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Organizational structuring for homeland security: a U.S. state-by-state comparative analysis

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ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURING FOR HOMELAND SECURITY:

A U.S. STATE-BY-STATE COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS

by

Gary Michael Durbin

___________________________________________________________________

A Dissertation Presented to the
FACULTY OF THE GRADUATE SCHOOL
UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA
In Partial Fulfillment of the
Requirements for the Degree
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
(PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION)

December 2009

Copyright 2009 Gary Michael Durbin

ii
DEDICATION

This dissertation is dedicated to the memory of my father, Stephen F. Durbin,
who recently passed away after a short and unexpected diagnosis of cancer. He was
a wonderful man who is sorely missed by his family and friends. But, he lives on
eternally in our hearts and minds.

iii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
The completion of a Ph.D. degree, while working full time, requires strong
support from family, friends, and colleagues. This is especially true while working
on the final portion of the degree, the dissertation. After these many years of
academic study I would like to thank those who made it possible.
First, I would like to thank the faculty of the University of Southern California
(USC) School of Policy, Planning and Development (SPPD). Through the research
apprenticeship, teaching apprenticeship, coursework, doctoral seminars and one-on-
one discussions, they helped hone my academic career. Second, I would like to
thank my dissertation committee for their keen insights and invaluable contributions.
Dr. Tom Cummings (Marshall School of Business) and Dr. Peter Robertson (SPPD)
provided superb advice and guidance in reviewing my dissertation proposals,
providing theoretical insights, and advising on methods of research to finalize the
dissertation. However, the primary individual I would like to thank, and who I am
deeply indebted to, is Dr. Bob Myrtle, my dissertation chair. Through these many
years of the dissertation completion process he has been unwavering in his support
and encouragement through the initial proposals, methodology and final completion.
He has helped guide me through the entire process, reviewing multiple revisions,
recommending alternative approaches, and helping to refine various models. I feel
privileged to have been mentored by Dr. Myrtle, who is a true scholar and caring
professor.

iv
I would like to thank my colleagues and staff at work who have known of my
Ph.D. academic pursuit and who have always provided encouraging words to finish
the dissertation.
Finally, I would also like to thank my family through their immeasurable words
of encouragement through these many years. I am grateful to the support of my
father (recently departed) and mother, Steve and Rita Durbin, who have always been
my champions. I would like to thank my brother and sister-in-law, Bill and Carmella
Durbin, sisters and brothers-in-law Laure and Mark Ferguson and Kathy and Dale
Rusmisel, and my nephews and nieces, who have always encouraged me in this
difficult academic endeavor, but also reminded me to occasionally “smell the roses”
along the way. Without the support of all of these people mentioned above, none of
this would have been possible.

v
Table of Contents

Dedication ii

Acknowledgements iii

List of Tables viii

List of Figures ix

Abstract x

Chapter 1: Introduction 1

Introduction 1

Research Questions 3

Outline of Dissertation 6

Chapter 2: Literature Review 8

A. Introduction 8

B. Homeland Security (Federal) 9

(1) History (Pre-11 September 2001) 9
(2) History (Post-11 September 2001) 13
(3) Organizational Structuring (Federal) 14

C. Homeland Security (State) 17

D. State Government Reorganizations 23

(1) Overview 23
(2) An Earlier Model: State Emergency Management 27
Reorganizations
(3) Models for State Reorganization 30
(a) Chackerian Model 30
(b) Berkman and Reenok Model 31
(c) Other Theories 34

E. Literature Review Conclusions 41

vi
Chapter 3: Research Design 45

A. Introduction 45

B. Methods/Data Sources 45

(1) Primary Data Source 45
(2) Secondary Data Source 46

C. Description of Approach 47

(1) Content Analysis of State Websites 47
(2) Model 51

Chapter 4: Findings 54

A. Influence of Political Make-Up of State Policy Making 64
Based on Their Response to 9/11

B. Offered Explanations for the Policy Actions 66

C. The Role of the Federal Government in Influencing State 68
Organizational Structures

D. The Influence of Different Risk Factors on Changes in 70
Organizational Structure Following 9/11 Events

E. Influence of High Risk Locations on State Restructuring 76
Decisions for Homeland Security

Chapter 5: Conclusions and Further Developments 82

A. Introduction 82

B. Conclusions 83

(1) How have the U.S. states responded organizationally 83
post the terrorist events of 11 September 2001 to meet their
individual homeland security needs?
(a) High Degree of Organizational Change 83
(b) Middle Degree of Organizational Change 84
(c) No or Minor Degree of Organizational Change 84

(2) Why have the U.S. states responded the way they did? 85

vii
(3) What role, if any, did the federal U.S. Department of 94
Homeland Security have in influencing the state structures
addressing homeland security?

C. Limitations 98

D. Suggested Areas for Future Research 99

Bibliography 105

Appendices 114

Appendix A: Executive Order 12656, Assignment Of Emergency 114
Preparedness Responsibilities, November 18, 1988 (full text)

Appendix B: H.R. 5005 Homeland Security Act Of 2002, 141
January 23, 2002 (key extracts pertaining to States)

Appendix C: National Strategy For Homeland Security, Office 151
of Homeland Security, 16 July 2002 (key extracts pertaining to States)

Appendix D: Department of Homeland Security Reorganization 173
Plan, 25 November 2002

Appendix E: Homeland Security Presidential Directive/HSPD-8, 186
17 December 2003, National Preparedness

viii
List of Tables

Table 1: Nine-Cell Model Reflecting Level of Organizational 52
Hierarchy vs. Level of Organizational Change

Table 2: Pre 11 September 2001 State Organizational Placements 55
for Emergency Response and Public Safety (Year 2000)
(Ordered from Highest to Lowest)

Table 3: Post 11 September 2001 State Organizational Structures 57
for Emergency Response, Public Safety and Homeland
Security (Years 2001 – 2008) (Ordered from Highest to Lowest)

Table 4: Nine-Cell Model Reflecting Level of Organizational 58
Hierarchy vs. Degree of Organizational Change (with Cell
Counts for U.S. States)

Table 5: Political Parties of Governors and Legislators at Time of 65
Organizational Change for the 38 States that did Change and
Political Parties of Governors and Legislators for the 12 States
that did not Change

Table 6: Rhetoric – Post 11 September 2001 Statements Made by 67
States Who Reorganized for Homeland Security Explaining
Why They Reorganized/Tied to Type of Organization

Table 7: Pre 9/11 vs. Post 9/11 Organizational Hierarchies for 70
Emergency Management and/or Homeland Security

Table 8: Influence of Risk Factors on Organizational Structure 71
on Restructuring for Homeland Security

Table 9: (Aggregate) Comparison of States Within FEMA 79
Regions – Comparing Pre 9/11 and Post 9/11
Organizational Structures for Homeland Security

ix
List of Figures

Figure 1: U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Organizational 2
Chart

Figure 2: U.S. Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) 11
Organizational Chart

Figure 3: Aggregate Numbers of States Pre 9/11 and Post 9/11 62
Organizational Placements for Homeland Security

Figure 4: Year of Organizational Change 70

Figure 5: Comparison of Ocean States Pre 9/11 and Post 9/11 74
Organizational Structures for Homeland Security

Figure 6: Comparison of Border States Pre 9/11 and Post 9/11 75
Organizational Structures for Homeland Security

Figure 7: Comparison of States with Cities at Highest Risk for 77
Terrorist Attacks – Comparing Pre 9/11 and Post 9/11
Organizational Structures for Homeland Security

Figure 8: FEMA Regional Contacts 78

Figure 9: Potential Forces Impacting State Decisions to Reorganize 103

x
ABSTRACT

On 11 September 2001 the United States experienced multiple high-casualty
terrorist events within its homeland resulting in the deaths and injuries to thousands
of its citizens. These events had a subsequent profound effect on governance in the
United States, impacting the roles of federalism and intergovernmental relations, to
include how the 50 U.S. states responded. In 2002 Congress passed H.R. 5005
Homeland Security Act of 2002, establishing a new Department of Homeland
Security at the Federal level. This had a “ripple effect” on how the individual states
changed to address homeland security.
This dissertation explores the changes the 50 individual states took in addressing
their homeland security needs, specifically if, how and why they changed their
organizational structures. This dissertation topic is important since one of the
primary functions of both federal and state governments, if not the primary function,
is the safety and protection of its citizenry. Organizations, as collectives of people
and functions addressing societal issues and problems, play a critical role in
addressing issues such as safety and homeland security, since they impact lines of
authority, communication with federal, state and local agencies in addressing
problems, and the distribution of monies/grants to help plan for and protect against
terrorist events and other man-made and natural disasters.

1

CHAPTER 1
Introduction

Homeland security is a concerted national effort to prevent terrorist attacks within
the United States, reduce America’s vulnerability to terrorism, and minimize the
damage and recover from attacks that do occur.

(Federal government definition of homeland security, National Strategy for
Homeland Security, 2002)

Introduction

In its July 2002 National Strategy for Homeland Security, the then Office of
Homeland Security, in defining homeland security from a federal government
perspective, recognized that homeland security can only occur through a concerted
national effort, emphasizing the federalist structure of American governance and the
critical role states would play in securing the U.S. homeland (National Strategy, 2,
2002). This national emphasis on homeland security, a direct result of the terrorist
attacks on the U.S. on 11 September 2001, eventually led to the creation of the new
Department of Homeland Security at the federal level. This new department, the
largest federal department since the establishment of the Department of Defense in
the 1940s, was created from integrating and blending 22 previously disparate federal
agencies, with their own employees, missions and cultures, into a single, unified
department designed to secure the homeland (U.S. Department of Homeland
Security Strategic Plan, 6, 2004) (see Figure 1).
The National Strategy provided “direction” to federal departments and agencies
with a role in homeland security, but offered “suggested steps” states could adopt to
improve security and offered incentives for them to do so (National Strategy, 2,

2

2002). This dichotomy between direction at the federal level and suggestions at the
state level recognize the semi-autonomous authority individual states have, in our
federalist structure, in determining how best to meet their own individual security
needs and the role that plays at the national level.

FIGURE 1: U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY (DHS)
ORGANIZATIONAL CHART (from U.S. Department of Homeland Security
Website, last updated 17 July 2008)

3

This dissertation deals with only a portion of the new emphasis on homeland
security: how the 50 U.S. states have organizationally structured to address their
individual homeland security needs. This analysis will investigate how they
responded structurally, why they have chosen a particular structure, and what role, if
any, has the federal government had in influencing the state structures.
“Homeland security” is a relatively new concept in American governance, with its
progenitors in organizational structures dealing with civil defense and emergency
management or emergency preparedness. In 1998 the term was first used by the U.S.
military. However, not until 9/11 did the term “homeland security” enter the lexicon
of government agencies at all levels.
Research Questions
This study addresses the following three research questions: (1) How have the
U.S. states responded organizationally post the terrorist events of 11 September 2001
to meet their individual homeland security needs?, (2) Why have the U.S. states
responded the way they did?, and (3) What role, if any, has the federal Department
of Homeland Security had in influencing the U.S. state structures addressing
homeland security? In this dissertation, the unit of analysis will be the individual 50
U.S. states.
Based on the literature review described in Chapter 2, this dissertation will
attempt to answer these three fundamental questions on states’ decisions to, or not to,
reorganize for homeland security.

4

Research Question #1: How have the U.S. states responded organizationally
post the terrorist events of 11 September 2001 to meet their individual
homeland security needs?
(a) It is argued that the terrorist attacks on the U.S. on 11 September 2001 led to
most states deciding to reorganize structurally to address homeland security.
(b) In addition, for those states that did decide to reorganize structurally for
homeland security, this question compares and contrasts how they reorganized.

Research Question #2: Why have the U.S. states responded the way they did?
For those states that chose to reorganize structurally, this question looks into the
potential reasons for those decisions. For those states that chose not to reorganize
structurally for homeland security this question looks at the influences that affected
those decisions, to include political ideology and rhetoric.

Research Question #3: What role, if any, has the federal U.S. Department of
Homeland Security (DHS) had in influencing the state structures addressing
homeland security?
(a) This research question looks at the role the federal government has had in
shaping state level organizations. This includes looking at those states which had
established a Department of Emergency Management organizational structure after
the establishment of the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and the
role that may have played in adopting a Department of Homeland Security

5

organizational structure after the establishment of the federal Department of
Homeland Security.
(b) This question also reviews what impact, if any, the extent of the DHS federal
funding grants have had on states’ decisions to reorganize structurally for homeland
security.
(c) And, finally, this question looks at both mimetic behavior by the states in
adopting an organizational structure similar to the federal organizational structure for
homeland security and the role the immediacy of a catastrophic event like the
terrorist events of 11 September 2001 had on how quickly these decisions were
made.
In sum, (a) these questions go beyond the “how” questions to address the “why”
questions concerning the reasons/influences that affected these reorganization
decisions; and (b) these questions also address the level of structural reorganization,
specifically looking at those states that chose to establish separate homeland security
departments reporting directly to the governor and those deciding to leave or place
their homeland security organization at a lower hierarchical level. Further, (c) these
questions include looking at the role established homeland defense functions (i.e.,
civil defense) are likely to have on these reorganization decisions. In addition, (d)
these questions look at a variety of models most likely to be adopted by the states
depending on the mix of political parties (political ideology) in the legislative and
executive branches of state government. Finally, (e) these questions also look at the
role rhetoric plays in the decisions why and how states chose to reorganize

6

structurally for homeland security.
Outline of Dissertation
This chapter provides an introduction, and introduces the three research questions.
It also contains the dissertation outline.
The literature review in Chapter 2 investigates the academic and professional
literature on state government reorganizations, homeland security at the federal level,
and homeland security at the state level. Homeland security at the federal level was
reviewed due to its impact on how states addressed their homeland security needs.
In addition, this literature review discusses several theoretical frameworks that help
explain these reorganizations. This literature provides an overview of state
government reorganizations, a review of an earlier model dealing with state
emergency management reorganizations, in some ways a precursor to state homeland
security reorganizations, and several theoretical models. Homeland security at the
federal level reviews the history both pre and post 11 September 2001. Homeland
security at the state level reviews the various state responses, to include state
decisions on reorganization. This literature review, in turn, ties into a variety of
theoretical frameworks to include resource dependency and path dependency.
Chapter 3 describes in detail the research design. This includes a description of
the approach/research methodology adopted. It takes an e-governance approach to
data gathering, to include an analysis of all 50 U.S. state websites as they pertain to
homeland security.

7

Chapter 4 reflects the findings as they relate to the three research questions.
These include both data supporting and refuting effects impacting reorganizations at
the state level for homeland security.
In Chapter 5, conclusions drawn from the analysis of findings are presented and
summarized. This also includes limitations of the research and applications. In
addition, it includes some suggestions for future developments.

8

CHAPTER 2

Literature Review

A. Introduction
This dissertation’s literature review summarizes the theoretical basis for the
various organizational structures U.S. states have adopted in addressing their
homeland security needs. As identified above, it attempts to answer the following
research questions: (1) How have the U.S. states responded organizationally post
the terrorist events of 11 September 2001 to meet their individual homeland security
needs?, (2) Why have the U.S. states responded the way they did?, and (3) What
role, if any, has the federal U.S. Department of Homeland Security had in
influencing the state structures addressing homeland security? (i.e., Does the
establishment of a homeland security agency by the federal government influence a
similar response by state governments?)
This literature review will begin by assessing homeland security at the federal
level to determine what impact, if any, the federal structuring has had on the state
structuring. Emphasis will be placed on the role of federalism and intergovernmental
relations. This literature review will then concentrate on that part of the literature
that deals with state implementation of homeland security initiatives and the
concomitant organizational structures that have been developed to deal with them.
Finally, this literature review will review the literature on state government
reorganizations, reviewing a variety of models for state reorganization. This
includes looking at an earlier model on how a federal reorganization, the creation of

9

the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), influenced states’ decisions
to reorganize. Finally, this literature review includes looking at the role of resource
dependency, path dependency, institutional theory, implementation theory, strategic
choice, and other organization theories have had in explaining how U.S. states have
structured for homeland security.
B. Homeland Security (Federal)

(1) History (Pre-11 September 2001)

Prior to the terrorist events of 11 September 2001, as early as 1995, the term
“homeland” was a familiar term on Capital Hill, and the term “homeland security”
entered the government lexicon in 1998 (Beresford/2004/1). Congressional
documents, including a July 1995 report of the Senate Committee on Armed Forces,
used the term “homeland,” and in 1998 the military started making a distinction
between the terms “homeland defense” and “homeland security,” with the latter
newly developed term and concept to include crisis and consequence management,
emphasizing a broader and overarching concept (Beresford/2004/5). U.S. states also
periodically used the term “homeland security” prior to 11 September 2001.
However, not until 9/11, and the initial establishment of the Office of Homeland
Security in 2001 and the subsequent establishment of the Department of Homeland
Security (DHS) in 2003, did the term “homeland security” enter the lexicon of
government agencies at all levels as well as the American public.
Before 9/11 the U.S. federal government had not used the words “homeland
security” in the context of protection of the United States from terrorist events.

10

Instead, as a more comprehensive approach since terrorism was a concern but not the
primary concern at the time, it had used the words “emergency preparedness” or
“emergency management.” Numerous federal agencies were responsible for
emergency management within the U.S. over the last 50 or 60 years (i.e., Federal
Civil Preparedness Agency, Office of Defense Mobilization, Federal Civil Defense
Administration, Office of Civil Defense and Mobilization in the 1950s; Office of
Civil Defense, Department of Defense, Flood Insurance Administration, Department
of Housing and Urban Development and Defense Civil Preparedness Agency in the
1960s; and the Federal Disaster Assistance Administration, Federal Preparedness
Administration, U.S. Fire Administration, and Department of Commerce in the
1970s) (Waugh, 1990, 25).
In 1979 the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) was established to
consolidate responsibility for emergency management at the national level (see
Figure 2). It also became the primary federal agency to coordinate with state
organizations dealing with emergency management matters. It was, in essence, the
precursor to DHS as the primary agency dealing with the states for these matters.
FEMA, for example, guided and assisted states in the development of plans and
procedures to address emergencies and provided the President with periodic
assessments of states capabilities to respond to national security emergencies
(Waugh, 1990).
After FEMA was established in 1979, there were subsequent actions taken to
further reorganize the federal government to address emergency management. In

11

FIGURE 2: U.S. FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY
(FEMA) ORGANIZATIONAL CHART (from U.S. Federal Emergency
Management Agency Website, last updated 21 January 2009)

1988 President Ronald Reagan signed Executive Order 12656, Assignment of
Emergency Preparedness Responsibilities (see Appendix A). This Executive Order
outlined the new responsibilities of the Federal departments and agencies in national
security emergencies. The Order concluded with a listing of the emergency
preparedness responsibilities of 25 separate federal departments and agencies, with
FEMA given the primary responsibility to deal with the individual U.S. states
emergency preparedness. This responsibility included assisting states with the
development of plans and procedures, providing the President a periodic assessment
of the states’ capabilities to respond to national security emergencies, coordinating
the implementation of policies and programs for effective mobilization of federal and

12

state resources, and other related actions (Waugh/1990/157 – 188).
In the 1990s, during President William Clinton’s administration, he signed a
number of presidential Executive Orders directing FEMA to manage additional types
of emergencies or disasters. He signed E.O. 13073 to press federal agencies for
needed Year 2000 (Y2K) conversion. He also signed Presidential Decision
Directives 39 (1995) and 62 (1998) addressing terrorism policy, while 63 (1998)
addressed protecting critical infrastructures (Sylves and Cumming/2004/5). FEMA
had worked with the FBI following the World Trade Center bombing in 1993 and the
Murrah Federal Office Building bombing in Oklahoma City in 1995. Therefore,
before 11 September 2001, FEMA’s role was starting to expand to include working
with the FBI on some domestic terrorist events, but its organizational structure
remained the same. Since this dissertation looks at the possible influence the federal
government has had on states’ decisions to reorganize for homeland security, this
might suggest two possibilities: (1) pre 9/11 (but after the formation of FEMA in
1979) U.S. states with FEMA like structures may have started to expand the roles of
these organizations to include domestic terrorist events while maintaining their
structures, and (2) post 9/11 those states that adopted a FEMA state type
organizational structure post the establishment of FEMA in 1979 may be more
amenable to similarly adopting a Department of Homeland Security (DHS) state type
organizational structure post the establishment of the Office of Homeland Security in
2001 and the subsequent establishment of DHS in 2003.
In conclusion, prior to the terrorist events of 11 September 2001, the federal

13

government’s organizational structures dealing with threats to the homeland were in
terms of emergency preparedness. Primary emergency preparedness responsibilities
rested with the National Security Council (NSC) and FEMA, but also 25 different
and separate Federal departments and agencies had specific emergency preparedness
responsibilities. And, among these, FEMA had the primary role, in our federalism
form of government, in dealing with and ensuring that the individual U.S. states were
prepared for emergencies that threatened them and the nation.
(2) History (Post-11 September 2001)

On 8 October 2001 President George W. Bush established the Office of
Homeland Security (OHS) and the Homeland Security Council. The OHS mission
was to develop and coordinate the implementation of a comprehensive national
strategy to secure the United States from terrorist threats or attacks, and the Council
was created to coordinate the executive branches homeland security activities
(Haynes, 2004, 372).
On 23 January 2002 President Bush signed H.R. 5005 Homeland Security Act
(see Appendix B). In the Spring of 2002 President Bush proposed a Department of
Homeland Security which “reflected his desire to move beyond the indeterminate
coordination efforts of OHS to a strong administrative structure for managing
consolidated programs concerned with border and transportation security, making
effective response to domestic terrorism incidents, and ensuring homeland security”
(Thaler ed., Relyea author, 20, 2005). On 16 July 2002 the president issued the
National Strategy for Homeland Security (see Appendix C) with the following three

14

strategic objectives: (1) prevent terrorist attacks within the U.S., (2) reduce
America’s vulnerability to terrorism, and (3) minimize the damage and recover from
attacks that may occur (376). On 2 August 2002 President Bush signed a $29 billion
Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for homeland security activities, and
on 25 November 2002 President Bush filed the Department of Homeland Security
(DHS) Reorganization Plan (see Appendix D) to begin moving agencies over to the
new DHS on 1 March 2003 (377).
In addition to federal legislation post 11 September 2001, President Bush signed a
series of Homeland Security Presidential Directives that provided additional policies
to address homeland security issues at the federal, state, and local levels. These
Presidential Directives dealt with a full range of issues, to include National
Preparedness. Homeland Security Presidential Directive/HSPD-8, Subject: National
Preparedness, 17 December 2003, for example, established policies to strengthen the
United States to prevent and respond to threatened or actual domestic terrorist
attacks, major disasters, and other emergencies (see Appendix E).
In summary, post the terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001, a great deal of
activity occurred at the federal level to address homeland security issues, to include
legislation, structural reorganization, funding, and a series of Presidential Directives.
(3) Organizational Structuring (Federal)

At the federal level a new Department of Homeland Security was created to deal
with homeland security issues. This department, emphasizing a top-down hierarchal
approach to organizational structuring for homeland security, was contrary to most

15

scholars’ arguments on how best to structure for homeland security. They argued,
instead, for less structured models such as interagency models, network models, and
bottom-up models that would allow for more flexibility in dealing with the
asymmetric threat terrorism posed.
1

Newmann, for example, argued that post 11 September 2001 there are two
primary models for homeland security organizational structures: (1) a departmental
model, and (2) an interagency model, and he defines homeland security as a subset
of national security instead of vice versa (Newmann, 2002, 126). Congress argued
for the departmental model in which homeland security would fall under a new
cabinet department, created by merging existing bureaus and agencies. This would
also allow Congress to oversee the department in congressional hearings. Newmann
advocated an interagency model, along the lines of the National Security Council,
since no single agency could deal with all homeland security issues and coordinate
with all of the federal, state and local agencies involved (p. 127). The interagency
model, according to Newmann, would be more effective and report directly to the
president.
While Newman argued for an interagency model for homeland security at the
federal level, Wise believed a network approach would be best (Wise, 2002, 132).
Wise and Nader suggest that homeland security will require significant changes in
the way governments are organized and operate at the federal, state and local levels

1
(Note: Using Taylor’s and Fayol’s concepts, “bottom up” organizations occur when changes in the
performance of individual tasks affect the larger structure of work relations, while “top down”
organizations emphasize hierarchical organizational form in which all participants are linked into a
single pyramidical structure of control relations, and unity-of-command principles (Scott/1998/40)).

16

(Wise and Nader, 2002, 44). Wise and Nader agree that homeland security is a
major challenge to the intergovernmental system, requiring close cooperation at the
federal, state and local levels (p. 54). This relationship does not mean strict
hierarchical relationships, but one that allows flexibility and still makes efforts to
develop both a national strategy and a variety of networks of national, state and local
organizations (p. 54). The federal government has a lead role in establishing national
priorities and policies, and the state and local governments have key roles in incident
response (p. 55). They state that as the federal government becomes more involved
in the preparedness, planning, and mitigation phases of homeland security, a greater
federalization of traditional local functions (e.g., police, fire, basic infrastructure)
could be in prospect due to the financial assistance role the federal government has
with states and local governments (Wise and Nader, 2002, 56).
Kincaid and Cole surveyed members of the American Political Science
Association’s Section on Federalism and Intergovernmental Relations in 2001
concerning their predictions for the future of American federalism in the wake of 9 –
11 (Kincaid and Cole, 2002, 182). The majority of the federalism scholars believed
the terrorist attacks would not have a significant impact on U.S. federalism and
intergovernmental relations (p. 182). Two-thirds of these scholars appear to have
supported a highly federalized, intergovernmental effort to protect citizens against
terrorism (p. 184) and they generally opposed privatizing most public services
relevant to terrorism (p. 185). A slight majority (51.7%) favored categorical grants
for the use of federal homeland security aid funding, while a minority (48.3%)

17

favored block grants (p. 185). The majority of scholars supported state legislation
getting tough on terrorists, but did not see a need for state cabinet-level offices
comparable to the federal Office of Homeland Security (p. 188). The majority of
scholars generally endorsed a more federalized as opposed to devolutionized
approach to counter terrorism, but party affiliation of the scholars seemed to be the
factor most closely associated with their organizational recommendations (p. 191).
In conclusion, organizational structuring at the federal level resulted in a top-
down, hierarchical Department of Homeland Security created by Congress in direct
contrast to what most scholars advocated. These scholars recognized the inherent
problems in this top-down approach and instead advocated for more flexible
approaches to include interagency, network, and bottom-up models for structuring
for homeland security.
C. Homeland Security (State)
Prior to the establishment of the Department of Homeland Security, state and
local government officials had urged the federal government to consolidate its anti-
terrorism activities under one roof to establish a single clearing house instead of
several competing organizations and rivals like the Justice Department and the
Federal Emergency Management Agency (Desimone, 2002, 33). Therefore, they
were arguing for a single agency to deal with (i.e., bureaucratic form in contrast to a
network or interagency model).
During those years, grants to state and local agencies from the federal government
concerning anti-terrorism and emergency preparedness came from several federal

18

agencies. These different funding sources made consolidation of programs receiving
that funding more difficult. While this continued after the establishment of FEMA;
FEMA did start taking on the primary role of funding to states. Therefore, FEMA,
as the controller of the federal “purse strings” to states, was of considerable
importance to the states.
The federal granting process in the aftermath of 11 September 2001 had an
impact on how states structured for homeland security. Roberts states that following
11 September 2001 most state agencies have reoriented their organizational
structures to address the threat of terrorism. While Roberts does not define his term
“reoriented” he does provide examples of how states vary in the degree to which
they have integrated homeland security, to include designating homeland security
offices or officers by 2003, addressing counterterrorism measures, and does state that
in other states “the reorganization was more thorough” (Roberts, 2005, 442) to
include some states opting to create new homeland security agencies. Some states
responded by integrating existing emergency response organizations with the new
homeland security tasks so that they function in lockstep. Emergency managers in
these states were successful in convincing their leaders that homeland security is
simply an extension of current emergency management responsibilities, similar to
FEMA’s approach to all hazards management. In other states, the reorganization
was more thorough. Political leaders in some of these states concluded that
homeland security is the broadest category in emergency preparedness and moved
natural disaster organizations under homeland security agencies. Other states created

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new organizations solely responsible for homeland security. Almost all made some
organizational changes by 2003 (Roberts, 2005, 441/442). In addition, Roberts states
that “changes in federal funding priorities lead to changes in organization of
emergency management agencies at the state and local levels” (Roberts, 2005, 441)
citing an earlier study by Martha Derthick in 1970 who demonstrated that money
from the federal government can rearrange the organization of state agencies via the
federal assistance grants provided to Massachusetts. Later in my research and
findings I explore the impact of federal funding as it pertains to state decisions to
reorganize for homeland security.
Roberts also stated that “state and local emergency management agencies
reorganized to meet the terrorism threat to a much greater degree than has FEMA.
While FEMA expanded its programs for terrorism preparation and recovery, it did
not alter its basic organizational structure in the way that many state and local
agencies did. Many state preparedness agencies, however, did undergo
organizational restructuring to emphasize homeland security and terrorism. Two
explanations for the change in mission and organizational structure stand out. First,
the all hazards approach – the idea that emergency management should emphasize
disaster procedures and spending that can be applied to all disasters rather than those
tailored for specific threats – did not take hold uniformly at the state and local levels.
This led to minor confusion about agencies’ missions and core tasks, which
prevented them from building a reputation. Second, many state emergency
management agencies may have simply been too small and weak to withstand the

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funding and attention shift toward the terrorist threat. These agencies depend on
federal and state grants for their operational budgets, and when grant criteria
emphasized the terrorist threat, state and local agencies shifted their priorities. In
addition, the law enforcement culture, which is more concerned about terrorism than
is the natural hazards culture, is stronger in some state and local agencies than at
FEMA” (Roberts, 2005, 443). Writing in 2005, Roberts outlines the immediate
response of many states to the new emphasis on homeland security post 9/11. In the
subsequent years, however, the literature suggests that the all hazards approach has
gained importance since preparation for all hazards, by its nature as more general in
nature, also prepares a state for the less frequent, yet potentially more serious,
terrorist threats.
In reviewing the literature, several surveys were found concerning state
organizational structuring for homeland security post 9/11. Specifically, the
National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA), the Council of State
Governments (CSG) and the National Governors Association (NGA) conducted
several surveys from 2002 – 2008 with the state emergency management directors or
state homeland security directors to try to assess how states may have changed their
organizational structures for homeland security, and if so under what authority (e.g.,
governor’s executive orders, legislation) (NEMA and CSG/2002, NEMA/2006,
NEMA/2007, NGA/2005, NGA/2006, NGA/2007). These surveys did find that
several states had changed their organizational structures post 9/11, many by
executive order, and more states were receiving the majority of their homeland

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security funding from the federal government. States with divided government were
likely to use executive order to establish a department of homeland security. In
addition, the more federal Department of Homeland Security funding received by
the states the more likely it was to adopt the federal model (i.e., separate department
of homeland security). (Note: In this dissertation, as part of my research design, I
plan to collect funding data to determine if it has had an impact on states’ decisions
to reorganize.) In the 2007 NGA survey, for example, they argued that states
homeland security efforts were characterized as being in a state of ongoing
evolution, as priorities, directives, and guidance from the federal government
continued to affect structures, focus, and operations at state levels (NGA/2007/2).
While these surveys have value, along with Roberts’ assessment, they have their
drawbacks and limitations. For example, in the NGA 2006 survey only 38 of the 50
states responded. In addition, the questions asked in the surveys primarily addressed
how the state directors changed their states structures and authorities to address
homeland security, but did not address, or only peripherally addressed “why” states
have reorganized for homeland security.
This dissertation attempts to address these limitations and drawbacks to add to the
body of knowledge concerning states’ organizational structuring decisions post 9/11.
It attempts to do so by the following: (1) taking an in-depth 14-month review of the
50 state websites, taking an e-government approach to research; (2) increasing the
“return rate” to 100% since all 50 states had information on their websites
concerning how they addressed homeland security in their respective states; (3) using

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a secondary data source, The Book of the States, to determine the political make-up
of the states when state organizational structural decisions were made; (4) trying to
address the more difficult questions of “why” states chose to reorganize, if they did
so, and (5) tying the research to theoretical models to try to explain the state
decisions to reorganize for homeland security.
Bowling and Wright (1998) argue that in the last few decades there has been an
increase in the decentralization from the national government to the states in terms of
accepting and discharging duties in implementing programs based on the extensive
growth of federal aid programs to the states (Bowling and Wright, 1998, 430). As a
result, “the presence of federal funds in the accounts of a state administrative agency
is, arguably, one of the most significant factors influencing agency policies” (437)
resulting in a dependency on federal aid (Bowling and Wright, 1998, 437).
Eisinger (2006) recognized this decentralization from the national government to
the states (and local) governments, as imperfect federalism, arguing that this
decentralized system post 9/11 posed a set of security challenges that initially failed
to be addressed. He states that national security is fundamentally a central
government responsibility, but given the nature of terrorism it requires a highly
localized response by states and cities which requires a close and cooperative
intergovernmental partnership. States received all federal funds, through such
programs as the State Homeland Security Grant Program (SHSGP) and the Urban
Area Security Initiative (UASI), and were obligated to re-grant 80 percent of the
funds to local governments by set deadlines. States also were required by the federal

23

Department of Homeland Security to submit a homeland security strategy as a
condition for receiving any federal grants (Eisinger, 2006, 537/539/542).
Bell (2008) notes, in The Book of the States 2008 edition, the current status of
homeland security and emergency management structures as reflected in a
National Emergency Management Association (NEMA) January 2008 survey. She
states that there is no one organizational structure for a state emergency
management agency – most states designed it based on their specific needs. All
states have a designated homeland security point of contact and this position has
become a critical component of a governor’s staff (Bell, 470/472, 2008).
In conclusion, the states have sought a reliable and steady source of federal
funding to the states to address their homeland security needs. In addition, the states
are looking to the federal government to provide them with flexibility to address
their individual state homeland security priorities. Finally, the states are also
expecting the federal government to provide them with specific guidance for
establishing, achieving and maintaining responses to homeland security needs.
D. State Government Reorganizations

(1) Overview

Prior to the 1960s state government was often considered a bloated bureaucracy
characterized by many departments and organizations, often with a weak executive
branch. In many states the number of executive branch agencies grew to 100 or 200
before a reorganization occurred (Conant, 17, 2000). However, during the 1960s –
1990s there was a modernization of the executive branch of state government, with

24

the governor’s expansion of authority and a general consolidation of executive
branch agencies, with the desire to improve effectiveness and efficiency (Conant, 13,
2000). There were three common models used for state government: (1) Cabinet
Model – which became the reform ideal for many states for state government
reorganization which included concentration of authority in the governor,
departmentalization or functional integration of independent agencies, and
elimination of boards or commissions; (2) Traditional Model – the model most
frequently used by the states and characterized by some functional consolidation and
some expansion of gubernatorial authority, but less than the Cabinet Model; and (3)
Secretary/ Coordinator Model, used relatively infrequently and characterized by very
low numbers of agencies and low department executive’s control over consolidated
departments (Conant, 18, 2000).
In the 15-year period from 1965 – 1979 the executive branch was reorganized in
21 states through comprehensive reorganization initiatives. As shown by the rhetoric
of the reorganization initiatives, unplanned growth, waste, duplication, overlap, and
inefficiency were the problems the reformers wanted to overcome. The idea was to
streamline the structure by consolidating agencies into departments and expand
executive power, to deal with the problems of agencies’ fragmentation and diffusion.
Many states also adopted four-year terms for their governors, with larger staffs, new
staff agencies, and the authority to develop executive budget recommendations
(Conant, 19/20, 2000).
While comprehensive state reorganizations were the primary means for state

25

reorganization efforts in the period 1965 – 1979, Conant argues that in the 1980s

(and 1990s) a more incremental approach on a smaller scale was taken. Four factors
have been cited in the scholarly literature for this change: (1) the success of the
extensive modernization and reform efforts initiated in the 1950s and’70s; (2) the
shift in gubernatorial, legislative, and administrative interest from structure and
power to budget and management processes, additional revenue requirements, and
critical policy issues; (3) legislative resistance to expanded executive power; and
(4) resistance of executive branch officials and agency clientele to comprehensive
reorganization initiatives (Conant, 21/22, 2000).
In the United States’ federalist form of government, the states are often portrayed

as dependent on the federal government for a variety of reasons, which may in turn

influence the direction of state reorganizational efforts. Wright and Cho (2000)

asked the question “Do national actions impacting on state administrative agencies
contribute to policy fluidity or turbulence within the agencies?” They measured
federal aid and national legal/regulatory actions, as forms of “cooperative
federalism.” They found that national presence and impacts through federal aid
escalated rapidly from the 1960s to the 1970s, but since then the general features and
several specific characteristics of federal aid to state agencies have remained stable.
They found only modest or fragmentary evidence of correlations between federal aid
features and agency policy fluidity. This policy fluidity, or turbulence, refers to state
agency policy changes they measured by asking the agency heads the extent of
change in program and policy priorities over the prior four-year period (Wright and

26

Cho, 61, 2000). Only among the relatively few state agencies with the highest levels
of federal aid dependency did they find higher levels of policy fluidity. Therefore,
the extent of federal funding provided to states for homeland security may be a
factor, (stronger for Roberts, more moderately for Wright and Cho) associated with
states’ decisions to reorganize structurally for homeland security. Since both Roberts
and Wright/Cho argue that federal funding influences state decisions to reorganize,
albeit with varying degrees of influence, I intend to examine whether the funds
received had an influence over the structural changes for homeland security. They
believe that intragovernmental forces within the state, referring to state influences
such as interoffice struggles for power and spheres of influence as opposed to federal
or city influences, seem to be stronger forces contributing to the unwieldy character
of state administration (Wright and Cho, 62/63, 2000).
Wright and Cho then came up with three possible conclusions to explain these

findings: (1) Is it possible that the significance and efficacy of national policies and

programs have been overrated? (2) Are there autonomous state administrative

establishments? State agencies, under this interpretation, are not extensions or
subordinates of either national patrons or national policy prescriptions. Instead, the
varied state agencies constitute administrative streams of identity, integrity,

reliability, and resiliency that are appropriately (or inappropriately) channeled by

potent state-level forces; and (3) A more radical conclusion, perhaps the cumulative

character of national impacts on state agencies over several decades has been so

substantial that national actions have greatly reduced the variations within and

27

among state administrative operations (Wright and Cho, 62/63, 2000).

