress that echoed the general evolution of Athenian . D' . ss7 sentiments to wnysms. Earlier works of Isocrates were not so kind to the tyrant, as in the Panegyrjcus, where the orator lamented the state of a destroyed Italy and enslaved Sicily under the tyrant. 888 Within this passage, the description of the tyrant by an important intellectual was damaging to Dionysius, after Isocrates represented him as a negative example of leadership who must not be emulated. His portrayal as a destroyer of poJejs and as a slave-master was the antithesis of a proper Greek ruler. In this way, he echoed the sentiments of Lysias, who also warned the Greeks about the possible domination of the Greeks by Dionysius in his Olympjc Oratjon. The Panegyrjcus, written around 380 at the nadir of Athenian-Syracusan relations, reflected a wider disillusion in Athens with the tyrant and his policies. 889 Yet, when 886 1 n· · 1 c ,, , · · ' ' ' ' · -e ' ' ' e ) soc. 'lonysJus a/\,1\, aV'rO'> av uoL 7rl'vEVUa'> Evrav a oLE !'vEX 1JV . 887 For the correspondence between !socrates and Dionysius I, see also Chapter 2, pages 133-34. 888 Isoc. Paneg. 169 ('haA.,[a 0Ev dvdu-TaTO'> ryEryovE, "'i.LK£1-..,[a OE K.aTa0E0oVt..,wTal). See also Chapter 1, pages 66-68 for the sad state of Greece according to Lysias. 889 For an overview of Isocratean relations with Dionysius, see Mathieu 1966: 101-4. 269 the reader of I socrates tracks the evolution of Isocrates' feelings regarding Dionysius as the years pass, one sees a marked turn from his opinion toward the positive. Passages of his Archjdamus and PhjJjpf§! 0 praised the tyrant for his ability to conquer neighboring territories and to defeat the Carthaginians, 891 and the orator also noted in his Njcocles how Dionysius faced internal and external threats. 892 In this second passage, Isocrates related the success of Dionysius to issues concerning contemporary troubles in mainland Greece, namely its devastation by warfare and constant bickering between various poJejs. Instead of depicting Dionysius as an enslaver, he argued that he has freed the cities of Sicily from external and internal threats. Instead of describing Dionysius as a destroyer of cities, he claimed that the tyrant made Syracuse the greatest of all Greek cities. Such passages are important not merely because they show a change to a positive view of the tyrant, but also because the recipients of these works of Isocrates were important political figures. 893 With his positive image of the tyrant, Isocrates campaigned for Dionysius as a non- threatening paradigm for other leaders to follow (and even as a possible political ally 890 The Archjdamus of !socrates was written in the voice of Archidamus III, who began to rule in 360. The phjjjp was written even later, around the year 346. Both of these works were written several decades after the Panegyrjcus and reflected the ever-increasing tendencies of !socrates to panhellenism. 891 For Dionysius's spreading of power, see Isoc. Phjfjp 65. For Dionysius's valor in face of the Carthaginian threat, see !soc. Archjdamus 44-45. 892 This work also was written later during the rule of Dionysius I, around 372. See !soc. Njcocles 23. 893 Archidamus III was king of Sparta from 360 to 338, navigating the role of the Spartans in the Greek world after their decline post- Leuctra. Nicocles was King of Salamis, who began to rule in 37 4/3, succeeding his father Evagoras. He was known for his panhellenic tendencies and was represented as a mild ruler who did not oppress his subjects. 270 if necessary). Although Isocrates was not physically present at the court of Dionysius, his own status as an intellectual with political ties to leadership around the Mediterranean was indirectly of benefit to the tyrant. In a way, this ability of Isocrates to support Dionysius from afar, while his own court members around him seemed to have little effect on their own cities, demonstrated the shortcomings of the court in international political matters. The culmination of Isocrates' positive feelings toward the tyrant is found in his Letter to Djonysjus, partially extant and likely written around 368. 894 Although only the first few sections remain, one still may comprehend both the regard that Isocrates has for the tyrant and his intentions for Dionysius to rectify the political mayhem in Greece. After the opening of the letter, he flatters the tyrant by referring to him as the possible salvation of the Greeks, the foremost of the race, and the holder of the greatest power. 895 Isocrates goes on in the next chapter to ask Dionysius to work on behalf of Greece and argues that now was the best opportunity for the tyrant to become more involved in their political affairs. 896 Finally, Isocrates stresses the tyrant's wider role in repairing the power of the mainland by repeating soon after 894 Chapter 1 of the letter states that !socrates wrote it in his old age, and chapter 8 states that the Spartans were no longer in power. As the Spartans were defeated at Leuctra in 371, the letter must date after this year. 895 1 n· . 7 (' , ~ ~ 'E'', , , , ~ , , , SOC. 'JOflYSJUS V7rEp 'T1]'; 'TWV i'vi\/T}VWV UWT1JPW'; ... 'TOV npWTEVOV'Ta TOV ryEVOV'; IWL fJB'fl1I'T1]V ~xovcra OVvafLw). 896 !soc. fljonysjus 8. !socrates notes that this perfect timing for Dionysius to help is due to the general weakness of Sparta, which had been defeated by Thebes only several years before in 371 at the Battle of Leuctra. He notes that with the weakness of Sparta and the willingness of Athens to work with Dionysius, Dionysius has the perfect opportunity to act. 271 that he speaks on behalf of Greece. 897 One again sees the evolution of Dionysius from a successful protector of Sicily to the possible savior of the entire Greek world. Furthermore, Isocrates acts in the role of member of Dionysius's court, even though he is not physically present at the court. He acts as a mediator between the tyrant and other cities in Greece. In addition to noting that he speaks on behalf of Greece (as noted directly above), he also conveys the desires of Athens by expressly arguing that the Athenian people are looking to Dionysius for support. 898 In this sense, by acting as a mediator between the cities of mainland Greece and Dionysius I, Isocrates attempted to provide political capital for the tyrant. Of course, as with other members who were present at the court of Dionysius, Isocrates had his own selfish reasons. Although he was not being paid by Dionysius, as other members of the court were, he still wanted a type of reward from him for his work, namely the provision of funds and troops for campaigns against the non-Greek enemies of Greece. Because Dionysius I was identified as a great political leader with hegemony over many areas of Europe, 899 Isocrates directly engaged the tyrant in his desire to seek a solution to the problems ailing the Greek world in the fourth century BC. As will be discussed in the next chapter more thoroughly, during the first decades of the fourth century, Dionysius had gained control of the majority of Sicily, had gained a foothold in Italy through his links with the Locrians and Gauls, had 897 I n· . 9 soc. 'lonysJus . 898 1 n· • 8 ('~'' I 1"\ r~l ,, rl I y I) SOC. 'JOflYSJUS 1] 0 1]fLETEpa 7r01'vl8 1]UEW'; av aVT1]V OOL 7rapauxoL UVVaryWV/.J,c,OfLEV1]V • 899 Diodorus occasionally refers to the larger sphere of Dionysian influence (2.5.6, 16.5.4, 16.9.1- 2, and 20.78.3). Much of this depiction derives from the pro-Dionysian Philistus. Even Lysias, who was anti-Dionysian, notes the control that Dionysius has over much of the Mediterranean. See Sordi 1986: 85-88. 272 begun to increase his foothold in the northern Adriatic, and had successfully negotiated diplomatic relations with both Sparta and Athens. Mainland Greece, however, was a political mess after the Battle of Leuctra, ripped apart by conflicts between Athens, Sparta, and the growing power of Thebes. The ever-looming power of Persia also threatened Greece. With his successful wars and diplomatic forays, Dionysius was the perfect target for the pan-hellenic program of Isocrates. Since the democratic system of the Athenians was unable to heal the social and economic woes of Greece, perhaps tyranny (if approached in the correct way) could provide the strength needed to improve the health of the Greek world. 900 By this time, only Dionysius seemed to be a viable candidate for Isocrates' ideas, a sentiment reflected in Athenian inscriptions providing honors to the tyrant and to his family. 901 These inscriptions, along with the victory of Dionysius at the Lenaea of 367, reflected new relations between Athens and Syracuse that were not this strong since the late 390s. The tone that Isocrates used with Dionysius in his letters was a continuation of this good will from Athens to the tyrant. This positive interaction between Isocrates and the court of the tyrant even continued under Dionysius II through the tyrant's interaction with scholars, such as Helicon of Cyzicus, who consorted with the friends of Isocrates. 902 Regardless of his own desires, Isocrates was perhaps the brightest example of an influential intellectual who interacted with the tyrant for the benefit of the tyrant and his city. Plato had traveled to Syracuse two decades before but had failed in his 90 ° Franco 1993:47. 901 JGII 2 103 and 105 specifically mentioned his children. 902 Pl. Ep. 13.360c. 273 interactions with the tyrant. Plato, however, was not working for the benefit of the tyrant abroad, since Plato had come to Sicily to strengthen the rule of the tyrant in Sicily. On the other hand, Isocrates had stayed in Greece but was working for the benefit of the Greeks. Yet Isocrates was more politically useful for the tyrant, by apparently not only providing his with the glory and affirmation that he so desired but also by providing him with possible alliance and the opportunity to increase his empire. Thus, Isocrates (who was not present physically at the court) seems to be a better member of the court than any of the court members in Syracuse. Does this mean, perhaps, that the court could be perceived of more ideologically, rather than geographically in proximity to the tyrant? Rather, I think that the 'success without physical interaction' which Dionysius experienced with Isocrates speaks more about the futility of the court around the Dionysii. While members of the court occasionally politically influenced the tyrant, the court of the tyrant did not build relations between Syracuse and their own poJejs. Perhaps the Dionysii wished only to bring the court together for intellectual reasons or to provide counsel regarding the internal rule of Syracuse. The lack of political clout of the court abroad, however, may have to do with the nature of the tyrant's court. The picture of the court given in the sources is a sort of intellectual centrifuge, where scholars and poets came for various amounts of time, only to eventually be catapulted out. This is not to say that the court was a complete failure, smce the Dionysii would gain limited political advantage from scholars, such as Isocrates and Plato, advantage that would not have been available to them if they had never attracted court members in the first place. Nevertheless, in opposition to the procurement of mercenaries or large-scale movement of population, the court did not provide as 274 much benefit to the tyrants as it could have. The court did not function as a stable and cohesive 'court' at all times, without a sense of community and a common cause around which the court could rally. To see the best example of this type of community and shared ideal for a group of intellectuals, we must turn to the story of the most successful opposition to the rule of the tyrants. The tyrant wished to keep his court fragmented, so as to prevent collaboration of his closest associates agajnst him, but he also wished to limit the alliances built between members of the court and other cities, so as not to encourage the strengthening of Dionysius's rivals. Yet, as we will see below, the inability of the Dionysii to foster relationships forced their court to create community elsewhere. These new communities ironically would form the base of the threats to the rule of the tyrants. C. The fight against tyranny: the Academy vs. the Dionysii We now go forward a few years to the reign of Dionysius the Younger, during which time his uncle Dian had been an important advisor to the tyrant. Because of the popularity of Dian and the jealousy of Dionysius II concerning the close relationship of Dian with Plato, Dian had fallen under the suspicion of Dionysius II. The tyrant then planned to erase Dian from the political scene, either by arresting him on a charge punishable by the death penalty (from which he escaped 903 ) or by sending him into exile to Italy. 904 While the abbreviated passage of Diodorus only 903 Diad. Sic. 16.6.4-5. 904 Plut. Vlt. Djon 14.4. Sections 3 and 4 of chapter 14 note the pretext for this exile. Dian apparently had sent a letter to the Carthaginians requesting that he be part of any peace negotiations between Dionysius II and Carthage, as well as offering his help to the Carthaginians. This correspondence fueled the suspicions of the tyrant that Dian was attempting to increase his political influence. 275 notes the travels of Dian to the Peloponnese, the more in-depth account of Plutarch provides interesting information about Dian's post-exile life, a narrative which focuses on the integration of Dian politically and intellectually in several locations. In addition to his travels in the Peloponnese, 905 Dian spent time in Athens with Plato at the Academy, during which time he likely was provided the honor of enktesjs, and purchased a house in the countryside. 906 Within this passage, one learns that Dian became a member of the Academy community, living with Callippus in the city and befriending Speusippus, the nephew of Plato. 907 As has been noted, 908 such aid to Dian was not a centralized attempt by the city of Athens to lend support to Dian against Dionysius II, likely due to their alliance created with Dionysius I in 367. By living in Athens during this time, however, Dian lived in a vastly different political climate from the tyranny of his nephew, while his interactions with friends in Athens were unlike the atmosphere of the court in Syracuse. His fellow intellectuals would play a major role in the political leadership of Dian during the subsequent expedition and during his rule at Syracuse. By becoming part of this community, he not only came to share a common group of ideas and teachings (namely those of Plato) but 905 Plut. Vlt. Djon 17.4 states that he traveled to Sparta and was made a citizen of the city (AaK£0at.p .. 6vwL OE Ka'i "'i.7rapn&/T1}V ai.nOv E7rolJJUavcro), in disregard of the possible anger of Dionysius II, who was an ally of the Spartans. Furthermore, Dian had been given privilege of thearodokja at Epidaurus (IG IV 2 1.95, lines 39-40) and also visited Megarian Ptoodorus (Plut. Vlt. Djon 17.4 and Val. Max. 4.1 ext.3). See Marasco 1982: 166-69 for the travels of Dian in the Peloponnese. 906 Plut. Vlt. Djon 17.1 (d.cypov OE owcywcyi], xripw EKT~CfaTo). For enktesjs, see Zelnick 2004: 327- 329. For honors in Athens in general, see Niku 2007: 21 and 59. 907 Plut. Vlt. Djon 17.1 notes that Speusippus was the closest friend of Dian in Athens (p.a/cuyw nvv 'Ae~vrJrn <j>ilcwv) and was given the house of Dian when he left Athens. 908 Marasoo 1982: 164-66. 276 also translated that sense of shared ideals into personal political alliances, since these friends at the Academy would form the core of leadership during the attempt of Dian to gain control of Syracuse. The Academy (or rather several members of the Academy) played a major role in the affairs of the Greek world during this time due to the nature of the institution. Although the members of the Academy were philosophers, the philosophy that they practiced was applicable to the contemporary political world. Rather than retreating from the world, as Socrates did in his comic portrayal in the Glouds, 909 the Academy dealt with practical issues, including the political reform of tyrannies. 910 The Academy did not necessarily find contact with tyrants abhorrent, since Plato and other distinguished members, including Xenophanes, 911 willingly engaged in hetajrja with both Dionysii. In addition, many prominent tyrants across the Greek world had close connections with the Academy. 912 The Academy's reason for this close contact with the tyrants, however, was to transform tyrannies into a milder form of government, a process most notably discussed in the Hjero of Xenophon. Members of the Academy, therefore, attempted to convince tyrants to be tyrants no longer, and the refusal of the tyrants to make such a transformation often had wide-ranging political ramifications. While many members of the Academy became close to 909 For the philosopher disengaged from the real world, see the caricature of Socrates in Ar. Nub. 225-27. 910 See Pl. Ep. 7.328c and Vatai 1984: 72-76. 911 See especially the episode where Xenophanes is gifted with a crown in Ael. VH 2.41 and Diog. Laert. 4.2.8. 912 These tyrants include Clearchus, Timolaus of Cyzicus, Euaeon of Lampsacus, Chaeron of Pellene, and Hermias of Atarneus. See Vatai 1984: 88-94 for references. 277 tyrants, several members of the Academy also had a hand in their death. 913 The political intervention by Dian in Syracuse and his hostility towards Dionysius II, therefore, was part of a larger trend of political intervention by Academy members across the Greek world. Before looking at the influence of several Academy friends of Dian, we must evaluate the biases of the main source concerning the campaign of Dian and his subsequent rule in Syracuse, namely the biography of Dian written by Plutarch. Plutarch likely excerpted most of his information from Timonides of Leucas, who had taken part in the expedition with Dian and who had correspondence with the nephew of Dian and future head of the Academy, Speusippus. 914 Plutarch himself was a member of the Academy several centuries later, with positive bias for fellow Academy members appearing in his own works. His portrayal of Dionysius II, for example, certainly reflected the opinions of the Academy toward the workings of tyranny. 915 Can Plutarch be used as a reliable source with such prejudice? While Plutarch portrayed Dionysius II m a negative light, he also did not withhold information concernmg members of the Academy (e.g. Dian and Callippus) after their successful campaign to wm back Syracuse, information that reflected very poorly on them. The turn from mild to more tyrannical rule under Dian (e.g. his new reliance on foreign mercenaries) and the treacherous coup d'etat by Callippus, which 913 For example, Chion and Leon killed Clearchus of Heracleia, while Piton and Heraclides killed Kotys. See Isnardi Parente 1970: 104-109 for references. 914 Plut. Vlt. Djon 22.3. See also Orsi 1994: 28-29 and Masse 1997. 915 Especially regarding the tropes of illegitimate power, the overabundance of mercenaries, and the general hatred of the tyrant by the populace. See Masse 2006: 189-92 for the portrayal of Dionysius II in Plutarch. 278 resulted in the murder of Dian, also appear in the narrative of Plutarch. By not withholding the negative portrayal of these men, Plutarch use this historical episode to provide a lesson on the benefits of Academy ideals and the wretched fates of those who stray from them. Nevertheless, he did not wish merely to denigrate the person of Dionysius but to use his downfall for an educative purpose, a decision that suggests an accurate picture of the intervention of the Academy into the political history of Syracuse. Of the members of the Academy who played a role in the campaign of Dian against Dionysius II, little is known, save for names. 916 Two members, however, stand out in the narrative. The first is the nephew of Plato, Speusippus. As mentioned above, Speusippus became the most trusted friend to Dian when he lived in Athens from 365 to 361. He accompanied Plato on at least one of his three trips to Sicill 17 and was one of the most politically persuasive members of the Academy entourage. He appears to have had a contentious relationship with Dionysius II. Although several passages discussing Dionysius II and Speusippus are likely anecdotal, they perhaps also contain a kernel of truth regarding the nature of a contentious relationship between two pupils of Plato. Two passages of Athenaeus and one from Diogenes Laertius describe correspondence between the tyrant and Speusippus. 918 916 One example is Miltas the Thessalian (Plut. Vlt. Djon 22.3). Another such likely example is Eudemus of Cyprus, a friend of Aristotle, who was with Dian when he attacked Syracuse (Plut. Vlt. Djon 22.3-4). He would later die in oombat near Syracuse (Cic. Djv. 1.25.52-54). See Loicq-Berger 1996: 67-68 for further discussion of Eudemus. 917 Speusippus also likely came with Plato to Sicily during his seoond voyage, as mentioned in a letter of Plato (Ep. 2.314e). For the history of Speusippus in Sicily, see Sonnabend 1996: 88- 89. 918 Ath. 7.279e, Ath. 12.546d, and Diog. Laert. 4.1.2 respectively. 279 Within the correspondence, Dionysius II scolded Speusippus for his behavior, by focusing on the latter's hedonism, in regard to both his love of money and his relationship with the courtesan Lastheneia. 919 Within this correspondence are echoes of internal fighting amongst members of the court, as discussed in the first half of this chapter. Such judgment followed the pattern of competition among the court as its members attempted to fight for position in order to gain favor with the tyrant. In this case, however, one again sees Dionysius II jockeying for position in order to gain favor with Plato, just as he had competed previously with Dian. By upbraiding Speusippus for his moral deficiencies (which often were characteristic of a tyrant), Dionysius could represent himself as an enlightened follower of Plato, in opposition to the more debauched Speusippus. Unfortunately, this focus on problems of morality reflects the tendency of Dionysius II to disregard political directions, especially his inability to follow the program of Plato and the Academy for proper rule, and to focus instead on personal connections for self-esteem or self-glory. Speusippus, while participating in a critique of Dionysius's behavior, did so in a more political manner. Plutarch recounts that Speusippus, after arriving in Syracuse, went out and spoke with the people of Syracuse, in order to discover their feelings concerning the rule of Dionysius. 920 Although the populace originally did not divulge their sentiments, since they thought that Speusippus was setting a trap for them, 921 they eventually trusted him and pleaded for Dian to free them from the 919 McKinlay 1939: 53-54 and Sonnabend 1996: 62. 920 Plut. Vlt. Djon 22.2 (piit.) .. nv rlvafLlPfl'VfLEVOL TaL'; iw8pW7rols ~<,aTEpitv8avov T1}v Oufvowv ainWv). 921 Jbjd. 280 tyrant. Speusippus himself had encouraged Dian beforehand to free Syracuse and the remainder of Sicily from the tyranny of Dionysius II (Plut. Vlt. Djon 22.2). 922 ,, ,,~I II•' <:;:!p ''~' ,, O'TE ryap ev 4VpaKovuau:; '"a'TWV o~erp~JVev, o~ 7rep~ £ .. /7revuurr7rov, wc; eouce, fLCilv!l.,ov dvafL~ryvVfLevo~ 'Toic; dv8pW7rou; Ka'TefL&v8avov 'T0v Ouivo~av aln·Wv, Ka~ 'TO !LEv 7rpc'D'Tov Ecpoj3oVv'To 'T0v 7rappr;u£av Wc; Oui7re~pav o'Uuav lnrO 'ToV I I \:' ' I r \ ' \ 9 \ I I 'TVpavvov, X,POVCf:J 0 E'lrUFTEVCYaV. 0 ryap aV'TO') TJV 7rapa 7raV'TWV fvoryor:; OeofLEvwv Ka~ 7rapaKefvevofLEvwv Etv8e'iv !1£wva tL0 vaVc; lxovra fLr;O' Cnrtv£'Ta') fLr;O' ~7r7rov'), d/\,1\,' aln·Ov elc; lnrr;perucOv EfLf3&v'Ta xpi;ua~ 'TO uWfLa '"~-~'''A' Ka~ 'TOVVOfLa £ .. M<E11.UV'TaU:; E'lr~ 'TOV i..l.WVVCYWV. For when Plato was tarrying in Syracuse, Speusippus, as it appeared, mingled more with its people and learned to know their feelings. Although at first they were afraid of his boldness of speech, thinking it a trap set for them by the tyrant, in time they came to trust him. For all now spoke in the same way, begging and exhorting Dian to come without ships, soldiers, or horses. He was simply to come himself in a boat and to lend the Sicilians his body and his name against Dionysius. Within this one passage are encapsulated the political possibilities of the court and the successful use of foreign scholars who rallied behind a cause (although this cause was anti-tyrannical). Speusippus not only encouraged Dian to overthrow the tyranny but also did the legwork, by going amongst the demos in order to gain support for Dian and providing the impetus that he needed to begin his campaign to seize power. Unlike many other members of the court of the Dionysii, the purpose of Speusippus 922 Epjstle of Socrates 34.1 (~ Orelli 36) also notes that Speusippus was the main impetus for military action by Dian. For discussion of this passage, see Sonnabend 1996: 88-89. Ironically, this passage of Plutarch states that Plato himself would have nothing to do with the expedition both because of his advance age and his ties of hospitality with the tyrant (8,' alOw Ti], 7rpo' b.wvVuwv gEVLa'; ). 281 was not just to please the tyrant or to be rewarded monetarily for his work but, instead, to implement the milder political policies and ideals of the Academy. The other member of the Academy who had a major influence on the political life of Dian was another Athenian, Callippus. 923 Callippus had also been a disciple of Plato at the Academy and had made the acquaintance of Dian there. 924 He apparently was a close personal friend of Dian as well, cementing his friendship by initiating him into the Mysteries. 925 Like a few select members of the Academy, he accompanied Dian to Sicily to help him in his quest to seize power. He was a commander of troops for Dian, entering Syracuse at their head and receiving a garland for his service. 926 Even more than with Speusippus, these passages show the utility of the Academy in making political change. Not only did Callippus travel to Sicily with Dian, but he also victoriously led the troops of Dian into battle. Within their shared experiences in Athens and Eleusis, these two men formed a connection based on common values which evolved into political and military aid. Even though their original friendship was not based on philosophy, the Academy certainly was a useful tool for introducing the men and for encouraging their interaction. 923 For the life of Callippus, especially in relation to his relationship with Dian, see Marchandi 2007:481-99. Several inscriptions also make mention of him, namely JGII 2 5433 and 5450. 924 Plut. Vlt. fljon 54.1 notes that their personal connection was not through their education in philosophy. 925 PI t T"t n· 54 1 c · - ' - ' · ' ' · - ' e U . v 1 , 'JOfl . EIC fLV(I'rarywryunv IWL 'T1]'; 7rEpurpEXOVU1]'; erat.pEW8 ryJJWpi.fLOV avnp ryEVEU aL KaL uvvr}817). 926 PI t T"t n· 54 1 c" ' 'e- · ' " ' - - · ' · ' U . v 1 , 'JOfl . WUTE ICaL UVVElliEI'v EW El8 Ta') L.VpaiCOVUa') npWTO') 'TWV erat.pwv a7raV'rWV, EOTE¢avwfLEVo'> KaL "'J\,afLnpO'> Ev TOL'> rlryWaL KaL Cnd(TTJfLO'> ). Callippus was the only member of the Academy who was listed by name as fighting on behalf of Dian. 282 Unfortunately, their later years would be marked by their falling away from the ideals of the Academy. The rule of Dian after his rise to power was based on actions antithetical to the teachings of Plato and the Academy. Although he did, at first, follow the commands of the Plato and the Academy by acting modestly and fixing his eyes on its tenets, 927 he committed several errors. First, he maintained his rule with an army that was based on mercenaries and even attempted to integrate them into Syracuse against the wishes of the citizenry, a grave mistake in the eyes of Plato. 928 In this sense, he followed the example of Dionysius I, who both imported mercenaries into Syracuse and other cities of his empire and provided them with land and other rights. More importantly, he did not act mildly toward his opponent Heraclides. Although he had attempted to pardon Heraclides and to dissuade him from seizing rule (and although Heraclides was certainly not an ideal citizen 929 ), Dian stepped over his bounds by allowing the murder of Heraclides by his supporters. 930 At this point, Callippus appeared within the historical record after a two-year absence, upon seeing the political tumult after the death of Heraclides as an opportunity to take over. 931 He would take the lead in a plot with the mercenaries of 927 See especially Plut. Vlt. Djon 52.2-4. He also followed the ideas of the Academy as regards the type of government, wishing to curb the licenses of the democracy (52.4 and 53.2) and to form a type of mixed government, where the aristocracy presided (53.2). 928 See, for example, the gifts provided to his mercenaries in Plut. Vit. Djon 52.1. See also Lintott 1982: 212-13 for this assessment. 929 The actions of Heraclides put him firmly in the camp of powerful democracy and not with the type of government espoused by the Academy. 930 Plut. Vlt. Djon 53.3-4. 931 Callippus may have had connections with Heraclides, as noted in Val. Max. 3.8 ext.5. 283 Dion 932 and orchestrated the murder of Dian at the hands of his Zacynthian mercenaries. 933 He then seized power for himself and ruled for thirteen months. 934 Again, we see reliance on foreign mercenaries and impetuous violent acts more reminiscent of tyranny. Within this narrative, one sees the failure of Dian followed by the failure of Callippus. Neither had been able to maintain the community that they had experienced at the Academy. This loss perhaps is best seen in a passage of Plutarch that recounts how Callippus came under suspicion by the wife and sister of Dian, who then forced him to swear the oath of Demeter and Persephone sworn at the Eleusinian Mysteries. After treacherously swearing the oath, even though he knew he would murder Dion, 935 Plutarch then noted the outrage that Demeter would have felt, knowing that the mystic was slain by the mystagogue. 