CENPA-334~04 |
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NEWS AND NOTES #11 - 4 - The anomaly of the Nixon move must be seen as well in light of the diminishing U.S. funds available for foreign aid due to the internal economic crisis. And as the Diggs1 statement says it should also be contrasted to the claimed scarcity of monies to aid Black business in this country. And it is particularly important that the military value of the Azores does not seem to be of overriding importance to the U.S. A New York Times editorial of Dec. 9 notes that the Azores is not "essential for American or NATO defence. The bases /Azores and those in Spain.7 are conveniences, not necessities in an era of nuclear submarines and long-range jet bombers." Commentor Bruce Oudes writing in Newsday (1/1/72) notes that the aid to Portugal is 5058 larger than the deal with Spain and "was readied without so much as a promise by Lisbon to undertake negotiations to end its three African wars . . . Absent as well was the usual pro forma plea by the U.S. in favor of self-determination in 'Portuguese1 Africa. " Plus parts of the pact could be open-ended, including the PL 480 loans and already the millions for excess equipment is not the maximum ceiling of the loan. Aside from considerations of long-term U.S. strategy in Southern Africa, what Nixon and his planners are facing is the rapid deterioration of Portugal's control in Africa, even after the colonial power launched massive offensives and publicized unprecedented victories. Paul Dodd, writing from Cape Town in th-' Christian Science Monitor says that "The struggle being waged by black guerrilla movements to overthrow the white ruled countries in southern Africa is reaching a new and decisive stage. . . The Portuguese stand in danger of losing this undeclared war in both its southern provinces (sic). There the guerrillas now control vast areas of the countryside, with the Portuguese concentrating on defending the towns." FRELIMO'S successes in Tete witness this. Nixon's meeting with Pres. Pompidou in the Azores, hosted by Caetano, was "an important political favor" for Portugal in its European context of entry into the Common Market. Caetano noted that the pact was better than possible ones with other countries and said that "We are helping the United States . . . and it Is right that the U.S. should help us. . .".(NYT, 12/20 and Le Monde, 12/20). Nixon's political pat on the back to Portugal came soon after an OAU delegation met with him to urge no more aid to Lisbon. The idea that Southern Africa may be the "next Viet Nam" is misleading. It is already another Viet Nam, though U.S. involvement has not been so open. The new pact underlines how difficult the "low profile" has become to maintain, with Portugal being bled white by the wars. In strategic terms the new pact can be seen as part of the general U.S. interest In maintaining the status quo or influencing the course of change in Southern Africa (a strategy which involves the U.S. Atlantic/Indian Ocean policies). The U.S. will support change only on its own terms which can be seen not only In terms of short-run economic interests (although significant enough) but also in terms of long-term U.S. political and economic interests In Africa as a whole, In which a stable, economically strong Southern African bloc which is at the same time a staunch ally of the U.S. would be a vital part. The fact that "stability" or "gradual change" means the continued subjugation of the African majority in Southern Africa Is clearly on secondary importance for the grand strategists In Washington.
Object Description
Description
Title | CENPA-334~04 |
Filename | CENPA-334~04.tiff |
Full text | NEWS AND NOTES #11 - 4 - The anomaly of the Nixon move must be seen as well in light of the diminishing U.S. funds available for foreign aid due to the internal economic crisis. And as the Diggs1 statement says it should also be contrasted to the claimed scarcity of monies to aid Black business in this country. And it is particularly important that the military value of the Azores does not seem to be of overriding importance to the U.S. A New York Times editorial of Dec. 9 notes that the Azores is not "essential for American or NATO defence. The bases /Azores and those in Spain.7 are conveniences, not necessities in an era of nuclear submarines and long-range jet bombers." Commentor Bruce Oudes writing in Newsday (1/1/72) notes that the aid to Portugal is 5058 larger than the deal with Spain and "was readied without so much as a promise by Lisbon to undertake negotiations to end its three African wars . . . Absent as well was the usual pro forma plea by the U.S. in favor of self-determination in 'Portuguese1 Africa. " Plus parts of the pact could be open-ended, including the PL 480 loans and already the millions for excess equipment is not the maximum ceiling of the loan. Aside from considerations of long-term U.S. strategy in Southern Africa, what Nixon and his planners are facing is the rapid deterioration of Portugal's control in Africa, even after the colonial power launched massive offensives and publicized unprecedented victories. Paul Dodd, writing from Cape Town in th-' Christian Science Monitor says that "The struggle being waged by black guerrilla movements to overthrow the white ruled countries in southern Africa is reaching a new and decisive stage. . . The Portuguese stand in danger of losing this undeclared war in both its southern provinces (sic). There the guerrillas now control vast areas of the countryside, with the Portuguese concentrating on defending the towns." FRELIMO'S successes in Tete witness this. Nixon's meeting with Pres. Pompidou in the Azores, hosted by Caetano, was "an important political favor" for Portugal in its European context of entry into the Common Market. Caetano noted that the pact was better than possible ones with other countries and said that "We are helping the United States . . . and it Is right that the U.S. should help us. . .".(NYT, 12/20 and Le Monde, 12/20). Nixon's political pat on the back to Portugal came soon after an OAU delegation met with him to urge no more aid to Lisbon. The idea that Southern Africa may be the "next Viet Nam" is misleading. It is already another Viet Nam, though U.S. involvement has not been so open. The new pact underlines how difficult the "low profile" has become to maintain, with Portugal being bled white by the wars. In strategic terms the new pact can be seen as part of the general U.S. interest In maintaining the status quo or influencing the course of change in Southern Africa (a strategy which involves the U.S. Atlantic/Indian Ocean policies). The U.S. will support change only on its own terms which can be seen not only In terms of short-run economic interests (although significant enough) but also in terms of long-term U.S. political and economic interests In Africa as a whole, In which a stable, economically strong Southern African bloc which is at the same time a staunch ally of the U.S. would be a vital part. The fact that "stability" or "gradual change" means the continued subjugation of the African majority in Southern Africa Is clearly on secondary importance for the grand strategists In Washington. |
Archival file | Volume20/CENPA-334~04.tiff |