CENPA-356~22 |
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Caetano also had to be continually aware of the strength of the old guard ultra- rightists (particularly in the army), who were carefully watching his response to colonial policies and opposition, to make sure that his moves did not threaten political order and the existing consolidation of power. The old guard was hesitant of anything that appeared to be even the smallest change. Caetano had the task of pointing out through the success of his strategies or the reliance on repression, that he was in control. The right had to be shown that his petty reforms did not mean any change in ideology while other social forces were sold the same reforms as the beginning of real change within Portugal. In all practical reforms, the most important aspect is the appearance of change as a mechanism of political manipulation and pacification. To this end, Caetano used the press to a much greater extent than Salazar, and claimed during his first few months of office that a new press law was to be introduced. Widely publicised small changes did occur at first, but were instituted and used in order to consolidate support for Caetano. For example, in the election this so-called increased freedom of the press meant controlling information on the opposition to point out its disorganisation and to show that their demands were similar to what Caetano «said)> he wanted. Any efforts to discuss meaningful freedom of the press were dismissed by familiar arguments that Portugal was not ready for this because a prerequisite was ((proper education of both the press and the public)), which of course was difficult in a wartime situation. Accordingly, the new Press Law put into effect on the 1st June, 1972, limits the freedom of the press even more than before. The consistent contradiction referred to above appears clearly in the new Law. Thus, Art. 128 abolishes the Censorship Services, but Art. 129 imposes ((Previous examination for all texts and images to be published in the press». The reaction to this law in Portugal can be seen by a decision taken by the National Trade Union of Journalists, which in its General Assembly, resolved to ((express to the Government their deep dissatisfaction for the new Press Law, which increases their burden of responsibility without giving them a concurrent right of freedom of expression)). All his practical reforms, from the start were aimed at alleviating opposition from the various social forces within and outside of Portugal. He immediately issued statements which claimed that economic development and social reforms were priorities. One of his first moves on this front was to move younger professionals who were untainted by office under Salazar, into the ministries in the restless areas of education, social welfare, and the economy. This he hoped would integrate some of the younger, educated and potentially discontent elements into the established order. It would also hopefully, develop more effective internal economic and social policies which could pacify the urban workers and the rural peasantry with slight increase in wages and minimal changes in educational, health and social services. Of course, in the two most important ministeries, the interior and the army, two hardliners were kept on, indicating what the fundamental source of power is. In dealing with students, Caetano attacked the most glaring yet artificial grievances. In response to the realisation that large numbers of educated and skilled manpower would be needed to pull the country out of economic stagnation - and to neutralise student criticism - he announced an investigation into the efficiency of higher education. Caetano's experience in the University as professor and onetime rector, led him to believe that, if possible, it was better not to use crude methods of repression and imprisonment against student leaders, since this often led to more opposition, and turned imprisoned leaders into martyrs. Following this line, his new appointment as minister of Education, Professor Jose Veiga Simao, cancelled criminal procedings a- gainst some student leaders and sacked the unpopular rector of Coimbra University. Such small concessions he felt would have no effect on the security and stability of the coming change within Portugal. It would also give the state justifiable grounds for interference if the students moved too far into the opposition camp. The students, however, proved less easy to control than he had imagined. In April and May, 1969, there were large demonstrations against the suspension of some student leaders, culminating in a strike and on May 6th, the University was closed down. Many students were arrested and the following month the cabinet announced that only students with good behaviour would be deferred from military service. In July the students boycotted their exams, and in August the president of the Coimbra students union was brought for trial. The trial was later adjourned, but the following month the elected leaders of the student union were dismissed on orders of the government — so much for their new right to elect their own leaders. The removal of petty grievances within the context of the fascist state, inevitably cannot neutralise opposition - except on the surface and in the short run. For as Caetano assured the ultra-rightists, and as opposition forces such as segments of the students, were quick to realise, the minimal changes in form did not reflect any fundamental change in the political and economic structures. Caetano's approach to workers organisations was similar. Free elections of leaders in the state controlled workers' syndicates and a national minimum wage were instituted in an effort to combat the growing discontent. Workers outside the syndicates (particularly agricultural workers) were to be organised into syndicates and subject to government protection. This could be sold as increased workers participation, while allowing the state to control the form of organisation that was created. Voting rights were extended when qualifications changed from tax-based criteria to literacy. But since 40 per cent of the population was illiterate, you were still locking out the most oppressed classes. Again these measures were equivalent to the removal of petty grievances at no cost to the control or influence of the state, since the exiting unions and the right to vote have cry little to do with the allocation of power in the Caetano dictatorship. Their only 20
Object Description
Description
