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new Commander-in-Chiefs arrival in Mozambique, the various branches of the armed forces were integrated into a unified command to increase efficiency as 'strategic tactical forces'. Arriaga was granted greater autonomy for himself as Commander-in-Chief, and mobility of operational units was increased. He also indicated that more attention would be given to welfare of troops to combat growing discontent and desertion within the Portuguese military. The new Commander also replaced nearly all the chief military and naval officers in the country. Co-ordinated and simultaneous with changes in the military, Oliveira announced a number of changes in civilian administrations and replaced four of the six provisional secretaries (heads of government departments), senior officials in charge of statistics, the economy, health and cereals, and the governors of Cabo Delgado and Zambezia Provinces. He has also indicated that the government plans to 'increase the density of the administrative network' in other words extend the tentacles of administrative control. This has already begun with a comprehensive study of the whole administrative network, and the division of the largest province, Manica e Sofala into two provinces, to be called Beira and Vila Pery. The widespread introduction of such sub-divisions and sub-units at various levels in the hierarchy are designed to have the advantage not only of bringing the web of administrative supervision down closer to the peasants in the rural areas, but also to give more scope for the increased 'African participation' that is another important element of the new strategies. More significantly these changes can also improve the assistance that the district boards and the local government bodies of the provinces, provide the military operations and assure closer linkages of the two networks. For example, the implementation of the aldeamentos schemes (resettlement of the African population) is one of their responsibilities, and one that will certainly grow as increased efforts are made to regroup the populations in efforts to cut the people off from the liberation struggle. In 1970, Cabo Delgado received a special allocation of 23 million escudos ($805,000) of which 13 million was for the improvement and extension of the aldeamentos network and the rest for other 'rural improvements'. In coordination with this, it was announced in Lisbon a crash programme of white settlement in the colonies. 12 PUBLIC RELATIONS Caetano's emphasis on communications and the use of mass media to put over his domestic policies, is similarly applied to the most difficult problem of all, the wars. Under Salazar, relatively little effort was made to actively involve the people io the war effort, apart from a few communiques and the constant assertion that the battle would soon be won. However, with the growing dissent and unrest this is no longer sufficient. Earlier this year during a visit to Portugal, General Arriaga appeared in a major press conference and television broadcast to explain in detail the major Portuguese ((victories)) in Mozambique. He painted a vivid picture of FRELIMO - a ((communist, racist and tribalist organisation)) engaged in ((organised banditry)), and then went on to describe in stark contrast, the three main weapons being used against FRELIMO: the 'communication of the truth to the people, - convincing their minds and conquering their hearts'; economic and social promotion; and 'firm, persistent and quick military repressive action'. The military actions were sold as only being used against 'those who are the enemies of the Portuguese and who obstinately refuse our invitation of security and progressive well-being and opportunity for access to higher forms of life'. The propaganda effort is to put the emphasis on the positive and constructive, with military action as the last resort. PORTUGUESE PAMPHLET. An old theme Arriaga also stressed the importance of good propaganda, both at home and abroad, by way of communiques, interviews, exhibitions etc. and encouraging journalists to visit the war zones. The sense of urgency about the need to mobilise and involve the people is most evident in the colonies themselves, with the press and other media being encouraged to take a more active role than before - of course under strict supervision. Taking up Arriaga's theme, newspapers in Mozambique report that everyone in Mozambique is responsible for the war, and that despite military actions the end is not yet in sight because all elements in the country are not united in the effort. For the first time in 1970 the press was permitted to report on the discussion in the Mozambique Legislative Council in which also for the first time, the Governor- General encouraged comments and open discussion'. 'SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT' General Arriaga has frequently acknowledged that the guerrillas of the liberation forces are advancing because they have the support of the local populations. His logical conclusion, therefore is that these two groups must be separated, both physically and psychologically. This is to be done by winning their hearts, by economic and social progress, and by military action. The Director of the Portuguese National Information Services, Mr Dutra Faria, has confirmed that such measures have nothing whatsoever to do with rights or justice, but are merely inevitable and necessary if victory is to be won. He has outlined five principles for 'the battle' social justice, respect for traditional institutions of different ethnic groups, economic and social development, increased African participation in public administration, and internal security. Three of these fall into Arriaga's 'winning the hearts' category. A. Winning the Hearts The Portuguese army has had a 'Psychological Action Section' for some time, but with little success, as guerrillas with increased popular support continue to advance. The reasons are not hard to find. In the first place the traditional methods used; rewards for weapons, leaflets in local languages, loudspeaker broadcasts from aircraft are quite impractical. The
Object Description
Title | Mozambique revolution, no. 48 (1971 July-Sept.) |
Description | Contents: Message from the president of FRELIMO on the day of the Mozambican revolution (p. 1); Alliance against imperialism - FRELIMO's visit to socialist countries (p. 5); War communique - report from the military front (p. 8); The United Nations: one step forward - role of UN specialized agencies (p. 9); War review - analysis of the political and military situation over the last twelve months (p. 11); End of a mission - why the white fathers left Mozambique (p. 23); Visitors in free Mozambique - six journalists and cameramen from Soviet Union and a representative of the Union of Secondary Schools of Finland (p. 23); Guine: 12 years after Pijiguiti - FRELIMO's statement on the national day of Guine-Bissau (p. 28). |
Subject (lcsh) |
Nationalism -- Mozambique Self-determination, National Mozambique -- History Portugal -- Politics and government -- 1933-1974 |
Geographic Subject (Country) | Mozambique |
Geographic Subject (Continent) | Africa |
Geographic Coordinates | -18.6696821,35.5273467 |
Coverage date | 1960/1971-10 |
Creator | Mozambique Liberation Front (FRELIMO) |
Publisher (of the Original Version) | Mozambique Liberation Front (FRELIMO). Department of Information |
Place of Publication (of the Origianal Version) | Dar Es Salaam, U.R. of Tanzania |
Publisher (of the Digital Version) | University of Southern California. Libraries |
Date issued | 1971-07/1971-09 |
Type |
texts images |
Format | 36 p. |
Format (aat) | newsletters |
Language | English |
Contributing entity | University of Southern California |
Part of collection | Emerging Nationalism in Portuguese Africa, 1959-1965 |
Part of subcollection | Mozambique Collection |
Rights | The University of Southern California has licensed the rights to this material from the Aluka initiative of Ithaka Harbors, Inc., a non-profit Delaware corporation whose address is 151 East 61st Street, New York, NY 10021 |
Physical access | Original archive is at the Boeckmann Center for Iberian and Latin American Studies. Send requests to address or e-mail given. Phone (213) 821-2366; fax (213) 740-2343. |
Repository Name | USC Libraries Special Collections |
Repository Address | Doheny Memorial Library, Los Angeles, CA 90089-0189 |
Repository Email | specol@usc.edu |
Filename | CENPA-346 |
Description
Title | CENPA-346~14 |
Filename | CENPA-346~14.tiff |
Full text | new Commander-in-Chiefs arrival in Mozambique, the various branches of the armed forces were integrated into a unified command to increase efficiency as 'strategic tactical forces'. Arriaga was granted greater autonomy for himself as Commander-in-Chief, and mobility of operational units was increased. He also indicated that more attention would be given to welfare of troops to combat growing discontent and desertion within the Portuguese military. The new Commander also replaced nearly all the chief military and naval officers in the country. Co-ordinated and simultaneous with changes in the military, Oliveira announced a number of changes in civilian administrations and replaced four of the six provisional secretaries (heads of government departments), senior officials in charge of statistics, the economy, health and cereals, and the governors of Cabo Delgado and Zambezia Provinces. He has also indicated that the government plans to 'increase the density of the administrative network' in other words extend the tentacles of administrative control. This has already begun with a comprehensive study of the whole administrative network, and the division of the largest province, Manica e Sofala into two provinces, to be called Beira and