936 Here, the bond that was created in Athens was irreversibly broken. Due to the disregard of their previous education, neither was able to create stable and long-lasting rule, by relying on the support of mercenaries and others to maintain power. The disposition of each was portrayed differently, with Dian more faithful to the ideals of the Academy and Callippus as more godless and scheming. 937 Both, however, ultimately failed to 932 Plut. Vlt. fljon 54.2-4. 933 For the murder of Dian, see Plut. Vlt. fljon 57. 934 Callippus eventually would be driven from Syracuse by Hipparinus, the younger brother of Dionysius II. After wandering through Sicily with his meroenaries, he sacked Rhegium but was eventually murdered. See Diad. Sic. 16.36.5 and 16.45.9, as well as Plut. Vit. fljon 58. 935 Plut. Vlt. fljon 56.3-4. 936 PI t T"t n· 56 4 c · · (3 ' ' • ' • ''' ' ' "' ' ' U . vi , 'JOfl . W') aUE OVfLEV1]'> 7raV'T(JJ'), EL ICaL ICa'T a{\,1\,QV X_POVOV EU't'aTTE 'TOV fLVU'T1]V alnijc; 6 fLVUTarywry6c;). 937 For this portrayal see Plut. Vlt. fljon 58 and Plut. De sera 553d. Galvagno 2005: 113-17 284 replicate their political and military success after they lost the support which had allowed them to succeed in the first place. Thus, their relatively short reigns were devoid of stability. As noted above, we see that the court best provided success m the international political sphere when a sense of common purpose and shared community drove their actions. This success was encapsulated by the campaign of Dian against Dionysius, during which his friends from the Academy played a major part. His ability to enlist friends who shared his vision for Sicily through hours spent together at the Academy was contrasted with the failures of Dionysius, who was unable to garner any ideological support from his own court. This function of the court equally was confirmed by the subsequent failure of Dian (and Callippus) to maintain this support, as they fell away from the ideals of the Academy and followed their own individual goals. Thus, the story of the court for the leadership of Syracuse is one of unrealized advantages, since these leaders were unable to both attract intellectuals and to integrate them for maximized benefit. D. The panhellenic tyrant: Dionysius I at Delphi and Olympia As shown in the previous section, one way in which the tyrant could benefit from his court in order to gain political prestige internationally was the use of court members as a type of mediator between Syracuse and other cities. The second way in which the tyrant established links by means of his court was through his own identification as a scholar. By representing himself as an intellectual, the tyrant could gain political prestige without the interference of other court members, an discusses the idealized Image that IS presented m later sources, mainly based on his relationship with Plato. 285 interference which could be problematic. The tyrant therefore became like a member of the court and attempted to perform the same function. The most viable time and place for the tyrant to appear in such a guise was at panhellenic festivals, during which the tyrant could display both his economic power and his prowess as a scholar in order to obtain (in theory) admiration and subsequent alliances with other Greek cities. The festivals at Delphi and Olympia were the most common places for tyrants around the Greek world to show off their might to other cities. Did the tyrants of Syracuse follow this pattern, and if so, did they differ in any way from their predecessors? Furthermore, how and why did these leaders choose this venue to demonstrate their power, rather than investing their resources and their time m military ventures? Before several case studies, a brief look at the Hjero of Xenophon will provide a solid foundation from which to discuss historical events, since participation in panhellenic festivals was one subject of the text. In the first chapter, when Simonides discussed the differences between private citizens and the tyrant, he noted that private citizens traveled abroad to other Greek cities to visit international festivals. 938 While private citizens could visit these K:owac; 7ravrrtvpe'' (which would include the panhellenic festivals of Delphi and Olympia), tyrants should not travel to such places, because their property would not be secure and their rule liable to be lost. 939 At the end of the work, Simonides scolded Hiero for taking part in 938 X u· 1 11 ( ' \ ·~ ~ J! \ ' ,, ,, ,, (3 ,, e I " \ ' en. _uler. . OL fLEV WUJJ'TaL EpxovcraL ICaL El8 7r01'vEl8 a') av OV!'vWV'TaL EafLa'TWV EVEICa, ICaL El8 ' ' ' ) Ta'> Kowa'> 7raV1ryvpEl8 . 939 X u· 1 12 ( J! \ J! I ' I " ,, "\ e ' en. _uler. . OVTE Ta 0/..K,OL ICEIC'T1]V'TaL Exvpa, WO'TE al'vl'v0l8 7rapa1Ca'Ta EfLEVOV') <j>o(3epov cyap f.l.~ &p.a Te uTeprJewrn Ti]c; d.pxiJc; ). See also Strauss 1963: 58-59. 286 panhellenic festivals by sending chariots to compete and argued that such competition placed the tyrant on the level of the common citizen. 940 More importantly, Simonides argued that such participation distracted the tyrant from his proper focus, the prosperity of the city that he rules (Xen. Hjer. 11.5-6) I '\: I ' \ \ \ '\:\ I ,.+, \ ' \: \ I 7rpO(Frwreveu:; evoafjLOVU;t; eryw fLEV ryap ovoe 7rpO(TTJKEW -y7]f-L~ avop~ 'Tvpavvtp , '"' , , 'r- e ,.... , , , ,, e 'r- ,, .. , .+.e - npo<:; wuv'Ta<; arywv~~:,eu aL vuavv fLEV ryap ovK av avfLa~:,ow a''""a 't' avow, ' ' \ l l " " \ \: I I I \:' '' I OJ') a7rO 'lrDI\d'vWV OU<CJJV 'Ta') oa7raVa') 7rOWVfLEVO'), VU<WfLEVO') 0 av 7raV'T(J)V fL&IvuFr a Ka 'Tarye !v(jJo. How is the no bier victory gained, by the excellence of your team, or by the prosperity of the city of which you are the head? Indeed, my own opmwn is that it is not seemly for a great tyrant to compete with private citizens. For your victory would excite envy rather than admiration, on the ground that many estates supply the money that you spend, and no defeat would be greeted with so much ridicule as yours. The text juxtaposes aper~, a result of competition that is focused on the tyrant, with EUOa'fLOV{a, a benefit deriving from a foCUS instead On the internal strength of the pojjs. 941 By focusing on his pojjs, rather than seeking glory at panhellenic festivals, the tyrant could gain the renown of Greek cities around the Mediterranean. What do such theoretical texts about chariot racing have to do with the tyrant as a court scholar? While the type of competition may be different, the venue 940 X u· 11 6 (' ' ' ' ''' ' "' ' ' ' ' ' ' '' ' ' '" e ) en. _uler. . eyw fLEV ryap ovue npoa7]K£W 't'1JfLL avopL Tvpavvcp npo'; WUJYra') arywvl"•c,eu aL . 941 Xenophon expresses this same sentiment in Ages. 9.6-7, by noting that breeding horses may demonstrate wealth but not nobility. For discussion, see Strauss 1963: 35-38 and Sordi 1980a: 7-9. 287 and the stakes were the same for the tyrants of Syracuse. Indeed, even if Xenophon never personally visited Dionysius I, he certainly had the events of his reign in mind, especially the failed performance of the aforementioned play written by Dionysius at the Olympic Games of 388. 942 When Dionysius I, for example, chose to send his own play to these Games, he too demonstrated his desire to vaunt his own personal talents rather than to bring glory to his city. 943 Furthermore, through Simonides, Xenophon explicitly referred to the failure of Dionysius I at these Games. Simonides warned that failure at such an event would cause great scorn to be heaped on the tyrant, 944 scorn which, as will be discussed below, was the fate of Dionysius. Thus, this philosophical text provides the framework for the appearance by the tyrant at these panhellenic sites by warning the tyrant of the dangers of doing so without the proper motives. Tyrants across the Greek world, especially those of Syracuse, appeared mainly at two panhellenic sites, Delphi and Olympia. For Dionysius I, the only fourth- century tyrant who had extensive connections at the two sites, each site demonstrated a different way of interaction. 945 At Delphi, the participation of the tyrant was less personal, since he gained political prestige as a tyrant-patron for the 942 Aalders 1953: 208-14, using Hatzfeld 1946-1947 as his reference point, makes a convincing argument that the Hjerowas written near the end of Xenophon's life between 360-355. While Aalders argues against the recipient of the work as Dionysius II or Dian, rather believing it is a more general treatise on tyranny, I believe that Xenophon certainly knew of their reigns and the participation of Dionysius I in several dramatic festivals. 943 Mari 2006: 56-59 discusses the relationship between tyrant and pofjs m offerings at panhellenic sanctuaries. 944 X u· 11 6 ( ' '' ,, ' ,, ' - ) en. _uler. . vuCWfLEVO'; o av 1ravcrwv fLal\,uPra ~<,wraryEI\,CfJO . 945 For general discussion, see Giuliani 1994: 163-65. 288 site, rather than failing as a tyrant-poet attempting to win glory for himself. His interaction at the site followed those of his tyrannical predecessors. While the pojjsof Syracuse as a whole was represented at Delphi, 946 earlier tyrants of Syracuse, such as Gelon and Hieron, also made their mark at the site by dedicating monumental objects, including golden tripods. 947 When Dionysius I therefore involved himself with the affairs of Delphi, he consciously did so with these earlier tyrants in mind and hoped to replicate their success. For example, Dionysius attempted to dedicate statues at Delphi (as well as Olympia) in 374/3 BC, 948 although the statues never had their intended effect. 949 Unlike his participation in the dramatic competition of Olympia, Dionysius here was following the traditional standards of his Deinomenid predecessors by sending offerings to the site. 946 Paus. 10.11.5 notes that the Syracusans built a treasury at Delphi after the defeat of Athens during the Sicilian Expedition (KaL "'i.vpaKovuLwv, TOw piv Eunv 6 87]uavp0'; d7r0 TaLi 'ATnKoV TaLi p.eyalcov 7rmwp.aTo,). The treasury has been identified (although not with oomplete certainty) across from the Treasury of the Athenians, as discussed in Partida 2000: 135-46. 947 The golden tripods were deposited at Delphi between 480 and 468. For the inscriptions of the tripods, see Syll. 3 34 (Gelon) and Syll. 3 35 (Hieron). For dedications by Hieron and Gelon, see Diad. Sic. 11.26.7, Paus. 6.19.7, and Find. Pyth. 1.73-80. For a reoonstruction of the monument and discussion of literary evidence, see Adornato 2005: 395-420. Privitera 2003: 391-423 discusses the context of the dedications in the historical context of the Deinomenids, while Rougemont 1993: 157-92 places the dedications in the wider context of dedications at the sanctuary from all of Magna Graecia and Sicily in the Classical and Hellenistic periods. 948 Diod. Sic. 16.57.2 (b.wvvu-Lov TaLi "i.vpaKou-Lwv Ovvdu-Tov 7rEfL']ravroc; Elc; 'O"'A,vfL7rfav KaL llEt.,cpoV'> iuyalcp.am EK xpvuov ml €/cc<j>avTo' OEOrJf.UOVP'YrJfLEVa). The dating of this action is provided by reference to earlier actions in the text. Sartori 1966: 34-36 discusses these donations in depth, while Harrell 2006: 126-32 discusses the donations in light of the larger scheme of gifts at panhellenic sanctuaries. See also Chapter 2, page 129 for the donations of Dionysius I. 949 Diad. Sic. 16.57.2-3 relates that the Athenian general lphicrates captured the ships carrying the statues and sold the statues as booty. Dionysius apparently then sent a letter to the Athenians decrying their sacrilegious act. 289 How did Dionysius I interact with Delphi, and how successful was this interaction? Although his political alliances with other cities will be the focus of the following two chapters, a brief summary of the historical context will explain the appearance of Dionysius I at Delphi more clearly. Toward the end of his reign, the tyrant had made overtures to aid the larger Greek world, (perhaps) taking part in two separate panhellenic conferences of 371 and 368 at Delphi. 950 Because Dionysius took part in arranging a general peace amongst the warring Greek states, the Athenian boule voted honors to him and his sons. 951 Within this inscription, an interesting passage also mentions his role in the rebuilding of the Delphian sanctuary of Apollo, 952 which had burned or had been damaged in an earthquake in the winter of 373/2. 953 These actions show Dionysius's desires to become involved in larger Greek issues and to demonstrate his status as protector. In this sense, acting as patron of the arts in cooperation with other Greeks, rather than acting as an artist acting by himself, provided the most political success for the tyrant. By reconstructing the Temple of Apollo, was restoring the status of the site and 950 Xen. Hell. 6.4.2 and 7.1.27 respectively. Neither passage is clear as to the presence of Dionysius in person at the conferenoe, although the context would strongly suggest that envoys and perhaps military foroes at least were present. 951 JG II 2 103, lines 23-24 note that the tyrant helped in the peace (i'Jo?Je[ovrnv njr]l [!'Jau]rl<iw, El[p~]v?J<). The inscription is also included with commentary in Tad 133. Jehne 1994: 43 and 80, Ryder 1965: 134, and Cole 1981: 217-19 all discuss this text and the involvement of Dionysius I in this peace. See also Chapter 2, page 129 for Dionysius's involvement. 952 JG II 2 103, lines 9-10 notes the ([T?j'] o[lK]oOofL[ia' T]l [au vE]w). Although the letters have been obscured, the context of the inscription makes the restoration fairly secure. 953 For the text and discussion of the inscription of 363 BC recounting the donations for the repairs, see Tod 140. The text also mentions a Ei:!OafLO<; "'i.vpa1C6uw<;, who donated thirty drachmae. 290 improving the expenence of the pilgrims who visited the sanctuary. Ironically, by following traditional Greek conceptions of patronage and by focusing on the greater community, he brought more prestige to himself than if he were merely seeking glory. In opposition to this manner of interaction is the way in which Dionysius I appeared earlier at the sanctuary of Olympia. Like Delphi, Olympia also had been a target of Deinomenid attempts to display their might. 954 One vehicle to show off their economic and political power was the construction of treasuries, located in the Altis to the north of the Temple of Hera. While some were dedicated by whole cities, 955 others were built by tyrants. 956 Regardless of the dedicator of the treasury, these structures served as a repository of offerings and sacred vessels from the pojjs and thereby represented the entire pojjs at the sanctuary, rather than merely the tyrant. Another tradition was the sponsoring of chariots, an activity that Hieron of Syracuse had participated in and had won at Olympia in 4 76 and 4 72. 957 While following his predecessors in this more individual competition by sending several four-horse chariots, 958 Dionysius also chose to demonstrate his economic and cultural capital in a new way, namely by presenting a play which he himself had authored. As noted in the previous chapter, the obsession of Dionysius with the art of drama was a 954 For example, Hieron dedicated a series of helmets at Olympia to celebrate his victory over the Etruscans. See SEG11.1206, 23.253, and 33.328 for the inscriptions of the helmets. 955 Paus. 6.19.15 gives Gela as an example. 956 For example, the tyrant Myron built the Treasury of the Sicyonians. See Paus. 6.19.1-2. 957 Find. OJ. 1 was written to commemorate the victory in 4 76. Olympic victor lists preserved in the Oxyrhynchus papyri also reoord these victories (see 2.88). 958 In the account of the Games, Diad. Sic. 14.109.1 mentions these chariots (n!ep,7r7ra 7rlcEiw), which also were a complete failure. 291 theme throughout his re1gn. For example, when Diodorus Siculus describes the accession of the tyrant to power through his denunciation of the Syracusan generals, he notes that Dionysius entered the theater of Syracuse and interrupted a play, thus representing himself as the ultimate actor as he attempted to persuade the Syracusan citizenry of his credentials for leadership. 959 Why would Dionysius also choose to present his plays at Olympia? Two main reasons seem most persuasive. The first reason is based on geography, since tragedies were being presented all around the Greek world by this time, with theaters in several of the major poJejs of the Greek world by the fourth century. Thus, because the festival was attended by the most important individuals from all parts of the Mediterranean, the fame of Dionysius as a powerful leader and a dramatic poet ostensibly could be disseminated after the contest. The second reason is chronological, since previous tragedies (e.g. those of Aeschylus) also had begun to be restaged by this time. While a monument or treasury at a panhellenic site often only was of importance to pilgrims or to those visiting these sites every few years, a successful tragedy would provide a longer- lasting legacy throughout the Greek world for many years. Unlike his participation at Delphi, which had focused on more traditional ways of benefaction, the more self-serving and individualistic episode at Olympia was a total failure. As Simonides had warned not to do in the Hjero, Dionysius set up ornate tents showing off his wealth and hired professional rhapsodes, not to bring honor to any common cause but for his own glory. 960 Just as stated both in the Hjero 959 Diad. Sic. 13.94.1-3. For the theatricality and manipulation of public opinion by tyrants, see Lewis 2000: 98-99. 96 ° For the full text, see Diad. Sic. 14.109, which notes that the rhapsodes were meant to bring 292 and the Agesilaus, Dionysius focused more on wealth and less on merit. Because of his delusions of personal grandeur (and his lack of talent), the crowd laughed in scorn at the verses of the tyrant and started a small riot near the tents. 961 In addition, the failure of the tyrant was due to his inability to control the reaction of the crowd. At home in his court, Dionysius could easily manipulate his court for praise and glory. If a member of the court did not appreciate his scholarly work ( cf. the reaction of Philoxenus to the tragedies of Dionysius), he subsequently would suffer the wrath of the tyrant. Yet in the less controlled environment of the panhellenic games of Olympia, his ability to manipulate the reaction of the crowd (even with professional rhapsodes and luxurious tents) was diminished due to the sheer numbers. The audience of the Games was not part of Dionysius's micro- community. His mistake was to believe that the panhellenic festival was merely a larger version of the symposia he held in Syracuse. Unfortunately for Dionysius, he was unable to manipulate his audience in the same way. While his rule was not threatened by his taking part in the Olympic Games of 388, (especially because he himself did not travel to Olympia), 962 Dionysius suffered great damage to his image, both as a scholar himself and as a viable leader among the Greeks. As noted in the first chapter, Lysias took this opportunity to attack the tyrant. Having already condemned the presence of the tyrant, 963 he then delivered glory to Dionysius (7rot/J}uwuw ~vOogov TDv b.wvVawv). 961 D. d s· 14 109 2 r.. ' '' - • e - ' ' - ' ' '' ' lO , lC. , , \Y'E'Ta OE TaVTa ava EWpOVV'TE'; 'T1}V ICaiCLaV 'TWV 'lrOI/T}f.La'TWV, UlHfEf\,(J)V 'TOV A I \ I > \ ~ rl \ "\ ~ ~ 'Y \ \ ) L.J..WVVUWV ICaL K,a'Tfr'fWWU/WV E'lrL TOUOVTOV, WO'TE TLVa'; 'TOI\,fL1]UaL ot..ap7ra~::,EW Ta') OK/T]Va') . 962 Diad. Sic. 14.109.2 notes that Dionysius sent his brother Thearides as the head of the delegation. 963 Diad. Sic. 14.109.3 states that Lysias was at the Games during the presentation of Dionysius's 293 his Olympian Oration, in which he called the Greeks to action against the oppressors of Greece, including Dionysius. Through his distaste for Dionysius, 964 Lysias thus attacked the aspirations of the tyrant with gusto, noting his role in the destruction of Greece. Rather than praising Dionysius as a scholar and political power, he represented the tyrant as a barbarian, by consistently grouping the tyrant with the Persian king. 965 Such a depiction was the opposite of that stemming from the dedication at Olympia after his victory over the Carthaginians by Gelon, who demonstrated his military power over the barbarian other. 966 While Dionysius hoped to use the Olympic Games of 388 as a venue to display his credentials as the quintessential Greek and a great example of Greek culture, this depiction by Lysias (and the later depiction of Dionysius after his victory at the Lenaea on 367 967 ) shows the tyrant as that barbarian other, a wolf in Greek sheep's clothing. Why was Dionysius so unsuccessful in his attempt at Olympia, and what does this say about the nature of the relationship between Dionysius and his court? In tragedies and urged the organizers of the event not to admit representatives of a tyranny most impious (Tov' €f auE{3EUTrLTrJ' Tvpavvi!lo,). Again, see Chapter 1, pages 66-68 for this episode. 964 Lysias identified with both cities, as his family was originally from Syracuse and was a resident alien in Athens. Under the rule of the Thirty Tyrants, his own brother, Polemarchus, had been murdered. For the accusation of murder, see Lys. 1. 965 For example, he describes both Greeoe as held under the power of the barbarian and many Greek cities as destroyed by despots ( 7rot.,t.2t 0Ev ainij'; tJvcra V1rO Tip (3apf3dpcp, 7rof.) .. 2tr;; OE 7r6""A,El8 inrO Tvpdvvwv dva(ruhovc; ryeyEv1]pivac;) in Lys. 33.3. Later, in chapter 5, when describing the dangers that threaten Greece, Lysias complains that both the Persians and Dionysius control the seas through their many ships (vaV'> OE 7rof.) .. 2tc; 0Ev ainO'> KEICT1]Tat,, 7rof.) .. 2tc; 0' 6 TVpavvoc; Tijc; ~LKE/cia,). 966 For description of the dedication, see Paus. 6.19.7, as well as 6.9.4-5 for an earlier appearance of Gel on at Olympia. For discussion of the monument, see Mari 2006: 45-46 and 64. 967 The most famous presentation of his tragedies was his victory in 367 at the Lenaea, as mentioned in Ael. VH13.18, Them. Or. 9.126c, and Tzetz. ChjJ. 5.178-181. 294 addition to straying from traditional ways through which tyrants gained honor at these sites, several possible reasons come to mind. One point concerns the nature of the venue. As Simonides pointed out, the tyrant will find his most success by focusing on the pojjs. Such a sentiment was also found in these panhellenic Games, where, although common Greekness and personal glory are present, the pojjs represented the object of glory. Odes that praised victors were performed in their communities, and spoils won from victories were placed in the treasuries of the pojjs. By seeking only his personal glory at the expense of the pojjs (in addition to his poor verse writing), Dionysius failed at being a scholar and at gaining political prestige in this environment. In addition, unlike the first formula mentioned at the beginning of this section, whereby the tyrant used the members of his court as mediators to gain political connections, the participation of Dionysius at the Olympic Games followed the second formula of direct communication with other cities. By acting as a scholar (i.e. a court member), Dionysius did not follow international protocol, thus dooming himself to failure where earlier tyrants had succeeded. His identity had been compromised, as he attempted to portray himself both as powerful leader and intellectual. Rather than allowing a true poet to coin verses (as Pindar had done for Hiero ), he attempted to win glory for himself on both fronts. Rather than allowing a member of the court to perform his job in the service of the tyrant, Dionysius attempted to 'play' court member, thereby dooming his performance to failure. While Dionysius I was the protagonist in the debacle at Olympia, his phjJoj would suffer the wrath of the tyrant. After hearing of the disastrous reaction to his poetry, the tyrant fell into madness and suspected that his court was plotting against 295 him. The scene of jealousy culminated in the slaughter of several court members on false charges and the exile of several others (Diad. Sic. 15.7.3). r \:\ A I ' I \ " I ,.+, I ' I ' o oe i..l.WVVCYW') aKovua<:; 'TTJV 'TCVV 7r0~7JfLa'TWV Ka'Ta-ypovr;uw eve7recrev eu;; • ro , , , , , , ~, ,, , , 'e , , , ro , V7rEpJV011./l]V l'vV7r7J<:;: a~e~ oe fLal'vl'vOV 'TOV 7ra OV') E'lrUTaCYW l'vafLJVaVOV'TO'), fLavuDOr;'l Oul8ecw; Kan!.(rxe 'T0v 1frvx0v aV'ToV, Ka~ cp8oveiv aV'Tip cp&cncwv r! \ ,.+,'l r I r ' p l I \ I ' \ a'7TaV'Ta<:; 'TOV') 't'U'vOV') V7TCV7T'TEVEV OJ') E'lr~JVOVI'vEVOV'Ta<:;. Ka~ 7repa<:; E'lr~ 'TocroV'To 7rpoijtv8e /v{n-rrr;<;:; Ka~ 7rapaKo7rij<;;;, Wa-'Te 'TWv cp£tvwv 7rofvtvoVc; !LEv ' \ , Ire \: I ' I ' l " ' '> 1 \: \ \ , ,.+, 1\: E7r~ y--voecrw aunau:; ave,~,ew, OVK a,...,~ryovr:; oe Ka~ e't'vryaoevuev. Dionysius, on hearing of the insult that was cast upon his poems, fell into a fit of melancholy. His condition grew constantly worse and madness seized his mind, so that he kept saying that he was the victim of jealousy and suspected all his friends of plotting against him. At last, his frenzy and madness went so far that he slew many of his friends on false charges, and he drove not a few into exile. With such actions, Dionysius conformed to the stereotype of the tyrant presented in literature, whose paranoia and constant fear of conspiracies threatened those closest to him, including his family and friends. 968 The incident at Olympia, which both embarrassed the tyrant and damaged his image abroad, provided the perfect opportunity for these fears to materialize. While the perpetrator of the diplomatic disaster was the tyrant himself, he transferred blame to his court. The result was the re-ignition of the process of mobility, as he sent many members (who he had brought into the court) away from his court. This reaction was a self-fulfilling prophecy, 968 Thuc. 6.85.1. Polyb. 6. 7.8 describes these consp1racws as a natural result of the cycle of governments, as the populace seeks to overthrow the tyrant. Plut. Vlt. Djon 9.3-5 details the constant fear by Dionysius I of those closest to him, including his family and military confidantes. 296 smce, by disbanding his court due to his fear of sabotage, he himself was undermining his own rule by fulfilling the stereotype of an unhinged ruler with no close friends. Thus, as seen with other examples during the rule of the Dionysii discussed above, this experiment with mobility (i.e. the creation of the court) did not work for two main reasons. The first, as seen in the failure of Dionysius I at Olympia and the failure of Dionysius II with the advice of Plato, centers on the inability of the tyrant to use his court for its proper purpose as intellectual capital. The second reason was the ultimate lack of a community at the court, as represented best by the reaction of Dionysius I after the Olympic Games of 388. Due to these deficiencies of the tyrant, the court was not a successful diplomatic tool through which the Dionysii could have further cemented the power abroad they had gained through more hostile military campaigns. 297 CHAPTER 5 -FRIENDS OR FOES? FORMAL RELATIONS BETWEEN THE TYRANTS AND GREEK POLEIS As discussed in the last chapter, within the relationships between the tyrant and his court, political links were created between the tyrant and other poJejs. As we have seen, the close relations of Plato with the leadership of Tarentum (namely Archytas) through the intercession of the Pythagoreans would have provided opportunities for the Dionysii to spread their political power within southern Italy. Many times, however, tyrants created official links with the governments of foreign cities by other more traditional means. These attempts to increase the political capital of the tyrant throughout the Greek and non-Greek world also were created through another process of small-scale mobility different from those discussed already. International relations between the tyrants of Syracuse and other cities (e.g. Athens and Sparta) were the result of movement of ambassadors and of other close personal relations of the tyrant (e.g. wives and children). These alliances then spawned further episodes of mobility, as closer relations between poJejs provided easier access for travel between these cities. Official alliances facilitated contact and movement of traders, soldiers, and other migrants between Sicily and other cities around the Mediterranean. In this first chapter concerning international relations, I will discuss the political dialogue between the Syracusan tyrants and other Greek poJejs around the Mediterranean. I will analyze the process of these relations and the mobility involved on the part of envoys (whether official envoys of Syracuse or other individuals who acted in the guise of envoys). Why did the tyrants of Syracuse seek outside aid during their rule, and how did they achieve these goals? In addition, what 298 were the consequences of these new alliances, both for the tyrants and for the Greek poJejs with whom they collaborated? How did these new relations increase the opportunity for the tyrant to increase his empire? I. International relations and envoys: an overview Were connections with other poJejs a natural consequence of the institution of tyranny? As mentioned in the first chapter of this dissertation, the tyrant (including those of Syracuse) often avoided his own citizens, by surrounding himself with bodyguards and mercenaries. 969 This aversion ultimately forced the tyrant to foster official relations with outside entities, who could provide help in his time of need. This collaboration is attested for tyrants from the very beginning of their existence, especially with the early tyrannies in Asia Minor. 970 These Ionian cities were cosmopolitan in nature, taking advantage of the geographical closeness of these cities, along with the ease of transportation between them, to encourage communication and alliances between the earliest tyrants. 971 For example, we read of contact between the sixth-century tyrants Periander of Corinth and Thrasybulus of Miletus, through which Periander apparently gave political advice to Thrasybulus concerning the maintenance of his rule (namely to dispose of all powerful men in the city to ensure his leadership). 