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J U.S. Department of Justice Office of Justice Programs National Institute of Justice Perspectives on Policing January 1990 No.13 A publication of the National Institute of Justice, U.S. Department of Justice, and the Program in Criminal Justice Policy and Management. John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvud University The Evolving Strategy of Police: A Minority View By Hubert Williams and Patrick V. Murphy . . . then is an IUldersuu to evuy age abolU which history does ""' often spealc, bectiJl.se history is wrinenfrom records /'ft by the privileged. We learn abo"1 po/iii.cs from the po/iii.cal leadus, abo111 economics from the DllnpreMws, aboiu slavery from the planla1ion owMrs, abolU the thinlcing of an age from ils inlellectwal elite. - Howard Zlnn 1 Introduction Kelling and Moore, in their recent interpretation of the strategic history of American policing, succinctly summarize that history as falling generally into three eras: (1) political , (2) refonn, and (3) community.2 This attempt to create paradigms, as with all such attempts, should be seen metaphorically, providing us with ways to crystalli7.e the complexities of history in simplified terms. Seen in this way, their analysis provides useful insights and a clearer interpretation of the changing role of police in American society-81 least with respect to the majcrity in that society. &spite its utility, we find their analysis disturbingly incomplete. It fails to take account of how slavery, segregation, discrimination, and racism have affected the development of American police departments-and how these factors have affected the quality of policing in the Nation 's minority communities. Furthermore, we find Kelling and Moore to be silent on the important role that minorities have played in the past, and will play in the future, in affecting and improving the quality of policing in America. These omissions seriously diminish the accuracy and objectivity of their analysis and make it less useful than it otherwise could be in understanding the past and predicting the future of American policing. This is one in a series of reports originally developed with some of the leading figures in American policing during their periodic meetings at Harvard University's John F. Kennedy School of GovemmenL Th~ reports are published so that Americans inlereSted in the improvement and the furure of policing can shue in the information and perspectives that were pan of extensive debates at the School's Executive Session on Policing. 1nc police chiefs, mayors, scholars, and others invited to the meetings have focused on the use and,JXomise of such strategies as community-based and problem-oriented policing. The testing and adoption of these sttategies by some police agencies signal important changes in the way American policing now does business. What these chan.ges mean for the welfare of citizens and the fulfillment of the police mission in the next decades has been at the he.an of the Kennedy School meetings and this series of papers. We hope that through these publications police officials and other policymakers who affect the course of policing will debate and challenge their beliefs just u those of us in the Executive Session have done. 1nc Executive Session on Polic ing has been dev eloped and administered by the Kennedy School's Program in Criminal Justice Policy and Management and fWlded by the National Institute of Justice and private sources lhat include the Charles Stewart Mott and Guggenheim Foundations. James K. Stewart Director National Instirute of Justice U.S. Department of Justice Mark H. Moore F-=ulty Chairman Program in Criminal Justice Policy and Management John F. Kennedy School of Government Harvard University This paper addresses these omissions by adding a .. minority pcrspcctive ... Ours represents a .. minority perspective .. in two different senses. First, our understanding of what factors have shaped the evolution of policing was shared by only a minority of those participating in the discussions of the Harvard Executive Session on Community Policing. Whereas Kelling and Moore (and many others) a11empted to explain the evolution of policing in terms of strategic choices made by police executives who were de veloping a professional ideology, we sec policing as powetfully conditioned by broad social forces and attitudes-including a long history of racism . They sec police departments as largely autonomous; we sec them as barometers of the society in which they operate. ' ' .. . the legal order not only countenanced but sustained slavery, segregation, and discrimination . .. and . . . the police were bound to uphold that order '' Second, our view is particularly attuned to how institutions, nonns, and attitudes have dealt with racial minorities and how those dealings affected the role of police during each of the eras described by Kelling and Moore. More optimistically, we believe that improvements have occurred in the last several years and that furtha improvements are possible, although not assured, in the future. We arc particularly aware of the implications for African-American minorities, but we believe that the patterns set in these relations have imponantly affected relations with other racially distinctive minorities such as Hispanics, Asians, Native Americans, and other people of color. In this paper, we contend that the stralegies of police in dealing with minorities have been diffetent from those in dealing with others, that the changes in police strategies in minority communities have been DlQl"C problcmalic , and dw. therefore, the beneficial consequences of those changes fer minorities have been less noticeable. Spccifacally, we argue that: • The fact that the legal order not only countenanced but sustained slavery, segregation, and discrimination for most of our Nation 's history-and the fact that the police were bound to uphold that order-set a pattern for police behavior and attitudes toward minority communities that has persisted until the present day. That pattern includes the idea that minorities have fewer civil rights, that the task of the police is to keep them under control. and that the police have little responsibility for proteeting them from aime within their communities. • The existence of this pauem of police behavior and attitudes toward minority communities meant that. while imponant changes were occurring in policing during our Nation 's history, 2 members of minority ~ benefited less than others from these changcs-<:enainly less than it might have seemed from the vantage point of the white community and the police executives who were bringing about those changes. •The Kelling and Moore discussion of the "political era" of policing, a period generally defined by them as extending from after Reconstruction through the fJJ'Sl decade of the twentieth century, neglects the early role of the first varieties and functions of police in this country~ well as the legal and political powerlessness of minority communities in both the North and the South. This omission means that their anal ysis fail s to recognize that members of those minority communities received virtually none of the benefits of policing that were directed to those with more political clout • Many of the most notable advances in poli cing broug ht abou t by the advent of the "reform era" proved to be elusi ve, if not counterproductive, for mi norities. Several of the hiring and promotional standards, although implemented as antido tes to the rampant nepotism and political favoritism that had characterized policing during the .. political era" proved to be detrimental to blacks-just at the time when, to a limited extent. because of their increasing political power, they were beginning to acquire the credentials that would have allowed them to qualify by the old standards. • The potential of "professional policing" during the re form era was not fully rcaliz.cd--cithcr fer minorities or for whites--ontil the civil rights revolution of the late 1960's and the coming to power of progressive mayors, both black and white, and the police executives appointed by them who were capable of bringing about changes relevant to blacks and other minorities. It w~ that movement. led primarily by black Americans, and that political crnpowcnncnt that finally began to produce the putative benefits of professional policing: a fairer disuibution of police services, less use of deadly force , greater respect for individual rights, and equal opportuniry for minorities within the Nation 's police dcpanments. Withou t that movement. the promise of professional policing would have remained hollow. ' ' • . • minority communities received virtually none of the benefits of policing .. . directed to those wilh more political clout . ' ' • The minority community also played a key role in initiating the era of community policing. It was the riots of the late 1960's-and the election of many black and white progressive mayors. who appointed lilcemindcd police chiefs-that stimulated broad social invesunents in police agencies, therefore putting the issue of police-community relations inescapably on the minds of police executives and the mayors who appointed them. The fact that police actions triggered many of the riots and then could not control them revealed to everyone the price of having a police deparunent backed only by the power of the law, but not by the consent. much less active suppon., of those being policed. '' ... the riots of the late 1960's • . • stimulated broad social investments in police agencies . • . ' ' • The era of community policing holds poiential benefits and hazards for the quality of American policing. The polential benefits lie in the fundamental ienet of community policing: the empowerment of communities to participaie in problem solving and decisions about delivery of services based on the needs of individual neighborhoods. The hazards lie in the possibility of excluding those cotnmunities that have been the lemit powerful and least well organized and th~ repeating the historical patterns of race relations in the United States. If, however, the more recent trends towards inclusion of African-Americans and other minorities in policing and in the broader society are continued, then community policing might finally realize a vision of police departments as organizations that proteet the lives, property, and rights of all citizens in a fair and effective way. The political era: Policing the powerl~ Kelling and Moore argue that during the political era, from the introduction of the "new police" in the 1840's until the early 1900's, American police derived both their authority and resources from local political leaders. We maintain that their account is based largely on an analysis of policing in the cities of the northeastern United States, mostly following the Civil War and Reconstruction, and omitting the importance of racial and social conflicts in the origination of American police departments. As such, their analysis omits several crucial parts of the story of policing in America: the role of "slave pauols" and other police insauments of racial oppression; the role of the police in imposing racially biased laws; and the importance of racial and social turmoil in the creation of the first versions of America's "new police." Most analyses of early American history reflect an understandable, white, twentieth-century bias toward northern, urban, white conditions. While the literalW'C is replete with studies of the growth of law enforcement in northern urban areas in generat3 and northern cities such as BOSU>n,4 Chicago,5 Detroit, 6 and New York City,7 in particular, little aa.ention has 3 been paid to police development outside the urban North. Kelling and Moore reflect a similar bias. Since the vast majority of blaclc:s in the early years of America lived in the South, and about 80 percent of those lived outside of cities, this perspective creates a significant distortion. Prominent police historian Samuel Walker has noted the difficulty of establishing dates marking the origins of American modem-style policing, that is, a system of law enforcement involving a permanent agency employing full-time officers who engage in continuous patrol of fixed beats to prevent crime. The traditional analyses. based on wban evidence, have suggested that such policing evolved from older systems of militias, sheriffs, constables, and night watches, and cUlminated in the "new police" of Boston in 1838, New York City in 1845, Chicago in 1851, New Orleans and Cincinnati in 1852, Philadelphia in 1854, St Louis in 1855, Newark and Baltimore in 1857, and Detroit in 1865.8 As Richardson points out, however, these analyses neglect that: [mmy other cities with] elaborate police arrangements were those with large slave populatiom where white masters lived in dread of possible black uprisings. Charleston, Savannah. and Richmond provided for combined foot md mounted patrols to prevent slaves from congregating and to repress any attacks upon the racial and social stalus quo. In Charleston. for example, police costs consticuted the lcgest item in the municipal budget.9 Indeed, as both WalkerlO and Reichelll contend, there is a strong argument to be made that the first American modemStyle policing occurred in the "slave patrols," developed by the white slave owners as a means of dealing with runaways. Believing that their militia was not capable of dealing with the perceived threat, the colonial State governments of the South enacted slave patrol legislation during the 1740's, e.g .