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ordination ef intergovernmental relations. Rapidly increasing activities in this field require executive oversight (Chapters 3, 5, and 11).
CITY ATTORNEY
THE CITY ATTORNEY'S RESPONSIBILITIES AS CHIEF LEGAL
ADVISER AND CITY PROSECUTOR REQUIRE THAT THIS OFFICE
BE INDEPENDENT FROM THE MAYOR AND THE COUNCIL.
Proposal—Continue the City Attorney as an elected
official, and retain his present duties (sections 3.40-
3.48).
The legal functions performed by the City Attorney's
Office have been performed in an impartial and objective manner. The Attorney's duties and method of selection are important factors in maintaining a balance
between the legislative and executive branches. For
these reasons the Attorney is retained as an elected officer and his current duties are continued (Chapters 3
and 4).
CITY ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER
THE CITY ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER (CAO) IS RESPONSIBLE
TO BOTH THE MAYOR AND THE COUNCIL. THE OFFICE HAS
LITTLE OFFICIAL AUTHORITY BUT IT EXERCISES CONSIDERABLE INFLUENCE BECAUSE OF ITS INVOLVEMENT IN THE
BUDGET PREPARATION PROCESS. THIS ARRANGEMENT CONFUSES AUTHORITY AND IS INCOMPATIBLE WITH AN INTEGRATED MANAGEMENT ORGANIZATION.
Proposal—Make the CAO responsible to the Mayor for
administration of the affairs of the city (section
3.20).
Under the current charter the CAO is in the difficult
position of serving two bosses and having little authority other than to recommend. As a result, city administration is weak and uncoordinated.
The proposed charter establishes an integrated management organization with the CAO serving as a chief
of staff to the Mayor. The CAO will continue to assist
the Mayor in the preparation of the annual budget. The
result will be more efficient administration of city activities (Chapter 3).
BOARDS AND COMMISSIONS
CITY BOARDS OF COMMISSIONERS ARE PERFORMING APPROPRIATE APPEALS, REGULATORY, AND ADVISORY FUNCTIONS, BUT THEIR USE AS ADMINISTRATIVE HEADS OF CITY
DEPARTMENTS DIFFUSES EXECUTIVE AND LEGISLATIVE AUTHORITY. IN ADDITION, CHARTER SPECIFIED COMPENSATION
FOR BOARD MEMBERS IS ARBITRARY AND INEQUITABLE.
CITY GOVERNMENT FOR THE FUTURE
Proposal—Retain boards of commissioners for app
regulator}', and advisory functions but, as a gen
rule, discontinue their use as heads of governmental departments (sections 4.02 and 4.03).
Boards and commissions currently control and manage some of the city's largest departments. Some of
them have independent powers and are not controlled
by the Mayor or the Council.
Municipal government has become too complex to be
managed by part-time lay citizen boards. Under the
proposed charter, with the exception of the Police and
proprietary departments, boards will not have administrative control over departments. Almost all departments will be managed by general managers, and
boards will continue to serve in advisory, appellate, and
regulatory capacities (Chapter 5).
Proposal—Remove the stated compensation for members of boards from the charter and have it established by the Council upon the recommendation of
the Mayor (section 6.08).
Compensation for commissioners is now specified in
the charter in dollar amounts. As a result, most board
members are compensated the same amount despite
wide variations in responsibilities and work loads. This
arbitrary and inequitable arrangement is corrected in
the proposed charter by permitting the Mayor -
Council to set commission compensation accordii
the services rendered (Chapters 5 and 7).
PROPRIETARY DEPARTMENTS
THE EXISTING ORGANIZATIONAL ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE
PROPRIETARY DEPARTMENTS OF AIRPORTS, HARBOR, AND
WATER AND POWER HAVE PROVEN ADEQUATE. THE QUESTION OF WHETHER OR NOT THE DEPARTMENTS SHOULD
CONTRIBUTE TO THE GENERAL FUND IS UNRESOLVED AND
REQUIRES CHARTER ATTENTION.
Proposal—Continue the existing organization and independent powers for the proprietary departments
(Article 5).
As revenue-producing activities, the proprietary departments are like business enterprises. Each department performs a completely different service for a
unique user group, but all operate as regional agencies.
These activities must remain free from the political
pressures of City Hall.
The boards serving as the heads of the proprietary
departments act in a manner similar to boards of directors of private corporations. They appoint general
managers and control the departments.
