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Better now than later: the cost of victims' delayed accusations

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Better now than later: the cost of victims' delayed accusations

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Content i

BETTER NOW THAN LATER:
THE COST OF VICTIMS’ DELAYED ACCUSATIONS

MEDHA RAJ
University of Southern California
Department of Management and Organization
3670 Trousdale Parkway
Los Angeles, CA 90089-0808
mraj@usc.edu
512-923-2943

A Dissertation Presented to the
FACULTY OF THE USC GRADUATE SCHOOL
UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA
In Partial Fulfillment of the
Requirements for the Degree
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
(BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION)

May, 2019

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ABSTRACT
#The MeToo Movement shed light on victims’ decisions to delay voicing accusations of sexual
assault or harassment. Victims may also delay voicing accusations of other types of wrongdoing.
In this work, I examine a social cost of victims’ delayed accusations. I demonstrate that people
perceive victims who delay (vs. do not delay) voicing accusations as lower in integrity-based
trustworthiness. I demonstrate that this social cost arises because people believe that such victims
were less affected by the wrongdoing and therefore believe that these victims have less of a right
– that is, less psychological standing – to accuse their transgressors. These findings show that
victims who delay voicing accusations face double-victimization: They not only suffer the cost
of the wrongdoing but also the social cost of being perceived by others as less trustworthy. Given
the implications of these findings, I test the effectiveness of two interventions aimed at
attenuating the social cost of victims’ delayed accusations.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT…………………………………………………………………………………… ii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ……………………………………………………………........... iv
THEORY AND LITERATURE REVIEW …………………………………............................ 1
Victims’ Accusations of Interpersonal Wrongdoing …………......………………..….. 3
Delayed Accusations and Victims’ Reduced Standing ……………………………….. 5
The Social Consequences of Victims’ Delayed Accusations ……………...……….…. 8
Attenuating the Cost of Victims’ Delayed Accusations ………………………………. 9
OVERVIEW OF STUDIES …………………………………………………………………... 12
GENERAL DISCUSSION …………………………………………………………………..... 34
Theoretical Implications ……………………………………………………………..... 35
Practical Implications …………………………………………………………………. 36
Limitations and Directions for Future Research ………………………………………. 38
Conclusion ……………..…………………………………………………………….... 39
REFERENCES ………………………………………………………………………………... 41
FIGURES ……………………………………………………………………………………... 48
SUPPLEMENTAL MATERIALS ……………………………………………………………. 53

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I am deeply grateful to the many people who encouraged and supported me during the
Ph.D. program. I had advisers, colleagues, friends, and family members who all joined me on
this crazy ride. I am thankful to have had their guidance and friendship. First and foremost, I am
incredibly thankful for Scott Wiltermuth, my advisor. Scott was exceedingly generous with his
wisdom, time, and support during the Ph.D. program. He encouraged me to challenge myself and
think outside-the-box. He offered pushback to my ideas and highlighted weaknesses in my
thinking. By doing so, Scott enabled me to grow intellectually.
I would also like to thank the rest of my dissertation committee. Nathanael Fast provided
insightful feedback to better frame and position my findings. Kyle Mayer helped me
contextualize my findings for different audiences, while pushing me to think about the broader
implications of my findings. Eric Anicich provided support to me during the dissertation process,
helping me navigate the theoretical logic behind my arguments. Norbert Schwarz challenged me
to think deeper about the underlying psychology behind my findings. I also wish to thank my
collaborators, Gabrielle Adams and Daniel Effron, for their friendship and support throughout
the process.
In addition, I wish to thank the other Ph.D. students in the program (both in Management
and beyond), who spent countless hours talking to me about my ideas. The Ph.D. program can be
challenging at times, but the other students helped make the process fun. I also wish to thank the
MOR faculty for their support. One could not ask for a better department, full of faculty who are
not only smart, but also incredibly kind and generous with their time.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, I am grateful to my family. I am grateful to my
mother, Rajashri Srinivasan, for pushing me and encouraging me to pursue a Ph.D. in
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Management; to my father, Reuben Raj, for always encouraging me to enjoy the process; and to
my brother, for supporting me when things got a little tough. I am grateful for my grandparents –
Adhi, Kalyani Patti, Pudu Patti, and Tha Tha – who serve (and served) as strong role models in
my life. I am also grateful to Anirudh Jangalapalli for his constant support and love, which
continue to help me grow as person.
1

THEORY AND LITERATURE REVIEW

The #MeToo Movement encouraged victims of sexual assault or harassment to speak up
about their experiences. In response to this call to action, some victims elected to accuse their
transgressors of wrongdoing. Many of these victims waited days, months, or in some cases, even
years to do so. Victims of sexual assault or harassment are not the only victims who may need
time to accuse their transgressors. Those who have had their ideas stolen and those who have
otherwise experienced unfair treatment may also delay accusing their transgressors because the
decision to accuse others of transgressions is generally a complicated one (e.g., Krefting &
Powers, 1998; Pinder & Harlos, 2001).
The paucity of research on victims’ delayed accusations is surprising as these delays
harm victims, people whom the transgressor may victimize in the future, and the organizations in
which these accusations arise. The case of Larry Nassar, the Michigan State University sports
doctor who sexually assaulted over 300 of his female patients, illustrates this point (Smith &
Hartocollis, 2018). Many of Nassar’s victims, either ashamed or afraid to speak out against him,
found it difficult to accuse him soon after he assaulted them (Cacciola & Hauser, 2018). Indeed,
the first victim to accuse him publicly did so sixteen years after Nassar sexually assaulted her
(Levenson, 2018). Victims’ delayed accusations likely made it harder for victims to seek justice
for the wrongdoing because others discredited them for delaying their accusations (e.g.,
Denhollander, 2018). Victims’ delayed accusations also proved costly for Michigan State
University. For failing to prevent Nassar from sexually assaulting his patients, Michigan State
University reached a $500 million settlement with Nassar’s victims (Smith & Hartocollis, 2018).
In this research, I examine one possible cost that victims incur when they delay accusing
others of wrongdoing. Specifically, I examine whether victims’ delayed accusations lead people
2

to perceive such victims as lacking integrity-based trustworthiness and whether these decrements
in people’s perceptions of victims’ integrity-based trustworthiness affect how people behave
toward such victims. I further test whether this occurs because victims’ delayed accusations
reduce people’s perceptions of victims’ psychological standing – that is, victims’ right to accuse
their transgressors of wrongdoing (Miller, Effron, & Zak, 2009; Miller & Effron, 2010). Given
the practical implications of these findings, I examine two interventions that attenuate the social
cost that victims suffer when they delay voicing accusations.
In investigating the relationships between victims’ delayed accusations, standing, and
integrity-based trustworthiness, I aim to make four contributions to the literature. First, the
present research adds to the literature on accusations (e.g., Kennedy & Schweitzer, 2018) by
generating novel insights on people’s perceptions of victims’ accusations of wrongdoing when
victims delay accusations. In doing so, I demonstrate that victims who delay voicing accusations
face double-victimization: They not only suffer the cost of the wrongdoing but also the social
cost of being perceived by others as less trustworthy. Second, in identifying this social cost, this
work extends the literature on trust (e.g., Kim, Cooper, Dirks, & Ferrin, 2013; Kim, Ferrin,
Cooper, & Dirks, 2004) by identifying how victims’ responses to wrongdoing affect people’s
perceptions of victims’ trustworthiness. This represents an important departure from existing
work that has largely focused on how transgressions negatively affect how much people trust
transgressors, rather than victims.
Third, the present research extends current theory on psychological standing by
identifying a novel predictor of standing (Miller, Effron & Zak, 2009; Miller & Effron, 2010),
the passage of time. Specifically, I show that people perceive victims who delay (vs. do not
delay) voicing accusations as having less standing to accuse their transgressors. Finally, the
3

present research contributes to the literature on the effects of decision-making times on
interpersonal judgments (Critcher, Inbar, & Pizarro, 2013; Tetlock et al., 2000). Although extant
work demonstrates that people evaluate others’ behavior and character based on the time that it
takes people to make decisions (e.g., Critcher, Inbar, & Pizarro, 2013; Kupor, Tormala, Norton,
& Rucker, 2014), work has not examined how the time that victims take to respond to
transgressions may affect peoples’ evaluations of victims. This omission in the literature is
surprising as people often draw on cues from victims to determine whether to offer support and
resources to them (e.g., Miller & MacFarland, 1986; Mullen & Okimoto, 2015; Okimoto &
Wenzel, 2014).
Victims’ Accusations of Interpersonal Wrongdoing
According to various accounts, approximately 75% of employees experience some form
of harassment, bullying, or abuse at work (e.g., Djurkovic, McCormack, & Casminir, 2006;
Einarsen & Raknes, 1997; Trudel & Reio, 2011). Those who are victimized often experience
psychological stress (e.g., fear, anxiety) and impaired health (e.g., psychosomatic symptoms)
(e.g., Dansky & Kilpatrick, 1997; Fitzgerald, Swan, & Magley, 1997; Pearson, Andersson, &
Porath, 2000). Moreover, such feelings of victimization can lead to reduced job satisfaction,
organizational commitment, and job performance (Barling & Phillips, 1993; Donovan, Drasgow,
& Munson, 1998; Einarsen & Raknes, 1997).
Given these costs, victims may wish to take action and address the wrongdoing by
confronting their transgressors (e.g., Cortina & Magley, 2003). One route by which victims can
do so is by engaging in voice and vocalizing their dissatisfaction with the other person’s actions
(Hirschman, 1970). Specifically, victims can accuse their transgressors by asserting (to their
transgressors) that their transgressors’ actions violated their expectations (definition adapted
4

from Kennedy & Schweitzer, 2018). In this way, accusations enable victims to raise concerns
about issues that they experience with the hope that these concerns will be addressed (e.g.,
Harlos, 2010; Olson-Buchanan & Boswell, 2008).
The decision to engage in voice and accuse one’s transgressor is a complicated one for
victims. Indeed, people are often reluctant to engage in voice and speak up about their concerns
(e.g., Roberts & O’Reilly, 1974; Ryan & Oestrich, 1991) and may hesitate to do so for many
reasons. People may experience discomfort disclosing negative information to others (Conlee &
Tesser, 1973; Rosen & Tesser, 1970). They may believe that engaging in voice is risky and may
worry that others will retaliate against them (Cortina & Magley, 2003), particularly when sharing
their concerns with those with power in the organization (Detert & Burris, 2007; Detert &
Treviño, 2010). People may also hesitate to voice their concerns if they believe that others would
discredit them for doing so (Milliken, Morrison, & Hewlin, 2003; Morrison & Milliken, 2000).
Thus, people appear to consider the costs and benefits of engaging in voice (Dutton et al., 1997;
Near & Miceli, 1986). Victims may therefore need time to decide whether, when, and how to
express their concerns about issues that they experience at work (e.g., Morrison, 2014).
While victims’ concerns about the potential costs of accusing their transgressors may lead
victims to delay voicing accusations, victims may suffer a social cost for doing so. Victims who
delay voicing accusations may therefore become victims twice over, bearing not only the cost of
the wrongdoing but also the additional cost of others’ harsh judgments. In this work, I examine
whether people perceive victims who delay voicing accusations as lower in integrity-based
trustworthiness, as compared to victims who do not delay voicing accusations. I further examine
whether people’s perceptions that victims who delay (vs. do not delay) voicing accusations have
reduced standing predict people’s perceptions of victims’ integrity-based trustworthiness.
5

