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Emerging catastrophes in slums of the developing world: considerations for policy makers
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Emerging catastrophes in slums of the developing world: considerations for policy makers
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EMERGING CATASTROPHES IN SLUMS OF THE DEVELOPING WORLD:
CONSIDERATIONS FOR POLICY MAKERS
by
Steven J. Jensen
A Dissertation Presented to the
FACULTY OF THE USC PRICE SCHOOL OF PUBLIC POLICY
UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA
In Partial Fulfillment of the
Requirements for the Degree
DOCTOR OF POLICY, PLANNING AND DEVELOPMENT
May 2012
Copyright 2012 Steven J. Jensen
ii
Acknowledgements
This project has been an extraordinarily difficult undertaking. 425 papers, books,
and government reports have been digested over a four year period. Many nights have
been spent pondering, praying, and seeking answers to what this all means.
I have looked too closely at our collective future on this beautiful planet, and felt
horror one minute and indescribable joy the next. But that I believe is the essence of
what it is to be human, if one is willing to engage. This century is proving to be a wild
journey and it promises to intensify. Get ready.
My thanks go first to my lovely and brilliant partner, Shirley Feldmann-Jensen,
who helps me make sense out of this crazy world.
To my professor, Manuel Castells, I owe much as he has helped me to see what is
hidden in this world, yet must be uncovered.
My gratitude is with my advisor, Professor Peter Robertson for his patience and
wisdom. To Professor Eric Heikkila for pushing me to stay with this until I get it right, or
as close to right as I can. To Professor Richard Little for his understanding of the
realities of this field.
Finally my sincere appreciation goes to my friend and mentor of twenty years,
Professor Richard Resurreccion, who has encouraged and guided me through much of
life.
iii
Table of Contents
Acknowledgements
ii
List of Figures
v
Terms
vi
Abstract
vii
Introduction 1
Target Audience 5
Objectives and Scope 6
Methods 6
Structure of this Document
8
Chapter One: Hazards and Humanity 10
1.1 Catastrophes, Cities and Slums 10
1.1.1 Catastrophes 10
1.1.2 Slum Defined 13
1.1.3 Urbanization and Slum Growth 14
1.1.4 Vulnerability: The Pressure and Release Model” 17
1.1.5 Risk Conflation 19
1.1.6 Myth of Marginality? 21
1.1.7 Some Lessons from History 22
1.1.8 What are we doing? 23
1.2 Global Threats: Looking Beyond the Usual Hazardscape 24
1.2.1 Environmental Degradation 25
1.2.2 Eating and Drinking: Food and Water Security 28
1.2.3 Epidemic: Limited Options for Controlling Outbreaks 29
1.2.4 Economy: Global Downturns 30
1.2.5 Energy: Oil Shortages and Price Hikes 31
1.2.6 Summary 33
Chapter Two: Governance 35
2.1 “Complex Adaptive Systems” 35
2.1.1 Capacity for Creative Innovation 36
2.1.2 The Parts and the Whole 38
2.1.3 The System and its Environment 39
2.1.4 Information in Evolving Complexity 40
2.1.5 CAS and Governance 41
iv
2.2 Four Types of Governance 43
2.2.1 Fragile Governance 44
2.2.2 Rigid Governance 45
2.2.3 Flexible Governance 46
2.2.4 Robust Governance 46
2.2.5 Finding the Balance 47
2.3 Local Implications of Globalization 48
2.3.1 Trends in the Globalization of Hazards and Risk 49
2.3.2 New Opportunities
51
Chapter Three: Working in the New Normal 53
3.1.1 Changing Roles of International, National and Local
Governance
53
3.1.2 Rethinking Governance and Catastrophes 58
3.1.3 Working in Complex Adaptive Systems 59
3.1.4 Networked Society and Communications 61
3.1.5 Implications for Higher Education 62
3.1.6 It is all in the Timing: Policy and the Focusing Event 64
3.1.7 A Way Forward
66
Conclusion
69
Further Research
73
References
74
Appendices
Appendix A: An Emerging Globalized System of Hazards –
Technological, Organizational, and Institutional
81
Appendix B: Emergency Services Administration Program Goals –
California State University at Long Beach
89
v
List of Figures
Figure 1: Depiction of the Unique Opportunities and Threats at this Point in
History
vii
Figure 2: Three Environments
4
Figure 3: Triangulation
8
Figure 4: Emergency Continuum
10
Figure 5: Natural Disasters Reported, International, 1900 – 2008
12
Figure 6: ReliefWeb’s Disaster Updates for Last 72 hours
13
Figure 7: Percentage of World Population in Rural and Urban Areas 14
Figure 8: Urban Population Living in Slums, 2005 15
Figure 9: Cities with a Significant Earthquake Threat 16
Figure 10: Progression of Vulnerability Creating Processes 19
Figure 11: Natural Hazards Composite Map Overlaid with Slums over One-
million People
24
Figure 12: Influence of Exogenous Threats
25
Figure 13: Scenarios for Peak Oil Time Frames
32
Figure 14: Interrelationships of Selected Factors
33
Figure 15: Adaptive Capacity of Four Governance Types
44
Figure 16: Development of a Globalized System of Hazards-related Risk
50
Figure 17: Building a Globalized System: <1950 to 2010 51
Figure 18: Depiction of the Unique Opportunities and Threats in History 67
Figure 19: Increase in Disasters Worldwide as Compared to Increases in Global
Capacity
69
vi
Terms
Capacity: The combination of strengths, attributes and resources available within a
community, society or organization (UNISDR).
Catastrophe: An event causing great and often sudden damage or suffering (UNISDR).
Complex Adaptive Systems: A complex, nonlinear, interactive system which has the
ability to adapt to a changing environment (Comfort, 1994).
Disaster: A disruption of the functioning of a society involving widespread human,
material, economic or environmental losses, which exceeds the ability of the
affected society to cope using its own resources (UNISDR).
Global: Refers to the range of arrangements such as supra-national or multi-national.
Globalization: The capacity to work as a unit in real time, or chosen time, on a planetary
scale owing to technical, organizational and institutional arrangements (Castells).
Governance: The use of institutions, structures of authority and collaboration to
allocate resources and coordinate activity in society or the economy (Bell).
Hazard: A dangerous phenomenon, substance, human activity or condition that may
cause loss of life, injury or other health impacts, property damage, loss of
livelihoods and services, social and economic disruption, or environmental
damage (UNISDR).
Local: Refers generally to any sub-national levels of governance such as regions or cities.
National: Refers to the country-wide level of government
Resilience: The ability of a system, community or society exposed to hazards to resist,
absorb, accommodate to and recover from the effects of a hazard (UNISDR).
Risk: The combination of the probability of an event and its negative consequences
(UNISDR).
Slum: A group of individuals living under the same roof that lack one or more of the
following conditions: access to safe water, access to sanitation, secure tenure,
durability of housing, and sufficient living area (UN Habitat, 2003).
Vulnerability: The characteristics and circumstances of a community, system or asset
that make it susceptible to the damaging effects of a hazard (UNISDR).
vii
Abstract
Slums, due to their extreme vulnerability, will be a setting for unprecedented
catastrophes. These rapidly expanding communities will soon house two-billion people
world-wide. Emerging global issues, from environmental degradation to oil shortages to
food security, will be heavily leveraged against slums. Each of these global issues alone
could be devastating; together they have the potential to compound the depth and breadth
of the existing hazardscape.
Globalization and changes in governance have rendered inadequate the existing
frameworks for managing catastrophes, while setting the stage for new ways of
approaching issues surrounding slums. With few exceptions, sovereignty is migrating
from the state and being replaced by a loosely knit but potentially effective system with
globalized components and local communities of interest that can be effectively exploited
if approached strategically. This study reframes the problem of catastrophes in slums and
suggests new ways of looking at their governance.
Figure 1: Depiction of the Unique Opportunities and Threats at this Point in History
1
Introduction
This project has been a labor of love… and of hate, of horror and fleeting joy. I
could not imagine a more difficult place to live than a slum, yet I find myself studying
this from a position of privilege. My life is one of ease. Any strife is of my own making.
Yet I am compelled to study slums, one of the most prominent features that we have
created on our planet.
I have visited many of these places and immersed myself in a range of literature
surrounding slums. I know the reality of these places and have come to understand where
they are likely to go if they continue on their present trajectory. That will be a
slaughterhouse. Yet their fate is largely our collective choice and we are all accountable
for the outcomes.
It is quite remarkable that we find ourselves at a point in history where there is a
convergence of multiple threats that can destroy large segments of the world’s
population, while at the same time there are emerging forms of governance that will
enable us to work our way through these seemingly intractable global threats. The focus
of these threats will likely be the most vulnerable of human settlements, the slums in the
developing world. Here, possibilities for change are difficult in the best of
circumstances. In times of crisis the inherent alienation of these communities makes
positive outcomes particularly difficult. However, there are emerging opportunities for
building resilience within these communities.
Rather than addressing specific solutions “on the ground”, this study focuses on
opportunities created as governance changes at the global, national, and local levels. By
2
reframing these themes in terms of globalization, networks, and communications, a better
understanding of the emerging opportunities for change is provided. Key to this is an
appreciation of the degree to which a globalized system is emerging for addressing
hazard-related risk.
The causes of slum growth and its haphazard outcomes have been unmanaged,
leaving much of the world with an urban form that is not safe or sustainable. However,
we can see this tragedy beginning to unfold and can mitigate its impact. This “Guidance
for Policy Makers” introduces the problem of slums and catastrophes through a broad
overview of several relevant fields. From this some likely developments can be inferred
and policy options are offered for managing this likely course of events.
What exactly constitutes a slum is unclear. While conditions vary widely, slums
can be characterized by a lack of basic services, where housing is poorly built and
overcrowded (UN Habitat, 2003). Additionally, most slums exist within a rapidly
changing urban environment with a complex hazardscape, resulting in extreme
vulnerability.
About one billion people now live in slums; by 2030 slums will be home for two
billion people (UN Habitat, 2003, p.3), reflecting deep changes in the world over the last
half-century. Given their size, slums are both a significant and vulnerable part of many
nations, yet their problems continue to be ignored in most parts of the world.
In addition to this inherent vulnerability, slums are likely to be heavily impacted
by critical global issues. For this study, relevant global issues were identified based upon
their likely consequences and collectively referred to as the “Five E’s”:
3
• Environmental degradation: local effects of climate change coupled with
pollution
• Eating and drinking: inadequate food supply and safe water
• Epidemic: crowding and poor sanitation limiting options for controlling
outbreaks
• Economy: downturns that are heavily leveraged against these producers
• Energy: oil shortages or price hikes threatening support systems and participation
in the global economy.
Any one of these factors alone could be devastating, but the interaction of these factors
could leave many slums in crisis. For example, energy issues pose threats to the food
supply which could weaken the population, leaving it more vulnerable to epidemic.
While slum dwellers endure many hardships, very low incomes tend to constrain
their ability to adapt. Those living at this level of poverty are constantly shifting limited
resources between basic needs, i.e., food, water, sanitation, shelter, clothing,
transportation, health, and education. The result is a fragile existence with little
resilience, or the ability to withstand any shocks that are out of the ordinary. This lack of
individual and collective resilience has the potential to create a “tipping point” in slums,
whereby external factors can severely overwhelm basic needs. Consequently, the fragile
existence of the slum could collapse, leading to a range of adverse outcomes that could
rapidly extend to national levels and beyond.
These communities can adjust and cope to a degree, but these exogenous factors
are of a scale that is likely to overwhelm slums as they presently exist. The danger posed
by failed states and exacerbated by desperation in slums is likely to be the outgrowth of a
collective failure to address this emerging problem. Consequently, significant structural
changes will be inevitable. A series of cascading failures could result, with economies
faltering and governments destabilized. This could ultimately cripple many nations and
undermine any efforts toward development. However, if we can predict the problem, we
can at the very least minimize the problem.
Catastrophes are a predictable result of the maladjustment to the environment.
Mileti (1999) explains that catastrophes stem fro
systems: the natural, built and social environments.
This interaction has lead to a trend of increasing
vulnerability which “stems from the fact that all these
systems—and their interactions
complex with each passing year" (Mileti, p.3).
If catastrophes can be seen in terms of the failure of interrelated systems, then it
follows that structural change at failure points within these interrelated systems will be
required for recovery from the catastrophe.
complex, but it is possible to
fail. An understanding of potential failure can be critical in the development of policy.
The challenge is in devising
implementation, all based on understanding a range of interconnected factors that have
inherent uncertainties. This proactive approach to policy development is the tough part,
since we work in a world accustomed to reacting to problems rather than anticipating
them.
This study considers how catastrophic events impact policy and governments, the
appropriateness of current and emerging forms of governance for the structural change
faltering and governments destabilized. This could ultimately cripple many nations and
ine any efforts toward development. However, if we can predict the problem, we
can at the very least minimize the problem.
are a predictable result of the maladjustment to the environment.
Mileti (1999) explains that catastrophes stem from interactions among three major
systems: the natural, built and social environments.
This interaction has lead to a trend of increasing
stems from the fact that all these
and their interactions—are becoming more
each passing year" (Mileti, p.3).
If catastrophes can be seen in terms of the failure of interrelated systems, then it
follows that structural change at failure points within these interrelated systems will be
required for recovery from the catastrophe. Global interdependence and vulnerability is
complex, but it is possible to recognize where interrelated systems have the potential to
fail. An understanding of potential failure can be critical in the development of policy.
