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Impact of training on leader's ability to effectively lead during a crisis

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Impact of training on leader's ability to effectively lead during a crisis

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Impact of Training on Leaders’ Ability to Effectively Lead During a Crisis
by
Lloyd Pete Phillips

Rossier School of Education
University of Southern California
A dissertation submitted to the faculty
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Education

December 2022

© Copyright by Lloyd Pete Phillips 2022
All Rights Reserved

The Committee for Lloyd Pete Phillips certifies the approval of this Dissertation

Anthony Maddox
Marc Pritchard
Monique Datta, Committee Chair

Rossier School of Education
University of Southern California
2022

iv
Abstract
The number of crises continues to rise globally, and the need for leaders to effectively manage
these events becomes more important as the associated cost continues to increase. This study
investigates the link between effective crisis leadership and the lack of formal crisis leadership
training. Since the early 1980s, in the United States, there have been approximately 273 weather
or climate disasters with an associated financial impact exceeding $1.8 trillion. This financial
impact omits the projected $2.59 trillion in 2020 COVID–19 support, the U.S. Congress
allocated to the 54 states and United States Territories. The situational leadership theory is the
theoretical framework best suited for examining the problem of ineffective crisis leadership as it
facilitates the exploration of the unique challenges associated with crisis leadership, which
differs from traditional leadership. In order to properly address the challenges presented by this
study, organizations must agree to invest in leadership training, training must be standardized,
and universities need to take a leadership role in the future development of crisis leadership
curricula.
Keywords: leadership, crisis leadership, disaster, disaster leadership

v
Dedication
To the Disaster Recovery Community, whose efforts, attention to detail, and personal sacrifices
are often unnoticed, but due to your faithful service, numerous communities continue to recover
from traumatic events and with a resiliency that ensures the next event will be less destructive.
My mentors and teachers: Congressman Mac Thornberry, Sam Hernandez, Honorable Paul
McHale (Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense), and Pete Verga (Principal
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense). You taught me the true meaning
of effective crisis leadership and the importance of proper preparation of self and staff.

To my parents, Mr. and Mrs. Phillips. Thank you for believing in me, never allowing me to give
up, and for encouraging me to follow my dreams.

vi
Acknowledgments
This study is the result of many years working with those tireless professionals who
dedicate their lives to aiding those in need following a disaster.
To my USC peers, who consistently pushed me to continue this journey: Dr. Monique
Datta, I am grateful to you for sitting with me that first day while I tried to hide in the back of the
room. You unleashed a vortex of energy upon my feeble mind, and without your energy and
consistent encouragement, this journey would have ended after the first semester. Dr. Anthony
Maddox, who taught me how to think anew. Without your insight and inspiration, I would still
be crippled by my single frame of reference. You taught me the true essence of creativity and the
importance of other individuals’ perspectives. Dr. Alexandra Wilcox. Dr. Mary Ho, Dr. Adam
Kho, and Dr. Marcus Pritchard thank you for sharing your experiences and establishing this
foundation that will serve me as I go out into the world. Finally, to my peers in Cohort 15 that
shared this journey with me and never gave up, even when COVID–19 changed our world, thank
you for the support, encouragement, and unwavering dedication to finishing OCL and making a
difference in the world.
To my Austin Coffee Group and the numerous military and industry friends who
supported me throughout this journey and stimulated my thinking with their intellect, steadfast
critique of my ideas, and, most importantly, your willingness to share their unique experiences,
insight, and perspectives on leadership.
There are no conflicts of interest to disclose. Correspondence concerning this dissertation
can be addressed to Pete Phillips, Email: lphillips@gmp25.hbs.edu.

vii
Table of Contents
Abstract .......................................................................................................................................... iv
Dedication ....................................................................................................................................... v
Acknowledgments.......................................................................................................................... vi
List of Tables ................................................................................................................................. ix
List of Figures ................................................................................................................................. x
List of Abbreviations ..................................................................................................................... xi
Impact of Training on Leaders’ Ability to Effectively Lead During a Crisis ................................. 1
Context and Background of the Problem ............................................................................ 2
Purpose of the Project and Research Questions .................................................................. 4
Importance of the Study ...................................................................................................... 4
Overview of Theoretical Framework and Methodology .................................................... 5
Review of the Literature ................................................................................................................. 6
Historical Significance of Disasters and Community Impact ............................................. 7
Past Crisis Leadership Failures ........................................................................................... 8
Potential Causes of Leadership Failures ........................................................................... 14
Conceptual Framework ..................................................................................................... 21
Methodology ................................................................................................................................. 24
Research Setting................................................................................................................ 25
The Researcher.................................................................................................................. 26
Data Sources ..................................................................................................................... 27
Method: Interviews ........................................................................................................... 27
Participants ........................................................................................................................ 28
viii
Instrumentation ................................................................................................................. 31
Data Collection Procedures ............................................................................................... 31
Data Analysis .................................................................................................................... 32
Trustworthiness and Credibility ........................................................................................ 32
Findings......................................................................................................................................... 33
Findings for Research Question 1 ..................................................................................... 35
Findings Research Question 2 .......................................................................................... 41
Recommendations ......................................................................................................................... 44
Recommendation 1: Investment in Initial and Reoccurring Leadership Training ............ 46
Recommendation 2: Crisis Leadership Training Standardized Globally ......................... 47
Recommendation 3: Certified Crisis Leadership Training at Universities ....................... 47
Limitations and Delimitations ........................................................................................... 48
Recommendations for Future Research ............................................................................ 50
Conclusion ........................................................................................................................ 51
References ......................................................................................................................... 53
Appendix A: Definitions ............................................................................................................... 65
Appendix B: Protocols .................................................................................................................. 72
Appendix C: Ethics ....................................................................................................................... 75
Appendix D: HSPD-8 ................................................................................................................... 77

ix
List of Tables
Table 1: Leadership Approaches and Preparedness Levels ...................................................... 21
Table 2: Data Sources ……………………………...…………………………………………25
Table 3: Participant Backgrounds ............................................................................................. 30
Table B1: Interview Protocols ..................................................................................................... 73

x
List of Figures
Figure 1: Conceptual Framework ............................................................................................... 23
Figure 2: Three Pillars of Addressing Ineffective Crisis Leadership ......................................... 46

xi
List of Abbreviations
COVID-19 Coronavirus Disease, 2019
CRS Congressional Research Service
DoD Department of Defense
FEMA Federal Emergency Management Agency
GAO Government Accountability Office
NCEI National Centers for Environmental Information
NGO Nongovernmental organization
NOAA National Oceanic and Atmospheric Organization

1

Impact of Training on Leaders’ Ability to Effectively Lead During a Crisis
When an unforeseen event impacts an organization, group, or community, effective
leadership helps determine the timeliness and success of the response and recovery (Leonard &
Howitt, 2009). People expect their leaders to reduce the impact of the crisis or lead them through
the event with the most negligible impact (Boin et al., 2016). The researchers further assert that
when sufficiently addressed, the impact of crisis situations is reduced in significance, but failures
to adequately address results in potentially devastating events. The effectiveness of leaders
during a crisis is further complicated by the pressures of crisis leadership resulting from the
immediacy required of decisions, commonly referred to as time compression, and the departure
from the routine leadership environment brought about by the obscurity of the crisis environment
(Johnson, 2014). Leadership is a complex issue with varying definitions. For the context of this
study, the definition used is Northouse's (2019) definition of leadership, the “process whereby an
individual influences a group of individuals to achieve a common goal” (p. 5). Effective
leadership cannot exist without the inextricable relationship between the leader and the people
they lead (Mundy, 2016). This blended definition of leadership, as defined by combining
Northouse and Mundy (2016), refines what effective leadership is and adds relevance. Boin et al.
(2016) define a crisis as an unplanned or unanticipated situation that is undesirable. These can
include but are not limited to acts of terror, natural disasters, disruptions in business operations,
and global pandemics, as recently experienced.
Short and long-term crisis leadership is unique from daily leadership as it presents
pressures that transcend the day-to-day responsibilities of leaders (Johnson, 2014). Johnson
continues recognizing crisis leadership requires a more immediate decision process that differs
from daily decisions. Compared to regular management tasks, crisis leadership requires that
2

leaders possess a unique aptitude and ability to execute outside of the normal process and is
difficult for inexperienced or untrained leaders to comprehend (Walsh et al., 2015). Boin et al.
(2016) categorized crisis situations as part of a phase of operations, where normal processes
deemed ineffective. The study focuses on examining effective leadership training and its impact
on leadership in crisis situations and how leadership styles must adapt to the uniqueness of the
situation or risk being ineffective.
Context and Background of the Problem
The problem of crisis leadership and associated failures during adversity is important to
examine with the recent and persistent growth in the range of disasters, increasing in associated
cost of recovery from the disaster, and length of recovery efforts (Smith, 2020). Consequently,
effective leadership becomes an essential element to mitigating long-term impacts and lengthy
recovery efforts (Smith, 2020). The continuous growth in disasters, as noted by the National
Oceanic and Atmospheric Organization (2021), is accentuated by the importance of effective
leadership and the subsequent exploration of the associated gap in effective crisis leadership
training programs, both in government and industry, and the link to acceptable crisis leadership
(Menzel, 2006).
Smith (2020), writing for National Oceanic and Atmospheric Organization’s (NOAA)
National Centers for Environmental Information (NCEI), noted that the frequency, expense, and
magnitude of disasters continue to grow in the United States. There have been 273 weather or
climate disasters, each with a cost exceeding $1 billion, impacting the United States since 1980,
with the total cost of these events exceeding $1.8 trillion. This cost does not include the projected
$2.59 trillion in federal support to the 54 states and United States territories for support
associated with the 2020 COVID–19 events (Data Lab, 2020).
3

Three sequential hurricanes that hit the United States in 2017 exceeded previous natural
disaster damage totals, with a combined cost exceeding $300 billion (NOAA, 2018). In 2020, a
combined 22 major natural disasters, defined as events exceeding $1 billion in damages,
impacted the United States, surpassing the previous record number of 16 natural disasters in
2011 and 2017. Solving this problem of ineffective disaster leadership becomes more important
as the size and recovery cost of large disasters increases (Smith, 2018).
A comprehensive examination of this problem needs to include all government and
private sector crisis leaders. Still, for practical purposes, this study narrowly focuses on
government and industry support officials at the local, state, and federal levels. Specifically, this
research targets those government officials from federal, state, local governments, and industry
support leaders responsible for direct support to crisis leadership. The national leaders are from
executive branch agencies tasked with support to state and local officials, which include the
Department of Housing and Urban Development, Federal Emergency Management Agency,
Department of Homeland Security, Department of Commerce, and Department of Agriculture.
State leaders are those agencies responsible for crisis recovery and mitigation. The disaster
management responsible entities vary by state but include the state office of emergency
management, the state office of agriculture, and the state office of housing assistance. Industry
leaders are those that provide explicit support to federal and state disaster-focused agencies and
individuals with portfolios that provide disaster and political consulting services, housing
recovery assistance, and immediate assistance to crisis managers in the wake of events with the
potential to generate significant media attention.
4

Purpose of the Project and Research Questions
The purpose of this study was to understand the relationship between ineffective crisis
leadership and insufficient formalized certified leadership training at the federal, state, local, and
tribal levels. The analysis of this problem focuses on the challenges of effective crisis leadership
in a variety of situations and their relation to the lack of adequate crisis leadership education and
training.
The federal government maintains responsibility for training and assisting state and local
governments to recover from Presidential Disaster Declarations. This study's specific purpose
was to understand the implications of government training strategy as a responsibility in the
preparation of leaders as it pertains to their requirement to respond to crisis events. The aligned
research questions as applied to the purpose of this problem are as follows.
1. How do leaders’ prior training and experiences impact their preparation for and
leading during crisis situations?
2. What proactive strategies can organizations develop to prepare leaders for
management tasks in their response to future crisis situations?
Importance of the Study
Solving this problem of ineffective disaster leadership becomes more important as the
magnitude and associated recovery cost dramatically increases, approaching the $1 trillion mark
and $3 trillion when including COVID–19 (Smith, 2020). Issues addressed by the researcher will
hypothetically help inform future studies that address suitable solutions to crisis leadership
challenges and subsequent responses. Solutions to the problem will theoretically facilitate a
timely response to future events with fewer errors (Government Accountability Office [GAO],
2008). GAO (2019) congressional statements identified a need for expanded training, as disaster
5

recovery organizations employ insufficient personnel with the prerequisite leadership and
professional abilities required during disasters. Without addressing this problem, recovery will
be inadequate. The long-term financial impacts on the federal government will continue to grow
as states lack the resources required to cover associated recovery costs (Gaddis, 2007; Howell,
2019). As each leadership crisis event presents its unique challenges, the examination of the
impact of training on leaders and their subsequent ability to recognize this dynamic and adapt
their leadership styles to address the non-standard environment is informative (Saltz, 2017).
Overview of Theoretical Framework and Methodology
The primary theory in the exploration of this problem of practice is situational leadership
theory. Situational leadership theory derives from the associated research of Hershey and
Blanchard (Northouse, 2019). The foundation of this theory resides in the assertion that
leadership is situational and leadership styles must adapt to each unique situation (Northouse,
2019). The situational leadership model encompasses four leadership qualities, as represented in
Figure 1: telling (S1), selling (S2), participating (S3), and delegating (S4). These qualities are not
universally applicable, and leaders need to learn when and under which conditions to apply these
behavior qualities. Goleman (as cited in Bartool, 2013) added to this theory with the addition of
emotional intelligence and its applicability to effective leadership and development.
The situational leadership theory is suitable for examining this problem of practice in that
it offers a framework for exploring the unique challenges associated with crisis leadership.
Whereas contingency theory contends leaders cannot change based on the current situation,
situational leadership theory promotes a view that leaders can adapt their leadership style based
on situational demands (Northouse, 2019). As each crisis presents its own unique challenges, the
examination of the impact of training on leaders and their subsequent ability to recognize this
6

