are far more urbanised and which have
much more contact with the rest of the
country. Such repercussions make themselves felt, first among the Mozambican
population, but the psychological effect
is no less on the colonial population and
especially on the large international capitalist interests which are watching the
advance of the struggle in this region,
seeing it as a test of the capacity of the
Portuguese army to control the situation.
This explains the constant movement of
the Portuguese commander-in-chief, General Kaulza de Arriaga. After each important success of FRELIMO, he organises
a meeting with capitalist groups in
Lourenco Marques with the aim of restoring their somewhat shaken confidence
in the abilities of his troops.
The hopeless quagmire into which colonialism is falling cannot be better illustrated than by the sharp contradiction
affecting the Portuguese army in connection with the Cahora Bassa scheme. The
political importance of the scheme, the
massive investments involved, the presence of European technicians and the
watchful tyc-s of world opinion, are all
forcing the colonialists constantly to
step up the protective measures, reinforcing the security arrangements and increasing the numbers of troops stationed
there. The three concentric circles of defence which General Kaulza de Arriaga
likes so much to dwell on in his speeches
to foreign journalists merely mean that
about 30,000 men have been immobilised there. In other words, a substantial
part of the Portuguese army has been
pinned down in one spot and is obliged
to play the role of bodyguard for this
white elephant, as it has been called,
while the FRELIMO forces retain their
choice of tactics to be used. As the
President of FRELIMO, Comrade Samora Machel, has stated, «Cahora Bassa
is not our main target. Our plan, as it was
defined when we started the war, is to
spread trie struggle throughout the entire
country; since Cahora Bassa is inside our
country and in a province where there is
fighting, it necessarily falls within this
plan. We do not concentrate our action
in Tete or Cahora Bassa, but of course
there are circumstances which make it a
very important target for us, namely the
extent of imperialist involvement and the
implications for our struggle if the scheme
were to be carried out.))
The Portuguese command can only think
of one way of getting out of this impasse:
that of strengthening their forces in that
zone. In order to do so, they have to step
up recruitment.    However, this presents
difficulties. In Portugal conscription
seems to have reached its limits. The
period of service in the colonies is now
4 full years and this immobilisation of
economically active labour for such a
long period has had serious effects on the
Portuguese economy. To this must be
added the peculiar phenomenon Portugal
is experiencing, being the only country
in the world where the total population
is declining. Under these conditions, the
recruitment of even African troops presents difficulties, due to the need of
maintaining a certain balance between
Portuguese and Mozambican troops, the
latter not being looked upon as wholly
reliable. At present the Portuguese army
is therefore resorting to transferring
troops from other provinces, some of
which are at war. Thus, at the end of
last year, 25,000 troops were sent to reinforce the Portuguese forces in Tete. It
should be remembered, however, that this
transfer of troops was as much a result of
the advance of the struggle in Tete, as a
consequence of successes achieved in
other provinces. Indeed, while the situation in Tete has specific features, notably
the direct threat to capitalist and imperialist interests, and therefore gets greater
publicity, it would be wrong to let this
make one underestimate the progress registered in the provinces of Niassa and
Cabo Delgado.
Indeed, the Portuguese troops transferred
to Tete had for many months been confined to the garrisons in Cabo Delgado
and Niassa, which are situated on hostile
terrain and are subject to constant harassment. The decision to transfer them to
Tete seems to have been seen as a lesser
evil, to put an end to the heavy losses and
the constant lowering of their morale.
However, these measures were not able
to prevent the irresistible progress of the
struggle, which reached the centre of the
country in July this year.
It is clear that this description of the
progress of the struggle is oversimplified
since it does not take into account the
fundamental causes of the successes
achieved, which lie in the political work
carried out by FRELIMO cadres and,
above all, in the high spirit of struggle
shown by the people. The powerful way
in which the people have joined the
struggle and their capacity to endure the
greatest sacrifices in order to put an end
to colonial oppression which is daily becoming more unbearable, explain the
rapidity of the advance of the struggle.
The Portuguese army has tried to counter
this spirit of resistance with psychological
action   or   coercive   measures  for  con
trolling the population. An example of
psychological action can be found in
Niassa province where, although not confined to this province, it is particularly
intensive. The general line is to confuse
the people. Early -tins year, thc Portuguese started to take a well-dressed African wearing a suit and tie among the
people in thc strategic hamlets, saying lo
them: «This is your governor, the
government now depends on you. Tell
him all your problems. All that is needed
now is to finish with the guerrillas.» At
the same time, pamphlets which invariably show the destruction of FRELIMO
or the «wonderful 1 ife» in thc strategic
hamlets, or the power of the Portuguese
troops, are still being dropped in their
thousands in the war areas, but without
any effect whatsoever on the people,
most of whom do not know how to read.
It is now clear that this propaganda has
failed.
The large-scale recourse to the policy of
strategic hamlets which with the tarring
of roads, is looked upon as a panacea, is
only achieving the opposite effect of increasing the resistance of the people. In
January this year, a special correspondent
of The Guardian (UK) reported on the
method used by the Portuguese to force
the population to go into a strategic hamlet, quoting a statement made by a Portuguese commando:    «We give the blacks