Delayed Accusations and Victims’ Reduced Standing
According to the theory of psychological standing (e.g., Miller, Effron, & Zak, 2009;
Miller & Effron, 2010), merely experiencing hurt and/or anger is insufficient to justify speaking
up or acting in response to perceived injustice. People require psychological standing, which
refers to the subjective license or legitimacy to act (Miller, Effron, & Zak, 2009). Actors’
psychological standing is determined, to some extent, by others’ beliefs that actors have (or lack)
standing (Miller & Effron, 2010). In other words, actors’ standing is socially-constructed. Just as
the courts decide who has the legal standing to bring a case for judicial review, social groups
determine who has the standing to act on certain issues and may penalize those who act without
the requisite standing to do so.
Past work has identified a number of factors that predict whether actors have the standing
to act or speak up on an issue. These factors include having a material or moral stake in an issue
(e.g., Ratner & Miller, 2001), having personal experience with an issue (Effron & Miller, 2015),
or being a member of a group affected by an issue (e.g., Effron & Knowles, 2015; Ratner &
Miller, 2001). For example, even when men and women share similar views about gender parity
in organizations, only women are seen as having the right to express their views about the policy
because women are more affected by inequality in organizations than are men (Sherf, Tangirala,
& Weber, 2017).
To date, the literature on standing has not examined the role of time as a predictor of
actors’ standing. In this work, I introduce a novel predictor of standing – the passage of time.
Across a variety of contexts, the time that people take to make decisions plays an important role
in influencing people’s evaluations of decision-makers (e.g., Kupor et al., 2013; Tetlock et al.,
2000). In the context of victims’ delayed accusations, I theorize that the time that victims take to
6

accuse their transgressors influences how people perceive victims’ standing. Specifically, I
propose that delays in victims’ accusations will lead people to perceive victims as having less
standing to accuse their transgressors.
Victims’ delays – and specifically, the time that victims take to accuse their transgressors
– may affect people’s perceptions of victims’ standing to accuse their transgressors for many
reasons. People may believe that victims who delay (vs. do not delay) voicing accusations are
more likely to misremember the wrongdoing. This is consistent with evidence in the literature
that time distorts memory (Conway et al., 1994) and that people often forget details of events
over time (Schmolck, Buffalo, & Squire, 2000). This may then lead people to perceive victims
who delay (vs. do not delay) voicing accusations as having reduced standing to accuse their
transgressors.
The time that victims take to accuse their transgressors may also lead people to believe
that victims who delay (vs. do not delay) voicing accusations are accusing their transgressors for
strategic reasons. People use the time that others take to make decisions as an important indicator
of their selfish motives. For example, people perceive those who take a longer (vs. shorter) time
to act cooperatively as calculating and self-interested (Jordan, Hoffman, Nowak, & Rand, 2016).
Consequently, people may perceive victims who delay voicing accusations as acting
instrumentally. Thus, victims who delay (vs. do not delay) voicing accusations may appear to be
more motivated by strategic concerns than by desires for justice, or else they would have spoken
up soon after the wrongdoing. Accordingly, people may believe that such victims have less
standing to accuse their transgressors.
Alternatively, the time that victims take to accuse their transgressors may lead people to
believe that victims who delay (vs. do not delay) voicing accusations were less affected by the
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wrongdoing. When victims have suffered more harm, victims are more likely to seek justice for
the wrongdoing (e.g., Aquino, Tripp, & Bies, 2006). Hence, victims’ delay accusations may
suggest that the wrongdoing did not seriously affect victims and that they were not sufficiently
motivated to seek timely justice for the harm that they suffered. Because these victims may
appear to have a reduced material stake in the wrongdoing relative to victims who do not delay
voicing accusations, people may perceive victims who delay (vs. do not delay) voicing
accusations as having less standing to accuse their transgressors (e.g., Ratner & Miller, 2001).
In a similar vein, people may not believe that victims who delay (vs. do not delay)
voicing accusations may be less affected by the wrongdoing at the time that these victims make
their accusations. People may ascribe to the belief that “time heals all wounds”, which is
consistent with work that demonstrates that forgiveness unfolds over time and victims’ revenge
and avoidance motivations decrease over time (McCullough, Fincham, & Tsang, 2003). Thus,
because people may believe that victims are less affected by the wrongdoing as time passes,
people may believe that victims who delay (vs. do not delay) voicing accusations are less
affected by the wrongdoing at the time they accuse their transgressors. Because these victims
may appear to have a reduced material stake in the wrongdoing (e.g., Ratner & Miller, 2001),
people may perceive such victims as having less standing to accuse their transgressors.
Alternatively, people may believe that it is possible that victims who delay voicing
accusations fail to recognize that transgressors may have reformed over time. This is consistent
with work that illustrates that temporal distance from a wrongdoing is an important predictor of
empathy (McCullough et al., 1998; McCullough, Worthington, & Rachal, 1997), because “the
intensity of one’s emotional connection to the event begins to dull” (Wohl & McGrath, 2007; p.
1025). When victims delay (vs. do not delay) voicing accusations, people may therefore
8

experience greater empathy toward transgressors. Perceiving delayed accusations as unfair to
transgressors, people may believe that victims who delay (vs. do not delay) voicing accusations
have less standing to accuse their transgressors.
Finally, the time that victims take to accuse their transgressors may lead people to believe
that victims who delay (vs. do not delay) voicing accusations make it harder for transgressors to
defend themselves. This is consistent with the fact that evidence degrades over time (e.g., Ochoa
& Wistrich, 1996). Again, believing that victims’ delayed accusations may be unfair to
transgressors, people may believe that victims who delay (vs. do not delay) voicing accusations
have reduced standing to accuse their transgressors.
Taken together, these arguments provide support for the possibility that victims’ delayed
accusations – and more specifically, the passage of time – may reduce people’s perceptions of
victims’ standing to accuse their transgressors. Importantly, this may result in a social cost for
victims who delay voicing accusations of wrongdoing.
The Social Consequences of Victims’ Delayed Accusations
When people act without the requisite standing to do so in the eyes of others, they risk
facing disapproval and being discredited by others. Effron and Miller (2015) found, for example,
that advisees perceived advisors who had not suffered for their misdeeds as having reduced
standing to advise others against engaging in the misdeeds and judged these advisors as
hypocritical and self-righteous, compared to advisors who had suffered for their misdeeds.
Victims who delay voicing accusations, because they have reduced standing to accuse
their transgressors, may also face disapproval from others. Given that such victims have reduced
standing to accuse their transgressors, people may perceive victims’ accusations as inappropriate.
Moreover, people may judge such victims’ actions as inconsistent with how they would have
9

acted were they in the same position (e.g., Diekmann, Walker, Galinsky, & Tenbrunsel, 2013)
and judge these victims as not sharing their values. Accordingly, delayed accusations may affect
people’s perceptions of victims’ integrity, “the belief that an individual adheres to principles that
one finds acceptable” (Mayer & Davis, 1999; p. 124), an important component of trustworthiness
(Mayer, Davis, & Schoorman, 1995).
Past work suggests that accusations affect people’s perceptions of an accuser’s integrity-
based trustworthiness. Kennedy and Schweitzer (2018), for example, find that people perceive
others who accuse (vs. do not accuse) others of engaging in unethical behavior as having higher
ethical standards and integrity. In other words, they find that accusations increase people’s
perceptions of accusers’ integrity-based trustworthiness. Here, I suggest the opposite. I propose
that because people perceive such victims as inappropriately accusing their transgressors without
the requisite standing to do so, victims’ decisions to delay voicing accusations may decrease
people’s perceptions of victims’ integrity-based trustworthiness Integrating the above arguments,
I put forth the following hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1: When victims delay (vs. do not delay) voicing accusations, people perceive victims
as lower in integrity-based trustworthiness.

Hypothesis 2: When victims delay (vs. do not delay) voicing accusations, people perceive victims
as having reduced standing to accuse their transgressors.

Hypothesis 3: When victims delay (vs. do not delay) voicing accusations, people perceive victims
as having less standing to accuse their transgressors, which then predicts perceptions that such
victims are lower in integrity-based trustworthiness.

Attenuating the Cost of Victims’ Delayed Accusations
Victims can mitigate the cost of delayed accusations by speaking up sooner rather than
later. For many reasons, however, victims may need time to decide whether, when, as well as
how to voice their concerns (e.g., Krefting & Powers, 1998; Pinder & Harlos, 2001). As a result,
10

victims may delay voicing concerns about interpersonal wrongdoing that they experience at
work. Victims who delay voicing accusations may wish to minimize the social cost associated
with their decisions to do so.
I propose that victims who delay voicing accusations may be able to bolster people’s
perceptions of their standing by describing and reinforcing the message that they suffered harm
as a result of the wrongdoing. Having a material stake in an issue grants people the standing to
speak up or act in response to perceived injustice (e.g., Miller & Ratner, 1996; 1998). Past work
on psychological standing indicates that those who are more (vs. less) affected by an injustice
have greater standing to respond to it (e.g., Ratner & Miller, 2001). Hence, victims who have
delayed accusing their transgressors may be able to legitimize their decisions to speak up if they
describe the harm that they have suffered. In other words, although the passage of time may lead
people to believe that victims have less standing to accuse their transgressors, victims may be
able to alter this perception by highlighting and reinforcing their material stake in the
wrongdoing. I therefore put forth the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 4: Reinforcing victims’ material stake in the wrongdoing will attenuate the social
cost of victims’ delayed accusations.

