Another bridge blown up. This one was in Niassa Province
Portuguese communiques at first denied
or minimised our forces' activity in Manica e Sofala, or else reduced it to ((operations in the Tete isthmus.» At that very
time, however, substantial information
and the eye-witness accounts of civilian
iraders, truck drivers and others, confirmed our presence and activity in the
area around Vila Pery, which is well to the
..outh. The sole result of all this has been
to discredit all information put out by
the Portuguese High Command.
The widespread distrust of official
sources of information has been further
aggravated by the fact that the South
African and Rhodesian press, which until
recently had no qualms about publishing
pretty crude accounts of the war in
Mozambique, is now showing barely concealed contempt for the military capacity
of the Portuguese army.
True, the lack of credibility of Portuguese war communiques has long been
evident to world opinion, but now scepticism mingled with anxiety is gaining a
hold on the colonialist population itself.
Owing to their repercussions throughout
the country, and especially in colonialist
circles, the attacks on Chingozi airport
and Tete provided an illustration of the
confusion and difficulties besetting the
colonial army as a result of its own lies.
The Portuguese Command initially chose
the tactic of silence. But in the face of
the many reports circulating among the
people, which had become a topic of
conversation everywhere in the country,
on 22 November they issued a first communique which denied that our operation
had been successful claiming that only
three mortar shells had hit the runway,
but had failed to explode. Two days
later, a second communique stated that
long-range shells had been fired but that
they had fallen short of their target and
caused no damage.
Three days later, the unofficial radio
station broadcast a commentary on the
reasons why the military command, contrary to usual practice, had issued two
successive special communiques on the
same attack, which had in any case failed.
The commentary in question, apart from
the usual recriminations against troublemakers and rumour-mongers, was permeated with a tone distinctly critical of
the Portuguese Military Commander,
Kaulza de Arriaga, who, through his
haste and clumsy communique had
merely increased the impact of the Tete
operation.
One can speculate on the reason for this
criticism, the prelude to disintegration
within the colonial apparatus in Mozambique. The foremost cause is doubtless
the success achieved by our fighters,
which is making each sector of the colonial apparatus wash its hands of the
matter, as in every time of crisis, and to
blame others for the failure.
The second reason is to be found in what
is now common knowledge, i.e. General
Kaulza de Arriaga's political ambitions,
which have not failed to rouse the anxiety of the Caetano government.
In an interview published elsewhere in
this bulletin, we mention the statements
made by deserters from the Portuguese
army who speak of indoctrination courses
based on seemingly nationalist Mozambican watchwords, which are organised
by General Kaulza de Arriaga for the
troops under his direct command. If one
were to relate this strange behaviour with
the no less ambiguous ties the General
maintains with J. Jardim, a Beira businessman and one of the upholders of the idea
of white independence in Mozambique,
one might reach the conclusion that
having failed in his ambition to become
President of the Republic of Portugal,
General de Arriaga is seeking the political
space he needs to realise his ambitions.
Moreover, Kaulza de Arriaga's political
designs are clearly connected with his
efforts to appear to be a 'politician', as is
revealed by the changing tone of the
statements on strategic matters and the
military communiques put out by the
Portuguese military command in Mozambique. The initial bravado which preceded
the big 'Operation Gordian Knot' launched in May June, 1970 'the war will
be over in a few weeks' was followed
by attempts to save face over the failure ,