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The 2011 NFL lockout: labor negotiations and their impact on public relations in professional sports leagues

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The 2011 NFL lockout: labor negotiations and their impact on public relations in professional sports leagues

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THE 2011 NFL LOCKOUT:
LABOR NEGOTIATIONS AND THEIR IMPACT ON PUBLIC RELATIONS IN
PROFESSIONAL SPORTS LEAGUES

by

Jonathan Gregory Lam

A Thesis Presented to the
FACULTY OF THE USC GRADUATE SCHOOL
UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA
In Partial Fulfillment of the
Requirements for the Degree
MASTER OF ARTS
(STRATEGIC PUBLIC RELATIONS)

May 2011

Copyright 2011

Jonathan Gregory Lam

ii
Epigraph
“We shall negotiate out of fear; and we shall never fear to negotiate.”
– John F. Kennedy

iii
Dedication
God: “I can do all things through Christ which strengtheneth me.” - Philippians
4:13. If it were not for You, I would not be here. Thank You for always being by my side.
After graduating from Syracuse, You knew how lost I was. I had no direction and no
plans. I finally applied here to USC and prayed with all my heart to be admitted to this
program. You knew how much I wanted it and how hard I would work for it. You have
also seen me through the darkest times of my life and I have always prevailed because of
You. You have made me all that I am and You will continue to make me all that I can
become.
Mom: “My mama told me, ‘Go to school. Get your doctorate. Something you
could fall back on, you could profit with.’ But still supported me when I did the
opposite.” I know I haven’t always made it easy on you, but you’ve always loved me and
believed in me. You raised me and you let me grow up on my own. You always said that
I could be great and I promise you I will be; I will make you proud. 爱你 DJ Sabby Sabz: It’s the mayaaaaaaa, suckaaaaaaaaa! Here we go now! Here we
go now! Ah-ha ah-ha ah-ha, GO CHEESE! Even though you drive me crazy (like when
you make up stories about your knee), you know how to make me laugh like no one else.
LT: Thanks for being my big bro. You’ve always done what’s best for me and
always supported me. You knew when to give me a break and when to push me, and I’ll
always appreciate that. HFF.
My other “little sister”: Mamma mia! I never would have thought this friendship
turned out the way it has. If I couldn’t vent to you about things, I probably would have

iv
gone crazy. You are (almost) always right, but even when I don’t listen to you, you still
have my back. I can only hope to be half as good to you as you have been to me. If you
ever need anything, I’m there for you.
To Charlie: What can I say that I haven’t already said? It’s been quite a ride and,
through good times and bad, I’m glad we’ve stuck together. You’ve heard me out, even
when I know you didn’t want to. You’ve pushed me like no other and I’m thankful for
having you in my corner. There’s nothing you can’t do; don’t let anyone tell you
otherwise. Just believe in yourself. I’m P.O.Y. and remember: T.G.T.N.D. “If they say,
why, why (ja da ja ja sa sa sa sa).”

v
Acknowledgements
I would like to acknowledge the contributions of my committee chair Jennifer
Floto and my readers Jonathan Kotler and Burghardt Tenderich. I appreciate your
thoughts to make this the best thesis possible. I especially appreciate your patience to
read through everything and still manage to pay close attention to detail. It is hard to
imagine that I was concerned about my ability to write 60 pages in the beginning and
now it has stretched to 138. As you know, sports is my passion and I sincerely hope that
passion is reflected in this thesis.
Jenn: Since I started this program, you have always been there to help me. You
cultivated my writing skills and taught me everything I know about crisis management
(and labor negotiations are the epitome of crisis management). You have encouraged me
and believed in me even when I doubted myself.
Jon: Your similar passion for sports strengthened this thesis and your attention to
detail is impeccable. I’m so grateful that I had the opportunity to study in London with
you. Beyond what you taught me about the United Kingdom, I appreciate our open
discourse. You keep me on my toes and I know to keep a sharp mind around you. It is not
enough to be steadfast in a discussion without having facts to argue your point. And even
if you don’t have the facts, you can still win the debate. I guess that’s what they teach you
in law school. Hopefully, that’s the next step.
Burghardt: Thank you for reading this on such short notice. It especially must not
have been easy to read a thesis of this length in that timeframe, but you still managed to
give me interesting ideas and comments.

vi
I would also like to thank David Carter, Josh Rawitch and Jeff Moeller for taking
the time to interview with me. You are all outstanding teachers and truly know the
intricacies of this industry. There is certainly no way I could have written my
recommendations without your insights.

vii
Table of Contents
Epigraph II
Dedication III
Acknowledgements V
Abstract IX
Chapter One: Labor Negotiations and the 2011 NFL Lockout 1
Chapter Two: Why Labor Negotiations Fail 3
The Seven Virtues Versus the Seven Deadly Sins 3
Humility Versus Pride 3
Diligence Versus Sloth 4
Charity Versus Greed 4
Patience Versus Wrath 4
Unity 5
Transparency 5
Optimism 6
Chapter Three: The 1981 Major League Baseball Strike 7
Series of Events 7
Public Opinion 17
Chapter Four: The 2004-05 National Hockey League Lockout 21
Series of Events 21
Public Opinion 49
Chapter Five: The 1982 National Football League Strike 56
Series of Events 56
Public Opinion 61
Chapter Six: The 1987 National Football League Lockout 65
Series of Events 65
Public Opinion 73
Chapter Seven: Current Events of the 2011 National Football League Lockout 77
Issues 77
Emergence and Prominence of Social Media 78

viii
Chapter Eight: Tactics 79
Effective Leadership Communication Tactics: Ethos, Logos and Pathos 79
Logos 79
Ethos 80
Pathos 80
Effective Use of Social Media 81
Chapter Nine: NFLPA’s Challenges, Opportunities & Additional Tactics 84
Leadership of DeMaurice Smith 84
Attacking the League 85
Unity: Internal Communications 87
Unity: Social Media 89
Chapter Ten: NFL’s Challenges, Opportunities & Additional Tactics 91
Leadership of Commissioner Roger Goodell 91
Defending the League’s Reputation 93
Engaging with the Fans 97
Relationship with the Teams 102
Owners’ Unity 104
Chapter Eleven: Conclusion 106
Bibliography 110

ix
Abstract
Above all else, communication is the key to public relations. As PR practitioners,
our job is to listen to our audiences and communicate with them. Businesspeople
generally make decisions with the most economic sense, but incorporating public
relations into their operations would certainly yield the optimal payoff, especially in the
long-term. It is inconceivable that professional sports could exist without fans; yet, the
fans suffer the most during bouts between owners and players. We can push any message
we want, but actions speak louder than words. If there is no corresponding action for our
messages, then our practice is all for naught.
Public relations practices are not entirely different from private relations
practices. Generally speaking, we admire qualities like humility, diligence and patience;
these qualities establish trust. Conversely, qualities like pride, sloth and wrath detract
from that trust. We look for these qualities in public figures like we look for them in our
everyday relationships. Furthermore, labor negotiations are akin to an argument between
a mother and father. Communication between parents is key like communication between
owners and players. Yet, as the argument drags on, it is only a matter of time before the
fans, the proverbial children, see the contention. Does one side sacrifice its own
happiness and well-being for the “good of the children,” or does it compromise with its
other half to reach a happy ending? Does one tell the entire truth of the situation, or does
it omit enough truth to maintain optimism that there will be resolution? This thesis seeks
to identify how the owners, the players and, most importantly, the fans can all be one
happy family through the following steps:

x
1. Examine how the union and the league handled public relations efforts during
the 1981 MLB strike, 1982 NFL strike, 1987 NFL lockout and 2003-04 NHL
lockout, and how these efforts affected their positions at the bargaining table
and their relationship with the fans,
2. Weigh the public relations risks and rewards of communications, business and
legal operations,
3. Investigate what the players union can do to explain its side of the story—that
the NFL is a tyrant forcing them to play under unfair conditions,
4. Outline what steps the NFL can take to protect its reputation from such
attacks.

1
Chapter One: Labor Negotiations and the 2011 NFL Lockout
On March 11, the National Football League (NFL) indefinitely locked out the
National Football League Players Association (NFLPA) and its members, starting with
the upcoming 2011-12 season. The NFLPA has decertified as a union and is now
classified as a trade association, which allows the players to pursue antitrust litigation
against the league. For the sake of this thesis, it will be referred to as “the NFLPA” and
“the union.” The now-expired collective bargaining agreement (CBA) had been in effect
since 1993 and had been extended throughout the years, the last of which was on March
8, 2006. On May 20, 2008, 30 of 32 NFL owners voted to opt out of the agreement—
effectively shortening the agreement by two years. The league entered its “Final League
Year” on March 5, 2010 after the two organizations failed to extend the CBA; the
agreement expired on March 11 after an extension on March 3.
Labor negotiations play a major role in society. They are designed to create
equality between management and the rank and file, but more often than not and for a
variety of reasons, employers hold the power at the bargaining table. The NFL tops Major
League Baseball (MLB), the National Basketball Association (NBA) and the National
Hockey League (NHL) as the most profitable professional sports league in the world with
$8.8 billion in gross revenue.
1
Fans are ravenous for the product. The league stands as the
Goliath to the NFLPA’s David. “Despite the recession and notwithstanding a 4% increase
in ticket prices for the 2009 season, NFL attendance remained strong,” down only 1%

1
“The State of the Game: A Current Look At the Success of the League,” NFLPlayers.com,
http://www.nflplayers.com/articles/cba-news/the-state-of-the-game-a-current-look-at-the-success-of-the-
league/ (accessed December 2, 2010).

2
from the previous year.
2
So far, it appears that the owners are the villains because they
are locking the players out and taking the sport away from the fans. Yet, all hope is not
lost. Labor negotiations require strong leadership and strong messaging at both ends of
the bargaining table.

2
Ibid.

3
Chapter Two: Why Labor Negotiations Fail
The Seven Virtues Versus the Seven Deadly Sins
As will be observed in the following case studies, labor negotiations collapse
because of several reasons. Namely, parties face the trade-off between business and
public relations. It is a classic dilemma between accepting the short end of a deal and
maintaining public image, or holding out for the best deal at the cost of public image. The
league and the union ultimately make business decisions with a public relations risk.
Business interests and public relations are not mutually exclusive, yet labor negotiations
play them out as such. That is, a party may take the public relations risk in hopes of a
better business proposition, but eventually end up losing ground at both the bargaining
table and in the public arena, mostly because fans’ displeasure pressures that party to
accept a deal. League commissioners and union executive directors should display certain
exemplary characteristics by observing some of the seven virtues and avoiding the seven
deadly sins.
Humility Versus Pride
Pride may be the biggest problem in negotiations from which all other issues
originate. Neither side wants to give in to the other’s demands. If one begins to step down
from its position and appears willing to negotiate, then it believes it is giving the other
party an advantage. Both sides are willing to sacrifice their public image for a better
business proposition. This is a natural action because negotiations come down to
business. Willingness to negotiate on the finances facilitates talks tremendously and it
may be the biggest gesture a side can make, but a lack thereof ultimately stems from

4
fiscal responsibility, not pride. The issue with pride is not the willingness to move on the
bottom line, but the willingness to get a deal done.
Diligence Versus Sloth
The case studies will show that idle hands are the devil’s work and the more
stubborn side tends to end up on the losing end of the negotiation regardless. Whether or
not there is a direct correlation can only be speculated, but the tide certainly turns against
one party, which seemingly forces it to come to the bargaining table with a more
negotiable, if not defeatist, attitude. Both sides must approach these talks proactively and
continually make new proposals. It may appear desperate to the other side, but the
proposing side can restructure a different deal with the same financial outcome or make
concessions in exchange. What is important is that it is making an effort to get a deal
done and is not ashamed to make the first move.
Charity Versus Greed
Work stoppages generally occur when one party feels it is owed more
compensation than it is currently receiving. An important principle is whether this party
actually deserves more or simply wants more. There must be balance to sustain a
functioning system. Interestingly, this issue usually circles more around attitude than it
does around equity. The greedier party is generally the one that attempts to assert
dominance over the other party.
Patience Versus Wrath
It may appear counterintuitive, but both sides must exhibit patience without being
idle. There must be a constant effort to reach a deal, but the talks must appear amicable.

5
The more contentious the relationship, the further and further the two sides are from
reaching a deal. The relationship should be a partnership rather than an opposition.
Winning over the public should not be measured by how effectively one can belittle its
opponent because that sets an arena of antagonism and pessimism, which does not truly
favor anyone. One should be more favorable in the polls because it has a story that makes
it look better, not a story that makes its opponent look worse.

Unity
Herein lies the power of internal communications. The league must communicate
a unified message to its owners and teams, and the union to its players. Unity affects
public relations and operations efforts by strengthening an organization’s messaging and
resolve, respectively. The case studies will show that the party that shows cracks in unity
loses the negotiations because dissension shows weakness. As Abraham Lincoln said, “A
house divided against itself cannot stand.”

Transparency
Transparency is crucial to public relations. The most glaring problem during labor
negotiations is how it is used. Transparency should be used as an awareness-building
tactic, but more often than not, it turns into a way to engage in a public debate. Each
party must be aware of the facts. The league and the union already know the topics up for
bargaining, but they should be transparent with each other. Otherwise, reports surface
that one party is hiding information, which raises questions with the fans. The fans do not

6
need to know all the details of the negotiations because they will not understand it, but
they should be aware of the issues and the progress.

Optimism
Owners understand the financial stakes of not bringing the sport back, so the issue
is generally not if, but when the sport will come back. Maintaining optimism during
negotiations allows the fans to see an end in sight. In all the case studies, both the league
and the union have painted bleak pictures of negotiations because they are using the
media to pressure the other into breaking. It is a tremendous oversight because they are
directing these messages at each other, but seemingly do not realize that the fans are
seeing these messages as well. The league and the union already know if negotiations are
going poorly and are at a standstill. There is no need to publicize this because it takes
away fans’ hope of an imminent resolution.

7
Chapter Three: The 1981 Major League Baseball Strike
In this case study, we will observe how failure to prepare a long-term deal only
reopens past issues. The owners lost to the players for several reasons. First, the owners
lacked complete unity. Some owners publicly commented on negotiations while most
remained silent, namely because there were penalties for these statements. Second, the
union was proactive and it proposed several plans to the owners. Finally, the owners
lacked a leader. The commissioner stayed away from negotiations and delegated those
responsibilities. Also, representatives of both the league and the union argued with each
other in public. One owner went as far as to say the strike could ruin baseball, which
exemplifies the pessimism associated with public bickering.

Series of Events
In April 1980, players boycotted the final week of spring training because owners
took issue with how little they were compensated when they lost players to free agency.
According to the collective bargaining agreement at the time, players were eligible for
free agency after six years in the majors. Understandably, they would then sign with other
teams in search of higher salaries. In return, owners would receive a player from the
amateur draft. Although they agreed to it, owners were displeased with this process
because the talent of their rosters declined. They felt if they lost a player to another team,
they were owed a player as compensation by the signing team. Players obviously
disagreed with this proposal because that would defeat the purpose of free agency. Major
League Baseball was on the brink of a strike, but a May 23 meeting led to a negotiation

8
of the four-year CBA.
1
The issue was left unresolved and the 1980 season finished with
no work stoppages.
The threat of a strike resurfaced the following year. The players union remained
steadfast while team owners reportedly presented a united front as evidenced by this 1981
statement:
George Steinbrenner, principal owner of the New York Yankees, said today that
major league owners are “more unified and more prepared” for a strike by the
players than at any other time since he has been affiliated with baseball.
Steinbrenner, speaking at a luncheon of a Cleveland sports club, also said: ‘“I
don’t think a strike is going to help anybody. I wouldn’t blame the American
public for getting turned off.” … Steinbrenner, referring to Marvin Miller,
director of the players association, said a hard-nosed stance by the union “could
be a Waterloo” for him.
2

Perhaps feeling attacked, the 29-man executive board of the Major League Baseball
Players Association (MLBPA) voted unanimously on February 26, 1981 to strike on May
29 if the issue was not resolved. Miller responded, “We had no choice … We are still
ready, willing and able to negotiate a settlement, and we intend to try just that. There is
ample time between now and May 29 to do that. We chose that date because it gives us
the maximum time for the possibility of a settlement.”
3
The call for a strike triggered
denouncing reactions from the league offices. Commissioner Bowie Kuhn, an employee
of the owners, said that he “saw no reason for the players to strike … [and] called the

1
Dave Beaton, “Baseball Strike Still Possibility,” Miami News, January 5, 1981, Sec. B, Pg. 1.
2
AP, “Steinbrenner: Strike Threat Unifies Owners.” New York Times, February 19, 1981, Late Edition
(East Coast), http://www.proquest.com/ (accessed December 2, 2010).
3
Murray Chass, Special to the New York Times, “Player Union Sets May 29 Deadline.” New York
Times, February 26, 1981, Late Edition (East Coast), http://www.proquest.com/ (accessed December 2,
2010).

9
owners’ plan ‘very fair.’”
4
Ray Grebey, director of the player relations committee (PRC),
essentially said the players agreed to this contract and now they must stick to it:
The players’ action in scheduling a strike is most regrettable … Any attempt to
shift responsibility for their action to the 26 major league clubs is without
foundation and entirely inexcusable … The free-agent compensation plan, which
is at issue, was written in discussions between the clubs and the players last May
and was implemented in accordance with our May agreement.
5

In the meantime, Miller spoke to teams about the negotiation process and what the union
planned to do.
6
Even with this issue unresolved, the 1981 season opened as scheduled on
April 9.
One day earlier, the MLBPA “submitted two proposals to the owners’ labor
representatives … then asked the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service [led by
mediator Kenneth E. Moffett] to enter the negotiations.”
7
Things only got worse from
there, from both an operational standpoint and a communications standpoint. The owners
began to panic and re-signed players to lucrative contracts in order to preserve their
rosters because they seemingly anticipated they would lose in these negotiations and
projected salaries would only skyrocket after the issue was resolved. This was not even
the worst of it. The owners refused to speak about negotiations because, as we can see
from a New York Times article at the time, “they do not wish to incur hefty fines from the
five-man disciplinary committee that shook Harry Dalton [general manager] of the

4
Ibid.
5
Ibid.
6
UPI, “Fans Disrupt White Sox.” New York Times, March 7, 1981, Late Edition (East Coast),
http://www.proquest.com/ (accessed December 2, 2010).
7
Murray Chass, “Players Request Mediation.” New York Times, April 8, 1981, Late Edition (East
Coast), http://www.proquest.com/ (accessed December 2, 2010).

10
Milwaukee Brewers recently with a $50,000 penalty.”
8
Baltimore Orioles owner Edward
Bennett Williams was scheduled to meet with Commissioner Kuhn and American League
President Lee MacPhail for commenting on the negotiations.
9
Furthermore, owners were
unaware of the status of negotiations because the player relations committee restricted
them from attending sessions.
10
Their statements on these sessions, however, were less
than positive. One owner said, “I’ve heard nothing that sounds good,”
11
and another
owner said, “It’s becoming increasingly more obvious what’s going to happen, and that’s
nothing.”
12
Condescension became the tone as “some owners and other management
people have said they do not believe the players will strike, that they are making too
much money, have too many benefits and will not give all that up for an issue that
supposedly would have little impact on them.”
13
Reports also surfaced that Grebey told
his people that the players were bluffing and, at worst, would strike for only a few days.
14

Despite what Steinbrenner said three months earlier, it was evident the owners were
falling apart at the proverbial seams.

8
Murray Chass, “Baseball Talks: No Accord Seen.” New York Times, May 10, 1981, Late Edition
(East Coast), http://www.proquest.com/ (accessed December 2, 2010).
9
Murray Chass, “Baseball Talks Hotter; Progress Invisible.” New York Times, May 22, 1981, Late
Edition (East Coast), http://www.proquest.com/ (accessed December 2, 2010).
10
Murray Chass, “Baseball to Resume Negotiations Today; Outlook Pessimistic.” New York Times,
June 16, 1981, Late Edition (East Coast), http://www.proquest.com/ (accessed December 2, 2010).
11
Chass, “Baseball Talks: No Accord Seen.”
12
Ibid.
13
Ibid.
14
Ibid.

11
The league and the players union agreed to postpone the strike, but the National
Labor Relations Board filed for an injunction against the Player Relations Committee and
the clubs, which exposed the owners to a plethora of issues and would essentially force
them to negotiate with the MLBPA.
15
The request for injunction stated that the “owners
have failed to bargain in good faith and … that the players have a right to receive
financial data from the clubs for bargaining.”
16
The injunction placed the owners in a
lose-lose situation. If granted, it would have put their proposal for free agent
compensation on hold, but it would have pushed the strike back until the 1982 season. If
denied, the players would strike.
17
Now, the players’ union had more power at the
bargaining table and the owners seemed stubborn. Furthermore, at the hearing, both Kuhn
and Grebey “disavowed any link between the commissioner and the owners’ labor
efforts.”
18
Since the owners voted Kuhn as commissioner, it made sense for him to serve
as their representative. In fact, in order to avoid questioning by Louis Hoynes, chief
lawyer for the owners, Kuhn went so far as to submit an affidavit, which said, “I am not a
spokesman for the PRC either publicly or in collective bargaining.” His shirking of
responsibility as a negotiator between the two parties downgraded him as a commissioner
and leader and could have cost him has job.

15
Murray Chass, “Baseball Strike Off As Players, Owners Extend Deadline.” New York Times,
May 29, 1981, Late Edition (East Coast), http://www.proquest.com/ (accessed December 2, 2010).
16
Ibid.
17
Murray Chass, Special to the New York Times, “Kuhn's Role Issue in Talks.” New York Times,
June 4, 1981, Late Edition (East Coast), http://www.proquest.com/ (accessed December 2, 2010).
18
Ibid.