• in South Carolina: Foreasmuch [sic) as many late horrible and barbarous massacres have been accually commiued md many more designed. on the white inhabilallts of this Province, by negro slaves, who are generally prone to such cruel pr1etices, which makes it highly necessary that con.stan1 patrols should be established.12 Neighboring Georgians were also concerned with maintaining order among their slaves. The preamble to their 1757 law establishing and regulating slave patrols contends: .. . it is lbsolutely necessary for the Security of his Majesty's Subjects in this Province.. that Pattols should be established under propel' Regulations in the settled parts thereof, for the better keeping of Negroes and other Slaves in Order 111d prevention of any Cabals, Insurrections or other Irregularities amongst lhem.13 Such statutes were eventually enacted in all southern States. Although specific provisions differed from State to State,14 most of these laws responded to complaints that militia duty was being shirked and demands that a more regular system of surveillance be established . '' h . l . . h ... t eir ana rysis omits .•. t e importance of racial and social turmoil in the creation of the first versions of America's 'new police.' '' In Georgia, all urban white men aged sixteen to sixty, with the exception of ministers of religion, were to conduct such patrol "on every night throughout the year." In the countryside, such pauols were to "visit every Plantation within their respective Districts once in every Month" and whenever they thought it necessary, " to search and examine all Negro-Houses for offensive weapons and Amrmmition ." They were also authorized to enter any "disorderly tipling-House, or other Houses suspected of harbouring, ttafficking or dealing with Negroes" and could inflict corporal punishment on any slave found to have left his owner's property without pennission . IS Foner points out that "slave patrols" had full power and authority to enter any plantation and break open Negro houses or other places when slaves were suspected of keeping anns; to punish runaways or slaves found outside their plantations without a pass; to whip any slave who should affront or abuse them in the execution of their duties; and to apprehend and take any slave suspected of stealing or other criminal offense, and bring him to the nearest magisttate. 16 Understandably, the actions of such patrols established an indelible impression on both the whites who implemented this system and the blacks who were the brunt of it Reflecting the northern, urban perspective, Kelling and Moore begin their consideration of American policing only after the earliest "new police" were established in the 1840's and 18SO's. ·Even so, their analysis neglects to point out the imponance of the role played by social discord in general, and the minority community in particular, in the creation of these departments. Phenomenal ~ in immigration, rapid population growth, and major changes in industrialization led to more and more people, many of whom were from an impoverished, rural background, settling in an alien urban environment Conflicts between black freedmen and members of the white urban working class significantly contributed to social unrest In 1830 Alexis de Tocqueville toured the United States to study prison refonn. Unfamiliar with American nonns, be was surprised to discover that there was more overt hostility and halted toward blacks in the North , where slavery did not exist, than in the South, where it did. Those who challenged the swus 4 . \ quo by demanding the abolition of slavery suffered verbal and physical abuse in northern cities. 17 This tension was reflected in a number of race riots in the mid-1830's in America's major cities. New York City had so many racial disorders in 1834 that it was long remembered as the "year of the riots." Boston suffered three major riots in the years 1834 to 1837, all of which focused on the issues of anti-abolitionism or antiCatholicism. Philadelphia. the "City of Brotherly Love," experienced severe anti-Negro riots in 1838 and 1842; overall, the city had eleven major riots between 1834 and 1849. Baltimore experienced a total of nine riots , largely race-related , between 1834 and the creation of its new police in 1857. ln a desperate attempt to cope with the social disorder brought about by this conflict, America's major cities resoned to the creation of police deparunents. Clearly, this was a case of the political sy stem responding to incendiary conflict within the society at large by demanding that the police be reorganized to deal with those conflicts . In their discussion of the political era. Kelling and Moore observe that the police found their legitimacy either in politics or in law. For blacks, both before and several generations afrer the Civil War, neither of these bases of legitimacy provided much, if any, opportunity to shape policing to their benefit As the authors point out, local political machines often recruited and maintained police in their positions, from foot officer to police chief. In relUm, the police encouraged voters to support certain candidates and provided services designed to enhance that suppcn DepaJUnents were organized in a decentralized manner, giving officers a great deal of discretion in carrying out their responsibilities. Police officers were closely linked to the neighborhoods in which they pattolled, often living there and usually of the same ethnic stock as the residents. For those with political influence, this era provided close proximity to power. Good jobs could be had. Special favors could be obtained. The police could be expected to be exuemely sensitive to community concems--0r lose their jobs if they were not. ' ' ••• the first American modern-style policing occu"ed in the 'slave patrols' . . . '' For those with no access to political power, however, the situation was very different Before slavery was abolished, the issue of black political power in the South was moot The Constiwtion itself provides a sardonic reflection on the s we of political power assigned to slaves. The group of white delegaies assembled in Philadelphia never even considered slave representation, slave votes, or slave power. The only issue was whethec a slave owner would enjoy a three-fifths increment of representation for every slave he owned. During the debate, William Paterson stated bluntly that slaves were .. no free agents, have no personal liberty, no faculty of acquiring property, but on the contrary, arc themselves property" and hence like other property "entirely at the will of the master." To make certain there was no mistake, the Constitution explicitly prohibited Congress from abolishing the international slave trade to the United States before 1808 . '' •.• de Tocqueville •.. was surprised to discover that there was more overt hostility and hatred toward blacks in the North ... '' Early American law enforcement officials in slave States were empowered-and expec~ enforce starutes carrying out the most extreme forms of racism, not restricted solely to enforcing slavery:· In 1822, for example, Charles~~. South Carolina. experienced a slave insurrection panic, caused by a supposed plot of slaves and free blacks to seize the city. In response, the Stale legislature passed the Negro Seamen's Act., requiring free black seamen to remain on board their vessels while in Carolina harbors. H they dared to leave their ships, the police were instructed to arrest them and sell them into slavery unless they were redeemed by the ship's master. The other coastal slave States soon enacted similar legislation. Berlin presents this brief synopsis of Southern justice: Southern law presumed all Negroes io be slaves, and whites systanatically bamd free Negroes from any of the righis and symbola they ~uated with freedom. Whiies legally prohibited Negro freemen from movi113 freely, participating in politics, testifyini aglll'5t whites, keeping guns. or lifting a h.md io strike a white person .. . In addition they burdened free Negroes with special imposts, bamd them from certain trades, and often tried -~punished them like slaves. To enforce their proscriptive codes and constantly remind free Negroes of their lowly status, almost every State forced free Negroes to register and carry freedom papen, which h.S to be renewed periodically and might be inspected by any suspicious white.18 Police supervision further sttengthencd the registration system. City officials periodically ordered police to check the papers of all newly arrived free Negroes or investigate freedmen who failed to regista or lacked visible means of support. 19 Outside the slave Swes, the rights of blacks were only somewhat less resuicted. Although Henry David Thoreau and William Lloyd Garrison exaggerated when they called 5 ~husctts a slave State, their harsh denunciation is a reminder that a black person could be a slave there or in any of the other "free" States because of the protection afforded by the Federal and State constitutions for masters' rights in fugitive and sojourning slaves. It fell to agents of law enforcement. constables and members of the day and night watches, to carry out these laws. By 1800, some 36.505 non.hem Negroes still remained in bondage, most of them in New York and New Jersey.20 Several northern States enacted gradual emancipation starutes after the Revolution. Because such statutes freed only children born after a specified date, how ever, many slaves remained unaffected, and the freed children were held in apprenticeship until some time in their adult years . The State of New Jersey was typical . In 1804, the legislature freed the children born to slave mothers after July 4 of that year, the child so frud would be "apprenticed" to its mother 's owner, men until age 25, women until 21. Only in 1844 did it remove all barriers to the freeing of slaves. Again, these laws were also enforced by the local constable. Even after the northern States took action to free slaves-ranging from constitutional provisions in Vennont in 1777 to gradual-abolition acts in New Jersey in 1804 and New York in 1817, the legal and political rights of blacks were quite circumscribed. Every new State admitted to the Union after 1819 restricted voting to whites . Only five States~ husctts, Rhode Island, Maine, New Hampshire, and Vermont-provided equal voting rights for black and white malcs. lliinois, Ohio, Indiana, Iowa, and California prohibited black testimony in court if whites were a party to the proceeding, and Oregon forbade Negroes to hold real estate, make contracts, or maintain lawsuits. ~huscus banned intermarriage of whites with blacks and enforced segregation in hotels, restaurants, theaters, and transportation. Berlin describes a raid in 1853 in which SL Louis police raided well-known hangouts of freedmen , whipped those who were unregistered, and shipped them out of town. Such raids continued for almost a year.21 Litwack describes the situation of nonhcrn blacks this way : In virnlally every phase of existence, Negroes found themselves systematically separated from whites. 1bey were eitha excluded from railway cars, omnibuses, stagecoeches, md steamboats or assigned to special "fun Crow .. sections; they sat, when permitted. in secluded and remote comers of theaters and lecture halls; they could not enter most hotels, restaurants, and resorts, except as servants; they prayed in "Negro pews" in the white chun:hes, and if partaking of the sacrament of the Lord's Supper, they waited until the whites had been saved the bread and wine. Moreover, they were often educ:&led in segregaled schools, punished in segregated prisons, nursed in segregaled hospitals, and buried in segreg&led cemeteries.22 Indeed. as poinled out by C. Vann Woodward. an eminent historian of the South, "One of the strangest things about Jim Crow [the laws and practices separating the races] was that the system was born in the Nmh and reached an advanced age before moving South in force."23 '' [lfl free black seamen •.. dared to leave their ships, the police were instructed to arrest them and sell them into slavery ..