dynamic and adapt their leadership styles to address the non-standard environment will be
informative.
Northouse (2019) concluded that leadership is situational, and styles are best applicable
when they adjust to accommodate the unique requirements of each distinctive environment.
These traits are not necessarily relevant to daily leadership requirements; therefore, the desire is
that leaders learn how to apply these required behavioral attributes.
The design of this study utilized a qualitative, field-based, face-to-face interview
protocol. The researcher conducted interviews with government officials from the federal, state,
and local governments and industry leaders responsible for crisis leadership. Specifically, these
included national leaders from the United States Government executive branch agencies and
leaders from state agencies and departments accountable for crisis response and post-crisis
mitigation. Industry leaders interviewed were those who support federal and state disaster-
focused agencies and individual leaders with high-profile portfolios providing direct support
during crisis events.
Review of the Literature
The following section examines the literature involving the core failure issues and causal
factors, and situations producing a lack of adequate formal training for leaders tasked with
overseeing communities and organizations during disaster events. Hurricane Katrina is the
touchstone event in government leadership failures at all levels of oversight. As Hurricane
Katrina is most often associated with government crisis leadership failures, most relevant
research into government failures focuses on these events. The review begins with general
research related to the historical significance of disasters and community impact. After these
sections, there is an overview of past crisis leadership failures and training. The review
7

transitions and examines current academic research on crisis leadership failures and the potential
causal factors of these failures. Following the general literature, the review explores the
situational leadership framework, focusing specifically on leadership in various situations and
organizational leadership's ability to provide satisfactory crisis leadership, and the link to training
key stakeholders.
Historical Significance of Disasters and Community Impact
The increase in disasters, rising cost of recovery, and subsequent impact on communities
underscore the need to examine the historical context of disasters and the government's entry into
the full spectrum of the disaster industry (Steinberg, 2001). Early government involvement on
disasters focused on post-event relief (Rivera & Miller, 2006). This disaster era comprised the
years 1889–1926 and encompassed the 1889 Johnstown floods, the 1900 Galveston Hurricane,
and the 1926 Miami Hurricane (Kapucu et al., 2011). Following this disaster era is the 1927–
1949 era, in which Congress enacted the Disaster Relief Act of 1950 (Barnett, 1999; Kapucu et
al., 2011). During these first two time periods, Congress approved 128 disaster relief acts, yet aid
only included in-kind support in lieu of monetary support (Barnett, 1999).
In 1948 Congress authorized the first federal appropriation in support of disaster relief
and the following year codified the support structure with the enactment of the Disaster Relief
Act of 1950 (Painter, 2020). The Disaster Relief Act of 1950 limited funding to $5 million but
did not prevent Congress from enacting appropriations legislation specific to disasters outside of
this limitation. Government disaster assistance continued to expand during this period which
reflects in the growth in support from 1% in 1950 to more than 70% by the mid-1970s (Clary,
1985; Davies, 2017).
8

The transition to the current disaster era began in 1974 with the passing of the Disaster
Relief Act of 1974 and the creation of a government agency responsible for overall government
assistance to entities impacted by the full range of disasters and crises (Kapucu et al., 2011;
Painter, 2020). The driving factor for this consolidated agency creation centered on bureaucratic
and structural challenges within the federal emergency management community (Drabeck,
1987). Lindell and Perry (1992) continued in the analysis of the necessity for the consolidation of
federal emergency management efforts as most federal efforts were reactive and few, if any,
directed towards a preventative structure.
The Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Amendments of 1988 (P.L. 100–707)
retitled the Disaster Relief Act of 1974 as the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency
Assistance Act, codified the relationship between federal, state, and local government entities
during a disaster (P.L. 93–288, 1974). The era ushered in a new profession focused on
emergency and crisis management (Wilson, 2001). A key issue resulting from the establishment
of this new profession is the uniqueness of responsibilities at the federal, state, and local levels
(Wilson, 2001). This uniqueness associated with each crisis and the belief of elected leaders that
events are unlikely to occur during their tenure creates a knowledge gap as leaders do not
allocate adequate funding, resources, and training for pre-crisis events. The causal factor in
leadership failures during crisis events is the identified gap (Schroeder et al., 2001).
Past Crisis Leadership Failures
Whereas it is accepted that all disasters are local events, the federal government
maintains responsibility for training and assisting state and local governments as it relates to
recovery from Presidential Disaster Declarations (Wilson, 2001). The Disaster Relief Act of
1950, The Disaster Relief Act of 1966, the Robert T Stafford Act Disaster Relief, and the
9

Emergency Assistance Act of 1988 delineated this obligation. Presidential Policy Document 8
clarified this responsibility and further designated which agencies would be responsible for
implementing and managing all crisis management and disaster recovery missions. In addition,
this unique designation includes the advancement of associated disaster strategies and training
(White House, 2011).
Currently, the government, outside of direct disaster funding, has failed to provide
adequate training to crisis leaders at the state and local levels (Craddock et al., 2015). The
authors highlighted that although funding is a critical component, it does not exist in isolation. In
a congressional report, the GAO (2006) asserted that federal funding alone does not equate to
adequate recovery. The GAO (2019) reaffirmed this opinion in that leaders during a crisis must
comprehend the complexities of administering federal resources, and without proper training,
errors become standard practice. Insufficient federal funding remains a persistent problem,
therefore inhibiting the government's ability to provide adequate training to leaders at the state
and local levels of government (GAO, 2018). The report continues in its reference to the
Hurricane Harvey Federal coordinating officer's statement on limited training funding and the
resulting impact on the ability to meet basic recovery training needs.
Harrop and McCreight (2019) contended disaster leadership is successful when aided by
adequate training programs coupled with multi-level and agency exercises. The authors
determined that this training approach assists involved agencies and their leaders build the
appropriate knowledge for the specific roles and reducing the gap in understanding the resources
available daily and those of the functions and entities providing support during the crisis
recovery process. The disaster response to Hurricane Katrina exemplified substantial failures at
the federal government, the State of Louisiana, and the City of New Orleans (Ink, 2006). A
10

critical component of leadership breakdowns during the response to Hurricane Katrina is
attributed to the knowledge gap resulting from a lack of pre-disaster training. This knowledge
gap resulted in a deficiency in the capacity of leadership and their subsequent inability to manage
the event (Kapucu & Van Wart, 2008). Critical to successfully developing emergency and crisis
management leadership and support staff resides in increasing leaders' knowledge base through
crisis and disaster education and training (Farazmand, 2007). McLean and Ewart (2020)
reinforced this criticality in their assertion that during a disaster situation, leaders traditionally
underdeliver due to their lack of preparation and training pre-event.
Farazmand (2007) directly attributed Hurricane Katrina's leadership failures to the lack of
interagency coordination and elected officials' inability to make timely and informed decisions.
Management of non-traditional government organization relationships is complicated when the
first interaction transpires during a crisis. Local governments fail to lead during disasters due to
their inability to manage the myriad of government and non-government partners (Kusumasari et
al., 2010). GAO (2006) identified four critical issues associated with Hurricane Katrina failures,
of which robust training and understanding the complexities of roles and responsibilities were
two of the shortfalls.
Training shortfalls often result in significant leadership failures during crisis response
events. The 1994 Storm, King Mountain fires highlights this type of failure due to training
shortfalls. During this event’s response, 14 smokejumpers parachuted into the wildfire in an
effort to control the event. As the day ended, 13 smokejumpers perished from a series of
leadership blunders. The ensuing investigative report concluded that significant leadership
breakdowns were the outcome of an absence of proper leadership training. This paucity of
training is a major contributing factor in the leader's incompetence and results in the crisis leader
11

failing to overcome limitations during the crisis (Keyes et al., 2010). The researchers continue in
advocating that leadership development pre-disaster becomes essential to preventing critical
leadership blunders during crisis events.
The continued growth in size and complexity of disasters and their impact requires local
leaders to coordinate outside their daily business environment (Smith & Birkland, 2012). The
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Inspector General (IG) noted that the Top Officials 3
Exercise highlighted the current knowledge gap in leaders' understanding of the roles and
responsibilities at various levels of government (GAO, 2006). In their survey of disaster leaders,
Craddock et al. (2015) observed that less than 40% of the surveyed disaster leaders responded
they did not receive adequate recovery training. Drabek et al. (2007) attribute this lack of
training to failures to comprehend the roles of the various interagency partners.
Government Culture Associated With Past Crisis Leadership Failures
The disjointed federal disaster recovery organizational structure infuses a
misunderstanding into local communities as a variety of federal agencies exercise distinctive
disaster recovery responsibilities. Five federal agencies exercise responsibility for disaster-
related portfolios (Brown & Lindsay, 2018; Olshansky & Johnson, 2015). These federal agencies
hold their own unique leadership hierarchy, political culture, independent federal funding
infrastructure, and oversight (Disaster Relief Act of 1966; Federal Disaster Relief Act of 1950).
A fragmented federal recovery system becomes the result of uniquely independent federal
agencies exercising mutually exclusive leadership roles in recovery. This non-linear, also known
as a vertical chain of command and control structure, injects confusion into local leaders who do
not understand who is in charge resulting in leadership failures (National Preparedness Report,
2018).
12

Drabek and McEntire (2002) indicated that disasters are complex, and this uniqueness
renders them disruptive and unpredictable and levies requirements on communities that
necessitate organizational actions that necessitate synchronization across multiple groups and
agencies. The researchers maintain this position by proclaiming that this multiagency and
jurisdictional response requirement is essential to response operations and creates a culture
where confusion becomes commonplace. In New Orleans during the Hurricane Katrina recovery,
Farazmand (2009) attributed the lack of intergovernmental coordination and elected officials’ (at
the various levels of government) inability to make decisions and take appropriate action to the
documented critical leadership failures. The view put forth by the researcher is important, as
intergovernmental coordination and management of non-traditional government agencies and
those essential relationships were challenging when pre-disaster coordination with these partners
failed to take place. Kusumasari et al. (2010) supported this statement when the researchers
noted that local governments fall short in their leadership responsibilities during crisis situations
due to their incapacity to oversee the multitude of government and non-traditional partners.
FEMA surveys from previous disaster communities and lessons learned from associates'
failures highlight the importance of creating a culture of complete community involvement
(FEMA, 2011). Effective crisis leadership in a multijurisdictional environment requires a
collaborative effort and culture (Kapucu & Garayev, 2013). This approach represents a social
transition from a bureaucratic, top-down approach into a more integrated cross-jurisdictional
management style (FEMA, 2011). This whole community approach is an essential element of
post-crisis event recovery as it facilitates an understanding of the complexities associated with
mitigation and resiliency (Chandrasekhar, 2010).
13

Building upon this pre-identified whole community approach, a key challenge created
within the community is the tension created by the divide between operational realities and
political drivers (Bosomworth et al., 2017). This dynamic and cultural difference is exacerbated
by the conflict created in differing political and policy goals at the federal, state, and local levels
of government (Birkland & Waterman, 2008). While the confrontation between operational and
political realities contributes to leadership failures, the general population's cultural view of
government capabilities and the increased demand from the public and local officials on limited
federal and state resources result in a perceived failure (Birkland & Waterman, 2008).
As part of this community, crisis management teams are responsible for developing, or
possessing the necessary skills to lead together and with external partners in order to be effective.
Key to this collaboration is a culture that facilitates individuals sharing with team members,
listening to team members, and forming a cohesive bond that facilitates flexibility and
adaptability in this demanding environment (Brumfield, 2012). Knowledge gained during a crisis
event and building trust between the leaders and stakeholders enable leaders to effectively
manage the event (James & Wooten, 2011). The authors further their position in that this earned
trust has the potential to positively impact the public's perception of the leader's response to the
crisis. This trust in leadership from the public becomes essential to the long-term health and
viability of the government and its leaders if they are to be successful (Nicholls & Picou, 2013).
Public Opinion Related to Crisis Leadership Failures
Public opinion is an important aspect to consider when examining crisis leadership
failures. Increased government involvement in disaster recovery has resulted in an increased
expectant level of support for the demands from public and community leaders (Choi, 2008).
Assigning responsibility is a crucial tenant of democracy and leadership, as leaders can often
14

delegate authority but always maintain responsibility (Malhotra & Kuo, 2008). The examination
of public opinion of leadership during a crisis event is essential as it serves as an indicator of
compliance and confidence in the decisions of government leadership (Wright et al., 2022). The
researchers noted that this negative opinion is facilitated by government inconsistency in
messaging, pre-event planning, and perceived transparency. Partisan bias is determined not to be
a significant issue when assigning blame post-event. The information available regarding the
response to the event becomes the deciding factor in assigning blame (Malhotra & Kuo, 2008).
The researchers concluded the public leveraged accurate and timely information to combat
political biases when assigning responsibility. As previously referenced, transparency and
accurate information influence public opinion. With the advent of new forms of communication
technology, public access to prompt and accurate information is readily available (Liu et al.,
2021). Gomez (2008) postulated that citizens need to be informed about the actions of the
government in order to assign attribution for success or failure.
Potential Causes of Leadership Failures
There are numerous causes of leadership failures. In the examination of failures during
large-scale crisis events, the coordination between the various respondents is the root causal
factor (Boin & Bynander, 2015). The inability of decision-makers and leaders to effect action is
a lack of relationship-building with crisis support agencies prior to the crisis (McLean & Ewart,
2020). The researchers determined that disasters differ from routine events as they are
overwhelming, place unusual demands on all respondents, and inadequate training and
preparation can be catastrophic. These demands, specifically the Hurricane Katrina response,
represent failures at the federal, state, and local municipality levels of government. Kapucu et al.
(2008) identified a lack of training and capacity as leadership failure casual factors. Keys et al.
15

