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Our early operations were of necessity extremely limited - sabotage operations against roads, bridges and
railway lines? mines were laid in
anticipation of convoys which might not
come until days or weeks later, v/hen
our soldiers had gone elsewhere and
could take no follow-up actiono Later,
as our numbers increased, ambushes
against small groups of the enemy could
be combined with the mining operations.
As our numbers grew even larger, and
the fighters could be organised into
companies and batallions, ambushes of
large convoys and attacks against encampments could be undertaken and
then assaults against the military
posts themselveso
Thus, over the past five years the
armed struggle has grown not only
geographically, until it covers one third of the country, but also in
intensity and efficiency. Mining operations andambushes are now considered routineo They no longer occur in isolation but as part of a
precise plan of operation to obtain maximum effect• Towns are isolated
and roads made impassable, Thus, in Tete, for example, the roads
linking Chacha, Bene, Chitecula, Malewera, Demiciano and Cassuende are
under constant attack. Similarly in Niassa as a result of our incessant-
activities on the roads linking the capital, Vila Cabral, to the posts,
the town is virtually isolated and can hardly get supplies except by air.
In Cabo Delgado our forces control all the main roads, thus isolating
the enemy garrisons.
Moreoever, the organisation and co-ordination between our military bases
now means that not only can far larger enemy groups be attacked (often
as large as two companies - 200 men) but also that these attacks can be
constant and unremitting over a period of days. In one operation in
Cabo Delgado, for example, an enemy company was ambushed on the v/ay from
Sagalto Mashudi and after their heavy casualties had been returned to the
base, they continued on their way only to fall on our mines. . While retreating to Lipanhangule, a group became isolated and was attacked by our
fighters. Those that reached Lipanhangule sent for transport from Sagal,
which hit our mines and two lorries were destroyed.
22
Object Description
Description
| Title | CENPA-339~26 |
| Filename | CENPA-339~26.tiff |
| Full text | Our early operations were of necessity extremely limited - sabotage operations against roads, bridges and railway lines? mines were laid in anticipation of convoys which might not come until days or weeks later, v/hen our soldiers had gone elsewhere and could take no follow-up actiono Later, as our numbers increased, ambushes against small groups of the enemy could be combined with the mining operations. As our numbers grew even larger, and the fighters could be organised into companies and batallions, ambushes of large convoys and attacks against encampments could be undertaken and then assaults against the military posts themselveso Thus, over the past five years the armed struggle has grown not only geographically, until it covers one third of the country, but also in intensity and efficiency. Mining operations andambushes are now considered routineo They no longer occur in isolation but as part of a precise plan of operation to obtain maximum effect• Towns are isolated and roads made impassable, Thus, in Tete, for example, the roads linking Chacha, Bene, Chitecula, Malewera, Demiciano and Cassuende are under constant attack. Similarly in Niassa as a result of our incessant- activities on the roads linking the capital, Vila Cabral, to the posts, the town is virtually isolated and can hardly get supplies except by air. In Cabo Delgado our forces control all the main roads, thus isolating the enemy garrisons. Moreoever, the organisation and co-ordination between our military bases now means that not only can far larger enemy groups be attacked (often as large as two companies - 200 men) but also that these attacks can be constant and unremitting over a period of days. In one operation in Cabo Delgado, for example, an enemy company was ambushed on the v/ay from Sagalto Mashudi and after their heavy casualties had been returned to the base, they continued on their way only to fall on our mines. . While retreating to Lipanhangule, a group became isolated and was attacked by our fighters. Those that reached Lipanhangule sent for transport from Sagal, which hit our mines and two lorries were destroyed. 22 |
| Archival file | Volume20/CENPA-339~26.tiff |