(2) An Earlier Model: State Emergency Management Reorganizations

In many ways, the establishment of the Federal Emergency Management Agency
(FEMA) in 1979, with the subsequent establishment of state level emergency
management agencies, might suggest a similar response to the establishment of a
Department of Homeland Security (which includes FEMA) and the subsequent
establishment in many states of state level departments of homeland security, or
hybrids thereof with emergency management functions.
Smith conducted a survey of state emergency management organizations, with
42 states responding. She found that 35 of the 42 state emergency management
agencies reorganized structurally from 1985 to 1993. She then tailored her survey
questions to address why state emergency management agencies reorganized. Here
are some of her findings: (1) forces external to the organization did not exert a
greater influence than those internal to the organization in the decision to reorganize;
(2) a change in top leadership did not rate and rank as one of the most important
reasons why an agency decides to reorganize; (3) increasing effectiveness,
efficiency, and/or economy did rank as one of the top three reasons (i.e., rhetoric) for
deciding to reorganize; (4) a major budget crisis (fiscal stress) was not a factor
appearing in the top three reasons espoused by state emergency management
agencies for their decisions to reorganize; (5) emergency management agencies from
other states were found to exert more influence on the decision to reorganize than
public sector organizations operating at other levels of government, regardless of

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whether or not their mission was emergency management; since nine states answered
this question with only six giving valid responses, these findings are quite limited;
(6) state emergency management agencies located within the same FEMA regions
were found to exert a greater influence than those located in other regions; (7) state
emergency management agencies were not found to be more likely to acknowledge
the role of politics when speaking hypothetically about the phenomenon than when
speaking about their last reorganization; (8) politics played a role in states’ most
recent reorganizations; and (9) in contrast to her hypothesis, states did not most
commonly cite the implementation phase as the area where politics played a role in
their reorganizations (Smith/1994/135-160).
Smith (1994) found that the establishment of FEMA, with its policies, guidelines
and regulations, had a significant impact on state emergency management agencies.
She argues that there were several reasons for this: (1) FEMA contributed
substantially to the budget of most state emergency management agencies, creating a
dependence on FEMA’s financial support for maintaining their viability; (2) as a
result of this financial dependence, the policies and standards established by FEMA
for state emergency management agencies, particularly those tied to eligibility for
federal funds, had a major impact on the states’ levels of discretion and the ways
they did business; (3) the Civil Defense Act of 1950, as amended, placed demands
on federal, state and local governments to protect their citizens from disasters. This
Act is administered by FEMA and requires coordination across all three levels of

29

government. However, the assurance of state and local compliance with this Act was
generally limited to the threat of the fiscal impacts for noncompliance; and
(4) states were heavily dependent on the federal assistance obtained through FEMA
in the event of a major disaster. If the magnitude of the disaster exceeded the state’s
ability to respond, states called upon FEMA to coordinate the addition of federal
assistance in their response and recovery efforts (Smith/1994/56&57).
Smith also argued that because of the dependence of the states on FEMA,
FEMA’s status and image also had significant impacts on state emergency
management agencies. FEMA’s public image, for example, reflected either
positively or negatively on state emergency management organizations, as a result of
the actual or implied close connections between the methodologies and philosophies
of the states and FEMA, with congressional committees responsible for funding
FEMA considering this public image. Smith also found FEMA dependent on state
and local emergency management agencies to accomplish its mission and vice versa
(Smith/1994/57&58).
Since Smith’s study evaluated FEMA’s influence on state decisions to reorganize
for emergency management, in many ways the precursor to DHS’s influence on state
decisions to reorganize for homeland security, and addressed the more difficult
question of “why”, her study is applicable to my study. Her study raises potential
influences for state emergency management reorganizations of which I plan to study
to see if they have influenced U.S. states decisions to reorganize for homeland

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security, to include: (1) the role of rhetoric, (2) the role of fiscal stress, (3) the role of
states within the same FEMA regions, and (4) the role of politics.
(3) Models for State Reorganization

(a) Chackerian Model
Chackerian provides some insight into the key questions on why state executive
branches are reorganized (Chackerian/1996/25). According to Chackerian, the
dominant view of reorganizations is that they “are grounded in the short-term
struggle for political access and symbolic rewards and that they are largely
unpredictable” (Chackerian/1996/26). His primary focus was looking at
comprehensive state reorganization which he defined as “one that involves the
creation, abolition, or reorganization of at least four discrete agencies that involve
four or more functional areas such as health, transportation, and labor, or
administrative support services such as audit, budget, and personnel”
(Chackerian/1996/28&29).
Chackerian believed that reorganizations are: (1) less frequent during waves of
economic growth and more frequent during waves of economic decline; (2) more
likely when normative management rhetoric prevails in the private sector; (3) more
likely when the party of the governor and the majority party in the legislature are not
the same; (4) less likely the more competitive the legislature; (5) more likely when
there is an interaction between high legislative party competition, governor’s party
control of the legislature, and long-wave economic downturns; and (6) more likely
when there is an interaction between high legislative party competition and

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governor’s party control of the legislature and when reorganization rhetoric is
fashionable (Chackerian/1996/32-36).
Chackerian suggests that: (1) large-scale government executive branch
reorganizations are rare events; (2) societal events are not in themselves directly
relevant to what governments do; and (3) political institutions not only can facilitate
the effects of management rhetoric, they also can facilitate or block access of
economic issues to the decisional agenda (Chackerian/1996/41-42).
(b) Berkman and Reenok Model

Berkman and Reenok show that executive branch restructuring occurs
incrementally as well as through the better recognized comprehensive reorganization
(Berkman and Reenok/2004/796). They define “comprehensive reorganizations” as
“complete overhauls.” These comprehensive reorganizations reflect efforts to
redesign executive branches along the lines of three models: (1) the cabinet model
(with most concentrated executive authority), (2) traditional and
(3) secretary/coordinator (which offered governors less control over agencies and
personnel). What all three models had in common was the consolidation and
replacement of agencies, bodies, and commissions with a smaller number with
greater functional breadth (Berkman and Reenok/798).
Berkman and Reenok define “incremental consolidations” as “partial”
reorganizations that consolidated as few as one agency or even what some have
called “major” reorganizations, which involved the creation, abolition, or
reorganization of at least four discrete agencies involving a total of four or more

32

functional areas (Berkman and Reenok/798). They argue that incremental
consolidations are less well understood and could indicate failed or incomplete
comprehensive reorganizations or, instead, are cross-sections of long term, on-going
efforts that may affect as few as two agencies. They believe that incremental
consolidation offers an alternative model that is clearly different from having
failed to restructure at all but is not the same as a comprehensive reorganization, and
that can be empirically identified (Berkman and Reenok/2004/798-799).
Berkman and Reenok conclude that while comprehensive reorganizations clearly
involved more fundamental restructuring, consolidation over time is also an
important route to restructuring that is not well recognized in the research on
executive reorganization. They believe that once a state starts to take consolidating
steps it enters onto a path where it will then take others. And, once on this path they
believe it is highly unlikely that the state will engage in comprehensive
reorganization. They argue that incremental steps may be enough of a middle-level
response to relieve internal political pressure that comes about from the growing
misalignment of design with demands. They believe that incremental and
comprehensive approaches to reorganization develop under different conditions.
They state that fiscal slowdown does not lead to an incremental mode of decision
making; rather, fiscal slowdown can be used by policymakers to promote top-down,
comprehensive reform. Incrementalism, they argue, reflects a different style of
decision making, where subunits of government address particular problems from

33

particular goals facing different environmental constraints and opportunities
(Berkman and Reenok/2004/810&811).
In conclusion, both the Chackerian model and the Berkman and Reenok model
provide insight into some of the forces at play in state decisions to reorganize which
have some bearing on my study of why states may have chosen to reorganize to
address homeland security. While the Chackerian model, primarily based on review
of comprehensive state reorganizations involving four or more discrete agencies,
may not be as applicable here since fewer state agencies were affected by homeland
security reorganizations, some factors will be pursued to include the role of politics
(i.e. political party of the governor and the majority party of the legislature), and the
role of rhetoric. In addition, the three primary forms of comprehensive
reorganizations are reviewed to determine which may be most applicable to my
study (i.e., Cabinet model, Traditional model, and Secretary/coordinator model).
Berkman and Reenok, which primarily review executive branch restructuring taking
an incremental approach with fewer state agencies affected, offer some additional
insight to pursue in my study since there are elements of incremental reorganization
in state restructuring for homeland security. They said that consolidation and
replacement of agencies, bodies and commissions with a smaller number with
greater functional breadth were common. Based on this model one would expect
similar consolidation by states to address homeland security.

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(c) Other Theories

Baumgartner and Jones offer another explanation for state reorganization which
they call “punctuated equilibrium.” They define punctuated equilibrium as the
interplay between those mechanisms that induce equilibrium and stability (what they
call negative feedback processes) as well as those explosive properties of the
political system that occasionally create major disruptions, reorganizations, and
reconfigurations of the institutions of political life (positive feedback processes)
(Baumgartner and Jones/1/2002). It could be argued that the explosive and
catastrophic terrorist events of 9/11 that led to the major reorganization at the federal
level with the creation of the new federal Department of Homeland Security, also
had a ripple effect on states’ responses to their own homeland security needs. For
example, Tierney, in citing both Birkland and Rubin and Renda-Tenali, argues that
under certain conditions, disasters can serve as “focusing agents” that lead to the
development of new legislation, policies, and practices (Tierney/2005/1). She
provides examples of legislation enacted in the wake of the 1984 Bhopal, India
chemical disaster, which influenced the passage of Title III of the Superfund
Amendment and Reauthorization Act in 1986, and the 1989 Exxon Valdez oil spill,
which was partly responsible for the 1990 Oil Pollution Act. In this research study,
we see similar enactment of federal legislation as a response to the terrorist events of
11 September 2001 which acted as a “focusing agent” that led to enacting H.R. 5005
Homeland Security Act of 2002 and the 2002 National Strategy for Homeland
Security.

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Baumgartner and Jones explain that negative feedback systems include self-
correcting mechanisms that react to counterbalance outside forces to maintain
stability. They argue that congressional and bureaucratic behavior include these
processes whereby members seeking reelection provide benefits to constituency
groups to mobilize their support, pulling back when rival groups show their own
power (Baumgartner and Jones/9/2002). They also explain another political force,
the positive feedback mechanism that includes a self-reinforcing process that
accentuates rather than counterbalances a trend. Positive feedback processes are
changeable, fickle, and erratic compared to stable and predictable outcomes with
negative feedback processes. Self-reinforcing processes can be explosive, as
compared to self-correcting processes, which, by their nature, inhibit dramatic
change (Baumgartner and Jones/13/2002). The authors explain that others may
“mimic” this behavior if they perceive it as going with a winner. They found that
public policies are complex and that government responses to them have been
subject to changing attention, positive and negative feedback processes, and
alternating periods of stable attention and dramatic alterations in public response to
various social issues. In addition, they found that institutional design is intimately
related to issue definition; issues and structures reinforce each other, and each affects
how the other evolves over time (Baumgartner and Jones/291/2002).
Brademas (1978/37) believes that reorganization affects the distribution of power
and influence over policy, and the federal government does have influence over state
reorganizations. He argues that several factors contribute to the reorganization of the

36

federal executive branch, to include: (1) separation of powers; (2) decentralized
political parties in which national parties are not highly disciplined structures but
rather loose coalitions; and (3) the federal system in which the national government
has some specific powers but state governments retain all those not delegated to the
national government (Brandemas/27).
Brandemas recognizes that a variety of federal policies affect what states do,
including federal grants, revenue sharing and non-state specific policy initiatives. He
also noted that local and state organization structures can be influenced by
organizational change at the national level. In some instances local or state
reorganizations occur to effectively align themselves with federal programs. In other
instances, reorganizations may be influenced by mandates or incentives to develop
certain organizational structures (Brandemas/27&36/1978).
In conclusion, Brademas believes that the process of reorganizing the federal
government involves politics, not in a partisan sense, but that reorganization involves
policy and the distribution of power. State executive reorganization also is affected
by federal executive reorganization.
In summary, state government adopted three common organizational models:
(1) Cabinet Model, (2) Traditional Model, and (3) Secretary/Coordinator Model.
Through the 1960s and 1970s, 21 state comprehensive reorganizations took place,
resulting in major restructuring, consolidating agencies into departments and
expanding the power of the governors. In the 1980s and 1990s smaller, or
incremental reorganizations took place. Federal aid dependency was found to be a

37

factor in states’ decisions to reorganize, albeit a weak one. Some reorganizations
were found to be due to the short-term struggle for political access and symbolic
rewards. Incrementalism reflects a different style of decision making addressing
particular goals facing different environmental opportunities and constraints.
Punctuated equilibrium, addressing both positive and negative feedback processes,
has also been used to explain policy and reorganizational decisions.
The federal government also has a stake in how the individual states address
reorganizing for homeland security. They are concerned about effective responses to
both natural and man-made disasters, including terrorism.
Roberts (2007) recognizes that the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has
had, and continues to have, an impact on the function of homeland security and
emergency management issues at the state level. He noted that the DHS influences
disaster preparedness by issuing grants (and sometimes regulations) to influence the
priorities and behavior of state and local governments. Roberts further recognizes
that states are still in the process of determining how best their individual states
should structure in order to incorporate homeland security needs post 9/11.
At the federal level, one can see how the field of emergency management
eventually led to a morphing into a new field of homeland security after the terrorist
events of 11 September 2001. I would argue that the reason why many states, prior
to 9/11, had emergency management in their titles and structured themselves as state
offices or departments of emergency management or emergency services was due to
a large extent on the role FEMA played in the granting process prior to the

38

establishment of DHS. FEMA, created in 1979, had been the model at the federal
level that many state agencies emulated in addressing their emergency management
needs in the 1980s and 1990s, creating state emergency management
agencies/departments.
While the Chackerian model and Berkman and Reenok model have aspects of
applicability to my study, there is a significant difference concerning possible factors
for state reorganizing for homeland security. Their models, both the comprehensive
reorganizations and incremental reorganizations, took place over many years. In
addition, the creation of FEMA occurred over a lengthy period of time and did not
occur due to a catastrophic event that required immediate action. In contrast, with
the catastrophic terrorist events of 9/11, at the federal level we see established
immediately, within one month of the events, a federal Office of Homeland Security
to be followed 1 ½ years later by a federal Department of Homeland Security. The
immediacy of these actions impacted state decisions to reorganize their own state
agencies to address homeland security in a more immediate fashion. This study will
look at these variety of models and forces to help explain how and why states
reorganized for homeland security.
FEMA’s longstanding relations with state and local government emergency
management officials helped presidents extend their range of disaster management
influence to sub-national governments. FEMA received political support from state
emergency managers, which made up a large part of the National Emergency
Management Association (NEMA) (Sylves/2004/7 & 10).

39

I would argue that as the President is the executive branch leader at the federal
level, working with Congress as the legislative branch in determining the
organizational structure and function necessary to deal with federal homeland
security issues, the Governor of each state as the state executive branch leader deals
with similar political and policy issues. For example, the Governors work with their
state legislative branches in determining the organizational structure and function
necessary to deal with homeland security issues at the state level. Various pressures
came to bear, to include the need to do, or appear to do, something to address state
homeland security issues post 9/11. We also see how state governors enacted
executive orders at the state level to address organizing for homeland security post
9/11. Since the President of the United States issued a series of executive orders and
established an Office of Homeland Security, followed by a cabinet level Department
of Homeland Security, one could expect that the governors of the U.S. states might
respond similarly at the state level (i.e., issuing a series of state executive orders,
followed by legislation to create state Offices of Homeland Security and/or
Departments of Homeland Security). This example may be more likely with this
type of governmental reorganization since both the primary role of both the president
and governor is protection of his/her citizens.
Waugh (2000), noted that while state emergency management agencies take many
forms, there was a growing tendency to mimic FEMA in name and function. He
noted that many state agencies responsible for emergency management were
originally created as part of the civil defense system, housed in the state adjutant

40

general’s office and were called civil defense offices or agencies. With the
establishment of FEMA there was a trend for some states to mimic FEMA and create
organizations that were involved with emergency management. And, we can see
similar mimic behavior by the states in establishing their own homeland security
departments. He noted that in keeping with the trend toward greater executive
control over administrative functions in government at all levels, more and more
state emergency management agencies were being located in or very near the office
of the governor. The administrative problems evident in South Carolina’s response
to Hurricane Hugo in 1989 increased the attention to the location and response
channels of emergency management agencies. Experience with Hugo and other
major disasters indicated that emergency management offices operated best when
they were located within or very close to the office of the chief executive officer
(Waugh/2000/40-43).
Therefore, as Waugh’s findings apply to this study on homeland security, one
would expect state emergency management agencies to mimic the federal
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) in name and function. However, there is a
potential complicating factor -- FEMA did not go away at the federal level but rather
was “consumed” by the DHS as one of the 22 disparate federal agencies included in
the department, and still retaining the FEMA title. However, not only functionally,
but symbolically, FEMA at the federal level was placed in a subordinate role, if you
will, to the larger federal DHS, of which it is a part. We see similar tensions post
9/11 in the states determining if homeland security is a subset of emergency

41

management or the other way around.
E. Literature Review Conclusions
Based on the literature, several trends have been recognized as impacting states’
decisions to reorganize. Immediately post 9/11 the term “homeland security” was
initially adopted to encompass and address terrorist events in organizational
structuring (see Appendix C National Strategy for Homeland Security published in
2002). It created the “chicken and egg” conundrum of what comes first, or has
primacy, whether homeland security is a subset of emergency management or vice-
versa with homeland security taking on the primacy role. As the years passed post
9/11 the initial concept of homeland security encompassing primarily the new
emphasis on terrorism morphed into a general consensus among the states to adopt
an all hazards approach, regardless of whether the decision was to reorganize a state
organization as homeland security, a hybrid of homeland security and emergency
management, or remain as an emergency management organization. DHS in recent
years developed the State Homeland Security Grant Program (SHSGP) which
rebalanced the immediate post 9/11 federal funding to address primarily anti-
terrorism issues to instead provide a more balanced approach to adequately
emphasize an all-hazards approach in federal funding (NEMA/2007/7).
Another trend, which relates to one of the basic research questions of this
dissertation dealing with the possible impact the federal government has had on state
governments’ decisions to reorganize for homeland security, indicates mimetic
behavior has taken place between some federal government agencies and their state

42

government counterparts. When FEMA was established in 1979 many states, in
turn, adopted similar organizational structures/names establishing state emergency
management agencies or other types of state emergency management organizations.
With the establishment of DHS the literature suggests similar mimetic behavior with
many states emulating the federal Department of Homeland Security, while perhaps
not in structure since DHS was a comprehensive reorganization encompassing up to
22 separate and disparate federal agencies while states had more of an incremental
reorganization approach, with many states reorganizing and renaming their
organizations as homeland security organizations, or hybrids with emergency
management. As mentioned above, Brandemas noted that state organization
structures can be influenced by organizational change at the national level -- in some
instances state reorganizations occur to effectively align themselves with federal
programs. In other instances, reorganizations may be influenced by mandates or
incentives to develop certain organizational structures (Brandemas/27&36/1978).
Another finding, based on the literature, suggests that the federal government also
impacts states’ decisions to reorganize through its policy and funding decisions,
creating state dependency (i.e., resource dependency) relationships with the federal
government. These can be seen in restrictions placed on the states in order to receive
federal homeland security grants, to include requirements such as developing state
homeland security strategic plans. Also, as reflected in the NEMA, NGA and CSG
surveys, the more federal DHS funding received by the states the more likely it was
to adopt the federal model (i.e., separate department of homeland security).

43

In addition, rhetoric offers an explanation for why some states decided to
reorganize for homeland security. Based on past research, the explanations for
different organizational responses included to address effectiveness and efficiency
(like the Traditional model). Some states wanted to show that they were doing
something post 9/11 to address citizen concerns. Many governors executive orders
describing why they created new homeland security organizations included language
addressing effectiveness and efficiency reasons, to include reducing duplication and
overlap in functions.
In looking at Smith’s earlier model of why states reorganized for emergency
management, several additional propositions are suggested for this dissertation
dealing with homeland security. First, the creation of a new federal agency (i.e.,
FEMA in her case) can lead to decisions by states to reorganize (i.e., now the DHS).
Second, increasing effectiveness, efficiency and/or economy continues to be a
reason, or rhetoric, cited by states for reorganizing. Third, politics would be
expected to play a role in states’ decisions to reorganize for homeland security. This
latter concept is provided further support in Chackerian’s model, for example, in one
of his hypotheses which indicates that reorganizations are more likely when the party
of the governor and the majority party in the legislature are not the same.
However, while neither Chackerian (who found that societal events are not in
themselves directly relevant to what governments do), nor Smith (who found that
fiscal stress, for example, is not a major factor to reorganize), found external events
impacting on states’ decisions to reorganize, a major non-fiscal externality, such as

44

the profound terrorist events of 9/11, would suggest that this did have an impact on
states’ decisions to reorganize for homeland security.

45

CHAPTER 3
Research Design

A. Introduction

This chapter describes the research design, methodology, analytical process and
data used in this comparative analysis of U.S. States homeland security
organizational structuring. Two data sources were used: (1) a primary data source,
reviewing each of the 50 U.S. state websites for homeland security, and (2) a
secondary data source using volumes, both pre and post 9/11, from The Book of the
States. The first data source represents the qualitative component of this research
design, and the second data source represents the quantitative component. This
chapter discusses the analytic approaches to understand if, how and why states
reorganized after 9/11.
This chapter attempts to address the different influences that have affected states’
decisions to reorganize structurally post 9/11, to include political, financial, risk and
rhetoric influences.
B. Methods/Data Sources
This dissertation uses both a qualitative research design, combined with a
quantitative research design using tables of information from The Book of the States
concerning the state’s political and funding characteristics.
(1) Primary Data Source. The primary data source, the qualitative component,
consisted of a detailed review of each of the 50 U.S. States official websites for
information concerning how and why they have structured for homeland security.

46

This analysis included a review of the similarities and differences between the States.
Qualitative research, according to Luton (2005), dominates the work in public
administration since it is designed for exploring many of the field’s important
questions, because it is well suited to research that is conceptual, pragmatic, and is
effective at exploring, describing, interpreting and explaining (Luton/2005/6&7).
While there were drawbacks in not developing and disseminating a survey
instrument to send to the states, since surveys can ask specific questions, the author
chose to conduct a content analysis of the 50 state websites for the following
reasons: (1) as opposed to survey instruments which often have problems concerning
response rates, the content analysis resulted in a 100% “response rate” since all 50
states included information on their websites concerning their particular homeland
security/emergency management organizations; (2) the content analysis approach
was a 14-month endeavor which allowed for an initial 12-month in-depth review of
states’ websites to include organizational diagrams and descriptions, strategic plans
developed to address homeland security, governors executive orders describing why
(rhetoric) the states had changed their organizational structures, as well as legislative
and budgetary information. This was followed-up a year later with a 2-month review
of all state websites to determine if there had been any changes.
In reviewing the individual states’ websites, patterns and trends were evaluated to
determine if conclusions could be drawn concerning how and why they reorganized,
and the impact the federal Department of Homeland Security had on those decisions.
(2) Secondary Data Source. To make the qualitative analysis cited above more

47

powerful, a quantitative aspect was added by using various individual state
characteristics and statistics from The Book of the States. These books are published
annually by The Council of State Governments, founded in the 1930s. They provide
specific state-by-state details concerning the state executive branch, legislative
branch, state finances, federal expenditures and aid, intergovernmental relations, and
a myriad of other state topics. Another reason why the author chose not to develop
and use a survey instrument is the perception that often times when discussing
politics, a key reason for many reorganizations, respondents may be less than candid.
To address this, The Book of the States was used as an independent source to analyze
both the political and fiduciary impact on the states. Each volume of The Book of the
States, from pre-9/11 to present (i.e., volumes from 1999 – 2008) were reviewed and
information was pulled from multiple tables concerning the state governor’s political
party, the state Senates, the state House of Representatives, and federal aid to the
states.
In addition to cross tabulations and Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) statistics,
regression analysis was applied to the data. Specifically, the regression analysis
included the Extent of Organizational Change as the dependent variable. The
independent variables included Department of Homeland Security (DHS) funding
one year before change (to measure a possible lag effect in funding), DHS funding at
time of change, and Legislative and Executive Political Parties at time of change.
C. Description of Approach
(1) Content Analysis of State Websites

48

From May 2006 – May 2007 each of the 50 U.S. states’ websites were analyzed
to determine what information could be obtained in reference to the three research
questions of this study: (1) How have the U.S. states responded organizationally
post the terrorist events of 11 September 2001 to meet their individual homeland
security needs?, (2) Why have the U.S. states responded the way they did?, and (3)
What role, if any, has the federal Department of Homeland Security had in
influencing the U.S. state structures addressing homeland security? In addition, a
follow-up analysis of each of the 50 U.S. states’ websites was conducted from March
2008 – May 2008 to determine if any further state homeland security reorganizations
took place since the May 2006 – May 2007 initial analysis.
Qualitative analysis was used and an interpretive approach to data collection was
applied in reviewing the 50 U.S. state official web sites for homeland security and
emergency management. In many cases the states included a history of the
organization. For example, in Alabama’s Department of Homeland Security web
site it had a section called “About AL DHS” which described when it was
established and how (i.e., established by an act of the Alabama State Legislature and
signed into law by Governor Bob Riley on 18 June 2003), listed the director and
staff, provided a mission statement and had a multitude of separate links that
provided information on their organizational structure to include descriptions of the
subordinate divisions and branches. In addition, many states included information
on their history to include what the predecessor organization(s) consisted of. Some
states required reviewing separate web sites where states had retained both an

49

emergency management function as well as a new homeland security function.
Often times, where states created new organizations to address homeland security, or
if they chose to remain as they were but incorporated homeland security in existing
organizations, both executive orders by the governors as well as web sites linked to
the legislatures laws were reviewed to determine why they were created, when, and
what their purpose and organizational structures consisted of. In summary,
documentation included state strategic plans on homeland security, organizational
charts, state annual reports, state statutes, Governors executive orders, grant
applications, regional office descriptions, mission statements and various
organizational level descriptions of tasks and responsibilities.
The documentation described above was analyzed for each of the 50 states, and
then synthesized into approximately 5 – 7 pages per state to include any changes in
organizational structure, when they occurred, why they chose to reorganize, and
other relevant information. This information, in turn, was entered into an Excel
spreadsheet which listed all 50 states, the organization(s) responsible for emergency
management/response and public safety functions, the placement in the
organizational structure, the year, if any, where they placed this responsibility when
the homeland security function was added (if it was added), and if they changed,
how their organizational structure may have changed. For example, in a particular
state pre 9/11 it may have been a Division of Emergency Services within a
Department of Military Affairs. But, post 9/11 it may have created a new stand-
alone Department of Homeland Security that reported directly to the governor, no

50

longer reporting to the Department of Military Affairs, and with prior emergency
services functions becoming part of the state Department of Homeland Security.
After this initial data was gathered for each state, new data was added from The
Book of the States to include the political make-up of the individual state at the time
of the organizational change as well as the funding provided by the federal
government for homeland security purposes. The funding issue was pursued since
the NEMA and NGA studies sited in the literature review stated that the more federal
DHS funding received by the states the more likely it was to adopt the federal model
(i.e., separate department of homeland security).
As suggested by the literature we included the governor’s political affiliation, the
exact number of Democrats, Republicans and Independents in the Senate and House
of Representatives for each year from 1999 – 2008 as well as information about the
percentages in each party, compared to the total legislative bodies. In addition,
fiduciary information for each state by year was pulled from The Book of the States
to include the percentage of grant money received by FEMA (initially) and
subsequently by DHS (once it was created) concerning homeland security grants.
This was coupled with information pertaining to what percentage these amounts
were compared to the overall individual state budgets.
In this same spreadsheet, data from the content analysis conducted for each of the
50 states were entered including the level and degree of organizational change, if
any. Thirty-five (35) specific state organizational change descriptions were
identified, which following the method suggested by Strauss and Corbin (1990) were

51

reduced to 6 as a means to show similar patterns. The six basic organizational types
identified were: 1) A Stand Alone Homeland Security (post 9/11) (Stand Alone), 2)
Part of Military/Police (Mil/Pol), 3) Part of Public Safety (Pub Saf), 4) Hybrid
(Department of Emergency Services and Homeland Security (post 9/11), 5) Stand
Alone Emergency Management and 6) Other.
In addition, based on issues raised in the literature review concerning the creation
in some U.S. states of FEMA-like state structures after FEMA was formed in 1979, I
explored similar potential mimetic behavior in states post 9/11 and the creation of the
DHS. Also, as President Bush discussed the need to establish a DHS to replace an
OHS to insure a strong administrative structure to deal with border and other risk
factors to the homeland, I explored the potential impact on those states that could
include higher risk factors for the nation.
(2) Model
The literature suggested change could be incremental or comprehensive and could
involve reorganization of existing agencies, of two or more different agencies or the
creating of totally new entities. I used placement in the organizational hierarchy and
degree of change to construct the model used in Table 1. This construct was used to
describe the change (or lack of change) in the organizational structure and placement
in each state. As noted earlier we used the constant comparison method (Strauss and
Corbin, 1998) to develop a typology of organizational forms. These organizational
forms were used to examine the influence of political forces, explanations for the
structural changes (rhetoric), and risk factors on the type of organizational structure

52

adopted. Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) was used to assess the relationship
between legislative make-up and homeland security funding and the type of
organizational form adopted.

TABLE 1: NINE-CELL MODEL REFLECTING LEVEL OF
ORGANIZATIONAL HIERARCHY VS. LEVEL OF ORGANIZATIONAL
CHANGE.
LEVEL OF ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGE
HIGH MIDDLE NO OR MINOR
CHANGE
LEVEL OF ORGANIZATIONAL HIERARCHY

HIGH
(DIRECT)

New Stand Alone HS
Dept (Reporting Direct
To Governor)

New Combination
Homeland Security and
Existing Org Dept Level
(Reporting Direct to
Governor)

Existing Org Dept
Level (Reporting
Direct to Governor)
MIDDLE
(1
st
LEVEL)

New Stand Alone HS
Division Level
(Reporting to Department
Level)

New Combination HS &
Existing Org Division
Level (Reporting to
Department Level)

Remains as Existing
Org Division Level
(Reporting to
Department Level)
LOW
(2
nd
EVEL)

New Stand Alone HS
Branch Level (Reporting
to Division Level)

New Combination HS &
Existing Branch Level
(Reporting to Division
Level)

Remains as Existing
Branch Level
(Reporting to Division
Level)

In conclusion, this research design adopted both a qualitative and quantitative
approach to data collection which included one primary data source (in-depth

53

analysis of the 50 U.S. state websites for homeland security), and one secondary data
source, data pulled from The Book of the States from 1999 – 2008. These data were
used to describe the changes in organizational forms and functions following 9/11
and to assess the impacts of different factors on the nature of the changes.

54

CHAPTER 4
Findings

This chapter reports the findings from the analysis of data. It analyzes the
following three research questions: (1) How have the U.S. states responded
organizationally post the terrorist events of 11 September 2001 to meet their
individual homeland security needs?, (2) Why have the U.S. states responded the
way they did?, and (3) What role, if any, has the federal Department of Homeland
Security had in influencing the U.S. state structures addressing homeland security?
In this dissertation, the unit of analysis has been the individual 50 U.S. states.
Prior to 11 September 2001 responsibility for emergency management/response
and public safety functions were found in 18 different organizational structures (see
Table 2). The top three placements for this responsibility were (1) Emergency
Management Agencies (stand alone) with 10, (2) Divisions of Emergency Services
within a Military/Adjutant General Department with nine (9), or (3) a Division of
Emergency Management within a Department of Public Safety with six (6).
Fourteen of these organizational placements had a direct reporting line to the
governor.

55

TABLE 2: PRE 11 SEPTEMBER 2001 STATE ORGANIZATIONAL
PLACEMENTS FOR EMERGENCY RESPONSE AND PUBLIC
SAFETY(YEAR 2000) (ORDERED FROM HIGHEST TO LOWEST)
STATE ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURES IN 2000 NUMBER (#) OF EACH
ORGANIZATIONAL
STRUCTURE IN 2000
1. Emergency Management Agency (stand alone) 10
2. Division of Emergency Services/in Department of
Military & Veteran Affairs (or Dept of Adjutant
General)

9
3. Division of Emergency Management/in Department
of Public Safety

6
4. Emergency Management Agency/in Department of
Defense/Military, Veterans & Emergency Management

5
5. Office of Emergency Services/Emergency
Management

4
6. Emergency Management Agency/in Department of
Public Safety

2
7. Division of Emergency Management/in Department
of Local Affairs (or Community Affairs)

2
8. Department of Emergency Management/in Secretary
of Public Safety

2
9. Office of Emergency Management/in Military
Department (or Dept of Adjutant General)

1
10. Civil Defense Division/in Department of Defense 1
11. Bureau of Disaster Services/in Military Division 1
12. Division of Emergency Management/in Department
of Public Defense

1
13. Department of Emergency Management 1
14. Emergency Management Division/in State Services
Bureau/in Department of State Police

1
15. State Police Division & Office of Emergency
Management

1
16. Office of Preparedness, Security and Fire Safety/in
Department of Public Safety

1
17. Division of Emergency Management (direct
reporting agency to governor)

1
18. Office of Emergency Services and Security 1

56

After 11 September 2001 the organizational placement of Emergency
Management/Public Safety functions changed substantially. As depicted in Table 3,
the number of organizations identified as having a responsibility for Public Safety
and Security increased from 18 to 23. One of the more significant changes was to
specifically mention Homeland Security as a key organizational responsibility.
Thirty-three states made specific mention of Homeland Security as part of the
changes that took place.