The challenge is in devising appropriate policy and gaining widespread acceptance and
implementation, all based on understanding a range of interconnected factors that have
inherent uncertainties. This proactive approach to policy development is the tough part,
rld accustomed to reacting to problems rather than anticipating
This study considers how catastrophic events impact policy and governments, the
appropriateness of current and emerging forms of governance for the structural change
4
faltering and governments destabilized. This could ultimately cripple many nations and
ine any efforts toward development. However, if we can predict the problem, we
are a predictable result of the maladjustment to the environment.
m interactions among three major
If catastrophes can be seen in terms of the failure of interrelated systems, then it
follows that structural change at failure points within these interrelated systems will be
Global interdependence and vulnerability is
where interrelated systems have the potential to
fail. An understanding of potential failure can be critical in the development of policy.
appropriate policy and gaining widespread acceptance and
implementation, all based on understanding a range of interconnected factors that have
inherent uncertainties. This proactive approach to policy development is the tough part,
rld accustomed to reacting to problems rather than anticipating
This study considers how catastrophic events impact policy and governments, the
appropriateness of current and emerging forms of governance for the structural change
5
brought about by catastrophic events, and the role of governance in managing future
catastrophes. It reframes these themes in terms of globalization, networks, and
communications, thus providing a better understanding of the emerging opportunities for
change. Key to this is an appreciation of the degree to which a globalized system is
emerging for addressing hazard-related risk.
Discussions of governance have focused on institutions established within the
state. However, processes of globalization are significantly altering this space. Of
particular interest is the tendency of sovereignty to migrate away from government as a
state becomes more globalized (Castells, 2004). At the same time, there is evidence of
the emergence of a globalized system for managing hazards-related risk, which will be
explored in depth in this study. This “de-facto” globalized system when combined with
civil society and business sectors, can supplement hazards management capacities that
have previously existed within a government body. This significantly changes the ability
to manage these emerging hazards, if the governing body is capable of effectively
assimilating outside resources.
Target Audience
The thrust of this project is to develop practical guidelines for working through
the structural changes that may be necessary to avoid, minimize, or recover from
catastrophes. These guidelines are intended for policy makers at all levels of
government. Of particular concern are those outside the traditional roles of government,
who will be drawn into policy roles as emerging forms of governance fan out to the
6
broader community from the traditional policy makers. Also of concern are the
thousands of smaller cities where most of the urban population growth is actually
occurring. Meeting needs at that level requires a much broader diffusion of capabilities.
These smaller cities are typically under-supported, with the mega-cities and their
dramatic problems getting more of the attention.
Objectives and Scope
There are three related objectives for this guide. First is to show how the rapid
and uncontrolled local growth of slums combined with previously unseen levels of global
threats has set the stage for unprecedented catastrophes. Second, governance and policy
options for coping with this are outside of most of our normal practice, which should be
reconsidered in light of the aforementioned emerging trends. Third, establishing new
policy directions while educating the next generation of leaders and managers is the best
strategy for realizing the fundamental changes that will be necessary in how we approach
catastrophes.
The scope of these guidelines is very broad, incorporating findings from many
perspectives. As such, a “big picture” view is necessary given the nature of the problems
facing slums, where the confluence of many trends acts as multipliers for inter-related
impacts.
Methods
This study grapples with the complex issue of governance and catastrophes in
slums, drawing primarily from the confluence of natural sciences, sociology, and public
7
policy. As such, the study does not dwell deeply on the details within a narrow
discipline. Instead, the study focuses on the relationships between these fields of study in
attempt to capture a view of the inherent connections and the “big picture”. In this way
this study can be best classified as descriptive research which has taken a
transdisciplinary approach. Franco (2008) defines transdisciplinary research in disasters
as:
a shared framework of understanding between scientists from different
disciplines, which is based on the contributing traditional disciplines, but also
extends them; and that is designed to address complex societal problems by
engaging in a process of mutual learning between science and society (p.237)
The problem of catastrophes is complex and transdisciplinary at its core, cutting
across many aspects of our world. Reductionist approaches to studying catastrophes can
miss the complexity of the problem and consequently can be at risk of not finding
appropriate solutions. However, a transdisciplinary approach attempts to assimilate
overwhelming amounts of theory and knowledge from both research and practice, but can
be at risk of missing important details as it tries to understand the “big picture”.
A comprehensive theory of disasters is newly emerging at best. Franco notes that
while, “complexities have been explored to some degree in general disaster research …
comparatively little theoretical work in the field of disaster management has been done
to… frame this work adequately in a transdisciplinary context” (p.101). If there are to be
advances in a more comprehensive catastrophe-related theoretical framework, it will
come from broad perspectives drawn from a variety of disciplines.
Lagadec’s research is
increasingly unconventional crisis environments. He states
existed on the periphery …
intellectual effort must now concentrate on events and data excluded until now:
discontinuity, irreversibility, extremes, volatility, radical change, crystallization and
resonance” (p.14). Further,
and the closer these tools can be brought to the people at the front line of the management
procedure, the less they will refuse the obstacles which confront them” (p.14).
The complexities of catastophes can be viewed from different
angles through triangulation
specific point by pointing towards it from at least three perspectives.
This concept has been applied to qualitative inquiry by Denzin (1978)
to stress the importance of looking at a problem from a variety of vantage points.
The problem of slums and catastrophes is herein examined from multiple
perspectives, but each of these different views point to essentially the same approach.
Care has been taken to note contrary views.
can lend itself to practical applications. At its core, this study is applied research with the
objective of developing appropriate policy guidance for managing catastrophes.
Chapter One provide
catastrophes in slums, with a focus o
Lagadec’s research is at the intersection of crisis prevention and management in
increasingly unconventional crisis environments. He states, “Issues which had previously
… must now be treated as core issues and not freak events
st now concentrate on events and data excluded until now:
discontinuity, irreversibility, extremes, volatility, radical change, crystallization and
Further, he holds that… “we need new tools for the new challenges
ools can be brought to the people at the front line of the management
procedure, the less they will refuse the obstacles which confront them” (p.14).
The complexities of catastophes can be viewed from different
riangulation, a navigation technique for identifying a
specific point by pointing towards it from at least three perspectives.
This concept has been applied to qualitative inquiry by Denzin (1978)
to stress the importance of looking at a problem from a variety of vantage points.
The problem of slums and catastrophes is herein examined from multiple
perspectives, but each of these different views point to essentially the same approach.
Care has been taken to note contrary views. These threads come together in a model that
nd itself to practical applications. At its core, this study is applied research with the
objective of developing appropriate policy guidance for managing catastrophes.
Structure of this Document
One provides background on several fields related to potential
, with a focus on relevant trends and likely future directions.
8
at the intersection of crisis prevention and management in
Issues which had previously
must now be treated as core issues and not freak events…
st now concentrate on events and data excluded until now:
discontinuity, irreversibility, extremes, volatility, radical change, crystallization and
holds that… “we need new tools for the new challenges
ools can be brought to the people at the front line of the management
procedure, the less they will refuse the obstacles which confront them” (p.14).
to stress the importance of looking at a problem from a variety of vantage points.
The problem of slums and catastrophes is herein examined from multiple
perspectives, but each of these different views point to essentially the same approach.
threads come together in a model that
nd itself to practical applications. At its core, this study is applied research with the
objective of developing appropriate policy guidance for managing catastrophes.
related to potential
n relevant trends and likely future directions.
9
Chapter Two considers theories of Complex Adaptive Systems, governance, and the local
implications of globalization. Chapter Three considers provides guidance for policy
makers, with multiple threads are woven together into a framework appropriate for
managing catastrophes.
“The crises of our time, it becomes increasingly clear, are the necessary impetus for t
revolution now under way. And once we understand nature's transformative powers, we
see that it is our powerful ally, not a force to be feared our subdued.”
Catastrophes are complex. Understanding their nature requires the integration of
perspectives from a wide range of fields.
hazards and creating vulnerability which is not adequately acknowledged and addressed.
Add to that exogenous threats that are a product of our increasingly crowded,
interdependent world and a volatile situation is likely to develop. As the scale of the
disaster problem increases, so does the complexity.
understanding of the main issues relevant to this study.
1.1 Catastrophes, Ci
1.1.1 Catastrophes
There is a continuum of events, ranging
in scale from accidents to extinction
events. Near the mid-range of that continuum
would be catastrophes. These are the scale of events that are beyond the coping
mechanisms that are in place for most nations. On the far end of the spectrum are events
Chapter One:
Hazards and Humanity
“The crises of our time, it becomes increasingly clear, are the necessary impetus for t
revolution now under way. And once we understand nature's transformative powers, we
see that it is our powerful ally, not a force to be feared our subdued.”
Catastrophes are complex. Understanding their nature requires the integration of
erspectives from a wide range of fields. Rapid shifts in urban forms are exacerbating
hazards and creating vulnerability which is not adequately acknowledged and addressed.
Add to that exogenous threats that are a product of our increasingly crowded,
erdependent world and a volatile situation is likely to develop. As the scale of the
disaster problem increases, so does the complexity. Chapter One establishes
understanding of the main issues relevant to this study.
1.1 Catastrophes, Cities and Slums
is a continuum of events, ranging
in scale from accidents to extinction-level
range of that continuum
These are the scale of events that are beyond the coping
hanisms that are in place for most nations. On the far end of the spectrum are events
10
“The crises of our time, it becomes increasingly clear, are the necessary impetus for the
revolution now under way. And once we understand nature's transformative powers, we
Thomas Kuhn
Catastrophes are complex. Understanding their nature requires the integration of
Rapid shifts in urban forms are exacerbating
hazards and creating vulnerability which is not adequately acknowledged and addressed.
Add to that exogenous threats that are a product of our increasingly crowded,
erdependent world and a volatile situation is likely to develop. As the scale of the
establishes a common
These are the scale of events that are beyond the coping
hanisms that are in place for most nations. On the far end of the spectrum are events
11
which cause near or complete destruction of human life, while accidents, emergencies
and disasters are within the coping mechanisms of most nations.
Catastrophes are characterized in many different ways, but are generally seen as
violent events marked by massive upheaval. Essentially, a catastrophe is an event that
brings great changes, with the potential to force a restructuring of systems that are found
to be deficient. For the purposes of this study three elements define catastrophe:
1. Impact is widespread and deep.
2. Normal coping mechanisms are overwhelmed.
3. Underlying causes force us to restructure systems for recovery.
The key point is that catastrophes are of sufficient magnitude as to overwhelm our
systems and require structural change if we are to return to a more stable state.
There remains some confusion in practice with the terms emergency, disaster and
catastrophe. For this study the focus will be on the class of events loosely defined as
catastrophe. However, some of the literature quoted may use the terms “emergency” or
“disaster.” In such cases, “catastrophe” may be assumed if it clearly does not alter the
original author’s intent and meaning. The literature will be presented as is and the
implications inferred for higher magnitude catastrophic events.
Understanding catastrophes and learning how to manage them is problematic in
itself. Birkland (2006) explains that:
The paradox of learning driven by truly large events is that whereas such events
provide significant fodder for learning, they are also likely to overwhelm the
ability of a system to respond with routine procedures and therefore may limit
learning. Large events are exceptions rather than typical examples of problems in
a given domain. One could argue that in domains prone to disaster large events
are the most important because they reveal just how bad a disaster can be.
(Birkland, p.162)
12
Catastrophes will be of particular concern in the 21
st
Century. Recent years have
seen a rapid escalation in the frequency, scale and complexity of disasters. This rapid
escalation does not stem from the hazards themselves, which have remained constant
through this period. The graph below illustrates this rapid escalation by looking only at
the number of disasters.
Figure 5: Natural Disasters Reported, International, 1900 – 2008 (CRED, 2009)
The problem is that cities have been built inappropriately for the hazardscape
(Mileti, 1999). The rapid growth and extreme vulnerability of many cities has set the
stage for the recent escalation of catastrophes, which are likely to be the “new normal”
(Perrow, 2007) and should be well understood because of their unique demands.
To view this another way, the U.N.’s ReliefWeb serves as a clearinghouse for
disaster information. The picture below shows active disasters on one particular and
usual day. While the big catastrophes get our attention, along with the close-by events,
the number of disasters underway at any one time strains our capabilities and demands
better approaches.
13
Figure 6: ReliefWeb’s Disaster Updates for Last 72 hours (4/28/11, http://reliefweb.int)
1.1.2 Slum Defined
A slum household is "a group of individuals living under the same roof that lack
one or more of the following conditions: access to safe water; access to sanitation; secure
tenure; durability of housing; and sufficient living area" (UN Habitat, p.12). UN-Habitat
has linked these key characteristics to Millennium Development Goals (MDG), providing
commonly accepted definitions and quantifiable indicators. However, the UN-Habitat
slum definition does not capture the range of origins and evolutions of slums across the
world, which reflects the diversity of human struggles. Moreover, the quality of the data
is in some countries suspicious.
The urban reality for slum-dwellers includes land speculation driving up prices,
overcrowding on hazardous lands, difficult access to water, sanitation problems,
evictions, fires in congested areas, poor transportation, and associated public health risks
(Eckholm, 1975). Davis points out that slum dwellers trade physical safety for locations
that are less subject to eviction (Davis, p.121). Often this means settling in hazard prone
14
locations. This, added to other risks, leaves slum dwellers vulnerable to hazards on top of
a marginal existence.
1.1.3 Urbanization and Slum Growth
The global economy is rapidly restructuring, with a subsequent redistribution of
populations from rural to urban areas. Half of the world’s people now live in urban areas.
By 2030, about 60% of the world will be in urban areas. Based on UN models, this
estimate assumes western patterns of industrialization and urbanization; alternative
models put 2030 urbanization at 50% using different growth patterns. Either way, this
represents a massive and rapid change in how we live on the earth.
Figure 7: Percentage of World Population in Rural and Urban Areas
(United Nations, 2010, http://esa.un.org/unup)
Much of this urban growth will be in slums. About one billion people now live in
slums; by 2030 slums will be home for two billion people (UN Habitat, p.3). Given their
15
size, slums are both a significant and vulnerable part of the social, political and economic
fabric of many nations. Most countries have experienced slum growth over the past 20
years, but poorer countries with have experienced far more. The map below shows the
regions where slums area more dominant feature.
