$435,000,000
On 10 December, 1971, the State Department informed a scandalised general public that the previous day in Brussels it had
signed an agreement with Portugal promising that country a sum exceeding
$435 million in credit, in addition to
other forms of aid. This aid was allocated as fojlows i.a. $400 million loan
for economic and social development, $
30 million for farm commodities, and a
right to draw a minimum of $ 5m in non-
military excess equipment, in addition to
a loan of $ 1 million for education and
the free lease of an oceanographic ship.
It was announced at the same time that
the United Stated had been authorised
to continue to use the Lajes base on
Terceira Island in the Azores until February 1974.
This announcement was made on the eve
of Nixon's visit to the Azores where he
was to meet Pompidou after being received by Portuguese Prime Minister Marcelo Caetano. Observers were immediately struck by two factors:
The first was the unusually high amount
of the promised loans which the New
York Times referred to as «one of the
largest assistance packages negotiated in
many years in exchange for foreign base
rights». The same observers stressed the
considerable disparity between this and
the sum paid to Spain for the renewal of
the concession on the Rota base.
The second factor is the relationship that
has been intentionally suggested in the
mind of the public by announcing this
agreement on the eve of Nixon's trip to
the Azores in order to give the average
man the impression that the huge loan
granted to Portugal was merely the proper payment for the use of the base.
It is important to know if this is really
the case, and what western strategists
have been wondering is whether the Azores still play the same decisive strategic
role as in the past.
22
NIXON'S
INVESTMENT
PORTUGUESE
COLONIALISM
The American presence in the Azores
dates back to the end of the Second
World War. Under the influence of the
British, the Portuguese allowed the United
States to use the Azores, only too happy
to have the alibi of this newfound friendship with the winners of the war, in the
hope that this would make people forget
the too overt sympathy that they had
previously shown for the Axis Powers.
In 1951, the first formal agreement was
signed under which the United States,
within the framework of the North Atlantic Treaty, had the right to use the base
in time of war. In time of peace the
right to station troops there and to use
the base is dependent on treaties which
are renewable every five years.
The strategic importance of the base, in
which the US invested $100 million between 1951 and 1957, was not questioned
until mid-1960. It figured greatly in the
shaping of Kennedy's policy towards Portugal, of which we shall speak later. The
Berlin crisis and the threat of a sudden
aggravation of East-West relations in
Europe, helped Portugal to retain an effective weapon for bringing pressure to
bear on the United States and to ensure
itself of that country's decisive backing
in getting NATO's blessing for the colonial wars and, therefore, military support.
The treaty for the lease of the Azores was
renewed for five years in November 1957.
Negotiations were started again in 1962,
on the expiry of this new period, in the
tense climate created by the Kennedy
Administration's attitude at the United
Nations. Finally, on 3 January, 1963, a
temporary agreement was reached. A
$ 50 million loan was granted by the
American Export-Import Bank, an agreement for the 50-50 financing of a warship was extended to three ships representing $ 15 million in additional aid
and 30 T-37 C fighter planes were supplied. Portugal, however, retained the
right to revoke the agreement on the
Azores at six month's notice.
However, profound changes occurred in
world strategic concepts owing to the
development of intercontinental ballistic
missiles and especially, as regards limited
wars, the appearance of long-range aircraft and nuclear submarines.The«world's
biggest gasoline station)) as the Azores
have been called became a secondary
factor in American strategy and western
strategy as a whole. This was widely
recognised by experts well before the
signing of the last agreement. For more
than three years a substantial number of
experts who have analysed this problem
have noted the considerable lessening of
the strategic importance of the Azores
and have urged the White House not to
be guided by the need to keep the Azores.
State Department officials have even hinted that the US was not prepared to pay
too high a price for the Lajes base.
One might therefore wonder why President Nixon decided to step up negotiations on the renewal of agreements which
had been dragging on since 1969 and,
to this end, to send his Vice-President to
Portugal on his return from where he
pleaded the Portuguese cause.