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Intergenerational transfers in rural China: Do children's gender and birth order matter?

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Intergenerational transfers in rural China: Do children's gender and birth order matter?

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INTERGENERATIONAL TRANSFERS IN RURAL CHINA:
DO CHILDREN’S GENDER AND BIRTH ORDER MATTER?

by

Lu Zhou

A Dissertation Presented to the
FACULTY OF THE USC GRADUATE SCHOOL
UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA
In Partial Fulfillment of the
Requirements for the Degree
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
(SOCIAL WORK)

August 2010

Copyright 2010 Lu Zhou
ii
Acknowledgments
I strongly believe that obtaining a doctoral degree is an endeavor that cannot be
accomplished independently. The completion of my doctoral education would not have
been possible without support from many individuals.
First and foremost, I am greatly indebted to Dr. Marilyn Flynn for her excellent
guidance and valuable support. Dr. Flynn’s thoughtfulness and encouragement have been
vital to my academic and personal development. My deepest appreciation goes to the
other two members of my Dissertation Committee. I am very grateful to Dr. Iris Chi for
her constructive comments and broad vision for this study and for previous help and
support at every stage of my doctoral study. Gratitude is also given to Dr. Merril
Silverstein, who shared his expertise with me and brought a different perspective to my
study.
Also, I would like to express my sincere appreciation to my parents, Mr. Ying
Zhou and Mrs. Fang Sui, for having faith in me and providing me with unending
encouragement and support. In addition, I am grateful for the friendship of Mr. Lloyd Sun.
His timely advice and insightful comments at critical times have enabled me to make
sound and reasonable decisions on many occasions.
Finally, there are many other family members, faculty, staff, and colleagues in the
United States and in China to whom I am indebted. Although it is impossible to identify
everyone by name, I would like to take this opportunity to express my sincere thanks to
those who have in some way contributed to the completion of my doctoral education.
Thank you all.
iii
Table of Contents
Acknowledgments ii

List of Tables v

List of Figures vi

Abstract vii

Chapter 1: Introduction 1
Problem Statement 1
Purpose of the Research 6
Applicability to Social Work 7
Organization of the Dissertation 8

Chapter 2: Literature Review and Conceptual Framework 10
Intergenerational Transfers: Definition and Significance 10
What Are Intergenerational Transfers? 10
The Significance of Intergenerational Transfers 14
Conditions in Rural China 16
Motivations for Intergenerational Transfers: Theoretical Framework, Empirical
Evidence, and Significance 31
Theoretical Framework 31
Empirical Evidence for Intergenerational Transfer Motivations 37
Relevance of Transfer Theories to Social Security Policy Development 38
Conceptual Model and Research Hypotheses 39
Conceptual Model 39
Research Hypotheses 41
Data Analysis Plan 41

Chapter 3: Methods 43
Sample 43
Measures 48
Dependent Variables 48
Independent Variables 49

Chapter 4: Results 52
Stage One: Testing of Hypotheses 1 and 2 52
Monetary Transfers From Children 52
Time Transfers From Children 56
Summary of Testing of Hypotheses 1 and 2 59
Stage Two: Testing of Hypotheses 3 and 4 59

iv
Chapter 5: Discussion 61
Major Findings 61
Effects of Children’s Birth Order 61
Effects of Children’s Gender 62
Factors Related to Intergenerational Transfers 63
Strengths and Limitations 68
Strengths 68
Limitations 69
Implications for Future Research and Government Policy 71
Implications for Future Research 71
Implications for Government Policy 72

References 76

Appendices
Appendix A: Anhui Province, China 88
Appendix B: Chaohu Area, Anhui Province, China 89

v
List of Tables
Table 1: Description of Analytic Variables (N = 1,165) 46

Table 2: Size of Monetary Transfers by Child and Characteristics of Elders in 55
Anhui Province, China, 2009

Table 3: Size of Monetary Transfers by Child and Characteristics of Adult 55
Children in Anhui Province, China, 2009

Table 4: Size of Time Transfers by Child and Characteristics of Elders in 58
Anhui Province, China, 2009

Table 5: Size of Time Transfers by Child and Characteristics of Adult Children 58
in Anhui Province, China, 2009

Table 6: Summary of Intergenerational Monetary and Time Transfer 59
Motivations by Children’s Birth Order

Table 7: Summary of Intergenerational Monetary and Time Transfer 60
Motivations by Children’s Gender

vi
List of Figures
Figure 1: Anhui Province, China 88

Figure 2: Chaohu Area, Anhui Province, China 89

vii
Abstract
This dissertation is a unique case study of the effects of children’s birth order and
gender on intergenerational transfer motivations in rural China. Intergenerational transfer
motivations are critical determinants in public transfer programs and policies in Western
countries such as United States. However, these concepts are relatively new within the
Chinese culture, and the effects of children’s birth order and gender have not previously
been examined with regard to intergenerational transfers involving rural Chinese elders.
The purpose of this study was (a) to examine the factors that affect
intergenerational transfers; (b) to explore motivations for the transfer of income and time
from the perspective of rural-dwelling Chinese parents; and (c) to compare and contrast
motivations for intergenerational transfers by children’s gender and birth order from the
perspective of Chinese parents.
A stratified multistage method was used to randomly select 1,224 potential
respondents from the Chaohu area, Anhui Province, China, and data were collected in
2009. After the exclusion of participants who failed to pass the cognitive test, the sample
size for the present study was 1,165. Findings demonstrated that children’s birth order
had a significant effect on intergenerational transfer motivations from parents’
perspectives. However, children’s gender did not play any role in determining the
motivations for intergenerational transfers. Implications for government policy and future
research are discussed.
1
Chapter 1
Introduction

Problem Statement
Intergenerational transfers, both of money and of time, have long interested
economists, social scientists, and social workers. The transfer of resources between
generations takes two basic forms: from parents to adult children (downward transfers)
and from children to elderly parents (upward transfers). From a policy perspective,
upward intergenerational transfers are crucial in developing countries, because they
represent the most important safety net for older adults (Sloan, Zhang, & Wang, 2002).
Social work professionals are especially interested in the topic of intergenerational
transfers because they can be used to help the government shape policies and practices to
improve the quality of life for elders. Social work professionals understand not only the
balance between individual, societal, and state responsibility for elder well-being but also
the proper roles of the state, the private sector, voluntary organizations, and the family in
supporting elders.
As the most populous developing country in the world, China is now an aging
society. In 2009, the population older than age 60 reached 167 million, making up 12.5%
of the total population. This population continues to grow and is expected to reach 300
million by 2020, accounting for 16.7% of the total population of China (China Daily
News, 2010). Although a tremendous challenge for the Chinese government and social
work professionals, establishing a national old-age security system is important for
2
coping with population aging and maintaining the social stability achieved since the
economic reforms of the 1980s.
The majority of Chinese elders live in rural areas, where the level of economic
development is comparatively low. According to the China Research Center on Aging
(2006), the population of rural elders aged 60 or older is estimated to be 108 million, or
more than 60% of the country’s elders. The average annual income for rural older adults
is approximately RMB 2,970 (US $434), which is only one fourth that of their urban
counterparts. Low incomes and the lack of a pension system for the rural population have
combined to create serious economic hardship—particularly in the absence of any formal
support or other forms of social security (Joseph & Phillips, 1999; S. Li, Feldman, & Jin,
2004).
To guarantee basic living standards for the elderly and safeguard their legitimate
rights and interests, the Chinese government has made continuous improvements to the
old-age insurance system since the 1990s. Specifically, it has enacted a series of laws and
regulations to promote the development of aging services, enhance seniors’ social status,
and protect elders’ rights within a “harmonious society.” For example, in 1996 the
Standing Committee of the Eighth National People’s Congress, in accordance with the
Chinese Constitution, enacted a law to protect the lawful rights and interests of the aged,
develop programs to ensure their well-being, and carry forward the virtue of the Chinese
nation with respect to respecting and supporting the aged.
Afterward, the State Council promulgated several pension programs to promote
the development of a basic old-age insurance system for employees in urban areas,
leaving the rural population with little or no coverage. According to the Ministry of
3
Human Resources and Social Security (2009), the Chinese urban pension system covers
205 million people, or about 15% of the population. In contrast, the rural pension
program, which began in the 1990s, covers only about 10% of the labor force, and the
number of participants in that program dropped by a third between 1999 and 2004. This
setback may be attributed to systemic differences between the central and provincial
governments. The provincial governments have their own authority and may choose not
to implement policies that come from the central governments. The underdeveloped
administrative infrastructure in rural areas might also be to blame. Thanks to the recent
boom in the economy, central and local governments may have some financial recourse,
but there is still a lack of mechanisms or means for delivering services to underserved
rural elders.
Although aging issues in urban areas are similar to those in other countries, the
situation is quite different in rural areas because of their relatively low socioeconomic
development. Almost no other area in the world faces the set of aging-related problems
common in rural China. Because the government can offer few resources to rural elders,
family support and individual savings are crucial. Also, the government assumes that
families will take care of rural elders. China’s traditional culture is marked by a time-
honored tradition of self-reliance and security provided by the family. Many rural elders
have little choice but to rely exclusively on their children for financial, instrumental, and
emotional support.
However, reliance on a single private source (such as children) for old-age
support functions reasonably well only under certain limited conditions. It can be an
effective strategy for dealing with risks that adversely affect only a few individuals at one
4
time, but it is not good in the face of risks that affect the whole family. For instance,
children can fully support older parents only if there are no mitigating circumstances in
their own families. Also, the splitting apart of families due to migration dilutes the extent
of available support from children to parents, as the present study shows. In addition,
family relationships are prone to conflict. Parents may not want to obligate their children
to support them in order to preserve a degree of autonomy and avoid the conflicts that are
common in parent–child relationships (Leisering, Sen, & Hussain, 2002).
It is essential to establish a formal old-age security system in rural areas to ensure
support in the midst of dramatic socioeconomic transformation. However, before
designing this policy, experts must understand the influence of private intergenerational
transfers on public transfer programs. Private transfers serve a variety of social and
economic functions that impinge on the objectives and functions of public programs.
They could affect the outcome of public policy in unexpected ways. For instance, private
transfers provide support for elders in retirement and the funds for rural–urban migration.
Thus, they may supplement or overlap with public transfers, in particular transfers from
programs aimed at rural elders who have retired or experienced a decline in earning
power.
The Chinese government is committed to extending national social insurance to
all citizens and to increasing levels of social assistance for rural elders. Therefore, it is
crucial to explore the motivations for private intergenerational transfers in rural areas and
their effect on public policy. This is highly relevant for developing public policy and
promoting the economic well-being of rural elders. The experiences of Western countries
suggest that private intergenerational transfers might be replaced by public assistance.
5
Thus, the effect of government aid might be offset by a reduction in private transfers. But
how private transfer behavior reacts to increased public assistance depends heavily on the
motivations for exchanging money and time between generations. However, few studies
have focused on this topic among Chinese populations.
Understanding what leads children to transfer resources to parents is significant
for China and for other countries that share similar cultural traditions, because future
decisions about the size of benefits in social security and public assistance systems may
depend upon this knowledge. If children reduce their transfers by an amount equivalent to
new public cash transfers, then there will be a major increase in government expenditures
but no net social benefit for elders. Alternatively, if children are motivated to continue
their transfers despite parents’ receipt of additional income from the government, then the
net well-being of elders will increase with the same level of government outlay.
Previous research has indicated that children’s gender and birth order play an
important role in the helping behaviors adult children show their parents. Sons and their
families usually provide more to parents in the way of financial transfers, and older
children provide larger transfers than their younger siblings (X. Chen, 2001; I. F. Lin et
al., 2003; Sun, 2002). But is this also true from the perspective of rural elders? That is, do
parents expect a greater return from sons or elder children in the first place?
These questions imply that parents’ motivations for raising offspring may differ
depending on the children’s gender and birth order, especially in rural areas where
traditional family relationships and expectations have survived many of the modern
influences of social change. If those effects do exist, how significant are they? These
6
questions are central to future policy development because different motivations may
have different effects on public transfer programs.
Because China is still a developing nation—at least with respect to its rural
population—and the number of elders is exceptionally large in absolute terms, any new
public income transfer policies are certain to be costly and even beyond the limits of the
government’s current financial capability. Therefore, if children’s gender and birth order
are indeed significant variables in determining the motivations for intergenerational
transfers, this knowledge might permit an initial targeting of incentives or disincentives
in order to conserve resources while yielding real improvements in the standard of living
for older people.
Considering the motivations for upward transfers in terms of children’s gender
and birth order as a basis for social policy would represent a major innovation not only
for China but for other countries in the 21st century. It would set a precedent allowing for
better articulation between private and public sector allocative decisions and ultimately
has the potential to improve the quality of life for elders even under conditions of
resource constraint.

Purpose of the Research
The purpose of this study is (a) to examine the factors that affect intergenerational
transfers in rural China; (b) to explore motivations for the transfer of income and time
from the perspective of rural-dwelling Chinese parents; and (c) to compare and contrast
motivations for intergenerational transfers, by children’s gender and birth order, from the
perspective of Chinese parents. A conceptual model of hypothesized relationships is
7
empirically examined using probit and multiple linear regression techniques. Conclusions
are based on data from a sample of 1,165 rural older adults from a cross-sectional survey
conducted in the Chaohu area, Anhui Province, China, in 2009.
Given the interest in understanding intergenerational transfer motivations within
the Chinese context, this study also identifies the impacts of the Confucian tradition of
filial piety and the unique effect of internal migration on rural family structures and living
arrangements.