(2012) support Kapucu et al.’s study in their emphasis on the importance of suitable training.
Leadership training assists crisis students, those identified as leaders undergoing crisis training,
in the development of a more robust understanding of the disaster environment and the
specialized requirements of leadership in this dynamic environment. Parker et al. (2009) argued
that leaders at all levels of government and, by default, industry were unprepared for the
magnitude of Hurricane Katrina, and this failure was the result of numerous years of pre-event
planning and preparation. With proper training, there is a reduction in the severity of failure and
mistakes (Le My & Deckker, 2009). Stern (2019) identified five essential elements to adequately
preparing for leadership during a crisis. Three of these five specified pre-event preparations were
identified as a necessity for leaders and their teams. Education, training, and exercise were
critical to this pre-event preparation and identified as required accomplishments for leaders’ pre-
event.
Crisis Training and Exercises
In the examination of global crisis leadership successes and failures, it is critical to
review crisis training and exercises. McLean and Ewart (2020) postulated that great crisis leaders
required the support of a robust support structure, and this structure remains predicated on
development pre-disaster. Planning and pre-event preparation are essential elements of crisis
leadership (McConnell & Drennan, 2006). The researchers reaffirmed continuous learning,
regular training, and exercise programs support this level of preparedness. Stern (2013)
postulated leaders must exercise, train, and educate themselves in preparation for crisis events.
The author asserted this training, education, and exercise requirement should also extend to the
staff's support to the leaders and that it remains the leader's responsibility to ensure their staff
16

adheres to this requirement. This training, exercise, and education pre-crisis are equally
important to political leaders.
Whereas training, exercise, and learning are foundational, these requirements need to be
formalized and standardized. Stevens (2013), as a former FEMA training coordinator, put forth a
position that a lack of collaboration and training alignment between academia and the
practitioners serves as an inhibitor to the advancement and creation of effective crisis leaders. In
his assessment of current training shortfalls, the researcher again stressed the link to a lack of
hands-on training, simulations, and real-world experiences. Stevens (2013) further supports this
hands-on approach and determined the application of theoretical and functional frameworks
needed to support this education. The blended approach to crisis training is paramount as studies
show that singularly designed training approaches do not adequately serve the multitude of crisis
situations.
Characteristics of Training
The characteristics of crisis leadership training impact the individual and organization.
Effective training is essential to professional development, and training is more effective when
integrated and multidimensional for adequate knowledge retention (Meier, 2016). The researcher
further supports this multifaceted approach of blended learning in his application of Hersey-
Blanchard’s situational leadership model. For disaster training to be effective, it should seek to
establish within the leadership and responders the preparedness and capacity to adequately
respond and prevent post-event (Nazli et al., 2014). To effectively determine the usefulness of
training, there needs to be a thorough evaluation of the organization's needs to establish a
baseline. Anderson (1994) viewed this comprehensive analysis as the first step in the evaluation
process and involves a systematic evaluation of all organization levels, including those leaders
17

who need to be trained, what needs to be retained, and what annual training needs to occur.
Training should be tailored to both the individual and the organization (Nazli et al., 2014).
Instruction tailored to the individual receiving the crisis leadership training should address those
tasks specific to the requirements assigned to the individual staff member (History, 2007). This
training becomes foundational and facilitates the transition to organizational training. Jasper et
al. (2013) supported this position in their assessment that whereas organizational training should
build upon individual training, it is advantageous also to develop the necessary skills to support
the agency, improving individual skills and overall situational awareness. Training, for it to be
effective, should include government and non-government entities (Roosli & O'Brien, 2011). To
be effective, crisis training is more productive when it occurs before and after the event (Smith &
Wenger, 2007). The researchers further advocated for the modification of current disaster
funding streams to support disaster training programs that enhance local recovery efforts.
Funding Training
Many critical issues need to be adequately addressed prior to a crisis situation. Amongst
these key issues, the acceptable training of those responsible for managing the crisis is
paramount (McLean & Ewart, 2020). Getha-Taylor asserted that crisis leadership is plagued, as
only those not traditionally tasked with crisis leadership have no understanding of training
requirements associated with the crisis. As Meier (2016) outlined, effective training is the
foundation of efficient, timely, and adequate crisis response. Hsu et al. (2013) further supported
this idea in reference to the applicability of effective training to global efforts. Building on earlier
opinions, Hsu et al. discussed the importance of training as they assert that quality, consistency,
and frequency directly impact how those involved in the crisis evaluate their own performance.
Traditionally, leadership training budgets are inadequate or do not exist. These budgets are in
18

direct competition with other core functions and requirements; therefore, leaders choose to fund
these different priorities and forgo the funding of leadership training (Lynch, 2016). Washington
D.C.'s political pressures and favors routinely impact traditional funding for crisis leaders and
communities, discounting the actual needs of communities at risk and their leaders (Zappile,
2014). Currie (2017) noted that after action reviews conducted by the leaders responsible for
ascertaining the appropriateness of responses to 2017 disasters concluded the need for a
comprehensive examination. This examination must include a comprehensive review of national
preparedness, training, and associated funding as communities did respond to the 2017
challenges. The researcher determined those communities’ capacities post 2017 disasters were
not at the projected levels. In the aftermath of the 2017 disaster season, a federal official noted
the diminished capacity of the federal government to respond to disasters and the link to limited
funding focused on the basic training needs (Currie, 2017). The author builds on previous
statements as he attributes this inadequate funding and lack of adequate training to high staff
turnover. With disaster recovery and response staff that is not adequately trained, the federal
deployment and subsequent execution of assigned tasks become problematic as they lack the
required knowledge to effectively implement federal programs (Currie, 2020).
Challenges With Existing Training
There are many challenges with current training. With the inadequacy of funding focused
on disaster training and deployment of this marginally trained staff, response challenges occur,
leading to increased recovery times and potential errors (Currie, 2020). The 2017 Hurricane
Maria crisis response in Puerto Rico and the United States Virgin Islands presented significant
challenges to leaders due to limited pre-event preparedness, while crisis response efforts in
Texas, associated with Hurricane Harvey, did not have the same challenges (Currie, 2017). A
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lack of focused training and exercises resulted in 54% of the available federal government staff
serving in positions without the prerequisite qualifications (Currie, 2017). Government audits
attribute a significant number of existing leadership and staff challenges to the availability of
courses and a lack of consistent mentor programs and live job training programs (Currie, 2020).
The inadequacy of sufficiently trained personnel was highlighted as a shortfall during the
COVID–19 response. State and local leaders identified the availability of adequately trained
personnel to be paramount to proper crisis response (Currie, 2020).
Crisis leadership training programs exist, but as Currie (2020) outlined, these programs
are inadequate and fail to provide the full spectrum of needed leadership training. Allio (2005)
further supports this inadequacy in the researcher’s assertion that conventional leadership
training programs focus on the theories of leadership, underlying concepts, and basic leadership
principles while ignoring those needed leadership tenets and essential competencies. Building on
the previous statement, the author proposes effective leadership programs must blend the
relationship between the aforementioned theories and their practical application. This blend
between the practical application of leadership theories and competency development results in
the development of the needed leadership skills, critical thinking capacity, and self-actualization.
Strategies to Address Existing Training
The integration of several strategies can impact existing training. A practical
andragogical approach to suitable leadership training should be formal, certified, systematized,
and multidimensional, occurring pre-disaster, during the disaster, and post-disaster (Kayes et al.,
2010). The researchers identified the effectiveness of this approach in providing the necessary
management foundation to leaders, ensuring their success during the chaos of crisis situations.
Walsh et al. (2015) asserted that crisis leadership failures result from a lack of formalized
20

leadership training. This dearth in training hinders the leader's ability to effectively and
efficiently oversee the dynamic environment associated with crisis leadership. Walsh et al.
(2015) identified these shortcomings in current crisis leadership training in advocating for a
training structure that includes formal degree programs, virtual and in-person exercises,
seminars, on-the-job training, and continuing education. This training structure is similar to the
leadership training structure utilized by the United States Army (Slattery et al., 2009). Research
demonstrates applicability across the full spectrum of disaster recovery organizations and
management experience levels (Slattery et al., 2009). Additional research asserts, that relevant,
focused, pre-disaster training assisted students in building a robust understanding of the crisis
ecosystem and what method to employ in the effective leading of organizations (Keys et al.,
2012).
Due partly to the unpredictable environment of disasters, the distinctive challenges
associated with crisis leadership render customary classroom-focused learning methodologies
insufficient (Walsh et al., 2015). Building on this construct, the researchers examined the
inadequacies of traditional training and advocate for a training infrastructure that includes
formalized degree-awarding programs, virtual and in-person exercises, seminars, and on-the-job
training. Complimentary to this training is the necessity for continuing education, similar to the
requirements for other certified practitioners.
Addressing this problem of ineffective disaster leadership and associated training
shortfalls becomes more critical as the magnitude, severity, and associated recovery cost
dramatically increase. Solutions to leadership training challenges facilitate a timelier response to
future events with minimal errors (GAO, 2008). The consequential outcome of the leadership
failures during previous disasters resulted in the White House (2006) publishing the Homeland
21

Security Presidential Directive (HSPD)-8, which formalized and standardized disaster response
training. Although the publishment of HSPD-8 addressed some of the general issues, shortfalls in
funding and accreditation remain (White House, 2006). GAO's (2019) assertions acknowledged a
continuing need for expanded crisis leadership training as the scope and complexity of disasters
grow, and recovery organizations employ personnel with deficiencies in the prerequisite
leadership and professional abilities required during disasters.
Conceptual Framework
Situational leadership theory is the central foundation employed in this study in the
exploration of ineffective crisis leadership and its relationship to a deficiency in pre-crisis
leadership training and education. While this framework is appropriate for this study, there are
criticisms of situational leadership theory, that include ambiguity, incompleteness, and
multiplicity of available models (Meirovich & Gu, 2015). The key concepts emphasized in the
literature are the different leadership requirements in a crisis and leadership during daily
operations (Saltz, 2017). Hersey et al. (1979), identified two key tenants associated with
situational leadership theory, leader's style, and preparedness level. In addition to these critical
elements, there are four identified main leadership approaches and preparedness levels (Table 1).

Table 1
Leadership Approaches and Preparedness Levels
Learner readiness level
4
Learner readiness
level 3
Learner readiness
level 2
Learner readiness
level 1
High experience
High confidence
High willingness
High experience
Low confidence
High skill
Low experience
Low skill

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The issue of adequate training for crisis leaders is essential because evidence highlights
that effective leadership is a predictor of disaster recovery's overall success and timeliness of
disaster recovery (Leonard & Howitt, 2009). Therefore, for leaders to be effective in crisis
management, potential training must effectively develop those skills required in the
administration of the complicated environment of crisis leadership. Effectively trained leader
status is defined in Blanchard and Johnson's (2008) situational leadership theory and maturity
levels. In this application, the researcher transforms situational leadership theory into a teaching-
learning framework. Table 1 outlines readiness levels and the association with the learner
(Meier, 2016). As the researcher outlined, the blended model of training advocates teaching
based on readiness levels, R1 to R4, with R1 representing initial entry and R4 reflective of the
most experienced learners. Therefore, training designed for the R1, the low-skilled practitioner,
is different from training intended for the R4, the most experienced practitioner. The leader's
behavior adapts based on the learner's readiness levels; furthermore, as the readiness of the
learner changes, situational leadership changes. This relationship between leader behavior and
the learner is not linear but positioned by Blanchard et al. (2017) as curvilinear. More
specifically, the relationship includes a combination of task behavior (T) and relationship
behavior (R; Thompson et al., 2009). Some researchers define these behaviors as Support and
Directive (Northouse, 2013). Figure 1 illustrates the interrelationship between relationship, task,
and development levels. Besides the identified two key elements and readiness levels, there are
four main leadership styles. The four quadrants outline these leadership styles: directing (S1),
coaching (S2), supporting (S3), and delegating (S4). These behaviors coexist based on the
learner and the situation; therefore, these leadership styles are not linear, and the leader works
with the learner based on their readiness level (Hersey & Blanchard, 1982; Lynch, 2011).
23

Figure 1
Conceptual Framework

Bosse et al. (2017), building on the situational leadership model, argues that leadership
effectiveness is augmented when leadership style and follower readiness are closely aligned.
Hersey et al. (1997) postulated that leadership results from being effective and matching the
leader's behaviors with those of the individuals or the organizations being led. Hersey further
24

proposed this being an adaptive process, whereas relationship behaviors and task behaviors are
linked to the readiness of those performing the associated task. Based on the situational
leadership process Hersey (1997) put forward the concept that training produces more effective
leaders in varying situations, and this learning changes the individual leaders, thus preventing the
necessity to change leaders in differing situations.
Methodology
The purpose of this study was to understand the relationship between ineffective crisis
leadership and insufficient formalized certified leadership training at the federal, state, local, and
tribal levels. The study examines past leadership failures, public opinion associated with past
leadership failures, and the current training environment including funding and types of training
available to leaders. This section outlines the design of the research study and describes the
participants selected for this study. A reexamination of the theoretical and conceptual
frameworks is in this section to illustrate how they form the study's foundation. An overview of
the data collection process and instrumentation in this section provides further information.
Finally, in providing structured data analysis, appropriate implementation of ethical and safety
protocols, it ensures participants’ confidentiality. The selection of narrative research is
appropriate because of the researcher's extensive experience leading organizations during crisis
situations. The research questions and data sources, as highlighted in Table 2, serve as a
foundational data collection guide.