Figure 8: Urban Population Living in Slums, 2005 (%)
(Urban Population, Development and the Environment, UN, 2008)
The map below illustrates another aspect of this problem. Most of the cities
shown on the map have significant slums, contributing to their vulnerability when faced
with earthquakes.
16
Figure 9: Cities with a Significant Earthquake Threat
(2010: Earth Institute at Columbia University)
The rapid growth of slums can be attributed to many different factors, but
economic drivers tend to be predominant. Davis (2006) describes how the Structural
Adjustment Programs (SA), imposed as conditions of loans through the International
Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank in the 1980's and 90's, sought to reduce
developing countries’ fiscal imbalance by introducing austerity measures and free-market
policies. This built upon neo-liberal principles in an attempt to provide opportunity for
those who relocated to the urban areas.
At the same time, the widespread transformation of agriculture into a high-input
industry all but ruled out the participation of the traditional subsistence level farmer.
With that, some were pushed as they lost their land while others were pulled to the city
by the promise of a better life (Packer, 2006). Rapid urbanization with insufficient
industrialization and other forms of job creation left many destitute. Hamza states:
… driven by rapid growth strategies, and an inevitable SA and reform agenda, the
developing countries realized that they had a comparative advantage in energy-
17
intensive manufactured exports… A potential implication is the trade-off
between production, competition and efficiency and negative environmental
consequences with the creation of potentially disaster-vulnerable settlements.
(p.293).
Castells describes the process of urban development as an outgrowth of the
expanding global capitalist economy. As such, a few large cities act as trade centers of
colonial and neo-colonial exploitation, inextricably connected to the economic and
political systems of the developed world. This leads to dependent urbanization,
characterized by high levels of unemployment, material inequality, and poverty (Castells,
2011). The structural forces which are behind urbanization have left few options for
people. A move to the city is inevitable for most; once there the possibilities are limited.
The poor usually have few or no options as to where and how they will live. Thus
vulnerability is forced upon them because of limited choices. This could come in the
form of anything ranging from local forced relocations to macro-economic forces such as
structural adjustment requiring a move from rural to urban areas. As such, when viewed
from a long-term perspective, catastrophes become a predictable outcome of flawed
policy and planning. The urban poor are particularly at risk to a wide range of hazards
beyond their control.
1.1.4 Vulnerability: "The Pressure and Release Model"
In catastrophes, vulnerability can be seen as the collision of the human limitations
with hazards in the environment. Manyena describes vulnerability as:
… a reflection of the intrinsic physical, economic, social and political
predisposition or susceptibility of a community to be affected by or suffer adverse
effects when struck by a dangerous physical phenomenon of natural or
18
anthropogenic origin. It also signifies a low level of disaster resilience. Disaster
resilience could be viewed as the intrinsic capacity of a system, community or
society predisposed to a shock or stress to adapt and survive by changing its
nonessential attributes and rebuilding itself (Manyena, p.443).
In general, the poor tend to be risk averse in economic terms, but more risk taking
in spatial terms (Pantoja, 2002). Charvériat observes that for the poor, awareness of the
hazards of new locales contributes to an aversion to spatial risk, but the advantages of
hazard-prone locations are perceived as outweighing the risks. For many, there is actually
no choice as to where they will live. Risk reduction strategies may simply be out of the
question when daily survival dominates their attention (Charvériat, p.60-64).
The “Pressure and Release” model (PAR) provides a well accepted theoretical
understanding of vulnerability. Blaikie argues that there are a set of variables that impact
vulnerability, deeply rooted in the history and culture of particular locales. These include
"class… occupation, caste, ethnicity, gender, disability, health status, age, immigration
status… and the nature and extent of social networks" (Blaikie, p.11). Life is dynamic;
consequently people's vulnerability will continually be influenced by wars, national
debts, famine, droughts, climate change, urbanization, and other factors beyond their
control. As depicted below, the basis for PAR is an "intersection of two opposing forces:
those processes generating vulnerability on one side, and physical exposure to a hazard
on the other… [To] relieve the pressure, vulnerability has to be reduced" (Blaikie, p.22).
Figure 10: Progression of
Induced pressures on either side of the disaster equation result in increases in risk.
"People's vulnerability is generated by social, economic, and political processes that
influence how hazards affect people in varying ways and different intensities"
p.3).The progression of vulnerability
causal phases. When viewed in this way, it is clear that vulnerability is the result of a
wide range of policy and planning failures, actions that are well
1.1.5 Risk Conflation
Urban hazards are characterized by a complex and dynamic mix of risks.
Mitchel (2006) explains that,
"…new amalgams of hazard are being created in metropolitan areas with
overlapping natural, technological, b
Progression of Vulnerability Creating Processes (Blaikie, p.23)
Induced pressures on either side of the disaster equation result in increases in risk.
"People's vulnerability is generated by social, economic, and political processes that
influence how hazards affect people in varying ways and different intensities"
p.3).The progression of vulnerability-creating processes is divided into interrelated and
causal phases. When viewed in this way, it is clear that vulnerability is the result of a
wide range of policy and planning failures, actions that are well within control.
Risk Conflation
Urban hazards are characterized by a complex and dynamic mix of risks.
Mitchel (2006) explains that,
"…new amalgams of hazard are being created in metropolitan areas with
overlapping natural, technological, biological, and social risks, exposing more
19
(Blaikie, p.23)
Induced pressures on either side of the disaster equation result in increases in risk.
"People's vulnerability is generated by social, economic, and political processes that
influence how hazards affect people in varying ways and different intensities" (Blaikie,
creating processes is divided into interrelated and
causal phases. When viewed in this way, it is clear that vulnerability is the result of a
within control.
Urban hazards are characterized by a complex and dynamic mix of risks.
"…new amalgams of hazard are being created in metropolitan areas with
iological, and social risks, exposing more
20
people and places to environmental hazards. Safety gaps are widening among
differentially vulnerable populations and neighborhoods at risk. Public policies
and hazard response measures are increasingly being tested beyond their
capacities, with tragic consequences" (Mitchell, 2006, p.137).
Attempting to reduce catastrophes to a single component for analysis and management
ignores the complexity.
Risk conflation defines the compounding effect of risk events interacting with one
another to amplify or generate unforeseen consequences (WEF, 2006). This is the
“perfect storm”, the inevitable outcome of highly interdependent global systems.
Little (2002) describes 3 broad classes of failure in interdependent systems:
1. Cascading failure: a disruption in one infrastructure causes a disruption in a
second infrastructure.
2. Escalating failure: a disruption in one infrastructure exacerbates an
independent disruption of a second infrastructure.
3. Common cause failure: a disruption of two or more infrastructures at the
same time because of a common cause (Little, p.3)
Interdependent systems are not inherently good or bad. Rather, interdependence
can set the stage for a high level of resilience within complex systems. Conversely,
interdependent systems can be vulnerable to complete system collapse with failure of
critical components.
A report on risk to the World Economic Forum acknowledges this type of
cascading failure:
Intermediate circumstances – either unrelated, or deliberately opportunistic – may
divert the direction of impacts, causing harm in unexpected places; reveal
weaknesses in a community’s response capabilities or even degrade them, making
effective responses impossible; or simply worsen the primary impact, perhaps
tipping damage into catastrophe. The ultimate impact often depends on the
vulnerable interconnections in the global system that may be exposed as a result
of a risk event occurring (World Economic Forum 2006, p.9).
21
Global social, economic, and political systems are rapidly becoming more complex and
interdependent. Consequently, the potential for failure and resulting catastrophes is also
increasing in scale and complexity.
1.1.6 Myth of Marginality?
Slums can serve a vital function, as they provide low-cost transitional housing for
the labor market. However, they are rarely valued and often left to develop haphazardly.
Janice Perlman shed light on the slum with her pioneering studies of the people of the
favelas of Rio de Janiero. Her studies indicate that these people are:
• Inexorably integrated into society, albeit in a manner detrimental to their own
interests.
• Contribute their hard work, their high hopes, and their loyalties, but do not benefit
from the goods and services of the system.
• Exploited, manipulated, and repressed rather than economically and politically
marginal.
• Stigmatized and excluded from a closed class system, rather than socially and
culturally marginal (Perlman, p.86).
In contrast to these points, Perlman has found the hard work and sacrifice of many
in the slums is being compromised by the current prevalence of drugs, gangs, and
violence (Hanley, p.27). This violence has worked against slum communities, causing
people to become trapped. Simply put, the violence and intimidation keeps people in
their houses and community cannot develop. This has become a dysfunctional aspect of
many slums, serving to further the stigma which works against integration into societies.
Thus what at one time served as a transitional form of low-cost housing has become a
dysfunctional trap which is difficult to escape.
22
1.1.7 Some Lessons from History
Toynbee's study of history shows that civilizations grow when they meet one
challenge, only to be met by another. Conversely, Toynbee (1948) stated that
“civilizations in decline are consistently characterized by a tendency towards
standardization and uniformity". In other words, strong civilizations tend to innovate and
adapt to their changing environments while weaker ones tend to be more rigid in their
approach to challenges and tend to be overwhelmed by disruptions.
Toynbee defined the stages through which a civilization may pass as it develops,
stabilizes and eventually decays. Obviously this generalization may not characterize the
evolution of all civilizations. However, Toynbee argues that civilizations are born out of
a “golden mean”: too much challenge will crush the budding civilization, and too little
challenge will allow it to stagnate.
Catastrophes have been a significant force in shaping history, though their impact
is not often recognized. Powers shift, politics change, economies rise and fall, and mass
migrations are triggered. de Boer offers a few examples of the social impact of
catastrophe:
• "An earthquake in 464 BC that destroyed much of the city of Sparta and a slave
revolt soon afterward significantly weakened the militaristic city-state in its
rivalry with Athens, triggering Sparta's decline.
• "An earthquake and tidal wave that killed 40,000 people in the Portuguese capital
of Lisbon in 1755 prompted the French philosopher Voltaire and others to
question the dominant philosophy of optimism on which the ancient régime was
founded. That earthquake contributed to the intellectual ferment that produced the
Enlightenment and the French Revolution.
23
• "The manner in which Nicaraguan dictator Anastasio Somoza along with his
relatives and cronies stole much of the international aid sent to rebuild the
shattered capital, Managua, after a 1972 earthquake fueled the sputtering
Sandinista revolution that triumphed in 1979 (Ford, 2005).
Again, the balance of challenge and peril is a significant factor in driving civilizations
forward, or destroying them.
Diamond developed a series of reasons why societies fail to solve perceived
problems. He suggests the following reasons may explain our reluctance to deal with
environmental issues, in particular:
1. The public may dislike those who first perceive and complain about the problem.
2. Previous warnings may have been false alarms, leading to the "boy who cried
wolf" problem when a real problem emerges.
3. "It is someone else's problem" leads to nobody addressing the issue.
4. A short-term focus keeps us from managing long-term issues.
5. The phenomena of short-term decision making based on "crowd psychology"
whereby crowds get caught up in an emotional response, or the well known flaw
in group decision making of "group think".
6. Finally, there is the process of denial, whereby a problem is ignored because the
perception of it is painful. (Diamond, p.434-5)
1.1.8 What are we Doing?
The figure below illustrates the global distribution of risk derived from a
composite view of hazards, overlaid with slums housing over one million people. This is
cause for concern because some of the largest slums lie in the areas depicted to have high
risk.
24
Figure 11: Natural Hazards Composite Map (Munich Re, 2008),
Overlaid with Slums over One-million People (Davis, 2005)
Global interdependence and vulnerability is difficult to understand and forecast,
as it is based on a range of interconnected factors that have inherent uncertainties (WEF,
2010). There seems to be insufficient attention given to the complex interactions in these
rapidly developing global systems which are creating massive change in many parts of
the world.
1.2 Global Threats:
Looking Beyond the Usual Hazardscape
Slum communities can adjust and cope to hazards to a degree; the interaction of
the natural, social, and built environments was previously discussed. However,
exogenous factors are rarely considered but are now of a scale that is likely to overwhelm
Cities with biggest slums
slums as they presently exist, particularly as they interact with the existing hazardscape.
Risk conflation helps explain how the interaction of these global “Five E’s” could be
compounded by the local hazardscape to impact
local slums. For example, energy issues pose
threats to the food supply which could weaken
the population, leaving it more vulnerable to
epidemic. Any one of these factors could leave
slums unsustainable.
This study considers
as the “Five E’s”:
• Environmental degradation
pollution
• Eating and drinking
• Epidemic: crowding and poor s
outbreaks
• Economy: downturns that are heavily leveraged against these producers.
• Energy: oil shortages or price hikes threatening support systems and participation
in the global economy
1.2.1 Environmental D
There is a unique and complex r
and poverty. There is also likely to be considerable variation in the effects of climate
change, both across the world and within a particular locale. Therefore it i
consider the following possible impacts as rough generalizations.
slums as they presently exist, particularly as they interact with the existing hazardscape.
Risk conflation helps explain how the interaction of these global “Five E’s” could be
ocal hazardscape to impact
local slums. For example, energy issues pose
threats to the food supply which could weaken
the population, leaving it more vulnerable to
epidemic. Any one of these factors could leave
This study considers the most prominent of these global issues, referred to herein
Environmental degradation: local effects of climate change coupled with
Eating and drinking: inadequate food supply and safe water
: crowding and poor sanitation limiting options for controlling
: downturns that are heavily leveraged against these producers.
: oil shortages or price hikes threatening support systems and participation
in the global economy
Environmental Degradation
There is a unique and complex relationship between environmental degradation
There is also likely to be considerable variation in the effects of climate
change, both across the world and within a particular locale. Therefore it i
consider the following possible impacts as rough generalizations.
25
slums as they presently exist, particularly as they interact with the existing hazardscape.