• ' ' With neither political power nor legal SWlding, blacks could hardly be expecled to share in the spoils of the political era of policing. There were vinually no black police offK:CrS until well inio the twentieth century. Thus, police aucntion IO, and proiection for , areas populaled primarily by racial minorities was rare during this era. The reform era: Policing by the l_aw for those unprotected by it According to Kelling and Moore's interpretation. the basic police strategy began to change during the early 1900's. By the l 930's, they argue, the reform era of policing was in full sway. Strikingly, their ~~on completely overlooks the momentous events of the Civil War and Reconstruction, a time of grr.at change in the legal and political status of minorities. In the earliest days of the Civil War, President Lincoln and other northern politicians insisted that the issue of slavery had little to do with the conflicL In fact, in July 1861, when Congress Jmembled in special ~ion, one of its first acrs was to pass, almost unanimously, the Crittenden Resolution, affuming that the "established institutions" ol the seceding Swes were not to be a military &argeL To a large extent, this position was dicwed by political forces--fO keel> lhe border States in the Union, generate support among the broadest constiiuency in the Nonh, and weaken the Confederacy by holding out the pos.gbility that Ibey could return ro lhe Union with their property, including their slaves, intacL24 Eventually, however, as the Confederacy put slaves to wort as military laborers and the presence of Union troops precipiwed large-scaJc descrtioo of plantation slaves, this policy was overcome by evenrs. On January 1, 1863, Lincoln signed the Emancipation Proclamation. Bowing to political reality, however, he excluded from its purview the 450,000 ·slaves in Delaware, Kentucky, Maryland, and Missouri; 275,<XXJ in Union-<X:CUpied T~; and tens of thousands in occupied portions of Virginia and Louisiana. 6 By 1864, the Senaie approved the 13th Amendment, abolishing slavery duoughout the Union, but it failed IO receive the necessary two-thirds majority in the House. Eventually, in January 1865, this amendment narrowly won House approval and was sent to the Stares for ratification. Although several Southern legislatures were reluctant to lend their support. this amendment was ratified by the end of the year. To some, this not only ended one of America's most shameful institutions but offeted the hope of the beginning of a Nation where Nonh and South , black and white, were ruled by one law impartial over all. As we know with historical hindsight. such an interpretation was far too optimistic. Even at the time, questions were raised about the practical implications of the amendmenL James A. Garfield asked, ''What is freedom? Is it the bare privilege of not being chained? •.• If this is all, then freedom is a bitter mockery, a cruel delusion." More IO the point. Frederick Douglass maintained, "Slavery is not abolished until the black man has the ballot "2S In fact, a political vacuum developed between 1865 and 1867 in which the opponents of the extension of full citizenship to blacks were able to exercise great influence. President Andrew Johnson, with hopes of receiving the support of his fellow Southerners in the election in 1868, left the definition of black rights to the individual States. They accepted the opponunity with a vengeance. In addition to prohibiting black suffrage, the provisional legislatures passed the Black Codes, a series of Swe laws intended to define the freedmen's new rights and responsibilities. . .. '' In the earliest days of the Civil War, President Lincoln ••• insisted that the issue of slavery had little to do with the conflict. ' ' Mis.Vs.Vppi and South Carolina enacted the first and most severe Black Codes lOWatd the end of 1865. Missmippi required all blacks to possess, each January, written evidence of employment f<I the coming year. Laborers leaving their jobs before the contract expired would forfeit wages already earned and, as under slavery, be subject to arrest by any whire citizen. A person offering work to a laborer already under contract risked imprisorunent or a fine. Blacks were forbidden to rent land in urban areas. Vagrants-under whose definition fell the idle, disorderly, and those who "~nd what they cam" -could be punished by fines or involunwy plantation labor. other aimina1 offenses included "insulting" gestures or language, " malicious mischief," and preaching the Gospel without a license. In ~ anything had been overlooked, the ; . legislature declared all existing penal codes defining crimes by slaves and free blacks "in full force" unless specifically altered by law. South Carolina's Code barred blacks from any occupation other than fanner or servant except by paying an annual iax ranging from $10 to $100.26 ''[The 13th Amendment] offered the hope of the beginning of a Nation where North and South, black and while, were ruled by one law impartial over all ' ' Virtually all of the former Confederate States enacted such laws. Blacks protested most bitterly, however, against apprenticeship laws, which seized upon the consequences of slavery-the separation of families and the freedmen's poverty-to provide planters with the unpaid labor of black minors. Generally, these laws allowed judges to bind to white employers black orphans and those whose parents. were deemed unable to support them. The former slave owner usually had first preference, the consent of the parents was not required, and the law permitted "moderate corporal chastisement "27 This entire complex of Black Codes was enforced: ... by a police apparatus and judicial system in which blacks enjoyed virtually no voice whatever. Whites staffed urban police forces as well IS State militias, intended, as a Mississippi white put it in 1865, to "keep good order and discipline amongst the negro population. ''28 Sheriff's, justices of the peace, and other local officials proved extremely reluctant to prosecute whir.es accused of aimes against blacks. In those rare cases in which they did prosecute, convictions were infrequent and sentences were far mcn lenient than blacks received for the same crimes. For example, Texas coons indicted some 500 white men for the murder of blacks in 1865 and 1866, but not one was convicted.29 Largely in response to the Black Codes, Congress passed, over President Johnsoo 's veto, the Civil Rights Act of 18()6. This act defined all persons born in the United States (except Indians) as national citizens and spelled out rights they were to enjoy equally without regard to race-maJcing contracts, bringing lawsuits, and enjoying " full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of person and propeny." No State law or custom could deprive any citizen of these rights. Furthermore, Federal officials were authorized to bring suit against violations and made all persons, including local officials. who deprived a citizen of a civil right liable to fine or imprisonment 7 To institutionalize the legal implications of the Civil War beyond the reach of shifting political majorities and presidential vetoes, Congress, after a long struggle, passed the 14th Amendment, providing, among other things, that equal protection under the law be afforded to every citizen. Although it implicitly aclcnowledged the right of States to limit voting because of race, they could do so only at the expense of losing a significant portion of their congressional representation. The 1866 congressional election essentially became a referendum on the 14th Amendment-Republicans in favor, President Johnson and the Democrats opposed. The Republicans won an overwhelming victory, large enough to give them well over the two-thirds majority required to override a veto. In contrast. all Southern legislatures except TeMessee repudiated the amendment by enonnous majorities. Frustrated, and sensing its political strength, the Congress passed, again over Johnson's veto, the Reconstruction Act of 1867. This act divided the eleven Confederate States, excei>t Tennessee, into five military districts and stipulaled the process by which new State governments could be created and recognized. This process required the ratification of the 14th Amendment, writing of new constitutions providing for manhood suffrage, and approval of these constitutions by a majority of registered voters. After two years of .. Presidential Reconstruction," characterized by a lack of commitment to the extension of full rights to blacks, the era of ''Radical Reconstruction" began. Given the right to vote, many blacks participated in-and wo~lection to the new State legislatures. To allay any concerns that the issue had not been addressed completely, Congress passed the 15th Amendment, providing the right to vote to all persons, regardless of"race, color, or previous state of sezvitude," and prohibited the abridgement of that right by Federal and State governments. The Civil Rights Act of 1875 outlawed the exclusion of blacks from hotels, theaters, railroads, and other public accommodations. The results of black suffrage on policing were not long in coming. Blacks appeared in several southern police departments soon after Radical Reconstruction began, especially where Republicans were in office and where blacks constituted a large percentage of the population. Black police appeared in Selma, Alabama, in 1867; Houston, Texas, in 1870: and Jackson, Mississippi, in 1871.30 In New Orleans, a majority of whose population was black, a police board composed of three black members out of five appointed a police force that included 177 blacks by 1870.31 Such change was not always easy, however. In July 1868, in Raleigh, Nonh Carolina, wider the headline "The Mongrel Regime!! Negro Police!!" the Conservative Daily Sentinel announced the appointment of four black police officers and concluded that "this is the beginning of the end."32 Race riots occurred in Jackson and Meridian, ~issippi, because black police attempted to use their police authority over whites.33 ' ' .•• apprenticeship laws ... seized upon the consequences of slavery ••. to provide planters with the unpaid labor of black minors. ' ' In 1872, a Republican mayor in Chicago appointed the first black policeman in the North, where black: suffrage w~ not required by Congress. Three years later, a mayor belonging to the People's Pany replaced that officer with another black. In 1880, the Republicans won the mayor's office again, resulting in the appoinunent of four more black policemen. These officers all worked in plain clothes-in pan not to off end the sensibilities of racist whites-and were assigned to blaclc neighborhoods, practices adopted in most departments that hired blacks at th8t time. By 1894 there were 23 black policemen in Chicago.3• Blacks were appointed in other cities in the North soon after those in Chicago: in Washington, D.C ., in 1874; in Indianapolis in 1876; in Oeveland in 1881 ; in Boston in 1885.35 Lane provides one of the most thaough and fascinating analyses of the political complexities involved in appointing the first black: police officers.36 The approxinwely 7 ,000 blacks in Philadelphia's Seventh Ward had become a consistent Republican constilUency, accounting for more than 10 percent of the pe.rty's vote. During the 1880 mayoral campaign, however, the black vote became a target of both parties' attention. Although the Seventh Ward voted overwhelmingly for the Republican candidate, the winner was Samuel King, a refonn DemocraL Mayor King then appointed Alexander Davis and th.JU other black men to the police department. The selection aiteria applied in appointing these Philadelphia officers reflect a common pauem in the choice of the earliest black officers. As Lane points ow: In m era before my sort of civil service, when many ofracers wae scmilitera1e at best, the four blacks chosen, although c:unently trapped in unskilled jobs, were chancteristicaly overqualified. 