e
2133, 24224~ IRELL a MANE~LA: # 2
COIJrIDDl'l'lAL
la. NAME OF IN'I'ERVI.EWER r
Brad Stiling
lb. DAT! or INTERVIEW1
Jun• 10, 1991
le. LENGTH OF INTIRVIEW1
2 1/2 h.oura
ld. NOTESa
2.
3.
4.
Favors a form of promotional system to emph.aaize the amount
of time that an of ticer spend• in the field as opposed to
emphasizing ability to perform desk joba. Patrol is the
backbone ot th• L.A.P.D., but those in the hierarchy have
little experience with patrol.
Rell call training is extremely inetfectiv•, and the L.A.P.D.
should use exp1rt• from the academy to conduct th• training
instead of leaving it up to individual watch oommAnder•.
With raapect to use of force, th• chok• hold was the most
humane mean• of dealing with a combative suapect while doing
as little harm ae possible. ·
Inatitutionalized rotation of off icera 1• not a 9reat idea.
Some officers gain extenaiva knowledge ot their diviaion,
and it makes no sense to move theae officers. Furthermore,
rotating off 1cera in apecial unit• merely diminishes the
exp•rtise within theee ·unita.
I .o I CODl:1
Seil i ng 002
!§!":
Male
RACE&
CAucaaian
Seiling 002, June 10, 1991 l
~ RC~ BY!IRELL & MANE~~A IRELL 6 IANELLA;a 3
•
•
•
s. AG!1 ~ - '· DIVISION1
Central Bureau Narcotic•
1. CORR!H'l' RANllASSIGNMIN'l':
9. MISC. L.A.P.D. BACKGROOHD1
10. PIELD TRAINING -- SIL!CTION OP P,T,0,11
A wr .itten test waa requi;ed to become a field trainin~
.officer1 however, at tti.t tim•, if an o!fic•r had at l111t
10 year• in the field, he or she did not nee4 to take the
writ.ten tast.
During hi• oral •xam, th• interviewer• que1tioned him about
the fact that he had coached football on the college level.
Thia experience in education/coaching help•d him pa91 the
oral exam. Other than d1•cu1aing h~• qualification• •• an
educator, th• 1nterv1awera diacu11ed typical police work and
crim• problema. The officer haa no knowledge ·of how the
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~ RC V av:rRELL & MANEL LA 2133 124224 .. IRELL 6 MANEL LA;# 4
11.
oral interviewers grade the applicant• fer P3 pcaiticn1, but
he believes the rating ayatam 11 compl•t•ly arbitrary and
ean be baaed on the interviewer•s individual biases and
prejudices. Purthermore, supervisors who do not like an
officer can blackball the officer from receiving good
promotions.
FIELD TRAINING -- TRAINING OF F.T.O.a:
The officer is not sure whether he attended r.T.O. School
before training officers. He 1tre111ea that the L.A.P.o. has
a lot of training, inoludin; one-day cla•••• for its officers,
and the L.A.P.D. hammers its officers with training material•
over and over.
12. FIELD TRAINING -- MISCONDUCT BY I DISCIPLINE or r.T.0.1:
It is common for th• L.A.P.D. to put incompetent F.T.0.8 on
a desk, but this is a bad idea because theae officers might
have an attitude problem and they are in conatant contact with
th• community, The result is a decline in police-community
relationships.
There have been oa••• where F.T.O.a have b••n di•ciplined
for use of force under certain circumatancea, r.T.O.a
probably •r• dealt with more severely than other officers
because F.T.O.s are supposed to know better and ate held to
a hi9her standard. On• problem with diaciplinin; F.T.O.a i•
that prob~tionary otf icer1 are often afraid to say anything
because they do not feel it is their pla~e to question their
P.T.O.
13. PI!LO TRAINING -- EVALUATION OF F.T.0.a' PERFORMANCE:
sergeants fill out nightly evaluations of r.T.0.1 based on
followup calls made after the P.T.O. and his or her
probationary officer have responded to a call. Every six
montha, . F.T.O.s r•ceiv• ratin;e from the ••r;eanta (all Pla
and P21 receive evaluations every six months as well), More
than cne aupervi1or ahould evaluat• an F.T.O. because P.T.0.1
should be held to higher standards than other officers.
