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*m> aflKJPaSS!* * WAR REVIEW On the 23 December, 1971, during an inspection tour of Mozambique, the Portuguese minister of the Navy, Admiral Pereira Crespo stated on his arrival in Nampula that he was very happy to visit the «military capital)). It was only a few months later, for the stated reason that changes had taken place in the military situation, that the headquarters of the general staff of the armed forces was transferred from Nampula, in the north, to Beira, in the centre of the country. This small incident shows the extent to which improvisation and disarray are prevailing within the colonialist high command in the face of what a South African journalist has called «the disturbing rapidity)) with which the armed struggle is progressing in Mozambique. Indeed, one of the predominant features of the present situation is the spread of the struggle to new regions towards the south, both in Niassa and Cabo Delgado and in Tete. In this latter province the armed struggle, which was launched south of the Zambezi River at the end of 1970, has now spread to the whole province. What is more, the extensive and far- reaching nature of the struggle in this province created the support bases needed for the launching of armed struggle in yet another province. It was on 25th July this year that the FRELIMO fighters carried out the first operations in the central province of Manica e Sofala, during which posts were destroyed, arms captured and members of the population liberated from strategic villages into which they had been herded. This advance of the struggle is changing the strategic situation in the whole of the region. In fact, the Portuguese system of defence is based on the establishment of boundary lines south of the fighting zones, roughly following favourable natural obstacles. In the centre-west of the country, the most important line was the one running along the Zambezi river. Raised to the level of a major line of defence, not only for Mozambique, but also for the whole of White Southern Africa, the river zone has been invested with a network of defence posts aimed at preventing the FRELIMO fighters from crossing the river. They cleared large strips of land along the river at spots thought likely to serve as crossing points for the guerrillas. They destroyed all the boats of the population and established fixed crossing points controlled by them. The ultimate goal of this plan is the construction of the Cahora Bassa dam, which we have on countless occasions denounced for its avowed aim of creating conditions for white settlement, which would be used as a human barrier against the expansion of the armed struggle for liberation. It is therefore not hard to understand thc panic which seized the Portuguese command when they realised that FRELIMO operations south of thc Zambezi were no longer taking the form of sporadic operations but were showing continuity, and at the same time meeting with the response and growing involvement of the population. Their disarray was all the more understandable in that the Portuguese strategists found themselves confronted with insurmountable contradictions arising out of the nature that armed action assumed in Tete province. It is important to analyse these factors. In the first place, there were the actual tactics adopted by the FRELIMO fighters in this province.Taking into account the high concentration of Portuguese troops in this area, the guerrilla units adopted the tactic of successively dividing up their forces. Each time when, by the establishment of the struggle in a certain area, the numerical strength of the fighting group was increased through local mobilisation, it then sub-divided immediately and a new group set off to operate in a fresh zone. In this way, while stepping up the number of operations and expanding the fighting area, the FRELIMO units made all enemy counter-guerrilla action impossible or ineffective, because the many small units remained elusive. This was all the more successful owing to the very nature of the colonial presence in Tete Province and the system of oppression and exploitation which provided the nationalist forces with many targets. Indeed, far more than Niassa and Cabo Delgado provinces, Tete is one of thc centres of settler economic exploitation and therefore offers the FRELIMO forces a wide field of action. We may take the example of the Angonia area, which is the major potato growing area in Mozambique. It was sufficient to step up sabotage operations along communication lines in the region for potatoes to completely vanish from the markets in Lourenco Marques. This situation has deprived the Portuguese army of the initiative and doomed it to undertaking defensive actions at the economic centres and along communication lines, in order to protect the apparatus of exploitation and to keep it running, for fear of losing what is the very reason for the colonialist presence. Furthermore, the political repercussions of armed action in this province have been very great throughout Mozambique, as these are regions which
Object Description
Title | Mozambique revolution, no. 52 (1972 July-Sept.) (copy 2) |
Description | Contents: Editorial - The opening of a new front (p. 1); We value Africa's aid - FRELIMO at the conference of East and Central African states (p. 3); War review - Developments over the past 12 months (p. 4); FRELIMO's women envoys - In Africa, Europe and Asia (p. 7); The crimes of colonialism - Testimony to the un human rights commission (p. 9); Visitors in free Mozambique - British solidarity group; Canadian lecturer; Italian delegation; Bulgarian doctor (p.11); A soldier escapes from Caetano's war - A Portuguese deserter speaks (p.17); FRELIMO's new recruits - Mozambicans desert the colonial army and join FRELIMO (p.18); O.A.U. Secretary-General visits FRELIMO (p.19); War communique - Latest report from the front (p. 20); Economic development in the liberated areas - Report to the economic commission for Africa (p. 22). This is an issue reprinted and distributed by the LSM Information Center in Richmond, Canada. |
Subject (lcsh) |
Nationalism -- Mozambique Self-determination, National Mozambique -- History Portugal -- Politics and government -- 1933-1974 |
Geographic Subject (Country) | Mozambique |
Geographic Subject (Continent) | Africa |
Geographic Coordinates | -18.6696821,35.5273474 |