12
The injunction was not granted and after several talks failed between the two
parties, both Miller and Grebey had words for each other. “Grebey said the owners
‘advanced several ideas that were in the area that the association has raised concern
over.’ He said that the ideas represented movement, but Mr. Miller called them
insignificant.”
19
Miller reiterated the message that the players union did not want a strike,
but the owners refused to bargain reasonably: “We wanted them to amend it [their free
agent pool proposal] … make a counterproposal, make a series of counterproposals. They
are not interested.”
20
On June 12, Miller announced the players were on strike. At this
point, he stepped away from the bargaining table and handed his duties over to the new
players’ negotiating committee comprised of MLBPA lawyers Donald Fehr and Peter
Rose and four players: Bob Boone of the Philadelphia, Steve Rogers of the Montreal
Expos and Doug DeCinces and Mark Belanger of the Baltimore Orioles. Steinbrenner
made it a note to vocalize his displeasure of Miller’s move:
“Who does he think he’s kidding?” asked Steinbrenner. “Certainly not the
American public and certainly not the owners. He’s the man and everyone knows
it.”
“Marvin and the owners should get their tails back to the negotiating tables as
often and as long as is humanly possible in order to get this thing settled,” he said.
“It reminds me of a ship captain who has guided his ship across the ocean and just
at the crucial time when the ship is approaching New York harbor and the
strategic docking must take place, he turns command of the ship over to the
crew.”
Steinbrenner said that, although he liked and admired Miller, “as a baseball owner
who is totally interested in getting the game back together for the sake of the fans,

19
Murray Chass, “Baseball Players Go Out on Strike After Talks with the Owners Fail.” New York
Times, June 12, 1981, Late Edition (East Coast), http://www.proquest.com/ (accessed December 2, 2010).
20
Ibid.

13
I have to ask myself what is going on when I am told that the chief negotiator for
the players is not concerned enough to be present at a key negotiating session with
the owners and the Federal mediator?”
21

Miller’s departure left the MLBPA without an identifiable leader, just like when Kuhn
renounced his responsibility as a negotiator. This would be akin to the vice president
running the country. Yet, it is not as if Steinbrenner took it upon himself to lead the
negotiations.
Just four days after the strike was announced, people from both the players’ side
and the owners’ side did not foresee a speedy resolution.
22
Orioles owner Edward Bennett
Williams and Texas Rangers owner Eddie Chiles tried to take a more active role in the
negotiations, but since they were not allowed at the bargaining table, their attempts could
only go so far.
23
Though the owners gave the PRC their votes of confidence, this
indicated they were still uneasy about the progress of the talks and essentially brings into
question how confident they really were. Steinbrenner echoed this sentiment when he,
along with Williams and Chiles, met with Kuhn and MacPhail to reportedly “[urge] the
commissioner to have Grebey replaced and that the three owners were prepared to mount
a threat to the commissioner’s job if he did not act quickly in an effort to end the
walkout.”
24
When Grebey learned of this meeting, he simply dismissed it as insignificant

21
“Miller Assailed By Steinbrenner.” New York Times, June 13, 1981, Late Edition (East Coast),
http://www.proquest.com/ (accessed December 2, 2010).
22
Chass, “Baseball to Resume Negotiations.”
23
Ibid.
24
Murray Chass, “Baseball Talks to Resume.” New York Times, June 19, 1981, Late Edition (East
Coast), http://www.proquest.com/ (accessed December 2, 2010).

14
and irrelevant.
25
Both sides went back and forth in negotiations to no avail. Talks were
amicable, but ultimately fruitless.
26
Reports surfaced that there was a growing division
among owners and that, since they were not allowed in negotiating sessions, some
owners hoped to speak with each other at a general meeting to convince others to join
their cause. Miller commented, “They’re scared to death to have the dissidents in a room
with the others … Outside they can’t express their opinions because they’ll be fined;
inside they can’t because they won’t give them the opportunity.”
27
Again, the owners
showed signs of panic while the players union may have felt the same sentiments, but
they took a much more lax stance.
In this time, Kuhn was suspected of “[fomenting] the strike and that he wanted to
break the players’ union or that he was directing the club owners’ strategy.”
28
With his
integrity on the line, he finally came out of hiding and addressed his role in the strike.

He
asserted that negotiating with the players union was not part of his job description and
that that responsibility fell on Grebey as well as Miller. Furthermore, his power as
commissioner was limited and he tried to deflect attention away from him and towards
the negotiations. He also considered Miller as the instigator for the strike. He dismissed
the notion that he was trying to disband the union and instead stated the union was

25
Murray Chass, “3 Owners Reported Ready to Threaten Kuhn's Job.” New York Times,
June 17, 1981, Late Edition (East Coast), http://www.proquest.com/ (accessed December 2, 2010).
26
Ibid.
27
Murray Chass, “Meeting Is Called Off By Baseball Owners.” New York Times, June 21, 1981, Late
Edition (East Coast), http://www.proquest.com/ (accessed December 2, 2010).
28
Joseph Durso, “Kuhn's Viewpoint: Compensation Vital.” New York Times, June 26, 1981, Late
Edition (East Coast), http://www.proquest.com/ (accessed December 2, 2010).

15
necessary, as well as the player relations committee, because they provide a unified
voice. Kuhn sided with the owners and felt if teams lost valuable players to free agency,
they should be compensated by a free agent pool rather than an amateur draft choice
because the latter creates a talent gap on a team’s roster. He also said the free agent pool
would have “no effect” on the players because the player does not lose any money in the
process. This raises two key issues: 1) Kuhn did not believe in the future of the league if
he says amateurs cannot fill the role of a departed free agent, and 2) he believed players
are not affected because they are objects. Some may have established families in their
team’s town and should not be forced to pack up and leave for another city because they
are essentially being traded.
Perhaps Kuhn’s endorsement of Grebey as the owners’ chief negotiator effected
the change, but after an owners meeting on July 10, they finally unified and put their full
support behind Grebey and the PRC, including Chiles, Steinbrenner and Williams. Ed
Fitzgerald, chairman of the Milwaukee Brewers and of the PRC, said, “There are no
dissidents.” MacPhail reiterated, “If there was any dissension among the owners … it was
not visible at the meeting tonight.”
29
The next day, the MLBPA agreed in principle to a
proposal submitted by Moffett, which the PRC rejected and submitted a counterproposal
in response, which the players union subsequently rejected. This reflected the PRC’s
attitude during negotiations. It would wait for the union to make a proposal and would
either reject it outright or submit a counterproposal. Steinbrenner said the onus was now

29
Murray Chass, “Owners Support Grebey.” New York Times, July 10, 1981, Late Edition (East
Coast), http://www.proquest.com/ (accessed December 2, 2010).

16
on the owners to submit a proposal.
30
Furthermore, after reviewing and rejecting the
proposal, Grebey said, “Marvin [Miller] wrote it. It’s a setup.”
31
This is important
because, if it were true, Miller wrote the proposal and accepted it, thereby eliminating the
integrity of the six-person player negotiating committee. Despite his newfound support
for Grebey, even Steinbrenner said, “‘I have no reason to believe that [Miller wrote the
proposal].”
32
On July 27, after talks continued to fall through, Chiles said:
Bad management on both sides is responsible for the major league baseball strike,
and that if an equitable settlement is not reached, “We’re going to have to say
adios to baseball.”
“If we don’t settle it by then, we’ll have no baseball,” he said.
“We have two major forces here, the owners and the players, and we have to learn
to live together because we’re dependent on each other,” Chiles said. “We’re all
in the same boat. You can’t sink half a boat and expect the other half to float on
ahead. Right now we’re both going down together.
“The future of baseball is on the line, to a certain extent. How we handle this is
going to determine if we come out of it and continue to get better and better, or
get worse and worse. A phony, fictitious settlement really wouldn’t do anybody
any good. It would be a step in a downhill plunge.”
33

On July 31, the two sides settled the issue of free agency compensation and extended the
CBA. The 50-day work stoppage left sour feelings between the two parties. The players
union took the settlement as a victory rather than a compromise. Doug DeCinces of the

30
“Steinbrenner Prods Owners.” New York Times, July 13, 1981, Late Edition (East Coast),
http://www.proquest.com/ (accessed December 2, 2010).
31
Murray Chass, Special to the New York Times, “Owners Reject Moffett Proposal; Talks Break
Off.” New York Times, July 12, 1981, Late Edition (East Coast), http://www.proquest.com/ (accessed
December 2, 2010).
32
“Steinbrenner Prods Owners.”
33
The Associated Press, “Owner Assails Both Sides.” New York Times, July 27, 1981, Late Edition
(East Coast), http://www.proquest.com/ (accessed December 2, 2010).

17
Baltimore Orioles, a member of the players’ negotiating committee, said “I very seriously
doubt that the owners will try to challenge the players again.” Even the owners seemed to
take the settlement as a defeat. MacPhail said, “There are people who don’t like it … but
people in our league at least felt it was time to get it done.”
34
It appears the owners were
unhappy with the agreement, but accepted it simply because they had had enough.

Public Opinion
As soon as the strike was announced, a random sample of 30 people in midtown
Manhattan revealed that the fans did not fully understand the issues at hand and felt they
were the real victims.
35
Predictably, fans felt the players were overpaid, but the owners
were unwilling to negotiate. An op-ed in the New York Times called the strike “an act of
defiance against the American people” and said the “people of America care about
baseball, not about your squalid little squabbles.”
36
Yet, like most strikes in professional
sports at the time, fans tended to side with management and blame players,
37
which left
the players fighting an uphill battle because the onus was on them to lead public relations
efforts so fans could understand their plight. Two weeks into the strike, a “phone-in poll
conducted by NBC … showed that 53% of the 162,802 respondents favored the owners.

34
Murray Chass, “Strike Over, Baseball Resumes Aug. 9.” New York Times, August 1, 1981, Late
Edition (East Coast), http://www.proquest.com/ (accessed December 2, 2010).
35
“Fans Are Disillusioned By Both Sides.” New York Times, June 13, 1981, Late Edition (East Coast),
http://www.proquest.com/ (accessed December 2, 2010).
36
A. Bartlett Giamatti, “Men of Baseball, Lend an Ear :[Op-Ed].” New York Times,
June 16, 1981, Late Edition (East Coast), http://www.proquest.com/ (accessed December 2, 2010).
37
Red Smith, “Sports of the Times; The Crowd Defects.” New York Times, June 21, 1981, Late Edition
(East Coast), http://www.proquest.com/ (accessed December 2, 2010).

18
‘Those ballplayers better talk to some auto workers and steelworkers,’ Martha Cummings
wrote in The Houston Post.”
38
Indeed, the blue-collar workers did not understand why
players with million dollar salaries would strike.
39

Perhaps no article at the time swung favor toward the players as much as Sports
Illustrated’s June 22 cover story “Strike! The Walkout the Owners Provoked.” It told the
MLBPA’s side of the issue. Unlike previous coverage that lamented how fans were being
deprived, Sports Illustrated took another approach: that working under tyranny was un-
American, that the players were essentially fighting for freedom—perhaps the most
identifiable American trait. “This is a struggle in which the workers fought to preserve
the status quo and avoid a strike, while the bosses sought radical change and courted a
walkout … The issue wasn’t just high salaries; it was freedom.”
40

The Sports Illustrated article also reported that the MLBPA was doing everything
in its power to avoid a strike by revising the collective bargaining agreement
implemented in 1976. “Only twice did Grebey formally ‘modify’ the 1980 proposal …
The owners, in essence, were doing little more than rewording their 15-month-old
proposal.”
41
The owners now looked like idlers. Rather than propose a plan outlining
what they would like, they were leaving it up to the MLBPA to make suggestions and
simply rejecting them until they found an acceptable proposal. The owners were not

38
Jim Kaplan, “No Games Today,” Sports Illustrated, June 22, 1981, 19,
http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/vault/article/magazine/mag1124569/index.htm (accessed December 9,
2010).
39
Smith, “Sports of the Times.”
40
Kaplan, “No Games Today,” 18.
41
Ibid, 19.

19
taking action while the fans were losing their national pastime. The strategy appeared to
be to wait the strike out until the players folded, and the owners seemed to be ready to do
this at any cost. “If, in achieving their goal, they bring ruination on their own business
and destroy the fabric of the game, well, in war there must be casualties.”
42
The owners
were prioritizing pride ahead of the fans.
As the summer wore on, public opinion began to shift towards the players. A July
1 poll showed that “28 percent of Americans 18 or older backed the players, and 27
percent were with the owners.”
43
Fan demographics provided some insight for the divide.
“Republicans, the wealthy, and college graduates prefer the owners, according to the poll.
Democrats, the poor and those without a high school education support the players.”
44

This was a clear change from the beginning when blue-collar workers did not understand
why the players were on strike. “When the strike began, many fans blamed the players,
but six weeks of Ray Grebey have reminded workers what management often tries to do
to them.”
45
These workers could now identify with the union because they fought the
same fight.
The union managed to overcome the league because the owners lost the fight at
the bargaining table and in the public eye. Fans lost faith in the league and threatened to

42
Smith, “Sports of the Times.”
43
“Poll Shows Americans Are Evenly Divided on Strike.” New York Times, July 1, 1981, Late Edition
(East Coast), http://www.proquest.com/ (accessed December 2, 2010).
44
Ibid.
45
George Vecsey, “Sports of the Times; Bleakly Looms the Summer.” New York Times,
June 13, 1981, Late Edition (East Coast), http://www.proquest.com/ (accessed December 2, 2010).

20
boycott.
46
The players took some of the blame, but the lion’s share was on the owners for
a two key reasons. First, the league lacked a leader. Kuhn separated himself from the
issue and some owners—namely Steinbrenner, Williams and Chiles—did not embrace
Grebey as their chief negotiator. The union lost Miller as a negotiator once the strike was
announced, but he remained as its figurehead. Second, idle hands are the devil’s work—
the owners did not make moves to end the strike. Instead, they waited around, essentially
wasting the fans’ time, until the union presented them with something favorable.

46
Thomas Rogers, “Sports World Specials; Strike Back, Fans.” New York Times, July 27, 1981, Late
Edition (East Coast), http://www.proquest.com/ (accessed December 2, 2010).

21
Chapter Four: The 2004-05 National Hockey League Lockout
Here, we will observe the value of unity versus transparency. The NHL asserted it
was hemorrhaging money to player salaries and provided numbers that proved just that;
the players union discredited these reports. The commissioner insisted on a salary cap to
curb team spending, which the players refused. In principle, the cap was to implement a
long-term deal so fans could enjoy longer labor peace; the commissioner constantly
mentioned the cap was for the fans. League representatives were penalized if they spoke
about negotiations, which jeopardized the concept of transparency, but it maintained
unity. Early on, the players claimed they were united against the owners, but they would
soon fall apart as negotiations dragged on. The league and the union fought in courtrooms
and in public. The fans practically knew everything, which dashed their hopes of a quick
resolution. The relationship had become so strained that the commissioner and the
executive director of the players union had to be removed from negotiations.

Series of Events
NHL Commissioner Gary Bettman addressed labor issues following the 2001-02
season—more than two years before the contemporary collective bargaining agreement
was set to expire on September 15, 2004. He felt the league was hemorrhaging revenue
on player salaries—a league-reported 76 percent
1
—and needed a new economic system
that imposed a salary cap. NHL Players’ Association Executive Director Bob Goodenow

1
Kevin Allen. "Lockout Threat Has Both Sides on Edge ; Players, Management Await Other's
Moves :[Final Edition]." USA TODAY, September 16, 2003, http://www.proquest.com/ (accessed January
9, 2011).

22
felt the complete opposite. In a preemptive strike, Bettman said, “We remain prepared,
available and eager, any time, anyplace, any day, to undertake substantive dialogue with
the players’ association on a new collective bargaining agreement.”
2
The key here was
that Bettman made the first step to call for change. He was not trying to disturb the peace,
but he sent a message that change was necessary and he would be open to negotiation. As
the leader of the league, he portrayed himself as a reasonable man—and only
unreasonable men, i.e., Goodenow, would be unwilling to negotiate with such a person.
Goodenow may have sensed Bettman’s strategy and wanted to maintain the
union’s credibility so he responded by saying he was open to discuss a new CBA—with
the exception of a salary cap. Goodenow’s response was simply a reaction, but it still
seemed that the union was being proactive about negotiating a new agreement, which
would have kept it from appearing idle. He said, “I don’t know what to expect. Gary says
he wants cost certainty and he likes the football system, so if that equates to a cap, he
knows from his lockout strategy that the players believe strongly in the principle of a
marketplace … We don’t believe in caps.”
3
The two leaders previously butted heads over
the same issue during the 1994-95 season with the union prevailing.
4
Goodenow may
have felt confident coming off this negotiation, and rightfully so, because the league

2
Lonnie White, “Lonnie White / On the NHL; Labor Problems Are on Horizon :[Home Edition].” Los
Angeles Times, June 19, 2002, http://www.proquest.com/ (accessed January 11, 2011).
3
Gary Graves, “Bettman Seeks Talks ; Commissioner Suggests NHL Will Endure Work Stoppage to
Attain Economic Reform :[Final Edition].” USA TODAY, November 13, 2002, http://www.proquest.com/
(accessed January 11, 2011).
4
Joe Lapointe, “Pact Reached for Salvaging Hockey Season.” New York Times, January 12, 1995, Late
Edition (East Coast), http://www.proquest.com/ (accessed January 11, 2011).

23
validated this feeling by extending the CBA twice after to preserve harmony.
5
Since he
took over as executive director in 1992, “player salaries [jumped] by 240 [percent] and he
[won] over the players’ total support. During that same period NHL revenues [grew] by
‘only’ 160 [percent].”
6
This time around, however, the same problem did not necessarily
mean the same result. For better or worse, Bettman stood tall and refused to extend the
agreement again. It introduced the possibility of a work stoppage, but the commissioner
was willing to accept this cost. “My preference is a deal without labor unrest,” Bettman
said. “But that’s not the defining point, which is making the right deal. We as a league are
prepared to endure whatever is necessary to get the right deal, because we owe it to our
fans to fix this.”
7
A sustainable league economy was his primary concern, but he wisely
mentioned that the fans were the reason for the change. The league could have continued
to operate under that CBA, but according to Bettman, player salaries were increasing
faster than league revenues, which would have caused the league to eventually fold.
8
He
further commissioned former Securities and Exchange Commission chairman Arthur
Levitt to investigate the league’s finances. Levitt reported the league posted a net loss of
$273 million during the 2002-03 season, with 19 of the 30 NHL franchises accounting for
$342 million in losses. Levitt echoed Bettman’s concerns: “The NHL has to address the

5
Graves, “Bettman Seeks Talks.”
6
Rick Westhead and Paul Jay, “Cost Certainty No Salary Cap.” Profit, March 1, 2004, S4-S15.
http://www.proquest.com/ (accessed January 13, 2011).
7
Ibid.
8
Ibid.

24
ratio of salaries to revenues. Otherwise, the league is on a treadmill to extinction.”
9
The
NHLPA dismissed the study, but it was clearly a classic and powerful PR tactic on
Bettman’s part.
The next two seasons continued normally, but general managers felt the pinch of
the looming lockout as big-time transactions declined due to uncertainty.
10
The union
proposed a five percent salary cut and a revenue sharing system. According to the union,
the proposal would have saved over $200 million, but the league rejected the offer
because it did not incorporate a salary cap.
11
It appeared the league would not flex on this
provision because the union’s savings plan would not help resolve the medium- to long-
term financial issues the league believed it faced. Furthermore, players united and said
they could survive a lockout. “All the guys on the (New York) Islanders are prepared,”
says defenseman Adrian Aucoin. “We make sure that as veterans, we talk about it all the
time.”
12
Bettman publicly stated the reform was for the fans whereas, although a unified
message, Aucoin positioned the players as selfish. Rather than playing for the fans or the
admirable love for the game, the players were playing for themselves and their
paychecks.

9
Greg Farrell and Adam Shell, “NHL Lost $273 Million Last Season, League Report Says :[Final
Edition].” USA TODAY, February 13, 2004, http://www.proquest.com/ (accessed January 11, 2011).
10
Kevin Allen, “Lockout Threat Has Both Sides on Edge ; Players, Management Await Other’s
Moves :[Final Edition].” USA TODAY, September 16, 2003, http://www.proquest.com/ (accessed January
11, 2011).
11
Mike Brehm, “League, Union Have Their Say on Collective Bargaining Issues :[Final
Edition].” USA TODAY, February 9, 2004, http://www.proquest.com/ (accessed January 11, 2011).
12
Ibid.

25
Bettman made all the right moves to win the battle in the public arena against the
union, but facts are facts and a December 2003 Forbes article argued that the
contemporary system could work—teams just needed to know to use it. The Minnesota
Wild had the highest operating profit during the 2002-03 season. “The premium in the
NHL is on cost control and smart management.”
13
The article outlined the team’s strategy
to use naming rights and arena management rights, but more importantly: “You can win
without overspending for talent.”
14
This sent a clear message that small-market teams
could be profitable, but Wild owner Robert Naegele Jr. said even his team could not
survive under the CBA. His comment could only be taken with a grain of salt because as
an owner, especially an owner of a small-market team, he would naturally say there
needed to be a new agreement.
A March 2004 Profit article reiterated that the salary cap was a non-issue and the
owners were to blame for skyrocketing salaries. The main difference was that “player
unions believe the players themselves are the product. Owners can argue it’s their
organization’s brand … holding their league together and keeping the fans returning.”
15

The article posited that competition was the ultimate product. But how competitive is it
when wins are correlated with deep pockets? The Detroit Red Wings had the fourth-
largest payroll and the second-best record during the 2002-03 season while the Florida
Panthers had the second-lowest payroll and the second-worst record. “Bettman said that

13
Mary Ellen Egan, “Wild Economics.” Forbes, December 8, 2003, 94-98. http://www.proquest.com/
(accessed January 15, 2011).
14
Ibid.
15
Westhead and Jay, “Cost Certainty.”