57

TABLE 3: POST 11 SEPTEMBER 2001 STATE ORGANIZATIONAL
STRUCTURES FOR EMERGENCY RESPONSE, PUBLIC SAFETYAND
HOMELAND SECURITY (YEARS 2001 – 2008)
2
(ORDERED FROM
HIGHEST TO LOWEST)
STATE ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURES FROM
2001 - 2008
NUMBER (#) OF EACH
ORGANIZATIONAL
STRUCTURE 2001 -
2008
1. Office of Homeland Security (reporting directly to the
governor)

9
2. Office of Homeland Security/in Department of Public
Safety

5
3. Department of Emergency Services & Homeland
Security

3
4. Division of Emergency Services/in Department of
Military & Veteran Affairs (or Dept of Adjutant
General)

3
5. Division of Emergency Management/in Department
of Public Safety

3
6. Department of Emergency Management 3
7. Department of Homeland Security (stand alone) 2
8. Division of Homeland Security & Emergency
Management/in Department of Military & Veterans
Affairs

2
9. Office of Homeland Security & Emergency
Preparedness (reporting directly to governor)

2
10. Division of Homeland Security & Emergency
Management/in Department of Public Safety

2
11. Division of Homeland Security/in Department of
Public Safety

2
12. Emergency Management Agency (stand alone) 2
13. Emergency Management Agency/in Department of
Defense/Military, Veterans & Emergency Management

2
14. Department of Safety & Homeland Security 1
15. Bureau of Homeland Security/in Military Division 1
16. Division of Homeland Security & Emergency
Management/in Department of Public Defense

1

2
A few states changed organizational structure several times – counted latest year’s change only.

58

TABLE 3: CONTINUED
17. Division of Emergency Management & Homeland
Security/in State Services Bureau/in Department of State
Police

1
18. Office of Homeland Security/in Emergency
Management Agency

1
19. Homeland Security Section/in Emergency
Management Division/in Military Department

1
20. Civil Defense Division/in Department of Defense 1
21. Office of Preparedness, Security and Fire Safety/in
Department of Public Safety

1
22. Division of Emergency Management (direct
reporting agency to governor)

1
23. Office of Commonwealth Preparedness/in office of
governor

1

In Table 4, we summarize the changes states made in their Emergency Management
and Public Safety responsibilities following the 9/11 terrorist events.
TABLE 4: NINE-CELL MODEL REFLECTING LEVEL OF
ORGANIZATIONAL HIERARCHY VS. DEGREE OF ORGANIZATIONAL
CHANGE (WITH CELL COUNTS FOR U.S. STATES).
DEGREE OF ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGE
HIGH MIDDLE NO OR MINOR
CHANGE
LEVEL OF
ORGANIZATIONAL
HIERARCHY

HIGH
(DIRECT)

New Stand Alone HS
Dept (Reporting Direct
To Governor)

TOTAL = 11

New Combination
Homeland Security and
Existing Org Dept Level
(Reporting Direct to
Governor)

TOTAL = 6

Existing Org Dept
Level (Reporting
Direct to Governor)

NO CHANGE
TOTAL = 3
MINOR CHANGE
TOTAL = 4*
3

TOTAL = 7

3
Four (4) states had minor changes, but did not change to include Homeland Security Functions.
Two (2) of the four (4) remained at No or Minor Change/High (Reporting Direct to Governor), and
the remaining two (2) of the four (4) moved from No or Minor Change/Middle to No or Minor
Change High (Reporting Direct to Governor).

59

TABLE 4: CONTINUED

MIDDLE
(1
st
LEVEL)

New Stand Alone HS
Division Level
(Reporting to Department
Level)

TOTAL = 8

New Combination HS &
Existing Org Division
Level (Reporting to
Department Level)

TOTAL = 5

Remains as Existing
Org Division Level
(Reporting to
Department Level)

NO CHANGE
TOTAL = 9
MINOR CHANGE
TOTAL = 1*
4

TOTAL = 10
LOW
(2
nd
EVEL)

New Stand Alone HS
Branch Level (Reporting
to Division Level)

TOTAL = 2

New Combination HS &
Existing Branch Level
(Reporting to Division
Level)

TOTAL = 1

Remains as Existing
Branch Level
(Reporting to Division
Level)

TOTAL = 0

TOTAL = 21

TOTAL = 12

NO CHANGE
TOTAL = 12
MINOR CHANGE
TOTAL = 5

TOTAL = 17

Using the restructuring of existing organizations or the creation of new ones to
address Homeland Security as our definition of organizational change, 33 states were
found to have some degree of change as the result of 9/11. Among those 33 states,
17 states (51%) placed homeland security responsibilities at the highest level
hierarchy, and 13 states (40%) placed homeland security responsibilities at the
middle level hierarchy. Only 3 states (9%) placed homeland security at a low level

60

hierarchy.
Of the states that chose to reorganize for homeland security, half created an
organization that reported directly to the governor. Not all states that reorganized
following 9/11 added a homeland security function. Three of the five states that did
reorganize without adding a homeland security function elevated their emergency
management function to report directly to the governor. Another maintained a direct
report to the governor while moving it to a separate emergency management
department. The remaining change was a lateral move from one department to
another department. While these five states did not specifically include homeland
security functions in their changes, their actions suggest a desire to achieve a better
functional alignment with those responsibilities as well as or to increase the
importance of these functions by placing them closer to the governors of these states.
If these additional five states are added, then a total of 38 (76%) of U.S. states
changed their organizational structures Post 9/11 at the same time. There were 12
states that chose not to reorganize.
To provide a more nuanced look at the restructuring that occurred we traced the
movement of the Emergency Management and Public Safety responsibilities
between different entities Pre/Post 9/11.
5
Figure 3 summarizes the organizational
and functional changes states made after the terrorist events of 11 September 2001.
As is expected, Pre 9/11 there were no stand alone Homeland Security organizations

4
One (1) state had minor changes, but did not include Homeland Security Functions. This state
remained at No or Minor Change/Middle Reporting to Department Level.

61

in the U.S. states reporting directly to the governors, nor were there any hybrid
organizations (i.e., combining Homeland Security with another function like
Emergency Management). Post 9/11 eleven (11) states established a stand alone
Homeland Security organization reporting to their governors and five (5) states Post
9/11 created a hybrid organization with Homeland Security reporting to their
governors. These 16 U.S. state organizations incorporating Homeland Security at
the level directly below the governor represent 32% of the states, or approximately
one-third. In addition to these 16 states that incorporated Homeland Security, there
was a net increase in 2 states where homeland security was part of a Public Safety
organization.
The state entity that experienced the greatest change in organizational placement
of the Homeland Security function post 9/11 was the agency responsible for
emergency management. Twelve entities previously responsible for emergency
management functions were moved to 4 different organizations. Six of these entities
became part of the newly formed Department of Homeland Security and one became
part of a newly formed Homeland Security/Emergency Management department.
Four agencies were transferred to public safety departments and one transferred to
the Department of Military Police. Interestingly, the reorganizations that followed
9/11 saw two transfers of the emergency management functions to the agency
responsible for emergency management. One transfer came from the unit
responsible for military/police functions and the other from another agency.

5
The term entity is used because emergency management functions were housed in different
organizational units including departments, divisions, and agencies and to use one of those words

62

FIGURE 3: AGGREGATE NUMBERS OF STATES PRE 9/11 AND POST
9/11 ORGANIZATIONAL PLACEMENTS FOR HOMELAND SECURITY.
ORGANIZATIONAL
PLACEMENTS

PRE 9/11

POST 9/11

TOTAL

STAND ALONE
HOMELAND
SECURITY

0
- From Mil/Pol = 4
- From Pub Saf = 1
- From Stand Alone
Emergency Mgt = 6
- From Other = 0

INCREASE OF 11
POST 9/11/01

TOTAL = 11

PART OF MILITARY/
POLICE

20

- From Mil/Pol = 12
- From Pub Saf = 0
- From Stand Alone
Emergency Mgt = 1
- From Other = 0

DECREASE OF 7
POST 9/11/01

TOTAL = 13

PART OF PUBLIC
SAFETY

11
- From Mil/Pol = 1
- From Pub Saf = 7
- From Stand Alone
Emergency Mgt = 4
- From Other = 1

INCREASE OF 2
POST 9/11/01

TOTAL = 13

HYBRID

0
- From Mil/Pol = 2
- From Pub Saf = 2
- From Stand Alone
Emergency Mgt = 1
- From Other = 0

INCREASE OF 5
POST 9/11/01

TOTAL = 5

STAND ALONE
EMERGENCY
MANAGEMENT

17
- From Mil/Pol = 1
- From Pub Saf = 0
- From Stand Alone
Emergency Mgt = 5
- From Other = 1

DECREASE OF 10
POST 9/11/01

TOTAL = 7

OTHER*

2
- From Mil/Pol = 0
- From Pub Saf = 1
- From Stand Alone
Emergency Mgt = 0
- From Other = 0

DECREASE OF 1
POST 9/11/01

TOTAL = 1
TOTAL 50 50 50

Another significant change in the responsibility for homeland security came
through the establishment of a Department of Homeland Security and Emergency
Management. Five states decided to combine homeland security and emergency

might mislead the interpretation of changes.

63

management into one department reporting to the governor. Two entities previously
responsible for emergency management that were part of the Military Police became
part of the combined department of Homeland Security and Emergency
Management. Two other entities previously responsible for emergency management
that were part of a public safety agency also became part of the combined
department of Homeland Security and Emergency Management. One department
that was responsible for Emergency Management became part of the combined
department.
The last significant change in the responsibility for homeland security was
experienced by the state agency with a military/police role. Eight entities previously
responsible for emergency management tasks were reassigned to four different units.
Four of these entities became part of the Department of Homeland Security. Two
more became part of the combined Department of Homeland Security and
Emergency Management. One became part of the public safety unit and the other
became part of emergency management. Interestingly, in another action,
responsibilities for the Department of Emergency Management were transferred to
the Department of Military Police.
Some additional findings reveal that: 1) Almost 55% of the increase in Stand
Alone Homeland Security organizations came from prior Stand Alone Emergency
Management organizations, 2) approximately 36% of the increase in Stand Alone
Homeland Security organizations came from prior Military/Police organizations, and
3) approximately 9% came from a prior Public Safety organization. For Hybrid

64

organizations Post 9/11 there was an even split, with 40% coming from
Military/Police organizations and 40% coming from Public Safety organizations. In
addition, for those states that chose neither Stand Alone Homeland Security nor
Hybrid organizations Post 9/11, they tended not to move into another organizational
structure but instead decided to remain in their current organizational structure for
homeland security Post 9/11. For example, 12 of the 13 states that were part of a
Military/Police organization Pre 9/11 remained Military/Police organizations Post
9/11, or 92%. The same is true for Stand Alone Emergency Management
organizations, with 5 of the 7 states remaining, or 71%; and the same is true for
Public Safety, albeit smaller, with 7 of 13 states, or 54%, remaining as part of Public
Safety organizations.
A. INFLUENCE OF POLITICAL MAKE-UP OF STATE POLICY MAKING
BASED ON THEIR RESPONSE TO 9/11:

To explore possible explanations for the choices states made in response to 9/11
and actions at the federal level, several assessments were made. Since
reorganizational decisions require legislative action, I first examined the influence of
the political make-up of the state legislatures on their policy responses.
Since state level policies are influenced by both internal and external forces I
sought to assess where the pre 9/11 placement for public safety policies would be
associated with the post 9/11 policy decisions on whether actions at the federal level
might influence those outcomes. And finally, because states vary by the nature and
degree of risk associated with events such as 9/11 a series of explanations between
states with different risk factors was assessed. Table 5 lists the political parties in

65

power at the time of organizational change. The findings indicate that same party
legislatures are more likely to form separate Departments of Homeland Security than
split party legislatures. Nine (9) of the 13 states that established stand alone
homeland security departments were of the same party. This represents 69%, or the
majority of the states. The most frequent organizational changes occurred when the
Governor was Republican, the majority of the House of Representatives was
Republican, and the majority of the Senate was Republican.
TABLE 5: POLITICAL PARTIES OF GOVERNORS AND LEGISLATORS
AT TIME OF ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGE FOR THE 38 STATES THAT
DID CHANGE AND POLITICAL PARTIES OF GOVERNORS AND
LEGISLATORS FOR THE 12 STATES THAT DID NOT CHANGE*
6

DEM
GOV &
PARTY
THE
SAME
REP
GOV &
PARTY
THE
SAME
DEM
GOV &
REP
LEGIS
REP
GOV &
DEM
LEGIS
DEM
GOV &
MIXED
PARTY
LEGIS
REP
GOV &
MIXED
PARTY
LEGIS
OTHER
(i.e.
Bicameral
Legis)
TOTAL
STAND
ALONE
HS

2

1

4

2

1

2

1

13
PART OF
MIL/POL

2

2

1

0

0

1

0

6
PART OF
PUB
SAFETY

0

4

1

1

1

2

0

9
HYBRID 3 0 0 2 0 0 0 5
STAND
ALONE
EMERG
MGT

0

3

1

0

0

0

0

4
TOTAL
STATES
THAT
CHANGED

7

10

7

5

2

5

1

37
TOTAL
STATES
THAT DID
NOT
CHANGE

2

2

0

3

0

4

1

12
7

6
While this table lists 37 states, it took out the one bicameral legislature which would reflect 38
states.
7
For the 12 states that did not change, only the political party make-up immediately Post 9/11 are
reported.

66

Several findings can be drawn from Table 5. First, regardless of political party
make-up, the most common organizational changes resulted in either a stand alone
Homeland Security organization reporting directly to the governor (13) or becoming
part of a Public Safety organization (9), with these two representing 59% of the
reorganizations. Second, when a Republican governor and a Republican legislature
(Rep Gov & Party the Same) were in charge there was a 100% increase in
organizational change (i.e., 10) than when a Republican governor and Democratic
legislature were in charge (i.e., 5). However, when a Democratic governor and a
Democratic legislature (Dem Gov & Party the Same) were in charge there was no
difference in organizational change (i.e., 7) than when a Democratic governor and
Republican legislature were in charge (i.e., 7).
States where the Executive branch (i.e., Governor) political party was different
from the legislative branch political party were not found to be less likely to establish
a separate Department of Homeland Security. Out of the 12 states that established a
stand alone Department/Office of Homeland Security post 9/11 (not counting the one
state that has a bicameral legislature), six of the states established separate
Departments/Offices of Homeland Security even though the governor and
legislatures were from different parties (i.e., four with Democratic governors and
Republican legislatures, and two with Republican governors and democratic
legislatures.)
B. OFFERED EXPLANATIONS FOR THE POLICY ACTIONS:
Rhetoric, such as the language used by Governors in their executive orders, was

67

found to be partially supported with the decision to reorganize for homeland security.
Table 6 summarizes the rhetoric used by the states to explain why they chose to
change their organizational structures to address homeland security concerns. The
most frequently cited reasons are to emphasize a response to terrorism (cited by 27
states, or 75%), to emphasize an all hazards approach (cited by 21 states, or 58%),
and to emphasize coordination among federal, state and local communities (cited by
18 states, or 50%). Three states also stated they reorganized for both “efficiency and
effectiveness,” three states also stated they reorganized “to mirror the federal DHS,”
and seven states also stated they reorganized for “accountability” reasons. However,
by far, the rhetoric most frequently used by states was to address terrorism.
TABLE 6: RHETORIC -- POST 11 SEPTEMBER 2001 STATEMENTS
MADE BY STATES WHO REORGANIZED FOR HOMELAND SECURITY
EXPLAINING WHY THEY REORGANIZED/TIED TO TYPE OF
ORGANIZATION
RHETORIC = ADDRESS
TERRORISM
ADDRESS
COORDINATION
ADDRESS ALL-
HAZARDS
HOMELAND
SECURITY
ORGANIZATION

17

11

8
EMERGENCY
MANAGEMENT
OR PUBLIC
SAFETY
ORGANIZATION

2

2

4
HYBRID
HOMELAND
SECURITY &
EMERGENCY
MANAGEMENT

8

5

9
TOTAL 27 18 21

As indicated in Table 5, interagency models (i.e., Emergency Management or
Public Safety Organizations or hybrid Homeland Security and Emergency

68

Management) were most likely to be adopted by states when legislatures and
executives are from the same parties (i.e. 10 of 18), with rhetoric (Table 6)
containing phrases emphasizing improved coordination or communication justifying
that decision. As reflected in Table 6 above, those states which adopted interagency
models were more likely to include rhetoric containing phrases emphasizing
coordination or communication. For these states, 20 of the 30 (67%) phrases
addressed coordination or all-hazards, while 10 of the 30 (33%) phrases addressed
terrorism.
C. THE ROLE OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT IN INFLUENCING
STATE ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURES:

As Table 7 depicts, there was a substantial shift in the direct oversight of
homeland security functions by most governors post 9/11. Prior to 9/11, 12 states
had their emergency management and public safety agency reporting directly to the
governor. Following 9/11, there was a substantial elevation in the attention given to
this responsibility with the elevation of this function to a direct reporting
responsibility. Apparently governors felt, as did the president, homeland security
needed to be a direct responsibility of the chief executive. In the literature review
Newman argued that there are two primary models for homeland security
organizational structures: (1) a departmental model, and (2) an interagency model,
and he defined homeland security as a subset of national security instead of vice
versa. It appears that the departmental model has emerged as the model of choice,
with the number of department level organizations responsible for homeland security
increasing 100% post 9/11, as reflected in Table 7.

69

Figure 3 offers some additional insights into where the changes were made. Prior
to 9/11 the emergency response and public safety function was housed in three
agencies. The agency most frequently identified with this responsibility was a
military or police agency (20 states). Stand Alone Emergency Management agencies
(17 states) and being a part of a public safety agency accounts for most of the
remaining organizational placements.
Following 9/11, and an apparent alignment with developments at the national
level, a new agency was created either as a stand alone or combined emergency
management and homeland security agency. Most of the changes involved
relocating emergency management and public safety responsibilities from a stand
alone emergency management agency (6 states) or a military/police agency (4
states). While military/police and public safety agencies were the most frequently
listed placement for homeland security responsibilities, a shift from public safety
responsibilities as part of military/police agencies to a more broadly focused
organization such as public safety (2 states), homeland security (11 states) and a
hybrid agency (5 states) was also found.
This patterning of responses seem to indicate that developments at the federal
level may have had some influence over developments at the state level. And when
the DHS funding at the time of change in organizational structure is compared to
change in that structure a statistically significant relationship is found p<0.011.

70

TABLE 7: PRE 9/11 VS. POST 9/11 ORGANIZATIONAL HIERARCHIES
FOR EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AND/OR HOMELAND SECURITY
PRE 9/11 POST 9/11
DEPARTMENT/AGENCY
REPORTING DIRECTLY TO
GOVERNOR = 12
DEPARTMENT/AGENCY
REPORTING DIRECTLY TO
GOVERNOR = 24
DIVISION = 36 DIVISION = 24
BRANCH = 2 BRANCH = 2

Figure 4 below indicates that most states that decided to reorganize for homeland
security chose to do so within the first three years post 9/11, with the largest number
taking place in 2003 (i.e. combining both Department Level and Part of Other Org).
For example, 32 total reorganizations occurred in the years 2002 - 2004, out of the
46 total reorganizations, which represents 70% of the reorganizations in the
timeframe 2001 – 2008. (Note: Some states reorganized more than once post 9/11
and therefore the numbers in Figure 4 below reflect more than the 38 total states that
reorganized for homeland security post 9/11).
FIGURE 4: YEAR OF ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGE
0
2
4
6
8
10
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Department Level
Part of Other Org

D. THE INFLUENCE OF DIFFERENT RISK FACTORS ON CHANGES IN
ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE FOLLOWING 9/11 EVENTS

Several risk factors have been found to influence changes in U.S. states
organizational structures post 9/11, as reflected in the tables below.

71

TABLE 8: INFLUENCE OF RISK FACTORS ON ORGANIZATIONAL
STRUCTURE ON RESTRUCTURING FOR HOMELAND SECURITY

As stated in the literature review, in the Spring of 2002 President Bush
proposed a Department of Homeland Security to replace the existing Office of
Homeland Security at the federal level, “to move beyond the indeterminate
coordination efforts of OHS to a strong administrative structure for managing
consolidated programs concerned with border and transportation security, making
effective response to domestic terrorism incidents, and ensuring homeland security”
(Thaler ed., Relyea author, 20, 2005). These findings explore the possible risk
factors, to include border states, ocean states and others, to determine what impact, if
any, on state organizational structuring for homeland security.
To assess the influence of different risk factors on the type of organizational
placement of the Homeland Security functions several assessments were conducted.
The first assessment was to see whether being an ocean state influenced the
organizational placement of the Homeland Security function. There are twenty-three
states that touch the ocean. Prior to 9/11 emergency management and public safety
responsibilities were primarily assigned to a military or emergency management

72

focused entity. After 9/11 many of the functions were moved to newly established
homeland security or hybrid organizations.
As reflected in Figure 5 six ocean states relocated the emergency management
and public safety from a military oriented entity to a hybrid organization (3 states)
homeland security agency (2 states) and one ocean state placed that responsibility in
an emergency management agency.
Four ocean states reassigned the emergency management and public safety
function to 3 different organizations. Two ocean states assigned that function to an
organization that had an established public safety entity. One ocean state assigned
the emergency management and public safety function to the newly established
homeland security organization and the other ocean state to the newly formed hybrid
organization.
Another factor which may influence the placement of the emergency management
and public safety function is whether the state bordered another country. As
reflected in Table 8 above, 15 states share a border with either Canada or Mexico
(counting land mass borders only, not the few states sharing Great Lakes borders
with Canada). In contrast with ocean facing states, the states that border either
Canada or Mexico did not change the emergency management and public safety
functions for military oriented organizations. Examining the patterning of
responsibility reassignments depicted in Figure 6 most of the change involved
moving the emergency management and public safety function from an emergency
management agency to either the newly established homeland security organization

73

(1 state) or the newly established hybrid organization (1 state). One border state
assigned the emergency management function and public safety function assigned to
the emergency management agency to a department of public safety. Two border
states reassigned the emergency management and public safety function from an
organization having a public safety function to either the newly established
homeland security organization or the newly established hybrid organization.

74

FIGURE 5: COMPARISON OF OCEAN STATES PRE 9/11 AND POST 9/11
ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURES FOR HOMELAND SECURITY.
ORGANIZATIONAL
STRUCTURES

PRE 9/11

POST 9/11

TOTAL

STAND ALONE
HOMELAND
SECURITY

0
- From Mil/Pol = 2
- From Pub Saf = 0
- From Stand Alone
Emergency Mgt = 3
- From Other = 0

INCREASE OF 5
POST 9/11/01

TOTAL = 5

PART OF MILITARY/
POLICE

11

- From Mil/Pol = 5
- From Pub Saf = 0
- From Stand Alone
Emergency Mgt = 0
- From Other = 0

DECREASE OF 6
POST 9/11/01

TOTAL = 5

PART OF PUBLIC
SAFETY

3
- From Mil/Pol = 0
- From Pub Saf = 1
- From Stand Alone
Emergency Mgt = 2
- From Other = 0

NO CHANGE POST
9/11/01

TOTAL = 3

HYBRID

0
- From Mil/Pol = 3
- From Pub Saf = 1
- From Stand Alone
Emergency Mgt = 1
- From Other = 0

INCREASE OF 5
POST 9/11/01

TOTAL = 5

STAND ALONE
EMERGENCY
MANAGEMENT

8
- From Mil/Pol = 1
- From Pub Saf = 0
- From Stand Alone
Emergency Mgt = 2
- From Other = 1

DECREASE OF 4
POST 9/11/01

TOTAL = 4

OTHER*

1
- From Mil/Pol = 0
- From Pub Saf = 1
- From Stand Alone
Emergency Mgt = 0
- From Other = 0

NO CHANGE POST
9/11/01

TOTAL = 1
TOTAL 23 23 23

75

FIGURE 6: COMPARISON OF BORDER STATES PRE 9/11 AND POST 9/11
ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURES FOR HOMELAND SECURITY.
ORGANIZATIONAL
STRUCTURES

PRE 9/11

POST 9/11

TOTAL

STAND ALONE
HOMELAND
SECURITY

0
- From Mil/Pol = 0
- From Pub Saf = 1
- From Stand Alone
Emergency Mgt = 1
- From Other = 0

INCREASE OF 2
POST 9/11/01

TOTAL = 2

PART OF MILITARY/
POLICE

6

- From Mil/Pol = 6
- From Pub Saf = 0
- From Stand Alone
Emergency Mgt = 0
- From Other = 0

NO CHANGE POST
9/11/01

TOTAL = 6

PART OF PUBLIC
SAFETY

5
- From Mil/Pol = 0
- From Pub Saf = 3
- From Stand Alone
Emergency Mgt = 1
- From Other = 0

DECREASE OF 1
POST
9/11/01

TOTAL = 4

HYBRID

0
- From Mil/Pol = 0
- From Pub Saf = 1
- From Stand Alone
Emergency Mgt = 1
- From Other = 0

INCREASE OF 2
POST 9/11/01

TOTAL = 2

STAND ALONE
EMERGENCY
MANAGEMENT

4
- From Mil/Pol = 0
- From Pub Saf = 0
- From Stand Alone
Emergency Mgt = 1
- From Other = 0

DECREASE OF 3
POST 9/11/01

TOTAL = 1

OTHER*

0
- From Mil/Pol = 0
- From Pub Saf = 0
- From Stand Alone
Emergency Mgt = 0
- From Other = 0

NONE

TOTAL = 0
TOTAL 15 15 15

An interesting observation is found in distinguishing the Canadian border states
and the Mexican border states. Out of the 11 U.S. states bordering Canada, only two

76

states changed their organizational structuring post 9/11 (i.e., New York changing
from an emergency management organizational structure to a homeland security
organizational structure; and New Hampshire changing from an emergency
management organizational structure to a public safety organizational structure).
This represents 18% of the U.S. states bordering Canada that changed their
organizational structures. In contrast, three of the four U.S. states bordering Mexico,
or 75%, changed their organizational structures to a different organizational structure
post 9/11 (i.e., adopting a stand-alone homeland security structure, or a hybrid
homeland security and other organizational structure).
In Table 8 four border states transferred the emergency management and public
safety responsibilities from a military focused organization to three different
organizations. Two border states assigned the transferred responsibility to the newly
created hybrid organization with one border state transferring the responsibility to an
emergency management organization. In is interesting to note that two border states
reassigned the emergency management and public safety responsibilities of the stand
alone emergency management organization to the newly created homeland security
agency.
E. INFLUENCE OF HIGH RISK LOCATIONS ON STATE
RESTRUCTURING DECISIONS FOR HOMELAND SECURITY:

States with cities at highest risk for terrorist attacks were reviewed to determine
what restructuring decisions they made for homeland security post 9/11 (University
of Arizona, Science Daily, 2008). Figure 7 compares these states pre and post 9/11
on six different organizational structures.

77

FIGURE 7: COMPARISON OF STATES WITH CITIES AT HIGHEST RISK
FOR TERRORIST ATTACKS – COMPARING PRE 9/11 AND POST 9/11
ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURES FOR HOMELAND SECURITY.
ORGANIZATIONAL
STRUCTURES

PRE 9/11

POST 9/11

TOTAL

STAND ALONE
HOMELAND
SECURITY

0
- From Mil/Pol = 1
- From Pub Saf = 0
- From Stand Alone
Emergency Mgt = 2
- From Other = 0

INCREASE OF 3
POST 9/11/01

TOTAL = 3

PART OF MILITARY/
POLICE

5

- From Mil/Pol = 1
- From Pub Saf = 0
- From Stand Alone
Emergency Mgt = 0
- From Other = 0

DECREASE OF 4
POST
9/11/01

TOTAL = 1

PART OF PUBLIC
SAFETY

4
- From Mil/Pol = 0
- From Pub Saf = 3
- From Stand Alone
Emergency Mgt = 0
- From Other = 0

DECREASE OF 1
POST
9/11/01

TOTAL = 3

HYBRID

0
- From Mil/Pol = 2
- From Pub Saf = 0
- From Stand Alone
Emergency Mgt = 0
- From Other = 0

INCREASE OF 2
POST 9/11/01

TOTAL = 2

STAND ALONE
EMERGENCY
MANAGEMENT

3
- From Mil/Pol = 1
- From Pub Saf = 0
- From Stand Alone
Emergency Mgt = 1
- From Other = 1

NO CHANGE POST
9/11/01

TOTAL = 3

OTHER*

1
- From Mil/Pol = 0
- From Pub Saf = 1
- From Stand Alone
Emergency Mgt = 0
- From Other = 0

NO CHANGE POST
9/11/01

TOTAL = 1
TOTAL 13 13 13

In the 13 U.S. states with highest risk for terrorist attacks, we see a substantial
shift away from a military/police affiliation (reduced from 5 to 1, or an 80%

78

decrease) to an increase in stand alone homeland security organizations (increased
from 0 to 3) and an increase of hybrid organizations (increased from 0 to 2). Public
safety affiliated organizations decreased from 4 to 3, and there was no change in
stand alone emergency management organizations, remaining at 3.
Smith, in her earlier study of FEMA, suggested that the role of states within the
same FEMA regions (see Figure 8) influenced states decisions to reorganize for
emergency management. Below, I look into the potential role of states within the
same FEMA regions influencing those states decisions to reorganize for homeland
security.
FIGURE 8: FEMA REGIONAL CONTACTS
8

Region 1 = Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, Vermont
Region 2 = New Jersey, New York (and Puerto Rico and Virgin Islands)
Region 3 = Delaware, Maryland, Pennsylvania, Virginia, West Virginia (and Washington D.C.)
Region 4 = Alabama, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina,
Tennessee

8
FEMA map obtained from U.S. Government FEMA regions map.

79

FIGURE 8: CONTINUED

Region 5 = Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, Minnesota, Ohio, Wisconsin
Region 6 = Arkansas, Louisiana, New Mexico, Oklahoma, Texas
Region 7 = Iowa, Kansas, Missouri, Nebraska
Region 8 = Colorado, Montana, North Dakota, South Dakota, Utah, Wyoming
Region 9 = Arizona, California, Hawaii, Nevada (and American Samoa, Guam, Commonwealth
Of the Northern Mariana Islands, Republic of the Marshall Islands, Federated
States of Micronesia
Region 10 = Alaska, Idaho, Oregon, Washington

TABLE 9: (AGGREGATE) COMPARISON OF STATES WITHIN FEMA
REGIONS – COMPARING PRE 9/11 AND POST 9/11 ORGANIZATIONAL
STRUCTURES FOR HOMELAND SECURITY
FEMA
REGIONS:
Pre 9/11 Org
Structure
Post 9/11 Org
Structure

TOTAL
Region #1:

(6 States)

- 3 Stand Alone
Emerg Mgt
- 2 Mil/Pol
- 1 Pub Safety

- 2 Stand Alone
Emerg Mgt
- 1 Mil/Pol
- 2 Pub Safety
- 1 Hybrid

Region #1 increased from 3
different org structures pre
9/11 to 4 different org
structures post 9/11
Region #2:

(2 States)

- 1 Stand Alone
Emerg Mgt
- 1 Mil/Pol

- 1 Hybrid
- 1 Stand Alone
Homeland Security

Region #2 remained 100%
different in org structures
post 9/11
Region #3:

(5 States)

- 2 Stand Alone
Emerg Mgt
- 2 Pub Safety
- 1 Mil/Pol

- 1 Stand Alone
Emerg Mgt
- 1 Mil/Pol
- 1 Hybrid
- 1 Stand Alone
Homeland Security
- 1 Other

Region #2 increased from 3
different org structures pre
9/11 to 5 different org
structures post 9/11
Region #4:

(8 States)

- 2 Stand Alone
Emerg Mgt
- 4 Mil/Pol
- 1 Pub Safety
- 1 Other

- 2 Stand Alone
Emerg Mgt
- 3 Pub Safety
- 3 Stand Alone
Homeland Security

Region #4 decreased from 4
different org structures pre
9/11 to 3 different org
structures post 9/11
Region #5:

(6 States)

- 2 Stand Alone
Emerg Mgt
- 2 Mil/Pol
- 2 Pub Safety

- 1 Stand Alone
Emerg Mgt
- 2 Mil/Pol
- 2 Pub Safety
- 1 Stand Alone
Homeland Security

Region #5 increased from 3
different org structures pre
9/11 to 4 different org
structures post 9/11

80

TABLE 9: CONTINUED
Region #6:

(5 States)

- 2 Stand Alone
Emerg Mgt
- 1 Mil/Pol
- 2 Pub Safety

- 1 Stand Alone
Emerg Mgt
- 1 Pub Safety
- 2 Hybrid
- 1 Stand Alone
Homeland Security

Region #6 increased from 3
different org structures pre
9/11 to 4 different org
structures post 9/11
Region #7:

(4 States)

- 3 Mil/Pol
- 1 Pub Safety

- 2 Mil/Pol
- 1 Pub Safety
- 1 Stand Alone
Homeland Security

Region #7 increased from 2
different org structures pre
9/11 to 3 different org
structures post 9/11
Region #8:

(6 States)

- 4 Stand Alone
Emerg Mgt
- 1 Mil/Pol
- 1 Other

- 1 Stand Alone
Emerg Mgt
- 1 Mil/Pol
- 3 Pub Safety
- 1 Stand Alone
Homeland Security

Region #8 increased from 3
different org structures pre
9/11 to 4 different org
structures post 9/11
Region #9:

(4 States)

- 1 Stand Alone
Emerg Mgt
- 1 Mil/Pol
- 2 Pub Safety

- 1 Mil/Pol
- 1 Pub Safety
- 1 Hybrid
- 1 Stand Alone
Homeland Security

Region #9 increased from 3
different orgs structures pre
9/11 to 4 different org
structures post 9/11
Region #10:

(4 States)

- 1 Stand Alone
Emerg Mgt
- 3 Mil/Pol

- 3 Mil/Pol
- 1 Stand Alone
Homeland Security

Region #10 remained as 2
different org structure pre
9/11 and post 9/11

TOTAL = 50
States (10 FEMA
Regions)

- 18 Stand Alone
Emergency Mgt
- 19 Mil/Pol
- 11 Pub Safety
- 2 Other

- 8 Stand Alone
Emergency Mgt
- 11 Mil/Pol
- 13 Pub Safety
- 6 Hybrid
- 11 Stand Alone
Homeland Security
- 1 Other

Table 9 above indicates that pre 9/11, within each of the 10 different FEMA
regions, there was substantial variation in the type of organizational structure the
individual states adopted to address their emergency management needs. After 9/11

81

those variations did not decrease within the 10 different FEMA regions but actually,
as a whole, increased (i.e., 7 increased, 2 remained the same, 1 decreased). Unlike
Smith’s argument that state emergency management agencies located within the
same FEMA regions were found to exert a greater influence than those located in
other regions, I found that states in the same FEMA region did not have an apparent
influence on the organizational placement or form. In fact, not only are they
somewhat different, but post 9/11 with the advent of homeland security as an
organizational structure also adopted by many states, the intra-FEMA organizational
structure differences increased. This would suggest that non-regional factors are
more important to individual states, looking at their own state emergency/security
needs.

82

CHAPTER 5

Conclusions and Further Developments

A. Introduction
The terrorist events on 11 September 2001 eventually led to a new federal
Department of Homeland Security (DHS), a comprehensive reorganization, created
from integrating and blending 22 previously separate federal agencies. The creation
of this new federal agency, along with the states’ desire to address terrorism
preparedness and response, led to most U.S. states reorganizing for homeland
security. These reorganizations at the state level, however, were primarily in terms
of partial reorganizations, or incremental reorganizations, not meeting the definition
of comprehensive reorganizations. However, the word “incremental” implies that
changes occurred over a substantial period of time. This was not the case found in
this study, with states reacting to the terrorist events of 9/11 in relatively short
fashion, within several years of the events. This dissertation examined several
models that can help explain this phenomena.
This dissertation has attempted to address the following three research questions:
(1) How have the U.S. states responded organizationally post the terrorist events of
11 September 2001 to meet their individual homeland security needs?, (2) Why have
the U.S. states responded the way they did?, and (3) What role, if any, has the federal
Department of Homeland Security had in influencing the U.S. state structures
addressing homeland security? In this dissertation, the unit of analysis has been the
individual 50 U.S. states.