Applicability to Social Work
This study is applicable to the field of social work for several reasons. Although
this research does not explicitly contrast the Chinese experience with that of other
emerging or advanced economies, it is nonetheless implicitly multicultural in its
orientation. It begins by analyzing underlying cultural patterns and practices that in turn
have significant implications for the conceptualization and administration of fundamental
social welfare programs such as social security. The research goes well beyond a typical
economic analysis that would consider only distributional effects to recognize that culture
may be a powerful determinant in decision making. Social work is concerned with the
family and the community context in which decision making occurs and therefore is able
as a field to make an especially important contribution to the reconceptualization of
social security policies.
As professionals whose aim is to help human beings, social workers have played a
central role in the development of social security and employment policy in the United
States and Europe. The social development literature has largely articulated a social work
8
perspective on these policies in rural Asian families, a perspective that is generally a
product of the activity or observations of nongovernmental organizations. For the first
time, the present study brings a social work perspective to these issues in rural China
based on a model of quantitative analysis that lends itself more readily to policy design.
Traditional systems of family support of older adults are gradually breaking down or
reforming, opening up the potential for new government roles. Leaving rural Chinese
elders dependent on only one source of support (i.e., their children) is no longer a viable
method of maintaining social harmony and individual well-being, which are fundamental
concerns of social workers in all cultures.

Organization of the Dissertation
This dissertation is organized as follows. In Chapter 1, the nature and rationale of
the study, its purpose, and the specific aims of the research are discussed. Chapter 2
presents a summary of the conceptual and empirical literature relevant to topic, including
the significance and definition of intergenerational transfers, the definition and theoretical
model of transfer motives and filial piety, background information on internal migration,
and information on the influences and relationships of other variables in the conceptual
model. Chapter 3 discusses the quantitative research methodology used in the current
study, including the study design, participants, measures, data collection procedures, and
data analysis. Chapter 4 provides the results for the quantitative components of the
research. Participants’ demographic data and other relevant variables are summarized
first, then the results of the probit and multiple linear regressions are summarized.
Chapter 5 contains a discussion of the research findings and their implications for
9
policies as well as future research. Study strengths and limitations are also discussed. The
appendices contain two figures of the study area.

10
Chapter 2
Literature Review and Conceptual Framework

Intergenerational Transfers: Definition and Significance

What are intergenerational transfers? The term intergenerational transfers
normally refers to cash, services, or assets other than cash that are exchanged among
generations. Such transfers take two forms: from elderly parents to adult children
(upward transfers) and from parents to adult children (downward transfers). Despite the
conventional idea that adults should be financially self-sufficient, intergenerational
transfers to parents from children occur in both developed and developing countries and
in fact are encouraged by tradition and established value systems.
Upward transfers can occur in the form of financial support and/or time. Financial
transfers can include cash, goods, and real estate. Time transfers, called instrumental
support from the sociological perspective, include help with household tasks and personal
care. Household assistance may involve cleaning and laundering, cooking, or making
home repairs. Personal care refers to assistance with activities of daily living, such as
bathing, dressing, eating, and toileting (George, 1998a). Time transfers clearly have
economic value—and, indeed, the services provided by time transfers can be purchased
with money. Because different factors are associated with the provision of time and
money transfers, however, these transfers are typically and appropriately examined
separately.
11
Several nationally representative samples of American adults have yielded good
estimates of the frequency of transfers from adult children to aging parents within
specified time intervals. Money transfers are made less frequently than time transfers of
personal care and household assistance. About 3% to 10% of American adults transfer
$500 or more to their parents within a 1-year interval (Eggebeen, 1992; Hogan, Eggebeen,
& Clogg, 1993; McGarry & Schoeni, 1995). In contrast, personal care transfers to older
parents are made by 7% to 15% of adult children in a 1-year time frame (Logan & Spitze,
1994; McGarry & Schoeni, 1995; Stone, Cafferata, & Sangl, 1987). Between one fifth
and one third of American adults provide their parents with household assistance in any
given month (Eggebeen, 1992; O’Neill, 1997). Yet all of these percentages vastly
underestimate the lifetime incidence of transferring money or time to older parents,
because many adults who may not have transferred time or money to their parents in any
given year will have done so in previous years or will do so in the future. However, this
evidence indicates that intergenerational transfers from adult children to older parents are
far from rare in American society.
China presents a more extreme example, especially outside of urban communities.
In rural China, adult children are likely to be the only source of economic and social
support to older parents because of the absence of universal public pension and long-term
care programs. Y . J. Lee and Xiao (1998) estimated that nearly 70% of rural elders
receive income transfers from adult children. One recent study indicated that virtually all
older parents had received financial transfers from at least one child in the preceding 12
months (Silverstein, Cong, & Li, 2006).
12
Time transfers are also very common. Silverstein et al. (2006) found that more
than half of rural older parents received some household help or personal care from their
children. Those who received no instrumental support were elderly persons whose
children were living elsewhere and not at home.
Like upward transfers, downward transfers may take the form of time and/or
money, goods, and real estate. Adults support children’s school expenses, offer housing,
care for grandchildren, and are increasingly important sources of assistance throughout
their adult children’s lives. Research shows that in the United States, family monetary
assistance typically flows down the generations, especially from parents to adult children
(Eggebeen & Hogan, 1990; Hughes, Waite, LaPierre, & Luo, 2007; McGarry & Schoeni,
1997; Rossi & Rossi, 1990; Soldo & Hill, 1993).
George (1998b) pointed out that money transfers from older parents to adult
children take two primary forms. One pattern is an equal disbursement model: Equal
amounts of money are provided to all children regardless of their level of need or their
personal characteristics. The other pattern is one in which older parents transfer money to
their adult children in response to the children’s needs for financial resources. The equal
disbursement pattern is the less common of the two and is used primarily by wealthy
older adults when distributing parts of their estate prior to death (Cox, 1987). The other
more common pattern tends to be occasional and sporadic, although some older people
provide regular financial assistance to their children (McGarry & Schoeni, 1997). This
pattern is likely to be particularly prevalent in times of recession.
In addition, grandparents remain an important source of child care for a sizeable
fraction of working parents in the United States, although the number of children cared
13
for by grandparents has declined as the use of formal child care has increased (Bowers &
Myers, 1999; Fuller-Thomson & Minkler, 2001; Hofferth, 1996). At the same time, the
proportion of grandparents who provide coresidential care for grandchildren has
increased (Lugaila, 1998). Some grandparents assume responsibility for raising a
grandchild when the parents are unavailable because of substance abuse, illness, or
incarceration (Goodman & Silverstein, 2002; Kelley, Yorker, & Whitley, 1997). Others
share responsibility for grandchildren in response to their adult child’s financial need,
divorce, or work commitment (Musil & Ahmad, 2002). In other words, in the United
States, grandparents who care for grandchildren provide a critical service for both the
grandchildren and the adult child.
Although intergenerational monetary transfers in rural China are predominantly
upward transfers, one study found that 42% of a relatively poor group of rural older
parents had provided financial transfers to their children (Silverstein et al., 2006). Older
adults may also provide financial assistance to their adult children when the children get
married or otherwise require startup funds (Q. Liu & Reilly, 2004; Yan, 2003). On some
occasions, adult children consider these types of downward monetary transfers their
parents’ responsibility and base their own decision to provide future old-age support to
their elderly parents on the provision of such transfers (Cong, 2008).
In contrast, millions of young workers migrate out of impoverished rural regions
to take better paying factory and service jobs in cities and therefore need time and money
from their parents, who remain at home caring for grandchildren (Q. Liu & Reilly, 2004;
Secondi, 1997). As a result of the household registration system (hukou), which assigns
people almost permanent residential status to either urban or rural locations, most
14
migrants from rural China are away from their home villages only temporarily, which
makes it difficult for them to take their children with them (Bai & Song, 2002; Silverstein
et al., 2006; Zhao, 2005). Therefore, older parents have to provide care for their
grandchildren left behind in rural villages. Cong and Silverstein (2008) found that more
than 16% of rural grandparents provided daily full-time care to their grandchildren, and
more than 24% of elders reported that they provided weekly or monthly help.

The significance of intergenerational transfers. The family is a critical social
institution in terms of providing support to its members. The effects on this support of
longer life expectancy and greater diversity of family forms are being hotly debated in
academic and policy circles (Bengtson, 2001). One function families provide is the
transfer of resources—both time and money—among members. All over the world,
upward and downward intergenerational transfers (both of money and of time) help
determine the consumption patterns of family members across the life cycle (Lillard &
Willis, 2002).
There are at least two reasons why policymakers should be informed about the
size and determinants of private transfers. One is that if private donors cut back their
transfers as the amount of public transfers increases, the effect of public programs on
beneficiaries will be less than originally intended. This is because government transfer
programs usually have administrative costs. The other is that some of the benefits of
public programs will be shared with private donors (Cox & Jimenez, 1990). In other
words, the donor may benefit from public program, which is supposed to benefit only the
15
recipient of the public transfer. For instance, elderly parents may provide “public
transfers” to their children when they need help.
In the United States and other developed countries, market institutions (e.g.,
employer-provided pensions and health insurance) and tax-supported public institutions
(e.g., public education, social security, and health insurance) have gradually come to
substitute for some traditional family functions. However, in most developing countries,
such as China, pensions and health insurance from either the private or public sector are
largely nonexistent, especially in rural areas, so the family is likely to be chiefly
responsible for elder care (Lillard & Willis, 1997).
In rural China, adult children as the primary source of support for aging parents
has been a particular focus of attention, because government mechanisms for old-age
support remain limited. Accurate estimates of the value and magnitude of
intergenerational upward transfers would help policymakers better understand the full
extent to which rural older adults depend on their adult children. The more critical
question could then be addressed: If public assistance or social insurance programs were
to be provided, might those upward private transfers decrease or disappear entirely?
It is also critical to explore the size of downward transfers (especially in terms of
grandchild care) from older parents to adult children to identify whether the burden is too
heavy for these elderly people. A large literature suggests that excessive caring for
grandchildren may jeopardize older parents’ physical and mental health (Grinstead, Leder,
Jensen, & Bond, 2003; Jendrek, 1993; Minkler, 1999; Minkler, Fuller-Thomson, Miller,
& Driver, 1997). For example, Jendrek found that the day-to-day care of children,
especially very young children, is physically taxing and can involve loss of sleep and
16
exposure to infections. Time pressures, added emotional stress, and the physical work of
child care may also produce feelings of exhaustion and overload, reducing life
satisfaction. If this is the case, the well-being of older caretakers might be advanced
through the development of new public transfer programs such as day care centers in
rural communities that reduce the necessity for older adults to undertake burdensome
child care.

Conditions in rural China

Social security. There are currently two small-scale public pension schemes in
some rural areas of China. One is an old-age insurance plan with voluntary contributions.
The other is a non-contributory scheme that provides county-specific benefits for a very
narrowly targeted segment of rural elders (China Population Council, 2005).
The old-age insurance plan was piloted in one province in the late 1980s and was
officially extended to the other provinces in 1992. Starting from economically developed
areas, pilot projects for establishing an old-age social insurance system were instituted in
rural areas in 1986. After an experimental period, the Ministry of Civil Affairs
promulgated the Basic Program for Rural Social Security Insurance at the County Level
in 1992, calling for a rural social old-age insurance system with the county as the basic
unit of operation (D. Wang, 2006). Adhering to the principle of establishing a rural old-
age insurance system funded primarily by individual contributions with supplemental
collectively sponsored contributions and governmental policy support, China has set up
individual pension accounts managed by county governments and has encouraged parents
17
of a single child to participate in this program through higher subsidy standards from the
collectives.
Participants—including workers of towns and village enterprises—voluntarily
contribute and accumulate assets in their individual accounts. In most counties,
particularly those in the less developed middle and western regions, rural residents are the
sole contributors to their accounts. But in the more affluent eastern counties, some
workers receive subsidized contributions from their employers if they work in town or
village enterprises; those without employers are sometimes sponsored by their village
community (Y . Yang, Williamson, & Shen, 2010).
A few provincial governments, such as those of the Beijing and Jiangsu Provinces,
provide additional financial subsidies to rural participants (China Economy Net, 2007).
Starting at age 60, participants receive an annuity-based pension whose size is based on
the accumulated sum in the account. The administration, investment, and allocation of
these benefits is overseen by the county government. Thus, the structure and
implementation of the pension plans vary from one county to another (Ministry of Civil
Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, 1992). In 2007, there were 52 million
contributors to this rural old-age insurance plan and 3.9 million pensioners (China Social
Security Annual Bulletin, 2007).
The other small-scale public pension scheme in China is a non-contributory social
assistance program called Rural Five Guarantees. It is intended for rural elders who are
incapable of working and have neither income, nor assets, nor children. Beneficiaries of
the Rural Five Guarantees program are supported through either a collective placement in
an Elders House or through individual placement with a local family (China Population
18
Council, 2005). As of 2007, those in an Elders House received a government pension of
approximately US $267 per person per year. For those contracted out to local families,
the yearly pension averaged about US $196. About 5.3 million rural elders benefit from
this social assistance program (China Civil Affairs Statistical Bulletin, 2007).
However, pension coverage for rural elders is still very limited (China National
Economy and Social Development Statistical Bulletin, 2007). The 5.3 million rural elders
benefiting from Rural Five Guarantees and the 3.9 million pensioners drawing benefits
from rural old-age insurance schemes brought the total number of rural elders receiving
regular pensions to approximately 9.2 million in 2007 (China Civil Affairs Statistical
Bulletin, 2007; China Social Security Annual Bulletin, 2007).
The reason pension coverage is so limited is because the development of the rural
old-age security system ground to a halt after 1998. Government restructuring in that year
transferred the work of rural old-age security from the Ministry of Civil Affairs to the
Ministry of Labor and Social Security. In July 1999, the State Council noted that the
conditions in rural areas were not conducive to carrying out old-age security on a large
scale. It therefore decided to rectify the existing insurance programs, stopped accepting
new beneficiaries, and encouraged regions with appropriate socioeconomic conditions to
gradually move toward commercial insurance (D. Wang, 2006). During this period, the
majority of rural areas saw a decline in the number of farmers with insurance and
experienced increasing difficulties operating the old-age insurance funds because of
institutional and policy changes.