25

Table 2
Data Sources
Research questions Interviews
RQ1: How do leaders’ prior training and experiences impact their
preparation for and leading during crisis situations?
X
RQ2: What proactive strategies can organizations develop to prepare
leaders for management tasks in their response to future crisis
situations?
X

Research Setting
This field-based narrative research study pursues a better understanding of the link to
crisis leadership failures and the absence of formal, certified crisis leadership training, leveraging
the experience of disaster leaders at various levels of government and non-government entities.
The identified research question forms the data collection and research methodology foundation.
This narrative qualitative field study capitalized on the experiences and perceptions of 10 leaders
with more than 5 years of disaster or crisis leadership in government or non-government
organizations. The selection of leaders with 5 more years of experience facilitates the inclusion
of leaders that have responded to more than one disaster, as the frequency and intensity of
disasters have continued to increase since the 1980s (Smith, 2020). The study leveraged after-
action reports and lessons learned from organizations that have responded to a crisis with an
impact exceeding approximately $3 million in damages. The selection of the $3 million
thresholds results from United States federal guidelines for significant disasters and the
declaration threshold for government agencies, calculated on a sliding scale based on various
disaster-related factors (Disaster Relief Act, 1988).
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The Researcher
Leveraging the positionality definition of Villaverde (2008), my interest is directly linked
to this study and developing a better understanding of the link between inadequate crisis
leadership training and the leader's ability to manage a crisis effectively. Having led a large
disaster response organization during the largest disaster in the state's history, my positionality
directly aligns with the participants chosen for this study. This familiarity with the dynamics of
leading during a crisis provides an understanding of the challenges endured by the study
participants. It provides a common framework from which to gather information but equally
facilitates the potential for confirmation bias due to familiarity with crisis leadership roles and
industry shortfalls.
Mitigation of the potential bias is linked to a two-year absence from the direct interaction
with leaders in the disaster response and recovery community and allowing the initial group of
participants to suggest leaders to participate in the research. Interview questions result from
consultation with Organizational Change and Leadership professors, peers, and the strict
adherence to question guidelines. Utilizing the interview guide as outlined in Merriam and
Tisdell (2016), focusing on open-ended questions, and not inserting the researcher's opinion into
the process reduces the propensity for bias. Each participant received the recording and
transcription of the interview for accuracy verification. The information provided to the
participant for review included any notes taken by the researcher, as another level of
transparency and accuracy. By means of providing the participants with the opportunity to
review responses and field notes, clarity and accuracy increased and the elimination of
perception of researcher bias and assumptions.
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Data Sources
The dissertation analyzes research data gathered during field interviews of leaders
responsible for organizations during crisis events. The researcher identified 10 leaders from
government and non-government organizations for this study. Additionally, research participants
suggested the inclusion of other leaders in the crisis leadership community that meet the pre-
established minimum requirements for inclusion in the research study. Participants included in
the research currently occupied or have occupied a leadership position for more than 5 years in
an organization directly related to disaster response, crisis management, or directly providing
support to an organization that supports crisis or disaster response.
Method: Interviews
The participant interviews took place in a setting outside of their typical working
environment to reduce distractions and unsolicited interruptions, with clearly defined intentions
and protections provided to participants (Taylor et al., 2015). Merriam and Tisdell (2016)
outlined the importance of interviews in qualitative analysis. This approach allowed the
researcher to gain critical insight into the research from the participant's perspective, thereby
understanding the activity, situation, or experience.
Interview questions asked participants about their previous, current, and future leadership
training. In addition to the inquiry into participant training, questions examined the application
and adequacy of the leadership training. The interviews utilized electronic voice capturing
devices and transcription services, then coded using computer-aided tools provided by the
university.
28

Participants
The participants for the study included senior disaster recovery and crisis management
leaders, previously elected officials, politically appointed leaders, career government officials,
and non-government industry associates. Some participants have previous military experience,
but military service was not a criterion to participate in the study. However, military service is
noted due to the extensive crisis leadership training provided to leaders at all levels of military
service (Kayes et al., 2010). For the selection of participants, the methodology used was
convenience sampling, as the pool of crisis and disaster leaders with the prerequisite leadership
criteria is limited. LinkedIn, organization staff websites, and email helped to identify and contact
participants. There were 10 participants in the study, and requirements for participation included
government, non-government, and industry mid-level and senior leaders with more than 5 years
in a management position and have been involved in a crisis within the past 10 years.
The participants were government and private sector leaders; for practical purposes, this
study narrowly focused on government and support officials at the local, state, and federal levels.
Specifically, government officials are responsible for crisis leadership or direct consulting
support to government crisis leadership. Federal leaders were from executive branch agencies
tasked with crisis management. The identified state leaders were from those agencies responsible
for crisis recovery and mitigation services. In contrast, industry leaders were focused on those
leaders that provide consulting support to the aforementioned disaster-focused agencies and
leaders. The selection of participants in this demographic ensured participants received adequate
opportunity to attend leadership training and possess the organizational knowledge to assess
overall training effectiveness. Convenience sampling also provided that selected participants
have led organizations or teams during events exceeding the $3 million disaster threshold.
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Participants agreed to participate in this study of their own volition and within the
established parameters; therefore, no coercion took place for participation. In addition, to protect
the identity of organizations and participants, pseudonyms were utilized. The usage of
pseudonyms allows for the free exchange of information without the fear of reprisal, should
someone not agree with the position of a participant or the detail of the information provided.
Furthermore, direct quotes were avoided as an additional means of protecting the identity of the
participants from reprisal, should their participation in the study be discovered or revealed post
publishing of the research.

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Table 3
Participant Backgrounds
Pseudonym Sector Title/Organization Experience Training
Longhorn Government Director 5 Years
Formal training previous,
informal training
current

Chiefs Government Senior director 15+ Years
Formal training previous,
informal training
current

Cowboys Industry Vice president 25 + Years
Formal training previous,
informal training
current

Rebels Industry Senior executive 15 + Years
No formal training
previous, formal
training current

Aggies Government Director 5+Years
No formal training
previous,
informal training
current

Tide Industry Senior vice president 15 + Years
No formal training
previous, informal
training current

Saints Industry Senior executive 25 + Years
Formal training previous,
informal training
current

Gators Government Senior executive 25 + Years
Formal training previous,
informal training
current

Falcons Government Senior executive 25 + Years
Formal training previous,
no training current

Bears Industry Director 8 + Years
Informal training
previous, no training
current

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Instrumentation
Participation in the research study was voluntary, and participants consented to the usage
of digital recording devices and subsequent transcription. Once collected and analyzed, the data
formed the basis of the research study. The interview protocol for the study was semi-structured,
consisting of 15 interview questions. The design of the interview questions ascertained if formal
crisis leadership training is provided and assess the effectiveness of the training in the execution
of required leadership duties. Furthermore, the questions sought to understand the future training
needs of leaders and the validity of accredited training over non-formalized training. The
interview protocol is in Appendix B.
The study utilizes the theoretical framework’s situational leadership theory presented by
Hersey and Blanchard (1982). The theory postulates that situational leadership is based on the
relationship between:
1. The quantity of guidance (task behavior) a leader provides.
2. The quantity of expressive support (relationship behavior) a leader provides.
3. The “readiness” level followers demonstrate in accomplishing assigned tasks the
leader is attempting to accomplish.
The level of training (readiness) governs crisis staff's performance during the execution of the
required task. Subsequently, this determines the relationship of the leader to staff which impacts
the leader's effectiveness.
Data Collection Procedures
This semi-structured narrative approach provides the opportunity to uncover participants'
unique experiences, utilizing the researcher as an element of the research process (Creswell &
Creswell, 2018; Merriam & Tisdell, 2016). Interviews took place utilizing the computer meeting
32

software Zoom to ensure the participants remained safe and to reduce the possibility of viral
exposure due to COVID–19 global pandemic The interview protocol included open-ended
questions, which facilitates uninfluenced opinions and a more open dialogue between the
participant and researcher (Creswell & Creswell, 2018). Each participant received a consent
form, which contains information regarding the anonymity of participants and documentation to
gather participant background information.
Data Analysis
How people understand the world and study their understanding of the world is key to
narrative research (Merriam & Tisdell, 2016). Data analysis is the process of developing an
understanding of the information collected on people's understanding of the world in which they
reside by segmentation, deconstruction, and reconstruction of the data (Creswell & Creswell,
2018; Merriam & Tisdell, 2016). Initially, the researcher assembled, collated, and transcribed
each of the interviews and researcher's notes. After this initial process, a cursory reading took
place to ascertain broad themes' emergence. After this initial review, a more detailed
examination and organization of the data occurred which created themes. The establishment of
themes facilitates the development of a priori coding which initiates the open coding process.
The subsequent coding or axial coding facilitates the development of the interrelation of
collected data (Gibbe, 2018). This data analysis process sought to connect the conceptual
framework with the research question, bringing clarity to the interrelationship of ineffective
crisis leadership and education.
Trustworthiness and Credibility
The reassurance of trustworthiness and credibility in this research study is from the
employment of strategies outlined by Merriam and Tisdell (2016). These strategies include
33

developing multiple sources, and post interview, returning the results to the participants to check
for accuracy and validate the information collected during the interviewees participation.
Utilization of this approach enhances trustworthiness as it ensures the researcher’s biases are not
inserted into the collected data (Birt et al., 2016) Furthermore, respondent validation enables the
study to seek feedback from initial research findings; therefore, reducing the potential of
misinterpretation. This research approach validates collected information with respondents.
Reflexivity is another strategy utilized, as the researcher, having previously led
organizations during large crisis events, can inject personal biases. By identifying and explaining
these biases, the researcher seeks to mitigate these influences on the research process and
inferences (Merriam & Tisdell, 2016).
Findings
The purpose of this qualitative field study was to understand the connection between
ineffective crisis leadership and insufficient formalized certified leadership training at the
federal, state, local, and tribal levels. More specifically, the study focused on developing an
understanding of the implications of inadequate and continuous training strategy as a
responsibility in the preparation of leaders and their ability to respond to crisis events.
The semi-structured narrative approach facilitated the unearthing of participants'
distinctive experiences. This approach enabled the utilization of the researcher as an element in
the research process (Creswell & Creswell, 2018; Merriam & Tisdell, 2016). Interviews,
conducted through computer meeting software Zoom protected participants from potential
exposure to COVID–19, had interviews taken place in a traditional face-to-face environment.
Each interview was recorded utilizing the Zoom recording functionality and within the
previously established IRB protocols. All interviews leveraged open-ended questions, to ensure
34