83

This chapter summarizes conclusions that are drawn from the findings. In
addition, it discusses limitations of the analysis. The chapter concludes with some
suggestions for future research.
B. Conclusions
(1) How have the U.S. states responded organizationally post the terrorist
events of 11 September 2001 to meet their individual homeland security needs?
The terrorist attacks on the U.S. on 11 September 2001 led to most states deciding
to reorganize structurally to address homeland security (i.e., 38 of 50 states, or 76%).
What is interesting in this research is, unlike other reorganizations studied, states
were found to have varied the degree of change. This research found a variety of
changes in organizational structures and the extent of change.
(a) High Degree of Organizational Change:
Post 9/11, eleven (11) states had a high degree of organizational change and high
level of organizational hierarchy (i.e., creating a new stand alone Homeland Security
Department reporting directly to their governors), eight (8) states had a high degree
of organizational change and middle level of organizational hierarchy (i.e., creating a
new stand alone Homeland Security division level Homeland Security Division
reporting to a Department level), and two (2) states had a high degree of
organizational change and low level of organizational hierarchy (i.e., creating a new
stand alone Homeland Security branch level Homeland Security Branch reporting to
a division level). A total of 21 U.S. states created new stand alone Homeland
Security organizations post 9/11, albeit at different levels of organizational

84

hierarchy. Smith suggested that following the establishment of the Federal
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) in 1979, states adopted similar
organizational structures. We see similar mimic behavior in the U.S. states occurring
after the establishment of the federal Office, then Department of Homeland Security
in 2002, with many U.S. states establishing stand alone homeland security
organizations.
(b) Middle Degree of Organizational Change:
Post 9/11, six (6) states had a middle degree of organizational change and high level
of organizational hierarchy (i.e., creating a new combination Homeland Security and
Existing Organization Department reporting directly to their governors), five (5)
states had a middle degree of organizational change and middle level of
organizational hierarchy (i.e., creating a new combination Homeland Security and
Existing Organization division reporting to a Department level), and one (1) state
had a middle degree of organizational change and low level of organizational
hierarchy (i.e., creating a new combination Homeland Security and Existing
Organization branch reporting to a division level). A total of 12 U.S. states created
this new combination, or hybrid, Homeland Security & Existing Organization post
9/11, albeit at different levels of organizational hierarchy.
(c) No or Minor Degree of Organizational Change:
Post 9/11, four (4) states had minor degrees of organizational change and high levels
of organizational hierarchy and three (3) states had no organizational change and
high levels of organizational hierarchy (i.e., either a non-Homeland Security or

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Existing Organization Department Level reporting directly to their governors), for a
total of seven (7), one state had a minor degree of organizational change and middle
level of organizational hierarchy and ten (10) states had no degree of organizational
change and a low level of organizational hierarchy reporting to a Division level).
There were no low level (i.e., Branch level). Therefore, a total of 12 U.S. states had
no changes post 9/11, and five U.S. states had minor changes post 9/11, albeit at
different levels of organizational hierarchy.
As discussed in the Findings comparing the pre 9/11 and post 9/11 state
organizational placements for emergency response and public safety, there was a
total increase from 18 to 23 separate organizational forms post 9/11. While the
aggregate increase by 5 may not seem high, the organizational forms themselves did
change substantially. Many reflected the new emphasis on homeland security, either
as a stand alone agency or a hybrid organization which included homeland security.
(2) Why have the U.S. states responded the way they did?
As Conant (2000/17) mentions, from the 1960s - 1990s there was a modernization
of the executive branch of state government with the consolidation of organizations
and the expansion of the governors authority, with the desire to improve
effectiveness and efficiency. In addition, there were three common models used for
state government: (1) Cabinet Model, (2) Traditional Model, and (3)
Secretary/Coordinator Model (Conant/2000/17; and Berkman and
Reenok/2004/796). The Traditional Model was the model most frequently used by
the states, characterized by some functional consolidation and some expansion of

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gubernatorial authority. The findings of this dissertation study, I would argue, have
the states falling on a continuum from adopting either the Traditional Model or
Cabinet Model (i.e., characterized by concentration of authority in the governor,
departmentalization or functional integration of independent agencies, and
elimination of boards or commissions). For example, those states that chose to
establish stand alone/department level state Homeland Security Departments
reporting directly to the governor are following the Cabinet Model of state
government while those states that chose to combine homeland security and an
existing organization at a division level, reporting to a department, may be more
along the lines of the Traditional Model.
As Desimone stated in the literature review, state officials had urged the federal
government to consolidate its anti-terrorism activities under one roof to establish a
single clearing house instead of several competing organizations and rivals. Since
Desimone’s article was written in 2002, and the DHS was formed in 2003 as one
organization with FEMA as a subordinate organization, to a large extent the states
had received what they had requested. While many states chose to consolidate
within one organization, other states retained separate agencies for homeland
security/anti-terrorism and emergency management. One possible explanation is that
within DHS itself, there may be different organizations besides FEMA that have
some impact on the states. This may be grounds for future research.
As stated in the Literature Review in Chapter 2, there are several reasons cited for
state reorganizations, to include: (1) efficiency and effectiveness (Conant and

87

Smith), (2) incrementalism (shift in gubernatorial, legislative and administrative
interest from structure and power to budget and management processes), additional
revenue requirements, and critical policy issues (Conant), (3) high levels of federal
aid dependency (Wright and Cho/2000), (4) emergency management agencies from
other states were found to exert more influence on the decision to reorganize than
public sector organizations operating at other levels of government (but Smith’s
findings were limited), (5) state emergency management agencies located within the
same FEMA regions were found to exert a greater influence than those located in
other regions (Smith) (Note: But not found in my research), and (6) politics played a
role in states’ most recent decisions to reorganize (Smith).
According to Chackerian, the dominant view of reorganizations is that they “are
grounded in the short-term struggle for political access and symbolic rewards and
that they are largely unpredictable” (Chackerian/1996/26). His primary focus was
looking at comprehensive state reorganization and believed that reorganizations are:
(1) less frequent during waves of economic growth and more frequent during waves
of economic decline; (2) more likely when normative management rhetoric prevails
in the private sector; (3) more likely when the party of the governor and the majority
party in the legislature are not the same; (4) less likely the more competitive the
legislature; (5) more likely when there is an interaction between high legislative
party competition, governor’s party control of the legislature, and long-wave
economic downturns; and (6) more likely when there is an interaction between high

88

legislative party competition and governor’s party control of the legislature and when
reorganization rhetoric is fashionable (Chackerian/1996/32-36).
Chackerian suggests that: (1) large-scale government executive branch
reorganizations are rare events; (2) societal events are not in themselves directly
relevant to what governments do; and (3) political institutions not only can facilitate
the effects of management rhetoric, they also can facilitate or block access of
economic issues to the decisional agenda (Chackerian/1996/41-42).
In this dissertation study, political party composition was a factor, albeit weak
one, in states reorganizing for homeland security in which several findings can be
drawn. First, regardless of political party make-up, the most common organizational
changes resulted in either a stand alone Homeland Security organization reporting
directly to the governor (13) or becoming part of a Public Safety organization (9),
with these two representing 59% of the reorganizations. Second, when a Republican
governor and a Republican legislature (Rep Gov & Party the Same) were in charge
there was a 100% increase in organizational change (i.e., 10) than when a
Republican governor and Democratic legislature were in charge (i.e., 5). However,
when a Democratic governor and a Democratic legislature (Dem Gov & Party the
Same) were in charge there was no difference in organizational change (i.e., 7) than
when a Democratic governor and Republican legislature were in charge (i.e., 7).
States where the Executive branch (i.e., Governor) political party was different
from the legislative branch political party were not found to be less likely to establish
a separate Department of Homeland Security. Out of the 12 states that established a

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stand alone Department/Office of Homeland Security post 9/11 (not counting the one
state that has a bicameral legislature), six of the states established separate
Departments/Offices of Homeland Security even though the governor and
legislatures were from different parties (i.e., four with Democratic governors and
Republican legislatures, and two with Republican governors and democratic
legislatures.)
Rhetoric, such as the language used by governors in their executive orders, was
found to be partially supported with the decision to reorganize for homeland security.
Table 7 summarizes the rhetoric used by the states to explain why they chose to
change their organizational structures to address homeland security concerns. The
most frequently cited reasons are to emphasize a response to terrorism (cited by 27
states, or 75%), to emphasize an all hazards approach (cited by 21 states, or 58%),
and to emphasize coordination among federal, state and local communities (cited by
18 states, or 50%). Three states also stated they reorganized for both “efficiency and
effectiveness,” three states also stated they reorganized “to mirror the federal DHS,”
and seven states also stated they reorganized for “accountability” reasons. However,
by far, the rhetoric most frequently used by states was to address terrorism. The
emphasis on preparing for and responding to terrorism, through a coordinated
federal, state and local level response, was especially strong. The rhetoric states
used reflect the organizational form adopted and functions assigned, particularly in
regard to states that decided to change their organizational structure, form and

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functions to address homeland security as it was initially explained in the National
Strategy for Homeland Security to address terrorism.
The states reaction to the emphasis on addressing terrorism may be explained in
terms of the impact the federal government has had on the states. Both the federal
H.R. 5005 Homeland Security Act of 2002 and the federal 2002 National Strategy
for Homeland Security, Office of Homeland Security, emphasized the need to
combat terrorism and increase coordination among federal, state and local
communities. For example, in the Executive Summary in the 2002 National Strategy
for Homeland Security it states “the purpose of the Strategy is to mobilize and
organize our Nation to secure the U.S. homeland from terrorist attacks. This is an
exceedingly complex mission that requires coordinated and focused effort from our
entire society—the federal government, state and local governments, the private
sector, and the American people” (2002/vii).
Governors had an enormous influence in determining whether to reorganize for
homeland security, either by signing executive orders to that effect, or by influencing
the legislative bodies within their respective states to create the organizational
structures to deal with the threat of terrorism.
As reflected in Table 7 above, extra emphasis should be given to the rhetoric
states have used to explain why they have reorganized for homeland security. For
example, the state of Wisconsin has codified in its state statutes when
reorganizations should occur, under Chapter 15 Structure of the Executive Branch,
Subchapter 1 General Provisions, 15.001 Declaration of Policy:

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(2) Goals Of Executive Branch Organization. (a) As the chief
administrative officer of the state, the governor should be pro-
vided with the administrative facilities and the authority to
carry out the functions of the governor’s office efficiently and
effectively (NOTE: emphasis added) within the policy limits
established by the legislature.
(b) The administrative agencies which comprise the executive
branch should be consolidated into a reasonable number of
departments and independent agencies consistent with execu-
tive capacity to administer effectively at all levels.
(c) The integration of the agencies in the executive branch
should be on a functional basis, so that programs can be co-
ordinated.
(d) Each agency in the executive branch should be assigned
a name commensurate with the scope of its program respon-
sibilities, and should be integrated into one of the departments
or independent agencies of the executive branch as closely as
the conflicting goals of administrative integration and respon-
siveness to the legislature will permit.
(1) Goals Of Continuing Reorganization. Structural reorgani-
zation should be a continuing process through careful execu-
tive and legislative appraisal of the placement of proposed
new programs and the coordination of existing programs in
response to changing emphasis or public needs, and should
be consistent with the following goals:
(a) The organization of state government should assure its
responsiveness to popular control. It is the goal of reorgani-
zation to improve legislative policy-making capability and to
improve the administrative capability of the executive to carry
out these policies.
(b) The organization of state government should facilitate com-
munication between citizens and government. It is the goal of
reorganization through coordination of related programs in
function-oriented departments to improve public understand-
ing of government programs and policies and to improve the
relationships between citizens and administrative agencies.
(c) The organization of state government shall assure efficient
and effective administration of the policies established by the
legislature. It is the goal of reorganization to promote effic-
iency by improving the management and coordination of
state services and by eliminating overlapping activities.
(State of Wisconsin website)

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As reflected in Wisconsin’s statute above, which are indicative of other states
statutes describing how the executive branch is both organized and reorganized, the
goals are to address changing emphasis or public needs, improve legislative policy-
making capability, improve communication and understanding between citizens and
government, and to promote state efficiency and avoid overlapping activities. These
same goals apply to states reorganizing to address their homeland security needs.
But these don’t explain the full picture. Other reasons, as reflected in the Findings in
Chapter 4, also provide insight into why and how states have reorganized for
homeland security.
Finally, as Conant states in the literature review above, historically there have
been three common models used for state government reorganizations: (1) Cabinet
Model – which became the reform ideal for many states for state government
reorganization which included concentration of authority in the governor,
departmentalization or functional integration of independent agencies, and
elimination of boards or commissions; (2) Traditional Model – the model most
frequently used by the states and characterized by some functional consolidation and
some expansion of gubernatorial authority, but less than the Cabinet Model; and (3)
Secretary/ Coordinator Model, used relatively infrequently and characterized by very
low numbers of agencies and low department executive’s control over consolidated
departments. I would argue that instead of the more frequently used Traditional
Model for state reorganizations, the less frequent but ideal reform Cabinet Model
was adopted by many states when it came to reorganizing for homeland security.

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Many governors wanted to concentrate authority directly with the governor for
homeland security by either elevating homeland security to a departmental function
or placed in the Office of the Governor directly.
As reflected in Table 10 six ocean states relocated the emergency management
and public safety from a military oriented entity to a hybrid organization (3 states)
homeland security agency (2 states) and one ocean state placed that responsibility in
an emergency management agency. While pre 9/11, a total of 11 of 15 ocean states
were part of a military/police organization, post 9/11 only 5 remained. Six of the
other states, as stated above, chose primarily either hybrid organizations or homeland
security organizations. One can surmise that these states wanted to further address
and enhance the role of homeland security in their states, often times elevating to
department level organizations reporting directly to the governors.
Some U.S. states chose not to reorganize structurally for homeland security at all.
As cited by Conant (2000, 21/22), as expressed in the state movements away from
comprehensive reorganizations to incremental reorganizations, legislative resistance
to expanded executive power was identified as one of the reasons for limiting
organizational change. Smith (1994) found that internal forces exerted a greater
influence than external forces in decisions to reorganize state emergency
management offices. This may have been a factor here, with the internal forces in
individual states such as internal office politics, resistance to change from
established emergency management directors, etc. may have influenced the decisions

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for the 12 states that chose not to reorganize for homeland security. A review of
internal state forces may be grounds for future research.
The influence of risk factors on organizational restructuring for homeland
security, as depicted in Table 9 above, provides evidence for both supporting and
refuting reorganizations based on certain conditions. For example, most border
states post 9/11 (i.e., bordering Mexico or Canada) did not change the emergency
management and public safety functions for military oriented organizations. This
may reflect a belief among these states that border control to include homeland
security requires a strong affiliation with the states’ military component through the
state adjutant general and/or state Military Department. In contrast, the ocean states,
as reflected in Table 10, had a larger affiliation for organizational change for
homeland security post 9/11. Ocean states, which include the Gulf states and
Atlantic states subject to natural disasters such as hurricanes, tornadoes and floods,
and Western states subject to natural disasters such as fires, earthquakes and
mudslides, may have had other priorities. This may be grounds for future research.
(3) What role, if any, did the federal U.S. Department of Homeland Security
have in influencing the state structures addressing homeland security?
This study has shown the continuing influence of the federal government on state
structures. For example, for the last two decades through presidential executive
orders initially concerning emergency preparedness in the 1980s, through today
concerning federal homeland security presidential executive orders and federal
legislation, we see this influence.

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In 1988, when President Reagan signed Executive Order 12656 Assignment of
Emergency Preparedness Responsibilities (see Appendix A), he provided direction
at the federal level to FEMA concerning their influence on the U.S. states when it
came to emergency preparedness. This influence included guiding and assisting
state governments in achieving preparedness for national security emergencies,
including the development of plans and procedures for assuring continuity of
government, planning support for prompt and coordinated Federal assistance to the
states in response to national security emergencies, providing the President periodic
assessments of state capabilities to respond to emergencies, coordinating the
implementation of policies and programs from efficient mobilization of state
resources, developing public information, education and training programs to assist
the states, and coordinating among the heads of federal, state and local agencies the
planning, conducting and evaluating of national security emergency exercises.
Therefore, before 11 September 2001, we can see that the federal government,
through FEMA, had an influence on states. States, in turn, responded by altering
their structures to address the emphasis on emergency management. After 11
September 2001 we see this continued federal government influence, as expressed in
the H.R. 5005 Homeland Security Act of 2002 (see Appendix B) and the 2002
National Strategy for Homeland Security (see Appendix C). Both H.R. 5005 and the
National Strategy discuss the role and influence the federal government has over the
states, to include overseeing and coordinating departmental programs and
relationships with the states through the Office for State and Local Government

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Coordination, assessing and advocating for the resources needed by the states to
implement national strategy for combating terrorism, and providing states with
regular information and technical support to assist with local efforts to secure the
homeland. In addition, the President called on each governor to establish a single
Homeland Security Task Force (HSTF) for their state to serve as his or her primary
coordinating body with the federal government. President Bush also signed a series
of Presidential Directives after 9/11, including Homeland Security Presidential
Directive/HSPD-8 in December 2003 (see Appendix E), which required states, to the
extent permitted by law, in order to receive Federal preparedness assistance, to adopt
statewide comprehensive all-hazards preparedness strategies consistent with the
national preparedness goals. This included the requirement that the Secretary of the
Department of Homeland Security review and approve strategies submitted by the
states to address homeland security.
One can see, in both the presidential directives pre and post 9/11, the role and
influence the federal government has had in states emergency preparedness and
homeland security, from the planning stage to the funding stage. Is it any wonder
that many states, needing to meet the federal mandates, adopted organizational
structures to smooth that coordination process.
However, not only were federal mandates impacting states’ decisions to
reorganize, as Roberts states in the literature review, changes in federal priorities, as
reflected in the federal assistance grants programs, lead to changes in reorganization
of emergency management agencies at the state and local levels after 9/11 (Roberts,

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2005, 441). In my study federal funding was found to be an influence on how states
reorganized for homeland security.
In addition, one could argue that post 9/11, while FEMA’s role was still very
important, it was somewhat diminished in stature since it was no longer a stand alone
agency but was a subordinate organization within DHS. This real, but also symbolic,
federal emphasis appears to have had a significant impact on why many states chose
to reorganize post 9/11 to emphasize homeland security. Smith, for example,
argued that FEMA’s public image reflected either positively or negatively on state
emergency management organizations, as a result of actual or implied close
connections between the methodologies and philosophies of the states and FEMA.
Could this public image have been tarnished when FEMA was placed in a
subordinate role within DHS?
Roberts also argued that state emergency management agencies reorganized post
9/11 to emphasize homeland security and terrorism to a much greater degree than
had FEMA, which did not alter its basic organizational structure the way many states
did. He suggests two explanations: (1) the all hazards approach – the idea that
emergency management should emphasize disaster procedures and spending that can
be applied to all disasters rather than those tailored for specific threats – did not take
hold uniformly at the state and local levels; and (2) many state emergency
management agencies may have simply been too small and weak to withstand the
funding and attention shift toward the terrorist threat. These agencies depended on
federal and state grants for their operational budgets, and when grant criteria

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emphasized the terrorist threat, state and local agencies shifted their priorities. In
addition, the law enforcement culture, which is more concerned about terrorism than
is the natural hazards culture, is stronger in some state and local agencies than at
FEMA. My study has also revealed that after 9/11, there was an increase in federal
emphasis and funding for terrorism preparedness measures which earmarked funds
for that purpose in the states. As a consequence, many states had reorganized to
emphasize homeland security.
In addition, as explained in the Findings, there was a substantial shift in the
direct oversight of homeland security functions by most governors. Prior to 9/11, 12
states had their emergency management and public safety agency reporting directly
to the governor. Following 9/11, there was a substantial elevation in the attention
given to this responsibility with the elevation of this function to a direct reporting
responsibility. Apparently governors felt, as did the president, homeland security
needed to be a direct responsibility of the chief executive. Also, we see a 100%
increase, from 12 states pre 9/11 to 24 post 9/11 that elevated their organizational
hierarchies from emergency management and/or homeland security to report directly
to the governors.
C. Limitations
One possible limitation of this study is that a survey instrument was not
specifically developed to ask questions of the individual state homeland security or
emergency management units. However, it is believed that this limitation was
overcome by a more comprehensive state-by-state qualitative analysis of the states.

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However, since states websites were not identical in design and content,
interpretation needed to be applied to the large amount of information in order to
synthesize it into the tables and research questions presented in this study. In
addition, in some cases, inferences were made from the data concerning the changes
adopted.
Another possible limitation of this research dealt with picking one timeframe in
reviewing the 50 U.S. state websites for homeland security information.
Specifically, taking the timeframe May 2006 – May 2007. However, this limitation
was mitigated by the fact that all 50 websites were again reviewed from March 2008
– May 2008 to determine if there had been any changes in data. Only a few states
had changed their organizational structure for homeland security in the interim.
Also, the states included, for example, dates when either executive orders or
legislation was signed to create homeland security organizations, which provided
rhetoric on why they changed as well. Regardless of the timeframe chosen, these are
hard facts (i.e., executive orders signed, legislation passed) that would not be subject
to change in case a U.S. state website was revised later.
D. Suggested Areas For Future Research:

(1) The National Emergency Management Association (NEMA), the professional
association for U.S. state emergency managers, created the Emergency Management
Accreditation Program (EMAP) in 1997 to evaluate and accredit U.S. state
emergency management programs, based on the only standards available, the
National Fire Protection Association’s 1600 “Standard for Disaster/Emergency

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Management and Business Continuity Programs” (Lucus/2006/1). EMAP, providing
a national set of standards in which states can be rated, rates states using the four
phases of emergency management: preparedness, response, recovery, and mitigation,
with a potential new phase of prevention added. One possible area for future
research is to develop a new 5-phase Homeland Security/Emergency Management
Accreditation Program (HSEMAP) that would include the new emphasis on
homeland security in addition to traditional emergency management functions, and
rate state’s performance using this model. Also, recommended in this new
HSEMAP is a cross-comparison on how states have restructured post 9/11, and the
possible impact that may have on their performance.
(2) Another suggestion for future research is based on the regional structure concept
of homeland security. Regionalism has recently become the primary
intergovernmental organizational structure for planning and implementing
intergovernmental homeland security and emergency management, as has been
adopted by the state of Florida with seven regional structures (Caruson and
MacManus/2007/1). Florida was an early adopter of this regional approach, which
many credit with Florida’s ranking as having the nation’s best emergency
management system (Caruson and MacManus/2007/1). As a result of their research,
Caruson and MacManus tested the following hypotheses concerning homeland
security policy at the local level: (1) H1: The level of concern about specific
domestic security threats will vary across regions and will reflect the specific
vulnerabilities of the locality; (2) H2: As the number of security vulnerabilities

101

increases in a region, the higher the level of concern among survey respondents; (3)
H3: Concern about security threats exerts a demand for greater cooperation among
regional stakeholders. The higher the level of concern among local officials, the
more likely officials are to report an improvement in intergovernmental cooperation;
(4) H4: In addition to security concerns, the greater the level of regional
intergovernmental complexity the more necessary intergovernmental coordination
becomes. Thus, the more complex the intergovernmental landscape, the more likely
it is that intergovernmental cooperation will improve; (5) H5: Regional preparedness
is a function of the level of security concern among local officials, the degree of
intergovernmental complexity in the region, and the level of cooperation among
local officials and first responders. As each of these factors increases, we expect to
see higher readiness ratings; and (6) H6: Unmet regional needs negatively impact
preparedness. As the level of unmet security needs increases, local officials’
estimates of preparedness decline (Caruson and MacManus/2007/6&7). MacManus
conducted a survey of Florida’s city and county officials in obtaining their data.
Their conclusions include suggesting that Florida’s regional approach to homeland
security can serve as a model for other states, since regionalism improves
intergovernmental communications and networks, and harnesses economies of scale
(Caruson and MacManus/2007/20&21). Another possible area for future research is
adopting their model as a possible performance measurement model, determining the
extent to which the 50 states have adopted a regional approach to homeland security,
which is a form of state reorganization to address homeland security.

102

(3) A third suggestion for future research is to understand why those states that chose
not to reorganize structurally for homeland security chose this course of action.
(4) A fourth research suggestion is grounded more in theoretical applications. This
dissertation, while focusing on state homeland security, touched on the broader
concepts of federalism and intergovernmental relations in federal-state interactions.
But, state intragovernmental influences were not addressed. One future research
recommendation might include conducting a survey of state homeland security
agencies to determine the relative impact these various forces have in influencing
state decisions to reorganize, both internal and external.
Historically, the U.S. government reacted to the state-sponsored attacks on Pearl
Harbor in 1941 with the creation of a new Department of Defense (DoD). Then,
after the non-state sponsored terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, the U.S.
government reacted with the creation of the new Department of Homeland Security
(DHS). As a consequence, we saw civil defense organizations created in the states
post creation of the DoD, and we saw homeland security organizations created in the
states post creation of DHS. But, not all states changed their organizational
structures. One might want to plot and research these various forces on state
decisions to reorganize over time:

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FIGURE 9: POTENTIAL FORCES IMPACTING STATE DECISIONS TO
REORGANIZE

As depicted in Figure 9, besides the external factors listed in this dissertation and
the effects of political party make-up and funding influences on state decisions to
reorganize for homeland security, as a recommendation for future research, scholars
may want to pursue the role internal factors play in state decisions to reorganize to
include the background, experience and education of existing staff in the emergency
management and homeland security fields, and potential bureaucratic resistance to
change. In addition, Post 9/11 we have seen homeland security as an emerging field
of academic study at the university level with degrees in homeland security.
External Factors
(Federal laws,
guidance, funding)
Natural Disasters vs.
Man-Made Disasters
(non-terrorist) vs. Man-
Mad Disasters
(terrorism)
Internal Factors
(Internal Politics,
Bureaucratic resistance
to change, …)

U.S. State
Reorganization
Influences

104

Perhaps, as states start to hire new employees with homeland security degrees, and as
homeland security becomes a more well-established field of academic study, future
scholars may pursue studying these impacts on state decisions to reorganize for
homeland security.

105

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APPENDIX A

EXECUTIVE ORDER 12656, ASSIGNMENT OF EMERGENCY
PREPAREDNESS RESPONSIBILITIES, 18 NOVEMBER 1988

Whereas our national security is dependent upon our ability to assure continuity
of government, at every level, in any national security situation that might confront
the Nation; and

Whereas effective national preparedness planning to meet such an emergency,
including a massive nuclear attack, is essential to our national survival; and

Whereas effective national preparedness planning requires the identification of
functions that would have to be performed during such an emergency, the
assignment of responsibility for developing plans for performing these functions, and
the assignment of responsibility for developing the capability to implement these
plans; and

Whereas the Congress has directed the development of such national security
emergency preparedness plans and has provided funds for the accomplishment
thereof:

Now, Therefore, by virtue of the authority vested in me as President by the
Constitution and laws of the United States of America, and pursuant to
Reorganization Plan No. 1 of 1958 (72 Stat. 1799), the National Security Act of
1947, as amended, the Defense Production Act of 1950, as amended, and the Federal
Civil Defense Act, as amended, it is hereby ordered that the responsibilities of the
Federal departments and agencies in national security emergencies shall be as
follows:

PART 1 – PREAMBLE

Section 101. National Security Emergency Preparedness Policy.
(a) The policy of the United States is to have sufficient capabilities at all levels
of government to meet essential defense and civilian needs during any
national security emergency. A national security emergency is any
occurrence, including natural disaster, military attack, technological
emergency, or other emergency, that seriously degrades or seriously threatens
the national security of the United States. Policy for national security
emergency preparedness shall be established by the President. Pursuant to
the President’s direction, the National Security Council shall be responsible
for developing and administering such policy. All national security
emergency preparedness activities shall be consistent with the Constitution
and laws of the United States and with preservation of the constitutional

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government of the United States.
(b) Effective national security emergency preparedness planning requires:
identification of functions that would have to be performed during such an
emergency; development of plans for performing these functions; and
development of the capability to execute those plans.

Section 102. Purpose.
(a) The purpose of this Order is to assign national security emergency
preparedness responsibilities to Federal Departments and agencies. These
assignments are based, whenever possible, on extensions of the regular
missions of the department and agencies.
(b) This Order does not constitute authority to implement the plans prepared
pursuant to the Order. Plans so developed may be executed only in the event
that authority for such extension is authorized by law.

Section 103. Scope.
(a) This Order addresses national security emergency preparedness functions and
activities. As used in this Order, preparedness functions and activities
include, as appropriate, policies, plans, procedures, and readiness measures
that enhance the ability of the United States Government to mobilize for,
respond to, and recover from a national security emergency.
(b) This Order does not apply to those natural disasters, technological
emergencies, or other emergencies, the alleviation which is normally the
responsibility of individuals, the private sector, volunteer organizations, State
and local governments, and Federal departments and agencies unless such
situations also constitute a national security emergency.
(c) This Order does not require the provision of information concerning, or
evaluation of, military policies, plans, programs, or states of military
readiness.
(d) This Order does not apply to national security emergency preparedness
telecommunications functions and responsibilities that are otherwise assigned
by Executive Order 12472.

Section 104. Management of National Security Emergency Preparedness.
(a) The National Security Council is the principal forum for consideration of
national security emergency preparedness policy.
(b) The National Security Council shall arrange for Executive branch liaison
with, and assistance to, the Congress and the Federal judiciary on national
security emergency preparedness matters.
(c) The Director of the Federal Emergency Management Agency shall serve as an
advisor to the National Security Council on issues of national security
emergency preparedness, including mobilization preparedness, civil defense,
continuity of government, technological disasters, and other issues, as
appropriate. Pursuant to such procedures for the organization and

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management of the National Security Council process as the President may
establish, the Director of the Federal Emergency Management Agency also
shall assist in the implementation of and management of national security
emergency preparedness policy by coordinating with the other Federal
departments and agencies and with State and local governments, and by
providing periodic reports to the National Security Council on implementation
of national security emergency preparedness policy.
(d) National security emergency preparedness functions that are shared by more
than one agency shall be coordinated by the head of the Federal department or
agency having primary responsibility and shall be supported by the heads of
other departments and agencies having related responsibilities.
(e) There shall be a national security emergency exercise program that shall be
supported by the heads of all appropriate Federal departments and agencies.
(f) Plans and procedures will be designed and developed to provide maximum
flexibility to the President for his implementation of emergency actions.

Section 105. Interagency Coordination.
(a) All appropriate Cabinet members and agency heads shall be consulted
regarding national security emergency preparedness programs and policy
issues. Each department and agency shall support interagency coordination to
improve preparedness and response to a national security emergency and shall
develop and maintain decentralized capabilities wherever feasible and
appropriate.
(b) Each Federal department and agency shall work within the framework
established by, and cooperate with those organizations assigned responsibility
in, Executive Order 12472, to ensure adequate national security emergency
preparedness telecommunications in support of the functions and activities
addressed by this Order.

PART 2 – GENERAL PROVISIONS

Section 201. General.
The head of each Federal department and agency, as appropriate, shall:
(1) Be prepared to respond adequately to all national security emergencies, including
those that are international in scope, and those that may occur within any region of
the Nation;
(2) Consider national security emergency preparedness factors in the conduct of his
or her regular functions, particularly those functions essential in times of emergency.
Emergency plans and programs, and an appropriate state of readiness, including
organizational infrastructure, shall be developed as an integral part of the continuing
activities of each Federal department and agency.
(3) Appoint a senior policy official as Emergency Coordinator, responsible for
developing and maintaining a multi-year, national security emergency preparedness
plan for the department or agency to include objectives, programs, and budgetary

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requirements.
(4) Design preparedness measures to permit a rapid and effective transition from
routine to emergency operations, and to make effective use of the period following
initial indication of a probable national security emergency. This will include:

(a) Development of a system of emergency actions that defines alternatives,
processes, and issues to be considered during various states of national
security emergencies;
(b) Identification of actions that could be taken in the early stages of a national
security emergency or pending national security emergency to mitigate the
impact of or reduce significantly the lead times associated with full
emergency action implementation;

(5) Base national security emergency preparedness measures on the use of existing
authorities, organizations, resources, and systems to the maximum extent practicable;
(6) Identify areas where additional legal authorities may be needed to assist
management and, consistent with applicable Executive orders, take appropriate
measures toward acquiring those authorities.
(7) Make policy recommendations to the National Security Council regarding
national security emergency preparedness activities and functions of the Federal
government;
(8) Coordinate with State and local government agencies and other organizations,
including private sector organizations, when appropriate. Federal plans should
include appropriate involvement of and reliance upon private sector organizations in
the response to national security emergencies;
(9) Assist State, local, and private sector entities in developing plans for mitigating
the effects of national security emergencies and for providing services that are
essential to a national response;
(10) Cooperate, to the extent appropriate, in compiling, evaluating, and exchanging
relevant data related to all aspects of national security emergency preparedness;
(11) Develop programs regarding congressional relations and public information that
could be used during national security emergencies;
(12) Ensure a capability to provide, during a national security emergency,
information concerning Acts of Congress, presidential proclamations, Executive
orders, regulations, and notices of other actions to the Archivist of the United States,
for publication in the Federal Register, or to each agency designated to maintain the
Federal Register in an emergency;
(13) Develop and conduct training and education programs that incorporate
emergency preparedness and civil defense information necessary to ensure an
effective national response;
(14) Ensure that plans consider the consequences for essential services provided by
State and local governments, and by the private sector, if the flow of Federal funds is
disrupted;
(15) Consult and coordinate with the Director of the Federal Emergency

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Management Agency to ensure that those activities and plans are consistent with
National Security guidelines and policies.

Section 202. Continuity of Government. The head of each Federal department and
agency shall ensure the continuity of essential functions in any national security
emergency by providing for: succession to office and emergency delegation of
authority in accordance with applicable law; safekeeping of essential resources,
facilities, and records; and establishment of emergency operating capabilities.

Section 203. Resource Management. The head of each Federal department and
agency, as appropriate within assigned areas of responsibility, shall:
(1) Develop plans and programs to mobilize personnel (including reservist
programs), equipment, facilities, and other resources;
(2) Assess essential emergency requirements and plan for the possible use of
alternative resources to meet essential demands during and following national
security emergencies;
(3) Prepare plans and procedures to share between and among the responsible
agencies resources such as energy, equipment, food, land, materials, minerals,
services, supplies, transportation, water, and workforce needed to carry out assigned
responsibilities and other essential functions, and cooperate with other agencies in
developing programs to ensure availability of such resources in a national security
emergency;
(4) Develop plans to set priorities and allocate resources among civilian and military
claimants;
(5) Identify occupations and skills for which there may be a critical need in the event
of a national security emergency.

Section 204. Protection of Essential Resources and Facilities. The head of each
Federal department and agency, within assigned areas of responsibility, shall:
(1) Identify facilities and resources, both government and private, essential to the
national defense and national welfare, and assess their vulnerabilities and develop
strategies, plans, and programs to provide for the security of such facilities and
resources, and to avoid or minimize disruptions of essential services during any
national security emergency;
(2) Participate in interagency activities to assess the relative importance of various
facilities and resources to essential military and civilian needs and to integrate
preparedness and response strategies and procedures;
(3) Maintain a capability to assess promptly the effect of attack and other disruptions
during national security emergencies.

Section 205. Federal Benefit, Insurance, and Loan Programs. The head of each
Federal department and agency that administers a loan, insurance, or benefit program
that relies upon the Federal government payment system shall coordinate with the
Secretary of the Treasury in developing plans for the continuation or restoration, to

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the extent feasible, of such programs in national security emergencies.

Section 206. Research. The Director of the Office of Science and Technology and
the heads of Federal departments and agencies having significant research and
development programs shall advise the National Security Council of scientific and
technological developments that should be considered in national security emergency
preparedness planning.

Section 207. Redelegation. The head of each Federal department and agency is
hereby authorized, to the extent otherwise permitted by law, to redelegate the
functions assigned by this Order, and to authorize successive redelegations to
organizations, officers, or employees within that department or agency.

Section 208. Transfer of Functions. Recommendations for interagency transfer of
any emergency preparedness function assigned under this Order or for assignment of
any new emergency preparedness function shall be coordinated with all affected
Federal departments and agencies before submission to the National Security
Council.

Section 209. Retention of Existing Authority. Nothing in this Order shall be deemed
to derogate from assignments of functions to any Federal department or agency or
officer thereof made by law.

PART 3 – DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE

Section 301. Lead Responsibilities. In addition to the applicable responsibilities
covered in Parts 1 and 2, the Secretary of Agriculture shall:
(1) Develop plans to provide for the continuation of agricultural production, food
processing, storage, and distribution through the wholesale level in national security
emergencies, and to provide for the domestic distribution of seed, feed, fertilizer, and
farm equipment to agricultural producers;
(2) Develop plans to provide food and agricultural products to meet international
responsibilities in national security emergencies;
(3) Develop plans and procedures for administration and use of Commodity Credit
Corporation inventories of food and fiber resources in national security emergencies;
(4) Develop plans for the use of resources under the jurisdiction of the Secretary of
Agriculture and, in cooperation with the Secretaries of Commerce, Defense, and the
Interior, the Board of Directors of the Tennessee Valley Authority, and the heads of
other government entities, plan for the national security emergency management,
production, and processing of forest products;
(5) Develop, in coordination with the Secretary of Defense, plans and programs for
water to be used in agricultural production and food processing in national security
emergencies;
(6) In cooperation with Federal, State, and local agencies, develop plans for a

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national program relating to the prevention and control of fires in rural areas of the
United States caused by the effects of enemy attack or other national security
emergencies;
(7) Develop plans to help provide the Nation’s farmers with production resources,
including national security emergency financing capabilities;
(8) Develop plans, in consonance with those of the Department of Health and Human
Services, the Department of the Interior, and the Environmental Protection Agency,
for national security emergency agricultural health services and forestry, including:

(a) Diagnosis and control or eradication of diseases, pests, or hazardous agents
(biological, chemical, or radiological) against animals, crops, timber, or
products thereof;
(b) Protection, treatment, and handling of livestock and poultry, or products
thereof, that have been exposed to or affected by hazardous agents;
(c) Use and handling of crops, agricultural commodities, timber, and agricultural
lands that have been exposed to or affected by hazardous agents; and
(d) Assuring the safety and wholesomeness, and minimizing losses from hazards,
of animals and animal products and agricultural commodities and products
subject to continuous inspection by the Department of Agriculture or owned
by the Commodity Credit Corporation or by the Department of Agriculture;

(9) In consultation with the Secretary of State and the Director of the Federal
Emergency Management Agency, represent the United States in agriculture-related
international civil emergency preparedness planning and related activities.