26
the last nine teams to win the Stanley Cup were from the top third in payroll.”
16
Owners
were spending so much on marquee players that they were essentially buying wins and
bankrupting smaller teams. Ten of the 12 teams that spent more than the league average
on player salaries made the playoffs. Goodenow argued that payrolls did not affect
competition. Notably, the Ottawa Senators finished with the best record in the league and
ranked 18th in payroll. Teams could remain competitive without overpaying players so
the owners were ultimately responsible for managing their finances. “The fact that club
management hasn’t used their full authority in curbing player salaries has led Bettman to
admit agents and the union have outmaneuvered management for the past several
years.”
17
This article revealed that rising salaries was a product of competition among
owners rather than players. The league could still offer the same product without excess
spending, but owners of big-market teams were handing out huge contracts and building
dynasties. The salary cap essentially punished the players for the owners’ mistakes.
Unfortunately for the union, the article likely did not have as profound an effect as it
should have because it was published in a Canadian magazine; only six of the 30 NHL
franchises are based in Canada.
The league and the union met on April 30, 2004 after an almost seven-month
hiatus. The two sides met for 90 minutes only to announce they would reconvene in

16
Chris Foster, “Labor Talks Yield Little; Salary Cap Remains the Key Issue in Negotiations As the
NHL Players Assn. and the League Stand Firm :[Home Edition].” Los Angeles Times, May 26, 2004,
http://www.proquest.com/ (accessed January 29, 2011).
17
Westhead and Jay, “Cost Certainty”

27
May.
18
This follow-up meeting proved to be a disaster as each side only strengthened
their arguments and moved further away from a resolution. The possibility of a lockout
became very real. The league had prepared $300 million to “tap for operating costs
during a lockout”
19
and “began reducing its staff at its offices in New York and Toronto,
telling many employees they have no guarantee of being rehired after a lockout.
Individual clubs already have told many employees that their paychecks could be cut or
disappear if a lockout lingers.”
20
The union told players to “save their money”
21
and
“[encouraged] them to formulate plans to go to school or play elsewhere if they wish.”
22

Both sides acted prematurely and gave fans little hope that the season could be salvaged.
The ensuing results of the 2003-04 season only strengthened each side’s arguments. The
Detroit Red Wings boasted the highest payroll in the league and unsurprisingly finished
with the best record. Eight of the 12 teams that spent more than the league average on
player salaries made the playoffs, but the other eight playoff teams spent less than the
league average. Competition was alive and well. Three of the final four teams in the
playoffs—the Calgary Flames, the San Jose Sharks and the Tampa Bay Lightning—
ranked 18th, 20th and 21st, respectively, in player salaries and, for the first time in ten
years, the winner of the Stanley Cup—the Tampa Bay Lightning—ranked outside of the

18
Gary Graves, “League, Union Meet but Resolve Nothing :[Final Edition].” USA TODAY,
April 30, 2004, http://www.proquest.com/ (accessed January 13, 2011).
19
Helene Elliott, “NHL Talks Get Nowhere Fast; the Players’ Union Objects to Six Proposals Made
By the League As a Lockout Looms :[Home Edition].” Los Angeles Times, July 22, 2004,
http://www.proquest.com/ (accessed January 15, 2011).
20
Ibid.
21
Foster, “Labor Talks Yield Little.”
22
Elliott, “NHL Talks Get Nowhere.”

28
top third in payroll. Goodenow now had proof that teams could win the Stanley Cup and
still live within their means.
The league made six different proposals to the union in a July 21 meeting, but the
union rejected all of them, but “would listen more so it could fully understand the
proposals and see if it could achieve them without a cap.”
23
Two weeks later, the union
rejected them outright. Bill Daly, the league’s chief legal counsel, admitted negotiations
were at an impasse and Bettman said the league would not accept the union’s proposed
luxury tax and revenue-sharing system as a substitute for a salary cap. Meanwhile,
NHLPA Senior Director Ted Saskin said the “players wouldn’t strike and would play
without a new collective bargaining agreement, but said that had not been discussed.”
24

This belittled Adrian Aucoin’s threat that players were prepared to strike, but the league
would not open the season without a new agreement. It would have been a presumably
uncapped year so the league would have catered to the players again. This had
dichotomous implications for the league because letting the season go on would have
empowered the union, but locking the players out would have made the league the villain
because it ultimately would have been responsible for a work stoppage.
Players refocused their attention on the World Cup of Hockey in hopes that it
would “motivate both sides to get a deal done,” said the USA’s Doug Weight of the St.

23
Mike Brehm, “NHL Sticking Point: Salary Cap :[Final Edition].” USA TODAY, July 22, 2004,
http://www.proquest.com/ (accessed January 14, 2011).
24
Helene Elliott, “NHL Talks Produce No Change; Meeting in Toronto Fails to Make Progress on a
Labor Deal to Get Next Season Started on Time :[Home Edition].” Los Angeles Times, August 5, 2004,
http://www.proquest.com/ (accessed January 15, 2011).

29
Louis Blues.
25
The players clearly wanted to play the upcoming 2004-05 season. Saskin
reiterated this point on August 27 after two days of meeting with the league: “A lockout
does nobody any good. It’s a ludicrous position. The players want to play hockey, but
will only do so under a fair system … we are prepared to accept changes in the system.”
26

The union remained opposed to a salary cap, but appeared to soften its position so the
season could move forward. It had not made a proposal in 14 months and Daly asserted
the union was stalling: “They want to get a work stoppage. If they think they can do
better in a work stoppage, then they are making a very bad bet.”
27
This marked the
beginning of a war of words between the two sides because both parties really felt the
pressure to get a deal done. With the CBA set to expire in two and a half weeks, the two
sides headed into crunch time as talks went sour.
The two sides met several more times until their final meeting on September 10
left fans with virtually no hope. The league rejected the union’s latest offer. Saskin said
the players were making huge sacrifices with this proposal and it was a major change
from the current agreement. Daly said the proposal was worse than their original one in
June 2003: “Even under the union’s modeling and projections, which we do not agree
with or accept … more than half of our clubs would still lose money and nearly a third of

25
Kevin Allen, “World Cup Casts Light on Labor Strife ; Players Hope Tournament Provides
Motivation on CBA :[Final Edition].” USA TODAY, August 24, 2004, http://www.proquest.com/ (accessed
January 15, 2011).
26
Chris Foster, “No Movement in NHL Talks; a League Official Accuses the Union of Wanting a
Lockout Simply So That It Can Improve Its Bargaining Position :[Home Edition].” Los Angeles Times,
August 27, 2004, http://www.proquest.com/ (accessed January 15, 2011).
27
Ibid.

30
the clubs would still lose in excess of $10 million each season.”
28
Furthermore, the league
reported $224 million in losses during the 2003-04 campaign. Neither side had softened
their stance on the salary cap issue so a resolution appeared unachievable, especially with
the agreement set to expire in five days and no new talks scheduled. It seemed both the
league and the union quit on the season and on their fans.
Misery loves company and, on the eve of the expiration of the collective
bargaining agreement, players painted a grim picture for fans. Bill Guerin, a player
representative of the union, said he was not optimistic about a quick resolution. Mike
Modano, his Team USA teammate, said, “The fans won’t like it, but we’ve got to stand
firm as a union and not give in to a salary cap.”
29
He also said the players would not have
a problem with missing the season. Saskin tried to make the players out to be the victims
of the labor negotiations, but Modano set the union back seven months in the public arena
and returned the players to an image of selfishness and stubbornness.
Finally, after more than two years of speculation, the National Hockey League
locked its players out on September 16. Commissioner Bettman addressed the media in
New York and engaged in an ugly battle with Goodenow, saying, “This union doesn’t
seem to care about the problems, the game or the fans.”
30
Goodenow called in almost
immediately from Toronto and said, “I have quite a chuckle at the insinuation we are

28
Kevin Allen and Mike Brehm, “Owners Nix Latest Offer ; No NHL Talks Are Scheduled :[Final
Edition].” USA TODAY, September 10, 2004, http://www.proquest.com/ (accessed January 15, 2011).
29
Joe Lapointe and Pat Borzi Contributed Reporting from St. Paul for This Article., “Expected N.H.L.
Lockout Curbs the Enthusiasm.” New York Times, September 14, 2004, Late Edition (East Coast),
http://www.proquest.com/ (accessed January 16, 2011).
30
Joe Lapointe, “Lockout Is First Shot in Hockey’s Labor War.” New York Times,
September 16, 2004, Late Edition (East Coast), http://www.proquest.com/ (accessed January 16, 2011).

31
triggering a lockout … [that] is absolutely stupid and ridiculous.”
31
The issue was no
longer about salvaging the season; it was about who was responsible for the lockout.
Furthermore, the union projected that the negotiations would cost the league a season and
a half while Bettman wisely strayed away from a timetable. This left the fans with some
hope that the season could still continue, even if it were shortened. Goodenow, however,
dashed those hopes: “‘Gary wants a salary cap … [until] he gets off the salary-cap issue,
there’s not a chance’ of an agreement.”
32
Trevor Linden of the Vancouver Canucks, the
president of the players association, contested Bettman’s argument that the salary cap
achieved competitive balance within the league. Linden said the cap was more of a
policing instrument for owners’ uncontrollable spending. True or not, he dismissed
Bettman’s assertion as “absurd.” The union appeared too concerned with fighting a battle
against the league rather than fighting for the fans. Another fear was that the lockout
would force teams to fold in order to stabilize the league economy. Modano said, “Maybe
the league expanded too much too quickly. It created a lot of jobs, but when you look
back, there are maybe four or five teams that shouldn’t have been in it.”
33
This would
undoubtedly disappoint fans in those markets, but Bettman would not allow these teams
to fail and promised that all the franchises would return from the lockout “healthy and
competitive.” Although Bettman was in clear contention with the union, he did not lose
sight of the fans.

31
Ibid.
32
Ibid.
33
Lapointe and Borzi, “Expected N.H.L. Lockout.”

32
Two days after the lockout, Kings President Tim Leiweke said he believed the
lockout would last an entire year and attacked Goodenow, calling him “a bald-faced
liar.”
34
Bettman sent a clear message to Leiweke and all the owners by fining Leiweke.
The commissioner did not want owners to make public comments. This was a poor move
on Bettman’s part because it appears that the league has something to hide. Also, it
seemed that the owners were not on the same page because they should be able to speak
in public as long as they had an agreed-upon, unified message. It does the league no good
for all the owners to have no comment on the negotiations. In the meantime, the union
went to the National Labor Relations Board to file an unfair labor practice complaint
against the league. The complaint claimed that the league did not provide the union with
a list of locked-out players, which would determine which players were eligible to
compete in the minor leagues. The relationship between the league and the union was
clearly strained as talking was no longer an effective means of communication. The more
contentious the relationship, the less hope there was for fans that an agreement could be
reached.
On October 7, Daly authorized teams to book replacement events in their arenas
30 days in advance, which guaranteed erasure of the season through early November. No
new talks had been scheduled and Saskin said that since the union made the last proposal,
he was waiting for the league to present a proposal. He was willing to talk to the league,
but he felt that it was not the right time: “We’re waiting to see what they come up with…

34
Chris Foster, “NHL Situation Seems to Be Getting Worse; Players’ Union Files an Unfair Labor
Practice Complaint, Bettman Fines Leiweke for Comments and No Talks Are Scheduled :[Home
Edition].” Los Angeles Times, September 24, 2004, http://www.proquest.com/ (accessed January 16, 2011).

33
As soon as we get them off a cap, we can talk.”
35
This is a questionable message because
the union was simply waiting for the league to make a move. With the season already
wiped out for another month, neither side had anything to lose by contacting the other.
Instead, they were waiting for the other attrite. The league in the meantime planned to
“visit NHL cities to discuss the labor impasse with fans, season ticket holders and
reporters.”
36
On October 20, the league extended the date rollback from 30 days to 45
days. It pressured the union to reopen talks because players were not being paid during
the lockout, but owners could still make money by leasing out their arenas.
Players began to crack and urged for a resolution. Calgary defenseman Andrew
Ference said, “It’s asinine and it’s both sides … How are you going to solve a conflict
without communication? I don’t understand the motivation behind sitting around.”
37
One
of the reasons the union refused to accept a salary cap is because it questioned the
league’s losses based on Arthur Levitt’s February report. Levitt naturally defended his
findings, but Saskin believed the league set guidelines for him; essentially, he would find
what they wanted him to find. Saskin argued:
If we retained Arthur Levitt and paid him millions of dollars and what we wanted
him to look at was the overall economic impact on owners and in doing so
account for all related entity revenue, all tax implications, all expansion proceeds
and all other things not accounted for in the league accounting process, I’m sure

35
Helene Elliott, “In NHL Labor Talks, Silence Is Not Golden; the League and Players’ Union Are
Both Standing Their Ground, With No Negotiations Planned :[Home Edition].” Los Angeles Times,
October 7, 2004, http://www.proquest.com/ (accessed January 17, 2011).
36
Ibid.
37
Chris Foster, “Levitt Pushes for NHL Talks; Author of Report Predicting Bleak Future for League
Under Current Conditions Says Union and Officials Need to Discuss a New Collective Bargaining
Deal :[Home Edition].” Los Angeles Times, October 21, 2004, http://www.proquest.com/ (accessed January
17, 2011).

34
we would get a much different picture than the league attained with the mandate
they gave him.
38

The union was acting out of desperation and devised as many excuses as possible to stall
talks to avoid a salary cap. It wanted to deny that business may actually be as bad as
Levitt found, compounded by the fact that the league offered the union to conduct its own
audit, which the union refused.
39
This is a questionable refusal because if the union truly
stood behind its accusations that the league was falsifying numbers, then it should have
conducted the audit and revealed its findings to the public. Otherwise, it implies it has
something to hide.
On November 3, the league canceled the All Star game, which indicated at least
half the season would be canceled. Bettman said he did not have a deadline for canceling
the season and that it may just “slip away,” a consequence that Goodenow said his
players were willing to accept.
40
Saskin already considered the 2004-05 season gone and
projected the next season could also be canceled.
41
These are not the ideas either side
should want to get across to their fans. Each side likely made these statements to pressure
the other into giving in, but the greater implication was that fans were losing hope in the
season and trust in these leaders.

38
Ibid.
39
James Deacon, “How to Get a Deal.” Maclean’s, September 27, 2004, 34-36.
http://www.proquest.com/ (accessed January 17, 2011).
40
Chris Foster, “NHL Cancels All-Star Game; The Move Affecting Game Set for Feb. 13 in Atlanta Is
Another Sign the Season Is in Jeopardy Because of Lockout :[Home Edition].” Los Angeles Times,
November 4, 2004, http://www.proquest.com/ (accessed January 17, 2011).
41
Jon Saraceno, “Issue of Trust (Or Lack Of) Is At Heart of NHL’s Long Winter of Discontent :[Final
Edition].” USA TODAY, November 17, 2004, http://www.proquest.com/ (accessed January 17, 2011).

35
Two weeks later, the NHLPA met with player agents for help to end the lockout.
The union gave agents all its documents exchanged with the league so they could
understand the issue and formulate a strategy. This was the first move from either side in
70 days, but Goodenow stopped short of saying the meeting would result in a new
proposal: “We are working on the whole issue, but is there a proposal that is being
developed and is imminent to be communicated? The answer is, ‘No, there isn’t.’” The
union took one step forward and one step back. Calling the meeting evidenced the union
wanted a resolution, but Goodenow’s statement suggested the union was too proud to
contact the league to end the lockout.
A November 29 Forbes article disputed the league’s widely reported $224 million
loss during the 2003-04 season and estimated the figure at $96 million.
42
This justified
the union’s suspicion that the owners misrepresented their numbers, but there was no
doubt the league was in dire straits. With these discrepancies, onlookers would have to
see if the league found the union’s proposal sufficient. Would the public accept Forbes’
report and pressure the league to accept the proposal? Unfortunately, this did not have the
effect the union would have hoped. First, the proposal would have presumably been a
short-term solution because, although players were curtailing their salaries, it still did not
place a limit on them so they could potentially earn the same salaries again while the
team still fails to generate enough revenue to cover those salaries. The league would find
itself in the same position in the near future. Bettman stood for a salary cap because he

42
Michael K. Ozanian, “Ice Capades.” Forbes, November 29, 2004, 124-129.
http://www.proquest.com/ (accessed January 17, 2011).

36
needed to be certain this problem would not come up again, which is why he did not want
to compromise in the negotiations as much as he wanted to “get it right.”
43
Second, as
mentioned before, the NHL did not have a large fan base so there was little public
awareness of the lockout, much less an outcry to it. In fact, only 56 percent of Americans
knew about the lockout.
44
Although this gave the commissioner the power to sit on
negotiations, he still should have conduced a quicker resolution.
On December 9, three months since their last meeting, the union and the league
reopened negotiations. Goodenow offered a carefully-worded message the week earlier:
“Almost three months have passed since the players made their last proposal, and we
have yet to receive a counteroffer from the league … We have been working hard at other
creative solutions and believe our new proposal will provide a basis to end the owners’
lockout and resume N.H.L. hockey.”
45
He wanted fans to know that the union was trying
to end the lockout while the league was just waiting for the right offer, a dangerous
strategy as demonstrated by the owners in the previous case study. Yet, he was blaming
the owners for the work stoppage with the term “owners’ lockout.” By definition, the
owners cause a lockout so “owners’ lockout” is repetitive. This was simply a ploy to
convince fans that the union was not responsible for the lockout. The union’s new
proposal included a 24 percent salary rollback (an increase from the union’s original five

43
Kevin Allen, “Union: Owners Should Look Again At Last Offer :[Final Edition].” USA TODAY,
November 18, 2004, http://www.proquest.com/ (accessed January 17, 2011).
44
Selena Roberts, “With Hockey Fans Silent, the N.H.L.’S Players Union Shows It Is Listening.” New
York Times, December 12, 2004, Late Edition (East Coast), http://www.proquest.com/ (accessed January
17, 2011).
45
Jason Diamos, “N.H.L. Players Seeking New Talks With League.” New York Times,
December 3, 2004, Late Edition (East Coast), http://www.proquest.com/ (accessed January 17, 2011).

37
percent), a luxury tax system and revenue sharing, but still no salary cap. Bettman was
astounded by the proposal and credited the union for recognizing the severity of the
league’s financial woes, but said the new CBA would have to address “systemic
issues.”
46
Bettman did not want to discuss the details of the proposal and would question
the union’s motives if it did so, but after the meeting, the union outlined the proposal on
Canadian national television with a grandeur presentation. Now, the public knew the
sacrifices the union was making. The union showed transparency with this approach, a
necessary component of public relations. Moreover, this would pressure the
commissioner to end the lockout on the union’s terms. The union also posted the proposal
on its website. New Jersey Devils owner said the proposal was a step in the right
direction, but conceded that his team would still not be profitable under it. Upset about
their pay cuts, Saskin said, “The 24 percent is one thing, but if the whole season goes
down, you’ve [the players] just lost 100 percent of your salary.”
47
The union ensured that
its players did not complain about the proposal because it would have taken away from
the main point of ending the lockout and instead would have turned the focus on the
players’ selfishness.
Bettman rejected the union’s proposal on December 15 with a counterproposal
that capped salaries at 54 percent of revenue, which the union rejected. Again, neither
side discussed plans to renegotiate. Like the other negotiating sessions, when a

46
Joe Lapointe, “Players Offer 24% Solution to the N.H.L.” New York Times,
December 10, 2004, Late Edition (East Coast), http://www.proquest.com/ (accessed January 17, 2011).
47
Joe Lapointe, “The N.H.L. Must Figure Out If It’s Certain on Cost Certainty.” New York Times,
December 11, 2004, Late Edition (East Coast), http://www.proquest.com/ (accessed January 17, 2011).

38
compromise was not reached, the players and the league engaged in a public dispute.
Linden said, “If I’ve played my last game, it’s something I can live with … I love to play,
I love the game, but I’m not going to sacrifice my beliefs.”
48
Now the union’s president
insinuated that he would not accept the proposal because of pride. Bettman retorted:
If you accept everything the union says will result from this proposal, the players
will receive 56.6 [percent] of our revenues on Day 1 of the new agreement … We
countered with 54 [percent]. We should be able to reach an agreement because,
after all, this should be about money … So if we cannot make an agreement, with
such a modest gap to bridge, it must be because the union does not believe its
proposed system will actually reduce costs to the 56.6 [percent] level and keep
them there. Rather, the result, or perhaps the union’s hope, will be the resumption
of the inflationary spiral.
49

The commissioner was right. It appeared suspicious that the union would not compromise
on a further 2.6 percent pay reduction. Goodenow said his proposal was not an admission
that the league was hemorrhaging money, but a basis to negotiate an agreement. The
players still did not trust the league’s numbers and would not agree on a proposal
premised on a salary cap, regardless of whether or not the savings were the same.
Goodenow said he made a bona fide offer, but if the savings were essentially the same, he
sent a mixed message by rejecting the league’s proposal. His offers were based on short-
term savings whereas Bettman’s were based on long-term sustainability.
Frustrated, on December 23, Bettman called a board of governors meeting for
January 14 to determine if he should cancel the season, but then canceled the meeting on
January 7 because “everyone [was] up-to-date on the status of negotiations, and in the

48
Helene Elliott, “NHL, Players’ Union Reject New Proposals; Bitterness Reigns and No Talks Are
Set As League Turns Down Plan for Rollback and Other Side Says ‘No’ to Salary Cap :[Home
Edition].” Los Angeles Times, December 15, 2004, http://www.proquest.com/ (accessed January 17, 2011).
49
Ibid.