the interviewer did not unduly influence responses or opinions and to enable a more open-ended
exchange of information between the participant and researcher (Creswell & Creswell, 2018).
The conceptual framework unveiled that the requirements for leadership differ during a
crisis from those leadership skills needed during daily operations. The purpose of this section is
to explore the link between effective leadership during a crisis and adequate certified training
through the lens of leaders that have effectively responded to a crisis situation, and their
interactions with various staff and leaders at a variety of levels during their careers. For this
study, the researcher asked 10 participants 15 interview questions, noted in the next section,
which are derivatives of the following research questions:
1. How do leaders’ prior training and experiences impact their preparation for and
leading during crisis situations?
2. What proactive strategies can organizations develop to prepare leaders for
management tasks in their response to future crisis situations?
The following questions served as the primary focus of the interview:
1. What is your current position in the organization?
2. What key responsibilities are associated with your position?
3. How prepared is your organization to provide the required support during a crisis?
4. What type of leadership training does your organization conduct?
5. As a leader in your organization, what could they do to properly train you in the
proper execution of your leadership duties?
6. How does your organization's training prepare you for making decisions during crisis
events?
7. How does training influence your decision-making process?
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8. What could your organization provide to better prepare you for the difficult
decisions?
9. How prepared are the leaders in your organization for executing their duties during a
crisis?
10. What are the key motivators in your organization as it relates to supporting
communities during crisis events?
11. What types of continuing training does your organization provide?
12. What changes would you make to your organization's leadership training program?
13. What types of crisis leadership training have you received?
14. What influence your leadership style?
15. Anything I did not ask that you would like to share regarding crisis leadership?
The situational leadership theory framework provided the necessary foundation for the
investigation of ineffective crisis leadership. It also looked at the association with formal training
in that it establishes the necessary guidelines and barriers needed to explore the unique
challenges associated with leadership during crisis situations. The interconnection of this theory
with the conceptual framework and the research questions brings clarity to the interrelationship
of ineffective crisis leadership and education. Therefore, two macro themes emerged from the
qualitative research findings. The two themes are formal training and no formal training, in that
the training was ad hoc or not formally recognized. These themes are subsequently used to
address the research questions.
Findings for Research Question 1
The following section, for research question 1, synthesizes the answers from the
interviews. The use of pseudonyms, outlined in Table 3 does the reflect the actual interviewee or
36

the individual names. Quotations used in this section were slightly modified or paraphrased as a
measure to further protect the identity of those participating in the research. If the participant
provided an answer that was outside of the question asked, a follow-up question for clarity was
added. The first research question, “how do leaders’ prior training and experiences impacted
their preparation for and leading during crisis situations,” evaluates the effectiveness of prior
crisis leadership training when leaders faced leading during a crisis event. From this question,
three key micro themes emerged: lack of formal training in current position, formal training at
the Department of Defense, and lack of formal training in current or previous positions. Whereas
leadership does not guarantee leaders will be successful during a crisis, the research highlights
the impact of training and the lack of training on leaders who were tasked with leading
organizations and communities during a crisis.
Theme 1: Lack of Formal Training in Current Position
There was a lack of formal training in the participants’ current positions. As previously
identified in research question 1, none of the respondents received formal training in their current
positions. While the government maintains responsibility for providing formal crisis training
(White House, 2006), this training is inadequate and unutilized as determined by the lack of
participation from respondents. Saints noted, as a senior leader in their organization, no formal
leadership is provided during the initial onboarding process. Tide also discussed the lack of
leadership training in their organization. They mentioned their organization’s continuous training
requirements, and how the organization’s yearly training remains focused on financial,
compliance, sexual harassment, and information security training. Crisis training continues to be
absent.
37

HSPD-8 formalized and standardized crisis training, under FEMA, post Hurricane
Katrina (White House, 2006), yet numerous organizations fail to provide training to their leaders.
This failure is evident in the GAO's (2019) acknowledgment of the critical need for training and
subsequent expansion of crisis leadership training provide by the government to communities
and government leaders. The GAO noted that as the frequency and complexity of disasters
continue to expand, the government can no longer accept the deployment of personnel with
inadequate training and leadership abilities. Cowboys stated during the interview, “my current
company does not offer crisis leadership training; thus, personnel don’t understand their roles,
authorities, or responsibilities during a crisis.” This reference is similar to the knowledge gap
identified by Kapucu and Van Wart (2008) and how an identified knowledge gap resulted in
leadership capacity deficiencies and the inability to effectively lead during Hurricane Katrina.
Aggies, Rebels, and Longhorn all responded similarly, as their organizations failed to
provide initial leadership and crisis training. However, Aggies and Longhorn did mention their
organizations provided some leadership training, post hire, but there was a not reoccurring crisis
training requirements. Aggies stated current training was internally developed and lacked cross
community standards. Chiefs brought to their current organization a crisis leadership foundation,
built from previous trainings, but mentioned the shortfalls of their current organization’s lack of
crisis specific leadership training.
Cowboys, Saints, and Falcons, effectively lead organizations with over 1000 people and
all have led during a significant crisis event. They have attributed their success to initial crisis
leadership, and continuing crisis training received during military service.
38

Theme 2: Formal Training at the Department of Defense
The Department of Defense, as an agency tasked with prosecuting the nation’s national
defense strategy, maintains a comprehensive leadership management and development program
(Dawson et al., 2010: Staff, 2009). This program ensures all military leaders are prepared to lead
during times of crisis, and includes a reoccurring element. Theme two reflects these lessons
learnt and are referenced by Cowboys, Saints, and Falcons during the interviews. These three
respondents previously served in an organization under the Defense Department, where they
received initial and continuing leadership and crisis training. All of these individuals referenced
the importance of this training received while working within the Department of Defense
community, in their response to crisis leadership situation. Each of these interviewees, Falcons,
Saints, and Cowboys, attributed their subsequent success to this training. All three of these
respondents noted the lack of training post Defense Department employment, and the void
created by the lack of continuing crisis training. Saints went further in the sharing of the reliance
on individuals within their staff, with previous military experience, in the response to crisis
situations. Both Falcon and Cowboys discussed the commonality of experience associated with
their military leadership training, and the comfort derived from working with individuals with a
similar background. But neither respondent highlighted a reliance on individuals on their staff
with previous military experience.
During the interview with Falcons, the participant referenced their previous military crisis
training, and how this training was leveraged during the response to the COVID–19 pandemic.
Falcons stated, current organizational training is non-existent, and leads to confusion during
crises, people unprepared to respond, and a general lack of basic resource knowledge during
crises. The response from Falcons is further supported by Farazmand (2009) when the researcher
39

linked leadership failure during an identified crisis to the inability of leaders to effectively
coordinate between different agencies. Falcons also hypothesized that in the absence of formal
training, leaders seek out their own training, and often, this training is unsatisfactory and non-
standardized. Four of the respondents, Saints, Gators, Cowboys, and Tide, are currently
responsible for the development of crisis leadership training in their respective organizations, but
each of them is relatively new to their positions; therefore, the training remains under
development. As addressed in the review of literature, formal and standardized training is
foundational. Stevens (2013) in his research supports this assertion that these requirements need
to be formalized and standardized. The former FEMA training coordinator contended that a lack
of collaboration and training alignment amongst academia and the experts serves as an inhibitor
to the advancement and creation of effective crisis leaders (Stevens, 2013). With each of these
four leaders being responsible for their organization’s independent training, there exist four
separate, nonstandard training programs.
The three respondents with prior Department of Defense service referenced the
importance of the required reoccurring training they received while assigned to the Department
of Defense, and each interviewee noted the lack of training they have received post Department
of Defense service.
Theme 3: Lack of Formal Training in Current or Previous Positions
The third theme derived from the interviews is the lack of formal training in current or
previous positions. This is an identified theme because all 10 respondents noted the lack of
training in their current positions, and seven of the 10 respondents lack prior Defense
Department service: therefore, these individuals did not benefit from employer provided
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formalized crisis training, resulting in these individuals receiving training coordinated by
themselves or suggested by a peer or associate.
In organizations that provided formal leadership training, none of the respondents’
organizations provided training focused on crisis leadership. Chiefs in their response to the
interview question “What types of crisis leadership training have you received?” noted the
training previously received while serving in the Department of Defense and the training focus
related to compassion, fatigue, and most importantly, crisis leadership. Chiefs’ current
organization offered no formal crisis leadership training but mentioned that in the previous
organization, emergency management coursework did address crisis leadership but not at the
level needed to be effective. Harrop and McCreight (2019) postulated that crisis leadership is
effective when layered with ample training.
All 10 of the respondents acknowledged the importance of crisis training and the lack of
available enough formal crisis training across government and industry. None of the respondents
receive formal crisis training in their current organization. Aggies, Longhorns, and Chiefs
reference their need to seek training opportunities outside of their organizations, as their
employer did not offer crisis specific training. In addition, the human resources department
coordinated leadership training and failed to effectively address the needs of these leaders.
Longhorns stated, that the focus of the leadership training provided was on business needs and
not on crisis leadership.
Each of these three themes, derived from the synthesis of the respondent’s answers to the
research question, bring about a more precise understanding of the interconnectivity of the
importance of training and education for effective crisis leadership. This interconnectivity
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becomes the foundation for potential training strategies organizations can employ in future crisis
leadership training development.
Findings Research Question 2
The following section synthesizes the answers to research question 2 “What proactive
strategies can organizations develop to prepare leaders for management tasks in their response to
future crisis situations?” From this question, one key micro theme emerged: the need for
continuous crisis leadership training. This micro theme’s significance is embraced by the
Department of Defense, as previously noted, as effective crisis leadership is predicated on the
exercising of leadership skills. Through the exercising of leadership skills, a healthy
understanding of the constantly changing crisis environment and the various entities that
potentially provide support during a crisis.
Theme 1: The Need for Continuous Crisis Leadership Training
Formal leadership is important, but there is a need for additional support in the form of
continuing crisis leadership training. Stern (2013) supports this theme where they proposed that
leaders exercise, train, and educate themselves in preparation for crisis events. This approach
needs to be a continuous process, as these skills are perishable. All the respondents agreed with
this assessment and reported their disdain for the lack of focus within their organizations for
initial and continuous training.
From the interviews, it is evident that all the respondents work within organizations that
do not employ a robust disaster strategy, as none of the agencies invest in initial or continuing
crisis leadership training. Longhorn, Chiefs, Rebels, Tide, Aggies, Saints, and Falcons all noted a
lack of adequate funding to attend or conduct internal or external training. The adequacy of
training funds results in a staff that is not properly trained and prepared for crisis situations.
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Chiefs, Saints, and Falcon have previously received training and rely heavily on this training in
their preparation for crisis leadership, but this training does not assist them in preparing their
staff for crisis leadership.
Rebels stated that their current organization, as a result of a recent disaster and lessons
learnt, directed the internal learning and development team to commit to the development of
crisis leadership training. While this is an important step in preparing staff for crisis leadership
skills, this ad hoc approach lacks the application of a universal standard. The review of literature
referenced Walsh et al. (2015) and the recognition of weaknesses in non-formal and standardized
crisis leadership training. The authors in their research advocated for a training structure which
focused on formal degree programs (credentialing), virtual and in-person exercises, seminars, on-
the-job training, and continuing education. While this research question revealed the importance
of continuous training, it also demonstrates interconnectivity between this continuous training
and the importance of formal training.
The importance of continuous training is reference in the responses of all 10 respondents.
Cowboys, Chiefs, Saints, and Falcons discussed their previous employment within the
Department of Defense, and the requirements levied by those organizations on its employees to
accomplish yearly training, at a minimum. None of the respondents belong to an organization
that requires or administer reoccurring crisis leadership training. Saints, Gators, Cowboys, and
Tide acknowledge their responsibilities for the design and implementation of crisis leadership
training in their respective organizations. All these interviewees recognized the importance of
continuous training as part of their responsibilities. Only one of the respondents, Tide, referenced
initial leadership training at their company and this training was not crisis leadership related.
Additionally, Tide shared the belief in a need for continuous crisis training and its importance to
43

the organizations’ ability to execute assigned task in delivery of service to its customers and
personnel.
Cowboys discussed his previous response to a major event and how the training received
by Cowboys and the response staff directly contributed to their ability to adequately support all
the events response agencies and personnel. Additionally, as the event extended, subsequent
support personnel lacked adequate training which resulted in confusion and errors. This dilemma
was referenced by the GAO (2019), in response to another event, where it was observed that
crisis leaders need to realize the complications of overseeing federal resources, which include
personnel and funds, and without appropriate and adequate training, errors become normal
behavior. Aggies stated, that during their initial onboarding to a disaster, no formal training was
provided, and learning was ad hoc (i.e., conducted while responding to the event). After the
event, no reoccurring training was required, and the respondent was left to design their own
training plan, with little to no guidance. This situation was further supported by Longhorns, as
this respondent was onboarded during a crisis situation, with no formal training, and thereafter
transferred to another organization with a disaster mission, where no formal initial or follow up
training is conducted.
Tide maintains responsibility for training within their organization, but due to limited
resources and business demands, training is not a priority. If training is conducted, it is neither
formal nor reoccurring. Tides utilize the hiring of individuals with previous crisis leadership
training to address the internal shortfall in initial and reoccurring training. Saints recently left his
employer due to various reasons but mentioned a lack of resources and priority on the crisis
portfolio as a contributing factor. For the company to be effective, an investment in the crisis
related leadership is essential to successful operations.
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Summary of Findings
With the synthesis of the information garnered from the research questions, it is evident
an interrelationship exists between crisis leadership effectiveness and the establishment of formal
training, education program that includes a continuous training component. All respondents
recognized this need for effective, continuous, validated, and standardized crisis leadership
training. Without the aforementioned validated and satisfactory training, errors persist as the
leaders lack the foundational knowledge required in this non-standard environment (Getha-
Taylor, 2007). Future investment in crisis specific leadership training is identified as a need by
leaders in the community and those professionals that provide support to those leaders. This
investment in training, both initial and continuous should also include a continuous training
element, as the skills is identified by the respondents as being a perishable skillset, and a onetime
approach to crisis training is inadequate.
Recommendations
With the continued change in the environment and global population growth, the
frequency and severity of disaster continues to grow. With this growth, the cost of recovery, and
urgency of communities and its citizens to rapidly recover is changing with this growth. No
longer can leaders remain idle while people remain negatively impacted by crisis. Leaders cannot
approach crisis situations from a business-as-usual construct as this has proven to have
substantial and negative outcomes on the lives of citizens, industry, organizations, and the
careers of those leaders that fail to adapt to the urgency of the situation, and expectations from
those impacted by the event can be daunting and overly demanding. This dilemma, associated
with higher-than-normal expectations came to fruition during the Hurricane Katrina recovery
effort. The crisis leaders, during the Hurricane Katrina catastrophe, did not set out to fail in their
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efforts to provide the people of New Orleans and Louisiana the timely support needed in the
aftermath of the Hurricane Katrina devastation.
The situational leadership framework utilized in this study outlines the importance of
preparedness, and the lack of preparedness is identified in the literature as a key component of
previous crisis leadership failures. These leaders, in the Hurricane Katrina example, did not
recognize the daunting task before them, as this level of devastation and chaos was new to them.
The business-as-usual style of leadership these leaders were accustomed to, proved to be
inadequate as crisis leadership requires decisions be made in a time-compressed environment,
with coordination with unfamiliar organizations. What the leaders in the aforementioned
response lacked was adequate preparedness training, and a comprehensive understanding of the
dynamic environment created during a crisis of this magnitude.
The recommendations presented here and depicted in Figure 2, provide the foundation for
addressing the dilemma associated with ineffective crisis leadership, as it proposes the key
pillars: investment in crisis leadership training, standardization of training, and the higher
education community’s leadership in the future training of crisis leadership. While these three
recommendations address the current problems, the continued growth of disasters require an
initial investment coupled with a commitment to continued investment, as the crisis ecosystem
continues to evolve over time and new organization enter the space. GAO (2019) acknowledged
this continuing need for expansion and investment, as the complexity and size of disasters
continues to grow.