Section 302. Support Responsibility. The Secretary of Agriculture shall assist the
Secretary of Defense in formulating and carrying out plans for stockpiling strategic
and critical agricultural materials.

PART 4 – DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE

Section 401. Lead Responsibilities. In addition to the applicable responsibilities
covered in Parts 1 and 2, the Secretary of Commerce shall:
(1) Develop control systems for priorities, allocation, production, and distribution of
materials and other resources that will be available to support both national defense
and essential civilian programs in a national security emergency;
(2) In cooperation with the Secretary of Defense and other departments and agencies,
identify those industrial products and facilities that are essential to mobilization
readiness, national defense, or post-attack survival and recovery;
(3) In cooperation with the Secretary of Defense and other Federal departments and
agencies, analyze potential effects of national security emergencies on actual
production capability, taking into account the entire production complex, including
shortages of resources, and develop preparedness measures to strengthen capabilities
for production increases in national security emergencies;

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(4) In cooperation with the Secretary of Defense, perform industry analyses to assess
capabilities of the commercial industrial base to support the national defense, and
develop policy alternatives to improve the international competitiveness of specific
domestic industries and their abilities to meet defense program needs;
(5) In cooperation with the Secretary of the Treasury, develop plans for providing
emergency assistance to the private sector through direct or participation loans for
the financing of production facilities and equipment;
(6) In cooperation with the Secretaries of State, Defense, Transportation, and the
Treasury, prepare plans to regulate and control exports and imports in national
security emergencies;
(7) Provide for the collection and reporting of census information on human and
economic resources, and maintain a capability to conduct emergency surveys to
provide information on the status of these resources as required for national security
purposes;
(8) Develop overall plans and programs to ensure that the fishing industry continues
to produce and process essential protein in national security emergencies;
(9) Develop plans to provide meteorological, hydrologic, marine weather, geodetic,
hydrographic, climatic, seismic, and oceanographic data and services to Federal,
State, and local agencies, as appropriate;
(10) In coordination with the Secretary of State and the Director of the Federal
Emergency Management Agency, represent the United States in industry-related
international (NATO and allied) civil emergency preparedness planning and related
activities.

Section 402. Support Responsibilities. The Secretary of Commerce shall:
(1) Assist the Secretary of Defense in formulating and carrying out plans for
stockpiling strategic and critical materials;
(2) Support the Secretary of Agriculture in planning for the national security
management, production, and processing of forest and fishery products;
(3) Assist, in consultation with the Secretaries of State and Defense, the Secretary of
the Treasury in the formulation and execution of economic measures affecting other
nations.

PART 5 – DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

Section 501. Lead Responsibilities. In addition to the applicable responsibilities
covered in Parts 1 and 2, the Secretary of Defense shall:
(1) Ensure military preparedness and readiness to respond to national security
emergencies;
(2) In coordination with the Secretary of Commerce, develop, with industry,
government, and the private sector, reliable capabilities for the rapid increase of
defense production to include industrial resources required for that production;
(3) Develop and maintain, in cooperation with the heads of other departments and
agencies, national security emergency plans, programs and mechanisms to ensure

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effective mutual support between and among the military, civil government, and the
private sector;
(4) Develop and maintain damage assessment capabilities and assist the Director of
the Federal Emergency Management Agency and the heads of other departments and
agencies in developing and maintaining capabilities to assess attack damage and to
estimate the effects of potential attack on the Nation;
(5) Arrange, through agreements with the heads of other Federal departments and
agencies, for the transfer of certain Federal resources to the jurisdiction and/or
operation control of the Department of Defense in national security emergencies;
(6) Acting through the Secretary of the Army, develop, with the concurrence of the
heads of all affected departments and agencies, overall plans for the management,
control, and allocation of all usable waters from all sources within the jurisdiction of
the United States. This includes:

(a) Coordination of national security emergency water resource planning at the
national, regional, State, and local levels;
(b) Development of plans to assure emergency provision of water from public works
projects under the jurisdiction of the Secretary of the Army to public water supply
utilities and critical defense production facilities during national security
emergencies;
(c) Development of plans to assure emergency operation of waterways and harbors;
and
(d) Development of plans to assure the provision of potable water;

(7) In consultation with the Secretaries of State and Energy, the Director of the
Federal Emergency Management Agency, and others, as required, develop plans and
capabilities for identifying, analyzing, mitigating, and responding to hazards related
to nuclear weapons, materials, and devices; and maintain liaison, as appropriate, with
the Secretary of Energy and the Members of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission to
ensure the continuity of nuclear weapons production and the appropriate allocation
of scarce resources, including the recapture of special nuclear materials from Nuclear
Regulatory Commission licensees when appropriate;
(8) Coordinate with the Administrator of the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration and the Secretary of Energy, as appropriate, to prepare for the use,
maintenance, and development of technologically advanced aerospace and
aeronautical-related systems, equipment, and methodologies applicable to national
security emergencies;
(9) Develop, in coordination with the Secretary of Labor, the Directors of the
Selective Service System, the Office of Personnel Management, and the Federal
Emergency Management Agency, plans and systems to ensure that the Nation’s
human resources are available to meet essential military and civilian needs in
national security emergencies;
(10) Develop national security emergency operational procedures, and coordinate
with the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development with respect to residential

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property, for the control, acquisition, leasing, assignment and priority of occupancy
of real property with the jurisdiction of the Department of Defense;
(11) Review the priorities and allocations systems developed by other departments
and agencies to ensure that they meet Department of Defense needs in a national
security emergency; and develop and maintain the Department of Defense programs
necessary for effective utilization of all priorities and allocations systems;
(12) Develop, in coordination with the Attorney General of the Untied States,
specific procedures by which military assistance to civilian law enforcement
authorities may be requested, considered, and provided;
(13) In cooperation with the Secretary of Commerce and other departments and
agencies, identify those industrial products and facilities that are essential to
mobilization readiness, national defense, or post-attack survival and recovery;
(14) In cooperation with the Secretary of Commerce and other Federal departments
and agencies, analyze potential effects of national security emergencies on actual
production capability, taking into account the entire production complex, including
shortages of resources, and develop preparedness measures to strengthen capabilities
for production increases in national security emergencies;
(15) With the assistance of the heads of other Federal departments and agencies,
provide management direction for the stockpiling of strategic and critical materials,
conduct storage, maintenance, and quality assurance operations for the stockpile of
strategic and critical materials, and reports relating to the stockpiling of strategic and
critical materials.

Section 502. Support Responsibilities. The Secretary of Defense shall:
(1) Advise and assist the heads of other Federal departments and agencies in the
development of plans and programs to support national mobilization. This includes
providing, as appropriate:

(a) Military requirements, prioritized and time-phased to the extent possible, for
selected end-items and supporting services, materials, and components;
(b) Recommendations for use of financial incentives and other methods to
improve defense production as provided by law; and
(c) Recommendations for export and import policies;

(2) Advise and assist the Secretary of State and the heads of other Federal
departments and agencies, as appropriate, in planning for the protection, evacuation,
and repatriation of United States citizens in threatened areas overseas;
(3) Support the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development and the heads of other
agencies, as appropriate, in the development of plans to restore community facilities;
(4) Support the Secretary of Energy in international liaison activities pertaining to
nuclear materials facilities;
(5) In consultation with the Secretaries of State and Commerce, assist the Secretary
of the Treasury in the formulation and execution of economic measures that affect
other nations;

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(6) Support the Secretary of State and the heads of other Federal departments and
agencies as appropriate in the formulation and implementation of foreign policy, and
the negotiation of contingency and post-emergency plans, intergovernmental
agreements, and arrangements with allies and friendly nations, which affect national
security;
(7) Coordinate with the Director of the Federal Emergency Management Agency the
development of plans for mutual civil-military support during national security
emergencies;
(8) Develop plans to support the Secretary of Labor in providing education and
training to overcome shortages of critical skills.

PART 6 – DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION

Section 601. Lead Responsibilities. In addition to the applicable responsibilities
covered in Parts 1 and 2, the Secretary of Education shall:
(1) Assist school systems in developing their plans to provide for the earliest possible
resumption of activities following national security emergencies;
(2) Develop plans to provide assistance, including efforts to meet shortages of
critical educational personnel, to local educational agencies;
(3) Develop plans, in coordination with the Director of the Federal Emergency
Management Agency, for dissemination of emergency preparedness instructional
materials through educational institutions and the media during national security
emergencies.

Section 602. Support Responsibilities. The Secretary of Education shall:
(1) Develop plans to support the Secretary of Labor in providing education and
training to overcome shortages of critical skills;
(2) Support the Secretary of Health and Human Services in the development of
human services educational and training materials, including self-help program
materials for use by human service organizations and professional schools.

PART 7 – DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

Section 701. Lead Responsibilities. In addition to the applicable responsibilities
covered in Parts 1 and 2, the Secretary of Energy shall:
(1) Conduct national security emergency preparedness planning, including
capabilities development, and administer operational programs for all energy
resources, including:

(a) Providing information, in cooperation with Federal, State, and energy
industry officials, on energy supply and demand conditions and on the
requirements for and the availability of materials and services critical to
energy supply systems;
(b) In coordination with appropriate departments and agencies and in

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consultation with the energy industry, develop implementation plans and
operational systems for priorities and allocation of all energy resource
requirements for national defense and essential civilian needs to assure
national security emergency preparedness;
(c) Developing, in consultation with the Board of Directors of the Tennessee
Valley Authority, plans necessary for the integration of its power system into
the national supply system;

(2) Identify energy facilities essential to their mobilization, deployment, and
sustainment of resources to support the national security and national welfare and
develop energy supply and demand strategies to ensure continued provision of
minimum essential services in national security emergencies;
(3) In coordination with the Secretary of Defense, ensure continuity of nuclear
weapons production consistent with national security requirements;
(4) Assure the security of nuclear materials, nuclear weapons, or devices in the
custody of the Department of Energy, as well as the security of all other Department
of Energy programs and facilities;
(5) In consultation with the Secretaries of State and Defense and the Director of the
Federal Emergency Management Agency, conduct appropriate international liaison
activities pertaining to matters within the jurisdiction of the Department of Energy;
(6) In consultation with the Secretaries of State and Defense, the Director of the
Federal Emergency Management Agency, the Members of the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission, and others, as required, develop plans and capabilities for
identification, analysis, damage assessment, and mitigation of hazards from nuclear
weapons, materials, and devices;
(7) Coordinate with the Secretary of Transportation in the planning and management
of transportation resources involved in the bulk movement of energy;
(8) At the request of or with the concurrence of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission
and in consultation with the Secretary of Defense, recapture special nuclear materials
from Nuclear Regulatory Commission licensees where necessary to assure the use,
preservation, or safeguarding of such material for the common defense and security;
(9) Develop national security emergency operational procedures for the control,
utilization, acquisition, leasing, assignment, and priority of occupancy of real
property within the jurisdiction of the Department of Energy;
(10) Manage all emergency planning and response activities pertaining to
Department of Energy nuclear facilities.

Section 702. Support Responsibilities. The Secretary of Energy shall:
(1) Provide advice and assistance, in coordination with appropriate agencies, to
Federal, State, and local officials and private sector organizations to assess the
radiological impact associated with national security emergencies;
(2) Coordinate with the Secretaries of Defense and the Interior regarding the
operation of hydroelectric projects to assure maximum energy output;
(3) Support the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development and the heads of other

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agencies, as appropriate, in the development of plans to restore community facilities;
(4) Coordinate with the Secretary of Agriculture regarding the emergency
preparedness of the rural electric supply systems throughout the Nation and the
assignment of emergency preparedness responsibilities to the Rural Electrification
Administration.

PART 8 – DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES

Section 801. Lead Responsibilities. In addition to the applicable responsibilities
covered in Parts 1 and 2, the Secretary of Health and Human Services shall:
(1) Develop national plans and programs to mobilize the health industry and health
resources for the provision of health, mental health, and medical services in national
security emergencies;
(2) Promote the development of State and local plans and programs for provision of
health, mental health, and medical services in national security emergencies;
(3) Develop national plans to set priorities and allocate health, mental health, and
medical services resources among civilian and military claimants;
(4) Develop health and medical survival information programs and a nationwide
program to train health and mental health professionals and paraprofessionals in
special knowledge and skills that would be useful in national security emergencies;
(5) Develop programs to reduce or eliminate adverse health and mental health effects
produced by hazardous agents (biological, chemical, or radiological), and, in
coordination with appropriate Federal agencies, develop programs to minimize
property and environmental damage associated with national security emergencies;
(6) Develop guidelines that will assure reasonable and prudent standards of purity
and/or safety in the manufacture and distribution of food, drugs, biological products,
medical devices, food additives, and radiological products in national security
emergencies;
(7) Develop national plans for assisting State and local governments in rehabilitation
of persons injured or disabled during national security emergencies;
(8) Develop plans and procedures to assist State and local governments in the
provision of emergency human services, including lodging, feeding, clothing,
registration and inquiry, social services, family reunification and mortuary services
and internment;
(9) Develop, in coordination with the Secretary of Education, human services
educational and training materials for use by human service organizations and
professional schools; and develop and distribute, in coordination with the Director of
the Federal Emergency Management Agency, civil defense information relative to
emergency human services;
(10) Develop plans and procedures, in coordination with the heads of Federal
departments and agencies, for assistance to United States citizens or others evacuated
from overseas areas.

Section 802. Support Responsibility. The Secretary of Health and Human Services

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shall support the Secretary of Agriculture in the development of plans related to
national security emergency agricultural health services.

PART 9 – DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT

Section 901. Lead Responsibilities. In addition to the applicable responsibilities
covered in Parts 1 and 2, the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development shall:
(1) Develop plans for provision and management of housing in national security
emergencies, including:

(a) Providing temporary housing using Federal financing and other arrangements;
(b) Providing for radiation protection by encouraging voluntary construction of
shelters and voluntary use of cost-efficient design and construction techniques
to maximize population protection;

(2) Develop plans, in cooperation with the heads of other Federal departments and
agencies and State and local governments, to restore community facilities, including
electrical power, potable water, and sewage disposal facilities, damaged in national
security emergencies.

PART 10 – DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR

Section 1001. Lead Responsibilities. In addition to the applicable responsibilities
covered in Parts 1 and 2, the Secretary of the Interior shall:
(1) Develop programs and encourage the exploration, development, and mining of
strategic and critical and other nonfuel minerals for national security emergency
purposes;
(2) Provide guidance to mining industries in the development of plans and programs
to ensure continuity of production during national security emergencies;
(3) Develop and implement plans for the management, control, allocation, and use of
public land under the jurisdiction of the Department of the Interior in national
security emergencies and coordinate land emergency planning at the Federal, State,
and local levels.

Section 1002. Support Responsibilities. The Secretary of the Interior shall:
(1) Assist the Secretary of Defense in formulating and carrying out plans for
stockpiling strategic and critical minerals;
(2) Cooperate with the Secretary of Commerce in the identification and evaluation of
facilities essential for national security emergencies;
(3) Support the Secretary of Agriculture in planning for the national security
management, production, and processing of forest products.

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PART 11 – DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

Section 1101. Lead Responsibilities. In addition to the applicable responsibilities
covered in Parts 1 and 2, the Attorney General of the United States shall:
(1) Provide legal advice to the President and the heads of Federal departments and
agencies and their successors regarding national security emergency powers, plans,
and authorities;
(2) Coordinate Federal Government domestic law enforcement activities related to
national security emergency preparedness, including Federal law enforcement liaison
with, and assistance to, State and local governments;
(3) Coordinate contingency planning for national security emergency law
enforcement activities that are beyond the capabilities of State and local agencies;
(4) Develop national security emergency plans for regulation of immigration,
regulation of nationals of enemy countries, and plans to implement laws for the
control of persons entering or leaving the United States;
(5) Develop plans and procedures for the custody and protection of prisoners and the
use of Federal penal and correctional institutions and resources during national
security emergencies;
(6) Provide information and assistance to the Federal Judicial branch and the Federal
Legislative branch concerning law enforcement, continuity of government, and the
exercise of legal authority during national security emergencies;
(7) Develop intergovernmental and interagency law enforcement plans and
counterterrorism programs to interdict and respond to terrorism incidents in the
United States that may result in national security emergency or that occur during
such an emergency;
(8) Develop intergovernmental and interagency law enforcement plans to respond to
civil disturbances that may result in a national security emergency or that occur
during such an emergency.

Section 1102. Support Responsibilities. The Attorney General of the United States
shall:
(1) Assist the heads of Federal departments and agencies, State and local
governments, and the private sector in the development of plans to physically protect
essential resources and facilities;
(2) Support the Secretaries of State and the Treasury in plans for the protection of
international organizations and foreign diplomatic, consular, and other official
personnel, property, and other assets within the jurisdiction of the United States;
(3) Support the Secretary of the Treasury in developing plans to control the
movement of property entering and leaving the United States;
(4) Support the heads of other Federal departments and agencies and State and local
governments in developing programs and plans for identifying fatalities and
reuniting families in national security emergencies;
(5) Support the intelligence community in the planning of its counterintelligence and
counterterrorism programs.

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PART 12 – DEPARTMENT OF LABOR

Section 1201. Lead Responsibilities. In addition to the applicable responsibilities
covered in Parts 1 and 2, the Secretary of Labor shall:
(1) Develop plans and issue guidance to ensure effective use of civilian workforce
resources during national security emergencies. Such plans shall include, but not
necessarily be limited to:

(a) Priorities and allocations, recruitment, referral, training, employment
stabilization including appeals procedures, use assessment, and determination
of critical skill categories; and
(b) Programs for increasing the availability of critical workforce skills and
occupations;

(2) In consultation with the Secretary of the Treasury, develop plans and procedures
for wage, salary, and benefit costs stabilization during national security emergencies;
(3) Develop plans and procedures for protecting and providing incentives for the
civilian labor force during national security emergencies;
(4) In consultation with other appropriate government agencies and private entities,
develop plans and procedures for effective labor-management relations during
national security emergencies.

Section 1202. Support Responsibilities. The Secretary of Labor shall:
(1) Support planning by the Secretary of Defense and the private sector for the
provision of human resources to critical defense industries during national security
emergencies;
(2) Support planning by the Secretary of Defense and the Director of Selective
Service for the institution of conscription in national security emergencies.

PART 13 – DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Section 1301. Lead Responsibilities. In addition to the applicable responsibilities
covered in Parts 1 and 2, the Secretary of State shall:
(1) Provide overall foreign policy coordination in the formulation and execution of
continuity of government and other national security emergency preparedness
activities that affect foreign relations;
(2) Prepare to carry out Department of State responsibilities in the conduct of the
foreign relations of the United States during national security emergencies, under the
direction of the President and in consultation with the heads of other appropriate
Federal departments and agencies, including, but not limited to:

(a) Formulation and implementation of foreign policy and negotiation regarding
contingency and post-emergency plans, intergovernmental agreements, and
arrangements with United States’ allies;

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(b) Formulation, negotiation, and execution of policy affecting the relationships
of the United States with neutral states;
(c) Formulation and execution of political strategy toward hostile or enemy
states;
(d) Conduct of mutual assistance activities;
(e) Provision of foreign assistance, including continuous supervision and general
direction of authorized economic and military assistance programs;
(f) Protection or evacuation of United States citizens and nationals abroad and
safeguarding their property abroad, in consultation with the Secretaries of
Defense and Health and Human Services;
(g) Protection of international organizations and foreign diplomatic, consular, and
other official personnel and property, or other assets, in the United States, in
coordination with the Attorney General and the Secretary of the Treasury;
(h) Formulation of policies and provisions for assistance to displaced persons and
refugees abroad;
(i) Maintenance of diplomatic and consular representation abroad; and
(j) Reporting of and advising on conditions overseas that bear upon national
security emergencies.

Section 1302. Support Responsibilities. The Secretary of State shall:
(1) Assist appropriate agencies in developing planning assumptions concerning
accessibility of foreign sources of supply;
(2) Support the Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation, as appropriate, with the
Secretaries of Commerce and Defense, in the formulation and execution of economic
measures with respect to other nations;
(3) Support the Secretary of Energy in international liaison activities pertaining to
nuclear materials facilities;
(4) Support the Director of the Federal Emergency Management Agency in the
coordination and integration of United States policy regarding the formulation and
implementation of civil emergency resources and preparedness planning;
(5) Assist the Attorney General of the United States in the formulation of national
security emergency plans for the control of persons entering or leaving the United
States.

PART 14 – DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Section 1401. Lead Responsibilities. In addition to the applicable responsibilities
covered in Parts 1 and 2, the Secretary of Transportation shall:
(1) Develop plans to promulgate and manage overall national policies, programs,
procedures, and systems to meet essential civil and military transportation needs in
national security emergencies;
(2) Be prepared to provide direction to all modes of civil transportation in national
security emergencies, including air, surface, water, pipelines, and public storage and
warehousing, to the extent such responsibility is vested in the Secretary of

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Transportation. This direction may include:

(a) Implementation of priorities for all transportation resource requirements for
service, equipment, facilities, and systems;
(b) Allocation of transportation resource capacity; and
(c) Emergency management and control of civil transportation resources and
systems, including privately owned automobiles, urban mass transit,
intermodal transportation systems, the National Railroad Passenger
Corporation and the St. Lawrence Seaway Development Corporation;

(3) Develop plans to provide for the smooth transition of the Coast Guard as a
service to the Department of the Navy during national security emergencies. These
plans shall be compatible with the Department of Defense planning systems,
especially in the areas of port security and military readiness;
(4) In coordination with the Secretary of State and the Director of the Federal
Emergency Management Agency, represent the United States in transportation-
related international (including NATO and allied) civil emergency preparedness
planning and related activities;
(5) Coordinate with State and local highway agencies in the management of all
Federal, State, city, local, and other highways, road, streets, bridges, tunnels and
publicly owned highway maintenance equipment to assure efficient and safe use of
road space during national security emergencies;
(6) Develop plans and procedures in consultation with appropriate agency officials
for maritime and port safety, law enforcement, and security over, upon, and under
the high seas and waters subject to the jurisdiction of the United States to assure
operational readiness for national security emergency functions;
(7) Develop plans for the emergency operation of U.S. ports and facilities, use of
shipping resources (U.S. and others), provision of government war risks insurance,
and emergency construction of merchant ships for military and civil use;
(8) Develop plans for emergency management and control of the National Airspace
System, including provision of war risk insurance and for transfer of the Federal
Aviation Administration, in the event of war, to the Department of Defense;
(9) Coordinate the Interstate Commerce Commission’s development of plans and
preparedness programs for the reduction of vulnerability, maintenance, restoration,
and operation of privately owned railroads, motor carriers, inland waterway
transportation systems, and public storage facilities and services in national security
emergencies.

Section 1402. Support Responsibilities. The Secretary of Transportation shall
coordinate with the Secretary of Energy in the planning and management of
transportation resources involved in the bulk movement of energy materials.

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PART 15 – DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY

Section 1501. Lead Responsibilities. In addition to the applicable responsibilities
covered in Parts 1 and 2, the Secretary of the Treasury shall:
(1) Develop plans to maintain stable economic conditions and a market economy
during national security emergencies; emphasize measures to minimize inflation and
disruptions; and, minimize reliance on direct controls of the monetary, credit, and
financial systems. These plans will include provisions for:

(a) Increasing capabilities to minimize economic dislocations by carrying out
appropriate fiscal, monetary, and regulatory policies and reducing
susceptibility to manipulated economic pressures;
(b) Providing the Federal Government with efficient and equitable financing
sources and payment mechanisms;
(c) Providing fiscal authorities with adequate legal authority to meet resource
requirements;
(d) Developing, in consultation with the Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System, and in cooperation with the Board of Directors of the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation, the Federal Home Loan Bank Board, the
National Credit Union Administration Board, the Farm Credit Administration
Board and other financial institutions, plans for the continued or resumed
operation and liquidity of banks, savings and loans, credit unions, and farm
credit institutions, measures for the reestablishment of evidence of assets or
liabilities, and provisions for currency withdrawals and deposit insurance;

(2) Provide for the protection of United States financial resources including currency
and coin production and redemption facilities, Federal check disbursement facilities,
and precious monetary metals;
(3) Provide for the preservation of, and facilitate emergency operations of, public
and private financial institution systems, and provide for their restoration during or
after national security emergencies;
(4) Provide, in coordination with the Secretary of State, for participation in bilateral
and multilateral financial arrangements with foreign governments;
(5) Maintain the Federal Government accounting and financial reporting system in
national security emergencies;
(6) Develop plans to protect the President, the Vice President, other officers in the
order of presidential succession, and other persons designated by the President;
(7) Develop plans for restoration of the economy following an attack; for the
development of emergency monetary, credit, and Federal benefit payment programs
of those Federal departments and agencies that have responsibilities dependent on
the policies or capabilities of the Department of the Treasury; and for the
implementation of national policy on sharing war losses;
(8) Develop plans for initiating tax changes, waiving regulations, and, in conjunction
with the Secretary of Commerce or other guaranteeing agency, granting or

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guaranteeing loans for the expansion of industrial capacity, the development of
technological processes, or the production or acquisition of essential materials;
(9) Develop plans, in coordination with the heads of other appropriate Federal
departments and agencies, to acquire emergency imports, make foreign barter
arrangements, or otherwise provide for essential material from foreign sources using,
as appropriate, the resources of the Export-Import Bank or resources available to the
Bank;
(10) Develop plans for encouraging capital inflow and discouraging the flight of
capital from the United States and, in coordination with the Secretary of State, for
the seizure and administration of assets of enemy aliens during national security
emergencies;
(11) Develop plans, in consultation with the heads of appropriate Federal
departments and agencies, to regulate financial and commercial transactions with
other countries;
(12) Develop plans, in coordination with the Secretary of Commerce and the
Attorney General of the United States, to control the movement of property entering
or leaving the United States;
(13) Cooperate and consult with the Chairman of the Securities and Exchange
Commission, the Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board, and the Chairman of the
Commodities Futures Trading Commission in the development of emergency
financial control plans and regulations for trading of stocks and commodities, and in
the development of plans for the maintenance and restoration of stable and orderly
markets;
(14) Develop plans, in coordination with the Secretary of State, for the formulation
and execution of economic measures with respect to other nations in national
security emergencies.

Section 1502. Support Responsibilities. The Secretary of the Treasury shall:
(1) Cooperate with the Attorney General of the United States on law enforcement
activities, including the control of people entering and leaving the United States;
(2) Support the Secretary of Labor in developing plans and procedures for wage,
salary, and benefit costs stabilization;
(3) Support the Secretary of State in plans for the protection of international
organizations and foreign diplomatic, consular, and other official personnel and
property or other assets in the United States.

PART 16 – ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY

Section 1601. Lead Responsibilities. In addition to the applicable responsibilities
covered in Parts 1 and 2, the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency
shall:
(1) Develop Federal plans and foster development of State and local plans designed
to prevent or minimize the ecological impact of hazardous agents (biological,
chemical, or radiological) introduced into the environment in national security

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emergencies;
(2) Develop, for national security emergencies, guidance on acceptable emergency
levels of nuclear radiation, assist in determining acceptable levels of biological
agents, and help to provide detection and identification of chemical agents;
(3) Develop, in coordination with the Secretary of Defense, plans to assure the
provision of potable water supplies to meet community needs under national security
emergency conditions, including claimancy for materials and equipment for public
water systems.

Section 1602. Support Responsibilities. The Administrator of the Environmental
Protection Agency shall:
(1) Assist the heads of other Federal agencies that are responsible for developing
plans for the detection, reporting, assessment, protection against, and reduction of
effects of hazardous agents introduced into the environment;
(2) Advise the heads of Federal departments and agencies regarding procedures for
assuring compliance with environmental restrictions and for expeditious review of
requests for essential waivers.

PART 17 – FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY

Section 1701. Lead Responsibilities. In addition to the applicable responsibilities
covered in Parts 1 and 2, the Director of the Federal Emergency Management
Agency shall:
(1) Coordinate and support the initiation, development, and implementation of
national security emergency preparedness programs and plans among Federal
departments and agencies;
(2) Coordinate the development and implementation of plans for the operation and
continuity of essential domestic emergency functions of the Federal Government
during national security emergencies;
(3) Coordinate the development of plans, in cooperation with the Secretary of
Defense, for mutual civil-military support during national security emergencies;
(4) Guide and assist State and local governments and private sector organizations in
achieving preparedness for national security emergencies, including the development
of plans and procedures for assuring continuity of government, and support planning
for prompt and coordinated Federal assistance to States and localities in responding
to national security emergencies;
(5) Provide the President a periodic assessment of Federal, State, and local
capabilities to respond to national security emergencies;
(6) Coordinate the implementation of policies and programs for efficient
mobilization of Federal, State, local and private resources in response to national
security emergencies;
(7) Develop and coordinate with all appropriate agencies civil defense programs to
enhance Federal, State, local, and private sector capabilities for national security
emergency crisis management, population protection, and recovery in the event of an

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attack on the United States;
(8) Develop and support public information, education, and training programs to
assist Federal, State, and local government and private sector entities in planning for
and implementing national security emergency preparedness programs;
(9) Coordinate among the heads of Federal, State, and local agencies the planning,
conduct, and evaluation of national security emergency exercises;
(10) With the assistance of the heads of other appropriate Federal departments and
agencies, develop and maintain capabilities to assess actual attack damage and
residual recovery capabilities as well as capabilities to estimate the effects of
potential attacks on the Nation;
(11) Provide guidance to the heads of Federal departments and agencies on the
appropriate use of defense production authorities, including resource claimancy, in
order to improve the capability of industry and infrastructure systems to meet
national security emergency needs;
(12) Assist the Secretary of State in coordinating the formulation and implementation
of United States policy for NATO and other allied civil emergency planning,
including the provision of:

(a) advice and assistance to the departments and agencies in alliance with civil
emergency planning matters;
(b) support to the United States mission to NATO in the conduct of day-to-day
civil emergency planning activities; and
(c) support facilities for NATO Civil Wartime Agencies in cooperation with the
Departments of Agriculture, Commerce, Energy, State, and Transportation.

Section 1702. Support Responsibilities. The Director of the Federal Emergency
Management Agency shall:
(1) Support the heads of other Federal departments and agencies in preparing plans
and programs to discharge their national security emergency preparedness
responsibilities, including, but not limited to, such programs as mobilization
preparedness, continuity of government planning, and continuance of industry and
infrastructure functions essential to national security;
(2) Support the Secretary of Energy, the Secretary of Defense, and the Members of
the Nuclear Regulatory Commission in developing, analyzing, mitigating, and
responding to emergencies related to nuclear weapons, materials, and devices,
including mobile and fixed nuclear facilities, by providing inter alia, off-site
coordination;
(3) Support the Administration of General Services in efforts to promote a
government-wide program with respect to Federal buildings and installations to
minimize the effects of attack and establish shelter management organizations.

PART 18 – GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION

Section 1801. Lead Responsibilities. In addition to the applicable responsibilities

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covered in Parts 1 and 2, the Administrator of General Services shall:
(1) Develop national security emergency plans and procedures for the operation,
maintenance, and protection of federally owned and occupied buildings managed by
the General Services Administration, and for the construction, alteration, and repair
of such buildings;
(2) Develop national security emergency operating procedures for the control,
acquisition, leasing, assignment, and priority of occupancy of real property by the
Federal Government, and by State and local governments acting as agents of the
Federal Government, except for the military facilities and facilities with special
nuclear materials within the jurisdiction of the Department of Defense and Energy;
(3) Develop national security emergency operational plans and procedures for the
use of public utility services (other than telecommunications services) by Federal
departments and agencies, except for Department of Energy-operated facilities;
(4) Develop plans and operating procedures of government-wide supply programs to
meet the requirements of Federal departments and agencies during national security
emergencies;
(5) Develop plans and operating procedures for the use, in national security
emergencies, of excess and surplus real and personal property by Federal, State, and
local governmental entities;
(6) Develop plans, in coordination with the Director of the Federal Emergency
Management Agency, with respect to Federal buildings and installations, to
minimize the effects of attack and establish shelter management organizations.

Section 1802. Support Responsibility. The Administrator of General Services shall
develop plans to assist Federal departments and agencies in operation and
maintenance of essential automated information processing facilities during national
security emergencies.

PART 19 – NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION

Section 1901. Lead Responsibility. In addition to the applicable responsibilities
covered in Parts 1 and 2, the Administrator of the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration shall coordinate with the Secretary of Defense to prepare for the use,
maintenance, and development of technologically advanced aerospace and
aeronautical-related systems, equipment, and methodologies applicable to national
security emergencies.

PART 20 – NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION

Section 2001. Lead Responsibilities. In addition to the applicable responsibilities
covered in Parts 1 and 2, the Archivist of the United States shall:
(1) Develop procedures for publication during national security emergencies of the
Federal Register for as broad public dissemination as is practicable of presidential
proclamations and Executive orders, Federal administrative regulations, Federal

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emergency notices and actions, and Acts of Congress;
(2) Develop emergency procedures for providing instructions and advice on the
handling and preservation of records critical to the operation of the Federal
Government in national security emergencies.

PART 21 – NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

Section 2101. Lead Responsibilities. In addition to the applicable responsibilities
covered in Parts 1 and 2, the Members of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission shall:
(1) Promote the development and maintenance of national security emergency
preparedness programs through security and safeguards programs by licensed
facilities and activities;
(2) Develop plans to suspend any licenses granted by the Commission; to order the
operations of any facility licensed under Section 103 or 104; Atomic Energy Act of
1954, as amended (42 U.S.C. 2133 or 2134); to order the entry into any plant
or facility in order to recapture special nuclear material as determined under
Subsection (3) below; and operate such facilities;
(3) Recapture or authorize recapture of special nuclear materials from licensees
where necessary to assure the use, preservation, or safeguarding of such materials for
the common defense and security, as determined by the Commission or as requested
by the Secretary of Energy.

Section 2102. Support Responsibilities. The Members of the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission shall:
(1) Assist the Secretary of Energy in assessing damage to Commission-licensed
facilities, identifying useable facilities, and estimating the time and actions necessary
to restart inoperative facilities;
(2) Provide advice and technical assistance to Federal, State, and local officials and
private sector organizations regarding radiation hazards and protective actions in
national security emergencies.

PART 22 – OFFICE OF PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT

Section 2201. Lead Responsibilities. In addition to the applicable responsibilities
covered in Parts 1 and 2, the Director of the Office of Personnel Management shall:
(1) Prepare plans to administer the Federal civilian personnel system in national
security emergencies, including plans and procedures for the rapid mobilization and
reduction of an emergency Federal workforce;
(2) Develop national security emergency workforce policies for Federal civilian
personnel;
(3) Develop plans to accommodate the surge of Federal personnel security
background and pre-employment investigations during national security
emergencies.

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Section 2202. Support Responsibilities. The Director of the Office of Personnel
Management shall:
(1) Assist the heads of other Federal departments and agencies with personnel
management and staffing in national security emergencies, including facilitating
transfers between agencies of employees with critical skills;
(2) In consultation with the Secretary of Defense and the Director of the Selective
Service, develop plans and procedures for a system to control any conscription of
Federal civilian employees during national security emergencies.

PART 23 – SELECTIVE SERVICE SYSTEM

Section 2301. Lead Responsibilities. In addition to the applicable responsibilities
covered in Parts 1 and 2, the Director of Selective Service shall:
(1) Develop plans to provide by induction, as authorized by law, personnel that
would be required by the armed forces during national security emergencies;
(2) Develop plans for implementing an alternative service program.

PART 24 – TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

Section 2401. Lead Responsibility. In addition to the applicable responsibilities
covered in Parts 1 and 2, the Board of Directors of the Tennessee Valley Authority
shall develop plans and maintain river control operations for the prevention or
control of floods affecting the Tennessee River System during national security
emergencies;

Section 2402. Support Responsibilities. The Board of Directors of the Tennessee
Valley Authority shall:
(1) Assist the Secretary of Energy in the development of plans for the integration of
the Tennessee Valley Authority power system into nationwide national security
emergency programs;
(2) Assist the Secretaries of Defense, Interior, and Transportation and the Chairman
of the Interstate Commerce Commission in the development of plans for operation
and maintenance of inland waterway transportation in the Tennessee River System
during national security emergencies.