Delayed accusations pose challenges for organizations. This is further complicated by the
fact that, a priori, it is not clear whether victim’s accusations are true or false. Nevertheless,
organizations risk facing serious costs if they do not address accusations of wrongdoing, even if
delayed, because failing to address victims’ concerns may allow issues to persist and cause
further problems (e.g., Perry, Kulike, & Schmidtke, 1997). Beliefs that victims who delay (vs. do
not delay) voicing accusations are less trustworthy may therefore make it hard for organizations
to take victims’ concerns seriously, as people are less receptive to the concerns of those that they
believe are less trustworthy (Whiting, Maynes, Podsakoff, & Podsakoff, 2012).
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Organizations can encourage people to speak up about issues at work by signaling that
they are receptive to employees’ concerns (Morrison & Milliken, 2000). One way to encourage
voice is to create a safe environment in which organizational members can speak freely (e.g.,
Edmondson, 2003). Organizations can do so by empowering employees to voice their concerns.
Sherf and colleagues (2017) found, for example, that although men believed that they did not
have the standing to speak up about gender parity issues at work, men were more likely to speak
up about these issues when the organization encouraged (vs. did not encourage) men to do so.
This organizational policy granted standing to men and made it appropriate for them to speak up.
I propose that organizations may be able to mitigate the cost of delayed accusations by
instituting a policy that empowers victims and grants standing to victims who delay voicing
accusations. I therefore test the effectiveness of an organizational policy that encourages victims
to voice their concerns about wrongdoing at work, even if delayed, during Annual Performance
Reviews (APRs). APRs, which are common in most organizations, provide organizational
members the opportunity to provide feedback (e.g., Meyer, Kay, & French, 1965). Organizations
also utilize APRs to solicit organizational members’ concerns about issues they experienced at
work (e.g., Harlos, 2010; Olson-Buchanan & Boswell, 2008). I propose that organizations can
use APRs to provide victims who delay voicing accusations the opportunity to voice concerns.
By empowering victims to speak up – even if delayed – this organizational policy may bolster
victims’ standing and in doing so, minimize the social cost of delayed accusations. Accordingly,
I propose:
Hypothesis 5: An organizational policy that empowers victims to voice delayed accusations will
attenuate the social cost of victims’ delayed accusations.

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OVERVIEW OF STUDIES
I test my hypotheses across multiple studies. Study 1 examines whether people perceive
victims who delay voicing accusations as lower in integrity-based trustworthiness. Studies 2a
and 2b examine whether people perceive victims who delay (vs. do not delay) voicing
accusations as lower in integrity-based trustworthiness because they believe such victims lack
the standing to accuse their transgressors. Study 2b also offers evidence that victims’ delayed
accusations also affect people’s willingness to trust victims. Study 3 examines why people
perceive victims who delay voicing accusations as having reduced standing and does so in the
context of sexual harassment at work, a timely context in light of the #MeToo Movement
(Kantor, 2018). Finally, in Studies 4 and 5, I examine the effectiveness of two interventions
designed to mitigate the cost of victims’ delayed accusations. Study 4 tests the effectiveness of a
victim intervention in which victims describe and reinforce the message that they suffered harm.
Study 5 tests the effectiveness of an organizational intervention that capitalizes on APRs to
bolster the standing of victims who delay voicing accusations.
For each experiment, I collected the data in single, complete batches and did not conduct
any analyses until data collection was complete. I report all measures, manipulations, and
exclusions. Based on recommendations for increased power (e.g., Simmons, Nelson, &
Simonsohn, 2013), across my studies, I sought to collect approximately 60-70 participants per
cell.
Study 1
In Study 1, I examined whether people perceive victims who delay voicing accusations as
lower in integrity-based trustworthiness, as compared to victims who do not delay voicing
accusations.

13

Method
Participants. One hundred and twenty-nine individuals (41.1% female; Mage = 37.71, SD
= 11.73) recruited via Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (MTurk) participated in this study in
exchange for monetary compensation.
Procedure. Participants read a vignette about two associates, Mark and Alex, who work
at an advertising agency. Participants read that Mark and Alex were assigned to develop an
advertising campaign for a new client and that they were expected to brainstorm, generate ideas,
and create materials to pitch to the client. The presentation to the client was described as an
important, high stakes presentation. Participants read that on the day before the presentation,
Alex missed work and that Mark had to stay late to finish the project. Participants also read that
although Alex missed work, Mark felt that both he and Alex received equal credit for the
presentation. Finally, participants read that Mark was certain that Alex had intentionally missed
work so that Mark would have to step in and complete Alex’s share of the work.
I employed a 2 (delay-of-accusation: no delay, six-month delay) × 1 between-subjects
design. I randomly assigned participants to one of two delay-of-accusation conditions in which
they either read that Mark accused Alex of intentionally missing work either the day after the
presentation or six months later.
Measures. After reading the vignette, participants completed the following measure and
provided basic demographic information.
1

Victim’s Integrity-Based Trustworthiness. Six-items measured participants’ perceptions
of Mark’s integrity-based trustworthiness, α = .85. Sample items included: “Mark has a strong

1
Participants also completed measures of Mark’s ability-based trustworthiness and benevolence-based
trustworthiness (Mayer & Davis, 1999; Mayer, Davis, & Schoorman, 1995). I did not have a priori
predictions for these measures and therefore report the results of this analyses for all subsequent studies in
which these measures were collected in the Supplemental Materials section of the paper.
14

sense of justice” and “Sound principles seem to guide Mark’s behavior”. Responses to these
items ranged from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree).
Results
Victim’s Integrity-Based Trustworthiness. Consistent with Hypothesis 1, participants
perceived Mark as lower in integrity-based trustworthiness when Mark accused Alex six months
after the wrongdoing (M = 4.70, SD = 1.12) than they did when Mark accused Alex the day after
the wrongdoing (M = 5.22, SD = 1.08), t(127) = -2.70, p = .008, d = 0.47.
Discussion
The results of Study 1 provide initial support for Hypothesis 1 by demonstrating that
people perceive victims who delay (vs. do not delay) voicing accusations as lower in integrity-
based trustworthiness.
Study 2a
In Study 2a, I explored the downstream consequences of people’s perceptions that
victims who delay (vs. do not delay) voicing accusations have reduced standing. Specifically, I
examined the effect of victims’ reduced standing on people’s perceptions of victims’ integrity-
based trustworthiness.
Method
Participants. One hundred and twenty-seven undergraduate students (39.4% female;
Mage = 20.77, SD = 2.46) at a private West Coast university participated in the study in exchange
for class credit.
Procedure. Participants adopted the role of a manager responsible for evaluating a job
candidate for a position at their firm. Participants read that they would watch a video of an
interview and then provide an assessment of the job candidate. In the video, the interviewer
asked the job candidate a few questions. Toward the end of the interview, the interviewer asked
15

the job candidate to describe a difficult situation that he had experienced at work and how he had
chosen to deal with it. The job candidate, Chris, described a situation at work in which he
believed that another analyst at his firm, Mark, had improperly taken credit for an idea that Chris
had developed. In the interview, Chris described addressing the situation by accusing Mark of
having taken credit for the idea he had developed.
This design was similar to a procedure used by Kim and colleagues (2004). I selected a
job interview context because job interviews are evaluative contexts in which interviewers pay
attention to job candidates’ integrity-based trustworthiness (Kacmar & Young, 1999). Moreover,
during job interviews, interviewers often ask job candidates to describe difficult situations that
they have encountered at work and how they chose to deal with them (e.g., Gifford, Ng, &
Wilkinson, 1985). Job interviews are therefore realistic contexts in which information about
individuals’ experiences addressing wrongdoing may be revealed to another person.
I employed a 2 (delay-of-accusation condition: no delay, six-month delay) × 1 between-
subjects design. I randomly assigned participants to one of two conditions in which the
interviewer asked Chris when he chose to accuse Mark of taking credit for idea that he had
developed. Chris either indicated that he had done so the day after the wrongdoing or six months
later.
Measures. After watching the interview, participants completed an evaluation of Chris,
the job candidate. This evaluation included the measures listed below. At the end of the study,
participants provided basic demographic information.
Victim’s Standing. Four items measured participants’ perceptions of Chris’ standing to
accuse Mark, α = .91. This measure was adapted from standing measures used in the literature
(e.g., Effron & Miller, 2015). Participants indicated whether: “… Chris had the right to accuse
16

Mark”, “… it was not appropriate for Chris to accuse Mark”, “… Chris was entitled to accuse
Mark”, and “… Chris did not have the legitimate right to accuse Mark” when he did so.
Victim’s Integrity-Based Trustworthiness. As in Study 1, six items measured
participants’ perceptions of Chris’ integrity-based trustworthiness, α = .79.
Willingness to Hire Victim. Finally, one item measured participants’ willingness to hire
Chris (Moore, Lee, Kim, & Cable, 2017). I included this measure because participants were
asked to imagine that they were responsible for evaluating and hiring a job candidate as the cover
story for this study. My confidence in this prediction that victims’ delayed accusations would
affect willingness to hire victims was weaker, however, than was my prediction that victims’
delayed accusations would affect perceptions of victims’ integrity-based trustworthiness.
Responses to this item ranged from 1 (not at all willing) to 7 (very willing).
Results
Victim’s Standing. Consistent with Hypothesis 2, participants perceived Chris as having
less standing to accuse Mark when Chris accused Mark six months after the wrongdoing (M =
3.89, SD = 1.46) than they did when Chris accused Mark the day after the wrongdoing (M =
4.58, SD = 1.28), t(125) = -2.85, p = .005, d = 0.50.
Victim’s Integrity-Based Trustworthiness. Participants perceived Chris as lower in
integrity-based trustworthiness when Chris accused Mark six months after the wrongdoing (M =
3.87, SD = 0.91) than they did when Chris accused Mark the day after the wrongdoing (M =
4.47, SD = 0.76), t(125) = -4.01, p < .001, d = 0.72. Thus, Hypothesis 1 received support.
Willingness to Hire Victim. Finally, participants were less willing to hire Chris when he
accused Mark six months after the wrongdoing (M = 3.45, SD = 1.15) than they were when Chris
17

accused Mark the day after the wrongdoing (M = 3.84, SD = 1.13), t(125) = -1.94, p = .055, d =
0.34.
Mediation. I examined whether participants’ perceptions that victims who delay (vs. do
not delay) voicing accusations have reduced standing predicted participants’ perceptions that
such victims are lower in integrity-based trustworthiness. To do so, I ran mediational analysis
using the PROCESS macro (Model 4) developed by Hayes (2017). I used 5,000 bootstrapped
samples for this analysis and used the same number of samples in all bootstrapping analyses
reported in this paper. The indirect effect of Chris’ standing was significant, B = -0.10 (SE =
0.05) (95% CI: LL: -0.2196, UL: -0.0129) (see Figure 1). These findings therefore provide
support for Hypothesis 3.
I also examined perceptions of Chris’ standing and integrity-based trustworthiness
serially mediated people’s willingness to hire Chris. I did so using the PROCESS macro (Model
6). The indirect effect of the serial mediation was significant, B = -0.07 (SE = 0.04) (95% CI:
LL: -0.1769, UL: -0.0087) (see Figure 2). Thus, people’s perceptions that Chris had less standing
when he delayed (vs. did not delay) voicing his accusation led to people’s beliefs that he was
lower in integrity-based trustworthiness. This consequently predicted people’s reduced
willingness to hire him.
-----------------------------------------
Insert Figures 1 and 2 about Here
-----------------------------------------
Discussion
The results of Study 2a reveal that victims’ decisions to delay voicing accusations of
wrongdoing not only lead people to perceive such victims as having reduced standing but also
18

lead people to perceive victims as lower in integrity-based trustworthiness. Further, these results
provide evidence that victims’ decisions to delay voicing accusations affect people’s willingness
to hire such victims.
Study 2b
Study 2b served to replicate the findings in Study 2a. In a departure from Study 2a,
however, Study 2b examined the behavioral implications of victims’ decisions to delay voicing
accusations.
Method
Participants. One hundred and twenty-eight undergraduate students (30.5% female; Mage
= 21.06, SD = 3.08) at a private West Coast university participated in the study in exchange for
class credit.
Procedure. Participants arrived at the behavioral lab in groups to purportedly participate
in a study on how first impressions are formed on virtual teams. To simulate the virtual team
experience, participants completed the study in separate rooms. Participants were informed that
they would be randomly paired with one of their virtual team members for this exercise. They
were also informed that one person would be selected to write a brief response to a prompt which
would then be shared with the other person, and that this written response would serve as the
basis of their first impressions.
Each participant was paired with a fictional participant named Alex. Participants read that
Alex had been chosen to write a response to the prompt. While Alex was writing his response,
participants completed a filler anagram task. Participants read Alex’s response once he was
finished writing it. Participants read that Alex had been asked to describe a difficult situation that
he had experienced in college and how and when he chose to deal with it.
19