46

Figure 2
Three Pillars of Addressing Ineffective Crisis Leadership

Recommendation 1: Investment in Initial and Reoccurring Leadership Training
Organizations, in order to adequately prepare for unplanned events, should invest in
leadership training that includes both initial leadership training and reoccurring leadership
training. The study participants were in complete agreement about the importance and
effectiveness of leadership training. They spoke about the lack of leadership training in their
organizations and those respondents who previously received both initial and reoccurring
leadership training spoke about the utility of this training during their response to crisis
situations. Walsh et al. (2015) addressed this in their research and postulated that previous
disaster failures were directly linked to a lack of formalized leadership training. An investment,
by all organizations in their leaders, will assist those leaders in establishing a basic understanding
of the dynamics of leading during a crisis and the associated ecosystem.
47

Recommendation 2: Crisis Leadership Training Standardized Globally
In the wake of the Hurricane Katrina disaster, numerous after-action reviews were
conducted at various levels of government and industry. A key shortfall identified post Hurricane
Katrina was the lack of standardized training and a lead responsible agency. The White House in
response to this identified failure published HSPD-8, which attempted to formalize and
standardize disaster response training. Whereas this document sought to remedy the identified
Hurricane Katrina after action standardization issue, it has limited applicability and did not
address the funding of training, which is addressed in the first recommendation. All respondents
identified standardized training as a concern and four of the respondents discussed their
responsibility for the design and administration of training in their organizations. Without clear
guidance to what should be included within the training syllabus organizations potentially
develop materials that fail to address those required skills. GAO (2008) identified this need for
standardized training in their report to Congress. With the establishment of a standardized global
leadership training construct, leaders regardless of their background, have the same foundational
skills and are better prepared to integrate the services of all stakeholders during the event.
Recommendation 3: Certified Crisis Leadership Training at Universities
While investment in a globally standardized training construct is essential, there remains
a void in who should provide the leadership needed to bring about standardization and adoption.
Universities have an established process for collaborating with other institutions of higher
learning; therefore, universities are well situated to take on the lead in developing a standardized
crisis leadership curriculum. With universities taking a lead role, degree programs and micro
certifications can be awarded, ensuring a global standard is maintained as universities are
subjected to routine evaluation and accreditations. Walsh et al. (2015) furthering this belief,
48

contended that crisis leadership training should include formalized degree awarding programs, or
that crisis leadership training should include formalized degree awarding programs, virtual and
in-person exercises, seminars, and on-the-job training. In the absence of training within their
respective organizations, all respondents sought training from outside providers. Since this
training was ad hoc, the validity of the training comes into question. As such, there remain
lingering questions about the insurance that the completed training was adequate and addressed
those skills needed to properly respond and lead their organizations during a crisis. With
universities developing the leadership training curriculum and providing the certification, leaders
are assured their training is certified, accredited, and transferable, regardless of the school of
choice. Care should be taken to allow universities to decide which department or college
maintains responsibility for leadership training based on the resources available to the university.
Furthermore, with the research community associated with universities entering the crisis
leadership training ecosystem, training will continue to evolve as researchers dedicate
themselves to developing a better understanding of the crisis leadership community's problems.
The GAO (2019) defended the need for the continued evolution of crisis training commensurate
with the changing scope and complexity of the disaster environment.
Limitations and Delimitations
The approach to this study leveraged a qualitative, field-based, face-to-face interview
protocol and did not provide for generalization. It is noted that the opinions of participants do not
automatically reflect the opinions of the crisis response leadership community. This research
approach facilitates the ability to reflect on participants' various crisis leadership experiences and
associated training or lack of training provided by their current or past organizations. Similar to
other qualitative research studies, this approach, as outlined in Merriam and Tisdell (2016),
49

allows for the focus on participants' experiences. The scholars continue emphasizing the
importance of analysis and understanding the information the participant provides during the
interview. Since the narrative inquiry was based on the participant's account of the situation, a
careful interview approach occurred to capture structure accurately and convey actions or
inaction and any underlying meanings communicated by the participant, as the level of
experience varies based on the participant's background.
The level of experience varies based on the participants' backgrounds. The research took
extra care to ensure the knowledge level of a more experienced professional did not lend itself to
the perception of those individuals having more credibility, as this could facilitate the
misalignment in the data collected and a subsequent challenge of data trustworthiness. Field
notes captured during the interview included information on the participants' actions, including
behaviors and voice inflection changes during the interview, as this information lends itself to
the trustworthiness and integrity of the interview process. The researcher's field notes captured
any concerns, perceived biases, or untruthfulness, thus supporting the transparency and
credibility of the research.
The sample size of this study was 10 participants, with specifics of the group outlined in
the subsequent text. The researcher conducted interviews with government officials from the
federal, state, and local governments, with care taken to ensure that all respondents did not work
for the same government agency or organization and were subjected to the same suggested
unfunded government leadership training requirements. Other participants included industry
leaders responsible for crisis leadership, with the same care taken to ensure participants did not
work within the same company, as this would inject potential bias into the research. Specifically,
national leaders from the executive branch agencies. The identified state leaders were from those
50

state agencies and departments accountable for crisis response and post-crisis mitigation, and this
demographic included local leaders operating under state authorities during crisis response.
Industry leaders interviewed were those currently or previously supported by federal and state
disaster-focused agencies and individual leaders with business portfolios and responsibilities that
included direct support to federal, state, and local leaders during crisis events. All participants
have previously participated in a large-scale crisis with a loss or damages exceeding $500
million or multiple crisis events with a loss or damages exceeding a billion dollars in losses.
Recommendations for Future Research
Current research in the crisis leadership field is primarily focused on emergency
managers, elected officials, and their staff. Within this research, little is focused on those leaders
in non-governmental organizations and the business community. Whereas this study explicitly
examined crisis leadership from a government lens and those organizations that support
government organizations in their response to crisis situations, the study determined that leading
during a crisis is industry agnostic. This situation is the result of 50% of the respondents having
transitioned from government service to private industry. Therefore, two future research areas
emerged from the interviews linked to leadership post-government service.
First, future research is needed to examine the effectiveness of industry leaders with
Defense Department service against those leaders with no Defense Department service. This
research should not be U.S. Defense Department specific, as other countries require their service
members to undergo crisis leadership training; thus, a broader approach is warranted. In the
examination of industry leaders, research should focus on executives at the director level and
above and not be limited to Fortune 500 companies.
51

Second, future research should examine the effectiveness of training received during
government service compared to the training received post-government service. This study
revealed that the Department of Defense currently maintains a robust leadership training
requirement that is unmatched by industry. Future research should examine the standardization
of leadership training across the Department of Defense and how the Department of Defense’s
standardization efforts could inform the future design of a global crisis training curriculum.
Respondents to this study with previous Department of Defense service referenced their training
during their service and its effectiveness in their post-service crisis leadership. Each respondent
asserted that training during that service surpassed any training received outside of that service,
leading to the need for a better understanding of that training and why it is perceived to be more
effective.
Conclusion
In today’s society, disasters have become commonplace and often exceed the capabilities
of a single response organization and its leaders; therefore, solving this problem of ineffective
disaster leadership becomes more important as the magnitude and associated recovery cost of
disaster continues to increase exponentially, approaching the $3 trillion when including COVID–
19 (Smith, 2020). People demand their leaders provide a timely, deliberate, and effective
response during crisis situations and are now more likely to hold leaders responsible when they
fail to act accordingly (McLean & Ewart, 2020). Ineffective crisis leadership remains directly
attributed to a lack of sufficient, standardized, and certified training. The continued failure to
address this shortfall leads to inadequate response and waste of limited resources. As the
frequency of severity of disasters continues to grow, as identified by NOAA (2018), resources
become more strained, and associated recovery costs increase (Howell, 2019).
52

While this study examined the relationship between ineffective crisis leadership and the
insufficiency of current training, as it remains non-standard across industries and fails to certify
participants. The research also revealed that adequate crisis leadership results from leaders taking
ownership and finding a means to acquire training that results in their success in the face of
insufficient training. The research identified the why in the training conundrum, but ultimately,
while we started with the why, it eventually ends with you! This issue is that leaders are
ultimately responsible for their destiny in today’s ever-changing crisis environment.