19
Elders’ relationships with their children. China has the largest population of any
nation and the largest absolute number of older people in the world. The majority of its
elders live in rural rather than urban areas. Rural elders differ from their urban
counterparts in many aspects. For instance, unlike urban elders, rural elders generally
have to continue to work to support themselves because there is no pension to
compensate them for their life-long employment. As L. H. Pang, Brauw, and Rozelle
(2004) pointed out, rural Chinese elders are economically vulnerable, and most of them
have to continue working “until they drop.”
Another good example between urban and rural is the contrast in medical
insurance systems. Urban elders usually have some kind of insurance coverage after they
retire. However, many rural elders living in poverty do not have any type of health
insurance because they cannot afford the premium or copay (Zhu, 2000). Almost three
fourths of urban elders are able to obtain some medical insurance, whereas only 44.7% of
rural elders have such coverage (China Research Center on Aging, 2006). In some
extreme cases, elders have committed suicide when they could no longer work and thus
became a burden to their families (Cong, 2008). The rate for attempted suicide is about
4.9% among rural elders and only 2.6% among urban elders (China Research Center on
Aging, 2006).
A nationally representative survey conducted in 2006 by the China Research
Center on Aging found that only 4.8% of rural elders received some pension from a
former employer, whereas 78% of urban elders received social insurance payments. This
report also indicated that the annual average income (in cash) for rural elders in old age
20
was RMB 2,970 (US $434), with an average annual expenditure of RMB 2,691 (US
$384). This means that few rural older adults are able to save for old age.
Thus, most rural elders feel that they are economically insecure, and many decide
to invest in and rely on their children rather than personal savings, insurance, or pensions.
This situation not only reflects the value of filial piety and culturally embedded
Confucianism but imposes strong obligations on adult children to support their parents in
various ways, especially by providing financial help (Shi, 1993; Sung, 1995).
Financially vulnerable rural elders have to depend on their assets, their savings,
and their children when they cannot work anymore, but after living in life-long poverty,
they have few assets. They also usually need to do as much as possible to assist their
children at such critical points as when they are getting married, when the parents might
be expected to build a house in which their children can live independently (Q. Liu &
Reilly, 2004; Yan, 2003). The importance of meeting these traditional expectations is
underscored by the fact that filial piety from children is often conditional and depends on
whether parents fulfill their responsibilities. Therefore, elders have to work even harder
or borrow money from others with a promise of future repayment in order to satisfy their
children’s expectations. Failure to do so may result in children withholding assistance
from their parents later on (Cohen, 1998; Yan, 2003). This kind of inter vivo asset
transfer depletes parents completely by the time they reach old age, particularly if they
have several sons (Cong, 2008).

Filial piety. It would be almost impossible to understand the aspirations and
struggles of Chinese older adults without understanding filial piety. Filial piety, which
21
emanates from Confucian teachings and defines the intergenerational relationship, is one
of the most fundamental family values across the Chinese culture. As an ethical/moral
system oriented toward practice, Confucianism defines the roles and duties of every
family member, particularly the eldest son, in the indigenous concept of filial piety.
According to Confucianism, family members are connected through mutual
interdependence over the lifetime. This means that family members are embedded in a
network of life-long mutual obligations toward one another. Life-long loyalty as well as
the maintenance of harmony in the family is expected. Adult children, especially the
eldest son and his wife, have the duty of caring for elderly parents in a material,
emotional, and spiritual way (Bengtson & Putney, 2000; Chow, 2001; Ho, 1996; Hwang,
1999; Pak, 1996).
Filial piety (or xiao) has been continuously practiced, taught, and appreciated in
behavior, attitude, and belief throughout Chinese history (Tu, 1997). Regardless of how
one categorizes filial piety, it is impossible to deny the depth and the pervasiveness of the
influence of this concept. This value has traditionally surpassed all other ethics in
Chinese culture. It holds strong influence in every aspect of life and is constantly adapted
and modified by the Chinese people.
However, respecting and caring for parents and older relatives is not unique to the
Chinese culture. Such practices are common in many other cultural groups, such as
African American populations (Hines & Boyd-Franklin, 1996), Hispanic American
populations (Falicov, 1996), Native American populations (Sutton & Broken Nose, 1996),
and Arab populations (Abudabbeh, 1996). In Western societies, filial piety is often
understood to be solely the practice of caring for aging parents and older relatives, which
22
is a narrow interpretation of filial piety within Chinese culture and a misunderstanding of
the Chinese family.
Filial piety actually describes a way of life in which the group comes before the
self and elders are to be honored, obeyed, and cared for. It is not just about caregiving; it
is about authority, power, transmission of knowledge and values, and the continuation of
the family lineage (Chow, 1996). Clearly prescribed rules and roles are passed from
generation to generation, and the obedience of children to their parents or parents-in-law
is expected. Elders control considerable assets within the family, which also gives them
control over family decision making (M. Y . Lee & Mjelde-Mossey, 2004).
This favored position of authority and control extends beyond the family. Old age
is revered throughout the greater society, and elders are accorded relatively high social
and economic status (Chow, 1996; Gernet, 1982). For example, the value system of filial
piety requires that the child obey and respect his or her parents and support them in old
age. Children’s duties to their parents are unconditional, because they owe their birth (i.e.,
the basis of their entire being) to their parents. Hence, theoretically speaking, the adult
child is obligated to provide his or her elderly parents with financial, instrumental, and
emotional support at any cost (Ishii-Kuntz, 1997).
In addition, filial piety in the Chinese context refers to a range of behavioral
prescriptions, including showing respect, being obedient, honoring or promoting the
public prestige of the parent and the ancestors, producing a male heir and carrying on the
family line, living with the parent (or staying close by if coresidence is not possible),
taking care of the parent whether the parent is healthy or sick, avoiding injury to the self
23
(because the body belongs to the parent), and others (Chow, 2001; Hsu, Lew-Ting, & Wu,
2001; K.-S. Yang, 1997).
The values of filial piety are even more popular and dominant in rural China,
where cultural prescriptions and expression tend to be more traditional (Davis-Friedmann,
1991; H. Zhang, 2004). Adult children are expected to support their aged parents as a
moral obligation and a duty under the law.1 Adult children are thought to be indebted to
the older generation and are obliged to assist in their physical, emotional, and material
well-being. Although some research has indicated that traditional filial piety is on the
decline or undergoing transformation (Chow, 2001; Kwan, Cheung, & Ng, 2003;
Silverstein et al., 2006; H. J. Zhan, 2004), it is still sufficiently prevalent that this value
system continues to influence motivations for intergenerational transfer.

Prescribed responsibilities of children. In Confucian cultures such as China and
Korea, children are legally and morally obligated to be financially responsible for their
parents (Shi, 1993; Sung, 1995). However, expectations vary by child. In most Asian
societies, a strict hierarchical order exists among children that depends on family and
gender norms (Knodel & Ofstedal, 2002; I. F. Lin et al., 2003).
According to the practice of patrilineal marriage, a daughter usually marries into a
place other than her natal village and is not entitled to any land in her new village after
marriage. Theoretically speaking, she belongs to another family and another village
(Cong, 2008). Only married sons are entitled to land for farming and housing, and in

1
The “Chinese Marriage Law” enacted in mainland China stipulates that “children shall have the duty to support and
assist their parents … If children fail to perform their duty, parents who are unable to work or have difficulties in
providing for themselves shall have the right to demand support payments from their children” (Chapter 3, Article 21;
Consulate-General of the People’s Republic of China in New York, 2003).
24
return they are expected to take care of their parents in their old age (Feldman,
Tuljapurkar, Li, Jin, & Li, 2006). For example, more than 80% of rural Chinese elders
believe that sons are the best providers for old age, which reflects their strong son
preference and high expectations for receiving help from sons’ families (X. Chen &
Silverstein, 2000).
Concerning instrumental support from children, the traditional belief that sons are
the best providers for parents’ old age reveals three nested expectations. First is the
expectation that children should be responsible for their parents. Second is the gendered
expectation that among children, sons and their families—rather than daughters and their
families—should provide for the parents’ old age. In this family system, sons and
daughters-in-law are clearly defined as central family members, whereas daughters and
sons-in-law are peripheral to the family core (Cong, 2008). Their exchanges with the
parents are almost more characteristic of those of friends, such that they are more likely
to be short term. Sons-in-law are not active participants in providing instrumental support
in a patrilineal family system (Antonucci & Jackson, 2003; H. Yang, 1996; H. J. Zhan,
2004).
The third (gendered) expectation is that within sons’ families, female members
(i.e., daughters-in-law) are the expected providers of instrumental support because
providing care or hands-on help is regarded as women’s work. In this way, the obligations
of daughters-in-law preempt those of sons and daughters in providing instrumental help
to older adults (Cohen, 1998; I. F. Lin et al., 2003; Youn, Knight, Jeong, & Benton, 1999).
However, a recent study indicated that elders are receiving more and more help from their
daughters because of improved transportation that facilitates daughters’ contact with their
25
parents as well as the economic independence daughters have gained through migration
and work off the farm (S. Li et al., 2004).

Migration of adult children. In 1980, China implemented a significant reform
designed to restructure the economy. Responsibility for producing agricultural goods was
assigned to rural households. Unfortunately, a vast surplus of rural labor was created as a
result of the communal production system. As a consequence, working-age adults began
to look for employment opportunities in larger cities outside of their villages of origin. At
the same time, rapid economic development in urban areas created an additional stimulus
for rural migration because of higher living standards and better employment
opportunities in the cities (Giles & Mu, 2007; S. K. Zhan, Sun, & Blas, 2002; T. Liu &
Chan, 2001).
Using a 1% sample from the 1990 and 2000 rounds of the Population Census and
the 1995 1% population survey, Liang and Ma (2004) estimated that the inter-county
migrant population grew from just more than 20 million in 1990 to 45 million in 1995
and 79 million by 2000. Surveys conducted by the National Bureau of Statistics and the
Ministry of Agriculture included more detailed retrospective information on past short-
term migration and suggested even higher levels of labor migration than those reported in
the census (Cai, Park, & Zhao, 2006).
The problem of the massive movement of the population is further complicated by
the existence of the household registration system (hukou), which was introduced in the
1950s. According to this system, people are required to live and work only where they are
officially permitted to do so. Rural migrants in the cities are forbidden to own land,
26
barred from the most desirable jobs, and unable to access the subsidized education and
medical care to which urban residents are entitled (MacKenzie, 2002).

Characteristics of migrants. Most migrants share characteristics that may
influence their intergenerational relationships with their parents. First, they have strong
bonds with their homelands and remit substantial amounts of money home (Cong, 2008).
A survey conducted in 1995 in Jinan, the capital of Shandong province, found that 85%
of migrants had remitted some income in the previous 12 months that accounted for more
than a third of their urban labor earnings (Q. Liu & Reilly, 2004).
Second, most migration is temporary (Cong, 2008). A survey conducted in
Shanghai showed that most migrants were not planning to stay permanently and revealed
a pattern of circular migration (F. Wang & Zuo, 1999). After 1997, the flow of labor back
to villages accelerated (De Brauw & Rozelle, 2003). The major underlying reason was
the segregation of urban and rural societies by the household registration system (hukou),
which established barriers for rural migrants to live permanently in urban areas. In
addition, other factors, such as low education and income, poor benefits, segregated labor
market and occupational opportunities, temporary housing, and barriers to children
obtaining reasonably priced education, also lead to rural migrants only temporarily
staying in urban areas (Bai & Song, 2002; H. Li & Zahniser, 2002; F. Wang & Zuo, 1999;
W. W. Wang & Fan, 2006).
The barriers to living permanently in urban areas create an increased demand for
child care back home (Cong, 2008). Surveys conducted in Shanghai and Beijing showed
that most rural migrants lived alone or in “collective households” (one household shared
27
by many single individuals; e.g., students in a university, single employees in a company)
without their families and children (J. Pang, 1996; F. Wang & Zuo, 1999). Because there
is no good public child care system in rural China, grandparents are valuable resources
for child care (F. Chen, Short, & Entwistle, 2000; Hermalin, Roan, & Perez, 1998). When
their adult children migrate for better economic opportunities, elders take on either a
surrogate parenting role or coparenting role with their grandchildren, which strengthens
the intergenerational interdependence between migrants and their (extended) families.

Influences of migration on intergenerational transfers. Intergenerational
relationships among rural families and intergenerational transfers have been substantially
influenced by migration in several ways. Chinese grandparents are not traditionally
responsible for the care of grandchildren. Historically, grandparents have been asked to
assist their adult children but not to take on the entire custodial role (Cong, 2008). Yet
there were exceptions. If a grandmother found that her daughter-in-law was not caring for
the grandchildren properly, the grandmother might intervene and assume parental
responsibilities (Chao, 1983). More recently, however, with accelerating migration and
the concomitant demand for child care, both grandmothers and grandfathers have
increasingly taken on the role of providing full-time care for their grandchildren (Parish
& Whyte, 1978; Silverstein et al., 2006).
Moreover, migration has made it more likely that elders will receive financial
support from children (Cong, 2008). Elders have shared in the benefits of their migrant
children’s increased economic capacity (Q. Liu & Reilly, 2004; Y . B. Zhang, 2002),
because filial responsibility obliges children to care for their parents when they are able
28
to do so (G. R. Lee, Netzer, & Coward, 1995). However, when elders provide custodial
care of grandchildren to facilitate their children’s migration, they may have expectations
for compensation when such care comes at a greater cost and is perceived as a favor to
children rather than a natural duty (Cong, 2008; Silverstein et al., 2006).

