~ANGELES PUBLIC lfBRARY
BUREAU OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION
UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA
BERKELEY
SAMUEL C. MAY
Director
CALIFORNIA CITY
GOVERNMENT
By JOHN C. BOLLENS and JOHN R . McKINLEY
COP. 2
December 1948
• !here is very little likelihood that ·the state legislature will add
Jiig amendments to or emasculate the 1.funioipal Corporations Act. Califor­ltles
acting through their League of Cal if'ornia Cities are vigilant end
-.e in. protecting the provisions of the .Act. They are responsible for
r~nt status as a modern and adequate act.
· ., '· It is easier for a special interest group to secure amendment of a
oi~ ·~ fl'eeholder charter than it is to ' secure change in the state legislation.
l·ia thus more possibility that such a group might add damaging sections
to 1'.reeholder charter •
. • · i ~ drafting local charters, boards of freeholders sometimes use new
te f • logy and ambiguous phrases instead of a.dopting words which have been
·aubj t ·to judicial interpr.etation. As a oonsequence, it is possible that
legi difficulties will arise in determining the exact meaning and intent of
oe . n sections of a freeholder charter.
'. f• The ti.oo tax limit imposed upon cities ' of the sixth olass may be
~!llf~ed by a majority of the voters of such cities.l
l're;fu,lder Charter Cities . :
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1Fitty-seven or about one fifth of the cities in California are operating
~ locally determined charters. (Table V, .on page 39) Slightly more than
S, ,000 live in charter 1 cities. These cities, which make up about nineteen
peroiint ot the incorporated places in the state, contain approximately eighty­on
P,91"oent of the people .living within city limits. They range in population
.tr~1 :oroville with 4,421 to Los Angeles with 1,805,687. Their average popula-
• tio including Los Angeles which has about one third of their total, is
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9. Excluding Los Angeles, the average drops to 64,338.
~· California city containing more than 3,500 people may adopt its own
r by following the procedure set forth in the state oonstitution:2
An election of a board of fifteen freeholders may be called by
a two-thirds vote of the city council or by a petition signed
bY 15 percent of the qualified electors of the city. If a
majority of the voters favor drafting a charter, the fifteen
freeholder candidates receiving the greatest number of votes
at the same election are given the res~onsibility of drafting
a charter within a period of one year.
2£.
A charter may be : fr~d by the ' city council or its representatives.
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i. ' 1947, Ch. 1343 c~anged the vot~ng · requirement from two-thirds
I Q a majority. ,
2.', caht~ Const., Art. XI, Seo~ 8
3. \Three valuable aids to councilmanio pr citizen charter drafters are Model
. Ci~ Charter (1941 revision) and A Guide to Charter Commissions (194~
;:b'O published by the National Kunic~pal . League, 299 Broadway, New York 7;
·•. ~d Revising a City. Charter (19~7), by Thomas H~ Reed, distributed by the
.· GovetDnental Research Association, 30 Rockefeller Plaza, New York 20.
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TABLE V
FREEHOLDER CHARTER CITIES IN CALIFORNIA
First, Pr~sent Charters
Alameda
Albany
_....-Alhambra
Bakersfield
Berkeley
Burbank
Chico
....--Compton
.....-Culver City
Eureka
Fresno
Glendale
Grass Valley
i--Hunti:ngton Beach
i--Inglewood
vt.ong Beach
Los Angeles
Marysville
.Modesto
Monterey
Napa
Oakland
Oroville
Pacific Grove
Palo Alto
Pasadena
Petaluma
Piedmont
yPomona
1907, 1937
1927
1915
J 1915
1895, 1909
i. . 1927
1923
1925
' 1947
1.895
1901, 1921
1921 :
1893, 1921
.·1937
1927
·1907, 1921
' 1889, 1925
1919
1911
1911, 1925
1893, 1915
1889, 1911
1933 '
1927
1909
1901
1911
1923
1911
First, Present Charters
/porterville
vRedondo Beach
Redwood City
Richmqnd
Riverside
Roseville
Sacramento
~linas
vSan Bernardino
vSan ·Buena Ventura
(Ventura)
San Diego
s&n Franoisoo
San Jose
.San Leandro
San Luis Obispo
San Mateo
San Rafael
..:-Santa Barbara
S.anta Clara
Santa Cruz
vSanta Monica
Santa Rosa
Stockton
v'forrarioe
v'f ulare
Vallejo
VVisalia
Watsonville
I II
' !