972 Within Sicily, the Syracusan tyrant Gelon also believed that tyrants needed to collaborate with other tyrannies, especially since 969 For the bodyguard of Dionysius I, see Chapter 1, pages 61-63. 97 ° For the earliest foundations of tyrannies in Lydia and Asia Minor, see White 19 55: 2-7. 971 Will1950: 368-69. 972 Hdt. 5.92 mentions this episode. Arist. Pol. 3.1284a and 5.13lla, switch the role of the tyrant who asks questions and the tyrant who answers. 299 democracy did not serve as a viable alternative. 973 Such collaborations were common among the tyrants of Sicily. Although Thucydides noted that tyrants normally only had relations with their close neighbors, behavior that limited their power, he argued that the tyrants of Sicily attained great power and suggested that their ability to network allowed them to increase their influence. 974 While the geographical location of Sicily was a great help in fostering personal networks, due to the relatively close proximity of Sicilian city-states (and its position at the crossroads of the Mediterranean), the political upheaval of the fourth century BC also encouraged tyrants to reach out to other cities. 975 In addition, even cities such as Athens and Sparta, who were previously had focused more on internal affairs and alliances with other poJejsof mainland Greece, were forced to seek out the outside aid of tyrants due to the fragile state of political affairs at that time. Thus, while the fourth-century tyrants of Syracuse followed traditional Greek practices of diplomacy with the creation of strategic alliances, they took advantage of the collapse of Greek poJejs on the mainland during their rule to create a greater empire within Sicily and abroad. As we will see, although traditional diplomacy often focused on the maintenance 973 For the disregard of the demos by Gelon, see Hdt. 5.92 and 7.156. For later collaboration, see the speech of the Spartan envoys in Hdt. 8.142.5, which characterizes Alexander of Macedonia and Mardonius as tyrants, and then notes that one tyrant acts as the helper of the other (Tvpavvo' cyap €wv TVpavvr rrocymTEpcya/;EmL). See Gray 1996: 377-78 for further discussion of these passages. 974 D f th d' . f th' ( • ' ' oC ' ' ' ' ' - ' ' ' ' ) ror ur er 1scusswn o IS passage oL ryap EV L.LICE!'vLCf E'lrL 7rl'vEllYTOV EXWP7Jaav uvvafLEW'; , see Luraghi 1995: 37-42. 975 For the increase in aristocratic connections and tyrannies in the fourth century, see Trundle 2006: 72-7 4. 300 and/or strengthening of the pojjs, these tyrants used their alliances to foster a supra- pojjs identity through empire. The problem with the acceptance of outside aid often was due to distrust created by distance between cities and their different political systems. The mechanism to help create trust between the tyrant and other cities was based on prior personal relationships, a common practice among Greeks. The institution of xenja, whereby one visiting party entered into a guest friendship, appeared in the earliest of Greek literature but continued to be a strong force for displacing mistrust between powerful individuals and their poJejs even in the fourth century BC. 976 Powerful men of aristocracies and the tyrants of Syracuse continued to participate in ritualized friendship to breach borders that oridinarily would be difficult due to constant conflict. 977 As will be discussed, this practice notably manifested within the context of marriages between tyrants and the daughters of leaders of other cities. 978 The links between cities, created when the xenos participated in some process of mobility (e.g. exile, warfare, official envoys), allowed cities which were not close geographically to become allies. 979 For example, the Dionysii and Agathocles used not only the movement of court members, but also of official envoys and marriages, to undertake and to perpetuate alliances. These bonds of xenja could be given for perpetuity, by passing on to the descendants of the original xenoi 980 These multi- 976 For the regulation of xenja by the polis, see Purcell1990: 56-57. 977 Herman 1987: 162-63. 978 See below, pages 336-350 for Dionysius I and pages 359-64 for Agathocles. 979 For further discussion of the process of xenja, see Herman 1987:44-54. 980 See Herman 1987: 16-17 for examples. 301 generational relationships that provided protection and other benefits to members of an entire family were formalized also between poJejs and tyrants (e.g. in the three decrees from the Athenians to Dionysius I and his family). 981 Once xenja was established, the process of mobility that created the xenja was repeated, since each member sharing this bond could visit the pojjs of his xenos with full protection and with resources at his disposal. 982 This protection often extended to other close friends and members of the pojjs, allowing for easier travel between the two cities. Furthermore, if one xenoswas acting in a military capacity, his personal connections even allowed him to collect troops. 983 Regardless of the identity of the xenoj, the process of xenja created horizontal relationships, 984 an important part of the political and military climate in Syracuse during the late Classical period, as attested by many examples. 985 During the Classical and Hellenistic periods, such relationships of xenja were possible even between Greek and non-Greek communities. The following chapter (Chapter 6) therefore will address relations between the tyrants and 'barbarian' cities. 986 981 See below, pages 323-33. 982 Herman1987: 74-75. 983 See Mitchell1997: 79-80. 984 Ma 2003: 15-19. 985 For an earlier fifth-century connection, between Pericles of Athens and Cephal us of Syracuse, see Plut. X orat. 835c (<j>ilcov 6vw ml f.!vov). For a list of further relations between important Syracusans and other Greeks during the reigns of Dionysius I, Dionysius II, and Agathocles, see Appendix A of Herman 1987. The most important for this project are Eunomus of Athens and Dionysius I (Lys. 19.19), Dionysius II and Archytas (Plut. Vlt. Djon 18.2), Dionysius II and Plato (Plut. Vlt. Djon 22.1), Dian and Plato (Pl. Ep. 3.316c), Dian and Callippus of Athens (Plut. Vlt. Djon 56), and Agathocles and Ophellas of Cyrene (Diad. Sic. 20. 70.3). 986 See, for example, the xenja between Dian and Synalos of Carthage in Plut. Vlt. Djon 25.5-6 (6 302 From these personal ties came the institution of proxenja, centered around the proxenos, a type of ambassador who guaranteed the safety of the citizens of another city. This position was not a full-time ambassador as an official government position in the modern sense, but a part-time position undertaken at crucial moments by important members of the city. As the focus of the city government was within the city and not diplomacy per se, these men were not chosen for their training in international affairs but rather for their standing within their home pojjs (and for their relationship with the other city). 987 Thus, leading men of Syracuse (e.g. Dian, the uncle of Dionysius II) served many roles in the city, including proxenos. Furthermore, in the late Classical and Hellenistic periods, men of culture (rhetors, poets, and historians) also were sent out to persuade cities to form alliances. 988 Proxenojhoused visitors from their partner city and provided them with access to courts if necessary in an attempt for these cities (who even occasionally were at war with one another) to build and to maintain relationships. 989 These proxenoj often first had been envoys to their partner city on multiple occasions and had a personal connection with its citizens. Representation by proxenoj was beneficial both to the proxenos, who gained prestige in both cities, and for the poJejs, b.Lwv Cna T7}v oUuav ainip qn"'J\,[av npO'; TDv Kapx1]06vwv). Herman 1987: 12 notes that it is difficult to find differences in xenja between only Greeks or between Greeks and non-Greeks. 987 See Mosley 1971:320-22 for the relationship of the proxenosto his city. Mitchell1997: 75-76 also notes the importance for personal connections. 988 See Chaniotis 19 88, especially 154-5 6, for the use of these men as ambassadors. SEG 3 8.194 7 discusses this article and other examples of this phenomenon. 989 For further discussion of the role of the proxenos, see Mitchell1997: 28-37. 303 who were the beneficiaries of the former's evergetism. 990 This institution thus was another way for cities to protect themselves from danger by creating a larger support network. 991 Thus, ambassadors were also useful for creating alliances that produced various protections, including asy}ja (protection against seizure), symbola (access to local jurisdiction for citizens of an allied city), and jsopojjteja (equal rights as . . ) 992 I h . h h L d L h c1tlzens . n t e same ve1n as t e proxenos was t e tnearo OKOB, w o was responsible for entertaining and protecting the theoroj (messengers sent out to announce major panhellenic festivals). Unlike the position of the proxenos, the thearodokos seems to have been a creation of the early fourth century BC, although it maintained a stable institution for several centuries. 993 This position also was normally filled by wealthy male citizens, although exceptions occasionally existed. 994 As will be discussed later, several notable Syracusans acted in this role during the . f h 995 t1me o t e tyrants. 99 ° For this mutual relationship, especially in the context of the Hellenistic period, see Archibald 2000: 261-63. 991 Such dangers included piracy and being sold into slavery. De Souza 1999: 60-65 discusses how such institutions on the city level helped protect its citizens, since communities themselves took part in human trafficking, especially during times of war. 992 A discussion of these various protections, offered to citizens through these decrees is provided in Migeotte 2004. For thorough analysis of symbola, see Gauthier 1972. 993 The proxenof seems to have held this role prior to the fourth century, although they may have shared some functions with the thearodokoi The number of proxenoj also seems to have increased at this time. For the evolution of the position, see Perlman 2000: 13-22 and 26-29. 994 Perlman 2000: 37-45 notes instances of women and entire cities, as well as the occasional non citizen, acting in the role of the thearodokos. Other figures related to tyrants who also acted as thearodokof include Hi aetas, the tyrant of Leontinoi, and Alcippus, the son of the Messenian tyrant Mamercus (see JG IV 2 1.95, lines 67-68 and 71-72 respectively for their appearance). 995 Dian and Heraclidas served as thearodokof to the messengers of the festival of Epidaurus in 356f5. See JGIV 2 1.95, lines 39-40 for their inclusion in the inscription. 304 One maJor 1ssue threatening these institutions was the identity of these representatives. For example, an issue facing the proxenos was his primary loyalty. The envoy all alliances both to his home city and to his allied city, having developed personal contacts there. 996 Did his friendship with members of another city threaten the interests of his original community? 997 For example, the friendship of Dian and the Carthaginians was seen as a problem by Dionysius II and his court, who suspected him of working with Carthage to overthrow the tyranny. 998 The proxenos needed to balance a fine line between creating connections beneficial to both cities and compromising either the interests of his home city or the protection of his host city, although the benefits to each city often outweighed any possible conflict of interest. 999 Thus was created a great dilemma in Greek relations, as Greeks across the Mediterranean attempted to collaborate in the name of 'Greek' unity in the face of 996 Mosley 1973:43-44 and 51 notes that the city could not leave the issue of envoys up to chanoe and chose powerful men within the city who nevertheless were able to foster proper relations with other cities. 997 Plato discusses this problematic relationship between the danger and benefits of traveling between cities. Pl. Leg. 12.949e-953e argues that isolation is often the best oourse and that the mixing of citizens from various cities was problematic and resulted in the confusion of pofjs laws or citizenship. Although the city oould not completely close off its walls or its ports (12.950a-b), it needed to strictly regulate travel (12.950d). See Barnet 2000: 117-20 for further exposition of this passage. Plato divides travelers to the city into four groups: those looking for profit (the most dangerous), visitors who do not come for profit (who should be treated well), and two groups of more official visitors (who should be put up at the expense of the city). See Pierart 2008: 213-16 and Barnet 2000: 120-23 for these groups. 998 Plut. Vlt. Djon 14.3-4 999 For the issues of compromising interests, see Herman 1987: 3-4 and 150-161. Mitchell1997: 50-51 argues that connections were mostly beneficial to cities and did not cause conflict. 305 decentralization and loyalty to one pojjs. 1000 Greeks did have common customs, such as kinship, language and religion, which allowed cities to have friendships while . . . h . h 1001 y h f d h . mamtammg t eu own egemony. et ot er actors prevente armomous interaction, including the balance of power. Thus, as statesmen (e.g. Isocrates) attempted to seek the help of Dionysius I in order to protect their own pojjs, would they be forced to accede hegemony to him for this protection? As Greeks formed larger networks of relations across the Mediterranean, would the cities in these alliances lose their own identity? As will be seen with the relations of the Dionysii and Agathocles with other poJejs, the balance of power between two cities was a constant f . II . . f . h . . f 1oo2 I source o angst, especm y smce one c1ty o ten was m t e pos1t10n o power. n addition, because these tyrants were building empires that often subjugated the identity of the pojjs, each pojjs needed to proceed with caution in their alliances. Furthermore, the difficulty of alliances was compounded on the island of Sicily, with its history of colonization and ethnic differences. 1003 Not only was Sicily a hodge- podge of Greek, Sicel, Elymian, and Carthaginian elements, but each city had its own political identity. Such clashes in political and ethnic identity led to problems, including disputes over territory, which required the intervention of outside 100 ° For further discussion, see Bederman 2001: 33-35. 1001 Giovannini 1993: 274-78 and 283-86. Ma 2003: 20-23 discusses the use of literary stories and myths focusing on common kinship. Traveling poets increased this tendency in the last Classical and Hellenistic periods. 1002 For the balance of power between Greek cities, see Bederman 2001:35-38. 1003 Berger 1991: 129-30 notes various problems faced in Sicily, including its lack of traditions and its dependence on tyranny, in opposition to many pofejsin mainland Greece. 306 arbitration, 1004 such as that performed by Hamilcar between Agathocles and various cities on the island. 1005 The ability for tyrants in Sicily to rule and to increase their empire could occur only if they conquered these diplomatic difficulties, either by careful diplomacy or brute force. In addition to these issues, during the fourth century BC, deteriorating relations between Greek cities across the Mediterranean further complicated relations. Different political systems at this time dissolved the common bonds between Greek cities. 1006 The tyrants of Syracuse thus faced problems due to the inherent distrust of tyranny amongst other city-states, notably democratic Athens. The danger of tyrants was a major theme in contemporary literature, including Athenian tragedy and the works of Demosthenes, who argued that there was no secure trust between two political parties with different constitutions (e.g. democracy and tyranny). 1007 Thus, the tyrants of Syracuse faced an uphill battle in order to be recognized as viable rulers and to rebuff threats to their rule, not only from other cities in Sicily but also from outside threats (e.g. as seen in the Athenian expedition only one decade before Dionysius I seized power). Creating links with other cities around the Greek world through the interchange of people was the most efficient way for them to procure the support needed to increase their empire. 1004 For an overview of international arbitration, including its processes, see Ager 1996: 6-14. 1005 For further discussion of this episode, see chapter 6, pages 377-78. 1006 For these customs in light of arbitration between cities, see Ager 1996: 30-31. 1007 For further discussion with examples from Demosthenes and Lysias, see Leopold 1981: 228- 29 and 241-42. 307 II. Intra-island relations between tyrants and Sicilian poleis. a vertical relationship Before turning to more distant alliances between the tyrants of Syracuse and Greek poleis overseas, a brief discussion of relations between the tyrants and other cities on the island of Sicily is necessary. What did the hierarchy of relations between cities on the island look like? Was there mutual collaboration between the tyrants and other cities, or was the hierarchy more vertical, with the tyrants maintaining hegemony over these cities? Due to the many micro-regions of the island and its ethnic divisions, the island of Sicily certainly offered the opportunity for close collaboration between vastly different peoples and cities that could produce a common identity and unity. At the same time, in opposition to many smaller islands, these geographical divisions (as well as the various identities of Greek cities that colonized the island) produced a relative lack of collaboration or a sense of shared Sicilian-ness. 1008 This fragmentation was due partly to the great size of the island. For example, Thucydides only calls Sicily an island (vi/em') twice, and the island does I . h . f . I . . h M a· Joog not seem top ay mto t e common conceptwns o msu anty m t e e 1terranean. Thus, among the Sicilians, there did not appear to be a conscious identification as 'Sicilian' in the first centuries following colonization. 1010 The common position for 1008 Constantakopoulou 2005: 2 notes that many islands in the Aegean, even those with more the one pojjs, identified themselves as an island. This island identity that superseded the pojjs also was seen in the description by outsiders, who often described the island as one unit. 1009 For Sicily as a viwo,, see Thuc. 6.1.1 and 6.2.5. Constantakopoulou 2007: 14-15 notes that Thucydides called Sicily by name 135 times. She also argues that this representation follows the ooncept of Braude! of Sicily as a continent. 1010 Malkin 2005b: 62-63 discusses the altar of Apollo Archagetes at Naxos (the first colony to be settled in 734 BC) as a departure point for all embassies leaving the island and, thus, as a symbol of Sicilian identity. Hall 2002: 121-23 discusses this argument but notes that the appearance of this altar and its significance as a locus of Sicilian identity is tenuous. 308 every pojjs in Sicily was autonomous, with each city having its own laws, political systems, and rights, which often reflected those of the mother-city. 1011 If citizens of the island did identify themselves, they had multiple political and ethnic identities (Syracusans, for example, not only saw themselves as citizens of Syracuse, but also as Dorian). Yet rarely was 'Sicilian' included among these identities of the islanders. 1012 The main instance when the inhabitants of the island were nearest to the concept of a 'Sicilian' identity was in the wake of the Athenian invasion. Hermocrates indeed had proclaimed at Gela in 424 the inhabitants of a single island surrounded by the sea as :Zuceicu)j'Ca,, in order to unify the island and to gain allies for Syracuse in the face of Athenian invasion. 1013 In the coming years, Syracuse itself was said to have had gained homojotropja internally and to have brought many cities of Sicily together to fight against the Athenians. 1014 Therefore, during the last quarter of the fifth century, the opportunity for greater unity among the islanders existed. While some may argue that Sicily had gradually moved to a more unified identity through political relations in the fifth century, 1015 their identity as 1011 For this argument, see Bondi 1990-1991:217-20. 1012 For the multiple identities of the Sicilians, see Malkin 2007: 183-84. Malkin argues that these identities became more religious in times of peace. 1013 For the speech of Hermocrates, see Thuc. 4.58-65 and Chapter 2, pages 112-13. For the creation of identity through this speech, see Harrison 2000: 86-88. Hall 2004: 49 argues for the difficulties stemming from this identity, since the definition of the Sicilians based on geography failed to deal with the many non-Greek groups of the island, who either were either on the side of the Syracusans or on the side of the Athenians. 1014 Cuscuna 2004: 153-62 brings together many of these passages which identify collaboration at this time. Thuc. 7.55.2 mentions the homojotropja of the Syracusans. Thuc. 4.59 and 4.63 provide two examples of how independent cities were able to move together in harmony. 1015 See, for example, Dominguez 2006: 322-23. 309 :Zuceicu)j'Ca' was tenuous at best and quickly disintegrated. After the failure of the Sicilian expedition, the cities of Sicily again became fragmented, and alliances between cities were rare. The Dionysii and Agathocles sought to have horizontal relations (i.e. where both parties were on equal ground) with other cities in Sicily only at the beginning of their rule. Thus, Dionysius I sought the aid of Gela and Enna at the outset of his tyranny, while Agathocles collaborated with the citizens of M · h"l · f. · ul · s 1016 F h organtma w 1 e attemptmg ust to se1ze r e m yracuse. or t e most part, tyrants created a vertical hierarchy of relations with their neighboring cities, (i.e. maintaining hegemony over them). Thus, any markers of shared systems among islanders (e.g. political institutions, coinage, weights and measures) stems from the imposition of such systems by Syracusan leadership, rather than a willing collaboration on the part of these cities to unify. As we will see, the larger-scale relations that the Dionysii and Agathocles had with other parts of the Mediterranean were fostered in part to subjugate these cities and to increase their empire beyond the borders of the island. III. Relations with Greek poleisoverseas A. The tyrant as diplomat: the Dionysii between Sparta and Athens As Dionysius I took power in Syracuse, mainland Greece still was being ripped apart by the last throes of the Peloponnesian War. As he grew in power, Dionysius would need to protect his rule from the meddlesome eyes of other city states to the east. Athens had invaded the island less than a decade before Dionysius came to power, and regardless of their defeat, they still coveted the island and its economic 1016 Just. Epjt. 22.2.1. 310 riches. Sparta too had become politically involved in the affairs of Sicily, a! though they ostensibly were protecting the Sicilians from Athenian imperialism. Yet as Dionysius stamped his own brand of imperialism on the island over the next two decades, he would need to keep the perennial powers of Athens and Sparta at bay. He did so by a series of defensive alliances, which provided support to other city-states while ensuring that they would not interfere in his own networks of power. Over the nearly four decades of rule, Dionysius would play these two cities off of one another. As his support in one city waned, he would improve relations with the other. Through these diplomatic maneuvers, Dionysius ensured that his own empire would receive the proper support from other cities on the mainland. The neglect of these two cities by Dionysius II, however, would prove to be a major factor in his downfall. The most stable form of support the tyrants received (especially under the Dionysii) came from Sparta, support partly stemming from their shared Doric roots. Although the idea of syngeneja (shared kinship) was often a trope that did not occur . I. 1017 d I h h h. b I I 1o1s h m rea 1ty an at aug t 1s concept ecame more popu ar ater, t e tyrants still based their diplomacy with Sparta on ideological grounds. Their alliances with Sparta also were due both to a similar governmental form of dual kingship and to the opportunity for Sparta to balance and undermine attempts of Athens, in order to 1017 Hall1997: 36-40 discusses the basis of syngeneja on stereotypes and its status as a tapas in literature. 1018 The most famous Sicilian example was that of Gela and Camarina, who shared common ancestry with Cos, since Cos had helped repopulate the cities during the reign of Timoleon (Diad. Sic. 16.82.7 and Plut. Vlt. Tjm. 35.2). A decree from Camarina (SEG 12.379) and a decree from Gela (SEG 12.380) discuss honors for travelers from Cos, including asyjja. For discussion of this relationship, see Curty 1995: 44-51, Rigsby 1996: 148-52, and Rizzo 1973: 10-14. 311 gain a political and economic advantage in the West. Within the historical record, most examples of interaction involve Sparta sending people to Syracuse, although several examples demonstrate mobility in the opposite direction. For example, the Syracusan Herodas, who was living in Phoenicia, traveled to Sparta in 39 7 to provide reconnaissance on the actions of the Persian Empire. 1019 While it is not certain that Herodas was an official envoy of the Spartan state (especially because he was described merely as a trader), these instances show that information and international relations could be completed by other means than official envoys. Others appear to be in the service of the tyrant or of the Spartan leadership. A prime example is Polyxenus, who married the sister of Dionysius I at the beginning of the ' I . D. . l"d dh. 1020 A h fD. . tyrants rue, JUSt as wnysms canso 1 ate 1s power. s t e power o wnysms was challenged at the beginning of his rule, Polyxenus was sent abroad to various cities in the West and Peloponnese, including Sparta, to drum up support. He returned with ships and a Spartan commander to put down the threat of a Carthaginian takeover in Syracuse. 1021 In return for this aid from Sparta, Polyxenus would be sent again by Dionysius in 38 7, this time with Syracusan ships, to aid the Spartan fleet in the Hellespont against Athenian forces. 1022 1019 For the voyage of Herodas to Sparta, see Xen. Hell. 3.4.1. See Descat 2002: 265-66 for the description of this example in the context of the Mediterranean acting as a medium for the transmission of information. 102 ° For this episode, see Diad. Sic. 13.96.3. This episode will also be discussed later in the context of tyrannical marriages (page 342). 1021 Diad. Sic. 14.62-63 describes the attack of Carthaginians and the aid provided by the Peloponnesians. 1022 Xen. Hell. 5.1.26. For further discussion of the role of Polyxenus in Syracusan-Spartan relations, see Pere-Nogues 2009: 113-14 and Meloni 1949: 194-95 and 200-1. 312 On the other hand, certain Spartans were a military force on the island already before the beginning of Dionysius I's rule. The military leader Dexippus first appeared in the historical record in 406 BC in the city of Acragas, 1023 having come from Gela earlier with a troop of soldiers. While the reasons for his original presence on the island are unknown (i.e. if was he acting in any official Spartan capacity), his presence likely was tied to the desire of Sparta to maintain military influence on the island. The Sicilian Expedition, which pitted the forces of Athens against those of Sparta and Syracuse, had ended less than a decade before, and as the Peloponnesian War drew to a close, Sparta still would have been concerned about Athenian influence. Dexippus even may have been left over from those troops who fought during the Sicilian Expedition and/or may have been part of the mercenaries recruited by the predecessor of Dionysius, Hermocrates, in 40 9. 1024 If he were part of the mercenaries of Hermocrates, his actions would not have been at the behest of the Spartans but would have been more personal (although stemming from the original interest in Sparta on the island against the Athenians). His role was primarily as military commander, who also directed the movement of both mercenaries and citizens. Regarding his first role, Dexippus served as a xenologos, by gathering mercenaries (e.g. Campanians) who were residing in the area to supplement the armies of various Sicilian cities. 1025 As regards his latter role, he served as leader of the Acragantines in the face of the Carthaginian 1023 Diad. Sic. 13.85.3 states that he had 1500 soldiers at his disposal and was held in high regard in Gela because of his Spartan citizenship ( ~xwv rlxLwfLa om T7}v 7racrpLOa ). 1024 For the use of mercenaries in his campaign to gather the bones of the soldiers of Himera, see Diad. Sic. 13.75.2. For this suggestion, see Pere-Nogues 1998: 10. 1025 Pere-Nogues 1998: 11. 313 military threat, by directing them to leave their city with his help. 1026 Later traveling to Gela, Dexippus began to play a large role in the affairs of Syracuse, since he had moved to Gela after helping the Acragantines, most likely to direct the affairs of the Geloans (who had come under the hegemony of Dionysius I). At the beginning of the rule of Dionysius I, the new tyrant was wary of those who had any influence within Syracuse. Although the tyrant had asked Dexippus to join his campaign, 1027 he soon saw the ability of the Spartan to successfully gather troops and to persuade citizens to follow his lead. Because Dionysius saw Dexippus as a threat, 1028 Dionysius soon would send Dexippus back to Greece in order to prevent any increase in the Spartan's power. 1029 The degree to which Dexippus represented the interests of Sparta during this time is not exactly known. When Dexippus is mentioned in the sources, he is portrayed as acting on his own accord and is even portrayed negatively as someone who accepts bribes. 