Risk conflation helps explain how the interaction of these global “Five E’s” could be
the most prominent of these global issues, referred to herein
: local effects of climate change coupled with
anitation limiting options for controlling
: downturns that are heavily leveraged against these producers.
: oil shortages or price hikes threatening support systems and participation
elationship between environmental degradation
There is also likely to be considerable variation in the effects of climate
change, both across the world and within a particular locale. Therefore it is best to
26
It should be noted that the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC)
estimates are based on opinions of the scientific community representing most of the
world's nations. As such, their estimates are compromises yet represent broad agreement.
In contrast, the National Intelligence Council report to the President urges far more
caution given the uncertainties that remain with estimations of climate change:
Many scientists worry that recent assessments underestimate the impact of climate
change and misjudge the likely time when effects will be felt. Scientists currently
have limited capability to predict the likelihood or magnitude of extreme climate
shifts but believe—based on historic precedents—that it will not occur gradually
or smoothly. Drastic cutbacks in allowable CO2 emissions probably would
disadvantage the rapidly emerging economies that are still low on the efficiency
curve, but large-scale users in the developed world—such as the US—also would
be shaken and the global economy could be plunged into a recession or worse
(National Intelligence Council, p.55).
Climate change could manifest itself in several different ways at the local level,
summarized below.
Extreme weather events and changes in precipitation patterns. Climate change
will probably be marked long term changes in precipitation patterns, as well as more
extreme weather events which are unevenly distributed. However, communities tend to
develop by adapting to commonly recurring hazard events. In general, slums have
trouble adapting when faced with higher impact, less frequent occurrences.
Glacier and snow pack melt. Related to the changes in weather and rainfall
patterns are changes in water supply from glaciers and snow pack melt. These sources
are a significant, but undervalued element of the ecosystem. Glacier and snow pack melt
systems are particularly vulnerable to small climate shifts. Stern suggests that this could
have a range of related impacts in some regions, "Melting glaciers will increase flood risk
27
during the wet season and strongly reduce dry-season water supplies to one-sixth of the
world’s population, predominantly in the Indian sub-continent, parts of China, and the
Andes in South America" (Stern, p.56). Again, this problem varies with geography but is
likely to have a significant impact on already questionable water supplies.
Sea level rise, land loss, and displaced people. A rise in sea level will create two
related sets of problems. In the area directly impacted, there will be an "increase in
coastal flooding, high costs of coastal protection, a loss of wetlands and coastal erosion,
and increased saltwater intrusion into surface and groundwater" (Stern, p.76). There is
also a compounding effect of displaced people moving into slums.
It is important to note that there remains the possibility of unpredictable and
unforeseen impacts, given the uncertainties surrounding climate change and its
interaction with unstable environments. Moreover, impacts will likely be complicated by
the non-linear nature of climate change. Stern suggests that the "chaotic nature of the
climate system means that even relatively small amounts of warming can become
amplified, leading to major shifts as the system adjusts to balance the new conditions.
Abrupt and large-scale changes could potentially destabilize regions and increase
regional conflict…" (Stern, p.81).
National Security and the Threat of Climate Change offers a more pragmatic view
on the implications of climate change. Eleven retired three-star and four-star admirals
and generals studied this issue and conclude that climate change in particular is a threat
multiplier in already fragile regions. This can lead to failed states, which in turn leads to
desperation (CAN, 2007).
28
Desperation in slums is likely to exacerbate instability in volatile regions of the
world. National Security and the Threat of Climate Change suggests that problems
associated with climate change will:
… Seriously exacerbate already marginal living standards in many Asian, African,
and Middle Eastern nations, causing widespread political instability and the
likelihood of failed states. Unlike most conventional security threats that involve
single entity acting in specific ways and points in time, climate change has the
potential to result in multiple chronic conditions, occurring globally within the
same time frame. Economic and environmental conditions in already fragile areas
will further erode as food production declines, diseases increase, clean water
becomes increasingly scarce and large populations move in search of resources.
Weakened and failing governments, with an already thin margin for survival, foster
the conditions for internal conflicts, extremism, and movement toward increased
authoritarianism and radical ideologies (Security and Climate, p.5).
Key to this military-based study is a higher level of comfort with decision making
in uncertain environments, as would characterize battlefield choices. By extension, the
uncertainty surrounding climate change should not preclude necessary action at this
point. National Security and the Threat of Climate Change concludes that the U.S.
should commit to global partnerships that help less developed nations build resiliency
(CNA, 2007).
1.2.2 Eating and Drinking: Food and Water Security
Climate change will impact a slum when arable land that supports it can no longer
be farmed, or when water supply is diminished. The Stern Review notes,
In tropical regions, even small amounts of warming will lead to declines in yield.
In higher latitudes, crop yields may increase initially for moderate increases in
temperature but then fall. Higher temperatures will lead to substantial declines in
cereal production around the world, particularly if the carbon fertilization effect is
smaller than previously thought, as some recent studies suggest (Stern, p.67).
29
There is also an economic aspect of this problem that could be devastating to
those in the slums. Rising oil prices (linked to fertilizers, pesticides, mechanized farming
and transportation) and climate change could conspire with potentially lower grain
volumes and increased demand to cause a steep spike in the cost of food commodities.
Moreover, this could cause speculation to play a greater role in food prices (National
Intelligence Council, p.52).
Fish stocks are likely to be impacted by ocean acidification, a direct result of
rising carbon dioxide levels. This is caused by increasing amounts of carbon dioxide
dissolving in seawater causing chemical changes (Stern, p.72). Fish is the primary source
of protein for at least one billion people worldwide (FAO, 2000). Given the other likely
impacts on agriculture, finding substitutions for impacted fisheries is unlikely.
1.2.3 Epidemic: Limited Options for Controlling Outbreaks
Slums are at risk to public health issues due to a huge range of factors, from
vector shifts to increases in pollution. Other factors increase the possibility of epidemics,
such as the ability of germs to exploit new conditions, coupled with the increased
mobility of populations.
Stern notes that climate change will "alter the distribution and incidence of
climate-related health impacts, ranging from a reduction in cold-related deaths to greater
mortality and illness associated with heat stress, droughts and floods. Equally the
geographic incidence of illnesses such as malaria will change" (Stern, p.100).
30
This is further compounded by the limited options for controlling disease spread
once it hits slums. Specifically, tactics such as social distancing and control of germ
spread are limited in the cramped and often unsanitary conditions of slums.
1.2.4 Economy: Global Downturns
External global economic forces are driving internal changes in many countries.
Stiglitz states that "globalization is not working for many of the world's poor"(Stiglitz,
p.214), but qualifies that this failure is the result of how it is managed rather than
globalization itself. The core of the problem is in the accountability mechanisms,
whereby officers of these institutions are in the final analysis concerned with the interests
of the central bank ministers who govern the institutions and provide the funds which
keep the institutions afloat. In spite of attempts at reform, critics hold that this essential
dynamic remains (Stiglitz, p.215).
While no clear authority has arisen in its place, the declining authority of the state
has been observed since the 1990's. Strange notes that the “the impersonal forces of
world markets… are now more powerful than the states to whom ultimate political
authority over society and economy is supposed to belong… the declining authority of
states is reflected in a growing diffusion of authority” (in Sharma, p.2).
All of these factors tend to be heavily leveraged against the poor, which
exacerbates poverty in slums. That poverty, in turn, increases slum dwellers’
vulnerability, which is often not addressed by impotent states. Robinson (2003) holds
that globalization is bringing about a major shift of capitalism rendering the nation-state
insufficient in his examination of developing nations.
31
1.2.5 Energy: Oil Shortages and Price Hikes
There is no clear consensus on the future of oil, yet the global economy, all the
way down to the slums, is increasingly dependent on it. Political and economic
influences continue to obscure a basic understanding of this critical resource. Goldstein
suggests caution in accepting data from companies and governments involved with oil,
all of whom tend to have a strong interest in skewing information one way or another
(Goldstein, p.42).
Global oil demand is destined to grow significantly over the next few decades.
To assess how long oil reserves might last, estimates of recoverable reserves are
compared to oil consumption based on global economic growth rates. Work by the
Energy Information Administration presents the most widely accepted estimates, with
estimates of two to three trillion barrels being reasonable (EIA, p. 37). The range of
estimates has been depicted below in 12 different scenarios, with the mid-range ones
shown in the graph below. Both the estimated times to peak, approximately twenty to
forty years, as well as the rapid decline in oil production, are noteworthy.
Figure 13: Scenarios for Peak Oil Time Frames (EIA, p.37)
32
The real issue is not when the world runs out of oil, but rather when supplies have
peaked and started a decline. This is when the law of supply and demand will inevitably
cause severe price increases. While everyone will be impacted by rapid price increases,
the shock will be particularly difficult for the poor who have become dependent on cheap
oil to some degree and have no ability to absorb the price spikes.
Developing countries are particularly vulnerable to oil supply and price factors,
with a large share of their GDP in energy-intensive manufacturing and energy used
relatively inefficiently. In an overall comparison with developed countries, developing
countries use twice the energy to produce a unit of output. The lifeblood of slums, low-
end employment, tends to be primarily or secondarily dependent on industries requiring
oil for cheap energy, raw materials, or transport to markets. Although exceptions exist,
these industries can be very sensitive to oil supply and prices. Consequently,
employment in the slums is very sensitive to oil shocks. Should there be oil shortages,
low-end employment will be difficult to sustain until oil substitutions are developed and
put in place.
There is an assumption by many that substitutions will be available in time to
solve our oil shortage problems. This is unlikely given the lead time to implement them,
which Hirsch (2005) states is typically about twenty years. That time frame corresponds
with EIA scenarios for rapid drop off in supply and price hikes, quoted above. Therefore,
it seems strangely delusional that the emerging global urban form can be so heavily
dependent on energy systems which we now know are tenuous at best, leaving slums
very vulnerable.
33
1.2.6 Summary
Urban hazards are characterized by a complex and dynamic mix of risks.
Communities can adjust and cope to hazards to a degree. However, exogenous factors
can overwhelm slum communities, particularly as they interact with the existing
hazardscape. These exogenous factors, the “Five E’s” (environment, eating and drinking,
epidemic, economy and energy) are highly interdependent.
The network diagram below provides a simple depiction of selected
interdependent factors that can contribute to catastrophe. This diagram was developed by
considering the interdependencies between the “Five E’s” together with broader issues
associated with globalization. The top nine issues were evaluated for their
interdependency with the other factors. This was done by reviewing the literature to
identify specific dependencies and assigning a simple ranking. A depiction of the
interdependencies was then developed using UCINET, a network analysis program. This
showed the high level of interdependence of these factors, with no one factor being in a
central position.
Figure 14: Interrelationships of Selected Factors
34
Global interdependence and vulnerability is difficult to understand and forecast,
as it is based on a range of complex interactions that have inherent uncertainties. Stern
explains,
… it is the sum of the parts that creates perhaps the greatest concern. Poor
households and governments may, for example, face falling food and water
supplies that will increase poverty directly, while also facing greater health risks
for example, through malaria or as a result of extreme weather events. These
impacts may be compounded if governments’ have limited or reduced financial
resources to manage these impacts, and to invest in building resilience against the
future impacts of climate change. (Stern, p.133)
Social, economic, and political systems are rapidly becoming more complex and
interdependent globally. Consequently, the potential for failure and resulting
catastrophes are also increasing in scale and complexity. This is being matched by
increasing global capacity to manage catastrophes, which can be very effective when
matched with the right types of capacities at the local level. To Gallopin (2002), the
compelling question is whether the future will be decided by “enlightened management”
or catastrophe.
35
Chapter Two:
Governance
Where Chapter One of this study has considered urbanization, hazards and
humanity, Chapter Two will consider governance as four distinctly different types based
on the work of James March. New possibilities emerging from globalization and their
relevance for dealing with catastrophic events will be examined.
In essence, this research shows that an ideal system of governance for coping with
potential catastrophe would have high levels of explorative and exploitive capacities.
This provides the ability to explore new and unfamiliar circumstances while having the
capacity to exploit opportunities when vulnerabilities or threats are identified.
Unfortunately, fully developed explorative and exploitive capacities have been expensive
to establish and maintain and in fact may reduce resilience in the long run by diverting
resources from other areas such as infrastructure and education. However, when
governance is viewed from the perspective of Complex Adaptive Systems (CAS) over
state-centric models, we see that the exploitive and explorative capacities exist in the
larger community, particularly considered as part of a globalized system. This raises
some new possibilities for improving resilience in communities.
2.1 “Complex Adaptive Systems”
CAS has gained some traction over the past 20 years as a means of better
understanding the functioning of social systems. Theories of CAS help us understand the
nature of these social systems, as it focuses on the interactions within the system as well
36
as the constituent parts. This approach has been useful in understanding governance, in
particular the functioning around disruptions such as catastrophes.
Louise Comfort did the pioneering work in this area, linking CAS with her
observations of the response to the Northridge Earthquake. Comfort (1994) identified
four characteristics of complex adaptive systems that help explain effective
organizational behavior during the response to a catastrophe:
1. Creative innovation among organizational units.
2. Relationships within the system remain flexible and focused on the overall goal.
3. Interactive exchange between the system and its environment.
4. Information is critical for finding the right balance between order and chaos.
Each of these four elements will first be explored in some depth. With that in mind, the
relevance of CAS to governance and catastrophes will be considered.
2.1.1 Capacity for Creative Innovation
Within complex systems, innovation is the key element in a strategy for
increasing resilience. According to Wildavsky (1988),
The organism or social system that can, from its supply of basic resources,
synthesize what it needs whenever new dangers arise is in a much stronger
position to cope with unexpected consequences or with hazards that only
occasionally manifest themselves... such responsive systems are capable of
converting available generalized resources, such as wealth, knowledge and
technical skill, into appropriately tailored solutions if, as, and when required
(p.71).