14. FIELD TRAlNIN~ -- ASSlGNMENT(S) TO PROBATI·ON!RS:
15.
Other than saying that the supervi•or• made •••iinment
decisions, the officer had little to add in thie area.
FIELD TRAINING -- RELATIONSHIP WITH I TRAINING or
PROBATIONERS;
The attitude of F.T.O.a has changed aince he first received
his tield trainini;. In the old day1, probationa·ry officers
lived in terror of their F.T.O.s. In fact, cne of hia F.T.O.s
thr•w hie notebook out of the car because the ;,T,O, did not
Seiling 002, June 10, 1991 3
·' Re v· BY: !R EL L & MANEL~~ e-ia-si ie:52 2133124224 .. IRELL & MANELLA;# 5
16.
like where the officer k•pt the notebook in the car. However,
the Polic' Department apparently ha• learned that probationary
otf icers cannot learn in an atmoaphere where they are .
terrorized. r.T.O.s now make more of an effort to educate
the probationary off icera rather than terrorizing or
dieci~lining the officers. The key to ~n effective
relationship between a probationary offioer and the F.T.O.
is to reach a point where the off icer1 can operate in the
car as co-equals. However, the r.T,O. must atr••• that he
or she i• in charge of th• ear and ultimately ia responsible
fer its success and aatety. This ia ••••ntial because the
F.~.o presumably has more experienc• and ia able to make
command decisions.
FIELD TRAINING -- EVALUATION or PROBA~IONERS:
Each probationer's training varies on a caaa-by-caae basis,
F.T.O.s are required to fill out a ni;htly diary, and the
F.T.O. must cover certain ta1k1/topics in the ~robationary
officer•s manual. The F.T.O. can cover some tasks with
scenario• or verbal 9uizze•. The r.T.o. must check off ·the
taak that the probationer has · completed and write comments
regarding each taak. The probationary officer must read and
initial all comment• that the F.T.O. mak••· ~he evaluation
forms that the r.T.O.s must fill out contain reference• to
how the probationarr, officer deala with peers, member• of
the community, and 'ethnic groups not there own.• Moat ·
F.T.O.s talk to their probationary officers nightly regarding
how to deal with the public.
While requiring daily evaluation• or•ates a lot of paperwork,
theaa evaluations are eaaential to the tield trainin; program.
If the Department did not require r.~.O.• to write daily
entries in a diary, otticers would not routinely note a
probationary ctfioer's pro9re11. Th••• daily entriea are
the moat effective way to let th• probationary officer know
. where h• or she stands in th• program.
The job of F.T.o. can be v•ry atr••aeul, ~eo1u1e the P.T.O.
often is doing the work of two of~icers. Thi r.T.O. must do
his or her own work and make sure that the prob1tionary
officer is not making any error•. rcr this reaaon, F.T.0.1
should 91t a breather from tr1ining, Every fiv• montha,
F,T,O.s should spend a month with a P2 or Pl to reduce the
stress and pressures of the job. Furthermore, this form of
rotation preventa · F.T.O.a from stagnating by gettin; locked
int~ a routine. However, the Department ahould not limit
the amount of time that an of~icer can be an r.~.o., beoauee
it is best for more experi•ne•d otticera to train probationary
officers.
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RCV ev:IR ELL. MAN ELLA IR ELL 6 MANELLA;# e
~ 17. ROLL CALL TRAINING1
18.
The effectivene11 of roll call training i1 directly related
to the speak~r and what is covered as well as who i•
listening. Certain topics . are a wa•t• of time becauee .·
offi cers have ·heard them repeatedly. (Por example, training
regarding pain compliance holda.) Veteran officers typically
do not pay caretul attention when roll call trainin; covers
a topic which they have heard many times. However, otficera
are extremely receptive to roll call training which relates
to actual experience in the streets and ia helpful in
identifying trends in the division, auch as new drugs or
identifying new gan; members.
With respect to use of force training during roll call
training, watch commanders typically have one or two otficer •
demonstrate proper technique1. Bowever, on occasion, the
otf ioers actually practice the uae of torce technique1.
USE OP FQRCEs
The Department frequently covers ite use of force policy
during roll call training. In fact, at lea1t once or twice
a month, roll call training relates specifically to the uae
ot force policy.