37 Davis, although born a slave, had graduated from Lincoln University, worked as a schoolteacher, and founded a newspaper. Only one of the other blacks appointed at that time had no experience beyond "laboring work." Despite their qualifications, the appoinunent of the first black police officers in Philadelphia produced the same responses as 8 were seen in many other cities. Several officers quit the force in protest. The new men were assigned to bea1s in or near black neighborhoods and immcdialely aaracted crowds of spcctatoo , saying such things ~ "Ain't he sweet?" or "Is the thing alive ?" As in Philadelphia, most deparunents, to appease the racial attitudes of whites, did not allow black: officers to arrest whites or to work with white officers. Even~ late~ 1961, a study reponed by the President's Commission on Law Enfcrcement and Adm inistralion of Justice found that 31 percent of the departments surveyed restricted the right of blacks to make felony arrests; the power of black officers to make misdemeanor arrests was even more limited.38 Miami established a different designation for the two races : blacks were " patrolmen" and whites were "policemen." In Chicago, blacks were largely confined to the Southside districts; in SL Louis, the "black beals" ranged from the central downtown area to the Northside. Los Angeles established a special "black watch" for the predominantly black Newton Station districL Afaet the initial dramatic changes brought about by the effects of Radie.al Rcconstruction, the situation for black:s-and policing-began to revert to the staJu.s quo ante. As early~ 1867, black suffrage went down to defeat in referendums in Minnesota, Ohio, and Kansas. Moderates within the Republican party began to back away from "extreme radical measures" such as egalitarianism. The Ku Klux Klan, founded in 1866 in Tennessee as a social club, launched a reign of lem>r against Republican leaders, black and white. In some parts of the South, anned whites blocked blacks from voting. Violence spread, especially in Georgia and Louisiana where, unable to hold meetings, Republicans abandoned their presidential campaign. By 1868, Republicans, the stalwan supporters of black rights, began to lose some of their strength in the South .39 '' Texas courts indicted some 500 white men for the murder of blacks in 1865 and 1866, but not one was convicted. ' ' By 1872. the presidential election focused on southern policy, the Democrats emphasizing the evils oC Rc:consuuction and the need to restore local self-government. Although the Republicans won, a significant number of fonncr Rad.icals supported the Democratic ticket, indicating that their campaign themes were more powerful than the tetums would indicate. While political suppon for Radical Reconstruction waned, debate about whether the 14th Amendment applied only to Swes raged throughout the Nation-and has continued ro do so even in the last decade. Presidents Grant and Hayes retreated . ' 1 . . from slrict enforcement of the so-called "Reconstruction amendments." The Supreme Court began to shift away from the broad interpretation of the 13th Amendment to the narrower 14th and 15th. This shift, in tum, encouraged legislators to narrow their concerns as well. '' Given the right to vote, many blacks participated in-and won-election to the new state legislatures. '' In 1874, a long-awaited compilation of the United States laws, known as the Revised StalMtes, was produced. This document rearranged the Nation's laws into supposedly relevant, logical categories. Inexplicably, however, this rearrangement failed to list the Civil Rights Act of 1866 either in the published text or in the "historical" documentation. Instead, various pans of the 1866 law were scattered throughout the document, under various chapter headings. Civil rights as an independent subject wonhy of the attention of lawyers, judges, law pra{tssors, and an entire generation of law students was neither easily researched nor, by implication, important One by one, case by case, the legal rights of blacks were ruled away. Against this already ominous backdrop came the Compromise of 1877, by which the Federal Govenunent agreed to end Reconstruction. withdraw military forces from the South, and cease enforcing civil rights laws. In exchange, the election of the Republican candidate for president, Rutherford B. Hayes, was assured. The dike that had laboriously been constructed against racist retaliation was suddenly broken. The stage was set for a massive reversal of the gains made in lhe previous 20 years. In 1883, the Supreme Court, in deciding five litigations joined as the Civil Righls Cases, declared the Civil Rights Act of 1875 unconstiiutional. Reflecting the earlier debates over the Reconstruction amendments, lhe ruling was based on the premise that those amendments prohibited only States, not individuals, from infringing on lhe equal protection and due process guaranteed to individuals by the Constitution. Moreover, in 1896, the Supreme Court, in the landmark decision of Plessy v. Ferguson, found State laws lhat required segregation of the races in public accommodations to be constitutional, thereby endorsing lhe proposition that public facilities could be .. separate but equal." This decision virtually completed the quaner-untury-long process of standing lhe law established by the Reconsauction amendments on its head. The effects were quickly seen in police departments. In department after department, blacks lost their jobs, either by dismissal or by being forced to ~gn. The disappearance of blacks from the New Orleans police department serves as the most dramatic 9 example of this trend. From a high of 177 black officers in 1870, the number dropped to 27 in 1880. By 1900, only five black officers remained; by 1910 there were none. The city did not appoint another black to the police force until 1950. It is in this context that the Kelling and Moore discussion of the refonn era must be interpreted. They argue that police refonners, led by August Vollmer and O.W. Wilson, changed the basic orientation of American policing in response to the excesses of the political era. The paradigm lhus adopted, lhey contend, rejected politics as the source of authority for the police, replacing it with law and professionalism. In an effort to curtail the close relationship between local political leaders and police, civil service replaced patronage and influence in the selection, assignmenL, and retention of police officers. Individual police officers were expected to avoid becoming closely associated with, and therefore contaminated by, the areas in which they patrolled. In some cases. they were prohibited from living in lheir beats. To further eliminate local political influence, functional control was centralized. By the time lhis era had reached its peak, during the 1950's and 1960's, police departments had become largely autonomous agencies, led by professionals guided by law, immune from political influence. As dramatic as this change must have appeared to the white middle-class inhabitants of America's major cities, the transition to lhe refonn era was barely noticeable to blacks and other minorities. Relying on law, ralher than politics, as the source of police authority had many desirable aspects for those provided full protection by the law. Once again, however, for those who lacked both political power and equal protection under the law, such a ttansformation could have little significance. ' ' ••. black policemen .•. all worked in plain clothes •.• and were assigned to black neighborhoods • . . ' ' Even the particular mechanisms implemented to bring about reform proved to be of little avail to blacks and olher minorities. Civil service examinations, for example, designed to avoid the influence of patronage and nepotism, provided slight consolation for lhose who had been denied access to quality education. These examinations, which according to some experts, reveal less about the qualifications of the applicants lhan about the cultural biases of the examiners, winnowed out a far higher proportion of blacks than whites. In Boston, for example, the examiners failed 75 pe~t of the blacks as opposed to 35 percent of the whites in 1970. In Atlanta, in the same year, 72 percent of the blacks and only 24 percent of the whites failed. In New York. in 1968, 65 percent of the blacks as opposed to 31 percent of the whites failed. Mexicans and Puerto Ricans fared even worse, perhaps because the tests were given in English .'40 '' Miami established a different designation for the two races: blacks were 'patrolmen ' and whiles were 'policemen.' '' Background investigations, which blacks and other minorities are more likely to fail than whites, also served as a barrier to inclusion. Fogelson reports evidence indicating lhat investigators rejected 41 percent of black applicants as opposed to 29 percent of whites in St Louis in 1966; 68 percent of the blacks, as opposed to 56 percent of the whites, were rejected in Cleveland in 1966; and 58 percent of the blacks, as opposed to 32 per cent of the whites, in Philadelphia in 1968.41 He concludes lhat these disparities were a function of two things, notwithstanding r8cial prejudice. First, many depaftments were unwilling to accept any applicant who had been arrested or convicted for any criminal offense, no matter how trivial--Ole President's Crime Commission showed that blacks were more likely to have a criminal record than whites.42 Second, most departments were reluctant to hire anyone who was cruant from school, changed jobs too often, a.uocia1ed with known criminals, or had broken miliwy regulations, all of which are men prevalent among blacks and other minorities than among whites .43 Regardless of the merits of these criteria, their effect was the same-the exclusion of minorities. Centtalization of control also provided little help for minorities, inasmuch as it meant that already strained relations with the police officer on the beal translalcd into even more strained relations with ·a distant government downtown. Reduced contacts with local officers meant that limited opportunities to bridge the racial baaier became even more limi&ed. '' Individual police officers were expected to avoid becoming closely associated with, and therefore contaminated by, the areas in which they patrolh'd. ' ' In their effcxts to attract qualified recruits. the ref armers not only raised salaries, increased benefits, and improved working conditions, they also extended their rtCruiancnt effons. One method of expanding the pool of applicants was to abolish residency requirements. This reform, although defended by 10 reformers on professional grounds, handicapped the blacks, Hispanics, and other minorities by slowing down the ethnic turnover in police departments. Without such a change, as whites fled from the inner cities, the increasing percentage of minorities remaining could have been expected to have been more readily reflected in the ranks of the police. Furthermore, despite heavy immigration of minmties to the Nation's urban centers, the competitive edge th.al had been experienced earlier by the Irish and other white ethnic minorities no longer held sway. Despite its limitations, the reform era provided, for members of the majority, a nwted improvement in the delivery of professional police services. For members of minority groups, however, the change from the political era, in which they lacked political power, to the reform era, in which they lacked the support of the law, meant, for the most pan, more of the same. In only 7 of the 26 cities for which the Kerner Commission· collected data was the percentage of nonwhite police officers equal to as much as one-third of the percentage of nonwhites in the city.44 The community era: Policing disintegrating communities By the la1e 1970's and early 1980's, according to Kelling and Moore, we had entered the era of community policing. Although law remained a source of authority, the police began once again to recognize that, ultimately, they are dependent on neighborhood. or community, support to achieve their goals . Turning to the ci~ they serve for consultation, the police realized that more was expected of them than simply enforcing the law. Looking at people as clients of their services, the police found that they were also being judged on their ability to maintain order, resolve conflict, protect rights, and provide other services. In order to be able to remain responsive ro community concerns, organizational decentralization was necessary. To remain even more flexible, officers were given authority and discretion to develop responses appropriate IO local needs. To organized, empowered communities, this strategy of policing offered exttaordinary opportunities to participate in structuring the nature of police services delivered. As a result of community dellWKls, for example, programs such as foot patrol were revived, long before they were found to be effective in reducing fear and. in some cases. crime. Despite the popularity of such initiatives, a closer examination of the areas in which such foot beats were crea!Cd reveals one of the serious problems with this approach. In the Swe of New Jersey, for example, ~ foot pattol was funded by the Safe and Clean Neighborhoods Program. most foot beats were instituted in areas with strong community or~ organizations-or both-with strong support from and ace~ to political leaders . .. Those without such resources-and those most in need of police services-often found themselves in a long queue. Although the 1954 Supreme Court decision in Brown v. Board of EdJAcalion of Tope/ca began to provide blacks and other minorities with their just share of legal rights and remedies, that provision came only with "all deliberate speed." As this glacially slow process continued, something more virulent occurred in minority communities, especially in the innei- cities. Those who could afford to do so moved into less crowded, m<l'C comfonable, neighborhoods, leaving behind vacant houses-and those who could not afford an alternative. Businesses closed. Tax bases eroded. Among those who remained, unemployment, especially among minority youths, grew markedly higher than among whites. The incomes of employed minorities was significantly lower than that of whites. The quality of education deteriorated. School dropout rates rose precipitously. Infant mortality rates reached alarming levels. Decent, affordable housing became scarce. More and more children were born to unwed mothers. Drug and alcohol use became endemic. Crime and the fear of crime soared out of control. 