Factors that affect intergenerational transfers. Whether parents receive a certain
type of help from their children depends on their specific needs, such as their economic
situation, their health status, or other demographic characteristics. For instance, parents’
age, marital status, and physical condition play a crucial role in eliciting intergenerational
transfers. Adult children are more likely to transfer money to widowed mothers and to
fathers in poor health, and the amount transferred increases when the mother’s health is
poor (Lillard & Willis, 2002; Park, 2003; Secondi, 1997; Sun, 2002).
Also, the resources available to older parents to draw on from the family network,
such as the number of children, can be an important factor. Number of children is
positively related to the level of support elders receive and to their general well-being
(Hermalin, Ofstedal, Freedman, Chang, & Roan, 1996; Pei & Pillai, 1999). Supporting
parents is regarded as a natural obligation, so when parents are in need of help, every
child is expected to provide support. A larger number of children imply a larger pool of
potential resources. In addition, whether parents leave bequests or meet children’s needs
for marriage may also affect the children’s decisions to provide support (Bernheim,
Shleifer, & Summers, 1985).
In addition, the elders’ economic status affects their ability to help themselves,
which in turn affects their need for help (Hermalin et al., 1996). Elderly parents with
29
more economic resources have fewer needs and are less likely than those with fewer
resources to depend on their children for financial support.
Which type of help a child offers (i.e., monetary vs. instrumental support) and the
amount of help offered correspond to that child’s own capacity and circumstances. Past
studies have found that adult children with more education or better health are able to
provide more support than those with less education or poor health, probably because
affluent and healthy children have more time and energy to care for their older parents
(Eggebeen & Hogan, 1990; I. F. Lin, 2008; McGarry & Schoeni, 1995). In addition,
contributions to supporting one’s parents are not supposed to be uniformly distributed
among siblings. For instance, children with relatively more disposable resources are more
likely than other siblings to offer parents financial help. Those who received more
investment from parents early on are also expected to contribute more in terms of old-age
support (Sun, 2002).
Children’s geographic proximity to their parents may also influence the type of
help they provide. Although providing certain forms of support requires being in close
proximity, other support can be provided from a distance. For example, whereas
monetary transfers are less dependent on distance, helping with personal care and daily
activities requires being in close proximity. Thus, children’s capacity to provide certain
kinds of support is to some extent conditional upon their physical proximity to their
parents. Whereas children who live farther from parents tend to provide monetary support,
those who live closer or in the same household tend to provide services to their parents
(Chi, 1996; Lillard & Willis, 2002; Sun, 2002).
30
Gender may also influence the type of support provided to aging parents.
Although gender equality is widely accepted by urban elders, a preference for sons is still
strong in rural areas (Feldman et al., 2006; Graham, Larsen, & Xu, 1998). In Chinese
culture, sons are the bearers of the family name and the legal heirs of the family property.
In contrast, daughters are portrayed as “spilled water” (“nonrefundable”). After marriage,
daughters belong to another family and another village (Cong, 2008).
Thus, there is normally a close tie between parents and sons, and sons are
expected to take the main responsibility for supporting their parents in old age. One
recent study conducted in Taiwan indicated that sons and their wives generally carry the
major responsibility for taking care of their older parents, and daughters fulfill the sons’
roles when sons are not available (I. F. Lin et al., 2003).
However, research has also found that daughters are more likely than sons to
provide care to parents. Daughters are emotionally closer to their parents and are more
willing to provide help (Sun, 2002). Also, improved transportation and increasing
economic independence make daughters more able to provide help to their parents (S. Li
et al., 2004). A recent study of family relations in northeast China indicated that elders
tend to feel that daughters are more considerate and caring, whereas sons are less
sensitive to parents’ needs. Although sons are more likely to provide monetary support,
daughters are more commonly involved in providing help with routine activities (D.
Wang, 1999). Therefore, there is an expected division of support among siblings
according to their gender that is based on cultural expectations.
Few studies have focused on the effects of birth order or gender on
intergenerational transfer motivations in rural China. The current study tests for those
31
hypotheses and develops policy recommendations for rural areas to improve the quality
of life of their elders.

Motivations for Intergenerational Transfers: Theoretical Framework, Empirical
Evidence, and Significance

Theoretical framework. Several theories address the motivations for transfer
behavior in families and present hypotheses that predict the empirical relationship
between characteristics of parents and children and the nature of transfers between them.
One explanation is that transfers are motivated by altruism. Parents may give money to
children (or adult children to parents) simply because they care about the well-being of
their kin (Becker, 1974, 1991). Another explanation is that money is transferred to
relatives in exchange for services. For instance, an observed monetary transfer from a
parent to an adult child might represent a “payment” for help or assistance provided by
the child (Cox, 1987). Although these two explanations are sometimes presented as
mutually exclusive, it is possible for a monetary transfer to be motivated by both altruism
and self-interest (Secondi, 1997). An aging mother might decide to give money to her
adult child because she enjoys helping her child (altruism) and also because she hopes
that the child will express his gratitude by visiting her more often (exchange).
This section briefly reviews the pure altruism and pure exchange theories, the two
dominant frameworks in this field. However, other alternative theories are introduced as
well, including the altruism–exchange hypothesis.

32
Altruism hypothesis. Altruism is an ethical doctrine that holds that individuals
have a moral obligation to help, serve, or benefit others at the sacrifice of self-interest, if
necessary. The concept of altruism has a long history in China. The term itself derives
from Confucianism and has been developed further in Chinese thought. Confucius made
benevolent love the center of his ethical teaching. He taught his students the moral
concept of love for others without condition and return, an idea that dramatically
influenced the Chinese value system and Chinese norms. Along with filial piety, altruism
is an important principle in Confucianism. The difference between the two principles is
that filial piety focuses on the blood connection between parents and children, whereas
altruism emphasizes the relationship between people who may not share the same blood.
However, altruism is not unique to the Eastern world. Dubs (1951) indicated that
primitive Confucianism is characterized by the same thinking as primitive Christianity:
that the whole of morality is summed up in the one notion of love for others. Altruism has
become an important topic among economists and sociologists, who use it to interpret
many human behaviors. For instance, the British social scientist Richard M. Titmuss
(1970) claimed that providing monetary compensation for donating blood might reduce
the supply of blood donors, because the introduction of monetary payments may reduce
the intrinsic motivation to behave altruistically and donate blood only for charitable
purposes. He contrasted the American practice, in which recipients were paid for blood,
with the British practice, in which blood was freely given to patients by altruistic donors.
He argued that more blood was wasted in America than in Britain. American hospitals
frequently ran short of blood, and blood purchased from American donors was less safe
and more likely to contain hepatitis.
33
Becker (1974, 1991) was one of the first to develop a rigorous economic model
that explains the relationship of altruism to motivations for intergenerational transfers. He
proposed that family members have altruistic feelings toward one another and that this
explains many aspects of family behavior. Each household head allocates resources
among family members so that no one can be made better off without making someone
else worse off. Some family members may receive more resources than they provide. The
head may choose to transfer resources to needier family members out of a sense of
altruism. In the context of transfers from parents to children, the more altruistic the head,
the more the head will finance investments in children without expecting repayment
(Becker & Tomes, 1976).
Altruism may also lead children to transfer resources to their aging parents,
particularly if parents have instilled a strong sense of filial responsibility in them (Y . Lee,
Parish, & Willis, 1994). Or, adult children might give to their parents simply because they
care about them and receive vicarious satisfaction from giving.
Specifically, d (“donor”) is altruistic toward family member r (“recipient”) if d’s
utility
2
depends positively on r’s well-being. Therefore, according to this hypothesis, an
increase in d’s income increases the probability of d transferring money to r. However, if
a transfer occurs, the amount of the transfer will increase as d’s income increases.
Conversely, an increase in r’s income reduces the probability that a transfer will take
place, and if a transfer does occur, the amount of the transfer will decrease as r’s income
increases. In other words, an increase in the gap between d’s income and r’s income

2
In economics, utility is a measure of relative happiness or satisfaction (gratification) gained. Given this measure, one
may speak meaningfully of increasing or decreasing utility and thereby explain economic behavior in terms of attempts
to increase one’s utility (Varian, 1992).
34
causes transfers to become more likely and more sizeable, whereas a reduction in the
income gap reduces both the probability and the amount of the transfers.
One limitation of the altruism hypothesis is that it is difficult to examine this
theory empirically. The key distinction between altruism and other models of transfer
behavior is that in an altruistic system, needy family members would theoretically receive
more transfers than they provide over their lifetime. Unfortunately, the lack of data on net
transfers over the life course makes this prediction difficult to test (Lillard & Willis, 1997,
2002).

Exchange hypothesis. In a well-known paper, Cox (1987) presented a different
model to explain transfer behavior, one that relies on the idea of exchange of money for
time. For instance, elderly parents may care for grandchildren in return for money from
adult children, or able-bodied adult children may perform chores for their parents in
return for money. Such exchanges could be contemporaneous or part of a long-term
contract. Cash transfers given today might be repaid, in cash or in kind, in future years.
Specifically, assuming r’s services are normal goods,
3
if money transfers are
payments for services rendered, a rise in d’s income will be associated with a greater
probability and a higher amount of transfers. This is because d is now willing to pay more
to obtain r’s services. But if r’s income increases, r will require a higher price for
providing services to d, which will cause a decrease in the quantity of services demanded
by d. Thus, transfers will become less likely as r’s income rises, which is very similar to

3
In economics, normal goods are any goods for which demand increases when income increases (i.e., with a positive
income elasticity of demand). The term does not refer to the quality of the goods (Varian, 1992).

35
the altruism hypothesis. If a transfer does occur, however, the amount of the transfer may
end up being higher or lower than before the change in r’s income. The change in the size
of the transfer will depend on the elasticity
4
of demand for and supply of r’s services.
Elasticity is a popular and useful concept in economics. As the price of a good
rises, consumers will usually demand a lower quantity of that good. They may consume
less of that good or substitute it with another product. The more the demand falls as the
price rises, the greater the price elasticity of the demand. Conversely, as the price of a
good falls, consumers will usually demand a greater quantity of that good, consuming
more and dropping substitutes. However, there may be some goods of which consumers
cannot consume less or for which adequate substitutes cannot be found. Prescription
drugs, fuel, and food are some examples. For such goods, demand does not greatly
decrease as price rises, and thus the elasticity of demand can be considered low. In the
current study, if adult children are the only resource on which older adults can rely, the
services provided by these children can be considered inelastic because there is no
replacement for them.
In the former case, if d’s demand for r’s services is elastic, d will substitute
cheaper services for r’s and therefore reduce the size of his or her transfers to r. But if d’s
demand is inelastic, he or she will not end up transferring more money to r. In the latter
case, there should be a positive correlation between r’s income and the amount of the

4
In economics, elasticity is a measure of responsiveness. It tells how much one thing changes when something else that
affects it is changed. For example, the elasticity of demand tells how much the quantity demanded changes when the
price changes. The elasticity of demand measures the responsiveness of quantity demanded to changes in the price
charged.
A good or service is considered to be highly elastic if a slight change in price leads to a sharp change in the quantity
demanded or supplied. Usually these kinds of products are readily available in the market, and a person may not
necessarily need them in his or her daily life. In contrast, an inelastic good or service is one in which changes in price
witness only modest changes in the quantity demanded or supplied, if any at all. These goods tend to be things that are
more of a necessity to the consumer in his or her daily life (Varian, 1992).

36
transfer, the opposite of what one would expect when transfers are motivated by altruism.
In other words, a negative correlation between the size of transfers and the recipient’ s
income is consistent with both theories, whereas a positive correlation is consistent with
the exchange theory only.
Exchange theory derives from the rational choice theories, which rest on a central
premise that individuals behave in ways that maximize their rewards or benefits—or, in
economic terms, that maximize utility. For example, older adults would wish to maximize
the rewards (money and time) that they receive from their children during their old age.
Therefore, they make a human capital investment, such as in terms of education, in their
children through a combination of grants and loans when the children are young.
Conversely, adult children might wish to minimize the flow of resources to their older
parents. Thus, one would expect transfers to be relatively rare, to occur only when the
need for them is strong, and to be made by those children for whom they are least costly
(i.e., those children with the greatest resources).

Alternative hypotheses. Aside from the altruism and exchange hypotheses,
economists and sociologists have developed several other theories to explain
intergenerational transfers, such as the old age security theory (Willis, 1980), risk and
insurance theory (Bernheim et al., 1985), parental repayment theory (Becker & Tomes,
1976), bargaining power in household theory (Schultz, 1990; Thomas, 1990), gender
difference theory (Y . Lee et al., 1994; Sun, 2002), and demonstration effect theory (Cox
& Stark, 1994). However, the altruism and exchange theories still form the basic
framework in this field, and most alternative theories are derived from them.
37
It is probable that private transfers are motivated by both altruism and exchange.
Lucas and Stark (1985) suggested as much (and suggested that the motivations should be
characterized as “tempered altruism” or “enlightened self-interest”). Stark and Falk (2000)
proposed that altruism and exchange may be intertwined if a transfer is motivated by
altruism but the attitude of the recipient is endogenous (meaning coming from the model
and explained by the model). In this case, the donor’s decision could be seen as an
optimization problem that includes the recipient’s emotion (feelings toward the donor)
function, in which emotion is induced by gratitude.