Participants read that Alex was a member of a student organization, tasked with planning
a fundraising event with another member of the organization named Chris. They read that Alex
and Chris were responsible for developing ideas for the organization’s upcoming fundraiser.
Participants read that whoever developed the best idea for the fundraiser would be the Chair of
the event. Participants also read that Alex and Chris met once to discuss some initial ideas for the
fundraising event, but that each of them developed and presented his own idea to the other
members of the organization. Participants read that on the day of the presentation Chris
presented an idea that Alex thought was similar to one that he had presented earlier to Chris. At
that time, Chris had dismissed Alex’s idea saying that it was not feasible. Chris had suggested
moving onto other ideas. Participants read that Alex was certain that Chris was trying to take
credit for an idea that Alex had actually developed and that he accused Chris of doing so. After
reading Alex’s response, participants completed the short first impressions evaluation form and
completed the trust game, which was presented to participants as a decision-making exercise.
I employed a 2 (delay-of-accusation condition: no delay, three-month delay) × 1
between-subjects design. I randomly assigned participants to one of two conditions in which they
either read that Alex had accused Chris of taking credit for his idea either on the day after the
presentation or three months later. In this study, I adjusted the delay from six months to three
months (i.e., in the same semester) in order to maintain realism in the university context.
Measures. Participants completed the following measures and provided basic
demographic information.
Victim’s Standing. Four items measured participants’ perceptions of Alex’s standing to
accuse Chris, α = .92. These were the same items as in Study 2a.
20

Victim’s Integrity-Based Trustworthiness. Six items measured participants’ perceptions
of Alex’s integrity-based trustworthiness, α = .88.
Behavioral Measure of Trust toward Victim. Finally, participants completed the trust
game (Berg, Dickaut, & McCabe, 1995; Righetti & Finkenauer, 2011), which served as a
behavioral measure of trust. Participants read that they had been assigned to the role of the
Sender and that Alex had been assigned to the role of the Receiver. Participants read that they
had $1 that they could either keep or send to Alex. They read that if they chose to send the $1 to
Alex, the money would triple to $3 and that Alex would then get to decide whether to keep the
$3 or send half the money (i.e., $1.50) back to them.
The trust game measures people’s willingness to be vulnerable with another person,
which is an essential part of trust (Mayer & Davis, 1999; Mayer, Davis, & Schoorman, 1995).
Participants who chose to send the $1 to Alex demonstrated that they trusted him because
sending the $1 indicated that participants were willing to be vulnerable, in that Alex could
choose to keep the money without sending any money back. Participants who did not send the $1
to Alex, in contrast, demonstrated that they did not trust him because they were unwilling to risk
the possibility that Alex would not send any money back to them. These participants were
therefore unwilling to be vulnerable with Alex.
Results
Victim’s Standing. Consistent with Hypothesis 2, participants perceived Alex as having
reduced standing to accuse Chris when Alex accused Chris three months after the wrongdoing
(M = 4.72, SD = 1.72) than they did when Alex accused Chris the day after the wrongdoing (M =
5.57, SD = 1.08), t(108.37) = -3.35, p = .001, d = 0.59.
2

2
Because the homogeneity of variance (HOV) assumption for these tests was violated, I report adjusted t-tests. I do
this for all other analyses in this paper in which assumption was violated.
21

Victim’s Integrity-Based Trustworthiness. Participants perceived Alex as lower in
integrity-based trustworthiness when Alex accused Chris three months after the wrongdoing (M
= 4.25, SD = 1.16) than they did when Alex accused Chris the day after the wrongdoing (M =
4.71, SD = 0.90), t(126) = -2.50, p = .014, d = 0.44. These results therefore provide additional
support for Hypothesis 1.
Behavioral Measure of Trust toward Victim. Participants were significantly less likely
to trust Alex when he accused Chris three months after the wrongdoing (27.7%) than they were
when he accused Chris the day after the wrongdoing (65.0%), χ
2
(1, N = 128) = 18.00, p < .001.
Thus, victims’ decisions to delay voicing accusations not only affect people’s perceptions of
victims’ standing and integrity-based trustworthiness, but also their willingness to trust victims.
Mediation. I then ran two separate sets of mediation analyses with perceptions of Alex’s
integrity-based trustworthiness and willingness to trust Alex as dependent variables. For both
sets of analyses, I ran mediation using the PROCESS Macro (Model 4). When the dependent
variable was perceptions of Alex’s integrity-based trustworthiness, the indirect effect of Alex’s
standing was significant, B = -0.26 (SE = 0.10) (95% CI: LL: -0.4698, UL: -0.0995) (see Figure
3). Thus, I find additional support for Hypothesis 3. I then ran serial mediation analysis to
examine whether victims’ delayed accusations also affected participants’ willingness to trust
victims. The indirect effect of this serial mediation was significant, B = -0.10 (SE = 0.08) (95%
CI: LL: -0.3294, UL: -0.0018) (see Figure 4). These results indicate that people perceive victims
who delay (vs. do not delay) voicing accusations as lower in integrity-based trustworthiness and
also trust these victims less.

22

-----------------------------------------
Insert Figures 3 and 4 about Here
-----------------------------------------
Discussion
Study 2b replicated the findings of Study 2a. People perceived victims who delayed (vs.
did not delay) voicing accusations as having less standing and consequently, perceived such
victims as lower in integrity-based trustworthiness. The results of Study 2b also demonstrate that
victims’ decisions to delay voicing accusations also affects people’s willingness to trust victims.
Study 3
In Study 3 I examined why people perceive victims as having reduced standing to accuse
their transgressors when victims delay (vs. do not delay) voicing accusations. In other words, I
examined how the passage of time affects people’s perceptions of victims’ standing. Specifically,
I examined six possible mechanisms through which the passage of time leads to perceptions of
victims’ reduced standing: 1) people’s beliefs that victims who delay voicing accusations may be
misremembering the wrongdoing, 2) people’s beliefs that victims who delay voicing accusations
may have strategic reasons for making the accusation, 3) people’s beliefs that victims who delay
voicing accusations were less affected by the wrongdoing, 4) people’s beliefs that victims who
delay voicing accusations are less affected by the wrongdoing at the time of the accusation, 5)
people’s beliefs that transgressors may reform when victims delay voicing accusations of
wrongdoing, and 6) people’s beliefs that transgressors cannot defend themselves when victims
delay voicing accusations of wrongdoing. In Study 3, I also examined the social cost of victims’
delayed accusations in the context of sexual harassment at work, a relevant type of wrongdoing
in light of the #MeToo Movement (Graf, 2018).

23

Method
Participants. One hundred and twenty-nine individuals (34.9% female; Mage = 33.14, SD
= 8.99) recruited via Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (MTurk) participated in the study in exchange
for monetary compensation.
Procedure. Participants read a vignette that described two associate consultants, Kate
and John, who work at TKP Consulting. Participants read that at the recent holiday party, John
had a lot to drink and that he spent some of his time that evening talking to Kate. Participants
read that John made some jokes during his conversation with Kate, which Kate felt were
inappropriate. They also read that Kate was certain that John’s behavior constituted sexual
harassment, and that she accused John of sexually harassing her.
I employed a 2 (delay-of-accusation condition: no delay, twelve-month delay) × 1
between-subjects design. I randomly assigned participants to one of two conditions in which they
read that Kate accused John of sexual harassment the day after the holiday party or twelve
months later. In this study, I adjusted the delay from six months to twelve months in order to
mimic the phenomenon in the real world. Many of the victims of the #MeToo Movement waited
for months, even years, to speak up and accuse their transgressors (Hu, 2017).
Measures. After reading the vignette, participants completed the following measures. At
the end of the study, participants provided basic demographic information.
Beliefs that Victim May Be Misremembering. Two items measured participants’ beliefs
that Kate may be misremembering the wrongdoing: “Kate has likely forgotten what happened at
the holiday party” and “Kate is probably misremembering what happened at the holiday party”,
r(129) = 0.69, p < .001.
24

Beliefs that Victim May Have Strategic Motives. Two items measured participants’
beliefs that Kate may have strategic motives for making her accusation (adapted from Reeder,
Kumar, Hesson-McInnis, & Trafimow, 2002): “Kate has something to gain by accusing John”
and “Kate has a strategic motive for accusation John”, r(129) = 0.85, p < .001.
Beliefs that Victim Was Affected by Wrongdoing. Three items measured participants’
beliefs that Kate was affected by the wrongdoing: “John’s actions seriously hurt Kate”, “John’s
actions clearly affected Kate”, and “John’s actions seriously harmed Kate”, α = .88.
Beliefs that Victims Is Still Affected by Wrongdoing. Three items measured participants’
beliefs that Kate is still affected by the wrongdoing: “John’s actions still seriously hurt Kate,
“John’s actions still clearly affect Kate”, and “John’s actions still seriously harm Kate”, α = .90.
Beliefs that Transgressor Has Reformed. Two items measured participants’ beliefs that
John may have reformed (from Wakslak & Kim, 2018): “John probably learned from this
experience” and “John likely addressed the personal shortcomings that may have contributed to
this past incident”, r(129) = 0.63, p < .001.
Beliefs that Transgressor Cannot Defend Self. Two items measured participants’ beliefs
that John could not easily defend himself: “It is hard for John to prove his innocence” and “John
cannot easily prove that he was not guilty”, r(129) = 0.68, p < .001.
Victim’s Standing. Four items measured participants’ perceptions of Kate’s standing to
accuse John, α = .88.
Victim’s Integrity-Based Trustworthiness. Six items measured participants’ perceptions
of Kate’s integrity-based trustworthiness, α = .87.