Innovation is more likely when the meta-organization (an “organization of
organizations”) has the “technical skill, organizational flexibility, relevant knowledge,
and goal-oriented focus to incorporate incoming environmental information into
appropriate adaptations to meet its defined goals” (Comfort, p.167).
37
Stuart Kauffman (1993) and Murray Gell-Mann (1994), among others, describe
the optimal space for innovation to flourish in CAS, the "edge of chaos". Kauffman,
through his study of biological processes of change, identified the "edge of chaos" as a
narrow region conducive to innovation in complex systems. Living systems can be seen
as a continuum between order and chaos, with the tendency to move toward a balance in
the center (Comfort, 1994). Kaufmann observed that systems are most resilient when
there is information flowing among component parts, together with the flexibility to
adapt to changing conditions. Kauffman sees this as the condition that is most likely to
generate innovation in dynamic environments (Comfort, 1994).
Gell-Mann, through his study of processes of change in physical systems,
identified the ratio between regularity and randomness as the primary factor in a system's
ability to adapt in a dynamic environment (Comfort, 1994). Gell-Mann thus describes an
innovative capacity in terms of simplicity and complexity. He holds that a system
becomes more complex as regularities characterizing a given system's operation increase
(Gell-Mann, p.50-53).
This dynamic reflects the earlier discussion of Toynbee on the “Golden Mean”, in
particular the observation that civilizations grow when they meet one challenge, only to
be met by another. Conversely, Toynbee (1948) stated that “civilizations in decline are
consistently characterized by a tendency towards standardization and uniformity". In
other words, strong civilizations tend to innovate and adapt to their changing
environments while weaker ones tend to be more rigid in their approach to challenges and
tend to be overwhelmed by disruptions. Thus, Toynbee argues that civilizations are born
38
out of a “Golden Mean”. Too much challenge will crush the budding civilization, and
too little challenge will allow it to stagnate. This may reflect the “edge of chaos”
explained by Kaufmann and Gell-Mann.
2.1.2 The Parts and the Whole
CAS seems to function through a balance of flexibility of the parts in mutual
adjustment relative to each other in an effort to achieve stability for the whole.
Wildavsky observed that, “no system can remain stable, unless the parts are able to vary
in order to protect the whole” (Wildavsky, p.77). In a meta-organization, constituent
organizations must be willing to put the needs and goals of the meta-organization first.
Conversely, if components of the system as a priority attempt to stabilize themselves
independent of the system, the whole will become more unstable (Wildavsky, p.216).
Thus the stability of components of the system is linked to the stability of the whole, with
risk shared throughout the system (Comfort, 2001).
If risk is to be distributed throughout a system, it should be understood by all as
well as possible. Related to this is Gell-Mann's axiom of connectedness: “everything is
connected to everything else at some level of interaction within a given time frame”
(Gell-Mann, p.112). Gell-Mann describes a web of layers and sub-systems; CAS then
seeks to discover those connections and make them understandable to the relevant
system. Comfort (1994) showed the relevance of these connections in building resilient
systems that can cope with disruptions:
Discovering weakness in one part of the system enables other parts to respond in
ways that either reinforce the weak areas or adjust their performance to dissipate
39
the weakness throughout the larger system. The overall performance of the
system improves through the interaction of its parts, even though individual
components remain weak (Comfort, 1994, p.56).
Thus the constituent parts can adjust capabilities and relationships between themselves to
allow the whole to function optimally in achieving the mutually agreed overall goal.
Again, constituent organizations must be willing to put the needs and goals of the meta-
organization first.
2.1.3 The System and its Environment
There is an iterative process of two-way exchange between a system and its
environment. This exchange allows a process of adaptation in a dynamic environment
(Comfort, 1994). Gell-Mann states that an adaptive process creates a new knowledge
that is then offered to the wider society, thereby enhancing the system (Comfort, 1994,
p.168). This can lead within the system to a mutual pattern of organizational learning
which can be critical for a complex endeavor such as disaster response.
Wildavsky considered this process critical to achieving resilience by "allowing
stability through change" (Wildavsky, p.166). In other words, systems are to some
degree governed by their ability to manage or absorb change. The system's adaptation to
changes in the environment depends upon the rate of change in the environment on the
one hand and the system's capacity to use this information on the other hand (Comfort,
1994).
The environment is also changed as a particular system interacts with it, and vice-
versa, in an iterative process. Each new phase of adaptation builds upon earlier forms
40
which have changed the environment (Comfort, 1994). This can lead to different
outcomes depending on the direction established by initial actions and their subsequent
evolution. Consequently, varying choices, combined with chance, can lead to different
adaptations to similar conditions (Gell-Mann, p.316).
Viewed more broadly, this adaptive process generates a transformation of
knowledge throughout the wider society (Comfort, 1994). In turn, this new level of
understanding ultimately reforms relationships between system and environment, leading
to new modified outcomes. In the dynamic environment which characterizes
catastrophes, this capacity for organizational learning is critical.
2.1.4 Information in Evolving Complexity
Information drives a complex adaptive system, both internally in adaptation
among its constituent parts and externally in an exchange with the environment (Comfort,
1994). Thus an effective flow of information is fundamental in building resilience, as
"resilience depends upon numerous participants interacting at great speed, sending out
and receiving different signals along a variety of channels" (Wildavsky p.121). Gell-
Mann takes this a step further in explaining that it is not just information, but the
combined product that is most important. It is this "mutual information" shared
throughout the system that enables it achieve structural change that is accurately matched
to a complex environment (Comfort, 1994).
Consequently, information flow is critical to transforming patterns of
organizational behavior in a catastrophe. Information flow and mutual adjustment
41
allows the system to seek a stable balance in a dynamic situation (Comfort, 1994, p.219-
236). Thus the means of collection, integration, and dissemination of information within
the meta-organization is vital for governance if there is a hope of achieving the type of
structural changes dictated after a catastrophe.
2.1.5 CAS and Governance
Theories of CAS provide insight into how impacted communities may be
mobilized. This may be essential for establishing the processes that will result in a more
appropriate approach to catastrophes. While the focus of CAS on the system is vital, it
should be kept in mind that action is ultimately an aggregate of individual actors. This
was discussed by Penrose in the 1950s, well before there were established concepts of
CAS. In a discussion of economics research, Penrose states:
… we have no reason whatever for thinking that the growth pattern of a biological
organism is willed by the organism itself. On the other hand, we have every
reason for thinking that the growth of a firm is willed by those who make the
decisions of the firm…and the proof of this lies in the fact that no one can
describe the development of any given firm... except in terms of decisions taken
by individual men. (Penrose, p.36)
Viewed another way, Castells (2000) explains that, “Power, as the capacity to impose
behavior, lies in the networks of information exchange and symbol manipulation, which
relate social actors, institutions, and cultural movements” (Castells, p.379). While CAS
helps define the functioning of systems, their outcomes remain a distinct responsibility of
the people who govern the system.
The term governance comes from the Greek kubernáo, which means to steer or
direct (Bell, p.1), but there is no consensus on the definition of governance among
42
researchers or practitioners. Definitions range from state-centered to society-centered
views that incorporate a wide range of institutional arrangements by which we organize
our collective lives.
A broad perspective on governance is appropriate, one which seems to reflect a
view which is emerging. The term “governance” can be found in development literature
from the late 1980’s, with reference to a more inclusive concept than just the institution
of government (Stern, p.1). Halachmi builds on the work of McCarney (1995) and
Carmichael (2002), with “governance” signifying “a change in the meaning of
government focusing on the wider processes through which public policy is effected” (p.
306).
The result of this broader responsibility for governance is the hollowing out of the
nation-state (Carmichel, 2002; Milward and Provan, 2000) as “functions are either pooled
upwards to supranational bodies, downwards to devolved administrations and regional
bodies, and outwards to civil society agencies or even removed from public sector
involvement altogether by privatization” (Halachmi,p.307).
A paradigm shift from a focus on “government” to “governance” has been widely
discussed. Kemp (2005) relates “governance” as a concept to CAS:
The notion of governance fits in with complex systems approaches to
understanding the workings of the political economy through the inter-
relationships among identifiable parts (e.g., social, economic, and ecological),
rather than just the parts themselves. A complex systems approach to governance
also implies explicit appreciation of complexity and uncertainty, likelihood of
surprise, and need for flexibility and adaptive capacity (Kemp, p.12–30).
These are not the characteristics that one would normally associate with “government”,
but are vital in dealing with the dynamic nature of catastrophe.
43
Governance issues might be seen in light of theories of CAS, which provide
insight into how communities impacted by catastrophes may govern themselves. This
may be essential for establishing the processes that will result in more appropriate
recovery from the catastrophes we are likely to encounter in the future, where policy
options are difficult to identify.
2.2 Four Types of Governance
Duit and Galaz identified four different types of governance and have related
these to CAS. In their model, the adaptive capacity of governance systems is determined
by their ability to explore and exploit (March and Olsen, 2006).
James March originally laid out this framework in “Exploration and Exploitation
in Organizational Learning,” wherein he argues that organizations find appropriate levels
of exploration capacity “captured by terms such as search, variation, risk taking,
experimentation, play, flexibility, discovery, innovation” and exploitation capacity, that is
“refinement, choice, production, efficiency, selection, implementation, [and] execution”
(March, 1991, p.12). March’s work provides an elegant framework for describing the
variations in governance and their appropriateness in catastrophes. The “adaptive
capacity of governance systems is developed through making a conceptual distinction
between “exploitation,” the capacity to benefit from existing forms of collective action,
and “exploration,” the capacity of governance to nurture learning and experimentation”
(Duit and Galaz, p.318). The following depicts this capacity and the resulting four types:
Figure 1
This matrix depicts the continuum between high and low
exploitation and exploration, with forms of governance being grouped into the resulting
four quadrants. Each of these quadrants and their suitability to governance in catastrophe
is discussed next from the perspective of CAS.
2.2.1 Fragile Governance
Starting at the low end of both of the continuums,
capacities for exploitation and exploration
performs badly when confronted with all forms of change.
institutions that support exploitation and exploration takes time and money, which might
be put to other more pressing issues in many countries. Hence this default form of
governance is found in abundance globally (Duit and Galaz, p.321)
position to cope with change.
Figure 15: Adaptive Capacity of Four Governance Types
(Duit and Galaz, 2006)
This matrix depicts the continuum between high and low levels of both
exploitation and exploration, with forms of governance being grouped into the resulting
four quadrants. Each of these quadrants and their suitability to governance in catastrophe
is discussed next from the perspective of CAS.
e Governance
Starting at the low end of both of the continuums, “Fragile Governance”
capacities for exploitation and exploration. Consequently “Fragile Governance”
performs badly when confronted with all forms of change. However, building the
nstitutions that support exploitation and exploration takes time and money, which might
be put to other more pressing issues in many countries. Hence this default form of
governance is found in abundance globally (Duit and Galaz, p.321), but is in a very
position to cope with change.
44
levels of both
exploitation and exploration, with forms of governance being grouped into the resulting
four quadrants. Each of these quadrants and their suitability to governance in catastrophe
“Fragile Governance” has weak
. Consequently “Fragile Governance”
uilding the
nstitutions that support exploitation and exploration takes time and money, which might
be put to other more pressing issues in many countries. Hence this default form of
is in a very bad
45
2.2.2 Rigid Governance
“Rigid Governance” has high levels of exploitive capacity, but low levels of
explorative capacity. This form is typically state-dominated and performs well when
change is slow and predictability is high, but performance drops rapidly in the face of
change (Duit and Galaz, 2005). This form presents some advantages:
… the lower capacity for exploration limits the perceived set of available
alternative policies and institutional arrangements. Communities combining high
levels of exploitation with low levels of exploration can be viewed as ideally
equipped for the task of steady state governance. As long as no surprises (external
or internal) occur, or circumstances do not change, this is the most efficient form
of governance as it maximizes the capacity for exploitation through a dense set of
social mechanisms (e.g., institutions, norms, and hierarchies) that ensure stability
and predictability necessary for keeping transaction costs low (Duit and Galaz,
p.321).
One would expect to see state-dominated models of governance in countries such
as Japan, Singapore, and France (Peters and Pierre, 2005). Here the well-established
institutional arrangements promote coordination among actors, but limits to explorative
capacities mean that decision makers might not fully understand more uncommon
situations that they might encounter. In this case institutions become a liability
obstructing the extraordinary measures that often need to be taken in the face of
catastrophe. However, Duit and Galaz (2008) hold that state-dominated governance is
46
preferred over network-based models under conditions of very fast change and high
unpredictability, due to its strong institutional arrangements.
2.2.3 Flexible Governance
“Flexible Governance” can be roughly equated with network-based governance.
This “governance system has well-developed capacities for exploration (e.g., learning
processes, feedback loops, monitoring schemes, resources, and capital) but is lacking in
the capacity to transform the gains from exploration into objects of exploitation” (Duit
and Galaz, p.321). In contrast to “Rigid Governance,” the lack of exploitive capacity
means that there will likely be difficulties in translating concepts into reality (Duit and
Galaz, p.322). This system is what one might expect in countries such as the Netherlands
(Pierre and Peters, 2005).
2.2.4 Robust Governance
“Robust Governance” has been described as a combination of “high capacity for
exploration and an equally high level of capacity for exploitation and is thus well
equipped for handling steady state governance, long-term transformation processes, and
sudden changes alike” (Duit and Galaz, p.321). These characteristics can be seen in
“High Reliability Organizations” such as airlines and nuclear power plants, but come at a
relatively high price. It is unlikely that there are any real-world examples of this type of
state, though perhaps Israel might come close to it.