Coverage date | 1964/1972 |
Creator | Mozambique Liberation Front (FRELIMO) |
Publisher (of the Original Version) | Mozambique Liberation Front (FRELIMO). Department of Information |
Place of Publication (of the Origianal Version) | Dar Es Salaam, U.R. of Tanzania |
Publisher (of the Digital Version) | University of Southern California. Libraries |
Date issued | 1972-07/1972-09 |
Type |
texts images |
Format | 28 p. |
Format (aat) | newsletters |
Language | English |
Contributing entity | University of Southern California |
Part of collection | Emerging Nationalism in Portuguese Africa, 1959-1965 |
Part of subcollection | Mozambique Collection |
Rights | The University of Southern California has licensed the rights to this material from the Aluka initiative of Ithaka Harbors, Inc., a non-profit Delaware corporation whose address is 151 East 61st Street, New York, NY 10021 |
Physical access | Original archive is at the Boeckmann Center for Iberian and Latin American Studies. Send requests to address or e-mail given. Phone (213) 821-2366; fax (213) 740-2343. |
Repository Name | USC Libraries Special Collections |
Repository Address | Doheny Memorial Library, Los Angeles, CA 90089-0189 |
Repository Email | specol@usc.edu |
Filename | CENPA-355 |
Description
Title | CENPA-355~06 |
Filename | CENPA-355~06.tiff |
Full text | *m> aflKJPaSS!* * WAR REVIEW On the 23 December, 1971, during an inspection tour of Mozambique, the Portuguese minister of the Navy, Admiral Pereira Crespo stated on his arrival in Nampula that he was very happy to visit the «military capital)). It was only a few months later, for the stated reason that changes had taken place in the military situation, that the headquarters of the general staff of the armed forces was transferred from Nampula, in the north, to Beira, in the centre of the country. This small incident shows the extent to which improvisation and disarray are prevailing within the colonialist high command in the face of what a South African journalist has called «the disturbing rapidity)) with which the armed struggle is progressing in Mozambique. Indeed, one of the predominant features of the present situation is the spread of the struggle to new regions towards the south, both in Niassa and Cabo Delgado and in Tete. In this latter province the armed struggle, which was launched south of the Zambezi River at the end of 1970, has now spread to the whole province. What is more, the extensive and far- reaching nature of the struggle in this province created the support bases needed for the launching of armed struggle in yet another province. It was on 25th July this year that the FRELIMO fighters carried out the first operations in the central province of Manica e Sofala, during which posts were destroyed, arms captured and members of the population liberated from strategic villages into which they had been herded. This advance of the struggle is changing the strategic situation in the whole of the region. In fact, the Portuguese system of defence is based on the establishment of boundary lines south of the fighting zones, roughly following favourable natural obstacles. In the centre-west of the country, the most important line was the one running along the Zambezi river. Raised to the level of a major line of defence, not only for Mozambique, but also for the whole of White Southern Africa, the river zone has been invested with a network of defence posts aimed at preventing the FRELIMO fighters from crossing the river. They cleared large strips of land along the river at spots thought likely to serve as crossing points for the guerrillas. They destroyed all the boats of the population and established fixed crossing points controlled by them. The ultimate goal of this plan is the construction of the Cahora Bassa dam, which we have on countless occasions denounced for its avowed aim of creating conditions for white settlement, which would be used as a human barrier against the expansion of the armed struggle for liberation. It is therefore not hard to understand thc panic which seized the Portuguese command when they realised that FRELIMO operations south of thc Zambezi were no longer taking the form of sporadic operations but were showing continuity, and at the same time meeting with the response and growing involvement of the population. Their disarray was all the more understandable in that the Portuguese strategists found themselves confronted with insurmountable contradictions arising out of the nature that armed action assumed in Tete province. It is important to analyse these factors. In the first place, there were the actual tactics adopted by the FRELIMO fighters in this province.Taking into account the high concentration of Portuguese troops in this area, the guerrilla units adopted the tactic of successively dividing up their forces. Each time when, by the establishment of the struggle in a certain area, the numerical strength of the fighting group was increased through local mobilisation, it then sub-divided immediately and a new group set off to operate in a fresh zone. In this way, while stepping up the number of operations and expanding the fighting area, the FRELIMO units made all enemy counter-guerrilla action impossible or ineffective, because the many small units remained elusive. This was all the more successful owing to the very nature of the colonial presence in Tete Province and the system of oppression and exploitation which provided the nationalist forces with many targets. Indeed, far more than Niassa and Cabo Delgado provinces, Tete is one of thc centres of settler economic exploitation and therefore offers the FRELIMO forces a wide field of action. We may take the example of the Angonia area, which is the major potato growing area in Mozambique. It was sufficient to step up sabotage operations along communication lines in the region for potatoes to completely vanish from the markets in Lourenco Marques. This situation has deprived the Portuguese army of the initiative and doomed it to undertaking defensive actions at the economic centres and along communication lines, in order to protect the apparatus of exploitation and to keep it running, for fear of losing what is the very reason for the colonialist presence. Furthermore, the political repercussions of armed action in this province have been very great throughout Mozambique, as these are regions which |
Archival file | Volume23/CENPA-355~06.tiff |