1927
1935
1929
1909
1907, 1929
1935
1893, 1921
1903, 1919
1905
1931, 1933
1889, 1931
1898, 1931
1897, 1915
1933
1911
1923
1913
1899, 1927
1927
1907. 1911
1907" 1947
1903, 1923
1889, 1923
1947
1923
1899, 1946
1923
1903
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A majority vote in favor 0£ the charter is required in order
' to obtain local ratification. The charter is then submitted
to the state legislature at its next session. It must ac­quire
a majority vote in both legislative houses (no charter
has yet £ailed to get legislative ratification)~
Arter local and state legislative approval, it is then filed
with the secretary of state.
Charter amendments may be proposed by the city council or by
a petition containing signatures of fi~een percent of the
city voters. They must be approved by majority vote of the
· city voters and the state legislature.
~ r~eeholder · charters illustrate the doctrine 0£ home rule for cities.
Brietly stated, it is the power given to cities by state constitutional
provisions to frame and adopt their own cha-rte rs, · and to have supremacy in
municipal affairs. The reasoning behind the doctrine of municipal home rule
is .. thAt each city is a natural social and economic unit having its indi vi­dual
problems of self govermnent. It is held that therefore citizens of in­_
dividual. cities. are in a better position to decide how they shall .be governed
rath.,r than having the functions and organization of city govermnent depen­dent
upon laws passed by the state legislature.I
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1 The entire subject of freehold charters and the doctrine of municipal
hOJll,!3 ;r-uJ.e has received voluminous interpretations by the state courts of .
California. From these many, and sometimes conflicting, ·decisions several
fairlYi W'8ll settled principles can be deduced.
I. ;,
• T,irst, a freeholder charter when ratified by the state legislature be­comes
a law of the legislature. It automatically repeals any inconsistent
general statutes dealing with municipal affairs of the city.
~econd, a chartered city is independent of general state laws dealing
witp piunicipal affairs and it pre~ils 9ver the general laws where there is
a cpnflict. It is necessary, however, that the charter have a blanket clause
giving the city power over "al 1 municipal affairs except as limited by the
charter.• · General state laws operate within chartered cities where there is
no conflict over municipal affairs and where the law concerns a matter of
.state policy.
· fhird, the important question o~ "what is a municipal affair?" must be
left to judicial interpretation. There has never been a clear court defini-
, tio~ pf •municipal affairs" in California. This has ~cessitated se~arate
court decisions as questions have arisen concerning specific municipal ac­tivities.
It is a slow process of judicial inclusion and exclusion • .. Some
matter s (compensation and pensions of city employees, election ani remoV.1
of municipal officers, provision for certain public utilities. prosecutions
1. But it should also. be noted that recent developments in general state
law affecting sixth class !'ities haye similarly been .directed toward
these objectives by providing for optional forms of government and for
a r ather broad grant of power.
tor violations of city' charter and municipal ordinances, opening. widening
and maintenance of streets, bridge construction and repair) are thus muni­cipal
affairs. Others (organization, consolidation and annexation of ter­ritory,
streets declared to be secondary highways, organization and control
of school districts, disposition of fines for misdemeanors in violation of
state laws) have been determined to be state affairs and not under the ju­risdiction
of charter cities.
There are several major benefits generally accruing to a ciiU through
adoption of a freehold~r-' oharter:
1. A freeholder charter gives the people of the community an oppor­tunity
to have the kind: of . government they themselves want, both as to form
of organization and tun~tions to be exercised.
2. Preparing a .freeholder charter creates public interest in civic
affairs because it p~acea the responsibility for community develoIEent di­rectly
in the hands of the citizens of the city.
3. It is often easier to revise and amend a freeholder charter locally
than it is ~o 4ave the state legislature change the lhlnicipal Corporations
Act.
4. Contrariwise. the city is not subjected to the whim of the state
legislature in municip«ll affairs should the legis;tature make some undesirable
changes in the Municipal Corporations Act.
5. Local government tends to be more adaptable to local conditions and ·
needs under a freeholder charter than it is under the ·system of uniform state
legislation.
6. A charter oity may set its own tax rate 'limitation. It may leave
the property tax rate ·at tl.00 per 1100 assess~d valuation as it is under
the Municipal Corparations · Act or it may extend the rate beyond this limi­tation
or choose to set none at all. This factor has influenced some large
cities that required additional revenue from property taxation to adopt
charters.
Forms of Cit\ Government
Mayor-Council
The mayor-councii &ystem, oldest of the three principal forms of city
government in Califolin t~ • ·consists of~ looal' elected .ohief: exeoutive {the
mayor)l, a group of ts;Te 4tb fifteen membersfi e'lected .at large or from wards.
and responsible for ena:d~tig . local laws (the . ootincil) and few ar many elected
or appointed department iie~ds and adminis~ra~~ve boards ; i V~iatio~s existing
within the t~ee majo1" j crms of ~ municipal government· are strikingly evident
1. California mayors are ·either elected by the voters or elevated to the posi­tion
by a vote of the eieoted cowicil from amo~ its own membership.
