CENPA-344~04 |
Save page Remove page | Previous | 4 of 29 | Next |
|
small (250x250 max)
medium (500x500 max)
Large (1000x1000 max)
Extra Large
large ( > 500x500)
Full Resolution
All (PDF)
|
This page
All
|
Loading content ...
headquarters of the DGS (the new name given to PIDE, the Portuguese secret police) and in the US cultural centre in Lisbon, and these caused extensive damage. Two trains carrying troops freshly returned from Guinea were derailed in the outskirts of Lisbon. At the same time demoralisation grows within the Portuguese army. Thousands of young Portuguese have run away from Portugal, refusing to be recruited for the colonial war. Others desert. The number of deserters is so high, even among officers, that the Portuguese Minister of Defence threatened to end the special consideration which has been given to university students concerning their recruitment «if the desertions continue)). Obviously this will make military service even more unpopular among the Portuguese people. Faced with defeats in Guinea, Angola and Mozambique and now with guerrillas who attack from within, confronted by the complete demoralisation of his army and isolated on the international plane, Caetano's regime cannot last much longer. Caetano himself is well aware of this. As a result 1970 found him desperately seeking any remedies which he thought could delay the final fall of colonialism. One of these was the «big offensive)). Another the attempted invasion of Guinea. Still another the announcement of the «big reforms)). Yet so weak is his position that these measures have backfired and his hopes have been frustrated. For without question the attempted invasion of Guinea, like the Mozambique offensive, was another major defeat for Portuguese colonialism. The reasons for the attack itself are very clear, of course. Threatened with the loss of the last vestiges of control over Guinea-Bissau by the victories in that country of the fighters of PAIGC, Caetano is unable or unwilling to recognise the real reasons for his defeat — the fact that the war in Guinea-Bissau, like the struggles in Angola and Mozambique, is a people's war and a revolutionary war. Instead he lays the blame on neighbouring countries. This is not a new attitude; Nixon also attacks North Vietnam, alleging that the Democratic Republic of Vietnam is responsible for the defeats the nationalists of South Vietnam inflict upon his troops. The failed Portuguese invasion had only one result, however, it convinced even those African countries who have been prepared to pursue a «dialogue)) with Portugal and South Africa that there can be no security for them while the Portuguese presence continues in Africa and while the white fascist minority regime continues to rule South Africa. Thus African unity against Portuguese colonialism and South African fascism has been reinforced. Then as 1970 drew to a close, there came the promise of so-called «autonomy» for the colonies; Caetano announced constitutional reforms which, according to him, will lead eventually to such a result for the ((Portuguese Overseas Territories)). Even a superficial analysis shows that any relation between these «reforms)) and real autonomy is pure coincidence. They are merely minor administrative adjustments aimed at facilitating the continued exploitation of the colonies while at the same time, as a publicity manouevre, bidding for badly-needed international support. There is no other reality behind the word «autonomy)). Moreover, as must be made perfectly clear, even »t there were more content to these reforms that would be irrelevant to us. For we are fighting to regain our total independence. We fight so that our people will be able to freely choose their leaders, to decide on their political orientation and on their social and economic structures. Anything short of this is absolutely unacceptable. Therefore the fact that Caetano felt it necessary to talk of autonomy at this moment is significant in only one respect: as evidence of the intense pressures to which he is now being subjected. Significantly these pressures are international as well as internal. In fact the year 1970 represented a decisive step forward in the isolation of Portuguese colonialism and its widespread denunciation. We can mention only a few of the most relevant facts here. Thus in February the Dutch Parliament passed a resolution condemning the Dutch government for its support to Portuguese colonialism. In June an international Conference of Solidarity with the Peoples of the Portuguese Colonies was held in Rome with the participation of 350 delegates representing 177 organisations from 64 countries. On the first day of July the Pope received the leaders of PAIGC, FRELIMO and MPLA in a private audience. The World Council of Churches announced in September its support to the liberation struggles, and granted a substantial amount of funds to several liberation movements, including FRELIMO. Another foreign company, this time from Italy, withdrew from the Cahora Bassa project after diplomatic representations from President Kaunda of Zambia to convince the countries involved in that imperialist scheme to desist from their participation. The Summit Conference of the OAU and of the Non-Aligned countries pledged in stronger terms than in the past to step up the fight against Portuguese colonialism. And finally, though in this case more routinely, Portugal was once again condemned at the United Nations by an almost unanimous vote of the member states. We see therefore that 1970 provided our struggle with new and important dimensions. All of them clearly foreshadow the collapse of Portuguese colonialism. As the President of FRELIMO said in his New Year message to the Mozambican people: «The days of Portuguese colonialism are numbered. We must intensify our struggle in order to hasten its fall)).