Title | CENPA-356~22 |
Filename | CENPA-356~22.tiff |
Full text | Caetano also had to be continually aware of the strength of the old guard ultra- rightists (particularly in the army), who were carefully watching his response to colonial policies and opposition, to make sure that his moves did not threaten political order and the existing consolidation of power. The old guard was hesitant of anything that appeared to be even the smallest change. Caetano had the task of pointing out through the success of his strategies or the reliance on repression, that he was in control. The right had to be shown that his petty reforms did not mean any change in ideology while other social forces were sold the same reforms as the beginning of real change within Portugal. In all practical reforms, the most important aspect is the appearance of change as a mechanism of political manipulation and pacification. To this end, Caetano used the press to a much greater extent than Salazar, and claimed during his first few months of office that a new press law was to be introduced. Widely publicised small changes did occur at first, but were instituted and used in order to consolidate support for Caetano. For example, in the election this so-called increased freedom of the press meant controlling information on the opposition to point out its disorganisation and to show that their demands were similar to what Caetano «said)> he wanted. Any efforts to discuss meaningful freedom of the press were dismissed by familiar arguments that Portugal was not ready for this because a prerequisite was ((proper education of both the press and the public)), which of course was difficult in a wartime situation. Accordingly, the new Press Law put into effect on the 1st June, 1972, limits the freedom of the press even more than before. The consistent contradiction referred to above appears clearly in the new Law. Thus, Art. 128 abolishes the Censorship Services, but Art. 129 imposes ((Previous examination for all texts and images to be published in the press». The reaction to this law in Portugal can be seen by a decision taken by the National Trade Union of Journalists, which in its General Assembly, resolved to ((express to the Government their deep dissatisfaction for the new Press Law, which increases their burden of responsibility without giving them a concurrent right of freedom of expression)). All his practical reforms, from the start were aimed at alleviating opposition from the various social forces within and outside of Portugal. He immediately issued statements which claimed that economic development and social reforms were priorities. One of his first moves on this front was to move younger professionals who were untainted by office under Salazar, into the ministries in the restless areas of education, social welfare, and the economy. This he hoped would integrate some of the younger, educated and potentially discontent elements into the established order. It would also hopefully, develop more effective internal economic and social policies which could pacify the urban workers and the rural peasantry with slight increase in wages and minimal changes in educational, health and social services. Of course, in the two most important ministeries, the interior and the army, two hardliners were kept on, indicating what the fundamental source of power is. In dealing with students, Caetano attacked the most glaring yet artificial grievances. In response to the realisation that large numbers of educated and skilled manpower would be needed to pull the country out of economic stagnation - and to neutralise student criticism - he announced an investigation into the efficiency of higher education. Caetano's experience in the University as professor and onetime rector, led him to believe that, if possible, it was better not to use crude methods of repression and imprisonment against student leaders, since this often led to more opposition, and turned imprisoned leaders into martyrs. Following this line, his new appointment as minister of Education, Professor Jose Veiga Simao, cancelled criminal procedings a- gainst some student leaders and sacked the unpopular rector of Coimbra University. Such small concessions he felt would have no effect on the security and stability of the coming change within Portugal. It would also give the state justifiable grounds for interference if the students moved too far into the opposition camp. The students, however, proved less easy to control than he had imagined. In April and May, 1969, there were large demonstrations against the suspension of some student leaders, culminating in a strike and on May 6th, the University was closed down. Many students were arrested and the following month the cabinet announced that only students with good behaviour would be deferred from military service. In July the students boycotted their exams, and in August the president of the Coimbra students union was brought for trial. The trial was later adjourned, but the following month the elected leaders of the student union were dismissed on orders of the government — so much for their new right to elect their own leaders. The removal of petty grievances within the context of the fascist state, inevitably cannot neutralise opposition - except on the surface and in the short run. For as Caetano assured the ultra-rightists, and as opposition forces such as segments of the students, were quick to realise, the minimal changes in form did not reflect any fundamental change in the political and economic structures. Caetano's approach to workers organisations was similar. Free elections of leaders in the state controlled workers' syndicates and a national minimum wage were instituted in an effort to combat the growing discontent. Workers outside the syndicates (particularly agricultural workers) were to be organised into syndicates and subject to government protection. This could be sold as increased workers participation, while allowing the state to control the form of organisation that was created. Voting rights were extended when qualifications changed from tax-based criteria to literacy. But since 40 per cent of the population was illiterate, you were still locking out the most oppressed classes. Again these measures were equivalent to the removal of petty grievances at no cost to the control or influence of the state, since the exiting unions and the right to vote have cry little to do with the allocation of power in the Caetano dictatorship. Their only 20 |
Archival file | Volume24/CENPA-356~22.tiff |