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in the mayor-council plan. The distinction is largely determimd not by
quality of personnel but through relationships existing between mayor and
council.
In all general law cities and many oharter cities in California, the
mayor- is simply the presiding officer of the counoil. He is chosen from a­mong
the council membership by its majority vote. In such instances, the
mayor has no exclusive powers of appointing administrative personnel nor
does he have authority to veto acts of the council. All of these cities
constitute one type of mayor-oouncil government. In addition, some charter
cities which provide for the election by the people of the mayor, indepen­dent
of the council, belong to this first type of mayor-council city. They
generally require confirmation by the council of the mayor's appointments
to administrative positions, and prohibit the mayor from vetoing acts of
the council. Conversely, a number of Califqrnia charter cities concentrate
substantial administrative and legislative responsibilities in the mayor,
and are therefore a second major variety of mayor-council organization.l
Two hundred twenty-nine of California's three hundred and four cities
operate under the mayor-council system.~ This .total is composed of two
hundred and eight or eighty-four percent of the general law cities, and
twenty-five or forty-four ·percent of the charter cities.
Commission
In the · comnission form of urban looal government five commissi.oner1J
are elected by popular vote. They serve as the legislature of the city,
and, in addition, each of them direots · an administrative department. Sacra­mento
was the first commission oity in the United States, adopting the form
in 1863. 3 The main feature of the syst~ as· · it functioned in Sacramento
was the election of three trustees, who simultaneously served together as
the city's legislative body, and separately as directors of the police, fire,
and water departments. A mayor and council replaced the commission system
in 1893.
After the plan was revived and popμlariz"d nationally through its adop­tion
by Galveston, Texas, and Des Moines, Iowa, in the early years of the
twentieth century, numerous cities in California and elsewhere experimented
with the system. The idea expanded until 1917 when over ~e hundred cities
in the United States were governed by commissions.. A reverse trend then got
under way, and during the last thirty years there has been a steady decline,
and very few adoptions. Since Vallejo 'and Santa Monica abandoned the system
1. Cities may fluctuate between these extreme~ of the mayor-.council form,
depending upon the mayor's conception of 'his duties, am his' personality.
2. For information about speoif'.ic cities_; see California. Secretary of State,
Rosters Public Officials of California (First 1948 Revision), P• 108-180-
3. Cal. Stats. 1863, p. 415 . .
...
/- ~ / in 1947 in favor of the oouncil-manager form, /Fres~o is the only oharter oity
in California operating aa a oommission city.1- - --
Although their :major officers are listed in the official state roster as
mayors and councilmen, .aq leaa populous general 1la• cities .in California
are functioning under a :modified commission plan. In such instanoea, the five
oounoilm.en, generally at their initial meeting after the looal election, de­cide
whioh of them shall be mayor and specify what city functions, most usu­ally
publio works, finance, and police and fire, shall be allooated to specific
counoil members. Councilmen in sixth class oitiea have absolutely no power
except when acting at a :meeti.Jlg of the city council. As a legislative body,
they haTe ponra conferred upon them by law. .la individual councilmen, they
have absolutely no power. They are not department heads and any purported
exervise of administratin authority is illegally aasumad. anl. . ..ia wholly with­out
atatutory authority • . Sinoe 1947, sixth claaa cities (whioh includes all
general law cities with only two exoeptions) can use either the mayor-counoil
or council-manager form of government, but are unable to adopt the commission
system.
Because their mayors and counoilm.en are part-time departmental advisors
rather than full-time administrators, ~ small California cities will prob­ably
continue to use the :modified commission formo Howenr, many heavily
populated California cities which have abandoned the plan did ao because of
a canmon, serious defect--diftusion of administrative responsibility among
five commissionerso The abaenoe of~ single, unifying executive .usually
meant little coordination ot city activities, much duplication of effort,
and frequent friction between department heads who were not elected upon the
basis of their qualifications to be directors of oity administrative depart­ments.
Large cities in California have turned away from the camnission form
in favor of the council-manager and mayor-oouncil aystema.
Council-llanager
The council-manager torm of city government, frequently termed the chief
contribution of the United States to municipal administration, contains sev-eral
major identif'ying oharacteristioss ·
lo The elected city council determines all municipal policies not set
forth in the city charter or the state general laws, enacts local ordinances,
votes appropriations, and appoints and may remove a chief administrator, the
city manager.