The officer believes that the current uae of tcrce policy
neade modification. The L.A.P.D. took a giant atep backwards
whe·n the Police Commission pl~ced its moratorium on the
choke hold. After pain compliance hold1, the next ettective
weapon in the Department's current uae of force pol·icy is
the baton. However, the choke hold WIS an effeetive and
human• intermediate means of dealing with • oomb1tive suspect
while causin; as little harm •• posaible. Th• problem• with
the chok• hold resulted from use of th• choke hold on auapects
who u•• PCP. Without the choke hold, officer• muat rely on
th• baton, which 11 much more brutal and do•• much more harm
to the su•p•ct than the choke hold. Th• intermediat• meant
in the Department•• current ua• 'of force fr•quently a:e
ineffective. Officers do not like to u•• tear gas because
more otten than not the tear gaa ends up on the officer
rather than the suspect. Leg aweeps and kick• can be
effective in getting a 1u1pect to the ground, but if the
suspect resists toe much, it will b• difficult for the officer
to aubdue the suapect ~
U•• ot force ahould be the very laat option that a ·police
o~ticer utilizes. In 99\ of the contact• with the community,
a police off icar can talk to th• people and avoid u•• ot
force. How•ver, to a certain extent, use of !oroe ie
inevitable in police work. Any officer who actively pursues
dangerous l•lon• will end up in uee of fore• aitu•tions.
Therefore, individual off icera muat educate th• public by
explaining exactly why they had u••d a certain type of fore•
Seiling 002, June 10, 1991 5
Rcv·ev:IRELL a MANELLA IRELL a MANELLA;# 7
19.
on them, eapecially if the offic•r'a deci1ion appear•d
qu@stionable. While the suspect may not be aatiafied with
the officar•a explanation, the ofticer would reveal hia or
her thought process to the suspect and ••tablish some level
of understanding.
ROONEY KING INCIDENT: ·
The off ic•r knew Sergeant Koona ~ery well and b•lievea that
Koons is a line man. Koons' principal miatake in connection
with the King incident was to become involved directly in
subduin9 King. Becau•• Koone was so wrapped up in attempting
to subdue Ring, he could not &UP9rviae the situation
effectively and control the off icera. ~he officer haa no
idea what was going through officer Powell'• mind because he ·
repeatedly beat Kin;.
The hesitancy of" the other officers on the seen• to ;et
involved probably stemmed from their fear of wreatlin; with
Kin; because Koons had . tazad him once and waa ;oin9 to do
it again. If an officer ties up with a suspect when the
suspect i• ta1ed, the officer could be stunned aa w•ll a1
the suspect. Based on hie knowled9e cf th• Foothill division,
he would have been concerned that King W&I armed.
Furthermore, the officer objects to th• r•ference to King as
a "motorist" b•eauae King had run a red light making him a
susp•et•d felon. The officer believes that if there was an
altercaticn. before the beating began (which h• •••umes there
wa•) then a certain portion of the uae of force wae j~etified.
However, th• officer concedea that th• •ituation got out of
hand, probably because Koons fail•d ad•quately to supervise
the arreat. Despite the fact that the cfticer admits that
Koons tailed to 1upervia• th• acene adequately, h• does not
believe that Koon• •hould receive jail time.
The proper tactics in that situation would have been to get
King in a prone position. If an . ottioer cannot ;et a
potentially violent suspect in a pr~ne pcaition, the off leer
is in danger. Finally, the offio•r• on the scene probably
knew that Kl~g was a ccnvict at one time. People who hav•
spent time in prison praaent special problems fer police
officers because convicts practice how · tc chall•n;e
authority, including gun takeaways.
20. CITIZ!N COMPLAINTSs
Bia only experience with citizen complaints was working at a
desk when ~ citizen came in to tile a complaint, The standard
. procedure for cith:en complaints i1 tor the de.sk officer to
get a •uP9rvisor and have the 1up•rviaor interview the
citizen. If 1 desk officer attempte to "kiss off" a
complain•nt and the Oepartm•nt learns of this, the d••k
officer will be aisciplined.