Object Description
Title | Mozambique revolution, no. 45 (1970 Oct.-Dec.) |
Description | Contents: Editorial: The coming victory (p. 1); Invasion of Guinea: The lesson for Africa (p. 3); War communique: Big offensive defeated (p. 6); Portuguese atrocities in Mozambique: Hears the evidence (p. 8); Cahora Bassa: Why we say no (p.13); The struggle in Niassa province by Niassa's military commander (p.15); Journey with a camera: British film-makers in Mozambique (p.18); Once they came with sweets and gifts: Portuguese psychological warfare (p. 20); Streamlined exploitation: Caetano calls it 'autonomy' (p. 23). |
Subject (lcsh) |
Nationalism -- Mozambique Self-determination, National Mozambique -- History Portugal -- Politics and government -- 1933-1974 |
Geographic Subject (Country) | Mozambique |
Geographic Subject (Continent) | Africa |
Geographic Coordinates | -18.6696821,35.5273465 |
Coverage date | 1961/1970-11 |
Creator | Mozambique Liberation Front (FRELIMO) |
Publisher (of the Original Version) | Mozambique Liberation Front (FRELIMO). Department of Information |
Place of Publication (of the Origianal Version) | Dar Es Salaam, U.R. of Tanzania |
Publisher (of the Digital Version) | University of Southern California. Libraries |
Date issued | 1970-10/1970-12 |
Type |
texts images |
Format | 28 p. |
Format (aat) | newsletters |
Language | English |
Contributing entity | University of Southern California |
Part of collection | Emerging Nationalism in Portuguese Africa, 1959-1965 |
Part of subcollection | Mozambique Collection |
Rights | The University of Southern California has licensed the rights to this material from the Aluka initiative of Ithaka Harbors, Inc., a non-profit Delaware corporation whose address is 151 East 61st Street, New York, NY 10021 |
Physical access | Original archive is at the Boeckmann Center for Iberian and Latin American Studies. Send requests to address or e-mail given. Phone (213) 821-2366; fax (213) 740-2343. |
Repository Name | USC Libraries Special Collections |
Repository Address | Doheny Memorial Library, Los Angeles, CA 90089-0189 |
Repository Email | specol@usc.edu |
Filename | CENPA-344 |
Description
Title | CENPA-344~04 |
Filename | CENPA-344~04.tiff |
Full text | headquarters of the DGS (the new name given to PIDE, the Portuguese secret police) and in the US cultural centre in Lisbon, and these caused extensive damage. Two trains carrying troops freshly returned from Guinea were derailed in the outskirts of Lisbon. At the same time demoralisation grows within the Portuguese army. Thousands of young Portuguese have run away from Portugal, refusing to be recruited for the colonial war. Others desert. The number of deserters is so high, even among officers, that the Portuguese Minister of Defence threatened to end the special consideration which has been given to university students concerning their recruitment «if the desertions continue)). Obviously this will make military service even more unpopular among the Portuguese people. Faced with defeats in Guinea, Angola and Mozambique and now with guerrillas who attack from within, confronted by the complete demoralisation of his army and isolated on the international plane, Caetano's regime cannot last much longer. Caetano himself is well aware of this. As a result 1970 found him desperately seeking any remedies which he thought could delay the final fall of colonialism. One of these was the «big offensive)). Another the attempted invasion of Guinea. Still another the announcement of the «big reforms)). Yet so weak is his position that these measures have backfired and his hopes have been frustrated. For without question the attempted invasion of Guinea, like the Mozambique offensive, was another major defeat for Portuguese colonialism. The reasons for the attack itself are very clear, of course. Threatened with the loss of the last vestiges of control over Guinea-Bissau by the victories in that country of the fighters of PAIGC, Caetano is unable or unwilling to recognise the real reasons for his defeat — the fact that the war in Guinea-Bissau, like the struggles in Angola and Mozambique, is a people's war and a revolutionary war. Instead he lays the blame on neighbouring countries. This is not a new attitude; Nixon also attacks North Vietnam, alleging that the Democratic Republic of Vietnam is responsible for the defeats the nationalists of South Vietnam inflict upon his troops. The failed Portuguese invasion had only one result, however, it convinced even those African countries who have been prepared to pursue a «dialogue)) with Portugal and South Africa that there can be no security for them while the Portuguese presence continues in Africa and while the white fascist minority regime continues to rule South Africa. Thus African unity against Portuguese colonialism and South African fascism has been reinforced. Then as 1970 drew to a close, there came the promise of so-called «autonomy» for the colonies; Caetano announced constitutional reforms which, according to him, will lead eventually to such a result for the ((Portuguese Overseas Territories)). Even a superficial analysis shows that any relation between these «reforms)) and real autonomy is pure coincidence. They are merely minor administrative adjustments aimed at facilitating the continued exploitation of the colonies while at the same time, as a publicity manouevre, bidding for badly-needed international support. There is no other reality behind the word «autonomy)). Moreover, as must be made perfectly clear, even »t there were more content to these reforms that would be irrelevant to us. For we are fighting to regain our total independence. We fight so that our people will be able to freely choose their leaders, to decide on their political orientation and on their social and economic structures. Anything short of this is absolutely unacceptable. Therefore the fact that Caetano felt it necessary to talk of autonomy at this moment is significant in only one respect: as evidence of the intense pressures to which he is now being subjected. Significantly these pressures are international as well as internal. In fact the year 1970 represented a decisive step forward in the isolation of Portuguese colonialism and its widespread denunciation. We can mention only a few of the most relevant facts here. Thus in February the Dutch Parliament passed a resolution condemning the Dutch government for its support to Portuguese colonialism. In June an international Conference of Solidarity with the Peoples of the Portuguese Colonies was held in Rome with the participation of 350 delegates representing 177 organisations from 64 countries. On the first day of July the Pope received the leaders of PAIGC, FRELIMO and MPLA in a private audience. The World Council of Churches announced in September its support to the liberation struggles, and granted a substantial amount of funds to several liberation movements, including FRELIMO. Another foreign company, this time from Italy, withdrew from the Cahora Bassa project after diplomatic representations from President Kaunda of Zambia to convince the countries involved in that imperialist scheme to desist from their participation. The Summit Conference of the OAU and of the Non-Aligned countries pledged in stronger terms than in the past to step up the fight against Portuguese colonialism. And finally, though in this case more routinely, Portugal was once again condemned at the United Nations by an almost unanimous vote of the member states. We see therefore that 1970 provided our struggle with new and important dimensions. All of them clearly foreshadow the collapse of Portuguese colonialism. As the President of FRELIMO said in his New Year message to the Mozambican people: «The days of Portuguese colonialism are numbered. We must intensify our struggle in order to hasten its fall)). |
Archival file | Volume21/CENPA-344~04.tiff |