Empirical evidence for intergenerational transfer motivations. The difference
between the altruism and exchange hypotheses has spawned a large empirical literature to
test which motivation better explains transfer behavior. The results are mixed, with some
research supporting the altruism hypothesis (Becker, 1974; Ioannides & Kan, 2000;
McGarry & Schoeni, 1995; Raut & Tran, 2000; Ravallion & Deardon, 1988; Tomes, 1981)
and other studies supporting the exchange hypothesis (Cox, 1987; Cox, Eser, & Jimenez,
1998; Cox & Rank, 1992).
What is interesting is that some studies fail to support either the pure altruism
model or the pure exchange model but provide evidence to support alternative ideas such
as risk and insurance theory (Kotlikoff & Spivak, 1981), demonstration effect theory
(Cox & Stark, 1994), and parental repayment theory (Y . Lee et al., 1994).
Most important, many previous studies have found no single model to be most
useful, with outcomes supporting both the altruism and exchange theories simultaneously
38
(Caputo, 2002; Cigno, Giannelli, & Rosati, 1998; Lillard & Willis, 1997, 2002; Lucas &
Stark, 1985; McGarry & Schoeni, 1995; Secondi, 1997).

Relevance of transfer theories to social security policy development. The
debate on transfer motivations is relevant for policymaking purposes and has received
increasing attention in terms of the analysis of social security in aging populations. This
is because private transfers interact with social security programs, and different
motivations may produce different patterns of redistribution of public expenditures.
Private and public transfers can complement, displace, or even reinforce each other. If
private and public transfers are close substitutes, an expansion of public transfers could
lead to a reduction in private transfers, diluting the effectiveness of any program. For
example, increased social security payments might cause children to reduce private
transfers to their retired parents. This displacement of private by public transfers is called
crowding out. Or parents might use the public pensions they receive to support their
children, thus paying the money back to the very generation that funds these pensions
(Reil-Held, 2006).
The altruism model predicts that public transfer programs will have little effect on
the distribution of economic well-being because private transfers motivated by altruism
may well be crowded out by public transfers (Cox & Jimenez, 1990). However,
exchange-motivated transfers may interact with public transfers in an entirely different
way because private transfers motivated by exchange might actually increase as a result
of the government stepping in to provide financial support (Secondi, 1997).
39
As discussed in “Conditions in Rural China,” children’s birth order and gender
may play important roles in intergenerational transfer motivations. Parents may expect
different help from their children based on the children’s birth order and gender. For
instance, parents may require more instrumental support from daughters but more
monetary transfers from sons. Also, the eldest child may be able to provide more help to
parents than can younger children. Therefore, knowing the motivations behind private
transfers, which are in turn based on children’s birth order and gender, is essential for
understanding the connection between public and private transfers.
The connection between public and private transfers is important because nearly
all public policies, including those that focus on the economy’s general performance,
redistribute income from one group to another. If effects of birth order and gender do
exist, then the government could develop policies based on either gender or birth order to
help children use their limited resources more efficiently and fairly. Because of a lack of
data, intergenerational transfer motives based on children’s birth order and gender have
rarely been studied in rural China. This dissertation explores fundamental questions about
underlying motivations for private transfers in rural areas with a focus on children’s birth
order and gender and may provide some useful policy direction that leads to improved
living standards for rural older adults.

Conceptual Model and Research Hypotheses

Conceptual model. The previous sections described the context and culture of
rural China and their empirical and theoretical connections with intergenerational transfer
40
motivations. Based on this literature review, a conceptual model was adapted from
previous work (Lillard & Willis, 1997, 2002; Park, 2003; Secondi, 1997). The analyses
that follow were conducted from the perspective of the older adult.
This study examined intergenerational transfer motivations of elders who received
a positive transfer (of either money or time) and analyzed the factors that influenced the
size of the transfers. It then compared and contrasted transfer motivations by birth order
and gender.
The following multiple linear regression model and probit regression model were
used to study the size of transfers:

TM
i
= c
0
+ c
1
× RI
i
+ c
2
× DI
i
+ c
3
× Z
i
+ e
i
(1)
TT
i
= c
0
+ c
1
× RI
i
+ c
2
× DI
i
+ c
3
× Z
i
+ f
i
, (2)

where c
0
is the intercept and c
1
, c
2,
and c
3
are the regression coefficients for RI
i,
DI
i
and
Z
i
,

respectively. TM
i
(transfers of money) is the size of monetary transfers and TT
i
(transfers of time) is the size of time transfers, RI
i
is the recipient’s income (elder’s
income level), DI
i
is the donor’s income (the adult children’s income level), Z
i
is a vector
that represents characteristics of the elder (e.g., demographic variables and other factors
that affect the intergenerational transfers), and e
i
and f
i
are error terms.
The coefficient of interest is c
1
: Whereas a negative c
1
would be consistent with
both altruism and exchange, a positive c
1
would lead one to reject altruism as the main
motivation for transfers, because it would indicate that higher income elders are receiving
larger transfers. Or a positive c
1
may simply reflect the fact that higher income donors
41
presumably related to higher income recipients transfer greater amounts to their relatives
(independent of motivation). Because of the positive correlation between the donor’s
income and transfer amounts, the coefficient of the donor’s income (c
2
) is expected to be
positive in any case.

Research hypotheses. Based on this model, the study addressed the following
hypotheses.

Hypothesis 1: For older children, both c
1
and c
2
will be positive and significant,
supporting exchange theory.
Hypothesis 2: For younger children, c
1
will be negative while c
2
will be positive,
supporting altruism theory.
Hypothesis 3: For male children, both c
1
and c
2
will be positive and significant,
supporting exchange theory.
Hypothesis 4: For female children, c
1
will be negative while c
2
will be positive,
supporting altruism theory.

Data Analysis Plan
Data analysis consisted of three stages: descriptive statistics, multiple linear
regression, and probit regression. First, descriptive statistics (i.e., means and standard
deviations) were captured to characterize the individual elderly participants and their
adult children in the sample.
42
Second, multiple linear regression was conducted to examine whether the size of
monetary transfers from adult children to elders was correlated with relevant variables
related to characteristics of the elders (i.e., age, gender, marital status, income, self-rated
health, functional health difficulties, number of chronic diseases, depression, current
number of children, emotional cohesion with each child, whether the elder had provided
grandchild care to the child) or their children (i.e., age, gender, education, marital status,
economic situation, number of children, and proximity to parents). Specifically, multiple
linear regressions were run several times by children’s birth order (1–4) and gender (son
vs. daughter). Based on the results and the conceptual framework, I draw conclusions
about the motivations of monetary transfers from children to parents.
Third, probit regression was conducted to analyze the relationships between the
size of time transfers and the variables related to characteristics of the elders and their
adult children. As with the multiple linear regressions, the analysis was conducted several
times based on children’s birth order and gender. Based on the results and the theoretical
framework, I make conclusions about the motivations for time transfers. Next, I
compared and contrasted motivations by children’s birth order and gender to determine
whether motivations varied by birth order and gender.
43
Chapter 3
Methods

Sample
The sample for this investigation was derived from the Anhui Province of China,
a mostly rural province and the fifth most populous province in China (see Appendix A,
Figure 1). This relatively poor province is located in eastern China. In 2007, its per capita
gross domestic product was about US $1,465, ranking it 28th among 31 Chinese
provinces, autonomous regions, and municipalities (Hong Kong Trade Development
Council, 2008).
A total of 12% of the rural population in Anhui Province is 60 years of age or
older (compared to only 8.5% nationwide), making it one of the oldest provinces in China.
This region was chosen specifically for its relatively high density of older adults and high
levels of out-migration of working-age adults. Between 1995 and 2000, Anhui Province
had the third highest rate of out-migration among all of the provinces in China and a
higher than average rate of labor-related migration.
Data were collected from the Chaohu area (see Appendix B, Figure 2), a region of
141,000 located on the northern bank of the Yangtze River in the central part of Anhui
province. This region was chosen specifically for its relatively high density of older
adults (12% of its population is 60 years of age and older). Even more important are the
high levels of out-migration by working-age adults to neighboring cities such as Hefei,
Nanjing, and Shanghai.
44
A stratified multistage method was used to randomly select 1,800 potential
respondents. First, 12 rural townships were randomly selected from all 126 townships in
Chaohu. Second, six administrative villages were randomly selected from within each
township. Third, within each selected village, all people aged 60 and older were stratified
to form two sampling frames based on age: (a) those aged 60 to 74, and (b) those 75 and
older, providing an intentional oversampling of the 75+ population.
The baseline survey was conducted in April 2001 in a sample of 1,715 individuals
aged 60 and older. Trained interviewers from the Population Research Institute at Xi’an
Jiaotong University conducted follow-up surveys in October 2003 with 1,391
respondents and December 2006 with 1,067 respondents. Interviews were conducted face
to face, guided by a structured questionnaire with validated measurement properties. A
standard back-translation method was used to ensure the accuracy of the Mandarin
translation of the questionnaire. The survey assessed rural older adults in terms of family
relations, intergenerational transfers, physical health status, and psychological well-being.
In June 2009, the fourth wave of data collection was conducted with 1,224
respondents. As in Waves 1, 2, and 3, participants were asked six questions (cognitive test)
with a total score of 9, such as basic math calculations and the current year’s animal
based on the lunar calendar. Any respondent who received a score less than 5 was
dropped from the study. After the exclusion of these participants, the sample size for the
present study was 1,165.
The sample for the fourth wave consisted of a population of rural elders with low
levels of education, of whom 67% reported that they had received no education at all (see
Table 1). A large majority of the older adults (94.3%) were engaged predominantly in
45
agricultural work. The mean age was 72.0 years (SD = 8.2), and women accounted for
50.4% of the sample. A total of 38.5% of the elders were not currently married. The
average total income (the sum of daily income, pension or retirement income, and other
sources) was reported to be RMB 2672.56 (US $393), and 58.4% of the elders had no
savings for their old age.
Respondents had a moderate level of functional health difficulty (M = 3.87 out of
30, SD = 6.80) and a low number of chronic diseases (M = 1.70 out of 9, SD = 1.52).
Nearly half of the elders (44.9%) rated their health status as “fair.” A mild level of
depression was reported (M = 6.14, SD = 3.84). The average respondent had four living
children (72.3%). Therefore, the current study tested for the intergenerational transfer
motivations of the first four children from the elder’s perspective and compared and
contrasted these motives.
A total of 96.7% of the elders had received monetary transfers from at least one
child in the preceding 12 months. The eldest child was the largest provider of financial
assistance, and more than 78% had transferred money to his or her parents in the past 12
months (M = 701.31, SD = 1,103.30). In contrast, only 46% of fourth children reported
that they had provided financial support to their older parents (M = 879.15, SD =
1,579.02). What is surprising is that only 24.4% of respondents reported that they
currently lived with children, which runs counter to what would be expected based on
traditional cultural norms in rural China. Few children lived in the same village as their
parents.
In terms of time transfers (instrumental support), 53.6% of elders had received
some household help or personal care from their children in the past 12 months, which is
46
consistent with the lower rates of coresidence and proximity. However, the eldest child
was still the biggest provider of help to older parents, and 60% of elders reported having
received a certain degree of instrumental support from the eldest child. In addition,
participants reported that they had relatively high emotional closeness with each child.

Table 1
Description of Analytic Variables (N = 1,165)

Characteristic M SD Coding scheme and range
Elder characteristics
Age 72.02 8.17 59–96
Female 0.50 0.50 0 (male), 1 (female)
Married 0.38 0.49 0 (not married), 1 (married)
Education 0.33 0.47 0 (no education), 1 (some
education)
Occupation 0.94 0.23 0 (other), 1 (agricultural work)
Income 1.00 0.82 0 (low income), 2 (high income)
Median-income group 0.31 0.46 0–1
High-income group 0.35 0.48 0–1
Self-rated health 1.10 0.87 0 (poor)–3 (excellent)
Functional health difficulties 3.87 6.80 0 (none)–30 (most)
Number of chronic diseases 1.70 1.52 0 (none)–9 (most)
Depression 6.14 3.84 0 (none)–18 (most)
Number of children 3.78 1.46 1–8
First child
Instrumental support from 0.54 0.50 0 (no), 1 (some help)
Grandchildren care for 0.48 0.50 0 (no), 1 (yes)
Financial support from 701.31 1,103.30 20–10,000
Log (financial support from) 2.58 0.46 1.30–4.00
Emotional cohesion with 4.40 1.52 0 (not close)–6 (very close)
Second child
Instrumental support from 0.23 0.42 0 (no), 1 (some help)
Grandchildren care for 0.44 0.50 0 (no), 1 (yes)
Financial support from 809.73 1,510.93 20–25,000
Log (financial support from) 2.63 0.46 1.30–4.40
Emotional cohesion with 4.45 1.47 0 (not close)–6 (very close)
Third child
Instrumental support from 0.11 0.32 0 (no), 1 (some help)
Grandchildren care for 0.38 0.49 0 (no), 1 (yes)
Financial support from 783.15 1,311.90 30–15,000
Log (financial support from) 2.64 0.44 1.48–4.18
Emotional cohesion with 4.52 1.48 0 (not close)–6 (very close)
Fourth child
Instrumental support from 0.06 0.23 0 (no), 1 (some help)
Grandchildren care for 0.35 0.48 0 (no), 1 (yes)
Financial support from 879.15 1,579.02 40–20,000
Log (financial support from) 2.66 0.46 1.60–4.30
Emotional cohesion with 4.47 1.46 0 (not close)–6 (very close)
47
Table 1, Continued