1030 Although Sparta often is merely mentioned as his city of origin, the interests of Dexippus in the southern and eastern cities of the island mirrored those of Sparta in the decade before and the decade after the accession of Dionysius. Although Dexippus eventually was sent away by Dionysius as 1026 Diad. Sic. 13.88-89 describes their safe travels to Gela. 1027 Diod. Sic. 13.93.4 (6 OE b.wvVaLo'; E7rE{3d"'A.,ero 0Ev TDv D.Egt/Tr7rov 7rEL8Ew ICOWWV7JUaL T1J'; €m(3o)viJ' ). 1028 For the relationship between Dionysius and Dexippus, see Pere-Nogues 1998: 16-17. 1029 Diad. Sic. 13.96.1 notes that Dionysius suspected that Dexippus would seize the opportunity and would give the Syracusans their freedom (ixpEwpiiTo ryGp TDv livOpa TOJ~nov, p/ij lcatpoV l.,afL{3av6fLEvor;; iwaKT1}u7]TaL ToLr;; "'i.vpaKoa-Lols T1JV EA£v8EpLav). 1030 Sordi 1990b: 19-21 notes this negative portrayal of Dexippus and argues that this picture of the Spartan was due to the writings of Philistus, who would have needed to create a proper reason (beside the fear of Dionysius) to send Dexippus away. 314 a possible threat, it does not appear that Dexippus had done any damage to the tyrant. On the contrary, his ability to mobilize the populace and to lead improved and stabilized the political situation in cities over which Dionysius soon would rule. In this sense, by better organizing the populations of this part of the island, Dexippus facilitated their later movements after his accession. The first decade of Dionysius I's reign was punctuated by several forays into Sicily by other Spartan leaders, who acted under the direction of the pojjs. In addition to increasing their political clout in Sicily and fighting against the influence of Athens in other Sicilian cities, Sparta also wished to fight against the possible influence of Corinth, the mother-city of Syracuse. 1031 For example, after Dionysius faced minor defeats in 404, the Spartans sent Aristus to rectify the political situation. In his guise as helper to the party rebelling against the tyrant, he betrayed their cause and handed over the rebels to Dionysius. 1032 Through this action, Aristus not only helped Dionysius but also aided Spartan policy by doing away with the Corinthian Nicocles, thereby lessening the influence of that city in Syracusan politics. Eight years later, another Spartan general, Pharax, again betrayed the cause of the anti-Dionysian party by bringing in ships for the tyrant, by refusing to help the citizens of Syracuse to depose Dionysius I, and by aiding the forces of the tyrant. 1033 In both of these instances, these Spartans acted in the 1031 For Sparta's early influence in Syracuse, see Giuliani 1994: 151-55. 1032 Diad. Sic. 14.10.2 also notes that the Spartans wanted to receive favors from Dionysius if they helped him to retain his rule. 1033 Diad. Sic. 14.63.4 and 14.70.1-3. In the latter passage, Pharax proclaims that he has oome to help the Syracusans against the Carthaginians, not to help them overthrow Dionysius ( ov A I \ J! "\ I ) Ll.WVVUWV 'T1]V apx1JV ICa'Tal'vVEW . 315 interests of their state to dissipate possible threats to the hegemony of Dionysius without overly asserting themselves in Syracusan politics. The intervention of these Spartans leaders in the political affairs of Syracuse in support of Dionysius made the tyrant beholden to Sparta, especially in the first years of his rule, but not to the degree where his own rule was weakened or his own empire threatened. In turn, Dionysius protected the island from the interests of the enemies of Sparta and increased his empire without the pesky intervention of rivals. Neither the dismissal of Dexippus to Greece nor the instability caused by early interventions of Spartan generals seemed to negatively affect Syracusan-Spartan relations, as ties between the two cities continued between Dionysius I and the Spartan king Lysander. Unlike the relationship between Dexippus or other Spartan leaders, the relationship between these two men was more long-lasting. The biographical tradition of Lysander records a relationship between the two leaders that was far more personal than Dionysius's relationship with Spartan military leaders and reflected their mutual respect. For example, Dionysius I is reported to have sent gifts for the daughter of Lysander as a type of gift-exchange, 1034 and the communication is said to have culminated in an actual visit of Lysander to Syracuse. The inclusion of these stories solely in the biographical tradition (i.e. Plutarch), without any confirmation in historical sources, however, calls this degree of personal closeness into question. This possibility of this visit was not completely impossible, 1034 For the gift of robes by Dionysius I, see Plut. Vlt. Lys. 2.5, Plut. Apophth. Lac. 229a, Plut. Conjug. praec. 141d-e, and Plut. Reg et jmp. apophth. 190e. Apparently, Lysander turned down the request the first time (for the fear of making his daughter look ugly). When he came to Syracuse as envoy later, however, he accepted the robes of Dionysius. For the discussion of guest-exchange, see Bommelaer 1981: 57-58. 316 however, as such visits of leaders to Syracuse were not unheard of during this time ( h 'I f AI f h M I . h f D' · ) 1035 e.g. t e apparent ex1 e o cetas o t e o ossmns to t e court o wnysms . Regardless of validity of Lysander's sojourn in Syracuse, some degree of collaboration allowed the two leaders to support each other's political and military successes. More certain contact between the two leaders through diplomatic processes occurred with the sending of ambassadors between Sparta and Syracuse on numerous occasions. Although Lysander did not likely provide much help early in the reign of Dionysius (although the Spartans had sent over Aristus 1036 ), he provided mercenaries to Dionysius several years later, in 398 and in 396. 1037 This aid in 396 also included the sending of Pharax, who (as mentioned above) prevented the revolt of the Syracusans and ensured the loyalty of the mercenaries to Dionysius. 1038 For his part, Dionysius returned the favor of support in 398j7, sending aid to Sparta. During the early years of Dionysius's reign, these relations between Sparta and Syracuse were most intense, since from the late 390s to early 380s, Dionysius turned away from Sparta and began to court Athens with more fervor. Even as he slowly began to diversify his international interests among other cities across the 1035 For Alcetas, see Diod. Sic. 15.13.2-3 (6<; ETVryxavE cpvryGs C/Jv KaL 0t..aTpL(3wv Ev TatS ~vpaKovua")· JG Il 2 103 describes honors for an Aloetas, son of Leptinus. Although the possibility has been raised that this Alcetas is the king of the Molossians, the patronymic and his identification as a Syracusan is strange. See Hagemajer Allen 2003: 207 for further discussion. 1036 For relations between Lysander and Dionysius, see Diad. Sic. 14.10.2-3 1037 For aid in 398, where Sparta allowed him to gather as many mercenaries as he wished, see Diad. Sic. 14.44.2. For aid in 396, when Polyxenus traveled to Sparta, see Diad. Sic. 14.62.1. For the dependenoe of Dionysius on Sparta, see Bommelaer 1981: 177-78. 1038 See Piccirilli 2001: 1037-40 for mutual aid between the two powers. 317 Mediterranean, during the 380s and 3 70s, Dionysius continued to keep the lines of . . b h b 'd' 'd S 1039 A ill commumcatwn etween t e two powers open y prov1 mg m to parta. s w be discussed later, this switching of allegiances by Dionysius I throughout his career, a sort of stable regime of instability in his program of international relations, was a useful tool in keeping cities throughout the Greek world at bay. The influence of the Spartans unfortunately did not endear the Syracusans to other cities around the Mediterranean, most notably Athens, and this alliance with Sparta made the Dionysii a prime target for their wrath. Dionysius I was portrayed not only as a problem for Athens but for all of Greece, as a conqueror and a destroyer of the Greek people. 1040 During the course of these personal attacks, he was likened to the kings of Macedonia and to the Persians, barbarians who threatened the Greek people and who needed to be avoided at all costs. 1041 As mentioned in previous chapters, the image of Dionysius among the Athenians was not good, especially when he attempted to take part in affairs outside of Italy, including at the Olympic Games of 388. Such negative propaganda weakened the image of the tyrant and increased the possibility of a hostile attack. Another hindrance to Syracusan-Athenian relations was the link between Athens and other rival cities to Syracuse in Sicily. For 1039 See Xen. Hell. 5.1.26-31 (when Dionysius provided ships under the command of Polyxenus), Hell. 7.1.20-22 (when Dionysius provided twenty triremes to the Spartans), and Hell. 7.1.28- 29 (when Dionysius sent a supporting force of soldiers). See also Diad. Sic. 15.47.7 (when Dionysius sent ships to aid the Spartans at Corcyra) and Diad. Sic. 15.70.1 (when Dionysius sent groups of mercenaries to Corinth to fight with the Spartans). See Squillaoe 2012: 55-57 for further discussion of the development of relations between Dionysius and Sparta. 104 ° For these portrayals, see Lys. 33.3 and 33.7-8, !soc. Paneg. 126 and 169, Diad. Sic. 15.23.5, and Aristid. Panath. 178. 1041 See Giuliani 1994: 159-62 for an overview of this negative propaganda. 318 example, Dionysius had taken interest in the center of the island and its Sicel inhabitants, who were Athenian allies, on several occasions, including his intervention at Enna in 403 and the founding of Adranum around 400. 1042 Warm relations between the Sicels and Athens had dated back to the period of the Peloponnesian War, as Thucydides speaks of the creation of an alliance between the Sicel leader Archonides. 1043 An extant decree, dating from the period 435-415, confirms this alliance through a degree of proxeny for Archonides. 1044 After the accession of Dionysius I, the tyrant threatened this network of relations by damaging the rule of another Archonides, likely a descendant of the aforementioned Archonides. 1045 After the citizens of Herbite, the city which this later Archonides ruled, made peace with Dionysius, the Sicel would go on to found a new city, Halaesa Archonidea with mercenaries and poor Herbiteans. 1046 While the Sicel identity of the citizens and new city that Archonides founded may have changed, his relations with Athens did not. The aforementioned decree, confirming the continuation of the alliance, was re-inscribed in 385/4, in order to bestow the grant of proxeny on 1042 In Enna, Dionysius is said to have encouraged Aeimnestus to take over power in a coup but then dethroned him and handed over the city, in order that Dionysius appear to be a liberator and champion of democracy. See Diad. Sic. 14.14.6-8 and Lewis 2000: 104 for discussion of this episode. See also Chapter 2, page 123. 1043 Thuc. 7.1.4 records the donation of Sicel troops to the Athenian cause. 1044 JG!s 32 . 1045 This Archonides was likely the son or grandson of the first Archonides, due to the time difference between the first decree with the Athenians and the contemporary events. 1046 See Diad. Sic. 14.16.1-2 for the creation of the new city. De Vida 1997 notes that Dionysius was the active party when making peace with the Herbiteans. Archonides is also not mentioned as part of the process but only as the instigator in the founding of the new city. 319 Archonides and his brother Demon, who was the leader of Centoripe. 104 7 The complicated and contentious relationship between Dionysius I and the Sicels thus was of great interest to the Athenians during the first half of his rule, as the Sicels were one of the few alliances that the Athenians had maintained from the Peloponnesian War Such a relationship benefited both the Athenians and the Sicels, smce Archonides had chosen to leave and to found a new city rather than acquiescing to peace with Dionysius. On his part, Demon also had taken part in hostilities against Dionysius in 396. 1048 Thus, any outside help that the brothers (and the Sicels, whose hatred for Dionysius was well-known 1049 ) could obtain from the Athenians would help to keep the ambitions of the tyrant in check. On the side of the Athenians, relations with Dionysius were at a low point post-388, 1050 and the Athenians again could assert their power in Sicily. Regardless of whether Archonides and Demon had shown any good will toward Athens, Athens could use their hostility toward Dionysius to reassert its influence at that time. The Peace of Antalcidas, signed in 38 7 under the administration of Sparta, had seen Athenian control weaken in the East, as they were forced to cede parts of Ionia and several Aegean islands back to 1047 JGI 3 228. The date of there-inscription is dated from the archon formula at the beginning of the decree. Lines 9-14 of the decree identify the decree as dating from the earlier period of 435-415, while the lacuna between lines 9-14 would have contained the directions for re publishing. The most thorough description of this decree is Walbank 1978: 354-58, while further discussion of the decree is found in Franco 2008: 172-74, Culasso Cataldi 2002: 104, and De Vida 1997: 20-22. 1048 Diad. Sic. 14.78.7 for later treaties between Dionysius and the Sioels. 1049 See, for example, Diad. Sic. 14.58.1, where the Sioels revolted in 396. 105 ° For the issues beginning c.388 and the new hostilities toward Dionysius in Greek literature, see Sanders 1987: 10-15. 320 Persia. 1051 With the eastern front weakened by Sparta and Persia, Athens could turn to the West, in order to stem the control of Dionysius I, who had provided ships for the enemies of Athens. In order to assuage Athenian hostility, Dionysius I sought several times to approach Athens. The increase of positive relations between the tyrant and Athens centered on two periods: the late 390s and the early 360s. 1052 As will be discussed below, the former period of peace was made formally between Syracuse and Athens through personal relations, while the latter stemmed from the fall of Sparta and peace between Syracuse and Athens' ally, Carthage. 1053 Within Athens, there also was likely a pro-Dionysian faction who were more amicable to the tyrant, including men like Isocrates, who later saw Dionysius as a possible candidate to lead his panhellenic union, and members of the Academy, who were not enamored with the contemporary democracy of Athens. 1054 Sicily also was an important locus of trade, especially for grain. Although the Black Sea region was a major source of grain for the city, the island of Sicily was another alternative for Athens in time of need. 1055 As a result, throughout the fourth century, Sicily appeared in Athenian inscriptions and 1051 For the terms of the peace, see Xen. Hell. 5.1.31. 1052 For Syracusans who appeared in Athenian inscriptions during the fourth century, see Osborne 1996: 299-300. Many of these Syracusans appear in a more private role and cannot be tied to activities under the control of the tyrants. 1053 For the timeline of Syracusan-Athenian relations, see Sanders 1979-1980: 70-72. 1054 Sanders 1979-1980: 66-67. 1055 SEG 38.1949 briefly summarizes Bresson 1987, who argues that Greek cities took great conoern concerning the import and export of goods. Although he argues that their concern exceeded worries about foodstuffs, such goods were an important part of many decrees. 321 Athenian honors for providing the city with grain. 1056 Other Athenians who traveled between Athens and Syracuse, however, also improved relations between the two cities. As mentioned in the previous chapter, important Athenians had visited the court, including the orator Andocides, although these visits were not necessarily sanctioned by the Athenian state and were not always fruitful for international relations. 1057 Other envoys, such as Eunomus, were sent on behalf of Athens in order to persuade Dionysius to be more amenable to their requests. Eunomus, a former xenos and filos of Dionysius, was sent to Syracuse in 393 to bring the two cities closer (Lys. 19.19-20). " ' ' p l I K' I ' ' ~ ,, " 7rptJYTOV fLEV ryap f..JOVI'vOfLEVOV OVWVO') 7rEfL7rEW 'TWa eu;; £ .. M<EI'v~av, Cf:JX,E'TO . ' ' E ' I A I ,.+, ,, " ' t I ' l "8 ' V7r0(J'Ta') fLE'Ta VVOfLOV, i..l.WVVCYWV 't'U'vOV OV'TO') Ka~ sEVOV, 'TO 'lr11./l] 0') 'TO VfLE'Tepov 7rfve'i(Fra drya8Ct 7rE'rrour;K6'To<;;;, Wc; EryW dx0Koa 'TWv Ev ITe~pa~e'i I 9 \:' 'l If:;: " l " " A I \: \ \ 7raparyeVOfLEVWV. TJCYaV 0 E11./lTWE') 'TOV 'lrl'vOV 7rE~CYa~ i..l.WVVCYWV ICTJOE(PTTJV fLEV , e E, , , , "''A "' , ..+.'• "'' , , ,.... ryeveu a~ varyopq, 7rOI'vEfLWV oe aKeoa~fLOVwu:;, 't'u,,ov oe Ka~ mJfLfLaxov 'TV 7r6tve~ 'Tf; VfLenf.pq. Ka~ 'Taih-' lnpa1-rrov 7rofvtvWv 1av8Vvwv V7rapx6vn:vv 7rp0<;;; , e ,, , , , , , , A , , , , 1 " 'TTJV a1'va'T'TaV Ka~ 'TOV') 'lrDI'vEfLWV'), Ka~ E'lrE~CYaV i..l.WVVCYWV fLTJ 7rEf-L'fa~ I <\1 I A~' 'Tpur;peu:; a<:; 'TO'TE 7rapemcevaua'To aKeoa~fLOVwu:;. 1056 For example, in the 330s, JG II 2 408 mentions Athenians who were commissioned to bring back grain from the island, as discussed in Oliver 2007: 248-49. Culasso Gastaldi 2004: 201-2 and 2002: 112-14 note that various works of Demosthenes, including Against Zenothemjs and Against Apatouras, as well as Diad. Sic. 19.103, Theophr. Hjst. pl. 8.4.5, JG II 2 744, and SEG 3.92, show links with Syracuse and the grain trade. Other Sicilians also appear in Athenian honors, most notably Sopatros of Acragas. An inscription, found in Q21 of the Agora ( edjtjo prjnceps provided in Camp 1974), records the honors given to the trader, including enkt§sjs, a seat in the Prytaneion, and a seat of importance at the Dionysia. For further discussion of the inscription, see Culasso Gastaldi 2002: 109-11 and Engen 2010: 253-55. For the dating of the inscription between 331-324, see Camp 1974: 322-24, who argues that the dating formula and grain shortage at Athens during this time provide this date. SEG 54.170 contains a brief overview of articles discussing the inscription. 1057 For the travels of Andocides to the court, see Lys. 6.6-7 and Chapter 4, pages 259-60. 322 First, when Co non wanted to send someone to Sicily, he offered himself and went off with Eunomus, who was a friend and guest of Dionysius, and who had rendered a great many services to your people, as I have been told by those who were with him at the Peiraeus. The voyage was undertaken in hopes of persuading Dionysius to connect himself by marnage with Evagoras, and to become an enemy of the Lacedaemonians and a friend and ally of your city. This they set out to do amid many dangers arising from the sea and from the enemy, and they prevailed on Dionysius not to send some warships which he had then prepared for the Lacedaemonians. Eunomus's guest friendship with Dionysius translated into bargaining power for Athens in its attempt to persuade Dionysius to marry the daughter of Evagoras, in order to create an Athenian-Syracusan-Cypriot alliance. 1058 While this attempt of Athens did not come to fruition (although it seems that the Athenians did persuade Dionysius not to send ships he had prepared for the Spartans 1059 ), the sending of Eunomus did signal a new diplomatic advantage for Dionysius, in that Athens was now attempting to shed its old enmities with Syracuse and to cooperate with the tyrant by sending envoys to Syracuse. At the same time as this diplomacy attempt, the decree of Cinesias was voted upon in 394/3. 1060 This inscription, of which only the first part remains, begins with the normal formulae of Athenian inscriptions of the ekld§sja and then records that the Athenians wished to praise ( J7rawe<Ta') several Syracusans, including Dionysius I, 1058 For discussion of the importance of this possible alliance, see Anello 1996:385-90 and 407-8. 1059 L 19 20 ( ' ' A ' ' ' ,,, ' •' ' ' A ' ' ) ys. . leaL E'lrELaav L.J..Wvvawv fL1J 7rEfL 'f aL TP1-'TJPEl8 a') TOTE 7rapEUICEvauwro aK£oai..f.LOVWl8 . 1060 The fragmentary inscription is JGII 2 18. 323 his brothers Leptines and Thearidas, and his brother-in-law Polyxenus. 1061 Were Dionysius and his family being praised for some completed action that they provided for the Athenians? Such an action has not been recorded in the historical record, as the sphere of relations of Dionysius and his family (especially with Polyxenus) at this time was focused in Sicily and in the Peloponnese. It may have been that the Athenians were merely using such a decree to approach the tyrant under the pretense of fi}ja between the two cities, so that they could form an alliance with the Syracusans. The relief of the inscription verifies this, as the personifications of Athens and of Syracuse are shown in a scene of dexj6sjs, with the ritual handclasp showing a reciprocal relationship. 1062 Secondly, as mentioned in the first chapter, the use of the term apx[ 0 Jv'f[ a] in line 7 (which also appears in the two later inscriptions of the Athenians for Dionysius I) is an interesting choice. The Athenians were obviously not going to refer to Dionysius as tyrannos, as the term already had gained a negative connotation. Using this term, which had also been used in the first line to refer to the Athenian official (J7r' Euf3o~>.ioo apxov'TO<;), was another way to show mutual respect and a type of equality between Dionysius and Athens, even though the forms of governance between the one-year rule of an archon and the lifetime rule of Dionysius I were vastly different. It also may be the case that, as in other cases of 1061 JGII 2 18, lines 6-10 (hraw.!uaT LlT[o]v[vuwv 'TO I v :STK]Eicia<; &px[o]v'T[a] mlAerr'TiVrJV 'To[v aOEic I ¢o]v 'TOV Llwv[v]u[io m]l 8mpi0rw 'To[v aOEic</>o I v] 'TOV Llwvvu[io ml IToicv]fEvov 'T[ov Kr]OEU'T~ I [v 'TOV Llwvvuio ]). 1062 For the description of the relief and its significanoe with the decree, see Low 2007: 45-48. She also argues that, while the inscription does establish phjfja between the two cities, the relationship may not have been one of complete equality between them. 324 tyrants across the Mediterranean, 'archon' was the preferred title for tyrants. 1063 Regardless of the results of this inscription, such a new 'alliance' between Athens was due to the influence of envoys, such as Eunomus, between the two cities, an alliance that would last for approximately five years. The close relations between Athens and Syracuse would quickly fall apart during the 380s and 370s, as Syracuse would again help Sparta and to strengthen its power in Sicily and southern Italy. Near the end of Dionysius I's reign, however, the tyrant again turned his focus toward mainland Greece and gained the trust of Athens again. Although he aided Sparta twice in 373 and in 369/8, he also took part in panhellenic projects with other Greek cities. 1064 Unlike his earlier failure to impress at the Olympic Games of 388, his attempts were more successful this time. 1065 After the defeat of Sparta at the Battle of Leuctra in 371, Dionysius originally tied himself to the anti-Boeotian party (of which Athens also was a member), sending soldiers against Thebes in 368. 1066 It seems that he took some part in a General Peace between the Greeks at this time, sending delegates to a conference in Delphi. 1067 1063 See Vanotti 2003: 4 7-51 for discussion of the term archon. As this source notes, Leucon and Persiades of Panticapaeum, also considered tyrants in Strabo 7.4.4, were also called by this title. See CJRB6a, 9, 18, 75,113,825,974, 1036,1043, and 1046. 1064 Foranoverviewofthevariousprojects,see Cole 1981:217-19 and Osborne 1982:57-59. See also Chapter 2, pages 129-30 and Chapter 4, page 290. 1065 For his panhellenic aspirations in the face of his status as tyrant, see Lewis 2009: 62-63. For the actions of Dionysius contributing to his view as the savior of Greece, see Giuliani 1994: 163-65. 1066 Xen. Hell. 7.1.28. 1067 For the participation in the conferenoe with the troops of Dionysius, see Xen. Hell. 7.1.27. Diodorus, however, does not mention a conference in regards to the approach of Philiscus to the Greeks. See Diad. Sic. 15.70.2. 325 Thus, an Athenian inscription mentions Dionysius I and his sons in regards to the keeping of the King's Peace. 1068 In addition, after the destruction of the Temple of Apollo at Delphi, Dionysius sent envoys to Athens and funds in order to finance the reconstruction of the temple. 1069 Such a positive relationship with panhellenic sanctuaries was consciously fostered by Dionysius, especially since he had previously gifted the temples of Delphi and Olympia with statues. 1070 With the sending of these envoys back and forth between Syracuse, Athens, and Delphi, Dionysius was able to strengthen his reputation with the mainland Greeks and to ensure mutual aid he might need in Sicily. Through his collaboration through these envoys (although he physically was not present), he also showed himself more ready to collaborate with the mainland Greeks on the rebuilding of their cities and their political power, rather than to focus on conquest and destruction (as he normally was portrayed). 1068 For the inscription of the peace, see Tad 2.133. For discussion of Dionysius I's role in the peace, see Ryder 1965: 134 and Jehne 1994: 43 discuss how much of a role that Dionysius had in the peace (especially he certainly had relations with many of the signers). Meloni 1949: 202-3 notes that Dionysius I is not mentioned in the peace between the Athenians and Persia in 386. 1069 For the rebuilding of the temple, see Tad 1.14, 2.133, and 2.14, along with FD3.5.1-13 and Xen. Hell. 6.4.2. Jehne 1994: 80 questions the degree of intervention by Dionysius in the rebuilding of the temple, although such an action certainly would have increased his standing among the Greeks. 1070 Diod. Sic. 16.57.2-3 (~~:aL b.wvvu!ov TaLi "i.vpaKou-Lwv Ovvdu-Tov 7rEfL']ravroc; Elc; 'O"'A,vfL7rLav KaL llEt.,cpoV') drydt.pnTa E/(, xpvuoV ICaL Et.,EcpavTO') 0E(J1]fLWVP11JfLEva). Dionysius apparently wrote an angry letter to the Athenians, after the statues had been stolen by Iphicrates, and aocused them of impiety and greed. Sartori 1966: 34-36 discusses this passage, noting that Diodorus refers to Dionysius I in this passage as the 'dynast of the Syracusans', suggesting the role of the tyrant in this instance as a diplomat (whereas 'tyrant' was used in military matters). 326 With these overtures to Athens, Athens drew closer to the tyrant, producing two more decrees at the very end of Dionysius's reign. 1071 This alliance is shown best in the later inscription, dating to 368/7. 1072 After the formulaic opening of the inscription, Dionysius is described in lines 9 and l 0 as being good ( acya8oc;) in regards to all he has done for Athens and her allies ([,-Joe; <TVfLfLaxovc;). In the following lines, a permanent alliance ([J]c; ['T]ov de' xp6vov) is created between the Athenians and Dionysius and his progeny (,-aile; JK:cy6vovc;), whereby each party offers to provide aid on land or on sea and promises not to bear arms against the other party. The oaths were first sworn between the Athenians and the envoys sent from Dionysius in Athens ( [ 'fDvc; 7rpe<Tj3 I e'' 'TOV J c; 7rapa L\.wvv<Ti[ ov i/Kovmc;]) 1073 and then sworn in front of the Syracusans by envoys sent from Athens ('foe; 7rpe<T/3[ e'' 'foe; 7rEfLcp8ev,-ac; Jc; ~'Ketc~av). Thus, this decree detailed a rare defensive alliance of non- aggression between Athens and Syracuse, which ensured that the two cities would not interfere negatively with each other militarily and that they would serve as allies in future campaigns. 1074 The decree also is interesting for the appearance of the boule of the Syracusans, although its appearance either may have merely paralleled the use of the boule of the Athenians or may have been an attempt by the Athenians . h h . d . 1" h 1075 agam to s ow t e tyrant m a more emocratlC 1g t. 1071 For an overview of the decrees and their relation to the panhellenic actions of Dionysius, see Osborne 1981:46-48 and 1982:57-59. 1072 JGII 2 105 (~Tad 2.136). 1073 Although the first instance of 7rpcu(3e" in lines 31-32 is not extant in the text, it can securely be added from the parallel appearance of 7rpcu(3[ e"] in line 3 9. 1074 For the importanoe of defensive pacts, see Alonso Troncoso 1996: 226. 1075 For example, the term archon has again been securely suggested by the editor of the 327 More important, however, is the new appearance of the ambassadors in this inscription. Unfortunately, this inscription does not give us a great deal of information about the ambassadors. Multiple presbejs were mentioned, but the exact number was not provided in the inscriptions. There was no set procedure on the number of envoys sent by a city, although the standard formula included the increase of envoys (who often appeared in groups of three, five, or ten) for more important political decisions. Larger numbers could create problems, as the envoys were not necessarily of the same political opinion or diplomatic ability, as shown especially with the appearance of the maladroit flatterer, Democles, in a Syracusan embassy to Athens that resulted in disaster. 1076 For example, only two Athenian ambassadors S . . II . 393 k . h D. . I 1077 Th were sent to yracuse ongma y m to spea w1t wnysms . e route taken by the envoys included in the inscription is not known, although the reference to the boule of both the Athenians and the Syracusans confirms that envoys would travel both ways. 1078 Private requests to the state (which would have been made inscription in line 8, due to the phrase TCJV :SLKEicia['] being preserved before the lacuna. For the possible participation of the Syracusan haul§ in the prooess, see Hagemajer Allen 2003: 222, who argues that the appearance of the Council of the Syracusans extended the responsibility for upholding the agreement beyond the tyrant. For the various groups who were expected to sign treaties, see Mosley 1961: 62, who also points out that many of these other groups listed in the inscription often only can be conjectured due to the lacunae in the inscription. 1076 The embassy with Democles is recounted in Ath. 6.250a-b. For the non-homogenized nature of the embassy, see Mosley 1965:263-64. 