Municipal & county government secion of Town Hall, p. 93 |
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184 . A STUDY OF THE CITY CHARTER Legislation The Mayor's formal powers in legislation are mild on the one hand and negative on the other. The charter requires him annually, before the presentation of the budget, to send to the Council a general statement of the condition and affairs of the city and to recommend the adoption of measures he considers expedient and proper. The charter also states that periodically he can send special communications to the Council. Thus, the Mayor clearly has the authority to propose legislation to the Council. In addition, the Mayor has the negative right to veto any ordinance, which then becomes law only if repassed by a two-thirds vote of the entire Council (three-fourths of the whole Council when a two-thirds vote or more was required for the original ordinance). However, the Mayor must exercise this righr within ren calendar days after an ordinance is presented to him. This is a very short period, considering that weekend days and holidays are included in the ten-day limit and comparing the time (sixty days after presentation of the Mayor's objections) given to the Council to override a veto. In terms of formal relationships between the Mayor and the Council, the real problem is the high degree of isolation of the Mayor from the legislative process. In some cities this isolation does not exist because the mayor serves as the presiding officer of the council or as a voting member or as both. At the present time, measures sponsored by the Mayor can be bottled up in a Council committee or shuttled between committees and thus never ger to the full Council because other members of the Council do not often withdraw the proposals from committee for presentation to the Council. (It may be suggested that this practice is fostered by the exclusive district system of Council representation which encourages councilmen to pay homage to one another.) At various times since 1925, proposals of the Mayor have been buried in Council committees mainly or solely because he initiated them. And it has been rare for a Mayor to ask to speak or to be requested to do so before the Council to explain his proposals. Actually, the two offices are so constructed by the charter as to work against easy interaction. The Mayor and the Council, under existing charter provisions, can go their separate ways and have almost no direct face- to-face contacts, despite the fact that they are both viral, interrelated parts of the same government. It is evident that a big, important step to improving the city government is to provide a significant means of breaking down the isolation, bred by the charter, between the Mayor and the Council. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS. MAYOR RECOMMENDATIONS 185 Appointment and Removal Authority The Mayor should have the authority to appoint all non-elective department heads and general managers, except those in the three proprietary departments (Airports, Harbor, and Water and Power), the Civil Service Department, the Department of Pensions, and the City Employees' Retirement System. Appointments should be made from civil service lists on the basis of recommendations by the City Administrative Officer and should be subject to confirmation by the Council.22 The procedure should be for the Mayor to consider the name of the person recommended to him by the City Administrative Officer as the best qualified and available individual on the basis of the list of candidates certified as qualified to the CAO by the Board of Civil Service Commissioners after its testing of the applicants. The Mayor should have the righr to accept or reject this initial recommendation and, if he rejects ir, he should be able once to ask the CAO for a second recommendation from the list. Council consideration of the proposed appointment will follow. If the Council turns down the Mayor's proposed appointment, the Mayor will requesr another recommendation by the CAO from the list. The Mayor should have the authority to remove any of these department heads and general managers. A dismissed department head or general manager should receive a written statement of the reasons for such action and should be entitled to a public hearing before the Board of Civil Service Commissioners. The board should then certify its findings and recommendations to the Mayor, but it should not be able to overrule him. After reviewing the board's report, the Mayor should consider the board's findings and his decision should then be final. Presiding Officer of the Council The Mayor should be the presiding officer of the Council. (Various executives in other governments serve in this capacity.) The Mayor should be able to enter into the discussions, but he should not have a vote on the Council. As Mayor, he should continue to have the veto power over ordi- --T he recommendations made here on appointment and removal of non-elective department heads and general managers do not apply to the City Administrative Officer. He should continue to be exempt from civil service, appointed by the Mayor, subject to Council approval, and removed by the Major with a majority vote of the Council members or by a two-thirds vote of the Council members alone.