39
absence of any meaningful offer from [the NHLPA], there [was] no reason for the board
to meet at [that] point in time.”
50
This showed the league was idling on negotiations, but
still did not want to shut the door on a partial season. The union also did not make any
moves to restart negotiations because it was waiting on the league to make the next offer,
which set talks back to lull between September 9 and December 9. According to an LA
Times article, “there [was] growing speculation that Bettman [would] try to declare an
impasse next fall, impose labor conditions and employ replacement players, daring the
union to hold together.”
51
This would have been a tricky strategy on a legal front, an
operations front and a communications front. The legal issues are too complicated for the
sake of this thesis, but on a communications front, it would have been a tyrannical tactic.
Bettman would have abused his power to smoke the players out of the lockout. On an
operations front, he would have put a lesser product on the ice. Indeed, teams would have
paid lower salaries, but fan attendance would have presumably declined because the
competition was not at the highest level. The NHL would have been like its minor league
system. Furthermore, as the lockout continued and polls showed the indifference of the
American people, the league was running itself into the ground. Player agent Pat Brisson
said, “The game is taking a major hit. Forget the owners, the players, the fans, the agents,
the popcorn vendors, the game itself has a value. If there is no season, the NHL is

50
Chris Foster, “With Nothing to Say, NHL Cancels Meeting; Board of Governors Was to Meet for the
First Time Since September, but Counsel Tells Teams That They Are Up to Date on Lockout
Status :[Home Edition].” Los Angeles Times, January 7, 2005, http://www.proquest.com/ (accessed January
17, 2011).
51
Chris Foster and Helene Elliott, “Forecast: Ice Cold; NHL Is on the Verge of Losing Season to
Lockout, and Both Sides Seem Prepared to Let It Happen :[Home Edition].” Los Angeles Times,
January 12, 2005, http://www.proquest.com/ (accessed January 17, 2011).

40
devalued to a much lower level.”
52
The writing was on the wall: the people did not need
the NHL.
By January 14, the league and the owners started throwing in the towel on a
partial season. Carolina Hurricanes owner Peter Kamanos Jr. said, “My gut feeling is that
this season’s gone.”
53
Daly stopped short of giving an exact date for canceling the season,
but said, “I think we’re in a critical time period.”
54
Cognizant of this, Saskin said it was
the league’s responsibility to come up with a proposal while Daly said:
We have no current intention of making the next offer … At a minimum, to the
extent that our last proposal to them was unacceptable, I think it’s incumbent on
them to come back to us and either discuss why or make us a new proposal.
That’s what most people consider to be a ‘negotiation.’ When the N.H.L.P.A. is
going to decide to engage in one is anyone’s best guess.
55

Goodenow advised his players to seek deals with European teams for the current season
and the next because he anticipated the lockout would last just as long. Again, these
statements echoed feelings of stagnancy and hopelessness. The war of attrition continued.
Both sides returned to their corners and did not want to make the first move, but this
time, a canceled season was on the horizon.
Bettman and Goodenow were clearly at odds with each other, which detracted
from the progress of talks. Linden took the reigns as president of the NHLPA and called a

52
Ibid.
53
Chris Foster and Helene Elliott, “Season Is in Peril, NHL Official Says; Daly, a Top Executive,
Discusses ‘Urgency’ of Situation While Not Stating an Exact Date That a Deal Would Be Needed to Not
Cancel All Games :[Home Edition].” Los Angeles Times, January 14, 2005,
http://www.proquest.com/ (accessed January 17, 2011).
54
Ibid.
55
Joe Lapointe, “N.H.L. and Union Are Talking, but Not to Each Other, As Season Slips Away.” New
York Times, January 17, 2005, Late Edition (East Coast), http://www.proquest.com/ (accessed January 17,
2011).

41
meeting with the league on January 18, which placed the union in a positive public light.
He requested that Goodenow not attend the meeting while he, Saskin and John
McCambridge, a lawyer, would represente the union. Linden also asked that Bettman not
attend the meeting so Daly, Harley Hotchkiss, the chairman of the board of governors,
and Bob Batterman, a lawyer, would represent the league. The union could not let
another day pass. Mike Modano, the Dallas Star center who said in September that the
union must stand firm against a salary cap, changed his tone and wanted a compromise to
be reached: “It’s going to be tough to come back in October and say that we’re going to
stay firm. You’re going to have guys who are saying, ‘What are we doing?’ You’re going
to have guys chomping at the bit to get a deal done.”
56
It seemed the league had finally
twisted the union’s arm into negotiating. This six-member committee held five meetings
over three weeks to no avail. The prevailing conclusion was that the two sides had strong
fundamental differences, but had enough open dialogue to work on a deal together rather
than convening in their respective corners and presenting proposals and counterproposals
Fans could breathe a sigh of relief that the league and the union were no longer at each
other’s throats. Yet, they could not hold their breath because these meetings produced no
results. Although the cooperation of both sides to compromise was commendable, it may
have been too little too late. On January 26, Colin Campbell, the NHL’s director of

56
Chris Foster and Helene Elliott, “Players’ Assn., NHL Executives to Talk; a ‘Small Group’ Meeting,
Requested By Union, Is Set for Wednesday; Neither Side Has a New Proposal to End Lockout :[Home
Edition].” Los Angeles Times, January 18, 2005, http://www.proquest.com/ (accessed January 17, 2011).

42
hockey operations, said the league needed to “give something back to the fans”
57
when
the lockout ended. The league needed to remember the reason for these negotiations and
the lifeblood of their sport. The fans had suffered a great deal because of the work
stoppage and the league needed a grand gesture to win them back.
Bettman and Goodenow rejoined the bargaining table on February 4, the first time
since December 14. The two sides continued to propose and reject each other’s proposals
until Bettman announced that he would cancel the season on February 15 or 16 unless
there was a new agreement by Monday, February 14. “For us, it’s always been about
making the right deal. The time frame is not relevant … Having said that … if we’re not
actively engaged in drafting documents this weekend, I don’t see how we can have a
season.”
58
At this juncture, there needed to be one last push for resolution, but Bettman
was ready to sacrifice the season for a salary cap. The union still questioned the
credibility of the league’s numbers, but this issue would only stall talks. As Bettman
pointed out, the league’s offer would only get worse and worse for the union the longer
the lockout lasted. The league anticipated that the union would eventually crack and
accept any form of an agreement just to get back on the ice. The two sides had one last
meeting on February 10, which collapsed after four hours. With such little time left
before the deadline, one would think the meeting would go until an agreement was

57
Helene Elliott and Chris Foster, “Owners, Union Will Meet Again; There Is Little Information After
Talks in Toronto. Oiler Chairman Takes a Hard Line on a Salary Cap :[Home Edition].” Los Angeles
Times, January 27, 2005, http://www.proquest.com/ (accessed January 23, 2011).
58
Helene Elliott and Chris Foster, “NHL Sets Alarm Clock; Bettman Says the Season Will Be
Canceled If a New Labor Deal Isn’t on Paper Before Monday. the Union Rejects the League’s Latest
Proposal :[Home Edition].” Los Angeles Times, February 10, 2005, http://www.proquest.com/ (accessed
January 24, 2011).

43
reached, or at least not end so quickly. Daly said, “We’re kind of out of tricks … We
don’t have anything left at this point. We will not reach out to the union at this point.
There is no expectation or optimism. It was a pointless meeting today. We got
nowhere.”
59
First, “tricks” is poor word choice. Although negotiations require tact, such
as bluffs and loopholes, fans can misinterpret “tricks” as the league playing games with
the union, the CBA and the fans. Second, saying there is “no expectation or optimism”
dashes the hopes of fans well before the proverbial timer hit zero. Quitting ahead of time
shows lack of character, especially in sports, where the most miraculous moments happen
in the waning minutes. Poor messaging from the league, but the union failed to capitalize
with anything better. With the league out of gas, the union should have continued to push
talks, but Saskin went in another direction: “We’re done … We are not picking up the
phone this weekend.”
60
When talks collapse, both parties are to blame: one for walking
away and the other for not convincing its counterpart to stay and listen. Neither side took
the it’s-not-over-until-it’s-over approach and instead seemed to call it quits four days
early.
Bettman set Wednesday, February 16 as the absolute deadline to reach a deal. The
two sides came back to the bargaining table so they were clearly not “done” as Saskin put
it. The league proposed a salary cap again, but this time, Goodenow gave in and accepted
it, but could not agree on the final number. An agreement was so close, yet so far. It

59
Joe Lapointe, “The End of Hope Is Near As N.H.L. Talks Break Off.” New York Times,
February 11, 2005, Late Edition (East Coast), http://www.proquest.com/ (accessed January 24, 2011).
60
Alan Adams, “Players Association Director: ‘We’re Done’ :[Final Edition].” USA TODAY,
February 11, 2005, http://www.proquest.com/ (accessed January 24, 2011).

44
could have been a joyous moment, but the fans were robbed again. Moreover, it was
questionable why Goodenow waited so long to accept a cap. It seemed as though he
wanted to wait until the absolute last moment and sacrificed the season and his players’
salaries en route. As the union leader, his primary audience is the players, but he gambled
with their money and had nothing to show for it. Finally, after more than two years of
speculation, on February 16, Bettman announced the cancellation of the 2004-05 season:
Every professional sports League [sic] owes its very existence to its fans.
Everyone associated with the National Hockey League owes our fans an apology
for being unable to accomplish what is necessary for our game and our fans. We
are truly sorry … We profoundly regret the suffering this has caused our fans, our
business partners and the thousands of people who depend on our industry for
their livelihoods. We will continue to explore and pursue all available options in
order to achieve a successful resolution to this dispute and to get the best game in
the world back where it belongs – on the ice, in front of the best fans in the world
… This is a sad, regrettable day that all of us wish could have been avoided.
Though a Band-Aid for a bullet wound, he apologized to the fans, recognized their
importance to his league and wanted to inform them that he would do his best to bring
their beloved sport back. The commissioner had ample time to resolve this issue so an
apology was largely ceremonial. He may have been sorry about the current state of
affairs, but he was not sorry for the lockout and he was not sorry for the canceling the
season because he still felt he did what was necessary for the game. This announcement
read little more than “I’m not sorry for what I did, but I’m sorry you feel this way.” His
aim for a salary cap and his conviction to attain it brought the league to this point. He
took a big risk (a canceled season) in hopes of a bigger reward (a more sustainable
league), but he still did not know if the gamble paid off so his apology meant little.

45
The two sides continued to meet in the coming months, but after the lockout, talks
had sway with the fans. If an agreement were reached the day after the cancellation, then
fans would question whether the issue was stubbornness or economics. If anything, the
longer it took to resolve the issue, the better it would be for both sides. This is not to
condone dishonesty, but the cancellation gave the two sides an opportunity to pay the
new CBA its due diligence. Obviously the sooner an agreement could be reached, the less
fans would have to wonder if the 2005-06 would be canceled. On the other hand, the two
sides had more than two years to resolve the issue, but came up with nothing so fans had
to wonder what another six months could do.
There were two major public relations follies during the negotiations. The first
was two issues involving the National Labor Relations Board:
The NHL filed a charge with the National Labor Relations Board challenging the
union’s reported practice of requiring any player who receives benefits from the
union during the lockout to repay that money if the player decides to become a
replacement player.
The NHL contended such a requirement would be coercive and a violation of
players’ rights under the National Labor Relations Act. Players are getting $5,000
to $10,000 a month during the lockout.
61

The league had flirted with the idea of using replacement players to start the 2005-06
season, but it would have had to “declare an impasse, implement its last best offer and
open for business. Players [could then] file a grievance with the National Labor Relations

61
Helene Elliott, “NHL and Union to Meet in Effort to Solve Labor Dispute :[Home Edition].” Los
Angeles Times, March 31, 2005, http://www.proquest.com/ (accessed January 26, 2011).

46
Board. If that fails, they could strike.”
62
Regardless of how they play out, legal issues
almost always make crises exponentially worse. First, this reflects poorly on the union
because it appears that it is handcuffing its players. Second, it reflects poorly on the
league because it is bullying the union back to the bargaining table. In the event of a
strike, the league anticipated that players would mutiny and return to the NHL,
essentially rendering the union useless. After all, what good is the union if it has no
players?
The second issue was when Philadelphia Flyers center Jeremy Roenick attacked
fans who believed players’ greed was responsible for the lockout:
We’re going to try to make it better for everybody, period, end of subject. And if
you don’t realize that, then don’t come … We don’t want you at the rink, we
don’t want you in the stadium, we don’t want you to watch hockey … I say
personally, to everybody who called us ‘spoiled,’ you guys are just jealous ... we
have tried so, so hard to get this game back on the ice.
63

This certainly showed that he did not care about the fans. It took away from the union’s
story that it was trying to end the lockout for the fans. The union’s main stakeholder is
the players, but fans expect the players to care about them to some extent. Otherwise,
players could play in an empty arena. Fans obviously matter to the owners because they
are the main source of revenue, but fans should matter to the players because they add
excitement to the game and they fill the arena with energy. Roenick left without a shadow
of a doubt that the fans were insignificant. An unfortunate detail was that he said “we”,

62
Kevin Allen, “NHL Replacement Issue Raised Again,” USA TODAY, April 18, 2005,
http://www.usatoday.com/sports/hockey/nhl/2005-04-18-replacements-possibility_x.htm (accessed January
26, 2011).
63
Associated Press, “Center: ‘You Guys Are Just Jealous’,” ESPN, June 27, 2005,
http://sports.espn.go.com/nhl/news/story?id=2095862 (accessed January 26, 2011).

47
which dragged the entire union into the matter and implicated his fellow players.
Furthermore, “we” has a more significant meaning in the hockey world than any of the
other professional sports because the hockey culture is heavily rooted in the concept of a
team as opposed to an individual. Had an NFL player said this, for example, it would
have been less meaningful, but it carries real weight when an NHL player says “we”.
Sean Avery, a player then with the Los Angeles Kings, showed the players had
had enough with the lockout and wanted to apologize to the fans:
We were brainwashed … And we’re sorry … We burned a year for nothing …
We didn’t prove anything. We didn’t get anything. We wasted an entire season …
We lost a whole season for nothing … Absolutely nothing … I am furious at Bob
[Goodenow] … [He] thought he was bigger than he was … [He] brainwashed
players like me … To be honest with you, most of us didn’t know what was going
on … Guys had no control over the situation. Guys were out there giving
interviews and we didn’t know the real story. Bob embarrassed a lot of guys …
We underestimated how rich the owners were … Nobody thought they would be
willing to burn a season … They won. They beat us … The fans get taken for
granted, but, to them, a million dollars is a million dollars … And we’re going to
come out looking like crybabies and whiners … The saddest thing that happened
to me during the lockout was the two or three times that fans asked me what was
going on … I wished I could have apologized to them then. I apologize to them
now … We owe the fans everything, we need to get them back, we need to cross
our fingers that they will come back … We’re really, really sorry.
64

The union appeared to lack solidarity and Goodenow sustained a major hit in his
credibility as a leader. The players, at least as far as Avery was concerned, no longer
believed in him and felt he led them down the wrong path. The rumored deal had the
union succumbing to the league’s salary cap. It had little to show for its refusal to accept
the change and it certainly made it seem like the players were to blame for the work

64
Bill Plaschke, “Bill Plaschke; Lost Cause; Kings’ Avery Says NHL Players Were Wrong and Are
Sorry :[Home Edition].” Los Angeles Times, July 6, 2005, http://www.proquest.com/ (accessed January 9,
2011).

48
stoppage. In the grand scheme of things, Avery probably did not conduce this opinion,
but it definitely did not do the union any favors.
The two sides finally drafted an agreement on July 13; the players ratified it on
July 21, ending the lockout after 310 days. From an economic standpoint, the NHLPA
suffered huge losses. Salaries were cut by 24 percent and capped at 54 percent of league
revenue, but salaries would increase as league revenue increased. In exchange, the
players received an increase in the league minimum salary from $175,000 to $450,000
and other considerations, such as guaranteed contracts and free agent eligibility at an
earlier age. All 30 franchises remained intact and the league instituted new rules to
promote more offense. Bettman said, “I know the league’s future is bright, and this will
be to the benefit of the game … We had no choice but to get it right.”
65
Indeed, it
appeared the owners attained everything they sought, but they also appeared to come
away with a favorable agreement after the 1994-95 lockout, but players and agents found
ways to maneuver around it. Now, it was a matter of whether or not this agreement could
sustain league growth as Bettman intended. Player agent Allan Walsh may have said it
best, “The CBA ratified by the players … is being portrayed as a surrender and
capitulation on behalf of the NHLPA membership … I would caution everyone that it is
not necessarily who wins the war, but the real question going forward is which side will
best manage the peace.”
66

65
Helene Elliott, “New Game for the NHL; Bettman Declares an End to the 310-Day Lockout, but
Rule Changes Figure to Make the Biggest Splash When the League Resumes in October :[Home
Edition].” Los Angeles Times, July 23, 2005, http://www.proquest.com/ (accessed January 26, 2011).
66
Ibid.

49
On July 28, Goodenow resigned and Saskin took over as executive director. He
said, “Looking to the future, this is the right decision to be made and the right time to
make it.”
67
Regarding the new agreement, he said, “I believe it can and will work well …
I don’t think this is a personal failure at all.”
68
Even Avery admitted that Goodenow did a
lot for the players, but he just felt that he should have realized the status of the situation
and handled it more appropriately. Though he said otherwise, a resignation after a crisis
almost always reads as a wrongdoing. There was little to be done operationally. If the
union’s executive committee felt he needed to resign, then he had no other option. The
union can only prepare for and accept the resulting public perception.

Public Opinion
Both the league and the union mismanaged their reputation throughout the
lockout, but the most glaring point is that the public did not care about hockey. Although
Canadians care significantly more about the sport, the NHL relies on stateside success
with 24 of 30 teams based in America. According to a poll taken at the beginning of the
lockout, 89 percent of Americans had little interest in the NHL and 61 percent did not
care about a canceled season, much less a lockout.
69
“Unlike the NBA, the NHL does not
have a substantial TV contract to even out total revenues. More than any other sport,

67
Helene Elliott, “NHL’s Union Chief Goodenow Resigns :[Home Edition].” Los Angeles Times,
July 29, 2005, http://www.proquest.com/ (accessed January 26, 2011).
68
Ibid.
69
Andy Holloway, “Game Misconduct.” Canadian Business, September 27, 2004, 29-30.
http://www.proquest.com/ (accessed January 9, 2011).

50
teams in the NHL depend on their own home attendance for their revenue.”
70
Each NHL
team received only $4 million per year from TV broadcasters while an NFL team would
receive $81 million per year.
71
By December, only 56 percent of Americans even knew
the NHL was in a lockout.
72
Finally, as time went on and fans realized they could live
without hockey, a poll revealed that 50 percent of sports fans would not be disappointed
if the season were canceled.
73
For better or worse, the passion for the sport was not there.
On the one hand, it gave Bettman the time he needed to get the right deal in place. On the
other hand, idling on the negotiations and abusing the fans does little to retain the fan
base or attract new fans.
The union had to fight an uphill battle from the beginning. As soon as Bettman
announced the lockout, a poll showed that 52 percent of the Canadian public blamed the
players and only 21 percent blamed the owners, and 60 percent believed the owners were
more reasonable versus 20 percent who believed the players were.
74
The union did little
to help matters as it continued to say it would not negotiate on a salary cap and any
mention of such a mechanism would deteriorate dialogue. Moreover, the union did not
seem to grasp the severity of the situation. It denied the losses of the league-mandated

70
Michael Leeds and Peter Von Allmen, “The Economics of Sports,” in the Business of Sports, ed.
Scott R. Rosner and Kenneth L. Shropshire (Sudbury, Ma: Jones and Bartlett Publishers, 2004), 363.
71
Ibid.
72
Selena Roberts, “With Hockey Fans Silent, the N.H.L.’s Players Union Shows It Is Listening.” New
York Times, December 12, 2004, Late Edition (East Coast), http://www.proquest.com/ (accessed January
17, 2011).
73
Mike Brehm, “Poll: No NHL Would Be No Biggie for Sports Fans :[Final Edition].” USA TODAY,
January 11, 2005, http://www.proquest.com/ (accessed January 17, 2011).
74
“NHL Players Get Blamed As Possible Season Cancelling Looms.” Ipsos, September 16, 2004,
http://www.ipsos-na.com/news-polls/pressrelease.aspx?id=2372 (accessed January 28, 2011).

51
audit and refused to conduct its own audit when the league offered to open up its books.
Although Forbes showed very different numbers, the league at least managed to show
some transparency. The union miscalculated the risk-reward for not accepting the
league’s offer. If it truly believed the league could continue to function under a
marketplace system, then it should have conducted its own audit. Unfortunately for the
union, it passed on this opportunity presumably because it knew the league’s economy
was as bad as Bettman said it was. The risk for conducting its own audit was that it would
have validated the league’s findings and weakened the union’s bargaining position
because it would have had to accept the salary cap. In the end, the union accepted the cap
and cost the players a year’s salary and the fans a year of hockey. It undeniably comes
down to money in these negotiations, but there was an absolute truth in this situation:
change was crucial. The Forbes article may have said that teams were underreporting
losses, but $96 million in losses is still nothing to overlook.
The union should not have been so focused on the salary cap issue because the
players were missing more than money. Stan Kasten, former president of the Atlanta
Thrashers, said the union could have accepted the salary cap issue and “[focused] on the
dozens of other issues that affect players every day, like game rules, rink conditions,
traveling and scheduling, not to mention the structural issues like contract guarantees and
free agency.”
75
Instead, the money remained at the forefront of the union’s mind.
Interestingly, the union’s justification for refusing to accept a salary cap was because it

75
Stan Kasten, “Major Change Is Inevitable for Hockey, Now or Later.” New York Times,
October 3, 2004, Late Edition (East Coast), http://www.proquest.com/ (accessed January 17, 2011).