1077 The two envoys were Eunomus and Conan, as noted in Lys. 19.19. Thuc. 4.118.6 notes that the number of envoys often changed. For discussion and lists of the numbers of envoys sent by various Greek cities, see Mosley 1965: 255-60. 1078 In addition to the reference of Dionysius as the TDv "i.ucE"'J\,[a'; tipxovra, the editors of JGII 2 105 also restore in lines 39-40 that the envoys were to be sent [ €, :SLKEici]av, rather than to Syracuse. The reference obviously shows that the Athenians believed the territory of Syracuse to extend beyond Syracuse. Caven 1990: 209-11 argues that the Syracusans likely would not 328 through an Athenian citizen) or those made through official emissaries (as was the case with the Dionysii) would have gone to the Council and the Assembly for 'f' . 1079 0 h . d . h . h h . ul f rat1 1catwn. nee t e envoys arnve at e1t er c1ty, owever, t e part1c ars o their visit are not known. When the envoys arrived, they would have needed to be identified properly as such, although there was no set identification for ambassadors. 1080 The ambassadors likely would have been housed with important members of the city, likely the proxenos, if one had been designated. 1081 Furthermore, it is not certain how long the ambassadors needed to stay at their respective cities. Decisions sometimes had to be sent to other bodies to be ratified before becoming a decree, as when the negotiations between Athens and Dionysius I were sent to the Council of Allies to receive their support. 1082 These allies often played a role in these inscriptions and demonstrate that these inscriptions and the alliance they created held a larger importance than merely between the two cities. 1083 The certain fact is that these ambassadors were representatives of both sides and participated in a process that brought mutual support to Syracuse and Athens have ratified the decree on their side, since Dionysius I would die soon after the decree. 1079 For the process of those who wished to make requests through emissaries in Athens, see Zelnick 1998:557-62. 1080 See Mosley 1973: 78-79 for discussion of identification for envoys. Aen. Tact. 10.8 suggested the idea of a type of passport for anyone exiting or leaving a city. Mosley suggests that diplomacy through tyrants was performed by means of tokens. 1081 See also Mosley 1973: 78-79 for discussion of housing. Xen. Vect. 3 discusses these procedures. 1082 See Mosley 1973: 68-71 or further discussion on the timetable of relations. He notes that other men likely had the power of ratification, in order to not slow down the process (see JGII 2 105). 1083 For discussion of the allies in Athenian inscriptions, see Pistorius 1985: 24-25. 329 through their communication. Although Dionysius himself did not travel to Athens at this time (and actually may have died before the decree was ratified by both sides)/ 084 such an inscription shows that Dionysius was not isolated and was able to maintain a balance of power between himself and Athens, further vouchsafing his own rule. The third decree, another decree from the Athenians honoring Dionysius and his sons, dates one year earlier than the above decree (i.e. 369/8). 1085 Why would the Athenians wish to honor the tyrant and his family at this time? It seems that several possible examples of communication between the Athenians and Syracusans during this time provided the opportunity for future collaboration. 1086 A decree, such as JG II 2 105, that requested an alliance made sense, as the Athenians wished to guard against themselves against the powerful tyrant in a time of political upheaval, especially the upheaval that had rocked mainland Greece during the past several years. The reason for the honors likely is found after the standard introduction and the mention of the presence again of envoys from Dionysius ( oL npeo-j3w; o [L 7r I apa J L\.wvv[ cr]io i/Kov'T[ e ]<;). 1087 The inscription then described communication between 1084 See Caven 1990: 209-11 for this argument. 1085 JGII 2 103. 1086 For example, a decree was given to a oertain Alcetas, son of Leptines, in 373j2. Woodhead 1970: 505-6 suggests that this decree would have been a way to honor a Syracusan and, therefore, to foster possible relations with the tyrant, who was aiding the Spartans at Corcyra during that time. In addition, an inscription dating perhaps to 371/0 (IGII 2 1422) describes a gift of catapult bolts perhaps given to Dionysius I by the Athenians. Cole 1981: 216-17 discusses this gift and calls the date into doubt due to poor AthenianfSyracusan relations at that time. Perhaps such a gift, however, was an attempt by the Athenians to reverse poor relations. 1087 JGII 2 103, lines 6-7. 330 regarding two issues: the rebuilding of the temple of Apollo at Delphi ([,-ij<;] by the Athenians, Spartans, and the rest of the Greeks ( ~v J7To~cra[v'TO 'A87!va I zo,]lca' successful intervention of Dionysius through his envoys during the final years of the 370s. The decree included two honors for Dionysius and his sons. Within the extant decrees of Athens, only a small number included honors, a paucity which makes it difficult to fully interpret the system of honors involving either cities or individuals. 1090 Both of the honors given to the tyrant, however, were fairly common in the honorary inscriptions: crowns and citizenship. As regards the former, the inscription noted that the people of Athens voted for a crown to be sent to the tyrant 1088 JGII 2 103, lines 8-10. 1089 JGII 2 103, lines 24-26. The use of i'Jo?Je[ovrnv] in line 23 also strengthens this sentiment. See Jehne 1994: 75-76 for the role of Dionysius in the Peace, as well as the importance of the present tense in the inscription. Buckler 1980:237-39 (as noted in in SEG32.56) affirms the present tense, as Dionysius was still defending the peace at this time. Cawkwell 1980: 50 (as noted in SEG 13.68) also is in favor of the present tense, restoring the present infinitive 87rlca €m;fcpEw (which would also show continuity in the mutual sharing of support). 109 ° Certainly a small percentage of those which existed remain for Athens, although the extant decrees of Athens far outnumber those of other cities. For a discussion of the difficulty with interpreting these grants, see Hagemajer Allen 2003: 202-6. It seems, however, that the Athenians were considered too free in giving honors to foreigners, as described more thoroughly in Mosley 1973: 7-8. 1091 JGII 2 103, lines 26-28. 331 ([e]lc[<h]epov [a]mo x[<tciwv opaXJL I wv]). 1092 The inclusion of descendants in the list of honors was notable for monarchs and tyrants, although they became more common from the early 360s. 1093 The more interesting grant concerns citizenship, as Dionysius, his sons, and the remainder of his descendants were named Athenians and were allocated to a tribe, deme, and phratry (['A877v I aio<; aU'TOv<;] Ka['J JKcy6vov[<; Ka' qmtcfi<; /Ca I' o~p..ov /Ca' cp]pa'Tpia<;). 1094 The grant of citizenship seems to have been giVen m earnest, as the earlier decrees with this particular phrasing included measures r f II . . . h . . b d 1095 Whil f wr u mcorporatwn mto t e c1t1zen o y. e some grants o citizenship were given in the hopes of securing a favor, the mention of Dionysius's help with the rebuilding of the Temple of Apollo and with the Peace suggest that this was bestowed for an actual benefaction. 1096 Of course, the actual usefulness of this grant was quite limited. There is no evidence that Dionysius ever traveled to Athens, and, even if he did, he would not spend enough time there to be incorporated into the citizen body. The only possibility for this grant to have been of use would have been to the descendants of Dionysius I, for whom the possibility existed to move to Athens and to be incorporated into the citizen body. 1097 In fact, the notable inclusion of the 1092 JG II 2 103, lines 29-30. Henry 1983: 23-24 discusses the number of crowns given as honors, also noting that the crown worth 1,000 drachmas was often given to notable foreigners. 1093 JG ] 3 113 notes honors also given to the sons of King Evagoras of Cyprus. See Henry 1983: 66-68 for examples of descendants receiving privileges. 1094 JGII 2 103, lines 31-33. 1095 Henry 1983: 63 notes that the dividing line for such decrees is 229 BC, from which point such grants were rendered much less meaningful. 1096 Osborne 1983: 186-92 notes the differenoe between honors which were bestowed after some good deed had been done and those which were given in order to create good-will. 1097 For the possibility of such grants actually being fulfilled, see Mitchell1997: 39. 332 sons in the decree demonstrates the desire both for Dionysius to continue his dynasty through his progeny through his alliances and for the Athenians to maintain the d I . d . h s 1098 goo re atwns an support w1t yracuse. During the rule of Dionysius II, international relations tended to follow the precedents set during the rule of his father, yet he mostly negelected the concern of his father for mainland Greek cities. For example, Dionysius II had renewed relations with Sparta in 356/5 and tended to seek more peaceful solutions with other city- 1099 D' . II 'nl d'd . h fl' . h h .. states. wnysms certm y 1 not w1s to create con ICt w1t ot er c1t1es beyond Sicily, since he faced much larger internal threats to his rule, such as the largest rival to his power, his uncle and one-time advisor Dian. Rather than Dionysius II, however, Dian was the closest to Sparta. After having been sent into exile by Dionysius in 358, Dian traveled throughout Greece and spent some time at Sparta. Having already served the role of the thearodokos between Syracuse and the festival at Epidaurus/ 100 Dian received further honors under the Spartans, who bestowed upon him a rare grant of Spartan citizenship for an unknown reason. 1101 Sparta apparently did this without too much concern for angering Dionysius II, who 1098 The sons of Dionysius appear in lines 20-21 and 31-32. Lucca 1994 argues for this reasoning concerning the inclusion of the sons. 1099 See Di Fede 1949: 69-72 for discussion of Dionysius II's international relations program, including ending war with the Lucani (although he waged a rather useless war with them for some time, as noted in Diad. Sic. 16.5.2), along with fostering friendship with Tarentum (Ath. 15.700d) and with Neapolis (Ath. 6.250d). 110 ° For the mention of Dian as thearodokos, see JGIV 2 1.95, lines 39-40. 1101 For the grant of citizenship, see Plut. Vlt. Djon 17.4 (AaK£0ai.fL6vwL OE KaL "i.7rapndnJV alnOv E7roliJUavcro) and 49.4 (Kacra 7rOL7]uw ryeyovWr;; "i.7rapTuinJ';). For the rarity of Spartan citizenship, see Arist. Pol. 2.1270a 33-40. 333 still had a treaty with the city. 1102 The relations of Dian with Sparta and other Peloponnesian cities aided him in his return to Syracuse in 355 by assisting in the f . f h P I . . . . 1103 S h procurement o mercenanes, most o w om were e oponnes1an 1n ong1n. uc relations between Dian and Sparta, however, seemed to be problematic and did not remain wholly positive regarding Dian. For example, after Dian took over rule in Syracuse, Sparta continued to take interest in Syracusan politics by sending Gysilus to reconcile Dian and his rival Heracleides. Dian, however, did away with Gysilus and Heracleides (an act which seriously harmed the image of Dian within Syracuse), perhaps because it was now Heracleides who had come into favor with the Spartans. 1104 Thus, after the internal unrest in Syracuse, pre-existing relations created through mobility (first in the case of Dian and then in the case of Gysilus) played a key role in the development of Syracusan politics. Because Dionysius II did not see the value in establishing his own closer relations with the Spartan state, his own rule would suffer, and he would succumb to the campaigns of Dian. Dian also would suffer his own loss of power due to his inability to negotiate properly with these external powers. To conclude, most of the movements of men between Syracuse and Sparta appear to be part of a concerted effort between the two political powers. 1102 For the treaty, see Plut. Vit. Djon 17.4 ('ri}'; b.wvva-Lov lcaTa¢poV1}uavTE'; Opyij';, KaL7rEp ainols nhE 7rpo8VfLW'; E7rL ToVc; 81}(3aLovc; 01Jf.L!.LaXoLwroc;). Marasco 1982: 171-73 argues that the Spartans had little problem angering Dionysius II, sinoe the tyrant had turned his resources toward Italy and away from Sparta. 1103 For the mercenaries of Dian, see also Plut. Vlt. Djon 42.4 and 43.3, along with Diad. Sic. 16.17.3-4. 1104 For the appearanoe of Gysilus and his relationship with Heracleides, see Plut. Vlt. Djon 49.3. See Pl. Ep. 4.321 b (where Heracleides and Sparta were corresponding) and Galvagno 2000: 129-31 for this argument of relations between Heracleides and Sparta. 334 To a degree, although many of these generals were sent out under the aeg1s of Sparta, they worked for their own advancement and according to their own rules once they had arrived in Sicily. 1105 Yet these more formal relations supported by the Spartan state provided important aid, especially for Dionysius I, in order to qual! threats close to home and to increase the tyrant's empire throughout the island. His relations with Athens also placed him at a disadvantage to his rivals. Of course, the Athenian Plato played a large role in the court of Dionysius II, but the official ties of the tyrant to the Athenian government were tenuous at best. Even though he was also given honors in the aforementioned inscriptions, there is no record of him ever visiting Athens. As in the previous section on relations with Sparta, his rival Dian took more advantage of his time spent in exile in Athens. Having traveled to Athens, Dian spent time at the Academy making the acquaintance of intellectuals. Just as he had received honors in Sparta, he also received enktesjs (the right to own land) and a plot of land in the Athenian ·a 1106 H. . h . . A h . r h. . ak countrys1 e. 1s success w1t recrmtmg t emans wr 1s campmgn to ret e Sicily was less successful than his recruiting campaigns in the Peloponnese, likely because the Athenians had just signed a treaty with Dionysius I (with mention of Dionysius II) in 367 and because Athens was not militarily strong enough at this point to risk military hostilities with Syracuse (although they still maintained relations with former allies who were hostile to the Dionysii). 1107 As Plato attempted 1105 Berger 1992: 83-84. 1106 Plut. Vlt. Dian 17.1-2 (rlcypov OE owcywcyi], xripw EKT~CfaTo). 1107 Marasco 1982: 164-66. Culasso Gataldi 2002: 105-8 does note a possible proxeny decree between Athens and Catane (IG Il 2 162) with letter forms dating to this period, which shows 335 to remam neutral in the conflict between Dian and Dionysius II, Athenian involvement was limited to several members of the Academy who played key roles in Dian's campaign, including the nephew of Plato, Speusippus, and his future rival, Callippus. 1108 Nevertheless, as with Sparta, Dian was able to eventually depose Dionysius II due to his ability to parlay his relations with Greeks of the mainland far better than the tyrant. B. The Dionysii, Magna Graecia and marriage Other Greek cities in the south of Italy also played a role in the program of international relations created by the tyrants, the most important of which was Locri Epizephyrii. Because Locri had fostered earlier relations with Syracuse during the Athenian Expedition, the city was a major target of Dionysius as he expanded to the Italian peninsula, beginning in 392. Perhaps the most important use of envoys was in seeking the hand of a wife for Dionysius I. 1109 First, we must briefly detour, in order to position this marriage in the context of tyrannical marriages across the Mediterranean, since another group of individuals (e.g. his wives and children) would come to act as quasi-envoys for the tyrant in his search to improve international relations. In the first chapter, we studied how his closest relations, often with those of foreign extraction, reflected and encouraged his own status as migrant. In what ways did the tyrant foster processes of mobility through these groups, in order to parlay his own power abroad? With the analysis of tyrannical marriages, we also will that Athens was still in contact with former allies on the island. 1108 Other members of the Academy, such as Xenophanes, were well-liked by the tyrant. For the politics of the Academy as regards Dian and Dionysius II, see Galvagno 2000: 131-36. See also Chapter 4, pages 275-77. 1109 For discussion, see especially De Franciscis 1961 and Van Compernolle 1987. 336 discover the preference of the foreign to the Syracusan, as the tyrant encouraged both the presence of non-Syracusans and the process of migration among his closest relations (including his wives). Within the standard image of the tyrant, several common tropes in Greek literature concerned their marriages. For example, the tyrant altered the citizen composition through forced marriages, through which citizen males were debased and women were forced to marry slaves or other foreigners. 1110 Dionysius I apparently participated in forced marriages, by marrying off the daughters and wives of citizens to newly-introduced slaves (although the rareness of this image in regards to Dionysius I suggests that this is only part of a negative image created by bias, rather than actual historical fact). 1111 Tyrants also were portrayed in literature as the object of foreign marriages. For example, their life external to the network of citizens and to the pojjs stemmed from their status as the product of a non-standard marriage. 1112 For example, Cypselus famously was born from a mother who was cast out of her family and forced to marry a non-man outside of her community, a rupture in social tradition that would create disruptive tyranny itself. 1113 Although Dionysius would experiment 111 ° For modern discussion, see Schmitt-Pantel1979: 227-29 and Asheri 1977: 38. 1111 Such an episode is only found in Aen. Tact. 40.2-3, where Aeneas notes that Dionysius did this to a oonquered city but does not provide the name. Whitehead 1990: 204-5 and Bettalli 1990: 335-36 discuss this passage, noting that, while such events are often part of a stock image of tyrants, the specific reference to Dionysius suggests that he did participate in such processes of forced marriage. 1112 Vernant 1982: 33-34. 1113 For the story of Cypselus, see Hdt 5.92. Gernet 1968: 349-50 argues that the breaking of endogamy by sending Labda to a foreign man resulted in the introduction of the tyranny of Cypselus. For the effect of his relationship with his mother for his eventual 'acoeptance' among the Corinthians, see Drews 1972: 133-34. 337 with the system of endogamy in his own family (thereby keeping power within), 1114 the birth of Dionysius II later would result from this standard formula of outside marriage, after the marriage of Dionysius I to the Locrian Doris. Why, however, did the tyrant participate in the practice of marriage with non-citizens? Spurning his own citizen body to find a wife elsewhere would seem, at first glance, to threaten his standing in the city and to cause discontent. His reasons for creating marriage alliances with other cities revolved around his desire to increase his status and political position abroad, since such marriages were contracted after the tyrant had begun to increase his empire beyond the pojjs. Ideologically, tyrants may have wished to recall legendary heroes by taking various wives of foreign extraction as an example of a more international status. 1115 Indeed, certain tyrants were proud of their foreign origins, which could help them to explain their pedigree to rule over their fellow countrymen (although, as seen in the previous chapters, the tyrants of Syracuse often fought against this foreign identity at the beginning of their rule). 1116 Marriage connections historically provided economic and political support from abroad to leaders who had no recourse to laws or support in their own cities. 1117 Because the tyrant had shattered ties with his own citizens by usurping power, it was not expedient for him to seek marriages within his own community. Dionysius I, for 1114 Gernet 1968: 348-49 discusses the marriages between uncles and nieces in the family of Dionysius I. 1115 McG!ew 1993: 175-76 makes this argument. 1116 Hall 2010: 26-27 argues that foreign origins provided an excuse for the rule of tyrants over their countrymen, noting the proclamation by Peisistratus of his Messenian heritage (Hdt. 5.65.3) and by Cypselus of his Lapith father (Hdt. 5.92.2). 1117 Sanchez de Ia Torre 1999: 154-55. 338 example, only married the daughter of the leading Syracusan, Hermocrates, at the beginning of his rule to cement power. Although he would bigamously enter into marriage with another Syracusan after the death of his first wife, he simultaneously married a Locrian, in order to gain international connections necessary both to maintain the peace at home and to spread his hegemony. As Simonides noted in the Hjero, the tyrant often would have been forced to marry beneath him in his own community, unless he married a foreign woman who hailed from an equally powerful family. 1118 Thus, even when democratic and other non-tyrannical regimes avoided aristocratic connections between different poJejs, by preferring to marry within their own city, the tyrants of Syracuse fought against this trend by continuing to foster . . I . h h I . 1119 S h . anstocrat1c-type re atwns t roug upper-c ass marnages. uc marnages between powerful families did not mean, however, that the tyrants themselves were I . D' . I 'b il h . d 1120 d h . d e 1tes. wnys1us was a mere sen e unt e ga1ne power, an e continue to fight against the elites of various cities, especially at the beginning of his rule. 1121 Agathocles also came from a poor background as the son of a potter and fought against the Syracusan elites during the first half of his rule. While they themselves did not become members of the elite within Syracuse, their marriages were firmly in 1118 X u· 1 28 ( - ' ' '' ' t' ' ' ' ' ' -) S d' 2004 en. _uler. . TqJ Towvv Tvpavvcp, av fL1J sEV1JV 11JfLTh avaryK,1] EIC fLEWvwv ryafLEW . or 1 : 73-7 4 mentions this passage in light of the life of Dionysius I. 1119 For this growth of aristocratic oonnections in the fourth oentury, see Trundle 2006: 72-7 4. 112 ° For Dionysius's lowly position in Syracuse, see Diad. Sic. 13.96.4 (where he is called a scribe and private citizen) and 14.66.5 (where he is called a public clerk), Dem. Lept. 161, and Polyaenus, Strat. 5.2.2. See also Chapter 2, pages 112 and 123. 1121 For his treatment of the elites of Gela, where Dionysius put them to death, in order to gain the trust of the populace, see Diad. Sic. 13.93.1-2. Collin-Bouffier 2010: 299-303 discusses the relationship between Dionysius I and the elites more fully. 339 the realm of the aristocracy, especially regarding the status of their wives. Although the wives of Dionysius and Agathocles were Syracusan, both were described with terms that most often described members of the elite. 1122 Their later wives, as daughters of the leading families of Locri and of the Ptolemies, also fit into this schema. Creating these horizontal links through marriage (i.e. with members of the same ruling status) would allow the tyrants to maintain their vertical relationships (i.e. with hegemony) over the other poJejsof their empire. As with intellectual and diplomatic movement, these horizontal relationships with the leadership of other Greek poJejs spanned great geographical distances, although long-distance relations through marriage were not limited to the fourth- century tyrants of Syracuse. 1123 Within earlier Sicilian politics, Anaxilaus (the tyrant of Rhegium) and Terillos (the tyrant of Himera) were tied through the marriage of Cydippe, the daughter of the Himeran ruler, to the Rhegian tyrant. 1124 Furthermore, the tyrants of Acragas and Syracuse in the early fifth century were connected between complicated networks of marriages. Gelon and (later) his brother Polyzelus would marry the daughter of Theron, Hieron would marry the niece of Theron, and Theron would later marry the daughter of Polyzelos. Such intra-Sicilian ties and ties between Sicily and Magna Graecia would serve to provide a measure of 1122 For example, the wife of Dionysius I, Aristomache, was referred to as €7rUI1JfLOT&/r1} in Diod. Sic. 14.44.8. The first wife of Agathocles was the widow of Damas, who was described as [voofo' in Diad. Sic. 19.3.1. Both of these adjectives were in the repertoire of words for the elite, as argued by Collin-Bouffier 2010: 293-97. 1123 See Davies 2002: 5-8 for further discussion of these links. 1124 For this union and its effects on the participation of Gelon in the campaigns of the Greeks, see Hdt. 7.165. 340 reciprocity and mutual support that would allow for these tyrannies to surviVe, at least for a short time. 1125 In Athens, Peisistratus gained political and military support by marrying Timonassa the Argive. 1126 The text notes the benefits of this alliance: a friendship with Argos that provided military aid for Peisistratus, as with the provision of 1,000 soldiers by Argos for the battle of Pallenis. 1127 In this sense, women (and the institution of marriage) acted as the transmitter of power between one city and another, since political and military connections between her former pojjs and the pojjs of her husband were due to her role as an intermediary. 1128 Her movement to and habitation in the city of her new husband were the guarantee of these relations. The marriages of Dionysius I were established in line with these traditions. Often, such marriages have been considered useful for legitimacy, so that the tyrant could claim the powerful past and ideological capital for his rule. Such precedents connected Dionysius to earlier tyrants (e.g. Peisistratus), as he performed similar 1125 For these marriages, see the scholium at the beginning of Find. OJ. 2. For discussion of the relations between these men, see Diad. Sic. 11.48. See Gernet 1968:350-52 for this argument, especially for the example between Syracuse and Acragas. Links would also stretch between Syracuse and Carthage, although this instanoe did not technically include tyrants. Mago, the father of Hamil car, had married a Syracusan woman. See Hdt. 7.166 (J1.rJTp6eEv o€ "2.vprJK6uwv), Whittaker 1978: 77-78, and Chapter 6, page 367. 1126 See Ath. Pol. 17.3-4 (hccyr]fLEV cyap IIELUWTPOTO' €f "'Apcyov' avopo' 'ApcyEiov evcyaTcpa) for the entire story and Gernet 1968: 346-4 7 for discussion and the argument that the marriage (which is also described in Hdt. 1.61) carried greater importance than a marriage between Athenians. One son from this marriage would demonstrate his allegianoe to Argos by acting as commander of the Argive Thousand (Thuc. 5.67 and 5.81). Rosivach 1988:47-51 discusses the government of Peisistratus in light of his foreign marriage alliances. 1127 Ath R ' 17 4 c"e ' , ' ' 'A ' • ' ..+.,, , , ,, , • , , OJ, . 0 EV ICaL 1] npo'; TOV') pr'fEWV') EVEU'T1] 'f'LI'vW, ICaL OVVEfLaXEUaV'ro XLI'vWL 'T1]V E'lrL IIaiclcr]v£0, tMXrJv). 1128 For the use of women in transmission of power, see Catenacci 1996: 160-65. 341 actions during his rule, such as the marrymg of foreign wives, the setting up of colonies, and the creation of a bodyguard. 1129 While an ideological element certainly existed in the marriages of Dionysius, the timing of his marriages and his choice of wives further showed his concern for contemporary politics and for his newly- founded empire. Turning briefly to his first marriage, upon taking power, Dionysius participated in political wife exchange, by marrying the daughter of the Syracusan Hermocrates and giving his sister in marriage to Polyxenus, the brother-in-law of Hermocrates. Diodorus notes that Dionysius did this from a desire to create a connection with a distinguished family, in order to cement his power within the city. 1130 Not only would this move increase his legitimacy in the eyes of the Syracusans, over whom Hermocrates also had ruled, but the marriages would give him new allies to help establish his rule in Syracuse and to increase his hegemony. For example, his marriage connection with Polyxenus was especially useful to Dionysius later in his rule, when Polyxenus would act as envoy to raise support among Greeks across the Mediterranean and to lead his fleet. 1131 Interestingly, Diodorus stresses that Dionysius set this series of marriages in motion immediately (eu8ew<;) after taking over. Thus, Dionysius understood that tying himself to a 1129 For example, see Lewis 2000: 102-3. 1130 D. d s· 13 96 3 c - " ' " (3 '' " • ' • • ' ' (3' e lO . lC. . . TOVTO 0 enpasE QV{\,OfLEVO'; OUCt..aV E7rlli1]fLOV El8 OUCEW'T1}Ta npOU!'va EU aL ''' ,, - (3(3') npor;; TO T1JV Tvpavvwa 7rOl/T]UaL a awv . 1131 When the rule of Dionysius was threatened by the Carthaginians in 396 (as recounted by Diad. Sic. 14.62-63), Polyxenus was sent to Italy, Corinth, and Sparta to recruit mercenaries, returning with soldiers and thirty warships (d7r€UTEL/\,E npEa-{3EvT7JV ... ITo!-vVgEVov TDv K,1]0Errr1}v). Xen. Hell. 5.1.26 states that Polyxenus led a fleet of twenty ships sent by Dionysius in 387 to aid Sparta. He was not as useful at the start of Dionysius's reign, when he advised the tyrant to flee Syracuse while under threat and to seek shelter with the Campanians (Diad. Sic. 14.8.5). See Pere-Nogues 2009: 113-14. 342 leading family of the Syracusans would help him to maintain power. Therefore, only after these marriages did he feel comfortable with putting his popular influential opponents to death. 1132 Concerning his relations with Magna Graecia, with problems at home and with the threat of Carthage looming, Dionysius soon felt the need to cement relations with another city, in order not to be completely isolated. The first place chosen by Dionysius for this alliance was Rhegium, with its strategic location directly on the Strait of Messina. Having dispatched ambassadors, he asked the Rhegians to form a marriage alliance by giving him one of their leading women. While the relations between tyrants and foreign women became part of a trope in literature, 1133 such marriages between cities were not simply a way for tyrants to display their propensity for choosing the foreign but also to increase their power from real political and military benefits. The reasons for this are two-fold, based both in his domestic and international policy. Concerning domestic policy, he needed to marry again in order to have an heir, as his first wife (the daughter of Hermocrates) had died at the time of an earlier Syracusan revolt, although sources differ on her fate. 1134 Thus, Dionysius apparently believed that the loyalty of his offspring would be the strongest protection of his tyranny. 