1, "" The convergence of these factors produced a vicious circle. The police, regardless of the era or the strategic paradigm. must. along with families and other community institutions, concern themselves with crime and the fear of crime. The inner cities, where families, schools, jobs, and other community institutions were disintegrating at a rapid pace, presented the police with the most serious crime problems of all. But the police, because of a gross underrepresentation of minorities among their ranks, a lack of sensitivity and undcrsWlding of minority concerns and culture , and, therefore, a lack of community SUppM. were least able to deal effectively in the innei- cities-precisely where they were needed most. '' Centralization of control • .• meant that already-strained relations with the police efficer on the beat translated into e11en more strained relations with a distant go11ernment downtown. ' ' Frustrated and angry, many blacks came to see the police as symbolizing the entire "system" -dlose instiwtions and resources that had been so unresponsive to their neech . Tensions rose, culminating in the series of riots in America's inner cities during the middle and lale 1%0's. Many Americans bad their first glimpse of ghettos as they burned through the nighL Reflecting the nalUrC and extent of the underlying problems, Senator Robert Kennedy observed. after visiting the scene of the Watts riot, "There is no point in telling Negroes to observe the law .. . It has almost always been wed against them ." Despite the tragic destructiveness of those riots, they did concentrate the minm of the Nation' s leaders wonderfully. In 1967, President Johnson appointed the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders (the Kerner Commission) to investigale the causes of the disorder and to recommend solutions. In a trenchant analysis, the commission report concluded that .. Our Nation is moving toward two societies, one black, one whitc-separalC and unequal. "4S Essentially, they said, wtw lay behind the riots was a long historical pattern of racism on the part of whites in America. In one of the most forceful pwages of their report. the commissioners observed: What white Americms have never fully understood-but what a Negro cm nevrr forget-ts that white society is deeply implicated in the gheuo. White institutions created it. white institutions maintain it. and white society condones iL 46 ' ' ••. the police began once again to recognize that, ultimately, they are dependent on neighborhood, or community, support to achie11e their goals. '' 11 Specifically, the Kerner Commission found tha1 many of the riots had been precipitated by police actions, often cases of insensitivity, sometimes incidents of outright brutality. They saw an atmosphere of hostility and cynicism reinforced by a widespread belief among many blaclcs in a .. double standard" of justice and proccction. MCl'C generally, they concluded thac In mlllY ways the policamn only symbolizes much deeper poblem.s. The policanan in the gheuo is a symbol not only of law, but of the entire system of law enforcement and criminal justice.47 The report off e.rcd five basic suggestions to address this situation: • Change operalions in the inner city to ensure proper officer conduct and to eliminate abrasive practices. • Provide adequate police protection to inner city residents to eliminate the high level of fear and crime. • Create mechanisms through which citU.ens can obtain effective responses to their grievances. • Produce policy guidelines to assist police in avoiding behaviors tha1 would creaie tension with inner city residents. • Develop community support for law enforcemenL Fearful that new conflagratioos would occur otherwise, and responding in many cases to newly elected black and progressive - ;;;hire mayors, many deparunents followed the commission's recommendations. As a result. a number of improvements have occurred that have reduced the barriers between the police and the inner city. Many more blacks and other minorities are now patrolling our streets. Strict rules against the wmecessary use of weapons, brutality, harassment, verbal abuse, and discourtesy have been promulgated and enforced. The use of ~ive pauol techniques has been curtailed, restricted to those situations in which it is justified. Steps have been taken to ensure adequar.e patrol coverage and rapid response to calls for service from inner city are&. Open, impartial, and prompt grievance mechanisms have been established. Policy guidelines have been implemented to direct officers' discretion in potentially tense situations. New approaches-storefront offices, adopting (or even organizing) neighborhood groups, addressing the causes of fear-have been put into effect to improve relations with the community. ' ' ... the police •.• were least able to deal effectively in' the inner cities-precisely where they were needed most. '' Because of these changes, the relationship between the police and citi:zens has improved considerably in the last several years-lo a large extent in white middle-<:lass neighborhoods, to a lesser extent in the inner city. Any transition to an era of community policing will be both a cause and an effect of these improvements. But such a transition is far from complete in the inner city. A recent assessment by the Commission on the Cities found that. despite a brief period of improvement, the conditions that produced the dissolution of ghetto communities arc actually getting worse. "Quiet riots," the report concludes, arc occurring in America's centtal cities: unemployment. povcny, social disorganization, segregation, housing and school deterioration, and aime arc worse now than ever before.48 lbese "quiet riots," although not as alanning or as noticeable to outsiders as those of the l 960's, arc even more destructive of human life. Under such conditions, it is unreasonable to expect that the residents of the inner city will have the characteristics-whether social, economic, or political-dial are required ro sustain the partnership required of the community policing approach. Furthermore, although the police arc better prepared to deal with residents of the inner city than they were 20 years ago, they arc far from having toeally bridged the chasm that has separated them from minorities-especially blacks-for over 200 years. There are still too few black officers, al all levels. Racism still persists within contemporary police departments. Regardless of rules and guidelines, inappropriale behavior on the slreets still occurs. Complaints about differential treatment, pauol coverage, and .. response time persisL And empirical studies have shown that community-oriented approaches that are effective in most neighborhoods work less well, or not at all, in are& inhabited by low-income blacks and other minority groups. ' ' ••• many of the riots had been precipitated by police actions, often .•. insensitivity, sometimes ... outright brutality. ' ' We welcome the prospect of entering the community era of policing. In a dramatic way, this represents a return ro the fust principles of policing as established in London in 1829. As Critchley so aptly put it. "From the start, the police was to be ... in tune with the people, understanding the people, belonging to the people, and drawing its strength from the people."49 Onr.:. community policing becomes a pervasive reality, we wiiJ have. finally approximated the attainment of that goal. We have begun ro bring such fundamental changes about in many of our Nation's police departments. But because of the devastation afflicting our iMer cities and the inability of our police to relate to those neighborhoods, the are& that most require a transition to the community era will unfortunately be the last ro experience such a change. Summary Kelling and Moore have contributed a valuable addition to our reperroire of conceptS for understanding the sttar.egic hisrory of American policing. Their interpretation of the shifts in policing from a political to a refonn to a community era provides useful insights. It is our conr.ention, however, that the applicability of this interpretation is confined largely to the whir.e majority communities of our Nation. For blacks, and to a lesser extent other minority groups, the utility of this analysis is quite limited. ' ' ••• the community era requires an empowered, cohesive community to be able to deal with a sensitive, responsive police 12 agency ••• '' During the political era. for example, blacks were completely powerless, leaving them unable to exC'lt the influence necessary to affect police sttategy. Accmling to the paradigm Kelling and Moore posit ro have prevailed in the reform era, police strategy was detennined largely on the basis of law, which left blacks almost completely unprotected. Finally, the community era • requires an empowered, cohesive community to be able to deal with a sensitive, responsive police agency; neither precondition prevails in many contemporary minority neighborhoods . Significant progress has been made, however. Large numbers of blacks and other minorities have joined-and in many cases have become leaders of-our major deparunents. The use of violence by police against minorities has declined dramatically in the last decade. Special efforts have been made to provide training to make our police officers sensitive to the needs and concerns of minority communities. Enlightened. better educated police leadership has opened the profession to new approaches and ideas. The rising popularity of community-oriented policing will undoubtedly further improve the relationship between the police and minorities. ' ' . .• many of the most articulate proponents of community policing are themselves African-American police executives. ~ '' .. We think it is a particularly hopeful sign in this regard that many of the most articulate proponents of community policing are themselves African-American police executives. Their un swerving emphasis, in their statements of values, on the protection of constitutional rights and the protection of all citizens, gives us reason to be optimistic about the future of policing. Nevertheless, the history of American police strategics cannot be separated from the hi story of the Nation as a whole. Unfortunately, our police, and all of our other institutions, must contend with many bitter legacies from that larger history. No paradigm-and no society-can be judged satisfactory until those legacies have been confronted directly. Notes l. Howard Zinn, Tht Politics of Hi story. Boston. Beacon Press, 1970: 102. 2. George L . Kelling and Mark H. Moore, "The Evolving Strategy of Policing," Pers~ctives on Policing, No. 4. Washington, D.C., National Institute of Justice and Harvard University, November 1988. 3. Robert M. Fogelson, Big City Police. Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1977. J.F. Richardson, Urban Police in tht United Stales. Port Washington, New York, National University Publications, 1974. 4. Roger Lane, Policing tht City: Boston, 1822-188.5. 13 Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1967. E.A . Savage, A Chronological History of tht Boston Walch and Police.from 1631-1865. Available on Library of American Civilization fiche 13523, 1865. 5. J. Flinn, History of tht Chicago Police from the Settlement of the Community to tht Present Time. Montclair, New Jersey, Patterson Smith, 1975. 6. 1. Schneider, Detroit and the Problem of Order, 1830-1880 : A Geography of Crime , Riot , and Policing . Lincoln, University of Nebraska, 1980. 7. J.F. Richardson, The New York Police: Colonial Times to 1901. New York, Oxford University Press, 1970. 8. Samuel Walker, A Critical History of Police Reform : The Emergence of Professi.onalism. Lexington, Massachusetts, Lexington Books, 1977: ~. 9. Richardson, Urban Police , n. 3 above: 19. 10. Walker, A Critical History, n. 8 above. 11. P. L. Reichel, "Southern slave patrols as a uansitional police type," AmericanloiunoJ of Policing, VII, 2: 51-77. 12. T. Cooper, ed., Stalutes at Large of South Carolina, v. 3, part 2, Columbia, South Carolina, A.S . Johnston, 1838: 568. 13. A. Candler, ed., The Colonial Records of tht State of Georgia, v. 18, Atlanta, Chas. P. Byrd, State Printer, 1910: 225. 