25

Results
Beliefs that the Victim May Be Misremembering. Participants were no more likely to
believe that Kate was lying about the wrongdoing when Kate accused John the day after the
wrongdoing (M = 3.10, SD = 1.74) than they did when Kate accused John twelve months after
the wrongdoing (M = 3.33, SD = 1.62), t(127) = -0.78, p = .437, d = 0.14.
Beliefs that the Victim May Have Strategic Motives. Participants were also no more
likely to believe that Kate had strategic motives for accusing John regardless of whether Kate
accused John the day after the wrongdoing (M = 3.68, SD = 1.80) or Kate accused John twelve
months after the wrongdoing (M = 4.12, SD = 1.79), t(127) = -1.39, p = .168, d = 0.25.
Beliefs that the Victim Was Affected by Wrongdoing. Participants were more likely to
believe that Kate was less affected by the wrongdoing when Kate accused John of wrongdoing
twelve months after the wrongdoing (M = 4.22, SD = 1.64) than they did when Kate accused
John of wrongdoing the next day (M = 4.79, SD = 1.39), t(127) = -2.11, p = .037, d = 0.37.
Beliefs that the Victim Is Still Affected by Wrongdoing. Participants were no more likely
to believe that Kate was still affected by the wrongdoing regardless of whether Kate accused
John of wrongdoing the day after the wrongdoing (M = 4.57, SD = 1.47) or Kate accused John of
wrongdoing twelve months after the wrongdoing (M = 4.19, SD = 1.75), t(127) = 1.33, p = .186,
d = 0.24.
Beliefs that the Transgressor Has Reformed. Participants were also no more likely to
believe that John had reformed when Kate accused John the day after the wrongdoing (M = 4.43,
SD = 1.22) than they were when Kate accused John twelve months after the wrongdoing (M =
4.33, SD = 1.50), t(127) = 0.43, p = .671, d = 0.07.
26

Beliefs that the Transgressor Cannot Defend Self. Additionally, participants were no
more likely to believe that John would not be able to easily defend himself regardless of whether
Kate accused John of wrongdoing the day after the wrongdoing (M = 5.10, SD = 1.24) or Kate
accused John of wrongdoing twelve months after the wrongdoing (M = 4.99, SD = 1.56), t(127)
= 0.45, p = .657, d = 0.08.
Victim’s Standing. As expected, participants were more likely to perceive Kate as having
reduced standing when Kate accused John twelve months after the wrongdoing (M = 4.14, SD =
1.55) than they were when Kate accused John the day after the wrongdoing (M = 4.90, SD =
1.48), t(127) = -2.85, p = .005, d = 0.50.
Victim’s Integrity-Based Trustworthiness. Also as expected, participants perceived Kate
as lower in integrity-based trustworthiness when Kate accused John twelve months after the
wrongdoing (M = 4.01, SD = 1.36) than they did when Kate accused John the day after the
wrongdoing (M = 4.79, SD = 1.16), t(127) = -3.50, p = .001, d = 0.62.
Mediation. I tested for serial mediation using the PROCESS macro (Model 6). In my
analysis, standing served as the second mechanism in the model. The beliefs that the victim was
affected by the wrongdoing mechanism met the criteria for mediation, while the other
mechanisms did not. The indirect effect of the beliefs that the victim was affected by the
wrongdoing and standing mechanisms was significant, B = -0.13 (SE = 0.06) (95% CI: LL: -
0.2652, UL: -0.0124) (see Figure 5). Given the possibility that participant gender may affect
participants’ perceptions of the victim (e.g., CITE), I ran similar analysis controlling for
participant gender. The indirect effect remained significant while controlling for participant
gender, B = -0.12 (SE = 0.06) (95% CI: LL: -0.2502, UL: -0.0025).

27

-----------------------------------------
Insert Figure 5 about Here
-----------------------------------------
Discussion
Study 3 replicated the social cost of victims’ delayed accusations in the context of sexual
harassment at work. Moreover, the results of Study 3 demonstrated that when victims delay (vs.
do not delay) voicing accusations, people believe that such victims were less affected by the
wrongdoing. People consequently perceive victims who delay (vs. do not delay) voicing
accusations as having reduced standing to accuse their transgressors and perceive these victims
as lower in integrity-based trustworthiness for accusing their transgressors without the requisite
standing to do so.
Study 4
In Study 4, I sought to explore whether victims can attenuate the cost of their delayed
accusations. Because people perceive victims who delay voicing accusations as having reduced
standing, I examined whether victims who delay voicing accusations can bolster people’s
perceptions of their standing to accuse their transgressors by describing and reinforcing the
message that they suffered harm as a result of the wrongdoing. Building on work that
demonstrates that those with more (vs. less) material stake in an issue have greater standing (e.g.,
Ratner & Miller, 2001), I test the effectiveness of an intervention that seeks to mitigate the effect
of delayed accusations on victims’ standing by reinforcing victims’ material stake in the
wrongdoing.

28

Method
Participants. One hundred and eighty-three individuals (44.3% female; Mage = 34.09, SD
= 11.98) recruited via Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (MTurk) participated in the study in exchange
for monetary compensation.
Procedure. Participants read the same vignette as in Study 4, in which the victim (Kate)
felt that she had been sexually harassed by her colleague (John) at a holiday party. In this study, I
employed a 3 (delay-of-accusation condition: no delay, twelve-month delay, twelve-month delay
with description of harm) × 1 between-subjects design.
Participants in the no delay condition read that Kate accused John the day after the
holiday party. Participants in the twelve-month delay condition, in contrast, read the Kate
accused John twelve months later. Finally, participants in the twelve-month delay with
description of harm condition read that Kate accused John twelve months later and that in
voicing her accusation Kate described the harm she suffered. Specifically, participants read:
In voicing her accusation, Kate expressed that she felt that it was her right and
duty to speak out against John because of how affected she was by his behavior at
the holiday party. His actions made her feel very uncomfortable at work.

She stated that John made crude sexual comments about her and that he had
violated her by sexually harassing her. She stated that it was distressing for her to
be around John, as it made her think about what she had experienced at the
holiday party.
Measures. After reading the vignette, participants completed the following measures and
provided basic demographic information.
Victim’s Standing. Four items measured participants’ perceptions of Kate’s standing to
accuse John, α = .89.
Victim’s Integrity-Based Trustworthiness. Six items measured participants’ perceptions
of Kate’s integrity-based trustworthiness, α = .86.
29

Results
Victim’s Standing. As expected, participants perceived Kate as having marginally less
standing to accuse John when Kate accused John twelve months after the wrongdoing (M = 4.47,
SD = 1.65) than they did when Kate accused John the day after the wrongdoing (M = 4.97, SD =
1.54), t(180) = -1.80, p = .073, d = 0.31. Furthermore, participants perceived Kate as having
greater standing when Kate accused John twelve months after the wrongdoing and described the
harm she suffered (M = 5.21, SD = 1.42) than they did when Kate accused John twelve months
after the wrongdoing but did not describe the harm she suffered (M = 4.47, SD = 1.65), t(180) =
2.71, p = .007, d = 0.48. Finally, there was no difference in perceptions of Kate’s standing when
she accused John the day after the wrongdoing (M = 4.97, SD = 1.54) or accused John twelve
months after the wrongdoing and described the harm she suffered (M = 5.21, SD = 1.42), t(180)
= -0.86, p = .392, d = 0.16.
Victim’s Integrity-Based Trustworthiness. Participants perceived Kate as lower in
integrity-based trustworthiness when she accused John twelve months after the wrongdoing (M =
4.14, SD = 1.25) than they did when she accused John the day after the wrongdoing (M = 4.91,
SD = 1.13), t(180) = -3.44, p = .001, d = 0.65. When Kate accused John twelve months later and
described the harm she suffered, participants perceived Kate as higher in integrity-based
trustworthiness (M = 4.60, SD = 1.25) than they did when Kate accused John twelve months later
but did not describe the harm she suffered (M = 4.14, SD = 1.25), t(180) = 2.10, p = .037, d =
0.37. Finally, participants did not perceive a meaningful difference in Kate’s integrity-based
trustworthiness when she accused John the day after the wrongdoing (M = 4.91, SD = 1.13) or
did so twelve months after the wrongdoing and described the harm she suffered (M = 4.60, SD =
1.25), t(180) = 1.39, p = .165, d = 0.26.
30

Mediation. I tested for mediation using the PROCESS Macro (Model 4). I compared the
twelve-month delay with description of harm condition to the twelve-month delay condition
(controlling for the no delay condition). The indirect effect through standing was significant, B =
0.38 (SE = 0.14) (LL: 0.1043, UL: 0.6654) (see Figure 6). I therefore found support for
Hypothesis 4. When Kate accused John twelve months after the wrongdoing and described the
harm she suffered, participants believed that she had increased standing and was higher in
integrity-based trustworthiness, as compared to when she accused John twelve months later but
did not provide a description of the harm she suffered.
-----------------------------------------
Insert Figure 6 about Here
-----------------------------------------
Discussion
In Study 4, I sought to identify whether victims may be able to mitigate the cost of
delayed accusations by describing and reinforcing the message that they suffered harm as a result
of the wrongdoing. Although people believe that victims who delay voicing accusations have
reduced standing and are lower in integrity-based trustworthiness, the results of Study 4 reveal
that victims can attenuate the social cost of delayed accusations. By highlighting their material
stake in the wrongdoing, victims who delay voicing accusations can boost people’s perceptions
of their standing and consequently, their integrity-based trustworthiness.
Study 5
The goal of Study 5 was to identify an organizational intervention that minimizes the cost
of victims’ decisions to delay voicing accusations. I tested the effectiveness of an organizational
policy that encourages organizational members to speak up during Annual Performance Reviews
31

(APRs) about any wrongdoing that they may have experienced in the past year. This policy
minimizes the cost of victims’ delayed accusations by legitimizing their decisions to do so.
Method
Procedure. One hundred and seventy-three individuals (41.6% female; Mage = 34.40, SD
= 10.18) recruited via Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (MTurk) participated in this study in
exchange for monetary compensation.
Procedure. Participants read a vignette about two accounting associates, Max and Jake,
who work for a firm called RK Coopers. Participants read that during a meeting for one of their
projects, Max, Jake, and a few of their team members (including their boss) met to discuss new
ideas for the project. They read that Max made many suggestions during the meeting and that in
response to Max’s suggestions, Jake seemed to mock Max. Participants read that Max felt
belittled by Jake. In short, Max felt that Jake had harassed him at work (e.g., Aquino & Lamertz,
2004; Einarsen, Raknes, & Matthiesen, 1994). Participants read that Max was certain that Jake
had insulted and belittled him during the meeting and that he accused Jake of doing so.
I employed a 3 (delay-of-accusation condition: no delay, six-month delay, six-month
delay but during APR) × 1 between-subjects design. I randomly assigned participants to one of
three conditions in which they either read that Max accused Jake the day after the wrongdoing,
six months after the wrongdoing, or six months after the wrongdoing but during his APR.
Participants in the six-month delay but during APR condition read that during APRs, employees
are encouraged to raise concerns about any wrongdoing experienced during the past year.
Measures. After reading the vignette, participants completed the following measures and
provided basic demographic information.
32