1135 The provision of offspring was so vital 1132 The death of Daphnaeus and Demarchus is also noted in Diad. Sic. 13.96.3. 1133 For the trope of the tyrant and the foreign woman, see Catenacci 1996: 121-26. 1134 Diad. Sic. 13.112.4, Diad. Sic. 14.44.5 and Plut. Vlt. Djon 3.1-2 contain different reasons for her fate and whether Dionysius actually was responsible for her death. Diodorus merely states that she died at the time of the cavalry revolt after being mistreated by them, while Plutarch states that she committed suicide after this abuse. 1135 At least so says Diodorus in 14.44.5 (Ow!.,af.Lf3dvwv Tfj TWv ryEVv1}8Evrwv dJVolt;t {3E{3alinacra T1Jp1}uEw T1JV OvvauTELav). For the dynasty of Dionysius, see also Isoc. 6.45 and Diod. Sic. 343 to him that he had his future mother-in-law put to death for apparently conspiring to make one of his wives barren. 1136 As Dionysius was slowly gaining control of the eastern half of the island during this time, control of the straits would allow him easy access to economic and military resources through the straits and down to Syracuse, h b II . h" h ]" . h" . 1137 t ere y a owmg 1m to procure t e necessary supp 1es to mcrease 1s empue. International policy also dictated his choice of a Rhegian wife, as he feared that the Rhegian and Messenians across the strait would join forces with the Carthaginians against him. 1138 Rhegium had already been hostile to Dionysius beginning in 399, when exiles from Aetna fled to Rhegium. 1139 They also had helped to relocate the refugees of Naxos and Catane in Mylae/ 140 and their own government was a d h . . . . . h f D. . 1141 Th r emocracy at t 1s t1me, m oppos1t10n to t e tyranny o wnysms. e way wr Dionysius to refute these former negative events was to create a defensive alliance through a traditional form of mobility, namely to bring a Rhegian wife to Syracuse and to thereby prevent future hostility from the city. 20.78.3, where Diodorus mentions the territory of Dionysius at his death as the greatest of Europe (j.LeyluT1JV TOw Kwra T1}v EVpW7r1JV OvvaOTELav). For modern discussion, see Sordi 1989: 70-73. 1136 For the death of his Locrian mother-in-law, see Plut. Vlt. Djon 3.3. 1137 For the narrative, see Diod. Sic. 14.44.3-5 (7rapa1Ca/-..,Ow hn.ryaplav 7roi.Jwaa-8at.). 1138 Diad. Sic. 14.44.3. 1139 For the fleeing of exiles to Rhegium, see Diad. Sic. 14.87.1. A history between Rhegium and Dionysius is provided by Raccuia 1981: 17-20 and 30-31. 1140 Diad. Sic. 14.40.1 notes that the Rhegians were their kinsmen. 1141 For the presence of a Rhegian democracy, see Diad. Sic. 14.40 and 14.44. 344 Although the city had concluded a peace with Dionysius, 1142 it appears that the assembly of the Rhegians voted at this time to refuse his request for a wife, a rejection which forced him to move on to Locri Epizephyrii. The actual 'affront' to Dionysius was described in two different fashions within the fourteenth book of Diodorus. The earlier description did not depict the refusal of the Rhegians as an affront, as the Rhegians voted not to accept Dionysius's proposal with much difficulty after much deliberation. 1143 A later passage of Diodorus, perhaps deriving from a different source and describing the later actions of the tyrant against Rhegium/ 144 added a more salacious detail: the offer by the Rhegians to Dionysius only of the daughter of the public executioner. 1145 Unfortunately for Dionysius, over the next decade, Rhegium would continue to provide political problems, led especially by the former phjJos of Dionysius and exile, Heloris. 1146 In 394 and 393, Rhegium would fight against Dionysius at Messana and would have some degree of success. 1147 The reply to this Rhegian affront by Dionysius appeared ten years after his original marriage rejection, when in 398, Dionysius would attack Rhegium in 388, using the scorn by the Rhegians as an impetus for his siege of the city. By 388, the empire of Dionysius had continued to grow stronger in the Italian arena and was ready to go on 1142 Diad. Sic. 14.40.4-5. 1143 Diad. Sic. 14.44.5 (7rolclcwv prJecvTwv !c6cywv). 1144 Sordi 1978: 1-3 argues that the more straightforward passage derives from Ephorus, while the later passage derives from Timaeus. 1145 D. d s· 14 107 3 c · ' · - - - ' - ' ' e ' ) lO . lC. . . W') fLOV1]V avnp OV'fXWP1JUaL ryafLEW 'T1]V TOV U1]fLWV vryaTEpa . 1146 In Diad. Sic. 14.8.5, Heloris makes the famous oomment 'Tyranny is a lovely death shroud' when Dionysius was fearing for his life during the revolt of the Syracusans in 404. 1147 For the Rhegians at Messana under the leadership of Heloris, see Diad. Sic. 14.87 and 14.90. 345 the offensive. As a result of its marnage rejection (and their political obstinacy), Dionysius would place the city under siege and would either slaughter or exile their remaining citizens into slavery. 1148 After the defeat of Rhegium, Diodorus discusses the barbaric treatment and unlawful punishments (JKv6cwu; ... HfLwpiau;) of Phyton, the Rhegian commander, by Dionysius. 1149 While passages such as these do not focus on the international policies of Dionysius, this failed attempt at marriage and its aftermath places the behavior of the tyrant in its usual tapas of barbarity. In regards to his political policies, however, if Dionysius I could not receive support from the Rhegians through marriage, he ensured that they would no longer be a threat through his military actions. Although he was not strong enough to concern himself with the conquest of Rhegium early in his reign, the political advantages he would gain through his subsequent alliances in Magna Graecia through Locri ensured that his revenge upon the Rhegians and the control of their territory eventually would be successful. After his first rejection by Rhegium, Dionysius then turned to Locri Epizephyrii to find a wife with whom he both could produce heirs and could extend his international reach (Plut. Vjt. Djan 3.2). 1150 1148 Diad. Sic. 14.111 describes the siege and notes that the Rhegians were sent off to Syracuse. Whoever oould afford the ransom was freed, while those who could not were sold into slavery. Arist. Oec. 2.1349b, however, notes that Dionysius merely took the ransom money and sold all of the inhabitants of the town into slavery anyway. 1149 Diad. Sic. 14.112 states that Phyton was flogged, tortured, led throughout the city, and eventually drowned (one day after his son suffered the same fate). Lewis 2000: 103-4 discusses this passage and argues that this event was likely a historical event and not legend stemming from the barbarity of the tyrant. 115 ° For the marriage, see also Diad. Sic. 14.44.6-45.1, Ael. VH13.10, and Cic. Tusc. 5.59. 346 \ A I I f:: r! " ' I ' \ \ /l ' 'e Ka~ i..l.WVVCYU{J CYVVapsaV'TO') O'TE 7rptJYTOV aV'TOKpa'TWp E'lr~ 'TOV 'lrOI'vEfLOV vpe TJ I l I \:' r I \ ' ,.+, I ' I e " \ \: \ wrpar-rryoc;, "ecyer-a' o 'T/fLEP'f fLEV afL't'or-epac; acyacye(J" a' fL''f 1<:a' fL'T/OEV' , e ,!, , , e , , , , '•e , "', ,, , ryeveu a~ -yavepo<:; av puJ'lrwv 07rO'Tepq npo'Tepq crvve,~, o~, 'TOV oe a,,,~,,ov xp6vov fcrov vEfLWV Eav'TOv Cna'Tefve'iv f.Kan!.pq, Kowf; fLEV el8UYfLEvwv \: " ' ' " \ I \:\ ' I I oeurrvew fLE'T aV'Tov, 7rapa VV!cra oe ev f-LEpe~ uvvava7raVOfLEVWV. Then Dionysius, after resummg power and making himself strong aga1n, married two wives at once, one from Locri, whose name was Doris, the other a native of the city, Aristomache, daughter of Hipparinus, who was a leading man m Syracuse, and had been a colleague of Dionysius when he was first chosen general with full powers for the war. It is said that he married both wives on one day, and that no man ever knew with which of the two he first consorted, but that ever after he continued to devote himself alike to each. It was their custom to dine with him together, and they shared his bed at night by turns. The Locrians voted to accept the proposal of Dionysius, and Dionysius sought the hand of Doris, the daughter of Xenetus, who was their most esteemed citizen. At the same time, he sought Aristomache as wife from the Syracusans, the daughter of a well-known colleague of Dionysius. While this bigamous half-foreign marriage was discussed in the previous chapter in regard to the foreign birth of Dionysius the Younger, analysis of these marriages of Dionysius leads to discussion of external links and the new international atmosphere created around the tyrant. The bigamous marriage of the tyrant was not particularly astonishing in and of itself, since the 34 7 acceptance of bigamy by the Greeks is unknown (neither Attic nor Doric sources discuss the legality of such marriages in depth). Several passages of Greek literature suggested that the Greeks believed monogamy to be ethical, although others discussed second marriages to ensure the production of heirs (as was the apparent reasoning behind the decision of Dionysius). 1151 Dual marriage thus was a way for Dionysius to act within murky social boundaries while maximizing his ability to create heirs and to extend his political power through marriage. The more relevant issue here is the foreignness of the Locrian wife, 1.e. the marnage of Dionysius to a non-Syracusan. As seen above, other tyrants, such as Peisistratus, had participated in foreign marriages, and Aristotle later placed this action of Dionysius firmly within the realm of tyranny, by noting that a marriage between Dionysius and the foreign Doris would not have occurred in a democracy or I bl . h d . 1152 C . h . f D. . a proper y esta 1s e anstocracy. oncernmg t e marnage o wnysms as described by Plutarch, the author was at pains to note that the status of the women within the marriage was completely equal. The simultaneous timing of the ceremony ( i;fLEpq fLEv dfL¢onfpac; dryaryc!.aBa~ fL~if), his devotion to each ( 'TOv OE &A.,il.,ov xp6vov fcrov VEfLWV eav'rov owHt..eZv eKadp!f), and his habit of dining with the women together and sleeping with them on alternate nights (Kowfl fLEV el8wvevwv 8e,7rveZv fLE'r' ainov, 7rapa VV/C'Ca oe Jv fLEPE' <Tvvava7TaVOfLEVwv) all demonstrate that his Syracusan wife was not 1151 For the correctness of monogamy, see Eur. Andr. 177-80. For bigamy as a way to ensure heirs, see Hdt. 5.39-41 (a notable instance in the Spartan monarchy). Burlando 1992: 26-34 provides discussion of these passages, as well as other later passages. For issues of legitimacy in such marriages, see Gernet 1968:345-46. 1152 Arist. Pol. 5.1307a 37-40 (6 Ev CnJfLOKpacrlqt aUK, dv EryEvero, aVO' dv Ev dpurroiCpaTLqt Ei'J fLEpBcypivv) and Burlando 1992: 23-25 for discussion. 348 given preference over the foreign wife. 1153 While Dionysius could have merely used Doris in a marriage of convenience for political advantage, any negative treatment to Doris, the daughter of a prominent citizen of Locri, or her treatment as a second- class citizen likely would have proved disastrous to his relations with Locri. At the time of Dionysius's marriage to Doris, Locri was the only strong ally of Dionysius abroad, as all other cities of the Italian League were hostile to him. 1154 Without some help at least from the Locrians, even maintaining his power in Sicily with little outside help was bleak. Through his marriage, Dionysius also was able to gain a foothold into Magna Graecia and a springboard for the tyrant to extend his hegemony into Italy. In this case, Dionysius's marriage to Doris provided much needed support in the form of troops and supplies over the next few years. As mentioned above, such marriages were employed by earlier Sicilian tyrants . d k f . h' d b . . 1155 A . d 1n or er to create networ s o power w1t 1n an etween c1tles. s mentlone before, the Athenians understood the usefulness of these networks when they sent envoys in an attempt to marry off the daughter of their ally, Evagoras of Cyprus, to Dionysius, in order both to break the alliance of Sparta and Syracuse and to foster an alliance of their own. 1156 While wives of other Sicilian tyrants became quite powerful 1153 Plut. Vlt. Djon 3.2. Diad. Sic. 14.44.7 also discusses the grand transportation of Doris to Syracuse, a quinquireme with gold and silver furnishing (7rEvn}p1J ... dpryvpols KaL X_Pvuols ' ' ) IW'TaOK£VaUfLaOL ICEICOUfJ/T}fLEV1]V • 1154 As seen, of course, by the reaction of Rhegium toward Dionysius. For discussion, see Burlando 1992: 19-23. 1155 For example, the marriages between the daughter of Anasilaus, tyrant of Rhegium, and Hieron of Syracuse or between the daughter of Theron, the tyrant of Acragas, and Gelon. 1156 L 19 20 c' '' ,, '' - , - - ' ' ' ' ' ' e E • ' ys. , 1}UaV 0 El'v'lrWE'; TOV 7rl'v0V 7rE/.1IaL L.J..WVVUWV K/T}UEU'T1]V fLEV ryEVEU aL varyopqt, "\ I ~\A ~ I ..+.'' ~\ \ I ~ ,, ~ ' I ) 7r01'vEf.J.LOV OE aK£UallJ.-OVWl8, 'f'Li'vOV OE IWL UVfJ-fJLLXOV TTJ 'lrDI'vEL TTJ VfLETEpCf • 349 in their own right, 1157 Doris faded into the background of history. The usefulness of the marriage of Doris politically, however, was quite far-reaching. The marriage ensured that Dionysius would have a base in his later forays into the Italian territory and succeeded in creating a legacy for Dionysius I, a sort of dynasty, to which Plato ld r · h' I 1158 H' . D . b h' . f wou re1er 1n 1s etters. 1s marnage to ons egan 1s creatwn o an international family, who would form the base of his empire. This dynasty would I · h' · 1159 h h h . I . f h f D . . appear ater m 1s re1gn, t roug t e me uswn o t e sons o ons m an f . d A h . . . . h . h 1160 A f . I a orementwne t eman mscnptwns onormg t e tyrant. s ore1gn e ements were introduced through the marriage of Dionysius and Doris, those elements were passed down through the children and throughout the remainder of the court, thereby encouraging mobility throughout the following generations of the tyrant. While this foreignness was ideologically harmful to the tyrants (as discussed in the first chapter), it politically was expedient for the tyrant to introduce this foreignness into his rule, with its accompanying alliances to other powerful cities. Indeed, the 1157 As did Damarete, the Acragantine wife of Gelon, who had helped in creating the peaoe between the Greeks and Carthaginians and who had minted her own coin, the damaretejon (aiJn] ryGp {nr' ainWv rigu:v8El.o-a uvvr}pry1]UE 7r"'A£LOTOV El'; Tf)V u-Uv8EOLV Tij'; Elpf}V1]';, ICal_ "' e ~ ' ' ' ~ ' \ "\ I I I >f:l .,_I" \ "\ e' ' ' ' I U'TE'f'aVW ELOa V'lf aU'T(JJV EICa'TOV Tal'vaVTOl8 XPVOWV, VOfLLUfLa EsEICO 'f E TO IC!'v1} EV a7r EICEW1]'; !lap.apcTEwv), as noted in Diad. Sic. 11.26.3. This passage is also notable regarding the larger discussion of envoys, as the positive treatment of the Carthaginians was partially due to the behavior of the envoys who came to Gelon. Catenaoci 1996: 160-65 discusses more thoroughly this case in the general discussion of wives transmitting power. 1158 Pl. Ep. 7.327e-328a (K,aTat.,Erywv OE n}v TE dpx7w Tij'; 'ha!-v[w; ~CaL "i.ucE"'J\,[a'; ~CaL T7JV ainoV OVvafLW Ev ainfj). 1159 Although the narrative of Plutarch suggests that Doris bore sons to Dionysius, their children came along later in his reign. Dionysius II, for example, was only a young man at the time of his father's death. For further discussion, see Sordi 1980b: 32-33. 116 ° For his international dynasty, see Sartori 1966: 52-54 and Chapter 2, pages 137-38. 350 positives of this mobility and foreignness outweighed any negativity created by introducing foreigners into the inner circle of the tyrant. Dionysius would repay the Locrians for their relations by apportioning them territory of other cities that he had conquered, in order to maintain good relations d · 11· · h h 1161 R I . b h . . . d an a strategic a mnce w1t t em. e atwns etween t e two c1t1es contmue through the reign of Dionysius I, by means of envoys such as the father of Echekrates, whom Timaeus states was an ambassador to the Locrians. 1162 The most famous instance of relations between the Syracusan tyrants and Locri, however, would occur during the exile of Dionysius II, after his defeat at the hands of his uncle Dian. Due to preexisting links due to his mother's provenance from that city, as well as its excellent position for regrouping, Locri was the perfect location for his ·1 1163 H. L · · nk . "f h b. h I f ex1 e. 1s own status at ocn 1s u nown, 1.e. 1 e was su ~ect to t e aws o Locri or attempted to seize power as tyrant. For example, Plutarch merely refers to Dionysius during his time at Locri as a wretched exile. 1164 Perhaps under Dionysius II or Agathocles, formal relations and strong influence in the affairs of the city 1161 For example, he gave them the territory both of the Caulonians (Diad. Sic. 14.106.3) and of the Hipponiates (Diad. Sic. 14.107.2). 1162 Polyb. 12.10. 7-9 notes that he had been entrusted with an embassy. For the role of Echekrates in the history of the Locrians, see Van Compernolle 1976: 340-41 and DeSanctis 1958: 54- 64. See also Chapter 1, pages 89-90 for the history of Locri. 1163 Meloni 1951: 149-52 details the reasons for his choice of Locri, including the good position of the city against marauding Italian peoples (Diad. Sic. 16.15.1-2, Strabo 6.1.4-5, and Just. Epjt. 23.1.4-14) and a possible location for military structures in the area (Strabo 6.1.10 and Plin. HN3.10.95). 1164 Plut. Vlt. Tjm. 1.4 (h <j>vcyaoo, ml m7mvou). Ghezzi 2004 evaluates this ambiguity and the various passages which suggest that he was subject to their laws or that he attempted to seize power. 351 appeared in the mention of a basjJeus ruling over a synteJeja in the city. A series of thirty-nine (or thirty-seven 1165 ) tablets belonging to an archive were discovered in Locri concerning the administration of the city, an archive that has been the subject of much debate. 1166 Although Dionysius II is said to have ruled in Locri for six years while in exile, 1167 the dating of the tablets suggests that they refer to a later ruler, such as Agathocles or Pyrrhus, or a Locrian leader. It does seem, however, that several of the tablets were inscribed while Dionysius II was resident at Locri. 1168 Another argument against Dionysius II (or Agathocles) concerns the type of government listed in the tablets. Although they refer to a basjJeus, the tenor of the tablets suggests that this was a position in the administration of a democratic government not some type of monarchical government. 1169 Other scholars, however, 1165 Although the original number of the tablets was numbered at thirty-nine, Del Monaco 1997 attached three of the fragments into one fragment, thereby reducing the number to thirty seven. 1166 For publication of the tablets, an edition with photographs was first provided by De Franciscis 1972. SEG 26.1141 contains an overview of various articles which discuss various reoonstructions of the tablets. This edition was then superseded by the edition of Costabile 1992. 1167 For positive arguments for the influence of Dionysius II as basjfeus, Just. Epjt. 21.3.9 mentions that Dionysius II ruled at Locri for six years (cum hjs artjbus per annos sex regnasset). In addition, the syntefeja, as mentioned in the sources, was similar to the role of Dionysius in military affairs (Just. Epjt. 21.2.8). It also could have been that Dionysius II ruled over a type of limited democracy, the existenoe of which is noted in Just. Epjt. 21.3.3-6. For these positive identifications, see D'Angelo 2001: 17-24. 1168 Ghinatti 1998 distinguishes four periods of tablets, which the earliest dating from the first half of the fourth century. Dubois 1999, however, questions some parts of this dating system. See also SEG48.1270 for a discussion of this issue. 1169 Costabile 1980 looks further at the figure of the basjfeus, who is discussed in tablets 1, 13, 23, 30, and 31. From her analysis, it seems that the basjfeus was one of several city magistrates and was given part of the grain supply to watch over. 352 have argued that Dionysius II perhaps could have ruled over Locri in such a capacity. Syracusan influence in the tablets appears through the use of Sicilian weights and measures, although this may speak more to the influence of Dionysius I in Locrian affairs. 1170 A democracy and tyranny could work together, as with the existence of an assembly during the rule of Dionysius I. 1171 Furthermore, the basile us listed in the synteJeja did show similarities with the role of Dionysius II in Locri, and his own relations with the aristocracy of the city and the presence of the Assembly of the Locrians does not preclude the possibility of Dionysius II as the ruler listed in the tablets. 1172 Due to several of the factors listed above, however, as well as the presence of Corinthian coinage (which became more popular during the intervention of Timoleon in the West), Dionysius II likely was not the basileus mentioned in the tablets. 1173 Nevertheless, by studying these tablets, we can further analyze the roles that Dionysius II had in Locri, even if he was not basjJeus. Although Dionysius II likely was not mentioned m these tablets, other passages suggest that he held some position of leadership at Locri. Justin notes that Dionysius, after being accepted as an exile, then took possession of the citadel as the leader, polluted the women of the city, and exiled or killed the wealthiest men of the 1170 Del Monaco 2000 discusses the system of weights and measures in the tablets. 1171 See D'Angelo 2001 for the possibility of Dionysius II as subject of the tablets. For the assembly under the Dionysii, see Diad. Sic. 14.45.2 (uvv~cyacyEv hKMwiav) and 15.74.5 (Ta , ·e , , , , , l 7rl'v1J 1J uvvaryarywv El8 EICIC!'v1JOLav . 1172 D'Angelo 2001: 19-24 notes several passages, including Just. Epjt. 21.1.5, 21.2.8, and 21.3.3-6. 1173 Filocamo 2006 makes this argument, especially regarding the presence of Corinthian coinage (e.g. X_PvuLov 7rEVTa1CopLv8wv). 353 . 1174 0 h . d c1ty. t er ep1so es show him in this negative light as leader, as when he prostituted the women of the city and stole their possessions. 1175 While these episodes are described slightly differently in sources that were more negative toward the tyrant, 1176 all sources (except for the brief reference to Dionysius in Plutarch) agree that Dionysius had a position of power in the city. These episodes also suggest that Dionysius maintained a force of loyal soldiers who were responsible for these attacks. 1177 In addition, numismatic evidence affirms the presence of Dionysius II at Rhegium for several years (from approximately 356-351) and then at Locri (until h . s· '1 . 346) 117s 1s return to 1c1 y m . Many other cities of Magna Graecia had relations with Dionysius I, although the relations were often limited to military conquest, as he conquered Croton, Rhegium, and Caulonia in quick succession and stayed involved in their affairs for the following decade. 1179 Coinage of Dionysius dating from the early fourth century 1174 Just. Epjt, 21.2.9-10 (uelut jure regnaret, arcem occupat sojjtamque sjbj saeujtjam exercet) and 21.3.8. 1175 Just. Epjt, 21.3.1-7. See also Strabo 6.1.8, Ael. VH 9.8, and Ath. 12.541c-e for his mistreatment of the women of the city. 1176 D'Angelo 2002: 179-83 discusses the sojourn of Dionysius II at Locri, noting that these episodes of murder and attack are found in Justin (who appears to be more dependent on Theopompus). Aelian (who is dependent on Clearchus) does not present the time of the tyrant in Locri as harshly, although he agrees on the general narrative of events. 1177 Di Fede 1949: 126-129 discusses the use of soldiers at Locri, although he argues that the strength of the Bruttii and Lucani eventually foroed Dionysius out. 1178 These series of coins are described further in Castrizio 2004: 294-96. The sojourn of Dionysius II is known only from this evidence, as the sources focus on his time at Locri only. The chronology (departure in 356 from Syracuse and departure from Locri in 346 after ruling for six years) requires that Dionysius was resident in another location. 1179 For the oonquering of these cities, see Diad. Sic. 14.44-45 and 14.102-108, along with Strabo 6.1.8, Dian. Hal. Ant. Rom. 20.7, and Livy 24.3.8. For an overview of these events, see Lomas 354 also testifies to his presence in Italy, especially through his mercenaries. 1180 Dionysius also had hostile relations with the Italiot League, which was founded in order to deal with the advances of the tyrant, 1181 although the league was disbanded in 389 by Dionysius. 1182 Later relations in Magna Graecia under Dionysius II and Agathocles centered on Tarentum, who became a major local power with the defeat of so many other cities. Dionysius II famously had relations with Archytas, the leader of Tarentum, through their relationship with Plato, who would act as the guarantor of positive relations between Syracuse and Locri. 1183 Tarentum later would team up with Acrotatus against Agathocles in 315/4, as both groups wished to prevent f h S · · h 1184 0 II h A h I I urt er yracusan expanswn m t e area. vera , owever, gat oc es most y would stay away from mainland Greece and southern Italy formally. Due to the changes in politics after the rule of Alexander the Great, his focus would turn to other areas of the Greek world. 1993: 35-36. 118 ° For example, issues of Dionysius I (with the head of Athena and a dolphin or hippocamp) are found in Calabria during this time, especially in fortresses of the area (e.g. Castiglione di Paludi). See Castrizio 2004: 294-96 for further description. 1181 For the creation of the Italian League, see Diad. Sic. 14.91.1 (rrof1!Laxiav o€ 7rpo' aicic~icov' E'lrOL~UaVTO ml uvvcopwv E'jWTWKEval;ov) and Diad. Sic. 14.101.1. Polyb. 2.39.6 notes that the first cities to join the league were Croton, Sybaris, and Caulonia, who established it according to Achaean laws and princi pies. 1182 For the disbanding, see Diad. Sic. 14.105.4. Polyb. 2.39.6 notes that the league was prevented by Dionysi us I. 1183 See Sonnabend 1996: 20-22, who mentions Pl. Ep. 7.338c-d (€cyw cyap 7rplv amlvaL fEviav ml "',' 'A ' ' - • T' ' ' ' ' • ' ' ) d PI t T"t n· 18 2 3 'f'LI'vWV PXVTTJ ICaL TOl8 EV apavn ICaL L.J..Wvvuup 7rOt/T]Ua'; a1re1r i'vEOV an u . v 1 . wn . - as examples. 1184 Diad. Sic. 19.70.8. See Lomas 1993: 42-44 for the role of Tarentum. 355 C. Agathocles and the Hellenistic Kingdoms Although Agathocles mainly stayed out of the affairs of Magna Graecia after he had come to power, he created important links with various Hellenistic kingdoms, including Macedonia and Ptolemaic Egypt. As regards the northern coast of Africa, Cyrene had created various connections with the island of Sicily. Economically, evidence of the export of Sicilian products (e.g. Syracusan wine, fish, and pigs) to Egypt has appeared in numerous fragments of Greek papyri. 1185 Syracuse also had created ties with smaller cities in the area, including Euesperides in western Cyrenaica, which had honored two Syracusans acting as np6gevo' for the Euesperitans in an inscription dating from the second half of the fourth century. 1186 Agathocles created an alliance with the Cyrenaean Ophellas, who had a tense relationship with the Ptolemies and who sought to create a friendship with the tyrant (Diad. Sic. 20.40.2-4). dv'T~ OE 'TaV'TTJ'l 'Tijc; xpe£a" f.7rrrrtE!vfve'To 'TOv 'Arya8oKtvc!.a uvryxwp0uew alrrip 'TWv Ev A~f3Vv 7rparyfL&n:vv Kvp~eVew. elva~ ryGp LKav0v aV'Tip 'T0v '2..ucetv£av, ~v' Egf; 'TWv d7r0 'Tijc; Kapx7786voc; 1av8Vvwv d7rafl.),,ax8Ev'Ta fLer' , \: 1 " , 1 " 1 " e \:' \ \ 'I l I ' " aoe~a<:; Kpa'Tew a7ra(rr;<:; 'TTJ'l vr;uov: 7rapaKEUY a~ oe Ka~ 'TTJV 'Ta,...,~av av'Ttp , , 't ,.... , ,.... ,, , r-' , , e , , , npo<; e7raVs71(J"W 7"7/'i apX'T/'i, eav Kf1W[I flHsovwv opecye(J" a,. 7"7/V flEV cyap A,f3v7!V l),et;evcyflEV'T/V flEcya"Acp /Ca' xa~>.m(jj 77"E"Aacye' fl7!0afLW<; apfl6t;ew , ,.... , <, , ,.... , , , e , ,,, , , , , ',.+," e av'Ttp, eu;; r;v Ka~ vvv ov Ka'T e7r~ VfL~av, a,~,,...,a Ka'T avary~<r;v a-y~X a~. 1185 For the list of products and the relevant papyri, see Santagati 1996: 280. See also SEG 39.1680 and 40.1594 for links between Cyrene, Egypt, and Sicily during this time. 1186 For the inscription, see SEG 18.772. For a brief discussion of the inscription, see Gill 2004: 391. 356 In return for this service, Orthon [the ambassador J promised Ophellas that Agathocles would permit him to exercise dominion over Libya. For, he said, Sicily was enough for Agathocles, if only it should be possible for him, relieved of danger from Carthage, to rule over the island without fear. Moreover, Italy was close at hand for increasing his realm if he should decide to reach after greater things. For Libya, separated by a wide and dangerous sea, did not suit him at all, into which land he had now come through no desire but because of necessity. Ophellas already had acquired settlers from Athens and the remainder of Greece for his new colony, a mass migration which had sent Greeks off to Libya in the thousands. 1187 Agathocles would be a suitable partner in securing land and leadership for the administration of the new colony, since Agathocles was concerned with the threat from the neighboring territory of Carthage. 1188 Thus, Agathocles sent Orthon the Syracusan as an envoy to Ophellas, in order to convince Ophellas that he merely wished to have a defensive alliance against Carthage and that he did not wish to spread his territory into northern Africa. What appeared at first as an equal alliance soon turned to the favor of Agathocles, as Ophellas was murdered, although the degree to which Agathocles was involved in the murder is up to debate. 1189 By allying himself with Ophellas, Agathocles gained a foothold in Cyrene and benefited from 1187 Diad. Sic. 20.40.5-41.1. For an overview of colonization under Ophellas, see Consolo Lang her 346-348. 