CENPA-356~24 |
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about 2 million emigrant workers living outside Portugal, and they are leaving at a rate of about 170,000 a year. These workers generally have above average skills and education, which are greatly needed within Portugal. The wage reforms instituted in the first few years under Caetano, were in large part directed at encouraging this group to remain or return to Portugal. The economic situation is full of contradictions, and is unresolvable within the context of the fascist, corporate state. All the weaknesses are so intertwined that to alleviate one, merely exacerbates another. On the one hand the economy is stagnant and to get it moving an increase in the labour force is necessary. But, there is an intense labour shortage due to the massive emigrations to Europe and the colonies over the past decade. In turn, the stagnating economy and the labour shortage obviously hurt the Portuguese war efforts in the colonies. However, on the other hand, emigration is also beneficial to Portugal. Settlers are needed in the colonies to aid in maintaining Portuguese control, and Portuguese workers outside the country sending money back have given Portugal its largest source of foreign exchange. So, despite the fact that criminal charges against those illegally emigrating have been loosened, if too many returned it would cut into the valuable foreign exchange that they feed into the lagging economy. Caetano hopes to avoid the issues raised by these conflicts by importing cheap labour from the colonies. It has been estimated that 15,000 Africans have arrived in Lisbon in the last few months, two-thirds of them from the Cape Verde Islands. But he is locked in. Again, Caetano can try to make petty reforms in the economy, but given the political and economic structures, and the continuation of the colonial wars, these small changes can barely even stabilise the situation. Foreign policy Changes in Foreign Policy have been a response to the growing need to increase support for the colonial wars and to draw more foreign capital into Portugal and the colonies. The new Foreign Minister, Rui Patricio, made it clear at his first press conference in July, 1970, that an important aspect of foreign policy making would be the development of a positive national image. A solid relationship with NATO allies is considered critical by the government as seen in the great importance Portugal gave to the NATO ministerial meeting in July, 1971 in Lisbon. But Caetano's strategy within NATO has changed in order to alleviate charges of the misuse of NATO supplied weapons in the war, and to temper the criticisms of some of the NATO allies who oppose the wars. Caetano now lays great emphasis on the fact that Portugal is fighting the colonial wars in Africa without outside assistance, but fails to mention the continuing use of NATO equipment in Africa, a clear violation to NATO regulations. In relation lo extending the areas NATO serves to include the South Atlantic, Portugal has carefully refrained from taking any pub lic initiatives. But at the same time, Caetano pushes the strategic location of the colonies for NATO security. The large scale foreign investment in the colonies that is now being encouraged, will also serve to push these countries to support the Portuguese war effort to protect their growing economic stake. But in order to make the idea of colonialism more palatable to these North American, Western European and Japanese interests, the Portuguese have made very minimal increases in the African wage scale, and slightly expanded the number of schools and hospitals. These token pacification measures, mostly only on paper, are sold under the rubric of ((economic and social development)) to increase outside support for the war. All these programmes and petty changes discussed so far have been aimed at neutralising opposition, pacifying discontent and expanding the power base of Marcelo Caetano. But they are complemented and enhanced by on-going efforts, to «split» established opposition groups and render them less effective. Forces which do not respond to the more co-optative method of repression then are confronted with crude force and secret police tactics. In his first few years Caetano was more successful in his pacification techniques than he has been recently. Increased opposition from the left and heightened pressures by the right have reduced Caetano to the Salazarist tactic of blaming subversive elements for most of Portugal's problems. Then his use of secret police and heavy repression becomes justified. Pacification through propaganda Caetano has pushed himself as a man who communicates easily with the people in hopes of undermining opposition and consolidating a power base, by creating the impression of ((consulting with the people». He has instituted regular informal T.V. appearances where in simple terms he presses home thc same points: the need for social improvements; thc importance of defending thc colonies, and the threat to Portugal's stability from inside and out. He has also travelled extensively within Portugal and to thc three African colonics reinforcing this image. 22
Object Description
Description