Victim’s Standing. Four items measured participants’ perceptions of Max’s standing to
accuse Jake, α = .89.
Victim’s Integrity-Based Trustworthiness. Six items measured participants’ perceptions
of Max’s integrity-based trustworthiness, α = .84.
Results
Victim’s Standing. As expected, participants perceived Max as having reduced standing
to accuse Jake when Max accused Jake six months after the wrongdoing (M = 4.16, SD = 1.35)
than they did when Max accused Jake the day after the wrongdoing (M = 5.23, SD = 1.24),
t(170) = -4.31, p < .001, d = 0.83. Furthermore, participants perceived Max as having greater
standing to accuse Jake when Max did so six months after the wrongdoing but did so during his
APR (M = 4.96, SD = 1.43) than they did when Max accused Jake six months after the
wrongdoing but did not do so during his APR (M = 4.16, SD = 1.35), t(170) = 3.17, p = .002, d =
0.58. There was no difference in perceptions of Max’s standing to accuse Jake when Max
accused Jake the day after the wrongdoing (M = 5.23, SD = 1.24) or Max accused Jake six
months after the wrongdoing but did so during his APR (M = 4.96, SD = 1.43), t(170) = 1.09, p =
.277, d = 0.20.
Victim’s Integrity-Based Trustworthiness. Participants perceived Max as lower in
integrity-based trustworthiness when Max accused Jake six months after the wrongdoing (M =
4.12, SD = 0.98) than they did when Max accused Jake the day after the wrongdoing (M = 4.93,
SD = 0.92), t(170) = -4.62, p < .001, d = 0.85. When Max accused Jake six months after the
wrongdoing, participants perceived that Max was higher in integrity-based trustworthiness when
Max accused Jake during his APR (M = 4.61, SD = 0.95) than they did when he did not accuse
Jake during his APR (M = 4.12, SD = 0.98), t(170) = 2.78, p = .006, d = 0.51. Finally,
33

participants perceived Max as marginally higher in integrity-based trustworthiness when Max
accused Jake the day after the wrongdoing (M = 4.93, SD = 0.92) than they did when Max
accused Jake six months after the wrongdoing during his APR (M = 4.61, SD = 0.95), t(170) =
1.79, p = .075, d = 0.34.
Mediation. I tested for mediation using the PROCESS Macro (Model 4). I compared the
six-month delay but during APR condition to the six-month delay condition (controlling for the
no delay condition). The indirect effect through standing was significant, B = 0.29 (SE = 0.11)
(LL: 0.0956, UL: 0.5247) (see Figure 7). I therefore found support for Hypothesis 5. These
results reveal that when Max accused Jake six months after the wrongdoing but during his APR,
participants believed that he had more standing and was higher in integrity-based
trustworthiness, as compared to when he accused Jake six months later but did not make the
accusation during his APR.
-----------------------------------------
Insert Figure 7 about Here
-----------------------------------------
Discussion
In Study 5, I sought to examine the effectiveness of an organizational intervention aimed
at minimizing the cost of delayed accusations for victims of wrongdoing. These findings of
Study 5 highlight the effectiveness of an organizational intervention that empowers victims to
speak up about interpersonal wrongdoing experienced at work, even if delayed. People perceived
victims who delayed voicing accusations but did so during their APRs as having greater standing
and higher in integrity-based trustworthiness, as compared to victims who delayed voicing
34

accusations but did not do so during their APRs. Thus, organizations may be able to minimize
the deleterious effects of victims’ decisions to delay voice by implementing this policy.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
As the #MeToo Movement highlights, often victims delay voicing accusations of wrongdoing.
Delayed accusations can be costly for victims and the organizations in which these accusations
occur. In this work, I examine a social cost of victims’ delayed accusations. I found that people
believe that victims who delay (vs. do not delay) voicing accusations are less affected by the
wrongdoing and consequently perceive such victims as having reduced standing to accuse their
transgressors. Moreover, people perceived these victims as lower in integrity-based
trustworthiness, which led people to trust these victims less. Finally, I designed and tested two
interventions that effectively mitigated this social cost for victims who delayed voicing
accusations.
By examining this social cost of victims’ delayed accusations, the current research
generates insights on people’s responses to victims of the #MeToo Movement, some of whom
delayed voicing accusations of wrongdoing. In many cases, people discredited the victims for
waiting to speak up about the wrongdoing (e.g., Denhollander, 2018). Importantly, the current
research provides evidence of why this occurs. I found that people believe that victims who delay
(vs. do not delay) voicing accusations were less affected by the wrongdoing and that this led
people to believe that such victims as having reduced standing to accuse their transgressors. This
was the case even when testing other competing mechanisms, including people’s beliefs that
victims who delay accusations may be misremembering the wrongdoing as well as people’s
beliefs that victims who delay may have strategic motives for accusing their transgressors.
It is important to note however, that victims’ accusations in response to the #MeToo
Movement are often more complicated than the accusations examined in this work. For example,
35

victims’ delayed accusations are sometimes voiced in response to serial wrongdoing. In other
instances, the wrongdoing involves one transgressor and multiple victims. The findings
presented here therefore cannot speak to the entirety of people’s responses to victims of the
#MeToo Movement who delayed voicing accusations. Future work could examine various
elements of the #MeToo Movement (e.g., serial wrongdoing, powerful transgressors), not
examined in this work, that may alter people’s perceptions of victims’ delayed accusations.
Theoretical Implications
This work makes several theoretical contributions. First, the findings extend the extant
work on accusations (e.g., Kennedy & Schweitzer, 2018) by examining people’s perceptions of
victims who accuse their transgressors. Importantly, this work examines victims’ delayed
accusations. In doing so, I demonstrate that victims who delay voicing accusations face double-
victimization: They not only suffer the cost of the wrongdoing but also the social cost of being
perceived by others as less trustworthy.
Second, and relatedly, this work yields insight into an unintended cost that victims might
face following wrongdoing and in doing so, extends the literature on trust. Although prior work
has demonstrated that wrongdoing leads people to trust transgressors less (e.g., Kim et al., 2013;
Kim et al., 2004), little is known about when wrongdoing may lead people to trust victims less.
Here, I find that victims’ responses to wrongdoing may lead people to perceive victims as less
trustworthy and consequently, trust victims less. Identifying when people perceive victims as less
trustworthy is important as people can offer victims important resources following wrongdoing
and are often responsible for addressing the wrongdoing (Ashton & Fuehrer, 1993; Butler,
Giordano, & Neren, 1985; Hobfoll, Dunahoo, Ben-Porath, & Monnier, 1994).
36

Third, this work extends current theory on psychological standing (Miller, Effron, & Zak,
2009; Miller & Effron, 2010) by identifying a novel predictor of standing. Specifically, I
demonstrate that victims’ standing to speak up decreases over time. By studying how the passage
of time affects victims’ right to accuse their transgressors, this work also examines psychological
standing in a largely unexplored context, victims’ responses to wrongdoing. Prior work has
examined actors’ standing to voice concerns about unfair policies or procedures (Effron &
Miller, 2012; Ratner & Miller, 2001; Sherf, Tangirala, & Weber, 2017), to express a minority
opinion (Morrison, 2011), to give advice (Effron & Miller, 2015), and to express prejudice
(Effron & Knowles, 2015), but has largely ignored victims’ right to respond to wrongdoing
committed by another person (see Miller & Zak (2008) and Raj, Wiltermuth, & Adams (2018)
for notable exceptions).
Finally, the current research suggests that there are important consequences of delayed
decision-making that social and organizational psychologists have not previously considered in
the literature. While past work has identified some consequences of delayed decision-making
(e.g., Critcher, Inbar, & Pizarro, 2013; Tetlock et al., 2000), to the best of my knowledge, work
has not examined people’s perceptions of victims’ delayed responses to wrongdoing. By
examining the cost of victims’ delayed accusations, this research takes a step toward
understanding how people make evaluative judgments of victims who delay their responses to
wrongdoing.
Practical Implications
The findings of this research generate some actionable implications for both victims and
managers. The current research demonstrates that victims’ decisions to address wrongdoing by
accusing their transgressors is complicated and that when victims accuse their transgressors
37

matters. If possible, victims should try not to delay voicing accusations as they may otherwise
risk suffering a social cost. It is therefore important to educate victims about the social cost of
delaying accusations.
Victims, however, may delay voicing their concerns even if they are aware of the cost of
delayed accusations because the decision to speak up is often a complicated one for victims (e.g.,
Harlos, 2010). This work provides insight into steps that victims can take to minimize the social
cost of delaying accusations by bolstering people’s perceptions of their standing. The findings
indicate that victims who delay voicing accusations can do so by describing and reinforcing the
message that they suffered harm as a result of the wrongdoing. Although the passage of time
may lead people to believe that victims who delay (vs. do not delay) voicing accusations were
less affected by the wrongdoing, victims can counteract the effect of their delayed accusations by
highlighting their material stake in the wrongdoing.
For organizations, a clear implication of these findings is that victims should be
encouraged to speak up about wrongdoing sooner rather than later because, as discussed earlier,
feelings of victimization have a number of detrimental consequences for victims (e.g., Donovan,
Drasgow, & Munson, 1998). Further, as these results indicate, victims’ delayed accusations may
lead others to trust victims less. Managers who wish to help victims avoid this social cost would
do well to promote an environment in which victims feel comfortable speaking up (e.g.,
Edmondson, 1999) in order to encourage victims to speak up sooner rather than later.
Managers may also wish to mitigate the cost that victims face when they delay
accusations. Organizations that fail to listen to the concerns of their organizational members,
even if delayed, may face bigger issues if these concerns are ignored. The Weinstein company,
for example, filed for bankruptcy as a result of the company’s failure to heed victims’ (delayed)
38

accusations that producer Harvey Weinstein had sexually assaulted them (Barnes, 2018). The
current research identifies one way by which organizations can mitigate the social cost of
victims’ decisions to delay accusations by empowering victims and legitimizing victims’
decisions to do so. I show that organizations, by allowing victims to speak up about wrongdoing
they have experienced in the past, grant standing to victims who delay voicing accusations and
mitigate the cost of delayed accusations for these victims.
It is important to note, however, that the decision to encourage victims to speak up about
wrongdoing they experience at work is a challenging one for managers. Indeed, managers may
wish to minimize the incidence of victims’ accusations. Encouraging victims to voice
accusations may surface accusations that otherwise may not have come to light. These concerns
may remain unnoticed and unspoken if these concerns are not very serious in nature. As a result,
managers may wish to practice some discretion in encouraging victims to voice accusations. The
organizational intervention highlighted in this work only seeks to highlight how organizations
can identify victims’ concerns. This does not imply, however, that managers must address all
concerns raised by organizational members.
Limitations and Directions for Future Research
This work has some limitations, some of which provide opportunities for future research.
First, I do not examine how delayed accusations of wrongdoing affect people’s perceptions of
transgressors. It is possible, for example, that delayed accusations may benefit transgressors.
Indeed, a transgressor who is accused long after a wrongdoing may elicit sympathy from others
(McCullough et al., 1998; McCullough, Worthington, & Rachal, 1997) and may therefore
receive reduced punishment for the wrongdoing. Victims’ delayed accusations may therefore
yield other detrimental outcomes for victims that I do not consider in this work.
39