47
Robust governance is the only type that has the adaptive capacity to respond
effectively to crisis. Beyond the exploitive and explorative capacities there are other
relevant characteristics that allow this form of governance to be effective in crisis, most
notably “early detection of change, flexibility in decision making in combination with
dense patterns of cooperative action, and the ability to reorganize” (King 1995; La Porte
1996; Duit and Galaz, 2008).
2.2.5 Finding the Balance
Once again, this adaptive capacity reflects the earlier discussion of Toynbee’s
explanation of the “Golden Mean” and the strength of a society being related to its ability
to meet challenges, with “civilizations in decline… consistently characterized by a
tendency towards standardization and uniformity" (Toynbee, 1948). In other words,
strong civilizations tend to innovate and adapt to their changing environments.
Toynbee’s “Golden Mean” helps explain the need for finding the correct levels of
explorative and exploitive capacities. Similarly, March in his study of organizations
suggests that it is important to find a balance of explorative and exploitive capacities.
These levels should be defined by the fact that “adaptive systems that engage in
exploration to the exclusion of exploitation are likely to find that they suffer the costs of
exploration without gaining many of its benefits… conversely, systems that engage in
exploitation to the exclusion of exploration are likely to find themselves trapped in
suboptimal stable equilibria” (March and Olsen 2006, p.12). In a similar way,
Wildavsky (1988) explained that finding the right balance between anticipation and
48
resilience is critical, as on the one hand resources would be expended needlessly to
develop unnecessary capacity or, in the other extreme, capacity would not be sufficient.
In either case limited resources would be expended needlessly, when they could have
been more productively used elsewhere.
“Robust Governance” should perform well regardless of the predictability and
rate of change (Duit and Galaz, 2008). Unfortunately that capacity is expensive to
develop and maintain when it is not needed. During times of stability there will be
questions raised about the efficacy of maintaining expensive mechanisms of exploration.
However, some of that capacity will exist in the wider community or internationally and
can be brought into the system as needed. This does require a broader view of
governance, one which does not take a state-centric approach to building capacity.
Indeed, assimilating the capacities as and when required might be the only practical way
to build the explorative and exploitive capacity.
2.3 Local Implications
of Globalization
Discussions of governance have focused on institutions established within the
state. However, processes of globalization are significantly altering this landscape. Of
particular interest is the tendency of sovereignty to migrate away from government and
the deep segmentation of societies, with the structural irrelevance of segments being of
no use to the globalized system. This diminished role of government is a critical point, as
it tends to be replaced by a loosely knit but potentially effective globalized system. This
49
has significant implications for governance and possibly averting catastrophes in slums,
as well as in less vulnerable communities.
2.3.1 Trends in the Globalization of Hazards and Risk
Castells (2011) describes globalized systems as being able to function in multiple
places across the planet as a unit in real time, due to well established technological,
organizational, and institutional capacities.
There is evidence of the emergence of a globalized system for managing hazards-
related risk, though at this point it may be overly focused on protecting supply chains and
related economic interests. This de-facto system was not developed to any particular
grand design. In fact, there are clear gaps and significant overlaps in some functions.
This globalized system does not appear to be the result of any particular design, but rather
the constituent parts have been developed independently and are now able to start
functioning together as a system. Nevertheless, this is a system now capable of
functioning as a unit in real time in many locations around the planet. Appendix One
provides an overview of the evidence of technological, organizational, and institutional
capacities that are now in place
To better appreciate the increase in global capacity over the last sixty years, the
developments described above were grouped by technological, organizational, and
institutional capacities according to the decade when they reached a point when they
could be considered functional. This is seen in the figure below:
Figure 16: Development of a Globalized System of Hazards
To understand the potential effects of this system, each capacity was added to the
previous ones to depict the overall growth of the system.
elements did not function in isolati
synergies that would develop as components worked together. This
more pronounced when other
factored in. To express the value of
assumed that they would double the effectiveness of the system.
figure below:
Development of a Globalized System of Hazards-related Risk: <1950
(Decade when the capability became effective)
To understand the potential effects of this system, each capacity was added to the
previous ones to depict the overall growth of the system. Additionally, each of these
elements did not function in isolation from each other and their strength was in the
synergies that would develop as components worked together. This synergistic effect is
other global developments such as transportation capacity
To express the value of these synergistic effects, it was conservatively
would double the effectiveness of the system. This is depicted in the
50
related Risk: <1950-2010
To understand the potential effects of this system, each capacity was added to the
each of these
strength was in the
synergistic effect is
such as transportation capacity are
these synergistic effects, it was conservatively
This is depicted in the
51
Figure 17: Building a Globalized System: <1950 to 2010
While it would not be realistic to quantify the capacity of this emerging
globalized system for hazards, it would be sufficient to say that there is a significant
increase in globalized capacity that has been built over the last sixty years. More
importantly, that globalized capacity should shape our approaches to dealing with
hazards.
2.3.2 New Opportunities
We now see emerging globalized systems that have the potential to make up
part of the capacity necessary in the robust system described by Duit and Galaz. Key to
this is having the ability at the local level to sufficiently integrate the globalized system.
52
Capacity does not need to reside in government itself. Capacity can actually exist in the
larger community, in an umbrella for the country or regional body, or it can be in an
international body.
The point is that a robust type of governance can have full and reliable access to
these functions without owning them. This implies that local level governance needs to
be about having the capacity to assimilate resources and make sense out of them for that
particular locality. Several questions arise:
• What does that skill set look like?
• How do we educate people for this?
• How do we ensure the capacity is there?
• What are the range of functions that need to be in place?
• How do we reward people in government and elsewhere for doing this
well?
Building the appropriate level of capacity will be critical for being able to meet the
challenges likely to define the 21
st
Century. The problem is that organizations need to
“dig the well before they need the water”, which will be addressed in Chapter Three,
“Working in the New Normal”.
53
Chapter Three:
Working in the New Normal
This is not the real world. This world is a manmade, dangerous fiction that destroys our
capacity to deal well with what’s really going on. The real world, not this fake one,
demands that we learn to cope with chaos, that we understand what motivates humans,
that we adopt strategies and behaviors that lead to order, not more chaos.
Margaret J. Wheatley
Leadership and the New Science
So far this study has presented a foundational look at slums, hazards and
governance. This has been examined through perspectives of globalization and
“Complex Adaptive Systems”, with the intention of finding opportunities to avert likely
catastrophes. Chapter Three of this study suggests practical ways that slum communities
can reduce their vulnerability by taking advantage of the global changes that area
underway.
3.1.1 Changing Roles of Global, National and Local Governance
The diminished role of government is a critical point in understanding the rapidly
evolving systems for managing hazards-related risk. With few exceptions, sovereignty is
migrating from the state and being replaced by a loosely knit but potentially effective
system with globalized components and local communities of interest that can be
effectively exploited if approached strategically. The task now is to ensure that these
emerging systems develop in ways that adequately protect the local communities that are
54
host to the larger economic interests. This section provides a brief review of the
emerging shifts at the global, national and local levels.
Global Level
Large scale, complex disasters in crowded cities are inevitable. The emerging
systems for hazards-related risk, combined with the tendency in a globalized country for
sovereignty to migrate away from government, points toward a much different type of
management. It is not necessarily bad. Properly managed, such a system could be very
effective and more sustainable. However, disasters are ultimately local events that
sometimes have national consequences. As such, it will be critical to get the global-local
interface working well.
The Global Redesign Initiative of the World Economic Forum has a task force
looking at disasters. They have identified five options for restructuring a global approach
to disasters. Most of these options involve creating a new international organization or
restructuring an existing one. However, one option is significantly different:
A new collaborative network process. A third option would be to create a process
that aggregates the risk related information produced by existing organizations
into a more integrated whole, with the intent of creating a more balanced and
comprehensive picture of the overall array of global risks. Existing specialized
organizations (WHO, for example) that scan for and track specific domains of risk
(health risks, in the case of the WHO) would contribute data that would be
aggregated, disseminated, and analyzed to form a “common operating picture”
that is made widely available and subject to debate, correction, and interpretation.
This would constitute a “wisdom of crowds” approach – and would operate
through creating infrastructure and processes through which the wisdom of other
organizations could be aggregated and utilized (Global Redesign Initiative,
p.297).
55
It might be that a “collaborative network process” is already happening in this emerging
globalized system for hazards. We just need to learn how to nurture what we have
already got and see what might be built upon.
The emerging globalized system for hazards may be what has been referred to as
a “nobody in charge system”, a network consisting of connections and agreements.
Cleveland (2002) refers to this as an “uncentralized system”. Other examples of common
“uncentralized” systems are the Internet, the VISA credit card system, and the
International Organization for Standardization.
Central to these “uncentralized” systems is collaboration, which is an important
aspect of the disaster management field. The interest in collaboration can ebb and flow
depending on the leadership at the time. However, the value of a collaborative approach
is being more explicitly stated and built into some new disaster management standards
(e.g., EMAP Standard 4.3.2). This renewed emphasis on collaboration will be a
significant factor in reframing our approach to future catastrophes.
National
The diminished role of national level government is a critical point in
understanding the rapidly evolving systems for managing hazards-related risk: with few
exceptions sovereignty is migrating from the state and being replaced by a loosely knit
but potentially effective globalized system. Castells (2005, 2011) has identified a pivotal
56
role for national level governments in establishing new strategic directions based upon
the changes being brought about by globalization and the rise of the networked society:
The shaping and guiding of this society is, as has always been the case in other
societies, in the hands of the public sector, regardless of ideological discourses
hiding this reality. And yet, the public sector is the sphere of society where new
communication technologies are the least diffused and where organizational
obstacles to innovation and networking are the most pronounced. Thus, reform of
the public sector commands everything else in the process of productive shaping
of the network society. This includes the diffusion of e-governance (a broader
concept than e-government because it includes citizen participation and political
decision-making); e-health; e-learning; e-security; and a system of dynamic
regulation of the communication industry, adapting it to the values
and needs of society. All these transformations require the diffusion of interactive,
multilayered networking as the organizational form of the public sector. This is
tantamount to the reform of the state. Indeed, the rational bureaucratic model of
the state of the industrial era is in complete contradiction to the demands and
processes of the network society. (Castells, 2005, p.17)
This globalized system can be linked with local civil society and the private sector
in ways that have significant potential if handled correctly. The role of government is
critical in this interaction, being one not of control but focused on strategically shaping
these partnerships. The task is to ensure that these emerging forms of governance
develop in ways that adequately protect local communities.
Local
While global capacities are well developed, local linkages are the obvious weak
point in this emerging “system”. There is ample evidence at local levels of an ability to
latch onto the globalized system when required. This global-local divide is not unique to
this aspect of globalization. Castells describes this dynamic:
57
… the actual system of governance in our world is not centered around the nation-
state, although nation-states are not disappearing by any means. Governance is
operated in a network of political institutions that shares sovereignty in various
degrees and reconfigures itself in a variable geopolitical geometry. This is what I
have conceptualized as the network state. It is not the result of technological
change, but the response to the structural contradiction between a global system
and a national state. (2005, p.15-16)
As Elinor Ostrom demonstrates, this entails local participation in policy and
process. Ostrom (1990) has identified the ability of communities to successfully manage
common pool resources. Through her study of a wide range of communities world-wide,
she identified the following principles as vital to working through “communities of
interest” that can successfully govern themselves:
1. Group boundaries are clearly defined.
2. Rules governing the use of collective goods are well matched to local needs and
conditions.
3. Most individuals affected by these rules can participate in modifying the rules.
4. The rights of community members to devise their own rules is respected by
external authorities.
5. A system for monitoring member’s behavior exists; the community members
themselves undertake this monitoring.
6. A graduated system of sanctions is used.
7. Community members have access to low-cost conflict resolution mechanisms.
8. For Common Pool Resources that are parts of larger systems: appropriation,
provision, monitoring, enforcement, conflict resolution, and governance activities
are organized in multiple layers of nested enterprises (Ostrom, p.38).
Ostrom won the Nobel Prize in Economics in 2009 for her work in this area. These
principles may also have application in managing the issues around slum communities.
For slum communities to advance themselves in a positive way, their “stake in the
game” must first be addressed. Here concepts such as Henri Lefebvre’s “Right to the
City” need to be considered along with those of Manuel Castells, David Harvey, and
58
others on questions of urban flows. Hernando de Soto (2000) takes a different view
which pivots on fundamental questions surrounding such as land tenure being linked to
capital flows. These are fundamental questions with significant financial consequences,
yet remain unresolved as we race forward in creating massive new urban forms. A
failure to address the fundamental questions of a right to some space, somewhere, in a
crowded world will have consequences and prevent the healthy functioning of
communities in resolving questions about their own well-being.
3.1.2 Rethinking Governance and Catastrophes
There remains a largely unchallenged assumption that governance in disasters and
catastrophes require an imposition of hierarchically based control to return the
community to stable state. Essentially, the discussion is defined by the tension between
command and control versus resilience and adaptation, or hierarchical versus
decentralized systems (Comfort, 1994). These theories draw heavily on the literature
from related fields of organizational behavior and industrial accidents, but do not fully
describe disaster response, which is characterized by a dynamic environment with
extreme complexity due to a wide range of variables and stakeholders (Comfort, 1994).
However, Comfort observes that hierarchical structures tend to "require a problem to be
well defined, the rules of operation clearly specified, and systems be closed to outside
interference and disturbance" (Comfort, 2001, p.3). Comfort (1994) further observes that
hierarchical systems do not function well in dynamic, changing environments that
characterize disasters and catastrophe.
59
Wildavsky described the appropriate use of two different strategies for managing
risk, as “under considerable uncertainty, resilience is the preferable strategy. Under
substantial certainty, anticipation (and hence protection of the system against forms of
failure) does make sense” (Wildavsky, p. 79-80). In the dynamic and uncertain
environment that characterizes disasters, anticipation processes are likely to be
counterproductive in the long run.