14. Alabama: W. L. Rose, ed., A Documentary History of Slavery in North America, New York, Oxford University Press, 1976. Arkansas: 0. W. Taylor, Negro Slavery in Arkansas, Durham, North Carolina. Duke University, 1958. Georgia: R. B. Flanders, Planlalion Slavery in Georgia, Cos Cob, Connecticut, John E. Edwards, 1967; B. Wood, Slavery in Colonial Georgia, Athens, University of Georgia Press, 1984. Kentucky: J . W. Coleman, Jr., Slavery Tunes in Kentucky, New York. Johnson Reprint Company, 1940; I.E. McDougle, Slavery in Kentucky 1792-1865, Westport, Connecticut. Negro Universities Press, 1970. Louisiana: S. Bacon, The Early Development of AmericOll Mwaicipal Police: A Study of tht EvolUli.on of Formal Controls in a Changing Society, unpublished dissertation, Yale University, University Microfilms No. 66-06844, 1939; J. G. Taylor, Negro Slavery in Louisiana, New York. Negro Universities Press, 1963; E. R. Williams, Jr., "Slave patrol ordinances of St Tammany Parish, Louisiana, 1835-1838," Louisiana History, v. 13 (1972}: 399-411. Mississippi: C. S. Sydnor, Slavery in Mississippi, New York. Appleton CenllD'y Co., 1933. Missouri: H. A. Trexler, "Slavery in Missouri: 1804-1865," in H. Trexler, Slavery in tht Stales : Selected Essays, New York, Negro Universities Press, 1969. North Carolina: G. G. Johnson, Ante-btllum North Carolina: A Social History, Oiapel Hill, University of North Carolina, 1937. Tennessee: C. P. Pauason, The Negro in Tennessee, 1790-1865, New York. Negro Universities Press, 1968; C. C. Mooney, Slavery in Tennessee, Westpart. Connecticut, Negro Universities Press, 1971. Vuginia: J. Ballagh, Jr., A History of Slavery in Virginia, New York, Johnson Reprint Co., 1968; A. Stewart, .. Colonel Alexander's slaves resist the patrol," in WL. Rose, ed., A Docu.menlary History of Slavery in North America, New York. Oxford Univemty Press, 1976. 15. B. Wood, Slavtry in Colonial Georgia, n. 14 above: 123-4. 16. P.S. Foner, History of Black Americans: From Africa to the Emergence of the Cotton Kingdom, Westport. Connecticut. Greenwood, 1975: 206. 17. Richardson, Urban Police, n. 3 above: 21. 18. I. Berlin, Slaws W11ho"1 Masters: The Frtt Negro in the An1tbtllwn So"1h, New York, Pantheon Books, 1974: 31~17 . 19.Berlin,above:319. .. 20. L.F. Litwack, North of Slavery: TM Negro in the Frt!t Statts, 1790-1860. Chicago, Chicago Press. 1961: 3. 21. Berlin, n. 18 above: 330. 22. Litwack, North of Slavtry, n. 20 above. p. 97. 23. C.V. Woodward, TM Strange Caner of Jim Crow, New York, Oxford University Press, 1966: 17. NCJ 121019 Hubert Williams is Prt!silknt of the Police Folllldalion, Washington, D.C., and former Police Dirtctor of Newark, New Jtrsey..Patrick V. Murplry is Director of the Police Policy Board of the U.S. Confertnct of Mayors Olldfonner .. Commissioner of the New York City Police Dtpartmenl. Editor of this series is Su.san Michaelson, Assistant Dirtctor of the Program in Criminal JMStice Policy 01UI Managtmenl, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University. Opinions or points of view uprt!sstd in this documenl art those of the a"1hors 01UI do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Dtp<111'1Mnl of Justice or of Han>ard University. TM Assistant Attorney General, Office of Justice Programs, coordinales the activitiu of the follt1Wing program Offices and Bun<UU: NOlional /nstilUl.t of Justice,Binau of JMStict Statistics. Bwtau of Justice Assistance, Office of Jwenile Justice and Delinquency Prtvention, 01UI Office for Vu:tims of Crime. 14 24. E.F. Foner, Reconstruction: America's Unfinished Revolution, 1863-1877. New Yak, Harper and Row, 1988: 4-5. 25. Foner, above: 66-f,7. 26. Foner: 199-200. 27. Foner: 201. 28. Foner: 203. 29. Foner: 204. 30. M. Delaney, .. Colored brigades, 'negro specials' and colored policemen: A hista:y of blacks in American police departments," unpublished manuscript, no date: 12. 31. J.W. Blamngame,BlackNew Orltans, 1860-1880. Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1973: 244. 32. H.N. Rabinowitz, Race Relations in the Urban So"1h, 1865-1890. Urbana, University of Illinois Press, 1980: 41. 33. V.L. Wharton, The Negro in Mississippi, 1865-1890. New York, Harper and Row, 1965: 167. 34. Walker, A Critical History, n. 8 above: 10. 35. Delaney, .. Colored mgades," n. 30 above: 20. 36. R. Lane, Roots of Violence in Black. Philadelphia: 1860-1900. Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1986: flJ-67. 37.Lane,above:~. 38. President's Commimon on Law Enforcement and Adminisll'Btion of Justice, Task Foret Report: The Police. Washington, D.C., U.S. Government Printing Office, 1967: 170. 39. Foner, Reconstruction, n. 24 above: 342. 40. Fogelson, Big City Police, n. 3 above: 250. 41.Fogelson, above:251. 42. President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Adminisll'Btion of Justice, Task Force Report: Science and Technology, Washington. D.C., U.S. Government Printing Office,1967: 21~28. 43. Fogelson, n. 3 above: 251. 44. Report of the National Advisory Commission on Civil . -.. Disorders, WashingtOn, D.C., U.S. Government Printing Office , 1968: 321. 45. Reporr. 1. 46. Report: 2 47. Report: 299. 48. F.R. Harris and R. W"tlkins , Qllkt Riots: Race aNl Poverty in the United Stales , New York , Pantheon Books, 1988. 49 . T.A. Critchley, A History of Police in EnglaNl aNl Wales , 190Q-1966, London, Constable and Company, Ud., 1967: 46. 15 TilC Executive Session on Policing. like olher Executive Sessions at Harvard's Kennedy School of Government. is designed to cnc:ourqe a new form of dialog between highlevel prctitionen and scholars , with a view to redefining md proposing solutions for substantive policy issues. Prctitioners rather Ihm .cademic:ims are given majority rep'esc:ntation in the group. TilC meetings of the Session are conducted u loosely structured saninms or policy debates. Since it began in 198S, the Executive Session on Policing lw met 1evm times. During the 3-day meetings. the 31 members have enagetically di.sc:uued the facts and values that have guided, and thole that should guide, policing. The Executive Session on Policing convenes the following distinguished panel of leaders in the field of policing: Allen Andrews Superintendent of Police Peoria. Illinois Camille Cates Barnett. Ph.D . Director of Finance md Administration Houston. Texas Cornelius Behm. Chief Baltimore County Police Oepctment Baltimore County, Mayland Lawrence Binkley, Chief Long Be.ch Police Oeputment Long Beach. California Lee P. Brown. Chief Houston Police Department Houston. Texas Susan R. Esttich, Professor School of Law Harvanl University Cambridge, Mass.chuseas Duyl F. Gile$, Chief Los Angeles Police Depanment Los Angeles, California Hennan Goldstein. Professor School of Law University of Wisconsin Midi.son. WISCOllSin Frmcis X. Hanmann. Executive Director Program in Criminal Justice Policy and Mmagement John F. Kennedy School of Government Harvanl University Cambridge, Mus.:huseas Peter Hunt. former Executive Director Chicago Area Project Chicago. Illinois George L. Kelling. Professor School of Criminal Justice Nonheastem University Boston, Massachusetts, md Research Fellow, Program in Criminal Justice Policy and Management John F. Kennedy School of Government Harvard University Cambridge, Mus.chuseas U.S. Department of Justice Office of J mtice Programs National lnstilUJe of JllStic~ Washington, D.C. 205321 OfficialB~ Penalty for Private Use $300 Robert R. Kiley, Chairman Metropolitan Transportation Authority New York. New York Robert B. Kliesmet. President International Union of Police Associations AFL-CIO Washington. D.C. Richcd C . Larson. Professor and Codirector Operations Research Center Mass.chuseas Institute of Technology Cambridge, Massachusetts George Latimer, Mayor St Paul. Minnesota Edwin Meese ID Former Aaomey General of the United States Washington. D.C. Marie H . Moore Daniel and Aorence Guggenheim L>rofessor of Criminal Justice Policy and Management John F. Kennedy School of Government H1rV1rd University Cambridge, Massachusetts Pattick Murphy, Professor of Police Science John Jay College of Criminal Justice New York. New York Sir Kenneth Newman Former Commissioner Scotlmd Yard London. England Oliver B. Revell Executive Assistant Director Federal Bureau of Investigation U.S. Oepanment of Justice Washington, D.C. Francis Ro.che, Commissioner Boston Police Department Boston, Massachusetts Michael E. Smith, Director Vera Instirute of Justice New York, New Yorlc Durel Stephens, Executive Director Police Executive Resecch Forum Wash.ington. D.C. James K. Stewart. Director National Institute of Justice U.S. DeparunentofJustice Wash.ington. D.C . Robert Trojanowicz, Professor and Director SchoolofCriminalJustice Michigan State University East Lansing, Michigan Kevin Tuclcer, Commissioner Philadelphia Police Department Philadelphia. Permsylvania Benjamin Wud, Commissioner New York City Police Department New York, New York Robert Wasserman. Research Fellow Program in Criminal Justice Policy and Mmagement John F. Kennedy School of Government Huvud University Cambridge, Mass.:huseas Daniel Whitehurst. President and CEO Whitehurst California Former Mayor of Fresno Fresno, California Hubert Williams, President Police Foundation Wash.ington, D.C. James Q. WWon. Collins Professor of Management Graduare School of Management University of California Los Angeles, California BULK RATE POSTAGE&: FEES PAID DOJ / NlJ Permit No . C=91
Object Description
Title | Commission meetings (1 of 6), 1984-06 - 1991-05-03 |
Description | Commission meetings (1 of 6), 1984 June - 1991 May 3. PART OF A SERIES: Materials in the series fall into one of several categories related to the Independent Commission's work product: (1) Commission meeting materials, which include meeting agendas, work plans, memoranda, and articles about police misconduct that were circulated and reviewed during the Commission's internal meetings; (2) public correspondence, which includes citizen complaints against the LAPD in the form of written testimony, articles, and an audio cassette tape, as well as letters drafted by citizens in support of the LAPD; (3) summaries of interviews held with LAPD officers regarding Departmental procedures and relations; (4) public meeting materials, which include transcripts, supplementary documents, and witness statements that were reviewed at the Commission's public meetings; (5) press releases related to the formation and work product of the Commission; and (6) miscellaneous materials reviewed by the Commission during its study, including LAPD personnel and training manuals, a memorandum of understanding, and messages from the LAPD's Mobile Digital Terminal (MDT) system. |
Coverage date | 1991-05; 1991-05-02; 1991-05-03; 1991-05-07; 1991-05-08 |
Publisher (of the digital version) | University of Southern California |
Date created | 1991-05-02; 1991-05-03 |
Date issued | 1984-06; 1986-08; 1988-11; 1990-01; 1990-10-29; 1991; 1991-04-03; 1991-04-07 |
Type |
texts images |
Format | 179 p. |
Format (aat) |
administrative regulations clippings (information artifacts) correspondence forms (documents) lists (document genres) memorandums newsletters schedules (time plans) |
Format (imt) | application/pdf |
Language | English |
Contributing entity | University of Southern California |
Part of collection | Independent Commission on the Los Angeles Police Department, 1991 |
Series | Independent Commission file list |
File | Commission meetings |
Box and folder | box 22, folder 4 |
Provenance | The collection was given to the University of Southern California on July 31, 1991. |
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Description
Title | Perspectives on policing no. 13 (1990-01) |
Description | Hubert Williams and Patrick V. Murphy. "The evolving strategy of police: A minority view" in Perspectives on policing (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Justice, National Institute of Justice) no. 13 (1990 January). Lacks p. [16]. |
Publisher (of the original version) | U.S. Department of Justice. National Institute of Justice |
Place of publication (of the original version) | Washington, District of Columbia, USA |
Date issued | 1990-01 |
Type | texts |
Format | 16 p. |
Format (aat) | newsletters |
Format (imt) | application/pdf |
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Box and folder | box 22, folder 4, item 29 |
Physical access | Contact: Special Collections, Doheny Memorial Library, Libraries, University of Southern California, Los Angeles, CA 90089-0189; specol@dots.usc.edu |
Full text |
J
U.S. Department of Justice
Office of Justice Programs
National Institute of Justice
Perspectives on Policing
January 1990 No.13
A publication of the National Institute of Justice, U.S. Department of Justice, and the Program in Criminal Justice Policy and Management.
John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvud University
The Evolving Strategy of Police:
A Minority View
By Hubert Williams and Patrick V. Murphy
. . . then is an IUldersuu to evuy age abolU which history does ""'
often spealc, bectiJl.se history is wrinenfrom records /'ft by the
privileged. We learn abo"1 po/iii.cs from the po/iii.cal leadus, abo111
economics from the DllnpreMws, aboiu slavery from the
planla1ion owMrs, abolU the thinlcing of an age from ils inlellectwal
elite. - Howard Zlnn 1
Introduction
Kelling and Moore, in their recent interpretation of the
strategic history of American policing, succinctly summarize
that history as falling generally into three eras: (1) political ,
(2) refonn, and (3) community.2 This attempt to create
paradigms, as with all such attempts, should be seen
metaphorically, providing us with ways to crystalli7.e the
complexities of history in simplified terms. Seen in this way,
their analysis provides useful insights and a clearer
interpretation of the changing role of police in American
society-81 least with respect to the majcrity in that society.