Seiling 002, June 10, 1991 6
RC~ BY:IRELL & MANELLA IR EL L l MANEL~A:# 6
~ 21 . IN~ERNAL DISCIPLINE:
There i s a double standard in diaciplin• within th• L.A.P.D.
Tha disciplinary system ia awift and harsh for those of the
rank of ser;eant or below. However, the discipline appears
to b• fair, and it does not pay for a patrol officer to
screw up. The · Department can be very unforgiving · if an
officer violates policy or creates problems in th• field.
However, officers above the rank ot captain do not get the
sAme treatment •• the rank and file. It seems that the
Oepartrnant attempts to make example• ot th• lower ranking
off icer1, and these off icar1 re1ent the fact that there
appear to be two ••t• of rulee. Furthermore, the penalties
9iven to higher ranking officers do not appear tc be aa
harsh•• those given to . officer• cf the rank ol sergeant or
below.
With the respect to the use of force, thia officer contends
that the Department gives out harsh penalties · for what may
be mistakes. There does not ap~ear to be ·a distinction
between mistakes in use of tact1c1 and will~ul beatings by
officers.
22, PROMOTION:
· sub~ectiv• oral interviews can be manipulated to prevent .
off 1cer1 trom being promoted to higher joba. ror example,
this officer applied for 28 d1tf1r1nt 1pecial units before
he was accepted to be a n•rcotica detective. A captain told
him that he had been skipped over because the captain was
not comfortable with testimony that he had given at a trial
board where the Department waa trying to g•t an off icar
tired. Be truthfully testified th•t he had not seen the
incident in question, but the captain beli•v•d that he wae .
merely attemptin; to protect one of his colleagues. In
effect, the captain blackballed him from promotion, and
other capdidates who were net a1 well quali~i•d received
promotiona before this officer.
Experience in patrol plays little role in the Department•a
promotion decisions. The hierarchy look1 down upon ottio•r•
who have epent too much time in patrol, apparantly believin;
that these officers are either too lazy or too dumb to be ·
promoted. However, time and patrol should be a prerequiaite
to promotion into ~011tion1 which 1upervi•• patrol officer•.
Many officers with little experience in the ?ield receive
promotions to mana~•m•nt positions, and thia create1 confusion
becauae, although the officers are good managera, they have
little knowledge and credibility in the area of patrol.
Inexperience in the field also manifest& ~tself in the new
breed of P.T.o.a. In recent years, many officers have become
F.T.O.s with lese than six months of experience after
Seiling 002, June lO, l99l 7
RCV BY: IRELL & MANELLA IRELL & MANEL~A:# 9
•
23 .
probation. Officer Powell, one of the particip1nt1 in the
King beating, was promoted to F.T.o. relatively quickly
after completinq hls own probation. The fact that officers
c~n b•coma F.T.O.s with 1uch little experience on the job
diminish•• the . prestige of the F.T.o.s. Experience in the
field ot at least five years •hould be a prerequisite to any
position which involves supervising patrol officera.
ASSIGNMENTS L TRANSFERS:
The posltlve effect of rotation of ofticers is that it
prevents' the officers from stagnating in on1 position.
However, rotation ahould be optional or discretionary, rather
than mandatory. It makes no 1ense to rotate a person out of
a division if that person likes the area, ia performing
ett•ctively, and has developed ties with th• coJIUl\unity.
Certain off icars can develop a deep level of truat and report
with member• ot the community that new officer• aimply cannot
have, Furthermore, rotating offic•r• out of •pecial units
diminiehe1 th• expertise within tho•• unit• .• Por example,
in speci&l gang units, it take• at lea•t a year to ;et to
know all of the gang members in the area and to underatand
th• relationships between the members in th• various gangs.
However, for training purposes, th• Department should create
apot1 within the special units to rotate patrcl officers
through the apecial units. Thia form of rotation wculd help
by spreading expertise throughout the O.partment.
Furthermore, officers routinely should •pend a portion of
their time in the tiald ao that they do not loae touch with
th• field and the rola ot a patrol officer. Thia form ot
rotation may ngt bt po••ibl• for officers in 1pecial unite
because it· might dama~e on9oin9 inveati;ation1 in auch areas
as narcotics.