Vila Pery. The widespread introduction of such sub-divisions and sub-units at various levels in the hierarchy are designed to have the advantage not only of bringing the web of administrative supervision down closer to the peasants in the rural areas, but also to give more scope for the increased 'African participation' that is another important element of the new strategies. More significantly these changes can also improve the assistance that the district boards and the local government bodies of the provinces, provide the military operations and assure closer linkages of the two networks. For example, the implementation of the aldeamentos schemes (resettlement of the African population) is one of their responsibilities, and one that will certainly grow as increased efforts are made to regroup the populations in efforts to cut the people off from the liberation struggle. In 1970, Cabo Delgado received a special allocation of 23 million escudos ($805,000) of which 13 million was for the improvement and extension of the aldeamentos network and the rest for other 'rural improvements'. In coordination with this, it was announced in Lisbon a crash programme of white settlement in the colonies. 12 PUBLIC RELATIONS Caetano's emphasis on communications and the use of mass media to put over his domestic policies, is similarly applied to the most difficult problem of all, the wars. Under Salazar, relatively little effort was made to actively involve the people io the war effort, apart from a few communiques and the constant assertion that the battle would soon be won. However, with the growing dissent and unrest this is no longer sufficient. Earlier this year during a visit to Portugal, General Arriaga appeared in a major press conference and television broadcast to explain in detail the major Portuguese ((victories)) in Mozambique. He painted a vivid picture of FRELIMO - a ((communist, racist and tribalist organisation)) engaged in ((organised banditry)), and then went on to describe in stark contrast, the three main weapons being used against FRELIMO: the 'communication of the truth to the people, - convincing their minds and conquering their hearts'; economic and social promotion; and 'firm, persistent and quick military repressive action'. The military actions were sold as only being used against 'those who are the enemies of the Portuguese and who obstinately refuse our invitation of security and progressive well-being and opportunity for access to higher forms of life'. The propaganda effort is to put the emphasis on the positive and constructive, with military action as the last resort. PORTUGUESE PAMPHLET. An old theme Arriaga also stressed the importance of good propaganda, both at home and abroad, by way of communiques, interviews, exhibitions etc. and encouraging journalists to visit the war zones. The sense of urgency about the need to mobilise and involve the people is most evident in the colonies themselves, with the press and other media being encouraged to take a more active role than before - of course under strict supervision. Taking up Arriaga's theme, newspapers in Mozambique report that everyone in Mozambique is responsible for the war, and that despite military actions the end is not yet in sight because all elements in the country are not united in the effort. For the first time in 1970 the press was permitted to report on the discussion in the Mozambique Legislative Council in which also for the first time, the Governor- General encouraged comments and open discussion'. 'SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT' General Arriaga has frequently acknowledged that the guerrillas of the liberation forces are advancing because they have the support of the local populations. His logical conclusion, therefore is that these two groups must be separated, both physically and psychologically. This is to be done by winning their hearts, by economic and social progress, and by military action. The Director of the Portuguese National Information Services, Mr Dutra Faria, has confirmed that such measures have nothing whatsoever to do with rights or justice, but are merely inevitable and necessary if victory is to be won. He has outlined five principles for 'the battle' social justice, respect for traditional institutions of different ethnic groups, economic and social development, increased African participation in public administration, and internal security. Three of these fall into Arriaga's 'winning the hearts' category. A. Winning the Hearts The Portuguese army has had a 'Psychological Action Section' for some time, but with little success, as guerrillas with increased popular support continue to advance. The reasons are not hard to find. In the first place the traditional methods used; rewards for weapons, leaflets in local languages, loudspeaker broadcasts from aircraft are quite impractical. The |
Archival file | Volume22/CENPA-346~14.tiff |