&spite its utility, we find their analysis disturbingly
incomplete. It fails to take account of how slavery, segregation,
discrimination, and racism have affected the development of
American police departments-and how these factors have
affected the quality of policing in the Nation 's minority
communities. Furthermore, we find Kelling and Moore to be
silent on the important role that minorities have played in the
past, and will play in the future, in affecting and improving the
quality of policing in America. These omissions seriously
diminish the accuracy and objectivity of their analysis and
make it less useful than it otherwise could be in understanding
the past and predicting the future of American policing.
This is one in a series of reports originally developed with some
of the leading figures in American policing during their periodic
meetings at Harvard University's John F. Kennedy School of
GovemmenL Th~ reports are published so that Americans
inlereSted in the improvement and the furure of policing can
shue in the information and perspectives that were pan of
extensive debates at the School's Executive Session on
Policing.
1nc police chiefs, mayors, scholars, and others invited to the
meetings have focused on the use and,JXomise of such strategies
as community-based and problem-oriented policing. The
testing and adoption of these sttategies by some police agencies
signal important changes in the way American policing now
does business. What these chan.ges mean for the welfare of
citizens and the fulfillment of the police mission in the next
decades has been at the he.an of the Kennedy School meetings
and this series of papers.
We hope that through these publications police officials and
other policymakers who affect the course of policing will debate
and challenge their beliefs just u those of us in the Executive
Session have done.
1nc Executive Session on Polic ing has been dev eloped and
administered by the Kennedy School's Program in Criminal
Justice Policy and Management and fWlded by the National
Institute of Justice and private sources lhat include the Charles
Stewart Mott and Guggenheim Foundations.
James K. Stewart
Director
National Instirute of Justice
U.S. Department of Justice
Mark H. Moore
F-=ulty Chairman
Program in Criminal Justice Policy and Management
John F. Kennedy School of Government
Harvard University
This paper addresses these omissions by adding a .. minority
pcrspcctive ... Ours represents a .. minority perspective .. in two
different senses. First, our understanding of what factors have
shaped the evolution of policing was shared by only a minority
of those participating in the discussions of the Harvard
Executive Session on Community Policing. Whereas Kelling
and Moore (and many others) a11empted to explain the
evolution of policing in terms of strategic choices made by
police executives who were de veloping a professional ideology,
we sec policing as powetfully conditioned by broad social
forces and attitudes-including a long history of racism . They
sec police departments as largely autonomous; we sec them as
barometers of the society in which they operate.
' ' .. . the legal order not only countenanced
but sustained slavery, segregation, and
discrimination . .. and . . . the police were
bound to uphold that order ''
Second, our view is particularly attuned to how institutions,
nonns, and attitudes have dealt with racial minorities and how
those dealings affected the role of police during each of the eras
described by Kelling and Moore. More optimistically, we
believe that improvements have occurred in the last several
years and that furtha improvements are possible, although not
assured, in the future. We arc particularly aware of the
implications for African-American minorities, but we believe
that the patterns set in these relations have imponantly affected
relations with other racially distinctive minorities such as
Hispanics, Asians, Native Americans, and other people of color.
In this paper, we contend that the stralegies of police in dealing
with minorities have been diffetent from those in dealing with
others, that the changes in police strategies in minority
communities have been DlQl"C problcmalic , and dw. therefore,
the beneficial consequences of those changes fer minorities
have been less noticeable. Spccifacally, we argue that:
• The fact that the legal order not only countenanced but
sustained slavery, segregation, and discrimination for most of
our Nation 's history-and the fact that the police were bound to
uphold that order-set a pattern for police behavior and
attitudes toward minority communities that has persisted until
the present day. That pattern includes the idea that minorities
have fewer civil rights, that the task of the police is to keep
them under control. and that the police have little responsibility
for proteeting them from aime within their communities.
• The existence of this pauem of police behavior and attitudes
toward minority communities meant that. while imponant
changes were occurring in policing during our Nation 's history,
2
members of minority ~ benefited less than others from
these changcs-<:enainly less than it might have seemed from
the vantage point of the white community and the police
executives who were bringing about those changes.
•The Kelling and Moore discussion of the "political era" of
policing, a period generally defined by them as extending from
after Reconstruction through the fJJ'Sl decade of the twentieth
century, neglects the early role of the first varieties and
functions of police in this country~ well as the legal and
political powerlessness of minority communities in both the
North and the South. This omission means that their anal ysis
fail s to recognize that members of those minority communities
received virtually none of the benefits of policing that were
directed to those with more political clout
• Many of the most notable advances in poli cing broug ht abou t
by the advent of the "reform era" proved to be elusi ve, if not
counterproductive, for mi norities. Several of the hiring and
promotional standards, although implemented as antido tes to
the rampant nepotism and political favoritism that had
characterized policing during the .. political era" proved to be
detrimental to blacks-just at the time when, to a limited
extent. because of their increasing political power, they were
beginning to acquire the credentials that would have allowed
them to qualify by the old standards.
• The potential of "professional policing" during the re form era
was not fully rcaliz.cd--cithcr fer minorities or for
whites--ontil the civil rights revolution of the late 1960's and
the coming to power of progressive mayors, both black and
white, and the police executives appointed by them who were
capable of bringing about changes relevant to blacks and other
minorities. It w~ that movement. led primarily by black
Americans, and that political crnpowcnncnt that finally began
to produce the putative benefits of professional policing: a
fairer disuibution of police services, less use of deadly force ,
greater respect for individual rights, and equal opportuniry for
minorities within the Nation 's police dcpanments. Withou t that
movement. the promise of professional policing would have
remained hollow.
' ' • . • minority communities received
virtually none of the benefits of policing .. .
directed to those wilh more political clout . ' '
• The minority community also played a key role in initiating
the era of community policing. It was the riots of the late
1960's-and the election of many black and white progressive
mayors. who appointed lilcemindcd police chiefs-that
stimulated broad social invesunents in police agencies,
therefore putting the issue of police-community relations
inescapably on the minds of police executives and the mayors
who appointed them. The fact that police actions triggered
many of the riots and then could not control them revealed to
everyone the price of having a police deparunent backed only
by the power of the law, but not by the consent. much less
active suppon., of those being policed.
'' ... the riots of the late 1960's • . •
stimulated broad social investments in
police agencies . • . ' '
• The era of community policing holds poiential benefits and
hazards for the quality of American policing. The polential
benefits lie in the fundamental ienet of community policing: the
empowerment of communities to participaie in problem solving
and decisions about delivery of services based on the needs of
individual neighborhoods. The hazards lie in the possibility of
excluding those cotnmunities that have been the lemit powerful
and least well organized and th~ repeating the historical
patterns of race relations in the United States. If, however, the
more recent trends towards inclusion of African-Americans and
other minorities in policing and in the broader society are
continued, then community policing might finally realize a
vision of police departments as organizations that proteet the
lives, property, and rights of all citizens in a fair and effective
way.
The political era: Policing the powerl~
Kelling and Moore argue that during the political era, from the
introduction of the "new police" in the 1840's until the early
1900's, American police derived both their authority and
resources from local political leaders. We maintain that their
account is based largely on an analysis of policing in the cities
of the northeastern United States, mostly following the Civil
War and Reconstruction, and omitting the importance of racial
and social conflicts in the origination of American police
departments. As such, their analysis omits several crucial parts
of the story of policing in America: the role of "slave pauols"
and other police insauments of racial oppression; the role of the
police in imposing racially biased laws; and the importance of
racial and social turmoil in the creation of the first versions of
America's "new police."
Most analyses of early American history reflect an
understandable, white, twentieth-century bias toward northern,
urban, white conditions. While the literalW'C is replete with
studies of the growth of law enforcement in northern urban
areas in generat3 and northern cities such as BOSU>n,4 Chicago,5
Detroit, 6 and New York City,7 in particular, little aa.ention has
3
been paid to police development outside the urban North.
Kelling and Moore reflect a similar bias. Since the vast majority
of blaclc:s in the early years of America lived in the South, and
about 80 percent of those lived outside of cities, this perspective
creates a significant distortion.
Prominent police historian Samuel Walker has noted the
difficulty of establishing dates marking the origins of American
modem-style policing, that is, a system of law enforcement
involving a permanent agency employing full-time officers who
engage in continuous patrol of fixed beats to prevent crime. The
traditional analyses. based on wban evidence, have suggested
that such policing evolved from older systems of militias,
sheriffs, constables, and night watches, and cUlminated in the
"new police" of Boston in 1838, New York City in 1845,
Chicago in 1851, New Orleans and Cincinnati in 1852,
Philadelphia in 1854, St Louis in 1855, Newark and Baltimore
in 1857, and Detroit in 1865.8
As Richardson points out, however, these analyses neglect that:
[mmy other cities with] elaborate police arrangements were those
with large slave populatiom where white masters lived in dread of
possible black uprisings. Charleston, Savannah. and Richmond
provided for combined foot md mounted patrols to prevent slaves
from congregating and to repress any attacks upon the racial and
social stalus quo. In Charleston. for example, police costs
consticuted the lcgest item in the municipal budget.9
Indeed, as both WalkerlO and Reichelll contend, there is a
strong argument to be made that the first American modemStyle
policing occurred in the "slave patrols," developed by the
white slave owners as a means of dealing with runaways.
Believing that their militia was not capable of dealing with the
perceived threat, the colonial State governments of the South
enacted slave patrol legislation during the 1740's, e.g .• in South
Carolina:
Foreasmuch [sic) as many late horrible and barbarous massacres
have been accually commiued md many more designed. on the
white inhabilallts of this Province, by negro slaves, who are
generally prone to such cruel pr1etices, which makes it highly
necessary that con.stan1 patrols should be established.12
Neighboring Georgians were also concerned with maintaining
order among their slaves. The preamble to their 1757 law
establishing and regulating slave patrols contends:
.. . it is lbsolutely necessary for the Security of his Majesty's
Subjects in this Province.. that Pattols should be established under
propel' Regulations in the settled parts thereof, for the better
keeping of Negroes and other Slaves in Order 111d prevention of
any Cabals, Insurrections or other Irregularities amongst lhem.13
Such statutes were eventually enacted in all southern States.
Although specific provisions differed from State to State,14
most of these laws responded to complaints that militia duty
was being shirked and demands that a more regular system of
surveillance be established .