2. Heither the mayor, who is usually appointed by the council from
among ita 01lll :members, nor the oouncil interferes with the adm.inistratiTe
l. Section 6 ot the :rreano oity charter states that •Bxoept aa othenriae ex­pressly
provided in this charter, the legiala-tive power of the oity and
general adminiatratiTe control of the city gonrmaent ••• . shall be wated
in a City Commiaaion ••. • ~amposed of the Commissioner or Public Safety
and Welfare and ex-offioio llayor, the Commissioner ot Finance, the Com­missioner
of Public Works, and two ••• Legislative Commissioners •
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turiotiona of the manager. The council deals with administration only through
the city manager, and these administrative functions are never delegated to
oounoil committees or members.
. ~ .' The city manager's authority must be commensurate with his responsi-bilities
as head of the city's administration. He generally has most, or all,
ot the following dutiess ' .. (a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
~ ..
(e)
(f)
{g)
(h)
To see that all laws and ordinances are enforced.
To exercise control over all departments and in acccr­dance
with civil service regulations appoint, supervise,
and remove department heads and subordinate employees
·_of the city.
·To make such recommendations to the council concerning
the affair~ of the oity as may seem to him desirable.
To keep the counoil advised of the financial condition
and future needs of the city.
To prepare and submit to the council the annual bu"tlget.
To prepare and submit such reports as may be required
by that body.
To keep the public informed, through reports to the
oounoil, regarding the operations of the oity govermnent.
To perform suoh other duties as may be prescribed by
charter, state law, or council ordinance or resolution.l
The.management functions most frequently vested in California city man-agers
· are i ·
{a) preparation of budget for current operations; \
(b) conduct of administrative planning;
{c) preparation of budget for capital improvements;
(d) control of e:xpenditures;
{e) coordination and direction of operations;
(f) appointment and removal of personnel; and
(g) representation of city in discussion of administrative
and policy questions relating to intergovernmental
relations.2
· Through appointment of city managers or chief administrative officers,
·seventy-seven cities in California have centralized part or all of their ad­ministrative
management in one person. (See Table VI, page 4~)3 This trend
l. International City Managers' Association, Recent Council-Manager Develop­me~
ts and Directory of Council-Manager Cities (April 1948), P• 3
2. ~ichard Graves, "council-Manager Govermnent in California Cities,• Western
~ity 23 :28, June 1947. Early council-manager developments in this state
are recounted in R. M. Dorton, •The City Manager Plan in Califcrnia• (un­pu?
lished M.A. thesis, University of California, Berkeley, 1925)
3. Forty-nine of these cities are approved as council-manager cities Qr' the
International City :Managers' Association. Prior to 1947, the office of city
manager could be filled in general law cities only by vote of the people.
The council of a general law city could, however, enact an ordinance pro­viding
for a chief administrative officer whose powers were limited to
making budget, personnel, and purchasing recommendations, ·subject to coun­cilmanic
ra~ification, and to coordinating departmental aotivities. Since
19~..,- it has been possible for general law city councils to enact ordinances
establishing the council-manager form of government. Cal. Stats. 1947,Ch.614
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TABLE VI
CALIFORNIA CITIES APPOINTING CITY MANAGERS OR CHIEF ADllINISTRATIVE OFFICERS
t. ., I ~
Charter Cities
Alameda (1917)
Alhambra (1916)
Bakersfield (1915)
Berkeley (1923)
Burbank ( 1927)
Chico (1923)
Compton (1925)
Culver City
Glendale (1914)
Inglewood
Long Beach 1921
on erey 1925
lan
Oroville
Pacific Grove (1927)
Pasadena (1921)
Petaltnna (1947)
Porterville (1927)
Redwood City (1929)
Richmond (1920)
Sacramento (1921)
Salinas (1936)
San Buena Ventura
(Ventura) (1933)
San Diego (1932)
San Francisco
San Jose (1916)
San Leandro (1928)
San Mateo (1923)
Santa Monica (1947)
Santa Rosa (1923)
Stockton (1923}
Torrance
Tulare (1923)
Vallejo (1947)
Visalia (1923}
General Law Cities
Antioch
Auburn ( 1948)
Avalon (1947)
Chula Vista
Claremont, (1948)
Coalinga
Coronado (1920)
Covina
Delano (1946)
El Cerrito
El Monte
Escondido
Fillmore (1918)
Glendora
Hawthorne (1948)
Hayward (1947)
Hillsborough (1928)
Lindsay
Lodi
Manhattan Beach
Martinet
Menlo Park (1947)
Merced
Mill Valley (1942)
Monterey Park
Na ti onal City
Newport Beach
Oceanside
Ontario (1944)
Oxnard (1947)
Palm Springs (1941)
Pittsburg (1919)
Redding (1946)
Redlands
· · Reedley
San Carlos
San Gabriel
South Pasadena (1920)
Ukiah
Upland (1930)
West Covina
wo·odland (1948)
Note: Cities followed by year are in the International City Kanagers' Assooia­tion
directory of approved council-manager cities (International City
Managers' Association, Municipal Year Book 1948 (1948). p. 493-4).