Second, I do not consider the veracity of victims’ accusations of wrongdoing.
Accusations can vary in their truthfulness and some accusations may even be false. People who
observe accusations, however, are rarely aware of the veracity of victims’ claims. I therefore
chose to focus my investigation on the cost of delayed accusations in which the accusations were
relatively ambiguous in veracity. It is not clear whether the social cost of delayed accusations
holds when people believe the victim’s accusation is false. In such instances, the passage of time
may not affect people’s willingness to trust victims who accuse their transgressors because they
may already trust victims less. Future work could examine this possibility.
Finally, in this research, I focus on identifying a cost of victims’ delayed accusations. It is
possible, however, that under certain conditions, victims may benefit by delaying accusations.
For example, people may perceive victims who delay voicing accusations more positively if
other victims who have suffered in similar ways also speak out. Future research could therefore
test boundary conditions of this social cost to shed light on moderating conditions under which
victims may benefit when they delay voicing accusations. These boundary conditions may be
useful in identifying other interventions that can attenuate the negative impact of delayed
accusations on perceptions of victims’ standing and integrity-based trustworthiness.
Conclusion
Victims often delay voicing accusations of wrongdoing, yet little is known about victims’
decisions to do so. This research suggests that victims who delay voicing accusations should
carefully consider the consequences of their decisions to delay voicing accusations of
wrongdoing and demonstrates that such victims may unwittingly suffer a social cost above-and-
beyond the cost of the wrongdoing. Given the social cost of victims’ delayed accusations, the
40

current research also provides insight on how victims and organizations can attenuate this social
cost for victims.

41

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48

FIGURES
Figure 1

p* < .05, p** < .01, p*** < .001
Figure 1. The indirect effect of victim’s decision to delay voicing accusation on perceptions of
victim’s integrity-based trustworthiness through lower standing. Note: Unstandardized
coefficients are reported. (Study 2a)
Figure 2

p* < .05, p** < .01, p*** < .001
a
The victim was the job candidate in the vignette.
Figure 2. The indirect effect of victim’s decision to delay voicing accusation on willingness to
hire victim through lower standing and lower integrity-based trustworthiness. Note:
Unstandardized coefficients are reported. (Study 2a)

Victim’s Standing
to Accuse Transgressor
Victim Delays
Voicing Accusation
Victim’s Integrity-Based
Trustworthiness
-0.70** (0.24)
-0.50** (0.15) / -0.10* (0.05)
0.14** (0.05)
Victim
a
Delays
Voicing Accusation
Willingness to Hire Victim
Victim’s Standing
to Accuse Transgressor
Victim’s Integrity-Based
Trustworthiness
-0.70** (0.24)
0.75*** (0.10)
0.17 (0.17) / -0.07* (0.04)
0.14** (0.05)
49

Figure 3

p* < .05, p** < .01, p** < .001
Figure 3. The indirect effect of victim’s decision to delay voicing accusation on perceptions of
victim’s integrity-based trustworthiness through lower standing. Note: Unstandardized
coefficients are reported. (Study 2b)
Figure 4

a
p = 0.07
p* < .05, p** < .01, p** < .001
Figure 4. The indirect effect of victim’s decision to delay voicing accusation on willingness to
trust victim through lower standing and lower integrity-based trustworthiness. Note:
Unstandardized coefficients are reported. (Study 2b)
Victim’s Standing
to Accuse Transgressor
Victim Delays
Voicing Accusation
Victim’s Integrity-Based
Trustworthiness
-0.85** (0.25)
-0.20 (0.17) / -0.26* (0.10)
0.31*** (0.06)
Victim

Delays
Voicing Accusation
Willingness to Trust Victim
Victim’s Standing
to Accuse Transgressor
Victim’s Integrity-Based
Trustworthiness
-0.85** (0.25)
0.40
a
(0.22)
-1.38*** (0.40) / -0.10* (0.08)
0.31*** (0.06)
50

Figure 5

Figure 5. The indirect effect of victim’s decision to delay voicing accusation on victim’s
integrity-based trustworthiness through lower beliefs that the victim was affected by wrongdoing
and lower standing. Note: Unstandardized coefficients are reported. (Study 3)

Victim Delays
Voicing Accusation
Victim’s Integrity-Based
Trustworthiness
Beliefs that the Victim
Was Affected by Wrongdoing
Victim’s Standing
to Accuse Transgressor
-0.56* (0.27)
0.39*** (0.05)
-0.26* (0.13) / -0.13* (0.06)
0.58*** (0.07)
51

Figure 6

p* < .05, p** < .01, p*** < .001
Figure 6. The indirect effect of victim’s decision to delay voicing accusation and describe the
harm she suffered (vs. victim’s decision to delay voicing accusation but not describe harm
suffered) on perceptions of victim’s integrity-based trustworthiness through greater standing
(controlling for victim’s decision not to delay voicing accusation). Note: Unstandardized
coefficients are reported. (Study 4)
Victim’s Standing
to Accuse Transgressor
Victim Delays
Voicing Accusation
and Describes Harm Suffered
Victim’s Integrity-Based
Trustworthiness
0.75** (0.28)
0.08 (0.17) / 0.38* (0.15)
0.51*** (0.04)
52

Figure 7

p* < .05, p** < .01, p*** < .001
Figure 7. The indirect effect of victim’s decision to delay voicing accusation but make
accusation during APR (vs. victim’s decision to delay voicing accusation but does not make
accusation during APR) on perceptions of victim’s integrity-based trustworthiness through
greater standing (controlling for victim’s decision not to delay voicing accusation). Note:
Unstandardized coefficients are reported. (Study 5)

Victim’s Standing
to Accuse Transgressor
Victim Delays
Voicing Accusation
but Makes Accusation
during APR
Victim’s Integrity-Based
Trustworthiness
0.80** (0.25)
0.20 (0.16) / 0.29* (0.11)
0.36*** (0.05)
53

SUPPLEMENTAL MATERIALS
Study 1
Measures
Victim’s Ability-Based Trustworthiness. Six items measured participants’ perceptions of
Mark’s ability-based trustworthiness, α = .95.
Victim’s Benevolence-Based Trustworthiness. Five items measured participants’
perceptions of Mark’s benevolence-based trustworthiness, α = .93.
Results
Victim’s Ability-Based Trustworthiness. There was no difference in perceptions of
Mark’s ability-based trustworthiness regardless of whether Mark accused Alex the day of the
wrongdoing (M = 5.61, SD = 1.14) or did so six months after the wrongdoing (M = 5.54, SD =
1.07), t(127) = 0.33, p = .745, d = 0.06.
Victim’s Benevolence-Based Trustworthiness. There was also no difference in
perceptions of Mark’s benevolence-based trustworthiness regardless of whether Mark accused
Alex the day after the wrongdoing (M = 4.59, SD = 1.37) or did so six months after the
wrongdoing (M = 4.37, SD = 1.35), t(127) = 0.95, p = .342, d = 0.16.

54

Study 2a
Measures
Victim’s Ability-Based Trustworthiness. Six items measured participants’ perceptions of
Chris’ ability-based trustworthiness, α =.89.
Victim’s Benevolence-Based Trustworthiness. Five items measured participants’
perceptions of Chris’ benevolence-based trustworthiness, α =. 88.
Results
Victim’s Ability-Based Trustworthiness. There was no difference in participants’
perceptions of Chris’ ability-based trustworthiness regardless of whether Chris accused Mark the
day of the wrongdoing (M = 4.47, SD = 0.85) or did so six months after the wrongdoing (M =
4.36, SD = 1.01), t(125) = 0.68, p = .494, d = 0.12.
Victim’s Benevolence-Based Trustworthiness. Similarly, there was no difference in
perceptions of Chris’ benevolence-based trustworthiness regardless of whether Chris accused
Mark the day after the wrongdoing (M = 3.26, SD = 0.92) or accused Mark six months after the
wrongdoing (M = 3.40, SD = 0.91), t(125) = -0.85, p = .395, d = 0.15.

55

Study 2b
Measures
Victim’s Ability-Based Trustworthiness. Six items measured participants’ perceptions of
Alex’s ability-based trustworthiness, α = .87.
Victim’s Benevolence-Based Trustworthiness. Five items measured participants’
perceptions of Alex’s benevolence-based trustworthiness, α = .86.
Results
Victim’s Ability-Based Trustworthiness. There was no difference in perceptions of
Alex’s ability-based trustworthiness regardless of whether Alex accused Chris the day of the
wrongdoing (M = 4.50, SD = 0.85) or did so three months after the wrongdoing (M = 4.52, SD =
0.68), t(126) = -0.98, p = .922, d = 0.03.
Victim’s Benevolence-Based Trustworthiness. There was also no difference in
perceptions of Alex’s benevolence-based trustworthiness regardless of whether Alex accused
Chris the day after the wrongdoing (M = 3.88, SD = 0.98) or did so three months after the
wrongdoing (M = 3.82, SD = 0.78), t(126) = 0.35, p = .728, d = 0.07.

56

Study 3
Measures
Victim’s Ability-Based Trustworthiness. Six items measured participants’ perceptions of
Kate’s ability-based trustworthiness, α = .93.
Victim’s Benevolence-Based Trustworthiness. Five items measured participants’
perceptions of Kate’s benevolence-based trustworthiness, α = .96.
Results
Victim’s Ability-Based Trustworthiness. There was no difference in perceptions of
Kate’s ability-based trustworthiness regardless of whether Kate accused John the day after the
wrongdoing (M = 4.97, SD = 1.24) or accused John twelve months after the wrongdoing (M =
4.75, SD = 1.29), t(127) = 0.96, p = .340, d = 0.17.
Victim’s Benevolence-Based Trustworthiness. Participants perceived Kate as lower in
benevolence-based trustworthiness when Kate accused John twelve months after the wrongdoing
(M = 3.96, SD = 1.67) than they were when Kate accused John the day after the wrongdoing (M
= 4.77, SD = 1.31), t(122.52) = -3.06, p = .003, d = 0.54.