53

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Appendix A: Definitions
Professionals in the crisis response and disaster recovery industry have a unique language
that leverages acronyms and modified definitions for plain language. Some words often have
multiple meanings, but this section will outline the most commonly used terms unique to this
industry and their usual definitions. For this dissertation, crisis and disaster are utilized
interchangeably. The common definition for crisis defines as:
A critical event, which, if not handled in an appropriate manner, may dramatically impact
an organization’s profitability, reputation, or ability to operate. Or an occurrence and/or
perception that threatens the operations, staff, shareholder value, stakeholders, brand,
reputation, trust and/or strategic/business goals of an organization (DigitalCare, State of
OR BC Workshop, 2006, p. 51).
All definitions are derived from Blanchard (2008) Guide to emergency management and
related terms, definitions, concepts, acronyms, organizations, programs, guidance, executive
orders and legislation.
Actions: specific activities that help you achieve your goals and objectives (p. 3).
Adaptive planning: is the joint capability to create and revise plans rapidly and
systematically, as circumstances require. It occurs in a networked, collaborative environment,
requires the regular involvement of senior leaders, and results in plans containing a range of
viable options that can be adapted to defeat or deter an adversary to achieve national objectives.
At full maturity, adaptive planning (AP) will form the backbone of a joint adaptive system
supporting the development and execution of plans, preserving the best characteristics of
present-day contingency and crisis planning with a common process (JFSC, Joint Transition
Course: planning primer, 2005, pp. 1–9).
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After action report/improvement plan (AAR/IP): is the final product of an exercise. The
AAR/IP has two components: an AAR, which captures observations and recommendations based
on the exercise objectives as associated with the capabilities and tasks; and an IP, which
identifies specific corrective actions, assigns them to responsible parties, and establishes targets
for their completion (FEMA, About HSEEP, 2008).
Alert: notification that a potential disaster situation exists or has occurred; direction for
recipient to standby for possible activation of disaster recovery plan. A formal notification that
an incident has occurred, which may develop into a disaster (DigitalCare, State of OR BC
Workshop, 2006, p. 46).
All disasters/emergencies are local: a recognition that all incidents begin locally, the
agency must particularly work to strengthen the all-hazards response, planning, preparedness,
mitigation, and prevention capabilities at the local level (FEMA, FEMA Strategic Plan, Fiscal
Years 2008–2013, January 2008, p. 8).
All-hazard: any incident or event, natural or human caused, that requires an organized
response by a public, private, and/or governmental entity in order to protect life, public health
and safety, values to be protected, and to minimize any disruption of governmental, social, and
economic services (USCG, IM Handbook, 2006, Glossary 25–1).
All hazard civil preparedness: in keeping with President Nixon’s desire to make the
Federal Government more responsive to the needs of State and local governments, the Defense
Civil Preparedness Agency (DCPA) program takes into account all of the hazards and dangers
which confront the Nation’s population today (DCPA, “All-Hazard Civil Preparedness,”
Foresight, 1974, p. 1).
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American Red Cross: The American Red Cross serves as the primary support agency to
DHS for coordinating mass care support with other non-government organizations during disaster
relief and CM operations” (JCS/DoD, Homeland Security (JP 3–26)), 2005, pp. II–21).
AOR: Area(s) of Responsibility (p. 26).
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense:
The Office of ASD(HD) is within the office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy
[USD(P)]. ASD(HD) is responsible for the overall supervision of all DOD HD related
activities. Within CS, ASD(HD) has been delegated the duties and authorities associated
with principal staff assistant for MSCA and MACDIS. ASD(HD) ensures internal
coordination of DOD policy direction, assists SecDef in providing guidance, through the
Joint Staff, to combatant commanders for MSCLEA and conducts coordination with DHS.
The principal duty of ASD(HD) is to provide overall supervision of the HD and CS mission
areas within DOD. In that role, ASD(HD) serves as the principal staff assistant and advisor
to the USD(P) and Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense on HD and CS on matters
including, but not limited to: (a) Preparedness to execute the national security missions of
DOD pertaining to the defense of US sovereignty, territory, domestic population, and
defense critical infrastructure against direct threats and aggression; (b) Military support to
civil authorities; (c) Defense Critical Infrastructure Program; (d) DOD domestic
antiterrorism and force protections in accordance with DOD Directive 2000.12; (e) DOD
installation preparedness; (f) DOD domestic counterterrorism activities, less those
involving special operations forces; (g) DOD continuity-related activities, to include
COOP, COG, and Enduring Constitutional Government managed under the Defense
Continuity Program; (h) Domestic crisis management including planning and response to
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man-made and natural disasters including the consequences of incidents involving
weapons of mass destruction; (i) Policy guidance on homeland defense-related education,
training, and professional development programs. (JCS/DoD, Homeland Security (JP 3–
26), 2005, pp. II–5)
Assessment: survey of a real or potential disaster to estimate the actual or expected
damages and to make recommendations for prevention, preparedness, and response (Ref. Center
1998).
Baseline assessment: is the initial set of probability and impact assessments usually made
when risks are first identified. Initial assessments describe risks under the initial baseline plan
and may indicate areas for needed risk management. Subsequent events, risk management
actions, and new information will always change the assessment, which will ultimately be
adopted as the baseline (DOA, Infrastructure Risk Management. Army, 2004, p. 12).
Business continuity: “The ability of an organization to continue to function before,
during, and after a disaster” (DHS, NIPP, 2006, p. 103).
Business crisis: “Any problem or disruption that triggers negative stakeholder reactions
that could impact the organization’s financial strength and ability to do what it does” (Institute
for Crisis Management, Annual ICM Crisis Report, March 2008, p. 1).
Credentialing: “The credentialing process is an objective evaluation and documentation
of a person’s current license or degree; training or experience; competence or certification; and
the ability to meet nationally accepted minimum standards, to provide particular services and/or
functions or perform particular procedures during an incident” FEMA, National Incident
Management System (FEMA 501/Draft), August 2007, p. 39).
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Crisis: “Any emotionally charged situation that, once it becomes public, invites negative
stakeholder reaction and thereby has the potential to threaten the financial wellbeing, reputation
or survival of the firm or some portion thereof” James, E. H., & Wooten, L. P. (2005).
Leadership as (Un) usual: how to display competence in times of crisis. Organizational
Dynamics, 34(2), 141-152.
Crisis: “situation that threatens high-priority goals of the decision-making unit, restricts
the amount of time available for response before the decision is transformed and surprises the
members of the decision-making unit by its occurrence.” Hopmann, P. T. (1974). International
Crises: Insights from Behavioral Research. By Charles F. Hermann (New York: Free Press,
1972. p. 334.). American Political Science Review, 68(4), 1861-1863.
Crisis management: In the literature that exists so far, the term “crisis management” has
been widely employed. But this terminology is ambiguous. “Crisis management” can be taken to
refer either to managing a crisis after it has arisen—that is, intervening in a crisis situation—or
managing in such a way that a crisis does not arise in the first place. The blanket term “crisis
management” is thus a conceptual blanket that covers a multitude of sins. It is best to avoid the
usage of such a label, since the inclusion of the word “management” in such a label implies that
the process so labeled is envisioned as a solution to the problem of crises in general. This,
however, is not really the case. At best, so-called crisis management addresses only crises that
have already arisen and usually only when such crises have become either imminent or already
actualized disasters (Allinson, 1993, p. 92).
Since “crisis management” is used in the literature to refer for the most part to either how
one responds to an existent crisis or how one might anticipate crises and therefore be able to
respond to them, crisis management most often connotes crisis intervention management whether
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after the onset of the disaster or in anticipation of a disaster. In either of these two modes, it is
nevertheless a “band-aid” approach since it either comes into effect after the wound or primarily
addresses itself to having a band-aid ready to cover the wound immediately so that the wound
does not bleed overly much (Allinson 1993, p. 93).
Exercise: An exercise is an instrument to train for, assess, practice, and improve
performance in prevention, protection, response, and recovery capabilities in a risk-free
environment. Exercises can be used for: testing and validating policies, plans, procedures,
training, equipment, and interagency agreements; clarifying and training personnel in roles and
responsibilities; improving interagency coordination and communications; identifying gaps in
resources; improving individual performance; and identifying opportunities for improvement.
(Note: an exercise is also an excellent way to demonstrate community resolve to prepare for
disastrous events) FEMA, HSEEP Glossary, 2018).
Federal coordinating officer (FCO):
(a) Appointment of Federal coordinating officer: immediately upon his declaration of a
major disaster or emergency, the President shall appoint a Federal coordinating officer to
operate in the affected area; (b) Functions of Federal coordinating officer - In order to
effectuate the purposes of this Act, the Federal coordinating officer, within the affected
area, shall (1) make an initial appraisal of the types of relief most urgently needed; (2)
establish such field offices as he deems necessary and as are authorized by the President;
(3) coordinate the administration of relief, including activities of the State and local
governments, the American National Red Cross, the Salvation Army, the Mennonite
Disaster Service, and other relief or disaster assistance organizations, which agree to
operate under his advice or direction, except that nothing contained in this Act shall limit
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or in any way affect the responsibilities of the American National Red Cross under the Act
of January 5, 1905, as amended (33 Stat. 599); (4) take such other action, consistent with
authority delegated to him by the President, and consistent with the provisions of this Act,
as he may deem necessary to assist local citizens and public officials in promptly obtaining
assistance to which they are entitled. 10/27/08 440 (c) State Coordinating officer: When
the President determines assistance under this Act is necessary, he shall request that the
Governor of the affected State designate a State coordinating officer for the purpose of
coordinating State and local disaster assistance efforts with those of the Federal
Government. (d) Where the area affected by a major disaster or emergency includes parts
of more than 1 State, the President, at the discretion of the President, may appoint a single
Federal coordinating officer for the entire affected area, and may appoint such deputy
Federal coordinating officers to assist the Federal coordinating officer as the President
determines appropriate (Stafford Act, June 2007 (FEMA 592), pp. 22–23).
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Appendix B: Protocols
Two research questions guided this study.
1. How do leaders’ prior training and experiences impact their preparation for and
leading during crisis situations?
2. What proactive strategies can organizations develop to prepare leaders for
management tasks in their response to future crisis situations?
Respondent Type (Type of Person to Be Interviewed)
The participants are government and private sector leaders; for practical purposes, this
study is narrowly focused on government and support officials at the local, state, and federal
levels. Specifically, government officials are responsible for crisis leadership or direct consulting
support to government crisis leadership. Federal leaders will be from executive branch agencies
tasked with crisis management. The identified state leaders will be from those agencies
responsible for crisis recovery and mitigation services. In contrast, industry leaders will focus on
those leaders that provide consulting support to the aforementioned disaster-focused agencies
and leaders.
Introduction to the Interview
My name is Pete Phillips, and I am conducting research on crisis leadership and formal
education training programs. I am a doctoral student at the University of Southern California,
and this research is part of the graduation requirements. As this is academic research, the
anonymity of respondents is a crucial tenant of my research. The respondents' identities will not
be shared in accordance with current academic protocols unless compelled by the judiciary.

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Table B1
Interview Protocol
Interview questions Potential probes Question type
As a leader in your organization,
what could they do to
properly train you in the
proper execution of your
leadership duties?
What benefit would be realized
because of this training?
Experience/knowledge
How does your organization's
training prepare you for
making decisions during crisis
events?
What changes would you make to
the training ?
Opinion/knowledge
How does training influence
your decision-making
process?
How well are you prepared
because of the training
conducted by your organization?
Opinion/knowledge
What could your organization
provide to better prepare you
for the difficult decisions?
Are there additional tools that you
would find beneficial?
Opinion/experience
What key responsibilities are
associated with your position?
How well are you prepared to
execute those responsibilities?
Opinion/values
How prepared is your
organization to provide the
required support during a
crisis?
What role does your position play
in the execution of these
responsibilities?
Opinion/values
What are the key motivators in
your organization as it relates
to supporting communities
during crisis events?
What impact does organizational
motivation have in the execution
of key responsibilities?
Opinion/values
What type of leadership training
does your organization
conduct?
Who is responsible for
administering the training for
your organization?
Knowledge/opinion
What types of continuing
training does your
organization provide?
How does this training prepare
you for your current position?
Knowledge/opinion
How prepared are the leaders in
your organization for
executing their duties during a
crisis?
What could be done to better
prepare leaders in your
organization?
Opinion
What are the key motivators in
your organization as it relates
to supporting communities
during crisis events?
Do community perceptions play a
role in leadership response and
motivation?
Opinion
What types of crisis leadership
training have you received?
If the training occurred before
your employment in your
Opinion/experience
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Interview questions Potential probes Question type
organization, what type of
training did you receive? If the
training occurred during your
employment, what type of
training?
What motivators influence your
leadership style?
Are these motivators shared by
other leaders in your
organization?
Opinion
What changes would you make
to your organization's
leadership training program?
Who in the organization is
responsible for training design
and implementation?
Opinion/experience
Anything I didn't ask that you'd
like to share regarding crisis
leadership?
Opinion/knowledge

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Appendix C: Ethics
In research, care must be taken to protect respondents from becoming harmed or
negatively impacted due to their participation in the research study (Weiss 1994). Furthermore,
the researcher must be cognizant of one's potential impact on the participant resulting from the
information the participant shares personally and professionally. It could lend itself to the feeling
of vulnerability or embarrassment (Merriam & Tisdell, 2016). Taking this into account, the
researcher should not accept a problem-solving role during and the time frame following the
collection of data. Researchers are not afforded the protections provided to journalists; therefore,
the researcher should adhere to the established research parameters and framework and disclose
all associated risks to their study participants (Blee et al., 2010). As this interaction with
respondents is on a personal level, careful attention should be paid to remain neutral and not
unduly solicit responses that are not of the participant's own volition or opinion (McConnell-
Henry et al., 2010).
The participant should be reminded that all interviews are recorded, participation is
voluntary, and the interview may be stopped at any point in the process if the participant does not
feel comfortable or no longer want to participate for any undisclosed reason (Merriam & Tisdell,
2016). After the completion of each interview, notes and recordings will be analyzed and shared
with the respondent for validation, and clarification when necessary. Respondent validation is
used to seek feedback and provide the respondent with another level of assurance that their
responses have not been misrepresented or inaccurately recorded. The researcher should ensure
their own opinions are not communicated to the respondent, either verbally or non-verbally as
this could unduly impact the respondent (Merriam & Tisdell, 2015). Respectful treatment of
respondents and the elimination of undue pressures in responses is instrumental to gathering
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accurate, unbiased data and creating a comfortable research environment (Merriam & Tisdell,
2015).
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Appendix D: HSPD-8
The following is a textual recreation of the HSPD-8 presidential directive released in
2003. I have presented this text as it appeared in the original release.
For Immediate Release
Office of the Press Secretary
The White House
December 17, 2003