Characteristic M SD Coding scheme and range
Child characteristics
First child
Age 47.44 8.84 20–73
Female 0.49 0.50 0 (male), 1 (female)
Married 0.80 0.40 0 (not married), 1 (married)
Number of children 2.02 0.99 0–7
Economic situation 2.12 0.81 0 (has a lot of difficulties)–3 (has a
surplus)
Coresidence 0.07 0.25 0 (does not live with parent), 1
(lives with parent)
Proximity 0.31 0.55 0 (does not live in the same village
as parent), 1 (lives in the same
village as parent)
Second child
Age 43.59 7.99 18–68
Female 0.47 0.50 0 (male), 1 (female)
Married 0.81 0.39 0 (not married), 1 (married)
Number of children 1.77 0.87 0–5
Economic situation 2.19 0.75 0 (has a lot of difficulties)–3 (has a
surplus)
Coresidence 0.05 0.23 0 (does not live with parent), 1
(lives with parent)
Proximity 0.35 0.85 0 (does not live in the same village
as parent), 1 (lives in the same
village as parent)
Third child
Age 40.26 7.39 15–66
Female 0.49 0.50 0 (male), 1 (female)
Married 0.79 0.41 0 (not married), 1 (married)
Number of children 1.58 0.83 0–6
Economic situation 2.23 0.75 0 (has a lot of difficulties)–3 (has a
surplus)
Coresidence 0.06 0.24 0 (does not live with parent), 1
(lives with parent)
Proximity 0.28 0.64 0 (does not live in the same village
as parent), 1 (lives in the same
village as parent)
Fourth child
Age 38.33 6.71 16–60
Female 0.44 0.50 0 (male), 1 (female)
Married 0.80 0.40 0 (not married), 1 (married)
Number of children 1.46 0.79 0–6
Economic situation 2.22 0.74 0 (has a lot of difficulties)–3 (has a
surplus)
Coresidence 0.04 0.20 0 (does not live with parent), 1
(lives with parent)
Proximity 0.30 0.91 0 (does not live in the same village
as parent), 1 (lives in the same
village as parent)

48
Measures

Dependent variables. In Equations 1 and 2, which explored the transfer sizes of
money and time, TM
i
(transfers of money) and TT
i
(transfers of time) were both
continuous variables. Transfers of money (TM
i
) in the fourth wave were based on the
total amount of money that the parent had received from each child during the past 12
months. Respondents (parents) were first asked to provide the exact amount of money
transferred, and if they could not give an exact number, they were asked to choose among
the following categories: 0 = less than RMB 50, 1 = 50–99, 2 = 100–199, 3 = 200–499, 4
= 500–999, 5 = 1,000–2,999, 6 = 3,000–4,999, 7 = 5,000–9,999, or 8 = more than
10,000 (RMB 100 = US $15). In the analysis, I used the actual amount if it was available
or the median amount of the category if the exact amount was not supplied. Thus, each
category corresponded to 0 = 25, 1 = 75, 2 = 150, 3 = 350, 4 = 750, 5 = 2,000, 6 = 4,000,
7 = 7,500, and 8 = 10,000. Next I added 1 to this variable to obtain the log transformed
value.
Time transfers (TT
i
) were originally estimated by asking how often each adult
child and his or her spouse provided the following services: (a) household chores (e.g.,
cleaning the house and washing clothes) and (b) personal care (e.g., bathing and dressing).
Frequency was ranked and coded as 0 = no help, 1 = seldom, 2 = several times per month,
3 = at least once per week, or 4 = daily or more often. I then summed the frequency
scores for each child and spouse to produce a single scale score ranging from 0 to 10.
Next I created a new dummy variable: 0 (no help) or 1 (some help, including 1–10).

49
Independent variables. Elder characteristics included the number of children and
dummy variables for gender (1 = female) and marital status (1 = married). Age was
measured in chronological years. Income was measured as the logged RMB value of the
total annual income of the respondent and his or her spouse from work or pension (+1).
Then this variable was coded into three groups based on the percentage of each group in
the sample: low-income group (US $0–22), median-income group (US $23–410), and
high-income group (>US $410). Next, two dummy variables, the median-income group
and the high-income group, were created (see Table 1). The reference group was the low-
income group. Elders’ previous help with grandchild care for each child was estimated
using a dummy variable (1 = yes, provided help).
In addition, elders’ health status was measured by self-rated health, number of
chronic diseases, functional health difficulties, and depression. Self-rated health was
measured with one question (“How would you rate your general health right now?”). This
question used a 4-item response scale ranging from poor to excellent, with higher scores
signifying worse self-rated health.
Number of chronic diseases was measured by summing responses to 12 yes/no
items. Respondents were asked “Do you currently have the following health conditions?”
Respondents could indicate high blood pressure, diabetes, heart disease, stroke, cataracts
or glaucoma, cancer or malignant tumor, bronchitis or other respiratory ailment, arthritis
or rheumatism, stomach ailment such as ulcer, weak bones, liver or gall bladder disease,
and other disease. The range was 0 to 12, with higher scores signifying more chronic
diseases.
50
Functional health difficulty was measured as the sum of 15 items reflecting
difficulty performing personal activities of daily living (dressing or undressing, walking
around the room, getting out of bed, standing up from a chair); instrumental activities of
daily living (preparing meals, shopping, doing housework, taking the bus or train,
managing money); and activities requiring physical strength, mobility, and flexibility
(lifting a 10-kg bag of rice, climbing one flight of stairs, walking 100 meters [about 328
feet], stooping, crouching, kneeling). Respondents indicated their level of difficulty
performing each task: 0 (no difficulty), 1 (some difficulty), or 2 (cannot do it without
help). Reliability of this scale was .93. The summed scale ranged from 0 (no difficulty
performing any task) to 30 (unable to perform any task).
Depression was measured by using nine questions based on the Center for
Epidemiologic Studies–Depression scale (Radloff, 1977) and tailored to the target
population. Three items indicated feelings of positive affect (feeling happy, enjoying life,
feeling pleasure), two items indicated feelings of negative affect (feeling lonely, feeling
upset), two items indicated feelings of marginalization (feeling useless, having nothing to
do), and two items indicated somatic symptoms (having a poor appetite, having trouble
sleeping). The frequency with which the participant had experienced each symptom in the
past week was coded as 0 (rarely or none of the time), 1 (some of the time), or 2 (most of
the time). After I reversed the coding of positive affect items I summed the nine variables,
which resulted in a depression score ranging from 0 to 18, with a higher score indicating
greater depression. The reliability coefficient (Cronbach’s alpha) for the nine items
was .78.
51
Children’s characteristics included their age, gender, marital status, education, and
number of children. Age was represented as age in years at the time the survey was
conducted. Gender (1 = female) and marital status (1 = currently married) were
dichotomous variables. Number of children was a continuous variable. Income level was
measured with one question (“How do you estimate this child’s economic situation?”).
This question used a 4-item response scale: 0 = has lot of difficulties, 1 = has some
difficulties, 2 = has approximately enough, and 3 = has a surplus. Because this was an
overall evaluation, it overcame the underestimation problem. Another dichotomous
independent variable was proximity (1 = child lives in the same village). Coresidence was
not considered because of the extremely low rate of coresidence in the sample.
In addition, each child’s emotional closeness with his or her parent was measured
using three questions that assessed the quality of each parent–child relationship. The
questions were adapted from the Effectual Solidarity inventory (Mangen, Bengtson, &
Landry, 1988), which assesses emotional cohesion between generations. The questions
were as follows: (a) “Taking everything into consideration, how close do you feel to (this
child)?” (b) “How much do you feel that (this child) would be willing to listen when you
need to talk about your worries and problems?” and (c) “Overall, how well do you and
(this child) get along together?” I coded the items as follows: 0 (not at all close/not at
all/not at all well), 1 (somewhat close/somewhat/somewhat well), or 2 (very close/very
much/very well). I summed these items and computed an additive scale, ranging from 0
to 6, for each child. I took the highest total score across all children to indicate this
construct for each elder. The reliability coefficient for these items was .82.
52
Chapter 4
Results

Stage One: Testing of Hypotheses 1 and 2

Monetary transfers from children. Multiple linear regression was used to
estimate the following models, and results are reported in Tables 2 and 3.

Size of monetary transfers by child and characteristics of the elder. Table 2
reports estimates of monetary transfers obtained from the first, second, third, and fourth
child. For the first three children, the coefficients of the recipient’s income (c
1
), including
for median-income and high-income elders, were positive and significant. The
coefficients of the donor’s income (c
2
) were also positive and significant. This suggests
that altruism (c
1
< 0, c
2
> 0) cannot explain the pattern of monetary transfers observed in
this sample.
Regarding the monetary transfers from the first three children to their parents, the
coefficient for high-income elders was always larger than that for median-income elders
(see Table 2), meaning that high-income elders received relatively larger monetary
transfers. Within an exchange framework (c
1
> 0, c
2
> 0), this result can be interpreted as
revealing that high-income recipients ask for higher payments in exchange for providing
grandchild care, and because these services are demanded inelastically (i.e., because
children may not find other people to take care of their kids while they migrate to large
cities), parents receive larger transfers. The idea that one of the services provided by
53
elders to their adult children is grandchild care is confirmed by the positive and
significant coefficients of the dummy variable of grandchild care.
However, reports about the fourth child revealed different results. The coefficient
of the recipient’s income (c
1
), including that of median-income and high-income elders,
was both negatively and significantly related to the size of the monetary transfers. The
coefficient of the donor’s income (c
2
; the economic situation of the fourth child) was
positive and significant. This is consistent with altruism theory (c
1
< 0, c
2
> 0).
The absolute value of the coefficient of the income of the median-income elders
(b = .02) was smaller than for the high-income elders (b = .04). The fourth child appeared
to provide more financial assistance to elders who had less income. The coefficient of the
grandchild care variable with regard to the fourth child was positive but not significant
and close to zero. The size of monetary transfers made by the fourth child to parents was
not affected by previous grandchild care provided by elders.
With regard to elder characteristics, age was significantly and positively
correlated with the amount of monetary transfers. Marital status had a negative and
significant impact on the size of monetary transfers. This shows that each child tended to
provide more financial support to elders who were not married. Emotional cohesion with
each child also played an important role in determining the amount of monetary transfers
from that child. The closer the child, the more he or she transferred to the elder. None of
the health variables (self-rated health, functional health difficulties, number of chronic
disease, or depression) were significant, although they were all positively related to
dependent variable.

54
Size of monetary transfers by child and characteristics of adult children. Both
children’s age and gender had negative and significant effects in determining the size of
monetary transfers (see Table 3). The older the first child, the less likely a transfer was to
occur; also, sons tended to provide more financial support than daughters to older adults.
The child with the most education was the most likely to transfer money. The variable of
proximity was negative and significant, which shows that children who did not live in the
same village as their parents tended to provide less financial support. The number of
children each child had had a negative and significant impact on the amount of monetary
transfer, which indicates that grandchildren compete with their grandparents for financial
resources.

Table 2
Size of Monetary Transfers by Child and Characteristics of Elders in Anhui Province, China, 2009

First child
(N = 799)
Second child
(N = 756)
Third child
(N = 653)
Fourth child
(N = 471)

Elder characteristic
Estimated
coefficient
t ratio Estimated
coefficient
t ratio Estimated
coefficient
t ratio Estimated
coefficient
t ratio
Age .14 2.09* .04 1.61* .10 1.48* .12 1.65*
Gender .02 0.54 .03 0.91 .04 1.11 .04 1.02
Marital status –.02 –0.44* –.01 –.14* –.04 –0.91* –.02 –0.75*
Median-income group .09 2.18* .04 1.01* .03 1.08* –.02 –0.29*
High-income group .11 2.49* .05 1.01* .04 1.22* –.04 –0.69*
Self-rated health .01 0.01 .02 0.49 .03 0.65 .03 0.60
Functional health difficulties .00 0.06 .05 1.16 .07 1.61 .01 0.27
Number of chronic diseases .05 1.29 .03 0.73 .03 0.67 .08 1.74
Depression .04 0.98 .02 0.56 .03 0.66 .05 0.92
Current number of children –.08 –1.26 –.06 –1.66 –.04 –1.00 –.07 –1.41
Emotional cohesion with child .18 5.21* .21 5.84* .19 5.09* .18 4.40*
Elder provided grandchild care .11 2.13* .04 1.16* .00 0.10 .00 0.10
*p < .05.

Table 3
Size of Monetary Transfers by Child and Characteristics of Adult Children in Anhui Province, China, 2009

First child
(N = 799)
Second child
(N = 756)
Third child
(N = 653)
Fourth child
(N = 471)

Child characteristic
Estimated
coefficient
t ratio Estimated
coefficient
t ratio Estimated
coefficient
t ratio Estimated
coefficient
t ratio
Age –.18 –2.45* –.13 –1.89* –.14 –2.00* –.02 –0.25*
Gender –.09 –2.38* –.11 –2.86* –.09 –2.23* –.14 3.05*
Education .16 4.17* .16 4.15* .13 3.14* .21 4.54*
Marital status .02 0.47 .07 0.14 .04 1.13 .03 0.64
Economic situation .20 5.99* .18 5.15* .20 5.29* .25 5.89*
Number of children –.09 –2.22* –.01 –1.66* –.04 –1.99* –.03 –1.41*
Proximity –.17 –5.12* –.14 –3.77* –.10 –2.76* –.13 –3.06*
*p < .05.
55
56
Time transfers from children. Probit regression was used to estimate the
following models, and results are reported in Tables 4 and 5.