52
wanted to maintain a marketplace system, but players were not eligible for unrestricted
free agency until the age of 31. Therefore, a team could potentially own a player’s rights
until it exercised its “right of first refusal,” so there was only an illusion of a free market.
If the union addressed these non-economic issues in exchange for a salary cap, then it
could have ended the lockout much sooner.
Players like Adrian Aucoin, Mike Modano and Jeremey Roenick antagonized fans
with their statements. They jeopardized the union’s mission and made themselves, as well
as their fellow players, out to be selfish and uncaring about the fans. Their frustration did
little for them at the bargaining table. They may have been attempting to show solidarity,
but the owners displayed the same strength, strength the players underestimated. LA King
President Tim Leiweke said, “We budgeted zero revenue for the Kings and zero revenue
for the L.A. Arena Company. If the season gets canceled, it will have no impact on our
budget. We already took that hit. I guess the good news is, we saw this coming.”
76
Other
teams, like the Mighty Ducks of Anaheim, reportedly lost less by not playing the season.
Since the owners were prepared financially, the players should have asked Goodenow to
accept the cap and save the season. Instead, the union opted to test the owners’ wills and
came out on the losing end. Bettman anticipated that the players could not last an entire
season and just had to wait for their resolve to break.
Most importantly, the union lacked a story. The players had exorbitant salaries so
why would fans sympathize for them? The union continued to promote the marketplace
system and cited the MLB as a successful organization that used the same system, along

76
Foster and Elliott, “Forecast: Ice Cold.”

53
with a luxury tax. The union blamed the owners for the failure of the system and if they
could control their own spending, then there would be no problem. The union completely
disregarded the fact that the NHL was not the MLB, in popularity or in earnings. There
was simply not enough incoming revenue to cover player salaries. Owners may have
overpaid their players, but would players accept pay cuts if that were the only way to
control spending in a marketplace system? If teams suddenly decided to pay their players
less and less, then the players presumably would have went on strike until they felt they
were being paid fairly for their services.
On the other side, the league maintained a healthy relationship with the fans.
Whether it was for business or for public relations, teams engaged with their
communities. For example, for the Mighty Ducks of Anaheim: “The Cincinnati AHL
affiliate played three games at the Arrowhead Pond, and fans could skate with the
players. About 18 tons of man-made snow also provided sled rides.”
77
This established
the brand and longevity of the teams. Players will come and go, but the team will always
be there. Furthermore, Bettman continued to mention that he wanted a salary cap so the
NHL could enjoy growth under a more sustainable economy, which would benefit the
fans. The league presumably could have operated under the union’s initial proposals, but
it would have only been a matter of time before the league was posting losses again,
according to Bettman and Daly. Bettman wanted the right solution so fans would
hopefully never have to deal with this situation again.

77
Tom Weir. “Clubs Work OT to Keep Fans Happy :[Final Edition].” USA
TODAY, March 11, 2005, http://www.proquest.com/ (accessed January 17, 2011).

54
The teams represent the league, but Bettman fined Tim Leiweke for speaking
about the negotiations, which indicated the league was not exercising transparency.
Moeller argued that the commissioner was justified in his decision:
The league instructed all 30 teams not to publicly comment on the state of
negotiations. It’s a “one voice” sort of thing. And the voice is going to be Gary
Bettman. The voice is going to be his office because you can’t have the guy in
Carolina and the guy in Edmonton and the guy in LA and the guy in New York
speaking because everyone has their own agendas. If you’re the Toronto Maple
Leafs, for example, and you’re making $1.2 million every night you have a home
game, and another team’s making $300,000 every night they have a home game,
there’s just going to be different agendas. At the end of the day, remember: the
commissioner works for the other 30 owners so they entrust him to do what’s best
for the game so he basically says, “Shut up, I’ll talk for the game and we’ll be
cohesive.” … The commissioner’s briefing all the teams and the governors and
whatnot, but at the end of the day, it’s a negotiation. One voice is selected to
represent that. I don’t have any issues with that.
78

Ideally, the league should have prepared a unified message for the teams, but Moeller
asserts that that was not possible. The league decided that the owners could not agree on
a message so they had to agree that Bettman was their leader. Unity clearly overruled
transparency.
Yet, the NHL did little to facilitate negotiations. The owners were prepared for
the lockout so they were in a position of power to wait until the union gave in to a salary
cap. This was dangerous because exercising power like that exhibits tyranny and idleness.
Even if the union refused to listen, the league should have continued to force talks. It had
nothing to lose at the bargaining table by continuing negotiations because it had a strong
enough case to not give up on the salary cap. The union was grasping at straws to justify
the marketplace system whereas the league had the benefit of a story:

78
Jeff Moeller, interview by Jonathan Lam, 15 February 2011, El Segundo, CA, digital recording.

55
[Each] team operates under its own economic situations, which enable some
teams to pay players more than others. Obviously, smaller market teams cannot
support the same payrolls as those in larger markets. To ensure the viability of the
teams evolving in smaller markets, it would seem only fair to take their financial
situations into account. It would also seem logical from a league-wide competitive
balance point of view to help smaller market teams gain access to the best
available talent in order to ensure that the sport remains competitive and attractive
for fans, sponsors, and players alike.
79

There was a fundamental economic truth behind the salary cap. Small-market teams
could not compete with their larger counterparts. The marketplace system not only
created a competitive imbalance, but these deep-pocket teams could run these small-
market teams, and eventually the league, out of business. The league needed to stick to
these points and continue negotiating. When it stepped away from the table, it showed
that it was as stubborn as the union.

79
Melane Aubut, “When Negotiations Fail: An Analysis of Salary Arbitration and Salary Cap
Systems,” in the Business of Sports, ed. Scott R. Rosner and Kenneth L. Shropshire (Sudbury, Mass.: Jones
& Bartlett Learning, 2004), 261.

56
Chapter Five: The 1982 National Football League Strike
The players went on strike after almost reaching a deal before the season began.
The president of the union claimed the players were united, but it soon surfaced that this
was not the case. The players could not continue any longer without pay. Some played in
all-star games to earn extra money, but they realized a resolution needed to be made
soon. The union originally projected the owners would cave after three weeks, but the
strike lasted eight weeks and the players soon gave up. The players should have lost more
with this lack of organization, but the executive director of the union wisely listened to
his players’ concerns and compromised a deal with the league. This exemplifies the
necessity of internal communications and it empowered the players because they
understood they could make headway against the owners. Furthermore, the union was
proactive in reaching a deal in the end, which reduced the potential public relations
damage the union image would have faced if it continued to wait out the owners. On the
other hand, the league practically ignored the fans and stubbornly waited for the union to
return to the bargaining table.

Series of Events
On September 20, NFLPA President Gene Upshaw announced the union would
strike after the first game of the season, which would be played that night between the
Green Bay Packers and the New York Giants. This had been long overdue since
negotiations began that February to no avail. Upshaw said, “No games will be played
until management abandons its unlawful course and engages in good-faith bargaining and

57
executes a fair and equitable agreement. We are prepared to withhold our services,
however long it takes. We have a solid front.”
1
This message paints the owners as the
enemies and solidifies the players’ support for the union, which Upshaw said was at 94
percent.
2
Joseph A. “Chip” Yablonski, labor counsel for the union, reaffirmed this when
he said the union was “prepared to stay out one day longer than they [the owners] are.”
3

Regardless of the reason for the strike, this indicates the union was going to wait until the
owners caved. That is not a negotiation; that is idleness. Furthermore, Upshaw said it
would take three weeks for the owners to feel the financial effects of the strike.
4
This also
indicates that the union expected the owners to give in, which is farfetched because
unions seldom outlast owners in a financial battle.
The union originally wanted 55 percent of gross revenues, but the league scoffed
at the proposal because “it would make the union partners with the owners.”
5
Instead, the
union abandoned that proposal and wanted a player compensation fund via a 50-50 split
of television revenues, a total of $1.6 billion. This showed that the union was willing to
negotiate. In fact, the league agreed to this proposal, with the money being distributed
over five years as opposed to the union’s four. Yet, even with an agreement so close, the

1
Robert Boyle, “And Then the Clock Showed 00:00,” Sports Illustrated 57, No. 14 (September 27,
1982): 14-15, http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/vault/article/magazine/mag1125942/index.htm (accessed
March 5, 2011).
2
Ibid, 15.
3
Ibid.
4
Ibid.
5
Ibid, 16.

58
players still elected to strike. NFL Management Council Executive Director Jack Donlan
did not think that would happen:
“The reason I am optimistic,” he said, “is that a strike doesn’t make any sense to
me. We’re close in the dollar figure. We just have to figure out how to package it.
When they strike, the heat will be on everyone. So the question the players will
ask themselves is, ‘What are we striking over?’ Someone will say, ‘Well, we want
$1.6 billion.’ And then someone else will say, ‘Isn’t that what they offered us?’
And then someone else will say, ‘Yes.’ And then I think the union’s going to get a
lot of pressure back.”
6

He was caught off-guard and fully expected the season to continue. The league gave the
fans plenty of reason to believe as such. The money was on the table, but the union still
passed. Actions speak louder than words and no matter how much the union said it
wanted to negotiate, coming this close to an agreement and then electing to strike placed
the union at a huge disadvantage in the public arena.
It did not take long for the union to realize it did not have the resources or
cohesiveness to prolong a strike. The union pitched Ted Turner to broadcast an all-star
game so players could earn extra money during the strike. Many marquee players
declined to participate because they did not want to risk injury for practically nothing.
7

Furthermore, Sports Illustrated reported that several players opposed the strike. Player
representative Russell Erxleben said, “He’d talked to 40 [teammates] and they were
unanimous against the union’s demand for a wage scale.”
8
Erxleben retracted this

6
Ibid, 17.
7
Paul Zimmerman, “This Was the Week That Wasn’t,” Sports Illustrated 57, No. 15 (October 4,
1982): 23, http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/vault/article/magazine/mag1125970/2/index.htm (accessed
March 5, 2011).
8
Ibid.

59
statement after speaking with union leaders. Marvin Miller, the executive director of the
MLBPA who led the union during the 1981 MLB strike, said:
The players still don’t realize how statements like [Erxleben’s] damage their
position … Every time a player says something like, “I’m solid now but I don’t
know how I’ll be in two weeks,” he’s just prolonging the strike. When we were
on strike last year I figured the owners had an automatic multiplier in their
heads—for every player who spoke out against our position, they figured 85
others were in silent support.
9

It was evident that Upshaw did not have the 94 percent support he claimed. There was
clear dissension within the union. Either through common ideals or the risk of incurring
$100,000 fine for speaking about negotiations, the owners maintained their unity.
10
As
mentioned, the party that lacks unity loses ground both at the bargaining table and in the
public relations arena.
Television networks had to fill in the time slots vacated by NFL games. TV
ratings dropped dramatically, which suggests the public wanted to watch football.
Certainly from a business aspect, owners had the ability to see this strike through. The
networks essentially loaned each team $1.07 million for two weeks. As Sports Illustrated
mentioned, this strike fund, “coupled with the fact that the owners aren’t paying players’
salaries, should more than offset lost revenues.”
11
There was no urgency for the owners to
end the strike because they had the resources to outlast the players. In fact, the only time
owners felt pressure to negotiate was when National Labor Relations Board general

9
Ibid.
10
Ibid.
11
William Taaffe, “They Weren’t Stricken By the Strike,” Sports Illustrated 57, No. 15 (October 4,
1982): 85, http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/vault/article/magazine/mag1125979/index.htm (accessed March
13, 2011).

60
counsel William A. Lubbers threatened the owners to either immediately bargain on a
wage scale or he would seek an injunction for unfair labor practices. This pressure was
alleviated when the five-man board overruled Lubbers, which empowered the owners
because they had already collected money from their season ticket sales and the union’s
strike fund was running out.
12
The owners may have dodged the financial bullet, but an
intervention by a third party like the NLRB has severe public relations implications
because it portrays the owners’ idleness and disinterest in bargaining. This revealed that
their strategy was to rely on their finances until the union gave in. The owners did little to
win over the fans with their “business first, fans second” approach.
The players barely had any leverage in negotiations, but still continued to hold
out. Both sides cast the fans aside and focused solely on the intricacies of the new
agreement. Sports Illustrated originally predicted the strike would last a month,
13
but
seven weeks into the strike, Donlan said, “We are not close philosophically, conceptually
or economically.”
14
Again, this reflects a trend in negotiations where pessimism sets in
and fans lose hope of a salvageable season.
Oddly enough, the owners solidified the players’ resolve, which should have
spelled disaster for the fans, but it ended up saving the season. NFLPA Executive

12
Paul Zimmerman, “Scorecard: The Strike: The Winners. The Losers. And Who Did What to
Whom,” Sports Illustrated 57, No. 23 (November 29, 1982): 22,
http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/vault/article/magazine/mag1126143/3/index.htm (accessed March 13,
2011).
13
Boyle, “The Clock Showed 00:00,” 15.
14
Jerry Kirshenbaum, ed., “Scorecard: The NFL Strike: A Legacy of Primitiveness and
Miscalculation,” Sports Illustrated 57, No. 23 (November 15, 1982): 21,
http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/vault/article/magazine/mag1126100/index.htm (accessed March 13, 2011).

61
Director Ed Garvey heard the grumblings of his players about the past agreement and
proposed a deal that included severance, a wage scale, postseason pay, the right to
bargain individual contracts and performance bonuses.
15
“They [the owners] threatened
to fine the players for shaking hands. They said, we won’t negotiate your concepts. They
did some of Garvey’s work for him. They firmed the players up.”
16
Fortunately, the
owners deemed the proposal reasonable, accepted the agreement and the season resumed
on November 21.

Public Opinion
Sports Illustrated outlined the public relations effects of the league and the
union’s actions. “While the union showed the world it could sustain a strike, the owners
demonstrated they could take one … The union … showed strength and organization. It
established itself as a unified force.”
17
Indeed, both sides flexed their might in
negotiations, but this did not impress the fans, who were largely forgotten during the
process. Twenty-five years after the strike, Pasquarelli recalled the contention at the time:
There were a lot of negotiations, a lot of words and a lot of broken hearts around
the country, as legions of fans sought diversions for long, NFL-less Sunday
afternoons. A lot of men who otherwise would have remained relatively
anonymous to America -- league negotiator Jack Donlan, NFL Players
Association executive director Ed Garvey and federal arbitrator Sam Kagel… --
became pretty famous.

15
Paul Zimmerman, “The Value of Walking Out,” Sports Illustrated 57, No. 23 (November 29, 1982):
22, http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/vault/article/magazine/mag1126148/index.htm (accessed March 13,
2011).
16
Kirshenbaum, “Scorecard: The NFL Strike.”
17
Zimmerman, “Scorecard: The Strike,” 19.

62
Then, the more their countenances showed up on television as they exited another
futile bargaining session, they became infamous.
18

The fans were cast aside for eight weeks while the league and union sorted out their
mess. Upshaw did not even mention the fans when he announced the strike on September
20. The fans showed their discontent the first week play resumed. “A lot of them stayed
home Sunday. In 13 stadiums the average attendance was down 8,390 from last year and
the no-shows—people who bought tickets but didn’t use them—totaled 115,586. In all,
the 13 games played to 77% capacity, off 12% from 1981.”
19

There were hardly any public relations benefits for either side from the strike.
Rather than taking the opportunity to build its rapport with fans, each side publicized
their negotiations, or lack thereof, as if arguing behind closed doors was not enough:
The press, whose periodic reporting of “progress” in the talks, sometimes based
on information from just one side, only prompted the other side, or so it often
seemed, to stiffen its resolve. “The press has been used to carry messages back
and forth,” said [Jack] Getman, [a professor of labor law at Yale]. “It has been
used to create a crisis atmosphere.”
20

This exemplifies the incorrect usage of transparency. The league had already entered
crisis mode when the players struck. At that moment, it could not get any worse from an
operations standpoint, but there was no way to predict the public relations ramifications
nor did the league or union seem to care. Instead of finding a way out, the two sides dug
themselves deeper by painting a bleak story for the fans with reports of no progress.

18
Len Pasquarelli, “Lengthy Strike Has Mostly Been Forgotten,” ESPN, September 21, 2007,
http://sports.espn.go.com/nfl/columns/story?columnist=pasquarelli_len&id=3030311 (accessed March 14,
2011).
19
Zimmerman, “Scorecard: The Strike,” 22.
20
Kirshenbaum, “Scorecard: The NFL Strike.”

63
Getman cited two critical public relations issues for the ongoing strike: poor
internal communications and poor attitude. With regards to internal communications, he
said:
It’s always easy to criticize the people across the table from you … But it’s a
measure of professionalism to be able to talk tough to your own people, to tell
them at some point, “You’re full of – – [sic]. You’re cutting your own throat. …
Talking compromise to the players doesn’t seem to be a task Garvey relishes. It’s
just speculation on my part, but if he makes the kind of speeches at the table that
he does in public, it can’t be healthy for negotiations. He makes and remakes the
same points, which can be annoying, and he doesn’t seem to listen to what other
people are saying.
21

As mentioned, internal communication is key to creating unity within an organization.
There must be a shared philosophy so leaders can act in the best interest of the
organization. Without this, they have no basis to construct a deal and would probably
head in a direction that no one agreed upon, which would lead to dissent.
Second, Getman asserted the league took a hard-nosed approach with the
negotiations, especially with the owners’ selection of Donlan as their key negotiator
because “many pro sports owners are self-made men with an anti-union bent and tend to
be ‘buccaneers’ by nature. In selecting labor negotiators they tend to pass over those who
emphasize accommodation with unions and settle instead on we’ll-show-them-who’s-
boss types.”
22
Donlan’s sole responsibility was to negotiate a deal. Public relations is not
part of his job description. In fact, the NFL Management Council was created “solely to

21
Ibid.
22
Ibid.

64
distance the 28 owners from the commissioner.”
23
As Garvey recalled, “[The owners]
sent over [Jack Donlan] who isn’t an owner, and couldn’t speak for the owners. (Two
months) later, they finally sent an owner, Dan Rooney of Pittsburgh, and the settlement
came soon after that.”
24
Commissioner Pete Rozelle should have assumed the public
relations role, but he suffered a huge setback as a leader because he did not participate in
the negotiations, much like MLB Commissioner Bowie Kuhn during the 1981 MLB
strike. Rozelle did not learn anything from that case as Kuhn was heavily criticized for
his absence from the bargaining table. The commissioner is more than a figurehead
position. He must serve as the leader of the owners and the face of the league. This would
explain the lack of commitment to the fans by the league. A league commissioner’s main
responsibility is to promote the growth of the league, which includes maintaining the
league image.

23
Bob Oates, “Holding the Line When NFL Management Calls Shots, the Old Guard Is an Effective
Bloc :[Home Edition].” Los Angeles Times (Pre-1997 Fulltext), October 4, 1987,
http://www.proquest.com/ (accessed March 5, 2011).
24
Bob Oates, “Q & A Ed Garvey Former Director of the National Football League Players Assn.
Major Changes Seen for Pro Football on TV Another NFL Strike Can Be Avoided, Trend to Pay Cable
Can’t, Lawyer Says :[Home Edition].” Los Angeles Times (Pre-1997 Fulltext), March 17, 1987,
http://www.proquest.com/ (accessed March 5, 2011).

65
Chapter Six: The 1987 National Football League Lockout
Like the MLB in 1980, the NFL failed to reach a long-term with the players union
in 1982 and found itself in the same position shortly thereafter. The owners handily
defeated the players for a number of reasons. The players were not as unified or prepared
as they were in 1982. Players went on strike, but did not universally understand the
reasons. In response, the owners locked out any player who stuck with the union.
Furthermore, the league continued its season by hosting games played with replacement
players to indicate that the football would be played with or without the star players. The
union failed to internally communicate to its players a single reason for going on strike.
Coupled with the lockout and the replacement games, this coerced players to cross the
picket line. Locked out players also protested outside their home stadiums in an
unprofessional and unruly manner.

Series of Events
After the agreement was reached in 1982, there were immediate predictions that it
would be renegotiated rather than extended in 1987 because it was widely considered a
victory for the owners. The players now wanted a fairer deal. Upshaw said:
Management has always taken the position the players are happy, that they make
so much money they’re not willing to fight for what they have. Well, I hope they
don’t misread us. I hope they don’t misjudge us. Because the players are devoted
to making advances in this contract. We’re not in an era of concession bargaining.
We will make some advancements.
1

1
Mark Heisler, “Players Take Soft Stance-So Far Mood Not As Dark As Before ‘82 NFL Strike, but
It’s Early :[Home Edition].” Los Angeles Times (Pre-1997 Fulltext), March 28, 1987,
http://www.proquest.com/ (accessed March 5, 2011).