24. £OHM.UNITY POLICING / COMMUNITY RELATIONS:
The L,A.P.o, ha• gone a long way in trying to improve
relations with th• community. However, the pre11 incite•
the community against the police. In th• aftermath of the
King beating, all L.A.P.D, officer• were indicted as racists
and abuser$ of· th• public. The Department•a prime community
relation1 strategy should be to demonst~•t• to the community
that abuse is not cominon within the L.A.P.D, Th• Department
does not necessarily do a good job of explaining the role
of polioe cf f icers and what is required to be an effective
poric• otficer. Frequently the public do•• not understand ·
the motivation of polio• otficera.
25. GAYS I LESBIANSa
~he Oepartment•s official policy ia that all citiaen• ahould
get equal and fair treatment. Thia o!!icer believe1 that
homo1exuali ty is a perversion and a men·tal handicap aa
Seiling 002, Jun• 10, 1991 8
RCV "BY : IRELL & MANELLA IRE LL & MANEL LA; #10
26.
opposed to an alternative life atrl•. However, he tries to
treat everyone fairly, and he bel eves that h• do•• ao
re;ardleae of their sexual orientation. This attitude is
the prevalent Attitude in the Department, but he does not
know how well all officers carry out tht Attitude.
WOMEN:
The Department has gotten aome excellent women officers, but
he is not prepared to generali••· Th• quality of officers
depends on the individual officer. · However, he haa noted a
problem of "reverse diacrimination~ within the D•partm•nt in
terms ot hiring and promotion. For example, a black male
raceive1 an automatic bonus on his oral score. Thi• officer
perceives thi• aa a problem ot management and wi•h•• that
the management would focua principally on the ability ot the
officer rather than characteristics unrelated to ability to
perform the job.
27. RACIAL MINORITIESt
Certain groups will feel picked on regardleaa of what the
police do. Be also stressed the importance ot developing
understanding regarding the rel• of . the police. The L.A,P.D.
hammers its officers with aenaitivity to community needs.
He believes that cultural training i• ett•ctive, but the
effectiveness of cultural training depend• on individual
officers. It ia not always possible to chan9e an otfic•r'1
attitude• with cultural training (although he haa only met
two individual1 in hi• 15+ year1 on the department who he
would classify as racist). There haa been a major
enlightenm•nt in the Department since tnie officer · originally
joined the Department over 15 year•.
28. ATTITUDES I OPINIONS RE L,A.P.D.1
The L,A,P.D. ia still one of the finest departments in the
country, but it will become less ag9resaive in dealing with
hardcore criminals as a result of the aftermath of the King
beatin; incident. This officer notes that certain officers,
including himaell, have been ha•itant in using force after
the King incident because they tear p•r•onn•l ccmplainta.
29. R!PORM SUGGESTIONS:
The L.A.P,O. should become more troop oriented. It should
adopt a four-day, 10-hour work week to provide officers with
more time to relax and reduce stresa. Patrol should become
the moat important determinant in an officer•e ~areer. The
Department ha• become too top heavy with an overabundance
.of officers in suparviaory and deak joba. The Dep•rtment
should get back to baaica and atress patrol in promotion•
and advancement within th• Department. Currently otticera
can get good jobs baaed on the connection• that they have
Seiling 002, June 10, l99l 9
RCV 6Y!IRELL & MANELLA 2133124224• IRELL 6 MANELLA: #11
developed while working atatt job1. Furthermore, officers
who work statf jobs have more time to study and do w•ll on
the various exams. While there is no fool proot way to
•elect officers for higher poeition•, th• Department should
de-emphasize the role of staff jobs conn•ctiona, and test
scores in determining who receives promotion1.
The Department definit~ly needs more street officers. This
goal can be achieved either by taking oltic•r• cut of staff
positions or by hiring more officers. The L.A.P.D. currently
is far too thinly stretched to police effectively. Officers
currently At• faced with the choice of reducing r•aponae
time to 911 calls or conducting on;oin; investi;ations of
crimea which could prevent future ctimee. B•cau•e of the
hierarehy ' a emphaais on response time, the ongoin;
i nvestigations trequ•ntly tall by the wayside. With more
officers, the Department could more effectively meet both
challenges.
30 . COO! OF SILENCE:
[Did not diacuaa.]
50 . MISCELLANEOUS:
Seil i n~ 002, June 10, l991 10