Size of time transfers by child and characteristics of the elder. Table 4 shows
estimates obtained for the first, second, third, and fourth children. For the first three
children, the coefficients of the recipient’s income (c
1
), including for median-income and
high-income elders, were both positive and significant. The coefficients of the donor’s
income (c
2
) were also positive and significant. This is consistent with the finding from
the multiple linear regression on monetary transfers, which rejected altruism (c
1
< 0, c
2
>
0) but supported the exchange model (c
1
> 0, c
2
> 0). Similar to the findings for monetary
transfers, the coefficient of the recipient’s income (c
1
) for the fourth (youngest) child,
including that of median-income and high-income elders, was both negative and
significant. The coefficient of the donor’s income (c
2
; the economic situation of the fourth
child) was positive and significant. This is consistent with altruism theory (c
1
< 0, c
2
> 0).
With regard to elder characteristics, gender was positively and significantly
related to the dependent variable, indicating that women were more likely than men to
receive instrumental support. Marital status had a negative and significant impact on the
size of time transfers. This shows that each child tended to provide more instrumental
support to elders who were not married. Emotional cohesion with each child also played
an important role in determining the amount of time transferred. The closer the child to
the elder, the more time the child gave.
As with the multiple linear regression on monetary transfers, all of the health
variables (self-rated health, functional health difficulties, number of chronic diseases, and
57
depression) were positively and significantly related to the dependent variable. This
suggests that elders who were in poor health tended to receive more instrumental help
from each child.

Size of time transfers by child and characteristics of adult children. Both
children’s gender and their marital status had positive and significant effects in
determining the size of time transfers. Daughters tended to provide more instrumental
support than sons to older adults. Married children were more likely to support their
parents in daily life, which indicates that the first child’s spouse may make some
contribution to the time transfers. The variable of proximity was positive and significant,
which shows that children who lived in the same village as their parents tended to
provide more instrumental support.

Table 4
Size of Time Transfers by Child and Characteristics of Elders in Anhui Province, China, 2009

First child
(N = 955)
Second child
(N = 908)
Third child
(N = 794)
Fourth child
(N = 560)

Elder characteristic
Estimated
coefficient
t ratio Estimated
coefficient
t ratio Estimated
coefficient
t ratio Estimated
coefficient
t ratio
Age .00 0.08 .01 0.52 .02 0.79 .02 0.65
Gender .33 3.35* .07 2.91* .04 2.11* .10 2.63*
Marital status –.34 –3.07* –.03 –2.14* –.04 –2.91* –.07 –2.39*
Median-income group .04 2.35* .11 3.91* .40 5.17* –.05 –2.63*
High-income group .05 2.46* .30 2.07* .55 5.87* –.07 –2.51*
Self-rated health .19 3.18* .18 3.14* .15 4.65* .13 4.60*
Functional health difficulties .07 6.36* .03 4.16* .03 3.11* .04 3.63*
Number of chronic diseases .11 3.09* .10 2.98* .09 2.67* .08 4.74*
Depression .02 3.98* .03 4.38* .02 3.96* .05 3.92*
Current number of children –.03 –0.14 –.04 –0.17 –.02 –0.17 –.10 –0.26
Emotional cohesion with child .08 2.65* .11 5.65* .10 5.09* .11 4.20*
Elder provided grandchild care .14 1.50 .08 0.72 .12 0.75 .01 0.10
*p < .05.

Table 5
Size of Time Transfers by Child and Characteristics of Adult Children in Anhui Province, China, 2009

First child
(N = 955)
Second child
(N = 908)
Third child
(N = 794)
Fourth child
(N = 560)

Child characteristic Estimated
coefficient
t ratio Estimated
coefficient
t ratio Estimated
coefficient
t ratio Estimated
coefficient
t ratio
Age –.00 –0.14 –.01 –0.45 –.02 –0.39 –.01 –0.19
Gender .08 2.18* .12 2.86* .14 3.23* .12 2.95*
Education .07 1.24 .01 0.42 .02 1.19 .01 0.54
Marital status .26 2.27* .07 1.14* .04 1.13* .03 1.59*
Economic situation .12 2.07* .02 2.10* .04 2.48* .10 3.89*
Number of children –.06 –1.13 –.07 –1.08 –.04 –0.90 –.02 –0.35
Proximity .19 1.88* .16 2.37* .17 3.65* .15 2.96*
*p < .05.
58

59
Summary of Testing of Hypotheses 1 and 2. Tables 6 and 7 summarize the
results of the multiple linear regressions and probit regressions. The first and second
research hypotheses were supported. Rural older adults generally expected “returns” from
older children but had lower expectations for younger children (see Table 6).

Table 6
Summary of Intergenerational Monetary and Time Transfer Motivations by Children’ s Birth Order

Child Variable
First Second Third Fourth
Monetary transfers
Elder’s income (c
1
)
Elder in median-income group .09* .04* .03* -.02*
Elder in high-income group .11* .05* .04* -.04*
Child’s economic situation (c
2
) .20* .18* .20* .25*
Motivations Exchange Exchange Exchange Altruism
Time transfers
Elder’s income (c
1
)
Elder in median-income group .04* .11* .40* -.07*
Elder in high-income group .05* .30* .55* -.05*
Child’s economic situation (c
2
) .12* .02* .04* .10*
Motivations Exchange Exchange Exchange Altruism
Note. c
1
= coefficient of the elder’s income; c
2
= coefficient of each child’s economic situation.
*p < .05.

Stage Two: Testing of Hypotheses 3 and 4
The same methods were used to test Hypotheses 3 and 4. The results are
summarized in Table 7, which shows that findings did not support the hypotheses that
gender plays a role in determining the motivation for intergenerational transfers, as
judged from the elder’s perspective.

Table 7
Summary of Intergenerational Monetary and Time Transfer Motivations by Children’ s Gender

First child Second child Third child Fourth child Variable
Son
(n = 364)
Daughter
(n = 435)
Son
(n = 378)
Daughter
(n = 378)
Son
(n = 309)
Daughter
(n = 344)
Son
(n = 241)
Daughter
(n = 230)
Monetary transfers
Elder’s income (c
1
)
Elder in median-income group .09* .09* .04* .04* .03* .03* –.02* –.02*
Elder in high-income group .11* .11* .05* .05* .04* .04* –.04* –.04*
Child’s economic situation (c
2
) .20* .20* .18* .18* .20* .20* .25* .25*
Motivations Exchange Exchange Exchange Exchange Exchange Exchange Altruism Altruism
Time transfers
Elder’s income (c
1
)
Elder in median-income group .04* .04* .11* .11* .40* .40* –.07* –.07*
Elder in high-income group .05* .05* .30* .30* .55* .55* –.05* –.05*
Child’s economic situation (c
2
) .12* .12* .02* .02* .04* .04* .10* .10*
Motivations Exchange Exchange Exchange Exchange Exchange Exchange Altruism Altruism
Note. c
1
= coefficient of elder’s income; c
2
= coefficient of each child’s economic situation.
*p < .05.
60

61

Chapter 5
Discussion

Major Findings
The purpose of this study was to understand the effects of children’s birth order
and gender on intergenerational transfer motivations in a sample of rural Chinese elders
and to examine the factors that may affect intergenerational transfers. The present results
contribute to knowledge about intergenerational transfer motivations in rural Chinese
families.

Effects of children’s birth order. The present analysis supports the hypothesized
relationship between children’s birth order and motivations for intergenerational transfers,
at least from the parent’s perspective. The findings support Hypotheses 1 and 2: Rural
older adults are motivated by exchange theory when raising older children but are driven
by the framework of altruism when it comes to supporting younger children. In other
words, parents expect older children to “pay back” their previous investments of time,
such as taking care of grandchildren (exchange), whereas they have lower expectations
for younger children (altruism).
The regression coefficients of elder’s income and children’s economic situation
were significant for the first and second children but not for the third child (see Table 6).
This indicates that rural elders depend heavily on their older children, especially the first
child, for old-age support. They have fewer expectations for the third child, as indicated
by the nonsignificant regression coefficients (see Table 6). The fourth child, normally the

62
youngest one, was the parent’s least likely choice for caregiver. In fact, rural elders
tended to provide certain amounts of help to the fourth child, such as grandchild care,
without any reward. This finding is consistent with the theoretical framework of altruism.

Effects of children’s gender. An unexpected finding is that the regression results
do not support Hypotheses 3 and 4: Rural older adults are motivated by the theory of
exchange when raising sons but are driven by the framework of altruism when it comes
to supporting daughters (see Table 7). There is no difference by gender in motivations for
intergenerational transfers, according to the parent’s perspective. Elders’ expectations are
based only on birth order, not gender. The deeply rooted traditional expectation for sons
to care for their older parents may be waning as more women become effective wage
earners in rural China (or at least in Anhui Province, where the data were collected).
People used to favor boys over girls because only a son could carry on the family
name and shoulder the responsibility of taking care of his elderly parents. Having no
male heir meant the end of a family’s line of succession. Under the influence of
Confucianism, Chinese people have attached great importance to filial piety throughout
the ages. In feudal times, supporting older parents and bearing sons to continue the family
line were the duties of every man. It was believed that the more sons a family had, the
more blessings it would have. However, daughters were treated differently. After getting
married, they would be regarded as members of their husbands’ families and would be
free of the obligation of looking after their own parents.
Today the idea of man as superior to woman has been somewhat discarded in
China because women are endowed with equal rights, interests, and social status as men

63
and play an equally important role in society. But the traditional male favoritism is still
prevalent in many parts of the country, particularly in rural areas. As the current social
welfare system in China is still incomplete, most people in rural areas have no
endowment insurance, so they must depend entirely on their sons for support when they
get old. For this reason, the traditional concept of “having sons against old age” is still
popular among rural residents.
A community-based household survey conducted by Graham et al. (1998) in
Anhui Province indicated that Chinese couples, particularly those in rural areas, have
historically had a strong preference for sons. This preference may affect couples’
reproductive behavior because they believe that only sons can take care of parents in their
old age. However, the current study shows that rural elders have the same expectations of
both sons and daughters. This indicates that the situation for girls in rural areas might
have improved.

Factors related to intergenerational transfers

Monetary transfers. Regarding monetary transfers from the first three children to
their parents, the coefficients for high-income elders were always larger than those for
median-income elders (see Table 2), meaning that the former received relatively larger
monetary transfers. Within the exchange framework, this is consistent with the idea that
monetary transfers may be payments in exchange for grandchild care or other services
provided by parents to adult children. However, the youngest child tended to provide

64
more financial assistance to older adults who had lower income (see Table 2), which
supports the framework of altruism.
What is surprising is that all of the variables that measured elders’ health (i.e.,
self-rated health, number of chronic diseases, functional health difficulties, and
depression) were positively but nonsignificantly correlated to the size of financial
transfers, which contradicts the existing literature. There is one possible explanation for
this. First, the study sample consisted of a group of rural elders who were relatively
healthy (see Table 1). Respondents had a low to moderate level of functional health
difficulty (M = 3.87 out of 30, SD = 6.80) and a low number of chronic diseases (M =
1.70 out of 9, SD = 1.52). Nearly half of the elders (44.9%) rated their health status as
“fair.” Only a mild level of depression was reported (M = 6.14, SD = 3.84). Second, the
study findings show that the size of monetary transfers depended primarily on each
child’s own capacity rather than on the parent’s health status. The positive and significant
regression coefficients of children’s economic situation support this idea.
The age and gender of children were negatively and significantly related to the
size of monetary transfers. The level of monetary transfers is usually high when adult
children migrate to work in large cities. However, migrants normally return to their native
villages to engage in agricultural work again when they get older. Also, the Chinese have
traditionally believed that sons are the best providers for their parents’ old age, and rural
elders have high expectations for receiving help (e.g., financial assistance) from sons and
their families (X. Chen & Silverstein, 2000).

65
Time transfers. All elder health variables (i.e., self-rated health, number of
chronic diseases, functional health difficulties, and depression) were positively and
significantly related to the size of time transfers. This may indicate that whether a child
provides instrumental support to his or her parents depends not on either the elder’s
economic situation or whether the elder has provided grandchild care but on the elder’s
health status. In other words, elders’ actual needs are one of the key elements in
determining the amount of instrumental support received.
Aging mothers received more instrumental support than fathers. This finding is
consistent with the characteristics of the study sample, in which men were relatively
healthier. Marital status and proximity were positively and significantly related to the size
of time transfers. This indicates that children’s spouses tend to share the burden of taking
care of elders, and children who live close to their parents are more likely to provide
instrumental support.

Number of children. Number of children was not significantly related to the size
of either monetary or time transfers. However, the coefficients were negative instead of
positive, which supports the existing literature. Before 1980, couples independently chose
the number of children they would have based on their own economic, conventional, and
spiritual needs. The participants in this survey had an average of four children. They had
known that some of their children might have died, as there was a high mortality rate at
that time. They had also known that they had to have enough children, especially sons, to
take care of them when they got older as well as to ensure that the family had its
successors. The number of children they chose to have needed to match their needs both

66
physically and spiritually. The lower a person’s socioeconomic level, the greater the
demand to have more children. This is especially true in rural China.
Older children are considered to be the major providers of financial and
instrumental support for elderly parents. But the current study finds that children
nonetheless tend to share the burden of care with their siblings. Therefore, the more
children an elder has, the less each individual child tends to give. All of these findings
indicate that interactions between a parent and a child cannot be isolated from
interactions between that parent and the siblings of that child or interactions among all of
the children.
Checkovich and Stern (2002) showed that the care provided by siblings is
correlated with their actions. Engers and Stern (2002) found that when daughters
provided care, other siblings reduced the amount of care they provided. Pezzin, Pollak,
and Schone (2006) conceptualized a parent’s living arrangements and the consequent care
allocation as a two-stage game involving an older parent and two children. They showed
that the living arrangement and care provided by each child is a joint decision by family
members with different preferences and who are facing different constraints.

