MILITARY ACTIVITY
No matter how much increased effort is
expended in winning the hearts of the
people and building up the economy, as a
means of pacification, Portugal's most important mechanism of maintaining colonial domination is military force.
A.   Military Expenditure
While it is widely acknowledged that
the wars place a great strain on Portugal's financial resources, it is difficult to
assess the precise extent of this because
of devices which split the budget into
'ordinary' and 'extraordinary' revenue
and expenditure. While most military
expenses come under the latter category
some, such as ministerial expenses are
covered by ordinary expenditure. Though
estimates themselves are always substantially exceeded, it is possible to get some
idea of the general picture.
alone increased the original estimates by
50 per cent to an amount equal to the
total estimated extraordinary expenditure
for that year.
c. The total of the 1970 estimates, the
known extra allocations, and the provisional territorial budgets for military
expenditure amounts to 12,930.9 million escudos ($ 452.58 million) - in other
words, $ 1.2 million a day.
d.. There has been considerable unease
among the military in Portugal at Marcelo Caetano's expressed concern for
domestic social reforms because they
could absorb resources required for tne
wars. At first glance it appears that
their fears are being justified. For the
first time, in 1971 the Portuguese budget
states that first priority is to be given
both to national defence and to public
investments under the Third Development
Plan. Although the amounts involved
bear no comparison - 4.947.2 million escudos ($173.15 million) investment expenditure - this is the first time since the
Portugal's Budgetry Estimates for 1971
in Millions Escudos and Dollars.
Estimated ordinary expenditure
19,617.9
(686.62)
Estimated extraordinary expenditure
12,431.7
(435.1)
Total expenditure
32,049.6
(1,121.7)
Estimated ordinary revenue
19,617.9
(37 )
(686.62)
Estimated extraordinary revenue
12,434.6
(63 )
(435.21)
Total revenue
32,052.5
(1,121.8)
a. Extraordinary revenue is 63 per cent
of the total. Sources for this include besides the defence tax: development bonds
foreign loans and substantial assistance
from the Gulbenkian Foundation to the
Third Development Plan. Therefore the
role of foreign finance in the war effort,
quite apart from NATO military assistance is considerable.
b. Under extraordinary expenditure by
far the largest item, at 7,030.6 million
escudos ($ 246.071 million) and comprising 56 per cent, is the allocation for
defence and security'. This is an increase
of 10.6 per cent over 1970's allocation of
6.349.9 million escudos ($ 222.246.5 million). Although complete information is
not available on actual expenditure in recent years, there were at least five supplementary allocations in 1970, totalling
3.582 million escudos ($ 125.4) which
outbreak of the wars that defence alone
has not had first priority. Moreover,
while the defence estimates rose by about
50 per cent in the period 1965 - 1968
they rose only 25 per cent during 1969 -
1971.
Yet, at the same time the tendency to
make the colonies self-financing, already
mentioned with regard to economic policies, is apparent also in terms of military
expenditures, as the colonies' military
budgets have been rising sharply. The
ratio of the colonies'to Portugal's total
military expenditure estimates has risen
from 29 per cent in 1967 to 47 per cent
in 1970. This would seem to confirm
the recent view expressed by one journalist, when speaking of Caetano's determination to pursue the war: 'Perhaps
the main reason is that, while the balance
sheet since the beginning of the war may
so far be slightly against Portugal, the
investments in the past few years in both
Angola and Mozambique should soon
right the situation very much in Portugal's
favour'. (Financial Times 19 July 1971).
This is confirmed by the fact that at the
moment it is Angola, with the most immediately lucrative investments in oil,
that has been hit hardest, with its military allocation doubled between 1969
and 1970.
B.   The War Effort
The great advantage of this great flurry
of activity in the social field is its invaluable contribution to detracting attention
away from the gravity of the military
situation.
The Overseas Minister now speaks of
Portugal's determination to win this war,
which in the new propaganda strategy is
described as' a war for peace, a war for
education, a war for economic development and a war for better health'. Although still insisting that 'force will be
met with force', the emphasis is placed
elsewhere. It is a new approach to an old
problem, and a recognition that the tedious repetition that everything is under
control, soon after to be contradicted by
the army's own actions, begins to have
negative effects.
Towards the end of 1967, the Governor-
General of Mozambique told the Legislative Council that in Niassa and Cabo
Delgado guerrilla activities had been substantially reduced during the year, with
the help of the civilian and military
authorities and the co-operation of the
local populations. It had been possible
to prevent further southern penetration
and reduce the area of activity in the
north. One year later he was still telling
the Legislative Council that guerrilla infiltration had been 'progressively eliminated'.
In February, 1969, on a visit to the northern provinces, the Defence Minister
maintained that they would try to restore peace 'in the shortest time possible'
- which was presumably the aim of the
massive offensive that took place one
year later. On another visit to Mozambique and Angola, in January, 1971, after
the offensive, he this time maintained
that the military reorganisation, together
with a reorganisation of all counter-subversive activities would facilitate a global
policy that would bring the day of final
victory and 'paz portuguesa' closer. He
described the military situation in Mozambique as 'highly favourable' with guerrilla
groups in Cabo Delgado and Niassa yet
again being 'systematically reduced' and
infiltration  in  Tete 'being dealt with'.
15