CAS cannot be controlled by top-down measures (Ball, 2011), rather they are
managed by establishing the direction and structure from the bottom up. Helbing states,
“Complex systems cannot be steered like a bus. Attempts to control the systems from the
top down may be strong enough to disturb its intrinsic self-organization but not strong
enough to re-establish order. The result would be chaos and inefficiency” (Ball, p.447)
As Helbing notes, attempting to impose order on a system that has inherent processes of
self- organization may end up being counter-productive: “Complex systems are still
manageable, not by imposing structures but by creating the transactional rules needed to
allow the system to find its own stable organization” (in Ball, p.447). This represents a
fundamentally different way of looking at management and leadership.
3.1.3 Working in Complex Adaptive Systems (CAS)
While CAS appears to be hyper-theoretical and impractical, in reality it is fairly
straight forward in practice. For example, this author was involved in a project that
applied the principles of CAS to the development of an incident management system for
use in all types of emergencies and disasters in New Zealand. To do this in practice
60
required that CAS be boiled down to some basic operating principles.
1. Ensure that the overall goal is well understood: "The primary role of leaders in
complex adaptive systems is to articulate the goal of the system in ways that
personnel at all levels can understand" (Comfort, 2001).
2. Ensure that everyone understands their role and is capable of fulfilling it:
"Enabling each member of the response system to understand how her actions
may contribute to, or detract from, the effectiveness of the entire operation… In
flatter structures, the underlying assumption is that no single individual
understands the whole problem, but that each member of the organization likely
has insight and a responsibility to act on the best knowledge available" (Comfort,
2001).
3. Ensure that information is flowing throughout the system so that mutual
adjustments can continually be made amongst constituent parts: “Responsibility
is shared, and decisions are based upon the most current, complete information
available. The strength of such organizations is that they are mobile, and
information flows easily through them to critical personnel. With multiple persons
reviewing and checking the information, errors or inaccuracies are discovered
more readily. Flatter structures are able to reallocate their resources and
personnel more quickly and efficiently, and move more effectively toward self
organization" (Comfort, 2001).
This system has been in place since 1999 and was successfully utilized in several
earthquakes, a large mine disaster, and many smaller disasters. While other countries
have similar incident management systems in place, the CAS-based design of the New
Zealand system allows it to be simpler for training and use. This elegant design results in
an inherent robustness that is not matched by more hierarchical systems. However,
recent research (AFAC, 2011) noted some deficiencies in practice:
1. Realignment of policy or an articulation of job functions,
2. Reforming processes, better ways of sharing more timely information between the
IMT and the fire-ground,
3. Re-engineer parts of the system to create appropriate processes to support
effective multi-agency coordination networks in incident management.
The first two deficiencies are easily resolved. The third, interestingly,
corresponds with March’s observations about “Flexible Governance”, which can be
61
roughly equated with Network Based Governance. This form has been described as
having “well-developed capacities for exploration but is lacking in the capacity to
transform the gains from exploration into objects of exploitation” (Duit and Galaz,
p.324). In this case, the exploitive capacity is weak at a national level, as probably could
have been predicted (March, 2006; Duit and Galaz, 2008). Resolution of this deficiency
probably lies in making better use of the resources available through the emerging
globalized system, as well as establishing links with the larger community.
3.1.4 Networked Society and Communications
Castells observes that we are in the network society, although not everything or
everybody is included in its networks. From a policy perspective, “the key question is
how to proceed to maximize the chances for fulfilling the collective and individual
projects that express social needs and values under the new structural conditions”
(Castells, p.16).
The interdependence of economies, cultures and institutions has been possible
because of information and communication technologies. Subsequently, “with this
transformation come new, spontaneous modes of social and political organization… that
are especially prone to discontinuous change. Nothing that fails to take this new
interconnectedness into account will work” (Ball, p.448).
Writing in Nature, Ball describes how our interdependence makes it hard to
understand the causes of major events, yet it is also within these networks that potential
solutions must lie (Ball, 2011). The task then is to understand the connections as well as
62
we understand the constituent parts. Ergo, “planning for the future might not be so much
a matter of foreseeing what could go wrong as of making our systems and institutions
robust enough to withstand a variety of shocks. This is how the new history will work”
(Ball, p.448).
3.1.5 Implications for Higher Education
"Education… becomes the practice of freedom, the means by which men and women deal
critically and creatively with reality and discover how to participate in the
transformation of their world."
Paulo Friere
Einstein famously stated that, “No problem can be solved from the same level of
consciousness that created it”. Education, and higher education in particular, are
essential in building capacity at all levels so that we might be able to cope more
effectively with catastrophe.
A lack of attention, inherent biases, and a host of other factors are likely to work
against rational decisions regarding the vulnerability of the poor in cities. Mitchel points
out that, “A great deal of additional research will be necessary before it becomes possible
to assess the degree to which any megacity is affected by various types of unprecedented
risks” (Mitchell, 1999, p.139). Decisions often emerge from approximations of the world
around us (WEF, 2007). To a large extent, this:
…stems from the fact that human brains have evolved to specialize in rapid
decision-making at the expense of processing complexity. In our original
condition, survival depended upon the rapid appreciation of threat and an
effective response. But they can also lead to inaccurate judgments, particularly in
risk perception (World Economic Forum 2007, p.26)
63
Posner (2004) makes the point that it is unmemorable events that people have
difficulty with. For example, even though the 1918-1919 pandemic killed 20 million
people in a short period of time and there is still no cure for the disease, people are
relatively complacent about influenza. Posner (2004) suggests that this is probably
because the pandemic has faded from our historical memory due the fact that no famous
people died in the pandemic, its victims being almost all young adults, and it was not
disfiguring. He adds that "this doesn't show that people are dopes or are irrational, only
that human mental capacity is limited and the mind uses various triggers to direct its
attention" (p.248). While it does not go much past speculation, Posner suggests that the
human mind has not evolved to handle the vagueness and complexity of the risk inherent
in catastrophes. He makes the point that,
…the human mind does not handle even simple statistical propositions well, and
has particular difficulty grasping things with which human beings have no
firsthand experience. By definition, we have little experience with low-probability
events and often none at all, so that such events can be apprehended only in
statistical terms. The two difficulties, that of grasping the significance of low-
probability events and that of thinking in statistical terms, thus are closely related.
(Posner, p.9).
To take Einstein’s admonition seriously, we need to educate a new type of
worker, one that can deal from “a different level of consciousness” than the one that
created the problem. Castells holds that at the,
…source of the entire process of social change there is a new kind of worker, the
self-programmable worker, and a new type of personality, the values-rooted,
flexible personality able to adapt to changing cultural models along the life cycle
because of her/his ability to bend without breaking, to remain inner-directed while
evolving with the surrounding society (Castells, 2005, p.18).
64
Giving substance to this idea of a new kind of worker is Tony Wagner, who
directed the Change Leadership Group at the Harvard Graduate School of Education. He
identifies seven themes that are necessary to prepare secondary students for the demands
of this century:
1. Critical thinking and problem solving
2. Collaboration and leadership
3. Agility and adaptability
4. Initiative and entrepreneurialism
5. Effective oral and written communication
6. Assessing and analyzing information
7. Curiosity and imagination (Wagner, 2008)
In a similar vein, the Emergency Services Administration (EMER) program at
California State University at Long Beach has identified the goals for preparing Masters
level students for the challenges of working in the field of disasters through emergency
management. These are attached as Appendix Two. Both of these programs, and many
more of their type, focus on the attributes that will be important in working through the
complex issues of this century.
3.1.6 It is all in the Timing: Policy and the Focusing Event
The processes for building policy around catastrophe should consider factors and
structures for keeping policy development and implementation objective and science-
based, or at least in a form that is appropriate for the particular culture. Particularly in
catastrophes, good policy making requires open discourse with a balance of voices to
give stability to the process, not just an imbalance of scientists or economists or
politicians or lawyers.
65
It is when the debate is in the shadows that the process is most vulnerable to an
outcome that does not fairly reflect all interests. An open and vigorous discussion of the
issues will keep it at the forefront until a suitable outcome can be achieved.
Policy options to mitigate the deep structural issues that contribute to catastrophes
are difficult to identify. Moreover, the uncertainty surrounding catastrophes and slums
does not provide readily identifiable constituencies, making solutions difficult. However,
the “focusing event” provides opportunities for shifts in power structures that may allow
disadvantaged groups more voice in the shape of the recovery.
Birkland defines a "focusing event" as:
… an event that is sudden, relatively rare, can be reasonably defined as harmful or
revealing the possibility of potentially greater future harms, inflicts harms or
suggests potential harms that are or could be concentrated on a definable
geographical area or community of interest, and that is known to policy makers
and the public virtually simultaneously (Birkland, 1997, p.22).
Policy change has been shown to be influenced by power in the conflict.
Increased attention tends to favor pro-change groups, as opposed to the status-quo which
might have had the advantage pre-event (Birkland, 2006). With more attention to
problems comes pressure to change policy. This pressure is not easily resisted by the
policy community. Negative attention tends to aggravate the problem and increase the
perceived need for solutions, leading to a greater likelihood of policy change
(Baumgartner and Jones, 1993). This can be countered by aggressive blocking by
political opponents. A response must be carefully managed by those trying to get a
hearing in an open policy environment. Birkland develops this:
Focusing events appear to change dominant issues on the agenda in reasonably
well organized policy domains… Even then, responses to calls for change will
66
vary with the visibility and tangibility of the harms done by the event and the
nature of the policy communities that deal with the events… the most important
contribution to our understanding of focusing events – and the policy process
more broadly – is that the politics of focusing events vary from domain to
domain, even when seemingly similar domains are compared… In other words,
the less clear the nature and harms done by the event, the less the issue will
expand, and therefore the lesser the detectable influence on the institutional
agenda (Birkland, 1997, p.72-73).
Good governance requires a balance of voices to give stability to the process.
Birkland (1997) explains how differences in policy communities and the nature of the
events influence group and agenda dynamics. The strength of relevant policy
communities pre-event is an important factor in the post-event policy process: healthy
pre-event participative communities are likely to get more appropriate policy after a
disaster. These "focusing events” tend to give more opportunities for politically
disadvantaged groups. Birkland found the focusing event to be an opportunity, “… to
champion messages that had been effectively suppressed by dominant groups and
advocacy coalitions. Such events can therefore be an important tool for groups seeking
policy change" (p.53).
3.1.7 A Way Forward
The diagram below is a simple depiction of the opportunities and threats present
at this unique time in history. Together these represent powerful forces that have the
potential to shape the course of history. The situation is not hopeless, but we have to deal
decisively with the realities of our era.
67
Figure 18: Depiction of the Unique Opportunities and Threats at this Point in History
Catastrophes stem from interactions among three major systems: the natural, built,
and social environments (Mileti, 1999). To avoid, minimize, or recover from
catastrophe, collective attention needs to be focused on the point of failure in the
interaction of these environments. While forces of nature are largely beyond our control,
where and how people live in relationship to those forces is a choice determined in a
large measure by the approach and quality of governance.
The importance of governance, through all levels and all sectors, is well
established. Less clear is how governance can be accomplished in the pressured
environment of catastrophes. Here the insights of Complex Adaptive Systems may be
useful in developing practical strategies. Elements (clarity on mission, roles, and
68
communications) have been identified as crucial in establishing governance frameworks
that can allow diverse systems to work together. These elements form a background for
discussions first about policy considerations and then ways in which some fundamental
changes can be brought about.
The issue, then, is how communities are able to explore the issues and exploit the
range of resources available to them. This is the robust type of governance discussed
earlier. By viewing robust governance through the lens of CAS, it becomes clear that
these capacities do not need to reside in the state itself. The point is that a robust type of
governance can have full and reliable access to these functions without owning them.
Local level governance needs to have the capacity to explore and exploit
resources to make use of them for that particular locality. This should be a core
competency in governance in the future.
69
Conclusion
“If you’ve come to help me you’re wasting your time. But if you’ve come because you
believe your liberation is somehow bound up in mine, stay and let us walk together.”
Aborigine proverb
The uniqueness of our time is depicted in this graph: disasters are increasing, but
so is our ability to manage them. On the one hand we see the rapid increase in disasters
which is largely attributable to the irresponsible ways in which we have developed our
cities. On the other hand we see the rapid increase in global capacity to cope with
disaster. The real question is: do we have the will to do the right things to minimize
suffering before disasters strike?
Figure 19: Increase in Disasters Worldwide, in red,
as Compared to Relative Increases in Global Capacity, in green
(derived from earlier figures)
70
There may come a time when human survival depends on realizing that all of our
destinies are inextricably linked. Until then it might be appropriate to question structural
changes that put people in a position where they suffer and have no reasonable recourse.
This is particularly true with rapid unplanned urbanization, which is forcing deep changes
upon much of the world.
The forces that have brought massive transformations to our cities are deeply
entrenched. Discussions so far have focused on the more obvious issues. In closing it
will be appropriate to expand the discussion to the dark side of human nature, the
criminal element that is willing to prey on the vulnerability of those who have so little.
The criminal element needs to be unmasked if progress is to be made, because this could
be the most insidious aspect of the multitude of problems in slums.
Perlman noted that criminal activity is now undermining the formation of
community and constructive interaction in the favelas of Brazil (in Hanley, 2005). This
is a significant change in what were once vibrant, functioning communities. The
dynamics behind this slide toward dysfunction is simple: people are afraid to interact in
their community due to the intimidation of gangs and other criminal elements. The
problem is global and of epic proportions. The criminal element now makes up around
7% of the world’s economy (Castells, 2011), with much of the criminal activity finding
haven in slums.