PART 25 – UNITED STATES INFORMATION AGENCY

Section 2501. Lead Responsibilities. In addition to the applicable responsibilities
covered in Parts 1 and 2, the Director of the United States Information Agency shall:
(1) Plan for the implementation of information programs to promote an
understanding abroad of the status of national security emergencies within the United
States;
(2) In coordination with the Secretary of State’s exercise of telecommunications
functions affecting United States diplomatic missions and consular offices overseas,

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maintain the capability to provide television and simultaneous direct radio
broadcasting in major languages to all areas of the world, and the capability to
provide wireless file to all United States embassies during national security
emergencies.

PART 26 – UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE

Section 2601. Lead Responsibility. In addition to the applicable responsibilities
covered in Parts 1 and 2, the Postmaster General shall prepare plans and programs to
provide essential postal services during national security emergencies.

Section 2602. Support Responsibilities. The Postmaster General shall:
(1) Develop plans to assist the Attorney General of the United States in the
registration of nationals of enemy countries residing in the United States;
(2) Develop plans to assist the Secretary of Health and Human Services in registering
displaced persons and families;
(3) Develop plans to assist the heads of other Federal departments and agencies in
locating and leasing privately owned property for Federal use during national
security emergencies.

PART 27 – VETERANS ADMINISTRATION

Section 2701. Lead Responsibilities. In addition to the applicable responsibilities
covered in Parts 1 and 2, the Administrator of Veterans’ Affairs shall:
(1) Develop plans for provision of emergency health care services to veteran
beneficiaries in Veterans’ Administration medical facilities, to active duty military
personnel and, as resources permit, to civilians in communities affected by national
security emergencies;
(2) Develop plans for mortuary services for eligible veterans, and advise on methods
for interment of the dead during national security emergencies.

Section 2702. Support Responsibilities. The Administrator of Veterans’ Affairs
shall:
(1) Assist the Secretary of Health and Human Services in promoting the
development of State and local plans for the provision of medical services in national
security emergencies, and develop appropriate plans to support such State and local
plans;
(2) Assist the Secretary of Health and Human Services in developing national plans
to set priorities and allocate medical resources among civilian and military claimants.

PART 28 – OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET

Section 2801. In addition to the applicable responsibilities covered in Parts 1 and 2,
the Director of the Office of Management and Budget shall prepare plans and

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programs to maintain its functions during national security emergencies. In
connection with these functions, the Director of the Office of Management and
Budget shall:
(1) Develop plans to ensure the preparation, clearance, and coordination of proposed
Executive orders and proclamations;
(2) Prepare plans to ensure the preparation, supervision, and control of the budget
and the formulation of the fiscal program of the Government;
(3) Develop plans to coordinate and communicate Executive branch views to the
Congress regarding legislation and testimony by Executive branch officials;
(4) Develop plans for keeping the President informed of the activities of government
agencies, continuing the Office of Management and Budget’s management functions,
and maintaining presidential supervision and direction with respect to legislation and
regulations in national security emergencies.

PART 29 – GENERAL

Section 2901. Executive Order Nos. 10241 and 11490, as amended, are hereby
revoked. This Order shall be effective immediately.

Ronald Reagan

The White House

November 18, 1988

Filed with the Office of the Federal Register, 1:08 pm, November 21, 1988.

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APPENDIX B

H.R. 5005 HOMELAND SECURITY ACT OF 2002, JANUARY 23, 2002
(Key Extracts Pertaining To States)

NOTE: H.R. 5005 Homeland Security Act of 2002, dated 23 January 2002, is a 187-
page document. Since the focus of this dissertation is on homeland security at the
state level, to include the federal responsibility to the states, only those relevant
portions of the Act are extracted below.

The Act is divided into the following 17 Titles: Title I – Department of Homeland
Security, Title II – Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection, Title III –
Science and Technology in Support of Homeland Security, Title IV – Directorate of
Border and Transportation Security, Title V – Emergency Preparedness and
Response, Title VI – Treatment of Charitable Trusts for Members of the Armed
Forces of the United States and Other Governmental Organizations, Title VII –
Management, Title VIII – Coordination with Non-Federal Entities; Inspector
General; United States Secret Service; Coast Guard; General Provisions, Title IX –
National Homeland Security Council, Title X – Information Security, Title XI –
Department of Justice Divisions, Title XII – Airline War Risk Insurance Legislation,
Title XIII – Federal Workforce Improvement, Title XIV – Arming Pilots Against
Terrorism, Title XV – Transition, Title XVI – Corrections to Existing Law Relating
to Airline Transportation Security, and Title XVII – Conforming and Technical
Amendments.

The term “State” means any State of the United States, the District of Columbia, the
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, Guam, American Samoa, the
Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, and any possession of the United
States (H.R. 5005-7).

COORDINATION WITH NON-FEDERAL ENTITIES – With respect to homeland
security, the Secretary [of Homeland Security] shall coordinate through the Office of
State and Local Coordination (established under section 801) (including the
provision of training and equipment) with State and local government personnel,
agencies, and authorities, with the private sector, and with other entities, including
by—
(1) coordinating with State and local government personnel, agencies, and
authorities, and with the private sector, to ensure adequate planning, equipment,
training, and exercise activities;
(2) coordinating and, as appropriate, consolidating, the Federal Government’s
communications and systems of communications relating to homeland security with
State and local government personnel, agencies, and authorities, the private sector,
other entities, and the public; and

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(3) distributing or, as appropriate, coordinating the distribution of, warnings and
information to State and local government personnel, agencies, and authorities and to
the public (H.R. 5005-9).

[The responsibilities of the Undersecretary of Homeland Security For Information
Analysis and Infrastructure Protection include] recommending measures necessary to
protect the key resources and critical infrastructure of the United States in
coordination with other agencies of the Federal Government and in cooperation with
State and local government agencies …To administer the Homeland Security
Advisory System including…providing specific warning information, and advice
about appropriate protective measures and countermeasures, to State and local
government…(H.R. 5005-12)…To review, analyze, and make recommendations for
improvements in the policies and procedures governing the sharing of law
enforcement information, intelligence information, intelligence-related information,
and other information relating to homeland security within the Federal Government
and between the Federal Government and State and local government agencies and
authorities (H.R. 5005 – 13). [The Undersecretary] shall, as appropriate, provide
State and local government entities, and upon request to private entities that own or
operate critical information systems – (A) analysis and warnings related to threats to,
and vulnerabilities of, critical information systems; and (B) in coordination with the
Under Secretary for Emergency Preparedness and Response, crisis management
support in response to threats to, or attacks on, critical information systems…(H.R.
5005-22).

[The responsibilities of the Office of Science and Technology, within the
Department of Justice, include] carrying out programs that, through the provision of
equipment, training, and technical assistance, improve the safety and effectiveness of
law enforcement technology and improve access to such technology by Federal,
State, and local law enforcement agencies…To establish and maintain advisory
groups…to assess the law enforcement technology needs of Federal, State, and local
law enforcement agencies (H.R. 5005-25)… To develop, and disseminate to State
and local law enforcement agencies, technical assistance and training materials for
law enforcement agencies, and technical assistance and training materials for law
enforcement personnel, including prosecutors (H.R. 5005-26).

[The responsibilities of the Office for Domestic Preparedness, within the Directorate
of Border and Transportation Security, include] (1) coordinating preparedness efforts
at the Federal level, and working with all State, local, tribal, parish, and private
sector emergency response providers on all matters pertaining to combating
terrorism, including training, exercises, and equipment support (H.R. 5005 – 57); (2)
coordinating or, as appropriate, consolidating communications and systems of
communications relating to homeland security at all levels of government; (3)
directing and supervising terrorism preparedness grant programs of the Federal
Government…for all emergency response providers; (4) incorporating the strategy

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priorities into planning guidance on an agency level for the preparedness efforts of
the Office for Domestic Preparedness; (5) providing agency-specific training for
agents and analysts within the Department, other agencies, and State and local
agencies and international entities; (6) as the lead executive branch agency for
preparedness of the Unites States for acts of terrorism, cooperating closely with the
Federal Emergency Management Agency, which shall have the primary
responsibility within the executive branch to prepare for and mitigate the effects of
nonterrorist-related disasters in the United States; (7) assisting and supporting the
Secretary, in coordination with other Directorates and entities outside the
Department, in conducting appropriate risk analysis and risk management activities
of State, local, and tribal governments consistent with the mission and functions of
the Directorate…(H.R. 5005-58).

TITLE V – EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS AND RESPONSE
SEC. 501. Under Secretary For Emergency Preparedness and Response. There shall
be in the Department a Directorate of Emergency Preparedness headed by an Under
Secretary for Emergency Preparedness and Response.
SEC. 502. Responsibilities. The Secretary, acting through the Under Secretary of
Emergency Preparedness and Response, shall include—
(1) helping to ensure the effectiveness of emergency response providers to terrorist
attacks, major disasters, and other emergencies;
(2) with respect to the Nuclear Incident Response Team (regardless of whether it is
operating as an organizational unit of the Department pursuant to the title)—(A)
establishing standards and certifying when those standards have been met; (B)
conducting joint and other exercises and training and evaluating performance; and
(C) providing funds to the Department of Energy and the Environmental Protection
Agency, as appropriate, for homeland security planning, exercises and training, and
equipment;
(3) providing the Federal Government’s response to terrorist attacks and major
disasters including—(A) managing such response; (B) directing the Domestic
Emergency Support Team, the Strategic National Stockpile, the National Disaster
Medical System, and (when operating as an organizational unit of the Department
pursuant to this title) the Nuclear Incident Response Team; (C) overseeing the
Metropolitan Medical Response System; and (D) coordinating other Federal
response resources in the event of a terrorist attack or major disaster;
(4) aiding the recovery from terrorist attacks and major disasters;
(5) building a comprehensive national incident management system with Federal,
State, and local government personnel (H.R. 5005—78), agencies, and authorities, to
respond to such attacks and disasters;
(6) consolidating existing Federal Government emergency response plans into a
single, coordinated national response plan; and
(7) developing comprehensive programs for developing interoperative
communications technology, and helping to ensure that emergency response
providers acquire such technology.

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SEC. 503. Functions Transferred. In accordance with title XV, there shall be
transferred to the Secretary the functions, personnel, assets, and liabilities of the
following entities: (1) The Federal Emergency Management Agency, including the
functions of the Director of the Federal Emergency Management Agency relating
thereto. (2) The Integrated Hazard Information System of the National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Administration, which shall be renamed “FIRESAT). (3) The National
Domestic Preparedness Office of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, including the
functions of the Attorney General relating thereto. (4) The Domestic Emergency
Support Teams of the Department of Justice, including the functions of the Attorney
General relating thereto. (5) The Office of Emergency Preparedness, the National
Disaster Medical System of the Department of Health and Human Services,
including the functions of the Secretary of Health and Human Services and the
Assistant Secretary for Public Health Emergency Preparedness relating thereto. (6)
The Strategic National Stockpile of the Department of Health and Human Services,
including the functions of the Secretary of Health and Human Services relating
thereto (H.R. 5005-79).
SEC. 507. Role of Federal Emergency Management Agency.
(a) IN GENERAL.—The functions of the Federal Emergency Management Agency
include the following:
(1) All functions and authorities prescribed by the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief
and Emergency Assistance Act (42 U.S.C. 5121 et seq.).
(2) Carrying out its mission to reduce the loss of life and property and protect the
Nation from all hazards by leading and supporting the Nation in a comprehensive,
risk-based emergency management program—(A) of mitigation, by taking sustained
actions to reduce or eliminate long-term risk to people and property from hazards
and their effects; (B) of planning for building the emergency management profession
to prepare effectively for, mitigate against, respond to, and recover from any hazard;
(C) of response, by conducting emergency operations to save lives and property
through positioning emergency equipment and supplies, through evacuating potential
victims, through providing food, water, shelter, and medical care to those in need,
and through restoring critical public services; (D) of recovery, by rebuilding
communities so individuals, businesses, and governments can function on their own,
return to normal life, and protect against future hazards; and (E) of increased
efficiencies, by coordinating efforts relating to mitigation, planning, response, and
recovery.
(b) FEDERAL RESPONSE PLAN.--
(1) ROLE OF FEMA.—Notwithstanding any other provision of this Act, the Federal
Emergency Management Agency shall (H.R. 5005-80) remain the lead agency for
the Federal Response Plan established under Executive Order No. 12148 (44 Fed.
Reg. 43239) and Executive Order No. 12656 (53 Fed. Reg. 47491).
(2) REVISION OF RESPONSE PLAN.—Not later than 60 days after the date of
enactment of this Act, the Director of the Federal Emergency Management Agency
shall revise the Federal Response Plan to reflect the establishment of and incorporate
the Department (H.R. 5005-81).

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TITLE VIII—COORDINATION WITH NON-FEDERAL ENTITIES; INSPECTOR
GENERAL; UNITED STATES SECRET SERVICE; COAST GUARD; GENERAL
PROVISIONS
Subtitle A—Coordination with Non-Federal Entities
SEC. 801. OFFICE FOR STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT
COORDINATION.
(a) ESTABLISHMENT.—There is established within the Office of the Secretary the
Office for State and Local Government Coordination, to oversee and coordinate
departmental programs and relationships with State and local governments.
(b) RESPONSIBILITIES.—The Office established under subsection (a) shall--
(1) coordinate the activities of the Department relating to State and local
government;
(2) assess, and advocate for, the resources needed by State and local government to
implement the national strategy for combating terrorism;
(3) provide State and local government with regular information, research, and
technical support to assist local efforts at securing the homeland; and
(4) develop a process for receiving meaningful input from State and local
government to assist the development of the (H.R. 5005-86) national strategy for
combating terrorism and other homeland security activities (H.R. 5005-87).

SUBTITLE H—MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS
SEC.872. REORGANIZATION.
(a) REORGANIZATION.—The Secretary may allocate or reallocate functions
among the officers of the Department, and may establish, consolidate, alter, or
discontinue organizational units within the Department, but only--
(1) pursuant to section 1502(b); or
(2) after the expiration of 60 days after providing notice of such action to the
appropriate congressional committees, which shall include an explanation of the
rationale for the action.
(b) LIMITATIONS.--
(1) IN GENERAL.—Authority under subsection (a)(1) does not extend to the
abolition of any agency, entity, organizational unit, program, or function established
or required to be maintained by this Act.
(2) ABOLITIONS.—Authority under subsection (a)(2) does not extend to the
abolition of any agency, entity, organizational unit, program, or function established
or required to be maintained by statute (H.R. 5005-109).
SEC.877. REGULATORY AUTHORITY AND PREEMPTION.
(a) REGULATORY AUTHORITY……………..
(b) PREEMPTION OF STATE OR LOCAL LAW.—Except as otherwise provided
in this Act, this Act preempts no State or local law, except that any authority to
preempt State or local law vested in any Federal agency or official transferred to the
Department pursuant to this Act shall be transferred to the Department effective on
the date of the transfer to the Department of that Federal agency or official (H.R.
5005-111).

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SEC.882. OFFICE FOR NATIONAL CAPITAL REGION COORDINATION.
(a) ESTABLISHMENT.—…(3) COOPERATION.—The Secretary shall cooperate
with the Mayor of the District of Columbia, the Governors of Maryland and Virginia,
and other State, local, and regional officers in the National Capital Region to
integrate the District of Columbia, Maryland, and Virginia into the planning,
coordination, and execution of the activities of the Federal Government for the
enhancement of domestic preparedness against the consequences of terrorist attacks
(H.R. 5005-112).
SEC.886. SENSE OF CONGRESS REAFFIRMING THE CONTINUED
IMPORTANCE AND APPLICABILITY OF THE POSSE COMITATUS ACT.
(a) FINDINGS.—Congress finds the following:
(1) Section 1385 of title 18, United States Code (commonly know as the “Posse
Comitatus Act”), prohibits the use of the Armed Forces as a posse comitatus to
execute the laws except in cases and under circumstances expressly authorized by
the Constitution or Act of Congress.
(2) Enacted in 1878, the Posse Comitatus Act was expressly intended to prevent
United States Marshals, on their own initiative, from calling on the Army for
assistance in enforcing Federal law.
(3) The Posse Comitatus Act has served the Nation well in limiting the use of the
Armed Forces to enforce the law.
(4) Nevertheless, by its express terms, the Posse Comitatus Act is not a complete
barrier to the use of the Armed Forces for a range of domestic purposes, including
law enforcement functions, when the use of the Armed Forces is authorized by Act
of Congress or the President determines that the use of the Armed Forces is required
to fulfill the President’s obligations under the Constitution to respond promptly in
time of war, insurrection, or other serious emergency.
(5) Existing laws, including chapter 15 of title 10, Unites States Code (commonly
known as the “Insurrection Act”), and the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and
Emergency Assistance Act (42 U.S.C. 5121 et seq.), grant the President broad
powers that may be invoked in the event of domestic emergencies, including an
attack against the Nation using weapons of mass destruction, and these laws
specifically authorize the President to use the Armed Forces to help restore public
order.
(b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—Congress reaffirms the continued importance of
section 1385 of title 18, United States Code, and it is the sense of Congress that
nothing in this Act should be construed to alter the applicability of such section to
any use of the Armed Forces as a posse comitatus to execute the laws (H.R. 5005-
114).

SUBTITLE I—INFORMATION SHARING
SEC.891. SHORT TITLE; FINDINGS; AND SENSE OF CONGRESS.
(a) SHORT TITLE.—This subtitle may be cited as the “Homeland Security
Information Sharing Act”.

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(b) FINDINGS.—Congress finds the following:
(1) The Federal Government is required by the Constitution to provide for the
common defense, which includes terrorist attack.
(2) The Federal Government relies on State and local personnel to protect against
terrorist attack.
(3) The Federal Government collects, creates, manages, and protects classified and
sensitive but unclassified information to enhance homeland security.
(4) Some homeland security information is needed by the State and local personnel
to prevent and prepare for terrorist attack.
(5) The needs of State and local personnel to have access to relevant homeland
security information to combat terrorism must be reconciled with the need to
preserve the protected status of such information and to protect the sources and
methods used to acquire such information.
(6) Granting security clearances to certain State and local personnel is one way to
facilitate the sharing of information regarding specific terrorist threats among
Federal, State, and local levels of government.
(7) Methods exist to declassify, redact, or otherwise adapt classified information so it
may be shared with State and local personnel without the need for granting
additional security clearances.
(8) State and local personnel have capabilities and opportunities to gather
information on suspicious activities and terrorist threats not possessed by Federal
agencies.
(9) The Federal Government and State and local governments and agencies in other
jurisdictions may benefit from such information.
(10) Federal, State, and local governments and intelligence, law enforcement, and
other emergency preparation and response agencies must act in partnership to
maximize the benefits of information gathering and analysis to prevent and respond
to terrorist attacks.
(11) Information systems, including the National Law Enforcement
Telecommunications System and the Terrorist Threat Warning System, have been
established for rapid sharing of classified and sensitive but unclassified information
among Federal, State, and local entities (H.R. 5005-118).
(12) Increased efforts to share homeland security information should avoid
duplicating existing information systems.
(c) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress that Federal, State, and
local entities should share homeland security information to the maximum extent
practicable, with special emphasis on hard-to-reach urban and rural communities.
SEC.892. FACILITATING HOMELAND SECURITY INFORMATION SHARING
PROCEDURES.
(a) PROCEDURES FOR DETERMINING EXTENT OF SHARING OF
HOMELAND SECURITY INFORMATION.--
(1) The President shall prescribe and implement procedures under which relevant
Federal agencies—(A) share relevant and appropriate homeland security information
with other Federal agencies, including the Department, and appropriate State and

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local personnel; (B) identify and safeguard homeland security information that is
sensitive but unclassified; and (C) to the extent such information is in classified
form, determine whether, how, and to what extent to remove classified information,
as appropriate, and with which such personnel it may be shared after such
information is removed.
(2) The President shall ensure that such procedures apply to all agencies of the
Federal Government.
(3) Such procedures shall not change the substantive requirements for the
classification and safeguarding of classified information.
(4) Such procedures shall not change the requirements and authorities to protect
sources and methods.
(b) PROCEDURES FOR SHARING OF HOMELAND SECURITY
INFORMATION.--
(1) Under procedures prescribed by the President, all appropriate agencies, including
the intelligence community, shall, through information sharing systems, share
homeland security information with Federal agencies and appropriate State and local
personnel to the extent such information may by shared, as determined in accordance
with subsection (a), together with assessments of the credibility of such information.
(2) Each information sharing system through which information is shared under
paragraph (1) shall—(A) have the capability to transmit unclassified or classified
information, though the procedures and recipients for each capability may differ; (B)
have the capability to restrict delivery of information to specified subgroups by
geographic location, type of organization, position of a recipient within an
organization, or a recipient’s need to know such information; (C) be configured to
allow the efficient and effective sharing of information; and (D) be accessible to
appropriate State and local personnel.
(3) The procedures prescribed under paragraph (1) shall establish conditions on the
use of information shared under paragraph (1)—(H.R.5005-19): (A) to limit the
redissemination of such information to ensure that such information is not used for
an unauthorized purpose; (B) to ensure the security and confidentiality of such
information; (C) to protect the constitutional and statutory rights of any individuals
who are subjects of such information; and (D) to provide data integrity through the
timely removal and destruction of obsolete or erroneous names and information.
(4) The procedures prescribed under paragraph (1) shall ensure, to the greatest extent
practicable, that the information sharing system through which information is shared
under such paragraph include existing information sharing systems, including, but
not limited to, the National Law Enforcement Telecommunications System, the
Regional Information Sharing System, and the Terrorist Threat Warning System of
the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
(5) Each appropriate Federal agency, as determined by the President, shall have
access to each information sharing system through which information is shared under
paragraph (1), and shall therefore have access to all information, as appropriate,
shared under such paragraph.
(6) The procedures prescribed under paragraph (1) shall ensure that appropriate State

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and local personnel are authorized to use such information sharing systems—(A) to
access information shared with such personnel; and (B) to share, with others who
have access to such information sharing systems, the homeland security information
of their own jurisdictions, which shall be marked appropriately as pertaining to
potential terrorist activity.
(7) Under procedures prescribed jointly by the Director of Central Intelligence and
the Attorney General, each appropriate Federal agency, as determined by the
President, shall review and assess the information shared under paragraph (6) and
integrate such information with existing intelligence.
(c) SHARING OF CLASSIFIED INFORMATION AND SENSITIVE BUT
UNCLASSIFIED INFORMATION WITH STATE AND LOCAL PERSONNEL.--
(1) The President shall prescribe procedures under which Federal agencies may, to
the extent the President considers necessary, share with appropriate State and local
personnel homeland security information that remains classified or otherwise
protected after the determinations prescribed under the procedures set forth in
subsection (a).
(2) It is the sense of Congress that such procedures may include 1 or more of the
following means: (A) Carrying out security clearance investigations with respect to
appropriate State and local personnel. (B) With respect to information that is
sensitive but unclassified, entering into nondisclosure agreements with appropriate
State and local personnel. (C) Increased use of information-sharing partnerships that
include appropriate State and local personnel, such as the Joint Terrorism Task
Forces of the Federal Bureau (H.R. 5005-120) of Investigation, the Anti-Terrorism
Task Forces of the Department of Justice, and regional Terrorism Early Warning
Groups.
(d) RESPONSIBLE OFFICIALS.—For each affected Federal agency, the head of
such agency shall designate an official to administer this Act with respect to such
agency.
(e) FEDERAL CONTROL OF INFORMATION.—Under procedures prescribed
under this section, information obtained by a State or local government from a
Federal agency under this section shall remain under the control of the Federal
agency, and a State or local law authorizing or requiring such a government to
disclose information shall not apply to such information.
(f) DEFINITIONS.—As used in this section:
(1) The term “homeland security information” means any information possessed by a
Federal, State, or local agency that—(A) relates to the threat of terrorist activity; (B)
relates to the ability to prevent, interdict, or disrupt terrorist activity; (C) would
improve the identification or investigation of a suspected terrorist or terrorist
organization; or (D) would improve the response to a terrorist act.
(2) The term “intelligence community” has the meaning given such term in section
3(4) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401a(4)).
(3) The term “State and local personnel” means any of the following persons
involved in prevention, preparation, or response for terrorist attack: (A) State
Governors, mayors, and other locally elected officials. (B) State and local law

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enforcement personnel and firefighters. (C) Public health and medical professionals.
(D) Regional, State, and local emergency management agency personnel, including
State adjutant generals. (E) Other appropriate emergency response agency personnel.
(F) Employees of private-sector entities that affect critical infrastructure, cyber,
economic, or public health security, as designated by the Federal Government in
procedures developed pursuant to this section.
(4) The term “State” includes the District of Columbia and any commonwealth,
territory, or possession of the United States.
(g) CONSTRUCTION.—Nothing in this Act shall be construed as authorizing any
department, bureau, agency, officer, or employee of the Federal Government to
request, receive, or transmit to any other Government entity or personnel, or transmit
to a State or local entity or personnel otherwise authorized by this Act to receive
homeland security information, any information collected by the Federal
Government solely for statistical purposes in violation of any other provision of law
relating to the confidentiality of such information (H.R. 5005-21).

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APPENDIX C

NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR HOMELAND SECURITY,
OFFICE OF HOMELAND SECURITY, 16 JULY 2002
(Key Extracts Pertaining To States)

NOTE: The National Strategy For Homeland Security, Office of Homeland
Security, 16 July 2002, is an 82-page document with an additional appendix. Since
the focus of this dissertation is on homeland security at the state level, to include the
federal responsibility to the states, only those relevant portions of the National
Strategy are extracted below.

The National Strategy is divided into the following nine sections: (1) Executive
Summary, (2) Introduction, (3) Threat and Vulnerability, (4) Organizing for a Secure
Homeland, (5) Critical Mission Areas (i.e., Intelligence and Warning, Border and
Transportation Security, Domestic Counterterrorism, Protecting Critical
Infrastructures and Key Assets, Defending against Catastrophic Threats, Emergency
Preparedness and Response), (6) Foundations (i.e., Law, Science and Technology,
Information Sharing and Systems, International Cooperation), (7) Costs of Homeland
Security, (8) Conclusion: Priorities for the Future, and (9) Appendix: September 11
and America’s Response.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY:
This document is the first National Strategy for Homeland Security. The purpose of
the Strategy is to mobilize and organize our Nation to secure the U.S. homeland from
terrorist attacks. This is an exceedingly complex mission that requires coordinated
and focused effort from our entire society—the federal government, state and local
governments, the private sector, and the American people (vii). (NOTE: “State” is
defined to mean “any state of the United States, the District of Columbia, Puerto
Rico, the Virgin Islands, Guam, American Samoa, the Canal Zone, the
Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, or the trust territory of the Pacific
Islands.”)

People and organizations all across the United States have taken many steps to
improve our security since the September 11 attacks, but a great deal of work
remains. The National Strategy for Homeland Security will help to prepare our
Nation for the work ahead in several ways. It provides direction to the federal
government departments and agencies that have a role in homeland security. It
suggests steps that state and local governments, private companies and organizations,
and individual Americans can take to improve our security and offers incentives for
them to do so. It recommends certain actions to the Congress. In this way, the
Strategy provides a framework for the contributions that we all can make to secure
our homeland (vii).

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The National Strategy for Homeland Security is the beginning of what will be a long
struggle to protect our Nation from terrorism. It establishes a foundation upon which
to organize our efforts and provides initial guidance to prioritize the work ahead.
The Strategy will be adjusted and amended over time. We must be prepared to adapt
as our enemies in the war on terrorism alter their means of attack (vii).

Strategic Objectives: The strategic objectives of homeland security in order of
priority are to:
- Prevent terrorist attacks within the United States;
- Reduce America’s vulnerability to terrorism; and
- Minimize the damage and recover from attacks that do occur (vii).

Threat and Vulnerability: Unless we act to prevent it, a new wave of terrorism,
potentially involving the world’s most destructive weapons, looms in America’s
future. It is a challenge as formidable as any ever faced by our Nation. But we are
not daunted. We possess the determination and the resources to defeat our enemies
and secure our homeland against the threats they pose (vii).

One fact dominates all homeland security threat assessments: Terrorists are strategic
actors. They choose their targets deliberately based on the weaknesses they observe
in our defenses and our preparedness. We must defend ourselves against a wide
range of means and methods of attack. Our enemies are working to obtain chemical,
biological, radiological, and nuclear weapons for the purpose of wreaking
unprecedented damage on America. Terrorists continue to employ conventional
means of attack, while at the same time gaining expertise in less traditional means,
such as cyber attacks. Our society presents an almost infinite array of potential
targets that can be attacked through a variety of methods (vii).

Our enemies seek to remain invisible, lurking in the shadows. We are actively
engaged in uncovering them. Al-Qaeda remains America’s most immediate and
serious threat despite our success in disrupting its network in Afghanistan and
elsewhere. Other international terrorist organizations, as well as domestic terrorist
groups, possess the will and capability to attack the United States (vii).

Organizing for a Secure Homeland: In response to the homeland security challenge
facing us, the President has proposed, and the Congress is presently considering, the
most extensive reorganization of the federal government in the past fifty years. The
establishment of a new Department of Homeland Security would ensure greater
accountability over critical homeland security missions and unity of purpose among
the agencies responsible for them (vii).

American democracy is rooted in the precepts of federalism—a system of
government in which our state governments share power with federal institutions.

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Our structure of overlapping federal, state, and local governance—our country has
more than 87,000 different jurisdictions—provides unique opportunity and challenge
for our homeland security efforts. The opportunity comes from the expertise and
commitment of local agencies and organizations involved in homeland security. The
challenge is to develop interconnected and complementary systems that are
reinforcing rather than duplicative and that ensure essential requirements are met. A
national strategy requires a national effort (vii).

State and local governments have critical roles to play in homeland security. Indeed,
the closest relationship the average citizen has with government is at the local level.
State and local levels of government have primary responsibility for funding,
preparing, and operating the emergency services that would respond in the event of a
terrorist attack. Local units are the first to respond, and the last to leave the scene.
All disasters are ultimately local events (viii).

Critical Mission Areas: The National Strategy of Homeland Security aligns and
focuses homeland security functions into six critical mission areas: intelligence and
warning, border and transportation security, domestic counterterrorism, protecting
critical infrastructure, defending against catastrophic terrorism, and emergency
preparedness and response. The first three mission areas focus primarily on
preventing terrorist attacks; the next two on reducing our Nation’s vulnerabilities;
and the final one on minimizing the damage and recovering from attacks that do
occur. The Strategy provides a framework to align the resources of the federal
budget directly to the task of securing the homeland (viii).

Domestic Counterterrorism: The attacks of September 11 and the catastrophic loss
of life and property that resulted have redefined the mission of federal, state, and
local law enforcement authorities. While law enforcement agencies will continue to
investigate and prosecute criminal activity, they should now assign priority to
preventing and interdicting terrorist activity within the United States. The Nation’s
state and local law enforcement officers will be critical in this effort (ix).

Protecting Critical Infrastructure and Key Assets…The National Strategy for
Homeland Security identifies eight major initiatives in this area…Enable effective
partnerships with state and local governments and the private sector (ix).

Emergency Preparedness and Response: We must prepare to minimize the damage
and recover from any future terrorist attacks that may occur despite our best efforts
at prevention. An effective response to a major terrorist incident—as well as a
natural disaster—depends on being prepared. Therefore, we need a comprehensive
national system to bring together and coordinate all necessary response assets
quickly and effectively. We must plan, equip, train, and exercise many different
response units to mobilize without warning for any emergency (x).

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Many pieces of this national emergency response system are already in place.
America’s first line of defense in the aftermath of any terrorist attack is its first
responder community—police officers, firefighters, emergency medical providers,
public works personnel, and emergency management officials. Nearly three million
state and local first responders regularly put their lives on the line to save the lives of
others and make our country safer (x).

Yet multiple plans currently govern the federal government’s support of first
responders during an incident of national significance. These plans and the
government’s overarching policy for counterterrorism are based on an artificial and
unnecessary distinction between “crisis management” and “consequence
management.” Under the President’s proposal, the Department of Homeland Security
will consolidate federal response plans and build a national system for incident
management in cooperation with state and local government. Our federal, state, and
local governments would ensure that all response personnel and organizations are
properly equipped, trained, and exercised to respond to all terrorist threats and
attacks in the United States. Our emergency preparedness and response efforts
would also engage the private sector and the American people (x).

The Foundations of Homeland Security: The National Strategy for Homeland
Security also describes four foundations—unique American strengths that cut across
all of the mission areas, across all levels of government, and across all sectors of our
society. These foundations—law, science and technology, information sharing and
systems, and international cooperation—provide a useful framework for evaluating
our homeland security investments across the federal government (x).

Law. Throughout our Nation’s history, we have used laws to promote and safeguard
our security and our liberty. The law will both provide mechanisms for the
government to act and will define the appropriate limits of action (x).

The National Strategy for Homeland Security outlines legislative actions that would
help enable our country to fight the war on terrorism more effectively. New federal
laws should not preempt state law unnecessarily or overly federalize the war on
terrorism. We should guard scrupulously against incursions on our freedoms (x).

The Strategy identifies twelve major initiatives in this area:

Federal level:
- Enable critical infrastructure information sharing;
- Streamline information sharing among intelligence and law enforcement agencies;
- Expand existing extradition authorities;
- Review authority for military assistance in domestic security;
- Revive the President’s reorganization authority; and
- Provide substantial management flexibility for the Department of Homeland

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Security (x and xi).

State level:
- Coordinate suggested minimum standards for state driver’s licenses;
- Enhance market capacity for terrorism insurance;
- Train for prevention of cyber attacks;
- Suppress money laundering;
- Ensure continuity of the judiciary; and
- Review quarantine authorities (xi)

Costs of Homeland Security: The national effort to enhance homeland security will
yield tremendous benefits and entail substantial financial and other costs. Benefits
include reductions in the risk of attack and their potential consequences. Costs
include not only the resources we commit to homeland security but also the delays to
commerce and travel. The United States spends roughly $100 billion per year on
homeland security. This figure includes federal, state, and local law enforcement
and emergency services, but excludes most funding for the armed forces (xii).

The responsibility of providing homeland security is shared between federal, state
and local governments, and the private sector. In many cases, sufficient incentives
exist in the private market to supply protection. Government should fund only those
homeland security activities that are not supplied, or are inadequately supplied, in the
market. Cost sharing between different levels of government should reflect the
principles of federalism. Many homeland security activities, such as intelligence
gathering and border security, are properly accomplished at the federal level. In
other circumstances, such as with first responder capabilities, it is more appropriate
for state and local governments to handle these responsibilities (xii).

INTRODUCTION:

Homeland Security and National Security: The Preamble to the Constitution defines
our federal government’s basic purposes as “…to form a more perfect Union,
establish justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the common defense,
promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and
our Posterity.” The requirement to provide for the common defense remains as
fundamental today as it was when these words were written, more than two hundred
years ago (5).

The National Security Strategy of the United States aims to guarantee the
sovereignty and independence of the United States, with our fundamental values and
institutions intact. It provides a framework for creating and seizing opportunities
that strengthen our security and prosperity. The National Strategy for Homeland
Security complements the National Security Strategy of the United States by
addressing a very specific and uniquely challenging threat—terrorism in the United

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States—and by providing a comprehensive framework for organizing the efforts of
federal, state, local and private organizations whose primary functions are often
unrelated to national security (5).

The link between national security and homeland security is a subtle but important
one. For more than six decades, America has sought to protect its own sovereignty
and independence through a strategy of global presence and engagement. In so
doing, America has helped many other countries and peoples advance along the path
of democracy, open markets, individual liberty, and peace with their neighbors. Yet
there are those who oppose America’s role in the world, and who are willing to use
violence against us and our friends. Our great power leaves these enemies with few
conventional options for doing us harm. One such option is to take advantage of our
freedom and openness by secretly inserting terrorists into our country to attack our
homeland. Homeland security seeks to deny this avenue of attack to our enemies
and thus to provide a secure foundation for America’s ongoing global engagement.
Thus the National Security Strategy of the United States and the National Strategy
for Homeland Security work as mutually supporting documents, providing guidance
to the executive branch departments and agencies (5).

There are also a number of other, more specific strategies maintained by the United
States that are subsumed within the twin concepts of national security and homeland
security. The National Strategy for Combating Terrorism will define the U.S. war
plan against international terrorism. The National Strategy to Combat Weapons of
Mass Destruction coordinates America’s many efforts to deny terrorists and states
the materials, technology, and expertise to make and deliver weapons of mass
destruction. The National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace will describe our
initiatives to secure our information systems against deliberate, malicious disruption.
The National Money Laundering Strategy aims to undercut the illegal flows of
money that support terrorism and international criminal activity. The National
Defense Strategy sets priorities for our most powerful national security instrument.
The National Drug Control Strategy lays out a comprehensive U.S. effort to combat
drug smuggling and consumption. All of these documents fit into the framework
established by the National Security Strategy of the United States and National
Strategy for Homeland Security, which together take precedence over all other
national strategies, programs and plans (5).