1188 For Agathocles' role, see Diad. Sic. 20.40.1-4 and Just. Epjt. 22. 7.4. 1189 Two versions of the death of Ophellas are recorded, both showing that Agathocles had a part of in the death of Ophellas. Diad. Sic. 20.42.4 notes that Ophellas died in an uprising that Agathocles had created. Just. Epjt. 22.7 argues that Agathocles treacherously had Ophellas put to death. See Consolo Langher 1996b: 255-58 for discussion of both sides. 357 the death of Ophellas by taking over his mercenanes, who were useful in his campmgns against Carthage on the African continent. In a sense, as Agathocles himself came to the African continent as the head of his troops, he too would become a sort of envoy, who could personally contact other polities through his own mobile behavior. After the death of Ophellas, Agathocles' new closeness to the Ptolemies was part of a larger program of relations with the Hellenistic kingdom. The easiest way for Agathocles to ally himself with the Ptolemies was through marriage, namely to Theoxena, the sister of Magas, the head of Cyrene who was placed in this position by Ptolemy Soter. Because of their mutual desire to weaken Carthage and to contain Cyrene, the Ptolemies and Agathocles had begun to work together in 310. Coins minted around this time under Ophellas and Agathocles in 310 are evidence of this collaboration through similar imagery, such as the head of Alexander and the elephant. 1190 These coins very likely were used to pay the mercenaries that defected to Agathocles after the death of Ophellas in 308. Thus, this numismatic evidence not only demonstrates the fruits of Agathocles' labor through the presence of these mercenaries but also reflects a conscious shift in the program of his international relations to the Egyptian kingdom. After securing his rule in Sicily and naming himself basjJeus in the final years of the fourth century, Agathocles turned his gaze away from Sicily and toward the greater Mediterranean. This union reflected the desires both of Agathocles and of the Ptolemies to create external power ties through 119 ° For example, golden didrachms minted from 310 to 304 with this imagery mirror the silver tetradrachms of Ptolemy I minted from 315 to 310. See Consolo Langher 1995: 433-43 and Santagati 1996:277-78. 358 marriage. 1191 The choice of a Ptolemaic bride and the connections from that union by Agathocles stemmed from Agathocles' need for support against the Carthaginians. Although hostility between Agathocles and Carthage had calmed at the end of the century, Agathocles had not put aside all thoughts of war. Indeed, even at the time of his death ten years later, Agathocles was reported to be preparing further campaigns against Carthage. 1192 Relations with Egypt would provide access to supplies and troops. Furthermore, the brother of Theoxena, Magas, had become the governor of Cyrene around 300. Even though Agathocles had already availed himself of Cyrene and its troops through his relations with Ophellas in his early campaigns against Carthage, familial ties with Cyrene would ensure continued support on the eastern front if Agathocles desired to attack the Carthaginians again. As regards the influence or effects of Theoxena on the career of Agathocles, little is known, except that she bore Agathocles two children, one son and one daughter. 1193 From the narrative of Justin, it appears that Theoxena remained the wife of Agathocles until his death, when he sent her and their children back to Egypt after being poisoned. 1194 Although the passage in Justin discusses the emotional scene in an overly pathetic manner, describing the pain felt by Theoxena and the children when leaving Agathocles, it historically suggests that the ties with Egypt through this marriage existed until the time of Agathocles' death. While general 1191 For further discussion, see Buda 1969-1970: 221-24 and Leveque 1968-1969: 144-45. 1192 Diad. Sic. 21.16.1 and Marasco 1984: 112-13. 1193 Although the use of the masculine in Justin 23.2 would suggest the presence of two sons, P Oxy. 37.2821 would suggest that one of Agathocles' children from Theoxena was a daughter. 1194 For this episode, see especially Just. Epjt. 23.2. 359 affection and the ties created through children also could have contributed to a successful marriage, the duration of their marriage likely was due to Agathocles' continued desire to maintain relations with Egypt. The son of Theoxena with Agathocles, Agatharchus, later became the epjstates of Libya and appeared in an inscription with his wife Stratonice as dedicators of a private shrine to Isis and Serapis during the reign of Ptolemy II. 1195 While the effects of Theoxena on the reign Agathocles are not fully known, nor her acceptance among the Syracusans, it appears that her marriage with Agathocles certainly produced long lasting political effects and continued contact with Egypt, Libya, and Cyrene. 1196 Theoxena was not the only female used by Agathocles to further his political progress, although this second example was sent away from Syracuse and not brought in. During the same period that Agathocles married Theoxena, he gave away in marriage Lanassa, his daughter from his second marriage. Agathocles thus followed in the tradition of other tyrants, who married their daughters off to other powerful men to cement political relations. 1197 The sources on this episode are limited to Diodorus Siculus and Plutarch (as the omission of these events in Justin follows his usual tendencies of skipping over the international relations of Agathocles). 1198 1195 The Stratonice mentioned may have been the mistress of Ptolemy II. For the inscription and discussion, see SEG18.636 and Bagnall1976: 195-200. 1196 For the treatment of Theoxena in relation to Agathocles' other international relations, see Bagnall1976: 206. 1197 One notable example is the Peisistratid Hippias, who married off his daughter Archedice to Aeantides, the tyrant of Lampsacus. See Thuc. 6.59, along with Barcelo 1993: 187-96. 1198 Both the episodes of Lanassa and the fight with Cassander over Corcyra in 300-299 are omitted by Justin. While Justin does focus on the family relations of Agathocles, the marriages of Lanassa do not appear. See Galli 1982: 167-68 and Consolo Lang her 1990a: 360 As mentioned before, the scope of Agathocles had moved away from Sicily to the larger Mediterranean. As part of this change in outlook, Agathocles looked toward the Adriatic, fighting over the island of Corcyra from 302 until 297, when he took over its possession. Corcyra and his daughter would both play a role in his new overtures with Pyrrhus, to whom he would marry his daughter. In this sense, the possession of the island was completely dependent on the marriage to Lanassa, who was sent as a type of envoy to Pyrrhus to ensure good relations with him. The reasons for Agathocles' capture of Corcyra stem from several factors. The Adriatic and Ionian seas were the overseas domain of previous tyrants, including the Dionysii. 1199 The strategic position of the island would allow for the easy transfer of supplies and troops in the Adriatic and Ionian Seas. In addition, Agathoclean possession of Corcyra would stop the progression of Macedonian power under Cassander and Demetrius. For these reasons, Agathocles enlisted the help of Pyrrhus through the giving of his daughter in marriage. Thus, sometime between the capture of Corcyra in 297 and 295, Pyrrhus married Lanassa, who had received Corcyra as her dowry. 120 ° For some time, at least, Pyrrhus was seen as a possible support for Agathocles and the Syracusans. For example, as the Syracusans were tired of frequent war with the Carthaginians, they hoped for aid from Pyrrhus through the 158-60 for further discussion. 1199 For an overview of Agathocles' relationship with Corcyra, see Goldsberry 1973: 61-64. 1200 Plut. Vit. Pyrrh. 9.1 (Advauuav T1JV 'Arya8o~<,t.,Eovr;; TaLi "'i.vpa1Cova-Lov, 7rpolx,a 7rpou¢Epopiv1}v ainip T1JV KEp1CvpaLwv 1r6t.,w iil,vWICVLav V1rO 'Arya8o~<,/..iovr;;). 361 connections with Lanassa and dispatched envoys to him for his help. 1201 This alliance, however, would last for only a few years. Sometime around 290, Lanassa left Pyrrhus for Demetrius, 1202 smce (as Plutarch relates) Lanassa was angry with Pyrrhus for being more devoted to his barbarian wives than to her. She then left for Corcyra and sought a marriage from the Macedonian Demetrius, who sailed there and left a garrison in the city. 1203 Within this episode, several interesting developments appear. Here, Lanassa made the decision to change the system of international links created by her father, when she cut ties with Pyrrhus and ties herself to his enemy Demetrius. Within this exchange, Lanassa ceded the island of Corcyra to Demetrius, an action seemingly approved of by the soldiers on the island. 1204 In some sense, this provides a rare glimpse into the mobile character, since the objects of the process of mobility often were silent participants in the process of migration. Even if Agathocles did have more influence on her decision than that included in the sources, here we see the mobile figure herself perpetrating the process by moving to the city of another leader. 1201 D. d s· 22 8 2 (' ' ~ ' ' ' ' " ' ' '' '' ' ' ~ II' ' ' 10 . IC. . . ow TqJ 'ffO{\,EfH!J IWfLVOVTE'; oL L.VpaKoaLoL Ta'> El'v7rwar;; ELXOV EV TqJ vppcp ow Advauuav T1JV ryvvaL~<,a, T1}v 8vryaTfpa 'Arya8o~<,l..iovr;; ... ICa'i 01.2L ToLna 1Ca8' i]p.lpav (it..,A.,ov') E1r' lit..,Ant.s 7rpEa-{3El8 ~UTEf.) .. nv npOr;; ain6v). 1202 For further discussion of Lanassa's marriages, see Landucci Gattinoni 1999: 115~ 16 and 121~ 23, along with Marasoo 1984: 105~ 7. 1203 Plutarch VIt. Pyrrh. 10.5 (i] rydp Advauua fLEfL"fapiv1} TDv ITVppov Wr;; fLCi"'A) .. ,ov 7rpou-Exovcra Tals (3 (3 ' t' , K' , ' ' ' ' ' (3 ' ~ , ,, A ' ) ap apOl8 ryvvaLsW El8 Ep1Cupav a7rEXWP1JUE, IWL UEOfLEV1] ryafMJV aOL!'vUCWV EICal'vEL L.J..1}fJ/T]Tpwv . 1204 No rebellion amongst the soldiers previously on the island is noted. The presenoe of a new garrison under Demetrius also staved off insurrection. 362 The reason for Lanassa's change of heart toward Pyrrhus is also pertinent. Plutarch notes that Lanassa had tired of being spurned in favor of the other wives of Pyrrhus. In the lines before this declaration, Plutarch notes the other wives of Pyrrhus: a daughter of Autoleon, king of the Paeonians (a Thracian people), and Bircenna, the daughter of an Illyrian. Thus, Lanassa was merely one of a number of wives married for political expediency, so that Pyrrhus could maintain his empire in northwestern Greece. It seems from Lanassa's own decision that this type of mobility (i.e. mobility stemming from marriage for political reasons) produced an unacceptable situation, in that she was treated as inferior. Regardless of her own agency in this decision, there also was political advantage for Agathocles by turning to Demetrius, especially due to the increase in power of Demetrius and his possible interests in the west. Through this marriage, therefore, Agathocles could either benefit from the power for his own rule or could prevent possible hostile interests or threats by Demetrius to the power of Agathocles in the western Mediterranean. The final observation on Lanassa's choice of Demetrius revolves around the change in the sphere of Agathocles' relations. Having previously wanted to stop the advance of Demetrius in the west, Agathocles now warmed up to the Macedonians in order to protect his interests (although Agathocles would only live for about a year after the marriage of Lanassa to Demetrius). As part of this new axis of Syracusan Macedonian relations, Agathocles would send his son to the court of Demetrius. 1205 As Diodorus recounts, the tyrant sent his son (also named Agathocles), in order to arrange a treaty of friendship and reliance. The son of the tyrant was received kindly 1205 For discussion of this episode, see Marasoo 1984: 111-12 and Vattuone 1987-1988: 68. 363 by the king, who provided him with luxurious clothing (reminiscent of the robes sent by Dionysius I to the daughter of the Spartan King Lysander) and was given gifts. 1206 When his son returned to Syracuse, he brought back Oxythemis as a phil as to cement the relations between the two groups (although the actual purpose of Oxythemis is unknown). 1207 Here was another example of emigration of a family member directly under the command of the tyrant, much like the betrothal of his daughter. As with wives, the transfer of children also guaranteed contact between political powers that could possibly create trust and collaboration. Such a relationship between the two powers would have allowed each to establish their own hegemony in geographically contingent areas (e.g. Agathocles maintaining rule in Corcyra close to the Greek mainland) while ensuring that each leader would not · r · h h ' · 1208 mtenere m t e ot er stern tory. Within the previous chapter, we have seen vanous examples of tyrants benefiting from official forms of mobility, whether they were envoys or family members. Although each tyrant focused on different geographical areas around the Greek world, these envoys were vital parts of maintaining or increasing their rule in Sicily and beyond. The choice of various cities occasionally was taken from pre- existing relationships, but each of these alliances showed sensitivity to the political 1206 Diad. Sic. 21.15.1. 1207 It is not certain how long Oxythemis stayed in Syracuse, but he at least was there until the funeral of Agathocles, since he is depicted as being present. The same passage of Diad. Sic. 21.15 notes that Oxythemis originally was sent to be a spy for the Macedonians. 1208 Marasco 1984: 111-12 also suggests that Demetrius could parlay his relations with Agathocles for oontacts in the West, namely for the movement of grain. Testifying of this importance is an inscription (IGII-III 2 499), dating from 301/0, that mentions the grain trade between Sicily and Athens. 364 and economic developments of the time. Although these tyrants did not particularly innovate regarding the processes of forming relations, they showed the ability not only to collaborate with other tyrants but also with other political systems across the Greek world, often by using a shared identity as Greeks (and often in opposition to a barbarian other). The Dionysii and Agathocles did not follow the stereotype of a tyrant, one who not only separated himself from his citizens but who also was unable to forge relations with other groups. On the contrary, these men were able to not only escape the odium of tyranny cast upon them by other political systems but also were able to thrive through cooperative political and military efforts. These efforts would be a major foundation for their long and successful rule as tyrant. 365 CHAPTER 6 -BARBARIANS OR BENEFACTORS? THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE TYRANT AND NON-GREEK PEOPLES The tyrants of Syracuse did not limit them themselves to alliances only with Greek poJejs. Throughout the reigns of these leaders, 'barbarian' cities and peoples often needed to be placated as well. The position of Sicily, so close to the various groups of Italy in the north and to the Carthaginians to the south, required a light touch regarding diplomacy. For example, this latter group had threatened the hegemony of the Greeks for decades before Dionysius I took power, and they would continue to threaten the independence of the Sicilian Greeks even through the time of Agathocles. Diplomacy under these tyrants, however, was not limited to defensive diplomacy (i.e. maintaining the status quo regarding their rule). As we will see, the Dionysii and Agathocles had a great deal of success with non-Greek cities, in order to foster offensive diplomacy, through which they were able to spread their empires throughout the island and beyond. Fundamentally, the processes of mobility at work to create these alliances with non-Greeks were the same as with Greeks. While the exchange of wives or other family members between the tyrants and non-Greeks was not common during this time, bonds forged from the practices of gevfa and cfnt..ia certainly were possible between these two groups. Furthermore, because the tyrants did not need to 'play Greek' with these groups (i.e. following traditional Greek practices and customs), they could collaborate based on more basic needs (e.g. money). Thus, these leaders often found the reward of alliances just as great without the danger of threatening their relations with other cities (as would happen if the tyrant preferred Sparta over Athens, thus garnering the wrath of the other pojjs). 366 Networks between the tyrants and these peoples (e.g. the Gauls and Campanians) were more direct, so that the tyrant could quickly gain the political and military advantages that he needed without worrying about complicated Greek networks of alliances. I. Carthage While the threat to the Dionysii and Agathocles from the cities of mainland Greece (especially through their aid to enemy cities of Syracuse on the island) was substantial at times, the threat of one non-Greek city, Carthage, was enormous and constant. 1209 The history of the Carthaginians in Sicily from the late fifth century to the early third century, however, was not one of complete hostility. Carthaginian leaders had been tied to Syracuse through marriage, and trade certainly existed between the two cities. 1210 Overall, the history between Carthage and Syracuse was punctuated with frequent conflict that threatened the stability both of the island and of the tyrant's rule. Thus, numerous treaties brokered by the sending of envoys between the two powers were often the only non-polemical remedy for these conflicts. In addition, several major characters in the history of Syracuse had friendly relations with Carthage, which further complicated the network of international alliances 1209 While most of the actions discussed in this section were performed by the city of Carthage, the sources occasionally demonstrate that the definition of 'Carthage' was complicated. For example, Carthage also had the help of other cities on Sicily, who were allied to them (e.g. Segesta and Panormus, as noted in Diad. Sic. 14.48.4). Furthermore, the fleet and forces were often referred to not merely as 'Carthaginian' (Diad. Sic. 14.54, 14.59, 16.60, and 16.79). See Whittaker 1978 for further discussion. 121 ° For example, the Carthaginian Mago was said to have married a wife from Syracuse (Hdt. 7.166). For discussion of the positive relations between the two cities, see Whittaker 1978: 77- 78. 367 between the tyrants and this city. Within the dynamic of relations with Carthage, the tyrants certainly did not want to be overly hostile to Carthage and to create further possibilities for warfare, yet overt friendship with Carthage also was not beneficial for their reign. Portraying Carthage as an enemy was an easy way for the earlier tyrants to create a common enemy and an imminent threat that would prove useful for consolidating rule. As discussed in the second chapter, by creating an 'other' for the citizens of a pojjs to hate, the tyrant drew attention away from the illegality of his rule. As a non-Greek people with an economic presence on the island, the Carthaginians provided an excellent source of 'extra-otherness' that was more 'other' than the rule of the tyrant. As the Carthaginians began to gain interest in Sicily after seventy years of relative indifference due to their defeat in 480, the predecessor of Dionysius I, Hermocrates, was able to harness the threat of the Carthaginians to establish himself as ruler of Syracuse. Hermocrates originally had attempted to get the support of Carthage in his fight against the Athenians when the latter group threatened the stability of the island, a request that shows how the original status of Carthage was not necessarily one of a dangerous enemy. 1211 Later, however, conflict between the Carthaginians and the inhabitants of Sicily culminated in the sack and destruction of Selinus in 409. After this point, fear and rhetoric escalated in Syracuse. Although the Syracusans sent envoys to the Carthaginians in 40 7 in order to sue for peace, 1211 For the position of Carthage between Athens and Syracuse, see Barcelo 1994: 5-6. Hermocrates also had allied himself with Persia, establishing friendship with Pharnabazus and taking money from him for his campaign in Sicily (Diad. Sic. 13.63.2 and Xen. Hell. 1.1.31). Pharnabazus also took part on missions to Susa (Hell. 1.3.14 and 1.4.1-4). See Vanotti 2005: 270-72 for the links of Hermocrates with the Persians, as well as Chapter 2, pages 114-17. 368 Hermocrates was able to block these attempts. 1212 For their part, the Carthaginians would also attempt to head off conflict, sending ambassadors to Acragas. 1213 Hermocrates, like Dionysius I after him, would balance the usefulness of external support from friendly relations with a city (e.g. Carthage) and the possible internal support among his own citizens by using this same city as an enemy. Even while Carthage not only had begun to become more involved in Sicilian affairs but also would sign a treaty with the traditional enemy of Syracuse, Athens, in 406, 1214 this threat also served an ideological purpose for Hermocrates. In fact, the rhetoric of his return to power was based on the perceived threat of the Carthaginians, from his relationship with Selinus (destroyed by the Carthaginians in 409 but reconstructed by Hermocrates soon after) to the repatriation of Syracusan bones from the Battle of Himera. 1215 In these earlier cases, diplomacy was not useful for the tyrant, as curtailing a threat from the Carthaginians would have placed the focus back on the threat of tyranny. Lack of diplomacy, in this case, would serve as a much more powerful deterrent to internal threats. Thus, the early reign of Dionysius I was 1212 For the sending of the embassy to the Carthaginians, see Diad. Sic. 13.79.8. Such an attempt by the Syracusans apparently showed internal conflict between the more peaoeful Syracusans and the more hawkish Hermocrates. For further analysis of this episode, see Anello 2008: 84- 87 and 1990: 205-6. 1213 D. d s· 13 85 2 c ·" - ,, ' - · - · '' ' · ' ' ' 10 . IC. . . asWVVTE'> fLai\,LUTa fLEV OVf1.1.LaXEW avTOlS, EL oE fL1J ryE, 1JUVXWV EXEW leaL cpLt.,ov'> ElvaL Kapx1JOovfm.s Ev Elpf}vv fLEvovcra'>). 1214 The inscription is preserved in JG 1 2 4 7 (see also SEG 10.136) and records the creation of a friendship and symmachja between Athens and Carthage. Stroheker 1954: 163-65 notes this inscription and other developments at this time. 1215 For the rebuilding of Selinus, see Diad. Sic. 13.63.3-4. For the return of the bones of the Syracusans, see Diod. Sic. 13.75 ('ra TWv TETE/-..,EvT1}1Cinwv O(rrii avv1}8pot-~E). For further discussion of the ideological implications of Hermocrates and the Carthaginians, see Vanotti 2005: 272-75. See also chapter 2, pages 114-16. 369 focused on fighting the Carthaginians and on portraying them as the ultimate enemy, so as to avoid fighting battles with his own citizens. Furthermore, the same ploy would be used by Agathocles almost a century later. The improvement of relations between the Carthaginians and Sicilians after the influence of Timoleon around the island was a roadblock for Agathocles to gain power. Warfare waged against the Carthaginians under Agathocles, the supreme commander, was the 1216 . perfect way for the future tyrant to seize power in Syracuse. In th1s way, diplomacy again did not serve the interests of the tyrant. Once the tyrant established his power, however, the need for diplomacy swung to the other extreme. As with Greek cities, diplomacy and the sending of envoys became a necessary way of preventing any hostility that threatened the position of the tyrant by external forces. Thus, the early career of Dionysius I was focused on dealing with Carthage in such a way that the tyrant could extend his influence across the island while not threatening his own rule in Syracuse. Thus, even while Carthage was attempting to make peace with the Sicilians at the beginning of his rule, Dionysius I would begin to spread his rule in eastern Sicily (e.g. at Gela and Camarina) under the guise of protecting their inhabitants against the encroachment of the Carthaginians. 1217 Although battles between Dionysius and the Carthaginians 1216 For pre-Agathoclean relations with Carthage, see Diad. Sic. 19.4.3 (where the Carthaginians were allies of the Agathoclean enemy Sostratus). For discussion of the anti-Carthaginian sentiments of Agathocles, see Anello 1990: 212. 1217 As discussed above, Syracuse and Carthage had been in peaoe talks in 407 (Diad. Sic. 13.79.8). Carthage also had sent off embassies to Acragas to prevent war (Diad. Sic. 13.85.2). For discussion of the 'threat' of Carthage used by Dionysius, see Anello 2008: 84-87 and Chapter 2, pages 119-21. Whittaker 1978: 60-63 also discusses the exaggeration of the Carthaginian threat in ancient authors. 370 were common at times, treaties signed by the two powers often calmed down hostilities. Various treaties and the sending envoys helped to set the boundaries between the territory under the sway of Dionysius in the eastern half of Sicily and the Carthaginian epiluateja. A treaty of 405 gave the Carthaginians their original inhabitants in Sicily (as well as the Elymians and the Sicani) and required Gela, Camarina, Selinus, Acragas, and Himera to pay tribute, while it gave Dionysius hegemony over the Syracusans (Diad. Sic. 13.114.1). 1218 , 1 \:' r I " A I \ ' I ' \ " \: "8 aCYfLEVW') 0 V7raKOVCYaV'TO') 'TOV i..l.WVVCYWV 'TTJV e~p7JV7JV E'lr~ 'TOUYOE E EV'TO: K \: 1 9 \ " 't ' " ' 1 'E> 1 \ ~ 1 apxr;oovuvv ewa~ fLE'ra 'Tcvv es apxr;'l a7rouavv '"VfLOVr:; Ka~ -'-M<avov<:;: ~ l 1 \:\ \ 'A 1 " \:' !I 1 \ \:\ 1 4EI'vWOVV'TWV') oe Ka~ Kparyav'Twovr:;, E'n o f-LEpawv<:;, npo<:; oe 'TOV'Tou;; r ' ' ' K I ' " ' ' ' I " ,, ,.+, I "'' e'"CfJOV') Ka~ af-Lapwawv<:; oucew fLEV ev WTE~X,UPTou:; 'Tau; 7ro,~,eu~, -yopov oe ' ' ' K ~ ' A ' ~, ' M ' ' "' ' ' 'TEI'vEW 'TOU; apX,TJUOVWU:;: EOV'TWOV') OE Ka~ E(J(Tl]VWV') Ka~ £ .. MCEI'v0V') r! , I 9 \~ I \'\A I I e a'7TaV'Ta<; aV'TOVOfLOV') ewa~, Ka~ 4VpaKOCYWV') fLEV V'lrD i..l.WVVCYWV 'TE'Ta)(. a~, ' "'' ' ,, ' ' " ' "' " ' " " ' p l " 'Ta oe aVX.JLal'vUJ'Ta Ka~ 'Ta<; VaV') a7rOOOVVa~ 'TOV') EX,OV'Ta') 'TOU; a'lrOt-Jai\DVUL. Dionysius was glad to comply, and they concluded peace on the following terms. To the Carthaginians will belong, together with their original colonists, the Elymi and Sicani. The inhabitants of Selinus, Acragas, and Himera, as well as those of Gela and Camarina, may dwell in their cities, which shall be unfortified, but shall pay tribute to the Carthaginians. The inhabitants of Leontini and Messene and the Siceli shall all live under laws of their own making, and the Syracusans shall be subject to Dionysius. Whatever captives and ships are held shall be returned to those who lost them. 1218 The treaty also gave autonomy to Leontinoi, Messana, and the Sicels. 371 Another treaty in 392 confirmed these boundaries, although it increased his empire in Sicily by giving Dionysius hegemony over the Sicels and Tauromenium. 1219 After a more difficult war in 383, Dionysius created signed another treaty similar to the first two, except that the Carthaginians received Selinus and Acragas as far as the Halycus River (a common border from now on for the division between Carthage and the Greeks. 1220 A few notes about the treaties. Most of the focus of the treaties was on the maintenance of Dionysius's rule as tyrant rather than on the position of Syracuse, as Dionysius and his envoys had the ultimate say in the terms, as with the treaty of 405. 1221 Other times, the assembly did appear to have a say, at least in declaring war on the Carthaginians in 398, while the alliance of Athens and Syracuse in 368/7 also mentioned the boule of the Syracusans. These institutions likely were rubber stamps of the tyrant or were a way for Dionysius to make the citizens feel involved (or to take the blame if defeat occurred). 1222 In addition, the treaties themselves (at least as noted in Diodorus) were not alliances per se but rather geographical decisions of what cities/areas would belong to Carthage. 1223 1219 Diad. Sic. 14.96.4 ("2.1KEicov' o€ OEiv Tavpopivwv). 1220 Diad. Sic. 15.17.5. 1221 See again Diad. Sic. 13.114.1. , ' V'lfO 1222 Diad. Sic. 14.45.2 notes that the Assembly of the Syracusans ratified the decision of Dionysius to make war in 398 (avvfryaryEV EKK"'A/r]ulav Ka'i 7rapEKd"'A£L ToVc; "'i.vpaKouLovc; 7r6t.,EfLOV cfEVE'fKEiv 7rpo' TOV' Kapx1]00VWV,). JG Il 2 105 details the role of the entire city in the honors given to the tyrant. See Giovannini 2007: 130-32 for the power balance in these treaties. 1223 See again Diad. Sic. 15.17.5, which lists Selinus and Acragas as Carthaginian cities, as well as territory west of the Halycus River, a common boundary that was also in effect during the intervention of Timoleon and the rule of Agathocles. See Stylianou 1998: 206-8 for the nature of the treaties. 372 These treaties often also dictated the status of certain cities, such as the treaty of 405/4, which noted that certain cities were forced to knock down their walls and to 'b . . ld . . 1224 U f I h . I d pay tn ute or to mamtam o mag1strac1es. n ortunate y, t ese treat1es a so o not have particulars about the process of ambassadors, but the presence of these treaties certainly proves their existence. More importantly than the envoys, these treaties also show how Dionysius had to strike a balance between battling with the Carthaginians and knowing when to stop and make peace. Thus, throughout the first half of the fourth century, the territory of these two powers was fairly stable, although selected cities changed masters during this time. This fairly stable political division also allowed Dionysius to occasionally turn his gaze away from Sicily and to focus on overseas territories, as he had begun at this time. The question of the Carthaginian 'empire' ( epiluateja) is important, since its changing size would dictate the tenor of relations between the tyrants and Carthage. 