Extending from the problem of crime is the nature of shifts in power relations as
we move toward a networked society. Castells writes:
71
This crime-penetrated business linked up with politicians at the local, provincial,
and national levels, so that, ultimately, the three spheres (politics, business, crime)
became intertwined. It does not mean that crime controls politics or that most
businesses are criminal. It means, none the less, that business operates in an
environment deeply penetrated by crime; that business needs the protection of
political power; and that many politicians, in the 1990s, have amassed
considerable fortunes through their business contacts. (Castells, 2000, p.192)
The realities of the 21
st
Century dictate that such perverse arrangements can no
longer be tolerated. Crime flourished when we were not paying attention: over the last
fifty years economies were expanding, there was plenty of land and resources seemed to
be without limits. All that has changed.
Maneuvering around these dark forces is reality for many people who call slums
home. They have to do this, so that their family can survive another day. Crime, whether
it is through corruption of officials or intimidation through gang violence, robs people of
their freedoms. It is freedoms which Sen argues is both the means and goal of
development (Sen, 1999). And it is exactly those freedoms, when exercised in concert
with the larger community, which will be key to finding our way through the challenges
of this century.
Crime is likely to be exacerbated by hardships we have reviewed in this study.
People confined to slums will eventually not tolerate this marginal existence and revolt.
Davis summarizes, "the Pentagon's best minds have dared to venture where most United
Nations, World Bank or Department of State types fear to go: down the road that
72
logically follows from the abdication of urban reform" (Davis, p.205). As a logical
outcome of current trends, one can easily envision conditions in which:
…this delusionary dialectic of securitized versus demonic urban places, in turn,
dictates a sinister and unceasing duet: Night after night, hornetlike helicopter
gunships stalk enigmatic enemies in the narrow streets of the slum districts,
pouring hellfire into shanties or fleeing cars. Every morning the slums reply with
suicide bombers and eloquent explosions. If the empire can deploy Orwellian
technologies of repression, its outcasts have the gods of chaos on their side
(Davis, p.206).
Is this in anyone's interest?
73
Further Research
This study was undertaken as descriptive research at the intersection of slums,
governance and hazards. Its intention was to identify and define the issues surrounding
slums. As such, most of the study’s conclusions should undergo more rigorous
exploratory research. The study also uncovered the following areas for future research:
1. Crime: What is the impact of crime, specifically the interaction between global crime
networks, local intimidation, and community formation in slums?
2. Power: What is the effect on slums of deeply intertwined power relationships
between criminal networks, business and political leaders?
3. Land tenure: Explore the complex set of issues around land tenure, the tendency for
land ownership to accumulate, rent-seeking behavior, de Soto’s work on capital, and
the “Right to the City”.
4. Networked Society: How is the networked society extended into disenfranchised
communities in a globalized economy?
5. Globalized System: How should a globalized system for hazards and risk be managed
(see World Economic Forum)?
6. “Communities of Interest”: Ostrom’s work should be studied for its applicability to
governance in slums.
7. The Five E’s: What is the present and forecast impact at regional levels? How do
these issues interact?
8. Higher Education: What is the optimal way to build and maintain capacity through
web-based distance education models and on-going support to communities,
particularly in smaller, remote cities?
9. Data: Base-line data needs to be collected in many slums.
10. Ethics: Clarify the impact of our actions on slums in an interdependent world.
74
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81
Appendix A
An Emerging Globalized System of Hazards:
Technological, Organizational, and Institutional Elements
Technological Capacities
Here are examples from hundreds of technological capacities:
Communication
• OneResponse is a collaborative inter-agency website designed to enhance
humanitarian coordination and support the exchange of information in disasters.
This is a public-private partnership between the UN and Microsoft.
(http://oneresponse.info)
• ReliefWeb provides timely disaster information and analysis by scanning of
international and non-governmental organizations, governments, research
institutions and the media for news, reports, press releases, appeals, policy
documents, analysis and maps related to disasters worldwide.
(http://reliefweb.int/)
Remote Sensing and Reconnaissance
Space-based systems can be redeployed to impacted areas for reconnaissance and
analysis. Two systems are in place to coordinate the use of this information:
• The International Charter aims at providing a unified system of space data
acquisition and delivery through Authorized Users to those affected by disaster.
82
Each member agency has committed resources to support the provisions of the
Charter and thus is helping to mitigate the effects of disasters on human life and
property.
(http://www.disasterscharter.org/home)
• UN-SPIDER aims at providing universal access to all types of space-based
information and services relevant to disaster management by being a gateway to
space information for disaster management support; serving as a bridge to connect
the disaster management and space communities; and being a facilitator of
capacity-building and institutional strengthening.
(http://www.un-spider.org/)
• Of particular interest is the privately funded Satellite Sentinel project, which seeks
to acquire, analyze and distribute satellite images of Sudan. It serves as a
watchdog against outbreaks of violence, terrorism and genocide after the recent
independence referendum. Backed by George Clooney, this independent
initiative monitors this volatile situation in an innovative way.
(http://www.satsentinel.org/)
Monitoring Networks
Monitoring networks provide real-time and historical information about virtually
every major natural hazard. Sensing capabilities and interpretation are denser in places
directly of interest to the funders, but a vast amount of information from around the world
is accessible on-line by anyone.
83
Geographic Information Systems (GIS)
Private sector providers such as ESRI and ImageCat provide a range of high level
GIS services, while public domain products such as HAZUS are available for anyone
with modest capabilities. Backing this up is a remarkable amount of data on every
country, making it possible to do a thorough analysis on hazards and their impacts in any
country.
Organizational Capacities
Listed below are selected recent developments of organizations, the second part of
a globalized system.
Response Organizations
Urban Search and Rescue and emergency medical capabilities have been
developed in many countries, with 21 countries sending rescue and medical teams in
response to the 2011 Japan earthquake and tsunami. Moreover, 146 countries and 39
international organizations declared their intentions to extend assistance (MOFA, 2011).
Scientific Organizations
The National Science Foundation (NSF) sets the direction and funding of disaster
research in the USA, and by extension much of the world, with the following objective:
84
One factor common to all disasters is the role of knowledge. Knowledge is the
most critical defense in understanding, preparing for, and responding to disasters.
The NSF is dedicated to disaster research and works with the Presidential
Administration and other federal agencies in a coordinated effort to anticipate and
minimize the worst effects of disasters (NSF, 2011).
Strong funding has enabled significant advances in our understanding of hazards
and this knowledge has been reasonably translated from academics to practitioners. The
NSF proposes to build on this work in its strategic plan for 2011-2016, though funding
remains in question. As evidence of the proliferation of this capacity, in the USA alone
there are 42 disaster-related centers and specialized think-tanks provide significant
research capacity.
Financial Organizations
Reacting to a series of the World Bank's Independent Evaluation Group’s
suggestions for improving its impact, the Disaster Risk Management Group now provides
advice on a strategic response to disasters and works toward the integration of disaster
mitigation in the Bank’s development activities. Other development banks and Bretton
Woods systems have followed a similar course, though the results have yet to be seen.
Insurance and Re-insurance Organizations
The re-insurance industry remains the final arbiter of risk, as more accurate
catastrophe modeling allows the re-insurance industry to more accurately evaluate risk.
However, regulatory liberalization and industry reforms leave it vulnerable to failure in
the event of multiple overwhelming catastrophes. With recent disasters the reinsurance
85
industry remains intact but the industry is on the brink right now and it may be just one
more catastrophic event away from the tipping point (RAA, 2011).
Global Civil Society and Non-Governmental Organizations
As political systems are being delegitimized, increasing societal demands are
being channeled through Civil Society. Approximately 40,000 NGOs are now
functioning around the world, which represents a substantial increase in capability
(London School of Economics, 2010). Many of these NGOs have disaster response
capabilities and are quite effective by virtue of their close positioning to potentially
impacted populations.
Universities and Training Organizations
Recent years have seen a proliferation of education and training programs, with
the US alone having 127 university programs at both the undergraduate and graduate
levels, as well as seven major training institutes. Over 10,000 students have graduated
with degrees in Emergency Management from 2000 through 2010. While the quality of
these programs varies widely, the widespread diffusion of emergency management
expertise will likely yield strategic improvements in communities over time.
Technical and Engineering Organizations
Engineering and geotechnical firms are well developed world-wide. This is
backed by strong education, research and information sharing capabilities. Recent
86
earthquakes have exposed flaws in our understanding of the environment and the
performance of structures, but this is being continually investigated and corrected.
However, construction remains one of the most corrupt industries in the world and
governments can be reluctant to implement appropriate land use and building standards.
Consulting Organizations
Pioneered by Frederick Cuny and Intertec in the early 1970’s, the modern disaster
consulting industry is now a juggernaut with its own momentum. While there are quality
disaster consulting firms with deep experience, much of the work is done by recent
graduates with limited life experience and an inadequate understanding of the hazards
field. However, properly managed, these firms have the ability to bring about positive
transformation at all levels in our approach to disasters. We also see significant disaster
expertise in established consulting firms such as RAND.
Military
For better or worse, the military in many counties has been deeply engaged in
many aspects of disaster management. They bring enormous capabilities with personnel
and logistics, as well as specialized capabilities such as communications, bio-chemical
detection, and emergency medicine. Moreover, many of the systems developed for the
military have great potential when adapted for civil use in disaster management.
However, the effective use of military resources requires a thorough understanding of
relevant laws and protocols, as well as cross-training prior to a disaster.
87
Media Organizations
Media organizations have developed significant capabilities in portraying
disasters, though their understanding and interpretation of these events can be skewed.
This is a disturbing point, as a RAND study on policy making showed that the massive
intelligence apparatus tended to be ignored, with politicians instead taking their signals
from the media. Rodrique (1995) argues that the media, in turn, actually set the priorities
in the response and recovery from disaster by where they focus their attention.
Institutional Capacities
Listed below are selected recent developments of key institutional capacities, the
third part of a globalized system.
Coordinating Institutions
The United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs was
established for the better management of international disaster response and extended
though much of the UN system. Alongside this system is the Inter-Agency Standing
Committee, which serves as the primary mechanism for inter-agency coordination of
humanitarian assistance between UN and non-UN humanitarian organizations. Adopted
in 2006, the “Cluster Approach” seeks to optimize the use of international resources in
humanitarian operations. At another level, the World Economic Forum’s newly
88
established Risk Response Network seeks to provide “a platform to better understand,
manage and respond to complex, interdependent risk” (WEF 2011).
Standards and Guidance
There has been a proliferation of international frameworks and standards for
different aspects of managing hazards-related risk (e.g., Hyogo Framework, ISO 9000,
ISO Societal Security, NFPA 1600 and EMAP). These international frameworks and
standards are relatively new and are still becoming established.
Incident Management Systems
Now commonplace in many countries around the world, incident management
systems provide standardized frameworks that allow different types of organizations to
come together for managing disaster response.
89
Appendix B
Emergency Services Administration Masters Program Goals,
California State University at Long Beach
1. Subject Matter Expertise
The EMER program recognizes the inherent multidisciplinary study required of
emergency services practitioners to reduce risk and build truly sustainable and thriving
communities. To that end, EMER seeks student applicants and provides faculty
instructors from a wide range of professional fields and academic disciplines. Through
the lens of the emerging discipline of emergency management students and faculty
critically examine multiple theoretical and research perspectives of historical, existing
and expectable disaster risks and community vulnerabilities across all phases of disaster
management.
2. Maintaining Subject Matter Currency in a Rapidly Changing World
EMER graduates should be confident and competent in the use of all methods of library
research and internet-based electronic technologies and software to gather information
from wide-ranging disciplines and resources to build solutions to complex problems in
real-time or operating proactively to generate long-range organizational/community
planning materials.
3. Organizational and Community Leadership
Through self-reflection and critical analysis of all past and current professional,
private/public and neighborhood network experiences, EMER students will develop the
attitudes and competencies to manage individuals, resolve conflicts, build efficient teams,
and move groups representing diverse interests and communities forward as fully
participatory and engaged contributors to solving problems and building strong
interdependent support systems.
4. Advance the Emergency Management Discipline through Action-Oriented
Research
The capacity to transform organizations to create effective, efficient, adaptive disaster
management systems relies heavily on the ability of professionals to understand how to
90
generate critical questions, gather information and interpret results permitting field-
tested program development and evaluation. Students graduating from EMER will
continuously develop as life-long learners their abilities to integrate multidisciplinary
emergency management theory, research and practice to strengthen their own leadership
skills, daily operations within their own organization and across community
stakeholders, and to anticipate and prepare for problems across all phases of disaster
management before problems emerge.
5. Cultural Diversity and Global Awareness
Building effective emergency management systems and resilient communities in an
increasingly complex world requires our EMER graduates to move beyond traditional
organizational boundaries and geographies of time, space and people to view diversity as
an inherent strength in all operational efforts to identify, critically examine and apply
models of effective disaster management which have been tested by communities
throughout the world.
6. Managing Resources
As resources become more limited, effective emergency services professionals must be
able to identify, procure, and/or create strategies necessary to build sustainable and
effective operations. EMER graduates will learn to apply economies of scale, which may
be used and/or perceived differently by varied organizations/community groups, across
all risk-reduction analyses and implement skills for developing resources through grant-
writing, human and social capital and public and private community resource
development.
7. Communicating Across all Stakeholders
Communication competencies, both written and oral, are critical to managing groups
and advancing the discipline of disaster management within lay and professional
audiences. The capacity to engage, motivate and move individuals and groups forward
relies heavily upon leaders’ abilities to express themselves verbally and in writing as
knowledgeable, trustworthy, reliable and ethical change agents. EMER continuously
challenges all students throughout their instruction to develop these critical
communication skills.
Abstract (if available)
Abstract
Slums, due to their extreme vulnerability, will be a setting for unprecedented catastrophes. These rapidly expanding communities will soon house two-billion people world-wide. Emerging global issues, from environmental degradation to oil shortages to food security, will be heavily leveraged against slums. Each of these global issues alone could be devastating
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Emerging catastrophes in slums of the developing world: considerations for policy makers
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