ORGANIZING FOR A SECURE HOMELAND:

The tactics of modern terrorists are unbounded by the traditional rules of warfare.
Terrorists transform objects of daily life into weapons, visiting death and destruction
on unsuspecting civilians. Defeating this enemy requires a focused and organized
response. The President took a critical step by proposing the creation of the
Department of Homeland Security. The creation of the Department, the most
significant reorganization of the federal government in more than a half-century, will

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give the United States a foundation for our efforts to secure the homeland. The
Department would serve as the unifying core of the vast national network of
organizations and institutions involved in homeland security (11).

American Federalism and Homeland Security: American democracy is rooted in
the precepts of federalism—a system of government in which our state
governments share power and federal institutions. The Tenth Amendment
reserves to the states and to the people all power not specifically delegated to the
federal government. Our structure of overlapping federal, state, and local
governance—the United States has more than 87,000 different jurisdictions—
provides unique opportunities and challenges. The opportunity comes from the
expertise and commitment of local agencies and organizations involved in
homeland security. The challenge is to develop complementary systems that
avoid duplication and ensure essential requirements are met. To meet the
terrorist threat, we must increase collaboration and coordination—in law
enforcement and prevention, emergency response and recovery, policy
development and implementation—so that public and private resources are
better aligned to secure the homeland (11, 12).

American People: All of us have a key role to play in America’s war on terrorism.
Terrorists may live and travel among us and attack our homes and our places of
business, governance, and recreation. In order to defeat an enemy who uses our very
way of life as a weapon—who takes advantage of our freedoms and liberties—every
American must be willing to do his or her part to protect our homeland (12).

Since September 11, thousands of individuals have stepped forward to ask, “What
can I do to help?” The President launched Citizen Corps in January 2002 to help
channel this volunteerism, and individuals in all 50 states and U.S. territories have
signed up since. In support of this effort, Citizen Corps released a guidebook—
produced by the National Crime Prevention Council with support from the
Department of Justice—to provide the American people with information about the
latest disaster preparedness techniques. As part of Citizen Corps, the Federal
Emergency Management Agency’s Community Emergency Response Team program
trains volunteers to support our first responders by providing immediate help to
victims and by organizing volunteers at disaster sites. Citizen Corps is expanding
the Neighborhood Watch Program to incorporate terrorism prevention and education
into its existing crime prevention mission. Volunteers in Police Service will
encourage the use of civilian volunteers to support resource-constrained police
departments. The Medical Reserve Corps will provide communities with medical
volunteers—both active and retired—who can assist health care professionals during
a large-scale local emergency. Finally, Operation TIPS (Terrorism Information and
Prevention System) will be a nationwide program to help thousands of American
truck drivers, letter carriers, train conductors, ship captains, and utility workers

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report potential terrorist activity. Operation TIPS will begin a pilot program in ten
cities in August 2002 (12).
Private Sector: Given our traditions of limited government, the American private
sector provides most of our goods and services. Private companies are a key source
of new ideas and innovative technologies that will enable us to triumph over the
terrorist threat. There are, for example, pharmaceutical companies producing new
vaccines against dangerous biological agents and information technology firms
investing in new communications technology for first responders. The President has
sought to tap into this creative genius by establishing a national Homeland Security
Advisory Council and calling on private citizens to serve on similar boards at the
state and local level (12).

The private sector also owns the vast majority of America’s critical infrastructure. It
includes crucial systems such as the agricultural and food distribution processes that
put food on our tables, utility companies that provide water and power to our homes
and businesses, and transportation systems that fly us from city to city and bus our
children to and from school. The private sector also includes many of our academic
institutions and a host of scientific, medical, engineering, and technological research
facilities (12).

A close partnership between the government and private sector is essential to
ensuring that existing vulnerabilities to terrorism in our critical infrastructure are
identified and eliminated as quickly as possible. The private sector should conduct
risk assessments on their holdings and invest in systems to protect key assets. The
internalization of these costs is not only a matter of sound corporate citizenship but
also an essential safeguard of economic assets for shareholders, employees and the
Nation. (See Costs of Homeland Security chapter for additional discussion.) (12).

State and Local Governments: State, county, municipal, and local governments
fund and operate the emergency services that would respond in the event of a
terrorist attack. Ultimately, all manmade and natural disasters are local
events—with local units being the first to respond and the last to leave. Since
September 11, every state and many cities and counties are addressing
homeland security issues either through an existing office or through a newly
created office. Many have established anti-terrorism task forces. Many have
also published or are preparing homeland security strategies, some based on
existing plans for dealing with natural disasters. Each level of government must
coordinate with other levels to minimize redundancies in homeland security
actions and ensure integration of efforts. The federal government must seek to
utilize state and local knowledge about their communities and then share
relevant information with the state and local entities positioned to act on it. (A
summary of homeland security actions taken by states, counties, and cities is
contained in a companion volume.) (12, 13).

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Federal Executive Branch: The President’s most important job is to protect the
American people. To do so, he relies on the departments and agencies of the
executive branch, which are responsible for executing and enforcing the federal laws,
as well as the White House and other offices of the Executive Office of the
President, which develop and implement his policies and programs (13).

Department of Homeland Security: The President’s proposal to create the
Department of Homeland Security is the outcome of a comprehensive study of the
federal government’s current structure, the experience gained since September 11,
and the new information we have learned about our enemies while fighting a war.
The new Department would bring together 22 entities with critical homeland security
missions and would provide us for the first time with a single federal department
whose primary mission is to protect our homeland against terrorist threats. The
Department would play a central role in implementing the National Strategy for
Homeland Security. It would be responsible for many specific initiatives and would
also streamline relations with the federal government for our state and local
governments, private sector, and the American people. This Department, although
focused primarily on homeland security, would continue to execute the non-
homeland security missions of its constituent parts (13).

White House Office of Homeland Security: Even after the Department of Homeland
Security begins to function, the White House Office of Homeland Security will
continue to play a key role advising the President and coordinating the interagency
process. It will continue to work with the Office of Management and Budget to
develop and defend the President’s homeland security budget proposals. It will
certify that the budgets of other executive branch departments will enable them to
carry out their homeland security responsibilities (13).

Department of Defense: The Department of Defense contributes to homeland
security through its military missions overseas, homeland defense, and support to
civil authorities. Ongoing military operations abroad have reduced the terrorist
threat against the United States. There are three circumstances under which the
Department would be involved in improving security at home. In extraordinary
circumstances, the Department would conduct military missions such as combat air
patrols or maritime defense operations. The Department would take the lead in
defending the people and the territory of our country, supported by other agencies.
Plans for such contingencies will continue to be coordinated, as appropriate, with the
National Security Council, Homeland Security Council, and other federal
departments and agencies. Second, the Department of Defense would be involved
during emergencies such as responding to an attack or to forest fires, floods,
tornadoes, or other catastrophes. In these circumstances, the Department may be
asked to act quickly to provide capabilities that other agencies do not have. Finally,
the Department of Defense would also take part in “limited scope” missions where

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other agencies have the lead—for example, security at a special event like the recent
Olympics (13).

Other federal departments and agencies: Many other government departments and
agencies support homeland security as part of their overall mission. The Attorney
General, as America’s chief law enforcement officer, will lead our Nation’s law
enforcement effort to detect, prevent, and investigate terrorist activity within the
United States. The Department of Agriculture’s Food Safety Inspection and
Agricultural Research Services have important homeland security responsibilities for
preventing agroterrorism. The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention and the
National Institutes of Health, both part of the Department of Health and Human
Services, provide critical expertise and resources related to bioterrorism. Several
other federal entities have significant counterterrorism intelligence responsibilities,
including the CIA’s Counterterrorist Center and the FBI’s Counterterrorism Division
and Criminal Intelligence Section. The CIA is specifically responsible for gathering
and analyzing all information regarding potential terrorist threats abroad. The
proposed Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection Division within the
Department of Homeland Security would be able not only to access and analyze
homeland security information, but also to translate it into warning and protective
action (13).

Intergovernmental coordination: There is a vital need for cooperation between
the federal government and state and local governments on a scale never before
seen in the United States. Cooperation must occur both horizontally (within
each level of government) and vertically (among various levels of government).
Under the President’s proposal, the creation of the Department of Homeland
Security will simplify the process by which governors, mayors, and county
leaders interact with the federal government. We cannot and will not create
separate and specialized coordinating bodies for every functional area of
government. To do so would merely replicate the stovepiped system that exists
today and would defeat a main purpose of creating the new Department (13).

Because of our federalist traditions and our large number of local governments,
the federal government must look to state governments to facilitate close
coordination and cooperation among all levels of government—federal, state,
and local. Therefore, the President calls on each governor to establish a single
Homeland Security Task Force (HSTF) for the state, to serve as his or her
primary coordinating body with the federal government. This would realign
the existing Anti-Terrorism Task Forces, established after September 11 in 93
federal judicial districts nationwide, to serve as the law enforcement component
of the broader HSTFs. The HSTFs would provide a collaborative, cost-effective
structure for effectively communicating to all organizations and citizens. They
would help streamline and coordinate all federal, regional, and local programs.

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They would also fit neatly into the regional response network that the
Department of Homeland Security would inherit from FEMA (14).

CRITICAL MISSION AREAS:

Critical Mission Area—Domestic Counterterrorism:

The attacks of September 11 and the catastrophic loss of life and property that
resulted have redefined the mission of federal, state, and local law enforcement
authorities…Not only are the federal law enforcement and U.S. intelligence agencies
communicating better with each other, the entire law enforcement community—
international, federal, state, and local—is now sharing more information…The
federal government needs to do a better job utilizing the distinct capabilities of state
and local law enforcement to prevent terrorism by giving them access, where
appropriate, to the information in our federal databases, and by utilizing state and
local information at the federal level. The FBI-led Joint Terrorism Task Forces, by
including participants from state and local law enforcement as well as federal
agencies, draw on state and local capabilities, and enhance intergovernmental
coordination (25, 26)…State and local law enforcement personnel, operating within
each community, are indispensable to our domestic counterterrorism efforts, playing
several critical roles, including uncovering and reporting unusual behavior and
security anomalies (27).

Critical Mission Area—Protecting Critical Infrastructures and Key Assets:

The federal government will work closely with state and local governments to
develop and apply compatible approaches to ensure protection for critical assets,
systems, and functions at all levels of society. For example, local schools,
courthouses, and bridges are critical to the communities they serve. Protecting
America’s critical infrastructure and key assets requires more than just resources.
The federal government can use a broad range of measures to help enable state,
local, and private sector entities to better protect the assets and infrastructures they
control. For example, the government can create venues to share information on
infrastructure vulnerabilities and best-practice solutions, or create a more effective
means of providing specific and useful threat information to non-federal entities in a
timely fashion (30).

We will establish a single office within the Department of Homeland Security to
work with the federal departments and agencies, state and local governments, and the
private sector to implement a comprehensive national plan to protect critical
infrastructure and key assets. The national infrastructure protection plan will
organize the complementary efforts of government and private institutions to raise
security over the long term to levels appropriate to each target’s vulnerability and
criticality. The federal government will work to create an environment in which

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state, local, and private entities can best protect the infrastructure they control (31).

The Department of Homeland Security would give state and local agencies and the
private sector one primary contact instead of many for coordinating protection
activities with the federal government, including vulnerability assessments, strategic
planning efforts, and exercises. The Department would include an office which
reports directly to the Secretary dedicated to this function, and would build on
current outreach efforts of existing federal agencies with infrastructure protection
responsibilities…The national plan will provide a methodology for identifying and
prioritizing critical assets, systems, and functions, and for sharing protection
responsibility with state and local government and the private sector. The plan will
establish standards and benchmarks for infrastructure protection, and provide a
means to measure performance…The Department would manage federal grant
programs for homeland security, which may be used to assist state and local
infrastructure protection efforts (33).

Critical Mission Area—Emergency Preparedness and Response:

We must prepare to minimize the damage and recover from any future terrorist
attacks that may occur despite our best efforts at prevention. Past experience has
shown that preparedness efforts are key to providing an effective response to major
terrorist incidents and natural disasters. Therefore, we need a comprehensive
national system to bring together and command all necessary response assets quickly
and effectively. We must equip, train, and exercise many different response units to
mobilize for any emergency without warning. Under the President’s proposal, the
Department of Homeland Security, building on the strong foundation already laid by
the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), will lead our national efforts
to create and employ a system that will improve our response to all disasters, both
manmade and natural (41).

Many pieces of this national emergency response system are already in place.
America’s first line of defense in the aftermath of any terrorist attack is its first
responder community—police officers, firefighters, emergency medical providers,
public works personnel, and emergency management officials. Nearly three million
state and local first responders regularly put their lives on the line to save the lives of
others and make our country safer. These individuals include specially trained
hazardous materials teams, collapse search and rescue units, bomb squads, and
tactical units (41).

In a serious emergency, the federal government augments state and local response
efforts. FEMA, which under the President’s proposal will be a key component of the
Department of Homeland Security, provides funding and command and control
support. A number of important specialized federal emergency response assets that
are housed in various departments would also fall under the Secretary of Homeland

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Security’s authority for responding to a major terrorist attack. Because response
efforts to all major incidents entail the same basic elements it is essential that federal
response capabilities for both terrorist attacks and natural disasters remain in the
same organization. This would ensure the most efficient provision of federal support
to local responders by preventing the proliferation of duplicative “boutique”
response entities (41,42).

Americans respond with great skill and courage to emergencies. There are, however,
too many seams in our current response plans and capabilities. Today, at least five
different plans—the Federal Response Plan, the National Contingency Plan, the
Interagency Domestic Terrorism Concept of Operations Plan, the Federal
Radiological Emergency Response Plan, and a nascent bioterrorism response plan—
govern the federal government’s response. These plans and the government’s
overarching policy for counterterrorism are based on a distinction between “crisis
management” and “consequence management.” In addition, different organizations
at different levels of the government have put in place different incident management
systems and communications equipment. All too often, these systems and equipment
do not function together well enough (42).

We will enhance our capabilities for responding to a terrorist attack all across the
country. Today, many geographic areas have little or no capability to respond to a
terrorist attack using weapons of mass destruction. Even the best prepared states and
localities do not possess adequate resources to respond to the full range of terrorist
threats we face. Many do not yet have in place mutual aid agreements to facilitate
cooperation with their neighbors in time of emergency. Until recently, federal
support for domestic preparedness efforts has been relatively small and disorganized,
with eight different departments and agencies providing in a tangled web of grant
programs (42).

Under the President’s proposal, the Department of Homeland Security will
consolidate existing federal government emergency response plans into one
genuinely all-discipline, all-hazard plan—the Federal Incident Management Plan—
and thereby eliminate the “crisis management” and “consequence management”
distinction. This plan would cover all incidents of national significance, including
acts of bioterrorism and agroterrorism, and clarify roles and expected contributions
of various emergency response bodies at different levels of government in the wake
of a terrorist attack (42).

The Department of Homeland Security would provide a direct line of authority from
the President through the Secretary of Homeland Security to a single on-site federal
coordinator. The single federal coordinator would be responsible to the President for
coordinating the entire federal response. Lead agencies would maintain operational
control over their functions (for example, the FBI will remain the lead agency for
federal law enforcement) in coordination with the single on-site federal official. The

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Department would direct the Domestic Emergency Support Team, nuclear incident
response teams, National Pharmaceutical Stockpile, and National Disaster Medical
System, as well as other assets (42).

Create a national incident management system. Under the President’s proposal, the
Department of Homeland Security, working with federal, state, local, and non-
governmental public safety organizations, will build a comprehensive national
incident management system to respond to terrorist incidents and natural disasters.
The Department would ensure that this national system defines common terminology
for all parties, provides a unified command structure, and is scalable to meet
incidents of all sizes (42).

The federal government will encourage state and local first responder
organizations to adopt the already widespread Incident Management System by
making it a requirement for federal grants. All state and local governments
should create and regularly update their own homeland security plans, based on
their existing emergency operations plans, to provide guidance for the
integration of their response assets in the event of an attack. The Department of
Homeland Security will, under the President’s proposal, provide support
(including model plans) for these efforts and will adjust the Federal Incident
Management Plan as necessary to take full advantage of state and local
capabilities. State and local governments should also sign mutual aid
agreements to facilitate cooperation with their neighbors in time of emergency.
Starting in Fiscal Year 2004, the Department would provide grants in support
of such efforts (42, 43).

Enable seamless communication among all responders. In the aftermath of any
major terrorist attack, emergency response efforts would likely involve hundreds of
offices from across the government and the country. It is crucial for response
personnel to have and use equipment, systems, and procedures that allow them to
communicate with one another. Under the President’s proposal, the Department of
Homeland Security will work with state and local governments to achieve this goal
(43).

In particular, the Department would develop a national emergency communication
plan to establish protocols (i.e., who needs to talk to whom), processes, and national
standards for technology acquisition. The Department would, starting with Fiscal
Year 2003 funds, tie all federal grant programs that support state and local
purchase of terrorism-related communications equipment to this
communication plan and require all applicants to demonstrate progress in
achieving interoperability with other emergency response bodies (43).

Prepare health care providers for catastrophic terrorism. Our entire emergency
response community must be prepared to deal with all potential hazards, especially

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those associated with weapons of mass destruction. Under the President’s proposal,
the Department of Homeland Security, working with the Departments of Health and
Human Services and Veterans Affairs, will support training and equipping of state
and local health care personnel to deal with the growing threat of chemical,
biological, radiological, and nuclear terrorism. It would continue to fund federal
grants to states and cities for bioterrorism preparedness. It would use the hospital
preparedness grant program to help prepare hospitals and poison control centers to
deal specifically with biological and chemical attacks and to expand their surge
capacity to care for large numbers of patients in a mass-casualty incident (43).

The Department of Homeland Security, working with the Department of Health and
Human Services, would provide grants to state and local governments to plan for the
receipt and distribution of medicines from the [National Pharmaceutical] Stockpile
…The Department would begin requiring annual certification of first responder
preparedness to handle and decontaminate any hazard. This certification process
would also verify the ability of state and local first responders to work effectively
with related federal support assets (44).

Under the President’s proposal, the Department of Homeland Security will help
state and local agencies meet these certification standards by providing grant
money (based on performance) for planning and equipping, training, and
exercising first responders for chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear
attacks (44).

Implement the First Responder Initiative of the Fiscal Year 2003 Budget. Before
September 11, the federal government had allocated less than $1 billion since 1995
to help prepare first responders for terrorist attacks. A range of federal departments
provided funding for training and equipment, technical assistance, and other support
to assist state and local first responders. These disparate programs were a step in the
right direction but fell short in terms of scale and cohesion (45).

In January 2002, President Bush proposed the First Responder Initiative as part of
his Fiscal Year 2003 Budget proposal. The purpose of this initiative is to improve
dramatically first responder preparedness for terrorist incidents and disasters. This
program will increase federal funding levels more than tenfold (from $272 million in
the pre-supplemental Fiscal Year 2002 Budget to $3.5 billion in Fiscal Year 2003).
Under the President’s Department of Homeland Security proposal, the new
Department will consolidate all grant programs that distribute funds to state
and local first responders (45).

Build a national training and evaluation system. Under the President’s proposal, the
Department of Homeland Security will establish national standards for emergency
response training and preparedness. These standards would provide guidelines for
the vaccination of civilian response personnel against certain biological agents.

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These standards would also require certain coursework for individuals to
receive and maintain certification as first responders and for state and local
governments to receive federal grants. The Department would establish a national
exercise program designed to educate and evaluate civilian response personnel at all
levels of government. It would require individuals and government bodies to
complete successfully at least one exercise every year. The Department would use
these exercises to measure performance and allocate future resources (45).

FOUNDATIONS:

Law:

Throughout this Nation’s history we have used our laws to promote and safeguard
our security and our liberty. The law will both provide mechanisms for the
government to act and define the appropriate limits of that action. The President,
recognizing this, directed the Office of Homeland Security to review state and
federal legal authorities pertinent to homeland security (47).

We have already taken important steps to protect our homeland. The USA
PATRIOT Act, signed into law by the President on October 26, 2001, has improved
government coordination in law enforcement, intelligence gathering, and
information-sharing. The Aviation and Transportation Security Act, which
established the Transportation Security Administration, has strengthened civil
aviation security. The Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act will
reinforce border security systems. Finally, the Public Health Security and
Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act will better the Nation’s ability to
prevent, prepare for, and respond to bioterrorism (47).

But more needs to be done. On June 18, 2002, the President provided Congress with
proposed legislation to establish a Department of Homeland Security. This new
Cabinet agency would have a single, urgent mission: securing the homeland of
America and protecting the American people from terrorism. Yet creation of this
department does not in and of itself constitute a sufficient response to the terrorist
threat. We must pass complementary legislation to address innate deficiencies in our
overall ability to counter terrorism (47).

Where new legislation at the federal level is necessary to accomplish our
counterterrorism goals, we should work carefully to ensure that newly crafted
federal laws do not preempt state law unnecessarily or overly federalize
counterterrorism efforts. The Tenth Amendment makes clear that each state
retains substantial independent power with respect to the general welfare of its
populace. States should avail themselves to the resources and expertise offered
by their sister states and federal counterparts (47, 48).

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Major Initiatives (State):

Given the states’ major role in homeland security, and consistent with the
principles of federalism inherent to American government, the following
initiatives constitute suggestions, not mandates, for state initiatives (49).

Coordinate suggested minimum standards for state driver’s licenses. The
licensing of drivers by the 50 states, the District of Columbia, and the United
States territories varies widely. There are no national or agreed upon state
standards for content, format, or license acquisition procedures. Terrorist
organizations, including Al-Qaeda operatives involved in the September 11
attacks, have exploited these differences. While the issuance of driver’s licenses
falls squarely within the powers of the states, the federal government can assist
the states in crafting solutions to curtail the future abuse of driver’s licenses by
terrorist organizations. Therefore, the federal government, in consultation with
state government agencies and non-governmental organizations, should support
state-led efforts to develop suggested minimum standards for driver’s licenses,
recognizing that many states should and will exceed these standards (49).

Enhance market capacity for terrorism insurance. The need for insurance
coverage for terrorist events has increased dramatically. Federal support is
clearly critical to a properly functioning market for terrorism insurance;
nonetheless, state regulation will play an integral role in ensuring the adequate
provision of terrorism insurance. To establish a regulatory approach which
enables American business to spread and pool risk efficiently, states should
work together and with the federal government to find a mutually acceptable
approach to enhance market capacity to cover terrorist risk (49).

Train for prevention of cyber attacks. State and local officials have requested
federal training regarding the identification, investigation, and enforcement of
cyber-related crimes and terrorism. The FBI, in coordination with other
relevant federal organizations, should assist state and local law enforcement in
obtaining training in this area (49).

Suppress money laundering. Terrorists use unregulated financial services,
among other means, to fund their operations. The Money Laundering
Suppression Act (P.L. 103-325) urges states to enact uniform laws to license and
regulate certain financial services. The USA PATRIOT Act also relies on state
law to establish the regulatory structure necessary to combat money laundering.
States should assess the current status of their regulations regarding non-
depository providers of financial services and work to adopt uniform laws as
necessary to ensure more efficient and effective regulation. By doing so, states
would protect consumers by providing increased stability and transparency to
an industry prone to abuse while at the same time providing state and local law

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enforcement with the tools necessary to dismantle informational and unlicensed
money transmission networks (49).

Ensure continuity of the judiciary. In the aftermath of a terrorist attack, our
judicial system must continue to operate effectively. Planning is critical to this
continuity. As such, states, relevant non-governmental organizations, and
representatives of the Department of Justice and the federal judiciary should
convene a committee of representatives to consider the expedient appointment
of judges; interaction and coordination among federal and state judiciaries; and
other matters necessary to the continued functioning of the judiciary in times of
crisis (49).

Review quarantine authority. State quarantine laws—most of which are over
100 years old—fail to address the dangers presented by modern biological
warfare and terrorism. States, therefore, should update quarantine laws to
improve intrastate response while working with their sister states and federal
regulators to assure compliance with minimum public health standards. To
facilitate this process, the Departments of Homeland Security, Health and
Human Services, Justice, and Defense should participate in a review of
quarantine statutes and regulations in conjunction with state and local
authorities to establish minimum standards. In addition, legislators should
provide strong federal, state, and local evacuation authority through
appropriate legislation or regulation (49, 50).

Information Sharing and Systems:

Integrate information sharing across state and local governments, private industry,
and citizens. Several efforts are underway to enhance the timely dissemination of
information from the federal government to state and local homeland security
officials by building and sharing law enforcement databases, secure computer
networks, secure video teleconferencing capabilities, and more accessible websites
(57).

First, the FBI and other federal agencies are augmenting the information available in
their crime and terrorism databases such as the National Crime Information Center
and the National Law Enforcement Telecommunications Systems. These databases
are accessible to state and local authorities (57).

Second, state and local governments should use a secure intranet to increase the flow
of classified federal information to state and local entities. This would provide a
more effective way to disseminate information about changes to the Homeland
Security Advisory System and share information about terrorists. The federal
government will also make an effort to remove classified information from some
documents to facilitate distribution to more state and local authorities. The effort

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will help state and local law enforcement officials learn when individuals suspected
of criminal activity are also under federal investigation and will enable federal
officials to link their efforts to investigations being undertaken in the states. The
Department of Homeland Security would create a Collaborative Classified Enterprise
environment to share sensitive information securely among all relevant government
entities. This effort, which is to include dozens of agencies, will put in place a
secure communications network to allow agencies to “plug in” their existing
databases to share information (57).

Third, a secure video conferencing capability connecting officials in Washington,
D.C. with all government entities in every state will be implemented by the end of
the calendar year. This capability will allow federal officials to relay crucial
information immediately to state homeland security directors and enhance
consultation and coordination (57).

Fourth, expansion of the ‘.gov’ domain on the Internet for use by state governments
has already been completed. In the past, only federal government websites were
permitted to use the ‘.gov’ domain. This change will ensure the legitimacy of
government websites and enhance searches of all federal and state websites, thereby
allowing information to be accessed more quickly. These ‘.gov’ sites will also allow
homeland security officials to exchange sensitive information on the secure portions
of those websites (57).

COSTS OF HOMELAND SECURITY:

Principles to Guide Allocation of Homeland Security Costs. Balancing benefits and
costs. Decisions on homeland security activities and spending must achieve two
overarching goals: to devote the right amount of scarce resources to homeland
security and to spend these resources on the right activities. To achieve the first
goal, we must carefully weight the benefit of each homeland security endeavor and
only allocate resources where the benefit of reducing risk is worth the amount of
additional cost. One implication of this standard is that it is not practical or possible
to eliminate all risks. There will always be some level of risk that cannot be
mitigated without the use of unacceptably large expenditures (63, 64).

The second goal for homeland security spending is to prioritize those activities that
most require additional resources. Given the resources available, we should strive to
maximize security by distributing additional funding in such a way that the value
added is approximately equal in each sector. Because some activities might achieve
substantial benefits at low cost, while others result in minimal gain at a high price,
resources should be shifted to their most “productive” use. These shifts should
continue until the additional value of risk mitigation per dollar is equalized (64).

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The role for government. The government should only address those activities that
the market does not adequately provide—for example, national defense or border
security. Our government provides these services on behalf of American citizens for
our collective benefit. Many homeland security activities—such as a national
incident management system—require government action (64).

For other aspects of homeland security, sufficient incentives exist in the private
market to supply protection. In these cases, we should rely on the private sector. For
example, owners of large buildings and hosts of large events may have a sufficient
incentive to provide security for those venues (64).

Federalism and cost sharing of expenditures. The homeland security mission
requires a national effort—federal, state, and local governments partnering together
and with the private sector. It is critical that we identify tasks that are most
efficiently accomplished at the federal versus local or regional level. A central
criterion is the degree to which the activity is national or sub-national in scope.
Many homeland security activities, such as intelligence gathering, border security,
and policy coordination, are best accomplished at the federal level. In other
circumstances, such as with first responder capabilities, state and local governments
are better positioned to handle these responsibilities (64).

At a time when budgets are tight across the country, the federal government will play
a key role in securing the homeland. It is critical, however, that all levels of
government work cooperatively to shoulder the costs of homeland security. The
federal government will lead the effort, but state and local governments can and
should play important roles. As a result, Americans will gain from these homeland
security efforts every day with improvements in public services such as law
enforcement and public health systems (64).

Regulations. Traditionally, governments have used regulations in addition to
direct expenditures to meet their objectives. Rigid regulation, however, has
proven to be an inefficient means of meeting objectives. To the extent that
homeland security objectives are to be met by regulations for state and local
governments or private-sector firms, the federal government will provide an
incentive to minimize costs and reward innovation by permitting maximum
flexibility in meeting those objectives. The federal government will focus on
specifying outcomes rather that the means by which they will be achieved (64).

The Costs of Homeland Security: Homeland security requirements take real
resources (such as labor, capital, technology, and managerial expertise) away from
valued economic activities (such as household consumption or business investment).
In some cases, homeland security spending also reduces resources that could be used
to purchase other types of public safety, such as cleaner water or safer highways. In
other cases, the investment in homeland security will result in public safety benefits;

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water testing to detect chemical or biological agents, for example, will improve
overall water quality. The sum of these economic resources shifted toward
homeland security is the fundamental economic cost of the endeavor (64).

Direct federal expenditure. In recent years, the federal government has allocated
considerable resources to homeland security. Including supplemental funding, the
federal budget allocated $17 billion to homeland security in Fiscal Year 2001. This
amount increased to $29 billion in Fiscal Year 2002. In Fiscal Year 2003, the
President budgeted $38 billion for homeland security activities. These budget
allocations must be viewed as down payments to cover the most immediate security
vulnerabilities (64).

The President has noted that terrorism is the greatest national security threat since
World War II. Minimizing the overall economic impact of fighting the war on
terrorism will require that increased budgetary spending on homeland security occur
within the context of overall fiscal spending restraint. It is important to reprioritize
spending to meet our homeland security needs, and not simply to permit unchecked
overall growth in federal outlays. Over the long term, government spending is
balanced by either higher taxes or inflation, both of which hinder the rapid economic
growth that serves as the ultimate source of resources for families’ standards of
living and national needs (64).

If we do not reprioritize spending, then the costs of homeland security will be even
greater because these expenditures do not represent the full cost of homeland
security to the economy. As noted earlier, the $38 billion in taxes needed to finance
the Fiscal Year 2003 homeland security budget request will not be available for other
uses such as personal consumption and private sector investments. The Council of
Economic Advisers estimates that of the $38 billion, $24 billion would come from
reduced consumption, while $14 billion would take the form of reduced private
sector investment. The cost is even higher, however, because of the economic
distortions introduced by the tax system. Under any tax system, every dollar
collected in taxes results in distortions that reduce the efficiency of the economy and
lower national income. This economic distortion (referred to as deadweight loss) is
roughly $0.27 per dollar of tax revenue (65).

State and local governments. It is difficult to measure the financial
contributions to homeland security made by state and local governments. It is
evident, however, that state and local governments are spending money or
planning to spend money which was never expected to be spent on defending
and protecting their respective communities. These costs include protecting
critical infrastructure, improving technologies for information sharing and
communications, and building emergency response capacity. At this time, the
National Governors’ Association estimates that additional homeland security-
related costs, incurred since September 11 and through the end of 2002, will

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reach approximately $6 billion. Similarly, the U.S. Conference of Mayors has
estimated the costs incurred by cities during this time period to be $2.6 billion
(65).

Private expenditures. Private businesses and individuals have incentives to take on
expenditures to protect property and reduce liability that contribute to homeland
security. Owners of buildings have a significant stake in ensuring that their
buildings are structurally sound, properly maintained, and safe for occupants. To
accomplish this, they often take protective measures that include employee education
and training, securing services, infrastructure assessment, technology, and
communication enhancements. Properly functioning insurance markets should
provide the private sector with economic incentives to mitigate risks (65).

Costs of homeland security in the private sector are borne by both the owners of
businesses in the form of lower income and their customers in the form of higher
prices. The Council of Economic Advisers estimates that private business spent
approximately $55 billion per year on private security before the September 11
attacks. As a result of the attacks, their annual costs of fighting terrorism may
increase by 50 to 100 percent. Increases in the cost of insurance premiums have
been more dramatic (65).

APPENDIX: SEPTEMBER 11 AND AMERICA’S RESPONSE:

The Response to the Terrorist Threat: Federal, state, and local governments and the
private sector must coordinate on issues affecting homeland security in order to
succeed in the fight against terrorism (A-2).

Officials across all levels of government have been working together on homeland
security related task forces to meet this goal. In addition, each state now has a
designated individual, charged by the respective Governor, to perform
homeland security responsibilities (A-2).
Supporting first responders…Congress appropriated $650 million for federal grant
assistance to states and localities for improving first responder terrorism
preparedness. With this vital federal assistance, first responders have received and
will continue to receive extensive training (including in weapons of mass destruction
response) and necessary equipment (A-2).

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APPENDIX D

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
REORGANIZATION PLAN
25 NOVEMBER 2002

Introduction

This Reorganization Plan is submitted pursuant to Section 1502 of the Department of
Homeland Security Act of 2002 (“the Act”), which requires submission, not later
than 60 days after enactment, of a reorganization plan regarding two categories of
information concerning plans for the Department of Homeland Security (“the
Department” or “DHS”):
(1) The transfer of agencies, personnel, assets, and obligations to the Department
pursuant to this Act.
(2) Any consolidation, reorganization, or streamlining of agencies transferred to
the Department pursuant to this Act. Section 1502(a). Section 1502(b) of the Act
identifies six elements, together with other elements “as the President deems
appropriate,” as among those for discussion in the plan. Each of the elements set out
in the statute is identified verbatim below, followed by a discussion of current plans
with respect to that element. This plan is subject to modification pursuant to Section
1502(d) of the Act, which provides that on the basis of consultations with
appropriate congressional committees the President may modify or revise any part of
the plan until that part of the plan becomes effective. Additional details concerning
the process for establishing the Department will become available in the coming
weeks and months, and the President will work closely with Congress to modify this
plan consistent with the Act.

Plan Elements

(1) Identification of any functions of agencies transferred to the Department
pursuant to this Act that will not be transferred to the Department under the
plan.

Except as otherwise directed in the Act, all functions of agencies that are
to be transferred to the Department pursuant to the Act will be transferred to the
Department under the plan. The functions of agencies being transferred to the
Department which the Act directs are not to be transferred are the following:
• Pursuant to Section 201(g)(1) of the Act, the Computer Investigations and
Operations Section (“CIOS”) of the National Infrastructure Protection Center
(“NIPC”) of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”) will not transfer to the
Department with the rest of NIPC. CIOS is the FBI headquarters entity responsible
for managing all FBI computer intrusion field office cases (whether law enforcement
or national security related).

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• Pursuant to Sections 421(c) & (d) of the Act, the regulatory responsibilities and
quarantine activities relating to agricultural import and entry inspection activities of
the United States Department of Agriculture (“the USDA”) Animal and Plant Health
Inspection Service (“APHIS”) will remain with the USDA, as will the Secretary of
Agriculture’s authority to issue regulations, policies, and procedures regarding the
functions transferred pursuant to Sections 421(a) & (b) of the Act.
• Pursuant to Subtitle B of Title IV of the Act, the authorities of the Secretary of the
Treasury related to Customs revenue functions, as defined in the statute, will not
transfer to the Department.
• Functions under the immigration laws of the United States with respect to the care
of unaccompanied alien children will not transfer from the Department of Justice to
DHS, but will instead transfer to the Department of Health and Human Services
pursuant to Section 462 of the Act.

(2) Specification of the steps to be taken by the Secretary to organize the
Department, including the delegation or assignment of functions transferred to
the Department among officers of the Department in order to permit the
Department to carry out the functions transferred under the plan.

A. Steps to be taken by the Secretary to organize the Department. The President
intends that the Secretary will carry out the following actions on the dates specified.
All of the following transfers shall be deemed to be made to DHS, and all offices and
positions to be established and all officers and officials to be appointed or named
shall be deemed to be established, appointed, or named within DHS.

