new Commander-in-Chiefs arrival in Mozambique, the various branches of the
armed forces were integrated into a unified command to increase efficiency as
'strategic tactical forces'. Arriaga was
granted greater autonomy for himself as
Commander-in-Chief, and mobility of operational units was increased. He also indicated that more attention would be
given to welfare of troops to combat
growing discontent and desertion within
the Portuguese military. The new Commander also replaced nearly all the chief
military and naval officers in the country.
Co-ordinated and simultaneous with changes in the military, Oliveira announced
a number of changes in civilian administrations and replaced four of the six
provisional secretaries (heads of government departments), senior officials in
charge of statistics, the economy, health
and cereals, and the governors of Cabo
Delgado and Zambezia Provinces. He has
also indicated that the government plans
to 'increase the density of the administrative network' in other words extend the tentacles of administrative control. This has already begun with a comprehensive study of the whole administrative network, and the division of the
largest province, Manica e Sofala into
two provinces, to be called Beira and Vila
Pery. The widespread introduction of
such sub-divisions and sub-units at various
levels in the hierarchy are designed to
have the advantage not only of bringing
the web of administrative supervision
down closer to the peasants in the rural
areas, but also to give more scope for the
increased 'African participation' that is
another important element of the new
strategies. More significantly these changes can also improve the assistance that
the district boards and the local government bodies of the provinces, provide the
military operations and assure closer linkages of the two networks. For example,
the implementation of the aldeamentos
schemes (resettlement of the African population) is one of their responsibilities,
and one that will certainly grow as increased efforts are made to regroup the
populations in efforts to cut the people
off from the liberation struggle. In 1970,
Cabo Delgado received a special allocation
of 23 million escudos ($805,000) of
which 13 million was for the improvement and extension of the aldeamentos
network and the rest for other 'rural
improvements'.
In coordination with this, it was announced in Lisbon a crash programme of white settlement in the colonies.
12
PUBLIC RELATIONS
Caetano's emphasis on communications
and the use of mass media to put over his
domestic policies, is similarly applied to
the most difficult problem of all, the
wars. Under Salazar, relatively little effort was made to actively involve the
people io the war effort, apart from a few
communiques and the constant assertion
that the battle would soon be won. However, with the growing dissent and unrest
this is no longer sufficient. Earlier this
year during a visit to Portugal, General
Arriaga appeared in a major press conference and television broadcast to explain in detail the major Portuguese
((victories)) in Mozambique. He painted
a vivid picture of FRELIMO - a ((communist, racist and tribalist organisation))
engaged in ((organised banditry)), and then
went on to describe in stark contrast, the
three main weapons being used against
FRELIMO: the 'communication of the
truth to the people, - convincing their
minds and conquering their hearts'; economic and social promotion; and 'firm,
persistent and quick military repressive
action'. The military actions were sold
as only being used against 'those who are
the enemies of the Portuguese and who
obstinately refuse our invitation of security and progressive well-being and opportunity for access to higher forms of life'.
The propaganda effort is to put the emphasis on the positive and constructive,
with  military  action  as the last resort.
PORTUGUESE PAMPHLET. An old theme
Arriaga also stressed the importance of
good propaganda, both at home and abroad, by way of communiques, interviews,
exhibitions etc. and encouraging journalists to visit the war zones.
The sense of urgency about the need to
mobilise and involve the people is most
evident in the colonies themselves, with
the press and other media being encouraged to take a more active role than before - of course under strict supervision.
Taking up Arriaga's theme, newspapers in
Mozambique report that everyone in Mozambique is responsible for the war, and
that despite military actions the end is not
yet in sight because all elements in the
country are not united in the effort. For
the first time in 1970 the press was permitted to report on the discussion in the
Mozambique Legislative Council in which
also for the first time, the Governor-
General encouraged comments and open
discussion'.
'SOCIAL AND
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT'
General Arriaga has frequently acknowledged that the guerrillas of the liberation
forces are advancing because they have
the support of the local populations. His
logical conclusion, therefore is that these
two groups must be separated, both physically and psychologically. This is to be
done by winning their hearts, by economic and social progress, and by military
action. The Director of the Portuguese
National Information Services, Mr Dutra
Faria, has confirmed that such measures
have nothing whatsoever to do with
rights or justice, but are merely inevitable
and necessary if victory is to be won. He
has outlined five principles for 'the battle'
social justice, respect for traditional institutions of different ethnic groups, economic and social development, increased African participation in public administration,
and internal security. Three of these fall
into Arriaga's 'winning the hearts' category.
A.   Winning the Hearts
The Portuguese army has had a 'Psychological Action Section' for some time, but
with little success, as guerrillas with increased popular support continue to advance. The reasons are not hard to find.
In the first place the traditional methods
used; rewards for weapons, leaflets in
local languages, loudspeaker broadcasts
from aircraft are quite impractical.   The