'' h . l . . h ... t eir ana rysis omits .•. t e
importance of racial and social turmoil in
the creation of the first versions of
America's 'new police.' ''
In Georgia, all urban white men aged sixteen to sixty, with the
exception of ministers of religion, were to conduct such patrol
"on every night throughout the year." In the countryside, such
pauols were to "visit every Plantation within their respective
Districts once in every Month" and whenever they thought it
necessary, " to search and examine all Negro-Houses for
offensive weapons and Amrmmition ." They were also
authorized to enter any "disorderly tipling-House, or other
Houses suspected of harbouring, ttafficking or dealing with
Negroes" and could inflict corporal punishment on any slave
found to have left his owner's property without pennission . IS
Foner points out that "slave patrols" had full power and
authority to enter any plantation and break open Negro houses
or other places when slaves were suspected of keeping anns; to
punish runaways or slaves found outside their plantations
without a pass; to whip any slave who should affront or abuse
them in the execution of their duties; and to apprehend and take
any slave suspected of stealing or other criminal offense, and
bring him to the nearest magisttate. 16 Understandably, the
actions of such patrols established an indelible impression on
both the whites who implemented this system and the blacks
who were the brunt of it
Reflecting the northern, urban perspective, Kelling and Moore
begin their consideration of American policing only after the
earliest "new police" were established in the 1840's and 18SO's.
·Even so, their analysis neglects to point out the imponance of
the role played by social discord in general, and the minority
community in particular, in the creation of these departments.
Phenomenal ~ in immigration, rapid population growth,
and major changes in industrialization led to more and more
people, many of whom were from an impoverished, rural
background, settling in an alien urban environment Conflicts
between black freedmen and members of the white urban
working class significantly contributed to social unrest
In 1830 Alexis de Tocqueville toured the United States to study
prison refonn. Unfamiliar with American nonns, be was
surprised to discover that there was more overt hostility and
halted toward blacks in the North , where slavery did not exist,
than in the South, where it did. Those who challenged the swus
4
. \
quo by demanding the abolition of slavery suffered verbal and
physical abuse in northern cities. 17 This tension was reflected
in a number of race riots in the mid-1830's in America's major
cities. New York City had so many racial disorders in 1834 that
it was long remembered as the "year of the riots." Boston
suffered three major riots in the years 1834 to 1837, all of
which focused on the issues of anti-abolitionism or antiCatholicism.
Philadelphia. the "City of Brotherly Love,"
experienced severe anti-Negro riots in 1838 and 1842; overall,
the city had eleven major riots between 1834 and 1849.
Baltimore experienced a total of nine riots , largely race-related ,
between 1834 and the creation of its new police in 1857. ln a
desperate attempt to cope with the social disorder brought about
by this conflict, America's major cities resoned to the creation
of police deparunents. Clearly, this was a case of the political
sy stem responding to incendiary conflict within the society at
large by demanding that the police be reorganized to deal with
those conflicts .
In their discussion of the political era. Kelling and Moore
observe that the police found their legitimacy either in politics
or in law. For blacks, both before and several generations afrer
the Civil War, neither of these bases of legitimacy provided
much, if any, opportunity to shape policing to their benefit As
the authors point out, local political machines often recruited
and maintained police in their positions, from foot officer to
police chief. In relUm, the police encouraged voters to support
certain candidates and provided services designed to enhance
that suppcn DepaJUnents were organized in a decentralized
manner, giving officers a great deal of discretion in carrying out
their responsibilities. Police officers were closely linked to the
neighborhoods in which they pattolled, often living there and
usually of the same ethnic stock as the residents.
For those with political influence, this era provided close
proximity to power. Good jobs could be had. Special favors
could be obtained. The police could be expected to be
exuemely sensitive to community concems--0r lose their jobs
if they were not.
' ' ••• the first American modern-style
policing occu"ed in the 'slave patrols' . . . ''
For those with no access to political power, however, the
situation was very different Before slavery was abolished, the
issue of black political power in the South was moot The
Constiwtion itself provides a sardonic reflection on the s we of
political power assigned to slaves. The group of white delegaies
assembled in Philadelphia never even considered slave
representation, slave votes, or slave power. The only issue was
whethec a slave owner would enjoy a three-fifths increment of
representation for every slave he owned.
During the debate, William Paterson stated bluntly that slaves
were .. no free agents, have no personal liberty, no faculty of
acquiring property, but on the contrary, arc themselves
property" and hence like other property "entirely at the will of
the master." To make certain there was no mistake, the
Constitution explicitly prohibited Congress from abolishing the
international slave trade to the United States before 1808 .
'' •.• de Tocqueville •.. was surprised to
discover that there was more overt hostility
and hatred toward blacks in the North ... ''
Early American law enforcement officials in slave States were
empowered-and expec~ enforce starutes carrying out
the most extreme forms of racism, not restricted solely to
enforcing slavery:· In 1822, for example, Charles~~. South
Carolina. experienced a slave insurrection panic, caused by a
supposed plot of slaves and free blacks to seize the city. In
response, the Stale legislature passed the Negro Seamen's Act.,
requiring free black seamen to remain on board their vessels
while in Carolina harbors. H they dared to leave their ships, the
police were instructed to arrest them and sell them into slavery
unless they were redeemed by the ship's master. The other
coastal slave States soon enacted similar legislation.
Berlin presents this brief synopsis of Southern justice:
Southern law presumed all Negroes io be slaves, and whites
systanatically bamd free Negroes from any of the righis and
symbola they ~uated with freedom. Whiies legally prohibited
Negro freemen from movi113 freely, participating in politics,
testifyini aglll'5t whites, keeping guns. or lifting a h.md io strike a
white person .. . In addition they burdened free Negroes with
special imposts, bamd them from certain trades, and often tried
-~punished them like slaves. To enforce their proscriptive codes
and constantly remind free Negroes of their lowly status, almost
every State forced free Negroes to register and carry freedom
papen, which h.S to be renewed periodically and might be
inspected by any suspicious white.18
Police supervision further sttengthencd the registration system.
City officials periodically ordered police to check the papers of
all newly arrived free Negroes or investigate freedmen who
failed to regista or lacked visible means of support. 19
Outside the slave Swes, the rights of blacks were only
somewhat less resuicted. Although Henry David Thoreau and
William Lloyd Garrison exaggerated when they called
5
~husctts a slave State, their harsh denunciation is a
reminder that a black person could be a slave there or in any of
the other "free" States because of the protection afforded by the
Federal and State constitutions for masters' rights in fugitive
and sojourning slaves. It fell to agents of law enforcement.
constables and members of the day and night watches, to carry
out these laws. By 1800, some 36.505 non.hem Negroes still
remained in bondage, most of them in New York and New
Jersey.20
Several northern States enacted gradual emancipation starutes
after the Revolution. Because such statutes freed only children
born after a specified date, how ever, many slaves remained
unaffected, and the freed children were held in apprenticeship
until some time in their adult years . The State of New Jersey
was typical . In 1804, the legislature freed the children born to
slave mothers after July 4 of that year, the child so frud would
be "apprenticed" to its mother 's owner, men until age 25,
women until 21. Only in 1844 did it remove all barriers to the
freeing of slaves. Again, these laws were also enforced by the
local constable.
Even after the northern States took action to free
slaves-ranging from constitutional provisions in Vennont in
1777 to gradual-abolition acts in New Jersey in 1804 and New
York in 1817, the legal and political rights of blacks were quite
circumscribed. Every new State admitted to the Union after
1819 restricted voting to whites . Only five States~
husctts, Rhode Island, Maine, New Hampshire, and
Vermont-provided equal voting rights for black and white
malcs. lliinois, Ohio, Indiana, Iowa, and California prohibited
black testimony in court if whites were a party to the
proceeding, and Oregon forbade Negroes to hold real estate,
make contracts, or maintain lawsuits. ~huscus banned
intermarriage of whites with blacks and enforced segregation in
hotels, restaurants, theaters, and transportation. Berlin describes
a raid in 1853 in which SL Louis police raided well-known
hangouts of freedmen , whipped those who were unregistered,
and shipped them out of town. Such raids continued for almost
a year.21
Litwack describes the situation of nonhcrn blacks this way :
In virnlally every phase of existence, Negroes found themselves
systematically separated from whites. 1bey were eitha excluded
from railway cars, omnibuses, stagecoeches, md steamboats or
assigned to special "fun Crow .. sections; they sat, when permitted.
in secluded and remote comers of theaters and lecture halls; they
could not enter most hotels, restaurants, and resorts, except as
servants; they prayed in "Negro pews" in the white chun:hes, and if
partaking of the sacrament of the Lord's Supper, they waited until
the whites had been saved the bread and wine. Moreover, they
were often educ:&led in segregaled schools, punished in segregated
prisons, nursed in segregaled hospitals, and buried in segreg&led
cemeteries.22
Indeed. as poinled out by C. Vann Woodward. an eminent
historian of the South, "One of the strangest things about Jim
Crow [the laws and practices separating the races] was that the
system was born in the Nmh and reached an advanced age
before moving South in force."23
'' [lfl free black seamen •.. dared to leave
their ships, the police were instructed to
arrest them and sell them into slavery ..• ' '
With neither political power nor legal SWlding, blacks could
hardly be expecled to share in the spoils of the political era of
policing. There were vinually no black police offK:CrS until well
inio the twentieth century. Thus, police aucntion IO, and
proiection for , areas populaled primarily by racial minorities
was rare during this era.
The reform era: Policing by the l_aw
for those unprotected by it
According to Kelling and Moore's interpretation. the basic
police strategy began to change during the early 1900's. By the
l 930's, they argue, the reform era of policing was in full sway.
Strikingly, their ~~on completely overlooks the
momentous events of the Civil War and Reconstruction, a time
of grr.at change in the legal and political status of minorities.
In the earliest days of the Civil War, President Lincoln and
other northern politicians insisted that the issue of slavery had
little to do with the conflicL In fact, in July 1861, when
Congress Jmembled in special ~ion, one of its first acrs was
to pass, almost unanimously, the Crittenden Resolution,
affuming that the "established institutions" ol the seceding
Swes were not to be a military &argeL To a large extent, this
position was dicwed by political forces--fO keel> lhe border
States in the Union, generate support among the broadest
constiiuency in the Nonh, and weaken the Confederacy by
holding out the pos.gbility that Ibey could return ro lhe Union
with their property, including their slaves, intacL24
Eventually, however, as the Confederacy put slaves to wort as
military laborers and the presence of Union troops precipiwed
large-scaJc descrtioo of plantation slaves, this policy was
overcome by evenrs. On January 1, 1863, Lincoln signed the
Emancipation Proclamation. Bowing to political reality,
however, he excluded from its purview the 450,000 ·slaves in
Delaware, Kentucky, Maryland, and Missouri; 275, |
Filename | indep-box22-04-29.pdf |
Archival file | Volume70/indep-box22-04-29.pdf |