January 24, 2003 (effective date of the Act pursuant to Section 4):
• Establish the Office of the Secretary.
• Begin to appoint, upon confirmation by the Senate, or transfer pursuant to the
transfer provisions of the Act, as many of the following officers as may be possible:
(1) Deputy Secretary of Homeland Security
(2) Under Secretary for Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection
(3) Under Secretary for Science and Technology
(4) Under Secretary for Border and Transportation Security
(5) Under Secretary for Emergency Preparedness and Response
(6) Director of the Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services
(7) Under Secretary for Management
(8) Not more than 12 Assistant Secretaries
(9) General Counsel
(10) Inspector General
(11) Commissioner of Customs
• Name, as soon as may be possible, officers to fill the following offices created by
the Act:
(1) Assistant Secretary for Information Analysis
(2) Assistant Secretary for Infrastructure Protection

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(3) Privacy Officer
(4) Director of the Secret Service
(5) Chief Information Officer
(6) Chief Human Capital Officer
(7) Chief Financial Officer
(8) Officer for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties
(9) Director of Shared Services
(10) Citizenship and Immigration Ombudsman
(11) Director of the Homeland Security Advanced Research Projects Agency
• Establish, within the Office of the Secretary, the Office for State and Local
Government Coordination, the Office of International Affairs, and the Office of
National Capital Region Coordination.
• Establish the Homeland Security Advanced Research Projects Agency and
the Acceleration Fund for Research and Development of Homeland Security
Technologies.
• Establish within the Directorate of Science and Technology the Office for
National Laboratories.
• Establish the Bureau of Border Security, the Bureau of Citizenship and
Immigration Services, and the Director of Shared Services.
• Establish the Transportation Security Oversight Board with the Secretary of
Homeland Security as its Chair.

March 1, 2003:
• Transfer the Critical Infrastructure Assurance Office (“CIAO”) of the Department
of Commerce, the National Communications System (“the NCS”), the NIPC of the
FBI (other than the CIOS), the National Infrastructure Simulation and Analysis
Center (“NISAC”), the Energy Assurance Office (“EAO”) of the Department of
Energy, and the Federal Computer Incident Response Center of the General Services
Administration (“FedCIRC”).
• Transfer the Coast Guard.
• Transfer the Customs Service, the Transportation Security Administration (“the
TSA”), functions of the Immigration and Naturalization Service (“the INS”), the
Federal Protective Service (“the FPS”), the Office of Domestic Preparedness (“the
ODP”), and the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center (“the FLETC”).
• Transfer the functions of the Secretary of Agriculture relating to agricultural import
and entry inspection activities under the laws specified in Section 421(b) of the Act
from the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service.
• Transfer the United States Secret Service.
• Transfer the following programs and activities to the Directorate of
Science and Technology:
o The chemical and biological national security and supporting programs and
activities of the nonproliferation and verification research and development program
of the Department of Energy.

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o The life sciences activities related to microbial pathogens of the Biological and
Environmental Research Program of the Department of Energy.
o The National Bio-Weapons Defense Analysis Center of the Department of
Defense.
o The nuclear smuggling programs and activities within the proliferation detection
program of the nonproliferation and verification research and development program
of the Department of Energy.
o The nuclear assessment program and activities of the assessment, detection, and
cooperation program of the international materials protection and cooperation
program of the Department of Energy and the advanced scientific computing
research program and activities at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory of the
Department of Energy.
o The Environmental Measurements Laboratory of the Department of Energy.
• Transfer the Federal Emergency Management Agency (“FEMA”).
• Transfer the Integrated Hazard Information System of the National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Administration, which shall be renamed “FIRESTAT.”
• Transfer the National Domestic Preparedness Office of the FBI, including the
functions of the Attorney General relating thereto.
• Transfer the Domestic Emergency Support Team of the Department of Justice,
including the functions of the Attorney General relating thereto.
• Transfer the Metropolitan Medical Response System of the Department of Health
and Human Services, including the functions of the Secretary of Health and Human
Services and Assistant Secretary for Public Health Emergency Preparedness relating
thereto.
• Transfer the National Disaster Medical System of the Department of Health and
Human Services, including the functions of the Secretary of Health and Human
Services and Assistant Secretary for Public Health Emergency Preparedness relating
thereto.
• Transfer the Office of Emergency Preparedness and the Strategic National
Stockpile of the Department of Health and Human Services, including the functions
of the Secretary of Health and Human Services and Assistant Secretary for Public
Health Emergency Preparedness relating thereto.
• Transfer to the Secretary the authority (in connection with an actual or threatened
terrorist attack, major disaster, or other emergency in the United States) to direct the
Nuclear Incident Response Team of the Department of Energy to operate as an
organizational unit.

June 1, 2003:
• Transfer the Plum Island Animal Disease Center of USDA.
• Establish the Homeland Security Science and Technology Advisory Committee.

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By September 30, 2003:
• Complete any incidental transfers, pursuant to Section 1516 of the Act, of
personnel, assets, and liabilities held, used, arising from, available, or to be made
available, in connection with the functions transferred by the Act.

B. Delegation or Assignment Among Officers of Functions Transferred to the
Department. The President intends that the Secretary will delegate or assign
transferred functions within the Department as follows:

1. Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection

a. Under Secretary for Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection (“IA and
IP”): Will be responsible for oversight of functions of NIPC, NCS, CIAO, NISAC,
EAO, and FedCIRC transferred by the Act, the management of the Directorate’s
Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection duties, and the administration of
the Homeland Security Advisory System.
b. Assistant Secretary for Information Analysis: Will oversee the following
Information Analysis functions:
• Identify and assess the nature and scope of terrorist threats to the homeland; detect
and identify threats of terrorism against the United States; and, understand such
threats in light of actual and potential vulnerabilities of the homeland.
• In coordination with the Assistant Secretary for Infrastructure Protection, integrate
relevant information, analyses, and vulnerability assessments (whether such
information, analyses, or assessments are provided or produced by the Department or
others) in order to identify priorities for protective and support measures by the
Department, other agencies of the Federal Government, State and local government
agencies and authorities, the private sector, and other entities.
• Ensure the timely and efficient access by the Department to all information
necessary to discharge the responsibilities under Section 201 of the Act, including
obtaining such information from other agencies of the Federal Government.
• Review, analyze, and make recommendations for improvements in the policies and
procedures governing the sharing of law enforcement information, intelligence
information, intelligence-related information, and other information relating to
homeland security within the Federal Government and between the Federal
Government and State and local government agencies and authorities.
• Disseminate, as appropriate, information analyzed by the Department within the
Department, to other agencies of the Federal Government with responsibilities
relating to homeland security, and to agencies of State and local governments and
private sector entities with such responsibilities in order to assist in the deterrence,
prevention, preemption of, or response to, terrorist attacks against the United States.
• Consult with the Director of Central Intelligence and other appropriate intelligence,
law enforcement, or other elements of the Federal Government to establish collection
priorities and strategies for information, including law enforcement-related

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information, relating to threats of terrorism against the United States through such
means as the representation of the Department in discussions regarding requirements
and priorities in the collection of such information.
• Consult with State and local governments and private sector entities to ensure
appropriate exchanges of information, including law enforcement-related
information, relating to threats of terrorism against the United States.
• Ensure that—
1. Any material received pursuant to the Act is protected from unauthorized
disclosure and handled and used only for the performance of official duties; and
2. Any intelligence information under the Act is shared, retained, and disseminated
consistent with the authority of the Director of Central Intelligence to protect
intelligence sources and methods under the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C.
Section 401, et seq.) and related procedures and, as appropriate, similar
authorities of the Attorney General concerning sensitive law enforcement
information.
• Request additional information from other agencies of the Federal Government,
State and local government agencies, and the private sector relating to threats of
terrorism in the United States, or relating to other areas of responsibility assigned by
the Secretary, including the entry into cooperative agreements through the Secretary
to obtain such information.
• Establish and utilize, in conjunction with the Chief Information Officer of the
Department, a secure communications and information technology infrastructure,
including data-mining and other advanced analytical tools, in order to access,
receive, and analyze data and information in furtherance of statutory
responsibilities, and to disseminate information acquired and analyzed by the
Department, as appropriate.
• Ensure, in conjunction with the Chief Information Officer of the Department, that
any information databases and analytical tools developed or utilized by the
Department—
1. Are compatible with one another and with relevant information databases of other
agencies of the Federal Government; and
2. Treat information in such databases in a manner that complies with applicable
Federal law on privacy.
• Coordinate training and other support to the elements and personnel of the
Department, other agencies of the Federal Government, and State and local
governments that provide information to the Department, or are consumers of
information provided by the Department, in order to facilitate the identification and
sharing of information revealed in their ordinary duties and the optimal utilization of
information received from the Department.
• Coordinate with elements of the intelligence community and with Federal, State,
and local law enforcement agencies, and the private sector, as appropriate.
• Provide intelligence and information analysis and support to other elements of the
Department.

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c. Assistant Secretary for Infrastructure Protection: Will oversee the following
Infrastructure Protection functions:
• Carry out comprehensive assessments of the vulnerabilities of the key resources
and critical infrastructure of the United States, including the performance of risk
assessments to determine the risks posed by particular types of terrorist attacks
within the United States (including an assessment of the probability of success of
such attacks and the feasibility and potential efficacy of various countermeasures to
such attacks).
• In coordination with the Assistant Secretary for Information Analysis, integrate
relevant information, analyses, and vulnerability assessments (whether such
information, analyses, or assessments are provided or produced by the Department or
others) in order to identify priorities for protective and support measures by the
Department, other agencies of the Federal Government, State and local government
agencies and authorities, the private sector, and other entities.
• Develop a comprehensive national plan for securing the key resources and critical
infrastructure of the United States, including power production, generation, and
distribution systems, information technology and telecommunications systems
(including satellites), electronic financial and property record storage and
transmission systems, emergency preparedness communications systems, and the
physical and technological assets that support such systems.
• Recommend measures necessary to protect the key resources and critical
infrastructure of the United States in coordination with other agencies of the Federal
Government and in cooperation with State and local government agencies and
authorities, the private sector, and other entities.
• In coordination with the Under Secretary for Emergency Preparedness and
Response, provide to State and local government entities, and upon request to private
entities that own or operate critical information systems, crisis management support
in response to threats to, or attacks on, critical information systems.
• Provide technical assistance, upon request, to the private sector and other
government entities, in coordination with the Under Secretary for Emergency
Preparedness and Response, with respect to emergency recovery plans to respond to
major failures of critical information systems.
• Coordinate with other agencies of the Federal Government to provide specific
warning information, and advice about appropriate protective measures and
countermeasures, to State and local government agencies and authorities, the private
sector, other entities, and the public.

2. Science and Technology

Under Secretary for Science and Technology: Will be responsible for performing the
functions set forth in Section 302 of the Act, including the following:
• Advise the Secretary regarding research and development efforts and priorities in
support of the Department’s missions.

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• Develop, in consultation with other appropriate executive agencies, a national
policy and strategic plan for identifying priorities, goals, objectives, and policies for,
and coordinating the Federal Government’s civilian efforts with respect to,
identifying and developing countermeasures to chemical, biological, radiological,
nuclear, and other emerging terrorist threats, including the development of
comprehensive, research based definable goals for such efforts and of annual
measurable objectives and specific targets to accomplish and evaluate the goals for
such efforts.
• Support the Under Secretary for Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection
by assessing and testing homeland security vulnerabilities and possible threats.
• Conduct basic and applied research, development, demonstration, testing, and
evaluation activities that are relevant to any or all elements of the Department,
through both intramural and extramural programs, except that such responsibility
does not extend to human health-related research and development activities.
• Establish priorities for directing, funding, and conducting national research,
development, test and evaluation, and procurement of technology and systems for—
1. preventing the importation of chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and
related weapons and material; and
2. detecting, preventing, protecting against, and responding to terrorist attacks.
• Establish a system for transferring homeland security developments or technologies
to Federal, State, and local governments, and to private sector entities.
• Enter into work agreements, joint sponsorships, contracts, or any other agreements
with the Department of Energy regarding the use of the national laboratories or sites
and support of the science and technology base at those facilities.
• Collaborate with the Secretary of Agriculture and the Attorney General as provided
in Section 212 of the Agricultural Bioterrorism Protection Act of 2002 (7 U.S.C. §
8401), as amended by Section 1709(b) of the Act.
• Collaborate with the Secretary of Health and Human Services and the Attorney
General in determining any new biological agents and toxins that shall be listed as
‘select agents’ in Appendix A of part 72 of title 42, Code of Federal Regulations,
pursuant to Section 351A of the Public Health Service Act (42 U.S.C. § 262a).
• Support United States leadership in science and technology.
• Establish and administer the primary research and development activities of the
Department, including the long-term research and development needs and
capabilities for all elements of the Department.
• Coordinate and integrate all research, development, demonstration, testing, and
evaluation activities of the Department.
• Coordinate with other appropriate executive agencies in developing and carrying
out the science and technology agenda of the Department to reduce duplication and
identify unmet needs.
• Develop and oversee the administration of guidelines for merit review of research
and development projects throughout the Department, and for the dissemination of
research conducted or sponsored by the Department.

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3. Border and Transportation Security

The Directorate of Border and Transportation Security (“BTS”) will include the
following: the Bureau of Border Security; the Office for Domestic Preparedness; the
Customs Service; the Transportation Security Administration; FLETC; and FPS.
The BTS Directorate will also have in place the key leaders of the new Directorate to
include:
a. Under Secretary for BTS: Will be responsible for oversight of all responsibilities
set forth in Section 402 of the Act, including the following:
• Prevent the entry of terrorists and the instruments of terrorism into the United
States.
• Secure the borders, territorial waters, ports, terminals, waterways, and air, land, and
sea transportation systems of the United States, including managing and coordinating
those functions transferred to the Department at ports of entry.
• Establish and administer rules, in accordance with Section 428 of the Act,
governing the granting of visas or other forms of permission, including parole, to
enter the United States to individuals who are not a citizen or an alien lawfully
admitted for permanent residence in the United States.
• Establish national immigration enforcement policies and priorities.
• Administer the customs laws of the United States, except as otherwise provided in
the Act.
• Conduct the inspection and related administrative functions of the USDA
transferred to the Secretary of Homeland Security under Section 421 of the Act.
• In carrying out the foregoing responsibilities, ensure the speedy, orderly, and
efficient flow of lawful traffic and commerce.
• Carry out the immigration enforcement functions specified under Section 441 of
the Act that were vested by statute in, or performed by, the Commissioner of the INS
(or any officer, employee, or component of the INS) immediately before the date on
which the transfer of functions takes place.
b. Assistant Secretary for Border Security: Will report directly to the Under
Secretary for Border and Transportation Security, and whose responsibilities will
include the following:
• Establish and oversee the administration of the policies for performing such
functions as are--
1. transferred to the Under Secretary for Border and Transportation Security by
Section 441 of the Act and delegated to the Assistant Secretary by the Under
Secretary for Border and Transportation Security; or
2. otherwise vested in the Assistant Secretary by law.
• Advise the Under Secretary for Border and Transportation Security with respect to
any policy or operation of the Bureau of Border Security that may affect the Bureau
of Citizenship and Immigration.
c. Director of the Office for Domestic Preparedness - Will report directly to the
Under Secretary for Border and Transportation Security and will have the primary
responsibility within the Executive Branch of the Federal Government for the

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preparedness of the United States for acts of terrorism, including the following
responsibilities:
• Coordinate preparedness efforts at the Federal level, and work with all State, local,
tribal, parish, and private sector emergency response providers on all matters
pertaining to combating terrorism, including training, exercises, and equipment
support.
• Coordinate or, as appropriate, consolidate communications and systems of
communications relating to homeland security at all levels of government.
• Direct and supervise terrorism preparedness grant programs of the Federal
Government (other than those programs administered by the Department of Health
and Human Services) for all emergency response providers.
• Incorporate homeland security priorities into planning guidance on an agency level
for the preparedness efforts of the Office for Domestic Preparedness.
• Provide agency-specific training for agents and analysts within the Department,
other agencies, and State and local agencies, and international entities.
• As the lead executive branch agency for preparedness of the United States for acts
of terrorism, cooperate closely with the FEMA, which shall have the primary
responsibility within the executive branch to prepare for and mitigate the effects of
nonterrorist-related disasters in the United States.
• Assist and support the Secretary, in coordination with other Directorates and
entities outside the Department, in conducting appropriate risk analysis and risk
management activities of State, local, and tribal governments consistent with the
mission and functions of the Directorate.
• Supervise those elements of the Office of National Preparedness of FEMA that
relate to terrorism, which shall be consolidated within the Department in the ODP
established pursuant to Section 430 of the Act.

4. Emergency Preparedness and Response

The Emergency Preparedness and Response Directorate will be headed by the Under
Secretary for Emergency Preparedness and Response. Under Secretary for EP&R:
Will be responsible for all of those functions included within Section 502 of the Act,
including:
• Helping to ensure the effectiveness of emergency response providers to terrorist
attacks, major disasters, and other emergencies.
• With respect to the Nuclear Incident Response Team (regardless of whether it is
operating as an organizational unit of the Department pursuant to the Act):
1. Establishing standards and certifying when those standards have been met;
2. Conducting joint and other exercises and training and evaluating performance;
and,
3. Providing funds to the Department of Energy and the Environmental Protection
Agency, as appropriate, for homeland security planning, exercises and training, and
equipment.

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• Providing the Federal Government’s response to terrorist attacks and major
disasters, including:
1. Managing such response;
2. Directing the Domestic Emergency Support Team, the Strategic National
Stockpile, the National Disaster Medical System, and (when operating as an
organizational unit of the Department pursuant to the Act) the Nuclear Incident
Response Team;
3. Overseeing the Metropolitan Medical Response System; and
4. Coordinating other Federal response resources in the event of a terrorist attack or
major disaster.
• Aiding the recovery from terrorist attacks and major disasters;
• Building a comprehensive national incident management system with Federal,
State, and local government personnel, agencies, and authorities, to respond to such
attacks and disasters.
• Consolidating existing Federal Government emergency response plans into a
single, coordinated national response plan; and
• Developing comprehensive programs for developing interoperative
communications technology, and helping to ensure that emergency response
providers acquire such technology.

5. Other Officers and Functions

a. Director of the Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services: Will report
directly to the Deputy Secretary; and will be responsible for the following:
• Establishing the policies for performing such functions as are transferred to the
Director by Section 451 of the Act or otherwise vested in the Director by law.
• Oversight of the administration of such policies.
• Advising the Deputy Secretary with respect to any policy or operation of the
Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services that may affect the Bureau of
Border Security of the Department, including potentially conflicting policies or
operations.
• Establishing national immigration services policies and priorities.
• Meeting regularly with the Ombudsman described in Section 452 of the Act to
correct serious service problems identified by the Ombudsman.
• Establishing procedures requiring a formal response to any recommendations
submitted in the Ombudsman’s annual report to Congress within three months after
its submission to Congress.
b. Citizenship and Immigration Services Ombudsman: Will report directly to the
Deputy Secretary; and will be responsible for the following:
• Assisting individuals and employers in resolving problems with the Bureau of
Citizenship and Immigration Services;
• Identifying areas in which individuals and employers have problems in dealing
with the Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services; and

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• Proposing changes in the administrative practices of the Bureau of Citizenship and
Immigration Services to mitigate identified problems.

(3) Specification of the funds available to each agency that will be transferred to
the Department as a result of transfers under the plan.

• The attached tables provide estimates of the funds available to the agencies and
entities that will be transferred to the Department by operation of the Act. The two
tables include total funding (mandatory and discretionary including fees) and
discretionary funding net of fees. The tables provide the enacted levels for 2002
and 2002 supplementals, and the President’s requested levels for 2003. Because of
the current state of the 2003 budget process, information concerning the funds that
will be available to each transferring agency on the date of the proposed transfers is
not currently available and will not likely be available during the time period in
which the President is to submit this Reorganization Plan. As additional information
becomes available, it will be provided as may be required in accordance with the
procedures under the Act for modification of this Plan or other applicable law.
(NOTE: Tables not included in this dissertation.)

(4) Specification of the proposed allocations within the Department of
unexpended funds transferred in connection with transfers under the plan.

• The attached tables provide estimates of the unobligated balances as of September
30, 2002, for the agencies and programs that will be transferred to the Department.
The first table provides estimates of unobligated balances for the accounts that are
moving to the Department in whole. The second table provides estimates of the
unobligated balances in the accounts of which only a portion will be transferring to
the new Department. These latter estimates, however, are of the unobligated balances
for the full account, only a portion of which are associated with the activities that
will be transferred to the Department. In addition, these unobligated balances are
based on the Department of Treasury’s estimates as of September 30, 2002, which
are the latest available figures. Since October 1, 2002, Departments and agencies
(except the Department of Defense) have been operating under continuing
resolutions, and, as such, have been spending these balances to maintain current
operations. Authority to reallocate unexpended funds of agencies transferred under
this Plan is found in H.J. Res. 124, the continuing resolution in effect currently and
until January 11, 2003. The resolution provides authority for the Office of
Management and Budget to transfer an amount not to exceed $140,000,000 from
unobligated balances of appropriations enacted before October 1, 2002 “for
organizations and entities that will be transferred to the new Department and for
salaries and expenses associated with the initiation of the Department.” Such
authority may be exercised upon providing 15 days’ notice to the Appropriations
Committees. We anticipate that it may be necessary to provide funding through

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such transfers both for transferring entities and for salaries and expenses associated
with the initiation of the Department, including, for example, those associated with
establishing the Office of the Secretary and other new offices provided for in the
Act. Any plan to use such funding will follow the procedures required under the
continuing resolution, including the provision of at least 15 days’ notice to the
Appropriations Committees. (NOTE: Tables not included in this dissertation.)

(5) Specification of any proposed disposition of property, facilities, contracts,
records, and other assets and obligations of agencies transferred under the plan.

• There is no intention to dispose of property, facility, contracts, records, and other
assets and obligations of agencies transferred under the plan. All of such assets and
obligations will transfer with each agency pursuant to Section 1511(d)(1) of the Act.
• Prior to and during the transition period (as defined by Section 1501(a)(2) of the
Act), the Department may identify property, facilities, contracts, records, and other
assets and obligations of agencies transferred that would be candidates for
disposition due to duplication, non-use, obsolescence, and the like. If and when any
such proposed dispositions are identified, we will follow provisions of the Act
relating to modification of this plan or further notification of Congress.

(6) Specification of the proposed allocations within the Department of the
functions of the agencies and subdivisions that are not related directly to
securing the homeland.

• As agencies and subdivisions are transferred into the Department, any functions of
those entities that are not directly related to securing the homeland will continue to
be allocated to the agencies and subdivisions in which they are currently
incorporated.

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APPENDIX E

HOMELAND SECURITY PRESIDENTIAL DIRECTIVE/HSPD-8
17 DECEMBER 2003
NATIONAL PREPAREDNESS

Purpose

(1) This directive establishes policies to strengthen the preparedness of the United
States to prevent and respond to threatened or actual domestic terrorist attacks, major
disasters, and other emergencies by requiring a national domestic all-hazards
preparedness goal, establishing mechanisms for improved delivery of Federal
preparedness assistance to State and local governments, and outlining actions to
strengthen preparedness capabilities of Federal, State, and local entities.

Definitions

(2) For the purposes of this directive:

(a) The term “all-hazards preparedness” refers to preparedness for domestic terrorist
attacks, major disasters, and other emergencies.
(b) The term “Federal departments and agencies” means those executive departments
enumerated in 5 U.S.C. 101, and the Department of Homeland Security; independent
establishments as defined by 5 U.S.C. 104(1); Government corporations as defined
by 5 U.S.C. 103(1); and the United States Postal Service.
(c) The term “Federal preparedness assistance” means Federal department and
agency grants, cooperative agreements, loans, loan guarantees, training, and/or
technical assistance provided to State and local governments and the private sector to
prevent, prepare for, respond to, and recover from terrorist attacks, major disasters,
and other emergencies. Unless noted otherwise, the term “assistance” will refer to
Federal assistance programs.
(d) The term “first responder” refers to those individuals who in the early stages of
an incident are responsible for the protection and preservation of life, property,
evidence, and the environment, including emergency response providers as defined
in section 2 of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 101), as well as
emergency management, public health, clinical care, public works, and other skilled
support personnel (such as equipment operators) that provide immediate support
services during prevention, response, and recovery operations.
(e) The terms “major disaster” and “emergency” have the meanings given in section
102 of the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (42
U.S.C. 5122)
(f) The term “major events” refers to domestic terrorist attacks, major disasters, and
other emergencies.

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(g) The term “national homeland security preparedness-related exercises” refers to
homeland security-related exercises that train and test national decision makers and
utilize resources of multiple Federal departments and agencies. Such exercises may
involve State and local first responders when appropriate. Such exercises do not
include those exercises conducted solely within a single Federal department or
agency.
(h) The term “preparedness” refers to the existence of plans, procedures, policies,
training, and equipment necessary at the Federal, State, and local level to maximize
the ability to prevent, respond to, and recover from major events. The term
“readiness” is used interchangeably with preparedness.
(i) The term “prevention” refers to activities undertaken by the first responder
community during the early stages of an incident to reduce the likelihood or
consequences of threatened or actual terrorist attacks. More general and broader
efforts to deter, disrupt, or thwart terrorism are not addressed in this directive.
(j) The term “Secretary” means the Secretary of Homeland Security.
(k) The terms “State” and “local government,” when used in a geographical sense,
have the same meanings given to those terms in section 2 of the Homeland Security
Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 101).

Relationships to HSPD-5

(3) This directive is a companion to HSPD-5, which identifies steps for improved
coordination in response to incidents. This directive describes the way Federal
departments and agencies will prepare for such a response, including prevention
activities during the early stages of a terrorism incident.

Development of a National Preparedness Goal

(4) The Secretary is the principal Federal official for coordinating the
implementation of all-hazards preparedness in the United States. In cooperation with
other Federal departments and agencies, the Secretary coordinates the preparedness
of Federal response assets, and the support for, and assessment of, the preparedness
of State and local first responders.

(5) To help ensure the preparedness of the Nation to prevent, respond to, and recover
from threatened and actual domestic terrorist attacks, major disasters, and other
emergencies, the Secretary, in coordination with the heads of other appropriate
Federal departments and agencies and in consultation with State and local
governments, shall develop a national domestic all-hazards preparedness goal.
Federal departments and agencies will work to achieve this goal by:
(a) providing for effective, efficient, and timely delivery of Federal preparedness
assistance to State and local governments; and
(b) supporting efforts to ensure first responders are prepared to respond to major
events, especially prevention of and response to threatened terrorist attacks.

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(6) The national preparedness goal will establish measurable readiness priorities and
targets that appropriately balance the potential threat and magnitude of terrorist
attacks, major disasters, and other emergencies with the resources required to
prevent, respond to, and recover from them. It will also include readiness metrics
and elements that support the national preparedness goal including standards for
preparedness assessments and strategies, and a system for assessing the Nation’s
overall preparedness to respond to major events, especially those involving acts of
terrorism.

(7) The Secretary will submit the national preparedness goal to me through the
Homeland Security Council (HSC) for review and approval prior to, or concurrently
with, the Department of Homeland Security’s Fiscal Year 2006 budget submission to
the Office of Management and Budget.

Federal Preparedness Assistance

(8) The Secretary, in coordination with the Attorney General, the Secretary of Health
and Human Services (HHS), and the heads of other Federal departments and
agencies that provide assistance for first responder preparedness, will establish a
single point of access to Federal preparedness assistance program information within
60 days of the issuance of this directive. The Secretary will submit to me through
the HSC recommendations of specific Federal department and agency programs to
be part of the coordinated approach. All Federal departments and agencies will
cooperate with this effort. Agencies will continue to issue financial assistance
awards consistent with applicable laws and regulations and will ensure that program
announcements, solicitations, application instructions, and other guidance documents
are consistent with other Federal preparedness programs to the extent possible. Full
implementation of a closely coordinated interagency grant process will be completed
by September 30, 2005.

(9) To the extent permitted by law, the primary mechanism for delivery of
Federal preparedness assistance will be awards to the States. Awards will be
delivered in a form that allows the recipients to apply the assistance to the
highest priority preparedness requirements at the appropriate level of
government. To the extent permitted by law, Federal preparedness assistance
will be predicated on adoption of Statewide comprehensive all-hazards
preparedness strategies. The strategies should be consistent with the national
preparedness goal, should assess the most effective ways to enhance
preparedness, should address areas facing higher risk, especially to terrorism,
and should also address local government concerns and Citizen Corps efforts.
The Secretary, in coordination with the heads of other appropriate Federal
departments and agencies, will review and approve strategies submitted by the
States. To the extent permitted by law, adoption of approved Statewide

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strategies will be a requirement for receiving Federal preparedness assistance at
all levels of government by September 30, 2005.

(10) In making allocations of Federal preparedness assistance to the States, the
Secretary, the Attorney General, the Secretary of HHS, the Secretary of
Transportation, the Secretary of Energy, the Secretary of Veterans Affairs, the
Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency, and the heads of other
Federal departments and agencies that provide assistance for first responder
preparedness will base those allocations on assessments of population
concentrations, critical infrastructures, and other significant risk factors, particularly
terrorism threats, to the extent permitted by law.

(11) Federal preparedness assistance will support State and local entities’ efforts
including planning, training, exercises, interoperability, and equipment acquisition
for major events as well as capacity building for prevention activities such as
information gathering, detection, deterrence, and collaboration related to terrorist
attacks. Such assistance is not primarily intended to support existing capacity to
address normal local first responder operations, but to build capacity to address
major events, especially terrorism.

(12) The Attorney General, the Secretary of HHS, the Secretary of Transportation,
the Secretary of Energy, the Secretary of Veterans Affairs, the Administrator of the
Environmental Protection Agency, and the heads of other Federal departments and
agencies that provide assistance for first responder preparedness shall coordinate
with the Secretary to ensure that such assistance supports and is consistent with the
national preparedness goal.

(13) Federal departments and agencies will develop appropriate mechanisms to
ensure rapid obligation and disbursement of funds from their programs to the States,
from States to the local community level, and from local entities to the end users to
derive maximum benefit from the assistance provided. Federal departments and
agencies will report annually to the Secretary of the obligation, expenditure status,
and the use of funds associated with Federal preparedness assistance programs.

Equipment

(14) The Secretary, in coordination with State and local officials, first responder
organizations, the private sector and other Federal civilian departments and agencies,
shall establish and implement streamlined procedures for the ongoing development
and adoption of appropriate first responder equipment standards that support
nationwide interoperability and other capabilities consistent with the national
preparedness goal, including the safety and health of first responders.

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(15) To the extent permitted by law, equipment purchased through Federal
preparedness assistance for first responders shall conform to equipment standards in
place at time of purchase. Other Federal departments and agencies that support the
purchase of first responder equipment will coordinate their programs with the
Department of Homeland Security and conform to the same standards.

(16) The Secretary, in coordination with other appropriate Federal departments and
agencies and in consultation with State and local governments, will develop plans to
identify and address national first responder equipment research and development
needs based upon assessments of current and future threats. Other Federal
departments and agencies that support preparedness research and development
activities shall coordinate their efforts with the Department of Homeland Security
and ensure they support the national preparedness goal.

Training and Exercises

(17) The Secretary, in coordination with the Secretary of HHS, the Attorney General,
and other appropriate Federal departments and agencies and in consultation with
State and local governments, shall establish and maintain a comprehensive training
program to meet the national preparedness goal. The program will identify standards
and maximize the effectiveness of existing Federal programs and financial assistance
and include training for the Nation’s first responders, officials, and others with major
event preparedness, prevention, response, and recovery roles. Federal departments
and agencies shall include private organizations in the accreditation and delivery of
preparedness training as appropriate and to the extent permitted by law.

(18) The Secretary, in coordination with other appropriate Federal departments and
agencies, shall establish a national program and a multi-year planning system to
conduct homeland security preparedness-related exercises that reinforces identified
training standards, provides for evaluation of readiness, and supports the national
preparedness goal. The establishment and maintenance of the program will be
conducted in maximum collaboration with State and local governments and
appropriate private sector entities. All Federal departments and agencies that
conduct national homeland security preparedness-related exercises shall participate
in a collaborative, interagency process to designate such exercises on a consensus
basis and create a master exercise calendar. The Secretary will ensure that exercises
included in the calendar support the national preparedness goal. At the time of
designation, Federal departments and agencies will identify their level of
participation in national homeland security preparedness-related exercises. The
Secretary will develop a multi-year national homeland security preparedness-related
exercise plan and submit the plan to me through the HSC for review and approval.

(19) The Secretary shall develop and maintain a system to collect, analyze, and
disseminate lessons learned, best practices, and information from exercises, training

191

events, research, and other sources, including actual incidents, and establish
procedures to improve national preparedness to prevent, respond to, and recover
from major events. The Secretary, in coordination with other Federal departments
and agencies are directed, and State and local governments are requested, to provide
this information to the Secretary to the extent permitted by law.

Federal Department and Agency Preparedness

(20) The head of each Federal department or agency shall undertake actions to
support the national preparedness goal, including adoption of quantifiable
performance measurements in the areas of training, planning, equipment, and
exercises for Federal incident management and asset preparedness, to the extent
permitted by law. Specialized Federal assets such as teams, stockpiles, and caches
shall be maintained at levels consistent with the national preparedness goal and be
available for response activities as set forth in the National Response Plan, other
appropriate operational documents, and applicable authorities or guidance. Relevant
Federal regulatory requirements should be consistent with the national preparedness
goal. Nothing in this directive shall limit the authority of the Secretary of Defense
with regard to the command and control, training, planning, equipment, exercises, or
employment of Department of Defense forces, or the allocation of Department of
Defense resources.

(21) The Secretary, in coordination with other appropriate Federal civilian
departments and agencies, shall develop and maintain a Federal response capability
inventory that includes the performance parameters of the capability, the timeframe
within which the capability can be brought to bear on an incident, and the readiness
of such capability to respond to domestic incidents. The Department of Defense will
provide to the Secretary information describing the organizations and functions
within the Department of Defense that may be utilized to provide support to civil
authorities during a domestic crisis.

Citizen Participation

(22) The Secretary shall work with other appropriate Federal departments and
agencies as well as State and local governments and the private sector to encourage
active citizen participation and involvement in preparedness efforts. The Secretary
shall periodically review and identify the best community practices for integrating
private citizen capabilities into local preparedness efforts.

Public Communication

(23) The Secretary, in consultation with other Federal departments and agencies,
State and local governments, and non-governmental organizations, shall develop a
comprehensive plan to provide accurate and timely preparedness information to

192

public citizens, first responders, units of government, the private sector, and other
interested parties and mechanisms for coordination at all levels of government.

Assessment and Evaluation

(24) The Secretary shall provide to me through the Assistant to the President for
Homeland Security an annual status report of the Nation’s level of preparedness,
including State capabilities, the readiness of Federal civil response assets, the
utilization of mutual aid, and an assessment of how the Federal first responder
preparedness assistance programs support the national preparedness goal. The first
report will be provided within 1 year of establishment of the national preparedness
goal.

(25) Nothing in this directive alters, or impedes the ability to carry out, the
authorities of the Federal departments and agencies to perform their responsibilities
under law and consistent with applicable legal authorities and presidential guidance.

(26) Actions pertaining to the funding and administration of financial assistance and
all other activities, efforts, and policies in this directive shall be executed in
accordance with law. To the extent permitted by law, these policies will be
established and carried out in consultation with State and local governments.

(27) This directive is intended only to improve the internal management of the
executive branch of the Federal Government, and it is not intended to, and does not,
create any right or benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law or in equity,
against the United States, its departments, agencies, or other entities, its officers or
employees, or any other person.

GEORGE W. BUSH

Abstract (if available)

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Asset Metadata

Creator Durbin, Gary Michael (author)

Core Title Organizational structuring for homeland security: a U.S. state-by-state comparative analysis

School School of Policy, Planning, and Development

Degree Doctor of Philosophy

Degree Program Public Administration

Publication Date 10/12/2009

Defense Date 02/18/2009

Publisher University of Southern California (original), University of Southern California. Libraries (digital)

Tag federalism,homeland security,intergovernmental relations,OAI-PMH Harvest,organizational structuring,terrorism,U.S. states

Place Name USA (countries)

Language English

Contributor Electronically uploaded by the author (provenance)

Advisor Myrtle, Robert C. (committee chair), Cummings, Thomas G. (committee member), Robertson, Peter John (committee member)

Creator Email durbin@usc.edu,gmdurbin@aol.com

Permanent Link (DOI) https://doi.org/10.25549/usctheses-m2659

Unique identifier UC1453240

Identifier etd-Durbin-3233 (filename),usctheses-m40 (legacy collection record id),usctheses-c127-270139 (legacy record id),usctheses-m2659 (legacy record id)

Legacy Identifier etd-Durbin-3233.pdf

Dmrecord 270139

Document Type Dissertation

Rights Durbin, Gary Michael

Type texts

Source University of Southern California (contributing entity), University of Southern California Dissertations and Theses (collection)

Repository Name Libraries, University of Southern California

Repository Location Los Angeles, California

Repository Email cisadmin@lib.usc.edu