CENPA-037~22 |
Save page Remove page | Previous | 22 of 53 | Next |
|
small (250x250 max)
medium (500x500 max)
Large (1000x1000 max)
Extra Large
large ( > 500x500)
Full Resolution
All (PDF)
|
This page
All
|
Loading content ...
after a,firm accustomed to risking a great deal for its profit margin, had backed out of a £15 million deal because it realised it would undoubtedly be liable to prosecution under the laws of sanctions against Rhodesia, this hypocrisy leaves no misconceptions as to the sincerity of Britain "sanctions" policy. Presumably, when the dam is built, the transmitters are in place, and the current is running along the cable to Salisbury, then Her Majesty's government will decide it is time to apply sanctions - for then the £15 million will be safely in its pocket. Perhaps Britain should be remined of a few facts:- the United Nations Security Council resolution of May, 1968, for which Britain voted, forbids U0No members from activities on the part of their nationals "which could promote or are calculated to promote the export of any commodities or products from Southern Rhodesia". Britain's own Order in Council, in addition to forbidding the export of any goods to Rhodesia, adds that no British subject may either "deal in" any such goods nor "do any act calculated to promote" the "acquisition, disposal or processing by himself or any other person" of goods exported from Rhodesia. It hardly seems credible that Britain can seriously doubt that Cahora Bassa will do anything other than give a great boost to the Rhodesian economy - both in the eventual provision of the cheapest source of power it has ever known and, mere immediately, through the demand it will generate for materials, equipment and probably labour. If the British government needs proof: 1) The huge output from the dam will be more than is required by the . three main receiving countries, South Africa, Mozambique and Malawi. Rhodesia needs more power, particularly such cheap, power. Portugal will not sit back with excess capacity while an eager customer'is . sitting on her doorstep. 2) A 'Newsreel' item broadcast on Salisbury radio on 15 July, 1968 said: "Rhodesia has a triple interest in this venture. The country must welcome the project, for its successful completion can only enhance the prospects for continued political stability and economic expansion in Southern Africa. More immediately,.. Rhodesian firms should be well placed in the supply of goods and materials for the dam site for at least a foreseeable period of up to five years. Lastly, Rhodesia has a very real interest in the power that will be generated at Cahora Bassa, as v/ith her economy expanding •at—its present rate and spurred on by sanctions Rhodesia's requirements for industrial use alone will outstrip present supplies 20
Object Description
Description
Title | CENPA-037~22 |
Filename | CENPA-037~22.tiff |
Full text | after a,firm accustomed to risking a great deal for its profit margin, had backed out of a £15 million deal because it realised it would undoubtedly be liable to prosecution under the laws of sanctions against Rhodesia, this hypocrisy leaves no misconceptions as to the sincerity of Britain "sanctions" policy. Presumably, when the dam is built, the transmitters are in place, and the current is running along the cable to Salisbury, then Her Majesty's government will decide it is time to apply sanctions - for then the £15 million will be safely in its pocket. Perhaps Britain should be remined of a few facts:- the United Nations Security Council resolution of May, 1968, for which Britain voted, forbids U0No members from activities on the part of their nationals "which could promote or are calculated to promote the export of any commodities or products from Southern Rhodesia". Britain's own Order in Council, in addition to forbidding the export of any goods to Rhodesia, adds that no British subject may either "deal in" any such goods nor "do any act calculated to promote" the "acquisition, disposal or processing by himself or any other person" of goods exported from Rhodesia. It hardly seems credible that Britain can seriously doubt that Cahora Bassa will do anything other than give a great boost to the Rhodesian economy - both in the eventual provision of the cheapest source of power it has ever known and, mere immediately, through the demand it will generate for materials, equipment and probably labour. If the British government needs proof: 1) The huge output from the dam will be more than is required by the . three main receiving countries, South Africa, Mozambique and Malawi. Rhodesia needs more power, particularly such cheap, power. Portugal will not sit back with excess capacity while an eager customer'is . sitting on her doorstep. 2) A 'Newsreel' item broadcast on Salisbury radio on 15 July, 1968 said: "Rhodesia has a triple interest in this venture. The country must welcome the project, for its successful completion can only enhance the prospects for continued political stability and economic expansion in Southern Africa. More immediately,.. Rhodesian firms should be well placed in the supply of goods and materials for the dam site for at least a foreseeable period of up to five years. Lastly, Rhodesia has a very real interest in the power that will be generated at Cahora Bassa, as v/ith her economy expanding •at—its present rate and spurred on by sanctions Rhodesia's requirements for industrial use alone will outstrip present supplies 20 |
Archival file | Volume5/CENPA-037~22.tiff |