Approval is not based on professional qualifications of individual city
managers but upon the degree of responsibility given to them by city
oounoils. The years lis~ed are those in which the council-manager plan
was originally put into effect. ·
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is the •most significant reoent development in California city government.
It is being fostered by the intensification and multiplioation of problems
oonfronting counoilmen in rapidly growing cities. These local legislators,
partioularly those in ·general law cities who oan be expected to devote only
a limited portion of their time to oity business, feel compelled to dele­gate
administrative planning and duties to a professional administrator
hired by and directly responsible to them.
he three methods of obtaining the oounoil-manager plan in California
have f+l been used. They are: (1) inclusion in the locally drawn charter;
{2) adoption through ordinance approved by majority vote of the council;
and (3) ratification by majority vote of the local residents of ordinance
aubmi tted by a council majority {referendum ordinan oe 'j-. When the oounoil­manager
system is based on a charter provision or referendUlll ordinance, a2
vote Qf the people is required to abolish the office of the oity manager.
It ia muoh more vulnerable to the possibility of being abandoned due to
irrelevant or hasty action when it is founded solely on a oounoil ordinance,
repealable at any time by a bare majority of the oity oounoil.
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1. The tirst and third methods, respectively, are exclusively available to
charter and general law cities. Details relating to the various methods
of adopting the council-manager plan. and provisions limiting its appli­cation.
are contained in Deering's General Laws, Act 5233.
2. This in no way affects the council's power of appointment and removal of
a specific c~ty manager, a power basic to the plan itself. ' -
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CHAPTER 4. UNINCORPORATED URBAN .AREAS AND METHODS OF
ACQUIRING PUBLIC SERVICES
There are 894 unincorporated areas in California which possess place
names.l This is almost three times the number of incorporated cities. They
range in population from 25 to 42,000. Some are independent rural tr~ding
centers, but many border incorporated cities of which they are econonuoally
and socially a part. Thirty2two of them are more populous than the average
sixth class California city.
Particularly since the l930's there has been a decided growth of areas
immediately beyond city limits largely at the expense of cities. During the
depression years these areas provided temporary relief from relatively high
city rents, and from increased city property tax burdens. Availability of
mass transportation facilities was until recent years significant in deter­mining
the direction of residential developments. Improvement and greater
use of automobiles and roads have greatly reduced this importance, and have
substantially enlarged the area in which people oan live and still work within
the oity. Better private transportation means and more paved highways, both
more intensively used, are playing major roles in the growth of unincorporated
areas.3
Builders are attracted to urban fringe areas because of the existence of
many tracts of land of'ten easily acquired at prices lOYer than those generally
asked for vacant land within the oity.4 Other attractions to private builders
are elimination of the oost of tearing down old structures, and absence of
stringent building and zoning controls.
1. California. Seor~t~ of State, Roster: Public Officials of California
(First 1948 revision), p. 181-186
2. The average population of California sixth class cities is 5,033. The
five largest unincorporated areas, all in Los Angeles County, are: East
Los Angeles (42,000), .Belvedere Gardens (38,000), Bellflower (34,500),
Altadena (32,000), and Bell Gardens (30,000). A thorough treatment of
the status of local governmental services in the unincorporated sectors
of Los Angeles County is f'cund in Haynes Foundation, Los Angele~ County
as an .Agency of Municipal Government; by George W. Bemis and Nancy Basche
(1947). ' " ,]
3. Richard Andrews, 11El.ements in the Urban-Fringe Pattern, 11 Journal of Land
and Public Utility ~s&onomios 181173-4, Kay 1942 .
4. In many cities a ' la~ge "peroentage of the area is vacant land. In twenty­two
cities in the Ub1ted States, ranging in' population from 50,000 to
4,000,000, the average percentage of vacant area is 44.7. One reason so
much land is vacant--a factor significant to the growth of unincorporated
fringe areas--is the high asking prioe, based upon exagge~ated hope of
future use. U.S. National -Housing Agency, Land Assembly for Urban Re­development
{Deoembe~ 1945), p. 6
47