with such remarks as: 'No general can
foresee the outcome of war'. Later on,
Arriaga sorrowfully confided to a foreign
correspondent: The guerrilla war will
always exist'. It was then that the tone
changed and military bragging ceased to
be the sole content of communiques,
being interspersed with bits of so-called
'political analysis' of which the avowed
purpose was to 'win over the hearts and
minds of the population'. This had the
added advantage of making it possible to
minimise the effect of military defeats.
The United Nations debate on terrorism
was the opportunity for taking further
steps along these lines. In order to label
us as terrorists, the Portuguese started
to clamour that they enjoyed the people's support and that the FRELIMO
fighters were terrorising the people. The
underlying reason, however, is quite different. The success of our operations,
and especially the political impact of our
activity among the people, are such that
growing numbers of people of all races,
including Europeans, look upon FRELIMO
as a serious and effective movement with
a clear political line. The most striking
example of this has been that of the
Lourenc,o Marques students, whose Students' Union has just been banned on the
orders of the colonial government. Mention should also be made of the wave of
arrests and prison murders throughout
the country, the most recent victims
being two Mozambican Protestant priests.
But a large number of European civilians
who inhabit or go to the war zones have
witnessed or sometimes been involved in
a large number of operations in which
they have seen in practice the distinction
we make between the colonial machinery
of repression and civilians who are not
involved in repressing or exploiting our
people. The lives of civilian truck drivers
travelling on roads where our fighters are
operating have been systematically spared, although the vehicles and their loads
have been destroyed. In this way, these
people have become living proof of the
political consistency of our movement
and of each of its militants.
It is for this reason that Portuguese communiques are now doing their utmost to
present FRELIMO as a terrorist organisation which mainly attacks the civilian
populations.
We have seen from past experience how
the Portuguese colonialists have had no
hesitation in massacring innocent people
to this end, then claiming that they are
victims of FRELIMO. It is therefore to
be feared that similar methods, in which
the Portuguese colonialists excel in cruelty, may be used on a large-scale in future,
with a view to trying to tarnish the considerable and growing prestige which
FRELIMO enjoys throughout Mozambique. A barbarous operation of this
type has already been carried out by the
Portuguese in Mussowanhati, in Tete Province.
The problems of the repercussions of our
operations is one of the chief preoccupations of the Portuguese administration,
not only in Mozambique but also in top
circles of the Portuguese government.
The frequent publications in the Rhodesian and South African press of reports
on the successes achieved by our forces
in the liberation struggle in Mozambique
has been highly displeasing to the Portuguese leaders. On 14 November, in a
nationally broadcast and televised speech,
the Portuguese Prime Minister launched
a particularly violent attack on Rhodesia,
criticising 'inexperienced neighbours who
allow themselves to be overcome by panic
and who do not conceal their fears, thus
playing into the hands of the enemy.'
In these circumstances, it can be assumed
that one of the items of the agreement
signed by Caetano and Smith during the
latter's visit to Lisbon last October was a
ban on all news on the Mozambican war
in the Rhodesian press. Indeed, a few
weeks later, on 27 November, the London Guardian and BBC correspondent,
Mr. Peter Niesewand, who had broadcast
the news of the sabotage of the Beira—
Tete railway line at 20 points over 120
kms. was detained by the Rhodesian police, who asked him to name his sources,
and who is now under threat of legal
proceedings.
At all events, the agreement between
Caetano and Smith was not complete.
Only a few days after Smith's return
from Lisbon at the end of October, there
was a meeting of the Rhodesian and
South African Ministers of Defence and
Chiefs of Staff in Salisbury, the aim of
which, according to information leaked
to the press, was to find ways in which
these countries could make up for Portugal's inability to halt the advance of the
liberation struggle towards the centre and
south of Mozambique.
Rhodesia, which is worried at our forces
approaching the Beira-Umtali railway,
which is vital for its supplies, is burning
with the desire to intervene in Mozambique in a more systematic and open
way than up to now.
The armed struggle for liberation in Mozambique is therefore entering a more
politically and militarily advanced phase,
and also a more complex political, social
and strategic context. Difficult tasks lie
ahead for the FRELIMO militants and the
whole of the Mozambican people. But
the experience, determination and momentum of our struggle will bear fruit in
new successes. The large-scale operations
which have just taken place recently and
the opening of new fighting zones are a
prelude to this.