Title | CENPA-356~24 |
Filename | CENPA-356~24.tiff |
Full text | about 2 million emigrant workers living outside Portugal, and they are leaving at a rate of about 170,000 a year. These workers generally have above average skills and education, which are greatly needed within Portugal. The wage reforms instituted in the first few years under Caetano, were in large part directed at encouraging this group to remain or return to Portugal. The economic situation is full of contradictions, and is unresolvable within the context of the fascist, corporate state. All the weaknesses are so intertwined that to alleviate one, merely exacerbates another. On the one hand the economy is stagnant and to get it moving an increase in the labour force is necessary. But, there is an intense labour shortage due to the massive emigrations to Europe and the colonies over the past decade. In turn, the stagnating economy and the labour shortage obviously hurt the Portuguese war efforts in the colonies. However, on the other hand, emigration is also beneficial to Portugal. Settlers are needed in the colonies to aid in maintaining Portuguese control, and Portuguese workers outside the country sending money back have given Portugal its largest source of foreign exchange. So, despite the fact that criminal charges against those illegally emigrating have been loosened, if too many returned it would cut into the valuable foreign exchange that they feed into the lagging economy. Caetano hopes to avoid the issues raised by these conflicts by importing cheap labour from the colonies. It has been estimated that 15,000 Africans have arrived in Lisbon in the last few months, two-thirds of them from the Cape Verde Islands. But he is locked in. Again, Caetano can try to make petty reforms in the economy, but given the political and economic structures, and the continuation of the colonial wars, these small changes can barely even stabilise the situation. Foreign policy Changes in Foreign Policy have been a response to the growing need to increase support for the colonial wars and to draw more foreign capital into Portugal and the colonies. The new Foreign Minister, Rui Patricio, made it clear at his first press conference in July, 1970, that an important aspect of foreign policy making would be the development of a positive national image. A solid relationship with NATO allies is considered critical by the government as seen in the great importance Portugal gave to the NATO ministerial meeting in July, 1971 in Lisbon. But Caetano's strategy within NATO has changed in order to alleviate charges of the misuse of NATO supplied weapons in the war, and to temper the criticisms of some of the NATO allies who oppose the wars. Caetano now lays great emphasis on the fact that Portugal is fighting the colonial wars in Africa without outside assistance, but fails to mention the continuing use of NATO equipment in Africa, a clear violation to NATO regulations. In relation lo extending the areas NATO serves to include the South Atlantic, Portugal has carefully refrained from taking any pub lic initiatives. But at the same time, Caetano pushes the strategic location of the colonies for NATO security. The large scale foreign investment in the colonies that is now being encouraged, will also serve to push these countries to support the Portuguese war effort to protect their growing economic stake. But in order to make the idea of colonialism more palatable to these North American, Western European and Japanese interests, the Portuguese have made very minimal increases in the African wage scale, and slightly expanded the number of schools and hospitals. These token pacification measures, mostly only on paper, are sold under the rubric of ((economic and social development)) to increase outside support for the war. All these programmes and petty changes discussed so far have been aimed at neutralising opposition, pacifying discontent and expanding the power base of Marcelo Caetano. But they are complemented and enhanced by on-going efforts, to «split» established opposition groups and render them less effective. Forces which do not respond to the more co-optative method of repression then are confronted with crude force and secret police tactics. In his first few years Caetano was more successful in his pacification techniques than he has been recently. Increased opposition from the left and heightened pressures by the right have reduced Caetano to the Salazarist tactic of blaming subversive elements for most of Portugal's problems. Then his use of secret police and heavy repression becomes justified. Pacification through propaganda Caetano has pushed himself as a man who communicates easily with the people in hopes of undermining opposition and consolidating a power base, by creating the impression of ((consulting with the people». He has instituted regular informal T.V. appearances where in simple terms he presses home thc same points: the need for social improvements; thc importance of defending thc colonies, and the threat to Portugal's stability from inside and out. He has also travelled extensively within Portugal and to thc three African colonics reinforcing this image. 22 |
Archival file | Volume24/CENPA-356~24.tiff |