1225 In addition, the change in Carthaginian hegemony in Sicily also would affect the routes of mobility on the island and would limit the migration of Greeks between cities (although the ability of Greeks and Carthaginians to move into each other's territories certainly was possible). The discussion concerning the epjkrateja of the Carthaginians often argues for the coherence of their rule on the island, rather than just maintaining individual cities with various degrees of autonomy dotted throughout the western part of the island. It seems that there were two phases of 1224 See Diad. Sic. 13.114 and 14.65 respectively. See also Bondi 1990-1991: 226-27 for the changing of statuses for certain cities and Anello 1986: 116-21 for analysis of the treaty. 1225 For an overview of the epjkrateja (or eparchja) of Carthage on Sicily, see Tusa 1990-1991: 168-70. 373 Carthaginian presence on Sicily, the first merely a commercial relationship with the island based mainly on emporja, with little political influence. 1226 Early in the reign of Dionysius, Carthaginian strongholds were dotted throughout the island with little military presence, although it seems that a few military garrisons were placed in strategic locations. 1227 Even at the end of the fifth century, however, the stance of Carthage in the affairs of Sicily was mostly defensive, with the city only getting involved when its interests were threatened or when aid was sought by other cities. 1228 Indeed, over the next few decades, it seems that Dionysius I often provoked C h . . . I h . h h d d h. . 1229 art agmmn mvo vement at t e pomt w en e attempte to exten 1s empue. During this time, it seems that the Carthaginians were content in having limited political control of the island, by focusing mainly on strategic economic ports on the edges of the island. It seems that the epjkrateja began toward the end of the reign of Dionysius I. 1230 A series of forts, rural settlements, and coinage from the Carthaginian cities of 1226 Bonnet 2009: 31 argues for these two stages of Carthaginian presenoe on the island. 1227 For example, as noted by Anello 1990: 208, during the attack of Dionysius on Motya in 397, there is no mention of a Carthaginian garrison (Diad. Sic. 14.51). Whittaker 1978: 73-74 suggests the presence of military garrisons, such as Heracleia Minoa. 1228 For example, Carthage got involved against Selinus only after the request of Segesta and brought a small number of troops (Diad. Sic. 13.43-44). Anello 1990: 203-4 argues that Carthage likely did not wish to spread their hegemony or to found their epjkrateja at this time. The Carthaginians were fearful of angering the Syracusans, who had just defeated the Athenians a few years earlier (Diad. Sic. 13.43.4). 1229 Whittaker 1978: 69 mentions several examples, including his attack on Pyrgi and his attempt to set us a base on Corsica. Strabo 5.2.8, when describing the attack on Pyrgi by Dionysius, states that he did so while he was on his way to Cyrnus, located on Corsica (1caTa TDv 7r/-..,oVv TDv €7rL KVpvov). 123 ° For an armistice signed between the Carthaginians and Dionysius I near the end of his reign, 374 the west, which denote a cohesive administration, verify this burgeoning empire. 1231 The number of soldiers on the island under Carthaginian control also increased at this time, although this military presence would gradually decrease throughout the fourth century. 1232 Archaeological evidence testifies to continued Punicization in the following decades throughout the interior of the island, with the construction of new settlements and phrourja/ 233 Such forts not only provided a way to repel the increasing empire of the Dionysii in the hinterland of Sicily but also unified the territory of the Carthaginians and marked it as a separate entity. The epjkrateja again became stronger during the reign of Agathocles, with a unified coinage system and administration. 1234 see Diad. Sic. 15.73.4. Tusa 1990-1991: 166 discusses different views for the start of the epjkrateja, including before the treaty of 374, after the peace treaty signed by Dionysius II in 366, or during the rule of Agathocles. 1231 Anello 1990: 209-10 notes that, after the treaty of 374, the Carthaginians began to increase their presence on the western part of the island. 1232 Anello 1986: 172-73 notes that the Carthaginian army on the island shrunk from over 100,000 (Diad. Sic. 13.80.5) to approximately 14,000 by the end of the fourth century (Diad. Sic. 19.106.2). 1233 Anello 1986: 170-72 provides an overview of this evidence. Monte Adranone shows Punic influence in its temple and city layout. A new line of Carthaginian oenters from Himera in the north to Heracleia Minoa in the south appears (including Crania, Monte Platanella, Monte Sara, San Benedetto, and Rooca Nadore). Other rural settlements also appear in the interior around Caltabellotta and Ribera. Although the creation of these sites lasts for several decades, the impetus of their construction seems to stem from this new epjkrateja, 1234 Anello 1986: 174-77 discusses numismatic evidence of various issues of coins between 390 and 290, which demonstrate a separate administration on the island. Certain legends ('MMHNT, 'MHMHNT, or S 'MMHNT) show destination for members of the island and most likely for soldiers. Local issues of Carthaginian cities ended in 305/300 but other coins at this time appeared, coins which suggest the existence of magistrates whose job it was to pay mercenaries. 375 Unlike his father, Dionysius II did not need to create an enemy to consolidate his rule. Having been given the mandate to rule by his father, Dionysius II needed to fend off any threats within the city that would plague his rule. Thus, most diplomacy with Carthage under the new tyrant was undertaken to assuage Carthage and to prevent attacks that could distract him from his affairs closer to home. Diplomacy early in his rule was performed mainly under the aegis of his uncle, Dion. 1235 Dian was sent several times as ambassador to Carthage as documented in the sources, 1236 although his closeness would cause him to be suspected of treason in a letter that was perhaps fabricated by jealous members of Dionysius's court. 1237 Regardless of the veracity of the letter, the Carthaginians ironically likely did play a role in the coup of Dian to gain rule in Syracuse. When Dian was docking in Sicily to begin his campaign, he landed at Heracleia Minoa, a stronghold of the Carthaginians, where his guest-friend Sinalus (or Paralus) gave him shelter. 1238 Although this aid was not a concerted effort by all Carthaginians, the relationship fostered between Dian and Carthage continued after he took power. Dian did not find the threat of the Carthaginians in the western half of the island sufficient enough and allowed them . . h . :J_ • h 1239 to mamtam t eu ep11aatem t ere. 1235 For a review of the relations of Dian with the Carthaginians, see Marasoo 1982: 160-63. 1236 For example, see Plut. Vit. Djon 5.8 (dA,A,a npEa/3ELa'; TE TG.s fLeyLOTar;; OufJICEL Ka'i 7rEfJ.CTr6fLEVor;; 7rpo' Kapx1Jooviov'). 1237 For the episode, see Plut. Vlt. Djon 14.3-4. 1238 Plut. VIt. Djon 25.5-6 (7rapWv 6 Kapx1]06vwr;; tipxwv "£Vval\,o') Ev Tip xwpLcp, gEvor;; &v ICaL cpLt.,o') b.Lwvor;; ). 1239 Galvagno 2005: 102-3 notes that this is in direct opposition to the advioe given by Dian's advisor, Plato, who warned against the barbarization of the island in numerous places, including Pl. Ep. 7.336a, 8.353a, and 8.357a. 376 After the intervention of Timoleon and the defeat of the Carthaginians at the battle of Crimisus in 340, conflict with the Carthaginians died down again before the entrance of Agathocles into the political picture. Rather than being an enemy, the Carthaginian Hamilcar served as a peace broker between the Syracusans and the military leader Agathocles. The Syracusans had asked Hamilcar for help in protecting Syracuse when Agathocles attempted to besiege the city after his second period of exile. 1240 Agathocles, however, also was a beneficiary of the diplomacy of Hamilcar, since Hamilcar had helped to broker a peace between Agathocles and several cities around the island, including Syracuse 1241 and Messina. 1242 Although Agathocles would receive additional help against hostile exiles of Messina who had transferred to Agrigento by the Spartan Acrotatus, 1243 Hamilcar would play a role in the negotiations between all cities involved. 1244 Hamilcar provided stability between the eastern and western spheres of influence on the island by signing a treaty with the tyrant re-establishing boundaries. 1245 Did Hamilcar, however, represent the 1240 Note, however, that Carthage had originally been tied to the oligarchs of Syracuse, with whom the city allied itself to prevent the power of Agathocles (Diad. Sic. 19.5.1-3). 1241 Just. Epjt. 22.2, Polyaenus, Strat. 5.3.7, and Diad. Sic. 19.5.4-6. For the relationship between Agathocles and Hamilcar, see Doloe 1960: 156-61. Doloe also calls into question the veracity of the episode. See also Chapter 1, pages 106-7. 1242 For the conflict between Agathocles and Messina, see Diad. Sic. 19.65.5 and 19.71.6-7. 1243 Acrotatus, who was hated by his own citizens, was sent over to Sicily ostensibly to mediate between Agathocles and the cities Messina, Agrigento, and Gela. Instead, he prooeeded to murder Sosistratus, the leader of the exiles, thereby helping to weaken this threat to the rule of Agathocles. For his intervention, see Diad. Sic. 19.70-71 and Magnetto 1997: 39-42. Berger 1992: 17-18 discusses the various stasejs of the Acragantines that involved the intervention of Syracuse. 1244 Diod. Sic. 19.71.6 (jJBitxdmavcro'; TGs uvv81}K,ar;; 'Af-1-t>.xov TaLi Kapx7]0ovfov). 1245 The treaty would (again) affirm that Heracleia Minoa, Selin us, and Himera were to remain 377 Carthaginian state? Although his intervention undoubtedly created some stability and perhaps prevented Carthaginian losses in battles, his actions did not increase Carthaginian influence on the island. Previously Carthaginian strongholds did remain in the hands of Carthage, but no new territory was gained. In addition, by aiding Agathocles in his pursuit of tyranny in Syracuse, he created a new menace for the Carthaginians. The negative reaction to Hamilcar was seen upon his return to Carthage, where he was condemned, 1246 with one author portraying Hamilcar as a traitor to his country. 1247 In this case, the diplomacy of Hamilcar was certainly a boon to Agathocles by establishing his power but was not representative of the will of Carthage. Envoys from Carthage continued to be an integral part of relations between Agathocles and Carthaginians during more hostile times and were necessary in treaties between the two powers, such as that signed in 306/5. 1248 This treaty was again important in setting the boundaries between the territory of Agathocles and the Carthaginian epiluateja, although it likely maintained the earlier boundary of the Halycus River established by Timoleon. 1249 Envoys also were part of the later attacks that saw the Carthaginians on the doorstep of Syracuse and Agathocles with his army sailing away to attack the city of the Carthage. In this case, however, the under Carthaginian control, as noted in Diad. Sic. 19. 71. 7. For a discussion of Hamil car as arbitrator, see Ager 1996: 55-57. 1246 Diad. Sic. 19.72.2 and Just. Epjt. 22.3. 1247 Consolo Lang her 1980: 322-25 discusses the negative image of Hamilcar in Justin. 1248 For the discussion of this treaty and its boundaries, see Van Compernolle 1954:395-98. 1249 This treaty between Carthage and the Greeks, signed in 339/8, is mentioned in Diad. Sic. 16.82.3. 378 envoys were sent to Syracuse to fool the citizens into surrendering by falsely claiming that Agathocles had been defeated. 1250 In the end, however, Agathocles and the Carthaginians fought battles both near Sicily and on the African continent for several years, until the soldiers of Agathocles made peace with the Carthaginians after Agathocles had escaped back to Sicily. 1251 Within the relations between Dionysius I and Agathocles, we see that most diplomacy and relations undertaken with the Carthaginians was of a defensive nature. Both sides wished to protect themselves from the advance or attack of the other. Except for the few instances when the Carthaginians threatened Syracuse or the one instance when Agathocles attacked Carthaginian territory, both parties were successful in keeping the other out of their respective realms. In addition, the border between Carthaginian and Syracusan hegemony in Sicily remained fairly stable at this time. This relationship between the tyrants and Carthage was still positive for the tyrants, both because they were able through diplomacy to prevent extreme threat to their rule at home and to use the threat of Carthage to argue for their own hegemony as protectors of Sicily. II. Peoples ofltaly As noted before, after the tyrants established their rule in Syracuse and Sicily, they turned their interest to other locations abroad, often to the shores of Italy. The tyrants also had contacts with several non-Greek peoples on the mainland. 1250 Diad. Sic. 20.15.2-3. This trick did not work, and the ambassadors were sent away. See Raffone 2001: 221-23 for discussion of this passage. 1251 Diad. Sic. 20.69.3-4. Two sons of Agathocles were murdered by the soldiers after they had learned of the escape of Agathocles to Sicily. 379 A city indirectly in contact with the tyrants through the influence of several groups from the second half of the fourth century (e.g. Carthage and the Celts) was Rome. 1252 The mention of the relationship between the tyrants and Rome was nonexistent in the sources, although common relations with other peoples of southern Italy (e.g. Lucanians and Samnites) would have suggested at least some mixing. 1253 In addition, Rome had genealogical links with certain cities of Sicily, especially Segesta. 1254 The limited influence of Rome under the Dionysii and threats from the Etruscans and Celts during the time of Agathocles, however, likely limited any formal contact between the powers of Rome and Syracuse. 1255 Furthermore, a series of treaties between Carthage and Rome distinguished clearly demarcated spheres of influence, which often meant that Sicily was off-limits to Rome. 1256 A series of three treaties explicated the rights of Romans in Sicily, beginning with the treaty of 509, which stated that Romans were given equal rights in trading in Sicily on the same terms as others. 1257 The second treaty, signed in 306, followed the first 1252 For example, the Celts created an alliance with Dionysius I after they had sacked Rome. 1253 Marasco 1984: 102-4 and Giannelli 1974: 23-24 discuss the lack of mention between Rome and the tyrants (especially Agathocles). They note that Rome had too much on its hands with the Etruscans and Gauls at this time and that the treaty between Rome and Carthage of 306 prevented Roman influence on the island. 1254 For example, Aeneas is said to have inhabited Segesta, while the Elymians were also said to have shared in Trojan heritage (Thuc. 6.2.3). See Cic. Verr. 2.4. 72 for the traditional links between Segesta and Rome and Zambon 2008: 222-23 for this cognatjo between Rome and Sicily. 1255 Marasco 1984: 102-4 and Giannelli 1974: 23-24. 1256 For a brief survey of the treaties, see Pedech 1964: 187-91. 1257 For the first treaty, see Polyb. 3.22-23. Rome was to stay away from Carthaginian territory, as well as to have limited contact in other areas (e.g. Libya and Sardinia). On its part, Carthage was to stay out of Latium, although it had free hand to deal with Greek or Etruscan threats in 380 treaty by limiting the spheres of influence of each power and by keeping the Romans out of Sicily and the Carthaginians out of Italy (although the Romans did have more · h d · s· il ) 1258 Th · 1259 · d · 279 · ng ts to tra e m 1c y . e most pertment treaty, s1gne m , agam defined Sicily as part of Carthaginian territory and forbade Roman intervention there. 1260 Thus, for Agathocles, such a treaty of non-intervention created problems with the Carthaginians, as Carthage would not need to worry about Rome meddling as they attempted to conquer Sicily. 1261 On the other hand, since Rome would not have concern for the Carthaginians or for affairs in Sicily, Rome could deal with the threat of the Etruscans, a group unfriendly both to the Carthaginians and Romans but friendly toward Agathocles. 1262 While the common interest in Magna Graecia at this time between the tyrants and Romans ensured that the two powers certainly knew of one another, the general policy of the Romans during this time of the remained of Italy. Walbank 1957: 341-44, in describing the treaty, notes that clauses in this treaty and the following treaties dealt with commercial and not political rights (e.g. that trade was strictly regulated) 1258 For the text of the second treaty, see Poly b. 3.24, as well as Diad. Sic. 16.69.1 and Livy 7.27.2. For modern discussion of the treaty, see Walbank 1957: 346-48, who notes that the Carthaginians had the upper hand in the terms of the treaty. 1259 For the last treaty, see Polyb. 3.25, Livy 9.43.26, and Serv. Aen. 4.628. 1260 Polybius seems to doubt the authenticity of the treaty (3.26), as he could not find a copy of the treaty and believed that Philinus was merely a pro-Carthaginian historian who did not report the treaty properly. See Mitchell 1971: 634-36 for discussion of the treaty, which is also known as the treaty of Philinus. Walbank 1957: 354 argues that the treaty of 306 was not that of Philinus, who was reporting a treaty signed at the end of Rome's war with Pyrrhus. 1261 For the problems that this treaty created for Agathocles and the possible ways for the tyrant to combat them, see De Sensi Sestito 1995: 19-23. 1262 For example, as noted before, the Etruscans sent ships to help break up the Carthaginian blockade of Syracuse in 307 (Diad. Sic. 20.61.6 and Just. Epjt, 22.8.4-6). 381 disengagement from Sicily (and their preoccupation with spreading their rule closer to home) limited any formal relations between Syracuse and Rome. Another non-Greek group that would radically alter the landscape of the island was the Campanians. They had been an important part of the rule of the tyrants as early as Dionysius I, for whom they served as a bodyguard and who saved him from mutiny at the beginning of his rule. 1263 Due to constraints of the scope of this project, their full usage cannot be fully analyzed, but their availability as mercenaries was utilized by both Greeks and Carthaginians. Although their use as mercenaries by the tyrants was continuous, it is not known if the tyrants had official political relations with the Campanians. For example, was there some central body with whom the tyrants communicated? The large numbers of Campanians used by the tyrants, especially Dionysius I, certainly would suggest the possibility. They may, however, have come through xenologoj or other means that were less official. In any case, the Campanians did not appear as a unified political group during the fifth and early fourth centuries on the island of Sicily. During the end of the fourth century and beginning of the third century, however, the Campanians began to use their military power in order to assert their political power in several locations. During this time, they neither returned to Italy I . d . b"l . h h . 1264 Th nor mere y ex1ste 1n a mo 1 e environment t roug mercenary serv1ce. ey became sedentary in several locations. The first location was in the western half of the island, at the site of Entella. The Campanians had asserted themselves at the site 1263 Diad. Sic. 14.8.5-9.3. The Campanians originally were left behind in the serviCe of the Carthaginians to guard Sicily, as noted in 14.8.5. 1264 For an overview of the development of the Mamertines in Sicily, see Zambon 2001: 266-69. 382 as early as 404, when a group of cavalry gathered by Dionysius I entered the city on the false pretense of becoming fellow inhabitants, killed the male citizens, married their wives, and took possession of the city (Diad. Sic. 14.9.8-9). 1265 , ~· K , - e , "' ,.... , 't , , , 'Tovo;; oe afL7ravovr:; 'Tau:; Ka r;~<ovuau:; owpeau:; 'T~fLTJCYar:; esa7rE(PTeu~,ev eK 'Tijc; 7r61\,ewr:;, VcpopWf-Levo<;;; aln·Wv 'T0v dj3ef3a~6'Tr;'Ta. oi 7ropev8Ev'Te<;;; elc; ''E l l ' I ' ' " ,, l p " ' ' I V'TEI'vl'vaV, Ka~ 7rE~CYaV'TE') 'TOV') EV 'TV 'lrDI'vE~ l'vaf-JEW eaV'TOV') CYVVOU<OV'), ' ' e I \ \ '.P " ' I ,.+, t \ \: \ " " VVICTO') E'lr~ EfLEVO~ 'TOV') fLEV TJJVWV'Ta') a7rECY 'YaSav, 'Ta') oe ryvvaucar:; 'TCVV ~ e I I I \ /l 7rapaawovor; ev'Tcvv 'l7JfLaV'Ter:; Ka'Teuxpv 'TTJV 7ro,~,w. To the Campanians he awarded the gifts that were due and then dispatched them from the city, paying attention to their fickleness. These men made their way to Entella and persuaded the men of the city to receive them as fellow-inhabitants. Then they fell upon them by night, slew the men of military age, married the wives of the men with whom they had broken faith, and possessed the city. Dionysius, however, would attack Entella and Segesta in 39 7 after laying waste to Motya and would take possession near the end of his rule in 368. 1266 The site would be taken over by the Carthaginians in 345, although it eventually would be restored to independence by Tim olean in 341. 1267 The continued existence of the site into the third century (albeit with problems) is attested by the Entella Tablets. The tablets, 1265 D. d s· 14 9 9 c ·• e' · "E '' ' ' ' ' - '' ' f3 - • ' lO • lC. • • OL 7ropev EV'TE') El8 V'TEI'vl'vaV, KaL 7rE/.1IaVTE') TOV') EV TTJ 'lrDI'vEL 1\,a EW EaVTOV') uvvofxovc;, vvKTD'> E7rd3fp .. evoL ToVc; 0Ev i]f3iiwrac; d7r€ucpagav, TG.s OE ryvvai.J(,ac; Twv ' e' I I \ 1"\ ) 7rapaOWOVU1] EV'TWV 11JfLaVTE'; Ka'TEUXOV 'T1}V 'lrOI'vW , 1266 Diad. Sic. 14.48.5 and 15.73.2. 1267 For the destruction, see Diod. Sic. 16.67. For the restoration under Timoleon, see Diod. Sic. 16.73.1-2. For the development and decline of the area around Entella, see Vaggioli 2001: 60- 61. 383 which have been the subject of much controversy and much debate, 1268 described the political situation of the town during the First Punic War, most likely in 249. 1269 The tablets discussed recent issues in the history of the town (beyond the chronological scope of this dissertation), but the continued Campanian influence was demonstrated by the appearance of meddjces in the tablets, who were dual leaders at Entella. 1270 As noted above, the Campanians truly began to unify during the reign of Agathocles. This unification would culminate in 289 at the very end of the reign of Agathocles with the successful attack on Messana. Although the exact reasoning for the mass exodus of Campanians to this area at this time is unknown (although one ancient author asserts that Oscans from Samnium migrated following a plague 1271 ), the result has been recorded. The Mamertines had influence in the election of new magistrates in Syracuse in 289, when they caused a fuss after being forbidden to vote. 1272 After the Syracusans were able to convince the Campanians to leave, the 1268 The nine tablets (one of which has been proven to be fake) have no known find site, although they all have a provenance in the inscription of Entella (except for one from the neighboring town of Nakona). Several appeared on the art market after likely being discovered by clandestjnj in the 1970s. While several are still extant, some disappeared again after being transcribed. 1269 The bibliography for the Entella Tablets is quite substantial. In an edited volume that discusses various aspects of the tablets, Ampolo 2002: xi-xiii argues for this date or at least for the period 254-241 BC. This volume also discusses the various dates that have been conjectured in the volume, including one opinion (Porciani 2002: 43-45) that the tablets date to the period of Agathocles' wars with Carthage in 309f8. 1270 These eventually would be superseded by hjeromnamones, a development that would reflect the continued Hellenization of the area. 1271 See the entry on the Mamertini in the Lexjcon on Festus. 1272 Diad. Sic. 21.18.1. 384 mercenaries all went north to Messana. After the men were welcomed into the town by the citizens, the Campanians again slaughtered the male citizens, married their widows, and took possession of the town (Diad. Sic. 21.18.1 ). 1273 ' e' ' ' ' e ' , <:;:' e · ' , M ' Ka~ 7raparyevr; EV'TE') E'lr~ 'TOV 7r0p fLOV, V7TEOE)(. TJCYaV V'lrD 'TCVV E(JCFTJVUJJV . ,, "',, , , . , ~, , , , "' , "' , , , "'e, OJ') av 'YU'vO~ Ka~ CYVfLfLaxpL V'lrD OE 'TCVV 'lrOI'vUTWV 'YU'vO-ypOVW') ava11./l]-y EV'TE') ' \ ' I \ ',.+,I \ r \: f:: I \ \ I eu;; 'Ta<:; ouaa<:;, VVK'TO'J e't'ovevcrav 'Tovo;; v7rooesaf-Levov<:;, Ka~ 'Ta<:; 'TOV'TCVV ryvvalxa') r-;0fLaV'TE') Kan!.(rxov 'T0v 7r6tvw. When they reached the Strait, they were welcomed by the people of Messana as friends and allies. When they had been hospitably received into the homes of the citizens, they slew their hosts in the night, married their wives, and took possession of the city. The town was renamed Mamertina, after an Oscan version of the god Mars, and the Campanians of that city were known as Mamertines. Although the viciousness of the episode may reflect anti-Campanian sentiment and prejudice against . 1274 mercenanes, the town certainly displays more Oscan elements after this date. Archaeological finds in necropoJejs and workshops show a m1xmg of Greek and Campanian that would last for many decades. 1275 This episode does not show an 1273 For this episode, see also Polyb. 1. 7.1-5, and the aforementioned entry of Festus. 1274 Asheri 1977: 33-35 discusses the stereotype of Campanians sweeping in, slaughtering citizens, and marrying wives. He mentions both the 404 episode at Entella and the 289 episode at Messana as examples of this stereotype. The language of Diodorus is very similar in both narratives. 1275 Zambon 2008: 45-48 discusses many of these examples, including brick seals and Oscan written in Greek letters. In addition, Tagliamonte 196 describes a dipinto vase dating from the end of the fourth century with the inscription ITa~eLa ITofL7rTLa (an Oscan name) was discovered in a tomb from Messana. This seems also to show limited influence of the Campanians even before this time. 385 example of interchange between a tyrant and another people but rather also demonstrates the result of continued contact between these two groups. Turning north, as Dionysius I expanded his empire throughout the coast of Italy, another major power presented itself to the tyrant: the Etruscans. Actual contact between Dionysius and the Etruscans appears to be limited. As he sought to gain resources for his campaigns (especially the payment of his mercenaries), wealthy Etruscan cities became a target. 1276 The most famous of these attacks was on the site of Pyrgi, using the piracy of the Etruscans and their blockade of Syracusan trade as reasons, although other sources describe this as a mere pretense for sacrilege and greed. 1277 From this attack, he was able to score 500 talents to pay his mercenaries, especially necessary for his continued attacks on the Carthaginians and his campaigns in Italy. 1278 Over the next decades, however, relations with the Etruscans appeared to be limited. After the intervention of the Etruscans in the . f T. I 1279 E campa1gns o 1mo eon, truscans again appeared in the campaigns of 1276 Sinatra 1996: 379 details several of these reasons for Dionysius to go to Etruria, including silver on Monte Amiata, iron on Elba, and their ties with trade to the far west. 1277 The attack on Pyrgi is discussed in Diad. Sic. 15.14.3-4. See also Polyaenus, Strat. 5.2.21, Aelian VH1.20, Strabo 5.2.8, and Aristotle Oec. 2.1349b. Giuffrida Ientile 1983: 74-75 notes that the description of greed and sacrilege in the sources stems from the negative biases of Timaeus. 1278 Sinatra 1996:380-81. 1279 Giuffrida Ientile 1983 discusses the Etruscan pirate(?) Postumius, who sailed into the harbor of Syracuse with twelve ships but was put to death by Timoleon (Diad. Sic. 16.82). Even though they did not appear in the historical record for several decades in Sicily, it seems likely that they were still present, due either to their alliance with Athens or with prisoners taken from Pyrgi. Bronze ooinage from this time has also been found in Sicily with the legend TYPPH[NDN] with the head of Athena. See Zambon 2001: 231-35 for an overview of the arrival of more Etruscans in Sicily in the second half of the fourth century, perhaps due to their exodus from northern Italy after the advance of the Celts. 386 Agathocles, both as mercenanes and as pirates. Such a relationship was not surprising, especially since Agathocles himself was said to have participated in piracy and encouraged such activities with other groups. 1280 Official relations between the Etruscans and Agathocles began as early as 314, when the city of Populonia sent soldiers to the aid of the tyrant. 1281 In addition, the Etruscans again sent help to Agathocles in 307, this time in the form of ships to the harbor of Syracuse to help liberate the city. 1282 In addition, Etruscan mercenaries were members of the army of the tyrant on several occasions, 1283 although (as with other mercenaries) their service was not without problems, as when they revolted from Agathocles due to lack of payment. 1284 The Etruscans thus served as a way for Agathocles to ensure that he maintained hegemony on the seas with a buffer zone between himself and the Carthaginians. The Dionysii also maintained good relations with the Celts, who were a good source of mercenaries for the tyrants. Their relationship started as early as 386, when Dionysius I made an alliance with them (Just. Epjt. 20.5.4-6). 1285 128 ° For Agathocles' activities as a pirate, see Just. Epjt. 22.1.14 (pjratjcam aduersus patrjam exercujt). De Souza 1999: 56-57 and Marasco 1984: 107-10 discuss Agathocles' relationship with Apulian pirates, after he supplied them with ships to attack his enemies. See also Diad. Sic. 21.4 (ml vav' lcTJuTpLKas xoprrywv ainoi,). Such efforts seem to be based not on an official alliance but the