Under the present organization, the three depart-
ments have been able to meet the demands place
them by tremendous growth. This performance
Object Description
| Title | City government for the future, 1969-07 |
| Description | Section 2: City government for the future: report of the Los Angeles City Charter Commission. Los Angeles, California: Los Angeles City Hall, 1969 July. PART OF A SERIES: A critical component of the Commission's investigation centered on the idea that governance of the LAPD was shared between the Office of the Chief of Police, an administrative body, and the Board of Police Commissioners, a citizen body. To better understand the dynamic between these two entities, the staff of Heller, Ehrman, White, & McAuliffe researched the history of the Los Angeles City Charter, focusing primarily on its provisions regarding the distribution of power and the structure and organization of the LAPD. Included in the series are reproductions of reports, dissertations, article clippings, excerpts from city documents, and charter amendments related to the charter's conception and development over time. The series also includes several summaries of expert witness interviews regarding the effectiveness of this structure. |
| Coverage date | 1809; 1850/1974; 1984 |
| Publisher (of the original version) | Los Angeles City Hall |
| Place of publication (of the original version) | Los Angeles, California, USA |
| Publisher (of the digital version) | University of Southern California |
| Date issued | 1969-07 |
| Type | texts |
| Format | 253 p. |
| Format (aat) | reports |
| Format (imt) | application/pdf |
| Language | English |
| Contributing entity | University of Southern California |
| Part of collection | Independent Commission on the Los Angeles Police Department, 1991 |
| Series | Heller, Ehrman, White & McAuliffe |
| File | Los Angeles City document index |
| Box and folder | box 21, folder 7, item 3 |
| Provenance | The collection was given to the University of Southern California on July 31, 1991. |
| Rights | This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License. https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ All requests for permission to publish or quote from manuscripts must be submitted in writing to the Manuscripts Librarian. Permission for publication is given on behalf of Special Collections as the owner of the physical items and is not intended to include or imply permission of the copyright holder, which must also be obtained. |
| Physical access | Contact: Special Collections, Doheny Memorial Library, Libraries, University of Southern California, Los Angeles, CA 90089-0189; specol@dots.usc.edu |
| Repository name | USC Libraries Special Collections |
| Repository address | Doheny Memorial Library, Los Angeles, CA 90089-0189 |
| Repository email | specol@dots.usc.edu |
| Filename | indep-box21-07-03 |
Description
| Title | City government for the future, p. 19 |
| Format (imt) | image/tiff |
| Physical access | Contact: Special Collections, Doheny Memorial Library, Libraries, University of Southern California, Los Angeles, CA 90089-0189; specol@dots.usc.edu |
| Full text | ordination ef intergovernmental relations. Rapidly increasing activities in this field require executive oversight (Chapters 3, 5, and 11). CITY ATTORNEY THE CITY ATTORNEY'S RESPONSIBILITIES AS CHIEF LEGAL ADVISER AND CITY PROSECUTOR REQUIRE THAT THIS OFFICE BE INDEPENDENT FROM THE MAYOR AND THE COUNCIL. Proposal—Continue the City Attorney as an elected official, and retain his present duties (sections 3.40- 3.48). The legal functions performed by the City Attorney's Office have been performed in an impartial and objective manner. The Attorney's duties and method of selection are important factors in maintaining a balance between the legislative and executive branches. For these reasons the Attorney is retained as an elected officer and his current duties are continued (Chapters 3 and 4). CITY ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER THE CITY ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER (CAO) IS RESPONSIBLE TO BOTH THE MAYOR AND THE COUNCIL. THE OFFICE HAS LITTLE OFFICIAL AUTHORITY BUT IT EXERCISES CONSIDERABLE INFLUENCE BECAUSE OF ITS INVOLVEMENT IN THE BUDGET PREPARATION PROCESS. THIS ARRANGEMENT CONFUSES AUTHORITY AND IS INCOMPATIBLE WITH AN INTEGRATED MANAGEMENT ORGANIZATION. Proposal—Make the CAO responsible to the Mayor for administration of the affairs of the city (section 3.20). Under the current charter the CAO is in the difficult position of serving two bosses and having little authority other than to recommend. As a result, city administration is weak and uncoordinated. The proposed charter establishes an integrated management organization with the CAO serving as a chief of staff to the Mayor. The CAO will continue to assist the Mayor in the preparation of the annual budget. The result will be more efficient administration of city activities (Chapter 3). BOARDS AND COMMISSIONS CITY BOARDS OF COMMISSIONERS ARE PERFORMING APPROPRIATE APPEALS, REGULATORY, AND ADVISORY FUNCTIONS, BUT THEIR USE AS ADMINISTRATIVE HEADS OF CITY DEPARTMENTS DIFFUSES EXECUTIVE AND LEGISLATIVE AUTHORITY. IN ADDITION, CHARTER SPECIFIED COMPENSATION FOR BOARD MEMBERS IS ARBITRARY AND INEQUITABLE. CITY GOVERNMENT FOR THE FUTURE Proposal—Retain boards of commissioners for app regulator}', and advisory functions but, as a gen rule, discontinue their use as heads of governmental departments (sections 4.02 and 4.03). Boards and commissions currently control and manage some of the city's largest departments. Some of them have independent powers and are not controlled by the Mayor or the Council. Municipal government has become too complex to be managed by part-time lay citizen boards. Under the proposed charter, with the exception of the Police and proprietary departments, boards will not have administrative control over departments. Almost all departments will be managed by general managers, and boards will continue to serve in advisory, appellate, and regulatory capacities (Chapter 5). Proposal—Remove the stated compensation for members of boards from the charter and have it established by the Council upon the recommendation of the Mayor (section 6.08). Compensation for commissioners is now specified in the charter in dollar amounts. As a result, most board members are compensated the same amount despite wide variations in responsibilities and work loads. This arbitrary and inequitable arrangement is corrected in the proposed charter by permitting the Mayor - Council to set commission compensation accordii the services rendered (Chapters 5 and 7). PROPRIETARY DEPARTMENTS THE EXISTING ORGANIZATIONAL ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE PROPRIETARY DEPARTMENTS OF AIRPORTS, HARBOR, AND WATER AND POWER HAVE PROVEN ADEQUATE. THE QUESTION OF WHETHER OR NOT THE DEPARTMENTS SHOULD CONTRIBUTE TO THE GENERAL FUND IS UNRESOLVED AND REQUIRES CHARTER ATTENTION. Proposal—Continue the existing organization and independent powers for the proprietary departments (Article 5). As revenue-producing activities, the proprietary departments are like business enterprises. Each department performs a completely different service for a unique user group, but all operate as regional agencies. These activities must remain free from the political pressures of City Hall. The boards serving as the heads of the proprietary departments act in a manner similar to boards of directors of private corporations. They appoint general managers and control the departments. Under the present organization, the three depart- ments have been able to meet the demands place them by tremendous growth. This performance |
| Filename | indep-box21-07-03~019.tif |
| Archival file | Volume68/indep-box21-07-03~019.tif |