Emotional cohesion. The measure of emotional cohesion was adapted from the
Effectual Solidarity inventory (Mangen et al., 1988), which assesses the quality of the
parent–child relationship. Bengtson’s theory of intergenerational solidarity is a
multifaceted, multidimensional construct reflected in six distinct dimensions of parent–
child interaction. It points to the many ways in which generations relate to one another in

67
terms of living arrangements (structural), shared values (normative), norms (consensual),
contact (associational), closeness (affectual), and instrumental support (functional).
According to Mangen et al.’s (1988) theory, structural solidarity is the
opportunity structure for intergenerational relationships reflected in the number, type, and
geographic proximity of family members. Associational solidarity is the frequency and
patterns of interaction in the various types of activities in which family members engage.
Affectual solidarity is the type and degree of (positive) sentiments held toward family
members, and the degree of reciprocity of these sentiments. Normative solidarity can be
viewed as the strength of commitment to performing familial roles and to meeting
familial obligations. Consensual solidarity is the degree of agreement on values, attitudes,
and beliefs among family members. Functional solidarity is the degree of support and
exchange of resources among family members.
Therefore, the amount of intergenerational transfers exchanged between parents
and children is associated with the degree of intergenerational solidarity among
generations. Understanding individuals’ perceptions of intergenerational transfers in close
parent–child relationships is certainly important. There is consistent evidence that as the
quality of relationships diminishes, the amount of transfers exchanged between the two
generations may decrease. However, how support is given and received may have
consequences for the mental health and well-being of older adults to the extent that it
influences the parent–child relationship (Eggebeen & Davey, 1998).
Most of the existing research on intergenerational transfers has been done in the
field of economics. The current study also adopted a conceptual model from
microeconomics. However, economists typically measure behaviors and choices, cost and

68
benefits, in terms of monetary value only. Although economists have begun to examine
what they term subjective utility (e.g., personal values and preferences), they typically
assign a monetary value to subjective utility and incorporate those values into the
standard economic paradigm (George, 1998b). They therefore neglect the influence of the
human relationship. Sociologists and social workers extend such classical economic
theories by proposing the involvement of resources other than financial assets, such as
emotional cohesion between generations (Emerson, 1981; Homans, 1974).
This study addressed this research gap and borrowed one measure of emotional
connection from the field of sociology. The emotional cohesion between parent and child
had a positive and significant influence on the size of both monetary and time transfers.
Within an exchange framework, grandchild care provided by parents to the first three
adult children was positively and significantly correlated to the size of monetary transfers.
Children who migrated outside of the community provided more financial transfers to
their parents, probably because they received more grandchild care or had received other
earlier forms of assistance. However, this effect did not appear with the fourth child,
whose care seemed to be motivated more by altruism theory. Prior provision of
grandchild care was, in this case, less important. Also, as the youngest children, some
fourth children might not have been married at the time of this study.

Strengths and Limitations

Strengths. This study expands understanding of intergenerational transfer
motivations in rural China and identifies important variables that should be considered in

69
the future development of Chinese social security policy. All data in this study were
collected through personal interview with respondents by trained interviewers. The
overall model that links the related variables to intergenerational transfers and
motivations has rarely been examined in the Chinese literature, although theories of
intergenerational transfer motivations have been proposed by Western scholars. Thus, this
work helps develop the knowledge base with regard to the experiences and needs of rural
Chinese older adults, an understudied population.
This dissertation is a unique interdisciplinary study that incorporates values,
methods, and theories from various fields. The values of equal rights and fair treatment
from the field of social work underlie the purpose of the study. The study’s conceptual
model (altruism vs. exchange) is based on microeconomic and sociological theory. This
study also uses various measurement scales from sociology, gerontology, psychology, and
social work. Therefore, this study contributes significantly to the cross-cultural empirical
literature.
The results of this study are generally consistent with those of similar previous
work in both Asian and Western countries, which suggests good reliability and cross-
cultural relevance. In addition, the objective measurement of emotional cohesion between
the parent and each individual child is an improvement over previous studies.

Limitations. Some limitations of the research should be noted. First, the effects
of children’s gender and birth order on intergenerational transfer motivations were
examined without considering the roles of daughters-in-law and sons-in-law. Within the
Chinese rural family system, sons and daughters-in-law are clearly defined as central

70
family members. Elders expect daughters-in-law to be the major providers of
instrumental support because giving care or hands-on help is regarded as women’s work.
Although daughters and sons-in-law are peripheral to the family core, sons-in-law still
could be active participants in providing monetary support in a patrilineal family system
(Antonucci & Jackson, 2003; H. Yang, 1996; H. J. Zhan, 2004). Unfortunately, this study
did not distinguish the different prescribed responsibilities among sons, daughters-in-law,
daughters, and sons-in-law.
Second, the study was based on parent report of exchanges with each child. The
Anhui region has comparatively high fertility, with an average of four children, and some
elders have as many as 10 children. The views of parents and children may not be
congruent, especially in relation to such important study variables as emotional cohesion.
Third, although this dissertation emphasized the interdependence of each child’s
relationship with the parent, it was not possible to examine how direct interactions among
siblings influenced children’s individual interactions with their parents. The mechanisms
of siblings’ interactions were inferred from the data but were not measured.
Fourth, the study was limited in the absence of distinction between migrant and
non-migrant children. Migrants on average at least double their income, and households
with current or return migrants are richer than those with only non-migrants (De Brauw
& Rozelle, 2003; F. Wang & Zuo, 1999). Also, elders are expected to take primary
responsibility for the care of migrants’ children but are not expected to take on a custodial
role for non-migrants’ children. All of these factors may affect the size of
intergenerational transfers from children to parents and the motivations for these transfers.

71
Finally, the cross-sectional nature of this study limits the ability to make causal
inferences. However, the hypotheses tested in this study were based on existing theory
and literature in the Chinese cultural context, which therefore engenders somewhat more
confidence in the findings than might otherwise exist.

Implications for Future Research and Government Policy

Implications for future research. More than anything, this study serves as a sort
of pilot study, highlighting potential areas for future research. For example, future
research could be conducted to address the key limitations of the current study.
Specifically, researchers and policymakers should take an extended family perspective
and collect information on interactions among siblings. Many family studies are
constrained by the availability of family members and consequently have to follow a
“lineage design.” This undermines the completeness of data on intergenerational
interactions and impedes theory development. To accommodate more theory
development, researchers must use more sophisticated statistical methods to adequately
examine every child’s influence on the interactions of his or her sibling(s) with their
parents.
The results of this study also suggest directions for future research. The current
study tested for transfer motivations in rural areas of China. However, no detailed
information was collected regarding government assistance programs. Therefore, future
research might aim to examine whether public assistance indeed crowds out private inter-
household transfers. Future research also needs to examine transfer motivations from

72
both parents’ and children’s perspectives. Because only older parents responded to the
survey in this study, not all of the information collected on adult children may have
reflected the children’s true opinions.
The current study scratches the surface of understanding intergenerational transfer
motivations in rural China yet raises many questions. These questions ought to be
pursued in subsequent research.

Implications for government policy. The main policy implication of these
results is that as long as children are making intergenerational transfers to parents to elicit
the provision of services, an increase in public transfers aimed at improving the well-
being of older adults in rural areas should not lead to crowding out of private transfers
and might actually increase the amount transferred privately. This is because the
dominant motivation that explains private transfer behavior in rural China is the theory of
exchange. Thus, children are a “strategic investment” and perhaps the only dependable
resource for vulnerable rural elders.
Another crucial finding from the current study is that the size of monetary
transfers from children to parents has nothing to do with parents’ physical and mental
health status. This may indicate that although financial support is important for older
adults, mental support or spiritual care are even more important. Therefore, it is
insufficient for the government to provide only cash payments to elders. Rural county-
based or village-based social service delivery systems or programs that can enhance the
psychological well-being and quality of life of frail elders are highly recommended.

73
For instance, community-based welfare services for vulnerable populations in the
cities were enthusiastically promoted by the government in the 1990s as a new source of
welfare. In such programs, an urban neighborhood of about 50,000 residents is overseen
by a street office. The street office is responsible for the provision of a variety of
community services, including both public and social services. Public services for general
residents include fire and crime patrol, environment management, sanitation
improvement, marriage registration, household registration, family planning, and family
and neighborhood clinic services. Welfare services include the supervision of delinquents,
nurseries, recreational and cultural activities, job placements for the unemployed, and
shelter workshops for people with disabilities or mental illness. Recent emphasis has
been placed on the development of volunteer services (Leung, 2001).
Community services are regarded as an emergent and vital source of personal
social services in urban cities, particularly for vulnerable populations such as frail and
single elders. Former Prime Minister Zhu Rongji even stated that local communities will
be the foundation of a new social welfare system (M. Zhang, 2001). Even though the
concept of community-based services is not new to China, how they are going to evolve
and shape the future of social service delivery in this transition economy and rapidly
changing society is still unknown, especially in economically underdeveloped rural areas.
Each individual province, county, or village should systematically implement pilot
models in selected demonstration sites before considering a large-scale implementation.
One recent study indicated that local governments need to reconcile four types of
tensions (demands vs. resources, social service vs. political control, horizontal alignment

74
vs. vertical jurisdiction control, and professionalism vs. volunteerism) to reengineer
service delivery systems (M. B. Lin, Gabbard, Hwang, & Jaggers, 2009).
Another astonishing finding from the current study is that the number of children
is not significantly related to the size of either monetary or time transfers. This finding
challenges the “more children, more happiness” myth in rural areas. Because children
tend to share the burden of care with their siblings, having plenty of children does not
necessarily bring about more late-life support. In recent years, legal issues related to
failure to provide support to elderly parents have been raised. The number of elderly
parents who have used the courts to demand support from their children has increased by
10% annually since 2007. For example, an 80-year-old woman was found dead alone in
her home in one rural city; this woman died of hunger despite having five sons (China
Daily News, 2010). Some rural young people cannot afford to fulfill their responsibility
of providing financial support to their elderly parents. Some even struggle below the
poverty line themselves, so for them to support their parents is impossible. Therefore, the
government should develop suitable old-age support systems based primarily on elders’
actual needs, not just the number of offspring they have.
The current study proves that traditional family support mechanisms in rural
China do not substantially reduce the need for additional government policies or
programs aimed at improving the living standards and well-being of older adults. After
years of experiments and practice, a social security framework has taken an initial shape.
However, China still has a long way to go to develop its social security services to a
satisfactory level. The aging of the population will put more pressure on the old-age
pension system and medicare expenditures while progress from urbanization will make

75
more urgent the establishment and improvement of a social security system that covers
both urban and rural areas.
Pressing ahead with an improved social security system is an important task for
the Chinese government in its efforts to build a prosperous society. The increase in
China’s overall economic strength as a result of the sustained, rapid, coordinated, and
healthy development of its national economy; the implementation of the scientific
concept of complete, coordinated, and sustainable development; and a well-researched
social security system suited to China’s national conditions will pave the way for China’s
social security system to continue to develop. Thus, in the years to come, the Chinese
people will benefit more from the nation’s development and progress and enjoy the more
plentiful fruits of its material civilization.

76
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Appendix A

Figure 1
Anhui Province, China

89
Appendix B

Figure 2
Chaohu Area, Anhui Province, China

Abstract (if available)

Abstract This dissertation is a unique case study of the effects of children’s birth order and gender on intergenerational transfer motivations in rural China. Intergenerational transfer motivations are critical determinants in public transfer programs and policies in Western countries such as United States. However, these concepts are relatively new within the Chinese culture, and the effects of children’s birth order and gender have not previously been examined with regard to intergenerational transfers involving rural Chinese elders.

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Creator Zhou, Lu (author)

Core Title Intergenerational transfers in rural China: Do children's gender and birth order matter?

School School of Social Work

Degree Doctor of Philosophy

Degree Program Social Work

Publication Date 08/03/2010

Defense Date 04/26/2010

Publisher University of Southern California (original), University of Southern California. Libraries (digital)

Tag altruism,Exchange,intergenerational transfer motivations,intergenerational transfers,OAI-PMH Harvest,older adults,rural China

Place Name Anhui (counties), Chaohu (city or populated place), China (states)

Language English

Contributor Electronically uploaded by the author (provenance)

Advisor Flynn, Marilyn S. (committee chair), Chi, Iris (committee member), Silverstein, Merril (committee member)

Creator Email luzhou@usc.edu,zhoulv_jason@yahoo.com

Permanent Link (DOI) https://doi.org/10.25549/usctheses-m3256

Unique identifier UC1107249

Identifier etd-Zhou-3928 (filename),usctheses-m40 (legacy collection record id),usctheses-c127-367548 (legacy record id),usctheses-m3256 (legacy record id)

Legacy Identifier etd-Zhou-3928.pdf

Dmrecord 367548

Document Type Dissertation

Rights Zhou, Lu

Type texts

Source University of Southern California (contributing entity), University of Southern California Dissertations and Theses (collection)

Repository Name Libraries, University of Southern California

Repository Location Los Angeles, California

Repository Email cisadmin@lib.usc.edu