57

Study 4
Measures
3

Victim’s Ability-Based Trustworthiness. Six items measured participants’ perceptions of
Kate’s ability-based trustworthiness, α = .94.
Victim’s Benevolence-Based Trustworthiness. Five items measured participants’
perceptions of Kate’s benevolence-based trustworthiness, α = .94.
Psychological Safety in Organization. Seven items adapted from (Edmondson, 1999)
measured participants’ perceptions of psychological safety in the organization, α = .66.
Participants completed a measure of their perceptions of psychological safety in the company. A
sample item includes: “If you make a mistake in this company it is often held against you”.
Victim’s Participation Efficacy. Three items measured participants’ perceptions of
Kate’s participation efficacy – that is, their perceptions of Kate’s ability to successfully engage
in voice, α = .93. This was a modified version of Tangirala, Kamdar, Venkataramani, & Parke’s
(2013) measure (e.g., “When it comes to accusing John, Kate is confident about her ability to
speak up”).
Victim’s Participation Instrumentality. Three items measured participants’ perceptions
of Kate’s participation instrumentality, α = .85. These items were adapted from Spreitzer’s
(1995) impact subscale (e.g., “If Kate speaks up regarding this issue, she will have a large impact
on what happens”).
Results
Victim’s Ability-Based Trustworthiness. Participants perceived Kate as lower in
ability-based trustworthiness when she accused John twelve months after the wrongdoing (M =

3
In Study 5, I included measures of psychological safety, participation efficacy, and participation instrumentality,
which are typically collected in voice research (e.g., Sherf, Tangirala, & Weber, 2017). A priori, I did not have
strong predictions for these measures.
58

4.88, SD = 1.19) than they did when Kate accused John the day after the wrongdoing (M = 5.30,
SD = 1.06), t(180) = -2.04, p = .043, d = 0.37. There was no difference, however, in perceptions
of Kate’s ability-based trustworthiness regardless of whether Kate accused John twelve months
after the wrongdoing and described the harm she suffered (M = 5.17, SD = 1.15) or Kate accused
John twelve months after the wrongdoing but did not describe the harm she suffered (M = 4.88,
SD = 1.19), t(180) = 1.42, p = .159, d = 0.25. There was also no difference in people’s
perceptions of Kate’s ability-based trustworthiness regardless of whether Kate accused John the
day after the wrongdoing (M = 5.30, SD = 1.06) or did so twelve months after the wrongdoing
and described the harm she suffered (M = 5.17, SD = 1.15), t(180) = 0.66, p = .514, d = 0.12.
Victim’s Benevolence-Based Trustworthiness. Participants perceived Kate as lower in
benevolence-based trustworthiness when she accused John twelve months after the wrongdoing
(M = 4.10, SD = 1.39) than they did when she accused John the day after the wrongdoing (M =
4.71, SD = 1.19), t(180) = -2.54, p = .012, d = 0.47. Furthermore, participants perceived Kate as
greater in benevolence-based trustworthiness when Kate accused John twelve months after the
wrongdoing and described the harm she suffered (M = 4.73, SD = 1.37) than they did when Kate
accused John twelve months later but did not describe the harm she suffered (M = 4.10, SD =
1.39), t(180) = 2.66, p = .009, d = 0.46. Finally, there was no difference in participants’
perceptions of Kate’s benevolence-based trustworthiness regardless of whether Kate accused
John the day after the wrongdoing (M = 4.71, SD = 1.19) or accused him twelve months after the
wrongdoing and described the harm she suffered (M = 4.73, SD = 1.37), t(180) = -0.07, p = .946,
d = 0.02.
Psychological Safety in Organization. There was no difference in participants’
perceptions of psychological safety regardless of whether Kate accused John the day after the
59

wrongdoing (M = 4.29, SD = 0.83) or did so twelve months after the wrongdoing (M = 4.12, SD
= 0.91), t(180) = 1.07, p = .284, d = 0.20. Additionally, there was no difference in participants’
perceptions of psychological safety regardless of whether Kate accused John twelve months after
the wrongdoing and described the harm she suffered (M = 4.20, SD = 0.91) or accused John
twelve months after the wrongdoing but did not describe the harm she suffered (M = 4.12, SD =
0.91), t(180) = 0.54, p = .590, d = 0.09. There was also no meaningful difference in participants’
perceptions of psychological safety when Kate accused John the day after the wrongdoing (M =
4.29, SD = 0.83) or did so twelve months after the wrongdoing and described the harm she
suffered (M = 4.20, SD = 0.91), t(180) = 0.55, p = .585, d = 0.10.
Victim’s Participation Efficacy. Participants perceived Kate as lower in participation
efficacy when she accused John twelve months after the wrongdoing (M = 4.29, SD = 1.58)
relative to when Kate accused him the day after the wrongdoing (M = 5.64, SD = 1.04), t(106.46)
= -5.55, p < .001, d = 1.01. Participants were no more likely to believe that Kate was higher in
participation efficacy when she accused John twelve months after the wrongdoing and described
the harm she suffered (M = 4.69, SD = 1.60) than they were when Kate accused John twelve
months after the wrongdoing but did not describe the harm she suffered (M = 4.29, SD = 1.58),
t(123.00) = 1.41, p = .162, d = 0.25. Participants, however, perceived Kate as lower in
participation efficacy when Kate accused John twelve months after the wrongdoing and
described the harm she suffered (M = 4.69, SD = 1.60) than they were when Kate accused John
the day after the wrongdoing (M = 5.64, SD = 1.04), t(107.58) = -3.89, p < .001 d = 0.70.
Victim’s Participation Instrumentality. There was no meaningful difference in
participants’ perceptions of Kate’s participation instrumentality regardless of whether she
accused John the day after the wrongdoing (M = 5.06, SD = 1.12) or did so twelve months after
60

the wrongdoing (M = 5.04, SD = 1.04), t(115.53) = 0.10, p = .920, d = 0.02. Additionally, there
was no difference in participants’ perceptions of Kate’s participation instrumentality regardless
of whether Kate accused John twelve months after the wrongdoing and described the harm she
suffered (M = 4.74, SD = 1.39) or accused him twelve months after the wrongdoing but did not
describe the harm she suffered (M = 5.04, SD = 1.04), t(114.57) = -1.38, p = .171, d = 0.24.
There was also no meaningful difference in participants’ perceptions of Kate’s participation
instrumentality regardless of whether Kate accused John the day after the wrongdoing (M = 5.06,
SD = 1.12) or did so twelve months after the wrongdoing and described the harm she suffered (M
= 4.74, SD = 1.39), t(117.00) = -1.42, p = .163, d = 0.25.
61

Study 5
Measures
Victim’s Ability-Based Trustworthiness. Participants completed a measure of Alex’s
ability, α = .95.
Victim’s Benevolence-Based Trustworthiness. Participants also completed a measure of
Alex’s benevolence, α = .93.
Results
Victim’s Ability-Based Trustworthiness. Participants perceived Max as lower in
ability-based trustworthiness when Max accused Jake six months after the wrongdoing (M =
4.49, SD = 1.14) than they did when Max accused Jake the day after the wrongdoing (M = 5.03,
SD = 1.19), t(170) = -2.59, p = .010, d = 0.46. Participants did not perceive a difference in Max’s
ability-based trustworthiness regardless of whether Max accused Jake six months after the
wrongdoing in his APR (M = 4.68, SD = 1.00) or Max accused Jake six months after the
wrongdoing but not in his APR (M = 4.49, SD = 1.14), t(170) = 0.88, p = .379, d = 0.18.
Additionally, there was a marginally significant difference in people’s perceptions of Max’s
ability-based trustworthiness when he accused Jake the day after the wrongdoing (M = 5.03, SD
= 1.19) relative to when he accused Jake six months after the wrongdoing but did so in his APR
(M = 4.68, SD = 1.00), t(170) = 1.68, p = .094, d = 0.32.
Victim’s Benevolence-Based Trustworthiness. Participants perceived Max as lower in
benevolence-based trustworthiness when he accused Jake six months after the wrongdoing (M =
4.09, SD = 1.21) relative to when he accused Jake the day after the wrongdoing (M = 4.74, SD =
1.19), t(170) = -2.88, p = .004, d = 0.54. Participants did not perceive a difference in Max’s
benevolence-based trustworthiness regardless of whether Max accused Jake six months after the
wrongdoing in his APR (M = 4.38, SD = 1.22) or did so six months after the wrongdoing but not
62

in his APR (M = 4.09, SD = 1.21), t(170) = 1.26, p = .208, d = 0.24. Additionally, participants
did not perceive a difference in Max’s benevolence-based trustworthiness when Max accused
Jake the day after the wrongdoing (M = 4.74, SD = 1.19) or did so six months after the
wrongdoing but in his APR (M = 4.38, SD = 1.22), t(170) = 1.59, p = .114, d = 0.30.

Abstract (if available)

Abstract #The MeToo Movement shed light on victims’ decisions to delay voicing accusations of sexual assault or harassment. Victims may also delay voicing accusations of other types of wrongdoing. In this work, I examine a social cost of victims’ delayed accusations. I demonstrate that people perceive victims who delay (vs. do not delay) voicing accusations as lower in integrity-based trustworthiness. I demonstrate that this social cost arises because people believe that such victims were less affected by the wrongdoing and therefore believe that these victims have less of a right—that is, less psychological standing—to accuse their transgressors. These findings show that victims who delay voicing accusations face double-victimization: They not only suffer the cost of the wrongdoing but also the social cost of being perceived by others as less trustworthy. Given the implications of these findings, I test the effectiveness of two interventions aimed at attenuating the social cost of victims’ delayed accusations.

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Asset Metadata

Creator Raj, Medha (author)

Core Title Better now than later: the cost of victims' delayed accusations

School Marshall School of Business

Degree Doctor of Philosophy

Degree Program Business Administration

Publication Date 03/11/2019

Defense Date 02/19/2019

Publisher University of Southern California (original), University of Southern California. Libraries (digital)

Tag accusations,OAI-PMH Harvest,psychological standing,transgressions,Victims

Format application/pdf (imt)

Language English

Contributor Electronically uploaded by the author (provenance)

Advisor Wiltermuth, Scott S. (committee chair), Anicich, Eric M. (committee member), Fast, Nathanael J. (committee member), Mayer, Kyle J. (committee member), Schwarz, Norbert (committee member)

Creator Email Medha.Raj.2018@marshall.usc.edu,mraj@usc.edu

Permanent Link (DOI) https://doi.org/10.25549/usctheses-c89-133488

Unique identifier UC11676956

Identifier etd-RajMedha-7145.pdf (filename),usctheses-c89-133488 (legacy record id)

Legacy Identifier etd-RajMedha-7145.pdf

Dmrecord 133488

Document Type Dissertation

Format application/pdf (imt)

Rights Raj, Medha

Type texts

Source University of Southern California (contributing entity), University of Southern California Dissertations and Theses (collection)

Access Conditions The author retains rights to his/her dissertation, thesis or other graduate work according to U.S. copyright law. Electronic access is being provided by the USC Libraries in agreement with the a...

Repository Name University of Southern California Digital Library

Repository Location USC Digital Library, University of Southern California, University Park Campus MC 2810, 3434 South Grand Avenue, 2nd Floor, Los Angeles, California 90089-2810, USA