nomy of Mozambique, are resentful of restrictive control
from a capital thousands of miles away. Signs of their discontent have been apparent in Mozambique and Angola. In
1969 in Angola, there was growing criticism of the Portuguese
concept of economic integration. The complaint was that
political decisions were taken in Portugal, giving priority to
((national interests)) at the expense of the settlers in the
colonies. Just before the last elections in Portugal, the Economic Association of Angola sent a petition to the Portuguese
government suggesting that there should be immediate reorganisation of the administrative structures of the overseas
territories in the direction of decentralisation coupled with
more Angolan representation in the central organs in Portugal.
There were similar rumours that there was a UDI-type movement in existence. Presumably, the 'autonomy' has been given
such prominence by Caetano in an effort to satisfy most of the
resentment of the white settler population in Angola and
Mozambique.
DOMESTIC CRISIS AND
PORTUGUESE COLONIAL POLICY
The recent developments and Portugal's colonial policies as a
whole cannot be examined in a vacuum, as though they concerned simply the relationship between the metropolis and the
colonies. They must be seen in the light of the Caetano government's overall policies, both international and domestic.
The Portuguese Fascist government is concerned with growing
discontent and unrest at home. Caetano spoke of ((dangers
which threaten society)), which he attributed partly to emigration and returned emigrant workers who brought back ((bad
habits)). Then he openly admitted that one of the factors of e-
conomic and social instability in Portugal was the growing
hostility to the colonial wars. The persistence and success of
the national liberation movements in the colonies engenders
pressure on the government to change its ((overseas policy)).
The increased decentralisation is a characteristic double-faced
response of Fascism to internal and external pressures. On the
one hand, greater administrative responsabilities in the colonies will allow the Portuguese government to devote more attention to domestic problems (invariably along repressive lines) and yet at the same time it may befuddle some Portugu -
ese at home and in the colonies to feel that something new is
in the offing - and thereby boost their morale, which is at a
low ebb.
ADMISSION OF FAILURE
As with the American War of aggression in Vietnam, so with
the Portuguese war of oppression in Africa, the need arises to
quell discontent at home by one means or another and raise
morale for prolonging the dirty war to stifle other people's
liberties. In the speech in question, Caetano observed that tho -
se who thought that the military aspect of the colonial campaigns were the most important were wrong. Instead, he urged
that «what counts is the number of people alive who our protection, our psychological action, together with the benefits of
the administration succed in maintaining firm and tranquil in
their fidelity to Portugal)). Consequently, the classical weapons of war must give way to modern ones, aimed at ((impressing and persuading the spirit)).
The above observation is particularly interesting, coming so
soon after the recent massive offensive of the Portuguese in
Mozambique. There could be no more authoritative indication
that this was a failure. Moreover, the Portuguese army can never defeat the FRELIMO forces for precisely the reason given
by Caetano. If strength of manpower and fire-power were the
decisive factors we would have defeated long ago. No, the
reason is that our great strength lies in our base among the
people. With their support, cooperation and direct participation in the struggle, we cannot be defeated and the Portuguese
know this. That is why they are currently placing so much
emphasis on the creation of ((psychological action units»
among the army, and stepping up their propaganda efforts.
What is doubly significant is that the Prime Minister of Portugal should consider this important enough to stress in a speech
concerning details of more «self-rule» for the colonies. The
connection is not coincidental - it is part of imperialist psychological  warfare  which  has elevated deceit into a science.
INTERNATIONAL IMPLICATIONS
As part of the psychological war, it is in Portugal's interest to
spread abroad the idea that 'autonomy' means more than
it really does. Despite his assertion that the government will
not be disturbed by external criticisms, it is clear that Caetano
and    the Fascist clan in Portugal are unsettled by growing
international hostility. The section of Western European public opinion sympathetic to the cause of African liberation,
lies within the ranks os students and progressives, but it has
been vocal and organised enough to prevent the capitalists of
several countries from joining Portugal and South Africa on
the Cahora Bassa project.   This must be very worrying since
Portugal has high hopes of joining these capitalists in the
European Common Market.
The final item in Caetano's speech which must not escape
attention is the question of Portuguese entry into the European Common Market. He hinted strongly that the decision
had been taken to do everything possible to gain entry. The
issue has been a source of considerable debate over the past
year, the main point of contention being the position of the
colorries. Since Portugal always maintained that the colonies
were part and parcel of the Portuguese state there would presumably have to be some special provision for them — provisions of the kind for which the former French and British
territories were not eligible. It is unlikely that this would be
accepted by the other members, and yet it was vital for Portugal to join because British entry into the Common Market
would mean the end of the European Free Trade Association,
whose concessions towards Portugal are one of the mainstays
of the country's economy. The policy of 'autonomy' and
decentralization helps to solve the impasse by superficially
reducing responsabilities in the colonies, while at the same
time maintaining full control in the last resort, in keeping
with Portugal's fundamental policy of a unitary state extending itself in Europe and Africa.
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