Object Description
Title | Legal research regarding the history of the Los Angeles charter, 1850-1963 (3b of 3) |
Description | Municipal and county government section of Town Hall. A study of the Los Angeles City Charter: a report. Los Angeles, California: Town Hall, Biltmore Hotel, 1963 December. PART OF A SERIES: A critical component of the Commission's investigation centered on the idea that governance of the LAPD was shared between the Office of the Chief of Police, an administrative body, and the Board of Police Commissioners, a citizen body. To better understand the dynamic between these two entities, the staff of Heller, Ehrman, White, & McAuliffe researched the history of the Los Angeles City Charter, focusing primarily on its provisions regarding the distribution of power and the structure and organization of the LAPD. Included in the series are reproductions of reports, dissertations, article clippings, excerpts from city documents, and charter amendments related to the charter's conception and development over time. The series also includes several summaries of expert witness interviews regarding the effectiveness of this structure. |
Geographic subject (city or populated place) | Los Angeles |
Geographic subject (county) | Los Angeles |
Geographic subject (state) | California |
Geographic subject (country) | USA |
Coverage date | 1850; 1887/1889; 1898; 1900; 1902; 1903; 1911/1916; 1918/1920; 1923/1963 |
Creator | Town Hall, Biltmore Hotel. Municipal and County Government Section |
Publisher (of the original version) | Town Hall, Biltmore; Anderson, Ritchie and Simon, printer; The Ward Ritchie Press |
Place of publication (of the original version) | Los Angeles, California, USA |
Publisher (of the digital version) | University of Southern California |
Date issued | 1963-12 |
Type | texts |
Format | 109 p. |
Format (aat) | books |
Format (imt) | application/pdf |
Language | English |
Contributing entity | University of Southern California |
Part of collection | Independent Commission on the Los Angeles Police Department, 1991 |
Series | Heller, Ehrman, White & McAuliffe |
File | Legal research regarding the history of the Los Angeles charter |
Box and folder | box 21, folder 6, item 2 |
Provenance | The collection was given to the University of Southern California on July 31, 1991. |
Rights | This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License. https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ All requests for permission to publish or quote from manuscripts must be submitted in writing to the Manuscripts Librarian. Permission for publication is given on behalf of Special Collections as the owner of the physical items and is not intended to include or imply permission of the copyright holder, which must also be obtained. |
Physical access | Contact: Special Collections, Doheny Memorial Library, Libraries, University of Southern California, Los Angeles, CA 90089-0189; specol@dots.usc.edu |
Repository name | USC Libraries Special Collections |
Repository address | Doheny Memorial Library, Los Angeles, CA 90089-0189 |
Repository email | specol@dots.usc.edu |
Filename | indep-box21-06-02 |
Description
Title | Municipal & county government secion of Town Hall, p. 93 |
Format (imt) | image/tiff |
Physical access | Contact: Special Collections, Doheny Memorial Library, Libraries, University of Southern California, Los Angeles, CA 90089-0189; specol@dots.usc.edu |
Full text | 184 . A STUDY OF THE CITY CHARTER Legislation The Mayor's formal powers in legislation are mild on the one hand and negative on the other. The charter requires him annually, before the presentation of the budget, to send to the Council a general statement of the condition and affairs of the city and to recommend the adoption of measures he considers expedient and proper. The charter also states that periodically he can send special communications to the Council. Thus, the Mayor clearly has the authority to propose legislation to the Council. In addition, the Mayor has the negative right to veto any ordinance, which then becomes law only if repassed by a two-thirds vote of the entire Council (three-fourths of the whole Council when a two-thirds vote or more was required for the original ordinance). However, the Mayor must exercise this righr within ren calendar days after an ordinance is presented to him. This is a very short period, considering that weekend days and holidays are included in the ten-day limit and comparing the time (sixty days after presentation of the Mayor's objections) given to the Council to override a veto. In terms of formal relationships between the Mayor and the Council, the real problem is the high degree of isolation of the Mayor from the legislative process. In some cities this isolation does not exist because the mayor serves as the presiding officer of the council or as a voting member or as both. At the present time, measures sponsored by the Mayor can be bottled up in a Council committee or shuttled between committees and thus never ger to the full Council because other members of the Council do not often withdraw the proposals from committee for presentation to the Council. (It may be suggested that this practice is fostered by the exclusive district system of Council representation which encourages councilmen to pay homage to one another.) At various times since 1925, proposals of the Mayor have been buried in Council committees mainly or solely because he initiated them. And it has been rare for a Mayor to ask to speak or to be requested to do so before the Council to explain his proposals. Actually, the two offices are so constructed by the charter as to work against easy interaction. The Mayor and the Council, under existing charter provisions, can go their separate ways and have almost no direct face- to-face contacts, despite the fact that they are both viral, interrelated parts of the same government. It is evident that a big, important step to improving the city government is to provide a significant means of breaking down the isolation, bred by the charter, between the Mayor and the Council. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS. MAYOR RECOMMENDATIONS 185 Appointment and Removal Authority The Mayor should have the authority to appoint all non-elective department heads and general managers, except those in the three proprietary departments (Airports, Harbor, and Water and Power), the Civil Service Department, the Department of Pensions, and the City Employees' Retirement System. Appointments should be made from civil service lists on the basis of recommendations by the City Administrative Officer and should be subject to confirmation by the Council.22 The procedure should be for the Mayor to consider the name of the person recommended to him by the City Administrative Officer as the best qualified and available individual on the basis of the list of candidates certified as qualified to the CAO by the Board of Civil Service Commissioners after its testing of the applicants. The Mayor should have the righr to accept or reject this initial recommendation and, if he rejects ir, he should be able once to ask the CAO for a second recommendation from the list. Council consideration of the proposed appointment will follow. If the Council turns down the Mayor's proposed appointment, the Mayor will requesr another recommendation by the CAO from the list. The Mayor should have the authority to remove any of these department heads and general managers. A dismissed department head or general manager should receive a written statement of the reasons for such action and should be entitled to a public hearing before the Board of Civil Service Commissioners. The board should then certify its findings and recommendations to the Mayor, but it should not be able to overrule him. After reviewing the board's report, the Mayor should consider the board's findings and his decision should then be final. Presiding Officer of the Council The Mayor should be the presiding officer of the Council. (Various executives in other governments serve in this capacity.) The Mayor should be able to enter into the discussions, but he should not have a vote on the Council. As Mayor, he should continue to have the veto power over ordi- --T he recommendations made here on appointment and removal of non-elective department heads and general managers do not apply to the City Administrative Officer. He should continue to be exempt from civil service, appointed by the Mayor, subject to Council approval, and removed by the Major with a majority vote of the Council members or by a two-thirds vote of the Council members alone. |
Filename | indep-box21-06-02~093.tif |
Archival file | Volume68/indep-box21-06-02~093.tif |