The aftermath of the dissolution of Zaibatsus, the Japanese combines: A study of the post-war development of monopoly in Japan. - Page 80 |
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70
March, 1953, and 90 per cent in September, 195*+•
It is interesting to note that even as of September,
1951*-, this reciprocal shareholding was below 10 per cent in
ease of the Mitsui group, which is said to be most behind
in recovery among the three biggest Zaibatsu. Further, the
percentage was equally low in the case of the Fuji Bank
group (former Yasuda Zaibatsu) whose solidarity was (and
still is) weak. On the other hand, the percentage was as
high as 26 per cent in the case of the Furukawa group,
which is small, but the solidarity of whose operational
firms is very strong.*^
Thus, the degree of reciprocal shareholding has much
to do with the degree of solidarity of re-formed Zaibatsus.
The respective Zaibatsu banks, together with the trust and
insurance companies, are usually playing the most important
part in this reciprocal shareholding. However, their share
holding seldom exceeds 10 per cent of the shares of a given
enterprise belonging to the group and, considering the
decreased relative importance of owned capital as compared
to that of borrowed capital, such shareholding by the banks
cannot be considered as a primary means for controlling
p"\Editorial Staff, “Zaibatsu Re-formation and the Realities of Finance Control,11 Tovo Keizai Shimpo. 2658s 121, January, 1953*
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| Title | The aftermath of the dissolution of Zaibatsus, the Japanese combines: A study of the post-war development of monopoly in Japan. - Page 80 |
| Repository email | cisadmin@lib.usc.edu |
| Full text | 70 March, 1953, and 90 per cent in September, 195*+• It is interesting to note that even as of September, 1951*-, this reciprocal shareholding was below 10 per cent in ease of the Mitsui group, which is said to be most behind in recovery among the three biggest Zaibatsu. Further, the percentage was equally low in the case of the Fuji Bank group (former Yasuda Zaibatsu) whose solidarity was (and still is) weak. On the other hand, the percentage was as high as 26 per cent in the case of the Furukawa group, which is small, but the solidarity of whose operational firms is very strong.*^ Thus, the degree of reciprocal shareholding has much to do with the degree of solidarity of re-formed Zaibatsus. The respective Zaibatsu banks, together with the trust and insurance companies, are usually playing the most important part in this reciprocal shareholding. However, their share holding seldom exceeds 10 per cent of the shares of a given enterprise belonging to the group and, considering the decreased relative importance of owned capital as compared to that of borrowed capital, such shareholding by the banks cannot be considered as a primary means for controlling p"\Editorial Staff, “Zaibatsu Re-formation and the Realities of Finance Control,11 Tovo Keizai Shimpo. 2658s 121, January, 1953* |