66
The union carried momentum from the last strike with newfound strength and
organization, which would even out the playing field in negotiations. Again, Upshaw
claimed he had overwhelming support from the players, this time at 99 percent, which
had to be questioned because his last projection of 94 percent proved groundless.
No progress was made as March dragged into August. Both sides indicated a
strike was unlikely, but there was no action to support this, which essentially rendered the
words meaningless. Furthermore, the two sides conducted their negotiations in private
because the press had too much influence in the previous strike.
2
Like the previous case
studies have shown, transparency has often translated into fans knowing that the league
and the union were fighting and no progress was made. The solution to poor use of
transparency should not have been to deny media access. Instead, the two sides should
have prepared better messages for the media. The issue with the last strike was not the
media itself, but how it was used.
August 31 came and went without an agreement, but the season opened on
September 13 with the two sides still in negotiations. At this point, it became clear why
optimistic messages require supporting actions. On September 16, Donlan rejected the
union’s proposal and called for federal mediation. The union set September 22 as the
final deadline to reach a deal. Upshaw said, “A strike is inevitable … because they
(management council) have had an agenda from the word `go’ that they were going to
continue (playing) under any circumstance. They’re trying to fulfill their own

2
Bob Oates, “The NFL Talks-A Walkout Appears Unlikely This Time :[Home Edition].” Los Angeles
Times (Pre-1997 Fulltext), August 13, 1987, http://www.proquest.com/ (accessed March 5, 2011).

67
prediction.”
3
The optimism from the previous month that a deal would get done faded as
it proved little more than false hope. The two sides were still far apart from a deal and
were falling into the same media trap as five years earlier. The press now became a
public forum for debate and despair, which dashed the optimism necessary for fans
during a work stoppage. NFL Management Council spokesman John Jones said, “I don’t
want to convey any sense of false hope or expectation. There is dialogue and there is
discussion. But there is no sense that a settlement is at hand.”
4
This was only one
example of Jones’ many misguided messages. Following the same meeting, Donlan said,
“The next two days are critical. If there’s no movement after two days, we’re looking at a
long one.”
5
This is not what fans need to hear because it appears that there is no end in
sight. Instead, the NFLMC should have created a message of optimism, such as, “We are
working diligently to negotiate a deal that will bring football back as quickly as
possible.” The league and the union continued to make the same public relations mistakes
by discounting the fans and publicizing their contention. The two sides again brought in
the National Labor Relations Board to pressure the other into negotiating. “The union
filed unfair labor practice charges with the National Labor Relations Board … protesting
$1,000 bonus payments to dissident players and guarantees of 1988 roster spots … The

3
“Both Sides Agree an NFL Strike Looms Owners Renew Call for Mediator; Union Expects to Walk
Out :[Home Edition].” Los Angeles Times (Pre-1997 Fulltext), September 17, 1987,
http://www.proquest.com/ (accessed March 5, 2011).
4
Gene Wojciechowski, “NFL Strike NFL Negotiations Will Resume Today, but Progress Is
Slow :[Home Edition].” Los Angeles Times (Pre-1997 Fulltext), September 24, 1987,
http://www.proquest.com/ (accessed March 5, 2011).
5
“Negotiators Meet for Much of Day in Philadelphia :[Southland Edition].” Los Angeles Times (Pre-
1997 Fulltext), September 24, 1987, http://www.proquest.com/ (accessed March 5, 2011).

68
Management Council … filed an unfair labor practice charge against the union for failure
to negotiate.”
6
Bringing in a third party indicated that talks were far from amicable,
which again dashed fans’ optimism.
The cornerstone of this negotiation was the union wanted unrestricted free agency
for four-year veterans. “According to NFLPA figures, 1,415 players have become free
agents since the 1982 Collective Bargaining Agreement was signed. But not one player,
under the current compensation system, has moved to another team.”
7
This system
restricted free agency because the team that signed an elite free agent would have to
surrender its top draft pick(s) to the team that lost him. Teams deemed this too heavy a
price so these free agents would either re-sign or retire.
8
The owners should have
appeared as the proverbial wardens who imprisoned their players. Americans can agree
that workers deserve the freedom to move if they are unhappy.
The message did not stick for two reasons. The first reason is players picked the
wrong time to strike since the average player’s salary rose from $90,000 in 1982 to
$205,000.
9
“A financial expert says a person could live well on what the average National
Football League player earns in four years. In fact, the economist, Rhoda Israelov, says
that four-year veterans have a chance to bank more by age 25 than most retirees have at

6
“NFL Strike `Mystery Man’ Gets Them Talking Rozelle Steps Into the Picture; Formal Meeting Set
Today :[Home Edition].” Los Angeles Times (Pre-1997 Fulltext), September 23, 1987,
http://www.proquest.com/ (accessed March 5, 2011).
7
Wojciechowski, “NFL Negotiations Will Resume.”
8
Goodwin, Michael, “Ideas & Trends: Free Agency At Issue; in NFL Strike, It’s the Principle and the
Money.” New York Times, September 27, 1987, Late Edition (East Coast),
http://www.proquest.com/ (accessed March 5, 2011).
9
Heisler, “Players Take Soft Stance.”

69
age 65.”
10
As with most labor negotiations, the fans could not sympathize for the players
because of their rising salaries. So what should have been an easy win for the union based
on principle would turn into a struggle based on salaries.
The second reason is that players did not agree on the free agency issue. Players
had an average career span of 4.5 years.
11
Fighting for a free agent system that would
benefit only a select few seemed like a moot point:
Just before the strike deadline, three Raiders … were asked what they thought the
No. 1 issue was. Each named a different one.
Upshaw told confidantes that he wasn’t keen on free agency, himself, but that it
was what most of the members listed No. 1 when they were polled. Of course,
they had to put something down.
12

The union was putting its players’ careers in jeopardy by failing to explain the issues.
Players were going to lose time and money, and they did not clearly understand what they
were fighting for.
The players struck on September 22 as planned and the scene looked eerily
similar to the one in 1982. “Again this year, the missing ingredient in NFL labor
negotiations is enlightened leadership from the club owners.”
13
Rozelle may have

10
“Economist Says NFL Player’s 4 Years More Profitable Than Lifetime for Most :[Home
Edition].” Los Angeles Times (Pre-1997 Fulltext), October 13, 1987, http://www.proquest.com/ (accessed
March 5, 2011).
11
Bob Oates, “NFL Strike: Day 1 Pro Football Somebody Should Put a Stop to This, While There’s
Still Time :[Home Edition].” Los Angeles Times (Pre-1997 Fulltext), September 23, 1987,
http://www.proquest.com/ (accessed March 5, 2011).
12
Mark Heisler, “Analysis Bad Call There’s No Real Winner in NFL Strike, and Losses Are Still
Being Counted :[Home Edition].” Los Angeles Times (Pre-1997 Fulltext), October 25, 1987,
http://www.proquest.com/ (accessed March 16, 2011).
13
Bob Oates, “NFL Strike: Day 1 Pro Football Somebody Should Put a Stop to This, While There’s
Still Time :[Home Edition].” Los Angeles Times (Pre-1997 Fulltext), September 23, 1987,
http://www.proquest.com/ (accessed March 5, 2011).

70
recognized the impact of his absence five years earlier and joined negotiations, which
provided the league with a much-needed leader. He did not participate in the actual
negotiations, but served as a communicator between the league and the union.
14
Still,
even with this addition, there was no significant progress, which now called into question
his effectiveness as a leader.
For the union, the strike carried graver public relations consequences. Rozelle
cancelled the third week of games, but brought in replacement players until a deal was
reached. Players on strike picketed outside stadiums and during practices, and taunted
these replacements, if not attacked them.
15
The players may have been unified, but they
were unified in a gang or a mob sense. This is not the image the union wants of its
players. There were enormous public relations ramifications of watching these players
attack replacements on television and reading these accounts in the newspaper.
Furthermore, Upshaw said the union would interfere with these games: “We don’t
advocate violence, but we do advocate doing whatever’s necessary to stop these games,
and we will do it … We’ll haunt those games … They are really tearing down our
product, and we don’t like it.”
16
Undoubtedly, the league was putting a lesser product on
the field, but owners felt it was a better move than missing games like in 1982. The
replacement games were the league’s way of saying, “The show must go on.” Cognizant

14
“Union to `Haunt’ Games Upshaw Says Strikers Will Try to Stop Them :[Southland Edition].” Los
Angeles Times (Pre-1997 Fulltext), September 30, 1987, http://www.proquest.com/ (accessed March 5,
2011).
15
“NFL Strike Shotguns and Broken Windows on Picket Line Mood of Regular Players Is Light-
Hearted in Some Places, Grim Elsewhere :[Home Edition].” Los Angeles Times (Pre-1997 Fulltext),
September 24, 1987, http://www.proquest.com/ (accessed March 5, 2011).
16
“Union to `Haunt’ Games.”

71
of this, players wanted to end the strike as soon as possible, especially since many were
still unclear of why they were striking in the first place. Keena Turner, the San Francisco
49ers alternate player representative said:
“Our team has made it clear that we don’t care about free agency. We want to
move off free agency.”
If only the 49ers are saying it out loud, most of the union rank-and-file seems to
be just as eager to see the union drop free agency. Players are said to be awaiting
the results of this meeting, and if no hope comes out of it, are ready to make a big
move across the picket line.
17

Again, Upshaw did not have the 99 percent support he claimed. At best, it looked like he
had 92 percent support as 130 players out of about 1585 crossed the picket lines to
resume play.
18

The mutiny should have given the owners momentum, but, perhaps in denial, the
union said it strengthened its resolve. NFLPA Vice President Brian Holloway said, “The
scales have tipped in our favor. You saw the American people say in very clear terms, the
NFL is not just owners and people dressed up in team colors.”
19
Teams refunded tickets;
attendance at these games was noticeably lower than normal. The fans did not want to
pay full-price for an inferior product. Furthermore, the league did not account for how the
fans would receive these games, not just for entertainment value, but also for community
pride. The replacement games were not just exhibition games; they counted towards the

17
Mark Heisler, “NFL Strike: Day 14 Players Don’t Seem Ready to Cave in Just Yet :[Home
Edition].” Los Angeles Times (Pre-1997 Fulltext), October 6, 1987, http://www.proquest.com/ (accessed
March 5, 2011).
18
“NFL Management, Union Disagree on Progress :[Southland Edition].” Los Angeles Times (Pre-
1997 Fulltext), October 9, 1987, http://www.proquest.com/ (accessed March 5, 2011).
19
Heisler, “NFL Strike: Day 14.”

72
final standings. Even if a city had the best team in the league, it could still lose enough
games during the strike and fall out of the playoff race because it did not field the best
replacement team. So the league could be denying a city a championship, which would
have fans up in arms. The union sincerely believed the fans were behind it. Exuding
confidence, Upshaw said he was “encouraged with the progress and if we can move as
fast on other areas, there’s a possibility we can play this weekend.”
20
If this were all that
was reported, then the end would have been in sight, but Jones detracted from this and
said the union “[overstated] the actual progress that has taken place.”
21
Here, the union
posited that the league took this approach because it wanted to “scare the players into
believing there is no hope … They don’t want the players to take too much hope from
what’s happening … Let’s face it, they’re still hopeful that the solidarity of the players
will crack. It hasn’t.”
22
There is no clearer example that the fans were still a secondary
audience to the league. It was using the media to break down the players rather than
enthuse the fans.
Still without an agreement, the union called off the strike on October 15. Players
trickled back to their teams as the replacement players packed up their things and left.
Just as it was at the beginning of the strike, the scene around the stadiums was a public
relations nightmare:

20
“NFL, Union Disagree on Progress.”
21
Ibid.
22
Ibid.

73
In Seattle, where a convoy of 25 cars carrying regular players arrived at 10:25
a.m., a bus carrying replacement players was turned back from team headquarters.
“We’re fired, we’re fired,” players shouted from the bus …
[In Los Angeles], “Scabs, get the heck out of our locker room!” one of the regular
Los Angeles Rams was heard to shout as the former strikers filed into the practice
facility.
23

The union should have instructed its players to behave appropriately because this
behavior strips the players of their professionalism. As far as the league, players who did
not cross the picket line before the strike was called off were not allowed to play the first
week back and were hence denied a paycheck. This reflects poorly on the league because
teams were adding insult to injury by penalizing players for remaining united and
adhering to their principles, though these principles remained unclear.

Public Opinion
There were no heroes during this work stoppage. Only villains. For the second
time in five years, the league and the union mishandled their public relations efforts
during labor negotiations. Finances and unity aside, pride proved to be the biggest
problem again. One fan said:
Before the NFL strike began, it seemed the players had a legit gripe against the
owners. However, no one really wanted to resolve the issue and we were left with
a shameful excuse of chest-thumping individuals to handle the crises, individuals
who have been taught at the highest educational level in the world. These
Einsteins are known to us as the players and owners.
24

23
“NFL Players Call Off Strike, Go Back to Teams Without a Contract :[Late Final Edition].” Los
Angeles Times (Pre-1997 Fulltext), October 15, 1987, http://www.proquest.com/ (accessed March 5, 2011).
24
“Striking Out At Both the Owners and Players :[Home Edition 3].” Los Angeles Times (Pre-1997
Fulltext), October 17, 1987, http://www.proquest.com/ (accessed March 16, 2011).

74
The league was in crisis mode, but there was no indication as such. Obviously, there is no
need to hit the proverbial panic button, but there should at least be acknowledgement of
the fans. Neither the league nor the union addressed the public to win the public relations
battle. For example, Jones made statements that indicated the league was using the media
to directly pressure the union rather than using the media to pressure the union via the
public. The latter would have given the league an avenue to push positive messages and
shape public opinion against the union.
Sports Illustrated clearly reported that fans lost in the 1982 strike and
demonstrated their frustration.
25
Indeed, the league staged replacement games, but there
was no clear reason why. The owners may have been looking out for the fans by
providing them with football on Sundays. The owners may have also been looking out for
themselves by trying to make money while the union was on strike. The games may have
also been a strikebreaking tactic. In any case, the league missed an opportunity to address
the fans and explain why football was coming back, albeit in a lesser form. There was a
story to tell, but the league left it up to the fans to create their own story. Some fans
evidenced their displeasure by asking for refunds, which naturally dropped stadium
attendance and team revenue. Television ratings for the first week of the replacement
games told another story. “Put any kind of National Football League game on television
and apparently people will watch it … the overnight Nielsen television ratings held up
pretty well and were far better than those for major league baseball.”
26
There was no

25
Paul Zimmerman, “Scorecard: The Strike,” 26.
26
Larry Stewart, “Television Viewers Aren’t Turned Off By the NFL Strike :[Home Edition].” Los
Angeles Times (Pre-1997 Fulltext), October 6, 1987, http://www.proquest.com/ (accessed March 5, 2011).

75
denying fans loved football and could not bear missing games like in 1982. This trend
would not hold up, however, since the product was not NFL-quality. By the second week
of these games, TV ratings dropped dramatically. Pasquarelli recalled, “If you were
absolutely desperate for football, and had a strong stomach, the ‘scab games’ did offer
some entertaining moments, usually determined by how many players for each franchise
crossed the picket lines.”
27

Still, the players also did little to help themselves, especially with their unruly
protests outside stadiums. By the first week of replacement games, news outlets received
mail that indicated the fans did not side with the players.
28
The owners ultimately won for
a variety of reasons. Namely, they were prepared and the union was not:
Critics contend the union underestimated management’s financial power and
overestimated its members’ commitment to the issue that prompted the strike-free
agency. Gary Roberts, a Tulane University law professor and an authority on
sports-labor law, also criticizes union leadership for failing to provide for its
players financially, either through a strike fund, a line of credit or by delaying the
strike so players could collect more pay.
Union leadership also misjudged the impact of the cash flow provided by the
replacement games. Attendance and ratings did fall, but not as much as the union
had hoped, and the networks continued to subsidize the substitute games …
The NFL Management Council’s seven-member executive committee also kept a
tight rein on its members, says Leigh Steinberg, a sports attorney and agent,
“which enables management to speak with one voice that tends to be constituted
of some of the toughest and shrewdest negotiators they have.” By contrast, the

27
Pasquarelli, “Lengthy Strike Mostly Forgotten.”
28
Earl Gustkey, “NFL Players Strike: Day 9 The Lines Are Drawn Nation’s Sports Editors Plan to
Cover Sunday’s NFL Games from Both Sides :[Home Edition].” Los Angeles Times (Pre-1997 Fulltext),
October 1, 1987, http://www.proquest.com/ (accessed March 5, 2011).

76
union was plagued throughout by widespread reports of deep divisions among its
staff, player representatives and members.
29

Operationally, the consequences of a lack of preparation are obvious. As the late John
Wooden put it, “Failure to prepare is preparing to fail.” From a public relations
standpoint, fans must wonder why the union would engage in this battle without adequate
preparation. With regards to internal communication, the union did not communicate a
singular message to the players so they had different understandings for why they were
striking in the first place. Consequently, if players had different reasons for going on
strike, they had different reasons for crossing the picket line. The union had to call off the
strike because it lacked internal support:
What the union left unexplored was the far more important factor: What was the
players’ depth of commitment to free agency, or any other issue? …
“There’s no question that the players really didn’t have an issue that was
universal,” says Paul Martha. “I mean, how many players in the NFL really cared
enough about the free-agency issue to strike? It really became an issue of
solidarity, not free agency.”
30

From the very beginning, players had to question what they were doing and why they
were doing it. With this type of uncertainty, it seemed as though the players were starting
something they knew they could not finish. If they were going down, they were not going
down alone; they were bringing the fans and four weeks of quality football with them.

29
Ibid.
30
Heisler, “There’s No Real Winner.”

77
Chapter Seven: Current Events of the 2011 National Football
League Lockout
Issues
Following the 1987 strike, the NFLPA immediately filed an antitrust lawsuit
against the league. The Court of Appeals rejected the suit in 1989; the union decertified
itself in response. The players filed more litigation until they negotiated a new agreement
in 1993, which reconstituted the NFLPA as a labor union. Under this agreement:
Player salaries have shown marked growth. The average salary has increased
61.5%, the minimum salary has risen 75% and there are nearly twice as many
millionaires in 1999 as there were in 1993. [The number of millionaires increased
from 516 in 1999 to 649 in 2002, and average salary increased to $1,258,800 in
2003.]
1

The players want to extend the agreement, but the owners argue it is no longer
sustainable. There are four issues on the bargaining table for a new agreement: a revenue
split of $9 billion, an 18-game regular season, a rookie wage scale and retirement
benefits. The owners want to alter the players’ revenue share, increase the number of
games, cap rookies’ salaries and reduce retirement benefits. The early perception is that
the owners are greedy by disrupting the status quo and, in effect, depriving the fans of
football. Each side must make compelling arguments either for or against change to win
the public over.

1
Adam Heller, “Creating a Win-Win Situation Through Collective Bargaining: The NFL Salary Cap,”
in the Business of Sports: Labor Matters: Unions, ed. Scott R. Rosner and Kenneth L. Shropshire (Sudbury,
Ma: Jones & Bartlett Learning, 2004), 229.

78
Emergence and Prominence of Social Media
The emergence of social media has added a completely new communications
dimension, which has never been seen before, especially with the creation of Twitter in
2006. Fans now have unprecedented access to information and opinion, predominantly
via Twitter and blogs. League and union leaders have opportunities to sway public
opinion through these avenues. Moreover, influencers like journalists and bloggers have
access to the same fans and can change the direction by adding to the depth of the
conversation. Fans can also reach other fans, which builds the breadth of the
conversation. So noticeable and influential is this change that it warranted a story in the
New York Times. The article cited an instance that demonstrated the power and speed of
social media:
N.F.L. Commissioner Roger Goodell sent an internal memo to his staff telling it
that he would take a $1 salary if owners lock out players. His promise to slash his
compensation from about $10 million was reported on Twitter by an NFL
Network reporter, provided by the league to the Sports Business Journal, then
reported and posted on Twitter by other outlets, including NFL.com.
Hours later, DeMaurice Smith, executive director of the players union, responded
on Twitter that he would work for 68 cents if an agreement is reached by the
Super Bowl.
2

That Tweet, by Jason LaCanfora (@JasonLaCanfora), the NFL Network reporter, was re-
Tweeted 47 times whereas Smith’s Tweet was re-Tweeted more than 100 times. Each of
these re-Tweets must have also been re-Tweeted. This exemplifies how a story gets
circulated through social media and continues to build a life of its own.

2
Richard Sandomir, “In N.F.L. Labor Fight, Battlefield Moves Online,” New York Times, January 26,
2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/27/sports/football/27goodell.html?_r=2 (accessed March 13,
2011).

79
Chapter Eight: Tactics
Effective Leadership Communication Tactics: Ethos, Logos and Pathos
Aristotle said, “The persuasive is persuasive to someone (and is either
immediately plausible and believable in itself or seems to be shown by statements that are
so.”
1
As the leaders, Goodell and Smith serve as the chief communicators of their
respective organizations. Using logos, pathos and ethos, each man must convince his
audiences that they are making the right decisions. Certainly the league can apply the
principles to the union at the bargaining table, and vice-versa, but this section seeks to
determine how these persuasion methods affect public relations, not operations.
Logos
“Persuasion occurs through the arguments when we show the truth or the apparent truth
from whatever is persuasive in each case.”
2

Logos appeals to peoples’ logic and reason. Each side has a story to tell and there
is a set of facts to support that story. Here, transparency plays a major role because the
fans deserve to know these facts, but it must always be taken with caution. Whether it
involves negotiations or fan relations, Carter, Moeller and Rawitch all agree that
transparency may do more harm than good. Goodell and Smith must decide if absolute
transparency is worth their organization’s respective unity and fans’ optimism.

1
Aristotle, On Rhetoric: A Theory of Civic Discourse, 2 ed., trans. George A. Kennedy (New York:
Oxford University Press, USA, 2006), page 41.
2
Ibid, 39.