Homeland Security Presidential Directive / HSPD-8
Subject: National Preparedness
Purpose
(1) This directive establishes policies to strengthen the preparedness of the United States to
prevent and respond to threatened or actual domestic terrorist attacks, major disasters, and other
emergencies by requiring a national domestic all-hazards preparedness goal, establishing
mechanisms for improved delivery of Federal preparedness assistance to State and local
governments, and outlining actions to strengthen preparedness capabilities of Federal, State, and
local entities.
Definitions
(2) For the purposes of this directive:
(a) The term “all-hazards preparedness” refers to preparedness for domestic terrorist attacks,
major disasters, and other emergencies.
(b) The term “Federal departments and agencies” means those executive departments
enumerated in 5 U.S.C. 101, and the Department of Homeland Security; independent
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establishments as defined by 5 U.S.C. 104(1); Government corporations as defined by 5 U.S.C.
103(1); and the United States Postal Service.
(c) The term “Federal preparedness assistance” means Federal department and agency grants,
cooperative agreements, loans, loan guarantees, training, and/or technical assistance provided to
State and local governments and the private sector to prevent, prepare for, respond to, and
recover from terrorist attacks, major disasters, and other emergencies. Unless noted otherwise,
the term “assistance” will refer to Federal assistance programs.
(d) The term “first responder” refers to those individuals who in the early stages of an incident
are responsible for the protection and preservation of life, property, evidence, and the
environment, including emergency response providers as defined in section 2 of the Homeland
Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 101), as well as emergency management, public health, clinical
care, public works, and other skilled support personnel (such as equipment operators) that
provide immediate support services during prevention, response, and recovery operations.
(e) The terms “major disaster” and “emergency” have the meanings given in section 102 of the
Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (42 U.S.C. 5122).
(f) The term “major events” refers to domestic terrorist attacks, major disasters, and other
emergencies.
(g) The term “national homeland security preparedness-related exercises” refers to homeland
security-related exercises that train and test national decision makers and utilize resources of
multiple Federal departments and agencies. Such exercises may involve State and local first
responders when appropriate. Such exercises do not include those exercises conducted solely
within a single Federal department or agency.
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(h) The term “preparedness” refers to the existence of plans, procedures, policies, training, and
equipment necessary at the Federal, State, and local level to maximize the ability to prevent,
respond to, and recover from major events. The term “readiness” is used interchangeably with
preparedness.
(i) The term “prevention” refers to activities undertaken by the first responder community during
the early stages of an incident to reduce the likelihood or consequences of threatened or actual
terrorist attacks. More general and broader efforts to deter, disrupt, or thwart terrorism are not
addressed in this directive.
(j) The term “Secretary” means the Secretary of Homeland Security.
(k) The terms “State,” and “local government,” when used in a geographical sense, have the
same meanings given to those terms in section 2 of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C.
101).
Relationship to HSPD-5
(3) This directive is a companion to HSPD-5, which identifies steps for improved coordination in
response to incidents. This directive describes the way Federal departments and agencies will
prepare for such a response, including prevention activities during the early stages of a terrorism
incident.
Development of a National Preparedness Goal
(4) The Secretary is the principal Federal official for coordinating the implementation of all-
hazards preparedness in the United States. In cooperation with other Federal departments and
agencies, the Secretary coordinates the preparedness of Federal response assets, and the support
for, and assessment of, the preparedness of State and local first responders.
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(5) To help ensure the preparedness of the Nation to prevent, respond to, and recover from
threatened and actual domestic terrorist attacks, major disasters, and other emergencies, the
Secretary, in coordination with the heads of other appropriate Federal departments and agencies
and in consultation with State and local governments, shall develop a national domestic all-
hazards preparedness goal. Federal departments and agencies will work to achieve this goal by:
(a) providing for effective, efficient, and timely delivery of Federal preparedness assistance to
State and local governments; and
(b) supporting efforts to ensure first responders are prepared to respond to major events,
especially prevention of and response to threatened terrorist attacks.
(6) The national preparedness goal will establish measurable readiness priorities and targets that
appropriately balance the potential threat and magnitude of terrorist attacks, major disasters, and
other emergencies with the resources required to prevent, respond to, and recover from them. It
will also include readiness metrics and elements that support the national preparedness goal
including standards for preparedness assessments and strategies, and a system for assessing the
Nation's overall preparedness to respond to major events, especially those involving acts of
terrorism.
(7) The Secretary will submit the national preparedness goal to me through the Homeland
Security Council (HSC) for review and approval prior to, or concurrently with, the Department
of Homeland Security's Fiscal Year 2006 budget submission to the Office of Management and
Budget.
Federal Preparedness Assistance
(8) The Secretary, in coordination with the Attorney General, the Secretary of Health and Human
Services (HHS), and the heads of other Federal departments and agencies that provide assistance
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for first responder preparedness, will establish a single point of access to Federal preparedness
assistance program information within 60 days of the issuance of this directive. The Secretary
will submit to me through the HSC recommendations of specific Federal department and agency
programs to be part of the coordinated approach. All Federal departments and agencies will
cooperate with this effort. Agencies will continue to issue financial assistance awards consistent
with applicable laws and regulations and will ensure that program announcements, solicitations,
application instructions, and other guidance documents are consistent with other Federal
preparedness programs to the extent possible. Full implementation of a closely coordinated
interagency grant process will be completed by September 30, 2005.
(9) To the extent permitted by law, the primary mechanism for delivery of Federal preparedness
assistance will be awards to the States. Awards will be delivered in a form that allows the
recipients to apply the assistance to the highest priority preparedness requirements at the
appropriate level of government. To the extent permitted by law, Federal preparedness assistance
will be predicated on adoption of Statewide comprehensive all-hazards preparedness strategies.
The strategies should be consistent with the national preparedness goal, should assess the most
effective ways to enhance preparedness, should address areas facing higher risk, especially to
terrorism, and should also address local government concerns and Citizen Corps efforts. The
Secretary, in coordination with the heads of other appropriate Federal departments and agencies,
will review and approve strategies submitted by the States. To the extent permitted by law,
adoption of approved Statewide strategies will be a requirement for receiving Federal
preparedness assistance at all levels of government by September 30, 2005.
(10) In making allocations of Federal preparedness assistance to the States, the Secretary, the
Attorney General, the Secretary of HHS, the Secretary of Transportation, the Secretary of
82

Energy, the Secretary of Veterans Affairs, the Administrator of the Environmental Protection
Agency, and the heads of other Federal departments and agencies that provide assistance for first
responder preparedness will base those allocations on assessments of population concentrations,
critical infrastructures, and other significant risk factors, particularly terrorism threats, to the
extent permitted by law.
(11) Federal preparedness assistance will support State and local entities' efforts including
planning, training, exercises, interoperability, and equipment acquisition for major events as well
as capacity building for prevention activities such as information gathering, detection,
deterrence, and collaboration related to terrorist attacks. Such assistance is not primarily intended
to support existing capacity to address normal local first responder operations, but to build
capacity to address major events, especially terrorism.
(12) The Attorney General, the Secretary of HHS, the Secretary of Transportation, the Secretary
of Energy, the Secretary of Veterans Affairs, the Administrator of the Environmental Protection
Agency, and the heads of other Federal departments and agencies that provide assistance for first
responder preparedness shall coordinate with the Secretary to ensure that such assistance
supports and is consistent with the national preparedness goal.
(13) Federal departments and agencies will develop appropriate mechanisms to ensure rapid
obligation and disbursement of funds from their programs to the States, from States to the local
community level, and from local entities to the end users to derive maximum benefit from the
assistance provided. Federal departments and agencies will report annually to the Secretary on
the obligation, expenditure status, and the use of funds associated with Federal preparedness
assistance programs.
Equipment
83

(14) The Secretary, in coordination with State and local officials, first responder organizations,
the private sector and other Federal civilian departments and agencies, shall establish and
implement streamlined procedures for the ongoing development and adoption of appropriate first
responder equipment standards that support nationwide interoperability and other capabilities
consistent with the national preparedness goal, including the safety and health of first responders.
(15) To the extent permitted by law, equipment purchased through Federal preparedness
assistance for first responders shall conform to equipment standards in place at time of purchase.
Other Federal departments and agencies that support the purchase of first responder equipment
will coordinate their programs with the Department of Homeland Security and conform to the
same standards.
(16) The Secretary, in coordination with other appropriate Federal departments and agencies and
in consultation with State and local governments, will develop plans to identify and address
national first responder equipment research and development needs based upon assessments of
current and future threats. Other Federal departments and agencies that support preparedness
research and development activities shall coordinate their efforts with the Department of
Homeland Security and ensure they support the national preparedness goal.
Training and Exercises
(17) The Secretary, in coordination with the Secretary of HHS, the Attorney General, and other
appropriate Federal departments and agencies and in consultation with State and local
governments, shall establish and maintain a comprehensive training program to meet the national
preparedness goal. The program will identify standards and maximize the effectiveness of
existing Federal programs and financial assistance and include training for the Nation's first
responders, officials, and others with major event preparedness, prevention, response, and
84

recovery roles. Federal departments and agencies shall include private organizations in the
accreditation and delivery of preparedness training as appropriate and to the extent permitted by
law.
(18) The Secretary, in coordination with other appropriate Federal departments and agencies,
shall establish a national program and a multi-year planning system to conduct homeland
security preparedness-related exercises that reinforces identified training standards, provides for
evaluation of readiness, and supports the national preparedness goal. The establishment and
maintenance of the program will be conducted in maximum collaboration with State and local
governments and appropriate private sector entities. All Federal departments and agencies that
conduct national homeland security preparedness-related exercises shall participate in a
collaborative, interagency process to designate such exercises on a consensus basis and create a
master exercise calendar. The Secretary will ensure that exercises included in the calendar
support the national preparedness goal. At the time of designation, Federal departments and
agencies will identify their level of participation in national homeland security preparedness-
related exercises. The Secretary will develop a multi-year national homeland security
preparedness-related exercise plan and submit the plan to me through the HSC for review and
approval.
(19) The Secretary shall develop and maintain a system to collect, analyze, and disseminate
lessons learned, best practices, and information from exercises, training events, research, and
other sources, including actual incidents, and establish procedures to improve national
preparedness to prevent, respond to, and recover from major events. The Secretary, in
coordination with other Federal departments and agencies and State and local governments, will
identify relevant classes of homeland-security related information and appropriate means of
85

transmission for the information to be included in the system. Federal departments and agencies
are directed, and State and local governments are requested, to provide this information to the
Secretary to the extent permitted by law.
Federal Department and Agency Preparedness
(20) The head of each Federal department or agency shall undertake actions to support the
national preparedness goal, including adoption of quantifiable performance measurements in the
areas of training, planning, equipment, and exercises for Federal incident management and asset
preparedness, to the extent permitted by law. Specialized Federal assets such as teams,
stockpiles, and caches shall be maintained at levels consistent with the national preparedness
goal and be available for response activities as set forth in the National Response Plan, other
appropriate operational documents, and applicable authorities or guidance. Relevant Federal
regulatory requirements should be consistent with the national preparedness goal. Nothing in this
directive shall limit the authority of the Secretary of Defense with regard to the command and
control, training, planning, equipment, exercises, or employment of Department of Defense
forces, or the allocation of Department of Defense resources.
(21) The Secretary, in coordination with other appropriate Federal civilian departments and
agencies, shall develop and maintain a Federal response capability inventory that includes the
performance parameters of the capability, the timeframe within which the capability can be
brought to bear on an incident, and the readiness of such capability to respond to domestic
incidents. The Department of Defense will provide to the Secretary information describing the
organizations and functions within the Department of Defense that may be utilized to provide
support to civil authorities during a domestic crisis.
Citizen Participation
86

(22) The Secretary shall work with other appropriate Federal departments and agencies as well as
State and local governments and the private sector to encourage active citizen participation and
involvement in preparedness efforts. The Secretary shall periodically review and identify the best
community practices for integrating private citizen capabilities into local preparedness efforts.
Public Communication
(23) The Secretary, in consultation with other Federal departments and agencies, State and local
governments, and non-governmental organizations, shall develop a comprehensive plan to
provide accurate and timely preparedness information to public citizens, first responders, units of
government, the private sector, and other interested parties and mechanisms for coordination at
all levels of government.
Assessment and Evaluation
(24) The Secretary shall provide to me through the Assistant to the President for Homeland
Security an annual status report of the Nation's level of preparedness, including State
capabilities, the readiness of Federal civil response assets, the utilization of mutual aid, and an
assessment of how the Federal first responder preparedness assistance programs support the
national preparedness goal. The first report will be provided within 1 year of establishment of the
national preparedness goal.
(25) Nothing in this directive alters, or impedes the ability to carry out, the authorities of the
Federal departments and agencies to perform their responsibilities under law and consistent with
applicable legal authorities and presidential guidance.
(26) Actions pertaining to the funding and administration of financial assistance and all other
activities, efforts, and policies in this directive shall be executed in accordance with law. To the
87

extent permitted by law, these policies will be established and carried out in consultation with
State and local governments.
(27) This directive is intended only to improve the internal management of the executive branch
of the Federal Government, and it is not intended to, and does not, create any right or benefit,
substantive or procedural, enforceable at law or in equity, against the United States, its
departments, agencies, or other entities, its officers or employees, or any other person.

GEORGE W. BUSH

Abstract (if available)

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Asset Metadata

Creator Phillips, Lloyd Pete, Jr. (author)

Core Title Impact of training on leader's ability to effectively lead during a crisis

School Rossier School of Education

Degree Doctor of Education

Degree Program Organizational Change and Leadership (On Line)

Degree Conferral Date 2022-12

Publication Date 09/06/2022

Defense Date 08/29/2022

Publisher University of Southern California (original), University of Southern California. Libraries (digital)

Tag crisis leadership,disaster,disaster leadership,leadership,OAI-PMH Harvest

Format application/pdf (imt)

Language English

Contributor Electronically uploaded by the author (provenance)

Advisor Datta, Monique (committee chair), Maddox, Anthony (committee member), Pritchard, Marc (committee member)

Creator Email lloydphi@usc.edu

Permanent Link (DOI) https://doi.org/10.25549/usctheses-oUC111645206

Unique identifier UC111645206

Legacy Identifier etd-PhillipsLl-11176

Document Type Dissertation

Format application/pdf (imt)

Rights Phillips, Lloyd Pete, Jr.

Type texts

Source 20220906-usctheses-batch-977 (batch), University of Southern California (contributing entity), University of Southern California Dissertations and Theses (collection)

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Repository Name University of Southern California Digital Library

Repository Location USC Digital Library, University of Southern California, University Park Campus MC 2810, 3434 South Grand Avenue, 2nd Floor, Los Angeles, California 90089-2810, USA

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