80
Ethos
“[There is persuasion] through character whenever the speech is spoken in such a
way as to make the speaker worthy of credence; for we believe fair-minded
people to a greater extent and more quickly [than we do others], on all subjects in
general and completely so in cases where there is not exact knowledge but room
for doubt. And this should result from the speech, not from a previous opinion
that the speaker is a certain kind of person; for it is not the case, as some of the
handbook writers propose in their treatment of the art, that fair-mindedness on the
part of the speaker makes no contribution to persuasiveness; rather character is
almost, so to speak, the most authoritative form of persuasion.”
3

Applying the four virtues (humility, diligence, charity, patience) mentioned at the
beginning of this thesis will establish the personal characters of these leaders. Granted,
Goodell works for the owners and Smith works for the players, but both men must
ultimately work for the fans. If the fans believe these men are on their side, then the fans
will be convinced these men are trustworthy.
Pathos
“[There is persuasion] through the hearers when they are led to feel emotion by
the speech; for we do not give the same judgment when grieved and rejoicing or
when being friendly and hostile. To this and only this we said contemporary
technical writers try to give their attention.”
4

Goodell and Smith must stir fans’ emotions, but not in a negative way. It is easy
to fall into a public debate, but this negates the ethos established; they must steer clear of
personal attacks. By giving them true optimism, these leaders are inspiring and earning
the fans’ trust and favor. This is more effective and honorable than appearing better by
making his counterpart appear worse.

3
Ibid, 38-39.
4
Ibid, 39.

81
Effective Use of Social Media
Leaders of both sides have used Twitter to push their messages, but it is curious
that they are not the greatest influencers. According to Klout.com, a website that
measures each Twitter account’s influence, Commissioner Goodell (@nflcommish) only
has a Klout score of 65 and NFL Vice President of Public Relations Greg Aiello
(@gregaiello) has a score of 64. For the union, Smith (@DeSmithNFLPA) has a score of
59. On the other hand, Sports Illustrated journalist Peter King (@SI_PeterKing) has a
score of 79 and LaCanfora has a score of 72. Both parties must reach out to influencers
like King to push their messages. Also, the league and the union each have websites for
these negotiations: NFLLabor.com and NFLLockout.com, respectively. Here, the parties
are pushing their own messages not only through the website itself, but also through
Twitter.
Bloggers are also key influencers because they not only use their blogs to spread a
message, but they also use Twitter to either opine or attract attention to their articles.
Both with Klout scores of 66, NFL Fanhouse (@NFLFanhouse) and Business of Sports
Network (@bizballmaury) were two influential blogs with Twitter, though the latter does
not have much influence solely as a blog. Yet, according to the NFL Fanhouse, the NFL
pages of SBNation and the NFL pages of the Bleacher Report have Google Page ranks of
7, 7 and 6, respectively. Currently, teams credential bloggers, but there are hardly any
credentialed league bloggers. The NFL should look to these bloggers and grant them the
same access they would for traditional journalists by credentialing them for interviews
and attendance to negotiations. Presumably, the expanded access will spread the league’s

82
message to the fans and will push the message that the owners are right, which should
sway public opinion towards them and away from the players. The league must take
small steps first and grant this access to a select few and measure the results. If these
bloggers write positive articles for the league and public polls reflect that, then the league
should continue to expand its blogger outreach. The effects may not be noticeable at first.
The league now has almost seven months before a deal absolutely needs to be reach in
order to not lose any games. In a recent Associated Press-Knowledge Networks poll, 25
percent of fans sympathize with the NFLPA compared to the 11 percent who sympathize
with the league.
5
It may be too unrealistic to expect a two percent increase every month,
but if such a poll is conducted every month, then the league should aim for a one percent
increase each of the first two months and then perhaps a two percent increase over the
next three months and then a four percent increase over the final two months. Also, some
fans may write their own blogs and players would be remiss if they did not contact these
bloggers to explain the strike and to maintain fans’ support, especially since players are
easier to access.
The league and the union cannot only rely on bloggers and journalists. Other
people may tell their story, but they also have the power to shape the conversation
however they see fit. It is an issue when Goodell and Smith are less influential than these
people. These leaders must build up their influence and increase their social media
presence. The union will most certainly take the offensive, especially since Smith

5
“AP-Knowledge Networks Poll - NFL Football,” The Associated Press, January 28, 2011,
http://surveys.ap.org/data/knowledgenetworks/ap_nfl_topline%20012811.pdf (accessed February 13,
2011).

83
characterized these negotiations as a war. The league must take action to defend itself,
but not engage in a war of words. It must be careful to not get sidetracked by what the
union is saying.

84
Chapter Nine: NFLPA’s Challenges, Opportunities & Additional
Tactics
Leadership of DeMaurice Smith
This is Smith’s first major task as executive director and he has already
demonstrated an aggressive attitude. This is his opportunity to define himself as a leader
and define the union’s relationship with the league. How he emerges from negotiations
will either position the union as the league’s partner or subordinate. As a leader, he must
undertake the responsibility of dispelling the union’s image as a group of overpaid,
spoiled athletes. Here, the union needs to assume the role of a “champion” and employ an
offensive strategy with institutional communication methods (as opposed to personal
methods) to attack its own reputation. “The strategy of the champion is useful when an
organization wants to challenge a reputational story that has become fixed in the minds of
the public and is unfavorable to the organization. The champion plays with an open hand,
talks in a loud voice, and uses public channels to make his challenge.”1 Though
debatable, the union has long been considered the league’s subordinate because the
league prospered more noticeably than the union during the Tagliabue-Upshaw era.
Smith has already distinguished himself from Upshaw by declaring that the union was at
war, an application of pathos. He is right to set the tone that the union will not lay down
at the owners’ feet, but his aggressive attitude must be contained, however, because the
media will scrutinize his every move. He must be careful to not appear abrasive.
Otherwise, the public may side with the league and understand why it would not want to

1
Pekka Aula and Saku Mantere, Strategic Reputation Management: Towards a Company of Good
(New York: Routledge, 2008), 93.

85
negotiate with the union. Goodell has been prepared for this situation whereas this will be
Smith’s first experience under the media microscope. As the union’s leader, Smith must
be aggressive to get his players what they want, but also hear out the league’s offers and
be willing to negotiate on them. After all, the players are working Americans. Smith has
an opportunity to apply ethos and appear as a man who is fighting for American rights.
The players want to work, but can only do so under fair conditions. No one would want
to continue working if their bosses decided to cut their salaries for no apparent reason.
Smith must be able to present the players in this light and change their reputation from
rich athletes to working Americans, which the union failed to do in 1987.

Attacking the League
The union must attack the league’s reputation by pushing the story that the
owners are upsetting the status quo of the league for selfish reasons:
The owners say that costs outpace the NFL’s revenue growth, which has been
remarkable: 43%, in total, since 2006, according to an analysis done by Forbes,
which calculated that in 2009, the league booked $9.3 billion in revenue. But the
owners claim that since, in part, player compensation has doubled over the past
decade — according to the league — players need to take a smaller share of a
growing revenue pie.
2

The players are content with playing under the current agreement, but the owners cite
rising salaries as the motivating factor for a new agreement. Yet, the owners refuse to
open up their books to the union and, by extension, the public. Without full disclosure of
teams’ finances, people can only speculate whether or not the owners are justified in

2
Sean Gregory, “NFL Labor Dispute: Should the NFL Show Players the Money?” TIME, January 21,
2011, http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,2043784,00.html?xid=rss-nation-yahoo (accessed
February 2, 2011).

86
reducing the players’ share in league revenue. The Green Bay Packers are a community-
owned franchise so they make their financial records public. These records indicate
player salaries heavily reduced operating profit.
3
The Packers, however, do not
necessarily reflect a league-wide trend. Carter says:
Elements of what they do reflect a trend. They’re not in a big media market. On
the other hand, they’re a big brand. They don’t have a big corporate presence in
their area. They don’t have a stadium that generates the kind of revenue that some
of the newer stadiums in the bigger markets have. They’re one interesting data
point, but I think that’s exactly why Commissioner Goodell and others want to
release other data. They don’t want people to be able to triangulate around to get
enough data points to be able draw some longer term conclusions about the
direction of cash flow, player expenses, future revenue sources.
4

In the end, Smith must be ready to be transparent while coercing the owners to do the
same.
With regards to the 18-game regular season, Goodell wants to reduce the number
of preseason games from four to two and extend the regular season from 16 games to 18.
Using logos, Smith must point out that this proposal contradicts his words. The
commissioner has emphasized player safety on the field by fining and suspending players
for vicious hits, but extending the season by two games exposes the players to 120 more
minutes of danger. Pointing out the conflict, Pittsburgh Steelers safety Ryan Clark said,
“Sometimes you need to have foresight … In one sense, we’re saying we want to protect
players from head injuries, but then you want us to go out there and do it two more times

3
Joe Drape, “For N.F.L., Lockout Would Be a Risky Strategy,” New York Times, January 29, 2011,
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/30/sports/football/30nfl.html?_r=1&src=twrhp (accessed February 4,
2011).
4
David Carter, interview by Jonathan Lam, 7 March 2011, Los Angeles, CA, digital recording.

87
in the regular season.”
5
The contention is that Goodell is nonsensical because he says one
thing, but is doing another. According to the NFLPA, the average player lasts about 3.5
years in the league,
6
but the union projects an 18-game schedule would reduce the
average career to 2.8 years.
7
Another way the extended schedule shortens careers is
players who play nine seasons under the 16-game schedule would only play eight under
the 18-game schedule;
8
careers would be even shorter for those who play in the playoffs,
when a season can last up to 22 games. Furthermore, players are eligible for five years of
post-career health benefits after three years in the league. If the union’s projection holds
true, then the average player would not receive these benefits. The union must convey
that the league wants the players to essentially work more hours for less pay and will not
care for them when they have been hurt due to the inherent dangers of the sport. Fans
should be able to sympathize with this message because it illustrates playing in the NFL
is as dangerous as working in a steel mill.

Unity: Internal Communications
More than 20 years later, the union has decertified itself in hopes of achieving
what the 1989 decertification did. Now, all 32 teams “would have independent unions

5
Associated Press, “Pittsburgh Steelers’ Hines Ward Says 18-Game Schedule Will Shorten Careers,”
ESPN, October 1, 2010, http://sports.espn.go.com/nfl/news/story?id=5634427 (accessed February 3, 2011).
6
NFL Players Association, “NFL-Hopeful-FAQs,” NFLPlayers.com,
http://www.nflplayers.com/about-us/faqs/nfl-hopeful-faqs/ (accessed February 3, 2011).
7
NFL Players Association, “2011-Lockout,” NFLPlayers.com, http://www.nflplayers.com/about-
us/2011-lockout-central/ (accessed February 3, 2011).
8
Associated Press, “18-Game Schedule Will Shorten Careers”

88
that bargain with individual owners. Players become independent contractors.”
9
The
players no longer have representation and are free to act however they see fit during this
lockout. Ten players have already filed a class action antitrust suit against the league as
well as an injunction to block a lockout. This is a risky strategy because it publicizes an
unnecessarily contentious relationship. Yet, it shows that the players want to play football
and the owners are the ones who are depriving fans of the sport. The league and the union
should function as a partnership and work together, but the players are instead forcing the
owners to negotiate through litigation. Although they are no longer bound by the union,
the players are still presenting a united front. On March 14, Liz Mullen of the Sports
Business Journal tweeted, “[NFLPA President] Kevin Mawae on injunction: ‘As long as
ability to play football in the fall that is what we want for ourselves and for our fans.’”
The players may very well want to play for personal reasons because they are not paid if
they miss games, but it is a key PR strategy to emphasize that they are playing so the fans
have football on Sundays.
Furthermore, Rawitch says the union must maintain internal communication with
the players after the lockout as well:
More than the teams, the union would probably prepare its players for what the
unified message should be coming out of a work stoppage … I think probably
those conversations happen at the highest levels. When you come out of a work
stoppage, I would imagine the union and the league then come up with their own
plan on “how are we going to win back the fans? They’re not happy with us.”
10

9
Gerald W. Scully, “Tackling the N.F.L. Labor Impasse.” New York Times, November 26, 1989, Late
Edition (East Coast), http://www.proquest.com/ (accessed March 17, 2011).
10
Josh Rawitch, interview by Jonathan Lam, 11 February 2011, Los Angeles, CA, digital recording.

89
Fans may sympathize with the players throughout the entire lockout, but if players
suddenly adopt a newfound selfish attitude after emerging victorious, then fans’ opinion
can easily change. The players must understand that winning over the fans is not a sprint;
it is a marathon. Losing fan support during labor peace will remain during the next labor
impasse because it leaves an impression in the minds of fans.

Unity: Social Media
Players must also use social media correctly. Reportedly, 716 of almost 1900 NFL
players have Twitter.
11
They face each other week in and week out on the gridiron, and it
is understandable if they take their aggressive attitudes with them off the field. Even
though the union has disbanded, the players must remain unified for a singular cause.
When reporters asked for his thoughts on labor negotiations, New York Jets cornerback
Antonio Cromartie went on a profanity-laced tirade about the union and the league’s
inability to reach a deal. From there, Seattle Seahawks quarterback Matt Hasselbeck
(@Hasselbeck) tweeted, “Somebody ask Cromartie if he knows what CBA stands for,” a
comment he later deleted, but not before Cromartie saw it. Cromartie (@A_Cromartie31)
then tweeted, “hey Matt if u [sic] have something to [sic] then say it be a man about it.
Don’t erase it. I will smash ur [sic] face in.” Moeller also recalled an incident when
fellow players criticized Chicago Bears quarterback Jay Cutler for quitting on his
teammates:

11
Judy Battista, “N.F.L. Labor Dispute Plays Out on Twitter :[Sports Desk].” New York Times,
February 22, 2011, Late Edition (East Coast), http://www.proquest.com/ (accessed March 18, 2011).

90
A lot of people are using that as an example of the NFL Players Association: [it]
won’t be able to stay together. They can’t even not rip one of their own players
during a game that they had nothing to do with. How are they going to be able to
keep it together during an intense labor negotiation? Time will tell, but that’s an
example I’ve seen a lot of people use so far.
12

Bickering over Twitter is just as harmful to the players’ cause as their unruly conduct
outside of stadiums during the 1987 strike.

12
Moeller interview.

91
Chapter Ten: NFL’s Challenges, Opportunities & Additional
Tactics
Leadership of Commissioner Roger Goodell
Roger Goodell has accumulated almost 30 years of NFL experience since
starting as a public relations intern in 1982. In all that time, he has not forgotten the
importance of protecting the NFL brand and has established himself as the face of the
NFL. Off-the-field player misconduct is nothing new in sports, especially in the NFL.
For example, under former Commissioner Paul Tagliabue, in October 2005, 17
players of the Minnesota Vikings team were involved in a sex party with prostitutes,
but only two players received fines—in September 2006. Also, Baltimore Ravens
linebacker Ray Lewis received the maximum fine of $250,000 in 2000 after pleading
guilty to misdemeanor obstruction of justice in a murder. The punishments were too
lax for the crimes. Nine Cincinnati Bengals players were arrested during the 2006-07
season. There were practically no consequences for their actions. Since taking over as
commissioner in 2006, cognizant of players’ statuses as role models and using ethos,
Goodell implemented a new player conduct policy with hefty fines and suspensions to
control these transgressions and to protect the NFL brand.
In addition to ruling his league with an iron fist, he has also earned a
reputation for strategically defending his decisions. During the 2007 season, Goodell
punished the New England Patriots and its head coach Bill Belichick for illegally
videotaping an opposing team’s defensive signals because it gave the Patriots a
competitive advantage. Before a national audience, NBC sportscaster Bob Costas

92
interviewed Goodell on Sunday Night Football about his decision. Costas tried to
throw the commissioner off with trick questions, but Goodell was prepared and
always returned to his main point: he had to protect the NFL brand, which included
all 32 teams playing within the same set of rules. “Goodell stayed cool, calm, and
under control at all times … [he] was not just disciplined and ‘on message,’ he was
candid and highly responsive … he never showed anger or frustration … [and
disagreed] without being disagreeable.”
1
He will face his fair share of media attention
in the coming months and must be as prepared with ethos as he was the night of
September 16, 2007.
The position of NFL Commissioner comes with split obligations. The owners
elected Goodell so he must report to them. Yet, without the fans, there is no league.
The 1987 strike proved that without the players, there is also no league. Above all
else, though, Goodell’s obligation is to the league. Carter says:
In the NFL now or the NBA with David Stern, they [the commissioners] will
be the lightning rod or they will be the person that is most often referenced.
Not necessarily in an evil way, but when you think about a labor impasse, the
first thing you talk about or think about is the league, not the players
association, so you believe that the people that are running the firms or the
leagues are the point people … In any given year, and based on the status of
the union head and the status of labor relations in this country generally,
whoever’s running the union may or may not have closer sway or as strong of
an input as the commissioner, but he [the commissioner] is always the poster
child for the sport.
2

1
Steve Adubato, What Were They Thinking?: Crisis Communication -- the Good, the Bad, and the
Totally Clueless (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 2008), 219-20.
2
Carter interview.

93
What is best for the league should be congruent with all these parties. By considering
all the audiences, public relations can positively affect the operations of an
organization. “In professional sports, the agreement must do more than merely satisfy
the wants and needs of [labor and management]. The system must allow for the
league to thrive and compete in the competitive entertainment industry in order to
attract a sizable customer base.”
3

Defending the League’s Reputation
With the union attacking the league, the league must be prepared to defend its
reputation. The NFL is the most profitable professional sports organization in
America and has the most PR savvy commissioner in the industry. Goodell has an
uncanny ability to stay on-message and should be prepared for any attack Smith
chooses to launch. It does the league no good to slander the union:
In the defensive battle area the defense counsel relies on official channels in
order to maintain institutional relationships and to consolidate reputation
against possible attacks. The defense counsel makes official public statements
to try to correct misunderstandings and present information that is favorable to
the client. Typically the defense counsel will claim to be acting in the right.
The reason for misconceptions lies elsewhere: in general misunderstandings
or mistakes made by the media.
4

The commissioner must stick to defending the owners’ decision to call for a new
agreement. Despite the publicly released finances by the Green Bay Packers, the
union still disputes that the owners are losing money to player salaries. In an

3
Heller, “Creating a Win-Win Situation,” 229.
4
Aula and Mantere, Strategic Reputation Management, 95.

94
interview with Rich Eisen on the NFL Network, when prompted to open the books,
Goodell said it would not facilitate negotiations and regarded financial transparency
as a non-issue:
[The union has] all of the information that’s necessary to make these
decisions. We’ve had collective bargaining agreements for 17 years. They
have all of our revenue, they have a majority of our expenses, they have
audited rights in there. They know, and have stated to us, that they understand
why the economics aren’t working, so it’s now time to get beyond those
negotiating ploys and get into serious discussions. It’s just a negotiation we’ve
got to have … The NBA opened their books and, at the end of it, what did the
union say? “It’s baloney.” There’s never going to be a time where the union is
going to look at the numbers and say, “We accept that.” It’s a negotiation.
That’s what it comes down to. And what you want to do is make sure they
have sufficient information to be able to make those decisions, but we need
solutions now. We need to get to the point now where we’re talking about the
economics and the other issues so that we get resolution because the
uncertainty is going to hurt everybody.
5

Using logos, Goodell justified the owners’ decision with an example and clearly did
not want negotiations to stall. In fact, on March 9, the league offered the union more
data, but the union still did not find it sufficient. Both sides must operate with the
numbers at hand because the case studies have shown that the figures do not change
even when a work stoppage drags on. Carter defends the league’s right to keep its
numbers private, “I don’t think the public relations benefit would outweigh the value,
the leverage that comes with keeping the numbers private.”
6
Again, considering that
what is best for the league should be best for the owners, the players and the fans, full
financial transparency might reveal other data harmful to both the owners and the
players, such as public subsidies and other sources/uses of funds disfavor both sides.

5
Roger Goodell, interview by Rich Eisen, 4 February 2011, Arlington, TX, television recording.
6
Carter interview.

95
By the NFLPA wanting these disclosures, they could be slightly harming themselves
in the process. As the owners’ representative, Goodell obviously wants to encourage
the union to accept the numbers, but he must push the message that the owners have
given the union enough information to make an informed decision.
Players have already criticized Goodell for the 18-game season because,
considering the owners’ call for a larger revenue share, the league is increasing
players’ risk of injury while essentially cutting player salaries. This proposal tarnishes
the league’s reputation because it appears that the NFL only cares about making a
profit and disregards its employees’ safety. Goodell must also listen to the players’
concerns because they will be the ones subjected to the most punishment by the
extended schedule. Like the NHL lockout, the league can make concessions to the
players in exchange for a larger share of the revenue. The players have said they will
accept the 18-game schedule if they are given two bye weeks during the season
instead of one. Carter says,
I think [the extended season] all boils down to money. I think they [the
owners] get there if the players are adequately incentivized. I think they [the
owners] bargain for those two extra games. I understand, I saw the some of
the reporting that talked about if you add those two games, some of the
forecasts wrote the average career span of a ballplayer will drop some five
months or six months or something like that. I get that trade-off. I also get that
over the years people have said that, or studies have said that, players will
cheat, steal, whatever, if they can win, even if it takes years off their life. So I
think it comes down to, ultimately, money and their ability to keep playing.
And if they can be incentivized, have the right health benefits—those are both
monetary—the NFL will get two games out of them, which is monetary
because they’ll [the league] sell them to the networks.
7

7
Ibid.

96
Also, given the risk of season-ending injuries, the league could also guarantee player
contracts. With this strategy, the league is clearly open to listening to the players,
again a necessary component of public relations. From a business standpoint, owners
will own more of the revenue pool, the fans will get more games and the players will
have guaranteed contracts and possibly see more money through a smaller share of a
larger revenue pool.
Finally, the NFL has been known for its hard-nosed take-it-or-leave-it
approach to negotiations. Carter says the fans expect this type of attitude from the
league:
The NFL is known for playing hardball. They’re known for being stoic and
aggressive and, “We’re going to do our thing,” so I don’t think people expect
warm and fuzzies coming out of the league office. That, ironically, helps
them, to be thought of as … an aggressive, stoic “here’s what we’re going to
do and here’s how we’re going to get it done.” If there’s any positive media
relations or PR to come out of that, then great, but I don’t think anybody
expects it … Goodell was brow-beating the network executives about their
need to sign on to his deal points for the new TV contracts, or they would be
hell to pay if they didn’t. They wouldn’t be able to televise the games so I
think people expect that level of hardball. Anything less might actually be a
media relations or public relations win for the league.
8

The league attributes about $4 billion, almost half of its entire revenue, to television
revenue.
9
If Goodell can throw his weight around with the television networks in such
a manner, fans have little reason to believe he will not do so with the union, which
would prolong the lockout. The league, however, can most effectively tell its story by
stepping down from this juggernaut position. “In January, Goodell sent an open letter

8
Ibid.
9
ESPN.com news services, “NFLPA Challenges Structures of NFL's TV Deals,” ESPN, June 10,
2010, http://sports.espn.go.com/nfl/news/story?id=5268239 (accessed March 30, 2011).

97
to fans that made the claim that the N.F.L. faces the same financial hardships that
they do: ‘Unfortunately, economic realities are forcing everyone to make tough
choices, and the N.F.L. is no different.’”
10
Certainly it is a feeble attempt because
almost no fan can identify with the “struggles” of billionaire owners. The owners
have only been affected by the economy because “the downturn has made it harder to
raise ticket prices and to get states and cities to subsidize new stadiums.”
11
This is
obviously not the same struggle the fans are facing, so this message is misguided.
Instead, the league should focus its efforts on explaining how it wants an agreement
that will benefit the fans via long-term labor peace or an extended season. Whatever
the reason, the message should always come back to the fans and how the change
benefits them.

Engaging with the Fans
Goodell has engaged with the fans and listened to their concerns. For
example, in January 2011, fan James Owen e-mailed the commissioner because he
was frustrated with the lack of dialogue over a new agreement and was concerned
about an impending lockout. Goodell responded with a phone call, which Owen
recalled:
He said he got my email and wanted to first off thank me for sending my
concerns to him, and wanted to let me know they are always concerned about
the fans and wouldn’t be in position where it was if it wasn’t for the fans … It

10
Tommy Craggs, “David Stern vs. Roger Goodell,” The New York Times Magazine, March 27,
2011, 19.
11
James Surowiecki, “Scrimmage,” The New Yorker, March 21, 2011, 23.

98
was the standard stuff we’ve heard from the league, but he added some
personal stuff to it.
12

This illustrates how an organization listens to its audience and engages with them, a
critical PR tactic because the audience feels appreciated, an application of pathos.
Goodell says he wants to put a better product on the field, but he must be
prepared to answer some questions regarding whom the extended schedule is for. Is it
for the owners? The owners will benefit from broadcasting rights via the paying
television networks and ticket sales with two additional regular season games. How
does this benefit the fans? Goodell said the 18-game season is in response to fans’
complaints about the quality of the preseason: “That was one of the basis at which we
started to look at the 18-2 concept … I feel an obligation to do the best we can to
present the highest quality. If we can’t do it right, we won’t do it.”
13
The numbers do
show that fans favor an extended season with 45 percent strongly or somewhat in
favor of the extended schedule as opposed to the 21 percent who are strongly or
somewhat opposed to it.
14
Do the fans really want more regular season games or less
preseason ones? The NFL forces season ticket holders to purchase the four preseason
games as part of a package. Therefore, there is speculation that fans, especially season
ticket holders, do not really want an 18-game schedule, but instead do not want to be

12
Lindsay Jones, “Broncos Fan Gets Surprise Call from NFL Commissioner,” All Things
Broncos, entry posted January 25, 2011, http://blogs.denverpost.com/broncos/2011/01/25/bronco-fan-
gets-surprise-call-from-nfl-commissioner/6723/ (accessed March 17, 2011).
13
Barry Wilner, “Goodell Wants to Get Deal Done in 'Next Few Weeks’,” Washington Times,
February 4, 2011, http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2011/feb/4/goodell-wants-to-get-deal-done-
in-next-few-weeks/ (accessed February 13, 2011).
14
“AP Poll - NFL Football.”

99
forced to buy the preseason games or be charged full price for these games.
15
So
Goodell should propose a plan that reduces the prices for preseason games. This
proves that he is actually listening to the fans. Otherwise, solely carrying out the
owners’ demand for an extended season reflects poorly on the commissioner and the
league because it implies the owners’ wants are more important than the fans’ wants.
Does an extended season present the “highest quality” football? Owners get more
money and fans get more games. If this were the entire situation, then an 18-game
schedule would make perfect sense. Players, however, barely make it through a 16-
game schedule as is and an 18-game schedule would be nothing short of brutal. Once
the playoff hunt begins under the extended schedule, the commissioner really must
question the quality of the product. By the end of the season, is the team that wins the
Super Bowl really the best team out there or is it just the healthiest one?
The league must maintain fans’ optimism. If the price of that optimism is
transparency, then so be it, Rawitch says:
You don’t want to shut down all communication with fans; you have to make
sure you’re continuing to talk to them. That said, negotiating through the
media is generally never a great strategy on anything. All it does is upset one
side or the other … You can’t say, “Well, the issue on the table right now is X
and here’s why the union doesn’t like it and here’s why we do like it.” That’s
not going to get you anywhere. I think you can still, in a lot of ways, frame
what some of the key issues are. You can say, “Hey, here are the primary
concerns that we have. Here are the primary concerns that the union has. And
we’re going to work together to try to find a way and we’ll update you again
in 10 days on the progress being made.” Then maybe you can allay people’s

15
Gene Wojciechowski, “NFL, Roger Goodell Not on Same Page As Fans About 18-Game
Season,” ESPN, February 12, 2011,
http://sports.espn.go.com/espn/columns/story?columnist=wojciechowski_gene&id=6112016&sportcat
=nfl (accessed February 13, 2011).

100
concerns that way … I think you want to be updating your fans as much as
you can.
16

The fans do not need to know the league is fighting with the union during
negotiations. They will figure that out on their own if negotiations drag on for
months. Fans already know what is happening because they know what is not
happening. Above all else, they want to hear good news. The merit in hearing that
talks are underway is minimal, if not negligible. The fans may appreciate the honesty
that negotiations are taking place, but that appreciation will quickly be replaced by
anger that talks are not progressing. Moeller says:
I think they [the NFL] just need to not lose any games and then everything
will be forgotten rather quickly. Once you get into missing games, fans aren’t
as quick to forgive … But, at the end of the day, it’s millionaires fighting with
billionaires. The average fan has a hard time relating to that. They just want to
see football so at some point, why are they not seeing football? It’s because
the owners are locking out the players. So, I think the longer it goes, the more
people will go against the owners. I think people will start on the players:
“What, you can’t get by on $2 million a year?” And then once they start
missing games: “Why are they missing games?” “Because the owners are
locking them out.” “Okay, I’m mad at the owners because I want to see
football.”
17

Stubbornness has cost owners and players the public relations battle in the past. The
longer an impasse goes on, the less hopeful and more irate fans become. At a certain
point, the fans will be aware of the issues and decide who is right and who is wrong,
but the party that emerges victorious in the public relations battle will be the one that
exhibited the diligence to get a deal done.

16
Rawitch interview.
17
Moeller interview.

101
There is no denying the importance of the fans. There is no benefit in ignoring
them and focusing only on the business, like the NFL did in 1982 and 1987. In 1982,
the league ignored the fans and reached the deal they wanted, only to find themselves
in the same position five years later. The sacrifice of remembering the fans is small,
but the reward can be huge, like in the NHL lockout. Moeller said:
It is cliché, but the fans drive your sport. Without the fans, there’s no one
coming to watch the sport. There’s no one watching it on TV. There’s no one
buying merchandise. There’s no sport. Without the league though, there’s no
teams. There’s no real answer, but ultimately, the fans need the league, the
league needs the fans. But obviously, it starts with the fans because they’re the
ones spending the money.
18

Indeed, the fans are what drive the business. Yet, that is exactly what the NFL and
any other professional sports league is, a business. Carter cautions against rushing
into getting a deal for the fans’ sake:
[An immediate agreement] is better than nothing, but if all it does is postpone
the pain and gets you to a point a couple years down the road where you’re
back in the same bucket, all you’ve done is take basically an advance on ill
will that’s going to hit you in a couple years down the road. So only if it’s
getting you towards greater labor peace. [It] doesn’t really work in your favor.
Otherwise, if you’re just postponing the inevitable, the people that fund your
sport and support are going to know that.
19

Everyone wants the season to start on time, but Goodell must communicate to the
fans the consequences of getting the wrong deal, like Bettman did during the NHL
lockout. If the owners maintain the status quo, per the players’ wishes, and time
proves that the economics were indeed unsustainable, then the fans will feel betrayed
because they face losing football on Sundays again. Labor talks occurred last year

18
Ibid.
19
Carter interview.

102
when owners did not extend the collective bargaining agreement. Fans had been
dealing with uncertainty, but the owners agreed to enter the “Final League Year” and
granted the fans immediate satisfaction (though the owners certainly were not hurting
themselves by playing another season). Now, one year later, talks have resurfaced and
so has the uncertainty. The league must make the commitment to the fans to forge a
deal that guarantees long-term labor peace, like the 1993 NFL collective bargaining
agreement, which lasted 17 years.

Relationship with the Teams
Commissioner Goodell can do his best to communicate with the fans, but
there is a limit to his effectiveness. The league must also empower the teams to
communicate with the fans and gain support, especially since the fans are siding with
the players. On March 14, in an e-mail sent by San Francisco 49ers President and
CEO Jed York to season ticket holder Jonathan Kotler, York addressed the lockout:
Although this is not the outcome any of us wanted, the NFL remains
committed to collective bargaining and the federal mediation process, which
we believe is the fastest way to a fair agreement for both the players’ union
and the clubs. The ultimate goal is to establish an agreement that is good for
the long-term health of the league and provides a tremendous product for you,
our fans. …
Throughout these labor proceedings, I will be committed to keeping an open
line of communication with our entire fan base. Like me, you are all true fans
of the NFL, so I encourage your patience and understanding during this time.
And, of course, I thank you for your continued support of the San Francisco
49ers.
Here, the team is clearly defending the league and pushing league messages. Even if
the league controls what teams can and cannot say to the fans, Rawitch says:

103
I think teams understand that they’re part of a bigger picture; you’re part of a
league … I don’t think that that’s a restrictive process. As long as when you
speak, you’re doing so in conjunction with the league. At the end of the day,
communication on any level comes down to coordination in a lot of cases … I
would certainly want to stay in touch regularly with my counterpart at the
league office to make sure that they know what we want to say. If they say
nobody’s allowed to speak, then we might try to explain to them why we feel
it’s important to speak to our fans. Or maybe they’ll be able to convince us
why it’s not.
20

No league can sustain its relationship with the fans if communication is only coming
from the league office; the teams are more familiar with the fans and can tailor league
messages to accommodate their respective fans.
Again, actions speak louder than words. The league and the teams can say all
they want, but actions must support those words, so the league must implore the
teams to carry out community relations efforts to retain the fans. During the NHL
lockout, various clubs implemented this strategy and the fans ultimately sided with
the owners. Rawitch says:
At the end of the day, the fans are fans of a team; they’re not necessarily fans
of the league. Obviously the league is instrumental; we [as a team] can’t play
a game without all the other teams, but you hear people identify themselves as
Dodger fans, as Mets fans, as Yankee fans. They don’t say, “Oh, I’m an MLB
fan.” The league will certainly help as well. I think any time there’s a work
stoppage, the league will try and do what they can. They’ll work with the 30
teams, maybe behind the scenes some and they’ll do things out front where
they’ll try to come up with community programs, stuff like that. It makes
sense that it falls on the teams … 3.7 million people come into our stadium
[Dodger Stadium]; they don’t come into the MLB offices in New York so I
guess I understand why it falls on us.
21

20
Rawitch interview.
21
Ibid.

104
Players and coaches will come and go, team ownership may change, but fans
ultimately pledge loyalty to their teams. The teams have a closer relationship with the
fans than the league does. The teams must capitalize on this relationship and make the
effort to reach out to the fans.

Owners’ Unity
Since 1970, there have been five work stoppages in NFL history. Though they
made some concessions, the owners managed to twist the union’s arm until it gave in.
Even the NFLPA acknowledges this:
The owners … were a powerful group that always stuck together in dealings
with the players. Because they shared most of their revenues, they were unlike
the Major League Baseball owners, whose internal conflicts made them less
than a united front when dealing with the players union.
22

The revenue-sharing system certainly helps maintain unity because the owners are
businesspeople. Carter says, “There are a lot of things going into any of these labor
impasses. Ultimately it does boil down to money.”
23
As Moeller pointed out about the
NHL lockout, different teams may have different agendas. Some teams, more than
others, may be more frustrated with the progress of negotiations. Yet, the league has
done a phenomenal job of maintaining unity through internal communication:
So far, the league’s strategy has emphasized making owners more accessible
to media than they have been in previous sports work stoppages. Whereas in
the regular season NFL owners were fined if they spoke about labor

22
“History - NFLPlayers.com,” NFLPlayers.com, http://www.nflplayers.com/about-us/history/
(accessed March 5, 2011).
23
Carter interview.

105
negotiations, recently both league and team officials have been seeking the
press.
Media analysis after recent talks broke down shows a number of owners
speaking both in the national and local marketplace about the league’s
willingness to negotiate and repeating a similar refrain—that players walked
away from the table and are more interested in litigation than negotiation.
24

The league also has a much greater advantage with this strategy because there are 32
owners as opposed to the union, which has about 1900 players. Like the NHL
lockout, however, it may be unrealistic to unify the owners with a message, especially
if smaller market teams begin to feel the pinch of the lockout, so they may have to
display their unity by supporting Goodell in his efforts. It will cost the league
transparency, but it will maintain unity.

24
Tripp Mickle, “NFL, Players Focus Time, Resources on Messaging,” Sporting News, March 28,
2011, http://aol.sportingnews.com/nfl/story/2011-03-28/nfl-players-focus-time-resources-on-
messaging (accessed March 31, 2011).

106
Chapter Eleven: Conclusion
The league and the union entered crisis mode when they missed the deadline
and when the union decertified. They have not gotten off to the best start, but if they
follow the recommendations at the beginning of this thesis, they each have an equal
opportunity to win at the negotiating table by winning over the fans. Cognizant of all
these efforts, the ultimate question is whether or not the fans are worth fighting for.
Football has overtaken baseball as America’s pastime; there is no reason to believe
the fans will not come flying back when play resumes. The NFL did not acknowledge
the fans in 1982 and 1987, but the fans still bought the product. Fans will take
football any way they can get it. The key here is that the two sides are engaged in “a
high-stakes battle to sway public opinion. It’s a battle that likely will have little effect
on ongoing negotiations but could go a long way toward determining how deeply the
fallout will be from the lockout.”
1
Above all else, public relations is about building
and maintaining relationships. Undoubtedly, both the union and the league have an
obligation to conduct their own efforts to win the fans’ support. They can achieve
more, however, if they work together.
The negotiations should be amicable. If the league and the union come out of
each meeting further and further apart, then there must be a change. Smith has already
declared the negotiations as a war, which Goodell quickly dispelled:
I know [DeMaurice Smith] quite well. I’ve spent an awful lot of time with
him. It’s not about personalities. It’s about having a commitment to a
negotiation that results in an agreement that’s good for everybody. It needs to

1
Mickle, “NFL, Players Focus on Messaging.”

107
be good for the players. It needs to be good for the clubs, but it has to be great
for the game.
2

Goodell must adhere to this message and Smith must contain his declaration of war.
Regardless of the outcome of talks, no one should emerge with personal attacks
because no good can come of that. Both men must maintain that they have a mutual,
functional relationship with each other and that the only issue on the table is the
agreement. The addition of personality clashes only adds fuel to the fire and it will
only be a matter of time before these leaders are pulled from negotiations, like
Bettman and Goodenow were from the NHL lockout. In fact, David Haugh of the
Chicago Tribune called for the removal of Smith;
3
Mike Vrabel, linebacker for the
Kansas City Chiefs, called for the removal of Goodell.
4
Neither side can afford such a
setback and should maintain their composure throughout the process.
James Surowiecki of The New Yorker asserted the owners “have created a
socialist paradise”
5
by operating as a cartel and the NFL is “like the trusts that
dominated American business in the late nineteenth century, before they were
outlawed.”
6
The league manages to operate this way because of the collective
bargaining agreement reached with the union. This process may seem un-American,

2
Goodell interview.
3
David Haugh, “NFL Labor: Union Chief's Ego Gets in the Way As He Overplays the Players'
Hand,” Chicago Tribune, March 13, 2011, http://www.chicagotribune.com/sports/football/bears/ct-spt-
0313-haugh-nfl-labor--20110312,0,7161607.column (accessed March 19, 2011).
4
ESPN.com News Services, “Mike Vrabel of Kansas City Chiefs Suggests Cutting NFL Brass
Out of Talks,” ESPN, March 19, 2011, http://sports.espn.go.com/nfl/news/story?id=6232940 (accessed
March 19, 2011).
5
Surowiecki, “Scrimmage.”
6
Ibid.

108
but fans do not care how the league works as long as it works. When asked if he
thought the owners were being greedy by taking a larger revenue share, Carter said:
Those aren’t mutually exclusive. I think it’s probably true that if they [the
owners and the players] work together, the pie can be bigger, but I don’t think
that eliminates owner interest in generating as much additional franchise value
as they can. I think those things can go together. I think they’re all in it for
more money, and I think one way to get to the most money, for both sides, is
to work together.
7

The players are concerned their salaries will be reduced by 18 percent.
8
If revenue
remains stagnant, then players would lose money, but there is no indication that this
will happen. “While salaries and team value increase, the real test for the success of
the NFL system lies with the fans. If people continue to buy tickets to the games and
watch them on television, the win-win system will allow the players and owners to
share in the ever-increasing revenue pie.”
9
Although important, rather than fight over
how much they share the pie, the owners and the players must cooperate to promote
the growth of the league like they did in 1993 and increase the size of the pie.
Finally, fans would probably prefer to know there is peace rather than merely
know talks are underway. The polls may show fans favor the league or the union, but
the fans are ultimately caught in the middle. Transparency is a key component of
public relations, but it should not be exercised over maintaining optimism. Rawitch
says:

7
Carter interview.
8
David White, “Q&A on the NFL's Labor Negotiations,” San Francisco Chronicle, January 19,
2011, http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f=/c/a/2011/01/18/spu41hacqm.dtl (accessed March
19, 2011).
9
Heller, “Creating a Win-Win Situation,” 229.

109
More than anything, you want to be constantly speaking. I think you want to
be updating your fans as much as you can. You don’t want to negotiate
through the media. Ever. I don’t think that often is successful. The best
agreements seem to get done behind closed doors and then they come out and
say, “Hey, we got a deal.” To the extent that you can try to keep the public in
the loop on, “Hey, we’re making progress. We understand how important this
is.”
10

Mickle also agrees that arguing through the media does not benefit anyone: “Any
lopsided shift in public opinion not only could add pressure on one side, it also could
undermine the image of the league. In the long run, that could cost both owners and
players revenue should the screaming match alienate fans too much.”
11
If the league
and the union can work in harmony, then actions are speaking louder than words, and
all parties ultimately win.

10
Rawitch interview.
11
Mickle, “NFL, Players Focus on Messaging.”

110
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Abstract (if available)

Abstract Above all else, communication is the key to public relations. As PR practitioners, our job is to listen to our audiences and communicate with them. Businesspeople generally make decisions with the most economic sense, but incorporating public relations into their operations would certainly yield the optimal payoff, especially in the long-term. It is inconceivable that professional sports could exist without fans

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Asset Metadata

Creator Lam, Jonathan Gregory (author)

Core Title The 2011 NFL lockout: labor negotiations and their impact on public relations in professional sports leagues

School Annenberg School for Communication

Degree Master of Arts

Degree Program Strategic Public Relations

Publication Date 05/03/2011

Defense Date 04/01/2011

Publisher University of Southern California (original), University of Southern California. Libraries (digital)

Tag labor negotiations,lockout,National Football League,NFL,OAI-PMH Harvest,Professional Sports,strike,work stoppage

Place Name USA (countries)

Language English

Contributor Electronically uploaded by the author (provenance)

Advisor Floto, Jennifer D. (committee chair), Kotler, Jonathan (committee member), Tenderich, Burghardt (committee member)

Creator Email jlam01342@gmail.com,jonathgl@usc.edu

Permanent Link (DOI) https://doi.org/10.25549/usctheses-m3874

Unique identifier UC1184512

Identifier etd-Lam-4580 (filename),usctheses-m40 (legacy collection record id),usctheses-c127-470979 (legacy record id),usctheses-m3874 (legacy record id)

Legacy Identifier etd-Lam-4580.pdf

Dmrecord 470979

Document Type Thesis

Rights Lam, Jonathan Gregory

Type texts

Source University of Southern California (contributing entity), University of Southern California Dissertations and Theses (collection)

Repository Name Libraries, University of Southern California

Repository Location Los Angeles, California

Repository Email cisadmin@lib.usc.edu